

ON THE WAY TO A NORMAL FOREIGN POLICY: GERMANY IN THE RED-  
GREEN YEARS (1998-2005)

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## **ABSTRACT**

**ON THE WAY TO A NORMAL FOREIGN POLICY: GERMANY IN THE RED-  
GREEN YEARS (1998-2005)**

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Germany and its distinctive foreign policy tradition started to experience both domestic and international changes after the end of the Cold War. However, the major changing movement came up with Germany's first post-war generation and their first red-green government. The objective of this thesis is to analyze change in foreign policy during the red-green government on the background of three important international crisis, Kosovo War in 1999, 9/11 Attacks and the Afghan War in 2001-2002, and the Iraq War in 2003. In this sense, foreign policy decisions of the red-green government in those crises and contribution to the political emancipation process toward a normal foreign policy are the topics covered along the chapters.

Keywords: German Foreign Policy, SPD, Greens, Normalization.

## ÖZ

### NORMAL BİR DIŞ POLİTİKA YOLUNDA: KIRMIZI-YEŞİL YILLARDA ALMANYA (1998-2005)

Şirin, Başar

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler

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Almanya ve kendine özgü dış politikası, Soğuk Savaş'ın sona ermesiyle hem iç hem de dış politikada değişiklikler yaşamaya başladı. Ancak Almanya için en büyük değişim Almanya'nın ilk savaş sonrası jenerasyonu ve bu jenerasyonun oluşturduğu kırmızı-yeşil koalisyonu ile ortaya çıktı. İşte bu tezin amacı, sosyal demokrat-yeşiller hükümeti dış politikasını, bu dönemde meydana gelen üç temel uluslararası kriz; 1999 Kosova Savaşı, 11 Eylül Terörist Saldırıları ve Afganistan Savaşı ve 2003 Irak Savaşı tabanında incelemektir. Bu bağlamda, kırmızı-yeşil hükümetin bu krizlerdeki dış politika tercihleri ve bu kararların Almanya'nın dış politika açısından normal bir dış politika olma yolunda özgürleşme sürecine katkısı tez içinde incelenen temel konulardır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Alman Dış Politikası, SPD, Yeşiller, Normalleşme.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

BND: German Federal Intelligence Service

CSU: Christian Social Union in Bavaria

CDU: Christian Democratic Union

EU: European Union

FDP: Free Democratic Party

GDP: Gross Domestic Product

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

KFOR: Kosovo Force

KLA: Kosovo Liberation Army

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PDS: Party of Democratic Socialism

SDP: Social Democratic Party of Germany

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSCR: United Nations Security Council Resolution

USA: United States of America

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

The end of the Second World War and the following new world order, which was established by the victorious powers of the war, created different challenges for almost all states. However; Germany had to face, without dispute, one of the most challenging situations among those countries because it was not only occupied after the war by four different states, it was also divided into two different states. Moreover, this large-scale destruction was very effective not only on German people as individuals but also on German collective mind, which shaped German foreign and security policy through the whole Cold War period.

The major development for after war Germany, dividing it into two different states was actually the solution of allied powers to the long lasting “German question”, which can be summarized as Germany’s middle position in Europe and being too powerful to be part of balance of power system and being not enough powerful to create a hegemony.<sup>1</sup> In that sense, West Germany’s full integration militarily with the NATO and politically with the European Union while leaving off the fate of the East Germany totally to the command of the USSR was a practical result of this understanding.

Although Germany’s full integration with the Western allies seemed to a solution, it was also obvious that this process with the West was not established under the principle of full sovereignty and equality. On the contrary, both politically and militarily Germany left part of its sovereignty to the NATO and Western Allies. As former Chancellor Willy Brandt once described, as “an economic giant, but a

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<sup>1</sup> Hans Kundnani, “Germany as a Geo-economic Power”, *The Washington Quarterly* 34, no. 3 (2011): 45.

political dwarf”<sup>2</sup>, Germany and its foreign policy had evaluated in a different way from its Western allies.

As it will be analyzed in detailed ways in the conceptual framework chapter, Germany’s special position formed a basis for a huge discussion on German foreign and security policy. Especially, the end of the Cold War and more importantly, reunification of two German states on October 3, 1990 had forced Germany to change its almost 40 years tradition of foreign policy. While for some prominent scholars like Peter Katzenstein, it was the “culture of restraint” which was established after the end of War but imposed by German decision makers self-consciously and transformed Germany into a “tamed power”<sup>3</sup>, some scholars saw the limitations on Germany as causes of Germany’s foreign trade-basis economic understanding and also being a model of new type of state like “civilian power” understanding. Of course, it should also be mentioned that especially after the reunification of Germany, the mainstream International Relations theories put more emphasis on German foreign policy which was exceptional case in the Cold War but a chance for mainstream theories to prove the strength of their theories.<sup>4</sup>

Under this important systemic change and at the same time Germany’s own political and public transformation, German foreign policy had also witnessed considerable changes with country’s first real post-World War II government. During the so called red-green years, from September 1998 until September 2005, Germany followed a political emancipation process toward a normal foreign policy step by step and the leader of Social Democratic Party of Germany, Gerhard Schröder, led this process as the Chancellor of Germany. Therefore, the main aim of this thesis is to enlighten the emancipation process of German foreign policy with the Red-Green coalition from 1998 to 2005 by focusing on three important

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<sup>2</sup> “Das Wort des Bundeskanzlers,” *Die Zeit Archiv*, October 1, 1965, <http://www.zeit.de/1965/40/das-wort-des-bundeskanzlers> (accessed April 4, 2014).

<sup>3</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997).

<sup>4</sup> Gunther Hellman, “Fatal Attraction? German Foreign Policy and IR/Foreign Policy Theory,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 12, no. 3 (2009):257.

international crises, 1998-1999 Kosovo War, the War in Afghanistan after September 11 attacks and the Iraq Invasion of US beginning from March 2003.

In that sense, several questions are aimed to be answered throughout a case study analyses and important theoretical contributions of prominent scholars, public or parliament speeches, official declarations, coalition agreements, television or newspaper interviews and also the memoirs of the decision-makers were used as main sources of information in order to show the change in foreign policy from the first hand. Those questions are:

*What were the main principles of Germany's foreign policy until the reunification of two German states?*

*How was German foreign policy affected by the end of the Cold War and the reunification?*

*What were the major factors that differentiated red-green government from its predecessors?*

*How was German foreign policy affected by German collective mind during the Kosovo War?*

*What were Germany's main motives to join War in Afghanistan?*

*How was German foreign policy shaped during the Iraq crisis?*

For this aim, in the first chapter of the thesis, specific theoretical approaches about German foreign policy will be discussed. In that sense, recently adopted versions of three main traditional German foreign policy understandings after the end of the Second World War; "tamed power", "civilian power" and "trading state" approaches will be analyzed. In addition to those traditional understandings, more recent "geo-economic power" understanding will be touched upon. After that, foreign policy understandings of three mainstream International Relations theories; "utilitarian liberalism", "social constructivism" and "political realism" with two distinctive versions, "offensive realism" and "defensive realism", will be evaluated. In this context, two key concepts of the thesis, normalization and emancipation, will

be explained in terms of German foreign policy and mostly from the defensive realist approach.

In the second chapter of the thesis, the main topic is the Kosovo War and its implications on the German foreign policy. However, before coming to that, a short story of after unification Germany and red-green government's coming to power will be mentioned. Following that, the main driving elements of German foreign policy will be covered with details and the emphasized points will be the process before taking decision of joining a military operation in Kosovo as first time after the Second World War and its future implications on the future decisions of the red-green government especially in terms of using military force as political instrument.

The third chapter will be allocated to the September 11 terrorist attacks and the following war in Afghanistan. In this chapter, the discourses of Germany's regained full sovereignty and taking responsibility as an equal state with its partners will be studied under the general framework of Germany's first out-of-NATO area operation in Afghanistan. Correspondingly, Schröder's putting his government at a risk to get mandate decision from the parliament and the different anti-terrorism war understandings of the United States and Germany are the other central points in this chapter.

The main issue in the last chapter of the thesis is the Iraq War. Especially, rapidly deteriorating relations between the United States and Germany because of strong opposition to war in German public together with September 2002 German federal election and the unilateral anti-terrorism approach of the United States will be main discussing issues in that chapter. Moreover, Germany's following its own national interests and its ability to say "no" against the Iraq War will be analyzed in terms of German foreign policy progress towards an "emancipated" foreign policy.

## CHAPTER II

### CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Germany and its distinctive foreign policy is a quite interesting topic in the literature. There are even many different foreign policy approaches which specifically try to explain the foreign policy behaviors of Germany. Although most of these theories were very much affected from the special position of West Germany after the Second World War and the reunification of two German states on 3 October 1990, they also tried to adapt themselves to the changing characteristics of the international system, especially with the late 1990's. At the same time, more comprehensive international relations theories like neorealism, neoliberalism or constructivism are interested in German foreign policy as well. Therefore, in order to understand the change and the continuity of the German foreign policy between 1998 and 2005, seven main approaches will be analyzed to be used for future analyses.

#### 2.1. Tamed Power

Starting with Peter Katzenstein's "Tamed Power" approach, he mainly concerns about the role of Germany after the end of the Cold War, specifically in Europe and the European Union. However, it is clear that that approach gives us important implications about the general tendencies of decision makers in Germany, especially in terms of reflecting national interest in that context. For Katzenstein, after the Second World War, German foreign policy lost the "power" concept and instead of this the policy makers embraced the "language of political responsibility".<sup>5</sup> While Anderson sees Germany's tendency as "reflexive support for

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<sup>5</sup> Katzenstein, *United Germany in an Integrated Europe*, 3.

exaggerated multilateralism,”<sup>6</sup> Katzenstein argues that this is actually the real motive behind Germany’s abstention from restoring its high profile and being the ultimate leader in the European Union.<sup>7</sup> However, what is the exact reason of this tendency or why does Germany not accept to restore its power? Here the answer for Katzenstein is very clear. According to him, the “culture of restraint”, one of the main principles of post-Second World War Germany, explains Germany’s distinctive policy choices. In fact, with “culture of restraint” he means institutionalization of German power through multilateral institutions and alliances. In a theory, Katzenstein argues, all institutions create individual norm, values and in such cases identities which come from common expectations of the members. Similarly, with these shared norms, values and identities, institutions do not only limit their choices but they also shape the actors and their identities. Of course for the German case, the European Union, the Atlantic Alliance and in a more general sense the United Nations constitute those main multilateral elements and as Katzenstein correctly argued like parents, who act for their family’s interest without taking into account their own interests, Germany shaped its own foreign policy in that way from the end of the Second World War until late 1990’s. The important point to be mentioned here is, on the other hand, this type of foreign policy was definitely not an idealist approach; contrary, it reflected totally the interests of Germany. However, all those interest were influenced by Europe and more specifically Germany’s new Europeanized identity.<sup>8</sup> More importantly, Katzenstein argues, not only the reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 did not change many things with Germany’s characteristics, but also for the future there will be no big change for German foreign policy preferences.<sup>9</sup>

Another important scholar who contributed to the concept of “tamed power” is Simon Bulmer. For him, Germany’s increasing power in the European Union over the last decades is also compatible with the “tamed power” approach. He sees this

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<sup>6</sup> Jeffrey J. Anderson, “Hard Interests, Soft Power, and Germany’s Changing Role in Europe”, in *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 85.

<sup>7</sup> Katzenstein, *United Germany in an Integrated Europe*, 2.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 14-15.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 38-48.



increasing power as an unintended result of Germany's domestic policies and general economic power such as Germany's monetary policy after the reunification and its direct effects on the European Union.<sup>10</sup> This so called "unintentional power", therefore, does not affect Germany's loyalty to the institutions of the European Union. However, like Katzenstein, he also points out that that does not mean that Germany does not follow its interests on behalf of the European Union rather they act according to the interests which were mostly shaped through those European institutions.<sup>11</sup>

Likewise, Jeffrey Anderson sees Germany's foreign policy approach as "exaggerated multilateralism" and claims that after unification of two German states, not only the domestic identity and policy preferences remained the same but also international expectations from Germany in the international system did not change drastically.<sup>12</sup>

## 2.2. Civilian Power

The second important approach of German foreign policy is "Civilian Power" approach mostly developed by Sebastian Harnisch and Hans Maull. Basing on Immanuel Kant's liberal "eternal peace" understanding and Karl Deutsch's "security communities" concept,<sup>13</sup> civilian power approach could be differentiated from the "tamed power" approach with its more liberal understanding. In fact, it both refers to an analytical tool to evaluate different foreign policies, a type of power which lets actors to reach their aims through special ways like constraining use of force and lastly a distinctive international actor which supports civilized international

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<sup>10</sup>Simon Bulmer, "Shaping The Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and the German Power," in *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 75.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>12</sup>Anderson, "Hard Interests, Soft Power, and Germany's Changing Role in Europe," 104.

<sup>13</sup> Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull, ed. *Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic* (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 4.

politics.<sup>14</sup> According to the three levels of analysis, on the other hand, the ultimate aim of a civilian power concept is to civilize the international system and international relations as a whole and to do that there are six main objectives. Those are;

- By promoting common security agreements, avoiding use of force both for domestic and international conflicts
- By promoting cooperative and integrative multilateralism, increasing rule of law in international arena
- Supporting democratic participation in domestic and international arenas
- Supporting peaceful conflict resolution methods
- Improving legitimization of international order by promoting social justice
- Supporting mutual dependence and division of labor through international system.<sup>15</sup>

In that point, it should be made clear that although the civilian power approach discourages the use of power in both internal and external conflicts, it does not totally reject the usage of military means. Rather it emphasizes international solidarity especially for protecting human rights and enhancing international law and with a clear mandate; it sees use of force as a possible way of policy.<sup>16</sup> Therefore, evaluating the civilian power approach as a naivety which follows eternal peace is a misunderstanding.

As this was a foreign policy approach that was developed mainly in the 1990's and mostly with Western Germany traditions, with changing structure of international system, reshaping of Western world especially in case of NATO and important international crises like Kosovo War, Afghanistan War and Iraq invasion

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., 5.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>16</sup> Nina Philippi, "Civilian power and war: the German debate about out-of-area operations 1990-99" in *Germany as a Civilian Power?: The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 64.

of the United States, the authors were forced to modify their arguments according to those recent events. While accepting those crises as important events which seem as breaking points of the traditional German foreign policy understanding, on the other hand, they still believe that the main principle of the civilian power approach, limiting the use of force or so called “culture of restraint” still stays at the German foreign policy roots.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.3. Trading State

The third important German foreign policy approach is the “trading state” concept developed by American scholar Richard Rosecrance. While basing the fact that changed characteristic of the international economic system does not need acquiring new land for the growth of the state anymore, he emphasizes importance of being active in world markets with their goods for any countries. Indeed, technological and industrial improvements were main reasons of this systemic change and it created much more efficient environment than former land acquiring based economic system and military power based foreign policies. Especially distinctive foreign policy preferences of Japan and Germany after the end of Second World War and their activeness in world markets with their high quality products, therefore, gave the international competition a new name; exporting. For him, these two distinctive examples of trading states were so successful that they became model of new type of states, so called “virtual states”.<sup>18</sup>

Similarly, Christian Hacke implies that trading state characteristic of Germany is so powerful that Germany and its “ideology of smallness” do not seek

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<sup>17</sup> Sebastian Harnisch, "Bound to fail? Germany's Policy in the Iraq Crisis 2001–2003" (paper presented at the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, September, 2003) 83, <http://www.deutsche-aussenpolitik.de/daparchive/dateien/2002/02232004xxx7.pdf>.

<sup>18</sup> Richard Rosecrance, "Rise of the Virtual State," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 45 (1996):46.

becoming a great power because with those very intensive trading relations it may deeply affect the other states both politically and economically.<sup>19</sup>

The important issue to highlight in that point is that with their putting distances to military power and use of force, the civilian power approach and trading state approach resemble each other. However, as Hans Kundnani emphasized, those two foreign policy approaches differentiate from each other with their ultimate aims. While the concept of civilian power follows more civilized international relations as a whole, including enhancement rule of law and avoiding use of force, the trading state approach aims improving economic performance and being active in global markets.<sup>20</sup>

#### **2.4. Geo-economic Power**

The forth and relatively more recent foreign German foreign policy perspective is proposed by Hans Kundnani. This so called “geo-economic” approach, in fact, could be seen on the bases of both Rosecrance’s trading state and Maull’s civilian power concepts. It emphasizes the fact that with the European integration since 1950’s and creation of European single market and European Monetary Union in 1990’s, it became impossible for Germany to follow former self-defined national interest based foreign policy. Indeed integration and interdependence had become two vital elements of German foreign policy. On the other hand, especially with 2000’s Germany’s civilian power approach has diminished. Both breaking of multilateral tradition during the Iraq War and increasing Euroscepticism in Europe made Germany and German foreign policy less strained than before. The main result

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<sup>19</sup> Christian Hacke. "Deutschland und Die Neue Weltordnung. Zwischen Innenpolitischer Überforderung und Außenpolitischen Krisen." *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 42 (1992): 3-16, quoted in Andrei S. Markovits, and Simon Reich, "The Contemporary Power of Memory: The Dilemmas for German Foreign Policy," *Communication Review* 2, no.1 (1997): 92.

<sup>20</sup> Kundnani, *Germany as a Geo-economic Power*, 33.

of that more freedom is, moreover, Germany's selectivity for different cases and taking decision according to their suitability<sup>21</sup>.

Within this new environment, Kundnani argues, following economy based foreign policy was both an internal and external necessity for Germany because of both the role of powerful business sector in Germany and intensive trade relations with almost all the world. Specifically, because Germany's exports create almost half of Germany's total GDP and two-thirds of total growth and because most of those trade relations were conducted with growing economics like Russia and China in addition to the European Union countries, German foreign policy decision makers should take into account all those elements. Therefore, he shows Germany's economic rather than political activeness in the European Union in order to provide price stability, focusing on trade relations rather than enhancement democracy, rule of law and freedom of speech in the relations with Russia and China and Germany's selectivity and time to time reluctance to act during the major political crises as proofs of his geo-economic power concept.<sup>22</sup>

Within all those examples of economy based explanations, Kundnani clearly differentiates his idea from Maull's civilian power approach. In other words, he does not see any purpose in German foreign policy for civilizing international relations. On the other hand, his differentiation from the trading state approach is more limited than civilian power concept. Especially, putting emphasis on the interest of Germany and binding the whole policy making process, even the decision of use of force, to the economic interest could be seen main points that differ those two understandings.

## **2.5. Utilitarian Liberalism**

In addition to those more specific foreign policy approaches, it is better to examine more comprehensive international relation theories in order to understand German foreign policy from different perspectives and compare them for future

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 34-35.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 41.

analyses. Starting with liberal international relations theory, an important liberal contribution may be seen in utilitarian-liberalism which was adapted to German foreign policy by Volker Rittberger and Corinna Freund. Defining basically as a combination of main liberal idea of foreign policy choices on the domestic factors and rational actor model of choice which aims maximizing of the utility, they propose two main assumptions for that idea. First, they are individual actors, not collective bodies, who make decisions and act according to them because individuals create collective bodies or collective bodies are composed of individuals. Second, all those actors try to maximize their utility. In that point, the main orientation of this utility concept is basic interests of the actors which secure their physical and social survival and then maximizing their gains.<sup>23</sup>

Turning to Germany's position in that context, the individual actors which he mentioned are political actors like chancellor, members of Bundestag and Bundesrat, administrative actors like members of military forces or central bank and political administrative organs like federal ministers. Moreover, private actors such as companies, economic pressure groups and political advocacy groups are part of the decision making process as well.<sup>24</sup>

For this view, therefore, because the reunification of Germany did not make huge changes in those actors, it did not actually affect the foreign policy of Germany and for the future it is likely that Germany will continue to follow a foreign policy which will be shaped by those different actors.<sup>25</sup>

With accepting actor-based level of analysis, examining those two liberal approaches shows how those theories can go other ways although their starting point is the same. However, Gunther Hellman concludes four main points of liberal German foreign policy to create a comprehensive understanding. First, on the basic principles of culture of restraint, integration and multilateralism, unified Germany

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<sup>23</sup> Corinna Freund and Volker Rittberger, "Utilitarian-Liberal Foreign Policy Theory," in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 68-79.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 81-89.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 99.

will not pursue autonomy policy. Rather Germany will be bound to multilateral institutions. Second and relating with the first point, Germany will not pursue self-defined national interests. Rather German foreign policy will be shaped together with those multilateral institutions. Third, because there are so many different actors who are active during policy-making process, it will be unlikely to capture one of those actors' position and making dramatic changes on the whole German foreign policy tendencies. Lastly, with the huge transformation process after the end of Second World War, two civilized foreign policy prototypes, Germany and Japan, will force United States to act in a more civilized sense in its international relations.<sup>26</sup>

## 2.6. Social Constructivism

The next more comprehensive foreign policy approach is social constructivism. The first point to mention here is many constructivist scholars see the division between international politics and foreign policy analysis unnecessary, therefore their analyses put those two fields together.<sup>27</sup> In fact, if someone looks at foreign policy decision-making processes of both liberalism and constructivism, it is very clear that both those theories put somewhat similar approaches on the issue of defining interest with an actor based structure. In other words, not the international system itself rather individual actors take part in decision making process. However, they differentiate from each other on the issue that how they define their interests. Unlike rational decision making choice of liberalism, constructivism approaches the issue from identity and social norms perspective. As Alexander Wendt openly points out, "*(I)dentities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a 'portfolio' of interests that they carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in the process of defining situations.*"<sup>28</sup> In other words, main actors shape their interests according to their own identities but the point is all those

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<sup>26</sup> Hellman, "Fatal Attraction? German Foreign Policy and IR/Foreign Policy Theory," 260-261.

<sup>27</sup> Vendulka Kubalkova, *Foreign policy in a constructed world*, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 15.

<sup>28</sup> Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International organization* 46, no.2 (1992):398.

identities also shaped by the socially constructed world that they live. In short, putting the social world on the table, those socially constructed interests constitute the basis of foreign policy choices.

When we look from the German foreign policy perspective, constructivist theory, which was also adapted to German foreign policy by Volker Rittberger, Henning Boekle and Wolfgang Wagner, they put emphasis on social norms rather than identities. That so-called “norm-consistent foreign policy” is actually consisted of two different traditions. The first one is transnational constructivism which emphasizes importance of international norms and values shared among states for foreign policy decisions. Societal constructivism, on the other hand, takes domestic norms which are shared by the citizens as determining factor of foreign policy decisions.<sup>29</sup> Making those two international and societal norms together, scholars create distinctive foreign policy approach for Germany.

In spite of the fact that German foreign policy choices are affected at both those two levels of expectations, for them it is wrong to say which one is more affective and it is hard to make reliable general predictions about the future tendencies. Because all those norms and values are open to changes in anytime, therefore, case by case empirical examinations are needed for successful German foreign policy predictions.<sup>30</sup>

## 2.7. Neorealism

The last theoretical approach to discuss here will be neorealism and its recent variations. As Kenneth Waltz previously mentioned, neorealism as a theory does not have specific foreign policy analysis. Rather this approach prefers systemic analysis of international politics and only through this analysis some implications for foreign

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<sup>29</sup> Henning Boekle, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, “Constructivist Foreign Policy Theory,” in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, ed. Volker Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 105-106.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 132-133.



policy choices might be derived. Other than that it is impossible for a theory being both international politics and foreign policy theory<sup>31</sup> and therefore, it is hard to make meaningful predictions about the foreign policies of the particular states. On the other hand, Colin Elman and his foreign policy approach in neorealism could be seen as a remarkable point in that issue. Especially in his article “Why not Neorealist Theories of Foreign Policy”, he points out possibility and indeed necessity of neorealist foreign policy theory.<sup>32</sup> For him, the important element to be underlined for neorealist foreign policy understanding is taking domestic level forces into account. Therefore, he criticizes neorealist scholars for their omitting domestic-level forces from their analysis even if they mention it should be included.<sup>33</sup>

The other important point he mentioned about neorealist foreign policy is the dichotomy between states’ motivations behind their actions.<sup>34</sup> In other words, lack of clear choice between defensive motives and offensive motives creates an uncertainty for neorealist foreign policy understanding. In that point, the better way to understand neorealist foreign policy is to analyze it within two variations; offensive realism and defensive realism.

As it is widely known, one of the most discussed issues within realist thought in the recent years is a dichotomy between offensive realism of John J. Mearsheimer and defensive realism represented mostly by Kenneth Waltz and Stephen Walt. Actually, taking the vital elements of neorealism which claim that states seek their own interests and try to increase their powers in the anarchical international system is common in both variations. However, the major difference is answering the question: how they try to increase their power, with an offensive way or a defensive

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<sup>31</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, "International Politics is not Foreign Policy." *Security Studies*, 6, no.1 (1996): 54-57.

<sup>32</sup> Colin Elman, "Horses for courses: Why not neorealist theories of foreign policy?," *Security Studies* 6, no.1 (1996): 7-53.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 34.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 29-30.

way?<sup>35</sup> As it was mentioned earlier on, including domestic state behaviors into the analysis is one of the main determining points for a meaningful foreign policy theory and in that point answering this main theoretical question is actually very important for realist foreign policy analysis.

Starting with offensive realism, the main assumption of this approach is that states always seek their security by reducing other's security and therefore, there is an unavoidable and constant conflict in the anarchical international system.<sup>36</sup> As Mearsheimer also puts it, the best way for states to secure their position in a dangerous international system is increasing their power because "*the greater the military advantage one state has over other states, the more secure it is*"<sup>37</sup> From that point, Mearsheimer openly draws a picture of realism that binds states totally to their self-help. On the other hand, defensive realism claims that states do not necessarily reduce other's security in order to increase their own. Therefore, the international system is not always and inevitably conflictual, even if it can possibly be conflictual.<sup>38</sup> Kenneth Waltz sees this issue also from the balance of power issue. According to him, the security seeking process for both powerful states and weak states is equally dangerous. That is to say, either being too powerful or being too weak can open states to external threats and the perfect way to escape from this conflict is to restore balance between states.<sup>39</sup>

Although with those two variants of neorealism, especially with the defensive realism, neorealism seems to have become a much more meaningful approach for foreign policy analysis, the distinctive characteristics of the German foreign policy was still not discussed enough from those points. As Masala also argues, in the last

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<sup>35</sup> Evan Braden Montgomery, "Breaking Out of the Security Dilemma: Realism, Reassurance, and the Problem of Uncertainty," *International Security*, 31, no.2 (2006): 151-185.

<sup>36</sup> Shiping Tang, "Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis," *European Journal of International Relations* 16, no.1 (2010): 35.

<sup>37</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions." *International Security* 19, no. 3 (1994): 5-49.

<sup>38</sup> Tang, "Social Evolution of International Politics: From Mearsheimer to Jervis," 35.

<sup>39</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 2010), 126-127.

decade German scientists were very much prone to name neorealism as obsolete and inappropriate theoretical approach for Germany.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, with some changes, the theoretical work of Volker Rittberger, Rainer Baumann and Wolfgang Wagner again plays important role for neorealist explanation of German foreign policy.

For those writers; with their explanations, neither offensive realism nor defensive realism is advanced enough to become a foreign policy theory. Therefore, they propose their own explanation of realist foreign policy within two variations; neorealism and modified neorealism. While accepting all states seek to pursue traditional power politics of neorealism, their emphasized point in this analysis is which form of power states pursue; autonomy or influence seeking policy. Their clear answer to this question, on the other side, "*the higher the security pressure on a state, the greater its concern will be to preserve or even extend its autonomy. In contrast, the lower the security pressure on a state, the more it will be ready to accept autonomy losses for gains in influence.*"<sup>41</sup> In other words, the main determining power behind states' foreign policy choices is their concern about the security they have because lack of any security threat for a particular state gives that state a flexible condition that lets state be more active in enhancing influence in different areas.

Although those scholars do not see offensive and defensive variations of realism adequate for foreign policy analysis and prefer to invent new term rather than using those two variants, unfortunately their modified realism understanding could not be differentiated radically from the defensive realism understanding in a theoretical sense. Moreover, more recent contributions to the defensive realism literature shared almost the same explanations with their modified realism understanding. Especially, the role of newly added factors like technology, geography, economy and their effects on security dilemma actually originated from

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<sup>40</sup> Carlo Masala, "Don't Worry, Be Happy. Eine Erwiderung auf Gunther Hellmann," *Welt-Trends, Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik und vergleichende Studien* 43 (2004): 52-56.

<sup>41</sup> Rainer Baumann, Volker Rittberger and Wolfgang Wagner, "Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory," in *German Foreign Policy Since Unification: Theories and Case Studies*, ed. Rittberger (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 55

the post-classical realism concept of Stephen Brooks.<sup>42</sup> However, it is also recently argued that post-classical realism is in fact tolerably equivalent to the defensive realism approach.<sup>43</sup>

On that mentioned framework, for the autonomy-dominated offensive approach firstly, they believe that especially after unification, Germany will seek to increase at power in terms of both autonomy and influence. However, if Germany experiences a conflict between those two choices, autonomy will be the preference of German decision makers. On the contrary, from the influence seeking more defensive perspective, Germany will again seek to increase her power in both ways but in case of conflict, influence will be the first choice.<sup>44</sup>

## **2.8. Normality and the Political Emancipation of German Foreign Policy**

As it will be one of the core issues of future analyses in this thesis, explaining the concepts of normality and the political emancipation is very important to create a more comprehensive understanding. Starting with the normality concept, there are actually three main normality perspectives in the recent German foreign policy discussions. Firstly, the concept of normality is used to describe the relations between the Germany's Nazi past and its effects on today's foreign policy decision process. In other words, following an unrestrained and self-assured foreign policy by breaking with the Nazi past is the first common normality understanding in German foreign policy discussions. Secondly, with the normality concept Germany is described as a "normal" ally in the NATO alliance and it acts like any other state in the NATO, which Germany had been bound for a long time. Also here the notion of *bündnisfähigkeit* or ability to be an effective member is the important part of the second normality understanding. Lastly, with the normality of the German foreign

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<sup>42</sup> Baumann, Rittberger, Wagner, *Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory*, 54-55.

<sup>43</sup> Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking Under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," *International Security* 25, no.3 (2006): 134.

<sup>44</sup> Baumann, Rittberger, Wagner, *Neorealist Foreign Policy Theory*, 65.

policy, it is meant Germany's following its national interests as a sovereign state.<sup>45</sup> As it is clearly seen, despite their three different emphasizing points, those three normality approaches are not totally independent from the each other and they are mostly compatible with neorealist foreign policy understanding. Especially, pursuing a self-confident and national interest based foreign policy together with using military forces as a political mean, within NATO framework and in a defensive ways, reflects the basics of realist foreign policy understanding. Therefore, creating a common normality understanding which includes realist elements from all three approaches could be seen as a more comprehensive normality conceptualization. In short, German foreign policy with three mainly realist points; independency from its Nazi past, ability to act similarly with any other state in NATO alliance and following its national interests, is the definition of a "normal" foreign policy for Germany through the thesis.

Relating with the normality issue, the political emancipation process, on the other hand, refers to Germany's attempts to reach a normal foreign policy and is mainly characterized by the "Salami Tactics" which basically propose the needs to adapt German foreign policy according to the necessities of the new international system. Because it is not easy to change the foreign policy dramatically in the one night, German policy makers followed those changes step by step like cutting salami slice after slice.<sup>46</sup> Relating with that idea, three serious international crises will be discussed in the following chapters as the important steps of the political emancipation process of the German foreign policy toward a normal foreign policy.

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<sup>45</sup> Hans Kundnani, "The Concept of Normality in German Foreign Policy since Unification," *German Politics & Society*, 30, no.2 (2012): 39.

<sup>46</sup> Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality," *German Politics* 10, no.1 (2001): 64.

## CHAPTER III

### THE RED-GREEN GOVERNMENT AND THE KOSOVO WAR

#### 3.1. German Foreign Policy between 1989 and 1998

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 and the reunification of Germany on October 3, 1990 came with too many consequences for Germany. From this point; in addition to Germany's new internal challenges, its allies and partners started to increase their expectations from Germany and wanted Germany to be more active in the international arena by taking more responsibility. In fact, it was actually the biggest foreign policy challenge of Germany in 1990's to fulfill those new expectations while pursuing its traditional foreign policy understanding.<sup>47</sup> However, here the real question was are German politics and public opinion ready to adapt themselves to those new challenges?

Following the unification and the end of the Cold War, the first serious challenge came actually not very late for Germany. When "Operation Desert Storm" was launched by coalition forces on January 17, 1991 after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, it was only 3 months after the reunification. Therefore, it was very normal that Germany did not have enough time to tackle with this crisis effectively. In fact, when the crisis first came out, chancellor Kohl did not reject the participation at the very first moment. However, after discussions with coalition partner the FDP and the foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Kohl remained reluctant because the official position of the FDP was that German constitution does not allow Germany to

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<sup>47</sup> Helga Haftendorn, "Gulliver in the Center of Europe: International Involvement and National Capabilities for Action," in *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, ed. Bertel Heurlin (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), 113.

participate any out-of-area military operation.<sup>48</sup> Following this not participating decision to the Gulf War, Germany's other reluctance was to send Alpha jets to Turkey, which triggered criticisms about Germany's role in the NATO and the Western Alliance. Germany's answer to those criticisms, nevertheless, was nothing but following "checkbook diplomacy." To do that, Germany contributed to coalition forces with 16 billion Deutsche Marks to compensate not joining the operation and the expectations from its allies.<sup>49</sup>

According to Nina Philippi, there are mainly three reasons that prevent Germany to join any military operation during the Cold War period. The first one is Germany's Nazi past and reluctance to use of force after the Second World War. Actually, this approach was supported by the NATO and particularly by the United States. Also, this external protection against any Soviet threat caused Germany to internalize the trading state identity and gave a chance to focus on domestic production. The second reason is the fear of conflict between the soldiers of West and East Germany in any place over the world. In other words, by taking part in military operations of Western alliance, Germany also could have to face the risk of confronting the forces of Communist alliance which might include soldiers from East Germany. The last one is hindering any potential fear from Germany's intentions originated from the Second World War and showing a good intention whenever it is possible.<sup>50</sup> As it was clearly seen during the Gulf War crisis, all those three factors disappeared with the reunification of Germany and the end of bipolar world structure. In accordance with that, this international structural change also revealed the need of Germany to reshape its foreign and security policies.

Unsurprisingly, the German government also recognized this urgent need. However, those fundamental changes did not occur suddenly. As it was mentioned earlier with the "Salami Tactics" understanding, German governments followed a policy to adapt German foreign policy according to the needs of the new international system and German decision-makers intentionally embraced "use of

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<sup>48</sup> Philippi, *Civillian Pover and War: The German Debate about out-of-area Operations 1990-99*, 50.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 50-51.

force” as an instrument of foreign policy. However, while it is not easy to change the foreign policy dramatically in the one night, German policy makers followed those changes step by step like cutting salami slice after slice.<sup>51</sup> In fact, as it is shown on table 1,<sup>52</sup> the military operations which Germany participated between 1989 and 1999 openly show this gradual progress of German activeness in the foreign military operations.

Table-1: German Participation in Military Operations between 1989 and 1998

<b>Conflict/Military Operation</b>	<b>Scope of German Participation</b>
Namibia 1989 Peace-keeping operation (UNTAG)	Contribution to international police force
Gulf War 1990/91	Financial and logistical support only; Dispatch of 200 soldiers and 18 fighter jets to Turkey as part of a NATO contingent
Cambodia 1991-92 Peace-keeping operation (UNAMIC)	Medical troops
Adriatic 1992-96 Monitoring of embargo against FRY (Operation Sharp Guard)	Naval forces (‘no combat operation’)
Somalia 1993-94 (UNOSOM II)	Supply and transport units
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993-95 (UNPROFOR)	Logistical support only (airlifts to Sarajevo etc.)
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993-95 monitoring of no-fly zone; NATO air strikes against FRY	Air-force personnel as part of AWACS unit; No participation in NATO air strikes
Georgia, since 1994 (UNOMIG)	10 German medical officers and military observers as part of UN peace-keeping force
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995-96 (IFOR)	Some 3,000 non-combat ground troops, stationed in Croatia

<sup>51</sup> Baumann and Hellmann, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality, 64.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 67.



Table-1: Continued

Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996 (SFOR)	Some 3,000 ground troops (including combat troops), stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina
Iraq 1998 US-led air raids	Offer to grant US the use of military bases in Germany; no participation in attacks
Kosovo/FRY since 1998 (KVM; air strikes; KFOR)	Participation in unarmed OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission; Participation in NATO air strikes (no UN Security Council mandate); Contribution to KFOR with some 8,000 ground troops

Source: Rainer Baumann and Gunther Hellmann, "Germany and the Use of Military Force: 'Total War', the 'Culture of Restraint' and the Quest for Normality," *German Politics* 10, no.1 (2001): 67

The second important crisis for German foreign policy after the unification, Yugoslav War of Dissolution, broke out just six month after the Gulf War. The situation worsened with the Bosnian War starting from the April 1992. In that time, the legal decision of German constitutional court about the Article 87a of German Basic Law was a real catalyst that allows Germany's participation in foreign military operations. Originally, this article of the German Basic Law states that "*Apart from defense, the armed forces may be used only to the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law.*"<sup>53</sup> As it was seen, this article was very much open to any interpretation and German politicians preferred to interpret it as prohibition of foreign military operations.<sup>54</sup> In that context, constitutional court's decision on 12 July 1994 mainly implied two things. Firstly, if it is part of the collective security agreements that Germany belongs to, the Basic Law does not prohibit the participation in military operations. Secondly, for the decision of participation, nevertheless, consent of the

<sup>53</sup> Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, Art. 87a.

<sup>54</sup> Josef Joffe, "No Threats, No Temptations: German Grand Strategy After the Cold War," in *Germany in Europe in the Nineties*, ed. Bertel Heurlin (London: Macmillan Press,1996), 261.

Bundestag was needed in any case.<sup>55</sup> Together with that, although the decision of the constitutional court was an important turning point for German foreign policy, it still did not prevent Germany from not joining NATO airstrikes during Bosnian War. However, many serious incidents in Bosnia War like Srebrenica Massacre affected deeply Germany's future out-of-area operations discussion.

In general, as Hüseyin Bağcı also mentioned, German foreign policy had experienced three important changes after reunification period. Firstly, re-Germanization period of German foreign policy started unlike NATO and the European Union oriented foreign policy choices. Secondly, unlike an increasing re-Germanization trend, German foreign policy wanted to remain in European integration process. However, the crucial factor at this point was Germany's willing to determine European policies as the motor power of the European Union. Lastly, after reunification, German domestic issues started to take more important role during the decision making process of the German foreign policy.<sup>56</sup> Therefore, as a whole, the period after 1989 could be seen a transformation process for German foreign policy to the needs of the new international system and the government change in Germany together with the first fully participated military operation in 1999 were the starting points of a totally new era in German foreign policy.

### **3.2. The 1998 Federal Elections and the Red-Green Government**

The year 1998 was not only the 16<sup>th</sup> year of Chancellor Helmut Kohl in his tenure but also the year he entered his fifth constitutive federal elections. In such a long time as a government leader, he was both the father of German reunification

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<sup>55</sup>Dieter Dettke, ed., *Germany Says "No": the Iraq War and the Future of German Foreign and Security Policy* (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 85.

<sup>56</sup>Hüseyin Bağcı, *Güvenlik politikaları ve risk analizi çerçevesinde Balkanlar: 1991-1993* (Dış Politika Enstitüsü: Ankara, 1994) 51-52.

and the Euro currency as well.<sup>57</sup> In the main opposition, on the other hand, there was another experienced politician Gerhard Schröder who was recently re-elected for his third time as the prime minister of Lower Saxony with almost 50 percent of the popular votes. Although Schröder was not too young, he had actually a new globally popular idea behind him, a third way, which was represented by Bill Clinton and it recently came to power in that time with Tony Blair in the United Kingdom.<sup>58</sup> In addition to Schröder's increasing popularity, newly emerged domestic problems originated from the reunification and particularly the historical high point of unemployment rates was another crucial topic during the pre-election period.<sup>59</sup> At the end, the German federal election took place on September 27, 1998 and the results led to the establishment of the first center-left government in Germany with the Social Democratic Party and the Alliance 90/The Greens.

Apart from being the first center-left federal government, another importance of this coalition was realizing the generational change in German politics. As it is known, members of the previous generation in Germany, including Helmut Kohl, were generally born before the Second World War and they experienced all the bad memories of the war. However, with red-green coalition for the first time, members of the post-war generation came into power. This generally so called "68'er generation" had two main characteristics in itself. First of all, they were born commonly after the end of the Second World War and therefore they did not experience the war. Second, they were influenced much or less from the West German student movements during the late 1960's. Although Schröder did not participate directly in the student movements like the leader of the Greens and the vice-chancellor, Joschka Fischer, he was actually involved in new left movement in

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<sup>57</sup>The Federal Chancellor, "Helmut Kohl (1982-1998)," *Chancellory*, [http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Webs/BKin/EN/Chancellery/Timeline\\_Federal\\_Chancellors\\_since\\_1949/Kohl/kohl\\_node.html](http://www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Webs/BKin/EN/Chancellery/Timeline_Federal_Chancellors_since_1949/Kohl/kohl_node.html) (accessed 05 Apr. 2014).

<sup>58</sup> For Third Way and the recent discussions; Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cornwall: Polity Press, 2013).

<sup>59</sup> Stefan Zagelmeyer, "Nationwide Protests as Unemployment Reaches New Record High," *Eironline*, Feb. 28, 2002, <http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/1998/02/feature/de9802148f.htm>

the 1970's and was still very much influenced by those 68 movement's ideas. Therefore, he could easily be claimed as a part of "68'er generation."<sup>60</sup>

In order to understand the effect of 68 generation into German politics in those times, the "debate of victims" in the late 1990's and early 2000's should also be well understood. The main issue in this debate was the positions of Germans as not only executioners but also the victims of the Second World War. Those who believed Germans were also victims of the war had mainly three arguments. First, they believed Germans in Soviet occupied zones after the war were the victims of Soviet Army atrocities for a long time. Thus, they were also affected by the war as its victims. Second, because of huge bombardments of allies during the war in cities like Hamburg or Dresden, it caused not only massive destructions in German cities, it also caused huge numbers of civil casualties in those cities. Third, the expulsion of Germans from the lands of former German Empire like Poland and Czech Republic created serious casualties and fatalities for those people.<sup>61</sup> Although, from time to time, public tendencies about this debate had changed and therefore it is hard to specify the more influential side; at least in two major cases, we can see clear decision of German public. While in Kosovo case, Germans were perceived by collective memories as perpetrators, during the Iraq War, the opposite idea was more influential in public debates.<sup>62</sup> If the debate is seen from the generational perspective, on the other hand, it can be rightly said that unlike former German generations and politicians; for the 68 generation, referring to Germans as victims of the Second World War was completely normal.<sup>63</sup> In fact, as it will be analyzed comprehensively in the following chapters, this normality understanding could be seen one of the main driving forces of German foreign policy emancipation process during red-green government years.

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<sup>60</sup> Hans Kundnani, "Perpetrators and Victims: Germany's 1968 Generation and Collective Memory," *German Life and Letters* 64, no.2 (2011): 281.

<sup>61</sup> Piotr Buras and Kerry Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force," *European Security* 13, no.3 (2004):224.

<sup>62</sup> Kundnani, "Perpetrators and Victims: Germany's 1968 Generation and Collective Memory," 280.

<sup>63</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, 26.

Gerhard Schröder and his vice-Chancellor Joschka Fischer were explicitly not focusing on foreign policy issues when they officially established the government on October 27, 1998. Their main focusing point was domestic policies and the most important proof of this orientation was the coalition agreement between the SPD and the Greens. In the total 51 pages of the coalition agreement, both parties had allocated only 5.5 pages for external relations and in those pages, the main topic was Germany's loyalty to the existing international alliances.<sup>64</sup> In addition to that, during the debates about the future of German foreign policy before the election, Schröder promised not to change German foreign policy directions.<sup>65</sup> However, the Kosovo War as a very huge crisis just at the doors of the European Union had already waited for the new government and it occupied Germany's internal and external agenda.

### **3.3. 1998-1999 Kosovo War**

Although the 1995 Dayton Agreement finished the military conflict between the Serbs, Bosnians and Croats, it was in that time still too early to argue that the Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution were ended completely. On the contrary, the forgotten minority group of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Albanians in Kosovo, started to fight against the Serbs under the organization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1995. Although the KLA was originally found in 1990 after losing Kosovo's autonomy status within Yugoslav Federation, it was mostly inactive during the independence wars of Slovenes, Croats and Bosnians. Still, with the series of attacks against Serbian forces, it had already been denounced as a terrorist group not only by the Serbian government but also by many foreign countries.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> German Federal Government, *Koalitionsvereinbarung zwischen der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands und BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN*, October 20, 1998.

<sup>65</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, p.142.

<sup>66</sup> Alpaslan Özerdem, "From a 'Terrorist' Group to a 'Civil Defence' Corps: The 'Transformation' of the Kosovo Liberation Army," *International Peacekeeping* 10, no.3 (2003): 80.

The killings of KLA leaders by Serbian forces in February 1998, after the new attacks of the KLA, rapidly deteriorated the conflict between the two sides. Especially, the KLA intensified its attacks and Serbian response to this increasing tension was more brutal. However, the diplomatic attempts and the embargo threats of the Contact Group, which was composed of United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Russia together with representatives from the EU and the NATO, had not been effective at the first stage. In fact, in those time period between intensified conflicts and the NATO air bombings, about 2000 people from both sides were killed and about 400,000 people were displaced because of the war.<sup>67</sup> Finally, in the following days of the Racak massacre on January 15, 1999, the allies decided to intervene in Kosovo on March 23, 1999. The “Operation Allied Force”, under the command of NATO took more than 2 months and when the operation was ended on June 10 and the Kumanova Agreement were concluded between NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Serbian government, the war left behind more than 13,000 people dead from both sides.<sup>68</sup> Moreover, with this agreement, the Yugoslav War of Dissolution came to end after more than 8 years and with the founding of several new countries in Europe.

In terms of German foreign policy, the Kosovo War was a very complex case. When the Kosovo Crisis broke out and the conflict was intensified by reciprocal actions of the KLA and the Serbian government in the summer of 1998, Germany was preparing for the federal election which took place in September 1998. However, the Kosovo issue had never become a major topic for election discussions. On the other hand, the tendencies of the leaders toward any military operation in Kosovo were more or less apparent. On the one hand, Chancellor Kohl was skeptical about the fully participation into allied forces against Serbian troops. He preferred mainly diplomatic negotiations for a solution. For the other top-candidate Schröder, the issue was more complicated. As it is widely known, an anti-war leftist wing had always been effective in the Social Democratic Party of Germany for a long time and

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<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

<sup>68</sup> Humanitarian Law Center, “List of Killed, Missing and Disappeared 1998-2000,” September 30, 2011, [http://www.hlc-rdc.org/db/kkp\\_en/index.html](http://www.hlc-rdc.org/db/kkp_en/index.html) (Accessed May 12, 2014).

they were again not supportive of participation in a war. Nevertheless, before the election, Schröder openly indicated his support for a military operation in Kosovo under necessary conditions.<sup>69</sup> Therefore, after the election as Chancellor of Germany, the future position of Schröder together with his vice-Chancellor Fischer about Kosovo War was pretty much clear. So much so that on October 9, 1998 in their very first foreign visit to the United States, even before the official beginning of their term, Schröder and Fischer ensured Clinton to support collective military action if the crisis goes to that point. Finally, on October 16, 1998, German parliament allowed 14 Tornado aircrafts and 500 soldiers to join NATO-led “Operation Allied Force” with the support of two government parties and two opposition parties, the CDU/CSU group and the FDP.<sup>70</sup> Similarly, after the air-campaign, Germany also fully joined the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission of the NATO in the summer of 1999. In general, Germany’s joining into the first out-of-area military operation after the Second World War and taking a combative role had a strong symbolic meaning to show that Germany will not pursue its traditional foreign policy understanding. Nevertheless, Germany’s decision of participation in Kosovo operation was not an easy decision as it seemed.

### **3.4. Determinants of Germany’s Participation Decision**

Germany’s Kosovo War decision, in fact, was affected by both external and internal factors and both factors were equally important for German foreign policy choices.

Starting with the first external factor, not only for Germany but also for Europe as a whole, the unwillingness of the United States to contribute militarily for any prospective Kosovo operation was the most important issue that shaped the

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<sup>69</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, 90-92.

<sup>70</sup> Hanns Maull, “Germany’s Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?” in *Germany as a Civilian Power?*, ed. Sebastian Harnisch and Hanns Maull (New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 107.

Kosovo policies of those states. In that time, having the majority in U.S. Congress, the Republican Party fiercely opposed to any military operation in Kosovo. Especially lack of American interest and seeing the issue as a problem of Europe itself were the main arguments of Republican congress people.<sup>71</sup> In addition to that, failing of a resolution in the House of Representatives which authorized the President to conduct military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia<sup>72</sup> made the case more serious for European states including Germany.

After huge discussions, in the final position, the United States joined the NATO bombings of Yugoslavia and following Kosovo Force with the personal decision of Bill Clinton with declaring state of emergency. However, his decision of action without congressional authorization and justifying himself by arguing that he had to fulfill the obligations coming from the United Nations or the NATO as commander in chief of U.S. army triggered further political discussions in the United States.<sup>73</sup>

Secondly, after the United States, Russia was one of the key actors in this crisis and all the Western countries should keep Russians in consideration before they act during the Kosovo crisis. Although Russia was a member of the Contact Group which had dealt with the War in Yugoslavia since early 1990's, it had special position in that group in two main senses and those factors influenced effectively the decisions of Russia. Firstly, except Russia, all the members of the Contact Group were members of the NATO as well. Therefore, it was not a surprise that Russia found itself in a hard situation while working together with that group of countries. Most importantly, while the NATO is on the one side and was also struggling for replacing its former position with a new mission in the new international system after the end of the Cold War, Russia on the other side was seriously threatened by

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<sup>71</sup> Sabrina P. Ramet, "The USA: To War in Europe Again," in *The Kosovo Crisis: The Last American War in Europe*, ed. Tony Weymouth and Henig Stanley (London: Pearson Education, 2001):164-165.

<sup>72</sup> United States Congress, Kosovo Resolution, 1999, 106th Cong., 1.sess., Washington D.C., <https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/sconres21>.

<sup>73</sup> John C. Yoo, "Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 148, (2000): 1673-1731.



those new efforts. Especially, the idea of not being a determinant power and feeling of isolation in Balkans, which is actually not too far from Russia geographically, were clearly problematic issues for Russian political elites.<sup>74</sup> Secondly, the one side of the Kosovo War, the Serbs, was ethnically bonded with Russians. As Mendeloff argued, the “Myth of Slavic Brotherhood” was in fact very effective on not only Russian public opinion but also Russian decision makers. Also, their strong belief in being protector of the Slavs throughout the history caused many misperceptions about what happens in Kosovo.<sup>75</sup> In so much that there were even many Russians who participated into the Kosovo War within Serbian front in an informal ways.<sup>76</sup> As it was expected, all those concerns motivated Russia to prevent the United Nation Security Council from adopting a resolution. On the contrary, this attitude of Russia forced Western countries to intervene in the region on their own beginning of an air-bombing over Serbia. Nevertheless, it should be also mentioned that after the “Operation Allied Force”, Russia did not resist any more and approved the existence of foreign military forces in Kosovo with the UNSCR 1244 and actively participated into missions of Kosovo Force (KFOR).

Thirdly, even if the negative approach of Russia toward Kosovo intervention had forced Western countries to act themselves, similar to the United States and Russia, the European countries also experienced a tough situation with the crisis. However, this crisis was dangerous not only for the individual European countries, but also for the European Union as an actor. As it was discussed above, during the first phases of the crisis, United States Senate was overwhelmingly against a military operation and failing of a resolution was a clear indicator of this tendency. Actually, in that time period, the European Union was also split into two sides as supporter vs. skeptical, but more importantly there was no confidence on the military capacity of the European Union, even if all members agreed on a military action. Within these

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<sup>74</sup>Oksana Antonenko, "Russia, NATO and European Security After Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (1999):124

<sup>75</sup>David Mendeloff, "Pernicious History' as a Cause of National Misperceptions Russia and the 1999 Kosovo War," *Cooperation and Conflict* 43, no.1 (2008):31-56.

<sup>76</sup>Rowland Jacky, "World: Europe Fighting for a Foreign Land," *BBC News*, May 20, 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/348340.stm>. (Accessed April 10, 2014)

two sides, four European leaders, English Prime Minister Tony Blair, French President Jacques Chirac, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema, were involved in the crisis more effectively. While Blair was supportive of military operation from the beginning, others believed in dialogue and diplomatic solutions. Only after the failure of diplomatic negotiations with Milosevic and the latest supportive decision of German government, European leaders started to think about military operation. On the other hand, as Blair also argued, they immediately recognized that the 85 percent of military asset that could be used in any European military operation actually belonged to Americans.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, the European countries had just only one option, to convince President Clinton to join a military operation under the umbrella of the NATO. Without doubt, the European Union was lucky in that case but more importantly the members understood how weak the Union was even to step in a crisis just beside their borders. In this regard, decision of the union members to have a stable and ready military force to react in an emergency case was a necessary and at the same time normal development.

As it was clearly seen, reactions of the United States, Russia and the European Union during the Kosovo crisis were important external factors that affected Germany's final decision. On the other hand, the red-green government had to face several internal problems as well before taking participation decision.

First of all, the popular "debate of out-of-area operations" in Germany was an important driving force for Germany's foreign policy during the Kosovo crisis. In fact, this debate was going on through all 1990's and mainly was related to the increasing number of German contributions to international military operations day by day, even if Germany had not participated in any of those operations fully. For those who oppose the idea of participation, this process was actually a slow "militarization" process and was dangerous for the future of German foreign policy. On the other hand, those who see this process as a "normalization" of German foreign policy argued that sharing the burden of its allies and acting similar like them was nothing but normal. Thus, there is nothing to fear from Germany's military

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<sup>77</sup> Tony Blair, *A journey: My Political Life* (New York: Random House LLC, 2010) 218.

actions in a multilateral context.<sup>78</sup> In addition, the Kosovo crisis influenced this debate in a more complicated way because during this crisis, the debate was not the confrontation of two camps; namely, the supporter of peace vs. greedy military supporters. Rather, more complex political and moral principles had been taken into account.<sup>79</sup> In that point, vice-Chancellor of the new government, Joschka Fischer could be seen as one concrete example of that problematic confrontation. As leader of a political movement which almost totally comes from the idea of peace and pacifism, it was definitely a hard decision to situate in a war-supportive side in this debate. In fact, this hard situation for Fischer came out in the party convention of the Greens on May 13, 1999. As a part of “realos”, the intervention-supportive political realist wing of the Greens, Fischer had to face both verbal and physical attacks in that convention. In his memoirs, he refers this party convention by far the worst party convention that he had ever participated in.<sup>80</sup> Of course he tried to justify the operation in this convention but especially his famous words; “never again war, never again Auschwitz, never again genocide, never again fascism” was very effective in that sense.<sup>81</sup> For him, opposing the brutal military actions of Milosevic was a duty of being human and if supporting a military action is needed to prevent the genocide, and then it should naturally be supported.

Even if the party convention speech of Fischer was effective and enough to take the consent of the Greens, he conducted also very active diplomacy in the crisis, from becoming the minister of foreign affairs until the air bombings, in order to show the non-military peaceful solutions are still on the desk until the last minute even if military option could be the last resort. The so called “Fischer Plan” was the most concrete example of those efforts. With this plan, actually, there were mainly

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<sup>78</sup> Baumann, “Germany and the Use of Military Force: ‘Total War’, the ‘Culture of Restraint’ and the Quest for Normality,” 71.

<sup>79</sup> Adrian Hyde-Price, “Germany and the Kosovo war: still a civilian power?,” *German Politics* 10, no.1 (2001):31

<sup>80</sup> Joschka Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 2007) 210.

<sup>81</sup> “Wortlaut: Auszüge aus der Fisher-Rede,” *Spiegel Online*, May 13, 1999, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/wortlaut-auszuege-aus-der-fischer-rede-a-22143.html> (accessed April 7, 2014).

three aims to be reached. First of all, it tried to initiate a shared body to isolate Serbia in the international arena. With the special emphasis on China and Russia more importantly, this aim succeeded with G-8 foreign ministers meeting on May 6, 1999. Secondly, it sought to obtain international legitimacy through a resolution from the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, this aim was only achieved after the beginning of NATO air bombings on June 10 but still UNSCR 1244 authorized existence of foreign military forces in Kosovo and gave international legitimacy to the on-going operation. Lastly, the Fischer Plan intended to create a more comprehensive approach for the whole Southeastern Europe with a Stability Pact. Having been proposed on April 8, the Stability Pact was adopted on June 10, 1999 and it targeted to solve internal and international problems in the region by socio-economic and cooperation based ways in the short term and to preserve the solutions by being members of more comprehensive cooperation organizations such as the European Union and the NATO in the long term.<sup>82</sup> As it was seen from the main objectives and immediate results of the plan, it could be accepted as a successful plan at the first stage because although the plan could not have solved the Kosovo crisis with diplomatic ways and non-military tools, it was still contributed into solution of crisis in the short term. More importantly, it also proposed middle and long term structural solutions to the regional problems. Especially, in terms of the NATO and the European Union, successful integration or candidacy positions of Southeast European countries can show the successful perception of the problems by German policy makers.

Secondly, although it succeeded at the final stage, lacking a resolution of United Nations Security Council provoked an internal debate in Germany. Especially, those who see Germany as a civilian power criticized the military operation without clear international mandate. As it was mentioned before, the civilian power understanding was supportive of military means only if there is a clear mandate and international legitimacy. Similarly, within both parties of the coalition, SPD and the Greens, it was easy to find supporters of this civilian power understanding. In the case of Serbia, however, Russia was for sure against any

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<sup>82</sup> Maull, "Germany's Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'Civilian Power'?", 109-110.

resolution from the Security Council and similarly China was not supporting the military intervention idea.<sup>83</sup> On the other hand, in terms of German politics and civilian power debate, the multilateral action of the Western alliance under the umbrella of the NATO was enough for the German public to support the operation without any resolution from the Security Council. Beyond doubt, to prevent genocide and major human rights violations, as Joschka Fischer defended constantly, were the main motives of this decision. For Hyde-Price, this supportive decision of both German politicians and the German public actually indicates more than a sole decision to taking part in an international military operation. Rather, that important decision reflects an evolving process of German foreign policy from a civilian power to a “normal” civilian power.<sup>84</sup> In other words, like German politicians, German public also did not close their eyes to events in Kosovo in the name of remaining their “culture of restraint” and supported the decision of the government.

In addition to those two main concerns, Germany had two more supplementary concerns which had slightly affected the decision. Firstly, coming of a huge number of refugees which was already experienced during the Bosnia War was again a possible development. Because there were already many people in Germany who came from those Balkan regions, Germany could be a destination for their relatives who had to escape from the region because of the war and to save their lives. Secondly, possibility of isolation in Western alliance was another fear of German decision makers. More and more pressure on Germany made the abstention decision much harder and if Germany had not participated in the operation like the Gulf War, Germany could lose all its influence in the alliance.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, 92.

<sup>84</sup> Hyde Price, “Germany and the Kosovo War: Still a Civilian Power,” 19-34.

<sup>85</sup> Maull, *Germany’s Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a ‘Civilian Power’?*, 118-119.

### 3.5. Implications on German Foreign Policy

From both internal and external perspectives, Germany's Kosovo War decision was not an easy one. Rather it was deeply affected by all those different factors which were referred above. Being the last NATO country that decided to participate in Kosovo operation also shows this fact very clearly. On the other hand, if it is looked from broader perspective and if the process is analyzed from the beginning to the end, it can be argued that German decision makers and German foreign policy as a whole gave good account of themselves in several ways.

Firstly, after a long time of distinctive foreign policy choices, Germany took one big step for its political emancipation and to become a normal state. Especially in terms of using military forces as an instrument, Germany demolished this long time foreign policy taboo for preventing human rights in a multilateral solidarity understanding.<sup>86</sup> Of course this symbolic change did not emerge from one day to another and Germany did not change totally its traditional foreign policy understanding after the Kosovo War. Rather, as a result of cumulating experiences through the whole 1990's and different international crises such as the Gulf War and Bosnia War, as it was also mentioned above, this step by step emancipation approach took strong impetus with the Kosovo War and made essential implications for the future of German foreign policy.

Secondly, like decision makers, German public also changed its skepticism about using military means even if there was still not a homogenous distribution between former Eastern and Western *Länder* and more skepticism in former East Germany.<sup>87</sup> However, it was still very clear that support of German public to the use of force when necessary for preventing human rights violations had increased drastically through the whole 1990's.

Thirdly, the red-green government came to power in a crisis period. Even though they had not focused on the foreign policy issues before the election and in

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<sup>86</sup> Philippi, *Civillian Power and War: the German Debate about out-of-Area Operations 1990-99*, 65.

<sup>87</sup> Maull, "Germany's Foreign Policy, Post-Kosovo: Still a 'Civillian Power'?", 114.

the campaign period, they had to face many serious foreign policy dilemmas even during the first months of their tenure. In addition to that, the burden of abstention from former military operation of its allies also created huge pressure on German decision makers in this crisis. Therefore, the full and active support decision for Kosovo operation gave Germany an area of maneuver for Germany's future decisions.

Fourthly, Germany's active participation into decision making process during the crisis contributed to the European Union positively just as German foreign policy. In the following days of the end of Kosovo War, the European Union initiated a long term regional plan for the region, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe on June 10, 1999. More broader than the Contact Group, this pact was composed of the countries in the region, except Serbia and Montenegro together with Moldova, the EU member states, supporting countries like the United States and Turkey and international organizations like the NATO and the IMF. The importance of this Pact again from the German perspective was that this initiative started during the Council of the European Union presidency period of Germany and particularly in Cologne meeting. Therefore, even after the crisis, Germany continued to be influential for the future of the region and the union as well.

Lastly, in addition to the EU's efforts for reforming defense policy, German government initiated reform process for its national army after seeing its inadequacy in the Kosovo crisis. So called Weizsaecker Commission suggested decreasing the number of armed forces but at the same time evaluating the German army toward a professional and purpose-oriented army. Even the proposition of the Weizsaecker Commission was adopted with its modified version; the basic principle of evaluating the army through professionalization succeeded in the long run.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, 108-109.

## CHAPTER IV

### 9/11 ATTACKS AND THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

#### 4.1. 9/11 Terrorist Attacks to the United States

As it was pointed out earlier, the red-green government came to power as a government focusing on internal politics, mainly unemployment, but the leaders had to face a serious international crisis in Kosovo even before the official beginning of their term in the office. Surviving in this crisis, nevertheless, did not relieve the red-green government for a long time. Approximately two years after the end of the Kosovo War, the red-green government experienced its second big international crisis within their first four year tenure.

On the morning of September 11, 2001, four hijacked planes crashed into three different targets including the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C. It was definitely a huge shock for Americans and the allies of the United States. Even so, the United States and its allies recovered from the shock rapidly and after less than one month, on October 7, Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the US led coalition. It took nearly 7 months for them to take control of huge parts of Afghanistan. On November 16, the German parliament approved to German participation in the operation. On December 22, the parliament also decided to take part in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), NATO-led security mission and by 2014 its mission is still going on.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> For the Mandate Request of the Red-Green Government; German Federal Government, "Antrag der Bundesregierung auf Einsatz bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA", (Berlin: November 7, 2001), <http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/bundesregierung-antrag-bundeswehr.html>.



Coming back to 2001, nevertheless, the first reaction of the German government to the terror attacks in the United States was very clear. Just several hours after the attacks, German chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced Germany's "unlimited solidarity" to the United States with a government declaration and named the terrorist attacks as a war against civilized war.<sup>90</sup> Moreover, German public reacted to the terrorist attacks faithfully. In so much that, on September 13 there was a huge demonstration in Berlin in which thousands of Germans expressed their respects for the losses.

In addition to the general one, an extra shock came up for Germans several days later with the fact that some of hijackers, who died during the attacks, had actually studied at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. With its approximately 4 million Muslim-population, this fact opened an internal security debate in Germany. In the following days, two consecutive legal packages were presented promptly by the red-green government. The first package, approved in November 2001, emphasized four main issues. Firstly, being free from political and administrative surveillance of religious groups and organizations repealed and the government took the chance to act more effectively against extremist groups. Secondly, without looking at citizenship or illegal acts in any foreign countries, terror suspects could be prosecuted by German legal system. Thirdly, the ways of terrorists to enter and to live in Germany was obstructed. Lastly, security controls on borders and airports were reinforced. In accordance with that, the second package was released to increase the effectiveness of enforcement and supply financial resource for the first package.<sup>91</sup> As it is openly seen from those two anti-terrorism packages, the red-green government took the jihadist terror threat very seriously. Approving the packages even before the Germany's official contribution to the Afghan War also shows the level of importance.

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<sup>90</sup> Gerhard Schröder, "Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers Gerhard Schröder zu den Anschlägen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika" (speech, Berlin, September 12, 2001), [http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/rede\\_schroeder\\_terror-usa.html](http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/rede_schroeder_terror-usa.html).

<sup>91</sup> Francis T. Miko and Christian Froehlich, *Germany's Role in Fighting Terrorism: Implications for US Policy*, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library Of Congress, 2004): 7.

The one important point to be mentioned here is that even though the red-green government reacted against the global terrorism threat very rapidly, Germany's anti-terrorism war understanding did not contain solely security and military based elements. Rather, Germany's anti-terrorism fight was shaped by five main principles, according to chancellor Schröder.<sup>92</sup>

- Judging the terrorists and their supporters and ending their internal and external settlements,
- Helping the countries that are under the threat of becoming failed state and by this way serving the interest of terrorist groups,
- Examining the structural reasons which contribute terror organizations like social order, economics or culture,
- Stopping the increasing number of weapons of mass destruction
- Getting international legitimization for military actions against terrorism through the United Nations.

As it seems clearly, Germany's anti-terrorism strategy was a multilateral approach both in terms of its main content and its scope. In other words, while this strategy focuses on the social, economic and cultural roots, it proposes mainly multilateral and collective solutions.

#### **4.2. Main Determinants of Germany's Participation in Global War on Terrorism**

According to the government's main principles and the initial declaration of the chancellor, the red-green government decided to join into coalition force immediately. However, like it was experienced in Kosovo crisis as well, joining a foreign military operation was not an easy decision for the red-green government. Similarly, there were both external and internal factors that red-green government had to take into account for their joining global war on terrorism decision.

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<sup>92</sup> Ibid., 4.

Starting with an external concern, the main problem was actually the difference between the United States and Germany about the fighting against terrorism understandings. As it was already mentioned, Gerhard Schröder made very clear with his speech how the red-green government regards the terrorism fighting issue. On the other side, the American approach to this issue was well-understood for the German government when vice-chancellor and minister of foreign affairs, Joschka Fischer, visited the United States on September 19, 2001 and met with his counterpart, Colin Powell. In his memoirs, Joschka Fischer explains that when he was coming back to Berlin, he understood that there would be some kind of new world war because all the American states people were convinced to fight against jihadist terrorism with fully military ways.<sup>93</sup> Moreover, it was also clear that for Americans, Afghanistan was not enough to fight against terrorism. Rather, they were seriously planning to attack Saddam Hussein's Iraq. For Fischer, even in that moment it was very stupid idea.<sup>94</sup> In that context, it can be argued that the War in Afghanistan was also the beginning point of separation between the United States and Germany that reached its top point just before the Iraq invasion of the United States in 2003.

Although the red-green coalition had already been convinced that the American government would not stop with a war in Afghanistan, President Bush made the American view crystal clear during his famous "axis of evil" speech on the 2002 State of the Union Address, just 3 months after the 9/11 attacks. In his speech, Bush directly put the names of three countries; North Korea, Iran, Iraq or axis of evil as regimes which support global terrorism against the United States or its allies.<sup>95</sup> With this speech, Bush ensured that in any case, the United States will fight against global terrorism and it will not be limited with the War in Afghanistan. Rather he threatened those countries publicly and openly. Moreover, the difference between

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<sup>93</sup> Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, 37.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>95</sup> George W. Bush, "President Delivers State of the Union Address," (speech, Washington, DC, January 29, 2002), The White House, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> (Accessed May 14, 2014).

American and German understandings for the fight against terrorism also became obvious.

Secondly, for a long time the clear mandate from the United Nations Security Council was seen as one of the main conditions to participate in any international military operation. Therefore, in this crisis, it was important external factor that influenced Germany's participation decision positively. In fact, this issue was discussed in the Kosovo case very intensively because Russia vetoed an international intervention in Kosovo and the UNSC could not manage to adopt a resolution. After all, Germany participated into its first full military operation under NATO command. However, for this case, the United Nations worked rapidly and effectively. Just one day after 9/11 attacks, the UNSC unanimously adopted resolution 1368 and condemned the terrorist attacks in the United States.<sup>96</sup> Even though initial attacks of the United States, the so called "Operation Enduring Freedom" did not have any Security Council resolution, the UNSC still adopted five resolutions about the global threats to international security, fight against terrorism and the situation in Afghanistan. Among them, resolution 1368 was particularly important because it officially authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help interim Afghan government and to provide security in Kabul and its surrounding areas.<sup>97</sup> From the German point, a clear international mandate, the unanimity in the Security Council and the idea of international solidarity were all important elements of German foreign policy and they were also compatible with Schröder's anti-terrorism fight principles. Therefore, it can be rightly said that active role of the United States after 9/11 affected Germany's participation into Afghan War decision positively.

In addition to those external factors, the Chancellor had actually his own personal concerns about this international operation. First of all, Schröder believed that the war against terrorism should not turn into war against Islam and become a clash of civilizations. Secondly, as he also mentioned in his speech of the elements

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<sup>96</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1368, S/RES/1368 (12 September 2001), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/533/82/PDF/N0153382.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>97</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, S/RES/1386 (20 September 2001), <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement>.

for anti-terrorism fight, using only military means for the fight would be fatal mistake. Thirdly, Schröder was convinced that Germany should not be part of any military adventure of the United States, even if he declared his unlimited solidarity just after the 9/11 attacks.<sup>98</sup> If those concerns are analyzed in a detailed way, actually they seem fairly logical concerns for German Chancellor. Starting from the first concern, with its huge number of Muslim minority, supporting a military operation which seems against Islam as a whole could create some domestic problems in German society. Therefore, the Chancellor insisted on not to give this kind of image with the war against global terrorism. For the second one, he also believed that terrorism has its roots on different elements like the society, culture or economics. Therefore, not fighting against these elements and focusing on only military means was definitely a wrong way to fight against terrorism, according to Schröder. As a last concern, he ensured Germany's not participation into any US-led adventure while emphasizing full support of Germany to the legitimate anti-terrorist fight. For this issue, in his important speech on September 19, just after his vice-chancellor Fischer came from the United States with the prediction of military attack against Iraq regime, Schröder announced publicly; "*We, as Germans and Europeans, want to show our unlimited solidarity to the United States by using all available means. I underline: Germany is prepared to take risks, also militarily, but it is not prepared to take part in adventures.*"<sup>99</sup> Of course it was both a warning for the United States and also indication of a fear that this war could go more beyond the first plans. In addition to that, this speech could be accepted as another sign of the separation between the German and American governments towards Iraq crisis.

Apart from external and Schröder's personal concerns, domestic politics of Germany was the last factor that shaped Germany's Afghan War decision. In fact, when the crisis first broke out and the military operation came on the desk, not surprisingly it evoked a large public and political debate like it had been seen in Kosovo crisis. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS) was one more time against

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<sup>98</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, 131.

<sup>99</sup> Gerhard Schröder, "Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers Gerhard Schröder zu den Anschlägen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika," (speech, Berlin, September 19, 2001), [http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/rede\\_schroeder\\_terror-usa02.html](http://www.documentarchiv.de/brd/2001/rede_schroeder_terror-usa02.html).

the German military action and also the only party that openly condemned the anti-terrorism fight of the United States. Similarly, the government parties, SPD and the Greens, were not so much interested in a military operation in a dangerous and unknown geography for German army. On the contrary, stance of the main opposition, the parliament group of Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) and Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), was mainly in a supportive way. This was indeed important problem for Chancellor Schröder. Of course taking a military action decision, while his own party and the coalition partner are mostly on the opposing side and the main coalition was on the supporting side, could endanger the survival of the coalition in the later period.<sup>100</sup>

From the perspectives of the coalition parties, actually, not all the members of the government parties opposed the military action idea. Rather, there were some slowly growing opposition groups in both parties. For Schröder, those were organized irresponsibility groups who stand against the government without taking the responsibilities of Germany and consequences of non-participation decision into the account.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, some of the Green party parliament members had already declared publicly that they would not vote for a forthcoming mandate proposal. The response of Chancellor to this chaotic situation was “all-or-nothing” decision. In other words, he bound the military mandate proposal with a “vote of confidence” to the government.

In fact, this risky vote of confidence was more dangerous for the Green Party than the SPD because in that time opinion polls were clearly in favor of Chancellor’s party while the Green Party had been seen under the 7 percent election threshold.<sup>102</sup> The meaning of a “no” vote was, therefore, very clear for Green parliament members; failing of the red-green government, new election and after that possible grand coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU while the Greens are out of the

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<sup>100</sup> Buras and Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force," 233.

<sup>101</sup> Gerhard Schröder, *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik* (Berlin: Hoffmann und Campe, 2013), 179.

<sup>102</sup> Forsa, “Wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre ...”, <http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/forsa/2001.htm> (Accessed May 12, 2014).

parliament. Also chancellor Schröder was very much convinced that Germany as a united and sovereign country should meet its responsibilities in the world.<sup>103</sup>

Moreover, a two sided discussion about the military action decision was an important discussion topic in the German media at that time. Quite interestingly, the overall view of the German media has almost the same tendencies with the German parliament. According to Heins, unlike left-wing newspapers, the conservative media supported Germany's Afghan War participation decision. Like he exemplified with two leading newspapers of Germany, left-wing Tageszeitung (taz) and conservative Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, the left wing media would like to see Germany in its "culture of restraint" and avoiding military actions. At the same time, he also emphasizes that the heavy and categorical opposition against military actions like during the Gulf War was not a case anymore. Rather, like the many parliament members of the government parties, the main concern was the moving of this military operation over Afghanistan and turning to be a war in Iraq. On the other hand, for the conservative media, Germany should not act according to its historical restraints anymore and it should follow a more self-confident foreign policy.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, Schröder and his government felt the same pressure on their shoulders both publicly and politically and he searched for a solution not only to take support from his own party and the society for this case, but also to provide a confidence for his government in the long term.

### **4.3. The Vote of Confidence and Aftermath**

Under those circumstances, German parliament went to vote for a mandate for the Federal Government on deployment of German armed forces in support of the common reaction to terrorist attacks against the United States on November 16, 2001 together with a vote of confidence for the government. The vote of confidence

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<sup>103</sup> Schröder, *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, 180.

<sup>104</sup> Volker Heins, "Germany's New War: 11 September and Its Aftermath in German Quality Newspapers," *German Politics* 11, no.2 (2002): 141-142.

was supported by 336 yes votes against 326 no votes. This result actually meant that the necessary number of votes for absolute majority, 335 votes, was reached with just one more vote. Symbolically, while four of eight Green party members who declared their position in a negative way against the mandate voted positively to prevent the collapse of the red-green government, the other four voted against the mandate to show their still on-going opposition against Germany's participation into the military operation.<sup>105</sup> In relation with that, on December 22, German parliament approved also deployment of 1200 German soldiers within ISAF command in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, this time the mandate passed from the parliament with a clear majority<sup>106</sup> and by this means, German military forces were for the first time after the Second World War deployed in out-of- NATO area mission with the early January 2002.

As it is openly seen, the red-green government, especially Schröder himself found a risky but effective solution to this major political crisis for both his government and Germany's foreign policy. Even he put his whole political career at risk to overcome this crisis. However, like it was seen in the Kosovo crisis, obtaining the mandate for military operation did not fully satisfy German government. As it was mentioned before, Schröder's anti-terrorism vision composed of both military and socio-cultural and economic means. In that sense, while the United States had started Operation Enduring Freedom with the on-going air attacks over Afghanistan, Germany took the initiative in a political mean. In so much that one of the most important political meetings for the future of Afghanistan was held in Bonn with great efforts of German government. In "Petersberg Conference" different political and ethnic groups of Afghanistan came together except Taliban group. The conference took place from November 27 to December 5, 2001 and Joschka Fischer had played a very important role to reach a compromise about the future of Afghanistan.<sup>107</sup> At the end of the conference, the "Agreement on Provisional

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<sup>105</sup> Buras and Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force," 234.

<sup>106</sup> "Abstimmung: Koalition Schafft Eigene Mehrheit," *Spiegel Online*, December 22, 2001, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/abstimmung-koalition-schafft-eigene-mehrheit-a-174234.html> (Accessed May 13, 2014).

<sup>107</sup> Schröder, *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, 184.



Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions” was officially signed by the participants of the conference and the basic principles of the future Afghan administration had been set.<sup>108</sup> Furthermore, creation of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was designed with this Bonn Agreement while it was finally established on December 20 after the UNSCR 1386 decision.

For German decision makers, this conference and following establishment of the ISAF was very crucial because they were generally prone to differentiate the Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force mission as reflections of two different bodies and understandings. The first reason of this differentiation was exactly the legitimacy issue. As it was repeated several times, for Germany, a clear mandate from the United Nations had been a major necessity for any international military operation for a long time. In that case, while the ISAF had been established with a clear Security Council decision, the Operation Enduring Freedom was actually a US-led joint action which was made up of voluntary countries and did not have any clear Security Council resolution which openly defines the establishment of this kind of coalition action. Rather, the American administration conducted this operation under the self-defense definition of the UN Charter and UNSC resolutions 1368 and 1373. Within those bases, operation was justified with a claim that it was actually not a unilateral military attack rather it was a coalition of countries against global terrorism.<sup>109</sup> However, for Germany, this justification of the United States did not meet the German requirements of clear UN mandate. The second reason for this differentiation was the main operational purposes of both elements. While the ISAF was established with totally defensive aims, the Operation Enduring Freedom was an offensive military action even during

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<sup>108</sup> United Nations, "Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions," (December 5, 2001), <http://www.un.org/news/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm>.

<sup>109</sup> Christine D. Gray, *International Law and the Use of Force* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 206.

George K. Walker, "Lawfulness of Operation Enduring Freedom's Self-Defense Responses," *Valparaiso University Law Review* 37, no.2 (2002):489.

its very early stages.<sup>110</sup> Therefore, because of those two main distinctions, the ISAF could be seen more coherent with Germany's general foreign policy choices and the vision of the red-green government against global terrorism. Especially, inclusion of political and social means into the ISAF mission is another important indicator of that reality. On the other hand, as a member of NATO and responsible power as Schröder mentioned before, the different tendencies between those two anti-terrorism mechanisms did not prevent Germany from contributing to Operation Enduring Freedom. Indeed, 3900 German soldiers including 100 from the special operation unit KSK<sup>111</sup> were joined Operation Enduring Freedom.

In the general sense, results of Germany's policy choices in Afghanistan should be analyzed by several ways. First of all and from broader sense, Germany's participation decision independently from Operation Enduring Freedom or International Security Assistance Force was a necessity of realpolitik in terms of the Western world as a whole. According to Kornelius and de Weck, both for Germany and the Western world, the real danger in Afghanistan was not to fight against Taliban. If the Western states had rejected to fight in Afghanistan, Taliban would have received control firstly over Afghanistan and then most probably over Pakistan. This could actually mean that the Taliban organization would reach the nuclear weapons as well. In that situation, they asked, "how could it have been possible to get a victory under this new condition?"<sup>112</sup> Although it was not so very clear that Taliban could expand that much easily to other regions, this argument still shows that for the Western world, it was a huge risk to take a step back and let the Taliban be more effective in such an important region in the world.

Secondly, for the first time in the history of Federal Republic, Germany did not refer to the Nazi experiences or to lessons learned from it before joining an

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<sup>110</sup> Sikander Ahmed Shah, "War on Terrorism: Self Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of US Drone Attacks in Pakistan," *Washington University Global Studies Law Review* 9 (2010):110-111.

<sup>111</sup> Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Germany, pacifism and peace enforcement*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006), 158.

<sup>112</sup> Stefan Kornelius, "The Undeclared War: Germany's Self- Deceit in Afghanistan," *Körber Foundation International Affairs*, no.8 (2009):6.

international military operation. As Wittlinger and Larose also pointed out, except from Joschka Fischer's speech in German parliament on October 11, 2001, in which he emphasizes special obligation and responsibility of Germany in that region by referring the threat of jihadist terrorism toward Israel, German decision makers used a new language to justify their military decision in Afghanistan.<sup>113</sup>

#### **4.4. New Discourse of Schröder in German Foreign Policy**

Although it seems at the first sight that foreign policy choices of the red-green government is the nothing but instant response to international developments, in fact this new foreign policy language was a reflection of the red-green government's intentional choices in such an urgent case. As previously stated, the participation choice was the necessity of *realpolitik*. However, for Germany, which pursued the civilian power understanding for his foreign policy decisions through many years, this was actually a new development. Indeed, referring publicly to this kind of political choices was not only a new but also a brave action for the government.

In that period, the most important proofs of Germany's new foreign policy characteristic were the decisions and ideas of the key actor of the red-green government, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Although his very first reaction to the 9/11 attack and the declaration of unlimited solidarity could be seen in the traditional understanding of German foreign policy, which was based on the principle of full cooperation with the Western alliance, Schröder started to show a more realistic understanding especially after perceiving the unilateral stance of the United States in global war against terrorism. Actually, his unlimited solidarity was generally not translated as unconditional support. Rather, he supported the United States with many personal and domestic concerns. Similarly, the increasing unilateralism of the United States turned this emerging conflict worse than ever, which peaked up two

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<sup>113</sup>Ruth Wittlinger and Martin Larose, "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy," *German Politics* 16, no.4 (2007):489.

years after 9/11 attacks with the Iraq War.<sup>114</sup> The speech of Schröder for not joining any US-led adventure just shortly after 9/11, therefore, could be seen an essential step towards that final point.

In the Afghanistan case, on the other hand, the main emphasizing point was not heavily the emerging conflict between the United States and Germany. Rather, Chancellor Schröder wanted to underline the new German foreign policy understanding as much as possible. Of course, the initial steps of this new foreign policy were taken in early 1990's and especially from the military side; the Kosovo crisis gave huge impetus to the evolution of the new understanding. In addition to all those developments, Afghanistan War contributed to the advancement from a discourse stance. Particularly, emphasis on the "responsibility" as well as "sovereignty" was the major element of the new German foreign policy understanding.

Although the coalition parties and the important portion of German public opposed the German military deployment in Afghanistan, Schröder and Fischer supported the military deployment with very clear argument. As Schröder said on November 16, before voting of military mandate for Afghanistan and confidence of the government;

*The decision to be taken for deployment of German forces is not taken easily by anyone, neither me. However, they are necessary and therefore they must be taken. We thereby meet the expectations of our partners directed to us... But more than that, united and sovereign Germany meets its grown responsibility in the world. We need to recognize: After the epochal changes since the fall of 1989, Germany has regained its full sovereignty. It has also taken on new responsibilities which our allies remind us of. We have no right to lodge a complaint. Instead, we should be pleased that we are equal partners in the international community since the epochal changes in 1989.<sup>115</sup>*

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<sup>114</sup>Buras and Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force," 232.

<sup>115</sup> Schröder, *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, 180. Translated by the author. "Die Entscheidungen, die für die Bereitstellung deutscher Streitkräfte zu treffen sind, nimmt niemand auf die leichte Schulter. Auch ich nicht. Aber sie sind notwendig, und deshalb müssen sie getroffen werden. Wir erfüllen damit die an uns gerichteten Erwartungen unserer Partner... Aber mehr noch. Durch diesen Beitrag kommt das vereinte und souveräne Deutschland seiner gewachsenen Verantwortung in der Welt nach. Wir müssen erkennen: nach den epochalen Veränderungen seit dem Herbst 1989 hat Deutschland seine volle Souveränität zurückgewonnen. Es hat damit aber auch

In fact, Schröder's words do not only refer to Germany's changing foreign policy concept. On the contrary, he emphasizes sharp difference between the old and the new policies by openly showing the sovereign being of united Germany and as a direct result, responsibilities and obligations.

Similarly, pointing out the concept of equality with its sovereign partners, Schröder saw the implication of political emancipation and normality understanding in the German foreign policy very clearly. As he similarly pointed out;

*The Bundestag's decision put an end to the chapter of Germany's limited sovereignty after World War II. It made us an equal partner in the international community of nations, one that had obligations to meet, such as those that have arisen from the NATO alliance in the case of Afghanistan. However, we Germans also acquired rights, such as to say no in the case of the Iraq war, because we were not convinced of the merit of a military intervention. In other words, the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the Hindu Kush is an expression of Germany's complete sovereignty over its foreign and security policy.*<sup>116</sup>

In other words, binding those main changing concepts to each other, Schröder draws very clear German foreign policy understanding in that period. Germany, as a fully sovereign state will and should take responsibility in international crises because both being an equal partner with other states and the results of this fact necessitate Germany's being active at the world stage. At the same time, as Wittlinger also argued, Germany's decision of military participation in Afghanistan by linking clearly the sovereignty and responsibilities gave Germany room for maneuver for the future.<sup>117</sup> As it would be seen after one year, Germany had used military participation in Afghanistan as justification for not joining in Iraq War.

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neue Pflichten übernommen, an die uns die Verbündeten erinnern. Wir haben kein Recht, darüber Klage zu führen. Wir sollten vielmehr damit zufrieden sein, dass wir seit den epochalen Veränderungen von 1989 gleichberechtigte Partner in der Staatengemeinschaft sind."

<sup>116</sup>Schröder Gerhard, "Essay By Former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder: The Way Forward in Afghanistan," *Spiegel Online*, February 12, 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/essay-by-former-chancellor-gerhard-schroeder-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan-a-607205.html> (Accessed June 1, 2014).

<sup>117</sup> Wittlinger and Larose, "No Future for Germany's Past? Collective Memory and German Foreign Policy," 489.

To sum up, the red-green government's foreign policy decisions after September 11 terrorist attacks were again hard to take, even if chancellor Schröder declared unlimited solidarity just after the attacks. In fact, both parliamentary and societal oppositions together with external factors were the main determinants of the decision making process. However, both Chancellor and the vice-Chancellor put their political careers at risk in order to take the mandate decision for German army deployment in Afghanistan, which is the first time without any reference to the Second World War and lessons from it. Although they successfully obtained both the mandate decision and the vote of confidence, the most important point to take attention during that period was constant emphasis of the red-green government and more particularly chancellor Schröder on a new German foreign policy discourse. Especially, two main concepts; Germany's regained sovereignty and the responsibility as an equal sovereign state with its partners created a baseline for this new foreign policy discourse. In terms of German-American relations, on the other hand, this crisis did not become a direct confrontation between those two states. Rather, it gave several implications about an increasing possibility of a conflict especially on a war against Iraq. Nevertheless, Schröder kept his solidarity promises by joining military campaign and with the Petersberg Conference and the Bonn Agreement; he showed clearly the German type of fight against global terrorism. Therefore, because of all those reasons, the 9/11 and Afghan War crisis could be seen second important step of red-green government after Kosovo War in order to reach new and politically emancipated foreign policy.

## **CHAPTER V**

### **IRAQ WAR AND THE GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY**

#### **5.1. The German Way**

The 9/11 terrorist attacks and following war in Afghanistan had kept the German political and public spheres busy for a long time. Nonetheless, those discussions did not come to an end with German military deployment to Afghanistan. On the contrary, after 2001, it became more or less apparent that there would be a serious confrontation between the United States and Germany on the issue of expanding global anti-terrorism war to Iraq and against the Saddam regime.

The red-green government, actually, finished the year 2001 without any serious political problem, especially an external one. The government granted recently the necessary military mandate as well as the vote of confidence, it took a very crucial role for re-establishment of political structure in Afghanistan with the Petersberg Conference and the Bonn Agreement, it had also solid public support in opinion polls and took a role as the EU Council president for launching Euro currency starting from January 1, 2002 and completion of membership negotiations of 10 new EU members at the end of December 2001. The year 2002, on the contrary, came with many problems for red-green government both internally and externally.

As it was discussed above, during its establishment, the major targets of the red-green government were based on domestic issues and this case was very obvious in coalition agreement as well. However, the government could not find a clear solution to the problem of unemployment especially in former Eastern German regions. In so much that, in early months of 2002, the unemployment numbers

exceeded the critical 4 million-line, which means that it was at the same level when the red-green government came to power in 1998.<sup>118</sup> Obviously, this development showed itself in opinion polls. Through the first five months of the year 2002, SPD had gradually lost almost 7 percent of its public support. In that same period, on the contrary, two opposition parliamentary groups, the CDU/CSU and FDP, increased their votes exactly 7 percent. Unlike those opposition parties, the other partner of the coalition was standing on between 6 and 7 percent.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, the federal elections on September 22, 2002 were very critical for both government and opposition parties.

The major topic that dominated 2002 elections was, in fact, the “German Way” concept of the SPD, publicly announced by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder first time in Hannover, where he served eight years as the Prime Minister of Lower Saxony. Although in the first stage nobody knew what it means exactly, Schröder’s speech was mostly on a German social state model against neo-liberal American model.<sup>120</sup> The one important point to be mentioned here was that in his speech in Hannover, Schröder did not bind Iraq issue directly to German Way concept. Rather, he preferred to stay in domestic issues. Social and economic issues like social equality, pensions, better education system and social welfare were important points of his speech. Also, he emphasized one more time Germany’s new self-confidence without arrogance, which was one of the top issues before joining in Afghan War. However, German Way understanding and its external perspectives had been largely discussed by both German politicians and academics.<sup>121</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Peter Pulzer, "The Devil They Know: the German Federal Election of 2002," *West European Politics* 26, no.2 (2003):153-164.

<sup>119</sup> Forsa, "Wenn am nächsten Sonntag Bundestagswahl wäre ...", <http://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/forsa/2002.htm> (Accessed May 12, 2014).

<sup>120</sup> Sturm, Daniel Friedrich, "Schröders Deutscher Weg," *Die Welt*, August 6, 2002, <http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article404934/Schroeders-deutscher-Weg.html> (Accessed May 13, 2014).

<sup>121</sup> For the details of the discussion; Peter Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations," *Survival* 47, no.1 (2005): 133-152. Regina Karp, "The New German Foreign Policy Consensus." *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no.1 (2005): 61-82.



One of the most important reasons of huge discussions on this new concept was actually the historical connotation of German Way (Deutscher Weg) understanding with German Special Path (Sonderweg) theory. Having been used first time in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the “Sonderweg” concept tries to explain German history from distinctive characteristics of German history and geography. While it was used mostly positively until early 1940’s and the fall of Nazi regime in Germany, after 1945 this concept gained negative meaning and tried to explain why Germany experienced totalitarian or fascist regime unlike other civilized Western countries.<sup>122</sup> In that sense, using such a problematic concept at least in terms of its name provoked many discussions even within the red-green government itself.

Vice-Chancellor and foreign minister Joschka Fischer, for instance, ruled out directly the idea of “German Way” just after re-election of red-green government. Especially during an interview with English Guardian newspaper, he openly said that *"I don't want to comment for the Chancellor, but I tell you: forget it...There is definitely, in foreign policy, no German way as there is in domestic policy."*<sup>123</sup> Moreover, the opposition party, FDP, criticized SPD’s German Way formulation very clearly. For that, FDP chairman Wolfgang Gerhardt warned the chancellor to escape from nationalistic policies in order to escape from alienating the United States and damaging the European integration process. He also proposed European Way for Germany instead of nationalist German Way.<sup>124</sup> Similarly, many academics approached German Way concept both in a positive and negative way. Among those scholars, particularly Buras thinks that external side of German Way understanding during the Iraq crisis had limited Germany’s space of maneuver and increased Germany’s dependence upon France.<sup>125</sup> On the other hand, Henry Kissinger, for example, saw German Way approach during the Iraq crisis as a whole *“a pretext for*

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<sup>122</sup> Jürgen Kocka, "Asymmetrical Historical Comparison: the Case of the German Sonderweg," *History and Theory* 38, no.1 (1999): 43-44.

<sup>123</sup> John Hooper, "Fisher Rejects Chancellor's 'German Way'," *The Guardian*, October 15, 2002, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/15/germany.johnhooper> (Accessed, May 13, 2014).

<sup>124</sup> Wolfgang Gerhardt, "Der Irak und der "Deutsche Weg"," *Liberal* 44 (2002): 39-43.

<sup>125</sup> Buras and Longhurst, "The Berlin Republic, Iraq, and the Use of Force," 244.


*a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction*". In accordance with that, proposition of the German Way concept could be seen as a political challenge to the United States as well as to Europe.<sup>126</sup> As it is openly seen from the academic and political discussions, the external side of German Way understanding was discussed more than its internal essence, even if the original German Way concept was based on mostly internal issues.

## 5.2. Main Determinants of Germany's Iraq Policy

In addition to Schröder's German Way understanding, the Iraq discussion and its huge effects on German internal politics could be clearly seen from public opinion polls conducted through 2002.

Table-2: Legitimation of Iraq War according to German Public Opinion

DeutschlandTREND : Legitimation of Irak-War



Source: Infratest Diamap, "ARD Deutschlandtrend," April 2003, <http://www.infratest-dimap.de/?id=245>.

<sup>126</sup> Henry A. Kissinger, "German-US Relations Thrown Into Crisis," *Korea Times*, October 23, 2002, quoted in Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations, 133.

According to Infratest-Diamap, while on March 2002, 66% of Germans believed that a war in Iraq is not legitimate, just 27% believed this was a legitimized war. On September 2002, moreover, the number of Germans who did not believe the legitimacy of war increased to 74%, while the number of positive thinkers fell upon 19%. In fact this decreasing trend continued in the year 2003 until 13% on March 2003. Similarly, according to results of an American opinion poll company, Pew Research Center, 71% of Germans were against the Iraq War while 26% stood on a positive side. However, the interesting point to be mentioned here is, in that same time period, on December 2002, the support of Iraq War in France was more or less similar with the numbers in Germany and the numbers were just reversed in the United Kingdom.<sup>127</sup> In that sense, it can be said from this fact that the huge and clear opposition of German public against the Iraq War was undeniable factor for both the approach of red-green government and opposition parties in order to shape their Iraq War stance.

Although the strong opposition of both German people and politicians against a war in Iraq was an undeniable fact, it should also be mentioned that this tendency was not the reflection of anti-Americanism thoughts. Here the most important indicator of this fact is the lack of any planned action against the war decision of the United States. In other words, the unilateral offensive attitudes of the United States after 9/11 attacks created a spontaneous public and political opposition against the United States. In addition to that, the coincidence of general elections in Germany which took place on September 22, 2002 was a contribution element that sharpened the stance of German politicians, especially of chancellor Schröder.<sup>128</sup> Therefore, as it will also be seen in Germany's foreign policy decisions in that period, there was not any domestic anti-Americanism tendency arising from the Iraq crisis that shaped the German public opinion.

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<sup>127</sup> "Amerikanische Umfrage: Deutschen Lehnen Irak-Krieg Vehement Ab," *Spiegel Online*, December 4, 2002, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/amerikanische-umfrage-deutsche-lehnen-irak-krieg-vehement-ab-a-225657.html> (Accessed June 13, 2014).

<sup>128</sup> Tuomas Forsberg, "German Foreign Policy and the War on Iraq: Anti-Americanism, Pacifism or Wmancipation?," *Security Dialogue* 36, no.2 (2005):226.

In addition to those internal developments, the external politics of the red-green government had deteriorated with early 2002; especially with the fact that after the Afghan War, military campaign against Saddam regime would be the next step of the United States. In accordance with that, the case became a more complicated issue for the German government.

If looked from the historical side, the Iraq perspective of the red-green government was actually based on the decisions of Kohl government which supported the non-proliferation efforts toward Saddam regime. In that sense, the red-green government supported not only the non-proliferation of Iraq but also a global non-proliferation approach especially through a NATO-initiative. However, withdrawal of the United States from Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was not welcomed by the German government at that time. Also the intelligence reports of the German Foreign Intelligence Agency (BND) did not show any need for extra sanction, especially military intervention, against the Saddam regime. In accordance with that, vice-chancellor and foreign minister Fischer rejected any future military operation on early March, 2002.<sup>129</sup>

However, the Iraq policy of the United States had been actually very clear for a long time. As former secretary of treasure Paul O'Neill, who served from January 20, 2001 until December 31, 2002, claimed, President Bush had decided the invasion of Iraq long before the 9/11 terrorist attacks and actually he was searching for an excuse to be used.<sup>130</sup> Moreover, in his famous speech of "Axis of Evil" on January 2002, Iraq had been named as one of the evil state of the world that supports global terrorism like North Korea and Iran. Similarly, US Senator from Arizona, John McCain, on the 38<sup>th</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy in February 2002 defined Iraq and Saddam regime as the most appropriate place for global terrorism. Also, he openly explained that any regime change in Iraq like Afghanistan could

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<sup>129</sup> Harnisch, "Bound to fail? Germany's Policy in the Iraq Crisis 2001–2003," 61-62.

<sup>130</sup> Marc Pitzke,, "Bush-Regierung: Ein Insider Packt Aus," *Spiegel Online*, January 12, 2004, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/bush-regierung-ein-insider-packt-aus-a-281466.html> (Accessed May 12, 2014).

deter other terror supporting states from their supportive acts.<sup>131</sup> From the German perspective as well it was the obvious case. During his Washington visit just eight days after 9/11 attacks, foreign minister Joschka Fischer was persuaded the idea that the US government has its plans to invade the Iraq in the future.

Even though one can easily be convinced of possible military attacks against Iraq with all those words, President Bush's appreciation for supporting anti-terrorism war visit to Berlin on May 2002 created a contrary impression for the German government. In his speech during a joint press conference with Gerhard Schröder, President Bush openly declared that "*And I told the Chancellor that I have no war plans on my desk, which is the truth, and that we've got to use all means at our disposal to deal with Saddam Hussein.*" At the same time, even if there was a military action against the Saddam regime, Schröder emphasized in the same conference, the United State leader promised to consult with allies before taking any decision of military action.<sup>132</sup> Indeed, this early consultation issue between the United States and its allies had already been stressed by foreign minister Fischer three months before the visit of Bush as an important element of being partners. Especially during an interview with "Die Welt" newspaper, Fischer made clear that the cooperation between democracies does not rely on obedience principles because the partners are not satellites.<sup>133</sup> Also, Chancellor thought that at least because of huge efforts in Afghan War, Germany deserved to be consulted as a partner before a military action.<sup>134</sup> As it is obviously seen, before declining to take part in Iraq War, it was the expectations of German leaders to conduct a serious consultation process with the United States. This expectation, moreover, was the result of Germany's

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<sup>131</sup>John McCain, "From Crisis To Opportunity: American Internationalism And The New Atlantic Order" (speech, Munich, February 2, 2002), The Avalon Project, [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/mccain\\_001.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/sept11/mccain_001.asp), (Accessed May 14, 2014).

<sup>132</sup>George W.Bush, "Remarks With Chancellor Schroeder of Germany in Press Availability" (speech, Berlin, May 23, 2002), U.S. Department of State, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2002/10421.htm> (Accessed May 14, 2014).

<sup>133</sup>Joschka Fischer, "Wir Sind Keine Satelliten," interview by Die Welt. Die Welt, February 02, 2002, <http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article373709/Wir-sind-keine-Satelliten-I.html> (Accessed May 13, 2014).

<sup>134</sup>Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations, 143.

long-lasting anti-war understanding, which put multilateral approach forward unlike the unilateral decision-making process of the United States.

### 5.3. September 2002 German Federal Elections

Although both German leaders and German public for a long time had mostly negative views on a possible military action of the United States against Iraq, for Schröder, the decision of not joining was not certain until the second half of 2002.<sup>135</sup> However, the main determining factor of Schröder's not-participation decision were in fact the German federal elections in September 2002 because before the elections, the Iraq War was a hot political topic in Germany and Schröder believed that without taking a clear position before the elections, it was impossible to be successful in the upcoming elections.<sup>136</sup> In the light of all those developments, Chancellor Schröder openly declared Germany's "no" decision to Iraq War on August 1, 2002 while a special session of SPD Bureau was still going on with a emphasize on Germany's solidarity with the United States one more time but at the same time rejecting any adventure in Iraq. The other fact to be underlined is that in this special session of the SPD Bureau, the German Way policy of the SPD was also approved as the latest campaign slogan for September elections<sup>137</sup> and after that time Schröder followed strictly an anti-war position relating with Iraq crisis.

In addition to Germany's clear "no" position, just four days before the elections, the speech of the federal justice minister Herta Däubler-Gmelin about George Bush created a serious problem for German government on the way of election. During her speech in a local election meeting, the justice minister had compared the policies of George Bush with Adolf Hitler by remarking President Bush uses Iraq War in order to escape from the domestic burden of the bad economic

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<sup>135</sup> Schröder, *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, 210.

<sup>136</sup> *Ibid.*, 210-211.

<sup>137</sup> Beste, Ralf, Geyer, Matthias et al., "Du Musst Das Hochziehen," *Der Spiegel*, March 24, 2003, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-26670383.html> (Accessed May 17, 2014).

situation in the United States and it was exactly the tactic which Adolf Hitler also used.<sup>138</sup> As it might be expected, the speech of Herta Däubler-Gmelin led a public indignation both in the United States and Germany even if she immediately explained she did not compare Bush with Hitler personally rather emphasized the similarity of their tactics. As a consequence of that speech, Schröder immediately wrote a letter of apology to President Bush. In his letter he said: *"I want to let you know how much I regret the fact that alleged comments by the German justice minister have given an impression that has offended you"* also about the future of his justice minister he claimed that: *"Let me assure you that there is no place at my cabinet table for anyone who makes a connection between the American president and such a criminal."*<sup>139</sup> After this apology, Herta Däubler-Gmelin did not resign immediately but she lost her ministry during the establishment of new the government.

In the light of those developments, the 2002 general elections resulted without actually any big surprise. (Table-3)

Table-3: Results of 2002 German Federal Elections

Parties	Party List					Total Seats		
	Votes	%	+/-	Seats	+/-	Seats	+/-	%
Social Democratic Party (SPD)	18.488.668	38.5	-2.4	80	-6	251	-47	41.6
Christian Democratic Party (CDU)	14.167.561	29.5	+1.1	108	-16	190	-8	31.5
Christian Social Union (CSU)	4.315.080	9.0	+2.2	15	+6	58	+11	9.6
Alliance '90/The Greens	4.110.355	8.6	+1.9	54	+7	55	+8	9.1
Free Democratic Party (FDP)	3.538.815	7.4	+1.1	47	+4	47	+4	7.8
Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)	1.916.702	4.0	-1.1	0	-32	2	-32	0.3

Source: Bundeszentrale for Politische Bildung, *Bundestagswahl 2002*.

<sup>138</sup> "Irak-Kreise: Daeubler-Gmelin, Bush und Hitler," *Spiegel Online*, September 19, 2002, <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/irak-krise-daeubler-gmelin-bush-und-hitler-a-214597.html> (Accessed May 17, 2014).

<sup>139</sup> "Schröder Apologies for Hitler Row," *BBC News*, September 21, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/europe/2271137.stm> (Accessed May 17, 2014).

The red-green government compensated the 2.4% loss of the SPD with the 1.9% increasing of the Greens votes. At the same time, main opposition group, the CDU/CSU, increased its votes by 3.3% and reached the same percentage with the SPD. However, it could not have succeeded to establish a coalition with the liberal party, which also increased its votes 1.1%, because of missing seven MPs to get the majority in the parliament. The real loser of the election, on the other hand, was the Party of Democratic Socialism which could gain only 2 MPs unlike the 36 MP's in the 1998 elections.

The decreasing trend of the Schröder's party in terms of popular votes was obvious before the elections. However, it can be argued that it was the votes of former East German Länder which made Schröder the chancellor for the second time. In addition to the strong opposition of those former communist Eastern states against the United States and the Iraq War, a major flood catastrophe in Eastern regions in the summer of 2002 and the quick response of the red-green government gave the votes of SPD a huge momentum in those regions. In so much that the Schröder's party increased its votes about 5 percent in all those former East German Länder and took the first place except just one Land, while the SPD lost from its popular votes in all the Western Länder including Schröder's home, Lower Saxony.<sup>140</sup>

#### **5.4. German Foreign Policy after Federal Election**

The victory of Schröder and his red-green government in the federal elections gave Schröder five more years to solve major domestic problems, especially unemployment. However, in foreign policy the situation was growing worse. Above all, the top level communication between German and American leaders was cut though the relations were continued in lower levels. President Bush did not celebrate Schröder's election victory and he did not respond Schröder's call after Bush's

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<sup>140</sup> "Bundestagswahl 2002 - Zweitstimmen und Sitze in den Bundesländern," Election.de, <http://www.election.de/cgi-bin/tab.pl?datafile=btw02l.txt>, (Accessed June 14, 2014).



success in 2002 mid-term elections.<sup>141</sup> Actually, both leaders had to wait until NATO Summit on November 2002 for their first public appearance together after a long time. Also, during this NATO Summit in Prague, Schröder found a chance to explain the reasons of his “no” position to the Iraq War. For him those six reasons are;

- 1) Risk of not protecting the territorial integrity of Iraq,
- 2) Risk for regional stability, increasing in the impact of Iran and negative effects to Israel-Palestinian conflict,
- 3) Risk of extension of global anti-Terror War about 10-15 years,
- 4) Risk of “clash of civilization” as Samuel Huntington argued. In other words, impression of a war against Islam and strengthening of radical terrorism in the long run,
- 5) Huge financial, human and time cost of re-construction of Iraq,
- 6) Doubts about the willingness of the American population and European states to share the burden of this long lasting fight.<sup>142</sup>

Of course those risks were not taken into consideration by United States government because as Timothy Garton Ash also stated, in the late 2002, War in Iraq had already passed the question of “whether or not” and became a question of “when and how”.<sup>143</sup>

In that sense, Schröder took a political risk and disassociated Germany from the Iraq War but now another threat was near at the hand; threat of loneliness and isolation in the foreign policy. Germany’s after election foreign policy choices, therefore, aimed to overcome this major threat. Actually, those efforts had already started in the summer of 2002 with the German-French Summit in Schwerin and

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<sup>141</sup> Dettke, *Germany Says No*, p.77.

<sup>142</sup> Schröder, *Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik*, 220-221.

<sup>143</sup> Ash, Timothy Garton, “Washington at War,” *The Guardian*, December 12, 2002, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/12/usa.iraq> (Accessed May 28, 2014).

with their public declaration in which the need for a United Nations Security Council Resolution about possible Iraq intervention was pointed out.<sup>144</sup> However, in terms of the French side, it was expected that they insist on the United Nations efforts in first place to inspect weapons of mass destruction allegation and if Saddam Hussein regime rejects those efforts, then France could support a UN mandate for military intervention. Surprisingly, the French government changed its position by January 2003 and requested the extending the UN inspection mission. At that time, President Chirac openly rejected a military solution for the problems in Iraq.<sup>145</sup> Likewise, during the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Élysée Treaty, Schröder and Chirac made their common position about Iraq War clearer with a joint declaration, which was published in *Berliner Zeitung* and *Liberation* at the same day.<sup>146</sup> This development definitely relieved Schröder and the red-green government because in that time, any United Nations Security Council Resolution to authorize a military operation in Iraq could have seriously harmed German foreign policy and forced Germany to face a political isolation.

The one important confrontation between the German side and the American side occurred during the 39<sup>th</sup> Munich Conference on Security Policy between the 8 and 10 February, 2003. During a session which two counterparts Joschka Fischer and Donald Rumsfeld had also joined, Fischer explained his negative stance against the Iraq War unlike the War in Kosovo, Macedonia or Afghanistan with a historical sentence: *“Excuse me, I am not convinced. This is my problem. I cannot go to the public and say, these are the reason’, because I don’t believe in them.”*<sup>147</sup> Actually, this was an obvious fact in that time. Just five days after than this speech, on

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<sup>144</sup> Hooper, John and Norton-Taylor, Richard, *“UN Must Sanction’ Iraq Strike,”* *The Guardian*, July 31, 2002, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jul/31/iraq.richardnortontaylor> (Accessed May 28, 2014).

<sup>145</sup> Henner Fürtig, *“Playing the Muscle-Man or New Self-Assuredness? Germany and the Iraq War,”* *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies* 1, no.3 (2007):322-323.

<sup>146</sup> Schmale, Holger, *“Gemeinsam Gegen Irak-Krieg,”* *Berliner Zeitung*, August 9, 2014, <http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/archiv/schroeder-und-chirac-fuer-friedliche-loesung-im-konflikt-mit-bagdad-deutschland-und-frankreich-wollen-kooperation-vertiefen-gemeinsam-gegen-irak-krieg,10810590,10059992.html> (Accessed May 28, 2014)

<sup>147</sup> Fischer, *Die rot-grünen Jahre*, 212.

February 15, many global anti-war demonstrations occurred all over the world and Berlin had witnessed the largest demonstration in Germany ever because of the strong opposition of German people against the Iraq War. In that anti-war demonstration, about 500,000 people including three federal ministers of Germany walked through famous 17<sup>th</sup> June Street and protested the United States and its aggressive policies.<sup>148</sup> Therefore, it can be argued that the anti-war trend among German public opinion before the German election continued to increase in the after elections period and this support gave more political space to the red-green government and the following events support Germany's increasing activeness in international arena.

After France's taking position against the Iraq War, and the political approachment between Germany and France, German government actually tried to increase its influence in the international arena. To do that, Germany's first step was the decision of taking active role during the establishment of NATO Response Force, a highly-qualified and ready-to-act military force under the NATO command. Actually, establishment of new multinational military force was planned in Prague Summit of NATO in November 2002 and with the powerful support of the United States, it was launched in June 2003. During that period, Germany, especially the foreign minister Joschka Fischer and defense minister Peter Struck, actively supported this initiative.<sup>149</sup> Actually, this German support was not a surprise because in that time it was obvious that Germany was trying to escape from the political isolation and deterioration of the relations with the United States. With this initiative, therefore, Germany followed not only its multilateral foreign policy understanding but also created new areas of maneuver by being active in current international issues.

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<sup>148</sup> "Anti-Kriegs-Kundgebungen: Grösste Friedens- Demonstration in der Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," *Spiegel Online*, February 15, 2003, <http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/a-235314.html> (Accessed May 28, 2014)

<sup>149</sup> Beste, Von, Ralf and Szandar, Alexander, "Guter Freund," *Der Spiegel*, November 4, 2002, <http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-25604141.html>. (Accessed June 1, 2014).

Secondly, starting of Germany's tenure as United Nations Security Council non-permanent member from January 2003 on gave Germany a chance to be more active about critical global security issues. Just after the beginning of its tenure, like the previous clear opposition of French President Chirac, Schröder declared that *"Don't expect Germany to approve a resolution legitimizing war, don't expect it"* during a local election meeting.<sup>150</sup> Therefore, he openly showed Germany's continuing position about the Iraq War with the UNSC membership as well. Moreover, in this two-year time period as non-permanent member, unlike widespread unanimity tendencies in the UNSC, Germany abstained from two resolutions, UNSCR 1487 and UNSCR 1497. More importantly, those resolutions were not relating with the Iraq issue and both resolutions were abstained from France as well unlike positive votes of the United States. Therefore, it can be argued that in those two years, Germany and France did not limit their cooperation in international level just with the Iraq issue. In fact, the German public opinion also supported this cooperation and saw France as number one partner of Germany while the popularity of the United States as partner was decreasing dramatically.<sup>151</sup>

Thirdly, Chancellor Schröder wanted to take part in not only contemporary crises in the Middle East, but also in the establishment of the Middle East's future. In other words, as Rudolf also argued, he wanted to put a "European stamp" on the Middle East issue.<sup>152</sup> His close cooperation with France on various international issues among Iraq crisis also reflected this view. However, opposite responses of many European countries toward Iraq War prevented Schröder from a unified Europe image in the Middle East. Actually, for a long time the position of the United Kingdom was together with the United States and it was publicly known. However, with a joint declaration of seven EU countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and Czech Republic together with the United Kingdom showed

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<sup>150</sup> "Schroeder Won't Back Iraq Resolution," *USA Today*, January 22, 2003, [http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-01-22-germany\\_x.htm](http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-01-22-germany_x.htm). (Accessed June 2, 2014).

<sup>151</sup> Rudolf, "The Myth of the 'German Way': German Foreign Policy and Transatlantic Relations, 139.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*

their full support to the United States for its global anti-terrorism war. Also it made clear that for the European Union willing to take a common position about the Iraq issue became a failure.<sup>153</sup> Another surprise support from Europe to the United States was a public letter of 10 southern and eastern European countries, so called Vilnius letter. With their letter, those ten new democracies in Europe; Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Romania, showed their full solidarity with the United States about the Iraq War.<sup>154</sup> The interesting point here is that five of those ten countries would join into the European Union just one year after this letter. Also, two of them were candidate countries and were to join the Union four years later. Unlike two motor countries of the European Union, pro-American approach of this “new Europe”, as United States defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld called them,<sup>155</sup> created a totally divided Europe unlike the early considerations of Gerhard Schröder.

The fourth and last important contribution to Germany’s Iraq policy came from Russia and Vladimir Putin. On February 10, 2003, after Putin’s Paris visit, French, German and Russian governments published their first joint declaration and proposed a peaceful way to solve the Iraq crisis under the framework of UNSCR 1441.<sup>156</sup> Also, they put the military option as a last resort in this declaration. Just less than one month later they made another public declaration and strongly requested the continuation of inspection process of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). At the same time, they clearly ruled out any military action in that period with these words; “*In these circumstances, we will not let a proposed resolution pass*

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<sup>153</sup> “United We Stand,” *Wall Street Journal*, January 30, 2003, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1043875685287040744>. (Accessed June 2, 2014)

<sup>154</sup> Philip H. Gordon, and Jeremy Shapiro, *Allies at war: America: Europe and the Crisis over Iraq*, (New York: McGraw-Hill Press, 2004), 132.

<sup>155</sup> “Outrage at ‘Old Europe’ Remark,” *BBC News*, January 23, 2003, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2687403.stm> (Accessed June 3, 2014).

<sup>156</sup> “Joint Declaration by Russia, Germany and France on Iraq,” Embassy of France in London, February 10, 2003, <http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Joint-declaration-by-Russia> (Accessed June 3, 2014).

*that would authorize the use of force. Russia and France, as permanent members of the Security Council, will assume all their responsibilities on this point.*"<sup>157</sup> Finally, with the following third joint declaration only five days before the starting of military operation in Iraq, three countries' ministers of foreign affairs, de Villepin, Ivanov, Fischer, declared their intentions to maintain a successful inspection process in Iraq.<sup>158</sup> However, like many efforts during the whole 2002 and early 2003, those last initiatives could not have created any serious solution and the United States together with the so called "coalition of willing" (the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland) launched the military campaign on March 20, 2003.

## **5.5. After the Iraq War**

The first phase of the Iraq invasion continued until May 2003 and the war officially ended with the withdrawal of the United States troops from Iraq on December 2011 with the announcement of President Obama on October 21, 2011.<sup>159</sup> From the German foreign policy and the red-green government aspects, the Iraq War created many important implications both internally and externally. Although it was not a direct opposition to the United States itself, strong anti-war approach of German public was a very important factor that shaped Schröder's Iraq decision. Moreover, the timeline of German 2002 election was substantial coincidence that forced Schröder to take a very fast decision before the election comes. Therefore, both the public opinion and the election were undeniable factors for German foreign policy during Iraq crisis. On the other hand, it is also obvious that Chancellor Schröder's decision was more than an approach which was totally ridden by

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<sup>157</sup>"The Official Text of the Joint Declaration by the Foreign ministers of France, Russia and Germany," The Guardian, March 6, 2003, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/mar/06/france.germany> (Accessed June 3, 2014).

<sup>158</sup>"Iraq: Joint Declaration by France, the Russian Federation and Germany," Reliefweb, March 16, 2003, <http://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/iraq-joint-declaration-france-russian-federation-and-germany-s2003320>, (Accessed June 3, 2014).

<sup>159</sup> "Barack Obama: All US Troops to Leave Iraq in 2011," BBC News, October 21, 2011, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15410154> (Accessed July 4, 2014).

domestic concerns and election calculations. Rather, his policy was the reflection of the next and perhaps the last step of the normalization of German foreign policy context. In other words, Schröder's "no" to the United States was a result of intentional choices of Germany which started with the breaking of military taboo in Kosovo, exposure of full sovereignty and global responsibility in Afghanistan and ability to take decision according to its own interest in Iraq crisis.

Finally, the end of the red-green government came not too late after the beginning of the Iraq War. Decreasing public support to the coalition parties became publicly known especially with the defeat of the SPD in Germany's most populous state, North-Rhine-Westphalia, on May 2005. Schröder's following decision to run a new federal election on September 18, 2005, moreover, resulted with another defeat for the red-green government. Total 33 parliament seats losses prevented third red-green government and forced two major parties of Germany to create big coalition under the leadership of Angela Merkel. On the other hand, both Chancellor and the vice-Chancellor had to put an end to their political careers.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **CONCLUSION**

The Second World War and the Cold War changed the world entirely. As the main reason of the war, on the other hand, Germany had to pay the highest price not only with dividing into two different states, but also with losing some of its sovereign rights to the victorious power. In that position, for the Federal Republic of Germany, those rights were left politically to the integrating Europe and militarily to the NATO. Therefore, those distinctive elements shaped and mostly limited Germany foreign policy differently from its Western allies.

With the fall of Berlin Wall and the official reunification of two German states, Germany was again one of the most affected states from this drastic change in the international system. However, rapid changes in the system and Germany's domestic politics did not match with Germany's traditional foreign and security policy. On the contrary, the first years of the new decade were very problematic for German decision makers. Especially during the 1990-1991 Gulf War and 1992-1995 Bosnia War, Germany struggled to meet the expectations of its allies within its traditional foreign policy framework.

Of course, this different foreign policy evaluation took the attention of the academic world. Especially, many scholars tried to analyze Germany's different foreign policy characteristics from different point of views such as culture, economy or military power and created distinctive German foreign policy concepts. In case for some mainstream International Relations theories, on the other hand, Germany was nothing but an exceptional case in those years. Nevertheless, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created a new world order after about 45 years of the existing system's establishment. Therefore, it was normal to see with the changing international system, while all those various approaches tried to adapt themselves to the changing world, the mainstream International Theories found a new chance to test their foreign policy understandings.



Among them, especially neorealist theory created a more comprehensive understanding in order to explain Germany's changing foreign policy choices after the reunification. Particularly, in terms of defensive realist approach, Germany as a self-confident, sovereign and responsible country started to emancipate its foreign policy understanding toward a normal foreign policy. It should be one more time underlined that with the normality of German foreign policy, it is meant that Germany as a country which is independent from its Nazi past and able to act like any other NATO state pursues its own interests in a realist term.

In the light of this normalization understanding, the real change in German foreign policy came with the government of first post-war generation of Germany, so called 68 generation. Their openness to face with Germany's foreign policy taboos was actually an important driving force for future changes and Chancellor Schröder together with vice-Chancellor Fischer found a chance to test their new foreign policy approaches just several months after they came to power.

With the lessons learned from the Bosnia War, the world did not close their eyes to the war in Kosovo. Therefore, a NATO-led military operation in 1999 not only finished the long standing Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution but also witnessed Germany's first active participation in a military operation since the end of the Second World War. Of course for many Germans, leaving the traditional "culture of restraint" was not easy to accept. However, especially Joschka Fischer's activeness in the policy making process in this crisis made the participation decision possible for the red-green government. More importantly, breaking the taboo of actively participation in a military operation was the first important step for political emancipation of Germany toward a normal foreign policy.

The second international crisis of the red-green government came actually soon after the Kosovo War. On September 11, 2001, attacks of Al-Qaeda militants with hijacked planes to three different locations in the United States deeply shocked the whole world. German Chancellor's initial solidarity promise against the global terror, however, could not be kept by him very easily. On the contrary, the leaders of the red-green government had to put their government and their political careers at risk in order to obtain a mandate for military operation. Apart from that, the real

development in German foreign policy was on the discourse level. Especially, Chancellor Schröder's continuous emphasize on Germany's full sovereignty and correspondingly, necessity to take international responsibility was the discursive dimension of German foreign policy emancipation arises from the War in Afghanistan.

The last big international crisis that the red-green government had experienced was actually not totally independent from the previous one. Rather, a political tension between the United States and Germany had already emerged before the Afghan War. However, when it had become clear that Iraq is the next target for the United States; German decision makers said "no" to join a "US-led adventure" in Iraq. Certainly, the public opposition and the upcoming federal election affected Germany's "no" decision but the real motive behind this decision of the red-green government was Germany's intentional foreign policy choices, which were finally shaped by German national interests as a whole. Similarly, red-green government's clear efforts to increase its political influence on the international arena could generally be seen as the last step and the completion of emancipation process of a normal foreign policy.

In general, Germany struggled to tackle with the new expectations and the problems of the post-Cold War world at the first stage but the first serious steps against those problems were taken by a new government and a new generation in the government. The process, which includes Germany's emancipation in the foreign policy and having a normal foreign policy, started with the Kosovo War and joining a first military operation since the end of the Second World War, continued with the War in Afghanistan and change in foreign policy discourse and finalized with Germany's "no" decision to Iraq and creating a new area of influence in the foreign policy according to German national interests.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A. Location, Size, Mandate and National Composition of the Crisis Management Missions to which Germany Contributed, 1990-2003

Military operation	Total size of operation/German contribution	Mandate and auspices	Other participating nations
Adriatic sea 1992-96 <i>Operation sharp Guard</i>	22 ships/2 Destroyers	UN mandate, UNSCR820 Joint NATO and WEU operation	12 nations including US, Great Britain, Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands
Monitoring embargo against FRY in the Adriatic Sea			
Somalia 1993-94 UNOSOM II	28,000 troops /1,700 troops	UN mandate, UNSCR 814 UN operation	28 nations, including US, France, Italy, Greece
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1993-95 <i>Operation Deny Fly</i> Monitoring and enforcing no-fly zone over Bosnia	4,500 airmen / 500 airmen	UN mandate, UNSCR 816 NATO-led operation	US, France, Great Britain, Turkey, Italy, the Netherlands
Bosnia-Herzegovina 1996-96 IFOR	60,000 troops / 3,000 troops	UN mandate, UNSCR 1031 NATO-led operation	All NATO members, 22 non-NATO members
Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996 SFOR	3,000 troops/3,000 troops	UN mandate, UNSCR 1088 NATO-led operation.	All NATO members, 22 non-NATO members
Kosovo since 1999 KFOR	50,000 troops/ 8,000 troops	UN mandate, UNSCR 1244 UN auspices but substantial NATO presence	All NATO members, 22 non-NATO members
East Timor 1999-2000 INTERFET	9,800 troops/ 1,000 military personnel	UN mandate UNSCR 1264 Australian-led multinational operation	29 nations, including Australia, UK, US
Macedonia, since 2001 <i>Operation Essential Harvest</i>	1,000 troops/ 500 troops	No UN mandate NATO operation requested by the parties to the conflict	Belgium, Canada, Czech Rep., France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, UK
Macedonia, since 2001 <i>Operation Amber Fox</i>	1,000 troops/ 600 troops	UN mandate, UNSCR 1371 NATO operation	Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Poland, Spain

Afghanistan, since 2001 <i>Operation Enduring Freedom</i>	3 US carrier battle groups, at least 18.000 allied forces excl. American Army and air force personnel/3.900 troops	No UN mandate but support in UNSCR 1368 and 1373 US-led multinational operation	Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, UK
Iraq, since 2003 <i>Operation Iraqi Freedom</i>	Between 200.000 and 150. 000 troops/ No German contribution	No UN mandate US-led coalition of the willing	Denmark, Italy, Poland, (Spain), UK, US
Congo June- September 2003 <i>Operation Artemis</i>	1,400 troops/350 troops French-led EU operation	UN mandate, UNSCR 1484	Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, South Africa, Sweden, UK

Source: Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement*, (Manchester:Manchester University Press, 2006)

## **APPENDIX B. Chronology of German Foreign Policy**

### **1998**

13.1. The Iraqi government again prohibits the access of the United Nations inspectors to Iraqi facilities.

7.2. Chancellor Kohl announces at the 34th Munich Conference on Security Policy an extension of the German military presence in the Balkans and declares that the Federal Republic would be available in the case of any attack on Iraq air bases.

2.3. The UN Security Council threatens the Iraqi Government in Resolution 1154 with "severe consequences" if the cooperation agreement reached with UN Secretary-General Annan is broken.

3.3. American President Clinton comments on the resolution adopted by the Security Council: the United States is ready and willing to strike militarily without hesitation in the event of further intransigence of Iraq. The Security Council resolution is a corresponding legitimacy.

18.3. The European Commission submits the "Agenda 2000", a comprehensive package of reforms to the agricultural, structural and financial policies of the European Union, and there should pave the way for the accession of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia and Cyprus.

22.3. The Albanian population of the Serbian province of Kosovo elects a new parliament. The choice is recognized neither internationally nor from Serbia.

3.4. A special envoy of UN Secretary-General Annan reports to the press about the preliminary completion of the inspection of the Iraqi President Residence. Thus, the agreement between the United Nations and Iraq was initially met.

23.4. The Bundestag is consistent with a large majority for Germany's participation in the European Monetary Union; euro will be introduced on 1 January 1999.

12.6. In a statement, the Balkan Contact Group calls on the Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to halt the expulsions in Kosovo, to engage in serious negotiations with the Kosovo Albanians and to provide access for international monitors and aid agencies.

19.6. The Bundestag approves the extension of the Bundeswehr mission in Bosnia. Germany will therefore continue to provide the SFOR peacekeeping force without time limit 3,000 soldiers.

5.7. U.S. mediator Richard Holbrooke states after a meeting with Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade to end the violence in Kosovo and to change the status of the province within the limits of the country.



28.7. The "troika" of the European Union (United Kingdom, Austria, and Germany) makes a new attempt at mediation in Belgrade to settle the crisis in Kosovo.

9.10. Gerhard Schröder takes as designated-Chancellor an invitation from President Clinton for a short visit in Washington. In press reports, it is said, Clinton and Schröder agreed on the dealing with the Kosovo crisis.

13.10. Under the military pressure from the West, Yugoslav President Milosevic declares to meet the conditions of a peaceful solution for the conflict in Kosovo. Moreover, 2,000 international observers are stationed in Kosovo.

27.10. Gerhard Schröder is elected by the Bundestag as the seventh German Chancellor. Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister is Joschka Fischer from "Alliance 90/The Greens".

31.10. The leadership in Baghdad announces the cessation of all cooperation with the inspection team of the United Nations.

13.11. The NATO Council in Brussels approves the contingency plan on a force to protect the 2,000 unarmed OSCE observers in Kosovo.

13.11. The Bundestag agrees on the Bundeswehr participation in the NATO air surveillance in Kosovo.

4.12. After a summit in Saint-Malo, French President Chirac and British Prime Minister Blair publish "Declaration on European defense" and a "Declaration on Strengthening Cooperation in the Common Foreign and Security Policy" (CFSP).

## **1999**

1.1. The federal government takes over the presidency of the EU as scheduled.

17.1. A massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanians in Racak on January 15 causes a huge indignation all over the world. NATO calls for a special meeting.

31.1. The NATO Council authorizes the Secretary-General of the Alliance, Javier Solana, to order air strikes against targets in Serbia.

12.2. U.S. President Clinton and Chancellor Schröder warn Serbia of a failure of the Rambouillet negotiations and threaten in case of failure of NATO's readiness to intervene militarily.

25.2. The Bundestag approves the deployment of 5,500 German soldiers as part of a NATO-led multinational peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

10.3. The U.S. Special Envoy Holbrooke tries to affect in vain the Yugoslav President Milosevic to accept the Kosovo Plan of Balkan Contact Group.

20.3. Serbia begins a large-scale offensive attack against the Kosovo Albanians under KLA.

24.3. The NATO launches air strikes on targets in Yugoslavia, where from the beginning the Bundeswehr is involved.

28.3. The NATO air strikes in Yugoslavia are expanded. 500,000 Kosovo Albanians decide to flee.

29.3. Russian President Yeltsin criticizes the military action by NATO against Yugoslavia. Russia would, however, not be drawn into an armed conflict because of the Kosovo crisis and will not put its relations with the U.S. at risk.

1.4. Federal Foreign Minister Fischer invites relating states to a Balkan Conference in the Petersberg Hotel near Bonn. Participants will be the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the eight neighboring states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Commission, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the Acting OSCE Chairman in addition to the foreign ministers of the EU Troika (Austria, Germany and Finland).

8.4. The EU Foreign Ministers approve at a special meeting in Luxembourg the deployment of a peacekeeping force in Kosovo.

9.4. Russian President Boris Yeltsin warns NATO that Moscow would not permit the use of NATO ground forces in Yugoslavia.

15.4. In a government statement before the Bundestag, Chancellor Schröder defends again the Yugoslav policy of the coalition. In the ensuing debate Fischer explains his aims of "stability pact southern Balkans".

23.4. At the NATO summit in Washington, a new strategic concept is adopted, which provides crisis management the deployment of troops outside the NATO area.

8.5. In a nightly bombardment of NATO, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade is destroyed and four people killed. NATO calls it as a "tragic mistake".

14.5. Federal Foreign Minister Fischer presents a six-point peace plan for Kosovo.

4.6. At the Cologne EU summit, leaders decide to make the WEU as the European defense alliance and an integral part of the EU.

10.6. At the International Balkan Conference in Cologne, "Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe" is adopted.

11.6. The Bundestag approves the deployment of the Bundeswehr in the international peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR).

12.6. The first soldiers of the Kosovo Force (KFOR) go to Kosovo. Units of the Bundeswehr take their assigned sector in the southwest of the Prizren province.

15.11. Foreign and defense ministers of the EU member states discuss defense and security policy. A document submitted by the UK paper provides for the establishment of independent military capacity of the EU.

## **2000**

18.4. The Eurocorps, composed of troops from Belgium, Germany, France, Luxembourg and Spain, take over in Pristine command of the international peacekeeping force KFOR.

11.5. The German Commissioner Verheugen announces a concrete scenario for the accession of the twelve candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the Union until the end of the year.

27.6. In a speech in the renovated Reichstag, French President Jacques Chirac speaks of a "pioneer" role of Germany and France in European integration. Other particularly integration willing EU members should come together in a "pioneer group", and so play the role of a pioneer for enhanced cooperation, if necessary, out of the EU Treaty.

22.9. EU defense ministers advise on the establishment of a joint task force.

2.10. In Serbia there is a general strike, which the opposition has called. President Milosevic is forced to recognize the election results of September 24 and gives his resignation.

24.11. Governments of the fifteen EU Member States meet in the Croatian capital Zagreb with the presidents of Albania, Bosnia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Macedonia. In a joint statement, it is said that five South East European countries are potential candidates for membership of the European Union.

27.11. After the hand counts the votes in Florida, US-presidential candidate Bush is declared as the winner. The Democrats challenge the result.

## **2001**

3.-4.2. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld reiterates the intention of the new administration to stick to the plan for the controversial missile defense system, "National Missile Defense" (NMD) at the Conference on Security Policy in Munich.

5.2. French President Chirac calls for a thorough reform of the European Union. This "redesign" would lead to the drafting of a constitution.

6.3. The international peacekeeping force in Kosovo, KFOR reinforced its presence in Yugoslav-Macedonian border area in order to fend off the attacks of Albanian battle groups.

9.4. The EU joins with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to Stabilization and Association Agreement.

03.05. The Macedonian army attacks against fighters of the Albanian "National Liberation Army". The KLA has declared an area near the border with Kosovo as a "liberated territory" on the day before.

05.09. The Federal Cabinet decides to extend the mandate of the Bundeswehr in Kosovo. German KFOR soldiers may also be used in the security zone bordering on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro in the future.

28.6. Former Yugoslav President Milosevic is transferred to the War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague and charges there because of expulsion and genocide.

16.-27.7. In Bonn another round of world climate conference takes place. Participants look for a way to implement the Kyoto Protocol without the United States.

29.8. The Bundestag approves a German participation in Operation "Essential Harvest" in Macedonia.

11.9. In the USA, several passenger aircraft are almost simultaneously hijacked and directed specifically to the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington. As a result of these terrorist attacks, both towers of the World Trade Center have collapsed. Parts of the Pentagon are also destroyed. An estimated 3,000 people lose their lives. President Bush refers to the attacks as "first war of the 21st century" and announces tough measures against the perpetrators of the attacks to.

12.9. The UN Security Council condemns unanimously the terrorist attacks in the USA in a resolution and rates it as a "threat to world peace and international security."

12.9. NATO declares the collective defense case for the first time since its establishment. It considers the terrorist attacks on the United States as an attack on the entire alliance. Germany contributes to the decision. Chancellor Schröder promises to the USA "unlimited solidarity".

13.9. Secretary of State, Colin Powell, publicly identifies Osama bin Laden as the main suspect of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington for the first time.

15.9. President Bush announces a comprehensive attack on the international Terrorism and calls for a national emergency situation.

17.9. The Taliban leadership in Kandahar denies the extradition of Osama bin Laden to the United States.

27.9. The Bundestag agrees Bundeswehr participation in the NATO's "Amber Fox" operation in Macedonia.

28.9. The UN Security Council unanimously adopts a second resolution about the terrorist attacks of September 11. With that, all states are obliged to act against the financial structures, training and recruitment as well as the movement of terrorists.

7.10. Beginning of American and British air attacks on Afghanistan.

11.10. In a government statement Chancellor Schröder reaffirms the willingness of Germany to participate in "military operations" in Afghanistan as part of an international anti-terrorist coalition.

6:11. Chancellor Schröder announces the deployment of Bundeswehr units in support of the military action in Afghanistan. Basis is a request from Washington.

16.11. As the first Federal Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder links a foreign policy issue (the vote in the Bundestag is about the approval of a Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan) with the confidence question of Article 68 of the Basic Law. The Bundestag says the Chancellor with a small majority has trust and also endorses the use of the Bundeswehr.

27.11. In Petersberg Hotel near Bonn, United Nations Conference on Afghanistan begins.

5.12. United Nations Conference about Afghanistan in Bonn agrees on the formation of an "International Security Assistance Force" (ISAF) and a transitional government with the Pashtun leader Hamid Karzai at the top.

13.12. President Bush declares the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the ABM Treaty concluded in 1972.

22.12. The Bundestag approves the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan as part of ISAF.

29.12. The EU presents an "anti-terrorism package" in Brussels.

31.12. The German Mark is used as a sole currency last time in the Federal Republic of Germany.

**2002**

2.1. A first flotilla of the German Navy leaves Wilhelmshaven to participate in Operation "Enduring Freedom" in the Horn of Africa.

29.1. In his State of the Nation, President Bush calls North Korea, Iraq and Iran as the "axis of evil".

31.1. In a meeting with President Bush, Chancellor Schröder assures a longer-term deployment of German soldiers and experts in Afghanistan.

12.2. The process of Yugoslavia's former president Milosevic begins in the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague.

24.2. Federal Defence Minister Scharping confirms that German elite soldiers of the Special Forces Command (KSK) are involved for weeks in Afghanistan against the terrorist organization Al-Qaeda.

23.5. In a speech to the German Bundestag President, George W. Bush calls the Europeans on the common fight against terrorism and the enemies of freedom.

30.7. Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac put four working groups to coordinate the mutual positions in key European and international issues. Moreover, closer cooperation in the military intelligence satellite is agreed.

5.8. To start the SPD election campaign, Chancellor Schröder warns of "Dancing with war and military intervention" and rules out not only direct military involvement, but also financial support intervention in Iraq.

05.09. Chancellor Schröder again criticizes the plans of the United States against Iraq. A military procedure would weaken the coalition formed to combat international terrorism. It lacks a political concept and he does not share the US-British threat analysis.

12.9. President Bush declares that if need, Iraq attack could be made without approval of the UN Security Council.

16.9. Iraq agrees to allow UN weapons inspectors into the country without preconditions.

22.9. From the Bundestag elections, the SPD-Green coalition emerges as the winner with a narrow margin.

24.-25.9. During an informal meeting with his NATO colleagues, Rumsfeld suggests the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force for worldwide operations.

2.10. In Paris, Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac cannot agree on a common stance on the Iraq conflict. Unlike Germany, France wants to keep the option for military use open.

11.10. President Bush receives from the Senate the mandate for an attack on Iraq.

8.11. The UN Security Council in New York unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which Iraq obliged to comply with all United Nations resolutions with strict conditions to control his arsenal.

20.11. At the NATO summit in Prague, governments of the member countries decide the inclusion of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. They also agree on the creation of a globally Reaction Force (NATO Response Force).

7.12. Iraq hands over the UN a 12,000-page dossier on its nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

20.12. The Bundestag extended the Bundeswehr mandate for the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) for another year.

## **2003**

1.1. Germany is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for two years.

1.1. The European Union takes over from the United Nations, "United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina "(UNMIBH), expires on 31 December 2005.

14.1. Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac propose the European Union should continue to be represented by a "double peak", directly chosen by the President of the Commission of the European parliament, and governed by a Council President, by a qualified majority in the European Council.

22.1. On the 40th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty Chancellor Schröder and French President Chirac publicly declare their opposition to a military operation against Iraq. Rumsfeld calls both countries therefore "a problem" and refers to them as "old Europe" that no longer speak for the entire Union.

27.1. The EU foreign ministers formulate a common position on the Iraq issue in Brussels. They call for further arms control, but do not mention specific deadlines.

30.1. In several European newspapers, a call appears with the title "Europe and America must stand together", which was signed by the Government of Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Hungary, Poland and Denmark and the Czech President Havel. The letter is widely interpreted as a European solidarity address to Washington and as a warning of a Franco-German domination of European opinion regarding the Iraq conflict.

5.2. The American Secretary of State Colin Powell accused Iraq in the UN Security Council for having biological and chemical weapons and cooperating with Al-Qaeda.

9.2. Russian President Putin in Berlin supports the approach of Germany and France over Iraq. After a meeting with President Chirac, they release a statement that reflects Russia, Germany and France at the common position.

17.2. On a special EU summit in Brussels, member states want to formulate a common position about the Iraq crisis. Upon completion of the summit, French President Chirac strongly criticizes some EU candidate countries in front of the press due to their signing of the call by eight European leaders to support the United States.

24.2. The United States submits to the UN Security Council, together with Britain and Spain, a draft resolution in which Iraq is referred to as a "threat to world peace and international security". Germany, France and Russia circulate a joint memorandum in the Council, containing an action plan for disarmament of Iraq by peaceful means.

17.3. The United States, Britain and Spain do without a vote on the draft resolution introduced by them. Thus, the diplomatic window is closed, so Secretary of State Powell in Washington. President Bush gives Iraqi President Saddam Hussein an ultimatum. An attack by the USA is thus only on the condition avoidable, that Saddam Hussein leaves his country by the March 19, 2003.

20.3. Soldiers from Britain and the USA invade Iraq.

9.4. American troops occupy the center of Baghdad.

29.4. Chancellor Schröder, French President Chirac and Luxembourg Prime Minister Juncker accept the invitation of the Belgian Prime Minister Verhofstadt for a "four-way summit" in Brussels. They agree for a closer cooperation in defense matters and the establishment of joint structures to strengthen the ESDP.

1.5 President Bush announces the end of operations in Iraq, but the "war on terror" is not over yet.

5.6. Hans Blix, head of the UN arms control Commission (UNMOVIC), notes in its final report that its employees have found no evidence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

11.7. The NATO Council in Brussels reacts cautiously to the demands for the commitment to the alliance in Iraq. France and Germany are skeptical about a greater role for NATO without UN mandate.



11.8. NATO takes over command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) which was led lastly by Germany and the Netherlands.

24.9. Chancellor Schröder underscores the wish for an expansion of the Security Council and for a permanent seat for Germany before the UN General Assembly.

25.10. The Bundestag had decided to deploy 450 soldiers outside Kabul in the city of Kunduz.

## **2004**

23.1. The foreign ministers of Russia and France meet in Moscow for the convening of a conference on the future of Iraq and its role in the region.

6.2. Federal Foreign Minister Fischer explains at the Munich Security Conference that he considers the plans for the deployment of NATO in Iraq with great skepticism. Germany will not block a consensus on this issue, but will not send Bundeswehr soldiers.

19.3. Because of recent clashes between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, the NATO Council in Brussels decides to reinforce the military presence in the region. Germany increased its contingent to KFOR by 600 soldiers to 3,700.

29.3. Seven Central and Eastern European countries ratify founding treaty of NATO in Washington.

05.01. Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Hungary, the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Malta and Cyprus become a full member of the European Union.

22.9. The North Atlantic Council in Brussels decides a framework about the involvement of the Alliance for the reconstruction of Iraq.

2.11. In the presidential elections in the United States, the incumbent George W. Bush prevails over his Democratic challenger John Kerry.

2.12. The EU takes over from NATO responsibility for the armed peacekeeping mission in the Balkan country.

## **2005**

18.2. The Federal Council passes the "Parliamentary Participation Act," which expands the federal government's scope of action in foreign missions of the Bundeswehr.

21.2. After his re-election, President Bush goes for first major trip to Europe. At a presentation in Brussels, the President refers to the strong friendship between America and Europe as essential for peace and welfare in the world.

21.2. In Brussels, the establishment of an EU office in Baghdad is decided. The Union wants to offer Iraq to train 700 lawyers, police officers and prison staff to support the democratic reconstruction of the country.

23.2. During a visit by U.S. President Bush in Mainz, Chancellor Schröder emphasizes that the United States and Germany are "equal friends, partners and allies". The differences over the Iraq war, both express, are at the past.

25.4. In Brussels, the Accession Treaty with Bulgaria and Romania is signed and it is agreed in Strasbourg that accession should take place in 2007.

16.5. Brazil, Germany, India and Japan to put a draft resolution into circulation, which proposes the expansion of the UN Security Council from 10 to 25 members as its object.

11.7. The General Assembly in New York begins with a further debate on reform and expansion of the Security Council. The debate in the General Assembly passes controversial and partly polemical.

18.9. From the early elections to the 16th German Bundestag, the Christian Democrats emerged as the winner by a narrow margin against the Social Democrats. SPD and the Greens lose their previous parliamentary majority, but also CDU/CSU and FDP fail to get a majority of the targeted government alliance.

14.11. Because of a suicide attack in Kabul, one Bundeswehr soldier and five Afghan pedestrians are killed. A second German soldier is hard and a third is slightly injured.

22.11. The Bundestag elects the CDU leader Angela Merkel as Chancellor. As the first woman in that office, she receives 397 of 612 votes.

23.11. German Chancellor Angela Merkel speaks out at first visits in Paris and in the EU and NATO in Brussels for the further development of Franco-German relations and improvements in the transatlantic relationship.

9.12. Ex-Chancellor Schröder receives the supervisory board chairman position of German-Russian pipeline company.

Source: Siegmund Schmidt, Gunther Hellmann and Reinhard Wolf. *Handbuch zur Deutschen Außenpolitik*. (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), 923-947.

## APPENDIX C. Turkish Summary

II. Dünya Savaşı ve ardından oluşan çift kutuplu dünyadaki Soğuk Savaş atmosferi şüphesiz dünyadaki birçok ülkeyi etkilemiştir. Ancak bunlar arasından, savaşın da en büyük sebeplerinden biri olarak görülen, Alman İmparatorluğu en büyük zararı gören ülkelerden biridir. Öyle ki, II. Dünya Savaşı'nın galip devletleri Almanya'nın birleşmesinden itibaren süre gelen "Alman Sorusu" problemini, imparatorluğu ikiye ayırarak çözmeye çalışmıştır.

Bir taraftan, Doğu Almanya olarak adlandırılan ve yaklaşık olarak bugünkü Alman devletinin 3'te 1'ini oluşturan bu yeni devletin inisiyatifi tamamen Sovyet Sosyalist Cumhuriyetler Birliği'ne bırakılırken, Batı Almanya olarak adlandırılan ve savaş sırasında Batılı güçler tarafından işgal edilen diğer kısmın geleceği Batı dünyası içinde şekillenmiştir.

Bu yeni kurulan Almanya Federal Cumhuriyeti her ne kadar prensip olarak bağımsız bir devlet olsa da, Alman sorunuyla tekrar yüzleşme istemeyen muzaffer devletler, Almanya'nın askeri ve güvenlik anlamında NATO ile, siyasi olarak ise savaş sonrası gelişmesi planlanan Avrupa bütünleşme süreciyle tamamen iç içe olmasını planlamışlardır. Bu noktada dikkat çekilmesi gereken bir nokta ise, Almanya'nın özellikle askeri ve güvenlik alanlarında bu oluşumların içinde bulunmasının eşitlik prensibi çerçevesinde değil, aksine egemenlik haklarından feragat edilerek sağlanmış olmasıdır. Öte taraftan bu egemenlik haklarından vazgeçme fikri, dönemin Alman siyasetçileri tarafından da büyük oranda kabul görmüş, Batı ile tam bütünleşme, Almanya'nın büyük savaş yaralarını sarabilmesi için ideal bir yol olarak görülmüştür.

Yaklaşık 45 yıl süren bu çift kutuplu dünya düzeninin sona ermesi, aynen kurulması sürecinde olduğu gibi Almanya'yı derinden etkilemiştir. Başta 9 Kasım 1989'da Berlin Duvarı'nın yıkılması ve 3 Ekim 1990'da iki Alman devletinin birleşmesi hem siyasi hem ekonomik hem de sosyal anlamda Almanya'nın dinamiklerini değiştirmesine yol açmış hem iç politikada hem de dış politikada birçok yeni gelişmeyi beraberinde getirmiştir. Özellikle iç politika alanında doğu

eyaletlerindeki işsizlik sorunu çok büyük bir problem haline gelirken, dış politika alanında tamamen yeni bir anlayışa ihtiyaç duyulduğu çok geçmeden ortaya çıkmıştır.

II. Dünya Savaşı sonrası Almanya'sının, birçok devletten farklı bir şekilde gelişim göstermesi, akademik dünya için de özgün bir örnek ortaya koymuş, gün geçtikçe Almanya'nın bu özel gelişim sürecine olan ilgi artmıştır. Özellikle Uluslararası İlişkiler alanında, Almanya ve Alman dış politikasının bu süreç içindeki gelişimi dikkatle takip edilmiştir. Öyle ki, başta Alman düşünürler olmak üzere, birçok akademik düşünür bu özgün yapı üzerine kafa yormuş ve konuyu ekonomi, siyaset, kültür, askeri güç gibi farklı bakış açılarıyla değerlendirmeye çalışmışlardır.

Bunlar arasında, Alman düşünür Peter Katzenstein tarafından geliştirilen “ehlileştirilmiş güç” (tamed power) anlayışı şüphesiz ki önemli anlayışlardan biridir. Katzenstein'a göre, savaş sonrası Almanya'sının zorunlu olarak elde ettiği en önemli özellik “sınırlama kültürü”nü edinmesi ve bunun ışığında güç kavramının siyasi literatürden tamamen çıkmasıdır. Bunun Alman dış politikasına en büyük etkisi ise, Almanya'nın Avrupa içinde liderlik iddiasında bulunmaması ve NATO, AB gibi kurumlarının çatısı altında çok taraflı bir politika sürecine girmesidir. Yine aynı şekilde, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında da Almanya kendi isteği dışında iç politikasının ve ekonomisinin yönlendirmesiyle AB içerisinde liderlik konumuna ulaşması Katzenstein'ın temel önerilerinden biridir. Yazara göre her ne kadar arzu edilmemiş bu liderlik rolü Almanya için gerçekleşmiş olsa da, özellikle yeniden birleşme sonrası Almanya'sının sahip olduğu bu sınırlama kültüründe çok radikal bir değişiklik görülmemektedir.

Almanya'nın farklı dış politika gelişimi konusunda bir diğer katkı ise Sebastian Harnisch ve Hans Maull'un “sivil güç” (civilian power) anlayışıdır. Immanuel Kant'ın “ebedi barış” ve Karl Deutsch'un “güvenlik toplulukları” görüşlerini temel alan bu anlayışa göre, Soğuk Savaş boyunca Almanya yeni bir dış politika anlayışı geliştirmiş ve tıpkı Katzenstein'ın “ehlileştirilmiş güç” anlayışında olduğu gibi klasik askeri güç anlayışını dış politikasından çıkararak sınırlama kültürünü dış politika anlayışının temeline oturtmuştur. Bu anlayışın Katzenstein'ın “ehlileştirilmiş güç” anlayışından en büyük farkı ise Almanya'nın bu yeni anlayışı

isteyerek kabul etmesi, Soğuk Savaş sonrasında da sürdürmeye devam etmeye niyetli olmasıdır. Yazarlara göre, “sivil güç” anlayışının en büyük farkı ise bu anlayışın küresel bir uluslararası ilişkiler modeli sunmasıdır. Başka bir deyişle, uluslararası ilişkilerin ve uluslararası siyasetin topyekûn medenileştirilmesi bu anlayışın oluşturduğu temel amaçtır.

Bu hususta üçüncü anlayış ise Rosecrance tarafından geliştirilen “ticaret devleti” anlayışdır. Bu yaklaşımın temel tezi, dünya üzerinde değişen ekonomik sistemin sonucunda eski düzendeki toprak fethetme anlayışı yerini küresel piyasalarda ürünleri ile etkili olmaya bırakmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Almanya’nın daha önce bahsedilen iç ve dış politika sınırlamaları ve güvenlik konusunda tamamen batı dünyasına bağlılığı, Almanya’nın tıpkı “sivil güç” anlayışındaki gibi klasik güç kavramını dış politika anlayışından çıkarmasına, askeri gücün siyasi bir araç olarak düşünülmemesine yol açmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Batı ittifakı ve özellikle NATO tarafından sağlanan güvenlik sayesinde Almanya, herhangi bir güvenlik endişesi taşımadan iktisadi anlamda ihracat odaklı çok güçlü bir ekonomi geliştirmesine yol açmıştır. Yazarın bu anlayıştaki bir diğer örneği de 2.Dünya Savaşı sırasında aynı yıkımı yaşayan Japonya’dır. Anlatılan anlayışa göre, bu yeni ticaret devletlerinin en büyük amacı ise iktisadi verimliliğini arttırarak uluslararası piyasalarda daha iyi pozisyon alabilmektir.

Dördüncü ve görece olarak daha yeni olan “jeo-ekonomik güç” anlayışı ise önceki üç anlayışın günümüz için yeni bir sentezi olarak görülebilmektedir. Hans Kundani tarafından ileri sürülen bu anlayış, Avrupa Tek Pazarı ve Parasal Birliği gibi önemli bütünleşme hareketleri çerçevesinde, bütünleşme ve işbirliği temelli dış politika anlayışına sahip olan Almanya’nın dış politikasının, 2000’li yılların başına kadar ekonomi önceliğinde ve askeri anlamda müttefiklerine bağlı olarak şekillendiğini öne sürmektedir. Ancak, 2000’li yıllarda, Almanya’nın dış politika konusunda süre gelen sınırlamalardan kurtulması, ekonomik temelli bu dış politika anlayışının, ulusal çıkarlar bağlamında bir seçicilik içinde gelişmesine imkân vermiştir. Bir diğer deyişle, ulusal iktisadi çıkar temelli bu anlayış, Alman karar alıcıların kararlarını verirken Almanya’nın iktisadi çıkarlarını temel almasını konu edinmiştir. Bu anlayışın yukarıda bahsedilen “sivil güç” ve “ticaret devleti”

anlayışlarından temel farkı ise, bir jeo-ekonomik güç olan Almanya'nın tüm uluslararası siyaseti medenileştirme gibi bir amacının olmaması aksine ulusal çıkarları temele alarak iktisadi bir analiz ortaya koymasındır. Ancak bu analiz çerçevesinde askeri gücün de bir siyasi araç olarak kullanılabilmesi bu yaklaşımı önceki ikisinden ayıran temel özelliklerden biri olmuştur.

Daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi, bu Almanya temelli dış politika analizlerine ek olarak, ana akım uluslararası ilişkiler teorileri Alman dış politikasının Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişimini kendi teorilerinin test edilebilmesi bakımından ilgiyle karşılamışlardır. İlk olarak faydacı liberal anlayış, bu yeni Alman dış politikasını kolektif yerel karar verici aktörler ve bu aktörlerin dış politika konusunda faydacı bir yol sürerek ülke için getirileri en yüksek düzeye çıkarması esasına dayanmaktadır. Bu anlayışın temel tezi ise, Almanya'nın yeniden birleşmesi ile temel siyasi aktörlerde çok büyük bir değişime gitmemesi, Alman dış politikasında uzun vadede herhangi büyük bir değişime gidilmemesine yol açmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, Hellman'ın da belirttiği gibi, sınırlama kültürüne bağlılık, salt ulusal çıkarlara bağlı bir dış politika izlememe, aktörlerden kaynaklı büyük bir değişim ihtimalinin düşüklüğü ve son olarak oluşturulan bu yeni ve medeni dış politika anlayışının diğer devletlere de örnek teşkil etmesi bu yaklaşımın temel dört savıdır.

Bir diğer geniş kapsamlı uluslararası ilişkiler anlayışı sosyal inşacılık asıl olarak uluslararası politika ile dış politika analizi arasında büyük bir ayrıma gitmemektedir. Aksine bu iki alanı birbirinin içerisinde değerlendirmektedir. Bu çerçevede, devletlerin dış politika anlayışı da yine aktör temelli oluşurken, bu görüşü liberal anlayıştan ayıran temel fark ise bu aktörlerin dış politika seçimlerini yaparken kimlikleri ve sosyal olarak inşa edilmiş yapıları temel almalarıdır. Alman dış politikası özelinde ise bakılır ise, kimliklerin dışında sosyal normlar temel alınarak yapılan bu dış politika anlayışı için, Alman dış politikasının içinde bulunduğu norm ve değerler temel belirleyiciler olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ancak yine bu görüşten yola çıkılarak, Almanya'nın karar alma sürecinde kullandığı norm ve değerlerin her an değişime açık olması genel politikanın da her an değişime açık olması sonucunu beraberinde getirmektedir. Bu durumda, Alman dış politikası hakkında genel çıkarım yapmanın zorluğu yazarlar tarafından vurgulanmış, daha tutarlı bir Alman dış

politikası analizi için büyük genellemelerden kaçınılarak, olaya dayalı incelemeler daha mantıklı bir yol olarak gösterilmiştir.

Bu konuda son uluslararası ilişkiler yaklaşımı neorealizmde ise tıpkı sosyal inşacılıkta olduğu gibi dış politika ve uluslararası siyaset uzun süre birbirinden bağımsız iki alan olarak görülmemiştir. Özellikle önde gelen neorealist kuramcılardan Keneth Waltz neorealizmin bir dış politika teorisi olmadığını çok defa dile getirmiştir. Ancak daha yakın zamanlarda bu anlayış kısmen değişmeye başlamış, Colin Elman gibi bir çok düşünürler tarafından neorealist bir dış politika yaklaşımının ihtimali ve hatta gerekliliği sıkça vurgulanmıştır. Ancak bu konuda Elman'ın da dile getirdiği en büyük problem, neorealist anlayışın devletlerin saldırgan ya da savunmacı olmaları arasındaki ayırım konusunda karara varamamalarıdır. Bu ayırımın en büyük sebebi ise; neorealist düşünürlerin, devletlerin içinde bulunduğu güvenlik çıkmazından kurtulmaları konusunda daha saldırgan mı yoksa daha savunmacı bir yol mu takip etmeleri konusunda farklı öngörülerde bulunmalarıdır. Bu yönüyle, tıpkı güncel neorealist tartışmalarda karşılaşıldığı gibi, dış politika analizinin de, savunmacı realist ve saldırgan realist adlarında temel iki alt başlık altında yapılması daha anlamlı görülmektedir. İlk olarak John Mearsheimer'ın temsil ettiği saldırgan realizm anlayışının temel görüşü olan devletlerin askeri güçlerini arttırarak kendilerini daha güvende hissetme anlayışına, Kenneth Waltz ve Stephen Walt'ın savunmacı realizm anlayışında karşı çıkılmakta bu durumun kaçınılmaz olmadığı vurgulanmıştır. Buna ek olarak, coğrafya, teknoloji, ekonomi gibi farklı etmenlerin, devletlerin bahsedilen bu güvenlik ikileminden kurtulmalarına yardımcı faktörler olarak öne çıkmaları da savunmacı realizm anlayışının temel tezini oluşturmaktadır. Alman dış politikası açısından ise, özellikle Rittberger'in bu iki anlayışı temel alarak oluşturduğu Alman dış politikası yaklaşımı da olaya iki yönüyle bakmaktadır. Yazara göre, saldırgan realizm açısından bakıldığında, bu devletler için siyasi bağımsızlık ve uluslararası sistemde etkili olma temel iki öncelikken, devletlerin kendini tehdit altında hissetmeleri ve bu iki seçenekten birini seçmeleri durumunda siyasi bağımsızlık en temel öncelik olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Öte taraftan, güvenlik tehdidinin sınırsız ve önlenemez bir gelişme olmadığını savunan savunmacı realist anlayış da devletlerin uluslararası sistemdeki etkilerini arttırmayı ve siyasi olarak bağımsız bir dış politikaya tercih

ederken, bu ikisi arasında seçim yapılması gerektiğinde, uluslararası alanda etkinliğini arttırmayı tercih etmektedir. Almanya'nın Soğuk Savaş sonrasındaki dış politika tercihleri ise takip eden bölümlerde de görülebileceği gibi genel anlamda savunmacı realist önerme ile uyumlu bulunmaktadır.

Bu temel teorik yaklaşımlar çerçevesinde, bu tez için temel iki anahtar kavram da detaylı bir açıklamayı hak etmektedir. Bunların birincisi normalleşme ve bu bağlamda normal bir dış politika anlayışıdır. Bu konuda Alman dış politikası, yeniden birleşme sonrası üç temel açıdan normal olarak tanımlanmaya başlamıştır. Bunların birincisi; Almanya'nın Nazi geçmişinin üzerine bir çizgi çekerek yeni oluşturduğu dış politika anlayışında bu geçmişten bağımsız hareket edebilmesi, ikincisi; uzun süreli bir Batı ve NATO müttefiki olarak özellikle askeri alanda tıpkı buradaki üye devletler gibi hareket edebilmesi ve son olarak kendi ulusal çıkarlarını takip edebilme fırsatı bulabilmesidir. Bu üç anlayıştan da görüldüğü gibi, tez içinde kullanılan normalleşme yaklaşımı büyük oranda realist bir yaklaşımı yansıtmaktadır. Buna bağlı olarak ikinci anahtar kavram dış politikanın özgürleşmesi ise Alman hükümetlerinin günün gerektirdiği dış politika şartlarına uyum sağlama çabasına vurgu yaparken, bunu yavaş ve kademeli bir değişim şeklinde tanımlamaktadır. Bu açıdan “Salam Taktiği” de denilebilecek bu kademeli yaklaşım çerçevesinde, Almanya'nın normal bir dış politikaya sahip olma yolunda attığı adımlar bu tez içerisinde siyasi bir özgürleşme olarak tanımlanmaktadır.

Bu anlayış ışığında, Alman dış politikasının Soğuk Savaş sonrası değişimi ise en başta Şansölye Helmut Kohl dönemine dayanmaktadır. 1991 yılında Körfez Savaşı'na anayasanın izin vermediği gerekçesiyle katılmayı reddeden Alman hükümeti, müttefiklerinin beklentilerini “çek defteri diplomasisi” olarak da adlandırılan, operasyonu mali olarak desteklemesi yoluyla karşılamayı seçmiştir. Yine 1992 yılında başlayan Bosna Savaşı'nda da, müttefiklerinin yoğun taleplerini aynı gerekçeyle reddetmiştir. Ancak, Avrupalı devletlerin hemen yanı başında meydana gelen Srebrenitsa Katliamı, Almanya'nın gelecek politikalarının şekillenmesinde rol oynamıştır. Aynı zamanda, 1994 yılında Alman Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin yukarıda bahsedilen iki uluslararası krizde uluslararası operasyona katılmama sebebi olarak sunulan anayasanın 87a maddesini, dış operasyonu



tamamen yasaklamayan bir madde olarak yorumlaması önemli bir gelişmedir. Bu karara ek olarak, Alman meclisinin onayı olduğu durumlarda uluslararası askeri operasyonlara katılımı mümkün kılınması bu zamandan sonraki gelişmeler için önemli bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilebilmektedir. 1998 yılında başlayan Kosova Savaşı'nda da bu geçmiş iki olayın ve bu kararın izleri görülmektedir.

Tabi ki 1998 yılını Almanya için önemli yapan bir diğer etmen de Eylül ayında yapılan federal seçimlerdir. Aşağı Saksonya eyaleti başbakanı Sosyal Demokrat Gerhard Schröder ile Yeşiller partisi başkanı Joschka Fischer'ın kurduğu kırmızı-yeşil koalisyonu, özellikle Almanya'nın II. Dünya Savaşı'nı yaşamamış ilk nesli olarak Alman dış politikası tabuları hakkında daha rahat karar alma şansına sahipti. 68 kuşağı olarak da atlandırılan bu neslin bir diğer özelliği de Almanya'nın Nazi geçmişi konusunda daha özgür olmalarıdır. Ancak bu özgürlük Nazi geçmişini reddetme şeklinde değil aksine Almanya'nın sorumluluğunu kabul ederek bu konuda atılması gereken her adımı atmak, ama aynı zamanda da gelecek için bu geçmişin altında ezilmemek ve daha özgür kararlar alabilmek şeklinde vücut bulmuştur. İşte Almanya'daki bu yeni neslin oluşturduğu ilk hükümet, daha resmi olarak göreve başlamadan karşılamak zorunda oldukları Kosova Krizi ile de Almanya'nın Soğuk Savaş dönemi dış politikasının en önemli unsurlarından biri olan uluslararası askeri operasyonlarda yer almama geleneğini sona erdirmişlerdir. Şüphesiz ki Almanya gibi savaş karşıtlığının uzun yıllardır toplum tarafından destek gördüğü ve özellikle Sosyal Demokrat Parti ve Yeşiller Partisi gibi içerisinde savaş karşıtı güçlü grupların yer aldığı partilerin yönettiği bir ülkenin bu savaşa muharip güç olarak katılma kararı kolay alınmamıştır. Ancak özellikle dış işleri bakanı Joschka Fischer'in Avrupa'da yeniden bir soykırımı önleme üzerine izlediği politika hem hükümet partileri içinde, hem Alman siyasetinde hem de toplumsal alanda başarılı sonuçlar vermiş, meclisin büyük çoğunluğunun desteği ile Kosova Savaşı'nda aktif yer alma kararı verilmiştir. Bu noktada dikkat çekilmesi gereken bir nokta da, bu kriz sayesinde yalnız Almanya'nın değil tüm Avrupa'nın hemen yanı başında meydana gelen acil bir durumda harekete geçirebileceği bir gücünün olmadığına ortaya çıkmasıdır. Hele ki Kosova Savaşı gibi Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin ilk etapta askeri anlamda çekimser kaldığı durumlarda, Avrupalı devletlerin askeri anlamda hareket kapasitelerinin çok düşük seviyelerde kaldığı çok

açık bir şekilde ortaya çıkmıştır. Alman dış politikası açısından bakıldığında ise, daha önce de bahsedildiği gibi, Almanya'nın askeri müdahalelerde aktif olarak yer almama geleneği bu krizle yıkılmış, Soğuk Savaş'tan beri gelen sınırlandırılmış Alman dış politikasının normalleşmesi yolunda ilk adım atılmıştır. Ayrıca, bu krizle birlikte Almanya'nın askeri açıdan yetersizliği fark edilmiş, geniş çaplı bir ordu reformu hazırlanarak Alman ordusunun gelecekte daha verimli olarak kullanılması yolunda ilk adım atılmıştır.

Sosyal Demokrat-Yeşiller hükümetinin yaşadığı ikinci büyük kriz Kosova Savaşı'nın yaklaşık 2 yıl ardından ortaya çıkmıştır. 11 Eylül 2001 sabahı Washington ve New York'a yapılan terör saldırıları kuşkusuz tüm dünyada infial yaratmış, Almanya açısından buna ek olarak bu saldırıyı düzenleyen teröristlerin Almanya'nın Hamburg kentinde mühendislik eğitim aldıkları ve bu saldırıyı burada planladıkları gerçeği Almanya'yı daha da sarsmıştır. Şansölye Schröder'in olayların hemen akabinde verdiği "sınırsız dayanışma" kararı ise Alman hükümeti tarafından yine kolaylıkla yerine getirilememiştir. Her ne kadar ana muhalefet partisi Hıristiyan Demokrat Birlik Partileri'nin Afganistan'da yapılacak bir müdahaleye destekleri olsa da, hem Sosyal Demokrat Parti hem de Yeşiller Partisi içinde bu karara açık olarak karşı olduğunu belirten gruplar ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu durumda siyasi olarak iktidarı zayıflama görüntüsü veren Schröder, Afganistan müdahale iznini bir güvenoyu yoklamasına bağlayarak iktidar partilerinin vekillerinin desteğini almayı amaçlamıştır. Özellikle Yeşiller Partisi yönünde olası bir erken seçim kararında baraj altı kalınarak meclis dışında kalma ihtimali, iktidar partisi vekillerinin hükümetleri lehinde oy kullanmalarıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Diğer taraftan ise, Şansölye Schröder, bu dönemde özellikle dış politika alanında yeni bir söylem geliştirmiş, Almanya'nın bu operasyona katılmasını, yabancı partnerleri ile eşit bir aktör olan Almanya'nın tam egemenliğinin bir sonucu ve yükümlülüğü olduğunu çok defalar savunmuştur. Bu anlamda, Afganistan krizi ile Alman dış politikası söylemsel olarak bir değişiklik geçirmiş, Alman dış politikasının karar verme konusunda tam egemen, ama aynı zamanda da müttefiklerine karşı askeri olarak sorumlu olduğu, Alman karar verici mercileri tarafından ısrarla dile getirilmiştir. Öte taraftan, her ne kadar Almanya küresel terörizm savaşında Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'ni tam olarak destekleyeceğini her fırsatta ifade etse de, Şansölye Schröder'in oluşturduğu, askeri

çözümlere ek olarak terörizm sorununun sosyal ve ekonomik yönlerine de vurgu yapan yeni anti-terörizm anlayışı, Amerika'nın tek boyutlu anlayışı karşısında gelecek için potansiyel bir çatışma alanı olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Özellikle Afganistan müdahalesinin hemen ardından ortaya çıkan Irak'a da müdahale beklentisi Afganistan Savaşı daha başlar başlamaz Almanya için bir tartışma konusuna dönüşmüştür. Ancak daha genel bir açıdan bakıldığında, Afganistan Savaşı ve Almanya'nın bu müdahaleye tam olarak katılması, Şansölye Schröder'in dış politika söylemindeki değişiklikler ile birlikte Alman dış politikasının özgürleşme sürecinde ikinci büyük adım olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Sosyal Demokrat-Yeşiller koalisyonunun yaşadığı son büyük uluslararası kriz ise yukarıda da bahsedildiği gibi aslında daha Afganistan Savaşı başlamadan ortaya çıkan Irak krizidir. ABD'nin yürüttüğü küresel terör savaşının Afganistan ile sınırlı kalmayacağına hem Almanya hem de tüm dünya için belli olması, sadece Alman siyasetini etkilememiş, Alman kamuoyunda da şiddetli bir tepki ile karşılanmıştır. Başından beri ABD'nin bir müttefiki olarak bu konuda istişare yürütülmesini arzu eden Alman hükümeti ise, Irak'a bir müdahaleye ilk andan itibaren olumlu yaklaşmamış, özellikle Birleşmiş Milletlerin yürüttüğü incelemelerin sürdürülmesini ısrarla talep etmiştir. Aksine Amerika Birleşik Devletleri daha krizin en başından itibaren bu hususta tek taraflı bir dış politika anlayışını sürdürmeye niyetli olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Öte taraftan, Almanya'nın Eylül 2002'de federal seçimlere gitmesi, hükümetin olası bir Irak Savaşı konusunda olumlu ya da olumsuz bir karar alması sürecini oldukça hızlandırmıştır. Alman toplumu içindeki yoğun savaş karşıtı eğilimi dikkate alan ve ulusal çıkarları çerçevesinde Irak Savaşı'na katılmayı uygun bulmayan Sosyal Demokrat-Yeşiller hükümeti olası Irak Savaşı'na katılmama kararını 2002 yılının yaz aylarında kesin olarak almıştır. Bu savaşa karşı "hayır" kararı şüphesiz Almanya-ABD ilişkilerini derinden sarsmış, özellikle üst düzey ilişkilerde kesintilere sebep olmuştur. ABD'nin uzun süredir Avrupa içindeki en yakın müttefiklerinden biri olan Almanya'dan böyle bir karşılık görmesi şüphesiz Almanya açısından uluslararası arenada yalnız kalma tehlikesini de beraberinde getirmiştir. Ancak Almanya bu süreçte dış politika açısından yeni açılımlar ve yeni etki alanları oluşturmaya çabalayarak bu süreçteki yalnızlık tehlikesiyle başa çıkmaya çalışmıştır. Bu amaçla, Schröder önce Jacques Chirac başkanlığındaki

Fransa ile yakınlaşmış, daha sonra bu iki ülkeye Vladimir Putin liderliğindeki Rusya'nın da katılması ile bu üç ülke uluslararası arenadaki savaş karşıtı cephenin öncüleri olmuşlardır. Şüphesiz Rusya ve Fransa'nın Birleşmiş Milletler Güvenlik Kurulu'nun iki daimi üyesi olarak Irak Savaşı konusunda bir uluslararası müdahale iznini engellemeleri, Almanya açısından önemli bir gelişme olmuştur. Uluslararası arenada Irak Savaşı'na Şansölye'nin AB içinde de ortak tutum belirleme çabası ise sonuçsuz kalmıştır. AB içindeki İngiltere önderliğindeki 7 ülkeye ek olarak eski komünist bloğu 10 güney ve doğu Avrupa ülkesinin Amerika'ya desteklerini açıklamaları Avrupa'nın bu konuda keskin bir şekilde ayrılmasına sebep olmuştur. Nihayetinde, Almanya, Kosova Savaşı'ndan itibaren başlayan dış politikadaki özgürleşme sürecinde, Irak Savaşı'na geçmişteki savaş karşıtlığı tezinin aksine kendi ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda hayır demiş, buna ek olarak da hem küresel anlamda hem bölgesel anlamda bir etki alanı oluşturmaya çalışarak uluslararası anlamda yalnızlaşma tehlikesi ile başa çıkmıştır.

Özetle; Almanya, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin yarattığı yeni döneme ilk safhada uyum sağlayamamış, ancak hem iktidar hem de siyasetteki nesil değişikliği ile bu süreçte ilk adımı atmıştır. Almanya'nın dış politika alanında özgürleşmesini ve normal bir dış politikaya sahip olmasını içeren bu süreç, Kosova Savaşı sırasında 2.Dünya Savaşı sonrasında ilk kez bir askeri operasyona tam olarak katılım sağlanarak, askeri güç kullanımı konusundaki tabusunun yıkılmasıyla başlamıştır. Afganistan Savaşı'nda ise Schröder tarafından egemenliğin ve küresel sorumluluğun öne çıkartılması, Alman dış politikasında söylemsel olarak bir değişiklik yaşanmasına sebep olmuştur. Son olarak Irak Savaşı'nda ise Alman hükümeti ulusal çıkarları doğrultusunda bu savaşa katılmama kararı alıp, çevresinde bir siyasi etki alanı oluşturarak yalnızlaşma tehlikesinden uzaklaşmış, bir taraftan da dış politikadaki özgürleşme sürecini tamamlayarak, daha önce açıklanan normal bir dış politikaya ulaşmayı başarmıştır.

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