

NATO-EU SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE POST-9/11 SECURITY ERA

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ABSTRACT

NATO-EU SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE POST-9/11 SECURITY ERA

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The objective of this study is to thoroughly examine the relationship between the EU and NATO in dealing with the challenges of the post-9/11 international security environment. In doing so, the following questions are addressed: How have both organizations come to define themselves as crucial security actors within a globally transforming security agenda? How effective has cooperation been so far in dealing with these various emerging security related issues in practice as outlined by their security strategic doctrines? How can security relations between them be characterized: cooperative or competitive?

This study argues that the relationship between NATO and the EU for the most part has been mixed being both cooperative and competitive at the same time. By analyzing each of the common security issues as outlined in NATO's new strategic concept and the European Security Strategy (ESS), this study also tries to add to the generally debated NATO-'ESDP' relations that focus solely on their crisis management relations as the overall basis for defining their relationship. It concludes that while relations between them has been both cooperative and competitive with certain practical achievements been made mostly through their crisis management operations, there is still need for further cooperation to be made in other security related areas as well. Preserving the future of stronger security relations between them can be achieved through a strengthened Common Security and Defence Policy working side by side with NATO.

Key Words: Cooperation, Competition, ESDP, International security, NATO-EU relations.

ÖZ

11 EYLÜL SONRASI GÜVENLİK ÇAĞINDA NATO-AB İLİŞKİLERİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

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Bu tezin amacı, AB ve NATO arasındaki ilişkiyi 11 Eylül 2001 sonrası uluslararası güvenlik ortamında meydana gelen sorunlarla başa çıkma yönünden derinlemesine incelemektir. Bu kapsamda aşağıdaki sorular irdelenmiştir: Dünya çapında değişen güvenlik planlamasında her iki organizasyon da nasıl kendilerini kritik güvenlik sağlayıcı aktörler olarak tanımlayabilmiştir? Her iki organizasyonun da stratejik güvenlik doktrinleri göz önüne alındığında, güvenliğe ilişkin yeni ortaya çıkan sorunlarla başa çıkmada aralarındaki işbirliği şu ana kadar ne kadar etkili olmuştur? İki organizasyonun birbiriyle ilişkisi daha çok işbirlikçi mi yoksa rekabetçi olarak mı tanımlanabilir? Bu çalışma AB ve NATO arasındaki ilişkinin aynı anda hem işbirlikçi hem de rekabetçi olduğunu savunmaktadır. Bu çalışma aynı zamanda NATO'nun yeni stratejik konsepti ve Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi'nde belirlenen her bir ortak güvenlik sorununu analiz ederek, birbirleri arasındaki ilişkiyi tanımlayan genel bir temel olarak sadece kriz yönetimine yoğunlaşan, tartışmalı NATO – Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ilişkisine de katkıda bulunmaktadır. Çalışmada, AB ve NATO arasındaki ilişkinin kriz yönetimi operasyonları sayesinde erişilen bazı gerçek kazanımlarıyla hem işbirlikçi hem de rekabetçi olmasına rağmen güvenlikle ilgili diğer konularda daha fazla işbirliğine gerek duyulduğu sonucuna ulaşılmaktadır. İki organizasyon arasındaki daha güçlü güvenlik ilişkilerinin geleceğinin korunması, NATO ile birlikte çalışan ve güçlendirilmiş bir Ortak Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikası ile gerçekleştirilebilir.

Anahtar kelimeler: İşbirliđi, Rekabet, Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma, Politikası, Uluslararası güvenlik, NATO-AB ilişkileri.

To the memory of my late Mother,

Anne Onyeador

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
CA	Comprehensive Approach
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DSACEUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EC	European Community
EDA	European Defence Agency
EEAS	European External Action Service
ESS	European Security Strategy
ESC	Emerging Security Challenges
ESDI	European Security Defense Initiative
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESCD	Emerging Security Challenges Division
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
EU	European Union
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
EUPOL	European Police
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
IFOR	Implementation Force
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force

KFOR	Kosovo Force
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Nongovernmental organizations
NRF	NATO Reaction Force
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SDSR	Strategic Defence and Security Review
SFOR	Stabilization Force
UN	United Nations
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States (of America)
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WHO	World Health Organization
WEU	Western European Union

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 21st century brought along with it a new dimension where the relations of nation states occur within a highly complex, and rapidly transforming interdependent structure enhanced by the emerging forces of new global actors, globalization, regional network of non-state and state actors; and a rise in security threats both locally and globally. Many of today's "emerging" security issues (or the "securitization"¹ of it) especially since the terrorist events of 9/11² in the US have spanned through state territories and therefore are in dire need for a broader, multidimensional solution which would enhance further cooperation between nation states as the most viable approach towards the handling of these challenges. These security challenges range from but not limited to; the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, failed states, regional conflicts, transnational organized criminal activities; cyber, energy and environmental security.

Cold War politics was based on the common thinking that an expansionist policy of the then Soviet Union should bring together the Trans-Atlantic western states in a united atmosphere to stand against this growing threat. Hence, NATO was created as a product of the realist political thinking based on a well-accepted securitized threat that focused its attention on a Soviet Union threat as primarily a military organization or 'hard-power' while the EU on the other hand was constructed as a 'soft' or civil power.

¹ See for instance, Hatzigeorgopoulos, Myrto. (2012) 'The EU, NATO and Emerging Security Challenges in 2012', *European Security Review*, 54: 1-6 where she argues that these "emerging" security challenges are not exactly new but its urgent prioritization by security actors especially since the terrorist attacks in Washington is what is new.

² For the purpose of this study the term 'post-9/11' period would be used to refer to the time period after the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. There is still some debate as to if this period is still ongoing till date. See for instance Enders, Walter (2004), 'After 9/11: Is it all different now?', September 2004.

However, NATO over the years has transformed itself by adapting its primary policies from a military based one of collective defense, to a much more comprehensive and security based one focused on crisis management and post conflict resolution in contemporary international environment (Brzezinski 2009: 2). With a large overlap in membership between both actors which in turn has limited the possibility of member defence budget to be used separately within the defence structure of both organizations as well as the spread of security threats through globalization, it is almost impossible to imagine both organizations working separately from each other.

Since its formation following the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the risk to Europe changed drastically and NATO found itself readjusting its institutional focus as a military and political alliance in respect to the new global threats. Towards Euro-Atlantic security NATO has contributed its resources to the stabilization of the Balkans. Its involvement in Bosnia and Kosovo became its first military actions. However, the 9/11 terrorist events brought to use for the first time in NATO's history, its Article 5 collective defense clause which implies an attack on one is considered an attack on the rest of the allied powers. This enhanced a strengthened need for NATO to adapt to the rapidly changing global security environment.

NATO is primarily a defense and security organization but has however grown over the post-Cold War years to include crisis management in its missions which makes it complementary to that of the EU as well as the fact that it was also designed basically for the provision of stability and peace within the European region against the excesses of the then Soviet Union. The EU on the other hand being a much more political and economic regional cooperation of states is less militaristic in nature with the aim of maintaining political and economic security within its region. Both organizations were originally designed with a focus on the European environment with limited interests in pursuing global security missions. However, with the changes brought about by global events beginning with the fall of the Soviet Union towards the 9/11 attacks and a rise in terrorism and other cross-cutting global security issues as outlined in their strategic doctrines – NATO's new strategic concept of 2010 and the 2003 European Security

Strategy (ESS) - it has become necessary for both organizations to increase their aims and scope towards the rest of the world as well. Just like other bureaucratic systems, such a change and adaptation towards a new international system of new risks and threats takes time especially when it involves cooperation on different levels with new actors that have different working strategies.

An 'inside looking out approach' has been used by many analysts of the Trans-Atlantic alliance policy debate as a way of understanding the issues surrounding collective security and basis for common strategies and partnerships between governments by looking at how each government or different international organizations for instance like NATO and the EU perceive threats and formulate policies towards its resolutions or their anticipation of the consequences if cooperation is not achieved (See Clarke 1998; Maull 1998).

It is however important to note that the values of both organizations are not necessarily in stark contrast with one another but may differ on the approaches and strategies on how to deal with these perceived threats to global security. In analyzing the identities of these different organizations, one has to look deeper into the inter-organizational problem focusing on identity of the different actors or members within it that riddle the coherence and collective capability of that particular organization and not necessarily the inter-institutional partnerships they create with other organizations (McClintock 2006: 14).

The problem of identity showcases the varying degree of security issue prioritization in relation to the different national interests amongst organization member states which they adopt toward the formulation of their policies and in turn, affects the output of their relations with other institutions. Between the EU and NATO in carrying out field missions for instance, the EU is expected in relation to NATO to engage in full civilian crisis management operations and to an extent military deployment missions while NATO in relation to the EU is to carry out only military operations (McClintock 2006: 15). However this has certainly not been the case since the EU's agenda to pursue the

development of its own military capabilities under its European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) which is aimed at reducing its dependence on NATO's military assets in crisis management activities.

The security relations between the EU and NATO has therefore come under heavy scrutiny as a result of some of these actions that indicate a move by the EU towards a full autonomy of its military capabilities from NATO as well as certain political problems that renders the communication exchange and decision making systems difficult such as the Turkish-Cyprus impasse. On the other hand, the successes of the EU-NATO cooperation under the utilization of the Berlin Plus agreement of Concordia and Althea in the Balkans as well as the current economic crisis that hit the global economy leading to shortfalls in defense spending makes the situation of a threat or end to future security cooperation between them less unlikely (Biermann 2008: 151).

In a today's global political structure riddled with unpredictable security threats such as the growing waves of terrorism and access to nuclear materials to name a few, it is necessary for the EU and NATO to adapt their civil and military planning strategies as well as the structures of their organizations towards dealing with these issues. The EU has civilian capabilities and personnel at its disposal while NATO has a stronger military capacity, however, the EU-NATO relationship has been scrutinized as being mostly 'unidirectional' where the EU is gaining more from its use of NATO resources and not vice versa as what the concept of effective cooperation should entail or what the ESS defines as 'effective multilateralism' (Varwick and Koops 2009: 117-120).

The common problem contemporary global political decision-makers face is that of unforeseen or rapidly evolving risks and threats to the international security system whereby they develop a range of varying strategies to manage such crises, independently of each other as a means to enhance stronger comprehensive effectiveness towards these problems. On the other hand, handling and strategizing for crisis management on independent levels may also heighten and affect the level of

competition that exists between the actors of the international system which also includes these international organizations.

Therefore, it is quite crucial that establishing stronger security relations be granted a major premise in enhancing platforms for maximizing cooperation between competitive parties that are involved in dealing with the security issues of our contemporary world. This not only provides a common, effective and rapid solution based approach for them, but also narrows their capability gaps and avoids the duplication of efforts through burden sharing initiatives (Biermann 2008: 151).

The basic reason why constructing a fully effective cooperation within organizations remains a hectic and an often tricky process however lies majorly in the very heterogeneous structure of the members that constitute these organizations and not only this, but also their beliefs, principles, mandates, basic national interests, political stability, availability or differences in resources, and their levels of development when it comes to the management of particular crisis or crisis in general.

The concept of security itself has transformed over the years to also focus on the importance of human security not just the state. The key to proper response to future security risks is the enhanced cooperation, contribution and combination of various capabilities by various actors in the international community. Looking at things in this manner, it would prove highly invaluable thus far to further worsen capabilities gap by limiting relations between international organizations. Security threats to both the EU and NATO organizations are basically similar which has helped explain to a large extent why this alliance continues to exist as they both try to deal with these threats in a concerted manner (McClintock 2006).

Events of the new security environment precipitated by the 9/11 attacks, has increased the need and urgency for dialogues and cooperation between major security organizations particularly, NATO and the EU. Many of today's current global security issues such as transnational criminal activities, climate change span and state territorial boundaries pose cross-cutting risks for states in the international system. Multi-

dimensional solutions would need to be found in order to deal effectively with it which is why cooperation between NATO and the EU is very essential. Furthermore, the global economic crisis of 2008 has added to the growing challenges both organizations have to face as increased budgetary pressures would continue to determine their efficiency. Both institutions have been trying to present themselves as important security actors and as thus, improved cooperation in planning operations, effective communication and coordination is crucial for them to avoid the risk of duplicating each other's efforts.

Managing today's security problems needs the full cooperation of the international community to work hand in hand to ensure this relative peace and security effectively. In other words, a combination of both civilian and military powers remains a powerful key to respond aggressively to these 21st century security challenges. Dealing with these problems simply requires a comprehensive approach encompassing a more enhanced coordination, effective cooperation and a steady flow of valuable information, consultations and interactions amongst all parties and players on the sphere of global political relations (Howorth 2001).³

1.1 Purpose of Research and Research Questions

The objective of this thesis is to thoroughly examine the security relations between NATO and the EU in the post-9/11 period. It analyzes both organizations as major security actors in the global security environment and how they have each transformed themselves vis-à-vis each other over the years to this effect. Furthermore, the major security threats and challenges that have characterized and transformed the post 9/11 global security environment as well as the individual and interactive actions both actors take in dealing with these "Emerging Security Challenges" (ESC's) would be evaluated

³ For full statement by the Secretary-General of the UNSOC meeting, 2012 on Building Peace amongst war torn states can be found in <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/sc10868.doc.htm>

based on NATO's Strategic Concept and the EU's Security Strategy (ESS). In doing so, this research seeks to understand the security relations between them as to whether being cooperative or competitive.

To guide this research the following questions would be addressed;

1. How have NATO and EU evolved as security actors and how has their security relations evolved as well?
2. How has the global security agenda and environment transformed to the post 9/11 political era spurring the need for increased security relations between NATO and the EU; and how have both actors defined the major threats of this era? In which ways have they both dealt with these problems as individual actors and as cooperative security actors?
3. Finally, in assessing how cooperation has been so far between NATO and the EU in regards to handling global security challenges; has their relationship been more of cooperation or competition and what issues limit effective cooperation between them? What does the future hold for continued relations between them?

1.2 Materials and Method

Major primary sources of information used in the conduct of this research include relevant texts, books and research by contributors to the transatlantic security cooperation. Internet sources of official speeches, debates, security strategies from official websites, publications from think tanks and research institutes are also used.

1.3 Organization of the Thesis

Chapter 1 would provide the major conceptual framework guiding the research and study beginning with a brief introduction to the surrounding issues of the global security environment and security cooperation. It also describes the problem statement; the materials used in this study, the chapter outline of the study, and define the concept of security in International Relations.

Chapter 2 will provide a brief background to the history of the key actors to this research - NATO and the EU – particularly as to how both organizations have shaped themselves into major security players in today's international political environment; and in its following sub section, provide an important outline of the history of their security relations with one another in three important phases, from the Post-Cold War and mid-1990's; to the creation of the ESDP in 1999 and the 'Berlin Plus' agreement of 2003 that provided a platform for more direct interactions between NATO and the EU on operational and political levels; and finally to the post-9/11 periods that altered inter-EU and intra-alliance relations leading to the important Tervuren summit which further highlighted the inter-organizational problems that hampered the success of the NATO-EU security relations and may still continue to affect it till date.

Chapter 3 will provide an understanding of the contemporary global security environment and describes how the conceptualization of security itself by major international actors has evolved and helped to shape contemporary global politics amongst them. The second section of this chapter will outline the practical areas of security cooperation between NATO and the EU as outlined in NATO's Strategic Concept of 2010 and the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 respectively and also how both organizations have dealt with the security concerns of the global security environment individually and cooperatively.

Chapter 4 would provide an assessment as to how effective security relations between both organizations can be described so far in dealing with the various security threats of the post-9/11 global political era. This chapter would also highlight a few important issues that are important for assessing the security relations between NATO and the EU thus evaluating crucial limiting factors that affect effective cooperation between them. This chapter would also analyze some debated scenarios that look at the future of their relationship with one another in handling these issues in the global security environment.

Chapter 5 would summarize and provide the conclusions of this study.

1.4 The Concept of Security in International Relations

Defining the term ‘security’ has hardly been a straightforward process as the meaning itself is quite a dynamic one applying to rapidly evolving situations and random subjects. In the study of International Relations, the concept of ‘security’ or security studies has evolved as a subset of the discipline alongside its main paradigms (Buzan and Wilde 1998: 33). While the process of globalization has helped to significantly blur the lines between traditional state-to-state security actors to include non-state actors, it also does the same for what constitutes domestic and foreign policy issues in analyzing security global politics (ibid.).

Cooperative security or as the case may be, security cooperation, is a term used quite loosely in the field of International Relations to refer to states working together to deal with common challenges and is used interchangeably with the term collective security. The term ‘collective security’ however is used more specifically to refer to a type of security system whereby states agree to coordinate their efforts towards protection from an act of aggression directed at one of their own (Mihalka 2001: 113). The concept of Collective security stems from the idea that a common threat/adversary would bring

states together under the premise of preserving the survival or security of each and every one of the state under it. It rests on the notion of one for all and all for one (Ulusoy 2003). In simple terms, the meaning of collective security involves efforts of a group of states acting together towards the preservation of their security. For instance, the alliance security system such as that of NATO has been described as the first form of collective security where member states are grouped together under a collective defense structure towards a single threat which at the time was expansionist threats of the Soviet Union in Europe. Other terms like common security and comprehensive security are often used too in global security discusses with the former referring to a situation where states are generally and equally affected by a common threat such as global warming or nuclear war while the latter refers to a security regime that deals with both ‘traditional’ threats (such as nuclear wars) that directly affect state actors as well as ‘non-traditional’ threats (such as drug trafficking) (ibid.). However for the purpose of this research, the term security cooperation would be particularly used to analyze the inter-institutional relationship between NATO and the EU.

Classical realists who dominated the discipline of international relations in the 1940’s viewed the world as a state-centric system; hence states were the main security actors pursuing their own self-interests which in essence, are their national interest. What came to constitute ‘high’ politics such as state security and military power were significantly distinguished from ‘low’ politics or domestic affairs such as health and welfare issues to provide a rationale for governments to pursue militarist agendas (Hough 2004: 3). The problem with this situation where all states would strive to pursue their own national security agendas was that there would definitely be conflict since they cannot all do this at the same time. This is what is known in the realist concept of security studies as “security dilemma” which could only be avoided through another concept of “Balance of Power” where according to Morgenthau, is the reality that power can be distributed equally amongst a group of countries so that the international system is balanced (1995: 223). Waltz, once said, “Rational countries living in the state of anarchy and the security dilemma would be suspicious of and

hostile to each other because of their tense relations, although that was not their original idea.” (1992: 3). Within such a hostile international environment, it was only logical states would use their “Balance of Power” to guard their own security (Xin 2001). The 1960’s and 1970’s however, brought about a rise in economic interaction between states and increased the scope of international relations beyond military power to economic power which in turn brought about neo-realist security concept to include both military and economic agendas (Hough 2004: 4).

Pluralism in the 1960’s went beyond the concepts of military and economic power of the state to assert that a number of actors - such as International Governmental Organizations, International Non-Governmental Organizations, and Multi-National Corporations - were influential in shaping the security of the international political system thus affecting the complexity of issues within it. Environmental, health or economic development issues regarded as ‘low’ political issues were beginning to influence international politics as well as domestic politics. Marxist international relations theorists went a step further to assert that economic factors were more important than military or other related issues in determining global politics as it has always done through globalization and the capitalist logic of the international system that uses military means by richer, more powerful states to protect its economic interest at the expense of poorer states (Hough 2004: 6). Thus, a global security agenda could only be shaped by a wider global system and not through states themselves which in turn could only be destroyed through a world socialist revolution (ibid.).

The events of the 1990’s that witnessed an unexpected development through the end of the Cold War raised new sets of questions posed to the major paradigms of International Relations especially towards their inability to predict the end of the war. Social constructivists argued that understanding political events required a deeper approach into the social and domestic agendas of states than just an on-the-surface analysis of global political relations. In other words, a sociological approach increased an understanding to the cultural aspects of policy making. This also means a states ideology or moral dimension could once in a while help explain its foreign political

decisions which defied the military-economic-national interest logic of the other international relations schools of thought (Hough 2004: 7).

The 'new world order' which ushered in a period of lesser security concerns premised on threats of a nuclear war also witnessed a shift to concerns about a whole new range of human based security issues. Ullman defined security threats as a sequence of events that "threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to a government of a state, or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state" (1983: 33). This definition of security 'widens' the meaning of it to focus on individuals and non-state security actors that in many ways affect the foreign policy choices of their states in making decisions on the global political stage. Realists like Waltz in his article, *The Renaissance of Security Studies* (1991: 211-239) have fiercely criticized such a definition by maintaining their focus on a more narrowed conceptualization of what constitutes a security issue. He maintains that security studies should deal with the 'study of threat, use and control of military force' (1991: 230). Realists in general are not eager to embrace these new post-Cold War 'widening' aspects to security concepts for fear of the primary elements of state conflicts, military power and national interest involved in security politics may be rendered redundant (Hough 2004: 6).

Clearly the end of the Cold War signaled a need for governments to re-focus their security policies on newer and wider array of threats especially that to human security. This widening concept of security gained stronger foundation through the works of academics in the 1990's. Ayoob argues that "security or insecurity is defined in relation to vulnerabilities, both internal and external, that threaten to, or have the potential to, bring down or significantly weaken state structures, both territorial and institutional, and regimes" (1997: 131). Unlike Waltz, his position recognizes the importance of domestic issues that could threaten the state especially Less Developed Countries (LDC's) but at the same time agrees that not all issues are as important as some such as environmental degradation or migration (ibid.).

Waever (1995: 67) argues in his own writing that “as concepts, neither individual nor international security exist” and calls for recognition to the fact that a “re-conceptualization of the security field in terms of a duality of state and societal security”. In the process of “securitizing” an issue, state elites according to Waever shape and define what constitutes the meaning of security through what he termed as ‘speech acts’. Klare and Thomas go a step further to define security as “world security” which should involve more than state defence against military attacks but other issues such as demographic pressure, economic and ecological problems that could greatly affect developed countries as well (1994). In other words, to them, global security can be synonymously viewed as human security as well.

Barry Buzan’s contribution from the ‘Copenhagen school of security studies’⁴ to the widening of the security concept was a very significant one. He asserts that threats and vulnerabilities can exist in both military and non-military ways but to be accepted as a security concern, it must be able to be differentiated from the “normal run of the merely political”. He further asserts that these threats would have to be defined by a securitizing actor “who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” towards a “referent object” (Buzan et al 1998: 5). His definition implied that global security issues are not only limited to the military aspect but can also constitute matters that may not even threaten states (Hough 2004: 8). Europe today can be defined as a “security complex” which according to Buzan is “a group of states whose primary security concerns link them together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991:190).

While the above discussed ‘wideners’ of the security concept focused on the position that factors other than military threats such as economic, social and environment contribute to security concerns although still being state-centric like the traditional realists; another approach to the security concept, the ‘deepeners’, go further in arguing

⁴ This school of thought originated with Buzan’s book *People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in International Relations* first published in 1983 which places particular importance to the social elements of security.

for a new security definition that would focus on the individual as the subject of threats instead of the state (Hough 2004: 11). In other words they argue that the major referent object to security concern should be the individuals that make up the state institutions and not the state itself (ibid: 12). This school of thought dominated by the pluralists and social constructivists, criticized the Copenhagen school for being state-centric in their approach to security conceptualization although of a much subtler form than the traditionalists. They argue that people - who could either range from civil servants to private individuals - responding politically to any issue that threatens their life can be deemed a security concern. Thus, by the end of the 1990's the concept of human security had taken root from these deepening security studies (ibid. 13).

Long before all these debates however, the importance of including other aspects of non-military security concerns to shape global perception of what constitutes security issues had been realized by international organizations and state politicians. The Brandt Report of 1980 (which was written based on an independent commission set up to review international development issues chaired by the former German Chancellor, Willy Brandt) had also highlighted the problem of poverty as a major global security issue (McSweeney 1999: 55). Also, despite its failure to secure international peace, the UN helped forge the idea that alongside managing conflicts through military means, the creation of specialized agencies to deal with health and welfare issues was just as important (ibid: 56).

After the Second World War that brought about the establishment of the UN, its charter included 'the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations' (Article 55) and through the enshrinement of human rights, recognized the importance of individual security within states (Matthews 1989: 167). It went even further in the 1990's to strengthen this idea by advocating the importance of human security (possibly for the first time in international politics) at a Pan African conference by the UN and Organization of African Unity where it is stated that the concept of security must be 'construed in terms of the security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic necessities

of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/her society in freedom and enjoying all fundamental human rights' (African Leadership Forum 1991). Furthermore, an important development to the deepening of the security concept witnessed the Security Council in 2000 pass a resolution for the first time that debated the HIV/AIDS pandemic which was a non-military issue (ibid: 170).

The 1990's also witnessed the emergence of various other threats such as rapid demographic growth, terrorism, drug trafficking, refugee flow, transnational crime, global warming, and resource shortages. In 1994 for instance, the US 'National Security Strategy'⁵ outlined many of the above listed threats while also acknowledging that not all security risks are military in nature. Joseph Nye's 'soft power' concept - which emphasizes a shift from the use of state military power to its values, culture, policies and institutions as a means to "attract" and "co-opt" - helped shape the thinking of foreign policy analysts like Strobe Talbott, the US deputy secretary of state in the Clinton administration to make calls for a 'widening' security agenda of the state. (Nye 1990). Following this trend, the Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Hu Jintao in 2007 advised that it was important China too increased its soft power. Events of the 9/11 terrorist attack increased urgency for global government recognition that in the new era of globalization, national state security could not be fully guaranteed by territorial borders alone and in turn, heightened human security concern for the US as a both a matter of foreign and domestic policy which led to the establishment of its Department of Homeland security in 2003 (ibid.).

Since the creation of the NATO and the EU, the fall of the Soviet Union, rise of China and India in the international system, and an influx of transnational threats have all come together to create uncertainties towards the development of the global security system. Contemporary era of globalization has in many ways than one affected the views and policy practices towards the global security agenda with - the current global financial crisis of 2008, high oil prices, Swine flu, the breakdown of transatlantic

⁵ This is a periodically prepared document released by the US government outlining major national security concerns and how they can be dealt with.

mutual support over US invasion of Iraq, the effects of natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina, the events of 9/11 and widespread terrorist activities around the world - all being part of the result of it (Hough 2004: 10).

The end of the Cold War most especially brought about a shift from the 'bi-polar' structure of the international system to a 'multipolar' one especially through the events of the Balkan wars that set the stage for the first EU crisis management operation and in turn increased the urgency for the west to realize it cannot deal with global issues on its own any more or any better than it could manage regional conflicts (Peral 2009: 5). Furthermore, it became pertinent for the EU to understand that for its survival and to maintain strong influence in the global order; multilateralism was to become an important concept to engage with in its practices. This meant that it had to work together with other regional and global powers to deal with global security issues in a collective effort to dispel future problems that could arise from 'competing unilateralism' (ibid: 5).

Despite past ups and downs in their relationship, EU-US cooperation has been and is the most economically significant and integrated relationship in the world as they are both key contributors towards the world economy. More importantly to security studies, their global political and security agendas have been the most crucial towards the development of cooperation that has helped emphasize the need for states to work together to tackle contemporary threats. Framework for this cooperation found itself first through the 'Transatlantic Declaration' of 1990 and furthermore, the 'New Transatlantic Agenda' adopted in 1995 that had four main objectives; promoting peace and stability, democracy and development around the world; responding to global challenges; contributing to the expansion of world trade and closer economic relations; and building bridges across the Atlantic (CSIS Report 2006: 15).

Events of the new security environment precipitated by the 9/11 attacks, has increased the need and urgency for dialogues and cooperation between major security organizations particularly, NATO and the EU. Many of today's current global security

issues such as transnational criminal activities and climate change span, state territorial boundaries and pose cross-cutting risks for states in the international system. Multi-dimensional solutions would need to be found in order to deal effectively with it which is why cooperation between NATO and the EU is very essential. Furthermore, the global economic crisis of 2008 has added to the growing challenges both organizations have to face as increased budgetary pressures would continue to determine their efficiency. Both institutions have been trying to present themselves as important security actors and as thus, improved cooperation in planning operations, effective communication and coordination is crucial for them to avoid the risk of duplicating each other's efforts.

CHAPTER 2

THE SECURITY ACTORS: NATO AND THE EU

This chapter will provide a brief background to the history of the key actors to this research - NATO and the EU – particularly as to how both organizations have shaped themselves into major security players in today’s international political environment; and in its following sub section, provide an important outline of the history of their security relations with one another in three important phases, from the post-Cold War and mid-1990’s; to the creation of the ESDP in 1999 and the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement of 2003 that provided a platform for more direct interactions between NATO and the EU on operational and political levels; and finally to the post-9/11 periods that altered inter-EU and intra-alliance relations leading to the important Tervuren summit which further highlighted the inter-organizational problems that hampered the success of the NATO-EU security relationship and may still continue to affect it till date.

2.1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a Security Actor

NATO is indeed the strongest politico-military alliance the world has seen to date. Its member states are from one of the most technologically advanced, economically productive and politically stable regions in the world amounting to about 900 million people which contributes a whopping 45% to the GDP of the world economy. Currently an alliance made up of 28 member countries, it is often argued that NATO was created as a response to Soviet threats but this is only a part of the reason why NATO was formed as the organization was established as a move towards deterring Soviet expansion threats, dismissing the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe and

engendering a stronger political integration in Europe. The stark and hostile realities of war which brought about the previously established League of Nations and its successor, the UN, eventually became the foundation, on which NATO was built in April 1949. In accordance with its Treaty, NATO is a collective defense organization committed to safeguarding the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means (Payne 2003: 7). Furthermore as a political alliance, the preamble of its treaty expresses that the member nations have a common heritage of freedom, individual liberty, democracy and rule of law (Kugler 1990: 26).

In 1949, the first NATO Secretary General, Lord Ismay, gave an address on the organization's goal stating that it was “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. Generally, this summed up the entire objective of the organization which was to form an alliance of a Euro-Atlantic defence position against the Soviet Union, to develop western military capabilities from the devastating effect of the world wars, and finally, to grant the superpower at the time - the US - to be a part of a stable and permanent solution to security of the west and the rest of the world (Reynolds 1994: 13).

Being more than just a response to events of the Cold War and Soviet Union threats in Europe, NATO has also served vital, western interests by bringing the US directly into the affairs of Europe and created a mutual commitment that has forged the transatlantic community of member states into a security community through common norms and shared economic values (Kugler 1990: 7) Articles 3-5 of its treaty stress the collective security foundation that bonds the member nations of the alliance.

The following is a summary of the Articles of NATO as outlined by the Washington Treaty:

- Article 1: Any conflicts between the member states of the organization must be settled by employing any means necessary to instill peace in the international system at par with the directions of the UN.

- Article 2: Economic relations and heightened understanding should be enhanced between member states in a bid to creating more peaceful situations for peace and prosperity.
- Articles 3 and 4: Every member state must act using the tool of self-help and guided mutual assistance between each other, create facilities for individual protection from outside attack as well as collectively too, and when the need arises, any party may consult the alliance on issues of territorial and sovereign security threats.
- Articles 5 and 6: An armed attack against one member of the alliance would be acted on as an attack on the rest of the members of the alliance. The application of military force and collective efforts would be employed to protect the security of the NATO region. These actions would be run through by the UN and would end when the UN has employed the adequate and necessary steps to instill and protect security in the international system
- Article 7: NATO is not designed to overtake the main international body and guarantor of peace, the UN.
- Article 8: Any conflict between any or more member states has no effect to the application of the treaty.
- Articles 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14: Based on the constitutions of the member states, a central council would be created and the treaty may come under revision after every decade while any party may disband from the treaty after 20 years. The treaty would remain in the safe keep of the US Government.
- Article 10: By a unanimous agreement, NATO may allow any state from the continent of Europe to join the alliance (NATO 1949).

The Treaty itself did not create an integrated organization but only a council and a “defence committee” to oversee the establishment of the treaty. This however was to change as the Korean War of the 1950’s helped force NATO members into developing

more concrete military plans in response to threats by the communist countries (Isby and Kamps 1985: 14). The North Atlantic Council, NATO international civilian staff, the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) was thus created. Through the creation of these organizational structures, the stage was indeed set for NATO to act as a security alliance and also set the framework of the NATO that exists today (Kugler 1990: 27).

With political stability gradually returning to Western Europe, new allies such as Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952 followed closely by West Germany in 1955. However, this stability was short lived with the formation of the Warsaw pact in 1955 by the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies as a response to West Germany's membership in NATO. It was during this period NATO adopted a strategic doctrine of "Massive Retaliation" based on the idea that if the Soviet Union attacked, NATO would respond decisively with nuclear weapons.

The Paris Agreement of 1954 was an important landmark in its security history that created NATO's "transatlantic bargain" in a bid to build its security position in Central Europe. The alliance agreed to admit the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) into NATO and maintain its military presence for the continued protection of West Germany in exchange that the FRG commits its military forces into full cooperation with NATO's SACEUR. The 1952 Lisbon Agreements also witnessed the provision of military forces by Britain, France and other continental powers in cooperation with the US and FRG forces operating in West Germany. This action of contributing military assets towards a single cause became the foundation for NATO's policy today (Kluger 1990: 29).

The years following the 1950's witnessed long talks over NATO's military strategy especially within the areas of nuclear and conventional weapons. The 1960's also displayed a re-ignition of Cold War tensions as a major nuclear disaster was narrowly avoided in the events of the Cuban missile crises between the US and the Soviet Union as well as the US involvement in the Vietnam War. From a primarily defence based

organization, NATO found itself adopting a new policy of détente that stressed the de-escalation of tensions between the West and the East through the preservation of the status quo (Reynolds 1994: 13). Through the replacement of the massive retaliation doctrine by US President John Kennedy's strategy of a "flexible response", NATO's military conventional role in response to a conflict was enhanced. Furthermore, NATO advanced its agenda as a political alliance through its calls for the use of dialogue and détente in dealing with the Warsaw Pact countries as spelled out in a report presented to the North Atlantic Council (NAC) by the then Belgian Foreign Minister, Pierre Harmel (NATO 2009). The Harmel Report was crucial to NATO's development as both a political and security alliance as it helped set the stage for the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 that bound the countries of the Warsaw Pact to respecting the freedom and security of their citizens (Reynolds 1994 13).

This détente was not to last for much longer as the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its deployment of Saber ballistic missiles in Europe led to the "dual-track" decision by the allies to deploy Pershing II theater nuclear weapons and cruise missiles in Europe as a response to Soviet threats with deployment to begin in 1983 through NATO. These events led to the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the US and the Soviet Union which began setting the stage for the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War.

Since its formation through to the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, the risk to Europe had changed drastically and NATO found itself in an identity crisis problem that spelled out an urgent need for readjusting its institutional focus as a military and political alliance in respect to questions raised about the future of its continued existence (Payne 2003:14). NATO adopted a 'new strategic concept' in 1991 that outlined the security threats such as political instability and ethnic unrest (NATO, 1991). It also established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)⁶ of that same year. The identity implications for NATO through its adoption of this new

⁶ This was later renamed the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.

strategic concept began a new stage in the transformation of its security image in the global security agenda.

In 1994 came the establishment of the Mediterranean Dialogue which was a forum of cooperation between NATO and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Also in the same year with the Partnership for Peace (PfP)⁷ program, the then 16 member Alliance took its first step towards enlargement with 25 countries from Central Europe and Central Asia and in 1997, its formal enlargement witnessed the inclusion of the nations of Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland and then later on in 2004 to include Estonia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Latvia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania with the latest addition of Albania and Croatia to the group in 2009 (Kecskemethy 2004:296).

Towards Euro-Atlantic security NATO helped contributed its resources to the stabilization of the Balkans. Its actions in Bosnia and Kosovo became its first military actions when in 1995, NATO planes bombed Bosnian Serb installations culminating to the Dayton peace negotiations. NATO's new peacekeeping and peace building roles were thus put into action in maintaining and ensuring the agreements under the framework of the Dayton peace accord was kept through its use of its Implementation Force (IFOR). Furthermore, in 1999, its military intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia) and in Kosovo carved out a more defined post-Cold War role for the Alliance (Payne 2003:15).

Flockhart (2011: 269) argues that the Balkan conflicts in general were positive for NATO in its post-Cold War construction of a new identity for itself. More than just being its first military operation, it gave the alliance the opportunity to gain experience in conducting its first crisis management mission and in turn, boosted the image of NATO as the "most dynamic and successful of the competing European security organizations" (Flockhart 2011: 270).

⁷ The Partnership for Peace program was created by NATO as a forum for developing trust between NATO and other states in Europe and the former Soviet Union which was formally launched in 1994.

The 9/11 terrorist events brought to use for the first time in NATO's history, its Article 5 collective defense clause which implies an attack on one is considered an attack on the rest of the allied powers. This enhanced a strengthened need for NATO to adapt to the rapidly changing global security environment. With the creation of its 9000-member NATO Response Forces (NRF), the Alliance bolstered its military operational capabilities to act quickly in response to conflicts. In 2003, NATO took control of the UN led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) that was engaged in the training of Afghan peacekeeping forces and marked the first time NATO partook in an "out of area" mission. Since then, NATO has found itself struggling with the burden of trying to protect and maintain security in one of the most violent and war torn regions in the world alongside its dependence on efforts with non-military institutions (EU, UN, NGO's). Despite the immense level of difficulty and financial burden in maintaining security in the Afghan region, many of its allies still hold a consensus that NATO's role has been crucial for limiting the growth of jihad terrorism there and its spread to other parts of the world (Kamp 2009: 22).

The US bombing of Iraq in 2003 created an important political impact that altered the security cooperation of NATO and NATO-EU members as a rift emerged between supporters of the war - which were primarily the eastern European NATO members - and non-supporters of the war, mainly France and Germany. Despite the dispute, upholding the transatlantic relationship was still important to them as NATO forces were sent to Iraq on a training mission to build-up and control the security situation in Iraq. Furthermore in 2004, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was created as a means to establish a security cooperative relationship between NATO and key Middle Eastern countries. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates are the only four participating members of this initiative till date with Oman and Saudi Arabia who have expressed interest to join (Kamp 2009: 24).

The Riga Summit of 2006 brought about plans for a more comprehensive approach initiative that would further help shape the alliance as a security actor. The summit formally brought the issue of "capabilities gap" to its transforming security agenda.

This gap divides the US and its European allies in their abilities (such as in areas of technology, investment and procurement) to carry out and organize large scale expeditionary operations such as that of NATO's Kosovo intervention (Yost 2003 83). This issue would be thoroughly examined in later sections of this study.

NATO also endorsed a "Comprehensive Political Guidance" that laid out a framework and timeline for the political priorities of NATO's capability issues, planning disciplines and intelligence. Consequently, the Bucharest Summit of 2008 further concretized NATO's adoption of a "comprehensive approach" (CA) that spells out an action plan through which NATO would improve its role as a post-conflict stabilization and crisis management actor in a bid to developing and ensuring ties with key international actors - such as the EU and the UN- similarly seeking for peaceful solutions to the security issues of the international system. The comprehensive approach from the Bucharest Summit maintained that through its experiences in Afghanistan and the Balkans (Kosovo), the international community needed to work more closely with each other in a coordinated manner and under a concerted effort of political, civil and military instruments so as to uphold each member's strengths and mandates to full use (Medcalf 2006: 33).

The CA is a very important issue for fostering cooperation towards the development of security relations between the EU and NATO as well as other international organizations and NGO's. Being primarily a military organization, it cannot adequately provide all the civilian contributions that are very necessary in sustaining peace and carrying out crisis management and post stabilization operations. This cooperation is also very essential in conflict areas where a de-militarization of the security elements would lead to a less tension-filled atmosphere necessary for development (Jacobsen 2010: 79).

The alliance continued to broaden its scope and roles as a transforming security actor as it took part in counter piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden, Horns of Africa and Indian Ocean where Operation Allied Provider was established based on the request of

UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon for provision of safe passage to escorts of the UN World Food Program (WFP) vessels in those regions. Some NATO members like France and Germany however again have expressed concern towards the shifting attention of the security organization away from the threats in Europe and called for its return to a more traditional role of protecting the interests of the European continent especially as Russia's politically maneuvering ambitions in regions like Georgia had become an issue to the rest of Europe (Medcalf 2006: 35). These concerns stem out of fear that inadequate attention to the security concerns would leave many weaker European nations under the influence of Russia. In the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO declined an offer of a Membership Action Plan to Georgia as a result of French and German concerns over Russia. Former Ukrainian President, Viktor Yushchenko described this move as a "huge mistake" as it created room for Russia to invade Georgia and subsequently, Ukraine in 2014 (Rettman, 2014).

The Lisbon Summit of 2010 brought things to a new level where a range of concepts involving the alliance response to growing security concerns on a stronger collective platform was discussed. This was outlined in the new "Strategic Concept" (titled "Active Engagement, Modern Defence") which also emphasized a renewed determination to improve its "partnership" through dialogue and cooperation with organizations like the EU and the UN. Under this new strategy, both organizations would reshape their objectives and awareness of the need for stronger peace and stability in the world by focusing on emerging security threats that has affected the world since the events of 9/11 such as the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, transnational organized crime, regional conflicts, as well as cyber, climate and energy security issues. Through this strategy, NATO had also resolved to continue the process of its reform and "transformation"⁸.

NATO eventually established the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) in 2010 to further emphasize its willingness to tackle growing security threats and

⁸ Transformation in the broad sense of the term is a permanent feature of the Organization. Since its inception, NATO has regularly reviewed its tasks and objectives in view of the evolution of the strategic environment.

providing solutions to it. This structure also strategically analyzes, monitors and predicts developments in international relations that could result as a threat to global security with its focus being primarily on WMD proliferation, terrorism, cyber and energy security (Medcalf 2006: 39). ESCD would be further analyzed in later sections of this study.

NATO has indeed managed to transform itself over the past two decades from a primarily “defence” or military structure to include crisis management operations as an important security actor. Since 1949, it has managed to construct a ‘hard power’ image for itself, against the Soviet Union and later in Bosnia and Kosovo in 1999 and more recently in 2011, Libya. Today, NATO has managed to promote dialogue and cooperation with 41 partner countries and actively fosters stronger security relations with other actors in the international system in a bid to effectively dealing with a number of security issues together. Flockhart (2011) argues however that the general assumption of NATO-EU partnership where NATO is generally described as focused on ‘hard security’ (or what she refers to as a ‘Tarzan’ narrative in reference to a strong male, dominating figure whereas ‘Jane’ is a feminine narrative which she likens to the EU’s ‘soft security’ role) can be subject to a reversal based on practical actions. She provides empirical evidence using NATO’s negative experience in Afghanistan where it has found itself trying to avoid failure and thus displaying more of a ‘Jane’ narrative whereby the EU’s determination for an autonomous ESDP has given it a hard security status. (Flockhart 2011: 277).

It is however understandable that NATO has found it quite difficult to adapt to a global political system where soft power is becoming much more acceptable however this test to adapt quickly would continue to force NATO to pursue and maintain stronger bilateral and multilateral cooperative initiatives in order to stay an important security actor. Over the years however, the EU has managed to develop its own security toolbox, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in a bid to react to concerns raised by the EU on a shifting focus of US Security policy away from Europe (Koenig

2010: 4) The following section would therefore show how the EU has managed to become an important security actor today.

2.2 The European Union (EU) as a Security Actor

Taking its early beginnings from the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 with only six member states (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands); the European Economic Community (EEC) along with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was created by the Treaties of Rome in 1958. The stage was thus set for a long reconstructive political and economic process for the European nation states after the devastating periods of the Second World War. The intention of the 1950 “Schuman declaration” (which proposed that the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany be joined and coordinated under a single supranational authority) was to transform Europe from a community of conflict-prone relationships to one that would foster regional integration premised on the assumption that future conflicts could be avoided between France and Germany through economic interdependence and political cooperation spearheaded by this coal and steel community. This action was well in line with both functionalist and neofunctionalist theories which projected the idea that important economic nations such as the France and Germany, be granted as much freedom as possible as key integrating determinants for instituting cross-border cooperation and integration (Karns and Mingst 2004: 160)

A treaty that would lead to the establishment of a European Defence Community (EDC) was signed in 1952 but eventually rejected by a suspecting France to the military ambitions of Germany in 1954. This eventually led to the 1954 Paris Conference (with its foundation already laid by the 1948 Treaty of Brussels that created a military agency under the name of the Western Union Defence Organization) which

renamed and established the Western European Union (WEU). This complex situation that witnessed states torn between their sovereignty and the need for economic development through the organization, viewed the WEU as a platform for collective defence and security amongst European member states against a shared communist threat although its existence was clearly lacking in strength and play on the international scene especially in comparison with NATO (Karns and Mingst 2004: 160)

However, the early years of informal European Political Cooperation (EPC) among the member states and the external relations of the then European Communities (EC) from the 1970's to the late 1980's garnered little recognition as a result of the idea that the EU's role in international politics was limited and often undervalued especially with the existence of the Trans-Atlantic Military Alliance, NATO (Van Crieking 2012). The EPC was an informal consultation forum created in 1970 and was later formalized by the Single European Act (SEA) 1986 where foreign policy matters were discussed towards a purpose of defining a common diplomatic approach to matters serving the interests of the European community. Despite plans by the SEA to strengthen platforms for debating non-military security, the EPC and by extension, the EC, had failed in its bid to quell the violence in Yugoslavia in the early 1990's where its fruitless attempt to employ its diplomatic instruments failed to provide a political solution to the Yugoslav crises (Hill and Michael 2005).

Consequently and with a resolved bid to enhance its foreign policy, the Treaty of Maastricht (formally known as the Treaty on European Union) was signed in 1992 and upon entry into force later in 1993, formally established the European Union. It also created three pillars of control within the newly formed European Union; the European Communities Pillar- which dropped the "economic" in its name to become the EC in order to widen its operations on foreign policy matters such as the economic, socio-economic, cultural and environmental issues; the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar - which handled foreign policy and military matters of the organization; and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar - which was dedicated to matters of law enforcement, asylum, immigration, criminal justice and adjudication of civil issues

(McCormick 2007: 44) This treaty outlined a broad set of principles to guide the external policy and actions of the EU which include;

- To safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence, and integrity;
- To consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law;
- To preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders;
- To foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty;
- To encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade;
- To help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development;
- To assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters;
- And to promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance (TEU, 1992).

From the establishment of the EU's Maastricht Treaty, the WEU was pushed to play an important role in the organization despite the fact not all EU members at the time wished to become members of the WEU. In June 1992, the WEU eventually laid out certain military and security related priorities (such as humanitarian and rescue tasks; conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking; joint disarmament operations; military advice and assistance tasks; post-conflict stabilization tasks) under the name of "Petersberg tasks" that was to involve it and the EU in peacekeeping, humanitarian and crisis

management roles. Later on in 1996, the WEU established the European Security Defense Initiative (ESDI) which was designed to create a European “pillar” within NATO for access to its military assets and capabilities in missions NATO refused to engage in military wise (Smith 2002: 34).

The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam went further to incorporate the same Petersberg tasks into the EU’s CFSP and as a result of the 1998 St Malo declaration by France and the UK that spearheaded the idea that the EU must have its own autonomous military capabilities, the WEU was disestablished through the Cologne European Council’s decision in 1999 to incorporate the tasks of the WEU other than collective defence, into the EU. Also, the office of the High Representative for CFSP was created to push forward the security and defence foreign policy agenda of the EU (Smith 2002:34). The St Malo declaration eventually led to the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

The Nice EU Council meeting of 2000 set in place certain political and military structures that would enhance the crisis management capabilities of the EU. One of which was the Political and Security Committee (PSC) with its major functions being to monitor international events and construct the CFSP mechanisms to deal with crisis and threats, while the EU Military Committee (EUMC) made up of the Chiefs of Defence of the Member States that give advice to the PSC on military issues alongside with the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis (CIVCOM) that does the same on civilian issues (Laursen 2005: 393).

Other structures established were the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) and the EUMS - which works under the directions of the EUMC with particular reference to carrying out military operations and missions as a very important role in the EEAS’s comprehensive approach - while the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) engages in the conduct of civilian missions in crisis management (Laursen 2005:393).

In meeting up with the proposals of the ESDP, the EU signed the Helsinki Headline Goal in 1999 that ensured that member states (notably France, Britain and Germany) cooperate on a voluntary basis in EU-led operations stating that by 2003, member states must be able to deploy military forces through its European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) for at least a year within a time limit of 60 days given that with a range of about 50,000-60,000 persons the full range of its tasks outlined in Article 17 of the TEU can be completed effectively (European Council Secretariat 2007b). Also, the Helsinki Goal outlined the provision for military and political structures that would be created in the council to ensure that the EU focuses on its operations without hampering the full effectiveness of the union. In 2003 the council maintained that the Union was capable of carrying out the operational roles outlined in the Petersberg tasks although with certain limitations (such as deployment time and scale of the crisis) which could be dealt with if the recommended measures on dealing with these problems could be reached (EU Briefings 2007). As a result, the headline Goal was later extended in 2004 under the 'Headline Goal 2010' for military crisis management operations (Robinson 2002).

Furthermore, the ESDP can draw its military capabilities also from the EU Battle Groups (EUBG) and the Eurocorps. In 2004, EU ministers agreed on creating seven Battle Groups by 2007 that could be deployed in 10 days with one group consisting of 1,500 soldiers. The Eurocorps on the other hand consists of 60,000 soldiers with the purpose of being deployed in dealing with low intensity conflicts and peacekeeping operations (CRS 2006a: 22).

Civilian crisis management as a concept has been important to the ESDP and likewise the development of the civilian capabilities of the EU. This concept emerged as a result of the European crisis in the Balkans especially in its attempt to maintain peace in Kosovo which was even more difficult than the fighting the war itself (Dwan 2006: 266). Based on the four priority areas of civilian action as defined by the Feira Council of 2000; police, strengthening the rule of law, strengthening civilian administration and

civil protection; the EU has been actively involved in civilian crisis management missions in and out of Europe.

The member states have provided more than 5,000 police officers of which 1,400 of them can be deployed within 30 days. Furthermore, in order to maintain rule of law, 631 officers in charge of crisis management operations as prosecutors, judges and prison officers were deployed while in the case of civilian administration, member states pledged a total of 565 staff for the mission. Finally member states have committed 579 civil protection experts for deployment. The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) in 2003 was the ESDP's first mission. Other missions include Operation Proxima in FYROM concluded in 2005, EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in FYROM concluded in 2006, and the EU's rule of law mission in Georgia, EUJUST Themis concluded in 2005; and the EUPOL RD Congo in 2007 which is still ongoing (ESDP 2008).

On 31 March 2003, the EU-led Operation Concordia took over the responsibilities of the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the FYROM. The success of this mission propelled the idea of the EU as a strong security actor in global politics. Building on the results of Concordia following the conclusion of the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the European Union deployed a new mission called Operation Althea on 2 December 2004. In its 2003 mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the EU's Operation Artemis and later, EUFOR Congo were of notable significance to the history of the development of the ESDP as this was the EU's first autonomous military mission outside its region. Furthermore, the EU has partaken in missions in other countries like Central African Republic, Chad, Georgia, Indonesia, Sudan, Palestine, and Ukraine-Moldova (Deighton 2002: 725).

The European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 played a crucial role in the history of the EU in regards to the development of its security and foreign policy as it is the EU's first and only common security strategy. It is a landmark document of the EU's foreign and security policy. Since 2003, the EU had made significant progress in countries like

Afghanistan and Georgia however the raging conflicts in the Middle East that furthered crime, terrorism, illegal arms trade, piracy, and Iranian nuclear programs created the need for the EU to adopt a new approach to redefine its security strategy through the 2003 ESS which emphasized the need to redefine itself as a global actor in crisis and security management by rallying both the civilian and military assets of its member states to deal with the threats and security issues of a more globalized world (Hill 2004: 155). The ESS (which was written in direct reference to the 2002 US National Security Strategy) defines the EU as a security actor by touching on very crucial international security questions (Toje 2005: 121).

Firstly, the global threats and challenges such as WMD Proliferation, terrorism, transnational organized crime, state failure, regional conflicts, (piracy, cyber security, energy security, and climate change was later included in the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy); Secondly it discusses the development of a more stable Europe and the rest of the world; and finally discusses Europe in a changing world by outlining the need for a stronger neighborhood policy, a more effective and capable Europe through preventive engagements and stronger partnerships through “effective multilateralism” (Council of the European Union 2003: 9). Preventive engagements refer to attempts made to stop a conflict before it erupts through what the ESS lists as diplomacy, aid and sanctions. Javier Solana describes preventive engagement as “mainstreaming of conflict prevention without implying any obligation to undertake pre-emptive military strikes either by the EU or by individual member states” (Toje 2005: 128).

Effective multilateralism is an EU external policy premised on the conviction that to be capable of responding to global threats, challenges and crises, the international community requires an efficient multilateral system based on universal rules and values. The EU does this in institutions such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the G8 and the G20 (Posen 2004: 1). Koops (2004: 3-18) argues that as an EU foreign policy doctrine, effective multilateralism needs the most extreme cooperation between the EU, NATO and the UN. He goes on further to state that the inclusion of “effective” to

“multilateralism” was a response to the new post 9/11 realities of global affairs and shows a resolve that the traditional conceptualization of multilateralism had failed (ibid: 5).

To further improve the military capabilities of the ESDP, the European Defence Agency (EDA) was set up in 2004 to bolster defence cooperation amongst its member states. The European Defence Agency’s mission is to develop defence capabilities; promote defence research and technology (R&T); foster armaments co-operation; and to create a competitive European Defence Equipment Market as well as to strengthen the European Defence, Technological and Industrial Base. In 2008, a Capability Development Plan (CDP) on crucial capability projects was endorsed by the EDA. On that basis, a Capability Development Plan (CDP) in cooperation with the member states, EUMS, EUMC and the General Secretariat of the Council (Flournoy and Smith 2005:16) was developed.

The Treaty of Lisbon renamed the ESDP to Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which entered into force on 1 December 2009. This treaty further developed a stronger mechanism for member states to willingly enhance military integration among them under an EU framework. Through an effort to enhance a more structured and effective comprehensive approach, the EU created a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate in 2009 to work alongside with the CPCC, the EU Operations Centre and the EUMS (McCormick 2007: 55).

With particular relations with the rest of the world on security matters, the Lisbon Treaty guarantees a stronger common and security defence policy as a crucial part of its foreign policy which includes a “mutual assistance” and “solidarity clause” that is somewhat similar to the NATO’s Article 5 clause recognizing a terrorist attack on one nation as an attack on the rest of the organization. It enforces the legal obligation for “the union and its member States to act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a manmade or natural disaster” and will assist member states “at the request of its political authorities” (Keller-Noellete

2011: 328). Based in Brussels, the CSDP encompasses a Political and Security Committee, the Crisis Management Planning Department, the European Defense Agency (EDA), the EU Military Staff (EUMS), the EU Military Committee and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (Oakes 2003: 44).

The 2009 Lisbon Treaty till date is the most current attempt at broadening its governing structure to enhance more effective policy making within its institutions. The treaty also granted two new positions of leadership within the Union, the president of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The former works as a political guide and makes sure politics within the union flow in a coordinated process with general consensus while the latter acts as the Chief Ambassador to the EU with a new European External Action Service (EEAS) launched in 2010 that will provide back up and support to the High Representative in the implementation of EU foreign policy (Oakes 2003:45).

The EU like NATO has gone through a long, historical process of becoming an important security actor in global affairs. As a soft power, the military capabilities of the EU's foreign policy have witnessed the least development in comparison to its civilian and normative power. There is a pervasive assumption that it is only through a significant development of its military capabilities that the EU can be taken seriously as an international security actor (See Everts et al 2004). However as outlined earlier in this study, its strong resolve to further its agenda of a fully autonomous⁹ ESDP has for some time constructed a 'Tarzan'- hard power status for the EU although that has again been reversed through events of the Euro crisis that has affected the defence spending of many of the member nations of the EU (Flockhart 2011).

As a normative power, the EU through its inherent features as a supranational entity wields a coercive power especially through its economy in the form of trade agreements and development assistances (Hyde Price 2006: 222). Nielsen (2013: 736) argues however that the issue with soft power is the façade of great expectations

⁹ In this context the word autonomous refers the ability of the EU to act separately from NATO and differs from "independent" which is a much stronger word.

beyond the capabilities of actually meeting them. This highlights the capability gap the EU has as it lacks adequate military assets or hard power to fully back up its civilian power.

In this context, there have been heavy challenges on the European side of the gap to reduce fragmentation and duplication in its defence industry as Europe as a whole spends only half of the entire US defence budget. However, the EU has managed to address the gap through two initiatives, the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Cornish 2006: 19). Further analysis would be outlined in later sections of this study.

2.3 Evolution of NATO-EU Security Relations

The phases of the development of security relations between NATO and the EU would be discussed in three phases that each mark a significant period in the history of their relationship. Relations between NATO and the EU was basically non-existent although there was some form of relations prior to the end of the Cold War as both their efforts were aimed at bringing security and stability to Europe. Throughout the course of the Cold War, there was some form of strict separation of roles between NATO and the ESCS's institutions especially since the 1950's. Despite the lack of a formal relationship between the EC and NATO, there was some division of labor and geopolitical burden-sharing between them that set the early stages for security relations between them (Koops 2010). While NATO was focused on maintaining a common defence goal towards preventing threats from the communist bloc, the EC focused on promoting political stability amongst its member states through securing democracy and free markets in the economic realm. In other words, while NATO acted as a sort of hard power through the use of its advanced military assets, the EC was more of a civil or soft power body using its economic power to influence its security policies. The

WEU which was created in 1954 remained basically dormant towards contribution to European security but later on gained importance acting as a go-between within EU-NATO relations under its creation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) through its establishment of a 'European' pillar within NATO. In essence, relations between NATO and the EU were characterized as being non-existent with structured separation. This was soon to change however in 1990 when the EC launched its efforts to develop a CFSP within the European integration process which would give a security dimension to the emerging EU thus defining for itself a role as a global security and political actor.

2.3.1 Post-Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War brought about questions that threatened the objectives of NATO as an organization. The major problem lay in the fact that NATO's *raison d'être* was based on the existence of a Soviet Union threat but with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, new grounds were created for which NATO became the stabilizing machine for a politically stable and peaceful Euro-Atlantic region. NATO remains the major structure for collective European defense against basic and conventional threats although much of the weight granted to the importance of this activity has dramatically reduced since the demise of the Cold War security environment (Payne 2003:14). While the risk to Europe had changed drastically since the early 1990s and NATO found itself readjusting to the new threats and risks that posed a challenge to the international system in which a transformation was well underway on the EU's part that led to the creation of the EU from the European Community through the Treaty on the European Union (commonly referred to as the Maastricht Treaty) in 1992 (ibid.).

This treaty laid the foundation that would affect its security policy realm (Deighton 2002: 124) through the formal establishment of the Common Foreign and Security

Policy (CFSP) which indicated a need by the EU to deal in an area that had been hitherto run by NATO. The CFSP dealt mainly with political and diplomatic affairs including matters of security or that of a military nature regarded as “high politics” (ibid.).

The failure of an effective EU intervention in the Balkan Wars of the 1990’s revealed the ‘capability-expectation’ gap the EU had in handling security issues (Hill 1993). This experience, coupled with EU’s heavy dependency on US military power while the US at the time was unwilling to get involved with Balkan security, not only strengthened the position of NATO and the US as primary actors in matters of military intervention but also expressed a renewed urgency amongst the EU member states leaders to strengthen their military capabilities (Varwick and Koops 2009: 104).

The support and recognition by NATO to strengthen the European pillar within its very structure led to the development of the European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) which had already been discussed in its Strategic Concept of 1991. NATO ministerial meetings in Brussels and Berlin in 1996 led to an agreement that struck a new balance in the post-Cold War relationship between NATO and the EU. The ESDI was to enable a more effective contribution by the allies to its mission and activities while the Western European Union (WEU) as the EU’s defense arm extension, was granted access to use of NATO’s military and defense planning systems and assets through the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept for use in missions where ‘NATO as a whole is not engaged’ (Allin 2002: 29). This not only increased cooperation between NATO and the WEU based on agreed principles - where in the EU’s pursuits of its CFSP through WEU European-led operations, ‘separable but not separate’ forces and assets were made available to it subject to US approval in NATO - but also, these ideas provided Europe with the ability to carry out actions in area of crisis management (Gomersall 1999: 2).

Two problems with this arrangement were first, the communication inadequacies of the WEU acting as an intermediary between NATO and the EU and secondly, the scheme

to “borrow” the military assets of NATO became a problem “practically and institutionally” (See Howorth 2003: 177). However, balance in NATO-EU relations were significantly altered with the Franco-British declaration at St Malo in 1998 as it became clear to the Europeans that if the EU was to become a security actor, it needed to create its own autonomous institutional and military capacities (ibid.). It is widely acknowledged that this declaration launched the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) which went on to mark an end in the NATO-WEU-EU relationship and a much more direct form of relations between NATO and the EU (Posen 2003: 7; Varwick and Koops 2009: 105).

The development of the ESDI was crucial for that of the ESDP and in turn began the differentiation process between the EU and US that in turn affected security relations between NATO and the EU. The ESDI was labeled a “US based NATO understanding” (Howorth 2000) that saw the creation of a European defense and security pillar/dimension within a NATO formulation. It was initially a technical-military arrangement that would grant Europe access to NATO security assets and capabilities which would share the burden between it and NATO. To maintain a central role by the US, it adopted a “NATO-first principle” that would keep the primacy of NATO in the security field which indicated certain reluctance by the US for a self-reliant EU. As a result, the ESDI arrangement was not much of a concern for the US. With the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the EU decided to adopt the security functions of the WEU therefore building a common ESDP within the EU. The ESDP raised concerns for the US since it was intended to be autonomous and within the EU framework that could spell security competition for the US in the future (Sloan 2005). A major difference between the ESDI and the ESDP is that the ESDP encompasses both non-military and military areas of crisis management (Vershbow 2012).

2.3.2 ESDP to the Berlin plus Agreement

The ESDP had two major objectives; first, in the field of security and defense, it sought to revitalize the full potential of the EU as an ‘autonomous’ actor on the international field with its own capacities with an access to the military assets of NATO at its disposal; second, it still recognized NATO as the primary institution for collective defense and crisis management which it was to maintain through the growth of the ESDP in a bid to strengthening their transatlantic security co-operation (Reichard 2006: 55). Basically, the ESDP aimed to grant Europe with the military and civilian means to deal with the Petersberg Tasks (set out in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997) which had as part of its strategic objectives, “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” (WEU, 1992).

Consequently, two major concerns were made as to the realization of the full potential of the ESDP especially as to the contradictory nature of its two main objectives firstly, concerns made by US officials and commentators in the Clinton and Bush administration viewed the ESDP with strong suspicion. The then deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott advocated for a much more involved military strength from Europe but on the same platform did not “want to see a European security and defense identity that comes into being first within NATO but then grows out of NATO and finally grows away from NATO” (quoted in Howorth 2007:42). Furthermore, Madeleine Albright’s article in the Financial Times contained her famous ‘three D’s’ (Albright 1998) - which suggested that the ESDP should not create a decoupling of North American and European Security, a duplication of NATO assets nor a discrimination of non EU-NATO member - only seemed to confirm a growing suspicion by the Clinton administration towards the EU as a potential rival to the military prowess of NATO (Varwick and Koops 2009: 104). Former NATO Secretary General George Robertson however proposed in 1999 what was to be referred to as the

‘three I’s’ in response to Albright’s D’s that was to act as a guideline for a successful relationship between NATO and the EU which was the “indivisibility of the transatlantic security relationship, the inclusiveness of all NATO members in EU military operations and the improvement of European defence capabilities (Varwick 2006).

The second concern to the ESDP was made towards the alteration of the EU from a ‘civilian power’ to a military one where some viewed it as an unnecessary diversion to realizing its full soft power potential¹⁰ as well as the problems or divisions it may cause between the more powerful EU member states and the less powerful or ‘pacifist’ ones (Cornish and Edwards 2001). Javier Solana however provided a solution to both sides of the debate through his strategy paper, a Secure Europe in a Better World where he asserts that through the concepts of ‘preventive engagement’ - through the use of soft power - and ‘effective multilateralism’ the ESDP could promote democratic reforms and a stronger international society respectively (Solana 2003). This draft paper formed the basis for the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted in December 2003 at the European Council in Rome which would be analyzed further in the next chapter of this research.

Following actions in the US-led NATO airstrikes in Kosovo between March and June of 1999 that witnessed limited contributions by the European troops, the EU made its first major step towards strengthening the ESDP’s institutional and operational capabilities. The European Council meeting of December 1999 that took place in Helsinki led to the adoption of a “Headline Goal” which made calls for the EU to have a deployable force base to be mobilized within 60 days of about 60,000 troops through the establishment of the European Rapid Reaction Force for crisis management operations by the year 2003 (Varwick and Koops 2009: 105). Furthermore, the Treaty of Nice signed in 2001 formalized the establishment of the Political Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) and the European Union

¹⁰ See for instance Andrew Moravcsik’s argument that the EU is better off focused on the application of its soft power in Moravcsik, Andrew, (2004) One year on: Lessons from Iraq, *Institute for Security Studies*, 68(3):167-175.

Military Committee (EUMC) which all the more reflected the readiness of the EU to act as a security actor in the international system and addressed its long-time image as just a ‘civilian power’ (Gnesotto 2004). Despite these developments however, the EU was still very much dependent on NATO military and planning assets in dealing with its own crisis management issues.

The EU-NATO declaration on ESDP in December 2002 was to create a platform for a ‘strategic partnership’ between both parties in areas of crisis management and conflict prevention. It stressed the importance of cooperation and coordination between both organizations ‘in order to provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable Euro-Atlantic security environment’ (NATO 2002). This agreement also reaffirmed the “Berlin-Plus” procedure that was to characterize the NATO-EU relationship through the assured access to NATO military assets and planning capabilities in EU crisis management operations. Concerns were raised however by France as to the ‘guaranteed’ access to these assets as to whether it would really be realized through this arrangement. France also raised issues as to the practicability of the “right of first refusal” concept that was to make the EU more dependent on the supremacy of the US (Rummel 2002: 455).

Furthermore, intra-institutional political and diplomatic problems affected and caused limitations to the Berlin Plus. The inauguration of the ESDP in 2000 meant Turkey (with Norway) who was as an important security contributor to both the WEU and NATO would be sidelined, which they tried to re-negotiate through the EU’s security and defence table for a membership seat at the new PSC (Howorth 2007: 144). Many of the problems that hindered the progress of defense discussions between the PSC and the non-EU NATO countries was as a result of Turkey’s dispute with Greece over Cyprus and also, its membership problems with the EU which culminated to a situation where Turkey was forced to use its seat in the North Atlantic Council to block access to NATO instruments by the EU as to be made possible through the “Berlin Plus” process (ibid.).

Despite these issues, a political and diplomatic resolution¹¹ to the Berlin Plus dispute was found that led to a breakthrough and significant step in NATO-EU relations. Under the label of ‘Berlin Plus’ the agreement was formalized on 17 March 2003 that granted EU access to the military capabilities of NATO (under the clause of “right of first refusal” where NATO has to decline to intervene in any crisis before the EU can have access to its assets) along with a mutual crisis management consultation forum, and exchange of security information between the two partners (Howorth 2003: 244).

The Berlin Plus agreement contained an outline of major procedures such as;

- NATO assures access by the EU to its planning capabilities as well as maintains the availability of its planning capabilities and common assets such as communication units and its Supreme Headquarters Allied Power Europe (SHAPE) in Brussels working with the EUMS with NATO taking control of the planning of operations if a response action would eventually happen.
- The EU can demand for a NATO European command option for its operation with the Deputy Supreme Allied Command Europe (DSACEUR) taking control at the SHAPE Headquarters under an EU mandate with other command structures subject to the decision of NATO or other member states.
- Procedures for the release, monitoring, return and recall of assets by NATO
- The EU may request the use of NATO military assets and facilities under a provision of conditions through a NATO-EU consultation arrangement that involved EU operations in cases of emergency involving NATO members.
- The creation of a “NATO-EU capability group” (NATO 2004: 4).

¹¹ A draft of the NATO-EU agreement, dated 17 February 2003, can be found at <http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/asroberts/foi/security.html>

The Berlin Plus and the Framework for an enhanced NATO-EU dialogue and a concerted approach on security and stability in the Western Balkans, agreed on 25 July 2003, are the only formal agreements between the two organizations. While the Berlin Plus provides the structure for NATO-EU co-operation, including crisis management and consultations, the 'Framework' outlines the agreement between both parties to exchange relevant information and keep each other regularly informed at all levels, including possible military options. The Framework also goes on to list the following areas where the two institutions plan to co-ordinate their assistance to the countries of the region: defence and security sector reform, strengthening the rule of law, combating terrorism, border security and management, and arms control and removal of small arms (ibid: 6-7). Finally, the Framework also created a platform for consultation mechanisms between NATO and the EU, for example between the NAC and the PSC, between the Military Committee and the EU Military Committee and between the Policy Co-ordination Group and the Politico-Military Working Group (NATO 2004: 5).

2.3.3 Beyond the Berlin plus and Tervuren Summit

In theory the Berlin Plus was credited to being a successful step towards a stronger cooperation between NATO and the EU but in practice it turned out to be a "highly technical and rather limited mechanism on the secure exchange of information" (Varwick and Koops 2009: 106). It represented a "comprehensive disappointment" (Cornish 2006: 12) that brought to question the issues of transatlantic burden sharing and EU autonomy. The issue of transatlantic burden sharing has been an important one for NATO and the EU with both security actors having a shared agenda to influence global politics on a wide range of issues. As a result of this, finding a common ground for division of labor between them in terms of geography and function is not so straightforward. Without agreements or a mechanism at high political levels to control

them, there would always be more functional competition than practical cooperation between the two sides (Cornish 2006: 4). A further assessment of this issue would be made in the subsequent chapter of this study.

Shortly after the Berlin Plus Agreement came Operation Concordia in Macedonia (which lasted from March to December in 2003) which not only showcased the advancement of military cooperation between the EU and NATO but was also the first concrete attempt at putting the Berlin Plus into practice and eventually setting the stage for its next mission, EUFOR Althea at Bosnia in December 2004 which was to succeed NATO's Stabilization Force and was the longest EU military operation till date. Taking a look at the EU's failure in the 1990's Bosnian wars, the cooperation with NATO especially in Sarajevo was of high value to the EU (Grevi *et al.* 2005: 7). Also, through the successes of the Concordia and Althea missions, effective, continued relations, exchange of information and operations between both organizations within the crisis management realm had been bolstered but to a limited level as it were bogged down by certain problems that greatly undervalued the effectiveness of the Berlin Plus arrangement (Yost 1998: 52).

Certain political issues such as the Turkish political impasse amongst others had hindered the effectiveness of the EU-NATO cooperation and thus provided certain limitations in making joint decisions in handling security threats and issues. In December 2002, an agreement was made for non-NATO EU member states to partake in EU-NATO meetings if they are members under the PfP Program. The then four EU neutral countries, Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden could participate in NATO-EU meetings and speak on a wide range of issues critical to that period such as Afghanistan and WMD related security problems (Keohane 2006).

With the 2004 EU enlargement from 15 to 25 countries that witnessed the inclusion of Cyprus and Malta into the EU who were not members of the PfP, certain political problems resulted from this between Cyprus and Turkey who is a member of NATO but not a member of the EU. The crisis in summary originates from the Turkish

intervention of Northern Cyprus since 1974 that is recognized only by it and not the Southern Part which is a full member of the EU. Turkey - as a result of its frustration with Cyprus blocking a UN peace plan in a 2004 referendum - through its veto power in NATO, blocks any meetings with Cyprus, as well as its participation in EU-NATO peace keeping missions as a result of the ongoing conflict it has with Greece. On the other hand, Cyprus stalls Turkey's EU accession bid (Messervy-Whiting 2005: 65-70). Being a very sensitive issue, both parties have employed political means to frustrate the other. Turkey stalls meetings between the PSC and NAC as well as limits Cyprus opportunity for bi-lateral relations with NATO under the PfP program. As a result of this, NATO-EU meetings only happen with 23 ambassadors instead of 25 and are limited to talks on joint EU-NATO operations rather than a much more comprehensive one (ibid: 71). Cyprus also rejects any discussion beyond the Berlin Plus operations when it and Malta are absent (Koenig 2010: 13).

France on the other hand continued to view the US with suspicion asserting that a strengthened involvement by the US in EU military affairs through a heightened NATO-EU cooperation would only continue to reduce the autonomy of the EU (Varwick and Koops 2009: 55). Using the Turkey-Cypriot dispute as well, France - who views NATO as a forum where global security issues should not be discussed - used the situation to block meetings thus frustrating other governments like the US, UK and the Netherlands (Keohane 2006).

Another problem that crippled effective cooperation between the EU and NATO was an inter-institutional rivalry that exists between them as the EU agenda to become an autonomous military power from its dependence on NATO's assets is viewed as competitively unsettling to the monopoly and advantage NATO has over the military domain in the west (Varwick 2009: 55). This has shown itself in missions such as that in Sudan, 2005, where the UK, Italy and the Netherlands opted for a NATO mission in response to the African Union's request for airlift while on the other hand, France, Germany and Greece supported an EU-led mission where in the end, separate missions

were carried out which undermined effective cooperation as outlined by the Berlin Plus agreements (Touzovskaia 2006: 252).

Prior to this however and very important to note was the impact of the 2003 Iraq crisis on the NATO-EU relationship which signaled a major change in security perspective and strategies that arose from the 9/11 attacks spurring countries like the UK to shift its focus from a European view to more of a global one (Howorth 2003: 11). Although France (who also pursued a much more global security perspective) supported the concept of multi-polarity, this was a counter-move to that of the UK who was more loyal to the unipolarity of the US as its preferred solution towards showing solidarity to the international community in dealing with terrorism (ibid.).

This inter-organizational and intra-organizational split between France and Britain's positions in both NATO and the EU created more of a division as the other EU countries had to choose camps between UK, Spain and Italy against France, Germany and Belgium in support of a stronger ESDP. This division also displayed itself through some of the EU member states' opposition to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 such as France, Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg culminating to the Tervuren Summit in Brussels that proposed a stronger autonomy for the ESDP in April 2003 (ibid.). The security cooperation between "NATO and the European Union which was already a delicate affair due to Turkey's EU ambitions got almost fully paralyzed" as a result of the bitter disputes brought about by the Iraq war (Kamp 2009: 25).

Calls for the establishment of an independent EU operational planning cell that would amount to the creation of an "EU General Staff" independent of NATO as initiated by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg in the Tervuren Summit amongst other initiatives (such as the creation of a European Rapid Reaction Force, the establishment of a European command for strategic air transport, the development of a joint European Nuclear-Biological-Chemical (NBC) protection unit, the creation of a European system for emergency humanitarian aid and of European training centers) was one of the major provisions that signified a renewed drive for military autonomy (Grant 2003). The

final communiqué of that meeting also introduced the concept of a European Security and Defence Union (ESDU) that involved the cooperation of the militarily capable and ready states in deepening their defence (ibid.). The Tervuren summit was fiercely reproved by the US and greatly threatened the transatlantic security relationship. The US state department spokesman of the Bush administration, Richard Boucher scornfully mocked the summit in 2003 by naming it the “Chocolate summit” in response to the Belgian Prime Minister’s comment towards the Tervuren proposal as an “absolute necessity” (Heisbourg 2004: 64).

An EU cell at SHAPE would not only duplicate the pre-existing NATO assets but undermine the Berlin Plus arrangement through its autonomous agenda. However, compromise was reached through a British initiative that proposed the establishment of an EU cell within NATO’s Allied Command Operations (ACO, formerly SHAPE) which further emphasized that the EU maintains its autonomy through the application of EU planning capabilities in missions falling within the scope of the Petersberg task while bigger and more elaborate missions would be handled with NATO’s assets (Ojanen 2006: 59). This British initiative signified a great shift by the UK towards its fellow EU member’s position for a stronger European autonomy especially through an EU council meeting on 17 October 2003 where it called for more “structured cooperation” on security and defence (Howorth 2007: 112). This shift in position created more reprieve from Washington towards London that required a series of meetings and discussions to allay US fears towards the political relationship it had to the UK and in essence, EU (ibid.).

This compromise also led to the establishment of small cells within both organizations such as the EU cell in NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Command as well as a Civil-Military Cell of NATO at the EUMS so as to reduce tensions from the rivalry (Howorth 2003: 12) although in 2004, this Civil-Military Cell was granted permission to create an EU ‘operations center’ which fully gained function in 2007 and is planned to be used in autonomous EU ‘military operations’ which only signaled more division

in the relationship between NATO and the EU as it furthered EU autonomy plans (European Council Secretariat 2007a :12).

Another major dispute that undermined the Berlin Plus agreement and thus a stronger NATO-EU relations through its display of a stronger call for European autonomy was the EU's launch of crisis management missions independent from NATO and in coordination with the UN such as Operation Artemis in Congo (2003), EUFOR RD (2006) in Congo and EUFOR Chad in Central African Republic which led to the creation of EU Battle groups, all of which were direct provocations to NATO and the US (European Council Secretariat 2007b). Operation Artemis was a mission carried out without prior consultation to NATO and was regarded as the first EU autonomous military mission that was done through the trilateral initiative of the British-French-German forces that created the so called EU Battlegroups (Lindstrom 2007). This 1,500 troops that attained full operational capacity in 2007 were set up to carry out missions in coordination with the UN (although not exclusively) in Africa through contributions from a coalition of EU member states (European Council Secretariat 2007b). Also with EUFOR RD Congo in 2006, the French insisted on the use of German Operation Headquarters in Potsdam which signified a shift from the spirit of the Berlin Plus arrangement that proposed EU missions should be controlled through the DSACEUR in SHAPE (ibid.).

The politics of military cooperation from the fallout of these missions created further division between NATO and the EU mostly through the rivalry between the EU's Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) and NATO's Response Force (NRF) especially in 2007 when NATO announced that contributions from its members towards the development of the NRF were at a relative low which provided enough impetus for the Battlegroups to be a better choice for EU-NATO member states (Dempsey 2007). The NRF which gained full operational capacity in 2004 for rapid deployment in high intensity operation with over 17,000 troops has come under heavy criticism as it is viewed by

some as a “creamskimming”¹² effort by the US to select the best forces to use in NATO leaving the ERRF with a second hand choice for their troops. The unlikelihood of the EU to agree to the use of the NRF in any preemptive mission or any mission not in coordination with a UN mandate is also a problem that has stressed the relationship between the two organizations (Howorth 2003:13).

In 2010, NATO adopted a new “strategic concept” that contributed to a stronger resolve for the organization to strengthen its “strategic partnership” through cooperation with other organizations, in particular, the EU. As outlined in the strategic concept, NATO would;

- fully strengthen the strategic partnership with the EU, in the spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity and respect for the autonomy and institutional integrity of both organizations;
- enhance our practical cooperation in operations throughout the crisis spectrum, from coordinated planning to mutual support in the field;
- broaden its political consultations to include all issues of common concern, in order to share assessments and perspectives;
- And cooperate more fully in capability development, to minimize duplication and maximize cost effectiveness (NATO, 2010).

Recognizing the above as solid measures to improve the significance of the organization as well as its influence on maintaining security in the Euro-Atlantic region and the rest of the world, in essence, the 2012 Chicago Summit of NATO Heads of State and Governments raised the agenda of the need for a ‘Smart Defence’ policy that

¹² Creamskimming is a pejorative conceptual metaphor used to refer to the perceived business practice of a company providing a product or a service to only the high-value or low-cost customers of that product or service. For more on this criticism see Riggio, Daniel. (2003) ‘EU-NATO Cooperation and Complementarity between the Rapid Reaction Forces’, *The International Spectator*, 38(3). ; Howorth, Jolyon. (2003) ‘ESDP and NATO: wedlock or deadlock?’, *Cooperation and Conflict*, 38(3): 235-254.

would still maintain the significance of NATO in light of the crucial blow struck to the allied powers in the 2008 economic meltdown that affected the economic and military capability contributions of especially the European allies. The Smart Defence initiative was a plan to discuss how the Alliance would develop and apply its capabilities under three proposed components; Cooperation - which involves the allies acting together to provide access to capabilities that they could otherwise not easily afford; Specialization- which entails NATO encouraging member states to focus their best efforts on their strengths and agree to a coordinated planned defence budget cut while the ability to make final decisions for themselves is still maintained; and Prioritization - that would encourage a transparent, and cost effective mechanism in meeting crucial capability requirements (Giegerich 2012: 69-77). Slightly similar, the EU's "Pooling and Sharing" concept was developed by the EDA that would push forward initiatives and projects that would gather military capability contributions from all its members (ibid.).

The declaration of the 2012 summit thus tried to implement and strengthen the earlier made commitment of a stronger partnership between NATO and the EU from the Strategic Concept under a combination of its Smart Defence initiative and EU's pooling and sharing concept by stating that in a period of heightened security challenges it is pertinent for the Alliance to make best use of its available resources, adapts these capabilities in a way it is ready to meet with any threats or emerging security concerns (Giegerich 2012: 77).

In conclusion, it is apparent that the development of a security relationship between NATO and the EU has been a very crucial one especially in managing global affairs. These actors have managed to carve out an image for themselves as very important security actors with NATO, regarded more of a hard power organization and the EU, a soft one. Despite their historical differences, both organizations arose towards addressing a common threat although with starkly different responses. While NATO arose as a response to a particular threat that involved primarily military means, the

ESDP arose as a result of the re-emergence of threats to European security that required political management (Howorth 2009: 101).

Both organizations since their inception have both had a cooperative and competitive relationship with each other in dealing with shared security threats, their membership and their visions for peace. This relation of cooperation and competition has transformed their security relations since the post-Cold War period to after 9/11. Cooperation with the EU from the perspective of NATO is indeed very crucial as it is an effective way in enhancing transatlantic burden-sharing between them in dealing with these security challenges. NATO requires the full participation of the EU through the sharing of information for the use of its civilian elements in crisis management crisis which they lack. The EU on the other hand needs the cooperation of NATO to back up its military capability shortfalls especially in a time of severe economic prices that has affected its defence spending. Both organizations are crucial for one another in preserving transatlantic security which is why cooperation between them is extremely necessary.

In areas of practical cooperation - especially that of crisis management in handling the events of the Balkan Wars - the EU had managed to depend a great deal on its cooperation with NATO towards effective management of the crisis. It can be argued that the 9/11 security crises greatly transformed relations between them as it became rather pertinent that in dealing with terrorism, spread of WMD and other important security issues, both organizations needed to work effectively with one another especially in the dissemination of valuable information, contingency planning and military operations. This showcased itself through the adoption of a security strategy by the EU in 2003 and also the 2010 NATO strategic concept which has been argued to have been influenced by the ESS.

As a result of the EU's pursuit of an autonomous ESDP, the political problems that stemmed from the Iraq War, Turkish-Cyprus impasse and the problems of the Berlin Plus arrangement as discussed earlier in this chapter, there were indeed heightened

tensions and competition between the two organizations which hampered their abilities to work effectively together; however, the 9/11 period to a great extent transformed relations between them as compared to that of the post-Cold War phase.

For the purpose of this study, the next chapter would focus more extensively on these emerging security issues as outlined by the strategic doctrines both organizations separately adopted as an empirical basis for examining a further and more direct relation between them.

CHAPTER 3

NATO AND EU IN THE POST 9-11 GLOBAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The previous chapter dealt particularly with NATO and the EU as the primary actors of this research as well as providing an outline to the various stages in the history of their security relations. For this study to further analyze the areas of security cooperation between the two organizations it is important to have an understanding of how the contemporary global security environment is provided and how the conceptualization of security itself by major international actors has evolved and helped to shape contemporary global politics amongst them. The second section of this chapter will outline the practical areas of security cooperation between NATO and the EU and also how both organizations have each dealt with the security concerns of the global security environment since 9/11. Understanding how both organizations have related with one another on both a complementary and competitive basis towards solving security problems is important for the final conclusion to this study.

3.1 Defining ‘Security’

The concept of security has been one that has had many definitions over time. There is no one single accepted definition of the word ‘security’ as it is both “ambiguous and elastic in meaning” (Adler 1993: 820-22). The idea or concept of security is perceived as being intersubjective in other words; security is viewed as an outcome of a process of social and political interactions that debate what issues or threats constitute as being dangerous to the mutual survival of the subjects involved. For Wendt (1992), security is “what we make of it”. The concept of security has transformed within the IR paradigm from the Traditional realist concepts that focused on the state as the referent

object when defining what security is and understanding how nations behave in their relations with one another. Military power was also central to their definition and use of security concept. The contents of economic power were later included to military power by the neo-realists in their definition of security. The pluralists defined the security as including non-state actors in the process such as INGO's, NGO's and MNC's while Marxists believed in the primary importance of economic power over military power in understanding what constitutes security. At the end of the Cold War with the dawn of a new age where nuclear war no longer seemed eminent, the social constructivists gained ground in postulating their definition of security as owing to a state's domestic agents, their ideologies, histories, culture, identities as being important to the type of foreign policy decisions they make when talking about security issues.

Since the 1990's however, debates have emerged mainly between traditional approaches, critical security studies and constructivist approaches towards defining the meaning of security. The so called widening school of security studies or the Copenhagen school expanded the meaning of security to include non-traditional or non-military threats such as poverty, disaster, human rights, and criminal activities to name a few while the 'deepening' school criticized the Copenhagen school for being state-centric in its definition of security. The Deepening school was important to Security studies as a result of its focus on humans as the referent object to security matters. The problems that arose from globalization engineered the spread of security issues across territorial boundaries and as a result security issues became cross-cutting which required more intensive and interdependent solutions for dealing with them. It became important for international organizations such as the EU and NATO to seek multidimensional solutions to these common security challenges through strengthened cooperation. The following section identifies the common security threats as outlined in the EU and NATO's strategic doctrines and how both organizations have dealt with it individually and more importantly, through joint initiatives.

3.2 NATO and EU Approach to Security

For the purpose of this research, this section would deal directly with specific areas based on common threat assessments made by NATO and the EU as outlined in NATO's Strategic Concept of 2010 and the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003 respectively. A brief analysis of both security strategies is therefore important to this section.

Events leading to the Iraq war in 2003 had indicated a transatlantic rift between the EU and NATO with both parties lacking a shared perception (Herd 2008) towards global security threats. As a result of the lack of support by EU member's states to the Iraq war and the political pressure it led to, the ESS was born (Anderson *et al* 2011: 5). This is why the development of the ESS is a crucial document because it marked an important phase in the EU's relationship with NATO as it proposed efforts for a better coordinated CFSP while marking itself as a global security actor and in turn expressed an attempt to hold common perceptions of what constitutes as global security challenges with the Alliance and other international organizations (ibid: 5).

Apart from the Iraq war that played a role as a factor to the creation of the ESS, other factors came in to play as well such as the EU's first military crisis management operation at the time in Bosnia, Operation Artemis as well as the appointment of Javier Solana as the EU High Representative for the CFSP who was mandated by the EU foreign ministers to come up with a draft proposal for the 'European Strategy Concept' (Anderson *et al* 2011: 6). However the document has been criticized for its legitimacy and effectiveness as it was written at a time when the EU was only made up of 15 member states (Drent and Landman 2012). It has also been criticized for being too short and too vague as it actually fails to mention exactly what to do in the event of a security problem (Biscop 2011).

The European Security Strategy is a 15 paged document that was first adopted in the Rome European Council meeting of December 2003 titled 'A Secure Europe in a Better World' is made up of three sections with the first being an analysis of the current European security environment, the second maps out strategic objectives for the EU and the final section dealing with the policy implications for the EU (ESS, 2003). It begins by stating the negative effects brought about by globalization on the security of the EU member states such as poverty, disease, competition for scarce resources and global warming before it goes on to outline the five key security threats which it describes as 'new, more diverse, less visible and unpredictable'. These include:

- Terrorism: which it states is "posing a great strategic threat" to the entire Europe with terrorist movements being well resourced and connected through electronic means with capabilities to cause violence to "massive casualties". Furthermore, it states that terrorism is born out of "religious extremism" and has Europe as its base and target;
- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: which it describes to be "potentially the greatest threat to our security" with a "frightening scenario" where if terrorist groups are able to have access to these WMD's could "inflict damage" on the people;
- Regional conflicts: which it states could have an impact directly or indirectly on European interests and can "threaten regional stability". It also states that "conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure" and "it provides opportunities for organized crime".
- State failure: which "undermines global governance and adds to regional instability" and which "can be associated with obvious threats, such as organized crime or terrorism"; and

- Organized crime, which can be linked to terrorism and is “often associated with weak or failing states”; organized crime has thus an “important external dimension” such as “cross-border trafficking of drugs, women, illegal immigrants and weapons” (ESS 2003: 3-5).

It is also important to note however that the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy adds piracy, cyber security, energy security, and climate change to the list (2008: 13-15). This report also “effectively confirmed the enduring validity of the 2003 ESS and the need to be ‘more capable, more coherent and more active’ in order for the EU to reach its full potential” (ibid.).

The ESS goes forward to propose three strategic objectives towards the protection of European security and dealing with the “key threats” which include; addressing the threats, building security in its neighborhood - which calls for the promotion of a “ring of well governed countries to the East and on the borders of the Mediterranean” and helping to establish “an international order based on effective multilateralism” (ESS 2003: 6-10).

NATO’s New Strategic Concept was adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon summit of 2010 to tackle the “Emerging Security Challenges” (ESC’s) which was accompanied by the Military Committee Guidance MC 400/3 in March 2012. The strategic concept is an official document that describes NATO’s “enduring purpose” and its “fundamental security tasks” as well as outlines the issues of the current global security environment (NATO 2008). Important to note however is this “new” strategic concept is not new but has been developed and transformed within the organization in three distinct phases; the Cold War, the immediate period after the Cold War and the 9/11 security environment. There were four strategic documents from 1949 to the end of the Cold War that stressed defence and deterrence although in the last two decades leading to the end of the Cold War, called for more dialogue and détente in handling security issues. Post-Cold War period had three strategic concepts

accompanied by classified military documents that was to help NATO achieve its efforts.

This brings us to the current 9/11 security environment that witnessed the emergence of new threats such as energy security and cyber-attacks which brought about the need to adopt a new strategic concept in 2010. Its main objectives were premised on the three core roles NATO is to play in regards to collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security- “by which is meant NATO’s ability to promote security and political change beyond its borders through strategic partnerships with third countries” (Bjorn 2005: 5). NATO views itself as an “essential source of stability in an unpredictable world” and although international collaboration is important, a partnership with NATO requires ‘shared values and interest’. Although these threats are labeled as “new”, it is actually their increasing prioritization and need to act that is what is new as some of these threats have existed for a long time already (Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012: 1).

In the Strategic Concept, The UN and the EU are regarded as the most vital international organizations that NATO must cooperate with. Very importantly, it goes on to address that as much as conventional threat to the NATO territory are perceived to be low, it cannot ignore its impact from other regions. Such threats include terrorism, proliferation of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction; instability and conflict from other regions, cyber-attacks, human, arms and narcotics trafficking; transnational illegal activities; and energy security all of which can affect the alliance’s territory (NATO, 2010).

When both official documents are compared, their security threat assessments are quite similar. It can even be argued that the NATO Strategic Concept itself was affected by the prospects of the ESS (Hedborg 2012: 9-15). The NATO Strategic Concept (which was further strengthened in the 2002 Prague Summit) and the ESS both recognize terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and failed states as their principle security issues while also spelling out the need for non-military means to dealing with these challenges

although for an organization like NATO, it remains focused on its military capabilities. Other areas both security documents are similar in are the areas of transnational organized crime, regional conflicts, and cyber security (Hedborg 2012: 13).

The following subsections would discuss how both organizations have each managed to deal with these security issues both individually and cooperatively.

3.2.1 Crisis Management: State Failure and Regional Conflicts

For the purpose of this research, these two areas have been categorized under one section as links between “weak and failing states” to threats of regional instability can usually be identified together (Wyler 2008: 6). This area of crisis management in a bid to dealing with state conflicts has witnessed the most crucial form of practical cooperation on the field between both organizations and has largely been used to describe the EU-NATO relationship today. This strategic partnership as already outlined in the Berlin Plus arrangement discussed earlier in this study laid the foundation for cooperation between both organizations in the field of crisis management.

Defining the concept of failed states and failing states is important here. Failed states are very significant threats to both organizations and while the concept of failing states is not new to them, the securitization of the threat is relatively new as driven by the US in post-9/11 preoccupation with the global security agenda (Batt 2004: 4). In 2002 for instance as a result of the terrorist attacks in Washington, President George W. Bush claimed through the U.S. National Security Strategy that “weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as a great danger to our national interests as strong states” (Rumsfeld 2002).

There is however no globally recognized definition of what failed or failing states are with the existence of completely failed states being a rare phenomenon itself (Batt 2004: 3). There is however a higher number of ‘fragile’ or ‘failing’ states within the international system (Rumsfeld 2002). There are also generally accepted characteristics that may define a failing state. US government experts assert that a failing or weak state may lack any or all of the following characteristics; peace and stability, effective governance, territorial control and porous borders; and economic sustainability (Wyler 2008: 4). As the breakdown of order may lead to chaos and anarchy, threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and instability, narcotics and human trafficking and transnational crime would thrive and eventually become major security concerns to regional and global security (Zartman 2005: 45).

The area of regional conflicts however has been a dynamic one that has showcased a high level of security cooperation between NATO and the EU especially in the fields of defence, crisis management and post conflict stabilization. On the political level, the EU and NATO established certain cooperation mechanisms for dealing with conflicts by allowing EU access to NATO assets. Meetings between the PSC and NAC are the formal basis for maintaining political dialogue between them. There have also been informal meetings between the EU and NATO in a bid to bypassing the political restrictions at the higher level. These meetings are usually on ad hoc basis behind closed doors and as a result, Turkey and Cyprus can participate without formally acknowledging it (Koenig 2010: 14). Problem with informal meetings like this is the inability to provide serious or formal decisions where countries like France has blocked its progress admitting concerns for the high sensitivity of some issues being discussed in such settings (ibid.).

The EU also established an ad hoc “committee of contributors” in its missions to give non-EU participants a participatory role in the decision making process. The Berlin Plus arrangement till date is the most important symbol of formalized cooperation between both organizations as access to NATO military planning capabilities was granted to the EU in order to avoid duplication of NATO structures. On the military-

political level, in order to facilitate the workings of the Berlin Plus agreement by enhancing the sharing of information and coordinated planning, the NATO Liaison team at the EUMS and the EU cell at SHAPE were established in 2005.

The capability gap issue which hindered effective practical cooperation on the field had to be dealt with in order to maintain relations between NATO and the EU. In 2001, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was created to devise strategies for remedying the capability gaps it had in its civil-military operational assets while in 2003; the EU-NATO Capabilities Group was created to enhance the development of capability efforts between both organizations. Consequently in 2004, the European Defense Agency (EDA) was established to improve European military capabilities and interoperability (Lindstrom 2005: 18). Despite the fact this Capability group has managed to improve transparency and a smoother exchange of information between them, it has failed to do more than that. Analysis is done separately and the meetings are usually done ad hoc and sometimes cancelled (Koenig 2010: 18). Furthermore, when it comes to capability development and burden sharing issues, NATO has always expected the EU to contribute more to the division of labor involved in the areas of infrastructure protection such as drones, helicopters, and vehicles in places like Afghanistan (ibid.).

In July 2003, both organizations published a joint draft titled ‘Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans’ which outlined their common willingness and steps to maintaining stability in their region. Activities in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) witnessed the first application of the Berlin Plus agreement between both organizations brought about through the smooth change from NATO’s Operation Allied Harmony to Operation Concordia where NATO military assets were made available for use by the EU (Carp 2006: 40).

The success of Concordia prepared the EU Force for its next mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Proxima, which was an EU operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, witnessed an improved stability in the security environment in the region eventually

culminating to the withdrawal of NATO SFOR mission and its hand over to the EUFOR in Operation Althea in 2004 which is the largest EU military mission to date. EUFOR employed NATO's planning expertise and other capabilities under the command of NATO's DSACEUR. NATO's presence in Bosnia was important to the Bosnians as it did not want a repeat of the failure by the EU in the handling of the 1990's Balkan crises although the EU already had experience in police training under the framework of the ESDP through the EU Police Mission (EUPM). The success of Althea was crucial to the future Kosovo and Afghanistan missions as well as the ability of the EU to shape its ESDP agenda (Carp 2006: 42).

In Kosovo, NATO had deployed a mission called Kosovo Force (KFOR) since 1999 to monitor and enforce the agreement that ended the conflict there. However with a resurgence of the conflict in 2004, NATO sent an additional 3,000 troops to the region to limit the violence and provide back up to the troops already in the region. The EU had provided civilian and police assets to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) deployed in 2008 working alongside with KFOR under the auspices of the ESDP to provide assistance to the police, judicial and custom authorities in Kosovo is regarded as the largest civilian mission ever launched by it. This mission also brought about the cooperation of NATO and EU security experts working together to support the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the time in his diplomatic efforts to preserving the unity of Kosovo (Yost 2005: 55).

It is in the area of Rapid Reaction Force planning that has witnessed one of the closest relationships between NATO and the EU. The NATO Reaction Force (NRF) was an initiative brought on as a 'transformation agenda' in NATO's 2002 Prague Summit. This plan was to ready 21,000 troops to be deployed within five days for a 30 day mission and reached full operating capability (FOC) by 2006. (Binnendijk and Kugler 2009). The NRF was also tasked with non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian aid and crisis response operations, peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and embargo operations also (Cornish 2006: 15).

Following this in 2003, the EU Battle group was launched in order to create a capability for the EU to deploy troops within 5-10 days and later in November 2004, the EUBG concept became formally adopted by the European Council as an important part of achieving the 2010 Headline Goal with its mission laid out to achieve the 'Petersberg tasks' and activities set out by the ESS. While some level of progress has been made by the EUBG in handling military operations, it has been criticized heavily for its military efficacy and its lack of naval and air forces with majority of its forces being on land (Cornish 2006: 14).

In the Southern Caucasus, the territorial conflicts over Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia provided a breeding ground for political instability, terrorism and transnational criminal activities. International efforts had proved difficult to quell the conflicts especially with the presence of Russian military structures in Georgia. Following the 2004 Istanbul Summit that spurred ties with countries in the southern Caucasus region such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia under the PfP program and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) led to the promotion of regional peace and stability in the region. On the other hand, the EU's assistance in maintaining peace and cooperation in the region led to the 2004 establishment of the EUJUST THEMIS as a rule of Law Mission to assist the Georgian Authorities in the strengthening of its own rule of law as well as EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) between the EU and Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Despite the awareness of the importance in maintaining peace and stability in this region, cooperation between the EU and NATO has been criticized to lack adequate institutional structures for a concerted cooperation in the region (Yost 2005: 55).

Events in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan created an 'out-of-area' context for cooperation and security operations between NATO and the EU in other regions. Post-9/11 events pushed the boundaries of security operations a step further outside traditional NATO and EU areas of responsibility. Through the UN-led ISAF mission, NATO took control of maintaining security by assisting the Afghan government within and outside Kabul. These forces are also tasked in the training and equipping of the Afghan police force in

dealing with security issues within its borders. However in 2007, NATO welcomed the EUPOL which was EU's Rule of Law mission to enhance justice reform and the funding of civilian capabilities and infrastructures within the NATO run Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) led by EU member countries (Cornish 2006: 14).

In Iraq, NATO provides training centers and facilities for higher security and defence staff as well as provides information and intelligence, logistics expertise, force generation, movement co-ordination, and secure communications support to Poland who controls the Multinational Division (MND) as a section of the international stabilization force. Also, through EUJUST LEX which was the EU's rule of law mission in Iraq, it provided training assistance in the fields of management and criminal investigation for senior officials and executive staff in the judiciary, the police and the prison services. Furthermore, requests by the African Union (AU) in 2005 for logistical support in airlift rotations in Darfur - a province of Sudan - created separate responses by the EU and NATO towards regional conflicts in the region while creating a situation of intense competition between both organizations (ibid: 16).

Through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), NATO had resolved to improving ties with the Middle Eastern nations of Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia in order to prevent conflicts and maintain stability in their regions. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) launched in 2004 was also an important medium for the maintenance of global and regional cooperation and stability between NATO and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have joined this initiative however; Saudi Arabia and Oman are still yet to join despite showing interest in the initiative (Cornish 2006: 17).

The EU too has played a role in maintaining global security in out of area missions such as the UN mandated EU-led peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo which provided assistance and protection of aid workers as well as stopping rebel violence within the region in 2003. In 2005 also, the EU sent a security sector reform mission to Congo to train, support and help in the buildup of the Congolese

army. Also, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the EU in cooperation with the US created an initiative to support the Palestinian police and the EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support (EUCOPPS) (Crisis Group 2005).

Very important also as a foreign relations tool to promote regional peace and stability, the EU's European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) addresses the significance of "building security in our neighborhood" as outlined by its European Security Strategy. In other words, the ENP seeks to view the EU's neighbors as a "ring of friends rather than third countries" in a bid to "encouraging stability, security and prosperity" through regional cooperation (Kahraman 2005: 2). Through its 2004 Action plan, the ENP (like its counterparts, the Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy) promoted calls for greater bi-lateral political, security and economic cooperation with the EU and 16 other individual countries which include; Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine (Desmond 2005).

3.2.2 Terrorism

The 9/11, 2001 terrorist attacks provided the EU and NATO with an intensified need to combat terrorism on a multilateral level which implied that an improvement in intelligence and security cooperation with each other - especially since "terrorism [had] become more dispersed, decentralized, and multifaceted" (Santamato 2013: 4) - was necessary. NATO defines terrorism as "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives" (NATO 2012). Unlike the EU definition below, the NATO definition does not outline the strategic aim for defining terrorism in global terms.

The EU definition of terrorism which was adopted on the 13 June 2002 in its Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism, describes terrorism based primarily on the following criminal offensive acts; An attack on a person's life that may cause death; an attack on a person's physical integrity; kidnapping or hostage taking; causing harm and destruction to a government or public facility; seizure of any means of public transportation such as aircrafts; manufacturing, possession, acquisition, transportation of biological and chemical weapons; release of dangerous substances or causing floods or fires that may be dangerous to human lives, interfering with the supply of water, power or natural resources; and threatening to commit any of the above listed acts (Council of the European Union 2002: 0003-0007).

Although the effectiveness of diplomatic, economic and financial tools in the combat of terrorism is highly recognized, the military maintains one of the primary roles in fighting terrorists. NATO - an alliance initially set up to deal with issues of collective defense - lacked a comprehensive plan in dealing with terrorism. However, this changed as a result of its post-Soviet transformation and in particular, the terrorist activities of 9/11 that led to a revision of its 1999 Strategic Concept to include countering terrorism as a primary task "affecting the vital security of all members" (Bensahel 2003: 24).

The 9/11 attacks on the US brought to use for the first time in NATO's history, its Article 5 collective defense clause which implies an attack on one is considered an attack on the rest of the allied powers (Santamato 2013: 5). NATO joined efforts with the rest of the international community in combatting terrorism in three ways; firstly by being a permanent transatlantic platform enhanced with the powers of dialogue and consultative forums in order to decide collectively on issues related to terrorism and in the event of one happening, a suitable counter measure; secondly, NATO contributed its military and civilian facilities towards the fight against terrorism; and thirdly, the allied powers operate on a wider network of cooperation and global partnerships that brings other nation states to the fight against terrorism for example, through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) which was launched in

2001 as a response measure to potential terrorist acts involving CBRN agents (NATO 2012).

NATO also offers training and education platforms in allied and partner countries focusing on dealing with counter-terrorism issues. This includes the NATO School in Germany, the NATO Defence College in Italy and the Centers of Excellence (COEs) that support its command structure (NATO 2009). There are currently 18 accredited COEs in operation acting as research hubs, training personnel, and working on policy and technological solutions to specific challenges the Allies are dealing with (Pryce 2011). In particular, its COE-Defence Against Terrorism (DAT) in Ankara, Turkey has served as a central hub for discussions regarding terrorism issues around the world (ibid.).

In December 2001, after a threat assessment and military guidance from its staff, the two NATO military commands – SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) - produced a military concept for combatting terrorism which was approved in the November 2002 Prague Summit. The Defence against Terrorism (DAT) concept dealt with four major areas mainly; antiterrorism, consequence management, counterterrorism, and military cooperation with civil authorities (Hallams *et al* 2013: 44). The Prague Summit also created the NATO Response Force (NRF) which was born out of the need for the security alliance to react quickly to terrorism and other security related issues that could affect them. The Summit also led to the adoption of a new capabilities initiative known as the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) that spelled out the improvement for action in eight specific areas which included; defense against chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons; intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition; air-to-ground surveillance; command, control, and communications; combat effectiveness, including precision-guided munitions and suppression of enemy air defense; strategic air and sea lift; air-to-air refueling; and deployable combat support and combat service support units (NATO 2002). While most of these efforts had been concerned mostly with weapons, an important “civil” infrastructure to bolster cooperation between NATO and

organizations like the EU was well underway at the Istanbul Summit of 2004, NATO announced an ‘enhanced set of measures’ that included the sharing of intelligence through a Terrorist Threat Intelligence Unit, the provision of assistance to protect civilians in big international events such as the Olympic Games, and cooperation with partners through the creation of NATO’s Civil Emergency Action Plan which includes an ‘active pursuit of consultations and exchange of relations with the European Union’ (Cornish 2006: 13).

Furthermore, as a response measure to the events of 9/11, NATO enhanced its intelligence sharing capabilities amongst its member states, provided access to its security ports and airfields, and increased its security for US bases on allied soil while providing assistance to them in dealing with security threats as a result of their support against terrorism. Through Operation Eagle Assist (OEA), it provided an Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft over US skies along with the contribution of 13 other NATO member nations including Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain. France and the UK also provided aircraft and ground forces assistance to Afghanistan before the overthrow of the Taliban regime and later deployed naval forces in the Indian Ocean for other maritime security operations (Hallams et al 2013: 46).

NATO also took control of the UN mandated ISAF forces in Afghanistan in 2003 which became its first out-of-area operation. This mission provided assistance to the Afghan government against the Taliban forces in ensuring security within the region with the aim of restoring power and authority to Afghan government forces by the end of 2014. The NATO-ISAF mission is not a counter-terrorism one but one where NATO had pledged its forces in training the security forces of Afghanistan in establishing security and peace within their nation unlike its Operation Enduring Freedom counter-terrorism operation led by the US military forces (Bensahel 2003: 10).

Through Operation Active Endeavour Operation which was launched in the wake of 9/11 and being NATO’s first counter terrorism operation, NATO deployed and

expanded its well skilled and trained naval forces and facilities to detect and monitor the seas towards the management of pirate activities in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean (NATO 2009). Originally a sole NATO operation, it grew over the years to include non-NATO nations under the Mediterranean Dialogue and PfP Program which involved activities such as information exchange, shipping vessel assistance, and a huge network of about 50 countries sharing information under the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (ibid: 10).

Other partnerships such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and NATO-Russia Council (NRC) created a platform for closer co-operation in airspace management to prevent the effects of terrorist threats to civilians (NATO 2009). The Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism (PAP-T) also became an effective framework for the cooperation and management of terrorist threats through joint efforts and measures such as political consultations and the sharing of information, operations and exercises, targeting terrorist financial capabilities, providing assistance to partners in their efforts to combat terrorism, civil emergency planning and cooperation with other international organizations. The PAP-T strengthened calls to “keep the Euro-Atlantic Partnership active and relevant to the changing security environment” (Santamato 2013: 11).

NATO’s operation Ocean Field which was created in 2009 was a direct reaction from maritime security issues that affected the cost of the Horn of Africa and was based on its recent counter-piracy measures of Operation Allied Protector. Its mission was to make a contribution to the international fight against maritime piracy while at the same time build efforts and cooperation with other naval forces including EU naval forces operating in the region as well. This operation was approved by the NAC in 2009 with its mandate eventually extended to the end of 2014 (ibid: 12).

On the part of the EU, the challenges terrorism poses to European security was not a new one to its member states. In 1979 for instance, there was an establishment of the police working group on terrorism that brought senior police officials together to

discuss and compare strategies that would be employed in dealing with terrorist groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Britain and Ireland or the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) or Baader-Meinhof Gang in Germany (Keohane 2005: 11). The 1980's witnessed a surge in transnational or organized criminal activities as well as terrorist ones which in turn brought about the inclusion of police co-operation amongst the EU member states to their formal policy area in the 1991 Maastricht Treaty (ibid.).

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, The EU's Plan of Action to combat terrorism which was adopted in 2001 extended counter terrorism plans to all external policy areas ranging from agriculture, to environment, to health, to aid, trade, justice freedom and security, environment, transport, finance control or external relations (Council of the European Union 2005). This plan emphasized terrorism as a major priority and responsibility for all member states to deal with. The EU also set up various initiatives to guide and manage activities in its external borders such as the creation of the European External Borders Agency (FRONTEX) which was the EU's agency for the security of its external borders with headquarters in Poland and later became operational in 2005 (Spence 2005: 33).

Through the extension of judicial cooperation amongst its 25 member states at the time, the EU's criminal law was restructured in a way that all cases of terrorism is dealt with in the same way throughout the EU. This manifested itself through the adoption of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) and the establishment of new institutions like Eurojust. The EAW - whereby the process of extradition is simplified to a transfer of suspects or sentenced criminals, which in turns speeds up the fight against terrorism - was launched on 13 June 2002. Prior to this was the establishment of the Eurojust in February of 2002 that sought for "harmonization of criminal law and procedures, centralized EU structures, mutual recognition of member state's laws and procedures and enhanced co-operation between them" (House of Lords, EU Committee 2004). The problem to this system however was the varying definitions on what constitutes a crime amongst EU states as a crime in one EU state may not necessarily be considered a crime in another EU state (Spence 2005: 45).

The Europol was another significant institution in the EU to the fight against terrorism. It was the European Law Enforcement Organization which was established by the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992 and aimed at encouraging effective co-operation in the relative authorities within member states in the prevention of terrorism and other types of international organized criminal activities as well as creating a forum for law enforcers, police or intelligence experts to relay and share information amongst themselves (Spence 2005: 46). In 2003 Europol intensified its focus on combatting terrorist activities through the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Task Force that collected information on terrorist suspects and through its annual TE-SAT reports, provided current information to the EU member states on the growing trends of terrorism. However just like the Eurojust, information sharing was a big challenge to the success of the Europol due to fear of sharing sensitive data between them (Spence 2005: 46).

In combatting terrorism, the monitoring of money laundering activities and the financing of terrorist groups is highly crucial to preventing a future attack which the EU realized through the creation of a network of communication, directives and regulations that were aimed at frustrating the financing efforts of individuals or organizations helping terrorist groups. Introduced in the famous 2004 Hague program¹³, the European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) became an effective tool for the application of intelligence facilitated law enforcement procedures to managing terrorist activities. The plan also made provisions for a national police officer that would have access to information from law enforcement agencies across EU member states (Keohane 2005: 16)

The EU has also largely cooperated with the US in fighting terrorism by enhancing multilateral supports with other international organizations including the UN. Through the sharing of important data, police and judicial cooperation and regular meetings aimed at combatting terrorism financing, both parties had thus recognized the crucial

¹³ This was a five year plan year plan that covered all aspects of their security and justice co-operation, to be implemented by 2010.

need for them to work together in fighting terrorism. In 2004, lots of agreements were signed between the EU and US based on the sharing of information such as airline data, the screening of shipping cargoes, regulating procedures for the extradition of terrorist suspects, and the US Homeland Security Department sent an attaché to the US delegation in Brussels to discuss counter-terrorism solutions between both parties (Keohane 2005: 17)

However In March 2004 just three days before a major terrorist attack in Spain, criticisms were made by the EU's Irish representative, Javier Solana, through his report on the EU's counter terrorism efforts mentioned that while some member states were not fully engaged in implementing the EU agreements such as the common arrest warrant, the EU also lacked the required capabilities to deal with terrorism. He also identified poor communication as well as lack of intelligence information sharing and co-ordination of efforts between the law enforcement agencies and defence policy makers of the EU member states (Keohane 2005: 18). The EU commission at the March Council identified that only four member states had ratified the 2000 EU Convention of Mutual Assistance and the 2001 Additional Protocol which were adopted following the 9/11 attacks to ensure that the definition of terrorism by all EU member countries were the same. It also complained about the lack of money-laundering and criminal funding related information which EU member states' agencies fail to provide (ibid.).

Following these terrorist attacks (which eventually occurred on 11 March 2004 in Madrid killing 191 people), the EU adopted the Declaration on Combating Terrorism at its meeting on 25 March 2004 which stated that "acts of terrorism are attacks against the values on which the [EU] is founded". This declaration was also a revision to the EU Plan of Action to Combat Terrorism of 2001 that was adopted following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US (Bossong 2013: 78). While acknowledging the position that terrorism was not a threat to European territory that called for an exclusive military response, the Council called for a 'priority third countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced' (Bossong 2013:

79). In summary, this EU counterterrorism strategy was based on four major priorities which were protection of Europe's critical infrastructure, requiring public and private co-operation; disaster management and civil protection in the event of CBRN attacks; identification of the causes of radicalization/recruitment, internationally and amongst member states; and review of 'stagnating societies' around the world, where young people have no hope (Merritt 2005).

Later in December 2005, the EU made a decision to deal with terrorism based on four main objectives: to prevent, protect, pursue and respond. These four concepts summarized the counter-terrorism strategies the EU had adopted in the fight against terrorism through the tackling of the root causes of terrorism (prevention); provide a shield for the people and infrastructures from attacks (protection); chase down terrorists wherever they are hiding (pursue); and cooperate effectively with one another in the eventuality of a terrorist attack (respond) (Council of the European Union 2005).

NATO and EU response to terrorism has been very different following the 9/11 attacks while at the very least they have recognized the need for joint coordination of their policies in dealing with these challenges. Both organizations have exchange information and relevant data concerning terrorists under a civil emergency planning structure. High level political meetings between the NAC and PSC have been constantly held to address these issues. However, some analysts such as Tigner (2009) has criticized the attempt by both organizations in handling these issues as weak and practically dead which characteristically reflects the flaws brought about by the differences in both organizations as the EU is more of a policy facilitator than a "first responder" (Cornish 2006: 21).

3.2.3 Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

In the area of Weapons of Mass Destruction proliferation, both NATO and the EU have each managed their roles in stopping the transport and spread of WMD with both institutions pledging to work towards a more cooperative standing towards capability development, sharing and exchange of information and the protection of civilians against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attacks (Davis 2010: 36). WMD's are weapons that can cause destruction to a large number of people, infrastructures and the environment on a very large scale. They can be nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical or any other type of weapon (Harigel 2001: 55).

Through NATO's 1994 "Alliance Policy Framework on Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction" - which focuses on the prevention of the proliferation of WMD by diplomatic means as the principal goal of its members - the Alliance has since focused on the proliferation of WMD as an important one to its security agenda. The creation of its WMD center through the 1999 Washington Summit enhanced political and military consultation forums for the discussion of WMD, arms control and disarmament issues and also called for the attention of its member states to increase alertness and response to the risk of the spread and delivery of WMD and the crisis it could lead to (Davis 2010: 36). However the problems related to issues of information and intelligence sharing has always affected the effectiveness of cooperation amongst its member states as certain information is subject to a wide range of political interpretations as well as some intelligence agencies being unwilling to exchange information due to trust issues (ibid.).

The Prague Summit of 2002 led to the adoption of some initiatives targeted at dealing with terrorist activities especially those resulting from the use of WMD and to defend them from nuclear, biological or chemical attacks. These five initiatives include; the development of a disease surveillance system, the development of a prototype NBC analytical laboratory, the development of an NBC event response team, the creation of

a NATO Biological and Chemical Defense Stockpile; and the creation of a virtual Center of Excellence for NBC weapons defense training. As much as these initiatives signified an important step for the Alliance to handle WMD issues, some member states believed that responsibility in these areas should remain with the national governments and not the Alliance (Davis 2010: 37).

While the WMD Center focused on the detection and prevention of WMD use, NATO also maintained cooperation with other international organizations such as the EU, World Health Organization (WHO), UN, and Organization for Security and Cooperation Europe (OSCE), through its Civil Emergency Planning Directorate in the management of the consequences of WMD related issues. Critics however have argued that as much as NATO cooperates with many international organizations on civil-military emergency planning, NATO-EU cooperation however, on “matters of consequence management remains extremely limited” (Bensahel 2003: 32).

The EU on the other hand through its “EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction” which was adopted by the European Council in 2003, alongside its ESS, signaled the EU’s renewed battle against the spread and delivery of WMD. This strategy was adopted shortly after the EU’s 2003 Action Plan and was guided by three main principles, namely; support to effective multilateralism, prevention and cooperation with partners (ibid.).

Furthermore, this strategy had two important stages in its implementation which include first and most importantly, the strengthening of the multilateral non-proliferation treaties while in the long run handling the underlying causes of weapons proliferation through the pursuit of diplomatic solutions to disputes and tensions brought about by arms control and disarmament arrangements. The second stage includes the use of force as a coercive measure and last resort under the UN charter and international law only in instances when the above mentioned measures fail to work (Kienzele 2013: 1145).

The EU's WMD strategy also helped reinforce the organizations commitment to Global Partnership while also witnessing a shift in the focus of its assistance projects especially via the launch of a series of outreach programs in the fields of export controls on the dual-use equipment. Also, the strategy spells out the task of gathering and sharing of information and intelligence through the creation of an EU Situation center tasked with this agenda (ibid.).

In 2006, the EU endorsed the idea of strengthening its WMD Strategy through the creation of a WMD Monitoring Center which would also enhance political dialogue on issues concerning WMD proliferation within and outside the EU. Consequently, through the adoption of the EU WMD Clause¹⁴ which addresses non-proliferation issues in its relations with third countries, the EU has provided technical assistance and organized outreach programs and seminars to several countries under international instruments such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention (BTWC) (Council of the European Union 2003).

3.2.4 Transnational Organized Crime

Just as already analyzed with terrorist organizations, transnational groups benefit from the conflicts and instabilities of failing states, and since the end of the Cold War, the global environment has witnessed a huge increase in the amount of transnational crime groups especially within the Balkans, Central Asia and various parts of Africa. The United Nations define it as “(...) a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more

¹⁴ For a full assessment of the EU WMD clause, see Grip and Lina (2009) ‘The EU Non-Proliferation Clause: A preliminary assessment, *SIPRI Policy Brief*

serious crimes or offences (...), in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (UNTOC 2001).

NATO goes on further to outline certain characteristics or areas that organized criminal activities tend to focus on which includes narcotics (such as opium and heroin), synthetic drugs (such as methamphetamine and ecstasy), arms dealing, human trafficking, pirating of intellectual property, and money laundering (which involves the transformation of cash to respectable capital); while focusing on drug and human trafficking as the “most promising” areas for higher organized criminal activities (NATO 2003).

In 2004, NATO adopted a zero-tolerance policy for the trafficking of persons. This important policy made calls for the application of civilian and military assets to engage in NATO-led operations where appropriate training and education would be administered to them. The policy works towards actively fighting human and drug trafficking by recognizing the fact that a concerted, multilateral approach with other international institutions is important (Kamp 2006: 55). In this regard, NATO has spurred practical cooperation with organizations like the UN, OSCE, International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the EU. For instance, the NATO School Oberammergau (NSO) conducts education and personal training within current or developing NATO operations, strategy, policy, doctrines and procedures (UNODC 2011).

The school also provides a course on European Security Cooperation alongside staff of UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) which provides training on the impact of smuggling and trafficking of persons and drugs to security within the framework of NATO operations. All NATO member countries are signatories to the “UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” adopted by the General Assembly in 2000 (UNODC 2011).

Just like NATO, the EU too is a party to the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol and in a resolved bid to combat this problem, has passed legislation criminalizing the trafficking of persons and the facilitation of illegal immigrations and also for the protection of the victims of such practices. Through the Europol and the EU's Judicial Cooperation Unit (EJUST), support has been provided to its member state's criminalization of such activities. Through a strategy of promoting the integrated management of its external borders, the EU has reinforced stronger border checks and more surveillance facilities especially in areas mostly affected by the trafficking of persons by sea (Ruiz 2008). This it does mostly through the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX). This agency also established the European Patrols Network that defined joint patrolling areas between neighboring member states of the EU. Furthermore, through global partnerships especially with third countries, the EU has provided capacity building, technical assistance and operational cooperation in dealing with transnational organized criminal activities (Ruiz 2008).

3.2.5 Cyber Security

Today's highly globalized as well as technologically advanced world brought along with it a new wave of modern warfare, cyber-attacks. Cyber space has become a new level of ground for both states and non-states, even individual actors to influence the media and inspire revolutions or aggressions towards governments that eventually garners a wide range of supporters from across the globe which threatens the political stability of the international community. Economic and political information on a digital level has become increasingly significant as well as its protection and interdependent structure by nation states (Abrial 2011).

This makes security issues and providing solutions to it very difficult as traces to the origin of threats are extremely tricky to find. Today it is hard to imagine a world where not one single government or other actors do not rely on the benefits of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). Cyber threats or cyber-attacks are carried out in cyber space via a series of wired or wireless computers towards unsuspecting, protected or unprotected bodies such as banks, personal computers, government agencies, communication satellites and can be huge threats to the global cyber structure (Dunn and Wigert 2004; Ghernaoutti 2013).

One of the biggest attacks however that brought about an awareness of how important cyber warfare is to international security was the cyber-attacks of 2007 carried out in Estonia that crippled the government, banks and other important entities that relied on the internet for daily operation for about 3 weeks. In a strong reaction to this event, many military organizations around the world modified their doctrines to recognize the importance of network security. NATO's Strategic Concept and the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration gave awareness to the fact that the rapidly increasing nature of cyber-attacks threatens the security of the Alliance's ICT system. Following the attacks in 2007, NATO officials met in Brussels and had talks on developing its own cyber framework and threat response action calling in light of Estonian issue which led to the NATO Cyber Defence Policy of 2008 (CSIS 2011).

This defence policy led to the creation of two entities responsible for different levels of cyber defence under the agreed framework; firstly, the Cooperation Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCoE) - constructed in Estonia - is a research and learning institute that has transformed and provided information on cyber policies and terms, training centers, and also provided information and solutions to Estonian and future cyber-attacks (Herzog 2011: 15). The facility has also been involved in the legal process of cyber space technologies, global agreements on important cyber terms and has generated a lot of awareness through its publications and research works. Secondly, the Cyber Defence Management Authority (CDMA) was formed in 2008 as the body to develop effective responses to cyber-attacks against the allied members and the NATO

structure itself which improved their cyber security through the Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) that acted as a counter-unit for future cyber threats and attacks (CSIS 2011)

However in 2008, the war in Georgia created further awareness that cyber-attacks are potentially a new and disastrous element of conventional warfare that can threaten the security of the alliance. In 2011, NATO defence ministers approved a revision to the NATO Policy on Cyber Defense and its associated Action Plan. This new policy laid out a clear plan of how the Alliance would bolster its defence capabilities and also positions that a collective defence response to cyber attacks is subject to the decision of the NAC. Furthermore, the revised policy stipulates other measures such as providing assistance to individual allies in building up their cyber protection, the integration of Cyber defence into the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) which eventually began in 2012, and boost up its efforts in the provision of research and training capabilities on cyber defence through its schools in Estonia. Further contributions by NATO towards combatting cyber threats was its establishment of a Cyber Threat Awareness Cell in 2012 to enhance intelligence-sharing and situational awareness and the creation of a NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) that became fully operation by the end of 2013 (NATO 2009).

This revised plan also states the need for NATO to cooperate with other partners and international organizations such as the EU as a crucial part of the policy. As a result, informal staff-level talks between NATO and the EU was boosted to discuss cyber defence issues. While cyber defense goal plans had been incorporated into bilateral cooperation programs NATO had with individual nations, the cyber defence staff of the EU observed that five partner countries (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland) had participated effectively in NATO's Cyber Coalition exercise (CC13) which was a program initiated in 2013 to exercise NATO's crisis management and information sharing abilities (NATO 2009).

On the part of the EU, the Proposal for the Cyber Security Strategy of the European Union (titled "An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace") which was adopted in 2013 and

its Proposal for the Directive on Network and Information Security (NIS) of the Commission (adopted in 2001) highlighted the importance for the EU to protect its cyber space from security related threats and criminal activities. This proposal is the first comprehensive policy document that the EU has produced in this area leading to the establishment of the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) in 2004. The strategy spells out the various roles and responsibilities the member states and other important institutions play towards the overall vision of the EU cyber policy while on the other hand; the directive focuses on ensuring all member states have the required level of national capabilities to deal with the security threat of the cyber space (ENISA, 2012).

The five strategic priorities of the EU's proposal is to achieve cyber-resilience, drastically reduce cyber-crime, develop a cyber-defence policy and capabilities related to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), develop industrial and technological resources for cyber security and establish a coherent international cyberspace policy for the EU. In achieving cyber resilience, the EU maintains cooperation with both private and public authorities and developed a policy on NIS (European Commission 2013: 3).

It also established the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA) in 2004 to handle public and private resources and capacities in a bid to prevent detecting or dealing with any security threats or problems resulting from cyber-attacks. In drastically reducing cybercrime, the EU cyber strategy proposes strong and effective legislations under the Framework of the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime also referred to as the Budapest Convention. It also spells out the need for increased funding for its member states to enhance their operational capabilities in dealing with cyber security and through improved coordination at the EU political level, law enforcement, judicial, public and private agencies, can effectively work together to complement the work of other EU member states in dealing with cyber related issues (European Commission 2013: 5).

Furthermore, in regards to the development of a cyber defence policy related to the CSDP, the European Defense Agency (EDA) is helping to develop cyber defence capabilities and technologies while also providing training and exercise assistance for the improvement of cyber defence. This measure also promotes cooperation and dialogue between civil and military actors within the EU through the sharing of information and expertise related to cyber security. It goes a step further to recognize cooperation with NATO and other important international organizations to avoid the problems associated with duplication of efforts. Regular cooperation between the EU and NATO experts have been going on and with the adoption of the strategy, the EU plans to further intensify its cooperation with NATO as this would ensure effective defence capabilities and creates new terrains for cooperation between both organizations (European Commission 2013: 12).

In developing technical and industrial resources for cyber security, the EU plans to bolster research and development investments and innovation efforts to reduce European dependence on foreign technology equipment in order to rely and trust its own ICT industry. It also plans to do this through the promotion of a single market for its cyber security assets and products. The European Commission also calls for the early involvement of the academic society and industry in a joint effort to providing solutions to ICT related problems under a civilian and military framework between both research agendas (ibid: 24).

3.2.6 Environmental and Energy Security

Environmental and energy security related issues have increasingly become a major area of concern for both organizations. NATO has identified how bad weather conditions and pollution for instance can ultimately cause disasters and violence which can negatively impact energy supplies to the people. In other words, both

environmental and energy security concerns are interdependent with one another as a factor from one of them can spell security disaster for the other. Through its Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center (EADRCC) which was set up following the disasters from the earthquakes in Turkey and Greece in the late 1990's, NATO has increased its civil-emergency response tactics to dealing effectively with environmental security issues. NATO has continued to emphasize the impact of climate change and the need for the military to act primarily in dealing with issues that arise from natural disaster (Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012: 4).

The alliance created a Partnership for Peace Trust Fund project to provide assistance to post-Soviet partner nations in cleaning up their old weapon stockpiles, clear lands that are still filled with unexploded detonative instruments such as land mines, and also help provide storage of war ammunitions. However, the ultimate agenda of this project is to provide a safe environment for the people and infrastructure (ibid.).

NATO's 1999 strategic concept mentions how the disruption of vital resources can become a security concern for the alliance but it was its 2010 Strategic Concept that stressed a greater need for the alliance to protect its military and assets from attacks and in essence, widen its energy security policies as an important part of its environmental security (NATO 1999). At the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders put forward a report on "NATO's role in energy security" that outlined steps and guidelines for dealing with security issues which was further discussed at the Lisbon summit of 2010. In this report, the importance of information and intelligence sharing was emphasized along with the projection of stability, increasing international cooperation, the support of consequence management and providing protection to vital infrastructures. To this end, NATO has engaged itself in various workshops and research projects with other partner countries. For instance an advanced workshop for energy security issues was set up in 2009 in Lithuania which was supported by the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program to address issues of energy security. In 2009, the SPS committee created a Defence and the Environment Experts Group (DEEG) to create an

environmental agenda that would set up and implement cost effective approaches to dealing with matters of energy and environmental concerns (NATO 2012).

NATO has also sought to increase cooperation through dialogue with the EU and International Energy Agency in its bid to protect critical energy infrastructures, transit areas and lines, and manage energy security conflicts. Furthermore, through its OAE mission, NATO's maritime forces have helped protect the Mediterranean from piracy activities while providing escort to non-military ships and conducting compliant boarding of suspicious vessels. Other operational alliances with NATO allied powers within the Mediterranean region include the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and International Cooperative Initiative (ICI), to raise awareness within these organizations and discuss issues of defence reform, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism cooperation, scientific developments and environmental protection which have affected resource security (ibid.).

On the part of the EU, the 2003 ESS failed to provide counter measures to the issues surrounding environmental and energy security in its agenda. However, the 2008 Report on the implementation of the ESS reinforced the issues of energy security and climate change and proposes counter measures to these problems. The report proposes an energy policy that includes both an external and internal dimension. It also calls for an EU need to deal with a more unified European energy market and provide certain measures to prevent disruption to energy supply. It stresses the importance of its engagement with Asia, Africa, its Eastern Partnership and partner countries like Russia, the US, Japan and China in promoting renewable energy and a well-coordinated global energy market (2008: 13-15).

The EU has referred to the problem of climate change as a "threat multiplier" where natural disasters and sources of other environmental problems can fuel political and security conflicts. It stresses the need to maintain international cooperation with other organizations in handling these security issues as a cross cutting one. However,

criticisms made to the energy cooperation between the EU and NATO argue that little has been done to manage these security issues on a formalized institutional level and more would be needed to guarantee energy infrastructure security (Borchert and Foster, 2007). They also argue that the important role of energy infrastructure has been overlooked in the EU's European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) as policymakers within the EU are reluctant to 'militarize' the subject of protecting energy capabilities with the use of hard power on the part of the Europeans and in the long run has and would continue to affect the transatlantic cooperation in dealing with matters of energy security (ibid.).

On the field of energy security, cooperation between NATO and EU through joint initiatives has been most noted in the Center of Excellence (COE) facilities. The Energy Security Center of Excellence (ENSEC COE) which was established in 2011 was to deal with high political issues and policy with an agenda aimed at discussing operational energy security. In addition, the ENSEC COE provides training and education to military leaders for energy security development and hosts military exercises as well. The ENSEC COE is working with the EU's "Go Green" initiative where they share relevant information and infrastructure protection training with each other and hope to introduce a renewed focus on climate change and disaster issues.

In conclusion, this chapter has extensively evaluated the transforming security agenda of the 21st global environment that highlights the importance of human security. As a result of globalization that has affected the spread of security concerns, there is indeed a growing need for international security actors to work together to fight these challenges together. It is clear the only way they can do this is through cooperation with one another. This provides this study with an empirical basis for understanding and evaluating relations between the EU and NATO in effectively responding to these threats.

While both organizations have both showcased levels of cooperation as well as complementing each other's actions through individual and joint initiatives in handling

security issues, the problem of competition has however continued to limit the amount of cooperation as a result of certain factors that would be evaluated in the following chapter. Most of their cooperation has been indicated through practical activities on the field in their crisis management operations. Both organizations have continued to highlight the need to work with each other in managing the other security issues such as cyber, energy and environmental issues but this has not really manifested itself in practice or the establishment of joint structures in dealing with it. A further assessment of their relations with one another would be made in the following chapter while going a step further to discuss some important issues that have been central to their relations and have one way or the other, limited NATO-EU security relations.

CHAPTER 4

THE FUTURE OF NATO-EU SECURITY RELATIONS

The previous chapter of this study comprehensively deals with the various key security related issues that has threatened the global security environment especially in the periods following the 9/11 attacks and how the NATO and the EU have both managed to provide solutions towards the management of these threats individually and to some extent, with one another. This chapter however would move a step forward to answering the important research questions as to how have relations between both organizations can be described so far in dealing with these security threats of the post-9/11 global political era. Has it been characterized by practical cooperation or has it been one of competition? In doing this, this section would analyze very crucial areas of debate that spell out reasons why cooperation between both organizations has been limited. Finally this section would spell out a few scenarios for the future of their relationship with one another in handling these issues in the global security environment concluding that both organizations would be more effective in managing security issues if they fostered better cooperation with each other.

4.1 An Assessment of NATO-EU Security Relations

Judging from the assessment of these two key security actors' security areas outlined by NATO's Strategic Concept and the European Union's ESS and the actions they have taken to deal with the Emerging Security Challenge's (ESC's), it is clear that security cooperation between both organizations has been neither one of absolute cooperation nor of perfect competition as both organizations have recognized the

extreme need for cooperation and “strategic partnership” as spelled out in their security strategies, but have done relatively little in translating this identified need to a more practical level on the field especially in the security related areas focusing on non-crisis management related issues (Drozdiak 2011: 11). With respect to the emergence of NATO-EU security cooperation, below is Table 1 that summarizes the findings within this study.

Table 1: NATO-EU Cooperation in Dealing with Common Security Threats

Security Threats	NATO	NATO-EU	EU
Regional conflict, Political Instability and State failure	Sudan - Airlift under AU NRF Georgia-EAPC/PfP coordination MD, ICI, PfP, EAPC, Gulf Council	EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP Berlin Plus agreement Operation Concordia Operation Althea KFOR-EULEX PSC-NAC and Informal meetings Afghanistan, Iraq	Operation Artemis EUFOR Congo EUFOR Chad Sudan- Airlift under AU EUBG ERRF Georgia –EUJUST Themis/ PCA ENP
Terrorism	NATO-ISAF EADRCC Prague Capabilities Commitment COE’s DAT concept OAE, OAP Operation Ocean Shield	Istanbul Summit 2004 – Civil Emergency Action Plan and improve relations with EU NAC-PSC meetings	EU Plan of Action to Combat terrorism EUPOL, EAW, FRONTEX, EUROJUST Declaration on Combatting Terrorism EUNAVFOR Operation Atalanta

Table 1 (cont'd)			
WMD Proliferation	WMD Center Prague Summit	NATO Civil Emergency Planning Directorate to share information with EU	EU Strategy against Proliferation of WMD EU Joint Situation Center WMD Monitoring Center
Transnational Organized Crime	Zero-tolerance Policy for trafficking in persons NATO School Oberammergau	Both are parties to UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol	European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation the External Borders (FRONTEX)
Cyber Security	NATO Cyber Defence Policy- COE, Cyber Defence, Rapid Reaction Team	Informal Staff level talks for further cooperation EDA to promote information sharing between NATO-EU cyber experts	EU Cyber Security Strategy ENISA EDA
Environmental and Energy Security	EADRCC Bucharest Summit report on NATO role in Energy Security Partnership for Peace Trust Fund OAP OAE	ENSEC COE facilities to discuss operational energy security Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) Groups – monthly meetings for discussion and coordination of maritime activities	European Program for Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP)

The remaining part of this section would assess relations between both organizations under four important debated issues that surround the analysis of NATO-EU security relations.

4.1.1 Missions on the ground: Balkans stabilization, Afghanistan, Gulf of Aden and Libya

Throughout the 1990's NATO and the EU played very important roles towards the crises in the Western Balkans first in Bosnia, then in Kosovo. However the level of contribution towards stabilization in the region was varied as NATO contributed more effectively in the aspect of providing military and planning capabilities towards the conflict than the EU. Bosnia was the first operation launched by NATO in 1995 to ensure the military aspect of the Dayton accord remained effective to the peace and stabilization of the region under the establishment of an Implementation Force (IFOR). SFOR overtook the mission later in 1996 (NATO Draft Report 2011; Hoppia 2013: 22). Contrary to the situation in Bosnia, there was no peace accord in Kosovo. After its air campaign in 1999, NATO led a stabilization force (KFOR) in the region to establish and maintain a secure environment there as well as provide assistance to the UNMIK.

These actions by NATO taking full control of European security exposed the EU's marginal contribution and its capabilities-expectation gap as well as the inability of the EU to control regional security conflicts within its own area through its full dependence on NATO military capabilities eventually leading to the creation of the ESDP and the Berlin Plus arrangement for EU-NATO cooperation in crisis management operations. Operation Concordia that replaced NATO's stabilization mission in Macedonia witnessed the EU's first ever military mission and also the first application of the Berlin plus security arrangement between both organizations in 2003. The success of this mission prepared grounds for further cooperation for Operation EUFOR Althea of 2004 later in Bosnia which was regarded as the most successful form of military cooperation between the EU and NATO where the EU had access to NATO's military assets and planning capabilities in the carrying out of these missions. Under the Althea mission, NATO's deputy SACEUR acted as operational commander to EU and promoted effective cooperation between them at SHAPE, the headquarters for the

mission (NATO Draft Report 2011). The mission also granted EU the ability to use about eighty percent of the troops and security staff deployed under the SFOR mission. This boosted the image of the EUFOR mission as a legitimate and credible one and in turn showcased the high level of cooperation on the field between NATO and the EU (ibid.).

The humanitarian crisis problem in Kosovo resurfaced much later again in 2004 as a result of riots by Kosovo Albanians as an act of revenge towards Kosovo Serbs that killed two Albanian children resulting in the further killings of Albanians and their displacements (Freytag 2004). With KFOR still on the ground to maintain security in the region, the EU deployed its Rule of Law mission (EULEX) to develop the rule of law, customs, and judicial area there. Cooperation between the EU and NATO saw some form of improvement but despite the creation of informal arrangements between there was no formal forum for dialogue in the Kosovo mission which limited efficiency in the operations as sharing of information was hindered thus affecting effective cooperation there (NATO Draft Report 2011).

In the case of Afghanistan which began in 2001 with Operation Enduring Freedom as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks in the US, the UN established ISAF to protect and ensure a secure environment in Kabul and its environs from a Taliban resurgence with NATO officially taking over the mission later in 2003. NATO's experiences in Afghanistan made it realize the need for important civilian contribution in post conflict stabilization and rehabilitation and as a result, the need for cooperation with the EU. In 2007, the EU took over a German-led police initiative and launched its EUPOL mission in Afghanistan to train the local police there. NATO welcomed this mission but however cooperation between it and the EU has been criticized as lacking adequate coordination mechanisms and a lack of functional political relationship between them (Hoppia 2013: 23). For instance it was revealed that despite the EUPOL's activities which had been launched since 2007 working alongside the ISAF mission, it was only later in 2012 that the EU sent its civilian personnel to be briefed on its mission in Afghanistan by SHAPE (ibid.). Furthermore, relations were dampened as a result of EU's inability to

agree with NATO as a whole towards the deployment of EUPOL in areas outside Kabul. As a result of this lack of proper inter-organizational relations, the EU was forced to resort to a time constraining method of negotiating on an ad hoc basis with NATO's PRT for the provision of security and transport for its staff (NATO Defence Report 2011). This limited operational efficiency and in turn, effective cooperation between both organizations on the field.

In the area of maritime terrorist activities and piracy, some level of cooperation has been seen between NATO and the EU. However from assessment, this form of cooperation is rather complementary than a joint-initiative as both organizations have deployed separate naval forces towards combatting Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden. When also discussing energy security, the Gulf of Aden is crucial as it is an area of transit for oil and commercial ships and as a result has attracted the activities of pirates who attack these ships and capture hostages for exchange (ibid.). This problem also extended to include the Indian Ocean as well as pirate activities in the region grew. While NATO deployed its naval forces in Operation Allied Provider which was a mission that lasted from October to December of 2008, and later Operation Allied Protector and Operation Ocean Shield in 2009, the EU had also deployed its own EUNAVFOR under a parallel operation called Atalanta in 2009 as its first naval mission. As much as this complemented NATO's mission in the field and reduced burden sharing problems for it, it was also regarded as a step towards a strengthened call for military capability independence for the EU thus stressing tensions in their relations. For instance, many more European allies in NATO have expressed a stronger commitment to contributing substantially to EUNAVFOR than Ocean Shield as a result of the fact that the EU secured an agreement with Kenya which allowed for the prosecution and imprisonment of Somali pirates in Kenya or in an EU member state (NATO Defence Report 2011).

The case of Libya has made interesting developments to their relations more so between NATO and its European allies than between NATO and the EU itself. The 2011 Libyan War showcased a major weakness in NATO capabilities but most

importantly, a decline in interest for the US to jump into any military mission and lead it which in turn created a realization for an EU need to strengthen its security defense capabilities (Dempsey 2013). According to Howorth (2013), the almost total absence of the EU in the Libyan crisis has led analysts to question the collective security actorness of the EU and its relations with NATO as a whole. This was mostly due to the impact of the 2008 financial crisis in Europe which in turn affected defence spending and budget cuts in the region leading to former US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates to raise concerns towards European contribution and a de-militarized European continent stating also that if Europe continues in its current trend of meager contribution to defence spending, this may become a problem for the future existence of NATO as a whole (Gates 2011). Since 2008, two-thirds of European countries have cut their military spending, with cuts of more than 10% in 18 European countries and more than 20% in eight. Latvia saw cuts of 51%; Greece, 26%; Spain, 18%; Italy, 16%; Ireland, 11%; and Belgium, 12%. By 2010 only the UK and Greece could reach the recommended 2% defense budget requirement alongside the US in NATO (Hoppia 2013: 14).

A lot of EU leaders were not in support of the Libyan War which also explained their meager contribution towards intervention and were even strongly supported by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton who went to various lengths to prevent the discussion of EU involvement in the crisis in the European Council meeting of 2011 (Howorth 2013). The Libyan crisis is a very important milestone for NATO-EU relations as a symbolic shift in US contribution to global defence and also its gradual shift to political security concerns in the Asian Pacific has led to a heightened resurgence in the need for the EU to strengthen its autonomy in managing their own defense security issues through a stronger CSDP. Goldgeier (2010) argues in his report on the “future of NATO” that while NATO has been an important cornerstone for European security and US foreign policy, its ability to continue playing this important role is still very much unclear. How this would spell the future of cooperation in NATO-EU relations would continually be debated on but

with one important perspective in mind - that it is inevitable that relations between both parties would continue to be characterized with both cooperation and competition especially as the EU continues to strengthen its CSDP.

4.1.2 Response to the Emerging Security Challenges

NATO and EU relations has been cooperative where there is a general agreement on the importance of these security challenges in today's global affairs but where they compete is that the EU has focused more on regional conflicts and state failures within its neighborhood while NATO has focused more on technological and defence related issues such as cyber security. For instance in 2003 when the ESS was drafted, energy, cyber and environment security was left out and only introduced much later in 2011 (Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012: 2).

In August 2010, the Emerging Security Challenges Division (ESCD) was established within the NATO international staff as an effective means focusing its resolve to managing these newly emerging security threats such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, piracy, cyber, energy and environmental security as outlined in its 2010 Strategic Concept. The major purpose of this body was to merge various skills and expertise into one single body to dealing with the ESC's in a cross cutting and comprehensive manner. The ESCD stressed lesser alliance on military instruments and more prevention, resilience and non-duplication of capabilities in handling crisis along with other international and regional organizations such as the EU. The major strategy of the ESCD reflected NATO's policies in working effectively with its partners through consultations, sharing information and intelligence, and exchange of experience and expertise through further collaboration with its partners (Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012: 2). In other words, the ESCD has acted as an important tool for streamlining and coordinating efforts in handling these security issues together with organizations like

the EU so as to prevent duplication of activities in certain areas. This has indicated the need for further cooperation between them.

While NATO has managed to create an institution for dealing squarely with the ESC's, the EU's response to the ESC's has been quite disorganized. Despite the fact that it has adopted certain strategy documents and resolutions in handling these security threats as already discussed in this research, it has however not carried out a re-structuring of these ESC's (like building an ESCD) and neither has it prioritized them like NATO. This of course has limited their abilities to work effectively together in handling these security matters (ibid.). The EU had also found it more difficult to coordinate its actions towards issues such as cyber defence and energy security unlike NATO. The importance of cyber threats for instance, only recently found its strategic domain within an EU response through the creation of the European Cybercrime Center in 2012 (ibid.).

It is important to note however that the EU unlike NATO has no primary mandate for defence and as a result this translates in its responses towards sensitive matters within the ESC's that require these capabilities in handling the challenges. This has created hurdles for cooperation between the EU and NATO in reaching a consensus for effective action towards threats. For instance in its response to terrorism, both organizations - albeit acknowledging the importance of policy coordination - responded differently to the terrorist events of 9/11. The EU's response was much slower than that of NATO's and as a result has hindered effective cooperation towards this matter. NATO's Prague Summit in 2002 laid out certain measures to upgrade its technological capabilities in handling matters of terrorism through its DAT program, and also introduced a 'civil' operations program that would include the cooperation of civilian elements from the EU. The EU's response on the other hand has argued for a less militaristic approach but a more integrated policy-based one (Cornish 2006: 20).

While other high level meetings on civil emergency planning, CBRN and counter-terrorism related issues have been held between the EU's Political and Security

Committee and NATO's North Atlantic Council, some policy analysts like Tigner has described the outcome of such meetings as being merely symbolic and producing no meaningful cooperative policies between both organizations. Tigner argues that cooperation within that of terrorism and WMD proliferation can be argued to be the least developed between NATO and the EU as very little has been done to indicate strong practical cooperation between both organizations (Tigner 2006).

Lindstrom further argues that the reason for this disparity in security cooperation on counter terrorism matters between both organizations is mostly based on the fact that unlike NATO which is more of a military or 'first responder' alliance, the EU considers itself to be more of a 'civil' actor which goes ahead to facilitate the implementation of policies made through deliberations or actions of the first responder (2005: 35). This difference would ultimately affect their responses by highlighting gaps in their capabilities towards dealing with matters of terrorism and affect practical cooperation in handling such a challenge. Perruche (2004) calls for better counter terrorism relations to be developed between both organizations through the construction of a platform as the exchange of intelligence and information is pertinent to dealing with the security problem by them.

4.1.2 Burden Sharing and Transatlantic Capabilities Gap

The issue of burden sharing and shared responsibility has been a very crucial one for the development of NATO-EU relations for a long time as it has majorly focuses on how both actors try to construct an international security image for themselves vis-à-vis each other. International burden sharing deals with the cost of how costs should be shared accordingly between parties or states involved in common initiatives or the provision of collective or public goods (Thielemann 2003: 253; Oneal 1989: 433).

In the period following the Cold War, NATO undertook high level intensity conflicts under its Article 5 defence operations while the WEU focused on low-level intensity conflicts of a non-military nature however as time went on this solution was soon to lose its effectiveness as both actors, especially the EU worked towards creating its own autonomous military capability to handle security matters. This shift focused on global security from the Euro-Atlantic one and highlighted further competition between both organizations (Carpenter 2014).

While NATO had pushed forward its agenda to engage in 'out of area' and crisis management operations for instance through its military operations with ISAF in Afghanistan and also through political initiatives as creating partnerships with Russia, Japan, Australia and others, the EU on the other hand has always been a regional and global actor through its economic policies but through the adoption of the ESS, has indicated a strong focus to pursuing its security actor status within the globe as well. (Cornish 2006: 8). This also means that in trying to achieve these goals, NATO's military capabilities can complement the deficiency of EU's in order to foster cooperation but has this been the case so far?

Many of the problems that hinder cooperation between the EU and NATO have been premised on the issue of their capabilities gap. It began during the Cold War with European inability to develop highly mobile military capabilities which has continued to manifest itself in the expanding divergence in the inability to conduct joint military operations between the US and Europe (see Schake 2003: 107). European capability shortfalls are indicated in their fragmented defence budgets and the amount of money they contribute towards military technology and research.

It has always been crucial for EU-NATO relations to seek a solution towards these capability gaps as it has continued to affect the effectiveness of their cooperation in pursuing their security and defence policies. It has no doubt been observed that defence

budget of EU in comparison to the US is about half of it¹⁵ which is no doubt very little and has been a huge problem for the EU if it is to develop its military potential to match that of NATO as an important security actor. In other words, this has potentially affected security cooperation between them on the practical level playing field and on the political field as the US and effectively, NATO cannot continue to shoulder most of the heavy weight from the economic burden of military missions (Taylor 2006: 30). Capability gap related issues affecting the relations between both organizations can be further analyzed through relations between NATO's Prague Capability Commitment (PCC) alongside EU's European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and European Defence Agency (EDA).

The PCC launched in 2002 was an initiative to develop NATO's defence capabilities through focus on its defence against CBRN attacks, intelligence and target acquisition, strategic air and sea lift, deployable and secure command, air to air refueling, deployable combat support and combat service support units (NATO, 2005). ECAP on the other hand was created in 2001 to deal with European capabilities problem through a 'bottom-up' approach of engaging in multinational projects which eventually set up a panel under its Headline Goal Taskforce (HTF) to avoid duplication and improve consistency through better coordination with NATO (Cornish 2006: 17). This was a great indication of cooperation between both organizations. The EDA which was established in 2004 was to improve EU defence capabilities for crisis management activities under the ESDP (EDA 2006). This meant a harmonization of the defence budgets and coordination of defense spending in the EU. The EDA also worked very closely with ECAP through the provision of guidance to its project groups with its mandate also premised on a formal relationship with NATO.

The European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) initiative has managed to create a forum for regular bi-lateral meetings between both organizations to discuss shortfalls and means for developing

¹⁵ See for instance Lindstrom 2005 where she writes that in 2004 US defence budget was \$453.6 billion which was more than twice the combined budgets of the 25 EU member nations.

their defence capabilities. Also, there has been NATO-EU collaboration in capability development through NATO's Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) and the EUMS has collaborated with NATO's Consultation, Command and Control Agency. However, despite the similarities in collaboration efforts and their agendas to avoid duplication and waste of capabilities, security relations between both parties based on the creation of the capabilities group have been criticized and described as 'largely informational and unproductive' (Flournoy and Smith 2005: 45).

Flournoy argues that further cooperation between the ECAP, EDA and PCC would require a stronger amount of momentum with its focus laid out on achievable goals rather than very ambitious plans it tries to pursue which includes the exporting of NATO's full defence transformation agenda to the ECAP. Not many analysts project a full division of labor situation with the EU matching up its military contribution to a NATO-EU security mission in the short or most foreseeable long term (2005: 45). Some analysts argue that the EU itself is neither seeking to become a military rival with NATO but it is however important for the EU to develop itself as a military option to it (See Hunter 2002: 161; Menom 2004: 648).

The capability gap issue is one that magnifies the difficulties that stress the EU-NATO cooperation to a degree that narrowing this gap has proved nearly futile to the cooperation of both organizations. On the other hand it also maintains constant interdependence by both parties on each other but to the disadvantage of NATO in this case. The EU lacks advanced technology and capabilities used for defense and security while NATO does not as it is a defense organization. The EU continues to depend on the Berlin Plus arrangements where it has access to the military assets of NATO to carry out response measures in tackling security issues and participating in missions. The usual mode of operation is usually for NATO to take part in only military actions while EU has to operate as both a defense force as well and as a civil and peace building (Giegerich 2006: 204).

The creation of the “Pooling and Sharing” (P&S) initiative through the “Ghent Framework” of 2010 by the EU and NATO’s “Smart Defence Initiative” (SDI) of 2011 was however an attempt to deal with its capability shortfalls. The former mentioned initiative was meant to bridge its capability gap by promoting the coordination of its defence budgets along with its limited resources based on the financial crisis situation while the latter was NATO’s own plan to “do more with less” and as it would seem, can evolve into a complementary approach that can foster cooperation between NATO and the CSDP (ibid: 209). This is an indication for strengthened security cooperation between both organizations. The two parallel initiatives could constitute a comprehensive approach for reinforcing NATO and the CSDP through the application of dealing with the security threats of the post 9/11 security period. Within this framework, considerable progress has been identified through the sharing of information within operations, operational engagement and capability development amid difficulties still in creating joint strategies in tackling these security threats (Hatzigeorgopoulos 2012: 6).

In line with the NATO treaty that is premised on a Transatlantic security agenda it has been argued that there is therefore no need for EU to develop its own military capabilities since it is still primarily an economic and political entity. However this has not really been the case as stronger support from Washington has called for a stronger CSDP that would take the burden of defense spending by the US alone in military missions (Varwick and Koops 2010). In light of the current economic crisis that struck the global economy and also hit very hard European economies, it would however be quite difficult to envisage a fully militarized EU autonomous from NATO in the nearest future.

According to Yost (2005: 55), despite European ambition to develop its own defensive capabilities, the reversal of current trends towards EU countries reduction of defense spending would basically depend on three important factors which include economic growth, threat perceptions and the prominence of social priorities other than national defense. He also asserts that, although with different and hidden political motives, UK,

France and the US are the three countries most determined to do something about the US-European capabilities by stimulating their European counterparts to acquire and improve their own military capabilities (ibid.). NATO and the EU should cooperate much more as a result of the uncertainty of security challenges and threats to the international system today. These risks and threats to international security require the combined and coordinated military and civilian efforts of these organizations as well as other organizations concerned with world security (ibid.).

With the US changing focus to the security concerns of the Asia-Pacific region away from Europe, the EU is forced to speed up process on developing its own military capabilities in a bid to defending its own security concerns as well as being relevant as a global security actor. Current economic conditions however make it difficult for many of the EU member states to meet the required 2% of GDP for defense spending within NATO which increases the burden of military spending on US as was seen especially in the case of the Libya (Gate 2011). This questions the very future of the cooperation between EU and NATO as EU remains dependent on the defense structures of NATO as it has done since the establishment of the organization. The only way forward in narrowing the huge capability gap will demand shared determination, transatlantic cooperation and coordination and increased European defense spending (Perruche 2004).

4.1.3 Political issues under Berlin Plus

A certain amount of operational success has been attributed to their military and crisis management missions in Macedonia and Bosnia via Operations Concordia and Althea missions and cooperation outside of Europe in Afghanistan with NATO's ISAF forces and EU's EUPOL, in Darfur where both organizations worked and supported AU missions, and also in anti-piracy missions off the Somalia coast with NATO and EU

naval forces acting through operation Ocean Shield and EUNAVFOR respectively (Grevi 2006: 5). The ERF's first mission came about through Operation Concordia commanded through NATO's DSACEUR. Althea was the successor to NATO's SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina and has remained EU's most intensive mission till today while Operation Artemis in Congo in 2003 was its first outside Europe mission which was not conducted under the Berlin Plus agreement or without any formal invitation to NATO (Keohane 2008). While the Berlin Plus had displayed grounds of collaboration between them, Artemis also spelled out a level of competition that had begun to take form through the autonomous agenda of the EU's ESDP.

The deployment of the Eurocorps under the Berlin Plus also showcased levels of cooperation between the EU and NATO and has been deployed three times under the command of NATO. In Sudan too in 2005, they have both provided airlift support to the AU mission there for its peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, the relationship between the EU Battle Group (EUBG) and the NATO Response Force (NRF) has become an ambiguous source of controversy to the cooperation between the EU and NATO. While both projects are similarly set up for military operations on the field, there have been a lot of differences between the two that has affected effective cooperation between both organizations on the operations field. The EUBG force is much smaller and less efficient than the NRF especially since it lacks a considerable amount of naval and air troops (Cornish 2006: 15).

In the area of logistics support, concerns have been raised that both organizations are fundamentally incompatible in their military spending because the EU is less flexible in its finances towards taking actions to a crisis situation unlike NATO. Additionally, the problem of national governments and the organizations be it NATO or the EU has always surfaced. Where NATO military commitment is more long term in nature, the EU's commitment is much less. National sensitivities has also been noticed to hamper an effective level of military cooperation between the two where the ability of military commanders switching operational control of the forces between the NRF and EUBG or vice versa has become a problem (Cornish 2006: 15).

However, most of the criticism made to the limits of the Berlin Plus has been from the political level of relations between the EU and NATO especially over the issue of 'autonomy'- should the EU's decisions be independent and/or should it have autonomy in the deployment of its own troops too? France on the one hand agrees that a strengthened involvement of US through a heightened NATO-EU cooperation would only reduce the independence of the EU as a stronger political union while Turkey, through its veto power, blocks any meetings with a non-NATO EU member, Cyprus, as well as its participation in EU-NATO peace keeping missions as a result of the ongoing conflict it has with Greece while on the other hand, Cyprus stalls Turkey's EU accession bid (Ulgen 2008).

Being a very sensitive issue, both parties have employed certain political strategies to frustrate the other. Turkey stalls meetings between the PSC and NAC because of Cyprus as well as limits Cyprus opportunity for bi-lateral relations with NATO under the PfP program. This political stalemate between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus has prevented the free flow and exchange of information as well as participations in meetings aimed at providing common solutions to common security issues has indeed being a huge problem that continues to affect the EU-NATO cooperation. This problem would need to be addressed effectively if the EU and NATO has to keep working together allowing provisions that would bring both factions of the conflict to a compromise that would be good for the cooperation of EU-NATO as a whole. However, this conflict may not be likely to end anytime soon as firstly, Turkey continues to reject proposals by the EU to solve the conflict through steps such as the establishment of an informal structure between EU and NATO secretary-generals for security and policy issues and secondly that Turkey authorize its military bodies in Kosovo to make the necessary arrangements on the ground (Ulgen 2008).

Additionally, through membership in international organizations, states seek to balance power and ensure their survival against threats from stronger powers. As a result, national interest and identity become very important tools states use to wield power for its own protection. Just like the EU has established for itself a powerful position as an

economic and political regional and global power, it has also come under challenge by an increasing strength of Asia-Pacific powers and a gradual shift of European security concerns by the US to the Asia-Pacific region (Griegrich 2006: 240).

Powerful states like France has always pursued foreign policies that sought to balance the strength and monopoly of NATO within European security by constantly opposing initiatives that greatly enhance NATO's role within its security objectives and as a result, "prevents a stable and common EU approach towards NATO at the member state level" (Varwick and Koops 2009: 119). A popular statement by former NATO Secretary General Japp de Hoop Scheffer in Berlin about the EU-NATO relationship describes it as a 'frozen conflict' and also goes ahead to mention that some nations are trying to keep both organizations at a distance from each other on purpose (De Hoop Scheffer 2007: 3).

UK's relations with Europe also outline the problems of national sovereignty and autonomy that defines the core basis of national interests which affect these nations' attitudes towards a more functional EU-NATO working relationship. In comparison with France, Britain's policies towards European integration has been less and less effective as its approach seeks to marginalize the country within Europe while seeking more independence and freedom from Europe while France seeks this same autonomy within the context of European integration. This has been the leading focus of French policy towards the EU and as well as NATO where it aims to create the capacity for itself to be difficult and take independent actions within the multilateral framework of an EU-NATO relationship unlike Britain who has never actually tried to fully distinguish itself from NATO and has made it less influential in shaping decisions through both NATO and the EU (Brenner 1998:239).

Germany too like France in comparison to Italy was determined to participate fully working in and through both organizations by making its assets available for effective multilateralism and not necessarily invoking nationalist sentiments of integration whereas Italy has been taken for granted on both European integration and NATO

platforms. State self-interest dominate the conduct of relations between each other and shifting concerns by the US towards the Asia-Pacific could only translate into a lesser and lesser concern for European security issues that has and would continue to spur the need for a stronger CSFP within the EU and lesser cooperation with NATO (ibid. 240).

If such political and economic concerns are not tackled properly by the member states of these institutions, it may spell heightened competition for them and lesser cooperation on certain matters and decision making processes that would overall affect the effectiveness of working effectively. Put all together, these dynamics of relations do not do well in giving encouraging signals or allowing effective cooperation to take place within the context of EU-NATO relations (Brenner 1998: 240).

Another problem that cripples, and in a long time may continue to weaken the effective cooperation between the EU and NATO is an inter-institutional rivalry that exists between them as the EU agenda to become an independent military strength from its dependence on NATO is viewed as competitively unsettling to the monopoly and advantage NATO has over the military domain. This has been witnessed most especially through EU missions in Sudan where the UK, Italy and the Netherlands opted for a NATO mission in response to the African Union's request for airlift while on the other hand, France, Germany and Greece supported a UN-mandated mission where in the end, separate operations were carried out which undermined effective cooperation as outlined by the Berlin Plus agreements (Lindstrom 2007: 49).

Other actions that have limited cooperation between them premised on actions that enhance a stronger and independent CSDP such as the EU-NATO calls for an independent EU operational planning cell as initiated by France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg, the carrying out of missions that were independent from NATO in coordination with the UN like Operation Artemis in Congo (2003), EUFOR (2006) in Congo and EUFOR in Chad; and also the creation of EU Battle groups, all of which were direct provocations to NATO and the US (ibid.).

The security issues of regional conflicts and state failures has witnessed the strongest levels of practical and civil-military cooperation between NATO and the EU through the field of crisis management. Operational collaborations between NATO and the EU as already discussed in the previous chapters under the Berlin Plus agreement as seen through the Concordia and Althea missions and crisis management operations in Congo, Chad and Sudan indicate a level of structured cooperation between them. However, the problems of capability gap has greatly limited the development of stronger ties between both organizations in dealing with these regional conflicts itself and also in handling matters of other security concerns outlined by their strategic doctrines in a concerted manner. In light of this, how then can the future of security relations be described between them?

4.2 Debated Scenarios on the Future of NATO-EU Security Relations

Different scenarios have continually been debated by experts and analysts on the future of NATO-EU security relationship. Varwick (2006) outlines two major scenarios which include firstly, a two-pillar alliance structure and secondly, a total collapse in the future of the transatlantic relationship with NATO going out of existence. The two-pillar alliance structure is nothing new as it has already been debated from the 1960's and since been brought up in strategies and debates that calls for an equal level of partnership between NATO and EU as asymmetric actors where the EU is responsible for security within its region while using NATO forces when needed. In other words, provisions within the Berlin Plus agreement would still be maintained in their relationship granting total freedom to the EU in dealing with peace-keeping and crisis management missions with or without the participation of NATO (ibid.).

This scenario also argues that supremacy within their cooperation would not be discussed in principle but practically and through the spirit of solidarity. In dealing

with global security issues, decisions and actions would be made on a case-by-case ground based on joint consensuses from both organizations. Varwick argues that for the success of this particular type of relationship, the EU would need to have fully developed its CSDP capabilities in dealing with its own regional security so as to avoid duplication of assets and decision making structures (Varwick 2006). Howorth (2003:238) also argues same that while NATO continues to maintain its dominance in the regional security alliance, in time the ESDP would fully develop to dominate the alliance.

In his second scenario, he asserts that transatlantic relations would collapse as a result of NATO gradually going out of existence. The EU and the US could become strategic rivals based on the assumption that global security threats could cause a huge rift between them. However, this situation is only probable when the EU has managed to transform its economic power into a military one which is hoped for by some European autonomists (Varwick 2006). Mearsheimer argues that “NATO must either disappear or reconstitute itself on the basis of the new distribution of power in Europe. NATO cannot remain as it was during the Cold War” (1995:14). Moreover, NATO’s expansion or even its existence only spells further problems based on the continued duplication of efforts (Bonnen 2003:125) while on the other hand, the differences in policies, security priorities and military capabilities between both organizations would eventually mean there would be no need for a permanent alliance (Cornish 2004: 54).

Koenig (2010: 19-28) additionally constructs three different scenarios for the future of NATO-EU security relations. Firstly, relationship between EU and NATO could return to a situation where the EU abandons its CSDP programs and focuses on being a civilian power leaving NATO to handle security matters on its own especially those requiring the use of military capabilities. This scenario however cannot be easily realized especially on the immense need for transatlantic burden sharing by both organizations. As expressed through NATO’s activities in Libya for instance, then US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates harshly criticized and outlined the need for Europe to step up its defense spending programs as very little contribution came from it towards

NATO security missions in Libya. Calls made by France also within the EU would make this scenario an unrealistic one as it has constantly argued for an autonomous CSDP within the EU's security and foreign policy (Howorth and Keeler 2003: 101). Documents such as the ESS, the reports on its implementation have constantly called for a stronger inclusion of the EU in the handling of global security matters and its military capabilities. As a result of these political developments it is highly unlikely that this scenario would be ever met anytime soon (ibid: 20).

In the second scenario, security relationship between NATO and the EU may evolve into a more uniformed structure of cooperation with both organizations becoming one institution while maintaining their own headquarters. This scenario implies that both organizations would have a joint command and control center for dealing with security matters. However the possibility of this situation again is subject to varied political positions between key players within NATO and the EU such as the UK, Czech Republic and Poland on one side and France on the other – who is unwilling to give up its comparative advantage of civilian capabilities to control by the US through a NATO command structure. The political tension and situation of the Turkish-Cyprus issue is also a major factor that would hinder this scenario a possibility. Even if these issues were fixed, practical problems such as reconciling the operational strategic differences or modes of planning between both organizations would become a problem for it (Koenig 2010: 21).

Thirdly, NATO-EU security relations may develop into a situation that enhances better division of labor between both organizations with NATO handling tougher security related issues such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, and regional conflicts while the EU may handle issues such as energy and cyber security that require less military capabilities. In this case, NATO may be invited to participate in EU missions on a case-by-case basis when its military capabilities are required. This scenario is highly unlikely too for political and economic reasons as the US would not be willing to handle all the 'dirty' jobs alone while the EU on the other hand may not want to be strictly identified as a 'civilian' actor alone in handling security matters of the global

environment especially within its very own backyard. This goes against the entire political agenda of the EU's CSDP plan which it has taken years to construct in order to project a global player image for itself (Koenig 2010: 24).

This study however supports the scenario that in light of the security threats of the 21st century it has become very crucial that the EU continues to pursue the development of its own autonomous military capabilities in order to complement that of NATO's; and reduce the transatlantic gap that has hindered maximum cooperation between them. If this would be the case, division of labor would become most effective between them especially when it is based on a flexible and ad hoc manner. In other words, capabilities in handling each of the security challenges as outlined by their strategic doctrines would be equal, however decision taken to handle them if one or both of them should intervene would be prioritized based on certain factors such as experience and geopolitical burden sharing.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The primary aim of this thesis is to thoroughly examine the dynamic relations between two international organizations - NATO and the EU - in managing and dealing with the security problems of the post 9/11 global environment and in doing so also, to analyze how this has shaped and would continue to shape security relations between both organizations. The reason this study focuses on the post 9/11 period as the appropriate timeline for assessing their security relations is premised on the idea that the events of the 9/11 crisis fostered a renewed need for a stronger transatlantic security relations and a recognition of the importance of how these emerging security threats (such as transnational crime and cyber and environmental security for instance) require newer approaches to dealing with them. However this thesis does not seek to evaluate how events of 9/11 directly affected relations between NATO and the EU but instead adopts this time frame in order to use the security related challenges they identify – as outlined in their individual security strategic documents – mainly as an important empirical basis for analyzing security relations between them. Despite the fact NATO has always had a strategic concept since the post-Cold War era leading to its 2010 new strategic concept, the EU only formally adopted its security strategy in 2003 which falls into the time frame of this study.

The concluding remarks of this thesis would proceed to briefly answer the research questions as outlined earlier in the introduction of this study. Firstly, how have NATO

and the EU evolved themselves as security actors and how has security relations between them evolved as well?

As security actors, this thesis emphasizes that it is clear that both organizations are shaped by different identities and histories and work towards different goals. NATO initially focused on collective defense as a military organization or 'hard power' structure towards protecting Europe from a then Soviet Union aggression in the Cold War period, has managed to reconstruct its global security actor image to include one of crisis management as an important part of its security agenda while also taking on 'out of area' security operations. This it managed to do so by first adopting a strategic concept in 1991 that focused on political instability and ethnic unrests and developing much later on in 2010 to include others threats such as terrorism and eventually, through its experiences from operations in the Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan and parts of Africa adopted the new Strategic Concept of 2010. The EU on the other hand, through its failure in properly managing the Balkan crises, was forced as an important regional organization to rethink its security 'actorness' from being just an economic actor or a 'soft power' organization to one with the capability to act in military matters. This culminated into a strong need in contributing more effectively to security and military operations especially in its own backyard with its own capabilities and in turn, a need to strengthen its ESDP.

Answering the question of how security relations has been transformed between them however, this thesis examines how both organizations have had to individually transform their security image while at the same time trying to maintain strong relations with each other in order to work together and not rival or duplicate the actions and efforts of the other. It answers this by analyzing three distinct phases ranging from the early Post-Cold War phase, to the ESDP and the Berlin Plus agreement periods; and beyond the post 9/11 era. The failure of an effective EU intervention in the Balkan crises was a major catalyst for enhancing their relations as it revealed a growing capability-expectation gap between both organizations which led to calls for the development of the ESDI within NATO's European pillar by NATO so as to enable

better contribution from them. However institutional and political problems through this arrangement created a need for the EU to develop its own military capabilities which led to the ESDP that significantly evolved a more direct security relation between both organizations. Following these developments, the Berlin Plus agreement indeed became a renewed political symbol and crucial platform for melting down tensions in relations between them brought about by this 'autonomous' military agenda of the ESDP that would fuel competition between them according to a highly suspicious US towards the EU. However, this agreement was limited in many ways by both inter and intra-organizational political issues such as the Turkish-Cyprus impasse as well as in practical areas on the field brought about by the huge transatlantic capabilities gap between NATO and the EU. Most of this manifested itself in the carrying out of separate military missions such as the EU's Operation Artemis in Congo and also through the rivalry between the ERF and NRF which raised issues that affected security relations between them. NATO's Smart Defence Policy and the EU's Pooling and Sharing Initiative however pushed forward an important need for cooperation between both organizations.

This brings us to the second research question as to how has the global security agenda transformed spurring the need for increased security relations between organizations and how both organizations have defined the major threats of the post 9/11 era.

The complex nature of global affairs has witnessed a transformation of the security agenda from one being entirely state-centric to one primarily focusing on the importance of human security within the international system. As a result, international security cooperation has become an important tool for managing the challenges brought about by a highly unpredictable global security environment in order to maintain stability within the system. The economic burden involved in defence spending as well as the spread of security challenges across state borders has constantly forced states and international organizations to work together towards effectively managing these security challenges. Mearsheimer (1990) argues that due to the international systems structure of aggression and anarchy; conflict is highly inevitable amongst states where

there is no higher body or sovereign authority that guarantees the protection of states from the possibility of the use of force or offensive military actions by other states.

However, this paradoxical nature of the political system still makes it somewhat possible for states to combine efforts against threats in a concerted manner but based on a highly competitive structure of political relations. Globalization has continuously increased and developed a much more stable arena where relations can be carried out between states in order to ensure and maintain the security of the global political environment. Furthermore, as a result of globalization, security issues are now more widespread and require the solutions of not just one, but many, if not all the nation state actors on a global realm as many of these issues are cross-cutting through territorial boundaries. This has helped create a basis for partnership and cooperation formalized by rules and democratic procedures to maintain their collective security structure.

In answering the question as to how both organizations have defined the threats of the post 9/11 era, this thesis examines the security challenges as encapsulated in the security strategic doctrines of NATO and the EU (NATO's New Strategic Concept and the ESS respectively). These doctrines identify common threats between them such as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, failed states, regional conflicts, transnational crime; cyber, environmental and energy securities. This study recognizes that many academic literatures debating the security relations between NATO and the EU mainly focus on their crisis management operations as the primary basis for examining their relationship. Conclusions from this study does not seek to dispute the fact that this takes primary importance in understanding security relations between them; but adds to this by highlighting the other common security related issues that have been somewhat ignored as crucial to the development of security relations between them.

Finally, how can security relations between both organizations be described judging from an assessment of how they have managed to deal with the aforementioned security issues and what does this say for the future of security relations between them?

This study concludes from its assessment of how both organizations have dealt with these security issues that relation between NATO and the EU has been characterized as been an oscillating dynamic of cooperation and competition. However findings in this study indicate that while both organizations recognize the need for cooperation between them through their security strategies, certain issues have continued to limit its practicality which has in turn heightened competition between them. As previously stated, most of their cooperation has been noted in the practical field of crisis management operations while other security areas have been left lagging in want for more attention by both organizations with a growing need to improve security relations in regards to this aspect. In the area of crisis management this study highlights how both organizations, through the Berlin Plus agreement have managed to deal with the security issues regarding the problems that arise from failed states and regional conflicts. Ironically, most of this cooperation has manifested itself in areas out of the transatlantic area such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan. Despite the level of practical cooperation in this field however, there has been limits to it which has highlighted some level of competition between them.

This study also finds that a lot more cooperation in the areas of cyber, energy and environment security is crucial for the security relations between them. In dealing with these issues, a lot more has been done individually with few joint initiatives between them short of a recognized need for cooperation between both organizations. This study suggests that while these security areas have only newly become very crucial concerns between both organizations, it is important that more practical levels of cooperation be increased between them. This can be enhanced most especially through the maintenance of a formalized strategic and political dialogues between them that is primarily focused on overseeing the establishment of a joint structure that would enhance information sharing, staff training and the development of IT and defense technology crucial for the management of these issues.

The major issues limiting cooperation between both organizations has been examined through their political burden sharing and capabilities gap issue; and its Berlin Plus

limitations as a result of the intra-organizational practical and political problems. These issues have continued to spur competition between both organizations and would continue to do so for a while until a solution is found. With both organizations constantly trying to boost its international security image, there is bound to be problems that could spell a weakness for their relations.

It can be argued that NATO is still the only actor primarily suited to handling intense conflicts of a military nature while the EU as a soft power should focus on using its economic influence in conflicts of a lesser capability or involving civilian assets where NATO fails to meet up. Interestingly, the issue of their capabilities gap should spell out the need for cooperation between them as NATO lacks civilian capabilities especially in managing crisis while the EU is capable of contributing towards this field. The comprehensive approach by NATO towards crisis management emphasizes the importance of civil-military planning in dealing with conflicts in complex situations where it becomes necessary for both elements to be employed within the full cooperation of the EU's civilian capabilities and NATO's military strengths in a bid to narrowing the capability gap that exists between them.

However this has not really been the case with the EU developing its own military capabilities through its CSDP which has affected security relations between them. France for instance through its position in the EU has always pursued an autonomous or military agenda for the organization while the UK traditionally prefers a closer alignment with the US through its relationship with NATO with Germany being in the middle of both sides. This situation has helped create political problems when discussing a more cooperative security relationship between NATO and the EU.

In answering the question of their future security relations, this study concludes that while relations between the EU and NATO has been and would continue to be both cooperative and competitive for a long time, it is only a maintained and shared perception of security challenges that will continue to force NATO and the EU to cooperate more effectively in employing their capabilities towards a concerted effort in

dealing with these security concerns. This shared perception can be possible if both organizations develop a joint security strategic doctrine that documents how these challenges could be managed under an agreement that could not only symbolize a significant step in dealing with these issues cooperatively, but limit competition through the construction of a joint emerging security challenges division like NATO's. While this may prove quite difficult as a solution any time soon as a result of their intra-organizational political problems (Turkish-Cyprus impasse for instance), how this can be done should create room for further academic research in this area.

Additionally, NATO should continue to remain the primary domain suited enough to handling security matters of a high intensity that require advanced defense capabilities at least for the time being; while the EU should continue to remain a sort of civilian power with its own military capabilities to handle lesser conflicts especially within its neighborhood as it further develops its CSDP. This should be done based on the sole purpose of complementing that of NATO's rather than being in outright competition with it. This would prove effective in maintaining the future of their security relations. If the EU is able to define for itself a solid military capability standing coupled with a stronger political mechanism for effective decision making in dealing with conflicts within its region, NATO and the EU will find itself in a whole new type of interdependent relationship. NATO and the EU are entering a phase where both organizations must prepare themselves for a new transatlantic/European security regime which would redefine their cooperative approach and set new standards for rules, norms and procedures of cooperation that would encourage member states of both organizations to realize the importance of maximizing a joint approach in solving problems.

The primary issue of trying to develop an autonomous European military alongside NATO's is mainly premised on concerns regarding future competition between the EU and NATO in maintaining their transatlantic relationship. It is quite pertinent that the US continues to emphasize through political dialogues that a stronger ESDP is best to

further narrow the transatlantic capabilities gap and enable the EU to handle more security matters while reducing the defence burden for NATO.

The future of security relations between NATO and the EU is a crucial one with potential for stronger cooperation in all the security related areas as outlined in this study. However, while the economic crisis in Europe continues to affect its defence spending with US defence budget shrinking as well and its security focus shifting to the Asia-Pacific region; it has become apparent that for the transatlantic bargain to maintain its significance, the EU would need to take on a larger role of maintaining security in its own region by not just pursuing its need for an autonomous CSDP but modernizing and updating its military capabilities as well in order to catch up with NATO standards. While this relationship as regards to EU military capability development will continue to be riddled with political suspicion as the EU strives to develop an autonomous CSDP for itself, looking at the transforming global security agenda as well as the broad platform of congruent membership both organizations share, it would indeed be highly unproductive if they worked separately and not together in dealing effectively with these security issues that affect the global security environment.

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APPENDIX A

MEMBERSHIP OVERLAP IN NATO AND THE EU

Country	EU	NATO
Albania		1 April 2009
Austria	1 Jan 1995	
Belgium	1 Jan 1957	4 April 1949
Bulgaria	1 Jan 2007	29 March 2004
Canada		4 April 1949
Croatia	1 July 2013	1 April 2009
Cyprus	1 May 2004	
Czech Republic	1 May 2004	12 March 1999
Denmark	1 Jan 1973	4 April 1949
Estonia	1 May 2004	29 March 2004
France	1 January 1957	4 April 1949
Finland	1 Jan 1995	
Germany	1 Jan 1957	9 May 1955
Greece	1 Jan 1981	18 February 1952
Hungary	1 May 2004	12 March 1999
Iceland		4 April 1949
Ireland	1 May 1973	
Italy	1 Jan 1957	4 April 1949
Latvia	1 May 2004	29 March 2004
Lithuania	1 May 2004	29 March 2004
Luxembourg	1 Jan 1957	4 April 1949
Malta	1 May 2004	

Table (cont'd)		
Netherlands	1 Jan 1957	4 April 1949
Norway		4 April 1949
Poland	1 May 2004	12 March 1999
Portugal	1 Jan 1986	4 April 1949
Romania	1 Jan 2007	29 March 2004
Slovakia	1 May 2004	29 March 2004
Slovenia	1 May 2004	29 March 2004
Spain	1 Jan 1986	30 May 1982
Sweden	1 Jan 1995	
Turkey		18 Feb 1952
United Kingdom	1 Jan 1973	4 April 1949
United States		4 April 1949

Note: NATO (28 members) and the EU (28 members) have 22 members in common

APPENDIX C
TURKISH SUMMARY

11 EYLÜL SONRASI GÜVENLİK ÇAĞINDA NATO-AB İLİŞKİLERİ

Yeni küresel oyuncuların git gide açığa çıkan güçleri, küreselleşme, devlet ve sivil figürlerden müteşekkil yerel ağlar ve de yerel ve küresel güvenlik tehditlerinde görülen artışla birlikte, yirmi birinci yüzyıl ulus devletlerin birbirleri arasındaki ilişkilerin son derece karmaşık ve hızla dönüşen bir yapı çerçevesinde gerçekleştiği yeni bir boyut getirmiştir. Ortaya çıkan bu yeni boyutta küresel ve yerel güvenlik dinamiklerinde büyük bir değişim görülmektedir. Mevzubahis güvenlik tehditleri, belirtilenlerle sınırlı olmamakla birlikte, *Kitle İmha Silahlarından* arınmadan, *Terörizm*, başarısız devletler, yerel çatışmalar, uluslar ötesi organize suç hareketleri, siber, enerji ve çevre güvenliğine dek uzanmaktadır.

Bu çalışmanın bilimsel hedefi 11 Eylül olayları ertesinde ortaya çıkan uluslararası güvenlik sorunlarıyla etkili mücadelede, Avrupa Birliği (AB) ve Kuzey Atlantik Anlaşması Örgütü'nün (NATO) birbirleriyle olan ilişkilerini tüm ayrıntılarıyla incelemektir. Askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik unsurların her geçen günle beraber evirildiğini hesaba katacak olursak her bir ayrıntının muhteva ettiği önem gözle görülür hale gelecektir. Böylece, her iki örgütün kendilerini önem arz eden güvenlik aktörleri olarak sürekli dönüşen ve değişen küresel güvenlik gündemi dâhilinde kendi kendilerini nasıl tanımladıkları; ana hatları birbirinden farklı güvenlik doktrinlerince belirlenmiş bu kurumların aralarındaki işbirliğinin ne derece etkili olduğu, ve bu ilişkinin öz doğasının rekabetçi ya da uyumlu olup olmadığı gibi kritik araştırma sorularına cevap aranacaktır. Güvenlik olgusu veya kavramı ya da güvenlik araştırmaları, geniş Uluslararası İlişkiler sahasında, bahsi geçen bu alanın esaslarıyla birlikte yeni bir alt kümeye evrilmiştir. Güvenlik olgusu ve uluslararası ilişkiler sahasında gözlemlenen bu değişimler pek çok birbirinden farklı, yine de birbirini tamamlayıcı bilimsel ekolün ortaya çıkmasına yol açmıştır. Gerçekçiler ve yeni-gerçekçilerin küresel güvenlik tanımı tamamıyla

devletlerin etkin rollerine, askeri ve ekonomik güçlere odaklanmışken, çoğulcular genellikle devlet dışı küresel güvenlik aktörlerine güvenlik meselelerini belirleyen müstesna özneler olarak yoğunlaşmaktadırlar. Her iki ekolün verileri de göz önünde bulundurulduğu taktirde güvenlik sahasında yaşanan sorunların ve bu sorunların çözümüyle ilgili unsurların birbirlerini tamamlayıcı doğası daha da açığa çıkmaktadır. Diğer yandan da toplumsal oluşturmacılar resmi ideolojilerin ve toplumu devamlı dönüştüren unsurların büyük önemini vurgulamışlardır. Bu vurgu Sovyetlerin çöküşü ardından önemini yitirse de, Ortadoğu ve Afrika gibi bölgelerdeki pek çok istisnai oluşumu açıklayabilmek için gereklidir. Fakat doksanlı yıllarda genişleyen güvenlik çalışmaları ekolleri, bir yandan halen devletin önemine odaklanırken, bir yandan da yoksulluk, insan hakları meseleleri gibi alışılmamış diğer güvenlik tehditlerini içermeye başladıkları görülmüştür. Lakin gittikçe öze inen bir diğer ekol güvenlik araştırmalarında anahtar öge olarak bireyin önemine yoğunlaşmıştır.

Güvenlik kavramının kendisi de, içerdiği anlamlar ve uygulamada görülen değişken unsurlar göz önünde bulundurulduğunda geçtiğimiz yıllar içinde sadece ve sadece devlet güvenliğinin taşıdığı önem ve hassasiyeti değil, insan güvenliğinin de taşıdığı önemi irdeleyecek biçimde dönüşmüştür. Bu dönüşüm sürekli bir değişim içinde olan güvenlik olgusunun sorunların derinliğine incek biçimde nasıl dönüştüğünü de göstermektedir. Olası küresel güvenlik tehdit ve tehlikelerini uygun ve etkili bir şekilde cevaplandırabilmek için gerekense, uluslararası topluluğun muhtelif üyelerinin çeşitli kapasitelerinin bileşimlerinin, daha gelişkin bir işbirliği içinde, katkı sağlayabilmeleridir. Bu katkının sorunlara çözüm bulabilmek adına büyük bir önem taşıdığı yadsınamaz. Olaylara bu açıdan baktığımızda, sorunu uluslararası örgütler arası ilişkilere indirgeyerek güç boşluklarını daha da genişletmek buraya kadar oldukça değerli kanıtlar ortaya koyacaktır. Ortaya konan kanıtlar bahsedilen örgütlerin yapısal değişimlerini irdeleyerek küresel tehditleri karşılama bu örgütlere sağladığı imkanları somutlamaktadırlar AB ve NATO'ya yönelik güvenlik tehditleri esasen benzer olup, her iki örgüt eşgüdüm halinde tehditlerle mücadele ederken, bu ittifakın varlığının devamının nedenlerini büyük oranda ortaya koymaktadır.

11 Eylül saldırıları neticesinde hızlanan yeni ve daha da tehlikeli bir güvenlik ortamında vuku bulan vahim olaylar, başlıca güvenlik örgütlerinin, özellikle de NATO ve AB'nin diyalog ve işbirliğine olan ihtiyaçlarının aciliyetini arttırmıştır. Bu ihtiyacın aciliyetini küresel güvenliğe yönelik tehditleri etkisizleştirmek için atılan adımlarda görmekteyiz. Günümüzün uluslar ötesi suç eylemleri, iklim değişimi süreci ve devletlerarası sınırlar gibi küresel güvenlik sorunları uluslararası sistem için birbirleriyle kesişen riskler oluşturmaktadır. Açıkça görülen bu kesişim noktalarını irdelemek NATO ve AB arasında gözlemlenen siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri işbirliği zaafalarını açığa çıkartmak için zaruridir. NATO ve AB arasındaki işbirliğinin esas teşkil ettiği çok boyutlu çözümlerin ortaya konması tam da bu noktada, belirtilen tehlikelerle mücadelede büyük önem arz etmektedir. Dahası 2008 küresel ekonomik krizi her iki örgütün etkenliğini belirleyen ve git gide artan bütçe problemleri açığa çıkartarak karşılaşılan tehditlere bir yenisini eklemiştir. Her iki uluslararası örgütte kendilerini önemli ve güçlü güvenlik aktörleri olarak göstermeye ve sunmaya çabalamaktadır. Bu çabalar küresel boyutta belirli bir noktaya kadar başarı göstermekle birlikte halen pek çok eksiği bünyesinde barındırmaktadır. Tüm bu nedenler her ikisi içinde birbirlerini tekrarlamamak ve birbirlerinin eylemleri baltalamamak adına, harekât planlamalarında gelişmiş işbirliği, etkili iletişim ve güçlü koordinasyon büyük bir gerek arz etmektedir.

Çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde, önemli küresel güvenlik aktörleri olan bu iki örgütün, NATO ve AB'nin, ayrı ayrı ve birlikte tarihçelerinden yola çıkarak, bu örgütlerin günümüzün tehditkâr uluslararası politik sahasında nasıl şu an buldukları konuma ulaşmayı ve orada kalmayı başardıkları hakkında kısa bir tarihi arka plan ortaya konacak. Bu örgütlerin tarihçeleri incelendiğinde hem küresel güvenliğe yönelik tehditlerin hem de bu tehditleri karışılmakta uluslararası örgütlerin oynadığı rollerde ne gibi niteliksel değişimler olduğu görülecektir. NATO İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında, 1949 yılında bir savunma ve güvenlik organizasyonu olarak ortaya çıktı. Fakat Soğuk Savaş ertesinde hedeflerine onu AB'yi tamamlayıcı ve destekleyici bir unsur kılan kriz yönetimini ekledi ve de SSCB'nin Avrupa bölgesine yönelik mütecaviz ve saldırgan girişimleri karşısında kesintisiz bir istikrar ve barış kaynağı olarak tasarlanmış olduğu gerçeği bu tamamlayıcı rolü daha da pekiştirdi. NATO'nun Soğuk Savaş esnasında

AB'yle birlikte oynadığı rol Batı Blok'unun Sovyetler karşısında kazandığı başarıda önemli bir paya sahiptir. Soğuk Savaş politikası Sovyetlerin yayılmacı tutumunun Atlantik ötesi batı ülkelerini bir araya getirecek siyasi ve stratejik atmosferi yaratacağı varsayımına dayanmaktaydı. Böylece, bu türden bir reel politik düşüncenin izdüşümü olan NATO Batı ittifakının sert güç aygıtı olarak kendini konumlandırırken, AB sivil karakterli, daha ziyade kültürel ve ekonomik meselelere eğilen yumuşak bir güç unsuru olarak öne çıkmıştı. Örgütlerin arasında bu yapısal farklılıklar, AB ve NATO'nun yirmi birinci yüzyılda büyük bir dönüşüm gösteren küresel tehdit olgusunu karşılamak adına gösterdikleri değişimlerde de açığa çıkmaktadırlar. Doksanların başında Sovyetlerin parçalanması ve soğuk savaşın neticelenmesini takiben, Avrupa'ya yönelik tehditlerin yapısı değişirken, NATO kendisini askeri ve politik bir ittifak olarak kurumsal hedef ve odağını yeni küresel tehditlere göre yeniden düzenlerken ve yapılandırırken buldu. Avrupa-Atlantik güvenliğinin tesisi için NATO kaynaklarını Balkan istikrarına yöneltti. Bosna ve Kosova'ya yapılan müdahaleleri bu yönde uygulanan ilk askeri hamlelerdi. Lakin, 11 Eylül saldırıları NATO'nun kurumsal tarihinde ilk kez bir ittifak üyesi saldırıya maruz kaldığı takdirde diğerlerinin de saldırı altında olduğu varsayılacağını belirten 5 fıkrasını uygulamaya koymak mecburiyetinde bıraktı. Bu hamle bahsi geçen örgütlerin hızla değişen küresel güvenlik atmosferine uyumuna duyulan ihtiyacı daha da güçlendirdi.

Öte yandan daha ziyade bölgesel bir siyasi ve ekonomik işbirliği teşkilatı niteliği taşıyan AB bölgesinde ekonomik ve siyasi güvenliği sağlama amacıyla kurulmuş olduğundan, özünde askeri bir nitelik barındırmamaktadır. İki örgüt de esasında küresel hedeflere ulaşmaktan daha çok Avrupa koşullarına göre teşkil edilmiştir. On bir Eylül olaylarının arifesinde Sovyetlerin çöküşü ve parçalanması, küresel terör hareketlerinde gözle görülür bir yükseliş yaratmış ve stratejik doktrinleriyle – 2010 yeni NATO stratejik konsepti ve 2003 Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi (AGS/ESS)- ana hatları belirlenmiş diğer kritik küresel güvenlik meselelerinin öne çıkmasıyla birlikte her iki örgütünde odağını küresel ölçekte genişletmesini gerekmiştir. Tıpkı diğer bürokratik karakterli sistemler gibi, bu türlü bir değişim ve yeni uluslararası bir düzene uyumlanmanın yarattığı yeni ve

daha çok tehlike arz eden riskler ve tehditler birbirlerinden değişik eylem stratejilerine sahip yeni aktörlerle farklı boyutlarda işbirliğine girişmeyi zaruri kılmaktadır

AB ve NATO'nun güvenlik sahasındaki ilişki ve işbirlikleri bu çalışmada ortaya konacak yapısal dönüşüm ve değişimleri üç aşamada ele alınmıştır. Bu üç aşama, her aşamanın birbirleri arasında eşgüdüm sağlanarak ortaya konulacaktır. İlk aşamada ortaya konan veriler, Soğuk Savaşın hemen ardından, doksanlı yıllarda NATO'nun Bosna ve ardından Kosova müdahaleleri ve de Batı Avrupa Birliğinin (BAB/WEU) NATO'nun askeri imkânlarına ulaşmasının önünü açan Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Girişimi (AGSG/ESDI) kurulmasıyla sonuçlanan, AB'nin mevzubahis çatışmaları gereğince cevaplandırmada uğradığı başarısızlıklarda kendisini göstermektedir. Bu başarısızlıklar Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Girişimi (AGSG/ESDI) gibi pek çok diğer yeni düzenlemeye duyulan ihtiyacı işaret etmektedirler. Bu ilişkilerin ikinci aşaması büyük oranda Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Plan'ıyla (AGSP/ESDP) ve de Berlin Plus anlaşmasıyla kriz yönetim harekâtlarında NATO ve AB arasında dolaysız iletişimin kuvvet bulmasıdır. Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Plan'ıyla (AGSP/ESDP) ve Berlin Plus anlaşmasıyla sağlanan bu kuvvet birliğinin öneme küresel tehditleri karşılamakta sağlanan ilerlemeyi gözler önüne sermektedir. Üçüncü aşamaya gelince, bu ilişkilerin Türk-Kıbrıs çıkmazı gibi işbirliğinin etkenliğine zarar veren, hatta neredeyse NATO üyesi iki ülkeyi savaşın eşiğine getirerek, ittifakın etkinliğini baltalayan işlevsel ve siyasi meselelerin Berlin Plus anlaşmasının her alanda tatbikine bağlı kılınmasıdır.

Üçüncü bölümde güvenlik kavramını tekrar kısaca tanımlayarak NATO ve AB'nin stratejik doktrinlerinin ana hatlarına odaklanılmaktadır. NATO ve AB'nin uluslararası güvenlik meseleleri karşısında aldıkları tutum ve oynadıkları rolün ehemmiyeti, pek çok yeni anlaşma ve doktrinle daha da pekişmiştir. Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi /AGS/ESS) 2003'te kabul edilmiş ve 2008'de tekrar gözden geçirilmiştir. Bu belgeler terörü, Kitle İmha silahlarını, devletlerin başarısızlıklarını, yerel çatışmaları, uluslar ötesi organize suç hareketlerini, siber güvenliğin, enerji güvenliğini ve iklim değişikliğini önemli tehditler olarak ortaya koymaktadır. Tehditleri açığa çıkarılması bakımından bu tür belgelerin oynadıkları rol bir yana, bu tehditleri cevaplandırmakta AB ve NATO'ya sağladıkları avantajlar açıktır.

Devlet kaynaklı kriz ve çatışmaları çözümlenmede problem yönetimi sahası, bugün AB-NATO ilişkilerini tanımlayan en önemli, fiili işbirliği biçimidir. Bu işbirliğinin yapısı ve sorunları çözümlenme kapasitesi AB ve NATO'nun ortak güvenlik harekâtlarını bir nebze de olsa kolaylaştırmaktadır. Berlin Plus anlaşmasında ön görülen bu stratejik ortaklık iki örgüt arasında kriz yönetimi alanında işbirliği sağlamıştır. Bu iş birliği örgütlerin karşılaştığı siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri tehditleri cevaplandırabilmesi için gereklidir. Siyasi boyutta AB ve NATO, AB'nin NATO imkânlarına erişimine izin veren ve böylece iki örgüt arasındaki koordinasyonu pekiştiren bir takım işbirliği düzenekleri yaratmışlardır. Makedonya'daki eylemler, NATO'nun Müttefik Uyumu Harekatı ve Concordia Harekatıyla NATO, imkanlarını AB'ye sunarak, daha sonra Bosna'da Althea Harekatında olduğu gibi hiçbir pürüze mahal vermeden Berlin Plus anlaşmasının uygulanmasına ilk kez tanıklık edilmiştir. Bu başarı iki örgüt arasındaki işbirliğinden duyulan umutları perçinlemiştir. Dahası Afganistan, Irak ve Sudan gibi Ortadoğu ve Afrika ülkelerinde vuku bulan olaylar, NATO ve AB arasında mevcut olan işbirliğini ve güvenlik harekâtlarını bölge dışı bir bağlama oturtmuştur. Böyle AB ve NATO arasındaki bölgesel işbirliği küresel bir nitelik kazanmıştır. On bir eylül terör olayları güvenlik harekâtlarının çerçevesini NATO ve AB'nin sorumluluk alanının bir adım daha dışına itmiştir. Fakat iki örgütün arasında görülen bir çeşit rekabet Sudan'da ayrı düzenlenen operasyonlarda ve NATO'ya danışılmadan düzenlenen Kongo gibi bağımsız görevlerde gözlenmektedir.

Terör ve Kitle İmha Silahlarından arınma alanlarında, her iki örgüt te terörle ilintili konularda istihbarat paylaşımı gibi çok taraflı yaklaşımın önemini ve aciliyetini benimsemiş, fakat bunu sağlamak için gereken adımlar bir türlü atılamamıştır. Günümüzde gözlemlenen pek çok küresel krizin altında da bir oranda bu başarısızlık yatmaktadır. Yine de Kitle İmha Silahlarından arındırma sahasında, NATO da AB de savunmasız sivil hedefleri kimyasal, biyolojik, radyoaktif ve nükleer saldırılardan savunmak için istihbarat paylaşımında daha da etkin bir işbirliğine gitme kararlılıklarındadırlar. NATO önlem olarak Kitle İmha Silahı merkezleri açıp Teröre Karşı Savunma taslağını ortaya koymaktayken, AB kendi anti-terör stratejilerini geliştirip, kendi Kitle İmha Silahı merkezlerini kurarak aynı yola gitmiştir. Bu sahalarda ve diğer

pek çok alanda da olduđu gibi, uluslar ötesi suç hareketleriyle, siber terörizm, enerji ve çevre tehditleriyle mücadeledeyse pek fazla gelişme gözlemlenmemektedir. Örneğin, donanma görevleri hususunda, Hint Okyanusu ve Aden Körfezinde AB'nin Atalanta Harekâtı, NATO'nun Okyanus Kalkanı Harekâtından tamamen bağımsız olarak ve koordinasyon sağlanmadan gerçekleşmiştir.

Dördüncü bölüm, On bir Eylül ertesini küresel siyasi dönemde gerçekleşen işbirliğinin nasıl ve ne olarak tanımlanabileceği hakkındaki son derece önemli sorulara cevap niteliği taşımaktadır. Bu işbirliğinin doğasının pratik işbirliği niteliğinde m olduğu, yoksa rekabetçi bir karakter mi taşıdığı bu bölümde ele alınacaktır. Böylece, bu bölümde iki örgüt arasındaki işbirliğinin neden ve nasıl belirli bir ölçüde kısıtlı kaldığını bir takım kriz yönetim harekâtları ve kritik tartışma alanları örneklendirerek aktarılmaya çalışılacaktır.

NATO ve AB, alanda çeşitli operasyonlar vasıtasıyla birleşik kurumsal çatı altında işbirliğini bir noktaya kadar başarmışlardır. Doksanlar boyunca, NATO ve AB Doğu Avrupa ve Balkanlarda, önce Bosna krizinde ardından da Kosova'da önemli roller oynamışlardır. Fakat, bölgede istikrara olan katkının düzeyi NATO'nun AB'ye ortanla daha etkili askeri ve stratejik destek sağlaması nedeniyle değişkenlik göstermektedir. NATO'nun Makedonya'da konuşlandırılmış istikrar gücünün yerini alan ve bölgedeki istikrara katkı sağlayan Concordia Harekâtı 2013 Berlin Plus anlaşmasının ilk uygulama örneği olması ve AB'nin ilk askeri görevi olması bakımından önem taşır. NATO'nun askeri imkânlarının belirli bir ölçüde başarıyla kullanıldığı 2004 Bosna Althea Harekâtı bu anlamda her iki örgütün en başarılı işbirliğini teşkil etmektedir. 2003 yılına gelindiğinde NATO Afganistan tecrübesine dayanarak, çatışma sonrasında ihtiyaç duyulan barış ve huzurun tesisinde sivillerin katkısına duyulan gereği ve de AB'yle olan işbirliğinin gittikçe artan önemini kavramıştır. Libya meselesi NATO, Avrupalı müttefikleri ve AB ilişkilerinde daha önce tanık olunmamış bir takım enteresan gelişmelere yol açmıştır. 2011 Libya Savaşı ABD'nin herhangi bir askeri müdahaleye kesin olarak duyduğu çekinceleri açığa çıkartarak NATO'nun içerdiği zaafı ve AB'nin ivedilikle kendi kendisini savunma kapasitesini ve potansiyelini arttırması gerektiğini göstermiştir.

Acil güvenlik tehditleriyle mücadelede ilişkilerini belirlerken, NATO bir Acil Durum Tehditler Departmanı kurarak, AB'yle daha yerinde bir işbirliğine yapısal bir biçimde yönelmiştir. NATO Acil Durum tehditleriyle ve tehlikeleriyle açık mücadele için bir kurum yaratabilmişken, AB daha düzensiz ve tepki vermiştir. On bir Eylül'den beri AB'nin teröre karşı verdiği tepkiler, NATO'ya oranla yavaş kalmıştır. Fakat gözlenen bütün bu durumların ve aksaklıkların nedeni olarak, NATO'nun bir askeri erken müdahale kuruluşu olması, AB'nin ise kendisini ve kendi yapısını daha çok sivil bir örgütlenme olarak görmesi ve ilk müdahalenin bu örgüte açtığı kanallar vasıtasıyla hareket ediyor olması gibi bir takım etken noktalar öne sürülmüştür.

Sorumluluk paylaşma meselesi uzun zamandır NATO-AB ilişkilerinin gelişiminde bu iki aktörün kendilerine çizdikleri uluslararası güvenlik imajı açısından büyük önem arz etmektedir. Dahası, AB ve NATO işbirliğini sekteye uğratan pek çok sorun bu iki örgütün arasındaki kabiliyet farkından ileri gelmektedir. NATO ya da fiilen ABD'nin askeri görevlerin ağırlığını yalnız başına yüklenmeye devam edemeyeceği gerçeği potansiyel olarak NATO ve AB arasındaki işbirliğini etkilemiştir. Fakat, bu sorunların çözümü NATO'nun Prag Yeterlilik Vaadi (PYV/PCC), Avrupa Yeterlilik Harekat Plan'ı (AYHP/ECAP) ve Avrupa Savunma Organ'ı (ASO/EDA) ve AB'nin ortaya koyduğu Birleştirme Paylaşma Girişimi(PG/P&S) ve NATO tarafından kurulan Akıllı Savunma Ajansı (ASA/SDI) gibi her iki örgüt açısından eşgüdüm sağlayacak organizasyonların kurulmasıyla cevaplanmaya çalışılmış ve bu hedefler belirli bir ölçüde başarılmıştır.

AB ve NATO ilişkilerini sekteye uğratan ve uzun vadede zayıflatmaya devam edecek olan bir diğer problemse AB'nin üye ülkeleri arasında var olan kurumlar arası rekabetin azımsanmaz ölçüde güçlü olmasıdır. AB bağımsız bir askeri güç olmayı hedefledikçe NATO'nun askeri sahada bir tekel olarak telakki edilmesidir. Fransa gibi güçlü Batı Avrupa devletleri, İngiltere'nin ve NATO'nun genel güvenlik hedefleri doğrultusundaki girişimlerine karşı durarak NATO içinde dengeleyici ve düzenleyici bir unsur olmaya çabalamışlar ve bir noktaya kadar bu amaca başarmışlardır.

Atlantik ötesi güvenlik ilişkilerinin geleceğine dair farklı senaryolar bu çalışmada ele alınmıştır. İlk iki sütunlu ittifak yapısını içeren ve ikincil olarak gelecekte

gerçekleşecek Atlanik ötesi ilişkilerde nihai bir çöküşü öngören iki ana senaryoyla karşılaşmaktayız. İki sütunlu ittifakın gerçekleşebilmesi için NATO ve AB arasın eşit fakat asimetrik bir ilişkiyi, yani AB'nin gerektiğinde NATO güçlerinden faydalanabildiği bir Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Planınının (AGSP/ESDP) varlığını gerektirmektedir. İkinci senaryoysa ABD ve AB'nin tehditlerin etkisiyle rakip haline gelmesi durumunda NATO'nun varoluş nedenlerinin ortadan kalkacağı varsayımından ibarettir.

Diğer sık tartışılan senaryolarsa, AB'nin CSDP programlarını terk etmesi ve tamamen sivil bir güç haline gelmesi ve de askeri güvenlik meselelerini tamamen NATO'ya devredip daha bütünlüklü bir yapıya bürünüp, kendi karargâhlarını korumakla birlikte tek bir yapıya evrilmesi; yada NATO'nun terör, kitle imha silahları ve bölgesel çatışmalarla, AB'nin ise siber güvenlik ve enerji gibi daha az askeri meselelerle ilgilendiği bir işbölümüne gidilmesidir. Bu işbölümünün mümkün mertebe uyum içerisinde sağlanabilmesi küresel ve yerel güvenlik tehditlerini karşılayabilmek açısından gereklidir. Bu araştırmada açığa çıkarılan verilerse, 21. yüzyıl güvenlik tehditleri göz önünde bulundurulduğunda AB'nin NATO'yu tamamlayıcı bağımsız askeri bir yapılanmaya giderek iki örgütün arasındaki ilişkiye zarar veren Atlantik ötesi boşluğu doldurmasıdır.

Bu çalışmanın sonuç bölümüyse, araştırmanın giriş bölümünde yer bulan araştırma sorularına yönelik kısa cevaplar içermektedir. İlkin, NATO ve AB'nin ve bu iki kurumun ilişkilerinin her bir güvenlik aktörü açısından ne olarak ve nasıl geliştiği ele alınacaktır. Başlangıçta, esas olarak Sovyetler tehdidi karşısında bir kolektif savunma örgütü biçiminde sert güce dayanan NATO güvenlik hedefleri kriz yönetimine dayanan alan dışı hareketler gerçekleştiren küresel bir güvenlik aktörüne dönüşebilmeyi başarırken, AB Balkanlardaki krizi yönetmekteki başarısızlığı nedeniyle kendi güvenlik aktörlüğünü-sadece ekonomik bir yumuşak güç olarak mı kalacağı, yoksa askeri sahada hareket kapasitesi olan bir örgüte mi evirileceğini- tekrar gözden geçirmek durumunda kalmıştır. Öte yandan, bu örgütlerin birbirleriyle güçlü ilişkilerini muhafaza ederek, birlikte çalışmak ve birbirlerinin çabalarını taklit etmemek ve de rekabetten kaçınmak

için Soğuk Savaş sonrasında Berlin Plus ve ötesine uzanan üç ana safhada nasıl dönüştükleri incelenecektir.

Bu sorunlara verilebilecek doğru bir cevap ararken, her iki uluslararası organizasyonun da 11 Eylül sonrası açığa çıkan güvenlik tehditlerini NATO ve AB doktrinlerinde (NATO'nun Yeni Stratejik Konsepti ve Avrupa Güvenlik Stratejisi) nasıl ve ne olarak tanımladıkları göz önünde bulundurulacaktır. Bütün bu adı geçen doktrinler her iki örgüte de yönelen küresel terör, Kitle İmha Silahlarından arınma, uluslar ötesi suç örgütleri, siber terör, enerji ve çevre güvenliği gibi ortak tehditleri bir bütünlük içerisinde tanımlamakta ve aynı bütünlük içerisinde karşılamaya çabalamaktadırlar. Bu çalışma, iki örgütün mevzu bahis tehditlerle nasıl mücadele ettiği ve bu mücadelenin hem müşterek hem de birbirine karşıt dinamikleri açığa çıkartılarak ve tüm bu karmaşık öğeleri somutlayarak sonuçlanacaktır. Fakat bu çalışmada ulaşılan bilimsel sonuçlar, iki örgütün işbirliğine duydukları acil ihtiyaca işaret etmekle birlikte, bazı temel sorunların iki kurum arasındaki rekabeti arttırarak bu işbirliğinin işlerliğini sınırladığını ve azalttığını da göstermektedir. Daha önce de defalarca belirtildiği üzere, bu örgütlerin aralarında bulunan işbirliği çoğunlukla kriz yönetimi sahasında gözlemlenmiş, diğer güvenlik sahaları güvenlik ilişkilerine duyulan ve her geçen günle beraber artan ihtiyacı gösterecek şekilde ihmal edilmiştir.

İki örgütün işbirliğini sınırlayan ve onları kısıtlı bir çerçevede harekete iten esas sorunlar, Türkiye-Kıbrıs çıkmazı ve organizasyonun dâhilinde karşılaşılan sorunları gidermek maksadıyla oluşan Berlin Plus kısıtlamalarında görülen siyasi sorumluluk ve yeterlilik farklarında aranmaktadır. Bu meseleler doğru bir siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri neticeye ulaştırılmadan iki örgüt arasındaki rekabet gün be gün artacaktır. Bu çalışma NATO'nun askeri güç ve olanak gerektiren yüksek yoğunluklu güvenlik sorunlarıyla mücadele eden ve bu tehditleri hızla bertaraf etme kapasitesine sahip esas teşkilat olarak kalması ve kendini bu şekilde konumlandırması gerektiğini, AB'ninse kendi askeri olanaklarına sahip sivil bir örgütlenme olarak etrafındaki muhtelif küçük çaplı çatışmaları CSDP dahilinde cevaplandırması ve çözümlemesi gerekliliğini açıkça göstermektedir. AB etkin, bağımsız bir CSDP oluşturmaya çabalarken, askeri olanakların gelişimi ve güçlenmesi bağlamında bu ilişki, ABD açısından siyasi şüphe ve

soru işaretleri içermeye devam edecek ve iki organizasyonun günümüzün güvenlik ortamında birbirlerinden ayrı hareket etmesi oldukça verimsiz ve hatta zararlı olacaktır.

APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ONYEADOR
Adı : IKENNA IFEANYICHUKWU
Bölümü : ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : NATO-EU SECURITY RELATIONS IN THE
POST-9/11 SECURITY ERA

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: