

THE ARAB SPRING AND TURKISH MODEL

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ABSTRACT

THE ARAB SPRING AND TURKISH MODEL

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This thesis analyses the question of Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries by focusing on four main dimensions which have special importance in this work: The Arab Spring with a theoretical and conceptual framework, the Arab Spring and its major causes, Turkey's reform process under the Justice and Development Party's rule, relevance and applicability of Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries. It seeks primarily to answer the question that whether or not Turkey is a model for the Arab Spring countries. The thesis argues that without structural changes in economics, and politics of the Arab Spring countries, Turkey cannot be a model for them. In other words, the thesis contends that if political and economic changes in a structural framework occur in in the Arab Spring countries, then Turkey can become a model for them. In this respect, the thesis puts main arguments of the model discussions.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Turkish Model, Constructivism, Justice and Development Party.

ÖZ

ARAP BAHARI VE TÜRK MODELİ

KUŞOĞLU, BARAN

Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tez Arap Baharı ülkeleri için Türk modeli sorusunu özel önemi haiz dört boyuta odaklanarak incelemektedir: Teorik ve kavramsal çerçeveden Arap Baharı, Arap Baharının temel nedenleri, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi yönetiminde Türkiye'nin reform süreci ve Arap Baharı ülkeleri için Türk modelinin geçerliliği ve uygulanabilirliği. Tez temel olarak Türkiye'nin Arap Baharı ülkeleri için bir model olup olamayacağı sorusuna cevap aramaktadır. Tez, Arap Baharı ülkelerinin siyasetinde ve ekonomisinde yapısal değişiklikler olmadan Türkiye'nin onlar için bir model olamayacağını tartışmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, tez, Arap Baharı ülkelerinde yapısal bir çerçeve içinde siyasi ve ekonomik değişiklikler yaşandığı takdirde, Türkiye'nin bu ülkeler için bir model olabileceğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda tez, model tartışmalarının temel argümanlarını ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Arap Baharı, Türk Modeli, Konstrüktivizm, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi.

To the Memory of My Father Bahattin

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BMENAI	Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
EU	European Union
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Countries
GNAT	<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i> (The Grand National Assembly of Turkey)
DECAF	Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
JDP	<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i> (Justice and Development Party)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	<i>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</i> (National Security Council)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organization of Islamic Conference
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
TESEV	<i>Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı</i> (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation)

UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
US/USA	United States of America
WB	World Bank

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Objective and Content

The Middle Eastern affairs have always been focal point of both foreign policy makers and academic circles of international relations because of global and regional players' power struggle. This time, however, the Middle East came to the world politics' agenda due to the social events. Thus eyes turned to this part of the world once again. Similarly an intense interest is seen to the reform process in Turkey. This widespread interest also brought debates of Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries to the agenda of the academic circles keen on this issue. In fact, as put forward by Kemal Kirisci, a prominent Turkish scholar, this is not a new development. There can be no doubt that the issue of Turkish model was widely discussed after the fall of Soviet Union. Thus, the question of reform and democratization emerged in its former republics. For instance the prestigious magazine of news and opinion published in London, the Economist announced Turkey to be the "Star of Islam" and a model for the Central Asian republics in 1991 (Kirisci, 2011: 34). The model debates re-emerged right after the Justice and Development Party's coming to the power in late 2002. Following the launch of "The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative" (BMENAI) in 2004 by the US President George W. Bush on the heels of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the idea of Turkey as a model was raised (Kirisci, 2011: 34).

Although there are many works on the Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries, there are no academic studies focusing on Turkish model debates from the constructivist point of view. Hence, this thesis seeks to answer whether or not it is

possible to refer a Turkish model for the Arab countries in light of the constructivist theory of international relations.

In this context, the thesis primarily aims to make a detailed examination of a Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries by focusing on four main dimensions which have special importance in this work: The Arab Spring with a theoretical and conceptual framework, The Arab Spring and its major causes, Turkey's reform process under the Justice and Development Party's (JDP) rule and relevance of Turkey for the Arab Spring countries. The thesis examines the possibility of Turkish model for these countries by analyzing the conditions in the region, the popular demands in the series of demonstrations, and Turkey's image in the Arab world. This analysis will help us understand what Turkish model means for the Arab Spring countries, how relevant it is to their restructuring process, and in which conditions Turkey can be a model for them.

This thesis comprises four main body chapters. After the introduction, the second chapter presents the social movements in the Middle East and North Africa. Like all great social upheavals, the Arab Spring was long in the making, and product of many intertwined causes. Hence, political and economic factors and the effects of social media over the uprisings are being examined respectively in this chapter.

The third chapter is devoted to the the reforms achieved by the JDP governments in the political and economic field and the foreign policy changes towards the Arab region. Turkey's political transformation provides an example for the opposition forces in the Arab world in terms of transition to a more accountable and representative form of governance. It is noteworthy here that the JDP's ability to detach the military from the domestic politics and to bring the military under government control is also attractive for the region's demonstrators.

The positive economic situation of Turkey also contributes to its image. Turkish economic model of export-led growth draws attention in the region. The economic successes of the JDP's governments contributed to strengthening of Turkey as a regional power.

Turkish foreign policy also seems to constitute an important element of Turkish attractiveness in the region. The first important step was Turkey's decision to not to support the US war effort in Iraq in 2003. Turkey's criticisms against Israel after the Gaza War further contributed to its popularity. In addition to this, Turkey developed better relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors and prioritized concepts such as dialogue, engagement and economic inter-dependence in its discourses towards the region. In this part of the thesis, special consideration is given to foreign policy changes (zero problem policy with neighbors) during the rule of JDP and to the Minister of Foreign Affairs's, Ahmet Davutoğlu's, approach. Generally speaking, this section of the thesis is a reflection of JDP's pragmatic and ideological foreign policy approach.

In the fourth chapter, Turkey's image in the Arab world, model debates and the course of model debates from the Turkish model to JDP model are dealt with by taking into account the different aspects of these issues. Since most Arab states have been successors of the Islamic Ottoman Empire, they retain a cultural similarity. TESEV's public opinion surveys conducted in the Arab world in the near past demonstrate that Turkey's attractiveness has been quite high in the region. There has also been a neo-Ottoman sentiment in Turkey that is often cultural since the 1970s.

Not only the different structural contexts of Turkey and the countries in the region as well as cultural affiliation and differentiation such as shared religion, namely Islam but also its different understanding and interpretations are also taken into account. Significant doubt about the applicability of the Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries finds supporters because of opposing perceptions and interpretations of

secularism stemming from different historical and political experiences of Turkey and the Arab world (Rane, 2012: 49).

In this way, the question that how the Turkish model as represented by the JDP can be applied to the Arab Spring countries is being examined whilst the direction of the model debates moves from Turkish Model to JDP Model. According to some Arab Islamist circles the JDP has been seen as an example of good governance, moderation and pragmatism. In this context, JDP's peaceful and gradualist strategy in the process of coming to the power is taken into consideration.

The last chapter concludes with an evaluation and answer to the question that whether Turkey can be model for the Arab Spring countries or not by taking into account and in light of the debates in previous chapters.

1.2 The Argument and Theory:

Millions of citizens in the Southern Mediterranean took the streets demanding an end to dictatorship and the right to choose their governments, as well as to express their cultural and religious identities (Vasconcelos & Vimont, 2012: 17).

Reference to culture and identities in the political history of the Middle East is not new in the literature. The issue of popular movements has caught the great attention of social scientists from various disciplines since the end of the Cold War. Former debates on this issue vary from the rise and decline of the pan-Arab movement to the lack of fit between the boundaries imposed by colonial powers and existing identities (Telhami & Barnett, 2002: 1). Recent debates have focused on the Islamic trend in the Middle Eastern politics and the extent to which it challenges the domestic legitimacy and political stability of the states in the region (Telhami & Barnett, 2002: 1-2). As rightly expressed in an article by Raymond Hinnebusch:

...It is important in shaping conceptions of political legitimacy, which are everywhere 'constructed' of inter-subjective (that is, cultural) understandings...Modernization is changing culture by increasing aspirations for participation and by endowing individuals with such necessary participatory tools as literacy (Hinnebusch, 2006: 377).

In this context, no student of Middle Eastern politics can understand the politics of the region without taking into account the flow of identity politics (Telhami & Barnett, 2002: 2), culture and constructed political legitimacy. Moving on this point, this thesis is based on the importance of politics of cultural values and identity in the political order of the societies living Arab Spring process. The thesis is also based on the importance of identity politics and culture in the debates of Turkish model for the Arab Spring countries. Hence this thesis has been inspired by the constructivist point of view since it is a compelling account of the origins of such study of culture and international relations (Reus-Smitt, 2005: 210).

Applying a constructivist theoretical approach requires an explanation of "culture". According to constructivism, cultural norms, values and ideas are the salient ingredients in decision making for both domestic and international politics (Goldflame, 2011). Constructivist approach views "culture" that governs perceptions, communications, and actions. In other words, constructivism offers a unique role for the cultural set of norms in internal and international affairs.

In detail, constructivism sees the world as a "work under construction". It is constantly changing and reshaping based on cultural norms, values and ideas. (Goldflame, 2011) What constructivism does offer is an account of how and where change may occur (Hopf, 2011:180). In this framework, for the constructivists, deep and sustainable change can only occur in conjunction with rooted cultural values and norms or, after a social reconstruction of values and norms (Goldflame, 2011). Constructivists highlight the politics of values. According to Wendt, structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material

forces. Identities and interests of actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. In Wendt's words:

State identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature of domestic politics (Wendt, 1994: 385).

Since individuals live in social context, all identities are constructed by some social incitements. That is why constructivism treats identity to be theorized within the social and historical context (Kılınç, 2001, 5). Within this context, Islamic movements sought national authenticity and what is original and "native" as against Western culture become important elements in support of the Islamic movements (Tür, 2001: 5). Needless to say, such issue played a crucial role during the popular demonstrations. Tunisian Islamist leader Rached Ghannouchi emphasizes this search, "The only way to accede to modernity is by our own path, that which has been traced for us by our religion, our history and our civilization" (Castells, 2010:23). Hence Fred Halliday, a prominent scholar, states that while the main structure of the state system may remain, the Middle East is moving from the artificial and externally imposed structure of the post-World War I era, to a more indigenous, and culturally suitable form of administration to the Middle East (Halliday, 2005: 195). Taken together with the emphasis of Fred Halliday, culture becomes not a given, a constant source, but the object of change, struggle and multiple instrumental definition.

Applying a constructivist approach to the Arab Spring and model debates help realize a coherence between culture, identity and change because constructivism assumes that so long as there is difference, there is a potential for change (Hopf, 1998: 180). In light of these explanations, the thesis argues that politics and change in the Middle East will be determined by cultural norms, mores and values, not realpolitik. For this reason, the main reference point of this thesis is the constructive approach of international relations.

A two-year research project, conducted by the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut in 2009 with the support of the UNICEF Middle East & North Africa Regional Office, says that two common elements characterize Arab youth's identities and influence their vision and priorities: family and religion. A regional survey of 18-24-year-old Arabs indicated the strong role of religion in their lives; 68 percent of respondents said that religion defines them as a person. Arab youth sees family and religion as powerful anchors of their identity. In other words, a Arab is a Arab to the extent that he is Muslim. Therefore, the thesis attaches special importance to religion which is one of the most important components of culture. In fact the rise of religious fundamentalism has challenged the mainstream theorizing in international relations. (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 121). It is noteworthy here that constructive approach of international relations emphasises shared ideas, norms, culture and identity as well as the role of religion in understanding of international affairs whereas the two main positivist international relations theories - realism and liberalism - treat religion as a non-issue which has little bearing on how international events are to be understood. (Zaman, 2011) At this point, a historical event, namely the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, should be remembered. According to Scott M. Thomas, the revolution is one of the most vivid examples of how the impact of culture and religion was ignored or marginalised in the study of international relations (Scott M, 2005: 2). Similarly, Halliday claims that an important aspect of the recent changes in the Middle East that relate specifically to the increasing role of religion in the region stems from Iranian Revolution (Halliday, 2007: 54).

In addition to this, identity throughout the Middle East has changed. Coming to the attention of the West for the first time with the Iranian Revolution, Islamist movements have occupied a primary position in the region thanks to their increasing power over time (Tür, 2001: 1). That is why Alvaros Vasconcelos and Pierre Vimont contend that the West must recognize that the Arab countries are facing an Islamic religious revival (Vasconcelos & Vimont, 2012: 24). Similarly, Tarık Ramadan, the

grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood- Hassan el-Banna, puts forward that Islam is a religious and ideological reference in the Arab awakening (Ramadan, 2012: 68). Throughout the Arab Spring, Iran has also claimed that the rising Islamic Awakening sweeping the region was inspired and motivated Iran's own 1979 revolution (Kahl & Lynch, 2013: 44-45). In other words, Islam served the enlightenment of self-consciousness which was going to be the motor of politicization. In this framework the thesis aims at showing the role of culture and religion in the Arab Spring demonstrations in conformity with the constructivist theory.

The results of the elections held in the countries which had toppled dictatorial regimes also shows this role as the Islamist parties achieved electoral success. In fact, the demonstrations were attended by people regardless of sex, race, age, or religious affiliation. They all had benefits in the outcome of the uprisings, as the issues that brought them out on to the streets affected them all. Unemployment, poverty, corruption, restrictions on freedoms, all these were reasons why people revolted against their governments. But this didn't mean that groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a strong presence in the anti-government protests (Zaman, 2011). It was very clear that Islamists acted prudently during the protests since they did not want to lead to Western support to the dictatorial regimes because of their powerful appearance in the popular demonstrations. This reality, however, did not cover the religious motivations of the most organized oppositional groups, namely political Islamists, in the whole region.

In fact, Western imperialism's creation of artificially bounded states divided the region into a multitude of competing state units. The boundaries of the modern Middle East state system were arbitrarily imposed and frozen by the Western powers according to their own needs, not indigenous wishes. Hence, Arab protesters pay special attention to emphasize their indigenous efforts for bringing universal values to their countries. This is expressed by Vasconcelos & Vimont, 2012 as following:

Those fighting for democracy do not feel they are adopting Western values but rather that they are calling for the application of universally shared values that are compatible with their cultural and religious traditions. Arab democratic revolutionaries say they will resist the imposition of any cultural or political agenda by the West in the name of justice and dignity (Vasconcelos & Vimont, 2012: 25).

In reaction to this immense Western imperialism, supra-state ideologies, expressive of the lost cultural unity, were increasingly embraced: Pan-Arabism by the Arabic-speaking middle class and political Islam among the lower middle classes (Hinnebusch, 2003: 55). Pan Arabism lost its power after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and within this context, Islamism emerged (Tür, 2001: 4). In other words political Islam gained ground with the decline of Arabism from the late 1970s (Hinnebusch, 2003, 67).

Similarly, Islamism in Turkey, is traditionally constructed and legitimated by a strong anti-Westernism in spite of the fact that Turkey has not experienced a colonial past (Dağı, 2006: 91). Since the establishment of the republic, the philosophy of enlightenment and secular establishments replaced the domineering status of the Islam. Actually, Islam indigenous identity, was seen a “genuine solution” to the Western influence and Islamic political identity was built in traditionally against Western political, economic and cultural challenges (Dağı, 2006: 91-92).

Undoubtedly, within every society there are multiple identities, each with variations and with sometimes conflicting subdivisions. These identities may be social and economic-by status, class, occupation, and profession (Lewis, 1998: 5). The Middle East is a region of old and deep-rooted identities, which is continuous and protracted, but depends on changing conditions. In this regard, Muslims may have multiple identities (Lewis, 1998: 9). Hence there is no contradiction between being a feminist and being a Muslim (Vasconcelos & Vimont, 2012: 41). In this regard, especially political Islam is the ideology of the marginalised petty bourgeoisie and masses that have been left out of state patronage networks (Hinnebusch, 2003: 68). Thus, Islam

has caught attention of more and more middle class so that Islamism gained grounds. (Tür, 2001: 5).

Actually, Islam has always been an important part of social life in the Middle Eastern countries. In addition to this, Özlem Tür, a prominent scholar in Turkey, argues that the legacy of colonial past in the Middle East paved the way for the Islamist movements in the region. According to her, the colonial powers handed over their power not to the masses but to the military élite when they left the Middle East. In the post-colonial period no political parties were allowed to exist and no real elections were held (Tür, 2001: 4). Therefore Tür touches the unique role of mosques in her article as following:

The mosques have served as the main platform where people met and discussed daily life for decades. Being the main socialising place of the communities, mosques served as a recruiting place for the Islamists as well. The well organized mosque network enables the Islamists to meet in the mosques, without the state's interference, giving them great freedom. This factor contributed to the strengthening of these movements in the region (Tür, 2001: 5).

European colonial rule has had another profound impact on Arab Muslim countries. Clement M. Henry, an important scholar in The American University in Cairo, even goes so far as to write that the most distinctive characteristic of the Middle East is neither religion, language nor culture but rather its colonial legacy (Henry, 2005:108). According to Rane (Rane, 2012:51-52); the anti-Islamic nature of Western norms and values paved the way for the development of Islamist movements. Indeed, such feelings contributed to the basis of Islamist political thought. Moreover, Islam was directly associated with the process of independence. For many Muslims, the process of independence was not complete, and only the election of Islamic or Islamist parties that reflect the identity and values of the people would finally mark the country's true independence from colonization.

As argued the Islamists were convinced that Islam was the only way to struggle against the western imperialism (Ramadan, 2012: 103). In short, the impact of European colonial rule on the Arab Spring countries makes it clearer that why political Islamists and Islamic movements are the most organized and efficient political opposition in most of the Middle East states.

Evaluating the rising impact of religion in the politics of the region; this thesis emphasizes the role of political Islam. At this point, it should be noted that constructivism, which emphasises shared ideas, norms, culture and identity, does offer a role for religion in the understanding of international affairs (Zaman, 2011). In this regard, Lewis (Lewis, 1998:6) points out that Islam turns out to be the source of political Islam in the region becomes important in terms of identity politics since social conflicts have an obvious importance in the development of identities within a society (Lewis, 1998: 6). Political identity is, needless to say, constructed. Hence, it has been through Islamic religious leaders that political dissatisfaction has often been articulated against those Arab leaders who have taken a line too close to Western positions (Hinnebusch, 2003: 68). Tür also supports Hinnebusch's evaluation by stating that political Islamists believe that the ruling western-oriented elites were associated with the western ideology, culture and thought. (Tür, 2001: 5).

Hinnebusch expresses that the identification with the territorial state in the Middle East has been historically weak and people tend to identify themselves by focusing on the sub-state units such as the city, the tribe, the religious sect – or on the larger Islamic umma-nation of Islam (Hinnebusch, 2003: 54). In addition to this, all the states of the region suffered competition from the mosaic of sub-state identities on which the state boundaries were haphazardly imposed after the World wars. Hence Halliday supports Hinnebusch's opinion and says that the new era which will take place in the Middle East is based upon clan, tribe and ummah. Thus, sub-state loyalties (kin, sect, tribe) and supra-state identities (Islam and Arabism) have been used as powerful tools for the mobilization of opposition against state

establishments. In light of these explanations, it is understandable why political Islam has become the main ideology of protests and Islamic movements. It is clear that there is much potential for conflict between the ruling political elite within each of the Arab states and the Islamic forces.

As mentioned above, the thesis makes analysis from the constructivist point of view. One of the central claims of this theory is that the world is socially constructed (Yetim, 2013: 84). It is thus culture and identity that come into the front seats in the thesis. According to one of the famous thinkers of the constructivism, Alexander Wendt, the political identity is also socially constructed. He points out that beliefs or knowledge, are also socially constructed (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 127). Wendt focuses on socially shared knowledge or culture, which is rooted in the relative experience of actors (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 127). According to Wendt, structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas, expectations or knowledge rather than material forces (Wendt, 1995: 73 & Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 122). Identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature (Wendt, 1992: 397 & Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 122). In my opinion, a supportative instance can be given for the social construction of beliefs¹, culture and knowledge: Turkey's "Muslim Identity" was the core of the respondents' answers of TESEV's public opinion surveys conducted in the Arab world in the near past. This identity is seen a reason of both being a model or not for an important percentage of respondents especially in some countries. Those who see Turkey as a model think that its Muslim background is the most important factor in making Turkey a model, whereas those who think that Turkey cannot be a model cite that Turkey is not Muslim enough (Altunışık, 2011: 2). The answer related to identity becomes more meaningful when it is kept in mind that in recent years Turkey has become a source of attraction because of its cultural products (Turkish TV series). In other words, the

¹ Knowledge in sociological sense is defined as "any belief an actor takes to be true". (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2007: 126)

popularity of Turkish television and series culminated the rise of Turkey's image in the region. (Aktaş, 2011: 167). Growing familiarity with Turkish culture and society through its popular television series, export products, and tourism to and from Turkey improves Turkey's image in the Arab world.

In addition to the importance of cultural values in both the Arab Spring and Turkish model debates, the thesis also refers to the necessity of structural reforms, legal changes and transformation of the material forces in the post-Arab Spring countries under the title of the model debates. This approach of the thesis is in accordance with the constructivist approach since by 'culture', constructivists generally mean social and legal norms and the ways in which these are deployed. (Reus-Smitt, 2005: 210) In a sense social and legal norms form the main structures of a system. Hence the thesis argues that if structural changes occur in the Arab Spring countries, then Turkey will become a model for them with its growing economy, balancing democracy and Islam, cultural affiliation, and increasing popularity in the Arab world. In other words, since the structural contexts of Turkey and the countries in the region are different, the vital importance of the necessary structural changes in all aspect of the political, economic, and social life of the Arab Spring countries are taken into account while arguing the model debates.

Undoubtedly, this kind of approach is in conformity with the constructivism which is characterized by an emphasis on the role of culture and identity without an ignorance of the importance of material structures (Halliday, 2005: 195). In other words, to highlight the importance of culture need not underestimate material factors, material structures like state and class (Halliday, 2005: 195). As put forward by Halliday:

No one should forget the words of the great historical essayist Barrington Moore, writing in 1966: Culture or tradition is not something that exists outside of or independently of individual human

beings living together in society. Cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history (Halliday, 2005: 195).

Actually this independent role supports one of the main arguments of this thesis, namely the role of culture in popular protests. In this context another example can be given which supports the role of culture in big social changes:

Max Weber (...) uses cultural variables, in part, to explain the great European revolutions which began in the seventeenth century (Rothman, 1970: 64).

After emphasizing the role of cultural values without an ignorance of the material structures, it is worth here mentioning identity-state relationship in the region. Indeed nowhere is the divergence of identity and state sharper than in the Middle East (Hinnebusch, 2003: 55). But the distance between the two has started to diminish in the post-demonstrations era especially in the Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. In fact this rapprochement is a reaction against the Western creation of the system in the region which was imposed and frozen by the Western powers according to their own needs, not indigenous wishes. According to Raymond Hinnebusch, the constructivism also argues that identities of states and legitimacy is progressively replacing military capability as a determinant of the future of the Middle East. At this point, in reaction, as a supra-state ideology, political Islam came on the scene (Hinnebusch, 2003: 55).

Within the scope of this theoretical perspective, the thesis explains the main arguments of the model discussions and tries to answer the question that whether Turkey is a model or not for the post-Arab Spring countries. The thesis aims to demonstrate that Turkish model proposed by many scholars and analysts as an example is not easily applicable in the post-Arab Spring era. Without structural changes in political and economic structures of the Arab Spring countries, Turkish experience under the JDP government will not make a sense for them although common identity forms an advantageous base for a model. But this does not also

mean that Turkey cannot be a model for those countries. This thesis tries to explain that if structural reforms can be put into practice, Turkish model for them will be meaningful. Besides these, Turkish experience will play an instructive role in drafting the structural reforms whenever they come to the agenda of these countries' governments.

1.3 The Problem of Definition: Revolution, Reform or Uprising?

Before labelling protests in the Middle East region, it is required to look at the name of the Middle East. "The Middle East" is self-evidently a Western term, and dates from the beginning of twentieth century, meaningful only in a Western perspective, has come to be used all over the world. It is even used by the peoples of the region it denotes to describe their own homelands. (Lewis, 1998: 5).

Since the beginning of the popular protests different terms have been used to describe what the region had witnessed (Kassem, 2013: 67). The protests and demonstrations against governments and regimes in the Middle East and North Africa geography are called by such names as "Arab Spring", "Arab Winter", Arab "Uprisings", "Arab Revolt", "Arab Awakening", "Arab Enlightenment", (Afacan, 2011); "Arab Events" (Dalacoura, 2012: 63); "Arab Renaissance" and "Arab Revolution"(Doğan,& Durgun, 2011:62) and "Islamist Winter" (Toameh 2011). It can be claimed that one reason of the disagreement with regard to labelling the events of 2011 is the inclination to think of the 'Arab world' as a unified entity (Dalacoura, 2012: 63). This reason even might be true to some extent; Arab societies and polities do indeed have tight interconnections and share some important characteristics (Dalacoura, 2012: 63). In my opinion, labelling the 2011 events differently is due to the fact that the events are viewed through different ideological lens. In this thesis popular movements against authoritarian administrations are called "Arab Spring" because it is commonly and widely used in the academic researches.

In fact, the term was used beginning in March 2005 by numerous Western media commentators to suggest that a spin-off benefit of the invasion of Iraq would be the flowering of Western-friendly Middle East democracies (Keating, 2011).

Yet the first specific use of the term *Arab Spring* as used to refer these events has started with the American political journal Foreign Policy. Marc Lynch used this specific term in his article under the title of “Obama’s Arab Spring” which was issued in Foreign Policy, in a January 6, 2011 (Lynch, 2011). Lynch denoted the events in Tunisia as an “Arab Spring” by referring to the popular movements in Lebanon in 2005 which began after the political killing of Refik Hariri and led to the resignation of pro-Syrian Prime Minister Omer Abdulhamit Karami. He used the term in his article as follows:

Are we seeing the beginnings of the Obama administration equivalent of the 2005 “Arab Spring”, when the protests in Beirut captured popular attention and driven in part by newly powerful satellite television images inspired popular mobilization across the region that some hoped might finally break through the stagnation of Arab autocracy? (Lynch, 2011).

This expression become widespread and the events in the region were called “Arab Spring”. But there has been other definitons. In this respect it is noteworthy that the use of social media as a driving force by the young protesters in Tunisia and Egypt has given an idea to some circles for identifying the process as “Facebook Revolution” (Giglio, 2011). In addition to this type of description, there has been another nomenclature in the literature, namely “Wikileaks Revolution”, based on the view that the protests escalated following the leak of US diplomatic cables including the information related to the corruption of Tunisian President, Ben Ali (Dickinson, 2011). One thing is clear that *Wikileaks* document revealed the extent of the Tunisian leader Z. Bin Ali and his wife L. Trabelsi’s personal wealth. In this context it can be said that “Wikileaks” increased the magnitude of the protests (Dede, 2011: 23).

It is necessary here to remember that the concept of “Spring” for identifying this kind of events is not new in political history. A German political philosopher, Ludwig Börne firstly used political metaphor of springtime. The philosopher used the term, “Völkerfrühling” in an article in the paper “Die Wage” in 1818, and as early as 1832 Börne’s expression received the English translation “the People’s Spring-time” (Zimmer, 2011). Historically speaking, the metaphor of spring was going to be widely used as a hope for liberalization.

In other words the “Arab spring” has a much earlier precursor: the European revolutions of 1848, which historians stated springtime of the peoples or spring of nations (Aktaş, 2011: 9). Originally, those terms are translations of German “Völkerfrühling” and French “printemps des peuples”.

Moreover, the definition of the Arab Spring also makes us at once to remember another important political event in the near history. The definition is reminiscent of “Prague Spring” which was a period of political liberalization that began on 5 January 1968, with the election of the reformist leader, Alexander Dubček as the First Secretary of Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and continued until 21 August 1968 when the Soviet Union and all members of the Warsaw Pact, with the notable exception of Romania, invaded the country to halt the reforms.

The term was also used for the fall of communism. For example, the fall of communism in Soviet Union was associated with “Moscow Spring” (Wiarda, 2012: 134).

Among all these concepts, the term of “Arab Awakening” is more popular among Arabs. They prefer to use this term instead of “the Arab Spring” in order to emphasize the importance of the role of the people in the process. According to Tarık Oğuzlu, a prominent scholar interested in the Turkish model debate, the metaphor of

“awakening” has been also more proper to symbolises more perpetual and stable transformation process in contrast to the metaphor of “spring” (Oğuzlu, 2011:16).

In addition to this, the term of revolution is used in the countries in which dictators had to leave the power. At this point, it is noteworthy to express that what is more important than how the Arab people or outsiders describe the social events is the theoretical concepts that we need to use for describing the process in these countries. In this respect there is one book that is useful for describing the events currently unfolding in Tunisia, Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries: Samuel Huntington’s: *Political Order in Changing Societies*, first published over forty years ago (Fukuyama, 2011). Huntington (Huntington, 1996: 344) tends to classify revolution and reform in terms of the speed, scope, and direction of change in the political and social systems.

According to Huntington, a revolution is a rapid, complete, and violent change in values, social structure, political institutions, governmental policies, and social-political leadership. He also put forward that a great or social revolution means significant changes in all these components of the social and political system. (Huntington, 1996: 344) In the light of Huntington’s explanations, what happened in some countries could not be identified as a revolution, although it was inspired by revolutionary aspirations. Marc Lynch, who coined the term Arab Spring in 2011, also states that the events are not yet revolutions (Lynch, 2012: 10). In spite of this, Mark Perry, an American author, identifies the popular uprisings as revolutions by comparing them with the American and French revolution because they have all the same characteristic, that is:

...when a handful of organizers sense the weakness of an authoritarian state, defy it, then organize violent street actions that lead, inevitably, to overthrow of the “old order” (Perry, 2014: 30).

Huntington also explains that changes limited scope and moderate in speed in leadership, policy, and political institutions may be classed as reforms. A reform means that a change in the direction of greater social, economic, or political equality, a broadening of participation in society and polity (Huntington, 1996: 344). On the basis of Huntington's conceptualization, it can be said that the social events in the Arab world culminated the reforms in some countries, and oppression and violence in some others (Dağı, 2013:5) such as *coup d'État* in Egypt, civil war in Syria, but not to revolutions. On the other hand, the public protests were also described as uprisings since uprising as a category could be situated halfway between revolution and revolt (Ramadan, 2012: 8).

Lastly, some argue that initial excitement towards people power in the Middle East has started to fade. Hence the concept of "Arab Spring" will be replaced by the shadow Arab Winter" (Schenker, 2012: 30; Wiarda, 2012: 134). In this context Dalacoura's believes that assessment can be given: "Instead of 'revolution', 'the discourses of uprising', 'revolt' or even simply 'crisis' can be taken into the account to describe the situation because there has been no serial collapse of authoritarian regimes leading to a democratic future" (Dalacoura, 2012: 63).

CHAPTER 2

THE ARAB SPRING AND ITS MAJOR CAUSES

The Arab world has always been an area of undemocratic regimes, continuous coup d'états, abuses of human rights, permanent wars and civil wars. For this reason, the Arab Spring came as a natural outcome for some quarters and as a surprise for the others. Any fundamental political transformation seemed highly unlikely because of the support of European and American powers for these regimes for a long time (Ramadan, 2012: 8). Nevertheless it should be noted that any possible spread of the revolt was expected due to the domino effects (Magen, 2012: 13).

Since the collapse of Soviet Union and communism, waves of democracy had swept over many regions of the world, from southern and Eastern Europe to Latin America, from East Asia to Africa but the Middle Eastern people did not join these waves for almost two decades (Ajami, 2012: 56). For this reason Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu characterized the “Arab Spring” as “normalization of history” – an event that should have happened long before but for different reasons has been postponed. Yet, for him the “legitimate demands and expectations of the people” could no longer be left unanswered (Alessandri & Altunışık, 2013: 4). Similarly, Olivier Roy, a leading scholar, expresses muslim societies believed their society as a whole was in need of political regeneration because of mass education and globalization (Roy, 2013: 19).

In fact the Arab World has been long judged immune to ‘democratic’ ideals (De Souza, 2011: 618). Some contend that the region’s majority religion, Islam causes an obstacle to the widespread regional democratisation, despite others claim that there is nothing within the Islam to mean that Muslim countries will ‘inevitably’ lack democratic credentials (Haynes, 2010: 133). In this regard, as rightly noted by

Olivier Roy, popular uprisings showed that “Islamic exceptionalism” is an illusion (Roy, 2013: 19).

Besides these, there has been a fear in the West related to the democracy in the MENA. There was a view long before the Arab Spring that “if free elections were held today, Islamist parties would win, either because many Arab voters support them or because opponents would be inadequately mobilized to defeat them” (Langohr, 2003: 276). This view is still valid in some circles. For instance, from Gatestone Institute, Khaled Abu Toameh contends that “In a free and democratic election, those who carry the banner of “Islam is the Solution” will score major victories in most, if not all, the Arab countries” (Toameh, 2011).

As a matter of fact, the Arab masses certainly want change and improvements. But when the subject comes to the democracy, this question can be raised: Do they want democracy? Bernard Lewis, as quoted by Dabashi, answers the question by summarising the issue as follows:

[Democracy] is a political concept that has no history, no record whatever in the Arab, Islamic world. We, in the Western world particularly, tend to think of democracy in our own terms... to mean periodic elections in our style. But I think it's a great mistake to try and think of the Middle East in those terms and that can only lead to disastrous results, as you've already seen in various places. They are simply not ready for free and fair election (Bernard Lewis quoted in: Dabashi, 2012: 28).

Leaving the debate on the possibility of democratic future in the Arab Spring aside for a while, there is a need to comprehend the protests. In this chapter, I will look at the social movements in the MENA countries and the political, economic and social factors behind them. Thus, this chapter will lay ground for the debate on Turkish model.

2.1 Social Movements in the MENA Countries

The self-immolation of a vegetable vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi on 17 December 2010 in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid, the symbol of the uprisings, have led to popular demonstrations in Tunisia (De Souza: 2011:620). Following the death of Mohammed Bouazizi, Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) called for an insurrection and this was a turning point in the uprising (Internation Crisis Group, 2011: 5). The nationwide mobilisation of the UGTT geographically extended the protest movement in Tunisia (Internation Crisis Group, 2011: 6).

The overthrow of Ben Ali administration in Tunisia therefore created an electric sense of uprising in Egypt in 25 January 2011 (Dalacoura, 2012: 64). Thousands of protesters inspired by events in Tunisia gathered in Cairo's Tahrir Square. Within days, the uprising had spread across the whole of the region, especially to Libya, Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. In Morocco and Jordan, rulers tried to prevent protest by announcing reform promises. In Morocco King Muhammad VI promised to make concessions that led to constitutional changes, and in Jordan peaceful protests led to promises of reform by King Abdullah II (Barany, 2013: 95). With the exception of Bahrain, very limited protests occurred in the Gulf Coopeation Council (GCC) states. Given their vast financial reserves, the prosperous dynastic monarchies of the Gulf have succeeded in suppressing the protests (Barany, 2013: 90). For instance, in Saudi Arabia, the regime increased the amount of social welfare spending and resorted to renewed repression. Saudi Arabia also spread the wealth to the regimes across the region (Lynch, 2012: 10). In this regard The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) played an important role during the protests by promising \$20 billion aid package to two of the less wealthy member states. It is noteworthy here, although this plan worked well for resource rich countries in the short term, their fiscal balances may deteriorate in the medium term (OECD, 2011: 42).

In Algeria, protests in January 2011 did not constitute a significant movement due to the experience of internal conflict in the 1990s that created a social trauma. Lebanon, Iraq and the Occupied Palestinian Territories were in grave trouble because of their own internal and geopolitical problems which isolated them from developments in the Arab region (Dalacoura, 2012: 66).

There is also a question that why the Tunisian and Egyptian movements were successful so quickly and the others were not? The main answer of this question is the opposition was supported or not blocked by the much of the military in Tunisia and Egypt joined, the opposition, while this happened far less in Libya, Syria, Bahrain, and Yemen. Actually the role of outside military participation, namely NATO's operation, was crucial in Libya, on the side of the opposition, and in Bahrain, where the government was backed by Saudi Arabian military help against protesters (Keddie, 2012: 151).

There are many different approaches that study the origins of the Arab Spring. According to these studies, the origin of Arab Spring was traced from a single explanatory factor, such as inflationary food prices or the countries' dictatorial systems, to more complex solutions typically represented by state fragility and conflict-tracking indices (Minkov & Tikuisis, 2012). It is clear that social mobilization is effected by long-standing grievances (Thelhami & Barnett, 2002: 3). The Arab people experienced long-standing grievances and their grievances constituted "a new Arab public sphere" in which Arab world united by a shared transnational media and bound by a common identity (Lynch, 2012: 13). The new public sphere also changed the nature of Arab national identity. Therefore, Lynch puts out that the enormous changes in the mental life of Arab youth that accompanied their embrace of new norms and values has created a new reality. "Structures are not fixed, but are flexible constructions that interact with the norms and identities of agents and agencies in the Arab World" (Lynch, 2012: 10).

In this context, Arab Spring, a battle over ideas, is an example of conflicts that fall nicely under the constructivist theory which tells us that we have to understand the diverse motivations of people (Eyadat, 2011). The people who revolted during the Arab Spring came from all walks of life and had such diverse demand as democracy, fairness and the right to a more equitable existence (Peterson, 2012), gender equality or secular state, on the one hand; a Islamic democracy or a Islamic state-*sharia* on the other. Hence, in this thesis the factors led to the upheavals are classified with a more comprehensive approach in conformity with the constructivist theory under three titles.

2.2 Political Factors of the Arab Spring

Across the region, 2011 has point out the existence of a transnational Arab public sphere (Bali, 2011: 27). Demands for political reform were placed ahead of all other priorities in the new Arab public sphere (Bali, 2011: 27). In the 1950s the Arabs had been motivated by the popular will to eradicate colonial borders and unite as a single great nation whereas by the 1980s authoritarian regimes had promoted a narrower state-centric patriotism. Consequently, that really frustrated the Arab communities. (Lynch, 2012: 13). With the 2000s identity has changed in the Middle East (Hartmann, 2013):

People used to gather in cafes to watch football (...) and now they gathered to watch parliament. Less than 24 months ago, it was the people that were nervous about being watched by the parliament (Mogahed, 2012).

At the same time legitimacy is gradually replacing military capability as a determinant of the future of the Middle East. In this context Arab Human Development Reports of the UNDP points out that all Arab goverments faced with the crisis of legitimacy. (Altunışık, 2008:44). The uprisings uncovered the wide gap between the rulers and the ruled in the Arab world (Bali, 2011:26). In addition this, since about 70 percent of Arabs are under 30 and the vast majority of protesters are

young people, the popular protests have also demonstrated the generational gap between the young majority and the old minority (Behr & Sasnal, 2012: 6). The struggle against authoritarian regimes were run and directed by frustrated young generation. (Lynch, 2012: 10).

Under the authoritarian systems, formal political participation was largely restricted to regime-affiliated party activity, co-opted civil society participation, or voting in nontransparent and often fraudulent elections. (Aktaş, 2011: 167-168). Hence, the grievances of protesters centered on the fact that the authoritarian regimes of Ben Ali and Mubarak offered them no meaningful pathway to political participation as well as failing to provide jobs befitting their social status (Fukuyama, 2011). Arab autocracies, it is argued, encourage violence domestically by blocking peaceful change, and export violence by using state-controlled media to deflect demands for accountability with propaganda against the United States, Jews, or the West (Langohr, 2003: 276). In this sense, the practices of actors embedded in the social structure this time could not reproduce the structure. On the contrary, rulers' policy of blockage led to the restructure of opponents' organization. They opposed the dictators in a more efficient way and initiated a struggle for the transformation of their state and its identity in both domestic and foreign policy.

In addition to this, there was something else unique about the Arab world. The Arabs were integrated within a shared political space and united by a common identity. All Arabs cared about Palestine or Iraq and caring about such things was part of their identity. In this emerging reality, the Arab space began to reunify in the early 2000s as it was in the form of protesting Western imperialism in the 1950s (Lynch, 2012: 12). By the way, it is worth analyzing the issue of the anti-Western stance of the movements. Although hostility to foreign policies seen as subservient to the United States and Israel was one of the components of the 2011 movements, it was not the main component of these events (Keddie, 2012: 152).

A power vacuum emerged in regional politics after the invasion of Iraq (Altunışık, 2010: 10). It is claimed that the occupation of Iraq have further compromised the chances for gradual, incremental change in the region (Henry, 2005: 126). However, what role Iraqi instability played in encouraging the Arab Spring is not clear (Frantzman, 2013: 144).

There is also an interesting view in terms of the subject of this thesis. As quoted by Alfred Bengio, Taha Özhan of the Washington-based Turkish think-tank SETA went so far as to suggest that Turkey's policies and stance on various regional issues had an impact on the eruption of the Arab revolutions (Bengio, 2012: 58).

In short the main issue in the MENA region was the repressive and authoritarian regimes which caused bribery, corruption, unemployment and injustice (Aktaş, 2011: 167-168). Repressive politics of these regimes led to gathering of people in the streets. In this framework protesters featured their political demands and their political identities. To put it more concretely, the protesters including all segments of the society such as moderate or radical Islamists, secularists, leftists or women, they all demanded to participate in politics without leaving their political identities. Hence they enjoyed this unique opportunity to reclaim their identity (Ramadan, 2012: 143). Yet that does not mean that individuals not affiliated with any organized entity did not participate in the protests. It is here attempted to express, in brief, the demand of political participation actually reveals the very essence of the Arab Spring.

2.3 Socio-Economic Factors of the Arab Spring

The causes of popular protests in the Arab Spring countries are numerous and complex. Nevertheless some of these complex factors can be classified. In this part of thesis social and economic factors are classified under the title of socio-economic factors since each has serious impact on the other.

Governments in the Arab Spring countries have dominated private sectors. Whether rich or poor, Arab governments have deployed their unequalled patronage resources to ensure the subordination, if not the loyalty, of their citizens. The balance of economic power has favoured government over opposition, authoritarianism over democracy (Springborg, 2011: 85).

In all these countries a small elite minority enriched themselves in the shadow of these corrupt administrations and their western allies owned all the business remaining from ex-colonialists by exploiting the countries' resources and lived a luxurious life (Dahlgren, 2011: 75). On the other hand people were forced to survive on near-starvation wages (Ramadan, 2012: 10). Therefore Islamists asserted that the true revolution is the replacement of corrupt officers with those whose moral integrity disallows them from messing with public funds (Dahlgren, 2011: 75). While Islamists constructed a political identity and language, they did not forget to build social support through the network of social welfare which meets the needs of the poor (Hazbun, 2010: 250).

Moreover, the Arab Spring protests took place not only in some poor countries such as Egypt, Syria but also in some rich countries of the region such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrein. This shows us the legitimacy problem as well as economic problems. As it is rightly expressed by Meliha Benli Altunışık, a reknown scholar in the Middle Eastern studies in Turkey, the socio-economic problems in the Arab world as documented by UNDP's Arab Human Development Reports and the persistence of authoritarianism underlined the deepening legitimacy problems for Arab regimes (Altunışık, 2010: 9).

Of the sixteen Arab countries, eleven are rentier states in that they derive more than 70 percent of their export income from oil and gas rents. Hence, in the Middle East, the Western notion of "no taxation without representation" is perverted into "no

representation without taxation.” Since most Arab states do not depend on taxing their population, they have failed—and will, for the foreseeable future, continue to fail—to develop the natural expectations of accountability and representation (Magen, 2012: 14). This situation raises the problem of legitimacy.

The Arab region has experienced a considerable rise in population. In 2010, the population of the Arab region doubled since 1980 (Mirkin, 2013: 12). Meanwhile, economies could not produce jobs for this exploding population of young people (Lynch, 2012: 6). Actually the region’s demographic structure explains the story (Mirkin, 2013: 7). According to Robert Springborg, a leading scholar in the US, in general, Arab populations are too young, too rural, too poor, too lacking in a middle class, too poorly educated and trained, too economically insecure, too dependent upon government (Springborg, 2011: 86-89). The region has also been experiencing population movements from rural to urban areas (Mirkin, 2013: 8). This demographic trend, combined with unemployment and underemployment² that mostly affected young people, women and the highly educated (OECD, 2011: 6), has posed a serious challenge to former governments and transition governments (Mirkin, 2013: 8).

Middle East offered a fertile ground for the growth of an organized Islamist movements because of rapid population growth and poor economic performance (Tür, 2001: 2). These movements are important for the subject of this thesis since they came to the power or became the main opposition group after the elections in the countries where dictators were toppled and have become the subject of Turkish model debates. For instance the Muslim Brotherhood before the military coup in Egypt and An-Nahda in Tunisia declared their intention to follow the path of JDP in Turkey (Duran &

² Underemployment exists when employed persons have not attained their full employment level in the sense of the Employment Policy Convention adopted by the International Labour Conference in 1964. See: ILO, Underemployment statistics, [cited: 28 December 2012] Available at: <http://www.ilo.org/global/statistics-and-databases/statistics-overview-and-topics/underemployment/lang--en/index.htm>

Yilmaz, 2011). Özlem Tür, an important scholar in Turkey, explained the development process of these Islamist movements, in 2001 as following:

Especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, socio-economic factors were seen as the main reason for the emergence of Islamist movements. Slow progress or lack of economic development was shown as the driving force behind the phenomena, the marginalised poor and rural immigration to cities were regarded as the main source of these movements. Later, it became increasingly clear that the Islamist movements did not mainly recruit from the uneducated poor. This had implications for the understanding of Islamism (Tür, 2001: 2).

Being important in terms of constructive approach, political identity and legitimacy of these Islamist movements are constructed in opposition to all failing ideologies of the post-colonial order. More precisely, the root of of Islamic movements is traced related both the disruption of traditional societies and to the failure of the nation-state (Castells, 2010: 7). As it is explained by Olivier Roy, Islamists have transformed public culture (Lynch, 2012: 6) by declaring their political legitimacy in the face of repression and exclusion by authoritarian regimes (Hazbun, 2010: 250). Besides all these, it should not be forgotten that the collective identities define politics across the region (Hazbun, 2010: 250) and Islamism is the most powerful one today in the MENA region.

Education and its connection with the economic environment also deserve a prominent consideration in any inquiry into the Arab Spring and other similar episodes of political change. In other words, education was seen as fundamental to personal consciousness. For instance, Huntington discusses how higher education in many modernizing countries often failed to provide skills that were relevant to the countries' needs, churning out graduates faster than jobs could be created, and thus leading instead to alienation and instability. In his words: "The higher the level of education of the unemployed, the more extreme the destabilizing behavior which results (Huntington, 1968: 48)."

Indeed, the Arab world has experienced a remarkable expansion of education in recent decades (Campante & Chor, 2012: 168). This expansion of education in the Arab world was matched with poor labor market prospect (Campante & Chor, 2012: 169). Along similar lines, rising expectations, when left unmet, spill over into political violence, and several observers have highlighted the potential for this combustible mix of conditions in the Arab world (Campante & Chor, 2012: 168). Hence it is claimed that education and its connection with the economic environment deserve prominent consideration in any inquiry into the Arab Spring and other similar episodes of political change (Campante & Chor, 2012: 168)

In short, political, economic and social structures in the Arab Spring countries on the eve of the popular protests provided a basis for the people to revolt against the rulers. However, it should be noted that these structures, economy and politics, were not in a situation of encouraging any democratic change when political spring came to the Arab world (Springborg, 2011: 432).

2.4 The Effects of Social Media over the Popular Protests

The media's role in conflicts, revolutions and socio-political change is not a new subject and has been widely addressed academically (Rinnawi, 2012: 120). For instance, it is claimed that the taped lectures of Khomeini had a great impact on the 1978 Islamic revolution in Iran. Another example was the impact of television camera on the perception of Vietnam War in the US which shocked the nation, broke its will and eventually changed the nature of conflict and its perception (Rinnawi, 2012: 120). Similarly Qatar-based Al Jazeera TV criticized Arab regimes and brought a new kind of news coverage, unusual in the Arab region (Rinnawi, 2012: 118). In this context, the Arab transnational media constituted a link between Arab States and other muslim communities scattering through MENA. Needless to say, media

had played an active role in the Arab Spring countries even before the latest events but more so during the popular protests ((Rinnawi, 2012: 119).

Actually, personal communication is replaced by digital technology. As a result of this replacement a “network society” has been formed. The concept of “network society” was introduced in 1991 by Jan van Dijk in his book *The Network Society*. He defined the idea of the “network society” as a form of society increasingly organizing its relationships in media networks. In this sense the main characteristics of the network society can be counted as follows:

Interaction, a sense of identity and belonging, the existence of a common goal, and the generally applicable rules and standards (Szajkowski, 2011:421).

In this framework, the transformation that ignites Arab popular protests starts with new communications technologies (Lynch, 2012: 11). The expansion of the system of the Social network in the region caused the penetration of the ideas into the distant and isolated regions which they had no direct link with the center of the demonstration. The Arab protesters have opened a new chapter in the socio-political importance of social media and their effect on the global identity space (Szajkowski, 2011:430). It is worth here pointing out that social media tools utilises global identity space (Szajkowski, 2011:421). For this reason Facebook, and Twitter have made Arabs, particularly the numerous young, more capable of self-expression, more anxious to engage in political activities, and more adroit at political organization (Magen, 2012: 13). In other words, the people reconstructed their social identities through the help of social interactions, such as Facebook, Twitter and BlackBerry Messenger (Hartmann, 2013). Additionally social media gave the marginalized part of societies a voice (Szajkowski, 2011:428).

This process also involved the acceptance of the value of the individual and social dignity and the rejection of a material deal with the autocratic regime (Szajkowski,

2011:429). In addition to this, Lynch explains, these new Arab media including satellite television, “increasingly construct the dominant narrative frames through which people understand events” (Lynch, 2003: 3), transforming Arab political culture (Lynch, 2006: 2) and has given the rise to an autonomous pan-Arab public sphere (Hazbun, 2010: 249). In the new Arab public, Arab and Islamic identities serve as a reference point. Hence Arabs take for granted that Palestine and Iraq are Arab issues about which Arabs should agree, (Lynch, 2006: 4)

It is also observed in the Arab popular protests that modern means of communication has given an opportunity to the Arab opposition to consolidate their power. They were united by a shared transnational media. Opposition forces efficiently used this power of social media in order to topple the authoritarian regimes. Social media played a critical role at a time when everything was censored. It supplied the avenues to communicate (Szajkowski, 2011:428). These social tools coordinated activities of hundreds of thousands of young people in the Arab countries. Social media tools - text messaging, e-mail, video and photo sharing, social networking, and the like - have helped the protesters to get more supporters. They also helped masses to break their wall of fear by rallying a large number of people and not just the small group of dedicated dissidents. (Szajkowski 2011, 420). For instance, for many Arab women social networking is the safest way in which frustrations, and share opinions without any backlash from their families and communities (Abdullatif, 2013: 23).

In fact Mohamed Bouazizi was not the first Tunisian to set himself on fire. Abdesslem Trimech, a street vendor, set himself on fire in the provincial town of Monastir on 3 March 2010 in protest against local government hindrance of his work. But not many people knew of his action. On the other hand, Bouazizi's self-immolation took place in front of a camera. The photos of his self-immolation were posted on Facebook and aroused a powerful set of emotions not only in Tunisia but also around the world (Szajkowski, 2011: 427). Therefore protests and demonstrations in public spaces in Tunisia and Egypt, reported through social

network sites and the visual media, helped ignite protests in Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Yemen, Libya and Algeria (De Souza, 2011: 620).

The Arab movements emphasized the power and importance of communication tools especially those of the Internet and social networks (Szajkowski, 2011:428). Social media highly contributed to these movements that constituted the Arab Spring. It is however far from the whole and complex truth as an explanation (Hirst, 2012: 3) without a framework including political and socio-economic factors. The spirit of protest spread far beyond these youth activists (Lynch, 2012: 13). For instance, televisions did not show the huge industrial strikes that made contribution to Mubarak's fall (Dahlgren, 2011: 75). In Egypt alone, the years of 2000s saw thousands of labor strikes and protests by judges and lawyers (Lynch, 2012: 13). This was a deep wave of popular mobilization (Lynch, 2012: 13).

In other words, the frustrations of Arab youth deepened at a time of revolutionary change in the information environment (Lynch, 2012: 6). The youth was seen as an integral process of the mobilization. This frustration combined with the power of information thanks to the digital technology. New communication technologies also shattered the Arab regimes' ability to control the free flow of information (Lynch, 2012: 7). Thanks to digital communication, these young people, with the support of all opponent groups, succeeded in gathering crowds in the big squares of their cities and ignited country-wide protests. In spite of huge contribution of new communication technologies, it is difficult to call these movements as facebook revolution or alike since the reason of protesters to revolt against their rulers is not the new communication technologies but political and socio-economic factors. The protesters only used these tools efficiently to achieve their goal.

Up till now, the popular protests have led to very mixed regional politics – some entrenched dictatorships, some reformed monarchies, some collapsed states, and

some civil wars (Lynch, 2012: 10) and a military coup. On the other hand, Tunisia succeeded in creating a democratic state for the time being.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY'S REFORMS UNDER JDP'S RULE

Turkey has been shown as a model instead of ousted authoritarian regimes because Turkey's reform experiences during the JDP government have been largely seen as a source of inspiration by the reformers in the region (Altunışık, 2008: 44). The JDP has embarked on a series of reforms in the politics, economy and foreign policy following its coming to the power in 2002 (Karagöl, 2013: 115). Hence, this chapter focuses on these important reforms which deeply affected Turkey's political and economic structure and foreign policy. This chapter also lays the groundwork for the model debates taking place in the following chapter by explaining these political and economic reforms and foreign policy changes respectively and their impact on the image of Turkey in the Middle East due to the fact that Turkey's internal transformation has increased its attractiveness (Altunışık, 2008: 41). Hence, in the first two parts of the chapter the political and economic reforms, and in the third part, the foreign policy changes adopted by the JDP will be analyzed.

3.1 Political Reforms

In this part, political reforms achieved by the JDP government will be examined. Although Turkey's political reform process goes back to the nineteenth century and democratization process dates back to 1950's, this part of my thesis will analyse the political reforms during the JDP rule because of its impact on the Arab societies and its importance in terms of Turkish model debate. In other words, since the JDP's democratic credentials are the center of the Turkish model debate (Tol, 2012: 355) this part will look at the reforms achieved by JDP for a powerful democracy in the country.

In fact, the reform process began during the coalition government which was formed in 1999 under the leadership of Democratic Left Party. Despite the difficulties of reaching consensus in a three-party coalition the government achieved significant reform measures (Altunışık, 2005: 54). The coalition government introduced at the beginning of 2002 a legislative technique in which amendments were made to the various laws within one law passed by the general assembly of the GNAT, known as “Harmonization Packages” (Dağı, 2006: 97). Thanks to this technique in legislation, the GNAT passed a series of reforms. These reforms such as reducing police powers of detention, easing curbs on human rights, lifting the ban on Kurdish language broadcasts, increasing civilian representation on the National Security Council, outlawing the death penalty and allowing instruction in languages other than Turkish in private language teaching institutions paved the way for a decision of European Union to open negotiations (Altunışık, 2005: 54).

The perspective of acquiring EU membership, which is opened up for Turkey in 1999, has considerably contributed to the internal reform processes (Nicolescu, 2012: 51). In other words, especially since 1999, Turkey has intensified political and legal reforms in order to attain candidacy to the Union (Bac, 2005: 16). JDP came to the power in this framework. In addition to this, the EU Copenhagen Summit of December 2002 gave the JDP government an opportunity to introduce reforms for compliance with the Copenhagen criteria (Çavdar, 2006: 488). Throughout the nation-building process of the Turkish Republic, Westernization (to be equal to Europeanization) has functioned a legitimizing factor of all the other reforms (Kılınç, 2001: 38). After coming to the power in 2002, JDP government has continued to use the same technique with even more efficiency (Dağı, 2006, 97). In this way, the JDP accelerated this reform process through “harmonization packages in the context of European Union” and amendments to the constitution (Altunışık, 2008, 42). As Vahap Coşkun rightly expressed, closer relations between Turkey and the European Union resulted in constitutional amendments and legal changes (Coşkun, 2013: 98). Successive JDP governments passed numerous constitutional amendments. A series

of changes in 2004, 2007, and 2010 have had significant political and legal consequence. (Coşkun, 2013: 100).

In essence, the JDP comprehended that the EU could play a critical role in achieving some political objectives (Çavdar, 2006: 488). The party aimed at using the EU as leverage to overcome domestic obstacles. In other words, the EU connection would facilitate certain changes that were somewhat radical for the country (Coşkun, 2013: 101). According to Dağı, JDP in fact realized that she needed the Western values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in order to struggle with Kemalist/secularist center (Dağı, 2006: 92). The JDP also realized the legitimizing power of democracy as a response to the pressures stemming from the military opposition (Dağı, 2006: 94). Dağı summarises process of reform achieved by the JDP in conformity with Turkey's responsibilities in path for EU accession as following:

The JDP's search for protection against the Kemalist/secular center including military and judiciary and consolidating its power through a policy of strengthening democracy, human rights and civilian supremacy over the military and the EU's demands for the membership have overlapped resulting in a speedy process of political reforms in Turkey (Dağı, 2006: 99-100).

It is not difficult to say that the governmental terms of the JDP show us a "civilianization" in Turkish polity and democratic consolidation in terms of civil-military relations (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010: 401). These achievements also coincided with the expectations and requirements of the EU. For instance, one particular EU requirement in the framework of the Copenhagen political criteria was the elimination of the involvement of the military in civilian affairs and politics (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010: 388). EU precondition, DECAF (Democratic Control of Armed Forces) necessitates some sort of measures such as the legal and constitutional separation of authority and jurisdiction between the civil and military spheres, parliamentary supervision of the defense budget, military's politically neutral stance,

governmental discretion over the professional, institutional and political activities of the military (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010: 388). Thus, significant measures were taken by the Turkish governments to decrease the autonomous power of the military (Altunışık, 2005: 54). The abolition of the State Security Courts in 2004 can be considered as one of the basic tenets of DECAF in Turkey. By doing so, legislative changes were able to bring about a reduction in the powers of the NSC (Toktaş & Kurt, 2010: 391). Actually, the 7th Reform Package was particularly important in that it limited the power of the National Security Council which was dominated by top army officers (Çavdar, 2006: 488). According to Altunışık: the defense budget has come under parliamentary control, moreover the power of military elites in courts and National Broadcast Authority and Higher Education Council were limited. Furthermore, The balance between the civilian and military members of the National Security Council (NSC) shifted. Secretariat of the NSC and the Council was left to the civilian control. In short, at least in theoretical terms, the NSC no longer makes decisions, but only offers advice (Altunışık, 2005: 54).

The September 12 referendum in 2010 also contributed to the democratization of civil military relations by removing provisional article 15 of the 1982 constitution which granted special political and prosecutorial immunities for Turkey's military junta of 1980-1983 (Aknur, 2013: 140-141). The head of the junta, Kenan Evren, and his colleagues had been immune from prosecution relating to all their acts during their time as military leaders thanks to that article. This reform paved the way for the trial of these persons. The trial of military personnel by civilian courts for criminal matters as well as banning the trial of civilians in military courts in times of peace were other important reforms in the context of the 2010 referendum. The referendum date itself, 12 September 2010, was also meaningful because it coincided with the thirtieth anniversary of the last coup d'état. Besides these, the government annulled the secret protocol on Security, Public Order and Assistance Units (commonly called EMASYA) which had permitted the military to conduct operations concerning internal security matters without the consent of civilian authorities (Aknur, 2013:

143). In short, Turkey's democratization process has led to civilian control of the military and reduced the military's previously unique authoritative role (Kaya, 2012: 26).

Many other important political reforms have been made during the JDP rule in the legislation. At this point, there is a need to go into detail related to the some articles in the constitution concerning party closure. In fact, the party closure was made more difficult thanks to the amendments in the constitution that was made by the coalition government in 2001. The amendments also mandated the constitutional court to take a decision as a sanction that is depriving political parties partially or fully of the state's financial assistance. A twist of fate the JDP derived benefit from these two amendments. At the end of the closure case of JDP in 2008, only 6 of the 11 judges of the constitutional court voted for the closure, with 7 required; however 10 judges voted in favor of the sanction cutting state funding of the party due to the fact that had become "the center of anti-secular activities" (Rıza, 2008: 1). Based on this experience, this time JDP itself made an amendment to the constitution in January 2010 related to the closure of political parties. It was made more difficult again: A 3/5 majority of all members was replaced with a 2/3 majority of members attending the meeting. In addition to this, the number of judges in the constitutional court was increased to 17 by a public referendum held in 2010.

All of these political reforms provided Turkey for making a progress in her relations with the EU. Thanks to this progress in Turkey-EU relations, a positive impact started to be formed on image of Turkey in the Arab World (Altunışık, 2008, 42). Many Arab reformers also see the Turkey-EU process as a test case whether the EU would incorporate a Muslim country or refuse it because of cultural differences (Altunışık, 2005, 58). This test also shows us the rightness of constructivist emphasis on cultural issues and identities.

In addition to this, Vahap Coşkun's assessments about the amendments in the 1982 Constitution also shows the importance of cultural issues and identities in the constitution making process.

The rise of globalization in the 1990s, however, motivated excluded, disadvantaged and isolated identity groups across the world to break their silence. Turkey experienced the various repercussions of this new global trend: People of all cultural identities, whom the political system had ignored, denied, suppressed, and excluded rose to the occasion and challenged their previously uncontested standings. Consequently, the question of constitutional amendments evolved into an area of interest for the general population beyond academic and political circles. Turkey's Kurdish, Alevi, non-Muslim, religious Sunni communities, and others demanded their governments to recognize their particular identities and expand their liberties. The sole means to meeting such popular demands was to amend the Constitution (Coşkun, 2013: 97).

The political and democratic reforms achieved by JDP have a serious impact on the Arab people. In other words, inspired by democratic, Islamic and conservative view of ideal state, the newly emerged JDP administration was seen as a proper example for the muslim communities in the region. Thus, those who demanded reform in the region focused on JDP case. (Kaddorah, 2010: 126). Therefore Mounir Shafiq contends in his article that the positive attitude on the part of Islamic, national, democratic and leftist Arabic forces towards the JDP can be ascribed to the political and democratic accomplishments of the party (Shafiq, 2009: 37).

3.2 Economic Reforms

One of the most attractive aspects of the "JDP model" in Arab perception is Turkey's apparent economic success (Ünver, 2013: 62). Hence it is beneficiary to understand Turkey's economic success which has been especially realized with the reforms during the last decade and its impact on the Arab streets.

In fact Turkey's efforts to transform its economy date back to the 1980s. In the framework of the economic liberalization program launched on 24 January 1980, Turkey started to transform its economy from state-led development model to an export-led growth model (Tür, 2011: 590). These liberalization packages led to the emergence of small-scale family businesses in Anatolia, known as the Anatolian Tigers. These businessmen that were dynamic, well adapted for flexible production patterns, and actively competing in international markets (Gümüüşcü, 2012). In other words, these reforms led over time to the rise of a conservative-religious middle class, the 'Muslim bourgeoisie (Acar, 2009: 18). As quoted by Çavdar, Ahmet Insel, a professor from Galatasaray University, describes these groups as "culturally conservative, politically nationalist and moderately authoritarian, economically liberal, or rather, on the side of free enterprise" (Çavdar, 2006, 483). Çavdar sees these rising conservative capitalists of Anatolia spearheaded (Çavdar, 2006, 483). In short, Turkey's neoliberal transition which began in the eighties led to the emergence of a new class within Islamist constituencies. Then, moderate Islamists established JDP as a conservative party representing neoliberal interests in 2001 (Gümüüşcü, 2012). In Ajami's words: the moderate ascendancy of the JDP in Turkey is secured by prosperity stemming from the "devout bourgeoisie" in the Anatolian hill towns (Ajami, 2012: 62).

In spite of integration with global markets and the growth of the Anatolian bourgeoisie during the 1990s, the Turkish economy has witnessed a series of crises. This set of crisis, especially the 2001 economic crisis, pushed economic actors that had previously been excluded from the benefits of state mechanisms such as Anatolian Tigers to "go and invest abroad". In his 2001 book, *Stratejik Derinlik* (Strategic Depth), current Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutođlu writes, "in relations with our neighbors, we need to increase the mobilization of individuals (Tür, 2011:591).

Improvement in economic relations with the Middle East followed Turkey's political relations which began to normalize at the end of the 1990s. Özlem Tür argues that apart from its dependence on political developments, the reasons for intensification of economic relations are twofold: Turkish economy was in need of trade and export because of its economic growth and. Secondly, JDP followed the policy of "trading state" which was seen as a act of necessity in the foreign policy (Tür, 2011: 589-590). In the framework of this policy, Turkey's exports to the Middle East more than doubled between 2002 and 2010 as a share of total exports, now reaching 20 percent. (The share of exports to Europe has dropped over the same period by about 10 percentage points, to about 45 percent.) (Aktaş, 2011: 166). Regional trade with the Middle Eastern neighbours is better than at any time since the founding of the Republic (Aktaş, 2011:164). Actually, bilateral free trade agreements and visa exemption treaties culminated Turkish companies' network of trade partners (Karagöl, 2013 125). In sum, trade connections with new markets and export volumes especially to the MENA countries contributed to the Turkish economy's recovery (Karagöl, 2013: 123-125). Moreover, whilst the Turkish economy is increasingly engaged in its neighborhood, interaction between Turkish business elite and the business people of the region has become significant (Kirisici, 2011: 37).


In addition to the policy of trade with neighbour countries, after the terrible memory of the financial crisis of 2001, establishing economic and political stability was the main aim of the JDP (Karagöl, 2013: 116). In fact the previously accepted IMF program (Dagi, 2006: 92) and Kemal Derviş's³ regulatory reforms (Öniş, 2012: 5) have paved the way for economic reforms. The JDP government has adopted a liberal agenda (Acar, 2009: 18) and made many reforms for a stronger economy. In this context, the government introduced new regulations for the banking system, opted for fiscal discipline and privatized state enterprises (Karagöl, 2013: 116). The

³ Kemal Derviş was the former Minister of State responsible for the Economy during the coalition government of tripartite (Democratic Left Party, National Movement Party and Motherland Party).

fiscal discipline helped reduced budget deficit and public spending (Karagöl, 2013: 119).

The JDP government also took measures to tackle high inflation. Inflation targeting regime resulted in 2005 decision to drop six zeros from the Turkish lira (Karagöl, 2013: 118-119). Inflation had been reduced to single digit levels for the first time after nearly three decades (Öniş, 2012: 6).

Table 1: Inflation Rates, Turkey (%)




Source: Karagöl, Erdal Tanas (2013) “The Turkish Economy during the Justice and Development Party Decade”, *Insight Turkey*, 15(4): 119.

The low inflation environment helped the party to enlarge its electoral base by including wider segments of middle and lower income groups. Low inflation also made the growth of the economy more sustainable (Öniş, 2012: 6).

The full implementation of this reformist program by JDP provided Turkish economy with high GDP growth, as can be seen from the table. Furthermore, this was inflation-free growth (Öniş, 2012: 6).

Table 2: GDP Growth, Turkey (%)



*Expected Growth Rate

Source: Karagöl, Erdal Tanas (2013) “The Turkish Economy during the Justice and Development Party Decade”, *Insight Turkey*, 15(4): 117.

As a result of this economic success of the JDP government, Turkey paid off 23,5 billion worth of foreign debt to the IMF and became debt-free to the institution in the first half of 2013 (Karagöl, 2013: 125).

Undoubtedly the world economic climate (higher growth in export demand, higher liquidity and funding possibilities) has also contributed to this recovery (Acar, 2009: 19) since global liquidity environment enabled Turkey to attract large inflows of foreign capital (Öniş, 2012: 6).

Nevertheless, there are two major problems that remain unsolved during the JDP’s rule; relatively higher unemployment and the current account deficit. Therefore JDP

leaders should pay more attention to these issues in the medium-term economic programme.

Being important of this thesis, it is a necessity here to express that Turkish experience demonstrates the compatibility of Islam and the market economy. As it is expressed by Mustafa Acar, a prominent scholar in Turkey, the Turkish transformation represented the tradition of more interesting interactions of Islam, democracy and the free-market economy (Acar, 2009: 20).

In short, Turkish economy has grown at a remarkable way. Moreover it has grown hand-in-hand with the development of democratic standards in the country (Kirisci, 2011: 37) which was discussed in the previous title.

3.3 Foreign Policy Changes towards the MENA Region

Political and economic changes in Turkey combined with the changes in Turkish foreign policy. Whilst Turkey tried to change its political and economic structure, she also endeavored to make a new foreign policy. This new foreign policy towards the region has really contributed to the positive image of Turkey in Arab perception. The new policy can be summarised as a policy of zero-problem with neighbour countries. Renewed foreign policy, which is also shaped by the economic considerations (Kirisci, 2011: 37), includes removal of visa restrictions, development of trade and cultural relations. In this sense, Soner Çağaptay draws attention to this change by using an analogy:

...If Atatürk saw Turkey as the Argentina of the Middle East, a country physically in the region but mentally in Europe, the AKP [JDP] envisioned Turkey as the area's Brazil, a rising economic power with a burning desire to shape regional events (Çağaptay, 2013: 1).

Before analysing this change in Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, there is a need to look at history of Turkey's involvement in the region briefly.

Turkey's involvement in the Middle East remained very limited during the early Republican period. The region was perceived by the rulers of this period as a backward zone of conflict. Indeed, Turkish-Arab relations were shaped by both historical and psychological factors. In addition to this there has been a Turkish mistrust toward the Arabs because of the bitter memories of betrayal or being "backstabbed". The roots of this mistrust and antipathy go back to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the First World War. The 1916 Arab revolt led by Sharif Hussein of Mecca against the Ottoman Empire played an important role in formation of this hostility. Many Turks saw his collaboration with the British as having stabbed the Ottoman Empire in the back. Founder of new Turkish republic once said:

... for centuries our people have been compelled to act in accordance with this absurd point of view in solidarity with the Islamic part of the Ottoman Empire and what happened? Millions of them died, in every land they went to. Do you know how many Anatolian boys perished in the sweltering heat of the deserts of the Yemen? (Yılmaz, 2012: 352).

In addition to this, with the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the Turkish republican elite blamed Islam for holding back progress in the region, and turned the country's face toward Europe. They believed that Turkey needed to be nationally organized in order to get rid of social and economic backwardness. This approach culminated in a Turkish policy of "noninvolvement" in Middle Eastern affairs. On the other hand, in this period, many Arabs felt that Turks had turned their back on Islam, and after winning independence they blamed their ills on Ottoman misrule (Tol, 2012: 350).

Turkey has started to pursue an activist foreign policy towards the Middle East especially since 2007 (Yılmaz, 2012: 359). It is such an important transformation that the debate about the causes of this transformation centered on a popular

question, “Is Turkey shifting its axis?” (Kardaş, 2010: 115). Tarık Oğuzlu answers this question by describing the transformation in his article:

Turkey’s foreign policy has increasingly been Middle Easternizing....Middle Easternization does not suggest a break with the West but rather the growing salience of the Middle East in Turkey’s relations with the West.... Turkey’s national security interests, as well as the nature of Turkey’s relations with the European Union and the United States, have increasingly become informed by developments in the Middle East (Oğuzlu, 2008: 3).

One prominent argument claims that this so-called “Middle Easternization” is the result of European states’ opposition to Turkey’s EU accession bid which induced Turkish leaders to take a more cautious approach to dealing with the EU (Bank & Karadağ, 2012: 6).

Another claim related to this transformation is put forward as following:

The change that the JDP has brought into the foreign policy vision of Turkey constitutes the principal reason of Middle East’s increasing significance in Turkey’s foreign policy rather than the international environment and its reflections on Turkey (Yeşilyurt & Akdevelioğlu, 2009: 41).

Actually, so many factors constituted the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy (Kardaş, 2010: 116). Thus there is a need here go into the details and look at the causes of this transformation. At this point it is worth analysing Kemal Kirişçi’s classification of the causes of transformation of Turkish foreign policy. Kemal Kirişçi notes, the causes of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy are numerous. He juxtaposes the causes by offering a brief survey of the academic literature addressing the transformation of Turkish foreign policy. He summarises this literature under five main titles: Firstly, Europeanization process and the engagement of Turkey with the EU. Secondly, domestic developments during the power of the JDP. Thirdly, a reformulation of how the Turkish state defines its own

identity internally and externally. In the fourth place, geopolitical factors and the altered balance of power after the end of the Cold War. Finally, the desire of Turkey to become soft power. After this summary, he rightly expresses that all of these five approaches do enhance our understanding of Turkey's changing foreign policy (Kirisçi, 2009: 33-37).

In more detail, firstly, Kirişçi tells us that Turkey's activism in this region can be explained by the country's enhanced identity-security in the EU context after 1999 which has undermined the political power of the military and paved the way for the democratization of Turkish foreign policy. An interesting but instructive comparison can be given at this point. Kirişçi's comparison between Turkish military operation in Northern Iraq in 1995 and in 2008 argues that these two operations represent two different eras in Turkish foreign policy. (Kirişçi, 2009: 30) Turkish foreign policy-making during the first military operation time was dominated by the military establishment and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which view the developments through the lens of national security (Kirişçi, 2009: 31). The first operation was made with minimal or no consultation with the government, and thus, it was considered rather unconventional (Kirişçi, 2009: 31). On the other hand, the February 2008 operation was based on an explicit authorization adopted by the Turkish parliament in October of 2007 (Kirişçi, 2009: 31). This really has altered Turkey's threat perceptions as well as her own image in the region (Gülseven, 2010: 171). As a result, it is contended that Turkey's assertive involvement in the Middle East is also closely related to the process of Europeanization (Yetim, 2013: 90).

As a second explanation in Kirişçi's classification, the literature influenced by constructivism in international relations attributes the changes in Turkish policy to a reformulation of how the Turkish state defines its own identity internally and externally (Kirişçi, 2009: 35). In this context, it is claimed that the ideological platform of the JDP and the growing conservatism of the public motivates the ruling party to "Middle Easternize" Turkish foreign policy (Kardaş, 2010: 115). Thus,

unlike previous Turkish governments, the JDP government has consistently emphasized Turkey's Islamic and Middle Eastern characteristics (Oğuzlu, 2008: 13). Some of these authors influenced by constructivism put emphasis on the change of foreign policy culture, while others point out the transformation of the way in which national security is redefined and perceived (Kirişçi, 2009: 35).

Third cause explains us that the rise of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) to power, together with a new elite and political agenda, is seen as an important force reshaping Turkish foreign policy (Kirişçi, 2009: 35). At this point the role of Ahmet Davutoğlu should be noted. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief advisor to the Prime Minister and then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey since 2009, is known as the intellectual architect of Turkish foreign policy under the JDP (Aras, 2009:2). The original roots of this foreign policy depended on the historical-cultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire (Erken, 2013:183). It should be emphasized that the Ottoman history can be taken as an example of for the country's new geopolitical vision rather than as a source of political mobilization (Erken, 2013:185). It can be said that the JDP authorities use all of these five sets of explanations in their discourse during the foreign policy construction process. Nevertheless the third cause stands out from all the rest especially after the 2007 elections (Erken, 2013:183).

Whenever the role of geopolitical factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy is invoked, the work of Ahmet Davutoğlu is most frequently cited. As the prime minister's chief advisor on foreign policy until 2009 and Turkish foreign minister since 2009, Davutoğlu's ideas and thinking have become closely associated with the transformation of Turkish foreign policy (Kirişçi, 2009: 36). Saraçoğlu summarises Davutoğlu's ideas and the transformation of Turkish foreign policy as following:

The fact that the thesis and discourses deployed in the *Stratejik Derinlik* [Strategic Depth] testifies to the transformation of the Turkish state's official ideology along the lines of the JDP's Islamic conservative nationalism (Saraçoğlu, 2013: 53).

According to Davutoğlu, the concept of strategic depth is a factor that should characterize Turkish foreign policy since Turkey has strong historical and cultural connections to surrounding regions. These connections give Turkey a geopolitical strategic depth. Thus, Davutoğlu has advocated the need to develop an activist foreign policy. According to Davutoğlu, Turkey's geopolitical importance cannot solely be described as a simple bridge function between West-East (Yetim,2013: 88). Therefore he describes Turkey as a central country. From his point of view Turkey should develop a “zero problem policy” with neighboring countries. Ankara must also solve conflicts between countries, in order to become a soft power in the region For Davutoğlu, free trade area without visa restrictions is also required to achieve this goal (Yılmaz, 2012: 359).

As a fifth set of explanations for the transformation of Turkish foreign policy, in Kirişçi's words, all of these developments transformed Turkey from being cited as a “post-Cold War warrior” or a “regional coercive power” to a “benign” if not “soft” power⁴ (Kirişçi, 2009: 29). However, Kirişçi has a reservation at this point. According to him, it is not always evident in this approach whether soft power constitutes the cause or an outcome of the transformation of Turkish foreign policy.

⁴ The concept of soft power has been popularized by Joseph Nye's book. Tarık Oğuzlu offers the most elaborate analysis in this respect. For soft power to exist, legitimacy/credibility is a must. According to the literature, legitimacy has three important sources (see Nye 2004). First, legitimacy can stem from the values owned by the power-holder. Second, legitimacy can stem from the political, social, economic and cultural institutions of a country. Third, legitimacy can arise from the methods employed in the execution of foreign policy (Oğuzlu, 2007: 83). Being a soft power in this context suggests that other actors would change their behaviour in line with the preferences of the power-holder not because the power-holder induces them to make a cost-benefit calculation, but because they view the power-holder's identity and policies as legitimate (Oğuzlu, 2007: 83).

These approaches, of course, are not mutually exclusive. For instance, another approach touches upon the transformation of the US Middle East policy as a significant factor. According to this view, the US has placed the region on top of its agenda after September 11, Turkey necessarily turned its face towards the Middle East (Yeşilyurt & Akdevelioğlu, 2009: 43).

There are also many scholars who make use of more than one approach. Duran and Kardaş, for example, try to show how considerations of a very *realpolitik* nature interact and prevail over identity-related factors in shaping Turkish foreign policy in general. Kardaş argues:

An essentialist, identity-based explanation of the increasing weight of the Middle East in Turkish foreign policy fails to appreciate the unique combination of structural factors and interest-based motivations that undergird Turkey's activism....There is no common identity that drives both the JDP's domestic agenda and its foreign policy; rather, a unique "strategic identity" blends both ideology and Realpolitik (Kardaş, 2010: 115)

Undoubtedly this foreign policy focuses on Turkish national interests in the region but this policy also cannot be considered without the dynamics of transformation that Turkey has experienced inside (Oğuzlu, 2012: 9). Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East during the JDP era has really undergone profound changes characterised by increasing political, cultural, and economic engagement. In other words, Turkish foreign policy towards the region is based on the principles of mutual gain through economic interdependence and close political ties based on cultural affinity and Muslim brotherhood until the Arab Spring. In fact Davutoğlu's statement related to the issue summarises Turkey's win-win and multilateral approach in its foreign policy:

In order to overcome the tensions with neighboring countries, it is necessary to take Turkey's relations with the neighbouring countries from the process taking place among the bureaucrats and to

disseminate the relations in the wider field based on economic and cultural ties (Davutoğlu, 2009: 23).

The JDP has a determination to open up Turkey to the globalized world as a competitive country (Dağı, 2006: 92) Besides these, Turkey's rise as an economic power along with the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) played an important role in the changing rhetoric towards the neighbours. The economic indicators have also showed that Turkey turned out to be a 'rising trading state' and led the JDP to change their "national role" conceptions (İşeri & Dilek, 2012:128). Within this context, Turkey tried to play third party role in the MENA region. For instance, in 2009, Turkish diplomats shuttled between Cairo and Damascus in an effort to broker a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel. In 2010, Turkey and Brazil proposed a deal to defuse the crisis over Iran's nuclear program and ease tensions between Iran and the West. Despite all of its short-comings, Turkey's mediating role in regional conflicts has attracted attention and has won it favorable notice in the Arab world (Tol, 2012: 351).

Following these developments a historical event occurred in the MENA region, namely the Arab Spring. The Arab spring challenged not only the authoritarian regimes in the region but also Turkish foreign policy strategy (Öniş, 2012: 45). To put it more concretely, as a result of proactive foreign policy towards the region over the past decade, Turkey had become a source of attraction to the opposition forces in the Arab world, while it deepened and improved its relations with the regimes at the same time.

In the wake of Arab uprisings this policy became unsustainable. The JDP government was forced to take sides. After brief hesitation and uncertainty, especially during the Egyptian uprising, the Turkish government began to support the Egyptian (Emiliano & Altunışık, 2013: 3), Libyan and Syrian opposition groups.

Hence Richard Falk, a prominent international law and international relations scholar, makes a commentary on Turkish foreign policy as follows:

Turkish foreign policy seemed more clearly than any other major state to be positioned on the right side of history (Falk, 2014: 14).

CHAPTER 4

RELEVANCE OF TURKEY FOR THE ARAB SPRING COUNTRIES

This chapter starts from the most important question about the Arab Spring which is the type of political, social, and economic systems that can be built on the ruins of the regimes brought down by the Arab Spring (Nafaa, 2011: 37). In other words, type of model that the Arab spring countries' will adopt has been very popular subject in the Middle Eastern affairs' literature. The debates of the kind of Islamic model that will be chosen by the Arab Spring countries is the starting point of this part of my thesis since the region's Islamic political forces and parties seem to be more organized and capable of mobilizing masses.

In fact there are many different opinions whether it would be better to adopt a model or not and which country could stand as an appropriate model (Oğuzlu, 2013: 68). Taliban in Afghanistan, the clerical rule in Iran or the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (Nafaa, 2011: 37), are given as main samples in the model discussions.

In this context, this chapter of my thesis discusses all aspects of the Turkish model because Islamist actors in the Arab Spring countries such as Rachid Ghannouchi of Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt declared their intention to follow the Turkish experience in order to differentiate themselves from the examples of Iran and Taliban. The leader of Libya's National Transitional Council, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, also has called Turkey a model for Libya and the other countries that experienced the Arab Spring by giving Turkey's democratic structure as an example. He stated that Libya will look to Turkey as a model for its own political and democratic structure (Rane, 2012: 48-49).

Hence this part firstly evaluates Turkey's image in the Arab world. Then it also considers the Turkish model debates and the ongoing discussion, from Turkish

model to Justice and Development Party model, which is started to be considered in the literature. In this framework, it will present a picture of the Turkish model, its possibility and applicability in the Arab Spring countries.

4.1 Turkey's Image in the Arab World

Since the establishment of Republic in 1923, Turkey followed a different modernisation and development strategy than that of the countries located in the Middle East (Oğuzlu, 2007: 85). Turkey's republican elites embraced the western ideas and civilization (Yılmaz, 2012: 350). Therefore it led to a consequence in the perception of foreign policy as an instrument for constructing a secular nation-state with a Western identity (Gülseven, 2010: 171). This foreign policy was followed by the idea of non-interference and non-involvement of Turkey in the domestic politics and interstate conflicts of all countries in the region (Yılmaz, 2012: 350).

The founding fathers of the republic thought that the establishment of a secular system was an act of necessity for acquiring a European identity and catching up with Western civilisation (Yılmaz, 2012: 351). Hence, in the past, Arab World had a negative passion toward Turkey because of its militant secularism, obsessive Westernization, and rejection of its Islamic-Ottoman heritage under the heavy weight of Kemalism (Taşpınar, 2011: 9). Turkey, rather than having an international/security identity of its own, was seen as a natural extension of the NATO alliance in the region (Oğuzlu, 2007: 85).

In the past decade, several developments have led to the changes regarding the perception of Turkey in the region. Some of developments are related to Turkey itself and some of them are related to the region. Nevertheless, all of them contributed to creating more positive perspectives on Turkey in the Arab World. Developments related to Turkey are summarised mainly under five titles: firstly the coming to power of JDP in 2002; secondly the decision of Grand National Assembly

of Turkey (GNAT) in March 2003 to refuse to cooperate with the US in its war against Iraq; thirdly the starting of accession talks with European Union (EU) as a candidate country in December 2004; as a fourth development Turkey's response to the Gaza War which is also known as Operation Cast Lead, the so-called Davos affair in 2009, (Altunışık, 2010: 8) namely "One Minute Event", Mavi Marmara operation of Israel and as a fifth development economic success of the JDP government.

From my point of view, the coming to power of JDP is the beginning contributor on positive Turkish image in the Arab World among these developments related to Turkey. Since the coming to power of JDP in late 2002, Turkey began moving in a different direction in its politics and economics. A process that had already started under Turgut Özal in the 1980s gained further momentum (Taşpınar, 2011: 9). Tarık Oğuzlu contends that Turkey missed the opportunity to realize that the first Gulf War in 1990 helped underline the Middle Eastern aspects of Turkey's identity (Oğuzlu, 2008: 6). From my point of view, Turkey re-caught this opportunity with the JDP rule. Due to her awareness on the Middle Eastern aspect of Turkish identity, JDP government aimed to improve Turkey's relations with the MENA countries. Thanks to this policy Turkish image in the whole region began to change.

Secondly, Turkey-EU process is very important for Turkey since Arab reformers see the process as a test case to see whether the EU would accept a Muslim country or refuse it due to cultural differences. In addition to this the EU encouraged Turkey to follow democratic reforms by forcing it to improve its human rights record and establish civilian control of the military (Kaya, 2012: 27). A success in this test will increase influence and soft power (Altunışık, 2005: 58) of Turkey which historically belongs to key Western institutions such as NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe and OECD. The improvements and achievements in the EU process undoubtedly contribute to the image of Turkey in the region.

Thirdly, the GNAT's refusal of decree of 1 March 2003 allowing the US to station its troops on Turkish soil in order to make an easy invasion of Iraq increased Turkey's credibility in the Arab world (Altunışık, 2008: 48; Kuşoğlu, 2008: 109). For instance, the election of a Turkish academic, namely Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu for the position of the Secretary General of the OIC is assessed as a positive indicator of this decision (Kuşoğlu, 2008: 110). The 1 March 2003 decision of Turkish parliament really led to a major change in Turkey's international image. Atasoy describes this positive perception as follows:

Previously known as a military-dominated American client-state, the new democratic Turkey succeeded in balancing its alliance commitments with the pursuit of its own principles and national interest (Atasoy, 2011: 2).


As a fourth development, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's consistent critique of Israeli policies during the Gaza crisis in 2008 and in Davos in 2009 had serious repercussions in the MENA region since the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is central to Arab political identity (Lynch, 2012: 6). Turkey's democratically elected government adamantly opposed the aggressive Israeli politics such as military attack on Lebanon and its blockade of Gaza whereas authoritarian Arab regimes looked for other ways (Atasoy, 2011: 2). For this reason, it was argued that Turkey was "taking a more honorable view of the region" by defending Palestinian interests better than many Arab countries (Çavdar, 2006, 490). Another important event led to positive change the image of Turkey and Prime Minister Erdogan on the Arab people's eyes was the *Mavi Marmara* Flotilla operation of Israel in 2010. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan harshly criticized the attack in the GNAT by stating that 'The act was a kind of terrorism and we are not going to give up our support and aid to Palestinians' (Yetim, 2013: 92).

After all these developments, the Turkish Prime Minister set out in September 2011 on an "Arab Spring tour," visiting the post-upheaval states of Egypt, Libya, and

Tunisia where Erdoğan was welcomed as a hero by crowds (Bengio, 2012: 58- 59). Actually Prime Minister Erdoğan has an image of influential leader in the eyes of the Middle Eastern people because Turkey maintains a critical and independent distance to Western policies in the region despite its integration with the West (Duran & Yilmaz, 2011). Thus, some even say, Turkey's popularity reached its peak that it has never reached since its foundation (Aktaş, 2011: 167).

The Pew Research Center's Global Project Attitude, which conducts public opinion surveys around the world, published a survey in 2012. The results of this survey show us that majorities in all six predominantly Muslim nations (Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, Tunisia and Jordan) have a favorable view of Turkey and most are also positive toward Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (Pew Research Center, 2012: 9).

Table 1: Popularity of Prime Minister Erdoğan



Source: Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, (10 July 2012), [cited: 14 April 2013] Available at: <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/07/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Project-Arab-Spring-Report-FINAL-Tuesday-July-10-2012.pdf>, p. 9.

Similarly, in a poll conducted by Brookings Institution, Turkey was ranked first among five Arab countries (Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates) believed to have played a “constructive role” in the Arab Spring (Çağaptay, 2013: 2). Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s popularity was also at top (Çağaptay, 2013: 2).

Despite its rising popularity, recent developments cause shrink for the prestige of Erdogan and his administration. As the troubles and conflict escalated in Egypt and Syria, Turkey began to lost its ground in the eyes of Syrian and Egyptian peoples. A recent poll conducted by TESEV shows that “Eighty-eight percent of those surveyed in Syria think that the Turkish government followed “unfriendly” politics towards their country, while the same rate is 68 percent in Egypt. In Iraq, 58 percent of the people gave same answers”. Needless to say, Turkey’s related policies, sectarian tension, brutal civil war in Syria drastically galvanize the popularity of Turkey (Uras, 2013). Nevertheless, if Syria and Egypt will not be included, Turkey has still a positive image in the eyes of participants from other countries in the region. Moreover TESEV’s poll in 2013 shows that Turkey is still seen as a model for more than half of the respondents (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2013: 19).

Last but not least, the success of Turkey’s economic model of high productivity and export-led growth has contributed to her image in a region where rentier economies dominate (Tol, 2012: 352). After all, the Arab people demanded to see some changes in the areas of economy, politics, social, fundamental rights and freedoms. The rationale for their demand was, if Turkey was able to bring about the changes without the prosperity of oil revenue, then why their governments cannot do the necessary changes with the advantage of the wealth that is generated through the oil fields. (Kayadibi & Birekul, 2011:257) In short political freedom, accountability, anti-corruption and economic justiceis constituted the rising image of Turkey in the Arab world (Bali, 2011: 29). Therefore, this caused a wide range expectation in

which Ersat Hürmüzlü, an advisor to Turkish president Abdullah Gül, insists that “Turkey is not looking for a role but the role is looking for it (Bengio, 2012: 58).

In fact, the reasons mentioned above make a circle that includes the concept of identity in its centre. From my point of view, although political and economic factors related to Turkey and related to the region are important for the model debates, the identity is the key concept. All these factors make a sense when they are read through the lens of identity. Hence the discussions related to the model of Turkey for the Middle East should be examined in the context of identity.

In concrete terms, the majority of Middle Eastern people read all the developments taking place in Turkey and in the region through lens of identity, namely Islam in this case. Thus, Turkey’s “Muslim Identity” is seen a reason of being a model for an important percentage of respondents of the polls conducted in some countries (Altunışık, 2010: 7). For instance, in a recent YouGov survey, the main reason for Arabs’ choice of Turkey as a good model was Turkey’s affinity with the Arab states in terms of culture, religion, and traditions (57 percent). Another survey, namely “The Perception of Turkey in the Middle East”, conducted by TESEV since 2009 with the purpose of assessing public perception of Turkey’s role in the region has showed that support for Turkey’s role was high among respondents (Akgün, 2010: 5). Turkey’s Islamic character plays an important reassuring role on this change (Altunışık, 2010: 22) since Turkey is slowly coming to terms with its Muslim identity (Taşpınar, 2011: 9).

4.2. Turkish Model Debates

As Meliha Benli Altunışık accurately expresses, Turkey’s relevance to the issue of modernization in the Middle East is not entirely new. Arab nationalists carefully observed the Turkey’s war of independence (Altunışık, 2008:41-42). But the policy othered Turkey by the rising Arab nationalism and the distanced Turkey from the

region by Turkish foreign and security elites have put limits on the relations (Altunışık, 2008:42).

The discussion of Turkish model had in fact emerged right after the end of the Cold War (Altunışık, 2005:45). The Economist, the prestigious UK magazine, announced Turkey to be the “Star of Islam” and a model for the Central Asian republics in 1991 (Kirişçi, 2011: 34). Altunışık discussed the the possibility of Turkey as a role model by following the statement of Anthony Blinkmen⁵ in 1999. According to her (Altunışık, 2005: 45) with regard to its history, size, strength, notion of mainly Islamic faith as well as its secular, democratic, and modernizing character, it was obvious that Turkey can be a role model.

Not long after this statement, the subject of Turkey as a model for Islamic countries in the Middle East was reappared following the Iraqi invasion in 2003. In the context of “war on terrorism”, Turkey was an example of “moderate Islam” for the reconciliation between Islam and democracy, (Altunışık, 2011). For this reason, The US President George W. Bush made a speech touching upon the compability of Islam and democracy at NATO Summit taking place in İstanbul in 2004:

I appreciate very much the example that your country has set on how to be a Muslim country which embraces democracy, rule of law and freedom (Altunışık, 2005: 46).

Besides these, related to the EU membership of Turkey, Prime Minister Erdoğan argued that such a move would make Turkey a model for the Islamic world.

Several developments in Turkey in the past decade have led to the changes of Turkish image and brought again the model debates at the forefront of the agenda (Altunışık, 2008:42). As mentioned previously these developments are as follows:

⁵ President Bill Clinton’s Special Assistant and Senior Director for European Affairs at the National Security Council.

The decision of Grand National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT) to refuse to allow the U.S to station its troops; the starting of accession talks with European Union (EU) as a candidate country in December 2004; Turkey's response to the Gaza War and the so-called Davos affair in 2009, (Altunışık, 2010: 8) namely "One Minute Event" and economic success of the JDP government. In addition to these developments taking place in Turkey, some international and regional developments have also led to positive changes about the perception of Turkey such as the intensification of intra-Arab divisions, the emergence of a power vacuum after the invasion of Iraq by U.S-led coalition (Altunışık, 2010: 10).

Political demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt have reopened the discussion: Is Turkey a model for the Middle East? (Duran & Yılmaz, 2011). In fact what the Turkish model means is really subject to debate (Altunışık, 2008: 45). Nevertheless the model issue can be sum up in two contexts. The issue of compability of moderate Islam and democracy are integral part of the evolution of political Islam and the coming of JDP to the power (Altunışık, 2008: 45). This model demonstrates the party with an Islamic past was able to come to the power through democratic means, via free and fair elections(Kaya, 2012: 27). Within a larger context, Turkey's conservative social and cultural outlook, but liberal political and economic program and an accession country with the EU is put forward as a model of Islamic liberalism for the Arab Spring countries (Kaya, 2012: 27).

To Burhanettin Duran, Professor at Istanbul Sehir University and Nuh Yılmaz, advisor for the National Intelligence Organization's press and human relations offices: "There are three main political groups with competing narratives on what the Turkish model means. The first group, predominantly authoritarian secular elites of the Middle East, portrays Turkey as an exemplar of both controlled modernization under military tutelage and integration of Islamist actors into the political system. This group's "Turkey model" is motivated by Eurocentric and Orientalist prejudices about the relationship between Islam and modernity. For them, since Middle Eastern

peoples are not mature enough to embrace democracy immediately, there needs to be a transitional period under the tutelage of the military. (...) The second group, mainly Islamist movements in the region, sees Turkey as a model for a completely different set of reasons. This group favours the democratic electoral process and the successful reconciliation of Islam with democracy, rule of law, and economic development.. Furthermore, Turkey's image as a prominent and independent actor that can criticize Israel appeals to this group. The third group, people in the streets of the Middle East, looks to Turkey as an inspiration because of its democratic transformation, vibrant economic development, and liberal political life. This group, which has observed the more liberal aspects of Turkish life through the country's cultural influence, especially its famous TV serials, is particularly attracted to Turkey (Duran & Yilmaz, 2011).

Those who focus only on the evolution of political Islam and the AKP government emphasize the importance of the Turkish example as revealing the possibility of moderate Islam and its compatibility with democracy. This is a particularly important asset, and has been used, for instance, by the US administration as a panacea for addressing the growth of Islamist radicalism in the world. Those who, on the other hand, focus on the Turkish experience in a larger context emphasizes the important example Turkey sets as a Muslim nation that is democratic, secular, economically well-integrated with globalization, an accession country with the European Union, and one historically belonging to key Western institutions such as NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe, and OECD. Within such a larger framework, Turkey's appeal cannot be limited merely to the AKP or the moderation of Islam, as they are the products of Turkey's other characteristics. Still, no matter which view one holds, it is clear that Turkey possesses the potential for soft power in the field of its internal politics (Altunışık, 2008: 45).

In light of these explanations, the reasons for Turkish model in the literature can be classified as the country's Muslim identity, its sustained economic success and democratic system.

There are also many opposite views. These views use political culture and identity as a reference point. The common theme of these views is that Turkish experience cannot be a model for the Arab Spring countries. The first of these views is related to the military tutelage in Turkey. This view is put forward as follows:

Turkey, because of its unique political culture, cannot be a model for the Islamist movements of the region. Turkish political vocabulary does not provide for such concepts as shura or sharia to advance an “Islamist” political agenda, as promoted by groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact, Turkey would not stand out as an appropriate model for many Muslims who would be unable to reconcile pseudo-democratic practices with their expectations from a democratic regime. One such example is the Turkish ban on headscarves at higher education institutions. Any failure to draw the right lessons from the Turkish experience might send the wrong signals to Tunisia and Egypt who are poised to create their own models of democratization in the region. The best model for the region, therefore, is not to impose a framework on any country, but rather to allow each to choose its own path. If we are genuinely interested in the realization of people's will in the Middle East, pushing for a model of military tutelage for any country would be insincere at best. Moreover, if a government with military supervision is presented as the Turkish model, this would not find any resonance on the streets of the Middle East. Turkey did not become a source of inspiration for the masses due to the benefits of military tutelage. The hopes of the Middle Eastern people for the future have not and will not be inspired by a Turkey under military tutelage (Duran & Yilmaz, 2011).

The second of these views is related to the secularism and its understanding by Turkish political Islamist parties in Turkey. This view says that Turkey cannot be a model for the Arab Spring countries because Turkey's Islamic political parties did not oppose secularism itself. They only proposed alternative definitions of secularism (Kuru, 2014) and did not challenge the legitimacy of state. Supporting this view, the review of Arab media and interviews indicates the existence of those who reject the Turkish case. According to this group Turkey has produced a system that is not genuinely Islamic and JDP adopted this secular system (Çavdar, 2006: 491). Islamic political parties in the Arab world, however, rejected secularism and generally

developed as social movements opposing the political *status quo*. (Rane, 2012: 51-52). Hence, during his September 2011 visit to Egypt, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's call for Egyptians "not to be afraid of secularism" drew criticism from the Muslim Brotherhood there (Ünver, 2013: 62).

A Turkish analyst Şebnem Gümüşçü comes to the same conclusion, albeit from a different perspective. She explains that the coexistence between Islam and democracy has come to pass in Turkey not from the JDP's development of institutional and political structures that accommodated both Islamic and democratic principles. But rather because Islamists themselves came to accept the secular-democratic framework of the Turkish state (Gümüşçü, 2012).

According to the third view, Turkish experience under the JDP rule cannot be admitted as a model for the region. In any case if Turkey is shown as a sample, real Turkish model is not JDP model, but model of Kemalist Turkey. In other words, if using a Turkish model, Arab revolutions should begin with Kemalism, not the AKP (Ünver, 2013: 62). According to Ünver (Ünver, 2013:63) Kemalist model of state legitimacy, the nature of Turkish nationhood based on secular-modernization and identity-building in times of crisis have once more demonstrated the possibility of a role model. Similarly, Kireççi (2012: 120) argues that Turkey's strong legacy of a parliamentary system, successful application of open market economy-without relying on natural resources-and its transformed model of secular system of government constituted the basis of Turkey's popularity in the image of Arab World. Thus, Turkey remains the most relevant reference for the Arab Spring countries.

In this context, another example can be given. After a visit to Turkey, Maronite Patriarch Beshara Rai of Lebanon called for Arab Spring countries to emulate the Turkish model because it separates religion from politics and respects the existence of other religions in the country (Kireççi, 2012: 120).

In addition to these main views, there are some important samples that touch upon different points of the subject. For instance, a prominent leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Essam El-Erian, argued that the Muslim Brothers' own political experience since 1928 was greater than that of the JDP's new experience (Çavdar, 2006: 492). As an other example, Fahmy Howeidy, an Egyptian intellectual, believes, the advocacy of the Turkish model is just another American strategy to control the Islamic World (Çavdar, 2006: 491-492). Besides these, Rane contends that Islamic political parties in the MENA region have not yet completed the transition from identity or ideology-oriented parties to policy-oriented parties whereas this transition began during the Welfare Party in the 1990s in Turkey (Rane, 2012: 52). Therefore, he put forward that Turkish model is not valid for the MENA region.

4.3 From “Turkish Model” to “JDP Model”?

Actually, the pre-JDP and JDP eras in Turkey refer to two different patterns of political development. The pre-2002 model was a top-down approach, that is “modernization from above under military guardianship,” whereas the post-2002 era is “democratization from below through deconstruction of military guardianship” (Atasoy 2011: 1). In the pre-2002 Turkish model, secular and western values were followed by Turkish military in Turkish society before Islamist politics arrived (Kaya, 2012: 27). In this era, however, it is claimed that the country's modernization processes were run and directed by the Turkish military (Kaya, 2012: 28). Therefore, the pre-JDP era cannot be shown as a model for the Arab people of the Middle East who complained of authoritarianism and lack of democracy in their protests (Kaya, 2012: 28). The debate on the model issue should focus on JDP model instead of Turkish model because the JDP's coming to power has been seen as “as a means of reconciling amicably the conflicting demands of the Islamist movement in Turkey, and democratic tradition t (Altunışık, 2008: 43). Actually, the JDP experience provides the moderate Islamist groups in the region with an example of a way to engage in

legal politics without abandoning their conservative agendas (Altunışık, 2008: 44). In short, JDP offers a model of secularism reconciled with religion (Kassem, 2013: 69).

Since 2002, JDP governments have brought about a major reorientation of politics in Turkey and accelerated democratic deepening. Established by former Islamists, the AKP defines itself as “conservative democrat,” accepts secularism in governance, and acts like a counterpart of European Christian Democratic parties. It pursues European integration along with the protection of traditional cultural values (Atasoy 2011: 1).

The JDP has devoted itself to developing Turkey’s position both as a Western country and as a democratic Muslim country that maintains its traditional common values (Kaddorah, 2010: 115). Although it stemmed from Turkish Islamic political movements, it did not reiterate or simulate the rhetoric or practices of the consecutive parties of that movement. Rather, it created its own formula, benefited from the later assays as well as the ideas and experiences of many Turkish political parties and social movements (Kaddorah, 2010: 116).

The JDP’s popularity in the MENA region has increased since the onset of the Arab uprisings (Rane, 2012: 48). The JDP has been speaking to the Islamic world as an insider actor (Altunışık, 2008: 44). 70% of respondents of TESEV fourth research in the region think that the AK Party is a friend of their country (Akgün & Gündoğar, 2012: 5). On the other hand, this percentage drastically decreased in Syria, Egypt and Iraq due to Turkey’s related policies as mentioned in previous section. In general the country itself is not the only model, Turkey’s current ruling party, the JDP is also one (Kaddorah, 2010: 114). It is noteworthy here that JDP era in Turkey comes to Arabs’ mind as a model because of the reasons mentioned above in the thesis. Therefore, in practice a Turkish model means the JDP model in Turkey.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Middle East remained a scene of continuous diplomatic games and communal troubles. It's understandable that while Arab people rebelled against the repressive regimes and systems to struggle for transformation of their countries, Turkey was pointed out as a role model for them. First of all, Turkish model attempts to have succeeded in addressing the social and identity conflicts (Bank & Karadağ, 2012: 18). Secondly, the Turkish model has also much more say in terms of the state-religion relations, economic development, and democracy building (Göksel, 2013: 157). Of course Turkey is not the most democratic and the most developed country of the world. This country which has also suffered from militarism, violations of human rights and corruption is still trying to cleanse itself from military influence on its civil life and politics. But Turkey is known as one of the most democratic countries in the Middle East and it has an obvious difference from other Muslim countries. It's an attractive and quite developed country compared with the other countries in the region. It has succeeded in bringing together eastern and Western values and given birth to one of the most influential countries in the Middle East. Despite the fact that political Islam faced heavy pressure of the army for years, Turkey succeeded in combining Islam and democracy. Thus, it constitutes a good example for other Muslim countries in the region (Aktaş, 167-168).

The Middle East is a region characterized by historical context and the psychological environment such as diverse social, economic and political conditions. In addition to this, the region is one of the world regions where the feelings of anti-imperialist nationalism remain alive and where an indigenous ideology, Islam, provides a world view still resistant to West-centric globalisation. This dynamic explains much of the international politics of the region (Hinnebusch, 2003: 15) As Hinnebusch notes, all analyses of the Middle East should incorporate an understanding of the identity-sovereignty dynamic of the regional system (Luomi, 2008: 15). For this reason, the

leader of JDP, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has tried to develop a political language and identity touching upon "common Islamic civilization" between Turkey and the MENA region (Duran, 2013: 93). In this way, Erdoğan would like to show that common historical past makes Turkey more responsive to the demands of protesters. A special attention was given to the domestic factors. The usage of this pro-Ottomanist language is mainly aiming at drawing domestic support behind the construction of its foreign policy on the Middle East (Erken, 2013: 183). This civilization discourse has also such a function that is being a barrier in front of the possibility of an identity dilemma in Turkish foreign policy which can be formulated as an obligation of choice between the West and the East. Thanks to this perspective, Turkey would assume a constructive role in the Middle East. In this way, Turkey would combine its central position with its historical and strategic depth (Duran, 2013: 93). Besides these, if the trends provide political liberalization for the Arab world it will also boost Turkey's economic and diplomatic ties and will enhance the relevance of the "Turkish experience" as a point of reference for the region in the longer term (Öniş, 2012: 45).

This pushes me to say that the view that Turkey is not and cannot be a model for the Arab Spring countries due to the mentioned reasons is not valid. The first type of this view which emphasizes Turkey's military tutelage is not valid since recent developments in Turkish democracy have shown that Turkish military's political influence has recently declined (Dağı, 2012). There really have been serious improvements related to the removal of the military tutelage with the adoption of reform packages in the legal system.

The second type of the view which contends that Turkish experience in reform is unique and cannot be repeated due to Turkey's secularism (Altunışık, 2005: 46) is not valid too. According to this view the JDP has never opposed the secular values and she adheres to the Western values. At this point it is a necessity to express that to take a model does not mean to clone the experience of another in governance,

economy or in value system as they argue (Kassem, 2013: 68). In this context the Turkey can be a source of inspiration for Islamists in the Arab region in the long run with its “passive secularism” adopted by the JDP (Kuru, 2014) if the Arab Spring countries recognize an alternative secularism -passive secularism- instead of “assertive secularism” which they have experienced mainly as a result of French colonial influence (Kuru, 2007: 594).

The third view that even Turkey herself has been facing difficulties originating from political Islamists and Kurdish nationalists is not also acceptable (Altunışık, 2005: 46). Recent developments in these forces’ rights invalidate this point of view. Turkey can be a model for the MENA region whilst consolidating her democracy. For instance her legal arrangements aiming at solving the problems of political Islamists, Kurdish nationalists, Alawits and minorities can be useful for the countries in the region.

It is true that every political or social system emerges from the historical experience of specific human communities that have their own cultural characteristics. Other societies facing similar problems, however, should be able to benefit from this rich experience in spite of their own characteristics (Nafaa, 2011: 37). It is clear that there are many overlapping factors that contribute to the development of Turkish model as Samuel Huntington emphasizes this demonstrative effect, whereby the example of earlier transitions provided models for subsequent efforts at democratization that in turn provided models for other efforts (Ülgen, 2011: 1). Moreover, Huntington notes that the regional ones were the most powerful demonstrative effects (Kirişçi, 2011: 36). Larry Diamond, a leading scholar of democracy and democratization, also draws attention to this point by underlining the importance of a model in inspiring reform and transformation among Arab countries (Kassem, 2013: 69). In addition to this, Turkey’s geographical proximity to the MENA region gives the Turkish model an advantage (Ülgen, 2011: 14). For all these reasons, in spite of the specifics of

Turkish history, the democratization path taken by Turkey can inspire the rest of the region.

It is also true that overthrowing a dictatorship is much easier than building a functioning democracy (Wiarda, 2012: 134). There is no doubt that Muslim countries in the MENA have few structural characteristics conducive to both democratisation and democracy (Haynes, 2010: 134). Nevertheless, as it is put forward by Springborg:

Political awakening in the Arab world offers the prospect of reversing a vicious cycle, whereby authoritarianism prevents good governance and therefore industrialisation, into a virtuous one in which at least the beginnings of democratisation pave the way for substantial improvements in governance, and hence much more rapid, thoroughgoing industrialisation. That industrialisation, in turn, would ultimately lead to demographic attributes that would help to build and sustain democracy. At least, that is the theory (Springborg, 2011: 98).

Clearly it will be a difficult and painful process for the people of the Arab Spring countries, one requiring a delicate balance between structural changes in state and society on the one hand, and public culture and ethics on the other (Tol, 2011).

In addition to these realities, it should be kept in mind that Turkey's current state of affairs is the result of an evolutionary process, not a rapid development (Kaya, 2012: 27). In other words, the process that is just starting in the rest of the Middle East has been proceeding in Turkey for some time (Tol, 2011). As Jack Levy put it:

Learning is not a passive activity in which historical events generate their own lessons that actors then absorb. ... Learning is an analytical construction. People interpret historical experience through the lens of their own analytical assumptions and worldviews (quoted in Çavdar, 2006: 480).

There is no doubt that the Arab Spring countries feel the need for structural reforms which are vital for the building and survival of the possible democracies in the

mentioned countries. It is this thesis' main argument that these countries will find the main samples of the essential reforms in the Turkish model. In other words, the Turkish model presents the epitome of democratic and economic reforms. It is a reality that attractiveness of the Turkish model decreased since Gezi protests in Turkey and because of continuous civil war in Syria. Nevertheless the Turkish model is far ahead of other models for the region in terms of democracy and economic development. It should be kept in mind that Ankara can promote itself as a source of inspiration for its Arab and Muslim-majority publics only by sustaining and deepening the principles of liberal democracy (Çağaptay, 2013: 807).

Finally, the concept of model should not be confused with the concept of prototype. The meaning of prototype is to reproduce a thing by imitating the original one whereas the meaning of model is to produce a sui-generis form in its historical framework by benefiting from the experience (Göle, 2011: 106). In this sense, the full application of a model may not be possible. Moving on this reality, Turkish model is much more applicable to the region (Göksel, 2013: 157) because the power of the possibility of Turkish model for the Arab spring countries derives from the concepts such as culture and identity. In other words, the most distinctive factors in the Turkish model debates are the identity and culture since the common religion and the common historical past of Turkish and the Arab Spring societies are the starting point. Indeed, the understanding the root of Turkish model may contribute to the general understanding of the transformation of Middle East. The countries of the MENA find Turkey's own experience more meaningful and see it as more relevant and transposable than the similar experiences (Ülgen, 2011: 1) because of common identity and cultural affinity with Turkey that achieved a remarkable democratic progress and economic development. Hence JDP leadership has been insistently emphasizing the neo-Ottoman heritage in its discourse towards the region. Such heritage and values were pronounced in MENA, the historic borderland between the east and west. The reality of this call and answer to it, even in all different views in the model discussions, shows us the explanatory power of the constructive theory and its

rightness to emphasize identity and culture and their link with the change, do not they?

To conclude, the power of the Turkish model comes from the common cultural values and identity but the applicability of Turkish model passes through many structural reforms. To understand this model requires an understanding of the conflictual history of MENA. Actually, the MENA countries have a long way to go to restructure their socio-economic life and to implement universal democratic values (Yılmaz, 2012: 368). The brutal Civil War in Syria do not bode well for the permanence of the transformation process. Geo-politics, energy issue and various other issues still dominate the agenda of the region. Moreover, the region is more inclined toward confrontation. In spite of these difficulties. Tunisia is succeeding in transition to democracy (Dağı, 2014). Then, why do not these Arab Spring countries succeed in forming a sustainable democratic state in their countries in the longer term by drawing their lessons from Turkish experience?

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APENDIX A

Table 1: 2002 Constitutional Amendments

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 78	If a city or district lacks representation in Parliament, a by-election shall be held on the first Sunday, 90 days following creation of the vacancy. In elections held per this paragraph, paragraph 3 of Article 127 of the Constitution shall not apply.
Provisional Article 1.	The last paragraph of Article 67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey shall not be implemented in the first by-elections to be held during the 22nd Term of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

Table 2: 2004 Constitutional Amendments

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 10/2	established constitutional guarantees for gender equality.
Articles 15/2, 17/4, 38/9 and 87	abolished all references to capital punishment in the Constitution
Article 30	abolished the confiscation of vehicles belonging to the media press property on criminal grounds
Article 38/10	established that courts cannot rule for capital punishment and overall confiscation of property
Article 38/11	allowed for Turkish citizens' extradition to foreign countries with regard to crimes under International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction.
Article 131/2	eradicated the Chief of Military Staff's right to appoint one member of the Board of Higher Education.
Article 143	abolished State Security Courts
Article 160	abolished constitutional obstacles before the Court of Exchequer's auditing of the Armed Forces
Article 90	established international treaties would take precedence over national laws if and when the two were in contradiction over fundamental rights and liberties.

Table 3: 2005 Constitutional Amendments

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 160	The Audit Court shall be charged with auditing, on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, all accounts related to revenues, expenditures and properties of the government departments financed by general and subsidiary budgets, with taking final

	<p>decisions on the acts and accounts of the responsible officials, and with exercising the functions required of it by law in matters of inquiry, auditing and judgment. Parties concerned may file a single request for reconsideration of a final decision of the Audit Court within fifteen days of the date of written notification of the decision. No applications for judicial review of such decisions shall be filed in administrative courts.</p> <p>Regarding taxes and similar financial obligations, when there is disagreement between the decisions of the Council of State and the Audit Court, the Council of State's will prevail.</p> <p>The supervision and final decision on the accounts of local administrations are made by the Audit Court.</p> <p>The establishment, functioning, supervisory procedures, qualifications, appointments, tasks and duties, rights and obligations and other matters concerning the status of its members and guarantees of the President and the members of the Court shall be regulated by law.</p>
Articles 161	<p>The expenditure of the state and those of public corporations other than state economic enterprises shall be determined by annual budgets.</p> <p>The beginning of the fiscal year and the preparation and implementation of the general and subsidiary budgets shall be defined by law.</p> <p>The law may prescribe special periods and procedures for investments relating to development plans, or for business and services expected to last more than one year.</p> <p>No provisions other than those pertaining to the budget shall be included in the Budget Act.</p>
Article 162	<p>The Council of Ministers shall submit the draft of general and subsidiary budgets and the report containing the national budgetary estimates to the Turkish Grand National Assembly at least seventy-five days before the beginning of the fiscal year.</p> <p>The draft budgets and the reports shall be considered by the Budget Committee, which shall be composed of forty members. In the composition of this Committee, the proportional representation of the various political party groups and independent members in the Assembly, shall be taken into consideration subject to the allocation of at least twenty-five seats to members of the party or parties in power.</p> <p>Draft budget, which shall be adopted by the Budget Committee within fifty-five days shall thereafter be considered by the Assembly and shall be decided on before the beginning of the fiscal year.</p> <p>Members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall express</p>

	<p>their opinions on ministerial, departmental and subsidiary budgets during the debates held in Plenary Session on each budget as a whole; the various headings and motions for amendments shall be read out and put to the vote without separate debate.</p> <p>During debates in the plenary session on the draft Budget Act, members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall not make proposals which entail an increase in expenditure or a decrease in revenue.</p>
Article 163	<p>The appropriations granted under the general and subsidiary budgets shall indicate the limit of expenditure allowed. No provisions shall be included in the budget to the effect that the limit of expenditure may be exceeded in pursuance of a decision of the Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers shall not be empowered to amend the budget by a decree having the force of law. In draft amendments entailing an increase in appropriations under the budget for the current fiscal year and, in draft laws and law proposals providing for additional financial commitments in the budgets for the current or following year, the financial resources which would meet the stated expenditure shall be indicated.</p>

Table 4: 2006 Constitutional Amendments

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 76	Every Turk over the age of 25 is eligible to be a deputy.

Table 5: 2007 Constitutional Amendments

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 77	established that elections for the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall be held every four years
Article 79	The Supreme Election Council shall be composed of seven regular members and four substitutes. Six of the members shall be elected by the Plenary Assembly of the High Court of Appeals, and five members shall be elected by the Plenary Assembly of the Council of State from amongst its own members, by secret ballot and by an absolute majority of the total number of members. These members shall elect a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman from amongst themselves, by absolute majority and secret ballot.
Article 96	The Turkish Grand National Assembly shall convene with at least one-third of the total number of members for all its affairs, including balloting. Unless otherwise stipulated in the Constitution, the Turkish Grand National Assembly shall convene with at least, one-third of the total number of members and shall take decisions by an absolute majority of those present; however, the quorum for decisions can, under no circumstances, be less than a quarter plus

	one of the total number of members.
Article 101	<p>The President of the Republic shall be elected by the public from among the Turkish Grand National Assembly members who are over 40 years of age and have completed higher education or from among ordinary Turkish citizens who fulfill these requirements and are eligible to be deputies.</p> <p>The president's term of office shall be five years. The President of the Republic can be elected to two terms at most</p>
Article 102	<p>The election of the President of the Republic shall be concluded within sixty days before the term of office of the incumbent President of the Republic expires; or within sixty days after the Presidency falls vacant for any reasons.</p> <p>In presidential elections conducted by universal suffrage, the candidate who receives the absolute majority of the valid votes shall be elected President of the Republic. If this majority cannot be obtained in the first ballot, the second ballot shall be held on the second Sunday following this ballot. The two candidates who receive the greatest number of votes in first ballot can run for the second ballot, and the candidate who receives majority of valid votes shall be elected President of the Republic.</p> <p>If one of the candidates who gains the right to appear on the second ballot dies or loses his or her eligibility, the second ballot shall be conducted by substituting within the vacant candidacy in conformity with the ranking in the first ballot. If only one candidate remains for the second ballot, this ballot shall be conducted as a referendum. If the candidate receives most of the votes, he or she shall be elected President of the Republic.</p> <p>The term of office of the incumbent President of the Republic shall continue until the President-elect takes Office.</p>
Provisional Article 17	In the first general elections held after the enactment of the law on the addition of a provisional article to the Turkish Constitution, the last paragraph of Article 67 of the Constitution shall not be applied to the provisions of Parliamentary Elections Law No. 2839, dated June 10, 1983 concerning independent candidates on joint ballot.

Table 6: 2008 Constitutional Amendments

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 42	<p>No one shall be deprived of the right of learning and education.</p> <p>The scope of the right to education shall be defined and regulated by law.</p>

	<p>Training and education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles and reforms of Atatürk, on the basis of contemporary science and educational methods, under the supervision and control of the state. Institutions of training and education contravening these provisions shall not be established.</p> <p>The freedom of training and education does not relieve the individual from loyalty to the Constitution.</p> <p>Primary education is compulsory for all citizens of both sexes and is free of charge in state schools.</p> <p>The principles governing the functioning of private primary and secondary schools shall be regulated by law in keeping with the standards set for state schools.</p> <p>No one should be deprived of the right to higher education due to any reason not explicitly written in the law. Limitations on the exercise this right shall be determined by the law. (2)</p> <p>The state shall provide scholarships and other means of assistance to enable students of merit lacking financial means to continue their education. The state shall take necessary measures to rehabilitate those in need of special training so as to render such people useful to society.</p> <p>Training, education, research, and study are the only activities that shall be pursued at institutions of training and education. These activities shall not be obstructed in any way.</p> <p>No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education. Foreign languages to be taught in institutions of training and education and the rules to be followed by schools conducting training and education in a foreign language shall be determined by law. The provisions of international treaties are reserved.</p> <p>(2) Through Constitutional Court ruling E.2008/16, K.2008/116 issued 5 June 2008, the phrase "No one can be deprived of the right to higher education due to any reason not explicitly written in the law. Limitations on the exercise of this right shall be determined by the law." section six of Article 42 is annulled.unless they resign from office</p>
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Table 7: 2010 Constitutional Amendments (Referendum)

Article Number in the 1982 Constitution	
Article 10/3	legislator may take to benefit women, children, the elderly, the disabled, widow(er)s and children of military and civilian service

	people who died in action or as part of their professional responsibilities, and veterans
Article 20/3	the right to protect personal information.
Article 23/5	the requirement of a judge's approval to restrict the liberty to travel abroad
Article 41/3-4	children's rights
Article 51/4	the right of citizens to become members of multiple labor unions at the same time and in the same line of work
Article 53/3	the right of civil servants and other public employees to collective bargaining
Article 54	additional organized labor, strike and lockout rights
Article 74/3	the right to access information
Article 74/4-6	The creation of a Public Monitoring Institution, which was regulated by the Parliament to investigate complaints regarding the state's abuse of power
Article 84/5	the abolishment of a clause which stipulated that MPs whose statements and actions led to the outlawing of their political party would lose their parliamentary seat
Article 125/2	in no case judicial power can be used as review of expediency the institution of judicial monitoring of Supreme Military Council decisions to terminate employment with the exception of promotions and mandatory retirement due to shortage of adequate positions
Article 145/1	the amendments imposed new restrictions on military courts' jurisdiction
Article 145/2	established that military courts may not try civilians with the exception of wartime conditions
Article 145/4	improved the working conditions of military judges
Article 146	increased the number of Constitutional Court judges to 17 and put an end to the appointment of substitute members
Article 148/3	the recognition of the right to submit constitutional complaints
Article 159	altered the Board's composition and increased the number to 22 full and 12 substitute members.
Temporary Article 15	the abolishment of Temporary Article 15 that granted all members of the legislative and the executive branches immunity before the law regarding the entirety of their decisions.

Source: BYEGM Website, 1982 Constitution, [cited: 23 February 2013], Available at: <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/content.aspx?s=tcotrot>

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APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Kuşoğlu
Adı : Baran
Bölümü : International Relations

TEZİN ADI : The Arab Spring and Turkish Model

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

TURKISH SUMMARY

2011 yılı başında Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika ülkelerinde meydana gelen toplumsal olaylar uluslararası ilişkiler literatüründe yerini almıştır. Tarihsel olarak, etnik ve dinsel çatışmaların merkezi olmuş bölge, şimdi halk gösterileri ve ayaklanmaları, askeri darbeler ve rejim değişiklikleri ile çalkalanmaktadır. Böylece ilgili gözler bir kez daha dünyanın bu bölgesine dönmüştür. Aynı şekilde yoğun bir ilgi Türkiye'deki reform sürecinde de gözükmemektedir. Bu yaygın ilgi de bu konuda meraklı araştırmacıların ve akademik çevrelerin gündemine Arap Baharı ülkeleri için Türk modeli tartışmalarını getirmiştir.

Bu tez Arap Baharı ülkeleri için “Türk modelinin” geçerliliği sorusuna cevap aramakta ve bu bağlamda konuyu uluslararası ilişkilerin önemli bir teorisi olan yapısalci yaklaşımın temel kavramları olan kültür, kimlik, normlar ve değerler penceresinden incelemektedir. Bu teorik çerçeveden hareketle tez Arap Baharı ülkeleri için Türk modeli sorusunu özel önemi haiz dört boyuta odaklanarak incelemektedir: Teorik ve kavramsal çerçeveden Arap Baharı, Arap Baharının temel nedenleri, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi yönetiminde Türkiye'nin reform süreci ve Arap Baharı ülkeleri için Türk modelinin geçerliliği ve uygulanabilirliği. Tez, temel olarak Arap Baharı ülkelerinin siyasetinde ve ekonomisinde yapısal değişiklikler olmadan Türkiye'nin onlar için bir model olamayacağını tartışmaktadır. Diğer bir deyişle, tez, Arap Baharı ülkelerinde yapısal bir çerçeve içinde siyasi ve ekonomik değişiklikler yaşandığı takdirde, Türkiye'nin bu ülkeler için bir model olabileceğini ileri sürmektedir. Bu bağlamda tez, model tartışmalarının temel argümanlarını yapısalci yaklaşım çerçevesinden ortaya koymaktadır.

Kültür ve kimlik, Ortadoğu çalışmalarında sık kullanılan temel kavramlar olmuştur. Bu nedenle söylemek gerekirse, Arap Baharı olarak adlandırılan ve birbirini takip eder şekilde meydana gelen toplumsal olaylarda kimlik ve kültür konusunun akademik çalışmalarda önem arz ettiği gözlemlenmektedir. Söz konusu kavramlar sömürgecilik sonrası Arap milliyetçiliğinin siyasal İslamcılığa dönüşümünü anlama

bakımından da son derece faydalıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, kültür, düşünce ve değerler on yıllardır yaşanan sürecin temel dinamiklerinin anlaşılmasında anahtar kavramlardır. Yapısalcı yaklaşım, kültürel değerleri temel alarak, dünya görüşlerinin bu değerler kapsamında şekillendiğini iddia etmektedir. Yapısalcılık, dünyayı “inşa halinde olan bir ortam” olarak görmektedir. Yapısalcılık kimliği toplumsal ve tarihsel bağlamda yorumlamaktadır. Dolayısıyla kültürel değerler ve kimlik konusu temel alınmadan yapılan Ortadoğu analizleri atıl kalmakta, bölgedeki tarihsel dönüşümü açıklayamamaktadır. Ortadoğu coğrafyasında, kültür verilen bir olgu değil, değişime ve dönüşüme açık bir kavramdır. Yapısalcı yaklaşımı, Arap Baharına uyarlayarak kültür, kimlik ve değişim arasındaki yakın ilişki daha açık ortaya çıkmaktadır. Türk modelinin Arap baharı sonrası bölge ülkelerini için uygun bir model olabileceği tartışması, yapısalcı teori ışığında yapılacaktır.

Ortadoğu’da Pan-Arapçılık, 1967 Arap-İsrail Savaşı’ndan sonra gücünü kaybetmiş ve bu ideolojinin yerini almak üzere İslamcılık ortaya çıkmıştır. Diğer bir deyişle 1970’lerin sonlarında siyasal İslamcılığın yükselişi ile Arap milliyetçiliğinin düşüşü birbirini takip etmiştir. Bu bağlamda, İslamcı hareketler ulusal özgünlük arayan, Batı kültürüne karşı özgün ve "yerli" söylem kullanan toplumsal bir hareket olarak ortaya çıkmış, gelişmiş ve bugün Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'nın temel aktörlerine dönüşmüştür.

Bu yerli söylem gerek toplumsal gösteriler sırasında gerekse göstericilerin liderlerinin açıklamalarında kendini belli etmiştir. Örneğin, Tunuslu İslamcı lider Raşid Gannuşi “moderniteye katılmanın tek yolu, kendi dinine, tarihine ve medeniyetine sahip çıkmaktır” şeklinde bir açıklama yapmıştır.

Türkiye’de de siyasal İslamcılık başlangıçta güçlü bir Batı karşıtı söylem içine girmiştir. Türkiye’de kendisini bir yönüyle İslamcılık şeklinde ifade eden yerli kimlik; Batı karşıtlığı, ülkenin yaşadığı Doğu-Batı ikilemi şeklindeki kültürel

sorunlara ve diđer temel sorunlara karřı geleneksel olarak inřa edilmiř bir “gerçek bir çözüml” olarak görölmüřtür.

Bu tez dört ana bölümden oluřmaktadır. Giriřte amaç ve içerikle birlikte teorik çerçeveden sonra, ikinci bölümde, Ortadoęu ve Kuzey Afrika'daki toplumsal hareketler üç bařlık altında incelenmektedir. Toplumsal ayaklanmalara neden olan siyasi ve ekonomik faktörler ve sosyal medyanın olayların gelişimindeki rolü ve etkileri, bu bölümde sırasıyla incelenmektedir. Arap dünyası uzun yıllardır anti-demokratik rejimlerle yönetilmiş, birçok askeri darbeye maruz kalmıř, sürekli savařların ve iç savařların yařandığı bir alan olmuřtur. Bu nedenle, Arap Baharı bazı kesimler tarafından uzun yılların biriktirdiğı toplumsal gerilimin doęal bir sonuç olarak gözükürken bazılarına sürpriz gibi gelmiřtir.

Halk protestolarının bařlangıcından bu yana farklı terimler bölgede yařananları ifade etmek için kullanılmıřtır. Ortadoęu ve Kuzey Afrika coęrafyasında hükümetlere ve rejimlere karřı protestolar ve gösteriler “Arap Baharı”, “Arap Kışı”, “Arap Uyanıřı”, “Arap Aydınlanması”, Arap İřyanı”, “Arap Ayaklanması”, “Arap Olayları” “Arap Rönesansı”, “Arap Devrimi” gibi isimlerle adlandırılırlar. Bu tezde de, yaygın akademik arařtırmalarda kullanılan “Arap Baharı” ismi kullanılacaktır.

Ayrıca, “Arap Baharı” söylemi yakın tarihin bařka önemli siyasi olaylarını hatırlamak için bize yol göstermektedir. Bu söylem özellikle, Çekoslovakya Komünist Partisi Birinci Sekreteri olarak Alexander Dubcek seçilmesi ile birlikte, 5 Ocak 1968 tarihinde bařlamıř ve 21 Ağustos 1968 tarihine kadar devam siyasi liberalleşmeyi tanımlamak için kullanılmıřtır. “Prag Baharı” Sovyetler Birlięi ve Varřova Paktı'nın tüm üyelerinin bu ülkeyi iřgal etmesi ile son bulmuřtur. Soęuk savařın sonuna doęru, terim aynı zamanda komünizmin çöküřü içinde kullanılmıřtır. Örneęin, Sovyetler Birlięi'nde komünizmin çöküřü “Moskova Baharı” ile adlandırılmıřtır.

Aslında tüm bu kavramlar arasında, “Arap Uyanışı” terimi Araplar arasında daha popüler olmuş ve daha çok benimsenmiştir. Zira Tarık Oğuzlu’ya göre, “uyanış” metaforu “bahar” metaforuna göre daha kalıcı, daha istikrarlı ve devam eden bir dönüşüm sürecini sembolize etmek bakımından Araplar açısından kabul edilebilir ve uygun bir terim olmuştur. Buna ek olarak, “devrim” söylemi diktatörlerin iktidarı terk etmek zorunda kaldığı ülkelerde kullanılmaktadır. Amerikalı siyaset bilimci Samuel Huntington devrimleri ve reformları hız, kapsam, siyasi ve sosyal sistemlerde değişim yönü açısından sınıflandırmak eğilimindedir.

Huntington’a göre, bir devrim toplumsal değerler, sosyal yapı, siyasal kurumlar, hükümet politikaları ve sosyal-politik liderlik üzerinde, hızlı, tam ve şiddetli bir değişimdir. Diğer bir deyişle büyük ve sosyal devrimler siyasal ve sosyal sistemin tüm unsurlarında meydana gelen önemli değişiklikleri ifade etmektedir. Dolayısıyla ki Arap Baharı kapsamındaki toplumsal ayaklanmalar neticesinde meydana gelen değişikliklerde devrimci esintiler olmasına rağmen bu olaylar bir devrim olarak nitelendirilememektedir. Ayrıca Huntington reformu, liderlikte, siyasette ve siyasal kurumlarda sınırlı kapsamda ve tedrici değişiklikler olarak tanımlamaktadır. Bu bağlamda son olarak ifade edilmesi gereken husus, Ortadoğu’da toplumların değişen iktidara karşı duydukları ilk heyecanının azalmaya başladığını ve ortaya kargaşanın çıktığını savunanların "Arap Baharı"nın yerini “Arap Kışına” bıraktığı yönündeki tezleridir.

Arap Baharı olarak adlandırılan toplumsal olaylar, Tunus’ta bir gencin kendini yakması ile başlamıştır. Tunus’taki halk ayaklanması, Mısır’da da bir elektriklenmeye sebep olmuştur. Kısa süre içinde olaylar, Cezayir, Libya, Bahreyn, Yemen, Suriye başta olmak üzere bölgenin tamamına yayılmıştır. Tunus ve Mısır’da toplumsal ayaklanmaların başarılı olması ve yönetimleri devirmesi diğer bölge ülkelerinin halkları nezdinde etkili olmuş ve onları da harekete geçirmiştir. Patlak veren bu toplumsal olaylar pek çok nedene dayanmaktadır. Bu nedenler temelde siyasi ve sosyo-ekonomik nedenler olarak sıralanabilir. Siyasi nedenlerin başında

halkın siyasete demokratik yollardan katılmasının önündeki engeller gelmektedir. Temel hak ve özgürlüklerdeki yasaklar ve kısıtlamalar diğer önemli engellerdir. Ekonomik nedenler ise gelişmiş bir özel sektörün olmamasından ötürü istihdamın kamuda yoğunlaşması ve işsizlik, istihdamda liyakatten önce iktidar sahibi yönetici seçkinlere yakınlık ve bağlılığın ölçüt olması nedeniyle yaygın yolsuzluk ve gelir dağılımı adaletsizliği olarak sıralanabilir.

Toplumsal olayların patlak vermesine neden olan sosyal faktörlerin başında ise hızlı nüfus artışı ve kırdan kente yoğun göç gelmektedir. 1980 yılından itibaren, bölge nüfusu ikiye katlanmıştır. Amerikalı bir düşünür olan Robert Springborg'a göre, Arap nüfusunun çok genç, çok kırsal ve fakir olması en önemli sebeplerin arasında yer almaktadır. Ayrıca, kırsal alanlardan kentlere doğru göç eden nüfus, şehirlerde ayaklanmalara zemin oluşturacak bir toplumsal katman oluşturmuştur. Bütün bu sebepler değerlendirildiğinde, Ortadoğu, İslami muhalefetin zemin kazanacağı bir bölge olmuştur.

Belirtmek gerekir ki, ekonomik sebepler, toplumsal olayları açıklamakta kimi zaman belirleyici olmaktadır. Ancak Arap Baharı'nın gelir seviyesi yüksek ülkelere de sıçraması ekonomik sebeplerin Arap Baharı olarak adlandırılan toplumsal olayları açıklamada tek başına bir faktör olmadığını ortaya koymuştur. Öte yandan belirtmek gerekir ki, yoksulluk, geri kalmışlık, yolsuzluk bu toplumsal olayların fitilini ateşlemede yönetime siyasal katılım ile birlikte temel etkenlerden olmuştur. Zira İslamcılar iktidara, eşitliğe dayalı adil bir düzen kurma söylemi ile talip olmuşlardır.

Bunun yanında, İsrail-Filistin çatışması ve ABD işgalinin ardından Irak'ta yaşananlar yeniden bir ortak Arap bilincinin gelişmesine sebep olmuştur. Özellikle Irak işgalinden sonra, bu durum daha belirgin hale gelmiştir.

24 Ocak 1980 tarihinde alınan kararlar neticesinde takip edilen ihracata dayalı büyüme modeli, özellikle 2002'den sonra Türk ekonomisinde iyileşmeye yol açmış ve büyümeyi beraberinde getirmiştir. Bu büyüme bölgedeki ülkelerin dikkatini çekmektedir. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetlerinin ekonomik alanda

gerçekleştirdiği reformlar neticesinde gelen başarılar Türkiye'nin güçlenmesine katkıda bulunmuş ve Türkiye'nin bölgesel bir güç olarak görülmeye başlamasının temel nedenlerinden biri olmuştur. 3 Kasım 2002'den itibaren başlayan dönemdeki liberal ekonomi politikaları Anadolu Kaplanları adı verilen sermaye sahiplerinin güçlenmesine sebep olmuştur. Bu yerli burjuva sınıfı başbakanın, hükümetin ve politikalarının en büyük destekçisi konumundadır. Diğer bir deyişle, 2001 yılından itibaren bu sermaye sahibi kesimin taleplerini dile getiren Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi iktidara gelince bu talepleri, takip ettiği politikaları aracılığıyla hayata geçirmeye başlamıştır. Bununla bağlantılı olarak dış politika yaklaşımında, "tüccar devlet" anlayışı takip edilmiştir. Türkiye'nin diğer yükselen ekonomiler (Brezilya, Rusya, Hindistan ve Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti) gibi artan gücü ve hızla itibar kazanması bölge ülkelerinin yönetimlerinin ve halklarının gözünden kaçmamıştır. Dolayısıyla Türk iş çevreleri ile bölge ülkelerinin iş adamları arasındaki iş ilişkileri gelişmiş ve ticaret hacmi artmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin yükselen ekonomik performansı, Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika ülkelerindeki halkların gözündeki imajına da katkıda bulunmuştur. Öyle ki; Washington ve Ankara merkezli Türk düşünce kuruluşu (think-tank) olan Siyaset, Ekonomi ve Toplum Araştırmalar Vakfı (SETA), Türkiye'nin siyasi ve ekonomik yapısında gerçekleştirdiği reformların ve izlediği politikaların ayaklanmalar üzerinde direk etkisi olduğunu belirtmiştir.

Cumhuriyetin ilanı ile birlikte, Türkiye bölgeye karşı mesafeli bir tutum içinde olmuştur. Benzer şekilde, bölge ülkeleri militarizm ve laikçi anlayışı yüzünden Türkiye'ye mesafeli yaklaşmışlardır. Geçmiş on yılda yaşanan olaylar karşısında Türkiye'nin takındığı tavır ve izlediği politika bölgede Türkiye'nin algılanışında değişikliklere yol açmıştır. Bunlar arasında özel önemi haiz olaylar beş başlık altında incelenmektedir. Türkiye'nin bölgeye yönelik yaklaşımlarında çok önemli yer tutan ve TBMM Genel Kurulu'nun 1 Mart 2003 tarihinde kabul etmediği önerge ile ABD'nin Irak işgalinin desteklenmemesi, 2004 tarihinde Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye ile tam üyelik müzakereleri için 2005 yılında görüşmelere başlaması yönünde aldığı karar, Davos'ta 2009 yılında yapılan Dünya Ekonomik Forumu'nda Başbakan

Erdoğan'ın İsrail Cumhurbaşkanı Simon Peres ile yaşadığı ve “one minute” olarak adlandırılan tartışma, ve Filistin'in İsrail kuşatması altında olan şehri Gazze'ye insani yardım götürmek üzere yola çıkan Mavi Marmara filosunun uluslararası sularda durdurularak İsrail askerleri tarafından müdahaleye uğraması sonucu Mavi Marmara vakası olarak adlandırılan olay ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümetlerinin ekonomik alandaki başarıları değişen Türkiye algısında temel beş başlık olmuştur.

Öte yandan Türkiye kamuoyunda da Arap dünyasına yönelik algıda değişiklikler meydana gelmiştir. Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Arapların Türkiye'yi arkadan vurduğu algısı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ni kuran askeri ve bürokratik elitlerin bölgeye çok uzun yıllar mesafeli yaklaşımlarına sebep olmuştur. Bu yaklaşım, “Ortadoğu işlerine karışmama” olarak dış politikaya yansımıştır. Diğer taraftan da, bu dönemde, Araplar, Türklerin İslam'a sırtlarını döndüklerini düşünmüştür. Dahası pek çok Arap lider, geri kalmışlıklarının nedeni olarak Osmanlı'nın kötü yönetimini göstermiştir. Ancak Türkiye siyasetinde ve ekonomisinde yaşanan dönüşüm özellikle dış politikada değişikliklere sebep olmuştur. Komşu ülkelerle “sıfır sorun” ve “karşılıklı ekonomik bağımlılık” olarak özetlenebilecek bu yeni dış politika gerçekten Arap kamuoyundaki Türkiye algısına ve imajına olumlu yönde katkıda bulunmuş ve olumsuz algının olumlu bir şekilde değişmesini beraberinde getirmiştir.

Aslında, Türkiye'nin dış politikasının dönüşümü anlayabilmek ve açıklayabilmek için Türkiye'nin ne yapmak istediğine bakmak gerekir. Bu noktada Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyelik hedefi, yeniden kimlik inşası ve yumuşak güç olma arzusu konuları ayrı bir önem arz etmektedir. Söz konusu hedeflerin hayata geçirilmesi için Türkiye'nin Ortadoğu politikasıyla ilgili attığı ilk önemli adım, 2003 yılında, ABD'nin Irak'ı işgalini 1 Mart 2003 tarihli tezkereyi Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nde kabul etmeyerek desteklememesidir. Buna ek olarak Türkiye'nin İsrail'e karşı genelde Filistin konusunda aldığı eleştirel tutum, özelde ise İsrail'in 2009'daki Gazze'ye yönelik “Dökme Demir Harekâtı”na karşı çıkışı Arap kamuoyunda daha da olumlu bir hava yaratmıştır. Bu nedenle, tezin Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesine

yönelik Türk dış politikasında değişiklikler başlıklı bölümünde, Türk dış politikasında yaşanan değişikliklere (komşularla sıfır sorun politikası, bölge ülkeleriyle karşılıklı ekonomik bağımlılık politikası) ve değişen bu Türk dış politikasının mimarı olarak bilinen Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu'nun düşüncelerine yer verilmektedir. Davutoğlu'na göre, Türkiye'nin jeopolitik önemi, sadece Batı-Doğu arasında bir köprü işlevi olarak tarif edilemez. Bu nedenle Davutoğlu Türkiye'yi merkezî bir ülke olarak tanımlamakta ve rol biçmektedir. Bu rolün gereği olarak Türkiye komşu ülkelerle "sıfır sorun politikasını" geliştirmiş ve bunu hedeflemiştir. Ayrıca vizeler kaldırarak, iş adamlarının önündeki engelleri aşmaya çalışarak, serbest ticaret bölgeleri kurarak Türkiye bölgede yumuşak bir güç olmayı amaçlamıştır.

Bu merkezi rol tanımlamasından ötürü, Davutoğlu, Türkiye'nin bölgede daha aktif bir dış politika takip etmesi gerektiğini savunmuştur. Bu kapsamda Türkiye bölgede, İran'ın nükleer programından kaynaklanan sorunla ilgili olarak Brezilya ile birlikte İran ve Batılı ülkeler arasında, Filistin-İsrail meselesinde, İsrail-Suriye arasındaki sorunlarda arabulucu olarak rol almaya çalışmaktadır. Arap ayaklanmalarının ardından Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi hükümeti açıkça taraf olmak zorunda kalmıştır. Kısa bir tereddüt ve kararsızlıktan sonra, Libya ve Suriye muhalefeti desteklenmiştir. Özellikle Mısır ayaklanması sırasında, Türk hükümetinin Mısır'a yönelik desteği olmuştur.

Aslında bir Türk modeli ve bu modelin uygulanabilirliği konusu, ilk kez Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü sonrası Orta Asya Cumhuriyetleri nedeniyle gündeme gelmiştir. Bu dönemde Türkiye Orta Asya coğrafyasında, "İslam'ın Yıldızı" olarak tasvir edilmiştir. Benzer şekilde, 2003 Irak işgali sonrası, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Genişletilmiş Büyük Ortadoğu projesi kapsamında Türkiye bölgeye model olarak gösterilmiştir. Arap baharı olayları, Türk modeli sorusunu yeniden gündeme getirmiştir.

Tezde Türk modelinin tüm yönleri ele alınmaktadır. Halk ayaklanmaları sonucunda devrilen Arap ülkelerinde iktidara gelenlerin hangi modeli benimseyeceği tartışma konusu olmuştur. Bu tartışmalarda Türk modeli ön plana çıkmaktadır. Libya, Mısır ve Tunus muhalefeti, Türk modelini seçeceklerini açıkça ilan etmişlerdir. Bu nedenle Türkiye modeline ilişkin görüşler ve Türk modelinin bölge halkları gözünde ne anlama geldiği de incelenmiştir.

Arap Baharı bir yönüyle Türkiye için bir avantaj haline dönüşmüştür. Arap Baharı olarak nitelendirilen halk protestolarının başlamasının ardından Türkiye'nin bölge halklarının taleplerini destekleyen açıklamaları önemli bir şekilde yankılanmıştır. Bu kapsamda Başbakan Erdoğan, 2011'in Eylül ayında Kuzey Afrika bölgesi turuna çıkmış, Mısır, Tunus ve Libya'yı ziyaret etmiştir. Başbakan konjonktürle uyumlu söylemlerinin de etkisiyle bölge halkı tarafında kurtarıcı olarak görülmüş ve Türkiye'nin imajı bu dönemde Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesine en olumlu biçimde yansımıştır.

Arap baharının başladığı dönemlerde, Başbakan Erdoğan'ın bölgedeki imajı zirveye çıkmıştır. Buna rağmen, son dönemde yaşanan olaylar bu yükseliş eğilimine sekte vurmuş, önce ivmesini yavaşlatmış sonra da düşüş sürecine sokmuştur. Suriye'de iç savaşın yarattığı kargaşanın ve Mısır'da gerçekleşen askeri darbe neticesinde iktidara gelen yönetimin açıklamalarının da etkisiyle özeldde bu iki ülkede önemli oranda, genelde ise bölge halkında Erdoğan'a karşı olan bakış olumsuz yönde değişmeye başlamıştır. Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı Dış Politika Programı'nın 2013 yılında yaptığı "Ortadoğu'da Türkiye Algısı" adlı araştırmada, Suriye halkının % 88'i Erdoğan'ın ülkelerine karşı dostane olmayan davranışlar içerisinde olduğu yönünde cevap vermiştir. Benzer şekilde, Irak ve Mısır'da da Erdoğan'ın itibar oranında düşüş gözükmektedir. Ancak öte yandan, Türkiye'nin Müslüman kimliği, iktidara kadar yükselen siyasal İslam ve onun politikaları ile son on yılda gerçekleştirilen reformlar Türkiye'nin imajına büyük oranda da destek olmuştur. Bu

destekten dolayıdır ki aynı araştırmada hala ankete katılanların yarısından fazlası Türkiye'nin model olabileceği yönünde görüş belirtmektedir.

Ortadoğu güç oyunlarının ve çıkar çatışmalarının merkezi olma görünümünü, etnik, sosyal ve kültürel açıdan her an çalkantıların ve krizlerin yaşanabileceği bir coğrafya olma durumunu devam ettirmektedir. Bu bağlamda Arap ülkelerinde insanlar baskıcı rejimlere karşı başkaldırırken, bazı ülkelerde iktidarları devirirken Türkiye, bu ülkelerdeki değişim sonrası senaryolar konuşulurken, değişim yaşayan ülkelere model olarak gösterilmeye başlanmış ve bu yönde akademik çalışmalar yapılmış ve anketler yayımlanmıştır. Zira Türk modeli, demokratikleşme, din-devlet ilişkileri, asker-sivil ilişkileri ve ekonomik kalkınma konularında pek çok şeyin Müslüman bir ülkede başarılabilirdiğini göstermekte ve bir çözüm önermektedir. Bir başka deyişle, uzun yıllar süren iç siyasal bunalımlarına ve çok sayıda askeri darbelerine rağmen, Türkiye kendi sistemini eksikleri bulunmasına rağmen demokrasi ve hukuk zeminine oturabilmiştir. Ayrıca Türk modeli, İslam ve demokratik değerleri bir araya getirme ve uyumlaştırma yeteneğini gösterebilmiştir. Bu şekilde, Ortadoğu'da bir ilham kaynağı olmaya başlamıştır. Farklı bir şekilde ifade edilecek olursa, demokratik, laik ve sosyal hukuk devleti olma tecrübesi Avrupa Birliği ile on yıllardır süregelen ilişkileri ve tam üyelik müzakerelerine başlaması, genelde dış politikasında özelde ise Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika politikasında yenilikçi ve aktif girişimleri, ekonomik reformlar neticesinde yakaladığı büyüme oranları ve refah artışı baz alındığında, Türkiye bölge ülkeleri için ideal bir model olarak durmaktadır. Bununla birlikte, bölgede Türk modeline bakışta olumlu ya da olumsuz yorumlar da gündeme gelmektedir.

Bütün bu tartışmaların yanı sıra, Türk modelinin, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi modeline dönüşüp dönüşmediği konusundaki tartışmalar da devam etmektedir. Aslında bu manada belirlemek gerekir Türk modeli bağlamında 2002 öncesi ve sonrası dönemler farklı birçok özelliği içinde barındırmaktadır. 2002'den önce, tepeden inmece bir demokratikleşme ve kalkınma hâkim olmakta iken, 2002 sonrası tabandan

gelen bir demokratikleşme çabası ön plandadır. Bu kapsamda, AKP öncesi Türk modeli Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesi için bir örnek teşkil etmesi bakımından önemli zorluklarla karşı karşıyadır. 2002 sonrası dönem, İslam ve demokrasiyi, kimi zaman çatışan yönleri bulunsa da, bir potada eriten ve birleştiren bir model olmuştur. Zira 2002’de iktidara gelmesiyle birlikte AKP, muhafazakâr-demokrat duruşuyla, Türkiye’nin demokratikleşmesi konusuna ağırlık vermiş, siyasal reformlar gerçekleştirmiş ve demokrasi standartlarını yükseltmiştir. Öte yandan Avrupa değerleri ile birlikte Türkiye’nin geleneksel değerlerinin çatışma potansiyeli taşımadığını, bütünleşmeye elverişli olduğunu göstermiş ve bunları siyasette birlikte kullanabilme yeteneğini göstermiştir. Dolayısıyla, son zamanlarda Türk modeli AKP modeli olarak da tartışılır hale gelmiştir.

Sonuç olarak Arap coğrafyasında meydana gelen toplumsal olaylar sonucunda diktatörlükler yıkılma süreci içerisine girmişlerdir. Diktatörlüklerin yerine, demokratik rejimler kurmak ise daha zorlu bir süreçtir. Bu nedenle söz konusu ülkelerdeki toplumsal değişim ve dönüşümü, devlet-toplum ilişkisi ekseninde değerlendirmekte fayda vardır. Arap ülkelerinin bu değişim sürecini canlı tutabilmeleri için ise demokratik rejimlere kavuşmaları gerekir.

Öte yandan belirtmek gerekir ki, Ortadoğu coğrafyası, etnik, sosyal ve kültürel açıdan her an çalkalanan bir yapı barındırmaktadır. Bölge, emperyalizm karşıtı duygu ve düşüncelerin güçlü bir kaynak olduğu görünümünü muhafaza etmektedir. Sorunların çözümünde İslam’a ve kaynaklarına yapılan referans, hala batılı değerlere karşı mücadelede en önemli yoldur. Bu değerlerin bölgedeki önemini bilen Erdoğan “Ortak İslam Medeniyeti” söylemi ile toplumsal ayaklanmaların yaşandığı ve yaşanması muhtemel ülkelerin halklarına hitap etmektedir. Zira bu İslami-Osmanlı söylemin arkasında, bölgeye yönelik aktif bir dış politika oluşturma çabaları yatmaktadır. Ancak özellikle Suriye iç savaşı, Irak’taki karışıklık ve Mısır’daki askeri darbe bu dış politikanın başarılı olması yönündeki en önemli engeldir ve bu dış politika başarı şansını bu dönem itibariyle bir miktar yitirmiştir. Tüm bunlara

rağmen anketlerin de gösterdiği üzere Türk modeli hala, bölge ülkeleri için en iyi alternatif olarak durmaktadır.

Bunların yanı sıra, Türk modeli konusu, onu aynen kopyalamak anlamına gelmemektedir. Türk modelinin bölgeye birebir aktarılması söz konusu olmamakla birlikte, bir ilham kaynağı olarak ortada durduğu önemli bir gerçekliktir. Bu ilhamın kaynağında kültür ve kimlik merkezi bir konumda durmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, Türk modelinin gücü, ortak kültürel değerler ve kimlikten kaynaklanmaktadır ancak Türk modelinin bölge ülkelerinde uygulanabilirliği birçok yapısal reformu gerektirmektedir. Zira bu modelin bölgede ne anlam ifade ettiğini görmek için Ortadoğu tarihini derinlemesine incelemek gerekir. Jeopolitiğin, enerjinin, etnik ve kültürel farklılıkların çeşitli problemler yaratarak olumsuz bir duruma sebebiyet vermesine rağmen, Türkiye neden Arap ülkeleri için bir rol model olmasın?