

ANTINOMIES AND THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY  
IN HEGEL'S *SCIENCE OF LOGIC*

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

ÖVÜNÇ CENGİZ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILISOPHY

JULY 2014

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## ABSTRACT

### ANTINOMIES AND THE PROBLEM OF ONTOLOGY IN HEGEL'S *SCIENCE OF LOGIC*

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July 2014, 229 pages

This thesis discusses the problem of the possibility of a post-Kantian ontology. The thesis argues that Kant denies the validity of the knowledge claims of classical ontology, and argues that our knowledge claims must be limited with the daily objects of our sensation. After having discussed that the limitation brought by Kant mainly stems from the Antinomies, the thesis further argues that a post-Kantian ontology must face the reasons Kant has pointed out for the limitation of thought. Finally, the possibility of reading Hegel's *Science of Logic* is discussed.

Keywords: Kant, Transcendental Philosophy, Hegel, Logic, Ontology, Antinomy

## ÖZ

### HEGEL'İN *MANTIK BİLİMİ*'NDE ANTİNOMİLER VE ONTOLOJİ PROBLEMİ

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Temmuz 2014, 229 sayfa

Bu çalışma, Kant sonrası ontoloji problemini tartışmaktadır. Çalışmada, Kant'ın klasik anlamıyla ontolojinin bilgi iddialarının meşruiyetini reddettiği ve bilgi iddialarımızın günlük deneyimin nesnelere ile sınırlandırılması gerektiğini savladığı savunulmuştur. Tezde Kant'ı bu reddedişe götüren nedenlerin Antinomiler olduğu tartışıldıktan sonra, Kant sonrası bir ontolojik yaklaşımın yüzleşmesi gereken kısıtlamalar incelenmiştir. Son olarak, Hegel'in *Mantık Bilimi*'nin aynı zamanda bir ontoloji olarak okunmasının olanağı tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kant, Aşkınsal Felsefe, Hegel, Mantık, Ontoloji, Antinomi

To My Family

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

The author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to his supervisor Assoc. Prof. Elif ırakman for her guidance, advice, and criticism not just throughout his research, but also throughout his philosophical education.

The author would also like to thank his parents for their support and patience.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Hlyya eşmeci Cengiz, for she is my endless source of motivation. Her love and intimate care helped me a lot when writing my thesis.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

There are, so to say, two pillars of modern philosophy, Descartes and Kant. These two are the founding fathers of the modern philosophizing in the sense that their philosophies changed the paradigm of thinking in modern times. With this paradigmatic change, reality now is to be understood not as substance but as subject. Indeed, it was with Descartes where subject, as a cognizing ego, emerged as a primary category first time in the history of philosophy. The category of subject was even prior to the category of God, *ens realissimum*, though only in epistemological sense. God of course lingered in his system making possible the relation between subject and the world. Yet, it is still the subject which is the first in the philosophy, and it is the self-knowledge of subject which is the criterion for all other knowledge; including the knowledge of God. With the philosophy of Kant, however, subject does no longer need God to interact with the world. The criterion of interaction is now not the God but the unity of subject. Subject, now, truly emerged as an autonomous agency and even the criterion of the possibility of any relation between subject and object resides within the subject itself. Thus, though it is admitted that the object still enjoys an independent existence of its own, it is nonetheless rendered a mere moment in the cognitive process of determination sole agency of which is subject.

However, such autonomy comes with a price. This seems somehow obvious if one adopts the idea that autonomy results from the freedom from world. Subject is in the

world, yet it is not purely natural. In other words, it enjoys a being of its own which is fundamentally different from that of object. They are not of the same kind, and as such subject frees itself from the deterministic structure which reigns over the objective world. In other words, these are two different substances each of which must be understood solely through themselves. They do indeed interact, but admittedly in a most curious way. However, their difference is what establishes the autonomy of subject since this fundamental difference makes subject free from all the mechanical and physical laws which absolutely determine the objects as they are. Thus, in the philosophy of Descartes, the price of subject's autonomy is its detachment from the object. This was the first rift opened between thought and being, man and the world. This rift deepened in Kant, however, who proclaimed that our knowledge claims are limited with finite beings, and even as such we know them only as they come to appear us. As we will see, the meaning of the term "appearance" is not that clear, however, what is clear is that the innermost reality of the world we live in, then, is not a legitimate object of knowledge claims. We may indeed have the scientific knowledge of objects that surround us, or the processes which determine them come-to-be or cease-to-be. But we no longer ask the origins of this coming-to-be or to where this ceasing-to-be leads, if it leads anywhere. Thought can know being, but can think it only in a very limited sense. It can grasp only finitude and only as it appears. Thus, the disengagement between thought and being is finalized. We may still think this innermost truth, thanks to the benevolence of Kant, as an ideal which will be a model for our scientific efforts, yet truth now is still a matter of faith. Where knowledge ends, faith lingers.

Of course, the immediate outcome of Kant's philosophy is the demise of what we know as classical metaphysics; i.e., man's endeavor to understand the utmost truth of the world. There is no legitimacy in trying to acquire the knowledge of first principles of being, and being as such (in its infinite totality) is not a legitimate subject for thought. This, of course, comes to mean that thought is ripped off not only from the world it lives

in but also from the infinity which in fact constitutes its intrinsic nature. Thought is infinite in its nature, not only because every thought of finitude necessarily results in a demand for infinity; as in the demand of the absolute totality of conditions for any given set of conditioned entities. Nor, does its infinity consist merely in the fact that thought always moves to a further meta-level when considering its own activity of thinking; as in I think, I think that I think, I think that I think that I think and *ad infinitum*. Thought is indeed infinite in this sense; that it necessarily reaches to the idea of infinity. Yet its “true” infinity consists in the fact that it comes to itself from its other and unities with itself thereby. In more familiar terms, thought can self-determine itself, and it is exactly this self-determination which forms its true infinite character. Thus, limiting thought with the thought of the finite beings which are themselves mere appearances, alienates it in two-fold sense. It alienates thought from the world which it is immediately directed at and in which it comes to life, and it alienates it from the infinity which establishes its true nature.

To be sure, like all limits, the limit set by Kant also immediately points the beyond of itself, and as such many have challenged to trespass it. The urge to this violation is in fact inherent in the very nature of thought itself. As we will see, thought fixes, determines, and does so by bringing a manifold under a unity. In other words, thought grasps the unity in a manifold. Thus, the copula “is” reflects the nature of thought’s activity. However, thought is not limited with the activity of determining. It also negates, transcends; i.e., violates. That is to say, thought not only grasps unity in difference, but it also discerns difference in unity. Therefore, the copula “is” does not consume the nature of thought; it is also a “not.” Some limit can be set to thought, yet in its limitedness thought sees nothing but the beyond of its limits. Thus, when one claims that ontology is no more possible, thought immediately recognizes the ontological pretensions of this seemingly impossibility. This urge may be the unfortunate fate of thought; or rather, perhaps it is the misfortunate fate of those who try to make thought come to an end.

Briefly, prohibition to thinking is itself an invitation to think what is prohibited. Any discourse on the impossibility of ontology, the knowledge of being, immediately immerses in and thus initiates an ontological discourse.

As we will see, Kant believed that the limitation of thought stems from its own structure, a structure which is amply exemplified in the history of thought. Thought, Kant argues, when it strives to attain the knowledge of infinite, necessarily dwells itself with many contradictions. And it is this contradictory structure of thought which renders it necessary that it must always remain within the limits of finitude. To be sure, Kant himself does not formulate his claim exactly in these words. He rather argues that thought must always be checked by sensation. Without such control it inevitably will find itself in “darkness.” Yet, what sensation can offer us is mere appearance: a finite object in two senses. It is finite, since it is a spatio-temporal object which is here and now. It is also finite in a second sense since it is a mere appearance, not even the object as it is in itself but only for us. Now, it is exactly this limitation of thought with finitude which prompts Hegel to criticize Kant. As we will see, Hegel will develop a system which does not feel the necessity of freeing itself from the infinity; on the contrary, his system will embrace it as a part of “truth,” though not its sole constitutive in any sense.

Though the results Kant arrived may not be promising for those who are not eager in any sense to leave the idea of infinity behind as an object of knowledge, however, they are still there and as such must be met on their own ground. In other words, one cannot simply point to the idea of infinity which is immanent to thought and continue to talk about this idea as if this idea does not involve the contradictions Kant pointed out. One must find a way to harbor the contradictions inherent in the idea of infinity; at least after Kant. As I have discussed above, Kant’s doctrine is challenged immediately. Yet, these challenges, I believe, must face the reasons that lead Kant to the conclusions he arrives.

Thus, my main subject of discussion in this thesis will be the question of the possibility of a post-Kantian ontology. In other words, I want to discuss whether Kant has successfully rendered all attempts for an ontological understanding futile and even unnecessary; and whether there is a possibility of an ontology which not only falls into pre-Kantian dogmatism, and which instead can confront the reasons that lead Kant to dismiss ontology as a valid branch of science. To this end I will discuss whether Hegel's *Logic*<sup>1</sup> can be regarded as a post-Kantian ontology. In other words, my subject will be the legitimacy of "speculative thinking."

However, for some, the question itself may sound archaic, or even redundant; a question which is at best of historical value and even as such not very valuable at all. Who, it may be asked, would feel a need for a speculative discipline directed towards the first principles of being in this very age we live in? We have, after all, many complicated and successful branches of sciences which do tell us the structure of being. This need for *a priori* knowledge of the principles of being may be felt in the previous ages where sciences were yet immature. Now, however, we have our physics, chemistry, biology, and etc., to learn the principles if there are any. Thus, we do not need all this unscientific verbosity, because, since they are unscientific in the strict sense, they have nothing to tell to us. The question of the possibility of ontology is out of date. Philosophy must remain within the secure limits which are set by natural sciences. This objection is likely to be raised from a positivist camp.

It is of course immediately clear that this is not the only possible objection that can be raised, or is indeed raised, to the philosophy of Hegel. It must be also admitted that the objection itself is unphilosophical and not a good representative of anti-Hegelianism in any sense. There are more profound and more philosophical objections to Hegel's

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<sup>1</sup> A. V. Miller, trans., *Hegel's Science of Logic*, (New York: Humanity Books, 1999). Hereafter *SL*.

system, and if any of these objections to Hegel's philosophy is to be considered, these more philosophically established ones must come first. Why, for example, not to consider the objection that Hegel's *Logic* reflects the totalitarianist tendencies inherent in modernism? After all, does not Hegel favor identity over difference to the extent that it renders difference a moment of identity?<sup>2</sup> Or, more basically, does not he violate even the most basic rules of thought, and etc.? This objection is certainly right, yet I believe that these questions and may be some others which are not uttered here, will be addressed within the course of what comes next. Although, it is obvious that the objection I chose to delineate here is not the best candidate among the long list of objections raised against Hegel for various reasons, I believe that it may help us to make clear the importance of the subject matter of my thesis.

As Hegel points out, philosophy does indeed depend on sciences for its development.<sup>3</sup> In fact, it must be noted that philosophy does owe its development not solely to sciences, but also to each branch of the spiritual and historical activities of men; i.e., religion, art, politics, history and etc. Indeed philosophy is a retrospective activity. It is because philosophy is aimed to understand the nature of things. However, if this understanding is to take place, the thing in question, whatever it is, must have already exhibited its own nature. Briefly, "The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering."<sup>4</sup> This relation of dependence is also obvious when we consider scientific activity. Newton, to be sure, did not feel the necessity to show the conditions of the possibility of universal and apodictic judgments in order to develop his physics. Indeed, no scientific activity as such rests on delicate ontological or epistemological discussions

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<sup>2</sup> For a more detailed discussion of this topic see Robert Stern, *Hegelian Metaphysics*, (Oxford: University Press, 2009), 358 ff.

<sup>3</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusätze)*, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, and H. S. Harris (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1991), § 12, 37. Hereafter *EL*.

<sup>4</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, trans. S. W. Dyde, (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2001), 20.

to continue its daily occupations. However, the other dimension of this relation is not that obvious. Yet, science itself rest upon ontological and epistemological admissions even if they remain implicit and not acknowledged explicitly. This reliance come to fore when daily occupations of science come to an inextricable point due to some crises that arises because of several reasons, say emergence of a rival paradigm or a new scientific discipline which radically differs from traditional ones. In this moment of crises it is philosophy itself which is called to aid. It is the coming of historical sciences (Marxism, psychoanalysis, theory of evolution, and etc.) into play, for example, that provoked epistemological discussions concerning the distinctive quality of scientific explanation which differentiates it from other modes of explanations which is still a matter of great importance since the first half of 20<sup>th</sup> century. However, as will be discussed in the following chapters, epistemology is not radically distinct ontology. And an epistemological discussion is in fact an ontological one in one sense since the epistemological question “how to know” depends and presupposes ontological questions of what is to be known and who is to know. Therefore, for example, when Kitcher argued that unification should be considered as one of the principles for identifying any explanation as scientific,<sup>5</sup> he, though not explicitly uttered, bases on an ontological view where finite entities that are to be explained are all related through some web of interaction.

Moreover, new scientific paradigms challenges our classical way of understanding the world; and in this sense they, again, invite an ontological discourse. Nowadays, we hear from those, who otherwise are immediately irritated from the name of Hegel, that some sub-atomic particulars pop-up from void in an instant just to return to void again, without much considering the ontological implications of such an scientific ‘fact.’ My concern is not that Hegelian ontology is finally acquitted thanks to the quantum mechanics nor that Kant’s philosophy is no more valid due to the demise of Newtonian

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<sup>5</sup> P. Kitcher, "Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World," in *Scientific Explanation*, ed. P. Kitcher and W.E. Salmon, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 410-505.

physics (even as a passing note, I must here state that Newtonian physics is not dead, it is rather limited). Rather, that it is obvious that all these scientific paradigms harbors and/or fosters a certain ontological understanding which comes to fore when science goes into a sort of crisis. In other words, whenever science gives a pause to the haste of its daily occupations to come to a self-understanding of its own activity (what is its true object, what is its true method, what is its true distinguishing (i.e., determining) aspect and so on) philosophy comes to fore. Philosophy, then, still remains as the “Queen” of all sciences. Ontology, however, is the true Queen, or Queen of Queens since, as Hegel aptly puts, it is the soul of other branches of philosophy (*EL*, §24, Add 1), or to formulate in different terms, it is the true soul of philosophy.

Moreover, this objection, now sounds naïve, gives us a good opportunity to point to the heart of the matter; i.e., why a discussion on the possibility of ontology is not an overly technical discussion which belongs to the grey and dark halls of academy. Hegel, as just stated, believes that philosophy is indeed indebted its development to the empirical sciences, however, on the other hand, philosophy “gives to their content the fully essential shape of *freedom* of thinking” (*EL*, § 12). Although the main point of Hegel’s discussion in the quoted passage is a bit different, it helps us to direct our attention to the relation between thinking and freedom; and why ontology is important in this very context.

“Man thinks.”<sup>6</sup> This is obviously so. As is repeated incessantly, but not always appreciated well enough, it is this aspect of man which elevates him from the squabbles of the finite world into a loftier world of purposes, ideas, beauties, divinities, that is, to

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<sup>6</sup> Benedict De Spinoza, *On The Improvement of Understanding, The Ethics, Correspondence*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes, (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1955), 83. Hereafter *The Ethics*. When I refer to the book, I will first give the number of the part (as in E2, that is *The Ethics*, Part 2), then I will give the number of the proposition, definition, axiom, corollary, or note. For example, E2 p4 n4 means *The Ethics, Part 2*, Note 4 to Proposition 4.

what is exclusively human. However, what is not apparently obvious is that man thinks therefore is free. For Spinoza, men may think that they are free, yet this is a mere illusion because they are only conscious of their desires but never of the causes that determine them to desire so.<sup>7</sup> Accordingly, nothing in universe, except the universe itself, is free, since universe alone acts from the very necessity of its own nature.<sup>8</sup> What is important to note here is that for Spinoza freedom is self-determination. However, what is more important to note here is the link between the idea of freedom and the idea of infinity. The universe is free in the exact sense that it is infinite; that is to say, the laws that determine the manner of its existence are not given to it from without. They rather stem from its very own nature. In this sense universe relates to itself, is united with itself. To be brief, then, the universe is free because it is infinite.

Kant, however, as is well known, derives the possibility of freedom in a quite different manner. According to Kant, we have to concede the fact that as long as human will is considered as a phenomenon, it is subject to laws of nature. However, if we take objects in a two-fold sense and consider human will as a thing in itself, it is “not subject to that law, and therefore is *free*.”<sup>9</sup> Such a freedom, however, is not knowable at least theoretically; nonetheless “I cannot *know*, I can yet think *freedom*” claims Kant (*ibid.*). Kant’s move here is quite interesting since in one act he both relates freedom with and detaches from thought. All I need to be free is that the thought of freedom “should not contradict with itself” so that I must at least be able to think it (Bxxix). The possibility of the condition of not-contradiction, however, is acquired by exempting freedom from being a possible object of knowledge. This is so, because, would freedom be rendered an object, it must obey the deterministic structure of the objective world. Thus, the moment

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<sup>7</sup> Spinoza, *The Ethics*, E1 Appendix, page., 75.

<sup>8</sup> Spinoza, *The Ethics*, E1 p17, c2; p29.

<sup>9</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, (New York: St Martin’s Press: 1965), B XXVIII. Hereafter I will give only edition letter and paragraph numbers.

Kant relates freedom with thought is the moment he detaches it from thought again. Kant, then, definitely established the link between thought and freedom, yet he placed the condition of the possibility of freedom to the unknowable.

Although Kant finds the condition of the possibility of freedom elsewhere, when he established that thought determines itself in the sense that it gives itself the rules of thinking, the link between thinking and freedom is re-established, though in a different manner. As discussed above, this relation is at first established when Kant claimed that the possibility of freedom is its intelligibility. Yet, now, Kant also established that thought is a self-determining, autonomous agency. With a detour to Spinoza, then, we are not far from the idea that thought is free since it is of a self-determining character, and it is infinite since it is free. This link between thinking and freedom is quite significant in Hegel's *Logic*. In a passage, which is definitely written as a response to Spinoza, Hegel reminds us that man desires, longs, and he also has needs and instincts as do the beasts, which constitute his relation with nature (*SL*, 32). However, for Hegel, to all these natural elements, thought permeates and transforms them "into something human." This is so, because thought idealizes all these desires, instincts, and cravings, and by doing so it frees them from the shape given them by nature. In other words, idealization is the introduction of freedom. Idealization is the introduction of freedom because thought determines. This determination consist in generating "the universal" and comprehending "the particular therein" (*SL*, 28). Thinking, then, is a process of double determination. Thought, when thinking its object, both determines itself and its object. Its self-determination consists in generating its universals purely from its own structure; its determination of its object consists in grasping that object in the universal. Briefly, thinking is moving from finitude to universality. Thus when idealizing, thought takes up a particular, it negates its finitude, and hence limitedness, by bringing it under a universal. This universality is that "which we are conscious ourselves of being and in which we have our freedom" (*SL*, 35). Thought is the element of freedom, not only

because it is an unrest urge towards universality, but also it negates. It is exactly in this negating element that thought transcends the fixedness of finitude and reaches universality. Therefore, the relation between thought and freedom is of an innate nature. Whenever one thinks, one is free; even if only in-itself and for it-selfness of this freedom requires labor, and action in history and community. Indeed the very formulation of the question “Is freedom possible” denotes the very possibility of freedom. The moment one asks whether one is free, is the moment one steps into the land of freedom. That freedom, however, is not an escape from the world, but lives in that very world. Briefly, for Hegel, what is rational is free, and what is free is rational. However, as obvious, what is rational cannot be merely thinkable in terms of being a non-contradictory idea, it must at the same time be a legitimate object of thought; i.e., it must be actual.

Moreover, the relation between infinity in the sense of self-determination and freedom is now obvious. The thought of freedom necessarily harbors the thought of infinity. Thus, for Hegel, if thinking is to be able to grasp its own freedom it should not turn away from infinity; on the contrary it must tarry with the infinite. However, one can object to this formulation of infinite as self-determination, and argue that the infinity that Kant discusses is not self-determination but rather an endlessness; i.e., the endlessness of the series of conditions, or the endlessness of the world as a total sum of phenomenon. However, as we will see in the last chapter, for Hegel endlessness is indeed a facet of infinity, yet it is not all the concept of infinity does reveal to us. And indeed, the infinity in the sense of endlessness is related, or to express more acutely, gives way to the infinite in the sense of self-determination. Briefly, I shall try to show how the discussion over “the thing in itself” (*Ding an sich*) between Kant and Hegel is, then, a discussion over the possibility of freedom.

In what follows, I will first discuss how we are supposed to read the *Logic*. I will briefly summarize possible strategies of reading; however, I will focus on two of these strategies. One of these strategies will argue that Hegel is a logical idealist, and thus his *Logic* is a radicalization and finalization of Kant's transcendental turn. The other, however, argues that *Logic* is a post-Kantian Spinozism. The difference between two approaches stems from the fact that they defend different versions of identity of thought and being. For the former approach, which takes Hegel as a logical idealist, there is a unity between thought and being, however, this unity is limited with the margins set by transcendental logic. In other words, there is a unity between thought and being, yet this unity is only to some extent. Thought can grasp finite entities, and what marks the difference between Kant and Hegel is that for Hegel what thought grasps about finitude reflects the true nature of finite beings; there is no transcendental residue of a "thing in-itself." However, infinity and contradiction are not regarded as pertaining to being as such. They rather exclusively belong to thought. For the latter, on the other hand, there is an absolute unity between thought and being, such that if thought reaches to idea of contradiction and infinity when trying to cognize being, then this necessarily means that there is contradiction and infinity in the structure of being.

Then, in the third chapter, I will turn to Hegel's discussion of Kant to argue two things. First to show that Hegel by no means disregard the transcendental turn initiated by Kant. This idea is also one of the reading strategies that will be enumerated in the second chapter. Second, that he indeed considers his own philosophy as a post-Kantian ontology not as a radical Kantianism, since I will try to demonstrate that the main motivation behind Hegel's criticisms of Kant is his demand for the absolute unity between thought and being.

Then, in the fourth chapter, I will discuss the reasons that lead Kant to banish ontology as a valid philosophical discipline. This is important, since, as I have discussed above, any post-Kantian ontological enterprise must meet Kant on his own ground. In that chapter, I will argue that Kant fails to provide a ground for the transcendental ideality of space and time in transcendental aesthetic, and I will further argue that a possible argument can still be derived from the discussion over antinomies. In other words, I will argue that, for Kant what makes it necessary to limit reason is the contradictions encountered in the thought of infinity. And since Kant believes that contradiction exclusively belong to nature of thought, but not being, he concluded that our knowledge claims must be limited with finite entities.

Finally, in the fifth chapter, I will argue that Hegel's true transcendental deduction must be sought in his account of the relation between finitude and infinitude. There, I will first discuss on two possible deductions given in the literature, and I will argue that this strategy is hardly convincing and that we must especially focus on Hegel's views on the concept of infinity and contradiction to see whether Hegel can legitimize his claim for a post-Kantian ontology. This is so, as I have stated above, a true post-Kantian ontology must face with the reasons that lead Kant to dismiss ontology as a valid branch of philosophy.

## CHAPTER 2

### *LOGIC AND ITS IMPLICATIONS*

It is a commonplace among the students of Hegel to state that the *Logic* is repellently hard. It is so commonplace that, stating this fact has already become a *cliché*. This is not only because of the complexity of the individual passages among individual argumentations, but also of the fact that readers of the book generally feel themselves to be hurled into a whirlwind. In general, writers provide a blueprint of their book for the readers so as to make the process of reading easier for them. Thus, thanks to the initial description of the method and the context of the work, whenever one feels oneself lost in the series of complicated argumentations, if there is any, of the book, one can find the way to exit by concerning the general plan or structure of the book and recalling where one is and to where one should head. However, as is well-known, this is not the case for Hegel. Hegel argues that logic is a peculiar form of science such that, as distinct from other sciences, it cannot speak about its method or context in advance (*SL*, 41). This peculiarity stems from the singularity of its content. The content of logic is thought, in other words, in *Logic* thinking takes itself as its own subject matter. Thus, thinking will provide what thinking is, how it proceeds and etc. Therefore, any “outline,” Hegel argues, “cramps the tracing out of their [i.e., the content of logic] systematic derivation” (*EL*, 1). Moreover, since what thinking is yet to be set throughout the logic, any forms or laws of thinking that can be set as a standard cannot be presupposed. Briefly, Hegel reminds us that, “what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole exposition” (*SL*, 41).

So, we will think about thinking; however, we do not yet know what thinking is, because what thinking is will only emerge after we complete the process of thinking thought. Now even if we neglect the singularity of Hegel's proposition, one crucial question lingers: how one even start to think thinking without presupposing any established idea concerning the nature or activity of thought? For example, one would argue that thinking is essentially judging, and, by examining various judgments that are ready at hand, conclude that judging, therefore thinking, is affecting a unity among discrete representations. Then, one would continue to set laws of thinking by further examining the different modes of unification one encounters in different types of judgment. Yet, if one is not to presuppose any of these established forms of reasoning, how would one establish a proper beginning? Thinking is to take itself as its own subject matter yet it is not to presuppose anything, thus it seems that it is devoid of any content. Even though this sounds highly abstract, this is what Hegel indeed intends:

But if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning itself is taken *immediately*, then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such. All that is present is simply to resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary, that we propose to consider thought as such. Thus the beginning must be an *absolute*, or what is synonymous here, an *abstract* beginning; and so it *may not presuppose anything*, must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science. Consequently, it must be purely and simply *an immediacy*, or rather merely *immediacy* itself. Just as it cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else, so too it cannot contain with itself any determination, any *content*... The beginning therefore is *pure being*. (*SL*, 70).

The passage quoted definitely begs questions. Of course it makes perfect sense that if the science of logic is not supposed to presuppose anything, then the beginning cannot be anything mediated. Mediation means a relation with another and this relation makes it necessary that this other must also be taken into account if the beginning is to be a proper one. In other words, the beginning must not be grounded in something else. Thus, one can understand why the beginning must be immediacy as such. Yet a most natural question immediately arises: is it possible to abstract even from language? We necessarily think in language and it does not seem possible for one to abstract from it. Moreover, logic studies thinking and its concepts, yet concepts come to life in

established languages. As such concepts bring with themselves all the social, historical, and cultural meanings that are attached to them in the course of the development of the language. Furthermore, it is also the case that to think on one concept requires many other concepts of the language since concepts owe their meaning to the linguistic web they belong to. As a result, for some commentators Hegel's project is flawed from the very beginning.<sup>10</sup> Now, even if we argue that that thinking is made possible by language, does not necessarily mean that thinking is immersed in explicitly linguistic relations or that one cannot look further for the pure logical implications harbored in the concepts of language, and thus dispense with the above discussed objection,<sup>11</sup> further questions await out on the horizon.

The last logical conclusion of the above quoted passage, that the beginning must be an immediacy as such and *therefore* it is pure being, sounds somehow suspicious. Are we really entitled to propose that immediacy as such is pure being? I mean, one can argue that the concept of the "pure being as such" is an immediacy because it involves no further determination in it. That is to say, it has no qualifications to determine it as "being X" therefore it must be considered as indeterminate immediacy as such. Yet, one can also propose that the same goes also for the concept of "pure thought as such." It also lacks any qualifications which would determine it as the "thought of X" and as such it is also an indeterminate immediacy. Thus, one can also conclude that the beginning of the *Logic* must be pure thought as such rather than the pure being. In fact, that would be more proper since the subject matter of logic is thought after all. Then why to begin with pure being rather than pure thought? This question, I believe, is a crucial one to be addressed. However, let me state, as a passing note, that in this beginning section I'll

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<sup>10</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies*, translated and with an Introduction by P. Christopher Smith, (London: Yale University Press, 1976), 92-112.

<sup>11</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006), 77-8.

only try to express natural questions that arise within the course of reading of Hegel's *Logic*. I'll try to address this and the other questions yet to be formulated below.

Other questions immediately emerge when we look at the first trilogy of the book; namely, being, nothing, and becoming. When we consider the indeterminate immediacy, i.e., pure being, we should see that, we are told, it has no "further determination." Having lack of any determination, thus, "it has no diversity within itself nor any with a reference outwards." Finally, being "is in fact nothing, and neither more or less than nothing" (*SL*, 82). The idea here is surprisingly simple. An analogy would help us better to see. A pure light, Hegel argues, is, in fact, not that different from a pure darkness since one can see nothing in either of them (*SL*, 93). Thus, speaking of pure being, that has no qualifications which will render it as this thing or another, immediately collapses into a speech about nothing. There is nothing to determine or see in pure being, and as such no difference can be set between pure being and nothing. Thus, here, it may sound as if Hegel is showing us the impossibility of such a thing as pure, simple, indeterminate immediacy, and thus impossibility of beginning without presupposing anything. However, this is not the case, and for Hegel we have already begun and moving further.

Having remind us that since pure being has no further determinations in it, it collapses into nothing, Hegel argues that nothing also has the same description with pure being: "it is simple equality with itself, complete emptiness, absence of all determination and content—undifferentiatedness." Now, both being and nothing proved themselves to be absence of determination, therefore Hegel concludes that nothing is "the same as pure being" (*SL*, 82). I believe one can make sense of this by taking these lines as arguing that both nothing and pure being refers to the same thing; i.e., same empty thought. And finally, since, nothing and pure being denotes the same empty thought, i.e., they are the same, their emergence is also a vanishing into other (*SL*, 83).

Thus far, it seems that Hegel has not added anything to the section of being, since if the thought of pure being collapses into the thought of nothing, then it naturally follows that the thought of being is the same as thought of nothing. Then, Hegel further argues that although they already passed into each other, their truth lies in that “they are not the same, that they are absolutely distinct” (*SL*, 83). So, they are inseparable in the sense that they have no further determinations, yet at the same time they are distinct, but this distinctness resolves into sameness at the moment it emerges. This emerging and collapsing, as Hegel grasps it, is a movement in between two inseparable yet distinct moments. Hence, becoming. The resultant category is becoming, since, Hegel reminds us, being and nothing do not actually collapse into each other, rather they are this collapsing. Both being and nothing proved themselves to be a movement into their opposites. Thus, this pure restless movement, in turn, proved itself to be the truth of the previous moments.

It is natural for one to think that what Hegel does in these passages is a kind of magic trick done by words. First, it seems that we just named the one and the same empty thought, thought of pure, indeterminate immediacy, with two different terms, i.e., being and nothing; just like naming one and the same planet as either Venus or “morning star”. However, then, these two different terms were also be taken to denote two different entities, or things, if I am allowed to use the terms ‘entity’ or ‘thing’ for being and nothing. Now, why are they different?

In his *Remarks* about the beginning and the first dialectical movement Hegel is clearly more concerned with those who, in his own terms, as stuck in ordinary thinking, are not able to think in abstract terms, and who, thus, fail to grasp the sameness of being and nothing (*SL*, 84-86). As I discussed above, my problem here is not their sameness but, on the contrary, distinctness. To repeat once more, if they are just two different names to

denote one and the same thing, i.e., the emptiness of the thought of pure, indeterminate immediacy, then there is no problem to assert their sameness. However, if we are to assert their absolute distinctness then it is obvious that we are not just taking them as names. Indeed, Hegel seems to have them as they are held in the ancient metaphysics. He reminds us Parmenides who embraced pure being as the sole truth, and, by referring to the ancient principle that *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, challenges those who remain fast to the distinctness of being and nothing explaining what their difference consists of (SL, 92). So, we can see that, what Hegel means with pure being is not just a name for the simple immediacy, but rather the being of Parmenides, which has ontological denotations; that is to say, which has something to do with what exists over there.

But again, how are we driven to a discussion about Parmenides when at the beginning we were supposed to consider what thought is? How are we to make sense of all these talk about being, nothing, becoming, and so forth? It seems that readers of Hegel faces two distinct, yet related, types of questions. First concerns the argumentation for the specific movements that take place between the concepts that are enumerated in the book, and what this movement tells us. The second one, which is immediately necessitated by the first question, concerns what lies at the core of the matter; i.e., what do we really talking about: just an analysis of concepts or some sort of metaphysics which claims objective validity for these concepts?

Luckily enough we are not that helpless nor blind in our endeavors to make sense of the book. Although Hegel, as discussed above, argued that science of logic cannot talk about its subject matter or its method, when discussing the historical necessities that made this work inevitable, he provides us some clues concerning the context of the work. In the very beginning of his *Logic*, Hegel complains about how once valued metaphysical thought, the rational inquiry of the nature of God, soul, and the efficient and final

causes, falls from grace and compares the demise of metaphysical thought with the demise of nations who forgot their spirit (*SL*, 25). This complaint immediately reminds one Kant who makes a similar definition of how metaphysics, once the “queen of all sciences” is castrated from all her power (Avii). However, the resemblance seems to end there since Hegel accuses the understanding of his age as being stuck in a false dichotomy between the form (thinking) and the matter (sense data) of cognition and having them as absolutely separated spheres; a distinction, as is well recognized, which forms the basis of critical philosophy. Accordingly, Kant’s philosophy is the rationalization of this abandonment of metaphysics since it teaches us that without the limits provided by experience thought generates solely “figments of brain” (*SL*, 45).

This opening already harbingers that Hegel’s *Logic* will somehow have metaphysical implications. To be sure, not only “Introduction” but also various passages throughout the *Logic* and the *Encyclopedia Logic* suggest that Hegel does indeed intend his *Logic* to have a metaphysical aspect. However, these passages also make it hard to understand what exactly Hegel takes metaphysics to be when he complains about the demise of metaphysics. In (*EL*, §24) Hegel argues that the “Logic coincides with metaphysics, with the science of things grasped in thoughts.” Thus, in *Logic* (*SL*, 50) he takes the content of his book to be “the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind.” Or, for example, let us consider this passage, which reads:

This is true in still greater measure of absolute spirit which reveals itself as the concrete and final supreme truth of all being, and which at the end of the development is known as freely externalizing itself, abandoning itself to the shape of an immediate being – opening or unfolding itself into the creation of a world which contains all that fell into the development which preceded that result and which through this reversal of its position relatively to its beginning is transformed into something dependent on the result as principle. (*SL*, 71).

These passages indeed sound as if Hegel is some kind a rationalist metaphysician who endeavors to understand the truth of being and of God; just like, for example Spinoza. However, with the slight difference that whereas for Spinoza the nature or the finite

mind is not created but generated from the eternal essence of the one substance through the very necessity of its own nature,<sup>12</sup> Hegel's substance sounds more Christian or, what is the same, Hegel's Christianity sounds more Spinozan.

However, the tone of the some other passages is quite different. In the *Logic* (*SL*, 63) he holds that his "objective logic corresponds to Kant's transcendental logic." Several more passages also reinforces the idea that the bonds between Hegel's *Logic* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* are stronger than one would expect from the statement that Kant's philosophy is the affirmation of the death of metaphysics. For example, Hegel argues that "the absolute truth of being is the known Notion and Notion as such is the absolute truth of being" (*SL*, 49), or that "being is known to be the pure concept in its own self" (*SL*, 60). Although these passages can be somehow taken to indicate a metaphysical doctrine of spiritual monism, they also make sense when read with the Kantian idea that the condition of the possibility of taking world as the object of our cognition is the categories of understanding. The absolute knowledge, then, would not be the knowledge of the essence of the God, but rather, as we will see below, the knowledge of the fact that self-determining thought is the possibility of experience, and hence the possibility of the objects of experience. Thus, one can also read these passages as Hegel's reformulation, albeit in his own inextricable style, of the Kantian dictum that the pure concepts are the conditions of the possibility of nature. Indeed, such a reading would help of some passages which, otherwise, it is very hard to make sense of. Consider the following (*SL*, 71): "Thus consciousness on its onward path from the immediacy with which it began is led back to absolute knowledge as its innermost truth." Thus, according to the reading suggested, this passage can be taken to reaffirm the idea that even the most basic, or immediate, form of experience, such as 'a thing stands over there and then', requires an a priori categorical structure; and thus this categorical structure with all its complexity stands as the possibility, or the ground, of

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<sup>12</sup> Spinoza, *The Ethics*, E1 P15, Proof.

the immediacy. Or again, the very same passages can be read along with the idea that Hegel is proposing a metaphysics which is neither theological nor pre-Kantian, but which solely claims an absolute overlapping between thought and being such that the structure of being is not inaccessible for thought. Thus, one can read the statement that the truth of being is Notion (*Begrif*) as a formulation of this metaphysical approach according to which being has a logical structure, which is, in fact, same as the logical structure of thought.

To be sure, secondary literature over Hegel provides ample ideas for reading *Logic*. There are, one can argue, about five suggestions concerning how one should approach the book; though, of course, this classification is neither the only one that can be made, nor does it consume all the ideas concerning the context of *Logic*. First, there are those who argue that one should not approach to *Logic* at all.<sup>13</sup> Second are those who argue that Hegel's project is flawed from the beginning or a complete failure because of the apparent impossibility of such a thing as a presuppositionless thought. Thought is always conditioned, it is further argued, and as such it must remain always as limited or checked at bay. Third are those who take Hegel to be a pre-Kantian metaphysician who talks about a divinely spirit who realizes himself through the creation of nature, man, and history. Consider, for example, the following passage:

Since the external reality to which these categories apply is not only an embodiment of *Geist*, but is posited by *Geist* as its embodiment, and hence reflects the rational necessity of thought, in *Logic* grasping the categories of thought about things, we are also grasping the ground plan or essential structure to which the world conforms in its unfolding.<sup>14</sup>

Although I do not claim that Taylor is a representative of such approach, still it is clear that the residues of this understanding of Hegel as a pre-critical dogmatic thinker even

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, K. R. Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies: Volume II The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel, Marx, and the Aftermath*, (London: GEORGE ROUTLEDGE & SONS, LTD, 1945), 30-1.

<sup>14</sup> Charles Taylor, *Hegel*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 225-6.

subsists at least in these lines. Finally, the fourth and fifth approaches, which will be the main topic of this chapter, suggest that Hegel's *Logic*, in fact, has a profound value, and thus it must not be omitted as a verbosity. Accordingly, *Logic* does not represent a pre-Kantian dogmatism; on the contrary it has a deep relation with Kant's project. Thus, fourth reading argues that *Logic* is a radicalization of Kant's first critique; or at least can be re-structured as such. The fifth and the final one, on the other hand, argues that *Logic* is a post-Kantian ontology, or, in other words, post-Kantian Spinozism.

In this chapter, however, I'll discuss extensively only the fourth and the fifth approaches. As to the first approach, I don't believe that Hegel is a philosopher who can be easily neglected. As one come across Hegel's writings on different subjects such as religion, politics, culture, history, and etc., one encounters with a very interesting figure who has a lot to say about the modern world we live in. To be brief, even his introduction of the historicity, and publicity of subject alone (mentioning his theory of recognition, his most studied theory, is a must here) suffices to show that if one desires to understand the modern world, one must face with Hegel. As to the second class, who rejects the possibility of presuppositionless thought due to different reasons, I believe the following can be mentioned. First, as argued above, that language cannot be abstracted from thinking does not necessarily render a logical work on the categorical relations of notions meaningless. Language is indeed the embodiment of thought: "Into all that becomes something inward for men, an image or conception as such... language has penetrated," (*SL*, 31). However, this does not mean that contingencies that breed in language render thinking a contingency, nor does it entail that we are necessarily captured in language games. We may use an analogy here. That there are various, or indeed, infinite contingent facts in the nature does not necessarily mean that one cannot reach to universal laws which operate in nature. That is to say, that there are contingencies in nature does not mean that nature cannot exhibit a logical, or, what is the same here, law-governed, structure. Likewise, contingencies of the language are not an

insurmountable drawback for studying the logical relations in language. Those, on the other hand, who believe that thought is necessarily conditioned, fail to notice the power of the critical aspect of thought. As soon as one argues that there are some conditions conditioning thought, one renders these conditions as an object for thought, and thus opens the way for thought to overcome them. If, on the other hand, one argues that thought is ultimately conditioned on external factors because even if thought can transcend some of its conditions, there will be always more which cannot be even made object of thought, then it is clear that such an assumption is highly problematic and as such begs many questions. As I have discussed in the Chapter One, any endeavor that try to limit thought through depending on some unknowable, does not necessarily end thought's knowledge claims. However, at this very point I must state that, I do not argue here that absolute knowing in the sense that man can know everything about the nature he lives in or about himself, is possible; though I believe in this as a possibility. However, I also believe that thought's claim for surpassing the limitations, suppositions, and the conditions that are set before it must be taken into serious account.

And finally, as to those who argue that Hegel is yet another uncritical thinker who fails to appreciate the transcendental turn initiated by Kant, and thus who advocates a Christianized divine spirit which is active in both the history of universe and mankind, I believe taking Hegel as such a conservative dogmatic would be a grave mistake. I'll discuss Hegel's relation with Kant's philosophy extensively in the following chapter. And it is in that chapter that I hope to show that such a claim is groundless. However, some remarks must be made over the idea that Hegel is a conservative Christian, though as a passing note.

The image of Hegel as a conservative philosopher is not that uncommon. His ideas and writings on state and history are often referred to in this portrayal of Hegel as a politically conservative thinker. But it is also known that the idea that he is a conservative and devoted philosopher is supported by his conception of religion and his

relation to Christianity. Such an interpretation of him as a religiously minded philosopher is not simply negligible. One can easily encounter texts arguing that Hegel's philosophy is simply Christian theology elevated to a complicated yet blurry language of Hegel's general philosophy. In other words, if one is to rub out the surface of his philosophy, what one is to see underneath is the God of Abrahamic religions speaking Hegelian language. What is further argued accordingly is that the society that is comprehended or else normatively decreed by Hegel is a somewhat secularized version of the one that is represented by Christian theology. I have provided a more detailed work on the problems of such a portrayal of Hegel elsewhere.<sup>15</sup> Here, I believe that it shall suffice to state that the belief that Hegel is a religiously conservative philosopher does not only reflect the truth of the matter, but also that Hegel has always been critical of Abrahamic religions which picture God as a transcendent entity, and kept his distance from their representation of God as an individualized subject. This distance is frankly evident in his early writings, especially from the style Hegel characterizes the doctrine and practices of Jesus Christ. However, it is crucial that he maintains this understanding also in his mature writings. In conclusion, briefly, for Hegel the importance of a religion lies in its socio-political influences. Convictions and consciences of individuals are strongly affected by religions. Thus, if there is to be a free democratic society, the established religion in that society must foster individual autonomy. Hegel thinks that as long as a state makes freedom of its members its goal, and acts upon the rationality of this world, cannot subsist together with a positive, organized religion. Hence he says in his essay *The Relationship of Religion to the State* (one of his latest essays) that "a people that has a bad concept of God has also a bad state, bad government, and bad laws."<sup>16</sup> The impasse of the modern age with regard to freedom is therefore for Hegel one between religion and state. Finally, his use of the God-language, on the other hand, I believe, is a stylistic strategy, like that of Spinoza.

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<sup>15</sup> Övünç Cengiz, Emre Ebetürk, "On Hegel's Philosophy of Religion" (paper presented at the annual meeting for the *Internationaler Hegel-Kongress*, Istanbul, October 3-6 2012).

<sup>16</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, "The Relationship of Religion to the State", in *Hegel Political Writings*, ed. Laurence Dickey and H. B. Nisbet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 226.

By no means do I pretend to show the unsoundness of the approaches discussed so far. Each of them deserve a much more discussion than provided here. However, my intention is to lay reasons why I will not focus on these approaches any more than I have already done. I just believe that, philosophy of Hegel, if not absolutely right, nevertheless provides crucial insights for the nature of thought, humanity, history, and man's spiritual activities which cannot be rendered empty as that easily. However, if we are to make use of these insights, we must, I believe, face with his most controversial claims of his *Logic* which establishes the "soul" of his system, and try to make sense of them. Thus, then, we are left with the final two approaches which propose that there is a way of reading *Logic* which will not render it a mere verbalism or a dogmatic delineation of God's essence in the literal meaning. The fourth approach takes Hegel as a logical idealist, and claims that Hegel can be read as radicalizing Kant's critical philosophy. However, this reading also argues that not all the aspects of *Logic* are salvageable in such a reading; thus leaving the ontological claims of the book aside. Since the most eminent and indeed the leading figure of the fourth approach is Pippin,<sup>17</sup> I will consider exclusively his work. The fifth approach, on the other hand, makes a stern effort to take serious Hegel's ontological claims in his *Logic*. Stephen Houlgate,<sup>18</sup> who argues that Hegel is a post-Kantian Spinozist, will be discussed as the representative figure of the fifth approach.

## 2.1. Hegel as a Logical Idealist

The logical idealist approach reads Hegel through his relation to Kant such that it focuses on Kant's theory of transcendental apperception, and how this theory gives way

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<sup>17</sup> Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>18</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*.

to the following identity philosophy.<sup>19</sup> According to Pippin, the key to the birth of German Idealism, and thus the identity theory, lies in Kant's doctrine that the transcendental unity of apperception is the supreme principle of experience. Even Hegel himself sometimes makes direct references to Kant's doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception as being the first step towards the doctrine of the identity of subject and object, and argues, for example, that "this original synthetic unity must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites."<sup>20</sup> Elsewhere he argues that:

It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the unity which constitutes the nature of the Notion is recognized as the original synthetic unity of apperception, as unity of the I think, or of self-consciousness. (SL, 584)

Pippin further argues that both *Phenomenology of Spirit*<sup>21</sup> and *Science of Logic* must be regarded as Hegel's appreciation of the principle of the transcendental unity of apperception, though in his own original system. Whereas, according to this reading, Hegel, in *Phenomenology of Spirit*, constructs an ideal history of a subject who apperceptively attends to its claims for knowledge and truth, *Science of Logic* is an account of the concepts presupposed by any subject who apperceptively intends a claim about determinate objects.<sup>22</sup> Thus, there is a strong continuity between these two philosophers. This account provided by Pippin is highly tempting and it is not a surprise that one can encounter many versions of this reading among the literature on Hegel. To give one example, Beatrice Longuenese also argues that Hegel's *Logic* should be placed within the Kantian lineage and that it is "a metaphysical and a transcendental deduction

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<sup>19</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 4.

<sup>20</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Walter Cerf, and H. S. Harris (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 70. Hereafter *FK*.

<sup>21</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). Hereafter *Phenomenology*.

<sup>22</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 23.

of categories of metaphysics: a justification of claims concerning their content as concepts, and a justification of claims concerning their relation to objects.”<sup>23</sup>

Accordingly, the continuity between these two philosophers consists in the fact that for both philosophers the doctrine that the transcendental unity of apperception is the basic condition of experience marks the transcendental break with classical metaphysics. Thus, both philosophers hold that if there is to be such a thing as experience to be possible, the subject of the experience must be able to perform some basic distinctions. This is so, because, as we will see, experience, especially for Kant, is the empirical knowledge of objects, not merely passively receiving raw data. (Yet, Kant would go further to argue that receiving data is also subject to conceptual determination. This aspect of transcendental deduction will come to forefront in the discussion of the Kantian heritage of Hegel). In order to do so, i.e., perform some basic distinctions, this subject must be equipped with a categorical schema which will enable subject to perform mentioned distinctions. And since this categorical schema is what makes experience possible, it cannot be itself empirically grounded. Moreover, both philosophers explain the necessity of this non-empirical categorical schema through the reflexive, that is to say apperceptive, nature of human experience. Thus, apperception emerges as a highly fundamental theme of the linkage between two philosophers.<sup>24</sup>

However, their discontinuity also resides in the same doctrine. Accordingly, Hegel refuses the idea that there can be a distinct discrimination between concept and intuition on the same grounds. And moreover, the pathway to the denial of a precise concept-intuition division is also provided by Kant himself, though according to Hegel Kant fails

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<sup>23</sup> Béatrice Longuenesse, *Hegel's Critique of Metaphysics*, trans. Nicole J. Simek, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 5.

<sup>24</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 7-9.

to embrace true logical outcomes of his theory. In other words, Hegel, relying on the argumentation provided by Kant for the transcendental deduction of categories, holds that Kant himself undercut the distinction between intuitions and concepts which he structured previously. This rejection, in its turn, leads to an account of categories content of which are determined not through relating them with intuitions but through their logical relations with other categories, and to the denial of the claim that there are things in themselves of which we cannot have any knowledge.<sup>25</sup> Thus, in order to see how the linkage and break between Hegel and Kant is established through the doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception let me first provide an account of the infamous transcendental deduction and how this doctrine is at work there.

### **2.1.1 The Transcendental Deduction of Categories**

The transcendental deduction is probably one of the most challenging passages in the entire history of thought. The intricacy of the passage mainly stems from, but not limited, with the difficulty of the issue it intends to address. Basically, deduction intends to show that the criteria which will ensure that the representations that reside in mind do relate to external objects that are free from mind (in other words the representations of mind do indeed represent extra-mental entities) also reside within the mind. To reformulate the matter in other words: the distinction between mental and non-mental is made within the mind, the link between the mental and non-mental is also established in mind, and finally the condition which will render this link a real one is also determined to reside in mind. Apart from the complexity of the subject matter, there are further formal and literary or technical issues. According to some, Kant does not follow a uniform strategy in the deduction but he rather confuses different strategies as if they are

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<sup>25</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 9. I will discuss this point further in the following chapter.

parts of a single one.<sup>26</sup> For others, for example, deduction is not limited with the passage entitled “Chapter II. The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding,” but rather it begins in the so-called metaphysical deduction and exceeds to the schematism of pure concepts. Luckily, this chapter does not have to entangle with mentioned delicacies, since it shall focus on the doctrine that self-consciousness is the supreme principle of human experience and the effects of this doctrine on *Science of Logic*. Thus, although there are various ways of interpreting Kant’s argumentation in the deduction, I will mainly try to follow the one which, I believe, is the most sympathetic to Kant’s intentions.

It has been a commonplace in Kantian studies to state that Kant uses the term “experience” in an unaccustomed way. Whereas experience, in traditional use, denotes the acquisition of raw sensible material through senses, in the *Critique* it means the empirical knowledge of an object: “..., work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience” (*CPR*, B1). Moreover, empirical knowledge of an object requires the manifold that is given through sensations to fall under a general description, or in other words, to be recognized in a concept.<sup>27</sup> We may, therefore, safely argue that experience in Kant is judgmental. That is to say, experiencing blueness is equal to judging that “x is blue,” which, in its turn, is equal to saying that “what I experience is blue.” This point will be clearer as the discussion over transcendental deduction advances. Recognition in a concept, however, requires a synthesis that affects a unity among the manifold given through senses. It is

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<sup>26</sup> For example Guyer argues that Kant employs four different and discrete strategies in this section. See Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) sections 4 to 5, 91-154. Also cf. Paton who claims that there are at least two distinct deductions in A version and another one in the B. Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysics of Experience*, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1936), 349. Furthermore, Bird argues that Kant’s argumentation in this section so branches that it is not possible for one to track all its implications. Graham Bird, *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in the Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York: The Humanities Press, 1973), 110.

<sup>27</sup> Henry E. Allison, *Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 67.

this requirement of unity and synthesis among the manifold of intuitions through which Kant establishes the necessary link with the transcendental unity of apperception and human experience. This link is provided by Kant's claim that synthesis is also a judgmental act. In other words, synthesizing is bringing the manifold under more general concepts in a judgment. To see how this link is established we must first look at the metaphysical deduction to see how categories of understanding are related to our judgments and then advance transcendental deduction to see how unity of apperception and thus the categories emerge necessary conditions of human experience.

### **2.1.2 The Metaphysical Deduction**

Now according to Kant when we analyze our judgments we see that in judging we in fact bring some less general representations under more general ones:

Accordingly, all judgments are functions of unity among our representations; instead of an immediate representation, a higher representation, which comprises the immediate representation and various others, is used in knowing the object, and thereby much possible knowledge is collected into one. (B93-4)

However such an analysis is not infinite; in other words, Kant defends that when analyzing our judgments we come to certain final most general forms which are not further analyzable. These forms are Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Modality, each having three moments of their own (A70). The key to the discovery of the pure concepts of understanding lies in the statement that "Pure synthesis represented in its most general aspect, gives us the pure concept of understanding" (B104). Thus, the forms of synthesis in various types of judgments give us the pure concepts of understanding, since Kant identifies pure concepts with the logical functions of unity in judgments.

Having given these preliminary steps Kant introduces the core of his argument for the metaphysical deduction of the categories:

The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding. The same understanding, through the same operations by which in concepts, by means of analytical unity, it produced the logical form of a judgment, also introduces a transcendental content into its representations, by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general. (B105).

In a nutshell, this passage says the following: Experience, i.e., knowledge of objects, thus cognition, is the combination of concepts such that they will form a judgment. However, if judgments have definite forms, then these concepts must be so constructed that they could be unified in a judgment. In other words, our concepts must be constructed in line with the logical functions of judgments in general. However, since these concepts also refer to intuitions (i.e., presentation of objects) our intuitions must also be structured in a way to admit being unified in a judgment.<sup>28</sup> In other words, there must be some pure concepts through which forms of judging are related to a manifold of intuition. To give an example, since in a categorical judgment certain predicates are applied to certain subjects, our objects of experience must be grasped as subjects capable of being attributable several predicates, and also we must distinguish subjects and predicates in our intuitions.<sup>29</sup> Thus, categories are the rules through which we structure concepts of objects so as to judge them in a judgment. Kant also reiterates this necessity in B128: “They [categories] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in respect of one of the logical functions of a judgment.” In other words, whenever we apply a certain judgmental form to an object, we must resort to corresponding category so as to make this application possible.

A closer look to the passage, however, would help us to conceive some important aspects of Kant’s doctrine here. According to Allison, this passage is crucial since it tells us that there is an identity between understanding’s acts in general and transcendental logic. In other words, understanding has a single characteristic act which is synthesizing,

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<sup>28</sup> Paul Guyer, *Kant*, (New York: Routledge, 2006), 75.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

or, in other words, unifying in a synthesis. It does the same operation both in general and transcendental logic but in different levels.<sup>30</sup> What this means would be clear as we continue to analyze the passage.

Allison argues that the expression of “analytic unity” in this passage refers to “concepts that are united in a judgment.”<sup>31</sup> Concepts are themselves analytical unities because they are single representations of a cluster of marks which are common to various objects. Since objects are analytical unities, and since a judgment is a unity of various representations (i.e., concepts), the term “analytic unity” refers to the concepts unified in a judgment.<sup>32</sup> So, to argue that understanding produces “the logical form of a judgment by means of analytical unity” is to argue that understanding produces a judgment of a certain logical form by unifying analytical unities (concepts) in a certain form.<sup>33</sup>

After having argued that forming a judgment is uniting concepts according to one of the logical forms, Kant, then, claims that “the same understanding” presents a “transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general.” The term transcendental content here, according to Allison, must be extra-logical in the sense that it must be a content which involves a relation to an object or an objective reality. In this case, presenting a transcendental content into representations is relating that representation with an object.<sup>34</sup> Thus, since understanding has also a transcendental (objectifying) function and since it carries out

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<sup>30</sup> Allison, *Transcendental Idealism*, 124.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 125.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* 126.

this function through the same operations it unifies concepts in a judgment, it necessarily follows that the forms of judgments are also the forms whereby understanding unifies the manifold of intuition so as to make them represent an object in a judgment. This idea forms the core of the metaphysical deduction.

The metaphysical deduction, a summary of which is provided so far, is subject to some criticisms, a most crucial of which is the following: We are to deduce the pure concepts of understanding from the logical forms of judgments. However, Kant has not provided us any argument as to why there are only 12 forms; that is, the argument that the table given in the *Critique* is the final one seems to be not grounded. Kant argues, in *Prolegomena*, that “I could make certain, that these, and this exact number only, constitute our whole cognition of things from pure understanding.”<sup>35</sup> However, this claim fails to satisfy some of the commentators.<sup>36</sup> Some others even compares Kant’s pretentiousness in the completeness of the table of categories with Hegel’s some of the most pretentious claims in the philosophy of nature.<sup>37</sup> Nor does Kant provide any reason why these categories are not further analyzable. Moreover, some object to that fact that the linkage between the table of judgments and categories is not that a smooth one.<sup>38</sup> However, even though it has some problematic aspects, the metaphysical deduction sheds light on a very important point in the critical philosophy. It shows us that, there is but one function of understanding, which is synthesizing or uniting in a synthesis; and this function is at work in both general and transcendental logic. So, it is obvious that

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<sup>35</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. Gary Hatfield, (Cambridge: University Press, 2004), 87.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, P. F. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, (London: Routledge, 1966), 45.

<sup>37</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 11.

<sup>38</sup> Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 43.

understanding is the sole source of unity, no matter what this unity consists of. This will of course open the way to transcendental deduction.

Now, the metaphysical deduction, with all its important implications, has only a hypothetical result, which is that if we are able to make judgments about empirical objects, both these judgments and the concepts of empirical objects about which we form judgments must take particular forms. However, in order to provide the objective reality of the pure categories of understanding Kant must also show our judgments do really relate to empirical objects.<sup>39</sup> The task of the transcendental deduction is, thus, providing this relation.

### **2.1.3 Transcendental Deduction Proper**

According to the commentary I stated above to follow, the transcendental deduction consists of two parts. In the former, Kant claims the necessity of the categories according to the objects of sensible intuition. The latter, on the other hand, claims this necessity through human sensibility and the data it provides, and therefore this part presupposes the outcomes of Transcendental Aesthetic. The difference between these two parts lies in the fact that whereas the first part establishes the objective validity of categories, the second part establishes the objective reality of the categories.<sup>40</sup> The difference between objective validity and objective reality is as follows.

Objective validity of a judgment is the capacity of that judgment to have a truth value. Thus, to say that a category is objectively valid is to say that that category makes a

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<sup>39</sup> Guyer, *Kant*, 99.

<sup>40</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 133.

judgment possible. Thus, to argue that categories have objective validity is to argue that categories are necessary conditions for the representation of an object in a judgment.<sup>41</sup> Objective reality of a concept, however, has an ontological meaning. Thus, to argue that a concept has objective reality is to say that it refers to an actual object. To give an example, the concept of “whitewalker” does not have an objective reality yet it can function as a subject in an objectively valid statement such as “whitewalkers are creatures of cold.” Thus, to claim objective reality for a category is to argue that that category can be applied to all the objects that can be given to us in intuition. Therefore, the second part of the deduction is related with the human sensibility.

Now, the distinction between the objective validity and objective reality of a concept presupposes two different meanings for the term “object.” Since the objective validity is related with judgment, the object of the objective validity rather refers to a logical conception of an object. This is a quite extensive definition of object and it covers everything that can be a subject in a judgment. According to Allison, Kant uses the term “*Object*” to indicate an object in this sense.<sup>42</sup> Objective reality, on the other hand, is related with an actual object and has an ontological denotation. Thus, Kant uses the term “*Gegenstand*” to indicate an object in real sense.<sup>43</sup> So, whereas the first part of the deduction establishes the necessity of categories for the “*Object*”, the second part does the same for the “*Gegenstand*.”

This partition is almost a commonplace in the secondary literature. According to another one, for example, deduction consists of, again, two parts, an objective and a subjective one. The objective deduction demonstrates the universal and necessary application of

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<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 135.

<sup>42</sup> Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 135.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

categories to the objects of all cognition and the subjective deduction demonstrates how categories are applied to the objects of intuition.<sup>44</sup> Thus, since there seems to be an agreement concerning this partition I continue to follow the partition described in the first place.

The importance of transcendental unity of apperception as the highest principle of the deduction of categories emerges in the following famous passage, which is also considered as the true beginning of transcendental deduction:

It must be possible for the I think to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me. (B 131).

This passage, in a nutshell, tells us that human cognition is reflexive in principle. However, when this principle is linked with the representation of a manifold of intuition, the pathway to deduction is opened.

This linkage is established in two steps. First is indicating that the representation of a manifold of intuition constitutes a “single complex thought.” Second, a single complex thought requires a “single thinking subject.”<sup>45</sup> The core idea in the last step is briefly that the sum of the separate thoughts of the parts of a unity is not equal to the thought of that unity.<sup>46</sup> Thus, grasping a multiplicity as a unity requires a “logically simple subject.”

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<sup>44</sup> Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, 82.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* 138.

<sup>46</sup> Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York: Macmillan, 2003), 459.

Now, if a single complex thought of the unity of a multiplicity logically requires a single thinking subject, then this subject must be a numerically identical “I think” and this subject must also be aware of its numerical identity. The latter is the condition of formation of a single complex thought. Let me reiterate a revealing example to further illustrate the issue further. Let us suppose that the manifold of the representations of A, B, and C are to be thought in a single consciousness as a complex thought of ABC. Now, the I that thinks the representation A, the I that thinks B, and the I that thinks C must be the same I otherwise it would not be possible for the mentioned I to form the complex thought of ABC.<sup>47</sup> This numerical identity of the I, which is entitled as the transcendental unity of apperception, is the condition which makes formation of complex thoughts possible:

For the manifold representations, which are given in an intuition, would not be one and all my representations, if they did not belong to one self-consciousness. As *my* representations (even if I am not conscious of them as such) they must conform to the condition under which alone they can stand together in one universal self-consciousness, because otherwise they would not all without exception belong to me. (B133).

Moreover, according to Kant, if the I is to form a forming complex thought out of a given manifold, it must also be aware of its own identity when thinking discrete moments of the unity that is to be formed. That is to say, “the unity of consciousness is correlated with the consciousness of unity (it takes one to know one).”<sup>48</sup>

This thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold which is given in intuition contains a synthesis of representations, and is possible only through the consciousness of this synthesis. For the empirical consciousness, which accompanies different representations, is in itself diverse and without relation to the identity of the subject. That relation comes about, not simply through my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but only in so far as I conjoin one representation with another, and am conscious of the synthesis of them. (B133).

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<sup>47</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 139.

<sup>48</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 139.

Here Kant argues two basic points: that the consciousness of the numerical identity involves a synthesis and that consciousness of identity is possible only through the consciousness of the synthesis.<sup>49</sup> The key point here is that, the synthesis required for the consciousness of the unity of consciousness is also a spontaneous act of consciousness. This point was already stressed in the metaphysical deduction and Kant once more repeats this point in the very beginning of the transcendental deduction section:

But the combination of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and cannot, therefore be already contained in the pure form of sensible intuition. For it is an act of spontaneity of the faculty of representation; and since this faculty, to distinguish it from sensibility, must be entitled understanding, all combination—be we conscious of it or not, be it a combination of the manifold of intuition, empirical or non-empirical, or of various concepts—is an act of understanding. (B130).

Apperception requires the actual consciousness of an identical ‘I think.’ This consciousness is not a datum of inner sense because it requires a synthesis of the “I think’s which accompanies to distinct representations in one universal ‘I think.’ Let me resort to the above given example once more. Assume that we have the representations of A and B. So there are also two representations of ‘I think A’ and ‘I think B.’ Now, the condition of the consciousness of the identity of these two ‘I think’s, that these two discrete ‘I think’s do in fact belong to one single subject, lies in the combination (synthesis) of the two representations of A and B in one consciousness (AB). Moreover, the relatedness of these representations of A and B cannot be derived from the contents of these representations and thus cannot be known through an analysis of their contents. To give another example, let us suppose that I first looked at a book on my desk, and then to a picture on the wall. However, that I just looked at a book cannot inform me that I’m contemplating the picture right now; or, vice versa, that I’m contemplating a picture on the wall cannot inform me that I just looked at a book a moment ago. Thus, in order for these two representations (representations of the picture and the book) to belong to one

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<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* 141.

single subject, there must take place a synthesis among them.<sup>50</sup> Moreover this synthesis is a spontaneous act of mind. Further, as argued above, without this synthesis the subject cannot achieve the consciousness of its own identity.<sup>51</sup> In other words, subject recognizes its own identity only in its own spontaneous act. If this act (synthesis of manifold) is given to the subject from without, it could not be able to reach its own identity.

At this point, it may be stated that arguing that understanding is the sole source of synthesis, regardless of its kind, poses several problems for Kant such as the accusation of atomism. If we take understanding as the sole source of unity we render the actual world a chaotic soup from which we acquire only discrete and disconnected raw material and which gains an ordered unity only thanks to the spontaneous act of understanding. However, the important point of Kant's doctrine is that, whether we take this doctrine in its strong sense or not, there is a spontaneous act of consciousness, and it is through this spontaneity that consciousness is aware of its identity. In a nutshell, what is of utmost importance is that, identity is a matter of spontaneity and vice versa.

Thus far Kant relates the unity of apperception and the synthesis of discrete representations in a single complex thought. The next step is establishing the relation between the transcendental unity of apperception and the representation of objects:

Understanding is, to use general terms, the faculty of knowledge. This knowledge consists in the determinate relation of given representations to an object; and an object is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united. Now all unification of representations demands unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them. Consequently it is the unity of consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of representations to an object, and therefore their objective validity and the fact that they are modes of knowledge; and upon it therefore rests the very possibility of the understanding. (B137).

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<sup>50</sup> Guyer, *Kant*, 85.

<sup>51</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 142.

As we can see, this relation is established by arguing that our representations are linked to an object through judgments. Rather, and more critically, the condition of the modifications of our minds to represent objects free from our minds is a rule governed unity (unity of apperception) among these modifications. So, the activity of understanding is defined as relating representations with an object through bringing diverse representations under a unity, under the guidance of categories as rules of unification. Here, we can see that, Kant takes a very curious step by arguing that, the condition of the relation between “in” and “out” (between the representations that are the modifications of mind and the objects that are the actual entities free from mind) lies in the “in” (to repeat once more, our representations can be said to represent an object in so far as they can be brought under the unity of the apperception).

As we can see, Kant establishes reciprocity between unity of consciousness and the representation of objects. As discussed above, Kant argued that consciousness can grasp its unity only through recognizing its unifying act. Therefore, the synthesis of the manifold of representations becomes a condition of the unity of consciousness. Now, Kant further argues that unification of representations requires unity of consciousness. The reason of this latter requirement, however, gives an important insight into the nature of thought.

As discussed above, concepts are regarded as analytical unities in the sense that they involve thought of a mark, which is common to a manifold of discrete representations, in a single representation. Now Allison argues that, the identical ‘I think’ can be taken as the form of the analytical unity. When thought grasps its own identity, it abstracts its identity from diverse representations. In other words, it abstracts a universal and identical ‘I think’ from diverse representations of, say, ‘I think A,’ ‘I think B,’ and etc. This means that the basic activity of thought is grasping unity in difference. Moreover,

this logical act is also at work when thought abstracts a common mark from diverse representations.<sup>52</sup> In Kant's words:

To know anything in space (for instance a line), I must first draw it, and thus synthetically bring into being a determinate combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness,...; and it is through this unity of consciousness that an object, ..., is first known. (B138).

Briefly, in this model, the sole source of unity is the transcendental unity of apperception and the transcendental unity of apperception is posited as the form of judgment. And since categories are the rules of unifying act, apperception and the categories are, at least, intrinsically connected.

To recapitulate the line of argumentation in the first part of the transcendental deduction: Synthetic unity, synthesizing the manifold into a unity, is set as the condition of the unity of consciousness and the representation of an object. Then, the faculty of judgment is set as the sole agent of synthesis and the transcendental unity of apperception as the sole source of unity. Finally, it is argued that if a manifold is to be brought under a unity in a judgment it must conform to the transcendental unity of apperception.

However, the object here is described as that "in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united" and it is obvious that this object is the logical conception of object; i.e. that which can be a subject in a judgment. Accordingly, whatever that can be represented through the unification of a manifold of intuition under a concept is an "object".<sup>53</sup> So, it is clear that so far the transcendental deduction has not advanced far from the metaphysical deduction. This is because, Kant has showed that transcendental unity of apperception is the objective condition of the representation of an object, yet the object at stake here is the object in the logical sense; i.e., that which can be a subject in a

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<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* 144.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* 145.

judgment. Thus, Kant must relate the transcendental unity of apperception with the object in its actual sense, i.e., the “*Gegenstand*”.

This, as we have seen, establishes the second part of deduction, and Kant gives two descriptions for the aim of this part. The first reads:

In what follows, it will be shown, from the mode in which the empirical intuition is given in sensibility, that its unity is no other than that which the category prescribes to the manifold of a given intuition in general. Only thus, by demonstration of the a priori validity of categories in respect of all objects of our sense, will the purpose of the deduction be fully attained. (B145).

And, the second reads:

We have now to explain the possibility of knowing a priori, by means of categories, whatever objects may present themselves to our senses, not indeed in respect of the form of their intuition, but in respect of the laws of their combination, and so, as it were, of prescribing laws to nature, and even of making nature possible. (B160).

Both passages state that the aim of the deduction is to establish a relation between the categories of understanding and the human sensibility. However, whereas the first passage relates categories with empirical intuitions, the latter goes further and argues that categories make nature, as a rule-governed unity, possible. According to Allison, this second part of the deduction also consists of two further parts.<sup>54</sup> Whereas the first part relates unity of apperception and the categories with the intuition of time through transcendental synthesis of imagination, the second part relates categories with the objects of human sensibility, i.e., the “*Gegenstände*”.

Allison states that Kant defines two kinds of syntheses, an intellectual one and a figurative one (B151). Whereas the former consists of bringing a manifold under the

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<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* 158.

unity of apperception, the latter is an imaginative synthesis, like, say, drawing a figure.<sup>55</sup> Now the core of the first part of the second part of the transcendental deduction will be showing that, first, the figurative synthesis is responsible for the unification and determination of time, and that this synthesis is also subject to categories.

As will be discussed in the next chapter, in the “Transcendental Aesthetic” any temporal unit is represented as a part of an all exclusive time. In other words, awareness of a time-unit comes with the awareness that this unit is a part of an infinite quantity. Now, the important point here is that time itself is not given as a single totality in sensibility. In a footnote to transcendental deduction Kant admits that:

Space represented as object (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains combination of the manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition gives only a manifold, the formal intuition gives unity of representation. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasize that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact, it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to senses but through which all concepts of space and time first become possible. (B160-1).

Now, any time portion is represented solely as that time moment. However, since in order to represent a time moment I must also represent it as a part of a unity, it follows that I must also represent other temporal units which are not present at that moment (past and future moments) and time as a single unity. Finally, it is the imagination which allows me to do this since, imagination, as Kant defines it, is the “faculty of representing in intuition of an object that is not itself present” (B151):

When I seek to draw a line in thought, or to think of the time from one noon to another, or even to represent to myself some particular number, obviously the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after the other. But if I were always to drop out of thought the preceding representations (the first parts of the line, the antecedent parts of the time period, or the units in the order represented) and did not reproduce them while advancing to those that follow, a complete representation would never be obtained: none of the above-mentioned

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<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* 160.

thoughts, not even the purest and most elementary representations of space and time, could arise. (A102).

In conclusion, the determination of time as a single unity is a result of the transcendental synthesis of imagination. However, the second part, where this synthesis is related with categories and the transcendental unity of apperception is not that smooth.

Kant abruptly subjects the transcendental synthesis of imagination to the transcendental unity of apperception almost in a dogmatic way and asserts that the transcendental synthesis of imagination “is an action of the understanding on the sensibility” (B152). However this linkage is not that clear. As discussed above, there is a necessary reciprocal relation between the unity of a manifold in a judgment and the unity of apperception. In other words, the unity of apperception requires the unity of a manifold of intuition in a judgment, and the unity established in a judgment presupposes the unity of apperception. However, no such reciprocal relation seems to exist between unity of apperception and the unity of time.<sup>56</sup> However, an ingenious reformulation would help us to understand the relation between the experience of actual objects and the transcendental unity of apperception.

According to Allison, although no transition is possible between the unity of apperception and the unity of time, a possible relation can be established between the representation of the unity of time with the unity of apperception. The core of Allison’s argumentation is as follows: In order for the product of the transcendental synthesis of imagination to be represented, it must conform to the conditions of the unity of apperception. Since these conditions are the categories (because of the fact that unity of apperception requires the manifold of intuition to be unified in a judgment rules of which are the categories), it follows that the representation of the transcendental

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<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* 162.

synthesis of imagination must also conform to categories. However, the most challenging obstacle in this line of argumentation is that, the manifold of the time-units are not unified in a judgment. Therefore a further linkage is required with the unity of the manifold of the time portions and the judgment.<sup>57</sup>

Now, Allison argues that if stayed strictly in Kantian terms, it must be stated that the condition of the unity of the consciousness of a temporal manifold is the association of the manifold to a single time. In other words, if the members of this manifold cannot be represented as related to each other in a single time, they cannot be represented in a single consciousness. Thus, since experience is bringing a manifold under a unity, we can further argue that the unity of time is the condition of experience. Accordingly, in order for Kant to relate categories with the forms of sensibility, all he needs to do is to relate these two with the transcendental synthesis of apperception.<sup>58</sup>

Now thus far Kant has achieved to demonstrate that time as a form is a product of a synthesis. However, if this product is to be represented as a unity it must conform to the transcendental unity of apperception. This establishes the relation between the categories and the forms of human sensibility. Still, this, by itself, is not sufficient to demonstrate the objective reality of the categories. In order to do so, Kant must establish the connection between categories and empirical intuitions. To this aim, Kant relates categories with the synthesis of apprehension.<sup>59</sup>

The synthesis of apprehension is “that combination of the manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empirical consciousness of the manifold (as

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* 162.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* 163.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* 164.

appearance) is possible” (B160). Accordingly, a synthesis takes place in the empirical intuition which makes empirical consciousness of a manifold possible. The important point here is that this synthesis is related with the contents of the phenomena. So, the final touch would be relating categories with this synthesis. This relation is given in a dense paragraph in which Kant gives an extensive outline of the deduction:

In the representations of space and time we have a priori forms of outer and inner sensible intuition; and to these the synthesis of apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always conform, because in no other way can the synthesis take place at all. But space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but as themselves intuitions which contain a manifold [of their own], and therefore are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold. Thus unity of the synthesis of the manifold, without or within us, and consequently also a combination to which everything that is to be presented as determined in space or in time must conform, is given a priori as the condition of the synthesis of all apprehension—not indeed in, but with these intuitions. This synthetic unity can be no other than the unity of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in accordance with the categories, in so far as the combination is applied to our sensible intuition. All synthesis, therefore, even that which renders perception possible, is subject to the categories; and since experience is knowledge by means of connected perceptions, the categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and therefore are valid a priori for all objects of experience. (B160-1)

Since perception is an empirical consciousness it presupposes a synthesis of the manifold into a unity so as to form a consciousness (to remind once more, without unity no consciousness is possible). This synthesis, to repeat once more, is the synthesis of apprehension. And since this synthesis of apprehension takes place in forms of intuition, it must conform to the conditions of the unity of these forms, which are the categories. Luckily enough, Kant here gives two examples to illustrate his point further:

When, for instance, by apprehension of the manifold of a house I make the empirical intuition of it into a perception, the necessary unity of space and of outer sensible intuition in general lies at the basis of my apprehension, and I draw as it were the outline of the house in conformity with this synthetic unity of the manifold in space. (B162).

The empirical intuition consists of a manifold of lines which occupy certain distinct parts of space. The synthesis of apprehension unifies them so as to form a determinate

figure of a house. However, if these lines are to be synthesized in a unity, the spatial parts they occupy must also be related and synthesized with each other. However, as discussed above, in order for various parts of space (or time) to be related to each other, they must be represented as belonging to a single space (or time). In other words, the condition of the association of different spatio-temporal parts in a consciousness is the representation of the unity of space and time. And finally, the condition of the representations of the unity of space and time, i.e., their determinations as formal intuitions, is the transcendental unity of apperception. Finally, Kant concludes his transcendental deduction arguing that he has showed both the objective validity and reality of the pure concepts of understanding.

Now what exactly does the transcendental deduction, with all its intricate arguments tells us? What exactly do we say when we argue that categories a priori determine experience. We must admit that the passages harboring the deduction are so fertile that a substantial number of discussions can be derived from it. However, as much as possible, I'll try to stay in the limits of the discussion of this chapter, i.e., the relation between Kant and Hegel. To be very brief the heart of the matter can be put as the following.

First, it tells us how categories inform our experience, so that we experience actual objects as determinate entities with identifiable properties. To demonstrate how categories perform this function Kant gives the example of the concepts of "body" and "divisibility" (B128). Accordingly, both the concepts of "body" and "divisibility" can assume both the roles of the subject and predicate in a judgment. For example, both sentences "all bodies are divisible" and "a thing divisible is a body" are logically valid. However, this logical uncertainty (i.e., both concept's assuming both logical roles) does not mean that the actual status of the bodies we perceive is also uncertain. As Kant remarks a category is that "by means of which its intuition is regarded as determined

with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments” (B128). Thus, with the help of the category of “substance” we determine the bodies given to us through sensation as subjects of our actual experience and not as predicates.

Second, deduction tells us how categories determine *a priori* what will count as an object for us in any possible experience. They make it possible for us that, that which we are conscious of is not an aggregate of discrete, successive images but a unified single phenomenon. Transcendental logic demonstrates that categories such as substance, quantity, or cause are the transcendental conditions of experience of an object. So, whatever is given to us as an object in experience, we a priori know that that object has a magnitude, that it persist in time, would endure change, would have different attributes in different moments of time, and that it is a part of causal chain prevailing in the physical world, even though we fail to calculate its magnitude or find the causes of its current state of affairs. On the other hand, what justifies our usage of these concepts is not that they mirror the nature as it is in itself; rather, they define what an object is.<sup>60</sup>

This, however, leads us to the difference between the general logic and the so-called transcendental logic. Whereas general logic abstracts from all content of thought and concerns only the relation between forms of thought, transcendental logic concerns the representation of objects. In other words, general logic only concerns with the logical possibility, i.e., conditions necessary for a thought’s being a possible thought; transcendental logic, on the other hand, concerns with the conditions necessary for thoughts to represent an object. Therefore, transcendental logic, unlike general logic, is related with intuition.<sup>61</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Logic*, 123.

<sup>61</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 24.

A further important point is that, it further tells us that human experience is, even though implicitly, reflexive, i.e., self-consciousness is the condition of the consciousness of an object. This necessity, that human experience is in itself reflexive, however, has further implications. First, as we have seen, the objects of consciousness cannot have the unity necessary for them to be objects of a single subject's experience unless this unity is affected to them by that subject. That is to say, consciousness is in itself self-consciousness. Further, it is this rule-governed unifying act what makes a state of my mind to represent an object independent of my mind. In Hegel's words, "'I' is the content of connection and the connecting itself."<sup>62</sup> Second, every act of consciousness is accompanied by a self-consciousness of that act. Moreover, what makes a thought act a particular kind of act rather than another kind is the self-consciousness of that act. To give an illuminating example:

In any remembering, thinking or imagining, although the object of my intending is some state of affairs or other, I am also potentially aware as I intend that what I am doing is an act of remembering, thinking, or imagining. My asserting that S is P is not an assertion of mine unless I am implicitly aware as I assert that I am asserting, not entertaining the possibility that S is P... But it is the case for Kant that my implicitly 'taking myself' to be perceiving, remembering, and so on is an inseparable component of what it is to perceive, imagine, remember, and so on.<sup>63</sup>

Finally, Kant associates the apperceptive aspect of human cognition with the spontaneity of thought. If there is a non-experiential aspect of experience which is a necessary condition of experience, it can be further argued that thought is not completely grounded in experience and in this sense self-caused or autonomous. In (B75), for example, Kant argues that "the mind's power of producing representations [pure concepts] from itself, the *spontaneity* of knowledge, should be called the understanding." Elsewhere he again claims that concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought (B93). The link between the

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<sup>62</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §166.

<sup>63</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 21.

apperceptive nature of thought and the spontaneity (of pure concepts) lies in the necessity of apperception for the possibility of these pure concepts.<sup>64</sup>

Of course these are not the sole outcomes that can be derived from Kant's doctrine. Yet they seem to appear as the most related ones with the subject matter of this thesis. However, I want to highlight three points which are crucial for the subject of this thesis. First, Kant has demonstrated that a certain kind of unity between form and matter, or subject and object, is the necessary condition of cognition. That is to say, that we have knowledge of objects itself signals a primordial unity between us and the objective world. Second, Kant further demonstrated that the spontaneity of subject is another necessary condition of cognition. Mind is not an empty plate where impressions are recorded. Thought, on the contrary, is of a self-determining character and it is this self-determination which makes cognition possible. Though, however, Kant does not follow this self-determination into its details. In other words, as will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter, he does not provide us an account how thought produces its pure concepts by itself. Finally, although Kant's philosophy rests on a distinction between form and matter, he, as we have seen, underlies the possibility of that distinction being a thorough and strict one. This is so, as also we have seen, the objective reality of categories requires not only that forms of intuition but also the content itself given through these forms must also be subject to categories. To remind once more, this condition is necessitated by the synthesis of imagination whereby space and time are brought to unity, and the synthesis of apprehension whereby the content is brought into a unity so as to constitute an object.

Unsurprisingly, such a colossal enterprise has met many objections. Some of these are so stern that they totally disregard metaphysical deduction as "null" or "meagre" and define

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<sup>64</sup> Robert Pippin, "Kant on the Spontaneity of Mind," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 17 (1987): 457.

transcendental deduction as a “drama.”<sup>65</sup> Some others argue that if Kant’s aim is to show how concepts operate in our experience, he accomplishes it only in “Analytic of Principles” and thus regard transcendental deduction redundant.<sup>66</sup> However, the most crucial ones, and the ones which are directly related with my thesis, are raised against the most subtle outcomes of deduction; that it is the synthetic unity of consciousness which makes not only the representations of objects but also objects of experience possible and finally relates mental states with objective ones.

First, a certain objection questions why the representation of the unity of self to itself requires a rule governed synthesis among the manifold of intuition. Accordingly, even if Kant accomplishes to show why the self requires certain rules to represent its unity to itself, he is still far away from demonstrating that these rules also establishes a connection between the states of self and the changes take place in these states, and the states of a rule-governed independent world.<sup>67</sup> Yet, even the most sympathetic commentators of Kant maintains that even though Kant is successful in demonstrating that categories are necessarily applied to experienced entities (those which are given through senses), he was unable to show that categories make nature possible (whatever may present itself to sensibility).<sup>68</sup> In other words, demonstrating that categories are the rules of the unification of perceptions which are in fact subjective objects, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that since categories are the rules of unification of perceptions, they also make possible an independent realm of things and states of affairs; let alone it succeeds to show that they relate these perceptions to an objective order and make experience possible in this sense. Indeed as we have seen, the house in the

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<sup>65</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 47-9.

<sup>66</sup> T. D. Weldon, *Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, (Oxford: University Press, 1946), 160.

<sup>67</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 75.

<sup>68</sup> Allison, *Kant’s Idealism*, 167-8.

example provided by Kant was a mental entity, a sort of mental image, unity of which is effected by the subject.

Providing a fair account of the objections raised against the argumentation of the transcendental logic would require a whole chapter, and a voluminous one indeed. Kant's aims, strategies, different line of argumentations he provided in line with different strategies and Kant's success in accomplishing the task he set for himself attract numerous discussions. This is not only because this section and the transcendental idealism are taken as to be the two pillars of transcendental idealism, but also because, as I have discussed above, transcendental deduction suggests the daring ideas that not only the criteria of relation between mental states of a self lies within the self the self but also goes further to imply that the world of objects with which the states of the self are to be related is made possible by the very self. However, luckily enough, the relation of the transcendental deduction to my thesis stems not from its success, but rather, as stated above, from its importance for the discussion of the affinity between Kant and Hegel. And, as discussed in the very beginning of the chapter the continuity and the discontinuity between these two philosophers stems from the arguments Kant provided for the thesis that transcendental unity of apperception is the supreme principle of experience.

## **2.2 *Logic* as the Finalization of the Transcendental Turn**

As I have discussed above, according to Pippin's line of interpretation introduced by him takes Hegel as embracing the transcendental turn, which suggests that there is an a priori conceptual scheme conditioning human experience. However, Hegel is not a mere post-Kantian philosopher, and the separation of two philosophers consists in the fact that Hegel's completion of Kant's project is grounded in the denial of an absolute and

decisive distinction between concept and intuition. Moreover, the germs of this denial are already harbored in Kant's philosophy.

As demonstrated above, Kant has set two objectives for the transcendental deduction. Whereas the first one aims to relate categories with empirical intuitions, the latter goes further to show that categories make nature, as a rule-governed unity, possible. Here, it seems that Kant extends the aim of the deduction. This extension is expressed by Kant in the following passage:

For unless the categories discharged this function [knowing a priori whatever objects *may present themselves to our senses*] there could be no explaining why everything that can be presented to our senses must be subject to laws which have their origin a priori in the understanding alone. (B160).

The key to the extension here lies in the stress that categories are a priori conditions not only of "whatever may conform to our conditions of representability" but also of "whatever may present themselves to the senses."<sup>69</sup> Without this extension, the categories would be solely subjective conditions of representation of objects given to understanding regardless of the manner they are presented. But since Kant argues that categories are also necessary conditions of the unity of the pure forms of intuition and thus the synthesis of apprehension, he establishes a connection between categories and the manner objects given in intuition. A good formulation of this extension is this: "nothing can be an intuited object unless it also conforms to categorical conditions."<sup>70</sup> Thus, the doctrines of the transcendental synthesis of imagination and the synthesis of apprehension, and the resulting doctrine that the givenness (not solely the representation) of an object is subject to categorical conditions provoke the idea that if experience is to be possible then intuition itself must be subject to the categorical determination. Thus, it is this idea, that "what counts as given in experience is also

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<sup>69</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 28.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, 29.

determined by conceptual conditions, by the spontaneity of the subject” which provokes successors of Kant for the idea that there is an identity between concept and the intuited entity.<sup>71</sup> So, we now have all the elements, of both the continuity and discontinuity between Kant and Hegel, to give a picture of the post-Kantian Hegel. Accordingly, the formula of the passage from Kant to Hegel is, crudely, this: take the doctrines of pure concepts and apperception (so that necessity of these pure concepts for any possible experience can be demonstrated), accept that the question of the objective validity of these concepts is the most important question of philosophy, and finally deny the distinction between intuition and concept; so you would have Hegel.<sup>72</sup>

However, rejecting intuition-concept duality results in the fact that Kant’s project undergoes drastic changes in Hegel’s system. First of all, for Hegel the categories are not empty without intuitions nor the activity of knowing is merely a formal activity which relies on the content given from without. In critical philosophy, although pure categories have a transcendental content, they have to be schematized in order for them to be applied to intuitions. That may sound strange since the whole point of the transcendental deduction was to demonstrate this relation, i.e., how categories can be applied to intuitions. However, Kant argues that the role of the schematism is to provide the “sensible conditions under which alone pure concepts of the understanding can be employed” (B175). Thus, the logical necessity of the a priori application of categories to intuition is demonstrated in transcendental deduction. However, there are further sensible requirements for this application. That is to say, if categories are to be determinate and be related with experience they have to be grounded in intuition. For Hegel, on the other hand, Notion (*Begrif*) is a self-moving spontaneity. In other words, the content of a notion is not determined by the matter provided by the intuition but rather through the categorical relations within a conceptual framework. Notions are

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<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 9-10.

moving, since, as Hegel believes he has demonstrated clearly, the categorical determinations are not fixed so that they can be put in a table to be exhibited; on the contrary determination of a concept necessarily yields to other concepts which may be regarded as irrelevant or even contrary to the initial one.<sup>73</sup> This movement is spontaneous since these categorical determinations are not empirically grounded but rather in this act of determination thought gives its own rules to itself.<sup>74</sup> Thus, the term a priori acquires a new meaning in Hegel's system. Although post-Kantian Hegel believes, Pippin argues, in the existence of an a priori schema which makes experience possible, he denies that this conceptual schema is a complete, ahistorical, and lifeless one. According to Hegel, what is a priori is a vivid self-moving unity which becomes determinate through the process of self-determination and categorical relations among other notions, and thus has a history and life of its own. Finally, since the distinction between concept and intuition is abolished, there is no rift between concept and the intuited objects or no transcendental residue of thing in itself in Hegel. Briefly, again, Hegel, according to Pippin, holds that any thought of an object involves some conceptual obligations, and that although these cannot be determined by anything extra-conceptual, they nonetheless determine what extra-conceptual is.<sup>75</sup>

Seen through these preliminary key points, then, Hegel's project in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* becomes an account of a self-conscious subject who relates to objects of experience through notions which are self-moving unities. Hegel names this account, according to Pippin, Spirit.<sup>76</sup> Accordingly, Hegel's various intense claims in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* such as "everything turns on grasping and expressing the True

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<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 91.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* 179.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*

not only as Substance, but also as Subject,” or “substance is in truth subject”<sup>77</sup> must be read along with the claim that Hegel is in fact offering us a completion of Kant’s project. If the possibility both of experience and of objects of experience resides in the concepts produced by the spontaneity of thought, and if there is an overlapping between these concepts and the intuitions, then we can grasp why substance is in its truth subject. Then, the true question of *Phenomenology* becomes whether it succeeds in showing the objective validity of concepts, i.e., whether the subjective conditions of representation of an object are at the same time objective. Thus, the Absolute knowledge, in this interpretation, involves the true transcendental deduction of the objectivity of notions.<sup>78</sup> This deductive function of *Phenomenology of Spirit* is also stated in the *Science of Logic* where Hegel argues that:

The Notion of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of it. Absolute knowing is the *truth* of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of the *Phenomenology* showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of the *object* from the *certainty of itself* is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth. (*SL*, 49).

Now, if the goal of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is to show that the free self-determination of Spirit (i.e., self-conscious spontaneous subject) is a necessary condition of cognition of objects and intentional action, the project of *Logic*, according to Pippin, is to demonstrate the logical requirements of this self-determination and to exhibit that there are various thought determinations that are necessary for these logical requirements.<sup>79</sup> Furthermore, these thought determinations, since the distinction between concept and intuition is abolished, are not only necessary conditions of the self-determination of a self-conscious subject, but they also express what there is in truth.<sup>80</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, §17.

<sup>78</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 92.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*

Then, according to the interpretation I am presenting, *Logic* is the completion of the self-grounding and legitimization of reason and absolute subjectivity. Thus, in this context, arguing that actuality has a notional ground is to argue that what makes possible the objects of any cognition is a conceptual schema. Moreover, focus point of any investigation (*Science of Logic*) of this conceptual schema is the claim that cognition has a self-reflexive character.<sup>81</sup> Pippin makes use of various passages where Hegel gives a strong impression that his *Logic* is a completion of Kant's critical project. For example, Hegel states the first volume of his *Logic* corresponds to the transcendental deduction of Kant (*SL* 62). Moreover, he argues that the basic drive of reason is to cognize itself through its cognition of objects (*SL*, 826). Elsewhere he holds that truth of every subject matter lies in thought and notion (*SL*, 833). Indeed, these passages suggest that there is more than just an affinity between two philosophers.

However, citing passages from *Logic* where Hegel expresses his debt to Kant is not, of course, enough to demonstrate that *Logic* is a completion, though with various drastic changes, of Kant's project. To be sure, Pippin argues that the structure and claims of the *Logic* complies with the commentary he proposes, and that many problematic issues of the book which provoked rigorous objections can be better understood within this context.

As argued above, one of the most controversial, and possibly the most debated, aspect of the *Logic* is its beginning with pure being and the first notional movement from being to nothing. To remind once more, Hegel argues that beginning of philosophy cannot be made with something concrete, since something concrete contains a "relation *within itself*" and thus it implies a mediation and transition to something else (*SL*, 75). Therefore, the true beginning of philosophy must be simple immediacy, or immediacy as

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 176.

such, i.e., pure being (*SL*, 70). In other words, pure being is the beginning since it is “indeterminate immediacy” (*SL*, 82). In the *Encyclopedia Logic*, Hegel just restates the matter: “Pure being makes the beginning, because it is pure thought as well as the undetermined, simple immediate, [and because] the first beginning cannot be anything mediated and further determined” (*EL*, §86). And as if these are not enough a curious way to make the beginning, Hegel further argues that since pure being is an indeterminate immediacy it passes into nothing.

Pippin argues that beginning with simple indeterminate immediacy and the transition to nothing makes a great deal of sense within the context offered by the commentary he proposed. Since the task of the *Logic* is to explain the self-determination of thought through its “attempt to determine a priori what can be a possible thought of anything at all,”<sup>82</sup> Pippin holds that the question of beginning shall be reformulated as such: If certain categories are necessary for the possibility of apperceptive experience of objects, “can there be a completely indeterminate, all-inclusive such categorical determination functioning as such a condition (the Concept ‘being’),” or, “can there be mere thought of anything at all?”<sup>83</sup> This reformulated question of the beginning corresponds to Kant’s debated claim that pure categories of the understanding determines a priori what can count as an object of experience. However, the difference with Kant and Hegel lies in the fact that whereas for Kant the structure of thought is somewhat ready at hand, fixed and determined, for Hegel thought determines itself through its endeavor to determine a priori its objects. In other words, the thought’s pursuit of determining a priori its objects is at the same time its self-determination.

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<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, 184.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 182.

As we can see, this reformulation of the question of beginning changes the focus of the question from an ontological point of view to a transcendental one. The problem of the beginning, in this context, concerns self-knowledge of the categorical structure of the self. This, Pippin argues, is consistent with *Logic*'s main thesis, which is that "in attempting to render determinate any possible object of self-conscious thought, thought comes to understand the 'truth' that it is 'thinking itself,' thinking its own activity."<sup>84</sup> Thus, in this context, beginning with pure being is quite legitimate since it is a pure thought and the content of this concept is determined solely by the conceptual requirements of the thought of anything at all.<sup>85</sup> Again, with this pure beginning, Hegel, unlike Kant who has relied on a table of judgments we find before ourselves, gives an account of how thought spontaneously determines itself, i.e., its categories.

Now, if the rationale of beginning with pure being is determining what objects thought can *a priori* determine for itself, and thus to ask whether pure indeterminate immediacy can function as such an object, then the answer is no. In other words, "the mere thought of anything at all" is just a thought of nothing. This is so, because, Pippin argues, Hegel intends to show that to think anything without the categorical indicators through which that thing is to be determined by being brought under a concept, is to think nothing.<sup>86</sup> Now, the most crucial aspect of this commentary is that, what turns into nothing is not being itself, but rather the thought of being. So, this transition tells us that, the thought of nothing is merely the thought that the pure being is not a possible object of thought. Thus, this line of reading Hegel evades the thorny effort to make sense of the sentences such as nothing should be taken in its "indeterminate simplicity" (*SL* 83). This line of reading, that it is us who intuit nothing in the thought of pure being, and thus it is us who

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<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.* 182-3.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, 183.

moves into the thought or category of becoming, has also other supporters in the secondary literature over Hegel. For example, consider the following: “Accordingly, when we predicate Being as an adequate expression of existence, we find that in doing so we are also predicating Nothing as an adequate expression of existence. And thus we pass over to the second category.”<sup>87</sup>

The outcome of the first dialectical movement is the category of “Becoming.” A plausible objection to the commentary offered by Pippin would be that if the first dialectical transition from being into nothing shows that pure immediacy cannot be an object of thought, then why *Logic* does not conclude with the concept of determinate being, i.e., *Dasein*, rather than becoming? Pippin argues that, the emergence of the category of becoming should be understood within the context of “logical idealism” he is attributing to Hegel. Accordingly, since the question of *Logic*, in this context, is “how thought by itself can determine objects of thought,” and since the first transition exhibits the unsteadiness of pure being as an object of reference, thought is forced to capture this instability with the category of becoming. In other words, the category of becoming reflects thought’s effort to think being in its indeterminateness.<sup>88</sup> Thus, however, what is to be held in mind at this point is that, Hegel, with the category of becoming, is not delineating a Heraclitian ever-changing reality. His goal is to demonstrate, to repeat once more, what thought can take for itself as its object. And becoming, as the course of *Logic* proves, fails to function as such an object. The lesson to be learnt from the opening passages of the *Logic*, then, is that that the true legitimate object of thought can

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<sup>87</sup> J. E. M. McTaggard, *A Commentary on Hegel’s Logic*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), 15. Also cf. Taylor, *Hegel*, p. 232.

<sup>88</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 188-9.

be being only as a “determinate, qualitative being, specifiable by determinate properties.”<sup>89</sup>

Yet, when *Logic* proceeds to the section concerning determinate being, finite object, or *Dasein*, it offers passages which jeopardize the logical idealism attributed to Hegel. First, Hegel, in these passages, uses a material language suggesting that he is not only speaking about the manner thought takes the objects but the inner reality of the objects themselves. Second, he describes finite objects as harboring contradiction within themselves, and being in an infinite relation with all the other objects to be what they are. One of such passages reads:

When we say of things that they are finite, so we must be understood to mean not only that they have determinateness, not only that they have a quality as their reality and a self-subsistent determination, not merely that they are limited – have their existence determined beyond their limits – but that it is much more the case that this non-being makes up their nature, their being. Finite things are, but their self-relation consists in the fact that they are negatively related to themselves, that just in this relation to themselves, they propel themselves beyond themselves, beyond their very being. They are, but the truth of this being is their end. The finite not only changes, like something in general; but it perishes, and it is not merely possible that it perishes, so that it could be without perishing, but the being of finite things is such that they have the germ of perishing as their essence. The hour of their birth is the hour of their death. (*SL*, 129).

All this talk about non-being’s being an essential character of a thing, the necessarily perishing of finite beings, their being a negative relation to them-self, seem to suggest that Hegel is not talking about the necessary conditions of a self-reflexive subject’s a priori determining possible objects of experience, but rather he is talking essential characteristics of a finite thing that inheres to it in actuality. Furthermore, Hegel seems to assign these characteristics in such a way that he renders finite entities unreal, i.e., not only changing but necessarily perishing into nothing. Indeed, as to the non-being’s being a property Hegel previously argued that “the negation of its other is now the quality of the something, for it is as this sublating of its other that it is something” (*SL*, 125). Thus,

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<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, 189.

if not being another thing is what makes a thing this thing, Hegel seems to offer an account of finitude which explains determination in an infinite web of exclusion relations. Thus, we can see that the reality of finite things is rendered quite slippery and what is posed as the real is, in a sense, a single substance harboring the web of infinite relations. It is clear that, the material language used by Hegel and the metaphysical implications of this language (the “unreality” of finites”) poses a formidable challenge for the logical idealist account of Hegel presented so far. Pippin, however, suggests that even such passages should be considered within the context of logical idealism.

In order to grasp how these passages should be incorporated into the logical idealist view of Hegel, it is beneficial to remember the discussion of the sections of *Logic* which concerns finite being. According to Pippin, this section tells us that, if we are to think a thing as a ‘this thing’ rather than ‘that thing’, we must think it as having a determination. Having a determination, on the other hand, is having certain properties. However, if having certain properties is what determines a finite being as this being rather than that being, then having certain properties implies a negative, i.e., contrastive, relation. This, in turn, suggests that this negative relation to other things is an essential part of determination. In Hegel’s style, then, negativity is the in itself characteristics of being as it is determined as finite. The crucial point of Pippin’s commentary of these passages is that it is not the finite thing itself which contains negativity in its nature, rather it is us, the self-reflexive subjects who try to cognize being as it is determined as finite being, who must develop the thought of this negative relation as an in itself characteristic of a finite thing. And it is in this context that we must grasp a thing as “perishing.”<sup>90</sup> The rationale of this line of reading the *Logic* is the fact that Hegel, in the passages, still working on the concept of being prior to any cognitive and reflexive classification. Thus in this pre-cognitive stage we have no instruments to classify which of the properties are the primary ones and thus distinguishes the finite thing from others:

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<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 192.

But because we have no conceptual ability, as yet, to identify the central or essential, or theoretically relevant, or objective or primary properties, there is no basis for asserting what Hegel continually calls in subsequent sections ‘affirmative being.’ Since a thing is contrastable with others by any and all properties that will do the job, any reconception of properties alters *the thing’s determinate being*. When Hegel says that a thing is ‘negatively related to itself’ and thus must ‘cease to be,’ I take him to mean that there is no way conceptually to assign any permanent structure to any thing, and therefore the only consistent overall thought of being at this stage is the thought of the radically unstable, the impermanent, as incapable of maintaining itself as such, and so as always ‘passing away.’<sup>91</sup>

So, briefly, listing a number of qualities is not sufficient enough to determine a thing. Rather, we must be able to classify them so as to conclude that which one of these properties are essential for the thing such that having these properties renders impossible for the thing to be that thing rather than this thing. It is these essential properties which truly determine a finite being such that they also tell us that which other properties can the thing in question can have and which properties it cannot. To give an example, being red is a quality, yet not a deterministic one. It cannot tell us that a thing, since it is red, must also have further certain properties or cannot have certain others. Being, say, water, on the other hand, is a deterministic one in the sense that it tells us what other properties a thing can have and what others it cannot. A thing having a property of being water at the same time must have the property of being wet, yet it cannot have the property of being combustive or what else. Moreover, without this point of view provided by the introduction of essential properties, we fail to see how a finite thing interacts with other finite things through its properties. In other words, we cannot see how the properties do the contrastive work which is necessary to determine a finite thing. The contrastive relations established in the point of the being in its immediacy, i.e., prior to the reflexive understanding, get stuck in a mere indifferent infinity. In other words, in this stage, all thought can assert about its object is that it is different from whatever there else is. It is only with the reflective account of the determinations of essence or essential properties

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<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 192-3.

that this negation becomes a determinate negation, such that thought comes to grasp how the properties a thing has perform contrastive function.<sup>92</sup>

When seen in this context, it is not Hegel who proposes unreality of finite beings in favor of the reality of an infinity. On the contrary, Hegel demonstrates, by adopting the language of the opinion he is to refute, on the one hand, that finite beings cannot be grasped in their complete independence, and the monisms which reduce finitude to a mere modification of the infinite single substance. Thus, his point is to show that, a true account of finitude depends on the reflective account of essence and this, in turn, will lead to the doctrine that the reality of the finitude (objects of experience) lies in the infinitude (the free self-determination of thought).<sup>93</sup>

However, all this talk about essences, grounds, and appearances, in turn, will lead to the doctrine that this reflexive activity requires a conceptual scheme, which is itself a product of self-conscious thought. That is to say, although thought will come to realize that actuality consists of the comprehension of essence and appearance as condition and conditioned, it will further realize that the ground “is not some other event or thing,” but rather “the principle in virtue of which it can be thought as this such a thing.” However, the Notion will be revealed, in the course of *Logic*, as the “only true or ‘absolute’ ground.”<sup>94</sup> This is what Hegel means when he says that the reality of the finitude (objects of experience) lies in the infinitude (the free self-determination of thought); or, what is the same, actuality has a notional foundation. The notion, on the other hand, is not mere an a priori category of thought through which it takes up its objects. Rather it is thought’s spontaneous self-determination: “when it [the Notion] has developed into a

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<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, 197.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, 199.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 224.

concrete existence that is itself free, is none other than the I or pure self-consciousness” (SL, 583).

Thus, the logical idealist Hegel is not a pre-critical metaphysician who is advocating a sort of spirit monism. He is not telling us that what is actual, or real, is the self-externalization of an all-encompassing spiritual substance. Nor is the *Logic* a necessary deduction of the actual content of the history of universe or world. Furthermore, he is not mere a category analysts, providing us a detailed account of how the somehow basic categories of thought necessarily relates with each other; an account leaving the objective validity of these categories intact. He is rather a post-Kantian, whose aim is to radicalize and thus complete Kant’s project of transcendental idealism. As we have seen, Kant had demonstrated why the a priori categories are the necessary conditions of representation of objects. Yet he also implied that categories should also be the necessary conditions of objects of experience. Hegel, in his *Logic*, purports to demonstrate that how the spontaneous, i.e., free, self-determination of thought is also the necessary condition of the objects of experience. Thus, in this sense, Hegel agrees with Kant that classical metaphysics and ontology must yield to transcendental logic. However, their difference lies in the fact that Hegel rejects that a thorough distinction could be made between category and intuition; as also, as we have seen, implied by Kant himself. Thus, in Hegel’s account there is no transcendental residue of things in themselves, and categories cover whatever there actually is.

As to the numerous passages, where Hegel strongly insists that his logic is an ontology in the proper sense, that he is giving an account of the self-determination not only of thought but being itself, (i.e., rather than an account how reflexive, self-conscious thought takes up its object), that the contradictions involved in finitude are not merely the contradictions of thought trying to account finitude in a pre-reflexive stage, but

rather the material contradictions and etc., Pippin argues that Hegel trespasses the legitimate limits his own argumentation sets.<sup>95</sup> To give further examples for such passages, Hegel argues that “syllogistic form is a universal form of all things,” (EL, §24, Add. 2) or again he says that “concept constitutes a stage of nature as well as Spirit” (SL, 586). These passages do not fit to the reading which takes the passage from objective logic to subjective one as a realization of the fact that self-determination of subject is the necessary condition of cognition. Moreover, Hegel, pace Pippin, does not argue that beginning is left behind as a mere thought of nothing, or as not an object of a possible thought. He says, for example, “the beginning of philosophy is the foundation which is present and preserved throughout the entire subsequent development;” or that, “there is nothing, ..., which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation,” (SL, 71, 68). Hegel, according to Pippin, is guilty, in the mentioned passages and in the materiality of the language he employs, of conflating logical issues with the ontological ones. Thus, Pippin’s account of Hegel as a logical idealist is a more manageable one which is confined to strictly Kantian limits. Although *Logic*, as Pippin demonstrates, provides ample passages to interpret Hegel as such, it is also clear that this interpretation somehow robs Hegel of his originality. This, Hegel, as Houlgate observes, “is actually closer to Kant than to Hegel himself.”<sup>96</sup>

### 2.3 Hegel as a post-Kantian Spinozist

According to Houlgate, Hegel is a post-Kantian Spinozist in the sense that Hegel’s *Logic* gives us not only the categories of the thought but also the necessary logical structure of being. This means that if one is to understand what determinate being is in actuality, for example, all one needs to do is to look at the logical structure and implications of the

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<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 188.

<sup>96</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*, 142.

category of determinate being.<sup>97</sup> Now, this sounds certainly Spinoza. As is well known, with his famous doctrine of parallelism, Spinoza holds that the structure of extended being and thought, the two known attributes of the one substance, is exactly identical since they exhibit the nature of the one and the same substance. Thus, he continues, the structure and the order of nature would be the same when examined either within the attribute of thought or extension.<sup>98</sup> This finally means that, one can learn about the structure of extension, for example, by examining the structure of thought. Of course this idea needs further explanation due to one simple reason: objects do not logically determine ideas, and vice versa, ideas cannot physically interact with, say push or pull, objects. Thus, there definitely are different types of relations in the attributes of thought and extension. Indeed, Spinoza does not intend to argue for the favor of such a metaphysics which definitely conflicts with this dictum. What Spinoza holds is simply that the structure and the order of the logical relations of the attribute of thought are exactly same as the structure and the order of the physical relations of the attribute of extension.

To return Hegel, this is what, according to Houlgate, he proposes in his *Logic*. Thought by solely examining its own structure can also examine and determine the structure of being. To reformulate this idea, the core of the matter is that, being, for Hegel, exhibits a logical structure which can be known by thought; and that, thought does not need to struggle with the problem of transcendence (i.e., how thought will reach to over there which is different from over here) to grasp this structure, since all it needs to do is examining its own structure.<sup>99</sup> Thus, Hegel argues that:

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<sup>97</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 116-8.

<sup>98</sup> Spinoza, *The Ethics*, E2, p7.

<sup>99</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 117.

This science regarded the thought determinations as the fundamental determinations of things; and in virtue of this presupposition, that the cognition of things as they are in-themselves results from the thinking of what is, it stood at a higher level than the critical thinking. (*EL*, §28).<sup>100</sup>

As can be seen from the quoted passage, Hegel definitely does not consider his ontology as a pre-Kantian dogmatism. For him, the dogmatism of the pre-Kantian philosophy consists in the fact that it takes being and thought as ultimately separated realms and believe that thought, when thinking about being, is in fact trying to cognize something that is alien to it (*EL*, §30). Now, this sounds strange, since when taken in this sense, Plato and Spinoza should definitely not be included in the list of dogmatic philosophers, and Kant, or as a part of his philosophy, must find a place for itself in the list. Indeed, Hegel's relation with Kant becomes more interesting at this point.

According to Houlgate, Hegel's Spinozism is anticipated by Kant himself.<sup>101</sup> As discussed in the previous sections, for Kant the objective validity of *a priori* concepts enables us to determine *a priori* the structure of objects as they appear to us. To remind once more, thanks to the pure concepts of understanding I know in an *a priori* fashion that if an object is to be an object of my cognition it must endure in time, wear certain attributes, be in causal relations with other objects and so forth. Thus, Kant argues that transcendental logic takes the place of classical metaphysics:

The proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding. (B303).

Of course the idea of the identity of thought and being was indeed supported by several philosophers. But, it was Kant who showed that such a unity, at some level at least, is the necessary condition of cognition. Or rather, it is a logical necessity. And it is in this

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<sup>100</sup> Also, cf. *SL*, 45.

<sup>101</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 124.

exact sense that, according to Houlgate, Kantian transcendental turn is what anticipates Hegel's ontological logic.

Now, of course Kant did not propose an absolute identity of thought and being in a Spinozistic or Hegelian sense. His proposed identity is rather between the pure categories of thought and the objects as they appear to us. However, as discussed above, Kant not only argued that categories are the conditions of the subjective representations of objects as they are given to us. He further argued that they are also the conditions of the givenness of objects in the sense that categories also determine the a priori intuitions of sensations and the content given thereby. It is natural that, this idea encourages the renunciation of any firm distinction between understanding and sensation, and thus thought and being. And once this distinction is renounced what remains is the Hegel's post-Kantian Spinozistic ontology.

Another factor, which renders Hegel's ontology post-Kantian, according to Houlgate, is Hegel's embracing the critical aspect of Kant's philosophy.<sup>102</sup> However, Hegel, Houlgate argues, takes a further step and radicalizes Kant's demand for critical thinking. He argues that, as we have seen above, a thorough critical thinking cannot take anything presupposed, not even the pre-established forms of judgments or the rules of logic (identity of indiscernibles or law of non-contradiction, etc.). This, of course, reminds one immediately Descartes who proposed to leave behind all that one believes to be true, and hence methodological doubt. However, Hegel's methodological doubt differs from that of Descartes in the sense that Descartes already presupposed much in the famous dictum of his philosophy: "I think therefore I am." The idea that the thinking must be an activity of an "I," a subject who is an indivisible simple substance, i.e., soul, already trespasses the limits set by the methodological doubt. What must be a proper beginning

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<sup>102</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 29-32.

for such a methodology would be rather “thinking, therefore *is*.”<sup>103</sup> This beginning, then, gives us the rationale of beginning with pure being. If we are to presuppose nothing, then we are left with the indeterminate immediacy of “thought *is*.” In other words, the beginning is the sheer being of thought as such; or rather, “thought as sheer being.”<sup>104</sup>

The beginning is, then, “the sheer isness of things, here considered by itself in abstraction from all relation to things or anything else as sheer, indeterminate being.”<sup>105</sup> As we have seen, this pure being immediately collapsed into its opposite, i.e., pure nothing as such. Pure Nothing, on the other hand, since it is also a pure immediacy in the sense of lacking all determination, revealed itself as the same as Being; or rather it also vanished into Being. We observed that these categories revealed the fact that their truth consists in this vanishing, and thus they are a movement of vanishing; i.e. becoming. I have asked above how we passed into a talk about the thought of being, nothing, and becoming from a talk about being, of nothing, and of becoming themselves. Now it is easy to see how. Since for Hegel, the structure of the categories of thought is identical with the structure of the categories of being, an investigation on the structure of thought will also give us the structure of being.

Now, the logical movement between being and nothing which leads to becoming, or to formulate in more Hegelian spirit, the movement of vanishing of the first two categories into their opposites which reveals becoming as their truth, is also a further determination of our initial concepts, in the sense that it shows how these most basic categories are determined in the actuality:

In the Logic, being and nothing are initially pure and indeterminate, but they soon prove to be much more determinate and complex than mere being and nothing (or becoming). Being will mutate logically into reality, being-something, actuality, and

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<sup>103</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 32.

<sup>104</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 129.

<sup>105</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 264.

ultimately, space, whereas nothing, or the simple “not,” will mutate into negation, otherness, negativity, and ultimately, time. In each one, however, being and nothing as such will be preserved.<sup>106</sup>

Now I believe it should also be easy to see the answer of the other question posed above. The pure being as such and the indeterminate nothingness are not just two names for one and the same thing, i.e., the empty thought of pure indeterminate immediacy. The difference between pure being as such and nothing in its immediacy consists in the difference between “is” and “not.” However, to repeat once more, when taken in their pure immediacy, “is” and “not” reveals themselves as a vanishing into their other, or opposite. According to Houlgate, the difference between “is” and “not,” or being and nothing is not to be defined but rather intuited.<sup>107</sup> This is so because, as discussed above, the initial point of logic is “thought is,” or “the sheer being of thought.” This, in its turn, mean that thought is minimally the awareness or intuition of being, even if only its own being.<sup>108</sup> One crucial point in this explanation is that, this difference does not linger there by itself from the beginning. Rather, it is the vanishing of being into nothing which creates the difference at the first place.<sup>109</sup> In other words, the *Logic* has begun with being, a pure “isness” or “is”, yet at the moment the beginning is made being vanished into nothing, “is” revealed itself as “not.” Furthermore, we observed the same movement in the category of “not.” So it is this vanishing which produces the difference.

However, several important points are to be mentioned here. That the category of being vanishes into nothing does not mean that there is no being. There is being, but the truth of this pure being is in fact this vanishing; i.e., becoming. So, Hegel rather tells us that pure being as such, in its immediacy vanishes into nothing which, due to its immediacy, vanishes into being in its turn. Thus, both being and nothing has been further determined

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<sup>106</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 266-7.

<sup>107</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 270.

<sup>108</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 130.

<sup>109</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 289.

through their relation with each other and proved themselves to be a becoming. Later, the truth of the category of becoming will prove to be determinate being. Another point is that, as mentioned above, *Logic* concerns the logical structure of being as abstracted from space and time.<sup>110</sup> Thus, Hegel is not giving us an account of the actual history of universe. In other words, it is not that, first there was being, but it vanished into nothing; yet again it emerged since nothing also vanished into being. Like, as if there was first a Big Crunch and then a successive Big Bang. All he shows is what the category of being logically entails; i.e., becoming. So, ontologically speaking, we say that the truth of being is becoming. The movement of the categories is not a temporal one; rather it is a logical one.

Moreover, that the truth of being is becoming is not an insipid ontological claim which merely claims that Heraclitus was right and Parmenides wasn't. According to Hegel, as we have seen, both being and nothing is a movement of vanishing into its other. Thus, there are, so to say, two moments in the category of becoming:

Becoming is in this way a double determination. In one of them, nothing is immediate, that is, the determination starts from nothing which relates itself to being, or, in other words changes into it; being is immediate, that is, the determination starts from being which changes into nothing: the former is coming-to-be and the latter is ceasing-to-be. (*SL*, 106).

That, on the other hand, becoming has two moments, or that every coming to be logically entails a ceasing to be and vice versa has a very important ontological import: "there is no pure genesis that does not involve a process of corruption and no pure destruction that is not a process of generation."<sup>111</sup> To repeat once more, Hegel is not speaking about how we understand the category of being, or that showing us that since we cannot establish anything determinate in that category we move further to another one. Or, again, he is not providing us an actual history of universe telling us where the

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<sup>110</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 266.

<sup>111</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 286.

existence has come. Rather, he is providing us the logical structure of existence such that any process of coming to be and ceasing to be must be followed by its complementary process. We can indeed observe this logical inference in both the natural and human history. I believe it is such valuable insights which make it hard to ignore Hegelian philosophy once and for all.

Another important point is that, the categories that are examined in the course of *Logic* both tell us something about the actual world, yet at the same time each proves itself to be incomplete or imperfect. For example, the category of being tells us that there is indeed being; whatever else it may prove itself to be. Now this is so obvious that it may even sound dreary to say something like that. However, it must be reminded that this is just the very beginning of the book. In other words, we are speaking in the most abstract stage possible. And in this most possible abstract stage, the only possible thing to be said about being is that it is. However, the moment being determines itself as “is,” it has revealed itself to be a constantly vanishing into its other and hence becoming. So, there is being, but being in its purity has proved to be imperfect, i.e., it has revealed its truth as becoming; thus there is being but as becoming. Likewise, becoming, in the course of the *Logic*, will prove itself to be imperfect in its purity, and reveal its truth as determinate being:

The resultant equilibrium of coming-to-be and ceasing-to-be is in the first place becoming itself. But this equally settles into a stable unity. Being and nothing are in this unity only as vanishing moments; yet becoming as such is only through their distinguishedness. Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of vanishing itself. Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result.

This could also be expressed thus: becoming is the vanishing of being in nothing and of nothing in being and the vanishing of being and nothing generally; but at the same time it rests on the distinction between them. It is therefore inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself.

This result is the vanishedness of becoming, but it is not *nothing*; as such it would only be a relapse into one of the already sublated determinations, not the resultant of

nothing and being. It is the unity of being and nothing which has settled into a stable oneness. But this stable oneness is being, yet no longer as determination on its own but as determination of the whole.

Becoming, as this transition into the unity of being and nothing, a unity which is in the form of being or has the form of the one-sided immediate unity of these moments, is determinate being. (*SL*, 106).

As Houlgate observes, this is one of the most difficult dialectical movements in the book.<sup>112</sup> To make sense of this quoted passage, let me remind once more the previous dialectical movements. Being vanishes into Nothing at the moment it emerges since it has no determinations in it whatsoever. Yet, Nothing, in its pure immediacy revealed itself as same with Being in the sense of not having any further determinations. However, they are not absolutely same, not two words naming one and the same entity; yet they are different because, as we have seen, their difference is created by the vanishing of Being into Nothing. Since they are both same and different, they revealed themselves as a restless movement (vanishing) into their other; and thus as becoming which is the name of this restless movement.

However, it is in fact due to this difference that there is a movement between both concepts. In other words, what makes becoming possible is their difference: “becoming as such is only through their distinguishedness.” All these comes to mean that, being as such is not an immutable existence determination of which is solely existing, and nothing else. On the contrary, Being (and also Nothing) reveals itself as a unity of both itself and its other, i.e., Being and Nothing; and hence becoming. In other words, they are each vanishing movements or self-abolishing unities. Now the core of this argument is this: They are different, and this difference makes it possible of their vanishing, yet they are the same so what vanishes emerges again. And thus, their vanishing is the vanishing of their difference, or what is the same: “Their vanishing, therefore, is the vanishing of vanishing itself.” Becoming, on the other hand, is the name of their

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<sup>112</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 290.

vanishing into their other, so vanishing of the vanishing becomes sublation of becoming: “It is therefore inherently self-contradictory, because the determinations it unites within itself are opposed to each other; but such a union destroys itself.” Or, in other words, “Heraclitean becoming ... is the vanishing and ceasing of the very vanishing that it is.”<sup>113</sup> However, this destruction does not mean that becoming is not logically possible, nor that it cannot even occur since it is vanishing of itself. On the contrary, the self-cancelling unity that becoming is has a steady outcome: “Becoming is an unstable unrest which settles into a stable result.”

This point of the argumentation, that is, why the vanishing of vanishing has a positive outcome, I must admit, is the hardest one to digest, It is not that this idea is totally alien to human thought. We are already familiar with the expression of negation of negation, however this is merely a repetition of negation and as such is of little help here. What is argued here is not a mere repetition of negation on one object. It is rather that becoming is made possible by the difference of its moments, and that since becoming is at the same time the movement of the abolishing of this difference, it has a stable result. The rationale of this outcome lies in that in this process of becoming its moments lose their “purity:”

Each thus ceases to be purely itself and also ceases to be the sheer vanishing and reemergence of its purity and comes to the point at which its purity has been definitely lost in an intimate unity with the other. Being thus proves to be both being and nothing together as one, and so, too, does nothing.<sup>114</sup>

Becoming is an unstable unrest because in it being and nothing remained in their purity. In determinate being, on the other hand, which is the cessation of becoming or vanishing of difference, they do not relate to each other in their purity. Determinate being, thus, is the unity of impure being and impure nothing; that is to say, it is the unity of being and

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<sup>113</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 290.

<sup>114</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 291.

non-being. If we try to express the logical movement here, we may well argue that, determination is the losing of the purity, or what is the same, introduction of negativity. Let me resort to Hegel's analogy one more time:

Something can be distinguished only in determinate light or darkness (light is determined by darkness and so is darkened light, and darkness is determined by light, is illuminated darkness), and for this reason, that it is only darkened light and illuminated darkness which have within themselves the moment of difference and are, therefore, *determinate* being. (*SL*, 93).

Another way to express this new unity between nothing and being is as follows: In the previous logical stage, becoming, being and nothing are combined together in their pure immediacy. In this new stage, however, they are not just combined, but they include each other as a part of their own existence, and thus they both lost their purity in the sense of being determined with their opposite. In this sense, being becomes determinate being which should be conceived as "being-that-is-not-being' or ... *being nonbeing*."<sup>115</sup>

Briefly, determinate being is the stable unity of being and nonbeing. This may sound curious enough, but its ontological connotations are even more curious. This means that, for Hegel, existence carries its own negation in itself. In other words, a determinate being (which will reveal itself to be a finite being) is nonbeing in two sense.<sup>116</sup> First it harbors "not" in itself so that it must cease to be. "Finite thing," in Hegel's worlds, "have the germ of decease as their being-within itself: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death" (*SL*, 129). Second, it carries negativity in itself such that the logical requirement of being something is not being something else. In other words, determinacy is introduced to being through the "not," the negativity. This is also one of

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<sup>115</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 299.

<sup>116</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 299.

the common themes between Hegel and Spinoza who argues that “finite existence involves a partial negation.”<sup>117</sup>

Furthermore, the determinate being will prove itself to be Quality. The rationale of this passage is as follows: As we have seen, Determinate Being has two moments, namely, being and non-being. In other words, it is both *Being* that is determinate, and Determinacy that is: “So far as determinate being is in the form of being, so far is it non-being, so far is it determinate” (*SL*, 111). In the former, the emphasis is on the being i.e., on the positive moment. In the latter, it is on the negative one, namely, on non-being. However, as we can see, both moments are both different, they are positive and negative moments, yet they harbor its other within itself: Determinate being is both Being that is determinate, and determinacy that is. The name Hegel gives to unity of being and non-being (“determinacy-that-is”) which is also determinate being is Quality.<sup>118</sup> This, in its turn, will prove to mean that, a determinate being will reveal itself as both positive and negative. In other words, it will expose itself as both a positive quality (i.e., Reality,) and a negative quality (i.e., Negation) (*SL*, 111 ff.). This logical exposition, however, has further ontological implications. As Houlgate aptly observes, first, negation is not only an operation of mind that it performs on concepts or thoughts. Thus, in other words, it is not self-consciousness thought which comes to grasp the idea that if it is to cognize an entity, it has to determine its qualities so as to determine it. Rather, it is the logical implication of determinacy that a determinate thing must have qualities. Second, determinate being is quality, thus as such it is not a substance which harbors its qualities externally in the sense that it remains untouched by any change of its qualities. If a thing’s quality changes, the thing also changes. And finally, there is no divinely *ens realissimum* which is purely positive and which expels all that is negative from itself.

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<sup>117</sup> Spinoza, *The Ethics*, E1, p8, n1.

<sup>118</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*, 304.

Being, logically, is being determinate, and this in its turn, is harboring negativity as its moment.<sup>119</sup>

Now, the emergence of the category of determinate being reveals some of the most crucial aspects of the spirit of Hegel's *Logic*. First, as we have seen, the category of Being is not left behind as an impossible idea as the book advances to newer categories. Rather, new categories yet to emerge are all further determinations of the initial categories of the *Logic*. As we have seen, Being and Nothing are not cast aside, but rather are inherited as the moments of the new emerging category of Determinate Being. Thus, the category of determinate being is the further logical determination of Being and Nothing in the sense that it preserves being and nothing in itself as its own moments. All the further categories, then, which will emerge from the immanent dialectical movement of the category of Determinate Being, will also preserve the initial categories: "on this ground [unity of non-being and being] all further determinations are developed" (*SL*, 111).

Moreover, the logical movement of determination also exhibits the non-dogmatic nature of Hegelian ontology. Being, due to its logical implication, reveals itself as a unity with itself and its opposite. It emerges as a pure immediacy, however, it could not remain in its pureness and vanished into its opposite. Since its opposite is also another pureness, it has undergone the same dialectical movement. Finally, since this dialectical movement is self-abolishing, they settle down into a stable unity. However, to remind once more, in this unity both Being and Nothing lost their pureness and are now only as moments of a higher unity. This new emerging unity, is the speculative unity of both; or, in other words, the *Aufhebung* (sublation) of the initial concepts. When a concept or thing is sublated, then, it does not lose its independence and rendered a mere moment of its

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<sup>119</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 306-11.

opposite. Rather, both the concept and its opposite lose their purity and come together in a speculative identity (*SL*, 107). Yet, in this new unity, they are both independent and related. They are independent since the difference between them remains; i.e., it is due to their difference that they become distinct moments. They are related, since both of them harbor its opposite as a moment of itself. However, as also we have seen, this movement of coming together into a unity with its opposite is not enforced to the concept from without; rather this emerging unity is the outcome of the very immanent logical necessity of the concept. Thus, then, the *Logic* tells us that there must be Being, but being also must be determinate. However, it must be so due to the inner necessity of the category of Being. In other words, the necessity which determines Being as Determinate Being is Being's own immanent necessity. That is to say, it is not us, who reflect on the categories of pure thought performs the movement among categories. Rather it is the "content" itself who "spontaneously develops itself" (*SL*, 27) through its very own immanent necessity. So, as Houlgate observes, the process of *Aufhebung* is a process without any *telos*.<sup>120</sup> The revealing of Being as determinate being, as life, as Idea, as Absolute Spirit, is not a work of a ghostly *Geist*, in the work of which we can observe its "ground plan."

Finally, the course of *Logic* will prove that the reality of finite beings lies in the infinity which surrounds them. I will discuss what this means in the final chapter. However, now, it shall suffice to note that, in Houlgate's reading for Hegel there is indeed infinity and it cannot be reduced to the infinity of self-conscious thought in the sense of self-determination (though these two infinities will prove to be related). For Hegel, as we will see, there are different infinities, or rather, infinity reveals itself in different forms in both its concept and actuality. Thus, the abolishing of the doctrine of thing-in-itself does not merely result in arguing that there is no transcendental rift between our grasping of objects and their in-itselfness. It also means that we can grasp the innermost truth of

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<sup>120</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 302.

finitude since this truth lies in its relation with infinity, and since thought can grasp infinity itself.

## **2.4 Choosing Among Hegels**

Thus far I have argued that there are mainly two approaches which do not dismiss Hegel's *Logic* as a complete failure and which try to make some sense of it, and I have discussed two figures as representatives of these approaches. As we have seen both approaches take Hegel as a philosopher who is greatly indebted to Kant. For Pippin, Hegel's *Logic* is a radicalization of Kant's transcendental project. According to Houlgate, on the other hand, *Logic* is a post-Kantian Spinozism which is motivated by Kant's transcendental deduction. In this sense, both commentators refuse the idea that Hegel's *Logic* falls into a pre-Kantian dogmatism. Moreover, both also agree on the fact that the categories of the *Logic* definitely have something to do with the actuality we live in. The difference between these two approaches stems from the fact that whereas for Pippin this relation consists in the objective validity of the categories in a more Kantian sense, for Houlgate this relation is much more stronger. Thus, it is the nature of the relation of the categories of the *Logic* and the actuality which marks the decisive distinction between the two approaches. Whereas Pippin's Hegel is a much more Kantian who limits cognition with the knowledge of determinate, i.e., finite, objects, Houlgate's Hegel is a Spinozist who talks about Being as such or Nothing in its indeterminateness in the material sense. Therefore, as we have seen, whereas for Pippin the thought of infinity and contradiction pertains solely to the nature of thought, for Houlgate these categories reflect the structure not only of thought but also of being.

Thus, according to Pippin, *Logic* is the exhibition of the self-determination of thought through its effort to determine a priori the objects of cognition. This is a double

movement in the sense that in the endeavor to determine its objects *a priori*, thought in fact determines itself. Pippin, as we have seen, further argues that all the movements that are set forth in the book can be read in this context. Accordingly, for example, whereas the category of Being refers to the question of whether “can there be mere thought of anything at all?” the first passage to nothing refers to the fact that the answer is “no.” The category of Becoming, then, is another futile effort of thought to determine its object in this indeterminateness. Thus, finally, thought has come to realize that, the only objects that it can determine a priori for cognition are the determinate ones which can be specifiable by determinate properties they have come to possess.

To remind once more, for Pippin this movement is the self-determining movement of thought. The self-determining activity of thought has moved from the thought of pure being to the thought of nothing, to becoming, and finally to determinate being. It is with the category of Determinate Being that thought has realized that legitimate object of cognition can be only a qualitative one, which can be further specifiable by its qualities. So, in this approach, it is us, or thought itself, which moves from one category to another such that this movement also reveals the grounding of self-determination of thought. This line of reading, that it is *us* who performs the dialectical movements among categories, as we have seen above, has also other supporters. To give one more example, Schelling for example, argues that this movement from becoming to determinate being is in fact our movement so as to find something more concrete.<sup>121</sup> The initial categories, on the other hand, that of Being, Nothing, and Becoming, are left behind as unadaptable, indeterminate categories.

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<sup>121</sup> F. W. J. von Schelling, *On the History of Modern Philosophy*, trans. A. Bowie, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 138. Also cf. Micheal Rosen who argues that negation is principally an operation of thought on its objects. Michael Rosen, *Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 32.

Houlgate, on the other hand, argues that the emergence of determinate being reveals the fact that being must be determinate.<sup>122</sup> However, as we have seen, this movement is the outcome of the inner necessity of the category of being. In other words, it is not *us* who moves to category of nothing from the category of being because we fail to fix anything determinate in the latter. Rather it is the Being which vanishes into its opposite. Furthermore, this vanishing by no means leads to a complete abolishing of being. Rather, both being and nothing are sublated into a stable unity which is the determinate being. This dialectical movement is a further determination of the initial categories, and the movement into the category of determinate being is both a necessary logical outcome of the category of being and its further determination. In other words, the truth of becoming is determinate being in the sense that being exists as determinate being, or, what is the same, determinate being is being. Thus, the initial categories are not left behind as the futile efforts to understand the structure of being and thought. They, in a sense, subsist in whatever is to emerge in the course of the *Logic*. Moreover, as we have seen, being enjoys determinacy by the introduction of negation. Thus, for Houlgate, unlike as it is for Pippin, negation is not an operation of thought on its objects. Things themselves must also harbor negation in order to be something determinate in the first place.

I believe that Houlgate's approach holds Hegel to his word in a stronger sense. Although Pippin's reading is a very original and, indeed, influential one, it seems to leave Hegel's most original claims behind; i.e., it nullifies the ontological aspect of the book. I believe that the text itself, as we have seen, supports Houlgate's reading. Indeed not only the *Logic* itself, but also other texts where Hegel discusses Kant's philosophy suggest that Hegel takes his *Logic* as an ontology which is at the same time follows the route opened by Kant himself. I will discuss Hegel's relation with Kant in the next chapter, and through this discussion I intend to show that Hegel by no means dismisses the purports

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<sup>122</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 297.

of Kantian transcendental turn, nor does he carry on classical dogmatism as if Kant has never existed, and that he considers his philosophy as indeed a post-Kantian ontology.

## CHAPTER 3

### HEGEL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT: AN OVERVIEW

It is always an inspiring event to witness the confrontation of two philosophers. It is not just that seeing how a great mind grasps another in a very peculiar and unusual way offers us new ways of considering both philosophers. But it is also interesting in the sense that when a philosopher renders another his subject matter, he usually projects his own philosophical ideas to his colleague. In other words, what major philosophers tend to read in other philosophers is in general their very own thoughts and since the core of the act of criticizing actually consists in, especially in the case of Hegel, projecting their own idea of philosophy to the subject-matter of criticism, what we experience in these so called criticisms is often a different version of the thoughts of the philosopher who is performing criticism expressed in the language of the philosopher criticized. And even a brief glance at Hegel's criticisms of Kant suggest that the narrative seems to be as just described. Indeed, it has become a commonplace in the secondary literature over Hegel's critique of Kant that Hegel's criticisms are external, such that he does not deal with the argumentation that forces Kant to accept the conclusions that he accepted, or that he failed to render Kant's argumentations their due, or that he judges Kant according to his own philosophical convictions.<sup>123</sup>

On the other hand, this "different version" would sometimes prove to be more helpful than one could expect, because in these criticisms philosophers incline to be more

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<sup>123</sup> See Paul Guyer, "Thought and being: Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy" in *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 171; John E. Smith, "Hegel's Critique of Kant," *The Review of Metaphysics* 26 (1973): 438; Karl Ameriks, "Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46 (1985): 3; also cf *Hegel's Critique of Kant*, ed. Stephen Priest, (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1992). Robert Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 11.

generous about sharing a more holistic picture of their own philosophies without bothering the reader with usual intricate speculations. This holistic view, on the other hand, would help reader in finding their ways in dispiriting speculative labyrinths. For example, when Hegel charges Kant for not grasping the fact that it is the unity of thought and being which constitutes the concept of God (*EL*, §51), we can have a glimpse of the affinity between the conceptions of God of Spinoza and that of Hegel in just one sentence. Thus, regarding Hegel's criticisms of Kant will help us to understand Hegel's own idea of a "proper" critical philosophy and to my mind this alone suffices to prove the importance of regarding these criticisms.

However, the benefits of regarding Hegel's critique of Kant is not limited with providing us yet another formulation of Hegelian philosophy expressed in a more Kantian, and hopefully more understandable, language. Whether or not Hegel failed to appreciate the binding force of the conclusions of transcendental idealism and thus whether or not Hegel does in fact represent a fall back to dogmatic metaphysics, is closely related with his criticism of Kant. I will argue that Hegel is aware of, and does indeed appreciate, at least most of the crucial arguments lying behind the doctrine of transcendental idealism. He does not ignore them; he just simply refuses the manner Kant makes use of them. In other words, he refuses the conclusions Kant derived from his argumentation and argues that Kant, in a sense, refuses to embrace the true logical implications of his own enquiry.

Finally, I hope to show that, Hegel's criticisms of Kant indeed reveals the fact that Hegel considers his philosophy as a genuine ontology which is directed at the a priori knowledge of the principles of being. This ontological stance, as we have seen, stems from and advocates the acceptance of the absolute unity of thought and being. To connect to the discussion of the last chapter, then, I hope to show that Hegel's criticism

of Kant would help to show us that it is Houlgate's approach which holds Hegel to his word.

My main argument in this chapter will be that the main core of Hegel's criticism of Kant is that transcendental philosophy confines reason to knowledge of finite entities, though their ontological status being a question still, and it convicts reason's demands to reach to the knowledge of the absolute, the infinite. Transcendental philosophy, in Hegel's eyes, does so, i.e., that its main endeavor is to limit the reason, first because it relies on, even tacitly, the Cartesian dualism of thought and being, and second it dismisses contradiction as something that needs to be discarded since contradiction is the formal indicator of falsity (in this case falsity of the assumptions which lead reason to take the infinite as its legitimate object). Since thought, in transcendental philosophy, is radically different from being, it has to rely on sensation, the only medium between thought and being, in order to have knowledge of any sort. However, this reliance proves that whenever thought tries to go over the limitations of sensation necessarily falls into contradiction. And since it necessarily falls into contradiction, it must accept the conclusion that it must confine its knowledge claims within the limits of sensation. Hence, any legitimate knowledge claim must be directed to and limited with finite entities.

This theme, on the other hand, shapes all other criticisms which may be labeled technical. In other words, when Hegel raises his objections, for example, to Kant's methodology, his point is that this method is crippled from the beginning because it harbors and relies on the infamous distinction between thought and being which must be the very subject of the philosophical enquiry in the first place; and as such, this method only serves to prove how thought must be kept apart from the true nature of being. Or, to give another example, when Hegel argues that synthetic *a priori* propositions indicates,

even within the boundaries drawn by Kant, to the unity of thought and being, his point is that the aim of the philosophical enquiry is to overcome the mentioned discrepancy between thought and being. Thus, when I consider several different topics of Hegel's criticism of transcendental philosophy, I will delineate these criticisms in line with my thesis that the relation between thought and being forms the main battle line between Kant and Hegel.

Hegel's views on Kant are scattered among many texts such as *Faith and Knowledge*, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, 1825-6 *Lectures*,<sup>124</sup> 1827 *Lectures*,<sup>125</sup> *Science of Logic*, and *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Since the former four studies provide a somehow more systematical account on Kant's philosophy (unlike *Phenomenology*, for example, where Hegel makes only passing remarks or gives ambiguous references), in this chapter I shall focus on these mentioned four studies. However, rather than recapitulating each study, I will follow main themes; because these themes reoccur in these studies repeatedly (for example the supposed stubbornness of Kant in demanding to learn swimming without getting wet) and it would be a waste of space to reiterate them for each of the mentioned studies. On the other hand, I must mention, even as a brief note, that *FK* forms an exception within these studies. It is not that it does not have a hint of continuity with other works, on the contrary it does; but it incorporates a quite different account of and approach to Kantian philosophy.

For Hegel of *FK*, Kant's philosophy is on the edge of arguing the unity of thought and being. Both the doctrines of Transcendental Imagination and the synthetic a priori

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<sup>124</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (The Lectures of 1825-1826), ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart (California: University of California Press, 1990). Hereafter LHP 1825-6.

<sup>125</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (The Lectures of 1827), vol. III, trans. E. S. Haldane and Franches H. Simpson (New York: The Humanities Press, 1974). Hereafter LHP 1827.

judgment, so the argument reads, harbors premises for that unity. As to the latter, Hegel says the following:

How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible? This problem expresses nothing else but the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical in the *a priori* way. That is to say, these heterogeneous elements, the subject which is the particular and in the form of being, and the predicate which is universal and in the form of thought, are at the same time absolutely identical. (FK, 69).

Of course, as expected, such a bold assertion immediately draws attention. For example, Guyer observes that, this passage is classic in the sense that it shows how Hegel reads “his own very different philosophical assumptions into Kant’s system from the start,”<sup>126</sup> and claims that the unity at stake take place in thought, and is a unity of thought determinations alone. Particular entities, on the other hand, carried into judgments through a complex relation between forms of intuition and general concepts, and thus being is not directly present in judgment; rather it is represented there.<sup>127</sup> Indeed, Kant defines judgment as follows:

Since no representation, save when it is an intuition, is in immediate relation to an object, no concept is ever related to an object immediately, but to some other representation of it, be that other representation an intuition, or itself a concept. Judgment is therefore the mediate knowledge of an object, that is, the representation of a representation of it. (A68).

Again, in FK Hegel, concerning imagination, says:

We must not take the faculty of imagination as the middle term that gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world. The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary and original. (FK, 73).

Now, first, these views have not endured long in Hegel’s thought. In *LHP* Hegel himself, for example, concerning synthetic a priori judgments, argued that “judgment signifies the combination of *thought determinations* as subject and predicate,” (emphasis added) (LHP-1827, 430) which shows frankly that he is well aware of the fact that what is united in such judgments are determinations of thought.

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<sup>126</sup> See Paul Guyer, “Thought and being: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy,” 179.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 181.

Moreover, what is really important with such claims is that it shows that for Hegel, and for German Idealism in general, knowledge implies a unity, both unity of thought and being and of various faculties of thought; in Kantian terms, the condition of the possibility of knowledge is such a unity. Indeed, Hegel later argues that transcendental imagination is the “most attractive” part of Kantian philosophy, since it shows that “knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both moments [pure concepts and pure sensuous perceptions]” (*LHP*-1827, 441).

As we can see, in the pages of *FK*, we witness a philosopher who is much more sympathetic to Kant, at least in theoretical matters, and whose main endeavor is not to overcome Kantian philosophy but just to show that transcendental idealism is itself on the way to argue the unity of thought and being. All Hegel has to do is to take the final step. However, that this final step will require a whole new philosophical system will be apparent in his later philosophical development.

Finally, we may sum up common themes in Hegel’s different accounts of Kant under two major headings:<sup>128</sup> a) Hegel’s skeptical approach to the project of critical philosophy as an epistemological project in general; b) Hegel’s critique of the doctrine of “think in itself” and the relevant charges raised against critical philosophy such as its formalism, subjectivism, and etc. Before proceeding further, I shall remark that Hegel’s criticisms by no means enjoy general acceptance. Thus I will consider some of the objections to Hegel’s account of Kant under relevant headings.

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<sup>128</sup> I owe this classification to John E. Smith. Smith, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 440.

### 3.1 Hegel's Methodological Criticisms

There has been a strong tendency, primarily in Anglo-American thought, to consider Hegel as a charlatan whose primary feature is but his torturing language.<sup>129</sup> However, anti-Hegelianism is not limited to a naive hatred to his extremely compelling language, a hatred which, as a student of Hegel I must admit, is in some sense understandable. Even those, who do not think that Hegel should be completely dismissed, and thus who are a bit sympathetic to some of the elements embraced in the Hegelian philosophy, such as inter-subjectivity and the theory of recognition, regards Hegel as a philosopher who fails to understand the greatness of Kant's philosophy and thus who recklessly labors in pre-critical substance metaphysics. According to some critics, for example, rejecting some key aspects of critical philosophy would represent, "in Kant's eyes," a return to "*status quo ante*".<sup>130</sup> Moreover such accusations belong not only to contemporary literature but originate even in Hegel's own time.<sup>131</sup>

Now it is true that Hegel does indeed try to revive the idea of the pre-Kantian metaphysics, that thought can grasp the true nature of being; but he is by no means a dogmatic philosopher disregarding critical philosophy. As Pippin indicates, "just attributing moderate philosophical intelligence to Hegel should at least make one hesitate before construing him as post-Kantian philosopher with a precritical

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<sup>129</sup> Beiser, Frederick. "Introduction: Hegel and the problem of metaphysics," in *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, ed. Frederick C. Beiser, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 1-2.

<sup>130</sup> Guyer, "Thought and being: Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy", 194.

<sup>131</sup> See Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche, and the Criticism of Metaphysics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 24-37.

metaphysics.”<sup>132</sup> Indeed, for Hegel critical philosophy represents a very important and revolutionary stage in the history of philosophy and thus in many passages he praises critical philosophy as a “very important step,” (EL, § 41 Ad. 1) or as a “great and important step,”<sup>133</sup> and he regards it as a great “step towards the true Notion of reason,” though a negative one (SL, 46). Thus, he agrees with Kant that the previous metaphysics are uncritical, and a reflection upon thought itself is an indispensable endeavor if the philosophy is to acquire a more systematic and scientific form. As to empiricism, for example, he argues: “And all the while it [empiricism] is unaware that that it contains metaphysics—in wielding which, it makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncritical.”<sup>134</sup>

On the other hand, although Hegel appreciates the basic motivation of critical philosophy, i.e., that the powers and faculties of reason must be subjected to a critical evaluation, he firmly rejects the method Kant employed. Hegel’s methodological objection mainly consists of the contention that Kant’s method abstracts thought from its true activity and thus fails to grasp its true nature. The main difference between a Kantian and a Hegelian critique is that, unlike Kantian critique, where the main question is “how metaphysics is possible,” a Hegelian critique consists in investigating what thought does when it engages in metaphysical thinking.<sup>135</sup> Thus, it will turn out that, a true critique must eventually consider the question “what thought does.”

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<sup>132</sup> Robert Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 7. Also cf Pippin, “The Unboundedness of the Conceptual On Finite and Absolute Idealism.” Presented in 2006 Conference: The History of the Transcendental Turn. Edited by Robert Pippin. Cited in Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 7.

<sup>133</sup> Hegel, *LHP* 1825-6, 218. Also cf. *LHP* 1827, 429.

<sup>134</sup> William Wallace trans. *Hegel’s Logic Being Part One of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 62, §38.

<sup>135</sup> Longuenesse, *Hegel’s Critique of Metaphysics*, 5 ff.

According to Hegel, the critique of the faculty of cognition is itself cognition and as such it must be held in a cognitive manner. Or in other words, it cannot presuppose any “forms of reflection and laws of thinking” (*SL*, 43) since its primary task is to clarify what is thinking at all. Thus, Hegel repeatedly argues that Kant’s method embraces an absurdity such that it tries to know before actual knowing can take place.<sup>136</sup> His famous analogy which asserts that Kant demands to know how to swim before even stepping in water intends this methodological complexity inherent in Kant.<sup>137</sup> However, in a proper critical approach, for Hegel, the forms of thinking must be:

Considered in and for themselves; they are the object and the activity of the object itself; they investigate themselves, and they must determine their own limits and point out their own defects. This is the same activity of thinking that will soon to be taken into particular consideration under the name “dialectic”; and we can only remark here in a preliminary way, that it is not brought to bear on the thought-determinations from outside; on the contrary, it must be considered as dwelling in them. (*EL* § 41 Ad. 1).

Hegel’s other charges, which assert that Kant derived faculties of cognition and concepts of thought historically and empirically,<sup>138</sup> or that Kant considers knowledge as a tool which is external to its subject-matter,<sup>139</sup> are all related with this methodological complexity. The main idea of the analogy of tool is that, whereas in testing an ordinary tool we do not have to use that tool, in the case of cognition we have no other way than to cognize (i.e., use the tool) when testing it.<sup>140</sup> Thus, given Kant’s Cartesian conviction that thought and being are fundamentally separate from one another, thought is external to being as a tool is external to its application. Forms of thinking, in Kantian tectonic, must wait content given through sensation and work on them. Thought can give itself no content, or if it gives nevertheless, it is doomed to dwell in contradictions. However, a

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<sup>136</sup> Hegel, *EL* § 41 Ad. 1, 82; cf *LHP* 1827, 428.

<sup>137</sup> Hegel, *LHP* 1827, 428.

<sup>138</sup> Hegel, *LHP* 1825-6, 222; *LHP* 1827, 132; *SL*, 47; also cf. *FK*, 89.

<sup>139</sup> Hegel, *LHP* 1825-6, 218; cf *Phenomenology*, §73, 46.

<sup>140</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 17.

critical philosophy, Hegel would say us, which is based on unsubstantiated convictions is not a true critical philosophy at all. And Hegel argues, basing on his philosophical conclusions, that a true critical project, which lets thinking to show its nature in its own activity, would show us that thinking “is not brought to bear on the thought determinations from outside;” it dwells in them. In a nutshell, the core of Hegel’s methodological objection is this: a critique of thought which abstracts thinking from its activity is doomed to fail in meeting up with its very own demands.

However, it must be immediately voiced that, contrary to what Hegel thinks, Kant is not that dry. Expressed less metaphorically, Kant does not demand the knowledge of the criteria of knowledge without the presence of the act of knowledge; or in other words, he does not seem to absolutely abstract thought from its very own act. According to Ameriks, for example, Hegel’s objection would be justified if Kant has demanded general principles which would justify particular knowledge claims without assuming that we have some warranted starting points; and in that case Kant would be a “methodist”. Yet, on the contrary, Kant, as a “particularist”, is arguing that “there are some warranted statements” and that “it is through reflecting on these given particular cases that we then develop a formulation of what the general criterion is.”<sup>141</sup>

Now although according to Ameriks these “warranted statements” are general and vague statements such as “there is something happening at ‘t’”<sup>142</sup> I believe that the case is different. For Kant there exist universal and necessary truths, i.e., synthetic *a priori* propositions which are obviously the products of the activity of thought. Thus, he discusses the possibility of synthetic *a priori* knowledge with respect to the structure

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<sup>141</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 16. Cf. Guyer, “Thought and being: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy”, 185.

<sup>142</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 16.

(and thus activity) of thought; either in the case of “The Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space”, for example, where he discusses the possibility of the synthetic *a priori* propositions of Geometry through the a priority of the intuition of space, or in the case of the “Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding” where he discusses the objective reality of the categories through the *a priori* and synthetic knowledge of the numerical identity of “I”.<sup>143</sup>

Second, Kant’s distinction among the faculties of thought or the limitations he brought to diverse faculties, are not simply arbitrary. As Guyer observes, these distinctions and limitations mainly depend on the confusions previous metaphysics suffer.<sup>144</sup> Many commentators do in fact stress this point, that antinomies play a paramount role in the critical project.<sup>145</sup> Indeed in a letter dated to September 21, 1798, and written to Christian Garve,<sup>146</sup> Kant himself admits the fact that the antinomies are the main motivation of his critical project:

It was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but rather the antinomy of pure reason – “The world has a beginning, it has no beginning and so on, right up to the 4<sup>th</sup> [sic]: There is freedom in man vs. there is no freedom, only the necessity of nature.” – that is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself.

Elsewhere I will argue, along with many commentators, that antinomies play a vital role in the critical project not only because they are the main motivation of the project, but

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<sup>143</sup> Guyer, “Thought and being: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy”, 185; also footnote 12, 207-8.

<sup>144</sup> Guyer, “Thought and being: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy”.

<sup>145</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 17; Guyer, “Thought and being: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy”; Justus Hartnack, “Categories and Things in Themselves,” in *Hegel’s Critique of Kant*, 78.

<sup>146</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Correspondence*, trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 552.

also because they supply only seemingly convincing argumentation for transcendental idealism. However, for the present chapter it is sufficient to say that Kant's project, so far, does not seem to be abstracting thought from its activity. He clearly takes the activity of thought (either thought as producing synthetic a priori propositions, or thought falling into unavoidable contradictions) into account; or rather he bases his account on this activity.

However, on the other hand, that Kant presupposes synthetic *a priori* propositions or antinomies as the basis of his philosophy does not free him from Hegel's objections. First, Hegel himself is not ignorant of the fact that critical project is based upon antinomies, and consequently that it depends on cognition:

However, this turn [transcendental idealistic turn] taken by cognition, which appears as a loss and a retrograde step, is based on something more profound on which rests the elevation of reason into the loftier spirit of modern philosophy. The basis of the universally held conception is, namely, to be sought in the insight into the necessary conflict of the determinations of the understanding with themselves. (*SL*, 46).

Second, Hegel's objections, in fact, touch on a much more profound point. And given the main thrust of Hegel's objection which will be delineated below, one can still argue that Kant does indeed fail to express thought in its true activity and thus does not venture into the depths of the ocean. Hegel's argumentation here has two facets which are related with each other. First deals with the manner Kant has deduced categories of understanding, and the second with the meaning Kant attached to antinomies.

For Kant thought, and thus judgment, is a unity and the act of thinking is bringing different representations under a unity (A69). In other words, knowledge of a manifold requires that manifold is "gone through in a certain way, taken up, and connected" (B103). Thus, every judgment depends on that "unity [transcendental unity of apperception] through which all the manifold given in an intuition is united in a concept

of the object” (B139). Moreover, categories, which are the functions of unity (A68) stem from understanding which is an “absolute unity” (A67). Briefly, thinking is bringing diversity under unity through synthesizing a manifold. Categories, on the other hand, are the modes of this synthesizing which are pure and a priori products of the understanding itself.

However, a very interesting situation emerges here. Now categories are modes of unity, yet they are *different* modes of unity; that is, they unify in different ways. And if categories “spring pure and unmixed out of ... an absolute unity,” then it follows that thought is a unity which can develop distinctions (different and diverse modes of unity) from within itself; it is not just a formal and abstract unity which is applied only to a manifold given externally. And a thorough and rigid critical project, which sets the goal as identifying the true nature and limits of thought, must consider this activity, since it is this activity which gives thought rules of thinking:

If thinking has to be able to prove anything at all, if logic must require that *proofs* are given, and if it wants to teach us how to prove [something], then it must above all be capable of proving its very own peculiar content, and able to gain insight into the necessity of this content. (*EL*, §42, 86).

Showing how the unity as such produces diversity from within and thus exhibiting the internal logical relations among conceptual determinations is what Hegel calls immanent deduction. What is more, the completeness of categories, the rules of synthesizing, and the necessity of their content, can be shown only through such a deduction.

Kant, on the other hand, deduced concepts of pure thought externally, i.e., he reduced thought, Hegel’s contention goes, to syllogistic reasoning, and extracted (or ‘discovered,’ according to Hegel) a list from traditional logic. However, deducing categories from history renders them arbitrary, since the question whether the forms of unity Kant discovers in traditional logic (in other words, in history of thought) consume

the entirety of the domain of the activity of thought or not cannot be responded without resort to an immanent deduction. Moreover, in transcendental philosophy categories acquire their content through the application of pure intuitions. For example, we learn that the content of the category of substance is “the permanence of the real in time” (A143/B183). However, as we have seen, for Hegel the distinction between concept and intuition is problematic, or rather he tends to refuse such a distinction; and indeed it is the transcendental deduction which motivates refusal of a rigid distinction between concept and intuition. Thus, he also refuses that content of categories can be fixed by “transcendental schematism;” nor does he consent to the idea that categorical determinateness depends on something extra-conceptual, pure intuition in Kant’s case. The only way, for Hegel, on the other hand, to fix their content, is through their “possible relations to other concepts.”<sup>147</sup>

Briefly, to repeat once more, a critical project consisting merely in an external deduction and failing to show how these categories are grounded in thought as such is doomed to render itself contingent. In other words: “the particular individuation of categories by which objectivity is uniquely enabled *remains ungrounded* until the intraconceptual relations that hold amongst the categories can be explicitly expressed.”<sup>148</sup>

And thus Hegel charges Kant for deducing categories empirically because he resorts to customary logic to deduce them rather than showing how that absolute unity developed distinctions:

We are all aware that Kant’s philosophy took the easy way in its *finding* of the categories. “I,” the unity of self consciousness is totally abstract and completely undetermined. So how are we to arrive at the *determinations* of the I, or at categories? Fortunately, we find various kinds of judgment already specified empirically in the

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<sup>147</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 9.

<sup>148</sup> David Weinkauf, “Hegel’s Logic as an *Allesaufhebung* of antinomies,” *Gnosis*, 10 (2009): 3.

traditional logic. To judge, however, is to think a determinate object. So, the various modes of judgment that have already been enumerated give us that the various determinations of *thinking*. (*LL*, §42, 84).

Or:

With regard to the manifold, the unity can be called “connection”. There are then varieties of this unity, for the connections determine themselves more precisely, and these modes of connection are the categories or universal thought-determinations. The problem with these universal thought-determinations is that Kant takes them from that part of the ordinary logic where the types of judgment are classified. He sets up different kinds of judgment as kinds of connection: positive, negative, infinite, singular, and other judgments are at the same time particular modes of connecting. Insofar as these particular modes of connection are picked out, they are categories. Kant adopts them empirically, just in the way they have been ordered in logic. He does not think about proceeding from unity to the kinds or determinations of unity—about developing the distinctions out of unity. (*LHP* 1825-6, 225).<sup>149</sup>

Now whether Hegel himself has succeeded to provide such an immanent deduction, or whether such a deduction is even possible or not is quite another question and will not be tackled here. Yet, it is a frank fact that many of Hegel’s criticisms against Kant, in fact, depends on the success of the *Logic* for their legitimacy. However, even at this very point we can still argue that Hegel’s criticisms are legit at least in their form, if not in content since in order to argue that the logical necessity of categories can be derived from history of thought alone, and thus that traditional logic consumes the entirety of the domain of the activity of thought, begs many questions and stands problematic.

There are, of course, some other objections to the specific formula, that “I” is the source of categories, Hegel used here. According to Priest, for example, for Kant transcendental ego is nothing but a formal condition of experience and is “devoid of any ontological commitment to an irreducible subjective ‘source’ of consciousness.”<sup>150</sup>

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<sup>149</sup> Cf. *LHP* 1827, 434-5.

<sup>150</sup> Priest, *Hegel’s Critique of Kant*, 20.

However, the relation between transcendental unity of apperception and categories seems to be quite tight. First, Kant himself speaks of apperception as “something real”: “For apperception is something real, and its simplicity is already given in the mere fact of its possibility” (B419). And this apperception, Kant argues, underlies categories of understanding (B422), or it is a “vehicle of concepts” (A341). Thus, as Allison observes, apperception has a much more intimate relation to categories rather than just being a formal condition of experience:

“The bare representation I,” which “must be capable of accompanying all other representations, and which in all consciousness is one and the same” (B132), can be regarded as the form or prototype of the analytic unity that pertains to all general concepts. In fact, it is simply this analytic unity considered in abstraction from all content. Consequently, the consciousness of the “I think” is itself the thought of what is common to all concepts. Second, the act of ‘I think’ is the form of the act of reflection, by means of which the mind grasps the identity in difference in the formation of general concepts. Once again it is nothing more than the “logical act,” considered in abstraction from all content. The consciousness of this act, that is, the consciousness of synthesis, is, therefore, the consciousness of the form of thinking.<sup>151</sup>

Generating a concept basically depends on grasping common marks in different representations, i.e., grasping “identity in difference.” Thinking grasps identity, and therefore it unifies; or vice versa, that is, since it unifies it grasps identity. It is the numerical identity of “I” which is the form of this act of unifying. This simply means that, it is just because thought can grasp its own identity in its own activity that it can grasp identity in difference and thus can bring a manifold under a unity. However, the self-consciousness in question is not the self-consciousness of an empirical soul materialized here and now. It is rather the self-consciousness of the thought itself; it is the consciousness of the fact that thought, in all its diverse acts, remains as the simple unity. And it is due to thought’s ability to grasp its own unity that it can generate different modes of unities which are also called concepts.

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<sup>151</sup> Allison, *Transcendental Idealism*, 144.

Second, Pippin argues that when Hegel claims that I is the source of categories, he points to this dependence; he does not venture to such a deduction.<sup>152</sup> Indeed Hegel's main project is to deduce a concrete unity (Notion) from pure immediacy (being as such).

Thus, following Pippin, I believe that we need not to speculate this far to respond this criticism. I believe that it is sufficient to remark that Hegel's argumentation here is open to reconstruction and that if we take pure thought as such as the source of unity, and thus categories as the modes of unity, an assertion to which Kant would not object, the argumentation would lose nothing from its weight. Thus we can avoid complex debates over the role of the transcendental unity of apperception in generating concepts and still argue that a true critique of thought shall not feel content in an external deduction: discovering forms of unity empirically in the history, i.e., discovering them in traditional logic; but rather it must engage in the strenuous labor of immanent deduction: showing how diversity is developed out of unity. Briefly, it must grasp not only identity in difference, but also *difference in identity*. Thus, for Hegel, the most important outcome of immanent criticism is that, it shows the way to grasp how thought produces categories out of itself and thus how thought can give content to itself. Thus thought is no more a formal unity, yet a concrete unity which can produce its own content from within.

### **3.2 Hegel's Criticism of The Doctrine of Thing in Itself**

The formality charge, Hegel raised against Kant, have more than one aspect. Above all, Kant's doctrine of categories, for Hegel, is formal due to the fact that it conceives them as fixed and determined for once and for all. However, Hegel believes that, as he will

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<sup>152</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 33.

argue to have demonstrated in the body of *Logic*, “moves”; or, in other words, he believes:

Any attempt to make use of a certain, determinate pure concept in discriminating objects fails or is inadequate in a way that leads to a certain kind of “revision” of such a notion, particularly a revision of its exclusiveness or independence, an understanding of its relation to other concepts necessary for its own application, concepts that might originally have appeared “other,” or the contrary of the original. (Pippin, 36-7).

This movement is what amounts to a dialectical logic. So, when Hegel charges transcendental logic for its formality, he does not argue that it is possible to deduce the actual history of the universe with all its contingency solely through self-reflective work of thought alone. Rather, he is arguing that, categories have their own history which exhibits their necessary logical relations with other categories.

However, as mentioned in the previous heading, formalism has another aspect which is related not with the constitution of the categorical schema of our faculty of knowledge, but with activity of thought. And this aspect of formalism is linked with Hegel’s other charge of subjectivism; that categories are categories of subject alone and have nothing to do with the reality as it is in itself whatsoever.

For Hegel, on the other hand, to argue that thought is a formal faculty, whose activity consists solely of unifying the material given to it externally or organizing the knowledge acquired hereby, creates an unbridgeable gulf between thought and being. This rupture, however, renders thought an empty faculty and reality an inaccessible beyond: “... thinking on its own is empty and comes as an external form to the said material, fills itself with it and only thus acquires a content and so becomes real knowing” (*SL*, 44).

And:

Thirdly, when the difference of matter and form, of object and thought is not left in that nebulous indeterminateness but is taken more definitely, then each is regarded as a sphere divorced from the other. Thinking therefore in its reception and formation of material does not go outside itself; its reception of the material and the conforming of itself to it remains a modification of its own self, it does not result in thought becoming the other of itself; and self-conscious determining moreover belongs only to thinking. In its relation to object, therefore, thinking does not go out of itself to the object; this, as a thing in itself, remains a sheer beyond of thought. (*SL*, 44-5)

Thus Hegel's criticism of the doctrine of thing in itself focuses on two main themes: thought has no reality in itself, since categories are, in a sense, meaningless apart from their application to the material given by sensation; and thought is ripped off from its claims to grasp reality as such and thus it remains subjective and formal.

As to the former, where Hegel argues that limiting the scope of the categories to their application to appearances means that "categories have no truth in themselves," (*LHP* 1827, 451),<sup>153</sup> it seems that this is one of the topics where Hegel is being a bit harsh about Kant. Yet I must immediately mention that Kant himself gives enough reason to think so: "All concepts, and with them all principles, even as such are possible a priori, relate to empirical intuitions, that is, to the data for a possible experience. Apart from this relation they have no objective validity" (*CPR* B298); and, categories "allow only of empirical employment and have no meaning whatsoever when not applied to objects of possible experience, that is, to the world of sense" (*CPR*, B724).

However, that categories are empty without intuition does not necessarily mean that they are empty per se. In Kant's philosophy categories have transcendental application as well as empirical application: "pure categories, apart from formal conditions of sensibility, have only transcendental meaning" (*CPR*, B305). In his discussion of the second analogy, to give an example, Kant argues that form of an alteration is different from the content of it, and that this form "can still be considered *a priori* according to the laws of causality and the conditions of time" (*CPR*, B252). This suggests that the

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<sup>153</sup> Cf. *EL* §43, 86; *SL* 46-7.

category of causality, in this case at least, is not meaningless apart from its empirical application. To make this point more clear, let me quote an example:

To adopt an example suggested by Russell, we do not know whether in the year 2000 there will be any people in London, but if there are and any three of them stand in a row, one of them will be “between” the other two. This assertion is perfectly intelligible quite apart from reference to actual individuals standing in that relation. The meaningfulness of the pure spatial concept is not identical with the intuitional material which instantiates it on some actual occasion.<sup>154</sup>

Ameriks also argues that Hegel fails to grasp the important distinction between the pure and schematized meanings of categories. For example, Ameriks proposes, one can consider a relation between God and the world in so far as one does not apply the category of causality in its schematized meaning but applies it in its purely logical meaning where “God stands in at least that general relation to the world in which any necessary real condition of a thing’s being stands to that being.”<sup>155</sup> Moreover we can further argue that categories owe their ideality to ideality of the forms of sensibility.<sup>156</sup> That is, that categories are empty by their own is due to the cognitive structure of human beings; it is not a defect pertaining to categories as such.

Last but not least, it must be also stressed that, apart from all the arguments given in defense of Kant above, the single fact that categories also expresses “the necessary shape of experience,”<sup>157</sup> along with forms of sensibility, alone suffices to argue that categories hold their meaning in transcendental philosophy without the aid of sensation.

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<sup>154</sup> Smith, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 452.

<sup>155</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 25.

<sup>156</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 24.

<sup>157</sup> Smith, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 452.

Although it seems that Hegel appears to be quite unfair in this particular objection, we can still venture a few words in his defense. His point rather seems to be the special meaning he attaches to the term “content.” As Smith observes, for Hegel “having content means developing content from categories themselves.”<sup>158</sup> So we may argue that for Hegel any content given to categories which are fundamentally foreign to them counts no content at all. As I have argued above, Hegel is mainly occupied with the necessity of the content of categories, and his point is that this necessity can be met only with a dynamic, moving, logical relation among categories, not with the contingency and particularity offered by sensation. Indeed in *Encyclopedia Logic* Hegel reminds that to argue that “by themselves, the categories are empty is unfounded, because they have a content in any case, just by being determinate” (*EL*, §43 Add, 86). Thus, whether or not Hegel disregards the transcendental meaning categories have in Kantian tectonic, it is obvious that this meaning does not satisfy Hegel’s philosophical ambitions.

Hegel’s other criticisms directed to the doctrine of thing in itself, however, carry far more weight with them. Hegel, in his *Encyclopedia Logic*, discriminates between different meanings of the terms “subjective” and “objective”:

“[O]bjectivity” has a threefold significance. *To start with*, it has the significance of what is externally present, as distinct from what is only subjective, meant, dreamed, etc.; *secondly*, it has the significance, established by Kant, of what is universal and necessary as distinct from the contingent, particular, and subjective that we find in our sensation; and *thirdly* it has the last-mentioned significance of what is there, as distinct from what is only thought by us and hence still distinct from the matter itself, or from the matter *in-itself*. (*EL* §41 Add. 83)

So, first, there is the usage in ordinary language where objective means “outside us,” and subjective means “pertaining to thinking”. Here, the ordinary consciousness fastens onto the belief that the element of truth belongs to the object and our thoughts must conform themselves to object if they are to rise truth from certainty (*SL*, 44). Second, there is the meaning Kant attached to these terms, where “the universal and necessary” is objective

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<sup>158</sup> Smith, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant,” 454.

and “what is only sensed” is subjective. Now, Hegel argues that although to ordinary consciousness this would seem as walking on his head Kant has every right to do so, since “what can be perceived by senses is really secondary.” In this second meaning of objectivity it is now the thought which carries the element of truth. However, this transcendental idealistic turn comes with a great price. Our thoughts, although universal and necessary, are still our thoughts only and “are cut off from what the thing is in itself by an impassable gulf” (*ibid.*) Briefly, Kant with his doctrine of thing itself places reality beyond reason’s reach, which, in turn, renders Kantian idealism subjective and formal.

And since this idealism is subjective, it can provide us only knowledge pertaining to subject:

That I see, hear, or otherwise sense something, is the receptivity of my organ. I only know about the sensation, not about the thing—my receptive knowing is altogether subjective. The objective component, or what Kant calls the category, is of course the antithesis to the subjective component, but it too is something subjective—not, of course, in the sense that it belongs to my feeling but because it belongs to the pure I of my self-consciousness, to the realm of reflective understanding. (*LHP* 1825-6, 228).<sup>159</sup>

As to the object, what is left to it is mere being. However:

But neither we nor the objects would gain anything merely because *being* pertained to them. What matters is the content, and whether the *content* is a *true* one. The fact that things merely *are* is of no help to them. Time catches up with *what is*, and so what is will soon to be *what is not* as well. (*EL*, 86)

So, briefly, although transcendental idealism bestows thought with universality and necessity, it does so by cutting thought off reality. Here, it is also critical to see the ontological understanding which underlies Hegel’s criticism of Kant.

On the other hand, Guyer argues that what Hegel fails to see is that necessity and universality must come with the mentioned price, because we know, with Hume, that these elements cannot be sought in sensation, since what sensation offers us is but

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<sup>159</sup> Cf. *LHP* 1827, 427-432.

contingency and particularity.<sup>160</sup> If we would argue that categories of understanding are also categories of being, we cannot know whether categories would be necessary or contingent for things in themselves. As Kant also argues what belongs to pure thought cannot be remain hidden from us (*CPR*, B27); as to the realm of things independent of the structure of mind, nothing can be argued as necessary.

Now, it is impossible to not see the Cartesian motif here. Thought can only have clear and certain knowledge of what belongs to it. As to the external object, we lean on the goodness of God. And if we are to remove the God from system, as Kant does at least in the first critique, we have to limit the scope of our knowledge claims with the representation of reality. (I do not claim that Kant is a thorough Cartesian, for he does not argue that, or he struggles not to argue that, knowledge of objects is a modification of self-knowledge. However, the uncritical distinction of thought and being prevails in Kantian philosophy as well). Hegel is of course aware of the Kantian answer to Humean challenge. Actually he argues that assigning the source of universality and necessity as 'I' is the "main point in the Kantian philosophy" (*LHP* 1827, 428); yet he insists that we do not need to pay the mentioned price: "although categories pertain to thinking as such, it does not at all follow from this that they must therefore be merely something of ours, and not also determinations of objects themselves" (*EL* §42 Add. 3, 85-6).

As we have seen, Hegel believes so since he further believes that there is an utter overlap between the structure of thought and the structure of being. Thus, thought, when thinking reality, does not have to go out itself first, and reach to what is there, which is also fundamentally alien to it, and then try to grasp its object's nature. For Hegel there is no need to struggle with all these transcendence problems. All thought must do, in order to understand the structure of being, is to look at its own being.

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<sup>160</sup> Guyer, "Thought and being: Hegel's critique of Kant's theoretical philosophy", 172.

Finally, another important aspect of Hegel's criticism of the doctrine of thing in itself also stems from his own ontological understanding. According to Hegel, a thing has, so to say, a double structure. It is both in-itself and is for-other. A thing's being in-itself refers to its most fundamental and independent existential sphere; i.e., its interior dimension. Being-for-other, on the other hand, refers to a thing's existence as it is in relation with other things. These two are definitely two different moments. A thing's being-in-itself differs both from the being-in-itselfness of other things and the same thing's being-for-other. However, although they exist as independent moments of a thing's existence, they are non-the less identical:

Something is *in itself* in so far as it has returned to itself out of the being for other. But something also has *in itself* (here the accent falls on in) or *within it*, a determination or circumstance in so far as this circumstance is outwardly *in it*, is a being-for-other.

Being-in-itself and being-for-other are, in first instance, distinct; but that something also has *within it* the same character that it is, and, conversely, that what it is as being-for-other it also is in itself – this is the identity of being of being-in-itself and being-for-other, in accordance with the determination that something itself is one and the same something of both moments, which, therefore, are undividedly present in it. (*SL*, 120).

Although it sounds complex, the idea of the section to where the quoted passage belongs is relatively simple. For Hegel, a thing has an inner being. This inner being is its independent being in the sense that it is what distinguishes it from other things. Moreover, a thing has a, so to say, relational being, which emerges in its relation to other beings. However, it is due to its inner being that a thing can enter into relations with other things. And conversely, a thing's simple itselfness can only be identified by being distinguished from the thing's being as it relates to other things. Therefore a thing's simple itselfness, or its innermost truth, is revealed through (and properly speaking what makes possible) its relations with its environment. Thus, according to Hegel no dimension can be set for a thing which is not revealed in its relations. Moreover, since being-in-itself and being-for-other make each other possible in their difference, they also fall into a speculative identity. Houlgate explains this identity with an example:

We can distinguish, for example, between the chemical composition of grass itself and the different effects it has on the stomach of a cow and that of a human being. Hegel's point is simply that we are dealing with one and the same thing in each case.<sup>161</sup>

Although the example quoted is illuminating enough, still a few additions can be made. We may further argue that, it is the chemical composition of grass (its being-in-itself or simple being) what makes in the first place possible its effects on a cow's and a human being's stomach (its being for-other). However, conversely, it is this effect what reveals, and in this sense makes possible, the chemical composition of grass. Thus, it is natural that, when looked from this ontological understanding, the doctrine of thing-in-itself, which suggest that it is a logical possibility that things may have another dimension of existence which is, again logically, impossible to be revealed in its relations with us, would be unreasonable. This understanding stands in a sharp contradistinction with Kant's claim that:

Now a thing in itself cannot be known through mere relations; and we may therefore conclude that since outer sense gives us nothing but mere relations, this sense can contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not the inner properties of the object in itself. (B67).

Briefly, then, for Hegel, as we have seen, a thing which is abstracted from all its relations is not a possible conception of something at all, since a thing exists with all its relations and cannot be as such ripped of them. Abstracting a thing's external relations is abstracting its interior being. Such an abstraction would inevitable yield nothing (*SL*, 121).

However, Kant does not propose the doctrine of thing in itself as a mere logical possibility. In other words, Kantian limitation of the application of categories solely to the representation of reality does not, for sure, come out of thin air. Although he argues for the ideality of space and time in length in *Transcendental Aesthetic*, Kant's main argument for this limitation comes from antinomies. I have argued that antinomies, in

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<sup>161</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 338.

fact, constitute the key stone of transcendental idealism, along with Transcendental Deduction of course. I will discuss why this is so and defend my thesis in the relevant chapter. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I hope that delineating Hegel's criticism of antinomies would suffice to help seeing the fact that the core of Hegel's criticisms of Kant is the distinction between thought and being, and the doctrine of antinomies, thus, plays, or must play, a vital role in the relation of two philosophers.

### **3.3 Hegel's Criticism of Kantian Antinomies**

For Kant, briefly, antinomies are the outcome of reason's passion for totality: "For a given conditioned, reason demands on the side of the conditions... absolute totality" (A409). Moreover, antinomies, for Kant, provide an indirect proof for transcendental idealism (A490f). The idea is, briefly, this: whenever we endeavor to grasp the unconditioned, the infinite, we are entangled with unavoidable contradictions. However, it is the transcendental realistic assumption what makes us believe that the unconditioned, the infinite is a legitimate object for knowledge. Yet, it follows that, given the contradictions we encounter, this transcendental realistic assumption is false (A424f). And seemingly since transcendental idealism is the only legitimate alternative to transcendental realism, it necessarily follows that transcendental idealism is true. Thus, antinomies offer another way to convince those who "may not be satisfied by the direct proof given in Transcendental Aesthetic" (A506/B534). Whether the main thrust of Kant's argument here, that antinomies constitute an indirect proof for transcendental idealism since transcendental idealism is the only alternative to transcendental realism which proves to be wrong, is plausible or not will be dealt in the next chapter. The importance of the antinomies for this chapter, however, is the manner two philosophers treat contradiction.

For Kant, contradiction is a sign for falsity. And if any assumption leads us to contradiction (for example the transcendental realistic assumption leads us to antinomies), it means that the assumption is wrong. Thus, for Kant antinomies are dialectical in the sense that they represent a confusion based on an illusion which consists of taking unconditioned as an object of experience. For Hegel, on the other hand, contradiction does not necessarily imply falsity; nor is it the end of the story. In other words, for Kant “antinomy is the key to the discovery of transcendental idealism; for Hegel, it reveals the inadequacy of that form of idealism, and the need for a more consistent alternative.”<sup>162</sup> Before delineating Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s account of antinomies, I shall remark that in this chapter I will not focus on passages where Hegel directly engages with Kant’s argumentation used for antinomies (*SL*, Section 2); but I will limit myself with picturing an overall, though inadequate, picture of the outlines of Hegel’s criticism.

Hegel describes antinomies as “the assertion of two opposed propositions about the same object” (*EL*, §48, 91). This definition is important since it may help us to shed light to a basic issue. For Hegel contradiction, in the ontological sense, is not the conjunction of a proposition and its negation ( $p$  and not- $p$ ), as it is in modern logic; rather the concept of contradiction is intimately related with the concept of identity: “The other expression of the law of identity: *A cannot at the same time be A and not-A*, has a negative form; it is called the *law of contradiction*” (*SL*, 416). However, the identity at stake here is dialectical identity: “ $x$  and  $y$  are identical if they make each other possible, and can therefore be viewed as two aspects of some new whole.”<sup>163</sup> Thus, when translated into an ontological language, contradiction becomes the co-existing of two

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<sup>162</sup> Sally Sedgwick, “Hegel on Kant’s Antinomies and Distinction Between General and Transcendental Logic,” *Monist*, (74) 1991: 403.

<sup>163</sup> Stephen Priest, *Hegel’s Critique of Kant*, 14.

mutually exclusive properties in one subject.<sup>164</sup> Moreover, in Hegelian language, contradiction is the expression of the fact that being determined means not only harboring contradicting determinations within itself, but also, for the very same reason, standing in an intimate relation with other determinations which are considered to be absolutely excluded from the former. This is a very important aspect of Hegel's philosophy, yet I will discuss it more extensively in the fifth chapter.

Thus when Hegel says that antinomies are "the assertion of two opposed propositions about the same object" he does not mean that, for example, "the world is both finite and not finite." Rather his point is that the world is both finite and infinite; a state which transcends the dichotomy between finitude and infinitude and which expresses that both moments depend on each other for their determination. This understanding of contradiction, on the other hand, will underlie his criticism of Kant's account of antinomies.

The main objection Hegel raised against Kant's account of antinomies is that Kant points out only four antinomies. However, for Hegel "everything actual contains opposed determinations within it and in consequence the cognition and, more exactly, the comprehension of an object amounts precisely to our becoming conscious of it as a concrete unity of opposed determinations" (*EL*, § 48, Ad. 93).<sup>165</sup> Hegel here does not engage in the reasons urging Kant to point out only to four antinomies. Rather his point is expressing that negativity and contradiction is an essential aspect of actuality and thus reality. In other words, in Hegelian ontology, identity is not pure in the sense that all difference is excluded from it:

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<sup>164</sup> For a more comprehensive discussion over the meaning of contradiction in Hegel's philosophy see Robert Hanna, "From an Ontological Point of View: Hegel's Critique of the Common Logic," *The Review of Metaphysics*, 40 (1986): 305-338.

<sup>165</sup> Also cf. *LHP* 1827, 448.

[In traditional logic] We are condemned to make such Megarian assertions as that a tree is a tree, God is God, etc. At the same level, the Law of Non-Contradiction merely forbids us to identify an object referred to by one concept with an object referred to by the *negation* of that concept: of an *A* we cannot say that it is a non-*A*. Whereas on the deeper level of interpretation of the present level, an assertion of Identity obliges us to be ready to assert different concepts of what is declared identical, and (presumably) to exclude from it concepts other than those which are merely negative.<sup>166</sup>

Hegel's other criticisms concerning antinomies are all related with this: that difference is a constitutive element of identity and that contradiction is an essential aspect of determination and thus reality, not just the unavoidable fate of reason endeavoring to grasp infinity.

According to Hegel, although Kant has achieved a great accomplishment when he showed that contradiction which is "posited by the determinations of the understanding in what is rational is *essential* and *necessary*" (*EL*, §48, 91-2), he nonetheless stopped at the negative result and argued that contradiction has its source in thought, not in being:

But the solution is as trivial as the viewpoint is profound; it consists merely in tenderness for the things of this world. The stain of contradiction ought not to be in the essence of what is in the world; it has to belong *only* to thinking reason, to the *essence* of the *spirit*. (*EL*, §48, 92).

Now, although Hegel complains about the tenderness of Kant, it is obvious that being, or even finite beings, things we experience daily, involves, necessarily, contradiction and negation does not seem to be that plausible. For this doctrine seems to propose that, when arguing that otherness is a moment of something's being what it is, this not-being other is also a property of it. Indeed Hegel himself says that "Finite things are," yet "non-being constitutes their nature and being" (*SL*, 129). As we have seen in the previous chapter, not only that having a non-being, nothingness, as a property sounds irritating, at least for some commentators, but also the idea that a thing must be related negatively to what it is not, seems to lead to a concept of bad infinity. Of course such passages inspired more moderate commentaries where finite being's involving

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<sup>166</sup> J N Findlay, *Hegel: A re-examination*, (Ipswich: Ipswich Book Company, 1958), 190.

contradiction means dissolving the illusory independence of “things without, however, refuting their existence.”<sup>167</sup> As Pippin observes, this topic is the point where all sorts of discussions over metaphysical dimensions of Hegel’s philosophy focuses on.<sup>168</sup> I shall immediately note that I’m not arguing pro or against Hegel’s doctrine of finitude and thus antinomies; at least in this chapter. However, this account of antinomies, provided by Hegel so far, has another dimension other than its metaphysical implications over the constitution of finite entities; which is related with thought’s attitude against being, and the unconditioned. Or, in other words, what remains from thought when it divorces from its claims over reality. And this aspect is rather important for the purposes of the present chapter.

For Hegel, Kant’s account of antinomies lead to the untenable result that thought reveals itself as contradictory when it endeavors to know the reality as it is in self, which, in turn, means that it must renounce its claim to know things as they are in themselves in order to avoid its contradictions. However, this withdrawal, for Hegel, would nullify thought since it amounts to the fact that “reason left to its own resources engenders only figments of brain” (*SL*, 45).<sup>169</sup> If reason is to be something in itself, it has to remain its connection with reality itself, since “an intellect which has cognizance only of appearances and of nothing in itself, is itself only appearance and is nothing in itself.”<sup>170</sup>

However, some writers argue that Hegel fails to appreciate the role of sensibility and the specific properties of time-space here, and thus he argues that Kant ascribes contradiction to thought itself. For example, according to Ameriks the chapter on

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<sup>167</sup> Longuenesse, *Hegel’s Critique Of Metaphysics*, 6.

<sup>168</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 194.

<sup>169</sup> Cf. *LHP* 1827, 451.

<sup>170</sup> Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, 77.

antinomies “is about how the infinite or unconditional (supposedly) cannot be determined to be present in the empirical realm.”<sup>171</sup> Again, according to Guyer, Hegel neglects the crucial relation between transcendental idealism and the forms of intuition and thus he fails to see that it is not a deficiency on the part of the categories which restrain their application to reality.<sup>172</sup>

Now, although it seems fair to argue that Hegel appears to disregard the central role and importance of the forms of intuition in Kant’s philosophy,<sup>173</sup> I believe that, especially in this particular matter, these charges are not that fair first because Hegel is not ignorant of the fact that unconditional ought not to be looked at in the empirical realm:

We must assuredly concede that the infinite is not given in the world, in sense perception. If we propose that our knowing is experience, a synthesizing of thoughts with the materials of feeling, then we cannot have cognition of the infinite at all in the sense of having a sensible perception of it. (*LHP* 1825-6, 237).

And:

It is certainly correct to say that the infinite is not given in the world of sensuous perception; and supposing that what we know is experience, a synthesis of what is thought and what is felt, the infinite can certainly not be known in the sense that we have a sensuous perception of it. (*LHP* 1827, 445).

Second, however, Hegel’s point is rather that the cognition of the infinite, the unconditioned, is subjected to the conditions of the cognition of finite entities.

In his discussion of Kant’s famous challenge to ontological proof of God’s existence, kernel of which Hegel wittily summarizes as “Being cannot be extracted from the Notion” (*LHP* 1827, 455), Hegel stresses that Kant’s point is somehow trivial and nobody is ignorant of it:

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<sup>171</sup> Ameriks, “Hegel’s Critique of Kant’s Theoretical Philosophy,” 26.

<sup>172</sup> Guyer, “Thought and being: Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy”, 189.

<sup>173</sup> Pippin, *Hegel’s Idealism*, 24-5.

That a hundred possible dollars are something different from a hundred actual ones is a reflection of a very popular nature, so much so that no proposition has been so well received as the assertion that no transition can be made from the Notion to Being; for though I imagine to myself a hundred dollars, I do not possess them for all that. (*LHP* 1827, 453).

So, when it comes to finite, contingent entities it is trivial that their existence cannot be extracted from their notions. If one is to talk of a real finite being, the existence of that being must be given in experience. However, God, the infinite, or the unconditioned is not a finite entity:

Hegel insists, however, that God is not such a finite object, the question of whose existence or non-existence is separate from the question of how it is to be conceived. God is indeed the sole reality whose existence is by definition entailed by the determination of its concept, because for Hegel God is the absolute form or Idea of existence itself. When thought thinks God, therefore it thinks the absolute character of existence, and this absolute character cannot be thought as that which might or might not exist.<sup>174</sup>

God, in other words, is not an empirical notion; on the contrary the notion of God “is logically required to make sense of what exists.”<sup>175</sup>

Likewise, the knowledge of the absolute, the unconditioned, cannot be subjected to the conditions of the cognition of finite entities. Hegel, on the other hand, insists on the fact that the knowledge of the infinite is a spiritual matter; or in Hegel’s words: “... no one will want to require a sense perception as the confirmation of the infinite too, however, since the infinite is present only for spirit” (*LHP* 1825-6, 237).<sup>176</sup> In other words, the unconditioned, true infinity in Hegel’s philosophy is also related with self-determination and autonomy of thought (*SL*, 137-8). It is so, because, as I have discussed in Introduction and will discuss in the fifth chapter, in Hegel’s philosophy infinity and freedom are interrelated. It is not merely that freedom implies infinity in the sense of

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<sup>174</sup> Stephen Houlgate, *Hegel, Nietzsche and the Criticism of Metaphysics*, 116.

<sup>175</sup> Priest, *Hegel’s Critique of Kant*, 45.

<sup>176</sup> Cf., *LHP* 1827, 445.

self-determination. But also, the infinity, in the sense of self-determination is related with the infinity in the sense of endlessness. However, both implications of infinity presented above are both the moments of the concept of infinite. I will discuss why this is so for Hegel in the fifth chapter, however, with this chapter, I hope to demonstrate that Hegel's criticisms of Kant provide us insights concerning two crucial subjects.

First, I hope that it is now obvious that, Hegel is well-aware of the motivations of transcendental turn. Although transcendental philosophy, for Hegel, "appears as a loss and a retrograde step" since it is a confirmation of the rift between thought and being, it still rests on a great insight which is that thought, when trying to take infinitude as its subject-matter, is necessarily led to various conflictions. Thus, I take this to be an affirmation of the idea that for Hegel the main motivation of transcendental turn is the antinomies.<sup>177</sup> Moreover, Hegel's further claim that contradiction is not thought's fate, but on the contrary an irreducible aspect of reality, even those of finite entities, shed light to the discussion of the previous chapter; i.e., how to read *Logic*? Indeed, as I have discussed throughout this chapter, the main motivation behind Hegel's criticisms of Kant is his demand for the absolute identity of thought and being.

As I have argued just above I take Hegel to asserting that the main motivation behind transcendental turn is the antinomies. Indeed, I'll discuss in the next chapter that, a closer look to the ideality of space and time, the central doctrine of transcendental idealism, reveals the fact that indeed the sole argumentation Kant can offer in favor of this doctrine does not come from transcendental aesthetics, as Kant himself argues, but rather from the antinomies. Thus, in the next chapter, I will argue that antinomies are the main motivation and the base of transcendental idealism, and in the fifth chapter I will

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<sup>177</sup> Cf. *SL*, 190.

discuss that, it is because of this central role of antinomies that they must be the point of focus for a post-Kantian ontology which takes itself to be genuinely post-Kantian.

## CHAPTER 4

### TRANSCENDENTAL IDEALISM

#### 4.1. A Brief Overview

As I have discussed in the previous chapter, Hegel's main objection to Kant consists in Kant's subjectivity and formality. Subjectivity and formality, in turn, renders categories mere means for subjective representation of objects, yet they have no power in explaining the truth of world as it is in itself. This, as we have seen, results in a limitation of thought. Moreover, I have further discussed that, for Hegel the main motivation of the famous transcendental turn lies in antinomies. In this chapter, then, I will discuss Kant's philosophy in more detail so as to discuss that how Kant's seemingly epistemological claims do in fact depend on ontological assumptions, and how these assumptions come to fore when Kant discusses antinomies. Moreover, I will also claim that Kant's account of antinomies provide the basis of Kant's limitation of thought.

Kant's philosophy stands as one of the most influential paradigmatic shifts in the history of human thought. Or, maybe the greatest one, along with Cartesian philosophy, since, as Pippin reminds us, the intellectual climate of our age can be read as an aftershock of that colossal intellectual earthquake that shook 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>178</sup> It is true, we would not be in grave error in arguing almost all the philosophical currents of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century is indebted to Kant's philosophy in this way or another. Indeed even the analytic philosophy, which purports to give philosophy a brand new shape, can be read as a

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<sup>178</sup> Pippin, *Idealism as Modernism*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1997), 4.

negative reaction against Kant.<sup>179</sup> Thus, it is also natural that such a figure would have great impact on young pupils of philosophy in his time. To be sure, this impact left deep marks in the minds of promising figures of that age like Hegel, and Schelling; so deep that they even expect a revolution in Germany which will be initiated by Kant's intellectual revolution.<sup>180</sup>

Although its affects are enormous, the core idea of Kant's philosophical project is relatively simple; that is, human knowledge has universal conditions to which objects of knowledge must conform. This idea corresponds to a Copernican revolution, as Kant names it, in metaphysical thought (Bxi). This celebrated Copernican revolution, Kant argues, that has taken place in natural sciences had already enabled them to enter in the secure path of science. So, just like Copernicus, who experimented to see what will happen if he applied a model where the spectator revolved around the celestial bodies and not vice versa, Kant offered a new model where it is objects which conform to the structure of mind. However, although Kant argues that he takes Copernicus as his example, in fact what Kant does is the exact opposite of that of his predecessor. That is to say, whereas Copernicus puts the object in the center and the subject in the periphery; subject, in Kant's revolution, settles in the center once again. And this realignment of subject-object relations, and all the dualities it has introduced into philosophy, will bring about many new philosophical problems, questions, camps, and actors.

Well, all revolutions arise from need, and the need Kant felt for his revolution is expressed as following:

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<sup>179</sup> Peter Hylton, "Hegel and Analytic Philosophy," in *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, pp. 445-485, 446.

<sup>180</sup> *Hegel: The Letters*, trans. Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 35, a letter from Hegel to Schelling dated 16 April 1795.

Hitherto, it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. (Bxvi).

The pursuit of extending our knowledge of objects a priori is metaphysics and what Kant defines as failure in B edition is depicted much more dramatically as an endless battleground in A edition (Ax). So, Kant argues, it is due to this endless battle that impedes any development in metaphysics: “while every other science makes continuous progress, metaphysics, . . . , perpetually turns around on the same spot without coming a step further.”<sup>181</sup> This battleground will be studied in Book 2 “The Dialectical Inferences of Pure Reason”, antinomies being the frontline of the battle. Now, just like incessant religious civil wars that ravaged Europe finally resulted in a religious peace among diverse sects, which in its turn made a considerable contribution to western democratic culture, the history of metaphysical wars lead to Kant’s Idealism which, so claims Kant, would end all those vain struggles. Hence, *Pax Kantiana*.

Of course, this is not the sole motivation behind Kant’s Critique, though I will venture to argue that it is the chief one. Nor is that struggle, in Kant’s eyes, just a historical one, rendering Kant’s revolution a mere moment in the history of thought; though, again, I also believe that it is quite safe to argue that Kant’s philosophy presupposes a historical maturity. That is to say, it presupposes the conclusiveness of several disciplines and sciences. As Strawson puts it, Kant “believed without question in the finality of Euclidean geometry, Newtonian physics, and Aristotelian logic.”<sup>182</sup> And this alone may raise doubt as to the strict logical conclusiveness of Kant’s project. Especially Kant’s reliance on Newtonian physics raises some doubts due to the fact that Kant seems to depend on what is empirical (the fact that Newtonian physics has not been challenged yet), to explain what is logical (Newtonian physics cannot be challenged). In other

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<sup>181</sup> Kant, *Prolegomena*, 5-6.

<sup>182</sup> P. F. Strawson, *Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*, (London: Routledge, 1966), 7.

words, the particular successes of natural physics' in showing that its universals do indeed apply to particular cases does not necessarily amount to the fact that the truths of natural physics are strictly universal: "[N]o one knows better than Kant that no accumulation of such particular examples can establish the validity of the universal proposition, *qua* universal."<sup>183</sup>

Be that as it may, we must still give Kant his due. Although his philosophy has mentioned historical presuppositions, he seemed to have every reason to suppose so. Euclidean geometry and Aristotelian logic had come to Kant's own time only with new additions and minor revisions, their foundations remaining intact. Newtonian physics also had emerged as the ultimate science without being challenged for more than a century up to Kant's time and establishing a paragon for all other sciences. So it is natural that Kant relied on these sciences and activities that much. It is also natural for him to believe that what he is doing is not presupposing but rather offering a plausible and consistent solution to a phenomenon, i.e., the unchallengeable conclusiveness of physics, logic and arithmetic. So, the problem for Kant thus becomes explaining a phenomenon: "Since these sciences [pure mathematics and pure science of nature] actually exist, it is quite proper to ask how they are possible; for that they must be possible is proved by the fact that they exist" (B21).<sup>184</sup>

On the other hand, according to Kant, the need for his revolution is not just historical, but rather structural. To put it in another way, all those wars waged are vain, not due to the deficiency of the combatants, but due to misfortunate structure of human reason; i.e.,

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<sup>183</sup> Henry Sidgwick, "A Criticism of the Critical Philosophy," *Mind*, 8 (1883): 77.

<sup>184</sup> This will be an important point which is to be kept in mind throughout this chapter; so that I will not directly resort to, when discussing Kant's arguments in favor of Transcendental Idealism, the existence of non-Euclidian geometries. This shall be so, because my main concern is not the conclusiveness of Kant's philosophy, but rather Hegel's appreciation of and relation with it. Thus, I will try to stay in the historical perspective as much as possible.

it has to ask questions which transcends all its powers (Avii). Thus, mentioned metaphysical struggles stem not arbitrarily from the contingency of the course of history but necessarily from the very structure of mind itself; and thus all these struggles are amply illustrated in the history of human thought. Briefly, that ending metaphysical wars and demonstrating that it is the fate of human reason to be caught in contradictions when it surpasses its limits is, as Kant names it, the negative motivation of Kant's philosophical project.

As to the positive motivations of Kant's philosophical enterprise, we may enumerate at least three more. Although Kant himself stated them as the positive outcomes of his philosophy (Bxxiv-xxv) I believe that they can be read as also the motivations. First is the possibility of synthetic a priori propositions. Here we can see the mentioned effects of the listed sciences and disciplines on Kant. Kant believed that both Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics operate with synthetic a priori propositions and he further believed that, without much doubt about the possibility of such a thing as synthetic a priori, the question to be asked is, then, "what is the condition of the possibility of synthetic judgments?" His whole project, as he stated in Introduction, can also be read as an answer to this question; i.e., its aim is to determine the possibility, the principles, and the extend of such knowledge (A3/B7). However, I believe and will argue that *Critique* by no means is limitable to such an epistemological project, since Kant's epistemological project both harbors and fosters a metaphysical one.

Second is opening a space to practical reason and rescue it from the incursion of speculative reason. Freedom, as the condition of morality, would not be possible if the speculative reason is to be regarded as the sole legislator; since soul, as an object of experience, cannot be freed from mechanism of nature. So, Kant argues: "I have therefore found it necessary to deny *knowledge*, in order to make room for *faith*" (Bxxx).

How Kant will manage to open space to morality will be one of the main objectives of this chapter. And I will argue that, that though the listed objectives or motivations (the negative and the positive ones) may be regarded as distinct, the conditions of their possibility, i.e., the possibility of ending vain metaphysical struggles for once and all, the possibility of a priori synthetic propositions, and the possibility of delimiting speculative reason, are not unconnected with each other. On the contrary, I will argue that Kant believes that what will limit speculative reason is at the same time what makes synthetic a priori judgments possible. Finally, one of the major concerns of Kant is avoiding the sensualization of all the concepts of understanding, and thus promoting a defense for the universally valid knowledge claims of reason (A271/B 327).

#### **4.2 Metaphysics of Transcendental Idealism**

As stated just above, the main idea of Kant's Copernican revolution is simple. To repeat once more, human cognition has universal conditions, and objects must conform to these conditions. However, although simple, Kant, operating from this basic postulation, arrives to many important philosophical results. As is well known, Kant argues that the conditions of human cognition are both conceptual and sensitive. Human sensibility has a structure of its own, and human cognition works via an a priori conceptual schema, to which objects must conform if we are to speak of an experience of these objects and if that experience is to be intelligible for us. Thus, if objects is to conform to the structure of human mind if there is to be such a thing as intelligible experience, and if one of this conditions is conceptual, then Kant is able to answer that challenging question which bothered empiricism all along: if experience is offering us nothing but disconnected and passing sense material, how we are to justify our representation of a law-governed world of substances causally interacting. Kant will tell us that if an object is to be an object of human experience, it must be a substance enduring in time, be attributable to various properties, be in causal interactions, and etc.. Furthermore, if both these intuitive

structure and categorical schema are a priori then Kant would be able to give answer to the question how synthetic a priori judgments are possible. We learn that, they are possible only because mind can know a priori only what it puts to its object. Thus, Kant would provide us what we lack in passive sensibility, i.e., necessity.

However, although Kant seems to solve, or at least evade, some of the most troublesome philosophical questions, he nonetheless created new ones. Among one of the fresh philosophical problems comes a new transcendence problem. As is eminent, as to the emergence of the Transcendence problem, we are indebted to Descartes who argued that mind can know with certainty only its own content. Thus the first transcendence problem emerged: how will we be sure that these mental materials correspond to physical objects which exist independently out of us? In other words, how can mind, as a distinct and self-contained substance, know the body, matter, which is another distinct and self-contained one? The sole answer Descartes could provide was faith, i.e., the benevolence of God, thanks to which He will not, or cannot, deceive us; the choice here depends on delicate theological discussions such as whether God can violate the necessity of his own nature or not. Now although Kant, in a sense, managed to evade this sort of transcendence problem, he nonetheless created a new one: If conceptual structure of mind operates on the sensuous data given by sensation, and if this categorical schema has nothing to do with sensation (they are not and cannot be derived from experience), then how can we show that the logical (concepts) can a priori operate on the intuitive (sense data)? If we are to formulate this problem in Kantian terms, it becomes the problem of objective reality of categories. This problem, in turn, as we have seen previously, leads to one of the most sophisticated and labored passages of the entire history of philosophy, i.e., the transcendental deduction. However, Kant's problems, unfortunately, are seldom limited with tiresome passages.

It is natural that the assertion that objects must conform to our cognitive structure may sound startling enough, even for now, and not only for ordinary minds who are not accustomed to ways of philosophizing, but also for the fresh students of Kant. We, as the descendants of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, are accustomed to the idea that a certain mental and intellectual infrastructure conditions our experience; whether this infrastructure be historical, cultural, social, religious, local-libidinal, and etc. However, the experience I speak here is experience of our individual or communal reactions to events and facts, which are attributable with value judgments. Kant, on the other hand, is arguing about objects of our daily experience; say, cats, chairs, walls, and etc. This must sound surprising since our daily experience teaches us that the objects of our experience enjoy a freedom such that whatever the categorical schema of our mind is, we are still subject to the structure of the objects. In other words, our experience is not voluntary such that we cannot, for example, render cold what we experience as hot. Of course this is not what Kant claims, yet what he does indeed claim is much more intriguing even for those who are accustomed to the ways of philosophizing.

Now, it is one thing to argue that experience has necessary elements, such as that it is spatial and temporal, another to argue, as Kant does, that necessary elements of experience are subjective. Thus, Kant does not only argue that experience has some conditions and necessary elements, he, rather, persistently argues that whatever is a condition and a necessary element of experience, it is a subjective condition and is in us; in other words, it resides in the subject: “that whatever is necessary for the representation or experience of something as an object,..., must reflect the cognitive structure of mind, rather than the nature of object as it is in itself.”<sup>185</sup> However, what comes next, as the outcome of this doctrine is even more challenging to digest. Kant argues that our experience is necessarily spatio-temporal (or at least temporal, if we are

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<sup>185</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 27. Also Cf. Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 2; and Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 339.

to speak within the limits of Transcendental Aesthetic; or spatial if we are to speak within the limits of Refutation of Idealism).<sup>186</sup> Furthermore, as mentioned above since what is a necessary element of experience, according to Kant, belongs to our cognitive structure, i.e., resides in us, space and time becomes but forms of our intuition. What this amounts to is that, what we intuit as physical objects existing spatio-temporally are reduced to affections of our minds:

What we have meant to say is that all our intuition is nothing but representation of appearance; that the things which we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them as being, nor their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us, and that if the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, be removed, the whole constitution and all the relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time themselves, would vanish (A42).

In other words, Kant identified “objects possessing spatial and temporal properties with mere mental entities.”<sup>187</sup> And the real objects, (or the object as it is independent of human cognition), things as they are in themselves, or in other words, as they really are, which agitate our sensibility so as to generate these impressions are/is rendered outside the reach of our cognitive faculties. This, in its turn, amounts to the fact that we can never know reality as it is in itself. Hence, Transcendental Idealism.

Kant himself argues that this idealism is a natural outcome of the commitment that human knowledge has universal conditions (Bxx). Thus, although Kant regards the existence of thing in itself problematic (A39) and elsewhere argues that that concept solely aims to limit “the pretension of sensibility” (B311), I agree with the idea that the system itself forces us to concede that Transcendental Idealism is not just a doctrine about the analysis of universal structure of human experience; it bears a certain metaphysical view:

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<sup>186</sup> See A34: “Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever.”

<sup>187</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 335.

Transcendental idealism is not a skeptic reminder that we *cannot be sure* that things as they are in themselves *are* also as we represent them to be; it is a harshly dogmatic insistence that we *can be quite sure* that things as they are in themselves *cannot be* as we represent them to be. Space and time are the indispensable elements in all of our intuitions and judgments, yet transcendental idealism is nothing other than the thesis that things in themselves, whatever else they may be, *are not* spatial and temporal.<sup>188</sup>

And it is this metaphysical view which renders Kant, according to some critics, “closer to Berkeley than he acknowledges.”<sup>189</sup>

Indeed Kant himself must have experienced the charge of Berkeleyanism, since in order to repel such criticisms he added the section “Refutation of Idealism” in B edition. There, Kant identifies two sorts of material idealism, that of Descartes and of Berkeley. However, the main focus of his discussion seems to be the idealism of Descartes, or as Kant names it, the problematic idealism. As to Berkeley, he simply argues that if space is taken to be a property of things in themselves then Berkeleyan idealism, which renders the existence of objects in space impossible, is unavoidable. Moreover, since transcendental idealism denied space being a property of things, such idealism has already been refuted by transcendental idealism.<sup>190</sup>

Cartesian idealism, on the other hand, claims, briefly, that the experience and thus knowledge of the existence of self is independent from the experience of objects, since, as Kant says, according to Cartesian idealism there is only one certain and clear empirical assertion, that is, “I am” (B274). The existence of objects, in turn, is inferred from the former, since the experience of their existence is but representations in mind, or

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<sup>188</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 333.

<sup>189</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 6.

<sup>190</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 295.

modifications of mind. Furthermore since all inference can be subject to doubt, this renders existence of objects in space problematic (B276).

Against Cartesian idealism Kant argues that it depends on a misunderstanding such that it regards “the consciousness of myself in the representation ‘I’” not a “merely *intellectual* representation” but an intuition (B278). That is to say, the Cartesian idealist takes the “I” of apperception, whose existence is an outcome of the act of thought, to be empirical awareness of self.<sup>191</sup> Thus, the “I am” which is to support the thesis that the knowledge of the existence of self is independent of the knowledge of the existences of objects is no more fit for the task. It is important to recall here that it is only intuition which gives us the direct awareness of the existence of objects (B33). However, the “I am” of Cartesian philosophy is not an intuition but a thought. Thus, Kant concludes that my empirical awareness of my own existence is a determination of time and “all determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception” (B275). However, since the “I” of Cartesian idealism is the product of thought not an intuition, it cannot serve as such a permanent (B277).

Now, it is this line of argument which constitutes Kant’s argumentation in Refutation of Idealism, which is, to put it very briefly, that the “outer experience is really immediate, and that only by means of it is inner experience ... possible” (B266-7). So, it is important to understand what Kant means with the doctrine that determination in time needs a permanent. So let me give a brief description of this doctrine.

In the first analogy, Kant argues that:

Thus the time, in which all change of appearances has to be thought, remains and does not change... Now time cannot by itself be perceived. Consequently there must be

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<sup>191</sup> Allison, *Kant’s Idealism*, 295.

found in the objects of perception, that is, in the appearances, the substratum which represents time in general; and all change or coexistence must, in being apprehended, be perceived in this substratum, and through relation of the appearances of it. (B225).

Kant's point here is roughly this: if we cannot experience any endurance in time, and if all there exists is just a continuous flux, then we would not be able to represent temporal relations; thus there must be something that endures that we can be aware of succession, coexistence, and duration, i.e. succession of x by y, coexistence of x with y, and the duration of x.<sup>192</sup> And this enduring thing (substratum, in the above example 'x') is declared to be a substance (A 182). As to the meaning of the term 'substance' there are diverging views whether it refers to ordinary objects of experience or to a Spinozistic one substance. Some of the critics, somehow depending on A 188-9, where Kant seems to argue that in order for there to be empirical unity of time, substances shall neither come into being nor cease to be, maintains that the meaning of the term refers to a thing which cannot be created or annihilated.<sup>193</sup> Indeed, elsewhere Kant also argues that that which underlies what appears there, can be, "when viewed as noumenon" also the subject who thinks that which appear (A 358). Some others argue that Kant's emphasis in the mentioned passage is to the empirical unity of time, and that the term substance refers to physical objects in space.<sup>194</sup> This debate, on the other hand, is not vital as to the thesis of the present chapter, because, as I will immediately argue that, both meanings of the term fail to provide what Kant expects them to provide. Thus I shall now continue to discuss the main argument of Refutation.

Kant recapitalizes his argumentation in a note to Refutation as the following:

Not only are we unable to perceive any determination of time save through change in outer relations (motion) relatively permanent in space (for instance, the motion of the sun relatively to objects on the earth), we have nothing permanent on which, as

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<sup>192</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 203.

<sup>193</sup> Jonathan Bennet, *Kant's Analytic*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1966), 188.

<sup>194</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 202.

intuition, we can base the concept of a substance, save only *matter*; and even this permanence is not obtained from outer experience, but is presupposed a *priori* as a necessary condition of determination of time, and therefore also as a determination of inner sense in respect of [determination of] our own existence through the existence of outer things. (B277-8).

Having argued that any empirical determination in time, in this case awareness of my own existence, presupposes something permanent, Kant further argues that this permanent cannot be in us (Bxxxix). This is due to two reasons. First, this cannot be an intuition in me, since I'm empirically aware of my existence due to the modifications of the inner sense, i.e., my states of mind. And the states of my mind are mere representations, which, as such, requires something permanent themselves. Consequently, the "I" of empirical apperception cannot be the permanent we are looking for. Second, this permanent cannot be the "I" of transcendental perception, the "I am" of Cartesian idealism, since it is the result of the spontaneity of reason. However, the required permanent shall not be a construction, but an intuition. This is because, in order to beat Cartesian skepticism, we cannot endure this permanent's being a construction, an inference, since for a Cartesian every inference as such can be put in question. Thus, this permanent must be something outside me:

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination of time presupposes something permanent in perception. This permanent cannot, however, be something in me... Thus perception of this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me; and consequently the determination of my existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things which I perceive outside me. (B275).

So, Kant's main theses in Refutation, now to put it more frankly, becomes this: "The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me."<sup>195</sup> However, as is sharply obvious, the reference to space makes things quite complicated. Things in space are mere representations, and Kant insistently remarks, if we move what is subjective from this representation nothing pertaining to space would remain (A42, for example). And as

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<sup>195</sup> Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience Vol II*, 377.

representations, the things I perceive as outside me definitely stands in need for something permanent. That something, which exists free from mind, and which agitates us so as to generate a spatial representation in us, on the other hand, is not an intuition, but rather a conclusion: “that though we cannot *know* [because we cannot intuit] these objects in themselves, we must yet be in position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears” (Bxxvii).

The difficulty here would be more clear if we consider Kant’s denial of the transcendental I of the Cartesian “I am” as the permanent once again. The “I am” includes in itself “the existence of that subject,” yet not the intuition of the subject (B 277). However, the same goes for that permanent which is required for the argumentation of Refutation. It cannot be a thing in space, since as a representation in me it needs a permanent itself; yet it cannot be the thing in itself, since it is not an intuition. It does not seem that Kant’s own theory really permit him to argue that spatial objects exist outside me. Or, as some critics have argued, Kant seems to conflate spatial objects with things in themselves in Refutation of Idealism<sup>196</sup> I believe that Strawson puts the matter here in great clarity, so let me quote a lengthy passage:

Kant very often accompanies his own assertions of transcendental ideality of both time and space with an assertion of the empirical reality of both. This, he claims with evident sincerity, distinguishes his idealism from that of Berkeley who “degrades bodies to mere illusion.” But we may wonder whether the distinction is as clear as he thought. He may seem, in claiming equal empirical reality for both space and time, to be saying that particular items in space and time, whatever their character, whether that of bodies in space (and time) or states of consciousness in time alone, are on an equal footing as regards actual existence (have equal empirical reality) though all of them are only appearances of things in themselves, i.e. are dependent for their existence on the affecting of ourselves as we are in ourselves by other (or the same) things as they are in themselves. But this is not really the import of his doctrine. The doctrine is not that, by affecting our cognitive constitution, things (including ourselves) as they are in themselves produce two distinct kind of existences, viz. bodies in space (and time) on

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<sup>196</sup> H. A. Prichard, *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909), 321.

the one hand and temporally ordered states of consciousness, including perceptions of those bodies in space, on the other. Rather, *all* the actual effects of these transactions between things in themselves are temporally ordered state of consciousness; but these include (and, it is later argued, if experience is to be possible, they must include) states of consciousness that we rate as perceptions of bodies in space. So space and time, bodies and states of consciousness, are not really on the same footing at all. The point may be obscured for us (and for Kant) by his insistence that all things in space and time are equally appearances; but the doctrine has a quite different force in respect of these two classes of things. States of consciousness, ordered in time, are appearances because they are merely effects things as they are in themselves and not states of some such things (ourselves) as they (we) really, atemporally, are. But bodies in space are appearances in a much stronger sense. They are not even effects of things as they are in themselves. It is simply that among the effects of things as they are in themselves are some states of consciousness which we are constrained to regard as perceptions of bodies in space; and apart from these perceptions bodies are nothing at all.<sup>197</sup>

Kant may have shown that awareness of self-existence requires something permanent and that this permanent must be somewhere outside self. However, his own doctrine does not allow him to argue that this something is a spatial object; nor can Kant argue that it is a sempiternal substance, like that of Spinoza's. This something, though it underlies the reality, is rendered beyond the reach of our cognitive faculties by Kant's doctrine, no matter what Kant wished or intended to argue. Indeed, Kant himself, in several passages, implies that externality of objects is an inference from our representations. One of such passages, for example, reads: "external objects, however, are mere appearances, and are therefore nothing but a species of my representations, the objects of which are something only through these representations" (A370) (though Kant immediately argues that a transcendental idealist is an empirical realist for whom the existence of external objects is not a matter of inference [A371]). In a nutshell, since Kant's doctrine mainly argues that we are aware of the affection between things as they are in themselves and our selves as we are in ourselves, the ontological statuses of these *relata* beg many questions.

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<sup>197</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 29.

The general overview of Kant I have given thus far is not, of course, undisputed. To be sure, this is one of the most discussed aspects of Kant's philosophy. To be brief, there are, so to say, two camps in this debate. The former camp, as I have tried to illustrate above, called as the "two world view" in the literature, argues that transcendental idealism renders physical objects to representations of mind and left reality intact, no matter what Kant have intended. Such an interpretation of Kant, of course, renders Kant's idealism a psychological one which, accordingly, claims the existence of somewhat mysterious entities which are not objects of human experience yet existence of which is necessary for there to be objects of experience. Hence, infamous noumenal causation. The other camp, the "twofold significance view," debates that transcendental idealism merely represents two ways of considering one and the same objects. The twofold significance view mainly operates with the distinction between the "Transcendental" level and the "Empirical" level, and argues that the tow-world view stems from failing to grasp how this distinction operates.<sup>198</sup> In the empirical level, ideality refers to sense data of an individual mind, and reality refers to public objects of human experience which exist independently of mind. The transcendental level, on the other hand, is the level of reflexive thinking on human experience. In other words, the transcendental level is related not with objects themselves, but rather with different modes of knowledge.<sup>199</sup> Thus, in this level ideality refers to the universal conditions of human experience, and reality refers to a thing in so far as it can be characterized independently from the universal conditions of human sensibility. Thus, the terms "appearance" and "thing in itself" acquire different meanings in different levels. In the empirical level the terms appearance and thing in itself designate two sets of entities. Appearances are mental entities and things in themselves are non-mental, physical

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<sup>198</sup> See, Graham Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge: An Outline of One Central Argument in Critique of Pure Reason*, (New York: Humanities Press, 1973), 37-51. Also cf Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 6-12; and Pippin, *Kant's Theory of Form: An Essay on the Critique of Pure Reason*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 193-201.

<sup>199</sup> Bird, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, 38.

entities. In the transcendental level, however, these terms designate two ways of considering one and the same entities:

At the transcendental, which is the level of philosophical reflection upon experience, 'ideality is used to characterize the universal, necessary, and therefore, a priori conditions of human knowledge... Things in space and time (empirical objects) are ideal in the same sense because they cannot be experienced or described independently of these sensible conditions.<sup>200</sup>

Thus, Kant's claim that our knowledge is limited to appearances amounts to an epistemological claim that human knowledge depends on a priori conditions which reflects subject's cognitive apparatus.<sup>201</sup> Finally, one can be a transcendental idealist, who argues that human cognition has universal conditions, and at the same time an empirical realist who, in turn, "allows to matter, as appearance, a reality which does not permit of being inferred, but is immediately perceived" (A371).

To be sure, there are ample passages in the first *Critique* to support both claims. To give a few examples, in favor of twofold significance view, Kant, at B 25, argues that transcendental knowledge "is occupied not so much with objects as with the mode of our knowledge of objects," and at B xxvi he argues that Critique teaches that "the object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as appearance and as thing in itself." On the other hand, in favor of two worlds view Kant also delivers sufficient passages. To cite one more, at A494 he argues that we are unable to know the cause of the representations in us; and it is this line of arguments which blazes the discussions over infamous noumenal causation. One can multiply the number passages that support either view, however, it is frank that listing related passages would not be decisive. Furthermore, finalizing this discussion is not, of course, within the limits of this thesis, nor do I think that such a thing is necessary since my aim is to discuss Hegel's *Logic* in its relation to

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<sup>200</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 7.

<sup>201</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 9.

transcendental idealism; not to designate a final position as to the outcomes of transcendental idealism. I believe it would suffice, as I have tried to do in the previous chapter, to indicate that for Hegel transcendental idealism not only degrades physical entities to mental ones and but also restrains thought from its loftiest endeavor, i.e., achieving the knowledge of the absolute; and that there is ample passages in the *Critique* that would convince Hegel that this is indeed what the Kantian philosophy amounts to. Thus, it would also suffice to show how Hegel would have reached such a view of transcendental idealism through the main body of *Critique* itself. Yet, still I will venture to say a few words about the issue.

Now, what Kant intended to postulate as to the ontological statuses of objects is one thing and, what his main doctrine lets him to argue is quite another. Kant would have believed the existence of physical objects which independently exist outside us, yet I believe that he undermines the very possibility of such a belief by insisting that space and time are but subjective forms and nothing more. That is to say, Kant does not argue that human cognition is necessarily spatio-temporal and the objects comply to this necessity because they are also spatio-temporal. He firmly denies objects in themselves being spatial and temporal. Furthermore, although the two-fold significance view highly softens Kant's ontological tenets, it is not quite clear what considering objects as they are free from the condition of human sensibility means. As we have seen in the previous chapter, for Hegel a thing exists with its both inner and outer relations, and if it is ripped of its spatio-temporality, it is also ripped of its relationality, it is also ripped of its reality. Being a physical object is being spatial and temporal, and what will remain there when it is stripped off its spatio-temporality and what exactly am I to consider?<sup>202</sup> A possible answer would be the logical relation of physical objects with the unconditioned, like the relation between modes and the substance in Spinoza. However, it is this line of

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<sup>202</sup> Cf. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, 112: "but if we try to think away space and time from the objects of experience, we have nothing left."

metaphysical reasoning Kant has intended to end. If *Critique* is really offering us two ways of considering one and the same object, it is quite obvious that the second way leaves nothing to consider. As a final point, as I will discuss below, Kant's theory is not limited with the claim that human experience is necessarily spatial and temporal; rather it strongly stresses that objects in themselves are neither spatial nor temporal, and that the non-spatiality and non-temporality of objects as they are in themselves is necessary for some key features of transcendental aesthetic.

Hitherto, I have tried to demonstrate that Kant's theory of experience has two aspects. First is an analysis of human experience and its necessary elements and conditions; second, a metaphysical view which is argued to be the outcome of the first part. It is perhaps not the first part, but definitely this second part of his philosophy, namely metaphysical connotations of Transcendental Idealism, what caused all new philosophical problems, struggles and endeavors to overcome new dualisms created by Kant's philosophy. So it seems that *Pax Kantiana* have not achieved what it was supposed to achieve at all. Hereafter, I will discuss the argumentation Kant offered for his transcendental idealism, and argue that the arguments from Transcendental Aesthetics fail to provide an indisputable and conclusive argumentation for transcendental idealism, and that Kant remedies this with the help of the antinomies.

### **4.3 Transcendental Aesthetic**

According to Kant, human knowledge is discursive, that is, mediate knowledge. Understanding determines and characterizes objects given by sensation. This means that it can relate to its object only through the mediation of intuitions. Intuition, on the other hand, is in an immediate relation with its object (A19), and as such is one of the two

sources of human knowledge, space and time being the forms of intuition. For Kant, on the other hand, demonstrating that space and time belongs to the subjective structure of our minds, such that they are but subjective forms of intuition, establishes the direct proof of Transcendental Idealism, which is, in its turn, provided in Transcendental Aesthetic.

In the very beginning of “Transcendental Aesthetic,” Kant provides us the meanings he attaches to terms sensibility, intuitions, sensation, empirical intuition, and appearance. Thus, accordingly, *sensibility* is the ability of being affected by objects, *sensation* is the effect of an object on faculty of representation, *empirical intuition* is the intuition which is related to object, and finally *appearance* is the object of empirical intuition (A19-20). Having defined these terms, Kant then introduces two more: “That in the appearance which corresponds to sensation I term its *matter*; but that which so determines the manifold of appearance that it allows of being ordered in certain relations I term the *form* of appearance” (A20). And then he proposes that there are two forms of appearances, or empirical intuition, space and time, and these are both pure intuitions and a priori.

Kant’s strategy for demonstrating that space and time are a priori forms of intuition and they are pure intuitions is twofold. First he analyses the representations of space-time and argues that they are both intuitions and a priori, and then he establishes the same conclusions for their ontological statuses. This is metaphysical exposition. The second leg of his argumentation, namely transcendental exposition, rests on claiming that in order for there to be such a thing as synthetic a priori judgment, space and time must be pure intuitions and not concepts. Kant’s arguments, on the other hand, are seemed to be designed primarily for space, and Kant seems to believe that what holds for space holds *mutadis mutandis* for time; and indeed carrying out the discussion over Aesthetic mainly

through the arguments designed for Space has almost become a commonplace in secondary literature.<sup>203</sup> This, of course, poses some problems which will be discussed within the course of this chapter. Thus I will follow the tradition and the focus of the following part would be space, however I'll also consider time whenever necessary and discuss whether the argumentation employed for space really holds for time or not. I will first provide an analysis of Kant's argumentation and several objections; and then I will argue to what extent Transcendental Aesthetic can be considered as a proof for transcendental idealism.

#### **4.3.1 Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space**

The so-called metaphysical exposition consists of two parts. The first part concerns with a priority of space and the second part maintains that space is not a concept but an intuition. However, just before undertaking the metaphysical exposition of the concept of space, Kant introduces three alternatives as to the ontological statuses of space and time. They are either real things, relation of things, or pure subjective intuitions, referring to Newton's, Leibniz's, and Kant's own doctrines of space and time respectively (A 23). Kant must have thought that these three alternatives are exclusive such that no other option is possible regarding the ontological statuses of space and time. I think this poses a problem already within the very beginning of argumentation, since I believe that that these alternatives are exclusive plays a role in Kant's argumentation that cannot be regarded as too little. However, I will discuss this point later. Having introduced his alternatives, Kant introduces a passage asserting the a priority of space

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<sup>203</sup> For some examples see, Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 84. Also cf Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 30; Prichard, *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, 36 ff; Guyer, *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, 345-6; Lisa Shabel, "The Transcendental Aesthetic," in *Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. Paul Guyer, (Cambridge: University Press, 2010), 93 footnote 3.

before presenting the main body of his argumentation in the very beginning of the section Space. There Kant maintains that:

Thus, if I take away from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks in regard to it, substance, force, divisibility, etc., and likewise what belongs to sensation, impenetrability, hardness, colour, etc., something still remains over from this empirical intuition, namely extension and figure (A21/B35).

Now, one must admit that this is indeed an interesting passage, yet it begs vital questions: how is one supposed to construct a figure imaginatively without using the contrast difference between the figure and its environment? In other words, “it is hard to understand what could be meant by visualizing a line without visualizing what, . . . , can be called a colour-boundary.”<sup>204</sup> One may further argue that visualizing a color-boundary is also a prerequisite of imagining extension because without that which extends, namely a figure, there is no extension.

Kant’s main point, of course, is that we have some spatial concepts, and we can, independently from sensation, determine some necessary properties of objects which fall under these concepts. Moreover, we can do so because space is not only an intuition, but an a priori intuition. Kant makes his point in the relevant sections which will be discussed immediately.

#### **4.3.1.1 A priority of Space**

Kant’s first argument concerning a priority of space is as follows: “Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experience” (A23). Kant argues that in order for me to represent an object outside me, i.e., in another region of space from that which I occupy, and to represent objects as distinct from each other, the

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<sup>204</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 33.

representation of space must be presupposed. Thus, “the representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically obtained from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is itself possible at all only through that representation” (A23). He further argues that we cannot represent ourselves the absence of space, yet, on the other hand, we can think space as empty of objects; thus Kant concludes that space must be “the condition of the possibility of appearances, and not as a determination dependent upon them” (A24).

The first part of Kant’s argument simply claims that space is the condition of spatial relations between objects. In order for a subject to experience or intuit objects with their spatial relations, the representation of space must be prior to this intuition or experience. In other words, things must be situated in somewhere (and somewhen) and some place, i.e., they must be experienced with their spatial relations, yet “it would be nonsense to say that space must be found some place or other.”<sup>205</sup> The second part seems to reinforce this idea by arguing that we can represent ourselves the absence of spatial relations, however, we cannot do the same for the space itself. So, briefly, Kant maintains that when we consider the relation between the representation of space and the representation of spatial relations, we shall see that space is prior to and thus condition of spatial relations. Now, it may well be the case that these two arguments are independent arguments which demonstrate a priority of space independently; or that these are two parts of one and the same argument.

Not surprisingly, the argumentation Kant offered so far has attracted many objections. First is the objection that Kant’s argument here is tautological. For some critics, to argue that in order to represent spatial relations we must presuppose the representation of space is just to argue that “we could not become aware of objects as spatially related

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<sup>205</sup> Justus Hartnack, *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge*, trans. M. Holmes Hartshorne, (New York: Brace And World Inc., 1967), 18.

unless we had the capacity to do so,<sup>206</sup> and as such this argument, by itself, since it is tautological and too short, does not demonstrate anything; let alone demonstrating that the representation of space is a priori. A second objection consists in the contention that Kant's argument does not eliminate alternative approaches such as claiming that there exists a symmetrical relation between appearances and space. According to symmetry doctrine, appearances might be the condition of space and time, just as much as space and time are the conditions of appearances.<sup>207</sup> So, that space must be regarded as the condition of spatial relations does not necessarily mean that space is a priori, just as a representation X's being presupposed by the representation Y does not necessarily mean that X is a priori. It may well be the case that both X and Y are abstractions from a more comprehensive representation. In this case, space and appearances are, or can be, abstractions from the order of things. Thus, Kant either fails to demonstrate a priority of space or he needs the second part of the argument, that we cannot represent ourselves absence of space for such a demonstration. Finally, a similar and related third objection goes as follows: Representing an object as red presupposes the representation of redness. However, redness is by no means a priori, it is an empirical concept.<sup>208</sup>

As to the first and third objection similar responds are given by Kant's more sympathetic Kant critics. A well-formulated one reads:

In spite of the opaqueness of Kant's own formulation, it is clear that he is not arguing that the representation of space must be presupposed in order to recognize things as spatial. Such an argument would make the claim tautological... He is arguing instead that the representation of space is necessary in order to be aware of things as distinct from ourselves and from each other. Since a reference to space is not already built into

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<sup>206</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 30.

<sup>207</sup> Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, 112.

<sup>208</sup> D. P. Dryer, *Kant's Solution for Verification in Metaphysics*, (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1966), 173.

these distinctions, as a reference to red is built into the thought of red things, the two cases are not analogous.<sup>209</sup>

Now although this response sounds convincing, I still fail to see how a reference to space is not built in Kant's argument. When we represent things as distinct from each other, we definitely do not do so by referring to their secondary properties but to the areas of spaces they occupy. However, it is clear that occupying a part of space already includes a reference to space. It seems that all Kant shows here is that space is a necessary element of human experience; yet that the space is an a priori element which resides merely in subject is far from being demonstrated in these lines.

As to the second objection it is argued that the representation of space in this line of argumentation "functions as a means or vehicle for the representation of objects as distinct from the self and from each other."<sup>210</sup> Thus, it is not plausible to maintain that representing appearances as distinct from each other and from ourselves is a vehicle for the representation of space.<sup>211</sup> Moreover, since space cannot be reduced to the order things, it should be clear that there should be no such symmetry that depicted above.

The first part of Kant's argumentation for a priority of space may seem problematic, yet the second part is even more controversial. First of all, several critics argue that our disability to think the absence of space and thus a non-spatial experience is physiological and as such it doesn't prove much.<sup>212</sup> And even if we concede that this is not a

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<sup>209</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 86. Also cf. Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 346. There he argues that Kant's argument refers to distinctness and diversity of objects. So such a reference saves Kant from being tautological.

<sup>210</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 85.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>212</sup> Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to 'Kant's Critique Of Pure Reason'*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 103.

physiological but an epistemic phenomenon, it is still not that clear what Kant has achieved with this thought experiment. As Strawson points out, imagining a “featureless blackness” does not prove anything at all.<sup>213</sup> All we can say is that we can abstract objects and reach to a pure abstraction which is imaginatively represented as a featureless blackness. And this image hardly counts as a proof of a priority of space since I can also think of nothingness as empty of existence and when I think of pure nothingness I would come with exactly the same image. Yet no body would dare to argue that nothingness is a priori.

Moreover, in the case of time, things get more curious. Kant confidently argues that “we can quite well think time as void of appearances” (A31), yet it is far from clear what thinking pure time means; moreover this time our faculty of imagination does not help us by offering an image like that of featureless blackness. This thinking is surely not representing, as Kant himself argues, time “cannot itself be perceived” (B219). Given these curiosities, some of the most sympathetic Kant commentators reconstruct Kant’s argument and argue that what Kant tries to demonstrate is that “we cannot represent to ourselves outer appearances without representing them in space.”<sup>214</sup> However, it is clear that such a construction brings us back to the first part of the argumentation without contributing much to Kant’s case.

#### **4.3.1.2 Space is an Intuition**

Kant maintains the thesis that space (and correspondingly time) is an intuition mainly by contrasting an intuition with a concept. This comparison mainly runs on singularity and

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<sup>213</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 30.

<sup>214</sup> Allison, *Kant’s Idealism*, 87.

uniqueness of space and on differences in the relations between space and its parts, and a concept and its intension. Kant's argumentation runs as follows:

Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space; and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same unique space. Secondly, these parts cannot precede the one all-embracing space, as being, as it were, constituents out of which it can be composed; on the contrary, they can be thought only as in it. Space is essentially one; the manifold in it, and therefore the general concept of spaces, depends solely on [the introduction of] limitations. Hence it follows that an *a priori*, and not an empirical, intuition underlies all concepts of space.

Space is represented as an infinite *given* magnitude. Now every concept must be thought as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different possible representations (as their common character), and which therefore contains *under* itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as containing an infinite number of representations *within* itself. It is in this latter way, however, that space is thought; for all the parts of space coexist *ad infinitum*. Consequently, the original representation of space is an *a priori* intuition, not a concept. (A25/B40).

Now the first part of the argumentation mainly depends on the singularity and oneness of space. Elsewhere Kant argues that "the representation which can only be given through a single object is an intuition" (A32). Thus, if a representation is unique, or can be thought only as a single object, it must be an intuition. However, it is quite clear that it is not so. There is only one substance in Spinoza as a logical necessity, and this substance is also unique in the same sense. Yet it is also clear that it is not an intuition.<sup>215</sup> To give another example, Hegel also contends that there is likewise one blue, yet it is not an intuition, either (LHP-1827, 435).

This problem is remedied immediately. In his *Lectures on Logic*, Kant defines a concept as follows: "*conceptus* contains that which is common to several objects."<sup>216</sup> Thus, logically, that which is common to objects, generally named as common marks, is prior

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<sup>215</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 91. Cf. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysics of Experience*, 116.

<sup>216</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Logic*, trans. J. Michael Young, (Cambridge: University Press, 1992), 485.

to the formation of a concept, since a concept is constructed via abstraction through these common marks. However, in the case of space, the representation of one space is always prior to the representation of parts of space, such that these parts are formed only by introducing a limitation to one space; it is not the case that one space is constructed from partial spaces. Moreover, a concept relates to its object through the mark which is common to all the objects which falls under the same concept, in the sense that the object is not identical with the concept itself.<sup>217</sup> However, parts of space exist *in* space, not under it, and they are identical with one space. Briefly, space and time are not ‘types’.<sup>218</sup> Now, one may argue that likewise one can think of one blue and maintain that partial blueness of blue things as parts of this one blue; and finally that they are identical with the one blue. However, I can think of different blue things as they are distinct from each other, for example, a red thing in between two blue things; yet I cannot do the same for parts of space. As Kant remarks, they coexist in the sense that there is, and must be, a continuum between parts of space without admitting any interruption. Same goes, of course, for the representation of time (A31/B47).

So, it is clear that space’s being intuition mainly derived from its relation to its parts, such that partial spaces must be thought as they are in one unbounded space. This is possible, in turn, by space’s also being an infinite magnitude, otherwise, frankly, it would not cover all spatial parts. However, givenness of space as an infinite magnitude is not that clear. Elsewhere, Kant argues that space and time “are indeed something, as forms of intuition, but are not themselves objects which are intuited” (A291/B347). So, there seems to be a dissonance between two assertions. Moreover, in his infamous Transcendental Deduction, Kant argues that space and time are not only forms of intuitions, but also formal intuitions which involve a manifold in themselves and “therefore are represented with the determination of the unity of this manifold” (B160).

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<sup>217</sup> Justus Hartnack, *Kant’s Theory of Knowledge*, 20.

<sup>218</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 348.

That is to say, like every manifold space and time must undergo a synthesis through which the manifold is brought under a unity, and thus is represented as a single representation. We then learn that the synthesis which determines space as a unity (and hence as a single object) is the transcendental synthesis of imagination; which means that the representation of space (and time) as an infinite magnitude contains an intellectual, namely, conceptual, determination. Thus, in a footnote in the same page he declares that:

Space, represented as *object* (as we are required to do in geometry), contains more than mere form of intuition; it also contains *combination* of manifold, given according to the form of sensibility, in an *intuitive* representation, so that the *form of intuition* gives only manifold, the *formal intuition* gives unity of representations. In the Aesthetic I have treated this unity as belonging merely to sensibility, simply in order to emphasise that it precedes any concept, although, as a matter of fact it presupposes a synthesis which does not belong to senses but through which all concepts space and time first become possible.<sup>219</sup>

So, the representation of the infinity of the magnitude of space is an outcome of a synthesis, and this synthesis must be a successive one if it is a product of transcendental imagination.<sup>220</sup> If so, then we may well argue that just as representation of partial spaces involves the idea of one infinite space, the representation of one infinite space also involves the idea of partial spaces.<sup>221</sup>

With his Metaphysical Exposition, Kant thus introduces his complex doctrine that our pure intuition of space, whereby we can, independently from sensation, form several spatial concepts, is at the same time the form of intuition through which we are aware of spatial objects. I have tried to demonstrate that Kant's argumentation discussed hitherto provides us invaluable insights concerning the concept of space and time. However, they seem to suffer from several problems which diminish their persuasive power. Even if we

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<sup>219</sup> CPR, footnote a, 170.

<sup>220</sup> Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 93. Cf. Kemp Smith, *A Commentary*, 347 ff.

<sup>221</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 35.

concede, without taking the problematic structure of the metaphysical exposition, that space is an a priori intuition and indeed the form of intuition we are still far away from ideality of space. In other words, so far Kant has provided us nothing which would convince us that space is just a subjective form and nothing else, and that things in themselves are not spatial. As I will discuss below the same goes for transcendental exposition; and I will then argue that we must look elsewhere for the ideality of space (and time), namely to antinomies.

### **4.3.2 Transcendental Exposition**

Kant defines transcendental exposition as "the explanation of a concept, as a principle from which the possibility of other *a priori* synthetic knowledge can be understood" (A25/B40). Thus, the core of the exposition is quite simple. There are some synthetic a priori propositions, and if they are to be possible, there must be some a priori intuitions, space and time respectively. Moreover since pure geometry also applies to physical world (B43-4) then the pure intuition of space must be also the pure form of intuition. The most controversial aspect of transcendental exposition is, as mentioned above, the unquestioned acceptance of the synthetic a priority of judgments of mathematics and natural sciences. As we will see below, Kant indeed provides us an explanation for the propositions of geometry, though a sketchy one. However, in the case of arithmetic and natural sciences we severely lack justification. I will deal with arithmetic below, I will briefly consider the a priority of the propositions of natural sciences.

Kant, the minimalist that he is when it comes to exemplify his claims, offers us only two synthetic a priori judgment examples from natural science, yet I will consider only one of them: "in all changes of the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged" (B17). Now, as is well known this physical principle is replaced with the one which

asserts that in all changes the quantity of matter and energy remains constant. Yet, the problem here is the fact that Kant limits himself with just pointing out that this judgment is synthetic a priori and does not give us an account how the synthesis performed in these judgments and how one can actually go beyond the concept of “all changes of the material world” and with what means one connects this concept with the concept of “the unchanged quantity of matter.” A possible answer comes from the analogies where Kant argues that the unity of time is dependent on the permanency of substrata: “Substances, in the [field of] appearance are the substrata of all determinations of time. If some of these substances could come into being and others cease to be, the one condition of the empirical unity of time would be removed” (A188). So if no substance, namely matter, can come into existence and cease to be, then the quantity of matter must remain constant. Here we may argue that, the synthesis in the proposition is due to the a priori intuition of time. However, one can also follow another path, and argue that this proposition is derivative from more general propositions of “nothing comes out of nothing” and “nothing goes into nothing,” which, in their turn, rely on the thought of unrelatedness of being and nothingness. Moreover, we also lack a demonstration of how empirical laws of natural sciences are derivative from these universal and necessary propositions. It is not that such a derivation is impossible; I rather want to stress the fact that Kant has an uncritical faith on the a priority of propositions of mathematics and natural science and that this alone render transcendental exposition questionable. This fact becomes more significant in the case of arithmetic.

The argument from geometry, on the other hand, cast much light on Kant’s thesis. Geometry is the pure science of space such that it determines the properties of space a priori yet synthetically. Finally, if a priori synthetic propositions of geometry are to be possible, then the representation of space must be not only an intuition, since synthesis is possible only through an intuition, but an a priori intuition. Kant's argument from geometry seems to be sound, even more sound than that of the metaphysical argumentation,

and that's why some commentators argue that the only argument that Kant can offer in favor of the subjectivity, but still not ideality, of space is the argument from geometry,<sup>222</sup> and some others argue that argument from geometry, if correct, would account for the ideality of space.<sup>223</sup> However, criticisms also leveled at argument from geometry, some of which I shall deal immediately, though briefly.

Let me briefly consider the existence of non-Euclidean geometries at this point, though as a passing note. At the first glance, it seems that the existence of non-Euclidean geometries would pose a problem for Kant. However, Kant would accept the existence of such geometries, because since the axioms of Euclidean geometry are not logical their negation would not involve a negation.<sup>224</sup> Yet he could not allow that the space of human experience is a non-Euclidean space because in this case space would not be the a priori form of intuition. Yet, still, Kant's theory of geometry suffers more than just the historical advances in mathematics. A first class of criticisms regards to the necessity of geometrical propositions. Accordingly, geometrical propositions owe their necessity to logical necessity, since geometrical theorems are deduced from the axioms of geometry by pure logic. However, so the criticism goes, that these axioms are geometrical is not related to the necessity of propositions.<sup>225</sup> A second cluster of criticism argues that the conformity of the structure of physical world and the structure of different geometries with internal necessity is an empirical matter.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 38.

<sup>223</sup> Gary Hatfield, "Kant on the perception of space (and time)," in *Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Paul Guyer, (Cambridge: University Press, 2006), 77.

<sup>224</sup> Also see, W. H. Walsh, *Kant's Criticism of Metaphysics*, (Edinburg: Edinburg University Press, 1997), 26. Cf. Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 178.

<sup>225</sup> Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense*, 177; also cf. Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 348.

<sup>226</sup> Gary Hatfield, "Kant on the perception of space (and time)," 88.

Kant provides a symmetrical argumentation for time, yet the case for time is not that promising. First Kant does not provide us a pure science of time.<sup>227</sup> Kant, later in the book, offers a relation between numbers and time:

But the pure *schema* of magnitude (*quantitatis*), as a concept of understanding, is *number*, a representation which comprises the successive addition of homogenous units. Number is therefore simply the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of a homogenous intuition in general, a unity due to my generating time itself in the apprehension of the intuition. (B182).

Here Kant again offers us a sketchy explanation as to how numbers are derived from the intuition of time. My “apprehension of the intuition” is representing an intuition as a unity through a synthesis of the manifold which the intuition contains. My generating time, on the other hand, is, as discussed above for the case of space, bringing the manifold of the intuition of time under a unity. This manifold, on the other hand, is but discrete temporal units. Thus, in generating a number, what I do is to correlate these temporal units with numbers; say, one dot refers to the number “1”, two dots to “2”, and etc. In other words, what I do is “counting” distinct yet uniform units. Yet if this manifold of dots is to be taken as the manifold of time, as Kant does, we reach to a concept of time which becomes a continuous unity of discontinuous time-units. First, such a representation of time is not uncontroversial let alone self-evident. Second, such a representation of time is a schematized representation, that is, a spatial representation; and the manifold, synthesis of the unity of which is a number, is a spatial manifold. Kant, of course, is aware of this and says that in order for a “bare concept” to make sense, “the concept of magnitude seeks its support and sensible meaning in number, and this in turn in the fingers, in the beads of abacus, or in the strokes and points which can be placed before eyes” (A240/ B299).<sup>228</sup> It is frank that constructing a number includes

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<sup>227</sup> Schurman, “Kant's Theory of the A Priori Forms of Sense” in *The Philosophical Review*, 8. Cf., Cummins, Phillip. “Kant on Outer and Inner Intuition” in *Noûs*, 2 (1968): 127.

<sup>228</sup> Also see B 50: “And just because this inner intuition yields no shape, we endeavor to make up this want by analogies.”

spatial intuition to represent countable distinct objects.<sup>229</sup> Yet, then, it is not clear why exactly we need time here, and why space cannot achieve the same task. That we count these objects does not liberate us from this question, since as we shall see below, that counting takes place in time does not necessarily mean that it is a temporal operation.

Kant also refers to the judgments of arithmetic and argues that these judgments involve a synthesis. Accordingly, the mathematical judgment that “7 plus 5 equals 12” is synthetic a priori because of the fact that the “concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 5.” What I do, on the other hand, when adding 7 and 5 is resorting to the aid of some intuition which will correspond to one of the terms of the relation, my hand or five points, for example, and synthesizing the concept of 7 with the concept of 5 via using the intuition [I add five points or five fingers to 7 one by one], and then coming to the result of 12. What Kant argues here is that there is a genuine act in this arithmetic judgment and thus it is synthetic. One may fail to see the fact that there is an act here but, as Kant himself reminds, when we consider greater numbers Kant's case becomes more obvious. Moreover since the synthesis is done by the use of an a priori intuition, since I do not resort to the a posteriori data derived from experience, the judgment is synthetic a priori. However Kant's account of arithmetic suffers from a certain objection; that we need time to sum numbers with each other does not yield the fact that the arithmetical relations are the relations of time, let alone the fact that arithmetic is pure science of time:

No doubt we require time to add unity to unity, but the temporal condition under which we perform the operation, has nothing to do with the results or the validity of operation than the muscular movements which enable us to represent it on the blackboard, or the circulation of the blood which makes them possible. The arithmetician, for that matter like the geometer, goes through processes which require time, but what he is determining is, not relations of time but relations of numbers. It is perfectly indifferent the addition would be momentary or successive. Not only therefore is there no pure science based on time (as there ought to be if time is an a priori percept, and an a priori

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<sup>229</sup> Lisa Shabel, “Kant's philosophy of mathematics,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy*, 100.

perception is the ground of geometry), but time is not even a condition, that is logical condition of, of arithmetic.<sup>230</sup>

We can consider another example to make the argument of this citation more obvious. Let us suppose that one is establishing a logical system, starting with certain axioms and definitions and then reaching to several theorems which are derived from the former. Now the contention is this: That one requires time to establish such a logical system does not render this system temporal, i.e., does not show that the relations among the terms of the system (axioms, definitions, theorems, etc.) are the relations of time. Likewise, Kant writes that “when I seek to draw a line in thought,..., the various manifold representations that are involved must be apprehended by me in thought one after another” (A102). However, although I need time in constructing a straight line between two points, drawing this line still represents merely a spatial property, not a temporal one. Similarly that one uses five points to sum 7 and 5 does not show us that the relation of addition, and therefore the relations of subtraction, division, multiplication, etc., are the relations of time. These mathematical operations are relations among numbers, rather than being relations of time, and numbers are notions “*sui generis*, as little reducible to time as to space.”<sup>231</sup> Briefly, if time is to be the a priori form of intuition, we must be informed about a pure science of time, which concerns the universal truths of the temporal relations; as geometry concerns the universal truths of the spatial relations. Arithmetic, on the other hand, seems to fail to meet the need of such a science of pure time, since Kant, as argued above, did not revealed the basis of arithmetic so as to prove that arithmetical relations are relations of time. Kant further presents two axioms as the axioms of pure science of time: “Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but successive (just as different spaces

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<sup>230</sup> Schurman, “Kant's Theory of the A Priori Forms of Sense”, 9.

<sup>231</sup> Schurman, “Kant's Theory of the A Priori Forms of Sense”, 9.

are not successive but simultaneous)” (B47). However, it seems that, since time has only one dimension, these two axioms are all that the pure science of time can achieve.<sup>232</sup>

Kant tries to remedy the lack of a pure science of time by introducing some considerations concerning change and motion:

... the concept of alteration, and with it the concept of motion, as alteration of place, is possible only through and in the representation of time; and that if this representation were not an a priori (inner) intuition, no concept, no matter what it might be, could render comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, that is of a combination of contradictory opposed predicates in one and the same object, for instance, the being and the not-being of one and the same thing in one and the same place. Only in time can two contradictory opposed predicates meet in one and the same object, namely, *one after the other*. Thus our concept of time explains the possibility of that body of a priori synthetic knowledge which is exhibited in the general doctrine of motion, and which is by no means unfruitful. (B48-9).

However, this argumentation does not seem to hold water. First, as is obvious change and motion are not wholly free from empirical elements. Second, change and motion correlates not only with time but also with space (the change of the position of an object in space, for example) whereas geometry deals only with pure space. Finally, with good reason one would expect that pure science of time shall deal not with numbers or objects moving in space, but with the temporal states, just as geometry deals with spatial states; that is to say, “since time is the form of inner sense, a pure science of time should enable us to deal a priori with inner states, ... and offer a basis for psychology rather than for physics.”<sup>233</sup>

Thus far I tried to give an account of the argumentation Kant have provided in the defense of the idea that that space and time are both a priori intuitions, and forms of intuition. I also provided a short account of various objections brought to Kant. I believe that these objections suffice to show that Kant’s arguments are not that convincing, let

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<sup>232</sup> Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*, 128.

<sup>233</sup> Paton, *Kant’s Metaphysic of Experience*, 128.

alone self-evident. However, even if we disregard these objections and take arguments of the Transcendental Aesthetic as sound, we are still far away from Transcendental Idealism: that space and time are not just a priori intuitions; they are nothing but a priori intuitions. This dogmatic assertion prevails throughout the body of the *Critique*, just to give a few more examples: “As appearances, they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What objects may be in themselves, . . . , remains completely unknown to us” (A42/B 59); “the representation of a body in intuition, on the other hand, contains nothing that can belong to an object itself, but merely the appearance of something,” (A44/B 61); “But this space and this time, and with them all appearances, are not in themselves *things*; they are nothing but representations, and cannot exist outside of our mind” (A492).

If we disregard the objections, we may convince ourselves that space and time are a priori intuitions. However, that space and time are a priori intuitions does not necessarily yield to the fact that they do not belong to things themselves. It may be also the case that space and time are a priori intuitions and things in themselves are also spatial and temporal, and that it is this reciprocity which makes experience possible as it is. In other words:

But the justification for Kant’s conclusion that space and time are *only* representations, therefore *not* things in themselves or properties or relations thereof, is far from obvious. Once again, what is to exclude the possibility that we can indeed have a priori knowledge of spatial and temporal relations because we are acquainted with a feature of our own minds which *restricts* us to the experience of objects which are themselves spatial and temporal?<sup>234</sup>

This is known as the problem of “neglected” or “missing alternative” in the secondary literature.<sup>235</sup> As I have stated in the very beginning of the section, Kant seems to believe

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<sup>234</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 349.

<sup>235</sup> See Yaron M. Senderowicz, *The Coherence Of Kant’s Transcendental Idealism*, (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 98; and Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 365.

that, concerning the ontological statuses of space and time, there are only three alternatives: they are either things, relation of things, or properties of our minds. However, it may also be the case that, as the quotation above suggests, space and time are both a priori intuitions, and things in themselves are spatio-temporal. To recapitulate once more, thus far we do not have any convincing argumentation which would convince us that that space and time are forms of representation only given the condition that they are merely forms of representation and do not reside in things in themselves.

In the section titled “General Observations on Transcendental Aesthetic” Kant provides three further arguments concerning why space and time cannot be properties of things in themselves. I shall briefly consider them. The first one argues that our sensibility provides us only relations and things in themselves cannot be known through their relations since relations do not belong to inner structure of objects (B67). Here Kant suggests that relations are not real, without further justification, and bases his argument on this unjustified suggestion.<sup>236</sup> The second is the theological argument where Kant argues that if we take space and time as conditions of things in themselves, then God himself would be spatial and temporal, which is absurd (B71-2). This argument, in turn, is based on also another unwarranted claim that God is a-temporal and a-spatial, a claim which itself is subject to many philosophical discussions. For example, according to Spinoza, extension must be an attribute of God, since otherwise God would be limited with extension (in the sense that He is *not* extended), which is absurd because God is infinite (nothing may be excluded from the being of God). Moreover, it may also be the case that some entities that we experience in space and time are spatio-temporal and some others not.

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<sup>236</sup> *Ibid.*, 352.

The third argument runs on the apodicticity of synthetic a priori judgments. Here Kant argues the necessity of synthetic a priori judgments entails the subjectivity of space and time:

If there did not exist in you a power of *a priori* intuition; and if that subjective condition were not also at the same time, as regards its form, the universal a priori condition under which alone the object of this outer intuition is itself possible; if the object (the triangle) were something in itself, apart from any relation to you, the subject, how could you say that what necessarily exist in you as subjective conditions for the construction of a triangle, must of necessity belong to the triangle itself? You could not then add anything new (the figure) to your concepts (three lines) as something which must necessarily be met with in the object, since this object is [on that view] given antecedently to your knowledge, and not by means of it. If therefore, space (and the same true of time) were not *merely* a form of your intuition, ..., you could not in regard to outer objects determine anything whatsoever in an *a priori* and synthetic manner (A 48).

First of all, this extracted passage clearly suggests that Kant does not only deliver us a moderate theory according to which human experience have universal epistemic conditions; he firmly argues that things in themselves cannot be spatial or temporal if there are to be synthetic a priori propositions. Here Kant seems to believe that the necessity of the synthetic a priori propositions is possible only if the objects of these propositions are created by the subject. Thus, admitting spatiality to things in themselves, which exist independently of the subject, would render, in Kant's eyes, the necessity of the propositions of geometry contingent. This is because, seemingly, our necessary knowledge is limited with the content of our own minds; hence the infamous Cartesian motif reappearing once again. Thus, the necessity Kant demands here is the absolute necessity, and for the objects of our daily experience to obey such a necessity requires them to be reduced to representations, spatio-temporality of which are the constructions of mind. However, the third alternative still remains unrefuted, because one can argue that the propositions of geometry are apodictic because space is a priori form of intuition, yet things in themselves are also spatial. And there is a strict conformity between the propositions of geometry and the objects of our daily experience due to the conformity of the structure of thought and being.

Hitherto, I have tried to provide a discussion as to whether Kant's arguments suffice to show that not only space and time are a priori intuitions, but also they are transcendently ideal, i.e., things in themselves cannot be spatio-temporal. Moreover, I have further argued that although one may find Kant's arguments presented in the Transcendental Aesthetic convincing enough, it is also clear that to argue the ideality of space and time, and thus reducing objects of our daily experience to mental entities requires more than the arguments of the Aesthetic. Now I will argue that this more is provided by the antinomies.

#### **4.4 Antinomies**

Kant's aim in the antinomies is to show, first, how we unavoidably stuck in contradictions in cosmological problems, and then expose that it is the transcendental realist attitude which underlies the cosmological problems, and thus which leads us to unavoidable contradictions. Thus, Kant argues that since the reason of our falling into contradictions is the transcendental realist attitude, and since transcendental idealism is the only alternative to transcendental realism, antinomies provides a proof for the ideality of space and time, albeit an immediate one (a490f).

According to Kant, the reason of the contradictions thought falls in is thought's demanding the absolute totality of conditions for any given conditioned; that is to say, its demand for the unconditioned. Furthermore this demand is the outcome of the following principle: "If the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and consequently the absolute unconditioned is also given" (A409). When reason applies this principle to the spatio-temporal world it ends up with cosmological ideas. Thus, reason frees the categories of the understanding from the limitations of experience and extends them to

the unconditioned, which cannot be given in experience but is only an idea (A409). Hence, unavoidable contradictions.

There are four antinomies which concern beginning and limit of world in space and time, a simple element occupying space, an uncaused free cause grounding the series of the conditioned, and a necessary being as the ground of the contingent beings. In each antinomy, Kant offers two positions which are opposite to each other. Each position tries to prove its soundness and completeness by showing the impossibility of the other position. Thus, we can see that for Kant here too there are only two mutually exclusive alternatives and the truth of any of them depends on the impossibility of the other. Furthermore Kant argues that both positions are equally successful to refute each other, and thus this success shows that it is impossible to develop a dogmatic solution for antinomies. Although there are four, I will consider only the first antinomy since it is directly related with space and time.

#### **4.4.1 First Antinomy**

The first antinomy considers the beginning and limit of world in space and time. Accordingly, whereas the thesis argues that “the world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space,” the antithesis claims that “the world has no beginning, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time and space” (A 426-7). As I have mentioned above, both the argumentation of the thesis and the antithesis proceed from showing the impossibility of its opposite. So, let me give a brief account of the argumentation of both thesis and the antithesis, and consider some standard criticisms.

## The Thesis:

If we assume that world has no beginning in time, then up to every given moment an eternity has elapsed, and there has passed away in the world an infinite series of successive states of things. Now the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. It thus follows that it is impossible for an infinite world series to have passed away, and that a beginning of the world is therefore a necessary condition of the world's existence (A 427).

The structure of the argumentation is briefly as follows: Adopt the opposite, i.e., the world has no beginning in time. Thus, an infinite time must have elapsed up to any given moment in time, say present time. This means that an infinite number of successive events must have occurred; which, in its turn, means that an infinite series must have been completed. However, an infinite series cannot be completed through successive synthesis. Thus, it is impossible that the world has no beginning in time. Ergo, the world has a beginning in time.<sup>237</sup>

Now, the most common criticism brought to Kant's argumentation here is that it depends on a form of psychologism; or rather it confuses a subjective impossibility with an objective one. This line of criticism is raised by many commentators,<sup>238</sup> but I believe Kemp Smith puts the matter in great clarity:

From the impossibility of traversing infinite space in thought by the successive addition of part to part, Kant here argues that "an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be viewed as a given whole," and consequently that the world cannot be infinitely extended in space. That is, *from a subjective impossibility of apprehension he infers an objective impossibility of existence*. But Kant has himself defined the infinite as involving this subjective impossibility; for in the proof of thesis a he has stated that the infinitude of a series consists in the very fact that it can never be completed through successive synthesis. Kant is therefore propounding against the existence of the infinite the very feature which by definition constitutes its infinitude. The implication would seem to be that the concept of the infinite is the concept of that which *ex definitione* cannot exist, and that there is therefore a contradiction in the very idea of the actual infinite.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>237</sup> Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism*, 40.

<sup>238</sup> See, for example, Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 111.

<sup>239</sup> Kemp Smith, *A Commentary To Kant's Pure Critique of Reason*, 485.

In other words, briefly, synthesizing is a subjective-logical act and has nothing to do with objective existence of the infinity itself. To further illustrate the point let me give an example. One cannot reach to an infinite number by counting or adding numbers one by one, i.e., by successive synthesis, yet there still is such a thing as “arithmetic infinity”. Likewise, that the impossibility of synthesizing the infinite numbers of states of things does not necessarily show that there is no such a thing as the infinity of the states of affairs of things.

However, this line of criticism is met by more sympathetic commenters of Kant. Allison argues that it is important to distinguish between two concepts of infinitude in Kant’s philosophy: the true concept of infinity and the defective concept of infinity.<sup>240</sup> For Kant the true transcendental concept of infinitude is that “according to which the successive synthesis of units required for the measure of a given quantum can never be completed” (A432); the defective concept of infinitude is simply a greatest number that can be reached (A430). This latter is defective since no number as such can ever be reached. Thus the key point here is that a true concept of infinity also harbors the concept of “inexhaustibility”. In other words, in a true infinitude, no completeness can be given; and, conversely, wherever a completeness (of successive synthesis, for example) is, no infinity can be given. Now, to show how this distinction resolves the matter at hand Allison introduces a further distinction.<sup>241</sup>

Allison reports that Kant defines two sorts of totality, *totum syntheticum* and *totum analyticum*. In a *totum syntheticum*, the whole can be thought only as a synthesis of its parts (like the universe), and as such it presupposes a completion (of the synthesis of the

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<sup>240</sup> Allison, *Kant’s Idealism*, 42.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, 43.

parts constituting the whole). In a *totum analyticum*, on the other hand, the part can be understood only by reference to the whole, and no completion is required. Thus, space and time, unlike the universe, are *totum analyticums*.<sup>242</sup> Now, Kant's point is that, Allison argues, the "inexhaustibility" contained in the concept of the true infinity, and the completeness presupposed by a *totum syntheticum* contradicts each other. Therefore to argue that the universe, a *totum syntheticum*, is infinite in space and time is contradictory, since the states of affairs constituting the universe is completed at the present time.<sup>243</sup> Thus, it may be argued, when Kant speaks of the completion of a successive synthesis, he does not refer to a subjective-logical act; rather he points to the fact that infinitude is inexhaustible, and any totality which involves a completed series cannot be infinite.

Although sounding very promising, this reconstruction of Kant's argument also seems to suffer from various weaknesses. First one can conceptualize an infinitude which does involve a completed totality, like the infinity of the set of natural numbers (it is completed in the one end).<sup>244</sup> Second, it is not clear as to why we must consider universe as a *totum syntheticum* and not as a *totum analyticum*. For example, one may regard universe as an extended substance (say some kind of ether), analogous to the substance of Spinoza, parts of which are modifications of it, and thus parts of which can be thought only by reference to the whole.

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<sup>242</sup> Though, as we have seen in the Second Chapter, the requirements of transcendental deduction makes it necessary that space and time are also brought to a unity through a synthesis.

<sup>243</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 42.

<sup>244</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 44.

### **The Antithesis:**

For let us assume that it has a beginning. Since the beginning is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing is not, there must have been a preceding time in which the world as not, i.e. an empty time. Now no coming to be of a thing is possible in an empty time, because no part of such time possesses, as compared with any other, a distinguishing condition of existence rather than of non-existence; and this applies whether the thing is supposed to arise of itself or through some other cause. In the world many series of things can, indeed, begin; but the world itself cannot have a beginning, and is therefore infinite in respect of past time (A427).

The structure of the argumentation of the antithesis is the same with that of the thesis. First, we adopt the opposite, that is, the universe has a beginning in time. However, if the universe has a beginning in time, there must be a period of empty time in which nothing is. Thus, in this empty time, there is no distinctive moment which entails the world to come into existence since the parts of this empty time are identical with each other. Therefore we cannot answer the question “Why did the world come into existence when it did?” Consequently, if we are unable to detect a moment of time in which the world came into existence, we cannot argue that the world has a beginning in time.

This argument too, unfortunately, does not enjoy a general acceptance. A first cluster of criticisms argue that, it may well be possible that the first event occurred with the first time.<sup>245</sup> A second claims that all that Kant can deduce from the premises is that the question why the world came into existence when it did rather than at some point of time is “in principle unanswerable.”<sup>246</sup> Thus, it is further argued that what Kant can prove through the thesis and antithesis of the first antinomy is the “undecidability of opposed propositions.”<sup>247</sup>

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<sup>245</sup> For example, Jonathan Bennet, *Kant's Dialectic*, (Cambridge: University Press, 1974), 160.

<sup>246</sup> Strawson, *Bounds of Sense*, 112.

<sup>247</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 406.

As to the first objection, it is argued that the notion of a first event at a first time is incoherent due to the following. An event refers to a change in a state of affair or in a thing. Thus this alone, that the affair or thing changed, presupposes a prior time in which the change has not occurred yet; or in other words an event presupposes a preceding time in which the affair or the thing was in a different state. Thus the conception of a first event at a first time is not coherent.<sup>248</sup> However, I believe that, the second cluster of criticisms remains as a challenge to the conclusion Kant derived from the antinomies. Yet this criticism, on the other hand, helps us to see how Kant makes use of contradiction. Now, we may further argue that, that the proposition “the world is finite” is demonstrated to be refutable does not necessarily verify the proposition that “the world is infinite.”<sup>249</sup> In order to do so, we must grasp the opposing propositions as dialectical opposites, as Kant does.<sup>250</sup> Thus, wherever Kant sees a dialectical opposition, he, rather than concluding the undecidability of the matter, resolves that the basic assumption leading to the opposition is false. Moreover, as I will discuss immediately, on the basis of the assumed falsity he refers the validity of its opposite, i.e., transcendental idealism.

#### **4.4.2 Antinomies as the Indirect Proof of Transcendental Idealism**

As I have discussed above, a possible conclusion to be reached in antinomies would seem to be suspension of judgment, and indeed in some passages Kant seems to adopt a similar position:

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<sup>248</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 48-9.

<sup>249</sup> Allison, *Kant's Idealism*, 49.

<sup>250</sup> Guyer, *Claims of Knowledge*, 405.

If the empiricist philosopher had no other purpose in propounding his antithesis that to subdue the rashness and presumption of those who so far misconstrue the true vocation of reason as to boast of insight and knowledge just where true insight and knowledge cease, and to present as furthering speculative interests that which is valid only in relation to practical interests (in order, as may suit their convenience to break the thread of physical enquiries, and then under the pretence of extending knowledge to fasten it to transcendental ideas, though which we really know nothing); if, I say, the empiricist were satisfied in this, his principle would be a maxim urging moderation in our pretensions, modesty in our assertions ... (A470).

Elsewhere Kant further argues that the critical method does not “consider the question [of antinomies] objectively” but rather with its relation to the “foundation of knowledge” (A 484), which suggests that no ontological claim concerning the world as a whole (and the ontological statuses of space and time) would follow the antinomies.

However, in spite of the presence of such passages, the role of the antinomies in transcendental idealism is quite frank. Kant argues that, from the dilemma (i.e., the falsity of two opposing propositions, that the world is either finite or infinite) offered by the mathematical antinomies, primarily the first antinomy, it must be concluded that the world does not exist in itself as a whole. Moreover, this is followed by the conclusion that “appearances in general are nothing outside our representations—which is what is meant by their transcendental ideality” (A506). He even argues that the world as a whole “in only in our brain, and cannot be given outside it” (A484).

Transcendental idealism, thus, when seen as motivated by the antinomies, is more than an epistemological doctrine about the necessary elements of human experience, or, again, an epistemological call for modesty for our claims of knowledge. It is a dogmatic assertion that our knowledge claims must be limited with finite entities of experience, which, in turn, are nothing but mere representations. And this assertion is based on the ideality of space and time, which is established depending on the dialectical oppositions

occurring when thought tries to think the infinite. However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, for Hegel dialectical oppositions, and thus the contradictions stemming from them, is an indispensable aspect of reality. Consequently, if Hegel is to provide us a post-Kantian ontology, which is sensitive to the conclusions of transcendental philosophy, he must offer us a way to sublimate these dialectical oppositions so as to show that being is dialectical; i.e., he must show that, suspension of judgment or abolishing the subject matter totally are not the only two options that are to be adopted in the case of antinomies. This, however, requires a dialectical account of antinomies.

## CHAPTER 5

### HEGEL'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION

I have discussed, in what followed, that though there are various approaches concerning how to read Hegel, the approach that considers Hegel as a post-Kantian Spinozist captures, as we have seen especially not only from the body of the *Logic* itself but also from how Hegel addresses basic issues in Kant's philosophy, the spirit of his *Logic* best. Moreover, I have further discussed that Hegel can be considered as a post-Kantian thinker in more than one aspect. First, although the idea of the unity of thought and being was present long before Kant, it was Kant who opened the way to understand this unity as a logical condition. In other words, an immediate outcome of the transcendental philosophy is that, if there is to be such a thing as cognition, then being and thought must be unified in some sense. Indeed, as we have seen, when Kant discusses the necessity of categories for the possibility of experience, he demonstrates two points. First, categories are necessary conditions of representations of objects, since any object is represented in a judgment. And since the unity in a judgment is nothing but the original transcendental unity of apperception, it necessarily follows that, objects must conform to this unity of apperception if they are to be represented by the subject. However, Kant further argues that not only objects but also forms of intuitions and the content given thereby also subject to that original unity, and thus categories. And it is exactly this doctrine of transcendental unity of apperception as the sole source of unity which prompts the idea that the condition of the possibility of cognition is a primordial unity between thought and being; though, Kant denied this unity at the moment he indicated it. Thus, Hegel's Spinozism stems not only from Spinoza, but also from Kant. As we have seen, Hegel also argued that, as did Kant, ontology must give place to logic after the transcendental turn (B303; *SL*, 51). Thus, Hegel, like Kant, argued that if we are to understand the structure of an object, we should look at the pure categories of

thought which define what being an object is. Thus, when thought thinks being, it no more relates to something that is in fact alien to it. Rather the knowledge of being is a self-knowledge in the sense that thought's self-understanding also reveals the truth of being. However, like Spinoza, and unlike Kant, Hegel further argued that thought is not limited with the knowledge of finitude; thought can not only think, but also grasp infinitude.

However, as we have seen, Kant denied firmly any knowledge claims concerning the infinitude because of the unavoidable contradictions these claims lead to. Yet Hegel insisted that they do so, or more truly, they have to do so, because not only infinitude but also finitude, and indeed everything actual, harbors contradiction as a condition of its existence. However, this claim stands in need of a deduction. Now, at this point, one may argue that the required deduction has already been given by Kant himself. In other words, Kant, by pointing out to a primordial unity between thought and being as a necessary condition of cognition, already provided what is needed. Although it is true that Kant pointed out a unity between thought and being, he nonetheless also pointed out their distinctness by arguing that contradiction pertains not to being but to thought as a sign of falsity. Thus, there must indeed be a unity, at least to some extent, between thought and being if there is to be such a thing as cognition; yet this unity is not the absolute unity claimed by Hegel and Spinoza. So, briefly, any argumentation that can be developed from Kant's transcendental deduction for the absolute unity of thought and being cannot serve as a complete deduction.

Another idea for deduction comes from, as may be expected, *Phenomenology of Spirit*. There, Hegel claimed to demonstrate how ordinary consciousness is raised from its natural attitude to a philosophical one. Ordinary consciousness operates from a conviction that there is a distinction between *truth* (object) and *certainty* (knowledge of

object). However, as the course of the *Phenomenology* exhibits, this distinction does not seem to be sustainable. Each knowledge assertion proves its truth to lie in the subsequent one because it fails to satisfy its initial claim. The most immediate certainty, for example, which claimed to grasp its object in its immediacy, that it is 'here' and 'now', experiences that its object is not that immediate since it reveals its truth as being a unity of different moments; i.e., it reveals itself as a multiplicity of 'now's and 'here's. Thus, both consciousness and its object evolve to a further stage; in this case perception. However, each of these phases reveals that their truth lies in the further ones. The end of this movement, as is well known, is the absolute knowledge, where the distinction between certainty and truth, i.e., thought and being, is overcome. Thought recognizes its own activity when trying to cognize its object, and grasps the fact that its object in fact reflects the same structure as does the thought itself. Hegel, in the *Logic*, argues that *Phenomenology*, in this sense, can be regarded at least as a preparation of science (of logic):

The Notion of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* is nothing other than the deduction of it. Absolute knowing is the truth of every mode of consciousness because, as the course of *Phenomenology* showed, it is only in absolute knowing that the separation of object from *certainty of itself* is completely eliminated: truth is now equated with certainty and this certainty with truth. (*SL*, 49).

Thus, it may be argued that Hegel himself seems to consider *Phenomenology* as the deduction of science of logic. Indeed, the course of *Phenomenology* has pointed out the fact that there is indeed a unity between subject and its object in both cognitive and social-historical-religious aspects.<sup>251</sup> However, there are two drawbacks in this consideration which, if not totally dismiss the deduction from *Phenomenology*, makes it quite reasonable to look for another deduction. First, *Phenomenology* is not a logical deduction of the absolute identity of thought and being in the strict sense. It has pointed out the unity between subject and object, and this unity, in its turn, also points to the

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<sup>251</sup> See, for example, John Burbidge, *On Hegel's Logic: Fragments of a Commentary*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1981), 203 ff.

unity of thought and being. However, this indication does not necessarily promote the idea that there is an *absolute* unity between thought and being. In other words, that *Phenomenology* revealed an identity between subject and object does not necessarily mean that this unity is the absolute unity demanded by a post-Kantian Spinozism. It may well be the case that, the unity revealed by *Phenomenology* is compatible with the unity that is demanded by logical idealism.

Second, *Phenomenology* needs to be left behind if we are to take serious of *Logic*'s claims. There, as I have discussed above, Hegel argued that *Logic* is a historical necessity in the sense that it is the outcome of the modern demand for a radical critical thought, which will free us from the assumptions and presuppositions which, otherwise, cannot endure thought's critical enquiry. It is, in that sense, an immediate outcome of the methodological skepticism of Descartes and critical enterprise of Kant. However, this radical criticism, as we have seen, demands that thought must be presuppositionless; that is to say, it has to leave absolutely everything aside and focus on what thought is minimally. Thus, presuppositionless thinking cannot derive its legitimacy from another source. As William Maker argues, *Phenomenology*, in this sense, cannot serve as a ground or can give us deduction of science.<sup>252</sup> Thus any deduction must be provided within the limits set by presuppositionless thought. And indeed an idea for a possible deduction for Hegel's *Logic* which is derived from the presuppositionless thought comes from Houlgate.

### **5.1 Presuppositionless Thinking as the Deduction of *Logic***

According to Houlgate, Hegel's transcendental deduction is not provided in the main body of *Logic*. However, this deduction is provided in the very idea of

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<sup>252</sup> William Maker, *Philosophy Without Foundations: Rethinking Hegel* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 73-4.

presuppositionless thought. Accordingly, Houlgate argues that the deduction from presuppositionless thought has two facets. First:

After Kant's critical turn, Hegel maintains, the logician cannot take for granted anything at all about thought except thought's own simple being. In the science of logic, therefore, we may begin from nothing more determinate than the sheer being of thought itself – thought *as* sheer being.<sup>253</sup>

And second:

If we are to be thoroughly self-critical, we cannot initially assume that being is anything beyond the being of which thought is minimally aware. We may not assume that being stands over against thought or eludes thought but must take being to be sheer immediacy of which thought is minimally aware – because that is all the self-critical suspension of our presuppositions about being and thought leaves us.<sup>254</sup>

Now, as we can see these two facets are closely interrelated. Briefly, if we are to leave all our presuppositions in order to be thoroughly critical, we must also leave our supposition that, which in fact belongs to ordinary thinking, thought and being are different spheres. In this case, sheer being of thought is identical with sheer being as such since we cannot take granted that these two are separated. What we can argue about thought minimally is that thought is the intuition of being.

However, what is problematic in this line of argumentation is that, if we are not to presuppose anything, then it is true that we cannot suppose that thought and being are distinct; yet it is equally true that we cannot suppose that they are one and the same, either. We cannot conclude the fact “a” and “b” are the same from the premise that “a” and “b” are not distinct since this conclusion presupposes laws of inference which are not justified within the course of *Logic*. Indeed, if from the very beginning we take *Logic* to be an ontology just because we cannot presuppose any distinction between thought and being, then it is a frank fact that we have already presupposed too much. In

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<sup>253</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 129.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, 130.

other words, that thought is minimally the intuition of being does not necessarily mean that there is an absolute overlapping between the structures of thought and being; there may still be a difference between being of thought and being as such. Thus, true presuppositionless thinking cannot take granted that thought and being are absolutely identical. As William Maker observes: “neither this difference [between thought and being] nor this identity can be presupposed in philosophy, that is, that philosophy cannot begin neither as ontology nor as transcendental logic.”<sup>255</sup>

To be sure, the idea of unity between subject and object is really there; i.e., we can trace this idea in many philosophers and in some who even tried to draw a firm distinction between the two, like Kant. However, if Hegel is truly a post-Kantian Spinozist, only an absolute unity between thought and being can satisfy the demands of his Spinozism. One may argue a limited unity between thought and being in the sense that though they are identical to some extent, i.e., although thought can have access to some aspects of reality, it is nonetheless quite distinct from it. As we have seen above, such a limited identity between thought and being is attributable to Hegel as a logical idealist. This Hegel, like Kant, argues that being, as it appears to thought, is subject to categories; however, since he, unlike Kant, dismisses a distinction between concept and intuition, his logical idealism attributes a unity between thought and being. However, this unity is also limited because, as we have also seen, logical idealism does not take infinity and contradiction as pertaining to the structure of being. They rather belong to thought and this difference is what makes the unity of thought and being limited. Thus, the doctrine of absolute identity of thought and being still requires a deduction of its own.

In other words the doctrine of absolute identity faces with a question which is quite natural: how can such a doctrine harbor the thought of being as contradictory? Indeed,

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<sup>255</sup> William, Maker, “Understanding Hegel Today”, in *G.W.F. Hegel: Critical Assessments*, ed. Robert Stern, (London: Routledge, 2004), 273.

the natural attitude towards contradiction is that it pertains to thought alone, and one cannot consider contradiction as an aspect of reality. On the contrary, what makes a state of affairs real is its exemption from contradiction. If a thought of a state of affairs or an object involves contradiction, then it must be concluded that there must be a problem with the thought of that state of affairs or object. Indeed, it is due to the contradictions which haunt the thought of infinitude that Kant concluded that infinite is not a valid object of cognition. Here, we can see how Kant also shares the natural attitude towards contradiction: If there is a contradiction in a thought of something, then, first, it is hold that the contradiction pertains solely to the thought, not to something in question, and, second, it is also assumed that contradiction signals to a falsity in that thought.

If I am right to claim that the strategies discussed above are hardly convincing as proper deductions then we are still in need of one. Thus, I will discuss in what follows that one must look to the main body of the *Logic* for a possible deduction; i.e., to what *Logic* tells us about contradiction and infinity. I believe that this is also consistent with Hegel's claim that the method and the validity of *Logic's* content can be demonstrated only within the *Logic* itself (*SL*, 43-45). Thus, if there is a deduction for *Logic*, it is *Logic* itself which is responsible for providing it.

## **5.2 The First Antinomy in the *Logic***

As I have discussed above, if we posit that Hegel must be placed within the Kantian lineage, then a deduction for the ontological claims of *Logic* must address to the reasons that led Kant to abolish ontology as a proper branch of science. Indeed, as I have also discussed above, antinomies, for Hegel too, are the main motivation of transcendental idealism, since antinomies “brought about the downfall of previous metaphysics and can be regarded as a main transition into more recent philosophy” (*SL*, 190). This, in its

turn, makes it necessary that we should consider Hegel's account antinomies in *Logic*. However, I must immediately indicate that *Logic*, as Pippin aptly states, is not some sort of "Hegelian dictionary," such that "as if when one wants to know what Hegel's position is on a topic, one searches through the Table of Contents and consults the particular argument."<sup>256</sup> Moreover, I shall state here what must be said only in the end: that Hegel's deduction is not to be looked for in a separate section in the book; on the contrary, the whole book, from its very beginning, is Hegel's deduction. I'll discuss this point in more detail below. Now although the remarks made are quite correct, nonetheless a brief look over Hegel's account of antinomies would help us to set on the proper path.

However, when we look closer to the discussion over antinomies, we may be puzzled with the fact that there Hegel seems to focus on the fallacies, as he believes, Kant's argumentations suffer. This may sound curious since where we expect a strict ontological discussion we find a technical one over the structure of thesis and antithesis. Yet as I will discuss below, what seems as a technical objection does in fact depend on more profound ontological discrepancies.

At this point, however, before carrying out a discussion over Hegel's thoughts on Kant's argumentation in the antinomies, let me remind once more Kant's line of argumentation in both the thesis and antithesis, and their proofs for the first antinomy. Accordingly, the thesis of the first antinomy is this: The world has a beginning in time. The proof of the thesis is apagogical, that is, it rests on demonstrating the absurdity of the opposite thesis; i.e., the world has no beginning in time. Since, as the argumentation goes, if we admit that the world has no beginning in time, then at any given time an eternity must have elapsed. Yet this is impossible since no eternity can be achieved through successive

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<sup>256</sup> Pippin, *Hegel's Idealism*, 190.

synthesis. Or, according to Alison's re-construction, true infinity, for Kant, requires inexhaustibility, where successive synthesis implies exhaustion or completeness. So, this logical contradiction is what constitutes the main point of the proof. As to the antithesis, which argues that the world is infinite in time, the proof depends on the claim that there is nothing in an empty time which would make it necessary that the world comes into existence.

Having provided a brief recapitulation of Kant's arguments in the first antinomy, we may now consider the following passage from Hegel's discussion over the proof of the thesis of the first antinomy. After paraphrasing Kant, Hegel argues that the whole argumentation is a nest of fallacy:

But it is once evident that it was unnecessary to make the proof apagogical, or even to carry out a proof at all, since the basis of proof itself is the direct assertion of what was to be proved. Namely, there is assumed some or *any given point of time* up to which an eternity has elapsed (eternity here has only the trivial meaning of a simply endless time). Now a given point of time means nothing else than a definite limit in time. In the proof therefore, a limit of time is *presupposed* as actual; but *that* is just what *was to be proved*. For the thesis is, that the world has a beginning in time. (SL, 235).

As we can see, Hegel makes no reference to the argument that infinity cannot be obtained by successive synthesis, which was supposed to be the main support of the proof. Hegel's point in the quoted passage is rather as follows. First, according to Hegel, although Kant discusses whether there is a beginning of the world in time or not, in fact the antinomy is based on the possibility of a limit in time. Thus, the thesis argues that there is a limit in time (a 'now' in the past) which is the beginning of the future times. However, the proof also assumes a limit in the actual time (actual 'now'). So, what is to be proved is presupposed in the proof itself. Likewise, the antithesis and its proof, for Hegel, suffer from the same fallacy:

The world is an existence; the proof *presupposes* that this existence *comes into being* and that the coming-to-be has an *antecedent condition* which is in time. But the antithesis itself consists in the very fact that there is no unconditional existence, no

absolute limit, but that the existence of world always requires an *antecedent condition*. Thus, what was to be proved is found as an assumption in the proof.

As we can see Hegel is hardly interested in the argumentation provided by Kant. Rather, he reformulates the thesis and antithesis, and by doing so he claims to demonstrate that both proofs in fact presuppose what is to be proved. Hegel's reformulation, then, consists in this: what Kant discusses as whether the world has a beginning in time or not, is in fact an antinomical relation between two basic claims: "(1) there is a limit, and (2) the limit must be transcended" (*SL*, 234). Indeed, Hegel also reformulates the second antinomy (which is about the divisibility and the indivisibility of substance) and argues that the concepts discreteness and the continuity forms the antinomical opposition. This, however, points to an important aspect of Hegel's treating Kant's antinomies:

Kant did not take up the antinomy in the Notions themselves, but in the already *concrete* form of cosmological determinations. In order to possess the antinomy in its purity and to deal with it in its simple Notion, the determinations of thought must not be taken in their application to and entanglement in the general idea of world, of space, time, matter, etc; this concrete material must be omitted from consideration of these determinations which it is powerless to influence and which must be considered purely on their own account since they alone constitute the essence and the ground of the antinomies. (*SL*, 191).

Hegel's point in this passage is that, if one is to grasp the true nature of antinomies, one has to look at the categorical determinations in their logical purity. This will, in its turn, make it clear that, the antinomical opposition does not stem when we transcend the limits provided by sensation and apply pure categories of understanding to cosmological ideas (world as the total sum of existents); rather a pure logical investigation would demonstrate that these categories, even without their application to cosmological ideas, are of an antinomical character:

But profounder insight into the antinomial, or more truly into the dialectical nature of reason demonstrates *any* Notion whatever to be a unity of opposed moments to which, therefore, the form of antinomial assertions could be given. Becoming, determinate being, etc. (*SL*, 191).

These lines, in fact, demonstrate the hearth of the matter. First, Kant, according to Hegel, disguises the true nature of antinomies, i.e., that all the categories are of an

antinomical character, by carrying the discussion to cosmological matters. In fact, it may further be argued that, the philosophy of Kant is structurally incompetent to grasp the dialectical nature of concepts since it takes them in their isolatedness and fixedness. Thus, second, transcendental philosophy, since it does not grasp categories in their dialectical movements, fail to capture the true solution to these antinomies. Since Kant's philosophy deals categories in their fixedness, it fails to affect a solution to antinomies by bringing them under a speculative unity. This is a subject of crucial importance so let me throw some more words on it.

As I have discuss above, according to Hegel the antinomical conflict is in fact between categories. Whereas in the second antinomy, the conflict is between the concepts of discreteness and continuity, in the first antinomy it is between limit and the transcendence of limit. However, since Kant takes these determinations in their isolation and fixedness, he sought solution in abolishing cosmological thought all together. However, speculative thought demonstrates that the true solution to antinomies is that "two opposed determinations which belong necessarily to one and the same Notion cannot be valid each on its own in its one-sidedness; on the contrary, they are true only as sublated, only in the unity of their Notion" (SL, 192). In other words, as soon as one stays in the fixedness and isolation of opposite conceptual determinations, one would have no alternative to banish the contradiction itself. Hegel, on the other hand, aptly demonstrates how Kant's argumentation is stuck between the separateness of the concepts limit and beyond:

But if—as is, then, the case—it were related to the past through the now, the given point of time, and were thus determined as future, then this point of time, too, regarded from the other side, would not be a limit; the infinite series would continue itself in what was called future and would not be, as was assumed, *completed*. (SL, 235-6).

Hegel's point, in this dense paragraph can be restructured as follows. First, to remind once more, the antinomy arises from the dialectical opposition between the concepts of limit and its transcendence; though Kant fails to see it as such. That is to say, both thesis

and antithesis depends on asserting the necessity of one of the concepts (there is a limit, and every limit must be transcended). Since they are both necessary, and since they are taken in their separateness, antinomy arises. Second, since Kant holds on to the fixedness and therefore to the opposition of categories, he fails to see how they are united in a more comprehensive concept (in this case, the concept of quantum). In other words, he fails to grasp the concept of limit in its unity with its beyond, and therefore argues that a limit is an ultimate end without beyond. This understanding, on the other hand, when applies the concept of limit to time, argues that, if there is a limit, since it is an ultimate end, then time must be broken off, so to say, and what appears with the introduction of limit to time must, in its turn, be a completed totality. However, would Kant see the unity of the opposites, that the limit is only through its beyond, then he would not argue that at a given time the state of affairs must be represented as a completed totality. Time is not broken off or end at a given moment (or limit) since that limit “would continue itself in ... future.”

Hegel’s reformulation of the first (and the second) antinomy provides us further insights into the nature of antinomies. For Hegel, to remind once more, antinomies stem from the dialectical structure of our concepts, not from their application to cosmological ideas. Further, antinomies reflect how finite thought (understanding) grasps the relation (or, more truly, the lack of relation) between finite and infinite. A limit in time is in fact a finite moment in time which is an infinite quantity. However, for Kant, since finite stands in opposition to infinite, a presentation of limit to time results in breaking off the time as an infinite quantity. Time does not survive through the finite limits that are introduced to it. This is why Hegel argues that “Kantian antinomies are expositions of the opposition of finite and infinite in a more concrete shape” (*SL*, 234). As Hegel will demonstrate, there is an opposition between finite and infinite, yet there is also a unity between them. The infinite is and through the finite, and *vice versa*, the finite is and through the infinite. This double relation of identity and difference is what constitutes

their speculative unity. The doctrine of speculative unity, on the other hand, will also help us to understand how contradiction is incorporated into the structure of our concepts and thus into the reality itself.

This, I believe, brings us to Hegel's account of infinity, and how infinity arises from the realm of finitude. However, as I have stated above, *Logic* is not a dictionary, and thus considering Hegel's account of contradiction and infinity requires understanding of the logical structure of the whole movement that leads to the category of infinity. This is so because the necessity of each emerging category comes from the previous stages of categorical development. Therefore, understanding a particular categorical determination requires an understanding of the whole categorical development thus far. As we have seen, for example, understanding the logical structure of the category of determinate being is possible only through understanding the logical structure of the category of becoming, since determinate being is the necessary outcome of the logical dynamism inherent in becoming. However, as we have also seen, the emergence of the category of becoming takes us to a consideration of the logical structure of the category of being. This, in its turn, means that, the structure of an emerging category reflects the structure of previous moments and is determined through them. As I have discussed in the second chapter, all the new emerging categories can be regarded as further logical development of the category of being. That is to say, as Hegel argues, the beginning of science is at the same time "the ground of the entire science" (*SL*, 70). So, let me provide a brief logical history of the emergence of infinity in Hegel's *Logic*.

## 5.3 From Finitude to True Infinity

### 5.3.1 Dialectical Identity and Speculative Unity

To recapitulate briefly, Kant proposes the transcendental ideality of space and time, and thus the limitation of our knowledge claims with finitude by depending on the contradictions that the antinomies lead. However, Hegel argues that all the categories of thought are of an antinomical, that is, dialectical, character. Yet, this is not the end of the matter. In other words, all the antinomical oppositions are resolved in the emerging new categories. And this resolve, which is the speculative unity of opposing determinations, is Hegel's true transcendental deduction.

In fact, we have witnessed this speculative movement among categories from the very beginning of the book. Indeed the beginning is the first deduction of the *Logic*. As we would recall, the *Logic* begins with the category of pure being as such which immediately vanishes into its other, namely, nothing. Hegel also asserts the same movement for the category of nothing and argues that it also reveals itself as a vanishing into being. So, although they are different, their difference is not sustainable since they reveal themselves as a movement into their opposite. Hence, becoming. All this means that the category of being unfolds itself as a movement into nothing. There is being, but the logical structure of being necessitates that it must turn into nothing. Yet nothing itself does not stand in its pureness, and it is also a movement into being. Thus, this tells us that the truth of both determinations is becoming, and being and nothing are merely moments of it. In other words, there is no being as such which excludes everything else and stands in its purity in the sense Parmenides defended. The being and nothing, in their purity are dialectically identical. The truth of being, then, is becoming which is the speculative unity of being and nothing.

As I have discussed in the Chapter Three, dialectical identity means that the opposing moments, which at first sight seem to stand in an exclusive relation, make each other possible. A and B are dialectically identical if, first, they appear as opposing determinations, and second, they make each other possible. The category of becoming is the outcome of the dialectical identity and thus speculative unity of being and nothing. There, being is possible only through its movement into nothing. Without this movement into its other, there is no intelligible way of speaking about being as such. It is a ceasing to be; i.e., being is made possible by nothing. And vice versa, the same is also true for nothing; it is a coming to be. Thus, since both moments are made possible by each other they are dialectically identical. And since they are dialectically identical, they result in a speculative unity of which they are moments.

As we have seen, the immediate logical outcome of the category of becoming is determinate being. As we recall, both becoming and determinate being are unities of being and nothing. However, whereas becoming is the unity of pure being and pure nothing, determinate being is the unity of impure being (which harbors nothing as a constitutive moment of it, i.e. ceasing to be) and impure nothing (which, in its turn, harbors being as a constitutive moment of it; i.e., coming to be). Briefly, then, determinate being is the unity of being and non-being (not being and nothing). Thus, as the famous formulation goes, determinate being is “what it is in not being what it is not.” In other words, determinacy “involves being real and negative at the same time.”<sup>257</sup> Here we can observe the same logical movement which is exhibited in the category of becoming. Determinate being is real; it has a sphere of existence of its own. Yet its reality is only through its negativity. It is only by virtue of not being what it is not. Thus, determinate being is a good example of speculative unity which depends on the

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<sup>257</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 312.

dialectical identity of opposing moments. In determinate being, the dialectical identity of being and nothing is clearly expressed, since it is through nothing that being is. In other words, what makes being “this” possible, is “not being that.” Thus, is and not are dialectically identical in this sense since they make each other possible. And their dialectical identity results in their speculative unity, i.e., determinate being. Then both becoming, and determinate being are speculative unities of being and nothing, though they differ in the degree of determination.

Now, it may sound as if the negativity here (i.e., the negativity in the determinate being) is a mere matter of contrast. In other words, for example, what makes the property of being red more *explicit*, is its contrast with the property of being, say blue. Yet this is not the case here. The speculative unity of being and non-being has further ontological implications. As we have seen determinate being is the further determination of the category of becoming, and as such it reserves the previous logical movement; i.e., it is a being which is nonbeing. Thus, determinate being is also a ceasing to be and coming to be. Therefore, the negativity here has a two-fold function. First, this negativity is what distinguishes and what connects determinate being with other determinate beings. Moreover, this negativity is also a dynamic one in the sense that a determinate being must cease to be what it is. In other words, negativity is the motor of the *Logic*<sup>258</sup> in the sense that it determines a thing as such, and at the same time determines the same thing to turn into its opposite. This double logical relation is evident in all the further determinations of determinate being. To give just one example, determinate being reveals itself as a something. However, something is only through its negative relation with an other. This means that a things relation with other things is not external or contingent in the sense that if they happen to connect in vast space somehow, they come to relate each other. Rather, on the contrary, a thing is “other-related” in the sense that its

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<sup>258</sup> Taylor, *Hegel*, 243.

very own existence necessitates some state of relation with other things.<sup>259</sup> Thus, this logically necessitated being “other related” reveals another dimension of the speculative identity in Hegel’s philosophy. As we have seen, categorical determinations are outcomes of the dialectical movement of previous determinations. That is to say, a new emerging categorical determination is the speculative unity of the previous categorical determinations which are in opposition with each other. Now, Hegel also demonstrates that, such a speculative identity is also to be found in actuality. Everything acquires its identity through its relation with all those entities which the thing in question is supposed to exclude. Thus, Hegel here portrays a much more dynamic picture of actuality where everything stand in a necessary relation, and thus acquires its being in this relation, to others. Moreover, to remind once more, something also proves itself to be self-othering in the exact sense that a determinate being has to cease to be due to the negativity inherent in its nature. In other words, internal change, becoming something other than which the thing initially is, is a logical determination of things; things necessarily change (*SL*, 118 ff).

What is crucial here is that, it is this logical necessity of determinate being to cease to be what it is (or its necessary self-othering) is what renders determinate being finite. In other words, a determinate being comes to an end (cease to be or self-other itself) due to this inner logical necessity. This is why Hegel argues that finite beings “have the germ of decease as their being-within-self: the hour of their birth is the hour of their death” (*SL*, 129). As Taylor puts it, having a determination which makes a thing real, is at the same time tends to terminate it.<sup>260</sup> In order to be real, a thing must be determinate, yet being determinate logically renders coming to stop being what it is. This coming to end is the innermost determination or the truth of finitude. It fulfills its inner being by stopping to be what it is. Therefore Hegel claims that finitude is self-contradictory (*SL*,

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<sup>259</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*, 373.

<sup>260</sup> Taylor, Hegel, 238.

130). And it is this self-negating character of finitude which leads to the emergence of infinity.

### 5.3.2 Emergence of Infinity

Finite being, as we have seen, is self-contradictory. It is a unity of being and non-being, and as such its logical structure points two important aspects of the being of finitude. First, it is what it is by not being what it is not. In other words, a finite being has a relational structure, in the sense that it has a distinct sphere of being of its own, yet this sphere comes to fore, and indeed made possible, by its relations with other finite entities. Second, which is important for the discussion of infinity, since finitude is a ‘not’ in the sense of being ‘non-being’ it must come to an end; that is to say, it must cease to be. However, the outcome of this ceasing to be is not a mere nothing:

The finite is thus inwardly self-contradictory; it sublates itself, ceases to be. But this its result, the negative as such, is ( $\alpha$ ) its very *determination*; for it is the negative of the negative. Thus, in ceasing to be, the finite has not ceased to be; it has become in the first instance only *another* finite which, however, is equally a ceasing-to-be as transition into another finite, and so on *infinity*. But ( $\beta$ ) a closer consideration of this result shows that the finite in its ceasing-to-be, in this negation of itself has attained its being-in-itself, is *united with itself*... This *identity with itself*, the negation of negation, is affirmative being and thus the other of the finite, of the finite which is supposed to have the first negation for its determinateness; this other is the *infinite*. (SL, 136).

Now there are a few points in this dense paragraph which stand in need of an explanation.

First, Hegel here argues that the ceasing-to-be of the finite is “its very determination.” As we have seen, the logical determination of finite thing is essentially negative in the sense that its being entails its non-being; i.e., its demise. Therefore, when finite thing cease to be it accomplishes its determination since its final determination entails its ceasing-to-be. However, this ceasing-to-be of finite is not an utter end. The ceasing-to-

be of a finite thing is the coming-to-be of another finite thing. The logical necessity of this new coming-to-be can, in fact, be derived from various sources. Hegel argues, for example, that if the end of the ceasing-to-be “is to be grasped as the nothing, then we should be back again at that first, abstract nothing, which itself has long since passed away” (*SL*, 131). In other words, if the ceasing-to-be of the finite thing is to lead to pure nothing then the whole dialectical movement must start from the beginning since, as we have seen, pure nothing is the same as pure being. Therefore, although the ceasing-to-be of the finite thing leads to a negative in the sense of the lack of the being of that finite, still this negative is not pure nothing but a determinate negative; i.e. another finite being.<sup>261</sup> Similarly, one can argue that, since the determination of something is its own othering, the ceasing-to-be of a finite thing must be coming-to-be an ‘other’ finite thing. Or, again, it may further be argued that, as the logical structure of becoming revealed, every ceasing to be must necessarily be followed by a coming-to-be. To use Taylor’s analogy, when a wood burns it turns into ash and smoke thus ceasing-to-be of wood is coming-to-be of ash.<sup>262</sup> Briefly, the ceasing-to-be of a finite being is the coming-to-be of another finite being. This necessity in fact is revealed in every further determination of determinate being. Therefore, it can further be argued that the truth of finitude is passing into another finite being. However, this process of ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be is an endless process. Thus, we have before us the first emergence of infinity. It consists in the endlessness of the process of ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be of finite beings. What is important to note here is that, even in this point, the first emergence of infinity in its most immediate form, infinity is and through finitude. It does not precede or transcend it. This is a crucial point in understanding Hegel’s conceptualization of infinity.

However, the concept of infinity is not limited with the endlessness of the process of ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be of the finitude. Hegel also argues that, finite, in its

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<sup>261</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel’s Logic*, 395.

<sup>262</sup> Taylor, *Hegel*, 242.

ceasing-to-be, is united with itself. In this unification, on the other hand, it negates the negation which constitutes its determination, and as such reveals itself as the infinite. This infinite, however, is not to be confused with the first infinite that was discussed in the previous paragraph. This is indeed a very dense argument yet still it makes perfect sense with closer inspection. As stated above, the true determination of finite is its self-othering; i.e., becoming something other than itself. However, this other, since it is the fulfillment of the determination of the finite thing, is not a radical other, but rather a continuation of the initial finite being:

[In ceasing to be] It [finite thing] is realizing a tendency inherent in what it is, namely, that of becoming something other than it is. This means, however, that in ceasing to be, a finite thing is actually revealing a previously hidden dimension of its own being and so is in fact coming to be itself in another disguise. Its being continues beyond its demise—albeit in a radically transformed mode.<sup>263</sup>

Thus, when a finite thing is transformed into another, it, in fact, continues to *be*, yet in a different form. And since, this be-ing continues among the endless process of ceasing-to-be and coming-to-be, it is infinite in this exact sense. This second infinite, then, consists of not endlessness of the process, but continuation of Being, or rather, be-ing. To state the matter in different terms, then, whereas the first infinite is the endlessness of the process of becoming, the second infinite is the “being” of this becoming. However, although these two infinities are different, they are intimately related. The first infinity arises from the endlessness of the process of becoming, the second one, on the other hand, arises from the self-sameness of becoming throughout this process. Therefore, since they are different, they are not radically different. Rather, they are different moments, or constituents, of the concept of infinity.

Even at this very point, where infinity emerged yet in its immediacy (i.e., it has not achieved its final determination), we can still have an understanding of the most crucial aspect of infinity; that it is and through finitude, or in other words, its truth is finitude. Although some commentators argue that, as we have seen in Chapter Two, that infinity

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<sup>263</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 397.

arises as a mere intellectual activity of thought in *Logic*,<sup>264</sup> Hegel explicitly argues what gives rise to the idea of infinity is not the act of understanding but rather finitude itself:

It is the very nature of the finite to transcend itself, to negate its negation and become infinite. Thus the infinite does not stand as something finished and complete above or superior to the finite, as if the finite had an enduring being *apart from or subordinate to the infinite*. Neither do *we* only, as subjective reason, pass beyond the finite into the infinite; as when we say that the infinite is the Notion of reason and that through reason we rise superior to temporal things, though we let this happen without prejudice to the finite which is in no way affected by this exaltation, an exaltation which remains external to it. But the finite itself in being raised into the infinite is in no sense acted on by an alien force... It is not in the sublating of finitude in general that infinity in general comes to be; the truth is rather that the finite is only this, through its own nature to become itself the infinite. The infinite is its *affirmative determination*, that which it truly is in itself. (*SL*, 138).

This paragraph, which is definitely one of the peak points in *Logic*, expresses the dialectical identity and speculative unity of finite and infinite in quite straightforward terms. First, infinity is not mere an ideal that reason necessarily leads to. It is, and it is amidst the incessant process of birth and death of things. However, since this process is constituted by finite beings, infinity is not something above the finitude, which transcends it and in its transcendence determines the finitude from without. On the contrary, it is through the flesh and blood of the finite. Briefly, the truth of infinity is finitude since finitude is the possibility of infinity. Second, this exaltation to infinity is the exaltation of finitude. In other words, what reveals itself as the infinite is the finite itself. Thus, the truth of finitude is infinity. Infinity is the possibility of finitude. Both finite and infinite are in a necessary relation to each other and as such harbors the other as a constitutive moment of itself. Hence, the dialectical identity of finitude and infinity. This dialectical identity will, thus, reveal their speculative unity, which establishes the true infinity in Hegel's thought.

Hegel, having demonstrated that finite and infinite are dialectically identical in the sense that they make each other possible, further argues that even if we take these determinations in their isolation, they will still point to their other, and thus reveal the

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<sup>264</sup> Also cf. Burbidge, *On Hegel's Logic*, 53.

other as a constitutive moment of themselves. When we isolate infinite, and look at its determination as it is in-itself, we see its opposite, the finite, in it. This is so, because isolation of infinite finitizes it. In other words, when infinite is taken in its separation from finite, the finite, then, is set as an other of infinite. However, since finite stands against infinite as something other than infinite, it, in this sense, sets a limit to it. In this case, there is something which the infinite is not, hence infinite is limited, and thus finitized, by something which it is not:

The infinite, in that case, is *one of the two*; but as *only one* of the two it is itself finite, it is not the whole but only *one* side; it has its limit in what stands over against it; it is thus *finite infinite*. There are present only *two finites*. It is precisely this holding of the infinite apart from the finite, thus giving it a *one-sided* character, that constitutes its finitude and, therefore, its unity with the finite. (*SL*, 144).

This, I believe, is one of the most profoundest criticisms that is brought to the Abrahamic religions' pictorial description of God as that which transcends its creation. If God is not matter, that is to say if it transcends the material world, then this means that there is something which stands against the existence of God. Thus, God, in its opposition to what he is not, is rendered finite and is no more the Absolute, but only a finite infinite; and hence finite.

Finite, on the other hand, when taken in isolation also reveals its truth as infinite:

The finite, on the other hand, characterized as independent of and apart from the infinite, is that self-relation in which its relativity, its dependence and transitoriness is removed; it is the same self-subsistence and affirmation which the infinite is supposed to be. (*SL*, 144).

The rationale of this passage is briefly as follows. As we have seen, what gave way to infinite is the ceasing to be of the determinate being, which is a necessary logical determination of it. However, then, in order to abstract determinate being from the infinite, and in order to see what determinate being is in its purity, one must also abstract the very determination which renders determinate being finite. In other words, abstracting finite being from infinite is at the same time abstracting the logical

determination which renders a thing finite. However, when this determination is abstracted the finite, then, reveals itself as something which is of a self-subsisting character; i.e., as something infinite.<sup>265</sup> These lines, which I believe to reflect the genius of Hegel, shows perfectly how the two determinations cannot remain in their isolatedness, i.e., purity, and how they acquire their identity through their relation with their opposite. Understanding, according to Hegel, since it clings to their abstraction and fails to see their dialectical identity, falsifies both finite and infinite. In Hegel's words:

The falsification of the finite and infinite by the understanding which holds fast to a qualitative distinct relation between them and asserts that each is in its own nature is separate, in fact absolutely separate from the other, comes from forgetting what the Notion of these moments is for the understanding itself. According to this, the unity of the finite and infinite is not an external bringing together of them, nor an incongruous combination alien to their own nature in which there should be joined together determinations inherently separate and opposed, each having a simple affirmative being independent of the other and incompatible with it; but each is in its own self this unity... (SL, 154).

As I have discussed above, each proves to contain its other in its own self. In other words, each acquire their identity through their relation to their others: "each one proves to be an integral moment of the process that the other one is."<sup>266</sup> This constitutes their dialectical identity. And since they are dialectically identical, they come together in a speculative unity which is the true infinity.

Both finite and infinite proves themselves to be a process of "uniting-with-itself-in-the-other."<sup>267</sup> Finite being ceases to be, yet in this ceasing to be it reveals itself as infinite (since, as discussed above, it continues to be in a different form) and in this infinity it unites with itself. Uniting with itself here means that finite thing acquires its identity through its relation with something else. Since what arises in this relation to other is the

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<sup>265</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 416.

<sup>266</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 418.

<sup>267</sup> *Ibid.*

identity of the finite thing, then finite thing comes to unite with itself (acquires its new identity) in other (since this identity emerges only in relation to other). The same process is also true for the infinite, in the sense of endlessness and continuation of the self-same; since they are possible only through the ceasing to be of the finite entities. Thus, this relation of harboring the other in its own self and thus uniting with its own self in the other, reveals a unity of both in which they exist as constitutive moments not as distinct spheres of being. This unity is the true infinite (*SL*, 148). True infinity, is the whole system of becoming and change through finite beings,<sup>268</sup> yet this system is always united with itself since the changes, ceasing-to-be's and coming-to-be's in this system always produces the system itself. In other words, one may argue that the true infinity expresses the reflexive structure of the being in its totality because of the following. What is produced in the system of finite things is the system itself; the whole of the system of finitude produces itself again and again. In other words, all the 'self-othering's, ceasing-to-be's result in the self-sameness of the totality of the system and in this sense it is united with itself therein. It is not limited with something else, and it always produces itself. What is determined in this endless system of change is the system itself, thus the true infinity is self-determination.<sup>269</sup>

According to Hegel, this uniting-with-itself in its self-othering, this self-determination reflects the structure of self-consciousness. Indeed, within the course of *Logic*, we will learn that being will reveal its true infinity when it truly relates to itself and become conscious of itself: "True infinity thus provides to be not just endless series of occurrences in space and time but the process whereby being brings itself to self-

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<sup>268</sup> Taylor, *Hegel*, 242.

<sup>269</sup> See G. R. G. Mure, *A Study of Hegel's Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), 49. Also cf. McTaggart, *A Commentary*, p 35.

consciousness (and so to life) and so becomes spirit.”<sup>270</sup> This may sound as a very bold assertion, yet it may be formulated in more humble terms which reflect the more materialist spirit of our age. Thought can be taken as the most complex form of being. Whereas dark matter represents the most primitive aspects of being (a sheer existence) thought represents its most dynamic aspects; i.e., its uniting-with-itself in its totality, and thus its reflexivity and self-determination.

I have tried to demonstrate that for Hegel contradictions do not arise when we apply the categories of understanding to cosmological ideas. On the contrary we encounter with contradiction in every aspect of reality. Reality, from its most immediate determinations to its most complex ones, is contradictory. Thus, contradiction is not a sign of falsity; on the contrary it is the motor of the reality which forces beings to relate, to change, to cease to be and finally in their ceasing to be to become something else. Briefly, the truth of reality is becoming, and the truth of becoming is negativity; i.e., contradiction. Then, for Hegel antinomies are not indicators of the fact that our cognition must remain within the limits of finitude. The truth of finitude, for Hegel, is the infinitude. Antinomies are, then, merely indicators of the most basic aspect of actuality. True solution to antinomies is demonstrating how the opposing (i.e., contradicting) determinations are dialectically identical in the sense that they render each other possible. Thus, this identity, in its turn, necessitates that they are brought together in a speculative unity of which they are moments. This resolve in a higher unity is the true solution to antinomical character of our categorical determinations. Therefore, for Hegel infinity is not something which stubbornly evades our cognitive powers. The endlessness that is inherent in the concept of infinity may render it tiresome in the sense that thought finds no way to consume its endlessness. However, for Hegel the truth of infinity is its unity with the finite. This unity is not endlessness that escapes from further determination. In fact, though can grasp, and thus determine, the structure of infinity, that it is a uniting-with-self in its

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<sup>270</sup> Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 425.

other. This structure, for Hegel is reflected in the structure of self-consciousness in the sense that self-consciousness is of a self-determining character. This self-determination and being-with-itself-in-an-other is what constitute thought's freedom.

Freedom for Hegel and German idealist stems from thought's power of self determination. Man, as a thinking subject, also shares the self-determining character of thought and as such he is self-legislative. Indeed, man is differentiated from the rest of nature since he can choose which laws he is to obey. He is not pray to his own nature, instincts, or processes in nature; he can determine the laws that will prevail in his life. This is his freedom, and indeed one can argue that man experiences his own freedom when he experience his law governed life. This fact can be observer in the life of many cultures in the process of history. We indeed encounter many cultures with many different and singular laws which, at the first sight, may seem useless. But it is clear that, that man can set his own laws for his own life is the experience of freedom.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

In my thesis, I have discussed two different ontological approaches, that of Kant and of Hegel, concerning how to address contradiction and infinity. I have argued that for Kant contradiction pertains exclusively to thought, and when it emerges, it indicates a falsity in the thinking procedure. Moreover, since contradictions arise perpetually when we endeavor to cognize the infinity, (the infinity of world in time and space, for example) Kant concluded that infinity cannot be a legitimate object of our knowledge claims. Thus, finally, according to Kant the only legitimate objects of cognition can be the finite objects given through sensation. According to Hegel, on the other hand, contradiction is an irreducible element of reality; and as such it is not limited to the thought of infinity, but pertains to the thought of everything, even of finitude, since reality is in itself contradictory. Moreover, I have argued that for Hegel infinity can be grasped by thought, not only because the contradictions arising thereby are not unresolvable, but also because thought is in itself infinite.

To this end, in the first chapter I have discussed various approaches concerning how to read Hegel's *Logic*. There I have focused on exclusively two approaches which place Hegel in the Kantian lineage; i.e., Hegel as a logical idealist and Hegel as a post-Kantian Spinozist. According to the former, Hegel is a logical idealist who radicalizes Kant's transcendental philosophy. Accordingly, both Hegel's continuity with, and separation from Kant mainly stem from Kant's doctrine of the transcendental unity of apperception; and how this unity functions as the condition of the possibility of experience. Therefore, I have provided a brief account of transcendental deduction and discussed that the

transcendental unity of apperception unity, for Kant, is the sole source of unity. And since it is the sole source of unity, and object which is to be represented by subject must be subject to the conditions of this unity. This is so, because for Kant objects are represented in a judgment, and judgments are acts of affecting a unity among a manifold. However, transcendental deduction produces a second important result. Since the transcendental unity of apperception is the sole source of unity, it is also the condition of the unity of our forms of sensation and the content given thereby. This second result is regarded by his followers as an indication, if not demonstration, of the unity of concept and intuition. Then, I have discussed how to read *Logic* as a radicalization of Kant's transcendental philosophy. In this approach, Hegel is a post-Kantian logical idealist who demonstrate that how the self-determination of thought (its producing its pure concepts from its own) is the condition of the determination of the objects of experience. Moreover, since Hegel rejects a thorough concept-intuition distinction, his logical idealism does not leave us with a transcendental residue of the thing-in-itself. In other words, since there is no concept-intuition distinction thought can grasp the in itselfness of things. However, this approach rejects the ontological claims of *Logic*, and argues that contradictions that arise between categorical determinations pertain solely to these determinations; i.e., contradictions are outcomes of the acts of reason when trying to cognize its objects.

The latter approach argues that Hegel is a post-Kantian Spinozist. As we have seen, for Kant the condition of cognition is a unity between concept and intuition, at least to some extent. Thus, Kant argues that categories of understanding *a priori* determine the structure of the objects of experience. Hegel's post-Kantianism, then, is a radicalization of this logical necessity in the sense that if one is to understand the structure of determinate being, one should look at the structure of the concept of determinate being. However, since Hegel rejects any distinction between concept and intuition, and since he proposes an absolute identity of thought and being, he is also a Spinozist. In other

words, thought, through only considering its own structure, can *a priori* determine the structure of being. And the contradictions thought encounter therein, then, due to the absolute overlapping between thought and being, must also pertain to the structure of being. Then, for example, if the thought of determinate being reveals itself as contradictory in the sense that determination necessarily entails negativity, and negativity, in its turn, necessarily entails ceasing to be, then this means that finite beings we encounter in actuality must necessarily come to an end. Briefly, *Logic* is a demonstration of the entire structure of being solely through an examination of the structure of thought. Finally, in this chapter I have argued that the latter approach seems to hold Hegel to his word, and is more convenient to the spirit of *Logic*.

In the third chapter I have discussed Hegel's criticisms of Kant, and by doing so I claimed to shed light on two crucial matters. First, I have tried to demonstrate that Hegel is fully aware of Kant's transcendental turn, and as such by no means he can be regarded as a pre-critical thinker. This, I believe, further strengthens the idea that Hegel belongs to the Kantian lineage. Second, I have discussed that the main motivation of Hegel's criticisms of Kant stems from Kant's implicit Cartesianism; that is, his detachment of thought and being. There I have concluded that Hegel embraces Kant's motivations and radicalizes them. According to Hegel, then, a thorough critical thought cannot presuppose that its categories are limited with what traditional logic offers. A true critical enterprise must venture to deduce thought's categories solely from the being of thought, as is also implied by Kant himself. Moreover, as we have seen, Hegel is fully aware of the motivations behind Kant's transcendental turn, yet he intends to offer his own response to these motivations. Then I have argued that, *Logic* is, or at least as Hegel intends it to be, an ontological enterprise which is directed at the knowledge of being as such. However, I have concluded that if Hegel is to be regarded as a post-Kantian philosopher he must face with the reasons that lead Kant to limit our knowledge claims as he did.

In the fourth chapter, I have argued that the main argumentation for the transcendental ideality of space and reason, and thus the limitation of thought with finitude, comes not from Transcendental Aesthetic, but from the antinomies. I have first discussed that the best Transcendental Aesthetics can offer is that space and time are necessary conditions of experience. However, this result by no means leads to the ideality of space and time. Then I have discussed Kant's second argumentation from the antinomies. Antinomies, for Kant, arise when we employ the categories of understanding to cosmological ideas (for example to the world as the sum total of the phenomena). This application, Kant demonstrates, necessarily leads to a contradiction between two opposing claims. There arises a contradiction because each of the claims can demonstrate its validity and necessity. Thus, then, we end up two valid yet opposing claims; and hence contradiction. Kant further argues that since it is the transcendental realistic attitude which claims to know the world in its totality, the contradictions arising in that though indicates the falsity of transcendental realism. And, finally, since Kant believes that the only alternative to Transcendental Realism is the Transcendental Idealism, he argued that antinomies can be regarded as another proof for the ideality of space and time.

In the fifth and final chapter, I have discussed how Hegel addresses to Kant's antinomies in his *Logic*. I have argued that at first sight Hegel's addressing to antinomies may seem as technical in the sense that he just points out the fallacies that the line of argumentations offered by Kant harbors. Hegel reformulates Kant's first antinomy and argues that the opposition is between the determinations of limit and its transcendence, and argues that Kant's arguments suffer from fallacy since the proofs includes what is to be proven. However, I have discussed that what seems as a technical objection in fact rests on more profound ontological discrepancies between two philosophers. For Hegel, antinomies do not arise solely from application of categories to cosmological ideas. Rather, all our categorical determinations are of an antinomical character. Indeed,

throughout the *Logic*, we witness opposing categorical determinations. Yet, the opposition does not mean that one of the categorical determinations is to be chosen or, rather, the both are to be left behind as null. On the contrary, for Hegel, opposition is the medium through which determinations are unified. In other words, Hegel demonstrates in *Logic* how any categorical determination acquires its content only through its relation to what it is supposed to exclude; i.e., what stands in opposition to it. This necessity, on the other hand, is what constitutes the dialectical identity of opposing determinations. Indeed, we have witnessed this dialectical relation among categorical determinations in the very beginning of the book. There, the category of being reveals itself as a movement into the category of nothing. This movement tells us that, being in its purity is impossible; or, what is the same, meaningless. Thus the category of being acquires its identity only through its movement into its opposite. Thus, being and nothing are dialectically identical. Moreover, their opposition is resolved in a higher categorical determination, becoming, which is their speculative unity. Thus, the truth of being is, then, becoming. Being is, but it is only as a movement into its opposite.

Hegel argues that, this conceptualization of the opposition between categorical determinations gives us the true solutions to antinomies. As we have seen, for Hegel, the truth of Kant's first antinomy is the opposition between the categorical determinations of limit and its transcendence. Since Kant, for Hegel, clings to the fixedness of these determinations and fails to grasp the dialectical identity of them, concludes that the solution of antinomy is abolishing the question itself. However, a limit is, but it is only through its beyond. Their speculative identity in the quantitative infinity is the true speculative solution to antinomies. In other words, the introduction of a limit to time does not result in breaking off time, as Kant argues, but rather this limit self-others itself into its beyond, and time continues. Moreover, I have discussed that, according to Hegel antinomies are expositions of the opposition between finite and infinite. This is so because, limit is taken to be as the finite which stands in opposition to time as the

infinite. Thus, since these two are taken in their fixed opposition, the introduction of limit to time results in breaking off time. Then, I have provided a description of Hegel's account of finitude and infinitude, and how these two are dialectically identical and thus result in a speculative unity which is true infinite.

Hegel's success in resolving Kant's antinomies is of course disputable. One may argue that Hegel's solution to Kantian antinomies is not satisfactory since Hegel fails to offer a genuine third option; but rather he seems to argue for either thesis or antithesis. As to the first antinomy, for example, Hegel in fact seems to defend the antithesis that the world has no beginning. This is also quite proper when we consider the progress of his *Logic*. As we would recall, the categorical determinations of the *Logic* are the material determinations of being. And since the categorical determinations of *Logic* leads to the category of infinity in the sense of endlessness, then according to the principles of the *Logic*, being must also reveal itself as infinite in the sense of endlessness in its material existence. Indeed Houlgate argues that infinity in the sense of endlessness is not an illusion produced by human mind but is a "real feature of being."<sup>271</sup> As to the fourth antinomy, it is clear that for Hegel there is an absolutely necessary being, but by no means this absolute being transcends the world and stands as its cause from without. For Hegel, as we have seen, the absolutely necessary being is the being itself (as in Spinoza), since we necessarily begin with "being is." Thus, one may further argue that Hegel fails to resolve Kantian antinomies and thus stands as a pre-critical thinker, no matter how his grasping Kant powerful is. Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate above, the same is also arguable for Kant. In other words, Kant's limitation of thought is by no means indisputable. However, the real issue does not lie in determining the strictness of the argumentations of philosophers offer. Rather, what is of crucial importance is to see the different manners of grasping the reality the two philosophers offer.

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<sup>271</sup> Likewise matter, Houlgate argues, is also infinitely divisible for Hegel. Houlgate, *The Opening of Hegel's Logic*, 411.

It is true, Kant's philosophy, regardless of its complexity, is more convenient to the natural attitude of thought which shuns away from contradiction. By saying this, I do not mean to disregard the greatness or the revolutionary aspect of Kant's philosophy by any means. Indeed, the idea that there is an a priori categorical structure which conditions experience is a grand revolution in the history human thought. All the history of philosophy may be a footnote to Aristotle and Plato, yet it is clear that Kant is a brand new chapter which surmounts previous ones. Yet, in the face of all its revolutionary aspects, Kant's thought still shares our natural conviction concerning being and contradiction. Our natural attitude, when trying to grasp being, sees nothing but being, and as such is bewitched against the phenomena of change and motion. It fails to grasp how a thing do and do not occupy same space at a given moment of time. Even the most brilliant brains of our age offer desperate solutions to the phenomena of motion in which there is no motion.<sup>272</sup> Thus, the same bewitchment pervades Kant's thought and renders his revolutionary idea a quite counterrevolutionary restriction. Hegel's *Logic*, is an uprising to this oppressive limitations.

*Logic* is indeed a very ambitious project. Its ambition does not solely lie in its claim to derive all the pure concepts of thought from immediacy of thought in one unified system. It is also ambitious in its ontological claims. *Logic* does provide us an account of why the being necessarily assumes the shape it has assumed. According to Hegel, being, which reveals itself as dark matter in its initial forms, logically must lead to life and self-conscious beings. A more humble one, for example, would take the emergence of self-consciousness as given, and then try to give a historical explanation how material existence produced mind without arguing any logical necessity. Moreover it is also a

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<sup>272</sup> Here I am referring to Russel's "at-at theory of motion." Cited in, Wesley C. Salmon, *Causality and Explanation*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 198.

question whether the *Logic* can live up to its ambitious intentions. Indeed, it has been a matter of debate whether the passages Hegel offers in the *Logic* are genuinely logically necessary. Some argues, for example, Hegel makes little tricks to go where he wants us to go.<sup>273</sup> As we have seen above, the passage from finite to infinite can be made from various categorical determinations, and even from the category of becoming. Thus, it may sound as if the series of the categorical determinations may be looser than Hegel intends. Yet, Hegel himself admits that *Logic* is in no way perfect, and as such is open to reconstruction (*SL*, 27). Indeed one may argue that the true beginning of the book must be determinate being as becoming, since all that the category of being proves is that there is no purity in actuality. This point is also made by Hegel himself:

There is nothing, nothing in heaven or in nature or mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity. (*SL*, 68).

There is no pure being, neither is there anything such as pure nothing. In fact there is no purity (and in this sense no pure irreducible difference or pure indifferent identity). Existence is, then, a restless movement between two impossible yet logically necessary poles. In other words, existence for Hegel is not a static being which fills the totality of the sphere of actuality and thus which excludes every non-being.

However, the value of *Logic* does not stem from its success as a self-contained system. Though, I believe that Hegel is quite right when he claims that the true philosophy is that which deconstructs the distinctions and differences that unphilosophical thought ends up. In this sense, I also believe the Hegelian dictum that the goal of philosophy must be overcoming the dichotomy of thought and being and demonstrating that how human beings reflects the structure of the cosmological order of which they are parts. However, I believe that the genuine value of *Logic* stems from the fact that it demonstrates how

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<sup>273</sup> Taylor, Hegel, 244. Also cf. Michael Foster, "Hegel's Dialectical Method," in *Cambridge Companion to Hegel*, 130-171.

thought reacts to every limit that is brought to it, even though this reaction needs to tarry with that which thought stubbornly shuns.

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## TURKISH SUMMARY

Kant'ın aşkınsal felsefesi, felsefe tarihinde paradigma oluşturan bir yere sahiptir. Kant aşkınsal felsefenin temel amacının bilimin temelini oluşturduğunu düşündüğü sentetik *a priori* bilginin olanağının koşullarının gösterilmesi olduğunu söylese de, bu felsefenin temel motivasyonlarından birisi de klasik anlamda metafiziğin bilgi iddialarının meşruiyetinin olmadığını göstermektir. Aslında, bu iki amaç, yani sentetik *a priori* bilginin olanağının koşulunu göstermekle metafizik tartışmaları sonlandırmak, aynı argümantasyona dayanır. Buna göre, insan deneyiminin zorunlu koşulları vardır ve bu zorunlu koşullar öznedir. Yani, deneyimin koşulları sadece öznde bulunur ve deneyimin nesnelere, o nesnelere kendilerinde var oldukları müddetçe, ait değildirler. Kant, her ne kadar böylelikle insanın nesnelere dair nasıl *a priori* ve apodeiktik bilgiye sahip olmasının imkanının sağlandığını iddia etse de, aşkınsal felsefenin çok daha tartışmalı sonuçları bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, deneyimin zorunlu koşulları olan zaman ve mekanın sadece öznde bulunduğunu iddia etmek, deneyimin nesnelere zihinsel temsillere indirgenmesi anlamına gelir. İkinci olarak ise, bilgi iddialarımızın sadece deneyimin nesnelere sınırlanması gerektiğini söyleyerek klasik anlamda ontolojiyi artık meşru olmayan bir felsefe disiplini haline getirmiştir. Varlığın en temel ilkelerini tartışan metafizik, doğası gereği sonsuzun, yani koşulsuzun, bilgisine yönelir. Ancak Kant için sonsuz, olası deneyimin nesnesi olamayacağı için, hakkında meşru bilgi iddialarında bulunabileceğimiz bir entitedir. Kant'ı bu reddedişe götüren nedenler ise, bu tezde iddia edildiği gibi, antinomiler, yani aklın koşulsuzun bilgisini elde etmeye çalışırken zorunlu olarak düştüğü çelişkilerdir. Kant'a göre, aklın mutlağın, yani sonsuzun bilgisine erişmeye çalışırken düştüğü zorunlu çelişkiler, sonsuzun insan bilgisinin meşru bir nesnesi olabileceği varsayımının yanlışlığını göstermektedir. Ancak açık ki, düşünceye getirilen her sınır, bizzat düşüncenin nesnesi haline gelir ve böylelikle düşünce onu aşmaya yönelir. Aşkınsal felsefenin düşünceye çektiği bu sınır da kendisinden sonraki filozofları ve düşünürleri bu sınırı aşmaya yöneltti. Bir çok

düşünür Kant'ın getirdiği sınırları aşma iddiasında bulunsa da, açık ki bir felsefe sisteminin Kant sonrası bir ontoloji olarak ele alınabilmesi için Kant'ı ontolojinin meşru bir bilgi kaynağı olduğunu reddetmeye götüren nedenlerle yüzleşmesi gerekmektedir. İşte bu çalışmada, Hegel'in Mantık Bilimi'nin Kant sonrası bir ontoloji olarak okunup okunamayacağı, yani Kant'ı aklı sınırlamaya götüren nedenleri yok saymadan onlarla yüzleşerek yine de metafiziğin mümkün bir disiplin olduğunu gösterip gösteremediği tartışıldı. Bu amaçla ikinci bölümde Hegel'in Mantık'ına yönelik çeşitli yaklaşımlar tartışılıp, Hegel'i Kant sonrası bir Spinozacı olarak okuyan yaklaşımın *Mantık*'ın kendi iddialarına en uygun yaklaşım olduğu iddia edildi ve Kant sonrası Spinozacı Hegel'in *Mantık*'da ne iddia edildiği bu bağlamda aktarıldı. Üçüncü bölümde, ikinci bölümdeki savı desteklemek için Hegel'in Kant eleştirileri tartışıldı. Buna göre, Hegel Kant'ın aşkınsal felsefesinin sonuçlarının tam olarak farkında olduğu iddia edildi. Ki böylelikle Hegel'i Kant öncesi bir dogmatist filozof olarak ele alan yaklaşımların bu olguyu göz ardı ettiği savunuldu. Son olarak Hegel'e göre Kant'ın düşünceye ve bilgi iddialarına sınır getirmesinin nedeninin antinomilerde karşılaşılan çelişkiler olduğu gösterildi. Dördüncü bölümde, Kant'ın aşkınsal idealizminin kaynakları ve sonuçları tartışıldı. Buna göre, Kant'ın zaman-mekanın idealitesi için öne sürdüğü en temel argümanın antinomilerden geldiği, Aşkınsal Estetik bölümündeki argümanların ise kendilerine yüklenen görevi başardıklarının oldukça tartışmalı olduğu savunuldu. Böylelikle, Kant sonrası ontoloji yapma iddiasında olan bir felsefe sisteminin öncelikle antinomilerde ortaya çıkan çelişkilerin mutlağa yönelik bilgi iddialarının mümkün olabileceği varsayımın yanlışlığın göstergesi değil de farklı bir şekilde yorumlanabileceğini göstermesi gerektiği savunuldu. Beşinci ve son bölümdeyse Hegel'in bunu gerçekten başarabilip başaramadığı tartışıldı.

Bu amaçla, ilk olarak Hegel'in *Mantık*'ının bize ne anlattığı tartışıldı. Hegel'e göre, *Mantık* tamamen varsayimsız bir düşüncenin ürünüdür. Yani düşünce hiçbir şeyi varsaymadan, daha önce düşünceye getirilmiş tüm kuralları ve sınırları askıya alarak,

sadece kendi içeriğini takip ederek ne üretebileceğini gösteren bir çalışmadır. Hegel'in iddiasına göre, düşünce hiçbir şeyi varsaymayacaksa, düşüncenin başlangıç noktası ancak arı dolaylılık olabilir. Bununla birlikte, Hegel bu dolaylılığın aynı zamanda en arı şekliyle varlık olduğunu söyler. Daha sonra, varlık kavramı incelendiğinde, bu kavramın kendi içeriğinde onu bu ya da şu varlık olarak belirleyebileceğimiz herhangi bir izlek olmadığını dolayısıyla kendi tersine yani hiçlik'e gittiğini söyler. Hiçlik de aynı şekilde, belirlenimsizliği dolayısıyla varlık'a gider. Hegel bu hareketin, yani varlık ve hiçlik kavramlarının birbirlerine geçişinin, bize yeni bir kavramı, yani varoluş kavramını, verdiğini söyler. Bu yeni kavram ise, kendisini varlık ve hiçlik'in birbirlerine geçiş hareketi olarak, yani varlığa geliş ve hiçliğe gidiş olarak açtığını, dolayısıyla bu varlığa geliş ve hiçliğe geçiş hareketinin belirlenimli varlık kategorisini oluşturduğunu, yani yeni bir aşamaya geçildiğini iddia eder.

Açık ki, Mantık'ın başlangıcı, yani varsayımsız düşünceden başlayıp bunu arı varlıkla eşitlemesi, ve sonraki ilk kavramsal hareket oldukça tartışmalıdır. Bütün bunları nasıl okumamız gerektiğini daha iyi kavrayabilmek için öncelikle bu literatürde Hegel'in mantığının nasıl okunması gerektiği ve ne anlattığı hakkındaki mevcut olan çeşitli yaklaşımlar tartışıldı. Her ne kadar hiçbir şekilde tüketici olmasa da, Hegel'in mantığına yönelik yaklaşık beş yaklaşım sayılabilir. İlk grupta, Mantık'ın tamamen bir safsata olduğunu öne sürenler bulunmaktadır. İkinci grup ise dilin yapısının Hegel'in Mantık'da yapmaya çalıştığı şeye, yani varsayımsız düşünceye asla izin vermeyeceğini iddia edenlerden oluşur. Üçüncü gruba göre *Mantık* Kant öncesi bir dogmatizmin eseridir. Son olarak dördüncü ve beşinci yaklaşımlar için Mantık tam olarak Kant'dan esinlenen ve bir nevi Kant'ın projesinin eseri olan bir çalışmadır. Dördüncü gruba göre, Hegel Kant'ın aşkınsal felsefesini radikalize ederken, beşinci yaklaşıma göre Hegel Kant sonrası bir Spinozisttir. Ancak bu çalışma daha çok dördüncü ve beşinci yaklaşımlara odaklanmıştır. İlk yaklaşım Hegel'in felsefe ve düşünce tarihine olan katkılarını tamamen yok sayma eğilimindedir, ancak açık ki Hegel, gerek modern dönem, gerek

öznenin tarihselliği ve toplumsallığı, gerek se de din, hukuk, ve tarih üzerine çok değerli yaklaşımları olan bir filozoftur. Bu filozofun tüm sisteminin ruhunu oluşturduğunu iddia ettiği *Mantık*, bu nedenle, kolayca yok sayılabilecek bir çalışma değildir ve bizi onu anlamaya davet eder.

İkinci yaklaşımın temel argümanı Mantık'ın varsayımsızlık iddialarının dil tarafından mümkün kılınmadığını söyler. Buna göre düşünce dilde ve dilin kavramlarında hayat bulur. Bu nedenle bu kavramların bir dilin tarihsel gelişimi süresince kazandığı anlamları ve dildeki diğer kavramlarla olan bağlantıları paranteze alınıp mutlak şekilde varsayımsız düşünce üretilebileceği iddia edilemez. Ancak, şurası açık ki Hegel düşüncenin ancak dilde hayat bulduğunu reddetmez. Bununla birlikte, düşünce dilin kavramlarının tarihselliklerinden kaynaklanan olumsuzluğu aşım bu kavramların arı mantıksal içeriklerine bakabilecek yetidedir. Bu nedenle, düşüncenin kavramlarının dilde ve tarihte anlam bulmaları bu kavramlara yönelik arı mantıksal bir çalışmanın önünde engel değildir. Üçüncü grubun iddiaların Hegel'in felsefesinin gerçeğini pek yansıtmadığı özel olarak üçüncü bölümde tartışıldı.

Dördüncü yaklaşım için Hegel mantıksal idealisttir. Bunun anlamı Hegel Kant'ın projesini tamamlama uğraşındadır. Kısaca bahsetmek gerekirse, hem Hegel hem de Kant için deneyimin öznel ve zorunlu kavramsal koşulları bulunmaktadır. Yani bir kavramsal şema deneyimimizin ne olacağını belirler. Ancak bu kavramsal şema deneyimden elde edilmemiştir ve tamamen aklın kendi ürünüdür. Aklın kendi kavramlarını kendi içinden deneyimden bağımsız olarak üretmesi is aklın, ve akıl sahibi öznenin, kendiliğindenliğini, yani otonomisini gösterir. Demek ki, akıl kendi kavramlarını kendi işleyişinde üretebiliyorsa, öz-belirli bir doğaya sahiptir. İşte hem Hegel hem de Kant'ın mantıksal idealist olmalarının anlamı her iki filozof için de öznenin spontan öz-belirleniminin deneyimin koşulu olmasıdır. Böylelikle Hegel'in *Görüngübilimi* bu

öznenin otonom öz-belirlenimin ve bunun sonucu olan kavramsal şemanın öznenin hem nesnelere deneyimine yönelik hem de kendi öz kavrayışına yönelik bilgi iddialarının koşulu olduğunu göstermektedir. *Mantık* ise bu özbelirlenimin mantıksal koşullarını ortaya koyar. Yani düşüncenin sadece kendi yapısından a priori kavramları nasıl ürettiğini ve bu kavramlarla nesneyi deneyimlemeye ve bilmeye çalışırken nasıl kendi bilgisine ulaştığını anlatan bir çalışmadır.

Bu yaklaşımın esas temsilcisi Pippin'e göre Hegel ile Kant arasında bağ ve kopuş Kant'ın aşkınsal çıkarım doktrininden kaynaklanır. Kant, aklın kavramlarının deneyimden bağımsız olduğunu ancak deneyimin koşulu olduğunu savlar. Ancak bu bağımsızlık ve koşul olma durumu deneyimde bize verilen içerik (yani görgül olan) ile kavramlar (yani mantıksal olan) arasında bir boşluk oluşturur. Kant'ın görgül olan ve mantıksal olan arasındaki ilişkisi kurduğu bölüme verdiği ad ise aşkınsal çıkarımdır. Aşkınsal çıkarım iki temel aşamadan oluşur. İlk bölümde Kant kavramların nesnelere bizde temsil edilmelerinin zorunlu koşulları olduğunu savlarken, ikinci aşamada kavramların nesnelere deneyimde verili olmalarının da koşulu olduğunu iddia eder. Ancak bu ikinci iddiayı temellendirebilmek için kavramların zaman ve mekan formlarının birliğinin de koşulu olduğunu savlar. Bu ise kavram ve duyarlılık arasında daha önce çizilmiş olan keskin ayrımın altını oyar. İşte Pippin'e göre Hegel bu bağı radikalleştirmiş ve kavram duyarlılık ayrımını tamamen reddetmiştir. Bu reddedişin çeşitli sonuçları vardır. Artık, nesne sadece bize belirlediği şekliyle değil kendi hakikatinde bilinebilir. İkincisi, nesnelere, Kant'da olduğu gibi, sadece bizdeki temsiller değil, kendilerinde de zamansal ve mekansal olan fiziksel objelerdir.

Pippin *Mantık*'ın bu okuma mucibince tekrar yapılandırılabilirliğini iddia eder. Buna göre, saf varlıkla başlamanın, öznenin a priori olarak kendisine hangi nesnelere deneyimin nesnelere olarak belirleyebileceğine yönelik bir soru olarak okunması

gerektiğini söyler. Yani düşünce tüm dolaylılığı içinde bir nesnenin varlığını kendine nesne olarak alabilir mi? Bu anlamda, varlıktan hiçliğe geçiş bunun mümkün olmadığını bir ifadesidir. Yani tüm dolaylılığı için varlık düşüncesi mümkün bir düşünce değildir. Yine benzer şekilde varoluştan belirlenimli varlığa geçiş ise, aklın ancak kendi kategorileri altına getirilip bu şekilde belirlenimli kılınabilecek niteliklere sahip bir nesneyi kendisine nesne olarak alabileceğinin göstergesidir. Dahası, sonlu nesneden sonsuza geçiş ise, hangi niteliklerin özsel nitelikler olduğunu belirleme yetisine sahip olmayan pre-reflektif bir öznenin nesneyi belirleme çabası içinde sonsuz bir tür sürece sürükleneyeceğinin göstergesidir. Bu özsel özellikler, bir nesnenin başka bir şey değil de ancak olduğu şey olmasını sağlayan ve hangi diğer özelliklere sahip olabileceğini ama hangi diğerlerine olamayacağını belirleyen özelliklerdir. Tüm bu kavramsal geçişler, öznenin nesnesini a priori olarak belirlemeye çalışırken yaşadığı bir süreçtir.

Bu yaklaşım, Hegel'in *Mantık*'da yaptığı ontolojik savları reddeder. Hegel'e göre, kitapta ortaya çıkan belirlenimler sadece aklın veya nesnesini a priori olarak belirlemeye çalışan öznenin değil aynı zamanda kendinde olduğu şekliyle varlığın da belirlenimleridir. Örneğin, bu yaklaşıma göre sonsuz aklın nesnesini belirli bir şekilde (pre-reflektif olarak) belirlemeye çalışırken içine düştüğü bir durumdur. Ortaya çıkan çelişkilere yine öznenin spontan öz belirlenim sürecinin bir karşısıdır. Ama bunlar nesneye ait olarak kabul edilemez.

Houlgate'in temel temsilcisi olduğu son yaklaşıma göre Hegel Kant sonrası bir Spinozisttir. Kant sonrası Spinozist olmanın anlamı şudur. Spinoza için tözün, insanın bilebileceği iki sıfatı vardır, düşünce ve uzam. Ancak bu iki sıfat arasında bir paralellik vardır. Yani düşünce sıfatı içindeki ilişkiler ve düzen uzam sıfatı içindeki ilişkiler ve düzenle bir ve aynıdır. Böylelikle düşünce sıfatı incelendiğinde aynı zaman da uzam

sıfatının da yapısı bilinebilir. Benzer şekilde Hegel için de düşüncenin yapısını incelemek aynı zamanda varlığın da yapısını verecektir. Yani hem Spinoza hem de Hegel için varlık ve düşünce arasında mutlak bir özdeşlik bulunmaktadır. Ancak Hegel'in Kant sonrası bir düşünür olmasının anlamı, Hegel için bu özdeşliğin mantıksal bir zorunluluk olması ve bu zorunluluğu gösterenin de bizzat Kant olmasıdır. Yukarıda da tartışıldığı gibi nesnelere öznede hem temsil edilebilmek hem de özneye verilebilmek için kategorilere uymak zorundadır. Bunun anlamı, öznenin nesnelere dair bilgi sahibi olması, kategori görünümü ve dolayısıyla özne nesne arasında bir özdeşliğe işaret eder. Hegel ise bu özdeşliğin mutlak bir özdeşlik olduğunu ve eğer düşünce kendi yapısını incelerken sonsuzluk ve çelişki kavramlarıyla karşılaşıyorsa, bunların zorunlu olarak varlığın da yapısına ait olması gerektiğini iddia eder.

İncelenen her iki yaklaşım karşılaştırıldığında, Hegel'i Kant sonrası bir Spinozist olarak ele alan yaklaşımın, Hegel'i mantıksal idealist olarak ele alan yaklaşıma göre, Mantık'ın kendi iddialarına daha yakın olduğu görülebilir. Aynı ilişki, Hegel'in Kant eleştirilerinde de açığa çıkar. Hegel'in Kant eleştirileri iki ana başlık altında toplanabilir. Hegel'in Kant eleştirilerinin yoğunlaştığı iki alan Kant'ın aşkınsal felsefesinin metodolojisi ve bu felsefenin ürettiği kendinde şey doktrindir. Hegel'e göre Kant düşüncenin gerçek işleyişini kendi ediminde incelememiş ancak tarihte varolmuş düşünme tarzlarının düşüncenin tüm yapısını yansıttığını varsaymıştır. Her ne kadar ikincil literatürde Hegel'in bu itirazının çok meşru bir itiraz olmadığına yönelik yaklaşımlar varsa da, Hegel'in buradaki temel meselesinin kategorilerin içeriklerinin sadece deneyimden geliyor olması ve deneyimden bağımsız olarak kategorilerin bir anlamıyla anlamsız olmasıdır. Hegel'e göre kategorilerin içerikleri deneyimden değil, diğer kategorilerle olan kavramlar arası bir ilişkinin ürünüdür. Ve gerçek eleştirel bir düşüncenin ise tarihte verili olan anlamları varsaymadan, aklın kategorilerinin kendi aralarındaki kavramsal ilişkiler bağlamında nasıl içerik kazandıklarını göstermektir. İkinci olarak, Hegel'e göre gerçek bir eleştirel düşünce tarihte bulageldiği on iki kategori varsaymadan, kendi öz-

belirlenimli yapısından nasıl ürettiğini gösterebilmelidir. Ki bunu gösterebilmek, Hegel için, düşüncenin kendi yapısından farklılığı nasıl üretebildiğini göstermektir. Dahası, Hegel'e göre Kant varlık düşünce ayrımını varsaymaktadır ve bu nedenle bilgiyi varlığa yönelik bir araç olarak kavrar. Bu itiraz ise, Hegel'in asıl meselesinin varlık düşünce özdeşliği olduğunu göstermektedir.

İkinci grup itiraz ise Kant'ın kendinde şey doktrinine yöneliktir. Hegel için Kant'ın kendinde şey doktrini varlık düşünce ayrımını pekiştirmekle kalmamış aynı zamanda hakikati düşüncenin erişiminden çıkarmıştır. Hegel'e göre bir şey ancak özellikleri ve diğer şeylerle olan ilişkileri içinde varolur. Kendinde şey, hem özelliklerinden hem de diğer şeylerle olan ilişkilerinden soyutlanmış bir varlık alanıdır ve tam da bu nedenle aşırı bir soyutlamadır. Bunun nedeni ise, özelliklerin ve ilişkilerin ancak zamanda ve mekanda mümkün olmasıdır. Bir şeyin zaman ve mekandan bağımsız olarak varlığından bahsetmek, Hegel'e göre, aslen hiçlikten bahsetmektir.

Son olarak, Hegel'in Kant eleştirileri, Hegel'e göre Kant'ın aşkınsal idealizminin temel zemininin antinomiler olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Hegel için Kant'ın felsefesinin en büyük katkısı, mutlağı bilme çabasında çelişkinin zorunlu olarak ortaya çıkması gerektiğini göstermesidir. Ancak, Hegel, Kant'dan farklı olarak, ortaya çıkan bu çelişkilerin yanlışlığın bir göstergesi değil de hakikatin zorunlu bir birleşeni olarak ele alınması gerektiğini savunur. Bu nedenle, dördüncü bölümde Kant'ın aşkınsal idealizminin felsefesi zeminin gerçekten de Hegel'in iddia ettiği gibi Aşkınsal Estetik bölümünden değil, antinomilerden olduğu tartışıldı.

Kant, zaman ve mekânın nesnelere ait özellikler değil de sadece özneye ait formlar olduğu sonucuna Aşkınsal Estetik bölümünde vardığını iddia eder. Bu bölümde, Kant hem mekân hem de zaman için iki ayrı grup halinde argümantasyon sunar, metafizik ve

aşkınsal serimleme. Ancak, vurgu genel olarak mekana yapılmıştır ve mekan için geçerli olan bir argümanın zaman için de geçerli olduğu varsayılır. Metafizik serimle kısmında, mekan kavramını ele alan Kant, bu kavramın aslında bir sezgi olduğunu iddia eder. Bunu yaparken ki argümantasyonu ise genel olarak mekanın diğer mekansal parçalar ile olan ilişkisine dayanır. Buna göre, bir mekan parçası, tüm kuşatıcı mekanın bir parçası olmaksızın, yani diğer mekansal parçalarla bir arada düşünülmesizin, kavranılamaz. Bu ilişki, şüphesiz bir kavramın kapsamı ve içlemi ile olan ilişkisinden farklıdır. Bir kavram birden fazla nesnede ortak olan bir izin düşüncesidir. Örneğin, beyaz kavramı, beyaz nesnelere ortak olan bir özelliğin, beyaz olma özelliğinin, ortak düşüncesidir. Ancak beyaz bir nesne, beyaz kavramından ayrı olarak düşünülebilir. Yani beyaz bir nesne, tüm beyaz nesnelere bir süreklilik içinde düşünülme zorunda değildir. Ancak, mekansal parçalar ancak diğer mekansal parçalarla olan süreklilikleri içinde düşünülebilir. Böylelikle, mekan, Kant için, ancak tekil bir entite olarak temsil edilebilir ve ancak tekil olarak temsil edilebilen bir entitenin ise bir kavram değil bir sezgi olduğunu öne sürer.

İkinci olarak, Kant bu bölümde, mekanın a priori olduğunu iddia eder. Buna göre, mekan, mekansal bir şeyi temsil etmemin koşuludur, ve bu durumda mekan deneyimde verili olamayacağı gibi deneyimi öncelemelidir. Ancak açıktır ki, bir şeyin bir başka şeyin verili olmasının koşulu olması onun sadece öznede bulunan a priori bir form olması için yeterli değildir. Bunun nedenleri tezde ilgili bölümde daha ayrıntılı biçimde tartışılmaktadır. Kant'ın bu amaçla sunduğu bir diğer argümana göre, mekanı içinde mekansal şeyler olmadan düşünebilirim ancak mekanın yokluğunu düşünemem. Bu da mekanın a priori olduğunu gösterir. Ancak, öncelikle, mekanı içinde mekansal özellikler olarak düşünebiliyor olmamın ne anlama geldiği hiçbir şekilde açık değildir. Saf bir mekan olarak, örneğin, bir karanlık düşünebiliyor olmam mekanı a priori kılmaz. Açık ki hiçliği düşündüğüm zaman da saf bir karanlık hayal edebilirim ancak bu hiçliğin a priori bir sezgi olduğu anlamına hiçbir şekilde gelmez. Kaldı ki bu argümantasyon, zaman için çok daha sorunlu bir hal almaktadır. Zamanı içinde zamansal şeyler olarak

düşünebiliyor olmamın ne anlama geldiği ve bu şekilde ne düşündüğüm hiçbir şekilde açık değildir. Bu ve tezde daha ayrıntılı olarak tartışılan kimi diğer sorunlar, aslında metafizik sergilemenin Kant'ın iddia ettiği gibi zaman ve mekanın a priori olduklarını göstermekte başarısız olmalarına neden olmaktadır.

Aşkınsal serilmemenin amacı, mekan açısından konuşacak olursak, mekanın a priori bir sezgi olmasının geometrinin sentetik a priori yargılarının olanağının koşulu olmasıdır. Buna göre, mekan bizde olan bir sezgi olduğu için, deneyimden bağımsız sentetik yargılarda bulunabilmekteyiz. Her ne kadar, mekan için olan argüman oldukça ikna eder gibi görünse de, zaman için aynı şeyleri söylemek oldukça zordur. Öncelikle geometrinin mekanın arı bilimi olduğu gibi, zaman için bir arı bilim tespit etmek pek mümkün değildir. İkinci olarak, Kant, her ne kadar, aritmetiğin zamanın arı bilimi olduğunu iddia etse de daha yakın bir bakış aslında aritmetik ve zaman arasındaki ilişkinin pek de Kant'ın düşündüğü kadar yakın olmadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Aritmetiksel bir işlemin zamanda yapılıyor olması, sayılar arasındaki ilişkinin nümerik bir ilişki değil de zamansal bir ilişki olduğu anlamına gelmez. İkinci olarak, Kant her ne kadar sayıların zamanın arı nesnelere olduğunu iddia etse de, aynen geometrik şekillerin mekanın arı nesnelere olması gibi, aslında sayılar ve zaman arasındaki ilişki de pek Kant'ın düşündüğü kadar içkin bir ilişki değildir. Kant, sayıların zaman birimleriyle eşleştirilmesiyle ortaya çıktığını iddia eder. Buna göre bir zaman dilimi bir nokta olarak düşünülüp bu da bir sayısı ile, iki zaman dilimi iki nokta olarak düşünülüp bu da iki sayısı ile özdeşleştirilir. Ancak burada yine açıktır ki, nokta mekansal bir temsildir ve sayıları oluşturan şey aslen bu mekansal temsiller ise zamana neden ihtiyaç duyulacağı belli değildir. Sonuç olarak, tezin bu bölümünde aşkınsal estetik bölümünün zaman ve mekanın birer sezgi olduklarını gösterse de a priori olduklarını göstermeye yetmediği iddia edilmiştir. Kaldı ki, zaman ve mekanın sezgi olmaları zorunlu olarak onların sadece özünde bulunmaları gerektiği anlamına da gelmez. Zaman ve mekan hem sezgi oldukları gibi aynı zamanda şeyler de kendilerinde zamansal ve mekansal da olabilir.

Kant, zaman ve mekanın nesnelere özellikleri değil de sadece özünde olan birer sezgi olduklarını yönelik bir diğer argümanın da antinomilerden geldiğini iddia eder. Antinomiler, düşünce, deneyimin sınırlarını aşarak deneyimde verilmeyen entitelere uygulandıklarında ortaya çıkar. Örneğin, düşünce dünyanın zamanda ve mekandaki sonsuzluğunu kavramaya çalıştığında, kendisini zorunlu olarak bir çelişki içinde bulur. Kant'a göre bu çelişki düşüncenin fenomenlerin toplamı olarak dünyayı kendisine bilgi nesnesi olarak alabileceğini varsayan aşkınsal realizmin göstergesidir. Ve yine Kant'a göre aşkınsal realizmin tek alternatifi aşkınsal idealizm olduğu içindir ki, antinomiler aşkınsal idealizm için dolaylı da olsa bir zemin sunar.

Bu tezde zaman ve mekanla doğrudan ilişkili olduğu için özel olarak ikinci antinomi tartışıldı. Bu antinomide Kant'a göre, her biri kendi meşruiyetini gösterebilen ama karşısındaki ile doğrudan çelişki içinde olan iki sav bulunmaktadır. İmdi, her iki sav da hem meşru oldukları hem de birbirlerini dışladıkları için Kant'a göre burada çelişki oluşur. İkinci antinominin savları sırası ile şunlardır: teze göre dünyanın zamanda ve mekanda bir başlangıcı ve sonu bulunmaktadır. Antiteze göre ise dünya zamanda ve mekanda sonsuzdur. Hem tez hem de antitez kendi geçerliliğini göstermek için öne sürdüğü iddianın tersinin mümkün olmamasını göstermek üzerinden işler. Buna göre, tezin kanıtı şu şekildedir. Dünyanın zamanda bir başlangıcı olmadığını varsayalım. Bu durumda dünyanın bugününe kadar sonsuz bir zaman geçmiş olmalıdır. Ancak sonsuzluk sentezle elde edilebilir bir durum değildir. Demek ki dünyanın zamanda bir başlangıcı olması gerekmektedir. Antitez ise dünyanın zamanda ve mekanda sonsuz olduğunu iddia eder. Yine tezde olduğu gibi, iddiasının tersinin mümkün olmaması üzerinden işler. Buna göre, dünyanın zamanda bir başlangıcı olduğunu iddia edelim. Bu durumda, zamanda içinde dünyanın olmadığı bir boş zaman bulunmalıdır. Ancak burada şöyle bir durum ortaya çıkar. Bu boş zaman birimleri birbiriyle niteliksel açıdan tamamen özdeşdir ve aralarında dünyanın o zamanda değil de bu zamanda ortaya

çıkmasını gerektirecek ayırt edici bir nitelik farkı bulunmaz. Yani dünya neden boş zamanın şu parçasında değil de bu parçasında varlığa geldi sorusu cevapsız kalır. Bu durumda dünyanın zamanda bir başlangıcının olması mümkün değildir. Demek ki dünya zamanda sonsuz olmalıdır. Sonuç olarak Kant'a göre hem tez hem de antitez kendi geçerliliğini başarılı bir şekilde göstermiş olduğundan aralarında bir çelişki doğar. Bu çelişki ise dünyanın zamanda ve mekandaki konumunu kendimize bilgi nesnesi yapmamıza olanak sağlayan varsayımın, yani aşkınsal realizmin yanlış olduğunun göstergesidir. Eğer aşkınsal realizm yanlışsa onun tek alternatifi olan aşkınsal idealizm doğru olmak durumundadır.

Elbette ki Kant'ın ikinci antinomideki yaklaşımına birçok itiraz gelmiştir. En temel itiraz ise, ardışık sentezle sonsuzluğa ulaşamıyor olmasının öznel bir durum olduğu ve bunun edimsel sonsuzlukla bir ilişkisinin bulunmadığı yönündedir. Bir diğer deyişle, benim ardışık sentezle sonsuzluğa ulaşamıyor olmam, zorunlu olarak sonsuzluğun kendinde olmadığı anlamına gelmez. Ancak kimi diğer yorumcular için Kant'ın buradaki temel meselesi sentezle sonsuza ulaşma meselesinden ziyade, iki farklı sonsuz kavramı arasındaki farklılık meselesidir. Buna göre, Kant için iki tane sonsuz kavramı bulunmaktadır, gerçek sonsuzluk ve yetersiz sonsuzluk. Buna göre, gerçek sonsuzluk hiçbir sentezle ulaşılamayacak bir sonsuzluk iken yetersiz sonsuzluk ulaşılabilecek en büyük sayıyı ifade eder. Bu iki sonsuzluk arasındaki farkı anlamak için ise Kant'ın iki bütünlük arasındaki ayrımını kavramak gereklidir. Bunlar sentetik bütünlük ve analitik bütünlüktür. Sentetik bütünlük bir tamamlanmışlık ve bir sentez gerektirir, yani parçaların bir araya gelmesiyle oluşan bir bütünlüktür. Analitik bütünlükte ise, bütünlük parçaya önceldir ve parçaların bir araya gelmesiyle oluşmaz, aksine parçalar bütünlüğün içinde anlaşılır. Yine Kant'a göre evren ancak parçaların bir araya gelmesiyle oluşan bir sentetik bütünlük olduğu için bir sentez ve tamamlanmışlık içerir. Zaman ve mekan ise tersine sentez ve tamamlanmışlık içermedikleri için analitik birer bütünlüktürler. Bu

durumda, tamamlanmışlık sonsuzluk kavramı ile çelişeceğinden dolayı evren, sentetik bir bütünlük olarak, sonsuz olamaz.

Kant'ın buradaki argümanının yeniden inşa eden bu tür yorumlar da çeşitli itirazlarla karşılaşmaktadır. Örneğin evrenin neden illa ki sentetik bir bütünlük olarak anlaşılması gerektiği çok açık değildir. Yine benzer şekilde, zaman ve mekanın da analitik bütünlükler olması biraz sorunlu bir meseledir. Yine bu çalışmada da çeşitli yerlerde daha ayrıntılı tartışıldığı gibi, Kant kitabın belirli bölümlerinde zaman ve mekanın birer bütünlük olarak temsil edilebilmesinin koşulunun anlağın gerçekleştirdiği bir sentez olduğunu savlar ve böylelikle zaman ve mekanın analitik bütünlükler olarak kavranmasını tartışılır hale getirir.

Ancak, tüm bu tartışmaları geride bırakırsak ortaya şu sonuç çıkmaktadır. Kant'ın aşkınsal idealizminin temel felsefi zeminini aşkınsal estetik değil de antinomiler oluşturmaktadır. Bu durumda, tezde de tartışıldığı gibi Kant'ın düşünceye getirdiği sınırlamaları aşma iddiasında bulunan bir düşünce ve felsefe sistemi Kant'ı düşünceyi sınırlamaya iten esas nedenlerle yani antinomilerle yüzleşmeli ve antinomilerde ortaya çıkan çelişkinin zorunlu olarak yanlışlığın göstergesi olmadığını gösterebilmelidir. İşte bu nedenle, beşinci bölümde Hegel'in *Mantık*'da antinomileri nasıl ele aldığı tartışılmıştır.

Daha önce de tartışıldığı gibi, Hegel için *Mantık* aynı zamanda bir ontolojik çalışmadır. Buna göre, düşüncenin kategorileri ve formları aynı zamanda varlığın da formları ve kategorileridir. Bunun anlamı düşüncenin deneyimden bağımsız olarak kendine içerik verebileceği değil, düşüncenin varlığın yapısını, en temel ilkleri üzerinden, bilebileceğidir. Ancak, yine daha önce tartışıldığı gibi Hegel için çelişki ve sonsuzluk olguları düşüncenin kendi yapısında ortaya çıkıyorsa aynı zamanda varlığın yapısına da

ait olmalıdır. Ancak açık ki çelişkinin varlığın yapısına ait olduğu fikri kendi çıkarımına ihtiyaç duyan bir fikirdir. Genel bir yorum, *Mantık*'ın ihtiyaç duyduğu çıkarımın *Görüngübilim*'den geldiğini iddia eder. Hegel *Görüngübilimi*'nde bilme iddiasın olan bir öznenin, kendi bilme deneyimi içerisinde nasıl mutlak bilgiye yani özne ve nesne, ve dolayısıyla varlık ve düşünce arasındaki özdeşliğin bilgisine ulaştığının idealize edilmiş mantıksal bir tarihçesini sunar. Buna göre, özne nesnesini en dolayimsız haliyle, yani şimdiliği ve buradılığı içerisinde bilme iddiasındadır. Ancak özne, kendi deneyimi içerisinde nesnesinin bir şimdiler ve buradalar çokluğu olduğunu deneyimler ve nesnenin en dolayimsız bilgisinin durumu olan duyarlılık pekinliğinden algı durumuna geçer. Özne bu süreç içerisinde kendi yapısı değişikçe nesnenin yapısının da değiştiğini deneyimler ve en sonunda düşüncenin kategorilerinin varlığın da kategorileri olduğu sonucuna varır. Ancak *Görüngübilimi*'nin *Mantık*'ın çıkarımı olarak okumakta da çeşitli çekinceler bulunmaktadır. Öncelikle, düşünce ve varlık arasında bir tür özdeşlik olması gerektiği fikri, felsefe tarihinde sıkça karşılaşacağımız bir fikirdir. Hatta, kavram ve sezgi arasında oldukça keskin bir ayrım çizmek isteyen Kant felsefesi için bile bu tür bir özdeşliğin varlığından söz edilebilir. Sonuç olarak, Kant'ın aşkınsal çıkarımının da gösterdiği gibi bilginin olanağının koşulu kavram ve sezgi arasındaki bir tür özdeşliktir. Ancak Kant için bu sınırlı bir özdeşlik olup, sonsuzluk ve çelişki gibi fenomenler varlığa değil ama özel olarak düşünceye ait fenomenlerdir ve özellikle çelişkinin varlığı düşüncede bir yanlışlığın varlığına işaretler. Ancak tezde de daha önce tartışıldığı gibi, Hegel düşünce ve varlık arasında her hangi bir özdeşlikten değil ama mutlak bir özdeşlikten bahsetmektedir. Bu durumda *Görüngübilimi*'nin Hegel'in *Mantık*'da öne sürdüğü türden bir özdeşliğin çıkarımı olabileceği tartışmalıdır. Kaldı ki *Mantık*'ın kendi temel iddiası da *Görüngübilimi*'nin *Mantık* için bir zemin oluşturabileceği fikrinin altını oymaktadır. Buna göre, *Mantık*, modern çağın eleştirel yaklaşımının bir eseridir. Yani, düşünce tamamıyla eleştirel olmalı ve hiçbir şeyi varsaymadan sadece kendi edimini izleyerek kendi yapısını anlamaya çalışmalıdır. *Mantık*'ın da bu türden bir varsayimsız düşüncenin ortaya çıkardığı bir çalışma olduğu düşünülürse *Görüngübilimi*'nin *Mantık*'ın zemini olarak okumak oldukça sorunlu bir hale gelir.

Bu çalışmada, *Mantık*'ın kendi çıkarımının ne olabileceğine dair literatürde verilen önemli bir yaklaşım da tartışılmıştır. Buna göre *Mantık*'ın aşkınsal çıkarımı kitabın ana gövdesi içinde değil ama tam da varsayımsız düşüncenin gerekliliklerinde mevcuttur. Varsayımsız düşünceye göre, düşünce kendisine tarihsel olarak ya da bir başka şekilde getirilmiş olan hiçbir varsayımı verili kabul edemez. Bu durumda da düşünce ve varlığın iki ayrı varlık alanı olduğu fikrini verili alamaz. Ancak eğer bu fikri verili alamazsa, o zaman düşünce ve varlığın özdeşliğini kabul etmek durumunda kalırız. Ancak, bu yaklaşımdaki temel sorunlu nokta, varsayımsız düşüncenin ilkeleriyle çok da uyumlu olmamasında yatar ve henüz düşüncenin meşruiyetini kendi yapısından türettiği en çıkarım kurallarını kullanmamızı gerektirir. Buna göre, iki şeyin birbirinden ayrı olamayacağı düşüncesinden bu iki şeyin özdeşliği düşüncesine gitmemiz gerekir ki bu geçişin varsaydığı mantıksal belirlenimler henüz varsayımsız düşüncenin kendi işleyişi içinde meşru bir biçimde ortaya konmuş değildir. Bu durumda çelişkinin ve sonsuzun hem düşüncenin hem de varlığın yapısına ait olduğu iddiası ayrı bir çıkarıma ihtiyaç duyar. Bu çalışmada, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi, Kant sonrası düşünce ve varlığın özdeşliğini savlayan türden bir felsefi sitemin ikna edici olan ve meşru bir zemine oturmuş bir çıkarım için Kant'ı bizzat düşünceyi sınırlamaya ve düşünce varlık özdeşliğini reddetmeye iten nedenlerle yüzleşmesi gerekir. İşte bu çalışma da bu nedenle Hegel'in antinomiler hakkındaki düşüncelerinin bize *Mantık*'ın çıkarımının ne olabileceği konusunda fikir verebileceği savunulmuştur.

Ancak tam da burada belirtmek gerekir ki, Hegel'in *Mantık*'ı, Hegel'in çeşitli konular ya da kavramlar hakkındaki düşüncelerini öğrenmek için sadece ilgili maddesine başvurulabilecek bir ansiklopedi değildir. Bir diğer deyişle, Hegel'in antinomiler hakkındaki düşüncelerini öğrenmek için sadece antinomilerin ele alındığı bölümün ne söylediğine bakmak yeterli olmayacaktır. Bunun nedeni ise, *Mantık*'ın kendi içinde bir bütünlük oluşturmasıdır. Yani, kitap içinde ortaya çıkan her bir kavramsal belirlenim,

içeriğini kendisine yol açan daha önceki mantıksal devinime borçludur ve ancak o devinim üzerinden anlaşılabilir. Örneğin, varoluş kategorisi ortaya çıkışının nedeni, varlık ve hiçlik kavramları arasındaki diyalektik devinimdir. Benzer bir şekilde, belirlenimli varlık kategorisinin ortaya çıkışı da, varoluş kategorisinin içsel diyalektik devinimin bir sonucudur. Bunu belirtmekle beraber, yine de Hegel'in antinomileri kitapta nasıl ele aldığını incelemek başlangıç açısından yol gösterici olacaktır.

İlginç bir şekilde, antinomiler kısmında ontolojik bir tartışma beklerken, bulduğumuz şey metodolojik bir itirazdır. Hegel'e göre Kant'ın antinomilerde öne sürdüğü argüman zinciri temelden hatalıdır çünkü hem tezin hem de antitezin kanıtları kanıtlamaları gereken şeyi varsayarlar. Dahası Hegel için Kant'ın antinomilerdeki hatası bu metodolojik sorunla da kısıtlı değildir ve Kant antinomilerin gerçek doğasını saklar. Buna göre, antinomiler aslında nesnel durumların bir toplamı olarak dünyanın zaman ve mekanda bir başlangıç noktasının olup olmadığını düşünürken ortaya çıkan çelişkili bir durum değildir. Aslında, antinomi, iki kategorik belirlenimin arasındaki zıtlık durumundan ortaya çıkar ve Kant'ın tartıştığı şeyin daha doğru bir formülasyonu antinominin "sınır vardır" ve "sınır aşılması gerekmektedir" kategorik belirlenimleri arasında olduğunu söyler. Burada önemli olan mesele, Hegel için antinomik belirlenimlerin tüm kavramsal belirlenimlerde ortaya çıkmasıdır. Buna göre, bir kavram, anlamını ve içeriğini ancak kavramsal belirleniminin dışında tutma iddiasında bulunduğu diğer kavram ya da kavramlarla kazanabiliyor olmasıdır. Yani, limit kavramı ancak o limitin ötesiyle var olur ve anlamını burada kazanır. Bununla beraber, sonsuzluk kavramının çeşitli çelişkiler içermesi Hegel için bu kavramın meşru bir bilgi nesnesi olamayacağını göstergesi değil, diğer her kavramsal belirlenim gibi sonsuzluk kavramının da doğasına ait olan bir durumdur. Tezde daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde de tartışıldığı gibi, bu anlamda bakıldığında, Hegel'in Mantık'ı ilk kavramsal belirlenimlerden beri kendi aşkınsal çıkarımını sunmaktadır çünkü daha ilk kavramsal harekette varlık ve hiçlik belirlenimleri kendilerini diyalektik bir hareket içinde açığa

çıkarırlar. Ancak, bu kavramlar yalnızca bu diyalektik hareket içinde anlamlarına kavuşurlar ve her ikisi de kendi gerçekliklerinin varoluş kategorisinde açığa çıktığını gösterir.

Sonuç olarak, tezde son bölümde Hegel'in Kant'ın antinomilerine gerçek anlamda üçüncü bir alternatif sunmadığı da iddia edilebileceği savunulmuştur. Tezde de daha ayrıntılı tartışıldığı üzere, Hegel antinomiler konusunda gerçek anlamda üçüncü bir alternatif sunmak yerine daha çok antinomilerde tezde ve antitezde gösterilen pozisyonlardan birisini savunuyor gibi durmaktadır. Örneğin ikinci antinomi konusunda, yani dünyanın zamanda bir başlangıcı olup olmadığı konusunda, Hegel'in meseleyi tartışması daha çok dünyanın zamanda sonsuzluğunu savunuyor izlenimini güçlü bir şekilde vermektedir. Yine benzer bir şekilde, ilk antinomiye nazaran Hegel maddenin, en azından potansiyel olarak, sonsuza kadar bölünebiliyor olduğunu savunuyor pozisyonundadır. Ancak mesele Hegel'in Kant'ın antinomilerde koyduğu sınırı tam olarak başarıyla aşabilip aşamadığı meselesinden ziyade Kant ve Hegel'in iki farklı düşünme tarzını temsil ettikleri meselesidir. Sonuç olarak, tezde daha ayrıntılı bir şekilde de tartışıldığı gibi Kant'ın bu sınırı tamamen tartışılmaz bir şekilde çizdiği tartışmalıdır. Asıl önemli olan şey Kant için çelişki yanlışlığın formel bir belirtisi iken Hegel için çelişki varlığın zorunlu bir birleşenidir. Ancak, burada Hegel için çelişkinin modern mantıktaki anlamıyla bir önermenin hem doğru hem de yanlış değerini aynı anlamda alması olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Çelişki Hegel için bir kimlik ve özdeşlik meselesidir. Yani bir kavram, kavramsal içeriğini ancak kendi mantıksal alnından dışlamakta olduğu iddiasında bulunduğu diğer kavram ve kavramlarla olan ilişkileri içinde kazanır. Benzer bir şekilde çelişki aynı zamanda varlığın da zorunlu bir bileşenidir. Bunun anlamı ise, bir nesnenin zorunlu olarak olduğu şeyden farklı bir şeye dönüşmek zorunda olmasıdır. Bir diğer deyişle, bir nesnenin bu nesne olarak var olması aynı zamanda onun olduğu şeyden bir başka şeye dönüşmesini de içerir. Yine, kavramsal belirlenimler benzer olarak, nesnelere de kendi kimliklerini, yani niteliksel

özelliklerini ancak diğer nesnelere ile olan ilişkileri üzerinden kazanır. Yani bir nesne ancak sahip olduğu ilişkisel özellikleriyle var olur ki bu da onun aslında onun dışında durması gerektiği düşünülen diğer nesnelere üzerinden bir özdeşlik ve kimlik kazandığı anlamına gelir.

Tezde, son olarak, Hegel'in Mantık'ının bizim için olan esas öneminin ne Kant'ın getirdiği sınırlamalara başarılı bir cevap getirip getirmediğinden ne de kendi içinde tutarlı bir sistem olarak kendi meşruiyetini sağlayıp sağlamadığından kaynaklandığı savunulmuştur. Mantık'ın asıl önemi, öncelikle düşüncenin kendisine getirilen her türlü sınırlamaya nasıl doğal bir reaksiyon getirdiğinin önemli bir temsilcisi olmasından kaynaklandığından doğmaktadır. İkinci olarak ise, daha önce de belirtildiği gibi Kant ve Hegel çelişkiye yönelik iki farklı düşünme tarzını temsil etmektedir. Her ne kadar Kant gibi çelişkiyi yanlışlığın formel bir göstergesi olarak görmek sağduyumuza daha uygun gelse de bu kavrayış tarzı, örneğin, hareket gibi bir çok meselede çözümsüz kalmaktadır. Hegel'in çelişkiyi de kucaklayan düşünme tarzının ise daha bütüncül bir düşünme tarzı olduğu savunulmuştur.

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Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

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Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

### YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezinden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: