C. B. OKTAYKAN

MARX, ENGELS AND INTERNATIONALISM: RETHINKING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE MARXIST FRAMEWORK

CAN BERK OKTAYKAN

METU

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Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Raşit Kaya
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Sheila M. Pelizzon Co-Supervisor	Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul	(METU, PADM)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz	(METU, PADM)	_____
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Name, Last name: Can Berk Oktaykan

Signature :

ABSTRACT

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Oktaykan, Can Berk

M.Sc., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz

Co-Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Sheila M. Pelizzon

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Nationalism, a phenomenon that has played a marked role throughout the entire Labor History, has always functioned as a means of stratification within the international ranks of labor. It is, in that vein, the argument of this work that the Marxist imperfection in the face of rising national currents in the first half of the nineteenth century came into being owing to two primary shortcomings. First, the practical issues pertaining to the position of the national working classes within the world division of labor giving rise to what has been coined as the 'aristocracy of labor'; and, second, the conventional misconception that portrays Marxism as responsible for the supposedly cursory manner in which anti-colonial movements were analyzed within and incorporated into the Marxist theory. This largely fictional rupture between internationalism and Marxism, as the argument goes, can only be bridged by a thorough analysis of the nineteenth century national liberation movements, enabling us to surpass the supposedly crystallized dichotomies of

Occident/Orient or North/South that are claimed by non-Marxists to be inherent in the Marxist theoretical framework.

Keywords: Marxism, Internationalism, Nationalism, Chartism

ÖZ

MARX, ENGELS VE ENTERNASYONALİZM: ON DOKUZUNCU YÜZYIL ULUSAL BAĞIMSIZLIK HAREKETLERİNE MARKSİST ÇERÇEVEDEN BİR BAKIŞ

Oktaykan, Can Berk
Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Mehmet Okyayuz
Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Sheila M. Pelizzon

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Emek tarihi boyunca belirgin bir rol oynamış bir olgu olan ulusalcılık uluslararası işçi sınıfının katmanlı yapısının ortaya çıkışına sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu çalışmanın temel iddiası, bu bağlamda, on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında yükselmeye başlayan ulusalcı dalganın karşısında kendini hissettirmeye başlayan ve Marksist paradigmaya içkin olduğu iddia edilen noksanların iki temel noktadan kaynaklandığıdır. Birinci olarak, uluslararası iş bölümünde kendine farklı pozisyonlar edinen ulusal emekçi sınıfların yol açtığı işçi aristokrasisinin oluşumu ve bunun pratikte yarattığı problemler; ikinci olarak ise mutat bir biçimde varılan yanlış bir kanı olan Marksizm'i kolonileşme karşıtı hareketlerin iddiaya göre yüzeysel bir biçimde kendi kuramına eklemlemekten sorumlu addeden anlayıştır. Enternasyonalizm ve Marksizm arasında var olduğu iddia edilen ve büyük ölçüde kurgusal olan bu boşluğu doldurmanın tek yolu, işbu çalışmada iddia edildiği üzere, on dokuzuncu yüzyıl ulusal bağımsızlık hareketlerinin titizlikle yeniden incelenmesi

ve bunun bize sağlayacağı Marksist kuramsal çerçeveye içkin olduğu söylenen Doğu/Batı veya Kuzey/Güney ikiliklerini aşma kapasitesini kullanmaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Marksizm, Enternasyonalizm, Ulusalcılık, Çartizm

A Mia Famiglia. . .

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PREFACE

The first time the author was acquainted with the Marxist approach to the colonial question was when he read parts of Wittfogel's famous — or infamous — work, *Oriental Despotism* as a sophomore. Having just been introduced to critical theory in the context of world economic history, that work had a lasting impact on the perception of the author with regards to one of the deepest premises of Marxism, if not the deepest: internationalism. Wittfogel, in his *magnum opus*, postulated that the main reason of the discrepancy of economic and political growth between the Occident and the Orient that came to the fore following the advent of full-fledged imperialist expansionism was the ossified political structures that held sway over the colonized areas in question. Economic and political stagnancy of such states, thus, was deemed to be inevitable. The evident problem with such a contention was that it naturalized the process of colonization, if not outright cherishing it as breaking the fetters of the centuries-old despotic regimes. Further, taking notice of the fact that Wittfogel did not formulate this thesis 'out of the blue', but, indeed, had drawn considerable inspiration from Marxian texts eased the process with which the Marxist paradigm was framed as conveying the impression of Eurocentrism in the mind of the author. The circle was thereby complete: If Wittfogel had no difficulties in framing non-Western societies as utterly and irredeemably stagnant through a not-so-ill-advised reading of Marxian texts, the habitual recognition of the Eastern societies as non-transformative blocs has to be a cornerstone of Marxist thought.

Taking this 'failure' of theoretical internationalism as an indicator of the *alleged* deep-rooted Eurocentric genesis of Marxism, it becomes substantially difficult to militate against the supposed Eurocentric outlook under the aegis of Marxist internationalism. And, it was no easier task on the part of the author to overcome such an understanding of the Marxist paradigm. Indeed, some of the initial readings that were analyzed in the materialization of this work, such as, Ronaldo Munck's *Marxism and Nationalism: The Difficult Dialogue*, and Roman Szporluk's

Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List tended to cement the all-too-convenient image of Marxism as an apparently internationalist and practically Eurocentric paradigm.[1]

Still, there were some issues with that outlook that had an short-circuiting effect on this rigidly superficial analysis in the mind of the author: Supposing that there was a theoretical chasm between the Marxian conceptualization of Occident and Orient, what kind of motivations may Marx have had in his "predisposition" towards embracing such a dichotomic analysis, which clearly contradicts his claim to the international nature of the working class? Are there any evidences in the writings of Marx and Engels that is suggestive of such a lopsided outlook with regards to the dynamism of various national working classes? What can be inferred from the conceptualization and utilization of the seemingly Eurocentric concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production? And, from a practical vein, is there any realistic hope of advocating the internationalist claims of Marxism in the twenty-first century, which, in itself, requires coming to terms with the supposed Eurocentric roots of the paradigm?

The author had to navigate stormy waters that were rife with controversies and long-standing debates over the quest of finding reliable answers to these questions. First of such controversies was where to locate the concept of Asiatic Mode of Production (hereafter, AMP). This question has been taken up by various scholars, including, but by no means is limited to, Godelier (1978), Mandel (1971), Hindess and Hirst (1975), Melotti (1977), Wittfogel (1967), Althusser (1969), Turner (1979) and Parry Anderson (1979). Based on the knowledge I have garnered so far, I do not think that Marx's formulation and use of the concept was of no major consequence as some key figures, such as Althusser seem to contend.[2] On the contrary, I purport a view that is

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[1] Another key feature of these works is that they tend to canvass an image of Marxism as a rigidly 'economic-determinist' paradigm, unable to wrangle with — indeed, helpless in the face of — issues that are not directly related to the problems pertaining to the material base. See, for example, Kubálková, Vendulka and Cruickshank, Albert. *Marxism and International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985); Blaut, James M. *The National Question: Decolonizing the Theory of Nationalism* (London: Zed Books, 1987); and Szporluk, Roman. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx and Friedrich List* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[2] Althusser bases his argument on the claim that Marx's analyses of the modes of production became a truly guiding thread only following the 'epistemological break' of 1857. This epistemological break

highly reminiscent of Hindess and Hirst's critiques of Wittfogel on the ground of the unmistakable crudeness of the latter's theory in addition to incorporating various elements from Melotti's discussion on the concept in his important book, *Marx and the Third World*. In its essence, our approach to the concept of the Asiatic Mode of Production is that there is no valid reason to insist that a Maginot Line was set up by Marx between Occident and Orient based on his formulation and employment of the concept. Indeed, in the light of the knowledge we hitherto have managed to harness from both the primary and the secondary sources, we argue that Marx's conceptualization of the AMP should be viewed not as purveying the Eurocentric panacea of unilinear growth of modes of production but as pouring cold water on such a theoretical tendency. This issue of the supposed relationship between the AMP and Eurocentrism will be expanded in the first chapter, and, as such, I will, for now, ask the indulgence of the reader in settling for the argument that a Marxian internationalist reading of world history is unwaveringly intertwined with the constant emphasis on the particular conditions and dynamics pertaining to different parts of the globe. The crucial point to bear in mind, in the context of this discussion on the AMP is that colonization had already established itself as a harsh reality of international politics in 1840s, which corresponds both to Marx obtaining his Doctorate degree from the University of Jena (1841), and with the materialization of his first published works.[3] Hobsbawm expounds on this point in his discussion of the dual revolution in the following words,

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signals the foundation of the Marxian theory of history (historical materialism) no less than it shows the establishment of Marx's new philosophy — dialectical materialism that was put in the place of ideological philosophy. The only possible method of evaluating the revolutionary position of non-Western societies (and the concept of AMP) from a Marxist standpoint, therefore, is to focus largely on *Capital* and, to a lesser extent *Grundrisse*. Pursuing that method also requires one to jettison Marx's journalistic writings and letters, branding them as 'pre-scientific'. Pre-scientific or not, it is obvious that the ideas and theses he sketched in the *Capital* was not revealed to Marx by divine inspiration but through the continuous accumulation of empirical and theoretical knowledge over the years. And, as such, the author does not find substantial evidence to discard a substantial part of his writings out of hand. See, Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1969), Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Étienne . *Reading Capital*, (London, New Left Books, 1970), and Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, (1979).

[3] The first joint work of Marx and Engels, *Die Heilige Familie (The Holy Family)*, was published in 1845, the year in which Marx completed one of his most celebrated early works, *Thesen Über Feuerbach (Theses on Feuerbach)*.

> Inevitably also, since the world revolution spread outwards from the double crater of England and France it initially took the form of a European expansion in and conquest of the rest of the world. Indeed its most striking consequence for world history was to establish a domination of the globe by a few western régimes (and especially by the British) which has no parallel in history. Before the merchants, the steam-engines, the ships and the guns of the west—and before its ideas—the age-old civilizations and empires of the world capitulated and collapsed. India became a province administered by British pro-consuls, the Islamic states were convulsed by crisis, Africa lay open to direct conquest. . . . *By 1848 nothing stood in the way of western conquest of any territory that western government or businessmen might find it to their advantage to occupy, just as nothing but time stood in the way of western capitalist enterprise*.[4] [emphasis added]

The reader might wonder what is the suggested relation between the temporal and theoretical facts: It was already too late for many parts of the globe to embrace evasive maneuvers to evade becoming yet another satellite of the colonizer states. Colonization raged throughout the continents, incorporating even the previously impenetrable Imperial China and was well on its way to throw the concept of the 'external area'[5] into the dustbin of history. The nineteenth century, therefore, symbolized the crystallization of one of the most fundamental urges of capitalist society: constant territorial expansion leading to false universalization, which would "not be able to change internally unless it encompasses the whole world."[6]

Marx, having acknowledged that fact, purported that there was only one way out for the colonized peoples from the stranglehold imposed on them by the major imperialist powers of his day. His proposition did not encourage fostering the false hope of a potential return to respective pre-colonial modes of production and state of social affairs, which were not so egalitarian to begin with, for he knew that what had

[4] Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848*, (London, 1962), pp. 3.

[5] This concept is used to signify the geographic area that was occupied by the states that were not a part of the capitalist world economy, and, as such, is one of the analytical formulations that was used by Wallerstein and in his key works, *World-Systems Analysis* (Duke, 2004), and *Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization*, (Verso, 1995).

[6] Avineri, Shlomo ed. *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*, (New York, Garden City, Doubleday, 1968a).

been done to the social fabric of the subjugated peoples through the process of colonization could not be undone. Instead, he postulated that the only way of 'mending the fence' of the socio-economic ruins that were created by the efforts of the imperialist powers was the continued unhindered development of the capitalist relations of production in those societies so that the dialectics of inequality that are sown by capitalists could begin to be ripened. The process of colonization, in that sense, was not heralded by Marx as the angelic savior of the non-Western peoples in that it introduced the advent of capitalism, but, in lieu, for the simple reason that the shift from pre-capitalist modes of production to the capitalist mode was a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition for the establishment of the pillars of the future communist society. One should recall, at this point, that, for Marx, no revolution could come into being if the development of the social antagonisms inherent in the previous order had not already intensified to their very apex. Thence, one needs to realize that,

> No social order ever perishes before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.[7]

A discussion of the Hegelian dialectics and how it exerted a great deal of influence on Marx's thought, in the context of evolution of the modes of production, is also necessary. A proposition that will be underlined from here on out, in that sense, is that stages of the growth of the mode of production has never been reduced to a simple one-way relation between the material base and the ideological, cultural, political and legal superstructure, an argument which was derived from Avineri's standpoint[8] on the question of Marxian dialectics. Hegel's influence, therefore, can be said to run deep within Marx's understanding of historical development. Indeed, Marxian reading of history can be portrayed as a reconciliation of Hegelian understanding of history as a progress towards the universal liberation of man with

[7] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Selected Works*, vol. 1, (Moscow, 1962), pp. 363.

[8] See, Avineri, Shlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, (London, Cambridge University Press, 1968b), and Avineri, Shlomo (ed.). *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization*, (New York, Garden City, Doubleday, 1968a).

Marx's crucial contribution of putting social being in the place of Hegel's overemphasis of consciousness, thereby making the relationship between being and consciousness stand 'on its feet'. This theoretical distinction, thus, is one of the primary reasons that set Marx apart from the previous generations of idealists for he intended nothing less than to severe the potential links that could tie him to idealist philosophy when he postulated, 'It is not the consciousness of men which determines their being, but on the contrary their social being which determines their consciousness.'[9] Given that this point, as well as the potential impact of Hegel's 'armchair Orientalism'[10] on Marx's thought, will be pondered on in the first chapter, it should suffice to say that Hegelian dialectics appears to be one of the main building blocks of Marxist theory.

This understanding of history as the 'production of man', as Melotti puts it, forms the very backbone of revolutionary progress. The 'forces of production', in that sense, corresponds to human labor power and natural sources including soil, fossil fuels, nuclear power, etc.. The 'relations of production', on the other hand, signify the relations between individuals, which provide a context of social roles that they must assume owing to their participation in the mechanisms of social reproduction. These binary social roles include, master and slave, serf and lord, and proletariat and bourgeois. Finally, taken together, the forces of production and the relations of production constitute the 'mode of production'. One can notice, at this juncture, that all of the binary social roles indicate a particular form of unequal relationship. Indeed, there are only two exceptions to this general correlation between modes of production and forms of exploitation: primitive classless society and future communist society.[11] This ironic common ground between the earliest and the latest forms of society was pointed out by Marx when he paraphrased Morgan, stating that

[9] Marx, Karl. 'Vorwort' to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1971), p.21.

[10] The expression was borrowed from Turner. Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism,* pp.31.

[11] Marx underlined this point in his *Kritik des Gothaer Programms (Critique of Gotha Programme)* (1875), arguing that proletariat's struggle to acquire political supremacy was simply for the sake of abolishing classes and establishing its own dictatorship.

'the new system to which modern society was leading was a reincarnation in a higher form of an archaic social structure.'[12]

Going back to the discussion on the AMP, one needs to dissipate the clouds regarding to what extent he or she subscribes to the various aspects entailed by this concept. Succinctly put, the only element I find to be lacking of this theory is the understanding that the abolishment of the social, political and economic structures of the pre-colonized societies paved a clear path for the subjugated peoples to follow. I propose, *au contraire*, that the process of colonization, instead of putting the colonized peoples on the trajectory of capitalist growth, unveiled a stage of transition that incorporated elements not only from capitalist mode of production but also from the feudal mode of production, thereby commencing a stage of economic paralysis. That is to say, the introduction of capitalism, while subjectively putting the population of the colonized state on the 'right track' to capitalist development, also inaugurated the objective backtrack and radicalization of the relations of production. The problem with respect to such a stage of paralysis is not that aspects having to do with feudalism are strictly offsetting the forward growth of the colonized area to the capitalist mode of production. Feudalism, one should not forget, was postulated by Marx as one of the necessary stages for the future development of socialism. And, despite the fact that the establishment of the feudal mode of production was not deemed to constitute a sufficient cause for the realization of bourgeois revolution that heralded the rise of capitalism, Marx was not very optimistic regarding the chances of a direct transition to socialism in the countries that had not experienced feudalism.[13]

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[12] Marx, Karl. *Letter to Vera Zasulich*, 8 Mar 1881, first draft, in *Marx-Engels Archiv*, D. Riazonov ed., (Frankfurt, 1926), pp. 329.

[13] The other necessary condition giving rise to capitalism was the rise of the *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, or civil society that eliminated the social and economic predicaments that were put on the commercialization of land and agriculture by the structures of *ancien régime.* The example of Portugal was a striking one as Marx used it to show that resulting from the fact that the Portuguese did not experience a communal movement that materialized in the other parts of the Western Europe neither did they experience the emancipation of cities or the ultimate growth of the conditions giving way to the rise of civil society. Portugal, therefore, did not experience the development of a capitalist mode of production due to the absence of favorable conditions. On the importance of the commercialization of land and agriculture as the necessary conditions for the emergence of capitalism, see, Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Early Writings* (trans. T.B. Bottomore), (London, 1963), pp. 110-119, 140-144, and

However, even this pessimistic approach of Marx to the revolutionary potential of the countries that can generally be analyzed as having the various mechanisms of the AMP institutionalized should not be taken as an unequivocal indicator of his alleged Eurocentrism. In point of fact, Marx did not favor the odds of socialist revolution taking place in the most highly developed countries even when discussing the revolutionary potential of various states in his major works. His projection of the revolution breaking out initially in the still under-developed Germany in the *Communist Manifesto* which was published in 1847, or his emphasis on the revolutionary potential of Russia in the Preface of the Russian edition of the *Manifesto* published in 1882 appear to provide us with valid reasons for questioning the validity of the claims that portray his thought as inherently Eurocentric. The point that needs to be stressed, at this juncture, is that Marx did not clearly favor the revolutionary potential of these countries based on their relative underdeveloped or non-capitalist mode of production, but because he foresaw that rapid development of capitalism in these countries was very likely to offset the social equilibrium that had to be maintained over the process of transformation. Indeed, one could argue, based on the textual evidence of Marx's works, as Avineri puts it, "Therefore Marx knows no short cuts to socialism."[14]

Nonetheless, this hybrid composition of elements that found their place at the heart of the colonized society also necessitated, in the context of Ireland and India, a revolutionary movement that was anti-colonial in its form but anti-feudal in its essence. That is to say, the conditions of the revolutionary progress were satisfied not directly by the national bourgeoisie (as was in Russia) but by an external force through oppressive mechanisms that were more radical in their tone of violence as

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also Marx, Karl and Engels Friedrich, *Capital* (Moscow, n.d.), I, pp. 717-733; on Marx's discussion on Portugal, see *Capital,* III, pp. 327.

This brief discussion is also important in the sense of proving that Marxist model of historical development does not presuppose, in any way, a singular course of historical development, which would be tantamount to embracing Eurocentric arguments, but a multitude of ways that do not necessarily culminate in the emergence of capitalism, which, in effect, gives way to the future communist society. The issue that needs to be acknowledged, thus, is that multilinear outlook to revolution of modes of production, to which Marx inscribed, does not signal an emphatic defense of Eurocentric standpoint but an aversion thereof. See, Melotti, Umberto. *Marx and the Third World*, (Macmillan, 1977) for a commendable analysis of this topic.

[14] Avineri, Shlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 151.

opposed to the apparatuses that were available to the national bourgeois. Having spent a considerable amount of time under the direct imposition of the colonial yoke, these societies, therefore, were quite susceptible to the adoption of national motifs that played a central role over the course of the struggle they waged for achieving national liberation. Moreover, with respect to the relations of production that were imposed on the colonies that resembled feudal relations of production more than that of capitalist, such a struggle of national liberation was required in order to overthrow the remnants of the colonized epoch and to institutionalize the capitalist relations of production.[15] One could tend to construct an analogy, at this point, between these societies and those that actually experienced a bourgeois revolution, e.g. France and England, on the grounds of taking up nationalist themes. Yet, such an analogy would be quite unwarranted given that the clash of socio-economic and political interests were much more complex and therefore daunting in the moribund Western European feudal states as opposed to the comparatively uniform opposition of the colonized Indians and Irish in their struggle against the colonial yoke.

Further, other primary reasons of our position with regards to this 'unconventional' stage of transformation to capitalism is that the extension of the colonizer state, which will be referred to as the colonial state throughout this work, does not bear even a slight resemblance to the capitalist state of Marx's day with respect to the expropriation of the land and labor of the colonized populace. Land, for one, was commoditized and put in the service of the capitalists of the colonizing country, which, more often than not, excluded the indigenous population, except potentially the workers of indigenous backgrounds at the later stages of colonization.[16] This

[15] This point was seemingly made by Trotsky when he argued that "The purification of the society of the defrocked feudalists is only possible if the proletariat, freed from the influence of the bourgeois parties, is capable of placing itself at the head of the peasantry and of establishing its revolutionary dictatorship. Likewise, the bourgeois revolution is tied up with the first step of the socialist revolution into which it will afterward be dissolved. The national revolution thus becomes a link in the international revolution. The transformation of the economic foundations and of all the relations of society takes on a permanent character." See, Trotsky, Leon. *90ème Anniversaire du Manifeste communiste*, *Le Manifeste Communiste*, (Brussels, 1945), reprinted in *The Communist Manifesto*, Frederick L. Bender ed., pp. 144.

[16] Emmanuel has a different take on this point. Colonial expansion, according to him, had more to do with the pressure of white settlers on acquiring more land and subjugating indigenous labor as a means to booster the working force as compared to the pressures that are related to investment imperialism originating in the colonizer state. Be that as it may, his approach does not run counter to our emphasis that the colonial state is the epitome of representing the interests of the mother country

transformation of land from a source of legitimation of the local rulers[17] to a type of commodity that was deemed to be wanting for the establishment of cotton and tea plantations had become an evident fact in the colonized parts of India no later than in the beginning of the nineteenth century.[18]

The commoditization of labor, on the other hand, whether in the form of coolie, house servant, or corveé, was, likewise, not based on the principles of the classical political economy with its emphasis on the equilibrium of labor market, but on the introduction of serfdom — with harsher conditions than before — to local populations that signified the parasitic relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. In other words, the labor contract, which is supposed to be based upon 'placid' negotiation between the employer and employee, thus redeeming itself from dependence on tradition, custom or direct use of violence that was prevalent in the previous stages of mode of production assume a strictly despotic characteristic in the colonial context. Thence, whether it was for the plantation worker or the household servant, direct use of violent mechanisms resided right at the heart of the wage-labor relations in colonies. The phenomenon of colonial administration as the primary mechanism of territorial expansion and as the political body that presided over the local population with regards to the issues pertaining to economics, politics and law, thus, cannot be epitomized as duplicating the functions of the core states. And, as such, it needs to be underscored that colonial state functioned as a hybrid mechanism, incorporating elements from both feudal and capitalist mode of production, that served, exclusively, one purpose: the safeguarding of the interests of the core capitalists. This, in turn, necessitates to insert a line of demarcation to separate the nature of relations between the colonial state and the ruling élite of the

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either in the form of facilitating the realization of the interests of its capitalist class, or through serving as a means for the ends of the settler population. See, Emmanuel, Arghiri. 'White settler colonialism and the myth of investment imperialism', *New Left Review*, no. 73 (1972), pp. 35-57.

[17] Another source of legitimation was administrative functions that were performed by the subsidiaries of the local owner and the populace, such as the administration of land and water rights equally and the constructions of canals, public houses, etc.

[18] The sale of landed property became one of the features of the British colonial rule in India as early as the eighteenth century. For a contemporary account on the commoditization of land in India, see Bahadur, Sayyid Ahmed Khan. 'The Cause of the Indian Revolt', in Mushirul Hasan ed. *Islam in South Asia Vol. II - Encountering the West: Before and After 1857*, (Manohar, 2008), pp. 188-192.

'mother country' (symbiotic), and that took place between the colonial state and subjugated peoples (parasitic).

The accentuation of capitalist development of the colonies through the workings of the colonial state, as Banaji pointed out[19], indicates the existence of a fallacious tendency to equate 'mode of production with relations of production'. The extension of new relations of production to colonies, according to him, results in the escalation and reproduction of 'backward' forms of exploitation that include slavery and serfdom. This characteristic effect of capitalism in the colonies can easily be illustrated by giving various examples including the cotton plantations that were established in the slave South (U.S.), or those that were set up in colonized India, subjugating the local populace to a somewhat better status of coolie.[20] Therefore, it is virtually impossible to fathom an "automatic transformation of labor-power into a commodity operating within a 'free' labor market with the development of capitalist economies."[21] This goes on to show that, as Turner mentions, the process of colonization cannot be regarded as establishing the solid foundations that capitalist mode of production can rest upon in the later stages. Instead, one needs to realize that colonization introduces comparatively more capitalistic relations of production to the colonized society, thereby putting it on the 'right' economic track, all the while it derails this potential growth of capitalism through its reliance on arbitrary violence that is not separated from the liberal understanding of the 'economic sphere'.

One should also note, at this juncture, that the analyses conducted in this work on the Marxian theory and its explanative power with respect to colonies are, by no means, intended as portraying a comprehensive vista that can be generalized to cover all colonies. To that end, the argument developed here is not proposed to support a universal understanding of colonies that can be applied to just about any colonized region in the nineteenth century. Our argument, instead, focuses on two specific historical cases that began experiencing full-fledged colonization well before the eve of the nineteenth century: Ireland and India. The reasons for this selection will be

[19] Banaji, Jairus. 'Modes of production in a materialist conception of history', (n.d., mimeo).

[20] For example, Indian coolies could not be bought or sold as opposed to the characteristics of slavery of the southern U.S.

[21] Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, pp. 17.

explained in the following sections, and, as such, I will take this opportunity to readdress the importance of Marx's focus on the spatio-temporal conditions in making cross-border comparisons and drawing theoretical conclusions.

The virtually unprecedented depth of Marx's and Engels' analyses of the historical metamorphoses of the modes, relations, and forces of production was the very first point that drew the author's ire against the penchant for representing their thoughts in a single-dimensional manner, which appears to run deep with a substantial part of *academia*. Both Marx and Engels spent significant amounts of time and energy on formulating their theses with especial accentuation of the particular. Indeed, whether it is for their early focus on England, France, Germany and the surrounding states, or the relatively high attention given by Marx in his later years to Russia, China, and India, there does not seem to be any shift from their uncompromisingly meticulous method of analysis. Henceforth, the first and foremost prerequisite of staying true to the Marxist roots, a position that fits to the author's intellectual standpoint, appears to go through the establishment of the analytical outlook that 'digs deep', to use a Geertzian concept[22], to excavate the details of particular historical cases. For although, as Avineri points out, Marx's theory of revolution is founded on universal criteria, its materialization, nonetheless, hinges ultimately on historical circumstances that naturally vary from one place to another.[23] One needs to recall, in that vein, that Marx constantly reemphasized his concern that his historical account of the genesis of capitalism outlined in *Das Kapital* should not be taken as an uncontestable universal law of development. In one of his unpublished letters written to the Russian journal *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* published in Geneva in 1877, Marx exclaims that,

> The chapter on primitive accumulation does not pretend to do more than trace the path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the womb of the feudal order of economy.

[22] Indeed, the degree of attention to detail of socio-political and economic structures in Marx's works, in more ways than one, appear closely similar to the Geertzian struggle of uncovering as many cultural 'turtles' as possible. See, Geertz, Clifford. *The Interpretation of Cultures*, (Basic Books, 1977).

[23] Avineri, Shlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx*, pp. 220.

> But that is too little for my critic. He feels he absolutely must metamorphose my historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into a historico-philosophic theory of the general path every people is fated to tread, whatever the historical circumstances in which it finds itself, in order that it ultimately arrive at the form of economy which ensures, together with the greatest expansion of the productive powers of social labour, the most complete development of man. But I beg his pardon. He is both honouring and shaming me too much...
>
> ...Events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings led to totally different results. By studying each of these forms of evolution separately and then comparing them one can easily find the clue to this phenomenon, but one will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.[24]

This work, therefore, is hoped to be a representative of constantly attempting to avert from being drawn into making overstretched generalizations, which, in all likelihood, would be to the chagrin of the founders of Marxist thought no less than any other major interpretative drawback. After all, history should not be separated from theory.

[24] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Selected Correspondence*, (Moscow, n.d.), pp. 378-9.

INTRODUCTION

THEORETICAL STANDPOINT, PURPOSE AND METHOD OF STUDY

Subject of Research

1.1 Marxist Thought and Theoretical Side of Claims to Internationalism

Marxism is one of the few paradigms that can make the claim of international application without instant rejection. One factor that plays a large role in this universal applicability is the fact that Marxism was crafted by focusing, chiefly, on the relations of production that shaped superstructures. Such superstructures include the prevalent ideology, culture, and the attribution of socially constructed roles to specific groups and individuals that these entail. Naturally, such an emphasis on the underlying material relations of the production processes made Marxist theory quite credible at the high tide of commercial capitalism.

One also needs, at this juncture, to elaborate on the concept of commercial capitalism. This term is used to signify the shift of the agendas of nineteenth century European states from the mercantilist standpoint to what Adam Smith advocated as lifting the restrictions that were previously put on market exchange.[25]

To be sure, this high tide of commercial capitalism is no less epitomized by worldwide socio-economic inequality than with the intensified disenfranchisement of peoples and the dehumanization of the work force. Naturally, in such a state of social affairs, the axiomatic social evolutionist arguments of liberalism, i.e. the history of

[25] For an in-depth analysis of the Smithean take on the benefits of unfettered commercial capitalism, see Thomas J. Lewis' detailed essay, *Persuasion, Domination and Exchange: Adam Smith on the Political Consequences of Markets*, *Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 2000).

mankind being portrayed as the continuous amelioration of the living conditions, appear as a means of whitewashing the structural ills of liberal economic paradigm. Thus, it seems possible to assert that whilst the predominant social evolutionist theme of liberalism functioned as a legerdemain in concealing the rampant inequality of advanced stages of capitalism, Marxism came to the fore as an attempt to unearth these structural ills and their governing position in the determination of social relations. Such a remedial emergence, of course, tipped the scales substantially in favor of Marxist thought, which becomes evident as one scrutinizes the numbers of large scale labor movements that materialized in the latter half of the nineteenth century.

Going back to the Marxist claim of internationalism, it appears that the reason for this aura of immunity stems from Marx's and Engel's claim that the human species differ from primates not on the grounds of physiological degrees of difference — unlike Darwin's theory of evolution — but owing to its inherent capability to produce makeshift tools.[26] This potential, their argument goes, emanates from the fact that labor is latent in human beings, and that it is only via making use of that potential had *homo sapiens* managed to enter a different trajectory from the rest of organisms.[27]

To further elaborate on this point: Even though neither Marx nor Engels denied that some features of human behavior could have had been taken over from the specie's

[26] Though this is not to say that Marx rejected Darwin's theories in their totality. One only should remind him/herself, in this sense, that Marx praised the value of Darwin's revolutionary contribution in numerous occasions. One such example would be Marx's letter to Lasalle on 16th of January, 1861, in which he wrote "Darwin's book is very important and serves me as a natural scientific basis for the class struggle in history. One has to put up with the crude English method of development, of course. Despite all deficiencies, not only is the death-blow dealt here for the first time to 'teleology' in the natural sciences but its rational meaning is empirically explained."

[27] The concept of labor and its transformative power is a recurring theme of Marx's writings. Indeed, Marx not only appears to have drawn a considerable amount of inspiration of Hegel's accentuation of labor (work) as *the* cornerstone of the development of the dialectics of Master and Servant, but he also manages to refine it as the only source that is puissant enough to lead to the ultimate emancipation of man. Naturally, one needs to exercise caution in not presuming a one to one correspondence between the Hegelian and Marxian dialectics, after all, Marx's breakthrough from philosophical theory to *praxis* was precisely what set him apart as the instigator of a primary turning point in the nineteenth century intellectual history. On the discussion of the role labor plays in the context of the Hegelian dialectics of Master and Servant, see Kojève, Alexandre, *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit*, (Cornell, 1969), pp. 3-31; on the discussion of Marx's conceptualization of labor as the catalyst of historical progress, see, Avineri, Shlomo. *The Social and Political Thought of Karl* Marx, pp. 65-95.

animal past, they claimed that human society could not be understood on the basis of abstract individual nature. Further, they asserted that the crux of the matter was not this question, but that its essence lay elsewhere. This point becomes all the more graspable when one scrutinizes Engels' unfinished draft, *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to* Man [21]. Engels' conception of humans, in that vein, was based on mankind's distinctive use of tools in the evolutionary process.[28]

Another interesting point to note is that it is possible for one to take Darwin's theory of social evolution at its nominal value and argue that it incorporates a more internationalist element than that of Marx. Yet, taking Darwin's theory on its face value also necessitate the adoption of a dismissive stance with regards to the unequal nature of relations of production that hold the present day societies — or the societies of nineteenth century for that matter — in its tight grip. Therefore, it is imperative for a comprehensive reading of commercial capitalism to not to overlook the relations of production and exploitation. And, it is at this point that Darwin's universalist theory of evolution is undermined as opposed to Marx's and Engels' internationalism that not only explain the complex nature of exploitation that holds sway over the relations of commercial capitalism but also manage to overcome it.

However, varying degrees of restrictions have been put on the relationship between individuals and their own labor over the course of the history of mankind, which came to its climax with the advent of the capitalist world economy. The capitalist mode of production, through carrying the separation of individuals from the means of production to new heights, heralded the complete alienation of the human being from the goods that are produced by him or herself.

Yet, one needs to exercise caution also on treating the concept of alienation and its microcosmic echoes with due diligence. It should not be forgotten, in that sense, that the relations of production, over the course of industrial capitalism, have not incorporated a motif of singular and full-fledged alienation. Instead, alienation of workers from the means of production followed a rather rocky road with regards to the endorsement of varying degrees of alienation. These degrees of alienation

[28] See Engels, Friedrich. *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man,* Progress Publishers, (Moscow, 1934).

differed considerably in accordance with the peculiarities of the particular working conditions. For example, the factory worker following the adoption of Taylorist production processes can be regarded as an optimal example at one end of the scale (full separation of the worker and the means of production), whereas his or her contemporary that specialized in the production of dairy products — owning lands and cows yet not necessarily in the possession of the feed grain or mechanical tools — appears to have occupied the middle ground on the scale of alienation.

All the same, the acknowledgment of the varying degrees of alienation need not constitute an appealing stance towards the argument that the criss-crossed nature of industrial workers — with respect to alienation — should lead to the outright elimination of class politics. On the contrary, the eventual outcome of any such alienation is exploitation despite the fact that the degree of alienation might be viewed as a crucial factor in the determination of the ultimate degree of exploitation. Thus, the Marxist understanding of the concept of alienation, in that regard, can be said to be not about the journey (the degrees) but about the destination (exploitation).

It also needs to be noted that, following the establishment of capitalism, this current of alienation was also solidified via the introduction of commodity fetishism, i.e. the alienated worker being lured by his or her final product, a product that is simultaneously his to claim (through his effort) and not his property, i.e. an external 'thing' (by the lost possession of the means of production). Therefore, it can be claimed that the nucleus of Marxist thought is encapsulated by a completely humanitarian understanding of human species and potential, and its artificial transformation by the capitalist bourgeois at the inception of the capitalist world economy. However, the claim of internationalism not only renders the theoretical pillars of Marxism subject to scrutiny, but also enables the questioning of the praxis. And, if Marx's famous *dictum* "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it"[29] is recalled, the examination of working class movements and the magnitude of their social base becomes all the more important.

[29] *Marx/Engels Selected Works*, (Moscow, 1969), Vol. 1, pp. 15.

1.2 Marxist Claim to Internationalism and its Practical Resonances

The very first labor movements began to materialize in Britain at the commencement of the nineteenth century.[30] These were followed by those in continental Europe and the U.S.. These 'prototype' labor movements were characterized by their organized nature through labor unions, trade unions and other organizations, their general awareness of the source of exploitation (as shown by opposition to the upper classes rather than engaging in Luddite acts), and having an understanding of their class position (via the establishment of class consciousness and solidarity) in the overall structure of the society. However, despite the eye-catching scale of these movements, such as the Chartist movement of 1820s, there appear to have existed certain loopholes, even at the initial stages of formation, with regards to their comprehensive structure.

One need only remember, to make this point more graspable, Marx's symbolic essay on the failure of the revolutions of 1848, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1898). In this work Marx rendered a careful analysis of the causes of the revolutionary failure, underlining the role that particular group interests played in antagonistically dissolving the revolutionary moment. His profound analogy about the peasants being like potatoes by virtue of their fragmented and controlled potential to become actors of the revolutionary struggle fits this point perfectly. Marx claimed that this was tantamount to the understanding of revolution as running backward, i.e. each higher class dropping the interests of the next lower one off the revolutionary agenda in order to make room for boosting its momentary advantage. It goes on without saying that such an opportunistic approach would not only eradicate the

[30] E. P. Thompson, in his preface of his classic work, *The Making of the English Working Class*, delineates the temporal boundaries of this formation period as "in the years between 1780 and 1832 most English working class people came to feel an identity of interests as between themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to) theirs" (Thompson, 1980: pp. 11). Further, other prominent scholars, such as E. J. Hobsbawm and R. S. Neale also consider the popular movements that took place in Britain during this episode to be first of their kinds with respect to formation of class perception and consciousness. Therefore, it does not seem to be viable attempt to brand some of the popular movements that occurred in previous episodes as 'labor' or 'working class' movements.

revolutionary momentum, but would also isolate the upper class in a lamentable position.[31]

It is at this juncture that one feels obliged to address a number of questions; such as, how should the internationalist claims be acknowledged from a practical perspective, and to what extent? What can be rendered as an ideal measuring stick in assessing the degrees of inclusiveness? What other large scale movements can be analyzed in a comparative sense to grasp the nature of ruptures from one another? Were there any instances of national liberation movements that can be rendered revolutionary over the course of their evolution?

The practical problematic of what can be made of the shibboleth of internationalism is, in itself, pivotal in grasping the underlying elements of working class struggles in general. However appealing taking the notion of internationalism at its face value might seem, the necessity of recognizing the latent impasse such an assertion entails cannot be overstated. This 'latent impasse', as we prefer to call it, calls for the adherence to internationalist principles to the extent that any measure of severing the ties to such a standard entails the incapacitation of Marxist thought in its attempts to ignite social change. That is to say, such a claim necessitates a degree of relevancy that has to cover at least the majority of samples that differ in their spatio-temporal context. On the other hand, when one leans towards the other end of the spectrum there emerges the concealed risk of only paying lip-service to internationalism, which is tantamount to having no practical aspect. Where does the Marxist praxis enter this picture?

It is, in that vein, our contention that working class movements that took place in the first half of the nineteenth century had neither been able to attain the full-scale internationalism that Marxist theory promised, nor did they remain confined to the narrow corridors of micro-scale antagonism. Take the lack of coordinated struggles with the simultaneous participation of the global North and the South, or the West and East for that matter, which is evocative of at least some potency in refuting the

[31] To reiterate, such a lamentable position is not indicative of momentary advantages that one fraction of class derives at the expense of another, but should be understood in the wider context of revolutionary struggle. Such an abandonment of maximalist projects, thus, should not be viewed as a question of gaining the upper hand momentarily but shoving off the breaks of the socialist revolution.

nominal value of internationalism. Naturally, it is possible to counter such an argument by proposing that there can be no realistic expectation of fulfillment of the conditions of revolution throughout the globe. Yet, even though it is beyond question that the ripeness of social conditions for a socialist revolution vary with respect to the trajectory that the national society in question pursues, such a claim would call for a considerable amount of historical evidence that validate the optimal nature of coordination between the societies that are flawlessly prepared to undertake the first steps of revolution and the others that follow from behind.[32]

Be that as it may, examination of historical cases of large scale labor movements do seem to lead to the withdrawal of claims to internationalism and to such an optimal coordination, on the part of Marxist intellectuals right at the very moment the Occident/Orient dichotomy is introduced.[33] In fact, there appear to be a general penchant, on the part of Western labor, to neglect the revolutionary potential of the large scale movements that take place in the East, and even a lack of sympathy and compassion towards the 'Other' prior to the fruition of the Bolshevik Revolution, or, one could easily argue, even after it.

This has been regarded as one of the central, and controversial, topics by both Marxist intellectuals and their critics. The origin of this split can be traced back to Marx's writings on India and Russia. Marx and Engels, when they were writing on the British colonization of India and its effects on the Indians, applied their moral certainty with regards to the progression of history — which has been compared with Hegel's understanding and use of the concept of universal history as the unfolding of Reason[34] — thereby endorsing the progressive notions of modernity. However,

[32] A point that needs to be emphasized, at this juncture, is that one has to go beyond the commonsensical understanding that proposes an equation between the notion of state and that of society. Indeed, abiding by such a 'doctrine' inevitably results in the omission of the internal socio-economic differences that are generated by the varying social standing of different ethnic elements that constitute a society. Naturally, such a dismissive attitude with regards to the relative socio-economic position of particular ethnicities in a society also brings about the exclusion of the underlying labor configurations that are caused by the presumed differences between different ethnic groups.

[33] On this issue, see Walzer, Michael. *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument on Home and Abroad*, (Notre Dame, 1994), and as a response, Van Der Linden. Harry, *Marx's Political Internationalism*, (1996).

[34] Giddens, for one, postulates that Marx's formulation of 'historical materialism' is indebted to the Hegel's attempt to theorize a 'universal history' of humankind. However, one needs to exert due diligence on analyzing this position. Hegelian 'March of the Universal Reason' is a completely

provided that uncorking the genie of modernity that appears to be evident in the general body of Marx's thought for the sake of uncovering the latent relationship between Marxism and modernity will be carried out in the later sections, the brief analysis of that relationship will be limited to the following humanist critique of the modernist element embedded in Marxism.

This self-assured theoretical position induced both Marx and Engels to ignore the human suffering and the horrors involved in the colonization process for the sake of showing the infallibility of the Marxist reading of international history. Marx claimed that owing to the full-scale competition that symbolizes the capitalist world economy, the capitalist is in ever-growing need of expansion of the productive forces and of exploiting the newly-incorporated parts of the proletariat. This necessity leads to his claim that the bourgeois has no other option but to produce "its own grave diggers"[35]. The application of this claim to the case of India in Marx's writings on the Sepoy mutiny of 1857 is fitting, in which he asserts that "There is something in human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its

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different catalyst of historical development as opposed to Marxian supposition of international working class as the harbinger of historical progress. One of the earliest publications of Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, is highly important for any attempt of delineating between the elements of Hegelian thought that Marx incorporated to his theory with some changes, e.g. dialectics, and other components he left behind. See, Giddens, Anthony. *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*, (Macmillan, 1995).

The issue of teleology, on the other hand, appears to be easily dissolved when the general corpus of Marx's texts are scrutinized. Marx, through positing labor at the core of revolutionary change, ironed out Hegelian tendency to prescribe teleological claims. "History does nothing" in Marx's words, it does not have an essence that directs humans to an end that imposed on them,

> ...it [history] 'does *not* possess immense riches, it does not fight battles'. It is *men,* real, living men, who do all this, who possess things and fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses men as a means of achieving — as if it were an individual person — *its* own ends. History is *nothing* but the activity of men in pursuit of their ends. [Marx and Engels, *The Holy Family*, (Moscow, 1956), pp. 125.]

And, despite the claims to the contrary, it needs to be realized that the gist of Marx's model of historical development that posits 'socialist society' at the end of the revolutionary road is not based on a priori assumptions but on historical and empirical evidence that signified the domination of capitalist mode of production and heightened antagonism between the two principal constituting classes of capitalist society. Further, the advent of socialist society was not an inevitable stage down the path that was independent of the collective action of the human agency, but only a probable outcome that could be achieved through wear, tear, and constant struggle on the part of the working class.

[35] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *The Communist Manifesto*, (Harmondsworth, 1967), pp. 93-94.

instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself"[36]. Therefore, the theoretical position of Marx's early writings on non-Western societies such as India and Russia fits in perfectly with the modernist element that is embedded within his understanding of universal history.

Yet, to render such a premise understandable should not directly lead to supporting it as ethically commendable. And, whether it is for his claim that Indian village life before the advent of the British East India Company harbored "undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life"[37] — which is explained by Chandra as signifying a lack of empirical knowledge[38] — or his position vis-à-vis the revolutions of 1848, in the context of which he argued that the "so-called revolutions of 1848 were but poor incidents," and that "Steam, electricity, and the self-acting mule were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous character than even citizens Barbès, Raspail and Blanqui,"[39] this sweeping understanding of historical evolution, with particular reference to its ultimate end, is apparent.

Challenging Marx and Engels on ethical grounds, in the light of those examples generally do not yield justificatory results for a complete whitewash of some of their remarks. Yet, such lopsided comments and predictions of the founding fathers of communism are not limited to non-Western states. In fact, they become even more dramatic in the context of continental Europe. Basic sympathies left aside, the attitude of *Neue Reinische Zeitung* with respect to South Slavs in general and that of Engels in particular illustrate such a tendency to draw hasty conclusions, and, as such, has been taken to task by many commentators. Davis, for one, writes that,

> In the first place, Engels' whole argument hinges on his analysis of the political situation, and when this proved to be defective.... he was left in the position of winking at injustice in the interests of a larger good which did not and could not

[36] Quoted in Kiernan, Victor. 'Marx and India', *The Socialist Register 1967*, (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1967), pp. 160.

[37] Marx, Karl. 'The British Rule in India', (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.), pp. 31-32.

[38] Chandra, Bipan. *Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India*, (New Delhi, Orient Longman, 1979), pp. 13,32,47.

[39] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Selected Works of Marx and Engels*, Vol. 1, (People's Publishing House, 1995), pp. 774-775.

materialize. *But a leader who winks at injustice is preparing a bed of nettles for his followers*.[40] [emphasis added]

Alas, such idealist criticisms often do not have any reservations about overlooking a basic fact that stands naked before our eyes: modernist internationalism of the nineteenth century had a particular emphasis on the element of modernity, i.e. if a state was considered to be retrograde, it was regarded as a part of the counter-revolutionary phalanx. In other words, a state had to embrace modernity first in order to become a 'historical' part of international solidarity. Marx and Engels, therefore, cannot be said to have entangled themselves in a web of inconsistencies through their partial treatment of different states and nations. Tsarist Russia, for one, remained as *the* bastion of reactionary fervor from the internationalist standpoint of Marx and Engels as late as the beginning of 1860s. Russia, throughout that period was framed as the *enfant terrible* of Europe out of the fear that a potential annexation of Poland would have dire effects on the socialist movement of Western Europe. Indeed, it was only in 1861, with the advent of the so-called 'emancipation of the serfs' that Marx felt the need to shift his focus to the ex-bulwark of reactionary forces. The ultimate appraisal of any European state or stateless nation from the Marxist lens hinged on its impact on the chances of success of the European revolutionary proletariat. Tsarist Russia, once the kernel of 'timeless and unchanging' Oriental despotism, could be viewed as "the vanguard of the revolutionary movement in Europe"[41] only because out of all the countries in which considerable social turmoil erupted it was the one worst shaken by peasant revolts and the winds of change. Similarly, despite their contradictory appearance, both Marx's favorable treatment of the demands for self-determination emanating from Ireland, Poland[42], and Balkan Slavs, and his temporal or permanent shelving of Croatian, Czech or Serbian demands that were of identical nature can be understood through acknowledging the import of claims to internationalism. As Davis puts it, "He [Marx] also favored self-determination for

[40] Davis, Horace B. *Nationalism & Socialism - Marxist and Labor Theories of Nationalism to 1917*, (New York, 1967), pp. 30-31.

[41] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich, preface to the 2nd Russian edition (1882) of the *Manifesto*, German original in *Werke,* (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1956-68), vol. IV, p. 577

[42] Likewise, Rosa Luxemburg's clashes with Lenin on the ground of the projected usefulness of Polish independence was also based on the foreseeable effects of such a change, which was to be transmitted by the Polish working class, on the revolutionary vigor of the Western European working classes.

Ireland and for the Balkan Slavs — in fact, for all subject peoples whose interests coincided at the time with those of the international proletarian revolution."[43] Succinctly put, there is a one-way relationship between modernity (general) and parochialism (particular) from Marx's perspective: the former always trumps the latter.[44]

Nevertheless, when our sights are set on the movements of European, i.e. Western, working classes, there is an apparent increase, as opposed to trans-continental examples, in the degree of cross-border solidarity, sense of a holistic approach in crafting the revolutionary agenda, and mutual aid that epitomize, albeit to varying extents, the revolutionary attempts of 1848 and 1968.[45] Thence one is inclined to ask whether the prototype Northern Marxist is allergic to the movements of Southern labor, i.e. that the Northern internationalism is solely applicable to the Northern hemisphere.

One should also note, at this juncture, Marx's and Engels' standpoint with regards to the issue of slavery. Although having briefly analyzed their take on the issue of Indian colonization and the dehumanization of Indian coolies, I would like to expand this point to include the case of the U.S. and the question of Southern slavery.

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[43] Davis, *Nationalism & Socialism*, pp. 45.

[44] This discussion also shows us why neither Marx nor Engels did not favor the adoption of a 'right of nations to self determination' as a governing principle in the historical analyses they conducted, a position that is sometimes wrongly ascribed to Lenin. The right of self-determination does not appear in Lenin's works as an absolute principle; in his words, "Every democratic demand (including self-determination) is, for the class conscious workers, subordinated to the higher interests of socialism" (1930:243). Further, this emphasis on the limitations of the right to self-determination was also coupled with a realist preference for the larger political units that resemble Engels' favorable treatment of major powers from earlier dates. Thus, in a pamphlet printed during the Great War Lenin would write: "To defend this right [of self-determination] does not mean to encourage in any way the formation of small states; on the contrary, it leads to a freer, more fearless and therefore wider and more universal formation of larger governments and unions of governments" (1930:235) . Therefore, Lenin's approach to the issue of self-determination is by no means to postulate it as a 'bourgeois' natural right.

[45] A valid counter-argument to this assertion may stress that neither of these mass movements had a particularly socialist nucleus to begin with. Nevertheless, given their unprecedented scale and their opposition to the exploitative mechanisms of capitalism one does not feel obliged to diverge from Hobsbawm's standpoint on these gigantic movements, particularly with regards to the revolutionary attempts of 1848. Further, a similar challenge can also be directed at the Chartist movement, or even at the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 if a rigidly puritan lens is to be adopted in the analysis of any social movement. Thus, instead of rendering quick judgments, we have to scrutinize the underlying set of motives that give rise to any such movement and their relative weight with respect to one another. See Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Revolution: 1789-1848*, (1st Vintage Books ed., 1996).

Marx's and Engels' approach to this issue has been commented upon by various scholars, one of the most notable of which is Eugene D. Genovese. Genovese in his influential works, *The World That Slaveholders Made: Two Essays in Interpretation* (1988) and *Roll, Jordan, Roll* (1976) claimed to have crafted an infusion of Marxian historiography and Hegelian dialectics in his portrayal of the southern plantation owners. Yet, it is quite possible to assert that he failed to emphasize the imperative aspects of both understandings which had been carefully explained by Martin Kilian and Lynn Tatom (1981).[46]

Genovese, in both of his works, constantly downplayed Marx's understanding of the relations between the material base and the ideological superstructure. Supposedly refraining from the misunderstood notion of economic determinism, he argued that the paternalistic figure of the southern slave owner was an adequate reason for arguing that "once an ideology arises it alters profoundly the material reality and in fact becomes a partially autonomous feature of that reality"[47]. Such an understanding clearly is based on a misconception of the historical materialism through the introduction of a separation between the ideological form and historical content. This presumed rift, in turn, not only undermines the import of the British mercantilist interests that gave rise to the practice of slavery in the first hand, but also proposes an imagery of southern slavery as having minimal ties to the commercial interests of the slaveholders.

However, the basic assumption dictates that a war that was supposedly geared towards the destruction of the institution of slavery would not have been necessary if engaging in slaveholding had not been deemed to be profitable. Further, evoking Hegelian dialectics in his attempt to converge southern slavery and the relations pertaining to serfs and lords in the context of feudalism, Genovese wrongly assumes that Hegel's analysis of the institution of slavery of antiquity can be applied, to a full extent, to the southern case. Such an ill-fated attempt fails both on the grounds of

[46] On the critique of Genovese, see Kilian, Martin A. and Tatom, E. Lynn, 'Marx, Hegel, and the Marxian of the Master Class: Eugene D. Genovese on Slavery', *The Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981).

[47] Genovese, E. D. *In Red and Black: Marxian Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History*, (New York, Pantheon, 1971), pp. 340.

underscoring the peculiarities of both cases, i.e. southern slavery and feudal epoch, and of accentuating Marx's critiques of Hegelian dialectics.

There does not seem to be any need to ponder upon how distinct the relations relating to the factors of production and means of production were in the case of feudalism as opposed to that of southern slavery. Genovese's dismissive attitude with regards to Marx's opposition to the fundamental features of Hegel's thought, on the other hand, is worth elucidating. Marx mentioned that Hegelian dialectics allowed him to realize the "the essence of *labor*" and that he comprehended "the objective man. . . as the outcome of man's labor"[48]. However, Marx also claimed that Hegel had only seen the positive side of the realities of the production process as he viewed alienation as an end in itself. In fact, this considerable rupture between the thought of Marx and that of Hegel can be formulated as,

> Whereas Hegel had viewed alienation as something positive and defined objectification as the universal self-consciousness's manifesting itself, Marx saw alienation as a negative quality created from specific social conditions which man could correct since he had created such conditions. . . Man became alienated because he did not possess these objects which he had created.[49]

One also needs to mention the 'racist' connotations[50] of Hegel's view with regards to the African peoples, which is overlooked by Genovese. Hegel conceived Africa to be "the Unhistorical, Undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere nature' that could only be 'on the threshold of the World's History." He promoted the enslavement of such a 'barbaric people' and argued that American slavery gave Africans an "education — a mode of becoming participant in a higher morality and the culture connected with it." In his writings of early 1830s he even noted that the

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[48] Marx and Engels, *Collected Works*, Vol. III, pp. 332-333.

[49] Kilian, Martin A. and Tatom, E. Lynn, *Marx, Hegel, and the Marxian of the Master Class: Eugene D. Genovese on Slavery*, *The Journal of Negro History*, Vol. 66, No. 3 (Autumn, 1981), pp. 198.

[50] Yet, despite the apparent similarities between such an attitude and those of slave owners should not lead us to jumping into condemning conclusions. That is to say, the racist overtones of such a remark does not detract any value of how great a philosopher Hegel was. Further, ethical accusations that are made in hindsight in the post-modernized and decolonized world falter if the historical context is well-established. In other words, one should exercise caution in not equating the ignorance of the Orient that was well-rooted in the early nineteenth century with the nationalism and racism that of the twentieth. Otherwise, intellectual history would turn into a stamping machine, distributing labels such as Hegel the racist, Marx the Eurocentric, and Nietzsche the nihilist.

Haitian Revolution, despite its evident successes, was not founded upon an "infinite thirst for knowledge" that could only belong to "the European mind."[51]

We should take notice of another major thorn in Marx and Engels' side that paved the way for the accusations of the place Eurocentrism occupies within Marxian works before moving on: the issue of historical and non-historical peoples. This categorization, Hegelian in origin, rests upon the presumption that building and maintaining a state is the expression *par excellence* of proving that a particular group of people is a viable part of the unfolding of universal history and the inevitable March of Reason. Invoking such a measurement tool can also be visualized in the form of a waste-disposal for the small nations that lacked any national state mechanism. As a fitting illustration, Engels wrote of

> These relics of a nation mercilessly trampled under foot in the course of history, as Hegel says, these *residual fragments of peoples* always become fanatical standard-bearers of counter-revolution and remain so until their complete extirpation or loss of their general character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a great protest against a great historical revolution. Such, in Scotland, are the Gaels, the supporters of the Stuarts from 1640 to 1715.
>
> Such, in France, are the Bretons, the supporters of the Bourbons from 1792 to 1800.
>
> Such, in Spain, are the Basques, the supporters of Don Carlos.
>
> Such, in Austria, are the pan-Slavist *Southern Slavs*, who are nothing but the *residual fragments of peoples*. . . . [52]

However, there are two main reasons not to take such sweeping statements, to which Engels appears more prone than Marx, at their face value. These are the general internationalist framework of their works, and their changing attitudes with respect to matters pertaining to imperialism and colonialism. To begin with, Marx and Engels were internationalists in the last analysis, meaning that just as Marx postulated material base to be decisive over the ideological superstructure at the very final

[51] See Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, pp. 83-84, 91-99; *Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 42-43

[52] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Collected Works*, Vol. VIII, pp. 234.

stage, so are the works of both figures have to be analyzed while keeping their general internationalist contours in mind. Thus, notwithstanding the appearance of some passages[53] which suggest that they may have fallen prey to chauvinistic sentiments from time to time, it seems incontestable that their utmost priority was to ensure the flourishing of the working class in the Western Europe.[54] Only by realizing this point can we hope to grasp the shifting positions of both Marx and Engels at particular historical turning points. For example, their support of the annexation of Schleswig-Holstein by Prussia in 1866 which was followed by their opposition to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by the latter in 1871, can only be rendered graspable in this manner.

Second, neither Marx nor Engels were intransigent with regards to changing their ideas and adapting them to fit into certain historical circumstances. In fact, pronounced shifts in their position with respect to the effects of colonization on India and Ireland appear to have taken place in the 1860s, just as they rethought their positions vis-à-vis Tsarist Russia. Further, these shifts were not only in the form of theoretical positions but also of the growing need, albeit rather few and far in between, to address ethical issues such as human suffering. Too many otherwise meticulous commentators prefer to write as though the tough-minded realism of Marx and Engels, for instance, is Eurocentric by definition; but you cannot derive

[53] Such remarks include Engels' dismissal of the Algerian revolt with Abd El Kader at its helm against the French colonization as the 'hopeless' struggle of 'the barbarian society' against the French who were welcomed as "an important and fortunate fact for the progress of civilization" (Feuer, 1971, p.489), and Marx's belittling comments on the Montenegrins as mere 'cattle robbers' and on the Mexicans as '*les derniers des hommes*'.

[54] The geographical emphasis might seem paradoxical to the ardent critique, however, to reiterate an aforementioned point, there can be no future communist society, in which the full-emancipation of man will be within reach, without the development of the capitalist mode of production first. In other words, communism, as postulated by Marx, is the antidote of capitalism, and just like any antidote it needs the germs it destroys to hold a firm ground in the society. It should also be stressed that the direct transition from pre-capitalist modes of production to socialism has been an experience that proves, rather than challenging, the rule. That is to say, first of all, Marx's works do not show a trace indicating that he ever actually believed that a direct transition from feudalism to socialism without a corresponding socialist revolution in a major European country, e.g. England, France, Germany, could be sustainable. In fact, even in the last thirty years of his life, in which he gave considerable weight to Russia in his works, he was adamant that a Russian socialist revolution could only be successfully maintained if it was complemented by a European revolution. Second, the first exception to this rule, the USSR, due in large part to the insufficient class consciousness of the proletarian and agricultural masses, was to be led by the Leninist vanguard party which gave birth, in the more bellicose context of late 1920s, to the Stalinist one man rule. A point that needs further elaboration, this problem will have to be rest aside due to time and space considerations.

Weberian 'Protestant' and 'Oriental' ethics from Marx. Therefore, instead of sneering at non-contextual parts of their readings one needs to recognize their intellectual growth over the years and to spare them an over-hasty burial alongside various Eurocentric icons.

1.3 Assessing the Degrees of Internationalism

A crucial issue to address in the framework of our analysis is how to measure the degree of internationalism that characterizes a particular social movement. Can any such movement or ideology be canvassed as an ideal-type, to utilize a Weberian term, of universal application so that it can be employed as a means to certify the universalist claims of other social actions? The answer would be a simple 'no', such an exemplary movement has never materialized and, chances are, it never will.

At this point, we need to take a step back and remind ourselves that any theory is but a broadened application that springs from singular and particular cases. In other words, the focus of one's field of research essentially dictates the outcomes of the ultimate framework, i.e. theories are context-dependent. This becomes even more evident in our case: What Marx did was to investigate the internal as well as the overt workings of the capitalist world economy and to relocate it within the history of mankind. However, this relocation was made possible by the uneasy marriage of theoretic holism and practical particularism.[55] Marx's analysis, in that sense, was specifically centralized upon the British — and to some extent German and French — capitalist transformation that appeared as the model *par excellence* for other prominent states of the nineteenth century. In that sense, Marx was quite aware of the

[55] It is quite possible to argue, in that vein, that the theoretic holism of Marx's works presupposed a distinction between the core, periphery, semi-periphery, and the external area. To be sure, such a formulation appears anachronistic given that Marx did not make an attempt to classify various societies based on their levels of integration into commercial capitalism. Nevertheless, in the light of the fact that his focus was particularly towards the countries that took part in the hegemonic race, the exclusivist — with regards to the non-Western societies — overtones of his paradigm seem to have laid the foundations of the naturalized Occident/Orient dichotomy that started pervading Marxist thought following his death. Yet, such an understanding does not seem to pose a daunting theoretical challenge for it undermines some of the most important cornerstones of Marxian works (basing the emancipation of mankind on the emergence of the future society out of the structural antagonisms of the old one). Further, such an ill-founded critique also overlooks the intellectual context of his day ('unblemished' by postmodern critique) in order to build straw-man figures of Marx and Engels.

fact that full-fledged capitalism was not fully established even within the limited geographical area of Western Europe, as he wrote in his Preface to the first edition of *Das Kapital* (1867),

> In this work I have to examine the capitalist mode of production and the conditions of production and exchange corresponding to that mode. Up to the present, their classical ground is England. . .The country that is more developed industrially only shows to the less developed the image of its own future.[56]

England, therefore, was understandably branded as the *locus classicus* of capitalism. The cradle of liberal-capitalist creed was, however, not only designated as the capitalist state *par excellence,* but also as the state that was the only one that could truly knock on the door to socialism. To be sure, Marx would gradually, in 1860s, withdraw his support for the revolutionary potential of the English working class as they started to channel their revolutionary vigor more and more through trade unions directed at immediate and partial gains, and thus became junior partners of the whole system. Regardless, this shows us that the potential landscapes in which the future communist society, as formulated by Marx, would emerge were in the relatively industrialized parts of the Occident and not in the Orient.

Nevertheless, this particular emphasis on the morphing of British society should not be regarded as the utter betrayal of the claims of internationalism for the peculiarity of Marxist paradigm lay in the fact that the capitalism of Marx's and Engels' day was well on its way to become the norm of the core states; as such, the capitalist world economy started casting its shadow over each and every society, thereby turning into a universal phenomenon. Marx's attempt to explain the mechanics and structures of capitalism therefore became more universally applicable as well. However, it should also be stressed, at this juncture, that there appears to be a fundamental theoretical rupture of Marx's works: An imperfect study of the Oriental civilizations, such as India and China that gives way to the Marxist interpretation of their outlook as a seemingly intrinsic approval and presupposition of the Occident/Orient dichotomy.

[56] Marx, Karl. *Capital,* I, pp. 8-9.

This understanding of an 'intrinsic approval', I will argue, originated from the orthodox Marxist intellectuals' lack of interest in scrutinizing the peculiarities of national liberation movements. Our understanding of the nineteenth century anti-colonial movements is that they had a 'progressive' motive in the first stages of their process of materialization. The notion of progress, in our theoretical framework, is used in two different senses: the liberation of the subjugated people from the colonial yoke, and liberation of the relations of production from the retrogressive economic structure that was forcibly employed by the colonizer. The realization of national liberation in those states that were directly colonized and that were maintained as colonies for centuries (India and Ireland) was the very first step of emancipating their societies by challenging (and abolishing) the authority of the colonizer. However, given the high degree of selectivity with which such movements had 'imagined' (using one of Benedict Anderson's terms) their communities, this revolutionary aspect can by no means be rendered as an equivalent of a socialist revolution. Yet, recent history has shown us that refraining from the national and anti-colonial struggles is just as, if not more, perilous than riding the popular nationalist wave to the extent possible. That is to say, socialist states of the post-World War II epoch adhered to the guidelines of dealing with nascent national liberation movements in the Third World that were provided to them by the Third Comintern. However, this procedure resulted in USSR's kindling with nationalist flame and the rift between USSR and China that came to be manifest as early as the 1950s.

Such examples show us that whenever the hitherto retained Marxist tendency of endorsing an apathetic stance towards national liberation movements was adopted, this had a considerable impact on the materialization of what could be called the 'transition process'. This process, which symbolizes the metamorphosis of the national liberation movement from the terms of maximalist struggle against the colonial forces to the formation of the class system of the society in-the-making, as a result of the aforementioned impact would be monopolized, time and again, by the upper strata. Thence, the 'revolutionary' aspect of the national struggle was quickly taken over by the priorities of the capitalist nation-state, which could only be realized in cooperation with the 'modernist' approach of Marx.

1.4 Marx and Modernity

The 'modernist' tone of his thought becomes apparent when Marx's 'The Future Results of British Rule in India' (1853) is examined. In this work Marx applies his hypothetical model of AMP to the Indian case, arguing that the geographical and cultural specificities of these non-Western societies impede the advent of socio-economic transformations that took place in post-feudal Europe. Such a preeminent characteristic, he claimed, gave rise to the materialization of a historical trajectory that is substantially different from the European case; in his words India "has no history at all, at least no known history. What we call its history, is but the history of successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging society."[57] Hence, the only viable route of this state of 'social paralysis' is deemed to be via the direct intervention of Western capitalist states.[58]

The reasoning behind this argument is that direct intervention is regarded as the only means that would render the goal of destroying the archaic social institutions of AMP possible through the creation of private property in land. One should also stress an important point of Marx's hypothesis whereby he claims that the colonization of India entailed both socializing the costs pertaining to military control, administration, and defense and the unequal distribution of benefits. This unequal accrual of benefits, according to Marx, illustrated that the British colonies "represented a tax on the British people as a whole for the benefit of a cross-section of the ruling class"[59]. Notwithstanding the debatable nature of such an argument[60], it needs to be admitted

[57] Marx, Karl. *The Future Results of British Rule in India* (1853), in *Dispatches for the New York Tribune*, (London, 2007), pp. 219.

[58] Such an overstretched contention should also be examined while acknowledging the fact that Marx, especially prior to 1860s, was not very knowledgeable on Asian history. To that end, we need to remind ourselves that sources that would allow access to Asian history in Marx's day were severely limited. Indeed even such sources that Sir James Frazer made use of in writing the his classic 'armchair anthropologist' account, *The Golden Bough* (1890), were comparatively vast than those that were accessible to Marx in 1850s and 1860s.

[59] Quoted in Turner, Bryan S. 'Karl Marx and Oriental Colonization', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Spring, 1977), pp. 170.

[60] One potential thrust of such critism may be that this socialization of costs were made out of the Indian society and not out of both the British and Indians alike. A question that needs to be addressed at that juncture is whether the costs of colonial administration accrued in any significant proportion to the British people.

that there were drastic differences with regards to the fulfillment of interests of different groups and classes of the colonizer state.

Going back to the original point of discussion, Marx's reading of the social dynamics of the majority of non-Western societies eventually boiled down to the proposal that "the greater the intensity of colonialism, the greater the modernity"[61]. Therefore, it appears that one can easily argue that, despite the potential of turning a blind eye on the ethical issues such an argument brings, Marx's understanding of social transformation, in the last analysis, fed off his presupposition that welcomed colonization as the harbinger of the social transformation paving the way for the advent of capitalism.

This apparent problem of endorsing modernity to full-effect, however, does not necessarily constitute a major problem. As we underlined in the previous sections, Marx was wrangling with an international problem — capitalist system — with the aim of providing an international solution — communism. Thence, his jumping unto the modernist train need to be examined both with regards to the generality of the theoretical and practical issues he coped with, and in the historical context of his day.

This analytical profundity is important in the sense that it enables us to draw the line between Marx's and Engels' take on the questions concerning the dichotomic outlook, and the charges made against them on the grounds that selective readings of their works might be taken as an indicator of their inherent racism. One such commentator, Dagobert Runes (1959), claimed that Marx's approach to the Jews was nothing short of an anti-Semite attitude, which was later attributed to the Nazis. However, as unfair some of Marx's word selection used in the depiction of the Jews in his *Zur Judenfrage* (1843) seem to be, such a verdict can only be made by forgetting the importance to read — and consequently present — the text as a whole. Indeed, taken as a whole, it seems evident that Marx did not say anything of the Jews that he did not say for the Christians. He wrote, for example, that "Christianity sprang from Judaism; it has now dissolved itself back into Judaism." One should also note that Marx did not consider the 'flaws' of the Jews to be innate, as he noted,

[61] Turner, Bryan S. *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, (London, 1978), pp. 171.

"Here again the supreme condition of man is his *legal* status, his relationship to laws which are valid for him, not because they are the laws of his own will and nature, but because they are *dominant* and any infraction of them will be avenged"[62].

Yet, following the modernist path generated its own hardships for the international coherency of Marxist paradigm. As shown by the debates on India in the works of Marx and Engels, and even when they were considering to skip one of the stages of development with special reference to Russia (in and after 1877) — which, according to Melotti, is postulated by Marx as exhibiting the form of 'Semi-Asiatic Society'[63] —, their belief in the conditionality of the success of the non-Western revolution on those of European origins was unshaken[64]. Therefore, Marx's and Engels' adherence to modernity appear to be crystallized in their discussions on the West, which is purported to have a determining role on how the non-Western social transformations will eventually play out.

Still, one should not attempt to generalize this modernist outlook on India to Marx's each and every analysis of peripheral societies. Indeed, when he was writing on British colonization of Ireland Marx adopted a highly critical approach to the British rule, claiming that Ireland "has been stunted in its development by the English invasion and thrown centuries back. . . . By consistent oppression [the Irish] have been artificially converted into an utterly impoverished nation." Therefore, it is apparent that Marx did not conceive each and every act of intense colonization as

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[62] Marx, Karl. 'On the Jewish Question', in Robert C. Tucker, ed. *The Marx and Engels Reader*, (New York, Norton, 1978), pp. 51.

[63] This formulation of 'Semi-Eastern' Russia was made in comparison to the "completely Eastern" situation of other non-Western societies, such as China. See, Marx, Karl. 'Russia and the Western Powers', *New York Daily* Tribune, 5 Aug. 1853; in Karl Marx, *The Eastern* Question, ed. Eleanor Marx Aveling and Edward Aveling, (London, 1897), p. 75.

From an empirical perspective, this conceptualization rested on the results obtained from Marx's analysis of the Russian society. His assessment ran in parallel lines to that of Trotsky, who pointed out that Russia was a prime example of how different phases could coexist, and archaic and modern forms could be interwoven. In Trotsky's words,

> Within this vast space every epoch of human culture is to be found, from the primeval barbarism of the northern forests, where people eat raw fish and worship blocks of wood, to the modern social relations of the capitalist city, where socialist workers consciously recognize themselves as participants in world politics. (1972:36)

On a discussion on Marx's and Trotsky's respective analyses of Russia, see, Melotti, Umberto. *Marx and the Third World*, pp. 82-95.

[64] *Marx and Engels Correspondance (1882)*, (International Publishers, 1968).

facilitating the modernization of a backward society. However, one should stress that Marx had the tendency to adhere to the premise of AMP in the context of non-Western societies. Thus, combining this point with Marx's focus on the development of capitalism in the core countries, one could assert with relative ease that he regarded the imposition of the principles of modernity to the non-Western societies as a prerequisite in breaking the supposed chains of stagnancy.

This brings to the fore the argument that unequal development took over where colonialism had left off. However, the undeniable importance of the transitory stage in the development of national liberation movements has been emphasized, heretofore, by only a handful of Marxists, such a figure of foremost importance being Lenin. And, even the far-sighted revolutionary lens[65] that made it possible for Lenin to grasp the nature of this point was not enough to make a sound impact on how national liberation movements were received within the general Marxist framework, thereby crystallizing into what can be rendered as the Achilles heel of Marxism.[66]

To that end, a delicate thread needs to be woven on the issue of Marxist internationalism, which has to stand no less distant from an idealist perspective than from a complete contextualism. Foregoing the natural implications of endorsing an idealist approach, one needs to assert that the other end of the spectrum, i.e. full-fledged contextualism, would pave the way for the argument that the internationalist aspect of the working class struggle has always been as optimal as possible. In other words, the underlying pitfalls of jettisoning practical realism is no less significant than following a line of apologetic reasoning. However, going back to the genesis of the supposed dichotomic outlook, it needs to be re-emphasized that any potential of

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[65] One needs to note, at this point, that Lenin's clairvoyant reading of the stages of socialist revolution have been regarded, often times, as endorsing a full-fledged political opportunism. Yet, such a label of opportunism should be viewed as having severed its ties to pejorative connotations rather than understanding it as resembling a type of market opportunism. This stems from the fact that any revolutionary attempt is doomed to failure — to which the revolutionary attempts of 1848 constitute a fitting example — without the cultivation and the know-how related to the timing of igniting the revolutionary flame.

[66] Combined with the theoretical and practical ruptures that materialized within the mainstream socialist parties of 1910s and the ensuing all-out struggle against fascism and Nazism none of the influential figures such as Palmiro Togliatti, Karl Kautsky, and Georg Lukacz revisited the question of colonial emancipation. Indeed, the only such outstanding example who scrutinized the peculiarities of the colonial states was Rosa Luxemburg, the obvious irony being that she and Karl Liebknecht were executed by the orders of Social Democratic leaders on 15 January 1919.

restoring the theoretical vigor of Marxism in the aftermath of perestroika and the ensuing collapse of the USSR hinges ultimately on the realization of Marxist internationalism. To that end, the roles of 'leader' and 'follower' that sprang from Marx's analyses of the non-Western societies need to be revisited and rethought so that we can come to terms with the idea that Marxist struggle can only be waged in an all-inclusive manner; otherwise we will only keep on paying our homage to Marx's famous *dictum* "Working men of all countries unite!"[67] and continue to render the issue of internationalism as a taboo with no realistic overtone whatsoever.

1.5 Awareness of Limitations

Although we attempted to highlight some of the pitfalls and boundaries of our designed area of research in the previous sections, in this part we will emphasize a couple of such limitations in more detail.

The difficulties of conducting this research arise in two principal strands. These are, namely, the natural need of drawing contextual insights with regards to the historical samples that will be pondered on, and clarifying the intellectual outlook on some methodological questions that, at times, require the negotiation of particular degrees of compromise.

Regarding the first limitation, it will be the continuous attempt of this work to validate the premise of contextual analysis virtually at every step through the materialization process. It is, in that vein, uncontestable that ascribing the role of self-aware socialist revolutionary to any participant of the social movements that will be analyzed, regardless of the role he or she played during the revolutionary struggle, is both a-historical and unwarranted. In other words, one needs to acknowledge that there was a fusion of socialist, liberal, and democratic demands, with varying weights put one each element, on the part of the British Chartists, Irish separatists, and Indian mutineers alike. Thus, any attempt to portray any one of these movements as having strictly socialist overtones appear to be destined to failure.

[67] Bender, Frederick . *The Communist Manifesto* (Critical Editions Ser.), (New York, 1988), pp.93.

Further, inviting the full-fledged internationalist expectations to hold sway over the analysis of particular 'revolutionary' groups will, likewise, be unrealistic and anachronistic. Chartism, in order to evoke a fitting example of our research, was geared towards winning improved conditions of work and higher chances for participating in leisurely activities for the English working class. Further, the formal demands for social reforms that found their places on Chartist petitions appear rigidly democratic even when one engages in a preliminary survey. Indeed, glancing over such documented goals of principle import — suffrage for every man over the age of 21 that is not a convict, demand for annually held elections, etc. — it becomes quite apparent that democratic goals and the desire for achieving full-citizenship are the two cornerstones of the Chartist struggle. Thus, Chartism, or Irish separatist movement and the Sepoy mutiny for that matter, did not exhibit an internationalist outlook by any imagination of the word.

How does the researcher cope with such considerable difficulties? Rather easily we would say given that our ultimate goal is neither to coronate nor to condemn any one of these movements on the grounds of not being purely socialist or internationalist. The primary research objective of this work, *per contra*, is bringing the validity of the alleged prescriptions of the founding fathers of Marxism into the dichotomy of Occident/Orient into question. And, given that Marx himself wrote meticulously about all these three cases — England, Ireland, and India — it seems that the first half of the nineteenth century needs to be the bedrock of any attempt that is geared towards digging the roots of this dichotomic perspective.

The second major problem that we encountered in realizing this work is the constant need to dissipate the clouds regarding the intellectual position in the context of particular theoretical questions. Take the two cases of the national liberation movements that will be focused on for one. Both the examples of Irish separatism and Indian anti-colonialism, in that sense, provide to be cases in the respective contexts of which it appears quite difficult to draw Euclidean boundaries with regards to their 'progressive' and 'reactionary' roots. Indeed, inasmuch as categorizing them as being purely progressive in their opposition to the oppressing colonizer might seem, one also need to recall Benedict Anderson's portrayal of the formation

of the nation-state in addressing such an issue.[68] Does there appear to emerge rigid lines between the 'progressive nature' of the liberationist struggle and the reactionary contours of the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion that came to play a substantial role in the formation process?

It is our contention that the futility of engaging in an attempt to demarcate the highly-blurred lines between liberation of the imagination of a nation-state and the actual formation of one on a rigidly defined progress/reaction scale need not be stressed. Further, we also need to remind ourselves that the examples of Ireland and India that will be covered in this work are those that can best be defined as national liberationist or anti-colonialist, which are ought to be differentiated from other nationalist movements of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Indeed, as we noted previously, the examples of Indian rebels and Irish separatists of the nineteenth century are not only unique in their relation to the social composition of other popular struggles of their times, but also with respect to the rare position they occupy as cases having undergone direct colonization as compared to other states that can at best be described as semi-colonies. This point is vital in the sense that it provides us with two prime examples of how the process of colonization effected the pre-capitalist modes of production and in what way. Returning to the question of how can these anti-colonial movements be measured against the paramount Western movements, in which European labor played a major role, the issue transforms into a need to re-emphasize. Succinctly put, the analysis of all the three movements will be not be made only in socio-economic grounds with recurring accentuation on the dialectic relation between forces and relations of production, but will also be focused on the respective intellectual vistas that shaped the political landscapes of each case. Combining this explanation with the aforementioned aim to unveil the presupposed Marxist perception of the 'leading' Occident and the 'following' Orient, we believe that we operate on the right grounds in the search of an old *clef de voûte* for explaining a present day phenomenon.

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[68] See, Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, (Verso, 1991).

1.6 Intellectual Rationale

There are two focal reasons that aroused our interest in conducting research on the topic of nineteenth century movements and their designated place within the Marxist paradigm. First, we believe that the nineteenth century, in its totality, is a gold mine with respect to providing keystones in understanding the present state of social affairs. The movements that epitomized this 'grand transitional stage' within socio-economic history have such defining aspects and parallels with one another that it is possible to posit the overt as well as latent characteristics of this epoch in a similar fashion to that of Braudel's 'the long sixteenth century'. Nonetheless, however appealing engaging in comprehensive analyses pertaining to social developments and intricacies of this period might seem, such accounts have been few and far between. As a graduate student that has no difficulty in positing himself as adherent of general contours of Marx's and Engels' thoughts, it appears that any attempt to expound upon the peculiarities of this epoch and their resonances that continue to hold sway over Marxist thought is, by itself, worthy of applause. Further, provided that our ultimate aim is to contribute a much more comprehensive and detailed vista of this period in the Ph.D. dissertation, the selection of this topic was almost natural.

This intellectual standpoint is also magnified by the struggles that we had to endure in overcoming the alleged intrinsic preconception of a dichotomized world from a Marxist lens. Naturally, it goes on without saying that we do not envision this work as doing anything remotely similar to a *coup de grâce* to any particular part of Marxist theory, but merely attempting to 'patch' some of its asserted issues that remained intact over the course of the last a-hundred-and-fifty years. Thus, intellectually speaking, this work can be purported as a stepping stone of reconciling Marxist internationalism with the socio-economic conjuncture of the nineteenth century, and of concretizing our personal take on how some remedies corresponding to particular loopholes pertaining to the internationalism of Marxist theory can best be purveyed.

The second main reason for our humble attempt of providing a rather holistic map for the relatively uncharted waters — uncharted in the sense of providing a comparative and in-depth Marxist perspective and not in terms of the availability of

numerous commendable historical analyses — of the nineteenth century is that comprehensive historical sketches of this period emphasizing the underlying socio-economic factors have been quite miniscule in their quantities. Indeed, the works that confounded the social movements in Britain, Ireland, and India have been relatively few, and those that 'dared' to revisit these examples and timeframe rather focused on other aspects that have inferentially fed into these movements.

There are some works that we glanced over and found quite worthy of mentioning, such as *Ireland and India - Nationalism, Empire and Memory* (2009) of Michael Silvestri, *Cosmopolitan Nationalism in the Victorian Empire - Ireland, India and the Politics of Alfred Webb* (2009) of Jennifer Regan-Lefebvre, and *Ireland, India and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Literature* (2007) of Julia M. Wright.

Thus, there seems to be an abundance of praise-worthy works on the subject; however, the intellectual questions that were underscored and that feed into this work have to do more with excavating the parallels and distinctions between the social movements pertaining to the three principal examples in this epoch. And, such an excavation only takes place in brief spurts — Silvestri and Regan-Lefebvre prefer to highlight the political relations between the Irish revolutionaries and those of India rather than bringing the material relations to the fore — and/or with regards to particular aspects — literature in the case of Wright's work — in the works that are mentioned. One should also bring up, at this point, Kate O'Malley's influential work, *Ireland, India and Empire - Indo-Irish Radical Connections 1919-64* (2008). This work, although rendering a viable attempt of delineating the intricacies of the political relations between British, Irish, and Indian nationalist and national liberationist groups, focuses on the end of empire. Thus, one can assert that the socio-economic underpinnings that gave rise to these nineteenth century social movements and the parallels/divergences in between them remain as an area that appears rather 'pristine'.

Further, there is also the issue that much of the fog which surrounds the relation between Marxism and Eurocentrism stem from the fact that there does not seem to be many authors that try to offer probing explanations for this topic. This becomes especially evident when most of the works about Marxism and nationalism are

scrutinized. Indeed, an important feature of most of the works that are about this subject is that they are extremely prone to issue blanket dismissals of a thorough discussion of Marxist internationalism whereby the reader is lead inexorably down the blind alley of blanket conceptions and overstretched presumptions. The main issue that the author has with such works is that they tend to treat Marxist theory as a mere epiphenomenon of some other omnipotent cause, such as the practical failure of particular socialist movements at a certain point in the twentieth century. On this measure, we believe that Marxism cannot be treated as a success or failure *in toto* for a variety of basic reasons. These reasons include surpassing the impermissible practice of backward projection, i.e. taking the flaws of a socialist movement that materialized sixty, eighty, or a hundred years after the completion of Marxian works as a heritage of the latter, refraining from the misguided attempts to reduce Marxist theory to a small number of touchtone conceptions, e.g. the causal relationship between the material base and ideological superstructure, and clearing the deck from any ideological source of motivation that operates on infinitely more presumptions as opposed to the rational and dialectical nature of Marxist theory. However, it appears impossible to achieve a tight grasp of the works of Marx's and Engels' without at least attempting to understand their theoretical backgrounds in the full complexity thereof which reminds us that history of political theory cannot be atomized first and assembled second with the lack of any thorough understanding of the intellectual trajectory itself. The Kantian analogy of trees which was made in the context of the relations between the individual and society can be used to fuel support for our standpoint on the issue:

> It is just as with trees, in a forest, which need each other, for in seeking to take air and sunlight from the others, each obtains a beautiful, straight shape, while those that grow in freedom and separate from one another branch out randomly, and are stunted, bent, and twisted.[69]

To render a few examples of such works, Ronaldo Munck in *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, despite the comprehensive vista he portrays with respect to how the outlook of Marx's and Engels' to the national liberation of colonies

[69] Kant, Immanuel. *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent* (1784), in *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals*, (Ted Humphrey trans.) (1983).

changed through time, ascribes an essence to nationalism while claiming that "Marxism cannot simply hide behind the banners of rationalism and reject all other causes as simple superstition or irrationalism."[70] It appears, however, that the main theoretical supposition lurking behind such an understanding is that nationalism as a phenomenon has an essence in itself, which is an invitation to the nationalist firebrands that have a tendency to spread like wildfire whenever they are deemed to have essential roots.[71] And, it becomes apparent at that juncture that one should not forget the fact that the prime mover of nationalism in modern epoch, the nation-state, itself is a socially produced artificial political body that always has had the tendency to exclude just as much as it included.

It also needs to be stressed, as a complementary note to the previous point, that putting the assumption of success or failure to rest as the foundation on which a work is built induces the author to set his or her sights to utilize the specific empirical cases — or taking only the particularly useful aspects of an historical event into account — that help validate his or her fundamental supposition. In other words, one can quite possibly employ only the cases that solidify the grounds which the work rests upon in order to create a mirage that he or she kept trying to push the boulder of Sisyphus uphill only to discover that it would roll back down in each and every instant. This work, in that sense, is an attempt to understand the Orient from the strictly Marxian perspective to see if Eurocentrism can be taken as an integral element of Marxist thought. It should suffice to note, to that end, that based on the theoretical and empirical knowledge that was gathered during the materialization process of this work we argue that Eurocentrism is not an inherent, innate, and permanent element of the works of Marx and Engels. By the same token, it is our contention that such an accusation can be made only through the method of in contextual representation and by selective employment of textual evidence. We also believe that the only viable remedy to such lopsided representation of a theory is

[70] Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue*, pp. 2.

[71] Szporluk made virtually the same claim as that of Munck when he wrote that "It is one of the central ideas of this study that nationalism — let us stress this point over and over again — was not a product of the Industrial Revolution, but rather had been born beforehand, and that a specifically *nationalist* reaction to the Industrial Revolution was not reducible to the liberal, conservative, or socialist position." (1988:8)

recalling that political thinkers cannot be judged by their appearance under anachronistic spotlights made up by the norms and values of the present day, but that they need to be permitted to develop independently under their own steam. Putting together these intellectual standpoints, it appears that the method of investigation that is adopted in this work is the only one that helps us to evade a 'bane or boon' approach to Marxism and to its relationship with internationalism.

Setting the theoretical tone at the inception and harvesting the empirical evidence later on is also crucial in that the selection of the three historical cases would have been inexplicable otherwise. Our historical survey of the nineteenth century socio-political landscapes, in that sense, is made to reveal any potential or realized cooperative linkage between the working class movement in England and the national liberation movements that were gaining momentum in the same period. In other words, the historical evidence is used in order to evaluate whether if the allegations made against the Marxist internationalism are justified.

Up to this point we have examined whether the notion of internationalism can be taken at its nominal value, and if there have been any such ideal examples that would serve as a measuring stick. As the results of our initial investigation shows, Marxist internationalism, in that sense, has both its flaws and its fortes.

Now the question turns into how one can assess the degree of practical internationalism that came to be associated with Marxist thought. To that end, revisiting the point where it all began, early nineteenth century Britain, in order to find the genesis of the supposed theoretical rupture between Occident and Orient emerges as the only valid option. For that reason, we will attempt to put on an objective lens in pondering on three fundamental cases that we believe to be representative of the nature of this theoretical and practical rift: British working class movement, Indian anti-colonial struggle, and the Irish separatist movement.

We intend to show that, from a strictly Marxist point of view, the respective major points of origin of these movements are one and the same. Put differently, the underlying material and social conditions that appear to have triggered Chartism have virtually a mirror image in the causes of manifestation of the Sepoy Rebellion,

and the rise of Irish nationalism alike. Such conditions that can be said to converge in a Venn diagram include, but by no means are limited to, material exploitation and social subjugation of the working classes and coolies, dehumanization of work force, infringements of individual rights, and the lopsided nature — in favor of the capitalist of the 'mother country' and at the detriment of the workers and coolies — of policies implemented by the colonizer government and colonizing companies. Thus, it is our claim that there is only a degree of difference between the labor movements of Western origins and those that originated in the non-Western states, that they do not necessitate a dichotomic manner of analysis — and henceforth the manifestations of what Engels, and subsequently Lenin, called 'the aristocracy of labor'. By 'degree of difference' it is meant that the usual constraints that the Northern capitalist class have had to deal with for the sake of keeping 'order and stability' at home were not applied to the colonial cases. In other words, the Northern capitalist states did not even feel the need to masquerade their exploits on the soil of their colonies, i.e. they could engage in virtual slavery, in the extraction and transfer of precious metals and other raw materials, and in applying severe disciplinary mechanisms at their discretion. These activities, in turn, culminated in a type of society that was utterly terrorized and molded exclusively according to the needs of the colonizer.[72] Thus, it can be said that the Western capitalist, who had to restrain himself from constantly overpowering the subordinate classes on the home soil, was

[72] The relation between the local group that is terrorized and the group that transforms into being the main constituent of the nascent nation-state, however, is not direct and sometimes could even verge on annihilating indigenous populations. Colonialism that swept the American continent — both South and North — is a fitting example of that. For example, neither the real victims of the Putamayo River colonization project, nor those that were victimized by the constant expansion of the thirteen colonies did play any role in the formation of Colombia or the U.S.. Therefore, such typical examples of early projects of colonization are distinguished by the eradication of the remnants of the old society in order to create some 'open room' for the 'saviors' of the mother country. Yet, other, and rather Herculean examples, such as India and China, are typified as societies, in dealing with which the colonizer lacked both the means to wipe out the native society and the willingness to establish more than a few permanent settlements. And, the appeal to the common man of an all-out struggle waged against the colonizer was so considerable that one can assert that the Western education received by the leaders of liberation movement constituted only half of the issue of triggering the large scale struggle. For an in-depth analysis of the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 that helps elucidate this point, see Collier, Richard. *The Great Indian Mutiny*, (New York, 1964). For a detailed investigation into the scale and intensity of activities of the Putamayo River Colony, see Taussig, Michael. *Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror and Healing*, (Chicago, 1991); for the North American case, see Wolf, Eric R. *Europe and the People Without History*, (California, 1982), and Zinn, Howard. *A People's History of the United States - 1492 to Present*, (Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 2005).

able to get his *revanche* in his dealings with the colonies with no other restraints than that of morality.[73]

We prefer to read human history not through a Schumpeterian — or as do the followers of the social conflict theory — lens of order through chaos but in a Hegelian manner like an ever-flowing stream that builds upon what came before; tranquility breeds tranquility, conflict breeds conflict, and triumph begets triumph, or so we hope. However, one thing cannot be denied: misunderstanding the past equals misjudging the present. It is our belief that understanding the nature of the Occident/Orient dichotomy that is supposedly omnipresent in Marxist theory through revisiting the nineteenth century, at which its initial manifestations were made, is of cardinal importance. This analysis discovers the origin of this rift within the ranks of later Marxists. It also commences the deciphering of the enigma of nationalism that has hitherto managed to preserve its status for whatever delusions were derived from the retrospective analyses of the works of Marxism's founding fathers. Essentially, these have set the tone for a continuing understanding that presupposes the binary opposition between the Occident and the Orient as a structural future of the Marxist paradigm from the outset. It is one of the central theses of this work that such an ill-founded diagnosis may have a silver lining after all: Neither Marx nor Engels ever became an easy prey to Eurocentrism through the use of unilinear stages of development that imposed the Western reality as a universal blueprint. Indeed, despite the message that is conveyed by the 'Asiatic' part of the AMP to the mind that is learned to come to grips with postmodern currents, it is one of the major achievements of Marx's theory that, as he wrote in his *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852), "Men make their own history", which underlines Marx's activist maxim, but not "under circumstances chosen by themselves."

[73] And, to be sure, such restraints of morality did not amount to having a large impact on the demeanor of the colonizer to begin with. The lines of morality, after all, is always drawn by those who, by definition, are 'morally superior'. The colonial history of Americas, Australia, Asia, and Africa all constitute valid examples to elaborate this issue of 'lost morals.'

1.7 Methodology

Having stated the research paradigm above, we would like to elaborate on the method with which our research will be conducted. Our hypotheses and diagnoses, for the time being, are based on the literature and other documents with which we became familiar as we were conducting research over the course of materialization of this work. The documents that we made use of are primarily theoretical and historical accounts depicting various approaches to the internationalist aspect of Marxist thought and its resonances in the non-industrialized parts of the globe. Further, we also tried to enrich our ideas via unearthing important recounts from published tracts in the discipline of anthropology, as well as from political speeches and court records, wherever applicable.

With regards to the underlying ontological and epistemological assumptions, one of the main presumptions will be that the colonial state, i.e. the colonial territory that was administered by the core states, existed as a particular form of state, which had its own peculiarities that were derived not only from pre-capitalist modes of production — and particularly from feudalism, such as the non-separated economic and political spheres from a liberal outlook — but also from the initial stages of the formation of nation-states and of the capitalist mode of production. Further, another principal assumption is that nationalist practices that held sway over the colonies were fundamentally different from those that originated in the colonizing societies. Put differently, we take it as a given that, notwithstanding the apparent similarities in terms of economic and social motivations that were ingrained at the roots of the nationalist policies adopted by both sides, there were essential differences between the national slogans that were generated in the colonized societies, and nationalist prejudices that swept the mind of industrial labor.[74] In other words, it is our contention that the nationalist ideologies, having been socially constructed according to the interests of the core country's upper class, were not only utilized as a justificatory mechanism for the utter annihilation of native societies, but were also

[74] Naturally, one should not overlook the specificities of particular cases, such as the rather homogenous characteristics of settlers of the prison colonies. For example, the prison colonies, for instance, Australia and certain parts of Africa, differed from the rest of the examples in the sense that the colonizer of these societies represented a somewhat different class in their 'home country'.

taken up by industrial labor as an adaptive mechanism when facing potential competition from immigrants, or when they supported the expansionist policies of their own governments, which differs considerably from the overriding preoccupation with national liberation in the colonies.

This presumption, despite its admitted appearance as a thesis within a thesis, is crucial in the sense that the fundamental workings of the capitalist world economy were not liable to change according to the geographical setting. That is to say, the underlying motivations for assigning Indian coolies to the British cotton and tea plantations as virtual slaves, or beating the Indian house servant to death were substantially similar in their *leitmotif* to the path the slave owner of the Southern U.S. followed in becoming the 'ultimate racist' amidst the racial prejudices that held sway over the nineteenth century American society: the consolidation of the privileged socio-economic positions of the dominant groups in the society. Lastly, it is assumed that the underlying socio-economic factors of the specific anti-colonial and working class movements constitute an adequate reason for drawing parallels that would allow us to claim that their origins are virtually the same, albeit realized in extremely different contexts.

The research strategy that will be employed for presenting the theoretical and practical implications of the results drawn from the research will initially be in the form of providing an introductory survey of where the phenomenon of colonial state fits unto a theoretical perspective (Chapter 1). Hence, in the first chapter, the form and essence of the Indian colonial state (or companies at the initial stages of colonization) will be looked at through the spectacles of the three principal political paradigms of the previous three centuries: Classical liberalism, statist institutionalism, and Marxism. This analysis will not only help us refute any potentially destructive argument that may challenge this work on the grounds of becoming an apologia of Marxism but will also permit us to dedicate a certain portion of the chapter to a discussion about the AMP, which has been stamped out as a futile effort by many scholars, Marxist and non-Marxist alike. Further, the theoretical discussions that are made in this chapter also lay the foundations of the analyses that are made in the subsequent chapters This will be followed by the

detailed analyses of the three historical accounts that took place in roughly the first half of the nineteenth century that will serve the purpose of validating the objectivity of the theoretical position; the English working class movement and Chartism (Chapter 2), Irish separatist movement (Chapter 3), and Indian anti-colonial movement (Chapter 4). The internal structure of these three chapters will be in the form of an initial historical portrayal imbued with Marx's and Engels' thoughts and their evolution through the years, which will lead to a concluding discussion on how that particular case fares in comparison with the other two. The conclusion will be a recapitulation of the theoretical and practical implications of the results obtained, and will try to relocate those discoveries within the overall structure of the Marxist paradigm.

The principal research methods that are planned to be employed will not be engaging in mathematical data analysis, but, instead, working within the contours of empiricism and realism. Empiricist methodology will be adopted when drawing conclusions from historical accounts and utilizing them to fill in the gaps of our analyses. However, the overall character of this work will be essentially realist in that it is not a major consideration on our part whether the theoretical implications will be realized at some point in the future, or not. In other words, the hypotheses that are brought to the fore in this work will be shaped in the light of the historical evidence emanating from authentic accounts and observations as well as from theoretical sources. And, as such, the main intention of the work is not to make projections that have a high likelihood of materialization in the future, but instead to delve into the nature of some notions that are taken for granted in present day *academia*. This method will be followed in pursuance of tackling the omnipresent misconceptions that give way to the maintenance of presumptions of dichotomic outlook that blunt the edges of Marxist internationalism.

CHAPTER I

THE COLONIAL STATE AS A FORM: A DIAGNOSIS

As a harsh reality of the period ensuing from the sixteenth century, the issue of colonialism has been canvassed in numerous ways. Whilst one of the two main strands of socio-economic thought, the adherent of conventional Eurocentrism — which, as a label, can also cover the armchair anthropologists of the pre-Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown era — , preferred to present this as a benevolent transition period from utter economic and social stagnancy to participation in the international economy[75], those who followed the antithesis of the conventional outlook focused on the validity of fundamental Eurocentric concepts, such as stagnancy, dynamicity, development, etc. in a vibrant attempt to overcome such rigid evolutionary classifications.[76]

In this chapter, we will set our sights on the issue of colonialism through a discussion of the colonial state, hoping to extract some of the key socio-economic pillars on which it rested. To remind the reader of our earlier formulation, the notion of colonial state is utilized to depict the state/company that arose at the behest of the 'mother country' to safeguard its social, political and economic interests in addition to

[75] See Wittfogel, Karl, "Chinese Society: An Historical Survey", *Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 16, No. 5, (1957), pp. 343-64; Ho, Ping-ti. "Economic and Institutional Factors In the Decline of the Chinese Empire" in Cipolla, C. M., *The Economic Decline of Empires*, (London, 1970), pp. 246-77 for the case of China and Lyer G.S. *Some Economic Aspects of British Rule in India*, (1903), for India.

[76] Franz Boas, the father of the academic tradition of cultural anthropology, was *the* anti-evolutionist *par excellence* that preferred to focus on cultural particulars instead of evolutionist grand schemes. His works have been regarded of such high import that his students, including Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, A. L. Kroeber, and Edward Sapir, with their respective anthropological outlooks, have shaped the discipline for years to come. For a brief discussion on the works of Boas and his students and their impact on anthropology, see, Barrett, Stanley R. *Anthropology: A Student's Guide to Theory and Method*, (Toronto, 2009), pp. 52-59.

acting as its territorial standard-bearer that supervised the territorial expansion given the dictates of the core state. The main reason for clinging to this formulation rather than adopting the conventional use of respective company names that serve as the extension of the core government over the colonized 'hinterland' is that we suspect that there is enough evidence to differentiate this governing body from a mere appendage to the core state. The British East India Company, for one, functioned as both a representative of the interests of the British state and as a crucible of power, in which the socio-economic demands of the British capitalists that had a financial stake in the colonized area in question conflated.

However disputable its roots and effects might seem, the colonial state, as a form, has always been regarded as a hybrid phenomenon, not fitting any of the rigid molds of the three principal paradigms of political science. This is understandable given the fact that, colonial state and its particular form has hardly ever been regarded as a phenomenon of considerable importance by the majority of political scientists. This order of importance was tantamount to the mainstream academic focusing mainly (or in most cases solely) on the effects of colonialism on the core countries and colonized peoples rather than scrutinizing the compounded mechanisms of expropriation that were at the disposal of these unique formation. Whatever its underlying reasons may be, such selectivity resulted in the manifestation of an discernible phenomenon of the colonial state that is, often than not, welcomed as the harbinger of modernity writ large. Yet, how the three main paradigms of political thought measure up to this phenomenon is as intriguing an issue as any other. Henceforth, in this chapter, this analysis of a probable correspondence between the three separate political molds, namely, classical liberalism, statist institutionalism and Marxism, and the colonial state will be elaborated upon. The method of analysis will be applying the founding principles of each of the three paradigms to the case of colonial India in order to see if they are a tailored fit and/or to what extent there simply are failures. This concentration on the case of colonial India is should not be viewed as sweeping the differences between India and Ireland under the rug. Indeed, the complexity and the large time-span with which the colonization of Ireland took place turns it into an unattainable attempt to cover its peculiarities in this section. Further, given that the colonization of Ireland comprises one of the sections of this

work, the empirical side of the analysis that is made in this section is limited to the case of colonial India. Following the analysis, a brief commentary will be made concerning which paradigm is more apt to explain the intricacies of the colonial states of India and Ireland out of the three.

Liberalism

2.1 Liberal Theory of the Founding Fathers and the Theory of Social Contract

Classic liberal thought was first formulated by Thomas Hobbes. According to his understanding, there had been a 'state of nature' prior to the establishment of society, in which all the individuals were equally free, powerful and rational. This postulation of the state of nature in which men was purported to be equal by nature is underlined in a classic passage of Leviathan in the following manner,

> Nature hath made man so equall, in the faculties of body, and mind; as that though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference between man, and man, is not so considerable, as that one man can thereupon claim to himselfe any benefit, to which another may not pretend, as well as he. For as to the strength of the body, the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination, or by confederacy with others, that are in the same danger with himself.[77]

In other words, however egalitarian such an equal allocation of these personal traits might seem, there was also a major problem of this absence of authoritarian leadership for only one right of nature prevailed in this state: self-preservation. And, as such, this unlimited measure of freedom and equality of power came at a great cost, a state of utter chaos and anarchy. To make better sense of the reason why Hobbes utilized such a state of nature concept in his work, it has to be understood that his main purpose in writing his magnum opus, *The Leviathan* was to show the intellectuals and the ruling élite the reasons of the ongoing civil war (as depicted by him in his less-celebrated work, *The Behemoth*) and to prevent the reoccurrence of

[77] Hobbes, Thomas. *Leviathan*, C. B. Macpherson ed., (Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 183.

any future threat of dissolution.[78] With the culmination of the civil war (and the consequent execution of Charles I) political society, thus, can be said to have "ipso facto dissolved; and then the people is a multitude of lawless men relapsed into a condition of war of every man against man"[79], thereby opening the floodgates to Hegelian *bellum omnium contra omnes*. Put succinctly, the 'state of war' thus becomes the first condition of mankind.

Man was to surmount this impasse by making use of his main faculty, reason, and via using his rationality and generating a social contract; man was to animate Leviathan, the state as a separate entity. Leviathan, in this vein, would be the sole and independent sovereign for man had completely bestowed his sovereignty to this 'creature' in order to put an end to the state of nature; hence, "civil society is formed through the submission of every man's will to that of the Sovereign."[80] In other words, only the delegation of man's power arising from his or her passion of fear would make the materialization of a 'supernatural' state that is capable of putting an end to the unpredictability of the state of nature possible. Indeed, in order to give life to the Leviathan, each subject has to give up all of his or her rights (complete subjugation) for the sake of granting the authority an unconditional sovereignty, with a sole exception of the right of nature (self-preservation), which cannot be forsaken.[81]

Regarding the issue of the duties of the state, Hobbes argued that state was responsible for making the conditions less uncertain compared to the chaotic state of nature and maintaining tranquility. Put differently, the main goal of the state was to

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[78] On this point, see: Ashcraft, Richard. 'Ideology and Class in Hobbes' Political Theory', *Political Theory*, Vol. 6 No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 38.

[79] Hobbes, cited in Quentin Skinner, 'Hobbes on Sovereignty: An Unknown Discussion', *Political Studies* (June 1965), pp. 218. The original of this passage is as follows, "In such a condition [the situation in which there is no 'common power' to keep the individual interests in line] there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious Building; no instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short." (Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pp. 186.)

[80] Hobbes, Thomas, *Elements of Law*, Ferdinand Tönnies ed., (New York, 1969) V pp. 246.

[81] Carmichael, D. J. C. 'Hobbes on Natural Right in Society: The 'Leviathan' Account', *Revue canadienne de science politique*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 4.

ensure that every imperfection of the state of nature is eliminated and that the characteristics of the new society would be the polar opposite of those of the old state of nature. And, as we have seen, the deficiencies of the state of nature were so numerous and fundamental that "… there is no security, no rights of property, no obligation of established laws, and life can be nasty, brutish and short."[82]

By the same token, another prominent figure of classical liberalism, John Locke, concurred with Hobbes on the fact that there was a state of nature in which equality of mankind reigned supreme. However, contrary to what had Hobbes argued, he claimed that this state of nature was ideal and peaceful, and, as such, was closer to a state of perfection and innocence than to a state of constant warfare. There is, according to Locke, this one cardinal problem with the state of nature though, and that was the threat to private property. Since all individuals are equal in the state of nature (just like in Hobbes' theory) and everything can be reduced to property (even one's life) in the Lockean framework, there emerged adequate reasons for breathing life into the social contract. In this context, the only reason for establishing a state was to make it more perfect by coming together and forming society and then establishing the state, which would enact the right to private property; thereby coming to the full circle of the Lockean natural rights of Life, Liberty and Property. Ironically enough, this would be the escalating point of inequalities of the distribution of wealth, and, as such, man was becoming ideologically more perfect and materially less equal simultaneously.[83] One last point to highlight concerning Locke's conceptualization of natural rights would be the continuation of *lex naturae*, for they were already present in the state of nature, i.e. before the formation of society, and would, thus, continue to exist after the establishment of the state (his argument in favor of minimal government stemmed from this point).

Having briefly examined the points put forward with regards to the concept of social contract by both canonical figures of classical liberalism, it is now possible to derive the converging points of two conceptualizations. First, social contract theory is

[82] Quoted in Ashcraft, Richard. 'Ideology and Class in Hobbes' Political Theory', *Political Theory*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Feb., 1978), pp. 36.

[83] Rousseau would be the first intellectual to problematize this *cul-de-sac* in his remarkable work "*Du Contrat Social*" (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *Du Contrat Social ou Principes des Droits Politique*, 1762).

essentially individualistic in that both Hobbes and Locke claimed that individuals precede society and, consequently, the state. Second, following the first point of convergence, it can be said that the building block of both conceptualizations of the state of nature is the autonomous, rational and free individual. Third, the main functions of the state are the disposal of the factor of unpredictability in Hobbesian terms and the provision of security for the sake of safe accumulation of private property in Lockean terms.

2.2 India and the British East Indian Company

Before applying these features of social contract theory to the phenomenon of the colonial state, a brief explanation of the colonization of India is due. The first colonizers made their appearance, in the form of trading outposts, in the beginning of the sixteenth century. The standard of the dominant colonizing force[84] changed to Union Jack in the seventeenth century, as the British eventually gained the upper hand in their struggle against the Dutch for supremacy over India.[85] In the eighteenth century, the contestants were now the British and the French, and sporadic conflicts ensued and escalated until the decisive Battle of Plassey, which consolidated the position of the ultimate victor in 1757. This corresponds to the period in which the rapidly tightening grip of the British on the Indian cultures, economics, and politics was well on its way to the acme of colonial exploitation which becomes all the more important for our purposes.

There were three main 'functions' of India for the British in both the epoch of the rule of the British East India Company and the direct rule following the disbandment of the Company in the aftermath of the Great Mutiny of 1857. These functions were

[84] All colonizing forces started the process of expansion by the initial establishment of a number of trading posts whose task was to regulate the trade between the area under the company's jurisdiction and the colonizing state. To this was added another objective, namely the supervision of local production in terms of goods and quantities produced as the company gained a foothold in the colony at the subsequent periods.

[85] The combined control of the Dutch, and British East India Companies, however, was severely limited at this stage. In fact, the total control of the Western powers over the Asian trade did hardly exceed ten per cent according to the Sir Josiah Child, one of the early governors of the British East India Company. For further information on this issue, see Levi, Scott C. *The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and Its Trade: 1550-1900*, (2002).

extraction of the natural resources, utilization of Indian society as a dependent market and for military purposes, and overexploitation of Indian land and labor for productive purposes.

To begin with, extraction of natural resources is straightforward enough in that it basically means the extraction of any kind of raw material, ranging from precious metals to deforestation for economic purposes, that the capitalist of the colonizing state can make use of. In the case of India, some of the most important resources were cotton, tea, and indigo, as India had been *the* cotton supplier of the world (an absolute monopoly in Smithean economic terms) for many centuries leading up to the British occupation. And, what the British did, when they started to hold India in their grip was to extract all the supply of cotton back to England for manufacturing right before they destroyed the Indian means of producing cotton altogether, reasons of which will be explained in the analysis of the second function.

The second method of 'utilizing' India was to transform it into a society that was fully dependent on imports, and not just on any imports, but on the British goods. After all, this was the age of mercantilism, an age in which the thirteen colonies had already waged a successful campaign as they drove out the British to reap the gains of commercial profits themselves.[86] The separation of the thirteen colonies had dealt a serious blow to the British plans of consolidating their commercial supremacy and maintaining their hegemonic position of the international trade. The soaring importance of India for the preservation of British commercial and political interests on the eve of the nineteenth century has to be expounded in keeping with these drastic changes in mind; India was a means for the British to reclaim their lost glory that had been surfaced in the form of stars and stripes. The fully-developed exploitation of India, therefore, was not only a question of taking the lion's share

[86] The inevitable loss of the thirteen colonies and its potential repercussions were vehemently expressed by Adam Smith whereby he tried to explain to the British ruling class that the secession of the thirteen colonies from the empire was a foregone conclusion as long as the interests of mercantilist capital was to be pursued to full effect. Such political ignorance, in the words of Benians, amounted to nothing less than"[taking] America captive in order one day to be taken captive by her might [which seemed] to the British nation a grand but painful dream, and it is curious that Adam Smith could imagine public opinion accepting this eventuality, but unable to accept the policy of friendly separation." Benians, E. A. 'Adam Smith's Project of an Empire', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1925), pp. 249-250.

commercially from a vast tract of land; the stakes also included the recovery of a pseudo-hegemonic position of one of the major powers of the day.[87]

This point is especially important in that only via this harnessing of the economic and political power derived from subjugating India would the British economy surpass the prolonged economic crisis of the late eighteenth century. The method employed by the British to materialize this transformation was simple: purging the Indian means of production of any major industry. As mentioned, India had a natural monopoly of cotton production — in addition to having a natural monopoly over other commodities such as tea with the Chinese — before the advent of the British, whereas they were to become the main destination of British finalized cotton goods after the eradication of various manual machines that they had developed. Before moving on to the next point, we also would like to stress that, given the so-called industrial jump of the British economy that occurred at the end of eighteenth century and the aforementioned sharp decline of Indian economy inaugurated virtually at the same period, one of the fundamental rules of capitalism was realized yet once again: one side's gain was to be the other's loss.

The last function of Indian economy was to 'hire' the Indian labor as house servants, coolies, and corveé labor to work in numerous plantations or as household slaves (very much corresponding to the situation in the South America). The working conditions of which, needless to say, were never humane, although, comparatively speaking, it is incontestable that the household slaves were in a much better condition than the slaves used in Southern U.S. plantations. As such, it can be said that the original owner became the servant of the proxy-owner of the Indian soil. All in all, utilizing the terms of Douglas C. North in order to formulate the functioning of the colonial state: the colonial government is primarily an institutional arrangement

[87] The position of British Empire in the wake of the loss of the thirteen colonies is described as pseudo-hegemonic owing to two important reasons. First, the British would have to wait a couple more decades for the commercial and political benefits of industrialism to become an unmistakable factor. Second, the British would emerge as the ideological leader of Europe in the reconstruction period in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, whereby they cemented their economically superior position with assuming political leadership of Europe. The true advent of the British hegemony, therefore, would materialize no sooner than 1815, when Napoleon was finally defeated and the British Empire came out of the wars as the foremost European power assuming the position of the guarantor of *Pax Britannica.* See Wallerstein, Immanuel. *Historical Capitalism*, (1983).

that sells protection and justice to the colonizer (the sole constituent in this case) while exploiting the rest.[88]

Now, it is time that we apply the three main features of the theory of social contract to the case of India; first, there was no individualistic origin of any contract made between the colonizer and the colonized during the British rule in India, let alone the very contract that 'builds' the society anew. As a matter of fact, all the individualistic elements of the Indian society were on their way to being wiped out in the wake of the consolidation of British supremacy. Further, one has to recall, in order to set matters straight, that there was no single 'Indian society' prior to the advent of the colonizers. There were numerous languages — there still are at least 29 different languages that had a million speakers or more according to the 2001 census — , religions, moral and ethic codes and so forth. But the first course of action the British undertook when they gained the control of India was to eliminate all distinct characteristics of the Indian society to the extent possible and to melt it down into a rather uniform and artificial mold, which made it considerably easier to govern and keep track of the society as a whole. However, it has to be admitted that one of the main particularities of the social contract theory, namely, individuals preceding the formation of the state, holds true if the pre-colonial Indian society is taken as representing the liberal understanding of the state of nature. Yet, this conceptualization of a pre-colonial state of nature is quite unwarranted since the society in question was by no means chaotic or hazardous with respect to property relations. In other words, if we have to speak in terms of abstract contracts, they had already been established before the signing of the ultimate one that was supposedly made for the colonial state. Such a contention is made meaningful in the light of the fact that there were many well-structured societies continuing their existence on the Indian peninsula before the British interests gained momentum and were on their way to became the commanding norm of governance. Therefore, the individualistic origin of social contract theory turns out to be non-existent when it is applied to the Indian colonial state.

[88] Cited in Waterbury, J. 'State and Society in Contemporary Political Analysis', paper presented to the *Conference on Dynamics of States and Societies in the Middle East*, (Cairo, 1989), pp. 2.

Having analyzed the first characteristic, scrutinizing the second one becomes all the easier. Eurocentric intellectuals claim that the pre-colonial 'savage' is neither autonomous (signifying the lack of degree of freedom owing to the absolute rule of one despot or the other), nor rational, nor free. The reasoning behind this understanding goes like this: provided that there is a despot reigning in any territory, no measure of rationality[89] and freedom can flourish, which is why the colonial rule in various parts of the globe has to be understood as a force of 'aid and liberation' that made the stagnant populations of the world transform into dynamic ones via incorporating them into the capitalist world economy. Hence, due to the lack of progressive spirit of those peoples, which is the reason why they could not 'develop' capitalism internally, they can only be regarded as free, rational and autonomous once the ultimate contract is made and the colonizer is in power. Still, two questions would suffice to show how erroneous and lopsided this argument is: First, how is it possible to develop a society via introducing a form of serfdom with harsher degrees of entailed it, i.e. through depriving individuals of any autonomy they previously had? And, second, can there be no well-working society in which the communal interests precede that of individuals, such as it was in the Imperial China? Eurocentric liberals, generally, do not have any logical answer to these two questions and, thus, they seem to falter in the face of the realities that are brought to the fore by the colonial state.

The last central element of the social contract theory, that is, the elimination of unpredictability or provision of security for the safe accumulation of property is indeed applicable to colonial India; however it only becomes so when we change the roles of the appropriator and the ex-owner. In other words, the colonial state does eliminate the factors of unpredictability that positively affect only the colonizer, while introducing quite a number of new factors of alternation for the colonized. The regularized case of beating household servants to death in India[90] can easily demonstrate the extent of this unpredictability that circumscribed the Indian population. Moreover, the same goes for the enhanced safety of accumulation of

[89] Wittfogel, Karl A. 'Chinese Society: An Historical Survey', *Journal of Economic Studies*, Vol.16, No. 5 pp. 344-5

[90] Collier, Richard. *The Great Indian Mutiny*, (New York, 1964), pp. 12.

property, as the colonial state, again, while ensuring the safety of British capital and investment, was also in charge of the confiscation of Indian property. Thus, if there truly was a motto of *Salus populi suprema lex esto* in Locke's understanding of law[91] that was adopted by the colonizer, it was applicable only to one side in the context of the colonial state, and that was the subjugator.

We also would like to address, at this point, the debate around the libertarian and regulatory state. As can be understood, the state model that we have in our hands, when scrutinizing the colonial state, is highly regulatory in setting goals and the proper path to achieve them. However, this should not be taken as a permission to categorize it as a regulatory government that is bounded with certain limits indicating the well-being and safety of its constitutive peoples; since, such a state that does not rely on anything other than the virtue of having the 'monopoly of physical violence' can only be classified as a pure despot. We have to remind ourselves, in order to render this point more graspable, that the colonial state neither had a constitution in the full meaning of the word[92] that could limit its acts (limited government), nor did it have a set of principles that refrained it from collecting taxes and following any positive measures.

Overall, it can be asserted with ease that the theory of the social contract of classical liberalism is virtually unsuitable for application to the phenomenon of the colonial state. The reader is advised that we will revisit the Hobbesian and Lockean conceptualizations of the state of nature once again in the analysis of the statist institutionalist paradigm.

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[91] Hancey, James O. 'John Locke and the Law of Nature', *Political Theory*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Nov., 1976), pp. 450.

[92] A brief examination of the issues addressed and the prescriptions given by the acts of 1773, 1784, 1786, 1793, 1833, 1835, and 1853 yield the results that cement this point. Indeed, the acts and charters of the British East India Company appears to have a constant dearth of positive measures, albeit an increasing degree of accountability put on various actions of the Company, that seem to be limited only to the reallocation of funds to foster the study of the English language and literature which was introduced by the English Education Act of 1835. Further, the growing degree of accountability for Company's actions did not, by any stretch of imagination, invite the colonizer-settlers to pursue responsible actions, but, instead it functioned as fortifying the position of the Company as a subsidiary of the Crown.

2.3 Liberalism and Its Emphasis on Liberty

Having briefly wrangled with the understanding of the autonomous individual that lies at the heart of the social contract tradition, now we will shift our attention to classical liberalism's general emphasis on liberty. The structure of this section is as follows: The concepts of the theory of the liberal state and liberal theory of the state will be analyzed to see if either one of them is suitable for application to the colonial state, which will be followed by a brief discussion on the optimistic, evolutionist and meliorist approach of liberalism to see if it bears any relevance to the post-colonial period.

As the reader might be well aware, the debate between the liberal theory of the state and the theory of the liberal state stemmed from the prescriptive element that is inherent in the character of liberalism. The critics of liberalism took the first step through their arguments claiming that liberal theory is essentially a prescriptive paradigm in the guise of a descriptive one. This is due to the fact that by putting all the emphasis on liberty, there appears a teleological end in the liberal theory and that is the establishment of the liberal state. On the contrary, prominent liberals have maintained that liberal theory does not have any inherent prescriptive attitude towards the glorification of a central value of liberty, and, as such, it does not steer each and every case to the ultimate 'safe harbor' of a liberal democratic government. In the words of John Gray,

> What, though, is the form of liberal limited government? It is clear that it need not be democratic government… Unlimited democratic government, from a liberal point of view, is rather a form of totalitarianism… For this reason, an authoritarian type of government may sometimes do better from a liberal standpoint than a democratic regime…[93]

The liberal argument follows this reasoning: Liberty *per se* is not the core element of liberal theory, and instead the former should be viewed only as a set of principles that the states need to hold fast to. Therefore, liberal theory cannot be regarded as a normative theory that shows the way to the ultimate goal of the liberal state.

[93] Gray, John. *Liberalism*, Second Edition (1995), pp. 71.

Furthermore, liberals also stress that if the Hobbesian principle of the form of state being determined at the very moment of the contract i.e., no predestined convergence on liberal values, is kept in mind, it would become, succinctly, very clear that liberalism does not exhibit any normative virtues. As Hamlin put it, ". . . a commitment to liberal theory in its contractarian form does not entail a commitment to a liberal state."[94] Yet, there is also a counter-argument to this point: if the core procedural elements are liberal, then what comes out of these presumed principles, has no other option but to be liberal itself. Thence, the liberal theory of the state, critics argue, is essentially a theory of the liberal state.

Having analyzed the sides of the debate, we can now apply the two approaches to the case of colonial India. First off is the liberal theory of the state: Since it has been shown in the previous sections that the colonial state of India had nothing to do with liberalism in terms of its relations with the Indian people and that it cannot be visualized as anything but a totalitarian mechanism, which only served the interests of the colonizer, in the context of those relations there are many impediments that block an application of this theory to the colonial state of India. The underlying reasons for such a seemingly overstretched statement are numerous. First and foremost, the formation of the colonial state is not based on popular consent, but on sheer force. Second, there is no main principle of liberty in the process of formation of the colonial state, and even if there were such a principle that principle would have been aimed at the eradication of liberty, and not its solidification. Third, the colonial state did not function in a way to provide equal grounds for autonomous individuals to realize their goals, but to exterminate any such measures that had provided equal grounds for the individuals in the pre-colonial setting. Fourth, the establishment of the form of colonial state is contingent, in the sense that it is in full opposition to the will of the colonized people, with regards only to the colonized and is as teleological — with regards to the construction of a subordinated economy — as possible from the point of view of the colonizer. Other potential causes go on and on like these, but to cut them short, if there is a main principle that is apparent in the formation of the colonial state, that is nothing but the 'elegant' extraction of any

[94] Hamlin, Alan. *Liberty, Contract and the State*, in Hamlin, A. and Petit B., eds., *The Good Polity*, Blackwell, pp. 87.

resource of the colonized via any means possible, for that is, after all, *raison d'être* of the colonial state.

The analysis we made in the case of the liberal theory of the state also befits the theory of the liberal state for there was absolutely no long term goal of establishing a liberal state in the colonial setting. This fact, by itself, serves as a *coup de grâce* to eliminate any potential of application of the theory to the colonial state of India.

The analysis, hitherto, has been made on the framework of the colonial period. Nevertheless, for the sake of elaborating the issue further, a brief investigation of the post-colonial state is due. Henceforth, I would like to share some thoughts about the general characteristics of liberal understanding and the post-colonial state.[95] According to John Gray, there are:

> . . . . four features, or perspectives, which give it [liberalism] a recognizable identity: it is individualist, in that it asserts the moral primacy of the person against any collectivity; egalitarian, in that it confers on all human beings the same basic moral status; universalist, affirming the moral unity of the species; and meliorist, in that it asserts the open-ended improvability, by the use of critical reason, of human life.[96]

The individualist, egalitarian, universalist and meliorist roots of liberal understanding have been scrutinized to an extent in the previous parts. When the horizon of the analysis is expanded beyond the colonial setting in order to include the post-colonial state for acquiring a more thorough understanding, we see that the precarious foundations upon which the colonial state is built tend to have a carryover effect that results in long years of political, economic and territorial instability. Indian society, for one, has suffered from the highly disadvantageous position in which it was incorporated into the capitalist world economy, which goes against the Eurocentric claim that the British have made it possible for the Indians to be an equal partner of the global economy. Such a statement, it goes on without saying, is rife with holes

[95] The concept of 'post-colonial state', in this context, is devised to refer to the nation-state that was built by people belonging to the indigenous population following the achievement of the national liberation. In short, the conception does not have any overt or latent ties to the postcolonial theory.

[96] Gray, John. *Liberalism*, Second Edition, pp. 86.

and assumptions, given the fact that the level of prosperity a state can attain from becoming a part of the capitalist world economy depends almost exclusively on the position it assumes — or is made to assume — during the initial stage of incorporation.

India, *unlike* just any other colony was not incorporated solely to benefit from acquiring a raw material producer, a position which does not have any potential for profit from the perspective of the indigenous population, and from turning it into an importer of finished products, which possess the highest amount of value added. Indeed, the colonization of India was also significant in that it represented a stepping stone in making inroads to the hitherto unconquerable Chinese Empire. In that sense, the subjugation of India functioned as the catchword 'open sesame' that opened the gates of Oriental paradise to Western capital.

Acknowledging this further significance and going back to the economic motives that played a large part in the colonization process, the position of raw material producer/potential market for manufactured goods that was adopted during the first stages of the incorporation process, essentially, is the worst one that a previously non-incorporated area has to endure, for it signifies the undervalued exports of natural resources (which tends to become a principal problem in the post-colonial stage as a result of depletion of various raw materials) and imports of finished products that have the highest profit margin. It is obvious, in that vein, that the period following the colonial state cannot be reckoned as a stage of prosperity either, never mind the political instability that sprang from the artificial unification of numerous pre-colonial states. In addition, these unequal sets of international relations that prevailed at the end of colonial rule set the tone for the formation of the post-colonial society, in which the focus was on developing as quickly as possible at the expense of equality and equity. Therefore, neither the period of colonial state nor the post-colonial era can be said to display a 'supreme reign' of not even a single one of Rawls' four main characteristics of the liberal paradigm, let alone all four of them, and this leads to the conclusion that the liberal paradigm is utterly dysfunctional with regards to deciphering the phenomenon of colonial state.

2.4 The Notion of State in the Statist Institutionalist Paradigm

The statist institutionalist paradigm denotes, in a historical sense, the separation of the state as an entity of its own (or a set of autonomous institutions) from the domain of the individual and the conceptualization of state power as *sui generis*[97]. And, as such, the main zeal of the statist institutionalist is to 'bring the state back in'[98] to its rightful place, as *the* dominant actor. The main characteristics of this paradigm are: first, conceptualized as two distinct entities, the state is given the priority over the individual, and it is for that reason that the statist individualists reject the theory of social contract claiming that it is not possible for individuals to shape the state and that the sole 'shaper of relations'[99] is the state — a conception of state that is even able to shape the morals, motives and decision making of individuals, which is the main motivation of coming up with a 'state-centric' analysis[100] as opposed to liberalism and Marxism's 'society-centered' approach.[101] Second, the state is an autonomous entity and it has both a penetrative and a transformative power in its dealings with society. Third, the state is institutionally distinct from civil society due to its being multifunctional and territorially-based — i.e. reigning over a territorially demarcated area.[102] In the beginning of this section, these features of Statist Institutionalist paradigm and their applicability to colonial India will be scrutinized. This will be followed by the main assumptions of statist institutionalist thought on

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[97] Yalman, Galip. *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey in the 1980s*, Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, (Istanbul, 2010) pp. 50.

[98] Skocpol, Theda. 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', in P. Evans and D. Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol., eds., *Bringing the State Back In,* (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 4.

[99] Ibid, pp. 6. This is an interpretation of the original term used by Skocpol, "state as society-shaping institutional structures".

[100] Cammack, Paul. 'Statism, New Institutionalism and Marxism', *Socialist Register*, (1990), pp.148.

[101] Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', pp. 6.

[102] This definition can be compared with Mann's definition of a state as a centralized and differentiated set of institutions that possess a monopoly of authoritative binding rule making and a monopoly of means of physical violence that is confined within a territorially demarcated area. (Mann, M. 'The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results', *Archives Europeenes de Sociologie*, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 333.)

the formation of the state and an analysis of whether those assumptions hold in the context of colonial India.

The first feature that sets statist individualism apart from liberalism is the magnified place of the state and its role in the context of state-society relations. The state, in this paradigm, is considered to be the 'prime mover' that is capable of altering any social relation, while simultaneously being invulnerable to any 'external attempt' to change it from outside of its domain. When we apply this image of the state to colonial India, the results seem to indicate a clear failure to explain that peculiar form of the colonial state. This breakdown stems from the fact that the colonial state was fully controlled by the British government, while it certainly was a God-like figure in terms of where it stood in the hierarchical pyramid of India, it was nothing but an actor of a supporting role when the bigger picture is taken into account. In other words, the colonial state, both in the period of the British East India Company and the following epoch of direct rule, did occupy the role of an impenetrable fortress in the midst of the Indian society. Nevertheless, the colonial state was nothing but a non-commissioned officer among field marshals in terms of its relations with the Crown. In short, its prominent role went as far as the limits imposed on it by the British government.

Secondly, statist institutionalists argue that the state is an autonomous entity ('truly autonomous' in Skocpol's terms) that can simultaneously possess penetrative and transformative power. They purport that the state élite have a distinct sphere of decision-making that is not affected by the economic élite or any other status groups (dominant classes or politically weighty social forces in Skocpol's terms)[103] that are standing at the apex of civil society. Therefore, the state élite can focus exclusively on the effects of a given policy on the state itself without taking into consideration the other status groups, classes, etc. This point is jotted down by Skocpol as follows:

> Although both the state and the dominant class(es) share a broad interest in keeping the subordinate classes in place in society and at work in the existing economy, the state's own fundamental interests in maintaining sheer physical order and political peace may lead it — especially in periods of crisis — to

[103] Skocpol, 'Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research', pp. 9.

> enforce concessions to subordinate-class' demands. These concessions may be at the expense of the interests of the dominant class, but not contrary to the state's own interests in controlling the population and collecting taxes and military recruits.[104]

This concept of fully-autonomous state élite is difficult to apply even to the core countries — which is why there has been an ongoing debate between statist institutionalists and Marxists on the grounds of state's autonomy[105] and why, in the end, even Skocpol herself cannot grant 'true autonomy' to the state[106] — and becomes even more problematic when applied to the colonial state. The state's autonomy, in this context, can be examined in two strands: its absolute autonomy vis-à-vis the Indian populace on one hand and its dependence on British dictates on the other. This argument is in line with the argument that is made on the presupposed superior status of the state compared to the society for only one fact has to be underlined in both cases in order to refute the argument in question. The colonial state — in the Indian setting, which can be extended to cover a wider range of samples — comes into being only as the defender of the British interests and this allows it to retain a distinct form of governance that is completely immune to the desires of the Indian society.

The last point that is brought to the fore by statist institutionalists is the multifunctional and territorial nature of the state, which leads to the claim that, the state's role (and its various functions) cannot be carried out by any fraction of the civil society. This point is very applicable to the colonial state in an ironic sense. The colonial state truly was a monopoly of physical violence in its dealings with the native population in addition to its mere *raison d'être* being the prevention of any other 'nation-wide' establishment that can wrangle with it over the control of the colony. In this sense, the colonial state was territorial to the maximum extent. Furthermore, the functions that the colonial state exhibited, ranging from the extraction of any surplus production that exceeded minimum self-subsistence level to

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[104] Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, (Cambridge, 1979), pp.13.

[105] See Cammack, Paul. 'Statism, New Institutionalism and Marxism', *Socialist Register*, (1990) for a precise account.

[106] *Ibid*, pp. 157.

the conscription of Indian natives as Sepoy auxiliary force that served as an alternative law enforcement mechanism, were truly one of a kind in that they could only be carried out by an exploitative network that had utter disregard for the needs of the locals.

All things considered, the arguments about the state's power and role made by the statist institutionalists fall short of having any kind of explanatory power concerning the colonial state of India, which hardly comes as a surprise given that the colonial state is by no means a 'natural' formation — indeed, one is inclined to ask if the establishment of core states could be conceived as 'natural' to begin with — , but an artificially created focal point of physical power. Thus, it would be highly unrealistic to not to expect a one-to-one correspondence between the British interests and policies of the colonial state, which, in turn, results in the eradication of any measure of that state's presupposed autonomy.

2.5 The Factors That Shape the State in the Statist Institutionalist Paradigm

There are three main methods that statist institutionalists argue to have the power to unearth any direct effect on the solidness of any institution and via the institutions the strength of the state itself. These, namely, are the adoption of the historical analysis in the formation of institutions, underlined importance of the origins of the establishment of any institution, and the employment of the 'critical juncture' approach.

Historical analysis is of utmost importance for statist institutionalists to assess the degree of how well-established any institution is. This argument is grounded upon the institutionalist claim that "The sequence in which events occur is causally important, and events in the distant past can initiate particular chains of causation that have effects in the present."[107] Thus, their basic claim is that a thorough analysis has to be made in order to shed light on the particular trajectory that an institution

[107] Levi, Margaret. 'A Model, A Method and A Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis' in *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, M. Lichbach and A. Zuckerman eds. (Cambridge, 1997) pp.28.

followed after its initial formation, which leads the analyst to grasp its ultimate form in the present day. This accentuation of historical analysis is in direct relation with the second tool that institutionalists utilize in order to assess the degree of stability of any given institution: in-depth analysis of its origins. Again, they argue that origins of any institution is of vital importance in that once the path is set, it is considerably costly (both in economic and socio-political terms) to change it. In other words, their argument lays on the fact that, once the tone of the particular direction of growth of any institution is set, it remains sticky thereafter (hence the names 'path dependence' and 'institutional stickiness').

When these tools are utilized in the analysis of the colonial state of India, they seem to have at least some explanatory power. One such puissant aspect of utilizing these methods is that they show that the origin of the colonial state, which is built upon, as mentioned before, sheer force and oppression, might have had laid the foundations for what came afterwards. In addition, one can easily make the claim that this irresistible foundation of the colonial state tended to have a snowball effect over the course of history. Put differently, there have been no tears shed by the colonizer over the course of establishment of a completely subservient Indian society and this fact can be interpreted, from a realist perspective, as quite ordinary given that the reason for the very establishment of the colonial state was not to serve the Indian people but to carry out the tasks demanded by the British government.

Last but not least, critical juncture approach is another method that institutionalists employ in their analyses of various institutions and this tool is utilized to assess the effects of various breaking points, which an institution has to endure, on diverse aspects of the institution itself. An example would be the *Weimarer Verfassung* that withstood both the First World War and the build-up to the Second World War, adding into its constitutional strength. However, in the case of the colonial state of India, such crucial ruptures that one can think of; namely, the beginning of effective rule of British East India Company in 1757 and the Sepoy Rebellion that materialized in 1857 — both of which can perhaps be better conceived as minor predicaments within the process of colonization instead of a full-fledged rupture —, resulting in the direct rule of the Crown, worked only as measures of consolidating

the British grip on the Indian peninsula. Thence, just like the other tools, this shows how tighter and tighter the British hold on the Indian society, majority of the people of which were forced to live at the fringes of subsistence, grew over time.

To summarize, the tools employed by the institutionalists do not aid us generously apart from showing how colonial rule and its 'satanic mills' were established systematically and without much change in their trajectory. In other words, once the institution of colonial state was set to embark on a journey of utter exploitation, no 'critical juncture' could steer it away from its ultimate goal but the ultimate overthrow of the colonizing forces.

This concludes the section on the statist institutionalist paradigm, but we would like to make a few remarks on Institutionalism before moving on to Marxism and its relation with the colonial state. As we have seen, the failure of both liberals and institutionalists to explain the phenomenon of the colonial state lay in the fact that their interest was to explain the form of Western liberal states rather than explaining other such forms that emerged within the 'colonial rubble'. Thus, when another actor (colonizer state as the proprietor) is added to the rather simple formulation of state and society, these theories start running in vicious circles and become prone to fading away. The institutionalist approach also cannot clarify the political input-output process. This understanding of the state as an ‘enigma’ is another impediment that conceals the process of decision-making. In the words of Karen L. Remmer, "Standing at the intersection of the political inputs and outputs, political institutions represent the black box of politics through which societal interests are translated into politics and policy outcomes."[108] Even though in the case of colonial state the roles of the exploiter and the exploited are relatively easy to determine, this point casts another shadow on the already too-shallow analysis of colonial state provided by the institutionalist paradigm.

[108] Remmer, Karen L. 'The Resurgence of Institutionalist Analysis', *World Politics*, Vol.50 No:1, pp. 50.

2.6 Marxism

Marxism is the study of the 'loose ends' of the capitalist world economy and its mechanisms of exploitation through the dialectical lens that expounds on the relation between forces and relations of production that, taken together, constitute the particular modes of production. Since the phenomenon of the capitalist world economy and its trajectory covers a very large time interval, Marxist scholars generally have followed in Marx's footsteps through scrutinizing the capitalist state via utilizing the method of 'form analysis'. As the name suggests, form analysis tracks down and explains different forms of capitalist states that come into being within their own particular spatio-temporal circumstances. In other words, there is no single form (and theory) of the capitalist state that one can point to, even though the core features of capitalism remain as a constant throughout the five-hundred year history of the capitalist state.

Part of this theoretical ambiguity with regards to the Marxist conceptualization of the capitalist (modern) state springs from the unfinished legacy Marx left behind. In the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859), Marx says that there will be a comprehensive study that examines the workings of the modern state in the envisioned Part IV of his work: "I examine the system of bourgeois economics in the following order: capital, landed property, wage labor; state, foreign trade, world market."[109] Marx, however, never reached Part IV due to a variety of reasons, most important of which was the enormous growth of his *magnum opus*, *Das Kapital*. Regardless, one can easily infer from Marx's other works in which a discussion of the state takes place, that Marx never saw the political as a mere 'epiphenomenon' as Althusser calls it. Indeed, the impact of Hegelian dialectics on Marx's thought is easily discernible if one reminds him or herself of two vital points of Marx's works: his recurring insistence on the importance of the particular conditions in which a society finds itself, and his dialectical method of analysis with respect to the relations between economic base and ideological superstructure.

[109] Marx, Karl. *Selected Works*, I, pp. 361.

Marx's pronouncements of particular conditions are deeply entrenched within the general theoretical body of his works. Althusser underlines this point when he points out that the Marxian understanding of superstructure should not be viewed as limited to the workings of the material base, but that it also refers to the their conditions of existence.[110] Such an argument that allots a greater role to the particularity of the conditions of existence than is customarily realized is predicated on the understanding that one cannot drive a wedge between the structural contradictions and the general framework of conditions whereby the contradictions are made manifest. Quoting Althusser at length in order to underscore this point appears necessary,

> As an example, take the complex structured whole that is society. In it, the 'relations of production' are not the pure phenomenon of the forces of production; they are also their conditions of existence. *The superstructure is not the pure phenomenon of the structure, it is also its conditions of existence*. This follows from Marx's principle, referred to above, that production without society, that is, without social relations, exists nowhere; that we can go no deeper than the unity that is the unity of a whole in which, if the relations of production do have production itself as their conditions of existence, production has as its condition of existence its form: the relations of production.[111]

This emphasis on the conditions of existence, therefore, cannot be overlooked as an ineffectual integer that is determined solely by the factors of production without, in turn, having any effect, on the factors themselves. In fact, as Althusser is quite keen to remind us, we need to recall how weighty the conditions of existence were deemed to be by various canonical figures of Marxist thought in order to make their import clear,

> When Lenin said that '*the soul of Marxism is the concrete analysis of a concrete situation*': when Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao explain that *'everything depends on the conditions'*; when Lenin describes the peculiar *'circumstances'* of Russia in 1917; when Marx (and the whole Marxist tradition) explains, with the aid of a thousand examples, that such and such a contradiction will

[110] Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*, pp. 205.

[111] *Ibid*, pp. 205.

> dominate according to the case, etc., they are appealing to a concept that might appear to be *empirical*: the 'conditions', which are simultaneously the existing conditions and the conditions of existence of the phenomenon under consideration. Now this concept is essential to Marxism precisely because it is not an empirical concept: a statement about what exists. . . .On the contrary, it is a *theoretical* concept, with its basis in the very essence of the object: the ever-pre-given complex whole. . . .If it is theoretically acceptable to talk of the conditions without sliding into the empiricism or the irrationality of 'that's how it is' and of 'chance', it is because Marxism conceives the 'conditions' as the (real, concrete, current) existence of the contradictions that constitute the whole of a historical process.[112]

The particular conditions of existence, therefore, is a vital part of the Marxist analysis of any society, a point to which we will return in our discussion of the AMP.

Hegelian dialectics, on the other hand, run like a golden thread through much of Marx's analysis of the relation between the material base and the ideological superstructure. It needs to be asserted, to that end, that economism is not an intrinsic feature of the Marxist paradigm by any stretch of imagination. Economy, for Marx, becomes the dominant factor in the shaping of superstructure *only* in the last instance:

> According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one he transforms the proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure — political forms of the class struggle and its results, to wit: constitutions established by the victorious class after a successful battle, etc., juridical forms, and even the reflexes of all these actual struggles in the brains of the participants, political, juristic, philosophical theories, religious views, and their further development into systems of dogmas — also exercise cases preponderate in determining their *form*. There is an interaction of all these elements , in which, amidst all the

[112] *Ibid*, pp. 206-7.

> endless host of accidents (that is, of things and events whose inner interconnection is so remote or so impossible of proof that we can regard it as non-existent, as negligible), the economic movement finally asserts itself as necessary. Otherwise the application of the theory to any period of history would be easier than the solution of a simple equation of the first degree.[113]

Only if this clear emphasis on the dialectical relations between the base and the superstructure is fully grasped, which goes through achieving a thorough understanding of Hegelian philosophy, can we hope to understand the Marxist paradigm in its entirety. Otherwise, one runs a high risk of ending up with a bare bones of the sacrosanct non-reciprocal cause-effect relationship that is sure to spark off a sharp reaction not unlike to that given by Engels as an answer to a question by Borgius, a pupil of Sombart, asking 'How causally do economic relations operate on development: as sufficient cause, occasional motive, permanent condition, or what?', to which Engels replied,

> What all these gentlemen lack is dialectics. They never see anything but here cause, there effect. That this is a hollow abstraction, that such a metaphysical polar opposites exist in the real world only during crises, while the whole vast process goes on in the form of interactions — though of very unequal forces, the economic movement by far the strongest, most primary, most decisive — that here everything is relative and nothing absolute — this they never begin to see. As far as they are concerned Hegel never existed. . . .[114]

This formulation suggests that the dialectics between economy and politics, religion, culture, etc. run at a reciprocal full-steam until the very terminal point. Therefore, one needs to emphasize, in the face of critiques of economic determinism that Marx constantly refrains from ascribing a hierarchy of instances that introduce a linear causality between the determinant economic base and ideological superstructure as a

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[113] Engels, Friedrich. letter to Joseph Bloch, 21 Sept, 1890, in *Werke*, vol. XXXVII, pp. 436; Eng. trans. in *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy*, Lewis S. Feuer ed., (London, Fontana Books, 1972), pp. 436.

[114] Engels, Friedrch. letter to Conrad Schmidt, 27 Oct. 1890, in *Werke,* vol. XXXVII, pp. 494; Eng. trans. in Feuer, op. cit., pp. 445. Similarly Lenin remarked: 'One cannot fully understand Marx's *Capital* . . . if one has not closely studied and understood the whole of Hegel's *Logic*. As a result, half a century after he wrote, no Marxist has understood Marx !' (V. I. Lenin, Filosofskie Tetradi; Eng. trans. in Karl Korsch, *Karl Marx*, New York, 1963, pp. 225).

mere outcome. It also needs to be noted, at this juncture, the dialectical relationships between the material base and the ideological superstructure, combined with Marx's emphasis on analyzing the different forms that the capitalist state assumes focusing on the peculiarities of each such form (form analysis) appears to be the best course of action that can be taken against the economist/deterministic readings that are prone to making generalizations that are pedantic and uncalled for.

Provided explanations regarding the intricacies of the Marxist purview of form analysis, a brief account of the problem should suffice at this point. Gross simplifications can be overcome only through abiding by these two major principles highlighted above: Hegelian dialectics and the emphasis on particularity. Indeed, taken together, these two theoretical and analytical methods allow us not only to sap and mine the great fortress of Eurocentrism that allegedly resides at the heart of Marx's and Engels' works but also to render the decisive conquest thereof. Dialectics, for one, make it possible for us to see the convoluted nature of the relationships between economic factors and the prevalent forms of ideology, culture, traditions, values, hierarchical codes, etc., whereas inscribing to the method of form analysis functions as a reminder to abstain from taking any aspect of particular cases as given and from deducing the characteristic virtues of the non-Western modes of production and societies from those of the West. The historical analyses that are provided throughout this work, therefore, attempt to bear the signs of compounded method of scrutiny for the sake of evaluating Marxist internationalism without tearing it from its context.

Mechanistic readings of the Marxist paradigm not only goes against the Hegelian dialectic that was taken up, altered and carried forward by Marx, but it also goes against the previous point that we made in our discussion: the accentuation of circumstances of existence. Indeed, when a particular aspect, such as forces of production, economy, etc. is championed as having the principal role in the context of a dialectical relationship, this translates into an understanding that the formation of the other aspects can be conceived basically as a reflection of the former i.e. an epiphenomenon that emerges irrespective of the particular conditions of existence. Such a conception, however, ends up begging the question of how to explain the

different outcomes that originate from quite similar economic settings. Althusser's analysis of economic determinism appears quite complementary to this approach,

> It is *'economism'* (mechanism) and not the true Marxist tradition that sets up the hierarchy of instances once and for all, assigns each its essence and role and defines the universal meaning of their relations; it is economism that identifies roles and actors eternally, not realizing that the necessity of the process lies in an exchange of roles 'according to circumstances'. It is economism that identifies eternally in advance the determinant-contradiction-in-the-last-instance with the *role* of the dominant contradiction, which for ever assimilates such and such an 'aspect' (forces of production, economy, practice) to the principal *role*, and such and such another 'aspect' (relations of production, politics, ideology, theory) to the secondary *role* — whereas in real history determination in the last instance by the economy is exercised precisely in the permutations of the principal role between the economy, politics, theory, etc.[115]

Having laid the foundations of our discussion on the capitalist state, we will move on to a brief analysis of the colonial state from a Marxist lens, permitting ourselves the liberty of elucidating the theory of AMP. This analysis will be made for challenging the academic penchant of equating the use of the concept with an inherent overdose of Eurocentrism. We believe that such an investigation is necessary in order to shatter such a pretension of treating Marx and Engels with Eurocentric scorn. Therefore, in the first part of this section the origins, features, and the underlying importance of AMP will be scrutinized, which will be followed by the examination of the core features of Marxist understanding with regards to theorizing the capitalist state and their appropriateness in terms of explanatory power on the colonial state of India.

2.7 The Asiatic Mode of Production: Its Origins, Features, and Importance

Marx's focus of research shifted to colonies and semi-colonies in 1850s due to a simple recognition, the recognition of the changing historical circumstances. The

[115] *Ibid*, pp. 213.

emergence of socialism against a background formed by waning capitalism would not be a foregone conclusion as once foretold. The English working class, for one, despite all the momentum that it had gained in the pre-1848 period, was becoming more and more oriented towards the utilization of trade-unions as early as 1860s in order to enhance the partial and momentary gains of its members.[116] Marx and Engels, having realized this turn of events, claimed, in their *Ireland and the Irish Question* (1867), that the only viable option out of the impasse the English working class found itself was to support the Irish emancipation. Marx pointed out that this necessity had originated from the need for breaking the influence of the nationalist sentiment that was holding sway over the English working class, in his words,

> Every industrial and commercial centre in England now possesses a working class *divided* into two *hostile* camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation. . . .[117]

Further, Marx deemed the emancipation of Ireland vital not only with regards to the its potential impact on the Irish society but also in the general context of European working class movements. English working class movement, after all, was one of the decisive struggles that, owing to England's hegemonic position in the world politics, could have a major impact on a universal scale. Marx was well aware of this point when he wrote to his daughter Laura in 1870 that

> To accelerate the social revolution in Europe, you must push on the catastrophe of official England. To do so, you must attack her in Ireland. That's her weakest point. Ireland lost, the British Empire is gone and the class war in England till now somnolent and chronic, will assume acute forms.[118]

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[116] To that end, it can be said that the British working class, following the loss of the spark that ignited the revolutionary spirit of 1848, wanted to be seen as citizens and not as stern revolutionaries. This inertia with respect to the radicalness of socialist agitation would continue approximately for thirty years until the rise of 'new unionism' in the beginning of 1880s.

[117] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Ireland and the Irish Question*, (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1965), pp. 293.

[118] *Ibid*, pp. 290.

Needless to add, changing circumstances were not limited to England, but were also becoming visible in continental Europe. The Franco-German war of 1870, for one, did not have the results that Marx was hoping for. The German victory and the ensuing annexation of Alsace-Lorraine was an important setback in terms of shoving off the break on the revolutionary momentum of German working class that had previously been on the rise. There were also drastic social changes that were realized through the implemented socio-economic policies in Russia. Indeed, Russia is a case in point with regards to the sudden and drastic changes that put the Russian society on the path to capitalist industrialization.

These pronounced shifts of the socio-economic landscapes of various countries had a stimulating impact on Marx's thought that drove him to engage in meticulous analyses of the non-Western countries, such as India, in 1860s. The theory of the AMP, on the other hand, had been devised by Marx a decade earlier, and had already established its place in the Marxian models of historical development by the end of 1850s.

Marx trod in the footsteps of Montesquieu, Hegel, and a numbers of British economists in the formulation of the AMP. Montesquieu, for one, was one of the central figures for those who studied law in Marx's day. Indeed, numerous formulations of Montesquieu, especially those he made in *De l'esprit des lois* (1748), found their way, either directly or indirectly, into Marx's works. For example, one of the three types of analysis in that work, 'despotic government' — with the others being monarchical and republican types —, was, one of those concepts that assumed a key role in Marx's works. The most prominent feature of Montesquieu's formulation of this concept was his emphasis that the form of despotic government was most suitable for Oriental nations. Indeed, he made the point that hot, large, and arid counties were most susceptible to generating this type of despotic leader, a point which is suggestive of a certain degree of geographical determinism. Further, he also stressed that religions, laws, and customs of these countries were typically unchanging, and combined with no private ownership of land, this factor lead to the deterioration of the 'natural laziness' of these indigenous populations, which was introduced, in the first hand, by climate. Regarded as the vanguards of socio-

economic stagnancy, it was thus possible to treat 'the despotic state, in which there exists neither honour nor virtue' but everything hinges on use of the whip of one man, as the most degenerate form of government.[119]

Marx's other sources of inspiration, especially Hegel and the prominent British economists of his day, such as Adam Smith, James Mill, and J.S. Mill, on the other hand, were key in cementing Marx's understanding of the non-Western societies as lacking the means to transform themselves. Hegel, who undoubtedly was Marx's main source of inspiration, saw Asia as a distinct 'moment', or dynamic component, with respect to the realization of the 'World Spirit' in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (1830-1). There was a single essential point of divergence between Chinese and European society according to this understanding: 'In China there is no hereditary aristocracy, no feudal state and not even any dependence on wealth, as in England; the supreme power is habitually exercised by the monarch'. Likewise, 'the most arbitrary and dishonouring despotism' in India could be viewed as 'normal' for 'there is no consciousness of self to stand in the way of tyranny and inspire the soul to revolt; nothing remains but physical hardship and the deprivation of the barest necessities and pleasure, which entail only a negative feeling.' The roots of socio-economic stagnation, thus, were traced back to the very social structure that made the subjects of the despot 'remain like children in tutelage'. In summation, for Hegel, it was 'the inescapable fate of the Asiatic empires to become subject to the Europeans.'[120]

AMP, in its essence, signifies a specific production model that was observable in a number of non-Western societies in which the great number of despotic governments had the general maintenance of irrigation throughout the plains as their prioritized duty. The importance of irrigation, in that instance, stemmed from the fact that sustainable agriculture was geographically impossible without such large-scale

[119] Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat de. *De l'esprit des Lois* (1748); Eng. trans. *Spirit of the Laws*, trans. T. Nugent, (New York, Hafner, 1949). For a list of Montesquieu's own sources, see Melotti, Umberto. *Marx and the Third World*, pp. 172, Ch. VI, footnote: I.

[120] Hegel, G. W. F. *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte* (1830-1), published 1840; Eng. trans. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree, (New York, Doner, 1956).

projects.[121] Such large-scale irrigation projects could only be organized and put into practice by an organ that had the means to establish a control over various village communes that were scattered all over a large tract of land, thereby leading to the emergence of 'father of many communities'[122], hence the materialization of the despotic figure. The extraction of surplus labor in exchange for performing these necessary functions was the most important outcome of the emergence of this despotic entity: "A part of their surplus labour belongs to the higher unity, which exists ultimately as a *person*, and this surplus labour takes the form of tribute, etc., as well as of common labour for the exaltation of the unity, partly of the real despot, partly of the imaginary clan-being, the god."[123]

Notwithstanding the obscurity that is ingrained in such a system of surplus extraction, the point that needs to be emphasized at this juncture is that the exploitation in the various forms of AMP was no less real than in other types of pre-capitalist modes of production. In other words, leaving its relative equality — in comparison with the optimal amount of extraction of surplus labor as epitomized by the capitalist mode of production — that is characteristic of pre-capitalist societies aside, we need to acknowledge the fact that AMP is emblazoned with actually existing mechanisms of exploitation, which make it diverge from the future communist society envisioned by Marx by quite a margin. This acknowledgment, in turn, lead to the potential recognition of the idea that only capitalism, through annihilating 'all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. . . has torn asunder the motley ties' which used to, in pre-capitalist societies, bound man to his natural superiors and in lieu of 'exploitation veiled by religious and political illusions has substituted naked, shameless, directly brutal exploitation.'[124]

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[121] Engels, Friedrich. *Anti-Dühring* (1987-8), in *Werke*, (Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1956-68), vol. XX, p.128; Eng. trans. by Emile Burns, (London, 1936), p.200.

[122] Marx, Karl. *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie —Rohentwurf* (1857-8), (Berlin, Dietz Verlag, 1953), pp. 30; Eng. trans. *Grundrisse*, trans. Martin Nicolaus, (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1973), pp. 110.

[123] *Ibid*, pp. 377; Eng. trans., pp. 473.

[124] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *Manifest der Komusitischen Partei* (1848), (Berlin, Dietz Verlag 1959), pp.9; Eng. trans. *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Scientific Socialism Series, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1971), pp. 34-5.

It also needs to be noted that any type of pre-capitalist mode of production is characterized by the presence of varying degrees of formal ascribed inequalities. In other words, only with the advent of the age of enlightenment — which has its roots in the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and the intellectual revolution of the seventeenth centuries — and the French Revolution, which became "a landmark in all countries"[125] could human beings realize that a social system of equality, liberty and fraternity did not have to belong solely to fantasia, but that it could also be constructed within the practical sphere. Besides, Marx knew that ethical arguments in favor of returning to an idealized past had no practical value in the sense that "capitalism had neither come into being because of moral considerations nor would it pass away because of them. Scientific analysis is required to understand it and a mighty organized physical force is required to overthrow it."[126] Further, while formal equality and the eradication of hierarchical roles and formal status-quo might be treated with scorn as only paying lip-service to such egalitarian notions and not having positive effects in reality, questioning the gains that were achieved by the French Revolution *in toto* ends up romanticizing a pre-capitalist golden age, an attitude which reminds one of Heine's *Ein Wintermärchen* (A Winter's Tale):

> Das mahnt an das Mittelalter so schön,
>
> An Edelknechte und Knappen,
>
> Die in dem Herzen getragen die Treu
>
> Und auf dem Hintern ein Wappen
>
> This reminds so beautifully the Middle Ages,
>
> Of noble servants and squires,
>
> Who bore loyalty in their heart
>
> And a coat of arms on their backs.[127]

[125] Hobsbawm, E. J. *The Age of Revolution*, (London, 1962), pp. 54.

[126] Selsam, Howard. 'The Ethics of Communist Manifesto', *Science and Society*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter, 1948), pp. 23.

[127] Dolf, Sternberger. *Heinrich Heine und die Abschaffung der Sünde,* (Hamburg and Düsseldorf, 1972), pp.360, [translation of the author].

It needs to be made clear, in that sense, that the pre-capitalist past, albeit being more egalitarian and stable in comparison to the capitalist Britain of Marx's day, cannot be idealized to an extent that would make it comparable to Marx's future communist society. In short, the preference between the capitalist state of the nineteenth century and the non-capitalist state of the 'glorified past' eventually boils down to taking the side either of formal inequality coupled with relative practical equality, or of formal equality combined with relative practical inequality. And, given that the first condition of fighting for the actualization of abstract forms of equality is to establish a formally equal social system, in which the ascribed nature of inequalities that were accepted before are discarded, it appears evident that the pre-capitalist past is not an alternative to the post-capitalist future from Marx's conception.[128]

Henceforth, it can be asserted that the principal feature of this mode of production at that juncture is the State's superimposition on the productive communities, which keep on existing, despite the fact that they no longer produce only for themselves but also for a higher unity that functions as an exploitative mechanism. This, as Melotti points out, indeed, is what Marx conceptualized — via his examination of an abundant amount of accounts on the Asiatic society that were rendered in various works that were written in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries — as the 'Asiatic mode of production' in a nutshell. His coinage of the term 'Oriental despotism'[129], signifying the distinctive political features of the system, in a manner similar to his use of Hegelian expression 'the general slavery of the Orient'[130] that describes the

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[128] Marx, in that sense, managed to show both the progressive facets of capitalism which tore asunder "the motley feudal ties that bound ma to his 'natural superiors,'" and hence razing to the ground the veil of obscurity that prevented the working class from seeing their oppressors without any delusions, and the inhumane nature of capitalist relations.

[129] There are a number of works that engage in commendable attempts to elucidate the origins of this term as well as the ethnocentric connotations it acquired due to the existence of numerous cases of its misemployment. These works include, Venturi, Franco. 'Dispotismo orientale', in *Rivista Storica Italiana*, vol. LXXII , no.1 (1960) pp. 117-26; also Koebner, R. 'Despot and Despotism: Vicissitudes of a Political Term', in *Journal of Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, vol. XIV (1951) pp. 275-302, and Stelling-Michaud, S. 'Le mythe du despotisme oriental', in *Schweizer Beiträge zur allgemeinen Geschichte*, vol. XVIII-XIX (1960-1) pp. 328-46.

[130] Despotism and general slavery, as Melotti (1977:48) underlines, can be understood as two faces of the same reality. 'Despot', coming from Greek for 'master' or 'slave-owner' to be more precise, is lifted by Marx from the Greeks through the mediation of Hegel. The validity of this conceptual heritage can be proved when the writings of youthful Marx are examined. In his critique of Hegel's constitutional theory, for example, Marx quotes the following passage: 'The same particular character pertains to tasks imposed in the East, in Egypt in connection with colossal architectural undertakings and so

unique set of relations of production which differentiate this mode from those of classical slavery and feudal serfdom.

Having portrayed a general vista of the theoretical genesis and empirical implications of the AMP, a comprehensive recapitulation of the basic features of Asiatic society can be rendered. There are three fundamental features of Marx's understanding of Asiatic society: the absence of private ownership in land, the commanding power of the central power, and the conception of the social body as a nexus of self-sufficient village communes.

The absence of private property in land is a defining characteristic of Marx's formulation of Asiatic society. Private property, in that instance, is formulated as one of the main catalysts of social revolution, which functions as the harbinger of the dialectic between the expropriated, pauperized, and, thereby, dehumanized mass of the society, and the wealth-accumulating, property-owning privileged social stratum that is on its way to translate material gains into enhancement of its socio-political status. The lack of privatization of land, therefore, is a firm predicament in the road to the revolutionary transformation of modes of production that needs to be obliterated for the sake of enabling the capitalist relations of production to take hold of the economic system of any pre-capitalist society. Indeed, combined with the arguments that were made in previous sections, the recognition of this formidable obstacle is the primary reason for focusing on the 'progressive' side of the project of colonization to the very point that ethical considerations are being swept under the revolutionary rug.

The second feature of the AMP, the centralizing power of Asiatic government, emerges as a 'keystone to the Oriental vault'[131] precisely at this point. Such an understanding of state's centralizing power is based on its position as the only institution that is capable of carrying out irrigation systems. This definition of the Asiatic state as the architect of large scale public projects lies at the heart of the

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forth. In these circumstances the principle of subjective freedom is lacking.' (Karl Marx, Kritik des Hegelschen Staatsrechts (1841-3), in *Werke*, vol. I, p. 262; Eng. trans. *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1970, pp. 60).

[131] Marx, Karl. letter to Friedrich Engels, 2 June 1853, in *Werke*, vol. XXVIII, p. 254; Eng. trans. in *Correspondence* 1846-95, pp. 66.

examination attempts directed at non-Western civilizations rendered in a number of works by Marx and Engels including Marx's *The British Rule in India* (1853). An interesting aspect of that article is that Marx introduces a newly formulized social factor, 'too low a degree of civilization', in order to explicate the existence of geography and other 'natural' factors that result in the low level of productive forces:

> Climate and territorial conditions, especially the vast tracts of desert extending from Sahara, through Arabia, Persia, India and Tartary, to the most elevated Asiatic highlands, made of artificial irrigations by canals and waterworks the basis of Oriental agriculture. As in Egypt and India, inundations are used for fertilizing the soil of Mesopotamia, Persia, etc.; advantage is taken of a high level for feeding irrigation canals. This prime necessity of an economical common use of water, which in the Occident drove private enterprise to voluntary association as in Flanders and Italy, necessitated, in the Orient, where civilization was too low and the territorial extent too vast to call into life voluntary association, the interference of the centralizing power of Government. Hence an economical function devolved upon all Asiatic governments: the function of providing public works.[132]

Therefore, two peculiarities of the Asiatic societies, the vast tracts of land and the low degree of civilization conceived as indicating the low level of productive forces associated with such communities, fuse as the primary factors that give way to the designation of the Asiatic state as the 'real landlord'.[133]

The village community that was scattered throughout the vast landscape formed the third and the final characteristic of Marx's formulation of the Asiatic society. Indeed, combined with Asiatic peoples' other tendency of leaving the construction and the maintenance of the great public works to the central government, the concentration of agriculture and commerce in small centers breathed life into 'the so-called *village*

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[132] Marx, Karl. 'The British Rule in India', p.24, in *Marx-Engels Reader,* p. 579.

[133] Marx, Karl. *New York Daily Tribune*, 5 Aug. 1853, in *Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernisation,* ed. with introduction by Shlomo Avineri, Anchor Books, New York, 1969, pp. 130. This point is also made in *Capital*, for example when Marx argues that '. . . [in India] . . . no private ownership of land exists, although there is both private and common possession and use of land. . . . The state stands over them as their direct landlord and sovereign. . . . The state is then the supreme landlord. The sovereignty here consists in the ownership of land concentrated on a national scale.' (Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. III, p. 841; Eng. trans. pp. 791)

system, which gave to each of these small unions their independent organization and distinct life.'[134]

The primary features of the village system, according to Marx's formulation, are: first, the secluded and divided nature of the villages that resulted from their dispersal over a considerable countryside[135]; second, the economic self-sufficiency of these units that was brought about by the particular blend that emerged owing to the union of agricultural and manufacturing industries[136]; and, third, the steady and definite division of labor that could be observed in each unit's basic structure as if it was an edict of natural law[137]. The combined materialization of all these factors, in turn, ensured the continued survival of the system via providing it with a buffer zone that neutralized, to an extent, the potential effects that changes occurring in the political sphere might have on it:

> The simplicity of the organization of production in these self-sufficient communities that constantly reproduce themselves in the same form, and when accidentally destroyed spring up again on the same spot and with the same name — this simplicity supplies the key to the secret of the unchangeableness in such striking contrast with the constant dissolution and refounding of Asiatic states, and the never-ceasing changes of dynasty. The structure of the economical elements of society remains untouched by the storm-clouds of the airy region of politics.[138]

One should also mention some of the important contributions to the Marxist paradigm that were made by the formulation of the AMP before moving on to the next section. The two most prominent of such contributions are: breaking free of the rigidly defined structure of the unilinear patterns of social revolution; and its overall effect with regards to showing us that a potential return to the respective pre-

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[134] Marx, Karl. 'The British Rule in India', p.28, in *Marx-Engels Reader,* pp. 580.

[135] Marx, Karl. 'The Future Results of the British Rule in India', *New York Daily Tribune*, 8 Aug. 1853, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, pp. 587.

[136] Marx, *Das Kapital*, vol. III, pp. 836; Eng. trans. pp. 786-7.

[137] *Ibid*, vol. I, pp. 375; Eng. trans. pp. 352.

[138] *Ibid*, vol. I, pp. 376; Eng. trans. pp. 352.

capitalist mode of production of a particular non-Western society cannot be seen to provide a viable alternative to Marx's portrayal of the future communist society.

First and foremost, the theoretical banishment of the concept of AMP leads directly into the emergence of a universal formula of historical development which tends to blunt the analytical edges of Marxism through minimizing, and even forsaking, Marx's attention to detail and his pronouncement of the significance of the particular. The 'traditional' unilinear schema, in that sense, should be regarded as a flotsam of the past, which was given theoretical flesh and blood only through the introduction of the AMP. Refraining from making full use of and elaborating on the contours of AMP, therefore, should not be regarded as remedying the malady of Eurocentrism that supposedly creeps in through the back door leading to each and every Marxist analysis, but instead as welcoming the establishment of such a 'principle'. In other words, the introduction of AMP propels the quest for providing a non-unilinear Marxist explanation to the problem of historical development that unfolds differently in each particular context. Further, from a reverse angle, this can also be understood as pointing out that at the absence of AMP, the analyst, whether Marxist or not, is left with only one option: measuring each distinct non-Western case against the ideal type of West European feudalism whereby the importance of historical and geographical context is belittled to mere 'degrees of difference'. Yet, positing a specific case as an ideal in terms of the universal stages of historical development it went through can only be viewed as going against the very spirit of Marxist thought, and, in effect, embracing the Weberian framework of historical analysis. AMP, therefore, can be said to aid us in our attempts to overcome 'the absurdity of treating the theoretical schema of the *Manifesto* as a universal formula.'[139].

Additionally, one should recall, at this point, the reasons that caused the abandonment of AMP and the thereby accentuated adherence to universal formulations, which has had disastrous effects since the time of the Second International. Indeed, the dismissal of the AMP became an originating point for Europe-centered beliefs 'which in practice have enabled them [Eurocentric

[139] Huberman, Leo and Sweezy, Paul. 'Notes on the Centenary of *Das Kapital*', in *Monthly Review* (New York), vol. XIX, no. 7, pp. 16.

demagogues] to pass off imperialist and racist ideas, even in working-class circles, by dressing them up as orthodox Marxism.'[140] This interpretation, which was also recreated by Maoist and Stalinist models as Melotti notes, translated, as a result, into two things: a theoretical rupture that originated from discarding the AMP, and an arbitrary enlargement of the other types of pre-capitalist modes of production — the primitive commune, slavery and, especially, feudalism.[141] Henceforth, it needs to be realized that this stupefying adherence to unilinear schemes of historical development is only defensible from a pragmatist point of view with occasional oscillations towards unmistakable imperialism.

However, this is not to say that any bilinear model of historical development that incorporates AMP into its basic structure can be taken as an ideal representative of Marx's take on the issue. In fact, on closer inspection, one can find just as many prejudices that plague the bilinear schemes of Plekhanov, Wittfogel, and Trotsky. Such lopsided and recurring themes include Plekhanov's emphasis on the existence of the common frontier that Russia had with Europe which was designated as a great advantage over the other Asian countries[142], and Wittfogel's interpretation of AMP as

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[140] Melotti, Umberto. *Marx and the Third World*, pp. 9.

[141] The pragmatic considerations that influenced the take of Stalin and Mao on the issue of historical development, which led them to reject the AMP, is perhaps one of the most prominent of such examples. Nonetheless, the theoretical roots of this approach can be easily traced back to the turn of the twentieth century. Such was the attitude of Dutch Social Democrat Van Kol, who, at the International Socialist Congress at Amsterdam (14-20 Aug. 1904), argued that 'The hypothesis of Karl Marx that certain countries will be able, at least in part, to bypass the capitalist period in their economic development has not been realized; the primitive peoples will reach civilization only by bearing this cross. It is therefore our duty not to hinder the development of capitalism, an indispensable chain in the history of humanity.' Naturally, the openly racist and imperialist tones of this statement that uses the unilinear interpretation of historical development as a pretext cannot be overlooked. Further, if we recall that there were quite a number of ardent defenders of colonization at this period, we might be better able to grasp that Van Kol was not an outcast in his arguments in favor of future socialist societies shaping their own colonial policies, 'regulating the relations of the countries which have reached a certain stage of economic development superior to that of the backward races.' (See the literary collection of texts and documents *Le Marxisme et l'Asie*, ed. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse and Stuart R. Schram, Editions Colin, Paris, 1965; Eng. trans. *Marxism and Asia from 1853 to the Present Day*, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, London, 1969, pp. 125-6). Similar understandings are also apparent in Bernstein, who claimed that 'not every fight by subject peoples against their masters is equally a fight for emancipation' and thus 'peoples who are aggressive and incapable of civilization have no right to our sympathy when they rebel against that civilization' (quoted by Luciano Amadio in the introduction to Rosa Luxemburg, *Scritti Scelti*, published by *Avanti!*, Milan, 1963, p. 27 n.) and in Labriola (for Labriola see Umberto Melotti 'Razzismo ed etnocentrismo nella cultura italiana', in *Terzo Mondo* (Milan), vol. I, no. 2 (Oct. 1968) pp. 28-68).

[142] Plekhanov, Georgy. *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, International Publishers CO., New York, 1969, pp. 63, 68-9.

drawing the conceptual boundaries of his theory of a perpetual Asiatic society, which, according to him, is the precursor and progenitor of 'despotic society as reborn in the Soviet Union and China.'[143] Such a prominent attitude, in turn, resulted in viewing AMP as lapsing into not making a single improvement over the old unilinear theory. Indeed, AMP, if anything, was considered to be more prone to rigidity and racism as opposed to the ironic conception of the old model as open and non-xenophobic, for 'although it relegated the non-European peoples — especially the Asiatic races — to an earlier stage of development than that of the West, it did not put them on a qualitatively different path, a view which the Manichean outlook of Wittfogel's later work seem to suggest.'[144] The point, therefore, is not attempting to supersede the old unilinear models of development via introducing another path that is 'objectively inferior' in comparison to the idealized five-stage model that the West-European societies had to go through. Instead, it is about introducing alternate pathways that are not based on qualitative, natural, innate, etc. differences for it is possible only through that way to grasp the import of theoretical contributions made to Marxism by Melotti and Godelier.

Constant attempts of aversion of ethnocentric elements is a prominent characteristic of Melotti's and Godelier's works. To be sure, both figures appear to be lapsing into Eurocentrism at certain points[145]. Regardless, the principal underlying element of the works of both authors that evolve them into paragons of engaging in commendable attempts of reappraisal of the Marxian steps of historical revolution in general and AMP in particular is their sustained awareness that 'only the most narrow-minded Europe-centered viewpoint would dare to ignore them [particular types of AMP] or

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[143] Wittfogel, Karl A. *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, Conn., 1957.

[144] Melotti, *Marx and the Third World*, pp. 13.

[145] Godelier when he manages to 'excavate' different typologies of AMP not only in Asia and pre-Columbian America, but also in Africa and in certain parts of Mediterranean Europe of ancient times, Melotti when his comments on the Chinese revolution, for one, is examined in detail. Despite such contradictory appearances however, one needs to give the intellectual credit that is due to both authors given that their awareness of Eurocentrism and the potential impact it may have in Marxist analyses is quite higher than most otherwise meticulous investigators. See Godelier, Maurice. *La notion de mode de production asiatique*, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes, Paris, 1963, also in *Sur le 'mode de production asiatique'*, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Marxistes, Editions Sociales, Paris, 1969, pp. 87.

consider them inferior to those of the West in classical and feudal times.'[146] Therefore, Marx's formulation of AMP is needed to be revived and improved upon in order not to fall easy prey to the theoretical and political myopia that is caused by implicit admission of Eurocentric elements.

The second key advantage of Marx's utilization of AMP is that his in-depth socio-historical analyses that were conducted prior to as well as following the formulation of the concept enabled him to illustrate that turning back to various types of pre-capitalist societies did not offer a viable alternative that could compete with the emancipation of men that is possible only following the establishment of the future communist society.[147]

Given the theoretical importance of understanding Marxian conception of 'human emancipation' a brief commentary appears to be necessary. We previously argued that Hegelian dialectics is one of the unmistakable pillars on which the Marxist paradigm is built. However, Marx did not settle for taking the Hegelian dialectics and their ultimate realization in the formation of the state as given. Indeed, the formation of the state can only understood as introducing yet another duality: the duality between the state as the sphere of political community, human being, unreal universality and the public, as opposed to civil society as the representative of the private individual, profane being, persistent particularities and the private. Further, this opposition between state and civil society does not stay as a mere duality but becomes the very link that initiates the dialectical process anew. In other words, the state in Marx is purported, unlike Hegel, as being incapable of transcending itself, and hence the contradiction between state and civil society, which is deemed to be the only way of realizing the full-potential of human being through breaking with every conditionality that he or she is subject to in the bourgeois society. In the words of Marx, "The political state, in relation to civil society, is just as spiritual as is heaven in relation to earth."[148] Therefore, it can be said that Marx not only employs but surpasses Hegelian dialectics through challenging everything that is ascribed to

[146] Melotti, *Marx and the Third World*, pp. 16.

[147] For Marx's complete notes on Indian history from 1850s on, see Marx, Karl. *Notes on Indian History (664-1858)*, (Hawaii, 2001).

[148] Marx, *On the Jewish Question*, The Marx-Engels Reader, R. C. Tucker ed., (1978), pp. 34.

human beings, which, in effect, trigger the loss of any potential equality via positing particular individuals and groups into asymmetric power relationships. In philosophical terms, this was the process whereby Marx managed to set the owl of Minerva free.[149]

Naturally, Marx was not unaware of the relative equality between and among social strata, and the relatively higher control of the producer over the means of production as opposed to the alienating and dehumanizing aspects of industrial society. Nonetheless, seeking for potential remedies to the maladies of modern society beneath the murky waters of pre-capitalist societies was tantamount to searching for a safe haven of equality while basking in the euphoria of an unequal past. This precisely was the point that Marx tried to underscore, albeit through a lens that borders on ethnocentrism, when he felt that it was his duty to declare in his discussion on the effects of British colonialism in India,

> Now, sickening as it must be to human feeling to witness those myriads of industrious, patriarchal and inoffensive social organizations disorganized and dissolved into their units, thrown into a sea of woes, and their individual members losing at the same time their ancient forms of civilization, and their hereditary means of subsistence, we must not forget that those idyllic village communities, inoffensive though they may appear, had always been the solid foundation of Oriental Despotism, that they restrained the human mind within

[149] *On The Jewish Question* (1843) is an exceptional work in the sense of demonstrating how Marx utilized the Hegelian dialectics as well of showing how the emancipation from religion, which is another precondition of the ultimate human emancipation, can be realized. Marx's main approach to the demands of the Jews for better representation in a Christian state is that the emancipation of Jews is only possible if they emancipate themselves of being Jews, i.e. through the emancipation of Jews from Judaism and man from religion. This is what Marx underscores as "we have to emancipate ourselves before we can emancipate the others." (The Marx-Engels Reader, R. C. Tucker ed., (1978), pp. 28.)However, contrary to Bruno Bauer's suggestion that the satisfaction of these principles are adequate for realizing the demands of Jews, Marx exclaims that human being's emancipation from religion is only the first step of reaching the ultimate terminal of human emancipation. Remaining at the level of political emancipation, which is what Bauer does according to Marx, therefore, should not be our final aim, which should instead be taken as the eventual transcendence of the innate contradiction between the all-encompassing universals (citizen) and egoistic, profit-maximizing particulars (following Jewish faith), thereby going beyond the bourgeois man and achieving human emancipation, as he put it, "Human emancipation will only be complete when the real individual man has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man, in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a species-being [*Gattungswesen*]; and when he has recognized and organized his own powers (*forces propres*) as social powers so that he no longer separates this social power from himself as *political power*."(The Marx-Engels Reader, *Ibid*, pp. 46).

> the smallest possible compass, making it the unresisting tool of superstition, enslaving it beneath traditional rules, depriving it of all grandeur and historical energies. We must not forget the barbarian egotism which, concentrating on some miserable patch of land, had quietly witnessed the ruin of empires, the perpetuation of unspeakable atrocities, the massacre of population of large towns, with no other consideration bestowed upon them than on natural events, itself the helpless prey of any aggressor who deigned to notice it at all. We must not forget that this undignified, stagnatory and vegetative life, that this passive sort of existence evoked on the other part, in contradistinction, wild, aimless, unbounded forces of destruction and rendered murder itself a religious rite in Hindustan. We must not forget that these little communities were contaminated by distinctions of caste and by slavery, that they subjugated man to external circumstances instead of elevating him to be the sovereign of circumstances, that they transformed a self-developing social state into never-changing natural destiny, and thus brought about a brutalizing worship of nature, exhibiting its degradation in the fact that man, the sovereign of nature, fell down on his knees in adoration of Hanuman, the monkey, and Sabbala, the cow.[150]

As this long quotation indicates, one needs to enforce a bottom line that separates the relativity of the past from the potential fullness of the future in the Marxist sense. And, one of the most considerable achievements of Marxist thought, blazoned by the testimony of so many great works, in general and the concept of AMP in particular is that it manages to show us that remaking pre-capitalist modes of production — with subject and sovereign in place of the modern conceptualization of *citoyen* — to fit into the mould of full-emancipation of Man is not possible. For, in the words of Althusser, 'After all, it is never possible to liberate, even from dogmatism, more than already exists.'[151]

[150] Marx, 'The British Rule in India', pp. 28, in *Marx-Engels Reader*, pp. 581.

[151] Althusser, Louis. *For Marx*, pp. 31.

2.8 Capitalist State and Its Core Features

The prominent features of the capitalist state, according to the Marxist paradigm are, institutional separation of economics and politics; extraction of surplus production by the capitalist class, and state as a factor of cohesion that works as a glue (or rather a duct-tape) in binding the community together.

The first element of this maxim is that in capitalism economics and politics are divided into two ontologically distinct fields so that market and production relations belong exclusively to the sphere of economics, whilst, 'other issues' are associated with the sphere of politics. This is one of the distinguishing traits of capitalism in comparison to feudalism and other pre-capitalist modes of production, owing to the fact that the sphere of economics and politics were one and the same in pre-capitalist societies, which led to the emergence of direct mechanisms of coercion and reproduction. As a result, this artificial distinction of the two domains makes it possible to relegate the workings of capitalist mechanisms in the labor, price and goods markets right into the empty container of economics. In other words, this reification of market as an entity of its own (that has its own dictates in the words of Margaret Thatcher) instigates the removal of pressures put on the political front and redirects those pressures towards a dummy-target of economics, whereas the reality suggests that economics and politics are two inseparable entities.[152] Once the distinction is made, reproduction of labor and production relations can be portrayed as a component of the sphere of economics so that the working class can internalize the fluctuations of capitalist world economy with relative ease. That is to say, if the market has its own dictates and working principles, then business cycles of contraction and expansion are, similarly, a *modus operandi* of the economic system that cannot be linked to the structures of the capitalist state. In addition, this naturalization of the manner of workings of the capitalist economy was consolidated beginning from the rise of the Keynesian demand management via state-provisioned healthcare and public education, so that the capitalist state has a solid ontological 'buffer' that it can rely on.

[152] A point which reminds us of Gramsci's assertion that ".. for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity." (Gramsci 1970: 161).

When this theory is applied to the colonial state of India, there appear to be some intriguing results. As mentioned before, the colonial state does not lean on any secondary mechanisms (or ontological differentiations) concerning its relations with the native population. Therefore, when an Indian coolie in the cotton plantations was punished for any reason, he or she could fathom that it is the colonial state as the representative of the mother country that empowers his or her master, and not the usual workings of a distinct entity called economics. What this analysis exhorts is that, when the Marxist paradigm is adopted, the image of colonial state does seem to resemble more that of feudalism, rather than capitalism. Indeed, given that the whip is still in the hands of expropriator, feudalism, in this vein, seems to be a better form of comparison than capitalism, which leads to a crucial paradox: the arguments of British officials that they were transforming the Indian economy into a modern one that can participate in the developing patterns of world trade were made at a time when the colonial state was reinserting an amalgam of capitalist mode of production and feudal type of surplus extraction in India (and in much disadvantaged terms one has to say, compared to the pre-colonial era, which reminds one of the reinsertion of serfdom in Poland in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries). As such, the British were fostering the capitalist mode of production in Britain, as it was the most efficient and efficacious of economic systems, whilst they were reintroducing a hybrid form of intensified feudalism, a highly degenerated system, in their colonies. I would also like to add that, the coherency of such a policy is deeply apocryphal even when a strictly liberal outlook is adopted, which solidifies the position of the liberal paradigm as a system of inconsistencies.

The second characteristic of capitalism, from a Marxist perspective, is that it is based on what can be called essentially as the system of surplus extraction *par excellence*. In other words, capitalism is unique by virtue of it being the most efficient of all the economic paradigms in terms of appropriating the surplus production of labor. This core element of capitalism is also a *sine qua non* of any colonial state, to which the colonized India was no exception. Moreover, its high efficiency is in direct relation to the first feature, for the optimal exploitation can be only 'achieved' via the artificial dissociation of the sphere of economics and politics.

This understanding of 'optimal exploitation', which leads to accumulation for the sake of accumulation, also has important implications for another interpretation: the assertion that there has to be reasonable limits to exploitation, so that future flow of sustained profits is ensured. However, one has to claim the opposite in the case of colonial state in general and, especially in the context of the Indian case. In the light of the fact that Indian population was considerably higher than Britain in both 18th and 19th centuries, it can be argued that not much importance was given to the 'turnover ratio' of the natives. That is to say, the Indian labor market was ideal for British purposes in that they did not have to hold back from utilizing their force at will to make the population as subordinated to their interests as possible, and this lack of forbearance did not translate into a cleaved Indian market for British goods owing to high population growth. I would also like to add that this cannot be taken as a deficiency of Marxist paradigm for, as stated in the beginning of this section, Marxism tries to explain the different forms that capitalism takes in the course of history and colonial state is a very distinct 'contributory' form of capitalism and the general lack of interest shown by the Marxist intellectuals following Marx and Engels to understanding the phenomenon of colonial state can best be described by their priorities rather than a theoretical fallacy on their part.

Last but not least, Marxist theory accentuates that without the state acting as a unit of cohesion binding all the classes in a highly segregated community, via the use of nationalism, religion, popular culture, etc., the naturalized exploitation of labor, and reproduction of labor that makes this possible, cannot take place. This feature of capitalism starts to become highly apparent in Britain, especially in the aftermath of the Chartist campaign and the breakdown of the revolutionary movement of 1848[153] — and in the conscious use of nationalism which was on its way to become evident in the unification of Italy in 1861 and the ensuing unification of Germany; however colonial state, again, proves to be the antithesis of this characteristic. As stated at the commencement of this section, the first priority of the colonizer in the colony is to construct a forcefully 'unified' and artificial entity to make the transformation process from pre-capitalist modes of production to the hybrid form of colonial state as

[153] See Neale, R. S. *Class in English History 1680-1850*, Basil Blackwell, (Oxford, 1981), pp. 112-113, and E. J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution 1789-1848*, (New York, 1962), pp. 250.

smooth as possible. However, once such an entity is constructed, the colonizer has to walk a fine line between keeping the colony united via oppression and not instilling too much of an (one might say overdose) ideology of unification so as not to stir up any resurgent movements.[154] By the same token, the colonial state's role of an actor of cohesion did not extend to the inclusion of suffrage, or to any other means of stimulus for the provision of political equality in its horizon, which might be taken as an unequivocal fact given the nature of the colonial state.

To conclude this section, we have seen that Marxist analysis of capitalist state is very adaptable to the phenomenon of colonial state of India. Indeed, the unrestrained use of one of the central features of state, monopoly of violence, combined with the lopsided application of the private property in land and commoditization of labor, which were derived from this brief analysis, are perfectly in line with our earlier proposal that the colonial state is a hybrid phenomenon. This ability to conform to the changing nature of the capitalist state, as argued previously, comes from a combination of the facts that Marxist theory aims at explaining the different forms that capitalism cloaks itself in and that colonial state is, after all, another form of the capitalist world economy, its distinctive feature being the absence of any restraints (*vis-à-vis* the native population) that force the state to act within a certain framework.

2.9 By Way of Conclusion

In this chapter the tasks of providing a brief analysis of the phenomenon of colonial state from the perspectives of three main paradigms of state and society relations have been undertaken. What this inquiry has shown us can be summarized in three central points: the failure of liberal paradigm originates from the fact that it focuses exclusively on explaining the core elements of conventional Western type of state formation, while failing to acknowledge the relevancy of colonial state in enabling the dominance (or the so-called uniqueness) of the West. To this end, it can be said

[154] The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 constitutes a great example in that it could only be realized when the British were growing overconfident (in terms of not taking any precautions even when forewarnings were made by high ranking British officials in India) and the Indians were growing restless. See Richard Collier, *The Great Indian Mutiny*, (New York, 1964), for a very vivid narrative.

that, liberal theory lacks an all-inclusive perspective in its dealings with the process of state formation.

Likewise, Statist Institutionalism, very much in line with the deficiencies of liberal theory, fails to grasp the idea that if there are no impediments put on the formation of a state that is absolutely autonomous (i.e. state elite can act with utter disregard for any other agenda, apart from that of the colonizer, but their own) the state will assume the role of God, omnipotent and omnipresent, and will transform into a purely despotic state, as it did in the colonial India. Hence the paradox of facilitating the advent of modernity via the establishment of a virtual tyranny.

Marxism, on the other hand, proved to be very viable with regards to explaining the peculiarities of the colonial state. We attempted, in that vein, to exhaust and embattle the opponents of Marxist thought that criticize its claims to internationalism based on an alleged Eurocentric nucleus that is preconceived to constitute part and parcel of Marx's formulation of the AMP. Believing in Lenin's hypothesis that a chain is as strong as its weakest link, an analysis of the concept seemed to be necessary.

The thrust of our defense of Marxist internationalism was realized through a detailed discussion on Marx's understanding and formulation of AMP which posited the concept not as the purveyor of Eurocentric thought but as its antidote. To reiterate, this standpoint was taken despite the recognition of the fact that Marx and particularly Engels had shared a part of the nineteenth century 'human palate' that was not inclined to relish cultural, social and economic differences as postmodern critique has taught us to do. After all, it was Marx, who said of India in the pre-colonial period: "All the civil wars, invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines... did not go deeper than its surface."[155] Nonetheless, this should not be taken as a critique of humanistic roots of Marx's thought. Marx, on the contrary, posited the emancipation of Man right at the heart of his paradigm. Further, it needs to be asked to such critics what good would it do had Marx chose to revere cultural, social, economic, etc. differences in a world in which a banner of the colonizer was flopping, either directly or indirectly, in the void of virtually each and every part of

[155] Burns, Emile. ed., *A Handbook of Marxism*, (London, 1936), pp. 182.

the non-Western part of the globe. Marx did not cherish such differences as an anthropologist of our day would do; he, instead, concentrated on formulating a commendable theory that heralded the emancipation of not a certain privileged part of the universe, but of each and every society that, in one way or the other, had experienced the sour taste that was left by capitalist mode of production. Therefore, it can be stated with ease that its focus on the relations and forces of production that are subject to change with respect to given spatio-temporal conditions makes Marxism the most applicable of the three paradigms to the hybrid form of colonial state.

I would also like to add a brief commentary to the emphasis of Marxism on nationalism in analyzing the colonial emancipation and transformation. We have been made to realize, time and again that, nationalism cannot be taken as an issue that will take care of itself (e.g. once the communist state is build, once the class consciousness is prevalent, etc.). However, overcoming this allergy towards the 'national question' would prove to be extremely difficult for Marxist intellectuals as the turbulent period following the inclusion of the acclaimed Article 9 ("The right of all nations in the state to self-determination") has indicated. In fact, it was Lenin who managed to transcend Marx's and Engels' earlier adoption of Hegelian dichotomy of historic and non-historic nations to a full extent and who suggested the adoption of oppressor/oppressed dichotomy instead. For him: "The focal point in the social democratic [national] programme must be that division of nations into oppressor and oppressed which forms the *essence of imperialism*...."[156]

However, it was the same Lenin, who at times wore the apparently stern realist cloak, arguing that the social democrat of the small nation has to fight against small nation narrow-mindedness, seclusion and isolation, and instead should consider the working class in its entirety, subordinating, in effect, the particular to the general interest.[157] Whether pragmatist or political realist, Lenin opened the floodgates, closing of which

[156] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXI, Progress Publishers, (Moscow, 1964), pp. 409.

[157] *Ibid,* pp. 347. This point, however, should not be seen as Lenin's departing point from the thought of Marx and Engels, but as a continuation of them. Recalling Engels' remark on the Slavic peoples of Eastern Europe and others of similar nature which were discussed previously, one is to recall that the significance of the international labor movement always trumps the right to self-determination of any nation, big or small.

would later became the main goal of Stalin.[158] The point being, Marxist analysis cannot afford to approach the issue of nationalism without due diligence; and if not, it has to stand fast in the face of rightful accusations of elimination of the right to self-determination.[159]

Truth be told, it has been a rocky road for the Marxists to wrangle with the issues of colonialism and nationalism since the very beginning. Regardless, the importance of the national liberation movements as heralding a crucial intermediary stage of the emancipation of peoples cannot be overstated. Therefore, if there is any chance of realization of the long-term interests of the working class, the right to self-determination and the joint interests of nations has to somewhat be coalesced in the working class interests. And, starting from the phenomenon of the colonial state and its peculiar form might make it easier to grasp how far the reach of capitalism extends in triggering the advent of nationalism (and subsequently, how much of an everlasting phenomenon 'the nation' in fact is). Furthermore, as noted by Ronaldo Munck, "Until the national question is settled, there can be no 'pure' class politics in Ireland. For that reason alone, if no other, socialists have an interest in the outcome of the Irish nationalist struggle."[160] And, this interest in the outcome of the Irish national struggle can (and should) be expanded to cover all the of the ex-colonies since "The modern nations, the national state and the bourgeoisie are all constituted on, and have their mutual relations determined by one and the same terrain."[161]

[158] Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue: Marxism and Nationalism*, pp. 78.

[159] See Pipes, R. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism 1917-1923*, (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 108.

[160] Munck, *The Difficult Dialogue*, p. 65.

[161] Poulantzas, Nicos. *State, Power, Socialism*, New Left Books, (London, 1978), pp. 117.

CHAPTER II

MARX & ENGELS AND THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS MOVEMENT

Britain, by the end of the Napoleonic wars, was well on its way to becoming the workshop of the world. It was virtually untouched by the devastating effects of the Napoleonic wars that swept over the major forces of the continental Europe, its arch-rival left well behind in economic terms. This surge of British power, in economic terms, was brought to the fore by a number of factors that include the technological superiority with regards to the production processes of various goods — the most important of which was cotton —, an international market with reliable prospects of excess demand for British production, and the reckoning of a new age diplomacy that would sweep the tumults of bellicosity behind in ushering a new era, *Pax Britannica*.

Successful maintenance of riding this politico-economic status of hegemony, however, would require no less diligence of social engineering than that was required by fighting the revolutionaries abroad. Indeed, the first half of the nineteenth century would become the stage on which one popular movement after another would appear under the political spotlight. With varying degrees of radicalness and distinct sets of demands, this stage would be occupied by agitations for parliamentary reform, the factory movement, immense trade unions, and Chartism, hence heralding a new epoch in which the external 'peace and harmony' was to be coupled with everlasting internal strife. Surpassing these popular movements with limiting the economic losses to a bare minimum was the first condition for the British upper classes to enjoy the benefits of being *the* workshop. In the words of Engels,

> England was to become [following the passing of the Reform Bill of 1831] the "workshop of the world"; all other countries were to become for England what Ireland already was — markets for her manufactured goods, supplying her in

> return with raw materials and food. England, the great manufacturing centre of an agricultural world, with an ever-increasing number of corn and cotton-growing Irelands revolving around her, the industrial sun. What glorious prospect![162]

The dialectical and historical importance of these popular movements were crucial for each and every class that chose to take a part in them, as various social strata was caught in the tension between the opposing tendencies, which reminds one of Marx's and Engels' emphasis of the conflicting interests for "The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against other classes."[163] The interests of the British aristocracy, for one, was diametrically opposed to any agitation that favored the strong egalitarian currents that were emanated by the French Revolution. Keeping their socially and politically privileged position while sustaining, and even potentially enhancing, their hold over the lion's share of the profits in the wake of the dual revolutions render the intransigent position of the aristocracy quite graspable.

However, one needs to clarify the composition of the each important class before carrying on with the respective social balance sheet of these classes of the period.[164] The upper class, in that sense, can be said to compose of aristocracy and the great landholders, whilst those who owned substantial industrial and commercial property as well as senior components of the bureaucracy and the 'professional men' correspond in their class designation to the middle class. The lower middle class, or the middling classes, on the other hand, was made up of petit bourgeois, professional men of lower ranking and other literates and artisans. Finally, the working class was formed by industrial workers that worked in factories and others in domestic industries, in addition to agricultural laborers, urban pauperized masses, domestic servants, other low-paid non-factory workers, and the majority of the working-class women.

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[162] Engels, Friedrich. *The Conditions of the Working Class in England*, Victor Kiernan ed. (1987), pp. 40.

[163] Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. *The German Ideology*, (Moscow, 1964), pp. 68.

[164] The following formulation of the class structure of the nineteenth century Britain is largely taken from the 'five-class model' of R. S. Neale. See, Neale, R. S. *Class in English History 1680-1850*, (Oxford, 1981), pp. 120-154.

While the aristocracy was hell-bent on keeping its 'right' to superimpose its will on the rest of the society, the position of the middle and the lower middle class were altogether different tales to tell. The various groups that constituted the middle class, with the proximity of their social status to those of the nobles, was well aware that a social revolution that resembled 1789 could, in all likelihood, end up having disastrous results for its social status. In contrary to the rather clear-cut position of the middle class, numerous groups that made up the lower middle class were becoming increasingly aware of the shaky foundations on which their interests laid. At one level, they understood that inertia was not a viable option given that technological progress of productive tools could, in the long term, turn them into remnants of an old age. At another level, they were starting to feel the need for keeping a safe-distance with the 'hands' or the working mass with all their 'no-good demagogues' that appeared to be quite apt in informing the masses that a future without private property was possible. This uneasy position of the lower middle class, in turn, would make them a decisive factor in the unfolding of the subsequent chapters of social movements.

This thumb-nail sketch of the British society, however, cannot be complete without adding the final ingredient to our formulation without which one cannot break the Chinese walls that divide the social composition of the eighteenth century Britain from that of the nineteenth century: the working class. The concepts of 'the working classes' and 'the working class' made their first appearance in the post-Napoleonic political lexicon. This was a time when the frame also coincided with the rise of the first generally-accepted 'labor movements', such as the Chartist movement (1838-1848), which was characterized by powerful bonds of class consciousness uniting masses together as well as by the demands for electoral reforms.[165] One of the main premises of E.P. Thompson's classic work, *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), that the English working class was already formed as a class in itself, appear to be in line with the historical evidence. Yet, to suggest that the British proletariat assumed its final form no later than the beginning of 1830s, which apparently is a

[165] Both E. P. Thompson and E. J. Hobsbawm accept the Chartism as a 'labor movement', and having read additional texts, the author finds no reason to question such a portrayal. See, Thompson, E. P. *The Making of the English Working Class*, (1963) and Hobsbawm, E. J. *Workers: Worlds of Labour*, (1984), pp. 176-194.

feature of Thompson's work is quite unwarranted to say the least. Indeed, such a claim would necessitate the existence of historical proof that purports the British labor as a monolithic bloc that reached the greatest numbers of participants possible following the industrial revolution,

> Yet, in fact, this uniquely early appearance of the 'working class' on the national scene reflected not an industrialized society, but a society in the first phase of the first of all 'industrial revolutions'. Even within the cotton industry, pioneer of the factory system, the mechanized loom was only just appearing in many towns during the 1830s and 1840s, while the handloom weavers, rapidly declining, had reached their numerical maximum — about a quarter of a million — as late as the 1820s. The factory itself was virtually confined to parts of the textile industry. The so-called 'Factory Acts', providing a minimum of protective legislation, were not extended beyond the range of this industry until 1867.[166]

Nevertheless, this does not challenge the fact that the British working class was on its way to emerge as the *sine qua non* product of the dual revolutions as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. Subject to increased levels of exploitation, utterly pauperized and alienated from the means of production to the maximum extent possible, this class, indeed, was composed of the masses on whose back the industrial edifice of satanic mills rested. Condemned, as they were, to shouldering the dehumanizing load of the industrial revolution, the working class, by the turn of the century, had already seemed to be the indispensable element of any kind of socialism, utopian or otherwise, that was devised by French and British intellectuals. Grasping the relationship between the soaring numbers of the pauperized masses and the existence of private property in land was thus a vital recurring theme in the works of early prominent socialists, such as, François Noël ("Gracchus") Babeuf, Henri de Saint-Simon, Charles Fourier, Auguste Blanqui, Louis Blanc, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Thomas Pain, and Robert Owen. This socialist heritage that was left by the French and British socialists, as well as the British political economy, was to leave its mark in the thought of Marx and Engels. To be sure, the theoretical fathers of Marxism drew their intellectual strength not only from these two sources but also

[166] Hobsbawm, *Workers: Worlds of Labour*, pp. 179.

from German philosophy as we stressed in the previous chapters. All the same, the British working class occupies a special place in the Marxist paradigm owing to the fact that both Engels and Marx started formulating their ideas based on the social position of workers within the British society. The underlying reasons for this focus on the British labor was related to both personal and historical grounds. For example, the first major work of Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, written in late 1844 and published in 1845, was, as the name suggests, a sociological survey of British labor within the larger context of British commercial and political landscapes.

Engels was not the only key author that thought a sustained preoccupation with the recently acquired industrial capitalist armor of the English inevitable. In fact, albeit their distinct standpoints in taking up the issue of social change that separated their works from that of Engels', "It was in the 1840s that English novelists turned from traditional scenes to confront the realities of urban life in an industrial society."[167] Disraeli's *Sybil*, which was published in 1845, was full of predictions of proletarian revolt, which could be prevented only if a moral attitude to the factory workers, in the image of benign Mr. Trafford, would be adopted. Similar themes of polarization of classes and the postulation of a remedy in the form of reconciliation that would realize the brotherhood of 'high and low' would be taken up by Mrs. Gaskell in *Mary Barton* (1848) and by Kingsley in his *Alton Locke* (1950). These literary works would be followed by Dickens' *Hard Times* (1854), with its critical take on the inhumanity of the Manchester mill-owners and their utilitarian outlook that knew no boundaries in blighting the imagination.

However, notwithstanding the numbers and the literary quality of such social critiques, the Engels' work did not need a solid fiction to set it apart from the rest of the pack as it managed to provide a vivid and detailed account of the life and struggles of the common British labor in the first half of 1840s. Indeed, the intellectual fascination of young Engels — who was 24 when he wrote the book —

[167] Daiches, D. and Flower, J. *Literary Landscapes of the British Isles,* (1979; Harmondsworth edn., 1981), pp. 193.

with the English working class was not based on any moral or utopian reason as he wrote unfalteringly in the Preface to the first German edition (1845),

> A knowledge of proletarian conditions is absolutely necessary to provide solid ground for socialist theories, on the one hand, and for judgments about their right to exist, on the other; and to put an end to all sentimental dreams and fancies pro and con. But proletarian conditions exist in their *classical form*, in their perfection, only in the British Isles, particularly in England proper.[168]

This view of the British labor as the prototype form of industrial labor was also shared by Marx as he, especially in his early years, posited the English working class time and again as the spearhead of the international socialist revolution. The English working class, therefore, was deemed by both intellectuals to rest at the apex of the national working classes with respect to the high levels of class consciousness that it attained as early as the beginning of the 1840s.

The problem is that however advanced in comparison to other national working classes it might seem the English working class was still very far from being decisive in class politics by itself. Indeed, the mass that belonged to the working class would require the leadership and experience so much so that only when this condition was satisfied through the participation of the lower middle class would popular movements reach their full force. Yet, given the comparative nature of this problem, one ought to understand that the English working class was truly one of a kind in terms of shedding light on the futures of other national laboring classes. This point was explained by Engels in the Preface in a concise a manner as possible that is worthy of a lengthy citation,

> A description of the classical form which the conditions of existence of the proletariat have assumed in Britain is very important, particularly for Germany and precisely at the present moment. German Socialism and Communism have grown, more than any other, from theoretical premises; we German theoreticians still knew much to little of the real world to be driven directly by the real conditions to reforms of this 'bad reality'. . . . We Germans more than

[168] Engels, Friedrich. *The Conditions of the Working Class in England*, Victor Kiernan, ed., (1987), pp. 29.

> anybody else stand in need of a knowledge of the facts concerning this question. And while the conditions of existence of Germany's proletariat have not assumed the classical form that they have in England, we nevertheless have, at the bottom, the same social order, which sooner or later must necessarily reach the same extremes as it has already attained across the North Sea. . .[169]

Henceforth, examining the popular movements that materialized in the first half of the nineteenth century Britain appears to be imperative for the sake of excavating any potentially Eurocentric origins that might have had a corrosive effect of watering down the practical side of Marxist internationalism. The main task of this chapter, to that end, is to expound some key turns of the popular movements that took place in Britain during this period as well as to ponder upon the echoes of a few concepts in the practical realm to see if their supposed meanings hold in the face of historical evidence. In the light of these premises, we will begin this chapter with the issue of alleged reformist attitude of British popular movements as opposed to the insistence of French radicals on achieving social transformation via revolution. This will be followed by a discussion on the issue of the 'aristocracy of labor' in order to find out if any parallel can be drawn between the social position of the lower middle class in British politics and the industrialized working classes of the Occident and those of the non-Western world. The final chapter will be on the nature of the relationships between the Irish and the English components of the British working class in order to discover the practical aspects of international co-operation that might validate the ultimate verdict on the collaborative nature of the British proletariat.

3.1 British Reformism and French Radicalism

The disappearance of the socialist labor movement in Britain following the untimely demise of Chartism in 1848 and the breakdown of the continental revolutionary movements in the face of the reactionary phalanx that was formed by the major continental powers — Prussia and Russia as the foremost examples — in 1848 is linked to two distinct yet somewhat related causes in various historical accounts: the

[169] *Ibid*, pp. 30.

retreat of the highly organized parts of the lower middle class from socialist agitation — becoming evident no later than 1842, which corresponds to the first years that Chartism unleashed the radical momentum that it had gathered thus far — and the reformist overtones of British socialism that has appeared to lack the revolutionist radicalism of French socialism. The temporal lines that separate the two epochs, in that sense, appear to symbolize a world of difference between two phases that British labor had to pass through.

The British working class movement in the first phase of the socialist struggle that materialized between 1815-1848 did have no counterparts in any other countries in terms of mass organization, the degree of political class-consciousness achieved, the development of early types of experimental socialist ideologies and militancy — with the possible exception of the French working class in the last two strands. The revolutionary period of the early years leading up to Chartism, therefore, was a matter of social accumulation and not of spontaneous combustions. However, what followed this long phase of revolutionary agitation was a period in which the radical elements of British socialism ran into a blind alley of modest reformism and evaporated for nearly thirty years, only to revive in the beginning of the 1880s within a completely different conjuncture. Nevertheless, the toned down radicalism of the British labor movement did not have anything to do with a decrease in the pace of industrialization and mechanization in the second half of the nineteenth century. *Per contra*, the actual rapid industrialization of the economy combined with full adherence to the contours of the liberal economic paradigm was realized only in this period. One is ought to remember, in that context, that the economic progress that was achieved in the second half of the century has the strength to turn the productive developments of the first half turn pale. This reminds us of the fact that the term 'revolution' is really a misnomer for the industrial progress achieved by the British beginning from the last years of the eighteenth century,

> For this was a country in which, even in the second half of that century [nineteenth century], a large majority of the population consisted of non-

> agricultural manual workers: perhaps 70 per cent according to the estimate of the statistician Dudley Baxter in 1867.[170]

Indeed, with considerable technological leaps in production of goods that were being produced in unfathomable numbers and in logistics to name just a few key developments, and other managerial reforms to keep industrialism on its track, this period was the true zenith of industrial revolution. Engels explained the significance of this epoch for the British economy in his 'England in 1845 and 1885', which was published in the London *Commonweal* of 1 March 1885, in the following words,

> For England, the effects of this domination of the manufacturing capitalists [which was consolidated by the failure of the Revolutions of 1848] were at first very startling. Trade revived and extended to a degree unheard of even in this cradle of modern industry; the previous astounding creations of steam and machinery dwindled into nothing compared with the immense mass of productions of the twenty years from 1850 to 1870, with the overwhelming figures of exports and imports, of the wealth accumulated in the hands of capitalists and of human working power concentrated in the large towns. The progress was indeed interrupted, as before, by a crisis every ten years, in 1857 as well as in 1866; but these revulsions were now considered as natural, inevitable events, which must be fatalistically submitted to, and which always set themselves right in the end.[171]

Henceforth, it becomes vital to scrutinize the potential causes that not only modified the radical tendencies of the British working class but also absorbed its revolutionary strength in the first half of the century in order to understand the reasons of its inability to finalize the revolutionary transformation. In fact, one of the widely accepted arguments is that the political tendencies of the English working class were never as radical as those of the French. Naturally, if this presumption is taken in its face value and combined with the lack of intellectual and organizational skills of the working class of the period this combination appears as a certain recipe for disaster. What might be the reasons that give way to the first half of this contention?

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[170] Hobsbawm, E. J. *Workers: Worlds of Labour*, (1984), pp. 177.

[171] Engels, Friedrich. 'England in 1845 and in 1885', *Commonweal*, 1 March 1885; quoted in Engels, *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, pp. 41.

The intellectual climate of England and France of the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries can be elucidated to show if there were any intellectual backgrounds of such a practical rift. Yet, this should not be taken as a crystalline conviction in favor of a one-to-one correspondence between the early socialist theories and the revolutionary masses. Contrary to such an understanding, the ineffective revolutionary ardor of the British working class had many roots, such as those having to do with demographic, religious, and ethnic aspects.[172] The lack of homogeneity in the capital city, for one, was one of the principal reasons why the British ruling classes found it too easy to entrench itself within the capital city despite all the social turmoil that raged outside.[173] Indeed, as Francis Place pointed out to Richard Cobden in 1840, there could not be any hope for the British capital to imitate Paris,

> London differs very widely from Manchester, and, indeed, from every other place on the face of the earth. It has no local or particular interest as a town, not even as to politics. Its several boroughs in this respect are like so many very populous places at a distance from one another, and the inhabitants of any of them know nothing, or next to nothing, of the proceedings in any other, and not much indeed of those of their own. London in my time, and that is half a century, has never moved. A few of the people in different parts have moved, and these, whenever they come together, make a considerable number - still a very small number indeed when compared with the whole number.[174]

In short, it can be said that there were various reasons that crafted the particular degrees of radicalness that came to be associated with the British working class in the first half of the nineteenth century. And, one should not forget that inasmuch as they stood a couple of steps behind the French worker in terms of their commitment to the cause of revolution, yet, this was a class that was described as one of the 'two nations' by Benjamin Disraeli in the 1840s. The mutually exclusive barriers that

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[172] For the religious reasons that impeded the growth of a revolutionary labor movement, such as the effects of the Methodism, Moravians and other sects, see, Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 26-55.

[173] See, Goodway, D. *London Chartism*, (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 221-5.

[174] Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 223.

separated the 'two nations' are explicated by J. S. Mill in a letter written to the Earl of Durham in 1839 in the following manner:

> They [working class] are the greatest sufferers of all by low profits, and an overcrowded field of employment. They belong almost universally to the "uneasy classes". They are nearly all of them struggling either against the difficulty of subsisting, or against that of providing for their sons and daughters. They have no common interest or fellow feeling with the aristocracy; under no circumstances can they hope to be participators of democratic principles.[175]

However, neither can we understate the impact of the intellectuals and their particular conceptualizations of pre-Marxist socialism given that their effects on the middle — and on the working class through their mediation — and the upper classes were remarkable which is another way of saying that their works set the rules of engagement for many years to come. Further, only in such a way can the historian explain the undying influence of such works, such as the *Rights of Man* of Tom Paine or the *Organisation du Travail* of Louis Blanc on the oppressor and the oppressed alike, thereby becoming the bedrock of revolutionary struggles in their own unique ways. The primary attempt of this section thus will be to consider how the leading socialist intellectuals of this period perceived their society in order to unearth the extent to which they saw their world as based on order and dictated by relations of authority and subordination based on the property qualification. Therefore, one needs to revisit the early socialist paradigms of both the French and the English intellectuals to see if any distinct pattern of radicalness was evolved to separate one tradition from the other.

Beginning our investigation of early socialism with the prominent French intellectuals, the first name that comes to mind is Babeuf (1760-97), who not only put the idea of incompatibility between private property and political equality into practice but also extended it. Drawing inspiration from important figures that came before him, such as Abbé Mably (1709-85) who pointed out that "equality cannot exist in conjunction with private property, which is the source of all our social

[175] Mill to the Earl of Durham, *London and Westminster Review* XXXII, (1839), pp. 485-486.

evils"[176], Babeuf understood that the tension between political equality on one side and the existence of private property and free market principles on the other was permanent. Therefore, as Filippo Buonarroti argued, the only way to put a halt to economic and hence political inequalities had to go through the complete abolishment of private property. Naturally, doing away with private property would constitute only the first part of the solution which would have to be followed by introducing a new set of obligations requiring everyone to place the fruits of his or her labor in a type of common storage so that the accumulated wealth could be redistributed in the most equal manner.[177]

Babeuf and his followers, amounting roughly to two thousand, were ready to realize the principles of their revolutionary programme when, during the winter of 1795-1796, bread and wood were both in short supply, which, combined with the actions of the speculators, resulted in the fluctuations of their prices to record levels. The revolutionary group, named 'The Society of the Panthéon', envisaged that the seizure of power would have to be followed by the establishment of a revolutionary dictatorship that would fill the void of governing body. This revolutionary dictatorship, in turn, would initiate the reforms transforming the society and ideas, norms and values of the of its members, culminating in turning power to the masses at a later date. Babeuf's 'Conspiracy for Equality' eventually failed, and its leaders were arrested, yet, this barebones sketch of Babeuf's approach to establishing the socialist society is important in the sense that his ideas would have an everlasting resonance on the nineteenth century French socialists.[178]

Moving on to the notable figures of the period leading up to the Revolutions of 1848, Fourier (1772-1837) emerges as a key utopian socialist that resemble, in many aspects, the British utopian thinkers. He was a believer of what he called 'Harmony' as an alternative to the exploitation and hypocrisy that he associated with bourgeois

[176] See Stein, Lorenz von. *History of Social Movement in France*, (Bedminster, 1964), pp.156.

[177] For the impact of the Babeuf's early socialism on the later socialists and anarchists including Buonarroti and Blanqui, see Lehning, Arthur. *From Buonarroti to Bakunin: Studies in International Socialism*, (Leiden, 1970).

[178] However, this is not to say that his influence was limited to the nineteenth century alone. Indeed, whether it is for his resort to conspiracy or his intention of establishing a temporary dictatorship Babeuf anticipated the vital elements of many later socialist and anarchist movements.

'Civilization'. In the state of harmony, he postulated, masses would attain universal happiness through the division of the society into a network of agricultural communes that had between eighteen and a hundred individuals. These communes were characterized by communal property and by the opportunity for every individual to carry out the work that he or she desired. In such a state of affairs, Fourier claimed, the individual would not only satisfy his or her desires by performing his work but would also willingly devote his or her labor to the common good.

Another important figure of this epoch was Saint-Simon (1760-1825), who is widely acknowledged as the first theorist that placed class conflict at the heart of historical change. A staunch believer of progress and human happiness, he believed that the only way to ensure the disappearance of class conflict was to establish a benign élite group who possessed optimal knowledge and skill in regulating the human affairs. The selection to this group was to be based on equal access to education in the society he envisioned. Saint-Simon, however, bemoaned the potential rise of the working class to power which led him to present his ideas to the bourgeois in hopes of convincing them that the formation of such a socialist society was in their interests.

Blanqui (1805-1881) was another key figure that played a large role in every French revolutionary uprising starting with the revolution of 1830. He put his faith into the destruction of the institutions, such as the Church and state, which he believed to be the originating point of all the degenerate ideas that kept the masses ignorant. Following in the footsteps of Babeuf, he believed that such destruction could only be realized by coups d'état led by small groups, which, in turn, would lead the proletariat through their superior knowledge and influence. Only when the masses were educated to a sufficient degree by that small group would it become possible for the democratic self-government to take over where the minority dictatorship had left off.

Blanc (1811-1882), a journalist and politician, was the intellectual that transformed French socialism from a sectarian ideal into a mass working class movement through his influential work, *The Organization of Labor*. In this work he postulated an image

of the future state that guaranteed regular work for each and every citizen. Confiscation of large-scale enterprises as well as banks, railroads and insurance companies was another important element of his thought. Blanc's socialism, in that vein, designated its *élan vital* as the replacement of capitalist enterprises with those that were under the control of state.

Proudhon (1809-1865), the last figure of our brief analysis was a 'mutualist' who, in his first book, *What is Property?*, portrayed the absentee landlords and capitalists as thieves who preyed upon the peasants and artisans. His sympathy for the latter groups led him to believe that mutual aid and anarchy offered the only way out of the capitalist system that was rife with inequalities. Indeed, his faith on the mutual as the skeleton key that had the power to lead the society out of the social antagonisms of his day was so strong that he rejected both communism and capitalism on the grounds that they were authoritarian. Instead, he advocated educating the masses on the laws as the pillars on which the community functioned. Once the nature of those laws is understood, he claimed, there would be no need for authority.

Hence we come to the full circle of our compressed survey of the canonical members of the French socialist tradition which permits us to highlight the important points of convergence that appear to recur over the course of this intellectual lineage. First, the dissolution of private property in the means of production appears as the initial condition for the establishment of the post-capitalist society. Indeed, whether the proposed course of action is to utilize the state as a means of establishing the future society, or to demolish the state first and start constructing the foundations of the future society anew, private property seems to be a theme that is designated as the 'mother of all evils'. Second, the primary task that the socialist leaders set for themselves appear to be the establishment of a future society, in which an individual's wealth would not be *the* determinant of his or her social position and welfare. Third, any form of ascribed social status and hierarchy is opposed, which is reminiscent of Feargus O'Connor's finishing remarks in his address to the Imperial Chartists: "My beloved friends, I will *join no party*. I will remain firm as the rock, and will cheerfully accept the cooperation of all who will join you and me in

breaking the oppressor's head."[179] This point is cemented further when one acknowledges that not even the established Church, with its particular sets of ascribed roles of hierarchy, was left aside without painting a considerable target on its back.

The radicalness of French socialism was also escalated by the living memory of the great revolution and of the revolutionary members of the society, writ large and small, such as the memory of the mass sans-culottes and the '*l'incorruptible*' Robespierre. Combined with the affluence of socialist remedies devised by those intellectuals that took account of the storm during the calm the recent memories of the revolutionary capabilities of the population, in that sense, kept the 'specter of revolution' very much alive in France.

Turning our sights to nineteenth century Britain, one is faced with a substantially different picture in spite of a number of similarities in various aspects of the socialist intellectual traditions. To begin with, the specter of revolution in Britain was quite close to being forgotten due to the fact that the most recent memories of a successful social revolution dated back to Levellers, Diggers, and Gerrard Winstanley and to the years between 1647-1652. Shattering the authoritarian pretensions, therefore, was not deemed to be a realistic option neither by the intellectuals nor by the organizing members of the British working class. Indeed, despite the apparent survival of the old revolutionary days in a number of forms in popular memory[180], it will be seen at the completion of our analysis that the nineteenth century British labor movements lived, and died, by the threat, and not the actuality, of revolution in a game of bluffs.

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[179] *The Northern Star*, 5th November 1842.

[180] The themes of the *Catchpenny Prints,* which were published *c.* 1780, for instance, were the symbolic representations of the antagonism between property and liberty, which were depicted in the form of a pair of fighting cocks. Another form of social critique that was present in other printed images were dressing baboons and apes in the clothes that were worn by the aristocracy and the high-ranking members of the military. This association of apes with wanton aristocracy also appeared as a common theme in the comic histories of Hogarth's.

Hogarth's penetrating satires deserve extra attention owing to the fact that they are epitomized with intransigent criticism of the ruling elite from the point of view of the lower class. Further, the comprehensive nature of his critiques was also solidified, with various facets of the links between exploitation and power, such as the subordination of women.

See *Catchpenny Prints*, (Dover Publications, New York, 1970), *Engravings by Hogarth*, (Sean Shesgreen ed.), (New York, 1973), Paulson, R. *Hogarth: His Life, Art and Times* (New Haven , 1971), and Antal, F. *Hogarth and his Place in European Art* (London, 1962).

The lower classes in England, nonetheless, had many reasons, even in the eighteenth century, to question the legitimacy of the laws that enacted private property. To that end, it is our contention that despite the temporal significance of the eighteenth century Britain laid in the obliteration of the final remnants of the feudal society in its transformation into an industrial society, the mode of production was already capitalist. Indeed, in spite of the considerable strength regional royalties and the ideas of Church and King had in inhibiting the growth of class consciousness within many strata, a class society was already in the process of formation which challenges the two-stage model that was formulated by Laslett in his *The World we have Lost*. In this work, Laslett defines the concept of class in the following manner,

> When the word class is used, in conversation and by historians it does not merely refer to status or to respect. The distribution of wealth and power is also at issue. This is obvious when the phrase class-conflict appears. For it nearly always seems to imply the clash of groups of persons defending and enhancing not simply a common status but also interest and power. The emphasis in on the solidarity of classes as groups of persons which act in championship of their conflicting aims. Such classes have a further characteristic in ordinary usage: they are nation-wide.[181]

Through making use of this formulation that incorporates many elements from Marx's conception of class consciousness, Laslett claims that there was only one class in pre-industrial England: the ruling landowner class. Yet, such an understanding of the class structure of the eighteenth century England appears to be quite controversial in the sense that regardless of whether the main criteria used to denote historical change is the mode of production or industrialization[182], the formation of a class and growing class perception and consciousness are essentially mutual. In other words, taken out of its relational context, neither power nor wealth as inherent structures in class relations can be intelligible. This view of the reality of factors of production as being graspable only in the framework of social relations in which they are embedded is explained by Marx in the following words:

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[181] Laslett, Peter. *The World we have Lost*, (London, 1971), p. 23.

[182] Laslett, for one, is an advocate of dividing "our European past in a simpler way, with industrialization as the point of critical change." (1971: 21).

> Capital consists of raw materials, instruments of labor and means of subsistence of all kinds, which are utilized in order to produce new raw materials, new instruments of labor and new means of existence. All these component parts of capital are creations of labor, products of labor, *accumulated labor*. Accumulated labor which serves as a means of new production is capital.
>
> So say the economists.
>
> What is a Negro slave? a man of black race. The one explanation is as good the other.
>
> A Negro is a Negro. A cotton spinning jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. It becomes capital only in certain relations. Torn from these relationships it is no more capital than gold in itself is *money* or sugar the price of sugar. . . .[183]

Henceforth, in the light of the fact that the possession of private property is just another indicator of the relations of power and wealth, there does not seem to be any evidence to challenge Neale's contention that "England [in the eighteenth century], therefore, possessed a social structure characterized by many strata based on different form of property, each with a different measure of ascribed status and power."[184] Further, the fact that influential political economists of the eighteenth century, e.g. Adam Smith, was well aware of the formation of a class-based society in the England of his day validate our point that the nineteenth century England offered as ripe conditions as any other for social classes to consolidate their positions.[185]

Going back to the turn of the century, we see that the problematic of private property and the social antagonisms it engendered did have considerable repercussions in British literature and poetry. For example, Jane Austen's novels have a distinct tone that revolve around the issue of private property and its effects on various groups that

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[183] *Selected Works*, vol. I, pp. 83.

[184] Neale, *Class in English History: 1680-1850*, pp. 75.

[185] Smith recognized the necessity of the existence of private property for the undisturbed accumulation of wealth. Indeed, his arguments in favor of the government originated directly from his understanding that "Civil Government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defense of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none at all." Smith, Adam. *The Wealth of Nations*, Everyman edn. (London, 1947), vol. II, pp. 203.

made up society. Another case in point is William Blake, who in his poem 'London' demonstrates how property absorbed life itself and left behind, in its wake, a 'chartered' city of inequality.

LONDON

I wander thro' each charter'd street,
Near where the charter'd Thames does flow,
And mark in every face I meet
Marks of weakness, marks of woe.

In every cry of every Man,
In every infants cry of fear,
In every voice; in every ban,
The mind-forg'd manacles I hear.

How the Chimney-sweepers cry
Every blackning Church appalls,
And the hapless Soldiers sigh
Runs in blood down Palace walls.

But most thro' midnight streets I hear
How the youthful harlots curse
Blasts the new-born Infant tear
And blights with plague the Marriage hearse.[186]

Other early political figures that had an long-lasting impact on the development of the nineteenth century socialism in Britain were Tom Paine and William Hone. Tom Paine, in the *Rights of Man*, located the illegal origins of property in the conquest of England by William the conqueror, who he argued "parceled out the country in this manner, and bribed some parts of it by what they call charters to hold the other parts of it the better subjected to their will."[187] He also refuted many ideas of Locke in arguing that his theory of appropriation was a nonsensical justification for great injustice, and in his challenges of Locke's reverence of the Revolution of 1688, claiming that it obscured the advance of reason and the revolutionary moment that was gathering momentum in France and America. He stressed, to that end, that the main constitutional product of the revolution, the Bill of Rights of 1688 should be renamed as the Bill of Wrongs for the aggravating effect it had over the pauperization of the masses.

[186] Blake, William. *Songs of Innocence and Experience* (Oxford reprint, 1967), plate 46.

[187] Paine, Thomas. *The Rights of Man*, (London, 1937), pp.39.

William Hone was a printer, bookseller and the writer of the lampoon that was published in forty-six editions by 1820 and is repudiated to have sold 100,000 copies overall; namely, *The Political House that Jack Built*. Tried, and subsequently acquitted, three times for publishing documents that were thought to be capable of arousing insurgency in the form of satirical parodies of the Catechism, Litany, and Creed, Hone was one of the foremost figures of this period that claimed property was inimical to political liberty.[188]

What brought the influential politicized individuals that we have covered so far and their perceptions of their society is that their conceptions appear to bear the mark more of orders than that of classes. Accordingly, the remedies that were brought forward by them relied on peaceable improvements that were to be carried out by a morally invigorated ruling clique. In that sense, one needs to concur with Neale's statement that, ". . . their watchword was not revolution but reform."[189] However, the impending comparison between the French and British socialists would also have to encompass the Ricardian, Owenite and Chartist frames of mind in order to draw a comprehensive vista, and a brief survey thereof will be what follows.[190]

David Ricardo (1772-1883), although not being a socialist himself, had a considerable impact on English socialism through his works that managed to construct systematic analyses of capitalist mode of production that drew on the background of mutual antagonisms among the landowning, capitalist, and working classes. These structural antagonisms between the interests of the three principal

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[188] Hone William, *The Political House that Jack Built*, forty-sixth edn. (London, 1820). For a more detailed analysis of Hone's works and trials, see Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 721.

[189] Neale, *Class in English History*, pp. 167.

[190] There are many other significant socialist figures in Britain during this period including, but by no means limited to, William Ogilvie, William Godwin, Charles Hall, and Thomas Spence. Spence, for one, opposed not only to hereditary and personal Lordship but also argued that the revolutionary circle would not be complete without abolishing private property in land when he noted that:

"The public mind being suitably prepared by reading my little Tracts. . . a few Contingent Parishes have only to declare the land to be theirs and form a convention of Parochial Delegates. Other adjacent Parishes would. . . follow the example, and send also their Delegates and thus would a beautiful and powerful New Republic instantaneously arise in full vigour. The power and resources of War passing in this manner in a moment into the hands of the People.. . their Tyrants would become weak and harmless. . . .And being. . . scalped of their Revenues and the Lands that produced them their Power would never more grow to enable them to overturn our Temple of Liberty." (Quoted in E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 161-162).

classes, Ricardo demonstrated, could be proved by showing the fluctuating shares of rents, profits, and wages respectively that made up the national income. His analysis, in that vein, differed significantly from that of Adam Smith, who portrayed the capitalist society as a harmonizing stage for the interests of all groups. By the same token, although Ricardo believed that the personal interest and common good was related, he posited the class position of the individual as the ultimate determinant of his or hate fate. Ricardo also commented on the nature of the conflicts between landlord and capitalist that surfaced in his day, arguing that landlords were the parasites that did not make any contribution to production and that rent, primarily, was wealth withdrawn from profits that were earned by capitalists. Marx, in turn, applied this analogy in the *Communist Manifesto* to the antagonistic relationship between capitalists and workers pointing out that profits were deduced from the social wealth that was produced by workers in the form of wages.

Robert Owen (1771-1858) was a mechanic and factory manager who claimed high wages and ameliorated working conditions would translate into enhancing the levels of an enterprise's profitability. He became an ardent advocate of shorter working hours and factory reform legislations in the 1820s. By 1830 Owen was at the helm of the National Equitable Labour Exchange System, which sought to eradicate the employing class as the stepping stone on which a self-governing and cooperative industry would be built. Ethical potential and social reform are intertwined in the thought of Owen to the extent that he opposed unethical competition as the 'root of all evil'. He also denounced religion since it linked social immiseration to inherited sinfulness as opposed to socially produced conditions.

Chartism was the foremost political movement of the nineteenth century Britain with a substantial working class composition. The movement took its name from the People's Charter of 1836, which demanded electoral reform and political power for the working class so that the advancement of labor's interests could be realized at a faster pace and with minimized losses. Some of the social and economic reforms that were formulated during this period included factory legislation, shorter working hours — ten-hour day to be exact —, and protection of child and female labor through their limitation. Close contacts between the Chartist leaders and Marx,

Engels, and the German exiles of the Communist League were established by the late 1840s, the movement, unfortunately, died much faster than it was formed which took place after the massive demonstrations in London in 1848.

Having completed our brief survey, we now can set sail on our quest to delineate the main features of British socialism in the first half of the nineteenth century. First of all, the reformist tone of the British intellectuals appears to be highly apparent as there is virtually no discussion about revolutionary conspiracy, which was the main element of Babeuf's and Blanqui's socialist thought, as a potential method for achieving socialism. Indeed, combining this flattened out radicalness with the absence of the memory of a revolutionary event that erased the very last remnants of the old society and with "the steady hiss of the guillotine [which] reminded all politicians that no one was really safe"[191] it seems apparent that French socialism of this period eclipsed that of the British with regards to their respective degrees of radicalness. Indeed, all great 'estates' that made up the French society were so unwilling to pause before taking the very last step in establishing the foundations of the type of society they desired that it makes any other contemporary socialist movement look reformist in comparison. Nonetheless, the only country in which phrases such as 'Lyon n'est plus' and "Ten thousand soldiers lack shoes. You will take the shoes of all the aristocrats in Strasbourg and deliver them ready for transport to headquarters by tomorrow ten a.m."[192] did in fact materialize within the popular lexicon was France, and no one can deny the sharpening effect of the French intellectuals in forging this uncompromising revolutionary tradition.

Why the British socialists did did not have the intransigent stance of the French socialists? There does not seem to be an easy answer to this question. To complicate the matters further, there was no industrial working class in France that had either had the numbers of the British working class or its exposition to high scales of industrial exploitation which was a decisive factor in the rise of the trade unions. In fact, the combined effect of the Revolutions of 1789 and 1830 was to delay the process of industrialization, and, thereby, the formation of the French working class

[191] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, pp. 71.

[192] *Œuvres Complètes de Saint-Just*, Vol. II, p. 147 (ed. C. Vellay, Paris, 1908).

by more than half a century. Still, inasmuch as some of the British intellectuals took the same stance towards private property as their counterparts did in France, the answer to the question of the nature of the methodological mantel to be put on in the revolutionary road always turned out to be experimental studies and parliamentarian reform as opposed to the accentuation of revolutionary coups d'état and conspiring élite in the French tradition. A brief comparison of the socialist traditions of the two countries, however, presents hardly enough evidence to make any comprehensive assertion pertaining to what one might call the inherent weakness of the British working class to adopt any decisive internationalist course of action in helping the proletariat of other countries. Indeed, without addressing the issue of the aristocracy of labor and its practical reality in the formation of the British working class one cannot hope to grasp why the British labor did not take the matters into its own hands while the cross of industrial capitalism was crucifying it as it did no other national working class.

3.2 Aristocracy of Labor: Myth or Reality?

In his later years Marx was quite close to losing all his hope for the revolutionary potential of the English working class. In fact, his dissatisfaction with the modest reformism of British proletariat was already becoming apparent by 1860s. This rift between the heyday of socialist agitation in the pre-1848 period and the rapid sinking of socialism into the abyss of oblivion would induce Marx to reconsider his position with respect to the Irish national liberation movement, and would even have an indirect effect on his revitalized interest on the Orient especially with regards to Russia, India and China. What can be the primary causes of split that transformed the British labor, who led the world in mass organization, socialist agitation and political class consciousness, into the mild trade unionist working class following 1848?

The post-Chartist English working class no longer fitted the description of the 'prime mover' of the international working class movement. To be sure, to expect that the contrast between the pre-1848 English proletariat and the working class of the post-1848 period to resemble that between black and white would verge on the lunatic.

There were, indeed, shades of gray in this epoch of transformation, which is to say that "No doubt this retreat took longer than we sometimes think Chartism did not die in 1848 but remained active and important for several years thereafter."[193] Nonetheless, the decline of British labor movement was evident: a retreat which would predicate any form of large-scale working class movement for years to come.

The British working class movement in 1840s, for Marx and Engels, was the prototype labor movement that originated from the most advanced capitalist economy of the time. Indeed, as we stated in the introduction, their hopes for the future of a bright and socialist future in Europe were depending to a large extent on the results of the mass movements that were in motion in this strongest link of the capitalist world economy. The downfall of Chartism in 1848 and the pacification of the political struggles during 1850s, which was an expansionary phase of capitalism in Britain, however, inserted a certain degree of reluctance to rely too much on the English working class for the realization of socialist revolution in Europe. In fact, Marx's and Engels' interests on the future of the English proletariat would receive another serious blow in 1857, the year of the next economic crisis, which, contrary to what they had expected, did not give rise to a revival of the Chartist movement. Their views regarding the English working class movement, from this time onwards would turn into complete disenchantment, signs of which would start to appear first in their private correspondence only to be followed by the strategic adjustments they made in their consecutive works. Indeed, two conceptions that made their appearance first in the private correspondence between Marx and Engels, the 'apparent bourgeois infection of the British workers'[194] and the 'embourgeoisement of the English proletariat'[195], appear, as shown by Hobsbawm, as vivid descriptions of what they thought was happening, and what indeed was happening, to British workers in the period of economic expansion after 1851.[196]

[193] Hobsbawm, E. J. *Revolutionaries*, (New York, 2001), pp. 113.

[194] Marx to Engels, 16 April 1863.

[195] Engels to Marx, 7 October 1858.

[196] Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries*, pp. 114.

The strategic discussions of Marx about this episode are key in two main strands; first, he realized the apparent adaptation of the labor movement to those years of capitalist triumph in Britain was a historical and therefore a temporary stage. The disappearance of the proletariat from the working class politics, in other words, was deemed not to be ultimate but a temporary setback, which was to be confirmed by the rise of socialism in the wake of Marx's death. Second, he never moved from his initial position that temporary advances achieved by capitalism, as in the period between 1851-1857, would establish the conditions of what one may call the 'affluent society' in which poverty had been banished completely.

In the end, the movement away from revolutionary significance to complete reformism of the British labor could only be explained, Marx claimed, by recognizing the importance of the effects of capitalist expansion after 1851 on the socialist agitation in England and, more significantly, by acknowledging the world domination that was enjoyed by British capitalism. This thesis, later on, would form the foundations of Engels' discussions on an 'aristocracy of labor' following Marx's death in 1881. Engels, however, not merely breathed life into this concept but also postulated that a potential loss of the hegemonic position of British economy and trade, which, in retrospect, was well on its way to completion by 1880s with the unprecedented rise of the American economy, would pave the way for a radicalization of British proletariat, both of which he observed as happening in 1880s.

The original Great Depression of 1873-1896 dethroned England as the world-dominating economic force of the era. Yet, even with the revival of the socialist agitation, the contours of the working class movement were strictly reformist. Engels spent more time and energy on scrutinizing the potential causes that might have given rise to this change of heart than did Marx. After all, one still could not overlook the fact that much of the reasons giving rise to Marx's basic view of the importance of the English working class movement still held:

> England, as the metropolis of world capital, as the country which has hitherto ruled the world market, is for the time being the most important country for working-class revolution; moreover, it is the only country in which the material

> conditions for this revolution have developed to a certain degree of maturity. Hence the most important task of the International is to accelerate the social revolution in England.[197]

The problem of the British worker thus was not the ripeness of the material conditions for the rise of the socialist current but simply that "it [the British working class] lacked the willingness to make a revolution, that is to say to use its political power to take over power, as it might have done at any time after the parliamentary reform of 1867."[198] Nevertheless, Marx did never accede to view the failure of the British working class to continue its revolutionary roots as a foregone conclusion. Indeed, Marx underlined the importance of parliamentary reform as a means for sweeping some of the bourgeois institutions that predicate the rise of socialist movement in bourgeois-democratic countries.[199] And, in doing so, Marx would remind the pitfalls that are associated with both passivism and the employment of unhistorical Bakuninist methods, e.g. needless acts of terrorism, etc., to the international working class. Marx, however, despite all his strategic attempts, could not manage to re-galvanize the British proletariat to an extent that would revitalize the revolutionary spirit of the 1840s. This was mainly the result of two peculiarities of the English working class: his limited influence on the British worker and the stratification within the labor ranks that started emerging no later than in 1830s. Given that a brief commentary on the former cause will be made at the end of this chapter, now it is time to put the aristocracy of labor, in both conceptual and practical terms, under scrutiny.

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[197] Marx to Meyer and Vogt, 9 October 1870.

[198] Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries*, pp. 116.

[199] This is not to say that Marx proposed parliamentary reforms as a potential substitute for revolution. Indeed they were only the initial preparation for the ultimate sweep of bourgeois laws and institutions, which could only be removed through revolution. Mandel's point that Marx did not see unionism as completely futile and degenerate, in that sense, ends up missing the point. Marx was indeed in favor of struggle in trade unions but only to the extent that it is to be transformed into a revolutionary workers movements following the achievement of parliamentary reforms. The real difficulty arose thus, according to Marx, when unionism was institutionalized as the only means of carrying on the struggle of workers. See Marx, *Speech after the Hague Congress 1872* (*Werke*, vol. 18, pp. 160); Marx, *Konspekt der Debatten über das Sozialistengesetz* (K. Marx-F. Engels, *Brief an A. Bebel, W. Liebknecht und Andre* 1, pp. 516); F. Engels, Preface to English translation of *Capital* Vol. I; Mandel, Ernest. 'Marx's Theory of Wages in the Communist Manifesto and Subsequently', in *The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx*, Brian Pearce trans., (New York, 1971) pp. 143-152.

The concept of the aristocracy of labor made its first appearance in a passage that was written by Engels in 1885, which was to be reprinted in the 1892 edition of the *Conditions of the Working Class in 1844*. Engels, in that passage, describes trade unions as forming 'an aristocracy among the working class' in the following manner:

> Secondly, the great trade unions. They are the organizations of those trades in which the labour of *grown-up men* predominates, or is alone applicable. Here the competition neither of women nor of machinery has so far weakened their organized strength. The engineers, the carpenters and joiners, the bricklayers, are each of them a power, to the extent that, as in the case of the bricklayer' labourers, they can even successfully resist the introduction of machinery. That their condition has remarkably improved since 1848 there can be no doubt, and the best proof of this is in the fact that for more than fifteen years not only have their employers been with them, but they with their employers, upon exceedingly good terms. *They form an aristocracy among the working class; they have succeeded in enforcing for themselves a relatively comfortable position, and accept it as final* [italics added]. They are the model working men of Messrs Leone Levi & Giffen, and they are very nice people indeed nowadays to deal with, for any sensible capitalist in particular and for the whole capitalist class in general.[200]

The connotations are made clear when the statement is viewed through the historical lens: The existence of a privileged substratum of the working class was an established social reality of 1880s. This 'upper working class' distinguished its 'respectable' origins from rest of the workers of 'rough' occupations via two principal mechanisms that introduced a 'natural selection' into the labor ranks. The first major mechanism was the nature of their 'crafts', which, albeit to varying extents based on the particular profession, required a certain type of education for the worker to go through, as well as necessitating the usage of tools in certain professions, and, most importantly, paid substantially higher wages compared to that of the factory worker, permitting to drive a wedge between different wage-earning strata within the ranks of labor. Second, it was the trade unions that ensured this differentiation would not only be constructed but also maintained. Trade unions stepped in whenever the risk of

[200] Engels, Friedrich. 'England in 1845 and in 1885', quoted in Engels, *The Condition of Working Class in England*, pp. 42.

losing ground to great numbers of educated workers or to mechanization became apparent. Unions, in that sense, functioned as erected barriers that helped the 'aristocracy' both to gain currency as a 'respectable' part of the working masses and to defend this privileged position by resorting to agitation of the working class whenever the industrial ground on which these barriers stood was found to be shaking.

This internal aspect of the stratification of the British labor was compounded by the arguments that are linked to the condensation of industrialized core countries and those that were either colonized or non-industrialized into two distinct and compressed groupings of the aristocracy and the actually toiling proletariat as conceptualized by Lenin in 1910s. Lenin, in that sense, carried the analogy of 'aristocracy' one step further to cover the inequalities among various national working classes that penetrated the supposedly rock-ribbed armor of unity and solidarity. In *What Is To Be Done?* (1902) he claimed that a purely trade unionist struggle "is necessarily a struggle according to trade, because conditions of labor differ very much in different trades, and consequently, the fight to improve these conditions can only be conducted in respect of each trade."[201] Unions were thereby chastised by Lenin as preparing the ground for 'the law of development' to gain a foothold of workers' consciousness. He argued, in that vein, that the gaunt devotion of the British proletariat to unionization was a direct outcome of workers' recognition of the diversity of conditions that prevailed in different industries and regions of the same economy which "must tend to fragment the working class into 'selfish' ('petty bourgeois') segments each pursuing its own interest, if necessary in alliance with its own employers, at the expense of the rest."[202] Narrow partial interests and ignorance within a working class could only be dissipated thus with the conscious avoidance of becoming wholly dependent on the contours of unionist struggle, an understanding that color a great part of Lenin's statement in his *Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question for the Second Congress of the Communist International* (1920):

[201] Lenin, Vladimir. *What Is To Be Done?,* (Tim Delany trans.), Marxist Internet Archive, pp. 36-37.

[202] Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries*, pp. 147.

> The industrial workers cannot fulfill their world-historical mission of emancipating mankind from the yoke of capital and from wars if these workers concern themselves exclusively with their narrow craft, narrow trade interests, and smugly confine themselves to care and concern for improving their own, sometimes tolerable, petty-bourgeois conditions. This is exactly what happens in many advanced countries to the 'labour aristocracy' which serves as the base of the alleged Socialist parties of the Second International.[203]

This crystal-clear representation of Lenin's understanding of the labor aristocracy was also applied to the general conditions of the international working class in his celebrated analyses in *Imperialism, The Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) and his article that was written in the same year, *Imperialism and the Split in Socialism*. The crux of the argument related to the labor aristocracy in these works are that the leading economic position of British capitalism — 'vast colonial possessions and monopolist position in the world markets' — introduced a split within the working class, dividing it into a labor aristocracy that had a minority status amid the great mass of workers and the correspondingly much larger lower stratum. This upper stratum, in the period leading up to 1870s, was characterized by a full-fledged opportunism that aimed both at maintaining the privileged position of its 'skill' within the labor hierarchy and at achieving momentary benefits that could be harvested from the leading position of British capitalism. Nonetheless, Lenin's argument goes, such opportunism could not prevail at an age when the world domination of the British economy had long withered away, only to be replaced by a multitude of competitors including the U.S. and Germany. Therefore, Lenin formulated the problem in such a way that "imperialism, while generalizing the phenomenon of the aristocracy of labour, also provides the conditions for its disappearance."[204]

The significance of this understanding of the labor aristocracy lay in that it was one of the pillars on which Lenin's theory of 'exploiting' and 'proletarian' nations stood. According to this theory, the conditions of late nineteenth century capitalism eased the way for the 'handful of the richest, privileged nations' to transform into 'parasites

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[203] Lenin, Vladimir. *Draft Theses on the Agrarian Question for the Second Congress of the Communist International*. Quoted in Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries*, pp 148.

[204] Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries*, pp. 149.

on the body of the rest of mankind', thereby heralding a new age in which the 'proletarian' nations were increasingly falling prey to the exploitative mechanisms of the core states. Lenin took a stand against this issue of imperialism plaguing the collective mind of the industrial labor when he argued that:

> Only the proletarian class, which maintains the whole of society, has the power to bring about a successful social revolution. And now we see that, as the result of a far-reaching colonial policy the European proletariat has partly reached a situation where it is not its work that maintains the whole society but that of the people of the colonies who are practically enslaved. . . In certain countries these circumstances create the material and economic basis for infecting the proletariat of one country or another with colonial chauvinism; of course this may perhaps be only a temporary phenomenon, but one must nevertheless clearly recognize the evil and understand its causes. . .[205]

Having briefly sketched the main aspects of Marx's, Engels', and Lenin's conception of labor aristocracy, we may shift our attention to how this theory fares in the practical realities of the English working class in the first half of the nineteenth century. The aristocracy of labor, as we mentioned, was already in a determinant position within the composition of the working class in 1850s. The problem, in that vein, is how far the origins of this phenomenon can be traced back with respect to the formation of the English working class. We need to begin by noting, in that regard, by concurring with Hobsbawm's critique of E. P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class*. Hobsbawm points out that the formation of the English working class was far from being finalized in 1830s as opposed to what Thompson seems to suggest in his remarkable work. The British working class, in that sense, was far from being 'made' before or even at the high tide of Chartism. Indeed, only after the political chasm of the post-Chartist episode and the Great Depression that started emerging in 1873 would the British working class adopt the decisive revolutionary outlook as it momentarily did in the 1840s thereby exhibiting the characteristics of both being a 'class in itself' and a 'class for itself'.[206]

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[205] Lenin, Vladimir. Quoted in Hobsbawm, E. J. *Revolutionaries*, pp. 152.

[206] To be sure, this does not mean that any period can be taken as a definitive stage in which a particular class becomes a monolithic entity with permanent characteristics. Classes are not final

Going back to the aristocratic roots of the British labor, we believe that there is enough evidence for one to conclude that the labor aristocracy has been one of the main constituents of British proletariat. This contention, it appears, can be established without the least difficulty by making use of three supplementary arguments: the decisive position of labor aristocracy in virtually all of the popular movements that materialized in Britain in the first half of the nineteenth century; the formidable proportion of the workers that belonged to this privileged strata; and, the total gains accruing to the whole of the British workers which were achieved by the mass movements at the leadership of the organizing groups that belonged to the lower middle class.

First and foremost, the presence of labor aristocracy was so decisive that any of the mass movements of this period would hardly be fathomable without adding this cog to the complicated machinery of working class agitation. Trade unions and their members of lower middle class occupations, in that vein, need to be conceived as the prime catalyst of social movements of the nineteenth century Britain. In other words, the fact that the skilled artisan was at the core of the working class movements is generally accepted.[207] Further, even if we one is to agree with E. P. Thompson standpoint with respect to the rather finalized making of the English working class until 1830s, it appears that "it is logical to project the later labour aristocracy backward into that period [1830s]."[208] And, in the light of our analysis of the radicalness of British socialist intellectuals in and before that period, it appears that the key importance of lower middle class in the formation of the working class movements can be taken as solid evidence for our claim that aristocratic roots of the British labor was well established before the downfall of Chartism in 1848 and the ensuing capitalist expansion of 1850s.

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products of a combination of productive forces, or as Hobsbawm wrote, "Classes are never made in the sense of being finished or having acquired their definitive shape. *They keep on changing* [my italics]" (1984:194). This point was also brought to the fore at various points in E. P. Thompson's own work, for example when he argues that "The working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present in its own making." (1963:9) The gist of our argument, therefore, is that the British working class did not exactly appear as a force on its own until the very end of the nineteenth century, and not that it did not stop changing at any stage. See Hobsbawm, *Workers*, pp. 194-179.

[207] See Hobsbawm, *Workers*, pp. 221-223, and Pelling. 'The Concept of the Labour Aristocracy' in *Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian England* (London, 1968), pp. 56-57.

[208] Hobsbawm, *Workers*, pp. 218.

However, we need to be careful in not understanding this point to be bound to lead on to any sweeping assessments on the internationalism of the British proletariat. Indeed, the proposed internal stratification of the working class cannot be perceived as conjuring up the specter of the Leninist view of Imperialism that sheds light on the English workers of post-Chartism and not before. That is to say that the British working class, with regards to establishing a commitment to the international working class struggle, was truly far from being made: it had to wage the democratic campaigns and pursue factory reforms to the extent that its members could become full citizens of the British society. The democratic demands of People's Charter is a case in point, and without understanding the fact that the lower classes, as well as the lower middle class, could not have embarked on the journey to class struggle in the absence of numerous democratic rights one cannot hope to render the underlying importance of democratic demands for British workers graspable. One could elucidate the import of these demands for democratic elections with the following analysis made by Engels:

> In 1835 a committee of the General Working Men's Association of London, with William Lovett at its head, drew up the People's Charter, whose six points are as follows: (1) Universal suffrage for every man who is of age, sane and unconvicted of crime; (2) Annual Parliaments; (3) Payments of members of Parliament, to enable poor men to stand for election; (4) Voting by ballot to prevent bribery and intimidation by the bourgeoisie; (5) Equal electoral districts to secure equal representation; and (6) Abolition of the even now merely nominal property qualification of £300 in land for candidates in order to make every voter eligible. These six points, which are all limited to the reconstitution of the House of Commons, harmless as they seem, are sufficient to overthrow the whole English Constitution, Queen and Lords included. The so-called monarchical and aristocratic elements of the Constitution can maintain themselves only because the bourgeoisie has an interest in the continuation of their sham existence; and more than a sham existence neither possesses today. But as soon as real public opinion in its totality backs the House of Commons, as soon as the House of Commons incorporates the will, not of the bourgeoisie

> alone, but of the whole nation, it will absorb the whole power so completely that the last halo must fall from the head of the monarch and the aristocracy.[209]

Secondly, it has been shown by Hobsbawm that, the lower middle class, from a numbers standpoint in terms of union membership, was far from being an indecisive component. This fact should not come as a surprise given that the craft unions offered the most effective means to labor aristocracy for establishing and maintaining its privileged status. Nonetheless, the staggering proportion of labor aristocrats in union membership needs to be emphasized despite the debatable nature of numbers that one can derive from statistical accounts based on different types of classifications that are used.[210] Further, given the restricted nature of memberships for craft unions that separated those who possessed skills, tools, and educational background from those who lacked them, it appears that, combined with their leading positions in the context of working class agitation, the aristocracy of labor also had the numbers to impose its will on the lower classes as early as the rise of trade unionism in 1820s.

The cooperation of the interests of lower middle class and those of unskilled labor is the final point of our discussion. The opportunism of labor aristocracy that Lenin rightfully accused the English working class in the period following the emergence of new unionism, in that sense, can be conceived as already in place in the first half of the century. However, such an understanding need not have any degrading connotations given that popular struggles of this period, as stated before, stemmed largely from democratic demands instead of desiring to build the society anew. Further, the coalition of those interests was also one of the principal sources from which the mass-scale movements of that period derived their popular appeal. Therefore, recalling the key position that labor aristocracy occupied in the formulation of those democratic demands, there is sufficient information to suppose that the aristocracy of labor not only represented the interests of a mere minority but those of the working classes as a whole.

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[209] Engels, *The Conditions of the Working Class in England*, pp. 236.

[210] See Hobsbawm, *Workers*, pp. 245.

The analyses presented in this section suggest that the reformist attitude that was inherent in the works of the socialist intellectuals of the period was consolidated by the governing position of labor aristocracy within the British working class struggle in the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, despite the fact that the English working class was still in the process of 'being made' in those years, the popularity of mass-scale movements appear largely to be the work of the lower middle class. Members of this stratum, while advancing and maintaining the privileges of their own class, also set the pace of democratic reforms that affected the entire working class. And, to that extent no vista of the early nineteenth century popular movements in Britain can be portrayed without the inclusion of the 'respectable' members of the working class. Henceforth, it appears, for better or for worse, reformism of labor aristocracy was inherent in the social movements that materialized in this episode, which, at the very least, is suggestive of the existence of an internal division within the ranks of labor long before the *Beehive* wrote in 1864:

> The working classes are divided into two sections, one comprising the skilled artisan and mechanic and the other the labourer, costermonger, the men who find their daily living by means which they would find it difficult to describe, although yet honest withal, and the roughs of all descriptions.[211]

3.3 Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism in Early Nineteenth Century England

Irish agitation in England in the first half of the nineteenth century was important in the sense that it, at times, had the momentum of a landslide with regards to binding the Irish workers together. Irish workers, in this period, had much to protest against, including ethnic and religious discrimination in addition to the pestilential swamp of poverty in which they had to survive both in England and back home. Indeed the Irish were the ultimate definition of being propertyless in a society in which "The greatest offence against property was to have none."[212] All of these factors played a role in radicalizing the Irish worker to an extent that insofar as any particular group

[211] *The Beehive*, 2 July 1864.

[212] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 61.

of the early Victorian era can be called revolutionary, it was them. However, inasmuch as they were driven to break the back of the resistance of the British capitalists, who subjugated them by showing that might was right, they were not organized and thus their revolutionary fervor was put at the behest of leaders many of whom belonged to middle or the lower middle classes with political agendas of their own. Irish agitation in England, nevertheless, is of great import for those who are willing to excavate whether if the roots of the British working class was internally contaminated with ethnic and religious divisions or not. In this section, therefore, a brief panorama of the position of the Irish workers among their British counterparts, their influence on and impact over the English working class movements will be sketched.

The number of the Irish immigrants in England, according to E. P. Thompson, was estimated to be over 400,000 by 1841.[213] Their numbers were especially great in the industrial towns including London, Liverpool and Manchester in which they constituted between one-fifth and one-third of the total working population.

The dramatic events that took place at the turn of the century, the ruthless repression of the United Irishmen's rebellion in 1798 and the enactment of the Act of Union in 1800 which represented the provision of the political firing squad to an already condemned people, induced many Irish to emigrate either to the U.S., Canada or England. An erroneous estimate[214] of the population of Ireland is a case in point with respect to demonstrating the general position of religious groups within the Irish society. According to this estimation, the population of Ireland 4,500,000 with the religious composition of 450,000 Anglicans, 900,000 Dissenters, and 3,150,000 Catholics. Dissenters were portrayed as "the most enlightened body of the nation" and that,

> They are steady Republicans, devoted to Liberty and through all the stages of the French Revolution have been enthusiastically attached to it. The Catholics, the Great body of the People, are in The Lowest degree of Ignorance and Want,

[213] *Ibid*, pp. 429.

[214] The results of the first official Census in 1821 showed that the total number of the Irish population was 6,803,000.

> ready for any Change because no Change can make them worse, the Whole Peasantry of Ireland, the Most Oppressed and Wretched in Europe, may be said to be Catholic.[215]

As opposed to the dominant British prejudices of anti-Gallican origins that prevailed at the time, in Ireland "a Conquered, oppressed and Insulted Country the Name of England and her Power is Universally Odious. . . ".

> The Dissenters are enemies to the English Power from reason and Reflection, the Catholics from a Hatred of the English Name. . . .
>
> In a Word, from Reflection, Interest, Prejudice, the spirit of Change, the misery of the great bulk of the nation and above all the Hatred of the English name resulting from the Tyranny of near seven centuries, there seems little doubt but an Invasion [of the French] would be supported by the People.[216]

It was in such a historical context that the numbers of Irish immigrants in England steadily rose after 1790. The first wave of immigrants between 1790 and 1810 were predominantly Protestants and Ulstermen of trader, artisan, weaver and cotton-operative origins who evacuated their homes in Ireland due mainly to the disastrous economic effects that the Act of Union had in giving rise to unequal economic competition. Indeed, the effects of the Act was so devastating for the Irish small and medium size producer that any chance for economic growth was irrevocably severed in the wake of its enactment; in the words of Treble,

> Indeed, it could be argued that one of the indirect consequences of the Union was to increase that dependence [the dependence of Irish peasantry on the land] by virtually destroying in the mid-1820s whole sectors of the Irish textile industry. The process of disintegration can be traced to the decisions, taken in the 1820s, to dismantle the remnants of the Irish tariff system. In 1821 the 10 per cent duty on English cotton goods were removed; in 1823 the levy upon English woolens met with a similar fate; in 1824 the silk tariff disappeared.

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[215] Howell, Thomas B. ed., *A Complete Collection of State Trials and Proceedings for High Treason and Other Crimes and Misdemeanors from the Earliest Period to the Year 1783, with Notes and Other Illustrations*, (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown, 1818), pp. 1201-1202.

[216] T. S. 11.3510 A (2); *Trial of the Rev. Wm. Jackson* (1795), pp. 80-81, quoted in E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 430.

> Once the Irish market had been thrown open in this fashion to English competition the final blow could not be long delayed.[217]

Following the 1810s, however, the migration pattern changed to one of mostly Catholics and peasants. The familiarization with the routes of migration was another factor that accelerated the number of immigrants which was also boosted with the occasional crop failure as in the famine of 1821-1822. The mass ejection of the Irish 'freeholders' between 1828 and 1830 was also decisive in intensifying migration. However, as swelled as the numbers travelling to England were, none of the migrants were enthusiastic to settle in 'the last place they would willingly approach.' Those who were fortunate and did not lack the financial means were emigrating to U.S. or Canada whereas those who did not had to leave abysmal conditions in Ireland had no other place to go than England. Those conditions that the majority of the Irish migrants left behind which were insufficient for even "the commonest necessities of life" were described in the Blue Books in the following manner:

> Their habitations are wretched hovels, several of a family sleep together upon straw or upon the bare ground. . . their food commonly consists of dry potatoes, and with these they are . . . obliged to stint themselves to one spare meal on the day. . . They sometimes get a herring, or a little milk, but they never get meat except at Christmas, Easter, and Shrovetide.[218]

One can only hope to understand the willingness of the Irish migrants to work even for the worst paying and back-breaking jobs in England by taking recognition of these conditions of bare life that they left behind in their homes, which made them indispensable for their British employers. To that point, one Manchester silk manufacturer exclaimed that "the moment I have a turn-out and am fast for hands I send to Ireland for ten, fifteen, or twenty families. . ."[219] The absolute pauperization that they were subjected to, in turn, translated into an industrial work-discipline that their employers happily capitalized upon. This discipline made them the most essential component of the heavy manual occupations that the industrial society was

[217] Treble, J. H. 'The Irish Agitation', in *Popular Movements c. 1830-1850*, J. T. Ward ed., pp.153.

[218] *Third Report of the Commissioners fro Inquiring into the Condition of the Poorer Classes in Ireland* (1836), pp. 3.

[219] *Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain* (1836), pp. vii.

built upon. The Irish thereby became the perfect substitutes for the English worker, who was not willing to oblige the conditions of work in certain arduous types of occupations. The Irish, on the other hand, did not mind the conditions, a point that is explained in the words of E. P. Thompson as follows:

> Demoralized in Ireland by a sub-subsistence economy or by the conacre system (by which they were reduced to semi-slavery to the farmers in return for the use of a potato patch) they had acquired a reputation for lethargy and fecklessness. Energy was no asset in a land where the good tenant was penalized by the doubling of his rent. In England they were capable of astonishing feats, showing a—
>
> . . .willingness, alacrity and perseverance in the severest, the most irksome and most disagreeable kinds of coarse labour, such for instance as attending on masons, bricklayers and plasterers, excavating earth for harbors, docks, canals and roads, carrying heavy goods, loading and unloading vessels.[220]

The Irish thus filled the gaps that were deemed too dehumanizing by the English labor. They, in that sense, were the real toilers of industrialization in the boiler rooms with very few numbers to actually manage to be employed in the superior production processes. Having acquired the industrial working discipline that could be matched by no other group, and rising in their numbers as a result of the aggravating conditions of an already too desolate an existence in Ireland, Irishmen, by the 1830s, had become the principal group to be employed in whole classes of work.[221]

Having drawn the historical background in which the Irish workers hammered out a toil-laden way of life for themselves in England, we now shift our attention to how this translated into their position within the English working class in its stages of formation. Irish labor occupied an uneasy position within the English working class. They represented "a seemingly inexhaustible flow of reinforcements" that the capitalists could rely on whenever the other components of the British labor became

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[220] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 433.

[221] *Report on the State of the Irish Poor in Great Britain* (1836), pp. v, vii-ix, xxx-xxxi; Wade, John. *History of the Middle and the Working Classes*, pp. 242-243, quoted in E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 434.

too demanding "to man the battlements of Satan's strongholds."[222] Adding into the practical difficulties was the religious barrier and the urban segregation which resulted in the emergence of a tight-knit community that had no tolerance for acts of aggression that were channeled from the outside. The overriding influence of the Church, for one, was so important that Daniel O'Connell attempted, time and again, to utilize the priesthood in order to exert religious pressure on the Irish migrants. The relations between the Catholic priesthood and Irish migrants were established at the moment of their migration. Indeed, through its administrative nexus, the Church came to bear a decisive influence on the working mass that showed no deference to any other authority. Priests helped them safeguard their remaining roots thereby becoming, in a sense, a safe haven for the migrants who had to adapt to a completely new way of life. Members of the Church also helped the migrants to keep in touch with their families by bringing news from of home, in addition to establishing a place of holiness in which the images of O'Connell and other liberators were welcome.

Segregation, on the other hand, was not extensive and it never became remotely similar to be pressed back to ethnic cantons. The numbers of inter-marriage, a sign of non-segregated communities, were formidable. And, despite the aforementioned barriers of religion, the absorption of the Irish into the working class communities were significantly easy. To be sure, there were occasional riots and pitched battles throughout 1830s and 1840s especially in places where the competition between the Irish and English unskilled labor was still formidable. In fact, London, particularly in the epoch of parliamentary disputes for Catholic Emancipation (1800-1829), could be portrayed as a city in which the anti-Catholic and anti-Irish sentiments ran high. Nevertheless, there were too many common grounds for both sides to coalesce their demands and to form an alliance as in Chartism, and a lot less for drawing battle lines. Thence, one can easily claim that a conscious political alliance had been formed and maintained between the Irish and English workers as early as the days of the United Irishmen.

The attitude of British reformers vis-à-vis the Irish migrants was also key in ensuring the consolidation of this alliance. Indeed, the prominent British reformers, such as

[222] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 437.

Cobbett, were generally in support of the struggle for Catholic Emancipation, and were not afraid of tracking various injustices that were committed by Castlereagh (referred to as "Derry-Down-Triangle" for his strict opposition to all change and reform). The cooperation between the Irish and English radicals was also evident in the formation of the Association for Civil and Political Liberty (1828), a radical and anti-O'Connolite organization based in London, which was predecessor of the National Union of the Working Classes (1830), which itself foreshadowed the formation of the Chartist London Working Men's Association in 1836. Hence, all in all one can easily refer to the existence of a "clear consecutive alliance between Irish nationalism and English Radicalism between 1790 and 1850, at times enlivened and confused by the fortunes of the O'Connor family."[223]

If the relative ease with which the Irish were admitted into the working class communities in England helped them to maintain and foster their revolutionary fervor, the neutral stance of the Church with respect to political issues hindered it. Indeed, the main internal obstacle that the Irish migrants faces in assuming a decisive revolutionary role was the Church's avoidance of tinkering with the revolutionary vigor of workers and the hesitant constitutionalist/reformist attitude of O'Connell.

Whilst the neutrality of the Church is perfectly intelligible provided that its members, by no means, wanted to entertain the possibility of endangering the limited foothold they had gained in England by the rising numbers of Irish migrants, the indecisive position of O'Connor require further elaboration. O'Connor was an important political figure that exerted a great deal of influence on the Irish. He was a successful agitator and manipulator that played a key role in the Irish Agitation throughout 1830s and 1840s. He, during that period, was on the lookout for various potential tactical alliances with Tories and Whigs alike and he resorted to covert political threats whenever that potentiality seemed to be suspended. The Agitation for Repeal, therefore, cannot be successfully fathomed without adding him to the political equation. It was his oscillating position in search for those alliances as well as his denouncement of violent methods that resulted in the rife between the Chartists and Irish nationalists that emerged in the first half of 1840s. Naturally, he was quite

[223] *Ibid*, pp. 441.

aware of the fact that neither the Whigs nor the Tories could be expected to give their consent for the realization of the Irish Repeal, which is noticeable in a letter written by him to P. V. Fitzpatrick in February 1839:

> With respect to Ireland, there is thorough indifference in both parties. In the Whigs coldness and apathy; in the Tories suspended hostility. They equally desire to keep Ireland out of sight, and to let her people continue in, I may call it, hopeless servitude.[224]

Nonetheless, notwithstanding his devotion to the cause of Repeal, even the 'monster meetings' he helped to organize in 1843, his position with regards to the separation of Ireland from Britain was obscure to an extent that Sharman Crawford, who protested O'Connell as regarding the maintenance of the Whig alliance as of utmost priority as opposed to the true interests of Ireland in late 1830s, would write:

> With regard to O'Connell . . . [he was] humbugging both repealers and Federalists — trying to make the repealers believe they are Federalists — and the Federalists that they are Repealers — and keeping up a delusive joint agitation — knowing right well that whenever particulars came to be discussed they would split like a rope of sand.[225]

Indeed, the fast-paced political maneuvers of O'Connell would be decisive in the surfacing of the rift between his side and that of the English Chartists under the aegis of Feargus O'Connor. Chartists, in that sense, were in full support of unconditional Repeal, which made them unique as the only important group that dared to venture beyond the traditional federalist lines in addressing the 'Irish question'. Their support for outright Repeal, however, did not translate into forming a formal alliance between the National Charter Association and the Loyal Nation Repeal Association due both to the personal conflicts between O'Connell and O'Connor, and O'Connell's genuine disapproval of the orations of 'physical violence' that was a recurring theme of the speeches of Chartist leaders in late 1830s.

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[224] O'Connell to Fitzpatrick, 6 Feb 1839 (W. J. Fitzpatrick, ed. *Correspondence to Daniel O'Connell* (1888), ii, I2).

[225] N. L. I. Smith O'Brien Papers, 434 (1277): Crawford to O'Brien, 18 Nov 1844, Quoted in Treble, 'The Irish Agitation', pp. 169.

The pacifist standpoint of O'Connell would also be decisive in the formal separation of the 'Young Irelanders' from the Repeal Association. O'Connell's emphasis on the non-violent means as he put it in 1844, "The greatest and most desirable of political changes may be achieved by moral means alone . . . no human revolution is worth the effusion of one single drop of blood"[226] was to be attacked by the 'Young Irelanders' on the grounds that even though the Repeal agitation would be conducted in a peaceful manner, it could not be presented as an universal elixir that was capable of solving all political hardships. This conflict on the means of agitation would eventually give rise to the falling out between O'Connell's side and that of the 'Young Irelanders' and Smith O'Brien. Therefore, however influential 'the Liberator' over the ripening of the Repeal agitation may have been, his ultimate impact on the British working class movement in the Chartist are in general and on the Irish national movement in particular would be one of division. As E. P. Thompson argued,

> If O'Connor had been able to carry Ireland with him as he carried the north of England, then the Chartist and "Young Ireland" movements might have come to a common insurrectionary flash-point. The reservations of the "moral force" Chartists on one hand, and the influence of O'Connell and the priesthood on the other, together with the terrible demoralisation of the "Great Hunger", prevented this from happening.[227]

3.4 A Diagnosis

We began this chapter by underlining the importance of British proletariat for Marx's and Engels' formulations of the potential trajectory of working class movement in Europe. Based on the textual evidence we pointed out that both figures held the English working class movement, especially its culmination in Chartism, in high regard. Yet, we also stressed that this veneration in the revolutionary potential of English workers were about to change following the collapse of Chartism in 1848 and the agitation-free period which followed in 1850s. At one level, the founding fathers of Marxism were right in putting their faith in English workers as the

[226] Gwynn, D. *Daniel O'Connell, The Irish Liberator* (1903), pp. 266.

[227] E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, pp. 443-444.

harbingers of the dawn of a new society for the simple fact that the former was the most organized and class conscious working class within the capitalist world economy. Hence, it is not too much of a distortion to claim that capitalism, as a mode of production, in Britain thus had made such great strides by 1830s that "Class, consciousness, militancy, hatred and contempt for the oppressor, belonged to this life as much as the looms on which men wave."[228] On another level, however, their youth and excitement might have clouded their judgments of English workers' revolutionary vigor for they were to realize that suggesting a sudden leap forward in class consciousness did not match well with reality. Indeed, the English working class, as we argued, was far from being 'made' in the period leading up to 1850.

Then we moved on to the analysis of the radicalness of the demands of the English working class as well as the 'revolutionary' methods adopted by them through the course of the first half of the nineteenth century. Comparing the views of some of the key figures of British radicalism with those of the early French socialism we claimed that a considerable rift separated the two traditions, which, in turn, shaped the political attitudes of the masses. We argued, to that end, that the relatively superior — indeed hegemonic — economic position of Britain was decisive in impelling the growth of a revolutionary mass consciousness that not only revered the vivid memory of 1789 but was capable of taking the matters into its own hands both in 1830 and 1848. In short, having the most advanced capitalist country of the age did not translate into the crystallization of an ethos of mutuality between the revolutionaries of Britain and Ireland, but, in fact, divided them.

A brief portrayal of the nature of labor aristocracy, its functions and its impact on British labor was canvassed in the subsequent section. There, in that vein, appeared to be plenty of evidence as to the existence of a privileged substratum within the labor ranks, or an aristocracy. Our scrutiny of this substratum suggested that it played a key role in both advancing and thwarting the interests of British labor. Indeed,

[228] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution*, pp. 255. Needless to add, the British capitalist employers of this period were also 'pioneers' of other abhorrent practices in an industrial environment, such as transforming children into mere articles of commerce and tools of labor and the practice of *jus prima noctis* [right of the first night] both of which are explained in *The Condition of the Working Class in England*. See Engels, *Condition of the Working Class*, in *Marx-Engels Collected Works* 4. pp. 461-463, 441-442.

given its preponderance within trade unions and other influential organizations it appears that reformism was well entrenched as a pillar on which the labor agitation stood. An interesting fact to note, at this juncture, being the virtual non-existence of unionism, which, in effect, hindered the potential growth of any such aristocracy within the French socialist tradition.

In the last section we drew a sociological sketch of the Irish agitation in the years 1820-1850 for the sake of clarifying the blurred lines of cooperation between the Irish and English workers. The results we obtained in our investigation showed that despite the ethnic and religious differences there were not sufficient reasons to introduce a split between the two groups with the sole exception of occasional conflicts that emerged due to the economic competition between the unskilled labors of both groups. Indeed, if a formal coalition of interest of Irish nationalists and Chartists did not materialize, it had to do more with the constitutionalist stance of O'Connell and his followers, coupled with the pacifism of the Church, than with material or ethnic grounds as such.

This survey demonstrates that neither the trade unionism of 1820s and 1830s nor the Chartist movement of 1840s can be expected to show any signs of commitment to the international working class struggle. Indeed, the English working class movement in this period can best be described as exhibiting the reformist characteristics in seeking democratic elections while drawing on the background of an intermediary stage with respect to the formation of class consciousness. In the end, inasmuch as the suffering British laborer was came to be aware of the fact that industry, for him or her, was not a triumph but a burden, the English proletariat had to endure much more in order to assume its definitive shape on the eve of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER III

THE LIBERTY TREE AND AN INEVITABLE DESTINY

We saw that the nineteenth century for the British empire epitomized the consolidation of its world leading position in productive capabilities and political influence. *Au* contraire, the same time period for Ireland signified the complete disintegration of the Irish economy as well as the dramatic rise of human suffering of a people for the majority of whom the passage of time, since the reign of Henry VIII, seemed only to take things away without giving back anything in return. Indeed, despite the recognition of the horrors of the twentieth century, even today the heart contracts at the sight of the anguish that the Irish had to withstand particularly in 1840s.

Ireland's position within the empire was unique in three ways. First, the Irish anti-colonial agitation was key in setting an example for the other subjugated peoples in their quests for national liberation. The Irish, therefore, were the pioneers of the process of decolonization which was to start as early as the late eighteenth century. Piers Brendon, in a recent work on decolonization, underlined this point when he wrote that "Ireland freed herself by her exertions and would help to free others with her example."[229] Further, given that Ireland's relationship with India was built upon this pioneering position of the Irish anti-colonial struggle, it becomes all the more important to study the early nineteenth century Ireland for our purposes. Second, Ireland was a unique reference point for the imperial officers in terms of understanding and experimenting with the cultural state of affairs of an indigenous people. Put differently, Ireland was the background laboratory for imperial

[229] Brendon, Piers. *The Decline and Fall of the British Empire 1781-1997*, (New York, 2008), pp. 316.

legislation and cultural studies that had a defining significance for the British in enhancing the effectiveness of their imperial governance.[230] This also indicates that Scott B. Cook's examination of Ireland in the nineteenth century giving way to his assertion that Ireland and India, unlike the other colonized areas, were always regarded as two special cases from the standpoint of British imperialists: British policy makers were content with comparing India and Ireland but not with Australia or Canada, and did not hesitate to answer the demands of the latter's settlers as opposed to those of the former's.[231] Third, the Irish were not only a subject population that was on the receiving end of the imperial politics but active agents in the shaping of the latter whether it was for the administrative positions they occupied in other British colonies of for making up a numerically significant proportion of the British forces that were deployed in the colonies. As Sean T. O'Caellaigh, one of the foremost republicans of his day, said in a 1924 speech addressing the Friends of Freedom for India in New York, it was largely because of the "the work of Irish brains and Irish brawn and muscle," that the Indian people

> have been beaten into subjection and have been so long oppressed. Until Ireland has taken some very definite steps to win back her good name and relieve herself of the odium that attaches to the race by reason of scandalous work done for England's benefit in India. . . we Irish have every reason to hang our heads in shame when the name of India is mentioned.[232]

Indeed, insofar as numbers of active participation of the Irish in the British colonial forces are concerned, more than half of the soldiers that were recruited to the British East India Company in 1800 were Irish, which is highlighted by the fact that by 1813

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[230] Ballantyne, Tony. 'The Sinews of Empire: Ireland, India and the Construction of British Colonial Knowledge', in Terrence McDonough ed. *Was Ireland a Colony? Economics, Politics and Culture in Nineteenth-century Ireland*, (Dublin, 2005), pp. 145-161. David Fitzpatrick, on the other hand, claims that Ireland was treated as a peculiar case in lieu of as an intrinsic component of the empire by the British, i.e. that "Ireland's rulers, whether grim or benevolent, tended to regard the Irish as a separate and subject native population rather than an integral element of a united people." Fitzpatrick, David. 'Ireland and the Empire', in (Andrew Porter, ed.) *The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume III: The Nineteenth Century*, (Oxford, 1999), pp. 494-521 (quotation on pp. 498).

[231] Cook, Scott B. *Imperial Affinities: Nineteenth Century Analogies and Exchanges between India and Ireland* (London, 1993), pp. 25.

[232] O'Caellaigh, Sean T. *India and Ireland*, (New York, 1925), pp. 9.

four recruiting offices of the Company were set up in Ireland.[233] The numbers of Irish troops in India in the time of the Indian Rebellion is a case in point: one estimate shows that the Irish were 14,000 strong, around 40 percent of the total British troops, in India at that point.[234] Therefore, there appear to be sufficient evidence to agree with Linda Colley's conclusion that "Without Irishmen the rampant growth of Britain's empire at this stage would scarcely have been possible."[235] The 'cosmopolitan nationalism'[236] of the Irish in the first half of the nineteenth century, therefore, appears as a guiding thread in analyzing the social fabric of the empire in that period. Further, provided that the social and economic roots of Irish nationalism have to be traced back to the major events that took place in the period leading up to 1850s, it appears that one needs to scrutinize Ireland of this epoch in order to draw any conclusions regarding the relationship between cosmopolitan nationalism and working class agitation. This chapter, therefore, will revolve around three themes that played a major part in the formation of the nineteenth century Irish nationalism, which constituted an integral part of the Irish anti-colonial struggle for decades to come. These three themes are the effects of the Act of Union of 1800, the struggle for Catholic emancipation, and the Great Famine of 1845-1849. The first section, in that vein, will canvass the impact of the Union on Irish economy and politics, which will be followed by an analysis of the social echoes of the parliamentary struggle for Catholic emancipation. The last section, via focusing on the devastating effects of the Great Hunger, will allow us to bring the historical evidence together in assessing the supposedly cosmopolitan nature of the nineteenth century Irish nationalism.

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[233] Gilbert, Arthur N. 'Recruitment and Reform in the East India Company Army, 1760-1800,' *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 1, (1975), pp. 89-111.

[234] Bailey Peter. 'Irishmen in the East India Company Army', *Irish Family History*, Vol. 17 (2001), pp. 84-92; Kenny, Kevin. 'The Irish in the Empire' in Kenny ed. *Ireland and the British Empire*, pp. 104-105.

[235] Colley, Linda. *Captives: Britain, Empire and the World1600-1850* , (London, 2002), pp. 310.

[236] The term is taken up from Jennifer Regan-Lefebvre and is used to denote a certain kind of nationalism that draws its strength from the participation of the colonized people through their representatives (M.P.s) in the parliament of the colonizer, which is coupled with the ability to see beyond the confines of one's own national struggle and thereby opting out for a much more international take that also underlines the hardships that other colonized peoples face. Regan-Lefebvre Jennifer. *Cosmopolitan Nationalism in the Victorian Empire: Ireland, India and the Politics of Alfred Webb*, (New York, 2009), pp. 114.

4.1 Ireland 1800-1850: From Whiteboys to the Great Hunger

The rebellious element against the British programme of re-settlement and colonization was well-established by the end of the eighteenth century. Colonized in the twelfth century[237], Ireland was in constant revolutionary flux for centuries. The first official wave of settler population, which mostly comprised of impoverished Protestant settlers from England and Scotland, was sent by Queen Elizabeth and Oliver Cromwell in order to gain a permanent foothold within a largely Irish and Catholic society. A turning point occurred in 1690, when the Catholic King James Stuart was overwhelmed at the Battle of Boyne by his son-in-law, the Protestant Prince William of Orange. A British programme of settlement in the eighteenth century, which showed utter disregard for the needs of the local populace, thus continued a long tradition of viewing Ireland as a virgin territory at the Empire's disposal.

However, as strong as the British tendency for colonizing Ireland was, the resistance it excited was even more formidable given the lack of arms, food supplies, and the imperial surveillance under which the members of resistance had to operate. The Whiteboys of the 1760s, for one, with their radically ambitious political goals that were recorded in one of their oaths as, "I sware, I will, to the best of my power, Cut down Kings, Queens, and Princes, Earls, Lords, and all such with Land Jobbin and Herrisy"[238], were the late comers in a continuous line of paramilitary resistance movements in Ireland.

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[237] The English rule in Ireland was first established by the grant of Ireland to Henry II in 1155-1156 by Pope Adrian IV and following Henry's visit to Ireland in 1171-1172. This grant made Ireland a lordship attached to the English Crown with a separate jurisdiction from that of England. This political status was maintained until 1541. Ireland had its own parliament throughout the Middle Ages, but the powers of the assembly were severely limited. These limitations included the passing of Poyning's Law (1494) which necessitated the submission of all the legislations that were proposed by the Irish parliament to the King and his council in England. Additionally, the Irish parliament could be summoned only if the approval of both the King and the Council had been taken. Henry VIII declared the King of England to be King of Ireland by the Act of 33 in 1541. Ireland thence became a sister kingdom of England, with the King presiding over both. This constitutional position of Ireland was maintained until the enactment of the Act of Union in 1800.

[238] Donnely, J. S. 'The Whiteboy Movement, 1761-5', *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol. 21 No. 81, (March, 1978).

Yet, even within such a continuous line of resistance there are some historical landmarks that stand out as an extraordinary example with regards to its impact over the following lines of succession. The Great Irish Rebellion of 1798 was one such example that managed, to a certain extent, to unite Catholic priests and Ulster dissidents which helped the Catholic peasants to leap the socio-cultural chasm between them and the Protestant middle class. Inspired by the revolutionary triumph of 1789, and assembled under the banner of Society of United Irishmen, which was established in 1791, the Rebellion of 1798 was to have important political repercussions for both the Irish and the empire.

The society, under the leadership of Wolfe Tone, was initially formed to petition for parliamentary reform, but those demands quickly gave way to a struggle for independence from Britain. The primary task of the rebels thus was independence that would be achieved through armed insurrection with the military aid received from revolutionary France. Wolfe Tone stressed this historic appeal to the Irish people "to break the connection with England . . . the never-failing source of all our political evils"[239] through his uniting propaganda of the common cause of overthrowing the British yoke. The propaganda, with regards to the Catholic majority, quickly took effect in uniting the secret societies that were already established. These societies, the most prominent of which was the 'Defenders' coalesced, in rapid manner, their interests with the general interests of the radicalized United Irishmen by 1794. The primary concerns of the Defenders were no less economic, such as the strain associated with taxes and the extraction of tithes, than it was religious and political:

> The disturbances spread to east and west, and it became evident that this rural movement was based on a more coherent and threatening ideology than earlier agitations. It involved some claims for land redistribution as well as historical memories of the Stuart cause; archaic and conservative elements were mingled with a new subversiveness. The ideas and oaths of the Defenders were

[239] Quoted in Gott, Richard. *Britain's Empire*, (Verso, 2011), pp. 130.

> transmitted by the highly mobile rural workforce, and some rural schoolmasters were involved in the mid-1790s.[240]

Despite the occasional clashes that took place between some Protestant and Catholic groups, the movement showed signs of success in uniting many of the groups that made up both sides. British authorities, however, becoming ever more vigilant in their approach to such potential unity, were successful in driving a wedge between the Catholics and Protestants. A local conflict, in which the confrontation of the two groups resulted in the defeat of the Catholic Defenders by the Protestant Peep O'Day Boys, in September 1795 in County Armagh gave rise to the formation of a strictly Protestant organization called the Orange Order. The Order was formed in order to safeguard the privileges of the Protestant settlers, and to evict peasants from the fields that were purchased by Protestants. Needless to add, the creation of the Order proved to be a major obstacle on the road to political unity

The United Irishmen, recognizing this split of interests turned their attention to a potential invasion from France, which, in their eyes, would vindicate the Rebellion and ensure victory. This likelihood of invasion — which, after all, was held back in December 1794, when Wolfe Torne and a French army of 14,000 men arrived off the Irish coast, only due to bad weather — would, however, alert the British that the United Irishmen were much more powerful than previously assessed. The British, taking recognition of that fact, replied by sending reinforcements to Northern Ireland, which was regarded as the stronghold of the United Irishmen, in 1797, and by assigning a new commander, General Gerard Lake, to the task of 'disarming' Ulster. General Lake, in turn, established a reign of terror and made a few strides in making his name synonymous with brutal repression.[241] His tactics included setting houses of the Irish on fire, which was advocated by him in the following manner:

> I think if they knew military law was proclaimed, and that one or two of their large towns were threatened to be burned unless arms of every kind were produced, it would have a very great effect; and if they did not bring their arms,

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[240] Foster, Roy. *Modern Ireland, 1600-1972*, London 1988.

[241] This reputation was earned not only in Ireland but also in India where General Lake became commander-in-chief in 1800.

> it would be advisable for the houses of some of the most disaffected to be set on fire. You may think me too violent, but I am convinced it will be mercy in the end.[242]

The concerns of the British with regards to the impending threat of rebellion were still geared towards arresting the leaders of the United Irishmen in March 1798, which was followed by the proclamation of martial law and night-time curfew to disarm the entire populace. The policy of disarming the population, however, went hand in hand with terrorizing the Irish with floggings, house-burnings, and indiscriminate shootings right until the 23 May 1798. On that day, the leaders of the United Irishmen, growing tired of waiting for a French or Dutch military intervention, gave the orders for a general insurrection, the nucleus of which would be Dublin. They rebelled in several counties, including a number of direct attacks on the British forts in Kildare and Meath, however the wave of repression, with General Lake at its helm, that followed was so swift and uncompromising that the outcome was, more or less, a foregone conclusion. Indeed, the only evident success of the Rebellion, the rebels erecting defenses on and successfully holding Vinegar Hill on the outskirts of the town of Enniscorthy, was rather symbolic and apparently short lived.[243]

The violent repression, on the other hand, resulted in the death of more than 30,000 Irish in a mere three months of rebellion. Despite the deceitful British admission of eighty-one executions through the Rebellion, the words of General Cornwallis sums up the manner with which the Rebellion was repressed: ". . . the conversation even at my table. . . always turns on hanging, shooting, burning, etc., etc., and if a priest has been put to death, the greatest joy is expressed by the whole company."[244] Yet, the experience of rebellion proved to be enough to make the British government realize that even the works of a rather non-organized minority could echo the thunder of the earthquakes which shook all humanity in 1789. And, thus, in 1798 the British Prime

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[242] Pakenham, Thomas. *The Year of Liberty: The History of the Great Irish Rebellion of 1798*, (London, 1969).

[243] Rebels erected a Liberty Tree on the hill and managed to defend their positions for three weeks.

[244] Quoted in Gott, *Britain's Empire,* pp. 135.

Minister, Pitt, made the decision to unite the two kingdoms, which was to be put into practice by Viceroy, Lord Cornwallis.

The public reaction was strongly against the establishment of Union. The stance of the Irish parliament on this issue was, however, reflective largely of the concerns of the nobility and gentry. Indeed, general feeling was largely indifferent towards the act, which is highlighted by the words of Cornwallis: "The mass of the people of Ireland do not care one farthing about the Union."[245] Pitt realized this indifference towards the Act and formed his initial strategy accordingly: The pejorative connotations of the Act would be balanced out with the passing of Catholic Emancipation in order to sway the public opinion in the direction of the pro-Union campaign. Consequently, the support of the Irish nobility and the Catholic middle class — who hated the prospects of revolution just as much as the British if not more — was ensured with the condition of following the Act with the Emancipation. Castlereagh was set to work in order to make sure that every possible means to create a majority for the Union in the Irish parliament were exhausted, which included making promises, threats, and bribes.

Both houses of the Irish Parliament reached an agreement over the terms of the Union. The British Act of Union became law on 2 July 1800, with the last meeting of the Irish parliament scheduled to take place on 2 August. The Act came into effect on 1 January 1800, heralding the advent of a new age in which Westminster would take the place of Dublin. A total of 100 exclusively Anglican MPs thus were sent to Westminster.[246]

The Act did not actually unite Ireland and England on equal terms. Indeed, the administration of Ireland was kept separate from that of the United Kingdom through the sustained positions of a Lord Lieutenant and Chief Secretary. Further, the transfer of legislative power from Dublin to London also did not amount to a considerable

[245] Quoted in *Ireland, 1815-1870: Emancipation, Famine and Religion*, (Donnchadh O'Corrain and Tomas O'Riordan eds.), (Dublin, 2011), pp. 235.

[246] British parliament, just like the Irish parliament before the Union, was exclusively Anglican: none of the peoples that belong to other religious denominations, e.g. Catholics, Jews, etc., could be MPs. Then again, that parliament was not quite representative to begin with. Property qualifications ensured that only wealthy people could vote. Further, gender was the cross-cutting factor of all qualification since women could neither vote nor be elected as MPs.

change since the social position of the Protestant ascendancy that was in control prior to the enactment of the Act was left virtually untouched. It was only a matter of time for the Protestant ruling class to see that their interests lay in the formation and preservation of the Union. In the words of J. C. Beckett:

> Within two decades, the Irish Protestants, as a body, had become ardent supporters of the Union, which they regarded as their only protection against the Roman Catholic majority. They were convinced that this support, self-interested as it was, gave them a special claim on government favour; and they tended to judge every government's Irish policy by its effect on their own position and influence.[247]

The Catholics, on the other hand, and especially their leaders who supported the Union, turned against it as soon as they realized that Catholic Emancipation was nothing but a bait. The main effect of the Act of Union, reverberations of which would be sufficient to form the context of all consequent political activity, thus was the crystallization of the battle lines that were to separate the two primary constituents of the Irish society: the Protestant Ascendancy and the Catholic majority. As Oliver MacDonagh put it, ". . . the Act of Union possessed for many the solemnity of fundamental law, far beyond the pretensions of ordinary legislation. With the finality of a vast constitutional rearrangement, it fenced in the range of the politically possible in the twentieth century."[248]

The unkept promise of Catholic Emancipation, as we stated before, would occupy a central place within the Irish politics until its settlement in 1829. Given that we already canvassed a brief sketch of the agitation for Catholic Emancipation in Britain in the previous chapter, we will, at this juncture, focus on its importance for the Irish in both symbolic and social terms.

The Catholic question was one of the most controversial issues in British domestic politics between 1800-1830. Its significance for the social life in Ireland was that

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[247] Beckett, J. C. *The Making of Modern Ireland, 1603-1923*, (London, 1966), pp. 268-291; quoted in O Corrain and O'Riordan, *Ireland 1815-1870*, pp. 236.

[248] Macdonagh, Oliver. 'Ireland and the Union, 1801-70', in (W. E. Vaughan ed.) *A New History of Ireland, v: Ireland under the Union, i: 1801-1870*, (Oxford, 1989), pp. 46-65; quoted in O Corrain and O'Riordan, *Ireland 1815-1870*, pp. 237.

despite the fact that Catholics were by far the major constituents of Irish society, they were formally discriminated against as a result of religious prejudices that branded them as potential traitors and having divided loyalties as opposed to the Protestant minority. The additional discriminatory acts that were enacted in the early eighteenth century, including punitive taxation, illegal possession of weapons, not to mention the discrimination in terms of employment, ownership rights, etc., only worsened the situation of designating the Catholic Irish as second-class citizens. Indeed, only in the last three decades of the eighteenth century would some legal measures, such as the Catholic Relief Act of 1778 permitting Catholics to purchase and inherit land and the Catholic Relief Act of 1793 allowing Catholics to bear arms, etc., would be taken by the British government as a result of the increased agitation by the educated Catholics for concessions. The only exclusions that remain at the end of the century were those that forebode them from becoming MPs and holding higher offices.

This conception of Britain's stability as dependent on the successful defense of the Protestant constitution, however, was a double-edged sword that fueled the agitation for Catholic Emancipation just as much as it succeeded in the erection of legal barriers that, in formal terms, would leave the Catholics as *l'enfant terrible* of the United Kingdom. The foundation of the Catholic Association in 1823 with O'Connell as its undisputed leader drew its strength largely from this centuries-old discrimination against Irish people infused with religious hatred going back to the reign of Henry VIII. Religion, in other words, was a cross-cutting category that, to a certain extent, transcended socio-economic position, education, degree of piety of certain individuals or groups, etc. That is to say, the foremost consequence of steady persecution was in fact to press further the process of religious radicalization within the Irish society. Religious disputes and the prominence of the Catholic Church in Irish politics thus originated from the centrality of religious motifs in inducing public opinion to stampede against the British rule that prioritized the struggle for religious over political emancipation.

However, the influence of the Church cannot be conceived in purely religious terms since its significance in Irish politics was directly related to the overwhelming majority of the Irish Catholics, the chief component of whom were the lower classes,

e.g. mostly the urban and rural poor. Politics of religion in Ireland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, therefore, offered a unique combination of the socio-political, in the form of religious, and economic interests.

The underlying magnitude of the agitation for Catholic Emancipation thus can only be grasped by acknowledging that the satisfaction of the demands for religious reform was the only way of refining the struggle for national liberation as a precondition of sorts. And, recalling Marx's emphasis on the trajectory that the endeavor for human emancipation would need to follow, it appears incontestable that due recognition should be rendered to the Emancipation, the realization of which largely signifies that the only alternative to making concessions was the further radicalization of masses, the opinions of whom had already undergone, in 1798, a sea-change and some subterranean alteration in the prevalent mood against the British rule.

Nonetheless, one cannot hope to canvass a comprehensive vista of Ireland in the post-Union period with a sole focus on the wind of the peasant rebellion, and on the significance of Catholic Emancipation, that was yet to reach gale force. Indeed, the economic aspects of the Act produced a real cataclysm for the Irish economy to an extent that was unprecedented for whatever industries pre-Union Ireland could assemble in a few relatively industrialized cities were tattered under the blows of free-trade liberalism and in the face of competition with the British economic juggernaut.

The Irish economy, by the end of the eighteenth century, was showing signs of slowing down after an expansionary phase which fed off from rising demand for food from the French and British colonies as well as from the growth of the industrial sector. In fact, Irish industries appeared quite apt to adapt the first wave of industrialization that took place in the 1770s. The industrial sector included an export-oriented linen manufacture, a woolen industry that mostly served domestic needs; food processing ventures, e.g. brewing, distilling, etc., and the producers of luxury goods such as silk-weaving and coach-building.

This expansion of the economy had a stimulating effect with regards to the growth of cities like Dublin and Cork as industrial centers. This was directly related to the enormous population growth that came to the fore throughout the second half of the eighteenth century. Indeed, there was roughly a twofold increase of the population which soared from less than 2.5 million in the early eighteenth century to approximately 5 million by the beginning of the nineteenth century. The rapid growth of population coupled with small-scale agricultural production that had to capitalize on cheap labor led to low living standards compared to most parts of Great Britain. To be sure, the doubling of the population in half a century was an indicator of how the living standards, even of the poor majority, improved in this period. Nonetheless, the enormous growth of population also signaled the proportional rise of the sections that were most vulnerable to suffer from famine such as the non-propertied laborers that depended on small tracts of land in order to support their families.

These inherent weaknesses of the Irish economy became more and more pronounced by the price slumps that were caused by the decreased demand for Irish meat and dairy products following the defeat of France in 1813. This was exacerbated by the reopening of the British markets to continental suppliers after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. The compounded result of the post-War decline of demand for Irish food products was that between 1812-1816 the prices paid for Irish grain in Dublin fell by almost fifty percent, whereas price of meat fell by more than half, and butter prices by one thirds. The effects of these price fluctuations were devastating for all classes of the Irish society. Farmers increasingly found out that the rents that were set during the years of the Napoleonic Wars were impossible to pay. Landlords, in effect, were directly hit by the decreased financial means of the farmers as they had difficulties in collecting rents. The rural poor faced with an insurmountable chasm that separated their production on small plots of land even from a minimum subsistence level. Further, despite the evident nosedive of the Irish economy in the period between 1815-1845, the population kept rising, reaching 6.8 million in 1821and 7.8 million in 1831, finally hitting a nineteenth century high of 8.2 million in 1841.

The aforementioned blow by the Act of Union to the two major industries in Ireland, wool and cotton, was dealt to an economy that was already plunged into chaos. Breaking down the very walls of import duties behind which the Irish economy flourished in the eighteenth century, the bottoming out of all duties by 1824 and the ensuing creation of a free trade area within the formally enlarged United Kingdom was the *coup de grâce* that took away any hope for economic recovery. This sudden removal of protection, in other words, accelerated a process that otherwise could have been a gradual decline due to the structural flaws of the Irish economy that we mentioned hence,

> By the late 1830s most of the mills that had once held out the promise of an Irish industrial revolution, had closed or were operating at a much reduced level. Ireland now depended on English and Scottish imports for the great bulk of its cotton and woolen cloth.[249]

Henceforth, this was the situation of the Irish economy that was badly-bitten by the characteristic vice of laissez-faire economics: unfair competition. And, this is the genesis of the most important event in modern Irish history: the Great Hunger of 1845-1849. It was the worst catastrophe of the nineteenth century Europe and one of the worst famines that took place in modern times. It was largely caused by the elimination of the protective barriers that were put on trade and precipitated by the utter inefficiency and unwillingness to send aid that were associated by the acts of relief that were carried through by the British government. It was, in more ways than one, the condemnation of a people, and especially the lower classes, to starvation just as much as it was the result of a potato blight that was caused by fungus *Phytophthora infestans*. As George Bernard Shaw wrote in *Man and Superman* (1903):

> Malone: ...'My father died of starvation in Ireland in the black '47. Maybe you heard of it?
>
> Violet: The Famine!

[249] Connolly, S. J. 'Society and Economy', in *Ireland 1815-70*, pp. 35.

> Malone (*with smouldering passion*): No, the Starvation. When a country is full of food, and exporting it, there can be no famine. Me father was starved dead; and I was starved out to America in me mother's arms. English rule drove me and mine out of Ireland...[250]

The prolonged starvation, therefore, was caused not only by the indifferent attitude of the majority of the British officials that was on display in their dealings with Ireland. Indeed, politicians were quite aware of the fact that the grounds that could give rise to such a social catastrophe, ranging from potential abuses of free market principles such as speculation of food prices and the bulk of the population subsisting on extremely small tracts of land with a focus on a single crop, but did very little to tackle those problems and to provide better alternative measures.[251] This governmental failure was worsened by the inadequate efforts that characterized the British interventions and aid measures that were adopted during the Famine. The thing that turned disaster into a catastrophe that was hitherto unimaginable thus was the unwillingness of British authorities to make provisions of food or to revise the export schemes that were *liberally* imposed on the Irish producer. In the words of Cormac Ó Gráda:

> The Irish famine relief effort was constrained less by poverty then by ideology and public opinion. Too much was expected of the Irish themselves, including Irish landlords. Too much was blamed on their dishonesty and laziness. Too much time was lost on public works as the main vehicle of relief. By the time food was reaching the starving through the soup kitchens, they were already vulnerable to infectious diseases, against which the medical science of the day was virtually helpless. Too much was made of the antisocial behavior inevitable in such crisis conditions. Too many people in high places believed that this was a time, as *The Times* put it, 'something like harshness is the greatest humanity'. . . . Most important, public spending on relief went nowhere near the cost of plugging the gap left by the failure of the potato. . . a shortfall of about £50 million (approx. €4.3 billion at 2009 values) in money. . . exchequer spending

[250] Shaw, George Bernard, *Man and Superman*, (1903), quoted in Ó Corráin, Donnchadh. 'The Great Famine , 1845-9', in *Ireland 1815-70*, pp. 58.

[251] For a brief yet successful presentation of all such causes of scarcity and hunger, Wellington to Northumberland, 7 July 1830, in *Dispatches*, vii, III-I2; repr. in P. S. O'Hegarty, *A History of Ireland under the Union,* (London, 1952), pp.291-292.

on famine relief between 1846 and 1852 totaled less than £10 million (approx. €860 million).[252]

This understanding of making an example of the 'lazy and undeserving' Irish was aggravated by the conscious failure of the British to alter the pattern of trade that predicated the importation of foreign food while it allowed for the exportation of Irish grain. Indeed, the worst years of the famine were epitomized by a considerable excess of exported over imported grain and the exorbitant prices of the food that was smuggled into Ireland.[253] Of course, there were voices of dissent in the ranks of those that were influential, but they were few and far between. The Mansion House, for example, issued a statement addressed to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in November 1845, which deserves to be quoted at length:

> That we arraign in the strongest terms, consistent with personal respect to ourselves, the culpable conduct of the present administration, as well in refusing to take any efficacious measure for alleviating the present calamity with all its approaching hideous and necessary consequences; as also for the positive and unequivocal crime of keeping the ports closed against the importation of foreign provisions, thus either abdicating their duty to the people or their sovereign, whose servants they are, or involving themselves in the enormous guilt of aggravating starvation and famine, by unnaturally keeping up the price of provisions, and doing this for the benefit of a selfish class who derive at the present awful crisis pecuniary advantages to themselves by the maintenance of the oppressive Corn Laws. . . that the people of Ireland, in their bitter hour of misfortune, have the strongest right to impeach the criminality of the ministers of the Crown, inasmuch as it has pleased a merciful Providence to favour Ireland in the present season with a most abundant crop of oats. Yet, while the harbours are closed against the importation of foreign food, they are left open for the exportation of Irish grain, an exportation which has already amounted in the present season to a quantity nearly adequate to feed the entire people of

[252] Ó Gráda, Cormac. *Black '47 and beyond: the Great Irish Famine in history, economy, and memory*, (NJ, 1998), pp. 82-83.

[253] According to the estimates of modern scholars, the excess of exports over imports of grain in 1845 was 485,000 tons, which was followed by a total of 87,000 tons in 1846. Only in 1847 did Ireland become a net importer of grain with the amount of 763,000 tons, and 125,000 tons in 1848. Estimates are taken from Ó Corráin, 'The Great Famine', pp. 61.

> Ireland, and to avert the now certain famine, *thus inflicting upon the Irish people the abject misery of having their own provisions carried away to feed others, while they themselves are left contemptuously to starve . . .*[254] [author's emphasis]

The hour of need was thus willingly turned into the hour of profit and the British officials overplayed their hands which led to unprecedented human suffering. Estimates show, with discrepancy arising from poor data that between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 people died in the famine years of 1846-1851. Unsurprisingly, the group that was most devastatingly affected by the famine was the agricultural laborers, whereas the upper and middle classes did not feel its sting. Marx would observe in writing *Capital* that "The Irish famine of 1846 killed more than 1,000,000 people, but it killed poor devils only" (*Capital*, I, pt vii, chapter 25). And, poor devils it killed, sparing only those that were fortunate enough to afford the costs involved with emigration. Varying estimates show that upwards of 2.1 million people left Ireland in the ten year time span between 1845-1855, either crossing the Atlantic or settling in Britain.

4.2 From Cosmopolitan Nationalism to Marxism?

We began this chapter by examining the unique position of Ireland within the politics of the British Empire. The underlying peculiarities that gave rise to this position were deemed to be manifold such as other subjugated people's perception of the Irish as the pioneers of anti-imperialist struggle, Ireland being used by the British as a social laboratory, and the availability of key Irish figures that held higher offices in the administration of other colonized areas. All these rather distinct characteristics appear to be directly linked with the uneasy relationship between Ireland and empire. To that end, we argued that the Act of Union, instead of establishing an equal partnership, was geared to the formalization of the subordinated pseudo-colonial position of Ireland.

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[254] O'Rourke, John. *A History of the Great Irish Famine* (Dublin, 1902), pp. 65-67.; repr. in Tóibín, Colm and Ferriter, Diarmaid. *The Irish famine: a documentary* (New York, 2002), pp. 47-48.

This was followed by a historical review of the three main events that created, in their own ways, the framework that shaped Irish politics for roughly a century. The Act of Union, for one, through cementing the subordinate position of Ireland, swung the pendulum perhaps too far in the direction of Irish nationalism, which could have been abated had the terms of equal partnership in economics, politics, etc., been established. The social repercussions of the Act were also key in fanning the flame of the struggle for Catholic Emancipation, the realization of which remained at the top of the list of Irish anti-imperial agitation until 1830. We claimed that this pronunciation of religious emancipation was perfectly in line with expectations that are formed in hindsight given that religion, as a common denominator for a highly subjugated people in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was the cultural characteristic that was most directly abused by the forms of formal and informal discriminations that were maintained against the Irish people. The tradition of all dead generations, in that sense, indeed, weighted like a nightmare on the brains of the living Irish as Marx's classic maxim suggested. In fact, the struggle for religious emancipation came to solidify the prominent position of the Church within Irish politics for generations to come. Lastly, the Great Famine of 1845-1849 appeared to make sure that the horrific memories of suffering in the old country would translate into new opportunities for cooperation with the migrant Irish that were dispersed all around the globe within the continuous tradition of anti-imperial agitation.

It appears unwarranted to propose that a lineage united the Irish anti-imperial, or nationalist for that matter, agitation that took place in the first half of the nineteenth century with that of the working class struggle that would materialize in later epochs. Cosmopolitan nationalism, indeed, was quite effective in overcoming the spatio-temporal boundaries of the empire in establishing common ground for anti-imperial agitation. This reliance on examples taken from the context of imperial, and hence international, relations was evident in the numerous pamphlets, newspaper articles, propagandist speeches, etc. Likewise, the emergence of cosmopolitan figures such as Alfred Webb and Dadabhai Naoroji could only be fathomed in a century in which the increasing fluidity of colonial borders would start working at the expense of the idea of empire, to which the rapid European-wide spread of Mazzini's *Giovine Italia* and its correspondent Young Ireland movement are other examples. Indeed, the wind of

cosmopolitan nationalism would turn into the gale that stemmed, at its later stages, the previous sanguinary use of power of the moribund empires. As an editorial in the London *Times* would write following the rising of the Young Irelanders in 1848:

> There are a few grave facts and one grave question for the English people and government to ponder on. Is Ireland worth keeping? Shall we retain this diseased and feverish member of our common empire, or shall we fling it from us for ever? Is the benefit that we derive from the possession of Ireland, or the loss that we should sustain from its secession, so great to make us anxious about keeping it? This is a grave question, and involves manifold considerations. It enters into all and every reflection respecting the future fortunes of the British Empire. *Is Ireland linked to us forever by an inevitable destiny*? Cannot we in justice, in honour, and without ignominy or detriment, shake it off? . . . We cannot go on with a fresh rebellion every year.[255] [author's italics]

Yet, even the most cosmopolitan nationalists of the nineteenth century were not prepared to take action on behalf of others. In other words, the national cause, apart from its discursive aspect, functioned solely within the context of imagined nation-states. And, thus, one should not read much into the cosmopolitan aspect of nineteenth century anti-imperialist struggle in Ireland, which runs the risk of blurring the lines between sympathy for foreign causes and realization, or even the mere expression, of solidarity with other such causes. Henceforth, notwithstanding the apparent similarities between Irish cosmopolitan nationalism and the British working class movement that tended, upon the whole, markedly to abate the pride, assuage the malice, and discombobulate many of the devices of their respective national and class enemies, one ought to realize that class struggle in Marxian terms is much more advanced than national liberationist struggle, in the already prepared soil of which the former grows, lest we should reduce Marxism to a mere single form of nationalism.

[255] *London Times*, 16 August 1848, quoted in Gott, *Britain's Empire*, pp. 393.

CHAPTER IV

IN SEARCH OF FREEDOM AGAINST THE 'WHITE PERIL'

India was the foremost example of full-fledged colonialism in Marx and Engels' day. By the 1850s, the fabric of the Indian society had already been transformed according to the interests of the British colonizers. Marx, especially in the context of the articles he wrote for the *New York Tribune* in 1850s, was in full recognition of the exposition of Indian economy to the torpid frosts of the colonial blight.[256] Indeed, Marx pointed out in the articles that he wrote that the complete metamorphosis of India economy had taken place as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century. This comprehensive transformation translated into turning the Indian peasant into virtual slaves in the labor market, the self-sufficient producer into the potential victim of impending famines, and the net-exporting Indian economy into a raw material producer that relied on British markets for any finished good.

The chief importance of India for the British following the loss of the thirteen colonies, however, was not limited to the opportunities that this vast economy offered for the British to capitalize upon: India was utilized as the administrative and military headquarters of England in dominating the Asian trade in general and that of South-Eastern Asia in particular. India, in that sense, was the principal stepping stone of the British whether it was for the forced production of opium by the Indian farmers, or the voluntarily formed native fighting force of Sepoys[257], that reveals the

[256] In total, nine articles of Marx were published by the *New York Tribune* in 1850s. These included, chronologically, *The British Rule in India* (1853), *The Future Results of British Rule in India* (1853), *The Revolt in the Indian Army* (1857), *The Indian Question* (1857), *The Indian Revolt* (1857), *Investigation of Tortures in India* (1857), *The Approaching Indian Loan* (1858), *The Indian Bill* (1858), *Great Trouble in Indian Finances* (1859).

[257] Indian private soldier that served a European country in Asia was called Sepoy in English, which corresponds to *sipaio* in Portuguese, and *cipayo* in French.

length to which the British government was prepared to go for the sake of keeping position, which verged on being an hegemony. Nonetheless, however imminent the British conquest of India might seem, an important point to note at this juncture is that the establishment of British domination in India was neither as smooth nor as steady as India's portrayal as the Crown jewel of United Kingdom in the Victorian age may suggest.

Prior to the defeat of the armies of Siraj-ud-Daula by the soldiers of Robert Clive at Plassey, outside Calcutta, India was a zone of conflict in which the British had virtually minimal influence. In fact, the survival of the British in the coastal enclaves such as Surat (1608), Masulipatnam (1611), Madras (1839), Bombay (1662), and Calcutta (1690), was only guaranteed by the tactical alliances that were made between the British and local rulers. Further, Clive's victory at Plassey on 23 June 1757 was only the beginning of the major conflicts that were to materialize between the British and Indians as the resistance of Indians was to intensify in direct correlation with the increase of the colonizing rigor of the British. Indeed, just after seven years following the Battle of Plassey India's most powerful three Muslim rulers would join forces in an attempt to halt the British advance on the continent, and possibly to oust the Company. The failure of this combined force would be followed by the Sepoy mutinies of the same year. There were two main factors that induced Sepoys to continue to be in the service of the British: the wages that they were paid and the punitive measures that British adopted in case Sepoys showed signs of lack of discipline. And in a manner that foreshadowed the violent repression of the Rebellion of 1857, the mutinies of 1764 were baptized by fire through 'cannonading' the rebels, which is explicated in a letter written by a young officer, Lieutenant George Craclow, to his mother:

> The prisoners were marched up to the guns, their irons knocked off, and [they were] lashed to the muzzles with drag ropes, the muzzles pointing just between their shoulders. . . I shut my eyes for half a second and the guns exploded with one report. I could hardly see for the smoke for about 2 seconds when down came something with a thud about 5 yards from me. This was the head and neck of one of the men. You can't imagine such a horrible sight. On each side of the guns, about 10 yards, lay the arms torn out at the shoulders. Under the muzzle

> and between the wheels lay the remainder of the bodies with the entrails scattered about. The heads had flown up in the air and fallen in rear of the guns. I would never have imagined bodies would go to pieces so easily.[258]

The growing sphere of influence of the British East Indian Company would thus become both the signal for insurrection and the brutal acts of repression that were partially consequent upon the former.

If the one side of British advance in India was made up of such unveiled acts of violent repression, the other was comprised of recurring events of hunger and famine that would start materializing as soon as the British stranglehold of Indian economy was nearing its completion in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Otherwise a land of plenty and affluence, India during the process of colonization had turned into the land of periodic starvation and meager conditions of living, with the lines that used to separate the Indian coolie or the indentured labor from the slave of West Indies becoming highly blurred. Indeed, the siphoning off of the Indian wealth through high taxation that was enforced by the Company started giving expression to the constant lack of food and money in the form of devastating famines as early as 1770. This was a time when "The sufferings of the hapless victims" of British colonial expansion" were aggravated by the monopolies of rice and other commodities enforced by the Company's senior officers and their Indian associates."[259] The British rule of colonial India, thence, is indicative of how the former never really cultivated any hope regarding the amelioration of colonized India, sinking, from its very inception, into an almost epicurean selfishness, disguised under the mantle of harbinger of civilization. Marx underlined this point when he wrote:

> There cannot, however, remain any doubt but that the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before. I do not allude to European despotism, planted upon Asiatic despotism, by the British East India Company,

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[258] Broehl, Wayne. *Crisis of the Raj: The Revolt of 1857 through British Lieutenant's Eyes*, (New England, 1986) quoted in Gott, *Britain's Empire*, pp. 44.

[259] Innes, Robert Percival, *The History of the Bengal European Regiment, now the Royal Munster Fusiliers, and how it helped to win India*, (Simpkin, 1885), quoted in Gott, *Britain's Empire*, pp 46.

> forming a more monstrous combination than any of the divine monsters startling us in the Temple of Salsette.[260]

What were the contours of Indian resistance against the eclipsing prominence of the Company? How the particular combination of religious, economic, and ethnic factors did came together within the context of anti-colonial agitation which culminated in the Great Mutiny of 1857? And, more importantly, how did Marx conceive the proclaimed civilizing mission of the British that too often fell short of the expectations that went beyond mere lip-service? A search for the answers to these questions will form the nucleus of this chapter for we contend that the forms of resistance as well as Marx's conception of colonial India, possession of which was the difference between being 'a first rate and a third rate power', cannot be understood without highlighting the British policies which both fed into and originated from the assertion that "The greatest fact, judging by the magnitude of its results, in the entire history of the world, is the establishment of the East India Company."[261]

In the light of the fact that the Rebellion of 1857 was the very climax of not only the growing political and religious discontent but also was a reaction, especially from the lens of the Indian peasant, against the hideous accumulation of capital in a few hands, we will engage in a brief analysis of the Indian society in the pre-1857 period and will try to reveal the effects of the Mutiny on the transformations that hitherto were realized. Nonetheless, this should not be viewed as positing the Rebellion of 1857 as a watershed in which everything changed. *Au contraire*, the point is to underscore all the continuities as well as the changes that were brought to the surface in this period of consolidation of British rule in order to assess the underlying value of Marx's texts, which, more often to none, condenses all that we are seeking to describe.

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[260] Marx, Karl. 'The British Rule in India', 25 June 1853, in *Dispatches for the New York Tribune*, (London, 2007), pp. 213.

[261] Kaye, J. W. 'How We Talked about the Burmese War', *Bentley's Miscellany* (1852) 32, pp. 461-470.

5.1 India at the Age of Conquest

An old tendency of Western historiography regarding the colonization of India was to portray an image of the indomitable British Empire that was, more or less, destined to become victorious against a moribund Mughal Empire that was inferior not only technologically but also administratively. The establishment of colonial India is thereby naturalized as the only possible outcome that could have materialized as a result of a confrontation between the British that was superior on all accounts compared to a generalized image of backward East. Colonialism, therefore, was posited as the only remedy to the Indian society that was structurally ill and was utterly incapable of wrangling with the British power. Interestingly, such a view of colonialism as a necessary but incomplete phase, incomplete in the sense of subordinating the needs of Indian economic development to the interests of British capitalists, was to take its hold on various defenders of Indian nationalism until the promulgation of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. Such was the approach of Chandra Dutt to the question of British colonization of India, which focused on the inadequate application of the principles of liberal capitalism to the latter in lieu of a critique of capitalism *per* se:

> It is, unfortunately, a fact which no well-informed Indian official will ignore, that, in many ways, the sources of national wealth in India have been narrowed under British rule. India in the nineteenth century was a great manufacturing as well as a great agriculture country, and the products of the Indian loom supplied the markets of Asia and of Europe. It is, unfortunately, true that the East India Company and the British Parliament, following the selfish commercial policy of a hundred years ago, discouraged India manufacturers in the early years of British rule in order to encourage the rising manufacturers of England. Their fixed policy, pursued during the last decades of the eighteenth century and the first decades of the nineteenth, was to make India subservient to the industries of Great Britain, and to make the Indian people grow raw produce only, in order to supply material for the looms and manufactories of Great Britain. . . . *They considered India as a vast estate or plantation, the profits of*

> *which were to be withdrawn from India and deposited in Europe.*[262] [author's italics]

The major drawback of colonization, hence, was not that the very idea of progress, to which it was too often juxtaposed, depicted the growth of the colonizing economy alone but that the unrealized potential of mutual growth was the result of the incomplete application of otherwise satisfactory liberal economic doctrine. Yet, such a view also ends up rationalizing and whitewashing the process of colonization, which, under close scrutiny, does not appear to hold any realistic hope for the growth of the colonized economy in that it, essentially, is a non-symbiotic process.[263]

This understanding of Indian states as unable to resist the British advance rests upon the classic assumption that portrays the Mughal Empire as a disintegrating force that could not stand in the way of the Company. Yet, just like the critique of liberal capitalism that refrains from condemning colonialism *per se*, this understanding of the conflict-ridden nature of India in the face of the most advanced contemporary European power whitewashes the establishment of colonialism. As Firistah and Dow wrote in their *The History of Hindostan* (1770):

> The advantages of a conquest of Hindostan to this country is obvious. . . . Hindostan is, at present, torn to pieces by factions. All laws, divine and human, are trampled under foot. Instead of one tyrant, as in the times of the empire, the country now groans under thousands; and the voice of the oppressed multitude reaches heaven. It would, therefore, be promoting the cause of justice and

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[262] Dutt, Romesh Chandra. 'The Economic History of India Under Early British Rule' (1906), in *From the Rise of the British Power in 1757 to the Accession of Queen Victoria in 1837*, (2nd ed.), (London, 1906), pp. ix-x, xiv.

[263] Such a pattern that posits the development of colonies as a natural result of colonization appears reminiscent of juxtaposing the establishment of colonial administration with the increased levels of colonial justice, whereas detailed survey of historical facts shows us that, as Kolsky argued, colonial justice and violence is the actual pair that emerged as a result of colonization. The point being, the distribution of justice was realized in such a partial manner that was heavily in favor of the European settlers, while the oppressive acts of the members of this group worked to discourage Indians from seeking justice altogether. In Kolsky's words, "India's colonial rulers promised to treat all subjects equally, but at the end of the day law's paramount purpose was to maintain Britain's hold. . . . This violated the theory of equal protection that undergirded the rule of law and made law complicit in acts of racial violence rather than a guide against them. As the radical Indian nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak vividly noted in 1907, "The goddess of British Justice, though blind, is able to distinguish unmistakably black from white."" (Kolsky, 2010:4), see Kolsky, Elizabeth. *Colonial Justice in British India*, (Cambridge, 2010).

> humanity, to pull those petty tyrants from the height to which their villaines have raised them, and to give to many millions of mankind, a government founded upon the principles of virtue and justice.[264]

The main contribution of the historical works of the last several decades, however, showed us that the eventual British victory in India was neither inevitable nor, in general terms, to the advantage of the majority of peoples living on the peninsula. Indeed, the swift British advance was made possible only by the 'heavy dose of opportunism'[265] that was apparent in the search for unstable alliances to maximize the economic and political gains that both the British and Indian states sought.

With regards to the proposed timelessness of the Indian society, the post-colonial critics have shown us that the portrayal of India as the land of timeless essences largely had to do with how the British perceived what they conceived as 'the nature' of the Indian society. Religion, caste, and tradition were, thereby, canvassed as completely rigid social institutions that demonstrated Indians' willingness for arbitrary rule as opposed to other forms of governance.[266] This 'historical condition' tended to take the guise of modernization and reform, under which colonial intervention operated, at its face value, whereas the actual force that concretized the relations of caste, religion and alike was none other than the colonial authorities who were exasperated with the fluidities within those hierarchical systems. Thus, the actual effects of British rule, contrary to their claims, were to freeze social and political institutions in a more formidable predicament than before. This frustrated the indigenous catalysts for social change.[267] And, this is the point where a classic passage of Marx's *The British Rule in India* attains its full meaning:

> All the civil wars, invasions, revolutions, conquests, famines, strangely complex, rapid, and destructive as the successive action in Hindostan may

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[264] *Firistah and Dow. The History of Hindostan*, (2nd ed.): Printed for T. Becket and P. A. de Hondt, (1770), II, pp. 239-240.

[265] The phrase is borrowed from Peers, Douglas M. *India under Colonial Rule:1700-1885*, (Pearson, 2006), pp. 5.

[266] Inden R. 'Orientalist Constructions of India', *Modern Asian* Studies Vol. 20 No. 3 (1986), pp. 401-446; Cohn, B. S. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, (Princeton, 1996).

[267] Washbrook, D. India, 1818-1860: The Two Faces of Colonialism. *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, A. Porter, (Oxford, 1999).

> appear, did not go deeper than its surface. England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstruction yet appearing. This loss of his old world, with no gain of a new one, imparts a particular kind of melancholy to the present misery of the Hindoo, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history.[268]

Marx was thus aware of what the Indians stood to lose in the face of British colonization: their customs, traditions, and norms of governance which made actual fairness a general rendezvous point for Indian peoples. And, as such, he constantly practiced caution in not ascribing an ontological goodness or vile nature to colonization. In other words, colonization, for Marx, was not commendable or despicable by its very nature. What made it contemptible was that it was procured as a weapon to safeguard the imperial interests of one European party whose utter disregard of those of Indians were made manifest time and again in the dealings of the former with the latter. One might ask, at this juncture, that if Marx was able to see through the professions of progress and declamations against stagnancy to which virtually all the colonizing forces resorted, then what was his approach to the issue of colonization? We contend, in that vein, that there appears to be plenty of evidence as to the argument that Marx regarded the process of colonization for colonies as a perpetual break from the conditions of what might be called, following Sahlins, the 'original affluent society' to a phase of colonial terror and sheer destitution, overcoming of which would necessitate the formation of an amalgam of national and class consciousness in binary opposition to the rule of colonizer. It goes on without saying, at this point, that Marx was in full recognition of the fact that one could not logically ensure the economic growth of India, the states of which had run considerable trade surpluses vis-à-vis Europe *ab aeterno*, through eradicating its most efficient productive sectors and morphing it into a plantation economy geared to producing raw material alone. In his words,

> The hand-loom and the spinning-wheel, producing their regular myriads of spinners and weavers, were the pivots of that society [pre-colonization Indian society]. From immemorial times, Europe received the admirable textures of Indian labor, sending in return for them its precious metals, and furnishing

[268] Marx, *The British Rule in India*, pp.214.

> thereby his material to the goldsmith, that indispensable member of the Indian society, whose love of finery was so great that even the lowest class, those who go about nearly naked, have commonly a pair of golden ear-rings and a gold ornament of some kind hung round their necks . . . It was the British intruder who broke up the Indian hand-loom and destroyed the spinning-wheel. England began driving the Indian cottons from the European market; it then introduced twist into Hindostan, and in the end inundated the very mother country of cotton with cottons.[269]

Given that we previously assessed the importance of the production of cotton goods, it appears quite easy for one to claim that the only economic growth the commencement of colonial era heralded was that of the colonizer, whereas the pauperization of the majority of the colonized peoples of India would be dovetailed with an eternal image of stagnating Orient, which, in reality, was largely the 'ultimate achievement' of colonial rule.

Further, in the light of the fact that even the contemporary conception of colonial India, with all the accessible resources at its disposal, was contaminated with a perception of the latter as having intrinsic ties to a rigidly defined caste system and with a corresponding lack of revolutionary fervor until the rise of the post-colonial critique in 1990s, one should not, out of hand, brand Marx's viewpoint of the Indian society as Eurocentric. In other words, Marx's lack of knowledge regarding certain structures and institutions of pre-colonial Indian societies have to be analyzed in the intellectual context of 1850s and 1860s. Only through combining this point with our previous argument that Marx viewed colonialism not as the savior of 'backward peoples' but as a historical process that derailed all the pre-colonial institutions that ensured social stability, and with our analysis of the Marx's formulation of human emancipation can we hope to go beyond a straw man figure of Marx with particular accent on his assertion of 'undignified, stagnatory, and vegetative life' and hope to grasp what he meant when he quoted Goethe's *An Suleika*:

Sollte diese Qual uns quälen

Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt,

[269] *Ibid*, pp. 215.

Hat nicht myriaden Seelen

Timur's Herrschaft aufgezehrt?

Should this torture then torment us

For it brings us greater pleasure,

Were not through the reign of Timur

Souls devoured without measure?[270]

One needs to revisit the eighteenth century in order to provide the reader with a brief sketch of how the British became the dominant force on the India peninsula. India, owing largely to its geographical features, had always been a meeting place of different religions and ideologies just as much as it became a central trading hub at quite early dates.[271] Thus the regional importance of India as a land of plenty was not conjured out of the air by paranoiac prophets for conquering the peninsula but was a historical fact. Taking notice of this fact were multitudes of overland invaders, most of which were assimilated into the very society after the passing of a few generations. The British, however, had to keep their overseas trading routes, through which they had established their first coastal enclaves, which, combined with the significant developments in transportation and communication, helped them maintain closer links with their place of birth.

The expansion of British ruled areas, the effects of which were multiplied by the significant increase of Indian population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries[272], started taking its toll on the natural environment, just as much as on the relations of production. Railway construction, for instance, demanded unprecedented rates of deforestation with its peak in the Madras Presidency alone requiring upwards

[270] Goethe, 'An Suleika',*West-östlicher Diwan*, quoted in Marx, The British Rule in India, pp. 219, author's translation.

[271] Chaudhuri, K. N. *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilization of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750*, (Cambridge, 1985).

[272] Estimations show that the population of India around 1750 was approximately between 150 and 200 million. By the first India-wide census in 1881, however, it had soared to 257 million. On the considerable increase of Indian population see Kumar D., ed. *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, (Cambridge, 1983), pp.463-532.

of 35,000 trees a year.[273] The deforested lands, in return, were converted into more land under the plough, which is estimated to have risen by 34 percent in the years between 1700-1850.[274]

The eclipse of the Mughal empire with its infusion of military ethos and effective administrative structure brought forth an episode of reconfiguration of the Mughal lands into a number of successor states, in which all the important social constituents of the Mughal society, including the warriors, merchants, and so forth, attempted to enhance their respective spheres of influence during an historical episode of political flux. Nonetheless, both the successor states and the Mughal Empire were potent forces in the first half of the eighteenth century to an extent that one should be careful not to conceive the twilight of the latter as indicative of an imminent fall in the face of superior British firepower and administrative structures. Indeed, as Bose and Jalal put it, "From a balanced angle of vision the eighteenth century does not appear any more as a dark alley in the shadow of towering empires. What emerges is a mixed scenario of shadow and light, with high points and low points."[275]

The twilight of the Mughal Empire following the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 also had an inspiring effect on the successor states and their respective plans of territorial expansion. Asaf Jah, who resided near the top of the Mughal hierarchy, managed to establish an autonomous state around its center of Hyderabad in Central India in 1724. This was followed by the Empire's loss of Bengal, which was soon to be followed by the adjacent state of Awadh.[276] The important fact was that, most of these ambitious rulers sought the help of European powers, whether it was the French or the British, in order to enhance their own positions. The lack of foresight that triggered this search for military alliances would, however, provide the British with adequate wind for setting sail on their quest for imperial domination. The most

[273] Rangarajan, M. 'Imperial Agendas and India's Forests: The Early History of Indian Forestry, 1800-1878', *Indian Economic and Social History Review* Vol. 31, pp. 147-167.

[274] Tomlinson, B. R: Economics and Empire: The Periphery and the Imperial Economy. *The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Nineteenth Century*, A. Porter, (Oxford, 1999), pp. 67.

[275] Bose, S. and Jalal, A. (eds.) *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy*, (New York, 1998), pp.48.

[276] Barnett, R. B. *North India between Empires: Awadh, the Mughals, and the British, 1720-1801*, (Berkeley, 1980); Alam, M. *The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India: Awadh and the Punjab, 1707-1748*, (Delhi, 1986).

apparent proof of what Peers aptly called the 'implosion of Mughal authority'[277] would be brought to the surface by a number of invasions that resulted in a significant upheaval of the Mughal heartlands between 1730s and 1750s. 1739 saw the raid of Delhi by Persian invaders led by Nadir Shah. In 1757, the Mughal Emperor himself was captured by an Afghan army, probably having as much a serious impact as did the conclusion of the Battle of Plassey, which took place in the same year. Another bloody battle was fought between Maratha forces and Afghans at Panipat, near Delhi, in 1761, with both sides suffering from heavy losses. And, this was the picture of India at a critical turning point that saw the rise of British power and influence and the decay of those of Moghul Empire simultaneously.

With regards to productive capabilities, India was the most foremost cotton dry goods producer in the world at the beginning of the eighteenth century, a position in which she would remain until the mercantilist restrictions were put on the Indian cotton textile at the end of that century. As Prakash put it, "At the turn of the eighteenth century, India was probably the largest and most cost-competitive textile manufacturing country in the world."[278] Introducing numbers in order to give a full and balanced assessment of the place finished cotton goods occupied within Indian exports, textiles made up 74 percent of the total exports to Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century. This significant proportion of textiles, however, had fallen to 54 percent by 1760, with an unprecedented increase in the production of tea from 1 to 25 percent between 1700-1760.[279] Given the fact that the production of tea in India would have to wait the opening of the Assam and Nilgiri hills of southern India, these numbers indicate that tea, which was procured from China in return of the exports of opium, was regarded as a major source of profit by the Company officials.

India was to remain as the paramount exporter of cotton goods until 1820s, when the effects of mechanized production were slowly but surely making progress. Indian producer, as capable as he or she was when it came to cotton textile production, was unable to compete with the advent of machine production, which, in the end,

[277] Peers, *India under Colonial Rule: 1700-1885*, pp. 20.

[278] Prakash, O. *European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India: The New Cambridge History of India, II. 5.* (Cambridge, 1998), pp. 349.

[279] *Ibid*, pp. 349.

combined with the lopsided policies of the Company, resulted in the wiping out of the Indian finished cotton goods. The benefits accruing to the British Empire as a dominating partner within the imperial trading networks until the eradication of Indian cotton textile, however, was not limited to enhancing its balance of payments position vis-à-vis Indian economy, which put the British producer in the driver's seat possibly for the first time in history. Indeed, textiles from India was one of the major mechanisms that strengthened the ties of imperial trading networks to an extent that tipped the scales in favor of rising British power and influence, which can be observed when one recalls the dominant position of the British in the slave trade. As a reminder, Indian cloth was one of the most demanded goods in return for African slaves, which were rightfully portrayed as the 'sinews' of the British Empire by Craton.[280] This principal importance of trade during the establishment and solidification phrases of British dominance in India begs us to address the question of whether if there was a direct relationship between the growth of trade and the ensuing conquest of India. Many prominent scholars, such as Mukherjee and Chaudhury, claimed that such a causal link between the rise of trade and the subsequent conquest took place owing either to the crafty plans of imperialist expansion fueled with capitalist production made by the British ruling class or to the inevitable nature of capitalist development that had to be realized somehow throughout the course of the nineteenth century.[281] Peers, on the other hand, advises to exercise caution in not reading much into this causal link in his claim that "it was not inevitable that the flag would follow hard on the heels of trade."[282] We, at this point, think that a clarification with regards to the establishment of the British East India Company is in order. The very establishment of chartered companies, whether it was French, Dutch, or British, signified that these institutions would be backed by royal power in the pursuit of magnified imperial interests in the non-European parts of the globe. To that end, it is clear, as Peers commendably points out that:

[280] Craton, Michael. *Sinews of Empire: Short History of British Slavery*, (New York, 1974).

[281] Mukherjee, R. 'Trade and Empire in Awadh, 1756-1804', *Past and Present*, Vol. 94, (1982), pp. 85-102; Chaudhury, S. *From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth -Century Bengal*, (Delhi, 1995).

[282] Peers, *India under Colonial Rule*, pp. 23.

> The British government had by mid-century [eighteenth] concluded that what was in the Company's interest was in the national interest, and hence were more willing to provide the kind of consistent support to the Company that enabled it to function despite the serious challenges it faced. Of these, the presence of Royal Navy was critical for it allowed the British to move resources around India more quickly by sea as well as to frustrate French efforts at bringing reinforcements.[283]

At another level, the more one draws nearer to become an ardent advocate of causal links, there emerges the threat of dismissing the contingent side of history altogether, and, as we stated before, the eighteenth century for both the British and Indians was an age of contingency when opportunist policies were the last missing piece of the imperial jigsaw puzzle.[284] The bottom line is, therefore, that neither perfect causality nor contingency alone can be used to make full sense of how the British transformed from a major trading partner of the established powers in the Indian peninsula to the paramount force that started holding India in her tight grip. Indeed, even though it appears evident that the chartered companies were the overseas representatives of major European powers right from the outset, their up and coming domination of India was far from being undeniable before 1760s.

Turning back to our historical analysis, one of the most important events of the eighteenth century India, which stands out from the rest in terms of the possibility of being considered a touchstone, was the fall of Bengal into the British hands. British control over Bengal, which was tried to be restored in 1756, was re-established in 1765 at the favorable conclusion of the Battle of Buxar. The British came out of this war as the foremost power in Northern India in addition to potentially expanding the territories under its rule to most parts of India. The Treaty of Allahabad, in that sense, turned out to realize the expansionary ambitions of the British through granting them the office of *diwan*, which allowed them to collect land revenue in the provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa in return for accepting the titular sovereignty

[283] *Ibid*, pp. 25.

[284] As a reminder, the increase of the European military activity in India was directly related to both the attempts of Indian rulers to find a European ally that would help them get the upper hand in military and political conflicts, and the Anglo-French political and commercial rivalry that induced both sides to answer any 'prayers' for partnership that came from the Indians.

of the Mughal Emperor. The terms of this treaty, to that end, allowed the British pay for its commercial investments by the land revenues that it could collect instead of by the imported bouillon which hitherto was the only means of payment available to the British. Further, the resilience of the late Mughal economy was highly observable in and around Bengal, which had all the major ingredients, including abundant labor, plentiful natural resources, etc. that had made it grow into one of the wealthiest regions in India.[285] Being one of the most noteworthy overseas trading centers, three-quarters of the Company's exports from India was made up by goods from Bengal.[286] The ascendancy of British power and influence became more evident following the conclusion of the Anglo-French conflict that was brewing ever since the French *Compagnie des Indes Orientales* was founded in 1664. Naturally, the shattered expansionist dreams of French forces and their governor Joseph-François Dupleix[287] (1697-1763) was coupled with the relegation of the Mughal Emperor to a nominal spearhead figure thereby paving the road to British domination in India.

The enhanced position of the Company in India became all the more important when the American colonies were lost in the 1770s and 1780s, the effects of which were amplified by the intensified rivalry between the French and the British following the French Revolution. These changes within the global context warranted a shift of the strategic position of the British with respect to their interests in India, leading to increased recognition of the gravity of maintaining their dominant position over the Indian peninsula: If the British were to keep their position as a global power, they essentially had to take the Indian bull by the horns. In acknowledgment of this fact, British government would become more interested and, consequently, more involved in the safeguarding of the British interests in India in spite of the Company's position as the nominal, and perhaps relatively autonomous, guardian of the former until 1858.[288] The growing scrutiny and control over the Indian economy, in turn, would translate into its increased exposure to the irresistible currents of the interests of

[285] Marshall, P. J. *Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India, 1740-1828*, (Cambridge, 1988).

[286] Metcalf B. D. and Metcalf T. *A Concise History of India*, (Cambridge, 2002), pp.49-50.

[287] Sen, S. P. *The French in India: First Establishment and Struggle*, (Calcutta, 1947).

[288] Yapp, M. *Strategies of British India: Britain, Iran and Afghanistan, 1798-1850*, (Oxford, 1980); Ingram E. *The British Empire as a World Power*, (London, 2001).

western capital, which were one of the vital signs of the initiation of the incorporation process into the global economy.[289]

Turning our attention to the causes that gave rise to the Rebellion of 1857, we need to lay down some trails pointing to the rise of different social groups in India originating from political and religious factors just as much as the economic ones. To begin with, nationalism in the modern sense of the word did not come to play a significant role in the emergence of the Rebellion for it was, very much corresponding to the Irish case, was still in the process of being formed and would need another number of decades to become a major component of Indian anti-colonial agitation as was the case at the first meeting of the Indian National Congress in 1885. To elaborate on this point, despite the existence of common cultural traditions and that of shared historical experiences especially in parts of northern India, there was not a political organization that could assemble different social actors on the common grounds of establishing a nation-state.[290] To be sure, given the complexity of numerous distinct constituents of the Indian society, the delayed development of such national consciousness in India between 1800-1850 appears quite understandable. Indeed, even the formation of a common class interest pertaining to particular groups, such as Rajas, i.e. rulers, princes, and local chiefs in India, and *zamindars*, i.e. landlords who were required to pay land tax to the government, were impeded as a result of the weakening effect of colonial penetration on the horizontal links that were supposed to unite the members of the same groups. The influence and power of the Company, therefore, created, to a certain extent, not only the material conditions but also those having to do with ideology in positing the majority of Indian peoples against a common enemy. Marx pointed out this feature of colonial rule in *The Future Results of British Rule in India* (1853) exclaiming that:

> The political unity of India, more consolidated, and extending farther than it ever did under the Great Moguls, was the first condition of its regeneration. That unity, imposed by the British sword, will now be strengthened and perpetuated by the electric telegraph. The native army, organized and trained by

[289] Bose, S., ed. *South Asia and World Capitalism*, (Delhi, 1990).

[290] Ray, R. K. *The Felt Community: Commonality and Mentality before the Emergence of Indian Nationalism*, (New Delhi, 2002).

> the British drill-sergeant, was the *sine qua non* of Indian self-emancipation, and of India ceasing to be the prey of the first foreign intruder. The free press, introduced for the first time into Asiatic society, and manage principally by the common offspring of Hindoos and Europeans, is a new and powerful agent of reconstruction. The Zemindari and Ryotwar [peasants stratum from whom land rents were directly, i.e. without mediation, extracted] themselves, abominable as they are, involve two distinct forms of private property in land—the great desideratum of Asiatic society. From the Indian natives, reluctantly and sparingly educated at Calcutta, under English superintendence a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government and imbued with European science. Steam has brought India into regular and rapid communication with Europe, has connected its chief ports with those of the whole south-eastern ocean, and has revindicated it from the isolated position which was the prime law of its stagnation. The day is not far distant when, by a combination of railways and steam-vessels, the distance between England and India, measured by time, will be shortened to eight days, and when that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western world.[291]

Yet, as Marx was well aware, the establishment of those conditions was not sufficient by themselves to overcome the social obstacles that were related to religion, caste, ethnicity, etc., which were being reproduced in more rigid forms during the British rule. In other words, setting the material conditions that were ripe enough for the establishment of political unity was one thing, whereas forging the links that would circumscribe such a unity was another, a point which he stressed in the same article, writing that:

> All the English bourgeoisie may be forced to do will neither emancipate nor materially mend the social condition of the mass of the people, depending not only on the development of productive powers, but on their appropriation by the people. But what they will not fail is to lay down the material premises for both. Has the bourgeoisie ever done more? Has it ever effected a progress without

[291] Marx, Karl. *The Future Results of British Rule in India*, , in *Dispatches for the New York Tribune*, (London, 2007), pp. 220.

> dragging individuals and people through blood and dirt, through misery and degradation?[292]

Furthermore, the 'revitalizing' socio-economic rubdown with the rough towel of colonialism which was to follow Indian society plunging into the crystal waters of developmental discourse would be no less damaging to the social fabric of pre-colonial India than the jeopardizing effects of political degeneration. One of the most serious changes that Indian society had to undergo at this period of reformation was the reification of caste and religious typologies that followed the collection of various types of information regarding Indian peoples, languages, religious practices, botany, archeology, and so forth. The obsession of the colonizer, in this case being the British, with the collection and categorization of these particular arrays of knowledge epitomized the recognition of the intricate relationship between knowledge and power, which was conceived to be inseparable from each other in that it was used solely for enhancing the effectiveness of the colonial rule.[293] The relationship between knowledge and power, in that sense, was understood as feeding off from each other, which turns the accumulation of knowledge into a mere manifestation of power from a Foucauldian perspective.[294]

This overriding need of colonial régimes to classify the subjugated indigenous populations led to, in the Indian context, the initiation of the search for essential truths about the Indian society with particular focus on the significance of religion.[295] Turning their attention to the ancient religious texts in order to 'understand' the Indian society, the British initially (until 1830s) relied on their intermediary

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[292] *Ibid*, pp.223.

[293] The accentuation of typologies with regards to the 'objectified' anthropological knowledge is widely perceived as a birth mark of the discipline of anthropology. For a brief analysis of this relationship between the colonizer's need for the accumulation of colonial knowledge and the birth of anthropology in the latter half of the nineteenth century see Clifford, James. 'On Ethnographic Authority', *Representations*, No. 2 (Spring, 1983), pp. 118-146.

[294] Foucault's problematization of pouvoir/savoir and biopouvoir, and Agamben's ensuing works on the topic appear quite relevant in terms of wrangling with the intertwined conceptions of knowledge and power at the Victorian age. See, Foucault, Michel. 'Governmentality', in Burchell and Gordon, *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, (Chicago, 1991), pp. 87-104; Foucault, Michel. *Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth (Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol. I)*, Paul Rabinow ed.,(Robert J. Hurley trans.), (The New Press, 1998), pp. 59-79; Agamben, Giorgio, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and the Bare Life*, (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans.), (Stanford, 1998).

[295] Inden R. 'Orientalist Constructions of India', cited *in passim*.

interpreters such as *pandits* and *maulvis*, both of which were made up of men of wisdom, in order to construct the categories based on the knowledge they previously had garnered.[296] The Indian census, as Bernard Cohn showed us, is one such example of creation of categories that was essentially non-reflective of the characteristics of various groups within the Indian society, which rather aimed at constructing classifications to which Indians were expected to conform.[297] All the same, these vast tracts of knowledge were all geared to increasing the level of control over, and the taxes collected from, the Indian population.

Nonetheless, the most significant impact of this social engineering on the structure of Indian society was the transformation of cultural traditions into legal taxonomy. In seeking to protect British interests and promote commerce, the British turned to ancient texts and took measures that ossified the way those texts were understood by the Indian experts, such as the Hindu *pandits* and Muslim *maulvis*, in the tailoring of the institutions and practices of colonial governance. The results were profound and enduring.[298] Particularly, the transformation of caste from a cultural tradition with high relatively high degrees of vertical mobility and flexibility into a legal taxonomy that was quite clear-cut in defining sets of rights and duties, eventually fixing identities. The British boosting the effectiveness and power of their authority over Indian society thus translated into the fixation of previously bendable tradition of caste into introducing an everlasting picture of the latter that appeared to have remained rooted like trees in the native villages of the Indian peninsula.

This rigid application of ancient customs and traditions to the new society that was in the process of formation was combined with the intensification of the pre-colonial tax system into a form that was in full accord with British interests. The old tax system, in that vein, symbolized putting the heaviest burden on the cultivators for the government was entitled to claim one-third of the agricultural production. Yet, even though they introduced no formal changes into that system, the British did not settle

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[296] Bayly, C. A. *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780-1870*, (Cambridge, 1996).

[297] Cohn, B. S. *Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India*, (Princeton, 1996).

[298] Washbrook, D. 'Law, State and Agrarian Society in Colonial India', *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, pp. 649-721.

with what they could traditionally lay their claims on, instead subjecting local populations, in practice, to far worse terms of taxation than those they were accustomed to. Nevertheless, this exploitation of customary principles in the practical sphere hardly comes as a surprise given that, in the words of Peers:

> . . . fairness and equity were in the end much less important than stability and attentions concentrated on identifying those sectors of rural society which would best help to meet the twin demands of revenue and security.[299]

The pronounced importance of these readjustments of old customs attain their full meaning in the words of Lord Cornwallis, who became the governor-general of India following the Permanent Settlement of 1793, asserting that "A regular gradation of ranks. . . is nowhere more necessary than in this country for promoting order in civil society."[300]

Abandoning the protection of peasants from practical abuse of the old traditions into the hands of local *zamindars*, especially when coupled with the introduction of commercialized agriculture and cash-cropping, in effect, led to disastrous consequences for the peasantry who had to bore the brunt of increased revenue expectations of the British with no legal shelter whatsoever. Indeed, the latent volatility that the prices of cash crops were subject to, such as indigo, had a considerable impact on exposing peasants to periodic starvation, who were squeezed out by the local *zamindars* in order to meet British demands. The main cause of this problem with the mutilated tax system being the productive capabilities of peasants throughout this stretch was helpless in the face of outside forces setting the prices of each and every cash crop. This failure to meet British demands, in turn, gave way, in numerous instances, to the purchase of lands that were formerly owned by *zamindars* by a capitalist class that was on the verge of making its first appearance. Estimates show that one-third of the *zamindars* in Bengal, for example, had to default and sell

[299] Peers, *India under Colonial Rule*, pp. 45.

[300] Quoted in Marshall, P. J. *Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India, 1740-1828*, (Cambridge, 1988).

their lands at auctions following the establishment of the terms of Permanent Settlement.[301]

The partial remapping of the Indian society at the expense of Indian peasantry further exacerbated the structural changes that Indian economy had to go through in the face of competition from more cost-effective machine-made textiles that were produced in Britain. The decreased competitiveness of Indian textiles, in that sense, shrank the purchasing power of Indian producers. This can be interpreted, according to the standard picture, as indicative of the general de-industrialization of the Indian economy in the nineteenth century. Recent works tended to confirm this argument through showing that notwithstanding the partial continuation of production for local markets even when facing competition from Britain, the decline of luxury production and the gradual downturn of other manufactured Indian goods were so swift that made the Indian economy turn into a mere appendage of the global economy by the second half of the nineteenth century.[302] The decline of Indian production thus brought forth the decay of numerous industrial craft centers and unprecedented levels of unemployment among artisans.

The picture of social dislocation prior to the Rebellion of 1857 is thus complete with the sole exception of religious conflicts that were on the rise between different communities in that epoch. The religious differentiation between Hindus and Muslims was one of the key integers that perplexed the otherwise straightforward simple model of British domination and Indian resistance. The adverse effects of the British rule were mostly corrosive to Muslims as a group. They collectively experienced greater erosion with regards to status and authority because the disintegration of the Mughal Empire heralded the decline of major urban centers, to which the intellectual wealth of the Empire was generally associated.[303] Unable to answer the rapid social changes that were initiated by the British, the intellectual

[301] Tomlinson, B. R. *The Economy of Modern India, 1860-1970: The New Cambridge History of India, III.3*., (Cambridge, 1993).

[302] Harnetty, P. "'Deindustrialization" Revisited: The Handloom Weavers of the Central Provinces of India, c.800-1947, *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, pp. 455-510; Roy, T. *The Economic History ıf India, 1857-1947*, (New Delhi, 2000).

[303] Robinson, F. *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, (Delhi, 2000).

fortresses of Lucknow, Delhi, Murshidabad and Allahabad all sank into the depths of cultural and intellectual despair during the transition into the colonial rule.[304]

Muslims, by 1850s, made up about a quarter of the Indian population under British rule. Initially quite a heterogeneous community, the trenchant effects of the policies that were adopted by the British had a converging impact over Muslims, particularly with respect to building a common identity based on religion. Local convert and migrants both made up considerable proportions of the total Muslim population that was mostly concentrated in north-west (which became Pakistan after the partition) and Bengal in the north-east. Just like their uneven geographical spread across India, there was no single predominant social stratum among Muslims. Those living in north-east, for one, were primarily cultivators. Elsewhere in India, however, as was the case in the Gangetic heartlands, Muslims had a historical advantage of the socially and politically notable positions they occupied over other religious groups, and, as such, the sting of the British rule were mostly felt by those who stood to lose the most. These were the social conditions that induced Muslim leaders to initiate mass agitation against British rule in order to restore Islam to its lost glory as early as the 1820s under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi (1786-1831). A significant feature of these movements were their strict opposition to essentially all western ideas, whose position was taken over by the history of Islam in their plans of regeneration.[305]

Having highlighted the social backdrop against which the great Rebellion of 1857 came into being, we will conclude this chapter with a brief analysis of what the Rebellion signified in terms of revolutionary consciousness and what it did not. To that end, the Rebellion showed the British that neither their rule in India, nor the hegemonic position they enjoyed in terms of world trade were built upon unshakable rock-solid foundations. "Our house in India is on fire" exclaimed one popular magazine, and that:

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[304] Hasan, M. *A Moral Reckoning: Muslim Intellectuals in Nineteenth-Century Delhi*, (Delhi, 2005); Bayly, C. A. *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of Expansion, 1770-1870*, (Cambridge, 1983).

[305] Metcalf and Metcalf, *A Concise History of India*, pp. 84-85.

> We are not insured. To lose that house would be to lose power, prestige, and character — to descend in the rank of nations, and take a position more in accordance with our size on the map of Europe than with the greatness of our past glory and present ambition.[306]

The death toll, despite the difficulties to calculate an exact estimation, show that casualties on both sides were quite significant. What was even more alarming than the momentous loss of human life was how the economic burden of repression that followed was put heavily on the shoulders of Indian population, jumping its total debt from £60 million to £100 million.[307] In addition to symbolizing the relegation of the bulk of the financial thorn into the Indian side, the Rebellion also proved to be a turning point for the reconfiguration of the terms of colonial subjugation into racist lines, which were to have serious repercussions for many decades to come.

Regarding the characteristics of the Rebellion, one is ought to note that they do not appear to validate any claim that purports the latter as a 'war of independence'. Naturally, as we stated before, the socio-economic conditions were ripe for such a mass movement to materialize. The dislocation of the rather privileged position of Muslims in the Indian midlands, combined with the subjugation of Indian and Muslim peasants to the conditions of bare existence and starvation translated into uniting the Indian belligerents under one roof. By the same token, the introduction of the 'doctrine of lapse' of Lord Dalhousie was a maneuver that jeopardized the privileges of the Indian ruling elite, inducing them, in turn, to take part in the Rebellion. Further, the tipping point of the Rebellion had, by itself, a symbolic aspect that encouraged the hitherto unrealized common struggle of the Hindu and Muslim against a common enemy depicted in the form of British colonizer.

The Sepoy Army was, by far, the largest military force in India as shown by the remarks of Richard Collier, who points out that "The ratio to which a former Governor-General had fixed at one to three, never less than one to four, was now less than one to six — 45,522 European troops as against 232,224 Indians."[308] The

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[306] *Illustrated London News*, 4 July 1857, quoted in Peers, *India Under Colonial Rule*, pp. 64.

[307] Peers, *India under Colonial Rule*, pp. 64.

[308] Collier, Richard. *The Great Indian Mutiny*, (New York, 1964), pp. 17.

mutiny of the Sepoy forces was, therefore, a necessary condition for the eruption of the Rebellion. Indeed, despite the existence of other necessary conditions that increased the likelihood of luring rebels that came from different socio-economic backgrounds, Sepoys were the initiators of the violent conflict and their downfall would wrung forth the ruin of the Rebellion.

Growing discontent within the rank and file of Sepoy regiments, however, were clearly visible much earlier than the actual breaking point. Lord Dalhousie, for example, noted as early as 1848 that "In India one is always sitting on a volcano."[309] This 'volcano' was brought ever near to eruption by the negligent attitude that was adopted by the British officials who had refused to increase the rates of pay of Sepoys for decades. In addition, new demoralizing acts were passed, such as the new enlistment act of 1856 that forced Sepoys to serve wherever they were deployed. With the numbers on their side, all these unsatisfactory developments fed into the alienation of Sepoy regiments from their British officers, who were seen as self-centered foreigners. Nonetheless, religious differences between Hindu and Muslim Sepoys were still a major predicament against unity within its ranks. The eradication of these religious barriers via the growing discontent regarding the increased activity of missionary schools in northern India proved to be a *coup de grâce* that ultimately severed the ties that designated Hindu and Muslim members of Sepoy regiments to different levels of agony. Ironically, the final act that proved to be the last straw in triggering the implosion of the Sepoy force was initiated by the British when they gave Sepoys a new rifle which obliged them to use cartridges that were rumored to have had been lubricated in cow or pig fat. These cartridges had to be bitten before loading, thereby potentially endangering the ritual purity of both Hindus and Muslims. The majority of Sepoys declined to use the new rifles, to which British officers responded by attempting to make examples of those who refused by shackling and confining them.

Despite the tactical advantage that the Sepoys enjoyed in catching the British by surprise, the wane of the Rebellion was just as swift as its wax. The rebellion could not ride the popular momentum it had gained for a variety of reasons. However, on

[309] Baird, J. G., ed. *Private Letters of the Marquees of Dalhousie*, (Edinburgh, 1910).

closer inspection it becomes evident that all these reasons eventually boil down to a lack of single vision that went beyond confronting the British rule. To be sure, rebels, at least the majority of them, shared common grievances with one another. Yet, there was an unmistakable lack of coherence in terms of the respective objectives of rebelling groups that prevented the Rebellion from gaining full-steam. Some leaders participated in the rebellion for restoring their traditional authority, while others took part in it as they feared that their religions and customs were under threat of missionary activities, still others attempted to regain their lost territories, and, for others challenging colonial authorities without any other task was a just cause in itself. The Rebellion, with the existence of all these different agendas, was thus confined to northern India and was virtually non-effective in most of the parts of western and southern India. This lack of total support, combined with the recently conquered Punjab remaining quiet throughout 1857-1858, benefited the British in that they could redeploy troops to wherever they were needed the most as well as in raising new recruits to fight the rebels.

All in all, the benefit of hindsight shows us that the brief success that was achieved by the participants of the Rebellion at its inception was destined to slow down due to the medley of objectives that we underlined above. This contention is supported even by the very figure of the acclaimed leader of the Rebellion, Bahadur Shah. Bahadur Shah was such a reluctant leader that some authors suggested to portray him as "a virtual prisoner of the rebels."[310] Henceforth, the fact that the rebels, in the aftermath of the uprising at Meerut, had nowhere else to go but to the royal palace of the last Mughal Emperor, and who remained there until the very appearance of the British at the gates of Delhi, is at least suggestive of that the 'predestination' of the Rebellion was a momentum-breaking *cul-de-sac* which proved to be unsurpassable for the rebels. Therefore, by the end of 1858 it had become clear that Indians had to endure more of colonial rule for a number of decades in order to construct a firm anti-colonial movement that went beyond mere confrontations. Marx wrote of the importance of Rebellion of 1857-1858 in the article *The Revolt in the Indian Army*, in the following manner:

[310] Peers, *India under Colonial Rule*, pp. 68.

> Before this [the mutiny of 1857] there had been mutinies in the Indian army, but the present revolt is distinguished by characteristic and fatal features. It is the first time that sepoy regiments have murdered their European officers; that Mussulmans and Hindoos, renouncing their mutual antipathies, have combined against their common masters; that "disturbances beginning with Hindoos, have actually ended in placing on the throne of Delhi a Mohammedan Emperor;" that the mutiny has not been confined to a few localities and lastly, that the revolt in the Anglo-Indian army has coincided with a general disaffection exhibited against English supremacy on the part of the great Asiatic nations, the revolt of the Bengal army being, beyond doubt, intimately connected with the Persian and Chinese wars.[311]

Another significant result of the Rebellion was that it epitomized a shift in the colonial policy from violence at micro levels to an institutionalization of racist attitude that exacerbated the brutal methods of repression. The unprecedented levels of violence in this period were spearheaded by two British commanders: the commander of the 1st Madras Fusiliers, Colonel James Neill, and the commander of a Highland regiment, Colonel Henry Havelock. Under the leadership of these two figures, measures taken up for 'British retribution' would become a norm of British tactics. Cannonading rebels, erecting 'rows of gallowses', burning whole villages were all re-inserted into the rules of conflict, since the only legal process that was in the store for the caught rebels, generally, was a summery trial. A chief of a commission appointed for setting trials for the offenders would write:

> Every day we lead expeditions to burn and destroy disaffected villages, and we had taken our revenge. . .Day by day, we have strung up eight or ten men. We have the power of life in our hands; and I assure you we spare not. A very summary trial is all that takes place.[312]

The indiscriminate killing sprees of the British army would also target urban populations who were killed and mutilated without any indication that suggested their involvement in the Rebellion. One observer, who wrote the following passage

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[311] Marx, Karl. *The Revolt in the Indian Army*, in *Dispatches for the New York Tribune*, (London, 2007), pp. 226.

[312]Quoted in Moon, Penderel. *British Conquest and Domination of India*, (Duckworth, 1989).

once the British control of Delhi was reestablished, would describe the mass killings and how:

> . . . all the city people found within the walls when our troops entered were bayoneted on the spot; and the number was considerable, as you may suppose, when I tell you that in some houses forty or fifty persons were hiding. These were not mutineers but residents of the city, who trusted to our well-known mild rule or pardon. I am glad to say that they were disappointed.[313]

In addition, despite the proclamation made by the Queen in 1858, which conveyed the end of the Company and the beginnings of direct rule, and its explicit references made in regard to ensuring the Queen's Indian subjects of just and equal treatment under the law with emphasized indifference to race, religion or caste, the realities of colonial rule would contrast sharply with those imperial principles. Therefore, the bloody repression of the Rebellion of 1857 can be portrayed as foretelling a permanent alteration in the imperial politics of India, in which the Indians were not only regarded as inferior human beings but also treated, both in formal and informal situations, in that manner. Marx, however, was in full recognition of this penchant for racist undertones of the British rule India to surface whenever the British felt their authority to be in substantial jeopardy, writing in 1853:

> The profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilization lies unveiled before our eyes, turning from its home, where it assumes respectable forms, to the colonies, where it goes naked. They are the defenders of property, but did any revolutionary party ever originate agrarian revolutions like those in Bengal, in Madras, and in Bombay? Did they not, in India, to borrow an expression of that great robber, Lord Clive himself, resort to atrocious extortion, when simple corruption could not keep pace with their rapacity? While they prated in Europe about the inviolable sanctity of national debt, did they not confiscate in India the dividends of the rajahs, who had invested their private savings in the Company's own funds? While they combated the French revolution under the pretext of defending "our holy religion", did they not forbid, at the same time, Christianity to be propagated in India, and did they not, in order to make money out of the pilgrims streaming to the temples of Orissa

[313] *Ibid*, quoted in Gott, *Britain's Empire*, pp. 464.

> and Bengal, take up the trade in the murder and prostitution perpetrated in the temple of Juggernaut? These are the men of "Property, Order, Family, and Religion."[314]

Time would show that the inherent hypocrisies of colonial rule in India was prone to bursting out in flames in the face of any serious threat. It would also show that violent oppression would not, by itself, suffice to maintain the subservience of Indian peoples, economy, resources, etc. to British interests. As Foucault would explain more than a century later unleashing a reign of terror cuts both ways in that it not only strengthens the side of the oppressor but it also reinforces the relationships of resistance that are embedded in power relations. Marx would write in 1857 that:

> However infamous the conduct of the Sepoys, it is only the reflex, in a concentrated from, of England's own conduct in India, not only during the epoch of the foundation of her Eastern Empire, but even during the last ten years of a long-settled rule. To characterize that rule, it suffices to say that torture formed an organic institution of its financial policy. There is something in human history like retribution; and it is a rule of historical retribution that its instrument be forged not by the offended, but by the offender himself.[315]

[314] Marx, *The Future Results of British Rule in India*, pp. 224.

[315] Marx, Karl. *The Indian Revolt*, in *Dispatches for the New York Tribune*, (London, 2007), pp. 234.

CONCLUSION

PLANTING THE MARXIST TREE

Writing in the year 2014, when the impact of postmodern thinking, an allergy towards 'grand schemes' that supposedly dictate actions of the masses, and when in the Third World dictators and local gendarmes faithfully serve as overseers of western capitalists, both phenomena having become well entrenched in *academia* and in reality respectively, this work attempted to wrangle with the problematic of the labyrinthine relationship between Eurocentrism and Marxism. This relationship, we argued, is purported by many authors as the main factor that allegedly lacerated the internationalist artery of Marxism thereby delaying the realization of its programme through a number of false starts, turning intellectuals and workers into socialists willy-nilly with a lack of internationalist gale to back up the power of principles and words. Perfunctory as they might appear, such claims are generally regarded as adequate for an inadvertent rejection of the works and theories of Marx and Engels at an age when spontaneity became the main criterion to judge social movements and when the protuberance of pessimism tend to usurp all the hope regarding not only the present state of global affairs but also their future.

Taking note of the words of the twentieth century Marxist Isaac Deutscher, who pointed out that, "Awareness of historical perspective seems to me to provide the best antidote to excessive pessimism as well as extravagant optimism over the great problems of our time"[316], we attempted to take up the task of bringing in a historical perspective that is capable of addressing the ever-present issue of whether Eurocentric elements are ingrained in the works of the founding fathers of Marxism,

[316] Deutscher, Isaac. *Heretics and Renegades*, (London, 1955), pp. 7.

or not. However daunting the potential scale of such a work might appear, we set our sights on covering both theoretical and practical issues that are, generally, conceived to warrant the proposed organic ties between Eurocentrism and Marxism.

In theoretical terms, the results obtained through the materialization of our introductory and first chapters have shown us that there is an overabundance of evidence that invite one to adopt a perspective contrary to what can be coined the conventional view with regards to the relationship between Eurocentric thought and that of Marx and Engels. Indeed, our brief survey of the theoretical landscapes of Marx's and Engels' thought seem to suggest, whether it was for the customarily misrepresented relations between the material base and ideological superstructure, or the generic misapprehension of Marx's theory of Asiatic Mode of Production, that the variety of primary resources we focused on does not validate any portrayal of the origins of Marxism as just a different Eurocentric mode of though concealed under the deceptive cloak of internationalism. To that end, we believe that our work has managed to present plenty of evidence for one to venture beyond the conventional clouds and dare to suggest that Eurocentrism is not ingrained in the kernel of Marxist thought. Bluntly put, we proposed that when presented in the context of the nineteenth century and within the integral wholeness of their hypotheses, the apparent lack of the preference for commendable expressions that emerge, at times, in different passages in the works of Marx and Engels do not validate their branding as mere adherents of Eurocentric thought. On a personal note, we believe that just as the posthumous publication of Malinowski's diaries, *A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term*, should not call for his portrayal as a Eurocentric amid what he conceived to be 'miserable savages', the entire body of the works of Marx and Engels cannot be reduced to the use of a number of terms of pejorative connotations.[317]

Readers might wonder, at this point, if an inclination to present the works of Marx and Engels in a lopsided manner to set their theoretical record straight induced the author to project a goal and forge evidence accordingly. The author will have to ask

[317] Malinowski, Bronislaw. *A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term*, (Stanford, 1989). For a take on the controversy that ensued the publication of Malinowski's diaries see Clifford, James. 'On Ethnographic Self-Fashioning: Conrad and Malinowski', in *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art*, (Cambridge, 1988).

the indulgence of the reader in rejecting such a gratuitous counter-argument out of hand. Indeed, provided that we canvassed the majority of the controversial passages that are introduced as suggestive of the supposed inherent relationship between Eurocentrism and Marxism in a number of works, we believe that objectivity of this work with regards to the evidence demonstrated is preserved. Nonetheless, the attainment of claims to objectivity is for readers to decide. Additionally, it should be noted that the author experiences no difficulty in concurring with Goethe on the grounds that a depiction of a type of beauty by a painter can only be successful if that beauty corresponds to what he loved in a real human being. In other words, our initial premise that the 'beauty of internationalism' is best depicted at the genesis of Marxist thought appear to be substantiated by the results obtained through the theoretical part of this work.

The discussion on the theoretical side of the relation between Marxism and Eurocentrism was followed by three historical case studies that were introduced to see if the practical realities of the period roughly between 1800-1860 would render our take on the former relation well-founded in the face of contemplation with critical detachment. The British working-class movement was the first case that was scrutinized. Our analysis of the condition of the working class and the development of class consciousness of its members in the first fifty years of the nineteenth century focused on three specific topics: the reformist attitude of the leaders of the working class agitation, the practical resonances of the concept of the aristocracy of labor, and the Catholic Emancipation of 1828, which was one of the most important political watersheds of this period in terms of providing English labor and its Irish counterparts in England a common ground of struggle.

The brief vista we managed to render with regards to these three issues showed us that the inherent reformism of British labor movement was intrinsically tied to the rise of a labor aristocracy, which, in more ways than one, appears to have inherited the privileged traditional status of artisans. Indeed, we have seen that the most organized section of the British proletariat that was highly capable of assuming leadership role, the unionized members of what is called the lower middle class, viewed its status as essentially superior in comparison to the rest of the working

class. Thus, notwithstanding the significance of trade unions in leading the working class agitation, their imperative position also signals the fact that the champions of the working class movement favored the continuation of factory production for the sake of maintaining their superior position within labor ranks.

Provided the underscored importance of trade unions in forging and maintaining the sinews of reformism of the British proletariat, an analysis of the struggle for Catholic Emancipation became all the more crucial whereby we purported that there is enough evidence to argue that the ranks of British labor was not contaminated, except in minor instances, by ethnic and religious strife. By the same token, the unity exhibited by the English and Irish proletariat in the first years of Chartist movement suggested that as important a figure as Daniel O'Connell was, his insistence on constitutionalism and aversion to the non-pacifist methods of class struggle proved to be the major predicament that prevented the complete unity of the Irish and English proletariat from taking place. With the decline of the cooperation between Irish and English workers, which is the only event that comes close to being an internationalist one, we concluded that the potential internationalism of the English working class frequently bordered on bankruptcy in this period. And, despite the fact that the making of the English working class was, unlike what E. P. Thompson indicated, far from being complete, we noted that Marx and Engels started changing their favorable outlook of the revolutionary fervor of British proletariat as early as the late 1860s, when it became clear that English working class was held spellbound by the potential material gains of capitalist growth. This, as we argued, was the decisive last straw that persuaded Marx to turn his face to the Orient, as well as to induce him to change his perception of the Irish Question.

Fittingly, we revisited the Irish anti-colonial agitation subsequently, the contours of which reminded us that religious and/or ethnic persecution breeds its mirror image resistance. Overcoming the odds of combating against the British authorities who enforced the measures of religious and ethnic oppression, therefore, appear to have been the heart and soul of the popular movements that materialized in Ireland during the first half of the nineteenth century. Marx's revision of his revolutionary recipe for British labor, in that sense, becomes pivotal. Despite his prior expectations that

posited the British proletariat as the only possible liberator of Ireland, Marx, in 1860s, arrived at the conclusion that:

> If we are to accelerate the social development of Europe, we must accelerate the catastrophe of official (i.e. ruling class) England. This requires a blow in Ireland, which is the weakest point of Britain. If Ireland is lost, the British 'empire' goes and the class struggle in England, which has up to now been sleepy and slow, will take more acute forms. But England is the metropolis of capitalism and landlordism in the entire world.[318]

Marx also spent considerable time and effort on enhancing his knowledge with regards to the empires and civilizations of the East, including Russia, China, and India, in the aftermath of ebb of the Revolutions of 1848. And, we followed our guiding thread into another 'heart of darkness' that was carved out by the British, this time in India. Excavating the roots of how 'white peril' first came to be established in the Indian peninsula, we showed that British supremacy largely benefited from internal clashes that stemmed from ethnic and religious differences. We also demonstrated that the blurring the lines that separated different ethnic and/or religious groups was the ultimate mistake that was made by the British in the wake of the Rebellion of 1857-1858. With regards to the emergence of socialist ideas, just as in contemporary Ireland, the de-industrialization of the Indian economy and the drain of its resources by the British meant that until ". . . in Great Britain itself the now ruling class shall have been supplanted by the industrial proletariat, or till the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether,"[319] the Indian working class would remain as stillborn. Put differently, the oppressive chains that linked both Ireland and India to England had to be broken for the socialist struggle in both countries to manifest itself.

The results that have been derived from our analyses of the three historical cases indicates that the only national working class that was capable of putting the principle of internationalism into practice was the British proletariat. The question, in that sense, turns into whether the virtual absence of internationalism in the context of

[318] Marx, Karl. Quoted in Hobsbawm, Eric. *Revolutionaries*, pp. 119.

[319] Marx, *Future Results of British Rule in India*, pp. 224.

British working class movement, with the sole exception of the aforementioned buildup to the Catholic Emancipation Act of 1828, can be viewed as overestimation regarding the revolutionary potential of British workers on the part of Marx and Engels. We contend that our work permits us to decline that proposition for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as we noted in the introduction, internationalism of Marx and Engels ultimately measured the internationalist aspect of any social movement against the yardstick of its impact on the European labor movements. That is to say, Marx and Engels, in recognition of that fact that the formation of working class was an observable phenomenon only in a few of the core countries that pursued the trajectory of industrial capitalism as their guiding lodestar, purported that the only way to assess the degree of successful internationalism of any popular movement was by projecting its effects on the socialist movements of Europe. The lack of actual collaboration between British labor and Indian, or Irish, nationalists, therefore, does not solidify the argument that British working class movement, as far as its revolutionary potential in the early nineteenth is concerned, was confined to narrow corridors of national politics. Its inherent reformism, on the other hand, does appear to suggest a certain pursuit of constitutional, and hence national, politics. Yet, in the light of the fact that both of the founding fathers revised their schemes, which initially designated British labor as the projected leader of European socialism, and moved British proletariat from the leading to a supporter role, we believe that they recognized the British working class politics to have intimate ties to national contours.

Furthermore, we need to remind ourselves that Marx's influence faced impenetrable limits with regards to its impact on the British labor movement. Indeed, the appearance of Marxism on the British scene came when a number of key types of labor movement, such as trade unionism, consumers' cooperation in national scale, etc., had already been established. In other words, as Hobsbawm wrote:

> The peculiarity of Britain is that it was the oldest, for a long time the most successful and dominant, and almost certainly the stablest capitalist society, and that its bourgeoisie had to come to terms with a proletarian majority of the

> population long before any other. The influence of marxism has been inevitably circumscribed by this situation.[320]

Henceforth, we believe that we have garnered enough historical evidence to validate our premise that practical drawbacks of British working class movement in the period of 1800-1860 do not signal an inherent structural failure of socialism that originates from the absence of actual international cooperation.

The commonsense, as well as the conventional outlook of *academia*, that prevails in the world of 2014 does not seem to exercise any caution in pairing the policies of the parties that profess to rule in Marx's name, or the views of particular members of the new-left tradition with the thought of Marx and Engels, thereby combining the failure of any such policies or views with a structural failure of the theories of the latter. At the end of the day, we are still living in a capitalist world in which neo-liberal policies still reign supreme. Ironically, arguments of this kind where also strikingly common in Marx's day, which becomes evident when one recalls that free-trade liberal ideology was at the acme of its popularity in the contemporary Europe of Marx's day.

The widespread belief that free trade meant unprecedented prosperity was the legitimate view of history in Marx's day. Yet, it did not coincide with the world Marx saw. He realized that 'making poverty history' was but an empty slogan that had no tone of reality in it. He pointed out that increasing aggregate wealth did not translate into eliminating either income discrepancies or human poverty and suffering even in the most developed countries of his day. Instead, it contributed to widening the unbridgeable gap between the affluent minority and the pauperized majority. He saw hypocrisy and abuse of illegitimate power wherever he looked in the colonized parts of the globe, ranging from major powers taking part in the enforced trade of opium to the increased trade in slavery in the West Indies.

Corresponding to the global picture in Marx's day, the high-water mark of globalization and free-trade liberalism that we face today have not succeeded in heralding equal growth and eliminating pauperization of masses in a global scale.

[320] Hobsbawm, *Revolutionaries*, pp. 120-121.

Indeed, Third World countries embracing protectionist measures as well as the popular movements that surfaced in the most advanced capitalist countries in the last ten years suggest that the controversies that are associated with the world in which we live today are not vastly different from those of Marx's and Engels' day. The analyses conducted in this paper show that the works of Marx and Engels still bear considerable amount of relevance to the present day social, political and economic conjuncture. Surely, various aspects of the theoretical heritage of Marx and Engels need to be updated to fit in to the present day context in order to sharpen their edges whereby it can be turned into the skeleton key, which functioned on the loose ends of capitalist world economy that it once was in the nineteenth century. This work, however, shows that the internationalist aspect of Marx's and Engels' works, in the context of our three historical examples, do not require any major modification in order to severe its supposedly inherent ties with Eurocentrism. After all, sins of some of the Marxist sons do not necessarily mean that they are derived from those of the Marxist 'fathers'.

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APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezde Marksizm ve Avrupa Merkeziyetçilik arasındaki ilişki incelenmektedir. Bu çerçeveden ele alındığında tezimizin temel savı Avrupa Merkeziyetçiliğin en önemli göstergelerinden olan Doğu/Batı diyalektiğinin Marksist paradigmaya içkin olmadığıdır; yazarın temel çabası ise, basitçe ifade etmek gerekirse, Marx ve Engels'in en önemli eserlerine dönüp bunlarda Avrupa Merkeziyetçi düşünce ile ilişkilendirilen nüveleri ortaya koymaktır. Bu noktada söylenmesi gerekir ki yazar Marksizm ve Avrupa Merkeziyetçilik arasındaki olası bir dirsek temasının Marksizm içerisinde kendisine Marx ve Engels'in ölümlerinden sonra yer bulan akımların (revizyonizm, post-Marksizm, Yeni Marksizm, vesaire) incelenmesinden değil, ancak Marksist paradigmanın fikir babalarının eserlerine yapılacak bir geri dönüşle ortaya konabileceği kanısındadır. Bu sebeple tezin bütününde Marx ve Engels'in 1840'lardan itibaren yayınlanmaya başlayan eserleri mercek altına tutulmuş ve hem kuramsal hem de pratik anlamda bu eserlerin Avrupa Merkeziyetçi anlayışla ne derece örtüştüğü incelenmiştir.

Tezimizin giriş ve ilk bölümleri Marksizm ve Avrupa Merkeziyetçilik arasında var olduğu kabul edilen yakın ilişkinin kuramsal bir incelemesinden oluşmaktadır. Giriş bölümünde, bu bağlamda ilk olarak temas ettiğimiz öğeler Marksizm'in uluslararası (enternasyonalist) bir düşünce sistemi olduğu iddiasının önemi ve bu iddianın çıkış noktalarıdır. Giriş bölümünde ifade etmeye çalıştığımız gibi, uluslararası köklerine darbe vurulmuş bir Marksizm büyük tasarıların reddiyesinin kabul gören akademik bir prosedür haline geldiği post-modern dünyamızda sadece iktidar oyununa büyük bir dezavantajla başlamakla kalmaz, ayrıca aynı zamanda küreselleşme ile omuz omuza yürüyen yeni düzen karşısında başarısızlığa mahkum edilir. Bu nedenle Marx

ve Engels'in emek tanımı, sömürüye tabii olması ve alet üretebilme kapasitesi ile olan ilişkisi açısından insanları diğer türlerden ve primatlardan ayıran bir özellik olarak, ve bunun Marksist düşünce sisteminin temelinde yatan uluslararası çağrışımları ile giriş bölümünde yapılan başlangıç uluslararası bir düşünce sistemi olma iddiasının pratikteki yansımalarının incelenmesiyle takip edilmiştir. Marx ve Engels'in eserlerinin oluşumunda on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında meydana gelen popüler hareketlerin önemi reddedilemeyecek biçimde işgal ettikleri konum göz önünde bulundurulduğunda kuramsal tartışmanın bu hareketler üzerinden incelenmesi yazara göre tabii kılınmaktadır. Tezimizin temel sorunsalı, bu noktada, Marx ve Engels'in temel eserlerinde yer verdikleri ve Avrupa Merkeziyetçi düşüncenin izlerini taşıdığı varsayılan bir takım önermelerin dönem bağlamsallığı ve bir bütün olarak Marksist düşünce sistemi içerisindeki konumları yeniden inşa edilerek incelenmeye çalışılmasına dönüşmektedir. Bu incelemenin somutlaştırılmasında karşılaşılması muhtemel olan ana problem, giriş bölümünde de ifade ettiğimiz gibi, pratik ve kuramsal boyut arasındaki dengeyi sağlamaktır; zira bu dönemde oluşan toplumsal hareketlerin yüzeyselce yapılan bir incelemesinden hareketle pratiğe verilen ağrırlığın bizleri Marksist düşünce sisteminin kuramsal dinamiklerinden yoksun bırakacağı açık olduğu gibi tamamıyla kuramsal bağlamsallığın inşası üzerine yoğunlaşan bir çalışmanın da pratik damardan bütünüyle kopuk olacağı şüphe götürmezdir.

Marksist kuram ile on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında meydan gelmiş olup, konu itibariyle, göze çarpan toplumsal hareketlerin arasında inşa edilmeye çalışılan bu dengenin oluşturulmasında en önemli sac ayaklarından bir tanesi Hegel diyalektiğinin Marksist düşünce sistemi içerisindeki konumunun yeniden gözden geçirilmesidir. Bu bağlamda denilmelidir ki Hegel diyalektiği Marksizm'e içkindir. Diyalektiğin Marksist paradigma için önemini temel bir örnekle açıklayacak olursak: Üretim güçlerinin optimal derecede güçlenmesi demek mevcut olan üretim ilişkilerinin bu dinamiği korumakta yetersiz kalmasına yol açar. Mevcut üretim ilişkilerinin yeniden yapılandırılması ise mevcut üretim biçimi için somut bir değişim teşkil eder. Dolayısıyla Marx ve Engels'in tarih okumasındaki üretim biçiminin gelişimi faktörü doğrudan üretim ilişkileri ve üretim güçleri arasındaki diyalektik ilişkiyle bağıntılıdır.

Ancak Marx yalnızca Hegel'in diyalektiğini kendi düşünce sistemine eklemlemekle kalmaz, bunu aşmayı da kendisine görev edinir. Tezimizde de konu ettiğimiz üzere Marx tam da Hegel'in kendi diyalektik sürecini sonlardığı noktada (devletin kurulması ile tinin gerçekleşmesi) devlet ve sivil toplum (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) arasında ortaya çıkan ikililiği tekrar diyalektiğe tabii tutar, çünkü, ona göre, bu ikililiğin devlet tarafından çözümlenmesi olanaksızdır. Başka bir deyişle Marx için burjuva toplumlar için asıl önemli olan diyalektik süreç köle-efendi diyalektiğinin çözümü ve efendi pozisyonunu sahiplenmeden toplumu yönetebilen bir devlet mekanizmasının kurulmasıyla ancak başlar. Bu noktada denilmelidir ki Marx'ın burjuva toplumlara karşı çıkışının belki de en önemli nedeni burjuva devriminin, tüm hukuki ve siyasal getirilerine karşı, sınıfsal kökeniyle sınırlı sonuçlara evrilmeye mahkum olmasıdır. Bu sebeple devlet içerisinde gerçekleştirilmesi gereken eşitlik (devlet dışındaki alanın eşitsizliklerin alanı olmaya mahkum olmasından dolayı) arayışı Marx'ın özellikle erken dönem eserlerinde kendisine temel bir yer edinen 'insan özgürleşimi' (human emancipation) kavramının diyalektik süreçlerle gerçekleştirilmesinde mutlak suretle kullanılması gereken bir mücadele alanıdır.

İnsanın özgürleşimi kavramı üzerine yoğunlaştığımız bu noktada altının çizilmesi gereken başka bir husus ise bu kavramın Marx tarafından sadece burjuva toplum düzeninde var olan özgürleşme iddiasının bir antitezi olarak değil, aynı zamanda ilkel-komün yaşamı ardında bırakmış toplumlarda insan emeği üzerine koyulan her türlü kısıt ve şarttan bağımsız bir insan tasavvurunu mümkün kılmak sebebiyle kullanılmış olmasıdır. Bu nedenle Marx'ın mümkünatını ortaya koyduğu komünist toplum yapısı insanın dini, ideolojik, geleneksel ve daha nice koşullanmışlıktan kurtulduğu bir toplum yapısına işaret eder. Bu tanımın anlaşıldığı noktada ise kapitalizm öncesi toplum tiplerini kapitalist üretim modeline bir alternatif olarak kabul etmek imkansızlaşır. Başka bir söylemle, Marx her ne kadar kapitalizmin hayat verdiği maddi ve toplumsal eşitsizliklerin aşılmasını komünist topluma geçişte bir önkoşul olarak öne sürse de burjuva devrimleri onun için, verili eşitsizliklerin (monarşik düzende süre gelen toplumsal statü ve hiyerarşi gibi) aşılmasını sağlaması sebebiyle, mutlak olarak yaşanması gereken bir süreci temsil eder. Dolayısıyla Marx ve Engels için kapitalizm öncesi üretim biçimlerine yapılacak olası bir dönüş ve

yüceleştirilen bir altın çağa duyulan özlem kesinlikle tasavvurunu yaptıkları komünist topluma bir alternatif teşkil etmez.

İnsanın özgürleşimi kavramının bu tez için önemi ise on dokuzuncu yüzyıl ortalarında çoktan doğrudan yollarla kolonileştirilmiş iki örnek olan İrlanda ve Hindistan üzerine Marx ve Engels'in yaptıkları incelemelerde yatar. Ancak, Marksist kuramın bu toplumsal hareketlerle olan ilişkisine geçmeden önce iki noktaya daha değinmemiz gerekir, ki bunlar da diyalektik ilişkinin maddi yapı ve ideolojik üstyapı arasındaki ilişkiye dair bize sunduğu öneriler ve Asya Tipi Üretim Tarzı'nın (ATÜT), simgelediği çoklu üretim biçimleri analizi nedeniyle, incelemeye tabi tutulmasıdır.

Öncelikle, giriş bölümünde vurguladığımız gibi, maddi eşitsizlikler üzerine inşa edilen yapı ile ideolojik, dini, hukuki, vs. koşullanmaları sembolize eden üstyapı arasında tek yönlü bir neden-sonuç ilişkisi arayışı Marx'ın kullandığı diyalektik tarihsel ilerleme anlayışına ters düşer. Bunun en önemli nedeni Marx ve Engels'in gerek eserlerinde gerekse mektuplarında yer verdikleri üzere maddi yapıya dayanan ilişkilerin ancak son kertede ideolojik üstyapı üzerinde ksesin bir belirleyiciliğe sahip oldukları gerçeğidir. Dolayısıyla üretim ilişkilerinin diyalektik örgüsü maddi yapı ve ideolojik üstyapı arasında son noktaya kadar süregelen tek yönlü bir neden-sonuç ilişkisi yerine karşılıklı bir etkileşim ortamına süreklilik sağlar. Diğer bir ifadeyle, maddi ilişkiler, son kerteye kadar, üstyapısal ilişkileri şekillendirdiği ölçüde kendileri de bu ilişkiler tarafından biçimlenir ta ki son noktada bu iki olgu arasındaki nedensellik kendine vücut bulana kadar. Tezimizin ilk bölümünü ayırdığımız 1800-1850 tarihleri arasında su yüzüne çıkan, zirvesine ulaşan ve deyimi yerindeyse miadını dolduran İngiliz işçi sınıfı hareketi buna canlı bir örnektir.

Sözü geçen bölümde de belirttiğimiz üzere İngiliz işçi sınıfının bu dönemde özelliklerini göstermeye başladığı hızlı biçimde ivmelenme ve soğrulma süreci alt-orta sınıf veya işçi sınıfının aristokratik bileşeni (aristocracy of labor) diye belirtilen sınıfsal öğenin maddi çıkarlarından kaynaklandığı kadar radikal söylem ve pratiklere sırtını yaslamayı tercih etmeyen lider kadroların varlığı ile de ilişkilidir. İşte tam olarak da bu sebeple sosyalist devrim için gerekli bir şart olan maddi ilişkilerin dönemim en gelişkin kapitalist toplumu olan Birleşik Krallıktaki olgunluğu tek başına sosyalist devrimin habercisi olarak addedilemez. Aksine, Gramsci'nin

1920'lerden itibaren eserlerinde yer vermeye başlayacağı gibi, üstyapısal ilişkiler ve bunların maddi yapı üzerindeki etkisi en az maddi ilişkilerin olgunluğu kadar sosyalist devrimin mümkünat dahiline girişinin belirleyicisi olan bir faktördür.

ATÜT ise, diyalektik tarih okuması ve yapı-üstyapı arasındaki ilişkilere benzer bir biçimde, yanlış anlaşılması durumunda Marksizm'e içkin olduğu varsayılan Avrupa Merkeziyetçi damarın temel göstergelerinden biri olarak kabul edilen başka bir öğedir. ATÜT kavramını Marksizm ve Avrupa Merkeziyetçilik arasında bir köprü olarak incelemeyi tercih eden akademisyenler bu kavramın doğu toplumlarındaki kapitalizm öncesi üretim biçimlerini epistemolojik olarak batı toplumlarının tarihsel ilerleme çizgisinden ayrıştırdığı gerekçesiyle bu kavramın kullanımına karşı çıkmaktadırlar. Fakat birinci bölümde yapılan özet maiyetindeki incelemenin de gösterdiği üzere bu tezi savunan ve ATÜT formülasyonunu Marx'ın doğu toplumları incelemesinin zayıf karnı olarak resmeden entellektüellerin görmezden geldiği iki temel unsur vardır. Bunlar, sırasıyla, Marx'ın kendi döneminde varlığı yadsınamayacak bir olgusallığa ulaşmış olan kolonileşme gerçeği ile yüzleşmekten çekinmemesi ve ATÜT kavramsallaştırmasının, iddia edilenin aksine, Marksizm'i taraflı olarak gerçekleştirilen bir doğu toplumları analizinin kıskacından kurtarmış olduğudur. Bu bağlamda öncelikle ifade edilmesi gereken nokta Marx ve Engels'in temel eserlerini vermeye başladıkları bir dönem olan 1840'larda doğrudan veya dolaylı yollarla tahakkuk eden kolonileşme sürecinin dünyayı çoktan kolonileştiren ve kolonileşen toplumlar olarak ikiye bölmüş olduğu gerçeğidir. Bu olgunun farkında olan Marx ve Engels'e göre kolonileşme sürecinin doğu toplumları üzerinde yarattığı ekonomik, sosyal ve politik etkiler telafi edilebilmenin çok ötesindedir. Bu noktada idrak edilmesi gereken temel nokta ise Marx ve Engels'in kolonileşme sürecini doğu toplumlarını içerisinde hapsoldukları mutlak atalet durumundan kurtaran ve dolayısıyla aklanması gereken bir süreç olarak değil toplumsal dokuyu altüst etmesi itibariyle geri dönüşü olmayan vetire olarak incelemeyi tercih etmeleridir. Bu noktada elbette eklenmesi gerekir ki ulusal bağımsızlığını sağlayan batılı olmayan toplumların zaman içerisinde izlemeye başladıkları yörünge kolonileşme sürecinin kati izleri konusunda Marx ve Engels'i haklı çıkaracaktır.

İkinci olarak not düşülmesi gereken nokta ise ATÜT formülasyonunun, kendi başına, olası bir Avrupa Merkeziyetçi Marx ve Engels okumasının önüne geçebilecek bir kavramsal güce sahip olduğudur. Bu iddiamızı derinleştirmek için ters bir olgusallık ilişkisi kuracak olursak; Marx'ın batılı olmayan toplumların kapitalizm öncesi üretim biçimlerini tanımlarken ATÜT biçiminde bir formülasyondan kaçınması kolaylıkla bu tip toplumların üretim biçimlerinin incelenmesinde batı feodalizminin bir çıta olarak kabul edilmesi olarak anlaşılabilir. Başka bir deyişle, böyle bir durumda batılı olmayan toplumlarda kapitalizm öncesi dönemde gözlemlenebilen çeşitli üretim biçimleri evrensel tarihin akışına ancak batı feodalizmine yakınlaştıkları ölçüde dahil edilebilir. Dolayısıyla eğer Avrupa Merkeziyetçi düşüncenin temel kıstası batılı olmayan toplumları batı toplumlarının tarihsel gelişim eğrisi üzerinden açıklama yoluna başvurmak ise ATÜT yoksunu bir doğu toplumu incelemesi tam da böyle bir yaklaşıma tekabül eder. Bu bağlamda unutulmaması gereken bir nokta da Marx ve Engels'in tarih okumalarında mutlak suretle kapitalist üretim biçimini veya ilerleyen dönemlerde inşası tamamlanabilecek komünist toplum modelini kaçınılmaz bir doğallığa sahip bir aşama olarak kavramsallaştırmadan kaçınma konusunda sürekli bir çaba göstermiş olduklarıdır. Marx ve Engels'in tarih okumaları tarih fetişizmi olarak anlaşılabilecek bir yaklaşımdan yoksundur. Ayrıca hatırlanması gerekir ki, bu teleolojik 'mahrumiyet' Marx ve Engels'in tarih okuması ve Hegel'in tarihsellik anlayışı arasındaki temel karşıtlığı oluşturur. Kapitalist üretim biçiminin önemi ise aslen komünist üretim biçimine geçiş potansiyelini gerçekleştirme konusunda ortaya çıkar; çünkü, kapitalist evreye geçmemiş toplumların, tikel örneklerin doğu veya batı toplumları oluşundan bağımsız olarak, emek sömürü ilişkileri ve içerisinden geçmekte oldukları yabancılaşma süreçleri kapitalizmi 'tatmadığı' ölçüde olası bir sınıfsal bilince sahip işçi sınıfının ortaya çıkmasına ket vurur. Ancak, mensubu oldukları toplumların bu tarihsel üretim biçimi yörüngesini takip etmesini sağlayacak toplumsal bileşen yine sosyalizmin savunuculuğunu üstlenen bireylerden başkası olamaz. Bu nedenle Marx ve Engels'e göre tarihsel gelişimin tek öznesi siyasal bilince sahip olan işçi sınıfının ta kendisidir, ve Hegel'in aksine, önünde durulamaz bir kesinlik debisine sahip bir 'tarih nehri' değildir.

Bu kuramsal incelemelere ilaveten tezimizin birinci bölümünde özgün ve melez bir yönetim biçimi olan sömürgeci devletin Marksizm harici devlet-toplum ilişkilerini

inceleyen diğer kuramsal okullar açısından bir tetkikine de yer verilmiştir. Liberalizm ve yapısalcı okulun temel motifleri kullanılarak yapılan bu incelemenin bize gösterdiği esas çıkarım ise batı toplumlarının yönetim biçimlerini açıklamak ve bunlara kılavuzluk etmek için kuramsallaştırılan bu iki akımın nasıl da kolonileştirilen toplumların idaresinde kullanılmak için inşa edilen devlet düzenini açıklama konusunda aciz olduğudur. Doğrusunu söylemek gerekirse tüm teleolojik varsayımları ve ontolojik önkabulleriyle bu iki düşünce sisteminin zaten batı toplumlarının çerçevesinde kaygan bir zeminde yükselen kuramsal yapısı mevzubahis doğu toplumları ve bunların kapitalizme evrilme süreci olduğunda açıklayıcı gücünün büyük bir bölümünü yitirmektedir. Bu yoksunluğun hayat verdiği kuramsal boşluk ise Marx ve Engels'in tarih okumasının önemini bir kat daha arttırır, zira bunun sahip olduğu açıklayıcı güç kuramsal sarkacın batılı olmayan toplumlara kaydığı anda karşılaşılan müşküllerle baş edebilecek güçtedir. İşte tam da bu nedenle eğer sömürgeci devletin on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısındaki gelişimi ve önemi konu edinilecekse kullanılması gereken kuramsal araç Marx ve Engels'in düşünce sistemi olmak durumundadır.

Ana hatları çizilmeye çalışılmış olan bu kuramsal inceleme on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında ete kemiğe bürünen üç örneğin tarihsel incelemesi ile izlenmiştir. Bu örnekler, sırasıyla, İngiliz işçi sınıfı hareketi, İrlanda'da aynı dönemde yaşanan ulusal bağımsızlığa yönelik devinim ve Hindistan'daki kolonileşme karşıtı mücadeledir. İngiliz işçi sınıfı mücadelesi ile bu örnekleri incelemeye başlayacak olursak, bu bölümde İngiltere'de bu dönemde yaşanan işçi sınıfı mücadelesinin üç temel hattına temas ettiğimiz söylenebilir. Bu üç temel nokta içerisinde incelediğimiz alt başlıklar da resme dahil edildiğinde Marx ve Engels'in niçin erken dönem eserlerinde İngiliz işçi sınıfını uluslararası sosyalist mücadelenin öncüsü ve lideri olarak konumlandırdığına dair ipuçlarına ulaşılmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, bu bölümde yaptığımız inceleme bir toplam olarak ele alındığında 1860'ların sonlarına doğru Marx ve Engels'in İngiliz işçi sınıfının dinamizmine duydukları güveni yitirmelerinin ve sosyalist devrim umudunun gerçekleşmesi yolunda doğu toplumlarına daha fazla ağırlık vermeye başlamalarının nedenleri de anlatılmaktadır. Bu incelemeye göre dönemin İngiliz işçi sınıfının 1848 devrimlerine kadar faal bir biçimde sürdürdüğü mücadelede reformist yaklaşımın devrim beklentisine üstün gelmesinin başlıca

nedenleri İngiliz entellektüellerin, özellikle Fransız çağdaşlarıyla karşılaştırıldıklarında, devleti var olduğu şekliyle yıkıp yeni baştan eşitlikçi düzenin kurumsal taşıyıcısı olabilecek bir biçimde inşa etmeye çalışma düşüncesinin içerdiği radikalizmden yoksun olmaları, dönemin işçi sınıfı hareketinin çoğunlukla işçi aristokrasisinin kalbinin attığı kurumlar olan işçi sendikaları güdümünde gerçekleşmiş olması, ve son olarak özellikle Çartizm yıllarında ihtiyaç duyulan İrlandalı ve İngiliz işçilerin devlete ve monarşiye karşı koalisyonunun gerçekleşememiş olmasıdır.

Öncelikle, radikalizm ve reformizm arasındaki açının dönemin İngiliz işçi sınıfı mücadelesinde ikinciden yana açılmaya başlaması, ki bu 1820'lerde sendikal hareketlerin başlangıcından itibaren gözlemlenebilmektedir, bu sınıfın uluslararası işçi sınıfı mücadelesinin öncüsü olma rolünü 'kaldıramamasının' başlıca nedeni olarak gösterilebilir. Araştırmamızda da yer verdiğimiz üzere İngiltere 1789 Devrim'inin canlı hatıralarına benzer bir deneyim yaşamış olmamakla beraber İngiliz yönetici kadrolar Fransız Devrim'ini izleyen süreçte devrime karşı cansiperane bir mücadeleye girişmişler ve bu politikanın yankıları kendilerine İngiliz radikal düşünürlerinin geleceğe dair çizdikleri portrelerde de yer bulmuştur. Dönemin Fransa'sının aksine sahiplenilen bu şiddet karşıtı ve örgütlü sosyalist bir grubun yönetimi ele geçirmesi ihtimalini bir kenara bırakan bu entellektüel gelenek on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında işçi mücadelesinin, liderler aracılığıyla, köklerine nüfuz etmiş ve İngiltere'de var olabilecek devrimci dinamiğin kırılmasında büyük bir rol oynamıştır. Daha uygun çalışma koşulları ve vatandaşlık haklarının, özellikle seçme ve seçilme konusunda, ön plana çıkması elbette sosyalist mücadele için, Marx ve Engels'in de ifade ettiği gibi, bir kayıp olarak anlaşılmamalıdır. Ancak, işçi sınıfı mücadelesi için böylesi bir yaklaşımın barındırdığı asıl tehdit bu hakların kazanımının sosyalist mücadelede bir 'kilometre taşı' olarak değil başlı başına bir hedef olarak anlaşılmaya başlamasıdır. 1830'ların sonlarında fitili yakılan Çartist hareketin başarısızlıkla sonuçlanan 1848 devrimlerinin hemen sonrasında çıkmaz bir sokağa girip yaklaşık otuz yıl boyunca rafa kaldırılması bu tehdidin dönemin İngiltere'sinde gerçekleşmiş olduğunun en temel kanıtıdır. Marx ve Engels'in de defalarca ifade ettiği üzere sistem içi çözüm arayışları ancak belli bir noktaya kadar sosyalist devrim mücadelesinin taşıyıcılığını yapabilir. İngiltere'de ise bu arayışlar

1870'lerin sonlarında işçi aristokrasisinin kendi ayrıcalıklı konumunun tehdit altında olduğunu fark etmesi ile başlayan 'yeni sendikacılık' dönemine kadar işçi sınıfının temel özelliği haline gelmiştir.

İşçi aristokrasisi üzerine notlar düştüğümüz bu noktada bu kavram ile ilgili olarak yaptığımız kısa incelemeye de değinmek gerekir. Eski zanaatkar ve loca sisteminin bir devamı olarak İngiltere'de 1810'larda yaygınlaşmaya başlayan sendikal hareket alt orta sınıf diye tabir edilen fabrikalarda kol emeğiyle çalışan 'vasıfsız' işçilerden yüksek gelir ve sosyal statü ile ayrılan ve bu imtiyazlı konumun devamlılığının ancak fabrika çalışanlarının toplu olarak işkolu eğitiminden geçmesinin engellenmesi aracılığıyla sağlanabildiği bu grubun ayrıcalıklı konumunun korunmasına dayanmaktadır. Bu alt tabakanın sendikal hareket aracılığıyla elde etmiş olduğu sosyalist mücadelenin hudutlarını tayin edici sosyal konum ise İngiliz işçi sınıfı hareketinin organik bağlar ile kapitalist üretim biçiminin devamlılığına güdülenmiş olması anlamına gelmektedir. Başka bir deyişle, İngiliz işçi sınıfı mücadelesinin 1800-1850 arasındaki dönemdeki varlığı böylelikle onu devrimci potansiyelinden mahrum bırakan bir lider tabakayla yapılması zaruri olan ittifaklara bağlı kılınmıştır.

İngiliz işçi sınıfının etnik açıdan farklı ancak nicel olarak hiç de azımsanmayacak bir bileşeni olan İrlanda'lı göçmen işçilere gelecek olursak, bu grup ve İngiliz kökenli işçiler arasındaki etnik ve dini bariyerler sanılandan çok daha düşük bir etkiye sahiptir. Bu iddia sosyolojik açıdan farklı etnik gruplara mensup bireyler arasındaki hatırı sayılır evlilik oranları ile güçlendirilebileceği gibi 1828 Katolik Özgürleşimi gibi İngiliz işçi sınıfından ve sendikalardan ciddi destek görmüş olan toplumsal hareketlerin varlığı ile de tahkim edilebilir. İncelememizde de yer verdiğimiz üzere her ne kadar pratikten ziyade sembolik bir değere sahip olsa da 1828 Özgürleşimi tarihsel, kültürel, sosyal ve ekonomik konumları itibariyle ayrışan iki önemli etnik katmanın nasıl bir çatı altında buluşabileceğini göstermiş olması itibariyle büyük önem taşır. 1830'ların sonlarına kadar sürdürülebilmiş olan bu ittifakın Çartist hareketin zirve dönemi olan 1840'larda çözülmüş olması ise doğrudan Daniel O'Connell gibi dönemin İrlanda bağımsızlık hareketi için muazzam bir öneme sahip liderlerinin sulhperver bir anayasal mücadele zeminini benimsemiş olması ile ilişkilidir. Dolayısıyla dönemin İngiltere'de ciddi yankılar uyandıran İrlanda

bağımsızlık hareketi etnik ve dini farklılıkları bütünüyle kesen bir uluslararası yaklaşımın işçi mücadelesi için mümkünat dahilinde olduğunu göstermekle beraber böylesi bir ittifakın devamlılığının nasıl da pamuk ipliğine bağlı bir doğası olduğunun canlı bir örneğini oluşturmaktadır.

Tezimizin üçüncü bölümünde üzerine odaklanma imkanı bulduğumuz on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısında gerçekleşen İrlanda bağımsızlık hareketi ise dini ve etnik farklılıkların aşılmasının sosyalist mücadele için zemin hazırlama konusunda ne derece elzem bir konuma sahip olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu bölümde de ifade ettiğimiz gibi öncelikle İrlanda'nın Birleşik Krallıktan kopuşunu aracısız bir biçimde İngiliz işçi sınıfı mücadelesinin başarıyla sonuçlanması ile ilişkilendiren Marx ve Engels, 1860'lardan itibaren bu sınıfın devrimci potansiyeline yönelik olarak değişen algılarını İrlanda'nın bağımsızlığını farklı biçimlerde öngörerek ifade etmeye başlamışlardır. İrlanda'da süregelmekte olan bağımsızlık mücadelesinin uluslararası sosyalist mücadeleye etkisi ile ilgili olarak değişen bu yaklaşım farklılığına göre İrlanda dönemin en gelişkin kapitalist üretim biçimine sahip olan Birleşik Krallığın küresel egemenlik ağının en zayıf halkası olarak anlaşılmaya başlanmış, ki bu da İrlanda'nın bağımsızlığını kendi gücüyle kazanması halinde sosyalist mücadeleye ivme kazandırabilecek bir şekilde anlaşılmaya başlanması ile eşanlamlıdır.

Bu bölümde yaptığımız incelemelerde ulaşma imkanı bulduğumuz bulguların da gösterdiği gibi 1790-1850 arası İrlanda'nın üç tarihsel evreden geçtiğini savunmak anlaşılır olmaktadır. Bu evreler, sırasıyla, İrlanda parlamentosunun resmi olarak Birleşik Krallığa bağlandığı Birlik Kanunu'nun resmileştiği tarih olan 1798, Katolik Özgürleşimi adına verilen mücadelelere sahne olan 1828'e kadar yaşanmış olan süreç ve son olarak da 1845-1849 yılları arasında baş gösteren Büyük Kıtlık dönemidir. Bu dönüm noktalarının simgelediği değişimleri hatırlayacak olursak: 1798'de yasallaşan Birlik Kanunu simgesel olarak İrlanda parlamentosunun Dublin'den Westminster'a taşınmasının ötesinde on dokuzuncu yüzyıl başlarında önceki dönemde kaydettiği kısmen başarılı büyümeden sonra hız kesmeye başlayan İrlanda ekonomisi için özellikle 1820'lerden itibaren felaket niteliğinde bir gelişme olmuştur. Gümrük vergilerinin ve yerel ekonomiyi koruyan diğer tarifelerin sırayla düşürülmeleri ve en nihayetinde kaldırılmaları ile sonuçlanan bu süreç İrlanda ekonomisini ihracat

ürünleri üzerine yoğunlaşan bir tarım ekonomisi haline getirmiş ve 1810'lardan itibaren sıradanlaşmaya başlayan büyük göç dalgalarının habercisi olmuştur.

Birlik Kanunu ile köşeye sıkıştırılan İrlanda ekonomisinin sosyal bir tazmini şeklinde anlaşılabilecek Katolik Özgürleşimi ise parlamento üyesi olma yolunda Anglikan olmayan mezheplere mensup diğer Birleşik Krallık vatandaşlarının üzerine konan kısıtları kısmen, ve daha çok sembolik bir biçimde, kaldırmıştır. Katolik Özgürleşimi kanunun daha çok sembolik bir değişimi müjdelediği yorumu ise kanunda seçmen olarak sayılabilmek için belirlenmiş olan mülkiyet koşullarının hiçbir şekilde değiştirilmemiş olması ile doğrudan ilişkilidir. Bu açıdan bakıldığında İrlanda'nın yüzyıllar boyunca Birleşik Krallığın çıkarlarına boyun eğen bir pozisyonda tutulmuş olması ve tufeyli temeller üzerine inşa edilen Birlik Kanunun İrlanda halkını ve ekonomisini adeta köleliğe mahkum etmek üzere izlemekte olduğu strateji karşılığında Katolik Özgürleşimi ancak minimal düzeyde bir telafi olarak yorumlanabilir.

Diğer taraftan Birlik Kanununun İrlanda ekonomisi üzerinde yarattığı mahvedici etki 1830'ların başlarından itibaren sürekli olarak patlak vermeye başlayan deyimi yerindeyse kronik açlık dönemlerinde kendisini göstermeye başlamıştır. Ancak yıkıcı etkiler üzerinden bir incelemeye baş vurulduğunda 1845 yılında belirginleşen ve on dokuzuncu yüzyıl Avrupa'sının yaşadığı en büyük felaketlerden biri olan Büyük Kıtlık emsalsiz bir dönüm noktası olarak ortaya çıkar. Bu dönemde yaşanan açlık doğrudan Britanya hükümetinin geç ve yetersiz müdahaleleri ile ilişkilidir, öyle ki İngiliz parlamento üyeleri bu dönemde aldıkları kararlarla büyük ölçüde kendi eserleri olan bu felaketin etkilerini asgariye indirme konusunda yalnızca minimal yardımlar yapmakla kalmamış, İrlanda'ya uygun fiyatlardan ithal edilebilecek durumda olan kıta Avrupa'sı çıkışlı tahıl ürünleri üzerine koyulan kotaları ve vergileri azaltmayarak adeta İrlanda halkını varlık içinde yokluğa mahkum etmiştir. Sonuç olarak, yapılan incelemelerin gösterdiği kadarıyla 1.000.000 ila 1.500.000 milyon arası İrlanda'lı 1845-1851 döneminde açlık ve açlığa bağlı olarak patlak veren hastalıklar nedeniyle hayatlarını kaybetmiş, bundan çok daha fazla sayıda insan ise imkanlarının el verdiği ölçüde Kuzey Amerika ve Britanya'ya göç etmek durumunda kalmıştır. Bu bölümde yapılan incelemenin de gösterdiği gibi etnik ve

dini tahakküm bir toplum üzerine dayatılmaya devam ettiği sürece sosyalist mücadele ve siyasal bilinç sahibi işçi sınıfının oluşumu gecikmektedir. Dolayısıyla denilebilir ki insan özgürleşimi için sosyalist mücadeleye başlamadan önce doğrudan sömürgeleştirilmiş İrlanda gibi toplumların kolonileştiren toplumların kıskacından kurtulması gerekmektedir.

Dördüncü bölümde ise 1750 ve 1850 yılları arasında Hindistan'da aralıklı bir seyir izleyen sömürgecilik karşıtı hareketler konu edilmiştir. Tarihsel incelememizde de belirttiğimiz gibi 1757 Plassey Savaşı ile pekiştirilen Britanya'nın Hindistan toplumları üzerindeki hegemonyası aslında karşısında durulamayacak bir ekonomik ve askeri güce sahip Büyük Britanya'nın sömürgeleştirilmenin kaderinde var olduğu Mughal İmparatorluğu sonrası Hindu toplumlarına karşı kaçınılmaz zaferi olarak anlaşılmamalıdır. Aksine Hindistan'ın Birleşik Krallık için kolay bir hedef haline gelmesi 1600'lerden itibaren başlayan tarihsel süreklilik içerisinde incelenmeli ve aynı zamanda bu koşulların oluşumunda Mughal İmparatorluğunun on sekizinci yüzyılın başlarından itibaren zayıflamasıyla ortaya çıkan otorite boşluğunu doldurma mücadelesine girişen iç faktörlerin taşımış oldukları önemin altı çizilmelidir.

On dokuzuncu yüzyılın başlarından itibaren 1857-1858 yıllarında yaşanan Büyük Hindu Ayaklanmasına kadar olan süreç ise Hindu halklarına sömürgeci devletin bir uzantısı olmanın ötesinde kısmen özerk bir müdahale gücüne sahip olan İngiliz Doğu Hindistan Şirketi'nin tarafından dayatılan ekonomik ve sosyal değişimlerin panoramasını bizlere sunar. Marx'ın da gazete yazılarında yer verdiği üzere bu dönem sömürgeleşme öncesi dönemle karşılaştırıldığında Hindistan'ın ticaret fazlasıyla ve bunu getirdiği değerli maden zenginliğiyle adeta özdeşleşmiş ekonomisinin ihracat ürünü üretimine endekslenmiş bağımlı bir ekonomi haline getirildiği zaman dilimine tekabül eder. Merkantilist ekonomik paradigmanın yörüngesinden kopmayan İngiliz Doğu Hindistan Şirketi bu dönemde yalnızca Hindistan ekonomisini pamuk, çay ve çivit gibi ham maddelerin üretimine ve bunların karşılığında İngilizler tarafından üretilen mamul malları edinmeye mecbur kılmakla yetinmemiş, aynı zamanda toprak mülkiyeti konusunda yapılan kademeli değişikliklerle toprağa bağımlı serfliğin meşrulaştırıldığı bir ortam yaratmıştır. Ancak Hindistan'ın Birleşik Krallık için önemi yalnızca ekonomik hegemonyanın

güçlendirilmesinde yatmaz zira Hindistan doğal kaynakları, nüfusu ve diğer özgün özellikleriyle İngilizler tarafından Çin'in saklı zenginliklerine ulaşma hedefinin gerçekleşmesinde bir ilerleme vasıtası olarak kullanılmıştır. Tüm bu ekonomik ve sosyal dönüşümlerin yarattığı toplumsal buhranın 1857 ayaklanmasında ete kemiğe bürünmesi ise doğrudan Hindu halklarını ayrıştıran en önemli sosyal faktörlerden biri olan din bileşeninin kinayeli bir biçimde Doğu Hindistan Şirketi'nde görev alan İngiliz subaylar tarafından Sepoy güçlerince kullanılması öngörülen yeni tüfeklerde kullanılmak üzere üretilen ve de domuz veya inek yağıyla greslenmiş olduğu düşünülen fişekler suretiyle ortadan kaldırılmasıyla doğrudan ilişkilidir. Ayrıca, bu ayaklanmanın ortaya çıkışında din bileşeninin taşıdığı önem İngiliz sömürgeciliğine karşı Müslüman liderler tarafından desteklenen karşı propagandanın oluşturulmasındaki en önemli faktörlerden biri olan misyonerlik okullarının Hindistan yarımadası üzerinde yayılmaya başladığı gözleminde de ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Marx'ın Hindistan'ın sömürgeleştirilmesi üzerine yazdığı gazete makalelerinde ise bu bölümde inceleme fırsatı bulduğumuz 1857 ayaklanmasının sosyal ve ekonomik nedenlerini tüm çarpıcılığıyla gözler önüne serilmiş ve sömürgeleşmenin Hindistan toplumlarını geçmişte kalan görece eşitlikçi ve istikrarlı toplum düzeninden kopuşu simgelediğinin altı çizilmiştir. Bu noktada vurgulanması gereken husus Marx'ın, özetimizin başında da belirttiğimiz gibi, sömürge düzenini aklamanın aksine kapitalist üretim biçiminin kuruluşunu komünist toplum düzenine geçişte yaşanması gereken bir süreç olarak kabul etmesidir. Başka bir deyişle kapitalizmi 'tatmayan' toplumların siyasal bilinç sahibi bir işçi sınıfı tarafından komünizme geçişleri olanaksızdır. Bu bağlamda ortaya çıkarılması mümkün olan bir karşı sav kapitalizm öncesinde Hindistan'da hakim olan üretim biçimlerini ontolojik olarak batı feodalizminden ayrı bir statüye konumlandıran Marx ve Engels'in Avrupa Merkeziyetçiliğin kıskacından kurtulmuş olsalar bile bu sefer de Oryantalizmin kucağına düşmüş olmalarıdır. Bu konuda öncelikle ifade etmemiz gereken Oryantalizm ve Marksizm arasında incelemeye tabi tutulabilecek böylesi bir ilişkinin bu çalışmanın merkezine oturttuğu problemin ötesinde olduğudur. Ancak yine de değinilmesi gereken bir nokta böyle bir karşı tezin ancak temel bir noktayı görmezden gelerek oluşturulabileceğidir. Eğer Marx ve Engels'in kurdukları düşünce

sistemini iki olası çözümü olan bir denklem, ki bunlar Avrupa Merkeziyetçilik ve Oryantalizmdir, olarak inceleyeceksek bu post-modern kritiğin su yüzüne çıkmaya başladığı tarihler olan 1980'lere kadar olan sürece kadar oluşturulmuş her kuramın böylesi bir yaftalama sürecinden geçmesini zorunlu kılar. Ayrıca eklememiz gerekir ki Marx ve Engels'in tarih okumaları doğu toplumlarında kapitalizm öncesi raylarına oturtulmuş olan üretim biçimleri ve batı feodalizmi arasındaki ilişkide farklılıklara temas ettikleri ölçüde Avrupa Merkeziyetçiliği aştıkları gibi bu toplumların sömürgeleşmesiyle olgulaşan kapitalist üretim biçimine geçiş sürecinin komünist toplum yapısına geçişi mümkünat dahiline sokmasının altını çizdikleri ölçüde de Oryantalizm ile arasına kesin bir çizgi koymayı başarır. Unutulmamalıdır ki 'insan özgürleşimi' kavramı evrensel bir kavramdır ve insanı diğer canlılardan ayıran emeğin içine hapsedildiği sömürü zincirlerinden yalnızca birini veya birkaçını değil tümünün ortadan kaldırdığı bir toplum yapısına geçişi ifade eder.

Bu kısa özette de ifade etmeye çalıştığımız gibi tezimizin oluşum sürecinde elde ettiğimiz kuramsal ve pratik bulgular Avrupa Merkeziyetçiliğin Marksizm'in kurucu figürleri olan Marx ve Engels'in eserlerine içkin olmadığı konusunda yeterli kanıt sunmaktadır. Ancak unutmamamız gerekir ki bu tezde yapılan çözümleme yalnızca on dokuzuncu yüzyılın ilk yarısındaki tarihsel dönemeçte birçok açıdan benzer bir konuma sahip olan İrlanda ve Hindistan örneklerini içermektedir. Kabul edilmelidir ki Marksizm ve Avrupa Merkeziyetçilik arasında var olduğu iddia edilen kuramsal bağların olgusallığı sorununa verilebilecek mutlak ve nesnel bir cevap yoktur. Böylesine kapsayıcı bir çıkarımda bulunmak yalnızca tarihsel örnekleri çeşitlendirerek ve Rusya ile Çin gibi Marx ve Engels'in üzerlerine yoğunlaştığı diğer örnekleri de araştırmaya dahi ederek mümkün kılınabilir. Ancak Hindistan gibi post-modern kritiğin beslendiği en verimli topraklardan bir tanesinin tezimizde önemli bir yer teşkil ettiği göz önünde bulundurulduğunda kapsayıcı çıkarımlardan çekinme gereksinimi kısmen de olsa aşılmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, denilebilir ki Marx ve Engels'in kendilerinden sonraki kuşaklara bıraktığı şekliyle anlaşılması gereken Marksizm uluslararası düşünceyi köklerine kadar yedirmeyi başarabilmiş bir düşünce sistemidir. Hatırlanmalıdır ki Marksizm'in menşeine yönelik bir inceleme revizyonizm, post-Marksist gelenek veya Yeni Marksizm üzerinden yapılamaz; aynı

Marksizm'e içkin olduğu iddia edilen Avrupa Merkeziyetçiliğin bu geleneklerin temsilcileri tarafından yazılan eserlerde aranamayacağı gibi.

APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü ■

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü ☐

Enformatik Enstitüsü ☐

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü ☐

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Oktaykan
Adı : Can Berk
Bölümü : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Marx, Engels and Internationalism: Rethinking the Nineteenth Century National Liberation Movements from the Marxist Framework

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans ■ Doktora ☐

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ■
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir. ☐
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz. ☐