

HUME'S LAW AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL THESIS: AN
INTERPRETATION OF AND SOLUTION TO THE "IS-UGHT"
PROBLEM

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EMRE ARDA ERDENK

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Assist. Prof. William G. Wringe
Co-Supervisor

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam (METU, PHIL) _____

Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol (METU, PHIL) _____

Assist. Prof. Hilmi Demir (BILKENT, PHIL) _____

Prof. Dr. David Grünberg (METU, PHIL) _____

Assoc. Prof. Ertuğrul Turan (A. Ü., PHIL) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Emre Arda ERDENK

Signature :

ABSTRACT

HUME’S LAW AS A PSYCHOLOGICAL THESIS: AN INTERPRETATION OF AND SOLUTION TO THE “IS-UGHT” PROBLEM

Erdenk, Emre Arda

Ph.D., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol

Co-Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Willian G. Wringe

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This thesis provides an interpretation of David Hume’s “is-ought” problem. According to this interpretation, “is-ought” problem suggests a psychological claim that there cannot be any moral relations. Based on this, I claim that Hume’s Law can be adequately interpreted as a psychological thesis. By means of this, I evaluate three main arguments of Treatise 3.1.1 and analyze the “is-ought” passage in virtue of a contextual reading. Ultimately, I conclude that Hume’s Law is not a logical claim against deductions of moral propositions from non-moral propositions. The Law states that moral propositions are not relations of ideas or inferred from matters of facts. Based on this interpretation, I provide a solution to this problem. I evaluate Hume’s notion of natural relations and, contrary to Hume’s claim, I claim that natural relations must be simple impressions of sensation. In addition to this, moral relations can be natural relations as simple impressions of sensation. According to this last claim, I argue that there can be moral relations as simple impressions.

Therefore, Hume's Law as a psychological thesis is invalid. My solution to the "is-ought" problem fixes some inconsistencies between Hume's Law and Hume's moral psychology. Ultimately, my alternative explanation provides an equally powerful explanation of how we derive moral judgments and obligations.

Keywords: David Hume, Is-ought Problem, Hume's Law, Moral Philosophy, Meta-Ethics.

ÖZ

PSİKOLOJİK BİR TEZ OLARAK HUME YASASI: “DIR/DİR-MELİ/MALI” PROBELİMİNİN BİR YORUMU VE ÇÖZÜMÜ

Erdenk, Emre Arda

Ph.D., Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ayhan Sol

Ortak Tez Yöneticisi: Assoc. Prof. Willian G. Wringe

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Bu tez, David Hume’un “dir/dır-meli/malı” probleminin bir yorumlamasını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu yorumlamaya göre, “dir/dır-meli/malı” problemi, ahlaki ilişkilerin olamayacağı yönünde psikolojik bir iddiayı savunmaktadır. Buna göre, Hume Yasası’nın ancak bir psikolojik tez olarak sağlıklı bir biçimde yorumlanabileceğini savunuyorum. Bu bağlamda, *İnceleme* 3.1.1’de yer alan üç temel argümanı değerlendiriyor ve “dir/dır-meli/malı” pasajını bağlamsal bir okuma ile analiz ediyorum. Sonuç olarak, Hume Yasası’nın, ahlaki önermelerin ahlaki olmayan önermelerden tümdengimsel olarak çıkarsanamayacağı yönünde mantıksal bir iddiayı savunmadığını söylüyorum. Yasa, ahlaki önermelerin ne fikirler arası ne de olgulardan türetilen ilişkilerden olamayacağını iddia etmektedir. Bu yorumlama ışığında, probleme dair bir çözüm önerisi getiriyorum. Hume’un doğal ilişkiler nosyonunu inceleyip, Hume’un iddiasının aksine doğal ilişkilerin basit duyu

izlenimleri olması gerektiğini savunuyorum. Buna ek olarak, ahlaki ilişkilerin de basit duyu izlenimleri olarak doğal ilişkiler olabileceğini iddia ediyorum. Bu son iddiaya göre, ahlaki ilişkilerin basit duyu izlenimleri olduğunu savunuyorum. Böylelikle, Hume Yasası psikolojik bir tez olarak yanlışlanmış olmaktadır. Benim ortaya koyduğum “dir/dır-meli/malı” probleminin çözümü, Hume Yasası ve Hume’un ahlak psikolojisi arasındaki bazı tutarsızlıkları da ortadan kaldırmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, benim alternatif açıklamam, ahlaki yargılar ve yükümlülükleri açıklamakta eşit güçte bir açıklama ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: David Hume, “Dir/dır-meli/malı” Problemi, Hume Yasası, Ahlak Felsefesi, Meta-etik.

To my dear wife Hülya and my lovely cat Miyoşı

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
DEDICATION.....	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND FIGURES	xii
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xiii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1. The Contemporary “Is-Ought” Debate	4
1.1.1. Cognitivism – Non-Cognitivism.....	4
1.1.2. Moral Realism – Moral Anti-Realism.....	5
1.1.3. Is Hume’s Law a Logical or a Semantic Thesis?: The Standard Interpretation	8
1.2. Hume’s Law as a Psychological Thesis	11
1.3. The Need for Revisiting Hume’s Law and the Plan of this Dissertation	13
2. HUME’S LAW AS THE REJECTION OF “RATIONALISTS’ OUGHT”	16
2.1. “Is-Ought” Passage in the <i>Treatise</i>	17
2.2. The Vulgar Systems of Morality	19
2.3. Exemplification of the Key Terms: Proposition and Deduction.....	25
3. OF “MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIV’D FROM REASON”	38
3.1. The Motivation Argument.....	42
3.2. The Discovery Argument	48
3.3. Hume’s Fork.....	56
3.4. The Overall Argument of Treatise 3.1.1	75
3.5. Extracting the “Is-Ought” Passage and Hume’s Law	77

4. NATURAL RELATIONS ARE DERIVED FROM SENSATION.....	83
4.1. Hume’s Theory of Natural Relations	84
4.2. The View of ‘Natural Relations as Simple Impressions’	92
4.3. Natural Relations of the Double Relation of Ideas	105
5. MORAL RELATIONS IN TERMS OF ‘NATURAL RELATIONS AS SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS’ VIEW	111
5.1. The Analysis of ‘Murder’ as a General Idea	113
5.2. A Closer Look at Hume’s Analysis of Willful Murder.....	117
5.3. Some Complications Resolved.....	135
5.4. The Place of the ‘Moral Relations as Simple Impressions’ View in the Contemporary Meta-Ethical Literature	138
5.5. Invariable Philosophical Relations and Judgments produced by ‘Natural Moral Relations as Simple Impressions’	148
5.6. Hume’s Account of Obligation and Its Examination in terms of Moral Relations as Simple Impressions	156
6. CONCLUSION.....	169
REFERENCES	175
APPENDICIES	
CURRICULUM VITAE	185
TURKISH SUMMARY	188
TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	205

LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND FIGURES

Diagram 1	108
Diagram 2	110
Diagram 3	120
Diagram 4	121
Diagram 5	122
Diagram 6 “Murder is wrong”	131
Figure 1 & Figure 2	143
Diagram 7 “You ought not to kill”	163

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Hume Abbreviations

Treatise & T	<i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i>
EHU	<i>An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding</i>
EPM	<i>An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals</i>
Essays	<i>Essays, Moral Political and Literary</i>
Abstract	<i>An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature</i>
Letter	<i>A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh</i>
Letters	<i>The Letters of David Hume Vol. I & II</i>

Other Abbreviations

MA	Motivation Argument
DA	Discovery Argument
HF	Hume's Fork
PI	Perceptual Intuitionism
EP	Ethical Perception
LO	Looks Objection

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Among contemporary philosophers, even those who have not found skepticism about empirical science at all compelling have tended to find skepticism about morality irresistible. (Railton, 1986, p. 163)

As we are human beings, one of the most distinguishing features of our nature is to evaluate and judge. It is not to say that we are the true judges of world, but it is a plain truth that we constantly, insistently, and irresistibly evaluate and judge what we experience, know, or feel. When we see an incorrect calculation, we say that the result is wrong. When we know that people tend to be polite to others, we say that politeness is a virtue. When we come to home at the end of the day, we say that “I feel comfort”. Nothing in the world, which is not out of our experiential realm or cognitive borders, escapes our evaluations. A big portion of our evaluations consist of our moral concerns. We praise and blame things and other people by their actions and characters. It is again a plain truth that we live in accordance with social and moral norms, and we regulate our daily life in terms of rules, customs, traditions, respect, punishment, etc. Even if as philosophers we cast doubt on every single thing about morals, the layman lives by these systems of morality. Whether we argue about the nature of morality as natural or artificial (or, pseudo or genuine), morality is the thing that we practice as laymen.

The philosophical questions start with this layman standpoint. The fact that we practice morality implies the first pre-philosophical axiom that: *Morality is essentially practical*. We evaluate things and react to them by means of these evaluations. If I believe that, “lying is immoral”, it is unexpected to see me constantly lying. When I lie, though, it is expected that I give some overriding principle or reason justifying my act of lying, which is apparently incompatible with

my evaluation of lying. Ultimately, from this standpoint, several meta-ethical issues arise. For instance, we want to know whether morality depends on facts, or whether no fact can justify moral evaluations. Secondly, can moral evaluations be true; so that we can be certain about true moral judgments? Thirdly, what is the relation between moral evaluation and moral judgment? Fourthly, are moral evaluations outcomes of our cognitive abilities, or emotional responses? What is the function of reason in morality? Fifth, is moral knowledge objective or a construct of human invention? We may increase the number of questions that we want to raise about morality. However, whatever we ask, the standpoint remains the same: *Morality is essentially practical.*

David Hume raises all these questions in his study of *A Treatise of Human Nature (Treatise)*. According to him, the moral science (as he calls it) must explain the nature of morality in terms of these questions. In this dissertation, my aim is not to give a scholarly work on Hume's moral philosophy. What I am intended to do is to examine the knotty problem that Hume raises in the *Treatise*. In order to object to his rationalist predecessors, Hume interprets their conception of morality as problematic. The standpoint is justified by the rationalists in terms of divine command, or immutable and eternal laws or principles of morals. They think that morality is essentially practical because we can demonstrate or show certainly that our moral obligations necessarily follow from self-evident or necessary moral principles. Hume wants to reject this. The knotty problem with this rationalist conception of the standpoint, for Hume, is about their justification of morality. The main idea of his rejection of rationalist morality is spelled out in *Treatise* 3.1.1:

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it.

This rejection of the idea that statements of obligation can follow from statements of facts of nature is well acknowledged among the philosophers of today

and back then. This passage is referred by several different names¹. Richard Hare (1954-5, p. 303) calls it “Hume’s Law”. At least because it is better than calling it the knotty problem, I will call this rejection as “Hume’s Law”. However, the real reason why I use Hare’s phrase is that the contemporary reception of this passage is like considering it as one of the most unshakeable principles of moral philosophy. One of the main motivations of this dissertation is to interpret this passage in the context of Hume’s moral philosophy. In this sense, I am not intended to examine Hume’s moral philosophy, but mostly explain the central themes of it.

Hume’s Law is, either directly, or indirectly related to various issues in meta-ethics. For instance, it seems at face value that, if the Law is true, then (i) moral realism is false; (ii) one cannot be a cognitivist for moral judgments; (iii) there are no logical ways to infer, derive, entail, or deduce “ought” propositions from “is” propositions; (iv) the meaning of moral propositions are entirely different (if they have any) from the meaning of factual propositions. As the reception of Hume’s Law is positive, all these consequences are somehow accepted overwhelmingly among moral philosophers². For instance, Michael Ruse (1986, p. 251) maintains, “[T]he very last thing the Darwinian wants to do is to break Hume’s law by denying that there is a genuine “is/ought” distinction”. However, because interpretations vary, there are disputes concerning which of these consequences follow from the Law and which do not. I am not going to issue these interpretations in this dissertation. My main thesis in this dissertation is to argue that interpreting Hume’s Law only as a psychological thesis is the adequate interpretation. Thus, it is the right occasion to look at the contemporary “Is-Ought” debate here. In the following section, I will outline the contemporary interpretations of Hume’s Law and collect them under the title of the *standard interpretation*.

¹ Putnam (2004, p. 19) calls it “The fact/value Dicotomy”. Black (in Hudson (1969, p. 100)) uses “Hume’s Guillotine”. Pigden (2010, p. 13) says “The autonomy of ethics”. Thompson (1989, p. 2) calls it “The Fact-Value Thesis”. Sturgeon (1986, p. 128) refers it as “The is-ought gap”. Hudson (1969) calls it “The Is-Ought Question”, Snare (1992, p. 83) uses “Hume’s Gap”, Schurz (1997, p. 1) labels it “The Is-Ought Thesis”.

² Cf., Kitcher (1985); Putnam (1981); Boyd (1988); Brink (1989).

1.1. The Contemporary “Is-Ought” Debate

1.1.1. Cognitivism – Non-Cognitivism

Actually, the debate on Hume’s Law based on cognitivism and non-cognitivism is an old-fashioned approach. Arguing meta-ethical issues in terms of these two positions were popular in late sixties and we see their influence on the meta-ethical debate in Hudson’s collection, *The Is/Ought Question*. It was popular back then to interpret Hume’s Law as a non-cognitivist argument. Basically non-cognitivism argues that it is mistaken to consider that moral judgments are some kind of factual judgments. In fact, our moral judgments reflect our emotional attitudes towards actions and characters³. When they relate this position to Hume’s Law, the interpretation of the “is-ought” passage becomes that no moral judgment (*ought*) can be derived from non-moral judgments (*is*). This idea means that moral judgments have some special characters, which make them differ in their meaning. Hudson explains this with an example: “[W]e see redness in a literal physical sense, but when we speak of ‘seeing’ the rightness of an action, we are not using the verb in exactly the same sense” (1969, p. 11). The difference between the factual judgments and moral judgments is mainly argued as that the latter refers to values that cannot be intrinsically factual. In other words, values do not refer to the external things⁴. Wittgenstein says, “[N]o statement of fact can ever be, or imply, a judgment of absolute value” (1965, p. 6). Consequently, moral judgments cannot be cognitive and, thus, cannot have cognitive meaning⁵. Ultimately, the idea of Hume’s Law turns into the claim that no consideration of morals can be analyzed or verified in terms of factual considerations. This means that any argument, which entails a proposition with *ought* must contain at least one premise with a moral content⁶. And this is what Hume means, according to non-cognitivists, by saying that this new relation of *ought* must be explained.

³ For non-cognitivism; see, Stevenson (1944).

⁴ Cf., Ayer (1936, Chap., 6).

⁵ See, Carnap (1960, p. 77).

⁶ See, Hare (1952, pp. 28-30).

Cognitivism, on the other hand, wants to argue that moral considerations are similar to ordinary factual statements. In this sense, moral attitudes are cognitive states (propositional states) and not emotional states. Consequently, just like our beliefs, thoughts, intentions, etc., our moral thinking involves in our higher-order mental capabilities. So, they reject the view that only desires or other emotional states can enable moral reasoning. Jonathan Dancy says:

A belief, that is, has to fit the world; the world is given, as it were, and it is the belief's job to fit that world, to get it right. A desire is not like that; the desire's job, if anything, is to get the world to fit it, to make things be the way it wants them to be. (1998, p. 1)

From this point of departure, cognitivists mainly try to object to Hume's Law by showing that moral statements can be either derived from or reduced to non-moral statements. Famously John Searle were arguing that, "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars" can be derived from Jones' testimony of his promise that, "Jones uttered the words 'I hereby promise to pay you, Smith, five dollars'" (1969, p. 121). The idea of Searle's contention is to claim that promise implies analytically that the thing promised ought to be done. Ultimately, cognitivist attempts to overcome the barrier of Hume's Law is to find some "analytic bridge principles"⁷; by which *ought* is deduced from *is*.

So we see that cognitivist vs. non-cognitivist debate mainly focuses on the nature of moral statements. While non-cognitivists believe that moral statements have no meaning, cognitivists think that their meaning can be equated with non-moral statements. This debate has, however, another feature. The non-cognitivist claim implies that there are no facts that moral statements refer to. Conversely, cognitivist claim implies that there are things that correspond to moral values. In this sense, we may continue with discussing briefly the next debate that is on moral realism and moral subjectivism.

1.1.2. Moral Realism – Moral Anti-Realism

Realism and anti-realism can be seen in various areas of philosophy. For instance, in the literature of philosophy of science there is an ongoing debate on the status of theoretical entities. What is interesting, though, while in the former debate

⁷ Pigden (2010, p. 13).

it is generally thought that scientific realism is the default position, in meta-ethics it seems to me that anti-realism is more prevailing. While philosophers tend to say that our theoretical entities such as electrons or quarks are real, they concede the idea that there are facts of morality. It is not the issue here to discuss this with a comparative field study in philosophy. However, there seem to be a biased disposition in philosophy with regard to realism in ethics.

Basically, moral realism is the view that we can talk about right or wrong actions and we do this by referring to the facts of the matter about these actions' rightness or wrongness. In short, any view, which argues that there are ethical facts, is moral realist. Mark Platts argues that, "desires frequently require an appropriate belief about the independent desirability of the object of desire" and from this point he thinks that moral anti-realism, "can be the end for a reflective being like us by being the beginning of a life that is empty, brutish, and long" (1981, pp. 69-82). This criticism of anti-realism has its merits on the idea that our moral considerations presuppose some kind of objectivity. If our moral judgments have no fixed references, then it would be impossible for us to have a consensus in acceptance of moral principles.

One of the most influential challenges to the naturalistic version of moral realism, which states that moral facts are natural, is raised at the very early stages of the last century. G. E. Moore (1903, §13)⁸ proposed an argument, as he called "Naturalistic Fallacy", by which he wants to argue that moral properties cannot be substituted by non-moral properties. They cannot be the objects of our perceptions. What he offers, instead, is that moral properties are real, but simple and non-natural things. Moore's argument is important because, it is sometimes tempting to think that Hume's Law and Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy are parallel arguments. So it is better to summarize the Naturalistic Fallacy here.

Let's say we analyze moral concepts in non-moral terms. For instance, we equate "good" with "conducive to happiness". If we ask, "It is true that x conduces happiness, but is x good?" then, Moore says, if this question is intelligible and the speaker intends to ask something more than "Is x, which is conducive to happiness, also conducive to happiness?" then "conducive to happiness" cannot be what we mean in calling something "good". So the first question is an open question because it

⁸ For a good discussion of the Naturalistic Fallacy; see, Frankena (1939).

cannot identify a moral concept with some natural property. Hence, according to Moore, moral naturalism is unwarranted and wanting. He claims that “good” names a *sui generis*, non-natural property, which can only be known by a kind of rational intuition.

Putting Moore’s rejection of moral naturalism aside, it is said that Hume’s way of precluding moral statements from arguments is in the same track with Moore’s idea that good is unanalyzable. No argument can be successful in deducing *ought* because the question of ‘Is it good?’ will always be open. I admit that there is this apparent (or textual) similarity. However, it is not actually true that they are on the same track. In my interpretation of Hume’s Law, I will show why Hume’s Law differs from the Naturalistic Fallacy in terms of its contextual background.

There are other worries concerning moral realism. Gilbert Harman (1977, Chap., 1) asks whether there is anything that cannot be explained by moral beliefs without an appeal to moral facts. In this case, the point is that if our moral beliefs are explanatorily sufficient, then it is an ontological baggage to have moral facts in our explanations of moral statements. Additionally, if these moral facts are explanatorily irrelevant, then we should give up our commitment to these moral facts. He suggests that upbringing and education are explanatorily sufficient and hence there is no need for the moral facts.

The last objection that I want to emphasize is J. Mackie’s argument from queerness (1977, Chap., 1). Briefly, if there were any moral facts, then their existence would have been very peculiar. They would be radically different from anything in the world. Because of this peculiarity, we should have had a very special faculty, a moral perception or intuition, to perceive these facts. The queerness of them is due to the idea that an objective value must necessarily be followed by anyone who recognizes it. However, we do not observe such “to be *pursuedness*” of morals so objective that everyone follows. Ultimately, there are either no such moral facts, or their metaphysics is radically different from the natural facts.

Ultimately, this debate of moral realism and anti-realism is related to Hume’s Law because we will see Hume thinks that virtue and vice are not the properties of objects. Secondly, for Hume justification requires the relation between the idea and the impression that this idea is derived from. In this sense, the truth-

value of our moral statements depends on the impression that they correspond to. In order for moral realism to be true, vice and virtue must be the properties of external objects. In this sense, the standard interpretation must rely on some kind of moral anti-realism. We may now see that the standard interpretation must also rely on non-cognitivism. I will argue that the analysis of meaning, for Hume, requires a psychological examination of our ideas in terms of their correspondent impressions.

1.1.3. Is Hume's Law a Logical or a Semantic Thesis?: The Standard Interpretation

The non-cognitivist and anti-realist interpretations of Hume's Law were both arguing for a logical and a semantic thesis. The logical thesis offers the interpretation that no *ought* can logically follow from an *is*. In other words, there are no *formally valid* arguments of this sort. According to the semantic thesis, the Law suggests that there are no materially valid arguments consisting of non-moral premises and a moral conclusion. The difference between these two theses is that the latter requires an analytic-bridge principle among the non-moral and moral statements, whereas the former claims that there are no syllogistically valid ways to deduce statements with copula *ought* from statements with copula *is*⁹.

The importance of this distinction is, according to Pigden, that Hume's Law implies the logical thesis. Pigden says, "Hume himself appears to have subscribed to Logical Autonomy but not Semantic Autonomy" (2010, p. 13). However, he does not give any apparent reason to justify this assertion. We may think that Hume's Law precludes the Semantic Autonomy because it mainly refers to the formal features of rationalist arguments. In this sense, these arguments are in the first place invalid in terms of their syllogism. And, we see this interpretation even in the first responses to Hume.

The first philosopher, who receives the idea of Hume's Law, was Thomas Reid. He was saying that it is as Hume thinks that no reason can be given for the deduction of morals. However, Reid says that this is because:

⁹ I am discussing this distinction based on Charles Pigden's explanations of the "*Logical Autonomy of Ethics*" and "*Semantic Autonomy of Ethics*". So logical thesis and semantic thesis refers to this distinction. See, Pigden (2010, pp. 13-14).

They [the first principles of morals] are self-evident; and their truth is perceived without reasoning or deduction. And moral truths that are not self-evident are deduced, not from relations quite different from them, but from the first principles of morals” (in Fieser 2005, p. 243).

As it was accepted at that period (also in the nineteenth century) a deductively valid argument contains its conclusion in its premises. In this sense, Hume’s Law is saying that without a moral statement in the premises, no moral conclusion can be drawn deductively from it. This reception can be seen the first seed of the logical thesis.

Semantic thesis is also well received at the same era. Pigden quotes Bentham and in this passage Bentham says that “what has been done” and what ought to be done” are two different things. “Unless these ‘two objects’ [*what has been done* and *what ought to be done*] ‘are completely separated from each other, the whole field of Ethics ... must ever [be] – yea, and ever will be, - a labyrinth without a clue” (Quoted in Pigden, 2010, p. 12). Bentham understands the Law as saying that morals and nature are two different realms. In this sense, there cannot be any analytic bridge principle among these two realms. To recall Searle’s claim that “to promise to give 5 dollars” analytically contains the meaning of “to ought to pay five dollars”, this is forbidden by the semantic thesis interpretation of Hume’s Law.

The Logical Thesis, then, relies on the conservativeness of logic. Accordingly, no moral conclusion can contain a moral term, which is not found in the premises. So, by using Hakan Salwen’s formulation of Hume’s Law as a logical thesis, the argument is the following:

The Logical Thesis of Hume’s Law: For all valid arguments, $K \Rightarrow X$, and all moral expressions ϕ , if ϕ occurs non-vacuously in X , then ϕ appears in K (2003, p. 17).

The Semantic Thesis, states that moral terms cannot be conceptually derived from non-moral terms. This way of characterizing Hume’s Law is the way to pinpoint a special sort of logical validity. This time validity is satisfied in terms of the conceptual guarantee of the meanings of the premises and the conclusion. For instance, ‘James is a bachelor, therefore James is an unmarried man’ is conceptually valid because there is an analytic bridge principle, which guarantees that, ‘All bachelors are unmarried man’. So, Hume’s Law in this manner is claiming that there cannot be any such conceptually guaranteed moral arguments.

The Semantic Thesis of Hume’s Law: For all valid arguments, $K \models X$, and all moral expressions ϕ , if ϕ is conceptually guaranteed in X , then ϕ appears in K .

I will call the combination of these two interpretations of Hume’ Law as *The Standard Interpretation*. Both theses argue that there are no logical ways, either formal or conceptual, to deduce moral statements from purely factual statements. In this sense, they stress the “is-ought” passage by focusing on the terms, “deduction”, “proposition”, “ought”, and “is”. Additionally, the standard interpretation claims that because there is an “is-ought gap” (both logically and semantically), moral statements cannot be the outcome of our cognitive states (i.e. beliefs). In the case of this, it rests on the non-cognitivist thesis. In fact, by being non-cognitivist, it also implies that there cannot be any moral facts. If there were any such facts, it could be possible to “deduce” them from other factual statements either logically or semantically. Therefore, the standard interpretation is both moral anti-realist, non-cognitivist, and it accepts the logical and semantic thesis of Hume’s Law all together:

The Standard Interpretation of Hume’s Law: For all valid arguments, $K \models X$ or $K \Rightarrow X$, and all moral expressions ϕ , if ϕ is conceptually or formally guaranteed in X , then ϕ appears in K and ϕ is a non-factual sentimental expression.

First of all, I should say that I am not against this Law; if we consider it as isolated from its context in Hume’s moral philosophy. I should underline this by saying that I am not going to argue that we *can* logically and/or conceptually deduce moral statements from non-moral statements. What I will show, instead, is that this interpretation does not reflect Hume’s argument or claim of the “is-ought” passage. The standard interpretation rests on a *textual* reading. I will argue that this type of interpretation is misleading. In virtue of this claim, I will provide a more accurate interpretation of the “is-ought” passage, which rests on a *contextual* reading. Ultimately, it will be seen that this new interpretation indicates that Hume actually does not commit himself to the standard interpretation. What he wants to give is a psychological thesis that; moral relations cannot be found in the external world; and in the relations of our ideas. This, we will see, has nothing to do with the logical or semantic relations of factual propositions and moral ones.

1.2. Hume's Law as a Psychological Thesis

As I conclude the last section, I will claim that Hume's Law can best be interpreted as a psychological thesis. In chapters 2 and 3, I will try to provide sufficient interpretive support to defend this claim. Shortly, I will argue that the more important terms of the "is-ought" passage are not "deduction" and "proposition", but instead "relation" and "vice and virtue". I will argue that the use of these terms have special meanings in the *Treatise*. So, a mere literal reading of these terms is insufficient to understand the passage. By deduction, Hume does not mean formal or conceptual arguments. Hume uses deduction in order to mean multi-step inferences. Secondly, the term proposition has no special meaning at all. By proposition, Hume means the pronouncements of ideas. In this sense, what is actually important is not how we pronounce our ideas, but from which impressions these ideas are derived from. We can see that, what Hume wants to show in the "is-ought" passage is a much broader claim with different justifications.

Hume's Law is a psychological thesis because the issue of implausibility of multi-step inferences from *is* to *ought* is due to Hume's own notion of relations. In this case, the grammatical form of these propositions has no importance. "Is" stands for any idea, which is either inferred from matter of facts, or relations of ideas. "Ought", however, stands for "vice and virtue" and our feeling of blaming or praising things in accordance with our sympathy mechanism. As we see, what Hume wants to claim is that these pronouncements of our feelings of blame and praise, or our judgments of actions or others as vicious or virtuous cannot be inferred either from matters of fact or relations of ideas. These two ways of inference constitute Hume's notion of philosophical relations.

We need, then, also consider Hume's positive claims about the status of our moral evaluations and obligations. Hume suggests the sympathy mechanism as the tool of our moral reasoning. In chapters 4 and 5 I will mainly focus on Hume's own analysis of moral evaluation and moral obligation. Basically, Hume thinks that obligation and evaluation is the same thing. So, "murder is wrong" means "you ought not to kill" and this is so because they are the same outcome of our sympathy with others. Hume's Law does not suggest, then, we cannot have meaningful moral statements. Moral statements are perfectly intelligible, because they refer to either

other's motives, or passions; or ours. Ultimately, in Hume's Law, Hume is advocating a psychological dichotomy between statements that are purely philosophically related, and statements that are the expressions of moral sentiments; or the impressions of reflections.

To be clearer, I need to say that this difference, again, is not the difference in linguistic structures, or semantic features of these statements¹⁰. For Hume the difference between them is that moral sentiments are impressions of reflections. All the philosophical relations are the associations of ideas and if we want to verify whether a relation really holds, we may check the impressions corresponding to the related ideas. However, for moral sentiments, Hume claims that there cannot be any *moral relations*. This means that the relation among our passions and the actions cannot be philosophically analyzed. In other words, we cannot arbitrarily compare a passion and an idea. Passions are "original existences", so for instance, when a passion of pride is produced, it is *just* produced. We cannot arbitrarily produce passions in order to relate them to our ideas. So it can be seen that the central theme of this interpretation is Hume's notion of relations and his rejection of moral relations as being "absurd".

In order to justify his claim that there cannot be any moral relations, Hume provides three main arguments against the rationalists. Motivation Argument, Discovery Argument, and Hume's Fork are the arguments, all of which eventually try to show the same conclusion: "Moral Distinctions Not Driv'd From Reason". As it is the section title of T 3.1.1, we will see that all of his arguments contain negative conclusions about the possibility of deriving morals from reason. The "is-ought" passage is in the last paragraph of this section. So, I will show that these three arguments constitute the components of the claim of *no ought from is is allowed*. Motivation argument claims that reason cannot prompt action. Discovery argument postulates that vice and virtue cannot be true or false. Finally, Hume's Fork states that vice and virtue cannot be the properties of external objects and neither can be found in the demonstrations of the relations of ideas. Ultimately, the reasons why *no ought from is is allowed* are these three conclusions. Ultimately, Hume's Law as a Psychological Thesis is the following:

¹⁰ As this difference between the linguistic structure and the psychological nature of relations is crucially important, I will always call them relations instead of judgments, propositions, or statements. It is true that relations are expressed by propositions but here the emphasis is on their nature.

Hume's Law as a Psychological Thesis: Multi-step inferences are found in philosophical relations. No moral expression can be shown by multi-step inferences. Therefore, moral expressions are not relations.

And, if we like to apply again Salwen's formulation here:

Hume's Law as a Psychological Thesis': For all valid arguments, $K \Rightarrow X$, and all moral expressions ϕ , if ϕ occurs in X , then ϕ is a *Humean* relation.

This way of interpreting Hume's Law differs from the other two alternatives in some certain respects. First, this interpretation not only comprises of the logical and semantic thesis, but it also shows that for Hume the problem is not only constructing formally or semantically valid arguments, but moral expressions are originally not the things that we can have in arguments. Being a relation is a "quality", "by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another" (T 1.1.4). Secondly, it shows that the reason why these moral expressions cannot be found in arguments is that they are themselves are facts. Passions are impressions of reflection and therefore they are "original existences". In this sense, Hume is not a crude moral anti-realist. Thirdly, Hume does not think that there is no way of deriving *ought* from *is*, what he says with the Law is that we cannot form any valid argument for this derivation by our reason. Reason is not the sole feature of our understanding. Ultimately, all the arguments and the consequences of Hume's Law depend entirely on Hume's moral psychology. Without any reference to this, no interpretation can adequately capture the rationale of Hume's Law. This brings us to the inquiry of revisiting Hume's Law as a Psychological Thesis.

1.3. The Need for Revisiting Hume's Law and the Plan of this Dissertation

If it is understood as a psychological thesis, Hume's Law needs a reexamination of its conclusion. Is Hume consistent? Is it really the case that there are no moral relations? Is it really impossible to derive moral obligation from non-moral ideas? All these questions signal out the need for revisiting Hume's Law. Based on these needs, in this dissertation I will claim the following thesis: Hume's Law concludes that there cannot be moral relations, but I think that moral relations can be simple impressions of sensation; and thus, we can infer moral obligation from our experience.

In terms of this, in chapter 2, I will provide a reading of the “is-ought” passage based on a contextual reading of *Treatise* and some historical references. I will claim that “deduction” cannot be understood literally. Secondly, the “vulgar systems” that Hume is referring will be evaluated in terms of Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston, who are mostly referred by Hume himself. My aim will be to show that; “ought” Hume is objecting is a certain type of rationalistic “ought”. By this specification, we will see that the “is-ought” passage is a tool for rejecting the rationalistic conception of morality as consisting of eternal and immutable principles.

Next, in chapter 3, I will examine the three arguments of Hume’s Law. Based on these arguments, I will reconstruct the “is-ought” thesis. Ultimately, we will see that Hume’s main thesis was actually that there cannot be any moral relations. While I am doing this reconstruction, I will also pinpoint where the standard interpretation goes wrong in interpreting Hume’s claims. I will claim that for the Motivation Argument, the non-cognitivist reading misleads Hume’s understanding of *belief*. Secondly, in the Discovery Argument, the standard interpretation takes the claim that morals cannot be true or false too literal. This makes the standard interpretation puzzled with Hume’s distinction of impressions and ideas. Thirdly, in Hume’s Fork, we will see that; Hume’s main attempt is to show that we are not only incapable of demonstrating vice and virtue, but also they cannot be found in the impressions of sensation. The standard interpretation, however, concentrates on the first horn: demonstration. In addition to the task of supporting my interpretation by reconstructing *Treatise* 3.1.1, I will also examine these three arguments in virtue of their internal problems. Ultimately, we will see that the only way to overcome the Law is to claim that there can be moral relations.

In chapter 4, I will examine Hume’s account of relations and argue that there is a way, in which moral relations are possible. I will claim that the natural relations of associations need to be the simple impressions of sensation; instead of complex ideas. Following this claim, I will try to justify my view of ‘natural relations as simple impressions’. I am going to show that relations must be found in experience; otherwise imagination cannot detect the associations of the simple compounds of our complex ideas. Secondly, I will also examine Hume’s account of double relation of ideas, which he endorses mainly in *Treatise*, Book II. This examination

will be important in chapter 5. I will try to pick out the natural relations among double relation of our passions and ideas.

Finally, in chapter 5, based on the ‘natural relations as simple impressions’ view, I will claim that it is plausible to think moral relations as simple impressions. In terms of this, I will argue that Hume’s claim that there are no moral relations does not include this possibility. By means of this I will provide an analysis of “willful murder” and show that it is possible to think that viciousness of murder is a relation, which we perceive by experience. Secondly, I will return to Hume’s own analysis of murder and claim that both analyses provide equally powerful explanations. Then, I will subscribe to a contemporary debate on Moral Perception. I am going to use the positive arguments of this view as additional support to the view of ‘moral relations as simple impressions’. Thirdly, I will argue that even if we cannot derive moral expressions by multi-step inferences, Hume allows us to make single-step, or animal inferences. In this way, epistemologically speaking, we may derive moral expressions, which are epistemologically as certain as our demonstrative knowledge. The expressions of the moral relations as simple impressions share the features of invariable relations of ideas. In this sense, I will conclude that these expressions are analytic-like statements. Finally, we will see that for Hume, there is no difference between *is* and *ought* in the sense that “to be obliged” and “it is virtuous” are almost the same thing. By means of this, I will evaluate three types of obligation: Natural, Moral, and Rule Obligations. We will see; if there are moral relations then, *ought* and *is* differ from each other in certain respects and in different types of obligations. I will claim that in virtue of this separation of *ought* from *is*, we can both make animal inferences from moral expressions of facts to moral obligations; and the account remains sentimentalist. Ultimately, moral relations as simple impressions view provide the solution¹¹ to Hume’s Law. In fact, it also fixes some difficulties with Hume’s general framework from which the Law arises.

¹¹ It is not appropriate to say that laws can have solutions. I am aware of this but this use has its reasons. First, Hume’s Law is not actually a law. It poses a problem and so it is reasonable to think that there can be a solution to this problem. Secondly, Hume’s Law is a name and the other mostly used name of it is “is-ought problem”. As I use Hume’s Law to refer to the “is-ought” problem, in several occasions this bizarre phrase of “solution to Hume’s Law” may appear.

CHAPTER 2

HUME'S LAW AS THE REJECTION OF "RATIONALISTS' OUGHT"

Never literary attempt was more unfortunate than my Treatise of Human Nature. (Hume, *Essays*, XXXIV)

One of the rationale of this thesis is to see that understanding Hume's Law with a textual reading of the "is-ought" passage in the *Treatise* cannot give us an adequate interpretation of what Hume means by saying that we cannot deduce *ought* propositions from *is* propositions. In virtue of this rationale, as the first chapter, it will be quite important to start interpreting Hume's Law by looking at the "is-ought" passage itself and the terms significantly used in it. In this way, a contextual and historical understanding of these terms will enable us to see that the standard interpretation fails to conceive these terms without being anachronistic. I will claim that an accurate interpretation should consider the claim of the "is-ought" passage by stringently evaluating; what "deduction" means for Hume; what are propositions; and what is the view, which Hume considers as "vulgar".

In this chapter, I will try to give answers to these questions. In terms of this, in the first section I will give an exegetical reading of the "is-ought" passage. In the second section, I will explain the "vulgar systems of morality" by looking especially on Samuel Clarke and William Wollaston. My intention is to show that the forbidden deductions consider moral arguments just as similar to mathematical deductions, or they consider that acts by themselves have truth-value. This rationalist view of morals will be called as the "rationalists' ought". In the third section, I will contextually and historically discuss two key terms of the "is-ought" passage: "proposition" and "deduction". I will argue that Hume's use of proposition

has no special import to this word. He does not use it as a logical term. For deduction, I will argue that; Hume thinks that deduction is a multi-step inference, which includes all kinds of arguments. In this sense, the sense of deduction in our conception and its sense for Hume and Hume's time are different from each other. I will argue that an interpretation based on the contemporary conception of deduction cannot be adequate. Ultimately, what Hume rejects in the "is-ought" passage is the "rationalists' ought" and the ways of deducing this "ought" can be both demonstrative (deductive in the contemporary sense), or causal (empirical).

2.1. "Is-Ought" Passage in the *Treatise*

This section deals with Hume's Law solely by examining the core passage, where Hume introduces the Law. Here, I am going to evaluate the passage in itself and try to analyze its key terms. I find this especially useful because some of the main misunderstandings in the Hume literature depend on either anachronistic mistakes concerning these key terms or the confusing applications of these terms in the entire *Treatise*. Some of these key terms are: "is", "ought", "deduction", and "relations" as "others" and "new". At face value these terms reflect no such misunderstandings or confusions. However, throughout this thesis a need for clarification of these terms will play a crucial role. For now, though, I will only evaluate the "is-ought" passage textually without reference to any other part of Hume's moral philosophy.

In most of the articles dealing with Hume's Law both scholarly and non-scholarly, one can find a long quotation from the *Treatise*, which allegedly expresses Hume's claim that in logic there is no valid way to conclude a sequence of premises with an "is" copula with a deduction of a proposition connected with an "ought" copula. This bold claim has variety of interpretations. Nonetheless this variety shares a fundamental consensus. In all of them, the main claim of the "is-ought" passage is conceived as a logical or semantic thesis. To start the exegesis, I follow the fashion of quoting the passage at its proper length:

I cannot forbear adding to these reasonings an observation, which may, perhaps, be found of some importance. In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden

I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, *is*, and *is not*, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an *ought*, or an *ought not*. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason (T 3.1.1).

Actually, we can take at least two different ways to interpret this passage. In one of these, we can dramatically pay attention to the words which are seemingly open to speculation. In the other way, we pick only the words which are necessary for a complete argument, if there are any.

If we choose to follow the first way, then the very first sentence tells us a lot. Hume says that in the “is-ought” passage he is not going to proceed in his arguments that he has already given in *Treatise* 3.1.1. He says that he is just going to add an observation which supports his claims in that section. This observation is about the ethics defended by Hume’s predecessors. Hume tells us that in these ethics philosophers uses “ordinary way of reasoning” and states descriptions about the world, God, or human affairs. What “surprises” Hume is, that when he is expecting to see only those affirmations expressed with the copulations “is and is not”, he finds that there are other statements in the very same reasoning which are expressed with the copulations “ought and ought not”. More precisely, after these “propositions” with copulations “is and is not”, propositions *only* with copulations “ought and ought not” are followed. Hume thinks that this sequence of reasoning cannot be accepted as an “ordinary way of reasoning”. The is-to-ought change in these ethics is not supported independently and this *ought* appears at the end of this reasoning all of a sudden.

If we divide the “is-ought” passage into two parts, the second half of the passage would be construed as consisting the most validated terms in the contemporary interpretations. In this sense the second way of interpretation would focus more readily on this part. After Hume realizes that “this change is imperceptible”, he mentions two important things. First, this “ought” is a new “relation or affirmation”. By new, Hume means that ‘ought’ relations do not fit into

his account of relations. We will examine this issue in detail in the following sections. So, because it is new and, if it should be the case that it must be a part of the reasoning, then an explanation of what this new relation is all about and why it is a consequence of the ‘others’ must be given. This ‘others’ refers to those of which Hume exemplifies with statements of descriptions. Furthermore, these “others” are “entirely different” from this “ought” relation. In terms of these reasons, Hume claims that a “deduction” of this new relation from “others” “seems altogether inconceivable”. Hume thinks that those ethics are careless or even unaware of this problem. They are inattentively deducing this new relation from the others without providing an independent reason of why such a deduction is valid. In this sense, Hume says that if his warning will be taken seriously, then it can be seen that all such ethics would become unattended. Ultimately, it becomes clear that “the distinction of vice and virtue” is neither “merely relations of objects”, nor “perceived by reason”¹².

In order to have a full grasp of the passage the following three types of explanations are needed. First, we need to identify the systems of morality with which Hume has hitherto met and try to see what kinds of reasoning they are offering. Secondly, we need textual clarification of some terms, which creates the anachronistic misunderstandings. Finally, we need to explain the contextual meaning of some of these vital terms in the passage and the Humean framework, in which they gain their specific meaning.

2.2. The Vulgar Systems of Morality

The systems, which Hume has hitherto met with, are those of rationalists’. As it is fairly straightforward both in Hume’s writings and in the literature, the most specific names that Hume has in his mind are Samuel Clarke (*A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* (1728)) and William Wollaston (*The Religion of Nature delineated* (1724))¹³. As the evaluation of moral

¹² One might wonder why I emphasize “merely”. I find this use significantly referring to Hume’s claims about “ought’s” status as a relation. Hume sees that there is a possibility of defending a position stating that there are relations between external objects (not impressions) and impressions of reflection. Nonetheless, Hume denies this. So, a textual reading can miss this point.

¹³ I have only picked these two philosophers. However, there are plenty of others, who are in the same tradition. Cf., Malebranche, *Search* 4.2.3; Locke, *Essays* 4.3.18; Barbeyrac, *Historical and*

rationalism is not the topic of this thesis, I will only pinpoint the specific places where Wollaston and Clarke introduce their claims that Hume is objecting to.

Charlotte R. Brown notes that by the time, when Hume introduces his moral philosophy, Hobbes' shadow over the issue of the origins of morality is casted out and there left only two alternatives to follow: rationalism and sentimentalism. Brown emphasizes that in order to introduce his sentimentalist morality; Hume needed to refute the rationalist alternative¹⁴. Instead of the "is-ought" passage, in the *A Letter from a Gentleman to his Friend in Edinburgh*, Hume mentions directly Clarke and Wollaston, and criticizes them:

He [Hume himself] hath indeed denied the eternal Difference of Right and Wrong in the Sense in which Clark and Wollaston maintained them, viz.. That the Propositions of Morality were of the same Nature with the Truths of Mathematicks and the abstract Sciences, the Objects merely of Reason, not the Feelings of our internal Tastes and Sentiments. In this Opinion he concurs with all the antient Moralists, as well as with Mr. Hutchison Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, who, with others, has revived the antient Philosophical Discourse, in order to throw an Odium on the Author! (1967, p. 30)

The rationale of this passage and the "is-ought" passage seems admittedly the same. I say admittedly because in the *Letter* Hume only mentions that he objects to the claim that morality is merely the object of reason and says that he argues that morality is the object of passions. However, in the "is-ought" passage instead of such an explicit exposition, Hume uses some of his technical terms, such as relation and argues that *ought* as a relation cannot be deduced from other relations. In this sense, at the end, both passages argue for the same thing, but in different levels. Nonetheless, there are some differences as well. For instance, in the "is-ought" passage, Hume does mention, neither rationalist's position concerning the nature of the "propositions of morality", nor his own position. Secondly, in the "is-ought" passage Hume mainly opposes to the sequence of reasoning and not the *ought* propositions *qua* propositions and their prescriptive content. Thirdly, here Hume says that Clarke and Wollaston equate mathematical truths with moral propositions, but in the "is-ought" passage this emphasis is not presented. Fourthly, and most

Critical Account of the Science of Morality, 4,6; Chubb, *Discourse concerning Reason*; Cumberland, *Treatise of the Laws of Nature*, 4.1; Carmichael, "Supplements and Observations" in *Natural Rights*, 17; Balguy, *Foundation of Moral Goodness*, 2; Jackson, *Existence and Unity of God*.

¹⁴ Brown (2008, p. 219).

importantly, here Hume never uses *ought* in order to emphasize the specific copulation of moral propositions.

In order to evaluate these differences, I think that we need first to see some of the specific passages where Clarke and Wollaston violate the “ordinary way of reasoning”. There is one famous passage where Clarke puts his argument, especially starting with God’s being and human affairs and ends with “oughts”:

The same necessary and eternal *different relations*, that different things bear one to another; and the same consequent *fitness* or *unfitness* of the application of different things or different relations one to another; with regard to which, the will of God always and necessarily *does* determine itself, to choose to act only what is agreeable to justice, equity, goodness and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole universe; *ought* likewise constantly to determine the wills of all subordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the same rules, for the good of the public, in their respective stations. (Raphael, 1991, p. 225)

Just as Hume mentions, Clarke first identifies the will of God, and second, affirms that people *ought* to act in alliance with God’s will. Hume finds this “change imperceptible”. Of course, in this passage, Clarke does not mention how this transition is valid. This transition is the one Hume mentions in the *Letter*. In the following passages Clarke criticizes Hobbes and claims that right and wrong are not contingent or conventional matters. He finds a morally wrong action unreasonable, dull, or “ridiculous”. Clarke says that mistaking the truth-value of a moral proposition is just like failing a calculation in arithmetic:

And it is as absurd and blame-worthy, to mistake negligently plain right and wrong, that is, to understand the proportions of things in morality to be what they are not; or willfully to act contrary to known justice and equity, that is, to will things to be what they are not and cannot be; as it would be absurd and ridiculous for a man in arithmetical matters, ignorantly to believe that twice two is not equal to four; or willfully and obstinately to contend, against his own clear knowledge, that the whole is not equal to all its parts. (ibid. p. 232)

So, for Clarke, moral propositions and mathematical propositions are the same thing in terms of their nature. With an adequate calculation of what is right and what is wrong we have to find out how we should act and how we should prevent our actions. However, there is one last missing link that we need to see. As we can easily realize, regardless of the qualitative sameness of moral and mathematical propositions, there is a crucial dissimilarity between them: a modal difference:

The only difference is, that *assent* to a plain speculative truth, is not in a man's power to withhold; but to act according to the plain right and reason of things, this he may, by the natural liberty of his will, forbear. But the one he *ought* to do; and it is as much his plain and indispensable *duty*; as the other he *cannot but do*, and it is the *necessity* of his nature to do it. (ibid.)

Clarke is also aware of the difference that morality has a different end from arithmetic. As he says it is one thing to accept a proposition as necessarily true and it is another thing to act according to it. We have a power to resist our moral duties, which is our free will. However, acting according to your will only disposes your ability; your *can*. In the case of your *ought* (your duty), it is as plain as the necessary truths in mathematics. This is where the *is-to-ought change* occurs. For Clarke moral propositions tell us what we are obliged to do. Even if such propositions are connected with “ought” they are still as evident as mathematical propositions telling us plain truths. In this sense, Clarke thinks that understanding must conceive the “demonstrated truth” (ibid.) of moral propositions just like it conceives “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ”. All these evidence indicates why Hume specifically attacks to the Clarkean notion of “ought”.

However, Clarke is not alone. To recall, Hume concludes the passage by claiming that moral distinctions are neither relations of ideas nor relations of objects. So far, we have seen that Clarke is more specifically interested in the claim that moral distinctions are relations of ideas. Wollaston, parallel to Clarke's position, comes up with a somewhat more radical claim. According to Wollaston, meaning is not an attribute that we can attach only to propositions. He thinks that all sorts of acts and gestures have meanings as well. By being meaningful, these acts and gestures imply propositions which are true if they “express the things as they are” (ibid., p. 274).

Wollaston specifically interested in those acts which express man's character. In terms of this, an immoral act “in its nature” is wrong and the proposition expresses this act must be false. This is, for Wollaston, as certain as the truth of a mathematical proposition. The more important feature of Wollaston's account is that he identifies propositions with acts. In other words, there is no stringent difference between a proposition and the act expressed in that proposition: both have the same meaning: “If that proposition, which is false, be wrong, that act which *implies* such a proposition, or is founded in it, cannot be right: because it is the very proposition itself in practice” (ibid., p. 280). So, for instance, the

proposition, “I promise to give you 5 liras” is true if and only if I utter these words and give you 5 liras. Or alternatively, it is false if I don’t give you 5 lira, even if I have already promised you to pay that amount of money. I think that there are complications with these accounts¹⁵. For instance, it seems at face value that it is almost an impossible task to determine which acts imply which propositions. In this example, the act can be the speech act, the gesture, the act of giving the money, or an inner-speech that I tell myself that from now on I am under an obligation to give you 5 liras. Let these complications alone, a more important passage in Wollaston’s account, which is directly related to the “is-ought” passage, is the following:

Things cannot be denied to be what they are, in any instance or manner whatsoever, without contradicting axioms and truths eternal. For such are these: *every thing is what it is; that which is done, cannot be undone; and the like*. And then if those truths be considered as having always subsisted in the divine mind, to which they have always been true, and which differs not from the Deity himself, to do this is to act not only in opposition to his *government* or *sovereignty*, but to his *nature* also: which, if he be perfect, and there be nothing in him but what is most right, must also upon this account be most *wrong*. (ibid., p. 282)

Here we encounter again with an “ordinary way of reasoning” which has an imperceptible change. Wollaston starts his reasoning with postulating that there are some propositions which are eternally true. Secondly, he claims that the truth of these propositions is unchanging even for the god itself. Thirdly, even the god must follow the truth of these propositions and can never violate them. Because there is such a relation between the god and these eternal truths, for a fellow man, the “right” thing to do is to act according to the truth of these propositions and not violate them by acts which may be contradictory to them. Why this is right or wrong is because everything attributed to god’s existence, by definition, must be perfect. Virtues like rightness and truth are all perfections and thus acts expressed by these eternally true propositions must be necessarily right.

As we can see, the “right thing to do” came out all of a sudden. The author has started with the eternal truths and the being of god and ended up with the normative proviso which tells us *how to act*. There may appear some interpretative complications concerning this passage. For instance, in this passage Wollaston, unlike Clarke, never uses the verb “ought” either as a modal verb or as technical copula of sentences implying obligation. In this sense, there can be an objection

¹⁵ According to Brown (2008, p. 221), Wollaston’s account was famous during his lifetime, but later it became “the butt of jokes”.

based on this complication. My answer to this is that, first of all, the issue of using *ought* in the latter sense is a delicate matter. In most of the texts of the time of Hume and his predecessors we are forced to understand sentences with *ought* copula as they imply the meaning *to be obliged* or *to have a duty*. I will come to this issue in the next sections.

The second complication would indicate that Hume was interested in those arguments which have premises with descriptive content and a conclusion with a normative content. This way of interpreting Hume is one of the varieties of the logical interpretation. They would say that here at least one premise has normative content that is “god is perfect”. In this case, the argument does not fit into the domain of Hume’s targets. I think this complication might have been plausible, if we had interpreted these texts from a present point of view. However, if we notice that for these philosophers (including Hume) propositions like “god is perfect” are not normative. Even if we may cast doubt on the validity of this claim, we can still hold that such propositions are not prescriptive by themselves. And this is what the most important notion of propositions with the copulation of *ought* is. In this sense, Wollaston’s argument has non-prescriptive premises with a prescriptive conclusion.

Apart from these interpretations and the complications, the reason, specifically, why I mentioned Wollaston is another feature of his account. Wollaston’s understanding of acts as expressing truth implies that rightness can be found in the relation between objects and not only in the relation between ideas. According to Wollaston acts alone can express truth or falsehood without the aid of propositions. In this sense, in order to understand an act’s truth-value, we may only use our experience of the act. So this allows us to conceive our obligations without the need of any moral intuition, or calculation. If I speech-act, “I promise to give you 5 liras”, then you can conceive my obligation to give you 5 liras without any appeal to any other ideas of yours which may demonstrate the relation between my obligation and my promise. So, for Wollaston right and wrong are the properties of actions.

To sum up, we have seen that Clarke represents the view that moral propositions are just like mathematical propositions. Wollaston, on the other hand, shares the same view but he adds something different from what Clarke’s account manifests. Wollaston thinks that acts just like propositions have meaning and hence

they are true or false (right or wrong). By adding this to the moral ontology, he expanded the rationalist view of the nature of morality from a cold-blooded abstract reasoning to mild behaviorist prescriptivism with a rationalistic demarcation.

2.3. Exemplification of the Key Terms: Proposition and Deduction

In the previous section, one of the key terms of the “is-ought” passage, that is the “vulgar systems of morality”, has been explained by virtue of two paradigmatic representatives of the moral rationalism. In this section, as it is the next task of the chapter, I am going to explain other key terms of the “is-ought” passage. I have already mentioned a little bit of the use of the terms “ought”, “relation”, “deduction” and “proposition”. All of these terms have crucial interpretative significance. In this chapter, my aim is to clarify the textual misunderstandings of interpreting “is-ought” passage. Misinterpretations due to “ought” and “relation” are not textual but contextual; for these terms an exclusive evaluation of *Treatise* is required. In this sense, clarification of these terms will appear throughout the thesis. “Deduction” and “proposition”, however, directly related to the dispute on the historical use of these terms. In terms of this, in this section, I will claim that Hume’s use of “deduction” and “proposition” cannot be read in reference to the current reception of these terms in philosophy. Ultimately, we will see that an anachronism for these terms can lead one easily to misinterpret Hume’s Law.

Proposition. The most prominent interpretation of the “is-ought” passage holds the view that Hume claims that there can be no logically valid deduction starting with *is-propositions* and concluding with *ought-propositions*. This interpretation depends on the meaning of both *proposition* and *deduction*. Although it is a more sophisticated task to posit the early modern notion of proposition –that I am not intended to examine here- there are signs in the *Treatise*, which enable us to infer whether Hume’s use of proposition is as stringent as it is understood by the prominent interpretation. In terms of this, I will argue that Hume’s use of proposition has no similarity to the current understanding of proposition and also it may most probably have no special or technical meaning which makes its use contextually important in Hume’s writings.

I am not going to give any definition of proposition or try to show the specific divergence of the meaning of proposition from *sentence*. What I want to do instead is to show that such a difference in meaning is clearly not the case in the *Treatise*. Let us look at some statistical search results for the related words. In the *Treatise* Hume uses the word proposition in 51 instances. Surprisingly, the word sentence appears only one time (and two times with an irrelevant meaning) and the word statement is not used at all. First of all, the last result is not interesting because the word statement in its use relevant to our discussion has a fairly new advocate in philosophy¹⁶. What is more interesting is that Hume almost always uses the word proposition in any context where it is about the meaning, or the truth-value of a declaration. The only use of the word sentence is about understanding sentences having difficult pronunciations (T 3.3.1). In this case, as it is the case for us, it may also be true for Hume that as David Lewis says, “The conception we associate with the word ‘proposition’ may be something of a jumble of conflicting *desiderata*” (1986, p. 54). As far as I understand the use of proposition in those instances, Hume mainly interested in two qualities that a proposition should have: being meaningful and be a truth-bearer¹⁷. For instance, Hume says:

The person, who assents, not only conceives the ideas according to proposition, but is necessarily determin’d to conceive them in that particular manner, either immediately or by the interposition of other ideas”. (T 1.3.7)

For this, I agree, for instance, with P. J. E. Kail’s note that he adds in bracket when he quotes this passage from Hume. Kail understands, as I do, proposition [the Humean use] as “the verbal expression of relations among ideas” (2007, p. 38). Secondly, David Owen in *Hume’s Reason* argues that Hume is not interested in whether ideas have propositional structure or not. According to him, “propositional means ‘can be a judgment or belief’, not ‘has propositional structure’” (1999, p. 99). This interpretation is quite evident in Hume’s following use: “[T]is far from being true, that in every judgment, which we form, we unite two different ideas; since in that proposition, *God is ... [W]*e can thus form a proposition, which

¹⁶ See, Strawson (1950).

¹⁷ So, there is at least one thing certain about Hume’s notion of proposition. In Rachel Cohon’s words, “Hume is not a (translated) Fregean”. In other words, “by ‘proposition’ he does not mean some abstract entity” (2008, p. 26, fn. 13). If Hume had been a “translated Fregean”, then it could be almost impossible to support it in its historical context because for the view of reality of propositions, as McGrath (2012) puts it, “one looks in vain in the writings of the British empiricists.”

contains only one idea” (T 1.3.7, n. 1). Therefore, it seems at least fairly straightforward that for Hume proposition has no special meaning as a logical term. Proposition is something which expresses our ideas and their relations. So, his use of proposition is broad and he never distinguishes propositions from sentences. In this case, it is plausible to say that Hume uses proposition both in a technical and a non-technical sense¹⁸.

We can now compare one of his technical uses and the use in the “is-ought” passage and decide whether both uses share any common features or not. At the beginning of T 3.1.1 Hume says, “This is still more conspicuous in a long chain of reasoning, where we must preserve to the end the evidence of the first propositions, and where we often lose sight of all the most receiv’d maxims, either of philosophy or common life.” Here, he says that in a chain of reasoning, conclusion must preserve what is said in the premises. Proposition is used as synonymous to premise. In the “is-ought” passage the emphasis of premises of a chain of reasoning, however, is not on the word “proposition” but instead, on the word “relation”. To recall, Hume was saying that propositions express relations either with copulation *ought* or *is*. These relations are the subjects of “deduction”. The premises of the chain of reasoning are propositions, of course. Nonetheless, they are not subject to deduction in terms of being proposition but in terms of the relation that they express. Ultimately, here, the word “proposition” is not used as a technical term (i.e. a truth-apt-unit)¹⁹. The technical term in this context is the word “relation”. So I conclude that the word “proposition” cannot help any interpretation, which desire to argue that Hume’s Law is a logical thesis. Hume may have used it in a technical sense in quite a few places. However, in the “is-ought” passage, Hume’s preference of using the word “proposition” does not indicate that his intention is to use it in the technical sense.

¹⁸ One can argue here that if propositions need to be meaningful and truth-bearer, then why we should conclude that proposition is not a logical term. After all, these two features are enough to make it logical. My answer to this is that for Hume, we will see it in detail shortly, deduction is not syllogistic. Hence, what propositions express are all ideas. And the form or the structure of either propositions, or the argument itself has no importance. As I have shown “God is” is a proposition even if it lacks the subject-predicate form.

¹⁹ Cohon continues in the aforementioned note and says that in the “is-ought” passage, “Since he is discussing the words ‘is’ and ‘ought’, presumably ‘proposition’ here is a synonym for ‘sentence’ and refers to a linguistic entity” (op. cit.).

Deduction. Let's start again with the search results from the text. The word deduction appears only four times and its cognates, *deduce* once and *deducing* does not appear in the *Treatise* at all. This result has two alternative interpretations. As many scholars do, we can say that Hume uses the term, *demonstrative reasoning* instead of *deduction* and both of these terms mean the same thing. On the other hand, as quite a few scholars do, we can say that by deduction Hume means *argument* in general and by demonstrative reasoning Hume means *arguments with necessarily true premises and necessarily true conclusion*. Since my purpose is not to delineate Hume's account of demonstrative reason and deduction, my task is in depth to figure out whether Hume used "deduction" in the "is-ought" passage in a stringent way similar to demonstration, or he was just negligent. I will claim that there are signs to conclude that Hume's use of deduction has both of these features and it is more suitable to conclude that he does not strictly mean deduction as we understand this term today.

Let us first compare his four uses of deduction in the *Treatise*. The first two uses appear in the same passage:

I doubt not but these consequences will at first sight be receiv'd without difficulty, as being evident *deductions* from principles, which we have already establish'd, and which we have often employ'd in our reasonings. This evidence both in the first principles, and in the *deductions*, may seduce us unwarily into the conclusion, and make us imagine it contains nothing extraordinary, nor worthy of our curiosity. (T 1.3.14; Italics added)

There are signs in this passage which shows that Hume is using deduction in its stringent sense. First, he says that these consequences are deductions from principles. Secondly, these deductions are evident. Thirdly, they bring out conclusions without the need of careful analysis. Fourthly, because the conclusions are so evident and plain we may think that there is nothing interesting in them. All of these are indications of a deduction in a stringent way and here Hume would not just mean argument in general. However, this does not indicate that these deductions are also demonstrations. A Gentleman lists three reasons why these "evident deductions" are demonstrative arguments. He says:

(a) Hume uses the word 'evident' which Locke (like other writers of the period) often employs to distinguish those deductions which are demonstrative from those which are not; (b) Hume's cocksure self-confidence that his argument is 'perfectly unanswerable' (T, 1.3.14.19/164), which ampliative deductions generally are not; and (c) that

his reasoning can indeed be recast as a deductively valid argument. (2010, p. 84)²⁰

According to Gentleman, ampliative deductions are not stringently deductions because the conclusion is not contained in the premises. In this sense, we have to understand that the consequences that Hume is talking about are contained in the premises. Let's suppose they are so and agree that the deduction is a stringent one. The remaining question is: Are these deductions demonstrations too? There is no adequate evidence in the passage which may help us to answer this question. In this sense, we may need additional help here. Gentleman quotes eighteenth-century Johnson's dictionary and defines demonstration in his words as the following: "Thus demonstration is a demonstrative argument or a deduction in the strict sense in which the premises are not only necessary but self-evident" (ibid., p. 78). Gentleman thinks that demonstration is a special type of deduction. I agree with his understanding. However, in the relevant quote there is no evidence indicating that these deductions are demonstrations. As Gentleman admits, deduction, Hume is referring (The idea of the necessary connection is derived from the impression of heightened expectation), has contingent premises (Every idea is derived from at least one impression; We have the idea of a necessary connection; The only impression that we possibly derive the idea of a necessary connection is the impression of heightened expectation) and thus it is not a demonstration (ibid., p. 84). So every demonstration is a deduction but not every deduction is a demonstration.

Owen argues that demonstration should not be understood as deduction, if deduction means only argument or inference (1999, pp. 83-112). So he is basically against the view of the Gentleman. Owen argues, "[...] any account of Hume's notion of demonstration that includes the notion of "deductively valid", where that notion is construed formally either in the modern or the syllogistic sense, is equally anachronistic" (ibid., p. 90). This claim is only about the demonstration and it does not help us much. In terms of the use of deduction, Owen remarks, "He [Hume] is

²⁰ The real name of the author is not indicated but the Lady referred in the title is Annette C. Baier, whose article in the same book is criticized by the Gentleman.

using ‘deduction’ in its standard eighteenth-century sense of ‘argument’” (ibid.)²¹.

A similar claim is made by A. C. MacIntyre as well:

The word ‘deduction’ and its cognates have no entry in Selby-Bigge’s indexes at all, so that its isolated occurrence in this passage at least stands in need of interpretation. The entries under ‘deduction’ and ‘deduce’ in the Oxford English Dictionary make it quite clear that in ordinary eighteenth-century use these were likely to be synonyms rather for ‘inference’ and ‘infer’ than for ‘entailment’ and ‘entail’ (1969, p. 43)²².

Owen supports his claim by appealing to Locke’s account of reasoning and the logic books of the period. MacIntyre, on the other hand, relies on the eighteenth-century dictionary explanation of deduction. Of course, both ways are acceptable. Even though Gentleman tracks down the use of deduction in a similar way and uses mostly the same resources with MacIntyre and Owen, he also refers to some other texts which may support his claim.

For instance, he refers to Watts’ *Logick* (1996) and his understanding of deduction as “the premises, according to the reason of things, do really contain the conclusion that is deduced from them” (Gentleman, p. 77). Secondly, he mentions Berkeley’s (1901, p. 317) use of *deduce*:

Fourthly, by a diligent observation of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general laws of Nature, and from them deduce the other phenomena, I do not say demonstrate; for all deductions of that kind depend on a supposition that the Author of Nature always operates uniformly, and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principles: which we cannot evidently know. (Gentleman, p. 79)

In Reid’s (2002, p. 31) remarks on the *Treatise*, Gentleman also finds another use of deduce: “Your system appears to me not onely coherent in all parts, but likeways justly deduced from principles commonly received among Philosophers ...” (Gentleman, p. 81). All this evidence shows that there was a use of deduction in its technical sense also in Hume’s times.

However, none of these evidence show that the use of deduction and demonstration falls into the same category. Secondly, in all of them deduction is meant to occur from general principles. In other words, it seems to me that all of

²¹ Owen claims that Hume had followed the tradition from Descartes to Locke that “reject[s] syllogism as a theory of reasoning” (ibid., p.3, nt. 5). He also claims that the major logic books (Arnauld and Nicole’s, *Logic or the Art of Thinking* (1996) and Gassendi’s, *Institutio Logica* (1981)) of the period use ideas (instead of propositions) as the ingredients of logic. Following this, Locke rejects syllogism as the adequate account of reasoning and replaces it with the account, for which inference is the perception of the relation between two ideas by a mediating idea.

²² For an objection to this, see Atkinson (1969, pp. 51-58).

them are about the syllogistic or formal way of reasoning. This shows that Hume may be carefully distinguishing two types of reasoning. On the one hand, he prefers calling demonstrative reasoning, by which he means the relation between ideas. On the other hand, he prefers calling deductive reasoning, by which he means the formal validity of an argument with premises containing the conclusion (or the alternative definitions of deductive validity in the formal sense). Ultimately, it seems to me that both Gentleman and Owen are right but Gentleman is inattentive because he disregards the point about the criticism of formal validity in the period. This makes him conclude that demonstration is a sub-class of deduction. On the other hand, Owen may overestimate the eighteenth-century use of deduction as argument or inference. The evidence that Gentleman is providing clearly indicates that deduction was meant also be the syllogistic way of reasoning.

There is another alternative to Owen's historical references. Adrian Heathcote (2010, p. 99) argues that Hume may not have been using Arnauld and Nicole's logic, and instead he was applying Ockham's list²³ of negative logical inferences. Heathcote says:

[H]ume's master argument does not rely on, what could be called, *positive* principles of inference – on what does follow from some set of statements – but rather on *negative* principles of inference, that is what kind of statements *cannot* follow from some set of premises (ibid., p. 97).

Heathcote's alternative reading suggests that all of Hume's conclusions including the "is-to-ought-change" better be analyzed in terms of Ockham's list. However, the problem with this reading is that he never identifies his way of treating Hume's use of *deduction* and *demonstration* as interchangeable. Heathcote may be right to say that Hume's account of demonstration is originated not in the seventeenth-century or eighteenth-century but in the medieval ages. However, the claim that formal validity and certainty of some relations of ideas are different still holds. I think that Heathcote assumed no difference between these two notions.

On this issue about Heathcote's interpretation, Alan Musgrave emphasizes a similar point like the one that I have just made. He says, "It has long been well-known that logical facts are one thing, psychological facts about what we believe another. The Laws of Logic are not, *pace* Boole, Laws of Thought" (2010, p. 123). Hume has a similar reaction, but he may also think that logicians are going wrong

²³ See, Ockham (1990).

when showing the psychological underpinnings of the logical facts. Hume criticizes the logicians by saying that they define and understand “conception, judgment and reasoning” separately. According to Hume these vulgar logicians define these “acts of understanding” as the following:

Conception is defin'd to be the simple survey of one or more ideas:
Judgment to be the separating or uniting of different ideas: Reasoning to be
the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others,
which show the relation they bear to each other (T 1.3.7, fn. 1).

Hume says that, first, because not all judgments require two separate ideas and, second, the causal reasoning does not require any mediating idea, this division is inaccurate. Hume thinks, “They all resolve themselves into the first, and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects” (ibid.). As Charles Echelbarger interprets this, Hume thinks that the way logicians conceive the “the syllogistic way of reasoning” (the deduction) only covers what Hume labels as “the reasoning” (1987-88, p. 353) in the above quote. However, Hume thinks that it must cover and get reunited in the name of conception. According to Echelbarger, “The formal nature of valid syllogistic reasoning seems to require something which traditional logicians called universal propositions of the subject-predicate form” (1987-88, p. 352). Ultimately, “Hume’s own view of the nature of mind, together with his rejection of the traditional realistic theories of universals, at once presents obstacles to such an account” (ibid.).

This tension between the formal features of reasoning and the psychological underpinnings is bypassed today by relying only on the formal features of validity. When Gerhard Schurz objects Heathcote’s own solution to the Master Argument, he notices this tension: “Modern formal logic, and scientific methodology in general, is exactly the attempt to overcome this subjectivity and unreliability of humans’ intuitive reasoning by developing criteria of validity (or reliability). These criteria are based on the logical form of arguments” (2010, p. 145). Hume seems to be not in an agreement with the modern formal logic as well as the vulgar logicians of the early modern period. Therefore, we must say that for Hume reasoning, if it is going to be equated with syllogism, then it cannot be understood as merely demonstrative. In this sense, when Hume mentions demonstration, he really does not mean deduction. And when he mentions deduction, he means syllogistic and formal arguments.

I conclude that Hume uses deduction for the formal arguments and demonstration for the relations of ideas. In this sense, an argument can be both deductively and demonstratively valid, but they are not mutually exclusive. As Kail also sees that the deduction-demonstration struggle “is not a blunder on Hume’s part but instead a commentator’s mistake of trying to assimilate demonstration to deduction” (2007, p. 40). This point also explains why Hume used “deduction” and its derivatives so infrequently. Hume’s project was to introduce the “science of man” and he was more curious to explain the causal origins of our ideas (the Newtonian project). In this sense, deduction appears to be too abstract and verbal, and this makes him more interested in how our ideas are related to each other. Hence, it is more adequate to conclude that both deduction and demonstration in their stringent sense have application in Hume’s philosophy. However, it would fall short of being a point about the “is-ought” passage.

Let us now turn back to the “is-ought” passage. The sentence where *deduction* appears was the following: “... how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” (T 3.1.1). At face value, this use of deduction seems just as the other use that I have already quoted at the beginning of this discussion. However, I will argue that there are some significant differences. First, in the passage from T 1.3.14 Hume was talking about deductions from principles, but in the “is-ought” passage deduction is meant to be between relations rather than principles. In order to claim that both applications of the word “deduction” are just the same, one should convince us that relations and principles are interchangeable. However, this seems to be very difficult. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, relations are either natural or philosophical. Natural relations are not our deliberate conclusions. In Hume’s words they are not “comparisons” (T 1.1.4) and “distinctions of reason” (T 1.1.7). So, when we consider natural relations, it is not reasonable to say that they are principles in the sense that they can be “employed in our reasonings”. Secondly, in this passage from T 3.1.1, Hume has already mentioned propositions and the imperceptible change in the ordinary way of reasoning that his rival rationalists attempted. Why didn’t Hume just say: “How these propositions with the copula *ought* can be a deduction from other propositions with the copula *is*?” This version of Hume’s Law reflects a better consistency with the contemporary readings of the “is-ought” passage as a logical thesis. Secondly, if

demonstration and deduction are interchangeable, why didn't Hume prefer the following version of his question: "How this new relation can be a *demonstration* from others?" After all, it is clear that Hume feels comfortable to use demonstration instead of deduction. Well, we can produce lots of other rhetorical questions as well. For instance, we can ask why Hume never used the word deduction in the exemplifications of algebra and arithmetic, and also in his account of relations of ideas. He would have said mathematical *deduction* instead of mathematical *demonstration* and it should have been just equally fine. However, he never did that. All of these considerations decrease the weight of the interpretations claiming that demonstration and deduction are interchangeable. Clearly, then, Hume differentiates two types of reasoning. In the case of formal reasoning he finds this is-to-ought change imperceptible. Further, and more importantly, he thinks that there cannot be a deduction from *ought* relations to *is* relations.

However, talking about deductions from relations seems as an interpretive deadlock. Again then, we need to be careful. We may quickly react to this claim and say that a deduction between relations is a bizarre notion. Nonetheless, we may ignore the significance of the term "relation" and read it just, as if it means "proposition" *simpliciter*. After all, relations are expressed in propositions. At this point it is helpful to remind the reader one of the crucial criteria of interpretation. Wade L. Robinson says, "The fundamental principle of interpretation is that we should always strive, in interpreting a text, for consistency for the author" (2010, p. 68). However, this consistency need not be necessarily achieved within the lines where the problematic phrases occur. It may be achieved from the context of which the argument lies. Robinson adds, "What thus matters in understanding a text is not what an author says in such-and-such a line, but what the author is trying to accomplish in the text as a whole" (*ibid.*, p. 69). So we cannot just simply assert that proposition and relation function in the same way. This would be an inappropriate solution to the inconsistency.

Here is why. I have already claimed that there is no special care for "proposition" in Hume's philosophy. I have suggested that it is perfectly legitimate to read "proposition" as "sentence". On the contrary, there is a great amount of work on relations in the *Treatise* and Hume has a special account for relations as well. Hence, we cannot just interchange a word with a special meaning with another

one, which has no specialty. We will see Hume's account of relations and its connection to the "is-ought" passage in Chapter 5.

Secondly, at the end of the "is-ought" passage, Hume states his overall claim in the passage, "... [T]he distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason" (T 3.1.1). This overall claim clearly shows that deduction would not be interchangeable with demonstration. As we know that Hume allows demonstration only for arithmetic and algebra, it cannot be used for proofs concerning relations of objects. However, what Hume claims is that such a "deduction" is not allowed both for contingent matters of facts and necessary relations of ideas. Then, another objection would be raised. One would say that Hume emphasizes only the relations of ideas when he is claiming that such a deduction is inconceivable. Nonetheless, he adds, at the end, the claim that it cannot be found in the relations of objects as well. There can be two possible answers to this objection. First, as textual evidence, we can say that when Hume exemplifies the premises that rationalists uses, he appeals to two types of propositions: one is self-evident (for the rationalists) and eternal truths and one is contingent matters of facts. For the former he mentions "the being of a God" and for the latter he underlines "observations concerning human affairs". This second type, without dispute, contains contingent propositions and they are propositions stating relations of objects. Therefore, in the proposition-talk, Hume was holding the overall claim of the passage. So, when Hume objects to deducing *ought* from *is*, he considers both relations of ideas and matters of facts. Ultimately, the virtue of adequate interpretation forces us to conclude that deduction is not merely demonstration and cannot be about formal validity. This claim is perfectly compatible with Owen's claim that "deduction" means "argument" or "inference".

Then, we can turn back to the big question standing in the first place: Why Hume used "deduction" instead of "inference" or "argument"? This is a perfectly legitimate question which causes all of these confusions. Annette C. Baier agrees with Owen and MacIntyre and argues that both for Locke and Hume "deduction" is interchangeable with "inference" with a mere difference that in the case of "inference" the operation is one step, whereas in the case of "deduction" it is a multi-step operation. (2010, p. 51) Let's have a quick look at Locke's use of "deduction": "According to reason are propositions whose truth we can discover by

examining and tracing ideas that we have from sensation and reflection, and by natural deduction find the proposition to be true or probable” (1975, IV.XVII.23). And here we have Hume making a similar point but instead of using “deduction”, he prefers using “inference”: “We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they be true or false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses” (T 1.3.5). I found Baier’s claim quite consistent in this context. Furthermore, if we run a search for “inference” in the *Treatise*, we may even get tired of counting how many times it appears in the entire text. At this point the last question to answer is: “Why Hume did not use “inference” in the “is-ought” passage?” I think we may find Baier’s explanation of deduction in Hume’s context prompting:

My hypothesis is that Hume, like Locke, restricts ‘deduction’ to the mediate inferences of those who have the ability to verbalize them, and so he uses that term more narrowly than ‘inference’, but, since not all deductions are ‘demonstrations’, considerably more widely than logicians do today (Baier, 2010, p. 52).

Baier’s criteria of verbalization may not be accepted as plausible²⁴. However, there are two crucial points that we have to consider. First, Hume thinks that animals are capable of making inferences. However, they carry these inferences not by reason but by custom alone (EHU 9.5/T 1.3.16)²⁵. Secondly, Hume also thinks that ideas are inferences from impressions (T 1.3.7). These types of inferences are silent. By silent, I mean there is no need to deliberate or articulate these reasonings (one-step operations). However, other types of inferences require deliberation and articulation in addition to the mental operation which originates them. In this sense, Baier’s distinction between “inference” and “deduction” makes sense. Ultimately, we can now see why Hume would not prefer to use “inference” in the “is-ought” passage. “Is-to-ought” changes, for Hume are multi-step operations which require articulation and deliberation. In the context, then the appropriate word to use is “deduction”. I think it suffice to say that Hume neither confuses his choosing of words, nor he uses deduction interchangeable with demonstration. When we consider the historical background and the contextual

²⁴ However, if we remember that in the early modern philosophy there was an enormous obsession with human’s language capacity as the indication of rationality starting with Descartes, Baier’s interpretation may become a little more plausible.

²⁵ His example is cause-effect inference. He also claims that children or even vulgar philosophers may fail in such reasonings.

adequacy of the relevant terms, it is plainly accurate to understand “deduction” as the general name for the inferences of the relations of matters of facts and the relations of ideas as a whole.

I believe that I have shown sufficiently enough arguments and interpretations concerning the issue of how to read the “is-ought” passage correctly. I have argued that in the “is-ought” passage Hume specifically attacks to the rationalists. In this way, the adequate interpretation must take it as not a general reaction to any attempts to deduce ought from is. Secondly, the most crucial term deduction must be read as the generic name of multi-step inferences. In this case, the contemporary interpretations, which take the use of deduction anachronistically, are implausible.

In this section, I postponed one of the most crucial tasks of interpreting the “is-ought” passage. The idea of Hume’s Law will be the topic of the next section. Why we can’t deduce ought from is, is not discussed by Hume in the “is-ought” passage. The reason is partly because the section in the *Treatise* ending with the “is-ought” passage contains the arguments, which are eventually summarized in the “is-ought” passage. In the next chapter I will evaluate critically these arguments. At the end of this evaluation, I will argue that the arguments constructing the “is-ought” passage suffers serious problems. Apart from these problems, the interpretation of the “is-ought” passage based on these arguments’ conclusions, differs drastically from the standard interpretation of Hume’s Law.

CHAPTER 3

OF “MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIV’D FROM REASON”

[I]t is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology. (Anscombe, 1958, p. 1)

The third book of the *Treatise*, titled as *Of Morals*, starts with a section, in which Hume inquires the relation between reason and morals. As it is stated in the title, all of the arguments in the first section of the third book try to show that moral distinctions –vice and virtue– are not originated, inferred, or derived from reason alone. The “is-ought” passage is one of the arguments (or an observation) that Hume presents in that section²⁶. Here, in this chapter, I have the following tasks. First, I will critically evaluate the arguments of T 3.1.1 and claim that the “is-ought” passage is not a separate argument. I will claim that the “is-ought” passage states a reflexive summary of all of these arguments. In other words, it cannot be evaluated in isolation and without a contextual look at the *Treatise*, especially T 3.1.1. Secondly, I will show that the crucial components of the “is-ought” passage are presented throughout the arguments presented in T 3.1.1. Without explaining these components, an encapsulated reading of the “is-ought” passage cannot bring out an adequate reading. Thirdly, by explicating these arguments we can provide a link between what the “is-ought” passage states and what Hume’s own account of morals is. I will argue that; Hume thinks that vice and virtues are not relations but sentiments. So, they cannot be found among the relations of ideas and also they cannot be inferred from matters of facts. In the case of this, the “is-ought” passage shows that the rationalist attempts to deduce *ought* from *is* is mistaken not because

²⁶ I want to call it an argument unless I provide the counter-interpretive evidence, which shows that it is not a separate argument. And these evidences will be presented through 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3.

of logical principles, which prevents this deductions based on formal or syllogistic principles, but because *ought* suggested by the rationalists is reflecting something categorically different from what *is* reflects. In this way, Hume is not suggesting that *ought* cannot be deduced from *is*. What he claims is that the rationalists' *ought* cannot be deduced from the two kinds of relations (relations of ideas and matters of facts) that Hume introduces in the *Treatise*. Consequently, I argue, he leaves the door open for other types of *oughts*, which are *ex hypothesi* in the same category with *is*. This last point will be issued in chapter 5.

In *Treatise* 3.1.1, Hume presents three main arguments in addition to his closing “is-ought” passage. Just as the section title indicates, these arguments also have negative conclusions. Based on what he argues in Book I and II of the *Treatise*, Hume argues that some of the so called features of reason concerning morality are misleading. A careful analysis of reason and passions has already explained these misleading conceptions in the previous books of the *Treatise*. In terms of them, Hume argues now; (i) Reason (alone) cannot motivate action (The Motivation Argument –MA), (ii) Reason cannot discover vice and virtue (The Discovery Argument –DA), and (iii) Reason cannot discover anything other than either relations of ideas, or inferences from matters of facts (Hume’s Fork –HF).

The standard interpretation of these arguments faces a trouble of substituting “belief” for “judgment” on several occasions. This, I think, results from taking Hume’s claims at face value. However, we will see that this attempt is misleading. The standard interpretation basically offers the following argument in several occasions with different forms²⁷:

- (1) Moral judgments influence our actions.
- (2) Beliefs alone cannot influence our actions.
- (3) Therefore, moral judgments are not made of beliefs alone.

This simplified version of the standard interpretation misses many important elements of the overall argument of T 3.1.1. For instance, for the standard interpretation, it is the representational nature of our beliefs by which Hume concludes that moral judgments cannot be the product of reason (alone). However, I will argue that the crucial step in Hume’s argument is actually that the judgments of reason are made of relations, but the source of morality (or the origins of our moral

²⁷ See; Foot (1966); Harrison (1976); Stroud (1977); Mackie (1980); Snare (1991); Bricke (1996); D. Shaw (1998); Radcliffe (1999); Baillie (2000).

judgments) is not. Hence, the source of morality cannot be the product of reason (alone). Secondly, in the standard interpretation there is a tendency to use *belief* and *judgment* as interchangeable terms²⁸. This use is based on the idea that both belief and judgment are cognitive states. So they consider that Hume's conception of reason resembles the contemporary conception of cognition. However, this understanding is misleading and depends on a problematic interpretation of the discovery argument. The exclusion of moral judgments from the domain of reason does not necessarily mean that there cannot be any moral judgments. So, more importantly, Hume's main conclusion is not to state that moral judgments are not beliefs. Instead of this, he wants to argue against the rationalists' idea that "morals"²⁹ –vice and virtue– are relations between the acts and the situations. In order to reject this claim, Hume wants to show that vice and virtue cannot be relations at all. Consequently, morals and moral judgments are quite different from each other. In the case of this, vice and the idea of vice are two different things³⁰. The former is an impression of reflection –a real existence–, whereas the latter is a faint copy of that entity, which can be true or false. So, according to my interpretation the idea that for Hume there cannot be any moral judgments must be misleading. In this sense, what Hume is really objecting is the idea that moral judgments cannot influence our actions without an originating passion. Just because moral judgments lack the power of actuating the will to act or avert does not mean that there cannot be any such kind of judgments. In this way of considering judgments may be an odd conception of moral judgments, but this lack of power to

²⁸ For instance Harrison interprets Hume as saying, "beliefs cannot alone move us to action, but simply inform us how desires can be satisfied" (1976, p. 6). The same substitution can be seen in Pigden when he identifies Hume's concept of reason as the "belief-forming faculty" (2009, p. 7).

²⁹ For the purpose of this dissertation, it is important to take notice to my use of "morals" in this context. In the *Treatise*, Hume mainly uses "morals" to mean morality. However, specifically in T 3.1.1, by using "morals" Hume refers to several different things. Morality, rules of morality, moral distinctions, the source of morals, distinction between moral good and evil, vice and virtue, right and wrong, and the sense of morality are all the phrases and words used as interchangeable in T 3.1.1. In this chapter unless otherwise is stated, by "morals" I will mean moral distinctions as known as vice and virtue. I have two reasons for this usage. First, the main thesis of T 3.1.1 is explicitly stating that "moral distinctions are not derived from reason". So, it is mainly the vice and virtue, which cannot be derived from reason. Secondly, the reason why Hume says that "the rules of morality" (by rules we may understand that moral judgments) "are not conclusions of reason" is that ideas of vice and virtue by themselves cannot influence our actions. However, this does not mean that there cannot be any ideas of vice and virtue at all.

³⁰ The difference is the difference between an impression and an idea.

produce action should not to be an essential property of moral judgment³¹. The “is-ought” passage rests on all these arguments of MA, DA, and HF. If the standard interpretation of these arguments are corrected, then it will be apparent that the conclusion of the “is-ought” passage suggests something different from the orthodox reception of Hume’s Law in the contemporary meta-ethical debates.

In terms of the internal problems of these three arguments, in the first section, I will be arguing that MA has a conclusion either depends on a conceptual *fiat*, or the argument is empirically wanting. Secondly, in the second section, the standard interpretation of DA centralizes one of the premises concerning the representational nature of ideas. However, I will argue that for Hume in order to show that reason cannot discover vice and virtue the relevant premise is not the former one, but it is the one, which focuses on the nature of ideas and passions as copies and original existences. Following this, it will be seen that DA intends to show that truth cannot provide normativity. Normativity can only be obtained by feeling the right passions in the right actions. In the third section, in HF, I will argue that the argument rests on a bridge principle, which is dogmatically asserted by Hume. Hume assumes that whatever is discoverable by reason is a relation. Without this bridge principle, HF is invalid. Apart from this problem, HF conceptualizes the rationalist’s “ought”. In this case, it is the most crucial step towards the accurate understanding of the “is-ought” passage. However, the criticism of the rationalist morality given in HF lies on Hume’s own commitments in his account of morality. Hence, HF is not sufficient to be an objection to the rationalist morality. In sum, I will be showing that Hume’s arguments of MA, DA, and HF are unsuccessful to provide the basis of the “is-ought” passage. However, what is more important than this, is that the correct interpretation of these arguments show that the “is-ought” passage argues something radically different from the standard interpretation suggests. Ultimately, I will claim that Hume’s Law concludes that morals (vice and virtue) are not relations and anything which is not a relation cannot be derived from

³¹ Arguably, one can say that if a moral judgment cannot influence our actions, then such a moral judgment is implausible. By being moral, a moral judgment must influence our actions, and if it turns out to be that there are no judgments, which can influence our actions, then we must concede that there are no moral judgments at all. Ultimately, this is what Hume is saying in T 3.1.1. To reply this, I will argue that for Hume, things that can influence our actions cannot be judgments. However, it must still be true that the ideas of vice and virtue must be the object of reason and, after all, judgments. So, I argue that in the Humean framework there is room for purely descriptive but also moral judgments.

reason. In this sense, no argument would be intelligible in showing that moral duties are inferred from the relations of objects or our ideas. In sections 3.4 and 3.5, I will expose this interpretation of Hume's Law.

3.1. The Motivation Argument

In paragraph 4 of *Treatise* 3.1.1 Hume gives his understanding of the rationalist account of morals. Referring to the Clarkean "fitnesses and unfitnesses" directly, he argues that rationalists claim that virtue is "like truth" and discovered "merely" by ideas. By means of this, Hume argues that in order to justify or refute their claim it is sufficient to examine whether reason alone has this capacity of discovering vice and virtue. This is the challenge that Hume is dealing with in the entire section of T 3.1.1. Hume starts his challenge by saying that morality has influence on "human passions and actions". So this is one of the essential features of morality that Hume wants to use for his own support. Morals, by being influential on our actions, cannot be derived from reason alone.

Hume says that he has already provided his arguments in the earlier books and he does not want to repeat them here. In *Treatise* 2.3.3, titled as "Of the influencing motives of the will", Hume defends one of his most famous affirmations: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions". The motivation argument rests on this affirmation. Hume says that understanding operates in two ways: demonstration and probability. To prove that reason alone cannot motivate action he says that he is going to show that neither of these operations can influence the action (alone) and secondly reason cannot oppose passions in the direction of the will. Hume starts defending it by providing an example presenting the relation between mathematics and mechanics. He says that in mechanics we apply mathematical knowledge in order to execute "mechanical operations". However, these mathematical relations are not the motivating causes of our investigations in mechanics; instead of this, they are the instruments that we are using in those inquiries. Also, a merchant wants to know the sum of his account not because he is influenced by his demonstrative reasoning but because he wants to adjust his budget. From these intuitive examples, Hume concludes that demonstrative reasoning does not play an influencing role in our actions.

For the probable reasoning, Hume argues that when we face with pleasant or uneasy situations, certain emotions arise accordingly. In this case, our probable reasoning plays a crucial role of informing us about the cause and effect relations in these situations. However, our aversion or propensity depending on the situation does not arise from this reasoning. Hume says:

But 'tis evident in this case that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience (ibid.).

After this point, Hume just continues to rephrase his general claim that “reason alone can never produce any action”. This irritating repetition strikes one to conclude that this is all what Hume says about the motivation argument. And this can indeed be true. After all, we cannot find any substantial argument except these two examples and an intuitive observation about the relation between our passions and the cause-effect relations. This yields Rachel Cohon to ask:

[W]e face an interpretative dilemma. Is the DC Argument [MA in my notation] intended as an argument *a priori* to the conclusion that reason as such cannot possibly cause any motivating passion? Or is it intended as an empirical argument to the effect that we do not observe any impulses to arise from reason alone? (2008, p. 16; Brackets added).

Cohon extracts this interpretative dilemma by, first, saying that if this is intended to be an *a priori* argument, then Hume is inconsistent with his claims in Book I. In Book I, Hume was claiming that causal relations cannot be found *a priori* and they cannot hold necessarily. In this way, this possibility should be eliminated. If it is an empirical argument, then Cohon continues that, it lacks sufficient amount of explanation and care. Hume was only stating that it is evident that the impulse is not arising from reason. However, this *evidentness* is in dispute. Cohon reminds us that; Hume emphasizes that reason and calm passions can be confused (T 2.3.8). If it is easy to confuse a calm passion as it may be a product of our intellectual faculties, then it may not be that evident that this impulse is not originated by reason. Then, Cohon concludes, “Where is the perceptible difference here between reason and a calm passion? There may be one, but Hume does not point it out. As an empirical argument, then, this one is inadequate.” (Cohon, p. 17)³² I think Hume was relying on people’s intuitions too heavily. In reading this

³² See also, Cohon (1988).

section, one can easily accept all of his examples and be convinced with his claims. However, Hume is not careful enough to see that sometimes this approach produces greater internal inconsistencies and inadequacies. Although Cohon says that there may be such a difference, Hume never identifies this difference explicitly. This problem, however, helps us to see one of the crucial interpretative problems of the standard interpretation. As it is unclear how a calm passion and an idea differ, it is also dubious whether Hume also really claims that (moral) judgments cannot motivate our actions. In Book I, Hume mentions the effect of belief in terms of enabling an idea with the power of influencing actions:

Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow'd on every idea of good and evil the power of actuating the will, *nor yet has entirely excluded them from this influence* ... [W]e find by experience, that the ideas of those objects ... produce in a lesser degree the same effect with those impressions. *The effect, then, of belief is to raise up a simple idea to an equality with our impressions, and bestow on it a like influence on the passions.* (T 1.3.10; Italics added)

Surely, it is still dubious how far a belief can make an idea similar to a passion in terms of actuating the will. However, it is clear that in Book I, Hume is not suggesting that reason (alone) cannot motivate action. This former passage, at least in appearance, is textually inconsistent with the claim that, “[R]eason alone ... can never have any such influence” (T 3.1.1.). It seems at first sight that these two arguments imply contradictory claims. If you are someone like Francis Snare, then interpreting MA would turn out to be a troublesome. Snare consistently interprets MA in terms of “cognitive beliefs” and “moral beliefs”. By means of this, the conclusion of MA turns out to be: “Beliefs which are solely reason-based are inert” (Snare, 1991, p. 47). In this way, our moral beliefs cannot be cognitive.

I cannot see any possible way to interpret MA in this way. I think that we have only two alternative ways to deal with this interpretive dilemma. First, we can argue that the arguments from T 3.1.1 and T 1.3.10 are actually inconsistent. Secondly, we can say that there is an explanation, which makes these two arguments consistent and the interpretation of MA accurate. I believe the second alternative is the correct way to follow. If we reject the standard interpretation of MA, then we can see that these two arguments are actually consistent. On the standard interpretation the tendency is to treat moral judgments and morals as synonyms. However, if those passages are consistent, then morals and moral judgments cannot be used as such. In T 1.3.10 Hume clearly states that beliefs can

influence our passions. So, if reason alone cannot motive our actions, whereas beliefs (or the effect of belief –to be precise) can, then this shows that beliefs are not solely produced by reason alone.

However, this is not to say that morals (vice and virtue) are belief-like entities. This must be followed by the idea that not the morals but moral judgments might be beliefs³³. Ultimately, we find a reason why we are allowed to make the distinction between morals and moral judgments again. Hume seems to be not interested in moral judgments in MA at all. His only target is to object and refute the rationalist obsession for the claim that vice and virtue are derived from reason. In this context, it is perfectly understandable that Hume does not deal with moral judgments at the point. Accordingly, the reason why Hume insists on the use of terms of morals and reason is now clearer and I hope the reason why I object to the standard interpretation, when it repeatedly substitutes moral judgments for morals and belief for reason is settled. As I have said, Hume considers morals and moral judgments as different things. Additionally, it is also wrong to interpret “reason alone” as “solely reason-based beliefs” because Hume does not mention or use the term “beliefs” in the MA argument at all. He is not interested in the issue of beliefs in this context. The issue here is simpler and directly related to the nature of vice and virtue, and reason. Moreover, he says, “*Reason of itself* is utterly impotent” (ibid.; Italics added). Surely, belief cannot mean “reason of itself”, and cannot be considered as solely the product of reason. Ultimately, Hume wants to say that the operations of reason and the products of these operations cannot influence action. However, the understanding has also different operations from reason. In this case, Hume does not exclude those operations from influencing the will and the action. Those operations of understanding may yield to beliefs which can be true or false³⁴. Hence, our judgments are not produced only by reason. “Reason” is a special operation of our understanding and understanding cannot be exhausted by “reason alone”.

³³ Considering that beliefs are lively ideas, they resemble the ideas of the impressions that sign others’ pains and pleasures. Hume claims that these ideas are increased in their force and vivacity and become real pains and pleasures. So, there is also some reason to think that beliefs and morals are similar in this sense of force and vivacity. For the complete analysis of this see 5.1, 5.2, and 5.6.

³⁴ Even if we are non-cognitivist about these beliefs, they can still motivate action. Non-cognitivism for moral beliefs does not essentially reject the idea that moral beliefs have motivating power.

Here, it is important to pay attention to the difference between Snare's distinction and some of our contemporary interpretations of MA. Snare has the problem of appealing to the use of belief in his interpretation. The other problematic substitution is the use of cognition as a synonym for reason. For instance, Norva Y. S. Lo interprets "reason alone" as the "cognitive processes" (2009, p. 73). She tries to avoid the problem of using "belief" by expanding the role of "reason" in Hume's philosophy. As she admits, as a process of cognition, reason does not include all the operations of understanding. She says, "Hume himself recognizes operations of our mind, such as observation and intuition, which are neither the rational process of reasoning nor the emotive process of experiencing sentiments" (ibid.). Although, she is cautious on this matter, she gets to the wrong conclusion that Hume must extend his argument to cover these non-rational processes as well. Accordingly, she thinks that observation and intuition, though they are non-rational, must be considered as cognitive processes. This is wrong because, there is no textual evidence in support of this claim. It is obvious that Hume explicitly concentrates on two operations of reason. It is also obvious that Hume thinks that not all of our beliefs are the outcomes of these two operations. Lo's point of equating reason and cognition comes from the idea that observation and intuition must be placed either on the side of reason or emotions; and there is no alternative. My point, on the other hand, places observation and intuition as different mechanisms of the understanding. If Hume had meant understanding by using the term reason, then talking about moral judgments, beliefs, and opinions would have become nonsense. However, these terms have special meanings and treatments in Hume's own account of morality. So, I don't see any inconsistency between the MA and the motivating force of beliefs. This interpretative dilemma results from Hume's general claim about beliefs in T 1.3.10.

In terms of the distinction between the morals and moral judgments, it is crucial to remember Hume's account of moral psychology. Morals in Hume's use of this concept, never implies beliefs, judgments, representations, or ideas. All of these concepts can be tied up under the label of "ideas". "Morals" or "moral distinctions" refers to vice and virtue, good and bad, and right and wrong. All of these terms refer to the other label of Hume's psychology: passions. So, what Hume wants to show with MA, is that all these morals can influence our actions. However,

more importantly, he wants to show that contrary to rationalists' claim, these morals cannot be derived from this special operation of the understanding; namely the reason. In this case, it is not true that, according to Hume, only morals have an influence on actions, and it is equally wrong to say that no judgments or beliefs can have influence on our actions. So, here are the claims of the MA argument in terms of my interpretation and my criticism of the standard interpretation:

- 1) Vice and virtue, good and bad, right and wrong, etc., cannot be derived from relations of ideas and matters of facts (Hume expands this in Hume's Fork).
- 2) *Some* judgments deriving from these special operations of reason (relations of ideas and matters of facts) *cannot* have influence on the actions (alone).

So from these two conclusions, we can infer:

- 3) Vice and virtue, good and bad, right and wrong, etc., are not the products of reason (Hume expands this in the Discovery Argument)
- 4) *Some* judgments deriving not from these special operations of reason *can* have influence on the actions (alone).

We will evaluate (1) and (3) in the following sections. (2), has already been covered in this section. (4) will be discussed in the end of this chapter. The reason why (4) is not explicitly argued in MA, I think, is that Hume's three arguments in T 3.1.1 concentrate on the negative claims objecting to rationalists. He argues for his positive claims about morality starting from T 3.1.2.

Before concluding this section, it may be useful to look at the instance, where Hume uses the word deduction again. "As long as 'tis allow'd, that reason has no influence on our passions and action, 'tis in vain to pretend, that morality is dicover'd only by a deduction of reason" (T 3.1.1). As I have already indicated, the special operations of reason are considered as "deductions" by Hume. MA supports my claim that, Hume does not reserve the term deduction only for demonstrative reasoning. This deduction of reason here clearly refers to those two operations of understanding –demonstrative and probable. As a mental process Hume finds reason in its all features and operations inactive; that is, without an originating passion no reasoning in itself can cause the body to act. Hume finds the MA argument in this presented form not sufficiently conclusive for his overall claim of

T 3.1.1. In order to explain (1), Hume presents a “still more conclusive and more applicable” (ibid.) version of MA: the discovery argument.

3.2. The Discovery Argument

After stating that reason is not the sole motivating cause of action, Hume wants to argue against one another component of the rationalist arguments. According to the rationalists, moral actions are either by themselves true or false, or reason captures truth or falsity in our actions³⁵. In this sense, moral actions are not only good or bad but also true or false (or *vice versa*). To recall the previous sections, for rationalists, God is both omniscience and omnipotent. Hence, good and truth mean almost the same thing. In the case of this, Hume wants to show that good and truth cannot be considered as such interconnected. Similar to MA’s conclusion, Hume wants to argue that our actions do not acquire their merits or turpitudes because they give rise to true or false judgments in the spectators mind. Truth and falsity do not suffice to guide our actions. By means to this interpretation, I criticize one of the main stream interpretations of DA which understands DA as stating that passions cannot be true or false (The representation interpretation). This reading centralizes one of the premises of DA, which claims that only things that represent other things can be true or false. I claim that this premise is not a major premise in the argument and can be discarded as well.

As it is the case in MA, DA also appears both in T 2.3.3 and in T 3.1.1. In this case it is better to look at these passages together. In *Treatise* 3.1.1 Hume says,

Reason is the *discovery* of truth or falsehood. Truth or falsehood consists in an *agreement or disagreement* either to the *real relations*, or to the *real existence and matter of fact*. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never be an *object of our reason*. Now ‘tis evident our passions, volitions, and actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and *implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions*. ‘Tis impossible, therefore they can be pronounc’d either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable to reason. (Italics added)

³⁵ See, Chapter 2.2.

Before dealing with its interpretation it is better to quote the passage from *Treatise* 2.3.3. Here Hume gives an expanded version of his idea that passions, volitions, and actions are original facts and realities.

A passion is an *original existence*, or, if you will, *modification of existence*, and contains not any *representative quality*, which renders it a *copy* of any other existence or modification. When I am angry, I am actually possess with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a *reference to any other object*, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. 'Tis impossible, therefore, that this passion can be oppos'd by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of *ideas*, consider'd *as copies*, with those objects, which they represent. (Italics added)

The phrases and words in italics are the crucial items that must be interpreted first. In this case, I want to start with the first word “discovery”. For Hume, there is a crucial difference between imagination and understanding in the sense that the function of the former is production and the function of the latter discovery. Regardless of considering reason as a faculty or as the outcome of the understanding, the discovery analogy tells us that reason’s capability is to detect the relation between the idea and the object represented by that idea. The reason why I am so cautious is that there is a tendency to interpret the discovery analogy as to generate or produce true beliefs³⁶. This interpretation may cause misleading consequences³⁷. As I have indicated, not the understanding but imagination is capable of producing beliefs. However, it is reason’s role to detect the truth-value of the produced belief by checking it in terms of the associations of ideas. In this sense, the task of the understanding is to check what the imagination produces and discovers whether it corresponds to what it copies³⁸.

³⁶ See, Zimmerman (2007, p. 219).

³⁷ For instance, it may lead us to think that all our beliefs are the outcomes of reason. However, the belief in necessary connection cannot be produced neither by relations of ideas, nor matters of facts. Hume says, “But ‘tis evident, in the first place, that the repetition of like objects in like relations of succession and contiguity discovers nothing new in any one of them; since we can draw no inference from it, nor make it a subject either of our demonstrative or probable reasonings” (T 1.3.14). So it is important to keep in mind that reason is responsible only for those beliefs which are the enliven versions of the ideas of the seven philosophical relations.

³⁸ One might object to this by saying that reason’s function is to compare ideas and make arbitrary unions using the philosophical relations. In this sense, it is indeed reason’s function to produce ideas (complex ideas). The idea of Golden Mountain is the product of reason and not imagination. I think that this objection is not correct. We will see in chapter 4 that imagination has the function of discovering natural relations, but *reason’s* function is to discover the philosophical relations. In this section, however, Hume only deals with philosophical relations.

Secondly, Hume says that being true or false is “the agreement or disagreement to the real relations or real existences or matters of facts” (T 3.1.1). The foundational division between relations of ideas and matters of facts plays again its crucial role here. Hume never gives any credit to any other possible category of knowledge. Here, the agreement or disagreement quite figuratively implies that only ideas in either of these categories can be knowledge and by being so, they can be true or false. So the “object of reason” can either be an idea copying a relation between other ideas, or an idea copying an impression of reflection or sensation.

In terms of this brief summary of the restrictions concerning reason, the obvious can be inferred: Anything which is not an idea cannot be true or false. However, what is more interesting is not this inference but Hume’s description of these restrictions. Obviously, passions, volitions, or actions cannot be true or false; and neither can any impressions of sensation be true or false. So an impression of ‘[this]-red-apple’³⁹ cannot be true or false but the idea copying this impression, such as “This apple is red” can be true if the impression actually is ‘[this]-red-apple’. Why Hume does not mention impressions of sensation in DA? I think the answer to this question lies in Hume’s division between sensations and reflections. In *Treatise* 1.1.2 Hume says, “The first kind [impressions of sensation] arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes”. However, the reflections are, “deriv’d in a great measure from our ideas” (ibid.). If reflections are derived from ideas in a sense, this may make one think that they may not be original existences as Hume thinks they are. If we remember his account of simple ideas, Hume says in italics, “*That all our ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent*” (T 1.1.1.). If the reason why ideas have truth-values is that they represent what they are derived from, then the same should be the case for the reflections as well. The latter passage may be interpreted as that anything derived from something represents that thing. In this case reflections must represent the idea that they are derived from. Ultimately, they can be true or false. However, this must be wrong. An original existence can be derived from a non-original existence but to say that it represents the non-original existence is somehow bizarre. So for passions this criterion of *anything derived*

³⁹ In order not to confuse impressions with ideas, I find it useful to write impression-sentences in a non-propositional form.

from something represents that something cannot work. Even if passions are derived from ideas they do not represent them. But why do they not represent them? So the problem is that, either passions can represent their correspondent ideas and can be true or false (hence DA is invalid), or we must read the representation component (an idea is true or false, if it represents the impression from which it is derived) of the DA as a silent premise and avoid considering it as a major premise.

What is wrong with my interpretation? Or, what can make my interpretation of DA inadequate? To see this, we need to pinpoint the key features of original existences on the one hand and the objects of reason⁴⁰ on the other.

Key features of objects of reason based on T 3.1.1 are:

- 1) They are in agreement or disagreement with real relations or real existences.
- 2) They are not complete in themselves.
- 3) They imply reference to other *things*.

Key features of original existences based on T 2.3.3.

- 1*) They have no representative quality (In opposition to 1).
- 2*) They are not copies of other existences (In opposition to 2).
- 3*) They do not refer to other *objects* (In opposition to 3).

Both sets of features include three descriptions that mention the features of the objects of reason and original existences. (1) and (1*) describe them qualitatively, whereas (3) and (3*) mention one of their crucial properties: referring. (2) and (2*) complete the sets by connecting (1) to (3) and (1*) to (3*) respectively. So we may consider these sets of statements (1-3 and 1*-3*) as arguments. For (3) to follow from (1) and (2) there need to be an additional premise (4), which is missing in Hume's original argumentation. Being in an agreement or disagreement with an original existence and being incomplete does not entail that it must refer to other things. So (3) must follow from the following premise:

- (4) Any idea which is incomplete must be in agreement or disagreement with the impression, from which it follows, and, which is real or in other words complete.

⁴⁰ Hume does not directly say "ideas" in the related passage. And I agree with Hume's attitude towards cognition in this context. "Objects of reason" in Hume's system are, of course, ideas. However, this broad categorization is far stronger against any account which may use anything but ideas in its system.

A similar addition is required for (3*) as well. Having no representational quality and being not a copy does not entail that it does not refer to any other object. So for (3*) to follow from (1*) and (2*) we must add an extra premise (4*) to the argument:

(4*) Anything which is not a copy of another thing, *essentially*, does not represent anything⁴¹.

(4) holds because it relies on Hume's definition of ideas. In this case it is *conceptually* true for Hume that ideas necessarily have truth-values. Nevertheless, the conclusion of (4*) holds *essentially* because it is *analytically* true: something is a copy if and only if it has an original⁴². The difference between these two notions is that the idea that only ideas have truth-value follows deductively from Hume's definitions in the *Treatise*, Book I. On the other hand, the justification of (4*) must be different. (4*) follows from a principle which seems to be an analytic truth (a copy has an original). However, intuitively though, those definitions and the analytic proposition seem to me not sufficient to accept the conclusions of both arguments.

Let's say I have an idea: "This dog is violent". When this idea enters into my reason, it immediately produces a passion of fear in my soul. This particular passion of fear is derived from my idea and hence it is somehow in a relation to my idea. This derivation is causal just like the derivation of ideas from sensations. However, the effect does not necessarily represent its cause, even though, intuitively speaking, it may occasionally represent its cause. The problem is that in the case of ideas derived from sensations, the idea must necessarily represent the sensation from which the idea derives (from 4). So, I ask: Why is not my fear in agreement or disagreement with my idea that "This dog is violent"? I can perfectly see that it is in agreement with my idea. Fear seems to be in agreement with violence. Consequently, because representation is defined in terms of agreement, which is a

⁴¹ Just to be precise, it is important to realize here that representation is not a mere resemblance. An original existence can resemble another thing, but it cannot represent that thing, because it can survive the non-existence of the other thing that it resembles. However, copies cannot exist without the thing that they represent.

⁴² This reminds me Cohon's criticism of MA in the previous section.

loose concept to conceive of, then my fear must represent my idea that “This dog is violent”⁴³.

Another vulgar example may work better. Let’s say someone show me a picture of my car. When I see the picture, I acquire the impression of ‘that-my-car-picture’. Afterwards, I turn my eyes towards my car and see my actual car. Now I have the impression of ‘that-my-car’. Are not these two impressions in an agreement? In the case of impressions of sensations as such, it is easy to reply to this question. The thing, which represents the other, must be a copy of it. According to the account of simple impressions, an impression of sensation cannot be derived from another impression. Hence, this example is misleading and can be avoided⁴⁴.

However, the case of fear and violence is different. In the case of my fear and my idea of the violent dog, if my mind accidentally or pathologically had produced a different passion (i.e. joy), would not we say that my idea and my passion of joy are in disagreement? So what I try to show is that original existences can represent non-original existences. This is not impossible to think of. However, the hard question is: *So, is my passion of fear true?* Even if we agree with this reasoning, it is quite difficult to bite the bullet and say that passions can be true or false (at least for those, who interpret DA as a representational theory of truth).

Hume in these two sets of arguments tries to use the representation criterion as the differentiating feature of ideas. Even if we accept that, as an obvious truth, copies have originals, in order to get to the conclusion that, only things that have representational quality can be true or false requires additional premises to be valid. If my objection is reasonable, then; either Hume’s definition of truth and falsity (as “the agreement or disagreement to the real relations or real existences”) is implausible; or Hume must reconsider the relation between ideas and passions as a philosophical relation as relations of ideas and matters of facts⁴⁵.

⁴³ In Chapter 4.3 and 5.2, we will see that for Hume there are relations among our passions and ideas. So, they are not entirely independent from each other.

⁴⁴ The same can be asked about the relation between the actual car and my impression of it. My impression clearly represents my car and it must be true. However, Hume would say that what causes my impression is unknown and hence we cannot talk about the relation between my car and my impression of my car. I think that DA, bounded by Hume’s skepticism and empiricism, is a far cry.

⁴⁵ For passions Hume talks all the time that some passions are agreeable and some are not. This sense of agreement is of course different from the one I discuss here, but the idea of an agreeable passion is that for particular pains and pleasures, there are particular indirect passions (T 1.2.5). For

So we end up with three possible criticisms of DA:

- 1) The definition of truth, based on representation must be considered as irrelevant.
- 2) Hume must accept the relation between a passion and an idea as a philosophical relation and admit that passions can be true or false (In other words DA is invalid)⁴⁶.
- 3) We must consider the DA argument as restricted to be an argument concerning the truth or falsity of ideas and avoid the claim of 4*.

I think all of these three criticisms are feasible and can be defended against both DA and DA's interpretations based on the representation premise. All of these three criticisms have different reflections on our interpretations of DA and for the overall thesis of T 3.1.1. I suggest that the first criticism does no harm to Hume's main objection to the rationalist opponents. The second one, however, clearly suggests something, which Hume can never accept, and is also related to one of the central questions in this dissertation. This second criticism will be the topic of the next section; namely Hume's Fork. In Hume's Fork, Hume argues that such a real relation is not possible. The third criticism cannot be taken partly because the argument from T 2.3.3 is the main motivation behind Hume's objection to rationalists.

In order to place all of these criticisms in context, we need to look at the proceeding passages in the *Treatise* related to DA. Hume is not interested in the idea that passions can be true or false. MA exposed Hume's central doctrine that reason (alone) cannot motivate actions. This doctrine expresses itself in every argument but in different forms. DA tries to show it by claiming that the property of being true or false is not an action-originating-element of our moral considerations. When Hume says that the DA argument has two advantages, he mentions this idea again: "It [DA] proves *directly*, that actions do not derive their merit from a conformity to reason; and it proves more *indirectly*, [...], that as reason can never immediately prevent or produce any action by contradicting or approving of it" (T

instance, someone who is successful must feel pride. Pride is the agreeable passion of success. I read it as that the relation between the pride and success is (to say the least) correct. Ultimately, the agreement criterion of truth is not conclusive. For relations among ideas and passions see, Ch. 4.3.

⁴⁶ Even if Hume does not necessarily accept that they can be true or false, he must still concede that the judgments about these genuine relations must be in an agreement or disagreement to what it represents. In this case, the question of whether passions can be true or false becomes unattended.

3.1.1.). What it indirectly proves is the conclusion of MA. Reason's involving by evaluating the correspondent idea cannot influence us to act. On the other hand, what it directly proves is more interesting. As I have just said, Hume is not interested in showing that passions cannot be true or false. He wants to show that moral good and bad are not derived from truth and falsity. Even, for a minute, we assume that passions can have truth-value; they still cannot obtain their moral values from their truth-values. Alternatively, it seems that for Hume truth cannot be normatively practical.

For the third criticism, we can find the reason why we need the argument from T 2.3.3. In a footnote, Hume directly discusses Wollaston's account of morality. In the footnote 2 of T 3.1.1 Hume, by referring Wollaston in name, argues that, if we accept that actions can be reasonable or unreasonable, it is still unanswered how these actions get their merits or demerits from their reasonableness or unreasonableness. Hume thinks that reasonings involving such considerations are circular. He says,

[...] in all those arguments there is an evident reasoning in a circle. A person who takes possession of *another's* goods, and uses them as his *own*, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this falsehood is the source of the immortality of injustice. But is property, or right, or obligation, intelligible, without an antec'dent morality? (T 3.1.1., fnt., 2.)

According to DA, a person who steals someone's property and declares it his own clearly makes a false claim. However, this declaration is false under certain rules, which qualifies stealing as not a proper way of entitlement. So, as Hume says, the source of the immorality of injustice cannot be the falsity of this declaration but it must be these sets of values and rules, by which we qualify it as false. In spite of the fact that Wollaston's arguments may have this problem of circularity; Hume goes one step further and asks that; even if we accept that "all immorality is deriv'd from this suppos'd falsehood in action" (ibid.), why this falsehood is immoral in the first place? If we accept the third criticism and think that DA is only about what ideas are and what passions, volitions, or actions are not, then we fail to accept Hume's argument here. Here, Hume assumes that original existences (actions, volitions, or passions) have truth-values and even if they have truth-values, the problem cannot be solved by the rationalists. The rationalists must "give a reason why truth is virtuous and falsehood vicious" (ibid.). Hume thinks that they cannot give any reason to support this because truth or falsehood does not give the merit or

turpitude of an action. Essentially (and this is what 4* implies), only original existences can be virtuous or vicious. Truth is not an original existence. Hence, truth cannot be considered as normatively equal as virtue. From (4) we cannot infer this conclusion. (4) is only interested in the question of, “What can have a truth-value and what cannot?” However, for Hume, in order to show that truth is not equal to virtue, we need the additional premise of (4*).

It seems, then, that by accepting the first and the second criticisms, we need to admit that DA is not presented to show that passions cannot be true or false. It is presented because Hume wants to argue that truth and virtue are different in kind. The former is the quality of ideas, whereas the latter is the quality of character or trait. This is, of course, not say that the representation interpretation of DA is wrong. What I try to emphasize is that it is only a minor implication of the argument, which has little importance in the overall thesis of T 3.1.1.

3.3. Hume’s Fork

For DA I have claimed that truth or falsity is not sufficient (or efficient) to conclude that an action or character is virtuous or vicious. This conclusion has many consequences and one of these is what the representation interpretation is suggesting. Accordingly, vice and virtue cannot be true or false because they do not represent anything. Another consequence, for instance, shows that virtue cannot be discovered by reason. If reason has the function of the discovery of truth or falsity, then it seems evident that vice and virtue cannot be discovered by reason because vice and virtue cannot be the objects of reason. However, Hume wants to go slowly and wants to show that this consequence can be justified by an independent argument. This argument is pronounced in some occasions as Hume’s Fork (HF)⁴⁷. This phrase is, best to my knowledge, first used by Antony Flew (1961, p. 53). The “relations of ideas” and “matters of facts” constitute the two horns of this fork⁴⁸. It is important to remind ourselves that whenever I refer to Hume’s Forks, I will refer to this distinction. I take notice to this point because one can find in the literature

⁴⁷ See. Dicker (2001, pp. 35-60).

⁴⁸ Hume divides the seven philosophical relations into two categories. Three of them fall under the “matters of facts” and four of them constitute the “relations of ideas”. Reason can only reach to knowledge by either one of these types of relations among ideas and impressions.

other distinctions also called as Hume's Fork. For instance, Constantine Sandis uses this phrase to refer to the reason-passion distinction (2009, p. 146). I simply do not mean this distinction when I say Hume's Fork. In this section, I will critically evaluate HF in Flew's sense.

As I have said earlier Hume wants to justify his claim that morality is not derived from reason with a different argument than MA and DA. MA concentrates on *reason as a power* and DA considers reason as a *process*. In HF, Hume does not elaborate reason directly. This time, his strategy is to focus on the features of the objects of reason. By means of this, Hume presents an argument of the form of a *reductio*. Accordingly, we first assume that virtue is the object of reason. Then, we try to find out whether it lies in the relations of ideas or it can be inferred from matters of facts. Hume's conclusion is that vice and virtue cannot be inferred from matters of facts and also it cannot be found by comparing ideas. Hence virtue and vice are not the objects of reason. This conclusion was implicit in the DA argument and as I criticized the argument, a reason why this conclusion is valid was missing in Hume's explanations. Now, we will see this missing explanation in the lines of HF.

Another important thing is that, in HF, Hume also claims that the fork is not a trident. For him, there is no alternative category of the objects of reason, which may cover virtue as an object of reason. I will argue that this crucial assertion plays an important role in the "is-ought" passage, but we will come to that point a bit later. Now, I want to start with the interpretation of the argument of HF.

In the following passage, Hume means that reason is a fork and not a trident. Hence, if morality is to be discovered by reason it must be the object of one of the horns:

As the operations of human understanding divide themselves into two kinds, the comparing of ideas, and the inferring of matter of fact; were virtue discover'd by the understanding; it must be an object of one of these operations, nor is there any third operation of the understanding, which can discover it. (T 3.1.1)

Hume goes on to argue that neither of these kinds is capable of discovering virtue. First, for comparing of ideas or as he equates it with demonstration, Hume claims that if virtue and vice consist in a relation, this relation cannot be any of the four relations that he offers for the relations of ideas. In a footnote, he expands his argument. By implicitly referring to the rationalists, Hume accuses those

rationalists, who argue that morality is demonstrable; by underlying that only things that are *relations* are demonstrable. He claims that, even if they do not consider vice and virtue as relations, these rationalists insist that these are demonstrable. In this sense, Hume considers that the rationalist claim is a misleading assertion. (T 3.1.1, fn., 3)

However, his argument against the rationalist claim is not as conclusive as his criticism of it. Hume claims that, if morality consists in “relations susceptible of certainty and demonstration” (op. cit.), they must be found in those four relations of resemblance, contrariety, degrees in quality, and proportions in quantity and number. This, for Hume, brings us “into absurdities” (ibid.). Why is this so? Hume’s answer is, in my understanding of it, very difficult to understand. He says, “For as you make the very essence of morality to lie in the relations, and as there is no one of these relations but what is applicable, not only to an irrational, but also to an inanimate object; it follows, that even such objects must be susceptible of merit and demerit” (Ibid.). What Hume wants to say is clear but how this objection works is still unclear to me. In this case, let me put this argument in a sequence:

- 1) Vice and virtue (the very essence of morality) lie in four relations of ideas.
- 2) These four relations are applicable to anything, including irrational beings and inanimate objects.
- 3) So, vice and virtue lie in those four relations founded between irrational beings and between inanimate objects as well.
- 4) Hence, it is possible⁴⁹ to judge⁵⁰ their (supposed) actions and characters as vicious or virtues.
- 5) It is not possible to judge their actions and characters as vicious or virtues.

⁴⁹ Instead of “possible”, the term “appropriate” may be used as well. However, these two terms may reflect different consequences for the argument. If we use “appropriate”, then it may mean that we are allowed to judge their actions. However, what Hume wants to say seems to me that it would make perfect sense, if we find their actions as virtuous or vicious. Hence, the alternative I picked up and used does not center “us” in evaluations of the actions of non-human animals and inanimate objects.

⁵⁰ Instead of “judge”, the term “discover” may be used as well. In overall, Hume wants to say that if a relation is virtuous or vicious, then it must be discovered by reason alone. However, in the examples, even if Hume uses the word “discover”, he means our evaluations concerning the relations. In this sense, this is, strictly speaking, not discovery but judgment. Hence, I prefer to use this term. If it bothers in this form, feel free to use “discover”.

6) Therefore, virtue and vice do not lie in those four relations of ideas.

Two things strike me immediately. First, how does (3) entail (4)? Second, what justify (5)? For the first question, let's assume that vice and virtue lie in those four relations. However, this assumption does not trivially entail that it is also possible to judge their actions. The first issue about this is that we need to determine what kind of possibility is Hume referring to? Is it logical, moral, or physical (cognitive, species-centric, individual-centric, etc.) possibility? The only alternative can work here is the logical possibility. It may not be morally possible to judge their actions because they may simply lack of action and character (and this seems quite likely for those inanimate objects like rocks, papers and scissors). It seems also quiet unlikely that this possibility is physical. Hume underlines in Book II:

'Tis indeed certain, that where the structure of parts in brutes is the same as in men, and the operation of these parts also the same, the causes of that operation cannot be different, and that *whatever we discover to be true of the one species, may be concluded without hesitation to be certain of the other.*

My hypothesis is so simple, and supposes so little reflexion and judgment, that *'tis applicable to every sensible creature*; which must not only be allow'd to be a convincing proof of its veracity, but, I am confident, will be found an objection to every other system. (T 2.1.12; Italics added)

Hume clearly thinks that concerning the nature of the passions and the “anatomy of the mind” there is not much of a difference between our species and others (even for the extraterrestrials, I guess)⁵¹. If we convinced ourselves that this possibility here must be logical, then the entailment of (4) from (3) is problematic. In other words, the transition from (3) to (4) must be explained or a bridge principle between (3) and (4) must be presented. Otherwise, the argument is invalid. It is one thing to claim that vice and virtue lie in those relations (3) and another to claim that this vice and virtue can be judged or discovered (4). When (3) is true, (4) can be false and *vice versa*. In order to provide support to this entailment, Hume offers two illustrations showing that (4) is false (so (5) is true) and hence, (3) is true. The first one is about the relation of parricide and the second one is about the incest.

Parricide among human beings is commonly accepted as vicious. Hume argues that this same relation can also be found (or observed) in the realm of inanimate objects. He says that an oak or elm, by dropping of its seed, produces a

⁵¹ This view is clearly different from the Cartesian conception of animals and their moral status. For a defense of this interpretation of the Cartesian psychology; see Regan and Singer (1976); Gibson (1932, p. 214); Singer (1975). For an objection to this interpretation see; Erdenk (2013).

sibling, which eventually destroys the parent tree. This same relation, however, is not considered as immoral as in the case of parricide in humans. Hume says, “Reason or science is nothing but the comparing of ideas, and the discovery of their relations; and if the same relations have different characters, it must evidently follow, that those characters are not discover’d merely by reason” (T 3.1.1). Before mentioning my own criticism of the example, it is worth noting one remark on this example. Howard Mounce makes a remarkable objection. If we recall Hume’s Newtonian paradigm, Hume wants to deal only with the “causes” of things. In terms of this, he considers that the parricide example is a good one because the “causes” look as the same. However, Mounce says,

Here we see, yet again, the influence on Hume’s philosophy of mechanistic assumptions. It is absurd to suppose that the sapling and the human being do the same thing and differ only in how they come to do it. For the concepts of doing something are different. Thus one cannot distinguish a human action from the belief and intention of the agent, since without belief and intention one has not yet arrived at the level of human action (2002, p. 83).

This criticism can be raised towards many of the examples that Hume is using in the *Treatise*. We will see in the following passages that the examples of incest and willful murder depend on the same assumption that human action has no special character. However, I do not think that Hume himself believes in this. We will see that in the positive claims of T 3.1.2, where Hume presents his own account of morality, Hume centralizes the special concept of sympathy, by which human action becomes somewhat special. In the case of this, I think that Mounce’s objection is correct but he fails to see that Hume’s central issue in T 3.1.1 is to reply to the rationalists. And, he wants to do this by playing the game with rationalist’s own rules (at least in appearance).

So, I concede that the illustration exhorts what it intends to. However, there is a different problem. It only shows that our reason is not capable of discovering a notion of immorality in the case of inanimate objects. This is not sufficient to conclude that a notion of immorality does not lie in those relations. In order to convince us, Hume needs to show that it is *impossible* to discover this very notion at least in one instance of that relation. Unfortunately, I do not think his illustration is a successful example of such an instance. Furthermore, even if Hume might be able to show one, it is still questionable whether discoverability is essential to the presence of that relation. So far, this argument can only show that, (stringently)

even if vice and virtue lie in relations of ideas, reason cannot discover them, or; (less stringently) even if vice and virtue lie in relations of ideas, reason *in some (or most of the) instances* cannot discover them.

The second illustration shows that, while incest in humans is a vice, in the case of animals it is not (or it has no meaning). So, from the same principle, we must think that this vice is not discovered by reason alone. However, this illustration also shows only that reason alone cannot discover vice and virtue. It does not prove that vice and virtue does not lie in those relations. In these illustrations, Hume provides his justification for the premise (5) of the argument. Fair enough to accept this, but still the transition from (3) to (4) is unanswered.

As I have said a bridge principle is needed and Hume somehow mentions it just after the *reductio* argument. He says:

Resemblance, contrariety, degree in quality, and proportions in quantity and number; all these relations belong as properly to matter, as to our actions, passions, and volitions. 'Tis unquestionable, therefore, that morality lies not in any of these relations, nor the sense of it in their discovery". (ibid)

Some philosophers raise a question about the “unquestionability” of this affirmation. It seems that Hume does not provide any reason why there are only these four relations and nothing else. Barry Stroud remarks that Hume only challenges those who wish to show that there is another relation other than these four. Even if Stroud criticizes this attempt, he does not find it unappealing. According to him, Hume’s opponents do not provide any “putative” moral demonstration relying on a different relation. Additionally, according to Stroud, Hume’s strategy is perfectly cogent because, “Hume concludes that any general characterization of the act in the human case that enables us to demonstrate its moral quality will also hold of the non-human case. And since that is absurd, it is impossible to arrive at moral conclusions by demonstration” (Stroud, 1977, p. 175). If this is correct, then Hume has an argument showing that there are only four relations in terms of demonstration. If this is so, why does Stroud complain about this issue in the first place? Apart from Stroud’s confusion, he is not the only one complaining about that Hume’s assertion is *a priori* or at least inconclusive. Rachael M. Kydd argues that these arguments are not as “decisive” as Hume claims. According to Kydd moral rightness need not be a “special kind of relation”. Kydd says,

It [moral rightness] might well be a wider relation obtaining between special things. More things are fitting than can be called morally right, and it seems difficult to imagine a special sort of fittingness –there cannot be different kinds of fittingness any more than there can be different kinds of causality or of identity –but there is no reason why the fittingness between certain special things– such, for example, as that between human actions and the ends or expectations of sentient beings –might not be called moral rightness. This possibility Hume overlooked entirely, though he is to be excused for his negligence in that Clarke overlooked it also. (1964, p. 49)

In Kydd's words we can find the reason why Stroud has this confusion. It is Clarke, who, in the first place, does not consider that moral relations can be among actions and ends. In the case of this, because Hume's primary task is to reject the Clarkean view of moral relation, Hume does not consider such relations as counter examples. However, if we consider Hume's arguments as attempts to reject the rationalist account of morality in general, then we can clearly say that these four relations are taken for granted for Hume. Then, we can say that the bridge principle has an argument if it is an objection to Clarke only. However, if it is taken as a general reaction, then it seems that it is based on an *a priori* assumption, which is most probably wrong (if Kydd's relation is feasible).

Keeping this problem in mind, we can see that, clearly, Hume thinks that, if there is a real relation that is the case, then it is discoverable by reason (alone). Vice and virtue are not relations, hence they are not discoverable by reason⁵². If this former argument is a response to Clarke, then the bridge principle is: *Whatever is a relation is discoverable by reason and whatever is discoverable by reason is **one of these four relations** (BPC)*. This principle restricts relations of demonstration by four. However, if it is a general argument against any kind of rival theory, which claims that morality is susceptible of demonstration, then we have the following bridge principle: *Whatever is a relation is discoverable by reason and whatever is discoverable by reason is **a relation** (BP)*. Actually, we can complicate the issue here. As a similar problem, we can question whether we should understand *relation* as Hume defines it, or can any reasonable account of *relation* be acceptable? From Stroud's point, we can understand that this complication would be too much. Even if Hume has a specific understanding of relations, he does not provide any argument why these four relations are the only relations of ideas. Hence, any acceptable account of relations must work. I think that we should choose to use BP instead of

⁵² For the argument; see, T 3.1.1, footnote, 3.

BPC. Even if Hume most of the time responds to Clarke (and Wolloston), he considers these two philosophers as the paradigm cases of rationalist account of morality. For Hume, responding to Clarke is like responding to all rationalists. Hence, Hume does not make this division for himself. Even if he is wrong in this manner, we should work with BP. So, let's install the bridge principle and its argument into the *reductio* argument; in lines between (3) and (4):

- 3) So, vice and virtue lie in those four relations founded between irrational beings and between inanimate objects as well. (1, 2)
 - a. Demonstrative reason discovers only relations. (BP)
 - b. Hence, reason discovers vice and virtue. (a, 3)
- 4) Hence, it is possible to judge their (supposed) actions and characters as vicious or virtues. (3, 2)
- 5) It is not possible to judge their actions and characters as vicious or virtues. (Empirically justified)
 - c. So, reason does not discover vice and virtue in those relations.
- 6) Ultimately, virtue and vice do not lie in those four relations of ideas. (BP, c)

The simple version of this argument is the following:

- i. Reason discovers only relations.
- ii. Reason does not discover vice and virtue.
- iii. Vice and virtue are not relations.

I think the problem now becomes apparent. It seems like that not the nature of vice and virtue, or of relations, but it is the *reason* which is the sole determinant of whether something is a relation or not. If reason discovers it, it is a relation. If not, it is not. How can Hume be so sure about that reason discovers all the relations? Can there be any other relation, for which reason is not capable of detecting it? Most importantly, how can *discoverability* grant *reality*? And this question cannot be overruled by *empiricism simpliciter*. Hume is well aware of such a possible objection and in order to answer to this, he provides in my opinion, the most crucial component of his argument.

Hume argues that morality cannot be found in an entirely new relation, which is completely different from all of those four relations. Hume says that in order to object to the existence of such a new relation is something like “fighting in

the dark” (ibid). In this case, for people, who want to introduce such a new relation, Hume suggests two conditions that this new relation should satisfy.

For the first condition, Hume starts arguing by repeating his claim that, “moral good and evil belong only to the actions of the mind, and are deriv’d from our situation with regard to external objects” (ibid). This is the overall summary of Hume’s account of morals. So, in order there to be a relation exposing this account of morals, from which the moral good and evil arise, this relation can only be a relation between internal actions and the external objects and not between internal actions or external objects among themselves. It may be better to quote the passage here:

[T]he relations, from which these moral distinctions arise, must lie only betwixt internal actions, and external objects, and must not be applicable either to internal actions, compar’d among themselves, or to external objects, when plac’d in opposition to other external objects. (ibid)

Such a relation, then, must be a relation between a passion and an external object. In this sense, he finds it impossible for such a new relation to be obtained because it would be neither an inference from cause to effect, nor a mere relation of ideas. For this he says, “Now it seems difficult to imagine, that any relation can be discover’d betwixt our passions, volitions and actions, compar’d to external objects, which relation might not belong either to these passions and volitions, or to these external objects, compare’d among *themselves*” (ibid).

Hume clearly means that it is impossible for such a relation to exist. He introduces such a bizarre condition because he thinks that it is necessary for Clarke’s notion of moral relations. For Clarke, a moral relation holds only between acts and situations. By means of this, Kydd argues that this condition need not be necessarily read as an exhaustive condition of moral relations in general. So this condition must be read as a necessary requirement only of Clarke’s system (Kydd, 1964, p. 45). However, this attempt does not explain why Hume does not specifically deal with Clarkean moral relations and instead of doing this, why not he mentions any possible relation (among his own system) that can be examined. Clarke accepts that moral relations do not obtain among internal actions. However, Hume also argues against such a possibility. So it is evident that Hume wants to refute any alternative account of relations, which can explicitly or implicitly make moral relations enter in to the stage.

In dealing with these so called moral relations among internal actions, Hume might have Wollaston in his mind. When making fun of the results of such relations, Hume says, “we might be guilty of crimes in ourselves, and independent of our situation, with respect to the universe” (T 3.1.1.). Well, Wollaston’s system may have this problem because, if I suddenly say (with an inner or outer voice, does not matter) that, “I promise to give five dollars to Ozan”, even if there is no situation requiring such a promise, I put myself under an obligation to give five dollars to Ozan. This is, as Kydd call it, an absurdity. However, it is not an absurdity in the case of Clarke’s system because Clarke does not think that moral relations hold merely among actions. To recall, he thinks that the *relata* of moral relations are actions and situations. In this case, again, I do not see any good reason to accept the idea that this condition is only “necessary for Clarke” (loc. cit.). Hence, I still hold the view that here Hume introduces the first condition of a moral relation, which, in turn, he believes that it cannot be achieved.

However, there is a problem with this conclusion. At the beginning, Hume starts by assuming that his account of morality is true; that good and evil are the properties of some of our internal actions such as our passions, and they are produced according to our position among the other external objects. If someone is searching for a new relation, would he buy Hume’s account of morals by *fiat*, or would he have another one in his mind already? So, Hume’s first condition is restricted to his own understanding of morality, which makes its justification circular. If we remember Wollaston, he was arguing that moral good and evil belong only to the external actions. What Wollaston needs to show as a new relation is the one between an external action and another external action. I am not suggesting that such a relation is feasible, but all I am saying is that he does not need to cope with the first condition. In other words, what Hume is suggesting with this condition is that his account of morality is the plausible one and all others are just getting morality all along wrong. However, this argument is supposed to be saying in the first place, why his account of morality is plausible; or why the others get it wrong. Unfortunately, Hume does not provide such an explanation here.

The second condition is about the necessity of the moral action directed by such a new relation. According to Hume rationalists are not cautious, when they argue that the moral distinctions have rational measures. They only consider one

side of this idea that moral relations remain the same no matter what the situations and the agents are. However they forget that the other side of their claim implies the idea that the effects of these moral relations must also be the same in any condition and for any moral agent. So in the second condition, Hume attacks to this second idea. In this case, Hume wants to show that it is implausible to think that the actions of people are all the same for the same moral situations. Hume objects to the idea that such a new relation is eternal and immutable and it remains the same for every rational creature. He argues that it is not sufficient to show that moral relations are just like the relations of arithmetic and algebra. He says,

In order, therefore, to prove, that the measures of right and wrong are eternal laws, *obligatory* on every rational mind, 'tis not sufficient to shew the relations upon which they are founded: We must also point out the connexion betwixt the relation and the will; and must prove that this connexion is so necessary, that in every well-dispose'd mind, it must take place and have its influence; tho' the difference betwixt these minds be in other respects immense and infinite." (ibid.)

Here the point is not about that such a new relation is impossible. It is about the relation between this moral relation and the will. This following sentence summarizes this issue: "Tis one thing to know virtue, and another to conform the will to it" (ibid.). Hume thinks that even if we come up with such a necessary and objective relation it is still dubious how it directs the will to perform an action. This is related both to MA and DA. Since reason is incapable of producing action and such a new relation can only be derived from reason (alone) (Hume's assumption), this relation is also incapable of producing action. Additionally, since morality is an active principle and it is capable of producing action, such a new relation would be in a bizarre relation to morality because it would be an inactive principle directing the will. Hume finds this bizarre consequence as evidence to support the first condition that such new relations seem to be difficult to be imagined. Hume continues by recalling his argument concerning the relation between cause and effect, that, similarly, the discovery of this new relation would not be done otherwise, but by experience. In other words, it is impossible to discover *a priori* that these new relations are eternal and immutable. He underlines this point with a clever sentence: "And 'tis impossible to fulfil the second condition; because we cannot prove *a priori*, that these relations, if they really existed and were perceive'd, would be universally forcible and obligatory" (ibid.). This is a clever assertion because for Hume to prove something is an *a posteriori* business. So when

he says, “we cannot prove *a priori*”, he just underlines a tautology in his general framework. *A priori* reasoning can only be demonstrative. So, for Hume such a new relation can only be discovered –if there is one– by causal reasoning and thus it can be neither eternal, nor immutable. The reason is the same with the reason why he denies the knowledge of necessary connection between the cause and the effect.

The first issue appearing immediately is the idea of the requirement of the conformity of the will to the moral relations. Hume finds it easy to assume that these moral relations can be eternal and immutable. However, he absolutely gives no credit to the assumption that the connection between the will and these moral relations can be necessary. It looks to me as believing that God exists, but at the same time refuting the idea that God is infinite. Surely the rationalist account depends mostly on divinity and the theological assumptions about the attributes of God. Without accepting those theological assumptions, it could be very difficult to get the idea behind it. For Clarke, for instance, God’s goodness, its active nature and its omniscience cannot be considered separately. What Hume wants to do here, however, is to analyze these relations as, on the one hand, knowledge, and on the other hand, as active principles. Hume clearly wants to be too powerful in his attack, but in this case, I think, his attack is too powerful to be reasonable. If he assumes that these relations can be eternal and immutable, then he must also assume that their connection to the will must be necessary. Otherwise, this cannot be an objection to the rationalist account of morality. Secondly, his objection to this claim that, the connection between the will and these relations cannot be necessary seems to me, depends on simple observations. These observations concerning the parricide and incest cannot be considered as sufficient to accept that these two conditions concerning the moral relations are reasonable.

My second concern brings out a different look at this second condition. In this case, we need to look at the issue of the necessary connection between the moral relation and the will from the other way around. We need to ask now, why these moral relations must *necessarily* cause our will to act according to these eternal and immutable laws or principles. Of course, this requirement comes from the idea that morality is an active principle. What this means is that it affects our actions, intentions, and aversions. I admit that this conception of morality is quite acceptable. However, what I object is the idea that this activeness must be so

necessary. It might be required by the rationalists of the time when Hume writes the *Treatise*. Nonetheless, I have argued that the relation in question in these two conditions needs not to be specifically and necessarily a *Clarkean* or *Wollostonian* moral relation, even though Hume considers them as the protagonists of this attempt of positing moral relations. Hence, we need to conceive Hume's claim that the relation between moral relations and the will must be necessary (for rationalists) as a conceptual necessity for the account of moral relations in general. So again, we can object to this idea by showing that this *necessity* is not necessarily the case.

First of all, let's say, there are eternal moral truths just like eternal mathematical truths. So, suppose that "murder is wrong' is true" and everyone have this knowledge. As Hume wants to say it, this fact of the matter has nothing to do with my act to kill someone intentionally or not. My will cannot be necessarily caused by this piece of eternal knowledge. On the other hand, I also know that, if I add two to two, I will come up with four. Again, as Hume has argued, this piece of knowledge does not cause my will to save my money; if I have one more coin. If we reject the idea that morality is *necessarily* an active principle, but at the same time admit that it is eternal and immutable, then there is no difficulty accepting that morality is just like arithmetic and algebra.

One would object this idea here, by saying that activeness of morality must be necessary, if you are arguing for objective morality. However, I have great difficulty in seeing the point of this objection. I understand this notion of objectiveness in either two possible senses. First, this might be suggesting that, if all those objective moral truths are installed to my software, then I am a fail-free moral mechanism, which cannot possibly act morally wrong. Secondly, it can also mean that, I am not a fail-free moral mechanism, but whenever I act against my software, I am doing something wrong. I think that Hume is trying to object to the first sense of this objectiveness. However, it is evident that objectiveness can take the form of the second sense. Additionally, this second sense is more consistent with how we exercise morality in ordinary life. It is a matter of fact that nobody acts in an exact similarity to other's acts. In the case of this, we can say that this second sense does not imply necessity in the sense that it is required above. So, if we accept this sense of objectivity, then Hume's second condition cannot be anymore a treat to the idea that there are moral relations and they are also objective.

This issue of necessarily practical morality is discussed by Philippa R. Foot as well. She criticizes the claim that morality is necessarily practical by arguing that two possible meanings of this claim do not justify the idea that moral qualities necessarily influence our conduct. She says:

I do not know quite what sense ought to be given to the proposition that morality is necessarily practical, but two things at least can be said. In the first place we take it as part of the meaning of what we call 'moral terms' that they are in general used for teaching particular kinds of conduct; though nothing follows about what any particular individual who uses the terms must feel or do. Secondly, since moral virtues are qualities necessary if men are to get on well in a world in which they are frightened, tempted by pleasure and liable to hurt rather than help each other, they need virtues as they need health or strength or the ability to make common plans. This general connection ... is quite enough to explain why people are often influenced by considerations of morality. They are not *necessarily* influenced, as Hume must have known. (Foot, 1966, p. 75)

Foot's and my points criticize these two different meanings of necessarily practical morality. She argues that not only morals (vice and virtue) but other non-moral qualities can also affect our actions. In this sense, our acts are not necessarily influenced by morality. My point, on the other hand, is showing that morals (vice and virtue) need not necessarily affect our actions, even though the knowledge of these moral properties is objective. Foot's understanding of the necessarily practical morality reflects Hume's own conception of morality as an active principle. However, my understanding reflects a reaction to Hume's reception of the rationalist conception. What Foot's objection brings about to my argument is that, it shows that one of the central premises in Hume's argument against moral relations is not true. So, the following is Hume's argument in the second condition:

- 1) Moral relations necessarily cause our actions. (Rationalists' claim)
- 2) Our actions can only be caused by morals. (Morality is active)
- 3) Moral relations must be morals. (1,2)
- 4) Moral relations cannot be morals. (From the first condition)
- 5) Therefore, moral relations cannot cause our actions. (2,4)

As we can see that the second premise is criticized by Foot. The first premise, on the other hand, is issued in my objection. This conclusion suggests that the assumption that morality is an active principle must be revised. This revision need, however, not to be a novel one. Foot might be wrong about her objection. When Hume was explaining the practicality and activeness of morality, he was

saying, “[M]en are *often* govern’d by their duties, and are deter’d from some actions by the opinion of injustice, and impell’d to others by that of obligation” (T 3.1.1., Italics added). So, it seems that for Hume, morality as an active principle does not mean that our actions can only be caused by morals. As he says, we “often” follow moral rules and obligations, but not all the time. Additionally, “duties, opinions of injustice, and obligations” are not morals (vices and virtues themselves). So, what is different in the case of the second condition is that, Hume responds directly to the rationalists’ notion of activeness that is the first premise stated above. So, if the second premise is wrong, then the argument cannot work. However, I have objected to the first premise independently. Following this objection, it must be said here that Hume’s second condition fails to show that moral relations cannot influence our actions. Although, it might be acceptable that it is a reasonable objection to the rationalists’ account of moral relations, it cannot be used to refuse any kind of account concerning the moral relations.

So far, everything was about the one horn of the fork. Just before the “is-ought” passage, Hume completes his fork by claiming that the vice and virtue cannot be found in matters of facts as well. This second claim, again we will see, rests on a simple observation and is not detailed by Hume. The proportion of this argument, perhaps, is considerably small comparing it to the arguments for the first horn of the fork. As a matter of fact, we may say that Hume does not provide an argument at all. He is just mocking by saying that “can there be any difficulty in proving that” and thinks that this following sequence of thinking will be sufficient to conclude that morals do not consist in matters of facts. By means of this, he is famously saying:

Take any action allow’d to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but ’tis the object of feeling, not of reason. (ibid.)

The vice entirely escapes us just as the necessary connection escapes us in the case of causation. And this attribution of vice to the object is actually our sentimental reaction towards the object. This reaction is a matter of fact, but this

matter of fact cannot be produced by any of our inferential or demonstrative abilities. Perhaps, it can only –if there is any– stimulate our will to take action towards the situation. After all, this is for Hume, what morality consists of. May be, it is not a good idea to call it an observation. As Rachel Cohon remarks that at this point Hume wants us, “to apply his earlier point about abstract relations to causal relations” (Cohon, 2008, p.92). As it is the case in the parricide example, we can find other instances, which seem exactly like willful murder in the sense of causal relations, but we never find them vicious. For instance, a lion hunts a deer, but we do not find it vicious⁵³.

Hume tries to be precise but some of his words need careful attention. For instance, he says that we need to consider only the object. What is the object of willful murder? Is it the act of killing (i.e. stabbing someone in the chest with a knife)? Is it the intention of the murderer to kill the innocent? Or, is it “x causes y to die (intentionally)”? Which one of these is the proper object that we need to examine? Hume is generous and says that we are allowed to examine it “in whichever way” we like, and his hypothesis is that, when we examine it, we can only find “certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts” (op. cit.). Hume wants to say that all these compounds, constitutes what willful murder is. And, there is no other compound (i.e. vice) can be found in the object of willful murder. However, if all these compounds are necessary to analyze willful murder, then we are forced to imagine a bloody murderer, an innocent person, a dagger, and a loud sound of scream. Hume certainly does not want us to imagine “x causes y to die” because unless we personify x and y, we cannot find any passion at all. In other words, Hume does not allow us to abstract the case, so that we can search for any other compound, if there are any. In this sense, Hume, either intentionally or by mistake, thinks that actions such as willful murder cannot be analyzed as mere causal relations. Here, what this shows is that not only vice but (nearly) everything “entirely escapes” us, “as long as” we “consider the object” (ibid.). Cohon’s interpretation of this issue is incomplete. She interprets this by saying, “Just as with abstract relations, every causal relation we can find might equally well be present somewhere without vice” (Cohon, 2008 p. 92). However, every causal relation might be present without passions, volitions, motives and thoughts as well. A droid,

⁵³ Funny though; we hunt deers (and lions) as well and do not think that “hunting deers is vicious”. Isn’t it so capricious to give examples from the other animals’ actions?

without any passion producing emotive states, can kill another droid intentionally, solely by some rational reasons. Or, in the case of parricide, the seed has no volition to cause the death of the parent tree. Or, an alien life form equipped only with passions and has no thought producing mechanism, can kill a conspecific. All the list of the compounds of a willful murder can escape us just like vice does. So the argument does not tell anything specifically about vice and virtue. It only states that willful murder has such and such compounds. Unfortunately, even those compounds are under suspicion.

I am trying to show that Hume's argument here does not discredit vice successfully. The strategy of Hume's argument does not only eliminate vice, but it also eliminates passions, thoughts, etc. This should be an unforeseen consequence of the argument. This unforeseen consequence implies that, not only vice, but also passions and thoughts cannot be found in willful murder. However, Hume would admit that this is just wrong. Then, Hume should concede that the way of examination that Hume is suggesting is implausible. We cannot understand willful murder as an ordinary causal relation. In other words, it is impossible to reduce it to an 'A causes B' type of action. At this point, I am not suggesting that vice is a compound of willful murder. This claim will be endorsed in the next chapter. What I have shown so far does not discredit Hume's main claim of the willful murder example that vice does not lie in the object. However, Hume's argument and his examination of willful murder are not sufficiently conclusive.

My criticism suggests that moral actions must be treated as special types of causal actions. I think that putting the problems in his argumentation aside, Hume treats moral actions as special. He says, "[W]hen you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it." (T 3.1.1) By pronouncing a causal action as moral action, we treat it as special because it causes us to produce some feelings or sentiments about it. So because not all causal relations make us feel in such a manner, then, when we pronounce an action to be vicious or virtues, we mean something important. In this case, I think, Hume is wrong to say that we "mean nothing", when we call an action vicious. He might be willing to say that, "we mean nothing about the object of the relation". This would be right because, for instance, in the case of willful murder, vice has nothing

to do with the knife, people involving in the action, etc. Alternatively, we might mean nothing about the passions, thoughts, volitions, and actions concerning the relation as well. This latter would be true, but only trivially. However, and equally, even this might be wrong. Vice is somehow related to these passions that people involving in the act of murder are producing. If this is so, then it cannot be an objection to the rationalist claim⁵⁴. The rationalist's claim wants to say that vice is a property of murder and not derived from those passions, etc. For a rationalist, vice is not one of the items listed above, nor is it derived from them. Ultimately, this argument is not carefully designed by Hume. It is, either not targeting the rationalist claim, or it is trivially true that vice cannot be reduced to the objects of the relation.

Another evidence, which supports this last claim makes itself apparent in Hume's analogy between the secondary qualities and vice and virtue. As Pall S. Ardal (1989, p. 207-8) argues, this analogy does not work at all. Hume says, "Vice and virtue, therefore, may be compar'd to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind" (T 3.1.1.). In terms of this Ardal says that, for Hume, vice and virtue are not properties that can be considered in the same category with the secondary qualities. Vice and virtue, "are not natural qualities, like colours, that can be discovered by observation; no scrutiny of external objects will reveal such qualities" (Ardal, 1989, p. 208). I agree with Ardal's interpretation. In this sense, I think, when Hume says that virtue and vice are perceptions in the mind, he is literally claiming this. On the other hand, Hume rejects the idea that secondary qualities are mere perceptions. In *Treatise* Book I, Hume gives his ideas about the secondary qualities. Interestingly, it seems inconsistent with his idea in the example of willful murder. He says, "If colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can conceive is possest of a real; continu'd, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and solidity, which are primary qualities chiefly insisted on" (T 1.4.4.). Hume has no such concern about vice and virtue⁵⁵. The passions, actions, volitions,

⁵⁴ Kydd has a similar point. See, Kydd (1964, p. 50).

⁵⁵ John P. Wright argues for the opposite claim. He thinks that for Hume secondary qualities are only in the mind and in this way they are similar to vice and virtue. However, his argument rests on the idea that for Hume primary qualities are completely different from the secondary qualities. His interpretation rests on his interpretation of Hume as a "sceptical realist". I will not further discuss this interpretative difference, but it must be conceded that the relation between the primary and

and thoughts are all real regardless of our contemplation of the situation. In this sense, Hume's consideration of vice and virtue similar to secondary qualities that Hume is giving in T 3.1.1 can be omitted from a serious consideration. Additionally, this inconsistency supports the claim that Hume's argument-like observation is unsuccessful in showing that vices and virtues do not consist in matter of facts.

There are other serious problems about the example of willful murder. For instance, Mounce says that in the example, Hume tries to analyze the disapproval of murder by appealing to purely subjectivist terms. He says,

Hume treats the disapproval of murder on the model of a sensation and its cause ... [A]ccording to Hume, I feel sensations of disapproval in my breast and note the murder as their cause ... It is absurd, however, to suppose that in disapproving of murder I first feel sensations of disapproval and only later discover that someone has been murdered ... The very point of my moral judgment is to convey, not that I feel *this*, but that given the character of the act it is only this one can *appropriately* feel. My judgment about what is appropriate to the act is evidently unintelligible unless I am already aware of it. (Mounce, 2002, p. 84)

I think it is obviously true that without being aware of the fact that murder is unpleasing, the passion of disapproval would make any sense in judging the act as vicious. Moreover, in all cases of approval or disapproval, some sort of reasoning is required. We need to determine whether it is a self-defense, committed in a war situation, an accident, etc. All these factors are external to the spectator's mind and passions⁵⁶. Hume is right that my feeling of disapproval is caused by all those external elements of murder, but he is wrong to say that it is sufficient to listen to your heart and hear the voice of your passions aroused in that situation.

Secondly, I want to introduce Snare's objection to Hume's method of analyzing the situation in the case of murder. As I have argued, Hume's examination of the example does not only eliminate vice and virtue, but together with them, too many other important compounds. Similarly, Snare argues that by Hume's strategy, many other important things must be thrown out as well. Snare calls this strategy as the "cognitivity test for vice" and finds it "too crude".

secondary qualities seems different from the relation between vice and virtue, and primary qualities. See, Wright (1983, pp. 107-112).

⁵⁶ The determination of which of these factors best fit into the situation must be prior to our evaluation of the situation as vicious or virtues.

According to him, if we apply this test for other objects, then we must concede that our ontology would be depleted. He says:

If more light or even a microscope will not get us closer to revealing that matter of fact which is the vice, neither will those things help in revealing what is the fact which is a law of nature, or a causal connection, or a dispositional property, or an institutional fact. Watching more carefully the salt dissolving does not reveal the solubility. A close-up of the billiard balls in contact does not reveal the causation. We can miss the table by examining too much the wood. Nor will we observe the parliament, the law, or the football match. If moral distinctions get thrown out, they will at least be in rather good company. And this may well suggest that the problem here is not in morality but in an inadequate empiricist philosophy. (Snare, 1991, pp. 41-2)

This criticism is based on the idea that the empiricism Hume endorses in the *Treatise* is not tenable. As the examples above suggest, by appealing to the Humean empiricism we must concede not only moral distinctions, but also too many other things that we conceptualize as facts today⁵⁷. This is not to say that vice and virtue can actually be facts of the matter. However, what is important to see is that they cannot be considered as merely derived from our passions. So, I want to conclude that the example of the willful murder is unsuccessful in terms of showing that vice and virtues are not matter of facts. However, in chapter 5, I will argue that there is an explanation of willful murder, which is at least as powerful as Hume's analysis. In fact, this explanation makes moral relation possible by claiming that moral properties are experiential. For now, we must continue with completing the interpretation of T 3.1.1.

3.4. The Overall Argument of Treatise 3.1.1

Before dealing with the "is-ought" passage, it will be helpful to combine all of these considerations and set up Hume's overall argument of T 3.1.1. The following sequence of argument is the combination of MA, DA and HF. Ultimately, they entail that morals are not relations and therefore cannot be derived from reason:

- (1) Morality is practical. (Forced by assumption)
- (2) Hence, morality must influence our actions. (1)

⁵⁷ A similar reaction is given by Hilary Putman (2004, pp. 19-24). Cf., Kovesi (1967).

- (3) Morals (vice and virtue) are influential in our actions⁵⁸. (2)
- (4) Judgments derived from reason (alone) cannot be influential. (MA)
- (5) Morals are not judgments derived from reason (alone). (3, 4)
- (6) Morals are original existences and cannot be the object of reason. (DA)
- (7) Moral relations cannot be found in relations of ideas and matters of facts. (HF)
- (8) Hence, there are no moral relations. (7)
- (9) Anything, which is not a relation, cannot be derived from reason. (7, 8)
- (10) Ultimately, morality cannot be derived from reason⁵⁹. (5, 6, 9)

Supplementary Argument A: Against Rationalists:

- (1) Moral judgments must have two constituents: epistemic and practical. (“It is one thing to know virtue and another to conform the will to it”)
- (2) Epistemic constituent cannot be eternal and immutable. (It cannot be found in relations of ideas)
- (3) Practical constituent cannot be necessarily influential. (“It is impossible to prove *a priori* that these relations are universal and obligatory”)
- (4) Hence, there cannot be any eternal and immutable moral judgments.

Supplementary Argument B: Against Moral Relations:

- (1) A relation is either demonstrable or inferred from cause-effect.
- (2) A moral relation cannot be demonstrated.
- (3) A moral relation cannot be inferred from cause-effect.
- (4) A moral relation must influence our actions.
- (5) No relation can influence our actions.
- (6) Hence, there cannot be any moral relations.

In the overall argument it can be seen that there is no reference to *beliefs* or *cognitive states*. Secondly, the objection to rationalist’s is considered as a supplementary argument and not considered as the primary end of the overall argument. In this sense, this Supplementary Argument must be read as a different argument. Thirdly, the argument against moral relations is considered as another supplementary argument. The reason why I labeled it as a supplementary argument is that overall argument need not necessarily argue against moral relations in general. The overall argument states only that anything, which is the object of

⁵⁸ Morality is substituted for morals by Hume in the argumentation.

⁵⁹ A similar form of argumentation can be found in Garrett (1997, pp. 192-3).

reason, cannot be the subject of morality. In the case of this, there can still be moral relations, but these relations cannot be the objects of reason. On the side of the Supplementary Argument B, it is intended to claim that there can be no moral relation at all.

I have mentioned the problems with all of these arguments in the previous sections in detail. So, I am not going to touch on them again. However, it is important to emphasize on some crucial things. First, Supplementary Argument A shows that there can be no eternal and immutable moral relations, which can necessarily motivate our actions. Supplementary Argument B, on the other hand, concludes that any kind of moral relation lacks of such motivational force. Secondly, all of these arguments are based on the forced assumption that morality is necessarily practical. So, the MA is the most important argument in T 3.1.1. This assumption, as I have argued against it, need not to be accepted with ease. In this case, in the final section, it will be crucial to examine the “is-ought” passage in the light of the following questions: (i) Does this assumption takes place in the “is-ought” passage? (ii) What is the relation between each of these arguments and the “is-ought” passage? (iii) What is the significance of the distinction between morals and moral judgments? (iv) Why is the issue of “relation” significant? (v) What do *ought* and *is* consist of? A careful analysis of the “is-ought” passage based on these questions and the exegetical work given in the previous chapter will introduce the contextually accurate interpretation of Hume’s Law.

3.5. Extracting the “Is-Ought” Passage and Hume’s Law

I have ended the last section with several questions concerning the “is-ought” passage. In this section, I will interpret the “is-ought” passage by trying to answer these questions. On several occasions, I have said that the “is-ought” passage does not contain a separate argument. In order to examine this claim it is better to start with articulating the claims of this passage and constructing the so-called argument of Hume’s Law. Until the second half of the “is-ought” passage, Hume does not provide any argument-like contention. In the second half, he starts to provide his claims against the arguments, which contain premises with “is” and

conclusions with “ought and ought not”. The second half of the passage can be formulated as the following sequence of lines:

- (a) “Ought” and “Ought not” express “new relations”.
- (b) These new relations are entirely different from the “other relations”.
- (c) If an argument consists of both these new and other relations, then a reason must be provided to show how these new relations can be a “deduction from others”.
- (d) No such reason can be given because; “vice and virtue is not founded on the relations of ideas and not perceived by reason”.
- (e) Hence, such a “deduction” is not possible.

Both the justification of the premises of (a) and (b), and the inference from (c) to (d) must be explained. First of all (a) and (b) are the claims of HF. In HF, Hume was arguing that morals are considered as relations by the rationalists. However, he concludes that there can be no moral relations in any sense of relations. In arguing this, he justifies his claim by arguing that such moral relations are entirely different from the other relations that Hume conceptualizes in the *Treatise*. Here in the “is-ought” passage; however, we learn something new. In the arguments of T 3.1.1 Hume always refers to vice and virtue and does not tell us that the propositions referring to those moral terms are formulated with the copula *ought*. Here in this argument, Hume explicates his idea that moral relations must have the grammatical form of “x ought to y”, which seems at face value different from the formulations such as ‘murder is wrong’, ‘promise keeping is a virtue’, etc. However, this difference in copulation need not necessarily mean that moral evaluation and moral obligation must be two separate things. In HF, Hume was arguing that these moral relations must have two constituents: (1) giving information about the normative status of the act in question (moral evaluation) and (2) impinging duties on the agents who are related with the relevant acts and the situations (moral obligation). So it is dubious whether Hume thinks that the propositions like “murder is wrong” and “you ought not to kill” have the same status. Hume underlines the difference by pointing out the difference in copulation. However, this is not sufficient to think that for Hume propositions of moral evaluation (i.e. lying is vicious) and propositions of moral obligation (i.e. one ought

not to lie) are two different things. In this sense, we still need to explain why Hume specifically refers to *ought*, while moral evaluations are formulated with *is*.

There can be two answers to this. First, Hume considers moral evaluations as *oughts*, even if they are formulated with *is*. Secondly, what he really wants to show with the “is-ought” passage is, that moral obligation cannot be *deduced* from *moral evaluation*. In this sense, whatever are moral evaluations, moral obligation cannot be subject to reason. I am in favor of the second alternative. We will see in the next two chapters that moral evaluations are factual statements. In this sense, the real problem with the vulgar systems is connecting obligation to propositions stating contingent facts of the matter.

This last point is a crucial step in my interpretation. In general, while examining Hume’s Law, many philosophers think that the propositions with *is* copula does not contain any moral terms such as vice, virtue, good, or bad. However, it is now clear that it is not the real problem that is singled out in Hume’s Law. For Hume, propositions like “murder is wrong” can be stated as a premise of a moral argument. However, even if this is allowed, the problem still remains. The problem is about the conclusion, and not about the premises. In an argument, if the conclusion is formulated with *ought* copula, then whatever the premises are, this conclusion cannot be inferred by reason. So, the open question for Hume is different from the open question of the “open question argument”⁶⁰.

Although it is allowed to have premises containing moral terms in our arguments, this does not need to mean that these propositions can be counted as having the same status with propositions which are clearly descriptive in content. In (d) and HF, Hume claims that moral relations cannot be inferred from matters of facts either. This is so because, for Hume, virtue is not a property of external objects. If, for instance, “murder is wrong” is a relation, then it seems that such a relation is also inconceivable. However, then we have an interpretive problem here. We must determine the answer of the following question again: When Hume highlights “ought” in the “is-ought” passage, is he speaking strictly or just talking about moral judgments in general? I think the most accurate answer to this question

⁶⁰ G. E. Moore argues that “good” is indefinable. The open question in moral argument is all because of this issue. However, for Hume there is no such problem of defining moral properties such as good or virtue. What is indefinable for Hume is the rationalists’ “ought”. In this sense, this “ought” for Hume differs from the other moral terms like virtue, good, etc. For Moore’s arguments, see; Moore (1903, § 13-14).

would be the following. The example of willful murder discussed in HF deals with something slightly different. In that example, Hume emphasizes the idea that virtue cannot be observed within the object. However, in (d), the emphasis is more on the idea that *obligatoriness* of an action cannot be inferred from the facts about the reality. These facts may well contain our emotional reactions to the situation. Ideas produced from our passions must be spelled out as facts because passions are impressions and therefore real existences. In the case of this contention, we must see the solution of this puzzle. Ultimately, Hume makes two different, but interrelated claims. On the one hand, he says that morals are not the properties of objects. On the other hand, he says that moral obligation cannot be inferred from matters of facts, even if these facts include our passions of approbation or disapprobation. Hence, the above interpretation is still adequate.

One of the other issues is that in chapter 2.3, I have argued that we need to consider “deduction” differently from it is conceived in the contemporary conception of deduction in logic. In this sense, we need to remember that deduction in question here must be considered as inference in general. This means that Hume wants to say that any possible attempt of inferring *ought* from *is* is inconceivable. In contemporary terms, these possible attempts can take the form of deduction or induction. So, in Hume’s Law, Hume is arguing for something of a broader claim than just saying that we cannot deduce (in the contemporary sense) *ought* from *is*, which is claimed by some of the contemporary interpretations to be the conclusion of Hume’s Law.

The reasons why this deduction (in Hume’s use of it) is inconceivable are not presented in Hume’s Law because the arguments of MA, DA, and HF provide sufficient arguments showing that moral relations cannot solely be produced by reason (DA); moral relations are neither relations of ideas, nor inferences of matters of facts (HF); and relations cannot influence actions (MA). The inference from (c) to (d) is justified by these arguments.

In terms of these considerations the following conclusions can be drawn. The conclusion of Hume’s Law depends stringently on the rejection of *ought* as a relation. This relation must necessarily be practical. Such a necessarily practical relation cannot be the object of reason. So, no inference in any kind can be drawn of

or out of these relations. If these are the reasons behind Hume's Law, we must concede that the "is-ought" passage does not contain a separate argument.

One would, however, object to this claim and say that, even though it is not a separate argument, it entails something new. All of the arguments in MA, DA and HF are based on the idea that morals influence actions. However, the main motivation behind Hume's Law is not about morals' influence on our actions. So, according to the objection, Hume's Law deals only with the impossibility of inferring *ought* propositions from *is* propositions. In this case, even if morals or moral relations somehow had influence on our actions, it could still be impossible to infer any *ought* from any *is*. Hence, it is legitimate to interpret and evaluate Hume's Law as a separate argument.

I take this possible objection as a legitimate one. However, this can only be partially correct. Throughout this chapter I have argued that in T 3.1.1 before the "is-ought" passage, we can encounter three main arguments. The overall argument is relying on the assumption that morality is necessarily practical. In this case, the objection here can be reasonable. Although this would be the case, the other two supplementary arguments play a crucial role in Hume's Law. The supplementary argument against moral relations provides the reasons why an inference from *is* to *ought* is not possible. By means of this, in that argument, we may add a final step and conclude that *moral relations cannot be derived from other (non-moral) relations*. And this conclusion would mean the same thing with (e). Secondly, the notion of *ought* cannot be understood, unless we turn our faces to the supplementary argument A against moral rationalism. More importantly, though, in my interpretation the driving spring of all these arguments is the necessity of the practicality of morality. I claimed that Hume's Law cannot be justified unless we appeal to MA, DA, HF, which are basically depended on this former notion about morality. In this sense, this objection is partially incorrect, because it fails to see that the premises of Hume's Law rely on the very first axiom of the overall argument. On the other hand, it is partially correct because the conclusion of Hume's Law adds something new to the overall argument. By adding this to the overall argument, ultimately, Hume is now stating that not only morals are not derived from reason, but also there cannot be any meaningful moral proposition

with the copula *ought*, which can be derived from reason as well. The tension between the morals and moral judgments are now clearer but not complete yet.

In the next two chapters, I will try to interpret and critically analyze this tension. In the next chapter, I will evaluate Hume's account of natural relations and try to show that in T 3.1.1, Hume does not exclusively exhaust the idea that there cannot be any moral relations. In this sense, if there is a possible way of characterizing moral relations, then this will mean that morality need not be necessarily derived from our sentimental reactions towards the actions or characters of others. In chapter five, I will expand this claim and argue that moral obligation and moral evaluation are not two separate things. In this sense, there is no such problem with "deducing" "ought" from "is". We will see that all of the arguments of T 3.1.1 can be objected by the view that moral relations are experienced in sensation.

CHAPTER 4

NATURAL RELATIONS ARE DERIVED FROM SENSATION

All the colours of poetry, however splendid, can never paint natural objects in such a manner as to make the descriptions be taken for a real landskip. The most lively thought is still inferior to the dullest sensation. (EHU, 17)

In the last two sections, I have defended my interpretation of Hume's Law based on a contextual reading of T 3.1.1. As I have said, Hume does make a distinction between our judgments of morality and the source of morality. This distinction throughout this thesis is called the distinction between morals and moral judgments. This central theme of T 3.1.1 is based on two crucial claims. On the one hand, Hume claims that morals cannot be found in relations. In other words, there are no moral relations. On the other hand, he claims that there are two constituents of morality. First, there is the knowledge of what is right and wrong (if there really is such knowledge). Secondly, there is the motivating force of morality. Hume claims by this second constituent that no inference can bring about any obligation on any human action. In this sense, I have already claimed that Hume's Law is not specifically related to the issue of the validity of moral arguments (if there really are such propositions).

Starting from this chapter, till the end of this dissertation I will try to argue that Hume's claim that there are no moral relations can be not exclusive and thus, incorrect. I will argue that Hume does not consider the possibility of moral relations as simple impressions exhaustively. In order to show that moral relations as natural relations are simple impressions, in this chapter, I have two tasks to complete. The first task is to settle Hume's theory of natural relations. The status of natural relations is not straightforwardly explained in the *Treatise*. In order to understand, what Hume considers for the natural relations in the first section, I will explain

Hume's theory of natural relations. I will claim that natural relations are at least perceptions. For the second task, from this unsettled status of natural relations, I will argue that natural relations must be simple impressions of sensation. By means of this, I will defend the view; I call the *stronger claim*, that complex impressions are constituted by simple impressions and the relation among these impressions. In this sense, I will claim that natural relations must be found in the content of complex impressions as one of their simple compounds. Ultimately, these two tasks will provide a basis for the next chapter. From this basis, I will continue in the next chapter to argue that moral relations are simple impressions. Finally, in the last section, I will try to figure out the relations between passions and ideas. In the double relation of ideas and also for the sympathy mechanism, Hume talks about some relations. However, there is an ambiguity of whether these relations are natural relations. I will claim that the relation between the subject of a passion (an idea) and the passion must be a natural causal relation. This last section will be important for the discussions of the last chapter.

4.1. Hume's Theory of Natural Relations

In this section, I am not going to issue the whole picture of Hume's theory of relations which can be found in any companion or textbook about Hume's philosophy. Instead, I am going to discuss one of the less discussed parts of Hume's theory of relations: the nature of natural relations. As it is well known, the principles of association constitute the natural relations that are the psychological connections among our ideas. On the other hand, the philosophical relations take place also among ideas but in this time these relations are related to how the understanding makes *comparison* between ideas. In T 3.1.1, when Hume rejects moral relations, he does this by implicitly considering them as possible philosophical relations. So, it seems to me that Hume does not consider the possibility that moral relations would be natural relations, even though for all complex ideas initially there are natural relations. In this respect, for a complete denial of moral relations, Hume should have evaluated and rejected the idea that moral relations might be natural relations. To give credit to Hume, I concede here that the example of willful murder may be interpreted as; that it is designed to

refuse this possibility. When Hume rejects the idea that vice cannot be found in the object, he might be saying that it cannot be found both as a property of the act of murder, or as the relation between the objects constituting this very act. In the last chapter, I said that in the case of willful murder vice is considered as a property. However, when he says that vice *always* escapes our examination of the object (murder), this, consequently, also means that vice cannot be a natural relation as well as a property of the object. I will leave this discussion to the next chapter, but before that we need to understand what natural relations are.

When I was reading the sections of *Treatise* related to Hume's views on relations, I had great difficulty in understanding the status of relations in general. Philosophical relations are labelled as complex ideas, whereas natural relations or the principles of association are not specified either as ideas, or impressions, but as "qualities" from which associations arise. What kind of qualities are these natural relations then? Secondly, this question brings me to another point where I started to think why relations must be either between ideas, or impressions and ideas⁶¹. To put it more explicitly, why cannot we have direct access to relations as the constituents of complex (or even simple) impressions?⁶² We will see that this possibility is never thought of by Hume⁶³. If this second question is intelligible, then the issue of the status of moral relations can get resurrected. If relations are simple impressions and, if it is reasonable to argue that moral relations are simple impressions, then it may become legitimate to say that there can be moral relations. The issue of natural relations as simple impressions will be discussed in 5.2. There I will try to show that it is acceptable that natural relations are simple impressions.

⁶¹ There must be the third alternative relations only between impressions. However, Hume seems to reject this alternative by saying, "But no connexions among distinct existences [impressions] are ever discoverable by human understanding" (T Appendix, 5). The following section will issue this alleged alternative.

⁶² This means that when we see "x is longer than y", why we see only "x" and "y" and discover longer than by imagination? Also, my intention here is not to endorse a different ontology of relations. I am trying to apply all the components of Hume's philosophy of mind and his theory of relations. So no further complication of the issue of the nature of relations is required. If it seems to be required, then I have no special offer for this. Finally, throughout this dissertation, I am not endorsing a positive account of relations. All the exposition of the relations rests on interpreting and criticizing Hume's contention that relations are complex ideas without giving a special explanation for natural relations.

⁶³ According to an interpretation, Hume is aware of that possibility in one interpretation and unaware of it in another. However, I will argue that the rejection of moral relations overrides that interpretation where Hume is seemingly aware of this possibility. For these two alternative interpretations see Inukai (2010).

To start with explaining Hume's theory of relations, the first important feature is that; relations are considered as complex ideas (T 1.1.4). Secondly, Hume distinguishes these complex ideas of relations as, on the one hand, natural relations, and on the other, as philosophical relations (T 1.1.5). The following passage is crucial:

The word RELATION is commonly us'd in two senses considerably different from each other. Either for that *quality*, by which two ideas are connected together in the imagination, and the one *naturally* introduces the other, after the manner above-explain'd; or for that particular circumstance, in which, even upon the arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to *compare* them (ibid.; Italics added).

The words in italics need careful examination. However, before that we need to look for something else. In the passage Hume refers back to T 1.1.4 for the "manner" how relations introduce themselves naturally. In T 1.1.4 titled as "Of the connexion or association of ideas" Hume explains how the mind join simple ideas to produce complex ideas. There are three "universal principles" which bind simple ideas by "some associating quality". So these universal principles are "[T]he qualities, from which this association arises, and by which the mind is after this manner convey'd from one idea to another, are three, viz. RESEMBLANCE, CONTIGUITY in time or place, and CAUSE and EFFECT" (ibid.). So ideas can naturally follow each other by either one of these associative principles or qualities.

The second sense of relations, which includes the philosophical relations are familiar to us. There are seven philosophical relations that I have already mentioned in the third chapter. Here in the previous quotation from T 1.1.5, what we learn about these relations is that they are the principles or the qualities by which the fancy or the imagination compares ideas. The first sense of relations is more interesting for us because, in the discussions of T 3.1.1, Hume does not mention this distinction between two senses of relations. According to the first sense, natural relations connect ideas and with these relations we come to have complex ideas.

Now, I need to work on the passage from T 1.1.5 in a more delicate manner. The first word that we need to clarify is "quality". In the passage, Hume defines the natural relations as qualities. So, resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect are the qualities by which simple ideas connect to each other and constitute complex ideas. It seems quite reasonable to accept that to resemble, to be contiguous and to be a cause or effect of something are all can be accepted as qualities of things. For

instance, the complex idea of “My laptop is on my desk” is a complex idea, in which two simple impressions (laptop and desk) are related by their quality of contiguity. The complex idea of “This is my mother’s picture” has two simple impressions (the picture and my mother) and they are related by the quality of the picture’s resemblance to my mother. The complex idea of “Cold makes me sick” is constituted by *cold* and *sick* which are related by the quality of the one being the cause of the other. These three examples are all about complex ideas. However, a natural relation can take place between a simple impression and a simple idea. For instance, when I see my laptop, the idea of the manuscript of my dissertation *naturally* follows in virtue of the fact that my dissertation is stored in my laptop (contiguity). When I see the picture of my mother, the idea of my mother *naturally* follows because the picture resembles my mother. Finally, when I feel cold, the idea of ‘flu’ can *naturally* follow because cold causes flu. As we see, the idea of natural relations rests on this notion of ‘*naturally follow*’.

Ideas derive from impressions. Impressions are raw materials of perception and we cannot have conscious access to them directly. As a consequence, if the relation between an idea and an impression had been deliberate (conscious, so to say); this would imply that impressions can be the object of our understanding. In this sense, simple ideas must naturally (i.e. without the aid of understanding) follow simple impressions, and this must be happening in virtue of resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect. In the case of the natural relations between ideas (in the case of complex ideas) the distinction between natural and philosophical relations makes sense. Some complex ideas are produced by conscious deliberation and some are not. For instance, the complex idea of red apple is constituted by two simple ideas of red and apple, which naturally follow each other by contiguity; but this relation is not made by our conscious deliberation. Whereas, the complex idea of pink giraffe is a complex idea composed of pink and giraffe is an outcome of our deliberate cognitive work. In experiencing the world, we are not conscious of Humean simple impressions, but instead we have a complex impression, which is constituted by atomic, discrete and simple impressions. In this sense, the complex idea derived from this complex impression, is constituted by a group of simple ideas, which arise together by a “gentle force” (T 1.1.4).

In the case of the relations between an impression and an idea, Hume suggests the same three relations as natural relations by which ideas are produced. Hume says, “[T]he idea or impression of any object naturally introduces the idea of any other object, that is resembling, contiguous to, or connected with it” (T 1.3.6). In this sense, there is no difference between the relations between impressions and ideas, and between ideas and ideas. This is an important reminder because, one can easily object Hume by saying that, if we cannot be aware of the content of our impressions, how can we realize the relations between impressions and ideas? As I have already evaluated, Hume thinks that ideas are kind of reflections of impressions (T 1.1.1). In this sense, an idea must resemble the correspondent impression (i.e. a copy resembles the original). Secondly, an idea is produced by an impression and that means that it is caused by it. Thirdly, an idea of a present impression follows the appearance of the impression and because of this it must be contiguous to it. So, these three relations are natural in the sense that they are the most undeniable candidates of constituting the relations between impressions and ideas. Moreover, Hume is also cautious in this manner. He says that these relations are not “infallible” and also not be the “sole” causes. However, they are still the “general principles” of the associations of ideas (T 1.3.6).

If we remember the examples that I have provided for understanding the natural relations, there we must cast a doubt on the very notion of relations themselves. What is a relation? We know that associations are attributed to ideas, but the relations which constitute these associations are not specified in Hume’s explanations. We know that ideas and impressions are perceptions. The association or the connection of ideas is meant to be one of the functions of our imagination, for which the mind is by nature predisposed to bound ideas in terms of these three qualities (T 1.1.4). So imagination must (so to speak) detect these three qualities holding among the ideas. This last interpretation may be doubted. Because of this possibility, we may point to some more textual evidence in the *Treatise*. For instance, Hume characterizes the relations as, “qualities which make objects admit of comparison” (T 1.1.5). These qualities, however, cannot be produced by imagination. In the case of resemblance relations; Hume says, “When any objects resemble each other, the resemblance will at first *strike the eye, or rather the mind*; and seldom requires a second examination.” (T 1.3.1; Italics added). More

explicitly, he says, “[W]e ought not to receive as reasoning any of the observations we may make concerning *identity*, and the *relations* of time and *place*; since in none of them the mind can go beyond what is immediately present to the senses, either discover the real existence or the relations of objects” (T 1.3.2). It is clear that for Hume imagination can only discover what is already presented in the content of ideas. And relations are also presented in this content. Similarly, Inuaki says, “[T]he relation is more accurately said to be highlighted rather than produced by the imagination, for nothing new comes into being as a result of this operation” (2010, p. 200). Ultimately, mind does not relate ideas, but detects the associations among ideas by discovering the relations between them.

In this case, the more important question to ask is: Whose qualities are they? These qualities must definitely be the qualities of perceptions. In other words, there must be some property or properties by which imagination can associate ideas and impressions. However, if this must be the case, then this implies that relations must also be simple impressions that are compounds of complex impressions and ideas. Hume says, “Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation” (T 1.1.1). From this definition of simple perceptions, we must think that a simple impression cannot provide a property which can be distinguished or separated from the impression. Ultimately, it is the following task by which I will claim that relations are simple impressions and, consequently, real existences.

In order to examine my claim that relations takes place between the objects of perception, the first place we may look at in the *Treatise* is the following passage:

’Tis likewise evident, that as the senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them regularly, and take them as they lie *contiguous* to each other, the imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its objects. As to the connexion, that is made by the relation of *cause and effect*, ... [’T]is sufficient to observe, that there is no relation, which produces a stronger connexion in the fancy, and makes one idea more readily recall another, than the relation of cause and effect betwixt their objects. (T 1.1.4)

First of all, we don’t need to pay much attention to the issue of the status of the objects of senses. There is an interpretive debate on Hume’s use of this phrase. He might be saying that the objects of senses are extra-mental entities, or they can

be the objects represented in the contents of ideas⁶⁴. Both interpretations work equally fine in my case. If they are extra-mental entities, then it may support my claim even more strongly. In that case, if my interpretation is correct and the objects of sensation are extra-mental entities, then relations are extra-mental objects as well⁶⁵. However, this is not required for defending my claim that natural relations are simple impressions. In this sense, let's assume that the objects of senses are the simple impressions of sensation. So, this means that these impressions constitute the content of ideas. In terms of this, in the passage, Hume claims that the associations that the imagination applies to the ideas are originally found among the impressions of sensation. So, the objects of sensation have the same qualities by which they stand in relation to each other. This idea is can be seen in the following passage in the *Enquiry*. Hume says:

A picture naturally leads our thoughts to the original: The mention of one apartment in a building naturally introduces an enquiry or discourse concerning the others: and if we think of a wound, we can scarcely forbear reflecting on the pain which follows it. (EHU, 3.3)

Of course, Hume talks about these things as ideas, but examples are so construed as to lead us to think that they are analogous to what happens in the external world. For instance the pain which follows the wound is an original existence and this shows that Hume does not merely talk about the ideas. In terms of these examples, we may now think that the relations of associations cannot be considered as merely intra-mental operations⁶⁶. Instead, they can be found both among the extra-mental entities and among the perceptions in the mind. As Kemp

⁶⁴ Some terminological clarification is needed. The objects of senses (or the objects of sensation) refer to those things which are experienced in sensation. In this sense, if they are extra-mental, then they are the things like tables, chairs, cars, and etc. If they are the objects represented in the contents of ideas, this means that they are the impressions of sensation. Impressions of sensation are different from the extra-mental entities because Hume thinks that impressions are caused by unknown causes. This is the Humean skepticism concerning the external world. Hence, Hume is expected to reject the idea that the objects of senses are extra-mental entities. So, when I refer to relations as operated by imagination or reason, then they are intra-mental entities (like all the perceptions). Consequently, the only meaning of the view of relations as extra-mental entities is that they are as real as tables and chairs.

⁶⁵ For Hume every perception, either an idea or impression, is an object of the mind. In this sense, relations, either as complex ideas or simple impressions are objects of the mind.

⁶⁶ Interpretations, holding the view that relations producing associations are among the real objects is a stronger version that I am not endorsing here. In my version, there can be relations holding between external objects and perceptions at the same time. In this sense, regardless of what the external world really consists of, perceptions are still associated with relations. This would be more accurate in the sense of being consistent with Hume's skepticism. For the stronger version, see: Hausman (1967); Kemp Smith (1941, pp. 246-8).

Smith (1941, p. 246) highlights it, Hume gives an interesting characterization of what happens, when an idea naturally follows another one:

'Twould have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, why upon our conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, and rouze up the other ideas, that are related to it ... I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow'd with a power of exciting any idea it pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is plac'd; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that, which the mind desir'd at first to survey. (T 1.2.5)

Hume conceives the underlying brain activity of forming ideas in the imagination as almost the same as the associations of ideas in the mind. The related brain traces of a conception of an idea are contiguous in the brain. More interestingly, when animal spirits fall into the relevant brain traces, they also activate other related ideas because of their spatial positions in the brain. This “imaginary” explanation may be thought of only analogous to the relation of contiguity, but then it must be admitted that the other two relations must have similar analogies underlying brain activity as well⁶⁷. Even if Hume did not think of seriously about this explanation, there are other indications of the idea that relations takes place among the external things as well. He says:

Cousins in the fourth degree are connected by causation, ... [I]n general we may observe, that all the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect, and are esteemed near or remote, according to the number of connecting causes interpos'd betwixt the persons. (T 1.1.4)

The relation of blood in terms of causation cannot be among our ideas. Even if one may object to this by saying that Hume is not cautious in writing and what he actually means is that the idea of the cousins are related by causation; and this particular type of causation is called the relation of blood. In this sense, it would be wrong to interpret him as saying that relations are among the objects of sensation. I think that this objection is unsuccessful. First, my interpretation does not deny that there are natural relations (the same types indeed) among the objects of

⁶⁷ Actually, Kemp Smith's motivation in quoting this passage is to argue that all three natural relations are actually versions of contiguity. Hence, according to him, there is only the relation of contiguity (1941, pp. 241-245). I am not going to evaluate this claim here because it would be irrelevant to my point. I am not interested in the question of how many relation types there are in Hume's analysis. My intention is to see, whether relations are some kind of impressions by themselves, or they are only imagination's instruments.

imagination. However, not denying this does not mean denying that there are relations among the objects of perception as well. These two claims are not contradictory. Secondly, it is actually my point that in order there to be a relation of causation between the ideas of cousins, the ‘cousins’ must be in that relations to each other. How can the mind cast relations on the ideas, if the content of these ideas do not stand in the relevant relation? Thirdly, and finally, if the complex idea of “Cousins are related with blood” is true, then this idea must be in agreement with the correspondent simple ideas and also the relation connecting these simple ideas must be one of the three relations of associations. Additionally, this relation must be predisposed at the level of sensation because otherwise, as Hume says, “[C]hance alone wou’d join them; and ’tis impossible the same simple ideas shou’d fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them” (ibid.). So, this bond of union cannot be produced, acted upon, or be applied by the imagination. This union must be already there and the imagination must detect it. Ultimately, what we get from responding to this objection is that natural relations must be (to say the least) perceptions. Now, we need to explicate this claim a bit more clearly.

4.2. The View of ‘Natural Relations as Simple Impressions’

In this section, I will argue that natural relations must be simple impressions. In the previous section, I have argued that relations must be compounds of complex impressions, which are prior to any investigation of the imagination or understanding. In this sense, in order to support this claim, I want to investigate the possible explanations of what it means that relations are the compounds of complex impressions. A weaker claim might show that a compound of impressions is nothing more than the order of simple impressions constituting (or bring about) the complex impression. A moderate claim would pose a surrealist version of the weaker claim and state that sensation might be delivering our successive impressions as if they are related⁶⁸. Finally, and most importantly, I will defend a stronger claim, which indicates that this compound of complex impressions and

⁶⁸ The idea is that even if sensation has no such role, the way we see things as related can be explained *as if* they are received by sensation as related. And, this “as if” clause makes the explanation surrealistic because it attributes to sensation something, which is actually not the case.

ideas are actually simple impressions that we perceive among the other simple impressions constituting the complex impressions. Ultimately, I will argue that natural relations cannot be considered as complex ideas. In this sense, while Hume's position on this is not settled explicitly, there is sufficient textual evidence showing that Hume might concede the stronger claim.

Let's start with the weaker claim. Hume is pointing out that our complex impressions contain something like an indication of the relation between the perceived simple impressions. When he deals with the idea of space, he says:

The table before me is alone sufficient by its view to give me the idea of extension. This idea, then, is borrow'd from, and represents some impression, which this moment appears to the senses. But my senses convey to me only the impressions of colour'd points, dispos'd in a *certain manner*. If the eye is sensible of any thing farther, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour'd points, and of *the manner of their appearance*." (T 1.2.3; Italics added)

When analyzing the complex idea of the table, Hume finds out that the unanalyzable bits of this perception are the simple impressions of colored points, which are positioned not randomly, but in an order of disposition. In this case, Hume defines this order of disposition as the "manner of their appearance". So the weaker claim indicates that this "manner of appearance" perceived in the complex idea of the table is part of the content of this impression. However, this weaker claim is not sufficient to find out, what really is that "manner of appearance". This description of the relation does not clarify anything about the nature of relations. We need something more precise.

In order to figure out this more precise description, we may now look at a moderate claim. In this case, the moderate claim would state that sensation exposing complex ideas, acts on the simultaneously (or successively) experienced impressions, as if they were related to each other. This surrealist version of the weaker claim is metaphysically stronger because, it gives to sensation a role of manipulating the impressions by disposing them "in a certain manner". This way of characterizing the notion of relations tells us that relations are attached to the impressions by sensation. Hence, relations are purely mental entities. If this is so, Hume cannot be consistent with his characterization of sensation. Hume thinks that the causes of our impressions are "inexplicable by human reason" (T 1.2.5).

However, if the moderate claim is correct, then sensation becomes (at least one of the) the cause of our impressions. Then, this must be wrong. So, the moderate claim also cannot define the notion of natural relations.

Finally, I will argue for a stronger claim. According to the stronger claim, our complex impressions are constituted by simple impressions of the objects of senses and the relation among these objects. Ultimately, the stronger claim indicates that natural relations are simple impressions⁶⁹. Let's consider a complex impression of the visual scene in front of me. In this complex impression, there are too many simple impressions such as my desk, laptop, speakers, pens, pencils, mouse, books, papers, files, cup of tea, cookies, etc. And let's say, for simplicity, I concentrate only on my desk and my laptop. If the ideas of the desk and laptop are associated in my mind, then for instance, one instance of their relation would be that my laptop is on my desk. So, in Hume's terms this complex idea must have two simple ideas of my desk and my laptop⁷⁰ that are disposed in a certain manner. Hence, if this certain manner is not itself an impression, then there are only two simple impressions constituting the complex idea: my desk and my laptop. However, this cannot be the whole story here. The relation 'being on' must be prior to the formation of the complex idea⁷¹. The mind itself cannot *naturally* associate the idea of my desk and my laptop by contiguity. As I have argued, the role of the imagination in the case of natural relations is to detect the relation among the relevant ideas by which one idea naturally follows the other. If this association is deliberate, then such a relation must be called a philosophical relation. In this case, 'being on', must be experienced in the sensation of the complex impression 'laptop-being-on-desk'. Ultimately, in this complex idea we must have three simple impressions: *laptop*, *desk*, and *being on*.

As I have stated earlier, the status of the objects of senses is not necessarily important for this discussion. All these three impressions may be caused by unknown sources as Hume suggests. In this sense, the stronger claim does not suggest that relations can only be extra-mental entities. What it actually claims is

⁶⁹ This claim is pretty much consistent with William James' (1950, p. 217) attack on Humean empiricism. "Radical empiricism" that James argues for, states that relations are real parts of experience.

⁷⁰ The actual simple impressions of this complex idea are, according to Hume, the colored points of my desk and my laptop. For simplicity, we may assume that the impressions of laptop and desk are simple.

⁷¹ The same example can be found in Inukai (2010, p. 194).

that natural relations can only be simple impressions. Consequently, they must be as real as any other impressions of sensation.

This stronger claim is not an objection to Hume, but an interpretation or understanding of his notion of natural relations. In the *Treatise*, this claim is actually stated in several occasions in different ways. I have shown these occasions in the previous instances. As a final indication of these occasions, we may look at a final instance, where Hume is more explicit about this issue: “I *immediately perceive*, that they [cause and effect] are contiguous in time and space, and that the object we call cause precedes the other we call effect” (T 1.3.14; Italics added). The contiguity of the cause and effect is immediately perceived by the mind. If something is immediately perceived, then it must be an impression of sensation. One can say that, not only impressions, but also ideas can be immediately perceived. Thus, contiguity can equally be an idea. However, if contiguity is an idea (it must be, then, a philosophical relation), then it cannot be immediately perceived because contiguity, then, must be a variable relation, for which there needs to be mediating ideas to infer it.

One can object to this interpretation by claiming that Hume is not saying that we immediately sense the relation of contiguity. Perception can either be of ideas or impressions. In this case, contiguity can still be an impression, or an idea. Despite the fact that this objection is perfectly cogent, it states something unimportant. First, the difference between an idea and an impression of an object is the difference in force and vivacity. Secondly, when I say that natural relations are simple impressions, I mean to say that they are the contents of simple ideas. In this sense the distinction between impression and idea does not make any difference in my use of these terms in this discussion. It is important to notice that in Hume’s framework, there cannot be any relation between impressions⁷². Simple impressions are isolated, encapsulated, discrete, unanalyzable, and atomic existences. Hence, any relation must be associating ideas and not impressions. However, this does not mean that our simple impressions are not related in our sensation to each other. Just as it was in the example above, a complex idea is derived from the related impressions. In this case, the crucial step is to understand the difference that this relation of impressions can only be detected by the imagination either, when these

⁷² As I have indicated earlier, even if there are relations among impressions, mind cannot discover them.

simple impressions produce simple ideas, or when it becomes conscious of the complex idea which is derived from these related simple impressions. Ultimately, it is a different issue of empiricism of what warrants the similarity of the relations detected by the imagination to the relations sensed by the sense organs⁷³.

Inukai claims that the “Imagined Relations” view is incompatible with the view I called the stronger claim. According to the “imagined relations” view, natural relations cannot be simple impressions because this would be inconsistent with Hume’s Separability Principle (Inukai, 2010, p. 202). According to her, simple perceptions are independent existences, which cannot be separated in more basic parts. Additionally, each simple impression is an independent existence⁷⁴. In terms of this Separability Principle; she argues that, if relations are simple impressions, then they must exist without the need of any other existences. She says, “[I]f there were separable perceptions of relations, then independent existence would have to be attributed to them, which would lead to absurdity” (Inukai, 2010, p. 203). She points out some textual evidence, where Hume gives no credit to the independent existence of relations as simple impressions. For instance, in the case of time (and similarly of space), Hume says that there is no additional impressions of notes from which our idea of time is derived (ibid.; T 1.2.3).

Secondly, she argues that, while simple impressions like the desk or the laptop can be experienced separately, the relation ‘being on’ cannot be experienced separately alike. In order to experience ‘being on’, the mind should perceive the complex idea of “The laptop is on the desk”. Accordingly, she concludes, “This violates the Separability Principle in a way that would make Hume concede that some perceptions are not ‘distinct existences’, which is in conflict with the nature of perceptions that he is not prepared to ‘renounce’” (ibid., p. 205). At this point, I should say that I do not follow this criticism concerning, what she calls the “Real

⁷³ Actually, this might not be such a crucial issue of interpreting Hume. As he says that impressions and ideas do not differ drastically, consequently, when we admit the stronger claim, then natural relations as simple impressions, and philosophical relations as simple ideas, follows consistently the descriptions of impressions and ideas. Hence, these two relation types can only differ from each other in their force and vivacity just as the other impressions and ideas do.

⁷⁴ This principle is also known as the principle of atomism. The principle states that, “whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination” (T 1.1.7). See also, Zabeeh (1960, pp. 87-9).

Relation View”⁷⁵. And, actually, there is a big confusion in thinking. The Real Relation View and the stronger claim do not suggest a connection between being experienced and being a distinct existence. It is true that most of the distinct existences are (can) also be experienced distinctly, but this does not make it a necessary condition. Also, I do not think that Hume assumes such a necessary principle either. It seems fairly plausible to say that the relation ‘being on’ cannot be experienced separately. However, at the same time, this cannot make it necessarily a fiction, or a phantasm of the mind.

For instance colors cannot be experienced separately; and colored things cannot be experienced as colorless. Hume himself concedes the idea that we conceive things by their qualities (i.e. colors). He says, “’Tis not only requisite, that these atoms shou’d be colour’d or tangible, in order to discover themselves to our senses; ’tis also necessary we shoul’d preserve the idea of their colour or tangibility in order to comprehend them by our imagination” (T 1.2.3). However, seemingly contrary to this assertion, Hume also indicates, “Tho’ a particular colour, taste and smell are qualities all united together in this apple, ’tis easy to perceive they are not the same, but are at least distinguishable from each other” (T 1.1.1). This is seemingly contrary because in the first passage, Hume claims that the minute parts of a thing cannot be perceived, if they are isolated from all of its secondary qualities. On the other hand, in the second passage, Hume says that all those secondary qualities, which make things appearing, can be perceived separately from each other. In this case, the crucial thing is to determine how this separation happens. Is this separation based on conceivability, or experience (phenomenal experience)? Based on the first passage, it seems that this is based on experience. The minute parts of things (phenomenally minute) can be *conceived* as isolated from some of their sensible qualities. Alternatively, we can attribute some qualities to those things, which they do not actually have. For instance, I can *conceive* of a blue apple. However, regardless of this being possible, we do not *experience* blue apples. Based on the second passage, the separation of perceptions is based on conception (or understanding). A red apple cannot be experienced as blue, *ceteris paribus*. The idea is not that a red apple can be experienced different in color in different light frequencies. What I want to show is that, if I experience a red apple,

⁷⁵ The stronger claim that I have suggested is consistent with the “Real Relation View”. Therefore, I take the objections to the latter as posing equal threat to the stronger claim.

then I experience a red apple, and not a blue one. However, this does not prevent me to imagine blue apples. Because of this, we can separate the idea of an apple into its more basic parts like its color, taste, smell, etc. In this case, we encounter an interpretative dilemma. What should be the criterion of separating complex ideas? Is it by imagination or experience?

In the first place, it seems evident that we have no simple impression of the color red. As Hume says, we are always experiencing colors attached to the things that they belong to. Hence, the color of an apple cannot be experienced separately. Consequently, it seems that it can only be separated by imagination. However, in the second place, things cannot be discovered, as Hume indicates, without the aid of their secondary properties. So, imagination can associate ideas in terms of the relations between their secondary qualities. Nonetheless, it seems that imagination cannot separate ideas in terms of their secondary qualities. We may think that this is not actually true because the idea of red and the idea of apple are associated by contiguity. If the imagination can associate them, it must also be able to separate them by reversing the same association. Even if this might be true, there is still the problem that the idea of color red does not correspond to an impression of color red. The impression of color red cannot be a simple impression, or there can be no impression of color red. This creates a crucial problem because every simple idea must correspond to a simple impression. Ultimately, separation cannot be done by imagination.

If we examine the complex impressions, we can come up with the same conclusion. When we listen to polyphonic music (i.e. a symphony), the sound of a chord, that we experience, can only be heard as a simple, unified, and single sound⁷⁶. Now, remember, or actually listen to a chord; and try to analyze this perception in order to detect every distinct note in it. It can be seen easily that the

⁷⁶ It may be hard to conceive such cases. In this case, it is better to imagine diachronically continuous phenomenal experiences such as toothache or watching an airplane moving. In those experiences, it is impossible to break them into their more simple compound ideas. Even if we experience the pain of a toothache as a continuous flow, there are actually compound phases of these experiences. An experiment shows that the shortest interval that we can distinguish temporally distinct experiences is around 30 milliseconds. See, Pöppel (1985). Barry Dainton (2004, pp. 374) calls these brief phases of conscious experience as the “specious present”. Dainton and Bayne explains these cases of toothache by saying, “[...] we can say that experiences at different times that are not phenomenally connected are nonetheless phenomenally *continuous* with one another provided they are linked by an overlapping chain of direct phenomenal connections” (2005, p. 549). Ultimately, if the duration of the sound of a chord is shorter than being a specious present, then it is possible to say that it is impossible for the imagination to separate its more simple compounds.

mind cannot do such an analysis by sensation. The sound of a chord is unanalyzable for the human mind, but at the same time, we are absolutely sure that this sound is polyphonic⁷⁷. In other words, we know that there is more than one note constituting a chord. So, this example shows that the content of the complex idea of the sound of a chord is unanalyzable, or cannot be broken down into its more basic constituents. Of course this is the case, when we try to do such an analysis by experience. If we do this analysis by imagination, we can conceive the notes of the chord separately because we may have adequate past experience of musical composition. Similar to the example of “the shade of blue” (T 1.1.1), we can find out which notes constitutes this singular sound. However, the separation of this complex idea, then, cannot depend on our sensation. Simple ideas constituting this complex idea of the chord, does not correspond to the simple impressions that we perceive, when we listen to that chord. All these simple ideas are derived from our ideas of memory and not imagination. Then the simple ideas constituting this complex idea do not derive from any simple impressions (which are temporarily contiguous to them). Ultimately, we are forced to say that this complex idea must correspond to a simple impression (The idea of the sound of a chord derived from the impression of its sound). However, this violates two principles. First, a complex idea cannot correspond to a simple impression. Secondly, a complex idea cannot be unanalyzable. So from my analysis some complex perceptions seem to be unanalyzable just like simple perceptions, and they correspond to simple impressions.

This problem is well-acknowledged in the literature. Zabeeh says, “Obviously, any statement of complex ideas does contain, besides terms which denote ideas, relations terms; and it is contested that Hume did not account for the denotation of such terms” (1960, p. 99). It seems that Hume does not account for the denotation of relations terms. In this case, my claim that some complex ideas are unanalyzable is consistent with Zabeeh’s remark but it suggests a more modest claim. For Zabeeh any complex idea must be unanalyzable. The problem with this

⁷⁷ Physiologically speaking, this claim can turn out to be false. To be precise, I do not know how the human auditory system works in this specific instance of hearing sounds. However, in Hume’s framework such a physiological account is not required. Intuitively, it seems evidently true to me that the sound of a chord is perceived as a unique sound, but at the same time we are aware that it is composed of different notes. So the sound of a chord is a simple impression in the Humean sense, but at the same time it must be a complex idea. Just like the ideas of space and time, the sound of a chord is constituted by more simple constituents.

denoting the relations terms is also questioned by T. H. Green. He asks, “What, then, is the one impression from which the idea of relation is derived?” (1874, p. 174) He blames Hume for not facing this issue in his account of relations. As Green suggests implicitly, Hume must somehow concede that the complex idea of a relation must be derived from a complex impression of the very same relation. Thomas Huxley (1895) suggests that this impression of relation must be generated by other impressions:

These feelings (succession, similarity, co-existence) are the foundation for everything that we call a relation. They are no more capable of being described than sensations are –they are as little susceptible of analysis into simpler elements– they are ultimate –they must be called impressions of relation. ... They differ from the other impressions, in requiring the pre-existence of at least two of the latter. Though devoid of the slightest resemblance to the other impressions, they are, in a manner, generated by them (1895, pp. 81-2; Quoted in Zabeeh, 1960, p. 99).

Even if we accept that there are impressions of relations as Huxley puts it, the problem that complex ideas containing those impressions remain unanalyzable. As Huxley says, it is impossible for the impression of a relation to correspond to a simple idea. Thus, the two impressions that are pre-requisite of the impression of relation together with that impression of relation must co-correspond to a complex idea. Otherwise, claiming that there is an impression of relation does not make any sense. In this case, Huxley’s suggestion faces the same problems and must admit that in claiming that there are impressions of relations, we are objecting to Hume and not correcting his account of relations.

The only solution to get rid of this problem is to claim that impressions of relations do correspond to *simple ideas*⁷⁸. So the idea of the sound of the chord is actually a simple idea. Intuitively speaking, this alternative seems also plausible. When we experience such a sound, the first reaction that we have is the idea that, “I am aware that I hear a sound which is unified. At the same time, I know that this singular sound is polyphonic”. This reaction shows that we are aware of a sound which sounds as singular, but we actually know independent from this perception that it consists of multiple notes. In terms of this, we acquire not one idea corresponding to the perception, but actually we acquire two ideas: one single idea

⁷⁸ Nicholas Capaldi says, “The division between simple and complex is an analytical one, whereas the division into sensation and reflection is genetic” (1992, p. 106). In terms of this, I think it is a matter of definition to call an idea simple or complex. Here, I am objecting to that definition, which specifies what is simple and what is complex.

of the experience and another complex idea about its content. In this case, the problem is solved because the simple idea corresponds to the simple impression of the sound of the chord and the complex idea can be separated into simple ideas of notes constituting the chord deriving from memory.

As a reply to this, I need first to take notice that two different ideas offered in the objection are not derived from the same origin. In this sense, the complex idea constituted by the simple ideas originated from memory is irrelevant to the inquiry that I am proposing here. Secondly, I am not sure that the simple idea offered by the objection is a plausible candidate. Every idea which is derived from experience must have a notion of awareness. For instance, when I experience a table, I form an idea that, "I am aware that I see a table and I know that this table has compounds". Being aware of experiencing something cannot count as a distinct idea because it makes every idea complex. In this case, "I am aware that I hear a sound which is singular" does not correspond to a separate impression. To have an idea of sensation, one must be aware that he experiences this sensation. Ultimately, this objection is wanting and we still need to say that the idea of the sound of a chord must be complex.

If we turn back to the status of the relation 'being on', first we need to underline that in Hume's account, the analysis of our simple impressions can only be accomplished by investigating ideas. In this case, imagination forms the limits of our consciousness on our impressions. Hence, conceptually, it must be admitted that 'being on' can be a simple impression, but it cannot be detected by the imagination as a simple idea. Just like in the case of the 'sound of a chord', the complex idea of a relation can correspond to a simple impression. If this will be the conclusion of this discussion, then apparently, I violate at least one of the two fundamental principles of *Treatise*. The first one is: "[W]ithout any exception, ... every simple idea has a simple impression, which resembles it; and every simple impression a correspondent idea" (T 1.1.1). If the sound of a chord and the relation 'being on' are simple impressions, there must be simple ideas corresponding to them. However, I claimed that the ideas corresponding to these impressions are complex. The second one is the Separability Principle: "Simple perceptions or impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation. The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguish'd into parts" (ibid.). If the idea of 'the sound of a

chord' or the idea of the relation "being on" cannot be analyzed in terms of the sensory experiences, then it must be said that they must be simple ideas. However, I claimed that they are complex ideas. It can be seen that the problem can be solved either by objecting to one of these principles, or by objecting to my claim that these perceptions are simple impressions, but at the same time complex ideas.

I think the Separability Principle interpreted as claiming that separation is made by imagination is wanting. And, the inconsistency of my claim with this principle is due to this misinterpretation. As I have already argued, the mechanism by which complex ideas are separated is not specified by Hume. In terms of this, I have claimed that separation cannot be done by disassociating complex ideas in virtue of the natural relations. Let's think of the complex idea of "The laptop is on the desk" again. If we disassociate the constituent ideas in virtue of the relation of contiguity, then we treat the relation as not a perception. However, as I have argued, this relation cannot be produced by imagination, but imagination can only detect the associative quality, if this quality is detectable.

In this sense, separation seems to be the task of the reason (or understanding) instead of imagination. Hume says, "When I oppose it [imagination] to reason, I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative and probable reasonings" (T 1.3.9). Actually, demonstrative and probable reasoning constitute the philosophical relations and this means that reason applies philosophical relations on ideas. This is more specifically stated as, "Judgment to be *separating* or uniting of different ideas. Reasoning to be the *separating* or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others, which *show the relation they bear to each other*" (T 1.3.7; Italics added). Even if Hume rejects dividing understanding into three acts as conception, judgment, and reason, he reserves the idea that judgment and reason separate and unite ideas. Hence, imagination cannot separate or unite ideas. The interpretation that separation based on imagination, however, depends on the Separability Principle stated in T 1.1.7. In that passage, Hume uses thought and imagination as interchangeable words. Hume says, "We have observ'd, that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the *thought and imagination*" (T 1.1.7; Italics added). From this passage, we can understand two different things. First, it states that two distinct faculties have the capacity of separating ideas. Secondly, thought

and imagination are interchangeable terms. I am in favor of the second alternative because there are textual evidences showing that Hume believes that it is only the distinction of reason, which can separate or unite ideas. In the same section Hume says:

'Tis certain that the mind wou'd never have dream'd of distinguishing a figure from the body figur'd, as being *in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor separable*; did it *not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be contain'd many different resemblances and relations*. Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a white colour dispos'd in a certain form, *nor are we able to separate and distinguished the colour from the form*. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, in what formerly seem'd, and really is, perfectly inseparable. *After a little more practice* of this kind, we begin to distinguish the figure from the colour by *a distinction of reason*; that is, we consider the figure and colour together, since that are in effect the same and undistinguishable. (ibid; Italics added)

There are two important things. First, Hume is saying that the figure and the body are in reality inseparable. The mind cannot even detect the relations in this singular existence. Additionally, when we perceive a globe of white, we can only perceive it as a simple white colored object. These explanations show signs that Hume admits that our simple impressions can contain relations. Secondly, these impressions, when they are experienced in different instances and by different aspects of reality, the mind can apply reason to separate these ideas from each other. This is actually my interpretation of the Separability Principle. By applying the philosophical relations, reason can conceive the figure as separated from the figured body. In fact, the criterion of separation is defined by interpreters as the principle of conceivability⁷⁹. Hume says, "*That whatever the mind clearly conceives includes the idea of possible existence, or in other words, that nothing we imagine is absolutely impossible*" (T 1.2.2). Accordingly, Hume thinks that when we separate or unite ideas, the separation or the union must be a possible existence and not imply a contradiction. In this sense, this way of applying this maxim can only be arbitrary and natural in the sense that ideas follow relations naturally and randomly. However, conceivability implies randomness, arbitrariness, and deliberation. In Hume's own example, this claim is more apparent. He says, "We can form the idea of a golden mountain, and from thence conclude that such a mountain may actually

⁷⁹ Zabeeh says, "Thus the principle of atomism, logically is based upon the principle of conceivability" (1960, p. 96).

exist. We can form no idea of a mountain without a valley, and therefore regard it as impossible” (ibid.). The idea of a golden mountain cannot naturally follow the impressions of gold and mountain. Earlier in the section of “Of the connexion or association of ideas”, Hume underlines that the natural relations are as “gentle forces” succeed in uniting the simple ideas, “which are most proper to be united in a complex one” (T 1.1.4). In this sense, the complex idea of the golden mountain can only be united by the “arbitrary union of two ideas in the fancy, we may think proper to compare them” (T 1.1.5). In addition to this, the impossibility of the idea of a mountain without a valley possesses the same idea, but in this time it shows that ideas that cannot be perceived by the imagination cannot be conceived as possible. This means that if two ideas do not naturally follow each other (mountain and no valley); it is even impossible to arbitrarily unite those ideas. There we see the relation between the imagination and reason. Ideas cannot be united or separated by reason, unless they are presented to the imagination. Conceivability principle presupposes that ideas that are conceivable must be perceivable too. However, conceivability can only be warranted by reason and not by imagination because no arbitrary union of ideas can be settled in the imagination.

Ultimately, this relation between the imagination and reason in terms of the separability by conceivability justifies my claims comprehensively. The first claim that simple impressions can contain relations can be seen in another place as well. This time Hume says:

Ideas never admit of a total union, ..., [o]n the other hand, impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire union; and like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself, and contribute only to vary that uniform impression, which arises from the whole. (T 2.2.6)

So, if the impression of a colored object is a uniform impression (simple), and the idea corresponds to that impression cannot admit a total union (complex), then my claim that complex ideas can correspond to simple impressions is granted. Ultimately, I want to end this discussion with utmost confidence, that in Hume’s framework, it is perfectly legitimate to accept the stronger claim that natural relations are simple impressions⁸⁰. And, the philosophical relations are the

⁸⁰ It is important to notice once again that I am not claiming that natural relations cannot be detected by the imagination. What I am actually claiming is that natural relations cannot be separated by imagination. Consequently, Hume is forced to say that relations are complex ideas, and does not exclude natural relations in this manner.

discoveries of these natural relations in terms of the distinction of reason. So, in the last section, I want examine the relations between passions and ideas. If these relations are also natural relations, then we can understand how DA and Hume's account of relations are consistent with each other.

4.3. Natural Relations of the Double Relation of Ideas

Before I move on to the next chapter, it will be useful to discuss the relations among our passions and ideas. So far, I have examined the relations between ideas and ideas; and impressions of sensations and ideas. However, in Book I of *Treatise*, Hume does not explain how our passions and ideas are related to each other. These relations are explained in *Treatise*, Book II. So in this section, I will try to explain these relations relying on Hume's explanations in *Treatise*, Book II. I will claim that between the idea of the subject of our affections and the passion itself is not explained by Hume explicitly. So, my task will be to interpret this relation (between passions and ideas). This interpretation and the explanation of the relations among passions and subjects of the passions will be useful in the next chapter.

As I have said, Book I has no explanation for these relations. At face value it can said that all three natural relations associate these passions and ideas. After all, Hume was quite explicit that there are only three natural relations. Even if this is true, which of these relations are used and to what they relate is still important. We will see in the next chapter that concerning the knowledge about them, causation and contiguity differ from resemblance. For the ambiguity of these relations, Kemp Smith underlines, "Hume's formulation of the principles of association in Book II, Part i, Section 4, where they are taken to be *five in number*, be his first formulation of the principles, the fact that they are being formulated *primarily in their bearing on the passions*" (1941, p. 245; Italics added). This might be interesting because in the relevant sections of Book II there is no apparent specification of relations implying that they are five in number. In this sense, Kemp Smith might be referring to the following relations as the other two completing the five:

(a) The relation between an impression and another impression:

All resembling impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than *the rest immediately follow* ... [I]deas are associated by

resemblance, contiguity, and causation; and impressions *only* by resemblance. (T 2.1.4; Italics added)

(b) The double relation of ideas:

Those principles, which forward the transition of ideas, here *concur with those, which operate on the passions*; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater violence, and the transition to it must be render'd so much more *easy and natural*. (ibid.; Italics added)

(c) The principle of sympathy:

[T]he sympathy between the passions and imagination will, perhaps, appear remarkable ... The full explication of this principle and all its consequences would lead us into reasonings too profound and too copious for this enquiry. It is sufficient, at present, to have established this conclusion, that the three connecting principles of all ideas are the relations of *Resemblance, Contiguity, and Causation*.⁸¹ (EHU, 3.18)

(b) and (c) can be considered as consisting of the same type of relations because the principle of sympathy is one type of mechanism by which the mind receives other's emotions by a double relation of ideas as well. In this sense, (b) includes (c). I will come to this point in a minute, but we need to start first with (a). For (a), there are difficulties. First, it is unsettled whether all impressions are related by resemblance, or only passions (or impressions of reflections in general) are in relation to each other by this relation. A contextual remark on this issue would be that Book I is designed to discuss impressions of sensation and Book II is "Of Passions". From this point, we may infer that (a) does only capture the impressions of reflections. Apart from this contextual outlook this remark makes also sense because impressions of sensation seem to be perfectly related to each other by the other two natural relations. If impressions are atomic in the sense that they are distinct existences, then in sensation of an object, our sensation must be like a film strip. The first frame and the second frame must be contiguous to each other as well. Additionally, in some cases, all frames of the strip may not resemble each other at all, but still they must be contiguous. Further, by relying on Hume's conception of causation, a frame must be the cause of the succeeding frame. Hence, all three natural relations play their associative roles in the case of impressions of sensation. Ultimately, in (a) Hume must be talking only of passions.

⁸¹ This part is completely omitted in the original Selby-Bigge edition of EHU. In some other editions, you may find this part in "Appendix" or "Textual Varieties". My edition of EHU keeps it in the original text.

So we see that passions can be related to each other by their resembling qualities and these associations are natural just like the associations of ideas⁸². For instance, pleasure resembles pride and pain resembles humility. However, why we should treat this relation among passions as a different sort of relation is still unanswered. I do not think that there is any reason to say that this specific type of resemblance constitutes a different sort of relation; different from the resemblance of impressions of sensation. In this case, we see that the resemblance relation among passions and ideas is also a natural relation. Hume says that one impression “immediately follows” the other. This is crucial because in the previous sections I have claimed that natural relations must be impressions too. In this case, if pleasure immediately follows pride by resemblance, then ideas of pleasure and pride must resemble each other. These ideas must also constitute a complex idea such as ‘pride is pleasurable’. If the relation, which takes place in this judgment of a complex idea, is a natural relation (or philosophical relation; it does not matter), then the knowledge of it must be certain. Ultimately, judgments, which are about the passions must be certain because relations of resemblance among ideas is a “relation of ideas” and not “matters of facts”. In order to examine this claim, we must however first to look at (b) and (c).

A double relation consists of two relations. We have already seen the first one (a). The second one may be more interesting because it is specifically the relation between an idea and a passion. In many diagrams, which are designed to illustrate this double relation, something is consistently missing. Apart from the fact that these diagrams are very helpful to understand the idea of the double relation of ideas, this unattended relation is crucial. Let’s have a look at the following example of a standard diagram of double relation of ideas⁸³.

In diagram 1 we see the double relation in the case of pride. Here, two relations in this association are resemblance and causation. However, there are four arrows instead of two and the other two arrows are left unexplained. The relation

⁸² It can also be discussed that passions can be related to each other by causation and contiguity as well. Why pride is not contiguous to pleasure? Why humility is not caused by pain? These questions are perfectly legitimate and must be answered. Unfortunately, I will not issue them here because they do not affect the outcome of the present discussion here.

⁸³ I prefer to pick the example from the *Stanford Encyclopedia* because of its convenient access. However, one can easily find similar instances in many other places. For this diagram see, Schmitter (2014).

between “my estate and pleasure” and the relation between “pride and the self” must also be clarified. In addition to this, there must be a fifth arrow starting from “my estate” and pointing “pride”, which would show the cause of this passion. At face value, it seems that Hume wants to say that there is no relation between the idea of “my estate” and “pleasure”. Hume says, “Bodily pains and pleasures ... arise originally in the soul, without any prec’ding thought or perception. A fit of the gout ... is not deriv’d immediately from any affection or idea” (T 2.1.1). As Hume says, pains and pleasures are impressions of sensations and no idea can produce them. However, in section five, he seems to be talking inconsistent with the former passage: “That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv’d” (T 2.1.5; *Italics added*). Three paragraphs later, he supports this idea by saying that, “Any thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also agreeable, and has self for its object” (*ibid*; *Italics added*). And finally, “No trivial or vulgar object, that causes not a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion, will ever, by its property or other relations, ..., be able to produce the affections of pride or humility, love or hatred” (T 2.2.2).




Diagram 1

Why these claims are contradictory to the first one? I think that the only way to consider these passages as consistent with the first passage is by interpreting

Hume's use of the word "production" in a non-technical sense. Production is paraphrased by "to give" in the last passage. This shows that the relation between the subject of the passion and its sensation is neither a natural relation, nor a philosophical one. It seems to me that Hume is confused here because; no perception can be related to each other with a completely different relation from these former types. Ultimately, we must at least concede here that there must be a relation (most probably causal) between the subject of pride and the sensation of it.

The second one between the passion and the idea of "self" is more crucial. As we know that the idea of "self" is the object of "pride". In terms of the relations between the object, passion, and subject, Hume says:

The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited, turns our view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the *one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it.* (T 2.1.2; Italics added)

Hume clearly thinks that pride produces the idea of "self". It seems that pride is not merely producing the idea of "self" but this production is natural and necessary. He says, "[P]ride: To this emotion she [the mind] has assign'd a certain idea, viz. that of self, which *it never fails to produce.* This contrivance of nature is easily conceiv'd ... [T]he passion, after its production, *naturally produces a certain idea.* All this needs no proof" (T 2.1.5; Italics added). We see that in terms of the relation between the pride and its object, Hume is more confident here, if we contrast it to his confusion in the case of the relation between the subject and the sensation of pride. Here, Hume specifies this relation as natural and by means of this I understand that he uses the term "produce" in its technical term. This must show us that, when I say 'I am proud of my estate', this judgment is a certain idea, if my pride is produced in the way Hume describes it. So, this was the relation between pride and its object.

The third relation that must be explained was between the pride and its subject. One can say that the relation between pride and its subject is indirect. Pleasure is the intermediate step between the subject and pride. The relation between pride, pleasure and subject is quite unsettled by Hume himself. However, there is at least one point, where Hume seems to be precise: "[T]hat every thing related to us, which produces pleasure or pain, produces likewise pride and humility. There is not only a relation requir'd, but a close one, and a closer than is

requir'd to joy" (T 2.1.6). It is apparently certain that there is a strong connection among pleasure, passion, and the subject. The subject of pride is the cause of both pleasure and pride. When the subject is the case, pleasure arises; and because pride resembles pleasure it naturally follows the pleasure. In fact, we must be sure now that the cause of pride is the subject. Ultimately, the previous diagram showing the double relation of ideas must be revised as the following:




Diagram 2

To conclude this section, the relation between the subject and the passion will be important, when we get to Hume’s account of moral obligation. The fact that this relation is a natural relation is related to Hume’s overall argument. Because it is (natural) causation it is consistent with Hume’s thesis that morality is not derived from reason. It would violate Hume’s Law, if this relation were a (philosophical) causation. As Hume thinks, no philosophical relation involves in the double relation of ideas. However, we will see that there are other inconsistencies concerning the double relation of ideas and the sympathy. This explanation of double relation of ideas will provide the basis for the discussions of the next chapter, when I evaluate the analysis of willful murder. In addition to this, this explanation is also needed in order to contrast the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view and Hume’s own sentimental account of morals.

CHAPTER 5

MORAL RELATIONS IN TERMS OF 'NATURAL RELATIONS AS SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS' VIEW

Shou'd it be asserted, that the sense of morality consists in the discovery of some relation, distinct from these, and that our enumeration was not compleat, when we comprehend all demonstrable relations under four general heads... (T 3.1.1)

Now, I am ready to continue with the importance of these claims in terms of the status of moral relations. As I have already mentioned, in T 3.1.1, Hume examines moral relations as possible derivatives of the philosophical relations. His conclusion is that moral relations cannot be part of philosophical relations. In the last chapter, we see that relations are divided into two, but this division depends on a very crucial factor: Separability Principle which can work only on philosophical relations and not on natural relations. In terms of this, there appears a new possible examination of the status of moral relations as natural relations. Accepting that moral relations cannot be a part of philosophical relations, we are not exhausting the idea that there cannot be any moral relations. In fact, we will see that moral relations as natural relations resemble some of the philosophical relations by means of verifiability and justifiability. Consequently, if it can be shown that moral relations are natural relations, then this would be a new inquiry and a new area of applicability of Hume's Law. Hume's Law might be valid, but still, it cannot invalidate moral relations as natural relations. In this case, the new task is to find out whether moral relations are natural relations, or they must be thrown out from the realm of perceptions completely. I will defend the claim that moral relations *are* natural relations.

In this chapter, the main claim will be that (natural) moral relations are found in the perception of external facts. Since they are perceptual in this sense, they must provide the most certain and indubitable knowledge similar to the three relations of ideas, which can be found immediately either by intuition or observation. To support these claims, I will first argue that the general idea of murder cannot have a common quality, other than a moral relation as a simple impression. I will evaluate all the alternatives for this common quality: non-relational simple impressions, non-moral relations and the impressions of reflection. The third alternative will be evaluated separately because Hume himself thinks that what makes an instance of killing a murder is our sentimental reaction to experience this instance. In this case, I will evaluate Hume's double relation of ideas and the sympathy mechanism. After these evaluations, I will introduce a contemporary discussion in the meta-ethical literature, namely The Ethical Perception View (or Perceptual Intuitionism), which basically argues that moral properties are high-level properties found in experience. I will explain this view in order to support my view that in Hume moral relations can be simple impressions. When I settle down this view, the last issue will be the verification and justification of the statements that we produce by inferring these moral relations. I will argue that, in the last section, moral relations as simple impressions are analytic-like statements which share almost all the features of the invariable relations that Hume proposes in the discussion of philosophical relations. On the basis of these claims and arguments, I will, finally, mention the connection of Hume's Law to the moral relations as simple impressions view. I will show that if we accept that there can be natural moral relations, then the conclusions of the Discovery Argument and Hume's Fork are false. By means of this it will show that Hume's argument against moral relations is invalid and the conclusion of the overall argument is false. Ultimately, in this chapter, I will conclude that moral statements such as 'murder is wrong' provide certain knowledge, which means (in the Humean framework) that if it is true, it can provide a foundation for morality, which is neither purely Humean nor rationalistic at all.

5.1. The Analysis of ‘Murder’ as a General Idea

To start with, we may first reevaluate the example of willful murder. However, this time, we need to follow the ‘stronger claim’ from the discussion of the previous chapter, and keep in mind that, accordingly, natural relations are simple impressions. In his example, Hume was saying that in examining willful murder there is no fact of the matter that we call vice. Let’s proceed slowly. The examination of willful murder can take place either in the imagination or in the understanding. Hume specifies this by saying that the matter of fact is not the object of reason. In this case, Hume examines willful murder in terms of “distinctions of reason”. To make it more explicit, Hume is saying that no philosophical relation can be *drawn* from the objects of the willful murder such as the relevant agents or the tools used.

At this point, we need to consider the possibility that in the case of willful murder there is a natural relation among the relevant objects. The obvious question to ask is, how can we be sure, or justified in claiming that in willful murder vice is a moral relation? Willful murder as a complex idea (a general idea) has many compound ideas corresponding to simple impressions. Even if this complex idea needs not to be necessarily derived from impressions, simple ideas constituting this complex idea must depend on past experiences. So, when I call a bundle of simple ideas a complex idea of a willful murder, it means that these simple ideas are put together in a certain manner. This certain manner of appearance must be one (or some, or all) of the three relations of resemblance, contiguity and cause and effect⁸⁴. For simplicity, let’s say, one instance of willful murder is constituted by simple impressions such as a knife with blood stain, a dead body, and a person who committed the act of stabbing someone to death. At first sight, relations between these three simple ideas are contiguity and cause-effect. So the claim goes that the mind associates these ideas by these relations, and produces the complex idea of willful murder. Nonetheless, following the stronger claim, we must concede that these relations must be simple impressions that are in the content of the complex impression of the act of willful murder.

⁸⁴ This is true, if Hume is right about his claim that there are only three natural relations.

Needless to say, this explication is not sufficient to exhaust the analysis of the complex idea of willful murder. In this sort of explanation not only vice escapes us, but also the general idea of murder also remains unexplained. According to Hume's notion of abstract or general ideas, we know that general ideas are names that we apply to ideas resembling each other by their some particular quality. When we apply a general name to a given perception, we associate that perception with other perceptions by this resembling quality. Hume says, "When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we apply the same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees of their quantity and quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them" (T 1.1.7). Consequently, there are actually no general ideas, but particular ideas may become general in their representation. Hume says, "A particular idea becomes general by being annex'd to a general term; that is, to a term, which from a customary conjunction has a relation to many other particular ideas, and readily recalls them in the imagination" (ibid.). So, it seems to me perfectly legitimate to search for the common quality of these particular ideas, by which they resemble each other.

In this case, when we pronounce an act as willful murder, we mean that it resembles other perceptions of willful murder in a certain quality. However, what quality can be common to all the instances of willful murder? 'The act of killing' is not an efficient quality because other types of killing share this same quality. If we say that this quality is 'intentional killing', it also fails because not all intentional killings are considered as willful murder. My contention here is to state the idea that if the resembling quality is not the relation itself, then it seems almost impossible to find a common quality (a distinguishing factor), which is unique to all instances (but not others) of a given general idea⁸⁵.

There I see three difficulties to find a common (non-relational) quality of a general idea. The first difficulty is about the nature of complex ideas. As the Separability Principle states, complex ideas are constituted by simple ideas and the manner of their appearance. Hence, any quality of a complex idea must be either a

⁸⁵ It might be said here that for the family resemblance, there needs to be no such a stringent distinguishing element shared by the instances. However, I think, even if this is true, Hume's account of impressions forces us to have such a stringent element. Taking impressions as atomic entities endorses this idea because we have to consider all the separable ideas of a general idea as corresponding to simple impressions. In this way, all general ideas must have constituent simple ideas, which correspond to simple impressions. Thus, this simple impression must take place in every instance of that general idea.

simple idea or a relation. In the case of willful murder, relations associating the relevant ideas are generic relations that cannot specify a cluster of ideas. On the other hand, sensory impressions concerning the willful murder seem to lack of any distinguishing impression that is common in all the members of the general idea of willful murder. Ultimately, this common quality must be either a different quality of the complex idea (neither a simple idea, nor a relation), or there must be another relation which can be found in all the instances of a willful murder. I will come to that possibility in a minute.

The second difficulty is the order of discovery or the production of a general idea. Let's say, it is our first time to experience an instance of a willful murder. So, in principle we have no previous ideas that determine this perception as a willful murder. Following the Humean path, the generation of a general idea is the repetition of similar instances of this initial perception and find out the resembling quality among these similar perceptions. Related to the first difficulty, it seems to me that this path is insufficient to generate general ideas. If all the qualities of a willful murder are accessible to the mind, then even in the first instance, we must be able to call this act a willful murder. Alternatively, if the common quality is not in the content of the perception, then it can only be the relation among the simple ideas constituting the idea of willful murder (if relations are not simple impressions).

Thirdly, it might be also possible that the common quality of the willful murder has no correspondent impression (of sensation). Instead of a correspondent impression, this common quality is a reflection upon its occurrence in the imagination. However, if this is so, then our general ideas must be more general than we ordinarily entertain them in common conversations. This possibility of a reflective common quality is actually Hume's alternative. In his original statement of the case of willful murder, Hume's explanation was that we have a feeling of disapprobation, when we perceive willful murder. So, by long custom we call these instances under the general heading of willful murder because they have this common quality of making us to feel in a certain way. However, this explanation does not explain why we call them willful murder. What it actually explains is the general idea of vice. Things that produce in us a certain feeling of disapprobation is called vice, but this cluster of things includes not only willful murder but so many other acts. In this case, our reflective responses to certain perceptions are not

sufficient to be the common quality of general ideas such as willful murder, lying, genocide, etc. In other words, prior to our emotional reflections towards particular acts or characters, we must already be acquainted with the common quality by which particular ideas resemble each other.

In terms of these difficulties, it must be conceded that the common quality of perceptions constituting general ideas, cannot be our reflections, or relations applied by imagination or reason. They must be already perceived in the content of complex perceptions. This claim is not suggesting that this common quality must be actually possessed by the external object. Following Hume, we can also be skeptical about this issue. However, according to my claim, it seems that this common quality must be a simple perception.

In order to settle this last claim, I want to go step by step. If we turn back to the first possibility, it was stating that the common quality is a simple idea derived from an impression of sensation (non-relational). By examining the general idea of willful murder, we must find out this distinguishing simple idea. Which simple compound of this sort is common to all the instances of willful murder? The intention of a person stabbing the knife to another person without any excuse must be to end his/her life. However, this cannot be a simple idea because I can easily distinguish the compounds of this idea as intention, excuse, ending life and stabbing. These particular ideas cannot distinguish willful murder individually by being common elements of any acts of willful murder. The compound of 'excuse' can be found resembling other perceptions such as 'cheating'. 'Intention' can be connected to many different perceptions. 'Ending life' seems to be the most common element of a willful murder, but it can easily resemble consensual killings such as 'euthanasia'. Finally, the kind of way to kill a person cannot be sufficient because not all the ways of killing resemble each other. At this point, it is important to notice that resemblance at this level of comparing ideas must rely on the representational content. Hence, the kind of pictorial stories of perceptions must resemble each other. The conceptual similarity cannot be counted as resemblance because such similarity would imply that our general ideas are like universals. However, Hume insists on his claim that general ideas are particulars. So, stabbing and pushing a button that triggers a nuclear weapon cannot resemble each other in terms of their (non-relational) experiential features. Ultimately, I cannot find any

distinguishing compound idea of this sort that is a common quality of willful murder.

So the second possibility was that the common quality is the (Humean) relation among these compound ideas. In 4.4.3, I have argued that, for Hume, relations are fundamentally general in the sense that they can be found in many unrelated actions. For instance, causation can be detected both in a billiard game and in a car crash. However, we cannot apply a general term to identify these two particular ideas as resembling each other. My laptop is contiguous to the table, but there is no general idea, which is applicable to both of these objects. As we can see, particular ideas cannot be labeled under a general term just because they share the same relations. I think that this point does not need any further investigation⁸⁶. As the third possibility is Hume's alternative, it is better to evaluate it in detail. The next section will issue Hume's account of double relation of ideas and the sympathy mechanism.

5.2. A Closer Look at Hume's Analysis of Willful Murder

In this section, I will evaluate the third possibility –Hume's alternative–; that the common quality is the passion produced reflectively by perceiving willful murder. Firstly, as I have argued earlier, a passion cannot distinguish willful murder from other acts. The first obvious reason of this is that passions can only distinguish acts in terms of pain and pleasure. So, some acts produce pain either in us or others; and some produce pleasure likewise. A willful murder causes the victim to feel pain and this may make us to sympathetically feel this pain and produce a feeling of disapprobation. However, parricide, incest, lying, dishonesty, torture, slavery, and all such similar acts produce pain as well. I have already mentioned the second obvious reason two paragraphs earlier. Accordingly, if the feeling of disapprobation is the common quality, then it is the common quality of the general idea of vice and not willful murder. And, the third (but not obvious) reason of this is that in order to sympathetically feel the pain of the victim, I must already know that this act is a murder. A little kid might not reflect onto a murder because he had no idea about

⁸⁶ I did not evaluate the resemblance relation because I am interested in the relations taking place within the instances of murder. Trivially, but truly, among the instances of murder there is a resemblance relation. However, the question is what makes these instances resemble to each other? Which of their compound or quality is resembling?

dead or he does not know that the act of killing will cause massive pain in the victim. The reason why he cannot reflect is simply because he has no idea of what murder is. If the general idea is primarily required for reflection upon passions, then no passion can be a distinguishing quality of general ideas. However, there is strong evidence that shows Hume thinks quite to the contrary. He says:

'Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the moral quality. *This we cannot do directly*; and therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are still considered as signs; and *the ultimate object of our praise and approbation is the motive, that produc'd them.* (T 3.2.1; Italics added)

Here most importantly Hume thinks that the influencing passion of the agent who performs the action is the quality, by which we can distinguish an action by praising or blaming it. In this sense, this is consistent with Hume's observation that vice cannot be found in the object. However, the first part in italics indicates that distinguishing the action by an appeal to the agent's passion cannot be done directly. In other words, we cannot, by sensation, experience this motive. In fact, this transition of the motive from the agent to the spectator can be done by the mechanism of sympathy. Now, it must be settled here that this passage does not threaten my criticism. In the previous paragraph, I was claiming that vice cannot specify murder by distinguishing it from other vicious actions, i.e. lying. Similarly, the motive of the agent, from which we sympathetically derive vice, cannot specify murder because this would imply that all generic types of moral actions are produced by action-type-specific motives. However, Hume does not claim that motives are such and such qualities. The other problem with the motives is that, according to Hume, some actions are not produced by motives at all. The following passage indicates that in the absence of motives, an agent can still act in a way that is praiseful, but this time his act will be based on a "sense of duty":

But may not the sense of morality or duty produce an action, without any other motive? I answer, It may: But this is no objection to the present doctrine. When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that motive, may hate himself upon that account, and *may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty*, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle, or at least, to disguise to himself, as much as possible, his want of it. A man that really feels no gratitude in his temper, is still pleas'd to perform grateful actions, and thinks he has, by that means, fulfill'd his

duty. Actions are at first only consider'd as signs of motives: But 'tis usual, in this case, as in all others, to fix our attention on the signs, and neglect, in some measure, the thing signify'd. But tho', on some occasions, *a person may perform an action merely out of regard to its moral obligation, yet still this supposes in human nature some distinct principles, which are capable of producing the action, and whose moral beauty renders the action meritorious.* (ibid.; Italics added)

This explanation of actions without motives shows that the sense of duty can also be the distinguishing quality of instances of moral actions. The question to ask is how to qualify two instances of killing as murder, if one is produced by a motive and the other is by duty? It seems that duty cannot also be the distinguishing quality. Moreover, the sense of duty cannot also be detected by sensation. In this case, the external performance seems to be the only "sign" that is the holder of this distinguishing quality. I will not discuss the difference between the motives and the sense of duty here because this will be issued in the last section. Ultimately, we end up with no legitimate candidate which can be the common quality of the instances of murder.

In order to put this point more bluntly, I want to evaluate willful murder by evaluating it in terms of Hume's double relation of ideas and his mechanism of sympathy. It will be seen that in Hume's own terms, it is also evident that the viciousness of murder cannot be derived from sympathizing with other's emotions and passions. In order to examine this claim, we need first to look at Hume's own formulation of vice and virtue in terms of the double relation of ideas.

As far as I can see, in the *Treatise* there are three passages, where we find the formulation of double relation of vice and virtue. In the first one, Hume argues that vice and virtue can be found in the same circumstances with the subjects of indirect passions:

Pride and humility, love and hatred are excited, when there is any thing presented to us, that both bears a relation to the object of the passion, and produces a separate sensation related to the sensation of the passion. Now virtue and vice are attended with these circumstances. *They must necessarily be plac'd either in ourselves or others, and excite either pleasure or uneasiness; and therefore must give rise to one of these four passions;* which clearly distinguishes them from the pleasure and pain arising from inanimate objects, that often bear no relation to us: And this is, perhaps, the most considerable effect that virtue and vice have upon the human mind. (T 3.1.2; Italics added)

Here Hume says that the double associations of virtue and vice are just like the ones for the indirect passions. However, at this time, virtue and vice seem to be

the subject of these indirect passions. Alternatively, we may read this passage and say that virtue and vice are not the subject of these indirect passions, but they arise simultaneously with the pain and pleasure that the subject causes in us. At this point, it is difficult to determine which of these interpretations is the most accurate one. I think the next two passages will help us to decide. At this point, we may look for the first diagram of the double association of virtue formulated in terms of the previous passage from *Treatise*:




Diagram 3

Secondly, Hume says that mental qualities which cause these indirect passions must be “pronounced” as virtuous or vicious:

[W]hatever mental quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey of reflexion, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives uneasiness, is vicious. Now since every quality in ourselves or others, which gives pleasure, always causes pride or love; as every one, that produces uneasiness, excites humility or hatred: It follows, that these two particulars are to be consider'd as **equivalent, with regard to our mental qualities, virtue and the power of producing love or pride, vice and the power of producing humility or hatred.** In every case, therefore, we **must judge of the one by the other**; and may **pronounce** any *quality* of the mind virtuous, which causes love or pride; and any one vicious, which causes hatred or humility. (T 3.3.1; Bolds added)

It is important to underline a few points here. First, Hume claims that the subjects of indirect passions are “equivalent” to virtue and vice, if we take them to be mental qualities. In this case, Hume says that these subjects are powers of producing these indirect passions (or equally we might say that they have this sort

of power of production). So, it is important to notice here that Hume does not identify these subjects with virtue and vice. His point is to show that as mental qualities these subjects must be classified as vicious or virtuous. Secondly, it is also very important in our discussion of moral judgments that, according to Hume, calling these qualities vicious or virtuous are themselves judgments. For instance, ‘Stealing is vicious’ is a judgment of vice because this subject, ‘stealing’, has the power of producing hatred; and consequently it is vicious. However, this explanation does not specify vice and virtue as anything. In this case, in our diagram, we do not find any place to put vice and virtue. In terms of these explanations, the second diagram, now, must be the following:




Diagram 4

The last passage that I want to point out here draws a similar picture of the double associations of indirect passions. However, it is again difficult to locate vice and virtue in the diagram:

The pain and pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the *mind*, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred. (T 3.3.5)

In this case, it is at least apparent that the subject of approbation or blame is the action or the quality of the mind. However, the problem with this passage is that, Hume says that, the pain and pleasure “constitute” the vice or virtue of these actions or qualities. This is confusing because the use of “constitute” here is quite loose and ambiguous. Throughout the *Treatise*, the use of this term is quite general

and there is no technical meaning attributed to this term. In terms of this, we should say that this use is literal and must be understood as saying that the reason why these subjects are vicious or virtuous is because they cause pain or pleasure in us. Still, we should admit that vice and virtue are attributed to the subject and not considered as identical to pain and pleasure, or to the indirect passions. Ultimately, the final diagram must be the following:




Diagram 5

If we recall the first diagram of vice and virtue, now we can determine whether virtue and vice are the subject of the indirect passions or not. We see that in the other two diagrams vice and virtue are not located. The reason of this was that in none of these explanations, Hume explicitly said that virtue and vice have an associative role in the production of the indirect passions. This shows that vice and virtue must be considered as the property (dispositional) of the subject of blame and appraisal. Alternatively, we can equally say that virtue and vice are the normative evaluations of actions or qualities that cause pain and pleasure and at the same time blame and appraisal. In order to be more explicit, we may try to figure out how Hume defines vice and virtue differently from these three explanations. It must be considered that T 2.1.7 titled as, “Of vice and virtue” can explain us what are these things called vice and virtue. In fact, Hume does explain vice and virtues in that section of *Treatise*, but his explanations require careful attention. Here are two important descriptions of vice and virtue. First, Hume says, “VICE and VIRTUE, which are the most obvious causes of these passions [indirect passions]...” (T

2.1.7). The most obvious cause of the indirect passions can be the pain and pleasure, or their subjects. Even if this definition does not provide us sufficient explanation of vice and virtue, it tells us that they are the causes of indirect passions.

So, to proceed in this examination, we need to look at the second definition of vice and virtue: “The very essence of virtue, according to this hypothesis, is to produce pleasure; and that of vice to give pain. The virtue and vice must be part of our character in order to excite pride or humility” (ibid.). Here, I understand that virtue and vice are also the causes of pain and pleasure. In this case, they cannot be equivalent to these emotions. Additionally, I find the last sentence quite puzzling. Hume says that vice and virtue must be the part of the character. The subjects of indirect passions are not necessarily part of any character. Inanimate objects, such as an estate, have no character whatsoever. In this case, Hume is saying that vice and virtue must be personal qualities of us and others. So, the domain of the subjects of blame and appraisal is narrower than the domain of the four main indirect passions. Ultimately, it is now apparent that vice and virtue produce pain and pleasure, and excite indirect passions. Additionally, previously, I have pointed out that virtue and vice are the pronouncements of the actions or qualities of mind that have such a double relation of ideas. Therefore, we must say that vice and virtue are the *names* of those subjects that produces pain and pleasure on the one hand, and cause indirect passions on the other. Nonetheless, these subjects cannot be found in the inanimate objects, but they are placed in the human mind as the ideas of those characters that excite our indirect passions.

So far, I have investigated the relations among the indirect passions, pain and pleasure, and the subject and the object of these indirect passions. Vice as the name of the subject of blame does not satisfy explaining the judgments such as “Murder is vicious” because, according to Hume, the action of murder itself cannot be the subject of blame. According to the conclusion of the last discussion, Hume claims that this subject must be the qualities of the person, who is the victim of this crime. In this case, it seems that there is another place, where we should seek for a common quality of instances of willful murder. The complex idea of an instance of murder must contain these qualities and also these qualities must cause pain and blame in us. The psychological mechanism, which processes these relations, is the sympathy mechanism.

Hume finds sympathy as the most remarkable part of human nature. I think he should think in this way because this mechanism is one of the most bizarre compounds of his conception of human nature. I will not discuss all the interesting features and the related problems with sympathy here. My interest is to find out what this mechanism is and how it works. Hume explains sympathy in the following way: “No quality of human nature is more remarkable, both in itself and in its consequences, than that propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from, or even contrary to our own” (T 2.1.11). In its simplest explanation, sympathy is a way of communicating with others’ passions and emotions. This characterization does not tell us much. In this case, Hume continues in the following paragraph and says:

When any affection is infus’d by sympathy, ’tis at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emotion, as any original affection” (ibid.).

Hume wants to apply the mechanism of how we derive our ideas from impressions for sympathy as well. So, as he says, passions and emotions of other persons are exposed by an impression (an external sign) and this impression is received and transformed to an idea. This idea, then, gains equal degree of force and vivacity of passions and becomes a passion again. The interesting thing about this process is that Hume does not say that the idea of others’ emotions is not the subject of the passion produced in us. In this case, it seems that in the process of sympathy there must be no involvement of double associations of ideas and impressions. Instead of the double association of ideas, natural relations of associations enable the transition from the impressions of others’ passions and emotions to our lively ideas corresponding to these associations. Resemblance, contiguity and causation all enable us to associate the impression of others’ passions and emotions with our lively ideas derived from them (ibid.).

However, this is not explicitly stated by Hume. In fact, Hume gives an example of how this mechanism works and in this example; it seems that the idea of the other’s passion becomes the subject of our indirect passion. He says:

[T]he principle of *sympathy*, by which we enter into the sentiments of the rich and poor, and partake of their pleasures and uneasiness. Riches give satisfaction to their possessors; and this satisfaction is convey'd to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity. This agreeable idea or impression is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion. (T 2.2.5)

As we have seen in the earlier encounters of the term “connect”, Hume was using it to mean “produce”, “cause” and “derive”. In terms of this, here, he says that the idea produced from the satisfaction of the possessor of riches causes in us a passion of love. In this case, we may interpret the mechanism of sympathy as a two-part mechanism, which includes both the double associations of ideas, and the natural associations of ideas and impressions. I think this is quite confusing because it is crucially important whether the idea produced by the other’s passions and emotions becomes a passion of ourselves, or it causes in us a feeling of pain and pleasure and at the same time excites a passion in us. I think the former interpretation is more accurate because, in other instances Hume emphasizes that this idea enables our passions to arouse. For instance, Hume mentions that even in the absence of other’s impressions of passions and emotions, we can sympathize with them. In doing this, our passions are derived from “general rules”:

[T]he communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises by a transition from affections, which have no existence... We find from experience, that such a degree of passion is usually connected with such a misfortune; and tho’ there be an exception in the present case, yet the imagination is affected by the *general rule*, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion, or rather feel the passion itself, in the same manner, as if the person were really actuated by it. (T 2.2.7)

I find this passage awkward in virtue of its careless formulation. First, how can the imagination make us “feel the passion itself”? Secondly, what does it mean that the imagination is affected by a “general rule”? Thirdly, if there is no impression (a sign) of the passions or emotions of others; or if it is the case, that opposite impressions are perceived, after all how can this be sympathy with others? Fourthly, and most importantly, how can we sympathize with the others’ passions, if we come up with producing opposite passions?

For the first question, it is a plain truth that imagination cannot produce any passion by itself. Hence, it cannot directly make us feel any passion. Then, it can only be with the double association of ideas that imagination can make us feel the passion itself. So, it seems that the ideas produced thorough the sympathy cannot by

themselves be passions. For the second question, “a general rule” concerning the affections towards particular actions must be something like *custom*. We all know that by long custom certain actions affect us with certain passions. Murder is always painful, or the possession of property is always pleasurable⁸⁷. As Hume underlines in his own example, people sometimes may not be affected in the way that they may be affected normally. However, this is not a restriction of constructing general rules such as ‘murder is painful’. In terms of this, when we do not perceive the ordinary affections of the others, we convey our attention to the general rule related to that particular action or character. This means that, we sympathize with others in those situations, where there is no appropriate affection perceived; by imagining the proper affections to the situation. From this general rule, the double association can produce the passion, which is proper to the situation. However, then, the third question becomes extremely important. If our sympathy has nothing to do with the actual affections of the others, then how can this be sympathy at all? I do not think that Hume has a specific answer to this question. For him, sympathy is not exactly empathy. As it is in his example of being rejoiced for someone’s possession, or success regardless of his/her indifference or uneasiness to his own situation, in some cases we are more apt to the situation than the other person. So sympathy seems to be not a mechanism of reflecting other’s passions and emotions regardless of the situation, but it is the mechanism, by which we receive (or produce) the proper affections relevant to the situation. This is evident because even in the absence of any affection, we can sympathize with the proper affections.

So, related to the fourth question, this shows that, when other’s passions are opposed to our sympathized passions, either their passions, or our opposing passions are inappropriate to the situation. Saying that they are inappropriate implies that passions have a relation to the actions and situations. In the following sentences of the previous quotation, Hume says that, for instance pity entirely depends on the imagination and the opposing passions do not prevent us to sympathize with others: “A contrast of any kind never fails to affect the imagination, especially when presented by the subject; and ’tis on the imagination that pity entirely depends” (T 2.2.7). This is ambiguous because it must be expected that imagination would not play such a role of determining the passion. However, in

⁸⁷ This implies Hume’s universalism of values. See, Lo (2006).

the footnote of the same passage, Hume underlines that here he does not use imagination in the same meaning as “imagination” when it is contrasted with memory, or reason. Even if we accept that imagination here means something different, it is still interesting how it enliven the *correct* idea and turns it into a passion. Considering the use of general rules, it seems to me that the role of others’ passions is not as important as the role of those general rules and the imagination.

One might object to my criticism; that general rules are more important for sympathizing with others, by saying that the origins of these general rules also depend on the affections of people. Hume was saying that from our constitution, our affections resemble each other. In this case, it is not too difficult to expect that people react to particular situations in a similar way. In fact, these general rules are the pronouncements of these similar reactions. I admit that the origins of these general rules are our similar affections towards particular situations. However, I do not think that this makes any difference in my criticism. I have said that one’s particular sympathizing with others would solely depend on general rules. Additionally, there is no need for him to acquire these rules from normal cases of past sympathies.

Imagine that James is raised in such an environment in which everyone reacts to situations with opposing passions, while actually feeling appropriate emotions. In other words, everyone is faking their gestures and external signs of emotions. So when someone is tortured, even if he feels pain, all of his external signs show that he enjoys being tortured. At the same time, this society has general rules, which are consistent with their actually felt emotions and passions. How would James react when he encounters an instance of willful murder? The Humean answer, I think, is that James’ sympathy mechanism would ignore all the external signs, and rely on the general rule. Otherwise, this society would not enjoy a consistent set of moral codes. However, then external signs of emotions have no significant role.

As a second example, we may examine the following situation. We see someone is torturing someone else. However, all the impressions indicating the emotions of the person tortured are implying that he is pleased with this situation. How do we get sympathized with this person? It must be accepted that we all share a general rule that, “torture is wrong”, but his passions are implying otherwise. If

we follow Hume's explanation, we must say that this man is in pain and we should sympathize with him by reflecting pity. So the exceptional cases just like this one, call for more explanation. In these cases, as Hume points out in T 3.1.1, reason helps us by providing more information about the situation. We know that (or if we know that) this man is enjoying this treatment and he has consent. I think that the general rule in this situation will be out of deliberation because the extra information will bypass the general rule and convey our imagination to joy instead of pity. Nonetheless, the reason why passions are not opposing now is not because of an ordinary way of sympathy. The extra information is now directing the imagination to convey to the passion of joy. This is actually what Hume means by reason's role in moral deliberations. Even if we cannot say that in the case of reason's role of correcting our deliberation the cause of our passions is the affections of the other person, in the example of intervening "general rules", the same claim would not be appropriate. Pleasure of that man cannot be considered as the cause of our passion of pity. Ultimately, it is possible that our passions towards others' affections can depend merely on ideas. In other words, the claim of the motivation argument is inconsistent with the role of "general rules" in our sympathy with other's passions. We will come to this point in the following section.

As a third example, we may imagine that there is a society of aliens in a distant part of the galaxy. People of this society are anatomically similar to us, except the fact that they do not have any emotions. Let's say this is the planet Vulcan from the TV series Star Trek⁸⁸. Assuming that they have moral codes and practical judgments, we may say that they believe in general rules such as 'murder is wrong'. When a Vulcan encounters an instance of murder, he may easily form a judgment that 'this action is wrong'. His inference clearly has nothing to do with sympathizing with others' pain. These examples at least, but not the least, show that others' affections are not necessary to blame or praise actions as vicious or virtuous.

A similar example can be drawn from real life cases. Psychopaths, or to put it more gently, people with empathetic impairments (PEI) do not have the ability to feel other's pain or pleasure⁸⁹. This inaction and disability in forming judgments

⁸⁸ Alternatively, if you do not like Star Trek, you may think of "Cybermen" from the TV series *Doctor Who*.

⁸⁹ Cf. R. D. Hare (2003).

based on other's emotional cues is because of an amygdala dysfunction⁹⁰. Nonetheless, it is known that they have no problem with their ordinary perceptual skills. They have perfectly functional "theory of mind", by which they can infer other's self-ascriptions from their behavioral cues⁹¹. When a PEI and a non-PEI experience the same instance of murder, it can be said that PEI would not infer that 'this action is wrong' (if he does not already know that 'murder is wrong'). Additionally, if this PEI had faced Gilbert Harman's poor cat, which is about to be tortured by a group of hoodlums, he would most probably prefer not to intervene and try to stop them⁹². Consequently, we can say that in the absence of perceiving other's external signs of their emotions, people can form moral judgments based on their tacit moral knowledge.

However, then, we may ask whether this type of moral deliberation is actually the sympathy mechanism? A Humean answer would be that in this type of cases, it is more likely that PEIs are performing something more like an ordinary inference (not even animal inference). In sympathy, regardless of the presence of other's pain or pleasure, the process must produce a passion. For PEIs this is not possible. However, then, should we say that PEIs' moral judgments are not moral after all? What would make the difference between the judgments of PEIs and non-PEIs? After all both can form the judgment that "This action is wrong". For the first question, I think that PEIs' judgments are as moral as ordinary people. As Hume also points out, as ordinary people not all the time we form our moral judgments based on other's emotions. Applying general rules by PEIs or non-PEIs does not make any difference in the outcome of the deliberation. In this case, for the second question, it is evident that emotions' role in the deliberation does not necessarily make a judgment moral or non-moral. As I have argued earlier, one plausible alternative would be the claim that moral relations are simple impressions that we perceive in our experiences. In terms of this, in the lack of tacit knowledge, PEIs disability of forming a judgment can be explained by saying that in addition to their disability to feel other's emotions, they also cannot experience these moral relations (or properties) in the phenomenal content of their experience of the action.

⁹⁰ Blair (2007, pp. 9-13).

⁹¹ Blair (2007, p. 10).

⁹² Harman (1977, p. 8).

In this example, I am not suggesting that the ‘moral relations as simple impressions view’ is a better explanation of what makes our judgments moral. Both Hume’s sentimentalist view and my explanation can serve equally weighted expositions. My view faces the difficulties in explaining PEIs moral judgments based on their tacit moral knowledge. So, it might turn out that ideas alone can drive our moral acts, and ultimately, morals are actually derived from reason. However, for the purpose of this dissertation, my aim is not to defend a rationalistic conception of morality; and I am not sympathetic to such a view either. My point is to show that there is an under-determination between my view and Hume’s sentimentalist view. Additionally, there is strong evidence that my view is more consistent with Hume’s account of general ideas. Before, I continue to expand this discussion, it is better to look at Hume’s possible analysis of “Murder is wrong”.

In terms of all these analyses of the relations between the passions and their subjects, we may now continue with the analysis of the judgment of “Murder is wrong”. As a Humean analysis, it will be an examination of the causal history of these general terms. In order to pronounce murder as wrong, we need to have at least the following items: an instance of murder, the pain of the victim, the lively idea of that pain, and the passion caused by this pain. I think that the general idea of murder must necessarily refer to a particular action, in which someone kills someone else. At this point, we do not need any further complication of defining murder in a more sophisticated way because what is essentially important for the sympathy mechanism is the sign of the victim’s pain. Hence, any action, in which someone is killed and suffers from it, is a murder⁹³. For the wrongness, we must check the double association of ideas that, at the end, enables us to get a feeling of disapprobation. Ultimately, the analysis of “Murder is wrong” can be drawn as the diagram 6.

By means of this diagram, we have to raise several questions. For instance, it is difficult to understand how the idea of (p) is derived from the impression that signifies the victim’s pain. Secondly, if we are dealing with the evaluation of a certain type of action, then how can we form a general idea of murder based on the

⁹³ It must be now even clearer, why I defended the claim that the general idea of murder cannot be generated without a compound that signals its specific wrongness. There are too many actions that can be counted as murder in terms of this definition. However, Hume tries to avoid this difficulty by pointing out that every pain and pleasure is peculiar in a sense that they signify specific sorts of characters and actions. In terms of this, I just cannot accept that this is more than an assumption.

common quality, which is the impression of the pain of the victim? Thirdly, and most importantly, what is the relation of murder with wrongness after all?

To start with the first question, we have to understand the impression of (p). As I have analyzed the general idea of murder earlier, all the sensory impressions that we may perceive in experiencing a case of murder are non-reflective. In this case, what we may possibly experience as the impression of (p) are those of victim's screaming, yelling, wounds, blood, etc. I do not think that any of these impressions are sufficient to produce the idea of (p), simply because sensation is passive admission of raw-sensory-data. The impression of screaming can correspond to the idea of screaming. A simple idea does not differ from its simple impression except its force and vivacity.




Diagram 6 "Murder is wrong"

Hence, the idea of (p) must correspond to an impression of (p). As the pain of others cannot be perceived directly, the idea of (p) is still the idea of impression that is the sign of the pain. In this case, the transition from the idea of (p) to the lively idea of (p) must produce the idea of the victim's pain in us. How can this be done? Who knows...? This is actually Hume's implicit answer. So, for this problem we cannot go any further and must accept that mind (imagination) has such a power

(mysterious or unknown) of producing other's pain from an idea of sensory impression⁹⁴.

At this point, it seems that Hume is pretty careless when he connects *Treatise* Book II to Book III. If the transition of impression to idea, and to the passion is that unimportant, then it is difficult to read his discovery argument as a strict dismissal of the idea that passions are original existences. If the lively idea of pain can transform into the passion or the emotion of pain so easily, then the difference between the pain and the idea of pain seems to be unimportant. In other words, the issue of determining the origins of morals loses its importance because; in the case of sympathy what causes the passion to exist is an idea. If we remember the discovery argument, Hume was saying that vice and virtue cannot be true or false, however, if what is vicious is the lively idea of (p), then it seems that it can have a truth-value because, it must resemble the first impression of (p) that is the sign of the other's pain.

For the second question, the impression of (p) cannot be the common quality of the general idea of murder. However, Hume might be saying that the pain of any particular act is unique. In the case of the murder, every instance of murder produces a particular pain and because the instances of murder resemble each other, pains of the victims resemble each other as well. It is quite intuitive that this can be true. Nonetheless, it is at the same time quite unintuitive that the complex idea of murder has a compound, which is the idea of other's pain. Hume admittedly acknowledges that not all the instances of murder produce pain. The use of "general rules" in sympathy implies that we call certain types of killing as murder, not because they produce pain, but because the act of killing is intentional and the victim has no consent for being killed. Consequently, the general idea of murder cannot depend on the common quality that the action is painful. As I have referred earlier, Hume is also aware of this. He was saying that the ultimate object of our blame and appraisal is the motive and not the action itself (T 3.2.1). Ultimately, if

⁹⁴ Here the more important issue is to explain how this idea of (p) produces a real pain and a passion in us. Hume relies on his ordinary observations, in which when we encounter people's suffering; we feel a similar pain in us. However, this does not show that this outcome of the pain in us is necessarily produced by this lively idea of (p). The connection between the idea and the pain is still unexplained. The same phenomenon can equally be explained by any theory of morals. A rationalist would argue that when we encounter such occasions, deducing the fact that 'it is wrong' produces a feeling of pain in us. Alternatively, someone, who thinks that we perceive moral relations in our experience, can also argue that this perception causes us to feel a pain. I think this part of Hume's account of sympathy does not say anything specifically important.

we are pronouncing an act as murder, it means that we have already valued the motive as wrong. And this valuation must be prior to the double association of ideas.

Thirdly, we saw in the diagram that there are two different paths producing the feeling of blame. In the first path, the originating item is an impression; and in the second path it is an idea. In terms of this, we need to examine both of these paths. In the first path, all the relations are natural. Impression of (p) naturally follows the idea and this idea naturally produces a pain and a passion in us. The pronouncement of the wrongness of the action is itself not a relation but it refers to these relations. Secondly, in the first path, there is no comparison or any distinction of reason playing any role. In between the pronouncement of the action as wrong, and perceiving the impression that signifies the pain of the victim, everything proceeds almost unconsciously. When we see that someone is killed we naturally feel a disapprobation and call this action wrong. Ultimately, as I have indicated earlier, these kinds of inferences are animal inferences. Animal inferences are either plainly true or plainly false depending on the impression from which its conclusion derived. In the first path, if we have the impression of (p), then our inference that “Murder is wrong” is evidently true. It can be asked now that, can we infer ‘murder is wrong’ from the mere idea that “The victim’s screaming resembles his/her pain”. If we recall Hume’s account of general ideas, he says that general ideas are particulars. In the sense of this definition, it is reflected that any general idea is actually a particular instance that has a common quality shared with others. So, if the latter idea about the instance of murder is a particular idea of murder (or the compound idea of murder that is the common quality), the animal inference is legitimate. For Hume, this idea is an instance of the common quality of murder because; he thinks that nothing in the external objects can produce passions of blame and appraisal in us. Therefore, the inference is legitimate.

In the second path, the originating perception of the process is not an impression. For this reason, this is more interesting to examine. As I have shown in the diagram, in the second path, we have an opposing impression (or there may be no sign of other’s emotions), which signals out that the person is not in pain. So, even if the originating perception is not an impression, but a general rule; we still acquire something from sensation, which produces an idea of (not p). So, we must

expect that the general rule must correct the idea of (not p) in order for us to feel blame. I think that there must be a comparison between the idea of (not p) and the general rule, from which the outcome will be the idea of (p). Such a comparison implies two things. First, the common quality cannot be this pain (or the pleasure) of the victim. Secondly, the agent must already know that instances of murder are painful. If the common quality had been the pain of the victim, then, when the idea of (not p) enters into imagination, by resemblance, imagination must have discovered that the action is not an instance of murder. However, it is also the case in Hume's own examples that imagination detects the action as an instance of murder because otherwise no general rule would involve in the production of the passion of blame.

If all these possibilities are unsuccessful, then we have two options to defend. The first option is to say that there is no general idea of willful murder in a Humean fashion. I think this is plainly false. The second option is to claim that in the content of the complex impression of willful murder, there is a compound by which the mind associates instances of willful murder. However, this compound is none of the three possibilities evaluated before. By stating this, we encounter a deadlock. According to Hume, in the mind there are only perceptions and nothing else. In this case, whatever that common quality is, it should be a perception (either an impression or idea). Therefore, the common quality must be in the content of the general idea of willful murder.

At this point, we need to recall the stronger claim that natural relations are simple impressions. Additionally, we will also rely on another idea from the previous chapter that some complex ideas are just like simple ideas by virtue of inseparability. In the example of the sound of a chord, I was claiming that it is a complex idea, but it cannot be separated into its more basic compound ideas based on temporarily contiguous impression. I think some acts like willful murder shares this nature of these sorts of complex ideas. However, separating the general idea of willful murder was not as difficult as the sound of a chord. This may mean that it is not true that the complex idea of willful murder is inseparable. Hence, the two cases are not analogous. I take this as a serious challenge because on the surface, these two cases do not resemble each other in terms of separability. However, there is a crucial problem of willful murder which prevents it being completely separable.

The common quality of willful murder is missing in the analysis of instances of willful murder. No possible compound of willful murder is shared by all the instances of it. Separability Principle tells us that a complex idea must be easily separated and the simpler compounds must be easily distinguished from each other. However, clearly one of the most crucial compounds here cannot be separated and distinguished from the others. In my contention of the Separability Principle, this makes willful murder an unanalyzable complex idea.

Now, if we remember the claim that relations such as ‘being on’ must be a simple impression, which is a compound of the complex idea of ‘the laptop is on the desk’, I think in the case of willful murder what we are looking for as the common quality is a natural relation that is a simple impression in our complex impression of the instance of a willful murder. This part of the argument, I should admit, contains the most bizarre claim⁹⁵. Although, the idea is quite awkward, it fits best to the Humean framework of general ideas. So, accordingly, when we perceive an instance of willful murder, we perceive a relation among the relevant compounds of the perception, which is shared by all the instances of willful murder. Even if this relation is perceived as an impression, it cannot be detected by imagination. It can, however, be discovered by distinction of reason indirectly. This happens, when we realize that ‘murder is wrong’. This can be the only cogent explanation of how we have a general idea of willful murder.

5.3. Some Complications Resolved

I am aware that there are some urgent issues that must be handled quickly before moving on. For instance, first, this specific natural relation must be explained. Secondly, what distinction of reason discovers this relation? Thirdly, how this explanation is compatible with Hume’s claim that there cannot be any moral relations?

The first issue. As I have admitted earlier, for Hume, natural relations are three in number: resemblance, contiguity, and cause-effect. In this case, if the common quality is a natural relation, then it must fall into one of these types of

⁹⁵ This claim is bizarre because it implies that wrongness can be perceived just as ordinary objects of sensation. However, this is the result of Hume’s own general principles.

natural relations. However, I have already showed that the common quality cannot be one of these relations. How, then, can it still be a natural relation?

It is admittedly true that this relation cannot be one of these natural relations. All of these relations can be found in many other perceptions as well. However, when we accept the stronger claim, we are no longer obliged to accept Hume's idea that natural relations are three in number. I have argued above that the relation of willful murder cannot be distinguished in the imagination. Those three natural relations are the only ones that imagination can discover.⁹⁶ In this case, there can be other relations (like the one in willful murder) in addition to those three. In fact, Hume defines these three relations as "the only *general* principles" that are detected by the imagination. He says, "They are not the sole causes. For the thought has evidently a very irregular motion in running along its objects, and may leap from the heavens to the earth, from one end of the creation to the other, without any certain method or order" (T 1.3.6). The difference between principles and causes lays on the difference between sensation and perception. Hume wants to say that even if we acquire more than these three relations in *sensation*, it is never possible for imagination to *perceive* more than these three natural relations. So any relation whatsoever boils down to any of these three, if the mind is conscious of this relation. Therefore, there can be other natural relations different from resemblance, contiguity, and cause-effect.

In the case of the willful murder, the relation is something which cannot be reduced to one of these three natural relations, when it is perceived by the imagination. Hence, when we perceive an instance of willful murder, we never get conscious of its relation. And, I think that Hume's examination of willful murder justifies this claim. In his examination, Hume is trying to find out the vice in the objects of imagination and concludes that there is no such a thing, because vice as a natural relation cannot be perceived by imagination. Vice is not a type of relation that can be settled in the label of any of those three relations. However, it is still a natural relation because it must be in the content of the complex perception of willful murder. The issue of, what kind of things are these natural moral relations, will be issued in the next section. I will propose an explanation of perceptual moral

⁹⁶ In some complex ideas mentioned earlier, even these three relations cannot be discovered by the imagination directly from the sensory impressions.

properties that is discussed in the current meta-ethical literature. With the help of this explanation, I think, the idea of natural moral relations can become clearer.

The second issue. It can be asked now how it is possible for the reason to distinguish this relation? It seems that reason cannot discover these natural relations by those seven philosophical relations. Actually, this will be the topic of the section 5.5 and because of this here I am not going to discuss it in detail. In short, I should say that for Hume judgments must be in two types. As I have occasionally pointed out this claim, judgments are not only the products of reason but they are eventually produced by understanding. This means that, there is this one type of judgments that are the outcomes of the distinctions of reason; and there is the second type, which is the direct outcome of single-step inferences. These single-steps inferences are also acknowledged by Russell. He says that, “We must bear in mind the distinction between inferences as understood in logic, and what may be called ‘animal inference’. By ‘animal inference’ I mean what happens when an occurrence A causes a belief B without any conscious intermediary” (1948, p. 182). So the distinctions of reason and animal inferences differ from each other in terms of the involvement of conscious deliberation. The latter will be discussed as the outcome of natural relations as simple impressions. At this point, however, I will postpone this discussion to 5.5.

The third issue. All this positive claims concerning the status of moral relations are seemingly incompatible with Hume’s claims in T 3.1.1. In this chapter, I have not shown that Hume’s overall argument of T 3.1.1 is wrong⁹⁷. Independent from T 3.1.1, in the last chapter, I disagreed with Hume’s Separability Principle, where I was showing that natural relations are simple impressions. Also, I argued that some ideas can be both complex and inseparable. Thirdly, based on Hume’s notion of general ideas, the common quality of the instances of willful murder must be a simple perception and this simple perception is a natural relation. Nonetheless, evidently, none of these claims directly incompatible with any arguments of T 3.1.1. Still, indirectly, they are showing something radically important for the overall argument of T 3.1.1. As Capaldi indicates, Hume thinks, “[T]here are no such things as moral relations (i.e. *moral relational ideas*)” (1992, p. 122; Italics added).

⁹⁷ I did not propose a knock-down argument against the overall argument, but I have offered some criticisms to the motivation and discovery arguments. Moreover, the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view is a counter-example to Hume’s claim in Hume’s Fork. Ultimately, throughout this chapter I have provided considerably significant criticisms to the overall argument.

So far, I did not claim that there are “moral relational ideas”. What I have argued for is that moral relations as natural relations can be impressions of sensation. In this way, the rejected status of moral relations can now be reissued in terms of the possibility of moral relations as natural relations. This means that in T 3.1.1 Hume misses one crucial possibility in terms of moral relations. If moral relations are natural relations, then there can be judgments concerning these relations. Consequently, these judgments will expose knowledge of these relations.

Before going to this discussion, I need to say that natural moral relations are not disqualified directly in the arguments of T 3.1.1. And, there is an obvious reason for this. Hume thinks that moral distinctions are derived from our impressions, not ideas. In objecting the idea that morality is derived from reason, it is sufficient for Hume to show that there are no *moral relational ideas*. Hence, for Hume, the rationalists’ “ought” does not include the possibility of moral relations as simple impressions of sensation. I will issue the relation of Hume’s Law to the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view in the last section of this chapter.

5.4. The Place of the ‘Moral Relations as Simple Impressions’ View in the Contemporary Meta-Ethical Literature

In order to have a better understanding of the view of ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ and its contrast with the Humean sentimentalism, I think, it will be helpful to evaluate the contemporary literature on moral perception and moral empiricism briefly. In this section, I will mostly follow Robert Cowan’s “Perceptual Intuitionism” (2013) and try to explain briefly how it is possible that we experience moral properties or relations in our perception. In explaining this, we will see that, while Humean sentimentalism falls under the category of universalism, its subjectivist components makes it incompatible with views endorsing some sort of ethical perception.

Perceptual Intuitionism (PI) is defined as the view that, “normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences” (ibid., p. 3)⁹⁸. Additionally, Cowan defines *Ethical Perception* (EP) as the view that, “moral agents can do have perceptual

⁹⁸ See also, Audi (2010); Dancy (2010); Cullison (2009); McBrayer (2010); Väyrynen (2008).

experiences (at least some of which are veridical) as of the instantiation of ethical properties” (ibid.). It should be underlined that moral properties mentioned in these definitions are not radically different from other ordinary complex properties. Cullison says, “The idea is that moral properties are relevantly similar to other complex non-moral properties that we clearly do have perceptual knowledge of. Vintners can distinguish between different kinds of dry red wine ... There is little reason not to extend this to moral properties” (2009, p. 160). There are two types of properties that are commonly discussed as being found in our experiences. Low-level properties are those, which are the shape, size, position, color, object-hood and other similar constituents of objects. High-level properties, on the other hand, are those of natural kind properties and causal relations⁹⁹. In fact, ethical properties are –if there is any– high-level in this sense.

One of the central objections to the EP view is the *Looks Objection* (LO). LO basically argues that ethical properties such as badness, wrongness, etc., do not look like anything. Cowan formulates LO as the following:

P1: There is such a thing as ethical perceptual experience only if there is a way that ethical properties look.

P2: Ethical properties, e.g., wrongness, cruelty, do not look a certain way.

C: There is no such thing as ethical perceptual experience (EP is false) (Cowan, p. 6).

I think that the Looks Objection and Hume’s denial of ethical properties as external properties of objects is quite similar. So, providing an answer to LO would support my criticism of Hume’s analysis of willful murder. Hume was arguing that in examining willful murder, nothing in the object *looks* like ethical (or moral if you like). All the sensory input that Hume was considering look in a certain way, but this certain way is not the way an ethical property would look like, if it *really* looks like to be anything. In replying to LO, it is often the case to distinguish two senses of *looks*. So, there we must be aware that there are at least two certain types of *looks*:

(a) Phenomenal *presence* representation

⁹⁹ Siegel (2006) argues that people are capable of perceiving such high-level properties.

(b) Phenomenal *presence as absence* representation (ibid.)¹⁰⁰.

This basically suggests that LO overlooks the idea that there are other senses of look beside the (a) type of looks. I think Hume has the same difficulty. So, if it is reasonable and there is sufficient reason to think that (b) type of look is possible, then we have a reason to refuse Hume's claims about the analysis of willful murder. To start with, I want, first, to introduce the idea of (b). Phenomenal presence as absence representations are those, which are different from colors, shapes, etc. In this case, what it covers includes those high-level properties of perception; and the ethical properties (Cowan, 2013, p. 7). To give an example, the following can be helpful:

[V]ision is not confined to the visible. We visually experience what is out of view, what is hidden or occluded... For example, you look at a tomato. You have a sense of its presence as a whole, even though the back of the tomato (for example) is hidden from a view. You do not merely *think* that the tomato has a back, or *judge* or *infer* that it is there. You have a sense, a visual sense, of its presence. (Noë, 2009 p. 470-1; quoted in Cowan, 2013 p. 7)

The backside of the tomato is present as absence representation in the perception. It is not important here to determine whether in ordinary perception we can really perceive the backside of the tomato. What is important is to see that we perceive the tomato as a whole. So this type of looks is a less robust type of phenomenal representations.

Another case is Siegel's example of perceiving "the property of being a pine tree after developing a recognitional capacity" (op. cit., p. 8). Similar to the backside of the tomato case, this property is also a less robust type of perceptual property. Being a pine tree is not as visible as the shape and figure of the pine tree. Siegel argues that, before having a recognitional practice of detecting pine trees, we cannot point out which trees are pine trees in a grove of many different sorts. However, when we gain such a capacity, it will become an immediate recognition. She says, "They [pine trees] become visually salient to you... Gaining this recognitional disposition is reflected in a phenomenological difference between the visual experiences had before and those had after the recognitional disposition was

¹⁰⁰ For those, who are more familiar with this topic, (b) is also known as the *amodal* representation. For (b) see also, Noë (2009); Nanay (2010); Macpherson (n. d.).

fully developed” (Siegel, 2010, p. 100)¹⁰¹. The crucial aspect of this example is that it claims that after gaining this recognitional capacity these properties of presence as absence representations become part of the “phenomenology of the experience” (ibid.).

The next issue of this presence as absence properties is, in Macpherson’s terms, to determine whether they are “suitably counterfactually sensitive” or not¹⁰². Accordingly, low-level properties are suitably counterfactually sensitive; meaning that if a low-level property (i.e. the color) had not been present –but at the same time all the other properties remain the same– this property would not have had been experienced. For Macpherson, all the phenomenally present properties in experience are counterfactually sensitive in this sense. If we consider the high-level properties, and apply the same counterfactual sensitivity test, then we can see that these properties are not “suitably counterfactually sensitive”. For instance, if all the low-level properties of a grove of pine trees were remain the same except that the property of being a pine tree had not been present, this property would still have been represented in the experience. Cowan remarks on this by saying, “Macpherson’s thought is that this feature (although, strictly speaking it is the *lack* of a feature) marks out those experiential properties that are represented as *phenomenally present as absent* in ordinary agents” (Cowan, 2013, p. 9)¹⁰³. In short, if the color of a pine tree is absent in representation, we cannot experience its color. However, if the property of being a pine tree is absent in the representation, we can still experience a pine tree.

This can also explain why Hume is misleading in his evaluation of willful murder. He was saying that vice escapes our examination of the object, when we turn our attention to its low-level properties. It is obviously true that, for instance, being a pine tree is not identical with any low-level property of the spectator’s experience. However, if it is a property that is phenomenally present as absent and counterfactually insensitive, then this would explain why we *see* that the particular

¹⁰¹ See also, Peacocke (1992, Chap. 3).

¹⁰² Macpherson (n. d.) quoted in Cowan (2013, p. 8).

¹⁰³ One might ask whether those properties depend, supervene on, or identical with the low-level properties. Cullison argues that the correlation between the low-level and high-level properties is not necessarily one of these latter alternatives. I will not discuss this issue here. Cf., Cullison (2009, pp. 167-8).

instance of willful murder is wrong. Hume's own explanation of its wrongness brings too many explanatory loads. Unlike Hume's explanation, the reason why we say that 'murder is wrong' is because; its high-level property of wrongness is counterfactually insensitive. Whenever, we keep its low-level properties constant, we *see* murder as wrong.

At this point, a possible objection to my correlation of EP with my view of 'natural relations as simple impression' view can be raised. One can say that according to my view, wrongness is not counterfactually insensitive and *looks* as a low-level property in experience. In other words, if the property of wrongness had not been present, and all the other properties were held the same, it is not possible that wrongness would still have been presented in the experience. This must be so because if it is a simple impression, its absence would mean that it is *really* absent. To reply this objection, I should first notice that wrongness as a simple impression is not something like impressions of low-level properties. Wrongness, in my contention, is *still* a relation; and more importantly it is a natural relation. By being a natural relation, whenever its objects are present, the property of wrongness must be present in the experience¹⁰⁴. However, a Humean can still endorse the view that this insensitivity can differently be explained by saying that this high-level property is actually not present in the experience, but it is our sentimental reaction to the situation. In this case, this property is the property of "not being phenomenally present at all" (Cowan, 2013, p. 10). To make Macpherson's view more appealing, Cowan mentions cases of *amodal* completion: "cases where it seems that perceivers have some sort of 'awareness' of the occluded parts of shapes, such that shapes can be said to be 'completed'" (ibid.).

The idea of *amodal* completion is that; unlike the view that people's completion of occluded parts of objects is a deliberated and cognitive process, the process is actually opaque to people's background beliefs and deliberate judgments¹⁰⁵. In the cases of the figures 1 & 2, seeing rectangles in the first figure

¹⁰⁴ Related to the previous footnote, my view may require an explanation of the status of the correlation of wrongness with the low-level properties of murder. It seems that the dependence is at least epistemologically too strong. Cf., Audi (1997).

¹⁰⁵ Briscoe (2011) thinks that cases like the second figure differ from the first figure. In the second figure, people rely on their background knowledge of specific figures of specific objects (i.e. deer). However, in the first figure, amodal completion occurs by stimulus driven perception. Nanay (2010) rejects this and says that both cases are the same. However, I will not issue this debate here.

and completing the unseen body parts of the deer in the second is reported by the subjects. It is said that this completion occurs due to the economy of our perceptual systems. The representation of the occluded objects is completed in virtue of the most likely object, or object that the occluded object might have been, if it were not occluded. So, the most likely object for the first figure is rectangles. For the second figure, the pattern of the representation makes us to see that the occluded parts of the objects are the rest of the deer-parts, which make the whole object a deer. Ultimately, this suggests that these sorts of completions do not depend on any cognitive states¹⁰⁶. For the purpose of supporting the claim that *amodal* completion occurs for the high-level moral properties, we need to find out some cases where, subjects' moral responses seem not depending on any of their cognitive or deliberative states. In this case, I think it is possible to find out such analogous examples in the well-known moral dilemmas.



Figure 1

Figure 2

The philosophical and scientific research using the famous moral dilemmas, the “trolley problem”¹⁰⁷, indicate that people, when they are forced to be free of any personal valuation or moral predisposition, find themselves without justification for their moral judgments. In this paper, I am not going to discuss the consequences of

¹⁰⁶ For *amodal* completion tasks see, Kanizsa (1985); Pylyshyn (1999); Nanay (2010); Briscoe (2011).

¹⁰⁷ Thomson (1976); Foot (1967).

the trolley problem in normative ethics, but I will discuss these former implications, to show that, when there is no cognitive states' involving in forming moral judgments, it is seen that people still can accomplish in making moral judgments. The psychologist Jonathan Haidt examined how people make moral judgments in extreme cases. He asked people to perform moral judgments and then to justify them. However, the situation is so constructed that justification seems almost impossible. The story they described for the subjects is the following:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are travelling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decided that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love but decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret between them, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that, was it OK for them to make love? (Haidt, Björklund, and Murphy, 2000)¹⁰⁸

When the subjects face this scenario, they immediately respond that it is wrong. However, when it comes to the justification of that wrongness they fail to give a reason because all the ways of justification is closed. For instance, there is no danger of inbreeding or any danger for siblings' relation. In this case, people tend to give justifications like: "I don't know, I can't explain it, I just know it's wrong" (ibid.). Haidt reports in his studies that moral judgments are generally the outcomes of automatic, inhibited, and intuitive responses. Here this result can be interpreted in the following way. They do not stipulate or deplete any low-level properties of the given scenario. In this case, people's insistence on judging the action as wrong supports the hypothesis that wrongness is a presence as absence representation in experience. This property remains the same, even if they removed all the cognitive items to change it. So, people's *pronouncements* show that they do not judge the act as wrong by appealing to any of their prior beliefs.

Another case that is shown by Antonio Damasio (1994, pp. 34-51) indicates that some structures of the brain plays important role in moral judgments or personal attitudes towards social issues. In addition to this line of evidence, Joshua Greene (2001, pp. 2105-108; 2002, pp. 517-23) designed some experiments about how we produce moral judgments in trolley cases by using fMRI measurements. Very briefly, in the "standard trolley" (impersonal violation) case people found it

¹⁰⁸ See also; Haidt (2001).

permissible to switch the trolley towards one agent, whereas in the “footbridge case” (personal violation), where the agent should push a fat person off the bridge in order to stop the trolley, people found this action impermissible¹⁰⁹. The interesting findings of these experiments are that people, who confirm the action in the personal violation cases, showed more brain activity in the areas, which are associated with emotional activity, comparing with people who confirm the “impersonal” cases. Secondly, for the people who confirm the “personal violation” it takes more time to come up with a moral judgment. Moreover, these people show more activity in certain parts of their brains, which are associated with higher-level cognitive activity. Here we see that, when people try to act or decide contrary to their prima facie commitments, their act or decision requires more of cognitive work than of emotional or perceptual. In other words, if they see that pushing the fat guy is wrong (regardless of using him for saving four total lives), and then deciding contrary to this must be struggling. For instance, while knowing that I see my laptop in front of me, I cannot just ignore the fact that “I see my laptop in front of me”. Ultimately, these moral cases support the claim that moral properties as high-level properties are present as absent representations in experience.

Here, I must concede that concluding this discussion in the former way is misleading. These cases, clearly and equally, support the Humean idea that in perceiving things there are no high-level properties. In the case of incest, Hume might equally explain the situation by saying that people, by sympathy, have a feeling of disapprobation, when they perceive the motive and pain-pleasure of these others. Secondly, in the case of the trolley example, Hume might be saying that people who confirm pushing the fat guy finds themselves in a situation of the combat of their passions. This struggle can only be ended by reason’s informative guidance. So, for Hume, there is still no need to explain moral properties as present as absent representations in experience.

¹⁰⁹ Very briefly, in the trolley problem, they ask to subjects, what they would have done, if they face the following situation. (Standard trolley scenario): Suppose you are standing near a railway and just your nearby there is a switch, which changes the track of the trolley. A trolley comes from a slope and there are five railway workers on the track. The trolley’s brakes are broken and it will kill those workers for certainty. However, you realize that the switch changes the track of the trolley, but this time it will kill one railroad worker. What will you do? Do you change the track, or you do not involve to what will happen next? (Footbridge scenario): This time you are standing on a bridge, under which the trolley will pass and kill those five workers. However, you realize that there is a “fat guy” standing just near you and you know for sure that the weight of this guy can stop the trolley and save the lives of those workers. Unfortunately, this guy will certainly die. The questions are the same. See Foot (1967); Judith Jarvis Thomson (1985).

I am aware of this situation, but I am not claiming that this proposal is much better and even a knock-down argument against Hume’s sentimental explanation of moral properties. Putting my criticisms of Hume’s view aside, I am proposing a more modest claim. I am saying that both views are equally explanatorily powerful. Hence, there is a case of under-determination. What I am criticizing is that the LO objection and Hume’s willful murder analysis ignore the possible explanation that I am endorsing here¹¹⁰.

There is one last thing that I need to discuss here. If we remember Hume’s use of the general rules in the sympathy mechanism, a similar account is required for the presence as absence view of high-level qualities. “Cognitive penetration”¹¹¹ of perceptual experiences is the view that non-perceptual states can alter the representational and phenomenal content of perception. Cowan formulates this as the following:

[A] visual experience, *e*, is cognitively penetrated if the representational content and phenomenal character of *e* are altered by states in the cognitive system, e.g., beliefs, concepts, desires, emotions, memories, imaginative states, intuitions, and where this does not merely involve those cognitive states having effects on the subjects’ visual *attention*” (Cowan, 2013, p. 13).

Just like Hume’s general rules, these cognitive penetrations adjust the perceptual input and make the experience “theory-laden” (ibid.). The difference between them is that the involvement of the general rules seems to be more deliberate than the cognitive penetration explained here. One might not be conscious of his/her perception is cognitively penetrated, while his/her perception is actually cognitively penetrated. However, a general rule is applied, if it is needed; if the pain or pleasure of the other person is inappropriate (or incorrect). To make it more explicit the following explanation is useful:

A perceiver who can recognize trees by sight seems to have some sort of memory representation, and some sort of perceptual input, such that the input ‘matches’ the memory representation, and the cognitive system of the perceiver registers that this is so... Part of what’s at issue... is *whether visual experience is an input to such processes of recognition or an output of such processes*. (Siegel, 2006 quoted in Cowan, 2013, p. 14; Italics added)

¹¹⁰ Not to mention that this view of “present as absent representation” is not mine.

¹¹¹ See, Macpherson (2012); Pylyshyn (1999); Siegel (2012).

By means of cognitive penetration, we can solve some problems. For instance, acquisition of high-level property recognition requires some kind of expertise. That's why we, ordinarily and gradually, become consistent in our moral deliberations. Young children fail to judge even the basic moral cases. When they are introduced with the proper representations, they start coping with moral problems. This cognitive involvement shapes the perception and they become moral experts as well. According to Cowan there are suggestive studies supporting this model of cognitive penetration (Cowan, 2013, p. 14)¹¹².

Without going into more detail, I want to say that EP satisfies all the explanatory needs of the moral properties. I conclude that EP is as explanatory as Hume's sentimentalism. I will not go one step further and say that EP is a better explanation of moral properties, but I have to underline that there are several advantages of EP that Hume's view lacks of. Furthermore, EP overcomes many problems that Hume's view cannot. For instance, the problem of the common quality can easily be restored by committing to the high-level properties of perception. Secondly, the problem of the involvement of general rules is also overthrown by cognitive penetration. In terms of this, the overall claim of T 3.1.1 can better be defended because the role of general rules is a threat for the thesis that "morality is derived from reason". Finally, this view does not underestimate the involvement of emotions and passions in the evaluations of moral acts. Cognitive penetration precludes all the mental items that are not, in Hume's terms, impressions of sensation. In this case, emotions and passions can adjust perception by cognitive penetration. Ultimately, I state that 'moral relations as simple impressions' view is a strong alternative that Hume ignores to object in the *Treatise*. Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to say that, if the EP view and my contention are correct, then there are moral relations that are high-level properties of our experiences.

¹¹² See also, Delk and Fillenbaum (1965); Plant and Peruche (2005).

5.5. Invariable Philosophical Relations and Judgments produced by 'Natural Moral Relations as Simple Impressions'

In this section of this chapter, I want to argue that the 'moral relations as simple impressions' view implies that pronouncing moral relations is made by "animal inference". Consequently, pronouncing, for instance, "Murder is wrong" means that I perceive an instance of murder, in which the high-level property of wrongness is present. Secondly, animal inferences are similar to those inferences made by invariable relations. The only difference between the animal inferences and the judgments of invariable relations is that the former is not a conscious or deliberate process. As Hume points out, the difference between the natural and philosophical relations is, for the former, ideas naturally follow each other and, for the latter, mind deliberately compares them in terms of the philosophical relations. So, if moral relations are inferred by animal inferences, this means that a change in the *relata* changes the relation. Hence, in a sense they resemble analytic statements. This means that, for instance, murder itself means that the act is wrong. Ultimately, judgments such as "Murder is wrong" must be true similar to how analytic statements are true, if we perceive the high-level quality of wrongness, when perceiving an instance of murder¹¹³.

In the light of this, I want to start with explaining why moral relations as simple impressions are inferred by animal inferences and not by (Humean-)logical inferences. As I have argued earlier in this chapter, judgments of natural relations are single step inferences. For instance, when we perceive snow, the idea of white naturally follows the idea of snow. In this case, this means that there is no medium process of inferring the whiteness of snow. The mere perception of snow is sufficient to infer that "Snow is white". So the ultimate claim will be that the relation of murder and wrong is just like the relation of snow and white.

¹¹³ In this section and in this dissertation in general, I have no intention to find a position in the debate of the necessary, logical and analytic truths. As I claim that Hume's Law is a psychological thesis, all these terms and their import are irrelevant to my topic. What is important for me is, though, the epistemological status of statements in terms of their certainty and conceivability. "Murder is wrong" can be analytically true but at the same time cannot be logically and necessarily true. However, this makes no difference. If I can show that the knowledge of moral statements are in the category of "most certain and indubitable knowledge", then it will be sufficient to say that these statements do not violate Hume's Law. If they are certain, then inferring them in our arguments may not be "imperceptible". For the connections and disconnections of necessary, logical and analytic truths see, Zalta (1988).

To make the point more explicit, it is better to discuss the invariable relations first. Hume divides philosophical relations into two subclasses. Invariable relations are those of resemblance, degree of quality, contrariety, and quantity or number. Variable relations are the other three philosophical relations: identity, space and time, and cause and effect. At face value, it can be said that this division matters only for the philosophical relations and finding a similarity between natural relations and invariable relations is hopeless. I think that this objection is misleading. First, Hume himself thinks that the relation of resemblance is both a natural relation and an invariable relation. If we look at the features of invariable relations, we can see why he thinks that resemblance is both a natural and invariable relation. Hume says that relations are invariable, “as long as our ideas remain the same” (T 1.3.1), or relations are, “unalterable so long as the ideas continue the same” (T 1.3.3), and invariable relations are found in, “reasoning from mere ideas” (ibid.). Hume calls this type of relations as “real relations” (T 3.1.1) and “real connexion[s]” (T Appendix, 4) as well. Hume thinks that these four relations are “the objects of knowledge and certainty” (T 1.3.1). Three of them (resemblance, contrariety, and degrees in quality) “are discoverable at first sight, and fall more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration” (ibid.). In this way, inferences made by these three relations are “always pronounce[d] at first sight, without any enquiry or reasoning” (ibid.). So, it seems that there is not much of a difference between the resemblance as a natural relation and a philosophical one. As Hume says, “When any objects *resemble* each other, the resemblance will at first strike the eye, or rather the mind; and seldom requires a second examination” (ibid.). So, it seems to me that the only difference between resemblance as a natural relation and a philosophical one is that for the latter it occurs when there is deliberate comparison of objects and for the former it is found in our unconscious associations of ideas in the imagination. The most important thing for the invariable relations is that just like natural relations there is no intermediate step of reasoning process involving in inferring judgments of these relations. Owen says, “The idea here is that those three relations can be known immediately, simply by comparing the related ideas. Intuition requires no steps of reasoning: no intermediate ideas need be found” (1999, p. 84). Alternatively, Norton explains this by saying, “These relations are unaffected by any variation in the timing or order in which their relata

are presented.” (2000, p. 25) However, this is only true for the three of these four invariable relations. Propositions in quantity or number are inferred by demonstration and not by intuition. Because of this I am not going to deal with these relations.

Interestingly, Hume does not pay attention to the invariable relations as much as the variable relations. After 1.3.1, he mainly discusses causation. This may indicate that for Hume, the nature of invariable relations is obviously easy to conceive. However, it would be better, if he had mentioned the connection of invariable relations to the natural relations. Even if he did not mention this, there are some important signs that indicate that these three invariable relations are perceptions, instead of reasoning. Hume says:

All kinds of reasoning consist in nothing but a *comparison*, and a discovery of those relations, either constant or inconstant, which two or more objects bear to each other. This comparison we may make, either when both the objects are present to the senses, or when neither of them present, or when only one. **When both the objects are present to the senses along with the relation, we call *this* perception rather than reasoning**; nor is there in this case any exercise of the thought, or any action, properly speaking, but a mere passive admission of the impressions thro’ the organs of sensation. (T 1.3.2; Bolds added)

The importance of this passage is that Hume says that for it is to be reasoning, the relation must be not present or unavailable to the senses. When both the *relata* and the relation are given in the sensation, then it must be called perception and not reason. So the three invariable relations are inferred as philosophical when they are not apparent in the perception. However, when they are accessible by perception, there is even no need to infer them. I think these points make the difference of natural and invariable philosophical relations. They are both invariable, but the latter always requires deliberation.

In terms of the previous passage, Zabeeh makes an exposition of Hume’s invariable relations. According to him, statements conjoined by invariable relations can be considered as analytic statements. He thinks, “Hume regards as analytic any statement of complex ideas, if the terms expressive of ideas are conjoined by invariable relations” (1960, p. 91). According to this exposition, he divides Hume’s analytic statements into two categories concerning the ways we discover them: by intuition and by demonstration¹¹⁴. He follows Hume’s intuition and demonstration

¹¹⁴ I will skip the second type because it is irrelevant to the topic.

distinction and says that the first type is “discoverable at the first sight” and he says, “The specimens which Hume provides of such statements are expressions of complex ideas which are conjoined by relations such as resemblance, contrariety, and degrees in quality” (ibid.). Consequently, if Zabeeh’s exposition is correct, then, statements such as, “My left hand resembles my right hand” and “This shade of green is lighter than that shade of green”, must be counted as analytic statements. The first reason that he provides is the following:

[B]oth statements are analytic because any changes in relata may produce changes in relation. That is, if my hands (or even if one of them) undergo a detectable change in respect to their resembling qualities, the statement that “my hands resemble each other in some specific respect” no longer remains true. (ibid., p. 92)

Secondly, he refers to Hume’s claim that invariable relations are “epistemologically indubitable” because they are perceptions and not reasoning. Hume says, “The only existences, of which we are certain, are perceptions, which being immediately present to us by consciousness, command our strongest assent, and are the first foundation of all our conclusions” (T 1.4.2 quoted in Zabeeh, 1960, p. 92). However, there are worries concerning such attempts to formulate the statements pronounced by Hume’s invariable relations as analytic. Owen says:

The four relations that depend entirely on ideas, unlike the other three relations, are susceptible to intuition and demonstration, and are more certain. But one must resist the temptation to see Hume’s distinction between these two sorts of relations as approximating to the analytic/synthetic distinction, or the necessary/contingent distinction. Consider degrees of quality, an example of which might be ‘this is an idea of red which is much brighter and more saturated than that idea of red’. This is in the more certain, intuitive class. But no one would classify it as analytic or necessary. (1999, p. 84)

Owen’s worry is understandable because, what he means here is that what we call as analytic today does not match with Hume’s invariable relations. Today, we often define analytic statements as, “those whose truth seems to be knowable by knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone” (Georges, 2013). The problem that Owen poses depends on the emphasis of “knowing the meanings of the constituent words alone”. As I have already claimed, for Hume, the meaning of a term depends on what impression that this term is derived from. In this case, the general idea of ‘bachelor’ contains the idea of ‘unmarried man’ as a distinguishing quality. So bachelors can be said to resemble each other by having the property of being ‘unmarried man’. Hence, I think that Zabeeh’s exposition is not unreasonable

for *simpliciter*. In this case, I do not see any difficulty of calling these statements as analytic. However, if it really bothers to call them analytic as being anachronistic, I may say that statements of invariable relations are similar to those statements that we call analytic today; they are analytic-like.

Having this brief understanding of invariable relations and their connection to natural relations, now I want to discuss the status of statements such as “Murder is wrong” as being invariable relations. The moral relations as simple impressions view showed that wrongness is the common quality of the instances of murder. Additionally, I have argued that this wrongness must be a natural relation that takes place among the objects of instances of murder. Admitting that wrongness is a natural moral relation, I think that in addition to the three natural relations, we must admit that natural moral relations must have the same verifiability and justifiability criteria with the other natural relations. In this section, I have argued that natural relations are invariable just as the three philosophical relations are. So, all natural relations must satisfy the following criteria: (i) their statements are inferred by perceptions and not reasoning; (ii) their truth must be discoverable at the first sight; (iii) they must be epistemologically indubitable; (iv) any change in *relata* may produce change in the relation. Ultimately, if statements of natural moral relations satisfy these conditions, we must admit that they are invariable and analytic-like statements.

For the first condition, in the previous section, I argued that wrongness/rightness of moral actions are perceptual and not cognitive. In this way, I am not going to discuss this claim again. Hence, the previous section enables the satisfaction of the first condition. The second condition follows, if the first condition holds. If moral relations are perceptions, then statements of these relations must be plainly true. This means that, if we really perceive that murder is wrong, this means that murder *is* wrong. Again, the previous section provides arguments and examples that support this claim. I am not suggesting that murder *is* wrong, but if moral relations are simple impressions, then this must be truly so. Third condition is about the epistemic status of all perceptions. For Hume all perceptions epistemologically indubitable and provides the most certain knowledge. In this sense, if the first two conditions hold, then three must hold as well.

For the final condition, we may test some statements of these sorts of moral relations. However, there we encounter a great difficulty of analyzing these statements as the moral predicate being a relation. In other words, statements of these sort are formulated as “x is virtuous”, “x is wrong”, “x is bad”, “x is praiseworthy”, etc. This makes it difficult to analyze because morals are found in these statements as predicates and not relations. In this case, it may be better to follow Hume’s own analysis of judgments. Accordingly, the grammatical form and the linguistic structures are unimportant.

First, it is important to notice that Hume’s treatment and use of judgments differ from our contemporary use of this term. Hume does not consider judgments as linguistic or logical entities. For Hume, in the case of moral judgments, moral experience and moral conduct are more important. Capaldi says, “He [Hume] is said, by many contemporary readers, to have been concerned with moral psychology rather than moral language” (1992, p. 97). So, it is crucial to keep in mind that what is essential or fundamental of moral judgments is the source or the mental operations underlying these linguistic entities. Their linguistic structures and grammatical forms are of no importance for philosophical inquiries concerning morals.

Hume underlines this last point by pointing out that words and ideas can easily be confused in reasoning. He says, “[’T]is usual for men to use words for ideas, and to talk instead of thinking in their reasonings. We use words for ideas, because they are commonly so closely connected, that the mind easily mistakes them” (T 1.2.5). This mistake is unavoidable because uniting and separating ideas are universal principles of the mind, which is the reason why languages are so similar. He says, “This uniting principle among ideas [association of ideas] ... is the cause why, among other things, languages so nearly correspond to each other” (T 1.1.4). This uniformity among languages is actually not important and also irrelevant for philosophical inquiries concerning morality. In *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Hume mentions why we should avoid inquiring language and turn our attention to the operations of mind:

Nothing is more usual for philosophers to encroach upon the province of grammarians; and to engage in disputes of words, while they imagine that they are handling controversies of the deepest importance and concern. It was in order to avoid altercations, so frivolous and endless, that I endeavoured to state with the utmost caution the object of our present

enquiry ... I do not find that in English, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as contradistinguished from the other ... A moral, philosophical discourse needs not enter into all these caprices of language, which are so variable in different dialects, and in different ages of the same dialect ... But, secondly, it is no wonder that languages should not be very precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices and defects; *since there is so little distinction made in our internal estimation of them.* (EPM, Appendix IV, pp. 98-101; Italics added)

This shows that inquiries of virtues and vices (among other philosophically important terms) must cover the mental underpinnings of language. In *EHU*, Hume puts it more explicitly: “When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion that a philosophical term is employed without any meaning or idea (as is but too frequent), we need but enquire, from what impression is that supposed idea derived?” (EHU, 2.9) So, it is the psychological mechanisms that must be examined in order to determine the meaning of a word. In the light of this, the previous passage indicates that the similarity of the meanings of vice and defects is due to the psychological similarities between the impressions producing defects and vices. This account of meaning differs from the later empiricists. Capaldi points out:

The difference between Hume and later empiricists such as A.J. Ayer is that whereas later empiricists have been concerned with the empirical referent of sentences, Hume was concerned with the empirical referent of a specific term ... Hence, when Hume engaged in an analysis of key issues he was apt to seek for the referent or origin of a specific term or word, not the sentence” (1992, p. 100).

So, what we need to do is to look at the ideas of ‘murder’ and ‘wrong’ and determine whether any change in one of them changes the truth of the statement. For instance, we face an instance of killing, but this time this killing will be an instance of euthanasia. Should we say that ‘euthanasia is wrong’? I think you should not. Alternatively, does it make any sense to say that “murder is right or virtues”? I think that it does not make any sense. Additionally, even if ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view is incorrect, Hume’s own explication of ‘murder is wrong’ implies the same outcome. By sympathy, perceiving an instance of murder almost necessarily follows that it is vicious. Not to mention that this outcome is the case, even if there are no emotional clues available. In this case, I think that the reason why moral relations are invariable is pretty simple. Murder contains ‘wrongness’ in its meaning. It is almost similar to the term ‘bachelor’. Throughout the chapter, all of the arguments support this conclusion. Saying that “Murder is

wrong” is an analytic-like invariable relation implies that ‘murder’ in itself is a judgment derived from perception. Ultimately, such statements constitute the most certain knowledge in Hume’s framework.

Finally, I want clarify how all these discussions are connected to Hume’s Law and specifically to the Overall Argument of T 3.1.1. I will claim that ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view is incompatible with the conclusion of Hume’s Fork, which is the seventh premise of the overall argument stating that: “moral relations cannot be found in relations of ideas and matters of facts”. Consequently, the conclusion that: “there are no moral relations” is false. Secondly, it can be seen that the Supplementary Argument A is not affected from this view. This means that Hume’s criticism of the rationalist morality still holds. Ultimately, here I am concluding that judgments such as ‘murder is wrong’ are not affected or do not violate Hume’s Law.

First of all, in the Supplementary Argument B, Hume was claiming that “a relation is either demonstrable or inferred from cause-effect”. In this chapter, I argued that it is not necessary for a relation to fall under one of these categories. If natural relations are simple impressions and moral relations are natural, then they must be, in Hume’s term, original existences. Additionally, this invalidated the Supplementary Argument B by falsifying its conclusion that “there cannot be any moral relation”. Again following Hume’s claims, it must be said that an original existence cannot be the object of reason. This intermediate step is consistent with Hume’s overall thesis that morality is not derived from reason. So, even if there are moral relations, because these relations are not ideas, the conclusion of the overall argument still holds. However, this is not the end of the story. To say that moral relations are not the object of reason does not necessarily imply that we cannot produce any judgment concerning them. In other words, for the overall argument to be valid there should really be no moral relations at all; to put it more technically, the only way that makes the overall argument valid is that morals (or moral relations) must be impressions of reflection as Hume suggests them.

If it is true that moral relations are impressions of sensation, then this falsifies the Discovery Argument in a sense that I have already argued in 4.4.2. As Hume says, all the impressions of sensation must have a corresponding idea. Hence, the idea of an impression must have a truth value. As I have argued in the last

section, perceptual knowledge constituted the most certain knowledge. From this point, I object to Hume's Fork. In this section, I showed that the knowledge of moral relations have the same status of the three invariable relations of ideas. This means that they are analytic-like invariable relations as well. Hence, it is not true that moral relations cannot be found in relations of ideas. However, the issue with Hume's Fork is more complicated than this objection.

First, as I have insistently argued in chapter four, Hume's only target is the "rationalists' ought". For the rationalists, this "ought" is demonstrable. In this case, when Hume says that moral relations cannot be found in relations of ideas, his attempt is to claim that moral relations are not demonstrable. In this sense, I think, he disregards the possibility that these moral relations can be found in animal inferences, or in intuition. However, he does not narrow the conclusion of the overall argument to target only rationalists. Secondly, Hume also rejects the idea that these moral relations are found in matters of facts or in cause-effect inferences. Hume thinks that morals are our sentimental reactions towards the situations and the motives and emotions of the other people. As I have showed in section 4.3, the only relation that can be found in the double relation of ideas is the cause-effect relation between the subject and the object. Because this is a cause-effect relation it cannot, for Hume, be a necessary or invariable relation. Therefore, morals cannot be inferred by invariable relations. However, I showed that the view of 'moral relations as simple impressions' and Hume's sentimental account is incompatible and explanations offered by these two views are under-determined. Hence, both views claim that morality is not found in matters of facts¹¹⁵. The difference between them, then, is that the view endorsed in this chapter claims that morality can be found in relations of ideas, whereas Hume's sentimental account denies this. Ultimately, this shows that the conclusion of the overall argument is false.

5.6. Hume's Account of Obligation and Its Examination in terms of Moral Relations as Simple Impressions

The last thing that I need to touch on is the relation between the 'moral relations as simple impressions' view and Hume's account of moral obligation. As I

¹¹⁵ For my view, this is true because present as absent properties of experience cannot be truly Humean facts.

have underlined in different occasions, for Hume, a theory of moral relations must deal not only with moral knowledge, but also it must deal with how we act or become obliged in certain situations. From this point, I claimed that moral relations have two constituents: moral knowledge and obligation. In this section, I will argue that, for Hume, moral evaluation and obligation is the same thing. In other words, saying that “Murder is wrong” is the same with “You ought not to kill”. In this sense, the analysis of “Murder is wrong” is equally sufficient for the analysis of “You ought not to kill”. What is important, however, is to see that this *ought* is different from the rationalist’s “ought”. For rationalists, *ought* must be eternally true: even in the absence of any moral agents, these statements must be true. Hume, on the other hand, thinks that *ought* is the pronouncement of our feeling of approbation or disapprobation of an action or a quality of the mind. In this way, it differs from the rationalist account because, for Hume, motives of our actions are primarily sentimental. In this sense, without any initial passion, *will* cannot generate any action.

My claim here will be that Hume’s treatment of obligation and evaluation with the same analysis is mistaken. By relying on the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view I think that obligation and evaluation cannot be the same thing. In terms of this, I will evaluate three types of obligation based on natural and artificial motives. I will argue that motives cannot be qualities of mind or character. Consequently, moral evaluation is one thing, and obligation is another. Additionally, however, I will claim that this distinction does not prevent us from inferring obligation from moral evaluations. The view that I am endorsing saves Hume from some difficulties. Some types of obligation in Hume’s exposition violate Hume’s Law by being inconsistent with the overall argument of T 3.1.1. However, my rethinking of the Humean account of obligation has no such difficulty.

Hume discusses obligation in terms of the motives. He says, “No action can be requir’d of us as our duty, unless there be implanted in human nature some actuating passion or motive, capable of producing action” (T 3.2.5). For obligation there must be motives to produce action. Motives can be seen as character traits, or qualities of the mind. In this sense, for Hume, the action itself cannot be the duty, but the motive can make it as a duty depending on its reception by the spectator.

Hume says, “All morality depends upon our sentiments; and when any action, or quality of the mind, pleases us *after a certain manner*, we say it is virtuous; and when the neglect, or non-performance of it, displeases us *after a like manner*, we say that we lie under an obligation to perform it” (T 3.2.5). I think that this passage is crucial to see several things. First, in the presence of a pleasing motive, we call an action virtuous. However, when there is no sign of this motive, we feel that we are obliged to bring out that motive to please ourselves by the presence of it. These pleasing and displeasing manners of the presence and absence of these motives is approbation and disapprobation. Haakonssen remarks on this by saying:

[W]e know from Hume’s general exposition of the emotional background to moral evaluation that this latter pleasure arises in conjunction with a peculiar indirect passion, which is closely akin to, and in a way nothing but a corrected version of love, and which we call moral approbation and the displeasure “arises in conjunction with the indirect passion which akin to hatred and is known as moral disapprobation” (1978, p. 8).

So this feeling of approbation or disapprobation constitutes the feeling of obligation. This feeling is so strong that even in the absence of the motive which produces this feeling, one can feel hatred directed towards himself and feel that he is obliged to perform that action. Hume says, “When any virtuous motive or principle is common in human nature, a person, who feels his heart devoid of that principle, may hate himself upon that account, and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty...” (T 3.2.1). So for Hume, some motives are universally acquired by all the humanity and the absence of these motives naturally makes one to feel uncomfortable. In this sense, these motives can be called natural and the obligation to fulfil these motives is natural obligation.

Accordingly motives can be either natural or artificial and the obligation is divided as natural and moral. I will argue that this distinction does not affect my claim that for Hume obligation and evaluation are the same thing. However, it may be useful to give a specific definition of the natural and artificial motives, and the natural and moral obligation respectively. Bernard Wand makes a quite explicit definition of these motives:

(1) Those actions which, it may be claimed, men will perform without the aid or influence of reason and custom. The motives to these actions Hume terms ‘natural’. (2) Those actions which it can be expected men will normally perform with the aid or influence of reason or custom. The motives to these actions Hume terms ‘artificial’” (1956, p. 155).

Hume objects to the idea that the moral worth or the sense of duty of an action cannot by itself derive obligation. There must be a motive, either natural or artificial, to make us praise or blame that action. In this sense, Hume says, “*No action can be virtuous, or morally good, unless, there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its morality*” (T 3.2.1). As we see that Hume constantly repeats the same idea that what makes an action virtuous is the motive that produce it. Secondly, he rejects the idea that actions cannot by themselves be virtuous depending on their sense of morality. The reason is, for Hume, obvious but the argument seems to me compelling:

It appears, therefore, that all virtuous actions derive their merit only from virtuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs of those motives. From this principle I conclude, that the first virtuous motive, which bestows a merit on any action, can never be a regard to the virtue of that action, but must be some other natural motive or principle. To suppose, that the mere regard to the virtue of the action, may be the first motive, which produc'd the action, and render'd it virtuous, is to reason in a circle. Before we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be deriv'd from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action. A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard. (ibid.)

Here, Hume's intention is to say that a sense of duty or the moral worth of an action cannot be regarded as the motive, by which we have an obligation to perform it. The only way, which one can act from a sense of duty, is, as it is stated in the previous passage, is when a person lacks a universal motive and hates himself for this reason. Consequently, artificial virtues, or motives are derived directly from a sense of duty strongly related to other people's approbation or disapprobation of the action. In this sense, we may define natural obligation as the feeling of disapprobation of the actions that are produced by natural motives. For instance, self-interest is a natural motive to action and 'preserving of one's wealth' is a natural obligation because the motive is our self-interest and gives satisfaction or pleasure to us. For instance, Hume says:

Tho' there was no obligation to relieve the miserable, our humanity wou'd lead us to it; and when we omit that duty, the immorality of the omission arises from its being a proof, that we want the natural sentiments of humanity. A father knows it to be his duty to take care of his children: but he has also a *natural inclination* to it. And if no human creature had that inclination, no one cou'd lie under any such obligation. (T 3.2.5; Italics added)

So the most distinguishing feature of natural obligation and natural motives is their *naturalness*. No social or cultural convention intervenes in these motives and even if there are no institutional rules about the fulfillment of these motives, we, as human creatures, have natural dispositions to act according to these natural motives.

Parallel to this, we may define moral obligation as the feeling of disapprobation of the actions that are produced by artificial virtues. In this case, promise keeping, justice, property, etc., are examples of these virtues. However, this feeling of disapprobation cannot be fulfilled all the time because; artificial virtues by themselves cannot be satisfactory to produce indirect passions in us. Hume says that such virtues are artificial; meaning that they were not in place before the establishment of society. In this sense, what is essential for the moral obligation is the consensus on some set of rules that are accepted as beneficial to everyone in the society. Following a similar understanding, Elizabeth Radcliffe defines moral obligations as follows: “According to Hume, this spectator-driven “sense of morality” gives us our notions of virtue and vice and of moral obligation...” (1996, p. 383). This “spectator-driven sense of morality” is an amplified version of the sympathy mechanism that I have discussed earlier. A spectator’s approbation or the disapprobation becomes crucial. We consider, what an imaginary impartial spectator, whose passions are almost all directed as benevolent and not self-interested, do in our situation and approve or disapprove the act accordingly. Hence, the moral disapprobation of, let’s say, promise keeping is not directed towards the ‘immorality’ of not keeping the promise, but it is caused by sympathizing with the other person’s emotions with the aid of the general rule that ‘lying is vicious’. In this sense, the moral obligation comes from this publicly admitted general rule. Korsgaard says:

The moral sense does disapprove of unjust actions, but not because they show the want of some natural motive – rather, because they are contrary to the public interest once the system is set up. Therefore, the only possible motive for performing them springs from that disapproval itself.” (Forthcoming, p. 18)

Tito Magri explains the use of general rules in this framework in three possible ways:

(A) a general rule corrects our natural motives, so that they come to support a given kind of activity, and is thus constitutive for it, in that it modifies the

value that agents ascribe to those of their actions to which these natural motives respond and that fall within the scope of the prospective activity; (B) this is done by modifying what the agents see as the consequences that are likely to result from their performing or not performing those actions; and (C) this is done, in turn, by redescribing those actions as instances of a general class, or of a general practice, of relevantly similar actions. (1996, p. 234)

As Magri puts it all these three possible uses of general rules are compatible with what Hume wants to do with the sense of duty in his explanation of moral obligation. It is, however, more important for me that these uses of the general rules are the same things with the use of general rules in the case of sympathy. It is not surprising, though, because –as I have shown– for moral obligation it is expected for the agent to sympathize with others. It must be noted, though, the general rules are not the source of any vice or virtue. As it is shown earlier, it would be reasoning in a circle to say that these rules constitute what is virtuous and what is vicious. While sympathy is the source of moral approbation, the natural motive of self-interest is the source of artificial virtues:

We partake of their uneasiness by *sympathy*; and as every thing, which gives uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call'd Vice, and whatever produces satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue; this is the reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows upon justice and injustice. And tho' this sense, in the present case, be deriv'd only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The *general rule* reaches beyond those instances, from which it arose; while at the same time we naturally *sympathize* with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. *Thus self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice: but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation, which attends that virtue.* (T 3.2.2)

It must be clear, then, public interest is crucially important for moral obligation. We do not need to go further and discuss the ambiguity of the source and the motive of justice¹¹⁶. I have greater interest in the issue of the relation between the motive and the source of moral obligation. It seems that even in the case of artificial virtues, natural motives play a crucial role. If the sympathy with public interest must attend the motive of self-interest, it means that sympathy with others is a correction of our natural motives. Our natural motives (by being self-directed) are partial and cannot be directed towards others. In this sense, when public interest attends to these motives, it must override their superiority in terms of action. Otherwise, public interest would be insignificantly impotent.

¹¹⁶ See, Darwall (1995, Chap. 10, p. 290); Vanterpool (1988, pp. 97-103); Ardal (1960, p. 187).

Actually Hume makes the difference between the natural and moral obligation explicit in “Of the Original Contract”. He says:

All moral duties may be divided into two kinds. The first are those, to which men are impelled by a natural instinct or immediate propensity, which operates on them, independent of all ideas of obligation... The second kind of moral duties are such as are not supported by any original instinct of nature, but are performed entirely from a sense of obligation” (*Essays*, pp. 479-80).

Then, the importance of the self-interest as the original motive to justice seems losing its importance. Clearly, there is an inconsistency between the passage from the *Treatise* and from the *Essays*. However, this ambiguity can be dissolved in the following manner. In the case of moral obligation, the sense of duty is extremely crucial. When we understand that we are morally obliged to do something, we do not need to have an original or natural motive. The sense of duty is sufficient to prompt the action. On the other hand, when we understand that we are naturally obliged to do something, without an original or natural motive, will cannot actuate any action. No rule by itself is sufficient to prompt actions that we are naturally obliged to do. In other words, for natural obligation, the sense of duty is redundant. In terms of moral obligation, in this contention, Stephen Darwall argues that there is a sense in which we should divide moral obligation into two: one that is originally motivated by the communication of the natural motive with the public interest; and one that is solely derived from the rules themselves. This latter view is stated as, “[A] sense of ‘obligation’ for which Hume believes people would have no use before the convention, before the expression of common interest in regulating themselves by the rule, viz., the idea of rule-obligation” (Darwall, 1993, 433). Darwall’s tripartite conception of Hume’s obligations is not essentially important here. However, the idea of rule-obligation implies that some obligations are not derived from motives, which are originally impressions (passions).

We see that obligation in general is the pronouncement of the feeling of disapprobation. In this sense, if I want to upgrade diagram 4 in order to include the obligation that “you ought not to kill”, it will turn out to be the following diagram 7. In the case of murder, there is a natural motive (the lively idea of (p)) for the obligation. Additionally, in the absence of (p), there is a general rule (which is serving for the public interest), by which we can sympathize with the victim. In this case, “You ought not to kill” is not explicitly a natural or a moral obligation (or a

rule-obligation). In the analysis of murder, I claimed that, in order to pronounce an action as murder, we must already value that action as wrong. In this sense, the common quality of murder is the viciousness of the relation among the objects constituting murder. In the analysis of obligation, we see that for Hume pronouncing an action vicious and obligatory are the outcomes of the same mechanism. In this sense, if viciousness of an action is a property of the experience (as claimed before), the *obligatoriness* of the action must also be a property that we perceive in experience. However, this need not be necessarily so. In order to examine the relation between obligation and evaluation we need to determine what type of obligation we are talking about. By means of this problem, I will evaluate the three types of obligation separately and try to show that for the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view, obligation should not be necessarily experiential. So the following three analyses presuppose that moral relations are properties of our sensory experiences.




Diagram 7 “You ought not to kill”

Natural Obligation derived from a Natural Motive. Under this type of obligations, we are dealing with paradigm cases of murder (where there is explicit exposure of natural motives). When we see that someone is trying to kill another one, we see that this relation is wrong. If we follow Hume’s exposition that the obligation is the feeling of being uncomfortable, when we do not act otherwise, then

seeing that the action is wrong can actuate this feeling. In this sense, this view does not reject the role of emotions completely. In cases like caring the child, helping the miserable, or someone in danger of being killed, we have a natural motive to help them. This motive is experiential. However, the feeling of natural obligation needs not to be experiential as well. In this sense, if natural motives are experiential qualities of perception, Hume's contention of natural obligation is inaccurate.

Although natural obligation and *natural* evaluation must be two different things, this does not show that the inference from the latter to the former is impossible. The natural evaluation is as I have argued is a perception. The natural obligation is, on the other hand, is an emotional state (or an indirect passion). Consequently, the natural obligation is an impression and not an idea. In this case, we need to determine by which relation these two impressions are associated. As I have argued earlier, one of the three natural relations can associate impressions¹¹⁷. For Hume, the only possible relation that can associate the wrongness of murder to the feeling of disapprobation is causation¹¹⁸. Ultimately, inferences from natural evaluations to the natural obligations must be causal inferences¹¹⁹.

In the case of philosophical relations, causation is a variable relation. In this sense, we must expect that causation as a natural relation shares the features of causation as a philosophical relation. This means that inferences from natural evaluations to natural obligations cannot bring about certain knowledge. It is a contingent fact of human nature that when we perceive wrongness as a natural motive, we acquire a feeling of blaming for that very action. Although this seems to be the Humean way of explaining the natural obligation, it is inconsistent with Hume's contention that, naturalness of this obligation comes from the fact that the natural motives are original existences and they cannot be averted completely. This means that natural motives are like instincts and the acts that we do according to them are instinctual actions. In terms of this, saying that it is a contingent fact of the

¹¹⁷ One can object to this by saying that among the passions the only relation is resemblance. So, only resemblance can associate impressions. However, here I am talking about the relation between impressions of sensation and impressions of reflection. In this sense, as I have indicated in the previous chapter, all three relations can associate these two types of impressions.

¹¹⁸ Wrongness is the subject of the feeling of disapprobation. See Chapter 4.3 for the first diagram.

¹¹⁹ If we take Kemp Smith's criticism of the natural relations, causation can be reduced to contiguity. In this sense, if they are only contiguous, then there is no point to discuss this issue any further. However, I simply do not follow Kemp Smith's interpretation.

human nature seems problematic because, (in normal conditions) whenever we perceive these motives instinctually we have to acquire a feeling of approbation or disapprobation. Thus, evaluating the relation between natural obligation and natural motive in terms of Hume's account of philosophical relations is inaccurate. To correct the interpretation we must say that this relation is purely automatic and mechanical (or physiological). Thus, it is not a good idea to talk about natural motive and natural obligation as two separate things. Ultimately, natural obligations are our automatic responses to the natural motives that we perceive in experience¹²⁰.

Moral Obligation derived from a Natural Motive. This is where we get the involvement of general rules and the significance of the sympathy mechanism. In cases where there are lack of emotional evidence, or when the person reflects opposite (contrasting to the appropriate emotional reflections) passions, we have an appeal to our *prima facie* accepted rules. This need can be a result of our lack of sympathetic abilities, or lack of perceptual evidence. For the use of general rules, I have argued that, whenever we have these rules stored as memory, perceptual evidences showing that the other person is in pain are unnecessary. In this case, when we think that we have a moral obligation to help the miserable (even if the miserable seems to be enjoying his life); we come to that conclusion directly from the idea that "helping miserable is a virtue"¹²¹. What is crucial is that, this obligation is directly derived from an idea and not an impression. However, this is inconsistent with the conclusion of Hume's Law: "morals are not deriv'd from reason".

As I have argued earlier, if the 'moral relation as a simple impression' view is correct, then there would be no such an inconsistency. If the virtuousness of helping the miserable is a high-level property of experiencing a miserable person, then this means that our perception is "cognitively penetrated" by our emotional and cognitive states. So, the obligation is not derived from an idea of a rule, but it is seen in the perception of the very action itself. And the involvement of these rules as cognitive states is their penetration of our perceptions by making them theory-

¹²⁰ We may remember Harman's cat thought experiment here.

¹²¹ One can say that there cannot be such a rule. However, rules in the case of moral obligation need not to be institutional or legal. Customary rules like the one that I have inferred have normative force in our actions and this is sufficient.

laden. This means that, when we see that an act is virtuous or vicious, we also see that we have an obligation to do or not to do it¹²².

Rule Obligation derived from an Artificial Motive. Lastly, I want to evaluate obligations which are directly derived from the rules themselves. The difference between the moral and rule obligation is that, the former is eventually derived from some natural motives (qualities of mind, or character); even if these motives may not be present to the agent. For the latter, obligation is directly derived from a rule, which would be nonsensical before any society exist. In this sense, rule obligations are directly derived from the sense of duty by sympathizing with others (or the public interest). For instance, in the case of promise keeping, we feel ourselves under an obligation because we think that “People ought to keep their promises”. As Hume says, there are no natural motives to keep promises. The sense of duty, artificial virtues, or the public interest, all are impossible to be considered as something similar or be evidence to some peculiar pain or pleasure. If we remember the original idea of sympathy, there must be some perceptual evidence of this pain or pleasure (or a general rule referring to such a pain or pleasure). Unfortunately, this is not the case for rule obligation. In this sense, rule obligation entirely depends on our ideas of rules that we publicly enjoy in sustaining the needs and the wants of the society. Hume might be correct in thinking that there are some original natural motives to these obligations. However, in making inferences of rule obligation, these natural motives play no role. Ultimately, rule obligation is also inconsistent with Hume’s Law in a certain respect because the inference of these obligations does not depend on impressions directly.

The ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view would not have any problem in explaining rule obligation. First, it must be now clearer that for this view there is actually no distinction between natural and artificial motives. All motives are experiential and in this way the latter distinction can only be conceptual. The motive to care your child, the motive to keep your promise, or the motive to save the life of the cat are not different, when they are perceived by an agent. All *moral* motives are experiential and all moral judgments are inferred from experience. In this sense, no rule can by itself be obligatory, unless we have experience of the relevant act as wrong or right; good or bad; virtuous or vicious; beneficial or

¹²² People’s responses in Greene’s study of incest may be useful to see how this happen.

unbeneficial... I think that Hume is right in saying that obligation is a feeling of disapprobation in the non-performance of a virtuous act. Additionally, he is also right in claiming that no reason alone can produce this feeling. Nonetheless, he is wrong to say that obligation and evaluation are the same things. We clearly saw that rule obligations and artificial motives cannot be the same thing, unless we give up a sentimentalist conception of obligation. However, if we want to be sentimentalists for obligation, then the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view provides a better explanation by distinguishing moral evaluation (detecting or discovering the motive) and obligation (feeling uncomfortable when acting otherwise). Additionally, the inference of rule obligation from these motives becomes legitimate because, there is no philosophical relation involved in these inferences. All obligations are the feelings of approbation and disapprobation. And the animal inferences of these obligations are purely mechanical and physiological¹²³.

To conclude this discussion, I want to summarize the general idea of this section. I claimed that for Hume obligation and evaluation must be the same thing because he considers that these two things are the outcomes of the same mechanism. On the basis of the previous sections, I claimed on the contrary that motives cannot be impressions of reflections and consequently evaluation and obligation need not to be the same thing. This proposal solves some difficulties with the relation between Hume’s account of obligation and the Overall Argument of T 3.1.1. Moral obligation and rule obligation seem to be inconsistent with Hume’s main thesis that morality is not derived from reason. And, this inconsistency is famously discussed in the literature as “Hume’s own ought conclusions”¹²⁴. The proposal of moral relations as simple impressions fixes this inconsistency by distinguishing moral obligation and rule obligation from their motives. According

¹²³ I should concede here that for rule obligation cognitive states are not only penetrating our perceptions, but they may play some deliberate role. For instance, the rule of ‘DNS hijacking is vicious’ may have no corresponding natural motive at all. Because there are actually no DNSs. In such cases, it may be correct to think that our obligation to prevent DNS hijacking is merely derived from the very rule itself. However, for Hume and for Humeans this needs not to be a problem. If a rule really is not originally derived from a natural motive, then it might be counted as a non-moral obligation. Not all obligations must be counted as moral. Rules of etiquette, rules of jurisdiction, and rules of thumb are all rules that serve their use for non-moral purposes. In this sense, the idea that there are rules which are not originally derived from some natural motive is reasonable, but it misses the point that a Humean conception of morality does not count these rules as moral. For a similar discussion of moral and non-moral obligation see David Copp’s distinction of two types of normative propositions. See, Copp (2001, pp. 22-26)

¹²⁴ See: MacIntyre (1969); Baier (2010).

to this view all motives are perceptual. In this sense, all types of obligation must be derived from *experience*. Natural obligations are our reflexive responses in terms of our moral perceptions. Moral and rule obligations are our emotional responses via our sympathy abilities. Therefore, obligation can be derived from evaluation because this is how the human nature works. As Hume says, passions are original existences. However, as I have highlighted throughout this dissertation, evaluations are not essentially philosophical or reflective. Ultimately, the ‘moral relations as simple impressions’ view serves a powerful explanation of morality as equal as Hume’s sentimentalist account and also it brings solutions for some of the difficulties with Hume’s own conception of morals.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION

Hume's Law is not a crude law against the syllogistic maneuvers of ways by which we may deduce *ought* from *is*. The Law is against the views of considering the foundation of moral principles as divine commands or unchanging eternal abstract relations. This way, the Law may also prevent those sorts of logical deductions, which are based on some formal derivation rules. So, whichever ways we use, Hume's Law states that at the foundation, morality is based on our reflective affections. In fact, no object can by itself be moral or immoral. The Newtonian project of Hume's science of man drives Hume to search for the causal origins of our moral evaluations and obligations. At the end, he finds out that our evaluations and obligations are originally based on our sentiments.

As the formal-syllogistic ways of deducing *ought* from *is* are crude ways to understand morality, I think that Hume's own treatment of morality as merely sentimental is also wanting. When he says that there cannot be any moral relations, I believe that, Hume is mistaken. The 'moral relations as simple impressions' view is a possible way to show that we experience moral relations in our sensation. Accordingly, pronouncing an action vicious cannot be originally caused by our feeling of disapprobation. It is true that our feeling of disapprobation can be the outcome of our moral evaluation. However, reflection by itself cannot be prior to evaluation. Chapter 5 was all intended to support this claim. Actually, the idea was; moral evaluation can be simultaneous with our experience of the subject of our blame or appraisal. In terms of this, I tried to underline that there is at least one possible way to conceive moral relations.

This contention is not an excessive refutation of Hume's objection to moral relations. I admit that moral relations cannot be demonstrated. Hence, there cannot be any eternal, unchangeable, or immutable moral principles. Morality is natural

and perceivable. In this sense, moral relations cannot be found or derived from any philosophical relations. However, this is not conclusive to concede the idea that there can be moral relations. I have provided a way to understand how our moral perceptions can provide us moral principles and moral obligations. In my proposal “Murder is wrong” is not qualitatively different from “There is a chair”. The degree of certainty of these claims is equal, but the discovery of the former might be more complicated comparing with the latter. The obligation, on the other hand, is a natural outcome of our moral evaluation. When we perceive that an action is wrong, we feel blame directed towards that act. In this sense, I have objected to the idea that evaluation and obligation are the same things.

All this contention rests on the interpretation of Hume’s Law that I provided in the first two chapters. So, there is no specific connection between Hume’s Law as a psychological thesis and the logical or semantic thesis. In other words, my interpretation does not provide any solution to the idea that we can deductively (in the way it is understood today) derive *ought* from *is*. On the contrary, my interpretation agrees with Hume’s Law as a logical or semantic thesis. I admit that there is no way to deduce *ought* from *is*, if we understand deduction as arguments, of which an expression occurs non-vacuously in the conclusion, it must also appear in the premises; or arguments, of which the conclusion is conceptually guaranteed by the premises. However this agreement is not much of an importance. As I have argued, for Hume, there cannot be any legitimate multi-step inferences from purely factual statements to purely moral statements. In this way, the psychological thesis suggests a broader claim for Hume’s Law. In addition to this, the difference between purely factual statements and moral statements is not the difference between their conceptual or grammatical features. The difference is between their psychological origins. Purely factual statements correspond to impressions of sensation, and purely moral statements correspond to impressions of reflection. As no philosophical relation can be found among these statements, Hume concludes that we can have no legitimate argument containing *ought* as its conclusion.

If I am right, and moral relations are impressions of sensation, then how does this really enable us to derive *ought* from *is*? As I have divided inferences into two types as single-step and multi-step, the way, I think, we legitimately can derive *ought*, is our single-step inferences: the most reliable way to have certain

knowledge. Moral evaluations are factual statements because we form these statements just like we form our sensory statements. In this way, moral evaluations must be considered as *is* statements. Secondly, for moral obligation I have argued that statements of obligation are the pronouncements of our reflective affections concerning our moral evaluations. In this case, following Hume's understanding of relations, the obligation naturally follows the evaluation. Hume is right to say that we cannot have demonstrations concerning how we get obliged to do things. However, he is misleading in his claim that we cannot infer obligation from our perceptual judgments. So, Hume underestimated the possibility of moral relations as experiential qualities. Ultimately, my suggestion was that our perceptual moral statements constitute the very foundation of morality. All these perceptual moral statements have a correspondent statement of obligation. Hence, when we pronounce an action as vicious, we also have a feeling of disapprobation. This relation between the evaluation and feeling of obligation is invariable: Whenever *relata* remain the same, relation holds. Therefore, "You ought not to kill" invariably follow from "Murder is vicious". This invariability, of course, is not as strong as logical necessity. However, if we compare the practicality of this invariability with the practicality of logical necessity, then we see that for morals these invariable relations mean more than logical necessity. Hume thinks that logical necessity has no practicality whatsoever. Reason is the slave of our passions. And, I think we should add more to this claim: Reason is also the slave of our sensations. As this invariability has motivational force, it suffices to give us inferences from *is* to *ought*. Waiting for to have logical inferences with formally valid arguments in terms of morals is as Hume might have said, "absurd", or hopeless. However, I think it is "absurd" not because I believe that it is impossible, but because it may add nothing further in our reliance on our moral duties. Nobody can feel more obliged, if they would be said that their duty is logically necessary. This is because; feeling that being obliged requires nothing more than the natural production of the feeling of blame and appraisal from the pronouncement of the moral evaluation. Ultimately, in short, whenever we see that x is a virtue, we naturally feel that the non-performance of this very act makes us feel bad. This is how our moral obligation is generated.

If we turn back to the interpretation of Hume's Law as a psychological thesis, now we may revisit the issue of cognitivism and non-cognitivism. My interpretation suggests a non-cognitivist reading. Hume considers both evaluation and obligation as primarily sentimental operations. In this sense it is compatible with the idea that our moral pronouncements are expressions of our feelings. However, there is a slight divergence from the standard account of non-cognitivism. Unlike standard non-cognitivism, Hume's Law does not imply that our moral judgments cannot have truth-values. Our moral judgments are ideas of passions. For Hume every idea must have a truth-value. In this sense, Hume's Law does not primarily deal with moral judgments, but it asserts that the origins of these judgments are neither ideas, nor impressions of sensation. Only by interpreting Hume's Law in this way, the overall argument of T 3.1.1 can make sense. Morals are not derived from reason, but this does not mean that moral judgments and morals are the same things. Vice and virtue are original existences (they are real things) and they cannot have truth-value. Nonetheless, moral judgments are the expressions of these facts. Ultimately, my interpretation is non-cognitivist but up until to this divergence.

The other issue was about moral realism. According to my interpretation, there is no reason to say that Hume is a moral anti-realist. Vice and virtue are facts. Therefore, there are facts of morality. It can be said, however, that Hume is not a hardcore moral realist. He does not believe that morals have independent existences; independent from human existence. They depend on human nature. If one thinks that our sentiments (or any of our perceptions) cannot be really facts, then one can happily announce Hume a moral anti-realist. However, because Hume did not subscribe to this view, his ontological commitments –impressions are original existences– makes him a moral realist. As far as I see in this context, we may think of *three types of moral realism*: (i) moral facts are eternal things; (ii) moral facts are experiential properties of actions; (iii) moral facts are facts of our human nature. I believe that Hume accepts the third type. Rationalists subscribe to the first, and the view I endorsed against Hume follows the second type of moral realism. Ultimately, we see that there is no need to be a moral anti-realist for accepting or objecting to Hume's Law.

My critique of Hume's Law, on the other hand, has a cognitivist confutation. Second type moral realism requires cognitivism. If moral relations (or properties) are impressions of sensation, then they are clearly represented by cognitive states such as belief. However, my view is not completely cognitivist because I admit that our pronouncements of obligation are sentimental. In this way, it is both cognitivist and sentimentalist in its essence. I argued that this way of characterizing morality has several advantages. Firstly, we do not need to think any more that evaluation and obligation are the same things. In this way, Hume's strong intuition that morality is more felt than thought, survives. The more important and practical part of morality, –obligation– remains sentimental. What needs to be changed in the Humean account is the commitment to the idea that our moral evaluations are also sentimental. This crucial change in Hume's original account can serve a better conception of morality.

In this dissertation, I left some issues open for discussion. Most importantly, the view of 'moral relations as simple impressions' entirely depend on the primary principles of Hume's empiricism in Book I and II of *Treatise*. These primary principles are; Hume's account of general ideas, distinctions of impressions and ideas, being complex and simple, philosophical and natural relations, variable and invariable relations. All the construction of my criticism depends on either some of these principles positively or negatively. In this case, I did not defend this view independently of Hume's general framework. I provided some support from the contemporary meta-ethical debate on moral perception, but this support is not sufficient to establish the idea of type-two moral realism. Such a project is not the issue of this dissertation. Secondly, I did not discuss the logical thesis and semantic thesis in terms of their pros and cons. For each of these theses there are attempts to find a way to bypass or defend Hume's Law. Such a work might be useful but irrelevant. Thirdly, examining Hume's theory of obligation might also be quite useful. Third Book of *Treatise* reserved mostly for his theory of justice. I did not examine Hume's theory of obligation comprehensively because; most of it is not relevant to Hume's Law. Hume's Law is a meta-ethical observation. However, Hume's theory of justice and obligation are normative inquires. In this dissertation, I picked up the relevant parts of these theories and discussed them with a sufficient care.

Even if *Treatise* was not written recently, the fame of Hume's Law has reached its pick just four or five decades ago. I should concede that it owes this fame to the logical thesis interpretation. However, by the time goes and naturalism and naturalism in ethics gain their credibility more and more, attempts to interpret Hume's Law as a psychological thesis get accelerated. This parallel increase in ratings requires an additional research. A research on Hume's Law and naturalized ethics can be a good topic to follow this dissertation. Another possible research may be done on the relation between scientific realism and moral realism based on Hume's Law: Can there be a parallel argument for theoretical entities and moral values? Finally, a neo-Humean account of morality based on the view of 'moral relations as simple impressions' can be constructed. Such a naturalist-cognitivist-sentimentalist view, I believe, can best characterize how we morally evaluate things, and how we get obliged to do some actions.

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Appendix A

CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Erdenk, Emre Arda
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 24 April 1985, Ankara
Marital Status: Married
Phone: +90 544 851 31 30
email: eerdenk@gmail.com

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
PhD	METU Philosophy, Ankara	2014
MA	CEU Philosophy, Budapest	2009
BA	Bilkent Üni. Philosophy, Ankara	2008
High School	Ankara Anadolu High School, Ankara	2003

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2010- Present	KMU Faculty of Literature	Teaching Assistant

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Intermediate German

PUBLICATIONS

Can the Nozickean Proviso Guide Homo habilis?: Cognitive and Evolutionary Criticism of the 'Historicity' of the Entitlement Theory (Köln: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010). ISBN: 3838334240.

“Yunan Düşüncesi ve Tragedyalar” in Aliye Çınar, *Felsefeye Giriş: Mitolojiden Kuramlara* (Bursa: Emin Yayınları, 2010): 24-43. ISBN: 9944404877.

“Bilimin Başarısının Gerçekçi Açıklaması ve O'nun Karşıt-Gerçekçi Alternatifi: “Seçilimci Açıklama” ve “Zayıf Sürrealizm”” in *Günümüzü Felsefe ile Düşünmek* (İzmir: Ege University Press, 2014), (In print).

“Problems of Robert Nozick’s Principle of Justice in Acquisition: Nozick’s Misunderstanding of the Nozickean Proviso and its Consequences“, *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in Human Sciences*, 1 (1): 21-29, 2010. ISSN: 1309-9655.

“Descartes’ Account of Feeling of Pain in Animals”, *FLSF* 15 (Spring): 201-210, 2013. ISSN: 1306-9535

Erdenk, E., A. & Şahin, M., M. “Evanjelic Protestanlık: Sivil Dinden Köktenci Fırkaya, Fırkadan Yeni Hristiyan Sağına” in Şahin, Mehmet Murat (ed.), José Casanova, *Modern Dünya’da Kamusal Dinler* (Sakarya: Sakarya Üniversitesi Kültür Yayınları, 2014) pp. 181-222, (In print), ISBN: 978-605-5077-03-7.

Doğalcı-Bilişselci Ahlaki Gerçekçilik Anlayışında Olgu-Değer Problemine Yeni Bir Çözüm: Basit Değer İfadeleri” in *M.E.T.U. I. PhD Candidates Workshop in Social Sciences*, May 2012, M.E.T.U., Ankara. (Invited)

ACADEMIC ASSIGNMENTS AND EXPERIENCE

Secretariat:

Studies in Preemptive Security Symposium (Önleyici Güvenlik Araştırmaları Sempozyumu), Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University & Karaman Police Department, September 2013.

II. International Turkish Speaking Students Congress (2. Uluslararası Türkçe Konuşan Öğrenciler Kongresi), Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, May 2013.

Coordinatorship:

Exam Schedule & Execution Coordinator in Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Sociology, 2012-2014.

Course Schedule Coordinator in Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Sociology, 2012-2014.

Assistant Coordinator of the Philosophy Department Activation Proposal Documents in Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Philosophy, March 2014.

Teaching Assistantship:

Tutoring the course of “Introduction to Philosophy”, Fall (2011), Fall (2012), Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Sociology.

Tutoring the course of “Problems of Philosophy”, Spring (2011), Spring (2012), Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Sociology.

Tutoring the course of “Urban Sociology”, Spring (2012), Spring (2013), Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Sociology.

Tutoring the course of “Social Psychology”, Fall (2013), Karamanoğlu Mehmetbey University, Department of Sociology.

ACADEMIC INTERESTS

Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science, Epistemology, 18th Century Philosophy, Contemporary Western Philosophy, Cartesian Philosophy, Philosophy of David Hume, Philosophy of Biology, Human Nature.

PERSONAL INTERESTS

Mythology, Poetry, Music Composition, Fishing, Tennis, Fencing.

APPENDIX B

TURKISH SUMMARY

Psikolojik bir Tez olarak Hume Yasası: “Dır/Dir-Meli/Malı” Probleminin bir Yorumu ve Çözümü

İnsan olarak, doğamızın en ayırt edici özelliklerinden birisi değerlendirmek ve yargılamaktır. Bu, bizim doğru yargıçlar olduğumuz anlamına gelmese de, deneyimlediğimiz, bildiğimiz ve hissettiğimiz şeyleri karşı koyulmaz bir biçimde sürekli değerlendirdiğimiz ve yargıladığımız da bir gerçektir. Yanlış bir hesaplama gördüğümüzde, sonucun yanlış olduğunu söyleriz. İnsanların, diğerlerine nazik davranma eğiliminde olduğunu bildiğimizde, nazikliğin bir erdem olduğunu söyleriz. Akşam olup eve döndüğümüzde, ‘Rahatladım’ deriz. Deneyimsel ya da bilişsel sınırlarımızın dışında olmayan hiç bir şey değerlendirmelerimizden kurtulamaz. Bu değerlendirmelerimizin büyük bir kısmını ahlaki değerlendirmelerimiz oluşturur. Nesnelere ve diğer insanları, eylemleri ve karakterleri doğrultusunda över ya da yereriz. Yine apaçık bir doğru olarak; bizler sosyal ve ahlaki normların ışığında yaşar ve gündelik hayatımızı, kurallar, gelenekler, saygı, cezalandırma, vb. şeyler, doğrultusunda idame ettiririz. Her ne kadar filozoflar olarak ahlaka dair her bir tekil şey için şüphe oluştursak da, sıradan insan bu ahlak sistemleri doğrultusunda yaşamaya devam etmektedir. Ahlakın doğasının doğal mı yoksa yapay mı olduğuna dair tartışsak da, sıradan insanlar olarak ahlak hepimizin pratik ettiği şeydir.

Felsefi problemler bu sıradan insan duruş noktasından başlar. Ahlakı pratik ediyor olmamız gerçeği ilk felsefe-öncesi aksiyomu ortaya koyar: *Ahlak özü gereği pratiktir*. Biz her şeyi değerlendiririz ve bu değerlendirmelere dayalı olarak hareket

ederiz. Eğer ben ‘yalan söylemek ahlaksızlıktır’ yargısına inanıyorsam, benden sürekli olarak yalan söylüyor olmam beklenmez. Yalan söylersem, benden bu inancımı hükümsüz kılan bir prensip ya da bu eylemimi gereçlendirecek bir sebep beklenir; ki bu eylemim inancımın kesin olarak uyumsuzluk içerisindedir. Böylelikle, bu duruş noktasından birçok meta-ahlaka dair problem ortaya çıkar. Mesela, ahlakın olgulara dayanıp dayanmadığını bilmek isteriz. İkinci olarak, ahlaki değerlendirmelerimizin doğru olup olmadığını bilmek isteriz ki bu sayede doğru ahlaki yargıların var olduğundan emin olabilelim. Üçüncü olarak, ahlaki değerlendirme ile ahlaki yargılar arasındaki ilişki nedir? Dördüncü olarak, ahlaki değerlendirmelerimiz bilişsel becerilerimizin birer sonuçları mıdır yoksa duygusal reaksiyonlarımız mıdır? Ahlak için aklın fonksiyonu nedir? Beşinci olarak, ahlakın bilgisi objektif midir yoksa insanın bir ürünü müdür? Ahlaka dair bu tip sorunların sayısını daha da arttırabiliriz. Fakat, ne sorarsak soralım, duruş noktası aynı kalacaktır: *Ahlak özü gereği pratiktir.*

David Hume bütün bu soruları *İnsan Doğası Üzerine Bir İnceleme (A Treatise of Human Nature)*¹²⁵ adlı çalışmasında sormuştur. O’na göre, ahlak bilimi (kendi deyimiyle) bu sorular ışında ahlakın doğasını açıklamak zorundadır. Bu tezde benim hedefim Hume’un ahlak felsefesine dair kapsamlı (*scholarly*) bir çalışma yapmak değildir. Amaçladığım şey, Hume’un *İnceleme*’de öne sürdüğü çetrefilli problemi incelemektir. Rasyonalist seleflerine itiraz etmek için, Hume, onların ahlak kavramsalının problemlili olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Duruş noktası, rasyonalistler tarafından ilahi emir, değiştirilemez ve ebedi yasalar veya ahlak prensipleri ile gereçlendirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Onlara göre ahlak özü gereği pratiktir çünkü ahlaki yükümlülüklerimizi ispat edebilir ya da zorunlu ahlaki prensiplerden türediklerini kesin olarak gösterebiliriz. Hume bunu reddetmek istemektedir. Bu ahlak kavramsalı ile ilgili çetrefilli problem, Hume’a göre, ahlakın bu şekilde gereçlendirilmesiyle ilgilidir. Rasyonalist ahlakın reddini barındıran temel pasaj *İnceleme* 3.1.1’de bulunmaktadır:

Karşılaştığım her ahlak sisteminde, yazarın öncelikle olağan düşünce yolunu takip ederek Tanrı’nın varlığını ortaya koyduğunu ya da insan ilişkileri ile ilgili gözlemler yaptığını fark ettim. Ne zaman ki bir an da; önermelerin alışıldık kipler olan *dır/dir* ve (*değil*)*dır/dir* ile bağlı olmasını beklerken, *meli/malı* ve (*değil*)*meli/malı* ile bağlanmamış hiçbir önerme bulamama şaşırdım. Bu değişim belli belirsiz olsa da, açıklanmalıdır. Bu

¹²⁵ Adı geçen eser, yazı boyunca *İnceleme* ve *İ* olarak kısaltılacaktır.

meli/malı yeni bir ilişki ya da olumlama açığa vurduğundan, gözlemlenmesi ve açıklanması zorunludur. Aynı zamanda, tamamen akıl almaz gibi gözükse; bu yeni ilişkinin nasıl ondan tümüyle farklı olan diğerlerinden bir tündengelelim olduğuna dair bir sebep ortaya konulmalıdır.

Yükümlülük ifadelerinin olgu ifadelerinden türetilmeyeceğine dair bu itiraz hem o dönemde hem de bugün felsefeciler tarafından yaygın bir şekilde tanınmıştır. Bu pasaj bir çok farklı isimle anılmaktadır. Richard Hare (1954-5, s. 303), bu pasajı Hume Yasası olarak adlandırmıştır. En azından, çetrefilli problem olarak adlandırmaktansa, bu itirazı ben de Hume Yasası olarak anacağım. Ancak, Hare'nin isimlendirmesini kullanmamın asıl sebebi, bu pasajın günümüz algılanmasında ahlak felsefesinin yıkılmaz prensiplerinden biri gibi kabul edilmesidir. Bu tezin ana motivasyonlarından biri de bu pasajı Hume'un ahlak felsefesi bağlamında yeniden yorumlamaktır. Bu bağlamda, Hume'un ahlak felsefesini anlatmak yerine, gerekli olan temel konularına değineceğim.

Hume Yasası ister dolaylı ister dolaysız olarak meta-etik alanındaki birçok problemle alakalıdır. Örnek olarak, yüzeysel bakıldığında, eğer Yasa doğru ise, (i) ahlaki gerçekçilik yanlıştır; (ii) ahlaki yargılar açısından bilişselci olunamaz; (iii) *meli/malı* önermelerini *dir/dır* önermelerinden mantıksal olarak çıkarsamanın yolu yoktur; (iv) ahlaki önermelerin anlamları (eğer anlamları varsa) olgusal önermelerin anlamlarından tamamen farklıdır. Hume Yasası'nın algılanması olumlu yönde olduğundan, bütün bu sonuçların çoğunluk tarafından bir şekilde kabul edildiğini söyleyebiliriz. Örnek olarak, Michael Ruse (1986, s. 251) şöyle diyor: "Darwincinin yapmak isteyeceği en son şey sahici bir "*dir/meli*" ayrımının olduğunu inkar ederek Hume'un yasasını çiğnemektir"¹²⁶. Fakat yorumlamalar değişiklikler gösterdiğinden hangi sonuçların Yasa'dan türetilbileceği, hangilerinin ise savunulamayacağı konusunda tartışmalar mevcuttur. Bu yorumlamalara bu tezde değinmeyeceğim. Benim bu tezde asıl savunacağım iddia; Hume Yasası'nın ancak bir psikolojik tez olarak yorumlanabileceğidir. Bu nedenle günümüz "dır-malı" tartışmasına kısaca değinmek gerekmektedir. Hume Yasası'nın günümüz yorumlamalarını standart yorumlama olarak adlandıracağım.

¹²⁶ Bkz., Kitcher (1985); Putnam (1981); Boyd (1988); Brink (1989).

1.1.Günümüz “Dır-Malı” Tartışması

1.1.1. Bilişselcilik – Karşıt-Bilişselcilik

Aslında Hume Yasası'nın bilişselcilik ve karşıt-bilişselcilik üzerinden ele alınması, modası geçmiş bir yaklaşımdır. Meta-etik konularını bu tartışma zemininde ele almak altmışların sonlarında popülerdi ve bu tartışmaların etkilerini Hudson'un *The Is/Ought Question* (1969) adlı derlemesinde görmekteyiz. O dönemde Hume Yasası'nı karşıt-gerçekçi bir argüman olarak yorumlamak popülerdi. Basitçe, karşıt-gerçekçilik, ahlaki yargıları olgusal yargılar olarak ele almanın yanlış olduğunu savunur. Hatta, bizim ahlaki yargılarımızın eylemlere ve karakterlere karşı ortaya konulan duygusal tepkiler olduğunu savunur¹²⁷. Bu pozisyonu Hume Yasası ile ilişkilendirdiklerinde, yorumlama; hiçbir ahlaki yargı (-*meli/malı*) ahlaki olmayan yargıdan (-*dir/dır*) türetilemez halini alır. Bu fikir ahlaki yargıların özel bir karakteri olduğu ve bunun, onları anlamsal olarak farklı kıldığı anlamına gelmektedir. Olgusal yargılarla ahlaki yargılar arasındaki bu farklılık için ikincinin özsel olarak olgusal olamayacak değerlere gönderme yaptığı iddia edilir. Bir başka deyişle, değerler dışsal objelere işaret edemez¹²⁸. Wittgenstein şöyle diyor: “Hiçbir olgu yargısı hiçbir zaman ne bir kati değer yargısı olabilir, ne de onu ima edebilir” (1965, s. 6). Böylelikle, ahlaki yargılar bilişsel olamaz ve bilişsel anlam taşıyamazlar¹²⁹. En nihayetinde, Hume Yasası'nın anlamı; hiçbir ahlaki ele alış olgusal değerlendirmeler ile analiz edilemez veya doğrulanamaz, olarak ifade edilir. Buna göre, herhangi bir argüman, meli/malı önermesi ile sonuçlanıyorsa, öncüllerinden en az bir tanesi ahlaki içeriğe sahiptir¹³⁰. Karşıt-gerçekçilere göre, Hume'un, bu yeni *meli/malı* ilişkisinin açıklanması gerektiğini söylerken kast ettiği budur.

Bilişselcilik, öte yandan, ahlaki ele alışların sıradan olgusal değerlendirmelere benzer olduğunu savunur. Bu bakımdan, ahlaki tutumlar bilişsel durumlardır ve duygusal durumlar değildir. Bu şekilde, tıpkı inançlar, düşünceler

¹²⁷ Karşıt gereklilik için bakınız, Stevenson (1944).

¹²⁸ Bkz., Ayer (1936, Böl., 6).

¹²⁹ Bkz., Carnap (1960, s. 77).

¹³⁰ Bkz., Hare (1952, ss. 28-30).

ve niyetler gibi ahlaki düşünce de yüksek-seviye zihin kapasiteleri ihtiva eder. Sadece arzuların ve diğer duygusal durumların ahlaki düşünceyi oluşturabileceğine karşı çıkarlar¹³¹.

Bu ayrışma noktasından hareketle, bilişselciler genellikle Hume Yasası'na itiraz etmeye çalışırlar. Bunu da ahlaki önermelerin olgusal önermelerden türetilebileceğini göstererek ya da onlara indirgenebileceğini söyleyerek yapmaktadırlar. Meşhur olarak John Searle, "Jones, Smith'e beş dolar ödemelidir" in Jones'un söz verdiğiine dair ifadesinden ("Jones 'Bundan böyle, Smith, sana beş dolar vermeye söz veriyorum'") sözlerini söylemesinden çıkarsanabileceğini savunmuştur (1969, s. 121). Searle'nin argümanın temel fikri, söz vermenin analitik olarak söz verilen şeyin yapılması gerektiği anlamına gelmesine dayanır. Böylelikle, bilişselcilerin Hume Yasası bariyerini aşmak için kullandıkları yöntemin, *-malı*'nın *-dır*'dan tümdengelimsel olarak çıkarsanabileceği "analitik köprü prensipleri"¹³² bulmak olduğu olarak ifade edilebilir.

1.1.2. Ahlaki Gerçekçilik – Ahlaki Karşıt-Gerçekçilik

Gerçekçilik ve karşıt-gerçekçilik felsefenin birçok alanında görülebilir. Örnek olarak, bilim felsefesi literatüründe teorik nesnelerin durumu ile ilgili süregelen bir tartışma mevcuttur. İlginç olan, bilim felsefesinde genellikle bilimsel gerçekçilik pozisyonu temel görüş olarak kabul edilirken, meta-etik tartışmalarında karşıt-gerçekçilik hakim pozisyonudur. Filozoflar, elektronlar ve kuarklar gibi teorik nesnelimizin gerçek olduğunu düşünürken, ahlaka dair olgular olduğu fikrini pek de tercih etmemektedirler. Amacım karşılaştırmalı bir tartışma yapmak olmasa da, etik gerçekçiliğe karşı felsefede taraflı bir önyargı olduğunu söylemek gerekir.

Basitçe, ahlaki gerçekçilik eylemlerin doğru ya da yanlış olduğundan bahsederken, bu eylemlere dair olgulara işaret ettiğimizi savunur. Kısaca, etik olguların var olduğunu savunan herhangi bir görüş ahlaki gerçekçidir. Mart Platts şöyle diyor: "arzular genellikle arzulanan objenin arzulanabilirliğine dair bağımsız inançlar gerektirir". Buna bağlı olarak, o'na göre ahlaki karşıt-gerçekçilik, "boş, vahşi, ve uzun bir yaşamın başlangıcı olarak reflektif bir canlı olan bizim sonumuz

¹³¹ Bkz., Dancy (1998, s. 1).

¹³² Pigden (2010, s. 13).

olabilir” (1981, ss. 69-82). Karşıt-gerçekçiliğe dair bu eleştirinin özü, ahlaki değerlendirmelerimizin bir tip nesnellığe dayandığı fikrine dayanmaktadır. Eğer ahlaki yargılarımızın belirli referansları olmasaydı, ahlaki prensipler üzerinde uzlaşa sağlamak imkansız olurdu.

Ahlaki olguların doğal olduğu görüşüne dayanan doğalcı ahlaki gerçekçilik görüşüne getirilen eleştirilerden biri geçtiğimiz yüzyılın başlarında ortaya konulmuştur. G. E. Moore (1903, §13)¹³³, “Doğalcı Yanıltmaca” adını verdiği argümanda ahlaki özelliklerin ahlaki olmayan özelliklerle yer değiştiremeyeceğini tartışmıştır. Buna göre, ahlaki özellikler algının objeleri olamazlar. Moore’un itirazı bir yana, Hume’un ahlaki önermeleri argümanlardan dışlaması ile Moore’un iddiasının aynı yönde hareket ettiği iddia edilmektedir. *Meli/malı*’yı tündengelimsel olarak çıkarsamaya çalışacak hiçbir argüman başarılı olamaz çünkü “Bu iyi midir?” sorusu daima cevapsız kalmaya devam edecektir. Bu tip bir metinsel benzerliğin varlığını inkar etmiyorum ancak bu iki argümanın aynı yolda ilerledikleri görüşü doğru değildir. Benim Hume Yasası yorumlamamda, Hume Yasası’nın Doğalcı Yanıltmaca’dan bağlamsal olarak farklı olduğu görülecektir.

Sonuç olarak, bu tartışmanın Hume Yasası’na bağlantısı, Hume’un erdem ve erdemsizliğin nesnel özellikleri olmadığı iddiası ile anlaşılabilir. İkinci olarak, Hume’a göre gerekçelendirme, fikirlerin hangi duyu izleniminden türediği ile ilgili olduğundan, ahlaki önermelerin doğruluk değeri onların hangi duyu izleniminden türediği ile belirlenebilir. Ahlaki gerçekçiliğin doğru olabilmesi için erdem ve erdemsizliğin dışsal objelerin özellikleri olması gerekmektedir. Bu bakımdan, standart yorumlama, bir tip ahlaki karşıt-gerçekçiliğe dayanmalıdır.

1.1.3. Hume Yasası Mantıksal mı yoksa Semantik bir Tez mi?: Standart Yorumlama

Karşıt-bilişselci ve karşıt-gerçekçi yorumlamalar, Hume Yasası’nın mantıksal ve semantik bir tez olduğunu savunmaktadır. Mantıksal tez, *meli/malı*’nın mantıksal olarak *dir/dir*’den çıkarsanamayacağı yorumunu ortaya koyar. Bir başka deyişle, bu tip formal olarak geçerli argümanlar mümkün olamaz. Semantik teze göre, Yasa, ahlaki olmayan önermelerden, ahlaki bir sonucun geçerli bir argümanla

¹³³ Doğalcı Yanıltmaca’ya dair iyi bir tartışma için; bkz., Frankena (1939).

çıkarsanamayacağını ortaya koymaktadır. Bu iki tez arasındaki farklılık, ikincisinin, ahlaki olmayan önermelerle ahlaki sonuç arasında bir analitik-köprü-prensibi gerekliliğini söylüyor olması; ve birincisinin, *dır/dir* ile bağlı önermelerden *meli/malı* ile bağlı önermelerin silojistik olarak geçerli argümanlar oluşturamayacağını söylüyor olmasıdır¹³⁴.

Pigden'a göre bu ayrımın önemi, Hume Yasası'nın mantıksal tezi ima ediyor olmasıyla ilgilidir. Pigden diyor ki, "Hume'un kendisi Mantıksal Otonomi'ye inanıyor, Semantik Otonomi'ye değil" (2010, s. 13). Fakat, Pigden bize bu iddayı desteklemek için yeterli sebep sunmamaktadır. Hume Yasası'nın Semantik Otonomi'yi dışladığını düşünebiliriz çünkü Yasa genellikle rasyonalist argümanların formel özelliklerine gönderme yapmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, bu tip argümanlar ilk etapta silojistik gerekçelerden ötürü geçerli değildir. Bu yorumlamayı, Hume'a yöneltilen ilk cevaplarda bile bulabilmek mümkündür.

Hume Yasası'nın fikrini ilk ortaya koyan filozof Thomas Reid'dir. Hume gibi O da ahlaka dair tümdengelimler için geçerli sebepler bulunamayacağını söylemiştir. Ancak Reid bunu şu gerekçeyle söylemektedir:

Onlar [ahlakın ilk prensipleri] izahattan varestelerdir; ve onların doğruluğu düşünceye ya da tümevarıma ihtiyaç olmaksızın algılanabilir. İzahattan varesteye olmayan ahlaki doğrular, kendilerinden apayrı olan ilişkilerden değil; ahlakın ilk prensiplerinden tümdengelimsel olarak çıkarılır. (Fieser 2005 iç., s. 243)

O dönemde (hatta on dokuzuncu yüzyılda) tümdengelimsel olarak geçerli olan bir argümanın, önermeler içerisinde zaten bulunması gerekliliği kabul ediliyordu. Bu bağlamda, Hume Yasası, önermelerinde ahlaki bir ifade bulunmadan, hiçbir argümanın sonucu tümdengelimsel olarak geçerli bir ahlaki sonuç olamaz demektedir. Bu algılama mantıksal tezin ilk tohumu olarak görülebilir.

Semantik tez de aynı dönemde aynı ölçüde kabul görmüştü. Pigden, Bentham'ı alıntılar ve bu alıntıda Bentham "olan" ve "olması gerekenin" iki farklı şey olduğunu vurgulamaktadır. "Bu iki obje [olan ve olması gereken] birbirinden ayrılana kadar, etik alanı ipucu barındırmayan bir labirent olarak kalacaktır" (Pigden 2010 iç., s. 12). Bentham, Yasa'yı, ahlak ve doğanın iki farklı dünya olduğunu söyler şekilde yorumlamaktadır. Searle'ün iddiasını hatırlarsak; "beş

¹³⁴ Bu ayrımı, Charles Pigden'nin "*Ahlakın Mantıksal Otonomisi*" ve "*Ahlakın Semantik Otonomisi*" ayrımı üzerinden tartışıyorum. Bkz., Pigden (2010, ss. 13-14).

dolar vermeye söz vermek”, “beş dolar verme yükümlüğü sahibi olmak” anlamını analitik olarak içerisinde barındırmalıdır ki bu semantik tez yorumlaması tarafından geçersiz olarak kabul edilmektedir.

O halde, Mantıksal Tez, mantığın kapalılığına dayanır. Buna göre, hiçbir ahlaki sonuç, önermelerde bulunmayan bir ahlaki terimi barındıramaz. Hakan Salwen’in formülizasyonunu kullanarak yazmak gerekirse, mantıksal bir tez olarak Hume Yasası şu şekildedir:

Mantıksal bir Tez olarak Hume Yasası: Bütün geçerli argümanlar için, $K \Rightarrow X$, ve bütün ahlaki ifadeler ϕ için, eğer ϕ X’de serbestçe bulunmuyorsa, ϕ K’da da bulunur. (2003, p. 17)

Semantik tez, ahlaki terimlerin ahlaki olmayan terimlerden kavramsal olarak türetilmeyeceğini ifade eder. Hume Yasası’nın bu şekilde karakterize edilmesi mantıksal geçerliliğin özel bir türüne işaret eder. Bu sefer, geçerlilik, önermelerin ve sonucun anlamlarının kavramsal olarak garantiye alınmasıyla sağlanır. Örnek olarak, ‘James bekarıdır, öyleyse James evli olmayan bir erkektir’ kavramsal olarak geçerlidir çünkü bunu sağlayan bir analitik köprü prensibi vardır: ‘Bütün bekarlar evli olmayan erkeklerdir’¹³⁵. Bu durumda Hume Yasası, kavramsal olarak garanti altına alınabilecek hiçbir ahlaki argümanın olamayacağı anlamına gelmektedir.

Semantik bir Tez olarak Hume Yasası: Bütün geçerli argümanlar için, $K \models X$, ve bütün ahlaki ifadeler ϕ için, eğer ϕ X’de kavramsal olarak garantilenmişse, ϕ K’da da bulunur.

Bu iki yorumlamaya genel olarak standart yorumlama olarak isimlendireceğim. İki tez de ahlaki önermelerin olgusal önermelerden ne mantıksal olarak ne de kavramsal olarak çıkarsanamayacağını söylemektedir. Bu açıdan, “*dır-malı*” pasajındaki “tümdengelim”, “önerme”, “-malı” ve “-dır” terimlerine vurgu yapmaktadırlar. Buna ek olarak, standart yorumlama “dır/malı boşluğu” nedeniyle ahlaki önermelerin, bilişsel durumların (örn. inançlar) sonucu olamayacağını da iddia etmektedir. Hatta karşıt-bilişselci olarak, ahlaki olguların olamayacağını da savunmaktadırlar. Eğer bu tip olgular olsaydı, onları diğer olgusal önermelerden mantıksal ya da anlamsal olarak çıkarsamak mümkün olabilirdi. Böylece, standart yorumlama hem ahlaki karşıt-gerçekçi ve karşıt-bilişselciyken hem de mantıksal ve semantik tez yorumlamasını savunmaktadır:

¹³⁵ İngilizce’de *bachelor* (bekâr) kelimesi sadece erkekler için kullanıldığından önerme Türkçe’ye çevrildiğinde anlamını yitirmektedir. İngilizce’si için bkz., s. 11.

Hume Yasasının Standart Yorumlaması: Bütün geçerli argümanlar için, $K \models X$ or $K \Rightarrow X$, ve bütün ahlaki ifadeler ϕ için, eğer ϕ kavramsal ya da formel olarak X 'de garantilenmiş ise, ϕ K 'da da bulunur ve ϕ olgusal olmayan bir duygu ifadesidir.

Öncelikle şunu söylemeliyim ki, eğer Hume'un ahlak felsefesinden bağımsız olarak ele alırsak, bu Yasa'ya itiraz etmiyorum. Tekrar altını çiziyorum ki ahlaki önermeleri ahlaki olmayan önermelerden mantıksal ve(veya) kavramsal olarak çıkarsamanın mümkün olduğunu savunmayacağım. Savunacağım şey, bu yorumlamanın “*dır-malı*” pasajında Hume'un söylemek istediği şeyi tam olarak yansıtamadığıdır. Standart yorumlama *düz* bir okumaya dayanmaktadır. Bu tip bir yorumlamanın yanıltıcı olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bu bağlamda, daha tutarlı bir yorumlama olarak *bağlamsal* bir yorumlamayı öne süreceğim. Nihayet, bu yorumlama Hume'un aslında standart yorumlamayı savunmadığını gösterecek. Hume'un ortaya koymak istediği şey, bir psikolojik tez olarak; ahlaki ilişkilerin dış dünyada bulunamayacağı ve fikirler arasındaki ilişkiler arasında da olamayacağı iddiasıdır.

1.2. Psikolojik bir Tez olarak Hume Yasası

Standart yorumlamanın aksine, “*dır-malı*” pasajının asıl önemli olan terimlerinin “tümdengelim” ve “önerme” değil, “ilişki” ve “erdem-erdemsizlik” olduğunu savunacağım. Bu terimlerin *İnceleme*'de özel anlamları olduğunu iddia edeceğim. Bu özel anlamları nedeniyle bu pasajın *düz* okunmasının Yasa'yı anlamakta yetersiz olduğunu düşünüyorum. Tümdengelim ile Hume, formel ya da kavramsal argümanları kast etmemektedir. Hume tümdengelim terimi ile bütün çok basamaklı argümanları ima etmektedir. İkinci olarak, önerme kelimesinin Hume açısından özel bir anlamı bulunmamaktadır. Önerme ile Hume, fikirlerin ifşa edilmesini kast etmektedir. Bu bakımdan, asıl önemli olan fikirleri nasıl ifşa ettiğimiz değil, fikirlerin hangi duygu izlenimlerinden türediğidir. Görüleceği gibi pasajda Hume daha geniş kapsamlı bir iddiayı birçok farklı gerekçelendirme ile göstermektedir.

Hume Yasası bir psikolojik tezdır çünkü *dır*'dan *malı*'nın çok basamaklı argümanlarla çıkarsanamamasının nedeni Hume'un kendi ilişki anlayışına

dayanmaktadır. Bu durumda, önermelerin gramatik formlarının hiçbir önemi yoktur. “*Dır*”, olgulardan yada diğer fikirlerden türetilen fikirleri temsil etmektedir. “*Mali*” ise sempati mekanizmamız sayesinde diğer şeyleri övme ya da yerme hissimizi temsil eden “erdem ve erdemsizliği” işaret etmektedir. Göreceğimiz gibi, Hume’un söylemek istediği şey; övme ve yerme ifşalarımız ya da diğerlerinin eylemlerinin erdemli ya da erdemsiz olduğu yönündeki yargılarımızın ne olgulardan ne de fikirler arası ilişkilerden türetilebileceğidir. Bu iki tip ilişki (olgulardan türetme ve fikirler arası ilişkiler), Hume’un felsefi ilişkiler nosyonunu oluşturmaktadır.

O zaman, Hume’un ahlaki değerlendirme ve yükümlülük anlayışına dair olumlu fikirlerine de bakmamız gerekir. Hume sempati mekanizmasını ahlaki düşüncenin aracı olarak ortaya koyar. Bölüm 4 ve 5’de özellikle Hume’un kendi ahlaki değerlendirme ve yükümlülük analizine değineceğim. Temel olarak, Hume, değerlendirme ve yükümlülüğün aynı şey olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu durumda ‘öldürmek kötüdür’ ‘öldürmemelisin’ anlamına gelmektedir çünkü her ikisi de sempati mekanizmasının ürününün ifşa edilmesinden ibarettir. Böylelikle, Hume Yasası’nın; anlamlı ahlaki önermelere sahip olamayız iddiasını taşımadığını görebiliriz. Ahlaki önermeler oldukça anlamlıdır çünkü ya diğer insanların tutkuları ve motiflerine ya da kendimizinkilere işaret etmektedirler. Nihayet, Hume Yasası’nda, Hume, tamamen felsefi olarak ilişkilendirilmiş olan ifadelerle, ahlaki tutkuların ya da yansıma izlenimlerinin önermeleri arasında psikolojik bir ikiliğin avukatlığını yapmaktadır.

Açık olması için tekrar etmek gerekirse, bu ikilik önermelerin dilsel yapıları ya da anlamsal özellikleri arasındaki farklılıktan kaynaklanmamaktadır. Hume’a göre ikilik ahlaki ifadelerin yansıma izlenimleri olmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Bütün felsefi ilişkiler fikirlerin bağlantılarıdır ve eğer bu ilişkilerin geçerliliğini test etmek istersek onların hangi izlenimden türediğine bakmamız gerekir. Fakat, ahlaki tutkular için, Hume’a göre, herhangi bir *ahlaki ilişki* mümkün olamaz. Bu, tutkularımız ve eylemler arasındaki ilişkinin felsefi olarak analiz edilemeyeceği anlamına gelmektedir. Bir başka deyişle, bir tutku ve bir fikri rastgele kıyaslayamayız. Tutkular “orijinal varlıklardır”; mesela bir gurur tutkusu üretildiğinde, o *sadece* üretilmiştir. Tutkularımızı, fikirlerle kıyaslamak için onları

rastgele üretemeyiz. Bu yorumlamanın ana temasının, Hume'un ilişkiler nosyonu ve ahlaki ilişkilerin "saçma" olduğunu iddiası olduğu görülmektedir.

Ahlaki ilişkiler olamayacağı yönündeki iddiasını gerekçelendirmek için, Hume rasyonalistlere karşı üç temel argüman ortaya koymuştur. Motivasyon Argümanı, Keşif Argümanı ve Hume Çatalı sonuç olarak aynı sonucu ortaya koyma çalışan argümanlardır. Ortaya koymaya çalıştıkları bu sonuç: "Ahlaki Ayrımlar Akıldan Türemez" iddiasıdır. Bu aynı zamanda İ 3.1.1'in de başlığıdır ve görüleceği gibi buradaki bütün argümanlar ahlakın akıldan türetilmeyeceğine dair negatif iddialar taşımaktadır. "*Dır-malı*" pasajı bu bölümün son paragrafında yer almaktadır. Böylelikle, bu üç argümanın *hiçbir meli/malı dır/dir'den türetilemez* iddiasının parçaları olduğunu savunacağım. Motivasyon argümanı aklın harekete geçirici olmadığına dairdir. Keşif argümanı erdem ve erdemsizliğin doğruluk ve yanlışlığa eşit olmadığını savunur. Son olarak, Hume Çatalı, erdem ve erdemsizliğin dışsal objelerin birer özelliği olamayacağı ve aynı zamanda fikirler arası ilişkilere dair kanıtlarla gösterilemeyeceğini iddia etmektedir. Sonuç olarak psikolojik bir tez olarak Hume Yasası şu şekilde ifade edilebilir:

Psikolojik bir Tez olarak Hume Yasası: Çok basamaklı çıkarımlar felsefi ilişkiler arasında bulunur. Hiçbir ahlaki ifade çok basamaklı çıkarımlarla gösterilemez. Öyleyse, ahlaki ifadeler ilişkiler değildir.

Ve eğer Salwen'in formülizasyonunu burada da uygularsak:

Psikolojik bir Tez olarak Hume Yasası': Bütün geçerli argümanlar için, $K \Rightarrow X$, ve bütün ahlaki ifadeler ϕ için, eğer ϕ X 'de var ise, ϕ bir *Humecu* ilişkidir.

Hume Yasası'nı bu şekilde yorumlamak diğer iki yorumdan belli başlı nedenlerle ayrılmaktadır. İlk olarak, bu yorumlama mantıksal ve semantik yorumlamayı kapsamakla birlikte, problemin Hume açısından sadece formel ya da semantik argümanlar kurmakla ilgili olmadığı, ahlaki ifadelerin aslen argümanlarda bulanabilecek şeyler olmadığıyla ilgili olduğudur. Bir ilişki olmak, bir nitelik olarak, "zihnin onun sayesinde bir fikirden diğer bir fikre geçiş yapmasını" (İ 1.1.4) sağlamaktır. İkinci olarak, bu ahlaki ifadelerin argümanlarda yer alamamasının sebebi kendilerinin birer olgu olmasıdır. Tutkular yansıma izlenimleridir ve sonuçta "orijinal varlıklar"dır. Bu yüzden Hume'a katı bir ahlaki karşıt-gerçekçi diyemeyiz. Üçüncü olarak, *-dır*'dan *-malı* çıkaramamızın sebebi, bu çıkarıma dair akıl

yoluyla bir argüman oluşturamayışımızdır. Ancak, akıl kavrayışın tek özelliği değildir. Sonuç olarak, Hume Yasası'nın bütün argümanları ve sonuçları tamamen Hume'un ahlak psikolojisine dayanmaktadır. Buna gönderme yapmayan hiçbir yorumlama Hume Yasası'nın asıl iddiasını başarılı bir biçimde ortaya koyamaz. Bu da bizi Hume Yasası'nı psikolojik bir tez olarak yeniden ziyaret etmeye itmektir.

1.3. Hume Yasası'nı Yeniden Ziyaret Etme İhtiyacı ve Tezin Ana Hatları

Eğer bir psikolojik tez olarak anlaşılacaksa, Hume Yasası'nın sonucu tekrar değerlendirilmelidir. Hume tutarlı mıdır? Gerçekten de ahlaki ilişkiler yok mudur? Gerçekten de ahlaki yükümlülük ahlaki olmayan fikirlere türetilemez mi? Bütün bu sorular Hume Yasası'nı tekrar ziyaret etmemiz gerektiğini göstermektedir. Bu ihtiyaçlar ışığında, bu tezde şu iddiayı savunacağım: Hume Yasası ahlaki ilişkilerin olamayacağını iddia etmektedir ancak bana göre ahlaki ilişkiler basit duyu izlenimleri olabilir ve bu sayede ahlaki yükümlülüğü deneyimden çıkarsayabiliriz.

Bu bağlamda, ikinci bölümde "*dır/mali*" pasajını *İnceleme*'nin bağlamsal bir okuması ve bazı tarihsel referanslar ışığında sunacağım. "Tümdengelim" teriminin literal anlaşılmaması gerektiğini iddia edeceğim. Bunu göstermek için dönemin mantık anlayışını ve Hume'un hangi mantık anlayışını temel aldığı ve hangisini eleştirdiğini inceleyeceğim. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, bir empirist olarak Hume'un Locke ve Kartezyen geleneğinden gelen tümdengelim anlayışına daha yakın olabileceğini fakat skolastik ve Aristocu mantık anlayışının da bazı öğelerini benimsemiş olabileceğini göstereceğim. Sonuç olarak Hume'un "tümdengelim" terimiyle bütün çok basamaklı argüman türlerini kastettiğini iddia edeceğim. İkinci olarak, Hume'un "bayağı sistemler" olarak adlandırdığı sistemleri Samuel Clarke ve William Wollaston üzerinden değerlendirip, bu sistemlerin görüşlerini açıklayacağım. Temel hedefim, Hume'un itiraz ettiği "*meli/mali*"nın belirli bir tip rasyonalistik "*meli/mali*" olduğunu göstereceğim. Bu sayede, Hume'un genel olarak bütün "*meli/mali*" önermelerini değil sadece rasyonalistlerin ahlak anlayışında bulunan önermeleri eleştirdiğini göstereceğim. Bu belirleme ile birlikte "*dır-mali*" pasajının, ezeli ve değişmez prensiplerin varlığını savunan rasyonalistik ahlak kavramsallığına bir itiraz olduğu görülmüş olacak.

Üçüncü bölümde, Hume Yasası'nın üç argümanını inceleyeceğim ve bu argümanlar doğrultusunda Hume Yasası'nı yeniden inşa edeceğim. Daha önce de vurguladığım gibi Hume Yasası'nın temel tezinin ahlak ilişkilerinin olamayacağı iddiası olduğunu göstereceğim. Bu yeniden inşayı yaparken, bir taraftan da standart yorumlamanın nerelerde hata yaptığını göstereceğim.

Motivasyon argümanı, erdem ve erdemsizliğin fikirler arası ilişkiler ve olgulardan türetilmeyeceğine dayanır. Bu iki tip ilişkiden türeyebilecek yargılar tek başlarına bizi harekete geçiremezler. Böylelikle, Hume erdem ve erdemsizliğin aklın ürünleri olmadığını gösterirken, aklın ürünü olmayan yargıların bizi harekete geçiremeyeceğine dair bir iddiada bulunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle *İnceleme*'nin diğer bölümlerine bakıldığında Hume'a göre inancın harekete geçirici gücü olduğu söylenebilir. Bu noktada standart yorumlama inancı bilişsel bir durum olarak kabul ettiğinden Hume Yasası'nın, bütün inançların motivasyon gücünün olmadığını iddia ettiğini savunur ki bu yanlış bir yorumlamadır. Sadece aklın türettiği inançlar ve yargılar tek başlarına motive edici olamazlar.

İkinci argüman, Keşif argümanı ise doğruluğun normatif olarak pratik olmadığını iddia eder. Buna göre, doğruluk ve yanlışlık eyleme değer katamaz. Sonuç olarak ahlaki iyilik ve kötülük, doğruluk ve yanlışlıktan türetilemez (keşfedilemez). Böylelikle, erdem ve erdemsizlik doğru ya da yanlış bile olsa, bu özellikleri bizi eyleme geçirme konusunda yetersiz kalacaktır. Bu yorumlama doğrultusunda, standart yorumlamanın, keşif argümanının temsil etme öncülüne yaptığı vurgu gereksizdir. Fikirlerin duyu izlenimlerini temsil ettiği için doğru ya da yanlış olabileceği iddiası keşif argümanının temel iddiası için önemli bir öncül değildir. Standart argüman bu öncülden yola çıkarak erdem ve erdemsizliğin temsil edici olmayışına vurgu yaparken, asıl önemli sonuç, fikirlerin doğruluk ve yanlışlık değerlerinin pratiklik kazandırıcı olmayışı olmalıdır.

Son olarak Hume Çatalı, aklın ancak ilişkileri bulabileceği öncülü ile başlar. Buna bağlı olarak Hume, aklın erdem ve erdemsizliği keşfedemeyeceğini söyler. Erdem ve erdemsizlik birer fikir olmadığından felsefi ilişkiler tarafından tespit edilebilir şeyler değildirler. Buna bağlı olarak erdem ve erdemsizlik ne kanıtlanabilir ne de dışsal objeler ve eylemlerden çıkarsanabilir. Bu durumda erdem ve erdemsizlik birer ilişki olamaz. Erdem ve erdemsizliği birer ilişki olarak kavramsallaştırabilmek için Hume bize iki kriter sunmaktadır. İlk olarak bir ahlak

ilişkisi, bir tutku ve bir dışsal obje arasında olmalıdır. İkinci olarak bir ahlak ilişkisi, bizi zorunlu olarak eyleme geçirmelidir. Standart yorumlama erdem ve erdemsizliğin kanıtlanamaz olması iddiasını ön plana alırken, diğer ilişki tipi olan olgulardan çıkarsanabilirliği üzerinde fazla durmamaktadır. Fakat, bu ikinci ihtimal Hume Yasası'nı yorumlamakta oldukça önemlidir çünkü "tümdengelim" terimini çok basamaklı argümanlar olarak yorumlamak için destek oluşturmaktadır.

O halde, İ 3.1.1'in genel argümanı şu şekildedir:

- (1) Ahlak pratiktir. (Varsayım)
- (2) O halde, ahlak eylemlerimizi etkilemek zorundadır. (1)
- (3) Erdem ve erdemsizlik eylemlerimizde etkilidir. (2)
- (4) Sadece akıldan türetilen yargılar motive edici olamaz. (MA)
- (5) Erdem ve erdemsizlik sadece akıldan türetilen yargılar değildir. (3, 4)
- (6) Ahlakın nesnelere orijinal varlıklardır ve aklın objeleri olamazlar (KA)
- (7) Ahlak ilişkileri fikirler arası ilişkilerde ve olgularda bulunamaz. (HÇ)
- (8) O halde, ahlaki ilişkiler var olamaz. (7)
- (9) İlişki olmayan bir şey akıldan türetilemez. (7, 8)
- (10) Sonuç olarak, ahlak akıldan çıkarsanamaz. (5, 6, 9)

Dördüncü bölümde, Hume'un reddettiği ahlaki ilişkilerin Hume'un epistemolojisi içerisinde bir yeri olup olmayacağı sorusundan hareketle, ahlaki ilişkilerin Hume'un ilişki kategorilerinden doğal ilişkiler arasında olup olmayacağını tartışacağım. Hume ilişkileri felsefi ve doğal olarak ikiye ayırır. İ 3.1.1'de sadece felsefi bir ilişki olarak ahlaki ilişkileri reddetmesine rağmen, Hume, ahlaki ilişkilerin doğal ilişkiler olabileceği ihtimalini göz ardı etmektedir.

Hume'un doğal ilişkiler kavramı incelendiğinde, karmaşık duyu izlenimlerini oluşturan basit izlenimler arasında doğal ilişkilerin de yer alması gerektiği görülmektedir. Bana göre, doğal ilişkiler basit duyu izlenimleri olmak zorundadır. 'Masanın üzerindeki laptop' duyu izlenimi ayrıştırıldığında, "masa" ve "laptop" duyu izlenimlerinin yanı sıra "üzerinde olmak" ilişkisinin de ne oldu açıklanmalıdır. Hume'un ontolojisinde sadece fikirler ve izlenimler olduğundan "üzerinde olmak" ilişkisi ancak bir basit izlenim olabilir. Bu durumda doğal ilişkiler duyu yoluyla edindiğimiz basit duyu izlenimleri olmak zorundadırlar. 'Basit duyu izlenimleri olarak doğal ilişkiler' olarak adlandırdığım bu görüş sayesinde son

bölümde ahlaki ilişkilerin de bu kategoride olabileceğini iddia edeceğim. Bu tip doğal ilişkiler, Hume'un genel zihin felsefesine aykırı gibi dursa da, sistemin zorunlu bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu noktada, aykırılık bu tip ilişkilere dair basit fikirleri çözümleyemememizden kaynaklanmaktadır. Her basit duyu izlenimi bir basit fikre karşılık gelmelidir ancak doğal ilişkiler bu kurala uymamaktadır. Bu noktada basit ilişkilere dair fikirlerin karmaşık olması gerektiğini iddia ediyorum. Bu problemin nedeni, karmaşık fikirlerin ayrıştırılmasının akıl tarafından yapıyor olmasıdır. Doğal ilişkiler hayal gücü tarafından tespit edilebilir şeyler olduğundan basit fikirler olarak tespit edilememeleri gayet normaldir. Akıl uyguladığı ayrıştırma felsefi ilişkiler sayesinde yapıldığından, akıl doğal ilişkilerle ilgili bir ayrıştırma yapamaz. Bu durumda Hume'un da dediği gibi ilişkiler karmaşık fikirlerdir çünkü ilişkileri keyfi olarak ayrıştırabilmemiz için onların felsefi ilişkiler olması gerekir. O halde, eğer ahlaki ilişkiler basit duyu izlenimleri olarak doğal ilişkilerse, Hume Yasası'na bir çözüm üretmiş olabiliriz.

Son bölümde, “kasten adam öldürme” kavramının analizini yaparak, cinayetin erdemsizliğinin deneyimle elde ettiğimiz bir ilişki olduğunu savunacağım. Bu durumda, erdemsizlik ilişkisi olgulardan çıkarsanan bir ahlaki ilişki olacak. İkinci olarak, Hume'un kendi “kasten adam öldürme” analizini inceleyerek Hume'un analizinin olsa olsa en çok benim analizim kadar başarılı olabileceğini savunacağım. Bu durumda her iki analiz de aynı güçte açıklamalar sunduğundan bir belirlenimsizlik durumu oluşmaktadır. Daha sonra, kendi görüşümü desteklemek adına, günümüz meta-etik literatüründe yer alan Ahlaki Algı görüşünü anlatacağım. Bu görüşün desteklerinin benim Hume eleştirimi de destekleyeceğini düşünüyorum. Üçüncü olarak, çok basamaklı argümanlarla ahlaki ilişkileri çıkarsayamasak bile, Hume'un tek basamaklı çıkarım ya da hayvani çıkarımı engellemediğini düşünüyorum. Bu sayede, ahlaki ifadeleri çıkarsamamızın mümkün olduğunu ve bu ifadelerin epistemolojik olarak kanıtlamayla elde ettiğimiz bilgi kadar kesin olacağını düşünüyorum. Basit duyu izlenimleri olarak ahlaki ilişkilerin ifadelerinin, Hume'un belirttiği fikirler arası değişmez ilişkilerle aynı özelliklere sahip olduğu kanaatindeyim. Bu nedenle, bu tip ifadelerin analitik-benzeri ifadeler olduklarını savunuyorum. Son olarak, Hume açısından “*dur*” ve “*mali*” arasında “yükümlü olmak” ve “erdemli olmak” bağlamında bir ayrım olmadığını savunuyorum. Bunun için, Hume'un yükümlülük görüşünü üç tip yükümlülük başlığı altında

inceleyeceğim: Doğal, Ahlaki ve Kuralsal Yükümlülükler. Eğer ahlaki ilişkiler doğal ilişkiler olarak varsa, “*dir*” ve “*malı*” arasında bir fark olmadığını savunmak doğru olmayacaktır. Bu ayırım sayesinde hem ahlaki olgu ifadelerinden ahlaki yükümlülük türetilebilecek hem de pozisyon halen sentimentalist kalacaktır. Sonuçta, basit duyu izlenimleri olarak ahlaki ilişkiler görüşü Hume Yasası’na bir çözüm getirmiş olacaktır. Hatta, Yasa’nın üzerine inşa edildiği Hume’un genel pozisyonundaki bazı hatalar da düzeltilmiş olacaktır.

Son olarak “kasten adam öldürme” analizine bakmak gerekirse; bu analiz Hume’un genel fikirler görüşünü esas almaktadır. Genel fikirler belirli özellikleri nedeniyle birbirlerine benzeyen fikirlere verdiğimiz ortak isimdir. Bu durumda, bir algıya bu ismi verdiğimizde, onu diğer algılarla bu benzerlik ilişki sayesinde bağlantılandırmış oluruz. Bir eylemi cinayet olarak adlandırdığımızda, o eylemin diğer cinayet algıları ile bir benzerlik ilişkisi kurması gerekmektedir. Benim iddiam ise bu benzerlik ilişkisinin eylemin içerisindeki ahlaki ilişkiden başka bir şey olamayacağıdır. Zira, eğer bu benzerlik, ahlaki ilişkiden kaynaklanmıyorsa, herhangi bir başka benzerlik bulmak mümkün değildir. Aranılacak ortak özellik sadece cinayete dair algılara has olmak zorundadır. Bu da ahlaki ilişki dışındaki diğer adayları elememizi sağlamaktadır.

Bu ortak özelliği sağlayabilecek üç tip aday mevcuttur. İlk olarak bu ortak özellik (ilişki olmayan) bir duyu izlenimi olabilir. İkinci olarak, Hume’un öne sürdüğü ilişkilerden (örn., neden-sonuç, yakınlık, vb.) birisi olabilir. Ve, son olarak Hume’un da analizinde savunduğu gibi; cinayeti algıladığımızda ortaya çıkan tutku olabilir. Bana göre bu üç aday da cinayetin ortak özelliğini oluşturmaya yeterli değildir. Üçüncü ihtimale daha yakından bakarsak şu problemlerin mevcut olduğu görülür. Eğer tutku bu ortak özellik ise, bu sadece cinayetin ortak özelliği olmak için çok geneldir. Erdem, ya da yerme duygusu bütün ahlaki eylemleri ortak paydada buluşturacak kadar genel tutkulardır. Ayrıca, tutkular, eylemleri acı ve zevk duyguları ile ayrıştırır ki, acı ve zevk de gene çok geneldir. Hume cinayeti ve benzeri ahlaki eylemleri algılamak için sempati mekanizmasını kullandığımızı belirtmektedir¹³⁶. Bu mekanizma açısından cinayeti algılamadan ve bu algıdan tutkular türetmeden önce, cinayetin kavramsal olarak bilinmesi gerekir. Bu nedenle sempatinin ürünleri ile cinayeti tanımlamak bir kısır döngü doğurmaktadır. Son

¹³⁶ Sempati mekanizması ile “cinayet kötüdür” önermesinin analizi için bakınız; Diyagram 6.

olarak, Hume bize sempati mekanizmasının işleyişinde genel kuralların da yerinin olduğunu söylemektedir. Bu durumda, bu tutkular zorunlu olarak cinayete dair duyu izlenimlerinden türetilmek zorunda değildir. O zaman, bu tutkular zorunlu olarak cinayet genel fikrinin ortak özelliği olamaz. Sonuç olarak bu üç ihtimal de başarısız ise geriye kalan tek ihtimal ahlaki ilişkilerdir. Basit duyu izlenimleri olarak ahlaki ilişkiler, ahlaki kavramlarımızın işaret ettiği fikirler arasındaki ortak özellik olma ihtimali en makul adaydır.

Bu analiz ahlaki ilişkilerin olamayacağı iddiasıyla çelişmektedir ve bu sayede de Hume Yasası'na bir itiraz sunmaktadır. Bu itirazın ışığında, probleme çözüm bulmak için ahlaki ilişkilere dair ifadelere bakmak gerekir. “Cinayet kötüdür” önermesi, bir cinayet deneyimi sahibi olmak ve bu deneyimin içerisinde kötülük ilişkisinin algılandığı anlamına gelir. Bu tip önermeler tek basamaklı çıkarımlardır çünkü direkt olarak deneyimden türetilirler. Kısaca, bir cinayet vakası gördüğümüzde o eylemi *kötü olarak* görürüz. Deneyimden türetildikleri için bu tip ilişkiler değişmez ilişki kategorisinde sayılmalıdır. Bu durumda ilişkiyi sağlayan nesnelere değişmediği sürece ilişki de değişmez. O halde, bu tip ilişkilerin bilgisi kesin bilgidir. “Cinayet işlememelisin” şeklindeki önermeler ise bir önceki tip önermelerin duygusal yansımalarını ifade eden önermelerdir ve ortaya çıkışları felsefi ilişkiler ve aklın müdahalesi ile değil, fizyolojik, mekanik ve tamamen otomatik tepkiler olarak meydana gelmektedir. Bu sebeple “Cinayet kötüdür”den “Cinayet işlememelisin” önermesini çıkarsamak için hiçbir ispat ya da kanıt ihtiyacı duymayız. Sonuç olarak ahlaki ilişki ifadeleri olgusal olduğundan ve yükümlülük ifadeleri bu olgusal ilişkilerin tepkileri olduğundan “*dır*”dan “*mali*” çıkarsanabilir. Bu çıkarım Hume Yasası'nda belirtilen kısıtlamalara uymaktadır. Çıkarım akıl ile yapılmamaktadır. Yükümlülük halen duygusal olduğundan motivasyon argümanı ile tutarlıdır. Farklı olan şey ise çıkarımın tamamen deneyime dayanıyor olmasıdır. Sonuç olarak, Hume Yasası psikolojik bir tez olarak Hume'un “genel fikirler” görüşü, sempati mekanizması ve yükümlülük anlayışı ile çelişmektedir. Fakat basit duyu izlenimleri olarak ahlaki ilişkiler görüşü ile beraber hem Yasa'nın yasağına bir çözüm üretmiş hem de Hume'un *İnceleme*'de tutarlı kalmasını sağlamış oluruz.

Appendix C

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Erdenk
Adı : Emre Arda
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Hume's Law as a Psychological Thesis: An Interpretation of and Solution to the "Is-Ought" Problem

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınmaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: