

RECONSIDERING DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND
POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TUNISIA

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ABSTRACT

RECONSIDERING DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND POSSIBILITIES OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN TUNISIA

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This thesis analyzes the variables that have impacts on durability and stability of the authoritarian regime in order to examine the possibilities for successful democratic transformations in the context of Tunisia. This thesis chooses Tunisia as a case study since a fascinating example of both durability and vulnerability of authoritarian regimes. From formal independence in 1956 until a constitutional coup in 1987, Tunisia was ruled by a single-party. Due to a set of economic and political crises in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, with the support of political elites, became the new president and this paved the way for upgrading authoritarian regime in Tunisia. During Ben Ali era, regime in Tunisia was seen as the one of the most resilience authoritarian regime in the Middle East and North Africa; somehow Tunisians became successful to put meaningful pressure on the regime in 2010-2011 with popular uprisings and opened the way for a democratic transformation in their country. In this respect, this thesis aims to find out how the capacity of the regime and the opposition affected resilience of authoritarian regime in Tunisia. In addition to that, this thesis investigates the relationship between elite defection in ruling elite

of an authoritarian regime leads crises and democratic transformation in a country. Thus, the basic conclusion of this thesis is that there are causal relations between durability, stability and vulnerability of authoritarian regime and capacity of the regime and capacity of the opposition.

Keywords: Authoritarian resilience, democratization, capacity of regime, capacity of opposition, Tunisia.

ÖZ

TUNUS'TA OTORİTER DİRENCİN VE DEMOKRATİKLEŞME İHTİMALLERİNİN YENİDEN ELE ALINMASI

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Bu tez başarılı demokratik dönüşüm olanaklarını incelemek amacıyla Tunus örneği üzerinden otoriter rejimlerin dayanıklılığı ve istikrarını etkileyen değişkenleri incelemektedir. Bu tezde Tunus'un örnek olay incelemesi seçilmesinin nedeni, Tunus otoriter rejimlerin hem dayanıklılığının hem de kırılabilirliğinin büyüleyici bir örneğidir. Resmi bağımsızlığını kazandığı 1956 yılından 1987 anayasa darbesine kadar geçen süre içinde Tunus Habib Burgiba önderliğinde tek parti tarafından yönetilmiştir. 1970'lerin sonunda ve 1980'lerin başında yaşanan ekonomik krizin etkisiyle, Zeynelabidin Bin Ali siyasi elitlerin desteği ile yeni cumhurbaşkanı olmuş ve Burgiba dönemini sonlandırmıştır. Bin Ali'nin Burgiba'nın yerine cumhurbaşkanı olması otoriter yükseltmenin yolunu açmıştır. Bin Ali döneminde Tunus'ta otoriter rejim Orta Doğu ve Kuzey Afrika'daki en dirençli otoriter rejimlerden biri olarak kabul edilmekteydi; ancak Tunuslular bir şekilde 2010 ve 2011'de ortaya çıkan halk ayaklanmaları ile rejim üzerinde anlamlı bir baskı oluşturmayı başarmış ve ülkelerinde demokratik dönüşümün yolunu açmışlardır. Bu bakımdan bu tez rejimin ve muhalefetin kapasitelerinin Tunus'ta otoriter direnç üzerindeki etkisini incelemeyi

amaçlamaktadır. Buna ek olarak, bu tez otoriter rejimlerin yönetici elitleri arasındaki ayrışma/bölünme ile demokrasinin dönüşümü arasındaki ilişkiyi incelemektedir. Bu tezde ulaşılan en temel sonuç ise otoriter rejimlerin dayanıklılığı, istikrarı ve kırılabilirliği ile rejim ve muhalefetin kapasitesi arasında nedensel ilişki olduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Otoriter direnç, demokratikleşme, rejim kapasitesi, muhalefet kapasitesi, Tunus.

*To My Beloved One, Umut,
My Precious Family and Friends*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ATUGE	The Association of Graduates of French Engineering Schools
CPR	The Congress for the Republic
EC	European Commission
EOI	Export oriented industrialization
EU	European Union
ISI	Import substitution industrialization
LTDH	The Tunisian Human Rights League
MSD	Movement of Social Democrats
MUP	Popular Unity Movement
NGOs	nongovernmental organizations
PSD	Socialist Destourian Party
PTT	Post, Telegraph and Telephone
QPS	Quranic Preservation Society
RCD	Constitutional Democratic Rally
SNES	The National Secondary School Teachers Union
UGET	The General Union of Tunisian Students
UGET	The General Union for Tunisian Students
UGTT	Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail / Tunisian General Labour Union
UNAT	National Union of Tunisian Farmers- l'Union nationale des agriculteurs Tunisiens / The General Union of Tunisian Farmers
UTAC	Tunisian Union of Crafts and Commerce- the Union Tunisienne de l'Artisanat et du Commerce / Tunisian Union of Artisans and Traders
UTIC	Tunisian Union of Industry and Commerce
UTICA	The Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Handcrafts

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Despite global resurgence of democracy and spread of the third wave of democratization across South America and Eastern Europe since the 1980s, non-democratic regimes in the Middle East showed remarkable resilience and remained in power. However, by mid-January 2011, non-democratic regimes in the Middle East found themselves struggling with challenges posed by the popular uprisings known commonly as “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening”.

The wave of unrest in the region was characterized in the beginning by huge, leaderless, spontaneous and peaceful popular protests in a number of Arab countries against long-standing autocratic regimes. It began in Tunisia in December 2010 in the central and southern areas which economically marginalized, affected by high unemployment and lack of appropriate infrastructure; and then spread to the coastal areas of the country. By January 2011, streets of Tunis were filled with thousands of Tunisians. Within eighteen days, protesters unseated one of the most entrenched autocrats in the world, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. After Ben Ali’s departure, the ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) party and one of the most hated security services, the political police, were quickly dissolved.

Inspired by the Tunisia’s peaceful ouster of their autocrats, protesters in several Arab countries from North Africa to the Gulf, took to the streets. By the end of 2011, none of the Middle Eastern states remained untouched by the wave of uprisings whereas

popular protests had toppled three entrenched autocrats in the Middle East; Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt and Gaddafi in Libya. The protests did not remain as domestic disputes; regional and international actors got involved as well. NATO coordinated airstrikes in order to support Libyan Transitional National Council, who also got arms supplies from Qatar, to topple Gaddafi. Gulf Cooperation Council sent Peninsula Shield Forces under Saudi Arabia's leadership to Bahrain to crackdown the popular protests. Syria, on the other hand, with the involvement of several international and national actors, became a state of stalemated crisis.

In 2014, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya have been experiencing transitions for three years; all have been facing several challenges. The ongoing instability in Libya that has been fed by disputes on federation and autonomy; Jihadist-related and militia-related violence; and failure to construct effective state institutions poses high potential security threats for the region. Mass protests in the summer of 2013 and following military intervention on July 3, 2013 in Egypt demonstrate that the overthrowing an authoritarian regime is not an easy process. Even though the political crisis and polarization in Tunisia are worrying, expectations for a democratic transition in this country are still high. On the other hand, regional politics are far from being stable despite the fact that many autocrats are still in power.

The ongoing transformation in some countries where the regimes were toppled by uprisings as well as continuing persistence of authoritarian regimes in other countries of the region require a re-consideration of the works on democratization and authoritarianism, especially those focused on the Middle East. Fall of the autocrats in 2011 has questioned the mythical paradigm of "persistent authoritarianism" in the Middle East.

Primarily, one should overcome conceptual or definitional problems which blurred the differences between vital concepts used in the literature on authoritarianism and democratization; state, regime and government. State is the permanent structure of domination and coordination where political power is located.¹ A regime, on the

¹ Stephanie Lawson, "Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization" *Comparative Politics* 25, No. 2 (Jan., 1993), p. 187; Robert M. Fishman,

other hand, is a political system “which determines how and under what conditions and limitations the power of state is exercised.”² Lastly, government is the individuals or team of individuals that take decisions and exercise power within the framework of established regime and the fundamental structure of the state.³ So, regime sets the rules of political governance and power allocation for government and shapes the relationships between the government and the opposition.⁴

Defining the concept of “authoritarian” is a much more complicated task, because the simplest definition of authoritarian regime covers non-democratic and non-totalitarian regimes.⁵ So it becomes a prerequisite to define democratic regimes and totalitarian regimes to clarify the content of authoritarian regime.

In general, the distinctive features of totalitarian regime are a monistic centre of power, an official ideology, and mass mobilizing single party. Much of the literature agrees that totalitarian regimes aim to dominate and regulate society through an ideological vision.⁶ Democratic regime, on the other hand, is a political system of the peaceful regulation of conflicts⁷ as well as peaceful government change through democratic norms, regulations and institutions.⁸ It is the result of universalistic wager

"Rethinking State and Regime: Southern Europe's Transition to Democracy," *World Politics* 42 (April 1990), p. 428.

² Lawson, “*Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization*”, p. 187.

³ Lawson, “*Conceptual Issues in the Comparative Study of Regime Change and Democratization*”, p. 186.

⁴ Sabine C. Carey, *Protest, Repression, and Political Regimes: An Empirical Analysis of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa*, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 16.

⁵ Juan José Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*, (Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), p. 159.

⁶ Juan José Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes.*; Robert Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century*, (New York & London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000).

⁷ Adam Przeworski, “Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Defense”, in *The Democracy Source Book* ed by Robert Dahl, Ian Shapiro and Jose Antonio Cheibub, (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 2003), p.13.

⁸ Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, (Chicago-London: , The University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 73-74.

due to the assignment of legal attributions and of the institutionalized wayer that determine the agents' rights and obligations.⁹

Authoritarian regime stands between these two regime types what makes it a “negatively defined” concept. Hence it is not a specific political model.¹⁰ So, an authoritarian regime is a political system which does not have the features of either a democratic regime or a totalitarian regime. With the emergence of hybrid regimes, which adopted some democratic institutions after the third wave of democratization, the conceptual dilemma in the literature on authoritarian regimes becomes more multifaceted. In the 1990s, scholars generally focused on the democratic aspects of these hybrid regimes and contributed literature of “democracy with adjectives”.¹¹ By 2000s, the focus shifted to the non-democratic aspect of hybrid regimes and created classifications based on “authoritarianism with adjectives”.¹²

Despite the fact that this conceptual complexity encourages the works on regime classification, it also shows that there are several types of authoritarian regime which have different institutional settings and create distinct regime logic.¹³ Much of the literature focuses on different modes of accessing and maintaining political power, in other words, analyzes the contestation structure to classify different sub-types of

⁹ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Dissonances*, (Notre Dame-Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), pp. 15-16.

¹⁰ Nouredine Jebnoun, “Rethinking the Paradigm of “Durable” and “Stable” Authoritarianism in the Middle East”, in *Modern Middle East Authoritarianism: Roots, Ramifications, and Crisis* ed by Nouredine Jebnoun, Mehrdad Kia, Mimi Kirk, (Routledge, 2013), p.1

¹¹ For the illiberal democracy see Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, *Foreign Affairs* 76, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 1997), pp. 22-43; For the pseudo-democracy see Larry Dimond, “Thinking About Hybrid Regimes”, *Journal of Democracy*, pp. 36; For façade democracy and electoral democracy see Jeff Haynes, “Introduction: the “Third World” and the third wave of democracy”, in *Democracy and Political Change in the Third World*, ed. By Jeff Haynes, (London & New York: Routledge, 2003).

¹² “Electoral authoritarian regimes” by Andreas Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).; “competitive authoritarianism” and “hegemonic authoritarian regime” by Larry Diamond, “Thinking about Hybrid Regimes”, *Journal of Democracy* 13, No: 2 (2002).; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism”, *Journal of Democracy* 13, No: 2 (2002).

¹³ Micheal Wahman, Jan Teorell and Axel Hadenius, "Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective," *Contemporary Politics* 19, No: 1 (2013), p.2

authoritarian regimes. Thus, there is an effort to explain the level of competitiveness and participation in different authoritarian regimes. There are also significant works that classify autocratic regimes according to coalitional patterns and class structure of a given country.¹⁴

The literature on regime classification that flourished especially with the third wave of democratization helped to overcome the perception of “standardized authoritarianism” in the Middle East. It also contributes to the conceptualization of the works on autocratic regimes in the Middle East by referring to a certain type of authoritarian regime instead of the name of the “presidents” to differentiate changing nature of regime, contestation structure, coalition pattern, state-society relations and so on. The political system in Tunisia after 1990s differs from the political system in Egypt after 1980s or in Syria in the 2000s. In a similar vein, the political system in pre-1987 and post-1987 in Tunisia differs in many ways. One-party authoritarianism differs from multi-party authoritarianism or monarchies because they lay on different institutions, coalition patterns, mode of rule, and so on. Hence the factors behind durability of authoritarian regimes differ from one sub-type to another. The diversity of experiences in the last three years in the Middle East shows how these differences matter for both durability of authoritarian regimes and transitions to democracy.

Upon gaining independence, the states in the Middle East adopted a variety of political regimes; Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Sudan and Lebanon adopted elective, parliamentary political systems which were then toppled by military regime or beset by civil war. Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, Bahrain and Libya adopted constitutional monarchies whereas Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates established absolutist monarchies. The monarchy in Libya was toppled by the military, who then established no-party authoritarian regime. National liberation movements in Algeria, South Yemen and Tunisia established single-party regimes in the aftermath of decolonization.

¹⁴ Stephen Juan King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009)

These authoritarian regimes in the Middle East were not influenced by the third wave of democratization whereas many states in Asia and Africa had experienced political transitions in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Certainly, all these political transitions in Asia and Africa did not produce real democratic regimes; in many cases authoritarian regimes restructured themselves as quasi-democracies, in other words, hybrid regimes. The third wave of democratization bypassed the Middle East, but also it contributed to the “menu of manipulation”¹⁵ according to Andreas Schedler. Moreover, according to Heydemann authoritarian regimes can survive by the “authoritarian upgrade”¹⁶. Both Schedler and Heydemann, in their works, explain how authoritarian regimes use democratic structures to cement their power, sustain legitimacy and ease the international criticism. The representative institutions manipulated by an authoritarian regime serve to “ease their existential problems of governance and survival” as a response to democratizing pressures according to Schedler.¹⁷ Heydemann explain the resilience of authoritarianism with “authoritarian upgrading” which “involves reconfiguring authoritarian governance to accommodate and manage changing political, economic, and social conditions.”¹⁸ According to Haydemann, five features of authoritarian upgrading are appropriating and containing civil societies; managing political contestation; capturing the benefits of selective economic reforms; controlling new communications technologies; and diversifying international linkages.¹⁹

By 1970s, some of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East began to adopt economic liberalization policies, a shift from import substitution industrialization

¹⁵ Andreas Schedler explains how electoral politics can become a tool of authoritarian powerholders in his work titled “The Menu of Manipulation”, *Journal of Democracy*, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002.

¹⁶ The term used by Steven Haydemann in his following work: “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World”, The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper 13, (October 2007) pp. 1-37, Available Online at: <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2007/10/arabworld/10arabworld> (Accessed 20.04.2014)

¹⁷ Andreas Schedler, “Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 21, No.1, (2010), p. 76.

¹⁸ Haydemann, “*Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World*”, p. 1.

¹⁹ Haydemann, “*Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World*”, p. 5.

(ISI) to export oriented industrialization (EOD); and then to apply structural adjustment programs.²⁰ In many cases the shift in economic policies caused social discontent. The negative impact of the debt crisis of the 1980s together with, the economic reform policies which cut public expenditure, reduced subsidies and increased the price of basic goods triggered “bread (food) riots” across the region. In general, the response of authoritarian regimes in the region marked by increasing repression of labor movement as well as civil society and controlled political liberalization which introduced some democratic institutions or/and regulations into their politics.²¹ However the liberalization efforts were followed by de-liberalization in a short time. Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, adopted limited political openings in the 1980s whereas Jordan renewed parliamentary elections in 1989. Kuwait also reestablished the parliament in 1991. However, the liberalization process remained limited and, in a few years, many of the reforms quickly eroded. Authoritarian upgrade, as Haydeman noted, indicates effectiveness of these regimes in adapting to and managing the democratization pressures. It is important to note that authoritarian regimes still stay in power not because they are resilient to change but, on the contrary, they can effectively manage the change. Then, one should ask how authoritarian regimes in the Middle East effectively manage change and why some of these regimes failed to survive from the popular uprisings on 2010-2011. This work, thus, discusses the resilience of authoritarian regime and possibilities of democratization by focusing on Tunisia.

Hence, primary aim of this thesis is to analyze the variables that impacted durability and stability of the authoritarian regime in order to examine the possibilities for successful democratic transformations. Key questions of the thesis include:

- What is the relationship between capacity of regime and durability of authoritarian regimes?

²⁰ Emma Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), pp. 1-4.

²¹ Steven Haydeman, *Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World*, pp. 1-37.

- Which primary institutions of state sustain infrastructural power for authoritarian regimes and thus, contributed its durability?
- How elite defection and cohesion influence the durability of authoritarian regimes?
- What is the relationship between capacity of opposition and durability of authoritarian regimes?
- Can elite defection in ruling elite of an authoritarian regime lead a successful democratic transformation of regime?
- Which roles can opposition play in demise of an authoritarian regime and a democratic transition?

The dependent variable of this work is the durability of authoritarian regime. The independent variables are the capacity of the regime and the capacity of the opposition. There are two variables that shape the capacity of the regime; the infrastructural powers of state and cohesion of ruling elite. Capacity of opposition is analyzed by focusing on its organizational capacity (recruit supporters, economic independence and sustain the loyalty). So, this thesis aims to analyze the causal relations between durability, stability, and vulnerability of authoritarian regime (dependent variable) and capacity of the regime (independent variable 1) and capacity of the opposition (independent variable 2).

The capacity of the regime determines the abilities of the regime to avoid or resolve the challenges decisively in its favor and contributes to durability and stability of the regime. This thesis argues that two interconnected variables, the infrastructural powers of state and cohesion of ruling elite, shape the capacity of a regime. In addition, the capacity of the opposition in an authoritarian regime determines the challenges against authoritarian regime; their ability to expand the duration and locality of challenges, and to politicize them, and lastly to overturn the regime.

First Hypothesis: Authoritarian durability depends on capacity of regime which is shaped by infrastructural powers of state and cohesion of ruling elite. Hence capacity of regime is a necessary condition for authoritarian durability.

Second Hypothesis: Elite defection does not always lead demise of authoritarian regime, on the contrary, victory of soft-liners in ruling coalition can also end up with an authoritarian upgrade. The level of threat posed by elite defection depends on the ruling elite's access to infrastructural power of regime. So, if authoritarian regime devoids of infrastructural powers, it become open to challenges in behalf of democratization.

Third Hypothesis: The capacity of the opposition in an authoritarian regime determines authoritarian durability. For authoritarian durability, low level of the capacity of the opposition is a necessary condition. For democratic transformation, oppositional forces need organizational capacity to overturn the authoritarian regime. So if oppositional elites gain organizational capacity, they can put pressures on the regime in favor of democratization.

Fourth Hypothesis: High capacity of regime *and* low capacity of opposition are sufficient conditions for authoritarian durability, while low capacity of regime *and* high capacity of opposition sufficient conditions for democratic transition in an authoritarian regime.

In order to test these hypotheses, this thesis will study two periods of crises in the same country, Tunisia. The first case covers the crises between 1969 and 1987, which triggered the coup against Bourguiba. The second case covers the crises emerged with 2010-2011 popular protests.

Tunisia is a fascinating example of both durability and vulnerability of authoritarian regimes. From formal independence in 1956 until a constitutional coup in 1987, Tunisia was ruled by a single-party under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba. This period was marked by early corporatist political structure which existed with the merger of the party and the state as well as subordination of mass organizations; and then undermining the corporatist political structure due to economic liberalization policies. As a newly independent country Tunisia aimed to sustain its economic development through ISI policies between 1956 and 1969; however these policies failed to achieve successful economic development. Then, Tunisia began to

implement economic liberalization policies which created in turn expanding social discontent. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, trade unions put pressure on the regime; strikes and protests spread and destabilized both economic and political life. In turn, they were fiercely crushed; their autonomy was destroyed and their leadership co-opted by the regime. Even though the regime in Tunisia repressed the trade unions, it could not effectively solve the elite defection within the ruling party. The process led to the constitutional coup in 1987 and upgraded authoritarian regime which introduced multi-party system to Tunisian political life and promised more political openings.

Thus, in post-1987 period, contestation structure was changed with adoption of multi-party system and few parties were legalized whereas many did not get legal approval, including Islamists. The ruling party was also transformed and restructured under a new name. Despite legalizing the multi-party system, the ruling party won all the elections and opposing parties could have seats in the parliament only thanks to the quota system. In sum, the regime appeared unwilling to consider real power-sharing with opposition or civil society while the opposition remained very weak to challenge the regime and force it for political reforms. Yet, somehow Tunisians became successful to put meaningful pressure on the regime in 2010-2011 with popular uprisings.

Since this thesis studies two separate periods in the same country, the method used is the historical comparative analysis, with a comparison of these two periods' institutions and agent's strategic decisions. Using a comparative study should help identify and discuss relevant factors, notably by contrasting different outcomes of crisis that the regime in Tunisia had faced and showing which variables have conditioned the survival of authoritarian regime or vice versa. Comparative-historical methods "employ comparison as a means of gaining insight into causal determinants" and "explore the characteristics and causes of particular phenomena" and "combine comparative and within-case methods."²² Hence, this method will be

²² Matthew Lange, *Comparative-Historical Methods*, (SAGE Publications, 2013), p. 15, Available Online at: http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/50317_Lange_Chapter_1.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014).

used to test up the role of argued independent variables in the field of authoritarian stability and durability. To achieve this goal with-in case analysis²³ will be used for in-depth understanding and description of the phenomenon under this case study of the work. This thesis will be based on primary sources collected in the form of official documents and interviews, and secondary sources such as scholarly articles, books, web logs (blogs), and analytic and journalistic material retrieved online.

The outline of the thesis is developed within the framework of the answers to those questions in turn. Chapter One starts with an analysis of theoretical approaches on durability of authoritarian regimes by focusing on state, coalition patterns and state-society relations. State is the focus of this examination since it provides infrastructural power and mechanisms to the actors of authoritarian regime for their political objectives. In reference to Nazih Ayubi's book titled *Over-stating the Arab State*, this work discusses the infrastructural power and mechanisms of Tunisian state and relation between the infrastructural powers and durability of authoritarian regime. Focusing on infrastructural mechanisms, also, requires a special interest on functions and mechanisms of ruling party as well as the role of coercive apparatus. The ruling party provides a contestation arena for the political elites with its institutional settings whereas state-society relation shapes the role of the ruling party in the regime. Chapter Two focuses on the crises which emerged after 1969 and led to the ouster of president Bourguiba. This chapter assesses the infrastructural powers that were provided by state, ruling party and subordinated mass organizations. Also, ruling coalition is analyzed to understand how the elite defection emerged between 1969 and 1987 impacted the durability and stability of authoritarian regime. In addition, the capacity of the opposition is discussed in this chapter also. In Chapter Three, how the capacity of the regime and the opposition play a role in demise of authoritarian regime in Tunisia is discussed using the same pattern of previous chapter. Moreover, this chapter investigates the role of elite defection in the demise of authoritarian regime. Chapter Four aims to analyze the transition period in Tunisia by focusing on the state, state-society relations and new emerging elites and their

²³ Barbara L. Paterson, "Within-case analysis" in *Encyclopedia of Case Study Research* by Albert J. Mills, Gabrielle Durepos, Elden Wiebe, (SAGE Publications, 2010), pp. 971-974, Available Online at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781412957397.n357> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

strategic decisions in order to investigate the possibilities for successful democratic transformation. The new constitution adopted January 2014 is also discussed briefly in this chapter. In keeping with the aims of this thesis to analyze the durability of authoritarian regime and possibilities for democratization, the main arguments will be examined in the conclusion chapter.

This thesis offers a limited look ahead to the puzzle of authoritarian resilience and possibilities of democratization, because it only studies Tunisia. However Tunisia provides comprehensive and comparative cases both for authoritarian durability and democratic transformation. Thus, I hope that this thesis will contribute further works on the resilience of authoritarianism and possibilities of democratization in the region.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON DURABILITY OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

The contemporary literature on regime durability which analyses the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East mainly focuses on institutions from state to institutions as democratic façade, or weakness of challengers. Analyzing dynamics and sources of authoritarian durability helps to spotlight vulnerabilities of authoritarian regimes as well. However discussion on durability of regime needs distinguishing between authoritarian longevity and durability, because durability of regime is distinct from duration in power. As Slater and Fenner argue even vulnerable authoritarian regimes may survive for extended periods of time if they are not seriously challenged. The recent challenges that authoritarian regimes have been facing since the beginning of 2011; and the failure of some of them to overcome these challenges highlight the importance of such division.

Referring Grzymala-Busse's work, Slater and Fenner define durability as the vector of duration (temporal length) and stability (constant outcome); and argue that duration, the longevity in other words, is not enough to measure the regime durability because it tells little about stability of the regime.²⁴ Stability of regime depends on the level of regimes ability to avoid or resolve conflicts –if cannot be totally avoided-

²⁴ Dan Slater and Sofia Fenner, "Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability", *Journal of International Affairs* 65, No. 1, (Fall/Winter 2011), p. 17.

decisively in regime's favor.²⁵ So it is possible to argue that some of the mechanisms and strategies adopted by authoritarian regimes contribute to the longevity of the regime by managing crises and postponing the challenges, however these mechanisms and strategies may not be effective when the regime face sudden emerging or/and high-intensity crises.

So, this chapter aims to reconsider the literature of authoritarian durability in the Middle East with the guidance of the definition made by Slater and Fenner. The first part examines the relationship between durability of regime and state while second part discusses the role of political elites in durability of authoritarian regimes.

2.1. Relation between Authoritarian Regime and State

Durability of authoritarian regimes depends on the level of their ability to avoid or resolve conflicts decisively in their favor. Authoritarian regimes' ability to avoid or resolve conflict in their favor derives from their infrastructural powers which are deployed by set of mechanisms.²⁶ Slater and Fenner argue that the most important infrastructural mechanisms sustaining durability of authoritarian regimes include coercing rivals, extracting revenues, registering citizens and cultivating dependence.²⁷ State is the strongest institutional foundation for authoritarian regimes' durability because it has "a variable amount of infrastructural power which regime actors can deploy through a set of mechanisms to achieve the particular political objectives of authoritarian durability."²⁸ Hence longevity and stability of an authoritarian regime differs according to effectiveness level of these mechanisms.

²⁵ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, p. 17.

²⁶ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, p. 19

²⁷ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, p.20.

²⁸ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, pp. 16-17

Slater and Fenner underlines the importance of sustain services and distributing benefits by state apparatus²⁹ while there is a number of works which spotlight state's role in economy as a mean of cultivating dependence. Much of the literature seeking to explain democracy deficit and robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East comprises the structural arguments that focus on the lack of prerequisites for democratization process. Within this, "political economy" approach focuses on the economic development to explain the determinants of democratization and authoritarianism. As originally proposed by Lipset, the explanation of political economy approaches argues that the level of economic development correlated positively with democracy, because political culture and social structure is closely associated with economic development. The middle class, who gains in size with socio-economic development, emerges as the main pro-democratic force in Lipset's hypothesis. On the other hand, Reuschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens draw attention to the fact that economic development also expands the size of urban working class and argue that urban working class plays more redemptive role in democratization. Hence "capitalist development is related to democracy because it shifts the balance of class power"³⁰ in favor of subordinated classes to demand reform and "facilitate their self-organization, thus making it more difficult for elites to exclude them politically."³¹ According to this assumption the capitalist development, at the same time, erodes the size and the power of the anti-democratic force- the upper classes.³² However in developing world, the relation between capitalist development and democracy is not as identical as it assumed. Some late-developing countries transform successfully to democracy while capitalist development has not brought the decline of significant number of authoritarian regimes in late-developing countries.

²⁹ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, p. 21-22.

³⁰ Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyn Huber and John D. Stephens, "The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy", *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 7, No: 3 (1993), p. 75

³¹ Reuschmeyer, Huber, and Stephens, *The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy*, p. 83

³² Reuschmeyer, Huber, and Stephens, *The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy*, p. 84.

Overwhelmingly the explanations of deficit of democracy in these late-developing countries focus on the level of *etatisme* that characterizes the political economy of these countries. Alexander Gerschenkron argues “that the later a country is its economic development, the larger the role that the state is likely to play in trying to promote development.”³³ More specifically, most of the late-developing countries experienced what Eva Bellin has called “stalled democracy” as a result of the dual paradoxes of state-sponsored industrialization. State-sponsored industrialization enhances the empowerment and autonomy of social forces from the state by fostering the development of labor and capital, and gives rise to the “developmental paradox” of the authoritarian regime; but at the same time it undermines their enthusiasm for democracy and causes “the democratic paradox.”³⁴

The democratic deficit of the Middle East and North Africa has its own place in Eva Bellin’s work where she argues that private sector capital and organized labor are less enthusiastic about democratization because of their dependence on state; however she also suggests that they are contingent democrats.³⁵ As a result, Bellin asserts that the change in contextual conditions such as the level of integration into the international economy and marketization of the domestic economy progress; the political agenda of these social forces is likely to change in favor of democratization because integration into the international economy and marketization of the domestic economy decreases state-sponsorship of capital and labor.³⁶

Similarly, Nazih Ayubi, underlines the economic and social role of the state in late-developing countries, which creates dependency of capital and labor on state, as the leading factor of democracy deficit.³⁷ Ayubi defines the states in the Middle East as

³³ Nazih Ayubi, *Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East*, (London: I.B.Tauris, 1996), p. 13

³⁴ Eva Bellin, *Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor, and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development*, (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2002), p. 4

³⁵ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, pp. 183-184

³⁶ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 184

³⁷ Ayubi, *Overstating The Arab State*, p. 13.

over-stating states which refers remarkable expansion of state in public and economic arena.³⁸ The state in the Middle East, which represents various degrees of corporatism, expands in quantitative terms by way of expansion not only in industrialization and social welfare but also in public personnel, public organizations and public expenditures.

Despite all liberalization and privatization policies since the late 1970s and 1980s, the states in Middle East is not really about to withdraw from the economy.³⁹ The privatization is basically a public policy adopted and applied by state to ease its “fiscal crisis” rooted from its inability to continue with its etatist and its welfarist policies at the same time under the pressure and temptation from globalized capitalism and its international institutions.⁴⁰ So, state’s withdrawal from economy, according to Ayubi, mainly is a result of state’s inability due to its fiscal crisis rather than the pressure from private sector or contingent decision of ruling elite.⁴¹

The privatization and liberalization in the Middle East and North Africa have not diminished the role of the state in economy and society; to the contrary, the character of these reforms provided the resources for regimes to resist democratization and to transform authoritarianism.⁴² Privatization and liberalization “created and then favored a rent-seeking urban bourgeoisie and landed elite with no interest in democracy or political participation” as noted by King.⁴³ The gains, which derive from liberalization and privatization, tend to be distributed unevenly and foster the dependency of social forces that benefited from the new economic policies, on state.

³⁸ Ayubi, *Overstating The Arab State*, pp. 2-3.

³⁹ Nazih Ayubi, "Etatisme versus Privatization: The Changing Economic Role of the State in Nine Arab Countries", in *Economic Transition in the Middle East: Global Challenges and Adjustment Strategies* ed. by Heba Ahmad Handoussa (Cairo: American Univ in Cairo Press, 1997), p. 125.

⁴⁰ Ayubi, *Etatisme versus Privatization*, p. 128.

⁴¹ Ayubi, *Etatisme versus Privatization*, p. 128.

⁴² Stephen J. King, "Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa", *Political Science Quarterly* 122, No: 3 (2007), p 434.

⁴³ King, *Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, p. 434.

State's role in economy and society is a significant factor in explaining the democratic deficit the Middle East and North Africa. "Democracy is a matter of power and power sharing"⁴⁴, thus dominant classes needs to be balanced by subordinated classes as well as the power of state needs to be counterbalanced by civil society in order to democratize according to Reuschmeyer, Stephens, and Stephens.⁴⁵ Zakaria offers expanding role of the free market economy instead of state's interventionist economic policies to balance the power of state and to protect individuals from the aggression of authoritarian regimes.⁴⁶ Similarly, von Hayek points at the relation between the state's role in economy and authoritarian regime and argues that authoritarian regimes which control the economic resources gather loyalty of citizens who depends on these economic resources to survive.⁴⁷ For both Zakaria and von Hayek, democratization depends on limiting state's role in economy and introduction of free market economy in an authoritarian regime.

There is also several works which underline significant impact of resource dependence on the authoritarianism in the Middle East. These works assume that states which derive much of their revenues from resource rents are more autonomous and less accountable, so, resource rent promotes authoritarianism. Beblawi argues that "With virtually no taxes, citizens are far less demanding in terms of political participation. The history of democracy owes its beginnings, it is well known, to some fiscal association (no taxation without representation)."⁴⁸ Similarly Giacomo Luciani argues that a state which is supported by revenues collected by resource rents does not need to respond the society.⁴⁹ Indeed, Micheal Ross examined the

⁴⁴ Reuschmeyer, Huber, and Stephens, *The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy*, p. 73.

⁴⁵ Reuschmeyer, Huber, and Stephens, *The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy*, p. 73-74

⁴⁶ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (Revised Edition) (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007).

⁴⁷ Friedrich August von Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom: Text and Documents—The Definitive Edition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009).

⁴⁸ Hazem Beblawi, "The Rentier State in the Arab World" in *The Arab State* ed. by Giacomo Luciani, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 89.

⁴⁹ Giacomo Luciani, "Resources, Revenues, and Authoritarianism in the Arab World: Beyond the Rentier State," in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical*

relationship between oil wealth and regime type and argued that “oil hinders democracy.”⁵⁰ He suggested three causal mechanisms- rentier effect, repression effect and modernization effect- to explain the link between oil and authoritarianism.⁵¹ The rentier impact on regime type is not confined oil-exporting states, as Beblawi argues; there are semi-rentier states which gained “location rent”⁵² as foreign military and political aid.

Moreover, there are a number of remarkable works which assess the role of coercive apparatus in sustaining and stabilizing authoritarianism. The authoritarian regimes relied on the security apparatus to repress opposition particularly at times of political crisis. The military and security services has emerged as the dominant group in authoritarian regimes due to their high dependence on both “high intensity” coercive acts, that target large numbers of people, well-known individuals, or major institutions; or “low-intensity” coercive acts, that consist of harassing, intimidating, spying, vandalizing the potential opponents.⁵³ The states in the Middle East and North Africa endow high amount of revenues on their security apparatus despite the economic challenges that they face. Brownlee’s works that focus on survival of authoritarian regimes that threatened by popular uprisings in Syria (1982), Tunisia (1987), Iraq (1991) and Libya (1993) shows that the ability of the incumbent rulers to suppress dissent by coercive apparatus directly impacted regime’s survival and re-stabilization.⁵⁴

Eva Bellin focuses on the well-financed coercive apparatuses and argues that the present conditions that foster authoritarianism are the will and the capacity of state’s

Perspectives, ed. Rex Brynen, Bahgat Korany and Paul Noble, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 211.

⁵⁰ Micheal L. Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”, *World Politics*, Vol: 53 (April 2001), pp. 325-361.

⁵¹ Ross, “*Does Oil Hinder Democracy?*”, pp. 332-337.

⁵² Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, pp. 95-98.

⁵³ Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 57-58.

⁵⁴ Marsha Pripstein Posusney, *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), p. 11.

coercive apparatus to suppress democratic initiatives in the Middle East and North Africa. At least four variables shape the will and the capacity of regime's coercive apparatus: the state of fiscal health; the state of international support network; the level of institutionalization and the level of popular mobilization.⁵⁵ The capacity to repress depends on the state of fiscal health and the state of international support network; the will to repress depends on the level of institutionalization and the level of popular mobilization.⁵⁶

Studies present that authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and North Africa depend highly on mechanisms of cultivating dependence and coercion. At this point, Ayubi argues that power of state in the Middle East are overestimated regarding the real power, efficiency and significance of state; because it is not a strong state but a "hard state or fierce state" which lacks of infrastructural power and ideological hegemony in the Gramscian sense.⁵⁷ He expresses the infrastructural weakness of the states in the Middle East as follow:

The real powers of regulation of these states are less impressive. Their capabilities for law enforcing are much weaker than their ability to enact laws, their implementation capabilities are much weaker than their ability to issue development plans. These states have 'annexed' parts of the society and the economy 'from the outside', without penetrating the society at large.⁵⁸

The infrastructural weakness of the states in the Middle East makes the authoritarian regimes less stable according to assumptions of Slatter and Fenner, because authoritarian regimes with inefficient infrastructural mechanisms cannot resolve the

⁵⁵ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective", *Comparative Politics* (2004), p. 148.

⁵⁶ Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring", *Comparative Politics* 44, No: 2 (2012), pp. 127-149.

⁵⁷ Ayubi, *Overstating The Arab State*, p. 2.

⁵⁸ Ayubi, *Overstating The Arab State*, p. 447.

political crises but at best meet or overcome them and “dooms societies to chronic crises, institutional flux and policy failures.”⁵⁹

Institutional analysis argues that adopting democratic institutions reframes the state-society relations on favor of democratization; and brings the breakdown of authoritarian regime eventually. In general, institutional analysis entails state and societal institutions that structure political conducts of political actors and includes “the rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the relations among various branches of government, and the structure and organization of economic actors like trade unions [...] and noneconomic associations.”⁶⁰

Significant number of structural analysis employs a prerequisites analysis on institutions and explains the democracy deficit and robustness of authoritarianism with the lack of some institutions or the existence of pseudo-democratic institutions. The works on authoritarianism with adjectives, in other word, hybrid regimes draw attention to the adaption of democratic institutions by authoritarian regimes in order to avoid the domestic and international pressure for democratization. The institutional manipulation helps the authoritarian regimes securing their ability to govern and their continuity in power, keeping control over the agents and adversaries. Despite the fact that the manipulation of democratic institutions by the current authoritarian regimes is a norm in contemporary world, there is a plenty rich literature focusing on the positive roles of liberalization by adoption of democratic institutions as a catalyst for further democratization such as the works of Guillermo A. O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter.

It is hard to argue that authoritarian regimes are very stable and have long lasting span life. For instance, Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell observe the global trends between 1972-2003 to measure the regime type frequency and regime survival span. According to these data, since 1990s, the limited multiparty regimes have emerged as the most frequent form of authoritarianism instead of military and one-party regimes

⁵⁹ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State : State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, pp. 17-18.

⁶⁰ Posusney, *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, p. 7.

which is the most common form of authoritarianism during 1970s and 1980s.⁶¹ However, the average life span of regimes shows that limited multiparty regimes are more short-lived than military and one-party regimes.⁶² They also claim that there is a strong correlation between years of executive tenure –and also personalism- and the lifespan of authoritarian regimes.⁶³ As a result, while the limited multiparty regimes are more fragile than other types of authoritarian regimes, the dominant party regimes prone to last longer than other form of limited multiparty regimes. The longer executive tenure makes dominant party regimes more stable. But it is important to note that still these authoritarian regimes which are not highly authoritarian are the most fragile.⁶⁴ The findings of life spans on nearly same time period by Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell confirm Geddes’ findings that one-party regimes are more long lasting than military regimes. According to Geddes’ findings, the life spans of the military regimes is on average 8.5 years, of the personalist regimes is on average 15 years and of the single-party regimes is on average 24 years.⁶⁵ In turn Hadenius and Teorell’s data shows that the life spans of one party regimes is 25.50, of no party regimes is 12.90, of military regimes is 11.10, of dominant limited multiparty regimes is 9.97, of non-dominant limited multiparty regimes is 5.87 and of democratic regimes is 17.50.⁶⁶

In this context some works focus on the potential contestation arenas for democratic forces in hybrid regimes which sustain more explanation for demise of authoritarian regimes and democratization. Levitsky and Way address the tension, which is an output of the existence of meaningful arenas for contestation in competitive

⁶¹ Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, “Pathways from Authoritarianism”, *Journal of Democracy* 18, No: 1 (2007) pp. 149-150.

⁶² Hadenius and Teorell, *Pathways from Authoritarianism*, pp. 150-151.

⁶³ Hadenius and Teorell, *Pathways from Authoritarianism*, p. 151.

⁶⁴ Hadenius and Teorell, *Pathways from Authoritarianism*, p 152.

⁶⁵ Barbara Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown", Manuscript, Department of Political Science, UCLA (2004) p. 19, Available Online at: http://pages.ucsd.edu/~mnaoi/page4/POLI227/files/page1_11.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014)

⁶⁶ Hadenius and Teorell, *Pathways from Authoritarianism*, p. 150.

authoritarianism, between “...violating democratic rules, at the cost of international isolation and domestic conflict, and allowing the challenge to proceed, at the cost of possible defeat.”⁶⁷ Also Schedler argues that the representative institutions formed by an authoritarian regime serve to “ease their existential problems of governance and survival”⁶⁸ as a response to democratizing pressures, also suggests that these institutions are arenas not only of control and cooptation but also of contention.⁶⁹ These political institutions have the potential to erode the authoritarian stability and governance, when they gain a level of power and autonomy.⁷⁰ In addition to these potential risk inside of authoritarian regime came from political institutions, the multiparty elections in authoritarian regime present opportunities for the pre-democratic opposition forces to weaken the authoritarian regime by targeting institutional liberation.⁷¹ To sum up, the manipulation of democratic political institutions by an authoritarian regime in order to survive and rule creates a fragile authoritarian defense against democratic pressures; as a result this potential risks have threatening authoritarian regime in the way of democratization. Furthermore, Schedler argues that the authoritarian regimes that adopt electoral politics “represent the last line of authoritarian defense in a long history of struggle that has been unfolding since the invention of modern representative institutions.”⁷²

2.2. Agency Factor: Political Elites

Although the state is the primary framework for social and political actions however the role of “the individuals and groups which in fact hold the power of decision”⁷³ on

⁶⁷ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, p. 59.

⁶⁸ Schedler, *Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense*, p. 76.

⁶⁹ Schedler, *Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense*, p. 77.

⁷⁰ Schedler, *Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense*, p. 77.

⁷¹ Schedler, *Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense*, p. 78.

⁷² Schedler, *Authoritarianism's Last Line of Defense*, p. 69.

⁷³ Volker Perthes, “Politics and Elite Change in the Arab World” in *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change* ed by Volker Perthes (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 2.

social and political actions emerges as a significant framework in recent analysis. Referring Robert Dahl's assumption that "key economic and social decisions" are made by "tiny minorities", Peter Bachrach underlines the significant role that played by political elites in a democracy.⁷⁴ Political elites composed of individuals who actually exercise amount of political power or political authority in society.⁷⁵ Hence political outcomes are shaped, at a large extent, "by the agendas and strategies of political actors in addition to being influenced by global and regional structures and developments and by constraints that limit the capabilities of individual states."⁷⁶ The crucial role of political actors and their strategies is commonly acknowledged by those scholars and researcher adopted agency-related process approaches to analyze regime changes and democratization. Inspired by Dankwart Rustow's dynamic model of democratization, agency-related approaches emphasize the strategic choices made by political elites; and stress on the process and observes the decision makers, the calculation of their actions and the strategies to explain the breakdown of authoritarian regime and democratization.

Referring the fact that the decisions and strategies of political elites matter indeed in regime breakdown and democratization, they may also play crucial role in durability and stability of authoritarianism. This work comprises political elites as those people who shape, orient and/or participate political influence and power in decision-making process, contribute to defining political norms and values and political discourse and; influence redistribution of resource in society, such as post holders in government and administration, leaders of parties (both ruling and opposition parties), governmental and non-governmental organizations, influential figures in media, religious leaders, leaders of interest organizations, lobbies and other means. The political elites, in this work, are analyzed by categorizing them into two; those who are in "ruling elites" and those who are "counter-elite", in other word, oppositional

⁷⁴ Peter Bachrach(Edt), *Political Elites in a Democracy*, (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010)

⁷⁵ Peter Bachrach, "Introduction" in *Political Elites in a Democracy*, pp. 1-2.

⁷⁶ Perthes, *Politics and Elite Change in the Arab World*, p. 1.

political elites. The ruling elites and opposition elites are interconnected and influence each other's decisions, strategies, capabilities and agendas in many ways.

Political elites occupy pride of place in the transitions paradigm that characterizes much of the recent literature on regime change and democratization. The agency-related process oriented approaches stress that authoritarian regimes will breakdown and democratic transition will emerge when hardliners and softliners of ruling elite as well as oppositional elites come to the uncertainty associated with free and fair electoral competition as the best option among alternatives.⁷⁷ Such a situation appears when “a condition of violence threat, a sufficient and plausibly threat of physical harm or forceful loss of resources force the actors in power to calculate the benefits of staying in power and cost of repressing the opponents” according to Philippe C. Schmitter.⁷⁸

The general pattern of the analysis is categorizing the factions in ruling elite as hardliners, exist of faction of those who have participated or benefited from authoritarian rule, and softliners, exist of beneficiaries who were not directly compromised by or deeply involved with regime policies. From this perspective democratization highly depends on elite defection in ruling coalition and, then on the victory of softliners over the hardliners; and is fulfilled with the consolidation of the new defined system.⁷⁹

Democratization is contingent upon a liberalizing coalition that exists of the softliner of ruling elite and the moderate or truly democratic opposition eliminate or neutralize

⁷⁷ Posusney, *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, p. 12.

⁷⁸ Philippe C. Schmitter, “Speculations about the Prospective Demise of Authoritarian Regimes and Its Possible Consequences” in *Transitions to Democracy* ed by Geoffrey Pridham, (Aldershot, Brookfield, Singapore, Sydney : Dartmouth Press, 1995), p. 90.

⁷⁹ Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Dankwart A. Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model”, *Comparative Politics* 2, No. 3 (Apr., 1970), pp. 337-363; Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party, Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability,” *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol: 10, (2012) pp. 869 – 889.; Jason Brownlee, “Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism”, *CDDRL Working Papers* (2004) Available Online at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20761/brownlee.working_paper.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014).

the hardliners, according to O'Donnell. Nancy Bermeo analyses the pivotal elite calculations on the cost of repression and of toleration when they face popular uprisings by reviewing several cases such as Peru, The Philippines, South Korea, Spain and Peru; and suggests that ruling elite dissolve and softliners become dominant if elections represent less risks or prone to bring their victory; and the cost of repression is higher than cost of tolerate.

While works on regime change and democratic transition focus on the process and outcomes of softliners' victory the works on authoritarian durability ask the reasons of their failure and hardliners success in sustaining elite cohesion. Barbara Geddes' work, which argues that single party regimes are more stable than military regimes or personalistic dictatorships, echoes deeply in the works on authoritarian durability and stability and draw attention to the ruling parties that enhance authoritarian durability.

The ruling parties of authoritarian regimes provide a distribution network for political and material patronage for ruling elites. But more importantly they sustain elite cohesion, social and electoral control, and political durability. By providing institutional settings for political negotiations within the ruling elite, ruling parties prevent elite defection. Also institutional structure of ruling parties sustains a contestation arena for political elites in the boundaries of authoritarian regime; and; and allow greater participation and popular influence on policy.

Brownlee, by expanding Geddes' dataset, analyze the impact of electoral politics on authoritarian regimes durability and breakdown and find that single party regimes have a significant bolstering influence on regime survival.⁸⁰ He explains the role of ruling parties in sustaining the durability of authoritarian regime by arguing that "the coalition-maintaining aspect of ruling parties rather than their operation as patronage network explains elite cohesion within the regime and electoral control at the polls."⁸¹ Similarly Magaloni underlines the similar role of ruling parties by arguing

⁸⁰ Brownlee, *Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism*, p.3.

⁸¹ Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, p. 215.

that in general political parties and elections play a central role in making power-sharing deals possible.⁸²

Way and Levitsky, on the other hand, argue “that the key to authoritarian stability, then, is not the existence of a ruling party per se, but rather the strength and cohesion of that party.”⁸³ The strength of the ruling party is based on scope and cohesion.

“Scope refers to the size of a party’s infrastructure the degree to which it penetrates the national territory and society. Where scope is high, parties possess mass organizations that maintain a permanent and active presence across the national territory, down to the village, neighborhood level, and/or workplace level. [...] Where scope is low, parties lack any real organization, membership, or activist base.”⁸⁴

Party cohesion refers to “leaders’ ability to reliably and consistently secure the cooperation of partisan allies within the government, in the legislature, and at the local or regional level.”⁸⁵ The scope increases the capacity of the ruling party while cohesion is vital to prevent fragmentation in ruling elite. The non-material elements of cohesion, which is ethnicity and ideology, strengthen intra-elite bonds according to Way and Levitsky and make the ruling party more powerful against the crises.⁸⁶

Elite cohesion emerges as an important factor in authoritarian durability, however all defections in ruling elites in authoritarian regimes do not bring collapse of authoritarian regimes and democratic transition. Moreover, King’s work on authoritarian regimes in the Middle East shows that authoritarian regimes can

⁸² Beatriz Magaloni, "Credible Power-sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule", *Comparative Political Studies* 41, No: 4-5 (2008), pp. 715-741.

⁸³ Steven Levitsky, and Lucan A. Way, "Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability." *APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper* 2010, p. 2.

⁸⁴ Way and Levitsky, *Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability*, p. 6.

⁸⁵ Way and Levitsky, *Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability*, p. 7.

⁸⁶ Way and Levitsky, *Beyond Patronage: Ruling Party Cohesion and Authoritarian Stability*, p. 44.

exclude some political elites from ruling coalition and replaced them with new elites and, thus sustain the durability of authoritarian regimes.⁸⁷ Similarly Isabelle Werenfels, in her work on Algeria, argues that authoritarian regime in Algeria sustain system continuity through changing political elites in ruling coalition.⁸⁸ Steffen Erdle's work on Tunisia points out similar conclusion and assesses that authoritarian regime in Tunisia, which experienced economic transformation with liberalization process; restore the stability and durability of the regime by shifting the ruling coalition in the late 1980s.⁸⁹

The discussion on the role of ruling elites in durability of authoritarian regimes produces two significant inferential conclusions. First, elite cohesion contributes to the durability of authoritarian regimes, especially at times of crises. The ruling parties promote elite cohesion by sustaining structural institutions for managing contestation arena and patronage network. Second, the regeneration of ruling elite, at times of crises, contributes to the durability of authoritarian regime.

In addition to political elites in ruling coalition, counter-elites that form oppositional elites occupy an important place in regime change and democratization literature. Several works on democratization emphasize not only the strategic choices made by ruling elites but also by oppositional elites. A democratic transition can be carried out by a liberalizing coalition that exists of the softliners of ruling coalition and the moderate or truly democratic opposition according to O'Donnell and Schmitter.⁹⁰

They categorize the opposition into three camps according to the agendas of oppositional elites: opportunistic opposition, maximalist opposition and moderate

⁸⁷ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*.

⁸⁸ Isabelle Werenfels, "Algeria: System Continuity through Elite Change", in *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change* ed by Volker Perthes (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 173-206.

⁸⁹ Steffen Erdle, "Tunisia: Economic Transformation and Political Restoration", in *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change* ed by Volker Perthes (Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp. 207-238.

⁹⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), p. 116.

opposition.⁹¹ They suggest that if the opportunistic opposition becomes the dominant voice within the opposition, they tend to cooperate with softliners and this alliance guide a transition to a sort of political democracy.⁹² The maximalist opposition is fully against any negotiation or cooperation with any segments of bureaucratic-authoritarian regime and insists on their demand. He claims that if the maximalist become the dominant within the opposition, two cases are possible. The first one is the increasing risk of coup.⁹³ The second one is that there is not a coup but the possibility surrounds the process. In such case the short term outcomes are the speedy democratization that goes beyond the political democracy, demise of authoritarian regime and the barriers to radicalization at the micro levels of society collapse.⁹⁴ The last camp in the opposition is the moderate opposition which is a true opposition and democratic one. Moderates aim not only to end authoritarian regime but also to establish a political democracy. In this regard they tend to guarantee the transition process to democracy, and also guarantee that during the process the fundamental interests of ruling coalition will not be harmed.⁹⁵

Munck and Leff, on the other hand, categorize the modes of transitions -as reforms from below, reforms through transaction, reform through extrication, reforms through raptures and revolutions from above- and their potential outcomes by analyzing the power level of oppositional elites.

In reform from below which is generally is prone to lead restricted democracy; a broad opposition movement pushes for inclusion to the political arena where the old elites are very strong and able to impose constraints.⁹⁶ In reforms through

⁹¹ O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, p. 116.

⁹² O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, p. 116.

⁹³ O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, p. 116.

⁹⁴ O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, p. 117.

⁹⁵ O'Donnell, *Counterpoints: Selected Essays on Authoritarianism and Democratization*, p. 118.

⁹⁶ Gerardo L. Munck and Carol S. Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective" in *Transitions to Democracy* ed by Lisa Anderson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p.198.

transactions, elites concede regime change and open the political arena for new elites and elite competition.⁹⁷ In this mode, there is problem of repeated clashes among executive and legislature because of its dualistic structure however it is prone to lead a less restricted democracy.⁹⁸ In reform through extrication, the regime change occurs as a result of elite contestation among old and new/counter elites while counter elites are relatively stronger than old elites and able to impose a clear break with past (smoother than rupture).⁹⁹ This mode is likely to produce less restricted democracy and make its consolidation easier.¹⁰⁰ Modes of reforms through raptures, as a most unproblematic type of transition constitute a dramatic breakdown with past, a completely new institutional framework on the contrary of controlled transition where the old elites are still strong and lack of intense elite competition.¹⁰¹ In this mode, transition to democracy is relatively easy but consolidation of it faces with critical issues because of lack of consensus and cooperative relations during the transition.¹⁰² In mode of revolutions from above, a segment of elites break down the old order and impose a transitional agenda. In this mode, the mutual trust, cooperative relations, elite competition and effective counter élites to balance transition are lack; as a result this mode is less likely mode that leads to consolidation of democracy.¹⁰³

The agenda and power level of the oppositional elites influence the modes of transition as well as the outcome of it, while institutional design and strategies of the authoritarian regimes affect the decisions and strategies of oppositional elites together with international factors. Lust-Okar formulates the potential decisions of oppositional elites to mobilize for political reform by analyzing the structure of contestation, which determines who is and is not allowed to participate in the

⁹⁷ Munck and Leff, *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p. 210.

⁹⁸ Munck and *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p.210.

⁹⁹ Munck and Leff, *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p. 210.

¹⁰⁰ Munck and Leff, *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p. 211.

¹⁰¹ Munck and Leff, *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p. 211.

¹⁰² Munck and Leff, *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p. 211.

¹⁰³ Munck and Leff, *Modes of Transition and Democratization*, p. 212.

political arena, in nondemocratic regimes. She suggests that there are three types of contestation structures within nondemocratic regimes: inclusive, unified structure of contestation; exclusive, unified structure of contestation; and divided structure of contestation.¹⁰⁴ Opposition elites tend to mobilize for political reform when contestation arena uniformly is open or closed to all of them. On the other hand, in a divided structure of contestation, the included opponent's parties are less prone to mobilize for political reform due to the fear of exclusion while excluded parties are more likely to mobilize masses for political reform.¹⁰⁵ In unified structures of contestation, both inclusive and exclusive, the risk and cost of creating coalitions between opposition parties is low, hence opposition parties are likely to cooperate and mobilize against nondemocratic regime.¹⁰⁶ However, in a divided contestation structure included opposition parties avoid coalitions with excluded parties not to be punished by exclusion.¹⁰⁷ Their strategy to balance the constraints imposed by undemocratic regime and satisfying their social base decreases their capability to mobilize the masses is much higher than the capacity of excluded parties, in a divided contestation structure.¹⁰⁸

A significant number of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East opened the contestation arena for political parties but have applied strict control over the participation of opposition parties, and created a divided contestation structure. Lust-Okar's works shows how a divided contestation structure restrains the opposition parties to form oppositional coalitions among those excluded and included to electoral politics and diminish the menu of maneuver especially for included

¹⁰⁴ Ellen Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*, (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo: Cambridge University Press), pp.38-40.

¹⁰⁵ Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*, pp. 68.

¹⁰⁶ Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*, p. 125.

¹⁰⁷ Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*, p. 168.

¹⁰⁸ Lust-Okar, *Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Institutions*, p. 168.

opposition parties. Hence, the divided contestation structure contributes to the explanations of factors behind the weakness and ineffectiveness of opposition parties to force authoritarian regime for political reform in the Middle East.

Posusney explores the options available to included/legalized opposition party elites which are boycotts, non-competition agreements, election monitoring, and struggles over election rules, and the dilemmas which opposition entails. Election boycotts can put a significant challenge against the regime, as happened in Morocco's 1970 election, but its success depends on a cooperative effort by at least most of the opposition forces. But ideological differences, the varying levels of internal cohesion of parties, and low level of mobilization capacity have generally impeded the success of election boycotts.¹⁰⁹ The same underlying factors present challenges for electoral coalitions, which can take form of joint slates or non-competition agreements, among opposition parties as well as for the attempts of changing the electoral rules and systems¹¹⁰ Opposition parties in the Middle East achieve cooperation on domestic monitoring activities which are on the rise.¹¹¹

These weakness associated with existing opposition parties in authoritarian the Arab regimes lead the opposition activists to the civil society organizations according to Vickie Langohr. She draws attention to rise of advocacy nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to the position of primary opposition to authoritarianism and their political opposition activities which typically are played by opposition parties such as defending economic interests of workers and farmers and calling for the replacement of incumbent regimes.¹¹² Hence, Langohr proposes that NGOs should

¹⁰⁹ Marsha Pripstein Posusney, "Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Oppositional Strategies", *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36, No: 4 (2002), pp. 47-48.

¹¹⁰ Posusney, *Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Oppositional Strategies*, pp. 50-52.

¹¹¹ Posusney, *Multi-Party Elections in the Arab World: Institutional Engineering and Oppositional Strategies*, p. 50.

¹¹² Vickie Langohr, "Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes", *Comparative Politics* 36, No. 2 (Jan., 2004) , pp. 181-182.

be seen as part of a larger “topography of opposition”¹¹³ and can play central roles in fostering democratization.¹¹⁴

The changing position of NGOs in politics of the Middle East is also underlined by Asef Bayat. He spotlights “notable shifts from class-based organizations (trade unions, peasant organizations, and cooperatives) to more fragmented activities positioned in the informal sector, NGOs, and social Islam.”¹¹⁵ He also suggests that urban mass mobilization often provoke significant changes, including political reform as happened in Algeria, Jordan, Tunisia, and Turkey in the late 1980s.¹¹⁶ But it is obvious that class-based organizations have failed to force authoritarian regime for political reform as well as economic reform in the Middle East. The co-optation of class-based organization by authoritarian regimes in the Middle East is sustained and pursued by state-sponsorship development of these social classes. Consequently, state-sponsorship limits agenda and strategies of elites of class-based organizations. However, Eva Bellin’s work shows that co-optation generally remain limited in the cadres of leadership; while the base of these organizations tends to take initiatives independently from leadership.¹¹⁷

2.3. Conclusion

Slater and Fenner’s work mentions that state is the strongest institutional foundation for longevity and stability of authoritarian regimes because it sustains infrastructural power for actors to deploy through a set of mechanisms to achieve the particular political objectives of authoritarian durability.¹¹⁸ So, the low level of infrastructural

¹¹³ Langohr, “*Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes*”, p. 182.

¹¹⁴ Langohr, “*Too Much Civil Society, Too Little Politics: Egypt and Liberalizing Arab Regimes*”, p. 200.

¹¹⁵ Asef Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 34, No: 01 (2002), p.3.

¹¹⁶ Bayat, *Activism and Social Development in the Middle East*, p. 5.

¹¹⁷ See Belin, *Stalled Democracy*.

¹¹⁸ Slater and Fenner, *Inside the Authoritarian State: State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability*, pp. 15-29.

power makes authoritarian regimes more vulnerable to the challenges. As Ayubi, Levitsky and Way, Pususney and Bellin argues in their works, the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, suffering different level of infrastructural power weakness, invest their efforts mainly on coercive apparatus and patronage. In addition, Brownlee's works indicates that authoritarian regimes also rely on institutional power of ruling parties which sustain institutional settings to political elites for political negotiations and contestation as well as a network of patronage. On the other hand, paradoxically, the power of ruling parties highly depends on the state's infrastructural power. As a result, the contributions made by ruling parties to the durability of authoritarian regimes are constrained by state's infrastructural power.

In addition to coercive apparatus and ruling parties; as argued by Bellin, Ayubi, King, Beblawi, Luciani and Ross; state's role in economy contributes to longevity and stability of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East by creating dependency of social forces on state and limiting their autonomy. Within this context, the role of class-based organizations and their elites in reframing the state-society relation in favor of democratization diminishes due to their state-sponsorship development.

The assumptions that suggest adopting democratic institutions reframes state-society relations in favor of democratization contradict the works which indicates that electoral politics in authoritarian regimes have not empowered the opposition parties. On the contrary, divided contestation structure limits the strategies of opposition to force the regime for political reform. Hence, as mentioned by Bayat, both the failure of class-based organizations and political parties to force the regime for political reform paves the way for NGOs.

To conclude, the authoritarian regimes suffering from infrastructural weakness are vulnerable to confronting major challenges. But constrains imposed by regime decreased the capacity of both social and economic oppositional forces to force the regime for political reform in many ways; while mass mobilization that enjoyed organizational support of class-based organizations or/and NGOs have much capacity to force regime for political reform. Moreover, the context and persistence

of political reforms obtained by mass mobilization depends on the power capacity of opposition forces.

CHAPTER 3

CRISIS OF ELITE DEFECTION & AUTHORITARIAN UPGRADING

In 1959, 78 year French administration ended in Tunisia; and the republic ruled by an authoritarian regime was formed under the leadership of Habib Bourguiba, and neo-Destour Party (then Socialist Destourian Party (PSD) in 1964). After a decade, authoritarian regime in Tunisia adopted a policy change in economy which triggered two major elite defection crises and mass protests. Authoritarian regime in Tunisia prevented presenting vital threats by mass protests via coercion and cultivating dependence mechanisms. However, the first crisis of elite defection in Tunisia led emergence of the opposition while the second crisis ended with authoritarian upgrading after the coup in 1987.

3.1. Structuring State in Tunisia

3.1.1. *Merger of State and Party*

The centralization of the state power in Tunisia can trace back to Governor Ahmad Bey era when as a response to the emergence of European power struggle over North Africa in 19th century.¹¹⁹ The constitutional reforms such as establishment of the Fundamental Pact (*Ahd Al-Aman*) in 1857 and the Constitutional Law in 1861;

¹¹⁹ Nebahat Tanriverdi, “Background of Tunisian Revolution”, *Alternative Politics* 3, No. 3, (November 2011), p.549.

integration to the European economic system by like reforming the tax system¹²⁰ continued during the French protectorate period.

The French protectorate followed totally a different policy in Tunisia from its other colonies; it created dualistic systems in education, jurisdiction and other arenas¹²¹ but preserved Tunisian bey's administration and further "retained, strengthened, and extended the bureaucratic administration of the local state".¹²² In addition to strengthened the existing institutions of the state, new local administrative institutions were established, consequently, the autonomy of the local authorities begun to diminish in favor of central government.¹²³ "[I]n Tunisia under the beys[,] elites were divided, their access to resources and power controlled; attempts at internal solidarity were frustrated; and lines of economic and cultural patronage cultivated. At the highest level, power was centralized and monopolized."¹²⁴

In spite of all efforts to centralization and monopolization of state power, the state machinery had still been suffering from poor infrastructural power and lack of powerful mechanisms in order to operate basic state services and sustaining security order; mainly because of these functions had been carried out by protectorate administration. Hence, after independence state capacity was reinforced with merger of state and party and subordination of mass organizations.

During the independence struggle against colonial power, the more repressive policy pursued by colonial power required forming a united national party or front¹²⁵ in colonized countries. The level of the colonial situation in Tunisia promoted one-party dominance in favor of Neo-Destour which enjoyed mass support and symbolized the

¹²⁰ Tanriverdi, *Background of Tunisian Revolution*, p.550.

¹²¹ Tanriverdi, *Background of Tunisian Revolution*, p.551.

¹²² Christopher Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, (New York: Routledge, 2010) pp. 20-21.

¹²³ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 21.

¹²⁴ Emma C. Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia: From Bourguiba to Ben Ali*, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1999), p.43.

¹²⁵ Thomas L. Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 22.

national aspirations.¹²⁶ The essential characteristic feature of neo-Destour Party was being a mass party which sought to reach the support of mass of the population as members or at least as supporters.¹²⁷ As a mass party, neo-Destour was able to deal with wider situations and with its developed communication systems and articulated structure.¹²⁸

On the other hand Neo-Destour, which emerged within the Destour Party in the 1930s, achieved structural capacity to end 75 years French protectorate by accomplishing successfully social organization and activism in all sectors and areas of the society and bringing all Tunisian social forces into its sphere. It had about 28.000 members and more than four hundred branches in Tunisia by 1937¹²⁹ and increased its members to nearly 100.000 in 1954.¹³⁰ Party was able to survive from the waves of repression for instance between 1938 and 1942 when all top leaders were jailed, and between 1952 and 1954 when the party underwent another repression wave and also during Bourguiba's imprisonment totally for 10 years.¹³¹ It should be noted that Neo-Destour Party had enjoyed the support of peasants of the country, Bedouin tribes, and urban population especially of the lower middle class and proletarians of suburbs¹³² as well as the traditional elites such as landowners, religious elites, and notables during the independence struggle.

Neo-Destour Party had a hierarchical structure that composed of basic units, intermediate authorities and leadership. The basic units of party existed of urban and rural committees organized the masses, educated them politically, sustain these new

¹²⁶ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 22.

¹²⁷ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 69.

¹²⁸ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 70.

¹²⁹ Moore, *Politics in North Africa* (Boston, 1970), p. 70.

¹³⁰ Moore, *Politics in North Africa*, p. 72.

¹³¹ Moore, *Politics in North Africa*, p. 70.

¹³² Moore, *Politics in North Africa*, p.72.

social groups a common ground¹³³ and act as a liaison between the central organs of the party and the people.¹³⁴ In 1957 Neo-Destour estimated its local committees at 1500.¹³⁵ These local committees, the cells, were “is more a vehicle for the mobilization and education of the masses than a forum for discussing national issues or for proposing national policies.”¹³⁶

The intermediate authority of the Neo-Destour Party was existed of federations, elected by the urban and rural committees and they connected the basic units to the central leadership.¹³⁷ In addition, federations provide “cadres” both during the independence struggle when the leadership members were subject to repression and post-independence period as local administrator.¹³⁸ The federations of Neo-Destour Party had a relative autonomy because they needed to act independent from leadership when French protectorate applied repressive policies which prevented operation of the central units of the party effectively.¹³⁹

The central unit of the Neo-Destour Party consisted of two inner committees and one outer committee: president, bureau politique and executive committee. The inner committees were small enough to control the discussion of major questions of policy while executive committee, the outer one, functioned as a parliament rather than cabinet, reflected life of party and took major party decisions.¹⁴⁰ President who

¹³³ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 83.

¹³⁴ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 85.

¹³⁵ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 83.

¹³⁶ Moore, “The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?”, *World Politics*, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Apr., 1962), p. 472.

¹³⁷ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 88.

¹³⁸ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, pp. 88-89; Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, pp.469-470.

¹³⁹ Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, p. 467.

¹⁴⁰ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, pp. 94-95.

constitute a cult of personality¹⁴¹ and political bureau that existed of 15 members were both elected by party congress.¹⁴²

In addition to these political units, Neo-Destour Party also aimed to influence the women population of Tunisia. Instead of establishing associations for women, the party decided to recruit the women population. Women emancipation was important target for Neo-Destour Party, not only because of its progressive program but because women population constituted an important economic interest as well as they were important agents for gaining new members for the party and mobilization.¹⁴³ As a result of this political strategy, a woman rarely had achieved a powerful position at the centre units of the party.¹⁴⁴

The dominant position of Neo-Destour Party was supported and strengthened by post-independence regulations. A new institutional order was established by formulating the electoral system which guaranteed the victory of Neo-Destour Party in the election; reducing the power of representative assemblies and judiciary; and increasing the authority of executive bodies.¹⁴⁵

The structural capacity of party gradually transferred to state but the merger of state and party did not fuse the party, on the contrary created a party-state. The leaders and cadres of the party captured all key position and state apparatus began to be controlled by the party after 1954.¹⁴⁶ After the general election in 1959 in which

¹⁴¹ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p.99.

¹⁴² Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 93; Clement Henry, Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, p. 475.

¹⁴³ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 121.

¹⁴⁴ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 121.

¹⁴⁵ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, p. 170.

¹⁴⁶ Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, p. 462.

Neo-Destour won all the seats of the new National Assembly, Neo-Destour became “solely responsible for rule and order in the country” pursuant to new constitution.¹⁴⁷

Administrative control of the party over regional and local governments was sustained by spreading the branches of the party and state bureaucracy. 14 jurisdictions headed by governors, who appointed by the President, were established.¹⁴⁸ Party branches took the place of traditional structures; weakened kinship based solidarity and served as a transmission mechanism between people and party-state.¹⁴⁹

After the reorganization of the party in 1958¹⁵⁰, central committee of the party had decided to increase party discipline on the federations and to reduce the autonomy of the federations by changing their electoral basis.¹⁵¹ The reorganization gave party members in government great powers over the party itself.¹⁵² After the sixth congress of Neo-Destour Party in 1959, the members of the federations, called Commissioners, began to be appointed by bureau politique.¹⁵³ These Commissioners governed the local branches instead of representing them¹⁵⁴ by approving the candidates for local committees/cells, the power of suspend or dissolve any cell committee and power of determine the number of cells and delimit their territorial competence.¹⁵⁵ Hence the power of inner committees over the local and intermediate parts of party had increased. Moore explains this policy applied after independence

¹⁴⁷ Emma C. Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 49-50.

¹⁴⁸ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, p. 73.

¹⁴⁹ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, pp. 73-74.

¹⁵⁰ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 51.

¹⁵¹ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 92.

¹⁵² Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 51.

¹⁵³ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 92; Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, p. 466.

¹⁵⁴ Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, p. 466.

¹⁵⁵ Moore, “*The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?*”, pp.469-470.

with two reasons. Firstly, after independence there was rapid increase in Neo-Destour Party's members. "From a membership estimated at 106,000 before July 1954, the Neo-Destour had acquired roughly 325,000 members by the time of its Fifth Congress in November 1955 and supposedly numbered 600,000 by 1957."¹⁵⁶ Parallel to this rapid increase in members, the number of cells also multiplied but the best cadres of the party transferred to the government. Hence, because of the rapid expansion of the party and lack of enough cadres to control the intermediate and local bodies of the party motivated the leadership to change the party organization.¹⁵⁷

The party bureaucracy which transferred its voluntary base into full time salaried officials had increased and spread to the whole corners of the country.¹⁵⁸ It could transmit the popular participation and mobilization by its local and intermediate bodies; the local branches, the cells are the arena for discussing the local problems, attached the youth and state officers such as teachers to the party activities¹⁵⁹, party leadership was open to new ideas and new leaders on intermediate levels and party aimed to stimulate more initiative from below¹⁶⁰ for the task of creating Tunisian citizens and national solidarity.

The party served the aim of creating national identity and mobilization of the masses in order to encourage their participation to economic and social projects hold by Neo-Destour, the state apparatus structured a hierarchy over the party. After reorganization of the party, it had a parallel organizational hierarchy in the government which reduced the distinction between party and the state.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p.467.

¹⁵⁷ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", pp.467-468.

¹⁵⁸ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p.477.

¹⁵⁹ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", pp.471-472.

¹⁶⁰ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p.482.

¹⁶¹ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 51.

Since independence, the party cadres became the main source for the government officials. As Moore stated;

Since 1957 many elected municipal councils have been set up in villages and towns, and they are composed largely of cell officers. Often, too, the cheikh, though appointed by the government, will have been the former cell president. Furthermore, the Governor's Delegate, who is the cheikh's superior in the administrative hierarchy, usually tries to keep on friendly terms with the cell committee, for the popular support which it represents is essential to the success of many government projects.¹⁶²

Political bureau functioned as the party's supreme executive organ and after the centralization of power in the center by reducing the autonomy of basic and intermediate bodies of the party, the executive power that hold by political bureau increased more than before.¹⁶³

3.1.2. Subordination of Mass Organizations

In addition to merger of state and party, mass organizations were subordinated after independence to increase the infrastructural powers of state. During the independence struggle mass organizations contributed power of the party by performing three main functions: becoming a formal nationalistic organizations by serving as a training base for new nationalistic elite; generating a new form of loyalty which is wider than kinship based solidarity; and forming the basic blocks of popular support out of parties.¹⁶⁴ The mass mobilization organizations such as associations were the natural allies of mass parties; in order to mobilizing the mass of the population and in some cases (when the party became illegal) to find legal ground, thus mass parties tend to form partnerships and allied organizations¹⁶⁵ like in Tunisia.

¹⁶² Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p. 471.

¹⁶³ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p.475.

¹⁶⁴ Hodgkin *African Political Parties*, p. 48.

¹⁶⁵ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 70.

During the independence struggle against French protectorate, many institutions were formed by Neo-Destour Party and also others successfully attached to the party. However it is important to note that the allied organization served as a functional actors rather than satellites of the Neo-Destour Party especially during the anti-colonial struggle.¹⁶⁶

The close relations between allied organizations and Neo-Destour Party promote a front for the party and a route to power within the party for allied organizations.¹⁶⁷ The establishment and development of the allied organizations had been actively encouraged by the party leadership such as UTAC (Tunisian Union of Crafts and Commerce- the Union Tunisienne de l'Artisanat et du Commerce), UNAT (National Union of Tunisian Farmers- l'Union nationale des agriculteurs Tunisiens), UGTT (Union Generale Tunisienne du Travail), UTIC (Tunisian Union of Industry and Commerce), UGET (the General Union for Tunisian Students), the Neo-Destour Youth and so on.¹⁶⁸

UGTT was established in 1946 after two failed efforts in the 1920s and 1930s.¹⁶⁹ The UGTT provided well-organized cadres to the party in public administration, key sectors of economy such as public works, the ports, the railways and the phosphate mines.¹⁷⁰ The UGTT backed Neo-Destour Party on national struggle with its members which were 100.000 by 1951.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 120.

¹⁶⁷ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, pp. 117-118.

¹⁶⁸ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 119; Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p. 462.

¹⁶⁹ Christopher Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p. 31.

¹⁷⁰ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, pp.31-32.

¹⁷¹ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p.32.

In 1955, Neo-Destour formed the General Union of Tunisian Farmers (UNAT) and controlled it and enforced Destour Socialist principle that property must have a social function as defined by government.¹⁷²

The Tunisian Union of Industry, Commerce and Handcrafts (UTICA) was established by Neo-Destour after the Second World War in order to counter French Communist effort in the country.¹⁷³ After the independence, UTICA continued its close relation with the party as a member of National Front and acted as lobby both inside the party and in the parliamentary commissions.¹⁷⁴ It was reconverted in 1961 to support economic planning.¹⁷⁵ By the end of 1960s, UTICA became inefficient organization which just confirmed the policies of Central Bank and of Political Bureau.¹⁷⁶

The unions possessed “the organizational capacity and political credibility to mobilize the masses”¹⁷⁷ thus their subordination to the party was essential to capture their organizational capacity and political credibility in order to sustain the party monopoly over politics and economics. As a result, the autonomy of the affiliated organizations had become an obstacle against Neo-Destour after independence in 1956. Thus, Neo-Destour Party systematically attempted to increase the autonomy of allied organization and their institutional capacity by using manipulation and repression such as replacement of the leadership cadres or creating rival unions, while the leadership of the unions accepted their subordination to party in order to access the ruling coalition and the policy making process.¹⁷⁸ This strategic decision changed when the power balance among ruling elite shifted later. The party state

¹⁷² Clement Henry Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p. 165.

¹⁷³ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 165.

¹⁷⁴ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 165.

¹⁷⁵ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 165.

¹⁷⁶ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 165.

¹⁷⁷ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 53.

¹⁷⁸ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 52.

absorbs all interest groups and begun to articulate rational interests. By 1965 for instance, UGTT was absorbed into the state.¹⁷⁹ By the end of 1960s, national organizations of labor, students, farmers, and businessmen weakened and lost their autonomy and credibility as representatives of occupational interests.¹⁸⁰ They were too weak to prevent regime from manipulating and undermining their structure.¹⁸¹

A similar subordinated relation was formed with bourgeoisie in Tunisia during this corporatist era. Despite the fact that planned development aimed to construct economy on the works of three sectors; state, cooperative and private; however, the project of creating private industrial bourgeoisie had not fully accomplished.¹⁸² A “parasitic” or “rentier” bourgeoisie which depended on state support was created in Tunisia.¹⁸³ Hence, this dependence had shaped the business- state relations where the class of industrialists could not constitute a dominant class both in politics and economy.¹⁸⁴ Tunisian Union of Artisans and Traders (UTAC) had dependent on the Destour Party and could not contribute economic opinion throughout Tunisian state and society.¹⁸⁵ In 1963, the union reformed itself and attached “Industrialists” to its name, but its character remained essentially the same.¹⁸⁶

In addition to the professional organizations, Neo-Destour supported to establishing youth unions which were under the general influence of the party in order to mobilize under the age of twenties.¹⁸⁷ In 1953, the General Union of Tunisian

¹⁷⁹ Vandewalle, Dirk, “From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol:42, No: 4, (1988:Autumn), p.605.

¹⁸⁰ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 157.

¹⁸¹ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 159.

¹⁸² Eva Bellin, “Tunisian Industrialists and the State”, in *Tunisia: Political Economy of Reform* ed by I. William Zartman, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 49-50.

¹⁸³ Bellin, *Tunisian Industrialists and the State*, pp. 52-55.

¹⁸⁴ Bellin, *Tunisian Industrialists and the State*, p. 56.

¹⁸⁵ Bellin, *Tunisian Industrialists and the State*, p. 58.

¹⁸⁶ Bellin, *Tunisian Industrialists and the State*, p. 58.

¹⁸⁷ Hodgkin *African Political Parties*, p. 122.

Students (UGET) was established with the support of the Neo-Destour.¹⁸⁸ After independence UGET began to be perceived as a step stone to reach high positions within the party and as a ground for political career.¹⁸⁹ Similar to UTICA, between the 1961 and 1963, the autonomists were excluded from the union.¹⁹⁰

These affiliated organizations had organizational autonomy but did not constitute independent centers of political power.¹⁹¹ Hence well before the independence, the neo-Destour Party had an imposing structure with local branches through the country and allied organizations such as UNAT, UGGT, UTAC (later UTICA) and UGET, representing all factional groups in the society.

3.2. From Defection Crisis in Ruling Elite and Hidden Instability to Authoritarian Upgrading

The social structure of Tunisia during the French protectorate was composed of both the traditional social groups and newly emerging modern classes. Beylical elites who were mainly Turks and Circussians separated themselves from the rest of the society, did not speak Arabic and had not mixed via marriage with local social groups until 20th century.¹⁹² Also grandes families of the city of Tunis continued play in administrative positions during the French protectorate.¹⁹³ Another traditional notable was the provincial families, the *maghzen*, that were provincial administrative officials appointed by Bey.¹⁹⁴ Ulama, the religious elite, continued to keep their social power by owning the hodous lands, educational institutions and jurisdiction

¹⁸⁸ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 168.

¹⁸⁹ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, pp. 170-171.

¹⁹⁰ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 171.

¹⁹¹ Moore, "The Neo-Destour Party of Tunisia: A Structure for Democracy?", p. 462.

¹⁹² Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p 44.

¹⁹³ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 43.

¹⁹⁴ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p 44.

during the French administrative.¹⁹⁵ In rural areas, Bedouin tribes still existed but begun to suffer from reforms on the lands and administration.¹⁹⁶

French administration had not destroyed the traditional social groups but fostered emergence of new groups by implementing several political reforms and booming Tunisian economy. The city bourgeoisie had expanded; in Sahel, “a middle class had developed around olive oil production and communal village units”.¹⁹⁷

French protectorate also spread Western education system which was introduced by reformist beys of Tunisia in pre-protectorate era.¹⁹⁸ Hence a new Tunisian intelligentsia had emerged as three main generations. The first generation named as Young Tunisian came from Tunisian prominent families, grandes familles.¹⁹⁹ Second generation existed of traditional Beylical elites, bourgeoisie and ulama; formed Destour Party.²⁰⁰ The last and most influential generation which formed Neo-Destour Party, was emerged from middle class, bourgeoisie, rural elites and traditional notables.²⁰¹ Working class had emerged in Tunisia and brought organized labor movements in political life.²⁰²

In Tunisia, the new elite composed of new social groups such as Western educated professionals, administrators, bourgeoisie and wage-earning class that emerged from the middle class mostly from the territories where the pre-colonial economic and social order had radically transformed during the colonial period.²⁰³ The majority of

¹⁹⁵ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p 44.

¹⁹⁶ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, pp.43-44.

¹⁹⁷ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p.44.

¹⁹⁸ Nebahat Tanriverdi, “Background of Tunisian Revolution, *Alternative Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 3, 547-570, November 2011, pp. 549-550; Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 44-46.

¹⁹⁹ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p.45.

²⁰⁰ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, pp.45-46.

²⁰¹ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 46.

²⁰² Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 27.

²⁰³ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, p. 27.

French-educated intellectuals came from the Sahil area where 10 percent of the total population had lived²⁰⁴ and this new elite with their new model of society, the nation, formed core of the Neo-Destour Party.²⁰⁵

In the societies where a feudal type of structure has survived with relatively little modification through the colonial period, political parties have tended at the outset to reproduce traditional pattern of authority and create alliances with traditional elites²⁰⁶ whereas the political parties have tended to direct to ally with other classes and use of modern pattern of authority where the colonial period introduce new social structure and class power balance. In such cases parties have other channels to access support and resources²⁰⁶ apart from traditional social structures. In Tunisia corporatism had shaped the class relations and ruling coalition during early independence years.

The organizational system of corporatism offers a way of integrating both business and working-class elements into political society and of regulating their participation in order to produce class-harmony.²⁰⁷ This organizational system was adopted in Tunisia; authoritarian regime in Tunisia took the support from key sectors of society, such as bourgeois landowners and merchants of Sahel and official labor union, the UGTT, in urban²⁰⁸ with its corporatist policies. During the independence struggle, Neo-Destour Party which confronted Destour Party's passive political position radically allied with labors, peasantry, middle classes, new intelligentsia, religious authorities and bourgeoisie during the independence struggle.²⁰⁹ Parallel to this coalition, Neo-Destour emphasized economic issues at a time world economic

²⁰⁴ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 51.

²⁰⁵ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 46.

²⁰⁶ Hodgkin, *African Political Parties*, pp. 18-19.

²⁰⁷ Howard J. Wiarda, *Corporatism and Comparative Politics: The Other Great "Ism"*, (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 12-13.

²⁰⁸ Gregory White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2001), p.82.

²⁰⁹ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 30. ; Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 47.

depression was spreading²¹⁰ as well as Tunisians were deeply affected by “landlessness, urbanization, unemployment, and burden of newly efficient and reformed taxation.”²¹¹ Thus, the rhetoric of Neo-Destour committed economic development and social justice; and also supported organized labour.²¹² This rhetoric was continued to use by the authoritarian regime after independence, while coalition in Neo-Destour Party transferred into the ruling elite of authoritarian regime. After the independence, a one-party state was established by the constitution and bolstered by electoral system.²¹³ In the elections Neo-Destour formed a National Front list which “included specific number of notables, twice that number of nominees from the trade union and the rest from the various affiliated political organizations.”²¹⁴

In Bourguiba era, conventionalist tactics were used to neutralize other political forces and to reinforce rational politics.²¹⁵ The conventional tactics basically was a traditional equilibrium of power or/and governance and traditional check and balance systems. Factional politics subdue challenges from network of the party and national organizations as well as prevents them to acquire *common objective bases of identity such as region, ideology, economic interests or bureaucratic position.*²¹⁶ “Within party-state officialdom factional alignments shift constantly”; for example Ben Salah, who offered a further mission to the party by arguing on economic decolonization²¹⁷, dismissed from UGTT but appointed Secretary of Health.²¹⁸ Later he became

²¹⁰ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 47.

²¹¹ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 44.

²¹² Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 47.

²¹³ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 50.

²¹⁴ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 50.

²¹⁵ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, pp. 98-101.

²¹⁶ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 105.

²¹⁷ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 102.

²¹⁸ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 105.

Minister of Finance and Planning. In addition to factional alignment shifts, Bourguiba forced rivals to work together.²¹⁹

The factional politics together with subordination of party to presidential state in Bourguiba era have a crucial output; this policy “prevent[s]ed the institutionalization of one-party rule by undermining the party’s structural autonomy”.²²⁰ After reorganization of the party Bourguiba subordinated Protectorate state to the party and then he subordinated the party to presidential state where the Political Bureau and the Council of Ministers submit to Presidential authority.²²¹ Thus the power of president was expanding rather than institutionalizing the party.²²² In long term factional politics prevented cliques in intermediate cadres to crystal into factions or interest groups that might present organized alternatives to existing policies or leaders.²²³

From the independence to 1969, ruling elites were composed of political elites of ruling party and of mass mobilization organizations as well as elites of state apparatus. In 1956, 40 of 90 deputies of National Constituent Assembly were associated with the UGTT, the UTICA, the UNAT and the UNFT.²²⁴ Popular segments that represented in the ruling coalition were initially consisted of organized labor, peasantry, and the public sectors, the military and white-collar interests at the early years of independence.²²⁵

By the beginning of 1970s, corporatist structural organization began to reduce and to dissolve with important policy change led by the state and the party. Especially allied organizations lost their former importance. Their position reduced to co-opted

²¹⁹ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 105.

²²⁰ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 105.

²²¹ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 104.

²²² Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 104.

²²³ Moore, *Politics in North Africa: Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia*, p. 105.

²²⁴ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 249.

²²⁵ King, *The New Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa*, p. 7.

bodies; however cooptation had remained limited with leadership cadres. In parallel to its subordination, transfer of UGTT cadres to state and party began to diminish; a young and educated generation, who had no connection with PSD, emerged within the UGTT.²²⁶ So, the transmission mechanism that connected the structures of national organizations with the governmental system had no longer functional.

The party held considerably more bargaining power than the national organizations and was thus more able to retain its input into the state, as well as its ability to extract from the state. Indeed, the party was still fused with the state in ideological, administrative and personnel terms, creating what Dirk Vandewalle called 'a modern administrative dictatorship'.²²⁷

After the end of French protectorate in Tunisia, creation of modern state characterized by attempts on formulation, creation and forging political structures and their arrangements. In this process, merger of state, party and affiliated organizations played a prior role in expanding the state power by promoting the structural capacity of the state. The outcome of that process was a highly centralized, authoritarian and personalized structure of state.²²⁸ Monopolization of all aspects of social and political life by an interventionist and progressive state led to more paternalistic and authoritarian regime.²²⁹

On the other hand, the period between 1969 and 1987 was a period of crisis in ruling coalition as well as the full emergency of new dominant classes; the rural and urban bourgeois. Parallel to this, their power and relation with the state and party had increased during this era, while the new economic strategy broke up the power of ruling coalition, empowered the workers, peasants and modernist elites in the party.

By the 1970s, fractions in ruling coalition, which were gathered under party/state authoritarianism, began to crystallize due to policy change in economy. While some

²²⁶ Dirk, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia", pp. 606-607.

²²⁷ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 59.

²²⁸ Micheal J. Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*, (Hurst Publishers, 2012) p. 49.

²²⁹ Dirk, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia" p.604.

fractions within the party and state elites were excluded, elites of party had gradually been replaced technocrats and a smaller bourgeoisie d'affaires whose own economic interests were antithetical to those of Ben Salah's cooperative movement.²³⁰

The crystallization of elite defection in ruling party turned to deep political crisis when Ben Salah together with socialist and left wing party members were expelled from the party in 1969.²³¹ The removal of political elites that supported cooperative movement is closely related to adopting a new economic policy, *infitah*.

The turbulence of the international economy triggered by the collapse of Keynesian model and fixed exchange rates, volatile energy prices, accelerating inflation rates and post-1982 debt crisis triggered shift on the basis of structural adjustment and reinforced IMF and the World Bank to develop policy conditionality for the future lending.²³² In the new structural adjustment, priority was given to macroeconomic stability rather than economic growth.²³³ These new regulations entailed in many ways unpopular economic reforms in the Third World. Hence, during the 1980s, "Western developmental institutions had often embraced authoritarian regimes as being better able to implement unpopular economic reform"²³⁴ at the expense of other democratic alternatives.

In Tunisian context, the global regime changes in the world economy, together with the policies of European Commission (EC, then European Union) in North Africa had impacted the economic policy implementation of the country. EC started negotiations in 1963, and signed Association Accords with Tunisia and Morocco in

²³⁰ Dirk, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia" p.606.

²³¹ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p.44.

²³² John F. J. Toye, *Structural Adjustment and Employment Policy: Issues and Experience*, (Geneva : International Labour Office, 1995), p. 3.

²³³ Toye, *Structural Adjustment and Employment Policy: Issues and Experience*, p. 8.

²³⁴ Roland Dannreuther, "The Political Dimension of Authoritarianism and Democratization" in *The Third World beyond the Cold War: Continuity and Change* ed. by Louise Fawcett and Yezid Sayigh, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 40

1969.²³⁵ In 1976, second generation of Cooperation accords which cover Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia was signed.²³⁶ These accords were the first Association agreements signed by an Arab country.²³⁷

The global economic liberalism and more significantly Association Accord with EC (later EU) had certain influence on the policy change in Tunisia after 1969 as well as on the coalition pattern in Tunisia. The most underlying policy was the removal of Ahmad ben Salah, minister of economy, who had implemented state capitalism in Tunisia, just after the Association Accords with EC. This removal also marked the end of an eight-year period of centralized economic planning behind high protective barriers, and the beginning of pro-market strategy of economic liberalism, *infatih*.²³⁸ In the 1970s, under Hedi Nouria's leadership and in the 1980s under Muhammed Mzali's leadership, Tunisia pursued a strategy of export-oriented growth, which mainly targeted European market.²³⁹

In the early years of the *infatih*, Tunisia received high economic growth rates and increasing contribution of a fast-growing industrial sector to those rates.²⁴⁰ However by the late 1970s, the early success of new strategy had not sustained mainly because of the extroversion and vulnerability of the Tunisian economy.²⁴¹ Tunisia turned to IMF standby loan in 1985 and to a structural adjustment reform in 1986.²⁴²

Policy change did not only led exclusion of socialist and left wing; but also political elites to demand political reform. In 1971 liberal elites under the leadership of

²³⁵ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 56.

²³⁶ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 56.

²³⁷ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 57.

²³⁸ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 29.

²³⁹ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 29.

²⁴⁰ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 30.

²⁴¹ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 30.

²⁴² White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 30.

Ahmed Mestiri began to demand a deep reform to democratize the party structure and restore its credibility.²⁴³ At the same year, Mestiri was expelled from party's central committee.²⁴⁴

Till 1974 congress, the party was rid of the liberal elements; some members were expelled and some resigned.²⁴⁵ These cadres were filled a new generation of officials, technocrats with little experience and political stature.²⁴⁶ Party elites and ruling elites were periodically cycled in 1974, 1977, and 1980.²⁴⁷ The most significant outcome of this deepening crisis was the dramatic growth of security establishment.²⁴⁸ Bourguiba's successor, Ben Ali, had risen from security establishment through high and ranks of the Military of Interior.²⁴⁹

Emma Murphy explains these changes as follows:

As the party became more ideologically and politically monolithic, it became decreasingly effective as a tool for mobilizing popular support. Grass roots activities were given less priority by elites already determined on their course of action and uninterested in opinions expressed from below. Thus: 'as efforts to foster popular awareness and participation virtually ceased, most local PSD committees did little more than dispense patronage in order to retain the support of area notables.'²⁵⁰

In addition to crisis in ruling coalition and consecutive reshuffling the cadres in party, by 1977 the economy entered downturn era and the situation got worsened in

²⁴³ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p.44.

²⁴⁴ Susan Eileen Waltz, *Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1995), p. 69.; Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 44.

²⁴⁵ Waltz, *Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face of North African Politics*, p. 69.; Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, pp. 44-45.

²⁴⁶ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 45.

²⁴⁷ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 150.

²⁴⁸ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 151.

²⁴⁹ White, *A Comparative Political Economy of Tunisia and Morocco*, p. 151.

²⁵⁰ Murphy, *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*, p. 59.

the mid-1980s. The early student protests were followed by worker strikes and finally turned to a general unrest. In 1978, UGTT called Tunisia's first general strike since independence, however it turned into a general unrest called "Black Thursday". The regime's response was brutally harsh; it ended with estimated 200 dead and 1000 wounded according to unofficial resources. In 1980, on the anniversary of the Black Thursday, a group of Tunisian commandos, called the Tunisian Liberation Army supported by Libya, attacked the southern town of Gafsa.

The regime adopted increasing repression policy against the increasing unrest in the country at the first stage. Many unionists and protesters were arrested after Black Thursday. During the 1970s, the strike activities accelerated and the regime's policies to repress and co-opt the UGTT did not prevent rising competitiveness of labor in the mid 1980.²⁵¹ Regime failed to fulfill its economic promises and in order to prevent potential strikes and unrest, regime put more pressure on the UGTT by cutting financial source, imposition a new leadership and waves of arrestments.²⁵²

In 1986, when the foreign exchange crisis reached serious level, the negotiations for a structural adjustment agreement with IMF and the World Bank were started in order to prevent bankrupt. Eventually the new political elites in the ruling coalition supported Bourguiba's ouster by Ben Ali in 1987.

Shortly after taking power, President Ben Ali placed the party with the cadre sympathetic to his economic liberalization agenda, mainly with businessmen and large land-owners that benefitted from increasing liberalization.²⁵³ The ruling party had dominated by rural notables and the urban bourgeoisie.²⁵⁴ In the first year of Ben Ali's presidency, 40 percent of the cadres had been replaced and the average age of

²⁵¹ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 110.

²⁵² Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, pp. 111-114.

²⁵³ Stephen J. King, "Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa", *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 122, (Fall, 2007), p. 450.

²⁵⁴ Stephen J. King, "Economic Reform and Tunisia's Hegemonic Party: The End of the Administrative Elite", *Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ)*, Vol. 20, No: 2 (March 1998), pp. 59-86.

the membership had dropped to the mid-30s.²⁵⁵ By the mid-1990s, thirty businessmen counted among the representatives of the RCD in parliament.²⁵⁶ However, grand families of Sahel namely from the cities of Manastir and Sousse, birth places of Bourguiba and Ben Ali, had continued to dominate political and economic life, and to ensure their place in ruling coalition.

3.3. Emergence of Opposition

With the collapse of the ruling coalition, the expelled factions in PSD gave pulse to emergence of new oppositional movements in Tunisia after 1970s. There was a unified exclusive contestation structure in populist authoritarian regimes of Tunisia. Instead of electoral politics, the ruling party sustained contestation arena for the political elites. However the defection of political elites and crises in ruling coalition between 1969 and 1987 were resulted with the exclusion of a number of political elites from ruling party. The excluded political elites, then, began to form opposition parties to force regime for political liberalization.

Before 1969, there were very limited oppositional forces out of the party, however there was the Tunisian Communist Party (PCT) which was banned by government in 1963. Two months after this Neo-Destour (then PSD in 1964) officially declared its support for a single party regime.

The liberals that were expelled from the party after their demands for democratize the party structure formed Movement of Social Democrats (MSD) which than played a key role in establishing the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH), the oldest human rights organization in the Arab world, in 1977.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ Lisa Anderson, "The Tunisian National Pact of 1988," *Government and Opposition*, Vol: 26, No:2, (Spring 1991), p. 251.

²⁵⁶ Bellin, *Stated Democracy*, p. 146.

²⁵⁷ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 46.

The other expelled group, the socialists, established Popular Unity Movement (MUP) under the leadership of Ahmed ben Salah in 1973 on the basis of a communitarian socialism which emphasized the state's role in building a more unified and enlightened society.²⁵⁸

In 1970, Nahda Movement under the name of Quranic Preservation Society (QPS) was formed by Ghannouchi and 'Abd al-Fatah Mourou. At the beginning, aim of the movement was to support the "Arab-Muslim character" of Tunisian society. Suppression of secular opposition by regime paved the way for movement to expand its base and agenda in the late 1970s. The Quranic Preservation Society subsequently became influential by focusing on economic and political issues. Ghannouchi called upon workers, stating that "It is not enough to pray five times a day and fast in order to be worthy of Islam... Islam is activism... it is on the side of the poor and the oppressed".²⁵⁹ The movement became influential in the UGTT by the early 1980s²⁶⁰ In April 1981 the Quranic Preservation Society headed by Ghannouchi requested a government license to set up a political party named the Islamic Tendency Movement (*Harikat al-Ittihad al-Islami*) which then renamed "Nahda", but their application was not recognized by the regime and Ghannouchi with other members of the movement were arrested.²⁶¹

Developments in 1981 marked as the beginning of both a transition period within Nahda and a coalition with some leftist groups. Non-Islamist organizations such as the Communist Party, the Socialist Democrats, the Rassemblement Socialiste, and the Tunisian League of Human Rights criticized the arrests and demanded the detainees to be released.

²⁵⁸ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p 46.

²⁵⁹ Linda G. Jones, "Portrait of Rachid al-Ghannouchi", *Middle East Report*, No: 153, (July– August 1988), 20.

²⁶⁰ Jones, "Portrait of Rashid al-Ghannouchi", p. 21.

²⁶¹ John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 101.

An alliance similar to that of the 1980s has been built in Tunisia today. Commitment of movement to non-violence, advocacy of dialogue, and cooperation with other opposition parties as well as relatively moderate orientation of the Islamic Tendency Movement provided the party cooperation abilities with other opposition parties. Cooperation among the leftist, secular, and Islamist opposition was deepened after the Islamic Tendency Movement's journals *Al-Ma'arifa* and *Al-Mujtamaa* were banned and non-Islamists groups opened their journals to voice Islamist views.²⁶²

The 1984 Bread Riots forced the government to moderate its policies. In this respect, many members of the Islamic Tendency Movement were released after the 1984 amnesty for political prisoners. On the other hand, the pressure of the state over the social life increased; on the contrary, these pressures became counterproductive to the base of the Islamic Tendency Movement. In 1986, Ghannouchi was banned from the mosques, prohibited from teaching, public speaking, and publishing his writings, and forbidden to travel abroad.²⁶³ Refusing to obey these bans, Ghannouchi continued lecturing and writing; he was arrested after a mosque sermon, which fired up student riots in the country that were already tense because of economic stagnation and political suppression. Ultimately, 3,000 Islamists were arrested in alleged links to Iran's Islamic Republic.²⁶⁴ The pressure on political Islam and leftist movements under Bourguiba's rule strengthened the Islamists, but the Islamists have not been marginalized or resorted to violence. This is a critical point that separated en Nahda from other Islamic movements in the region.

All these oppositional movements were not legal in the mid-1970s. In addition they lacked resources to build broad support across the country. This incapability forced them to cooperate with other organizations that have resources and a national structure.²⁶⁵ Hence, the UGTT became fulcrum between regime and opposition. On

²⁶² Jones, "Portrait of Rashid al-Ghannouchi", p. 22.

²⁶³ Jones, "Portrait of Rashid al-Ghannouchi", p. 22.

²⁶⁴ Esposito and Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, p. 105.; Jones, "Portrait of Rashid al-Ghannouchi", p. 23.

²⁶⁵ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 46.; Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 101.

one hand, regime tried to use the UGTT leadership to secure social peace and support the regime; on the other hand, opposition tried to force the leadership to distance itself from the regime in order to attach the UGTT a position for political and economic change by organizing strikes.²⁶⁶

The UGTT was attractive to oppositional forces because it had well endowed political resources as a press, an autonomous financial base, numerous seats in parliament, and international forum at the ICFTU and the ILO.²⁶⁷ Blocked wages and changing political conditions fueled labor combativeness during the 1970s.²⁶⁸ In addition, white collar unions (civil servants, education, banks and Post, Telegraph and Telephone [PTT]) provided the UGTT an ideological grounding.²⁶⁹

Labor-state relation in Tunisia had shifted after the 1970s. Bellin stated that after the subordination period between 1956 and 1970, relation between state and labor might be characterized as a period of measured autonomy for labor from 1970 to 1977. This period marked increasing numbers of protests and strikes; however showed duality between the leadership and workers at the base within the UGTT. The position of union officials were intervening to mediate the disputes or/and declare the strikes legal.²⁷⁰

By the late 1970s, some union leaders proposed that the UGTT formed an independent political party to advance the interests of the working class.²⁷¹ Furthermore, union leader Habib Achour met with president of Libya, Qaddafi, the most prominent enemy of Tunisia.²⁷² These developments began to challenge the

²⁶⁶ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, pp. 46-47.

²⁶⁷ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 102.

²⁶⁸ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 101.

²⁶⁹ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 102.

²⁷⁰ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 101.

²⁷¹ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 106.

²⁷² Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 106.

hegemony of the party-state, and soon triggered the full force of state repression, lasting from 1978 to 1987. In addition to suppressing strikes brutally, the UGTT was exposed to change its key cadres which diminished its structural and financial capacity with decline of its members. Hence, the UGTT became dependent on government subsidies.²⁷³ As a result of co-opted leaders and financial dependency, regime ensured the UGTT's renewed subordination to the party-state.²⁷⁴ However these efforts did not lead to a decline in working class combativeness.²⁷⁵

On the other hand, the capital in Tunisia was not pro-democratic or supportive to liberals who demanded more pluralistic political life in 1970s and 1980s. The structural power the bourgeoisie boosted by state's decision to sponsor the development of private sector industrialists after the decision to pro-market economic policies, as a result, the relation between state and bourgeoisie compromised private sector autonomy. Bellin described this relationship with "state-sponsorship".²⁷⁶ Three leading private sector associations in Tunisia, the UTICA, the Tunisian Chamber of Commerce and the IACE mobilized business support for the regime and were subordinated to party and regime.²⁷⁷

3.4. Conclusion

State machinery, nature of the state and society relations and strategic decisions made by political elites were shaped by the dynamics of protectorate administration, independence struggle and then formation of a new state. During the independence struggle, Neo-Destour Party structured a hierarchical party organization which served like state machinery by organizing masses, operating education programs, collecting revenues to finance independence struggle. Party utilized from mass organizations such as class based associations, youth, student and women rights

²⁷³ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 107.

²⁷⁴ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 107.

²⁷⁵ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 108.

²⁷⁶ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 46.

²⁷⁷ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, pp. 61-69.

associations. Moreover, party played active role in establishment and development of many mass organizations to increase its structural capacity. With independence, the structural capacity of party and mass organizations transformed to state apparatus which had been suffering infrastructural power weaknesses. This transfer had actualized by merging party and state: and by subordination of mass organizations. Considerable majority of political elites took part in ruling coalition but they lost their autonomy due to intense and gradual centralization of state power by absorbing the party and mass organizations.

In 1969, Tunisia adopted *infitah*, liberalization policy in economy. The policy change in economy led the elite defection which produced long-lasting crisis in ruling coalition between 1969 and 1987. Ruling party periodically cycled the cadres to stabilize the ruling coalition but failed. Together with failure of new economic development plans, defection of ruling elites came out with elimination of old generation cadres by new political elites in 1987. On the other hand, the political elites those excluded from ruling coalition as well as new political elites formed oppositional parties and movements.

CHAPTER 4

CRISIS OF MASS PROTESTS & FAILURE OF AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

The collapse of authoritarian regime was a result of several dynamics and segments of Tunisian society that unite. Self-immolation of Mohammed Bouazizi, a street vendor after having been publicly humiliated by local police officers, on 17 December 2010, triggered mass protests in the country. The protests started near Sidi Bouzid, Mohammed Bouazizi's hometown, then, spread to Kasserine and Thala on 24 December. President Ben Ali criticized the opposition by arguing that the uprising was politicized on 28 December. Although he defined the uprising as terrorist acts; on 10 January 2011, when the protest reached the centre, he declared that 300,000 jobs would be created over two years. Two days after, Ben Ali discharged the Minister of Interior and promised to release the protesters who had been charged. On the contrary, the number of deaths and injuries had continued to increase. On 13 January, Ben Ali appeared on TV scenes for the third time since the protests had started and announced the withdrawal of the order to shoot protesters and the repealed of the internet bans. He also stated that he was not going to be candidate for presidency in the 2014 elections. Meanwhile, the number of the deaths increased to 80. At the same time, the army was charged with securing the country and a curfew was announced. But, the Chief of Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces, Rachid Ammar, refused to obey this order. On 14 January, a state of emergency was declared and Ben Ali announced that he cancelled the government. But in the evening of this day, Ben Ali and his family fled to Saudi Arabia.

The end of Ben Ali's rule did not end the protests in Tunisia. After Ben Ali fled the country, Mebazaa, the spokesman of the parliament, was appointed as the interim president and Mohamed Ghannouchi, a former prime minister, was appointed as prime minister and tasked with forming an interim government. On 18 January, the protests continued against the interim government, which included the former ministers of Ben Ali in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interior Ministry, Defense Ministry, and Finance Ministry. The opposition parties were only in weak posts. This situation raised suspicions about Mebazaa and Ghannouchi, who had promised a national unity government. In addition, Ghannouchi told exiled opposition leaders and members of Nahda and the Republic Congress not to return to the country until the legal regulations regarding their conditions had been clarified. This call for opposition without identifying any specific date for legal regulations was perceived as political tactic. Ghannouchi announced that presidential and parliamentary elections would be held within six months and defended his new unity government and the ministers who served under the ousted president Ben Ali, defining them as "needed clean hands". His decision to retrain these old names in the interim government angered many. On 23 January, Hannibal TV was closed down after broadcasting an interview with a Communist Party leader; owner of the channel was arrested, suggesting that Ghannouchi and the interim government were no different than Ben Ali. All these reasons created a legitimacy crisis for the interim government and caused more protests. Attempts to solve this legitimacy crisis, such as mass resignations among the Constitutional Democratic Rally, did not work. Ghannouchi promised to cut all ties with former authorities could not allay the angry crowds in Tunisia. The process that started with the resignation of some ministers ended with the collapse of the government on 27 January. On the same day, Ghannouchi announced a new government that has no name from the Constitutional Democratic Rally, existing of 12 new independent ministers. However, protests targeted Ghannouchi and Mebazaa until their resignations.

The long lasting "authoritarian resilience" of Tunisian regime had reached to an end on 14 January 2011, after several weeks of anti-government protests. This chapter discusses the causes and process of the authoritarian regime in Tunisia.

4.1. State in Crisis

The state hegemony in political, economic and social life embodied in state as “tutelary” and state as “party”. These two compositions had been corroded; as a result, the authoritarian structure became fragile to re-articulate its former mechanism to confront the recent challenges.

Tutelary state provided infrastructural mechanisms to authoritarian regime for cultivating dependence which had contributed to durability of regime. Tutelary state based on the quasi-tacit contract between state and society whereby economic goods are exchanged for political and social deference; whereas this contract had compensated the lacks of state in infrastructural power and ideological hegemony. This contract, which created patron-client relationship between state and society, was no longer acceptable; at least for a part of the population. The main reason behind the break-down of the quasi-tacit contract is the erosion of rent-distribution in the country. Many analysis address the worsening socio-economic conditions which are dramatic rise in youth unemployment, growing regional disparities, erosion of the middle class, inadequate and ineffective economic policies in order to explain breaking-down of the social contract between state and society. These socio-economic conditions explained popular discontent and frustration in the country. On the other hand, the authoritarian regime had been able to survive for decades not because of that there had not been any popular discontent or frustration; but because of that regime successfully had managed these crisis till 2011. Rent-distribution had sustain the continuity of the social contract; but widespread corruption seriously inhibited rent-distributing capacity of tutelary state in the very core, corruption increasingly centralized redistributive privileges to the families of the president and his wife (Ben Ali/Trabelsi Family), to protect their interests.

The extended Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families composed of more than 140 persons²⁷⁸ and owned at least 180 major companies according to the Central Bank of Tunisia and

²⁷⁸ Peter J. Schraeder and Hamadi Redissi, “Ben Ali's Fall”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol: 22, No: 3 (July 2011), p. 9.

controlled nearly 50% of country's economy.²⁷⁹ The intermediary role of the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families is stated as "the privatization of the state" by Hibou. She refers to the contemporary mode of government in the south where "the state increasingly delegates its regulatory or even sovereign functions to private intermediaries."²⁸⁰ In turn, this specific form of government mobilized the proactive of domination and repression in Tunisia according to this discourse. She described this situation as;

(...)[W]e can talk about the privatisation of the state and move beyond analysis in terms of just corruption. Privatisation is a supplementary and fundamental means of control of economic and political life by the regime. Through the politics of repression, the political field and the public sphere are monopolised by the president; the economic and financial fields are now the only sites of conflict, the only objects in which stakes can be placed. All the recent politico-financial affairs attest to this (the El Taïef affair, the pharmacist's episode, etc.). Even if the agents of inveiglement or corruption are private, or even mere hoodlums, politics is always present, being the only thing that tolerates them, uses them, and confers another meaning on their activities.²⁸¹

In sum, the state increasingly delegated its regulatory and sovereign functions to the Presidency or more directly a personal allegiance to the President, mainly the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families. So, last two decades, not only the wealth transferred to the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families, but also the state's regulatory and sovereign functions transferred to them. For example, Hibou states position of the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families in privatization and taxation:

During the privatisation program, they (the Ben Ali and Trabelsi families) purchased companies at a nominal price and then sold them to industrialists and businessmen [at a substantial markup]. If a company was profitable, they took a cut of the profits. On foreign investments, they took commissions or a cut of the profits. They also served as intermediaries for

²⁷⁹ Emma C. Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy", *Mediterranean Politics*, 2011, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 300.

²⁸⁰ Béatrice Hibou, "Domination & Control in Tunisia: Economic Levers for the Exercise of Authoritarian Power", *Review of African Political Economy*, Vol. 33, No. 108, North Africa: Power, Politics & Promise (Jun., 2006), p. 196.

²⁸¹ Hibou, "Domination & Control in Tunisia: Economic Levers for the Exercise of Authoritarian Power", p. 198.

the award of public contracts. The Trabelsi network controlled customs and smuggling operations.²⁸²

Hibou argues that this new mode of government “serve both to advance the ‘economic miracle’ and simultaneously function as techniques of coercion and repression”, however, this study suggests that this mode of government made the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families the most prominent intermediary body and as a result, paralyzed the state apparatus. The practical meaning of that is beyond the “personalization” of politics in the country. The rent-distribution cycle had narrowed down to Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families, and also the transformation of some state functions to the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families had diffused the state apparatus. This leads passivation of party, and security apparatus.

The rising presidentialism was another characteristic of authoritarian regime in Tunisia. In 1988, Ben Ali banned the presidency for life and limited presidency for two terms and age of 70 but aftermath he centralized and increased the power of president; then in 2002, with a referendum strongly supported by RCD, these two limits were lifted.²⁸³ By constitutional revision executive power was concentrated in President’s hand while certain regulatory powers which had been held by Prime Minister were transferred to the President by nine amendments.²⁸⁴ In addition, Hibou argues that “decisions are taken only after they have been rubber-stomped by the President”, which left no adequate margins for maneuver capacity for taking the initiative or any meaningful autonomy even for the ministers.²⁸⁵ Furthermore, Hibou described this centralization as following;

The real political-decision making bodies are not the cabinet meetings but, on the other hand, the conseils ministériels restreints (CMR- core cabinet meetings) which are attended only by the ministers concerned and the President’s personal advisers- the later being, in reality, the only people

²⁸² Crisis Group, “*Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*”, Crisis Group Middle East/North Africa Report N°106, 28 April 2011, p. 10.

²⁸³ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 63.

²⁸⁴ Beatrice Hibou (Author), Andrew Brown (Translator), *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, (Oxford: Polity Press, 2011), p. 269.

²⁸⁵ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 269.

whose ideas can prevail; and, on the other hand, ‘an elusive informal network, constituted by cooptation, in which there mingle business milieus, personal, family and regional relations, senior figures in the running of the state apparatus, all of them linked by bonds of “disloyal loyalty”(Zweig)’. So the government does not actually govern, since everything is decided in the presidential palace and passed on through the party. In fact, the omnipresence of the RCD in the administration favours bureaucratic centralization and, conversely, makes it impossible for anything to be undertaken without the approval of the Head of State.²⁸⁶

Beside the increasing executive power of Presidency; 2002 referendum which created a second chamber in Tunisia’s National Assembly added another margin for expanding President’s power on assembly.²⁸⁷ The Chamber of Advisors had shared law-making power with the Chamber of Deputies while its 126 members were appointed by President.²⁸⁸

During Ben Ali era there was no separation of party and state as it was the case during Bourguiba’s presidency; as Ben Ali declared “the Rally is the party of the president and the party of change”.²⁸⁹ The demands for disentangling the state bureaucracy from the RCD was rejected²⁹⁰; its privileged access to the media , its ability to reward supporters and punish opponents; and its national infrastructure had sustained RCD to dominate the assembly since the beginning of the reform process. There were over 10,000 civil servants who work entirely for the party but were paid by the state.²⁹¹ In addition, over one hundred administrative offices were occupied by the party for its various activities.²⁹² The party was intended to fulfill three functions; to serve as an unifying force; a vehicle of stability and an agent of change.²⁹³ These

²⁸⁶ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 269.

²⁸⁷ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 62.

²⁸⁸ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 62.

²⁸⁹ Larbi Sadiki, “Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means”, *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 29, No:1, p. 65.

²⁹⁰ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, pp. 55-56.

²⁹¹ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 88.

²⁹² Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 88.

²⁹³ Sadiki, “Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means”, pp. 65-66.

three goals attached to RCD essentially were the typical historical missions of the PSD/Neo-Destour; unity, stabilize and edify the masses downsized all viable political forces and identities.²⁹⁴ As Sadiki mentioned, “the dyads of state as tutelary and state as party are today massive support system that hegemonies politics to the point of stultifying political life below the state”.²⁹⁵ Chaabane, a former adviser of Ben Ali, argues that student membership of the party has risen from a few hundred in 1987 to better than 8,000 in 1995; total party membership stood at 1,720,374 in 1993. Moreover, according to Chaabane, the party boasted 6,713 branches and 300 associations distributed across Tunisia, with 54,870 officials at branch level, and 83,390 candidates for local elections in 1993.²⁹⁶

Comparing to the total population of the country; there is a high potential that these numbers are exaggerated; however, it is important for addressing the hegemonic power of RCD. Hibou claims that RCD had 7500 local cells; 2200 professional cells and almost 2 million members, where the total population is around 10 million, in its 2006 dated book.²⁹⁷ The main tasks of RCD cells, as intermediaries of the central power was to propagate official discourse, implementing those discourses by setting up and running associations, and by providing information, guide social and professional life, and to report and to response the crisis that occurred there are.²⁹⁸ In addition, cells were prominent apparatus of redistribution. “The RCD is a network of interests and clientele that provides employment, grants, administrative facilities, aid of every kind, lodging, banking, facilities, free cards for medical treatment and transport”.²⁹⁹ According to Hibou, party in Tunisia determined social and economic citizenship.³⁰⁰ This network had operated “much more a bureaucratic apparatus than

²⁹⁴ Sadiki, “*Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means*”, p. 66.

²⁹⁵ Sadiki, “*Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means*”, p. 66.

²⁹⁶ Sadiki, “*Bin Ali’s Tunisia: Democracy by Non-Democratic Means*”, p. 66.

²⁹⁷ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 86.

²⁹⁸ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, pp. 86-90.

²⁹⁹ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 90.

³⁰⁰ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 90.

as a political party, in particular, a very high level of centralization and a parallel hierarchy to that of the administration”.³⁰¹

The ruling party, the RCD, increasingly passivated as a result of “privatization of state”. Thus, RCD could not effectively function as a network of interests and clienteles that provide employment, grants, aids and services. The material benefits distributed by the RCD had diminished.³⁰² Crisis Group report on Tunisia states that even the leader of local branches of the RCD was unable to find employment opportunities for their children.³⁰³ Dispossession of political power of RCD’s senior leadership and the mid-level officials both blocked rent-distribution and diminished their loyalty to the regime. The passivity of the RCD during the protests proved that the orders, released by the RCD’s Secretary General Mohammed Gheriani for organizing demonstrations in support of the President, did not translate into action. The pro-Ben Ali demonstrations on 14 January 2011, just hours before the departure of Ben Ali, changed their side and enjoyed the anti-regime protesters.³⁰⁴

The political power of senior leadership and the mid-level officials of the RCD were dispossessed especially during the last decade of Ben Ali era. Kamal Morjane, former minister of Ben Ali era described the changing position of the officials of RCD as follows;

It was not only the Tunisian political space that had been clamped down on all of these years; it was the RCD, and the apparatus of the state. Leila Trabelsi controlled everything, the media publicising his foreign and interior policy positions, everything. The ministers were completely stripped of their powers. Even access to the president was totally controlled.³⁰⁵

³⁰¹ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 88.

³⁰² Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*, p. 9.

³⁰³ Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*, p.9.

³⁰⁴ Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*, p. 9-10.

³⁰⁵ Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*, p. 10.

In the Middle East, most of the authoritarian regimes have supported by military which has wide economic and political power. However, in Tunisia military is small and lack these privileges. On the other hand, Tunisian authoritarian regime had been subjected to criticism of being a police state. Beatrice Hibou reported in her books titled “The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia” which was published in 2011 that the number of police hovers between 80000 according to foreign observers in Tunisia and 133.000 according to the Tunisian opposition.³⁰⁶ According to these statistics, “the ratio of police to ordinary Tunisians this varies from 1/67 to 1/112, whereas in France, the most heavily policed country in Europe, it is 1/265, in United Kingdom 1/380”.³⁰⁷ Since 1990s, internal security apparatus of Tunisia dramatically expanded; and much of this expansion took place outside of interior ministry.³⁰⁸ Hibou addressed the diversity of police services which were state security, the special services, the general intelligence services, the guidance services, the municipal police, the presidential security forces, the services of the National Guard, the custom services, the interior revenue, the health services, the department of foreign track and the CNSS.³⁰⁹ Police in Tunisia became an absolute instrumental force of command over all domains to be governed, starting with the individual”³¹⁰ and their function passed beyond the enforcing law.

In addition to the passivation of the ruling party RCD; the security apparatus, the prominent repression source in Tunisia, needs a special account. Despite the fact that the external cost of repression during the uprisings in 2010-2011 was high to Tunisian regime; the fragmentation of the security apparatus made difficult to repress widespread demonstrations organized in 2010-2011. It had been frequently repeated that authoritarian regime in Tunisia had relied on the security services, whose numbers were estimated at 150,000 (The number varies to the different works). In

³⁰⁶ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 81.

³⁰⁷ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 81.

³⁰⁸ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Magreb*, p. 64

³⁰⁹ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 82.

³¹⁰ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 84.

the previous chapter, it is also noted that in Tunisia, there were several different security units which varied in their security services. Aside from army consisting of 35,000 troops, the security apparatus included the Presidential Guard (roughly 5,000-8,000), the National Guard (roughly 20,000) and other police units as the political police, the tourism police, the university police and so on.³¹¹ President Ben Ali prevented a potential coup that rise against him from security apparatus by decentralizing it; on the other hand, decreased another potential also, total coordination the crackdown of popular uprisings. Crisis Group reports on Tunisia states how security apparatus failed to coordinate to repress the masses because of mutual hate and mistrust among these units.³¹² Under these circumstances, President turned his face to the army which was marginalized by the regime. The Tunisian army had not benefited from any privileged compensation or significant material advantages for their services to the state or in specific to the regime.³¹³

Ali Seriati, head of the Presidential Guard, had summoned army, police and various security services to coordinate the crackdown of the demonstrations; however, General Ammar, rejected this order. Moreover, the military was placed its troops between the security units and the protesters.

The authoritarian regime failed to confront demonstrations of 2010-2011. The most visible outcome of this failure is the ouster of the President, Ben Ali. He fled the country with the many members of Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families. But still there are controversial arguments on the authoritarian regime. Ottoway remarks, for now “the Presidents have left; the regimes are still in place”.³¹⁴ But in Tunisia, the change is

³¹¹ Schraeder and Redissi, “*Ben Ali's Fall*”, p. 6; Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way*, p. 11.

³¹² Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way*, pp. 11-12.

³¹³ Zoltan Barany, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: The Role of the Military”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol: 22, Issue:4 (2011), p. 31; Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way*, p. 11.

³¹⁴ Marina Ottaway, “The Presidents Left, the Regimes are Still Here”, *Carnegie Endowment*, Available Online at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/02/14/presidents-left-regimes-are-still-here/3t0a> (Accessed 20.04.2014)

not limited the ouster of the President Ben Ali and reached out to the party and the core names of the regime. The authoritarian structure has still remained in state apparatus undoubtedly; moreover, re-organization of state apparatus on democratic principles will need time, consensus among the actors, and decisive initiatives led by a road map. However, removal of core names from the state apparatus and regime lead the collapse of center which coordinate and connect the different state organs under the authoritarian regime. So, the state had not collapsed; but remnants of former regime lost their center.

First of all, the former high-ranking regime hard-liners were arrested. Furthermore, the ruling party, RCD, was dissolved and its funds liquidated. Dissolution of RCD and arrest of its leadership cadres put an end to party-state relations and “state as party” feature of authoritarian regime in Tunisia. The properties, assets and business of 110 members of Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families were also confiscated. The institutions that strongly influenced by the old regime such as Chamber of Deputies, the upper house, the political police and the Constitutional Court were also dissolved according to a legal degree on May 23, 2011.³¹⁵ There had been removal and replacement of high-level officials from ministries, security apparatus and judiciary in the last three years. These arrest, dissolutions and new appointments which mainly have targeted internal security apparatus and the judiciary have not yet democratized the state structure but broken the core of the network of the hegemonic authoritarian regime. The reforms and initiatives taken by the interim governments to eliminate the authoritarian regime will be discussed in details in the next part of this chapter.

4.2. Collapse of the Ruling Coalition

The collapse of the ruling coalition is subdivided in three phases: pre-breakdown, dissolution of the centre, the split of the elites and alliance with the new elites. The pre-breakdown phase covers the last one decade of the regime until 2010 and aim to investigate the declining nature of relations among the elites in ruling coalition.

³¹⁵ Schraeder and Redissi, “*Ben Ali's Fall*”, p. 16.

The ruling coalition of hegemonic authoritarian regime was existed of urban and rural economic elites and administrative elites of the party and the state. The ruling family, Ben Ali and Trabelsi Families, had privileged position in the ruling coalition whereas other partners had become the instruments rather than being in the central power.³¹⁶ The nature of the ruling coalition made them powerless and dependent on the center as well as vulnerable to factional divisions, significantly led by the center. Their commitment to the center and power struggles between each other made the coalition a loose one.

The hegemonisation of rent-distribution mechanism by the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Family and passivation and fragmentation of administrative elites had further and empowered these parties of ruling coalition. The urban bourgeois and rural landed elites were dependent on the state and the rent-distribution or with Bellin's description, "state sponsorship". When the rent-distribution mechanism hegemonised by the Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families, they began to expand in the economy at the expense of the urban bourgeois and rural landed elites. The former President of ATUGE (the Association of Graduates of French Engineering Schools) mentions that;

In the early 1990s, Ben Ali wanted Tunisia to make money. But his wife encouraged him to monopolise the business sector. Wealth was concentrated increasingly in their hands, and their methods left a lot of people broke. The leading business families were not protected. Ben Ali and his wife did not understand the effects of their greed.³¹⁷

These economic elites in ruling coalition had benefited from liberalization and privatization policies as well as the integration of Tunisia in the world economy during the 1990s. But the gradual expansion of Ben Ali/Trabelsi Families in economy became a significant obstacle to their economic benefits. How Balle and Cavatorta explain this situation as;

³¹⁶ Steffen Erdle, "Discussion Paper: Industrial Policy in Tunisia", *The German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE)*, Discussion Paper 1 (2011), p. 16

³¹⁷ Popular Protests in N Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way*, p. 10.

The intentional mismanagement of privatizations, the awarding of import/export licences, the creation of new business and the general predation by members of the Ben Ali clan on numerous sectors of the economy ... alienated not only ordinary working Tunisians ... but crucially the business and middle classes. This predatory behaviour therefore meant that middle- and upper-class people who had benefited from the integration of Tunisia in the world economy and managed to create successful businesses during the 1990s turned against the regime, as they were forced to share their profits with members of the Ben Ali clan. This made the Tunisian uprising, to an extent, a joint effort between different classes.³¹⁸

Similarly, the power of administrative elites of state and party in the ruling coalition had melted down because of increasing presidentialism. They were already diminished to the implementers and amplifiers of the decisions taken by the President.³¹⁹ In addition, the only connection between them was the center, the presidency or in other words the President and his family. Hence, the power struggle among them had prevented them to act autonomously. These fragmentations had accelerated by the pending leadership crisis and struggle among the royal families; between Trabelsi and Ben Ali clans.

Ben Ali was 74 years old and there had been periodic reports of his ill health. However, there was neither road map for power transfer, nor contender for the power. The appointments of the Ben Ali and Trabelsi Families members to the official posts on the RCD Central Committee had seen as the preparation for post-Ben Ali era.³²⁰ In addition to two families nesting into the party apparatus, there were strong findings that the rivalry between two families had increased. Their penetration to the security and state apparatus had deepen the fragmentation among the ruling coalition.

³¹⁸ Francesco Cavatorta and Rikke Hostrup Haugbøllea, "The End of Authoritarian Rule and the Mythology of Tunisia under Ben Ali", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2012), p. 185.

³¹⁹ Erdle, "*Discussion Paper: Industrial Policy in Tunisia*", p. 16.

³²⁰ Emma C. Murphy, "The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 16, No. 2, (2011), p. 299.

The dissolution of the centre phase, refers Ben Ali's and his family's departure from the country. It is hard to indicate a certain time period, because the sources, which light the negotiations between the ruling elites and process of bargaining, are in scant for the time being. On the other hand the accessible resources indicates that phase, the periphery of the ruling coalition decided to eliminate the center, the president Ben Ali and his family from the regime and ruling coalition. Their strategic decision aimed to end their subordination in the coalition, and the leadership crisis as well as to secure the authoritarian regime by alleviating the streets with the departure of Ben Ali and his family. There are serious indicators that the fear of a coup d'état by inner circle of security officials prompted Ben Ali's departure.

Leila Ben Ali (Trabelsi) reports that Ben Ali had asked her to prepare to go to Saudi Arabia for four or five days, long enough for the situation to return to normal in her book, *Ma Verité /My Truth*.³²¹ Ben Ali, also, says in the email that he sent to editor-in-chief of the French online-magazine *Mediapart*, that General Seriati, (the former) presidential guard chief, briefed him on the seriousness of the situation in Tunis, the capital and warned him that the Carthage Palace was surrounded by "hostile" forces within the security apparatus.³²² Samir Seriati, son of the General Seriati, tells that "my father went to Ben Ali and told them that the threat of a coup d'état was imminent, [...] urged him to go the military airport with his family."³²³

Whether the rumors on coup are true or not, the splits in the ruling elite became more visible after Ben Ali's departure and continued until the second interim government formed by Cebi El Sebsi. During this phase the elites, especially administrative elites of the party and the state, began to compete over the power. In the end, neither the coalition was strong to unite against challenges brought by widespread

³²¹ France 24, "*Ben Ali's wife blames general for Tunisia 'coup d'état'*", 23 June 2012, Available Online at: <http://www.france24.com/en/20120623-ben-ali-wife-leila-blames-general-tunisia-coup-d-etat-saudi-arabia> (Accessed 20.04.2014)

³²² TunisiaLive, "Former Tunisian President Ben Ali Tells His Version of His Departure From Tunisia", 11 December 2011, Available Online at: <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/12/11/former-tunisian-president-ben-ali-tells-his-version-of-his-departure-from-tunisia/> (Accessed 20.04.2014)

³²³ France 24, "*Ben Ali's wife blames general for Tunisia 'coup d'état'*".

demonstrations in 2010-2011; nor could the coalition unite after Ben Ali's departure. As a result, right after the Ben Ali's departure, the high-ranked politicians close to Ben Ali criticized his reign and promised certain steps toward democratization. However, they could not take the control of the country and calm down the streets.

The administrative elites of the RCD, ruling party tried to seize the control of the power during this era. First, directly after Ben Ali's departure, his Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi formed a "national unity government" that dominated by the RCD Party whereas Ghannouchi promised a certain separation between state and party.³²⁴ He announced that the former defence, foreign, interior and finance ministers will keep their key posts in the new national unity government. The opposition was named for very limited and weak positions in this interim government. Ahmed Ibrahim, leader of the Ettajdid party, was named minister of higher education and Mustafa Ben Jaafar, head of the Union of Freedom and Labour, got the health ministry.

Second, the security elites, which were the inner-circle security officers in police forces especially in the Presidential Guard, and can be described as the hardliners of the authoritarian regime, were eliminated from the coalition after a pitched battle. Two days after Serhati and his associates were arrested by the army in charge of planning coup.³²⁵ Street battles erupted between regular police, army and security forces loyal to Ben Ali which were mainly Presidential Guard, and political police.³²⁶ A Former Ben Ali adviser reports that throughout the Ben Ali's departure, the Presidential Guard operated in the provinces and in Tunis was taken very badly by

³²⁴ Al Jazeera, "Tunisia PM forms 'unity government'", 17 January 2011, Available Online at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/01/201111715545105403.html> (Accessed 20.04.2014)

³²⁵ The Telegraph, "Tunisia Army arrests security chief in coup plot as struggle for control intensifies", 16 January 2011, Available Online at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/tunisia/8262754/Tunisia-Army-arrests-security-chief-in-coup-plot-as-struggle-for-control-intensifies.html> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³²⁶ Teije Hidde Donker, "COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity", CADMUS, SPS Working Paper No: 12 (2012), p. 7, Available Online at: <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/26185> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

the local police forces.³²⁷ Till the beginning of February 2011, 3000 members of the political police were arrested by the army.³²⁸

The second interim government was formed on 25 February 2011 by Caid El Sebsi, who served as ambassador and then as a parliamentary in the President of the Chamber of Deputies. The reign of second interim government marked the control of power by administrative elite of the state; exclusion of the RCD, the ruling party, and political police. The RCD party was dissolved and banned by court; its funds liquidated, and its leadership cadres were arrested. So the party elites were eliminated from the ruling coalition. Furthermore, the political police was disbanded and the power of the interior ministry checked through institutional reforms.³²⁹ The soft-liners of the administrative elite of the state eliminated the prominent hardliners and cooperate with the opposition to transform the authoritarian structure.

4.3. The Role of the Opposition in the Collapse of the Authoritarian Regime and the Ruling Coalition

The protests have been generally seen as “unorganized masses” by many scholars and analysts. Bechir Ben Yahmed indicates that ‘no party, no union, no politician gave the impetus for this popular uprising nor were they in any way involved.’³³⁰ Haugbølle and Cavatorta agree on this argument and state that the main agents of the protests are not the political opposition parties or civil society who failed to coordinate different forms of cooperation over the last two decades, to challenge the regime in Tunisia.³³¹ These assumptions are derived from the fact that there were a widespread use of cell phones and social media, most notably Facebook and Twitter

³²⁷ Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia's Way*, p. 11.

³²⁸ Teije Hidde Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 7.

³²⁹ Teije Hidde Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 15.

³³⁰ Rikke Hostrup Haugbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, “Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up? : Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. 38, no. 3 (2011), p. 324.

³³¹ Haugbølle and Cavatorta, “*Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up? : Opposition Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints*”, p. 324.

in Tunisia during the protests. The surveys show that the usage of social media during the protests was remarkable. 64 percent of student respondents use Facebook as the primary source of information about the demonstrations between December 17 and January 14.³³²

Grasping the importance of the internet and new information technologies lead to perceive the protests as autonomous individuals that connected by discontent via social media. As a result, majority of the studies on the protests in Tunisia focus on the sources of discontent. On the other hand this part aims to analyze the role of civil society in the organization of protests.

Less than a month, the protests that began in Sidi Bouzid spread to whole country. As Lisa Anderson mentions, ‘the demonstrations in Tunisia spiraled toward the capital from the neglected rural areas, finding common cause with a once powerful but much repressed labor movement’³³³ Moreover, Emma Murphy underlines the activation of Tunisian associational life during the protests and also the support of the middle classes to the protests.³³⁴

Tunisian civil society, prominently labor, student and democratization/human rights movements, provided institutional structure for the protests to sustain it and spread from the periphery to the centre of the country. Before 2010-2011 popular protests, there had been significant protests and strikes local since 2005. Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy state that these protests and strikes remained local and short duration, took the participation of workers and young activists, and began to attract nationwide attention.³³⁵ Despite the fact that they failed to ³³⁶become nationwide,

³³² Schraeder and Redissi, “*Ben Ali's Fall*”, p. 11.

³³³ Lisa Anderson, “Demystifying the Arab Spring: Parsing the Differences Between Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya”, *Foreign Affairs*, May-June 2011, Available Online at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67693/lisa-anderson/demystifying-the-arab-spring> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³³⁴ Murphy, “*The Tunisian Uprising and the Precarious Path to Democracy*”, p. 301.

³³⁵ Marina Ottaway and Amr Hamzawy, “Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World” *The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, pp: 5-6, Available Online at:

these protests before 2010-2011 continued ‘to expand as activists from the labor unions, professional syndicates, young political bloggers and journalists joined it.’ In addition these numerous strikes and protests since 2005 especially in Tunisian periphery produced a new type of coordination and network of relations among the civil society actors, the cross-movement relations to channel, coordinate and sustain popular discontent.³³⁷

These strikes and protests, prominently strikes in Gafsa in 2008 and Sfax in 2010, created the impetus for greater collaboration across the civil society organization. For instance a combination of human rights activists, lawyers from the bar association trade union members and the student union (UGET) established a committee for the support of the Mining Region after the repression of Gafsa strikes by the regime in 2008.³³⁸ The main objectives of the committee are ‘defend the movement leaders in court, break the wall of silence that the regime tried to build around the movement and assist the prisoners’ family (mainly financially)’³³⁹

The new norms of civil engagement and new network of relations united ‘Islamists of various stripes, left-wing trade unionists, economic and social liberals, and French-style secularists’³⁴⁰ around the economic and social demands for change and played a decisive role in geographical spread of 2010-2011 popular protests.

http://carnegieendowment.org/files/OttawayHamzawy_Outlook_Jan11_ProtestMovements.pdf
(Accessed 20.04.2014).

³³⁶ Ottaway and Hamzawy, “*Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World*”, p:6.

³³⁷ Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 21-22.

³³⁸ Shelley Deane, *Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia’s Transition*, *International Alert*, February 2013, p.15.

³³⁹ Messaoud Romdhani, “Origins of the Tunisian Revolution”, *Alternatives International*, 31 October 2012, Available Online at: <http://www.alterinter.org/spip.php?article3888> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁴⁰ Deane, *Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia’s Transition*, p. 15, Available Online at: <http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/Tunisia2013EN.pdf> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

There was a strong presence of local unions and activists from the beginning of 2010-2011 popular protests, even in the first protest in Sidi Bouzid. An activist states that;

So on Friday 17 December we gathered in front of the regional government building: hundreds of unionist and activists. We had a sit-in in front of the government building and stopped traffic, until 8 at night. [...] together with the unemployed; and friends of Bouazzizi – all throwing oranges and other fruit at the regional government building.³⁴¹

Crisis Group also reports that Mohammed Bouazzizi led the hospital by teachers of the National Secondary School Teachers Union (SNES) of the UGTT and the protests in 17 December 2010 were accompanied by the trade unionists.³⁴²

The civil society organizations that supported the protests aided both in spreading the protests aided in organization of them. For example in Kasserine, the protests triggered by the lawyers, in turn, trade unions activated their networks at the regional level for instance in Regueb, Menzel, Bouzaine, Safx and Bizerte.³⁴³ Similarly, The National Council of the Bar Association organized protests in Tunis, Sousse, Monastir, Jendouba and Gafsa as well as lawyers went on strike on 6 January 2011.³⁴⁴

Another contribution of the civil society in the protests is their aid in mobilization of the youth and gaining their support. For instance in Kasserine, the lawyers for five days tried to mobilize protests but failed to rally masses until they decided to march in al Zuhur, a poor sub-urban neighborhood and marched backed to the city centre

³⁴¹ Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 6.

³⁴² International Crisis Group, “*Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*”, p. 3.

³⁴³ International Crisis Group, “*Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*”, p.5.

³⁴⁴ International Crisis Group, “*Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*”, p.5.

with the young people from poor neighborhoods.³⁴⁵ Besides, the student organizations, especially UGET had directly mobilized the youth. So schools and universities provided important infrastructural basis for mobilization rather than mosques which is subsequent uprisings in the Arab world.³⁴⁶

The civil society organizations in Tunisia gave the movement both structure and sustainability. Together with activists, they formed local coordination bodies, issued press releases, coordinated action and fine tuned demands, forming an infrastructure to manage and sustain the protests.³⁴⁷ They were also crucial to politization of the movement. Sami al-Tahiri, Secretary General of the SNES of the UGTT, states that “[They] immediately called on the people not to consider this act a suicide, but rather to consider it a political assassination. Bouazizi should be seen as a victim of the regime.”³⁴⁸

The protests between 17 December and 8 January are marked by their demands on political reform and economic grievances. But after 8 January, when the police repression dramatically increased in Kasserine and Thalla in particular, killing roughly 21 people according to the authorities and closer to 50 according to the hospital sources, but then of retreatment from Kasserine and Thalla, the demands rapidly morphed into challenges to the regime and its symbols.³⁴⁹ The retreatment of police forces welcomed as the ‘liberation of the city’ which encourage the protesters throughout the country.³⁵⁰

³⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, “*Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*”, p. 5.

³⁴⁶ Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 21

³⁴⁷ Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 6.

³⁴⁸ International Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*, p. 4

³⁴⁹ International Crisis Group, *Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*, p. 5; Teije Hidde Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 6-7.

³⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, “*Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (IV): Tunisia’s Way*”, p. 5; Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 7.

After the general strike in Sousse on 12 January and Sfax on 13 January, the UGTT publicly voiced their support for the protests and called for a nationwide strike on 14 January 2011. That evening, it was officially announced that the president had left the country and would not be allowed to return. After Ben Ali's departure, the protests had continued in the country, even the police forces went on strike for better working conditions and salaries. Moreover, most political opposition parties joined the ongoing protests that demand RCD's removal, the end of the interim government led by Mohammed Ghannouchi. These ongoing protests that organized or/and supported by political parties and civil society had played vital role in empowering the authoritarian regime in Tunisia. Especially the two main protests in Kasbah on February and July had crippled the authoritarian regime and ruling coalition which had tried to rebound from the crisis in the country. In February 2011, protests in Kasbah demanded the end of the interim government, which composed of RCD members under the leadership of Mohammed Ghannouchi. On July 2011 the protests in Kasbah which was organized by an alliance of NGOs and human rights activists demanded more participation for Tunisian youth in transition process, accountability for police actions during the protests of 2010-2011, and postponement of the election date to provide parties more time to organize.³⁵¹ The interim Prime Minister Caid El Sebsi rescheduled the election date following the protests.

4.4. Conclusion

New political elites- urban and rural elites and administrative elites of party and state- dominated the ruling coalition during Ben Ali era. The unification of party and state was maintained. However, executive power and decision-making process was concentrated in Presidency while the regulatory functions of state were delegated to Ben Ali/Trabelsi Family. The deskilling and disqualification of government and the party in executive as well as transferring regulatory functions of state to Ben Ali/Trabelsi Family paralyzed the state and party. Coercive apparatus, on the other hand, became the absolute force of rule and order; however the fragmented structure of security apparatus produced coordination issue among different security services.

³⁵¹ BBC, "*Tunisia's interim government delays election*", 8 June 2011, Available Online at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13702372> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

As a result of this fragmentation, coercive apparatus failed to coordinate the crackdown of December 2010-January 2011 protests. Consequently all these altered the infrastructural mechanisms of authoritarian regime; and made regime more vulnerable to potential challenges.

The ruling elites also failed to sustain elite cohesion because political elites in ruling coalition were pacified and subordinated by Bin Ali/Trabelsi Family, those who also expand in the economy at the expense of economic elites that supported authoritarian regime.

Lastly, contrary to the general acceptance, civil society organizations contributed to both organization and spread of December 2010-January 2011 protests; sustain the protests structure and sustainability and played a crucial role in polarization of the protests.

CHAPTER 5

TRANSITION TO WHAT?

Tunisia's new political structures mark a radical and visible break from the authoritarian form of governance that prevailed during Ben Ali era however it is hard to claim that the country reforms the structures fully on the democratic principles. Democratic transition itself is a long process and always contains the risks of setbacks from democratization. Considering all these facts, this part so far aims to analyze how transition period have impacted the state and state-society relations; the new contestation structure, and the political elites in Tunisian politics in the new period

5.1. State in Transition

The new period in Tunisia marked a radical rupture from the authoritarian regime. The hegemony of the authoritarian regime ate in the political life started to diminish; arenas of contestation is opened to the opposition forces than might challenge the autocratic incumbents. The interim governments which rule the country till the first election after departure of Ben Ali and the provisional government that formed after 23 October 2011 election implied several reforms that transformed the authoritarian regime. The changes that have occurred in the last three years are categorized into two: the purging reforms that exclude the name affiliated to the former hegemonic authoritarian regimes, and structural reforms that transform authoritarian structure.

The purging reforms began during the first interim government led by Mohammed Ghannouchi, then continued during the previous interim government led by Cebi El Sebsi and still have imposed by the provisional government. The purging reforms started with the resignations on 27 January 2011 during the first interim government and continued with a wave of arrestments of the former high level of officials and family member of Ben Ali.

Many high level officials affiliated with Ben Ali was excluded or replaced by first interim government. 42 high-level officials were sacked from the Interior Ministry on February 2011. The former officials such as the former Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem, the former Head of the General Directorate of National Security, the former RCD Secretary General Mohamed Ghariani, the former Justice the former Minister Bechir Tekkari, Transport Minister Abderrahim Zouari, and the former Defence Minister Ridha Grira were arrested. On 18 July 2012 the former Head of Security Ali Serhati was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment and the former Minister of the Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem for 15 years' imprisonment while forty other former high officials received sentences ranging from five to 20 years' imprisonment. On 12 August 2011 25 family members of Ben Ali were sentenced to between 4 months and 6 years' imprisonment for crimes of forgery, aiding the deposed President to escape, illegal possession of currency and possessing and dealing in narcotics. Similarly on 1 May 2012 the Sfax Court of Justice passed the first sentence against two police officers for the death of a demonstrator during the revolution, sentencing them to 20 years' imprisonment and to pay compensation of 40,000 euros. In addition to these arrestments many officials were replaced after departure of Ben Ali. The first interim government for instance replaces the 24 regional governors on 2 February 2011 to calm down the protesters. On 26 June 2012 President Moncef Marzouki removed the Governor of the Central Bank Mustafa Kamel Nabli from the office due to the serious disagreements between him and the government on the independence of the Central Bank.

The provisional government, on the other hand, has intensified purging activities on the judiciary. The government ordered a large number of transfers and dismissals of judges without consulting magistrates that affected from the orders. According to the

Tunisian observatory of the Independence of the Judiciary (Observatoire tunisien de l'indépendance de la justice) the government transferred 100 judges to new positions between December 2011 and April 2012. Moreover, on May 2012, the government sacked 81 judges on the charges of corruption.

The structural reforms during the last three years, so far, have not been significant whereby the actual reforms of transition process “have been rather modest, so far, and have focused more on purges rather than on the structural transformations.”³⁵²

The scope of the structural reforms are narrow as well as the number of the cases are very limited however it is important to focus on these limited structural reforms on the security institutions, judiciary and administration which played crucial role in sustaining authoritarian regime in Tunisia.

The structural reforms on administration in Tunisia during the transition period have gain momentum after the dissolution of RCD, the ruling party of the authoritarian regime, and Chamber of Deputies, the upper house. RCD, as an undistinguishable organ of the authoritarian regime dominated the assembly as well as function as an administrative body of the state. With the dissolution of the party, liquidation of its properties and ban on RCD members from running in elections for 10 years put a radical rupture from party-state structure.

Chamber of Deputies, the upper house was just one of the pillars of increasing power of presidency during Ben Ali era. The powers of the president in the new era become a main reform field during the transition period. The provisional Constitution of 26 articles which regulate the powers of the Republic's Presidents, the government and the Assembly itself was approved. The Provincial Constitution reduced the power of the Presidency, created so far the balance of power between President and prime minister. According to the provisional constitution, the president has the power of outline foreign policy, in consultation with the prime minister, designate the head of

³⁵² Derek Lutterbeck, “After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia”, *Arab Reform Initiative*, Arab Reform Initiative, (Malta: Mediteranian Academy of Diplomatic Studies), 2012, p. 1, Available Online at: <http://www.arab-reform.net/sites/default/files/After%20the%20Fall.%20SSR%20in%20Post-Ben%20Ali.pdf> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

government, sign and promulgate laws passed by the Constituent Assembly, and command the armed forces.³⁵³ However Article 7 of the provincial constitution allows the president, the prime minister and the head of the assembly to assume additional powers in “exceptional circumstances” are not defined clearly.³⁵⁴ While the provincial constitution prevents the concentration of power on one hand, it still sustains hegemonic power to the government. This provincial constitution is in force until the new constitution is approved.

In turn, new constitution aims to deepen the structural reforms on administration. On 23 October 2012, the government submits to parliament the draft Constitution which is establishing a semi-presidential republic whereby the president would be elected by universal suffrage for five years and parliament would be responsible for forming the government. Professor Mohamed Chafik Sarsar notes three broad objectives of constitutional reform; reforming representative legislature, balancing executive power with the legislature, preventing excessively powerful legislature by establishing oversight of the legislature itself and ensuring it does not abuse the powers it holds.³⁵⁵

In the Tunisian constitution, the aim of reducing the power of the president is prominent. Articles 76-87 regulate the powers of the president. It reduced the specific and bilateral powers of the president.³⁵⁶ There are powers to return a bill to the legislature, in foreign policy collaborating with the Prime Minister and some powers over referendums.

³⁵³ Amine Ghali, “Tunisia’s Constitutional Process: The Road Ahead”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 9 Dec. 2011, Available Online at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/12/09/tunisia-s-constitutional-process-road-ahead/84zy> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁵⁴ Ghali, “*Tunisia’s Constitutional Process: The Road Ahead*”.

³⁵⁵ Sujit Choudhry & Richard Stacey, “Semi-Presidentialism as a Form of Government: Lessons for Tunisia”, *International IDEA & The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law*, p.1 Available Online at: http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/2_Choudhry_Stacey_Separation_of_Powers.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁵⁶ The full text of the Constitution dated is available online at: http://www.jasmine-foundation.org/doc/unofficial_english_translation_of_tunisian_constitution_final_ed.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014).

Another important emphasis of the constitution is decentralization motivation; however the repeated emphasis of unity and the weakness of the descriptions for the organization of sub-national governmental structure indicate that the system of government is tilted quite strongly in favor of the central exercise of authority.³⁵⁷ The formations of the local and regional units and the degree of their authority have not clear yet, whereas according to the constitution they are expected to serve for the regional development.³⁵⁸

The structural reforms on the security services, significantly internal security and intelligence apparatus, which were vital power base of the hegemonic authoritarian regime for suppressing the opposition and sustain its stability, occupy significant importance for democratization process. The former interim governments and the government in the office “committed themselves to transforming the Tunisian police into a “republican” police force’ which would serve the interests of the nation and its citizens rather than the regime in power, and which should operate strictly on the basis of the rule of law.”³⁵⁹ Considering the fact that the purging reforms on security services such as dismissals of high ranking officials and dissolution of the political police, have not fully sacked the cronies in important position within the Interior Ministry, there is not yet a broader structural reforms of the internal security apparatus, or a roadmap for the future projects of how structural reforms can be applied.³⁶⁰ There are also concerns that members of the political police were integrated into other security bodies.³⁶¹ Many reports written by international organization indicate that there is an urgent need for structural reform on the

³⁵⁷ The draft constitution had the similar issues. For detailed analysis, look at: Jörg Fedtke, *Tunisian Constitutional Reform and Decentralization: Reactions to the Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia*, International IDEA & The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law, June 2013. http://constitutionaltransitions.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/3_Fedtke_Decentralization.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁵⁸ Chapter 7 in the constitution regulates the local government.

³⁵⁹ Lutterbeck, “*After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia*”, p. 15.

³⁶⁰ Lutterbeck, “*After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia*”, p. 21.

³⁶¹ Amnesty International “*One step forward, two steps back? One year since Tunisia’s landmark elections*”, 2012, p. 2, Available Online at: <http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/one-step-forward-two-steps-back-one-year-since-tunisia-s-landmark-elections> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

international security apparatus whereas the ill-treatment, torture, arbitrary arrests and use of excessive force by the police have continued as in the former hegemonic authoritarian regime as well as the transparency of the Interior Ministry remains very limited.³⁶²

Justice system which was both an instrument of the former regime as well as a victim objected by the regime for the repression, has experienced some changes after Ben Ali's departure. However the changes are far from being structural reforms which can secure an independent, accountable and competent judiciary, and remain as purging reforms. The Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice, which is headed by senior Ennahda member Samir Dilou, was established by the government have concentrated purging reforms rather than a deep structural judicial reform.³⁶³ Replacement of the former Supreme Council of Magistrates and the judicial roadmap that prepared by the Ministry of Justice have not been went into action yet.³⁶⁴ Moreover, the purging reforms induce the allegations against the government because these purging reforms have been applied by unilaterally by the executive power which is the similar practices of the former regime.³⁶⁵

Chapter Five of constitution regulates judicial authority and contains provisions for judicial independence. During the Ben Ali era, judiciary was open to the direct penetration of the President, mainly because there was no a guarantee of judicial tenure, which ensure the removal and appointment mechanisms out of political

³⁶² Lutterbeck, *“After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia”*, Amnesty International, *“One step forward, two steps back? One year since Tunisia’s landmark elections”*; Amnesty International, *“Briefing: Last opportunity for Tunisian lawmakers to enshrine human rights for all in Tunisia’s new Constitution”*, 5 June 2013, Available Online at: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE30/005/2013/en> (Accessed 20.04.2014); Human Rights Watch, *Tunisia: Bystanders Shot in Clash with Police*, June 2013, Available Online at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/06/03/tunisia-bystanders-shot-clash-police> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁶³ Freedom House, *“Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Tunisia”*, p.11, Available Online at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/countries-crossroads/2012/tunisia#.U4iLnPI_uFU (Accessed 20.04.2014); Lutterbeck, *“After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia”*, p.24.

³⁶⁴ Lutterbeck, *“After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia”*, pp. 24-25.

³⁶⁵ Lutterbeck, *“After the Fall: Security Sector Reform in post-Ben Ali Tunisia”*, pp. 24-25.

control.³⁶⁶ The constitution has shortcomings to ensure the guarantee of judicial tenure.³⁶⁷ However Supreme Judicial Council, which is to establish according to the constitution, might serve for safeguarding judicial quality and independence.³⁶⁸ It is to be composed of four councils: the Judiciary Council, the Administrative Judicial Council, the Financial Judicial Council, and the Judicial Councils Organization.³⁶⁹

The transition period introduce significant ruptures from the hegemonic authoritarian regime in Tunisia especially from the party-state legacy. Moreover, many key high-ranking incumbents of the former regime were arrested, removed or replaced. However it is hard to claim that the authoritarian regime have been in a promising democratic transformation process.

5.2. Reframing State-Society Relations

The demise of hegemonic authoritarian regime triggered a boom in civil society in Tunisia. At the beginning of 2013, Tunisia had 14, 966 associations while one-third of these associations were established after 2011.³⁷⁰ These newly established associations are generally related to human rights, political and social liberties, democracy, freedom of expression, gender issues, social issues, economic and regional inequalities³⁷¹. They have penetrated Tunisian interior, the Central West and the South region, where the civil society organizations were not active during the

³⁶⁶ *Constitution of Tunisian Republic*, Chapter 5, Article 106, 2014.

³⁶⁷ Tom Ginsburg, “The Tunisian Judicial Sector: Analysis and Recommendations”, *IDEA Working Paper Series*, International IDEA & The Center for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law, 2013, p. 5 Available Online at: <http://constitutionaltransitions.org/consolidating-arab-spring/> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁶⁸ *Constitution of Tunisian Republic*, Chapter 10, Article 148.

³⁶⁹ *Constitution of Tunisian Republic*, Article 112.

³⁷⁰ Foundation for the Future, “*Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*”, Jan 2013, pp: 7-8, Available Online at: <http://www.foundationforfuture.org/en/Portals/0/Publications/Etude%20SC%20english%20Version%20Finale.pdf> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁷¹ Foundation for the Future, “*Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*”, p. 8.

hegemonic authoritarian regime.³⁷² 23 per cent of the new established associations are charitable and relief associations while the rest are operating in the field of human rights, environment, culture, art, and development.³⁷³

As the transition process in Tunisia prompted changes in state structure, it also sets about the process of reframing state-society relations which was based on patron-client relationship during the hegemonic authoritarian regime. The state, as a tutelary and the party, had been regulated economic, social and political life via extensive state and state-affiliated institutions networks. There is a remarkable shift in state-society relations in Tunisia since 2011. At this point, democratization process needs a drastic and permanent shift in popular sovereignty and an increasing ability of civil society actors to make demands upon the state, in Tunisia. In the new era, the demand of a new state-society relation that based on openness, equality representation and opportunity remains influential.³⁷⁴

The shift on the relations between state and society is studied by periodization of last three year into two eras: the interim governments' era and the ongoing era of the transitional government. During the first period, the interim governments led by Mohammed Ghannuchi and Cebi El Sebsi, the relation between state and society had rapidly shifted in favor of civil society. The main reason of this shift is that interim governments were lack of legitimacy in a time of mass mobilization while there was strong civil society alliance demand for concrete change. Hence, the two interim governments were forced to invite the broader participation of civil society to the process which sustain interim governments an ability to make decisions in the name of a broad political coalition. The interim governments, by reforming state laws, paved the way for greater civic participation as well as formation of new political parties and civic organizations.³⁷⁵ The first interim government formed the High

³⁷² Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 8

³⁷³ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, pp: 12-13

³⁷⁴ Shelley Deane, "Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Transition", *International Alert*, (February 2013), p. 16.

³⁷⁵ Deane, "Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Transition", p. 12; For more detailed information on the developments, see the publications of International Center for Not-for-

Commission for the Realization of Revolution Objectives, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition, the Commission of Establishment of Facts on Malpractice and Corruption; and the Commission for the Establishment of Facts on the Abuses Committed by the Former Regime on 18 February 2011.³⁷⁶ These three commissions were composed of a committee of experts as well as representatives from across the political spectrum and civil society.³⁷⁷ Among them, the High Commission for the Realization of Revolution Objectives, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition was directly responsible for the political reform process to allow a democratic transition, and existed of 131 members.³⁷⁸ In addition second interim government led by Cebi El Sebsi, promulgated the Decree-Law No. 88 on 24 September 2011, which replaced the Ministry of the Interior with the General Secretariat of the Government as the authority responsible for the creation of an association and eliminated the requirement of a visa and the waiting period that was imposed during the former regime.³⁷⁹ As Alexis Arieff notes, “interim authorities appear to be sincerely attempting to respond to the public’s demand for a transformation of the political system based on broad consultations.”³⁸⁰

In the second era, the civil society involvement in democratization process have been decelerated, mainly because, the provisional government and the National Constituent Assembly have the legitimacy sustained by the election in 2011. There

Profit Law (ICNL), Available Online at: <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁷⁶ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, “*Constitutional Reform in Arab Countries: Tunisia*”, Available Online at: <http://www.library.cornell.edu/colldev/mideast/Interim%20Government.html> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁷⁷ Asma Nouira, “Tunisian change, blessings and curses”, The Daily Star, 12 April 2011, Available Online at: <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Article.aspx?id=136228#axzz34XQ6R2Vf> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁷⁸ Asma Nouira, “Obstacles on the Path of Tunisia’s Democratic Transformation”, *Carnegie Endowment*, 30 March 2011, Available Online at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/03/30/obstacles-on-path-of-tunisia-s-democratic-transformation/6bej> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁷⁹ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 17.

³⁸⁰ Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia”, *Congressional Research Service*, 27 June 2011, p.2.

are still numerous initiatives involving civil society in the activities of transition period. First of all the National Constituent Assembly formed a committee, composed of six members, responsible for the relations with civil society as well as have held weekly talks with civil society representatives concerning the constitution in six of Tunisia's governorates.³⁸¹ Moreover, a meeting on the theme "Towards a Participatory Development of the Constitution." was held on September 14-15, 2012 in the headquarters of the National Constituent Assembly.³⁸² Also the associations were invited to attend sessions contributing to the work of these committees in drafting the Constitution.³⁸³

Similarly by the Ministry of Regional Development prepared the "White Book" which "mobilizing civil society around regional development plans through setting up a mechanism of dialogue and cooperation with qualified associations and NGOs, as well as consultative arrangements established by law for the organized involvement of citizens."³⁸⁴

However there is no legal/formal mechanism or device of cooperation for the dialogue between state and civil society.³⁸⁵ Foundation for Future explains this situation as;

Since the revolution, the creation of 3000 new associations has changed the deal both quantitatively and qualitatively Officials understand the demand for participation expressed by CSOs: This is a new development that has long been due, and the fact that associations are now in direct contact with the Public Administration is an achievement in itself. Yet,

³⁸¹ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 19; Tunisia Live, "Tunisian Civil Society to Weigh in on Constitutional Draft", 19 December 2012 Available Online at: <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/12/19/tunisian-civil-society-to-weigh-in-on-constitutional-draft/> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁸² Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 19

³⁸³ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p. 19

³⁸⁴ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 18.

³⁸⁵ Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia (PDCS), "The Role of Civil Society in a Transition Period: Sharing the Slovak Experience with Tunisia", April 2012, pp. 8-9.; Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 18-19.

dialogue has not been completely established. Several factors on both sides of the fence explain this situation. Thus, in a context where the mechanisms and tools have not yet been developed, the status of the existing dialogue is subject to the uncertainty as to the convergence of two elements: government's initiatives and pressures exerted by civil society.³⁸⁶

On the other hand a leader of a Tunisian civil society organization argues that “a lot of NCA members think that by being elected, they have already engaged with the public; [they] don't realize that they need to go back and consult with their constituency.”³⁸⁷

Under these conditions civil society organizations involved the transition process through the pressure organizing protest demonstrations or contributing recommendations during closing seminars and roundtables.³⁸⁸ For instance on August 2012 women rights associations together with other civil society organizations organized big protests against the article on women in constitution. The article basically described the women “as a real partner of men in the mission of the homeland building, and the roles of both should complement each other within the household.”³⁸⁹ This description then removed from the draft constitution due the increasing protests and civil society pressure and replaced as “Women and men shall be partners in the construction of the society and the state.”³⁹⁰

The lack of formal mechanisms for cooperation and even for dialogue, have impacted the civil society involvement to the transitional process in a more acute way. Together with the weakness of the local government, the transmission from the

³⁸⁶ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p:19

³⁸⁷ Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia (PDCS), “*The Role of Civil Society in a Transition Period: Sharing the Slovak Experience with Tunisia*”, p.9.

³⁸⁸ Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p: 19.

³⁸⁹ Al Jazeera, “*Wording on women sparks protest in Tunisia*”, 19 August 2012, Available Online at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2012/08/201281981854620325.html> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

³⁹⁰ Article 11 in the Draft Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, 22 April 2013.

Tunisian interior to the centre, as well as, the cooperation between local government and civil society organizations is very low.³⁹¹

5.3. The New Contestation Structure: Fair and Free Elections

On 23 October Tunisia held constituent assembly elections. The Islamist party Ennahda obtained 89 of the 217 seats of the National Assembly while the Congress for the Republic (CPR) won 29 seats of, and Ettakatol won 20 seats in the National Assembly.³⁹² These three parties agreed to form a coalitional government on November 2011. Hamadi Jebali from Ennahda Party became the new Prime Minister and the leader of the CPR, Moncef Marzouki occupied the position of President of the Republic while Mustapha Ben Jafar, from Ettakatol, became the Speaker of Parliament.

Hamadi Jebali resigned after the assassination of a prominent opposition leader Chokri Belaid in February 2013. Ali Larayedh as a new Prime Minister formed a new coalitional government existed of the same partners, CPR and Ettakatol on March 2013.

The troika government led by Ennahda has led the transition process in the country and mainly has been charged with drafting a new constitution together with other basic law such as press and electoral code, performing quasi-legislative functions like approving the annual budgets, and preparing for future parliamentary and/or presidential elections.

Ennahda is the dominant actor in the troika government where it has been dominated the ministerial posts which was 40% in the first troika government then reduced to

³⁹¹ Partners for Democratic Change Slovakia (PDCS), “*The Role of Civil Society in a Transition Period: Sharing the Slovak Experience with Tunisia*”, p. 10; Foundation for the Future, *Study on Civil Society Organizations in Tunisia*, p:20.

³⁹² Tunisia Live, “*Final Results of Tunisian Elections Announced*”, 14 November 2011, Available online at: <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/14/tunisian-election-final-results-tables/> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

28%.³⁹³ In addition being the most dominant partner of the transition, Ennahda become a vital actor due to its political Islamic references. Hence its approach to the relationship between Islam and democracy will have undeniable impact on rotation of democratization process in Tunisia. The historical background of the party has been summarized in the previous chapter, as a result this part focus on the context of actual policies of last three years, especially during the troika governments.

Sarah J. Feuer argues that “Ennahdha has demonstrated a commitment to key components of a democracy, including the separation of powers and broad participation in elections and office holding.”³⁹⁴ Such a conclusion, in the study, is based on analyzes of three major sources of political pressure on Ennahdha’s governance: “the secular interests of Tunisian society and their representatives in the government; a small but vocal contingent of Salafists urging adoption of Islamic law; and diverging ideological trends within Ennahdha.”³⁹⁵

Despite the fact that Ennahda still protects its unity, the divisions, mainly between softliners and hardliners, become more visible on their responses to these three political pressures. This division also indicates the division between new and old generation as well as the party leadership and lower wing.

The softliners, that in general existed of older and less confrontational generation of members who had experienced exile and imprisonment during the former regime, for now dominant group and hold the party leadership.³⁹⁶ Moreover Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta sub-divide the party leadership into two camps: the leadership

³⁹³ Michael Collins, “Tunisia Names a Government at Last”, *Middle East Institute Blog*, 8 March 2013.

³⁹⁴ Sarah J. Feuer, “Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia’s Ennahdha Nine Months In”, *Brandeis University Crown Center for Middle East Studies*, No: 66, September 2012, p.2.

³⁹⁵ Feuer, “*Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia’s Ennahdha Nine Months In*”, p.2.

³⁹⁶ Feuer, “*Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia’s Ennahdha Nine Months In*”, pp. 5-6.

in exile and the leadership of the interior.³⁹⁷ The two groups remained connected with each other and share the ideological and theoretical base whereas they separated in practices in the politics especially after the revolution. The two main preoccupations after 2011 crystallized the differences among these two groups: revision of the organizational structure of the party and re-elaboration of the ideological tenets of the party within the framework of Islamism to compete in the newly plural system.³⁹⁸

The leadership in exile led by Ghannouchi, has acted as an intellectual hub and a lobbying group, constitutes the militant group who occupy more radical approach especially on the issue of cooperating with the elements of the former regime³⁹⁹ and avoids the clarify the Islamic project, which also highlight the relation between state/politics and religion, in order to prevent the splits within the party.⁴⁰⁰ The fear of splits within the party is accelerated with the pro-active policies of Salafi groups in the country. They have political parties like Jabhat al-Islah (The Reform Front) and Hizb al-Tahrir (Party of Freedom); social movements like Ansar al-Shari‘a (Supporters of the Sharia); and violent groups that self-identifying as Salafists.⁴⁰¹ In the elections none of their candidates or party won any seat in the assembly; however it is rumored that they took the control of more than two hundred mosques throughout the country.⁴⁰² Compare to their small size; they have engaged in highly visible and religiously oriented protests, in some cases committing violent acts

³⁹⁷ Fabio Merone and Francesco Cavatorta, “Ennahda: A Party in Transition”, *Jadaliyya*, 25 March 2013.

³⁹⁸ Merone and Cavatorta, “*Ennahda: A Party in Transition*”.

³⁹⁹ Mona Yahia, “Tunisia political isolation law divides Ennahda”, *Magrebia*, 21 June 2013.

⁴⁰⁰ Merone and Cavatorta, “*Ennahda: A Party in Transition*”; Erik Churchill and Aaron Zelin, “A Balancing Act: Ennahda's Struggle with Salafis”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 19 April 2012.

⁴⁰¹ Feuer, “*Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia's Ennahdha Nine Months In*”, p. 4

⁴⁰² Feuer, “*Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia's Ennahdha Nine Months In*”, p. 4.

against civilians and state officials.⁴⁰³ Politically they cover radical demand such as implementation of Sharia and Caliphate; however their coalition is loose and a broad umbrella of religiously conservative social movements.⁴⁰⁴ Jihadist group inside these Salafists seems to be quite small⁴⁰⁵, while the wide range of them are existed of the youth that search to engage political life in Tunisia.⁴⁰⁶

On one hand Ennahda tries to engage these Salafi groups into the legal political life in order to prevent their radicalization, on the other hand, there is an ongoing operations to winnow out the radical elements within these groups. Ennahda's participation to the Salafi meetings, which is also highly criticized by opposition, aims engagement of these groups into political process, even into Ennahda Party. It is also important to note that with the appointment of Lotfi Ben Jeddou to the Ministry of Interior, a crack down on Salafis groups began with the support of Algeria and Western allies.⁴⁰⁷

On the other hand, the leadership of the interior stayed in prison for years and then established networks of support for the liberated prisoners and their families in cooperation with associations such as the League of Human Rights, the Association, and Liberty and Equity.⁴⁰⁸ This cooperation with the human rights organization elaborated a common vision of basic freedoms and democracy with leftist and secular groups in Tunisia.⁴⁰⁹ Also they introduce more pragmatic approach on issue of clarifying the Islamic project and suggest the "democratic praxis of power rather

⁴⁰³ Monica Marks, "Who are Tunisia's Salafis?", *Foreign Policy*, 28 September 2012; Feuer, "Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia's Ennahdha Nine Months In", p. 4.

⁴⁰⁴ Marks, "Who are Tunisia's Salafis?".

⁴⁰⁵ Marks, "Who are Tunisia's Salafis?".

⁴⁰⁶ Al Ahram, "Q&A with Ennahda's Ajmi Lourimi", 6 August 2012.

⁴⁰⁷ Francis Ghilès, "Still a Long Way to Go for Tunisian Democracy", *Barcelona Center for International Affairs (CIDOB)*, Notes internacionales CIDOB, No: 73, May 2013, Available Online at: http://www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/notes_internacionales/n1_73/still_a_long_way_to_go_for_tunisian_democracy (Accessed 20.04.2014).

⁴⁰⁸ Merone and Cavatorta, "Ennahda: A Party in Transition".

⁴⁰⁹ Merone and Cavatorta, "Ennahda: A Party in Transition".

than the Ikhwani application of Islamic political mythology.”⁴¹⁰ For instance, Ajmi Lourimi states their position as;

We have already agreed that our identity is Arab and Islamist and there is an agreement on the implementation of the first article of the 1959 Constitution, which says that Tunisia is an independent and sovereign state, Islam is its religion, Arabic is its language and its regime is republican. There is also an agreement on the respect of individual liberties. Hence a girl shall be able to wear or not wear the veil. We suffered from the ban of the veil by force so we should not impose it by force either... We agreed on peaceful alternation of power and to let ballot boxes decide [who would govern]. These are principles that can serve as a framework for coexistence.⁴¹¹

Abdelfattah Mourou, Ajmi Lourimi, Hammadi Jebali, and Ali Larayedh are leading figures of the leadership of the interior who restructure the party organization, have deep experience, and network with other political actors of the country.⁴¹² Ajmi Lourimi states the need for the separation between the party and movement, the politics and proselytizing, which would be in the agenda of the next party convention.⁴¹³ The leadership of interior also argues to remove the political ban on the former RCD member which significantly differs from Ghanouchi’s approach. Hamadi Jebali argues that the exclusion of RCD politicians is equal to the exclusion of Ennahda during the former regime.⁴¹⁴

While the general picture is like this in the party leadership, the debate on the Islamic project and the relation between state/politics and religion had shaped the party’s lower wing. The most significant group in the lower wing is the hardliners who are young and more conservative generation has put pressure on the party leadership to move closer to the Salafist parties and more radical approach on the implementation

⁴¹⁰ Merone and Cavatorta, “*Ennahda: A Party in Transition*”.

⁴¹¹ Al Ahram, “*Q&A with Ennahda’s Ajmi Lourimi*”.

⁴¹² Merone and Cavatorta, “*Ennahda: A Party in Transition*”.

⁴¹³ Al Ahram, “*Q&A with Ennahda’s Ajmi Lourimi*”.

⁴¹⁴ Yahia, “*Tunisia political isolation law divides Ennahda*”.

of Sharia.⁴¹⁵ A large numbers of Ennahda's members have dissented from the party leadership on the issue of Sharia, where a poll indicates that a small majority of the party is in favor of including Sharia in the constitution whereas influential majority of the party's political council is not.⁴¹⁶ In general this confrontation leads to radically different interpretations within the party;

For many within the party, the Islamic project still coincides with the creation of an Islamic state at some stage down the line and their political actions reflect this vision. For others, the Islamic project has mutated into the creation of a civil state that is Islamic only in so far as there are no barriers to public displays of religiosity as in Ben Ali's times and Islam can legitimately occupy social space. [...]There is no need now to Islamize or secularize the society but rather to democratize it.⁴¹⁷

Despite the fact that the hardliners have the potential of gravitating to more radical spectrum of Salafi's stance in Tunisian politics, the leadership of the party which can labeled as "conservative", has been able to sustain the unity of the party even though their practical and ideological divisions till now.

The Congress for the Republic, led by Moncef Marzouki, is labeled as conservative, secular and central party. It was founded on July 24th, 2001 but did not get legal approval during the former regime. Its leader, Moncef Marzouki was former member of the Tunisian League for Human Rights and fled the country during Ben Ali era. The party's members had been objected repression and arrestments before 2011.

The Congress for the Republic adopted a conservative political ideology with its commitment to the secular politics and has developed close relations with Ennahda since it was formed. However party's alliance with Ennahda in troika government split the party which has limited representatives in the Constituent Assembly. The

⁴¹⁵ Feuer, "Middle East Brief: Islam and Democracy in Practice: Tunisia's Ennahdha Nine Months In", p. 6; Al Ahram, "Q&A with Ennahda's Ajmi Lourimi".

⁴¹⁶ Duncan Pickard, "The Current Status of Constitution Making in Tunisia", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 19 April 2012; Churchill and Zelin, "A Balancing Act: Ennahda's Struggle with Salafis".

⁴¹⁷ Merone and Cavatorta, "Ennahda: A Party in Transition".

leader of the party, Moncef Marzouki, is less directly involved in internal party affairs because he is also the president of Tunisia since December 2011.⁴¹⁸ The party had 29 seats in the assembly but their number decreased when 12 representative of the party left The Congress for the Republic and formed a new party, Independent Democratic Congress.

Mohammed Abbou, Secretary-General of the Tunisian Congress for the Republic, responded the increasing critics with noting that “party’s alliance with the Islamist Ennahda is temporary and only intended to ensure the country’s political stability... [and] will end after the 2013 elections.”⁴¹⁹ Moreover Abbou also states that there are differences between Ennahda and the Congress for the Republic Party on the values of civil state.⁴²⁰

The Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties FDTL), also referred to as Ettakatol, is labeled as secular and left party. It was a small and legal party during the former regime and many of its members including its leader Mustafa Ben Jaafar split from MDS in 1990s. The party has positioned itself a negotiator between the other two parties in the troika government.⁴²¹ However Ettakatol also suffers from splits like the Congress for the Republic due to its alliance with Ennahda. Many of its members transferred to Nida Tounes.⁴²²

The three party of the troika government have faced serious internal division and challenges. Ennahda’s future position on the relation between politics and state will

⁴¹⁸ Marina Ottaway, “The Tunisian Political Spectrum: Still Unbalanced”, *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 19 June 2012.

⁴¹⁹ The original interview text is in Arabic at website of Al Khaleej and is available online in English at the website of Al Monitor: Al Monitor, “Secular Tunisian Party Set to Drop Islamist Ennahda After 2013 Vote”, 20 October 2012, Available online at: <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/fr/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/tunisia-secular-party-set-to-drop-islamist-ennahda-after-2013-vote.html> (Accessed 20.04.2014).

⁴²⁰ Al Monitor, “*Secular Tunisian Party Set to Drop Islamist Ennahda After 2013 Vote*”.

⁴²¹ Amel Djait, “Ettakatol a-t-il encore du souffle pour mobiliser ?”, *WMC*, 9 July 2013

⁴²² Kapitalis, “*Deux députés d'Ettakatol rejoignent Nida Tounes*”, 9 July 2013.

influence the transformation of the party while the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol have encounter serious challenges in their parties.

5.4. Conclusion

Tunisia's new political structures mark a radical and visible break from the authoritarian form of governance that prevailed during Ben Ali era. Current transition process in Tunisia indicates that authoritarian regimes become vulnerable to challenges and the democratization becomes an option when authoritarian regimes are unable to reach or manege the infrastructural powers of state. In Tunisia, the state has entered a deep transformation process which disabled the links between the authoritarian regime and the state to a significant extent. During the first part of the process purging reforms were adopted and, thus a significant number of figures affiliated to the former authoritarian regime were excluded. The break of connections between authoritarian regime and state also pushed political elites of the regime to carry reforms on behalf of democratization and liberalization. In Tunisia, political elites of the regime began to adopt some significant reforms. After the exclusion of hard liners of the former authoriatarian regime, the new political elites, today, continue to work on structural reforms that transform authoritarian structure. There are also strong indications of reframing the state-society relations on democratic basis. Lastly, the contestation structure is transformed and the restrictions on political and social life eased. Despite all these positive developments and indicators, it is early to predict that Tunisia is going to complete its democratic transformation. The possible splits in Nahda and secular parties constitute vital threats to democratization.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The examination and comparison of contentious episodes in Tunisia shows that the dependent variables suggested by this thesis from the outset are relevant in explaining the durability and stability of authoritarian regime in Tunisia. Primarily, this thesis analyzed the relationship between the capacities of authoritarian regimes and the opposition on the one hand and durability and stability of authoritarian regimes on the other hand.

As discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, authoritarian regime in Tunisia had been challenged by two major crises. The first challenge to durability and stability of authoritarian regime in Tunisia was triggered by exclusion of some political elites from the ruling coalition as a result of policy change in economy in 1969 and resulted with authoritarian upgrading in 1987. The challenge that was encountered between 1969 and 1987 consisted of multidimensional crises which can be categorized as two elite defection crises and prolonged mass protests. The second challenge to durability and stability of authoritarian regime in Tunisia was stimulated by the popular uprisings of 2010-2011. The mass protests then produced elite defection in the ruling coalition.

In these two periods, the authoritarian regime in Tunisia faced both mass protests and elite defection, however the outcome of these crises are different in these cases. The regime in Tunisia survived the first by upgrading the authoritarian regime while the

second one pushed it into a deep transformation which may have led to democratization. By comparing these two crises in Tunisia, this thesis analyzed the causal relations between durability and stability of authoritarian regime (dependent variable) and capacity of regime (independent variable 1) and capacity of the opposition (independent variable 2).

The capacity of regimes depends on the level of their ability to avoid or resolve conflicts decisively in their favor. So this thesis indicates that there are two interconnected variables, the infrastructural powers of state and cohesion of ruling elite, which shape the capacity of a regime.

The examination and comparison of contentious episodes in Tunisia shows that two infrastructural powers of state, coercion and cultivating dependence, played key role in durability and stability of the authoritarian regime. These two infrastructural powers had been sustained by coercive apparatus, ruling party which is organized as a state organ and subordinated mass organizations in Tunisia. So durability and stability of authoritarian regime depended on the level of infrastructural powers.

During the first decade of independence, authoritarian regime in Tunisia cultivated dependence via corporatism; merger of state and party; and subordination of mass organization. During the independence struggle, Neo-Destour Party structured a hierarchical party organization which served like state machinery by organizing masses, operating education programs, and collecting revenues to finance independence struggle. Neo-Destour Party utilized from mass organizations such as class based associations, youth, student and women rights associations. With independence, the structural capacity of party and mass organizations transformed to state apparatus which had been suffering infrastructural power weaknesses. This transfer had actualized by merging party and state; and by subordination of mass organizations. The considerable majority of political elites took part in ruling coalition but they lost their autonomy due to intense and gradual centralization of state power by absorbing the party and mass organizations. However, adopting *infatih*, liberalization policy in economy in 1969 led to the exclusion of subordinated mass organization which was absorbed by the state in the first decade of

independence. This decision also decreased the power of cultivating dependence and led to the elite defection which produced a long-lasting crisis in the ruling coalition between 1969 and 1987 as well as prolonged mass protests in the country. However, the authoritarian regime still was able to cultivate dependence via the ruling party and state machinery and also to use power of coercion to suppress the opponents and mass protests. Exclusion of subordinated mass organizations led to a highly centralized, authoritarian and personalized structure of state.⁴²³ Monopolization of all aspects of social and political life by an interventionist and progressive state created a more paternalistic and authoritarian regime in Tunisia.⁴²⁴ The ruling party and state apparatus provided infrastructural powers for coercion and cultivating dependence, so authoritarian regime in Tunisia was able to put an end to crises even though it could not resolve the core issues which caused them. The ruling party, whose name then was changed to Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) had continued to sustain infrastructural power to an authoritarian regime with its expanded structure. The party continued to function as intermediaries of the central power and to propagate official discourse, to implement those discourses by setting up and running associations, to guide social and professional life and to report and to response to the crisis that occurred. As can be noticed, the functions of the ruling party varied from security to civil society. Coercive apparatus expanded in number after 1987 and continue to occupy a pivotal role in sustaining durability and stability of authoritarian regime in Tunisia.

Contrary to the first challenge, authoritarian regime failed to overcome the crisis which emerged with popular protests of 2010-2011, because it lacked productive use of infrastructural powers which was sustained by the state, ruling party and coercive apparatus. The state was weakened in the last decades especially because the executive power and decision-making process were concentrated in the Presidency

⁴²³ Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*, p. 49.

⁴²⁴ Dirk Vandewalle, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 42, No: 4 (1988: Autumn), p.604.

while the regulatory functions of state were delegated to Ben Ali/Trabelsi Family.⁴²⁵ This high concentration of power in Presidency subordinated the government and the party. In addition, transferring regulatory functions of state to Ben Ali/Trabelsi Family left no adequate margins for maneuver capacity for taking the initiative or any meaningful autonomy for the decision-makers of the party and state apparatus.⁴²⁶

Coercive apparatus, on the other hand, became the absolute force of rule and order in the country especially by 1990s.⁴²⁷ The security apparatus flourished in a number of different services such as state security, the special services, the general intelligence services, the guidance services, the municipal police, the presidential security forces, the services of the National Guard, the custom services, the interior revenue, the health services, the department of foreign trade, and the CNSS.⁴²⁸ However the fragmented structure of security apparatus produced a decentralized security apparatus and thus, produced a coordination issue between different security services. As a result of this fragmentation, coercive apparatus failed to coordinate the crackdown of December 2010-January 2011 protests. Consequently all these altered the infrastructural mechanisms of the authoritarian regime; and made the regime more vulnerable to potential challenges.

The capacity of the regime determines the abilities of the regime to overcome crises with which it faced, while the capacity of the opposition in the authoritarian regime formed potential challenges; their ability to expand the duration and locality of challenge; to politicize the challenge and; to overturn the regime.

By end of 1970s, the economy experienced a downturn which triggered a series of protests and strikes. The early student protests were followed by worker strikes and finally turned into a general unrest. By the mid-1980s, competitiveness of labor

⁴²⁵ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 269; Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, p. 62.

⁴²⁶ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 269.

⁴²⁷ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, p. 64.

⁴²⁸ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 82.

reached its peak while the Bread Riots broke out in Qasserine in 1984. Also, the expelled factions in PSD gave pulse to emergence of new oppositional movements in Tunisia after 1970s. The liberals that were expelled from the party after their demands to democratize the party structure formed Movement of Social Democrats (MSD). The other expelled group, the socialists, established Popular Unity Movement (MUP). In 1970, the Nahda Movement under the name of Quranic Preservation Society (QPS) was formed and in April 1981, transformed into a political party named the Islamic Tendency Movement (Harikat al-Ittihad al-Islami) which later was renamed “Nahda”. All these oppositional movements were not legal in the mid-1970s. In addition they lacked the resources to build broad support across the country. So the UGTT became attractive to oppositional forces because it had well-endowed political resources as a press, an autonomous financial base, numerous seats in parliament, and international forum at the ICFTU as well as the ILO.⁴²⁹ Despite the fact that the UGTT posed serious challenges to the authoritarian regime by mobilizing masses, organizing strikes and becoming a platform for other oppositional forces; its agenda largely remained restricted on labor wages and rights, and government’s economic policies.

The political parties were not able to politicize the mass protests in accordance of pushing the authoritarian regime for political liberalization because of their capacity’s weakness. Their efforts to force the leadership of the UGTT to distance itself from the regime in order to attach the UGTT a position for political and economic change by organizing strikes failed because state-sponsorship hindered the development of enthusiasm for political liberalization as well as repressive policies of the regime diminished its structural and financial capacity after 1978.

Contrary to the crises period of 1969-1987, opposition became succesful to pose a vital challenge to authoritarian regime in Tunisia. Tunisian civil society, prominently labor, student and democratization/human rights movements, provided institutional structure for the protests, so the protests were able to spread from the periphery to the centre of the country. Civil society organizations also aided in organization of

⁴²⁹ Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 102.

protests, mobilization of the youth and gaining public support, and provided protesters both structure and sustainability.

Civil society in Tunisia began to flourish after 1990; developed their organizational capacity by the mid-2000s; and organized or supported several protests in the country. The new norms of civil engagement and new network of relations emerged in Tunisia especially due to the weakness of the political parties.

Before the 2010-2011 popular protests, there had been significant protests and strikes which remained local and short in duration with the participation of workers and young activists, and began to attract nationwide attention.⁴³⁰ Although these protests remained local and short in duration, there was a trend of increasing participation by the labor unions, professional syndicates, young political bloggers, and journalists. In addition to this trend, these pioneer protests in Tunisian periphery produced a new type of coordination and network of relations among the civil society actors, the cross-movement relations to channel, coordinate and sustain popular discontent.⁴³¹ So the emergence and development of the new type of coordination and network of relations among the civil society actors created the impetus for greater collaboration across the civil society organization. As well as united “Islamists of various stripes, left-wing trade unionists, economic and social liberals, and French-style secularists”⁴³² around the economic and social demands for change. During the protests of 2010-2011, civil society organizations formed local coordination bodies, issued press releases, coordinated action, fine tuned demands, and formed an infrastructure to manage and sustain the protests.⁴³³

After the ouster of Ben Ali, the role of civil society in the demise of the authoritarian regime was also prominent. The interim governments led by Mohammed Ghannouchi and Cebi El Sebsi, were forced to invite the broader participation of civil society to

⁴³⁰ Ottaway and Hamzawy, “*Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World*” pp: 5-6.

⁴³¹ Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, pp. 21-22.

⁴³² Deane, “*Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia’s Transition*”, p.15.

⁴³³ Donker, “*COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity*”, p. 6.

the process by ongoing pressure and protests. The interim governments reformed state laws and so enabled greater civic participation as well as formation of new political parties and civic organizations.⁴³⁴ During the interim governments, civil society organizations involved in newly established commissions; the High Commission for the Realization of Revolution Objectives, Political Reforms and Democratic Transition, the Commission of Establishment of Facts on Malpractice and Corruption; and the Commission for the Establishment of Facts on the Abuses Committed by the Former Regime on 18 February 2011.⁴³⁵ Increasing involvement of civil society organizations to the process forced authoritarian regime to retreat and then to demise.

This thesis also analyzed the relationship between the elite cohesion in a ruling coalition and durability and stability of an authoritarian regime. The role of cohesion in ruling coalition is emphasized in many works on durability of authoritarianism. In general, several works share the common ground that collapse of authoritarian regime is structurally precluded by the maintenance of elite cohesion.⁴³⁶ Hence elite defection presents an existential threat to durability of authoritarian regime.

However the findings of this thesis indicate that elite defection does not always lead demise of authoritarian regime. Moreover, the crises period that analyzed in this thesis imply that victory of soft-liners in ruling coalition can also end up with an authoritarian upgrade. The level of threat posed by elite defection depends on the ruling elite's access to infrastructural power of regime.

⁴³⁴ Deane, "*Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Transition*", p. 12; For more detailed information on the changes; See International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL), Available online at: <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf> (Accessed 20.04.2014)

⁴³⁵ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, "*Constitutional Reform in Arab Countries: Tunisia*".

⁴³⁶ Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jason Brownlee, "Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism", CDDRL Working Papers, Available online at: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20761/brownlee_working_paper.pdf (Accessed 20.04.2014); Lust-Okar, Ellen and Amaney Jamal, "Rulers and rules - Reassessing the influence of regime type on electoral law formation." *Comparative Political Studies* Vol: 35, No:3, (2002), pp. 337-366.

As mentioned before, between 1969 and 1987 there were two major elite defection crises. The first elite defection in ruling coalition emerged as a result of policy change in economy in 1969. Factions in ruling coalition began to crystallize due to policy change in economy by 1970s. The crystallization of elite defection in ruling party led exclusion of socialist and left wing party members who supported cooperative movement.⁴³⁷ Between 1971 and 1974, liberal elites under the leadership of Ahmed Mestiri expelled from or forced to resign the ruling party following their demand of a deep reform to democratize the party structure and restore its credibility.⁴³⁸ Party elites and ruling elites periodically were cycled in 1974, 1977, and 1980⁴³⁹ and the number of security establishment members in ruling coalition dramatically increased during this era.⁴⁴⁰ Bourguiba's successor, Ben Ali, had risen from security establishment through high and ranks of the Ministry of Interior.⁴⁴¹ The exclusion of these political elites following the first elite defection crisis triggered mass protests as well as emergence of opposition outside the ruling party.

The second elite defection crisis took place between the older generation of the ruling party and the new generation of the party and the state administration, and the new political elites which existed of rural notables and the urban bourgeoisie. In 1987 the older generation was expelled from the ruling coalition after the ouster of Bourguiba and their seats were filled by the cadre sympathetic to his economic liberalization agenda, mainly with businessmen and large land-owners that benefited from increasing liberalization.⁴⁴²

This elite defection led to the authoritarian upgrading in Tunisia after 1987, however, elite defection which triggered by 2010-2011 popular protests led to the demise of

⁴³⁷ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, p.44.

⁴³⁸ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, p.44.

⁴³⁹ Gregory White, *A comparative Political Economy of Morocco and Tunisia*, (New York: University of New York Press, 2001), p. 150.

⁴⁴⁰ White, *A comparative Political Economy of Morocco and Tunisia*, p. 151.

⁴⁴¹ White, *A comparative Political Economy of Morocco and Tunisia*, p. 151.

⁴⁴² King, "Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa" p. 450.

authoritarian regime. After 1987, not only the component of ruling coalition but also its structure had transformed. Increasing presidentialism dissolved the power of administrative elites of state and party in the ruling coalition and diminished them the implementers and amplifiers of the decisions taken by the President.⁴⁴³ In addition, the presidency or in other words the President and his family became the only connection among the elements of the ruling coalition. This situation also led to a power struggle in the ruling coalition and prevented autonomous acts of ruling elites. The family of the former president and his wife penetrated the security and state apparatus which not only paralyzed but also deepened the fragmentation among the ruling coalition.

Between the emergence of popular uprisings and ouster of Ben Ali, the ruling elite could not coordinate to take over the control of developments. Their efforts to combat the protests failed, while there are rumors that the inner circle of security officials attempted to topple Ben Ali in those days. Splits and power struggles among ruling elites had continued after the ouster of Ben Ali. As a result, the coalition could not unite to overcome the challenges posed by widespread demonstrations in 2010-2011. The inner-circle security officers in police forces, the RCD, the ruling party, and the political police were eliminated in the first couple of months. The soft-liners of the administrative elites in the state apparatus eliminated the prominent hardliners and cooperated with the opposition to transform the authoritarian regime.

Despite the fact that the authoritarian regime had faced two major elite defection crises; the ruling elites were able to manage the regime capacity which was provided by the ruling party and state apparatus between 1969 and 1987. In contrast, the ruling elite could not prevent demise of the authoritarian regime in 2011 because their abilities to manage the infrastructural powers of regime were damaged by increasing presidentialism and paralyzation of state apparatus.

To conclude this thesis has argued that the capacity of regimes and opposition has direct impact on durability and stability of authoritarian regimes and that elite

⁴⁴³ Erdle, “*Discussion Paper: Industrial Policy in Tunisia*”, p. 16.

defections in ruling coalition pose existential threats to durability and stability of authoritarian regimes when the abilities of ruling elites to manage capacity of regime are damaged. Comparison with different periods of crises confirms the plausibility of these hypotheses, however systematic testing across other cases is necessary to establish validity of this hypothesis since this thesis analyzed only one case, Tunisia.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

1980'lerden beri Güney Amerika ve Doğu Avrupa'da demokratikleşmenin üçüncü dalgasının yayılmasıyla birlikte ortaya çıkan küresel demokratik canlanmaya rağmen, Ortadoğu'da demokratik olmayan rejimler kayda değer bir direnç göstermiş ve iktidarda kalmaya devam etmişlerdir. Ancak, Ocak 2011 ile birlikte, Ortadoğu'daki demokratik olmayan rejimler kendilerini yaygın olarak "Arap Baharı" ya da "Arap Uyanışı" olarak bilinen halk ayaklanmalarının yarattığı zorluklarla mücadele ederken bulmuştur.

Bölgede isyan dalgası ilk başlarda uzun yıllardır hüküm süren otokratik rejimlere karşı Arap ülkelerinde gerçekleşen bir dizi, büyük lidersiz, kendiliğinden ve barışçıl halk protestoları olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bu halk ayaklanmaları Aralık 2010'da Tunus'un ekonomik olarak geri kalmış, yüksek işsizlik oranlarının ve altyapı eksikliğinin etkilediği iç ve güney bölgelerinde ortaya çıkmış ve daha sonra ülkenin sahil bölgesine yayılmıştır. Ocak 2011 tarihi itibarıyla, başkent Tunus sokaklarını binlerce Tunuslu doldurmuştur. On sekiz gün içinde, protestocular dünyanın en yerleşmiş otokratlarından biri olan Zeynel Abidin Bin Ali'yi devirmiştir. Sabık cumhurbaşkanı Bin Ali'nin ülkeyi terk etmesinin ardından, ülkenin yönetici partisi olan Demokratik Anayasal Birlik Partisi ile en çok nefret edilen güvenlik kurumu olan siyasi polis hızlı bir şekilde çözülmüştür.

Tunus'ta Bin Ali döneminin barışçıl protesto gösterileri neticesinde son bulmasıyla birlikte Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika'daki diğer ülkelerde Tunus'tan ilham alan protesto dalgası başlamıştır. 2011 yılının sonuna doğru bölgede bu protesto dalgasının ulaşmadığı tek bir ülke kalmamıştır ve bu protesto dalgası Tunus'ta Bin Ali, Mısır'da Mübarek ve Libya'da Kaddafi dönemlerini sona erdirmiştir.

2014 yılı itibariyle, Tunus, Mısır ve Libya son üç yıldır bir geçiş dönemi içindedir ve üç ülke de pek çok zorluk ile mücadele etmektedir. Öte yandan bölgesel siyasetin istikrarsız seyrine rağmen pek çok otoriter rejim varlığını hala devam ettirmektedir. Bir yandan bölgede bazı ülkelerde halk ayaklanmaları sonucu ortaya çıkan ve devam eden dönüşüm süreçlerinin yaşanması diğer yandan ise bazı ülkelerde varlığını koruyan otoriter direnç özellikle Ortadoğu'yu merkez alan otoriterlik üzerine yapılmış çalışmaların yeniden değerlendirmesini gerekli kılmaktadır. 2011 sonrası dönemde bölgede bazı güçlü otoriter rejimlerin sarsılması veya yıkılması gerçeği bölgeye atfedilen “kalıcı ve dirençli otoriterlik” mitinin sorgulanmasını da beraberinde getirmiştir.

Asya ve Afrika'da birçok rejim 1970'ler, 1980'ler ve 1990'lar boyunca, siyasi geçiş dönemleri yaşamışsa da Ortadoğu'da otoriter rejimler demokratikleşmenin üçüncü dalgasından etkilenmemiştir. Öte yandan, Asya ve Afrika'daki tüm bu siyasi geçişler gerçek demokratik rejimlerin ortaya çıkmasıyla sonuçlanmamış; bu geçiş süreçlerinin önemli bir kısmında otoriter rejimler kendilerini hibrid yada bir diğer deyişle melez rejimler olarak yeniden tesis etmiştir. Andreas Schedler'e göre Ortadoğu'da ise demokratikleşmenin üçüncü dalgası bölgedeki rejimlerin “manipulasyon menüsüne” katkı sağlamıştır.⁴⁴⁴ Ayrıca, Heydemann otoriter rejimlerin “otoriter yükseltme” ile hayatta kalabildiklerini iddia etmektedir. Schedler ve Heydemann çalışmalarında, otoriter rejimlerin güçlerini sağlamlaştırmak, meşruiyetlerini sürdürmek ve uluslararası eleştirileri hafifletmek için demokratik

⁴⁴⁴ Andreas Schedler otoriter rejimlerin seçim siyasetini hayatta kalmak nasıl kullandıklarını anlatan çalışması için bakınız: “The Menu of Manipulation”, Journal of Democracy, Volume 13, Number 2, April 2002.

yapıları nasıl kullandıklarını ortaya koymaktadırlar.⁴⁴⁵ Schedler'e göre otoriter rejimler tarafından manipüle edilen demokrasinin temsil kurumları, demokratikleşme baskısı ile karşılaşan bu otoriter rejimlerin yönetişime ve hayatta kalmaya dair varoluşsal sorunlarını hafifletmektedir. Heydemann ise otoriter direnci değişen siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal şartlar karşısında değişimin düzenlenmesi ve uyum sağlanmasını sağlamak amacıyla otoriter yönetimin yeniden şekillendirilmesini ifade eden "otoriter yükseltme" ile açıklamaktadır. Haydemann'a göre, otoriter yükseltmenin beş özelliği- sivil toplumun benimsenmesi, siyasi çekişmenin yönetilmesi, seçici ekonomik reformlardan faydalanmak, yeni iletişim teknolojileri kontrol etmekve uluslararası bağlantılarını çeşitlendirilmesi- bulunmaktadır.

Otoriter yükseltme otoriter rejimlerin demokratikleşme baskılarının yönetiminde ve karşı politikaların benimsenmesinde gösterdikleri başarıyı temsil etmektedir. Bu noktada otoriter rejimlerin değişime dirençli oldukları için değil, değişimi başarılı bir şekilde yönetebildikleri için varlıklarını devam ettirebildiklerini ortaya koymak gerekmektedir. Bu noktada 2010-2011 halk ayaklanmaları sırasında bazı otoriter rejimlerin değişimi başarılı bir şekilde yönetirken bazı rejimlerin başarısız olmasını sorgulamak gerekmektedir. Bu çalışma, bu nedenle, Tunus'a odaklanarak ülkedeki otoriter direnci ve demokratikleşme olanaklarını analiz etmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu tezin temel amacı, başarılı demokratik dönüşüm olanaklarını incelemek amacıyla Tunus örneği üzerinden otoriter rejimlerin dayanıklılığı ve istikrarını etkileyen değişkenleri analiz etmektir.

Bu çalışmanın bağımlı değişkeni, otoriter rejimin dayanıklılığı; bağımsız değişkenleri ise rejimin kapasitesi ve muhalefetin kapasitesidir. Rejimin kapasitesini şekillendiren iki değişken bulunmaktadır: devletin altyapısal güçleri ve yönetici elit arasındaki bağlılık. Bu tezde muhalefetin kapasitesi, örgütsel kapasite (destekçilerin bulunması, ekonomik bağımsızlık ve sadakatin sürdürülmesi) üzerinden analiz edilmektedir. Bu tezde ulaşılan en temel sonuç ise otoriter rejimlerin dayanıklılığı, istikrarı ve

⁴⁴⁵ Otoriter yükseltme, yani "authoritarian upgrading" terimi için Steven Heydemann'ın çalışmasına bakınız: "Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World", The Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper 13, (October 2007) pp. 1-37 available at <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/research/files/papers/2007/10/arabworld/10arabworld>

kırılganlığı ile rejim ve muhalefetin kapasitesi arasında nedensel bir ilişkinin bulunduğudır.

Rejimin kapasitesi, karşılaştığı zorlukları önleme veya kati suretle kendi lehine çözüme yeteneklerini belirlemektedir ve rejimin dayanıklılığı ile istikrarına katkıda bulunmaktadır. Bu tez, birbiriyle bağlantılı iki değişken olan devletin altyapısal güçleri ve yönetici elit arasındaki bağlılığın rejimin kapasitesini belirlediğini savunmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, otoriter bir rejimde muhalefetin kapasitesi, otoriter rejime karşı ortaya koyulan zorlukların niteliğini ve niceliğini, zorlukların süresinin ve mekansal etki alanının yayılma kapasitesini, zorlukların politize hale gelme ve nihayetinde rejimi yıkma potansiyelini belirlemektedir.

Birinci Hipotez: Otoriter dayanıklılık, devletin altyapısal güçleri ve yönetici elit arasındaki bağlılık tarafından belirlenen rejimin kapasitesine dayanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla rejimin kapasitesi otoriter dayanıklılık için gerekli bir koşuldur.

İkinci Hipotez: Otoriter rejimlerde yönetici elitleri arasındaki ayrışma/bölünme her zaman otoriter rejimin yıkılmasına ya da çözümlenmesine neden olmamaktadır. Aksine, yönetici elit içerisindeki ayrışmanın “ılımlı kanat” tarafından kazanılması otoriter yükseltme ile de sonuçlanabilmektedir. Yönetici elitler arasındaki ayrışma/bölünmenin ortaya çıkardığı tehditin niteliği, yönetici elitlerin devletin altyapısal güçlerine erişimlerinin seviyesine bağlıdır. Otoriter rejimde yönetici elitlerin devletin altyapısal güçlerinden yoksun kalmaları durumunda rejim, demokratikleşme lehine zorluklara ve varlıksal tehditlere açık hale gelmektedir.

Üçüncü Hipotez: Otoriter bir rejimde muhalefetin kapasitesi, otoriter devamlılığı belirlemektedir. Otoriter devamlılık için, muhalefet kapasitesinin düşük düzeyde kalması gerekli bir durumdur. Demokratik dönüşüm içinse, muhalif güçlerin örgütsel kapasiteye ihtiyaçları bulunmaktadır. Muhalif elitler örgütsel kapasite kazanabilirlerse otoriter rejim üzerinde demokratikleşme lehine baskı oluşturabilirler.

Dördüncü Hipotez: Yüksek rejim kapasitesi ve düşük muhalefet kapasitesi otoriter direç için yeterli koşullardır. Öte yandan otoriter bir rejimde düşük rejim kapasitesi ve yüksek muhalefet kapasitesi demokratik dönüşüm için yeterli koşullardır.

Bu hipotezleri test etmek amacıyla, bu tez, Tunus'ta ortaya çıkmış iki kriz dönemini incelemektedir. Birinci kriz dönemi, Burgiba'ya karşı düzenlenen anayasal darbeyi tetikleyen 1969 ile 1987 yılları arasını kapsamaktadır. İkinci kriz dönemi ise 2010-2011 halk ayaklanmaları ile birlikte ortaya çıkan kriz döneminden oluşmaktadır.

Tezde yer alan bölümlerde Tunus üzerine yapılan inceleme ve analizler, önerilen bağımlı değişkenlerin otoriter devamlılık ve istikrar ile bağıntılı olduğunu göstermektedir. Bölüm 2 ve Bölüm 3'te Tunus'ta otoriter rejimin karşılaştığı iki önemli kriz dönemi incelenmiştir. Tunus'taki otoriter rejimin devamlılığına ve istikrarına yönelik ilk tehdit, 1969 yılında ekonomide politika değişikliğinin kabul edilmesini müteakip yönetici elitlerden bir kısmının tasviye edilmesi ile birlikte ortaya çıkmış ve 1987 yılında otoriter yükseltme ile sona ermiştir.

1969 ve 1987 yılları arasında otoriter rejimin karşılaştığı çok boyutlu krizleri elit bölünmesi ve uzun süren kitlesel protestolar olarak kategori etmek mümkündür. Tunus'taki otoriter rejimin devamlılığına ve istikrarına yönelik ikinci tehdit ise 2010-2011 halk isyanları ve sokak hareketinin tetiklediği yönetici elitler arasında gerçekleşen bölünme ile ortaya çıkmıştır.

Bu iki dönemde, Tunus'ta otoriter rejim kitlesel eylemler ve elit bölünmesinin ikisiyle de karşılaşmıştır fakat bu iki kriz döneminin sonuçları birbirinden oldukça farklıdır. Tunus'ta otoriter rejim ilk kriz döneminden otoriter yükseltme sayesinde ayakta kalırken, ikinci kriz dönemi demokratik dönüşüm ile sonuçlanabilecek derin bir dönüşüm sürecini tetiklemiştir. Bu tezde bu iki kriz dönemini karşılaştırarak otoriter rejimin devamlılığı ve istikrarı (bağımlı değişken) ile rejimin kapasitesi (bağımsız değişken 1) ve muhalefetin kapasitesi (bağımsız değişken 2) arasındaki nedensel ilişki incelenmektedir.

Bu tez, rejimin kapasitesini etkileyen devletin altyapısal gücü ile yönetici elitler arasındaki bağılıktan oluşan birbiriyle bağlantılı iki değişken olduğunu göstermektedir. Tezdeki bölümlerde yapılan inceleme ve tartışma Tunus'ta otoriter rejimin devamlılığı ve istikrarı açısından devletin iki altyapısal gücünün, cebir ve bağılılık devşirmenin, kilit bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Bu iki altyapısal güç devletin cebir aygıtları, devlet organı gibi yapılandırılmış yönetici parti ve rejime tabi hale getirilmiş kitle örgütleri üzerinden sağlanmaktadır. Bu çerçevede otoriter rejimin devamlılığı ve istikrarı rejimin erişim sağlayabildiği altyapısal güçlerin seviyesine ve niteliğine bağlıdır.

Bağımsızlığın ilk on yılında Tunus'ta otoriter rejim korporatizm ile, yani parti ile devletin birleştirilmesi ve kitle örgütleri üzerinde üstünlük kurulmasıyla bağılılığı devşirmiştir. Bağımsızlık mücadelesi sırasında Yeni Düstur Partisi kitleleri organize ederek, eğitim programları üstlenerek ve bağımsızlık mücadelesini finanse etmek için vergi toplayarak devlet mekanizması gibi hareket eden hiyerarşik bir parti inşa etmiştir. Bu dönemde Yeni Düstur Partisi sınıf temelli kurumlarla gençlik, öğrenci ve kadın hakları örgütleri gibi kitle örgütlerinden faydalanmıştır. Bağımsızlık ile parti ve kitle örgütlerinin kurumsal kapasitesi altyapısal güçleri zayıf olan devlete nakledilmiştir. Bu güç nakli parti ve devletin birleştirilmesi ve kitle örgütleri üzerinde üstünlük kurulmasıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bağımsızlık sonrası kurulan siyasi düzende siyasi elitlerin büyük çoğunluğu iktidar koalisyonu içinde yer almıştır fakat parti ve kitle örgütlerinin devlet tarafından yutulması sonucu kademeli bir şekilde gerçekleşen yoğun merkezileşme özerkliklerini kaybetmelerine neden olmuştur. Ancak 1969 yılında *infıtah*, yani ekonomik liberalleşme politikalarının kabul edilmesi bağımsızlığın ilk on yılında devlet tarafından yutulan kitle örgütlerinin yönetici koalisyondan ihraç edilmelerine neden olmuştur.

Politika değişikliği ve yönetici koalisyonda yapılan tasfiyeler rejimin bağımlılık devşirme kapasitesini düşürmüş ve hem 1969 ve 1987 yılları arasında rejimin yönetici koalisyonu içerisinde ortaya çıkan uzun süreli elit bölünmesini hem de yıllar süren kitlesel eylemleri tetiklemiştir. Buna rağmen, rejim yönetici parti ve devlet mekanizması üzerinden bağımlılık devşirmeye devam etmiştir. Ayrıca muhalifleri ve kitlesel protestoları bastırmak için cebir gücünü kullanabilmiştir. Rejime tabi

kılınmış kitle örgütlerinin tasviyesi hayli merkezileşmiş, otoriter ve kişiselleştirilmiş bir devlet yapısının ortaya çıkmasına neden olmuştur.⁴⁴⁶ Sosyal ve siyasal hayatın bütün yönlerinin müdahaleci ve tedrici bir devlet tarafından tekelleştirilmesi Tunus'ta daha ataerkil ve otoriter bir rejim yaratmıştır.⁴⁴⁷ Yönetici partisi ve devlet aygıtı cebir ve bağımlılık devşirebilmesi için rejime altyapısal güçler sağlamıştır. Böylece Tunus'ta otoriter rejim krizlere neden olan asli sorunları çözemesi de onlara bir son verebilmiştir. Adı sonradan Demokratik Anayasal Birlik Partisi olarak değişen yönetici partisi, genişletilmiş yapısı ile otoriter rejime altyapısal güç sağlamaya devam etmiştir. Parti, merkezi gücün aracılığıyla işlev görmeye ve resmi söylemi yaymaya, dernekler kurarak ve kontrol ederek bu söylemleri uygulamaya, sosyal ve profesyonel hayata rehberlik etmeye ve ortaya çıkan krizlere müdahale etmeye devam etmiştir. Görüldüğü gibi yönetici partinin fonksiyonları güvenlikten sivil topluma geniş bir yelpazeye yayılmıştır. 1987'den sonra cebir aygıtları genişlemiş ve otoriter rejimin devamlılığı ve istikrarının sürdürülmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaya devam etmiştir.

İlk zorluğun aksine, Tunus'ta otoriter rejim 2010-2011 halk ayaklanmaları ile birlikte ortaya çıkan krizi aşmayı başaramamıştır. Çünkü devlet, yönetici parti ve cebir aygıtları aracılığıyla sağlanan altyapısal güçleri verimli olarak kullanabilme olanaklarından yoksun kalmıştır. Son yıllarda, yürütme ve karar alma süreçleri cumhurbaşkanında yoğunlaştığı ve devletin düzenleyici fonksiyonları Bin Ali/Trabelsi ailelerine devredildiği için devlet önemli ölçüde zayıflamış ve pasifize etmiştir.⁴⁴⁸ Cumhurbaşkanındaki bu yüksek güç yoğunlaşması hükümeti ve partiyi ikinci plana itmiş ve etkisizleştirmiştir. Ayrıca, devletin düzenleyici fonksiyonlarının Bin Ali/Trabelsi ailelerine devredilmesi parti ve devlet aygıtlarındaki karar alıcılara

⁴⁴⁶ Willis, *Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab Spring*, p. 49.

⁴⁴⁷ Dirk Vandewalle, "From the New State to the New Era: Toward a Second Republic in Tunisia", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 42, No: 4 (1988: Autumn), p.604.

⁴⁴⁸ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 269; Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, p. 62.

inisiyatif alabilmeleri veya manevra yapabilmeleri için yeterli alan ve özerklik bırakmamıştır.⁴⁴⁹

Cebir aygıtları, diğer taraftan, özellikle 1990'lardan itibaren ülkedeki iktidarın ve düzenin mutlak kuvveti haline gelmiştir.⁴⁵⁰ Özel hizmetler, genel istihbarat servisleri, rehberlik hizmetleri, zabıta, belediye polisi, cumhurbaşkanlığı güvenlik muhafızları, Ulusal Muhafızları, gümrük hizmetleri, sağlık hizmetleri, dış ticaret polisi ve Ulusal Güvenlik Sistemleri Komisyonu gibi pek çok farklı güvenlik biriminin kurulmasıyla birlikte güvenlik aygıtı nicel olarak artmıştır.⁴⁵¹ Ancak güvenlik aygıtlarının parçalı yapısı adem-i merkezi yapıda bir güvenlik aygıtı oluşturmuştur ve böylece farklı güvenlik kurumları arasında koordinasyon sorunu ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu parçalanma sonucunda, güvenlik aygıtı Aralık 2010-Ocak 2011 protestolarının bastırılmasının koordine edilmesinde başarısız olmuştur. Dolayısıyla bütün bunlar otoriter rejimin altyapı mekanizmalarını işlevsiz hale getirmiş ve rejimi potansiyel tehditlere karşı daha savunmasız hale gelmesine neden olmuştur.

Tezde yer alan bölümler otoriter bir rejimde muhalefetin kapasitesi, otoriter rejime karşı ortaya koyulan zorlukların niteliğini ve niceliğini, zorlukların süresinin ve mekansal etki alanının yayılma kapasitesini, zorlukların politize hale gelme ve nihayetinde rejimi yıkma potansiyelini belirlediğini ortaya koymaktadır.

1970'lerin sonunda, ekonomi, bir dizi protestoları ve grevleri tetikleyen bir düşüş yaşamıştır. Başlarda öğrenci protestolarını işçi grevleri takip etmiş ve bu durum nihayetinde genel bir kargaşaya dönüşmüştür. Qasserine'de, 1984'te patlak veren Ekmek İsyanları sırasında işçi hareketleri zirve noktasına ulaşmıştır. Ayrıca PSD'nin tasviye edilmiş kadrolarının yeni partiler kuma çabalarıyla birlikte 1970 sonrası dönemde yeni muhalif hareketler doğmaya başlamıştır. Parti yapısının demokratikleştirilmesi talepleri sonrası partiden uzaklaştırılan liberaller Sosyal Demokrat Hareketi'ni (MSD) kurmuştur. Bir diğer tasviye edilmiş grup olan

⁴⁴⁹ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 269.

⁴⁵⁰ Alexander, *Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb*, p. 64.

⁴⁵¹ Hibou, *The Force of Obedience: The Political Economy of Repression in Tunisia*, p. 82.

sosyalistler de Halkın Birleşik Hareketi'ni (MUP) kurmuştur. 1970'de Kuran Toplumunu Koruma (QPS) kurumu kurulmuş ve 1981'de, daha sonra "Nahda" ismiyle anılacak olan İslami Eğilim Hareketi (Harikat al-Ittijah al-Islami) adıyla siyasi bir partiye dönüşmüştür. Bu muhalif hareketlerin tümü 1970'lerin ortalarında yasa dışıydı. Üstelik ülke genelinde geniş destek sağlayacak kaynaklardan da yoksundular. Muhalefetin bu eksiklerinin yanı sıra, basın kurumu, kendini idame eden maddi imkanlar, parlamentoda belirli sayıda koltuk ve ILO'da ve ICFTU gibi uluslararası kuruluşlara üyelik gibi imkanlara sahip olmasından ötürü Tunus İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (UGTT) muhalifler için cazip bir kurum haline gelmiştir.⁴⁵² Bu dönemde kitleleri harekete geçirmek, grevler düzenlemek ve diğer muhalif güçler için bir platform oluşturmak gibi otoriter rejime karşı ciddi baskılar yapmasına rağmen UGTT'nin temel gündem maddesi işçi maaşları ve haklar ile hükümetin ekonomi politikasıyla sınırlı kalmıştır. Kapasitelerinin zayıflığından dolayı politik partiler kitleleri, politik liberalleşme amacıyla otoriter rejime protestoya yönlendirmeyi başaramamıştır. Muhalif elitlerinin UGTT liderlerini rejimle aralarına mesafe koymaya zorlama çabaları başarısızlıkla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu başarısızlığın nedeni ise devlet himayesinin politik özgürleşme hevesini engellemesi ve 1978 yılından sonra rejimin uyguladığı baskıcı politikaların UGTT'nin yapısal ve ekonomik kapasitesini azaltmasıdır.

1969-1987 arası kriz döneminin aksine muhalefet ikinci kriz döneminde Tunus'taki otoriter rejime karşı mücadelede başarılı hale gelmiştir. Sivil toplum örgütleri, özellikle öğrenciler, işçiler ve demokratikleşme/insan hakları hareketleri protestolar için bir temel oluşturmuş ve böylece protestolar ülkenin güney bölgesinden sahil kesimlerine doğru yayılabilmıştır. Ayrıca sivil toplum örgütleri protestoların düzenlenmesi, gençlerin harekete geçirilmesi ve halk desteğinin sağlanması için gerekli altyapı ve kurumsal desteği sağlamış ve böylece protestoların devam etmesine destek olmuştur.

Tunus'taki sivil toplum örgütleri 1990'lardan sonra gelişmeye başlamıştır. 2000'lerin ortalarında ise organizasyon kapasitelerini geliştirerek ülkede birçok gösteriyi

⁴⁵² Bellin, *Stalled Democracy*, p. 102.

destekler ve organize eder hale gelmişlerdir. Tunus'taki sivil toplum hareketleri siyasi partilerin zayıflığından ötürü ortaya çıkan boşluğu doldurarak gelişmiş ve yeni ilişki ağları ve toplumsal hareketler geliştirerek güçlenmiştir.

2010 öncesi dönemde Tunus'ta işçi ve genç hareketlerin katılımıyla çok sayıda protesto ve grev ortaya çıkmış ancak bunlar kısa süreli ve yerel protesto ve grevler olarak kalmıştır.⁴⁵³ Öte yandan 2010 öncesi protesto ve grevler ülke genelinde ilgi çekmeye başlamıştır. Bu protesto ve grevler kısa süreli ve yerel kalsalar da işçiler, profesyonel sendikalar, genç politik blog yazarları ve gazeteciler arasında eylemlere katılım oranlarında artış eğilimi ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu artış eğilime ek olarak çevredeki öncü protestolar sivil toplum örgütleri arasında yeni bir tür koordinasyon ve ilişki ağının oluşmasını sağlamıştır.⁴⁵⁴ halkın memnuniyetsizliğinin kanalize ve koordine edilmesi için çalışan farklı sivil toplum örgütleri ortak çalışmalar içinde yer alarak kurumlar arası işbirliğini geliştirmiştir. Böylelikle sivil toplum örgütleri arasında yeni oluşan koordinasyon ve iletişim ağları daha kuvvetli oluşumlar için zemin hazırlamıştır. Farklı siyasi duruşlara sahip İslamcılar, sol eğilimli işçi birlikleri, ekonomik ve sosyal liberaller ve Fransız tipi sekülerler ekonomik ve sosyal değişim talepleri zemininde birleşmiştir.⁴⁵⁵ 2010-2011 protestoları sırasında sivil toplum kuruluşları yerel koordinasyon ekipleri oluşturmuş, medya sunumlarını gerçekleştirmiş, hareketi koordine etmiş, talepleri netleştirmiş ve gösterilerin yönetimi ve devamlılığı için bir altyapı sağlamıştır.⁴⁵⁶ Sabık cumhurbaşkanı Ben Ali'nin Tunus'u terketmesinin ardından otoriter rejimin çözülmesinde sivil toplumun payı öne çıkmaktadır. Devam eden gösteriler nedeniyle Mohammed Ghannushi ve Cebi El Sebsi tarafından yönetilen geçici hükümet, sivil toplum örgütlerini geçiş sürecine dahil etmek zorunda kalmıştır.⁴⁵⁷ Geçici hükümet temel yasalarda reforma

⁴⁵³ Ottaway and Hamzawy, "Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World" pp: 5-6.

⁴⁵⁴ Donker, "COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity", pp. 21-22.

⁴⁵⁵ Deane, "Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Transition", p.15.

⁴⁵⁶ Donker, "COSMOS Working Paper: Tunisia: Surprise, Change and Continuity", p. 6.

⁴⁵⁷ Deane, "Transforming Tunisia: The Role of Civil Society in Tunisia's Transition", p. 12; Bu dönemde kabul edilen düzenlemeler hakkında daha fazlası için bakınız: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Tunisia/88-2011-Eng.pdf>

gitmiş ve eski engelleyici düzenlemeleri değiştirmiştir. Bundan dolayı sivil katılım hızla artmış, yeni siyasi partiler ve sivil toplum örgütleri ortaya çıkmıştır. Ayrıca bu dönemde Siyasi Reform Komisyonu, Yakın Zamanda Yaşanan Olaylardaki Şiddet ve İfrat için Hakikat Araştırma Komisyonu ve Yolsuzluk için Hakikat Araştırma Komisyonu kurulmuş ve bu komisyonlara sivil toplum örgütlerinin katılımı sağlanmıştır.⁴⁵⁸ Sivil toplum örgütlerinin sürece dahil olmasındaki artış otoriter rejimi geri adım atmaya ve sonrasında çöküşe götürmüştür.

Bu tez ayrıca otoriter rejimin direnci ve istikrarıyla yönetici koalisyonundaki elitlerin bağlılığı arasındaki ilişkiyi de incelemiştir. Yönetici koalisyondaki bağlılığın otoriter direncin devamlılığında ve istikrarında oynadığı rol birçok çalışmada vurgulanmıştır.⁴⁵⁹ Genel olarak, bu çalışmaların pek çoğu, elit bağlılığının sağlanmasıyla otoriter rejimin çöküşünün yapısal olarak engellendiği hususundaki ortak görüşü paylaşmaktadır. Dolayısıyla elitlerin ayrışması otoriter rejimin dirence karşı hayati bir tehdit ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak bu tezin bulguları elit ayrışmasının her zaman otoriter rejimin çöküşüne yol açmadığını ortaya koymaktadır. Üstelik bu tezde analiz edilen kriz dönemi, yönetici koalisyondaki ılımlı bakış açısı sahiplerinin başarılarının otoriter yükseltmeyle sonuçlanabildiğini de göstermektedir. Elit ayrışmasından kaynaklanan tehdidin seviyesi yönetici elitlerin rejimin devlet aygıtı tarafından sağlanan altyapısal güçlere erişimlerine bağlıdır.

Daha önce de bahsedildiği üzere 1969 ile 1987 arasında iki temel elit ayrışmasından kaynaklı krizler ortaya çıkmıştır. Yönetici koalisyondaki ilk elit ayrışması 1969'daki ekonomi politikasındaki değişikliklerin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Yönetici koalisyondaki hizipler 1970'lerde ekonomi politikasındaki değişimler sırasında belirginleşmeye başlamıştır. Yönetici parti içindeki elit ayrışmasının belirginleşmesi korporatist politikaları destekleyen solcu ve sosyalist üyelerinin uzaklaştırılmasına

⁴⁵⁸ Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, "Constitutional Reform in Arab Countries: Tunisia".

⁴⁵⁹ Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jason Brownlee, "Ruling Parties and Durable Authoritarianism", CDDRL, Working Papers, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20761/brownlee_working_paper.pdf ; Lust-Okar, Ellen and Amaney Jamal, "Rulers and rules - Reassessing the influence of regime type on electoral law formation." *Comparative Political Studies* Vol: 35, No:3, (2002), pp. 337-366.

ön ayak olmuştur.⁴⁶⁰ 1971’le 1974 arasında, Ahmed Mestiri önderliğindeki liberal elitler, parti yapısının demokratikleşirmesi ve parti güvenilirliğinin yeniden tesisi için köklü reform taleplerini dile getirmiş ve taleplerini takiben partiden ihraç edilmiş ya da istifa etmeye zorlanmışlardır.⁴⁶¹ Parti elitleri ve yönetici elitleri 1974, 1977 ve 1980’de devir daim halinde sürekli değişmiştir.⁴⁶² Gene bu dönemde güvenlik elitleri hızlı bir şekilde yönetici elitlerin arasına katılmaya başlamış ve güvenlik aygıtları dramatik bir şekilde genişlemiştir.⁴⁶³ Bourguiba’nın halefi Bin Ali güvenlik kurumlarından iç işleri bakanlığına, oradan da cumhurbaşkanlığına yükselmiştir.⁴⁶⁴ İlk elit krizini takip eden dönemde sol kanatın ve liberal kanatın siyasi elitlerinin yönetici koalisyondan tasviye edilmeleri hem kitlesel eylemleri tetiklemiş hem de yönetici parti dışında muhalifetin ortaya çıkmasını da neden olmuştur.

1980’lerle birlikte yönetici elitler arasında ikinci elit ayrışması krizi başlamıştır. Bu kriz yönetici partinin eski jenerasyonu ile parti ve ülke yönetimindeki yeni jenerasyon, taşra önde gelenleri, ve kırsal kesim burjuvalarından oluşan yeni siyasi elitler arasında cereyan etmiştir. 1987’de, Bourguiba’nın cumhurbaşkanlığı koltuğundan indirilmesinin hemen ardından yönetici koalisyon içindeki eski jenerasyon elitler partiden ihraç edilmiş ve yerleri yeni ekonomi politikalarına olumlu yaklaşan iş adamları ve büyük toprak sahipleri gibi çoğunlukla liberal ekonomi politikalarının artışıyla kar sağlayan siyasi elitlerce doldurulmuştur.⁴⁶⁵ Bu elit ayrışması 1987’den sonra Tunus’ta otoriter yükseltmeye, yani yeni otoriterlerin yükselmesine yol açmıştır. Öte yandan 2010-2011’deki halk gösterilerinin tetiklediği elit ayrışmasının sonuçları çok daha farklı olmuştur ve otoriter rejimi çöküşe sürüklemiştir. 1987’de, sadece yönetici koalisyonu oluşturan unsurlar değil yapısı da dönüşüme uğramıştır. Devlet başkanının yetkilerindeki artış yönetici koalisyondaki

⁴⁶⁰ Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, p.44.

⁴⁶¹ Alexander, Tunisia: Stability and Reform in the Modern Maghreb, p.44.

⁴⁶² Gregory White, A comparative Political Economy of Morocco and Tunisia, (New York: University of New York Press, 2001), p. 150.

⁴⁶³ White, A comparative Political Economy of Morocco and Tunisia, p. 151.

⁴⁶⁴ White, A comparative Political Economy of Morocco and Tunisia, p. 151.

⁴⁶⁵ King, “Sustaining Authoritarianism in the Middle East and North Africa” p. 450.

partinin ve idari elitlerin güçlerinin azalmasına ve cumhurbaşkanı tarafından alınan kararların uygulayıcıları ve destekleyicileri haline gelmelerine yol açmıştır.⁴⁶⁶ Dahası, cumhurbaşkanlığı ya da bir başka söyleyişle cumhurbaşkanın kendisi ve ailesi, yönetici koalisyonun parçaları arasındaki koordinasyonu ve iletişimi sağlayan tek bağlantı haline gelmiştir. Ayrıca bu durum yönetici koalisyon içinde güç mücadelesine neden olmuş ve yönetici elitlerin özerk bir biçimde hareket etmesini engellemiştir. Sabık cumhurbaşkanının eşi ve ailesi güvenlik ve devlet organlarına nüfuz etmişler ve bu durum yönetici koalisyonu sadece felce uğratmamış, aynı zamanda koalisyon içerisindeki bölünmeyi derinleştirmiştir. Halk ayaklanmalarının ortaya çıkışıyla Bin Ali'nin iktidarının sona ermesi arasındaki süreçte yönetici elitler gelişmelerin kontrolünü ele alacak koordinasyonu sağlayamamıştır. Gösterileri cebir kullanarak engelleme girişimleri başarısız olurken aynı dönemde güvenlik elitleri içerisindeki çekirdek kadronun Bin Ali'ye karşı bir darbe girişimi hazırlığında olduklarına dair dedikodular da ayyuka çıkmıştır. Yönetici elitler arasındaki bölünme ve güç mücadelesi Bin Ali'nin ülkeden ayrılışından sonra da devam etmiştir. Sonuç olarak yönetici koalisyon içindeki siyasi elitler halk isyanlarının bastırılması ya da sonlandırılmasını sağlayacak politikaları kabul etmek ve uygulamak için biraraya gelmeyi başaramamıştır. Güvenlik elitlerinin emniyet kurumları içindeki çekirdek kadrosu, yönetici parti RCD ve siyasi polis ilk birkaç ay içinde devre dışı bırakılmıştır. Devlet organları içindeki ılımlı yönetici elitler, bu dönemde önde gelen sekterleri tasviye etmiş ve otoriter rejimi dönüştürmek için muhaliflerle iş birliğine gitmek zorunda kalmışlardır.

Otoriter rejimin başlıca iki elit ayrışması kriziyle yüzleştiği gerçeğine rağmen yönetici elitler 1969-1987 arasında devlet organları ve yönetici parti tarafından sağlanan rejimin kapasitesini yönetmeyi başarmıştır. Öte yandan, yönetici elitler 2011'de otoriter rejimin çöküşünü engelleyememiştir çünkü artan cumhurbaşkanlığı yetkileri ve devlet erkinin felç edilmesi nedeniyle rejimin devlet erkleri tarafından sağlanan altyapısal güçleri kullanma kabiliyeti hasar almıştır.

⁴⁶⁶ Erdle, "Discussion Paper: Industrial Policy in Tunisia", p. 16.

Sonu olarak bu tez, rejimin kapasitesi ve muhalafetin kapasitesi otoriter rejimin direnci, devamlılıđı ve istikrarı üzerinde dođrudan bir etkiye sahiptir ve yönetici elitlerin rejim kapasitesini idare yetenekleri hasar aldığında yönetici koalisyon içerisindeki elit ayrışması, rejimin istikrarı ve direnci için dođrudan, varlığına bir tehdit oluşturmaktadır. Farklı kriz dönemlerinin kıyaslanması bu hipotezlerin akla yatkınlığını onaylamaktadır ancak bu tezde tek vaka çalışması yapıldığından ötürü bu hipotezlerin geçerliliğinin sağlanması için de farklı vaka çalışmalarının sistematik olarak değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir.

APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : YAŞAR (TANRIVERDİ O)

Adı : NEBAHAT

Bölümü : ORTADOĞU ÇALIŞMALARI / MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : RECONSIDERING DURABILITY OF
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME AND POSSIBILITIES OF
DEMOCRATIZATION IN TUNISIA

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: