

A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COLD WAR AND TURKEY'S POSTWAR
DRIVE TO THE WEST

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

TOLGAHAN AKDAN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

AUGUST 2014

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgel (AU/IR)

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes (METU/IR)

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoglu (METU/IR)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name : Tolgahan Akdan

Signature :

ABSTRACT

A SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS OF THE COLD WAR AND TURKEY’S POSTWAR DRIVE TO THE WEST

Akdan, Tolgahan
M.S, The Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

August 2014, 214 pages

This thesis attempts to account for the primary dynamics behind Turkey’s postwar drive to the West. It offers a conceptualization of the Cold War as an inter-systemic conflict, which then enables this study to integrate the geopolitical relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in a systemic framework. In this regard, it suggests that the geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey should be conceived of not as an “ontologically autonomous” ahistorical geopolitical tension but rather as a derivative of the Cold War as a wider systemic conflict. Therefore, this thesis explores the mainstream and radical approaches on the Cold War and tries to locate the geopolitical conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Union into framework of inter-systemic conflict and thus show the systemic character of Turkey’s drive to the Western alliance, which amounted to a profound socio-economic integration into the international capitalist system.

Keywords: The Cold War, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union, the United States, Turkey

ÖZ

SOĞUK SAVAŞ VE TÜRKİYE’NİN BATIYA YÖNELİMİNİN SİSTEMİK BİR ANALİZİ

Akdan, Tolgahan
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

Ağustos 2014, 214 sayfa

Bu tez, Türkiye’nin Batı’ya savaş sonu yöneliminin arkasındaki ana dinamikleri saptayarak bu yönelimin niteliğini tanımlamaya çalışmaktadır. Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki jeopolitik ilişkileri sistemik bir çerçeveye entegre etmeyi sağlayacak Soğuk Savaş’ın sistemler arası bir mücadele olarak kavramsallaştırılmasını önermektedir. Bu bakımdan, Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki jeopolitik gerginliğin “ontolojik olarak otonom” bir tarihdışı jeopolitik gerginlik gibi kavranması yerine bu gerginliğin daha geniş bir sistemik çatışma olarak Soğuk Savaş bağlamında okunması gerektiğini belirtmektedir. Bundan dolayı da, bu tez, Soğuk Savaş ile ilgili anaakım ve radikal yaklaşımları inceleyerek, Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki jeopolitik çatışmayı sistemlerarası çatışma çerçevesine yerleştirmek suretiyle uluslararası kapitalist sisteme derin sosyo-ekonomik bir entegrasyon anlamına gelen Türkiye’nin Batı ittifakına yöneliminin sistemik karakterini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Soğuk Savaş, Bolşevik Devrimi, Sovyetler Birliği, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, Türkiye

To the men and women
who believe that another world is possible

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş for his exemplary guidance, monitoring and constant encouragement throughout the course of this thesis. Without his help this thesis would definitely be incomplete.

Secondly I would also like to thank my examining committee members, Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgel and Asoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu for their suggestions as they helped me refine my work.

I am thankful to my friends Çağlar Dölek, Gözde Emen, Öykü Şafak, Soner Çubukçu, with whom I shared much throughout the writing process of this thesis. They were always ready to help me whenever I needed them.

My thanks are also due to Ahmet Akkaya, Burak Erdinç, Coşkun Musluk and Çağdaş Özeniş, who ardently supported my efforts to finalize this study.

Last but not the least; I am grateful to my wife, Reyhan Betül Akdan, who has lived with me through this process and shared in my joys and sorrows. To her, many thanks and much love.

None of the following would have been possible without the contributions of these precious people and I am immeasurably grateful.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ.....	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION: Defining the problematic	1
2. A THEORETICALLY INFORMED HISTORICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COLD WAR LITERATURE IN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE.....	14
2.1. Introduction	14
2.2. Into the Mainstream: Debating the origins of the Cold War.....	16
2.2.1. Conservative reaction: Orthodoxy	17
2.2.2. Challenging the moral superiority of the US: Revisionism	23
2.2.3. Revitalizing the Orthodoxy: Post-revisionist “consensus”	29
2.3. Into the radical approaches: Debating the nature of the Cold War	32
2.3.1. Cold War as intra-systemic conflict.....	32
2.3.2. Cold War as inter-systemic conflict.....	40
2.4. Conclusion.....	45
3. A THEORETICALLY INFORMED HISTORICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COLD WAR LITERATURE IN TURKEY	47
3.1. Introduction	47
3.2. Addressing the sources of conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Union: Mainstream approaches.....	51

3.2.1. A prototype of the official Turkish foreign policy approach: The memoirs of Feridun Cemal Erkin.....	53
3.2.2. Soviet expansionism forcing Turkey to the West	64
3.2.3. Soviet search for security	80
3.3. Addressing the character of Turkey’s relationship with the West: Radical approaches.....	88
3.3.1. Rise of the left as a new political force	89
3.3.2. The leftist currents in the 1960s	96
3.3.3. Reflections on the foreign policy analysis	107
3.3.4. Turkey playing the game of Anglo-American imperialism: Left Kemalism	111
3.3.5. Turkey allying itself to the Western capitalism: Class-based approach	123
3.4. Conclusion.....	133
4. THE COLD WAR AND TURKEY’S DRIVE TO THE WEST	137
4.1. Introduction	137
4.2. The nature and origins of the Cold War	139
4.3. The strategies of the Soviet Union in pre- and postwar periods	146
4.4. The character of Turkey’s postwar integration into the West.....	161
4.5. Conclusion.....	180
5. CONCLUSION	182
REFERENCES	187
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY	204
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	215

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: Defining the problematic

Having dealt with it intensively in the second half of the twentieth century, political historians in Turkey have long regarded it as basically solved. The problem this thesis poses is how to account for the primary dynamics behind Turkey's postwar integration and the character of this integration into the West. In this regard, what did the Cold War come to mean for Turkey? Did it denote a near Soviet threat emanating from merely geopolitical considerations as the strategic competition between the superpowers spread from Europe to the Near East, inter alia the hinterland of periphery? In this regard, did its integration point to a geopolitical alignment against a geopolitical threat, which in turn had nothing to do with the Cold War as an inter-systemic struggle between the rival systems of capitalism and socialism? Or beyond resultant geopolitical tensions, did the Cold War set forth a systemic turn in front of Turkey with clear dividing line between the West and the Soviet Union? In this regard, did Turkey's integration into the Westren alliance amount to a wider socio-economic integration into the capitalist system?

Though now established as a specific episode in history, the Cold War has always been a subject of intense debate among historians, political scientists as well as scholars of international relations throughout the past half century, not only for its historical significance in shaping the fate of humanity throughout the "short twentieth century,"¹ but also for comprehending the subsequent political repercussions of its end. Those who have studied the Cold War attempted to explain

¹ It refers to the period between the years 1914 and 1991. The period begins with the beginning of World War I, and ends with the fall of the Soviet Union. It is defined by Eric Hobsbawm, a British Marxist historian. See Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extreme: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (Abacus: London, 1995).

the origins of the conflict which put the world at the brink of nuclear war for several times. Early debates in the 1950s under heavy conservative political atmosphere were about the motivations and strategies behind the postwar Soviet policies in Eastern Europe and the Near East. In this connection, the term “Cold War” was first took up by orthodox Western historians to explain how the Stalin’s aggressive policies disrupted the wartime alliance among the US, Great Britain and the USSR and resulted in a war, indeed a cold war.² Therefore, they tended to blame the Soviet Union with its aggressive expansionist policies for the breakdown of wartime alliance which in turn led to the onset of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. These accounts dominated the historiography of the Cold War until the 1960s. By then, many came to shed new light on the origins of the Cold War.

Since explaining the origins of the Cold War has been one of the most contested topics, there has never been consensus on either what the term “cold” means or what a “cold war” signifies. As Fred Halliday indicates the term “cold” implies a double, yet contradictory connotations: First “to mean that relations between East and West are cold, frozen, paralyzed, frosted and so forth, i.e. are not warm;” and second “to mean that although relations are bad and warlike, they are to some extent restrained and have not reached the point of ‘hot’ war [emphasis in original].”³ So then what

² Odd A. Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.3. It was Bernard Baruch who introduced the term “Cold War” to describe relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in a speech given during the unveiling of his portrait in the South Carolina House of Representatives in April 1947. The term “Cold War” was adapted and popularized by American newspapers and magazines as an appropriate description of the situation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his memoirs, Baruch writes that “As the Soviets thwarted an atomic agreement, lowered their Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, and broke one promise after another in those early postwar years, it became clear that they were waging war against us. It was a new kind of war, to be sure, in which guns were silent; but our survival was at stake nonetheless. It was a situation that soon came to be known as the ‘cold war,’ a phrase I introduced in a speech before the South Carolina legislature in April, 1947.” See Bernard M. Baruch, *The Public Years* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p.388. See also Glossary entry of “Cold War Origins - Genealogy of the term” in *Encyclopedia of the American Foreign Relations*, <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/A-D/Cold-War-Origins-Genealogy-of-the-term.html>; *The Baruch Family*, www.baruch.cuny.edu/library/alumni/online_exhibits/digital/2008/bernard/exhibit1.html. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

³ Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (Verso: London, 1986), p.7.

did a “cold war” mean in the sense that the US President Harry S. Truman’s fateful speech known as the Truman Doctrine is allegedly considered to be the first proclamation of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union?

On March 12, 1947, US President Truman⁴ asked for \$400 million in military and economic assistance for Greece and Turkey from the Congress. In an address to a joint session of Congress, Truman stated that

One way of life is based upon the will of the majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and freedom from political oppression. The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of personal freedoms. I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

Greece was then in a civil war whereas Turkey was allegedly subject to the pressure from the Soviet Union while having internal stability. He warned Congress that without help, Greece would fall to communism and that Turkey and other countries would follow.⁵ The ideological rhetoric of struggle between the democratic and

⁴ In July 1944, Truman was nominated to run for Vice President with President Franklin D. Roosevelt. On January 20, 1945, he took the vice-presidential oath, and after President Roosevelt’s unexpected death only eighty-two days later on April 12, 1945, he was sworn in as the nation’s thirty-third President. In 1948, Truman won reelection. Truman left the presidency in January 1953. “Biographical Sketch: Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States,” *Truman Library*, www.trumanlibrary.org/hst-bio.htm. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

⁵ This approach to the Soviet threat was also reflected on another US official report, the National Security Council’s study NSC 7; this document defined the Soviet threat in global terms and asserted that “the ultimate objective of Soviet-directed world communism is the domination of the world.” To this objective, “Soviet-directed world communism employs against its victims in opportunistic coordination the complementary instruments of Soviet aggressive pressure from without and militant revolutionary subversion from within.” In this context, while the former ascribed to Greece civil war, the latter referred to the Soviet pressure over Turkey. United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948. General, the United Nations, Vol. I, Part 2. “Report by the NSC on the Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism, March 30, 1948.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948, p.546-550. Arthur Vandenberg, Senator of Michigan, avers on March 12, 1947 that “Greece must be helped or Greece sinks permanently into the communist order. Turkey inevitably follows. Then comes the chain reaction

totalitarian ways of life in the Truman Doctrine constituted a defining characteristic of the US political outlook throughout the Cold War.⁶ That is, as presenting the Soviet political system and institutions as antithetical to the Western democratic political system and institutions, Truman single out the the Soviet Union as the new threat for the “free world.” From this point forth, a closer look at the Soviet Union does help us to comprehend the nature of the threat it posed to the West, particularly the US.

With the extension of the WWII to the East in the form of a brutal war of conquest over Soviet vast lands, it turned into an up front and a salvation war for the Soviet Union. It suffered the most severe losses against Hitler’s Germany during four years’ war mostly on its own territory. Losses of the Soviets range from 6,750,000 to 14,500,000 soldiers (killed and missing) as well as somewhere between 6,000,000 and 20,000,000 million of its civilian population.⁷ Six of the Soviet Union’s fifteen republics had been occupied, in whole or in part, by the German armed forces, and extensive destruction of crop land, farm animals, factories, mines, transportation networks, and housing stock disrupted the Soviet economy.⁸ It was possibly the worst war ever in all of human history in terms of savagery, brutality and casualties. As Gaddis points out, though have survived, the Soviet Union

which might sweep from the Dardanelles to the China Seas.” Norman A. Graebner, “Realism and Idealism,” in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy* (Scribner’s/Gale Virtual Reference Library, 2002). For an elaboration of this from an orthodox point of view, see Beatrice Heuser, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making,” *Review of International Studies* 17, no.1 (1991), especially between p.20-23.

⁶ David Reynolds, “The European Dimension of the Cold War,” in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002), p.134. See also Kermit D. Johnson, *Ethics and Counterrevolution: American Involvement in Internal Wars* (University press of America: Maryland, 1998), p.78-81

⁷ For example, for Gaddis, some 27 million Soviet citizens died as direct result of the war, John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (Penguin: New York, 2005), p.9. For Painter Soviet war related death range from 20 to 27 million deaths, S. David Painter. *The Cold War: An International History* (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002), p.5. For others, see Matthew White’s National Death Tolls for the WWII (a compilation of scholarly estimates), www.necrometrics.com/ww2stats.htm. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

⁸ Painter, *The Cold War*, p.5.

became in 1945 a “shattered state.”⁹ While at first desperately resisting and then impressively repelling the German forces, Soviet military capacity lagged behind that of the US. The Red Army emerged as a remarkable land force, but the Soviets lacked a long-range strategic air force, had an ineffective navy and until August 1949 also lacked atomic bomb.¹⁰ According to one of many early postwar US intelligence reports regarding the Soviet capabilities and intentions, the report listed Soviet military weakness and “the time required to remedy them to a degree sufficient to make the USSR willing to risk a major armed conflict.”¹¹

- (i) War losses in manpower and industry and the set-back in a far from fully developed industry. (15 years)
- (ii) Lack of technicians. (5-10 years)
- (iii) Lack of a strategic Air Force. (5-10 years)
- (iv) Lack of a modern navy. (15-20 years for a war involving major naval operations)
- (v) Poor conditions of railway and military transportation systems and equipment. (10 years)
- (vi) Vulnerability of Soviet oil, rail and vital industrial centers to long-range bomber.
- (vii) Lack of atomic bombs. (5-10 years, possibly less)
- (viii) Resistance in occupied countries. (5 years or less)
- (ix) Quantitative military weakness in the Far East-especially naval. (15-20 years)

⁹ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, p.9.

¹⁰ See Matthew A. Evangelista, “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” *International Security* 7, no. 3 (1982), p.133-134. Under the guidance of Leon Trotsky, the Red Army of Workers and Peasants was founded during the course of the Russian Civil War, and having superseded the Red Guard, became the established army of the new Soviet Union following the completion of the 1917 Russian Revolution. The actions of the Red Army were determined by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which installed in every unit a political commissar to overrule military officers should their commands run counter to official Marxism–Leninism. The Red Army existed as an enforcer of Soviet Moscow’s will. Following the German invasion in 1941, the Red Army initially suffered devastating territorial and human losses, its ill preparedness for attack obvious. It was able to turn its fortunes around with a series of masterful tactical displays, and declare victory in what the Soviet regime termed “The Great Patriotic War.” In 1946 the Red Army was renamed the Soviet Army to mark the fact that it was no longer the enforcer of the revolution but the legal army of an established independent country. David Martin Walker and Daniel Gray, *Historical Dictionary of Marxism* (Scarecrow Press: Lanham, Md., 2007), p.253.

¹¹ Joint Intelligence Staff, “Soviet Capabilities,” November 9, 1945, Appendix C, quoted in Evangelista, *Stalin’s Postwar Army*, p.133-134.

The Soviets would be unlikely to risk a major war for at least 15 years, the report concluded. In line with this, in another American report, the US analysts stressed the unlikelihood of the Soviet Union's "embarking on [an] adventurist foreign policy."¹² Moreover, the US Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes writes that "I do not believe the Soviets will violate the integrity of Iran, Turkey, Greece, Italy, or any other country. For many reasons the Soviets do not want war now."¹³ Likewise, the Foreign Minister of Turkey, Hasan Saka stated that¹⁴

Soviet losses in the war against Germany have been so great that such large occupying forces would be required in Germany, Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria and that manpower in the reconstruction of Soviet cities, industries, railroads et cetera was so essential that it was most unlikely the Soviet Government would embark on any such venture [employment of Soviet armed forces against Turkey] entirely aside from a desire not to create an unfavorable impression throughout the world as the result of aggression.

Moreover, Kennan who played a decisive role in shaping the postwar American policy-making argues that the Soviet Union was "by far the weaker party as

¹² Joint Intelligence committee 250, "Estimates of Soviet Postwar Capabilities and Intentions," January 18, 1945, quoted in Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after the World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Britain," *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper 13 (1995), p.23. In this regard, Pechatnov wrote by drawing on the documentation available on Soviet military planning, "Soviet contingency plans did not envision any offensive operations in Western Europe, concentrating instead on holding the line of defense in Germany." Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Soviet Union and the World 1944-1953," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.104.

¹³ James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (Harper: New York, 1947), p.295. James Francis Byrnes was appointed Secretary of State by President Harry S. Truman on July 3, 1945. He left office on January 21, 1947. Byrnes led the Department of State during the significant transition from World War II to the Cold War. See "*Biographies of the Secretaries of State: James Francis Byrnes*," Office of the Historian, US Department of the State, <http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/byrnes-james-francis>. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

¹⁴ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. The Near East and Africa, Vol. III*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945, p.1230. Hasan Saka was Foreign Minister of Turkey from September 13, 1944 until September 10, 1947. From September 10, 1947 to June 10, 1948, Saka served as Prime Minister of Turkey. Metin Heper and Nur Bilge Criss, *Historical Dictionary of Turkey* (Scarecrow: Lanham, Maryland, 2009), p.266-267.

opposed to the Western world.”¹⁵ Though the only remaining land power in Eurasia, a war-torn USSR seemed not to pose an immediate threat at least in economic or military terms beyond the line it had captured over the Eastern Europe at the end of war as the report, all the other figures and statements suggest. If these analyses are credible regarding the postwar Soviet comparative weakness, then what was the challenge did the Soviets pose to the US which was in a uniquely favorable and powerful situation as compared to its exhausted allies and defeated rivals at the end of war?¹⁶

Unlike the Soviets, the US, with the words of Gaddis, “... was able to choose where, when, and in what circumstances it would fight, a fact that greatly minimized the costs and risks of fighting.”¹⁷ The US war-losses range from 292,000 to 408,000 citizens (as put by Gaddis, American war-related losses were negligible as compared to Soviets),¹⁸ nonetheless it had built up the greatest war machine in human history since its farms, factories, mines and transportation networks survived the war intact.¹⁹ By the end of 1942, the US was producing more arms than all the axis states combined, and in 1943 it made almost three times more armaments than did the Soviet Union. In 1945, the US had two-thirds of the world’s gold reserves, three-fourths of its invested capital, half of its shipping vessels, half of its manufacturing capacity²⁰ and most of its food surplus as well as nearly all of its

¹⁵ George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947), p.581. In this regard, Leffler as well argues that the Soviet Union would not risk war since it was too weak. See Melvyn P. Leffler, “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945–1952,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.77.

¹⁶ Leffler, *American Grand Strategy*, p.67; Painter, *The Cold War*, p. 4

¹⁷ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, p. 8.

¹⁸ Gaddis writes that American casualties were just under 300,000. For him, the soviet casualties roughly 90 times the number of Americans casualties. *Ibid.*, p.8.

¹⁹ Painter, *The Cold War*, p.5.

²⁰ Leffler, *American Grand Strategy*, p.67.

financial reserves.²¹ Its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was 1.644.761 (measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars), which was nearly five times 333.656 (measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars) of the Soviet Union in 1945.²² It was able to get out of the depression thanks to its wartime mobilization and war efforts and came into an era of outstanding prosperity.²³ In brief, the US possessed both enormous economic and military power: It was the US Navy controlling the sea and Air Force dominating the skies²⁴ as well as alone controlling the atomic bomb.²⁵ Yet, though after the war there was a huge imbalance between the US and the rest in particular the Soviet Union, the US government did not feel secure, then why did the US regard the Soviet Union as a threat to its vital interests? To put it differently, if, as it appears, there was no serious Soviet challenge to the US in economic and military terms, then what was the nature of the postwar conflict between the US and the USSR all about? In this regard, what was the US scared of? Was it afraid of the possibility of further Soviet expansions as the orthodox

²¹ Michael Cox, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 1 (1990), p.26; Painter, *The Cold War*, p.5.

²² GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. The Geary-Khamis dollar, more commonly known as the international dollar, is a hypothetical unit of currency that has the same purchasing power parity that the US dollar had in the United States at a given point in time. It is widely used in economics. The years 1990, 2000 or 2005 are often used as a benchmark year for comparisons that run through time. It is based on the twin concepts of purchasing power parities (PPP) of currencies and the international average prices of commodities. The data were obtained from "Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1-2003 AD," prepared by Angus Maddison (Groningen Growth and Development Center, 2003). According to Maddison, the historical data were originally developed in three books: Angus Maddison, *Monitoring the World Economy 1820-1992* (OECD: Paris, 1995); Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (OECD Development Centre: Paris, 2001); Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: Historical Statistics* (OECD Development Centre: Paris, 2003). For further information see www.ggd.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

²³ Leffler, *American Grand Strategy*, p.67; Painter, *The Cold War*, p.5.

²⁴ Painter, *The Cold War*, p.5.

²⁵ Cox, *From the Truman Doctrine*, p.26; Painter, *The Cold War*, p.5.

historians²⁶ in the US argued? Or was it afraid of a recurrence of another inter-imperialist war accompanying to the rise of interwar like autarchic economic tendencies and thus losing the war time trade opportunities which would force it to sink in depression again as revisionist historians²⁷ in the US supposed? Or was it all a misperception of Soviet “defensiveness” and “caution” as expansionist as a result of Stalin’s “ill-defined” quest for security like the post-revisionists²⁸ claimed? Or was the Cold War conflict a result of conscious efforts of bloc leaders to consolidate their respective interests and to resolve internal contradiction as well as securing order within each bloc as internalists alleged or was it an inter-imperialist struggle between different types of capitalist states as the theoreticians of state capitalism put forth? Or did the US feel threatened by the challenge posed by a historic alternative with a totally different domestic politics and socio-economic system, and assume that they would not be secure until the Soviet Union had either been reincorporated into the world economic system or destroyed altogether?

In fact, existence of a war-torn but with a different socio-economic system had made important effects on struggles taking place on the international level and within each national unit. In other words, the very existence of the Soviet Union as relying on very different political, social and economic systems did pose an ontological threat to the capitalist type of social organization. It embodied a historic alternative in the form of real socialism, which gave rise to a systemic struggle between the major capitalist states and the Soviet Union in pre- and postwar international relations. With the words of Kennan, “what I was talking about when I mentioned the containment of Soviet power was not the containment by military

²⁶ See Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian–American Relations from Early Times to Our Day* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: New York, 1950); Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (Norton: New York, 1970).

²⁷ William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Norton: New York, 1972); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–2006* (McGraw-Hill: New York, 2008).

²⁸ See John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983), p.180.

means of military threat, but the political containment of a political threat.”²⁹ As clearly stated in Kennan’s retrospective considerations in his memoirs regarding the postwar Soviet threat, it was a political threat because it represented a different developmental perspective of economic and political progress and thus a different social organization resting on an alternative and thus rival form of socio-economic system which vied for global influence in Europe as well as in the Third World countries.

Gathering the story together, by a cold war, it is meant to be a global inter-systemic struggle between mutually antagonistic social, political and economic systems for why the socio-economic properties of the Soviet Union were seen as a potential threat to the well-being of the American way of life based on liberal-democratic capitalism and a geopolitical threat when the Soviet social system threatened to expand.³⁰ In this regard, the Cold War began to be a concomitant of the world politics with 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. That is to say, this thesis supports the historiographical approach that singles out the Bolshevik Revolution as the origin of the East-West conflict.³¹ This in turn denotes that at one point a systemic conflict was inevitable between the Western capitalism and the Soviet socialism. It is inevitable because both systems had a global claim of superiority and ascendancy. Therefore, the international expansion of one system necessarily threatened the political security and social existence of the other and the social constituencies that benefited from each social system. In this sense, in the postwar period, both the US and the USSR tended to expand as the principal advocate of rival socio-economic system in order to prevail against each other. In this formulation, the US and the Soviet Union are conceived as states with specific socio-economic properties and

²⁹ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Little, Brown: Boston, 1967), p.359, quoted in Feis, *From Thrust to the Terror*, p.223.

³⁰ Richard Saull, *The Cold War and after: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (Pluto Press: London, 2007), p.9.

³¹ See Isaac Deutscher, *The Great Contest: Russia and the West* (Oxford University Press: London, 1960); Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*; and Saull, *The Cold War and after*.

reflecting forms of politics not confined to themselves alone.³² Thus, the Cold War is not reducible to the policies of and conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, though intensification of these tensions was largely a result of, but not limited to, deliberate efforts of either Washington or Moscow as the principal actors in the course of this systemic conflict. It is not limited simply because the conflict between two rival social systems reflected onto and became contingent upon anti-colonial, nationalist, and communist revolutionary movements in Third World countries where each bloc leaders tended to support rival political forces with specific social constituencies in their political and military interventions.³³ The US sought to contain these revolutionary movements wherever it appeared as the extension of Soviet socialism; whereas the USSR, which claimed to be an anti-imperialist power, sought to support the national liberation movements against the European colonial powers with a view to displacing the Western-backed governments with local communist or other non-pro-Western parties.

In this context, the systematic content of revolutionary threat was not only a threat to solely the constituencies of the US, but rather to the social forces all around the world benefiting from the capitalist social relations which rest on the divorce of the mass of the population from the means of production.³⁴ Therefore, this threat was not only felt in the US or Western Europe, but also in other parts of the world as well as in Turkey. As for Turkey, the domestic political and economic system was shaped by anti-communist, anti-Soviet, pro-American and pro-market policies in the years following the WWII. In such a framework, this thesis attempts to outline a conceptual framework to explain the Cold War as an inter-systemic conflict, which will then enable this thesis to locate the geopolitical factor - the Soviet demands and

³² Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.9.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.7.

³⁴ With the words of Marx: "The capitalist system presupposes the complete separation of the labourers from all property in the means by which they can realise their labour." Karl Marx, "Capital," in *Marx-Engels Reader*, Ed. R. C Tucker, Vol. 1, 2nd ed. (Norton: New York. 1978). See also Bertell Ollman, "Marx's Use of 'Class'," *American Journal of Sociology* 73, no. 5 (March 1968)

Turkey's response - into framework of inter-systemic conflict and thus show the systemic character of Turkey's integration into the Western alliance.

The main effort of this thesis is devoted to bring together and make a comprehensive survey of historical material. The official sources utilized in this thesis cover the official archive documents published by Allied forces, the US and Turkey. In this regard, I have relied on these official documents belonging to the pre- and postwar period. These are the official archive documents published (i) by Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1973: *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (1923-1934)*; *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları (1935-1939)* and *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1946)*., (ii) by the US government: *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series and (iii) by the Allied Forces: A collection of documents on Nazi-Soviet Relations from archives of the German Foreign Office. I have also utilized from certain statements, message and interviews as well as memoirs belonging to the principal statesmen and high ranking diplomats like İsmet İnönü and Feridun Cemal Erkin among others.³⁵ Yet the most extensive references are made to the works of political historians and other academic sources originated in the US, Western Europe and Turkey.

The organization of this thesis is as follows: After having defined the basic problematic of this thesis in the introduction chapter, the second and third chapter are devoted to portray a theoretically informed historical-critical review of the debates having been articulated in mainstream and radical circles in the US, Europe and Turkey. The review is organized in two separate chapters. In the first place, the debate in the US and Western Europe is to be deliberated in order to present the

³⁵ İsmet İnönü became the second President of the Turkish republic after the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. İnönü kept Turkey out of World War II and prepared the country for multi-party elections, which resulted in the removal of his Republican People's party from power (1950) and thus his presidency. Feridun Cemal Erkin served as a high level diplomat and foreign minister in the most critical times of the Turkish foreign affairs aftermath of the WWII.

picture drawn outside Turkey in relation to the Cold War.³⁶ Consequently, the review of the debates in the US and Western Europe will provide us with a broader perspective to position Turkey's Cold War literature in relation to the Cold War in the third chapter. It is evident that the historical analyses of the Cold War correspond to a vast amount of literature, therefore, this is rather a long survey. Yet, this is not the only reason for such a long review. In fact, there is a genuine necessity of an appraisal of the Cold War debates inside and outside Turkey in Turkish literature. For that reason, such a lengthy survey is part of an effort, on the one hand, to make a humble contribution to Turkish literature by making a map of the Cold War debate and on the other hand, it will enable us to locate the arguments this thesis advocates within the general discussions.

The fourth chapter will start with outlining the conceptual framework that will guide the historical discussions in the following sections. This will be built on the critique that will be developed in regard to the debates on the Cold War in the second and particularly third chapters. It will continue with an elaboration of the strategies of the Soviet Union with regard to inter-systemic relations and conflicts. This will portray a picture of the pre- and postwar inter-imperialist and inter-systemic struggles, which will help, then and there, to understand the dynamics behind the Soviet strategic orientation toward Turkey. The chapter will conclude with elaborating on character of Turkey's postwar integration into the West. As a result, such an approach will allow this study to integrate geopolitical conflict with the wider systemic struggle to better explain the dynamics and the character of Turkey's postwar integration into the Western alliance. The last chapter is conclusion.

³⁶ Beyond the literature of the US and Western Europe, the discussions in other parts of the world, in particular Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union or the recent discussions in Russia have not been included due to the weaker intellectual interaction between these areas and Turkey.

CHAPTER II

A THEORETICALLY INFORMED HISTORICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COLD WAR LITERATURE IN THE US AND WESTERN EUROPE

2.1. Introduction

Since the WWII came to an end, the debates on why Europe came out of the war as divided and why the wartime alliance collapsed, which culminated into the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union became a central focus of the scholarly interests in the postwar years. This chapter attempts to make a review of the contending approaches to the origins and nature of the Cold War in the US and Western Europe. Two general categorizations will be used to classify the different approaches, to name, the mainstream and radical approaches to the Cold War. It goes without saying that each of these categorizations indeed has its own sub-classifications.

The mainstream Cold War debate mostly originated in the US among the diplomatic historians and long dominated the historiography of the Cold War in the other parts of the World. The debate will be covered under three groups of approaches, namely Orthodoxy, Revisionism and Post-revisionism. The debate in the US, as one of two main antagonists, have centered on the quest for the responsible that allegedly turned the postwar security environment from a favorable condition nurtured by the wartime alliance to an uncertain future embroiled in a global rivalry under the shadow of atomic bombs. Who was responsible for the disintegration of the wartime alliance and thus for the onset of the Cold War? Was it a result of the Soviet efforts for world domination or the US imperialist open door policies? The mainstream debate on the origins of the Cold War has long been dealt through such questions. In this debate, the authors from the US or the authors whose work was published in the

US has long dominated the mainstream agenda. Therefore, the review of mainstream debate will cover the historical debate on the Cold War in the US. However, this is not to suggest that these discussions have been limited to the US. In fact, the orthodox-revisionist debate had felt itself in Western Europe as well¹ yet because the agenda of this debate set by the authors from the US, that is, the views have been mainly circulated in the US and pumped out around the world. Therefore, under the mainstream approaches, the debates in the US will be mainly covered. Nevertheless, the radical views circulated among “Western-Marxist” authors as well as the authors whose work was published in Western Europe, as the main area of contest for supremacy between the superpowers, will be reviewed under the category of radical approaches. This will enable us to present the Western-Marxist interpretations of the Soviet Union as well as their interpretations of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the West, in particular the US.

Unlike the mainstream ones, the radical approaches have been mainly articulated in Western Europe and mostly draw on Marxian perspectives on the Cold War. Marxist scholars in Western Europe have mainly interested in the analysis of the nature and the objective basis of the rivalry between the US and USSR. The radical approaches will be appraised with respect to their answers to the question of what was the nature and the objective basis of the rivalry between the US and USSR? Was the Cold War conflict an inter-imperialist war in the sense that each of the bloc leaders sought to ensure its own sphere of interest and made the Cold War conflict instrumental for securing the intra-bloc domination? Or was it a systemic one between two antagonistic socio-economic systems?

¹ Most of the contributions from Europe has an orthodox tendency, see, for example, André Fontaine, *History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950* (Pantheon: New York, 1968); Desmond Donnelly, *Struggle for the World: The Cold War: 1917-1965* (Collins: London, 1965); Wilfrid Knapp, *A History of War and Peace 1939-1965* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1967). For a revisionist perspective, see Claude Julien, *America's Empire* (Pantheon: New York, 1971).

2.2. Into the Mainstream: Debating the origins of the Cold War

Though various different classifications,² there are mainly three sub-categorizations mostly referred in the mainstream debates which are orthodoxy, revisionism and post-revisionism.³ The debates within mainstream have mainly revolved around the search for the responsible in the form of either the Soviet threat or the US imperialism as the primary factor behind the onset of the Cold War. In this sense, the postwar conflict was at first not considered as an unfolding rivalry between two sides but rather regarded as an imposition of one to the other, driven by either the Soviet expansion in line with the communist ideology or the US imperialism on the basis of securing an open market capitalism under its domination. Yet, in the orthodox and the revisionist approaches, the role of ideology has been reduced to leadership decision-making by ignoring the link between the ideological values and the socio-economic structures. For example, it was the ideological orientation of either Stalin or Truman-not the socio-economic properties of their respective countries- that led to a cold confrontation between the US and the USSR.

² See, for example, Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (Verso: London, 1986); Cox, Michael, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 1 (1990); Richard Saull, *The Cold War and after: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (Pluto Press: London, 2007).

³ For the key representatives of these various interpretations, see "Bibliographical Essay," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010). The classification of the Cold War historiography under three general categories has been mainly drawn upon by the post-revisionists, particularly J. L. Gaddis, the leading US scholar on the Cold War since the post-revisionism presented itself as the progressive synthesis (thesis/antithesis/synthesis) of the early two approaches. See, for example Gaddis, *The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War*. Agreeing with this notion of progressiveness would imply a process of modification while absorbing its insights, however, what the post revisionism does, at least in the personification of Gaddis, is to revitalize the orthodoxy. Nevertheless, I prefer to draw on these categories, the main reason is the polemical character of debates among them. That is to say, as Westad puts forth "*that they [the revisionists], through their opposition to orthodox views, created the debate.*" Odd Arne Westad, "Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War," in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, Edited by Odd A. Westad (Frank Cass: London, 2000). For example, by turning the orthodoxy on its head, revisionists inquire the same issue of who is responsible for the breakdown of wartime alliance and then the onset of the Cold War as well and precipitate a hot debate especially within the US. Therefore, reviewing the revisionists within the mainstream appears to me more appropriate. For a different categorization of revisionists covered within the radical theories of the Cold War, see Saull, *The Cold War and after*. See also Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*.

With post-revisionists, the role of the ideology was entirely downgraded as a straitjacket as well as a misleading factor behind the states' foreign policies. It was the postwar international structure that led to the Cold War regardless of either the ideology of US and the USSR or their domestic socio-economic and political systems. Nevertheless, though denying the idea that the policies of states are driven by the ideological motives, post-revisionists argue that liberal democratic values of the US impeded the US decision-makers to see the realities of postwar world politics and led them to incorrectly evaluate the behavior of the Soviet Union for which, post-revisionists suggest, even so Stalin played hard to persuade the American decision-makers to the contrary.

2.2.1. Conservative reaction: Orthodoxy

The official explanation of the origins of the Cold War portrayed by the primary political actors and diplomats like Winston Churchill, Harry Truman, James F. Byrnes, Dean Acheson, George F. Kennan and others⁴ formed a basis for what came to be known as the “orthodox” or “traditionalist” approach in the 1950s and 1960s, by scholars like Thomas A. Bailey, Herbert Feis and others.⁵ In this sense, the traditional explanations on the origins of the Cold War can be seen as an elaboration of the views first laid out by the policy makers of the US and Britain.

Once the cement of, if there was ever, a common foe disappeared, the wartime cooperation vanished over the questions of Germany, Eastern Europe and the Near East (Iran, Turkey) in the early postwar period. The Soviet Union started to be portrayed as a new threat with its totalitarian and communist ideology by the US officials, among which George Kennan was by far the most influential one.

⁴ Some of the most representative memoirs of the American statesmen that reflect the thinking of US policymakers during the Truman era are Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs* (Doubleday: New York, Garden City, 1955-1956); Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (Norton: New York, 1969); George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Little Brown: Boston, 1967). For many more examples, see “Bibliographical Essay,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010).

⁵ Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian–American Relations from Early Times to Our Day* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: New York, 1950). See *Bibliographical Essay*.

Kennan's key role in shaping American strategy and the attitudes of Washington officials towards Moscow in the Cold War was rested on two documents, he wrote, namely "Long Telegram" in 1946 and "the Sources of Soviet Conduct in 1947."⁶ Kennan's analysis in these documents provided an influential explanation of Soviet behavior and the foundations for America's Cold War policy of containment.

The Soviet Union, Kennan avers, was inherently aggressive and expansionist as a result of its ideology since it was the ideology that "taught them that the outside world was hostile and that was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their forces."⁷ Due to the idea of being surrounded by a hostile world, for him, "their [Soviet leaders] sense of insecurity was too great"⁸ which consecutively enable the Russian leaders to see no opposition having any merit or justification whatsoever since any opposition was possible to be seen as remnants of capitalism abroad.⁹ Therefore, "it became necessary to justify the retention of the dictatorship by stressing the menace of capitalism abroad."¹⁰ By going along with the totalitarianism of the Soviet leaders, as Gaddis wrote Kennan was able "to fuse concerns about totalitarianism and communism in dealings with Soviet Union."¹¹ The term "totalitarianism" attained new connotations with the fusion of representations of Hitler's Germany and images of Stalin's Russia and thus provided the framework for the Western officials to present communists, in a hostile

⁶ "Long Telegram" was sent by George Kennan as the American charge d'affaires in Moscow from the United States Embassy in Moscow to the Department of State on February 22, 1946. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" was published in *Foreign Affairs* in 1947 when he was the Director of Planning for the United States Department of State. It was published under the pseudonym Mr. X. www.history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/kennan. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

⁷ Kennan, George F., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947), p.569

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.568.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.570.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ John Lewis Gaddis, "Soviet Unilateralism and the Origins of the Cold War," in *Major Problems in American History Since 1945*, Edited by Robert Griffith and Paula Baker (Houghton Mifflin: New York, 2001), quoted in Abbott Gleason, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1995), p.75.

fashion, as fundamentally similar to the Nazis they had previously fought¹² since this connotation with its historical memory made a straight relation between internal repression and external aggression and expansion.¹³ It was in this conception of threat, President Truman made his famous speech and stated that “totalitarian regimes imposed upon free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States”¹⁴

However, for Kennan, “peaceful coexistence and mutually profitable coexistence of capitalist and socialist states is entirely possible,” at least “for ‘capitalist’ world...”¹⁵ but traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity further fostered by Marxist dogmas and its totalitarianism left no room for accommodation between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.¹⁶ Therefore, in the postwar period, the conflict with the USSR supposedly became inevitable and the response of the US policy-makers to this threat was the policy of “containment” to halt the expansion of the Soviet State as well as communism.

¹² Gleason, *Totalitarianism*, p.1.

¹³ This attribution of totalitarianism to the Soviet Union was also utilized in the course of the Cold War as the US embarked on military interventions into the revolutionary crisis within the Third World countries. As the so called “the bastion of democracy,” in order to justify its political, economic as well as military supports to the undemocratic governments, the US appealed to the distinction between “authoritarian” and “totalitarian” governments. The authoritarian governments sponsored by the US were allegedly considered as being open to change, to democracy and to capitalism whereas the totalitarian governments linked to the Soviet Union were reckoned close to capitalism and democracy and therefore, to any hope for change. For further information on this distinction, see Kermit D. Johnson, *Ethics and Counterrevolution: American Involvement in Internal Wars* (University press of America: Maryland, 1998). For the list of the US military interventions in Third World, see footnote 22 in chapter II in this thesis.

¹⁴ “The Truman Doctrine,” Truman Library Public Papers, March 12, 1947. trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=&st1. (accessed on September 23, 2013).

¹⁵ United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States*, 1946. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union Vol. VI. “The Long Telegram by the US Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946.” Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, p.701-702

¹⁶ *The Long Telegram*, p.4-6.

On the basis of the above official stance, for the traditionalist or orthodox, the Cold War was once a simple story of Soviet Union expansionary actions and the US reaction, which formed the standard interpretation between the 1940s and the early 1960s. For the orthodoxy, it was the Soviet aggressiveness that was considered to be a primary, if not the sole factor led to the breakdown of the wartime alliance against Nazis and thus the start of the Cold War as Bailey alleged “If the Kremlin had chosen to conciliate rather than alienate us, we no doubt would have been willing to contribute generously in technicians, materials, and money to the rehabilitation of war-ravaged Russia.”¹⁷ In other words, the Cold War started because of the Soviet Union embarked upon an ideologically driven expansionist policy in Eastern Europe and elsewhere with the intention of exporting world revolution since “their long-range strategy was to bankrupt the bastion of capitalism and soften it up for world revolution.”¹⁸ For the orthodoxy, Soviets acted, the Americans reacted since they seem to be convinced that the US had no other internal or external motivating interest than to encourage international cooperation and harmony. It was this conviction that enables the orthodox historians to avoid any discussions of internal motivating factors driving the US’ global commitments and thus it provides the requisite legitimacy and justification for these commitments with a view to halting the Soviet expansions and to reestablishing an international order based on freedom, self-determination and democracy.¹⁹ In this regard, under the pressure of Soviets’ global ambitions, “the war-hating Americans”²⁰ were in a way forced to adopt a defensive position, against a hostile foe motivated by ideological purposes, in order to ‘save’ the ‘free world’ from the spread of communism. In this sense, Bailey writes that “Stalin and Molotov were the real fathers of the huge and costly postwar

¹⁷ Bailey, *America Faces Russia*, p.319-320.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.320.

¹⁹ The conceptualization of the US actions abroad as a reaction to communist menace is the leitmotif of the orthodox thesis since it presented the US global commitments as an act of self-defense against the totalitarian aggression.

²⁰ Bailey, *America Faces Russia*, p.325.

preparedness program in the United States.”²¹ This in turn entails a global commitment to contain the Soviet Union.

The Korean War reinforced the orthodox urge for the necessity of global alliances and commitments by adopting an indefinite policy of containment as a response to the Soviet strategy of pursuing expansionary policies. In other words, the extension of the US commitments to areas previously considered to be beyond the orbit of American interests was justified on the assumption of defending the security of the “free world” against communist aggression. However, the American military and economic assistance backed the monarchy in Greece (1947); American command operations fought against anti-Japanese HUK rebels in Philippines (1947) and crushed Puerto Rican independence rebellion in Ponce (1950); American involvements in Iran (1953) and in Guatemala (1954) led to the overthrow of popularly elected governments; and its full-scale war in Diem’s Vietnam resulted in the backing of corrupt authoritarian regimes.²² These interventions, apparently opposed to the liberal democratic values the US which was then supposedly fighting for, were justified, as Bailey did, under the urgency of security above democracy. He phrased it, “... in this critical hour we prepared to put security above democracy, in the hope that democracy would come later.”²³

At this juncture, the domination of orthodox or traditionalist account of the origins of Cold War based on a conservative “idealist” approach was challenged. The early

²¹ Ibid., p.20.

²² The list of the US military interventions in Third World is incomplete here. For the full list see Mustafa Türkeş, “Tarihsel ve Güncel Boyutlarıyla Uluslararası Müdahale Döngüleri,” *Türk Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi*, 2003. Zoltán Grossman, “A Briefing on the History of US Military Interventions,” *Z magazine*, October 2001, <https://www.academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html>. (accessed on November 3, 2013). See also “US Military and Clandestine Operations in Foreign Countries from 1798 to Present,” *Global Policy Forum* (December 2005), <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/26024.html>. (accessed on November 3, 2013).

²³ Bailey, *America Faces Russia*, p.336.

critics came from the Realists like George Kennan²⁴ and Hans Morgenthau who argued for a limited form of commitment based on the assumption that the USSR was more of a traditional form of great power rather than an ideologically-driven state as the orthodox suggests.²⁵ In this regard, the basic divergence between orthodox and the realists was the debate over the nature of the Soviet challenge and the question of how to deal with this challenge. In this context, the debate between them became more visible with the 1950s when the Cold War struggle moved beyond the core of Europe and Japan into the new areas in the Third World and the realist critics gained more solid ground which advocated a more limited and non-ideological commitments/dealings with the postwar international problems.²⁶

Realists advocated a differentiated approach to Europe and Japan, on the one hand, and the Third World, on the other. In this regard, Morgenthau warns the US policy-makers that an undifferentiated approach would threaten to turn the United States

²⁴ Though Kennan himself played a leading role in the development of the containment policy, he had proposed that “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies.” Kennan, *The sources of Soviet Conduct*, p.575. However the US Cold War strategy assumed a more assertive and militaristic character which led Kennan to criticize the overextension of the US global commitment.

²⁵ Characterization of the Soviet Union as an ideologically driven state implies that the Soviet leadership embarked upon unreasonable policies in the postwar period. In this sense, while the West, particularly the US was seen as quite fair and reasonable in their policies, policies of the Soviet Union in the postwar period especially on Eastern Europe for pro-Soviet or friendly regimes and Near East (Iran- demand for oil concession agreement; Turkey-demand for bases on the straits) were interpreted as unreasonable, which arguably in turn resulted in the breakdown of the wartime alliance and the onset of the Cold War. Against such an approach, realists conceive the Cold War as a typical great power struggle for power under the conditions of anarchy. Therefore, conflict between states in general – and the US and the Soviet Union in particular- was not merely a function of or driven by their very different ideologies, but the almost natural consequence of their position in the world at the end of the WWII. Thus, in contrast to orthodox who emphasize the importance of domestic political factors (democracy vs. totalitarianism) and ideology (free market capitalism vs. communism) on behavior of postwar bloc leaders, and thus put more weight on the ideological character of the Cold War, realists put the basis of international relations as the states’ “non-ideological” quest for power. See the seminal work of Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (AA Knopf: New York, 1948).

²⁶ For the analyses of Morgenthau’s critique of American involvement in Third World, Michael Cox, “Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War,” in *Realism reconsidered: Hans J. Morgenthau and International Relations*, Edited by Michael Williams (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007); Lorenzo Zambernardi, “The impotence of power: Morgenthau’s critique of American intervention in Vietnam,” *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011).

into the world's counter revolutionary policeman, particularly in Third World. This would in turn make the US appear to support the unpopular regimes against the national liberation struggles. Therefore, such an overly reactive outlook would undermine the framework through which foreign policy has been articulated with a moral force and would erode the justifications for American commitments against the Soviet totalitarianism on the basis of protecting the values of freedom, democracy and self-determination. More importantly, for Morgenthau, this would provide the Soviet Union with the opportunity to make itself, not the US, in the wider Cold War look like the champion of progressive change.²⁷

Therefore, realists supported a strategy of acting wherever the vital national interests of the US urge it to act rather than a strategy of reacting whenever the Soviets acted. In this regard, for realists, it was ideology that impeded the policy-makers to see the "realities" of international politics. Hence, they opposed to the unnecessary American involvements especially in the situations where the US might not have a vital interest which were committed as the moral responsibility of the US for protecting the "free world" against the aggressors. For that reason they regarded these involvements as mistaken or misguided, but not immoral since the realists shared a similar outlook with the orthodox on the US international position and the recognition of aggressiveness of the Soviet Union in the postwar period.

2.2.2. Challenging the moral superiority of the US: Revisionism

Though Cold War realists rejected various aspects of official doctrine, the realist critics were not from without but rather from within. Consequently, they were neither able to develop an alternative vision, nor propose a substantive critique of foreign policy due to their adherence to the Cold War "consensus" based on a grand narrative of an American-led "free world" against the "totalitarian" aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. In this sense, both the orthodox and the realist accounts accept the basic premise of American policy after 1945 that containment was a proper

²⁷ Cox, *Hans J. Morgenthau*, 180.

response to communist aggression. Likewise, realists too did not question the motivations behind the purpose of the US policies in the world.

Yet another, but a more important critic, a radical one what became known as the “revisionist” approach²⁸ started to raise its voice. The pioneering work, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, appeared in 1959, William Appleman Williams challenged the Cold War consensus on the traditional views and proposed alternatives.²⁹ Though at first “Tragedy made a rather modest splash,”³⁰ it was tried to be discredited as a “Stalinist track” or as a reductionism due to its emphasis on economic factors as the primary impulse behind the American foreign policy. Even Williams was said to step out of the mainstream international relations scholarship.³¹ However, *Tragedy* became part of the mainstream debate³² as the orthodox explanation of the Cold War became discredited largely in reaction to the Vietnam War along with the erosion of America’s moral superiority and virtue under the thousands of tons of explosives including chemicals dropped by the American B-52 bombers over the North Vietnam and communist targets in South Vietnam.³³ Consequently radical readings of the Cold War found a way to

²⁸ Revisionism was a heterogeneous body of scholarship; therefore, here I appraised most notable works mainly drawing on “open door thesis.” William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Norton: New York, 1972); Walter LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–2006* (McGraw-Hill: New York, 2008). However, due to its heterogeneity, there are even discussions on whether the term “revisionism” provides a useful demarcation within the literature or not. See for example Michael Leigh, “Is there a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?” *Political Science Quarterly* 89, no.1 (1974).

²⁹ Cox and Kennedy-Pipe assert that Williams drew more on Fredrick Jackson Turner and Charles Beard than on Karl Marx or Vladimir Lenin, as a result, for them, the analysis of Williams was radical in form but quintessentially American in general. Michael Cox and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan,” *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 1 (2005), p.98.

³⁰ Bradford Perkins, “The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-five Years After.” *Reviews in American History* 12, no. 1 (1984), p.1.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ For articles, videos and speeches on weapons of the Vietnam War, see www.history.com/topics/weapons-of-the-vietnam-war. (accessed on November 3, 2013).

participate into the mainstream debates. Elaborations of Williams' "Open Door Thesis" became proliferated across a series of books. Walter LaFeber's *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* is one such.

For Williams, in the US the traditional belief is that the domestic well-being of democracy and prosperity at home depends upon overseas economic expansion and access to foreign markets.³⁴ Therefore, this quest for open markets was the essential motive behind the American relationship with the other nations.³⁵ In this context, in the postwar era Williams saw a purposive design behind the American foreign policy rather than as reactive in character against ambitious actions of Soviet Union. He writes that "the traditional strategy [Open Door Policy] was merely reasserted and put into operation at the end of the war..." and "this reassertion of the traditional open door strategy guided the community of American policy-makers throughout the war and into the Cold War era."³⁶ This means that the postwar American diplomacy was not simply responsive, but rather was deliberately expansionist in the line of a consistent strategy of Open Door Policy. Williams further argued that "the policy of the open door, like all imperial policies, created and spurred onward a dynamic opposition to which it forfeited the initiative."³⁷ What he mainly argues that the pursuit of open door policy in the postwar era by the American policy-makers forced the Soviet Union either to accept the American policy or to be confronted with American power and hostility.³⁸ Therefore, for Williams there happened no meaningful negotiations for the formation of postwar

³⁴ Williams, *Tragedy*, p.37-38.

³⁵ However, there was an essential ambiguity in Williams' position regarding the drive behind the American expansionism. "The reader is never quite clear – whether America's institutions necessitated expansion or whether America has been expansionist out of the mistaken conviction that well-being ... of these institutions required constant expansion." Robert W. Tucker, *The Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, Md., 1971) quoted in Perkins, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, p.6

³⁶ Williams, *Tragedy*, p.209.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.209.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.206.

international order³⁹ since “the United States never formulated and offered the Soviet Union a settlement based on other ... terms.”⁴⁰ Consequently, “it was the decision of the United States to employ its new and awesome power in keeping with the traditional Open Door Policy which crystallized the Cold War.” It was “American policy therefore [that] influenced Soviet policy and action.”⁴¹

That being the case, he does not find it reasonable to claim that the US with its great relative supremacy between 1944 and 1962 was forced to follow a certain policy⁴² such as Washington’s decision to embark upon a global policy of “containment” as a response to halt the communist expansion. It was rather the uncompromising policies of the US that left no other options for the Soviet Union other than to extend and consolidate its control over Eastern Europe with a view to assuring its problem of security and reconstruction.⁴³

LaFeber’s *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-2006* can be seen as an elaboration of the Open Door Thesis first laid out in *Tragedy*, most of LaFeber’s arguments seemed to support its claims. He argues that the Open Door Policy is believed to be by Washington officials as the only way for preventing another economic depression. Therefore, recurrence “... could be averted only if global markets and raw materials were fully open to all peoples on the basis of equal opportunity, or the open door, for everyone.” However, he maintains that this was more than a pure belief since “American domestic requirements, moreover, dictated such a policy,” therefore, for Washington, “the world could not be allowed to return to the 1930s state of affairs, when nations tried to escape depression by creating

³⁹ Ibid., p.209.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.208.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.216.

⁴² Ibid., p.208.

⁴³ Ibid., p.204-229.

high tariff walls and regional trading blocs that dammed up the natural flow of trade.”⁴⁴

A possible recurrence would mean massive governmental intervention into the economic sphere which would in turn mean regulation of individual society and thus curtailment of personal freedom. Therefore, for sustaining the well-being of American society, an open world marketplace after the war was seen as an indispensable feature of a new international order.⁴⁵ Before this postwar objective, there were the imperial systems of British and French, and the communist system of Soviet Union. At this point, LaFeber asked why were the Soviet system on the one hand and the British and French systems on the other hand treated differently by the US? The answer he gives is while the British as well as the French accepted the American dollars and rules, the Soviets did not.⁴⁶

After the war, devastated England and France had no option other than asking for help of the US. In 1945, the US offered \$3.8 billion to Britain, however, the loan was subject to conditions under which British promised to reserve their commercial policy for trade liberalization over their imperial bloc. Likewise, French received what they request, but only upon a promise of limitation on government subsidies and currency manipulation.⁴⁷ That is to say the negotiations on these loan agreements were carried out in line with the Open Door Policy of free trade and open markets by the Washington officials.

In the Soviet case, LaFeber argues, the war destroyed 1700 towns and 70,000 villages, and left twenty to thirty million deaths as well as 25 million homeless. In this devastating situation, the urgent issue was the rapid reconstruction of the Soviet

⁴⁴ LaFeber, *America, Russia and the Cold War*, p.10.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.10.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.13.

economy and this would require Eastern Europe both as a strategic buffer against the West, and for its economic resources.⁴⁸ Therefore, for LaFeber, the basic demand behind Stalin's negotiations with Roosevelt and Churchill at Yalta was the recognition of Soviet "right to control the large parts of Eastern Europe,"⁴⁹ though not strictly as communist satellites except the Rumania and Poland since in other areas such as Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland the Soviet approach varied. In Finland for example Stalin agreed to an independent, noncommunist regime on the condition that she would follow a friendly foreign policy towards Russia.⁵⁰ However, the US, LaFeber argues, opposed to recognize the Eastern Europe as the Soviet's sphere of interest for two reasons. First one was that though the US did not require the Eastern European markets, a stable, prosperous world did require a healthy Europe, which in turn meant a united Europe with its Eastern sectors providing food and Western areas the industrial products, meaning that each needed the other. As a second reason, if the US allowed Stalin to establish his own sphere in Europe, Churchill, de Gaulle, and others might try to rebuild their blocs as well.⁵¹ Thus, LaFeber alleged, an open Eastern Europe was put on the negotiation table as a precondition for a postwar cooperation with Soviets.⁵² Yet the US efforts to open the Eastern Europe by ignoring its significance for the Soviet system forced Stalin to tighten its control inside Russia and revise its postwar calculations with respect to the Eastern Europe.

To brief, both Williams and LaFeber agrees that the postwar US foreign policy towards the Soviet Union was not a result of latter's eagerness to dominate the world, but rather former's traditional pursuit of open door policy. Both argue that Stalin was aware of Soviet weakness both economically and militarily, therefore he followed a pragmatist foreign policy and did not intend a direct confrontation with

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.14.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p.14.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.20.

⁵¹ Ibid., p.14.

⁵² Ibid., p.18.

the US. In this sense, at least at three points they challenged the traditional wisdom over the origins of the Cold War. Firstly, unlike the orthodox, the revisionists argue that it was not the communism that paved way to the Cold War but rather the US open door imperialism. Secondly, against the orthodox claim that the US foreign policy in the postwar period was built upon legitimate security interest and the promotion of democratic values and freedom, revisionists claim that it was the domestic economic considerations, not the security threat posed by the Soviets that guided the US foreign policy. Lastly, while the orthodox interpreted the Soviet actions as part of a broader expansionist strategy of global domination, Revisionists argue that there was no Soviet blueprint for domination of Eastern Europe or globe behind the postwar Soviet foreign engagements.

2.2.3. Revitalizing the Orthodoxy: Post-revisionist “consensus”

Scholarly debate over the origins of the Cold War between the orthodox and revisionists underscores the ideological motivation behind the behaviors of either the USSR or the US leadership. Orthodox see the Soviet Union as an ideological state embarked upon immediate world domination, while treating the US as a pragmatic, reactive state; whereas the revisionists see the US as an ideological state embarked upon world domination through the pursuit of open door policy, while seeing the USSR reacting in a pragmatic and defensive manner to the US imperialist actions. However, the post-Vietnam era witnessed the emergence of a new interest in reconsideration of the origins of the Cold War with a view to downplaying the importance of ideology in analyzing the US and the USSR foreign policy decision making.

Largely drawing on Cold War realist critics and Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism, the post-revisionists in general and John Lewis Gaddis in particular as the leading diplomatic historian of American foreign relations published many studies with a claim of achieving a synthesis that integrates both the domestic and international dimensions of American diplomacy with the help of greater access to archival sources. The new synthesis presented itself as “a third stage,” “a new consensus” in

the historiography of the Cold War by “draw[ing] from both traditional and revisionist interpretations to present a more balanced explanation of the beginning of the Cold War.”⁵³

What basically differentiate the post-revisionist from the orthodox and revisionist interpretations is that the post-revisionist, though eclectically, utilized the early Cold War realist critiques of the US foreign policies and borrowed important insights from the dominant paradigm of international relations, to name, Waltz’s neorealist literature. On the one hand, the Cold War realists, particularly critiques of Kennan and Morgenthau regarding the overextension of the US global commitments enables the post-revisionist to distinguish the US involvements in Europe and Japan, and the US third world policies. While seeing the US policies credible to the former in the presence of the Soviet threat, they are strongly critical of the US intervention into the latter. On the other hand, neorealism allows the post-revisionists to posit the non-ideological pursuit of security as the basis for their postwar analyses.⁵⁴ With the words of Waltz, “competition and conflict among states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound.”⁵⁵

The Cold War system is considered as a product of the postwar changes in the number of great powers and distribution of capabilities. As a result, there emerged a bipolar world in which “each of the two great powers is bound to focus its fears on

⁵³ John Lewis Gaddis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983), p.172.

⁵⁴ For Westad, the deemphasizing of ideological conflicts is connected to the emergence of detente in superpower relations. Odd A. Westad, “The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.5.

⁵⁵ Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988), p.619. For Waltz, it was the anarchic structure of the international relations that imposes constraints upon behaviors of states and presupposes a self-help system in which each state has to take care of itself. Therefore, there is no division of labor or functional differentiation among states. That is to say all states behave in similar ways despite their different forms of government and diverse political ideologies.

the other, to distrust its motives, and to impute offensive intentions ...”⁵⁶ Hence, by following Waltz, for post-revisionist, “the proper question is rather what, not who, started the Cold War” as a consequence of the geopolitical arrangements brought about by the War.⁵⁷ In this regard, for post-revisionists both the US and Soviet Union acted primarily in the line with their national interest and so despite their different forms of government and diverse political ideologies, they are not strikingly different from each other or from other great powers in history.⁵⁸

On the basis of a realist theoretical framework, diplomatic historians of the US came close to the international relations. Gaddis as the leading post-revisionist interprets the origins of the Cold War as a result of mutual misperceptions, conflicting interests and shared responsibility between the superpowers. In this regard, as indicated, unlike the orthodox historians, he admits that there was no ideological blueprint for world revolution in Stalin’s mind, nevertheless, the Cold War, for Gaddis, was so to speak an unintentional consequence of the unilateral actions of Stalin. He states that “the primary cause of the Cold War was Stalin’s own ill-defined ambition, his determination to seek security in such a way as to leave little or none for other actors in the international arena”⁵⁹ which alerted American officials about the Soviet Union intentions over Eastern Europe. On this point, like orthodox, Gaddis argues that the Soviet expansionism, rather than the expansion of the US, was the primary cause of the Cold War since the American expansion was welcomed by its allies and regarded as a counterweight to the Russians.⁶⁰ In this sense, against the revisionist argument of American policy-makers’ concern about a postwar depression, he writes that “economic instruments were used to serve

⁵⁶ Ibid., p.628.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.628.

⁵⁸ Westad, *The Cold War*, p.5; Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, p.25-26.

⁵⁹ Gaddis, *Post-Revisionist Synthesis*, p.176.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p.180.

political ends, not the other way around.”⁶¹ That is to say, domestic economic needs have not been the primary impulse behind American postwar policymaking. Consequently, Gaddis argues that the new evidence confirms the key arguments of old orthodoxy on the basis of systemic archival research.⁶²

For the post-revisionist, both superpowers behave in a similar way as in seeking power and security despite their ideological differences. Therefore, they do not posit any causal links between the socio-economic system of superpowers and their respective foreign policies. This absent link between the nature of the socio-economic structure of bloc leaders and their foreign policies as well as the nature of the conflict between them in the mainstream debates has been addressed by a number of radical theories of the Cold War.

2.3. Into the radical approaches: Debating the nature of the Cold War

The radical approaches can be classified under two categories. The first group of scholars sees the Cold War as related with primarily the intra-bloc conflict for which the international Cold War conflict was instrumental to resolve the intense socio-economic contradictions within the political relations of each bloc. The scholars in the second category, on the other hand, conceive the Cold War as an inter-systemic conflict emanating from the international antagonism and conflict between the two antithetical social systems.

2.3.1. Cold War as intra-systemic conflict

This approach underscores the internal/intra-bloc socio-economic dimension as the primary impulse behind the origins and the evolution of the Cold War conflict. The Cold War conflict is seen as a result of conscious efforts of either one or both of the bloc leaders to consolidate their respective interests and to resolve internal contradiction as well as securing order within each bloc.

⁶¹ Ibid., p.175.

⁶² Ibid., p.180.

According to Michael Cox, as one of the principle advocates of the internalist approach,⁶³ the hostility between the USSR and the capitalist countries did not come about with the end of the War rather there had been a conflict since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 because the capitalist countries had felt threatened by the existence of the new Soviet state. After Bolshevik revolution, for the capitalist countries, the main problem was how to deal with the new revolutionary state as it stood outside of and in partial oppose to international division of labor and made no contribution to the reproduction and expansion of capitalism as a world system.⁶⁴ In this sense, the real problem between the West and the USSR, Cox argues, was not the different political economic formation of the Soviet Union or its nationalization of industry, but “the total separation of Soviet economy from the world market.”⁶⁵ That is to say, even if there were socio economic differences between the West and the USSR, this does not itself explain the essential cause of conflict or its intensity,⁶⁶ as well as the emergence of the Cold War in the postwar period.

The opposition between West and the USSR became more intense with the consequences brought about by the WWII since the War led to the expansion of the USSR into Eastern Europe and thus the closing off of an even greater area from Western control.⁶⁷ Like the pre-war period, in the postwar American concerns did not stem from either the Red Army, or the immediate activities of the communist parties in Western Europe, but rather the problem was the contraction of larger areas from the capitalist market and thus the source of the danger was furtherance of this as a result of continuity of the crisis of capitalism. With the words of Cox, “the real

⁶³ Cox, *From the Truman Doctrine*; Michael Cox, “The Cold War and Stalinism in the Age of Capitalist Decline,” *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 1, no.1 (1989).

⁶⁴ Cox, *From the Truman Doctrine*, p.28; Cox, *The Cold War and Stalinism*, p.26.

⁶⁵ Cox, *The Cold War and Stalinism*, p.26.

⁶⁶ Cox, *From the Truman Doctrine*, p.28-29.

⁶⁷ Cox, *The Cold War and Stalinism*, p.26.

problem in 1947 was not Soviet military power, but the near collapse of the West European bourgeoisie following fifty years of slow decay.”⁶⁸

If the crisis and thus decline of capitalism persisted, this would discredited the market capitalism as a viable model to overcome the economic difficulties the war had left in Europe which supposedly would in time result in strengthening and radicalization of the communists in Western Europe, particularly in France and Italy where communist parties was then relatively strong though they did not have the strength (or the intention) to over throw capitalism anyway. This would be followed by the imposition of greater state control of trade and industry so as to reconstruct the economy. In turn a statist Western Europe would develop closer links with the emerging planned economies of Eastern Europe. The end result of this process would lead to the reorientation of Europe as a whole away from the world market towards the Soviet sphere of influence, which would in turn resulted in a total contraction of Europe from the capitalist world market. This is what constituted the meaning of the “Soviet threat” in 1947, Cox claims. In this context, then “the Cold War was not primarily the expression of some deep irreconcilable socio-economic conflict between the US and the Soviet Union, but a strategy developed by the American bourgeoisie to rescue a declining capitalism after more than three decades of crisis.”⁶⁹

Consequently, according to Cox’s internalist approach, these crisis circumstances forced the American bourgeoisie to develop policies with a view to restoring the bourgeoisie rule in Western Europe. In this context, taking a tough stance against the communism of the USSR was a necessary precondition for securing conditions of capital accumulation and thus for overcoming the crisis of capitalism. That is to say, Cox writes, “without the Soviet Union, the rehabilitation of bourgeoisie rule on

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.30.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.25.

a world scale would have been impossible in the postwar period ...”⁷⁰ In this context, Cox argues that the US presented the Soviet threat as central to the maintenance of its own position within the Western capitalist world. He maintains that the subtraction of part of the capitalist market in Europe as a result of the USSR’s occupation of Eastern Europe led to stability and order to area which still remained in the capitalist market. By the same token, according to Cox, USSR contributed to Western equilibrium through its control over the communist left since revolution in Western Europe was not in the Soviet interest. He further argues that the very totalitarian nature of the systems which Soviet Union advocated made the political argument for democratic capitalism almost irresistible after 1947. Therefore, he claims that despite the American rhetorical opposition to the Soviet Union in theory, in practice it did little to dismantle Soviet power.⁷¹

Once the Cold War system had established between two blocs, for Cox, the Soviet Union itself benefited from this relationship with the US as well. In this regard, he states that “the primary function of the Cold War therefore was to reinforce the isolation of the USSR and strengthen internal discipline at a time of great crisis.” That is to say the international conflict was utilized by Stalin to impose a strong hold over Eastern Europe and re-impose very tight control over the communist movement.⁷² Nevertheless, for Cox, the Soviet policies were in a form of “offensive defence or defensive offence” to counter American pressure after 1947.⁷³

However, unlike Cox, Peter Gowan argues that the bipolar bloc structure of the Cold War system served the material interests of the US and underpinned the

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.36.

⁷¹ Ibid., p.36-39.

⁷² Ibid., p.43.

⁷³ Ibid., p.27.

American primacy over the core.⁷⁴ In this context, Gowan highlights that the US “adopted a drive of aggressive confrontational pressure upon the Soviet bloc with forward deployment of forces. This then established a real political and material structure of confrontation between the two blocs.”⁷⁵ In turn this drew the whole of the capitalist core into the military alliance against the USSR.⁷⁶ However, unlike Cox who argues that though the Cold War was essentially an American project, the Soviet Union did as well contribute to the establishment and consolidation of this bipolar structure, Gowan puts forth that the militarized Cold War system was not an effect of the Soviet confrontation, since he maintains, if it were, then the US was expected to dismantle its military alliance systems, once arguably established as deterrent to the Soviet bloc, but instead the disintegration of the Soviet bloc have led to attempts to revitalize these military alliance systems.⁷⁷

While Cox and Gowan recognizes the difference between the socio-economic systems of the US and the USSR though as appraised above it was not the reason behind the postwar conflict, the UK Marxist theoreticians of “state capitalism,” another variant of internalist approach, questions the socio-economic distinctiveness of the Soviet Union and describes the Soviet Union as a state capitalism. Thus, for them, it was not a workers’ state or even a “degenerated workers’ state”⁷⁸ but rather

⁷⁴ Peter Gowan, “The Bush Turn and the Drive for Primacy,” in *The War on Terror and the American ‘Empire’ After the Cold War*, Edited by Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull (Routledge: New York, 2006), p.140.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.140.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.140.

⁷⁷ Peter Gowan, “Triumphing Toward International Disaster: The Impasse in American Grand Strategy,” *Critical Asian Studies* 36, no.1 (2004), p.7-8.

⁷⁸ See Tony Cliff, *Russia: A Marxist Analysis* (Pluto Press: London, 1970). To browse online version, see www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1964/russia/index.htm. (accessed on November 3, 2013); Michael Kidron, *Western Capitalism Since the War*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1968); Nigel Harris, *Of Bread and Guns: The World Economy in Crisis* (Penguin: Middlesex, Harmondsworth, 1983); Chris Harman, *Class Struggles in Eastern Europe, 1945-83* (Biddles: England, Guildford, 1988); Alex Callinicos, *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* (Polity: Cambridge, 2009). The theory of “state capitalism” is an important conceptualization in the Western Marxism critique of the Soviet Union. In this sense, as Marcel van der Linden argues, the Western Marxism in this sense denotes “non-Soviet, or non-Soviet-like Marxist thought” in the West. For a historical appraisal of

a different form of capitalist state. Therefore, according to the state capitalist arguments, the Cold War was essentially a form of inter-imperialist conflict between different antagonistic forms of capitalist state.

The theory of “state capitalism” with regard to the Cold War is mainly circulated within the current around Tony Cliff, to name Mike Kidron, Nigel Harris, Chris Harman and Alex Callinicos. The basic problematic that guides their works is why the USSR was not a socialist society or worker state. For Cliff, the USSR was a capitalist state since the distinguishing factor of a worker state is the worker control of production. In this regard, he writes that “The economy of a workers’ state and a capitalist economy have many common characteristics....The distinguishing feature is the existence or non-existence of workers’ control over production.”⁷⁹ Against the absence of the private property in the Soviet Union, Cliff makes a distinction between the property relations of Stalinist Russia and its social relations of production, he writes that “that the concept of private property in itself, independent of the relations of production, is a supra-historical abstraction is recognised by every Marxist.”⁸⁰ And in the USSR, for Cliff, it was the bureaucracy that controlled the production process production.⁸¹ “The bureaucratic clique that first appears as a

debate over the theory of state capitalism, see Marcel van der Linden, *Western Marxism and the Soviet Union* (Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2007). See also W. Jerome and A. Buick, “Soviet State Capitalism? The History of an Idea,” *Survey* 62 (1967); Erich Farl, “The Genealogy of State Capitalism,” *International* 2, no.1 (1973).

⁷⁹ Cliff, *Russia*, chapter 2, part 7.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, chapter 1, part 3.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, chapter 6, part 8. Though Cliff and his followers identified themselves as Trotskyist, with regard to the role and status of the bureaucracy, they departed from Trotsky for whom “the state, so to speak, “belongs” to the bureaucracy,” but “the attempt to represent the Soviet bureaucracy as a class of “state capitalists” will obviously not withstand criticism. The bureaucracy has neither stocks nor bonds. It is recruited, supplemented and renewed in the manner of an administrative hierarchy, independently of any special property relations of its own. The individual bureaucrat cannot transmit to his heirs his rights in the exploitation of the state apparatus. The bureaucracy enjoys its privileges under the form of an abuse of power It conceals its income; it pretends that as a special social group it does not even exist.” Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going* (1937), chapter 9, part 2. www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch09.htm. (accessed on November 3, 2013).

distortion gradually transforms itself into a class which fulfills the tasks of the bourgeoisie in capitalist relations of production.”⁸²

This gradual transformation for Chris Harman corresponded to the decimation of the working class as a result of foreign invasion and civil war in the years following the October revolution. Therefore, absence of a strong working class to impose its will on this administrative machine changed the internal balance of social forces within the USSR decisively.⁸³ The result with the words of Harman was that “Bolsheviks continued to rule Russia – but in the name of a class that hardly existed any longer.”⁸⁴ The Bolshevik bureaucrats turned out to be arbitrators between different social groups, through which they accumulated power, but at the same time they were inevitably corrupted in the midst of playing different social groups against each other.⁸⁵ Harman maintains, one by one the principals of October revolution were abandoned, which culminated in a counter-revolution. However, though they had unlimited control inside the Russia, they were still under the military pressure of advanced capitalist states and the only way out was to “imitate, inside Russia, all the mechanism of exploitation used by capitalism abroad”⁸⁶ to catch up these states. In these catch-up efforts, they extensively use the State mechanism to boost the internal economic development. In consequence, “the state capitalism substituted for the small, competing firms of ‘market’ capitalism.”⁸⁷ Thus as inferred above, the drive behind the internal capital accumulation process was not the competition between different firms, but instead it was the international military competition. For Harman, though the mechanism is different, the result is the same.⁸⁸ In other

⁸² Cliff, *Russia*, chapter 6, part 8.

⁸³ Harman, *Class Struggles*, p.4-5.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.5.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.6.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p.7.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.8.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p.9.

words, international military competition among major national capitalisms supplemented the market competition.

In this context, Alex Callinicos writes that “the bureaucratic state capitalist regime that had emerged by the early 1930s in the Soviet Union represented the most extreme case of a general process.”⁸⁹ In this sense, Callinicos even ignores the Bolshevik revolution itself and sees the internal developments of the USSR in the years following the revolution as identical to the nationalization and cartelization of Roosevelt’s New Deal, the British National Governments, German National Socialist Government and the Japanese Empire in industry and agriculture, which were taken as a solution to the Great Depression.⁹⁰ Therefore, for theoreticians of State capitalism and particularly for Callinicos, the postwar conflict between the US and the USSR was superpower imperialism in nature⁹¹ between antagonistic capitalist states. After the war, he argues, the US was in an effort to revitalize a liberal international order to rescue American capitalism, before which the most important obstacle was the survival of the state capitalist regime in the USSR and its expansion into the Eastern and Central Europe since the USSR “represented the persistence of the pre-war order of rival economic and geopolitical blocs.”⁹² In this context, while a possible political expansion of the Soviet Union did led to serious geopolitical considerations in the US, which culminated in the adoption of containment policy, Callinicos asserts it did not led to a general war since “both the US and the USSR, at least in the period of détente in the 1960s and 1970s, were willing to regard themselves and each other as status quo powers with no interest in revising the postwar settlement”⁹³ since the bipolar conflict served as a disciplining force on the members of both blocs.

⁸⁹ Callinicos, *Imperialism*, p.159.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.159.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p., 165.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p.169.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p.176-177.

2.3.2. Cold War as inter-systemic conflict

Unlike the internalist approach which sees the Cold War as mainly an intra-systemic conflict and locates the dynamic of the Cold War conflict in the internal contradiction within each bloc, the theoreticians of this approach sees the Cold War as an inter-systemic conflict. This denotes that it was the international antagonism and conflict between two social systems namely capitalism and the real socialism that drove the dynamic of postwar conflict. Isaac Deutscher, Fred Halliday and Richard Saull are the principal proponents of this approach.⁹⁴

The pioneering book was Deutscher's *the Great Contest: Russia and the West*, the contest in the title of the book denotes that since the October 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, world politics was characterized by a competition between antagonistic social systems for global socio-economic supremacy on the basis of comparative economic performance of each.⁹⁵ This contest in economic sphere, for him, was the Soviet challenge to the West.⁹⁶ However, the Soviet Union was inherently different from the previous contenders because if it prevailed that would have significant political repercussions. In this regard he writes that "when Germany and the United States caught up industrially with Britain, their success did not place a question mark over the social system prevailing in Britain. The two nations had achieved their ascendancy within the framework of social relationships and institutions very similar to, and largely modeled on, those which had predominated in Britain."⁹⁷ He maintains that the economic ascendancy of these new nations validated the affectivity of capitalist model, whereas the industrial achievements of the USSR

⁹⁴ See Deutscher, Isaac, *The Great Contest: Russia and the West* (Oxford University Press: London, 1960); Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*; and Saull, *The Cold War and After*.

⁹⁵ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.6.

⁹⁶ Deutscher, *The Great Contest*, p.65.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.66.

would pave the way to questioning of the structure of Western society.⁹⁸ This is what exactly he understands from the so called Soviet challenge to the West, as the Soviet Union attained industrial maturity, this would place the Western social and political institutions under scrutiny, which in turn would revitalize the old question of social versus private ownership of means of production in a new manner.

For Deutscher, impacts of Soviet achievements in the under-developed countries was “unmistakable,” he affirms that “to them the unparalleled rapidity of the industrial rise of the Soviet Union already suggests that they themselves are more likely to achieve a similar rise on the basis of public rather than private ownership.”⁹⁹ That is to say, before the revolution Russia was itself an under-developed country and it overcame its fate in an unevenly developed world through a socialist model of public ownership and national planning. For Deutscher, what the Soviet model claimed was that “the stimuli for their economic growth are, so to speak, built-in in the public ownership and national planning of industry.” In this regard, the question was that “can private enterprise keep pace with state enterprise in technical innovation?”¹⁰⁰ This, for Deutscher, constituted the essence of the competition between the opposed social systems which vied for global ascendancy.

In this context, Deutscher argues, coexistence of antagonistic social systems is possible in various modalities in friendly or hostile neutrality ranging from cooperation and alliance establishments to living side by side and ignoring each other. The relation in the late 1920s and 1930s was an example of ignoring each other and living in mutual isolation. The WWII brought the alliances between the

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.66. He wrote these in 1960, he was optimistic about the economic performance of the Soviet Union. Indeed, he expected the USSR to become the industrial equal of the US in near future. In this sense, Saull argues that Deutscher’s ‘idealistic’ hopes about the future of the Soviet socialism was based on the Marxist-Leninist assumption that an economic system based on state planning would inevitably out perform a capitalist system characterized by a history of crisis, slump, depression and war. Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.6.

⁹⁹ Deutscher, *The Great Contest*, p.69.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.69.

West and Russia. Yet, for him, they may also confront each other in intense hostility but without resorting to arms.¹⁰¹ In this sense, after the war, he asserts, Russians anticipated “peaceful coexistence as a competitive contest between the opposed social systems, a contest which should be conducted in the economic sphere and by political means but from which war and the threat of war ... should be excluded.”¹⁰²

However, while armament was seen as an irrational waste of immense resources and energies in the Russian socialism in which production based on public ownership and national planning, in the Western capitalism the armament was treated as a stimulus to economic growth and well-being. Therefore, the competition between the West and the Soviet Union in the new phase of competitive coexistence in the postwar period, took the form of military-strategic competition of the Cold War.¹⁰³ In this sense, as Saull argues, Deutscher tended to separate the military-strategic competition of Cold War between the US and the USSR from the systemic competition of relative economic growth and prosperity between capitalism and socialism.¹⁰⁴

Unlike Deutscher who separated the role of the military competition and arms race between the US and the USSR from the systemic competition between capitalism and socialism, Halliday integrates Deutscher’s conceptualization of great contest between the two rival systems with postwar dynamic of the arms race and the military competition. Nevertheless, like Deutscher, he continues to separate the socio-economic and ideological dimension of inter-systemic conflict from that of military dynamics¹⁰⁵ because he distinguishes the periods of Cold War from the other periods of the international struggle which existed between the two rival social

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.64-65.

¹⁰² Ibid., p.65.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.71.

¹⁰⁴ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.6-7.

¹⁰⁵ Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, p.9.

systems. In this sense, according to Halliday, a Cold War referred “to a particular period of globalized systemic conflict, namely one in which the emphasis is upon the military and strategic confrontation and in which negotiation is minimal or non-existent.”¹⁰⁶ Therefore, a Cold War between the US and the USSR was not an inevitable concomitant of the systemic competition between capitalism and socialism which had been a feature of world politics since 1917.

Systemic competition and nuclear arms race together were decisive in the course of the phases of postwar history. It was their individual evolution and mutual interaction that for Halliday can explain the causes and the courses of the periods of Cold Wars.¹⁰⁷ In this regard, the systemic conflict between two rival social systems was the main cause of the Cold War as well as the dominant contradiction¹⁰⁸ as it became globalized both in geographical and political terms since 1945. Besides the systemic antagonism, the nuclear arms race was the other important factor that determined the character of postwar international system. While the former formed the structure within which international relations worked through, the latter has fundamentally transformed nature of any future war as well as the risks and methods of diplomacy in the peace time.¹⁰⁹

As inferred above, for Halliday, a rivalry between two antagonistic social systems is different from the earlier great power politics. In this regard, he argues that in three respects the competition between two social systems differs from that among the previous great powers. First, it is a rivalry that is globalized, i.e. involves the whole world in its political and military dynamics. Second, the rivalry rests upon a bipolar conflict between the US and the USSR. Third, this conflict is systemic. It is not just between rival states. Therefore, “there are underlying reasons, inherent in their

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.9.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.30.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.30.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.30-31.

respective social orders, which dictate that they cannot permanently resolve their disagreements.”¹¹⁰ This is because of the three fundamental aspects of the nature of the conflict between the two social systems. These societies, principally, are organized on the basis of contrasting social principles, with private ownership in one, and collective or state ownership in the other.¹¹¹ Next, both systems stake an ideological claim to be world systems and ideal societies which others should aspire to follow. Lastly, because of this basic systemic conflict, both support opposing forces in the world which must inevitably override attempts at state-to-state accommodation.¹¹²

In brief, for Halliday, the Cold War is not an inevitable concomitant of the international conflict between capitalism and socialism rather the periods of Cold War was contingent upon the relationship between the distinct logics of social systemic conflict and arms race triggered by the existence of nuclear bombs. However, because the systemic conflict had been a feature of world politics since 1917,¹¹³ as Saull correctly argues, Halliday implicitly grants an explanatory primacy to the arms race and military power as, in the last instance, constitutive of Cold War.¹¹⁴ Furthermore in this respect, for example, for him, the periods of reduced military tension such as the *détente* during the 1970s are not the periods of Cold War in spite of the continuation of the socio-economic and ideological aspects of antagonism.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.32.

¹¹¹ In this sense, he writes that “for all the betrayal of the intentions of those who made the Bolshevik revolution, a contrasted social system, representing different social interests and classes, was produced and it is this difference which above all else underlines the Great Contest.” Ibid., p.32-33.

¹¹² Ibid., p.32-33.

¹¹³ Ibid., p.8.

¹¹⁴ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.7.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p.7.

2.4. Conclusion

In the debate on the origins of the Cold War, the orthodox hold the Soviet Union primarily responsible and tend to interpret the Soviet policy as motivated by ideologically-oriented expansionist impulses. The revisionists place greater emphasis on the security needs of the Soviet Union and put the responsibility of the Cold War on the US. As having the claim of being a synthesis between the orthodox and revisionists, the post-revisionist interpret the origins of the Cold War as a result of mutual misperceptions and shared responsibility between the two superpowers. In this regard, they see mutual responsibility of the two countries because they acted mainly in the line with their conflicting national interest. Through such an analysis of shared responsibility of the both sides, the post-revisionists attempt to overcome the question of who was the responsible side in the outbreak of the Cold War, which is indeed the leitmotif of the orthodox-revisionists debate.

The orthodox-revisionists debate in this sense could be summarized through the following question: The actions of which side could be considered as a reaction to the ambitious policies of the other in the immediate years following WWII? In this regard, according to the orthodox, the US postwar policies against the Soviet Union were characterized as a reaction to the Soviet policies in the Eastern Europe and Near East. That is to say, they interpret the US global commitments as an act of self-defense against the combination of traditional Russian expansionism and communist menace.¹¹⁶ Yet the revisionists present an entirely different picture. They change the track of criticism from the Soviet Union to the US and find the tensions and contradictions within the US capitalism as the main reason behind the onset of the Cold War. The revisionists pay critical attention to the US economic power and argue how the US employed a number of different instruments to realize its postwar objective of “open door” imperialism. In this regard, the US left no other option to

¹¹⁶ Such a similar fusion of anti-communist sentiment with anti-Russianism as a common theme could be seen among the orthodox realists in Turkey as well. In analyzing the worsening relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union in pre- and postwar years, the orthodox realists identify the Soviet policies against Turkey with those of expanding Russian Empire against the declining Ottoman Empire in 19th and early 20th centuries.

the Soviet Union but to react to the US. It created a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe in order to protect its security interests on a defensive rationale.

While the mainstream debate centers on the question of who was the responsible, the radical approaches pay critical attention to the nature of the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. The first group of theories emphasizes the contradictions within each bloc. They argue that though there was antagonism between the two bloc leaders and their respective social system, the Cold War was mainly instrumentalized in resolving the internal socio-economic contradictions within each bloc. In this regard, unlike the mainstream debate, this approach turns the spotlight from the external geopolitical and ideological conflicts to internal/intra-bloc conflicts. The second group of radical theories, on the other hand, sees the Cold War as inter-systemic conflict, that is, for this second group, the international antagonism and the antagonism between the two social systems constitute the basic motive behind the Cold War.

After having reviewed the debate on the Cold War in the US and Europe, the next chapter is devoted to the appraisal of Turkish literature. The links between the literatures inside and outside Turkey will be made, where such links are necessary.

CHAPTER III

A THEORETICALLY INFORMED HISTORICAL APPRAISAL OF THE COLD WAR LITERATURE IN TURKEY

3.1. Introduction

Unlike the debates in the US or Europe, due to the poor academic interest in the analysis of the Cold War per se, it as a subject matter has never been a central concern in the mainstream debates in Turkey. That is to say, the main axes of the debates are not either who was responsible for the onset of the Cold War or what was the very character of the postwar confrontation between the US and the USSR?¹ Rather the debates center on the relations of Turkey with either the Soviet Union or the US.

The Cold War in Turkey in this regard has been largely dealt as a subject of the diplomatic history of the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union and the US respectively by the political historians.² Most of the mainstream literature is consisted of edited books which are comprehensive in terms of their scope but not adequate either for a systematic or in-depth analysis of the Cold War period. Their

¹ Though such questions have been articulated by several researchers in Turkey, their views could be considered as reproductions of the American revisionists, particularly the advocates of “the open door thesis.” These researchers are Türkkaya Ataöv, Yalçın Küçük and Haluk Gerger, whose detailed views are covered under the radical approaches. See Türkkaya Ataöv, *Amerikan Emperyalizmi: Doğuşu ve Gelişimi* (İleri Yayınları: İstanbul, 2007) and *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (İleri Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006); Yalçın Küçük, “Sosyalizmi Dondurma Savaşı” and “İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı” in *İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı: Soğuk Savaş*, Edited by Ferhat Telli (YGS Yayınları: İstanbul, 1998); Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, Vol. 2 (Tekin Yayınevi: İstanbul, 2003); Haluk Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası: “Soğuk Savaş” Tan “Yeni Dünya Düzeni” Ne* (Yordam Kitap: İstanbul, 2012).

² For a discussion of the evolution of the discipline in Turkey, see Gökhan Erdem, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Tarih’in Gelişimi ve Sorunları Sempozyumu: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar* (AÜ SBF Yayınları: Ankara, 2006).

main preoccupation was the study of elite decision-makers with accounts based on the official explanations of foreign policy bureaucracy as well as “hard” empirical evidence collected from documentary archives and tended to reflect a patriotic bias. Events are often seen as the outcome of decisions by historical actors and interpretations are derived from a literal reading of the official statements and documents, where the reason given for actions taken is assumed to be the explanation of those actions. In this connection, one can argue that most of the mainstream literature in Turkey has a semi-official character and in this regard within a discourse of national interest allegedly free from any ideological dealings, the foreign policy orientation of Turkey was presented as if it was above and free from the internal political struggles, which in turn made other discussions that went beyond the legitimate line drew by the state marginalized and pushed out of the mainstream debates. Therefore, the debates having been voiced in radical leftist circles have not been much taken into consideration. In fact, until the 1960s, one can hardly find a critical account of the postwar Turkish foreign policy except the pieces written by the Sertels on the pages of the newspaper *Tan* in the immediate postwar years, which was indeed an unfortunate example of how dangerous was to criticize the official Turkish foreign policy at that time, no matter how modest their critics was in nature.³ In this regard, the quantitative weakness of critical/radical approaches demonstrates how the mainstream debate in Turkey has become immune to the challenges. That is, the mainstream approaches have an overwhelming domination over the Cold War debates in Turkey. Even today, almost 22 years after the disintegration of the USSR, these approaches continue to dominate Cold War historiography in Turkey. This domination can be followed through a simple survey of new MSc and PhD theses most of which are reproductions of earlier narratives based on the official explanations.⁴ It is to certain extent, dissatisfaction with

³ See Mithat Kadri Vural, “II.Dünya Savaşı Türkiye’sinde Bir Muhalefet Örneği Olarak ‘Tan’ Gazetesi,” *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7, no.16-17 (2008); p.381-395; Nazım Arda Çağdaş, *The Birth of anti-Soviet Image in the Turkish Press Following the Second World War and its Reflections after the Death of Stalin (1953 - 1964)* (MA thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, September 2008).

⁴ To illustrate, see Yusuf Turan Çetiner, *The Making of Turkey’s Western Alliance 1944-1952* (PhD thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, January 2001); Demet Çalışkan, *The European Security Process*

prevailing accounts of the Cold War itself in general and Turkey's integration into the West in particular that constitutes the most significant motivation behind this thesis.

This appraisal will mainly be made through the authors from Turkey and the debate on the Cold War and Turkey's foreign policies in the immediate postwar years will be covered, as in the debate in the US and Western Europe, under two categorization of mainstream and radical approaches. Likewise, semi-official traditional accounts will be named as orthodox approach and the attempts to revise the semi-official orthodox realist views from within will be reviewed as revisionism. Yet the views of revisionists in Turkey are not parallel or similar to those of the American revisionists. They are defined as revisionists because in certain ways they pose important challenges to the semi-official orthodox realist position in Turkey. In this context, similar to the way followed in appraising the American literature, though the views of the Turkish revisionists are critical of the traditional realist accounts, it is nevertheless included in the mainstream accounts. Several reasons can be suggested for this inclusion: (i) There is a polemical nature in their arguments against the orthodox views; (ii) though they advocate different arguments to those of the orthodox, they have discussed the issue within the framework drawn

in the Second half of the Twentieth Century and its Implications on Turkey (MA thesis, İstanbul: Marmara University, 2001); Ferhan Karaca, *Türk-Amerikan Askeri İlişkileri (1945 sonrası)* (MA thesis, Ankara: Gazi University, 2002); Hasan Üzmez, *Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Giriş Süreci* (MA thesis, Van: Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi, 2003); Yavuz Güler, *Kuzey Atlantik Paktı ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Pakta Giriş Süreci* (MA thesis, Ankara: Gazi University, 2003); Hakan Tek, *The Decision-making Process of Turkey Deploying Turkish Troops to Korea* (MA thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, December 2005); Sedat Sav, *Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na Fiilen Girmemesinin İç ve Dış Toplumsal Etkileri ve Sonuçları* (MA thesis, Malatya: İnönü University, June 2008); Muhammed Emin Karadağ, *II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Türkiye'nin ABD ve Rusya ile Siyasi İlişkileri* (MA thesis, İstanbul: Kadir Has University, 2008); Çağatay Benhür, *Stalin Dönemi Türk-Rus İlişkileri (1924-1953)* (PhD thesis, Konya: Selçuk University, 2008); Alptekin Molla, *NATO Savunma Politikaları Çerçevesinde Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinin Analizi* (MA thesis, Sivas: Cumhuriyet University, February 2008); İlyas Kayış, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Genel Durumu ve Uyguladığı Dış Politika* (MA thesis, İstanbul: Beykent University, 2009); Mert Özişikli, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türkiye'nin İttifak Arayışları ve NATO'ya Girişi* (MA thesis, Denizli: Pamukkale University, June 2009); Remzi Öner Özkan, *The Soviet Territorial Demands from Turkey: 1939-1946* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, January 2010); Hulusi Köse, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türkiye Amerika ilişkileri (1945-1950)* (MA thesis, İstanbul: İstanbul University, 2010).

by the orthodox realists; (iii) similar to the previous one, it is hard to argue that they are able to go beyond a realist research agenda in the sense that in theoretical terms there is hardly any difference in the way they deal with the Cold War and particularly the postwar relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union and the US respectively.

In Turkey, a country that was a neighbor of the Soviet Union, the mainstream debate centers on Turkey's conflictual relations with the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar years. In this regard, the mainstream debate over the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union as a result of the latter's infamous demands for privileges on the straits in the aftermath of the war will be embraced through the question of whether the demands of the USSR on the Turkish straits were aggressive as an indication of its postwar expansionary policies or defensive so as to secure its most vulnerable Southern borders? This will undergo further questioning with a view to discussing whether Turkey moved into the West as a direct consequence of Soviet pressure or it would nevertheless opt for being part of the West for some other reasons?

The radical approaches among the leftist circles shifted the center of the debate from the problematic relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union to its dependent relations with the US. In this regard, Turkey's relations with the US came under scrutiny with a view to investigating the reasons of Turkey's dependence on the US. It was no longer the so called "Soviet threat" that forced Turkey to move into the Western alliance, that is, Turkey's espousal to the West was not considered as a result of the policies of the Soviet Union. They seemed to interpret the discourse of "Soviet threat" as being deliberately exploited, on the one hand, to convince the West about how the Soviets were dangerous for the world and, on the other hand, to ease Turkey's postwar adjustment to the new international capitalist order. The guiding question in this regard will be what was the direction and nature of change in Turkey's foreign policy and the concurrent process of economic liberalization and political gravitation toward the West.

3.2. Addressing the sources of conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Union: Mainstream approaches

What is the first thing that usually comes to mind when one talks about the Cold War in Turkey? Soviet Union and its demands for military bases or territorial concessions from Turkey! Soviet Union and the Russian quest for access to warm Seas! Soviet Union and its spread of communism!

The Soviet Union and its aggressive expansionism along with its hostile attitude towards Turkey became the crux of the mainstream debate in interpreting the Cold War. The mainstream debate is categorized under two general headings, namely the orthodox realist and the revisionist approaches. These categories are in no way exhaustive but they cover the most representative works. The mainstream debate is extremely important to show how the Cold War or the Turkish foreign policy during the Cold War has been historically handled and thus it shows the tendency of the discussions within the literature in Turkey.

The mainstream debate has mainly revolved around the question of whether the Soviet territorial claims against the Eastern borders of Turkey and demands for bases on the Turkish straits were a reflection of Soviet ambitions for gaining access to warm waters or a logical quest for Soviets to secure its most vulnerable Southern borders. And so did the Soviet claims on Turkey effectively force it to side with the Western bloc and its leader the US or would Turkey nevertheless join the West for internal economic requirements?

For the orthodox realist approach, security considerations constitute the prime impetus behind the integration of Turkey into the Western bloc on the basis of Turkey's threat perception emanating from its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union. That is to say the Cold War for Turkey was characterized by the Soviet threat, which entailed territorial demands on its Eastern region, specifically Kars and Ardahan and demands for bases on the Turkish straits. Consequently this state

of affairs forced Turkey's state elites to join the Western bloc, which culminated in its membership in NATO in 1952. Yet, for them this was an unwilling move towards the West, in the absence of such demands, Turkey's policy makers would continue their balanced stance between the West and the Soviet Union as in the pre-war period. Therefore, for these approaches Turkey's drift towards West and particularly the US had nothing to do with the ideology, it was a rational foreign policy move to preserve its security under the conditions brought about by the geopolitical consequences of the War, of which the most significant one is the growth of the Soviet power and its return to the old-Tsarist aggressive policies towards Turkey to gain control over the straits.

On the other hand, the revisionist approach saw security fears at the heart of Soviet policy. Therefore, the Soviet demands from Turkey were mainly to ensure its security. That is, the purpose of the Soviets was not expansion of its sphere of influence, but consolidation of its security. Therefore, Turkey's direction to the West was not a consequence of Soviet fear, that is to say, in the absence of the Soviet demands, Turkey would nevertheless opt for the West. Yet the Soviet fear was effectively used to push Turkey's move towards the West. In this sense, under the shadow of the Soviet demands the main impetus lied on the interests of economically dominant constituents of Turkey.

Yet, before going into the discussions of these two approaches, the official explanation for the postwar Turkish foreign policy will be appraised through the memoirs of the Feridun Cemal Erkin as a high-ranking diplomat during the most critical times of tension between Turkey and the USSR. The official explanation is important in the sense that it laid the ground on which the subsequent discussions have been made.

3.2.1. A prototype of the official Turkish foreign policy approach: The memoirs of Feridun Cemal Erkin

The official explanation for the postwar Turkish foreign policy, as elsewhere, laid the ground on which the subsequent mainstream debate took place. In this sense, in Turkey seldom has a single individual impact to shape Turkish foreign policy as Feridun Cemal Erkin. This is not only a result of his key role as a policy-maker, but also through his memoirs, Erkin profoundly affected how researchers viewed the Soviet Union and the course of Turkey-Soviet Union relations. In this regard, in Turkey's Cold War historiography, the memoirs of Feridun Cemal Erkin ⁵ had been the most important source of the Cold War mainstream debates in Turkey.⁶ Erkin's book, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi (Turk-Soviet Relations and the Straits Question)*, is not only important as an observation of a witness to these times, but more essentially, in a manner similar to the role Kennan played for postwar Washington policies, Erkin allegedly played a key role in shaping Ankara's attitudes towards the Soviet Union as well as the West.⁷ The straits problem occupies the center of the Erkin's memoirs.⁸

⁵ Feridun Cemal Erkin was a high-ranking diplomat during the most critical times of tension between Turkey and the USSR-proclaimed by the exchange of diplomatic notes in 1946 and a Foreign Minister during Cyprus-related dispute between Turkey and the US-manifested in the famous exchange of letters between US President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Prime Minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü in mid-1964.

⁶ Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs declassified official documents belonging to the pre- and postwar period and made them public in 1973. Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları (1935-1939)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973); Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1946)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973). Until release of these official documents, Yalçın Küçük argues, because Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not even yet publish a single document, there was no other documents than the memoirs of Erkin with respect to the Soviet demands from Turkey. In other saying, for Küçük, the memoirs of Feridun Cemal Erkin was the main, if not sole, source for the researchers with respect to the Soviet demands. Due to this fact, through a critical reading of Erkin's memoirs as well as a historical analysis of postwar Turkish foreign policy, he even argued that the Soviet Union had never demanded military bases or territorial concessions from Turkey, since for him these so called "Soviet demands" were fabricated by Feridun Cemal Erkin and Selim Sarper. See Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, p.299-302, 305. Besides these official publications, the researchers started to make references to the minutes of Potsdam Conference with the 1990s. See Kamuran Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953* (Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 1991); A. Suat Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri, 1920-1964* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları: Ankara, 1992).

⁷ In the book, he writes that the draft of the two notes sent as answers to the two postwar Soviet notes were written down by himself, these counter notes in a way determined the attitudes of Turkey both

In relation to prewar Turkish foreign policy route, Erkin states that the Anglo-Turkish declaration of a mutual cooperation and assistance agreement (on 12 May 1939) frankly showed “the final and permanent orientation of Turkish foreign policy.”⁹ To remind, this declaration was initiated before the infamous talks held between the Turkish Foreign Minister, Şükrü Saraçoğlu and the Soviet Minister of Foreign affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, which has been regarded as the initial sign of a break up in the Turkey-Soviet Union relationship in the traditional approaches. In this regard, as clearly inferred from Erkin’s statement, Turkey’s efforts to make its own way separate from that of Soviets went beyond the alleged Soviet demands because Erkin evaluates the negotiations between Turkey and Soviet Union in 1939 during which Molotov-Saraçoğlu meeting took place, as an effort on Turkey’s part “to penetrate Soviet intentions.”¹⁰ In fact, his rhetoric is problematic for a state that tied itself to another state with a friendship and neutrality treaty roots of which goes deeper of the very same state’s independence war against British-backed Greece. That is to say, when Erkin evaluates the negotiations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, he does not consider it as negotiations between two friendly states but rather as something designed to find out the latter’s supposedly unfriendly intentions against the former. Meanwhile, there is no hint of questioning the intentions of the British against Turkey; rather what he puts forth was a common attitude between Turkey and British against the Soviet Union.

towards the USSR and the West. Feridun Cemal Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Başnur Matbaası: Ankara, 1968), p.294-316.

⁸ It is important to note in relation to Erkin’s book is that it is not a diary, therefore, the views he expressed in his memoirs are unavoidably retrospective. Therefore, cautions needed to avoid misleading about Turkey’s or even Erkin’s position at the relevant time frame.

⁹ Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.126. [All translations from Turkish in this thesis, unless otherwise noted, are mine] Turkey and Britain issued a joint declaration to the effect that if there should be a war in the Mediterranean, the two countries would cooperate. The same declaration was made with France following France’s cession of Hatay on June 23, 1939.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.126.

Despite the above fact, the pre-war break up was largely regarded as a result of Soviet policies since Turkey did its best to converge its interest with that of Soviet Union. In this context, while Turkey tried to play a role of a bridge between the West, particularly Britain and France, and the Soviet Union during the “peace front” negotiations, the latter unilaterally chose to ally itself to Germany while making unreasonable demands from Turkey. In this context, Erkin writes that “the Western countries felt themselves forced to try every effort to ensure cooperation with the Soviets within the limits of their means.”¹¹ Yet because of the failure of the negotiations among the Soviet Union and British, French due to the former’s “selfishness and extreme wishes” together with latters’ “hesitation and indecision,”¹² there left nothing for Turkey to do other than signing an alliance treaty with Britain and France to safeguard itself. In this latter case, one can easily notice from Erkin’s point of view that there was nothing wrong with the intentions of the British or the French in relation to the Soviets other than their lack of confidence/insecurity against the Soviet Union. Yet with the outbreak of war and its extension to the East, the Soviets did not bring their demands against Turkey. As a result, the tension falls off the agenda for a while.

Though having succeeded in staying out of the War, Turkey supposedly experienced a solitude that urged Turkish foreign policy-makers to resolve its isolation through cultivating closer ties with the Western states on the one hand, and restoring its relations with the Soviet Union in the postwar period on the other. Yet these efforts were allegedly disrupted with first the Soviet denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality,¹³ and with another meeting held on June 7, 1945 between Soviet Foreign Minister, Molotov and Turkey’s Ambassador to

¹¹ Ibid., p.134

¹² Ibid., p.134.

¹³ The treaty was concluded between the national government in Turkey and communist regime in the USSR on 17 December, 1925. For the full text of the treaty with its protocols, see İsmail Soysal, *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları ile birlikte Türkiye’nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları: Birinci Cilt (1920-1945)* (Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 2000), p.276-281. (Note: the table of contents in Soysal’s book does not show the correct pages).

Moscow, Selim Sarper during which Molotov did not only reiterate their prewar demands for bases for Soviet naval forces on the straits,¹⁴ but he also allegedly demanded the return of Kars and Ardahan to Soviet Union. In the meeting, Erkin asserts, Molotov made clear what the Soviet government demanded from Turkey in exchange of a new treaty that would replace the old Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality concluded between the national government in Turkey and communist regime. This in turn would secure Russian friendship in the international order brought about by the WWII. In his memoirs, Erkin saw the military successes of the Red Army as the main reason that triggered changes in the attitudes of the Soviet leader and diplomats towards Turkey,¹⁵ in a way he implies that by the growth in Soviet military power together with its postwar international prestige, the Soviet leaders embarked upon a policy to utilize the favorable international environment to carry out its aggressive policies against Turkey's borders and straits.

For Erkin, the denunciation of 1925 Treaty was ill-timed and opened up a period of uncertainty between the relations of two countries. It was untimely declared because the Soviets did not even wait the termination date of November 7, 1945. He maintains that the aim was to leave Turkey in an unstable as well as uncertain external situation before the San Francisco Conference.¹⁶ Molotov, Erkin maintains, further asked for Ankara's proposals for a new treaty more appropriate to two countries interests and to improvement of their relations. Erkin even sees this Soviet suggestion as "pushing Turkey to a slippery slope."¹⁷

Under this situation, Erkin mentions about the talks between the Turkish authorities and the Soviet ambassador, Vinogradov in Ankara for a new treaty. During these

¹⁴ Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.253-254.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.246.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.249-250.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.252.

talks as signs of its good-will, Erkin talks about two gestures made by Turkish government¹⁸ with a view to facilitating the negotiations. In this context, he criticizes the attitude of Turkish government as showing the signs of weakness as a result of misguided talks with the Soviet ambassador. Instead, he proposed to adopt a tougher stance against the Soviet Union since, for Erkin, these moves were not only unnecessary and but also dangerous since in the eyes of Russians, they meant the weakness of Turkey more than anything. In this sense, he asserts that “no other factors but the weakness of adversary would push the Russian to boldness.”¹⁹ Moreover, he maintains these talks in Ankara had created an impression that as if Moscow was ready to sign an alliance treaty with Ankara on the basis of the conditions negotiated in Ankara. He does not mention about the content of the negotiations but complains about the fact that “Ankara talks, polished with Turkish gestures and also the intimidations of Vinogradov, was even taken to the limits of searching for alliance possibilities.”²⁰ Furthermore, he asks that “to sign an alliance treaty, fine but with what purpose and against which aggressor?”²¹ As clearly inferred, Erkin took a negative attitude against a new friendship treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union and more importantly, if Erkin is right, within a short period of time after the denunciation of 1925 treaty, the new negotiations advanced quite a long way for a new treaty. This is obvious in his remark about the return of Selim Sarper, the Turkish ambassador, to its mission in Moscow with the hope of signing a treaty allegedly drafted earlier in Ankara.²² Yet with the meeting on June 7, 1945 between Molotov and Sarper, Erkin claims, the new tension rolled back the process and transformed the relations between two states irrevocably.

¹⁸ These are the release of two prisoners who had been arrested and then convicted for their attempted murder of the German ambassador, Von Papen on February, 1942; and the surrender of a number of Russians having Turkish origins to the Soviet authorities.

¹⁹ Ibid., p.253

²⁰ Ibid., p.253

²¹ Ibid., p.253.

²² Ibid., p.253.

Besides the direct demands from Turkey through bilateral negotiations, the Soviet Union also brought this issue at Yalta and Potsdam Conferences where the postwar international order was negotiated among the big three, namely the US, Britain and the USSR. According to Erkin, at Yalta, on February 10, 1945, Stalin stated that “the Montreux Convention had lagged behind events since it was negotiated and signed when the Western states did not have friendly approaches to the Soviet Union.”²³ By such a reason, Erkin asserts, Stalin wished to get the US and Britain to take Russian interests into account and stated “it was unacceptable to allow Turkey to hold Russia by the throat.”²⁴ Against Stalin’s remarks, for Erkin, both Roosevelt and Churchill had positive attitudes. For Roosevelt, the Soviet Union should have free access to warm waters. Churchill, while finding Stalin’s suggestions reasonable and agreed to the fact that as the greatest state in black sea region, Russia should not be depended on a narrow gate, wished to inform Turkey that its sovereignty and territorial integrity would be guaranteed.²⁵

According to Erkin, Stalin’s suggestions regarding the amendments for Montreux Convention at Yalta were far from being reasonable. Against these unreasonable demands, he finds the positive attitudes of Roosevelt and Churchill as part of their efforts to keep the Soviet Union within the allied coalition.²⁶ He maintains that both the US and Britain kept their positive position in relation to the Soviets’ demands for the revision of the Montreux Convention at Potsdam as well. At Potsdam, Erkin argues, Stalin reiterated the Soviet demands which had previously reported to the Turkish government, and specified the Soviet aspiration for establishment of the

²³ The other reasons, Erkin maintains, Stalin gave for the necessity of revision of the Convention were as follows: (i) Share of Japan was greater than the Soviet’s in preparation of the Convention, (ii) the Convention was tied to the League of Nations which had already become a thing of the past, and (iii) under the Montreux Convention, Turks did not only have the right to close the straits during a war, but it was also left to Turkey to decide whether there was a threat of war and whether to close the straits. *Ibid.*, p.266.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.266.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p.266-267.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.267.

Soviet land and sea bases on the straits one more time. Against Soviet suggestions, the new president of the US, Harry S. Truman- who took Roosevelt's place upon his death as the wise president- proposed a new thesis and tried to convince the Soviet leader that the liberalization of the Turkish Straits would be guaranteed under an international authority consisting of the three great states. However, Erkin argues, despite their agreement on the necessity of revising the Montreux Convention on the ground that it did not comply with the conditions of the day, the three allied states did not agree on amendments to be made on the Montreux Convention. As a result, Erkin maintains, it was decided that "the issue be discussed through direct talks between Turkey and the three states that represented at Potsdam with each individually."²⁷

Meanwhile, Erkin states that "the war of nerves that the Soviet Union waged against Turkey took a broader and more violent nature every passing day."²⁸ Under the propaganda on Soviet radio and newspapers about territorial claims on Turkey, "the fury in the country came to a head. The whole nation held a grudge against communism." In these circumstances, Erkin writes that he himself contacted with the American and British ambassadors to ask the attitudes of their governments against the Soviet territorial demands on neighboring countries which were a clear violation of the formal commitments taken under the United Nations framework. The answer, Erkin maintains, delivered by the American ambassador was that "the American government and nation watched in admiration the courage and determination that Turkish nation in the face of oppression."²⁹ In this regard, for Erkin, "this statement was the first de facto interest of the American State in Turkey's fate in particular and the Mediterranean security in general." This change in the US attitude was materialized, Erkin maintains, with the visit to Istanbul by the

²⁷ Ibid., p.269.

²⁸ Ibid., p.273.

²⁹ Ibid., p.279.

US Missouri battleship on April 5, 1946.³⁰ According to Erkin, “American interest in Turkey occurred at the one of the most dangerous moments of history of Turkish nation.” He adds that “the same good-will, cooperation and spirit of solidarity were seen in London as well.”

That being the case, through diplomatic contacts, Erkin puts forth, Turkey tried to close the distance between its own position and those of the American and British by convincing them to take a tougher stance against the dangerous walk of the Soviet government against Turkey’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.³¹ Although, for him, the formula that was proposed by the US president and supported by Great Britain was “vague, vague and completely inappropriate,”³² an unconditional rejection of this formula would annoy the “distinguished owner of the formula” and thus the Great Britain. This in turn would leave Turkey all alone with its Northern neighbor.³³ Thus, Turkey accepted the Truman formula through a pronouncement to London and Washington in August³⁴ because, as he argues, “Turkey can only reach security through binding its fate with the US and the Great Britain”³⁵ against the Soviet purpose of decoupling Turkey from its increasing Western friendships and to doom it to solitude.

In this sense, Erkin sees any friendly attitudes of the Soviets as a part of efforts to separate Turkey from the West so as to force Turkey to get into bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. Therefore, he finds these efforts as dangerous. For example, a friendly conversation between the Soviet Ambassador to Ankara, Vinogradov and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Nurullah Sümer

³⁰ Ibid., p.279.

³¹ Ibid., p.278.

³² Ibid., p.269.

³³ Ibid., p.269-270.

³⁴ Ibid., p.270.

³⁵ Ibid., p.283.

during a soiree in February 1946,³⁶ was considered by Erkin as not an appropriate behavior in the British Embassy. This friendly conversation, Erkin argues, worried the British Ambassador, Sir Maurice. Yet he does not elaborate on why the British ambassador felt uneasy against such an exchange between two neighbors. In other words, why the British Ambassador felt uncomfortable with a friendly dialogue between two tense neighbors, if both states were in an attempt to normalize the relations between each other? Instead, Erkin pays attention to the reasons and objectives of this Soviet behavior and interprets it as the manifestation of the failure of the Soviet bullying policy against Turkey.³⁷ This move, Erkin maintains, also reflected the concerns of Kremlin about the efforts made by the Turkish diplomacy to construct friendly and cooperative relationship with the Western states. In his assessment, he writes that “Russian pressure hit the rock of Turkish determination and this led Kremlin to adopting smoother ways against its Southern neighbor.”

As seen from his remarks, Erkin does not give any credits to any friendly attitudes of the Soviet Union and sees them as a part of the infamous Soviet plan against Turkey. In this sense he opposes to any friendly gestures from Turkey to its Northern neighbor because it would probably ease the tension between the two countries and this in turn would hamper Turkey’s efforts to develop closer relationships with the Western states. Therefore, according to Erkin, in any case, Turkey should never turn its face from the West and never be convinced by the Soviet policies. In this regard, one can argue that the conflict with Soviet Union, for Erkin, was a great opportunity for Turkey to cultivate closer ties with the US and Britain. Therefore, what Turkey was supposed to do, for Erkin, was not to wink at the Soviet efforts to normalize the relations. But rather through this tension with the Soviet Union, Turkey should try hard to attract the interests/attentions of the

³⁶ During a soiree organized by British Ambassador, Sir Mayrice and his wife Lady Peterson, the Soviet Ambassador, Vinogradov made a friendly and cheerful chat with the Deputy Turkish Foreign Minister, Nurullah Sümer on the dance floor. According to Erkin, this image that worried the British Ambassador Sir Maurice was a plan of the Soviet Ambassador Vinogradov for the success of his policy to ease the tension between Turkey and the USSR. *Ibid.*, p.281.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.281.

Western states to Turkey, this could only bring peace both to Turkey and the region because he sees every Soviet move as a tactical change in achieving its objectives.

In this context, against the new orientation of Soviet policy to ease the tension, Erkin started to work on with purpose of reviving the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1939 which would be a proclamation of the place of Turkey. Through the British ambassador to Ankara, he asked for a statement from the British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin at the House of Commons which would reveal Anglo-Turkish alliance links.³⁸ As a result of Erkin's allegedly efforts, on February 21, 1946, Bevin made a statement at the parliament as a result of which, according to Erkin, "the Anglo-Turkish alliance gained a new life and vitality in the face of Kremlin as well as the other capitals and Turkish nation." Indeed, Erkin argues that Turkey could take more comfortable and free breathe with the achievement of guarantee in Washington and London. In this sense, For Erkin, "Turkey was able to alter the track of its ill-fate."³⁹

Following these developments, the Soviet Union sent two diplomatic notes to Turkey about the straits. In these notes, Erkin argues, the USSR proposed a new regime for straits to the Turkish government.⁴⁰ In Turkey's reply, Erkin says, it was stated that the technical part of the Montreux Convention which does not meet the new requirements should be reviewed and adapted to current circumstances.⁴¹ In

³⁸ Ibid., p.285.

³⁹ In the parliament, Bevin stated that "I want to say we have a Treaty with Turkey. I really must be frank and say I do not want Turkey converted into a satellite State. What I want her to be is really independent. I should like to see the treaty of friendship renewed between Soviet Russia and Turkey. I cannot see that that conflicts with the treaty of friendship with us and I must say that if anything could contribute to confidence between us it is the right attitude of mind of both of us towards that particular case." Ibid., p.289.

⁴⁰ The first note was delivered on 8 August 1946 by the Soviet charge d'affaires to the Foreign Minister. Turkish reply followed those of the US and Britain. In its answer, Ankara kept its former position. Thereupon, a second note was delivered to Turkish Prime Minister on 24 September 1946. As for the second note, the notes of the US and Britain were delivered to the USSR after the reply of Turkey. The exchange of notes between the USSR and Turkey ended after those of the US and Britain delivered to the USSR in October. Ibid., p.296.

⁴¹ Ibid., p.300.

this regard, Erkin maintains that since the first three proposals of the Soviet Union consisting of duplication of the proposals by the U.S. government had been essentially considered by the Turkish government under certain terms and conditions, the answer note mainly dealt with the fourth and fifth proposals. In this context, in relation to the third proposal, Erkin indicates, it was stated that a proposal of the Straits regime issued only by the Black Sea states could not be accepted as it ignored the termination procedure of the current Convention and the interests of other states which had signed the Convention. As for the fifth one, because such a proposal was impossible to comply with an independent country's sovereignty rights and the security, the note, Erkin argues, certainly rejected the proposal of common defense of the Straits with the Soviet Union.⁴² For Erkin, common defense of the straits would mean the sharing of the sovereignty right with a foreign state.⁴³

Erkin qualifies the note diplomacy of the USSR as a diplomatic war waged against Turkey and as one of the strongest diplomatic attempts to get the control of the straits by Russia, yet it was ended with no developments in line with the Soviet desires. Erkin argues that while the Socialist Soviet state pursued a peace policy through denying any expansionist purposes in 1936, later it opted for adopting the tradition of imperial Russia which used to see the Black Sea as base for realizing its conquest dreams, which in turn did not bring peace to the region.⁴⁴ For Erkin, there was certainly a Soviet blueprint for gaining the control of the straits, yet this desire was not an end in itself but rather it was an initial step for its further expansionary move towards the Mediterranean region. This conflict started to rise again between Turkey and its Northern neighbor with the change in latter's orientation toward Turkey as it got strengthened. And it was very clear in the pages of Erkin's memoirs that once again the Soviet Union began to be considered as a threat, correspondingly

⁴² Ibid., p.300.

⁴³ Ibid., p.315.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p.327.

the perception of Soviet Union was fused with that of the Tsarist Russia along with the hostile historical memoirs. In this regard, Erkin does not consider these Soviet demands as a sole consequence of the communist ideology of the Soviet Union, but rather saw these Soviet efforts as the revival of the old imperial aspirations with new ideological underpinnings. Therefore, he saw the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union as a historical extension of the Ottoman-Russian relations at the center of which the control of the straits used to lie. He phrased that “the ongoing preparations and the visible signs show that the dream and ambitious that occupied the thoughts of Tsars since the Great Petro made itself felt on the Soviet Union as well.”⁴⁵ Therefore, Turkey’s move towards the West did not have a direct ideological meaning, that is to say, for Turkey the threat was the Soviet Union whether communist or not. This in turn means that Turkey approached to the West, not because it was a capitalist but rather it provided a security umbrella to Turkey against the expansionary policies of the Soviet Union.

3.2.2. Soviet expansionism forcing Turkey to the West

The orthodox realist approach in Turkey has a semi-official character because they seem to be quite convinced of the official explanation for the basic tenets that guided Turkey’s postwar foreign policy portrayed by through declassified official documents belonging to the pre- and postwar period⁴⁶ and statements and memoirs of the principal diplomats and statesmen like İsmet İnönü and Feridun Cemal Erkin among others. In this sense, the writings of primary representatives of the traditional approach like Fahir Armaoğlu, Mehmet Gönlübol, Haluk Ülman, Selim Deringil, Rifat Uçarol, A. Suat Bilge, Kamuran Gürün, and Faruk Sönmezoğlu among others on the postwar Turkish foreign policy can be seen as an elaboration of the official views of those statesmen.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p.253.

⁴⁶ Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları (1935-1939)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973); Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1946)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973).

A large body of works has been produced and circulated among mainstream circles. Unlike the American orthodoxy and its subsequent realist critics from within, the orthodoxy in Turkey has a realist theoretical perspective from the beginning and realism in the Turkish context does not bear a critical meaning with regard to the foreign policy of Turkey. In this context, as in the US, these approaches bear the imprint of the political environment in Turkey. As a result, their interpretations of the Turkish foreign policy are dominated by a methodology which is determined by their political positions.⁴⁷ İlhan Uzgel in this regard notes that the realist paradigm is dominant in Turkish foreign policy studies, which in turn led to a perception and presentation of the Turkish foreign policy as a struggle for security and survival.⁴⁸ In this connection, the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union have been largely discussed within such a framework of security relations. That is, the observable or empirical aspect of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union has been presented as the reality itself. This in turn enables these researchers to present their analyses within a non-ideological framework and thus to keep the ideological character of their studies under the guise of power politics among states, which have as if nothing to do with ideology.

However, they even do not comply with the most essential assumption of the realist theory, which could be summarized as follows: Each state pursues its own national interests and preoccupied with the pursuit of power (power optimization) with a view to ensuring and maintaining its own security and survival under the anarchic structure of world politics. Thus, national interest takes precedence over everything

⁴⁷ İlhan Uzgel, "Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy Writing," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 4 (2007): 113-128, p.114.

⁴⁸ Uzgel lists the following points as reasons of this dominance. (i) That the developments such as the instabilities resulting from Turkey's geostrategic location, strategic conflicts and prevalence of use of power in these conflicts and rise of nationalism can easily and conveniently be explained by the realist approach, (ii) that the analysts, who are not professional academicians, adopt the realist approach, which has relatively simple assumptions and empirical correspondence observed in daily life, (iii) that Turkish political and military elites define foreign and domestic policy as a sphere of security, and that realism provides the necessary perspective in this sense, and (iv) lastly, in connection with the previous point, the effect of the security-based definition of foreign policy on academicians in their adopting security-based point of view as content and the nation state as the unit of analysis. İlhan Uzgel, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2004), p.16-19, 21.

else. As a result of this, morality is either set aside as a fetter to obtaining power or used as a guise to obtain the national interest.⁴⁹

Realism in Turkey has been even ambivalent in these essential respects, particularly in approaching to the orientations of US and the USSR foreign policies. While being convinced of the American moral superiority, the realists argued the US foreign policy as a part of defending the “world peace.”⁵⁰ Seyfi Taşhan writes in this respect that “the assumption by the United States of the role of leadership of the free world, brought moral as much as material support to the nations whose freedoms were threatened and gave them a new will to fight.”⁵¹ Such a conception of the US foreign policy was in compliance with the official position of Turkey. Upon the signing of Greek-Turkish Aid Act by President Truman, in his message to the American nation İsmet İnönü stated that “for us, this is a bright and hopeful sign indicating that the United States fully embraced its role of preserving and confirming the world peace.”⁵²

However, in the case of the Soviet Union, they conceived its foreign policy against Turkey as a result of its strategic calculations for expansion into the Balkans,

⁴⁹ For Realist theory, see E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Macmillan: London, 1946); Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (AA Knopf: New York, 1948). See also John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2001); Jack Donnelly, “Realism,” in *Theories of international relations*, Edited by Burchill, Scott; Linklater, Andrew; Devetak, Richard; Donnelly, Jack; Nardin, Terry; Paterson, Matthew; Reus-Smit, Christian and True, Jacqui (Palgrave Macmillan: England, Basingstoke, 2009); Jill Steans, Lloyd Pettiford, Thomas Diez and Imad El-Anis, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes* (Pearson Education Limited: Essex, Harlow, 2010).

⁵⁰ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (ODTU Press: Ankara, 2007), p.3

⁵¹ Seyfi Taşhan, “Turkish US Relations Revisited on the Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday,” *Foreign Policy* 11, no.1-2 (1984), p.4.

⁵² “Bizim için bu, Birleşik Amerika'nın, cihan sulhunun devam ve teyidi uğrunda kendisine düşen azim rolü tamamiyle benimsediğini gösteren parlak ve ümitlerle dolu bir işarettir.” İlhan Turan, *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler (1944-1950)* (TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları: Ankara, 2003), p.170

Mediterranean and the Near East⁵³ and presented it as the new threat for the “world peace.” It was this threat that allegedly brought the US and Turkey together. Oral Sander phrases it, “the Soviet threat was also felt in Eastern Mediterranean, and it was only logical that the leader of the Western democracies and the most threatened regional state Turkey would form close ties with each other and come to a certain understanding and form an organic tie.”⁵⁴ As in the American orthodoxy, foreign policies of these two states and their respective relations with Turkey have been portrayed as antithetical to each other.

Yet this difference in the early analyses began to disappear with the policy shifts in the official position of Turkey. Such an important shift was one in the conceptualization of the US and its foreign policy impetuses, the questioning came to a head with the tension between Turkey and the US in relation to the Cyprus crisis, particularly with the exchange of latter between the US President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Prime Minister of Turkey.⁵⁵ In this regard, for the orthodox realist approach, even if the postwar containment policy of the US was intended to preserve the world peace, this policy in time turned into a policy more preoccupied with preserving the interests of the US. Therefore, the orthodox realist approach conceptualizes the early US foreign policy not simply as a rational calculation of its

⁵³ Abdülhahat Akşin, *Türkiye'in 1945'ten sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri ve Orta Doğu Meseleleri* (İstanbul, 1959), p.8; Seyfi Taşhan, *Türkiye'nin Savunması İçinde Türkiye'nin Tehdit Algulamaları* (Dış Politika Enstitüsü Yayınları: Ankara, 1987), p.36–37.

⁵⁴ Oral Sander, “Turkish US Relations Revisited on the Centenary of Harry Truman’s Birthday,” *Foreign Policy* 11, no.1-2 (1984), p.11.

⁵⁵ This policy shift could be clearly observed through a literal reading of additional chapter in Feridun Cemal Erkin’s memoirs. The difference in his approach to the US and the Soviet Union in the additional chapter, which was written in 1967 as compared to the previous main chapters written in 1950s, is that in the high time of the Cyprus question in 1960s, Turkey tried to improve its relations with the Soviet Union as leverage to release the firm attitude of the US against Turkey’s Cyprus policy. Yet, as Erkin, who served as foreign minister of Turkey in the years between 1962 and 1965, frankly argues, these efforts to improve the relations with the Soviet Union were in no way considered at the sake of Turkey’s alliance relationship with the West. That is, Erkin phrases it, “... we told our counterparts that the system of alliances is one of the pillars of Turkish foreign policy. The various relations tying Turkey to its allies made this county an integral and inseparable part of the West. The improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations depends on the recognition and acceptance of this fact.” Erkin, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.368-395.

national interests, but they presented it, while examining its evolution, as devoted to the assurance of the “world peace.” This in a way perceptively denotes a fusion between the US national interests and the future of “world peace.” Nevertheless, since then these approaches started to question foreign policy of the US and present it as the pursuit of power and its own national interests.⁵⁶ In this sense, one can talk about more consistent realist interpretations in relation to the relations between Turkey and the US. Although internal dynamics under the shadow of the Johnson letter were more effective in this transformation, it anyway accompanied to the rise of realism in the US. Nevertheless, more consistent realist interpretations in Turkish orthodoxy did not come to the fore as a critique of official foreign policy similar to Morgenthau’s critique of the US foreign policy, but rather it simply corresponded to the shift in the official position with regard to the US. Yet, it can be suggested that the rise of realism in the US and Turkey has a similar rationale. As previously discussed, in the US the rise of realism in analyzing the Cold War corresponded to the years following the US involvement in the Vietnam War, which caused waves of global reactions to the US. This in turn culminated in the moral degradation of the US foreign policy. Indeed, realism was a response of the US academia to this degradation so as to restore its image against the Soviet menace. In this regard, the realists in the US attempted to guide the foreign policy of the US and to show how Soviet leaders seemed to be realists, while their American counterparts not. That is to say, with a view to making the world safe for democracy, the American leaders did not make an analysis of the world as it really was, but rather they were driven by a deep moral desire to refashion the world in its own image.⁵⁷ Therefore, the realist critique is not purely an academic exercise. Similarly, the realists in Turkey, as in their American counterpart, attempted to show how the US advocated its national

⁵⁶ In this sense, as Gönlübol and Ülman argue, with the mid-1960s the relations between Turkey and the West became one of the main problematics, what sort of interests and disadvantages did Turkey’s relations with the West has produced? See Mehmet Gönlübol and Haluk Ülman, “Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı 1945-1965,” *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 21, no.2 (Ankara University, 1966), p.151.

⁵⁷ For the meaning of the realist critique of American foreign policy, see Cox, Michael, “Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War,” in *Realism reconsidered: Hans J. Morgenthau and International Relations*, Edited by Michael Williams (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007).

interests on the sake of which it could even leave Turkey alone with the Soviet Union. Therefore, Turkey should pursue a realist policy against the US as well, given its support to Turkey against the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar years. Unsurprisingly, the realists in the US as well as in Turkey never abandon their conceptualization of the US postwar policy as a reaction to/result of the expansionary policies of the Soviet Union in the postwar period.⁵⁸ Türkkaya Ataöv describes the attitude of the realist orthodox literature in Turkey as “being conditioned to the US.”⁵⁹

As for the nuances in orthodox realist accounts, at one pole there is the simple orthodox approach that does not question the motives behind the American foreign policy. The related sections of Fahir Armaoğlu’s book, *20. yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi* (Political History of the 20th Century) can be given as the best example in this regard. At the other pole, there lie the more consistent realist accounts, the best example is Faruk Sönmezoğlu’s book, *II. Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Türk Dış Politikası* (Turkish Foreign Policy from World War II to the present). The other interpretations are somewhere between the two.

The analysis of a long-term historical problem emanating from the control and status of the straits on the center of bilateral relations between the Ottoman and the Russian Empires and later between Turkey and the Soviet Union is the leitmotif of the orthodox realist approach.⁶⁰ In this regard, with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia researchers show how relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union took the path of peace since both sides needed each other. In this context, Abdülhâk Akşin argues that Russia and Turkey came under a cordon sanitaire after the end of the World War I since both have problems with the winners of the war. As for Turkey, it was not able to entirely resolve its problems with Britain and France at

⁵⁸ Bağcı, *1950’li Yıllar*, p.3-4.

⁵⁹ Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, p.38

⁶⁰ See, for example, Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*; Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*.

Lausanne Conference. Mosul question continued to be a source of controversy with Britain. With respect to the relations with France, despite the signing of the Ankara agreement in 1921 which ended the Franco-Turkish War, Hatay question had not yet been settled. More significantly, the Italian threat in the Mediterranean turned out to be a source of insecurity in Turkey. Therefore, the security of their shared border constituted the basis for friendly relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Akşin maintains that by securing its North, Turkey prepared itself to the threats coming from the South.⁶¹ That is to say, it was a functional partnership between Bolsheviks and Kemalists neither more nor less.⁶²

The tension in the Turkish-British relations as a result of Mosul question together with the apprehension in Soviet Russia in relation to the rapprochement between Germany, Britain and France in the wake of the Locarno Treaties arguably resulted in the Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality concluded between the national government in Turkey and communist regime in Russia.⁶³ Yet, thereafter Gürün argues, the relations with Soviets began to decline starting from 1934. He

⁶¹ Akşin, *Türkiye'in 1945'ten sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri*, p.7-8.

⁶² After the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia the new regime withdrew from the war and made public all of the Tsarist Government's secret agreements. As a result of the Brest-Litovsk treaty on 3 March 1918, the Eastern frontier of the Ottoman Empire returned to the line before the 1877-78 war and before the status established by the 1878 San Stefano and Berlin agreements. According to the agreement, Russian forces had to withdraw from Eastern Anatolia within a six-month period, Kars, Ardahan and Batumi were to be returned and the Armenian militias were to be totally disbanded. For the realist approaches to the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union in the years following the Bolshevik revolution, see Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, 25-112; Rifat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, (Hava Harp Okulu Yayınları: Ankara, 1979), p.422-424; Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.1-103; Rıfıkı Salim Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri (26 Eylül 1939-6 Ekim 1939) ve Dış Politikamız Üzerindeki Etkileri* (Gazi University Press: Ankara, 1983), p.9-17; Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Der Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004), p.86-90; Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, "1919-1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 1-133 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.17-28.

⁶³ Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995* (Alkım Yayınevi: İstanbul, 2009), p.408. For the Locarno Treaties, see Oral Sander, *Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2010), p.32-33.

further puts forth although this decline was not yet obvious in the beginning, it became clear after the 1936 Montreux Convention.⁶⁴

According to the orthodox realist approach, while Russia supported Turkey's right to control the straits at Lausanne, in Montreux negotiations, it moved away from the idea of Turkey as the sole arbiter of the straits.⁶⁵ In this regard, beginning from the mid-1930s with the Montreux negotiations, Gönlübol and Sar claim that the straits once again turned out to be the most important subject of bilateral relations.⁶⁶ Though at Montreux Conference Russia officially seemed to accept Turkey's proposal, the relations between the two states started to take a turn for the worse, but one could not yet talk about a break up in the relations.⁶⁷ The concomitant development to the decline in the Turkey-Soviet relations was the rapprochement between Turkey and Britain arguably as a result of the British support to Turkish proposal for the new regime of the straits at Montreux and the rise of a common Italian threat in the Mediterranean.⁶⁸ What is more as Turkey and the Soviet Union entered into quest for alliances on the eve of a new war in Europe, the two countries began to make their own ways.⁶⁹ That is to say, the threat of war emanating from the German and Italian aggressiveness was presented as a significant factor on the evolution of the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union and their relationship with Britain respectively. In this regard, Bilge argues that "After determining the principles of cooperation with Britain against Italy, Turkey only then wanted to complement this through cooperation with the Soviet Union against Germany. As to

⁶⁴ Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, 133; see also Gönlübol and Sar, "1919-1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 1-133 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.110; Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.113-128; Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri*, p.18-21.

⁶⁵ See Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.151.

⁶⁶ The Convention set the terms of navigation including the demilitarization of the area, the establishment of an International Commission for overseeing the passing of foreign ships and the restriction of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits. Gönlübol and Sar, *1919-1938 Yılları*, p.109.

⁶⁷ See Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.133.

⁶⁸ Gönlübol and Sar, *1919-1938 Yılları*, p.118.

⁶⁹ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.438.

the Soviet Union, it wanted to keep Turkey on its side in the resistance against Germany and preferred to give priority to Germany.”⁷⁰

Accordingly, the distance between Turkey and the Soviet Union grew as the war became closer.⁷¹ Yet, this break up was considered largely as a result of Soviet policies since Turkey did its best to converge its security interests with those of Soviet Union because Turkey’s security measures against a possible war of aggression were not at the cost of the Soviet friendship. In this context, in order to counter the Italian and German threat, they argue, Turkey endeavored to get closer to Britain-France as well as Russia in order to secure its north and south.⁷² In line with this, Turkey signed the declaration of mutual assistance with Britain and France because it allegedly believed that the Soviet Union would join to the “peace front” as well.⁷³ That is to say, Turkey was not in an intention to depart from the Soviet Union, for that reason it welcomed the Soviet peace front talks with the British and the French.⁷⁴ Parallel to its negotiations with Britain and France for mutual assistance pact, Turkey proposed mutual assistance pact to the Soviet Union as well during the visit of the USSR vice Foreign Minister Potemkin in April 1939.⁷⁵ In other words, according to this approach, for Turkey, friendship with Britain did not mean a retreat in its intimate relationship with the Soviet Union.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ A. Suat Bilge, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türk Sovyet İlişkileri” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 338-427 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.130.

⁷¹ Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, 133.

⁷² Gönlübol and Sar, *1919-1938 Yılları*, p.118, 141. See also İlhan Uzgel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler,” *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 258-277 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012), p.274.

⁷³ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.438; Gönlübol and Sar, *1919-1938 Yılları*, p.140. See also Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri*, p.41-48.

⁷⁴ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.436; Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander, “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası,” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995* (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.137.

⁷⁵ Gönlübol and Sar, *1919-1938 Yılları*, p.118; Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.139.

⁷⁶ Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.137.

Nonetheless, no result was reached from the negotiations between the Soviet Union and Britain and French. Accordingly, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939. This was allegedly an unexpected development for Turkey and indeed, for Esmer and Sander, opened up a new phase in Turkey's foreign relations since Turkey was left alone with two Western states in the "peace front" to which it joined with the expectation of a similar initiative in the Soviet Union's part.⁷⁷ The new situation, Esmer and Sander further argue, came with a new dilemma for Turkey: Whether Turkey would abandon the British-French declaration by taking a stand similar to that of its old friend and great neighbor the Soviet Union, or it would leave the Soviet Union by maintaining its adherence to the declaration.⁷⁸

At this juncture, Turkey arguably decided to try a third way and Foreign Minister of Turkey, Şükrü Saraçoğlu visited Moscow on 24 September upon the invitation of the Soviet side with a view to reconciling the two friendships.⁷⁹ As Deringil puts it, "Saraçoğlu would strive at softening the strained relations between the Soviet Union and Britain and thus to get the Soviets closer to the Anglo-Turkish-French alliance."⁸⁰ In this regard, Turkey arguably was in an effort to play a role of a bridge between the West, particularly Britain and France, and the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union intended to assure Turkey's neutrality under the insistent pressure of Germany.⁸¹ It was these negotiations between the two states that have been regarded as the beginning of the break up between Turkey and the Soviet Union since the Soviet Union made unacceptable demands during the negotiations for a mutual

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.140.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.140.

⁷⁹ See Burçak, *Moskova Görüşmeleri*, p.75-105; Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.129-148; Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında* p.140-143.

⁸⁰ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012), p.92.

⁸¹ Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında* p.141-142.

assistance pact.⁸² The most significant one was the signing of a pact between the two countries that envisaged the common defense of the straits.⁸³

The unacceptable Soviet proposals were immediately rejected by Saraçoğlu and he returned to Turkey on 17 October without signing any agreement.⁸⁴ As a result, the negotiations for a mutual assistance pact between Turkey and Soviet Union in 1939 marked the end of Turkish-Soviet talks.⁸⁵ These negotiations arguably indicated that the Soviet Union did not want to sign a mutual assistance pact without getting a major concession from Turkey and this major concession was the control of the straits.⁸⁶ In brief, for the orthodox realist, the Soviet unilaterally chose to ally itself to Germany while making unreasonable demands from Turkey. At this juncture, nothing left for Turkey to do other than signing an alliance treaty with Britain and France.⁸⁷

After the outbreak of the war, besides the Soviet prewar direct demands and pressure over Turkey, these researchers argue that the Soviet Union also raised the issue in the German-Soviet negotiations in November 1940 with a view to convincing the Germans about its right to control the straits. While the aim of the negotiations in Berlin between the USSR and Germany was to establish both countries' new areas of influence in the world, arguably Turkey was on the Soviet-German bargaining table as well.⁸⁸ In relation to these German-Soviet negotiations, Esmer and Sander argue that Soviet demands were almost the same with those it

⁸² Bilge, *Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı*, p.388.

⁸³ Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında* p.142.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.143.

⁸⁵ Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.175; Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.143.

⁸⁶ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.145.

⁸⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.439; Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.143.

⁸⁸ See Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.149.

made on August 7 and September 24, 1946. This in turn means that the Soviet Union had always pursued the same policy against Turkey in the WWII and they had never abandoned certain demands in a period of six years.⁸⁹

The orthodox realist approach tends to evaluate the process starting from the negotiations between Saraçoğlu-Molotov and continuing with those between German-Soviet as the expression of the so called “Soviet intentions” and present these intentions as the basic factors having shaped the Turkish foreign policies during the WWII. In other words, Turkey’s all efforts were regarded as to secure its independence and territorial integrity against the Soviet pressure and aspirations.⁹⁰ In this regard, Kamuran Gürün pointed out that Russians pressed Turkey to enter into war which would probably ended up with German occupation of Turkey. This in turn would force Turks to welcome Russians as their liberators. Even if Germany did not occupy the country, this would have nevertheless weakened Turkey which would have been again a desirable result for Russia.⁹¹ In line with this, Mustafa Aydın argues that it was the Turkish Government’s apprehension about the Soviets’ intentions that largely kept Turkey out of the war.⁹² Such an approach to Turkey’s non-participation to the war in a sense comes to mean that the unreliable as well as opportunist policies of Turkey during the war were a result of its concerns about the intentions of the Soviet Union over Turkey.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.150.

⁹⁰ Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, p.503.

⁹¹ In this regard, Gürün further argues that Numan Menemencioğlu, as the then Foreign Minister, brought his governments concerns into the fore during the Cairo Conference and stated that “If our Çatalca line failed and the Germans seized the Bosphorus and its hinterland, how this would work for you? Then did we hope that the Russians would beat the Germans and would come to liberate Istanbul? Would the Russians liberate Istanbul for me?” see Kamuran Gürün, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası, 1930'dan Günümüze Kadar* (AÜ SBF Yayınları: Ankara, 1983), p.100.

⁹² Mustafa Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, 1939-1945” in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 399-476 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2001), p.448. See also Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.146.

Nevertheless, according to these accounts, Turkey's commitment to remain out of the war made it to be at odds with both Britain and Soviet Union.⁹³ That is to say, though succeeded in staying out of the War, after the war ended, this in turn returned to Turkey as a postwar solitude.⁹⁴ Yet this situation even soured with the developments brought about by the end of the WWII since according to the realist orthodoxy, as the Soviet Union strengthened its hands it began to collect the fruits of its great victory on the battlefield in different regions⁹⁵ one of which was Turkey. Yet unlike the Eastern European countries, Turkey did not fall under Soviet occupation. In this regard, though Turkey sought to improve relations with Russia through offering a Turkish-Soviet joint friendship declaration in May 1944, it failed to open the doors for Turkish-Soviet friendship and cooperation since for the Soviet Union recent developments were strengthening its position and allegedly waited for

⁹³ The orthodox realists purport how Turkey managed to stay outside of the war and keep foreign forces out of its borders despite the pressures coming from allied powers in different times from different states to enter into the War. Here the battle of Stalingrad was taken as the turning point. For them, while before the Stalingrad, Soviet pushed for Turkey's entry into the war to open up another front against Germany to relieve the pressure over the Soviet Union, after the Stalingrad victory Moscow returned its former pre-1941 position and began a "pressure policy" against Turkey. Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı*, p.450; Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.388. That is to say, the success in the battle of Stalingrad made Stalin change his attitude to Turkey once again because the Soviet Union gained the upper hand in the war. Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.179; Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.255. Meanwhile, Britain forced Turkey to take part in the war against Germany, for which the British military delegation held talks in Ankara in January 1944 on Turkey's joining the war and providing military assistance to Turkey, but these did not produce any result as well. In this regard, Gürün argues that an instruction to the US Ambassador in Ankara was even sent to tone down relations with Ankara at the request of the British. See Gürün, *Dış İlişkiler*, p.125.

⁹⁴ These were allegedly the years of "Turkey's solitude" which has been brought to the fore in a broader way in the years following the relapse of the Cyprus question and particularly Johnson letter since at that time arguments of "Turkey's Solitude" was used to strengthen its hand in resisting American pressure over Turkey in relation to the Cyprus dispute. Against a possible unilateral action of Turkey to the Cyprus, the US president pointed to the American support to Turkey in its tension with the USSR. In the letter this support was put into words as leverage to prevent Turkey from intervening into Cyprus. In this context, with the mid-1960s an emphasis on Turkey's solitude meant that Turkey had resisted the postwar Soviet threat with its own determination regardless of either American or British supports since it is argued when they decided to support Turkey against the Soviet Union, the tension with the Soviet Union had already been eased. The so called "Johnson Letter," delivered on 5 June 1964 by the then US Ambassador to Ankara Raymond Hare to the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü. For more on the Letter, see Süha Bölükbaşı, "The Johnson Letter Revisited," *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993): 505-525 and Haluk Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası* (Cep Kitapları A.Ş.: İstanbul, 1987).

⁹⁵ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.265.

a more suitable time.⁹⁶ Because in these months the Soviet Union could already see the end of the war, it was already preoccupied with the postwar international order than the war.⁹⁷ It was in this context that the Soviet Union forced concessions from the Turkish Government by making extreme demands, building up arguably its military along the border and through propaganda.⁹⁸ As a result, for this approach, it was the unreasonable Soviet demands that ultimately separated the two countries ways.

The first sign of a change in Moscow's attitude to Turkey arguably came in 1945 after the Yalta Conference with Moscow's denunciation of the Turkish-Soviet 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality on March 19.⁹⁹ The reason behind this decision was portrayed as the profound changes that have taken place, especially during the WWII, therefore this treaty is no longer in accord with the new situation and needs serious improvement.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the Soviet government stated that they were ready to negotiate with Turkey to conclude a new treaty. Turkey, in its reply on April 4, 1945, stated that "it accepted the Soviet suggestion to conclude a new treaty to replace the existing one" and indicated its readiness to examine with attention and goodwill any proposals that the Soviet Government suggested for the conclusion of a new treaty.¹⁰¹

During the second phase of the negotiations between Vyacheslav Molotov and Selim Sarper on June 7, 1945, the Soviet side raised two conditions for the conclusion of a new treaty between Turkey and the USSR. This time Molotov

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.254-258.

⁹⁷ Aydın, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı*, p.457.

⁹⁸ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.265.

⁹⁹ This treaty had been extended three times and was due expire on 7 November 1945. Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.265-267; Bilge, *Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı*, p.389.

¹⁰⁰ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.265.

¹⁰¹ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.268; Bilge, *Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı*, p.389.

arguably made proposals to make changes in the Montreux Convention and the Eastern border between two countries. For the Soviets, allegedly the straits should not be left to the will of Turkey alone and the agreement that regulates the border between two countries was signed at a time when the Soviets were weak.¹⁰² Molotov received Ambassador Selim Sarper on 18 June one more time and repeated their demands. Turkey refused to speak on these items and thus the possibility of concluding a new treaty, to replace the older one, was ended.¹⁰³

Realists argue that despite the Soviets suggestion of a new treaty to replace the 1925 treaty in accordance with the new international situation during the Molotov-Sarper meetings, at the Potsdam conference, the Soviet government tried to present these negotiations as if Turkey insisted on a new alliance treaty with the Soviets. Yet, they maintain that this statement did not reflect the truth since Turkey did not ask for an alliance treaty for no reason but it offered such a treaty upon the Soviet termination of the 1925 treaty with a view to finding out what its great neighbor wished.¹⁰⁴ In this regard, Bilge argues the expectation was that Turkey would make concessions under pressure. As a consequence of Turkey's decisive attitude, this time the Soviet Union tried to have the two great states approve its demands at the Potsdam Conference.¹⁰⁵

After the Potsdam Conference, Soviet maintained its pressure on Turkey. In addition to the propaganda activities through radio and newspaper publications, the Soviet Union delivered a note to Turkey on the common defense of the straits by Turkey and the USSR on August 7, 1946. After the Turkish reply, in which it kept

¹⁰² For the conversation between Ambassador of Turkey to Moscow, Selim Sarper and Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov on June 7, 1945, see Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1946)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973), p.261-263.

¹⁰³ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.269-273.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.289.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.289.

its former position, another exchange of notes took place with another Soviet note on September 24, 1946. These two notes were the official written Soviet documents delivered to Turkey, through which the Soviet Union arguably reiterated its demands *vis-à-vis* the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey. Under these circumstances, while refusing the Soviet demands and resisting the pressure it exerted, Turkey tried to convince the US and Britain how the expansionary policies of the Soviet Union constitute a major threat to the new international order. In the line with this, it worked hard to revive first its alliance with Britain and then establish close ties with the new leader of the West, the US. At some point, with rise of the Cold War as a result of Soviet's expansionism in Eastern Europe and Near East, the US started to intervene into the European affairs with a view to halting the Soviet expansion. First fruit of this new orientation of the US foreign policy was the declaration of Truman Doctrine through which the US promised to deliver aids to Greece and Turkey against the "attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." And this is in turn considered as a success of Turkish foreign policy in the sense that Turkey managed to get military aid from the US as the most powerful state to balance the USSR.¹⁰⁶

Therefore, postwar security considerations constitute the prime impetus behind Turkey's pragmatic approach to the US and Turkey's postwar efforts to join into the Western alliance under the leadership of the US resulted from Turkey's threat perception emanating from its closeness to Soviet Union.¹⁰⁷ In other words, the Cold War for Turkey was characterized by the Soviet threat, which entailed territorial demands on its Eastern region, specifically Kars and Ardahan and demands for bases on the Turkish straits. Consequently this state of affairs forced Turkey's state elites to join the Western bloc and its leader the US, which culminated in its membership in NATO in 1952. In this regard, this was an unwilling move towards the West, in the absence of such demands, Turkey's policy makers would continue

¹⁰⁶ Bağcı, *1950'li Yıllar*, p.8. See also Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, p.506; Gönübol and Ülman, *Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı*, p.151.

¹⁰⁷ Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih*, p.503.

their balanced stance between the West and the Soviet Union as in the pre-war period.¹⁰⁸

In brief, according to these approaches, the Soviet demands were part of a Soviet blueprint with a view to extending its power towards the Balkans and the Mediterranean. In this regard, they argue that the Soviet Union brought these demands firstly in the first months of the war during Foreign Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu's visit to Moscow in 1939. Subsequently, these demands were at the German-Soviet negotiation table in 1940. Thereafter, the Soviet claims came to the agenda at the end of the war as well. Therefore, they do not consider these demands as a diplomatic maneuver, as the revisionist argues in the subsequent section, by the Soviets at the negotiation table against Turkey with a view to ensuring security of its vulnerable Southern borders. Rather it was part of a long-term gradual plan of the Soviet Union to get control of the straits. These approaches reduce the gradual break-up between Turkey and the Soviet Union to the strait question which became a problem again as the Soviet Union changed its attitude against Turkey as it got stronger. In line with this, the tension over this historical straits question constituted the most important drive, if not sole, behind Turkey's integration into the Western alliance.

3.2.3. Soviet search for security

The revisionist interpretations challenged the widely accepted idea that the Soviet leaders were committed to postwar expansionism against Turkey. They argue that the Soviet Union's demands over Turkey, though in contradiction with the sovereignty right of Turkey, had a defensive rationale, and that the Soviet Union was in an attempt to secure its vulnerable South with a view to avoiding encirclement by the other great powers. Moreover, they argued that Turkey resisted to the Soviet pressure with its own determination because the pressure of the Soviet Union had already lost its intensiveness when the US support came.

¹⁰⁸ Bilge, *Güç Komşuluk*, p.352; Gürün, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri*, p.315.

However, the challenge of the revisionist interpretations do not have a radical character, they do not rightly locate the nature of the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Indeed they use a conceptual framework similar to that of the earlier orthodox accounts. That is to say, they do as well present and discuss the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union as mainly a security issue in the framework of the postwar geopolitical competition. In other words, the revisionist approach too has a tendency to reduce the relations among states to the security oriented geopolitical considerations. In such a conceptual trap, the revisionist researchers conceive the postwar conflict as great power conflicts between the new superpowers of the world. In this regard, while the orthodox realist accounts see Turkey's commitment to the West, particularly the US as an effort to balance the power of the Soviet Union which pose direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey in the postwar, the revisionist accounts see the tension between Turkey and the Soviet union as a result of mutual insecurity against each other. The contribution of the later accounts complicated the picture since, they see the claims of the Soviet Union against Turkey as a response to the latter's rapprochement with the Western great powers. Yet the reaction of the Soviet Union with the claims contradictory to Turkey's sovereignty rights dragged Turkey into a further insecurity. Under such circumstances, Turkey's domestic economic requirements constituted leverage to Turkey's state elite to enter into a close relationship with the US.

Within such a formulation, the notable advocate of the revisionist approach is Baskın Oran.¹⁰⁹ Unlike the realist orthodoxy for which the Soviet demands were part of a Soviet blueprint for further expansion, the advocates of the revisionist approach interpreted the Soviet claims against Turkey as mainly to ensure its

¹⁰⁹ Baskın Oran, "Türkiye'nin 'Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu' Sorunu Nedir? Türk Sovyet İlişkileri 1939-1970," *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 26, no.2 (1970): 41-93. See also Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler, 1945-1960," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran (İletişim Yayınları: Ankara, 2012).

security, that is to say, the purpose of the Soviet Union was not expansion, but to consolidate its security.

Baskın Oran as the primary representative of this approach argues that Turkey's tension with the Soviet Union has traditionally been discussed within an emotional environment in which the fusion of the Tsarist Russia with its agonizing historical baggage together with those of 1945-46 developments had contributed to this emotional theme. In this regard, according to Oran, the Soviet Union should not be regarded as expansionary state, but rather the Soviet Union in its relations with Turkey looked after its own security. He argues that the key concept to understand the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union is the geographical location. These two countries had problems because they were neighbor and this had two-fold impacts on Turkey. While the first one was the effect of the Soviet Union, the second was the effects of other great states rival to the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰

In this context, Oran argues that thus far the effect of the Soviet Union has been taken into consideration with respect to the security of Turkey. However, for him, the impacts of the other rival great powers on Turkey's security should also be taken into consideration in order to show how Turkey became instrument to the other great powers while trying to escape from the Soviet Union.¹¹¹ Moreover, he argues that the Turkey-Soviet Union security relations were mutually dependent on each other¹¹² because Turkey's security depends on the Soviet satisfaction of its own security. In this connection, he argues that because Turkey satisfied the security needs of the Soviet Union until 1939, they were able to develop good relations. Yet under the drums of war, in line with the orthodox realist approach, Oran maintains that the two states were dragged into different paths since the threat perception of each were not in parallel to one another. While for the Soviets it was Germany that

¹¹⁰ Oran, *Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu*, p.43-44.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.44.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p.44.

posed a threat from the West and the Balkans, for Turkey the source of the danger aroused from Italian activities in the Mediterranean.¹¹³ Moreover, as a result of the failure of the negotiations between Britain and France, and the Soviet Union, the latter approached to Germany and signed a non-aggression pact with it. Thereafter it began to make pressure on Turkey not to enter into an alliance with Britain and at least it forced Turkey to remain neutral with a view to ensuring closing of the straits.¹¹⁴ In relation to the 1939 Saraçoğlu-Molotov meeting, like the realist orthodox, Baskın Oran regards these demands as not compatible with Turkey's independence as well. Yet he does not see these Soviet efforts as expansionary, but rather for him the Soviet Union was in an effort to secure its vulnerable South.¹¹⁵

After the war ended, similar to the earlier debates, he claims that because the Soviet Union felt itself stronger, it sought to have a say on the straits.¹¹⁶ In other words, according to Oran, after the war, a strengthened Soviet Union brought its demands on the agenda as a result of its security needs against Turkey. However, he finds the Soviet demand to change the border between the two states unreasonable even from the perspective of the Soviet Union. But he does not see this demand as expression of the Soviet aspires to make border changes. For him, the most plausible reason behind such a demand was likely to be its value as a bargaining chip on the table to

¹¹³ In this regard, there is an ambiguity in Oran's approach regarding the target of his critiques whether it is the official foreign policy or the orthodox realist interpretation of this policy. Although he argues that security of Turkey and the Soviet Union was mutually interdependent, yet at the same time he puts forth that the two states were dragged towards unparalleled foreign policies with the urging of events. That is, for Oran, Turkey's rapprochement with Britain was a decisive factor for Russian insecurity against Turkey, but he did not see this as a misguided foreign policy move but rather see it as result of geopolitical consequences came with another world war. Then for Oran tensions between Turkey and the Soviet Union seemed to be an inevitable geopolitical consequence. This in turn means that the geopolitical considerations on both sides urged such foreign policy moves despite the contradictory impacts of those moves on their security. That is, no party was responsible for the break up. Thus the foreign policy of Turkey seemed not to be misled, then in this sense, his account is much of a critique of earlier interpretations and less of a critique dedicated to the official Turkish foreign policy. *Ibid.*, p.48.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.49.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p.49.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.55.

prevent the usage of the straits against the Soviet Union.¹¹⁷ Like Baskın Oran, Erel Tellal, another advocate of this approach, as well argues that “the main problem for the Soviet Union at the end of the war was to ensure its security in the straits” and argues that the USSR voiced territorial claims on Eastern Turkey as a bargaining chip.¹¹⁸ In this regard, the main difference between the earlier accounts and those of Oran and Tellal is that while the formers see the Soviet demands as expansionary, the latters see them as defensive in nature. That is to say, for Oran and Tellal, the intention of the Soviets was not to get control of the Straits with a view to expanding into the Mediterranean, but rather the Soviet Union put the claims on the table as a policy for safeguard itself.¹¹⁹ In other words, the Soviets made efforts to control the straits with the intention of closing the straits rather than using it as its port for further expansion.¹²⁰

In this context, what Baskın Oran suggests is that as a quirk of its geography, Turkey, having such a great neighbor, should pursue neutral foreign policy. To put it differently, it should refrain from close relationship or engagements with other great powers since this would inevitably make Russians feel insecure which in turn result in a similar effect on Turkey as well. He supports his views with the historical examples and argues that the South of Russia has always been this country's “soft underbelly.” That is to say, whenever it was in conflict with other great powers in different eras, Russia had always been afraid of an aggression by those great powers through the straits with the consent of the Ottomans. In this regard he gives the example of the Crimean War during which Russia came face to face with that fear. Consequently, according to Oran, at every opportunity, Russia tried to ensure closeness of *de jure* and *de facto* status of the straits to the non-Black Sea great

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.56.

¹¹⁸ Tellal, *SSCB'yle İlişkiler*, p.502. See also Erel Tellal, *Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Gelişmeler Çerçevesinde SSCB-Türkiye İlişkileri, 1953-1964* (Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları: Ankara, 2000).

¹¹⁹ Oran, *Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu*, p.46.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.46.

powers. This is why, for him, it has always been interested in the straits throughout history.¹²¹

Both Oran and Tellal consider the territorial claims of the Soviet Union as a big tactical mistake and argue that these unreasonable demands effectively forced Turkey into siding with the United States.¹²² Yet Oran does not find the tensions with the Soviet Union sufficient to explain Turkey's foreign policy shift to ally itself to the West because he also talks about the internal economic requirements of Turkey. He writes that

Turkey wanted to overcome the sense of insecurity the Soviet Union had created as being the one of the great powers contending for world domination by establishing close ties with the US as much as possible. In other words, while the Soviets pushed Turkey, America pulled. The economic imperatives of Turkey, which had to feed a large army as a result of this insecurity and whose revenues diminished due to the normalization of world prices with the end of the war, required to get aid from the US which was then the most powerful and wealthiest country.¹²³

However, he puts forward that “even if this threat does not exist and the burden of the army did not bring down Turkish economy, Turkey would nonetheless join the West and would become dependent like today.” In this regard he maintains that “the righteous response in the wake of Soviet threats within Turkey was tremendously exploited by the Western countries and the bourgeoisie who had economic interests in joining the West. By this way, joining the West was swiftly and easily accomplished.”¹²⁴ In this sense, he argues “there is not a bourgeoisie that would not

¹²¹ Ibid., p.46. Yet in this sense, there was one another ambiguity in Oran's argumentation, what was the reason behind the Soviet claims over Turkey? That is whether the Soviet claimed for certain privileges because it felt itself strong enough to demand from Turkey or Turkey left no choice to the Soviet Union but to ensure the security of its South as a result of Turkey's rapprochement with Britain.

¹²² Ibid., p.72; Tellal, *SSCB'yle İlişkiler*, p.502.

¹²³ Oran, *Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu*, p.66.

¹²⁴ Ibid., p.72.

want the entering of foreign goods into Turkey for its self-interest and that can produce without being in need of the technic and collaboration of foreign capital in Turkey.”¹²⁵ In line with this, for Oran, the reason behind Turkey’s efforts to enter into the NATO was not the Soviet threat which had already been disappeared, but its concern about foreign aid.¹²⁶ In this regard, one can argue that though Oran admits that the Soviet claims did exerted pressure over Turkey, these claims, at the same time, are used as leverage to ease Turkey’s integration into the Western alliance.

In brief, Baskin Oran challenges the orthodox realist arguments in relation to the main impetus behind Turkey’s ride to the Western alliance since, for him, the Soviet threat did contributed to this move, but it was not the sole decisive factor. The Western countries and Turkish bourgeoisie manipulated the Soviet threat to make Turkey enter into the Western alliance. In this regard, while the efforts to get aids from the US are regarded as secondary reason behind Turkey’s move towards the West in the orthodox realist accounts, in the revisionist approach, economic requirements ascended to a primary reason. Yet according to revisionists like the orthodox realists, Turkey approached to the US, not because it was a capitalist, but rather it was then by far the wealthiest country in the world. What is new in Oran’s approach is that he makes a subtle point to the dependent relationship of the Turkish bourgeoisie with the Western countries, in a way one can argue he sees the joining of Turkey into the Western alliance as somewhat contradictory with the economic development of Turkey. Yet he does not go beyond a certain point. Beyond this point is main motif of the radical approaches to which I have more to say in subsequent section.

What is at stake in the mainstream debate in relation to Turkey’s approach to the Western alliance has been mainly revolved around the course of deteriorating

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.72.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.72.

relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union. Researchers attempt to answer whether deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union forced Turkey to get close to the West or not. In these debates, the straits problem occupies the central place. For the orthodox realist approach, the relations took a negative turn as the Soviet Union altered its attitude against Turkey's sovereignty right over the straits. That is, as it got strengthened, it started to make pressure for privileged rights on the straits. In this regard, the Russian ambitions over the Turkish straits have been presented as the historic source of problem between the two countries. By the same token, in the postwar period Russian expansionary policies to gain the control of the straits allegedly seemed to force Turkey to join the Western alliance so as to attain a security umbrella against the Russian threat.

The revisionist approach does not raise a radical objection to the way the issue has been traditionally handled. The crux of the revisionist arguments lay on its conception of the Soviet intentions against Turkey. In this regard, the revisionist approach challenged the orthodox thesis in two critical ways. In the first place, it rejects the traditional argument that the ultimate objective of the Russian leaders was to access to the warm seas. On the contrary, it is argued that the Russian policies traditionally did not aim at opening the straits to expand into the Mediterranean, but rather they tried to close them to the other great powers. The relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey started to deteriorate because Turkey began to run over an important foreign policy principle imposed by its geographic location. That is, its close relationship with the Britain unavoidably pushed the Soviet Union an insecure climate since Turkey became closer to another great power rival to Soviets. This in turn resulted in the insecurity of Turkey as well.

To brief, the mainstream debate is mainly oriented with geopolitical considerations, particularly those between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Yet they have not been much interested in the ideological character of the relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union as well as the West, particularly the US. And resting on a realist framework, they consider the Cold War as a great power struggle between the US

and the Soviet Union in the postwar period, yet the critical point to the mainstream debate is that it was the Soviet Union that triggered the postwar global confrontation between the two states, that is, the measures of the US were regarded as reactionary in essence against either expansionary or defensive actions of Soviet Union.

3.3. Addressing the character of Turkey's relationship with the West: Radical approaches

The radical accounts, one can suggest, found a way to engage the Turkish foreign policy in the wake of two developments. These are the 1960 *coup d'état* and the rise of tension in Cyprus. While the first brought forth the 1961 Constitution which, despite its limits, released the internal pressure over the critical voices, the tension in Cyprus led to the re-appraisal of the American foreign policy and the NATO. The US attitude in the latter case in the 1960s created disillusion among public¹²⁷ as well as reaction against the unconditional faith of Turkish government on the US foreign policy. That is, the public reaction to the US attitude led to the questioning of Turkey's commitment to the US foreign policy, this in turn created a political atmosphere conducive for radical interpretations of Turkish foreign policy¹²⁸ to publicize their foreign policy alternative.¹²⁹

¹²⁷ Türkkaya Ataöv writes in this regard that "in 1964 tension when the US took its known stand, the Turkish soldiers who received medals in Korea gave their medals back one by one and news and pictures of this remained at the forefront of our press for weeks." Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*.

¹²⁸ Yet this in no way means that there had been no criticisms until 1960s against Turkish foreign policy, in this regard the *Forum* magazine, which was an important periodical began on 1 April 1954, covered various critical articles against the authoritarian politics of the Democratic Party as well as its pragmatic foreign policy. The foremost criticisms expressed in the *Forum* were related to the examples of misguided/wrong foreign policy decisions of Democratic Party. They accused the party leaders moving away from the Atatürk's foreign policy principles and pursued a non-principled pragmatic foreign policy. In this regard, these assessments seemed to be similar to those expressed by Avcioğlu (he himself along with Mümtaz Sosysal contributed to *the Forum* for a while), and other leftist Kemalists. Yet *Forum's* critiques had not a revolutionary radical character since they advocated Turkey's place in the West-East polarization in the Western bloc and did not question Turkey's commitment to NATO. For an assessment of *the Forum* see, Diren Çakmak, *Forum Dergisi: 1954-1960* (Phd Thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, August 2007)

¹²⁹ Until that time critical engagement with those issues such as Turkey-US bilateral agreements, the US military bases within Turkey, Turkey's membership in NATO had become a taboo, that is, the US support for Turkey against the Soviet Union was too virtuous to be criticized since its support was the decisive factor in deterring the Soviet threat against Turkey. This unreserved faith of consecutive Turkish governments along with the parallel approach of the orthodox realists in the US

Following the elaboration of the above two decisive moments in the rise of radical engagements with Turkish foreign policy, this section will continue with a historical analysis of the leftist currents in the 1960s. Then and there, the attention will be given how these leftist currents reflected on the foreign policy analyses. After having set up the historically informed theoretical context, this section will conclude with an appraisal of the two radical leftist approaches to the Cold War and the Turkish foreign policy.

3.3.1. Rise of the left as a new political force

Before moving into the discussion of how the left be able to participate to the Turkish politics in the 1960s, it seems to be illuminating to discuss why it was swept out from the legal political processes in the first place after the WWII. In the period after 1945, in an effort to adjust itself to the new international order, Turkish state elites comprehensively exploited “the Soviet threat” in accommodating its internal and external policies. On the one hand, the alleged threat coming from the Soviet Union was presented as the decisive factor behind country’s reorientation of its foreign policies towards the Western alliance; on the other hand, this threat was instrumentalized to determine the limits of the political opposition so as to laid the foundations of a legitimate space for pro-American and pro-market policies within Turkey. In this sense, the radical ideological and political currents had been marginalized and swept out of the political sphere until the 1960s.

As a result, the elimination of left centrifugal forces accompanied to the establishment of a multi-party regime in which endorsed political parties had more similarities than differences. In this regard, as Cem Eroğul argues, the crush of the

foreign policy in turn made Turkey’s commitment to the US and the NATO unquestionable in the face of an alleged Soviet threat. As a result, the radical voices had been swept from the political scene and their critiques were marginalized. Even critical voices against Turkey’s official position could face with charges of “treason” and “espionage.” Being one of the historical pioneers in this regard, Türkkaya Ataöv makes a brief description of the political environment of these times in the preface of his book, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*.

radical forces had been an important precondition for the establishment of a coherent multi-party system in Turkey.¹³⁰ This pressure over the leftist circles, despite the contrary expectation, was not released, but intensified even more under the power of Democratic Party (DP).¹³¹ Yet this heavy situation of the radical forces changed with the liberalization of the political sphere after the enactment of the new constitution of Turkey in 1961.¹³² The first movements that showed up under new conditions came with the 1961 constitution were the leftist movements.¹³³

Besides the new constitutional conditions which created a legal framework for the radical thought and political organizations, the worsening situation of the Cyprus crisis and the concomitant tension in Turkey-US relations constituted another decisive moment in the emergence of radical interpretations of Turkish foreign policy. This tension manifested itself in an infamous letter sent from US President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Prime Minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü on June 5, 1964, against a possible unilateral action of Turkey to Cyprus.¹³⁴ In this letter, the US president warned the Turkish government to give up its plans “to intervene by

¹³⁰ Cem Erođlu, “Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu: 1945-71,” in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Edited by Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak (Belge Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006), p.148

¹³¹ In an atmosphere in which the leftist poet Nazım Hikmet Ran was imprisoned, the leftist writer Sabahattin Ali was murdered, the leftist journalists Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel were forced to leave Turkey and many leftist professors of the Ankara University, Faculty of Language, History and Geography including Niyazi Berkes, Mediha Berkes, Muzaffer Şerif Başođlu, Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav and İlhan Başgöz were purged, DP emerged as the leftist intellectuals’ beacon of hope. Democratic Party as well sought to support all oppositional forces in Turkey until the final polls put DP in first place in the parliamentary election held on May 14, 1950. For analyses of the policies of CHP and DP against the left, see Taner Timur, *Türkiye’de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2003), p.99-116; Ergun Aydınođlu, *Türkiye Solu (1960-1980)* (Versus: İstanbul, 2007), p.39-44; Yıldız Sertel, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel Kimdi, Neler Yazdı?* (Yapı Kredi Yayınları: İstanbul, 1995); Çağdaş, *The Birth of anti-Soviet Image*, p.24-53.

¹³² Though leftist movements gained the opportunity to have their organizations with 1961 Constitutions, articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Criminal Code were still there and outlawed the establishment of communist organizations and communist propaganda.

¹³³ Erođlu, *Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu*, p.148.

¹³⁴ For the full text of Johnson letter, see www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html. (accessed on February 9, 2014). For an evaluation of Johnson Letter with the viewpoint of witnesses as well as the Turkish translations of Johnson letter and İnönü’s reply to this letter, see Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*.

military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus.” The US president reminded the commitment of the Turkish government “to consult fully in advance with the United States” on such matters. That is to say, for Johnson, the Turkish government must have consulted to the US government and got its consent before taking such a decision. Furthermore, Johnson wrote about the possible international implications of the Turkish invasion,

a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.

Besides, Johnson pointed to the fact that the Turkish government had right to use US-made military equipment only with the US consent and according to strict regulations,

the bilateral agreement between the United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. Under Article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished ... I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances.

The impact of this letter, as Gönlübol and Kürkçüoğlu recognize, went beyond the essence of the Cyprus event itself after such an aggressively-worded letter was leaked to the press.¹³⁵ In this regard, the exchange of letter between Johnson and İnönü has been argued to be a turning point in the relations of Turkey with the

¹³⁵ Mehmet Gönlübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “1965-1973 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası, in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 491-540 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.499. Johnson’s letter was published by the newspaper *Hurriyet* (Turkey) in 1966. Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politigi*, p.8

US.¹³⁶ İnönü's famous statement—"a new world would be established, Turkey would take its place as well"—seemed to confirm such an approach at first. Yet the character of this turn in the Turkey-US relationship is worthy to elaborate. In this respect, a statement from a high-ranking diplomat, Osman Olcay, who had contributed to Turkey's reply letter to the US, frankly reveals what this turning point stood for the Turkish government. According to Olcay, "it [Johnson's letter] was helpful and effective in revealing the real dimension of NATO alliance and the limits of obligations of the members of NATO."¹³⁷ As can be inferred, the turning point in Turkish foreign policy following the Johnson letter denoted a new position more cautious and careful in the relations with the United States rather than a radical policy change since there happened nearly no change at the level of action in the aftermath of the letter. Turkey neither withdrew from NATO nor closed the US bases in the country. Likewise, the bilateral agreements between the two countries continued to remain in force as well.¹³⁸ In this regard, to reiterate, the Turkish

¹³⁶ According to Haluk Şahin, it was Abdi İpekçi who used this phrase in *Milliyet* on June 10, 1964 for the first time. Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*, p.9-10. In this regard, as Şahin points out, the orthodox realists tend to portray the delivery of this letter to Truman Doctrine as a similar but in reverse as a turning point in the relations of Turkey with the US. That is, just how the Doctrine gave rise to a remarkable relations in the Turkey-US relations, the Letter reversed this era of good relations. See, for example, Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi*, p.937-947;

¹³⁷ Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*, p.111.

¹³⁸ However, after the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in summer 1974, the US imposed an arms embargo on Turkey. As a reaction to the embargo, Turkey terminated the bilateral agreement dated 1969 and Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil announced on June 17 that all US military and intelligence-gathering facilities in Turkey would be placed on "provisional status," if the embargo would not be lifted until July 25. The embargo was not lifted; as a result the Turkish government suspended all the US military installations except one air base-İncirlik within the framework of NATO on July 26. The bases were not closed, but their activities were suspended and their control was transferred to the Turkish armed forces. Yet in time as the Cyprus issue became an insoluble problem, the tension in Turkish-American relations steadily decreased which on the one hand led to the removal of the embargo (ultimately lifted in October 1978) and on the other hand led the American bases to re-start their operations. For further information on this embargo process, see Laurance Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of the American Diplomacy* (Times Books: New York, 1977); Burcu Bostanoğlu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2008), 494-501; Murat Karagöz, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years: An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making," *Perceptions* (2004-2005). As seen, while the US tried to force Turkey to withdraw troops from the island which jeopardized two NATO allies-Turkey and Greece, Turkey tried to use the US bases as leverage to open up a space for its Cyprus policy. Yet even in this case Turkey did not tend to withdraw from, or at least suspend its membership in NATO. Moreover, when it suspended all activities of the American bases, İncirlik air base was kept out of the negotiations and it maintained its operations. Therefore, despite this tension

government in the tension with the US did not intend to bring any radical changes to the basic principles/determinations of the Turkish foreign policy, the significance of this tension for the Turkish government pointed to a more vigilant attitude against the US foreign policy.¹³⁹

A similar attitude in accordance with the change in the official position seemed to take place in the semi-official realist approach to the US as well. The realists seemed to display a “sense of delusion” in a way accompanied to “the awakening” of the government of Turkey. In this regard, for example Gönlübol, Ülman, Bilge and Sezer argue that Johnson letter showed us that

the United States sees the Soviet Union as its enemy as long as and only to the extent this state directly threatens the American interests alone and [...] wishes to use the chain of alliances of which it is the leader for this purposes. This result of Johnson letter awakened the rulers of Turkish foreign policy.¹⁴⁰

In spite of all these things, reappraisal of the orthodox realists took the form of a modest position through making more consistent realist analysis of the US foreign policy against Turkey. That is, they did not question either Turkey’s place in the Western alliance or the nature of Turkey’s relations with the US and its membership in NATO.

between the two close allies, they were able to contain the tension within NATO and the relations between the two states could be restored at the end of this embargo process.

¹³⁹ Yet it should be noted that taking such a vigilant position against the US could not be comprehended without considering the pressure coming from the left over the Turkish government in responding the crisis with the US.

¹⁴⁰ “Birleşik Amerika, Sovyetler Birliği’ni bu devlet yalnız Amerikan çıkarlarını doğrudan doğruya tehdit ettiği sürece ve ancak bu ölçüde düşman saymakta ve ... lideri bulunduğu ittifaklar zincirini bu amaçla kullanmak istemektedir. Johnson'un mektubundan çıkan bu sonuç Türk dış politikasını yönetenleri uyandırmış ...” Mehmet Gönlübol, A. Haluk Ülman, A. Suat Bilge and Duygu Sezer, “1945-1965 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası,” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 191-334 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.332.

Yet the radical questioning came to the fore with the emergence of the radical interpretations of Turkish foreign policy. In this regard, the profound impacts of Johnson letter on the public opinion created in a way the favorable ideological conditions for the radicals to express their criticisms of Turkish foreign policy on the basis of anti-imperialist and anti-American sentiments together with a solid emphasis on independence.¹⁴¹ In this sense, accompanying to the rise of anti-Americanism in the public opinion was the emergence of the left as a new political force with its efforts to articulate nationalism with a socialist and anti-imperialist content. In this sense, by presenting themselves as the real representatives of nationalism in Turkey, the left deliberately attempted to give the concept its actual meaning with a socialist and anti-imperialist content. That is to say, “socialists are the real nationalists” since the main concern of Turkish socialists is to ensure the welfare of the people and the full independence of Turkey from the yoke of imperialism. A liberal economy and alliance with imperialist countries, particularly with the US, were the policies of “pseudo-nationalists,” whereas anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist socialists like themselves were “the real nationalists.”¹⁴² As its political discourses, strategies, and programs acquired a nationalist tone, this in turn contributed, on the one hand, to the legitimization of the left and, on the other hand, to overcome the heavy atmosphere descended over the left to participate to the political as well as the foreign policy debate.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ The below admission of Nihat Erim who played important roles in the determination of Turkey’s cyprus policy is illuminating on how Johnson’s letter was effective on public oppinion in Turkey. He phrased that “so far the impact of Johson’s letter on Turk-American relations had been notable. It could be said that Turkey was the only country in the world where it had not been raised the slogan of “Go Home” to the Americans up to that time.” Nihat Erim, *Bildiğin ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler içinde Kıbrıs* (Ajans-Türk Matbaası: Ankara, 1975), p.303 quoted in Şahin, *Gece Gelen Mektup*, p.10.

¹⁴² Gökhan Atılğan, *Kemalism ve Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar: Yön-Devrim Hareketi*, (TÜSTAV: İstanbul, 2002), p.103.

¹⁴³ For the uneasy relationship between the Turkish left and nationalism in the 1960s, see Erkan Doğan, *Articulating Socialism with Nationalism: A Critical Analysis of Nationalism in the Turkish Leftist Tradition in the 1960s* (Phd Thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, August 2010); Gökhan Atılğan, *Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968): Temeller, Ayrılıklar, AÜ SBF Dergisi* 64, no.3 (2009): 1-25.

In such a political climate in the wake of Johnson letter, the left addressed the character of Turkey's relations with the US, and found the US attitude in the Cyprus crisis as a clear indication of how the US commitment to Turkey's security was closely conditional upon its imperialist interests, despite the privileges given to the US for allegedly securing country's sovereignty and territorial integrity against the Soviet threat. The starting point in this respect is the fact that even if there were once Soviet claims over Turkey, they no longer exist. Yet at the time of the Soviet claims over Turkey, Britain and the US did not yet give any binding guarantee to Turkey; therefore even if there were an actual Soviet threat, Turkey would dismiss this threat with its own determination. Why did then Turkey sign agreements and join military alliance, which were contradictory to its independence despite the fact that the Soviet Union did not reiterate its claims and retracted its demands in 1953? Therefore, it does not make sense to explain Turkey's postwar integration into the Western capitalist world with an obsolete Soviet threat.

From such a position, the basic problematic of the leftist groups is Turkey's commitment to the US and NATO together with the problems associated with this commitment such as political and economic dependence, bilateral agreements with the US, the American bases. In this regard, they linked the socio-economic backwardness of Turkey with the political and economic dependency of Turkey on the Western countries, primarily on the US. That is to say, they saw imperialism as the chief obstacle to any social and economic progress in Turkey. As a result, they concentrated their criticisms on imperialist policies of the US and thus shifted the center of the analysis from Turkey's problematic relations with the Soviet Union to the postwar dependent relation of Turkey with the US with a view to explaining how Turkey's dependency on the US with its abandonment of neutral and independent foreign policy prevented the industrialization and thus development of the country.

At this point it is important to note that the contending revolutionary currents in the 1960s have reflected on the radical accounts of Turkish foreign policy in certain

important aspects. Therefore, a brief overview of the revolutionary currents in the 1960s will enable us to put radical interpretations of Turkish foreign policy into perspective with a view to revealing the roots of their different or/and similar standpoints to main foreign policy issues. In this regard, the below is an appraisal of the three main leftist currents as well as the debate having taken place among them in the period from the legalization of the left to the military coup of 1971. The three main currents are *the journal Yön (Direction)* as an intellectual movement,¹⁴⁴ WPT (Workers' Party of Turkey - Türkiye İşçi Partisi) as the political organization of the Turkish working-class¹⁴⁵ and the NDR group (who advocates the National Democratic Revolution as the appropriate revolutionary step before Turkey) as the old cadres of TKP (Turkish Communist Party) which emerged from within WPT as a reaction to latter's approach to the nature and strategy of revolution after the 1965 election.¹⁴⁶

3.3.2. The leftist currents in the 1960s

With the formation of the WPT in February 1961 together with the publication of the journal *Yön* in December 1961, the left started to show up in the political scene of Turkey. At the beginning, the radical front seemed to be united in an environment where it overlooked the internal differences among different groups. In this context, the two axes of left in Turkey in early 1960s, *Yön* and WPT displayed an image of unity on two different planes. While *Yön* was initially a platform where all of the radicals found the opportunity to express their views, WPT as a political

¹⁴⁴ *Yön* (Direction) was founded in 1961 and published weekly until 1967. The publication was the organ of the non-Marxist, left-wing radicals led by Doğan Avcıoğlu. Metin Heper and Nur Bilge Criss, *Historical Dictionary of Turkey* (Scarecrow: Lanham, Maryland, 2009), p.337

¹⁴⁵ WPT (Workers' Party of Turkey-Türkiye İşçi Partisi) was formed in 1961 by 12 labor union leaders belonging to the biggest (moderate left-wing) labor confederation, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions [Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu] (TÜRK-İS). Later, left-wing intellectuals joined the party. In the 1965 general elections, the WPT, under the leadership of Mehmet Ali Aybar, a former university professor, won 3 percent of the vote and became the first leftist party in Turkey to give members to Parliament. In July 1971, the WPT was dissolved by the Constitutional Court on charges of carrying out communist propaganda and encouraging activities designed to divide the country. Heper and Criss, *Historical Dictionary of Turkey*, p.316.

¹⁴⁶ Igor P. Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey: 1960-1980* (Brill: Leiden, 1992), p.109-121.

organization was a melting pot of different tendencies within the left. In the early period, it is possible to speak of a relative similarity in the views of WPT with *Yön* particularly on the issues of the non-capitalist path, anti-imperialism as well as the need for a national front. In other words, the struggles of the *Yön* as a journal and the WPT as a political organization were in a way complementary on two different planes.¹⁴⁷

Yet the breakthrough and relentless struggle within the left came after the 1965 general election when WPT gained 3 per cent of the total votes cast and won 15 seats in the parliament. This was a decisive moment in the sense while on the one hand a socialist party which “openly represented interests clashing directly with the ruling classes” was allowed to function in Turkey and gained seats in the Parliament.¹⁴⁸ Yet on the other hand the revolutionary agenda and strategy of WPT as the legal parliamentary movement came under heavy criticisms of the NDR group from inside and *Yön* group from outside.¹⁴⁹

After the 1965 election, the encouraging election results seemed to prompt a change in party strategy and the leaders of WPT started to speak of struggle to establish socialism in Turkey, though it had not been written in the party program.¹⁵⁰ In this regard, they started to formulate a new revolutionary concept on the basis of the

¹⁴⁷ In the first period, the discourses of both of these groups were not radicalized due to the issue of legitimization. And the legitimization of the left, as discussed above, corresponded to the worsening of the Cyprus crisis.

¹⁴⁸ Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (C. Hurst & Company: London, 1977), quoted in Serpil Güvenç, *Socialist Perspectives on Foreign Policy Issues: The Case of TIP in the 1960s* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, December 2005), p.2

¹⁴⁹ See Mustafa Şener, *Türkiye Sol Hareketinde İktidar Stratejisi Tartışmaları: 1961 – 1971* (PhD thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, 2006); Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*; Hikmet Özdemir, *Yön Hareketi, Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı* (Bilgi Yayınevi: Ankara, 1986); Gökhan Atılğan, *Kemalizm ve Marksizm*; Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, p.552-575; Aydınoglu, *Türkiye Solu*.

¹⁵⁰ Ertuğrul Kürkçü, “Türkiye’de 1968,” in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Edited by Ertuğrul Kürkçü (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1988), p.2070. See also Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.21-26.

indivisibility of national democratic and socialist struggle in Turkey. Aybar as the leader of the party argues that¹⁵¹

we won ... the first national independence war as an anti-imperialist war. Yet because the war was not accompanied with a socialist struggle at the same time, because no radical transformations were implemented, which would dissolve the economic basis of landowners and compradors; in the end, we are over again subject to imperialism.

That is to say, for Aybar, an anti-imperialist liberation struggle cannot be separated from a struggle against comprador capitalism, in a sense if the national liberation struggle would not be accompanied by a socialist struggle, it would end up with another failure as in the first one.

Such a transformation in the direction of WPT towards a socialist agenda in a way led to a debate among the left and thus to the dissolution of apparent “unity.”¹⁵² This, Ertuğrul Kürkçü argues, divided the common struggle of “patriotic” forces in a front against the US imperialism on the basis of an anti-imperialist alliance.¹⁵³ The most important outcome of this debate was that it brought to the fore a significant issue which in a few years determined the main axes of internal struggles within the left as well as WPT. The debate within the left mainly revolved around what would be the nature and strategy of revolution.

On the one hand, this was a debate over the nature of revolution which indeed constituted the essence of the collision between the advocates of Socialist Revolution (SR) and those of National Democratic Revolution (NDR). While the former pointed to the pursuit of a socialist revolution which at the same time would have to fulfill national democratic tasks, the latter referred to a stagist strategy to

¹⁵¹ Mehmet Ali Aybar, “Türkiye Sosyalizmi,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013), p.153-154.

¹⁵² Ertuğrul Kürkçü, “Önsöz,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013), p.33-35.

¹⁵³ Kürkçü, *Önsöz*, p.37.

revolution, that is, national democratic tasks were historical preconditions on the way to a socialist revolution which must therefore follow NDR.¹⁵⁴ The problem in this respect was mainly about what would be the revolutionary stage before Turkey whether a national democratic revolution or a socialist one. That is to say, the question was whether Kemalist revolution in the years following the war of independence had been accomplished or it had not yet been carried out to its final stage. On the other hand, the debate over the strategy of revolution was related to the question of leadership as well as problem of alliance among different classes or groups. That is, by relying on which forces, classes and groups in Turkish society, could the National Democratic Revolution or Socialist Revolution be accomplished? To sum up, the question of how the revolution could be carried out; whether through giving priority to the national democratic tasks and attaching importance to the role of the military-civilian bureaucrats as well as intellectuals or by advocating a strategy of indivisibility of socialist and national democratic struggle through parliamentary means under the leadership of the WPT as the political organization of the Turkish working class, rested at the heart of this divide.

At the beginning, the controversies became visible on the pages of *Yön* with “TİP Tartışmaları” (WPT Debates) which started with an article of Doğan Avcıoğlu entitled “TİP’e Dair” (About WPT) on June 17, 1966. On the issue of the nature of revolution, for Avcıoğlu, Turkey needed an anti-imperialist nationalist struggle because as an underdeveloped and dependent country; Turkey’s level of development was not convenient for a struggle for socialist revolution. That is, he proposed a gradual transition to socialism at this level of development. In this regard, Avcıoğlu argued that Turkey’s urgent problem was to get rid of its dependent situation which called for the agenda of an anti-imperialist nationalist struggle. It was indeed such a nationalist agenda, Avcıoğlu argued, what found its response in the circles open to anti-imperialist struggle which were not yet ready for

¹⁵⁴ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.109-112.

socialist struggle.¹⁵⁵ From this point forward, Avciođlu phrased, “WPT on the one hand considers anti-imperialist struggle as the number one issue, and on the other hand, by bringing the slogans of a classic proletarian-bourgeoisie struggle into the forefront, it is splitting and weakening the forces.” That is to say, he maintained, “WPT was waging two battles at the same time, yet due to the second battle, this led to, the breakup of the forces which are ready for the first battle and the breakup of the objectives.” Though for Avciođlu it is possible to conduct two battles at the same time yet the conditions in Turkey were not yet appropriate to such a struggle. Therefore, he proposed that “... in our opinion it is a vital issue to prioritize the national struggle against imperialism and its collaborators and to distinguish it delicately from the proletarian-bourgeoisie struggle.”¹⁵⁶ That is, Avciođlu argues, “the way to socialism leads through the struggle for national liberation. Therefore, today the chief task on the road to socialist reconstruction is the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle, which is the concern of all democratic and patriotic forces.”¹⁵⁷

In this debate, Mihri Belli as the leader of the NDR group within WPT was in agreement with Avciođlu and took a stand against the leaders of WPT. Similar to Avciođlu, for Belli, the conditions of Turkey were not convenient to a struggle for socialist revolution.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, he proposed a gradual transition to socialism, at this level of development. In this regard, he argues, “in order a society to have the stage of the socialist revolution; it is a must for this society to reach the condition of

¹⁵⁵ Dođan Avciođlu, “TİP’e Dair,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013), p.276.

¹⁵⁶ Avciođlu, *TİP’e Dair*, p.276-277.

¹⁵⁷ Quoted in Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.95.

¹⁵⁸ In this regard, he phrases that “who insists on conduct of democratic revolution and socialist revolution at the same time; who degenerates “the struggle for national independence is a struggle in the road to socialism” which in essence is an accurate view and puts it into the form of “we run together the struggle for independence and socialism; who puts forth the slogans which delete the concept of stage and confuses the minds; is doing nothing more than to split the revolutionary ranks and to isolate the socialist movement. Mihri Belli, “Milli Demokratik Devrim,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013), p.221.

a true independent and democratic society, that is, it must accomplish all the tasks of National Democratic Revolution.”¹⁵⁹ He further writes that “yes, our revolution is National Democratic Revolution. For the very moment of our history, the primary social contradiction that we have to solve is the contradiction between imperialism and its collaborators and the national forces of Turkish society.”¹⁶⁰ Therefore, for Belli, at this stage of development Turkish revolutionaries were confronted with two fundamental tasks; (i) attainment of national independence and (ii) elimination of feudal remnants.¹⁶¹ In this sense, according to Belli, while the national objective of the revolution is “to put an end to the domination of imperialism,” which “calls for an end to the control of foreign and comprador capital as the basis of imperialist domination in Turkey over the economy and thus the politics,” the democratic objective of the Democratic Revolution “is to remove feudal relations and to cut the means of domination and exploitation of land owners, usurers-merchant capital of feudal system over rural laborers.”¹⁶² In brief, Yön and NDR movements advocated anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle for overcoming Turkey’s social and economic backwardness as a separate initial stage before launching a struggle for socialism in Turkey.

As prioritizing the national democratic tasks as an initial stage on the way forward to socialism, which would cut Turkey’s ties with imperialist countries and sweep the feudal relations, Yön and NDR groups considered the national democratic revolution as the revolution of all groups and classes whose interests contradict with imperialists and their collaborators. To this purpose, they advocated a national front strategy comprised of all national groups and classes- including national bourgeoisie- apart from the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landowners. In this regard, Avcıoğlu argues, the leftist forces of the country have to consolidate on the

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p.210.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p.218-220.

¹⁶¹ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.34.

¹⁶² Belli, *Milli Demokratik Devrim*, p.218-220.

basis of a national democratic, not a socialist, platform.¹⁶³ Likewise, Belli argues that “National Democratic Revolution is a revolution of all national classes and groups and the success of the revolution is conditional on the establishment of revolutionary alliance (National Front) among these national forces.” Therefore, the National Democratic Revolution would be made against imperialism and its local “non-national” “parasite” collaborator classes- the comprador bourgeoisie, landowners and usurers-merchant capital of feudal system. This in turn denotes that the internal exploitative relations, that is, the internal class conflicts are underemphasized at this stage of development against the contradictory relationship between imperialism and the national itself. In other words, Yön and NDR movement gave priority to the external exploitation and evaluate the comprador bourgeoisie and landowners as providing the imperialists with leverage to exploit the nation. This requires the idea of a national front against imperialism and its collaborative “non-national” elements.

According to Yön and NDR movement, as the countries of Asia and Africa Turkey was an underdeveloped agrarian country where feudal and semi-feudal relations survived along with an underdeveloped capitalism under the economic and political dependence of the US, therefore the working class was not politically mature enough to be organized and thus lead the revolutionary struggle. From this point forward, Yön and NDR groups, though in different measure, assigned important role to military-civilian bureaucracy in their revolutionary strategy. In this sense, they argue, military-civilian bureaucracy and intellectuals in Turkey were in a historical manner the main forces against imperialism and reactionary forces. This can be seen both in Avcıoğlu’s and Belli’s analyses. For example, while for Avcıoğlu the Turkish army was the main power against the reactionary forces, for Belli the military-civilian bureaucracy as “the most conscious part of the petty bourgeoisie” was always against imperialism. In this regard, unlike the armies in the West, both

¹⁶³ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.95.

YÖN and NDR groups find the revolutionary character of the army as peculiar to Turkey.¹⁶⁴

WPT's approach to the revolution diverged from that of Yön and NDR groups on the basis of their evaluation of, the development level of Turkey, the national bourgeoisie, working class and military-civilian bureaucracy. Although, for WPT similar to YÖN and NDR movements, the main contradiction of society was between imperialism and all its collaborators and all laborers¹⁶⁵ and thus it called for the necessity of elimination of feudal remnants and imperialist ties as well. WPT had a different conceptualization in relation to the nature of the relationship with imperialism in the sense, as Küçük argues, for WPT it is not possible to separate the socialist and anti-imperialist struggle from each other.¹⁶⁶ For that reason, WPT denied the necessity of a transitional stage to socialism and advocated the indivisibility of the anti-imperialist struggle for independence and the anti-capitalist struggle for socialism.

This rests on its interpretations of national bourgeoisie against Yön and NDR's approach to it as a constituent of national front against imperialism. In this regard, Aybar writes that "in order to cooperate with the national bourgeoisie, there must be a class like this before. There is no such class [national bourgeoisie] in Turkey. That is, there is not an industrialist class which is distinct from comprador bourgeoisie and against American imperialism."¹⁶⁷ According to WPT, the alliance with imperialists made the national bourgeoisie a reactionary force, the reason is, for

¹⁶⁴ Belli, *Milli Demokratik Devrim*, p.245-246; Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.99. See also A. İrem Tunçer, *Peculiarism in the Turkish Left During the 1960's* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, September 2008), p.36-43. In fact, May 27 coup had critical impacts over the strategic considerations of revolutionary movements in relation to how to capture the power. May 27 represented the short way of how to come into power for the YÖN movement as well as for NDR. Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, p.568; Atılğan, *Kemalizm ve Marksizm*.

¹⁶⁵ Aybar, *Türkiye Sosyalizmi*, p.150.

¹⁶⁶ Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, p.572-573.

¹⁶⁷ Aybar, *Türkiye Sosyalizmi*, p.144.

Aybar, the fact that “because our mercantile class arose as a “comprador” class, that is, it serves as a mediator to the international capitalism pursuing foreign markets, the mercantile class failed to perform a development parallel to that of Europe, therefore industrialists did not reached the stage of bourgeoisie.”¹⁶⁸ By the same token, Aybar argues that “external and internal exploitation are closely bound up with each other, into what forms a single system.”¹⁶⁹ Therefore, for Aybar, it is not possible to separate external exploitation from the internal exploitation.¹⁷⁰ This in strategic terms comes to mean that the struggle against imperialism should be in tandem with the struggle against domestic dominant classes. This is because, according to Aybar, the dominant classes and groups (Large landowners, importers and exporters, industrialists and financial capital circles), who have exploitative relations with toiling classes, at the same time serve as mediators to the exploitation of country by the foreigners.¹⁷¹ Yet, this is not the only issue that Aybar diverges from the Yön and NDR groups, Aybar also argues that if the national bourgeoisie or middle strata would lead the struggle, they would reestablish their relations with imperialism in the future.¹⁷² Therefore, WPT under the leadership of Aybar put emphasis on the class character of the struggle against imperialism and advocated the leadership of the working class.

As embracing a different position *vis-a-vis* Yön and NDR, for the WPT leaders, the national democratic revolution was formulated for the newly established underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. That is, there were differences between the levels of development of those countries and Turkey. In this regard,

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p.142.

¹⁶⁹ Mehmet Ali Aybar, *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm* (İstanbul: Gerçek, 1968), p.607.

¹⁷⁰ Dış sömürüyü iç sömürüden ayırmak mümkün değildir. Aybar, *Türkiye Sosyalizmi*, p.153-154

¹⁷¹ Sadun Aren, *TİP Olayı (1961-1971)* (Cem Yayınları: İstanbul, 1993), p.221, quoted in Melek Zorlu, *TKP'den TİP'e Sol Kemalizm: MDD Örneği* (MA thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, September 2006), p.144.

¹⁷² Quoted in Suavi Aydın, “‘Milli Demokratik Devrim’den ‘Ulusal Sol’a Türk Solunda Özgücü Eğilim,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no: 78 (1998).

Behice Boran argues that Turkey has been experiencing the bourgeois democratic revolution since sixty years and the capitalist relations of production had already become the hegemonic relation. Turkish working class was qualitatively and quantitatively powerful than those of Asia and Africa and thus was able to lead the struggle for socialism and accept responsibility of the movement in the country against the hegemonic class. Boran sees the establishment of WPT as the strongest evidence of the spontaneous consciousness of the Turkish working class.¹⁷³

Similar to its rejection of attributing “revolutionary” features to “the national bourgeoisie” in Turkey, WPT did not tend to assign important role to the military-civilian bureaucracy as well since from the very beginning WPT insisted on the leadership of working and toiling classes and was skeptical of the character of the bureaucracy in Turkey. Yet beginning from 1966 as Aybar started to characterize the bureaucracy whether civilian or military as a class as well as a dominant class within a center-periphery conceptualization, the character of bureaucracy along with “Turkish socialism” as socialism appropriate for the conditions of Turkey began to be a point of dispute among WPT leaders, namely Aybar and Boran.

Aybar evaluated the bureaucracy through the concepts of *Osmanlı tipi devlet* (Ottoman type of state), *ceberrut devlet* (*despotic state*), *bey takımı* (class of landlords) and *bürokrat burjuvazi* (bureaucrat bourgeoisie). In this regard, he argues that bureaucracy as a dominant social class takes part in the alliance among the imperialists and the comprador bourgeoisie and feudal landlords. In fact, he sees the dominant position of the bureaucrats as peculiar to Turkey as the historical heritage

¹⁷³ Behice Boran argued that the national democratic revolution route was not compatible with the socio-economic conditions of Turkey for several reasons. (i) Although Turkey was an underdeveloped country, Turkish working class was qualitatively and quantitatively stronger than those of Asia and Africa and thus was able to lead the struggle for socialism and accept responsibility of the movement in the country against the hegemonic class. (ii) “Classical” democratic rights such as multi-party system, general elections, secret vote, eight hours working day, right to establish trade unions, right of collective bargaining and strike were existent in Turkey in spite of their deficiencies. (iii) Turkey had never been a colony in spite of foreign intervention, maintaining the characteristic of an independent state. Behice Boran, *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları* (Sarmal Yayınevi: İstanbul, 1992), p.206, 322-323, quoted in Güvenç, *Socialist Perspectives*, 32-33.

of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁴ In this sense, the category of bureaucracy of Aybar is antithetical to that of Avcıođlu. Yalçın Küçük argues that while Dođan Avcıođlu sees it as the source of all goodness, Mehmet Ali Aybar sees the bureaucracy as the source of all evil.¹⁷⁵ In this regard, while Avcıođlu's YÖN and NDR movements find military-civilian bureaucracy as progressive in a historical manner and expect the latter to lead the revolutionary movement together with intellectuals and youth, Aybar characterizes the military-civilian bureaucracy as a reactionary force along with the comprador bourgeoisie and aga class again in historical perspective. This is in a way, as in the case of Avcıođlu albeit in reverse, a peculiarity of Turkey under the imperatives of imperialism.

However, Behice Boran differed from Aybar and Avcıođlu as well as NDR group in the sense that for Boran it is wrong to argue that the bureaucracy is either progressive or reactionary. Unlike Aybar, she argues "today, bureaucracy as a whole is not a class in any meaning and measure, it is a stratum." And as a stratum, military-civilian bureaucracy has a contradictory and inconsistent character. Therefore, Boran maintains, it is not ahistorical character of this stratum that determines its progressiveness or creationism but rather historical conditions force this stratum to adopt a certain political position. For example, for Boran, with the 1950s, this stratum had been in power struggle with aga and bourgeoisie class, this in turn force it to adopt a position against imperialism and to be on the side of national independence, social justice, and the masses. That is to say, it does not have *a sui generis* character as Avcıođlu and Aybar argue, on the contrary its political

¹⁷⁴ See Aybar, *Türkiye Sosyalizmi*, p.135-141.

¹⁷⁵ For review of Aybar's approach on bureaucracy, see Şener, *İktidar Stratejisi Tartışmaları*, p.280-286. What is striking in this sense is that both Avcıođlu and Aybar rely on an ontology which perceives state-society relations as external to each other and do not conceive state bureaucracy from a class-based perspective. For the separation of state and society, see Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995), p.19-48; Heide Gerstenberger, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2007), 3-36; John Holloway and Sol Picciotto, "Capital, Crisis and the State," *Capital and Class*, no. 2 (1977); Simon Clarke, "The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodization of the Capitalist State Form" in *Open Marxism*, Edited by W.Bonefeld, R.Gunn and K.Psychopedis, Vol.I (Dialectics and History) (Pluto Press: London, 1992), p.133-150.

position depends on its relations with the social classes. In line with this, Boran argues, “if this stratum captures the state again, it necessarily has to rely on one or other clusters of basic classes,” therefore, the socialists should already try to emancipate this stratum from bourgeois ideology and to align it to working-toiling classes.¹⁷⁶

In brief, as presented above, the debate on the nature and strategy of revolution constitute the main axes among the leftist currents in Turkey in the 1960s. The main divergences were about the evaluation of the development level of Turkey and the role of military-civilian cadres as well as the character of the bourgeoisie class. While *Yön* and NDR groups advocated a stagist strategy, which envisioned a national democratic phase before launching a struggle for socialism, the leaders of WPT tied the national democratic struggle with the struggle for socialism and thus promoted the indivisibility of national democratic and socialist struggle in Turkey. What corresponds to this debate is the problem of leadership, that is, under the leadership of which class, the revolutionary struggle should be made. In this regard, though in different measures, *Yön* and NDR ascribed important role to military-civilian cadres and insistes on inclusion of the national bourgeoisie class in a national front alliance against the imperialism. Unlike the formers, WPT, which claimed to be the political organization of the working class, advocated the leadership of the working class. WTP rejected the existence of a national bourgeoisie in Turkey and thus remained distant to a national front strategy.

3.3.3. Reflections on the foreign policy analysis

Upon such a panoramic nexus of debate within the 1960s’ left in Turkey, the below is an analysis of how the different ideological and political positioning in relation to the nature and strategy of revolution reflects itself onto the foreign policy analyses.

¹⁷⁶ Behice Boran, “Bürokrasi üzerine Tartışmalar,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013), p.167-178.

Yön and NDR groups found the main problem facing each of the underdeveloped countries as being a nation against external forces. The primary conflict came to be seen as between imperialism and the country itself. Thus, socialism in this respect for the advocates of *Yön* and NDR had an essential anti-imperialist content rather than being anti-capitalist. Such a view necessitated the establishment of a popular national front with the participation of all national groups and classes including “the national bourgeoisie” against imperialism and “the non-national elements”—the comprador bourgeois and feudal remnants—under the leadership of military-civilian bureaucracy. As a result of such a conceptualization of revolutionary strategy, in their foreign policy analysis they do not much question the class character of the state bureaucracy.

This to certain extent results from the conceptual framework they employ in foreign policy analysis. The advocates of this approach are mainly preoccupied with the contradictory relations between imperialism and its collaborators and the nations rather than the conflicts among classes. That is to say, they mainly prioritize the conflict between the imperialist countries and the dependent underdeveloped countries. In this regard, the internal exploitative relations among different classes at this stage of development have a subordinate status. And within such a conceptual set up, they do not make class analysis of the state itself as well as the bureaucracy. As in their predecessor- *the Kadro movement*,¹⁷⁷ they were in a way in an attempt to influence the military-bureaucratic cadres so as to take over the revolutionary socio-economic transformations Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had started. For example, the adherents of Kadro movement had, Mustafa Türkeş argues, depicted Turkish state as representing the interests of the whole nation. Türkeş writes that “it is obvious that the members of the Kadro Movement made the discussion of whose interests the state should represent rather than a discussion of whose interests the state

¹⁷⁷ The Kadro movement was a nationalist leftist current in 1930s. It took its name from, and expressed its views through, the periodical *Kadro* which was published in Turkey between 1932 and 1934 by a group of intellectuals including Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge and Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu. Mustafa Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 1999).

represents when it comes to Turkey. In other words, they got stuck between the problematic of what is and what should be.”¹⁷⁸ In this regard, as in the case of Kadro, the adherents of *Yön* and NDR rely on an ontology which perceives state-society relations as external to each other and thus locate the state bureaucracy above all the societal struggles/contradictions. It is indeed this externality that abstracts the state from its class character. In other words, if they approach to the state from a class-based perspective, it would not be possible to advocate a revolutionary strategy under the leadership of military-civilian bureaucratic cadre. Therefore, in a manner similar to what Türkeş argues for the Kadro movement as “try[ing] to influence and transform the Kemalist state by avoiding making a class analysis,”¹⁷⁹ the abstraction of the state from its class character seemed to be a purposive effort on the part of *Yön* and NDR groups to advocate a “revolution from above” under the leadership of nationalist revolutionary bureaucracy and intellectuals.

The views of *Yön* and NDR groups corresponds to a foreign policy approach which puts emphasis on the dependent status of Turkish foreign policy and pays attention how Turkey became dependent on the US with its abandonment of independent foreign policy. In this regard, they advocated a fully independent foreign policy as not only a precondition for a secure relationship with the Soviet Union, but also as a necessity for a “revolutionary” national development free from any imperialist interventions.

However, they have not been much interested in the socio-economic properties of Turkey in their foreign policy analysis with a view to examining the ideological aspect of the postwar Turkish foreign policy orientation. As a result, they do not see

¹⁷⁸ Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi*, p.197-198.

¹⁷⁹ Türkeş, *Kadro Hareketi*, p.198. For an analysis of the intellectual relationship between the Kadro movement and the *Yön-Devrim* movement, see Coşkun Musluk, *The Relation between Nationalism and Development: The Case of the Yön-Devrim Movement in 1960's*, (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, September 2010).

decisive link between the socio-economic properties of Turkey and its foreign policy towards the Soviet Union or the US. That is to say, they pose important criticisms against the official foreign policy, yet not from a class-based perspective but seeing the route of Turkish foreign policy in wrong direction at hand of short-sighted statesmen under the influence of reactionary forces. Thus, they see Turkey's orientation towards the West and particularly the US as a foreign policy move, yet it was a miscalculated as well as a misperceived foreign policy move under the conditions brought about by the geopolitical consequences of the WWII.

Unlike YÖN and NDR movements, as the above discussion reveals, both in Aybar's or Boran's approaches, WPT's position corresponds to a distanced position to the military-civilian bureaucracy in strategic terms and in this sense it enables them to question the bureaucracy from a class-based perspective.¹⁸⁰ This is because WPT argued to be the political organization of the Turkish working class and advocated a revolutionary strategy through parliamentary means. As a result, they put importance on the leadership of the working class. In this discussion, though faced the accusation of "opportunism" by committing to the parliamentary democracy, WPT seems to have a class-based analysis and strategy. For example, it does not separate the internal class conflict from the contradiction between imperialism and dependent underdeveloped country.

From this point forward, the reflection of WPT position on the foreign policy analysis takes the form of a class-based analysis in examining the Turkish foreign policy. That is to say, the researchers attempt to examine the dynamics behind Turkey's integration into the Western alliance on the basis of socio-economic properties of Turkey. That is, they do not only put emphasis on the dependent situation of Turkey on the West in the postwar period, but also address Turkey's socio-economic formation and the social constituencies benefiting from the

¹⁸⁰ Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.9. In this regard, I take Behice Boran's analysis of bureaucracy as a reference point because Mehmet Ali Aybar remained distant to the bureaucracy as well, but not from a class-based point of view.

capitalist social relations as the prime impetus behind Turkey's integration into the Western alliance.

After having discussed in what ways the debates among the leftist groups in Turkey reflected on their interpretations of the Turkish foreign policy, the detailed analyses of the foreign policy approaches developed within these debates will be elaborated in the subsequent pages. In this context, there are mainly two approaches, namely left Kemalist and class-based approaches. While left Kemalism will be suggested as corresponding to the views of Yön and MDD groups, class-based approach incorporates the interpretations of the WPT.

3.3.4. Turkey playing the game of Anglo-American imperialism: Left Kemalism

This approach principally problematizes the contradictory relationship between national development and imperialism; in a way, advocates of this approach see independence as a precondition for the national development. The term left Kemalism will be used to define this approach because their main preoccupation was to achieve a synthesis of the main principles of Kemalism with those of socialism. This in a way implies that the advocates of this approach do not see Kemalism as inherently contradictory to socialism. Doğan Avcıoğlu and Türkkaya Ataöv are the principal promoters of this approach.¹⁸¹ While the views of Avcıoğlu will be appraised as the leading representative of the YÖN group, Ataöv's interpretation will be deliberated as an advocate of NDR movement.

The advocates of this approach link the social and economic backwardness of Turkey to the previous developmental efforts along with the capitalist path since for them the power of foreign capital and the dependence of Turkey on the West had

¹⁸¹ Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi: 1938'den 1995'e* (İstanbul, Tekin Yayınevi, 2000) and *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Ankara: Bilgi, 1968); Ataöv, *Amerikan Emperyalizmi; and Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*.

disastrous consequences on the country.¹⁸² This is because while the political independence of Turkey had been won under the leadership of Atatürk, it had not yet been accompanied by economic independence. This in turn led to Turkey to fall under the influence of imperialism once more because Türkkaya Ataöv writes “continuance of political independence was depended on securing the economic independence.” Yet, he maintains, because efforts to change the society were not taken beyond the superstructure, the social class structure of the country did not undergo radical transformations. As a result the landowners, merchants, importers took the state under their influence.¹⁸³ In this regard, Doğan Avcıoğlu writes that

Industrialization was realized in very small measure, nor was a democratic agrarian revolution – the essential basis for our development – brought about. Therefore, no real shifts in favour of progressive forces occurred in the social structure of society... Turkey nationalized foreign companies under Atatürk, but after the Second World War it made compromises: on the advice of American experts, to attract foreign private capital it adopted laws protecting this capital in the country, signed agreements with the governments of the US and the Federal German Republic, and guaranteed foreign capital investment.¹⁸⁴

As seen, both Avcıoğlu and Ataöv see the war of liberation as an anti-imperialist war, yet underline the incompleteness of Kemalist revolution the gains of which set back by the efforts of reactionary forces in the years following the death of Atatürk. Therefore, in engaging the postwar Turkish foreign policy this approach concentrates on the dependent relationship between Turkey and the US and thus its

¹⁸² Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.85. In this regard, Kemal Kurdaş writes in an article published in YÖN that “The Western world was able to develop in conditions of capitalist liberalism, passing through a very long and tortuous period lasting a century. Today, can an underdeveloped country endure a whole century developing within such a system? Moreover, in this 100-year period of development the system of capitalist liberalism exploited colonies and received help from new continents such as America and Australia. Turkey, which only recently was itself in the position of a colony, has no such opportunities. And if it follows the same path it will again fall into the hands of colonizers. Quoted in Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.90.

¹⁸³ Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, p.168-169.

¹⁸⁴ Quoted in Lipovsky, *The Socialist Movement in Turkey*, p.90.

critique addresses Turkey's commitment to the Western alliance at the expense of its independence. Thus this approach advocated de-linking of Turkey from imperialist countries for an independent national development trajectory since they see imperialism as hindering national independence and thus social progress in Turkey. That is, the advocates of this approach find the existence of comprador bourgeoisie and the feudal remnants along with imperialism as the main obstacles to the social progress in Turkey. In this regard, they advocate an independent foreign policy like Atatürk's foreign policy.

Doğan Avcıoğlu is critical of the Turkish foreign policy starting from 1939 because Turkey had lost its independent position through which the newly established republic once was able to establish close cooperation based on mutual trust with all its neighboring countries by assuring the security requirements of those countries. For the advocates of this approach, the basic tenets that guided the Turkish foreign policy under the presidency of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk constitute the main reference points in their assessment of the Turkish foreign policy for the period following Atatürk's death. In other words, they reinterpret Atatürk's ideas, words and actions and suggest these interpretations as ultimate references for the latter period. In this regard Doğan Avcıoğlu sees the success of Atatürk in its pursuance of a fully independent peaceful foreign policy. Avcıoğlu argues that Turkey gave a national liberation war against the British and French imperialism and avoided binding itself to military alliance with the great powers as well as gave guarantee all of its neighboring states that no harm would come to them from Turkey.¹⁸⁵ Furthermore, Turkey made close cooperation with the Soviet Union which was under the nightmare of war and imperialist encirclement and assure them that Turkish lands and straits would not be used by other states against Russia.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁵ Avcıoğlu, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi*, p.1601.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid. According to Avcıoğlu, such a policy of friendship with all neighbors on the basis of an independent peaceful foreign policy did enable Turkey to pursue modernization policy and an independent development. Ibid., p.1603.

Yet Avcioğlu asserts that the situation completely changed in 1939. “With an unnecessary rashness Turkey untimely bound itself to the British and French military alliance which came with only trouble, without bringing about any security guarantee,”¹⁸⁷ despite the fact that “Atatürk suggested neutralism in the summer of 1938.”¹⁸⁸ This pointless foreign policy move in turn, he argues, on the one hand drew Germany’s hostility to the Balkans and on the other hand confronted Turkey with the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁹ For the latter case, for Avcioğlu, Russia had already ceased to hope for reaching an agreement with the British for a mutual assistance treaty in early May 1939. In this sense, he sees the replacement of Litvinov with Molotov as foreign commissar as a shift in Soviet foreign policy. Under the minister of Litvinov, the Soviet Union had entered the League of Nations and called for joint action with Britain and France against the aggression of Germany, Italy, and Japan. In this regard, Avcioğlu argues, Molotov's appointment on May 3, 1938 denotes the abandonment of these efforts since the Munich agreement had increased the insecurity in Stalin’s Russia against the West.¹⁹⁰ In this context, Avcioğlu criticizes the orthodox realist argument that Turkey’s efforts to join the peace front were based on a belief that the Soviet Union would join the front as well. Though the Nazi-Soviet non-Aggression Pact (August 23, 1939) came after the Anglo-Turkish declaration (and Franco-Turkish declaration on May 12 and June 23, 1939 respectively), the replacement of Litvinov (May, 1938) and the German–Soviet Trade and Credit Agreement (December 1938) signaled the change in Russian attitude against both Britain and Germany. In such a situation, Avcioğlu maintains, by signing a non-aggression pact with Germans, Russia had opted for neutrality in the war between Germany on the one side and Britain and France on the other side.¹⁹¹ But as for Turkey, he argues, it abandoned its traditional neutrality policy

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p.1603.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p.1489.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p.1503.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p.1505-1506.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p.1508.

and declared its decision to make an alliance with Britain and France. To put it differently, Turkey's rashness to take part in Anglo-French alliance endangered its relations with Russia since Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939 denoted the abandonment of Turkey's traditional policy drawn by Atatürk at the cost of the neutrality that constituted the basis of the friendly relations between Turkey and its Northern neighbor. That is, it was this agreement that jeopardized Turkey's relationship with the Soviet Union¹⁹² since the Anglo-Turkish alliance given way to the possibility of extension of war to the Balkans and opening of Black Sea to the British and French navies.¹⁹³

In the new conditions, while Russia pushed for Turkey's neutrality with the concern of appeasing Germany and keep war away from its borders, Turkey in line with the orthodox arguments, Avcıoğlu argues, hoped for signing a mutual assistance agreement with the Soviet Union in Black Sea and straits as at the same time adhering to its alliance with Britain and France.¹⁹⁴ In this sense, in negotiation between Saraçoğlu and Molotov in 1939, Turkey pursued *politique de faite accomplie* in relation to its alliance with Britain and France; therefore it looked for an alliance with the Soviet Union which would be accepted by Britain and France.¹⁹⁵ As regards to the Soviet demands expressed by Molotov in the negotiation, he finds those demands as part of the Soviet efforts to discourage Turkey from its alliance with Britain and France and turn Turkey to its old neutrality policy. Yet, Avcıoğlu maintains, with the negotiations between Molotov and Saraçoğlu the two states separated their ways since there was no way to reconcile the two positions the parties held.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹² Ibid., p.1604.

¹⁹³ Ibid., p.1508.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., p.1509.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.1511.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid., p.1511-1512.

According to Avcioğlu, “if İnönü or a prime minister that did not involve in various events of the war years would have taken the initiative, the hostility and insecurity between Turkey and the Soviet Union created under the hard conditions of the years between 1939 and 1945 could have been accommodated. Maybe a trusting relationship with the Northern neighbor could have been established as in the Atatürk’s days.”¹⁹⁷ In this regard, though he finds the Soviet demands as ridiculous and inappropriate, he does not see them as the indicators of long term Russian strategy of descending to warm seas by getting control of the straits. For the Soviet denunciation of the 1925 treaty, Avcioğlu argues that this treaty which prescribed extensive cooperation in the foreign policies of these two states had essentially lost its meaning since 1939.¹⁹⁸ He maintains that “let alone cooperation, the two countries had come to meet each other through Churchill. Termination of the treaty did not carry any meaning beyond determining the current state of relations.” Yet in addition, for Avcioğlu, it can also be regarded as the expression of discontent from the Turkish foreign policy.¹⁹⁹ As for the Sarper-Molotov negotiations and Molotov’s verbal demands of border regulation and joint defense of the straits for a new treaty between Turkey and the Soviet Union, he claims that Turkey did not even search for a compromise and thus the negotiations ended at the beginning at the level of ambassadors.²⁰⁰ Under these circumstances, Avcioğlu maintains, even though it did not bring any security guarantee to the defense of Turkey, Turkish ministry of foreign affairs attempted to have British Foreign Minister said that “Turkish-British alliance is in effect,” this was preferred to high level bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.²⁰¹ That is to say, he phrased, “against Molotov’s demands Turkish government rushed to Britain.”²⁰² He characterizes this attitude as “Kamil Paşa

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p.1605.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p.1578-1579.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., p.1579.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., p.1581.

²⁰¹ Ibid., p.1606.

²⁰² Ibid., p.1584.

mentality” and positioned it as antithetical to Atatürk’s attitude. In this sense he further argues that “they had to face the consequences of resorting to the protection of imperialism as a way of salvation.”²⁰³

In relation to the postwar tension, he asks the question of who saved Turkey. He argues that Britain wanted the support of the US while the US suggested that “let’s wait, the big three might talk in the Potsdam.”²⁰⁴ Against the attitudes of Britain and the US, Avcıoğlu further writes that “its trusted allies left Turkey alone.” He adds that “... were Anglo-Americans ready to protect Turkey in the critical years of 1945 and 1946?”²⁰⁵ His answer is that neither Britain nor the US gave any serious guarantee to Turkey. He argues that while Britain was then in a total economic depression, the US was against the military assistance to Turkey.²⁰⁶ Like Baskın Oran, by drawing on Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, according to Avcıoğlu, “in those days, if Russia really intended to attack, Turkey was vulnerable and had to rely on its own strength.”²⁰⁷

To sum up, Avcıoğlu does not consider these demands as the forefront factor that drive Turkey to bind itself to the Western alliance. He rather considers these demands as allowing British to convince Turkish state elites about the Russian threat with a view to using Turkey for fostering its imperialist interests in the Balkans, Middle East and Mediterranean. Yet he further argues “though in words, Molotov’s absurd and inappropriate demands validated this fear.”²⁰⁸ In this regard,

²⁰³ Ibid., p.1606-1607.

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p.1584.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., p.1598.

²⁰⁶ In this regard, he adds that “but both states as well quickly adopted the role of Savior and protector of Turkey.” Here, Avcıoğlu implies a reference to the famous exchange of letters between US President Lyndon B. Johnson and the Prime Minister of Turkey, İsmet İnönü in mid-1964. Ibid., p.1598.

²⁰⁷ Ibid., p.1599, 1606.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., p.1604-1605.

according to Avcıoğlu, Turkey untimely bound itself to British-French alliance and thus abandoned its neutrality policies. All of these developments culminated in on the one hand deterioration of relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union and on the other hand the political and economic dependency of Turkey on the Western imperialist countries, primarily the US.

The other important representative of this approach is Türkkaya Ataöv. The works of Ataöv, *Amerikan Emperyalizmi: Doğuşu ve Gelişimi* (American Imperialism: Its Birth and Development-1967), *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (America, NATO and Turkey-1969) came in the late 1960s. Ataöv's works are pioneering in the sense that he for the first time in Turkey problematizes the Cold War itself as a subject matter. His discussions about the Cold War accompanied to the orthodox-revisionist debate in the US. He basically takes a revisionist position against the orthodox argument; in this regard his works are under the intellectual influence of the revisionists in the US. He writes that "A thorough analysis of the period 1945-1949 reveals that the conflict known as the Cold War today was deliberately launched by the United States."²⁰⁹ Because the basic premises of the Cold War revisionism have already been covered, at this point the details of Ataöv's analysis of the origins of the Cold War will not be retraced. Instead the below is his evaluation of Turkish foreign policy.

Similar to Avcıoğlu, he argues that "our national salvation war was an independence war. ... It was an anti-imperialist war against advanced capitalist countries and Greece as an instrument of them."²¹⁰ As different from Avcıoğlu, Ataöv sees it as an anti-capitalist war targeting the major capitalist countries and having no true ally in those countries as well.²¹¹ Yet, Ataöv maintains, the economic independence measures did not accompanied to this political independence which

²⁰⁹ Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, p.16.

²¹⁰ Ibid., p.168.

²¹¹ Ibid.

culminated in Turkey's reorientation to Western capitalism because those measures were not radical enough to transform the social power structure.²¹² In this sense, he argues, the efforts to create a Turkey bourgeoisie with the help of state ended up with a weak class having domination merely over small-scale consumption industry despite the fact that shortages and price increases during WWII strengthened the bourgeoisie.²¹³ As a consequence, Ataöv maintains, this class who failed to develop Turkey turned its face to major capitalist states to assume the role of being their internal representative. For Ataöv, the impulse behind such a move did not arise from the interests of Turkey, but rather the dominant class saw its own interests in this way.²¹⁴

In this context, Ataöv sees the 1939 British-French-Turkish treaty as the first of such a move towards the West. He further argues that "though this treaty at first sight gave the expression of an alliance against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, the credit agreements amounting to £25 million, £15 million and £31/3 million signed along with this treaty constituted the important side in the sense that they led Turkey again to borrow from the Western capitalists."²¹⁵

He regards these agreements together with the postwar developments as the penetration of imperialism into Turkey. He puts the arrival of the USS Missouri battleship to Turkish territorial seas within such a perspective. He writes in this respect that "American battleships appeared in our seas in the environment after the WWII when Turkish dominant classes were ready to open their doors to Western capitalism and imperialism."²¹⁶ A ten million credit agreement on February 27,

²¹² Ibid., p.169-170.

²¹³ Ibid., p.169.

²¹⁴ Ibid., p.170, 177.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p.177.

²¹⁶ In this regard, he further argues that America who, tried to move its capital, soldiers and mandate during the Turkish National Independence War and had to withdraw at the end of this war, no doubt wanted to turn back at the first opportunity. Ibid., p.178-179

1946 followed the arrival of Missouri and he writes “this agreement predated the Soviet notes ... and probably the signature of it had nothing to do with these notes.”²¹⁷

In this context, he phrased that “it seemed Turkey was already ready to enter into the West before the Soviet territorial claims and the enunciation of the infamous Soviet diplomatic notes.”²¹⁸

As for the Soviet notes, he argues that they came to the agenda as a result of the joint resolution taken by the US, Britain and the Soviet Union in July 1945 in Potsdam Conference. This resolution called each of the three states for handling this issue with Turkey individually and directly. In this respect, the first Soviet note (August 7, 1946) was the third note following the notes of the US (November 2, 1945) and Britain (November 21, 1945).²¹⁹ According to Ataöv, these notes were delivered when the Soviet Union felt itself weak under the postwar conditions. In this respect, the objective of these notes was to protect the Black Sea coasts of 2100 kilometers in length and to base certain claims on the article 5 in the Turkish-Soviet treaty (March 16, 1921) in which the straits were expected to be addressed at a conference among the Black Sea Coastal States.²²⁰

When replied to this note and the subsequent note delivered on September 24, 1946, Turkey was not a member of NATO and there were no American bases and bilateral agreements, Ataöv states. The Soviet Union did not reiterate its claims and he adds in 1953 it got its demands back.²²¹ In this regard, he writes “these notes should be properly evaluated, yet they should not be allowed to overshadow attitude of our

²¹⁷ Ibid., p.179.

²¹⁸ Ibid., p.177.

²¹⁹ Ibid., p.178.

²²⁰ Ibid., p.181.

²²¹ Ibid.

dominant classes as the real reason behind our integration into the capitalist world.”²²²

According to Ataöv, as Oran and Avcioğlu, the Soviet policies as defensive in nature since he writes “the conceptualization like ‘Russian desire for access to warm Seas’ is far from explaining today’s any truth and should be discredited.”²²³ In this regard, he accepts that the Tsarist Russia did pursue imperialist policies, yet for him it is hard to argue that the impulse behind these policies were the desire for warm seas. By making a historical analysis, he puts forth that Tsarist Russia deliberately sought ports only in direction of Baltic.²²⁴

In relation to Turkish straits, he argues the possibility of falling under the control of a rival state like Britain in 19th century forced Russia to deal with the strategically important Turkish straits. Yet for him in a historical manner Russia have not tended to expand in the direction of South. Therefore, Ataöv avers, the real purpose behind all these arguments about the Russian desire for warm seas was to put fancy dress on the fact that “Turkish dominant circles approached to Western capitalism and gave significant privileges incompatible to Turkish independence to the foreigners.”²²⁵

Left Kemalist approach does not indeed correspond to a radical break from the way previous approaches deal with the foreign policy issues in the sense that they as well evaluate the category of foreign policy within a framework of “national interest” as representing the interest of a nation as a whole. This is because, they see the main problem facing Turkey was being a nation against external/imperialist forces. That is to say, the urgent problem before the social and economic progress of Turkey was

²²² Ibid., p.182.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Ibid., p.183.

²²⁵ Ibid., p.186.

to get rid of its dependent situation on the imperialist forces. This in turn means that in their foreign policy analyses, they mainly preoccupy with the conflict between imperialism and the nation rather than the class conflicts that exist within Turkey. Even though they made class analysis of Turkish society, and defined certain classes or groups as “non-national element,” yet what makes these classes or groups as non-national does not arise from their exploitative relations with the laboring classes, but rather they are considered to be as collaborators of the imperialist forces against the nation to which they belong.²²⁶

If one takes the examples Avcıoğlu gives, one can see that he presents the foreign policies of Switzerland and Yugoslavia as a model to Turkey as long as they preserve their neutrality and independency despite the fact that they have different political economic formations. Therefore, one can argue that they criticize the postwar anti-Soviet and pro-Western policies of Turkey, but not from a systemic point of view, they find such a foreign policy orientation as a deviation from the principles of neutrality and independency. That is to say, similar to how realists see the postwar close relationship of Turkey with the West against the Soviet threat as a necessity of its national interests, advocates of this approach consider Turkey’s move away from a neutral and independent foreign policy by allying itself to the West as contrary to the national interest of Turkey.

Their conception of socialism is suitable for such a framework as well. As discussed above, because they see Turkey as an underdeveloped Third World country, they have a Third World socialism perspective. Their conception of socialism has an

²²⁶ Yet it would be fair to argue that Ataöv seems to develop a class-based approach with a view to revealing the class character of the so called “national interests.” He indeed questions whether there is such a thing as national interests and whose interests are presented as “national interests.” According to Ataöv, “the interests ... were a question of the protection of privileged status of the dominant classes. ... The interests of the state aimed to, one the one hand, expand its external sphere of influence and destroy the internal opposition. While all things were made in favor of the ‘national interests,’ the class dominating the state was looking to strengthen and prosper.” Ibid., p.168-172. Yet because both Avcıoğlu and Ataöv take the principles of independency and neutrality of Atatürk’s foreign policy as the main reference point, they evaluate the pre- and postwar foreign policy developments on the basis of these principles rather than on a class-based systemic approach.

essential anti-imperialist content rather than being anti-capitalist. In other words, the struggle for socialism was indeed a struggle against imperialism as well as a struggle for independent national development with a view to overcoming Turkey's social and economic backwardness. In this context, for the representatives of this approach, to reiterate, a neutral and independent foreign policy is the only way to serve the national interests of Turkey because it is considered to be a necessity for a "revolutionary" national development. For this reason, both Avcioğlu and Ataöv see the imperialism as the chief obstacle to any social and economic progress in Turkey, that is, Turkey's commitment to policies of imperialist West sustained the socio-economic backwardness of Turkey because of the pursuit of a capitalist path of development on the basis of foreign aid and private sector. In this regard, they shift the center of the analysis from Turkey's problematic relations with the Soviet Union to the postwar dependent relation of Turkey with the US. Therefore, they find Turkey's integration into the Western alliance as a product of the efforts of imperialist countries in collaboration with the reactionary forces in Turkey.

Though the advocates of this approach problematize the socio-economic backwardness of Turkey and link it with the political and economic dependency of Turkey on the Western countries, they do not see the decisive link between the socio-economic system of Turkey and its foreign policy toward the Soviet Union or the US. That is, they do develop an important critique of the postwar anti-Soviet Turkish foreign policy, but they do not make these critiques because they see the Soviet Union as not a threat, which is indeed part of their argument, rather they see the postwar Turkish foreign policy as a deviation from neutralism and independency.

3.3.5. Turkey allying itself to the Western capitalism: Class-based approach

The second strand of the radical approaches comprised of the group of intellectuals who advocate a socialist revolution and develop a class-based analysis in examining the postwar Turkish foreign policy. That is, this latter approach attempts to examine

the class character of Turkey's integration into the Western alliance. With the words of Yalçın Küçük,²²⁷

Turkey's intelligentsia, though familiar with the word class, is not yet able to get rid of the habit of thinking classless. In a classless society, everyone and everything is good. Only foreigners are bad. So ... in Turkey it is considered that the Cold War was started outside and Turkey entered into the world of evil with imperialism.

In this regard, the advocates of this approach discuss the issue within an ideological framework with a view to revealing the ideological character of Turkey's position in the Cold War. Yalçın Küçük and Haluk Gerger are the prominent advocates of this approach.

Similar to Avcıoğlu and Ataöv, for Yalçın Küçük as well, the year 1939 constituted a turning point in term of Turkish foreign policy orientation. He argues that "Turkey started to pursue a policy that did not give confidence to any of its friends in 1939."²²⁸ While initially having played between the Soviet Union and the British-French bloc, Turkey parted ways with the Soviet Union. For Küçük, this split came to light with the agreement concluded between Turkey and Britain in May 1939. This was followed by the alliance agreement signed in October of the same year.²²⁹

According to Küçük, when the war started and the fascist Germany made an assault to France, Turkey set the 1939 agreement aside, and signed a trade agreement with Germany in June 1940.²³⁰ Küçük states that this pact ensured the security of Balkan wing of the fascist forces, and constituted the last step for the war preparations against the Soviet Union. As for Turkey, Küçük maintains, this pact meant to join

²²⁷ Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, p.260-261.

²²⁸ In 1939, Turkey began to pursue a policy that did not provide non of its friends with confidence. *Ibid.*, p.265.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.266.

into the anti-Soviet policy of Hitler's Germany. For Küçük, Turkey was aware of the meaning and consequences of the agreement concluded with Nazi Germany in 1941 and knew this was a choice. That is to say, Küçük asserts, Turkey knew that this agreement would later make it difficult to "enter into the orbit of England and especially the US, on which it set its mind" later on.²³¹ For Küçük, because Turkey knew all these, it was aware by 1945 that it was alone even before experiencing this "solitude." This means that the lack of confidence Turkey caused during the war years made it difficult to find a place in the Western world.²³² In other words, despite the calls and pressures made throughout the war by Britain and its allies on Turkey to enter into the war, it did not enter into the war. This means for Küçük that "the non-participation in the second war was in conflict with the participation in the camp leading by the US after the war. There were not in coherence with one another".²³³ As claimed in the "official foreign policy historiography of bourgeoisie," Küçük argues, this resulted in the postwar solitude for Turkey.²³⁴ Therefore, for Küçük, "If Ankara feels 'solitude' due to its non-participation in the war Turkey demands war. To say the least, its interest requires war agitation".²³⁵ "Thus, in 1945 and afterwards, only a war could provide Turkey with what it longed for. If there was no hot war, it had to assent to a cold war."²³⁶

"It should be very difficult to launch the Cold War, this is because anti-Sovietism is inherent to the Cold War," Küçük argues.²³⁷ However, for Küçük, in the aftermath of the war, the entire world exhibited love to the Soviet Union which brought

²³¹ Ibid.

²³² Ibid.

²³³ Ibid., p.258-259.

²³⁴ Ibid., p.259-260.

²³⁵ Ibid., p.260.

²³⁶ Ibid., p.266.

²³⁷ Ibid., p.277.

German fascism to its knees, and to the Soviet people.²³⁸ Besides, “glorification of Stalin,” who lost prestige due to signing a non-aggression pact with Germany before the war, was undertaken as well. By this way, “it was tried to be conveyed that Stalin was not Stalin, and the Soviet Union was not communist.”²³⁹ Even so, for Küçük, “they were indeed scratching Stalin and the Soviet order. Yet, they thought they were praising them.”²⁴⁰ Within this context, it could be quite difficult to create the tale of “Soviet threat.”²⁴¹ Yet it was necessary because it was required for the US to bring and set up American democracy and capitalism to the countries adjacent to the Soviet Union for economic reasons.²⁴² Küçük phrases it, “in order to continue with the gluttony which had become a passion in the United States, it was required to promulgate the “American life style” to the other countries. That was why Cold War and anti-Sovietism were necessary.²⁴³ And that was why the tale of “Soviet threat” was necessary in Turkey and similar countries.²⁴⁴

Turkey was ready for this, Küçük argues; “Turkey was ready even before the Cold War preparation turned into a policy in the United States. Since it was ready beforehand, when Turkey began to shout that ‘I was being threatened!,’ nobody believed in the United States.”²⁴⁵ Therefore, after a while, “it was increasing its

²³⁸ Ibid., p.278, 281.

²³⁹ Ibid., p.279.

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p.279-280.

²⁴¹ The thesis of fabrication of this tale was quite important for Küçük both in terms of outset of the Cold War as well as Turkey’s entering into the Western alliance. In fact, Küçük puts forward that the “Soviet threat” stupefied all the brains from progressives to reactionaries in all over the world. Ibid., p.280-282.

²⁴² Ibid., p.281-282. In this sense, Küçük, like Ataöv, states by taking American revisionists as reference, that America launched the Cold War knowingly and willfully. See Yalçın Küçük, “Sosyalizmi Dondurma Savaşı” and “İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı” in *İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı: Soğuk Savaş*, Edited by Ferhat Telli (YGS Yayınları: İstanbul, 1998): 31-111.

²⁴³ Ibid., p.288.

²⁴⁴ Ibid., p.282.

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

lamentation within the country on the one side; and it was beginning to speak out ‘internal threat’ by creating communists on the other side. In this way, Turkey’s role in the scenario for Cold War was accomplished.”²⁴⁶ Consequently, for Küçük, “‘External threat’, and when it was not sufficient, ‘internal threat’ were coming together, and the Truman doctrine came about as the United States became conscious of new Market, new demand and new areas of influence.”²⁴⁷

Küçük links the change in the US attitude toward the Soviet to the presidency of Truman after the death of Roosevelt because, for Küçük, with Truman the US began to be governed by a team, which was “enemy to the world peace and anti-Soviet.”²⁴⁸ “Henceforward, the affairs of the team of Feridun Cemal Erkin-Edwin Wilson-Şükrü Saraçoğlu became easier.” For Küçük, Turkey played a very active role in the outset of the Cold War²⁴⁹ because “the prestige of the Soviet Union and Stalin was so high that it was nearly impossible to prime anti-Sovietism.”²⁵⁰

At first sight, Küçük gives the impression of relying on a systemic approach to the Cold War as comprehending the Cold War on the basis of anti-Sovietism. Yet by linking change in the US attitude towards the Soviet to the rise of Truman to the US presidency after the death of Roosevelt, he steps down to a revisionist position. That is to say, for Küçük, with Truman’s presidency, he governed the country with a team which was “against the world peace and preoccupied with anti-Sovietism.” In this sense, in Küçük’s account, anti-Sovietism of the US was not a systemic response; rather it was an ideological preference of the new US leadership. Such an approach corresponds to the revisionist debate in the US as the previous account of Ataöv.

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p.262.

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p.263.

²⁴⁸ Ibid., p.283.

²⁴⁹ Ibid., p.260, 280.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p.264.

When it comes to the debate over the course of relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union, Küçük argues, in the postwar period Turkey and the Soviet Union headed towards a new agreement, which would suit to the interests of the both sides and to the new situation.²⁵¹ Even he comes to state on the basis of the memoirs of Erkin that before the meeting of Sarper and Molotov in Moscow, and just two months after the declaration of the Soviet Union that it would not renew the 1925 friendship agreements, a new agreement was drafted which was ready to be signed.²⁵² However, for him, “all the developments rolled back after June 7, 1945 with a lie fabricated by Feridun Cemal and Selim Sarper.”²⁵³ In this regard, for Küçük, the claims of the Soviet Union for land and base from Turkey were fabricated by these two men.²⁵⁴ Put it differently, against the question of whether, by claiming privileged rights on the straits and border revisions in the East, the Soviet Union was a threat or not to Turkey, Küçük argues that these demands did not even come to the agenda of the negotiations between the two countries in the postwar period. For him, these demands were simply a fabrication of Erkin and Sarper. Therefore, the Soviet Union had never constituted any threats to Turkey.

Nevertheless, though these historical figures played important role in the deterioration of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union as well as in the process of Turkey’s integration into the West, for Küçük, those roles were only meaningful under objective historical circumstances. In other words, even though Küçük makes emphasis on the historical role of these individuals in the historical course, these roles are meaningful only within the historical objective conditions. That is, Turkey intended to enter into the orbit of the US due to its class structure,

²⁵¹ Ibid., p.301.

²⁵² Ibid., p.302.

²⁵³ Ibid.

²⁵⁴ Ibid., p.298-299.

and objective and subjective circumstances.²⁵⁵ He phrased it, “Turkey with its class structure, objective and subjective situation, wanted to enter into the orbit of the US.”²⁵⁶

Haluk Gerger as well argues that Turkey entered into the post WWII period as a solitude country and links this solitude in the international area to its unreliable moves during the war. He phrases it, “being torn between Britain, France and to some extent the US on the one hand, and the USSR on the other and furthermore the Nazi Germany, Turkey had to suffer from solitude satisfying none of the parties and to pay for its opportunist attitude, which lacked good faith and was away from principles and clarity, after the war.” In addition to the crisis it was experiencing in the international arena, Turkey was also undergoing a structural transformation process internally in terms of class relations.²⁵⁷ According to Gerger, economic shortages under war conditions made black market an integral part of life and this created an economy based on bribery and profiteering in Turkey during the war.²⁵⁸ For Gerger, “war profiteers, who got rich after this weird capital accumulation period dominated by war economy rents, especially commercial bourgeoisie composed of importers and exporters who profited from currency exchange rates, market oriented land owners, contractors, some shrewd small shopkeepers, agents and brokers, middlemen, wholesalers, usurers and corrupt bureaucrats were forming a new class bloc.”²⁵⁹ Regarding this as a new interclass balance, Gerger asserts that the new bourgeois bloc, overly enriched was and diversified with the corrupt bureaucrats, “was no more contended with its dominance in the economy and

²⁵⁵ For Küçük, Ismet Pasha did not see any harm in bilateral meetings with the Soviet Union and important steps were taken. After a while, Ismet Pasha too “understood” the objective circumstances. And, he became a vigorous advocate of American policy even before he was overthrown in 1950. *Ibid.*, p.302-303.

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁵⁷ Gerger, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası*, 12-13.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p.43.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

demanded political power as well, with the courage it gets from internal and external conditions.” He also places DP’s rise and coming to power within this context. However, according to Gerger, the transformation began not with DP but in RPP and with RPP. For Gerger, RPP, which realized the importance of international and domestic transformation, tried to catch up with this transformation and considered the chances of relying on the new dominant bloc inside and the US outside.²⁶⁰ Within this respect, Gerger views the post-war transition to multiparty system as image making and describes the internal transition to liberal capitalism and the external leaning towards US impact as main targets of the new era. Between these two targets, suggests Gerger, “there is an organic unity, beyond a complete harmony.” Therefore, Gerger goes on, “it both met the requirements of international capitalism and acted in line with the given foreign policy, and responded internally to the demands of the new dominant class bloc which had gained power.”²⁶¹ According to Gerger, transformation and harmony started with RPP during one-party regime and following the transition to multi-party regime, RPP and DP were equally ambitious in the issues of “articulation with international capitalism, free trade policy, foreign debt and credit provision, promoting national and foreign capital and leaning politically towards the American camp”. Gerger states that the US and Turkey’s new bourgeois power bloc came together under these conditions, in the militarist market of the Cold War, in an environment of tension and conflict.²⁶²

With regard to relations with the USSR, Gerger argues that Turkey is “gripped by traditional suspect – fear – mistrust psychology”, within its post-war loneliness.”²⁶³ Making an important emphasis at this point, he notes that the post-war reputation and proven “alternative laborer project” of the Soviets created “an anti-Soviet

²⁶⁰ Ibid., p.48.

²⁶¹ Ibid.

²⁶² Ibid., p.54.

²⁶³ Ibid., p.55.

psychosis” in Turkey.”²⁶⁴ In return, Gerger maintains, Soviets “demanded to secure the relations for themselves under the new conditions and within the universal polarization that they saw approaching.”²⁶⁵ He argues that (i) Turkey’s “natural orientation,” (ii) Turkey’s attitude during the war, (iii) Turkey’s strategic location that gets concretized in the straits, and (iv) the mistrust stemming from the long border shared with Turkey were decisive in USSR’s approach and attitude toward Turkey.

Gerger claims that the relations that got tense after the notes delivered by the Soviets to Turkey were used as (i) “demagogical excuse of, socio-psychological preparation for, legitimacy basis of Turkey’s determined direction towards the American camp” and (ii) “a kind of blackmail against the US for attracting attention to Turkey through exaggerated threat”.²⁶⁶

However, for Gerger, there are more important objective domestic and external reasons of Turkey’s direction towards the West, which are beyond the tension with the USSR. In his evaluation within this respect, Gerger states that Stalin’s demands (and irrespective of their being realized or not) were in no way relevant to Turkey’s entry in NATO. To justify his argument, Gerger argues that Turkey was still going to enter into Western camp and NATO, even if it were geographically part of another region of Europe, as a result of similar class-based and economic reasons, like Portugal and Spain. In this regard, touching upon a significant point, Gerger asserts that the dominant classes had a real fear about the USSR. As he also puts it, “Soviet Reality had an impact of reawakening their [bourgeoisie of Turkey] structural class-based fears.” Therefore, Gerger argues, “Turkish bourgeoisie

²⁶⁴ Ibid., p.56.

²⁶⁵ Ibid.

²⁶⁶ Ibid., p.57.

perceived the Cold War also as a kind of ‘international civil war’ between labor and capital.”²⁶⁷

Therefore, Gerger says, Turkey used internal and external threat campaigns to prevent domestic opponents from being directed towards undesirable ends, on the one hand, and kept this blackmail of internal and external enemy on the agenda to get multipurpose aids from the US, similar to Yalçın Küçük’s argument, on the other, within the rising Cold War environment. Again in line with Küçük, Gerger states that Turkish dominant classes needed an environment of tension/conflict, within which the discourse of the existence of internal and external threats could be effective in Turkey and thus they could provide military services to get the targeted aims.²⁶⁸ Gerger further suggests that, “Turkey accomplished being one of the two countries mentioned in a text, which could mean declaration of the Cold War”, with the declaration of Truman Doctrine, “and in the meantime managed to guarantee a promise of aid by the US.”²⁶⁹

Similar to Küçük’s, in Gerger’s perspective as well, there were objective internal and external factors that go beyond the tension with the Soviet Union in Turkey’s drive to the West. And like Küçük, he tries to overcome the debate over “the Soviet threat” and argues that the Soviet demands had nothing to do with Turkey’s determination toward the West. In relation to the origins of the Cold War Gerger does not manage to overcome the revisionist agenda of the US Cold War debate as well because, for Gerger, the Cold War was born out of the postwar necessities of capitalist restructuring.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁷ Ibid., p.58.

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p.59.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p.62.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p.33-39.

To sum up, as could be seen from the above, both Küçük and Gerger attempt to overcome the existing literature in relation to the debate over the Cold War as well as the Soviet demands on Turkey. Indeed, their works make significant contributions to the literature in understanding the class character of the postwar Turkish foreign policy, yet they are not immune to criticism. While Küçük simply rejects the Soviet demands themselves, Gerger ignores these demands by disassociating these demands from Turkey's determination toward the West. In other words, while Küçük argues that such a geopolitical conflict had never taken place between Turkey and the Soviet Union and thus it was a fabricated story, Gerger claims that this geopolitical tension between the two states was simply irrelevant to Turkey's postwar orientation. That is, both researchers tend not to see the geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey which appears to dominate the Turkish Cold War literature as an effective factor behind its postwar determination toward the West. From this point forward, for both researchers, there were objective class dynamics behind Turkey's articulation with the West, yet they are unable to integrate the postwar geopolitical tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union with their political economic framework. They just find this geopolitical conflict as either fabricated or irrelevant. In a way, one can suggest, they could not explain and integrate this geopolitical tension with its socio-economic dimensions. Thus, they end up with being stuck in this debate either since they could not establish a meaningful relation between these demands, the Cold War and Turkey's position.

3.4. Conclusion

In Turkey, the realist orthodoxy has been challenged on three main aspects. These are; (i) revisionist criticism addressing the objective of the Soviet demands as search for security, (ii) left Kemalist criticism pointing to the abandonment of the independent and neutral foreign policy of Turkey as the forefront factor behind Turkey's geopolitical problems with its neighbors, and (iii) class-based criticism revealing the socio-economic dimension of Turkey's integration into the Western capitalist alliance.

The Soviet Union acting with expansionist impulses, in the orthodox realist accounts, was unquestionably a threat to Turkey. What revisionists did was to bring this Soviet threat into question. Nevertheless, for revisionist as well, as long as the Soviet claims over Turkey contradicts with Turkey's sovereignty rights over the straits, the Soviet Union was a geopolitical threat to Turkey. Yet unlike realists, this threat was not considered as an outcome of the expansionist Soviet policies, but rather it was a result of security-oriented considerations of the Soviets. Nonetheless, both orthodox realists and revisionists employ a conceptual framework which sees the rivalry between states as the center of analysis and thus they are largely preoccupied with explaining how geopolitical circumstances constitute the prime dynamics behind state's foreign policy orientation. Within such a framework, they see the Cold War as a continuation of conventional great power competition in a new international bipolar structure.

The worsening of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union, in the orthodox realist accounts, was presented as a result of the change in Soviet policies against Turkey in the years following the WWII. Therefore, Turkey's approach to the West is seen, in these accounts, as a result of the change in the attitude of the Soviet Union against Turkey. That is, the Soviet Union left Turkey no other choice but to get closer to the US with a view to balancing the Soviet power and thus getting a security umbrella against the Soviet menace. These orthodox arguments were challenged by the left Kemalists. For left Kemalists, by joining to the British-French alliance and thus abandoning its neutrality policy, Turkey in the first place caused the deterioration of relation with the Soviet Union. That is to say, it was Turkey, not the Soviets, which had changed its policies and led to the deterioration of relations between the two countries. In this regard, for the left Kemalists, the Soviet intention was misconceived at hands of incompetent statesmen (Avcioğlu) and manipulated by the imperialists and their internal collaborators (Ataöv). Nevertheless, left Kemalists, as the orthodox and revisionists, kept on seeing the

Cold War as mainly a geopolitical conflict between the Western imperialist states and the Soviet Union.

The orthodox realists see Turkey's integration into the Western bloc as driven by mainly geopolitical considerations in the face of the Soviet threat. In their analyses, they are mainly preoccupied with the policies of states and not much interested in the internal political struggles among different social classes. Against the geopolitically-oriented and state-based analyses, the class-based approach develops a political economic analysis of Turkey's postwar foreign policy. In this regard, Turkey's drive to the West is not interpreted as motivated by the "Soviet threat" on the basis of geopolitical considerations since the so called "Soviet threat" was considered as either fabricated (Küçük) or irrelevant to Turkey's determination toward the Western bloc (Gerger). There were objective class dynamics behind Turkey's integration into the Western bloc.

To sum up, the review of the debate within the Turkish literature reveals that the orthodox-revisionist debate on the origins of the Cold War in the US defines the limits of Cold War debate in Turkey. That is, the main axis in the historiography of Turkish foreign policy as parallel to the mainstream debate in the US is whether postwar policies of Turkey, as its ally the US, were a reaction as an act of self-defense against the Soviet polies or a deliberate espousal to take part in the capitalist alliance against the Soviet Union. The orthodox places blame for the Cold War firmly on the Soviets, and claims that the adoption of militarized containment policy, the establishment of NATO and the other military build ups, so on so forth, was just the reaction of West, particularly the US as the only remaining power having resources to save the world peace against the Soviets, with a view to halting communist advances and thwarting the Soviet expansion of its area of influence for global domination. In this regard, Turkey was an example, among others, of such Soviet expansionism in the postwar period. Against the orthodox interpretation attributing responsibility for the outbreak of Cold War to the Soviet Union, the radical interpretations in Turkey, similar to revisionists in the US, shift the blame on

the US and her allies including Turkey. That is, Turkey had utilized from as well as contributed to the postwar hostility between the US and the Soviet Union so as to use it as leverage to ally itself to the Western bloc.

CHAPTER IV

THE COLD WAR AND TURKEY'S DRIVE TO THE WEST

4.1. Introduction

The outcomes of historical survey of the Cold War debate reveal that the debate in Turkey has been locked up on the question of whether there was a Soviet military threat to Turkey or not in the postwar years. According to the orthodoxy, the Soviet Union not only made diplomatic pressure on Turkey with expansionist impulses, but it also kept the military option on the table as well. In this regard, by fusing the Soviet image with a historical Russian image, they, on the one hand, presented Tsarist Russia's historical hostility to Ottoman Empire as an evidence of the Soviets' hostile intentions against Turkey. On the other hand, they see the communist ideology of the Soviet leadership as the other factor that contributed to the expansionist impulse of the Soviet Union. Yet, they seemed not to attribute a central place for the ideological factor in their analyses, as compare to their counterparts in the US, because such an approach would recognize the ideology as a factor, at least, on the decision making process of political leadership. This in turn would contradict with their analyses of the Turkish foreign policy since they tended to examine the Turkish foreign policy as above any ideological orientations of Turkish leadership. Therefore, such a contradiction in their position prevented them to make a sound emphasis on the ideology of the Soviet Union. As a result, they do not attribute any ideological or systemic significance to Turkey's postwar integration into the Western bloc. They present the "Soviet threat," which is defined *vis-à-vis* its hostile claims over Turkey, as the primary, if not sole, factor in determining Turkey's postwar foreign policy orientation and see Turkey's integration into the West as a geopolitical alignment against a geopolitical threat. In

this regard, they tended to consider this geopolitical factor as autonomous from the socio-economic properties of Turkey, the Soviet Union or the US.

Against these orthodox arguments, the leftist accounts found a security rationale behind the Soviet demands. Yet they tended either to adhere to the geopolitical framework (Oran, Avcıoğlu, Ataöv), or not to analyze these demands at all (Küçük, Gerger). That is to say, even though the Soviet Union made certain demands on Turkey, it could not be itself suggested as a military threat against Turkey. Therefore, they seemed not to see a Soviet threat to Turkey in the postwar years and found economic or socio-economic reasons behind Turkey's determination toward the Western bloc. Yet, while the leftist accounts tended to avoid reducing Turkey's integration into the Western alliance to the geopolitical factors, they seemed to fail in integrating the geopolitical conflict emanating from the Soviet claims over the straits in their political economic framework.

In this regard, what seems to be mainly needed in Turkish literature is to suggest a conceptualization of the Cold War, which will guide us to integrate the geopolitical relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union in a systemic framework. In this regard, if the Cold War is considered as an inter-systemic conflict, this will then allow this study to question the ahistorical conceptualization of the Soviet policies against Turkey. That is, rather than explaining the "Soviet threat," through providing historical evidences from rival imperial ambitions of the Tsarist Russian against the Ottoman Empire on the control of the straits in order to demonstrate the evil intentions of the Soviet Union, and Turkey's orientation toward the West as consequence of this Soviet threat; the question should be whether the geopolitical tension between the two states, which seemed to determine the course of their relations, was autonomous from the Cold War? To put it differently, the question should be whether the geopolitical tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union could be comprehended without locating it into the inter-systemic conflict? This thesis in this regard suggests that the geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey should be conceived of not as "ontologically autonomous" ahistorical

geopolitical tension but rather as derivative of the wider systemic conflict, the domestic socio-economic properties of each state and the wavering moments of their bilateral relations.

In this context, the second section of this chapter seeks to suggest such an alternative framework which; (i) will formulate the Cold War as an inter-systemic conflict rooted in the antagonistic socio-economic properties of capitalism and socialism, in this sense it will suggest that it was a new form of struggle between two historical alternatives, which was qualitatively different from the previous conventional great power struggles among the imperialist states; and (ii) thus it will propose an alternative periodization of the Cold War, with the words of Hobsbawn, as “the short twentieth century,” 1917-1991. The next section will undertake an elaboration of the strategies of the Soviet Union with regard to inter-systemic relations and conflicts. This will portray a picture of the pre- and postwar inter-imperialist and inter-systemic struggles, which will help, then and there, to understand the dynamics behind the Soviet strategic orientation toward Turkey in the subsequent section. After all, it was the course of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union that was presented as the principle determining factor behind Turkey’s post-1945 drive toward the West. In this regard, the fourth section will elaborate on character of Turkey’s postwar integration into the West. As a result, such an approach will allow this study to integrate geopolitical factor with the wider systemic struggle to better explain the dynamics and the character of Turkey’s postwar integration into the Western alliance.

4.2. The nature and origins of the Cold War

The historical narrative of the Cold War as well as of the postwar Turkish foreign policy has been dominated by the views of the scholars drawing on a realist framework. The realist accounts conceived the Cold War as a product of the geopolitical consequences brought about by the WWII. It was taken up as the bilateral superpower antagonism in Turkey. In this regard, the postwar superpower conflict was characterized as strategic competition for extending its spheres of

interest. The motives of this competition were considered as similar to the previous great power rivalries. What had changed was the balance of power among states, as a result of the redistribution of power capabilities. That is, the multipolar international system had been transformed into a bipolar one after the WWII. Therefore, the Cold War was reduced to the military-strategic competition-that is geopolitical rivalry- between the US and the Soviet Union and was thus disengaged from the essence of this ideological conflict -that is the antagonistic socio-economic properties of each social system.

However, the seizure of power in Russia by the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP) (Bolsheviks), which later changed its name to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,¹ created a new form of challenge different from the previous challenges of France, Germany and the United States to Britain because their successful industrial catch-up did not raise questions over the social system prevailing in Britain. In Isaac Deutscher's words,²

the attainment of industrial maturity by new nations demonstrated only the vitality of bourgeois society and its immense capacity for expansion. Britain was weakened as the world empire; but in her very reverse there triumphed the principle that underlay her organization.

¹ The Bolsheviks were the majority fraction of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDLP), which was established in 1898 in Minsk. RSDLP was split at the Second Party Congress in 1903 as the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks. For the Bolsheviks, this name had been tarnished and disgraced by the opportunists, the betrayers of socialism because the Russian Mensheviks called themselves as Social-Democrats. As a result, at the Seventh (extraordinary) Congress of the RSDLP (Bolsheviks), upon Lenin's proposal, the name of the party of the Bolsheviks was changed as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union since, for Lenin, this name precisely corresponded to the aim of the Party, namely, the achievement of Communism. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course*, Edited by A commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) (International Publishers: New York, 1939), p.186.

² Isaac Deutscher, *The Great Contest: Russia and the West* (Oxford University Press: London, 1960), p.66

In this regard, these challenges were essentially struggles among the major capitalist countries as the moments of contradiction between “global capitalism” and the “national appropriation” of the surplus product. Bukharin in this regard stated that³

there is here a growing discord between the basis of social economy which has become world-wide and the peculiar class structure of society, a structure where the ruling class (the bourgeoisie) itself is split into ‘national’ groups with contradictory economic interests, groups which ... are competing among themselves for the division of the surplus value created on a world scale.

Although the “national capitals” were in a constant competition among themselves for the appropriation of the surplus product, they were part of the global capitalist system. Therefore, they were dependent on the global reproduction of the capitalism as a system of production relations, and of exchange relations on a global scale.⁴ That’s why the accommodation of the conflicts or rivalries among the capitalist states within the international capitalist order is more conducive, as in the post-1945 period than the accommodation of the systemic challenge posed by the Soviet Union. This is because, in this inter-systemic struggle the Soviet Union was seen as threatening not just vital geopolitical or economic interests of the other capitalist states, but also the essential properties of their socio-economic system.

The power of the Bolsheviks in Russia was an ontological challenge to the socio-economic structure of capitalist society as well as the international capitalist order. Therefore, it was not an inter-imperialist relationship, but an inter-systemic relationship over the question of how to organize society, which combines inextricably economic, political and ideological dimensions.⁵ That is to say, it was a

³ Nikolai Bukharin, *Imperialism and World Economy* (Merlin: London, 1972), p.106; see also John Milios and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, *Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule* (Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, 2009), p.14-20

⁴ Bukharin, *Imperialism*, p.27

⁵ The capitalist triumph performed in the scene after the ‘collapse of the communism’ in late 1980s and early 1990s was the manifestation of the belief that there is no viable alternative to liberal democracy. In this regard, capitalism is presented as the state of nature of humanity and accepted as

challenge simultaneously to the capitalist exploitation (the exploitative relation between capital and wage-labour), to the imperialist domination (the dominance of some countries over others as a result of the uneven capitalist development) and to the ideological supremacy of capitalism as a global system (the Soviet system had an ideological claim to be a global system, that is, universal validity of the Soviet socialist system).

In this context, (i) the socio-economic systems of the Soviet Union and the capitalist states were not only different but also antagonistic to each other. That is, each social system was organized on the basis of conflicting social relations, while private ownership of means of production in capitalism and the collective or state ownership in socialism. Hence, the Soviet system presupposed the destruction of capitalist production/distribution relations in the sense that it required the abandonment of private property as the foundation of capitalist form of production and the market as the basic mechanism for distribution of goods and services. That is why the international expansion of the Soviet system necessarily threatened the political reproduction and social existence of the capitalist relations and the social constituencies that benefited from it.⁶ Moreover, as much as the antagonism between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union was derived from antithetical social organization of each, it was derived from the different social interests and classes they represented.⁷ (ii) The Bolsheviks regarded themselves as the vanguard

the law of nature implying that any break from these tendencies would eventually result in destruction as in the case of Soviets Union. As Francis Fukuyama argues in his famous article, “end of history,” “Soviet socialism was not superior to the West in any respect but was in fact a monumental failure.” This definite failure in turn was declared as the end of history. That is, the history was at the end, the end of struggle over how to organize society. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History?*, *The National Interest* (1989). “All that remain,” as William Brown argues, “was to enlarge the circle of market-based democracies. Brown, A liberal International Order,” in *Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformations*, Edited by William Brown, Simon Bromley and Suma Athreye (Pluto Press: London, 2004), p.108.

⁶ Richard Saull, *The Cold War and after: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (Pluto Press: London, 2007), p.9, 204; Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (Verso: London, 1986), p.32

⁷ Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War* , 32

of a worldwide revolutionary movement. For this reason, in the immediate years following the October Revolution, the Soviet Union sought to engage with the other countries not through the diplomatic relations with governments, but through the revolutionary movements and parties in those societies. To do this, it created the Comintern (Communist International) in 1919, which provided an organizational mechanism to draw together the other revolutionary parties to overthrow the capitalist governments of the other countries.⁸ Indeed, such a mechanism to establish links among the revolutionary parties across boundaries posed a threat to the old Westphalian state system, which rested on two pillars, the sovereignty of states, and non-interference in their internal affairs.⁹

Consequently, the Soviet challenge, as Saull suggests, forced the major capitalist states to deal with the problem of a revolutionary state rested on a very different socio-economic system¹⁰ and international communism. That is to say, in Hobsbawn's phrase:¹¹

For a large part of the Short Twentieth Century, Soviet communism claimed to be an alternative and superior system to capitalism, and one destined by history to triumph over it. ... The international politics of the entire Short Twentieth Century since the October revolution can best be understood as a secular struggle by the forces of the old order against social revolution, believed to be embodied in, allied with, or

⁸ David C. Engerman, "Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.25; Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.16; Bülent Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006), p.6-7; Edward H. Carr, *International Relations between the two World Wars, 1919-1939* (Macmillian: Hong Kong, 1990), p.72-73

⁹ For the Westphalian state system, see Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1991); Friedrich Kratochwil, 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System,' *World Politics* 34, no.1 (1986): 27–52.

¹⁰ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.12

¹¹ Eric Hobsbawn, *Age of Extreme: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (Abacus: London, 1995), p.56

dependent on the fortunes of the Soviet Union and international communism.

This thesis defines the Cold War, following Richard Saull, as a form of global inter-systemic conflict between states and social forces associated with the rival social systems of capitalism and socialism.¹² In this regard, the Cold War began to be a concomitant of the world politics with 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. That is to say, this thesis suggests that the Cold War as an inter-systemic conflict, though in different forms, existed in pre- and post-WWII periods.¹³

However, as the above appraisal of the literature of the Cold War shows, the Cold War has been mainly taken up as a postwar phenomenon arising from the consequences of the WWII. It was largely discussed as a struggle about the conflicting postwar objectives of the US and the USSR. That is to say, the Cold War came to be conceived of as the diplomatic history or a phase of the post-1945 US-Soviet relationship. In the mainstream debate, -putting aside the post revisionist approach which entirely discredited the ideology as an analytical category- though an ideological perspective did exist in their approach to the Cold War, they mainly considered the impact of ideology as a factor on the decision making process of political leadership of either the Soviet Union (orthodox) or the US (revisionist). In these discussions, the socio-economic difference between the two states has not been considered as a determining factor in their analysis. In fact, this difference came to the picture with the radical approaches. Yet the radical approach performed a similar tendency in defining the Cold War in the sense that though they did put emphasis on the systemic difference between the US and the USSR, they did not see this systemic difference as the main underpinning of the Cold War since they discussed the Cold war as the militarized form of this struggle. That is to say, when this difference turned out to be a matter of geopolitical struggle and took a militarist

¹² See Saull, *The Cold War and after* and Saull, Richard, "Locating the Global South in the Theorisation of the Cold War: Capitalist Development, Social Revolution and Geopolitical Conflict," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (2005).

¹³ Saull, *The Cold War and After* and Saull, *Locating the Global South*.

form between the US and the USSR, only then they talked about the existence of a cold war.

In this framework, the analysis of the Cold War as a postwar phenomenon rests on the tendency to examine the international conflicts in the interwar period on the basis of an inter-imperialist struggle. However, just as there was the post-1945 systemic struggle between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist states among which the US came ahead, there was a form of systemic struggle after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which had made long lasting consequences on the international relations. Therefore, the Cold War, as a systemic struggle between the rival social systems of capitalism and socialism, did exist pre-1945 period and played a determining role on course of the international relations. This is utmost important because, as argued above, the most of the literature tended to explain the interwar international relations through the inter-imperialist struggle and to marginalize the significance of the inter-systemic struggle. However, without taking this systemic struggle into account, it is hard to understand and explain the pre- and post-1945 international relations in general and Turkey's foreign policies belonging to those periods in particular.

From this point forward, the next section seeks to elaborate on evolution of the inter-systemic relations in pre- and postwar periods through the analysis of the strategies of the Soviet Union. As will be seen in the subsequent pages, this inter-systemic relationship was not changed from within, that is to say, this systemic struggle preserve its essential characteristic, as described above, in pre- and postwar periods, yet the changes in the balance of power among the major capitalist states resulted in transformation of this systemic relationship in pre- and postwar periods. As a result, the inter-systemic struggle between the Soviet Union and the West became the principle form of relationship and source of conflict in the postwar international relations..

4.3. The strategies of the Soviet Union in pre- and postwar periods

Although all wars are fairly bad, the two world wars that shook the world in 31 years were possibly the worst wars ever in all of human history. The scale of the world wars left all previous wars in the history of mankind in the shade. Fighting took millions of soldier and civilian lives, left as much as people homeless and devastated the European economy and industrial infrastructure. The First World War was born out of the inter-imperialist struggle and created the conditions for the first open challenge to capitalist system, which was the Bolshevik Revolution. In this regard, it is difficult to understand the history of the 20th century without delivering the transformative importance of the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia on the international politics and the subsequent historical developments. The Bolshevik revolution of October 1917 provoked a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the major capitalist states. It is this confrontation that lasted, though in different forms, throughout the 20th century.

This conflict was a global confrontation from the very beginning, which called for a world revolution. That is to say, as considering that the chaos created by the inter-imperialist war brought them to power in Russia, the Bolsheviks believed that it would bring the revolutionary forces to power in the major capitalist states as well. In this regard, to draw together and coordinate the activities of the communist parties committed to the world revolution, the Comintern was thus established. The Comintern rested on the idea that in the midst of the chaos brought about by the WWI necessitated a new organizational structure to advocate working class solidarity and world revolution against the capitalist governments of the West because as much as the WWI shattered the old order, it sowed the seeds of a new order. In “Manifesto of the First Congress of the Comintern,” it was stated that¹⁴

¹⁴ The Manifesto of the First Congress of the Comintern was signed by Rakovsky, Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Platten, <http://www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1919/03/manifesto.html>. (accessed on July 20, 2014).

Humanity, whose whole culture now lies in ruins, faces the danger of complete destruction. There is only one power which can save it – the power of the proletariat. The old capitalist “order” can exist no longer. The ultimate result of the capitalist mode of production is chaos – a chaos to be over-come only by the great producing class, the proletariat. It is the proletariat which must establish real order, the order of communism. It must end the domination of capital, make war impossible, wipe out state boundaries, transform the whole world into one cooperative commonwealth, and bring about real human brotherhood and freedom.

As seen, the Bolshevik revolution had a universal pretension in the sense that the Bolsheviks did not only commit to the establishment of a socialist system in Russia but also the establishment of a global socialist system.¹⁵ Lenin concluded his speech in Comintern at the end of March 1919 in this regard that “soon we shall see the victory of communism throughout the world; we shall see the foundation of the World Federative Republic of Soviets.”¹⁶ Yet this commitment was not only rested on an expectation, but also a necessity since for the Bolsheviks, the revolution could only survive in Russia, where the conditions for a socialist revolution were simply not present, insofar as their revolution would spread elsewhere, particularly to the major capitalist countries.¹⁷ That is to say, the Bolshevik leaders did not expect that socialism could survive in Russia without “the complete victory of the communist revolution” in the rest of the world. In the road to the world revolution, Bolsheviks primarily had to be able to stay in power in Russia.¹⁸

¹⁵ Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes*, p.56; Geoffrey Roberts, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991* (Routledge: New York, 1999), p.1; Carr, *International Relations*, p.72; Edward H. Carr, *Socialism in one country, 1924-1926* (MacMillan: New York, 1958), p.8

¹⁶ Lenin’s *Collected Works*, vol.29 (Progress Publishers: Moscow, 1972), p.240-241. To browse the online version, see <https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/mar/x04.htm>. (accessed on July 20, 2014).

¹⁷ Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes*, p.58; Carr, *International Relations*, p.73; Engerman, *Ideology*, p.20; Richard Overy and Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Road to War* (Penguin: London, 1999), p.212; Carr, *Socialism in one country*, p.8, 15.

¹⁸ Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes*, 63.

Yet, the revolution inside Russia was not into a comfortable position, on the contrary, it faced a bitter and protracted civil war, through which various counter-revolutionary armies fought against the Red Army. The capitalist states with their money, equipment and direct armed interventions, which were anxious about the international implications of a Bolshevik victory in Russia, supported the counter-revolution movements. The capitalist states (Britain, France, the US (for a shorter time), Japan, Poland, Greece and Rumania) attacked the Soviet Union from the south, north and east. The civil war ended in 1920 and left the country impoverished to the extent that it brought the Russian economy almost to the point of complete collapse. It also led to the loss a fringe of territories which had belonged to the Tsarist Empire (Finland, the Baltic States, Bessarabia (to Romania) and half of Poland).¹⁹ However, despite the wishes of Bolsheviks and their strive for survival, the world revolution did not take place, which culminated in the political isolation of the Soviet Union.²⁰ In this regard, the Soviet position transformed from being the epicenter of world revolution to being the isolated oasis in a sea of the capitalist states. These circumstances then forced the Bolshevik leaders to reexamine their considerations about the prospect of world revolution. In this regard, the question to be solved for the Bolshevik leaders was no longer the imperative of the world revolution, but the prospect of the revolution within the Russia.²¹ As a result, in the 1920s and 1930s, the basic impulse behind the Soviet strategic thinking was one that sought to secure its diplomatic and security interests so as to create a “breathing-space” to save the revolution and to build “socialism in one country” since the survival of the Soviet Union was considered as the precondition for the survival of the world revolution. Therefore, the Soviet Union sought to cultivate normal diplomatic and economic relations with the capitalist states through a policy of

¹⁹ For a comprehensive analysis of the civil war in the Soviet Union, see Evan Mawdsley, *The Russian Civil War* (Birlinn: Edinburgh, 2011); see also Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes*, 63; and Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.213-214.

²⁰ Hobsbawn, *Age of Extremes*, p.64-65; For the German Revolution, see Pierre Broue, Ian H. Birchall, Brian Pearce, *The German Revolution, 1917-1923* (Brill: Leiden, 2005).

²¹ Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.213-214; Saull, *After the Cold War*, p.36-37

peaceful coexistence. In this regard, due to the failure of the Versailles Treaty in resolving the problems among major capitalist states and the persistence of the divisions within the capitalist world, the Bolshevik leaders expected that the Soviet Union could play on the contradictions among major capitalist states. This in turn would provide the Soviet Union the opportunity to even cooperate with imperialist powers if it was considered as necessary for the survival of the Soviet Union. Stalin stated in this regard that anything “which is a necessity from the standpoint of Soviet Russia, is also a necessity from the standpoint of the world revolution.”²²

In the beginning, the Soviet Union was able to establish formal diplomatic relations with the newly established neighboring states. It concluded treaties of peace with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. It signed treaties of friendships with Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan in 1921.²³ Yet the Soviet Union had not yet been recognized by any of the major European states. Though in 1921 Britain concluded a commercial agreement with it and sent a trade mission to Moscow, which was followed by Italy as well, yet these agreements did not turn into the official recognition of the Soviet Union. The first serious achievement of the Soviet government in breaking its political isolation in Europe came on April 16, 1922 with the Treaty of Rapallo, signed between the Soviet Union and Germany in Italy.²⁴ With the Rapallo, the two outcasts of the Versailles order “joined hands” and agreed to normalise their diplomatic relations so as to “co-operate in a spirit of mutual goodwill in meeting the economic needs of both countries.”²⁵ The signature of the German-Russian Agreement was a significant development in the sense that it was

²² Quoted in Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.214

²³ Carr, *International Relations*, p.73;

²⁴ The Treaty was signed during the Genoa Conference in Italy by Georgi Chicherin, Foreign Minister of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, and his German counterpart Walther Rathenau. Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.216; Carr, *International Relations*, p.75; Saull, *Cold War and After*, p.28

²⁵ For the text of the German-Russian Agreement; April 16, 1922 (Treaty of Rapallo), see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/rapallo_001.asp. (accessed on July 20, 2014); Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.216; Carr, *International Relations*, p.75

the first official recognition of the Soviet Union by a major capitalist state and it was the first German open attempt “to break ring which the Versailles Powers had drawn round her.”²⁶ Although the rapprochement between Germany and Soviet Union reaffirmed with the Treaty of Berlin in 1926, the significance of their relations, as the two politically isolated states, for Germany waned with the signature of Locarno Treaty in 1925. In the Article 1 of Locarno Treaty, signed on December 1, 1925 in London, it was stated that²⁷

The High Contracting Parties collectively and severally guarantee, in the manner provided in the following Articles, the maintenance of the territorial status quo resulting from the frontiers between Germany and Belgium and between Germany and France, and the inviolability of the said frontiers as fixed by or in pursuance of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, and also the observance of the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the said treaty concerning the demilitarised zone.

The treaty was devoted to the mutual undertaking of Germany and Belgium, and Germany and France that “they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other.”²⁸ Therefore, in Locarno, Germany voluntarily accepted its existing western frontiers as settled in Versailles peace treaty. The treaty caused apprehension in the Soviet Union as an attempt (i) to reintegrate Germany into the Western world, (ii) to wean it from the Soviet entanglement, and (iii) to isolate the Soviet Union in the international relations.²⁹ In return, it sought to respond with establishing relations with other states on the basis of mutual guarantee of each party not to participate in hostile action, military or economic, against the other, and to remain neutral in the event of a war emanating from aggression against the

²⁶ Carr, *International Relations*, p.75

²⁷ For the text of The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy; October 16, 1925 (The Locarno Pact), see http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/locarno_001.asp. (accessed on July 20, 2014).

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Edward H. Carr, *The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin* (The Free Press: New York, 1979), p.87

other.³⁰ In this framework, the basic objective of the Soviet Union was to prevent combined action against it and not to get involved in an event of conflict among the imperialist states. Therefore, it tended not to commit any military undertakings and sought to bring its neighbors into this policy of “non-aggression and neutrality” with a view to avoid getting involved in a conflict through indirect commitments.³¹ In this context, it renewed the 1921 treaty with Turkey in December 1925 that was under difficult conditions in its relations with Britain during that period as well.³²

In 1920s, the primary objective of the Soviet Union, as seen, was to gain official recognition in the international relations with a view to breaking its political isolation by playing off one imperialist state against the other so as to prevent any joint actions by European imperialist states against it and to create a breathing-space to focus on its domestic problems. In this regard, while the Soviet Union sought a policy of “peaceful coexistence” and economic cooperation with the capitalist world, the Comintern maintained its endeavors to overthrow the capitalist governments of the other states for world revolution. In the immediate years after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, the Bolshevik leaders, as stated above, sought to establish relations with communist and revolutionary movements, which were then seen as providing leverage for the spread of revolution beyond Russia. However, after the failure of the world revolution, the relations of the Soviet Union with those revolutionary movements became more paradoxical as it developed normal diplomatic relations. As Carr calls it, such a “dual policy” as combination of “peaceful co-existence” through formal diplomatic relations with capitalist states and revolutionary endeavors to support and bring together the communist parties for coordinated efforts though the Comintern required the Soviet Union to balance these

³⁰ Carr, *The Russian Revolution*, p.87

³¹ Carr, *The Russian Revolution*, p.87; Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (1923-1934)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973), p.11

³² *Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı*, p.11

two contradictory relationships.³³ In this regard, the Soviet Union sought to limit or subordinate revolutionary movements to its strategic interests for it could jeopardize the relations between the capitalist states and the Soviet Union, which would in turn endanger the survival of revolution in Russia.³⁴

However, in 1930s, the rising of the militarist-imperialist states of imperial Japan in the east and Nazi Germany in the west transformed the strategy of the Soviet Union and forced it to seek collective action against Japan, which invaded Manchuria, and established a long frontier with the Soviet Union in 1931 and against Hitler as a hard-line anti-Bolsheviks came to power in Germany in 1933. As a result, though the Soviet Union made desperate endeavors to keep its relations with Germany which was once the center of its strategy since the Treaty of Rapallo, it sought closer relations with Britain and France with a view to isolating or containing the fascist powers,³⁵ which turned out to be the leitmotif of Soviet strategy until the Munich agreement in 1938. As the Soviet Union sought collective action, the revolutionary slogans of world revolution and call for struggle with bourgeois democracy of the Comintern became a barrier to the strategic requirement of Soviet Union in its search for a joint action with liberal capitalist states against fascist states in 1930s.³⁶ This new strategic reorientation of the Soviet Union resulted in even more downplay of the support for world revolution. In this sense, the appointment of Maksim Litvinov as the successor of Georgy Chicherin was a sign of change in Soviet strategy. In the years following his appointment, Litvinov began to differentiate the democratic capitalist governments from the fascist-militarist governments of Germany, Japan and Italy. In this context, the Soviet Union had signed Litvinov Protocol with the neighboring states of Estonia, Latvia, Poland and Rumania on 9 February 1929, in which those countries promise not to use force to

³³ Carr, *International Relations*, p.73

³⁴ Saull, *Cold War and After*, p.37

³⁵ Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.225

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.227

settle their disputes.³⁷ Turkey joined the Protocol on 1 April 1929. This was followed by a convention between the Soviet Union and all of its neighbouring countries (Roumania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and Finland) on the Definition of the Aggressor on July 3, 1933. In this convention, the Soviet Union clearly promised not to interfere in internal affairs of the neighbouring countries. This could be, one can suggest, considered as a further subordination of the Soviet support to revolutionary parties to its strategic requirements.³⁸ Soviet Union joined the League of Nations on 18 September 1934, where Litvinov advocated disarmament and collective security against fascist aggression.³⁹ In line with this, Comintern was forced to adopt a popular front strategy and became a defender of democracy and collective action. As a result, the communist parties in the other countries adopted the Popular Front Strategy and established active cooperation with all democratic and republican parties against the fascist political forces. Even their political rhetoric transformed from the words like “dictatorship of the proletariat,” “revolution,” “social fascists” to “antifascism,” “democracy,” “peace,” “independence.” As a result, to reiterate, collective actions of the Comintern for worldwide revolution was subordinated into the strategic interests of Soviet survival.⁴⁰ The Soviet Union became a defender of international status quo.⁴¹ This strategic reorientation of the Soviet Union and the Comintern played out the

³⁷ This Protocol provided for renunciation of war among its signatories according to the principles of General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy (the Kellogg–Briand Pact) signed on 27 August 1928, which renounced the use of war to resolve “disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them.” For the text of Kellogg–Briand Pact, <https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280168041> and for Litvinov Protocol, <http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1929/123.html>. (accessed on July 20, 2014).

³⁸ For the text of the Convention for the Definition of Aggression, see <http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/ConventionontheDefinitionofAggression.pdf> (accessed on June 9, 2014).

³⁹ Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.227; Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy*, p.38.

⁴⁰ Kermit E. McKenzie, *Comintern and World Revolution 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine* (Columbia University Press: New York, 1964), p. 143–5; Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.227-228.

⁴¹ Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.229.

inter-systemic conflict within the struggle against fascist-militarist political forces in the form of “national independence” or “the national democratic revolution.”⁴²

Although the Soviet Union was able to sign a mutual assistance pact with France in May 1935, yet its importance waned as a result of reluctance of French conservatives to deal with communists at all, and they avoided assuming any military undertakings with the Soviet Union.⁴³ The reason for that A. J. P. Taylor argues that⁴⁴

when the Anti-Comintern Pact [concluded first between Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936 and then between Italy, Germany, and Japan on November 6, 1937] pushed political ideas forward, men in the two democratic countries [Britain and France] also felt the call of anti-communism. They inclined to be neutral in the struggle between Fascism and Communism, or perhaps even on the Fascist side. They feared Hitler as the ruler of a strong, aggressive Germany; they welcomed him -or many did- as the protector of European civilization against Communism.

Then the Italian invasion of Ethiopia on October 3, 1935 and the German remilitarization of the Rhineland came on March 7, 1936 and the Soviet Union through the League of Nations endeavored to make a collective response. However,

⁴² Saull, *Cold War and After*, p.38. If remembered the appraisal of the leftist currents in Turkey in the years after the 1960 coup d'état in Chapter III-3, the primary objective of the revolutionary movements were the expulsion of the external imperialist domination. In this regard, the orientation of the leftist currents, particularly the NDR movement, could not be grasped without the strategic orientation of Soviet Union, even though the leaders of the NDR movements firmly emphasized their dissociation from the Soviet Union. However, as the leaders of the WPT argued, a project of national democratic revolution could not be disentangled from the international and domestic class struggle due to the class character of the imperialist domination and the role of traditional ruling classes in the imperialist domination.

⁴³ Frederick W. Deakin, Harold Shukman and H. T. Willett, *A History of World Communism* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1975), p.119–21; Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.229.

⁴⁴ Anti-Comintern Pact, concluded first between Germany and Japan (Nov. 25, 1936) and then between Italy, Germany, and Japan (Nov. 6, 1937), was apparently directed against the Communist International (Comintern) but, by implication, specifically against the Soviet Union, see the glossary entry of “Anti-Comintern Pact” in Encyclopædia Britannica <http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/27573/Anti-Comintern-Pact>. (accessed on July 14, 2014).

Britain and France sought to reach accommodation with Mussolini, and took no action against Germany, even though they violated the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaties.⁴⁵

Even though Litvinov maintained his League diplomacy until 1939, it did not result in any guarantees or pacts that could secure the Soviet Union against the fascist states.⁴⁶ As a result, Litvinov announced to the West in a speech on 26 June 1938,⁴⁷

The Soviet government ... relieved itself of responsibilities for the future development of events. [...] it makes no difference to us, of course, which Power will exploit this or that colony, win this or that foreign market, subject to its rule this or that weak state.

In this regard, the Soviet search for a collective action against fascist-militarist states was not reciprocated with the same enthusiasm on the part of Britain and France. They did not seriously consider the Soviet proposals for military talks, pacts and joint front. Yet the exclusion of the Soviet Union from Munich conference in which Germany, France, Britain, and Italy negotiated on the Nazi Germany pretension on the portions of Czechoslovakia mainly inhabited by German speakers, was a milestone in the Soviet strategic orientation. The conference concluded with Munich agreement on 29 September 1938, which left those areas to Germany. Ivan Maisky, the Soviet ambassador in London, wrote to Moscow after Munich agreement that “The League of Nations and collective security are dead.”⁴⁸ As a result, as Overy and Wheatcroft put it, “isolation was complete and obvious. Everything pointed to what Stalin had most feared, cooperation between the states of capitalist Europe directed against the Soviet Union, either in concert or by giving

⁴⁵ Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, 229-230.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.236.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.238.

Germany a free hand in the East directed against Soviet territory.”⁴⁹ Under such political circumstances, Maxim Litvinov was dismissed in May 1939 and the Soviet Union abandoned its endeavors to form a joint front with the West. As a result, Molotov was appointed as the new People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs. This corresponded to a new strategic orientation, which denoted that the Soviet Union would avoid being drawn into a war with Germany while the liberal capitalist states sat back.⁵⁰ This was the historical process that gave way to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, officially the Treaty of Non-aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union on 23 August 1939.⁵¹

Although liberal capitalist states were hostile to Nazi Germany’s imperial ambition on the continental Europe, they tended to tolerate and, if possible, to keep fascism under control. In this connection, they held the assumption that if Hitler could be satisfied in one way or another by adjusting the Versailles provisions on terms generally acceptable to the signatory states, he could accept to play his game according to their rules.⁵² However, they tended to deny giving such credits to the Soviet Union until 1941, which was considered as fundamentally different form of political challenge from a systemic point of view.⁵³ It was such a systemic suspicion and hostility manifested itself through such political insecurity after all constituted the essential characteristic of the Cold War.

In this context, the political insecurity of the major capitalist states and their avoidance of forming an anti-fascist front in the 1930s demonstrate the existence as well as significance of the inter-systemic conflict prior to the WWII. Therefore, the

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p.237.

⁵¹ John Barber and Mark Harrison, “Patriotic war, 1941-1945 217,” in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, Edited by Ronald Grigor Suny (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006), p.221-222

⁵² Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.30-31; Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.52

⁵³ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.30-31.

significance of the inter-systemic conflict within and between states on the interwar international relations points to the fact that the new fascist states embark upon the overthrow of the Versailles order, which had been imposed on Germany by the major capitalist powers as part of post-WWI European order. Yet they embarked upon a counter revolution against the Soviet Union and international communism as embodied in the formation of the Anti-Comintern Pact.⁵⁴

Consequently, though the conflict between the conservative (Germany, Italy and Japan) and liberal (Britain, France and the US) capitalist states was significant in understanding the interwar international relations, a form of cold war did exist in the interwar period, without which it would be difficult to explain the course of events that led to the outbreak of the war in September 1939.⁵⁵ In this regard, the persistence of systemic hostility of the major capitalist states against the Soviet Union had a central importance in explaining the interwar international relations.

Even though the war and the struggle for political survival brought the Soviet Union and the liberal capitalist states (Britain and the US) together in a wartime alliance against the common threat of fascist-militarist states (Germany, Italy and Japan), this alliance of the formerly antagonistic states continued to witness significant tensions under the surface of alliance in the face of fascist threat. The reasons behind the tensions rooted in the question of who would assume the most of military burden against the fascism, in particular Nazi Germany, on the one hand, and the conflicting visions of the postwar world order, on the other.⁵⁶ In this regard, while Britain was fighting to not let the continental Europe to fall under the German domination as well as to keep its empire, the US was fighting to restore the liberal international capitalist order, but on the basis of an open and free international economic exchange. In this regard, as will be discussed below, the US had a

⁵⁴ Ibid., p.31.

⁵⁵ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.17, 49; Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.240.

⁵⁶ Saull, *The Cold War and after*, p.46.

conflictual postwar vision with both Britain and the Soviet Union as in the aftermath of the WWI.⁵⁷ On the one hand, Britain's endeavors to maintain its system of imperial preferences and the restrictions on the economic activities of other capitalist states within the empire, contradicted with the US postwar vision of open door policy, as the revisionists argued.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the great Soviet victories at Stalingrad in January 1943 and Kursk in July 1943 not only repelled the Nazis, but also resulted in the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe. Moreover, the end of the WWII brought about a new status as great power for the Soviet Union along with the new prestige of the Soviet model as the growth of communist and left parties in Europe and national liberation movements in Asia, which provided leverage for the expansion of Soviet influence.

On the nexus of inter-systemic and inter-imperialist relationships, during the interwar years, as discussed above, the Soviet Union sought to play on the contradictions and conflicts among the major capitalist states with a view to prevent them to form a joint front against itself, on the one hand, and it sought to establish relations with neighboring states on the basis of mutual guarantee of each party not to participate in hostile action, military or economic, against the other, and to remain neutral in the event of a war emanating from aggression against the other, on the

⁵⁷ With the conclusion of the WWI, the US attempted to create a liberal international order, but it failed and resulted in an era of economic stagnation, protectionism and conflict among the major capitalist states, which rooted in the contradictory political and economic interests of "national capitals." This state of affairs could only come to an end with the conclusion of another world war. In fact, the emergence of the US as a world power lied behind its entry into the WWI, yet due to isolationist tendency of the US Senate, the President Woodrow Wilson's project for a new liberal international order collapsed without the active role of the US in the League of Nations. At that time, the objectives of Wilson's project for a new liberal order were (i) the establishment of an order among the European states, which would in turn prevent further conflicts among capitalist states and thus would secure the reproduction of the capitalist system and (ii) the elimination of the discriminatory practices of Britain and France against the US. Yet this objective of the US to reshape the capitalist world, which was encapsulated in a new liberal international order, was embarked upon in the context of the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, which posed an ontological challenge to the capitalist international order, as discussed above. Mustafa Türkeş, "Giriş: Kuş Bakışı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Geçiş," *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* 39, no.1 (2012): 1-24; Türkeş, Mustafa, "Review of the Book Studies in Atatürk's Turkey, the American Dimension," *Turkish Historical Review* 2 (2011); Brown, *A liberal International Order*.

⁵⁸ See Chapter II-2.2.2 in this thesis.

other hand.⁵⁹ Yet with the rise of the fascist-militarist states, it sought collective action and even came to term with the international status quo. However, due to the unwillingness of the Britain and France to construct a joint anti-fascist front with the Soviet Union, it receded from this strategic search for collective action and attempted to stay out of a war among capitalist states whether liberal or fascist for which it even signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Nevertheless, behind its treaty with Nazi Germany, there lied the tactic to gain some time to war preparations as well.

At the end of the WWII, the fundamental problem of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, as Pechatnov puts it, was “how to enhance Soviet security positions while avoiding, or at least postponing, a break up with the United States and Great Britain.”⁶⁰ That is to say, the postwar Soviet strategy developed within a context of conflicting imperatives. On the one hand, the Red Army’s occupation of the Eastern Europe created the historic opportunity to enhance the security of the socialist system from future military threats and at the same time to realize Bolsheviks’s long-suppressed desire to expand “socialism in one country” into “socialism in one region,” for which in a wartime conversation Stalin stated that “this war is not as in the past: whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”⁶¹ Yet, such an opportunity pointed to the adoption of an assertive foreign policy. However, the Soviet Union wanted to avoid military conflict with

⁵⁹ Carr, *The Russian Revolution*, p.87

⁶⁰ Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Big Three After the World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Britain,” Working Paper 13, *Cold War International History Project* (1995), p.23

⁶¹ Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1962), p.114, in Norman Naimark, “The Sovietization of Eastern Europe,1944–1953 175,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.175

the West because the Soviet Union was anxious about the potential Western countermeasures.⁶²

As a result of such conflicting circumstances and calculations, the Soviet Union tended to pursue a differentiated strategy toward Europe, in which the Soviet Union envisaged a Europe composed of three political zones or spheres, as Charles Gati puts it:⁶³

- (i) a non-Communist, relatively stable zone in Western Europe, one that would also include Greece;
- (ii) a Communist zone under Soviet control in Eastern Europe – along the vital routes to Germany and the Balkans – that would range from Poland and the eastern part of Germany to the Black Sea states of Romania and Bulgaria;
- (iii) an intermediate zone in East-Central Europe of coalitional political systems under only gradually increasing Communist influence, extending from Yugoslavia in the south through Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia to Finland in the north.

Behind such a set up for Europe, the Soviet Union wanted to further increase the depth of its defense, yet without providing any reasons for the US to maintain its existence in Europe and to involve itself in the political affairs of the continent.⁶⁴ In this regard, Pechatnov argues that the Soviet Union conceived of the US “as a distant giant, posing no direct military threat, and likely to withdraw from Europe after the war.”⁶⁵ Moreover, Pechatnov maintains, the Soviet Union expected the reoccurrence of a new inter-imperialist struggle between Britain and the US, which, on the one hand would force them to keep Germany and Japan weak and on the

⁶² Charles Gati, “Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance,” in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002), p.176-177.

⁶³ Gati, *Hegemony*, p.177. See also Naimark, *Sovietization*, p.175.

⁶⁴ Gati, *Hegemony*, p.177.

⁶⁵ Vladimir O. Pechatnov, “The Soviet Union and the World 1944-1953,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010), p.93

other hand, would prevent them to form a hostile Western coalition against the Soviet Union.⁶⁶ Likewise, according to Melvyn Leffler, the Soviet Union wanted to avoid military conflict with the US, yet it sought to be prepared to defend itself, if the wartime alliance collapsed and fighting break out with the US.⁶⁷ With such considerations, the Soviet strategy toward Turkey, as Pechatanov puts it, could be described as “‘knocking at the doors’ in search of weak point around the Soviet periphery.” In brief, on the basis of their archival researches in the Soviet archive, both Pechatanov and Leffler concluded that there was no a Soviet master plan in the postwar period toward either Europe or Near East.⁶⁸

In the postwar era, however, the Soviet Union faced a very different capitalist foe, the US, and a very different capitalist world order. While the US presented itself as a bastion of freedom, and democracy in stark contrast to “totalitarian” Soviet Union, the new capitalist order after a period of political instability and economic crisis performed as a collective unity by means of dense institutional linkages binding the major capitalist states to the US against the Soviet Union.

4.4. The character of Turkey’s postwar integration into the West

This section seeks to show how the transformations of the inter-imperialist and inter-systemic relationships and sources of conflict in international relations determined/conditioned and/or provided leverage for the boundaries of Turkey’s interwar and post-1945 foreign policy alternatives. That is, the transformations of multipolar international system in interwar years into a bipolar system in the postwar period, in which the inter-systemic conflict not only became the main axis of the international relations but also became increasingly institutionalized as the relations among the capitalist states turning into a more dependent within a

⁶⁶ Pechatanov, *The Soviet Union*, p.93.

⁶⁷ Melvyn P. Leffler, “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996).

⁶⁸ Pechatanov, *The Soviet Union*, p.101; Pechatanov, *The Big Three*, p.23; Leffler, *Inside Enemy Archives*.

framework of multilateral institutions and inter-governmental cooperation. In this way, the section will argue that Turkey's integration into the Western alliance could not be reduced to the dynamics of Turkey's bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and to show how Turkey's integration into West pointed to a wider political, economic, military integration -that is systemic,- rather than a geopolitical alignment against a geopolitical threat emanating from the Soviet geopolitical pressure.

In the aftermath of the WWI, on the nexus of two main relationships, Turkey adopted a multifaceted foreign policy through which it endeavored to utilize from both the contradictions among the capitalist states and the inter-systemic conflict between these states and the Soviet Union. In this regard, in the early period, Turkey played on the inter-systemic struggle between the Soviet Union and Britain (the latter was a declining hegemon) with a strategy in which Kemalist government remained close to the Soviet Union with an anti-imperialist orientation, yet Turkey rigorously avoided binding its fate only to the Soviet Union.⁶⁹ In fact, Turkey's relations with both the West and the Soviet Union had their own difficulties. Kemalist government in Anatolia was fighting for national independence against the West-supported Greece and defining the objective of their struggle as the political and economic independence within the boundaries of "National Pact." On the one hand, though having a critical position within the capitalist system, they were trying to create a Western political-social-economic system.⁷⁰ As for their relations with the Bolsheviks, despite their ideological difference, they were trying to cooperate with the Bolsheviks in a common anti-imperialist front. In this regard, the similar aspects of the process in Russia and Turkey forced the Kemalist and the Bolshevik movements to establish close bilateral relations with each other in a hostile international environment. In this regard, they performed a willingness to come

⁶⁹ Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2008), p. 25

⁷⁰ İlhan Uzgel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler," *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 258-277 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012), p.142.

together in their struggle against the same foe, which was the British and French imperialism. Nevertheless, the ideological orientations of these two political leaderships were different in the sense that the systems they had in their prospective political agenda were intrinsically antagonistic. Kemalists wanted to westernize the country because they saw westernization not only as a way to catch up with the West in order to “reach the level of contemporary civilization,” but also as a means of self-defence against the West. That is to say, they interpreted the West as a model to construct it at a national form with a view to ensuring the development and the security of the country. In this regard, they were in a search of developmental strategy within the capitalist system. However, Bolsheviks as communist revolutionaries got a very different way and made the first socialist revolution, which as discussed above was the first open challenge to the capitalism. Yet, it was not this systemic or ideological difference that formed the ground on which the two revolutionary governments established their bilateral relations in their early years. In this regard, the Kemalist appeared to highlight the similar aspects of their struggle against imperialism in the international relations rather than emphasizing the ideological difference with the nature of the Soviet revolution in Russia.

As for the Bolshevik leadership, as discussed above, the failure of the world revolution drove the Bolshevik leaders to adopt a peaceful coexistence policy through normalized diplomatic relations with the capitalist states in the West, while they did not abandon the idea of world revolution. Yet they reoriented their efforts toward the revolutionary potential in the East. The idea behind such a reorientation rested on the belief that if the colonial systems of the capitalist world could be weakened with the loss of its colonies, which in turn would open the way to transform the balance of domestic class power and thus overthrow of the bourgeoisie rule in the capitalist countries. Therefore, in this new formula, the destruction of the colonial empires took precedence in the way to the final victory of communism in the Bolsheviks’ considerations. In this regard, Second Congress of the Comintern, which met in July and August in Moscow, invited the exploited and

oppressed peoples in the colonial and semi-colonial countries to Baku. As Zinoviev stated in the First Session of Baku Congress,

The Communist International turns today to the peoples of the East and says to them: 'Brothers, we summon you to a holy war, in the first place against British imperialism!

We want these two streams [the nationalist and communist revolutionaries] to draw closer and closer together, so that the second stream may be cleansed of national prejudices, so that they may be merged in one single tumultuous, powerful stream which, like the sea, will sweep all obstacles from its path and clear the land of all the evil from which we have suffered so long.

This was the first attempt of the Comintern to establish a common front between the communists and the nationalist revolutionaries in the East. Until that time, the Comintern was largely a westward-looking organization, which primarily concerned with the domestic class struggle in the major capitalist countries. However, with this move, the communists turned their faces toward revolutionary movements in the East, the primary objective of which was the expulsion of external imperial domination.⁷¹ This is the framework in which the Soviet orientation toward Turkey in early relationship of the two governments took its essential character. That is, the relations between Ankara Government and the Soviet Government developed in conformity with the new Eastern orientation of Soviet foreign policy during the early 1920s.

In such a framework, both governments had a common interest of coming together against the activities of the Western major states in the region, on the one hand, and of gaining official recognition in the international relations with a view to breaking their political isolations. Yet this rapprochement was an uneasy relationship from the beginning, this could be followed though a review of the questions directed to Mustafa Kemal Paşa in the Grand National Assembly as well as his certain statements on various occasions in 1921 and through the statements and addresses

⁷¹ Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy*, p.7.

of the Bolshevik leaders. In the Turkish parliament, the questions and discussions were related to the nature and boundary of the relations between Ankara Government and Soviet Government. As an answer to the question of Nafiz Bey (Canik) with regard to government's relations with communist, Mustafa Kemal Paşa stated on January 3, 1921 that⁷²

In our relationship with Russians, the principle of communism was not discussed to the detriment of capitalism. Nobody tell us or forced us to be communist for establishing a relationship, we did not say that we decided to be communist in order to be friend with you.

In an interview on November 6, 1921, with Ruşen Eşref, Mustafa Kemal Paşa further stated in this regard that⁷³

Communism is a social phenomenon. Condition of our country, social circumstances of our country, the strength of the religious and national customs affirmed us that communism in Russia is not suitable to apply in our country. Recently, the parties founded on the principle of communism in our country realized this truth by experience and are convinced to terminate their operations. Even Russia's intellectuals themselves came to agree to this truth. Therefore, our relations and friendship with Russians are only related to principles of coalition and alliance of two independent states.

As inferred, Mustafa Kemal Paşa did not want to take the opposition of the communists in the sense that he did not simply discredit the systemic orientation of the Soviet government, rather by highlighting the difference between two countries, he put the issue in a way that as if communism was not a suitable system for Turkish society. Nevertheless, Mustafa Kemal seemed to limit relations with the Soviet Union as the diplomatic relations between the two independent states.

⁷² *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (1918-1927)*, Vol. 1 (Divan Yayıncılık: Ankara), p.133

⁷³ *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (1918-1927)*, Vol. 3 (Divan Yayıncılık: Ankara), p.25

As their counterparts, the Bolshevik leaders as well were aware of the fact that Kemalists were not communist. In this regard, Lenin informed the first ambassador of the Soviet Government to Ankara, Semion Ivanovich Aralov that Mustafa Kemal was not a communist, and that he was leading a movement with bourgeois characteristics, but a valuable ally.⁷⁴ The Bolsheviks preferred to support Kemalist movement among others in line with their new orientation because they thought that (i) the direction of this movement was not yet clear and (i) the Kemalists was fighting against the same foe as well. As stated by Zinoviev in the first session of the Congress on September 1, 1920,⁷⁵

this is the movement of the oppressed nationalities which have not yet chosen the road they will follow, do not yet know exactly what they want, but which feel that a strap is chafing their backs, that French and British capitalism are sitting astride their necks.

we patiently support those groups which are not yet with us and even on some questions, are against us. For example, in Turkey, comrades, you know that the Soviet Government supports Kemal. We do not for one moment forget that the movement headed by Kemal is not a Communist movement.

Even though the two movements were aware of their ideological differences, their common interests and strategic considerations against the imperialist states took precedence. The Soviet Union supported the national liberation struggle in Anatolia as a solution to its political engulfment. At that time, the British had taken under control the straits with the armistice of Mudros⁷⁶ and by accommodating Greece in

⁷⁴ Semyon İvanoviç Aralov, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, trans. Hasan Ali Ediz (Burçak Yayınları: İstanbul, 1967), p. 37–38, quoted in Nazım Arda Çağdaş, *The Birth of anti-Soviet Image in the Turkish Press Following the Second World War and its Reflections after the Death Of Stalin (1953 - 1964)* (MA thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, September 2008), p.15-16.

⁷⁵ For the text of First Session, Baku Congress of the Peoples of the East, September 1, 1920, <https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/baku/ch01.htm>. (accessed on July 25, 2014).

⁷⁶ For analyses of the Armistice of Mudros, see Erik Jan Zürcher, “The Ottoman Empire and the Armistice of Moudros,” in *At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes, and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918*, Edited by Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle (Leo Cooper: London, 1998), p.266-275.

Anatolia, it would have indirect control over the region.⁷⁷ Moreover, Britain had formed a sequence of buffer states in the Caucasian through the supported governments of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In this respect, the victory of the Kemalist movement in Anatolia would remove the danger of the presence of a strong state hostile to the Soviet Union in the straits and the possibility of Soviet being deprived of the Baku oil.⁷⁸ As for Turkey, Ankara Government was in a search of a state, which would provide the necessary external support in the national independence war. Under the political circumstances of the day and in terms of their struggle against the common enemy, the Soviet Union was the only state from which Ankara Government might readily seek support.⁷⁹

The inter-systemic struggle between the Soviet Union and the Western capitalist states was not only a determining factor behind Turkey's postwar drive, but also it was a factor in the very process of independence and nation-building in such a way that Ankara Government was able to establish close relations in the face of its political isolation. The underlying factor in such a political situation lied in the Western approach against Ankara Government. The foreign minister of Ankara Government, Ahmet Muhtar Bey stated in a speech addressing the parliament in 1921 that⁸⁰

there are no changes in our relations with the West. Our government has not received from none of the entente states any significant offers whether written or spoken in the official language. What we want is the political and economic independence within our national boundaries. We are ready to extend our hand every state, which will recognize it and inform us. But there is no such an offer.

⁷⁷ Levent Ürer, *Mondros'tan Mudanya Mütarekesine Türk Dış Politikası* (Altın Kitaplar: İstanbul, 2005), p.96.

⁷⁸ Ürer, *Mondros'tan Mudanya Mütarekesine*, p.96

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.95

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.110

As understood from the speech of Ahmet Muhtar Bey, the Ankara Government was then ready for reconciliation with the Western states. Yet the problem with the West was the character of this reconciliation. While the Ankara Government sought to reach an agreement on the basis of independence within the boundaries of “National Pact,” the Western imperialist states endeavored to impose a mandatory relationship on Turkey (their insistence on the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres).⁸¹ However, as Mustafa Kemal Paşa stated in relation to the Soviet Union, “just as nobody tell us or forced us to be communist for establishing a relationship, we did not say that we decided to be communist in order to be friend with you.” That is to say, even though their different systemic envision for the future of their respective countries drew the boundaries of friendship between the two revolutionary movements, neither Bolsheviks nor Kemalists imposed conditions on the other side and attempted to establish an equal relationship against the imperialist states, which did not recognize the governments of both countries as an equal participant of international relations.

The Treaty of Lausanne, which invalidated the Treaty of Sèvres, ended the political isolation of Turkey on 24 July 1923 and thus brought about Turkey’s international recognition. On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly declared Turkey to be a republic and elected Mustafa Kemal as the first president. The unresolved issues of the conference, more importantly the status of Mosul, which was left to the League of Nations as a contested issue between Turkey and Britain, became the primary items on the agenda of Turkish foreign policy. In this context, Turkey in years following the Treaty of Lausanne tried to utilize the inter-systemic hostility between the western imperialist states and the Soviet Union as well as the conflicts among the imperialist states. In this regard, due to the systemic difference, the rapprochement between the two governments was from the very beginning

⁸¹ Timur, *Türk Devrimi*, p.39, For an analysis of Treaty of Sèvres, see Baskın Oran, “Sèvres Barış Antlaşması,” in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 113-138 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012), p. 113-138

suspicious and limited and mutual suspicion had further increased, one can suggest, as the relations of the two countries transformed with the Western capitalist states.

After the mid-1930s under the hostile international environment emanating from the revisionist policies of fascist-militarist states, Turkey sought to ensure its security against an Italian threat that may come from the Mediterranean, on the one hand and to take advantage of the rising competition among the capitalist states, on the other. In this regard, Turkey managed to reestablished its sovereignty over the Straits with the Montreux convention in 1936, to get back Hatay province and to sign a tripartite mutual assistance pact with Britain and France in 1939 despite the pressure of the Soviet Union. Stalin and Molotov tried to dissuade Saraçoğlu from the alliance of Britain and France and intended to assure Turkey's neutrality. It was these negotiations between the two states that have been regarded as the beginning of the break up between Turkey and the Soviet Union because the Soviet Union brought up its infamous demands on the agenda of the negotiations for a mutual assistance pact.⁸² The most significant one was the signing of a pact between the two countries that envisaged the common defense of the straits.⁸³ On October 1, 1939, Molotov stated in relation to the negotiations with Turkey that "since 1 October no meeting has [taken place] with the Turkish Foreign Minister and that the outcome of the negotiations cannot as yet be surmised. ... The Soviet Government intended to convince Turkey to adopt full neutrality and to close the Dardanelles, as well as to aid in maintaining peace in the Balkans."⁸⁴ However, the Soviet proposals regarding the common defense of the Straits were immediately rejected by

⁸² Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları (1935-1939)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973), p.232.

⁸³ Ahmet Şükrü Esmer and Oral Sander, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 137-185 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996), p.142.

⁸⁴ Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, *Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*. "Telegram from Moscow by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office, October 9, 1939." Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948, p.120-121.

Saraçoğlu and when he was on his way back to Turkey without signing any agreement;⁸⁵ the Turkish-British-French Pact was signed on 19 October 1939.

Even though Turkey had made its war preparation within the Western alliance, in fact, Turkey's de facto strategy during the war was to stay out of the war. As Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu argues, for Turkey, concern to stay out of war was a decisive factor.⁸⁶ Turkey managed to preserve its de facto neutrality by taking advantage of the contradictions among Britain, Germany and the Soviet Union. Just before the German troops crossed the Soviet Border, on June 18, 1941, Turkey signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Britain and the US accepted Turkey's neutrality early in the war. Aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German penetration deep into the Soviet Union, Turkey moved towards firmer neutrality and told both sides that this was also in keeping with their interests. After German attack, Stalin sought Turkey's entry into the war with a view to release the German pressure over the Soviet Union. After the tide of war on the Eastern front turned in favour of Soviet Union with major victory at Stalingrad, the issue of aiding Turkey and inducing it to enter the war became more important to Britain, and it put increasing pressure on Turkey to join the War.⁸⁷ Throughout the war, the Allies held conferences in Casablanca (12-24 January 1942), Washington (12-26 May 1943), Quebec (2-14 August 1943), Moscow (19-30 October 1943), Cairo (22-26 November 1943; 1-6 December 1943), Tehran (28 November to 1 December 1943), Yalta (4-11 February 1945) and Potsdam (July-August 1945) to discuss their war strategies. During the Quebec Conference and the first conference held in Cairo, Churchill defended the view that a second front had to be opened in the Balkans through Turkish participation to the war. Yet Turkey refused the Allies' request to enter the war. This was partly related to the level of military assistance, which the

⁸⁵ Esmer and Sander, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında*, p.143.

⁸⁶ Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, *Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler*, p.277. See also Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. "Dış Politika Nedir? Türkiye'deki Dünü ve Bugünü," *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 35, no. 1-4 (1980): 309-335, p.322.

⁸⁷ Gökay, *Soviet Eastern Policy*, p.55

Turkish leaders still considered to be very limited and unsatisfactory, and partly because they claimed that Germany and Bulgaria would probably retaliate by attacking Turkish territory in Europe and its coastal cities.⁸⁸ The Turkish leaders seemed to be concerned about their defensive strength. In the face of pressure from the Allied Powers, they took the firm view that Turkey had more to gain than to lose by remaining neutral.⁸⁹ As the final German defeat became imminent, Turkey made certain moves in support of the Allies. June 6, 1944 was the date of the Normandy landing. On May 26, Turkey had decided to end strategic chrome exports to Germany. On August 2, 1944, diplomatic relations with Germany were ended.⁹⁰ On February 23, 1945 the Turkish Grand National Assembly decided by a unanimous vote of 401 members to declare war on Germany and Japan. During the debate, Foreign Minister Hasan Saka said that the British Ambassador's advice had been thoroughly examined by the government and that it had been decided to accept it as being in keeping both with the alliance and with the "high interests" of the state which had all long inspired the government's policy.⁹¹

However, the two main relationships and the sources of conflict in international relations underwent a major transformation with the consequences of the WWII, which changed the international system on a new geopolitical constellation on the basis of competition and antagonism between the US and the Soviet Union.⁹² Different from the interwar years, the US managed to alter the pattern of relations among the major capitalist states and with an international framework through multilateral institutions and inter-governmental cooperation, it managed to integrate all the other capitalist powers into an effective system of coordination under its

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Sina Akşin, "Turkey's Declaration on Germany at the end of the World War II," *Turkish Year Book*, Vol. 33 (2002), p.289

⁹¹ Akşin, *Turkey's Declaration*, p.289-290

⁹² Overy and Wheatcroft, *The Road to War*, p.227

aegis.⁹³ In this regard, inter-capitalist relations became more stable and if tensions and conflicts emerged, they were able to resolve these tensions and conflicts without resorting to war.

With the transformation of the relations among the capitalist states, the inter-systemic conflict primarily between the US and the Soviet Union became the main axis of the international politics. In this framework, while Turkey, in the interwar years, during which inter-imperialist and inter-systemic struggle constituted the two main axes of the multipolar international relations, sought to ensure its security and development search through the contradictions inherent in these relationships, in the post-WWII, the inter-systemic conflict between the Soviet Union and the Western capitalist states became the most important, if not sole, determinant of Turkish foreign policy.

In the new international context, the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic pressure over Turkey in the immediate years following the WWII. Molotov delivered a note to the Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper on 19 March 1945 demanding revisions to 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality due to the profound changes brought about by the WWII. That is, for the Soviet Union, 1925 Treaty, which had been extended three times and would terminate in on 7 November,⁹⁴ was no longer corresponded to the new international situation. The negotiations for a new Treaty, which would replace 1925 Treaty, were subjected to two conditions by the Soviet side. These were the two conditions popularly known in Turkey as the “Soviet demands,” which were revision (i) of the 1936 Montreux Convention which governed shipping in the Dardanelles Straits and the leasing of military bases; (ii) of the border between two

⁹³ Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (Verso: London, 2012), p.8.

⁹⁴ On December 17, 1929, the 1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality had been extended for two years with a bilateral protocol that was signed in Ankara. On March 7, 1931 an additional protocol also entered into force. Again, this treaty was extended for 5 years with an additional protocol that was signed on 30 October 1931, and prolonged for the last time for another 10 years on November 7, 1935.

countries. Hostile commentary in the Soviet press accompanied to the Soviet diplomatic initiative. The Soviet Union also articulated its demands in international conferences as well, namely Yalta in February and Potsdam Conference in August as well as the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in December 1945. Furthermore, in line with the decision taken in the Potsdam, Soviets delivered two diplomatic notes on August 7, and September 24, 1946 to Turkey regarding their demands for revision of the Montreux Convention, the notes did not include Soviet verbal demands for border revision in the Eastern border in relation to Kars and Ardahan. The below is the Soviet diplomatic note:⁹⁵

For its own part, the Soviet Government proposes to establish for the Straits a new regime, proceeding from the following principles:

Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing freedom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers.

Despite the Soviet Union's emphasize to enhance Soviet security in the straits and Black Sea, the US and Britain seemed to find Soviet proposal for revision of Montreux Convention at Potsdam legitimate, yet they opposed the Soviet acquisition of military base.⁹⁶ In this regard, Britain and the US regarded Soviet for military bases not only as a form of diplomatic intimidation, but also a threat to their strategic and economic interests in the region. In fact, the Allies apprehensions were less to do with the sovereignty rights of Turkey and more to do with the consequences – economic, political and strategic – of Soviet positioning in the Straits. As a response to the Soviet pressure, the US announced the dispatch of part of the US Mediterranean fleet to Turkey and the US Missouri battleship visited

⁹⁵ United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946. The Near East and Africa, Vol. VII. "The Soviet Charge in Washington (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, August 7, 1946." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946, p.829.

⁹⁶ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," *The Journal of American History* 71, no.4 (March 1985), p.809.

Istanbul on April 5, 1946. In relation to the US interests in Turkey, Leffler argues that they sought to take advantage of a favorable opportunity to enhance the strategic interests of the US in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.⁹⁷

In 1947, the US, with the words of Bailey, adapted “a get-tough-with-Russia policy.”⁹⁸ The Truman Doctrine together with the Marshall Plan set the stage for the US global commitment to contain where communism already existed and to prevent its further expansion.⁹⁹ The US President Truman, as stated above, appealed to congress to deliver aids to Greece and Turkey as strategically vital areas for preventing the expansion of communism to the Mediterranean region and the Middle East.¹⁰⁰ As a set of principles of the US foreign policy, the stage was set for the US to support these strategically vital areas in their efforts to halt the communist expansion.¹⁰¹ The Truman Doctrine, Herbert Feis writes, “contained an elaboration of American policy of global scope, and called upon the American people to carry an assignment that could be stretched to furthestmost foreign horizon.”¹⁰² Feis further argues that the President speech rested on “the assumption that the United States had the power to make its wishes or its will effective anywhere in the world.”¹⁰³ In this regard, the Truman Doctrine was not only a declaration of the US willingness to back anti-communist forces in Greece and Turkey against the Soviet Union, but more crucially the doctrine also signaled a global commitment strategy

⁹⁷ Leffler, *Strategy*, p.808.

⁹⁸ Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia: Russian–American Relations from Early Times to Our Day* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: New York, 1950), p.320.

⁹⁹ See John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2005).

¹⁰⁰ Bailey, *America Faces Russia*, p.320.

¹⁰¹ See Bailey, *America Faces Russia*, Chapter 27: 320-346.

¹⁰² Herbert Feis, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (Norton: New York, 1970), p.193-194.

¹⁰³ Feis, *From Trust to Terror*, p.197.

of the US to support potential allies anywhere else such aid was needed.¹⁰⁴ This in turn can be phrased as by portraying the Soviet political system and institutions as antithetical to the Western democratic political system and institutions. Indeed the threat for Truman was the Soviet Union as the hypostatized communism as well as totalitarianism. The doctrine was followed by an ambitious economic plan, the Marshall Plan, for providing the US economic aid to Europe. The US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall proposed aid for a joint European recovery program in his speech in June 1947 at the Moscow Foreign Ministers conference. Yet in the postwar period before the announcement of the Marshall plan, the US dollars were already pumped into France and Italy for political “stabilization” against the left,¹⁰⁵ while a 1945 loan had been delivered to Britain with certain political conditions.¹⁰⁶ The announcement of the Marshall Plan moved European polarization to a higher level, as a result of which the French, Italian, and Belgian CPs (Communist Parties) were expelled from government in May 1947 because within the structure of the Marshall Plan, the provision of aid was closely linked to the nature of development or development options in recipient countries.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁴ Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, p.3.

¹⁰⁵ See Irwin M. Wall, *The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1991), p.53-56; John Lamberton Harper, *America and the Reconstruction of Italy, 1945-1948* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002); and James E. Miller, “Taking Off the Gloves: The United States and the Italian Elections of 1948,” *Diplomatic History* 7, no.1(1983): 35-56.

¹⁰⁶ Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.300. The US-Britain loan agreement was a postwar loan separate from the lend-lease program. The loan amounted to \$3-75 billion, repayable over fifty years at 2 per cent interest, repayment to begin five years after the loan was made. The loan was tied to a British commitment to reverse the wartime policy of strict control over the convertibility of pounds into dollars one year after the loan was ratified. This was the most explicit policy concession made by Britain in return for the loan. But the loan agreement was accompanied by a separate agreement on commercial policy to commit Britain to an effort at trade liberalization. See Jim Tomlinson, *Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945-1951* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1997), p.25-26.

¹⁰⁷ Robert E. Wood. *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy* (University of California Press: Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, 1986), part one.

As a countermove to Marshall Plan, a new organization was established at a meeting of European Communist Parties in Poland in September 1947, the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau), with a view to sharing information among Communist Parties,¹⁰⁸ but in fact to monitoring compliance with Soviet instructions. The establishment of the Cominform was the manifestation of a change in the Soviet strategy against the prospect for cooperation and peaceful coexistence with the West. In this regard, the Soviet Union abandoned its differentiated plan for postwar Europe and initiated drastic changes in its policies against the Eastern Europe and Germany. In line with this strategy, by 1948 liberal parties of coalition governments in East-Central Europe were eliminated from the government with the support of the Soviet Union and the Communist parties rose to power throughout East-Central Europe. All these brought to an end the period of the Popular Front Strategy of domestic cooperation through coalitions in Western and in East-Central Europe and the Popular Front strategy of international cooperation with the West.¹⁰⁹ In line with the new strategy, the Soviet Union started to solidify the Eastern Bloc and thus launched the strategy of ‘Two Camps’ line of Andrei A. Zhdanov, through which conformities were toughened in Eastern Europe, most dramatically through the Czechoslovak Revolution of 19-25 February 1948.¹¹⁰ In his “two camp” speech at the founding meeting of the Cominform, Zhdanov argues that the era of

¹⁰⁸ More commonly referred to as the Cominform, the Communist Information Bureau was a cabal of nine Marxist–Leninist parties inaugurated at the behest of Josef Stalin in 1947. The group initially included the communist parties of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, though the last of these was expelled in 1948 owing to its “Titoism.” The Cominform sought to bring about communication and cooperation lacking between its constituent members since the 1943 dissolution of the Comintern. However, it was not intended as a replacement for that organ, but instead as a means with which to express international solidarity between communist parties, chiefly through the dissemination of pro-Soviet propaganda among its members. The Cominform was completed in 1956 upon Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia. David Martin Walker and Daniel Gray, *Historical Dictionary of Marxism* (Scarecrow Press: Lanham, Md., 2007), p.61.

¹⁰⁹ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, p.300; David Reynolds, “The European Dimension of the Cold War,” in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002), p.134-135; Gati, *Hegemony*, p.188; Naimark, *Sovietization*, p.191.

¹¹⁰ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, p.300; Reynolds, *European Dimension*, p.134-135. For the Zhdanovism, see *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Cilt 3 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1988), p.1001.

cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West came to an end. Even though, Zhdanov maintained, the Soviet foreign policy adhered to long-term coexistence between capitalism and socialism, he did not believe any more that the west would reciprocate to the Soviet Union because he interpreted the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as the manifestation of American imperialism, which in turn reflected aggressive military and strategic predisposition as well as commitment to economic expansion and ideological warfare.¹¹¹ After the establishment of Cominform, the Soviet Union tightened its economic relationships with the East European countries, which culminated in the formation of the Comecon (Council of Mutual Economic Assistance) in January 1949.¹¹²

Yet the clash of Soviet and American objectives in Germany and Eastern Europe had reached its high point in the Berlin Blockade crisis in June 1948. As a response to the Western policy of restoration of Germany's old economic structure as well as uniting their zone without approval of the Soviet Union, the latter retaliated by blockading the connections between West and East Berlin -the start of a blockade that would last from 24 June 1948 until 12 May 1949.¹¹³ In response to this move, the Western allies organized the Berlin airlift. The blockade was lifted in May 1949 and resulted in the creation of two separate German states along with the establishment of NATO would further consolidate the larger division of Europe.¹¹⁴ In consequence, in Europe relations seemed to settle down as the US and the Soviet Union tried to consolidate rather than extend themselves. As a result, the center of rivalry shifted from Europe to the Third World,¹¹⁵ where the future orientation of the post-colonial states was not yet evident. Indeed, the two superpowers or the

¹¹¹ Gati, *Hegemony*, p.190.

¹¹² Naimark, *Sovietization*, p.191.

¹¹³ For an excellent account of the US policies towards the future of Germany, see Carolyn Eisenberg, "US Policy in Postwar Germany: The Conservative Restoration," *Science & Society* 46, no. 1(1982).

¹¹⁴ Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, p.4.

¹¹⁵ Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, p.4; Saull, *Locating the Global South*, p.254;

socio-economic systems each took the lead vied for supremacy in the Third World. Therefore, it was the region, where the superpowers bided against each other in constant rivalry and where the armed conflict was most possible and indeed happened.

In such a framework, Turkey allied itself to the Western capitalist bloc and the domestic political and economic system was shaped by anti-communist, anti-Soviet, pro-American and pro-market policies in the years following the World War II. This means that the global systemic conflict made political considerations of local political subjects associated with a wider and global struggle for the organization of social, political and economic life. Thus, in order to understand the nature of threats Turkey faced and the developmental trajectory it opted for after the WWII, it is necessary to handle the issue through a systemic approach by setting the relations of Turkey with both the West, particularly the US and the Soviet Union as an extension of an inter-systemic struggle. Therefore, it would be very hard for one to make sense of the direction and nature of profound changes in political and economic structures of Turkey in concomitant to the change in its foreign policy without taking into account the transformative impacts of this inter-systemic confrontation.

Then what did the transformation of the international politics from multipolarity to into bipolar structure on the basis of the inter-systemic struggle come to mean for Turkey. In this regard, as the inter-systemic struggle became the dominant character of the international relations, Turkey's prewar strategy to play on the two main relationships and sources of conflict lost its material basis. As stated above, the transformation of the relations among the capitalist states restricted each states foreign policy alternatives and set a systemic choice before each state as well as Turkey. As crystallized in Truman Doctrine, which called for the nations "to choose between alternative ways of life," integration into either of these antagonistic social, political and economic systems involved a choice of socio-economic system (a reorganization or adjustment of domestic socio-economic system).

The postwar US strategy stood upon two objectives, which were anti-communism and commitment to a multilateral vision of a capitalist world economy.¹¹⁶ Preparing to rebuild the international economic system while World War II was still raging in Europe and the Far East, representatives of forty-four countries gathered at Bretton Woods in 1944 to establish the institutional basis for a postwar multilateral world economy. What came to be known as the “Bretton Woods system” centered on two organizations: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).¹¹⁷ The Bretton Woods institutions and the character of the postwar world economy that the US sought to establish after 1945 were founded upon anti-statist and anti-protectionist considerations.¹¹⁸ Besides these financial institutions, in the fields of defense and security, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) was established in order to realize the two objectives above. Yet as Mustafa Türkeş phrases it, “from the very beginning of its establishment, NATO did not only serve as only a defense organization, but also it assumed wider political and ideological functions as “regulating” the relations among the member states and keeping them within the system.”¹¹⁹ As a result, the US managed to harmonize the relations among capitalist states under its hegemony through these inter-governmental institutions. Beyond these institutions, the US also launched the politically motivated Marshall Plan, in which, access to aid has been structured in a way that promote dependent development. That is, the provision of aid in the framework of Marshall Plan became conditional upon “openness to and alliance with foreign capital; import of organizational and production technologies; monetary, fiscal, and trade policies extending the domestic reach of international market forces; and despite considerable variation, a general “dissociation” of the

¹¹⁶ Mustafa Türkeş, “NATO Bağlamında ABD-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Devamlılık ve Değişim,” in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, Edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu (Der Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004), p.381

¹¹⁷ Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, p.22

¹¹⁸ Saull, *After the Cold War*, p.63

¹¹⁹ Türkeş, *NATO*, p.381-382.

“entrepreneurial-repressive state... from the nations.”¹²⁰ In this regard, the Marshall Plan sought to restrict the pursuit of alternative development policies (statist) if recipient countries wanted to access to development aid. As a result, there was no longer an international environment in the postwar period, which would provide Turkey to cultivate closer relations both with the West and the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and create an autonomous space for maintaining its pre-war industrialization policy within the capitalist system, on the other.

4.5. Conclusion

It is hard to understand the international relations in the pre- and postwar periods without taking into account the inter-systemic struggle between the Western capitalist states and the Soviet Union. This systemic struggle was utmost important to understand the dynamics behind the Turkish foreign policy as well. In this regard, the analysis of the Soviet strategic orientations in the interwar years and postwar periods had two critical respects. On the one hand, the relations of the Soviet Union with the Western capitalist states and its strategies adopted in the context of this relationship in the interwar years came to demonstrate the existence as well as importance of an inter-systemic struggle in the international relations. On the other hand, this systemic struggle was critical in the analysis of the Soviet strategies in pre- and postwar periods against Turkey. In this regard, Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union could not be detached from the wider inter-systemic conflict between the Soviet Union and the West because, as could be followed through the above analysis of the Soviet strategies, the moments of the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union or the different attitudes of the Soviet Union against Turkey seemed to be in consistent with the evolution of its strategies in the wider inter-systemic conflict. That is, it is hard to talk about a historically coherent and unrevised strategy of the Soviet Union toward Turkey, particularly in relation to the straits. However, as discussed in Chapter III, the mainstream approaches in Turkey evaluated the expansion of Soviet influence and control in Eastern Europe and its

¹²⁰ Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis*, p.4-5.

pressure over Turkey as a purposeful and coherent part of a Soviet master plan for territorial expansion. In this regard, they presented the Soviet policy against Turkey in the line with the traditional policy of imperial Russia for gaining the control of the straits to use it as base for further expansion.¹²¹ In fact, such analyses represent an ahistorical reading of Turkey's relations with its northern neighbor whether it be Russian Empire or the Soviet Union *vis a vis* their hostile policies against Ottoman Empire or Turkey. These analyses indeed ignore the first ontological challenge to the capitalist social relations, which thus entirely disregarded the inter-systemic struggle created by this challenge because for them the Soviet Union, from the very beginning, had inherited a master plan, despite its close relations with the new republic in early years, against Turkey to take control of the straits. In this regard, these accounts interpret the common geographical features of the two countries as if they were doomed to have conflicts over the status of the straits. It is true insofar as the status of straits had been a special, if not the most important, item on their bilateral agenda, yet posing the issue in a historically problematic way led us to examine the whole historical processes through an unchanged Russian quest for access to warm seas.

¹²¹ See Chapter III-3.2.1 and 3.2.2 in this thesis.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Turkey's integration into the West and the character of this integration have been a subject matter of many studies. It may well be stated that there are three main groups of studies on the subject in question. These are orthodox realist, revisionist and leftist approaches. The orthodox realists interpret Turkey's drive to the West as a geopolitical alignment against a geopolitical threat, "the Soviet threat." In this regard, they focus on the deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union as a result of the latter's infamous demands for privileges on the straits in the aftermath of the war. As attitude of the Soviet Union changed against Turkey with a view to extending its influence on Turkey, Turkey was forced to take a side in this post-war struggle. In other words, not having a direct interest in the struggle between the superpowers, Turkey had to approach to the US as a response to the hostile policies of the Soviet Union. This comes to mean that for them Turkey's drive toward the West was an unwilling move towards the West, in the absence of such demands, Turkey would have maintained its relations with both West and the Soviet Union. For these accounts, there was certainly a Soviet blueprint/long-term master plan for gaining the control of the straits. This conflict started to rise again between Turkey and its Northern neighbor with the change in latter's orientation toward Turkey whenever it got strengthened.

The revisionist interpretations challenged the widely-accepted idea that the Soviet leaders were committed to post-war expansionism against Turkey. They argue that the Soviet Union's demands over Turkey, though in contradiction with the sovereignty right of Turkey, had a defensive rationale, and that the Soviet Union was in an attempt to secure its vulnerable south with a view to avoiding

encirclement by the other great powers. However, the challenge of the revisionist interpretations do not have a radical character, they do not question the nature of the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Indeed they use a conceptual framework similar to that of the earlier orthodox accounts. That is to say, they do as well present and discuss the relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union as mainly a security issue in the framework of the post-war geopolitical competition. In such a conceptual trap, the revisionist researchers conceive the post-war conflict as great power conflicts between the new superpowers of the world, i.e. the US and the USSR. In this regard, while the orthodox realist accounts see Turkey's commitment to the West, particularly the US, as an effort to balance the power of the Soviet Union, which posed direct threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey in the post-war period, the revisionist accounts see the tension between Turkey and the Soviet Union as a result of mutual insecurity against each other. For the revisionist, as Turkey abandoned its neutrality having constituted the essential ground, on which Turkey and the Soviet Union had been able to cultivate intimate relations, approached to Britain as a rival power to the Soviet Union, this triggered insecurity on the part of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the revisionists interpret the Soviet demands as a bargaining chip on the table so as to force Turkey to adopt a neutral position once again, even though the Soviet attitude, in turn, gave way to insecurity on the part of Turkey as well. As a result, the Soviet attitude against Turkey was not considered as an outcome of the expansionist Soviet policies, but rather it was a result of security-oriented considerations of the Soviets.

The radical leftist accounts shifted the center of the debate from the problematic relations of Turkey with the Soviet Union to its dependent relations with the US. In this regard, Turkey's relations with the US came under scrutiny with a view to investigating the reasons of Turkey's dependence on the US. It was no longer the so-called "Soviet threat" that forced Turkey to move into the Western alliance, that is, Turkey's espousal to the West was not considered as a result of the policies of the Soviet Union. They seemed to interpret the discourse of "Soviet threat" as being deliberately exploited, on the one hand, to convince the West about how the Soviets

were dangerous for the world and, on the other hand, to ease Turkey's post-war adjustment to the new international capitalist order. The leftist approaches could be encapsulated in two groups, which are left Kemalist and class-based approaches.

For left Kemalists, by joining to the British-French alliance and thus abandoning its neutrality policy, Turkey in the first place caused the deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union. That is to say, it was Turkey, not the Soviets, which had changed its policies and led to the deterioration of relations between the two countries. In this regard, for the left Kemalists, the Soviet intention was misconceived at hands of incompetent statesmen and manipulated by imperialists and their internal collaborators. Nevertheless, left Kemalists, as the orthodox and revisionists, kept on seeing the Cold War as mainly a geopolitical conflict between the Western imperialist states and the Soviet Union. Moreover, the left Kemalists along with the revisionists tend to examine the Turkish postwar foreign policy as reference to the Turkish foreign policy in the interwar period till 1939; for them, the newly-established republic once was able to establish close cooperation based on mutual trust with all its neighboring countries by assuring the security requirements of those countries. This in turn led them to ignore the profound changes underwent in the international relations in the postwar period. As a result they end up with an ahistorical analysis of Turkey's drive to the west.

The class-based approach interprets Turkey's integration as a socio-economic integration and refers to the changes in domestic class relations as the essential dynamics behind Turkey's drive to the West. In this regard, they tend not to see the geopolitical tension between the Soviet Union and Turkey, which appears to dominate the Turkish Cold War literature as an effective factor behind Turkey's post-war determination toward the West. They find this geopolitical conflict as either fabricated or irrelevant to Turkey's integration into the West. That is, for the advocates of this approach, Turkey's drive to the West is not interpreted as motivated by the "Soviet threat" on the basis of geopolitical considerations since the

“Soviet threat” was considered as either fabricated or irrelevant to Turkey’s determination toward the Western bloc.

All these works make significant contributions to the literature in understanding the postwar Turkish foreign policy, yet they tend to evaluate the geopolitical and socio-economic dynamics as independent from each other due to the problem in their conceptualization of the Cold War, as a result of which they interpret the Turkey’s integration either as a geopolitical alignment against the Soviet threat or as a socio-economic integration. Yet it might be argued that they failed to integrate these two dynamics behind postwar Turkish foreign policy.

Against these arguments, this thesis argues that they ignore the transformative impacts of the changing patterns or forms of the inter-imperialist and inter-systemic relationships and sources of conflict. As discussed in chapter 4, with the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, the struggle between rival systems of capitalism and socialism became a defining relationship of international relations along with the inter-imperialist rivalries. In this regard, the inter-systemic struggle between the Soviet Union and the West existed in the years following the 1917 October Revolution. Therefore, this systemic relationship along with the relations among the major capitalist states became the main axes of the international relations. In this regard, in the interwar years, Turkey was able to take advantage of these two sources of conflicts and by playing off one imperialist against other or on the inter-systemic struggle; it could develop relations both with the imperialist states and the Soviet Union. However, the WWII brought about a new international environment, in which the inter-systemic struggle took precedence over the inter-imperialist conflicts thanks to the institutionalization and stabilization of inter-capitalist relations through dense linkages of multilateral organizations, which linked them to the US. As a result, the Cold War as an inter-systemic struggle became the predominant character of international relations. In this sense, if to reiterate, the arguments of the orthodox realists, which was that if the Soviet Union had not made those demands from Turkey; or the arguments of revisionists and left Kemalists,

which was that if Turkey did not abandon its independent and neutral foreign policy; Turkey would have maintained its intimate relations with the Soviet Union, tend to disregard the postwar transformation of the international politics, which in turn led them to analyze the policies of both Turkey and the Soviet Union in an ahistorical manner.

Therefore, explaining Turkey's drive with an analysis of the geopolitical factor as if the most important one to drift Turkey into the West, was less an argument than effort to put out of sight the systemic character of Turkey's drive toward the West. In the interwar period, the international environment, as stated above, was conducive to cultivate relations with both the imperialist states and the Soviet Union. However, as the inter-systemic struggle became the defining relationship of the international relations, it posed a clear division line before each state. As stated in the Truman Doctrine, each nation came to face a choice between two alternative ways of life. Therefore, the international environment shaded by inter-systemic struggle in the postwar period was not conducive for Turkey to maintain its relations both with these two alternative systems. Therefore, even if the Soviet Union had not made such demands on Turkey, Turkey would have nevertheless faced such a choice. Thus, this thesis argues that the geopolitical conflict between Turkey and the Soviet Union be located into framework of inter-systemic conflict, which in turn enables us to understand the profound political and economic transformations underwent in Turkey.

As a result, since the Cold War was an inter-systemic struggle and this inter-systemic struggle had political, economic, social and military dimensions, it could not be reduced to a reconfiguration of geopolitical order and the balance of strategic-military power. Therefore, Turkey's drive to the West could not be reduced to a geopolitical alignment against a geopolitical threat, rather it had geopolitical, economic and social dimensions. Consequently, Turkey's postwar integration into the capitalist alliance amounted to more than just a geopolitical alliance.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Books, Articles and Documents

Acheson, Dean, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (Norton: New York, 1969)

Ahmad, Feroz, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975* (C. Hurst & Company: London, 1977)

Akşin, Abdülhat, *Türkiye'in 1945'ten sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri ve Orta Doğu Meseleleri* (İstanbul, 1959)

Akşin, Sina, "Turkey's Declaration on Germany at the end of the World War II," *Turkish Year Book* 33, no. 0 (2002)

Aralov, Semyon İvanoviç, *Bir Sovyet Diplomatının Türkiye Hatıraları*, trans. Hasan Ali Ediz (Burçak Yayınları: İstanbul, 1967)

Aren, Sadun, *TİP Olayı (1961-1971)* (Cem Yayınları: İstanbul, 1993)

Armaoğlu, Fahir, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi 1914-1995* (Alkım Yayınevi: İstanbul, 2009)

Ataöv, Türkkaya, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (İleri Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006)

Ataöv, Türkkaya, *Amerikan Emperyalizmi: Doğuşu ve Gelişimi* (İleri Yayınları: İstanbul, 2007)

Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (1918-1927), Vol. I (Divan Yayıncılık: Ankara, 2006)

Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri (1918-1927), Vol. III (Divan Yayıncılık: Ankara, 2006)

Atılğan, Gökhan, *Kemalizm ve Marksizm Arasında Geleneksel Aydınlar: Yön-Devrim Hareketi* (TÜSTAV: İstanbul, 2002)

Atılğan, Gökhan, Sosyalist Milliyetçilik Söylemi (Türkiye, 1961-1968): Temeller, Ayrılıklar, *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 64, no. 3 (2009)

Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Milli Kurtuluş Tarihi: 1938'den 1995'e* (Tekin Yayınevi: İstanbul, 2000)

Avcıoğlu, Doğan, "TIP'e Dair," in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20'lerden 70'lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013)

Avcıoğlu, Doğan, *Türkiye'nin Düzeni: Dün, Bugün, Yarın* (Bilgi: Ankara, 1968)

Aybar, Mehmet Ali, "Türkiye Sosyalizmi," in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20'lerden 70'lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013)

Aydın, Mustafa, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı ve Türkiye, 1939-1945" in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 399-476 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2001)

Aydın, Suavi, "“Milli Demokratik Devrim”den ‘Ulusal Sol’a Türk Solunda Özgücü Eğilim,” *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 78 (1998)

Aydınoğlu, Ergun, *Türkiye Solu (1960-1980)* (Versus: İstanbul, 2007)

Bağcı, Hüseyin, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar* (ODTU Press: Ankara, 2007)

Bailey, Thomas A., *America Faces Russia: Russian–American Relations from Early Times to Our Day* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press: New York, 1950)

Barber, John and Harrison, Mark, "Patriotic war, 1941-1945 217," in *The Cambridge History of Russia*, Edited by Ronald Grigor Suny (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006)

Baruch, Bernard M., *The Public Years* (Holt, Rinehart and Winston: New York, 1960)

Baylis, John and Smith, Steve, *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2001)

Belli, Mihri, "Milli Demokratik Devrim," in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20'lerden 70'lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013)

Benhür, Çağatay, *Stalin Dönemi Türk-Rus ilişkileri (1924-1953)* (PhD thesis, Konya: Selçuk University, 2008)

“Bibliographical Essay,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010)

Bilge, A. Suat, *Güç Komşuluk: Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği İlişkileri, 1920-1964* (Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları: Ankara, 1992)

Bilge, A. Suat, “Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Türk Sovyet İlişkileri,” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 338-427 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996)

Boran, Behice, “Bürokrasi üzerine Tartışmalar,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, Yayınları, 2013)

Bostanoğlu, Burcu, *Türkiye-ABD İlişkilerinin Politikası* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2008)

Bölükbaşı, Süha, “The Johnson Letter Revisited,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 29, no. 3 (1993)

Broue, Pierre, Ian H. Birchall and Brian Pearce, *The German Revolution, 1917-1923* (Brill: Leiden, 2005)

Brown, William, “A liberal International Order,” in *Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformations*, Edited by William Brown, Simon Bromley and Suma Athreye (Pluto Press: London, 2004).

Burçak, Rıfıkı Salim, *Moskova Görüşmeleri (26 Eylül 1939-6 Ekim 1939) ve Dış Politikamız Üzerindeki Etkileri* (Gazi University Press: Ankara, 1983)

Bukharin, Nikolai, *Imperialism and World Economy* (Merlin: London, 1972)

Byrnes, James F., *Speaking Frankly* (Harper: New York, 1947)

Callinicos, Alex, *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* (Polity: Cambridge, 2009)

Carr, Edward H., *International Relations between the Two World Wars, 1919-1939* (Macmillian: Hong Kong, 1990)

Carr, Edward H., *Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926* (MacMillan: New York, 1958)

Carr, Edward H., *The Russian Revolution: From Lenin to Stalin* (The Free Press: New York, 1979)

Carr, Edward H., *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (Macmillan: London, 1946)

Clarke, Simon, "The Global Accumulation of Capital and the Periodization of the Capitalist State Form" in *Open Marxism*, Edited by W. Bonefeld, R. Gunn and K. Psychopedis, Vol. 1 (Dialectics and History) (Pluto Press: London, 1992)

Cliff, Tony, *Russia: A Marxist Analysis* (Pluto Press: London, 1970), available at <<http://www.marxists.org/archive/cliff/works/1964/russia/index.htm>> (accessed on November 3, 2013)

Cox, Michael, "From the Truman Doctrine to the Second Superpower Détente: The Rise and Fall of the Cold War," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 1 (1990)

Cox, Michael, "Hans J. Morgenthau, Realism and the Rise and Fall of the Cold War," in *Realism reconsidered: Hans J. Morgenthau and International Relations*, Edited by Michael Williams (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007)

Cox, Michael, "The Cold War and Stalinism in the Age of Capitalist Decline," *Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory* 1, no. 1 (1989)

Cox, Michael and Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 7, no. 1 (2005)

Çağdaş, Nazım Arda, *The Birth of anti-Soviet Image in the Turkish Press Following the Second World War and its Reflections after the Death of Stalin (1953 - 1964)* (MA thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, September 2008)

Çakmak, Diren, *Forum Dergisi: 1954-1960* (Phd Thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, August 2007)

Çalışkan, Demet, *The European security process in the second half of the twentieth century and its implications on Turkey* (MA thesis, İstanbul: Marmara University, 2001)

Çetiner, Yusuf Turan, *The Making of Turkey's Western alliance 1944-1952* (PhD thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, January 2001)

Deakin, Frederick W., Shukman, Harold, and Willett, H. T., *A History of World Communism* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson: London, 1975)

Deringil, Selim, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012)

Deutscher, Isaac, *The Great Contest: Russia and the West* (Oxford University Press: London, 1960)

Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paketi (1923-1934)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973)

Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: Montreux ve Savaş Öncesi Yılları (1935-1939)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973)

Dışişleri Bakanlığı, *Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Yılları (1939-1946)* (Dışişleri Bakanlığı Yayınları: Ankara, 1973)

Djilas, Milovan, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich: New York, 1962)

Doğan, Erkan, *Articulating Socialism with Nationalism: A Critical Analysis of Nationalism in the Turkish Leftist Tradition in the 1960s* (Phd Thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, August 2010)

Donnelly, Desmond, *Struggle for the World: The Cold War: 1917-1965* (Collins: London, 1965)

Donnelly, Jack, "Realism," in *Theories of international relations*, Edited by Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus-Smit, and Jacqui True (Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2009)

Eisenberg, Carolyn, "US Policy in Postwar Germany: The Conservative Restoration," *Science & Society* 46, no. 1 (1982)

Engerman, David C., "Ideology and the origins of the Cold War, 1917-1962," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010)

Eley, Geoff, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850-2000* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2002)

Erdem, Gökhan, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Tarih’in Gelişimi ve Sorunları Sempozyumu: Bildiriler ve Tartışmalar* (AÜ SBF Yayınları: Ankara, 2006)

Erim, Nihat, *Bildiğin ve Gördüğüm Ölçüler içinde Kıbrıs* (Ajans-Türk Matbaası: Ankara, 1975)

Erkin, Feridun Cemal, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri Ve Boğazlar Meselesi* (Başnur Matbaası: Ankara, 1968)

Eroğul, Cem, “Çok Partili Düzenin Kuruluşu: 1945-71,” in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Edited by Irvin C. Schick and E. Ahmet Tonak (Belge Yayınları: İstanbul, 2006)

Esmer, Ahmet Şükrü and Oral Sander, “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk Dış Politikası,” in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995* (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996)

Evangelista, Matthew A., “Stalin’s Postwar Army Reappraised,” *International Security* 7, no. 3 (1982)

Farl, Erich, “The Genealogy of State Capitalism,” *International* 2, no. 1 (1973)

Feis, Herbert, *From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945–1950* (Norton: New York, 1970)

Fontaine, André, *History of the Cold War: From the October Revolution to the Korean War, 1917-1950* (Pantheon: New York, 1968)

Fukuyama, Francis, *The End of History?*, *The National Interest* (Summer 1989)

Gaddis, John Lewis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford University Press: New York, 2005)

Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Cold War: A New History* (Penguin: New York, 2005)

Gaddis, John Lewis, “The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War.” *Diplomatic History* 7, no. 3 (1983)

Gati, Charles, “Hegemony and Repression in the Eastern Alliance,” in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002)

Gerger, Haluk, *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası: "Soğuk Savaş" Tan "Yeni Dünya Düzeni" Ne* (Yordam Kitap: İstanbul, 2012)

Gerstenberger, Heide, *Impersonal Power: History and Theory of the Bourgeois State* (Brill: Leiden and Boston, 2007)

Gleason, Abbott, *Totalitarianism: The Inner History of the Cold War* (Oxford University Press: New York, 1995)

Gowan, Peter, "The Bush Turn and the Drive for Primacy," in *The War on Terror and the American 'Empire' After the Cold War*, Edited by Alejandro Colás and Richard Saull (Routledge: New York, 2006)

Gowan, Peter, "Triumphing Toward International Disaster: The Impasse in American Grand Strategy," *Critical Asian Studies* 36, no. 1 (2004)

Gökay, Bülent, *Soviet Eastern Policy and Turkey, 1920–1991: Soviet Foreign Policy, Turkey and Communism* (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006)

Gönlübol, Mehmet and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "1965-1973 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 491-540 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996)

Gönlübol, Mehmet and Cem Sar, "1919-1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 1-133 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996)

Gönlübol, Mehmet and Haluk Ülman, "Türk Dış Politikasının Yirmi Yılı 1945-1965," *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 21, no. 2 (1966)

Gönlübol, Mehmet, Haluk Ülman, A. Suat Bilge, and Duygu Sezer, "1945-1965 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası," in *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1995*, 191-334 (Siyasal Kitabevi: Ankara, 1996)

Graebner, Norman A. "Realism and Idealism," in *Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy*, (Scribner's/Gale Virtual Reference Library, 2002)

Grossman, Zoltán, "A Briefing on the History of US Military Interventions," *Z magazine*, October 2001, available at <<https://www.academic.evergreen.edu/g/grossmaz/interventions.html>> (accessed on November 3, 2013)

Güler, Yavuz, *Kuzey Atlantik Paktı ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Pakta Giriş Süreci* (MA thesis, Ankara: Gazi University, 2003)

Gürün, Kamuran, *Türk-Sovyet İlişkileri 1920-1953* (Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 1991)

Gürün, Kamuran, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası, 1930'dan Günümüze Kadar* (AÜ SBF Yayınları: Ankara, 1983)

Güvenç, Serpil, *Socialist Perspectives on Foreign Policy Issues: The Case of TIP in the 1960s* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, December 2005)

Halliday, Fred, *The Making of the Second Cold War* (Verso: London, 1986)

Harman, Chris, *Class Struggles in Eastern Europe, 1945-83* (Biddles: England, Guildford, 1988)

Harris, Nigel, *Of Bread and Guns: The World Economy in Crisis* (Penguin: Middlesex, Harmondsworth, 1983)

Heper, Metin and Nur Bilge Criss, *Historical Dictionary of Turkey* (Scarecrow: Lanham, Maryland, 2009)

Heuser, Beatrice, "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making," *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 1 (1991)

History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks): Short Course, Edited by A Commission of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (International Publishers: New York, 1939)

Hobsbawn, Eric, *Age of Extreme: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (Abacus: London, 1995)

Holloway, John and Sol Picciotto, "Capital, Crisis and the State," *Capital and Class*, no. 2 (1977)

Holsti, Kalevi J., *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989* (Cambridge University Press: New York, 1991)

Jerome, W., and Adam Buick, "Soviet State Capitalism? The History of an Idea," *Survey: A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* 62 (1967)

Johnson, Kermit D., *Ethics and Counterrevolution: American Involvement in Internal Wars* (University press of America: Maryland, 1998)

Julien, Claude, *America's Empire* (Pantheon: New York, 1971)

Karaca, Ferhan, *Türk-Amerikan askeri ilişkileri (1945 sonrası)* (MA thesis, Ankara: Gazi University, 2002)

Karadağ, Muhammed Emin, *II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan günümüze Türkiye'nin ABD ve Rusya ile Siyasi İlişkileri* (MA thesis, İstanbul: Kadir Has University, 2008)

Karagöz, Murat, "US Arms Embargo against Turkey - after 30 Years: An Institutional Approach towards US Policy Making," *Perceptions* (Winter 2004-2005)

Kayış, İlyas, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Genel Durumu ve Uyguladığı Dış Politika* (MA thesis, İstanbul: Beykent University, 2009)

Kennan, George F., *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Little Brown: Boston, 1967)

Kennan, George F., "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 25, no. 4 (1947)

Kidron, Michael, *Western Capitalism since the War*, (Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 1968)

Knapp, Wilfrid, *A History of War and Peace 1939-1965* (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1967)

Köse, Hulusi, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türkiye Amerika İlişkileri (1945-1950)* (MA thesis, İstanbul: İstanbul University, 2010)

Kratochwil, Friedrich, 'Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the State System,' *World Politics* 34, no. 1 (1986)

Küçük, Yalçın, "İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı" in *İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı: Soğuk Savaş*, Edited by Ferhat Telli (YGS Yayınları: İstanbul, 1998)

Küçük, Yalçın, "Sosyalizmi Dondurma Savaşı" in *İdeolojilerin Dünya Savaşı: Soğuk Savaş*, Edited by Ferhat Telli (YGS Yayınları: İstanbul, 1998)

Küçük, Yalçın, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*, Vol. 2 (Tekin Yayınevi: İstanbul, 2003)

Kürkçü, Ertuğrul, "Türkiye'de 1968," in *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Edited by Ertuğrul Kürkçü (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1988)

Kürkçü, Ertuğrul (ed.), *Sosyalizm ve Toplumsal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 3 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 1988)

Kürkçü, Ertuğrul, “Önsöz,” in *Türkiye Sosyalist Solu Kitabı 1: 20’lerden 70’lere Seçme Metinler*, Edited by Emir Ali Türkmen (Dipnot: Ankara, 2013)

Kürkçüoğlu, Ömer “Dış Politika Nedir? Türkiye’deki Dünü ve Bugünü,” *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 35, no. 1-4 (1980)

LaFeber, Walter, *America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–2006* (McGraw-Hill: New York, 2008)

Leffler, Melvyn P., “Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952,” *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985)

Leffler, Melvyn P., “Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened,” *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 4 (1996)

Leffler, Melvyn P., “The emergence of an American grand strategy, 1945–1952,” in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010)

Leigh, Michael, “Is there a Revisionist Thesis on the Origins of the Cold War?” *Political Science Quarterly* 89, no. 1 (1974)

Lenin’s Collected Works, Vol. 29 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1972), available at <<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1919/mar/x04.htm>> (accessed on June 20, 2014)

Lipovsky, Igor P., *The Socialist Movement in Turkey: 1960-1980*, Vol. 45 (Brill: Leiden, 1992)

Maddison, Angus, “Historical Statistics for the World Economy: 1-2003 AD,” available at <<http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm>> (accessed on September 23, 2013)

Mawdsley, Evan, *The Russian Civil War* (Birlinn: Edinburgh, 2011)

Marx, Karl, “Capital,” in *Marx-Engels Reader*, Edited by R. C. Tucker, Vol. 1 (Norton: New York, 1978)

McKenzie, Kermit E., *Comintern and World Revolution 1928-1943: The Shaping of Doctrine* (Columbia University Press: New York, 1964)

Milios, John and Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos, *Rethinking Imperialism: A Study of Capitalist Rule* (Palgrave Macmillan: Hampshire, 2009)

Molla, Alptekin, *NATO savunma politikaları çerçevesinde Türk-Amerikan ilişkilerinin analizi* (MA thesis, Sivas: Cumhuriyet University, February 2008)

Morgenthau, Hans, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, (AA Knopf: New York, 1948)

Musluk, Coşkun, *The Relation between Nationalism and Development: The Case of the Yön-Devrim Movement in 1960's* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, September 2010)

Naimark, Norman, "The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, 1944–1953," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn. P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010)

Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941, *Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office*. "Telegram from Moscow by the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office, October 9, 1939." Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948

Ollman, Bertell, "Marx's Use of 'Class'," *American Journal of Sociology* 73, no. 5 (1968)

Oran, Baskın, "Sèvres Barış Antlaşması," in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 113-138 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2012)

Oran, Baskın, "Türkiye'nin 'Kuzeydeki Büyük Komşu' Sorunu Nedir? Türk Sovyet İlişkileri 1939-1970," *AÜ SBF Dergisi* 26, no. 2 (1970)

Overy, Richard and Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Road to War* (Penguin: London, 1999)

Özişikli, Mert, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası Türkiye'nin İttifak Arayışları ve NATO'ya Girişi* (MA thesis, Denizli: Pamukkale University, June 2009)

Özkan, Remzi Öner, *The Soviet Territorial Demands from Turkey: 1939-1946* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, January 2010)

Özdemir, Hikmet, *Yön Hareketi, Kalkınmada Bir Strateji Arayışı* (Bilgi Yayınevi: Ankara, 1986)

Painter, S. David, *The Cold War: An International History* (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002)

Panitch, Leo and Sam Gindin, *The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire* (Verso: London, 2012)

Pechatnov, Vladimir O., "The Big Three after the World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Britain," *Cold War International History Project*, Working Paper 13 (1995)

Pechatnov, Vladimir O., "The Soviet Union and the World 1944-1953," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd. A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010)

Perkins, Bradford, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-five Years After," *Reviews in American History* 12, no. 1 (1984)

Reynolds, David, "The European Dimension of the Cold War," in *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and David S. Painter (Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2002)

Roberts, Geoffrey, *The Soviet Union in World Politics: Coexistence, Revolution and Cold War, 1945-1991* (Routledge: New York, 1999)

Sander, Oral, "Turkish US Relations Revisited on the Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday," *Foreign Policy* 11, no. 1-2 (1984)

Sander, Oral, *Siyasi Tarih: 1918-1994* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2010)

Saull, Richard, "Locating the Global South in the Theorisation of the Cold War: Capitalist Development, Social Revolution and Geopolitical Conflict," *Third World Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (2005)

Saull, Richard, *The Cold War and after: Capitalism, Revolution and Superpower Politics* (Pluto Press: London, 2007)

Sav, Sedat, *Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'na Fiilen Girmemesinin İç ve Dış Toplumsal Etkileri ve Sonuçları* (MA thesis, Malatya: İnönü University, June 2008)

Sertel, Yıldız, *Annem: Sabiha Sertel Kimdi, Neler Yazdı?* (Yapı Kredi Yayınları: İstanbul, 1995)

Soysal, İsmail, *Tarihçeleri ve Açıklamaları ile birlikte Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları: Birinci Cilt (1920-1945)* (Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi: Ankara, 2000)

Steans, Jill, Lloyd Pettiford, Thomas Diez, and Imad El-Anis, *An Introduction to International Relations Theory: Perspectives and Themes* (Pearson Education Limited: Essex, Harlow, 2010)

Stern, Laurance, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of the American Diplomacy* (Times Books: New York, 1977)

Sönmezoğlu, Faruk, *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi* (Der Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004)

Şahin, Haluk, *Gece Gelen Mektup: Türk-Amerikan İlişkilerinde Dönüm Noktası* (Cep Kitapları A.Ş.: İstanbul, 1987)

Şener, Mustafa, *Türkiye Sol Hareketinde İktidar Stratejisi Tartışmaları: 1961 – 1971* (PhD thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, 2006)

Taşhan, Seyfi, "Turkish US Relations Revisited on the Centenary of Harry Truman's Birthday," *Foreign Policy* 11, no. 1-2 (1984)

Taşhan, Seyfi, *Türkiye'nin Savunması İçinde Türkiye'nin Tehdit Algulamaları* (Dış Politika Enstitüsü Yayınları: Ankara, 1987)

Tek, Hakan *The Decision-making Process of Turkey Deploying Turkish Troops to Korea* (MA thesis, Ankara: Bilkent University, December 2005)

Tellal, Erel, *Uluslararası ve Bölgesel Gelişmeler Çerçevesinde SSCB-Türkiye İlişkileri, 1953-1964* (Mülkiyeliler Birliği Vakfı Yayınları: Ankara, 2000)

Tellal, Erel, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler, 1945-1960," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 499-521 (İletişim Yayınları: Ankara, 2012)

Timur, Taner, *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Hayata Geçiş* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2003)

Timur, Taner, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2008)

Trotsky, Leon, *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going* (1937), available at <www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky/1936/revbet/ch09.htm> (accessed on November 3, 2013)

Truman, Harry S., *Memoirs* (Doubleday: New York, 1955-1956)

Tunçer, A. İrem, *Peculiarism in the Turkish Left During the 1960's* (MA thesis, Ankara: METU, September 2008)

Turan, İlhan, *İsmet İnönü: Konuşma, Demeç, Makale, Mesaj ve Söyleşiler (1944-1950)* (TBMM Kültür, Sanat ve Yayın Kurulu Yayınları: Ankara, 2003)

Türkeş, Mustafa, *Kadro Hareketi: Ulusçu Sol Bir Akım* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 1999)

Türkeş, Mustafa, "Tarihsel ve Güncel Boyutlarıyla Uluslararası Müdahale Döngüleri," *Türk Sosyal Bilimler Kongresi* (2003)

Türkeş, Mustafa, "NATO Bağlamında ABD-Türkiye İlişkilerinde Devamlılık ve Değişim," in *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, Edited by Faruk Sönmezoğlu (Der Yayınları: İstanbul, 2004)

Türkeş, Mustafa, "Review of the Book Studies in Atatürk's Turkey, the American Dimension", *Turkish Historical Review* 2 (2011)

Türkeş, Mustafa, "Giriş: Kuş Bakışı Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne Geçiş," *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi* 39, no. 1 (2012)

Uçarol, Rifat, *Siyasi Tarih* (Hava Harp Okulu Yayınları: Ankara, 1979)

United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1945. The Near East and Africa, Vol. III. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945

United States Department of State, *Foreign relations of the United States*, 1946. Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union Vol. VI. "The Long Telegram by the US Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of State, Moscow, February 22, 1946." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946

United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946. The Near East and Africa, Vol. VII. "The Soviet Charge in Washington (Orekhov) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, August 7, 1946." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946

United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1948. General, the United Nations, Vol. I, Part 2. "Report by the NSC on the Position of the United States with Respect to Soviet-Directed World Communism, March 30, 1948." Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1948

Uzgel, İlhan and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar Cilt I: 1919-1980*, Edited by Baskın Oran, 258-277 (İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, 2001)

Uzgel, İlhan, *Ulusal Çıkar ve Dış Politika* (İmge Kitapevi: Ankara, 2004)

Uzgel, İlhan, "Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy Writing," *Uluslararası İlişkiler Dergisi* 4 (2007): 113-128

Ürer, Levent, *Mondros'tan Mudanya Mütarekesine Türk Dış Politikası* (Altın Kitaplar: İstanbul, 2005)

Üzmez, Hasan, *Türkiye'nin NATO'ya Giriş Süreci* (MA thesis, Van: Yüzüncü Yıl Üniversitesi, 2003)

Van der Linden, Marcel, *Western Marxism and the Soviet Union* (Brill: Leiden-Boston, 2007)

Vural, Mithat Kadri, "II. Dünya Savaşı Türkiye'sinde Bir Muhalefet Örneği Olarak 'Tan' Gazetesi," *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi* 7, no. 16-17 (2008)

Walker, David Martin and Daniel Gray, *Historical Dictionary of Marxism* (Scarecrow Press: Lanham, Md., 2007)

Waltz, Kenneth N., "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 18, no. 4 (1988)

Westad, Odd A., "Introduction: Reviewing the Cold War," in *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory*, Edited by Odd A. Westad (Frank Cass: London, 2000)

Westad, Odd A., "The Cold War and the International History of the Twentieth Century," in *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Edited by Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2010)

White, Matthew, "National Death Tolls for the WWII," available at <www.necrometrics.com/ww2stats.htm> (accessed on September 23, 2013)

Williams, William Appleman, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (Norton: New York, 1972)

Wood, Ellen Meiksins, *Democracy against Capitalism* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995)

Wood, Robert E., *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy* (University of California Press: Berkeley - Los Angeles - London, 1986)

Zambernardi, Lorenzo, "The impotence of power: Morgenthau's critique of American intervention in Vietnam," *Review of International Studies* 37, no. 3 (2011)

Zorlu, Melek, *TKP'den TİP'e Sol Kemalizm: MDD Örneği* (MA thesis, Ankara: Ankara University, September 2006)

Zürcher, Erik Jan, "The Ottoman Empire and the Armistice of Moudros," in *At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes, and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918*, Edited by Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle (Leo Cooper: London, 1998)

Electronic Sources

"Anti-Comintern Pact" in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, available at <<http://global.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/27573/Anti-Comintern-Pact>> (accessed on June 14, 2014)

"Biographical Sketch: Harry S. Truman, 33rd President of the United States," *Truman Library*, available at <<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/hst-bio.htm>> (accessed on September 23, 2013)

"Biographies of the Secretaries of State: James Francis Byrnes," Office of the Historian, US Department of the State, available at <<http://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/byrnes-james-francis>> (accessed on September 23, 2013)

"Convention for the Definition of Aggression," available at <<http://www.iilj.org/courses/documents/ConventionontheDefinitionofAggression.pdf>> (accessed on June 9, 2014)

"George Kennan and Containment," *Office of the Historian, US Department of the State*, available at <www.history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/kennan> (accessed on September 23, 2013)

“German-Russian Agreement; April 16, 1922 (Treaty of Rapallo)”, available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/rapallo_001.asp> (accessed on July 20, 2014)

“Johnson Letter”, available at <<http://www.cyprus-conflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html>> (accessed on February 9, 2014)

“Kellogg–Briand Pact”, available at <<https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280168041>> (accessed on July 20, 2014)

“Litvinov Protocol”, available at <<http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/LNTSer/1929/123.html>> (accessed on July 20, 2014)

“Minutes of the Congress of the Peoples of the East, Baku, September 1920,” available at <<https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/baku/index.htm>> (accessed on July 25, 2014)

“Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy; October 16, 1925 (The Locarno Pact),” available at <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/locarno_001.asp> (accessed on July 20, 2014)

“Truman Doctrine,” *Truman Library Public Papers*, March 12, 1947, available at <<http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=&st1>> (accessed on September 23, 2013)

“US Military and Clandestine Operations in Foreign Countries from 1798 to Present,” *Global Policy Forum*, December, 2005, available at <<https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/155/26024.html>> (accessed on November 3, 2013).

“Weapons of Vietnam War”, available at <<http://www.history.com/topics/weapons-of-the-vietnam-war>> (accessed on November 3, 2013)

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez, Türkiye'nin Batı'ya İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası yöneliminin arkasındaki ana dinamikleri saptayarak bu yönelimin niteliğini tanımlamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Soğuk Savaş Türkiye için ne anlam ifade ediyordu? Avrupa'dan başlayıp Yakın Doğu'ya yayılan süper güçler arası stratejik mücadeleye ve yalnızca jeopolitik değerlendirmelere dayandırılan Sovyet tehdidi anlamına mı geldi? Bu bakımdan, entegrasyon, sosyalizmin ve kapitalizmin sistemler arası mücadelesinden bağımsız jeopolitik bir tehdide karşı jeopolitik bir ittifak mıdır? Ya da jeopolitik çatışmaların ötesinde, Soğuk Savaş Türkiye'nin önüne Batı ve Sovyetler Birliği arasında net bir ayrışmayı gösteren sistemik bir dönüşüm mü sundu? Bundan dolayı, Türkiye'nin Batı'ya entegrasyonu, kapitalist sisteme daha geniş bir sosyo-ekonomik entegrasyona mı karşılık gelmektedir? Bu çerçevede, bu çalışma, Soğuk Savaş'ın ve Türkiye'nin Batı'ya savaş sonrası yöneliminin analizi açısından Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki jeopolitik ilişkilerin sistemik bir çerçeveye yerleştirilmesini sağlayacak bir Soğuk Savaş kavramsallaştırması gerektiğini belirterek, ve jeopolitik faktörleri—Sovyet talepleri ve Türkiye'nin verdiği tepkiyi—sistemler arası çatışma çerçevesine yerleştirerek, Türkiye'nin Batı'ya entegrasyonunun karakterini göstermeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Tezin düzeni şu şekildedir: Tezin temel sorunsal(lar)ı giriş bölümünde tanımlandıktan sonra, ikinci ve üçüncü bölümlerde, ABD, Avrupa ve Türkiye'deki anaakım ve eleştirel çevrelerin Soğuk Savaş üzerine yürüttükleri tartışmaların teorik ve tarihsel bir değerlendirilmesi yapılmaktadır. Bu inceleme iki ayrı bölümde düzenlendi. İlk olarak, ABD'de ve Batı Avrupa'daki tartışmalar üzerinde duruldu. Bu da, üçüncü bölümdeki Türkiye'deki Soğuk Savaş yazınına, Türkiye dışındaki genel tartışma çerçevesi içerisine konumlandırabilmek adına böyle bir yöntem tercih

edildi. Dördüncü bölüm, takip eden kısımlardaki tartışmalara yol gösterici olması açısından Soğuk Savaş'ın kavramsal bir çerçevesini sunmakla başlamaktadır. Bu bölüm, Sovyetler Birliği'nin, iki savaş arası ve savaş sonrası dönemdeki uluslararası ilişkilerin iki ana ilişki ve çatışma kaynağı bağlamında benimsediği stratejik yönelimleri ve bu yönelimlerin dönüşümünün analiziyle devam etmektedir. Bu tartışma savaş öncesi ve sonrası emperyalistler arası ve sistemler arası tartışmaları resmetmeye çalışarak Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türkiye karşı stratejik yönelimlerinin altındaki dinamiklerin anlaşılmasında yardımcı olacaktır. Bölüm, Türkiye'nin Batı'yla savaş sonrası entegrasyonunun dinamikleri ve karakteri üzerinde yapılan bir analizle bitmektedir. Son bölüm ise sonuç kısmıdır.

İkinci bölüm, ABD ve Batı Avrupa'da Soğuk Savaş'ın kökenlerini ve karakterini tartışan yaklaşımların incelenmesini amaçlamaktadır. Farklı yaklaşımların sınıflandırılması için iki genel kategori kullanılmıştır: Anaakım ve radikal yaklaşımlar. Bu kategorilerin kendi alt kategorileri olduğu da belirtilmelidir.

Anaakım tartışmalarda farklı sınıflandırmaların olmasına rağmen, bu tartışmaların sınıflandırılmasında temel olarak üç ana alt kategori kullanılmıştır: Ortodoksi, revizyonizm ve post-revizyonizm. Anaakım tartışmalar Soğuk Savaş'ın başat nedeninin Sovyet tehdidinden mi yoksa ABD emperyalizminden mi kaynaklandığının sorgulanması etrafında şekillendiği görülmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Ortodoksi-revizyonizm tartışması şu sorularla özetlenebilir: İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında hangi tarafın eylemleri diğer tarafın saldırgan politikalarına reaksiyon olarak değerlendirilebilir? Bu bakımdan, ortodoks görüş, ABD'nin savaş sonrası politikalarını Sovyetler Birliği'nin Doğu Avrupa ve Yakın Doğu'daki politikalarına bir tepki olarak değerlendirdiği belirtilebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, ABD'nin küresel girişimleri geleneksel Rus yayılcılığına ve komünist tehdide karşı bir savunma olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Buna karşılık, revizyonistler tamamen farklı bir çerçeve çizmektedirler. Eleştirinin odağı Sovyetler'den ABD'ye kaydırılarak ABD kapitalizmine içkin çelişkiler Soğuk Savaş'ın arkasındaki temel nedenler olarak tartışılmaktadır. Revizyonistler ABD'nin ekonomik gücüne eleştirel bir şekilde

dikkat çekmekte ve ABD'nin savaş sonrası amacı olan “açık kapı” emperyalizminin gerçekleştirilmesi için kullandığı çeşitli araçları incelemektedirler. Bu açıdan, ABD'nin takip ettiği politikalarla Sovyetler Birliği'ne ABD'ye karşı reaksiyon göstermek dışında bir seçeneği bırakmadığını belirtmektedirler. Revizyonistlere göre, Sovyetler Birliği Doğu Avrupa'da savunmacı bir akılla güvenliğini sağlayabilmek için bir nüfuz alanı oluşturmaya çalışmıştır.

Vietnam sonrası dönemde Soğuk Savaş'ın kökenleri üzerine yeniden bir sorgulamaya ilgi gösterildi. Post-revizyonistler Soğuk Savaş'ın kökenlerini karşılıklı yanlış algılama ve çatışan ulusal çıkarlar olarak saptayıp Soğuk Savaş'ın ortaya çıkmasındaki sorumluluğu süper güçler arasında paylaşturmaktadırlar. Post-revizyonistlere göre, ideolojik farklılıklarına rağmen güç ve güvenlik arayışlarından dolayı her iki süper güç de benzer saiklerle hareket etmişlerdir. Bu nedenle, süper güçlerin sosyoekonomik sistemleri ve dış politikaları arasında nedensel ilişki kurmamaktadırlar.

Radikal yaklaşımlar ise iki alt kategoride sınıflandırılabilir. İlk grup araştırmacıların, Soğuk Savaş'ı, sosyoekonomik çelişkilerden kaynaklanan blok içi siyasal ilişkilerdeki çatışmaların çözümünde bir araç olarak gördükleri belirtilebilir. Bu gruptaki araştırmacılar, blok içi sosyo-ekonomik ilişkilerin Soğuk Savaş'ın temel itici gücü olduğunu savunmaktadırlar. Soğuk Savaş'ı bir blok liderinin veya her iki blok liderlerinin kendi çıkarlarını pekiştirmek amacıyla ve blok içi düzenin sağlanması için içsel çelişkilerin çözümüne yönelik bilinçli eylemlerinin bir sonucu olarak değerlendirmektedirler. İkinci gruptaki araştırmacılar ise, Soğuk Savaş'ı antogonistik iki sosyal sistem arasındaki çatışmalardan kaynaklanan sistemler arası bir mücadele olarak değerlendirmektedirler.

ABD ve Avrupa'daki tartışmaların incelenmesinden sonra, üçüncü bölümde Türkiye'deki Soğuk Savaş yazınının bir değerlendirilmesi yapılmıştır. ABD ve Avrupa'daki tartışmaların aksine, Türkiye'de Soğuk Savaş'ın kökenlerine ve karakterine yönelik zayıf akademik ilgiden kaynaklı olarak Soğuk Savaş

Türkiye'deki araştırmacıların yaptığı analizlerde merkezi bir konuma sahip olmadığı ileri sürülebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, tartışmalardaki temel hat Soğuk Savaş'ın ortaya çıkışında kimin sorumlu olduğuna ya da Soğuk Savaş'ın karakterine yönelik bir sorgulama olmamıştır. Daha ziyade, tartışmaların Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ve ABD ile olan ilişkileri üzerinden yapıldığı görülmektedir. Bu sebeple, Soğuk Savaş'ın, Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ve ABD ile ilişkilerini inceleyen siyasi tarihin bir alt başlığı olarak ele alındığı öne sürülebilir. Türkiye'deki tartışmalar da, ABD ve Batı Avrupa'daki tartışmaların değerlendirmesinde izlenen yönteme sadık kalınarak iki ana başlık altında incelenmiştir. Bunlar anaakım ve radikal yaklaşımlardır.

Anaakım yaklaşımlar ise iki alt başlık altında, Ortodoks realist ve revizyonist yaklaşımlar olarak sınıflandırılmıştır. Anaakım tartışmalarda temel olarak Sovyetler Birliği'nin Türkiye'nin doğu bölgesine yönelik toprak iddiaları ve Boğazlar'da üs talebinin, Sovyet yayılcılığının mı, yoksa Sovyetler'in kırılğan güney sınırlarının korunması amacını güden rasyonel bir değerlendirmenin mi sonucu olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Buna göre, Sovyetler Birliği'nin taleplerinin Türkiye'yi Batı blokuna katılmaya itip itmediği, ya da Türkiye'ye yönelik bu talepler olmasaydı bile Türkiye'nin ekonomik nedenlerden dolayı yine de Batı ile bir entegrasyona yönelik yönelmeyeceği bu tartışmaların ele aldığı soruların başlıcalarıdır.

Ortodoks realist yaklaşıma göre, Türkiye'nin Batı'ya entegrasyonundaki temel güdü Sovyetler Birliği'nin coğrafi yakınlığının yarattığı tehdit algısıdır. Soğuk Savaş, Türkiye için Sovyet Birliği'nin Doğu Anadolu üzerindeki, özellikle Kars ve Ardahan'daki, toprak iddiaları ve Boğazlar'a yönelik taleplerinin oluşturduğu jeopolitik bir tehdittir. Sonuç olarak, bu durum Türkiye'nin yönetici elitlerini 1952'de NATO'ya üyelikle sonuçlanan Batı'yla entegrasyon sürecine sürüklemiştir. Ancak Batı'yla entegrasyon isteksiz bir entegrasyondur, Sovyet taleplerinin olmadığı durumda Türkiye'nin savaş öncesi dönemde olduğu gibi Batı ve Sovyetler Birliği arasında dengeli bir politika yürüteceği öne sürülmektedir. Türkiye'deki revizyonist yaklaşım ise ortodoks realistlerin yaygın bir şekilde kabul gören Sovyet

liderlerinin savař sonrası Türkiye'ye yönelik genişlemeci bir politika izlediđi iddiasına karşı çıkmaktadır. Her ne kadar Türkiye'nin egemenlik haklarına aykırı olsa da, Sovyet taleplerinin savunmacı bir akılla ortaya çıktığını, Sovyetler'in diđer büyük güçler tarafından çevrelenmeye karşı önlem olarak zayıf olan güney bölgesini güçlendirmeye çalıştığı ileri sürülmektedir. Bu anlamda, Sovyet talepleri genişleme ya da nüfuz alanı oluşturmayı değil, Sovyetler Birliği'nin savunmasını güçlendirme isteđinin bir sonucu olarak değerlendirilir. Bu nedenle, Türkiye'nin Batı'ya yöneliminin Sovyet tehdidinden kaynaklanmadığı, Sovyet talepleri olmasa bile ekonomik sebeplerden dolayı Türkiye'nin Batı'yı tercih edeceği öne sürülmektedir.

Ancak revizyonist yaklaşımın meselenin geleneksel tartışılma şekline radikal bir itirazda bulunduğu söylenemez. Bu anlamda, anaakım tartışmaların Türkiye ve Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki jeopolitik kaygılar üzerinden yapıldığı görülmektedir. Bundan dolayı Türkiye'nin Sovyetler ve Batı – özellikle ABD – ile girdiđi ilişkilerin sistemik karakteri üzerine bir tartışma yapılmamaktadır. Realist bir teorik çerçevede Sođuk Savař ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki güç mücadelesi olarak değerlendirilmektedir.

Türkiye'deki radikal yaklaşımların ise yaşanan iki gelişme üzerinden Türkiye'deki dış politika tartışmasına katılabileceđi uygun bir ortam bulabildiđi savunulabilir. Bunlar, 1960 askeri darbesi ve Kıbrıs'taki gerilimin yükselmesidir. 1961 anayasası sınırlı da olsa eleştirel düşünce üzerindeki baskıyı azaltırken, Kıbrıs'taki gerilim Amerikan dış politikasının ve NATO'nun yeniden değerlendirilmesine yol açmıştır. ABD'nin 1960'lardaki tavrı kamuoyunda hayal kırıklığına ve Türk hükümetinin ABD dış politikasına koşulsuz güveninin sorgulanmasına ve bu duruma tepki gösterilmesine yol açmıştır. Kamoyunun ABD'ye tepkisinin Türkiye'nin ABD'ye verdiđi desteđin sorgulanmasına yol açtığı ve bunun sonucunda bu politik ortamın da radikal yaklaşımların kendi dış politika alternatiflerini yüksek sesle dile getirebilmelerine olanak sağladığı ileri sürülebilir.

Türk dış politikası tartışmalarına radikal yaklaşımların dahil olmasını sağlayan iki belirleyici olayın incelenmesinden sonra, bu bölümde, 1960'lar Türkiye'sindeki devrimci akımların tarihsel bir analizi yapılarak, bu akımların temel dış politika konularına yönelik farklı ve/veya benzer bakış açılarının Türk dış politikasının radikal yorumlarına nasıl yansıdığı tartışılmaktadır. Bu bakımdan, 1960'lardaki üç temel sol akımın ve aralarındaki tartışmaların bir değerlendirilmesi yapılmaktadır. Bu üç ana akım ise entellektüel bir hareket olarak Yön dergisi, Türkiye işçi sınıfının politik organizasyonu olarak Türkiye İşçi Partisi ve Türkiye'nin önündeki devrimci adım olarak Milli Demokratik Devrim'i (MDD) savunan eski Türkiye Komünist Partisi kadrolarının oluşturduğu MDD grubudur. Tarihsel teorik çerçeve kurulduktan sonra, bu bölüm radikal sol yaklaşımların Soğuk Savaş ve Türk dış politikasını nasıl değerlendirdiğinin incelenmesiyle sonuçlandırılmaktadır.

Sol çevrelerin radikal yaklaşımları, tartışmayı sorunlu Türkiye-Sovyetler Birliği ilişkileri zemininden çekip Türkiye'nin ABD ile girdiği bağımlılık ilişkisine taşıdığı görülmektedir. Türkiye'nin ABD ile ilişkisi yakından incelenerek Türkiye'nin ABD'ye bağımlılığının sebeplerine yönelik analizler yapılmaktadır. Türkiye'nin Batı ile ittifakının kökenlerinin artık Sovyet tehdidinde aranmamaya başlandığı görülmektedir. Türkiye solu içerisinde iki temel yaklaşımın olduğu görülmektedir. Bunlar, sol Kemalist ve sınıf temelli yaklaşımlardır. Sol Kemalist yaklaşım için Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün liderliğinde iki savaş arası dönemde izlenen dış politika, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk'ün ölümünden sonraki yıllarda yürütülen dış politikanın analizlerinde temel referans noktasıdır. Diğer bir deyişle, bu düşünürler Atatürk'ün sözlerini ve eylemlerini yeniden değerlendirerek sonraki dönemler için takip edilmesi gereken mutlak prensip olarak belirtirler. Bu anlamda Atatürk döneminde yürütülen dış politikanın bağımsız ve tarafsız olduğu belirtilerek, bu bağımsız ve tarafsız dış politikanın Türkiye'nin komşularıyla barışçıl ilişkiler kurabilmesinin önkoşulu olarak değerlendirilir. Bu bakımdan da Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile yaşadığı gerilimin, Türkiye'nin bu dış politika prensiplerinden uzaklaşmasından kaynaklandığı iddia edilmektedir. Sınıf temelli yaklaşım ise Türkiye'nin Batı ile olan ittifakının sınıfsal bir değerlendirmesini yapmaktadırlar. Türkiye'nin Batı'ya

yöneliminde Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile yaşadığı gerilimleri aşan objektif içsel ve dışsal faktörler olduğunu belirtmektedirler. "Sovyet tehdidi" tartışmasının aşılabilmesi için Türkiye'nin Batı'ya yöneliminde Sovyet taleplerinin herhangi bir rolünün olmadığını savunmaktadırlar. Ancak bu yaklaşımın, Sovyetler Birliği ve Türkiye arasında savaş sonrası yaşanan jeopolitik gerilimi ekonomi-politik çerçeveye yerleştiremedikleri görülmektedir. Sovyetler Birliği ile Türkiye arasındaki, Sovyetler'in Türkiye'ye yönelik taleplerinden kaynaklanan çatışmanın, Türkiye'nin Batı ittifakına katılması açısından ya ilgisiz ya da tümünden bu taleplerin gerçekdışı olduğu şeklinde değerlendirilmektedir.

Türkiye'deki anaakım ve radikal yaklaşımların, Türkiye'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası takip ettiği dış politikasını analiz ederken jeopolitik ve sosyo ekonomik dinamikleri birbirinden bağımsız olarak değerlendirdikleri ileri sürülebilir. Bunun da bu yaklaşımların Soğuk Savaş kavramsallaştırmalarındaki sorundan kaynaklandığı belirtilebilir. Bunun sonucunda da Türkiye'nin Batı'ya entegrasyonunu ya Sovyet tehdidine karşı jeopolitik bir ittifak olarak ya da Türkiye'nin Sovyetler Birliği ile yaşadığı gerilimden bağımsız bir şekilde sosyoekonomik bir entegrasyon olarak yorumlamaktadırlar. Bundan dolayı, bu yaklaşımların, Türkiye'nin savaş sonrası dış politikasının ardında yatan bu iki dinamiği bir bütün olarak değerlendiremedikleri iddia edilebilir. Bu bakımdan, bu tez, bu yaklaşımların, emperyalistler arası ve sistemler arası ilişkilerin değişen örüntülerinin ya da biçimlerinin dönüştürücü etkilerini ihmal ettiklerini öne sürmektedir.

Bu bağlamda, ikinci ve özellikle üçüncü bölümlerde yapılan literatür değerlendirmesinin ardından, bu çalışmada, Soğuk Savaş'ın ve Türkiye'nin Batı'ya savaş sonrası yöneliminin analizi açısından, Türkiye ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki jeopolitik ilişkilerin sistemik bir çerçeveye entegre edilmesini sağlayacak bir Soğuk Savaş kavramsallaştırmasına ihtiyaç olduğu belirtilmektedir. Dördüncü Bölüm buna yönelik alternatif bir çerçeve önermekle başlamaktadır. Bu bakımdan, Soğuk Savaş'ı, kapitalizm ile sosyalizmin antogonistik sosyoekonomik özelliklerine

dayanan sistemler arası bir çatışma olarak formüle etmektedir. Bunu da iki tarihsel alternatif arasında, emperyalist devletler arasındaki geleneksel büyük güç mücadelelerinden niteliği itibarıyla farklı olan, yeni bir mücadele biçimi olarak değerlendirmektedir. Bunun yanında, bu tez, Soğuk Savaş'ın alternatif bir dönemselleştirmesini önermekte ve Soğuk Savaş'ın başlangıcını 1917'de Rusya'da gerçekleşen Bolşevik Devrimi'ne kadar götürmektedir. Bolşeviklerin Rusya'da iktidarı ele geçirmelerinin hem kapitalist toplumun sosyoekonomik yapısına hem de uluslararası kapitalist düzene ontolojik bir meydan okuma anlamına geldiği ileri sürülmektedir. Bundan dolayı, Sovyetler Birliği ile Batılı kapitalist devletler arasındaki ilişki, emperyalistler arası bir mücadele değil, toplumun nasıl düzenleneceği üzerinden, sistemler arası bir mücadele olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bunun da ayrılmaz ekonomik, politik ve ideolojik boyutları vardır. Bu bakımdan, Bolşevik Devrimi aynı zamanda kapitalist sömürüye (ücretli emek ile sermaye arasındaki sömürü ilişkisi), emperyalist tahakküme (kapitalizmin eşitsiz gelişimi sonucu bazı ülkelerin diğerleri üzerindeki hâkimiyeti) ve kapitalizmin küresel bir sistem olarak ideolojik üstünlüğüne (Sovyet sosyalist sisteminin de evrensel geçerliliği olan küresel bir sistem olma iddiası vardır) bir meydan okumadır. Ancak literatür Soğuk Savaş'ı İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrası bir olgu olarak değerlendirme eğilimindedir. Bu da uluslararası çatışmaları iki savaş arası dönemde emperyalistler arası mücadele temelinde değerlendirme eğilimine yaslanmaktadır. Ancak, Batılı kapitalist devletlerle Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki ilişkileri, aralarındaki sistemik mücadeleyi göz önüne alarak değerlendirmeksizin, ne savaş öncesi ne de savaş sonrası yılları anlamak kolaydır.

Bu sistemik mücadele aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin savaş öncesi ve sonrası takip ettiği dış politikanın dinamiklerini anlamak açısından da son derece önemlidir. Bu bağlamda, Sovyetler Birliği'nin savaş öncesi ve sonrası benimsediği stratejik yönelimlerinin analizi iki açıdan önemlidir. İlk olarak, Sovyet Birliği'nin Batılı emperyalist devletlerle olan ilişkileri ve bu ilişkiler bağlamında benimsediği stratejiler savaş öncesinde de sistemik bir mücadelenin varlığını göstermektedir. İkinci olarak ise bu sistemik mücadele içerisinde ve emperyalistler arası ilişkilerin

seyri bakımından da Sovyetler Birliđi'nin Türkiye ile kurduđu iliřki ve bu iliřkinin zaman ierisindeki seyri incelenmektedir. Ortodoks realistlerin srdrdkleri tartiřmalarda, Sovyetler Birliđi'nin Türkiye'ye ynelik politikalarının, Rusya İmparatorluđu'nun Bođazlar'ın kontroln ele geirme ve bunu Yakın Dođu ve Akdeniz'e dođru geniřlemek iin bir s olarak kullanma politikasının bir devamı olarak deđerlendirildiđi grlmektedir. Bylesi bir yaklařım, Türkiye'nin kuzey komřusuyla iliřkilerinin tarih dıřı bir okumasına karřılık gelmekte ve kapitalist toplumsal iliřkilere ynelik bu ilk ontolojik meydan okumayı analizlerinde ihmal etmektedirler. Bunun sonucunda da Bolřevik Devrimi'yle beraber ortaya ıkan sistemler arası mcadeleyi grmezden gelerek, Sovyetler Birliđi'nin yeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'yle kurduđu yakın iliřkilere rađmen Sovyetler Birliđi'nin en bařından beri Bođazlar'ın kontroln eline geirmeye ynelik bir "master plan" sahibi olduđu varsayımıyla deđerlendirmeler yapılmaktadır. Ancak Sovyetler Birliđi'nin Türkiye'ye ynelik "sıcak denizlere inme" ve bunun iin Bođazlar'ı kontrol altına alma gibi hi deđiřmeyen bir "master plan" erevesinde yaklařtıđını sylemek zordur. Sovyetler Birliđi'nin Türkiye'ye ynelik yaklařımı, Türkiye'deki anaakım tartiřmaların aksine, uluslararası iliřkilerin iki temel iliřki biimi ierisinde benimsediđi genel stratejisiyle uyumludur.

Sovyetler Birliđi'nin stratejik ynelimlerinin analizinin ardından, Türkiye'nin İkinci Dnya Savařı sonrası Batı'ya yneliminin dinamiklerini ve bu ynelimin karakterini gstermeye alıřan bu alıřma, kapitalist devletler arasındaki iliřkilerin ve bu devletlerin Sovyetler Birliđi ile kurduđu iliřkilerin seyrinin Türkiye'nin savař ncesi ve sonrası dıř politika alternatiflerinin sınırını belirlediđini/etkilediđini ileri srmektedir. Bu erevede Türkiye'nin iki savař arası dnemde hem emperyalistler arası eliřkilerden hem de Sovyetler Birliđi ile Batılı kapitalist devletler arasındaki sistemik atıřmadan yararlanmaya alıřtıđı ve ok kutuplu uluslararası sistemde grece ok ynl dıř politika tercihleri yaparak her iki tarafla da iliřkiler geliřtirebildiđi grlmektedir. Ancak, uluslararası iliřkilerdeki iki ana iliřki ve atıřma kaynađı İkinci Dnya Savařı'nın sonularıyla birlikte byk bir dnřm geirmiřtir. Bu da ABD ve Sovyetler Birliđi arasındaki rekabet ve antogonizm

temelinde yeni bir jeopolitik gruplaşma üzerinden uluslararası sistemi değiştirmiştir. İki savaş arası dönemden farklı olarak savaş sonrasında, savaştan güçlenerek çıkan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, büyük kapitalist devletler arasındaki ilişkilerin örüntüsünü değiştirmede ve yine çok taraflı ve hükümetler arası kurumlar yoluyla da bu devletleri kendi hegemonyası altında etkili bir koordinasyon sistemi içerisine entegre etmede muvaffak olmuştur. Bu bakımdan da, kapitalistler arası ilişkiler daha istikrarlı hale gelmiş, gerginlik ve çatışmalar ortaya çıktığında ise bu gerginlik ve çatışmalar savaşa başvurulmadan çözülebilmıştır. Sonuç olarak da, savaş sonrasında Batı ittifakı ile Sovyetler Birliği arasındaki sistemik mücadelenin uluslararası ilişkilerin başat ilişki biçimi haline gelmesiyle Türkiye'nin savaş öncesinde izlediği çok yönlü dış politikasını takip edebilmesinin maddi zemininin ortadan kalktığı ileri sürülebilir. Yükselen sistemik mücadele, Truman Doktrini'nde de ifadesini bulduğu gibi her ulusun önüne sistemik bir tercih koymuştur, çünkü iki kutuplu dünyada herhangi bir kutba entegre olma politik, ekonomik, sosyal ve askeri bir dönüşüm anlamına da gelmektedir. Bundan dolayı, Türkiye'nin savaş sonrası Batı'ya entegrasyonunun, bir jeopolitik Sovyet tehdidi karşısında güvenliğini sağlamak amaçlı bir jeopolitik ittifak olarak okunması, indirgemeci bir yaklaşım olmakla beraber, temelde Türkiye'nin yaşadığı derin sosyoekonomik dönüşümü de göz ardı eden bir yaklaşımdır.

Bu anlamda, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında, Türkiye'nin dış politikasının temel belirleyeni, diğer ülkelerde olduğu gibi, bu sistemik mücadele olmuş ve Türkiye, sınıfsal tercihleri ve sosyoekonomik özellikleri doğrultusunda, Batı'dan yana tercih yaparak Batı ittifakına katılmıştır. Ancak bu katılımın/entegrasyonun karakteri ABD öncülüğünde oluşturulan yeni kapitalist sistem çerçevesinde gerçekleşmiş ve Türkiye'nin savaş öncesinde yine kapitalizm içerisinde kalarak uyguladığı, dışı kapalı, devlet öncülüğündeki kalkınma stratejisinden vazgeçilerek uluslararası kapitalist sisteme, dışı açık ekonomik koşullarda entegre olunmuştur.

Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin, Türkiye'ye yönelik Sovyet talepleri gerçekleşmemiş olsaydı dahi savaş sonunda iki taraftan birini tercih etme zorunluluğuyla karşı

karşıya kalacağı öne sürülebilir, çünkü sistemik mücadele üzerinden tanımlanan uluslararası ilişkilerde her iki sistemi temsil eden devletlerle aynı anda yakın ilişkiler kurma olanağı azalmıştır. Bu bakımdan da Türkiye, savaş öncesinin çok kutuplu dünyasında sahip olduğu dış politika alternatiflerine ve esnekliğine, savaş sonrasında uluslararası yapının dönüşümüyle birlikte artık sahip değildir. Soğuk Savaş, politik, ekonomik, toplumsal ve askeri boyutları olan bir sistemler arası mücadeledir ve bu mücadele, stratejik-askeri güç dengesine indirgenemez. Aynı sebepten dolayı, Soğuk Savaş'ın hâkim olduğu uluslararası ortamda Türkiye'nin Batı'ya yönelimi de jeopolitik bir tehdide karşı jeopolitik bir ittifaka indirgenemez, zira bu entegrasyonun jeopolitik bir boyutu olduğu kadar, politik, ekonomik ve toplumsal boyutları da vardır.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: