

NATIONALIST CONSERVATISM AND ITS ENEMIES: COMMUNISTS, JEWS,
DONMEHS AND FREE MASONS IN *BÜYÜK DOĞU*, *SERDENGEÇTİ* AND
SEBİLÜRREŞAD

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ABSTRACT

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This study offers an analysis of the representation of the enemies for nationalist conservative discourse, which has an ongoing influence on the present day Turkish right-wing politics. It aims to illuminate how and why the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are articulated as the enemies vis-a-vis the Turkish nation in the discourse of nationalist conservative intellectuals, including Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti and Eşref Edib Fergan. To this aim, the periodicals of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad*, identified with nationalist conservative stance are examined. In this framework, this study argues that by positioning the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons against the felicity and prosperity of the Muslim Turkish nation, nationalist conservatism represents them as the main perpetrators of social antagonisms.

Keywords: Nationalist conservatism, the enemies, *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti*, *Sebilürreşad*

ÖZ

MİLLİYETÇİ MUHAFAZAKARLIK VE DÜŞMANLARI: *BÜYÜK DOĞU*,
SERDENGEÇTİ VE *SEBİLÜRREŞAD* DERGİLERİNDE KOMÜNİSTLER,
YAHUDİLER, DÖNMELER VE MASONLAR

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Bu çalışma, günümüz Türkiye'sinde sağ siyaset üzerinde hala etkisini devam ettirdiğini gözlemlediğimiz milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemdeki düşman temsillerini ele almaktadır. Çalışmanın temel amacı, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde Türk milletinin karşısında düşmanlaştırılan komünistlere, Yahudilere, Dönmelere ve Masonlara dair nasıl bir tablo çizildiği ve ortaya çıkan bu düşman tablosunun milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından nasıl bir işleve sahip olduğuna yanıt aramaktır. Bu amaçla çalışmada, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti ve Eşref Edib Fergan'ı kapsayan milliyetçi muhafazakar entellektüel figürlerin söylemi ile milliyetçi muhafazakar çizgide yayın yapmış olan *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* ve *Sebilürreşad* dergileri incelenmektedir. Çalışmada ortaya atılan temel argüman, komünistleri, Yahudileri, Dönmeleri ve Masonları Müslüman Türk milletinin refahı ve saadeti önünde birer engel olarak resmeden milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin, onları toplumsal antagonizmaların baş aktörleri olarak temsil ettiğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçi muhafazakarlık, düşmanlar, *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti*, *Sebilürreşad*

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS	vii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. AN HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TURKISH CONSERVATISM.....	12
2.1. Introduction	12
2.2. Defining Conservatism	12
2.3. General Tendencies in Turkish Conservatism	15
2.4. Turkish Conservatism and Kemalist Modernization	21
2.5. The Relation of Turkish Conservatism with Islam	23
2.5.1. The Road to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis	26
2.6. "Anatolian and Ottoman Legacy" in Conservative	
Approach to Nationalism	30
2.7. Conservative Approach to Communists,	
Non-Muslim Minorities, Donmehs and Free Masons	32
2.7.1. Communists / Communism	33
2.7.2. Non-Muslim Minorities, Donmehs and Free Masons	36
2.8. Concluding Remarks	41
3. GENERAL ARGUMENTS OF NATIONALIST CONSERVATISM	44
3.1. Introduction	44
3.2. Islam - Nation - Nationalism	44

3.3. Struggle with "Fake Nationalists": Kemalists	53
3.4. Criticism of Modern Life and Kemalist Reforms	57
3.5. "Muslim Turk Anatolians" as the Essence of the Nation	63
3.6. The Claim to "Represent the People"	69
3.7. Concluding Remarks	74
4. THE REPRESENTATION OF THE ENEMIES FOR NATIONALIST CONSERVATISM	77
4.1. Introduction.....	77
4.2. An Overview of the Enemies for Nationalist Conservatism	77
4.3. The Images of the Communists / Communism.....	80
4.4. The Representation of the Jews	88
4.4.1. Turkish anti-Semitism	88
4.4.2. The Alleged Disruptive Roles of the Jews in Muslim-Turkish History	90
4.4.3. The Images of the Jews	100
4.5. The Representation of the Donmehs	108
4.5.1. Donmehs in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic	108
4.5.2. The Images of the Donmehs	110
4.6. The Representation of the Free Masons / Free Masonry	121
4.6.1. Free Masonry in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic	121
4.6.2. The Images of the Free Masons / Free Masonry	124
4.7. Concluding Remarks	129
5. CONCLUSION	133
REFERENCES	140
APPENDICES	148
A. TURKISH SUMMARY	148
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	159

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On July 31, 2014 Turkish Prime minister delivered a speech in the province of Van, located in Eastern Turkey, as a part of the presidential election campaign. Addressed to a large crowd of supporters, the speech took almost fifty minutes. At a emotional point of his speech, the Prime Minister uttered the following words: "So you commit all kinds of acts against humanity, shell a city from the sky without any discrimination. Then immorally accuse people of being anti-Semitic when they tell you to stop. ... Who protected them when all the world kicked Jewish people out? Our ancestors, the Ottomans. Don't you have any shame?"¹ The anger of the Prime minister was against those who criticized his statements comparing Israel's bombardment on Gaza to Hitler and the Nazis and accused him of being anti-Semite. While cursing on the deaths of the Palestinians as the consequence of Israel's air strikes, the Prime minister had earlier said that "what Israel did to Palestine, to Gaza surpassed what Hitler did to them," adding that they did not accept what he did, either.²As a reaction to Israel's killings, the Prime minister had felt the need to remind the cheering crowd "the hospitality" that the Jews, having escaped from oppression, were offered in the Turkish land sometime over 500 years ago.

On July 23, 2014, a writer from daily published newspaper *Yeni Şafak* acknowledged for its conservative tendency and close relationships with the government, wrote in the article, entitled "Yahudiler ve İnsanlar," quoting from Nurettin Topçu that " 'the Jewish race has been sent on the earth to destroy all the good things, all the essence

¹ "Turkish PM Erdoğan cites 'Hitler's perverse ideas' to slam Israel," 31.07.2014, <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkish-pm-erdogan-cites-hitlers-perverse-ideas-to-slam-israel.aspx?pageID=238&nid=69835&NewsCatID=338> (accessed on 5 August 2014).

² "CNN Exclusive: Turkish PM sits down with CNN's Becky Anderson," 24.07.2014, <http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2014/07/24/cnn-exclusive-turkish-pm-erdogan-sits-down-with-cnns-becky-anderson/> (accessed on 1 August 2014).

and the divine truth to which people are attached with all their heart and soul.' 'Doing harm on people and humanity is the natural instinct of the Jews.' "³ Moreover, the writer emphasizing "money as the weak point of the Jews" called for boycotting Jewish products. On July 24, 2014 M. Şevket Eygi, this time from *Milli Gazete* also acknowledged for conservative and Islamist tendency, with respect to Israeli-Palestine conflict, advised the readers against "over one million crypto Jews that are residing in Turkey who support the Zionist causes secretly despite condemning Israel in public."⁴ Besides, more than a year ago during the Gezi Park protests, when the huge efforts were done to find out "the real perpetrators" behind the protests, and when all the signs were pointing at "the interest lobby," one of the ministers of the Republic declared, although he later on stated that he was misinterpreted, that "the international Jewish Diaspora was behind the protests."⁵

The examples mentioned above are the results of a couple hours' of random googling and recollection, which can be varied. Nevertheless, in either way they bring forward several simple questions into minds: Was what the Prime minister said in addressing the cheering crowd a simple action of denying the accusations of being anti-Semitic? Were not the *Yeni Şafak* writer's opinions of the Jews a simple expression of anti-Semitic stance that the Prime minister had denied? Who are "the crypto Jews" that Eygi pointed at? What was the basis that the officials built their allegations pointing at "the trouble makers"? Or did they really have and, in fact, need one and if not what might be their aim at targeting without base? But above all, has anti-Semitic stance of Turkish authorities been restricted to Israel-Palestine conflict and Gezi Park protests, or has it always been the Jews that have been targeted? So has been the

³"Yahudi kavmi, insanlığın kalbi ve ruhuyla bağlandığı her güzel şeyi, her sağlam temeli, her kurtarıcı hakikati yıkmak için dünyaya gönderilmiştir. İnsanlara ve insanlığa fenalık yapmak, yahudide sanki bir içgüdüdür." Tenekeci, İbrahim. "İnsanlar ve Yahudiler," 23.07.2014, http://yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/Ibrahim_Tenekeci/insanlar-ve-yahudiler/54977 (accessed on 31 July 2014).

⁴ Eygi, M. Şevket. "İsraili Kinayan Gizli Yahudiler," 24.07.2014, http://www.milligazete.com.tr/koseyazisi/Israili_Kinayan_Gizli_Yahudiler/20803#.U9wa3_1_vuI (accessed on 31 July 2014).

⁵"Başbakan Yardımcısı Beşir Atalay: 'Yahudi diasporası sözlerim çarpıtıldı,' " 03.07.2013, <http://www.salom.com.tr/newsdetails.asp?id=87619> (accessed on 25 July 2014).

driving force behind this study to examine these questions and research the facts, fallacies and emotions behind them.

Someone looking at the examples above, on the other hand, can suggest that these are the just recent examples and how come that it is possible that they are referred to as the starting point of this study that has been going over a year now. At this point, the collective memory of us, living in the land, comes into play: 1934 Thrace events, the events of 6-7 September, Bloody Sunday of 1969, the Maraş Massacre of 1978, the Sivas Massacre of 1993. These are mentioned with no attempt of comparison, which I believe would underestimate the meaning of each, but draw the attention to the single fact which is they all have been "justified" to be the spontaneous outbursts of the frustrated masses against the alleged threats. At this point, it has to be noted that as far as Turkish society is concerned, the people has always been identified with the tendency to unite against a common enemy. Nevertheless, considering the fact that these alleged threats are not innate, the main concern of this study will be to offer an analysis on how and why these "enemies," critical in the mobilization of the masses, are constructed.

Right-wing politics in Turkey, though identified with diverse tendencies from nationalism to conservatism, from Islamism to liberalism, unite on a common ground to employ "enemies." Judging both from the past and present experiences, Turkish right discourse is identified with diversity concerning the articulation of "the enemies": the Jews, Greeks, Armenians, communists, Free Masons, Donmehs (crypto-Jews), Alevis, Kurdish people, missionaries and others.

Within this context, this thesis is an attempt to offer an analysis of the enemies for the Turkish right, the boundaries of which will be limited by the intellectual thinking of nationalist conservatism as the rising ideology of Turkish right following the transition to multi-party period. From the mid-1940s basically to the late 1960s, nationalist conservatism served as a mutual platform for the Turkish right including conservatives, Islamists, and nationalists. Thus, Turkish right-wing politics of the period has more or less been shaped by nationalist conservatism. Although those gathered under the roof of nationalist conservatism dispersed to different paths by the

end of 1960s (Çetinsaya, 2004: 447), the impact of this right wing ideology continued in the following decades, as most explicitly expressed in "the Turkish-Islamic synthesis" (Bora, 1998: 127). In this regard, nationalist conservatism, which aimed at the identification of Turkishness with Islam (Koçak, 2002: 609), is argued to be the driving force behind the rising of Islam from the mid-1940s onward and emphasized to still have a great impact on the right-wing Turkish politics of the present day. Therefore, considering the fact that it included not only conservatives, but also different figures of Turkish right from Islamists to nationalists, and even the figures of Turkism of the era, nationalist conservatism will provide a valuable source to identify the codes of Turkish right of the period and present day.

The boundaries of nationalist conservatism in the study, on the other hand, are to be determined by the thinking of three prominent figures of the period, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti and Eşref Edib Fergan, and their periodicals: *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad*. In this sense, I will try to offer an analysis of the enemies for nationalist conservatism: the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons. These figures and their periodicals have been selected according to the significant role they played in the rising of nationalist conservatism from the mid-1940s onward. The intellectual figures of nationalist conservatism, which intended to achieve "the synthesis of Islamism with Turkist/ultra-nationalism" (Bora, 2002b: 260), represented a transition between Islamism and nationalism. Moreover, as Bali (2001: 415) claims with the transition to multi-party rule in 1946 the figures of Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and Fergan exerted great influence on Turkish society, but more particularly over the Islamic movement, recovering from the oppression of one party-rule, through the periodicals they published. Following Bali it is to be noted that these figures, setting the example of "organizing through publications" (Taşkın, 2003b: 202), were critical in reaching the masses. In this regard, the significance of studying these periodicals increases when considering the fact that it is to be argued in this study that nationalist conservatism through the publications nourishes the hatred and prejudice against the alleged enemies. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that the periodicals of the period identified with nationalist conservative stance have not been restricted to *Büyük Doğu*,

Serdengeçti or *Sebilürreşad*. For instance, the periodical of *Yeniden Milli Mücadele* is identified as having a nationalist conservative stance. Following the general tendency of the period, the periodical also represented a transition between Islamism and Turkish nationalism by searching for a harmony with Islam and Turkishness (Taşgetiren, 2002: 614). Yet, the periodical has not been included in the study since *Yeniden Milli Mücadele*, which began to be published after 1970, did not concur periodically with the others.

Despite its significance, it would be wrong to suggest that there exist many wide-ranging, comprehensive studies on nationalist conservatism. To my knowledge, putting aside the substantial articles published in the series of *Political Thought in Modern Turkey* by İletişim Publishing (2002, 2003, 2004), which are to provide insight to this study as well, the only inclusive study on nationalist conservatism is Taşkın's work (2007) which offers an analysis on the nationalist conservative intelligentsia during and after the Cold War era by concentrating on the figures of Erol G ng r, Mehmet Kaplan, Ahmet Kabaklı, Taha Akyol and the periodical of *T rkiye G nl ğ *. The work of Taşkın is critical in the sense that it offers a reading of nationalist conservative intelligentsia over parallelization with the Kemalist intelligentsia, with whom they are asserted to be in fierce struggle for power. Although Taşkın's reading of nationalist conservatism will be applicable on this study as well, this study will differentiate from the work of Taşkın by concentrating on an earlier era in the evolution of nationalist conservatism and earlier figures of Kısak rek, Serdengeçti and Fergan. In this regard, this study will seek to provide insight into comparison concerning the arguments of nationalist conservatism.

Nevertheless, in some studies Kısak rek, thus *B y k Doęu* are mainly mentioned with their Islamic identity with respect to their critical role in the rising of Islam following the transition to multi-party period. Yet, in this study following the argument of Bora (1998: 129-30), Kısak rek concerning its critical role in "the identification of Turkishness with Islam" and defining of nationalism based on religion will be referred to as a nationalist conservative figure while *B y k Doęu* will be taken as a nationalist conservative periodical without underestimating its Islamic stance. Similarly Serdengeçti, despite being identified as a passionate Turkist of the

war-time era displaying close relationships with Nihal Atsız, after the mid-1940s was more or less associated with nationalist conservatism, as the one behind the long running motto of "we are Turks as much as Mount Tanrı and we are Muslims as much as Mount Hira." In this regard, considering his role in the embracement of Islam by the nationalists of the following decades, *Serdengeçti*, as "an old Turkist and new Islamist" as Kısakürek defines him (as cited in Ayvazoğlu, 2002: 567) is concluded to have been a critical figure of nationalist conservatism from the 1940s till the 1960s with more particular respect to his role in contributing to the popularization of nationalist conservative thinking among the masses (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003: 642). Fergan, on the other hand, is also acknowledged to be a significant name in searching for "harmony between Turkishness and Islam" following the general tendency of nationalist conservatism. Undoubtedly, *Sebilürreşad*, on the pages of which the signatures of many leading Islamists were observed including Mehmed Akif Ersoy as the editor-in-chief (Arabacı, 2004: 103), began his publishing life as an Islamist periodical. Nevertheless, the second period of the periodical is relatively associated with nationalist conservative stance. As, for instance, claimed by Debus (2009) in her comparative work on the periodical, as one of the few publications offering a comparative analysis of two periods of the periodical between 1908-1925 and 1948-1965, it is asserted that *Sebilürreşad* was one of the leading periodicals that had impact on the way to "Turkish-Islamic synthesis," as the final expression of nationalist conservative doctrine.

The significance of nationalist conservatism for this study is not restricted to determine the boundaries of the study. Nationalist conservative discourse, as will be argued, builds itself on the dichotomy between "the people" and "the enemies." In this regard, it is argued that for nationalist conservatism the people is promoted as "a repressed entity" surrounded by the enemies (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003). For this reason, the periodicals will provide a valuable source for the images of the enemies. All three of the periodicals are identified with hostility against the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, positioned against the welfare and felicity of the people. At this point, it has to be noted that although there are a number of studies concerning the three periodicals, *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad*, the

numbers of the studies and scholars dealing with the articulation of the alleged enemies are limited. Among them Bali has been the most significant one. As the leading scholar studying Turkish anti-Semitism, Bali includes these periodicals in his studies with respect to the images of the Jews, Donmehs and partly Free Masons. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to suggest that these offer detailed analyses of the periodicals concerning the representations of the enemies. Yet, putting aside the periodicals and the boundaries of nationalist conservatism, the general arguments developed by Bali (2001, 2003) concerning the anti-Semitic stance of the Turkish right will serve as a major reference point to this study. Except Bali, the work of Debus (2009) concerning *Sebilürreşad* mentioned above, is significant in the sense that it covers the Jews, Free Masons, and communists as "the enemies of Islam" in her work. Nevertheless, Debus's coverage is limited to a couple of pages and barely mentions the Donmehs.

Concerning the other two periodicals the analyses are limited to a few articles, mainly published in the series of *Political Thought in Modern Turkey* by İletişim Publishing (2002, 2003, 2004). Besides, even if we put aside the periodicals, the numbers of studies offering an analysis on the hostility against the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are not many. Among them, for instance, Baer's work (2010) on the Donmehs narrates the history of them during the Ottoman Empire and the Republic. However, though Baer at some point refers to the causes of the hostility against the Donmehs with general arguments, the book is a mainly a historical narrative. Concerning Free Masonry, on the other hand, the article of Özman and Dede (2012) is critical on the grounds that in addition to dealing with the general arguments of the anti-Masonry attitude of the Turkish right-wing, the article also offers an analysis of anti-Masonry texts. Within all, anti-communist propaganda is probably the most studied one. Nevertheless, considering the fact that starting from the late 1940s throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the relation of the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masonry with communism served as a base for Turkish right in general for the articulation of hostility against them, studying of the representation of communism/communists is also critical.

From here on, this study aims at providing an inclusive analysis of the construction of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons as the enemies against the welfare of the Muslim Turkish nation. Hence, it will deal with the representation of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons separately. Besides dealing with the images that nationalist conservatism bases its anti-communist, anti-Semitic, anti-Donmeh and anti-Masonry attitude, the study will seek to provide an answer to how these images as a whole function for nationalist conservative arguments. In this regard, this study will search for a meaning for the articulation of the enemies in nationalist conservatism.

Following Açıkel (1996), it will be argued that nationalist conservative discourse builds its essence on "the discourse of the repressed," which necessitates the construction of the enemies. As Açıkel (1996: 156) calls it "the Holy Synthesis" in the framework of Turkey, the discourse of the repressed is defined as "the strategy of a social entity to cope with the pathologies of late capitalism and late modernization." Identified as "the ideology of late modernization and late capitalism," "Holy Synthesis tries to articulate nationalist religious symbolic levels with paradigm of development in such an authoritarian way and repressive way that economically repressed masses are caught up by the gravity of sublimation promises of Nietzschean *Will to Power*" (Açıkel, 1996: 198). In this context, judging from the argument of Açıkel (1996: 198) that is "the discourse of the repressed is potentially the precondition for the discourse of the will to power," it is to be contented that nationalist conservatism builds its own "will to power" through the articulation of the enemies. In other words, through this study, I will seek to illuminate how the representation of the enemies works in nationalist conservatism to articulate "the discourse of the repressed." By trying to develop the argument of Bora and Erdoğan (2003: 635) which is "conservative populism points at Free Masons, communists, Jews, cosmopolites and copycats as the scapegoats of social antagonisms and thus sustains its will to power through the negative sublimation," I will argue that by placing *repression* at the core of its discourse, nationalist conservatism points at the enemies, enlisted as the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons for the calamities that the Turkish nation faced in the past and are to face in the future and,

contend that nationalist conservatism has been in need of the enemies to legitimize its "will to power." Moreover, it will be contended that by pointing at communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons as "the thieves of enjoyment" in the words of Zizek (2002b), nationalist conservatism nourishes the hatred critical in the mobilization of the masses. As Zizek (2002b: 216) writes in the framework of Yugoslavia, "each nationality that constituted Yugoslavia had built its own mythology narrating how other nations deprived it of the vital part of enjoyment." Hence, he asserts that "dealing with others is particularly shaped by the myths attributing 'great enjoyment' to them" (2002b: 214). In this context, following Zizek it will be argued that this alleged enjoyment of the enemies articulated in nationalist conservatism strengthens "the discourse of the repressed" and legitimizes the anger of the masses raised against them.

In this regard, the periodicals of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad* will be taken as reference. Although the periodicals will constitute the primary sources of the study, the books of Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and Fergan will also be utilized as the primary sources. During the analysis process, not only the written texts in the periodicals, but also the visual ones including cartoons, covers and pictures concerning the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, compiled during the archival study, will be included. At this point, it is important to note that the texts compiled from the periodicals have not been restricted to the narratives of Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and Fergan, and involved many other writers, including the anonymous ones and readers' letters. Within the boundaries of the study, all the daily, weekly and monthly published issues of *Büyük Doğu*⁶ between 1943-1978, except the ones which were missing in the collections of National Library located in Ankara,⁷ the issues of *Serdengeçti*⁸ published between 1947 and 1962 except the ones which

⁶ The first issue of *Büyük Doğu* was published on September 17, 1943 by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek. *Büyük Doğu* till its last publication on June 5, 1978 was published as daily newspaper, weekly and monthly periodical at intervals.

⁷ The missing issues are the 15 issues which were published daily in 1951 and the issues published daily in 1956 between May 3 and July 5.

⁸ *Serdengeçti* was first published on April 1947 by Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti. Issued intermittently for 15 years as monthly periodical, it was published only for 33 issues, lastly on February 1962.

could not be found in the collections of National Library⁹ along with the issues of *Sebilürreşad*¹⁰ published between 1948 and 1965 will be included.

The study will be organized around three main chapters. The first of the main chapters will establish a general framework to set the context of nationalist conservatism within Turkish conservatism while others will offer a textual analysis based on the results of the archival study, concerning the arguments of nationalist conservatism and the representation of the enemies.

"The discourse of the repressed," which is argued to be the response of the masses to the late modernization (Açikel, 1996: 155), necessitates an analysis on conservative approach to modernization. Hence, the second chapter will provide an analysis on the general tendencies of Turkish conservatism, including nationalist conservatism, and their approach to Turkish modernization. In this regard, I will focus on the approaches of diverse conservative tendencies, based on the classification of Bora (1998), to several issues of concern which I believe will give a better understanding to the following two chapters. In this sense, the second chapter of the study will deal with Turkish conservatism with the intention to draw a framework to nationalist conservatism. With the purpose of setting the context of nationalist conservative discourse, I will try to display the similarities and differences in comparison to other conservative tendencies.

After setting the context of nationalist conservatism within Turkish conservatism, in the third chapter, I will specifically deal with the arguments of nationalist conservatism. Hence, I will concentrate on the identification of nationalist conservatism by taking the thinking of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad* as reference. I will more particularly search for their identification of the nation,

⁹ The missing issues are: 21st- 23rd-25th -26th-31st-32rd. Similarly the same issues could not be found on http://www.serdengecti.net/index.php?option=com_rsgallery2&Itemid=11, (accessed on 30 March 2014), in which the issues of the periodical are available online.

¹⁰*Sebilürreşad* or *Sirat-ı Müstakim* of the period was initially published in 1908 just after the beginning of Second Constitutional era by Eşref Edib Fergan. The name of the periodical was changed into *Sebilürreşad* after 1912. Having its roots in the Ottomans, the periodical continued to be published till 1925. Following 15 years of silence, Fergan began to publish the periodical of *Islamic-Turkish Encyclopedia* in 1940. Nevertheless, in 1948 he stopped publishing it and began to republish *Sebilürreşad*, which was published for 361 issues (Arabacı, 2004).

approach to religion and modernity. Contending that nationalist conservatism differs from other conservative tendencies with its radicalism in expressing opposition to the Kemalist ideology, it will be argued that nationalist conservatives are more open to express "the will to power" with respect to Taşkın's (2007) arguments on nationalist conservative drive to replace the Kemalist intelligentsia. In this regard, I will deal with the struggle of nationalist conservatives with Kemalists and the modernization they have pursued by trying to display on what arguments nationalist conservatism builds its anti-Kemalist stance.

The fourth chapter will deal with the images of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, as the most articulated "enemies" for nationalist conservatism, separately. I will look at how they are represented with the attempt to display the bases that nationalist conservatism builds its anti-communist, anti-Semite, anti-Donmeh and anti-Masonry arguments on. In doing so, I will concentrate on the specific themes concerning their representation. I shall try to evaluate how and why the articulation of the enemies functions in nationalist conservatism by making reference to both Açıkel and Žizek.

CHAPTER II

AN HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TURKISH CONSERVATISM

2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will concentrate on Turkish conservatism with the aim to draw a framework to nationalist conservatism, as the main tendency of Turkish conservatism during the Cold War era. To start with, I will try to define what *conservatism* is. Considering that the boundaries of this study will not be feasible to go through a detailed analysis, I will only discuss some of the key points in defining conservatism, which I believe will facilitate to identify the codes of Turkish conservatism. Then, I will offer a brief analysis of diverse tendencies in Turkish conservatism, including nationalist conservatism. After that, I will focus on the approaches of the diverse conservative tendencies to several issues of concern, including Kemalist modernization, Islam, and nationalism with respect to Anatolian and Ottoman legacy. Last but not least, I will briefly deal with the images of enemies for Turkish conservatism to find out at what point nationalist conservative discourse tends to display similarities with other conservative tendencies in its vision of the enemies.

2.2. Defining Conservatism

The late eighteenth century is crucial in the evolution of conservatism as a modern thought. Although there have been varied approaches to identify the conservative thought, the variances generally disappear when pointing at its origins: the French Revolution. Conservatism is identified as the outcome of "the Revolution of 1789.

As Beneton (2011: 11) suggests, with reference to Edmund Burke and his followers, conservatism was the product of "the reaction to French Revolution." Similarly,

Çiğdem (2003: 16) based on Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Louis de Bonald, and Friedrich Gentz, asserts that "conservatism owes its existence to French Revolution and in this sense it does not have a pre-modern history." Bora (1998: 54-56), on the other hand, without underestimating "traditionalism" and Restoration period as the early phase of conservative thought also attributes the French Revolution the decisive role in shaping of modern conservatism. In this regard, the origin of conservative thought with particular reference to the French Revolution is traced back to modern era.

For Beneton (2011: 11), conservatism was born "counter-revolutionary" since "it not only condemned the practices of the Revolution, but also denied its principles from the very beginning." As Heywood (2007: 66) emphasizes, "conservative ideas arose in reaction to growing pace of political, social and economic change, which in many ways was symbolized by French Revolution," as mostly demonstrated in Burke, credited as the father of modern conservative thought, and *his Reflections on the French Revolution in France*, published in 1790.

Beneton (2011: 10-11) asserts conservatism initially merged "as an intellectual and political movement born in modernity as a reaction to it." In this sense, he refers to it as "anti-modern" in essential since "it was developed to protect traditional political and social order of European nations." Nevertheless, for him, "the desire to conserve," or "the dedication to *status quo*" and "the fear of change" is not adequate to identify conservatism. In other words, conservatism cannot simply be identified as "anti-modernism" (Bora & Onaran, 2003: 234).

Modern conservatism does not oppose to modernism, or simply "what is new," but seeks for the ways to conserve the traditional political, social and cultural structures, as asserted by Bora (1998: 54), who highlights that conservatism, differing from the early traditionalism and Restoration, has been granted with "the ability and the will to achieve the continuity of the tradition in the present life." Moreover, in opposition to the radicalism of reactionaries, which strictly resists to "the change" and attempts to "revive the past" (Taşkın, 2003b: 187), conservatism moves with the motivation to preserve the traditional institutions in the present life, and in this sense it does not

argue against the idea of "reform" if required. As stressed by Öğün (2003: 567), Burke expressed that "he was not against all change," but "the extreme change." Hence, Burke was against "the renewal based on a complete rupture from the past," as designed by the French revolutionists (Beneton, 2011: 21). In *Reflections*, Burke condemned the French Revolution in the sense that it asked for "a radical rupture from the past." Burke, siding with the British Revolution of 1688, which encouraged a smooth transition in consistent with the past, attacked the French Revolutionists for ignoring the vestiges of the past (Beneton, 2011: 19-20). In this regard, what has been proposed by Burke and his followers cannot be summarized as "a complete resistance to change," as demonstrated by Heywood (2007: 66), who suggests that "Burke did not advocate blind resistance to change, but rather a prudent willingness to 'change in order to conserve.'" In other words, for conservative thought, the change has been beneficiary to "conserve."

Altınyıldız (2003: 179) asserts that "conservatism emerged on the reaction aroused against the threat of fading of past heritages." Accordingly, the primary concern of the conservative ideas is to "conserve" which is to maintain the old structures, practices and institutions. As Scruton (2001: 10) expresses, according to whom "conservatism arises directly from the sense that one belongs to some continuing, and pre-existing social order," "the will to live" is what constitutes conservatism. Nevertheless, while it seeks for the ways to "conserve" old structures, practices and institutions, conservatism is also concerned with "building of future availing of the essence of past" (Altınyıldız, 2003: 179). Similarly Çiğdem (2003: 17) proposes, with particular reference to the Turkish conservatism, for conservatives "the building of the present times has relatively been a more serious occupation than the revival of the past." In this regard, it is argued that for conservative thought the structures, the institutions, the practices of "the past" serve as the legitimate grounds on which "the future" is built.

Modern conservative thought does not object to modernization. As Mert (2007: 164) puts forward, "Burke or his followers have not objected the change apparent in every part of life as the result of the increasing modernization and capitalism." Hence, their primary concern has been to deal with "extremisms," as in the spirit of the French

Revolution (Beneton, 2011). In this regard, conservatism can be summarized as the attempt to "purify modernization from extremisms" (Bora, 1998: 82).

In this context, following the argument of Mert (2007: 165-66), which is Burke and Western conservative thought has influenced the evolution of Turkish conservatism, I will now try to offer an analysis of Turkish conservatism.

2.3. The General Tendencies in Turkish Conservatism

The roots of Turkish conservatism should be sought in Turkish modernity project, which was carried out by the elites of the newly founded Republic. Although Turkish modernization process had initially emerged in the first half of the 19th century in the Ottoman Empire, it, in the hands of the new regime, soon evolved into a national project aiming at joining the Western civilization. Republican modernization project differed from the Ottoman modernization with its "radicalism." It denied the Ottoman heritage and attempted "the radical transformation of traditional Ottoman Islamic social, economic, and political structures" (İrem, 2002: 87). In this sense, the Republican modernization, as "a social engineering project," sought for the crafting of a national identity, independent from the past heritage. For Kemalist intelligentsia, who sought for the origins of the Turkish nation before the conversion to Islam, the rupture from the Ottoman past was highlighted as the only possible way for the crafting of a new secular national identity (Ayvazoğlu, 2003: 509). This aspiration of the new Republic for "a complete rupture" from the Ottoman heritage, on the other hand, was a decisive moment in the evolution of Turkish conservatism. As pointed out by Çiğdem (2003: 16), "Turkish conservatism owed its existence to the Republican revolution," as did the Western conservatism to French Revolution. In this regard, the origin of Turkish conservative thought has been rooted in modernism.

Following the arguments of Burke concerning the French revolution, Turkish conservatism initially grew as an alternative to the Kemalists' radicalism concerning the Republican modernization project. Yet, it was not the outcome of a severe reaction to modernism voicing the denial of the Republic or the revival of the past order. As İrem (2002: 107) asserts "the conservative political agenda emerged from

the day-to-day experiences of Kemalist modernism." The primary concern of the Republican conservatism, as the earliest understanding of modern Turkish conservatism, was not to revive the Ottoman monarchy, but "search for those things worth preserving in the present state of affairs" (İrem, 2002: 107). In the same way, Çiğdem (2003: 16-17), emphasizing that Republican conservatism is the product of modernism, demonstrates that "in modern Turkish history there never truly existed a political movement which aimed at reviving the Ottoman order except from voicing of a weak Ottomanism." In this sense, he concludes that "Republican conservatism has always been a reformist one."

Modern Turkish conservative thought does not have a single definition; but is identified with diverse tendencies. As mentioned above Republican conservatism, having evolved around Kemalist modernism was the earliest representative of modern conservative approach, particularly represented by İsmayıl Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken and Mustafa Şekip Tunç (İrem, 2002: 88). These intellectuals, under the influence "Bergsonism," challenged against the positivism of Ziya Gökalp which inspired the modernization process of the new Republican era (İrem, 2002: 95). Particularly shaped in the 1930s, Republican conservatism did not challenge the process of modernization and Westernization. Neither had it argued against the Kemalist reforms. In this sense, it cannot be defined as anti-Kemalist. As Mert (2007: 135) points out Republican conservatism was simply against the radicalization of these reforms and the way they were imposed from above on the people. Concluding that it did not display any form of resistance to secularism, she asserts that Republican conservatism was against the interpretation of secularism as the denial of religion.

In addition to Republican conservatism, Bora (1998: 95-96) identifies five tendencies in Turkish conservatism throughout its evolution: *cultural conservatism*, *conservatism as Islamism*, *conservative revolution*, *liberal conservatism* and *nationalist conservatism*. At this point, it is significant to note that baring in mind that the classification of conservative tendencies and the figures can vary in distinct studies; in this study the classification proposed by Bora (1998) will be taken as reference.

Cultural conservatism of Yahya Kemal Beyatlı, succeeded by Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, Nihad Sami Banarlı, Ekrem Hakkı Ayverdi and Samiha Ayverdi did not oppose to Republican modernism (Bora, 1998: 84-90). Their attitude more reflected a "nostalgic" sense of mourning over "the losses" as the outcome of the modernization process. Although it would be wrong to suggest that they moved with the motivation to revive the Islamic-Ottoman order, cultural conservatives paid a particular attention to Ottoman past. As Çetinsaya (2003: 363) emphasizes, Beyatlı, arguing against Ziya Gökalp's racial notion of Turkism which pointed at Central Asia for the roots of the Turkish nation, marked the date of 1071 as the decisive moment in the evolution of the Turkish nation. In this sense, the Ottoman Empire, as the peak of the Turkish history, held a crucial place in Beyatlı (Çetinsaya, 2003: 363). As the one behind the much-quoted line, "I am the future with roots in the past," Beyatlı, as pointed out by Ayvazoğlu (2003: 515), emphasized the importance of "continuity" of the past for the formation of "tomorrow."

For Bora (1998: 95), conservatism as Islamism, or in other words "conservative Islamism," refers to the conservative essence of Turkish Islamic movement. During the Republican era, conservatism, as pointed out by Aktay (2003: 349), served as a legitimate channel for the Islamists, repressed by the new secular Republic, to make their voice heard. As mentioned in the case of Republican conservatism, conservatism throughout its evolution during the early Republican era never identified itself as a counter revolutionary thought against the new secular Republic. In fact, as İrem (2002: 108) emphasizes the Republican conservatives, differing themselves from the Islamists groups, formed a temporary alliance with the Kemalists against the opponents of the regime, including the religious ones. However, the Islamists' acquiring a conservative character was mostly the result of "the militarist secular policies" of the 1920s and 1930s, as highlighted by Bora (1998: 82). Taking the Sheikh Said Rebellion as a reference - the reactionary movement aiming at the revival of the Islamic order - Bora (1998: 82) asserts that it would be hard to suggest that the conservative essence of Turkish Islamism was innate. The attitude of "conservative Islamism" towards the modernization process, on the other hand, did not reflect a collective opposition. As exemplified in Mehmet

Akif, who can be classified as a "conservative Islamist" outside the boundaries of Islamic reactionaries, conservative Islamists approach to modernization, in fact, demonstrated similarity with Ziya Gökalp's differentiation between "culture and civilization" (Bora, 1998: 80). Mehmet Akif, arguing against a modernization entirely dependent on "the copying of the Western forms," searched for reconciliation between "the spiritual world of the East" and "the material civilization of the West." In this sense, he encouraged to adopt the material qualities of the West, its technology and science while preserving "the authentic culture" (Bora, 1998: 80). Additionally, for conservative Islamism, "the interpretation of Islamic law" was not completely denied as in the case of reactionary groups. For instance, differing from those arguing against "the interpretation of Islamic law" including Said Nursi, Mehmet Akif displayed the signs of support with respect to the arguments searching for causes of the backwardness of the Islamic world (Aktay, 2003: 352-53).

Conservative revolution of Nurettin Topçu differentiated from other conservative tendencies by being a strong opponent of capitalism, technology and industry (Bora, 1998: 91). Topçu diverged from other conservatives by arguing against the notion that the material qualities of the West should be adopted. As demonstrated by Bora (1998: 91), Topçu openly rejected the distinction between "the culture" and "civilization" by advocating the disruptive effect of the latter on the former. In this sense, Topçu was against the process of modernization. Additionally, Topçu, as one of the leading devotees of Anatolian nationalism along with Remzi Oğuz Arık, played a critical role in the identification of Anatolia as "the Turkish-Islamic land" (Bora, 1998: 47). As opposed to the definition of the nation based on race/Turan, Topçu, in reference to "the victory of 1071," pointed at Anatolia as the source of the Turkish nation in the formation of which Islam was emphasized to have played a uniting role (Elibol, 2003: 270). As pointed out by Deren (2002: 538), for Topçu, who stressed the inseparability of Turkishness with Islam, "the Turks rose within Islamic civilization while Islamic civilization evolved as Turkish-Islamic civilization from the very beginning."

"The primary essence of liberal conservatism, was to embrace the essential principles of liberalism such as freedom, democracy and market as tradition," as suggested by

Bora (1998: 92). By encouraging that "these principles can only materialize if developed on a moral ground," liberal conservative thought challenged the interpretation of liberalism and modernization merely based on the material qualities (Bora, 1998: 92). In this regard, its main concern was to deal with the misinterpretation of the modernization, degrading the process to the adoption of the material qualities of the West. Liberal conservative tendency, significantly represented by Ali Fuad Başgil as the successor of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, was particularly shaped after the mid-1940s in Turkish political scene (Bora, 1998: 92). Başgil, as the leading figure of liberal conservatism, was not against the modernization process, but the authoritarian way it was carried out by the Kemalist intelligentsia. As Önder (2003: 300-01) points out, according to him, Turkish modernization failed from the very beginning, starting from the Tanzimat era, by being entirely dependent on "copying of the Western civilization." Providing the Japanese modernization process as an example, Başgil criticized the Kemalist modernization in the sense that it lacked "a synthesis between the past and the future" (Önder, 2003: 300-01). According to Bora (1998: 92-93), Başgil, provided a reinterpretation of Gökalp's differentiation between "culture and civilization" by encouraging that "instead of adopting the good qualities of the Western civilization such as its science, art, scientific method, and high moral sense, Turkish modernization was badly pursued by leading to the internalization of the materialistic, worldly and utilitarian side of the West," thus to the annihilation of the moral order. In this regard, he, through liberal conservatism, sought for the establishment of a moral order.

Last but not least, nationalist conservatism, tracing back to mid-1940s and onward, was the result of the transition to multi-party period. Nationalist conservatism, considering all the conservative tendencies mentioned above, was identified with a more radical stance against the ruling Kemalist ideology. It was diverged from the others by encouraging a strong reaction against the modernization process of "the Kemalist elites." Developed as an anti-Kemalist discourse, nationalist conservatism promoted itself as an alternative to the ruling ideology. Nationalist conservatism, represented mainly by Cevat Rifat Atilhan, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek and Eşref Edib Fergan in its early phase from the mid-1940s onward,

attacked the Kemalist intelligentsia for forcing the nation to detach from its past for a fresh beginning by promoting excessive "Westernization." Nevertheless, for nationalist conservatism the Kemalist modernization process was not the sole and primary concern. Nationalist conservatives of the early era not only greatly contributed, but also played major roles, as in the figure of Kısakürek, in the development of "Turkish-Islamic synthesis" of the late 1970s mainly represented by İbrahim Kafesoğlu, Ahmet Kabaklı, and Erol Güngör.

Nationalist conservatism grew as a common ground for those excluded from the ruling Kemalist regime: Islamists and Turkists. From the mid-1940s to the end of 1960s, Turkists and Islamists merged under the roof of "nationalist conservatism." As demonstrated by Bora (2002b: 260), nationalist conservatism developed with the particular attempt to achieve "the synthesis of Islamism with Turkist/ultra-nationalism." In other words, it aimed at the identification of Islam with Turkisness.

The embracement of Islam, starting from the mid-1940s, by Turkish nationalists as "an ally" under the roof of nationalist conservatism was the result of several factors (Koçak, 2002: 602). First of all, "the Case of Racism-Turanism" in 1944, which resulted with the arrests of many Turkists/Turanists of the period, including Nihal Atsız, Alparslan Türkeş, Reha Oğuz Türkkkan, Serdengeçti and C. Oğuz Öcal, is regarded as "a milestone" in the sense it ended the Turkist- Kemalist alliance, particularly shaped during the war era (Ertekin, 2002: 381). Excluded from the official ideology, Turkists/Turanists approached to the Islamists of the period, who, as the silenced segment of the population under the single party rule, were to appear more frequently in the public scene with the transition to multi-party period in 1945. In this sense, the transition to the multi-party period, leading to the revival of Islam in the political scene can be put forward as another driving force behind this reunification (Akgün & Çalış, 2002: 595). At this point, Koçak (2002: 609) suggests that "starting from the mid-1940s, while the Republican People's Party (the RPP) tried to reconstruct its relation with religion as a consequence of the newly established political atmosphere, the representatives of Turkist nationalism as an attempt to survive the trauma of 1944 embraced Islam more candidly." In addition, "the threat of communism" is also known to have contributed to this alliance in the

sense that "Islam served as a uniting element of the alliance between Turkists and Islamists" against the rising "threat of communism" in the political scene of the post-war era (Koçak, 2002: 609).

2.4. Turkish Conservatism and Kemalist Modernization

In order to provide an analysis of Turkish conservative approach to modernity, one should first emphasize the clear distinction between conservatism and reactionism. As mentioned above earlier, Turkish conservatism, except from single examples, never displayed a resistant attitude toward the change. In opposition to the revivalist approach of the reactionaries towards "the past" (Taşkın, 2003b: 187), Turkish conservatives sided with "the change" in consistency with the past. Highlighting Topçu as the only exception, Öğün (2003: 566) points out that the main concern of Turkish conservatives was to progress in continuity with "the tradition." In this sense, for conservatives conservation of the traditions did not present a challenge with progress as in reactionaries, who advocate "progress as a rupture from the past." Moreover, Öğün (2003: 567) demonstrates that one of the defining distinction between the reactionaries and conservatives is that though both are identified with longing of the past traditions, "conservatives are not that sensitive to traditions," as in reactionaries. In this regard, the traditions for conservatives, challenging with reactionaries for whom the change is of no acceptance, can be modified to current moment (Öğün, 2003: 567). However, that did not mean that Turkish conservatives lacked "the nostalgic sentiment" favoring the past over the present, as asserted out by Bora and Onaran (2003: 259), who put emphasis on "the nostalgia" as one of the critical component of conservative thought. The figures of cultural conservatism were critical in this sense. Their narratives were filled with agony over the loss of "the good old days." Nevertheless, this agony was not motivated with the reaction to revive the Ottoman-Islamic order since cultural conservatives were very aware that the revival of the past order was a desperate attempt. At this point it is important to note that even for nationalist conservatives, as the fierce opponents of the Kemalist policies of modernization, the attempt was not to revive the Caliphate or monarchy.

Under the influence of Bergson, the Republican conservatives sought for "a conservative modernity" (Bora, 1998: 71). For them, Bergson served as a reference point during the early Republican era against the radicalism of Kemalist modernism that intended for a complete rupture from the Ottoman-Islamic tradition (Bora & Onaran, 2003: 244). In particular reference to Bergson's notion of "duree," suggesting "the continuity of the past in the present moment" (as cited in Bora & Onaran, 2003: 244), Republican conservatives tried to legitimize the past tradition for the formation of the new Republic. In this sense, their intention was not to revive the Ottoman Islamic order, but to seek for a reconciliation between "the new" and "the old," best formulated in "the integration of the new technology with the old culture" (as cited in Bora & Onaran, 2003: 241).

Within diverse conservative tendencies, different but interweaving arguments were put forward by Turkish conservatives against the modernization project carried out by the Kemalists. As basically discussed above, the perception of Turkish conservatives on modernization mainly derived from Burke's harsh criticism of the way French Revolution was pursued (Beneton, 2011). Conservatives of the early Republican era, as pointed out by İrem (2002: 108), "were abided to the revolutionary principles of the Kemalists." Their primary concern was to deal with "extremisms" of the revolutions concerning the copying of the Western forms and ignorance of the authentic culture. In this sense, the process of the Japanese modernization aimed at protecting the authentic culture while pursuing the adoption of Western technology, was to provide basis to the Turkish conservatives (Çiğdem, 2002: 79). The offered solutions particularly centered around the differentiation of "the spiritual world of the East" and "the material civilization of the West" searching for a synthesis, as exemplified in "the East and West synthesis" of Peyami Safa (Bora, 1998: 44). Safa, as one of the representatives of conservative modernity in the early era, through "the East and West synthesis" sought for a cooperation between the East and the West by emphasizing the true integration of the material qualities of the West with the spirituality of the East (Ayvazoğlu, 2003: 528). However, at this point it has to be noted that "the spirituality of the East" in Safa and early conservatives more or less stood for "the traditions" than the religion. In this sense, it

differed from nationalist conservative perception for which "the spirituality" had a religious, but more purposely Islamic connotation.

Although Turkish conservatism did not reflect an open anti-Kemalist attitude concerning the modernization project basically till the transition to the multi-party period, it never truly adopted the way it was carried out. Ögün (2003: 566) demonstrates that Turkish conservatism has never been fond of the revolutions imposed above. That's why, the primary concern of Turkish conservatives, as mentioned above, was the way these revolutions was performed. Their criticism was aroused against the perception of modernization as "a social engineering project." The anti-Kemalist discourse of the multi-party period, on the other hand, was more or less derived from this criticism. Nationalist conservatism, for instance, mostly based his anti-Kemalist discourse on the argument on "the aloofness of Kemalist elites to the values of the people." Nationalist conservatives, as more particularly be discussed in the following chapter, challenged the Kemalists by promoting themselves as "the authentic representatives of the people" (Taşkın, 2007). In this sense, concerning the arguments of modernization process, "by whom" it was imposed more concerned the nationalist conservatives than "the way" it was carried out.

2.5. The Relation of Turkish Conservatism with Islam

In Turkish conservatism, contradicting with "the mainstream modernization thought equating conservatism with the religious thought, and more specifically Islam" (Bora, 1998: 79), religion has always been treated with caution. Turkish conservatism, contrary to the general myth, did not grow out of a reaction to the principle of secularism. In fact, basically till the transition to the multi-party period, Turkish conservatism, as a Republican product, evaluated religion in terms of "tradition, culture and spirituality" (Mert, 2007: 138). In this sense, religion was treated beyond the religious activities and, as İrem (2002: 99) demonstrates, was perceived as one of the common grounds of the nation along with tradition, language and custom to "consolidate a modern secular moral order" to prevent the nation from

going through a moral crisis in its transition to modernity. In other words, religion was by and large approached with moral concerns as the result of extremisms of modernization. The primary concern for Republican conservatives was to deal with "the moral problems" instead of "the metaphysical ones," following the general tendency of the conservative thought which, as Ögün (2003: 573-74) emphasizes, has generally preferred to employ itself with a more secular function by dealing with the former ones. Nevertheless, dealing with moral problems as the consequence of modernization process was not restricted early Republican conservatives, as for instance detected in "the liberal conservatism" of Başgil, seeking for the establishment of "a moral order" (Bora, 1998: 92-93).

As İrem (2002: 100) points out, the Republican conservative approach to religion, under the influence of Bergsonian spiritualism in challenge with positivist orthodoxy, was "spiritualist and mystic," and emphasized "the mystic essence in folk Islam." Against "the abstract scholasticism of the Islamic clergy," Republican conservatives searched for "a code of religiosity in the national folk tradition" (İrem, 2002: 100). Therefore, Republican conservative approach to religion was identified with a nationalist stance, differing from "the universalist Islamic reactionism which viewed national culture and institutions as harmful to the universal Muslim community, or *umma*" (İrem, 2002: 100).

The nationalist stance against the universalist approach to Islam was also backed by Topçu, as one of the leading figures of "Anatolian nationalism." His approach to Islam attributed great importance to the Anatolian land. Topçu, emphasizing that true Islam was rooted in the Anatolian culture, pointed to "the folk Islam" and "mysticism" (Bora, 1998: 90). However, Topçu, differentiating from the Republican conservative approach, paid particular importance to the Ottoman Empire in his approach to Islam. For Topçu, the Anatolian land from the victory of Manzikert in 1071 onward served to the formation of the Turkish nation, in which Islam played a uniting role (Çetinsaya, 2004: 444). In this sense, Topçu, for whom Mehmet Akif was a pioneer in the formulation of "the synthesis between religion and nation," can be referred to as one of the leading figures to search for the impartibility of Islam with Turkishness, succeeded by the nationalist conservatives (Çetinsaya, 2004: 445).

As Bora (1998: 125) emphasizes "from the mid-1940s onward, a new phase began concerning the religious policies of the nation" in the sense that religion was to be defined as one of the primary obligations of national morals. Although it might be argued that the general tendency of the conservative thought in the early Republican era was also to value religion with respect to morality, what differentiated conservatism of the multi-party was the identification of a more concrete source of morals: Islam. Differing from Bergsonian spiritualism, nationalist conservatives of the multi-party period associated morals with Islam, as detected in Necip Fazıl, as one of the leading voices of nationalist conservatism (Cantek, 2003: 650).

Nonetheless, the identification of morals with Islam was not the only change that shaped the conservative approach to religion. Starting from the transition to the multi-party period, the general tendency of conservatism concerning religion was to compensate for the disregard of religion during the one party rule. In this regard, the merge of nationalist conservatism as a common ground for the Islamists and the Turkists of the period was significant since it served Islam to come front both in the politics and the public sphere. Here, the significance of nationalist conservatism lay in its encouragement of Islam as the essential component of the national identity. As Bora (1998: 127) emphasizes, "the promotion of Islam as an essential component to consolidate national homogeneity" was the basis nationalist conservative discourse built itself throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In this regard, the role of religion was no longer restricted to the moral problems.

As mentioned before, nationalist conservatism, as a unitary platform, attempted to achieve "the synthesis of Islamism with Turkist/ultra-nationalism" (Bora, 2002b: 260). Although the Islamists and the Turkists of the period united under the roof of nationalist conservatism dispersed to different paths by the end of 1960s (Çetinsaya, 2004: 447), the impact of nationalist conservatism continued in the following decades, as most openly expressed in "Turkish-Islamic synthesis." As Bora (2012: 21) points out, "Turkish-Islamic synthesis," shaped by the Hearth of Intellectuals of 1970s, "was a reformulation of nationalist conservatism, more particularly contributing to referring to religion as the source of consent after the military coup of 1980." The aim of "the doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis was to integrate

Islam into the official ideology of September 12" (Kurt, 2010: 122). Basing its claim that there existed "a harmony between Turkishness and Muslim or Islam," as Kurt emphasizes (2010: 123), Turkish-Islamic synthesis encouraged "Turkishness and Islam as the two essential components of the national identity" (Mert, 2007: 79). However, as signified by Mert (2007: 78-79), this idea searching for harmony between Islam and Turkishness was a thing of past in the sense that it was earlier discussed in the final years of the Ottoman Empire by different circles concerning the attempts to preserve the Empire from falling down. Judging from this fact, I think, at this point, before going any further, it would be better to provide an overview on the relation of Turkish nationalism with Islam for the sake of the study. Thus, I will analyze it here under a separate heading.

2.5.1. The Road to Turkish-Islamic Synthesis

As Landau (2004: 26) points out Pan-Turkism, as the heir of Turkish Republican nationalist thought, did not disassociate itself from religion initially. In this regard, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism are regarded as separate but interweaving ideologies, as observed in the writings of two central figures in the development of Turkish nationalism: Yusuf Akçura and Ziya Gökalp. According to Mert (2004: 412), Akçura was one of the first figures that made mention of "Islamism" (Pan-Islamism), particularly detected in his article "Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset" published in 1904, which dealt with Islam as one of the ways to preserve the Ottoman Empire. Similarly Gökalp, accepted as "the father of Turkish nationalism," defined Islamism in "Üç Cereyan," published in *Türk Yurdu* in 1913, as one of the three paths that could be followed to prevent the Empire from falling down (Mert, 2004: 413). The role of *Sebilürreşad*, or *Sirat-ı Müstakim* of the period, in the intertwinement of Turkist and Islamist circles of the period is also highlighted in the sense that the periodical served as a joint ground for both Turkists and Islamists initially (Akgün & Çalış, 2002: 590). As Arabacı (2004: 96) points out, many leading figures of Turkism, including Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, İsmail Gaspıralı and Halim Sabit, contributed to the periodical in its first years. However, the role of *Sebilürreşad* as a uniting platform did not last for long and the voice of Islamists began to be more obviously heard. As

pointed out by Bora (1998: 114), *Sebilürreşad* voiced the criticism of the Islamists towards the Turkists, who were labeled as "traitors" and "separatists" and blamed for leading a division among Muslims. The division, on the other hand, was more particularly the result of the national uprisings among the Muslim population of the Empire. As Çetinsaya (2004: 420-23) states that it was after 1912-13 that Islamists began to raise their criticism towards the Turkists and gives the example of Mehmet Akif, suggesting that it was only after the 1912 that he began "to curse nationalism as a plot engineered by the others that would lead to the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, as the last fortress of Muslims." In this sense, it is asserted that "the rise of the emphasis on the language, blood, clan and race in Pan-Turkist publications" had also caused concern among the Islamist circles, as detected in the writings of Babanzade Ahmet Naim published in *Sebilürreşad* (Akgün & Çalış, 2002: 591). Ahmet Naim, as emphasized by Bora (1998: 114), particularly held the Pan-Turkists responsible for disrupting "the Muslim brotherhood" and made a distinction between "the true Turkists," whom he accused of encouraging irreligiousness, and "Turkist-Islamists." The reaction of the Turkists to these accusations, on the other hand, was to publish a periodical named *İslam Mecmuası*, which, according to Akgün and Çalış (2002: 593), can be featured "as the first step towards the formation of Turkish Islam."

The accusations raised towards the Pan-Turkists, on the other hand, were particularly the result of the increased "irredentist" views among the nationalists, with particular contributions of Gökalp and Tekin Alp, or with his Jewish name, Moiz Kohen (Landau, 2004: 40). Landau (2004: 44-46) asserts although "neither was a Turk," referring to the Kurdish origins of the former and the Jewish origins of the latter, both Gökalp and Alp were highly influential in the formation of "irredentist Pan-Turkism" in search of the establishment of "the happy lands of Turan." However, though the attempts of Pan-Turkists to establish the lands of Turan failed, the influence of both Gökalp and Alp continued in the following years concerning the formulation of Kemalist nationalism. At this point, it is significant to note that the figure of Tekin Alp is critical for Turkish Islamists, concerning their expression of criticism towards Turkists, as Bora (2002b: 261) emphasizes by stating that the

figure of Moiz Kohen provides basis to Islamists to feature Turkist-nationalism as "a plot conspired by the Jews in alliance with the West to detach Muslims from Islam."

Nevertheless, even though there existed contradictions between Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists, it was not until the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the gradual disappearance of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) from the political scene, as pointed out by Landau (2004: 29), that "Pan-Turkism totally disassociated from religion." Turkish nationalism, following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, embraced a secular tone by "positioning itself against Islamism" (Akgün & Çalış, 2002: 593). Koçak (2002: 601-02) argues that although there existed dissimilarities, Pan-Turkist ideology, mainly centered around the activities of "the Turkish Hearths," displayed closeness to the ruling Kemalist ideology and excluded Islam in an effort remain legitimate. In this regard, Bora (1998: 121) points out that the collaboration of the Turkists with the official ideology was more particularly visible in the attempts to "nationalize/Turkify Islam" by asserting that Turkist nationalists, featuring Islam as "an Arab religion," reached the conclusion that "Arab and Persian culture have led to the eradication of Turkish culture in the disguise of Islam," and searched for the ways to purify Islam from their impact.

In this sense, Nihal Atsız, as one of the leading Turkists of the Republican era, is critical. As emphasized by Bakırezer (2002: 357), Atsız argued against "the Muslim brotherhood" and portrayed those in search of "the Muslim unity" as "traitors." Moreover, Atsız, featuring Islam as a hinder before the advancement of Turks, even declared that "it was not thanks to Islam that Turks survived and prospered, but the opposite" (as cited in Akgün & Çalış, 2002: 594). At this point, Bora (1998: 122) suggests that this sort of "arrogant" expression was also inherited by the nationalist conservative discourse of the following decades. What is significant to note about Atsız, on the other hand, is the change of perception concerning his ideas on Islam in the 1950s, as can exemplified in his article "Veda," in which Atsız, despite emphasizing "Shamanism as the old religion of Turks," expresses "Islam as the

religion of Turks."¹¹ However, it has to be noted that it would be wrong to link Atsız's views on Islam to the Islamists' or nationalist conservatives' of the period. For instance, Atsız, in opposition to Kısakürek (2013b) who features Said Nursi as "the continual repressed," or Serdengeçti who refers to him as "the national hero;"¹² fiercely opposes to Said Nursi and his movement by promoting that Said Nursi as a Kurdish nationalist yearns for the annihilation of the Turkish nation."¹³ Nevertheless, Atsız is significant in the sense that he features the signs of the breakdown of the Turkist-Kemalist cooperation and the intertwining of Islam with Turkism, particularly observable after the mid-1940s. In this regard, judging from the single figure of Atsız, it would not be wrong to suggest that Turkish nationalist movement after the mid-1945 onward was to restore its relation with religion. At this point, the significance of the reopening of the Turkish Hearths in 1949 in this process is emphasized by Bora (1998: 127-28) according to whom, the reopening of the Hearths under the presidency of Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, who declared "religion as the oldest and most enduring institutions of the nations" in his inauguration speech, was an important sign of change towards "the rising wind of religious nationalism."

Turkish nationalists were to embrace religion more candidly and openly throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In this sense, the figure of Kısakürek, visible for his attempts to nationalize Islam, was critical. Güzel (2003: 340) asserts that Kısakürek, positioning himself against "the Salafi-Islamic movements," sought for the nationalization of Islam by attributing great significance to Turks in the survival of Islam. According to Bora (1998: 130), on the other hand, Kısakürek's "Turkish - Islamism" encouraging the superiority of the Turkish nation over other Muslim nations by highlighting the role of Turks as "the real bearer of Islam" greatly contributed to the obtainment of

¹¹ Atsız, Nihal. "Veda" in *Orkun*, Issue: 68, 18 January 1952, <http://www.nihal-atsiz.com/yazi/veda-h-nihal-atsiz.html> (accessed on 10 May 2014).

¹² Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Said Nur ve Talebeleri" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 14, March 1952.

¹³ Atsız, Nihal. "Nurculuk Denen Sayıklama" in *Ötüken*, Issue: 109, 7 March 1964, <http://www.nihal-atsiz.com/yazi/nurculuk-denen-sayıklama-h-nihal-atsiz.html> (accessed on 10 May 2014).

"the chauvinistic even racist stance in nationalism, identified on the basis of religion."

The nationalist/idealist movement of the 1960s was observable for the rising dominance of Islam in the national identity. Although the recognition of Islam as "the essential component of national identity" among nationalists was not without conflict, as most visible in the division between "Bozkurtçular" and "Hilalciler" (Güzel, 2003: 338), by the late 1960s Turkish nationalist movement was to recognize the importance of Islam, more particularly against "the rising threat of communism." As exemplified in the person of İbrahim Kafesoğlu, as one of the crucial figures of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, by the late of 1970s the dominance of Turkishness as the essential component of the national identity was replaced by the emphasis on "the natural harmony between Islam and Turkishness" (Taşkın, 2003a: 389). Against "the rising threat of communism," the nationalist/idealist movement of the 1960s throughout the 1970s made advantage of Islam for its popularization in reaching the people (Bora, 1998: 128-29). By the early 1980s, on the other hand, the nationalist movement, according to Bora (2003: 445-46) "went so far as to assert Islam as the primary and even principal component of national identity." Therefore, the dominant position of Islam in the national identity continued basically till the "re-Turkicizing" attempts of the 1990s as a response to the rise of the Kurdish movement (Bora, 2003: 445-46).

2.6. "Anatolian and Ottoman Legacy" in Conservative Approach to Nationalism

"Anatolia" was at the heart of the conservative approach to nationalism. Challenging to Gökalpian thought of nationalism, searching for the roots of Turkish nation in Central Asia (Çetinsaya, 2003: 363), Turkish conservatives attributed great importance to "the land of Anatolia" in the definition of Turkish nation. In this sense, the role of "Anatolian movement" in shaping the conservative understanding of nationalism was critical. As asserted by Atabay (2002: 515), "the Anatolian movement" emerged in the early 1920s as "an anti-thesis to Gökalpian pan-Turkist

thought of nationalism." Although "the race/ethnicity" was not undermined, Anatolian movement differed from pan-Turkism in the sense that it searched for the roots of Turkish race within the boundaries of Anatolia, not in Turan. Hence, "Anatolianism" is depicted as "the sort of nationalism born as a reaction to Turanism" (Atabay, 2002: 517).

Nevertheless, the conservative approach to Anatolia differentiated from the early Anatolian movement, which essentially gathered around *Anatolian* journal (Deren, 2002: 533), by putting great emphasis on the Ottoman heritage and Islam. The conservative approach was more particularly shaped by the second generation Anatolians of the late 1930s and 1940s, mainly represented by the "Anatolian nationalism" of Remzi Oğuz Arık and Topçu. While for both movements the date of 1071 was crucial in the sense that it signified the turning point for the Turkish national history, they varied from each other with their approach to the Ottoman heritage. While for the late Anatolians, the Ottoman Empire signified "the golden age" for the Turkish nation, for the earlier Anatolians "the golden age" for the Turkish civilization was more or less represented by the Seljuks (Deren, 2002: 536). Moreover, differing from the general tendency, M. Halil Yinanç, one of the early of proponent of the Anatolianism, emphasized "the meaninglessness of identification of Turkish history with dynasties" and trivialized the Ottoman and Seljuk heritage as a mere phase by using the term "Anatolian history" (Ayvazoğlu, 2002: 563).

The conservative ideas on nationalism, displaying similarities with the late Anatolian nationalism, challenged the disregard of the Ottoman legacy in the Turkish identity. Conservatives were against the construction of the Ottoman heritage as "the other" (Bora, 1998: 41-42) of the Turkish national identity as in the official Kemalist ideology. Following the path of Beyatlı, Turkish conservatism celebrated the Ottoman Empire as "the peak of Turkish civilization" (Çetinsaya, 2003: 363). At this point, cultural conservatives, noticeable for their "anti-Gökalpian" stance including Banarlı and Ayverdis, were significant (Bora, 1998). For instance, for Samiha Ayverdi, as one of the critical advocates of the Ottoman heritage, the Ottoman Empire, but more particularly the conquer of Istanbul and Mehmed the Conquer, denoted "the golden age" for the Turkish nation (Azak, 2003: 249). In this sense,

Ayverdi, struggling hard against the disregard of the Ottoman heritage in the Turkish identity, stood up for the sort of nationalism which recognized the Ottoman legacy (Azak, 2003: 249).

Already mentioned, Topçu, as one of the advocates of Anatolian nationalism, was against Gökalp's or Turkists' understanding of the nation solely identified with race. For him, the land of Anatolia, signifying "the common history of Turks," was at the core of his definition of the nation. Moreover, Topçu's view on the Ottoman heritage displayed similarities with cultural conservatives as he regarded the Ottoman Empire as "the ideal phase of Anatolian nationalism" (Çetinsaya, 2004: 444). Arık, as another proponent of "Anatolian nationalism," on the other hand, was a critical figure in the identification of Anatolia as the motherland, as most observable in his book entitled *Coğrafyadan Vatana*. As Bora (1998: 79) expresses, Arık through *Coğrafyadan Vatana* pointed out to Anatolians as the source of the Turkish nation, and for him, the nation, rooted in Anatolia, was already there, waiting "to be discovered." At this point, it has to be noted that this emphasis on "the exploration of Anatolia" was also valid for nationalist conservative approach to Anatolia, as to more specifically be discussed in the third chapter.

2.7. Turkish Conservative Approach to Communists, Non-Muslim Minorities, Donmehs and Free Masons

Since the primary aim of this study is to offer an analysis of the enemies for nationalist conservatism as one of the general tendencies of Turkish conservatism, it will be better to offer a general analysis of Turkish conservative approach to the communists/communism, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons/Masonry, which will enable us to make a comparison between nationalist conservatism and other conservative tendencies. Here, I will analyze it under two separate headings: Communists/Communism, and non-Muslim minorities, Donmehs and Free Masons. Since anti-communism was a uniting theme for the Turkish right wing from nationalists to conservatives and Islamists during the Cold War era, it is necessary to offer a particular analysis to communists/communism within the boundaries of Turkish conservatism. Besides conservative approach to the Jews, other non-Muslim

minorities, the Donmehs, Free Masons/Masonry will also be examined considering the fact that anti-Semitic, anti-Donmeh and anti-Masonry attitude has not been restricted to nationalist conservatism.

2.7.1. Communists/Communism

For Bora (2012: 14), the Turkish right wing essentially grew out of anti-left arguments, centering on anti-communist discourse. For the Turkish right communism stood for a real threat not only being the manifestation of a "hostile regime against property, religion" but also serving as a mask for Russia (*Moscow!*), which was grown into a nemesis for Turkey since "the 93 War," the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78 (Bora, 2012: 14). From the mid-1940s onward, the threat of communism grew as one of the major themes in Turkish right. With almost no exception, either from nationalism to Turkism or from conservatism to pro-Islamism, anti-communism was central in all right-wing ideologies throughout the Cold War era. Nevertheless, despite anti-communism was the core of the right-wing discourse, it was not restricted to it. As Taşkın (2002: 618) points out, anti-communist discourse of the Turkish right-wing, in fact, was more or less inherited from the anti-communist reactionism of secular nationalism of the founding elites. In order to highlight this transition, he gives the examples of Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın and his role in "the Tan Incident" of 1945 along with Mehmet Şevket Eygi and his role in "Bloody Sunday of 1969." Although representing diverse tendencies, both, Yalçın as a secular nationalist and Eygi as an Islamist reactionary, were united on a common ground against communism with their provoking roles in the happening of two diverse, violent incidents (Taşkın, 2002: 618).

As Bora (2012: 14-15) points out, the anti-communist discourse of the Turkish right "was the discourse of the criminalization, enemization/evilification and demonization," targeting all the left. In this sense, he asserts that for the right discourse, "the left" in general, in the service of "the communist ideology," referred to as a bunch of "traitors" in service of a foreign power: Moscow. For nationalists and conservatives, the anti-communist discourse, during the Cold War era, was a common ground serving the purpose of the construction of the left as evil. As

mentioned before, anti-communism was not the all new product of the Cold War Era or the Turkish right. Nevertheless, inherited more or less from "the anti-communist reactionary vein of the founding elites," anti-communism all through the Cold War era benefited the Turkish right as a common base on which they built their arguments targeting "the left," including "the founding elites" (Taşkın, 2002: 619).

"The threat of communism;" or "the Red threat" in common usage which, as pointed out by Yıldırım (2012: 47), was more likely to be derived from Ziya Gökalp as one of the first to make use of "the Red threat" in reference to 1917 Revolution in his article, "İki Tehlike" published in *Yeni Mecmua* in 1918, was, from the mid-1940s to the end of 1960s, mainly shaped by "the reactionary conservatism" of Kısakürek, Serdengeçti, Atilhan and Eygi that is associated with violence (Taşkın, 2003b: 202-03). As Taşkın (2003b: 202-03) points out, these figures, who can be classified under nationalist conservatism, were critical in the sense that they contributed not only to "the popularization of communism as the major threat to Islam," but to the growth of the idealist movement of the 1970s as a reactionary one easily turned into violence. In this regard, even though anti-communism continued to serve as a common ground for the Turkish right, from the end of 1960s onward "anti-communist reactionism" was passed from the conservatives to the idealists (Taşkın, 2002: 633).

The anti-communist discourse of the Turkish right, as mentioned before, was developed as an anti-left discourse. Therefore, "anti-intellectualism," as signified by Bora (2012: 16), was one of the core basis on which anti-communist discourse was built as a response to the expanding influence of the leftist/communist intellectuals in the cultural field throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The establishment of "the Intellectuals' Hearth" in 1970 was critical in this process. As Taşkın (2012: 414-15) concludes, the opening of "the Intellectuals' Hearth," reflecting "the fear" of the Turkish right against the rising hegemony of the socialist movement in the cultural field, was an open expression of the message that "they were the authentic intellectuals." For nationalist conservatives of the Cold War era, promoting themselves as "the organic intellectuals of the nation," the intellectuals of "the left" stood as a barrier in front of the growth of their authority in the cultural field (Taşkın, 2012: 110-18). In this regard, the intellectuals of the left were to be labeled as the

traitors working side by side with Moscow in the pursuit of communism. Nonetheless, for nationalist conservatism, this labeling was not restricted to "the socialist left." Differing from other conservative tendencies, nationalist conservatism did not refrain from associating the founding elites with communism, as will be discussed in the fourth chapter. With respect to the modernization process, the Kemalist elites were fiercely criticized for opening the way for "communist invasion" by leading to moral decline as the outcome of the excessive modernization/Westernization they carried out (Bora, 2012: 16). In this sense, one of the most remarkable sides of the anti-communist discourse of nationalist conservatives, differing from the founding elites, was the very emphasis on morality. As Taşkın (2002: 632) emphasizes, "the narratives associating communists with lack of morality were as significant as the ones concentrating on communists' endeavor to invade our lands in nourishing the anti-communist discourse." In line with this, the construction of communists with evil was more or less built on their lacking of morality.

Moreover, with the rising of anti-Semitism being a general tendency among the Turkish right-wing in the 1940s, the anti-communist discourse found expression in anti-Semitism. As pointed out by Bora (2002a: 915), Turkish anti-Semite discourse, from the end 1940s on, served to "the demonizing of the left" within the framework of anti-communism by promoting it as "a Jewish invention," based on the fact that Karl Marx himself was a Jew and that many Jews took part at the beginning of the Bolshevik revolution. Judging from both Marx and the Bolshevik revolution, both Islamic and nationalist circles concluded that the Revolution was "the work of Jews so as to achieve world domination," as emphasized by Bali (2003b: 409).

Last but not least, it is important to stress that the anti-communist discourse was not restricted to nationalist conservatives. Although, the role of nationalist conservatism, as the most prominent ideology of the Turkish right in the Cold War era (Taşkın, 2003a: 383), was vital in this process, it did not mean that other tendencies in Turkish conservatism were not effective in the construction of the anti-communist discourse. From cultural conservatives including Ayverdis, Banarlı to Safa, all were observable for their anti-communist stance. Even Topçu, who, as Öğün (as cited in

Bora, 1998: 91) points at, as a fierce critique of capitalism was referred to as "an Marxist" by nationalist conservative circles, reflected the similar anti-communist tendency of his counterparts since for Topçu (2012: 187-193) communism, as "a Jewish product," was a barrier in front of the development of "Anatolian socialism" that he wished for.

2.7.2. Non-Muslim Minorities, Donmehs and Free Masons

As emphasized above, the Ottoman legacy for Turkish conservative approach to nationalism was critical. The narratives of Turkish conservatives, more particularly of the cultural ones whose primary concern was the denial of "the past" in construction of "the present," were a sort of reflection of grief over the loss of "good old days." Their words mainly demonstrated longing for the Islamic-Ottoman order. Nevertheless, as emphasized by Bora and Onaran (2003: 236-37), the conservative nostalgia is inherently discriminative against the past in the sense that while some cultural components, structures, practices or traditions of the past are highly emphasized, some are excluded. In this sense, the multi-cultural structure of the Ottoman Empire, in reference to non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, was one of those to be excluded.

Turkish conservatism in general sense displayed an anti-minority attitude. As Bora (2002a: 911) emphasizes, the approach to the minorities, in the early years of the Republic reflected the implications of "suspicion" against them. As the result of the collective memories of the War of Independence and the occupation by Allied forces; the minorities, though not openly discriminated, were approached with "suspicion" (Bora, 2002a: 911). As observed in the lines of Baltacıoğlu (as cited in Bora, 2002a: 911), the minorities were suspected as "the interior enemies" having worked with collaboration with the Allies

The Turks have not only been slaughtered in Izmir and Bursa; for centuries, Turks have been slaughtered by the vicious fangs of the serpents known as minorities! (...) Turkey's wealth has been ransomed and stolen by the moneylenders of minorities,

(...) while Turkey's felicity and prosperity has been chipped away by their greed and lust!¹⁴

As the statements of Baltacıođlu demonstrate, the experience of the war was employed as a way to consolidate "the infidelity of the minorities." In other words, the construction of the minorities as "the evil" was particularly based on their alleged infidelity during the war. Besides, it has to be noted that the words of Baltacıođlu voiced the longstanding prejudice against the minorities thought of as the exploiters of Turks' prosperity. As Levi (1996: 30) puts forward, the general approach to them was "xenophobic" in the sense that they -the Jews, Armenians, and Greeks- were perceived as "foreigners" who had betrayed the nation by collaborating with the enemy. Yet, Bora (2002a: 911) emphasizes that the general tendency towards the minorities in the first decade of the Republic was particularly based on their "ignorance," rather than expressing a direct hostility. In this sense, the minorities were approached within the policies of Turkification. Bali points out that the particular concern of the Republic in 1920s with respect to the non-Muslim minorities was to Turkify them by leading "to dissolving of their religious/ethnic identities into the new Turkish national identity."¹⁵ This aim of Turkification, on the other hand, was mainly supported by the conservative intellectuals, including Baltacıođlu, in search of the integrity of the rising nation (İrem, 2002: 97).

While the general approach to the minorities in 1920s was more or less shaped by the cultural assimilation policies, the 1930s through 1940s witnessed more radical steps directed against them, as best exemplified in the Capital Tax Levy of 1942. According to Bali, the Capital Levy was not only "the last and the unforgettable example of the de facto discrimination of the non Muslims in the Single Party period," but also "the testimony of the failure of the Turkification policies." At this point, he concludes that the failure of the policies of Turkification was the outcome of the negative legacy of the past since in the eyes of the Republican elites, for whom the memories of the past in reference to the War of Independence and the years of

¹⁴ "Türkler yalnız İzmir'de, Bursa'da buđazlanmadı, Türkler belki asırlardan beri ekalliyet yılanlarının dışları arasında buđazlandı ! (...) Türkiyenin serveti 'ekalliyetin sarrafları' elinde hapsoluyor, (...) Türkiye'nin saadeti 'ekalliyetin nefsanıyetiyle' büzülüyordu!"

¹⁵ <http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/basel.pdf> (accessed on 20 July 2014).

Armistice were still alive, the minorities were never truly accepted as the true citizens, but "the infidels."¹⁶ Nevertheless, the most extreme attitude towards the minorities in the 1930s and early 1940s came from the Turkists. As one of the leading Turkists of the era, Atsız was a strong opponent of the minorities. As Bora (2002a: 914) points out, for him the minorities were "the eternal enemies of the Turks." Atsız, for whom the race was the sole criteria of becoming a nation, strongly opposed to the process of Turkification as he concluded that "one would not be counted as a Turk even if he/she speaks Turkish if not bounded with blood."¹⁷

Although the conservative stance to Turkification, as in the case of the Republican conservatives mentioned above, was not negative, that did not mean that their approach to the non-Muslim population was more embracing. Differing from the memories of the Republican conservatives, the collective memory of the cultural conservative was mainly related to the fall of the Ottoman Empire. In the minds of the cultural conservatives, including Samiha Ayverdi, Münevver Ayaşlı and Banarlı, the minorities were the primary suspects of the decline of the Empire. As Azak (2003: 253-54) narrates, for Ayverdi the Greek, Jew, and Armenian minorities had betrayed the Ottoman Empire by collaborating with the Western powers despite the generosity and wealth they were offered. In this regard, the infidelities of the minorities were one of the common themes that were used in her narratives, reflecting the hostility against them (Azak, 2003: 253-54). Moreover, the Donmehs were also paid particular attention in Ayverdi who gave a wide coverage of the Donmehs in her memoirs, in which they were approached with suspicion and hostility (Bali, 2002: 28). As Bali (2001: 422) suggests Ayverdi, "in order to base her hostility on a more credible and legitimate ground and prove how untrustworthy they are, she particularly gave coverage to the oral testimonies of the Donmehs themselves in her narratives." Similar to Ayverdi, Ayaşlı, a fierce opponent of the minorities, included the Donmehs in her memoirs with lack of sympathy. Ayaşlı, as a Salonican origin basing her narratives on firsthand experience, as pointed out by Bali

¹⁶ <http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/basel.pdf> (accessed on 20 July 2014).

¹⁷ Atsız, Nihal. "Türk Irkı: Türk Milleti" in *Atsız Mecmua*, Issue: 6, 1931, <http://www.nihal-atsiz.com/yazi/turk-irki-turk-milleti-h-nihal-atsiz.html> (accessed on 25 July 2014).

(2002: 29), was not very fond of the Donmehs and also approached with suspicion towards them with the particular emphasis on their "hypocrite identity."

According to Bora (2002a: 914), the general tendency of the Anatolian movement, on the other hand, was to ignore the minorities as if they never existed. He emphasizes that the minorities were mostly referred to as "the agents of the past who had played crucial roles in the initiation of Westernization movement." In this sense, the minorities were mostly covered with respect to modernization process. Topçu, as the leading representative of Anatolian nationalism, was a critical figure reflecting the enmity towards the minorities. Topçu, on the other hand, was noticeable for his particular hostility against the Jews. Topçu's anti-Semitic attitude was mostly the result of the assumption that "the Jews, as a universal authority, dominated all the economic activities in the world and exploited all humanity."¹⁸ Mostly depending on the economic themes, "Topçu's antagonism towards the Jews and the Free Masons," for Bora (2002a: 914), "was the reflection of a strict anti-modernist's distrust against the trade and the merchants," but more particularly capitalism itself. For Topçu (2012: 187-193), the Jews and Free Masons, featured as the main obstacles in front of the development of "Anatolian socialism" as the perpetrators of both "capitalism and Marxism," reigned over all humanity by holding all the capital in their hands." In this regard, it has to be noted that Topçu's emphasis on the economic themes concerning his approach to the Jews and Free Masons is also valid for nationalist conservative discourse, which will more explicitly be analyzed in the fourth chapter.

Besides Topçu, Atilhan, as the leading anti-Semite figure of the 1930s onward, was critical in influencing the anti-Semite, anti-Donmeh and anti-Masonic approach of conservative thought. As Bali (2003a: 404) points out, Atilhan was one of the leading figures to have a great impact in shaping the anti-Semitic attitude of nationalist conservatives. While Atilhan was closed to Turkist nationalists during the one party rule, following the transition to the multi-party period he started to write in nationalist conservative and pro-Islamist periodicals, including *Büyük Doğu*, *Yeniden Milli Mücadele*, *Serdengeçti*, and *Sebilürreşad* (Karaca, 2008: 5). As in cultural

¹⁸ For a detailed reading see, "Para ve Yahudi" in *Ahlak Nizamı* (Topçu: 2012).

conservatives, Atilhan's anti-minority arguments were predominantly related to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, Atilhan, differing from the cultural conservatives who held the Jews, Greeks and Armenians equally responsible, paid a particular attention to the Jews. As Bali (2003a: 404) points out, for Atilhan, who put great emphasis on "the betrayal of the Jews in Palestinian Front during the First World War," the Jews in alliance with Free Masons and the Donmehs led to the dissolution of the Empire in order to establish the Jewish land in Palestine. In this sense, in the discourse of Atilhan the Jews were denoted as "Zionists" (Bali, 2003a: 405). Moreover, besides associating them with conspiracy, Atilhan held the Jews, represented with stereotypes "as money lover, self-seeker and plotter," responsible for almost all the misfortunes and trouble in political, economic and social sphere, as emphasized by Karaca (2008: 6).

The conservative approach to the minorities was more or less shaped by the rising of nationalist conservatism from the mid-1940s onward. Even though, the disruptive roles of the minorities in the collapse of the Empire continued to be employed as one of the common themes, the minorities from the late 1940s onward became the subjects of the "ethno populism" that favored "Muslim-Turk Anatolians" over "the others" (Bora & Canefe, 2002: 658). In this sense, the minorities had become the targets of "nationalist populism," mostly triggered by Serdengeçti, situating them as "foreigners" against "the people of Anatolia" (Bora, 2002a: 915). They were mostly covered as the exploiters of "Anatolian people," as the essence of Turkish nation, as to be discussed in the following chapter of the study. Moreover, the association of the minorities with "the other evil of communism" was crucial concerning anti-minority stance of the era. The relation of communism or "the left" in general, with the Jews or the Armenians contributed to the demonization of the communists as being minority in origin (Bora, 1998: 33). Nonetheless, among the minority groups the Jews were the most targeted one of the period. Along with the hostility raised towards the Donmehs and Free Masons, anti-Semitism was at the core of the enmity against the minorities, as will be discussed in the fourth chapter. In this sense, with regards to nationalist conservative approach, the Greeks and Armenians were mainly

covered with respect to their relations to the Jews, or rarely in relation to the missionary activities.

2.8. Concluding Remarks

The aim of this chapter was to provide an overview on the general tendencies of Turkish conservatism with the particular intend to draw a framework to nationalist conservatism. Focusing particularly on the different issues of concern about Turkish conservatism, I have tried to offer a background information which, I believe, will not only facilitate to identify the codes of nationalist conservative discourse in the following chapters, but also explore the differences and similarities of nationalist conservatism with other conservative tendencies.

In opposition to the general assumption, Turkish conservatism was not the result of an anti-modern stance yearning for the revival of the past. Following the Western conservative thought, but more particularly Burke, Turkish conservatism, with almost only exception of Topçu, was not against "the change," or progress as a consequence of modernization. The primary concern of Turkish conservatives was to deal with the extremisms of the Kemalist modernization project aiming at a complete rupture from the past. Moreover, differentiating from Burke's condemnation of French Revolutionists in *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, the conservative approach to Republican modernization was not an expression of a fierce reaction; but a search for revising it as in Safa's *Reflections on the Turkish Revolution* (Mert, 2007: 165). As Mert (2007: 166) suggests, the ideas of the founding fathers of Turkish conservatism, with reference to Republican conservatives, including Safa, Ülken, Baltacıoğlu, and Tunç, did not express a resistance to modernization or Westernization. Instead they projected a modernization in harmony with the past. As an alternative to the Kemalist modernization, Turkish conservatives searched for a synthesis between the traditions of the past and the technology of the present, as best exemplified in the Japanese modernization. As Çiğdem (2002: 79) points out, for Turkish conservatives "Japanese way of modernization," aiming at preserving the

authentic culture while adopting the Western technology, served as the best example to follow.

In comparison with Western conservatism of Burke, it has to be noted that Turkish conservatism has not been "counter revolutionary." As a matter of fact, except for the anti-Kemalist discourse of early nationalist conservative figures, it would be wrong to suggest that there existed an explicit opposition to the ruling ideology. Even cultural conservatism of Ayverdi and Ayaşlı yearning over "the good old days," did not reflect a struggle with modernization, Republic or Kemalism since their ambition was to establish bonds between the old and the new, in other words between the Ottoman and the Republic, by encouraging Islam as a common ground, as suggested by Atay (2003: 172). Similarly Taşkın (2007: 59) expresses that the primary goal of the conservatives concerning the Ottoman legacy was the revival of Islam, not the regime, itself.

Basically till the mid-1940s, the conservative approach to modernity continued with a reconciliatory tone. However, with the rise of nationalist conservatism, which differentiated from other conservative tendencies with its anti-Kemalist discourse, a more radical attitude against the modernization process was acquired. Nevertheless, the main concern of nationalist conservatives was the Kemalist elites as "the fake Westernizing nationalists" (Taşkın, 2007: 74). As Çiğdem (2002: 78) says for *Büyük Doğu* of Kısakürek, their main target was to "alert the religious masses against the real and fake Westernizations." In this sense, the embracement of Islam was promoted as the main road to *real* modernization. As will more particularly be displayed in the following chapter, nationalist conservatives fiercely criticized the Kemalist modernization. However, at this point what is significant to emphasize is that the aim of nationalist conservatives was not to revive the past order, as in traditionalists or reactionaries.

The primary concern of nationalist conservatives with respect to modernization, as will be analyzed, was related to Kemalist ideology and its reforms, accused of depriving the nation of her past heritage, traditions, religion and moral values. In this regard, nationalist conservatives of early era differentiated from the late figures of

Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Although Kısakürek, Serdengeçti, Atilhan and Fergan were critical figures on the road to Turkish-Islamic synthesis, as the reformulation of nationalist conservatism in the words of Bora (2012: 21), the representatives of Turkish Islamic synthesis displayed positive relations with Kemalism. As Kurt (2010: 115) points out "there was an evident positive relationship with 'Kemalism or Atatürkism' and Atatürk in the Intellectuals' Hearth rhetoric/discourse." Moreover, as opposed to the early figures, "they perceived the early years of the Republic when Atatürk was alive as 'old happy days'- *asr-ı saadet*" (Kurt, 2010: 116).

Last but not least, it has to be put forward that the general conservative approach to "the enemies" did not differ from the nationalist conservative approach, as to be discussed in the following parts of the study. At this point, what is significant to note is that "the threat of communists/communism" for Turkish conservatives was a theme of consolidation during the Cold War era. Besides, dependent mainly on the studies conducted on them, it would not be wrong to propose that the general approach of conservatives to the non-Muslim population, Donmehs or Free Masons, including Topçu's anti-Semitic stance related to economic themes, the emphasis of both Ayverdi and Ayaşlı on the hypocrite identities of the Donmehs, Atilhan's conspiratorial mindset or the general implications of suspicion towards the non-Muslims will also be valid for nationalist conservative discourse to be scrutinized within the framework of this study.

CHAPTER III

GENERAL ARGUMENTS OF NATIONALIST CONSERVATISM

3.1. Introduction

In this chapter, my aim is to deal with nationalist conservatism within the discourses of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad* and thinking of Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and Fergan. I will try to provide an analysis of the arguments of nationalist conservative discourse. Firstly, I will examine the nationalist conservative approach to Islam, nation and nationalism. Second, I will concentrate on the struggle of nationalist conservatives with "fake nationalists" in their words: Kemalists. In this sense, I will look at the arguments they voice in promoting themselves as an alternative to the Kemalist intelligentsia. As one of these counter arguments, I will more specifically deal with their approach to the Kemalist modernization and their criticism of modern life, imposed by the Kemalist reforms. Then, I will try to focus on the perception of Anatolia/Anatolians by nationalist conservatism. In this respect, I will examine the identification of "Muslim Turk Anatolians" as the essence of the nation and nationalist conservative claims concerning their "repression" by the ruling Kemalist ideology. Last but not least, following Taşkın (2007) I will seek to offer an analysis on their claim to be "the authentic representatives of the people" with the aim to reveal the contradictions that are observable concerning this issue of representation.

3.2. Islam - Nation- Nationalism

Nationalist conservatism, as the rising ideology of the Turkish right from the mid-1940s onward which aimed at the identification of Turkishness with Islam (Koçak, 2002: 609), was the driving force behind the growing authority of Islam. Although,

as discussed in the previous chapter, the search for harmony between Islam and Turkishness was not restricted to nationalist conservatism and was a thing of past rooted in the late Ottoman politics (Mert, 2007: 78-79), nationalist conservatism was crucial in promoting Islam as the essential component of the definition of the nation.

Kısakürek, Serdengeçti, Fergan and their periodicals were decisive in the legitimization of Islam from 1940s onward. While the critical role of Kısakürek is emphasized as being the first example of defending Islamic thought as a Republican intellectual raised in a political and social structure totally detached from Islam (Özdenören, 2004: 143), Fergan is asserted to have contributed to the incline of Islamism toward nationalism from the late 1940s onward (Bora, 1998: 129). Serdengeçti, on the other hand, as the one behind the long-running motto of "we are Turks as much as Mount Tanrı and we are Muslims as much as Mount Hira"¹⁹ is known to have played a critical role in the embracement of Islam by the nationalists of the following decades.

Fergan, to whom Bora (1998: 129) refers as a "Turkist-Islamist" was a critical figure of the period in searching for "harmony between Turkishness and Islam." For him and his periodical, the primary concern was to restore Islam. Nevertheless, this restoration was principally built on the potency of the impartibility of Turks with Islam. That's why, Fergan made a distinction between "Muslim-Turkism" and "irreligious Turkism" in favor of the former since for him, as emphasized by Çetinsaya (2004: 437), "both being a Turkist and irreligious at the same time was unfeasible." This division, on the other hand, featured similarities not only with Babanzade Ahmet Naim, who had previously distinguished between "true Turkists" and "Turkist-Islamists" (Bora, 1998: 114), but also with Said Nursi who had earlier proposed a distinction between "constructive nationalism" and "destructive nationalism" (Çetinsaya, 2004: 436).

In this regard, in *Sebilürreşad* a definition of the nation based on a harmony between religion and race is adopted. As discussed in the previous chapter, *Sebilürreşad*, from

¹⁹ Serdengeçtiler. "Yolumuz-Bizim Milliyetçiliğimiz" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 1, April 1947.

the very first years of its publication in 1908, explicitly demonstrated against the Pan-Turkist emphasis solely on race in the definition of the nation. Opposing fiercely against the exclusion of religion in the definition of the nation, *Sebilürreşad* was crucial in emphasizing the role of Islam in the happening of the Turkish nation.

The focus of *Sebilürreşad* and Fergan is on the revival of Islam on legitimate grounds. The cause of *Sebilürreşad*, as observed in Fergan's statements concerning the 50th anniversary of the periodical, is defined as to ensure the welfare and felicity of Islam: "Our cause is the cause of Islam: the honor and dignity of Islam; the welfare and felicity of Islam; the freedom and development of Islam."²⁰

One of the legitimate grounds for *Sebilürreşad* concerning the restoration of Islam is to focus on the impartibility of the Turks with Islam by reinforcing Islam as the authority behind the future successes of them. Fergan, for whom "the advancement of Muslims is based on their embracement of Islam" (as cited in Arabacı, 2004: 125), asserts that "Muslim Turks should turn their hearts towards Islam if they want to flourish and prosper"

If the Turks finally gather their wits and turn their hearts towards God, and if the Turks succeed in keeping religion above all else without falling prey to political ambitions; then they will surely succeed in reaching their goals and salvation.²¹

The Muslim Turkish nation must seek its welfare and prosperity in the guidance of the Qur'an.²²

Additionally Fergan, advocating Islam as the driving force behind the strength of the Turkish nation, asserts that the enemies of Turks, listed as the communists, Jews, Dohmehs and Free Masons, all conscious of the authority of Islam in Turks'

²⁰ "Dava, İslam davası: İslamın izzet ve şerefi, islamın refah ve saadeti, islamın hürriyet ve inkişafıdır." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Sebilürreşadın Ellinci Yıldönümü" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 12, Issue: 276, September 1958)

²¹ "Türkler aklını başına toplar, kalbini hakka çevirirse, siyasi ihtiraşlara kapılmayarak dinini her şeyin üstünde tutarlarsa, hiç şüphe yok, selamete erer." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Onüçüncü Cilde Başlıyoruz" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 13, Issue: 301, January 1960)

²² "Müslüman Türk milleti refah ve saadeti Kur'anın rehberliğinde aramalıdır." ("Kur'an rehberliği" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 6, Issue: 137, October 1952)

progress, fight hard to annihilate Islam.²³ According to Fergan, Islam does not deny the progress and development. For instance, concerning the arguments of the "interpretation in Islamic law," he displays the signs of support by asserting that "the interpretation of Islamic law is likely if certain conditions are secured."²⁴

Islam, in *Sebilürreşad*, is defined as "the religion of reason, wisdom and novelty" and is situated against "the superstition, ignorance and laziness"

Islam is a religion of life, dynamism, novelty, reason and science. However, there are those who propound laziness, superstition, submission, ignorance, and reactionism by claiming to do so in the name of Islam. Neither these people nor their thoughts have any place in our pure and sacred religion.²⁵

Similarly, Fergan enlists "ignorance" as one of the main threats that Muslim nations have ever encountered.²⁶ Furthermore, the Islamic world, despite having lagged behind the West over the centuries, is defined as the source of the Western civilization: "The lands of Islam were once the beacon of science and knowledge, and a source of prosperity and abundance. However, it must be admitted that in recent centuries, the lands of Islam have started to lag behind in many areas."²⁷ Hence, Islam is depicted as not being an opponent of science and progress, but a strong advocate.

Moreover, for *Sebilürreşad* and Fergan, the revitalization of Islam does not negate with the Republic. As Arabacı (2004: 124) points out, Fergan and his periodical never adopt a counter attitude towards the Republic, or the state. Even though "the repression of religion" by the Republican People's Party rule (the RPP) is fiercely

²³ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950.

²⁴ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "İnkılap ve Din: 2" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 15, September 1948.

²⁵"Hayat, hareket, yenilik, hakikat, akıl ve ilim dini olan Müslümanlık namına hala tenbelliği, hurafeyi, miskinçe tevekkülü, cehaleti, kısaca geriliği öne süren adamlar bulunuyorsa, ne bunların, ne de söylediklerinin bizim yüce ve temiz dinimizle asla ilgileri yoktur." (Şenkon, Hakkı. "Manevi hastalığımızın teşhis tedavisi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 5, Issue: 133, August 1952)

²⁶ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "İslam Dünyasını saran Tehlikeler" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 13, Issue: 324, April 1961.

²⁷ "Bir zamanlar Garb aleminin ilim ve irfan ocağı ve feyiz kaynağı olan İslam diyarının son asırlar zarfında her sahada geri kalmış olduklarını itiraf ile hakkı teslim gerektir." (Şenkon, Hakkı. "Manevi hastalığımızın teşhis tedavisi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 5, Issue: 133, August 1952)

criticized, as will be discussed later, the Republic is not denied in *Sebilürreşad*, but rather asserted that "Islam is based on the essence of Republicanism."²⁸ At this point, it has to be noted that Fergan (2012: 46), despite being critical of its execution by the one party rule, does not argue against secularism by concluding that "secularism does not stand for 'irreligiousness' or 'immorality,' as perceived by the Republicans." In this sense, he and his periodical are critical not only in searching for harmony between Islam and Turkishness concerning the definition of the national identity, but basing it on a legitimate ground.

For Kısakürek (2013a: 146-56), on the other hand, the embracement of Islam is regarded as a decisive moment in the history of the Turks since, for him, the rising of them begins with their embracement of Islam. Similarly, their fall is identified with rupture from Islam, starting as early as the 16th century with Kanuni period and reaching its climax throughout the 20th century under the RPP rule. From here on, Kısakürek (2013a: 12) defines the aim of *Büyük Doğu* as to revitalize Islam: "*Büyük Doğu* is under the command of Islam. (...) The pure and noble *Büyük Doğu* (...) is the gateway of Islam. And at the threshold of the 21st century, its cause is to revive Islam over the course of events."²⁹ In this regard, Kısakürek displays similarities with Fergan, advocating earlier the cause of *Sebilürreşad* as to serve for the interests of Islam. However, for Kısakürek, Islam without Turks is of no value. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Kısakürek attributes great significance to Turks in the survival of Islam by encouraging the superiority of the Turks over other Muslim nations as "the bearer of Islam" (Bora, 1998: 130). Accordingly, what is highlighted by Fergan concerning the role of Islam in the progress of Turks is reversed in Kısakürek who highlights the role of the Turks in the revitalization of Islam. Kısakürek (2013a: 567) suggests that the rise of Islam is dependent on its revitalization in Turkey

²⁸ Kösemen, Yusuf Z. "Millet Hakimiyeti, Ahlak Hakimiyeti" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 73, March 1950.

²⁹ " 'Büyük Doğu', İslamiyetin emir subaylığı (...) Büyük Doğu (...) olanca saffet ve asliyetiyle İslamiyet'e yol açma geçidi; ve çoktanberi kaybedilmiş bulunan bu saffet ve asliyeti Yirmibirinci Asrın eşiğinde eşya ve hadiselere tatbik etme işi."

Turkey has held the sword of Islam for 500 years; and it was in Turkey that this sword was undone, leading to upheavals in the rest of the Islamic world. This is divine warning that only if Turkey recovers would the other lands of Islam also regain their strength and health.³⁰

In this regard, Kısakürek repeats the approach of Atsız (as cited in Akgün & Çalış, 2002: 591) who had declared that "it was not thanks to Islam that Turks survived and prospered, but the opposite." Similarly, Atılhan, as another advocate of nationalist conservatism of the period, promotes the Turks as "the only hope of the Muslim world" by declaring that "all nations of Islam have accepted Turks as their elder brother and leader, and the Turks have proven themselves worthy of this esteem."³¹ Moreover, Atılhan refers to the leadership of the Turks in the unity of Muslims, as the order of God: "God has commanded Muslims to be united and to show solidarity. The role that the leadership, sincerity and self-sacrifice of the Turkish nation have played in ensuring this cannot be denied."³²

Nationalism in Kısakürek thus in *Büyük Doğu* is not based on a racial definition. Instead, his definition is identified with a harmony between Islam and Turkishness. As pointed out by Çetinsaya (2004: 437), Kısakürek makes a distinction between "fake nationalism" and "true nationalism." In this sense, in his narratives the rulers of the Tanzimat era, the Young Ottomans, the Young Turks along with the Kemalist nationalists and the Turkists/Turanists are referred to as the "fake nationalists" since their definition of nationalism is asserted to be based on the detachment of Turks from their Islamic roots, as detected in his condemnation of Ziya Gökalp's understanding of nationalism: "Ziya Gökalp's 'dreg nationalism' is not based on building a nationalism based on Islam; but rather, it is based on using nationalism to

³⁰ "İslam, 500 yıl kılıcını elinde tutan Türkiye'de bozuldu ve her yerde altüst oldu. Bu, ancak Türkiye'de düzelirse her yerde sağlığa kavuşabileceğine ait ilahi bir ihtar."

³¹ "Bütün islam milletleri onu ağabey telakki ettiler ve Türk buna layık olduğunu gösterdi." (Atılhan, Cevat Rifat. "Küstahlığın derecesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 10, Issue: 249, July 1957)

³² "Cenabı Hakkın biz Müslümanlara emrettiği büyük ittihat ve kardeşlik meselesinde Türk milletinin önderliği, büyük hüsnü niyeti ve fedakarlığı olduğu asla inkar edilemez." (Atılhan, Cevat Rifat. "Müslümanlığın büyük hedefi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 85, August 1950)

replace Islam."³³ "True nationalists," on the other hand, are characterized as being dedicated to Islam.

In a similar way, Serdengeçti objects to "irreligious Turkism" and criticizes the Turkists' definition of nationalism only based on race

(...) when we say 'Turk,' we also mean 'Islam!' Our Turkism is not the one that writes eulogies to Genghis, Timur and their ilk, who brought down the Turkish-Islamic world to a level from which it never recovered, and who burned and destroyed Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand and Baghdad, along with the great civilizations and libraries of the Turkish-Islamic world.³⁴

As can be withdrawn from the lines of above, Serdengeçti, similarly to Fergan and Kısakürek, argues against the Turkists' definition of nationalism based solely on race and exclusion of religion. Thus, Serdengeçti, as one of the earlier advocate, differentiates from Turkism by positioning Islam at the core of his understanding of nationalism: "Our nationalism is a basic and simple form of nationalism that worships God and sides with the people."³⁵ Moreover, similarly to the standpoint of *Sebilürreşad*, in *Serdengeçti* rupture from Islam is featured as one of the main causes behind the fall of the Turkish nation: "The Greatest Truth has been silenced, while The Greatest Book has been relegated to a place of unimportance. This has been the cause of our ruin."³⁶ However, at this point, it is significant to note that in the narratives of Serdengeçti, race is not totally left outside the definition of nationalism, as exemplified in his address to Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, concerning the speech he made at the reopening of the Turkish Hearths. In this regard, Serdengeçti fiercely criticizes Tanrıöver for including the non-Muslims in his speech. Emphasizing the

³³ "Ziya Gökalp'ın İslamiyet esası üzerine kurmak değil de, İslamiyetle yer değiştirmekten başka gayesi olmayan posa milliyetçiliği..." (Kısakürek, 2013b: 8).

³⁴ "(...) biz, Türk deyince aynı şuurla İslam deyorusuz! Türkçülüğümüz Taşkentleri, Buharaları Semerkantları, Bağdatları, İslam Türk merkezlerinde yükselen büyük medeniyetleri, kütüphaneleri yakıp yıkan İslam-Türk alemini bir daha kalkamayacak kadar yerlere seren Cengizlere, Timurlara kaside yazan bir Türkçülük değildir." ("Nereye gidiyoruz?!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 4, March 1948)

³⁵ "Bizim milliyetçiliğimiz bir kere daha yazdığımız gibi hakka tapan, halkı tutan yalın kılınc bir milliyetçiliktir." ("Milliyetçilik ve Komünizm İstismarı" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 7, July 1949)

³⁶ "En Büyük Hakikat Susturuldu, En Büyük kitap arka sokaklara atıldı. Felaketimizin sebebi budur." (Zeki, Salim M. "En Büyük Hakikat Susturuldu, En Büyük Kitap Arka Sokaklara Atıldı. Felaketimizin Sebebi Budur.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 2, May 1947)

alleged unfaithfulness of the non-Muslim population, he asserts that it is hardly ever possible for people to come together to form a nation unless bonded by race

(...) we are not racists in the sense that our enemies claim we are. We do not consider race as an element of politics. However, we cannot ignore this reality: Races do exist, with all their individual characteristics. Race has played a significant role in the formation and organization of peoples and nations. It is difficult, and often impossible, for people who are not of the same race to form a single nation. Our 'racism' is one that is based on science and social realities.³⁷

In this sense, Turks from all over the world, bounded by race, is embraced by Serdengeçti

O! The helpless and dispossessed! Our brothers who, in countries stretching from the bloody mountains of Macedonia to the plateaus of Pamir, and from the mountains of Altai to the valleys of the Volga and the Urals, are suffering and dying under the repression of red tyrants! We call onto you: One day, we will avenge thee!³⁸

As can be withdrawn from the lines above, in *Serdengeçti*, the special attention is paid to Turks within the Soviet Union. The narratives concerning "the repression, killings and anguish of Turks under the Soviet rule" are particularly touched upon by Serdengeçti

In this century; the Turkish race, who inhabited the regions from the Danube to the Great Wall of China, has been subject to an unparalleled atrocity and murder that no eye has seen and no ear has heard; a terrible slaughter whose proportions no mind can grasp and no imagination can conceive. Siberia! This endless frozen wasteland has become a grave for a once great nation.³⁹

³⁷ "(...) biz de, düşmanlarımızın bize isnad ettikleri manada ırkçı değiliz. Irkı bir politika mevzuu olarak ele aldığımız yok. Fakat şu hakikati görmemezlikten gelemeyiz: Irklar bütün hususiyetleriyle vardır. Milletlerin milliyetlerin teşekkülünde en büyük rolü oynamıştır. Aynı ırktan olmayan insanların bir araya gelerek bir millet teşkil etmeleri zor, hatta çoğu zaman imkansızdır. Bizim ırkçılığımız ilmi, içtimai bir ırkçılıktır." ("Hamdullah Suphi'ye soruyoruz: Açtığımız Türk Ocağı mı, Ekalliyetler Ocağı mı?!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 6, May 1949)

³⁸ "Ey kimsesiz insanlar! Kanlı Makedonya dağlarından, Pamir yaylasına Altay dağlarına İtil-Oral vadilerine kadar uzanan ülkelerde, kızıl zorbaların zulmü altında, can veren, can çekişen kardeşler!. Size sesleniyoruz: Bir gün gelip intikamınızı alacağız!" ("Türklüğün Perişan Hali" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 8, October 1949)

³⁹ "Tuna'da ta (...) Seddi Çine kadar yayılan, dağılan Türk ırkı bu asırda gözlerin görmediği, kulakların duymadığı, akılların ermediği, hayallerin yetişemediği, bir vahşet ve cinayetle boğazlanmıştır. Sibiryaya!. Bu uçsuz bucaksız donmuş arazi koca bir milletin mezarı oldu." ("Doğu Türkistan Faciası" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 14, March 1952)

Nevertheless, not only the Turks, but also Muslims are paid attention in *Serdengeçti*. For instance, more particularly concerning the conflict between Pakistan and India in 1947, the Muslims, beyond the boundaries of the Anatolian land, are referred to be joined in religious fellowship

The Muslim people of Anatolia (...) consider the other countries and nations of Islam – especially the great Islamic state of Pakistan – as their brothers. They see themselves as part of the greater Islamic civilization. (...) No government or state that claims to represent these nations has the right or authority to separate and divide peoples that are united by a common history, a common geography and, above all else, a common religion.⁴⁰

In this context, it is important to emphasize that both in *Sebilürreşad* and *Büyük Doğu*, the similar attitude, concerning the saluting of Muslims and Turks all over the world, as to be discussed with respect to the articulation of anti-communism in the next chapter, is observable. For instance, while *Büyük Doğu* mentions of "the slaughter of Turks of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan by the Soviet rule,"⁴¹ *Sebilürreşad* touches on "the desperation of Muslims residing in Jerusalem under the oppression of the Jews."⁴² Moreover, in *Sebilürreşad*, there exists a column that is claimed to cover news from the Muslim world, ranging from the Pakistan affair to a mosque construction in Brazil⁴³ and displaying alliance with other Muslim population.

All the same, the critical side of the arguments of Fergan, Kısakürek and Serdengeçti concerning the definition of nationalism is the embracement of religion. Although they differentiate from each other slightly at some points, all explicitly challenge to the exclusion of Islam in the definition of the nation.

⁴⁰ "Bütün Müslüman Anadolu halkı, (...) başta, büyük İslam devleti Pakistan olmak üzere diğer İslam memleket ve milletleriyle kendini bir sayar, bir görür, kardeş bilir. (...) Tarihin, coğrafyanın, hepsinin üstünde büyük bir dinin birleştirdiği bu milyonlarca insanı birbirinden ayırmıya, bu milletleri temsil eden, hiç bir idarenin, hiç bir hükümetin hak ve selahiyeti yoktur." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Hadiselerin Muhasebesi" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 11, September 1950)

⁴¹ "Dünyada Fikir ve Hareket, 'Rusya Türklerine karşı katliam'" in *Büyük Doğu*, 10 April 1959.

⁴² "Yahudi Mezalimi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 7, Issue: 172, May 1954.

⁴³ "İslam Aleminden Haberler" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 80, June 1950.

3.3. Struggle with "Fake Nationalists": Kemalists

Nationalist conservatism developed as an anti-Kemalist discourse. Similarly to Burke's critique of the French revolutionaries (Beneton, 2011: 18), as discussed in the previous chapter, nationalist conservatives attacked the Kemalist intelligentsia for forcing the nation to detach from its past for a fresh beginning through modernization/Westernization. Differing from the Kemalists or conservative modernists, the nationalist conservatives observed the process of Westernization as "a defeat" (Bora, 2002b: 253), identified with the loss of authenticity and tradition. In this regard, as Taşkın (2007: 10) suggests nationalist conservatism grew out of the aim to "reinvent the tradition."

From the mid-1940s onward, nationalist conservatism encouraged itself as an alternative to the ruling Kemalist ideology. As emphasized by Cantek (2003: 645), one of the significant aspects of the 1940s was the split between "the intellectuals who had previously worked side by side to accomplish the mission of social engineering." Taşkın (2007: 45) advocates the real cause of this division as "the pursuit of becoming the organic intellectuals of the state." As Taşkın (2012: 410) suggests, in reference to Baumann, the Kemalists "as the legislator intellectuals" of the nation were granted with the authority to "design the national culture, lead to its learning by the public, and decide on what is to be unofficial and excluded." Nevertheless, as "the golden age" for "the legislator intellectuals" of the Kemalist intelligentsia came to an end by the end of 1940s with the beginning of the Democrat Party rule, the nationalist conservatives, "as the true descents of the nation," attempted to "take hold of the privileged position of the Kemalists," concerning the assignment of the national culture (Taşkın, 2012: 411).

Challenging to the Western values of the Kemalists, accused of being alien to the values of the people, nationalist conservatives put hard emphasis on "the revival of the national culture," claimed to be deeply rooted in the Islamic-Ottoman heritage, and appointed themselves as "the authentic representatives of the nation" (Taşkın, 2007). Taşkın (2007: 57-58) suggests that nationalist conservatives, "basing their arguments on the fact that Westernization detached the nation from its essence,"

argued against the process of Westernization pursued by the Kemalist intelligentsia. According to Bora (2002b: 253-62), for nationalist conservatives and the Islamists, Westernization was a process of "auto-colonization" in the words of Sezai Karakoç, carried out by the Kemalists under the authority of the Western powers, but more particularly the Zionists. That's why, for nationalist conservatism the West is held responsible for detaching Muslim Turks from Islam and depriving the nation from her roots/origins. Moreover, the Western world is believed to plot against the welfare of the Muslim Turks with the help of its particular agents: the communists, Jews, Donmehs, Free Masons, and the Kemalists. In this sense, the Kemalist modernization process, or "*Gavurlaşma*" in the words of Serdengeçti,⁴⁴ is believed to be the product of the West itself.

Judging from the argument that the Kemalists, working side by side with the foreign powers, are distant to the values of the people, nationalist conservatives arose with the claim to be "the authentic representatives of the people." At this point, Taşkın (2007: 74) emphasizes the funeral of Fevzi Çakmak, which took place in 1950, as a "show of strength for the organic intellectuals of the nation against the fake Westernizing nationalists," which, for instance, can be exemplified in the portrayal of the funeral by Serdengeçti who describes the resurgence of authentic generations of the nation against the colonizers of the West in the following words

For years, the squares of our cities had not witnessed anything like this. For years; on days considered as national holidays, these squares had only heard the orators of the state, who, akin to a gramophone record, repeated to the public the same platitudes and commonplaces from one year to another. For years, our squares listened only to the shouts of these deniers, who ignored thousands of years of glorious and honorable Turkish history that had affected three continents, and who reduced Turkish history to only the past 10 years. Nowadays, the squares are no longer filled with poor schoolchildren who line up as military regiments to mindlessly shout the Tenth Year Anthem. The youth which had been distracted and deceived for years has finally awoken. On that day, I saw the resurgence of generations that had once been devastated. I cried tears of joy. On the evening of April 11, the battle at the Marshal square had concluded with the victory of the youth!⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Yine Başladılar" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 12, May 1950.

⁴⁵ "Yıllardır bu meydanlar böyle bir şey görmemişti. Bu meydanlar milli bayram olarak kabul olunan günlerde iktidar nutukcularının, her sene gramofon plağı gibi tekrar ettikleri beylik bayramlık

As the continuation of these statements, Serdengeçti puts forward that through the funeral, "the authority of the Turkish nation was established in Beyoğlu, as the gateway of the Western imperialism, first time since the conquest of Istanbul by Mehmed II in 1453." In *Sebilürreşad*, on the other hand, "the thrill of the people upon the hearing the echoes of *takbir and tahlil* in the streets of Istanbul" is described as following

Following a period of twenty five years; the skyline of Istanbul was once again filled with the echoes of takbir and tahlil, which the people greeted with great excitement. The people were overflowing with joy; a joy that knew no bounds, and that spilled over and swelled, finding its way into the hearts of all. (...) Istanbul had never experienced a day like this.⁴⁶

As these statements demonstrate the funeral, for the non-Kemalists of the period not only signified the resurgence of "the organic intellectuals" in the public arena, but also the resurgence of Islam following years of oppression under the RPP rule.

The main motive that national conservatism promotes itself as alternative to the ruling ideology is that "the Kemalists are alien to the people," a theme particularly visible in the narratives of Serdengeçti (Bora & Canefe, 2002: 658), as detected in his address to İsmet İnönü, as "the National Chief," by calling him as "alien to his religion, alien to his roots, and alien to his traditions."⁴⁷ That's why, the Kemalist intelligentsia are not identified as "the true nationalists" since they are held responsible for detaching the nation from the Islamic-Ottoman tradition

They said that they were nationalists. However, they denied every element on which a nation depends – namely race, religion, and history. At People's Houses and every

sözlerden, binlerce seneye uzanan, üç kıtaya sığmıyan şanlı şerefli Türk tarihini 10 yıla indiren münkirlerin haykırışlarından başka bir şey işitmemişti. Artık bu meydanda toplananlar tabur tabur dizilip onuncu yıl marşını söyliyeye söyliyeye kendinden geçen zavallı mektep çocukları deyildi. Yıllardır avutulan, uyutulan genç artık uyanmıştı. Ben o gün orada mahvedilen nesillerin yeni bir basübadel mevte kavuştuklarını gördüm. Sevincimden ağladım. 11 Nisan Akşama doğru Mareşal meydan muharabesi gençliğin zaferiyle bitmişti!.." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Mareşal Meydan Muharebesi" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 10, May 1950)

⁴⁶ "Yirmi beş senelik bir fasıladan sonra tekbir ve tehlil sadaları İstanbul ufuklarını doldurunca bütün halk heyecan içinde kaldı. Halk bir sel gibi coşmuş, bendini aşmış, taşmış, köpürmüş, gönülleri istila etmişti. (...) İstanbul böyle bir gün yaşamamıştı." (Atılhan, Cevat Rifat. "Allahü Ekber-Allahü Ekber... ve Lillahilhamd" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 76, April 1950)

⁴⁷ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Kara Kitap" in *Büyük Doğu*, 14 June 1952.

other place, they ridiculed our stalwart ancestors who ruled over three continents for centuries, and turned them into objects of scorn. They separated us from our past and roots, and, by doing so, from our own identity. (...) They caused misery among the people through the reforms forcefully imposed from above.⁴⁸

As the statements of Osman Yüksel demonstrates the rupture from the past tradition constitutes the main point of criticism raised by the nationalist conservatives towards the Kemalists who are accused of leading to the ruin of the people through the reforms they pursued. In this context, nationalist conservatism, mourning over the past, pays a particular attention to "the losses over the gains" (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003: 637) concerning its argument against the Kemalist reforms

Under the guise of reform, an entire people was oppressed, devastated and robbed of its material and spiritual wealth. All this pillaging was performed by certain individuals, who then shared their plunder between themselves within their own exclusive partnerships. The spoils which they divided between themselves included not only our possessions, properties, and our sources of subsistence and livelihood; but also our religion, morals, history, language, character and soul. And all this in the name of reform!⁴⁹

Nationalist conservatism asserts that Kemalist reforms lack nationality. Kemalist reforms, as "the continuation of the *Düyun-u Umumiye* spirit" in the words of Kısakürek,⁵⁰ are accused of forcing the people to copy the Western forms in the name of modernization. In this sense, the people are claimed to be driven away from their authentic culture

Foreign culture, foreign customs, foreign tastes and foreign songs have spread to every corner of our lives and among every level of the populace, reaching even the most remote back-alleys."⁵¹

⁴⁸ "Milliyetçiyiz dediler. Fakat millet denilen varlığın dayandığı bütün unsurları ırkı-dini-tarihi-inkar ettiler. Kıtalar ve iklimlere hükmeden üç kıtada asırlarca dimdik duran ecdadımızı şurada burada, halk evlerinde türlü kılıklara sokarak alenen tahkir ve tezlil ettiler. Bizi mazimizden, bizi kökümüzden bizi bizden ayırdılar. (...) Milleti tepeden inme, birbiri ardından gelen inkılaplarla perişan ettiler." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Neler Neler Yapmadılar!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 5, 1948)

⁴⁹ "İnkılap maskesi altında bütün bir millet, manen ve maddeten soyulmuş, ezilmiş, perişan edilmiş; ve bütün talan, bellibaşlı şahıslar arasında tam bir komandit nizamla paylaşılmıştır. Paylaşılan da, yalnız malımız, mülkümüz, kabımız, kacağımız, ekmeğimiz, gömleğimiz değil; dinimiz, ahlakımız, tarihimiz, lisanımız, şahsiyetimiz, ruhumuzdur. Ve bu halin ismi inkılaptır!" (Özgen, Rasim. "Komandit Şirket" in *Büyük Doğu*, 17 November 1950)

⁵⁰ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "(DüyunuUmumiye) Ruh" in *Büyük Doğu*, 24 March 1944.

From here on, nationalist conservatives move with the motivation to bring back the authentic character of the national culture contrary to the alleged "fake Westernizing nationalists" (Taşkın, 2007: 74).

3.4. Criticism of Modern Life and Kemalist Reforms

From nationalist conservative perspective, the nation is claimed to have been deprived of her religion, moral values, and traditions as the result of modernization process, remarkably beginning in the Tanzimat era, and reaching its height during the reign of the RPP. Thus, one of the common themes that nationalist conservatism bases itself against the Kemalists is the criticism of modern life, identified with "immorality, irreligiousness, corruption and rootlessness," imposed by the Kemalist reforms. Hostility against the modern life constitutes one of the major bases of the argument against the Kemalist intelligentsia, who are claimed to have led to the decay of morality and the rising of irreligiousness through the reforms they have pursued. The reforms are particularly held responsible for the decay of "the spiritual life," the absorption of "the corrupt values" of the West, the rise of a rootless generation and the ruin of the family life.

At the outset, the reforms are held responsible for the decay of "spirituality." In this sense, the nation is featured to go through "a spiritual depression"

Our poor people! They are rightly frightened by the unusual rise in the use of drug substances that we are witnessing today; and by the fact that suicides, gruesome and vile murders, and disgustingly horrid crimes have reached levels that were up to now unheard of. (...) The causes of depression and the suffering it brings about are spiritual. And their cure is turning to spirituality.⁵²

⁵¹ "Yabancı hars yabancı kültür, yabancı zevk ve türküler ta buralara, arka sokaklara kadar yayılmış, halk tabakalarına kadar sinmiş." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Manevi Emperyalizm" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 2, May 1947)

⁵² "Zavvalı halkımız! Uyuşturucu maddelerin istihlakindeki görülmedik artışı; intiharların, tüyler ürpertici bir fecaatte işlenen cinayetlerin, tiksindirici bir çirkinlikteki cürümlerin duyulmadık bir hadde çıkması karşısında ürküyor. (...) Buhran ve doğurduğu ızdırabın sebepleri manevidir. İlacı da maneviyattır." (Başgil, Ali Fuad. "Maneviyat buhranı" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 5, Issue: 113, October 1951)

As discussed in the previous chapter, "the loss of spirituality" as the result of the modernization process was one of the critical issues for Turkish conservatism. Dealing with moral problems, as detected in the lines of Başgil, identified the general approach of the conservatives to religion. Hence, religion was valued in relation to morality. Nevertheless, what differed nationalist conservative approach from the other representatives of conservatism was the identification of a more concrete source of morals: Islam

Morality has two sources: One is religion, while the other is the philosophical beliefs of religious sects. (...) Our morals are based on Islamic morals, which by themselves embody an exceptional and pure moral philosophy (...)⁵³

As Kısakürek points out, Islam is identified as the source of morals and it is alleged that as the authority of Islam in everyday life diminished, so did the morals.

For nationalist conservatism, the Kemalist reforms are accused of "encouraging irreligiousness under the guise of secularism."⁵⁴ The Kemalist reforms are depicted as the ultimate victory of the Western world in achieving to separate Turks from Islam

The Western world has achieved its desires: The desire to cause Turkey to decay from within - which has become manifest since the times of the Ottoman Empire - to separate Turkey from its Islamic soul; and to eventually bring Turkey's collapse.⁵⁵

As detected in the yearning of Beyatlı for "the loss of good old days," the modern life, associated with "the city," is portrayed to be removed and isolated from Islam

(...) the excessively civilized upper classes raise their children according to a European understanding of morality, in neighborhoods where the azan is not heard. They are unable to see that Islam is the most beautiful dream and aspiration for Turkish children. (...) Today, these Turks live in small places such as Şişli, Nişantaşı, Kadıköy and Moda, which are all spirituality dry and arid wastelands that

⁵³ "Ahlakın iki kaynağı vardır: Dinler ve din yerinde felsefi mezhepler (...) Bizim ahlakımızsa, baştan başa müstesna bir ahlak manzumesinden ibaret Müslümanlık ahlakıdır ki, (...)" (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Ahlak Davamız" in *Büyük Doğu*, 17 July 1959)

⁵⁴ "Hidayet yolları açılıyor" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 97, March 1951.

⁵⁵ "Batı dünyası, muradına ermiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğundan başlayarak Türkiyeyi çürütmek, İslami ruh nescinden ayırmak ve çökertmek muradı." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Batı Muradına Erdi!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 24 April 1971)

are removed and isolated from Islam.⁵⁶

In the same way, for instance, Serdengeçti refers to Ankara as "the city without a temple"⁵⁷ to highlight the disregard of religion in the capital.

What is more, the reforms are alleged to impose corrupt values of the West on the people: gambling, prostitution, and alcohol; as, for instance, exemplified in the cover of *Büyük Doğu*, dated on February 16, 1959, featuring a nude statue of a woman in the middle surrendered with the bottles of wine, glasses, dices, and playing cards, around which is written "RPP REFORM." In this regard, *Büyük Doğu* pays a particular attention to the covering of issues of prostitution, alcohol, and gambling. In a column titled, "*Gazetecilik röportaj demektir: Röportajlarımız*," coffeehouses, beaches, bars and saloons as the spots of modernity are covered to lay emphasis on the moral degradation in the society. The beaches, for instance, are featured to be the major spots of being devoid of morals

Our beaches and beach life are places where modesty and morality is forgotten; (...) they are places where hideousness, shamelessness, vulgarity, crudeness, obscenity, nudity, lack of privacy and the lack of limits has reached nightmarish proportions – even among group of family and friends. And all this is called is modernism and civilization.⁵⁸

Similarly, the bars are depicted as the places where prostitution takes place while the coffeehouses are condemned for gambling. In *Serdengeçti*, on the other hand, the special analysis is given to *Şehvetnames*, the publications with sexual content, which are condemned fiercely for promoting immorality among the youth.⁵⁹ Additionally,

⁵⁶ "(...) fazla medenileşen üst tabakanın çocukları ezansız yeni semtlerde, alafraza terbiye ile yetişirken, Türk çocukluğunun en güzel rüyasını (Müslümanlık) görmüyorlar. (...) Biz, bugünün Türkleri, bilakis Şişli, Nişantaşı, Kadıköy, Moda gibi küçücük bir şehri anlatan yerlere yerleştik. Fakat o yerler müslüman ruhundan arı, çorak ve kurudur." (Beyatlı, Yahya Kemal. "Ezansız Semtler" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 November 1949)

⁵⁷ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Mabetsiz Şehir" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 7, July 1949.

⁵⁸ "Plajlarımız ve plaj hayatımız baştan başa cinsi ahlak sükutumuzun panayırı; (...) Çirkinliğin, hicapsızlığın, zevksizliğin, kabalığın, müstehcenliğin, aile ve dost eğlencesi şeklinde bile kafa kafaya ve çırlıçıplak cıvıklığın bu derecesi, kabuslar aleminde bile görülmemiştir; ve bunun ismi (modernizm), Garpçılık gayreti ve medeniyetidir." (Altuncuoğlu, Doğan N. "Röportajlarımız, Plajlarımız" in *Büyük Doğu*, 19 December 1947)

⁵⁹ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Şehvetnameler!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 5, 1948.

Serdengeçti, differing from *Büyük Doğu* in which mainly the observations of the districts of Istanbul are covered, depicts *Yenişehir* district of Ankara in the following words: "Where does this road lead? To a city without temples. (...) To lives filled with alcoholic drinks, women, gambling, mouthfuls of vomit, sin and superficiality."⁶⁰

In addition to the city life, the portrayal of moral degradation particularly centers on the youth and women. In this regard, the negative impacts of the reforms on the youth are mainly dealt with the arguments of their leading to the rising of a generation unaware of its authentic values, ignorant of its past and disrespectful of its elders: "They are ignorant and unaware of their own past. They wished to raise a youth that was careless about its own future, that was indifferent towards family and life, and which only applauded and worshipped its own self."⁶¹ The reforms are thought of having crafted "a rootless generation" that copies the lifestyle of the Western people and looks down on its own essence arrogantly

You denied your own roots, just because Europeans preferred dance while your father still wears the shalwar!... Just because the more 'civilized' Europeans 'invented the car,' you felt disgust towards Islam, your own religion!⁶²

Moreover, it is alleged that the negative impacts of the reforms predominantly have made it visible on the family life, as observed in the depiction of the modern Turkish family with incompatibilities by Kısakürek

Turkish homes with three floors have become the embodiment of strange intergenerational contrasts and incompatibilities, where the 80-years-old grandmother in the upper floor prays with tears in her eyes; where the 40-years-old mother in the middle floor plays poker with her friends and loved ones; and where the 18 years-old son in the lower floor kicks and stomps around, dancing to the

⁶⁰ "Bu yol nereye çıkar? Mabetsiz şehire... İçki, kadın, kumar, ağız dolusu istifra, dalga... Sefih ve süfli bir hayat.." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Mabetsiz Şehir" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 7, July 1949)

⁶¹ "Onlar mazarından bihaber, istikbaline karşı lakayd ailesiz galesiz yalnız kendilerini alkışlayan, kendilerine tapan bir gençlik yetiştirmek istediler." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Neler Neler Yapmadılar!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 5, 1948)

⁶² "Avrupalı dans ediyor ve baban hala şalvarla geziyor diye özünü inkar ettin!... Avrupalı otomobili icad etti diye sen İslamlıktan tiksindin!" (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Mürted" in *Büyük Doğu*, 26 December 1947)

rhythm of swing.⁶³

Serdengeçti, in his poem entitled "Asri Aile,"⁶⁴ on the other hand, features the Turkish family members as being "irreligious, shameless, corrupt, flamboyant, extravagant, alcoholic, fond of luxury, partying, gambling." Within the family members, women are the most fiercely attacked for lacking of morals. In this regard, nationalist conservatism labels "the excessive freedom," granted to women as the consequence of the Kemalist reforms, as the main cause of the devastation of the family life and conveys the message that women should be banned from the work life and their mere occupation should be to take care of their families

In recent times, women have become the main cause of social problems and suffering. (...) The women of our day have become unruly and lustful, as they encourage men to pursue them, and act in ways that are inviting or provocative. The time has come to return women to their homes, and to ensure that work life becomes once again the domain of men⁶⁵

Our foremost priority, before engaging in any other endeavor or discussing any other subject, should be to ensure that Turkish women cover themselves entirely except for their faces, and that they are returned to their homes in a manner similar to hens that have fled the hen coop!⁶⁶

Within a very short period of time, they randomly gave too many freedoms to women. By doing so, they shook from its very foundations of the institution of family, which forms the core of all communities.⁶⁷

⁶³ "Üç katlı Türk evi, üst katta 80 yaşındaki büyük hanımın ağlaya ağlaya namaz kıldığı, orta katta 40 yaşındaki hamnefendinin aşıkları ve ahbaplarıyla (poker) oynadığı, alt katta 18 yaşındaki küçük beyin (Sving) ahengiyle tepindiği garip bir tezat ve uygunsuzluk sergisi haline geldi." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Ve Tarihçe" in *Büyük Doğu*, 24 May 1946)

⁶⁴ http://www.serdengecti.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:asri-aile&catid=3:siirleri&Itemid=8 (accessed on 5 June 2014).

⁶⁵ "Son günlerin bütün içtimai facia ve ıstırahında başlıca rolü kadın oynuyor. (...) Erkeği de peşinden sürükleyerek, yahut büsbütün teşebbüse geçirerek, kadın, adamakıllı azmıştır. Kadını evine döndürmenin, ısındırmanın ve iş hayatını yavaş yavaş erkeğe aktarma etmesini sağlamanın zamanı artık gelmiştir." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Kadın" in *Büyük Doğu*, 16 September 1959)

⁶⁶ "Türk kadını, yüzünden başka her yerini örterek, kümes kaçkını tavuklar gibi evine iade etmeden hiçbir işe başlanamaz ve hiçbir mevzu konuşulamaz!" (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Kadını Kurtarınız!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 23 August 1967)

⁶⁷ "Kadınlara rasgele birden bire geniş hürriyetler verdiler. Böylece cemiyetin nüvesi olan aile müessesini ta kökünden sarstılar." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Neler Neler Yapmadılar!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 5, 1948)

It is possible to deny the negative impacts and blows that the Civil Law has delivered to our lives, our persons and our families? The marriage and inheritance system brought by this law has shaken the very foundations of families in our country. The family, which forms the basis of our national existence and, is experiencing further collapse with each passing day.⁶⁸

As all the statements above demonstrate, women are not tolerated in the work life. In general, women are desired to stay at home, be faithful wives to their husbands and caring mothers to their children while men are encouraged as the breadwinner of the family.⁶⁹ Moreover, according to Serdengeçti the more women become economically independent, the less they get marry and the more extravagant they become.⁷⁰ In this sense, the identification of women with luxury is also employed to provide basis to women's role in moral breakdown

The women dresses and attire of women are literally become instruments of social destruction. Those researching the cause of the weakening of familial bonds should focus on this subject. In times when, as the saying goes, 'the clothing needs of women were limited to only *cedik* shoes with gussets,' there were no such damages to familial bonds.⁷¹

All the same, it would be better to look at the envisagement of Serdengeçti for the society he misses for

I would like to live in a society were men do not know any house other than their own. (...) where men do not know or love any women other than their own wives, and where women do not know or love any men other than their own husbands. A society, where, as the head of the family, men are strong, determined, resolute, solemn and hard-working. A society where, as the homemaker, women are pure, self-sacrificing, faithful, patient, respectful and loving. (...) A society where the youth (...) are in pursuit of causes that are sacred. (...) I miss living in a society where mothers are not labeled as 'beldam,' fathers are not labeled as 'geezers,' and children

⁶⁸ "Medeni Kanunun milli hayatımıza, hususiyle, aile yuvamıza indirdiği darbeler inkar kabul eder şeyler midir? Bu kanunun evlenme miras sistemleri bu memleketin aile ocağını bombaladığı bir hakikattir. Millî varlığımızın temeli olan bu ocak, gözlerimizin önünde her gün biraz daha çökmektedir." (Başgil, Ali Fuad. "14 Mayıs Zaferini Kazanan" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 95, February 1951)

⁶⁹ Arslangül, Halil. "İslamiyette kadının mevkii" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 7, Issue: 171, April 1954.

⁷⁰ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Kadın ve Cemiyet" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 8, October 1949.

⁷¹"Kadın tuvaleti ve giyim eşyası, bugün tam manasile bir yıkım vasıtası olmuştur. Aile bağlarının gevşemesi sebeplerini araştıranlar en ziyade bu bahis üzerinde takılıp kalıyorlar. Eski tabirle zenne ihtiyaçlarının dört peşli bir *cedik* pabuçtan ibaret olduğu devirde, hiç şüphe yok ki yuvalar, bu kadar çabuk yıkılmıyordu." (Güngör, Selahattin. "Lüks Hastalığımız" in *Büyük Doğu*, 3 December 1943)

are not labeled as 'brats.' A society where different generations know, understand and love each other.⁷²

3.5. "Muslim Turk Anatolians" as the Essence of the Nation

As previously discussed, the most critical aspect of nationalist conservatism was the identification of Turkishness with Islam. Serving to the embracement of Islam as the prominent, essential quality of the national identity along with Turkishness, nationalist conservatism recognized the Muslim-Turk population as "the true people of the nation." However, by the 1940s, the word "Anatolian" was also adjoined to the definition of the nation.

As Atabay (2002: 518) points out, initially born as a reaction to the ideas of Turanism, Anatolianism as a nationalist movement soon evolved into two different paths following the War of Independence: "Anatolianism embodied with secular Kemalist sentiment" and "conservative Anatolianism." Differing from the former with its recognition of Islam as one of the essential characteristics of Anatolia, conservative Anatolianism was more or less articulated by nationalist conservatism of the 1940s (Atabay, 2002: 531-32), which depicted Anatolia as an homogenous entity composed of Muslim Turks. In this sense, the nation was identified with "Muslim-Turk Anatolians" (Bora & Canefe, 2002: 656), and anyone who was out of this clear cut definition was to be excluded as *the other*.

As Serdengeçti voices by expressing that "what constitutes the Turkish nation are the people of Anatolia,"⁷³ for nationalist conservative discourse Anatolia stands at the core of the identification of the nation. Nevertheless, the non-Muslim/non-Turkish population of Anatolia such as the Armenians, Jews and Greeks, are not included in

⁷² "Bir alem özlüyorum ki: Orada erkekler, evinden başka hane bilmesin. (...) erkek kendi karısından başka kadın, kadın kendi kocasından başka erkek tanımasın, sevmesin. Ailenin resisi olan erkek, ayarlı kararlı, kavi, metin, vakarlı, çalışkan olsun. Yuvanın kurucusu kadın, temiz, cefakar, vefakar, sabırlı, saygılı, sevgili olsun. (...) Gençler, (...) mukaddes bir davanın peşinde koşanlar olsun. (...) Öyle bir alem özlüyorum ki: Bu alemde analar 'kocakarı', babalar 'moruk,' çocuklar 'zamane' olmasınlar. Nesiller birbirini tansın, anlasın, sevsinler." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Özlediğim Alem!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 14, March 1952)

⁷³ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Kara Kitap" in *Büyük Doğu*, 31 May 1952.

this particular definition of the nation. Additionally, since Anatolia, for nationalist conservatism, refers to the land determined by the National Pact, "the alleged Turks" of Rumelia are not included in this definition of the nation, but situated against the people. The dichotomy between the Anatolians and "the others," which can be listed as the Jews, Free Masons, Donmehs, Armenians, Greeks, communists, along with the Kemalists, on the other hand, is more particularly visible in the writings of Serdengeçti, who depicts himself as one of "the heart-stricken children of the Anatolian land"

We, the heart-stricken children of Anatolia, shout to the top of our lungs, exclaiming that: In these lands; there is no place for the Salonican Donmehs, for the dregs of the Committee of Union and Progress, for the children of *pashas*, for Free Masons, for Communists and for outsiders who have wandered into these lands from left and right!..⁷⁴

At this point, Bora and Şen (2009: 1153) suggest that this division between Anatolians and Rumelians, as the ones "who came from the other side of *Meriç River*," is a commonly used theme in Serdengeçti, principally displaying the reaction against "the founding elites of the Republic of Rumelian origin." In this sense, as to be discussed in the following chapter, the Kemalist intelligentsia, with respect to Rumelian but more particularly of Salonican origins of the founding fathers, is not counted as belonging to the Turkish nation, which can be exemplified in the praise of Serdengeçti for Adnan Menderes as "the true Anatolian"

You are not one of the dregs of the Committee of Union and Progress, nor a member of the Macedonian gangs. You are one of us; from our lands and our own mold. You are among the descendants of the Aydınoğlus; do not listen to what the Donmehs from Salonica say (...) look at us instead. Look at the children of Anatolia. Look at the ill-fated lands of Anatolia (...)⁷⁵

Concerning the portrayal of Anatolia and Anatolians "the repression," on the other

⁷⁴ "Biz, Anadolu'nun bağı yanık çocukları, sesimizin olanca kuvvetiyle haykırıyoruz ve diyoruz ki: Bu topraklar üzerinde, Selanik dönmelerine, İttihat ve Terakki artıklarına, paşa zadelere, Farmasonlara, Komünistlere, şuradan buradan gelme adamlara hakkı hayal yoktur!." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "İmansızlar Saltanatı" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 6, May 1949)

⁷⁵ "Sen İttihat ve Terakki artıklarından, sen Makedonya çetesinden değilsin. Sen bizdensin, bizim toprağımızdan, bizim hamurumuzdansın. Sen Aydınoğullarının torunu, Selanik dönmelerinin sözüne bakma (...) Sen bize bak (...) Anadolu çocuklarına bak. Bahtsız Anadolu'ya bak." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Yaşa be Menderes" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 15-16, May - June 1952)

hand, is one of the commonly employed themes by national conservatism, which particularly contributes to the reproduction of "the discourse of the repressed" (Açikel, 1996). While the Anatolians, as "the true heirs of the nation," are emphasized to be deprived of the wealth of their own land, "the others" are alleged to enjoy most of it. Despite carrying the burden of the nation, the Anatolians are featured to live in poverty

It is these lands that fed Istanbul. (...) It is Anatolia that provided food and nourishment, while those living in other lands only gave order, lived in luxury, feasted and drank.⁷⁶

The poor and neglected children of Anatolia, who live in rugged houses of mudbrick, whose clothes are covered with countless patches, who satisfy themselves by eating only onions. The children of Anatolia who, despite everything, are able to find contentment in their condition. Their children whose souls are noble, and whose blood is pure and high.⁷⁷

Hence, the Anatolians are represented as "self-sacrificing, generous, noble, profitless, but suffering"

The resigned and suffering villagers of Anatolia (...) These are people who are content with what Allah has given them, and who do not have their eyes on the possessions of others.⁷⁸

In this regard, they are portrayed to "pursue refugee lives in their own land"

Among the groups who were involved in the founding of the Ottoman Empire (...) all that is left today are people who have been strangers in their own lands, wandering helplessly from one land to another.⁷⁹

Nevertheless, the cities, along with Anatolia, is also given a particular attention most

⁷⁶ "İstanbulu besleyen o. Yani Anadolu (...) Karşıdakiler sadece emrettiler, saltanat sürdürdüler, yediler, içtiler." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Anadolu öküz mü?" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 8, October 1949)

⁷⁷ "Fakir ve ihmal edilmiş Anadolu çocukları, çamurdan evlerde oturan, kırk yamalı elbise giyen, bir soğanla kifafi nefsedən, fakat gözü tok, ruhu asil, kanı necip Anadolu evlatları." (Atılhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Filistin için Cihad-ı Mukaddes: 2" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 2, May 1948)

⁷⁸ "Mütevekkil, çilekeş Anadolu köylüsü (...) Allah beş parmağı bir yaratmamış, kimsenin malında gözümüz yok diyen insanlar." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Mabetsiz Şehir" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 7, July 1949)

⁷⁹ "Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun kurucu unsur tipinden bugün ortada kalan. (...) O daima gurbetin adamıdır; yerinin neresi olduğu meçhul gibi bir hali vardır ve işte kendi öz vatanında, bütün hanümanı bir eşeğe yüklü, garip garip, gezip dolaşmaktadır." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Anadolu ve Anadoluculuk" in *Büyük Doğu*, 24 July 1959)

noticeably in *Büyük Doğu* and *Serdengeçti* to feature "the repression and victimization of the people" by creating a dichotomy between "the true people," alluding the Muslim Turks Anatolians and "their exploiters." At this point, it has to be highlighted that this special emphasis on the cities can more or less be associated with rising migration of rural to urban in the 1950s and onward. In this sense, the interviews published under the name of "*Gazetecilik röportaj demektir: Röportajlarımız*" in *Büyük Doğu* are critical. In this part of the periodical, the aim is described to give voice to the realities of "the people" by both giving place to the conducted interviews and the observations of the reporters. The critical side of some of these observations, on the other hand, is that they focus on the miserable living conditions of "the people," but more particularly on the ones residing in Istanbul. For instance, in one of the observations concerning the districts of Istanbul, the reporter, initially demonstrating his observations on the wealthy, extravagant people of Beyoğlu, concludes that "the true people of the nation" starve to death

Beyond a doubt, contrary to the smaller masses living in wealth and prosperity; the larger masses of society live in the depths of social pits, leading hungry and miserable lives, and unable to gather the courage to leave their current abode.⁸⁰

In *Serdengeçti*, on the other hand, *Serdengeçti* more particularly focuses on the lives in the districts of Ankara. Similar to the distinction between "Beyoğlu and the other Istanbul" in *Büyük Doğu*, he, as one of the old residents of Altındağ,⁸¹ makes a comparison between Yenışehir, which is asserted to be the residence of the founding elites, and Altındağ districts of Ankara

In Ankara, there is place called Altındağ. Nearly half of the city's population lives there. These people live in barracks whose roofs are made of rusty cans, and whose walls are made of hay and grass. They have no water, but have to pay water bills; they have no electricity, but have to pay electricity bills. The streets sweepers and cleaners never go to their district; but they have to pay city cleaning expenses as well. In Yenışehir, the annual cost of a single acacia tree is 146 Liras. However in Altındağ, such a sum is not even spent for a street or an entire district. For those in power, our people do not even have the value of a tree or a pile of wood. (...) Our

⁸⁰ "Şüphesiz olan, etrafa sahte bir refah ve saadet saçıcı bir sınıfa mukabil, asli kütlenin, toprak altında ve (katakomb) içinde, göze görünmek cesaretini bile göstermeden, aç ve sefil süründüğüdür." ("Başka bir sınıfın Hayatı" in *Büyük Doğu*, 2 February 1951)

⁸¹ *Serdengeçti*, Osman Yüksel. "Mabetsiz Şehir" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 7, July 1949.

Anatolia can be thought of as a larger version of Altındağ. Altındağ, which is a pool of mud and filth, has turned into a bed of suffering and misery.⁸²

In addition to focusing on the material exploitation of "the people," the articulation of "this discourse of the repressed" (Açikel, 1996) is also based on the repression of religion. In *Sebilürreşad*, for instance, the victimization and repression of the Anatolian people is more dealt with religious samples with particular emphasis on the claim that the Kemalist intelligentsia specifically targeted Islam while promoting secularism. It is asserted that the Kemalists' enmity towards religion has only been raised to Islam. It is particularly alleged that the RRP rigorously enforced secularism on Muslims while the non-Muslim population have been granted with absolute freedom to practice their religion, as Fergan claims

Poor Muslims. The noble and heroic Turks who once caused the world to tremble have become estranged in their own lands. Their backs have broken under pressure, and oppression has left deep marks and cuts in their souls. Everything they once possessed has been trampled and crushed. Their temples have been demolished, their past has been destroyed. The doors of all religious institutions have been locked with chains. In all schools, religious books and texts have been torn and shredded. The azan from the minarets has been silenced; and those who invoke the name Allah have been thrown into prisons.⁸³

While the heroic Turkish nation was once able to recite the azan in the language of the Qur'an before the walls Vienna; Turks today are not even allowed to recite the azan in the language of the Qur'an within their own places of worship. Why has it come to this? Because the narrow elitist faction that constitutes the Republican People's Party has willed so. The People's Party does what it wants, not what the people desires.⁸⁴

⁸² "Ankarada altındağ denilen bir yer vardır. Şehrin nüfusunun yarısı oradadır. Bu insanlar damları paslı tenekelerle örtülmüş, duvarlarında çayır çimen biten barakalarda otururlar. Sular yoktur su parası verirler, elektikleri yoktur elektrik parası verirler. Süprüntücü semtlerine uğramaz süprüntü temizlik parası verirler. Yenişehirde bir akasya ağacının yıllık masrafı 146 liradır. Halbuki Altındağda, bu kadar para bir sokağa bir mahalleye dahi sarfedilmez. Onların nazarında halkımızın bir ağaç bir odun kadar kıymeti yoktur. (...) Anadolumuz baştan başa koskoca bir Altındağdır, Altındağı değil çamur, balçık; açlık dert ve ızdırap yatağıdır." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Neler Neler Yapmadılar!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 5, 1948)

⁸³"Zavallı Müslümanlar, bir zamanlar dünyayı titreten asil ve kahraman Türkler, kendi memleketlerinde garip kalmışlardı. İstibdat bellerini bükmüş, zulüm vicdanlarını kavurmuştu. Her şeyleri ezilmiş, ayaklar altına alınmıştı. Mabetleri harap olmuş, mazileri yıkılmıştı. Bütün din medreselerinin kapılarına zincirler vurulmuştu. Bütün mekteplerdeki din kitapları yırtılmıştı. Minarelerde ezanlar susturulmuş, Allah diyeneler zindanlara doldurulmuştu." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Başbakanla bir hasbihal" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 6, Issue: 145, February 1953)

⁸⁴"Viyana surlarında Kuran diliyle ezan okuyan kahraman Türk milleti kendi öz diyarında, kendi öz minaresinde, kendi öz mabedinde Kur'an diliyle ezan okuyamadı ve hala da okuyamıyor. Niçin

The narratives concerning the repression the Anatolian Muslims went through are greatly employed in Fergan (2012: 109) who while describing the misery the Muslims faced under the rule of the RPP asserts that "the religious books of Muslims were burnt down, the mosques were closed down and turned into warehouses by Jews and Armenians and religious leaders were put into jail under the guise of secularism while non-Muslims freely practiced their religion." Similarly in *Büyük Doğu*, the execution of secularism by the RPP is fiercely attacked on the ground that non-Muslim minorities were free to perform the rituals of their own and propagate while Muslims were religiously oppressed

The Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Catholics, Orthodoxes and Protestants are all allowed to freely perform the rituals of their own religion and sect, and to conduct religious propaganda when they have the opportunity to do so. (...) Thus, we misinterpret the concept of secularism, applying its limitations only to Muslims and the Muslim faith. (...) Let us admit that this concept has become the banner of those hostile and hateful towards Islam. So; is it secularism they defend, or is it hatred towards Islam?⁸⁵

From here on, the Kemalists are accused of discriminating against the Muslim Turks Anatolians.

In this context, the claim of nationalist conservatives concerning being "authentic representatives of the people" (Taşkın, 2007) against the Kemalist elites, who are not only accused of exploitation of Muslim Turk Anatolians, but also segregation, is mostly based on "this discourse of the repressed" (Açikel: 1996). As being one of "the repressed people of Anatolia," nationalist conservatives claim this very right for itself.⁸⁶

okuyamıyor? Çünkü Halk Partisi erkanını teşkil eden ufak bir zümre böyle istiyor. Millet in istediği değil, onun istediği olur." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Artık Yeter Efendiler" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 11, Issue: 17, October 1948)

⁸⁵ "Rumlar, Ermeniler, Yahudiler, Katolikler, Ortodokslar, Protestanlar, kendi din ve mezheplerinin bütün ayinlerini, hatta fırsat buldukça propagandalarını serbestçe yaparlar. (...) Biz (Laik) mefhumunu daha ziyade dine zıd manada ele alıyor ve bütün bu takyit edişleri de yalnız ve yalnız müslümanlık hakkında reva görüyoruz. (...) İtiraf edelim ki, bu mefhum, daha ziyade ve doğrudan doğruya islamlık düşmanlarının dairesini göstermektedir. Biz (Laik) miyiz, yoksa İslam düşmanı mı?" (Güngör, Selahattin M. "Türkiye (Laik) dir!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 November 1946)

⁸⁶ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Yine başladılar!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 12, November 1950

3.6. The Claim to "Represent the People"

As discussed previously, nationalist conservatism particularly arose from the desire to replace the Kemalist intelligentsia (Taşkın, 2012: 411). In this regard, their particular argument was based on the claim that they, opposed to Kemalists' aloofness; were "the authentic representatives of the people" (Taşkın, 2007) defined as Muslim-Turk Anatolians, as detected in the words of Serdengeçti

Give us back our identity and our nation. We do not speak or embrace the voice of either Moscow or London. Our voice is that of God and the people. It is the voice of our people that has been silenced for a quarter of a century. It is the voice of one thousand year of Anatolian history, and the voice of our fallen and veteran soldiers.⁸⁷

According to Bora and Erdoğan (2003: 638), the success of nationalist conservatism over Kemalists has been the result of its "displaying more close relationships with the people." Nationalist conservatives, along with promoting themselves as being one of "the people," more particularly promoted themselves as being in the service of the people and the nation, exemplified both in *Büyük Doğu's* and *Sebilürreşad's* following allegements

We feel great pleasure, honor and felicity for being in the service of the Turkish people.⁸⁸

Is there any other newspaper or journal that has, for over half a century, consistently and relentlessly worked for the service of the people and of the nation?⁸⁹

Nevertheless, the claims concerning being "the authentic representatives" bare some contradictions within it. At this point, the attention should be drawn to the similarities of nationalist conservative discourse with Kemalism. According to Taşkın (2007: 14), the approach of nationalist conservatives to the people resembled

⁸⁷ "Bize benliğimizi bize vatanımızı bize bizi iade ediniz. Biz ne Moskova ne de Londra ağzıyla konuşanlarız. Bizim sesimiz hakkın ve halkın sesidir. Çeyrek asırdır susturulan milletimizin sesidir. Bin yıllık mazisi olan Anadolu'nun sesi, şehit ve gazi Mehmetçiğin sesidir." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Neler Neler Yapmadılar!.." in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 5, 1948)

⁸⁸ "Türk milletinin hizmetinde bulunmaktan en büyük zevki, şerefi ve saadeti duymaktayız." ("(Vatan) Satıcısına İnen Şamar" in *Büyük Doğu*, 19 September 1952)

⁸⁹ "Hangi gazete, hangi mecmua vardır ki, yarım asır böyle mütemadiyen ve muttariden millet ve memleket hizmetinde çalışmıştır?" (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "11nci Cilde Başlıyoruz" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 11, Issue: 251, August 1957)

to that of the Kemalists from the very beginning in the sense that they, though claiming the opposite, established a sort of "elitist relation" with the people. In this sense, "the passive construction of the people" (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003: 639) is critical. Though bearing in mind that the case of "representation," itself, is the product of power,⁹⁰ for nationalist conservative discourse, as pointed out by Bora and Erdoğan (2003: 639), "the people are yet to be created as long as exposed to 'foreign' effects, from which they certainly need to be purified."

From here on, "the people" is the source of criticism rather than praise, as detected in Kısakürek's condemnation of the present day Anatolians, featured as "greedy, mired in gambling and alcohol, malicious, syphilitic, rapist, murderer."⁹¹ The criticism is paradoxically raised towards the Anatolians, "as the essence of the nation," on the ground that they are unable to protect themselves from alcohol, gambling, and licentiousness

Once he drank ayran; and now he gulps down raki! Once his fingers turned the pages of Islamic texts and manuals; now, they turn and mix playing cards! Once he lead a pristine and untouched life for over 40 years; nowadays, he spends a fortune at the red light district of the town even at the age of 15! Once, he would not lie even if threatened with hanging; nowadays, he would not understand the value of truthfulness even if he was to be hanged for it! (...) Once, his body strong as a mountain could burn and overcome any curses; now, his own body is burning with disease and affliction! Once, he could heal and assist entire generations; now, his own body is waiting to be cured from syphilis.⁹²

In this sense, the Anatolians are portrayed as unguarded against the corrupt values of modern life, more particularly associated with city

The villager did not drink raki. It was the city-dwellers who caused villagers to become accustomed to drinking raki. Nowadays, a villager who manages to gather even a small sum spends it on raki; he then intoxicates himself, goes around yelling

⁹⁰ See Spivak, G. C. (1988), "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in C. Nelson and L. Grossberg (eds.) *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

⁹¹ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Anadolu ve Anadolulu" in *Büyük Doğu*, 24 October 1947.

⁹² "Bir zamanlar ayran içerdi; şimdi raki yuvarlıyor! Bir zamanlar ilmihal yapraklarını çevirirdi; şimdi iskambil destelerini karıştırıyor! Bir zamanlar 40 yaşına kadar bakir yaşardı; şimdi 15 yaşında kasabanın kırmızı fenerli sokağını haraca kesiyor! Bir zamanlar assalar yalan söylemezdi; şimdi ipe çekseler doğruluğun neye yaradığını bilemiyor! (...) Bir zamanlar, dağ gibi vücudiyle nazarları yakardı; şimdi sıtmadan kendisi yanıyor! Bir zamanlar, bir aşısıyla, bir nesli kurtarabilirdi; şimdi ferngiye karşı bizzat aş bekliyor!" (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Bir Zamanlar ve Şimdi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 21 June 1946)

and shouting, and even ends up using his gun in his drunken state.⁹³

Similarly both in *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad*, the corruption of the Anatolians is fiercely criticized. For instance, *Serdengeçti* condemns the landowners of Anatolia for spending their money on gambling, women and alcohol instead of taking care of the needs of their villagers

The grocers in our villages often lack salt and sugar, but they always have alcoholic drinks. Weddings without alcohol are nowadays unthinkable! Villagers who were once pure and clean in their hearts are becoming increasingly depraved. (...) In the past, the landlords of villages protected the poor and helped those in need. In the economic life of villages and towns, they used to assume the role of governors and regulators. However, landlords have nowadays become the new elite, who, in a single night, spend the entire wealth they earned from the toils and efforts of the Anatolian people in the music halls, bars, gambling tables and whorehouses of Istanbul. In a single night, they spend the entire wealth of several villages.⁹⁴

In *Sebilürreşad*, on the other hand, an anonymous narrator writes about what he/she witnesses on a small town restaurant, situated in North West Anatolian, in a denouncing tone

It was a place that resembled a diner, but it wasn't exactly one; there were many people sitting at the tables, and a large open area at the middle of the room. (...) It did not take me a long time to understand that the liquid in the glasses was raki, and that the one in the small tea glasses was water. (...) while the musicians played music, two boys aged thirteen and fourteen were belly dancing in the middle of the rooms in the same way lowly prostitutes would. The boys were so drunk that they could barely stand on their feet. They kept throwing their arms around the men in the room, while the men lustfully kissed them, as the avid lechers they were.⁹⁵

⁹³ "Köylü, rakı içmiyordu. Şehirli, köylüyü rakıya da alıştırdı. Şimdi, eline biraz para geçen köylü, rakı içiyor, keyf oluyor, nara atıyor, silaha sarılıyor." (Yesari, Mahmut. "Ayyaşlık Faciamız" in *Büyük Doğu*, 1 October 1943)

⁹⁴ "Köy bakkallarında tuz yoktur, şeker yoktur, fakat içki vardır. İçkisiz düğün dernek olmaz! Saf ve temiz bildiğiniz köylümüz de gün geçtikçe bozuluyor. (...) Eski köy ağları fikarayı korurlar, düşeni kaldırırlardı. Köy ve kasabanın iktisadi hayatında nazım vazifesini görürlerdi. Halbuki şimdi yeni zenginler, hacı ağalar, Anadolunun emeğini alın terini, İstanbulun bilmem hangi çalgılı kahvesinde, hangi barında, bir kumar masasının başında bir fahişenin koynunda bir gecede bir kaç köyü birden harcaıveriyorlar." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Nereye gidiyoruz?!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 4, March 1948)

⁹⁵ "Lokanta gibi bir yerdi, fakat lokanta değildi, bir çok kişiler vardı, masaların başında oturuyorlardı, ortada geniş bir yer bırakılmıştı. (...) Bardaktaki sıvıların rakı, çaylıkdakinin de su olduğunu anlamakta gecikmedim. (...) çalgılarla oynak havalar çalınırken ortada onüç veya ondört yaşlarında iki oğlan, yırtık ve şıllık iki orta malı kadın gibi göbek atıyorlar, bel kıvırıyorlar, (...) Oğlanlar ayakta duramayacak kadar sarhoştular, etraflarındaki adamların boyunlarına sarılıyorlar, adamlar da onların en keskin zamparanın en şehvetli ve azgın hırsı ile öpüyorlardı." ("Sodom'a Doğru mu?" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 15, Issue: 360, June 1965)

From that perspective, it has to be noted that the tribute is paid to the Anatolians of the past rather than the present/modern day, as pointed out by Cantek (2003: 652) who argues that for conservative discourse "there exists a yearning for the past compared to the uncertainty of the present day."

Nevertheless, the criticism raised against the people is not restricted to their being unguarded against the corrupt modern values. Concerning the arguments that nationalist conservatives assert about modernity and the Kemalists' aloofness to the people, it would not be wrong to suggest that nationalist conservative claims concerning the representation of the people are contentious. As Bora and Erdoğan (2003: 637) emphasizes the "noble savage," in reference to De Certeau that is "the people is needed to be taught and civilized," is one of the defining characteristics of conservative populism as well as the Kemalist one. In this context, at some point, but more particularly being valid for Kısakürek and *Büyük Doğu*, the people are approached with elitism accusing of them being uncivilized.

What makes the sample of *Büyük Doğu* critical is the observation of "the elitist tone" utilized against the villagers, or "the uncivilized, savage people of Anatolia." For instance, in the issue of *Büyük Doğu*, dated February 1, 1946, a photograph is published, featuring a man sleeping on a bench. Below the photograph the man is referred to as one of "the cunning villagers having rushed into the cities for opportunity"

This villager who was sleeping in the park at times when the weather was favorable represented one of the people who had travelled to the cities in hopes of finding new employment. He is thinking of a plan!⁹⁶

In another statement, also below a photograph featuring a man with fowl in his hands, the man is accused of being uncivilized and blemishing the city life

While the city of Istanbul finally started to gain the appearance of a civilized city, these people still represented an ugly blemish of the face of the city. These sellers of fowl wandered around in the city's streets with little shame and reservation. They

⁹⁶ "Havanın müsait bir anında parkta uyuyan bu köylü tipi, büyük şehirleri basan ve kendilerine yeni faaliyetler arayan yeni çarklı erkanıharblerimizden biridir. Pılan düşünüyor!" ("Şehirleri basan köylü tipi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 1 February 1946)

wandered around as aimlessly and thoughtlessly as fowl wandering around a barnyard!⁹⁷

The intolarant approach is also observable against the beggars

One of Istanbul's leading social problems that has still not been solved to our day is the presence of beggars. This old man who was begging in such a district as Ayazpaşa. But was he really a deprived person who had been forced to a life of begging?⁹⁸

In this context, "the etiquette columns," as "the pedagogic narratives" (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003: 637) describing the code of behaviors, published in *Büyük Doğu* is interesting. These columns written under the name of Neslihan Kısakürek in several issues published in 1946 intend to teach the people manners ranging from how to eat properly to how to walk in the streets, as exemplified in the lines below, demonstrating the manners of using cutlery

When at the dinner table; taking (or asking for) large amounts of food on your plate is inappropriate. (...) Putting your fork into bread in order to dip into pot liquor is inappropriate. Holding a fork from above is inappropriate. Using your knife to cut food that can very well be cut with the side of your fork is inappropriate. For food that needs to be cut with a knife when eating; cutting them beforehand into smaller pieces with a knife and then eating these pieces with a fork is inappropriate.⁹⁹

A person should not speak while he/she has food in his/her mouth. If a person is to drink water, he/she should first wait to finish the morsel in his/her mouth and then drink from a glass after there is no food in his/her mouth. While eating, it is necessary to consistently wipe one's mouth with a napkin when his/her mouth becomes dirty or oily.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ "Medeni bir şehir manzarasını hakkiyle kazanmağa başlayan İstanbul'u çirkinleştirenlerden bir tip. Bu kümes hayvanları satıcısı kümes hayvanlarından daha büyük bir başboşluk içinde şehir sokaklarında dolaşmaktan ne utanıyor, ne de çekiniyor!" (*Büyük Doğu*, 26 June 1969)

⁹⁸ "İstanbul'un bugüne kadar halledilmemiş içtimai dertlerinden biri de dilencilerdir. Ayazpaşa gibi bir semtte fütursuzca dilenen bu ihtiyar acaba hakiki bir muhtaç mı?" (*Büyük Doğu*, 26 June 1969)

⁹⁹ "Sofrada, yemeği fazla almak ihtar ve ricası ayıptır. (...) Ekmeği çatala batırıp yemeğin suyuna banmak ayıptır. Çatalı üstünden tutmak ayıptır. Çatalın kesebileceği lokmalarda bıçak kullanmak ayıptır. Bıçak kullanılacak yerlerde evvela lokmaları doğrayıp sonra çatala yemeğe kalkmak ayıptır." (Kısakürek, Neslihan. "Muaşeret Edebi: Hep Sofra" in *Büyük Doğu*, 6 December 1946)

¹⁰⁰ "Ağızda yemek varken konuşulmaz. Su içilicekse keza lokmanın bitmesini beklemek ve ağızda hiç bir şey kalmadıktan sonra bardağı ele almak lazımdır. Yemek yerken ağız yağlandııkça mütemadiyen peçete ile silmek icap eder." (Kısakürek, Neslihan. "Muaşeret Edebi: Hep Sofra" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 November 1946)

On the other hand, these codes of behavior, as a mean to civilize the people, is harshly criticized in *Serdengeçti* by Serdengeçti

Since the invention of the word civilization, there has hardly been any peace for us. Whatever you say, and whatever you do, it is considered as an affront to civilization, as well as a problem with regards to etiquette. You are not allowed to dress as you wish, or to eat and drink the way you want! (...) You never manage to figure out which one to use for which food! (...) For example, let us say that there is a fried food on the table. You agonize while trying to determine if you should cut it with a knife, or if you should crush it or cut it with a knife (...) and, despite your best efforts, its juices will spill over the white table cloth and napkins. You feel embarrassed, troubled and uncomfortable about the incident. (...) The easiest, most natural and most pleasurable thing to do would be to eat pieces of meat by using your hands, and by smacking your mouth and lips. But if you do that, you will be considered as 'uncivilized'! (...) Why not eat the way our ancestors once did, by sitting cross-legged around a table on the floor, and eating your soup and food comfortably until you were fully satiated?¹⁰¹

As can be withdrawn from the lines above, Serdengeçti, as "the tieless deputy in the Assembly,"¹⁰² contradicts with Kısakürek as he displays intolerance against the means of civilization. In this sense, the approach of Kısakürek and *Büyük Doğu* to the people differs from the others on the ground that it displays "an elitist tone," against which it claims to struggle. As Kısakürek, accusing the Kemalist elites of being alien to the values, traditions of the people, in his periodical criticizes these traditions or even the people for being uncivilized.

3.7. Concluding Remarks

Nationalist conservatism grew out of the unification of Islamists and Turkists on the same ground against the ruling Kemalist ideology. In this sense, from the very beginning, it has encouraged itself as an alternative, anti-Kemalist ideology, mostly

¹⁰¹ "Şu medeniyet sözü çalkalı rahatımız bozuldu doğrusu. Nereye varsan, ne yapsan bir medenilik sıkıntısı, adab-ı muaşeret üzüntüsü. İstedığın gibi giyinemezsin, istediğin gibi yiyip içemezsin! (...) Hangi yemeği ne ile yiyeceğini bir türlü bilemezsin! (...) Mesela, sofraya bir kızartma konulmuştur. Bıçakla keseceğim, çatalla parçalayacağım derken insanın canı çıkar. (...) Suyu, beyaz masa örtüsüne, peçetelere sıçırır. Utanırsın, üzülürsün, bitersin. (...) Bunun en kolayı en tabiisi ve zevklisi, et parçalarını eliyle alıp ağzını şapırtata şapırtata yemektir. Amma öyle yaptığın an, medeniyetten çıktın demek! (...) Nerede bir sofraya oturup bağdaş kurup kemiklerin iliklerini sora sora, içlerine sindire sindire yemek yiyen, çorba içen ecdadımız?" (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Teferruat Medeniyeti" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 6, May 1949)

¹⁰² http://www.serdengecti.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47:siyaset- (accessed on 15 June 2014)

basing its arguments on the claim to be "the organic intellectuals of the nation" in Gramscian terms, as Taşkın argues (2007: 45). By encouraging "the aloofness of the Kemalists," nationalist conservatives have grounded their legitimacy on "the representation of the people" that is identified as the "Muslim-Turk Anatolians."

For nationalist conservatism, the nation is defined with respect to Muslim-Turk Anatolians. Islam along with Turkishness is emphasized as the essential component of the national identity. As observable in Fergan, Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and the approach of their periodicals, the focus is on the search for cohesion between the two. In this regard, Islam is encouraged as the driving force behind the strength of Turks. Nevertheless, Anatolia as well as Islam stands at the core of nationalist conservative approach to nationalism. Moreover, it might be argued that Anatolia for nationalist conservatism provides ground for their claims to "be the authentic representatives of the people" against the Kemalists. Since in opposition to "the founding elites of Salonican origins" nationalist conservatives promote themselves as being one of the Anatolians in the service of the people. In this respect, it is to be argued that the claims concerning the representation of the people refer to a more concrete desire for "power." As Mert (2007: 176) points out, with reference to Baker, the emphasis on "the authenticity" cannot be evaluated as a simple expression of "the need of preservation," but "a clear reflection of the desire for power." From here on, it might be contended that behind the anti-Kemalist approach of nationalist conservatism lays "the passion for power."

Hence, nationalist conservatism primarily concentrates on the repression of the people by the founding elites who are regarded as the primary responsible for both moral and material exploitation of Anatolians. With the particular emphasis on *how they have been deprived of the wealth, comfort of their own land*, conservative approach points at the repression of the authentic people of Anatolia: Muslim Turks. That's why, "the enjoyment of the Kemalists," with reference to Žižek (2002b: 214) who asserts that "dealing with Others is particularly shaped by the myths attributing "great enjoyment" to them, is also paid particular attention to emphasize the repression of the true people of Anatolia who is the Muslim Turks

For thirty years they spoke and behaved as if they were gods. They ruled unchallenged as if they were the pharaohs. They ate and drank until they burst and vomited. (...) They spent their excessive travel allowances, travelled in private wagons, sailed in expensive yachts, and lead sumptuous lives in the palaces of the Sultans whom they chased away from this country. (...) A life of pleasure, entertainment and parties...Whenever they organized an official trip somewhere within the country, it was declared as a cause and excuse for celebrations! And when they set their feet to somewhere else within the country, it was considered as a cause and excuse for another celebration! (...) Every day there was a celebration; and every there was a festival! Let us all celebrate, let us all dance and hop around! But with all these celebrations and luxuries; who had to pay, who had to carry the burden? It was the nation, of course, that had to pay the burden, along with the people and the villagers.¹⁰³

Moreover, nationalist conservatism is identified with a strong reaction against the modernization process carried out by the founding elites. The modernization process and its impact on the people are fiercely attacked by nationalist conservatives. In this sense, their approach to modernization displays a more radical stance compared to other conservative tendencies. Modernization, equated with "Westernization," is accused of depriving the nation of her past heritage, traditions, religion and moral values. Hence, hostility is particularly raised against the Kemalist reforms. The reforms are particularly evaluated with relation to modern life, identified with irreligiousness, immorality, corruption and disregard of family life. Hence, "alcohol, prostitution, gambling, and dancing" are frequently mentioned in the depiction of the modern life. Nationalist conservatism repeats the general tendency of Turkish conservatism emphasizing the internalization of the material qualities of the West as the flaw of Turkish modernization. Nevertheless, nationalist conservative approach differs from the general tendency by directly pointing at the Kemalists as the perpetrators, who are held responsible for leading to the destruction of Muslim Turks Anatolians.

¹⁰³ "Tam otuz yıl tanrılar gibi konuşular. Firavunlar gibi saltanat sürdüler. Yediler, içtiler, kustular. (...) Bol harcırahlar, hususi vagonlar, yatlar, kökünü kazıdıkları sultanların saraylarında şahane hayatlar. (...) Zevk, eğlence alemleri... Falan filan, yere ayağını bastı, bayram! Falan filan, yerden ayağını çekti şenlik! (...) Her gün bayram, her gün seyran! Vur patlasın, çal oynasın! Altta kalan kimdi? Milletti, halktı, köylüydü." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Unutma!Affetme!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 8 May 1959)

CHAPTER IV

THE REPRESENTATION OF THE ENEMIES FOR NATIONALIST CONSERVATISM

4.1. Introduction

In this chapter, I will concentrate on the narratives of the enemies for nationalist conservatism in reference to the periodicals of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad*. Firstly, I will try to provide a general overview on the enemies for nationalist conservative discourse. After introducing the enemies briefly, I will deal with the most articulated enemies for nationalist conservatism that is the communists, the Jews, the Donmehs and the Free Masons, under separate headings. Under each heading, I will try to display the representation of communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons separately and how their images are constructed. By doing so, I will initially provide a historical background to each of the headings which, I believe, will facilitate to give a better understanding to the images that are constructed; then deal with themes, figures, incidents and motifs that are employed in the representation of them. Finally, I will try to evaluate how these images function in nationalist conservatism.

4.2. An Overview of the Enemies for Nationalist Conservatism

As the aim of this chapter is to provide a deep analysis on the enemies for nationalist conservatism, it will initially be better to provide a general overview concerning the classification of the enemies before dealing with them separately. For nationalist conservatism, the enemies, which are positioned against the welfare of the Muslim-Turk Anatolians, as "the essence of the nation" discussed in the third chapter, are varied. Nevertheless, regardless of the abundance in three of the periodicals, taken as

reference, the enemies are the same: "the communists, Jews, Donmehs, Free Masons, Kemalists, the RPP, non-believers, cosmopolites, and missionaries."

In *Büyük Doğu*, for instance, the enemies are enlisted as "the Godless, communist, Jew, Donmeh and Mason."¹⁰⁴ In another issue of the same periodical, dated on 19 December 1947, the enemies positioned against the Muslim Turks in allusion to "true Anatolians" are more diverse and are classified in seven distinct categories

The Republican People's Party, the crooks, the Donmehs, the communists, the atheists, the so-called Muslims who are in contradiction with religious tradition and the pitiful amples of artists and philosophers who are devoid of any talent, aspiration or fame...¹⁰⁵

The hostility toward the enemies, on the other hand, is dependent on distinct accusations, associated with the enemies. In this sense, the cause of *Büyük Doğu* is described as fighting with "irreligiousness, immorality, materialism, cosmopolitanism, communism, individualism, and rootlessness."¹⁰⁶

In a similar way, in *Sebilürreşad* the enemies, with more particular reference to Islam, are diverse: communism, Zionism, Free Masonry, missionary, imperialism, fifth column and internationalism. Nevertheless, within this diversity, the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are paid specific attention concerning the alleged threats they pose to Islam. Fergan proposes that "the Turkish nation faces three main threats," with those threats being described as "the black, yellow and red reaction." "The black reaction aims at *Christianizing* Turks; the yellow reaction, as the power of Jewry and Free Masonry, intends to *Judaize* Turks; and the red reaction, identified with the power of communism and atheism, works to *heathenize* Turks." Within this classification, the Donmehs are referred to as "the missionaries of Zionism" and are portrayed as working hand in hand with the Jews to Judaize the Turks. Fergan claims that though the ambitions of these powers seem to vary, they

¹⁰⁴ "Dostlar!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 13 May 1949.

¹⁰⁵ "CHP, bütün muhalefet matrabazları, dönmeler, komünistler, dinsizler, sünnet ehline zıd sözde müslümanlar, ve eserden, nefsten ve şöhretten mahrum sanatkar ve mütefekkir kopyaları..." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Hadiselerin Muhasebesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 19 December 1947)

¹⁰⁶ "Büyük Doğu Projesinin Ana Nizamname Projesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 June 1951.

unite for an ultimate cause, which is "the annihilation of Turk's religion"

The Turkish nation is facing three great threats. Three great dragons are constantly assailing its spiritual identity. Each one is attacking from a different front, and each one has a different intention; however, in the end, their ultimate goal is the same. All three of them are united to bring down the religion and faith of the Turks.¹⁰⁷

Additionally, for Fergan, the RPP is accused of inflicting these threats upon the nation.¹⁰⁸

In the narratives of *Serdengeçti*, the positioning of the RPP and the Kemalists as "the enemies" of the nation is more explicit. The Kemalists of "Salonican origin" are openly targeted in *Serdengeçti* as "the enemies of the people and God,"¹⁰⁹ along with the communists, Jews, Donmehs, and Free Masons. Moreover, in *Serdengeçti* the Donmehs, Zionists and Free Masons are held responsible for "the national disasters," with more particular reference to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, thus the fall of Muslim Turks, as found in the words of Atilhan

The enemy tried to conquer the castle from within, and to bring about our destruction by our own hands. The sacred flag that once flied over lands in three different continents have been lowered and hauled from the flagpoles.¹¹⁰

In Atilhan, the Zionists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are referred to as being "deadly poisons to the Turkish nation" without having any distinction in achieving the ultimate cause aiming at the destruction of the nation

Between the Free Mason and the Zionist, and between the Jew and the Donmeh; there is no difference with regards to character or activity. The goals and desires of these people centers around a single purpose: (1) to drain the blood of the Turkish people and villagers, who live poor and miserable lives in an otherwise rich homeland, until they bleed dry; (2) to cause the Turkish people to lose the position of

¹⁰⁷ "Türk milleti üç büyük tehlike karşısındadır. Üç büyük ejder, onun manevi varlığına mütemadiyen saldırmaktadır. Her biri ayrı bir cepheden taaruz etmekte, başka maksatlar gütmekte, fakat hedefleri müşterektir. Üçü de Türkün dinini yıkmakta birleşirler." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950)

¹⁰⁸ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950.

¹⁰⁹ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Yine başladılar!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 12, November 1950.

¹¹⁰ "Düşman kaleyi içten fethetmeğe ve bizi kendi elimizle yıkmaya çalıştı. Dünyanın üç kıtasında şanlı, şerefle dalgalanan mübarek bayrağımız o kıtaların burçlarından indirildi." (Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "Uyanış!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 13, June 1951)

esteem it has enjoyed for centuries within the Muslim world; and (3) to entirely eliminate Turkey from the map.¹¹¹

Within this framework, I will now try to offer an analysis of the enemies for nationalist conservatism. As the arguments of nationalist conservatism based on "the antagonism against the RPP and Kemalists" have been discussed in the previous chapter, I will now explain why the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, are the most referred enemies for nationalist conservatism.

4.3. The Images of the Communists/Communism

Communism, as one of "the inner enemies that should be severely fought against,"¹¹² is fiercely attacked by nationalist conservative discourse. From the point of nationalist conservatism, the formulation of communism as "an enemy" is dependent on several allegations. At the outset, for nationalist conservatives, communism does not necessarily indicate the ideology itself, but rather stands for *Moscow's* longstanding hostility against the Muslim Turks. Communism represents the ultimate attempt of Moscow's revenge on the Turkish nation. In this regard, it is portrayed as "a mask for Moscow's revenge." For instance, Kısakürek (2009: 22) emphasizing "the Turks' past with Moscow as a history of a long-drawn-out struggle lasting 2,000 years," asserts that "although 1,850 of the 2,000 years was particularly marked with Turks' victory and dominance, for the last 150 years Moscow has been fighting hard to eliminate the Muslim-Turk presence." Hence, communism, in addition to its previous attempts of "the Christianization of some Asian pryncedoms and the extermination of the Crimean Turks," is regarded as Moscow's last attempt at achieving its goal of annihilating the Muslim-Turk presence.

¹¹¹"Farmasonla Siyonist ve Yahudi ile Dönme arasında hiçbir karakter ve faaliyet farkı yoktur. Cümlesinin hedefi ve arzusu bir noktada toplanır: Zengin bir vatan toprağı üzerinde sefil ve sergerdan yaşayan Türk köylüsünün son damla kanını içmek, onu İslam âleminde haiz olduğı yüksek itibardan düşürmek ve bütün bütün harita-i alemde silip süpürmek." (Atılhan, Cevat Rifat. "Uyanış!" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 13, June 1951)

¹¹²Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Hadiselerin Muhasebesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 19 December 1947.

For nationalist conservatives, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 is critical in the positioning of Moskow vis-a-vis Muslim Turks. As detected in three of the periodicals, special attention is given to the narratives concerning "the repression of Muslim Turks under Soviet rule." As exemplified in *Sebilürreşad*, the stories concerning "the slaughter of Muslim Turks by the communist armies" take a large place in these narratives

In the times immediately following the collapse of the Tsardom, nearly 23 million Turks and Muslims lived in Soviet Russia. However, starting from 1917, a policy of systematic oppression and elimination was conducted against these peoples.¹¹³

Similarly while *Büyük Doğu* mentions of "the slaughter of Turks in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan by the Soviet rule;"¹¹⁴ Serdengeçti, for instance, in reference to Turks' removal to Siberia by the Soviet rule asserts that "Siberia has become the grave of the Turkish race."¹¹⁵ The employment of these narratives, particularly concentrating on "the extermination of Muslims" by the Bolsheviks, are significant in providing base to nationalist conservatism to position communism against religion, but more so to Islam

The principles of Marxism and Leninism are, in all subjects and areas, heavily based on materialistic considerations. As such, the communist party is opposed to all religions. In fact, it has a particular hostility towards the Islamic faith. All forms of national and religious sentiments among Turks and Muslims living in Russia are considered as obstacles in reaching their goals.¹¹⁶

As the lines above clearly demonstrate, communism is associated with materialism. The material life rather than spirituality is set as the primary concern of the communist doctrine. Besides, its main target is referred to as destroying religion and

¹¹³ "Çarlık idaresi çöktüğü zaman Sovyet Rusya'da 23 milyon Türk ve Müslüman yaşıyordu. Bunlara karşın 1917'den beri devamlı şekilde bir zulüm ve imha sistemi yürütülmüştür." ("Yirminci asrın en büyük faciası" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 3, Issue: 59, September 1949)

¹¹⁴ "Dünyada Fikir ve Hareket, 'Rusya Türklerine karşı katliam' " in *Büyük Doğu*, 10 April 1959.

¹¹⁵ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Doğu Türkistan Faciası" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 14, March 1952.

¹¹⁶ "Marksizm ve Leninizm prensipleri herşeyde maddi cihetler üzerinde durur. Bu itibarla komünist partisi, herhangi bir dinin aleyhindedir. Bilhassa İslam dinine karşı hususi bir düşmanlıkları vardır. Rusya'da yaşayan Türkler ve Müslümanlar arasındaki her türlü milli ve dini meyilleri ve hisleri, kendi maksatlarına engel sayarlar." ("Yirminci asrın en büyük faciası" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 3, Issue: 59, September 1949)

establishing an irreligious community. As a consequence, the devout are represented as "the main enemies of communists." For instance, Kısakürek, in an effort to display "the indignity of communists" concerning religion, argues that in the eyes of communists "God is an illusion created by the mentally ill persons; the prophets are false and insincere people while spirituality is used as a tool to suppress the retarded."¹¹⁷ Similarly Fergan, representing communism as one of "the threats to Islamic world," suggests the main target of communism as to create a fully materialistic society

They endeavor to turn mankind into emotionless, soulless and fully materialistic robots; to achieve this, they attempt to instigate all forms of misery, unrest and disorder within the countries they are active.¹¹⁸

Moreover, he promotes the aim of communism as "the red reaction," which is to establish "an irreligious society" by detaching Muslim Turks from Islam

The third dragon is the red army. (...) This dragon wages war with the intention of storming and capturing the fortress that is the faith of the Turkish people. By doing so, it aims to turn the Turkish people into a 'red' and irreligious society. (...) This threat has appeared only recently. (...) and it is now conducting powerful assaults against the castles of Islam.¹¹⁹

In addition to fostering a defeatist mentality against religion/spirituality, communism is alleged to work against "the national welfare." For example, it is alleged in *Sebilürreşad* dependent on a congress that took place in Moscow in 1955 addressing the worldwide communist writers as well as the Turkish ones that "the writers have been charged with destroying the national assets."¹²⁰ In this regard, communists are

¹¹⁷ "Allah, bunların gözünde, hasta ve mütereddi insanların yarattığı bir vehimdir. Peygamberler, bunların gözünde, ya bu hasta ve mütereddi insanların ta kendileri; yahut da hakikatsiz ve samimiyetsiz insanlardır. Mukaddesat, bunların gözünde, avanakları avlamaya memur ökse..." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Günün Büyük Tehlikesi Komünizma; Bunlar Kimdir?(1)" in *Büyük Doğu*, 13 September 1952)

¹¹⁸ "Beşeriyeti hissiz, ruhsuz tam manasiyle maddeperest bir robot haline sokmağa ve bunun için de her yerde sefalet, huzursuzluk, karışıklık vücade getirmeğe çalışır." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "İslam Dünyasını saran Tehlikeler" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 13, Issue: 324, April 1961)

¹¹⁹ "Üçüncü ejder de kızıl kuvvettir. (...) Bu da Türkün iman kalesini yıkarak onu kıpkızıl dinsiz bir cemiyet haline sokmağa savaştır. (...) Bu tehlike yeni başgösterdi. (...) Bu da şimdi islam kalesine en müthiş hücumlarda bulunmaktadır." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950)

labeled to lack patriotism. Moreover, it is also through anti-patriotism that the relationship between communism and Zionism is established. Both the communists and the Jews, which will be discussed in more detail in the sub-sect of the Jews, are alleged to pose threats to the national benefits of the countries they reside in.¹²¹

For nationalist conservatism, communism is conspired to be of Jewish origin. As previously mentioned, Karl Marx's Jewish origin served as the primary base for nationalist conservatives to conclude that "communism was the product of Jews to achieve world domination" (Bali, 2003b: 409). According to Kısakürek, for instance, Jews "as the best organized power in the world," first invented capitalism and then encouraged communism in order to diminish the power of non-Jewish capitalists

The Jews (...) have always considered and will always consider any group other than themselves as being enemies. We must not forget that it was the Jews who first brought money to face of this world, who invented capitalism, and who later invented communism when they saw that capitalism started to be used by the non-Jews as well, (...)¹²²

As the lines above demonstrate, both capitalism and communism are associated with Jewish conspiracy to destroy world order. On the other hand, the association of communism with other "enemies" is not restricted to Jews. The Free Masons are alleged to collaborate with communists as well. This collaboration is particularly based on the claim that Free Masonry fosters "irreligiousness" as in the case of communism

Just like the communist, the Free Mason is also devoid of religion. And just like the communist, Free Masons are also enemies to Allah, its Prophet, its Book, and its Angels. They are also enemies to the revelations, and the enemies of all that is holy. In every country they invade, the communists provide a clear example of the

¹²⁰ "Memleketi içinden yıkacak Komünist talimatı" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 15, Issue: 337, June 1962.

¹²¹ "Amerika'da Yahudiler veya Düşmanını Tanı Kitabı" in *Büyük Doğu*, 16 June 1952.

¹²² "Yahudinin (...) kendisinininkinden başka, her birliğe düşman olmaktadır ezeli ve ebedi memuriyetini şundan anlayalım ki, yeryüzüne parayı getiren ve kapitalizmayı icad eden kendisi, sonra, bu kapitalizma yabancı elinde terakki etmeye başlayınca ona karşı komünizmayı keşfeden yine kendisi, (...)"(Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Abdülhamid ve Yahudi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 October 1965)

irreligiousness they impose.¹²³

Along with Free Masons, the Donmehs are also claimed to be a part of this collaboration, as exemplified in M. Raif Ogan's allegations that "the communists, as the enemies of religion and faith, should be sought among the Free Masons and Donmehs"

As long as he remains loyal to his religion and faith, a Muslim will not like communism or become a communist. (...) Communists must be sought among the Donmehs, Masons and atheists; and when they are found, their heads should be crushed without any delay and warning.¹²⁴

Similarly in *Serdengeçti*, "communists, Free Masons and Donmehs are labeled as the three enemies of the national asset, religion and spirituality."¹²⁵ In this regard, for nationalist conservatives, Nazım Hikmet sets the primary example of the connection of communism with Free Masonry and the Donmehs. All "the evil" is embodied in the figure of Nazım Hikmet, who is rumored to be a Salonican-origin communist and Free Mason. For instance, the starting of a campaign by "Donmeh-origin" Ahmet Emin Yalman in 1949 calling for the release of Nazım Hikmet, as Bali points out,¹²⁶ for nationalist conservatives signified the peak of this collaboration

(...) because the famous Communist poet Nazım Hikmet was a Mason, the Mason Ahmet Emin Yalman defended him in his newspaper, writing lengthy columns for his release from prison.¹²⁷

¹²³ "Mason da komünist gibi dinsizdir. Mason tıpkı komünist gibi Allah, Peygamber, Kitab, Melek vahiyi inkar eder ve bütün mukaddesatın düşmanıdır. Komünist, istila ettiği her memlekette dinsizliğinin misalini verir." (Laç, A. Şeref. "Allah, millet, ordu, vahdet düşmanı Masonluk" in *Büyük Doğu*, 7 September 1952)

¹²⁴ "Bir müslüman, din ve imanına sadık kaldıkça komünist olamaz, sadık kaldıkça komünist olamaz, komünistliği beğenemez. (...) Komünisti, Dönmeler, Masonlar, dinsizler arasında aramalı bulmalı, bulunca da söyletmeden kafasını ezmeli." (Ogan, M. Raif. "Manzaraları" in *Büyük Doğu*, 30 March 1951)

¹²⁵ Ulusan, Muhlis. "Kırıkkalede Kutsi bir Gün" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 17, August 1952.

¹²⁶ http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/another_enemy.pdf (accessed on 23 May 2014).

¹²⁷ "(...) meşhur Komünist şair Nazım Hikmet Mason olduğu için, Mason Ahmet Emin Yalman, gazetesinde onu müdafaa etmiş, mahpushaneden kurtarılması için sütunlar dolusu yazılar yazmıştır." (Ogan, M. Raif. "Masonluk-Komünistlik" in *Büyük Doğu*, 9 March 1951)

The connection of the RPP with communism is also critical for nationalist conservatism. As the most expressive figure of this association, Kısakürek, pointing at the Democrat Party government as being the first to fight against "the evils of communism," asserts that

(...) the truth is that, the first real struggle against communism in our country was first organized by the Democrat Party. Until recently, the RPP administration demonstrated false and insincere attitudes as if they were opposed to communism, while in fact they not only tolerated the spread of communism, but even employ agents from Moscow in their organizations.¹²⁸

The alleged "communist-Free Mason-Donmeh-Jew-RPP" alliance, on the other hand, is best described in a cartoon which was published on the cover of *Sebilürreşad's* 357th issues. In the cartoon, Falih Rıfki Atay, as an ex-RPP representative, is portrayed with Nazım Hikmet carrying a portrait of Stalin on their shoulders. The two are followed by Yalman, who is illustrated as carrying a Masonic star hanging out from his pocket. Along with Yalman, Atay also carries a star while Nazım Hikmet is illustrated with a star tattooed to his arm and carrying a hammer and sickle inside the waistband.¹²⁹ Moreover, for nationalist conservatism, the alleged intend of communism to destroy religious commitment but more specifically Islam, is also critical in indicating the relation between communism and the RPP. For instance, Kısakürek establishes this relation of between the RPP and communism through the principle of secularism, and argues that communism and the RPP are united in hostility against Islam

RPP's understanding of secularism does not fit the real definition of secularism that focuses on full and absolute liberties for all religions, and on the separation of religion and state. Instead, its definition of secularism is organized around a complete and absolute enmity against Islam. Thus, the RPP and communism are united with regards to their hostility towards Islam.¹³⁰

¹²⁸"(...) hakikat şudur ki, bu memlekette ilk defa olarak gerçek komünizma ile mücadele, Demokrat Parti Hükümetine nasip olmuştur. Düne kadar CHP idaresi, bunları güya takip eder gibi sahte tavırlar takınırken, işin kaynağında komünizmaya yalnız müsamaha göstermekle kalmıyor; hatta Moskof ajanlarını bizzat ve bifiil teşkilatlandırıyor."(Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Günün Büyük Tehlikesi Komünizma; Bunlar Kimdir? (2)" in *Büyük Doğu*, 14 September 1952)

¹²⁹ *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 15, Issue: 357, October 1964.

¹³⁰ "C.H.P.'nin laisizma anlayışı, tam ve mutlak serbestlik ve sadece hükümetten ayrılık manasına gelen hakiki laisizmayla uymadığına, sadece tam ve mutlak bir İslam düşmanlığı belirttiğine göre, bu

Other alleged evidence that is articulated to consolidate the relation between communism and the RPP by nationalist conservatives are "the Village Institutes," accused of teaching communism, as argued by Kısakürek (2009: 34) who encourages that "the Village Institutes have been the hotbeds of communist propaganda" and asserts that "the RPP attempted to use the Village Institutes as a mean to accelerate the breakdown and decay of Turkish society, and to deliver the Turkish people to the lap of communism."

With respect to the modernization process, nationalist conservatism, as mentioned in the previous chapter, attacks the RPP for not only degrading religion in the society, but also the morale in the sense that moral degradation is emphasized as to be the outcome of rupture from Islam identified as "the source of morality." That's why, one of the arguments that nationalist conservatism bases itself against the modernization process is that the moral breakdown provides a base for pervasive communist ambitions. As detected in Serdengeçti, who sets women's obtaining more freedom as the result of Kemalist modernization as an example, the moral decline is encouraged so as to lead to the advance of communism

The freedom granted to women which undermines the family, destroys the cohesion and peace within families, promotes prostitution and licentiousness, and actually prepares the ground for the advance of communism.¹³¹

Moreover, moral degradation is believed to create an opportunity for "the communist invasion," particularly in the cultural field. The term "cultural bolshevism,"¹³² for instance, is used in *Sebilürreşad* to endorse the claim that the communists, taking advantage of the moral breakdown, conspire against the welfare of the Muslim Turks by encouraging degeneration and immorality through literature, scenes and art

umde üzerinde de beraberlerdir." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Hadiselerin Muhasebesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 1 September 1950)

¹³¹"Aile meselesini kökünden baltalayan aile yuvalarında bir damla huzur bırakmayan, fuşu ahlaksızlığı, teşvik tahrik eden kadını sokağa düşüren bu nevi bir kadın hürriyeti her bakımdan komünizmin hazırlıycısıdır."(Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Kadın ve Cemiyet" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 8, October 1949)

¹³² The term "cultural bolshevism" is used in reference to the book of *Yılanların Öcü* by Fakir Baykurt, which is claimed to be a "Moscow plot" engineered against the honor and dignity of the Turkish villagers. Accordingly, it is claimed that the book displays the villagers as perverts.

One of the approaches they employ is the utilization of literature, scenes and art as a mask to spread cultural bolshevism. They thus endeavor to undermine the traditional artistic preferences and tastes, the religious beliefs, and the family and moral values of the people, which they all label as bourgeois inventions. In doing so, they attempt to physically destroy the Turkish identity.¹³³

The alleged alliance between the Zionists, who are assumed to have a profound effect on the rise of Westernization movements,¹³⁴ and communists is significant at this point. This alliance, aimed at the rise of immortality, is identified as "Red Zionism" by Atilhan,¹³⁵ who asserts that "the Zionists work side by side with communists to degrade moral values among Muslims"

In Palestine, there is a Jewish organization that spends millions in order to undermine the Arab community, as well as the strength, morals, courage, nationalistic sentiments, devotion and the spirit of self-sacrifice of the Arab army. This Zionist organization prepares and prints obscene images of naked women, and secretly distributes millions of them in Syria and other Arab countries. (...) They carry out this task through their secret communist agents in Turkey. (...) Hundreds of thousands these obscene and immoral images are also printed and delivered to our Anatolian lands, where they are secretly introduced all the way into the sanctuary of Turkish families.¹³⁶

In this regard, in nationalist conservatism communism is promoted as a threat posed to "religion, morality, spirituality and national causes," which shall be defeated.

¹³³ "Takip ettikleri bir yol da edebiyat ve sahneden faydalanıp, sanatı maske olarak kullanarak kültür bolşevizmini yaymaktır. Böylece milletimizin sanat zevkinde, dini inanışında, burjuva uydurması addettikleri aile ve ahlakında, bir kelime ile manevi yapısında temin edecekleri çöküntü ile Türklüğün maddeten de yok olmasını gerçekleştirmeğe çabalamaktadırlar." ("Mahud Eser hakkında" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 15, Issue: 336, May 1962)

¹³⁴ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Kimin Hesabına Konuşuyoruz?" in *Büyük Doğu*, 30 August 1946.

¹³⁵ Atilhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Filistin için Cihad-ı Mukaddes" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 1, May 1948.

¹³⁶ "Filistinde Arab cemiyetinin, bilhassa Arab ordusunun ahlak ve salabetini, şehamet hislerini, milli seciyesini, feragat ve fedakarlık ruhunu çökertmek için milyonlar sarf eden büyük bir yahudi müessesesi vardır. Bu siyonist müessese müstehcen çıplak kadın resimleri hazırlar, yüzbinlerce, milyonlarca adet bastırarak gizli vasıtalarla Suriyeye ve diğer Arab memleketlerine sevk eder. (...) Bu işi Türkiyede de gizli komünist ajanları yapmaktadır. (...) Bu gayri ahlaki resimler her tarafa yüzbinlerce adet bastırılarak Anadolumuza sevk edilmektedir, bütün Türk ailelerinin harimi istemine sokulmaktadır." (Atilhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Bir Millet Böyle Çöker" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 15, Issue: 336, May 1962)

4.4. The Representation of the Jews

4.4.1. Turkish anti-Semitism

The roots of Turkish anti-Semitic discourse date back to the single party period as the consequence of the Kemalist policies of Turkification. According to Bali (2003b: 403), anti-Semitic discourse during one party rule particularly centered around two main themes: "the Jews' inability to speak Turkish adequately and their domination over Turkish economic life." Particularly observable in the comics of the period, as he highlights, such as *Akbaba*, *Karikatür*, *Mizah* and *Şaka*, the Jews were emphasized as profit-oriented and constantly envisaged as "being fond of money, black marketers, teaching their children to work primarily for material wealth, and pocketing the charity money." In addition to their portrayal of living in wealth, the Jews, on the other hand, were the second most targeted with their poor Turkish (Bali, 2003b: 403), reflecting the concern of Kemalist ideology towards the assimilation of non-Muslims and non-Turkish ethnic groups since, as pointed out by Aktar (1996: 16), the process mostly demonstrated itself in the emphasis given to the language, the traces of which can be detected in the "Citizen, Speak Turkish!" campaigns of the late 1920s, mainly supported by the Kemalist press.

As Bali (2003b: 403) points out, the anti-Semitic discourse of the single party period reflected contradiction in the sense that on one hand the anti-Semitic discourse criticized the Jews for not Turkifying while on the other it ironically displayed its reluctance concerning their Turkification by asserting that they should not be Turkified, particularly observed in Atsız and Atilhan as the leading anti-Semitic writers of the 1930s. Arguing against the hybridization of Turkish race, Atsız clearly advocated against the Turkification of the minorities in the sense that the Turkish race would lose its superior quality.¹³⁷ Atsız suggested that if the Jews were turkified, they would be freer to act among the Muslim Turks to reach their goals (as cited in Bali, 2003b: 404). Moreover, Atsız, as expressed by Bora (2002a: 914), specifically

¹³⁷ Atsız, Nihal. "Veda" in *Orkun*, 18 January 1952, <http://www.nihal-atsiz.com/yazi/veda-h-nihal-atsiz.html> (accessed on 10 May 2014).

targeted the Donmehs in his narratives, whom he positioned as "foreigners who appear to be the Turks" along with the young Christians converts since for him the Donmehs were the untraceable enemies working insidiously against the national causes.

Atilhan, on the other hand, as the most influential anti-Semitic writer of nationalist conservatives and Islamists of the period (Bali, 2003a: 404), employed the themes of Nazi anti-Semitism in his periodical *İnkılap*, which was later renamed as *Milli İnkılap*. Published between the years 1933 and 1934, the periodical, as pointed out by Bali (2003a: 406-07), was one of the leading sources of anti-Semitic propaganda of the period and contributed a great deal, along with *Orhun*, published by Atsız, to the outbreak of "the Thrace Incidents of 1934" targeting the Jews residing in Thrace. Moreover, Atilhan was the first to publish *the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, claimed to be "the secret documents of the Jews in achieving world domination," (Bali, 2001: 334-35) in 1934 in *Milli İnkılap* (Bali, 2001: 322). Along with *the Protocols of Elders of Zion*, the book of Henry Ford, *the International Jew*, and Hitler's *Mein Kampf* were published several times during the one party rule, having a great influence over the nationalists and Islamists of the period and the following decades, as asserted by Bali (2001).

Concerning the anti-Semitic discourse of the one party rule, but more particularly the 1940s, Bora (2002a: 915) states that it had a universal quality, more or less shaped by the world conjuncture. Nevertheless, he concludes that Turkish anti-Semitic discourse from the 1950s onward, taking the advantage of the increasing effects of modernization and capitalism, reflected itself as an opposition against the modernization process, for which it particularly held the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons responsible.

The multi-party period was also particularly remarkable with its violent anti-Semitic atmosphere. As an era ended in 1946 with the transition to multiparty period, many nationalists and Islamists, as the silenced segments of the population of the one-party rule, were to become more apparent both in the public sphere and the political arena. According to Bali (2003b: 405), the most significant development that had a large

impact on Turkish anti-Semitism following the transition to multiparty period was the establishment of the State of Israel. He asserts that the decision by the United Nations to the partitioning of Palestine in 1947 between independent Jewish and Arab states, soon followed by the Arab-Israeli war, led to the rise of anti-Semitism among many Turkish nationalists and conservatives, who acknowledged it as a "Muslim-Jew conflict."

The next critical incident that affected Turkish anti-Semitism in the multiparty period was the rising of anti-communism as a general tendency among Turkish nationalists, conservatives and Islamists from the late 1940s onward. Starting from the late 1940s throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the connection between Jews and communism served as a base for nationalist conservatives for the articulation of anti-Semitism. However, what should be emphasized is that though baring in mind what is asserted by Bora (2012: 14-15) concerning "the demonizing of the left," as discussed in the second chapter, it will be hard to demonstrate that anti-Semitic discourse expressed itself within the boundaries of anti-communism and did not target the concrete Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons as can be exemplified from the single event of the shooting of Ahmet Emin Yalman to the events of 6-7 September, which targeted the non-Muslim population including the Jews.

4.4.2. The Alleged Disruptive Roles of the Jews in Muslim-Turkish History

The Jews hold a significant place in the interpretation of the past for nationalist conservatives. Differing from the anti-Semitic discourse of the single party era, the nationalist conservatives' hostility against the Jews is more particularly justified in the disruptive roles they played in the decline of the Ottoman Empire, beginning from the Kanuni era until its official end in 1923 with the foundation of the new Republic. In this sense, Jews are referred to as one of the main perpetrators of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, as the peak of Turkish civilization, as summed in the words of Kısakürek

After coming to our lands following their exile from Spain; the Jews succeeded in entering Suleiman the Magnificent's court and harem, and even managed to reach positions of importance and influence. The Jews, who have always endeavored to

become a dominant people through agents such as Joseph Nasi, have played the most insidious yet effective role in causing the eventual decline of the Ottoman Empire. They have both secretly and openly cooperated with our enemies; and when they saw Sultan Abdülhamid as a representative of our religious and national unity and strength, they endeavored with all their strength and treachery to bring his fall – something which they ultimately succeeded at.¹³⁸

The alleged existence of "a golden age," in reference to the Ottoman Empire, is critical for the nationalist conservatives' views on the past (Bora & Onaran, 2003). From the perspective of nationalist conservatism, the golden age for the Turkish nation and civilization begins with the conquest of Istanbul in 1453, reaches its height under the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent; and comes to an end with its decline in the 19th century, particularly marked by the Tanzimat reform movements

There was once a golden age during which our faith as well as our love and devotion to Islam were at their purest. Our faith allowed us to build a world empire and a civilization that ruled the world. This imposing tree cast its shadow across the entire world; however, due to the inefficient and incompetent rulers that followed Suleiman the Magnificent, this tree did not receive care and attention it needed. The golden age of the empire thus began to fade, while the shoots on our tree of faith began to wither.¹³⁹

For nationalist conservatives the end of "the golden age" for Muslim Turks is dated back to the nineteenth century. Though the role of Jews in the happening of Tanzimat, as the bearer of the modernization process in the Empire, is decisive in this decay; the first signs of the decline of the Empire are traced back to the Kanuni era for nationalist conservatives with reference to the Spanish Jews.

¹³⁸ "İspanya'dan kovulduktan sonra memleketimize giren, Muhteşem Süleyman-ı Kanuni'nin haremine kadar sokulan, orada baş gözde makamına kadar yükselen ve ilk iş olarak (Yasef Nasi)nin şahsında kendi kavmini hakim kılmaya bakan Yahudi, duraklama, alçalma çığırlarımızın türlü sebepleri arasında en sinsi, fakat en tesirli rolü oynamış birçok gizli ve açık müessesesiyle tereddimize yardım etmiş ve nihayet Abdülhamid'in zatında dini ve milli kuvvetli birlik temsilcisini gördüğü için bütün gücü ve olanca hain metoduyla onu yıkmaya çalışmış ve sonunda muvaffak olmuştur." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Abdülhamid ve Yahudi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 October 1965)

¹³⁹ "Müslümanlığın en saf manada imanına, aşkına, vecdine, hamle ve hareket kuvvetine sahip olduğumuz bir altın devir vardı. Bu iman, cihan çapında imparatorluklar ve dünyaya hakim bir medeniyet kurdu. Bütün yeryüzüne gölge salan bu muazzam ağaç, Kanuni'den sonra, bazı ehliyetsiz ve kabiliyetsiz ellerde, gereken dikkat ve ihtimamı bulamadı. Altın devir kirlenmeğe başlamış ve iman ağacımızın filiz uçları solmaya yüz tutmuştu." (Çelik, Hayrettin. "Davanız Davamız: Türkçülük ve Biz" in *Büyük Doğu*, 20 May 1952)

Bali (2003b: 402) signifies that anti-Semitism is one of the least studied issues in Turkey. For him, this is basically the result deriving from the myth that Turkey has a popular record of tolerance and hospitability. In the special case of Jews, two incidents in history provide justification for this assumption: the expulsion of Jews from Spain in 1492 and their exile from Nazi Germany in 1933. At this point, it is important to emphasize that for the nationalist conservative discourse the latter, which is "of about 60 Jewish professors teaching at universities who escaped from Germany were welcomed in Turkey" (Bali, 2003b: 402), is not valid as the former one.

The Jews escape from the Spanish inquisition is commonly referred to by nationalist conservatism to emphasize the generous hospitability of the Ottomans. Thanks to the compassion of Suleiman the Magnificent, they are alleged to have found refuge in the Ottoman land upon their expulsion from Spain. It is claimed that Jews who had been oppressed and tortured in Spain and Portugal, were not only welcomed, but also offered wealth and felicity in the Turkish land

These Zionist villains, who had once suffered oppression and torture in Spain and Portugal, had received no aid or support from other peoples in other lands, but only their hatred and loathing. Despite this, the Turkish people nevertheless welcomed them to their own lands, (...) and generously shared with them his own food, rights, wealth and felicity without expressing any jealousy or rivalry towards them.¹⁴⁰

On the other hand, the sense of reproach towards Kanuni, as the one who let the Jews in, is observed in nationalist conservative discourse, but more particularly in the narratives of Kısakürek. By the one allowing the Jews enter his Empire, Kanuni, himself, is blamed for exposing the nation to the Jewish threat, thus contributing to the decline of "the golden age"

Suleiman the Magnificent proudly bore the title of '*Taht-ı alibahtımın edna payesi kasr-ı Kayser ve milki mevrusumun bir katresi milk-i İskender*' when addressing the Kings of the Western world – a title that has been unmatched by any other ruler in history. However, despite his magnificence, he was unaware that he had, for the first

¹⁴⁰ "İspanya ve Portekizde zulüm ve işkence görüp, dünyanın nefret ve istikrahından başkaca yardım ve hüsnükabul görmiyen bu siyon canilerini, (...) Türk milleti bağrına bastırmiş ve ona kendi lokmasını ve kendi hakkı olan bütün refah ve saadeti, kıskanmadan, cömertçe ve bol bol lutfetmiştir." (Atılhan, Cevat Rifat. "Asri Ehli Salib: Siyonizm" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 18, October 1948)

time in Ottoman history, left the gates of his empire open and exposed to the Jewish threat.¹⁴¹

From here on, two Jewish figures are paid particular attention: Nurbanu Sultan and Joseph Nasi. According to Kısakürek, the influence of the Jews in the Empire, but mainly in economic life, begins with Nurbanu Sultan, who was married to Kanuni's son, Selim II. He writes that it is thanks to Nurbanu Sultan, who is alleged to be Jew also, that Joseph Nasi, upon his escape from the Spanish inquisition, found refuge in the Palace and got the opportunity to promote his Jewish plans by raising to a major and influential position

Suleiman's son Selim the Blond – who is clearly the first sultan of the Ottoman Empire's stagnation period – had a Jewish wife: Nurbanu Sultan... The Jewish influence in the Ottoman Palace began with this Lady Master. It is precisely owing to this Lady Master that Joseph Nasi – the most important leader and figure of Jewish influence on the Turkish people – could find the opportunity to implement his principles, tactics and approaches for promoting Jewish plans.¹⁴²

According to Kısakürek, Nasi's, thus the Jews', influence in the Empire continued increasingly after the death of Kanuni under the rule of his successor, Selim II. According to Kısakürek, following the rule of Selim II, who is featured as "the puppet of Nurbanu Sultan," "the Jews, who had remained inactive till then, started to dominate trade, industry, customs and taxation."¹⁴³ Hence, in Kısakürek's narratives, Nasi represents the ungrateful Jew who takes the advantage of Turkish hospitality for Jewish influence in the Turkish land.

Second to the entrance of Spanish Jews to the Ottoman land, the period of reformation of the Ottoman Empire - the Tanzimat - are of critical importance in

¹⁴¹ " Taht-ı alibahtımın edna payesi kasr-ı Kayser ve milki mevrusumun bir katresi milk-i İskender' diye Batı dünyasının Krallarına tarihte bir misli görülmemiş bir gururla hitabeden Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, farkında değildir ki, içerden koskoca imparatorluğu ilk defa Yahudi hululüne bizzat kendisi açık bırakmıştır" (Kısakürek, 2012: 87).

¹⁴² "Kanuni'nin oğlu Sarı Selim - ki, inhitat devremizi en vazıh çizgilerle meydana çıkaran ilk padişahdır - Yahudi bir zevceye malikti: Nurubanu Sultan... Sarayda Yahudi nüfuzu bu Kadın Efendi ile başlar. Türk cemiyetinde Yahudi tesirinin en büyük ceddı, piri ve üstadı olan Yasef Nasi de, işte bu Kadın Sultan vasıtasıyla ki, tarihi Yahudi nüfuzu planının bütün esaslarını, tabiyesini ve icra yollarını tatbik mevkiine koymuştur." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudi hululü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 18 March 1949)

¹⁴³ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudi hululü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 18 March 1949.

signifying the disruptive roles of Jews in the decline of the Empire

The Jews were able to find kindness as well as their one and only true refuge within the embrace of the Turks and Islam. Although they found refuge among us, they soon began to spread their poison; and since the period of reformation of the Ottoman Empire (the *Tanzimat*), they effectively guided all of the changes and reforms.¹⁴⁴

From the perspective of nationalist conservatives, "the golden age" for the Turkish nation came to a halt with the period of reformation -the Tanzimat- which is regarded as the bearer of the modernization movements to the nation. Bearing in mind that modernization, in its relation to "conservative nostalgia," is believed to bring "a catastrophic social process" (Bora & Onaran, 2003: 235) leading to the failure of the golden age; the Tanzimat era of the 19th century is significant. The 19th century for the Ottoman Empire is noted for the collapse of "the Empire's multi-ethnic structure." As emphasized by Landau (2004: 21), "in the Balkans and other parts of the hybrid Empire, separatist ideologies and movements were increasingly active in their efforts to break down the Empire's multi-ethnic structure and establish their own mono-ethnic states on its ruins. By the end of the 19th century, the power of the Ottoman Empire to assimilate diverse ethnic minorities into the Ottoman society was damaged since beginning from the first half of the century, national ideologies started to develop all over the Empire, leading to the growing of mass revolts, particularly in the Balkans, against the central authority (Georgeon, 2013: 1-2).

For nationalist conservatism, the Tanzimat is regarded as the gateway to the rise of nationalist movements in the Empire, including the Turkish one

Before the Sultan's decree of reformation (the *Tanzimatı Hayriye*), there was no such thing as Turkish nationalism. Just as there was no nationalist sentiments among the Turks, nationalism also did not exist among the non-Muslim populations.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ "Yahudi tek lutuf ve sığınağı Türklerde ve İslamiyetin ağuşunda buldu. Bize sığındı, fakat en kısa zamanda içimize zehrini döktü ve Tanzimattan itibaren bütün istihale ve inkılaplarımız üzerinde müessir oldu." (Karakurt, Hakkı. "Yahudilik Meselesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 July 1954)

¹⁴⁵ "(Tanzimatı Hayriye)den evvel Türk milliyetçiliği yoktu. Türk milliyetçiliği olmadığı gibi gayri müslümanlar milliyetçiliği de düşünülüş değildi." (Karayel, M. Sami. "Tanzimatın Hediyesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 23 February 1951)

In this regard, it is perceived as "a liberty movement in favor of the minorities,"¹⁴⁶ targeting the unity of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the nationalist conservatives strictly object to the featuring of the Tanzimat as "a salvation movement." Instead, from their perspective, the Tanzimat is believed to have contributed to the collapse of the Empire by granting the Christian minorities with freedom, which eventually led to the rise of revolts all over the Empire.¹⁴⁷

The relation of the Jews with the Tanzimat is particularly established through Free Masonry in the sense that the lodges of Free Masonry are promoted to be "the headquarters of the Jews"¹⁴⁸ in the happening of the Tanzimat. Hence, the Tanzimat, as an attempt against the unity of the Ottoman Empire, is featured as a liberty movement prompted by Free Masonic activities, as claimed by Karayel who argues that "the Sultan's decree of reformation was an embodiment of Masonic influences and causes."¹⁴⁹ This claim, on the other hand, is particularly based on the common belief that all the leading political figures of the Tanzimat era, including Şinasi, Namık Kemal, along with the ministers were the members of the Masonic lodges.¹⁵⁰

The climax of the decline of the Empire is expressed as the overthrow of Abdülhamid II by the Jews in alliance with Donmehs and Free Masons. For nationalist conservatives, Sultan Abdülhamid is a significant figure. Although the 19th century is marked as the beginning of the end for the Empire, the reign of Abdülhamid II, between the years 1876 and 1909, is of exception. The glorification of him, more particularly in the narratives of Kısakürek, is highly observable. For instance, even the Suleiman the Magnificent is depicted with faults as in the case of "exposing the nation to the Jewish threat," Sultan Abdülhamid is the representation of flawlessness

¹⁴⁶ Karayel, M. Sami. "Tanzimatın İçyüzü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 2 March 1951.

¹⁴⁷ Karayel, M. Sami. "Tanzimatın Hediyesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 23 February 1951.

¹⁴⁸ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Kimin Hesabına Konuşuyoruz?" in *Büyük Doğu*, 30 August 1946.

¹⁴⁹ Karayel, M. Sami . "Tarih ve Sultan Hamit" in *Büyük Doğu*, 21 April 1944.

¹⁵⁰ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Türk (!) Masonları Ve..." in *Büyük Doğu*, 4 November 1949.

(...) in terms of importance; the height of Suleiman the Magnificent – the son of Sultan Yavuz – was akin to that of a matchstick standing on top of a mountain as high as the Himalayas. In other words, he was standing on a huge mountain of previous Ottoman achievements and successes, which formed the basis of his greatness. Sultan Abdulhamid, on the other hand, was akin to a giant standing at the bottom of a cliff. In other words, his personal greatness was overshadowed by the depths to which the Ottoman Empire had plunged by the time of his rule. Thus, those comparing these two Sultans mistakenly believe that Suleiman ranks higher since he is standing on top of a mountain, while minimizing Abdulhamid since he was standing at the bottom of a precipice. If these two Sultans – as well as all other Ottoman Sultans – were to be compared on an equal-leveled surface, this difference would become apparent. When Turkish history will be finally written with all its real and actual facts, this truth will become all the more apparent.¹⁵¹

As Açıkel (1996: 169) states for the discourse of the repressed, "the past is the testimony of the experienced injustices." In this sense, the victimization of Abdülhamid II is central for nationalist conservative discourse. Sultan Abdülhamid, who is believed to be misrepresented by official history, is treated as "the real national hero" for nationalist conservatives. Struggling hard against the labeling of him as "Red/Bloody Sultan," which according to both Kısakürek (2013c: 438) and Ogan¹⁵² was made up by the Armenians, nationalist conservatives depict Abdülhamid II as "the victim of official history." Though misrepresented, he is believed to have fought against the dissolution of the Empire by trying hard to pay the debts, end the hegemony of the non-Muslim minorities over the rule of the Empire, and ban the activities of the lodges of Free Masonry.¹⁵³ Moreover, according to nationalist conservatives, the injustices Sultan Abdülhamid faced continued even after his death in the sense that "he was cursed, dishonored, and undermined over the course of officialdom." As, for instance, Karayel argues in *Büyük Doğu* "a whole new history was made up by those who migrated from Salonica, depicting him as a

¹⁵¹ "(...) tevarüs ettiği şartlar bakımından Yavuz'un oğlu Kanuni Sultan Süleyman, Himalaya dağı yüksekliğinde bir tepenin üzerinde, kibrit çöpü boyunda bir insandır. Abdülhamid ise o dağın eteğinde ve uçurumun dibinde, dev boyutlu bir hükümdar. Fakat Kanuniyi ölçenler onu dağın eteğinden hesapladıkları için yüksek farzederler, Abdülhamid Hanı da küçüldürdüler. Eğer ikisini ve bütün Osmanlı Sultanlarını düz bir sath üzerinde ölçecek olurlarsa fark meydana çıkar. Gerçek Türk Tarihi yazıldığı zaman elbette bu ince hakikat meydana çıkacaktır" (Kısakürek, 2013c: 465).

¹⁵² Ogan, M. Raif. "Sultan Abdülhamid: Kızıl Sultan lafını çıkaranlar Ermenilerdir" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 10, Issue: 232, November 1956.

¹⁵³ Karayel, M. Sami. "Tanzimatın İçyüzü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 2 March 1951.

tyrant," and strictly challenges his portrayal as "the Red Sultan" by rejecting the violence attributed to him

The historical accounts regarding Abdülhamid that were mainly written by the notorious and mischievous group of Donmehs who migrated to Istanbul from Salonica are completely inaccurate and based on fabrications. These accounts not only try to depict lies as the truth, but also distort actual facts regarding Abdülhamid.¹⁵⁴

Conversely, he is promoted to be a compassionate leader.¹⁵⁵ For instance, Ogan refers to him as one of the few leaders to use the capital punishment least throughout the Turkish - Islamic history.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, his compassion is depicted as the main motive behind his deposition since Sultan Abdülhamid had rejected the use of violence against the march of the Army of Action, following the 31 March Incident (Kısakürek, 2013c: 542). According to nationalist conservatism, the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP), under the influence of the Jews, was behind the uprising as it had organized the soldiers, who had been brought from Rumelia, to encourage the unrest

The Jews successfully infiltrated the naïve and unwary ranks of the groups and organizations formed by people from Rumelia and Salonica (the Committee of Union and Progress). They then provoked these groups and organizations into taking action against the greatest defender of the cause of Islam and the enemy of the Zionists: the Great Sultan Abdülhamid.¹⁵⁷

From here on, the 31 March Incident is conspired to be a product of the Jews. For instance, Atilhan suggests that 31 March was a plot conducted by the Zionists, in alliance with Free Masons and the Donmehs, which targeted the destruction of the

¹⁵⁴ "Abdülhamit hakkında, Selanikten İstanbul'a göç eden mahut zümre tarafından baştan başa bir tarih uydurulmuştur. Yalana ilim ismi verilmiş; ve bu mevzuda sadece yalan söylenmemiş, hakikatin tam zıddı ifade edilmiştir." (Karayel, M. Sami. "İçyüziyle Abdülhamit: 8" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 November 1946)

¹⁵⁵ Karayel, M. Sami. "İçyüziyle Abdülhamit: 8" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 November 1946.

¹⁵⁶ Ogan, M. Raif. "Sultan Abdülhamid: Kızıl Sultan lafını çıkaranlar Ermenilerdir" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 10, Issue: 232, November 1956.

¹⁵⁷ "Yahudi, birtakım Balkanlı ve Selanikli bön ve gafil komitecilerin (İttihat ve Terakki) ruhuna sızarak, onları, İslam'ın en büyük davası ve Siyonistliğin düşmanı, Ulu Hakan Abdülhamid Han aleyhine kışkırttı ve harekete geçti." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yusuf İzzeddin'i Yahudiler öldürttü!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 November 1967)

Empire by overthrowing Sultan Abdülhamid: "the '31 March Disaster' was an artificial incident instigated through lies and treachery by Zionists, Freemasons and other hidden forces in order to uproot and destroy the Turkish Empire in a single strike."¹⁵⁸ For Atilhan, Muslim Turk Anatolians were forced by the Zionist allied soldiers to uprising in order to provide justification to his dethronement by the CUP

During this bloody game, Turks only assumed the role of figurants. (...) Under the threat of bayonets and gunstocks, they were forcefully gathered in madrassas and streets, and then walked towards the Hagia Sofia square. (...) The directors of this bloody drama were the servants of the World Zionism Movement.¹⁵⁹

Abdülhamid's victimization, on the other hand, is particularly based on his fierce struggle against the Zionism. According to Kısakürek, the Zionists, in alliance with the Free Masons, were the key power behind his fall since Sultan had fiercely rejected Theodor Herzl's offer of providing Jews with a small piece of land in the Holy Lands in return for a payment of a large amount of money. Therefore, the rejection of the Zion ideal is believed to be the main motive behind the overthrow of Abdülhamid II by "the Zionist-Free Mason alliance."¹⁶⁰ In this regard, he is depicted as a direct victim of the Jews and Free Masons. On the other hand, his being sent to Salonica after his overthrow and imprisonment in a Jewish mansion, named "Alatini," is considered to provide basis to the "Jewish revenge"

Throughout his reign, Abdülhamid was known for his hatred of Masons and Jews. He had rejected the offer of providing Jews with a small piece of land in the Holy Lands in return for a payment of millions of British pounds, and had issued a fatwa equating Freemasonry as an insult to the Muslim faith. For this reason, after his exile to Salonica, he was, purely out of a Jewish sense of revenge, imprisoned in a mansion named 'Alatini.' Abdulhamid was a direct victim of the Jews and Masons.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁸ " '31 Mart faciası' küfr ile hıyanetin, Siyonistle Farmasonun ve bir sürü esrarengiz gizli kuvvetlerin Türk imparatorluğunu bir hamlede ve kökünden yıkmak için hazırladıkları sahte bir ihtilafın ismidir." (Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "31 Mart faciası" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 9, Issue: 222, June 1956)

¹⁵⁹ "Bu kanlı oyunun sadece figüranları Türktü. (...) Süngü ve dipçik zoru ile kışlarından alınarak, medreslerden ve sokaklardan zorla toplanarak Ayasofya meydanına sürüklendiler. (...) Bu kanlı dıramın rejisörleri, sahne vazifeleri Dünya Siyonizminin uşakları idi." (Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "Yine 31 Mart Faciası" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 11, Issue: 266, April 1958)

¹⁶⁰Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yusuf İzzeddin'i Yahudiler öldürttü!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 November 1967.

¹⁶¹"Saltanatı boyunca Mason ve Yahudi düşmanlığıyla tanınan, (Hertzel)in Yahudilere Filistinde küçük bir yurt verilmesi ve buna karşılık milyonlarca İngiliz lirası takdim edileceği teklifini reddeden, Masonluğun da küfür müessesesi olduğuna dair fetva çıkartan Ulu Hakan, Selaniğe nefyedildiği

Moreover, Abdülhamid II, as emphasized by Fergan (2012: 135), was deposed by a Jew, Emanuel Karasu, who was one of three people in the committee that told Sultan Abdülhamid of his deposition

The Ruler of a 600 years-old Muslim Turkish State, and the Caliph of 650 million Muslims, was thus removed from his authority as Sultan and Caliph through the plotting of an evil Jewish-Italian Free Mason.¹⁶²

At this point, the association of the CUP with the Jews and Free Masonry is significant. The CUP, as the perpetrator of the 1908 Constitutional Revolution which is claimed to have played a critical role in the overthrow of Abdülhamid II, is alleged to have born out of the support of the Masonic lodges and operated under the plans and influence of Jewish Masons.¹⁶³ In this sense, the leaders of the CUP, as the predecessors of the Kemalist cadres, are suspected to have worked under the authority of the Free Masonry- Jewish alliance and held responsible for the dissolution of the Empire, as claimed by Fergan (2012: 42)

Following this same mentality and approach of the Jews, the CUP tried to rule the country from the Lodges of Masons. But it took them less than 10 years to drag the great Empire into ruin, and to demolish the very foundations of the state. The empire thus lost its battalions; the country was devastated and divided.¹⁶⁴

For nationalist conservatism, the Jews achieved victory with the signing of the treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne is important as it signifies the official end of the Ottoman Empire. For nationalist conservatives, on July 24, 1923 a new era began while another was closed as with the international recognition of the newly founded Turkish Republic, the Ottoman Empire became defunct. According to the nationalist conservatives, Treaty of Lausanne indicates the submission of Muslim Turks to the

zaman da, sırf Yahudi intikamı olarak (Alatini) isimli bir Yahudi köşküne hapsedilmiş, doğrudan doğruya Mason ve Yahudi kurbanı bir şahsiyeti." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yusuf İzzeddin'i Yahudiler öldürttü!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 November 1967)

¹⁶²"600 senelik Müslüman Türk Devleti Reis'ini, 650 milyon İslam'ın halifesini pis bir İtalyan farmason Yahudi'sinin eliyle saltanat ve hilafet makamından attılar."

¹⁶³ Ogan, M. Raif. "İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti, Yahut Masonluk ve Yahudilik" in *Büyük Doğu*, 3 November 1950.

¹⁶⁴ "İttihadçılar aynı zihniyeti takip ederek memleketi farmason localarından idareye kalkıştılar. 10 seneye varmadı; koskoca İmparatorluğu yıkılmaya sürüklediler, devletin temellerini yıktılar. Kıt'alar elden gitti, memleket parçalandı, perişan oldu."

ambitions of the Jews. In this regard, Hayim Nahum, as the last Chief Rabbi of the Ottoman Empire, who participated in the treaty negotiations as a member of the Turkish delegation along with Dr. Rıza Nur and İsmet Pasha, is a critical figure. In *Büyük Doğu*, for instance, it is claimed that Hayim Nahum, in agreement with Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, convinced Turkish delegation to abolish the Caliphate, as a move to destroy Turkish sovereignty over the Muslim nations. Additionally, the introduction of secularism into the new Republic is also regarded as the product of this secret agreement.¹⁶⁵ Thus, the treaty of Lausanne is regarded as a Zionist plot against Islam and Nahum represents the Jew's triumph in "its everlasting war against Islam," as stated by Kısakürek who suggests that "the assassination of Islam within Turkey by the Jews was completed within the scope of the Constitutional Reforms and the Treaty of Lausanne."¹⁶⁶

From here on, the role of the Jews in the establishment of the Republic is promoted through the Treaty of Lausanne, which signifies the rupture from the Muslim-Ottoman tradition. The Jews, for nationalist conservatism, stand as the actors, not only behind the fall of the Ottoman Empire, but also the ones behind the establishment of the new secular Republic.

4.4.3. The Images of the Jews

Arendt (1996: 19) stresses that "the Jewish question" that occupied the political arena after the Second World War was particularly related to their becoming "rootless." In this context, it would not be wrong to suggest that the "Jewish question" also occupied the minds of Turkish nationalist conservatives. The "rootless Jew" is a common theme employed by nationalist conservatives. "Jews' being without land" is usually referred in an effort to highlight their disloyalty. Kısakürek, describing "the history of Jews as the history of migration," emphasizes that the Jews lack patriotism

¹⁶⁵ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Hadiselerin Muhasebesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 December 1950.

¹⁶⁶ "Yahudilik Türk'ün şahsında İslama karşı suikastını Meşrutiyet İnkılabı ve Lozan Konferansına tesiriyle yerine getirmiştir." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudi Vatanı" in *Büyük Doğu*, May 1969)

and migrate to the countries from which they can profit the most.¹⁶⁷ National benefits of the countries they reside in are alleged not to be of vital importance for the Jews. Hence, their countries of citizenship are advised to be alert to the "Jewish betrayal" at any time

Jews never became spiritually united with any other nation. They were always a society by themselves, and they will always remain so. In case a nation upsets the plans of the Jews and eliminates their influence on the affairs of their country; the Jews will then initiate a conflict against that nation.¹⁶⁸

As can be withdrawn from the lines above, nationalist conservatism conveys the clear message which is the Jews cannot be trusted. For instance, Kısakürek, basing his evidence on Henry Ford's¹⁶⁹ claims concerning "the Jews' betrayal of Germany in the First World War," asserts that the Jews are disloyal to the host countries that they are welcomed in by expressing that "the First World War stands as a testament that the Jews have no loyalty to the countries they inhabit."¹⁷⁰

The Jews are accused of being ungrateful and exploiting the hospitality they are offered.¹⁷¹ Atılhan, for instance, suggests that the Jews make use of the generosity that they are presented in the countries they took refuge in for their own invasive causes

The tactic of the Jews is to first enter a country or land as guests. Then, with a perfidiousness that is characteristic of them, they will gradually invade the country, until they chase away their hosts and establish themselves in their place.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁷ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudi Meselesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 10 June 1952.

¹⁶⁸ "Yahudiler, hiçbir vakit, başka milletlerle manen birleşmediler. Onlar hepsi, başlı başına, bir birliktiler ve daima, öyle kalacaklardır. Eğer bir millet, Yahudinin çalışma neticelerini ve memleketin mali vaziyeti üzerindeki tesirlerini yok ederse, o zaman Yahudi, o militle mücadeleye girer." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Almanyada Yahudi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 29 July 1949)

¹⁶⁹ In reference to the anti-Semitic volumes of American industrialist Henry Ford, entitled *the International Jew* originally published in the early 1920s.

¹⁷⁰ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudi ve Mason Ruhü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 20 December 1946.

¹⁷¹ Atılhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Türkiyede Farmasonluk" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 7, June 1948.

¹⁷² "Onun adeti, bir yere evvela misafir gibi girmektir. Kendine mahsus bir yılışkanlıkla adım adım bir yeri istila eder, sonra da ev sahiplerini kovarak, oraya yerleşir." (Atılhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Filistin için Cihad-ı Mukaddes" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 1, May 1948)

In this regard, the Jewish people are accused of stealing the wealth of the true citizens and condemned to live in abundance. It is clearly advocated that the Jews lived in prosperous conditions thanks to the sacrifices Muslim Turks as -- "the true citizens" -- made

While the true children of the Turkish nation led simple and rudimentary lives in which they had to endure the most difficult of deprivations; these ungrateful Zionists have lived in these lands like lords, in the luxury of their mansions, castles, bars and casinos.¹⁷³

Even in times when many of the true children of this country lacked even roofs to cover their heads; this country has provided houses, mansions and all the necessities for a prosperous and wealthy life to the hundreds of thousands of Jews living in Palestine.¹⁷⁴

The association of the Jews with extreme wealth is critical at this point. As pointed out by Arendt (1996: 22-23), one of the main causes of the rise of anti-Semitism in Europe was the alleged wealth of Jews. Arendt (1996: 22), emphasizing that "by the time anti-Semitism reached its climax in Europe, Jews had lost their public functions and influence and nothing but their wealth was all they were left with," asserts that for the anti-Semites "wealth without a visible function was much more intolerable." From here on, it has to be noted that the signs of intolerance against Jews concerning "their useless wealth" are also observable in Turkish anti-Semite discourse of nationalist conservatism since the Jews, as proven in the examples above, is positioned against the interests of the true citizens, who are highlighted to live in extreme poverty, with the wealth they are alleged to possess.

Additionally, the Jews are alleged to establish their dominance in the countries that they reside in, as, for instance, detected in Kısakürek's claim concerning the Jews' possession of all slaughterhouses in Istanbul. As an example to "limitless Jewish

¹⁷³ "O Türk milleti ki, öz evlatları en iptidai bir hayat sürer ve mahrumiyetlerin en acısına katlanırken, onların kanı ve hayatları pahasına müdafaa ettikleri bir vatanın köşklerinde, şatolarında, barlarında, gazinolarında bu nankör siyonistler beyler gibi hayat sürmüşler, bolluk içinde yüzmüşlerdir." (Atılhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Asri Ehli Salib: Siyonizm" in *Sebişürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 18, October 1948)

¹⁷⁴ "Biz; bu vatanın sahipleri ve öz evlatları başımızı sokacak bir kulübeden mahrum iken Filistin sinesinde barındırdığı yüzbinlerce sığıntı Yahudiyi köşkler, malikaneler ve tam manasiyle refah ve saadet içinde yaşıyordu." (Atılhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Orta Şarkta Kangren" in *Sebişürreşad*, Vol. 10, Issue: 236, January 1957)

authority," he claims that "Muslim Turks, in their own land, are forced to eat meat butchered according to Jewish rule"

(...) to avoid the risk of eating animals slaughtered by the hands of Muslims; the Jews resorted to the solution of taking control of the Istanbul slaughterhouse, and of ensuring that all animals there would be slaughtered by their own hands and according to their own religious rituals. Thus, their solution was to force Muslim to eat meat slaughter by the hands of Rabbis!¹⁷⁵

With respect to their engagement with extreme wealth, the Jews are portrayed as being materialistic and profit-oriented. In this sense, they are alleged to dominate the economic life all over the world. The Jews, holding all the capital in their hands, are claimed to have achieved to expand their authority over people through material wealth, as Atilhan asserts that "the Jews have got their claws into societies worldwide by first establishing their domination on the worldly wealth and fortunes."¹⁷⁶ Judaism, on the other hand, is claimed be the main motive behind Jews' materialistic causes. For instance, Kısakürek, labeling "money as the God of the Jews," emphasizes that what matters the most for Judaism is not the moral values or virtue, but the capital itself: "In the Jewish religion (...) money is considered as a measure of a man's virtue. In fact, even the relationships between Jewish men and women are based on trade! Women are merely the subject of an 'exchange.'"¹⁷⁷

Jewish people are claimed to be in a constant struggle with non-Jews in business, despite demonstrating a strict cooperation among themselves. Kısakürek, basing his claim on the narratives of Henry Ford, states that the Jews, though scattered all around the world, work to profit their own kind. In this sense, they are featured as "the best organized power" in the world

¹⁷⁵ "(...) bütün İstanbul Mezbahasına hakim olmak oradan geçen bütün hayvanları bizzat kendi ellerile ve kendi dini merasimleri altında kestirmek ve kendileri Müslüman elile kesilmiş hayvanları yemek tehlikesine düşeceklerine, apaçık, Müslümanları, Yahudi hahamı elile kesilmiş etlerden yemeğe mahkum etmek çaresini bulmuşlardır." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudi ve Et" in *Büyük Doğu*, 30 March 1951)

¹⁷⁶ Atilhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Siyonizm, Komünizm ve farmasonluğa karşı beynelmilel dünya teşkilatı" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 8, June 1948.

¹⁷⁷ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Karl Marks'ın Kalemıyla Yahudi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 18 June 1954.

Jews are the best organized power on this world. They have developed such a unity and solidarity that, wherever they go, they will be loyal to one another, regardless of whether they are rich or poor.¹⁷⁸

Moreover "as the original capitalists of the world,"¹⁷⁹ the Jews are alleged to reside in cities rather than the urban areas. With the attempt to emphasize that "they avoid hard work and live from the labor of others;" the favorite occupations of them are listed as "trade, brokerage, banking, acting, attorney, medicine, and journalism;" while they are assumed to avoid "agriculture and the military."¹⁸⁰

As well as this, the Jews are portrayed to work against world peace. Nationalist conservatism, featuring Jews as "troublemakers," alleges that they pose a threat to world harmony and unity.¹⁸¹ Portrayed as "warmongers and agitators," they are claimed to be "the enemy of mankind."¹⁸² In this sense, the Jews, as the primary arm dealers in the world, are featured to be the main perpetrators behind the world wars

Whenever they notice that the people of a nation have attained a certain level of peace and calm, the Jews will not only attempt to prompt dissension and discord, but also to start wars and in order to sell the weapons they have in stock. This is because Jews are also the largest and most prominent arms dealers in the world.¹⁸³

According to conservative discourse, the disruptive mentality of Jews is particularly observable in their ever-lasting war against Islam. The figure of Abdullah Ibn Saba is critical at this point. As Fergan claims Ibn Saba, a Yemenite Jew who converted to Islam, is regarded as the main perpetrator of division among Muslims by leading to the creation of Shia Islams. Ibn Saba, claimed to be Muslim only in appearance, is

¹⁷⁸"Yahudilik, dünyanın en iyi organize edilmiş kuvvetidir. Onlar şöyle bir birlik vücuda getirmişlerdir ki, nereye gitseler, zengin veya fakir, birbirlerine sadıktırlar." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Almanyada Yahudi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 29 July 1949)

¹⁷⁹ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Yahudilik Sırrı" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 July 1949.

¹⁸⁰ Karakurt, Hakkı. "Yahudilik Meselesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 July 1954.

¹⁸¹ Ogan, M. Raif. "Yine Yahudilik" in *Büyük Doğu*, August 1969.

¹⁸² Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "İslam arasındaki ihtilaflar zail olmaktadır" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 14, Issue: 327, October 1961.

¹⁸³ "Yahudiler, insanların sulh ve sükuta kavuştuklarını görünce hemen bir fitne uyandırmaya, bir harp çıkarmağa kalkar, bu suretle ellerindeki silahları satmaya niyetlenirler. Çünkü en büyük silah tüccarları Yahudilerdir." (Elfaruki. "Yahudi masonluğunun husule getirdiği" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 94, January 1951)

accused of creating trouble among Muslims by leading to the assassination of the Caliph Uthman ibn Affan

History is filled with examples of how the Jews used their diabolical ingenuity to bring ruin to the great religions and states of this world. (...) Ibn Saba, a Jewish convert to Islam, caused the martyrdom of the Caliph Uthman ibn Affan. In doing so, Ibn Saba delivered the first political and religious blow to Islam. The conversion of Ibn Saba was, by itself, part of his plot to cause ruin to Islam from within.¹⁸⁴

Ibn Saba, as the predecessor of the Jewish converts -Donmehs- stands for the disruptive attitude of Jews against Islam. In the narratives of nationalist conservatism, he is featured as the plotter of the first blow to Islam.

In this regard, for nationalist conservatism the Jews foster a defeatist mentality. Challenging the argument that features the Jews as the smartest ones, it is advocated that "Jewish intellect has always been a defeatist one" and brought more harm than good to mankind

All Jewish intellectual are defeatists.(...) The only legacy that Einstein has left to mankind is the horrible theory of relativity that is devoid of higher truths, and the Atom bomb which is nothing more than an instrument of collective suicide for all of mankind. Freud, on the other hand, attempted to destroy the notions of sanctity and spirituality among men through his theories. (...) And we all know very well what the Jew Marx and his fellow communist activists have achieved.¹⁸⁵

For nationalist conservatism, the destructive mentality of the Jews also makes itself observable in their promotion of internationalism against nationalism. At this point, Fergan advocates that internationalism was invented by the Jews in order to annihilate the feelings of patriotism for the survival of its race

It was the Jews who first propounded the concept of internationalism. (...) Jews are constantly preoccupied with forcing new theories, new changes, new problems, new discords, and new ideas onto the societies in which they live. By doing so, they

¹⁸⁴ "Büyük dinleri ve büyük devletleri yıkmak hususunda Yahudiliğin şeytani zekası baştan başa tarihi kaplamış. (...) San'alı bir Yahudi dönmesi olan İbn Sebe, bu suretle Halife-i İslam Hazreti Osman'ı şehit ettirmekle İslamiyette hem dini, hem siyasi cepheden ilk büyük darbeyi indirmişti. Zaten Müslüman kıyafetine girmesi, Müslümanlığı içinden yıkmak içindi." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Müslümanlığa suikast" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 16, Issue: 144, February 1953.

¹⁸⁵"Gerçekten Yahudi dehalarının hepsi (defetist) tir. (...) (Aynştayn)dan insanlığa kalacak şey, içinde hiçbir hakikat yaşamayan korkunç bir izafilik dünyası ile son intihar aleti olan Atom bombasıdır. (Froyd) mukaddesat hissini ve ruhi temelleri berhava etmeye baktı. (...) Marks ve ona bağlı komünist aksiyoncuları malum." ("Yahudilik Meselesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 July 1954)

prevent the counties in which they live from being preoccupied and concerned about the Jews, and also ensure that these countries are constantly locked in a state of discord within themselves.¹⁸⁶

Moreover, the Jews are also promoted to foster defeatist mentality against morality. Basing on *the Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, in which the methods of Jews in achieving world domination are described, nationalist conservatism claims that the Jew's primary strategy is to work for moral degradation in the societies he resides.¹⁸⁷ According to the protocols, which were both published in *Büyük Doğu* and *Sebilürreşad*, in the achievement of its ultimate cause, the Jews are alleged to particularly focus on the young and women. It is stated that the moral corruption is to be achieved through "educating the young generation immorally, destroying the family life, diminishing the respect for religion, promoting luxury and fashion, and finally degrading the art."¹⁸⁸

The alleged success of Jews in propagandizing, as a plan claimed to exist in the protocols to establish Jewish hegemony, is also referred by the conservative discourse, according to which the Jews make use of the capital in their hands to make their propaganda all around the world. Fergan, for instance, asserts that the Jews provide large sums to the press and printed media to propagandize the goals of Zionism

The Jews never march in city squares, or take part in protests; they always work behind the scenes, feeding and supporting the forces that serve the goals of Zionism. To this end, they pay large sums to the press and place their advertisements on them. They boycott all newspapers that are opposed to Jews and Zionism, providing them

¹⁸⁶ "Beynelmileliyet fikrini ortaya attılar. (...) Onlar mütemadiyen yeni yeni nazariyelerle, yeni yeni değişikliklerle, türlü türlü meseleler, fitneler ihdas etmekle fikirleri meşgul ederek içlerinde yaşadıkları milletleri kendileriyle meşgul olmaktan alıkoymağa, milletleri tefrika içinde bulundurmağa intimam ederler." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Düzme Yahudi mehdisi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 6, Issue: 145, February 1953)

¹⁸⁷ As Bali (2001: 323) states the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, which was first published in 1903 in Russia, in brief describe the Jewish plan for the world domination. As "the bestseller of anti-Semite literature," the Protocols are alleged by anti-Semites to be the handbooks of the Jewish leaders discussing their plans to establish the Jewish hegemony.

¹⁸⁸ "Siyon protokollerinin 22 prensibi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 3 March 1950; "Gizli kuvvetin 23 maddelik iş hülasası" in *Büyük Doğu*, 4 October 1946.

with neither advertisements nor loans/credits.¹⁸⁹

Kısakürek, basing his claim on the narratives of Henry Ford, proposes that the Jews, as "the world's news source," manipulate the whole world in accordance with their own benefits.¹⁹⁰ According to nationalist conservatism, even behind the accusations of Jews as "Christ killers" lies the Jewish propaganda with the attempt to portray themselves as the perpetual victims and convince the whole world into their repression.¹⁹¹ In this regard, Atilhan suggests that the Jews, assumed to have inborn skills in propagandizing, have led the whole world into their oppression by deceit

We know that Jews do not perceive or represent events the same way they are perceived or represented by other, more noble nations. When they are beaten, they will pretend that they are victorious. And when they are victorious, they will pretend that they are the innocent and helpless victims.¹⁹²

In this context, the Jews, besides their disruptive role in the history of Muslim Turks concerning the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the new Republic, are negatively represented. More particularly based on the works of universal anti-Semitic literature, including *the Protocols of the Elders of Zion* and the narratives of Henry Ford, the Jews are illustrated with united negative images: unthankful, disloyal, exploiter, materialistic and disruptiveness. In this sense, they are depicted as a threat, not only to the welfare of Muslim Turks, but also to the whole of humanity.

¹⁸⁹"Yahudilere gelince onlar meydana çıkmazlar, perde arkasından Siyonizm gayesine çalışan kuvvetleri beslerler. Bilhassa bu yoldaki matbuata büyük sermayeler temin ederler, ilanlarını bunlara verirler. Yahudiliğe ve siyonizme karşı gelen gazetelere boykot yaparlar. Ne ilan verirler, ne de kredi açarlar." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950)

¹⁹⁰ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Ford'un Kitabında Yahudi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 29 July 1949.

¹⁹¹ Balkır, Ridvan. "Yahudi hulülü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 18 November 1964.

¹⁹²"Bunlar, hepimizin bildiği gibi, hadiseleri ve vakaları hiçte diğer asil milletler gibi, olduğu gibi görmezler ve göstermezler. Dayak yedikleri vakit, galip tavrı takınırlar. Galebe çaldıkları zaman masum ve mağdur rolü oynarlar." (Atilhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Filistin davasının mahiyeti" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 13, September 1948)

4.5. The Representation of the Donmehs

4.5.1. Donmehs in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic

The term "Donmeh" in general use refers to "religious converts." However, as Bali (2001: 411) points out, the "Donmeh" in the rightist parlance is generally used not "in reference to Greek, Armenian, or even Jewish converts to Islam," but more particularly to the followers of the seventeenth century messiah, Sabbatai Sevi. The origins of Donmehs trace to the conversion of Sabbatai Sevi, who was believed to be "a messiah" by many Jews, on October 16, 1666 to Islam in the presence of Ottoman Sultan Mehmet IV, as written by Baer (2010: 1). As stated by Bali, Sabbatai Sevi, asked either to prove the actuality of his mission or face death, chose to convert to Islam and was named after "Aziz Mehmet Efendi."¹⁹³ Briefly, following the conversion of Sabbatai Sevi, his believers followed him and chose to change their religions. Divided under three sects, "the Yakubi, the Kapancis and the Karakas," after his death the followers of Sabbatai Sevi continued to live in the Ottoman Empire, essentially in Salonica, Edirne and Izmir.¹⁹⁴

Nevertheless, it was not until modernity that the Donmehs attracted public attention. As Baer (2010: 7) states, emphasizing that "in spite of their differences from Jews and Muslims, they did not attract the attention of the Ottoman authorities after their initial conversion," until the modern era "the sincerity of the Dönme's religious beliefs" was not questioned. Thus, the Ottoman era is concluded to be "a period of tranquility" for the Donmehs (as cited in Baer, 2010: 7). In this regard Baer (2010: 101), with reference to their critical role in the happening of revolution, asserts that it was chiefly after the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 that the Muslim community took notice after the Donmehs.

¹⁹³http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/a_scapegoat_for_all_seasons0001.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2014).

¹⁹⁴http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/a_scapegoat_for_all_seasons0001.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2014). For a detailed reading see Baer (2010).

For Bali, on the other hand, the Population Exchange of 1923 between Greece and the newly founded Turkish Republic, calling for the deportation of the Muslim citizens of Greece to Turkey and the Greek Orthodox citizens of Turkey to Greece, was critical for the Donmehs to become an issue of public debate, triggered essentially by "the Karakaş Rüştü Affair."¹⁹⁵ Karakaşzade Mehmet Rüştü, a member of the Donmeh sect of "the Karakas," submitted a petition to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1924 following the Population Exchange agreement with the claim that "the Donmehs, neither Muslims nor Turks, should not be accepted as a part of the population exchange" (Baer, 2010: 150). In this sense, as Baer (2010: 158-59) emphasizes, Karakaş Rüştü, alleging that "the Donmehs had deceived the Turkish nation for centuries by pretending to be Muslims and Turks despite the fact that by origin and race they were Jews, and neither by soul or conscious they had any connection to Islam," was critical in "alerting the public to this 'danger.'" In addition to Karakaş Rüştü, the figure of İbrahim Alaettin Gövsa was also a critical figure in the early Republic contributing to the claims "that the Donmehs were racially and religiously Jews, not Muslims nor Turks" through publishing *Sabbatai Sevi: A Historical and Sociological Study of the Famous False Messiah of Izmir* at the end of the 1930s, in which he offered an analysis on the religion of the Donmehs (Baer, 2010: 176).

Additionally, in Bali the wartime Capital Tax Law of 1942 is encouraged as another key point in the history of Donmehs of the Republic in their acquiring "a decidedly negative connotation" by bringing up the Donmeh issue to public concern as the "exploiters" of the Turkish economy.¹⁹⁶ Since the Donmeh sub-category of the Tax Law specifically aimed at "the Jews who had converted to Islam in the wake of the movement of Shabbati Tzevi," and did not include all converts to Islam (Baer, 2010: 227).

¹⁹⁵http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/a_scapegoat_for_all_seasons0001.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2014).

¹⁹⁶http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/a_scapegoat_for_all_seasons0001.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2014).

From the mid-1940s onward, the rise of hostility against the Donmehs was witnessed with respect to the rising anti-Semitic stance, more observable in the Turkish right wing. The 1950s witnessed the revival of "secret Jews," as particularly detected in "anti-Donmeh" and "anti-Semite" attitudes in conservative nationalist and pro-Islamic publications as *Büyük Doğu*, *Yeniden Milli Mücadele*, *Hür Adam*, *Serdengeçti*, and *Sebilürreşad* (Bali, 2001: 415). As Bali (2001: 415) emphasizes particularly, the writings of Fergan, Kısakürek, Atilhan and Serdengeçti, who principally attacked Ahmet Emin Yalman fiercely - as the most visible "Donmeh" in the early Republic representing the values of a cosmopolitan life - contributed a great deal to the anti-Donmeh atmosphere of in the following decades.

Within this historical background, I will now try to offer an analysis concerning the images of Dohmehs.

4.5.2. The Images of the Donmehs

For nationalist conservatism, the Donmehs are essentially referred to as the descendants of Sabbatai Sevi, but more particularly to those of Salonican origin. As mentioned above, the association of the Donmehs with Salonica, as the home to the conspirators of Abdülhamid II, is critical for the portrayal of the Donmehs, who are assumed to have played crucial roles in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. By calling the 1908 Revolution "the triumph of the Donmehs," nationalist conservatism particularly reinforces the Donmehs, emphasized to have held important seats within the CUP, as the main perpetrators of the overthrow of Sultan Abdülhamid, soon followed by the collapse of the Empire

The establishment of a Constitutional Monarchy in the Ottoman Empire was a victory for the Donmehs. During the movements and reforms that lead to Constitutional Monarchy; the Donmehs, Masons and Jews acted in unison, and attempted to undermine the sense of religious and national unity, the morals and the traditions of the Turkish people that were embodied by the rule of Abdulhamid II.¹⁹⁷

¹⁹⁷ "Meşrutiyet hareketi ise Dönmeliğin zaferi oldu. Bu hareket ile başta dönmelik, masonluk ve yahudilik el ele davrandı ve II. Abdülhamid'in şahsında tecelli eden dini ve milli Türk birliğini, ahlakını, an'anesini çürütme hamlesine girişti." (Arı, Hüseyin. "Dönmelik" in *Büyük Doğu*, June 1969)

As the lines above demonstrate, the Donmehs are perceived to promote enmity against religion, national culture and moral values. At this point, Mustafa Kemal, as the Salonican leader of the new Republic, constitutes the main example. Mustafa Kemal provides basis for the common assumption that Salonicans not only destroyed the Ottoman Empire, but also detach the Turks from Islam by abolishing the Caliphate, and imposing "corrupted" values of the West on Muslim Turks (Bali, 2001: 432). In this regard, from the understanding of nationalist conservatism, it is through Salonicans that Westernization entered the nation, detaching the Muslim population from Islam. As Bali (2003b: 408) points out the existing hatred against Mustafa Kemal among conservative-Islamic circles comes from his Salonican origins, leading to his being perceived as "a Donmeh." In this sense, nationalist conservatives, though not openly voiced, make use of the alleged links between Mustafa Kemal and the Donmehs, occasionally humorously

One newspaper in Germany wrote a serious article that mentioned the following points: Atatürk's body was taken from his grave in the ethnography museum by the Donmehs of Salonica. These Donmehs, whose graveyards are normally kept separate from those of Muslims even in Istanbul, expressed that 'Atatürk is one of us;' after which they took his body.¹⁹⁸

For nationalist conservatism, the Donmehs, alleged to be both racially and religiously Jews, are never accepted as "true Muslims nor Turks;" but as "the refugee citizens."¹⁹⁹ As "the refugee citizens of Turkey," the Donmehs are alleged to have nothing in common with being Turkish or Muslim except the constitution. Hence, Safa refers to the Donmehs as "Turks by law."²⁰⁰ Similarly in his address to Ahmet Emin Yalman, as the most visible Donmeh of the period, Fergan clearly advocates that the Donmehs are just officially attached to Turkey by stating that "your religion and race are different. Other than your official nationality; what can you possibly

¹⁹⁸ "Almanya'da çıkan gazetelerden biri ciddi ciddi şu haberi vermiş: 'Atatürk'ün cesedi, etnoğrafya müzesindeki sandukadan, Selanik dönmeleri tarafından aşırılmış, İstanbul'da mezarlıkları bile ayrı olan bu adamlar 'Atatürk bizdendir' diye adamın cenazesini almışlar götürmüşler.'"(Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Gülünç Hakikatler" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 17, August 1952)

¹⁹⁹ Öcal, Cemal Oğuz. "Bir Dönmenin Haltercümesi" as cited in Bali, N. Rıfat. "Sabetaycılar Hakkında Milliyetçi Şiirler," http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/bir_donmeye.pdf (accessed on 30 March 2014).

²⁰⁰ Safa, Peyami. "Türk Olmak Şartı" in *Büyük Doğu*, 21 December 1945.

have in common with the Muslim Turkish nation?"²⁰¹ In one of the reader letters published in *Büyük Doğu*, on the other hand, the Donmehs are clearly reminded that they are not considered as Turks: "Do not think that you are a Turk just because you live in the land of Turks. Turks will not engage in the dishonor of considering you as one of them."²⁰²

The Donmehs are not referred to as "true Muslims," either. According to nationalist conservatives, the Donmehs, hidden behind Islam, have never truly converted to Islam, and are alleged to practice Judaism secretly. Basing his evidence on the narratives of Karakaş Rüştü, a voice from the inside as a member of the Karakaş sect mentioned above, Fergan advocates that "the Donmehs are intrinsically and racially Jewish, and their souls and consciences have nothing to do with Islam."²⁰³ Additionally, Fergan, in an effort to provide basis for his claim that "the Donmehs are Muslims only in appearance," asserts that the Donmehs had several failed attempts in the past to embrace Judaism explicitly. Basing his claim on Avram Galanti in reference to *Nouveaux documents sur Sabbetai Sevi: Organisation et us et coutumes de ses adeptes*,²⁰⁴ Fergan declares that "after the annexation of Salonica to Greece, the Donmehs residing in Salonica applied to the Greek government to return back to Judaism in an effort to stay in Salonica, but they were rejected by the Salonican rabbis." Moreover, he claims that during the occupation of Istanbul by the Allied Powers, the Donmehs applied to be recruited as translators like other non-Muslims, but their application was once again declined. Last but not least, the Donmehs, according to Fergan, had decided to declare their true identity after the

²⁰¹"Senin dinin de başka, ırkın da başka. Müslüman Türk milletiyle- resmi bir tabiyetten başka ne alaka ve münasebetin var?" ("Zamanımızın yalancı Mesihî" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 7, Issue: 155, June 1953)

²⁰² "Kendinizi, Türklerin vatanında yaşadığımız için Türk sanmayın. Türklük sizi sinesine kabul etmek gibi bir şerefsizlikten münezzehtir." ("Lanet" in *Büyük Doğu*, 18 September 1952)

²⁰³ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türkiyede Dönmelik Tarihçesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 13, September 1948.

²⁰⁴ As Baer (2010: 177) suggests the Turkish version of Avram Galanti's book, *New Documents on Sabbati Tzevi: the Organization and Customs of His Followers* published in 1935, was offered by İ. Alaettin Gövsa, who added his personal knowledge to Galante's account and presented it in Turkish.

1908 Revolution, but were advised not to by Cavit Bey, "who believed that the time was yet to come for their disclosure."²⁰⁵

The Donmehs, as in the case of the Jews, are accused of being "rootless/stateless." However, what distinguishes the nationalist conservative enmity against the Donmehs from the Jews is the alleged "hypocrisy" of the Donmehs. Differing from the Jews, easily spotted among Muslim Turks, the Donmehs are emphasized to be untraceable as they pretend to be Muslims in the public sphere. They are featured as "a much worse sect than the Jews."²⁰⁶ Their alleged hypocrisy, on the other hand, is believed to grant them free action in their expression of malice against Muslim Turks. In this regard, the Muslim Turks are forced to be more cautious against the disruptive intentions of the Donmehs than the Jews, or even communists

A Turkist must not only fight against all enemies who are from other lands, but must also be wary against the Donmehs and devshirmeh in his own lands, in the same way he would be wary of a knife behind his back. (...) For a Turkist, a Donmeh is a threat and a source of treachery that is million times worse than the communist, the anarchist and the nihilist.²⁰⁷

The Donmehs, as the descendants of Sabbatai Sevi, are alleged to pose a more dangerous threat to the welfare of Islam than the others. Although the Donmehs, strictly following the law of Sabbatai Sevi, are depicted to be cautious in practicing the rituals of Islam in public in order to cover their real identity, it is advocated that they deviously attack Islam, as expressed by Fergan

Just as Sabbatai Sevi had assumed the name of Mehmet; Converts generally have names such as Ahmet, Mehmet, Ali, Veli, Mustafa and Ibrahim. However, regardless of their names, their soul is still that of Sabbatai Sevi. (...) In their writings, they generally attack Islam insidiously, and sometimes openly. (...) Since they generally speak by pretending that they are Turks and Muslims, these Donmehs

²⁰⁵ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türkiyede Dönmelik Tarihçesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 12, August 1948.

²⁰⁶ Arı, Hüseyin. "Dönmelik" in *Büyük Doğu*, June 1969.

²⁰⁷ "Gerçek bir Türkçü, bütün düşmanlarına davanın öz dairesi dışında karşı koymak borcundayken, dönmelik ve devşirmelik ruhuna, arkasından gelen bir bıçak gibi, daire içinden tedbirli olmakla mükelleftir. (...) Bir Türkçü gözünde dönme, bütün manevi birlikler gözünde olduğu gibi, komünistten, anarşistten, nihilistten milyonlarca kere beter bir hiyanet ruhunun yatağıdır."(Müftüoğlu, Mustafa. "Türkçü ve Dönme" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 November 1949)

represent an even greater threat.²⁰⁸

Additionally, the insincere acts of the Donmehs are believed to have led to them to make a fortune by cheating on the Muslims, as stated by Fergan who asserts that "the Donmehs were able to amass considerable wealth by inserting themselves amidst the Turkish people through countless lies and deceitful attitudes."²⁰⁹

According to nationalist conservative discourse, the Donmehs discriminate against Muslim Turks. In this sense, Fergan, challenging the allegations that "Muslims are racists," asserts that the Donmehs are the most racist sect of the country: "Everyone knows that if there is one group that nurtures and shepherds racist sentiment in our country, it is the Donmehs."²¹⁰ The Donmehs, on the other hand, are believed to discriminate against Muslim Turks by not integrating with them and pursuing a life within the borders of their closed community with the effort to preserve their ethnic-religious identity. They are accused of not establishing closer relations with Muslims by marrying only members of the Donmeh sect and burying their death in separate cemeteries.²¹¹ Furthermore, Atilhan suggests that the Donmehs never employ Muslims in their businesses

In comparison to our high level of tolerance; or, to be more precise, our high level of indifference, towards them; these *rabidly racist* people will not even employ a single Turkish boy in their shops and counters.²¹²

Atilhan suggests that "despite occupying the most significant places in the areas of

²⁰⁸ "Sabatay Sevinin bir adı Mehmet efendi olduğu gibi bunların adları da Ahmet, Mehmet, Ali, Veli, Mustafa, İbrahimdir. Fakat ruhları Sabatay Sevi'dir. (...) Bunlar bütün yazılarında ekseriya sinsi sinsi, bazan da açıktan açığa islamiyete hücum ederler. (...)Türk olarak, müslüman olarak konuştukları için bunların tehlikesi daha büyüktür." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950)

²⁰⁹ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türkiyede Dönmelik Tarihçesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 13, September 1948.

²¹⁰ "Memlekette ırkçılık fikrini güden bir zümre varsa, bütün dünya bilir ki onlar da dönmelerdir." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Başbakanla bir hasbıhal" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 6, Issue: 145, February 1953)

²¹¹ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türkiyede Dönmelik Tarihçesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 10-11, August 1948.

²¹²"Bizim yüksek müsamamız, daha doğrusu kayıtsızlığımız sayesinde bu *koyu ırkçı* insanlar mağaza ve tezgahlarında bir tek Türk çocuğuna kuru bir ekmeğin parası dahi kazandırmazlar." (Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "Şeni ve Deni Manevra" in *Büyük Doğu*, 26 January 1951)

trade, industry and business, the Donmehs have, throughout their history, never displayed any closeness or friendship to anyone else except themselves."²¹³ Nevertheless, in Atilhan the alleged discriminative attitude of the Donmehs are supported by the narratives of cruelty, as witnessed in "the nailed barrels." Most frequently employed in Atilhan, as the writer of the book entitled *İğneli Fıçı* as an attack on the Jews (Karaca, 2008: 89), the Donmehs are also alleged to utilize "nailed barrels" in their secret synagogues, in which they would kill Muslim Turk children to use their blood to bake *matza*. In this sense, "the nailed barrels" are employed to prove the cruelty of the Dohmehs

Their hidden synagogues have barrels filled with nails on their inside. In Thessalonica, they would hunt down little Turkish children, and throw them while still alive into these barrels filled with nails.²¹⁴

In spite of their discriminative attitude towards Muslims, the Donmehs, on the other hand, are alleged to have a strong cooperation among themselves. For instance, Nazif Özge,²¹⁵ a member of the Donmeh sect, describes this cooperation in his interview published in *Büyük Doğu* by asserting that "the wealthy Donmehs regularly pay salaries to those Donmehs in need."²¹⁶

The Donmehs are alleged to have required high economic and political status in Turkey. More particularly visible in the narratives of Serdengeçti, the Donmehs are portrayed as "the enjoyers of Muslim wealth," as particularly detected in his claim that "the country is reigned over by the Donmehs of Salonican origin"

(...) we have in this country the rule of army deserters, of false reformists and revolutionaries, of the Donmehs from Salonica, and of those who do not have a grain

²¹³ Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "Şeni ve Deni Manevra" in *Büyük Doğu*, 26 January 1951.

²¹⁴ Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "İğneli Fıçı" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 6, Issue: 141, December 1952.

²¹⁵ Nazif Özge is a member of the Donmeh sect whose interviews and observations concerning Donmehs are published in *Büyük Doğu* newspaper between 23 July 1952 and 1 August 1952. The purpose of these interviews is allegedly identified to expose the hypocrisy, betrayal and cruelty of Donmehs based on the narratives of an inside voice. In these published interviews, Özge basically accounts stories on how he was betrayed by the Donmehs.

²¹⁶ "Dönmenin Hikayesi: Müthiş İfşat" in *Büyük Doğu*, 31 July 1952.

of the homeland's soil on their boots.²¹⁷

Serdengeçti, emphasizing their privileged status, declares that Salonicans, as the founders of the new secular Republic, occupy all the important seats in politics.²¹⁸

The Donmehs, represented as "the exploiters of Turkish hospitality and beneficiaries of Turks' excessive hospitality," are alleged to live from the labor of Muslims. In this sense, Fergan advocates that "while Muslims fought hard for the defense of the country, the Donmehs worked for their personal profits." Referring to the Donmehs as "the plunders of Muslim wealth," he suggests

By hiding behind a veil of hypocrisy, these people have engaged in the easiest and most profitable tasks, while leaving the most difficult and demanding ones to the Turks. The people thus lived (...) without any concern for anything other than their own interests and profit.²¹⁹

The Donmehs are alleged to have a huge fortune in comparison to Turkish population. In his interview in *Büyük Doğu*, Nazif Özge, featuring the ultimate cause of the Donmehs as to invade the country economically, declares that "even though the population of Donmehs is merely one in two thousand, their wealth equals half of the Turkish wealth."²²⁰ At this point, Kısakürek who portrays the Donmehs as an obstacle in the path of the Turkish population in reaching prosperity and felicity, suggests that the Donmehs should be expelled from the country and their wealth to be confiscated

All possessions, properties and valuables belonging to the Donmehs shall be confiscated, with the Donmehs being allowed only to keep enough means to ensure their subsistence for a period of one year. The Donmehs shall then be deported *en*

²¹⁷(...) bu memlekette, ayaklarına vatanın toprağı dahi bulaşmamış, asker kaçaklarının, sahte inkılapçıların, Selanik dönmelerinin saltanatı vardır." (Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Böyle Verilir" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 27, March 1958)

²¹⁸ Serdengeçti, Osman Yüksel. "Gülünç Hakikatler" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 14, March 1952.

²¹⁹ "Onlar da riye perdesine bürünerek karlı ve zahmetsiz işleri kendilerine, zor ve külfetli işleri de Türklere bırakarak, menfaat ve kazançlarını teminden başka bir şey düşünmiyerek, (...) yaşıyorlardı." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Dönmeliğin Türkleştirilmesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 6, Issue: 140, December 1952)

²²⁰ "Dönmenin Hikayesi: Müthiş İfşat" in *Büyük Doğu*, 31 July 1952.

masse.²²¹

Nevertheless, the criticism concerning the excessive authority of the Donmehs is not restricted to economic invasion. According to nationalist conservatives, all the important seats in the press, for instance, are invaded by the Donmehs. The fierce criticism of nationalist conservatives against the press centers on the notion that the majority of the Turkish press is controlled by the Donmehs who in turn are supplied by the Jewish capital. For instance, in an attempt to provide an analysis on the press, Kısakürek asserts that among the newspapers that are circulating in Turkey, the ones that are supplied by the Jewish capital, *Vatan*, *Hürriyet*, *Cumhuriyet*, *Yeni İstanbul*, and *Akşam*, have the highest circulation. Among these *Vatan* and *Yeni İstanbul* are given particular attention in the sense that they are "ruled by two missionaries of the Donmeh sect: Yalman and M. Nermi."²²² Similarly, Serdengeçti (2008a: 156), accusing the press of being distant from the national cause of Muslim Turks, promotes that in Turkey "there exists no such thing as the reign of Turkish interests within the Jewish-origin press"

There is no such thing as the 'Turkish Press.' Instead, there is only a flock of Jewish and foreign newspapers printed in Turkish, which only provide news written for a foreign and non-Turkish mindset. While the Turkish people are groaning and suffering bitterly under extreme poverty, these newspapers work to create a false reality and perception that claims the country is a 'bed of roses.' (...) It is these newspapers that chose to remain silent while the lands of Anatolia were being handed over to Donmehs from Salonica and to irreligious rulers as if it was their birthright; and while true men of faith, the defenders of our moral values and true patriots were being dragged out of their beds in the middle of the night (...) to be hanged at the nearest gallows tree.²²³

²²¹ "Dönmeler, bütün mal, mülk ve her türlü kıymetlerine el konmuş ve kendilerine sadece bir yıllık geçim imkanları bırakılmış olarak, kütle halinde sınır dışı edileceklerdir." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "İdeology Örgüsü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 30 March 1951)

²²² Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Hakkımızdaki tahrikin ocağını ifşa ediyoruz!!!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 19 January 1951.

²²³ "Türk matbuatı diye bir şey yoktur. Sadece Türkçe çıkan Yahudi menşeli yabancı ruhlu, yabancı haber veren bir yığın basma kağıt tüccarı vardır. Zavallı Türk milleti fakr-ü zaruret içinde inim inim inerken, ortalığı gül – gülistan gösteren bunlardır. (...), gaziler mücadelesi olan Milli Mücadele ve onun kurtardığı vatan, aziz Anadolu toprakları, Selanik dönmelerine, imansızlar saltanatına babalarının çiftliği gibi teslim edilirken; nice nice din uluları, ahlak kahramanları, vatanperver insanlar, meçhul şahıslar tarafından gece yataklarından kaldırılıp, darağaçlarında sallandırılırken (...) Susan bu gazetelerdir."

The Turkish press is alleged to run "under the power of the Jewish capital and the Donmeh authority."²²⁴ It is claimed that "the so-called Turkish press," evolved out of cosmopolitan Jewish capital, poses a threat to national interests and moral values. Moreover the press is identified as working against the welfare of Islam: "There is probably no other land in this world where the press insults and degrades to this extent all that is considered as sacred by its own people!!"²²⁵

As well as this, the harsh criticism towards "the Jewish - Donmeh origin press" is particularly embodied in the person of Ahmet Emin Yalman and his newspaper, *Vatan*. As pointed out by Baer (2010: 260), the 1950s is particularly remarkable for "vicious anti-Dönme and anti-Semitic articles in the Turkish press which created a dangerous atmosphere for Dönme in general and Yalman in particular." Yalman's survival from an assassination attempt in 1952 in Malatya is critical at this point to understand the extent of this danger, which according to Taşkın (2003b: 190) bears the stamp of "reactionarism easily turned into violence." The hatred towards the Donmehs becomes concrete in the figure of Yalman who is portrayed as being a "traitor, communist, and Mason."²²⁶ Yalman, "as the grandson of Ibn Saba," and his newspaper, *Vatan*, are targeted by nationalist conservatism for creating unrest among Muslims

Not a day passes without the newspaper *Vatan* writing something provocative that plants a poisonous dagger into the religious sentiments and sensibilities of the people.²²⁷

You are a person beyond contempt who is the main enemy, the main assassin and the main betrayer of Islam and its cause. (...) You are someone dedicated to dividing the Turkish nation and youth; someone who encourages the youth to gauge each other's

²²⁴ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Basınımıza dair rapor (1)" in *Büyük Doğu*, 4 September 1952.

²²⁵ "Dünyada hiçbir diyar yoktur ki, matbuatı, bu türlü, onun tapusunu taşıyan insanların mukaddesatına söğüp sayabilsin!!!" (Pertavsız. "Basınımızın Panoraması" in *Büyük Doğu*, 17 April 1959)

²²⁶ "Lanet" in *Büyük Doğu*, 29 August 1952.

²²⁷ "*Vatan gazetesi*, gün geçmez ki, ortaya bir fitne çıkarmasın, milletin en mukaddes hislerine zehirli bir hançer sokmuş olmasın." ("Vatanın çıkarmak istediği fitne" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 98, March 1951)

eyes out!²²⁸

Depicted as "the main enemy of Muslim Turks," Yalman is claimed "to insult Islam and Turkish nation" by organizing beauty contests. The Miss Universe contest of 1952 constitutes the main theme of the dispute between Yalman and the nationalist conservative circles in the sense that Yalman, "as the disseminator of immorality," is accused of "prostituting Turkish Muslim woman" (Baer, 2010: 260). In this sense, Yalman is condemned fiercely for tarnishing the Muslim Turkish women's reputation

O villain and traitor, who, under the guise of beauty contest, harms the honor and self-respect of Turkish girls and women! By sending one of our women to the 'whore market' in the United States, your fame has now extended beyond the boundaries of Turkey! Congratulations, you are now an international pimp! By calling a bunch of prostitutes 'Turkish girls,' you have rightly drawn upon yourself the anger and ire of millions of Turkish men, you impudent!²²⁹

Moreover, the Beauty contest was particularly related to the shooting of Yalman by Hüseyin Üzmez, a seventeen year old "far-right militant," who justified his act by claiming that he shot Yalman since "he had insulted Islam and the nation" by organizing Beauty contents (Baer, 2010: 260). At this point, it has to be noted that the act of Üzmez, both in *Büyük Doğu* and *Serdengeçti*, though not openly voiced, is not condemned but appreciated. In this sense, Üzmez is approached with sympathy for having acted for the reputation of Muslim Turkish women as, for instance, detected in the referring of *Serdengeçti* to him as one of "the repressed, victimized Anatolians."²³⁰

In this context, the labeling of the Donmehs as immoral is also highly observable in the nationalist conservative discourse, as exemplified in the particular attempts to disclose "the secrets of the Donmeh community." These disclosures are particularly

²²⁸ "Sen İslam ve iman davasının baş düşmanı, baş suikastçı, baş haini bir alçaksın, (...) sen, aziz Türk vatanını ve gençliğini kısım kısım böler ve birbirinin gözünü oymağa memur edersin!" ("Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Deyyus!" in *Büyük Doğu*, 30 March 1951)

²²⁹ "Güzellik müsabakası adı altında, Türk kızı ve kadınının haysiyet ve şerfiyle oynayanların baş müsebbibi, sen ey, vatan haini! Amerika avrat pazarlarına bir karı göndermekle şöhretin Türkiye hudutlarını aştı; beynelmilel kerhaneci oldun. Bir takım alüfelere 'Türk kızı' yaftasını yapıştırmakla milyonlarca Türk erkeğinin lanetini üzerine çektin hayasız!" ("Lanet" in *Büyük Doğu*, 20 July 1952)

²³⁰ *Serdengeçti*, Osman Yüksel. "Malatya Hadisesi ve Bir Hatıra" in *Serdengeçti*, Issue: 33, February 1962.

divided between the ones that chronicle the story of Sabbatai Sevi's conversion and those that focus on his followers and their rituals. However, in either way, it would not be wrong to suggest that the particular aim of these disclosures is to prove the alleged immorality of the Donmeh community.

In these disclosures, the Donmehs are represented as a sexually corrupt community. For instance, upon the question concerning the moral attitudes of the Donmehs, Nazif Özge declares that "though the Donmehs act with decency outwardly, they are not morally constraint in their private lives."²³¹ The rituals of the Donmehs, on the other hand, are referenced to provide a basis to these alleged sexual excesses. Fergan, asserts that the Donmehs practice promiscuous sex. It is alleged that according to the Donmeh tradition, in the annual Feast of the Lamb, also known as "four Heart Day," celebrated each year on March 22, they exchange wives and children born on the occasion of this feast are attributed a kind of "holiness."²³² Similarly, Nazif Özge promotes that according to the Donmeh tradition, the children born on the occasion of an intercourse of a religious leader are also known for having a kind of "holiness" and being close to God. Özge, narrating his wife's molestation attempt by a religious leader of the Donmeh sect, asserts that

Yes, these men have tried to molest my wife. Since if the women of their own creed were to sleep with such men and become pregnant, the children they will give birth to would be closer to Allah!!! And such children would still be raised by the community of the Donmehs.²³³

Another proof to the immoralities of the Donmeh sect is the portrayal of Sabbatai Sevi, as the founder of the Donmeh sect. Kısakürek (2012: 179-94), in *Dönmeğin Romanı* published in *Büyük Doğu* between 16 February 1951 and 30 March 1951, chronicles the life of Sabbatai Sevi. In Kısakürek's portrait, Sabbatai Sevi is notable for his sexual excesses. Kısakürek, referring to him as "the odd, degenerate Jew," claims that even though Sabbatai Sevi did not get involved in any sexual intercourse

²³¹ "Dönmenin Hikayesi: Müthiş İfşat" in *Büyük Doğu*, 31 July 1952.

²³² Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türkiyede Dönme Tarihçesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 1, Issue: 9, July 1948.

²³³ "Evet, karıma tasallut ettiler. Kendi akideleri icab dönme karıları böyle hocalarla yatıp da hamile kalacak olurlarsa doğacak çocuk (haşa) Allaha yakın olurmuş!!! Böyle çocuklara da dönme cemiyeti bakar ve onları yetiştirir." ("Dönmenin Hikayesi" in *Büyük Doğu*, 26 July 1952)

in his youth, he eventually became known for his reputation of sexual profligacy

(...) this odd and degenerate Jew would, after some time, begin to display an unexpected passion and lust for women. And thus Sabbatai Sevi would surpass even Rasputin – the famous rooster of the hencoop that was the Russian palace – in terms of lasciviousness.²³⁴

Moreover, Kısakürek portrays Sabbatai Sevi, as "the father of the Donmeh seed," is depicted as a mentally ill person by expressing that "maybe it might not be such a mistake to view this master imposter as a psychopath who may have sincerely believed in his role."²³⁵ In this sense, Sabbatai Sevi is not only thought of as immoral, but also as a psychologically unbalanced person.

In sum, for nationalist conservatism the Donmehs are accused of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the new Republic and bringing corrupted cosmopolite values to the nation. With particular reference to the Salonican origins of the founding elites, they are accused of enjoying the Muslim wealth by faking being Muslims and Turks. They are held responsible for detaching Muslim Turks from Islam, and leading to the erosion of moral values and national culture by imposing cosmopolitanism and reviving the modern "Sodom and Gomorrah" in the Muslim Turkish land.²³⁶

4.6. The Representation of the Free Masonry / Free Masons

4.6.1. Free Masonry in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic

The beginning of Free Masonry in Turkey dates back to the eighteenth century. As Landau (2004: 5) reports the first Masonic lodge was established in Istanbul in the early 1720s by Sait Çelebi, Ambassador of Ahmet III in Paris, together with the well-known printer, İbrahim Müteferrika. The first lodge was soon followed by the

²³⁴ "(...) bu garip imsak, (dejenere) Yahudide bir müddet sonra görülmemiş bir şehvet ve kadın hırsı şeklinde tecelli edecek; ve Sabatay Sevi, kadın düşkünlüğünde, Rus sarayındaki muazzam tavuk kümesinin meşhur horozu (Rasputin)i bile geçecektir." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Dönmeliğin Romanı" in *Büyük Doğu*, 2 March 1951)

²³⁵ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Dönmeliğin Romanı" in *Büyük Doğu*, 2 March 1951.

²³⁶ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Uyan" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 November 1949.

establishment of more lodges in distinct parts of the Empire including Izmir, Aleppo, Corfu, and Alexandretta (Landau, 2004: 5). Nevertheless, it was more particularly in the nineteenth century that Free Masonic activities grew in importance. In the late Ottoman Empire, Masonic activities, as Landau (2004: 6) suggests, were more particularly organized in urban centers including Istanbul, Salonica and Izmir. Until their ban by Abdülhamid II, as the successor of Murat V who was also a member of the lodge of Free Masonry, the Free Masonic activities were free to operate (Landau, 2004: 6). In this sense, as Baer (2010: 93) emphasizes "the Free Masons played an active role in the politics of the Empire between 1870 and 1918." However, following the ban of the lodges, Free Masonic activities are asserted to have gone underground, only to support the activities of the CUP (Landau: 2004: 6).

As Hanioglu (as cited in Baer, 2010: 93) asserts "the Free Masons declared themselves as the main force behind the 1908 revolution." According to Baer (2010: 93), the CUP was predominantly based in the Salonican Free Masonic lodges as Free Masons "provided safe houses to Young Turks." Similarly, Landau (2004: 6) demonstrates that "the clandestinity of the local lodges," particularly the ones located in Salonica, granted Young Turks with the advantage of being able to prepare for their ultimate takeover in 1909. In this sense, the revolution of 1908 was significant in the rising of Free Masonic activities since following the revolution an increasing number of Turks became intensively involved in the lodges (Landau, 2004: 7). Nevertheless, the lodges of Free Masonry, despite flourishing after the deposition of Abdülhamid II, were banned during the First World War, but reorganized after the foundation of the new Republic. In 1935, on the other hand, they were once again forbidden by Mustafa Kemal and reopened in 1948 after his death (Landau, 2004: 7).

Within its progress in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, Free Masonry was the target of criticism. As Landau (2004: 8) expresses, Free Masonry was approached with prejudice in the Ottoman Empire, particularly among the lower classes, based on two particular reasons. In this sense, the criticism directed against Free Masons was predominantly the result of their being perceived as "an elitist group" along with their association with the Jews (Landau, 2004: 8). Moreover, Landau (2004: 9), highlighting the attacks Free Masonry had faced since the late nineteenth century,

asserts that the opposition against it became more firm in the earlier years of the CUP with respect to its being perceived as a threat to the welfare of the Empire and religion, exemplified in the works of Şehbenderzade Ahmed Hilmi.

Opposition to Free Masonry continued to manifest itself following the foundation of the Republic, more particularly centering around the accusations for the fall of the Empire, and the alleged connections with Jews and communism. In this sense, Landau (2004: 10) points at two writers Atilhan and M. Raif Ogan. Although both of them is be referenced in the following part of the study concerning nationalist conservative approach to Free Masonry, at this point it would be better to pay attention to what Landau suggests. The earliest work of Atilhan on Free Masonry is referenced by Landau in a booklet, *Masonluk nedir?* published in 1937. In reference to the booklet, Landau (2004: 10) asserts that Atilhan, quoting from non-Turkish works, concludes Free Masons "as the faithless enemies of the nation, motherland, religion, family and army." Similarly for Ogan, in reference to his book, *Bütün gizli talimatlarına göre Türkiye'deki masonluk iç yüzü ve sırları*, as Landau (2004: 19) asserts; Free Masonry was concluded to be "an international plot." As well as this, the opposition to Free Masonry was not restricted to conservatives or Islamists, but included the nationalist circles, as well, suspicious of "the universalist values of Free Masonry" (Landau, 2004: 19). From here on, Landau (2004: 19-20) sums the opposition to Free Masonry in Turkey and some Arab states by suggesting that "while the libertarian views of it caused the conservative circles to suspect it, the universalist character of Free Masonry antagonized the nationalists in addition to the Islamists, annoyed with Judeo-Christian symbols, and the deprived, angered at the elitist makeup of the lodges."

Within this framework, I will now try to offer an analysis on the images that nationalist conservatism builds on its opposition against Free Masonry.

4.6.2. The Images of the Free Masons / Free Masonry

In nationalist conservatism, Free Masonry is described as a universal authority, scattered all around the world. Depending on "the Masonic documents," Kısakürek, in an attempt to emphasize the limitlessness of Masonic power, advocates that born initially in Britain in the mid-1600s, Free Masonry soon dispersed to Europe, Asia and America. Free Masonry, attracting many significant figures of the time, was particularly embraced by "the European aristocrats who were harassed by the Catholic Church, including Mozart, Voltaire, and Frederick the Second." In this sense, for Kısakürek (2012: 108-09), Free Masonry, born as a movement of "stones men", was eventually evolved into "an elitist community."

Free Masonry, referred to as "the world of unknown/mystery," is represented as "a religious sect rather than a society," whose rituals, ceremonies and beliefs are assumed to be kept confidential from those who are not introduced to it. Moreover, it is connoted as "an alternate religion" primarily based on Judaism

Free Masonry is not a society; it is a sect. It is a secretive organization that acts under the orders of the Jews. (...) It does have certain inherent limitations. Freemasonry is a religion that is the extension of the methods and activities of the Jews.²³⁷

As the lines above demonstrate, Free Masonry, associated with secret symbols and rites, is approached with suspicion. It is suggested that "it is hardly ever possible to dig into the reality of "this dark realm"

Since our childhood, we heard from our parents, schools and friends many interesting stories and mythologies regarding this world on which we know so little. However, there is one puzzle which I have been unable to resolve in my mind. Nearly all of those who do not consider these questions and problems the same way I do are wholly oblivious to this dark realm.²³⁸

²³⁷ "Masonluk, cemiyet değil, tarikattır. Batını işaret ve parolalara bağlı gizli bir hakimiyettir. (...) Kendilerine mahsus sırları vardır. Masonluk usul ve talimatı Yahudi esatirine bağlı bir dindir." (Ogan, M. Raif. "Masonluğun iç yüzü" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 3, Issue: 60, September 1949)

²³⁸ "Çocukluğumuzdan beri gerek ailelerimiz içinde ve gerek mekteplerimizde ve arkadaşlarımız arasında bu bilmediğimiz dünyanın enteresan hikaye ve mitolojileri hakkında bir çok sözler işittik. Fakat bir türlü zihnimde bu muamma çözülemedi. Benim gibi buna girmiyenlerin hemen hepsi de bu

Free Masonry, identified as a universal power, is more particularly associated with the Jews. Kısakürek, with reference to "the Masonic documents," emphasizes that even though "Jews were not actively involved in the beginnings of Free Masonry, by the eighteenth century they had taken over the seats of power in the Masonic lodges" (Kısakürek, 2012: 139). Hence, Free Masonry is alleged to "serve as a mask for the Jews" as claimed by Kısakürek who asserts that "Free Masonry is only a tool; it is actually the servant of a higher and more secretive organization, namely the servant of the Jews."²³⁹

Free Masonry, in cooperation with the Jews, is promoted to work for the welfare of Judaism. With the particular aim at promoting the interests of the Jews, Free Masonry is described as anti-patriotic and anti-religious. At this point, Atilhan suggests that Free Masonry, supplied by the Jewish capital, intends for "the ultimate enslavement of mankind under the rule of Jewish capitalism"

Freemasonry is Jew-supported organization that is the enemy of religion and nationalism, and which endeavors to transform the two billion people on the surface of this world into the slaves of a handful of Zionists.²⁴⁰

The association of Free Masonry with the Jews is also critical of the interpretation of Turkish Masonry. According to nationalist conservatism, Turkish Masonry is a "Jewish invention,"²⁴¹ aimed at the annihilation of Muslim Turks. Hence, the alleged cooperation of Free Masonry and Jews in Turkey is portrayed as being the main reason for all of the catastrophes that Muslim Turks went through on their path to achieve the Zionist cause of establishing the state of Israel. In this sense, the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, as pointed out by Bali (2003b: 406-07), is perceived as "the achievement of the ultimate plot" engineered by the Free Masonic-Jewish cooperation, as detected in the words of Fergan

karanlık alemi bilmemektedir." (Kulakçı, Nejat. "Masonluk bir iltimas şebekesidir" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 2, Issue: 31, February 1949)

²³⁹ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Vesikalarla Masonluğun İcyüzü" in *Büyük Doğu*, 10 December 1949.

²⁴⁰ "Farmasonluk yer yüzünde yaşayan iki milyar insanı bir avuç siyoniste köle yapmak isteyen bir İbrani teşekkülü, din ve milliyet düşmanı." (Atilhan, Cevat Rifat. "Masonların yırtılan maskesi" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 9, Issue: 222, June 1956)

²⁴¹ Ogan, M. Raif. "Masonlar" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 December 1950.

Mason Jews have assumed many important roles within our country. They were the ones who have caused the downfall of the Great Turkish Empire. They were the ones who have handed over the province of Tripoli to the Italians. They were the main agents who have caused the loss of Rumelia. During the World War, they were the ones spying on behalf of the British in Palestine. They were the ones who exacted revenge on the Ottoman Sultanate. They were the ones who have instigated the 31 March revolt. They were the ones who used and played with the Committee for Union and Progress as their puppet. They were the ones who have declared war on the sacred values of the Turkish people. They were the ones who have set the entire nation against each other, and have triggered dissension and discord. Finally; these Jewish Masons known as Zionists are the ones who have founded the Jewish Government in Palestine.²⁴²

As mentioned previously, the Free Masonry - Jews alliance is critical for nationalist conservatism in interpreting the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Free Masons, alleged to have occupied important seats in the late Ottoman politics, are claimed to have played crucial roles in the path toward the fall of the Empire

The leaders of the Tanzimat were Masons! Many of the leading intellectual and political figures following the Ottoman Empire's reform period were Masons! Sultan Murat, the predecessor of Abdülhamid, was a Mason! The Unionists were Masons! The Constitutionalism Movement was made up Masons! In fact, every movement in our country that is based on a blind imitation of Europe, and which is opposed to spirituality and tradition without offering a valid world view is guided by Masons.²⁴³

From here on, Free Masonry, with respect to the "elitist structure of the lodges," is alleged to have appealed to men of privilege in the Empire. Not only Sultan Murad V; but all the significant figures in the Empire, including the doctors, lawyers,

²⁴² "Mason Yahudileri memleketimizde çok mühim roller oynamışlardır. Koca Türk İmparatorluğunu parçalayanlar onlardır. Tırablus Garbı İtalyanlara peşkeş çeken onlardır. Rumelinin elimizden çıkmasına en mühim amil onlardır. Umumi harpte Filistinde İngilizlere casusluk eden onlardır. Osmanlı saltanatından intikam alan onlardır. 31 Mart isyanını çıkaranlar onlardır. İttihat ve Terakki cemiyetini ellerinde kukla gibi oynatanlar onlardır. Türk milletinin mukaddesatına ilanı harp edenler onlardır. Bütün milleti birbirine düşüren, memlekette türlü türlü fitneler çıkaran onlardır. Nihayet Filistinde Yahudi Hükümetini kuran onlardır, Siyonist denilen Yahudi Masonlardır." (Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Masonluk içinden çıkılmaz bir bataklıktır" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 2, Issue: 37, March 1949)

²⁴³"Tanzimatçılar Mason'du! Bir çok, Tanzimat sonrası fikir ve siyaset büyüğü Mason'du! Abdülhamid'in selefi Sultan Murat Mason'du! İttihatçılar Mason'du! Meşrutiyet Hareketi Mason'dur! Hülasa, memleketimizde körükörüne Avrupa taklitçiliğini ortaya atan ve her hangi bir dünya görüşüne malik olmadan ruh ve anane deviren her hareket Mason'dur." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Mason Nedir?" in *Büyük Doğu*, 25 November 1964)

tradesmen, bankers, levanter and most of the non-Muslim population are alleged to have been deeply involved in Masonic activities.²⁴⁴

Besides attracting the men of privileges, the power of Free Masonry is largely based on two factors: "secrecy and cooperation." Free Masons, thanks to their "secret identity" are assumed to exert their influence in all the political, economic and social spheres of life. Thus, Free Masonry is described as a more dangerous threat than communism

In recent times, two hidden forces are constantly at work in Turkey: Communists and Free Masons. (...) The latter has longer claws than the former, and is also more adapt at deception (...). This is, in fact, a requirement of Masons' centuries-old tactic on concealing their approach and position. Knowing or unknowingly; many of our country's universities, printed press, banks, financial and commercial organization and governments are under the influence of Masons.²⁴⁵

One of the most mentioned institutions, thought by nationalist conservatives as being under the pervasion of Free Masonry, for instance, are the charity organizations. The charities are described as the best way for Free Masons to reach the youth and educate them according to the secular Masonic teaching distant to religion

Free Masons consider it important to take control of Charity Organizations and Educational Institutions. This is important for them, since it allows them to spread the principles of their sect. They are particularly very insistent on the infiltration of education institutions. They focus on providing the youth – for the earliest ages – an education based on freedom and secularism (!) that is distant to religion and Allah.²⁴⁶

In addition, the bonds of brotherhood in Free Masonry are encouraged as an important cause in the attainment of their authority. Even though Free Masons are not depicted as being loyal to their county of citizenship, nor to the nation they reside

²⁴⁴ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Türk(!) masonları ve masonluğu" in *Büyük Doğu*, 4 November 1949.

²⁴⁵ "Son günlerde Türkiye'de iki gizli kuvvet ha bire çalışıyor: Komünistler, Masonlar. (...) İkincisi, birincisinden daha pençeli ve daha usta makiyajlı (...). Zaten vaziyetleri ve asla mevzilerini belli etmemek hususundaki asırlık taktikleri böyle gerektiriyor. Üniversitelerimiz, basınımız, bankalarımız, mali ve ticari muhitlerimiz ve hükümette bazı nüfuz kutupları, bilerek veya bilmeyerek Masonların tesiri altındadır." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Masonluk" in *Büyük Doğu*, 22 November 1967)

²⁴⁶ "Masonlar, Hayır Cemiyetleri ile Terbiye Müesseseleri'ni ele geçirmeyi, kendi tarikatlerinin prensiplerini yaymak noktasından ehemmiyetli bulurlar. Bilhassa terbiye müesseseleri hakkında çok haris bir azru beslerler. Gençlere, çocukluk yaşlarından, itibaren din ve Allah bağlılığından uzak, kendilerince serbest ve laik(!) bir terbiye vermeğe çalışırlar." (Ogan, M. Raif. "Masonlar" in *Büyük Doğu*, 15 December 1950)

in; they are alleged to foster strict bonds of friendship and cooperation among themselves: "Free Masons feel no loyalty towards any people, state or community. Their loyalty is limited only to their superstitious sect, and to their own Mason brothers."²⁴⁷ In this regard, Free Masons are described as "anti-patriots." Moreover, they are considered as "irreligious," the particular aim of which is featured "to create a faithless and Godless society."²⁴⁸

We should not forget that Free Masons are enemies of religion, at that, in their lodges, they constantly plan and work to destroy religion by any means available.²⁴⁹

However, bearing in mind the allegations that Free Masonry aims to "Judaize the Muslim Turks," as detected in Fergan's argument on the existence of "yellow reaction,"²⁵⁰ it is significant to emphasize that the claims concerning "the Masons' intent to destroy religions"²⁵¹ reflect a paradox.

Free Masonry is also associated with "heresy," as detected Ogan's depiction of Free Masonry as "the lodge of heresy."²⁵² One of the heretical practices, alleged to be conducted by Free Masons and Jews, is the excessive sexual intercourse. It is alleged based on the Talmud, which is claimed "to free sexual intercourse of Jewish men with non-Jewish women outside marriage," that Free Masons along with Jews commit "the sexual molestation of non-Jewish girls."²⁵³

²⁴⁷ "Farmasonlar, ne millete, ne devlete, ne cemiyete asla sadık deęillerdir. Sadakatleri kendi batıl tarikatlerine ve kendi Mason kardeşlerine münhasırdır." (Ogan, M. Raif. "Masonluk nedir, ne yapmak ister?" in *Büyük Doęu*, 29 June 1951)

²⁴⁸ Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Vesikalarla Masonluęun içyüzü" in *Büyük Doęu*, 10 December 1949.

²⁴⁹ "Unutmayalım ki, biz din düşmanınız ve localarımızda bütün gayretlerimizi göstererek dinin her tezahür şeklini imha edeceęiz." (Kısakürek, Necip Fazıl. "Mason Nedir?" in *Büyük Doęu*, 25 November 1964)

²⁵⁰ Fergan, Eşref Edib. "Türk Milletini ve Devletini Tehdit Eden Tehlikeler: Kara irtica, Sarı irtica, Kızıl irtica" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 91, November 1950.

²⁵¹ Atılhan, Cevat Rıfat. "Kendi vesikaları ile Masonluk" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 7, Issue: 176, July 1954.

²⁵² Ogan, M. Raif. "Tarikatlar İlga Olundu" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 4, Issue: 80, June 1950.

²⁵³ "Kimler bizimle mücadele ediyor" in *Sebilürreşad*, Vol. 5, Issue: 103, May 1951.

In sum, the opposition to Free Masonry in nationalist conservatism is more or less based on the negative representation. The portrayal of Free Masonry, depicted as a universal power against the welfare of religion, state and nation, particularly aims at alerting Muslim Turks against the Free Masonic activities.

4.7. Concluding Remarks

The specific aim of this chapter was to offer an analysis of the enemies for nationalist conservatism with respect to communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons. In this sense, I tried to focus on the themes, the figures, the incidents and the motifs that were employed in the representation of "the enemies." As the most referred enemies of nationalist conservatism, communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are all conspired to work against the welfare of Muslim Turks, as "the essence of the nation." In this sense, they are associated with varied accusations of encouraging "irreligiousness, immorality, materialism, rootlessness, cosmopolitanism, corruption, heresy." Moreover, they, in collaboration with each other, are portrayed as the main perpetrators behind all the conflicts Muslim Turks have faced. Therefore, they are all put into the same pot to signify "the threats posed to the nation."

Bali (2003b: 409) asserts that Turkish anti-Semitism, but more particularly the nationalist and Islamists circles, prefer to identify themselves as anti-Zionist, not anti-Semites; particularly basing their claim on the argument that "they do not specifically target Turkish Jews as long as they are Turkified and not associated with international Zionism." This claim, therefore, leads to a distinction between "the good Jews" and "the bad Jews." Nevertheless, what makes this claim contradictory, concerning nationalist conservative discourse, is the ambiguity of this distinction since it is hardly possible to make a concrete division as alleged. Nationalist conservatism does not commonly appeal to a concrete Jew,²⁵⁴ "who is in the last resort one stigmatized with the signifier Jew," as put forward by Žižek (as cited in Özman & Dede, 2012: 169-70). As a consequence, for nationalist conservatism not

²⁵⁴At this point, the assassination of Ahmet Emin Yalman as the result of the anti-Donmeh campaigns of the early 1950s, triggered by the Beauty contest, can be put forward as an exception.

only the Jews, but also the communists, the Donmehs and the Free Masons are present with united negative images: "irreligious, immoral, mysterious, hypocrite, disloyal, powerful, repressive, disruptive and heretic."

For nationalist conservatism, "the enemies," as mentioned before, provide justification to the disasters, more particularly in reference to the modernity thought of "a plot engineered by communists, Jews, Free Masons, and Donmehs" against the welfare of Muslim Turks. In this sense, the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of the new secular Republic are paid a particular attention. The Ottoman Empire, standing for "the golden age" for the Muslim Turk nation, is significant concerning the articulation of "the discourse of the repressed," (Açikel, 1996) that is to say, nationalist conservatism particularly depends on "the sufferings of the past" instead of "the glorious history narratives." At this point, Açikel (1996: 165) states that "the agony of the past is as important as the agony of present" in the reproduction of "the discourse of repressed." In this regard, what nationalist conservatives observe in the past is "their tragic end and the decline of their imperialistic causes;" and "Jews, Free Masons, Donmehs, Armenians, Greeks, missionaries, the West and the others" are held responsible for this decline, as Bora highlights (as cited in Açikel, 1996: 165). The diversity of these perpetrators for nationalist conservatism, on the other hand, is significant in the creation of "conspiracy theories," associated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. For nationalist conservatism the reading of the past is full of "conspiracy theories" aimed at the destruction of Muslim Turks, as "the essence of the nation." Additionally, it will not be wrong to suggest that "conspiracy theories" help to evade responsibility. As, all conspiring against the Muslim Turk nation, Turks have nothing to do but to submit to their faith.

Along with the interpretation of the past, the depiction of communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, nourishes "the repression of Muslim Turks." As discussed in the previous chapter, "the repression of the Muslim Turk Anatolians" plays a significant role in the articulation of nationalist conservative discourse. At this point, the relation of Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, for instance with "extreme wealth and power" is critical. Zizek (2002b: 216) points out that "every

nation that constituted Yugoslavia had built its own mythology narrating how other nations deprived it of the vital part of enjoyment." In this sense, nationalist conservatism builds its own "myth" accusing the Jews, Donmehs, Free Masons and communists of depriving Muslim Turk Anatolians of their potential affluence. As "the thieves of enjoyment," in the words of Žižek (2002b: 216), "the enemies" are identified as an obstacle in front of Muslim Turks' prosperity. From here on, it is argued that nationalist conservatism moves with the motivation to get rid of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons so that they can go back to glorious days of the past," identified with "the pre-capitalist era" (Bora & Erdoğan, 2003: 635).

The negation of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, as a way to purify the nation from them, is very observable in nationalist conservative discourse. As I have tried to display in this chapter, the representation of the Jews, the Donmehs and the Free Masons, is based on a depiction of "extravagance." The primary emphasis is on their "immorality," such as their alleged practices of "promiscuous sex" and "heresy." As discussed in the previous chapter, the decay of moral values as the result of the modernization process carried out by the Kemalists is highly emphasized by nationalist conservatism. However, as nationalist conservatism for "what lies beneath," (Žižek, 2000b: 222), it comes up with the Jews, in collaboration with communists, Donmehs and Free Masons, as the power behind this moral decay, allegedly proven in the Jewish protocols.

Last but not least, nationalist conservatism contributes to the bias against the Jews, Dohmehs and Free Masons by labeling them as "the elites of the society." As mentioned in the previous chapter, nationalist conservative discourse bases itself to the dichotomy between "the people" and "the elites", as in the case of Kemalist intelligentsia. The promotion of Jews, Free Masons and Donmehs as "hostile/unfriendly elites," not integrating with Muslim Turk Anatolians but displaying strong relationships among themselves, also nourishes the nationalist conservative dichotomy of "us" versus "the others." Additionally, as pointed out by Özman and Dede (2012: 176), these alleged strong bonds between the Jews, Free Masons and Donmehs points out to "the disappointment of *us*," failing to achieve

that bond. In this sense, nationalist conservatism does not argue against the existence of that sort of a bond, as the power behind the authority, but rather to its existing between *the others*. From here on, nationalist conservative discourse expresses itself in the desire for *the power of the others*, to which the negative representations of Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons provide justification. In this sense, their being portrayed against the welfare of Muslim Turks not only nourishes the prejudice/hatred, critical in the mobilization of masses, as declared by Açıkel (1996: 169) who argues that "in fascist ideologies the mobilization of masses is not dependent solely on reason but psychological dynamics;" but also legitimizes the yearn for power.

To conclude, the representation of the enemies for nationalist conservatism does not merely concentrate on their alleged disruptive roles in the history of Muslim Turks. Their association with "the dissolution of the Empire, the fall of Islam, modernization, cosmopolitanism, immorality or the slaughter of Muslim Turks," is only a part of these narratives. The representation of them with united negative images such as "irreligious, immoral, mysterious, hypocrite, disloyal, repressive, disruptive and heretic," take up a large space in the narratives of nationalist conservatism, as well. Thus it would not be wrong to suggest that the individual narratives on the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons contribute to the rising of hatred and prejudice against them.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The main purpose of this study was to reveal how the images of enemies function for nationalist conservative intellectual thinking. In this regard, throughout the study, it is attempted to search for a meaning of the representation of communists/communism, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons/Masonry as a whole and concluded that nationalist conservatism; studied within the discourses of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad* and the thinking of Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and Fergan, the articulation of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons not only stereotypes, but also labels them as the main perpetrators behind "the tragedies" that occurred in the history of Muslim Turks.

Following Açikel (1996: 198), it has been argued that the construction of the enemies in nationalist conservative discourse is a reflection of "historical frustration" against the modernization process. For nationalist conservatism, the modernization process pursued by the Kemalists is mainly charged with the fall of the Turkish nation through detaching the nation from her religion, Islam. In this regard, the modernization process is labeled as the main perpetrator behind the fall of Islam. Nevertheless, what has to be noted at this point with respect to the construction of the enemies is that as nationalist conservatism searches for "what lies beneath" (Žizek, 2002b: 222), it points at the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons as the perpetrators working in cooperation or individually against Islam. Hence, nationalist conservatism attempts to display the plots engineered by the enemies to halt the authority of Islam. From the narratives on the figure of Ibn Saba, a Yemenite Jew convert accused of creating division among Muslims to the ones accounting the slaughter of Muslims by communists or referring to the abolition of Caliphate by the

contributions of Hayim Nahum as the Chief Rabbi, they all provide examples to the alleged war of the enemies against Islam for nationalist conservative discourse.

From the nationalist conservative perspective, which greatly makes a claim on the Ottoman heritage, the Ottoman Empire is identified as the heyday of the Turkish nation. In this regard, nationalist conservatism signifies the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire as the end of "the golden age." Therefore, the revival of Islam, from whose fall communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are particularly held responsible, is promoted as a remedy to go back to the good old days. The Jews, on the other hand, in collaboration with the Donmehs and Free Masons are referred to as the main perpetrators behind the fall of the golden age. More particularly observed in the narratives of Kısakürek and *Büyük Doğu*, the Jews are mostly referenced to the disruptive roles they are alleged to have played in Muslim Turkish history since they stepped on the Turkish land having escaped from the Spanish inquisition. At this point, what needs to be emphasized is that the anti-Semite arguments that are observed in nationalist conservative discourse are mainly associated with the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. As Mert (2007: 127) writes for the general anti-Semite attitude of the Turkish right, nationalist conservatism is mainly nourished from the conspiracies related to the fall of the Ottoman Empire rather than the Palestine issue. The Jews along with Donmehs and Free Masons are referred to as the main perpetrators behind the modernization with respect to the alleged roles they played in the happening of Tanzimat, the 1908 Constitutional Revolution, the overthrow of Abdülhamid II, the dissolution of the Empire and the foundation of the Republic. Hence, the Jew-Donmeh-Free Mason alliance is held responsible for the rupture from the Muslim-Ottoman tradition.

Nationalist conservative discourse moves with the motivation to go back to good old days, identified with "the pre-capitalist/pre-modernization era" (Açikel, 1996: 156). However, although nationalist conservatism explicitly displays reaction against the Kemalist modernization process, accused of depriving the nation from her past heritage, traditions, religion and moral values in the name of Westernization, as discussed in the third chapter, its approach to modernization does not reflect a resistance aiming at the revival of the past order. Their objection is raised to the

modernity, more particularly associated with the values of urban life. As the outcome of the reforms imposed above by the Kemalists, which are claimed to encourage irreligiousness and moral degeneration, the nation is depicted to go through a moral and spiritual depression.

Moreover, what it strongly opposes in relation to modernization process is its being pursued by "the Kemalist elites," whom they are accused of being distant to the values of the people. In this regard, it is to be argued that nationalist conservatism grounds its claims concerning being "the authentic representatives of the people" on the aloofness of the founding elites (Taşkın, 2007). Moreover, the association of the founding elites with "Rumelia" serves as another base on which the claims concerning being "the authentic representation of the people" is built. "The dichotomy between the Rumelians and Anatolians," observable in Turkish political thought, is more or less related to the dominance of Rumelian origins among the founding elites (Bora and Şen, 2009: 1150). Hence, it is argued that being from Anatolia for nationalist conservatism provides ground on their claims to "be the authentic representatives of the people" against the Kemalists (Taşkın, 2007). In opposition to "the ruling elites," nationalist conservatives promote themselves as being one of the Anatolians in the service of the people. In this regard, it is contended that "historical frustration" (Açıkel, 1996: 198) observed in nationalist conservatism against the modernization is rooted in the allegations that it has been pursued by the Rumelian origins in collaboration with the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons. At this point, it has to be emphasized that the targeting of Salonican origin founding elites has most been observed in the narratives of Serdengeçti who particularly accuses them of living on the expenses of the Muslim Turk Anatolians in an effort to highlight the clash between the interests of the people and the Kemalists'.

The significant aspect of the intellectual thinking of the earlier figures of nationalist conservatism is the negative relationship set with Kemalism/Kemalists and the RPP, differing from the late figures of nationalist conservatism. The objection to "the ruling Kemalist elites" is explicitly demonstrated in nationalist conservative discourse. In this regard, it has to be emphasized that nationalist conservative thinking represented by Kısakürek, Serdengeçti and Fergan bases itself on the

dichotomy between the Kemalists and themselves. For nationalist conservatism, the claim is clear: not the Kemalists, who are accused of being alien to the values of the people, recognized as the Muslim Turkish entity, exploiting the wealth of the people, oppressing the people religiously, and detaching the people from the traditions, and moral values but they, as the bearer of the authentic values of Muslim Turkish Anatolians, should represent the people. In this context, in this study it has been argued that nationalist conservative claims concerning the representation of the people refers to a more concrete desire for power. As Mert (2007: 173) points out, "the theme which is the power should be passed to the authentic representatives of the nation has been commonly employed by the right-wing politics since the transition to the multi-party period." Hence, being "authentic" is encouraged as superiority against the alienated ones on the ground that they are identified with fakeness, not deserving to hold the power (Mert, 2007: 174-75). In other words, this emphasis on "the authenticity" legitimizes the nationalist conservative claim for hegemony.

Nevertheless, "the will to power" in nationalist conservatism is not restricted to anti-Kemalist stance. As mentioned at the very beginning, one of the arguments of the study, following Açıkel (1996: 198) who argues "the discourse of the repressed is potentially the precondition for the discourse of the will to power," has been to contend that nationalist conservative discourse employs the enemies to legitimize its "will to power" by pointing at the repression of the Muslim Turks by the enemies.

The repression of the Muslim Turk Anatolians, as the essence of the nation from the perspective of nationalist conservatism, is emphasized through the narratives accounting how they have been deprived of the wealth and felicity of their own land by pointing at the enemies as the perpetrators. In this regard, it has to be noted that the narratives on the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons come to the forefront. The Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are all positioned against "the true people" as "the thieves of enjoyment" in the words of Žižek (2002b: 214), who argues that "dealing with others is particularly shaped by the myths attributing 'great enjoyment' to them." In this regard, the association of the enemies with "great enjoyment" through narratives, laying emphasis on the great wealth and authority they possess in Turkey,

is critical to nourish "the discourse of the repressed": *the Jews own all slaughter houses in Istanbul, Turkish press is controlled by the Donmeh authority, the charity organizations are in the hands of the Free Masons*. For that reason, it is argued that nationalist conservatism builds its own "myths" accusing the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons of depriving the Muslim Turk Anatolians of their potential affluence and identifies them as an obstacle in front of Muslim Turks' success. Hence, in nationalist conservatism the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons stand for an alliance working in collaboration against Muslim Turks. The message, on the other hand, is quite clear: *if it was not the Jews, Dohmehs, and Free Masons; Muslim Turks would ...* .Therefore, it might be argued that nationalist conservatism legitimizes "the true citizens' will to enjoyment" on the drive to get rid of the Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons so that they can go back to "good old days," thus nourishes the hatred and prejudice critical in the mobilization of the masses, as declared by Açıkel (1996: 169) who asserts that the mobilization of masses is not dependent on reason, but psychological dynamics.

How this mobilization can be achieved, on the other hand, is best exemplified in the events of 6-7 September 1955. At this point, what comes to mind is the angered masses of the events of 6-7 September plundering, destroying the shops of non-Muslim minority in the streets of Beyoğlu. Putting aside the political reasons of the events, what was witnessed in the streets of Istanbul till the morning of September 7 could be interpreted as the success of "this discourse of the repressed" to mobilize "the economically repressed masses" (Açıkel, 1996: 198). Recalling the pictures of that morning, in which all properties of non-Muslims are damaged, the streets are covered with fabrics, furniture, and so on; it is argued that the events of 6-7 September 1955 provide an example on how "this discourse of the repressed" worked for the Turkish society. Moreover, the events, which first targeted the Greek population but soon turned into attacks on other non-Muslims, is critical to display how this mobilization can easily grow into mass violence.

Through this study, it is contended that this alleged enjoyment of the enemies articulated in nationalist conservatism strengthens "the discourse of the repressed" and legitimizes the anger of the masses raised against them. However, what is

significant to note is that "this discourse of the repressed" is not the only way that nationalist conservatism contributes to the rising of hatred against "the enemies" among the masses. In the narratives concerning the representation of the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons, they are depicted with negative united images as "irreligious, immoral, mysterious, hypocrite, disloyal, and heretic." Communists are condemned for lacking moral values and spirituality. Jews are depicted as unthankful, materialistic and disruptive. Moreover, as Zizek (2002a: 64) puts forward concerning German anti-Semitic propaganda, nationalist conservatism employs "hypocrisy as a basic nature" of Jews and emphasizes that they cannot be trusted since "they hide their real nature behind the mask of everyday appearance." In this regard, what has been put forward by Zizek for German anti-Semitic propaganda is observed to be more particularly valid for the narratives on the Donmehs and Free Masons concerning nationalist conservative discourse. Since Donmehs are mainly associated with hypocrisy and accused of being pretending to be Muslims and Turks; and Free Masons, belonging to a secret sect, are associated with mystery, nationalist conservatism warns Muslim Turks to be more cautious against them than the Jews or communists since they could not easily be spotted among the Muslim Turks. Moreover, the Donmehs are depicted to discriminate against Muslim Turks. All the same, on the other hand, the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons are conspired to work against the national causes. From the nationalist conservative perspective, while communists work to promote the interests of Moscow, the Jew-Donmeh-Free Mason alliance seeks for the accomplishment of the causes of Zionism.

Although "the enemies" to a certain extent are dealt with individual narratives, they are all allegedly united on a common ground through Jewishness. The communists, Donmehs and Free Masons are all related to Jewishness which is communism is the product of the Jews, the Donmehs are racially and religiously Jews, and the Free Masonry is ruled by the Jewish authority. Thus, the transition between the enemies is established through Jewishness. At this point, it has to be noted that the relation of communism with the Jews is more particularly set through moral degradation on the ground that in order to propagate communism, communists are claimed to take

advantage of the moral breakdown alleged to be triggered by the Jews as proposed in the protocols, published both in *Büyük Doğu* and *Sebilürreşad*. In addition to the Jews, Donmehs, accused of reviving "modern Sodom and Gomorrah in Istanbul," are also particularly held responsible for the moral breakdown. In this regard, it is contended that the moral degradation provides justification to targeting of all, as most explicitly observed in the shooting of Ahmet Emin Yalman in 1952 by Hüseyin Üzmez who justified his attempt as a reaction to prevent "the selling of young Turkish girls to American Jews" through organizing Beauty contest (Bali, 2001: 436). Judging from the fact that the Beauty contest has been condemned in three of the periodicals, it might be concluded that the representations of the enemies bare fatal consequences.

From here on, it is argued that the narratives on the communists, Jews, Donmehs and Free Masons contribute to the rising of hatred and prejudice against them. Yet, it has to be noted that this study does not offer an analysis surveying the effects of these narratives on the masses, but rather simply focuses on the narratives themselves. Nevertheless, without underestimating the limitations of the study, the critical side of offering an analysis on these narratives has been the very fact that the intellectual origins of nationalist conservatism continue to be still effective in contemporary Turkey. If we are to recall the examples provided at the very beginning of the study including the speeches of authorities and newspaper columns, it can be concluded that despite the elimination of communists and Free Masons, the Jews and Donmehs still continue to trouble the minds of Turkish authorities, writers, or people.

In this context, this study has offered a critical analysis concerning the articulation of "the enemies" for nationalist conservatism with the attempt to search for the origins of the present day thinking. Undoubtedly, it has concentrated on a narrow period and been restricted to the periodicals of *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* and *Sebilürreşad* and some figures of nationalist conservative intellectual thinking. Therefore, as a last word it should be emphasized that there exists the necessity to observe the following periods, at least to see what *other* enemies have replaced the communists or Free Masons.

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TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışma, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemdeki düşman temsillerini ele almaktadır. Çalışmada, çok partili hayata geçiş ile birlikte Türk sağının yükselen ideolojisi olarak milliyetçi muhafazakar entellektüel düşüncede, Türk milletinin karşısında düşman olarak konumlandırılan komünistlere, Yahudilere, dönmelere ve masonlara dair nasıl bir tablo çizildiği ve ortaya çıkan bu düşman tablosunun milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından nasıl bir işleve sahip olduğuna yanıt aranmaktadır. Bu noktada mevcut çalışmanın temel amacı; komünistlere, Yahudilere, dönmelere ve masonlara dair imgeleri ayrı ayrı ele almakla birlikte, bir bütün olarak bu düşman imgelerinin milliyetçi muhafazakar argümanlar ile ilişkisini ortaya koymaktır. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada; milliyetçi muhafazakar çizgide yayın yapmış olan *Büyük Doğu* (1943-1978), *Serdengeçti* (1947-1962), *Sebilürreşad* (1948-1965) dergileri incelenmiştir. Dergiler çalışmanın ana kaynağını oluşturmakla birlikte, çalışmada Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, Osman Yüksel Serdengeçti ve Eşref Edib Fergan'a ait kitaplara da yer verilmiştir. Dergilerin bahsi geçen yıllarda yayınlanmış tüm sayıları çalışmaya dahil edilmekle birlikte, Milli Kütüphane arşivinde eksik olan sayılar bunun dışında tutulmuştur. Dergilerin analiz sürecinde, yalnızca başyazarlarla; Kısakürek, Serdengeçti ve Fergan ile sınırlı kalınmamıştır. Tartışma açısından önem teşkil ettiği düşünülen diğer yazarlara ait yazılı ve görsel metinlere de yer verilmiştir.

Çalışma giriş ve sonuç bölümleri haricinde üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. Ana bölümlerin ilkinde, Türk muhafazakarlığı ve içindeki farklı eğilimlere dair genel bir çerçeve çizilmektedir. Bu farklı eğilimlerin; modernleşmeye, İslam'a, milliyetçiliğe, Osmanlı mirasına nasıl baktığı üzerinde durulmuştur. Öte yandan, bu bölümde Türk muhafazakarlığının düşman algısı; komünizm ve komünistler ile birlikte gayrimüslim azınlıklara, dönmelere ve masonluğa/masonlara bakış şeklinde iki başlık altında incelenmiştir. Bu şekilde, milliyetçi muhafazakarlığın Türk muhafazakarlığın içindeki diğer eğilimlerden hangi noktada farklılaştığı ya da benzeştiği ortaya konulmaya çalışılmıştır. İkinci ana bölümde, milliyetçi

muhafazakar argümanlar, *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* ve *Sebilürreşad* dergileri üzerinden ele alınmıştır. Bu bölümde, milliyetçi muhafazakarlık tanımlanmaya çalışılmış, temelde Kısakürek, Serdengeçti ve Fergan olmak üzere, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin milliyetçiliğe, dine/İslam'a, millete, moderniteye ve Kemalistlere bakışı üzerinde durulmuştur. Son olarak üçüncü bölümde, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin; komünistlere, Yahudilere, dönmelere ve masonlara dair çizdiği "düşman" imgeleri incelenmiştir. Bu imgeler, Açikel (1996) ve Zizek'e (2002) referansla anlamlandırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu noktada ortaya çıkan tablo ise milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin; komünistleri, Yahudileri, dönmeleri ve masonları bireysel anlatılarla olumsuzlamanın ötesinde, onları yaşanan toplumsal antagonizmaların baş sorumluları olarak resmederek Müslüman Türk milletinin refahı ve saadeti önündeki engeller olarak düşmanlaştırdığı yönündedir.

Türk muhafazakarlığının içindeki farklı eğilimlerden biri olan milliyetçi muhafazakar ideoloji, 1940'lı yılların ikinci yarısından itibaren görünürlük kazanmaya başlamıştır (Taşkın, 2007: 381). Çok partili hayata geçişten itibaren 1960'lı yılların ortalarına değin; Türkçüler'den İslamcılara, muhafazakarlara Türk sağı içerisindeki farklı kesimler milliyetçi muhafazakar çatı altında faaliyet göstermiştir (Çetinsaya, 2004: 447). Her ne kadar milliyetçi muhafazakar çatı altında birleşen farklı kesimler 1960'lı yılların sonlarına doğru bir dağılım yaşamış olsalar da milliyetçi muhafazakar ideoloji "Türk-İslam sentezi"nde olduğu üzere etkisini sonraki yıllarda da devam ettirmiştir (Bora, 1998: 127). Bu noktadan hareketle bu çalışmanın sınırlarını belirleyen milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, yalnızca incelenen dönem açısından değil devam eden yıllarda da Türk sağının kodlarını tanımlaması bakımından önemlidir.

Bu çalışmada milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin sınırları, üç temel ismin: Kısakürek, Serdengeçti ve Fergan'ın düşünceleri ile; bu isimlerin yayınladıkları *Büyük Doğu*, *Serdengeçti* ve *Sebilürreşad* dergileri ile çizilmiştir. Her ne kadar bazı çalışmalarda Kısakürek ve Fergan İslamcı kimlikleriyle, Serdengeçti ise Türkçü/milliyetçi kimliğiyle anılsa da; bu isimler, Bora'nın (1998: 96) deyişiyle, "milliyetçi-muhafazakar stile katkıda bulunan" düşünce adamları olmaları bakımından önemlidir. İslam'la Türklük arasında "uyum" arayışında olan milliyetçi muhafazakar

akım, "İslamcılıkla Türkçü ve ülkücü milliyetçilik arasında bir sentez geliştirmeyi hedefler" (Bora, 2002b: 260). Buradan hareketle, çalışmaya dahil edilen bu üç isim ve çıkardıkları dergiler, 1940'lı yılların ortalarından itibaren İslam'ın hem kamusal hem de siyasi alanda meşru bir zemine taşınmasında önemli rol oynamıştır.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Türk milletinin oluşumu açısından İslam'a kritik bir önem atfeder. Milliyetçi muhafazakarlık, dini dışlayan ve yalnızca "ırk"a referansa dayanan bir milliyetçilik anlayışının aksine, İslam'ı Türk milli kimliğinin asli unsurlarından biri olarak kabul etmektedir. İslam ile Türklük arasındaki uyum, Kısakürek'te "İslam'ın has taşıyıcısı olarak Türk milleti" (Bora, 1998: 130) şeklinde tezahür ederken, Fergan ve *Sebilürreşad*'ın söyleminde bu uyum "İslam'ın Türk milletinin arkasındaki itici güç" olarak tanımlanması ile ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bununla birlikte İslam kadar "Anadolu" da milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin, millet tasavvuru bakımından önemlidir. İslam kadar Anadolu da Türk milletinden sayılmanın koşulları arasındadır. Buna göre milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin millet tasavvuru "Müslüman Türk Anadolu halkı" olarak tezahür eder. Öte yandan "Müslüman Türk Anadolu insanını milletin özü" (Bora & Canefe, 2002: 656) olarak tanımlayan bu tasavvur, toplumun dikotomik temellerde sunulmasına katkı sağlamaktadır. "Müslüman Türk Anadolu halkı"na karşı konumlandırılan Kemalistler, komünistler, Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonlar ise bu dikotominin *düşman* öznelerini oluşturmaktadır.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, kendinden önceki muhafazakar eğilimlerin aksine anti-Kemalist bir tutum sergilemektedir. Bu noktada altı çizilmesi gereken husus, bu çalışmada incelenen milliyetçi muhafazakar düşüncenin sergilediği anti-Kemalist tutumun, yalnızca muhafazakarlığın içindeki diğer eğilimlerden değil daha sonraki süreçte tezahür eden milliyetçi muhafazakar oluşumlardan da farklılık gösterdiğidir. Daha önce de belirtildiği gibi 1940'lı yılların ortalarından itibaren yaygınlık kazanmaya başlayan milliyetçi muhafazakar akım, "Türk-İslam Sentezi"ne kadar uzanan bir hattı içinde barındırmaktadır. Fakat karşılaştırıldıkları ölçüde bu çalışmada incelenen ilk dönem milliyetçi muhafazakar figürlerin -Kısakürek, Serdengeçti, Atılhan, Fergan- söyleminde var olan anti-Kemalist tutumun, Aydınlar Ocağı çevresinde gelişen "Türk-İslam Sentezi" retoriğinde devam ettiği

görülmemektedir. Aksine Kurt'un (2010: 115) da belirttiği üzere, Aydınlar Ocağı söyleminde Kemalizm ile olumlu bir ilişki kurulmaktadır.

Çalışmanın 3. bölümünde ortaya konulmaya çalışıldığı üzere, bu anti-Kemalist tutumun temelinde modernleşme pratiklerine yönelik eleştiriler olduğu görülmektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından, kurucu Kemalist kuşak tarafından yürütülen modernleşme sürecinin sert biçimde eleştirildiği konuların başında ise modern hayat ve din politikaları gelmektedir. Toplumdaki ahlaki çöküşün, köksüzleşmenin, yozlaşmanın ve dinsizleşmenin sorumlusu olarak işaret edilen Kemalist modernleşmenin, milleti "mazisinden, ananesinden, öz kültüründen, maneviyatından ve ahlaki değerlerinden" uzaklaştırdığı iddia edilmektedir. Toplumun "ahlaki ve manevi bir buhran" içinde olduğunun altı çizilerek, bunun kaynağı olarak ise "Kemalist seçkinler" ve uyguladıkları politikalar işaret edilmektedir. Laiklik politikaları ise bunların başında gelmektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde laikliğe topyekün bir karşı çıkıştan ziyade, Kemalistler tarafından uygulanan laiklik politikaları sert bir şekilde eleştirilmekte ve uygulanan bu politikaların temel amacının Türkleri İslam'dan uzaklaştırmak olduğu ileri sürülmektedir. Bunun dayandığı en temel argümanlardan biri ise gayrimüslim ve Hristiyan unsurların dinlerini özgürce yaşamalarına izin verilmesine karşın, Müslümanların "kendi öz vatanlarında" ayrımcılığa uğratıldıkları iddiasıdır.

Öte yandan milliyetçi muhafazakarlığın anti-Kemalist tutumu, modernleşme pratiklerine yönelik eleştiriler ile sınırlı değildir. İktidarın "halka ve öz kültüre yabancı elitlerin" elinde olduğu ve "milletin hakiki evlatlarına geçmesi" gerektiği teması (Mert, 2007: 173), milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin anti-Kemalist tutumunun diğer bir başat karakterini oluşturmaktadır. Buna göre milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, devlet iktidarının "milletin değerlerine yabancı, milleti sömüren, dinen baskı altında tutan ve mazisinden, köklerinden, ahlaki değerlerinden, anelerinden uzaklaştırdığı" iddia edilen "Kemalist seçkinler" in elinden alınıp, milletin "asli ve otantik varislerine" geçmesi gerektiğini savunmaktadır (Taşkın, 2007: 58). Taşkın'ın (2007) milliyetçi muhafazakar entelijansiya üzerine yaptığı ve bu çalışmanın aksine daha geç bir döneme ait milliyetçi muhafazakar figürlere odaklandığı çalışmasında da belirttiği üzere, devletin "asli" unsurları oldukları inancından yola çıkan milliyetçi

muhafazakarlar "Kemalist seçkinler"e karşın "devletin organik entellektüelleri" oldukları iddiasını taşımaktadır. Bu çalışmanın sınırları açısından, bu iddianın dayandırıldığı temel noktalardan biri ise "Anadolu" ve "Rumeli" arasındaki ayrımdır. Bora ve Şen'in (2009: 1150) dikkati çektiği üzere, Türk siyasi hayatında gözlemlenen "Rumeliler ve Anadolu" arasındaki dikotomi milliyetçi muhafazakarlığın anti-Kemalist söylemini beslemektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, özede Selanik olmak üzere Cumhuriyet'in kurucu "seçkinlerinin" Rumeli kökenli oluşlarına istinaden onları "milletin hakiki evlatları" olmamakla itham ederken, onların devletin "asli temsilcileri" (Taşkın, 2007) olamayacaklarını vurgulamaktadır.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin modernleşmeye dair görüşleri, topyekün bir karşı çıkıştan ziyade, Çiğdem'in (2002: 78) deyişiyile "sahte" ve "hakiki" modernleşme arasındaki ayrım etrafında şekillenmektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakarlık açısından Kemalistler tarafından izlenen ve yalnızca "Batı" taklitçiliğine dayandığı öne sürülen "sahte" modernleşme ya da Serdengeçti'nin deyişiyile "*Gavurlaşma*" projesi, Türk milletinin İslam'la olan bağlarını kopardığı ölçüde milleti felakete sürüklemiştir. Buradan hareketle milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem; milletin kurtuluşunun yalnızca İslam'ın yeniden canlandırılmasıyla mümkün kılınabileceğinin üzerinde durmaktadır.

Bu çalışma açısından Kemalist modernleşme ve İslam'ın taşıdığı önem ise milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin, Zizek'in (2002b: 222) Doğu Avrupa ve komünistler bağlamında belirttiği üzere; "... *arkasında kimler vardı?*" sorusuna getirdiği cevapta yatmaktadır. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Türk milletinin bugün yaşadığı iddia edilen felaketin sorumluları olarak "Batılılaşmacı sahte ulusçuları" (Taşkın, 2007: 74) işaret etse de, bunların arkasında gerçekte kim olduğuna dair çeşitli komplo teorilerine başvurmakta ve bunun bir sonucu olarak da düşmanlara işaret etmektedir: komünistler, Yahudiler, dönmeler, masonlar.

Belirtildiği üzere milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, komünistleri, Yahudileri, dönmeleri ve masonları yalnızca bireysel anlatılarla değil, onları yaşanan toplumsal antagonizmaların baş aktörleri olarak göstererek düşmanlaştırmaktadır. Bu toplumsal antagonizmaların başında ise işaret edilen düşmanların İslam'a karşı giriştikleri iddia edilen mücadele ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun çöküşüne dair anlatılar gelmektedir.

Komünistler, Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonların, İslam'a ve Müslümanlara olan düşmanlıklarına dair farklı kanıtlar sunulmaktadır: "Müslüman görüntüsü altında Yahudi dönmesi İbn-i Sebe Müslümanlar arasında bölünmeye yol açmış, Lozan Barış Konferansı'na katılan Hahambaşı Hayim Nahum İngilizlerle işbirliği yaparak Hilafetin kaldırılması yönünde Türk heyetini ikna etmiş, komünistler ise Rusya'daki Müslümanları katletmişlerdir." Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin farklı zaman dilimlerine ait sunduğu bu örnekler çeşitlilik ve farklılık göstermekle birlikte, düşmanların İslam'a ve Müslümanlara karşı "tehdit" oluşturma paydasında birleşmektedirler. Öte yandan, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından İslam'ın gerilemesinin başlıca nedeni sayılan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun çöküşüne dair anlatılar Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonların düşmanlaştırılmasına dayanak sağlaması bakımından önemlidir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Osmanlı Devleti'nin çöküşünü Türk milletinin "altın çağı"nın sonu olarak resmetmektedir. Bu "altın çağın" sonunun hazırlanmasındaki başlıca aktörlerin ise Yahudiler ve onlarla işbirliği içinde oldukları belirtilen dönmeler ve masonlar olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Buna göre, "İspanya'da engizisyonundan kaçıp Osmanlı'ya sığınan Yahudiler, o tarihten itibaren sistematik bir şekilde İmparatorluğun sonunu hazırlamışlardır." Tanzimat reform hareketleri, Meşrutiyet'in ilanı (1908), 31 Mart İsyanı, Sultan Abdülhamid'in tahttan indirilmesi ve nihai noktada Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun yıkılması, Yahudi-dönme-mason komplosunun bir sonucu olarak gösterilmektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde, Türk milletini İslam'dan ve Osmanlı mirasından koparan, Batılılaşmanın önünü açan ve dolayısıyla da Müslüman Türk milletinin felaketini hazırlayan Yahudi - dönme - mason işbirliğidir.

Daha önceden de vurgulandığı üzere, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem toplumu dikotomik temellerde tanımlamaktadır. Komünistlerin, Yahudilerin, dönmelerin ve masonların, Müslüman Türk milletine yönelik "mağduriyet" anlatıları ise bu dikotominin beslenmesi açısından önemlidir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde, "mazlumluk söylemi" (Açıkel, 1996) komünistlerin, Yahudilerin, dönmelerin ve masonların temsillerinde önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söyleme göre düşmanları, Müslüman Türk milletini, "hak ettiği şeylerden mahrum bırakmak için, kendisine karşı kutsal bir ittifak oluşturmuştur" (Açıkel, 1996: 184).

Bu bağlamda milletin "asli unsurları" olarak görülen Müslüman Türk Anadolu halkı yokluk, sefalet içinde resmedilirken; komünistler, Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonların refah ve saadet içinde yaşadıkları iddia edilmektedir. Özellikle Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonlar ile ilgili metinlere bakıldığında, bu "asli olmayan unsurlara" Zizek'in (2002b: 214) ifadesiyle "aşırı bir keyif" atfedildiği görülmektedir. Zizek (2002b: 216), "Yugoslavya'yı meydana getiren her millet, diğer milletlerin onu, sahip olsaydı dolu dolu yaşamasını sağlayacak o hayati keyif parçasından nasıl mahrum bıraktığını anlatan kendi mitolojisini inşa etmiştir" der. Zizek'in Yugoslavya örneğinde olduğu gibi, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonları "keyif hırsızları" (Zizek, 2002b: 216) olarak göstererek onlara dair kendi "fantazilerini" yaratmaktadır. Bu "fantaziler," "düşmanlara" atfettikleri aşırı güç ve refah paydasında birleşmektedir. "Yahudilerin İstanbul'daki bütün mezbahalara sahip olmasından, Türk basınına hakim olan dönme nüfuzuna ya da tüm yardım kuruluşlarının Masonlar tarafından idare edilmesine" kadar sunulan bütün ithamlar; Yahudilerin, dönmelerin ve masonların, Müslüman Türk milletinin refah ve saadete ulaşmasının önündeki engeller olarak sunulmasına dayanak sağlamaktadır. Başka bir deyişle milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından; Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonlar, milletin hakiki unsurlarının "hak ettikleri keyife" ulaşamamalarının sorumluları olarak gösterilmekte ve ancak bu düşmanlardan kurtulduğu ölçüde bu "keyif"e ulaşabileceği mesajı verilmektedir.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından; komünistlerin, Yahudilerin, dönmelerin ve masonların düşmanlaştırılması yalnızca "mağduriyet" anlatıları üzerinden işlememektedir. Bireysel anlatıların da en az "mağduriyet" anlatıları kadar komünistlerin, Yahudilerin, dönmelerin ve masonların olumsuzlanmasına katkı sağladığı görülmektedir. Din, ahlak ve millet düşmanı olarak tanımlanan komünistler, Yahudiler, dönmeler ve Masonlar, "dinsiz, ahlaksız, sapkın, ikiyüzlü, gizemli, materyalist, köksüz, sadakatsiz ve vefasız" olmakla itham edilmektedir.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde, "dinsizlik" ve "ahlaksızlık" ithamları komünizm/komünist karşıtı görüşün temelini oluşturmaktadır. Türk milletini İslam'dan koparmak ve dinsiz, maneviyatsız, "maddeperest" bir toplum yaratmak komünistlerin yegane amacı olarak vurgulanmaktadır. Onlara yönelik bu "dinsizlik"

ithamları ise, komünist karşıtı görüşlerin, dönme ve mason karşıtı söylemlerle eklemlenmesine katkı sağlamaktadır. Bununla birlikte, Kısakürek'in "Köy Enstitüleri"ne ve laiklik pratiklerine yönelik ithamlarında olduğu gibi, CHP hükümeti de komünizmle mücadele etmemek ve hatta komünizme destek vermekle suçlanmaktadır. Öte yandan Bali'nin (2003b: 409) de vurguladığı üzere, Karl Marx'ın Yahudi oluşuna dayanarak komünizmi "Yahudi icadı" olmakla itham eden milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde, komünizm karşıtı söylem Yahudi karşıtı söylemlerle eklemlenmektedir. Bunun dayandırıldığı noktaların başında ise, "ahlak erozyonu" gelmektedir. Buna göre, Yahudiler tarafından tetiklendiği iddia edilen ahlak erozyonunun, komünizmin yayılmasına neden olduğu vurgulanmaktadır.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde Yahudi karşıtı görüşler, onların Müslüman Türk milletinin tarihinde oynadığı iddia edilen yıkıcı rollere yapılan vurgunun haricinde, Yahudilerin temsillerinde başvurulan olumsuz tanımlamalara dayanmaktadır. Yahudilere yönelik karşıt görüşlerin temelinde "köksüzlük" ithamları gelmektedir. Vatan sevgisinden yoksun olmakla itham edilen Yahudiler, vatandaşı oldukları ülkelere karşı sadakatsiz olmakla suçlanmaktadır. Yahudilerin "sadakatsizliklerine" ve "vefasızlıklarına" sıklıkla vurgu yapan milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Müslüman Türk milletini onların olası "iharetlerine" karşı uyarmaktadır. Yahudilerin "maddiyatçılığına" dair ithamlar onları buldukları ülkenin zenginliklerini sömürmekle suçlarken, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem Yahudileri Müslüman Türk milletinin üstünden geçinmekle itham etmektedir. Öte yandan, özellikle *Büyük Doğu* ve *Sebilürreşad* dergilerinde var olan Yahudi karşıtı görüşler zaman zaman dünyadaki anti-Semit kaynaklara göndermelerle beslenmektedir. *Siyon Liderlerinin Protokolleri Büyük Doğu* ve *Sebilürreşad*'da, Henry Ford'un *Beynelmilel Yahudi* adlı eseri ise *Büyük Doğu*'da referans olarak kullanılmaktadır. Her iki dergide de Protokollere referansla, Yahudiler yaşadıkları toplumları "ahlak erozyonuna" uğratmakla suçlanırken, bunun "Yahudi'nin dünya hakimiyeti"ni gerçekleştirmek arzusuyla başvurduğu taktiklerden biri olduğu belirtilmektedir. Bu bağlamda milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Yahudileri yalnızca Müslüman Türk milletine değil, tüm insanlığa karşı ortak bir "tehdit" olarak göstermektedir.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemdeki dönme karşıtlığı, büyük ölçüde onların ikiyüzlülükle itham edilmeleri etrafında şekillenmektedir. Bali'nin (2001: 411) istisnalar haricinde genel anlamda sağ söylem için ifade ettiği üzere, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde de dönmeler "sözde mesih Sabetay Sevi'nin müritleri olan dönmeler kastedilmektedir." Selanik'ten göç eden dönmeler ise, daha önceden de belirtildiği üzere Cumhuriyet'in kurucu unsurlarının Rumeli kökenlerine istinaden, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından daha önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Serdengeçti'nin "bu memlekette Selanik dönmelerinin saltanatı var" söyleminde olduğu gibi, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde dönmeler ile kurucu unsurlar arasında bir bağ kurulmaktadır. Öte yandan "dönmeler saltanatı"na yönelik ithamlar yalnızca siyasi güçle sınırlı kalmamaktadır. Ekonomiden basına kadar "memleketteki" bütün önemli koltuklara dönmelerin hakim olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, milliyetçi muhafazakar söyleme göre, Ahmet Emin Yalman ve *Vatan* gazetesi örneğinde olduğu gibi, Türk matbuatı "Yahudi sermayesinin emri ve dönmelerin tesiri" altındadır. Dönmelerin Türk ve Müslüman görünmekle birlikte aslında Yahudi milletine ve dinine sadakatle bağlı olduklarını vurgulayan milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Zizek'in (2002a: 64) 1930'ların anti-Semitist propagandasına istinaden belirttiği üzere, dönmeleri "gündelik görünüşlerinin maskesi altında saklanmakla" itham etmektedir. Bundan dolayı milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Müslüman Türk milletini dönmelere karşı komünistlere ya da Yahudilere olduğundan daha dikkatli olmaları konusunda uymaktadır. Dönmeler, Müslüman ve Türk görünmekle birlikte asla İslamı ve Türklüğü gerçekten benimsememiş; "ikiyüzlü, riyakar, gizli bir zümre" olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Öte yandan milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, onları Müslüman Türklere karşı ayrımcı, ırkçı tavırlar sergilemek ve onlarla kaynaşmamakla itham ederken, dönmelerin kendi aralarında muazzam bir dayanışma sergilediklerini belirtmektedir. Buna dayanak olarak ise dönmelerin Türklerle evlenmemeleri, ölümlerini farklı mezarlıklara gömmeleri ve yalnızca kendi aralarında iş yaptıkları iddia edilmektedir. Dönmelerin olumsuzlanmasının bir başka unsuru ise, onlara atfedilen "sapkın" yaklaşımlardır. Dönmelere ait olduğu iddia edilen adetlerin, ritüellerin; sapkınlık, ahlaksızlık içerdiği iddia edilmektedir. Bununla birlikte milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, Ahmet Emin Yalman ve güzellik yarışması

bağlamında olduğu üzere, dönmeleri Türk toplumuna ahlaksızlık aşılama suçlamaktadır.

Masonluğun "kökü dışarıda, beynelmilel" bir teşkilat olması mason/masonluk karşıtı görüşün temelini oluşturmaktadır. Buna göre masonluk, beynelmilel bir teşkilat olmasına rağmen bütün önemli, söz sahibi kişileri, Osmanlı Sultanı V. Murad örneğinde olduğu gibi, etkisi altına almayı başarmıştır. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söyleme göre masonluk, "içimize kadar sızmış bir güç" olarak, memleket içindeki Türk birliğine, İslam dinine düşman olan tüm unsurların bir araya geldiği bir teşkilatı temsil etmektedir. Öte yandan masonluk, birbirinden farklı unsurları içinde barındırmasına rağmen en temelde mutlak Yahudi otoritesine bağlı olmak ve Yahudi menfaatleri için çalışmakla itham edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde mason/masonluk karşıtı görüşler, Yahudi karşıtlılığıyla eklemlenmektedir. Masonluğu "gizli" ve "bilinmez" bir güç olarak itham eden milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, dönmeler özelinde olduğu üzere milleti masonluğa karşı uyarılmaktadır. Masonların, gizli kimlikleri sayesinde ülkedeki bütün önemli yerlere nüfuz ettikleri iddia edilmektedir. Nüfuz ettikleri iddia edilen kurumların başında ise hayır kurumları gelmektedir. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem, masonları Türkiye'deki tüm hayır kurumlarını ele geçirmek ve bu yolla Müslüman Türk gencini arzuladıkları şekilde, dini ve milli bağlılıktan uzak yetiştirmekle itham etmektedir. Bununla birlikte mason ritüelleri üzerinden masonluğa karşı "büyücü ocağı," "sapıklık tekkesi" gibi türlü ithamlarda bulunan milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin, dönmelere yönelttiği "sapkınlık" suçlamalarını masonlara karşı da kullandığı görülmektedir. Öte yandan Yahudiler ve dönmeler özelinde olduğu üzere, masonların da kendi aralarında sıkı ilişkiler sergiledikleri belirtilmektedir.

Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemin komünistlere, Yahudilere, dönmelere ve masonlara dair çizdiği bu bireysel temsiller onların olumsuzlanmasına sebep olmaktadır. Öte yandan, dikkat çekildiği üzere her ne kadar "düşmanlar," onlara dair bireysel anlatılarla yer bulsalar da, milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem onları Yahudilik üzerinden ortak bir paydada birleştirmektedir. Buna göre komünistler, dönmeler ve Masonlar Yahudilik üzerinden birbirine eklemlenmekte, ve Yahudi menfaatlerine hizmet etmekle itham edilmektedir. Bu bağlamda Özman ve Dede'nin (2012: 176) de dikkat

çektği üzerine, düşmanların kendi aralarında ve diğer "düşman" öznelerle kurduğu iddia edilen bu "birliğin" milliyetçi muhafazakar söylem açısından bir nevi "öteki"nin yaşamında arzulanan bir durumu belirtmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, komünistler, Yahudiler, dönmeler ve masonlar, onları Müslüman Türk milletine karşı konumlandıran milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemdeki toplumsal dikotominin düşman öznelerini oluşturmaktadır. Milliyetçi muhafazakar söylemde komünistlerin, Yahudilerin, dönmelerin ve masonların düşmanlaştırılması ise, onların Müslüman Türk milletinin refahı, saadeti ve huzuru önünde birer engel olarak resmedilmesi ve Müslüman Türk milletinin tarihinde oynadıkları yıkıcı rollerle anılmalarının yanı sıra onlara dair sunulan bireysel anlatılarla sağlanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda "mağduriyet" anlatıları kadar, onları "dinsizlik, ahlaksızlık, sapkınlık, ikiyüzlülük, köksüzlük, sadakatsizlik ve vefasızlık"la suçlayan anlatılar da onların düşmanlaştırılmasına dayanak sağlamaktadır.

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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