

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1983 AND 1999:
COMPARISON OF TURGUT ÖZAL AND MESUT YILMAZ IN THE PERIOD
OF TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DUYGU DEMİRDÖVEN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

SEPTEMBER 2014

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı (METU, IR) _____

Prof. Dr. İhsan Sezal (TOBB, Political Sciences) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Duygu Demirdöven

Signature :

ABSTRACT

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1983 AND 1999:
COMPARISON OF TURGUT ÖZAL AND MESUT YILMAZ IN THE PERIOD
OF TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY

Demirdöven, Duygu
M.S., Department of International Relations
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

September 2014, 98 pages

This thesis has been written to evaluate the Turkish Foreign Policy between 1983 and 1999. First, Turkish Foreign Policy is going to be explained until 1980. Second, the Motherland Party period which is the ruling party by Turgut Özal during the 1980s; third, as party leader Mesut Yılmaz term in the Motherland Party and the political conjuncture in the country at that time are going to be analyzed especially in terms of foreign policy-making considering realist understanding with neo-liberal instruments. Fourth and last, a comparison between two leaders of the Motherland Party- Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz will be done. In this part and conclusion, the main research question of the thesis, ‘Is Mesut Yılmaz a continuation of Özal’s reform period or a breaking down?’ is tried to be answered.

Keywords: Neo-Liberalism, Turkish Foreign Policy, the Motherland Party, Turgut Özal, Mesut Yılmaz.

ÖZ

1983- 1999 YILLARI ARASINDA TÜRK DIŞ POLİTİKASI:

TÜRKİYE’NİN DEĞİŞİM VE DÖNÜŞÜM SÜRECİNDE TURGUT ÖZAL VE MESUT YILMAZ KARŞILAŞTIRMASI

Demirdöven, Duygu

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

Eylül 2014, 98 sayfa

Bu çalışma Türk Dış Politikası’nda 1983 ile 1999 arasında yaşananları değerlendirmek amacıyla yazılmıştır. Çalışmaya temel gösterilecek kuramsal bir açıklama bölümüyle başlanacaktır. Sosyal bilimlerde, bir dönemi anlayabilmek için her zaman bir önceki dönemi bilmek gerekir. Bu yüzden, öncelikle 1980’ e kadar olan Türk Dış Politikası zamanın ruhunu aktararak anlatılacaktır. İkinci olarak, Turgut Özal liderliğindeki Anavatan Partisi dönemi; üçüncü olarak ise Mesut Yılmaz liderliğindeki Anavatan Partisi dönemi, özellikle dış politika yapımı noktasında, realist anlayış ve neo-liberal araçlar göz önüne alınarak açıklanacaktır. Dördüncü ve son olarak, iki lider arasında bir karşılaştırmaya gidilecek ve bu tezin asıl sorusu olan Mesut Yılmaz’ın Turgut Özal’ın başlattığı reform sürecini devam ettirip ettiremediğine yanıt aranmaya çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Neo-Liberalizm, Türk Dış Politikası, Anavatan Partisi, Turgut Özal, Mesut Yılmaz.

To My Dear Sister

Ebru

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my mentor and advisor, Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, for providing me really precious guidance, insight, and encouragement not only during the thesis process but throughout the entirety of my undergraduate and graduate school experience. This thesis would not have been possible without him.

I would like to state that I am thankful to Prof. Dr. İhsan Dağı and Prof. Dr. İhsan Sezal for their contributions to my thesis especially in the evaluation process.

I would also like to thank my family for their support, patience, and love during my all school years especially in these past months while I have been writing this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK	
2.1. Realism.....	4
2.2. Liberalism	9
2.3. Conclusion of the Theory Part	15
3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL 1980	
3.1. From the Establishment to the World Wars	16
3.2. From the Second World War to 1980	20
4. TURGUT ÖZAL	
4.1. A Quick Glance at Turgut Özal	26
4.2. Economic Liberalism	27
4.3. Active Foreign Policy	31
4.4. Turgut Özal: As the Leader of the Motherland Party and; the Prime Minister and the President of Turkish Republic	39
5. MESUT YILMAZ	
5.1. A Quick Glance at Mesut Yılmaz	44
5.2. Mesut Yılmaz: As the Minister of Foreign Affairs.....	45
5.3. Mesut Yılmaz: As the Prime Minister	51
6. CONCLUSION.....	57

REFERENCES.....	62
APENDICIES	
A. Governments in Turkish Republic	71
B. Turkish Summary	86
C. Tez Fotokopi İzin Formu.....	98

CHAPTER ONE

1. INTRODUCTION

Turkish Republic has been always the centre of attraction of the international political actors. Turkey is such a bridge amongst Asia, Europe, and Middle East in terms of her geographical location. This discourse stemming from the first years of the Republic yielded to the desire of being regional power when it comes to 1980s. Turgut Özal, who thought that being a political power can only be succeeded with being economic power, realized the rising of neo-liberal economies all over the world in those years and thought that it was going to affect Turkey, too. This period started from the economic regulations may be called as the transition and the transformation of Turkish political history. In this study, it is going to be analyzed that how this change occurred within the international political conjuncture and how Turkish politics has been influenced from this change. Turgut Özal who had laid the foundation of neo-liberal policies as the instruments within the realpolitik in Turkey and Mesut Yılmaz who had been expected to maintain the newly-established political understanding will be compared in terms of whether they are successor and predecessor to each other or not.

In this thesis, there will be the comparison of two leaders of the Motherland Party; Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz. Their personal characteristics, outlooks on global political and economic system, political attitudes both in domestic and foreign policy, and relations with the public especially rhetoric-based will be the main instructive while making this comparison. Since one of the leaders initiated a new understanding in the policy-making area, the main research question is shaped in the frame of whether the continuation of this new political tradition is succeeded or not. Therefore the main argument will be the two leaders' political behaviours and

its reflections on Turkish foreign policy in line with the domestic politics with a desire to reach a conclusion whether there is a continuation or not.

This thesis is divided into four chapters. Theories are required to understand the behaviours of nation states in international political sphere and evaluate their decision- making processes accurately. Therefore first chapter is the theory part in which realism and liberalism as the mainstream theories of International Relations discipline and this thesis will be sketched out.

In political sciences, knowing the previous situation and circumstances is crucially important to understand the current one. Thus, second chapter composed of a general overview of Turkish political history from the establishment in 1923 to the year of 1980. Unless the state behaviour of the Turkish Republic in international political arena until the years that thesis is commenced, it is not possible to make a comparison and comprehend what has been changed latter. Thus, whole political stages that Turkey lived throughout the history will be organized in order to set a framework. Turkish Republic has been encountered with a different economic and political conjuncture from 1980 onwards.

Third chapter is designated for Turgut Özal who has been the founder and leader of the Motherland Party, the Prime Minister, and the President within this new political conjuncture in Turkey. After his personal background is glanced, two principal concepts which were gained to the literature by Turgut Özal's works: economic liberalism and active-foreign policy will be explained. As the last part of this chapter, the statesmanship of Özal is going to be elaborated with the foreign policy instances.

Chapter four will cover Mesut Yılmaz term, as rising politician, in Turkish politics. After his short biography is given, his political term will be divided into two. First the political development especially in foreign policy area occurred in which the term that he has been the Minister of Foreign Affairs will be apportioned with Özal's presidency due to the fact that they worked for in the same period. And second the term that he has been the Prime Minister three times in between 1991 and 1999 will be displayed within the political structure both in international arena and in Turkey. As the thesis proceeding, it is going to be given a comparison of the policies and developments existed in the tenures of Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz both at domestic and intensely international level. They will be elaborated separately and sometimes together from the characteristic differences between the two leaders to their different types of perception.

In the conclusion, a leadership classification that was created by Bernard Bass- transformational and transactional leadership- will be explained. After the composition of this leadership types study is given, an application will be tried to be made between the leadership theory and the two leaders; Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz. Lastly, it will be an achievement about the research question of this thesis, which is 'Is Mesut Yılmaz a continuation of Özal's reform period or a breaking down?'.

CHAPTER TWO

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A great many of different theories exist in the International Relations discipline in order to analyze certain circumstances. Thus, there are various theoretical approaches such as realism, liberalism, or critical approaches in foreign policy-making area. However, this thesis will be based on realist and liberal theories especially in politics and economics. Therefore realism and liberalism as the mainstream theories in International Relations will be explained in detail and discussed regarding their adequacy in explaining the relevance of domestic political developments and foreign policy-making processes in international relations.

2.1. REALISM

Realism, which is mostly Anglo-American centred ideology, is the most dominant theory in the literature due to the fact that it gives the most accepted and powerful explanation of the state of war that is the regular condition of life in the international system.¹ According to the realist approach, all the states desire to have economic and military power therefore any cooperation amongst the states is not expected because of the fact that they look out for their own interests primarily.

¹ Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, "Realism" in *The Globalisation of World Politics* (eds.) John Baylis and Steve Smith, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th edn. 2011), 84-99.

Anarchy, balance of power, and national interests are some of the basic concepts that may be encountered with. There are numerous sub-groups under this classical realist approach as classical realism, neo-realism, and neo-classical realism.

First, classical realism is known as human realism or political realism by Morgenthau's own term in his book called "Politics Among Nations". Morgenthau developed the rational actor model and thought that states do not work randomly. He stressed the anarchic structure of international relations therefore the only way to sustain is maximizing the power. In foreign policy-making, the only actor is state and balance of power is crucially important for them in the framework of that power is the object. Thus, it is possible to separate the domestic policy and the foreign policy. In this approach, a strong linkage between human nature and states' behaviours are forged. The fact that humans are power maximisers leads states in having the inclination of pursuing the power. The basic characteristics of this approach were given by Morgenthau again. He defined six principles of political realism: first, "politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature", second, "interest is defined in terms of power", third, "interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but whose meaning can change", fourth, "universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; the circumstances of time and place must be considered", fifth, "the moral laws that govern the universe are distinct for the morals of any one nation", and sixth, "the difference between political realism and other schools is real and profound".² As in all theories, classical realism is criticized as being inconsistent and not testable in terms of its assumptions such as anarchy may not be absolute according to the critical. For instance, institutional liberals argue that the only actor in international system is not the states; there are international organizations, non-governmental organizations, etc.

²Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, (New York: Knopf, 1948).

Second, neo-realist theory also known as structural realism to the International Relations is outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his book that *The Theory of International Politics*.³ According to some theoreticians, neo-realism is in between of classic realism and classic neo-realism. Richard Ashley mentions this difference as follows: “Neo-realism is a progressive scientific redemption of classical realist scholarship.”⁴ The difference of the neo-realism from classical realism is that neo-realism tries to bring a scientific explanation as denying the normative dimension of human nature and state government. Thus, whilst classical realism was using inductive method, neo-realism utilized from deductive method. Neo-realism may be claimed as one step further of classical realism due to being a system level theory. According to the neo-realism, power struggles are rooted in the nature of international system not from the nature of states. Waltz argued that: “Neo-realism contends that international politics can be understood only if the effects of structure are added to traditional realism’s unit-level explanation.”⁵ In this theory, it is possible to see that sovereign states only exist within the international anarchy as the other realist theories also accept. However, balance of power through which states seek survival is the product of the object for survival not the object of that behaviour. Neo-realism asserts that domestic politics of the states cannot explain their foreign policy-making process. Waltz claimed that anarchy is the essential ordering principle of the international political system; nevertheless, differences in the distribution of power among the states caused structural differences.⁶ Thus, attacking towards a rival is an option besides the defence in order to be safe in case of rival being more powerful. Power which has been mentioned is about more than military regard; the ability to use military resources for coercing and controlling others in the system. States are forced to be powerful due to the fear of being

³ Kenneth Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics*, (Illinois: Waveland Press, 2010).

⁴ Richard Ashley, *The Poverty of Neorealism*, *International Organization* 38(2) Spring 1984, 225-286.

⁵ Kenneth Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, *Journal of International Affairs*, 44 (1) Spring/Summer 1990, 21-37.

⁶ Kenneth Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics*, (Illinois: Waveland Press, 2010).

dominated within the anarchical system.⁷ According to Waltz, another claim of neo-realist theory is that theories are scientific studies which are constructed upon abstractions not upon facts. Actual theories are the ones which totally focus on a definite concept instead of stressing on every issue.⁸

Third, neo-classical realism is one of the sub-groups of realist approach in International Relations which is a kind of combination of classical realism and neo-realism. This approach is generally used while the relevance of domestic political developments for international relations is mentioned. The term was developed by Gideon Rose in a 1998 *World Politics* review article.⁹ He explained this new approach as incorporation both internal and external variables, updating and systematizing certain principles which were put by classical realists already. Since there is an obvious relation between foreign policy decisions and material power capabilities in states, this approach is still realist approach. Due to the fact that those power capabilities are indirect and complex, there has to be a translation of systemic pressures through intervening variables at the unit level. This is a novelty for the approach in calling as neo-classical. Amongst four theories of foreign policy Gideon rose mentioned in neo-classical realism, it is going to be dealt with the most known one; domestic politics.¹⁰ This approach assumes that domestic policy derives from foreign policy; therefore foreign policy has its sources in domestic politics. Domestic factors such as national character, political ideology, or economic conditions affect the behaviours of that state in foreign policy-making. Since the domestic politics affect foreign policy; for instance, people live in Turkey

⁷ Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, 44 (1) Spring/Summer 1990, 21-37.

⁸ Waltz, 30.

⁹ Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*. 51(1), 1998, 144-172.

¹⁰ Rose, 165.

are more concerned of the relations with Israel than they are of the agreements between Argentine and Turkey. In order to understand a state's foreign policy correctly, domestic politics variables -ideological differences, domestic political pressures, or leaders' psychologies- should be taken into account. As it is directly quoted from Wohlforth:

Any realist discussion of international change must combine the domestic and international levels of analysis. A purely structural realist explanation cannot offer a comprehensive account of precisely why a given state's domestic political, social, and economic institutions decline in comparison to those of competing powers.¹¹

In terms of policy issues, if military capabilities favour pre-emption or domestic dynamics drive countries to a kind of chaos, then great power conflict is likely to emerge in domestic politics and defensive realism approach. According to Rose himself, the problem about domestic politics theory is the inadequacy of pure unit-level explanation.¹² Whilst the states have common internal characters may behave differently in their foreign policy decisions and the states do not have common domestic systems may act alike. This brings us to the difficulty of the pure unit-level explanation at this point.

¹¹ William Curti Wohlforth, *The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War*. (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993).

¹² Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy", *World Politics*. 51(1), 1998, 144-172.

2.2. Liberalism

The liberal tradition in political thought goes back at least as far as the thinking of John Locke in the 17th century; from then on liberal ideas profoundly shaped. Liberalism as one of the major theories of International Relations theories is a sort of public administration theory which prioritizes human rights, rule of law, democracy, and equality amongst individuals. In economic manner, this theory claims that the best way to promote the welfare of all is market capitalism. John Locke, John Stuart Mill, David Hume, Adam Smith, Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Immanuel Kant are the fundamental thinkers of liberalism throughout the history. The foundations of the liberal theory of world politics can be expressed in the form of three core assumptions, comprising the basic liberal claims about the essential social actors and their motivations, the relationship between state and civil society, and the circumstances under which states develop strategies and make choices in the international system.¹³

The bitter fruits of the First World War pushed scholars to think on the new approaches in order to restore the world peace and stability. Thus idealism appeared as an international politics approach stemming from John Locke's thoughts in 17th century.¹⁴ Idealism, also known as classical liberalism, pursued an

¹³ Andrew Moravcsik, *Liberalism and International Relations Theory*, (Massachusetts: Centre for International Affairs, 1992), Retrieved from http://www.princeton.edu/~amoravcs/library/liberalism_working.pdf

¹⁴“John Locke, born on August 29, 1632, in Wrington, Somerset, England, went to Westminster school and then Christ Church, University of Oxford. At Oxford he studied medicine, which would play a central role in his life. He became a highly influential philosopher, writing about such topics as political philosophy, epistemology, and education. Locke's writings helped found modern Western philosophy.” Retrieved from: <http://www.biography.com/people/john-locke-9384544>

ideal and utopia for world peace.¹⁵ As all liberal theories have an optimistic view on human nature, idealism also perceived human nature as reasonable and tolerant. Thus, if proper conditions are fulfilled, humans could handle the international politics amicably as their personal relations. The President of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, pioneered the establishment of League of Nations and initiated a new institutionalization based on the principle of collective security instead of collective defence.¹⁶ Therefore it could be understood that idealists deny the view of state is not sole actor in determining the policy-making, on the contrary, they think that international and supranational constituents such as the League of Nations, different human groupings within the society such as denominational differences, and individuals are also important as states are. Because there are different interest groups within the state, it cannot be said that states are unitary and states may not decide rationally all the time due to the fact that decision-making processes are affected from various factors. Because idealism is based on normative theory, the most important concepts are norms, values, and principles. Ethics is more favoured than national interests and the others that realists advocate. An association, referred as the family of nations or the international society, should exhibit behaviour to protect their own sovereignty and their set of values. Thus, moral values like peace and right to self-determination should be in foreign policy area. For idealists, peace and prosperity are the important concepts. A structure is needed to create prosperity and peace. The freedom of states is part of the problem of international relations. In order to solve this problem, two requirements should be followed from their diagnosis. First one is the need for explicitly normative thinking: how to promote peace and build a better world. Second one is the need for being states part of an international organization and be bound by its rules and norms. Idealists work through the low politics for instance economy and political freedoms in addition to the high politics

¹⁵ Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

¹⁶ Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

which contain security issues that realists are obsessed with it.¹⁷ In short, idealism which aims that how to pursue moral goals and how to act ethically in the international arena to the states is decision-making based upon ideas, rather than other causes such as material self-interest or passion. In international relations, idealism holds that the older models of international interaction, based on the concern for power, can be discarded and states can interact based on things such as human rights, humanitarian concerns, peace, international cooperation, or international law.

After the end of the Cold War, liberalism has differed as the other theories. In 1990s, Francis Fukuyama revived the idea of that international conflict would be terminated by the spread of legitimate domestic political orders.¹⁸ Before this revival, it is going to be appropriate to continue with republican idealism also known as the democratic peace theory to the discussion. Democratic peace theory was stemmed from the Perpetual Peace- Immanuel Kant by Michael Doyle in the article of Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs in 1983. This theory argues that democratic states do not fight each other; even if they have some disagreements, they could solve these problems without having a clash or conflict.¹⁹ Republican liberalism or democratic peace theory claims five basic principles about the fact that democracies always protect peace: First, healthy democracies do not fight other democracies that are why any two democracies never fought in history according to this approach. Second, possibility of peace increases proportionally to the states' democracy level. Third, how much one state is democratic then foreign policy of that state is less likely violence prone. To the

¹⁷ Scott Burchill, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, ..., Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations*. (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

¹⁸ Burchill et al, *Theories of International Relations*, 62.

¹⁹ Bruce Russett, Christopher Layne, David E. Spiro and Michael W. Doyle, *International Security*, 19(4), 1995, 164-184.

approach, it could be seen in one single sphere that is to bring democracy to the non-democratic countries nonetheless those countries are not democratic countries therefore it is not counted as being violence prone. Fourth, decision-making process is much longer in democracies therefore the decisions which have been taken are more accurate in democracies. Fifth and the most related to our topic, being the solution of problems in domestic political systems peaceful reflects to the relations within international systems, too. All in all, republican liberalism or democratic peace theory contribute a lot to this cooperative manner due to its suggestions that restrain states from waging a war without the consent of constituency.

Institutional liberalism is another sub-group of liberal theory. The main feature of institutional liberalism is that they believe in that international organizations and non-governmental organizations increase the cooperation amongst the states.²⁰ Through this cooperation, states seek to increase even maximize absolute gain according to institutional liberalism. This approach asserts that non-compliance of the states to global politics is the sole obstacle for the success of cooperation. Global governance and these institutions should be the emphasis in explanation of the international relations. Definition of the institution is given by neo-liberals as “persistent and connected sets of rules- formal or informal- that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations”.²¹ Institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU), or the World Trade Organization (WTO) and international regimes like the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea would create an opportunity for information exchange and international bargaining and strengthen the force of international agreements. The main desirable idea behind this approach is that growing of the

²⁰Robert O. Keohane, “Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism”, *International Relations*, 26(125), 2012.

²¹Robert O. Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches”, *International Studies Quarterly* (32), 1988.

international institutional arrangements in the world would contribute to the growing of common values and this would bring the peace in its wake.²² Although this theory is criticized being pro-Western by exemplifying the reliance on the NATO or the United States of America instead of more global institutions, institutional liberalism still contributes a lot to international relations discipline by giving a real institutional perspective for the first time. In conclusion, institutional liberalism claims that world peace could be achieved by the institutions. Only the states which pay attention to the multilateral relations can create cooperation with the other states. By these institutions, all the states especially the middle powers have access to the international political conjuncture and have a chance to discuss the global issues multilaterally.

Neo-liberalism which is one of the subgroup of liberalism basically accepts the existence of anarchy and states have no choice but pursuing their interests under this condition.²³ However, it is still not a big obstacle in order to reach cooperation. This cooperation is seen mostly in economic area. Because of the fact that interdependence amongst the states increased and the state gave more importance to the economic power rather than military power, the efforts to achieve economic cooperation are more successful. Neo-liberalism is a new paradigm both for the issues of economy and policy-making. In terms of economy, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, World Trade Organization (WTO), and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are the organizations that have been more powerful especially after the end of the Cold War. It can be claimed that neo-liberal approach strengthened the free trade agreements and organizations in the world. Because neo-liberals stress upon absolute gains rather than relative gains, they think that these kinds of organizations are for all. These institutions can also

²²Robert O Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutional Theory", *International Security*, 20(1).

²³ For more information, see Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of IR*, (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

promote soft power as Joseph Nye argued in his book called *Soft Power the Means to Success in World Politics*: “Many of these organizations will have soft power of their own as they attract citizens into coalitions that cut across national boundaries.”²⁴ In neo-liberal theory, it is possible to see about using of soft power materials that based on persuasion method and voluntary principle. Nye asserts that: “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness.”²⁵ In this sense it is also important to set the agenda and attract the others in world politics, and not to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power ‘getting others to want the outcomes that you want’ co-opts people rather than coerce them. Neo-liberalism defines the personal freedom in a positive manner. Neo-liberals resist using laws for social reform. Because they do not think that people attend to the society with some natural rights. As a conclusion, the main principles of neo-liberalism could be sorted as the rule of the market, cutting public expenditures for social services, deregulation, privatization, and eliminating the concept of the public good. Neo-liberalism which tries to explain international peace and security has broader meaning which is contained idealism, liberal institutionalism and pluralism as well.²⁶

²⁴ Nye, Joseph S. Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004).

²⁵ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Changing Nature of World Power", Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf (eds.), *The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992).

²⁶ Tayyar Arı, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*, (İstanbul: Marmara, 2008).

2.3. Conclusion of the Theory Part

International relations, which is one of the branches of political sciences, basically analyze that relations between actors in international system and states accepted as the main actors of international relations; and the other states, international organizations, multi-national corporations, international regimes, and international society. As in every discipline in social sciences, theoretical studies and contributions are required in international relations. In this thesis, whilst realist and liberal approaches have been given generally; in particular neo-liberal understanding is to be more used in explaining the economic instruments of that political era due to the fact that the Motherland Party's political opinion is parallel with the neo-liberal and conservative-liberal institutions especially in economics. And realist understanding has always been on the table while political decisions taken. Turgut Özal's two important ideas that economic liberalism and active foreign-policy are actually built on these two theoretical approaches in International Relations discipline. His point of view on economics contains liberalism especially neo-liberalism in the line with global economic conjuncture. Being member of international economic institutions such as Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation is an example of liberal economic attitude. However, putting the economy in the centre of foreign policy-making is undoubtedly 'realpolitik'. Therefore it will not be wrong to say that both Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz pursue realist policies especially in foreign policy thus they are realist leaders.

CHAPTER THREE

3. TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY UNTIL 1980

3.1. From the Establishment to the World Wars

Turkey is a state which was established in an unfortunate period, between the world wars. Due to the fact that the most crucial keyword of the process is anti-colonization, Lausanne Treaty means birth certificate of Turkish state as an important example to the other suffering countries after the World War I.

As it is well known, French Revolution and Industrial Revolution accelerated the collapse period of the Ottoman Empire. Balkan revolts, long and hard war times, economic problems e.g. tax collection, seigneurialism, crucial geostrategic location of the empire so on and so forth caused the termination. First World War sparked in 1914 and it lasted for four years. Ottoman Empire entered the war at the losers' side. Therefore, she was forced to sign Sevres Treaty. Moreover, Turks did not accept this treaty and started the period of War of Independence in 1919. The globe was not expecting this kind of resistance. Turks used all the facilities in their hands and won the independence. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the leader of the country, succeeded to replace Sevres Treaty with Lausanne Treaty and Turkish Republic acquired her birth certificate.²⁷

²⁷ Christiane Timmerman, Dirk Rohtus, Sara Mels (eds.), *European and Turkish Voices in Favour and Against Turkish Accession to the European Union*, (Bruxelles, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, 2008).

After this establishment story of the state, it will be appropriate to mention the posture of the state in internal and external political arena. The elements that formed especially the foreign policy stemmed from Lausanne Treaty. Since, in Lausanne Treaty, some articles were still in accordance with National Pact that Turkish state put her ideal boundaries and issues in Mosul, Hatay, and Straits questions were the focus points of the foreign policy of state in that case.

First, Turkish state faced with two issues at the same time in 1925: inside of the country, Seyh Said Revolt and outside, Mosul question. Although Mosul was in the National Pact and rich for oil, the location and population factors of the region paved the way for relinquishing of Mosul to Britain in return for 25% of oil profit for twenty-five years. It was a good deal in that time for Turkey. Since, she almost suppressed the Seyh Said Revolt, any case of Britain declaration of war had to be avoided. In chronological terms, important pacts towards the revisionist states in the Balkans, also in Middle East should be emphasized here. In 1934, Balkan Pact was materialized against especially Bulgarian threat. This pact was also towards Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Since, they created Four Power Entente in 1933 to discuss the European issues like 'European Directorate'. In Middle East, Saadabad Pact was signed with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan in 1937 to keep the Eastern border safe. Turkey was in need of these kinds of treaties to survive due to her amazing location and significant natural resources such as boron, feldspar, or bentonite.²⁸

Second, Turkey succeeded the full sovereignty over the Straits with the Montreux Convention in 1936. Before this, Straits were ruled by an international commission by non-Turkish head. The Straits issue was a very good example to the successful tactical retreatment of the state policy. Since, Straits were the bridge of Eurasia.

²⁸ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, (New York: Routledge, 2013).

Third, Hatay question was solved in favour of Turkish state. Hatay was a region in the border of Syria which was under the control of France as from 1918. Therefore Hatay was so important in terms of the balance of power principle regarding the relations with France. After the negotiation and for one year republican time of Hatay, finally it was annexed to the Turkish Republic boundaries in 1939.

Though Turkey seemed that she finalized all the problems she had, as Atatürk warned before his death a bigger world war was coming. The main reason of the war was the redistribution of power and wealth after the precedent one.²⁹ Especially Germany, as a rising power, was dissatisfied with her loose. Russia or in more accurate saying Bolshevik Russia had still a hot desire to reach warm seas besides her communist ideology in terms of spreading the idea of world revolution. Britain and France wanted to have power again as the rulers of the world. In Italy, with Mussolini's coming to power, like Hitler in Germany wanted to take the authority and have the territories in which they could succeed the fascism. Under these circumstances, Second World War started in 1939, as the 'war of ideologies' and lasted 1945 with dynamic changes.

Turkey, under İnönü government, always postponed the time of entrance to war. There were numerous reasons for this. The army of the state was not developed since the First World War. Not only First World War but also War of Independence crashed the military. Besides, Turkey did not have any budget for a new world-scale war. She newly applied Five Years Development Plan and could not even see the results. However, Germany always called Turkey to enter to the war. The answer of the question that why that country was Germany was because of the fact that Germany was extremely in need of Turkish territories to reach Middle East and Africa. Nevertheless, the acceptance of this calling meant a possible Russian threat for Turks. Due to the fact that Germany and Russia were at the same side of the

²⁹ A.J.P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War*, (London: Penguin, 2001).

war until 1 August 1914, in case that Turkey goes to war, Germany had given the Straits to Russia as a gift.³⁰ Besides, Turkey did not want to make the same mistake again as in First World War by choosing Germany. From all those, Turkey did not accept the Germany's offer.

Nonetheless, Turkey was a medium-range state and she needed an alliance with any great power. Under these circumstances, Turkey signed an alliance treaty with Britain and France. This treaty meant that in case of any threat towards Britain and France, Turkey enters into war and in case of any threat towards Turkey, they help Turkey. At that point, it has to be mentioned that Turkey was very lucky near the successful postponing policy of İnönü in time of Second World War.³¹ Since, when Turkey was called into war by Britain, France retreated back from the war. And Turkey claimed that there was no need to enter to war because the treaty was terminated automatically. It gained time to Turkey luckily. Then Germany attacked to Russia in order to move faster to the South. It also changed the entire picture. While Germany and Italy were one side of the war, Britain and Russia were other side. By the way, Turkey signed a treaty with Germany in terms of non-attack. Turkey showed her non-biased attitude to the world. While the war moving, Japan was included into the war by Germany and United States of America was included by Britain. Turkey still wanted to continue her position. When Britain and USA announced that the countries that did not enter to war cannot be in part of the league that is going to be created after, Turkey entered into the war in principle.³² Subsequently, an attack to Pearl Harbour by Japan and to Hiroshima by USA ended the war in 1945. In this way, Turkey was also in the winner side and was accepted to United Nations even as founding member.

³⁰ Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm: The Second World War*, (New York: RosettaBooks, 2002).

³¹ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2007).

³² William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, (New York: Routledge, 2013).

All in all, when it is looked at the period of 1923-1945, Turkey showed the kind of continuation of Ottomans' balance of power policy. In my opinion, İnönü chose the best option which had been in his hand and succeeded to acquire the best revenue from the war.

3.2. From the World Wars to 1980

Turkey continued the status quo policy until the membership of North Atlantic Treaty Organization time in 1951-52.³³ Regarding this approval to the membership, it can be asserted that Turkey sent troops to South Korea after United Nations' decision to stop the communist occupation coming from the North in July 1950. Being a member to NATO was important for three reasons. First, it would mean that Turkey's pro-Western foreign policy-making policies have been getting institutionalized. And second, Turkey would abandon her policy of neutrality at all. After NATO membership, Turkey has been reshaped regarding Cold-War balances by the United States of America. Important agreements were signed between the two party regarding military arrangements.³⁴

Turkey always imported the alignments with the neighbours. Balkan Pact, which was signed with Greece and Yugoslavia in 1953, was actually a peace and cooperation agreement. After one year, it turned out to a military alliance agreement due to the balance of power after the Second World War in the Balkans. In 1955, Bagdad Pact, which name was changed with Central Treaty Organization

³³ <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/80056.htm?selectedLocale=tr>

³⁴ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2007).

(CENTO) in 1959, was signed with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom against to the Soviet threat in Middle East.

Relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recurred after Stalin's death in 1953. Moscow government declared that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics had renounced her demands from Turkey and desired having good relations with Turkish Republic henceforward. Although these good relations -in political manner- did not last a long time, convergence programme in economy continued.

In 1950s, Turkey was faced with Cyprus issue. By the enosis³⁵ demands escalated in Greece by Makarios II's reign in 1953 and his research about the position of Cyprus resulted in favour of enosis, it can be said that Cyprus problem sparked. In 1954, he announced that in the case of rejection to it, they would bring the issue to the United Nations. Although Turkey tried to prevent this, Greece did what she had said. After that, a commission has been prepared in Turkish government which aimed to show the rights of Turkey upon the island and protect the rights of Turkish Cypriots.³⁶ In 1955, by the participation of three states- Turkey, Greece, and England-, London Conference was managed to solve the problem. While Turkey and England were in favour of status quo –because the military bases in Cyprus were so important for England in terms of her position in Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East-, Greece was insisting on enosis. Despite the successful diplomacy of Turkish side, when it was understood that there would be no pro-Turkish solution in the conference, revolts in Turkey were freed.

³⁵ Enosis means that the political union of Cyprus and Greece, as an aim or ideal of certain Greeks and Cypriots. <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/enosis>

³⁶ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2007).

However, actions became uncontrollable; lots of Greek houses and shops were bombed and people was hurt. If the military did not intervene to the uprisings, it might have been “Turkish Bartholomew’s Night”³⁷.³⁸ 6-7 September uprisings showed the success of diplomacy in London Conference.

In 1956, there were five options on the table for Turkey: the island should continue being of England or if not, it has to be given to Turkey or if not again, it has to be divided (division) or if not again, it has to be done self-government or the last choice was not a choice but it was the giving the island to Greece. Therefore, Turkey was on the side of division rather than protecting the status quo by 1957. With the Mexico’s offer to continue to the negotiations about Cyprus in United Nations General Assembly in 1958, parties decided to have a conference in Zurich. In February 1959, a text of treaty has been done and signed in Zurich first, in London second, and in 1960 Nicosia third. This treaty was about the establishment of an independent state in Cyprus. 16th of August was the date of declaration of ‘Republic of Cyprus’ and 24th of August was the approval for United Nations membership. According to the treaty, Deputy President would be Greek and prime minister would be Turkish. In addition, treaty makes Turkey, Greece, and England guarantor states and this was one of the main reasons of Turkey’s military intervention to Cyprus in 1974. Zurich and London Treaties were very crucial for Turkish Republic. With this treaty, Cyprus gained a legal statue and Turkey acquired the right to settle a permanent army about 650 soldiers in Cyprus. It was significant because this was the second deviation from the basic military doctrine in Turkey after Korean War which has been mentioned above.³⁹ As a conclusion, it

³⁷ The St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre happened in Paris in 1572 against the Huguenots by Catholic co-religionists during the French Wars of Religion. <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516821/Massacre-of-Saint-Bartholomews-Day>

³⁸ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950’li Yıllar*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2007), 113.

³⁹ Bağcı, 136.

seemed that everything had been reached a solution with the establishment of Republic of Cyprus. Nevertheless, Greece has not given up the enosis desire and the Cyprus Question is still continuing to occupy the agenda of not just the states but also international organizations even in 2010s.

31 July 1959 was the date of important date of application for membership to the European Economic Community. This community, which was established by Treaty of Rome in 1957, has been vital for Turkey in terms of strengthening of the pro- Western stance and economic growth. In 1963, The Agreement Creating an Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community or commonly known as Ankara Agreement was signed. In time, Additional Protocol to the Agreement which was aiming integration of Turkey to the European market was signed in 1970 and entered into force in 1973.⁴⁰ This protocol was to regulate the free movement of Turkish workers and defined the exact date for Customs Union as 31 December 1995.

When it comes to the 1960s, Johnson Letter was the thing that left its mark on the Turkish political history. After Turkey decided to military intervention to Cyprus in 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson who was the president of the United States of America sent a letter to İnönü. In this letter, it was clearly declared that in case of any intervention to Cyprus from Turkish side, Turkey would not be defended against the Soviet Union.⁴¹ This letter was very important due to the fact that it showed that Turkish national security should not be left to the guarantee of a single state. As a reaction to the letter, Turkish government declared that Turkish state's foreign relations would not be limited to only one state or alignment. On the contrary, relations and cooperation amongst the states would help improve the environment

⁴⁰ <http://ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2>

⁴¹ For the full text of the letter, see <http://www.cyprusconflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html>

of trust and peace.⁴² Relations between the United States of America have been transformed to a more balanced- interdependency by Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 1969. This treaty was arranging the conditions of American bases in Turkey. Thus, American efficacy has been confined in the country.

Turkey gave importance to the multi-dimensional foreign policy-making. Although it remained at economic level, relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics became more active than the previous years. At 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Turkey showed her position by calling Israel to withdraw from the occupied lands. This convergence led to being invited from Organization of Islamic Cooperation at the level of minister of foreign affairs for the first time in 1969. In 1970, Turkey was invited to the Non-Aligned Movement Summit. All these different platforms contributed a lot to Turkish Republic in terms of her multi-dimensional policy efforts.

Concerns towards Middle East actually increased with energy dependency of Turkey after 1973 Oil Crisis and the decision of military embargo after 1974 Cyprus Intervention, despite the fact that it did not cause any harm to Turkey's relations with the USA or NATO.⁴³ In that point, 1974 Cyprus Intervention and Aegean and Cyprus security should be mentioned in more detail. A military coup d'état was staged against Makarios in 15 July 1974.⁴⁴ After Makarios' death had been announced, the news that he flushed out and went to London and New York reached to Turkey. With the discourse of that this meant Greek intervention,

⁴² Translated by the author from:

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/CS_/t05/c031/cs_05031003.pdf

⁴³ Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, (İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2013).

⁴⁴ Makarios III, who was the first president of Cyprus Republic as de jure, was advocating the enosis movement.

Turkish Republic decided to military intervention based upon the fourth article of Zurich Treaty.⁴⁵ After the intervention, peace talks and finally Geneva Conference was held in 30 July 1974. This protocol is a very important success for Turkish diplomacy.⁴⁶ Turkey verified the intervention being legal and legitimate with the parties to the conference, had the conditions of military withdrawal approved, procured acceptance of the existence of two people on the island together regarding Cyprus' juridical status and being Turkish Cypriots autonomous.⁴⁷ After some disputes about the island, Turkey intervened to Cyprus again in 14 August 1974. This move isolated Turkey in international political arena. Turkey was associated to Cyprus either arms embargo by the United States of America or relations with European Economic Community.

In this part, Turkish Foreign Policy from the establishment until 1980 in accordance with the zeitgeist has been evaluated. From all political development throughout the foreign policy-making, it can be said that Turkey would enter into a new phase of her evolution in the Motherland Party era. As Gülistan Gürbey stated in the introduction part of her book that there are three crucial political terms in Turkish political history: first is Atatürk era between 1923 and 1938 in which the nation state idea had been succeeded by the establishment of Turkish nation state; second is Menderes era between 1950 and 1960 in which Turkey joined to the Western block successfully after the Second World War; and third is Özal era between 1983 and 1993 in which Turkey harmonized herself to the transition period from the Cold War to the globalization process.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/garanti-antlasmasi-zurich-11-subat-1959.tr.mfa>

⁴⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*, (New York: Routledge, 2013).

⁴⁷ Mehmet Ali Birand, *30 Hot Days*. (İstanbul: Rustem, 1985) , 61-76.

⁴⁸ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010), 15.

CHAPTER FOUR

4. TURGUT ÖZAL

4.1. A Quick Glance at Turgut Özal

Turgut Özal (1927-1993) was the statesman who had left his mark in Turkish political history in terms of economic liberalism and active foreign policy understanding. Since he was an electrical engineer, he started to his professional life in General Directorate of Electrical Power Resources Survey and Development Administration.⁴⁹ After he succeeded his master degree in economics in the United States of America, he contributed a lot to the establishment of State Planning Organization when he came back to Turkey. He created a team within this organization who would continue to serve him later in his political life as well.⁵⁰

He was appointed as the advisor to Süleyman Demirel who was the Prime Minister in that time. Between 1965 and 1971, he served as the undersecretary of State Planning Organization. After that, he has worked for being an advisor in the World Bank for two years. When he was back, he worked for Sabancı Holding, which is one of the biggest corporations in Turkey, as general coordinator.

Although he was candidate from National Salvation Party in which his brother elected before in 1977 parliamentary election also elected, he could not succeed. In 1979, he was appointed as undersecretary of the prime ministry. A set of economic regulation which is known as 24 January Decisions was prepared with Özal's great

⁴⁹ http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/cumhurbaskanlarimiz/turgut_ozal/

⁵⁰ Hikmet Özdemir, *Turgut Özal Biyografî*, (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2014).

efforts. He served as deputy prime minister in the government that established after 12 September, 1980 military coup. After his resignation, he established the Motherland Party in 1983, which was a centre- right party and had an ideology on economic liberalism, social conservatism, and Turkish nationalism. He came to power alone at first and second elections and became prime minister twice in a row. In 1989, he was elected as the eighth president of Turkish Republic by Turkish Grand National Assembly. It was his last job before he died in 1993.

4.2. Economic Liberalism

As it has been mentioned above, Turgut Özal is known as two important developments in Turkish political history: economic liberalism and active foreign policy. Economic liberalism is an approach that advocates free market economy, private property, deregulation, and less government intervention to the economics. The main development strategies and economic policies of Turkish Republic was established on the being industrialisation the main object and the fact that this object could only occurred by the protection of Turkish industry from foreign competition. Therefore once the production of a good is initiated in the country, the importation of that good would have been restricted before 1980.⁵¹

Liberal economy period in Turkey began with 24 January Decisions in 1980 under Özal's responsibility. In this economic reform package; there were the policies such as the changing of the exchange rate policy, increasing the prices of the goods and services that government business enterprises produce, and finally liberalization of the whole economy.⁵² Although some protective policies remained,

⁵¹ Hasan Kazdağlı, Turgut Özal'ın İktisadi Reformları, In İhsan Sezal (ed.), *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Çetin Ofset, 1996).

⁵² Kazdağlı, 94.

Turkish economy was liberalized in a great manner by export-oriented economic policies.⁵³ Timing of these decisions is crucial when it is thought about the global conjuncture. In 1980s, conservatism in politics and neo-liberalism in economics has been adopted by Ronald Reagan in the United States of America and Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom. It can be said that Özal patterned himself on Reagan and Thatcher both in political and economic terms.

When Özal came to power in 1983, he started the transition to the free market economy, mitigated the control over cambium, abolished the price control step by step, brought the method of defining the interest rates on the market, and made the rules more flexible. The fact that being Turkish economy's growing at annual rate the highest among the OECD countries could be shown as one of the concrete results of these liberal policies.⁵⁴ Though he also embarked on some privatizations, conditions of the time did not allow him. Because Özal's main objective here was to integrate the Turkish economy with the world economy and regain the national confidence, these developments are called as 'the Özal revolution'.⁵⁵ According to Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı, "He changed many trade laws in order to make Turkey much more attractive to foreign business capital. Many people choose to forget, but it was he who encouraged Turkish guest workers in Europe to invest in Turkey, and the term 'Anatolian Tigers' emerged as a result of his vision."⁵⁶

⁵³ Metin Heper, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Hayatı*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2011), 139.

⁵⁴ R. Hine, 'Turkey and the European Community: Regional Integration and Economic Convergence', in S. Togan and V.N. Balasubramanyam, *The Economy of Turkey since Liberalization*, (London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1996), 146.

⁵⁵ Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled, Atatürk and After*, (London: John Murray Publishers Ltd., 1997), 158-179.

⁵⁶ Hüseyin Bağcı, "Turgut Özal's Foreign and Security Policy Revisited", in *Zeitgeist Global Politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: ORION, 2008).

In order to understand the Turkish neo-liberal experiments, it is going to be really beneficial to look at the table below prepared by Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş⁵⁷:

Three Phases of the Turkish Neo-Liberal Experiment

	External Actors and Their Involvement	Domestic Political Context	Quality of Economic Performance
<p>Phase I</p> <p>“De-regulation Phase”</p> <p>1980-1989</p>	<p>IMF, World Bank and the OECD are heavily involved in the early 1980s; their influence diminishes following the recovery process; EU is the background.</p>	<p>Authoritarian interlude followed by transition to democracy; continuity of leadership under Özal; strong executive and firm commitment to reform at least towards the end of the decade.</p>	<p>Significant recovery and surge in exports during the early 1980s; quality of performance deteriorates towards the end of the decade due to growing fiscal instability and rising inflation.</p>
<p>Phase II</p> <p>“Rhetorical Transition and Institutional Crisis”</p> <p>1989-2001</p>	<p>IMF temporarily involved after the 1994 crisis; EU is weakly involved through the Customs Union; both IMF and the EU became important in 1999, however their real impact is not immediate. New bureaucratic agencies were introduced but they have not emerged as strong and autonomous players in their regulatory territory.</p>	<p>Weak coalition government unable to impose fiscal discipline; lack of commitment to reform but go along with the Customs Union as a necessary step to EU membership.</p>	<p>Economic performance is generally weak; growth heavily conditional on short term capital flows, fragile, debt led growth, associated with three crisis in less than a decade with devastating consequences for overall growth, employment and income distribution.</p>

⁵⁷ E.Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*, (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi University Press, 2007), 140.

Ziya Öniş attributed the success of all these economic reforms to Özal's personality:

Özal's unique qualities as an engineer and economic technocrat and his unique background that helped him to by-pass boundaries involving traditional and modern, elites and non-elites as well as national and transnational destined him to play a key leadership role first as a technocrat and then as a key political figure in the implementation of the reform process.⁵⁸

In conclusion, Orhan Morgil summarized the basic objectives and effects of the economic programme which foresaw a structural transformation in the Turkish economy as follows: first, the basic and long-term objective of the new economic programme is deregulating in economy and making the market economy operational; second, industrialization policy proceeded to another phase which has been open to foreign competition and directed towards exportation; third, investment policy has been changed i.e. while infrastructure investments were made by the state, industry and service sector investments were made by the national and foreign private sectors with the incentive system; and fourth, provision of price stabilization by taking the inflation under the control is the last objective of this new economic programme initiated by Turgut Özal.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ziya Öniş, Turgut Özal and His Economic Legacy: Turkish Neo-Liberalism in Critical Perspective, *Middle Eastern Studies* 40(4) 2004, 113-134.

⁵⁹ Orhan Morgil, Turgut Özal ve Ekonomi Politikaları, In İhsan Sezal (ed.), *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Çetin Ofset, 1996).

4.3. Active Foreign Policy-Making

Turgut Özal restructured the traditional foreign policy understanding of Turkish Republic. Graham Fuller who is an expert on Turkish foreign policy describes him by saying: “Turgut Özal, first as Minister of State for the Turkish economy, later a Prime Minister, and finally as President, has arguably been one of the most influential political figures on the Turkish scene since Atatürk.”⁶⁰ Maintaining the established order within the existing border and balances and realization of a Western oriented foreign policy formation are the main principles of Turkish foreign policy until the end of the Cold War. Özal brought the active foreign policy understanding instead of a status quoist foreign policy, although he was somehow criticized as being the only one in decision making mechanism by skipping the bureaucracy. As Şevket Ovalı asserted that Turgut Özal mostly bypassed the parliament, legislative and executive organs, and bureaucracy such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and took his decisions by using his own initiatives. Thus, it could be said that Turgut Özal’s foreign policy understanding is a deviation from the classical Turkish foreign policy in terms of method.⁶¹ Although nevertheless Özal was against the bureaucracy’s interfering role in political life, he created a new liberal conservative bureaucratic team.

Özal’s personal characteristics are highly important here. Above all, he was realist and pragmatic. For instance, he has always found the Middle East important as it can be seen in the party programme below. He saw the vacancies in the region with his liberal economic tendencies. Exportation with Middle Eastern countries reached

⁶⁰ Graham Fuller, *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 1997).

⁶¹Şevket Ovalı, “Dış Politika Sadece Kendi Tercihlerimizin Değil, Uluslararası Konjonktürün de Bir Ürünüdür”, in *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (1)* (eds. Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yegin. (Ankara: USAK, 2009), 345-356.

half of the Turkish total export quantity in the middle of 1980s.⁶² Direct investment from Middle East to Turkey dramatically increased as well. Foreign banks such as Saudi American Bank, Bank Mellat, Bank of Bahrain, etc. opened branches in Turkey.⁶³

His great vision on political sphere was making him reformist. Because he was courageous and risk bearer; he had never been afraid of ‘the new’, and had always sought innovation. Engin Güner, chief advisor of Özal, told that Özal used to keep the television open in his office always; he used to follow the breaking news especially in foreign TV channels such as CNN.⁶⁴ If it could be classified that there were two types of foreign policy approach in Turkish political history: Atatürk-type and İnönü type, Özal would definitely fit into the first choice.⁶⁵ Therefore he could pursue a proactive policy in foreign affairs. One of the other crucial characteristics of Özal that figured the success in the foreign policy area was that he could analyze and decide quickly and accurately.⁶⁶ The biggest example of these proactiveness and ability to decide quickly and accurately was Gulf Crisis which he perceived as an opportunity by Özal, although it did not absolute gain to Turkey according to some.⁶⁷

⁶²Muhittin Ataman, *An Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change: Explaining Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s*, (Kentucky: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky, 1999).

⁶³Muhittin Ataman, “Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış”, *Bilgi* (7) 2003 / 2, 49-64.

⁶⁴Engin Güner, *Özal’lı Yıllarım*, (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2003).

⁶⁵Hasan Cemal, *Özal Hikayesi*, (İstanbul: Everest, 2013).

⁶⁶Morton Abramowitz, *Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy*, (New York: The Century Foundation, 2001).

⁶⁷Ramazan Gözen. *Amerikan Kışkacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası*. (Ankara: Liberte, 2000).

Active foreign policy- making conception is such a political mark of Özal. In order to understand what is intended with this, looking at to the Motherland Party programme will be appropriate (directly quoting from the party programme):

The main principle of our foreign policy is to maintain peace in our region as well as in the world. Continuity of the State is the basis of our foreign policy. We believe that foreign policy is among the most sensitive issues in political competition. The main goals of our foreign policy are to strengthen national defence and to promote economic development. Turkey should play a more active role, to meet its defence needs, to accelerate its economic progress and development as well as to strike a balance between interests, in its relations with the Western World with which it has ties of political, military and economic cooperation. We must have a strong defence capability, particularly to ensure our national security. To this end, we must be economically powerful. We consider it an obligation to be a reliable party in our foreign relations and to be faithful to our commitments. It is quite natural for us to develop better relations with the countries of the Middle East and other Islamic countries due to our geographic location and our historical ties with them. We believe that Turkey will make significant contributions to the maintenance of peace in the region and in the world and especially to the development of economic relations, since, as members of both the Western World and Middle East it can act as a bridge in between. We find it useful to promote better social and cultural relations with the countries with which we have shared targets in terms of material and moral values and free democratic order, and to take part in international cooperation in areas such as science, art and technology all of which are considered common possessions of humanity.⁶⁸

⁶⁸<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITTheJusticePartyLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY.pdf>

Özal's active foreign policy desires could be thought as the transfer of his personal inclination about the United States of America to a political level between the two states.⁶⁹ Although he said in one of his speeches that world is expected to enter a bipolar order again, he was evaluating the USA as the central power of a unipolar world and had foreseen the collapse of the Soviet Union well in advance.⁷⁰ Close relations with the USA were directly interrelated with the liberal policies of Özal for two main reasons: because he was inspired by the President Ronald Reagan regarding neo-liberal economic policies and because Özal thought that economic aid packages coming from the international economic organizations mostly supported by the USA would help develop the Turkish economy rapidly.

However, Özal was never the advocate of dependent relations with only one country. Powerful constituents of the world order have not been composed of only the USA, but Europe as well. Attempts for the development of democracy and human rights were not solely the requirements demanded by the European Union; rather owing to the Özal's vision for the importance of being ally with Europe. Therefore he became the first statesman who applied for full membership to the European Union in 1987.⁷¹ Gülistan Gürbey stated that the social requests intended the full membership to the European Union rapidly. The factors that affected these social requests in the pursuit of an agreement are domestic developments such as practice of the free market economy, results of the military coup d'état, 1982 constitution act, etc. and international developments such as the enlargement of the European Union, membership of Greece, Islamic Revolution in Iran, etc. that

⁶⁹Hüseyin Bağcı, *Bir Devlet Adamı Olarak Turgut Özal ve Dış Politika*, in İhsan Sezal (ed.), *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Çetin Ofset, 1996), 20-27

⁷⁰Cumhurbaşkanı Turgut Özal'ın dış politika ve ekonomi açılarından "Türkiye'nin Stratejik Öncelikleri" adlı uluslararası sempozyumun açılışında yaptıkları konuşma: 5 Kasım 1991, İstanbul / konuşmacı: Turgut Özal. – (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1992).

⁷¹ <http://ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2>

forced Turkey to contact with the West.⁷² İhsan Dağı asserted as follows: “No doubt legislative and institutional reforms introduced in the European Union process, since the first application for full membership in 1987 under the leadership of Turgut Özal, have significantly improved the state-society relationship.”⁷³

When it comes to the relations with Greece, the Davos Process is crucial here. Davos Process was the rapprochement which took place during the time of the first Turkish application to the European Community. Turgut Özal initiated this rapprochement by a meeting with his colleague Andreas Papandreou at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 1988. The major achievement of the process was being taken some measures such as Confidence-Building measures, Tension Reduction measures and Good Neighbourliness measures. Most importantly, the Davos process was a major opportunity for civil society and non-governmental organizations to express their views on the dispute.⁷⁴

Turkish minorities in abroad have never been considered as much as from 1980 onwards. As a result of Bulgarization⁷⁵ project, Turkey peacefully offered signing a

⁷² Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010), 172, 173.

⁷³ İhsan Dağı, *Turkey between Democracy and Militarism: Post-Kemalist Perspectives*, (Ankara: Orion, 2011), 14.

⁷⁴ Maria Ikonomaki and Genco Orkun, *Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: the Role of Decision Makers*, (2000).

⁷⁵“In the 1980s Bulgaria implemented an assimilation policy directed at its Turkish minority. It was forbidden to speak Turkish, practice Turkish customs and exhibit other elements of Turkish culture. According to a post-monitoring report adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in 2010, during those years nearly 1 million ethnic Turks were subjected to forced “Bulgarization” and about 850 –900 ethnic Turks were sent to prisons or concentration camps arbitrarily and without due process. Between May and September of 1989, 350,000 ethnic Turks were forcibly deported to Turkey in order to make Bulgaria a mono-ethnic state.”

migration treaty. However, Bulgaria did not accept it despite the oppressions of international community. Beside the internationalization of the issue, Turkey announced that Turks in Bulgaria are never abandoned to their fate. After the forced immigration happened in 1989 by Bulgaria, when it was more than expected, Turkey had some troubles about the number of people and closed the boundaries. Özal was strongly criticized by both the leaders of the opposition parties and international actors.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, change of government solved the problem naturally; Bulgaria terminated the assimilation policy towards Turks in November, 1989.⁷⁷

Establishment of ‘Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization’ in 1990 and ‘Economic Cooperation Organization’ in 1992 accelerated the multi-dimensional foreign policy-making process. Although these organizations remained weak due to the inadequacies in the region in terms of cooperation tradition, Özal proved his inclination to being active around Turkish Republic. All in all, Özal believed that all the differences would exist and stand in the same place regarding foreign policy area.

Özal, especially in his last years, paid special attention to the Turkic Republics in Central Asia. In my opinion, end of the Cold War provided a more flexibility and freedom in the region with the establishment of independent states. According to Prof. Dr. Haydar Çakmak, there were four reasons of this attention: first, existence of oil and gas in those countries and having a potential of being a great market; second, idea of balancing the closeness which Süleyman Demirel had already felt

<http://www.todayszaman.com/news-268342-bulgarian-parliament-condemns-turkish-assimilation-by-communist-regime.html>

⁷⁶ Nevra Yaraç Laçınok, “Turgut Özal”, in Ali Faik Demir (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2009).

⁷⁷ <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1989-1992/fall-of-communism>

to these countries; third, Özal's calculations about national votes in his future political terms; and fourth, significant investments of Anatolian capitals in the region.⁷⁸

In order to organize the development aids to the region, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) was established in 1992.⁷⁹ Because Özal himself was highly dealt with the education and believed in man power, scholarships were provided to the students in those countries. Foreign policy grounds were created to strengthen the relations and cooperation with the region such as the Heads of State of the Turkish Speaking Countries in 1992.⁸⁰ Naturally, lots of propagandas were required to take the support from the public opinion. TRT Eurasia was established in 1990.⁸¹ Common school books and religious materials were prepared to be instructed in Turkic Republics. Although this convergence availed to Turkey, there were some disadvantages as well. The most important one was that Turkey had to be in competition with Russia and Iran which were effective in the region.

As mentioned above, Özal gave importance to the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans that much for the first time in Turkish political history. This political attitude paved the way for some debates on neo- Ottomanism. The term of neo- Ottomanism, which suggests that the solidarity among the states called as legacy of Ottoman Empire would be able to strengthen the peaceful ways in conflict resolution, used by Turgut Özal in late 1980s as the commonwealth with its

⁷⁸ Translated by the author: Haydar Çakmak (ed.), *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*, (İstanbul: Doğu, 2013).

⁷⁹ <http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/>

⁸⁰ http://www.mfa.gov.tr/enter-the-header_the-turkish-speaking-states-summit-to-be-held-in-baku-br_unofficial-translation_br_no_43---march-28_-2000.en.mfa

neighbours and old Ottoman connections.⁸² Zeyno Baran asserted that in a very explicit way:

Turgut Özal, president of Turkey from November 1989 to April 1993, dreamed of a new Turkish sphere of influence ranging ‘from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China’. To the east of Turkey, this vision included the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) and Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The Turks originally came from Central Asia, and, in fact, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Eastern Turkistan (modern day eastern China) used to be called ‘Turkistan’. With these ethnic, religious, historic, cultural and linguistic ties, Turkish leadership believed they would have great influence in this region.⁸³

Some evaluate the desire for being active in Gulf Crisis and being sensitive to Srebrenica Massacre as the results of neo-Ottomanism. However, Özal had always given the first importance to the realpolitik. His desire for taking active role in Gulf Crisis was not about neo-Ottoman ideas. If he had calculated it, then he would have been a side of Iraq. On the contrary, the fact that he had not been in league with Iraq in the Gulf Crisis indicates that he gave much more importance to political pragmatism instead of religious or any other kind of closeness.

All in all, Gülistan Gürbey recaps the foreign policy-making understanding of Turgut Özal as follows: First, economic cooperation is important and determinative. For Özal, relations amongst individuals are the factors which can affect the relations amongst the states. The economic relations that uniting the

⁸² M. Hakan Yavuz, Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism, *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 7 (12), 1998, 19-41.

⁸³Zeyno Baran, “Turkey and the Caucasus”, in İdris Bal (ed.), *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era*, (Liverpool: Brown Walker, 2004).

nations with common interests make the interrelations better. Thus, it is compulsory to develop and to strengthen the cooperation in economic sphere. Second, active foreign policy understanding necessitates to question the state bureaucracy which focused on the existed structure and to change it in the direction of being more flexible to take the initiative quicker. Özal was trying to provide the structural changes in state bureaucracy by new arrangements at a level of institution and personnel at first. He was endeavouring to limit the traditional domain of state bureaucracy and to minimise the influence of bureaucracy by consulting to unofficial advisors and personal relations and ignoring the related institutions' opinions if required.⁸⁴

4.4. Turgut Özal: As the Leader of the Motherland Party and; the Prime Minister and the President of Turkish Republic

All these liberal developments in the economy prepared the ground for political liberalism as well. It can be said that political liberalism showed itself in Turkish Republic especially in Özal's presidency. Limiting the sovereignty power which is hold by the state and non-intervention to individuals are the principal common elements of liberalism and conservatism. It is explained in the programme of the Motherland Party by Özal: "We are a nationalist conservative political party advocating social justice and free market economy."⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye 'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010), 89-90.

⁸⁵ <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITTheJusticePartyLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY.pdf>

Özal endeavoured to fix the anti-liberal points of Turkish jurisdiction. He abolished the article 141, 142, and 163 of the Turkish Constitution which were against the establishment of communist and sharia rule in Turkey.⁸⁶ According to him, the state shall only punish the violence and never intervene to the different opinions not matter how opposite it is.

As it has been mentioned above, Özal came to power by advocating the liberal economic model within a conservative framework. He sometimes criticized the statist understanding which stemmed from the French system strongly, instead proposed a new governance system that can be likened to the Anglo-Saxon governance type.⁸⁷ He tried to change continual status quo within the state as much as he could. He has always mentioned that state exists for the people as a tool. According to him, the main duty of the state is removing the barriers in front of the individuals and smoothing the way for them. He was opposing the inaccessibility of state- in the author's own words being an ivory tower- and trying to change this perception.⁸⁸ For instance, he generally preferred casual wear in his official visits. He entertained guests in the summerhouse in Okluk Bay, Marmaris instead of the Presidential House in Ankara.⁸⁹ His going to inspect military units wearing in shorts had a broad repercussion in press.⁹⁰ This attitude is directly related with his ideas on getting the military bureaucracy under the control of civil politics.⁹¹

⁸⁶<http://setav.org/en/understanding-state-society-and-religion-in-turkey-ii/yorum/305>

⁸⁷Turgut Özal'ın Görüşleri.

<http://anap.org.tr/anap/genelbaskanlar/OZAL/yayin/ozalgorus.htm>

⁸⁸ Mustafa Erdoğan, Türk Politikasında Bir Reformist: Turgut Özal, in İhsan Sezal (ed.), *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Çetin Ofset, 1996), 20-27.

⁸⁹ Hikmet Özdemir, *Turgut Özal Biyografisi*, (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2014).

⁹⁰For the photographs, see

<http://www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/gundem/turgut-ozal?tc=30&page=30>

⁹¹ Mustafa Erdoğan, Türk Politikasında Bir Reformist: Turgut Özal, In İhsan Sezal (ed.), *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Çetin Ofset, 1996), 20-27.

His decentralist views have been influential especially in terms of local governments' realm of authority. According to Özal, municipalities should deal with the roads, water, and electricity instead of the state itself by saying that: "Municipalities are the principal organizations for the rendering of services of urbanization. They have to be equipped with appropriate resources and facilities to provide more effective, prompt and efficient services."⁹²

Turgut Özal has always mentioned about three freedoms: freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and freedom of entrepreneurship- has been mentioned before.⁹³ Regarding individual freedoms, especially freedom of thought, Özal had always been the advocate of Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, he put the rule of law in the first place throughout his all reigns.⁹⁴ Although he believed in that they made progress in the development of human rights, freedom of thought and speech spheres could not be evaluated as successful as he had asserted. According to Cumhuriyet Newspaper's news; recall decision was made for 240 books between 1983 and 1987, and 2792 authors, translators, and journalists were put on trial between 1983 and 1989.⁹⁵

⁹²<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITTheJusticePartyLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY.pdf>

⁹³ Metin Heper, "Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", *Insight Turkey* 15(2) Spring 2013, 141-156.

⁹⁴ I. Özal Government Programme, <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/ambar/hp45.htm>

⁹⁵ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 February 1987, 25 February 1989, 30 July 1989, and 23 November 1989.

When it comes to freedom of religion, it is commonly known that Özal was a religious person and belonged to Naqshbandi Tariqa. His new bureaucracy -as mentioned above- was being consisted of the members of this tariqa.⁹⁶ His ideas about laicism were so clear; he claimed that states are secular, not the persons by adding he was a Muslim, not a secular. According to him, limitless freedom of conscience and worship is the guarantee of tranquillity.⁹⁷ Because Özal was an economy-oriented leader, he saw foreign relations primarily at economic level. Therefore, while he was using conservative and religious rhetoric with the freedom of religion discourse in domestic politics to prepossess the people; he was stressing the laicism and human rights in international arena to contribute to economic developments.⁹⁸

Kurdish issue has always been a domestic politics issue for Turkish Republic. As Cengiz Çandar who was the foreign policy advisor to Turgut Özal between 1991 and 1993 has stated that Turgut Özal is the only statesman who dealt with the Kurdish issue in such intensity.⁹⁹ He always desired a political solution for the Kurdish issue that is why he initiated the negotiation process with the PKK. These negotiations led to one month cease-fire on 16 March 1993. According to Çandar's memoirs; Turgut Özal shared his ideas about granting an amnesty to the people in mountains whose crimes have not been detected yet. Thus, those people would gain the political rights again.¹⁰⁰ Although Özal was planning a political reform package

⁹⁶ Heinz Kramer, *A Changing Turkey: The Challenge to Europe and the United States*, (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000).

⁹⁷ M. Sait Yazıcıoğlu, "Özal'ın İslam Anlayışı ve Dini Özgürlükler", in *Kim Bu Özal?: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet* eds. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, (İstanbul: Boyut, 2001).

⁹⁸ Nevra Yaraç Laçınok, "Turgut Özal", in Ali Faik Demir (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2009).

⁹⁹ Cengiz Çandar, *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012).

¹⁰⁰ Çandar, 22.

in order to stop the terrorist attacks of the PKK, his unexpected death on 17 April 1993 interrupted the solution process.

In conclusion, Turgut Özal left an indelible imprint in Turkish political history. He was the ‘one’ that expanded the horizon of Turkish politics and switched the pessimism of Turkish society by reflecting his own hope and belief onto people. While his reformist ideas carried Turkish Republic a step forward, these steps should have been furthered in his sequel. At this point, this thesis will proceed with the new era in the Motherland Party history- as predecessor of Turgut Özal and a rising politician; Mesut Yılmaz.

CHAPTER FIVE

5. MESUT YILMAZ

5.1. A Quick Glance at Mesut Yılmaz

Mesut Yılmaz was born in Rize in 1947. After he graduated from Istanbul Erkek Lisesi, he completed his undergraduate degree in finance and economy at Ankara University, Faculty of Political Science in 1971. He took his M.Sc. degree at Faculty of Economic and Social Sciences at University of Cologne in 1974. After he came back to Turkey, he worked as a director for various private companies in chemistry, textile and transportation sectors until 1983.

With the establishment of the Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal, Mesut Yılmaz became a founding member and Vice Chairman of the party. He was elected as a Member of Parliament from Rize in the elections held in the same year. He was appointed as the Minister of State in Charge of Information and as the Government Spokesman in first Özal government. In 1986, he became the Minister of Culture and Tourism. He chaired the Turkish- German and Turkish-Yugoslavian Joint Economic Commissions during his tenure.

After he was elected as the Member of Parliament twice, he was assigned as the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1987 until his resignation in February 1990. Mesut Yılmaz elected as the Chairman of the Motherland Party in June 1991. In the elections of October 1991, the Motherland Party was the main opposition party. Following election, which was held in December 1995, was very important for

Mesut Yılmaz due to the fact that he formed the coalition government with the True Path Party and became the Prime Minister of Turkey.

He was given the task of forming the government in June 1997. Yılmaz served as the Prime Minister until January 1999. He became the Minister of State and Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government known as 57. Government which was formed after April 1999 general elections.

In 2002 elections, he resigned from the leadership of the Motherland Party because of the failure to entry into the Grand National Assembly due to the electoral threshold. He became an independent candidate from his homeland, Rize, in 2007 elections and he was elected as a Member of Parliament. Yılmaz decided not to be a candidate again in 2011 general elections and he has retired from the politics.¹⁰¹

5.2. Mesut Yılmaz: As the Minister of Foreign Affairs

After Özal left the leadership of the party in 31 October 1989, Yıldırım Akbulut has become the leader between October 1989 and June 1991. Mesut Yılmaz, who has been the founding member in the Motherland Party since its establishment, took over the leadership of the party in June 1991 until his resignation in November 2002.

¹⁰¹All the biographic information was taken from the official website of Mesut Yılmaz: <http://www.mesutyilmaz.gen.tr/>

46. Government, also known as the Second Özal Government, had been in charge when Mesut Yılmaz was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Just after he began to his new duty, he visited the leaders of the opposition, Erdal İnönü and Süleyman Demirel said that he was going to visit them every month to express his supra-parties statesman image.¹⁰² He thought that foreign policy should be separate from the domestic politics. Actually, Mesut Yılmaz knew the ministry well due to the fact that he was deputizing the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vahit Halefoğlu when he was abroad. Therefore he has comprehensive knowledge on the foreign policy issues of Turkish Republic. Only obstacle for Mesut Yılmaz was that Özal perceived ministry as natural intervention sphere and was applying the decisions on his own excluding the ministers and bureaucrats.¹⁰³ The Motherland Party under the leadership of Turgut Özal was representing conservatism, economic liberalism, social democracy, and nationalism. The need for a synthesis of liberal economic rationality with social unity based on religious-moral values was underlined. The party stood for three freedoms of conscience, expression, and entrepreneurship.¹⁰⁴ However, under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz, Metin Heper explains the Motherland Party as follows:

“...does not have a clearly anchored identity and failed to adapt to the changing cultural and political circumstances. Yet, the party successfully holds together economic liberals and nationalists, and has a strong pro- Western stance. Yılmaz also contributed to the post-1999 coalition government, although he is prone to pronouncing statements offensive to the military.”¹⁰⁵

¹⁰²Faruk Bildirici, *Mesut Yılmaz ve ANAPlı Yıllar: Hanedanın Son Prensi*, (Ankara: Ümit, 2002).

¹⁰³ Bildirici, 154.

¹⁰⁴ Metin Heper, “Conclusion - The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey”, *Turkish Studies*, 3 (1), 2002, 138-146.

¹⁰⁵ Heper, 140.

One of the most important occasions in late 1980s was undoubtedly the Gulf Crisis. Iraqi troops led by Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August 1990 paved the way for Gulf Crisis. President Turgut Özal ensured that Turkey took an active role in the crisis with the allies. Two important factors mattered in decisions taken in Gulf War: first, reaction to Iraq invasion, materialized alliance, and United Nations decisions; second, realist and strong ideas belonged to Özal due to the fact that he was thinking about Gulf War had been a golden opportunity.¹⁰⁶ He was calculating being a guardian of all Kurds by gathering in Iraq and Iran. However, he thought that in order to do this, some moderations in our region were required first such as Kurdish language reforms.¹⁰⁷

Regarding this, he decided to include an item to the prevention of terrorism act. With Yılmaz's support, speech ban was limitedly abolished. The reason of the speed of this action taken was understood as the beginning of Operation Provide Comfort¹⁰⁸ by the United States of America and allies. The calculated result of the

¹⁰⁶ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010).

¹⁰⁷ Faruk Bildirici, "Kürtçe yasağı böyle kaldırıldı", *Hürriyet*, July 13, 1994.

¹⁰⁸ "Following Desert Storm, the entire Kurdish population of Iraq attempted to flee the country to the north out of fear that Saddam Hussein would attempt to exterminate their entire population. Because of political concerns, Turkish officials refused to allow these desperate people permission to cross the border into Turkey. The result was that hundreds of thousands of Kurds were essentially trapped on barren and rocky hillsides, vulnerable to not only Hussein's forces, but to the harsh elements as well. Without basic necessities, to include access to water, food and medical supplies, hundreds of Kurds were dying each week. In April of 1991, President George Bush made the decision to provide relief and protection for these beleaguered people. Smith was given the task of rapidly establishing and deploying a Joint Force whose mission was to "stop the dying." Literally overnight, Operation "Provide Comfort" was born. In less than 48 hours from receiving the order to do something, cargo and fighter aircraft were re-deployed to bases in southern Turkey where they began delivering humanitarian supplies. Over a period of a few weeks a US led coalition force was deployed into northern Iraq, resettlement areas constructed and a demilitarized zone established for the protection of the Kurds." Retrieved from:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm

operation was to establish a Kurdish rule independent from Iraq.¹⁰⁹ Although Özal's all these plans on taking an active military role in the war, cross-border operations were not approved by assembly at the end. Ramazan Gözen claimed that "the attribution of the decision which contained not sending military troops to Gulf region could not be explained only by not having support from the assembly. Hypothetically speaking, if the coalition strategy required shipment of Turkish troops to the region, than Turgut Özal could have taken the visa from assembly."¹¹⁰ According to the conclusions made by Gülistan Gürbey, policies in the Gulf region had not been supported by the majority. There are three reasons here: abandonment of the traditional neutrality policy in Near East region, being seen as pro-American, and the fear of going to war. Thus, preserving of traditional policy in the region had been advocated instead of an active foreign policy.¹¹¹

In final analysis, Turkey came into prominence in international arena with intensive diplomatic efforts. Turkey became second state that complied with the United Nations Security Council's decision on economic embargo on Iraq. As Prof. Fred Halliday asserted that:

Turgut Özal took the decision to impose economic sanctions on Iraq, cutting the pipeline. Later he give support to the military actions taken by the allies of Kuwait: in a move that was of considerable strategic assistance to the United States of America and its allies, Turkey allowed US and British planes to use Turkish air bases, in a supportive action, moved an estimated 100.000 troops to the Iraqi

¹⁰⁹ Faruk Bildirici, *Mesut Yılmaz ve ANAPlı Yıllar: Hanedanın Son Prensi*, (Ankara: Ümit, 2002).

¹¹⁰ Translated by the author from: Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kıskaçında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası*, (Ankara: Liberte, 2000), 170.

¹¹¹ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010), 304.

frontier. What Turkey did not do, and what Özal apparently wanted it to, was to participate directly in the war and open a second, northern, front against Iraq.¹¹²

Thus the pipelines that transport Iraqi oil from Kirkuk to Yumurtalık had been closed up.¹¹³ Mesut Yılmaz actually supported Özal's ideas such as showing force projection of Turkey in the region¹¹⁴; he was only opposing to Özal's Gulf War politics because of the fact that he took the decisions autonomously. Critics said that Özal was behaving as both a Prime Minister and a Minister of Foreign Affairs instead of that he should have been impartial as a President.¹¹⁵ Despite all the resistances, it can be asserted that the Presidency was the main decision-maker actor in the period that Özal was the President. Although Turkey suffered economically accepting embargo decision of the United Nations, Özal displayed the loyalty in the eyes of the United States of America.

Gulf Crisis was not the only issue that Mesut Yılmaz dissented from Turgut Özal. For instance, Özal's assessment on the Armenian drafts prepared in the United States of America as a one-hit wonder, unofficial statements related problems with Bulgaria, opinion about free movement would accelerate the resolution process, and declaration that Azerbaijanis are Shiites thus they are closer to Iran than us are the ideas that Mesut Yılmaz felt uncomfortable about and did not share with Özal.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 53.

¹¹⁴ Faruk Bildirici, *Mesut Yılmaz ve ANAPlı Yıllar: Hanedanın Son Prensi*, (Ankara: Ümit, 2002).

¹¹⁵ Ramazan Gözen, *Amerikan Kısılcacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası*, (Ankara: Liberte, 2000).

¹¹⁶ Nevra Yaraç Laçınok, "Turgut Özal", in Ali Faik Demir (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*, (İstanbul: Bağlam, 2009).

Kurdish conflict¹¹⁷ occupied not only Turkish domestic politics but also foreign policy area. Because of the intensity of the terrorist actions of Kurdistan Workers' Party, known as PKK, Turkish authorities were forced into doing something and numerous military interventions were organized. Distinguishing the civil Kurdish people from the terrorist groups was almost impossible thus it dragged Turkey into a deadlock in solving the security problem. After civilian casualties, human rights violations were added to the agenda of Western allies, especially the European Union. Defective military operations constituted impediments to possible accession process.

¹¹⁷“The public security situation also worsened, notably in the Kurdish provinces of the southeast. Following major social changes associated with the commercialization of agriculture since the 1950s, there were outbreaks of violence in Kurdistan during the 1970s, generally linked with the activities of the revolutionary left. After 1980, however, the disturbances took on a specifically Kurdish character. Several groups emerged, espousing demands ranging from freedom of cultural expression to outright independence; some turned to violence to advance their cause. The most important of these groups was the Kurdistan Workers' Party led by Abdullah Öcalan. The PKK, a leftist group founded in 1978, initiated violent attacks in the late 1970s before launching its armed campaign against the state in 1984 from bases in Iraq. The PKK sought an independent Kurdish state or, possibly, full Kurdish autonomy. With between 5,000 and 10,000 armed fighters, the PKK directed attacks against government property, government officials, Turks living in the Kurdish regions, Kurds accused of collaborating with the government, foreigners, and Turkish diplomatic missions abroad. The PKK received support from Syria and from Kurds living abroad and also acquired money through criminal activities. From 1991 the existence of so-called safe havens in Iraqi Kurdistan—established following the Persian Gulf War and protected by U.S. and British forces—provided new bases for PKK operations. Turkish governments sought to deal with the Kurdish problem by granting cultural concessions in 1991 and limited autonomy in 1993. The establishment of Kurdish political parties, however, remained forbidden. The main government effort remained the military suppression of the uprising; martial law was imposed in Kurdish areas, and increasing numbers of troops and security forces were committed to the task. By 1993 the total number of security forces involved in the struggle in southeastern Turkey was about 200,000, and the conflict had become the largest civil war in the Middle East. It is estimated that between 1982 and 1995 some 15,000 people were killed, the great majority of them Kurdish civilians. Dozens of villages were destroyed and many inhabitants driven from their homes. Turkish forces also attacked PKK bases in Iraq, first from the air and then with ground forces; in an operation in late 1992, about 20,000 Turkish troops entered the safe havens in Iraq, and in 1995 some 35,000 troops were employed in a similar campaign.” Retrieved from:

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/609790/Turkey/44446/The-1990s>

5.3. Mesut Yılmaz: As the Prime Minister

Yıldırım Akbulut was elected as the chairperson of the Motherland Party after Özal became President in 1989 and pursued this duty until the party congress which was held 15 June 1991. Right after the congress, Akbulut was defeated by Mesut Yılmaz and Yılmaz became the chairperson of the Party and the Prime Minister for the first time in 23 June 1991. At this point, Faruk Bildirici asserted in his book, which consisted of a kind of political biography of Mesut Yılmaz, that because the first lady, Semra Özal, has always favoured liberals within the body of the Motherland Party instead of conservatives. Therefore she pressured Turgut Özal for thinking Mesut Yılmaz for the chairmanship by saying he has been young, educated, multilingual, and liberal with a civilized look. However, Turgut Özal did not accept it because he thought that Mesut Yılmaz could escape when he has difficulties thus he was not brave enough to be a leader.¹¹⁸ Despite everything, Mesut Yılmaz has become the Prime Minister three times in 1991 for six months, in 1996 for three and a half months, and between 1997 and 1999 for one and a half year.

Mesut Yılmaz told that he encountered the Cyprus issue like a sword of Damocles hanging over the country's head in the foreign policy as soon as he came to the power.¹¹⁹ After the establishment of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in 15 November 1983, Greek Cypriots, Greeks and the United Nations reacted to this declaration of independence. United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution on renunciation of the independence however Turkey did not comply with this decision.¹²⁰ Relations with Greece have always been depended on the political

¹¹⁸ Faruk Bildirici, *Mesut Yılmaz ve ANAPlı Yıllar: Hanedanın Son Prensi*, (Ankara: Ümit, 2002).

¹¹⁹ Hakan Şanlıtürk, *Maratoncumun Molası: 'Mesut' Yıllardan Notlar*, (Ankara, 2004).

¹²⁰ [http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541\(1983\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541(1983))

conjuncture in the island. In addition to Cyprus issue; the issue of minority rights and the Aegean dispute have been the problems that created the hostility ground between the two countries during 1990s. Imia/Kardak Crisis increased the tension between Turkey and Greece and brought the two states to the edge of a war.¹²¹ These little rocks on which nobody lived submerged after an earthquake later on, however the important thing is Turkish Armed Forces calculated to bring the question of the possessions of islands having undetermined status in Aegean Sea.¹²² The relations with Greece would improve in the millennium by the efforts of Onur Öymen, diplomat and İsmail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the period of both domestic and foreign policy agenda has been increasingly intense, İsmail Cem¹²³ who had been the Minister of Foreign Affairs for five years between 1997 and 2002 tried to alter the concepts of Turkish foreign policy-making that had become like a supra-governmental discourse and developed new arguments.

¹²¹ “In late January a dispute blew up over the ownership of two small, rocky islets called Imia and Kardak Rocks respectively by Greece and Turkey. The quarrel over sovereignty led to vitriolic exchanges between Athens and Ankara, a build-up of military forces around the disputed features, and intervention by the United States in an attempt to defuse tensions between the two NATO allies.” Retrieved from the article: Martin Pratt and Clive Schofield, “The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea”, *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin*, Spring 1996.

¹²² Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*, (İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2013).

¹²³ According to Hüseyin Bağcı, “He is known here and abroad as a capable, knowledgeable and open-minded person who is trying to improve the image of Turkey and to defend Turkey's national interests in the international arena.”¹²³ Hüseyin Bağcı, “Who Is Really Afraid of Turkey?”, in *Zeitgeist Global Politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: ORION, 2008) . İsmail Cem himself evaluated new international outlook and Turkey's position within this framework as follows: “*Today, endowed with the rich heritage of a glorious past, it is Turkey's duty both to itself and to humanity to complement and blend its original identity and purpose with contemporary values and ideals. Turkey is now facing the task of rethinking its own universal purpose. It has to draw on the past, dream about the future and determine what original contribution it can bring to the grand walk of humanity. The goal of today's generation should be to carry Turkey to the 21st century with the characteristics of a Global State.*” İsmail Cem, “Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century”, *Tc. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*, (Ankara, September-November 1997).

Another important political occasions happened in Mesut Yılmaz government period was the relations between the European Union. As it has been mentioned above, application for full membership was done in 1987 under Turgut Özal government. However, after Özal's death, Turkish politics gave in a period of stagnation due to the numerous coalitions thus instability.¹²⁴ Christian Democrat Party leaders in which Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl was also found gave a statement about Turkey should not be a candidate for the membership to the European Union because of the fact that Turkey had different religion and culture.¹²⁵ This led Mesut Yılmaz to declare that Kohl is a political enemy despite the fact that he had defined Helmut Kohl as political rival before.¹²⁶

As a result of the European Union Luxemburg Summit which was held in 12 December 1997, Turkey was not included to the candidate list.¹²⁷ Mesut Yılmaz boycotted the European Union meetings and suspended the relations with the Union. It can be said that Turkey and the European Union relations dropped than ever before.¹²⁸ In Hüseyin Bağcı's own words:

In all previous summits in Cardiff, Vienna, and Cologne, Turkey was not a real issue on the agenda. Then both Turkey and the European Union pursued the policy of non-dialogue. In particular, it was Turkey's policy to freeze political relations with the European Union and try to reduce the disappointment of the Luxemburg

¹²⁴ İnal Batu, "Türkiye Avrupa Birliği'ne Ne Kadar Yaklaşırsa Bölgesinde O Kadar Güçlü Olur", in *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (3)* (eds. Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yegin, (Ankara: USAK, 2011), 12.

¹²⁶ *Milliyet*, Kinkel'den Sert Yanıt, 1998.
<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/04/03/dunyaframe.html>

¹²⁷ Luxembourg European Council, 12–13 December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm

¹²⁸ Ramazan Gözen, "Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupa Birliği'ne Doğru Dönüşümü". *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*, 2 (6) 2006, 1-16.

decision. Turkey, as is known, was excluded and was not seen as candidate for European Union enlargement. Therefore since these developments in international and regional as well as domestic politics forced the European Union to revise its decision concerning Turkey.¹²⁹

After gaining the candidate status in Helsinki Summit which was held in two years later, in 11-12 December 1999, Turkish Republic should have paid particular attention to the human rights and democracy issues. For example, Turkey was expected to evaluate of other alternatives such as cultural rights and democratic approach than military solutions regarding the Kurdish question which has been mentioned above.¹³⁰

Besides the relations with the European Union, as a heritage of Turgut Özal; multi-dimensional foreign policy, Mesut Yılmaz could not be deaf to the Bosnian War. The end of the Cold War paved the way for beginning of Yugoslavian dissolution. Bosnia and Herzegovina decided to have a referendum in order to declare independency in the parliament with the support of Muslims and Croats, despite the boycott of referendum by Serbians. After the declaration of independency, Bosnia and Herzegovina was recognized by the European Union and the United States of America in 7 April 1992.¹³¹ However, this independence did not bring peace; on the contrary, conflicts were sparked shortly before the referendum. All these conflicts kept snowballing and turned into a civil war took almost three years. Any mediation or arbitration endeavours by the statesmen did not to work to stop the

¹²⁹ Hüseyin Bağcı, “Finally, Dialogue Again!”, in *Zeitgeist Global Politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: ORION, 2008), 315.

¹³⁰ Ömer Faruk Gençkaya, “Turgut Özal’ın Güneydoğu ve Kürt Sorununa Bakışı”, in *Kim Bu Özal?: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet* eds. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, (İstanbul: Boyut, 2001), 111.

¹³¹ Patrick Moore, *The Widening Warfare in the Former Yugoslavia*, ERFE / RL Research Report, 2 (1), January 1993, 3.

massacre that carried out by Bosnian Serbians to Bosnian Muslims. Turkey opted for active diplomacy and followed a policy that preferred international resolution due to the geographic and historical reasons.¹³² Mesut Yılmaz also thought that Turkey should take measures to defend Bosnia and suggested that whether any international community response came to the massacres, Turkey should send arms aid breaking the embargo decision.¹³³ Finally, a military intervention against Serbian forces which was also suggested by Turkey materialized in December 1995 as a peacekeeping operation.¹³⁴ Nevertheless, the last straw was the attacking of Bosnian Serbians to Srebrenica and slaughtering all the Bosnian Muslims regardless of anything.¹³⁵ United Nations Former Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his ideas about the massacre on July 11, 2000 as follows: "The tragedy of Srebrenica will forever haunt the history of the United Nations."¹³⁶

¹³² Hüseyin Bağcı, *Güvenlik politikaları ve risk analizi çerçevesinde Balkanlar: 1991-1993*, (Dış Politika Enstitüsü: Ankara, 1994).

¹³³ Celal Kazdağlı, "Bosna'ya Müdahale An Meselesi", *Aksiyon*, July 29, 1995. <http://www.aksiyon.com.tr/aksiyon/haber-901-26-bosnaya-mudahale-an-meselesi.html>

¹³⁴ "Set up in 1995, UNMIBH exercised a wide range of functions related to the law enforcement activities and police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Mission also coordinated other UN activities in the country relating to humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human rights, elections and rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction. Following the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated on 31 December 2002." Retrieved from: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/>

¹³⁵ "Srebrenica massacre, slaying of more than 7,000 Bosnian Muslim, perpetrated by Bosnian Serb forces in Srebrenica, a town in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, in July 1995. In addition to the killings, more than 20,000 civilians were expelled from the area a process known as ethnic cleansing. The massacre helped galvanize the West to press for a cease-fire that ended three years of warfare on Bosnia's territory." Retrieved from: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1697253/Srebrenica-massacre>

¹³⁶ <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000710.sgsm7489.doc.html>

While those have been happening in foreign policy area, Turkish Republic encountered with a post-modern coup d'état in 1997.¹³⁷The Welfare Party which was led by Necmettin Erbakan took power in 1996 as the head of a coalition government. One year later, 1997 Military Memorandum also known as 28 February and post-modern coup began with the announcement of the decisions which had been taken after the National Security Council (MGK). In these decisions, the Council stressed that laicism was the guarantee of the democracy and rule of law in Turkey. Law enforcement should have been restored such as the auditing of schools, education system, secularism, etc. The Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to sign the decisions of compulsory eight-year education programme in order to prevent students from enrolling in religious schools, a headscarf ban at universities, and abolition of sectarian groups. One year after this occasion, the Welfare Party was shut down and Erbakan banned from politics for five years.¹³⁸

As a consequence, it can be generally said that Mesut Yılmaz pursued a realist understanding in foreign policy- making that Özal had legated. However, although it was difficult to separate crucial foreign policy issues from the whole political panorama because of the fact that domestic politics in which countless coalitions took place was fragile, it could be claimed that Mesut Yılmaz succeeded to sustain the Turkish foreign policy without any important injury.

¹³⁷ Post-modern coup d'état conception was first used by a major general according to Cengiz Çandar's article written in 28 June 1997, *Radikal* newspaper. Retrieved from: <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/cengiz-candar-ve-postmodern-darbe-siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/26.04.2012/1532707/default.htm>

¹³⁸ Al Jazeera, April 4, 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html>

CHAPTER 6

6. CONCLUSION

Hüseyin Bağcı gave the keyword about Turgut Özal in one of his articles: “Turgut Özal is the man who brought economic dimension to the Turkish foreign policy. He is the one who initiated the reform period that changed Turkish point of view to globe.”¹³⁹ What Muhittin Ataman has underlined in one of his articles that the foreign policy initiatives in Özal era was mostly based on economic calculations instead of security threats also supports this idea.¹⁴⁰ Gülistan Gürbey carried the idea one step forward by stating that Özal was in belief that free market economy and the democracy are complementary. Because he departed the idea of that the globe has been developed in terms of free trade and economy system, he was trying to approximate Turkey through economic and political aspect. What he intended by change or transformation concepts was economic and political change and transformation indeed.¹⁴¹

Honestly, Özal had always been the advocate of realist, pragmatic, opportunist, proactive, and reformist in decision-making especially in foreign-policy. İhsan Dağı issued an opinion about Turgut Özal term as follows: The legacy that Turgut Özal left to the Turkish political history is open society, civil life, democratization,

¹³⁹ Translated by the author: Hüseyin Bağcı, “Türkiye’ye Soğuk Savaş Sırasında Biçilen Elbise Artık Dar Gelmektedir.”, in *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (4)* (eds. Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yegin, (Ankara: USAK, 2011), 12.

¹⁴⁰ Muhittin Ataman, “Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış”. *Bilgi 7 (2)*, 2003, 49-64.

¹⁴¹ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi’nde Türkiye’de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010).

the European Union, and an active, being able to take initiatives in her political area, and being integrated with globe.¹⁴² Özal's biography has always been fruitful for the ones who would like to think Turkey in 21st century in the framework of continuity and transformation.

After Turgut Özal has been the President, although the Motherland Party had been ruling party for two terms, there were two Prime Ministers (Yıldırım Akbulut and Mesut Yılmaz) and four Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Mesut Yılmaz, Ali Bozer, A. Kurtcebe Alptemoçin, İ. Safa Giray) inside the Motherland Party governments.¹⁴³ This indicates that how Özal got involved into the politics even though he was the President at that time. This new political tradition may be initiated by Özal can be also seen in Hikmet Özdemir's book as a citation from the first speech just after Turgut Özal had been elected as the President: the speech of the new President given on 9 November 1989 could be accepted as the 'first' regarding a secular democracy based on the human rights, equal exercise of rights and freedoms, and emphasis on transformation in all spheres.¹⁴⁴

Mesut Yılmaz was the man who has been discovered and launched to the Turkish political history by Turgut Özal himself. Therefore it is not surprising that they belong to the same general political ideology within the same political party. According to Özdemir; Mesut Yılmaz declared that the future of Turkey is again the Motherland Party just before he took the news of Turgut Özal's death.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴² <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/roportaj/prof-dr-ihsan-dagi-ozalin-mirasi-erdoganda-41749>

¹⁴³ Boğaziçi University - TÜSİAD Foreign Policy Forum, Retrieved from http://www.mir.boun.edu.tr/admin/faculty/course_materials/2.%20Ara%C5%9Ft%C4%B1rma%20Raporu%20Metin%20DEHA%20SON.pdf

¹⁴⁴ Hikmet Özdemir, *Turgut Özal Biyografi*, (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2014).

¹⁴⁵ Özdemir, 638.

Despite all, Mesut Yılmaz as the successor of Turgut Özal being a leader of the Motherland Party was not sharing the hundred percent same point of view with Özal all the time. Yılmaz indeed, appreciated Özal's great efforts for the transformation of Turkish economy and politics as well. He mentioned in a conference which was held in Munich that the most obvious indicator of the transformation and change period in which Turkey has been experienced was that economy came into prominence and diminishing role of the military in politics. He grounded this transformation and change period in politics on that Turkish Republic had been globalized as of Özal period with the help of international political conjuncture that had changed with the end of the Cold War.¹⁴⁶

The biggest difference between Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz is their personalities. Whilst Turgut Özal was pursuing really active foreign policy, Mesut Yılmaz was more cautious in politics. The biggest example of this difference revealed itself in the period of Gulf War as it has been mentioned before. Turgut Özal as a President had been more autonomous in decision-taking than Mesut Yılmaz although he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs thus he should have been asked his opinion. One way or another, Gulf War became one of the most debateable foreign policy issues in Turkish political history.

Transactional leader and transformational leader difference which was created by Baas could be referred to in explaining two leaders; Turgut Özal and Mesut Yılmaz.¹⁴⁷ According to this theory, while transactional leaders aim to sustain the existed structure and to dynamise it; transformational leaders aim to change within

¹⁴⁶Yeni Posta, "Mesut Yılmaz Türk dış politikasını değerlendirdi", June, 26, 2013, Retrieved from: <http://www.yeniposta.de/mesut-yilmaz-turk-dis-politikasini-degerlendirdi.html>

¹⁴⁷B. M. Bass, "From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the vision", *Organizational Dynamics*, Winter 1990, 19-31.

the existed structure calculating the needs of the day.¹⁴⁸ As Joseph McCarthy and Charles De Gaulle may be showed as the examples of transactional leaders throughout the political history; Martin Luther King Jr. and Nelson Mandela may be exemplified to the transformational leaders. In transformational leadership, the important ideas are public and private acknowledgment of achievements and being concerned with ideas over processes. Transformational leaders delegate tasks for supporters to act autonomously or in small groups and encourage change and thinking outside of the box. As given in Turgut Özal chapter of the thesis above, he was mostly criticized for being ‘alone’ by-passing Ministry of Foreign Affairs for instance while he was taking his decisions. Therefore in this conceptualization, it could be asserted that Turgut Özal is a transformational leader due to the fact that he was future-oriented, was able to take risks, was creating a common vision and transferring it to the governed, and sometimes was in narcissist and authoritarian character. Hüseyin Bağcı summarizes him and his political term as follows: “Özal was, in the words of Cengiz Çandar, quite unique. [...] But, one thing is clear, he changed the face Turkey and its image in the world, for better or worse. Nobody can deny that.”¹⁴⁹

On the other hand, transactional leadership is composed of rewards and punishments. A transactional leader generally avoids change and works to keep status-quo, and being concerned with processes over ideas on the contrary to transformational leader.¹⁵⁰ When Mesut Yılmaz thought as an example to the transactional leader, as it is well-known Yılmaz was a pro-Western leader as Turgut Özal. He gave particular importance on liberalism both in economy and

¹⁴⁸Veysel Bozkurt, “Geleceğin Toplumu, Dönüşümcü Liderlik ve Turgut Özal”, in *Kim Bu Özal?: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet* eds. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, (İstanbul: Boyut, 2001).

¹⁴⁹ Hüseyin Bağcı, “Turgut Özal’s Foreign and Security Policy Revisited”, in *Zeitgeist Global Politics and Turkey*, (Ankara: ORION, 2008).

¹⁵⁰ B.M. Bass, From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the vision, *Organizational Dynamics*, 18 (3), Winter 1990, 19–31.

politics although he was a realist leader as Özal. He believed that Turkey deserved being in a higher rank in the world stage. However, due to his personal characteristics, Mesut Yılmaz was a responsive leader who was aiming to do the things right instead of doing the strategically right things. He was focusing on not to make a mistake that is why not opting for taking risk. Therefore, it could be appropriate to classify Yılmaz as transactional leader.

From all these leadership inferences, if it is required to turn back to the research question of this thesis which is “Is Mesut Yılmaz a continuation of Özal’s reform period or a breaking down?”; in order to answer this, I would like to finish my thesis by Turgut Özal’s own words from one of his interviews with Mehmet Ali Birand in the TV programme called 32. Gün¹⁵¹:

The leader of the Motherland Party should have been reformist; nevertheless Mesut Yılmaz has been acting in a status quoist way.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ For the video, see <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VBfsV9ttXs>

¹⁵² Translated by the author, Mehmet Ali Birand, Interview with Turgut Özal, *32.Gün*, Kanal D, March 15, 1993.

REFERENCES

BOOKS&ARTICLES

20 Mayıs Eğitim, Kültür ve Sosyal Dayanışma Vakfı. *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*. Edited by İhsan Sezal. İstanbul: Çetin, 1996.

ABRAMOWITZ, Morton. *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*. New York: The Century Foundation, 2001.

ADAMS, Ian and DYSON, R. W. *Fifty Major Political Thinkers*. New York: Routledge, 2003.

ARI, Tayyar. *Uluslararası İlişkiler Teorileri*. İstanbul: Marmara, 2008.

ARICANLI, Tosun and RODRİK, Dani. (eds.). *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability*. London: Macmillan. 1990.

ATAMAN, Muhittin. *An Integrated Approach to Foreign Policy Change: Explaining Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy in the 1980s*. Kentucky: Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Kentucky. 1999.

ATAMAN, Muhittin. Özalist Dış Politika: Aktif ve Rasyonel Bir Anlayış. *Bilgi* (7) 2003 / 2. pp: 49-64.

BAĞCI, Hüseyin. *Türk Dış Politikasında 1950'li Yıllar*. Ankara: ODTÜ, 2007.

BAĞCI, Hüseyin. *Zeitgeist: Global Politics and Turkey*. Ankara: Orion, 2008.

BAĞCI, Hüseyin. *Güvenlik politikaları ve risk analizi çerçevesinde Balkanlar: 1991-1993*. Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1994.

BAĞCI, Hüseyin. Who Is Really Afraid of Turkey?. *Turkish Daily News*. January 3, 2001.

BAL, İdris. (ed.). *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post Cold War Era*. Florida: Brown Walker Press, 2004

BALCI, Ali. *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*. İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2013.

BARLAS, Mehmet. *Turgut Özal Anıları*. İstanbul: Sabah, 1994.

BASS, B. M. "From transactional to transformational leadership: Learning to share the vision." *Organizational Dynamics*, Winter,1990. 19-31.

BAYLIS, John, SMITH, Steve and OWENS, Patricia. *The Globalization of World Politics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008.

BEITZ, Charles. *Political Theory and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.

BİLDİRİCİ, Faruk. *Mesut Yılmaz ve ANAP'lı Yıllar: Hanedanın Son Prensi*. Ankara: Ümit, 2002.

BİRAND, Mehmet Ali and YALÇIN, Soner. *The Özal: Bir Davanın Öyküsü*. İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2001.

BOZDAĞLIOĞLU, Yücel and ÖZEN, Çınar. Liberalizmden Neoliberalizme Güç Olgusu ve Sistemik Bağımlılık. *Uluslararası İlişkiler*, Vol 1. Issue 4. (Winter 2004). pp. 59-79.

BURCHILL, Scott, LINKLATER, Andrew, DEVETAK, Richard, DONNELLY, Jack, NARDIN, Terry, PATERSON, Matthew, ..., TRUE, Jacqui. *Theories of International Relations*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

CEM, İsmail. "Turkey: Setting Sail to the 21st Century". *Tc. Dışişleri Bakanlığı Stratejik Araştırmalar Merkezi*. Ankara, September-November 1997.

CEMAL, Hasan. *Özal Hikayesi*. İstanbul: Everest, 2013.

ÇAKMAK, Haydar. (ed.) *Liderlerin Dış Politika Felsefesi ve Uygulamaları*. İstanbul: Doğu, 2013.

ÇAKMAK, Haydar. (ed.) *Türk Dış Politikası 1919-2008*. Ankara: Platin, 2008.

ÇOMAK, Hasret and SANCAKTAR, Caner. (eds.) *Türk Dış Politikasında Yeni Yönelimler: İki Kutuplu Sistem Sonrası Türk Dış Politikası*. İstanbul: Beta, 2013.

ÇANDAR, Cengiz. "AK Parti: Turgut Özal'ın Devamı Olmak ile Mesut Yılmaz'ın ANAP'ı Olmak Arasında" *Hürriyet*. 27 May 2011.

ÇANDAR, Cengiz. *Mezopotamya Ekspresi: Bir Tarih Yolculuğu*, İstanbul: İletişim, 2012.

DAĞI, İhsan and SEZAL, İhsan. (eds.). *Kim Bu Özal? Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet*. İstanbul: Boyut, 2001.

DAĞI, İhsan. *Turkey Between Democracy and Militarism*. Ankara: Orion, 2008.

DAĞI, İhsan. "Özal'ın Mirası". *Zaman*, 18 April 2008, Friday.

DEMİR, Ali Faik. (ed.). *Türk Dış Politikasında Liderler*. İstanbul: Bağlam, 2007.

DİNÇER, Osman Bahadır, ÖZDAL, Habibe, and NECEFOĞLU, Hacı. (eds.). *Yeni Dönemde Türk Dış Politikası: Uluslararası IV. Türk Dış Politikası Sempozyumu Tebliğleri*. Ankara: USAK, 2010.

DİNÇER, Osman Bahadır, ÖZDAL, Habibe, and NECEFOĞLU, Hacı. (eds.). *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası, Cilt 1-2-3-4*. Ankara: USAK, 2009.

ERSEL, Hasan. "The Timing of the Capital Account Liberalization: the Turkish Experience". *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Vol. 15. 1996. pp. 45-64.

FULLER, Graham. *Turkey Faces East: New Orientations Toward the Middle East and the Old Soviet Union*. Santa Monica: RAND, 1997.

GÖZEN, Ramazan. *Amerikan Kışkacında Dış Politika: Körfez Savaşı, Turgut Özal ve Sonrası*. Ankara: Liberte, 2000.

GÖZEN, Ramazan. "Türk Dış Politikasının Avrupa Birliği'ne Doğru Dönüşümü". *Uluslararası Hukuk ve Politika*. 2 (6) 2006. pp. 1-16.

GRIFFITHS, Martin, ROACH, Steven C. and SOLOMON, M. Scott. *Fifty Major Political Thinkers*. New York: Routledge, 1999.

GÜNER, Engin. *Özal'lı Yıllarım*. İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2003.

GÜRBEY, Gülistan. *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*. Ankara: ODTÜ, 2010.

HALE, William. *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000*. New York: Routledge, 2013.

HALLIDAY, Fred. *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

HEPER, Metin. "Islam, Conservatism, and Democracy in Turkey: Comparing Turgut Özal and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan", *Insight Turkey* 15 (2) Spring 2013.

HEPER, Metin. "Conclusion - The Consolidation of Democracy versus Democratization in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, 3:1, 2002. pp. 138-146.

IKONOMAKI, Maria & ORKUN Genco. *Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: the Role of Decision Makers*. 2000.

KALAYCIOĞLU, Ersin. "ANAP: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party". *Turkish Studies*. Vol. 3. No. 1. Spring 2002. pp.41-61.

KARPAT, Kemal H. *Türk Dış Politikası Tarihi*. İstanbul: Timaş, 2012.

KENNEDY, Paul. *The Rise and Falls of Great Powers*. New York: Vintage, 1989.

KEOHANE, Robert O. "Twenty Years of Institutional Liberalism", *International Relations*, 26(125) 2012.

KEOHANE, Robert O. "International Institutions: Two Approaches". *International Studies Quarterly* (32). 1988.

KEOHANE, Robert O. and MARTIN, Lisa L. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory", *International Security*. 20(1).

KEYMAN, E. Fuat and ÖNİŞ, Ziya. *Turkish Politics in a Changing World: Global Dynamics and Domestic Transformations*. İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi University Press, 2007.

KISSENGER, Henry. *Diplomacy*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.

MAKOVSKY, Alan and SAYARI, Sabri. (eds.). *Türkiye'nin Yeni Dünyası: Türk Dış Politikasının Değişen Dinamikleri*. İstanbul: Alfa, 2002.

MELS, Sara, ROCHTUS, Dirk, TIMMERMAN, and Christiane (eds.). *European and Turkish Voices in Favour and Against Turkish Accession to the European Union*. Bruxelles, Bern, Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Wien: Peter Lang, 2008.

MORAVCSIK, Andrew. *Liberalism and International Relations Theory*. Massachusetts: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1992.

ORAN, Baskın. (ed.). *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*. İstanbul: İletişim, 2001.

ÖZDEMİR, Hikmet. *Turgut Özal Biyografisi*. İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2014.

RUSSETT, Bruce, LAYNE, Christopher, SPIRO, David E. and DOYLE, Michael W. *International Security*. 19(4). 1995. pp. 164-184.

SANDER, Oral. *Siyasi Tarih 1918-1994*. Ankara: İmge, 1989.

SANDER, Oral. *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*. Edited by Melek Fırat. Ankara: İmge, 2013.

ŞANLITÜRK, Hakan. *Maratoncu'nun Molası: 'Mesut' Yillardan Notlar*. Ankara: Gemi, 2004.

TAYLOR, A.J.P. *The Origins of the Second World War*. London: Penguin, 2001.

YAVUZ, M. Hakan. "Turkish identity and foreign policy in flux: The rise of Neo-Ottomanism", *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, 7:12 (1998).

WEBSITES

<http://ab.gov.tr/index.php?p=111&l=2>

<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/04/20124472814687973.html>

<http://anap.org.tr/anap/genelbaskanlar/OZAL/yayin/ozalgorus.htm>

<http://www.biography.com/people/john-locke-9384544>

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/516821/Massacre-of-Saint-Bartholomews-Day>

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/609790/Turkey/44446/The-1990s>

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm

<http://www.cyprusconflict.org/materials/johnsonletter.html>

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm

<http://www.mesutyilmaz.gen.tr>

http://www.mfa.gov.tr/enter-the-header_the-turkish-speaking-states-summit-to-be-held-in-baku-br_unofficial-translation_br_no_43---march-28_-2000.en.mfa

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-/taha-akyol/siyaset/yazardetay/18.04.2008/518314/default.htm>

<http://www.milliyet.com.tr/1998/04/03/dunyaframe.html>

http://www.mir.boun.edu.tr/admin/faculty/course_materials/2.%20Ara%C5%9F%C4%B1rma%20Raporu%20Metin%20DEHA%20SON.pdf

<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/enosis>

http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Homo_economicus.html

<http://www.secim-sonuclari.com/anavatan-partisi.parti>

<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITThe Justice PartyLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY/198602237%20THE%20PROGRAMME%20OF%20MOTHERLAND%20PARTY.pdf>

http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/TUTANAK/CS_/t05/c031/cs_05031003.pdf

http://www.tccb.gov.tr/sayfa/cumhurbaskanlarimiz/turgut_ozal/

<http://www.tika.gov.tr/en/>

<http://www.todayszaman.com//news-268342-bulgarian-parliament-condemns-turkish-assimilation-by-communist-regime.html>

[http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541\(1983\)](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/541(1983))

<http://www.yeniposta.de/mesut-yilmaz-turk-dis-politikasini-degerlendirdi.html>

<http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/roportaj/prof-dr-ihsan-dagi-ozalin-mirasi-erdoganda-41749>

APPENDIX A

GOVERNMENTS IN REPUBLIC OF TURKEY¹⁵³	
<p>I. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal (The People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İsmet İnönü (The People's Party)</p>	<p>(30 October 1923-6 March 1924)</p>
<p>II. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal (The People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İsmet İnönü (The People's Party)</p>	<p>(6 March 1924-22 November 1924)</p>
<p>Okyar Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: Ali Fethi Okyar (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Şükrü Kaya (The Republican People's Party)</p>	<p>(22 November 1924-3 March 1925)</p>
<p>III. İnönü Government</p>	<p>(3 March 1925-1 November 1927)</p>

¹⁵³ Prepared by the author being inspired from Ali Balcı, *Türkiye Dış Politikası: İlkeler, Aktörler, Uygulamalar*. (İstanbul: Etkileşim, 2013).

<p>President: Mustafa Kemal (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tevfik Rüştü Aras (The Republican People's Party)</p>	
<p>IV. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tevfik Rüştü Aras (The Republican People's Party)</p>	(1 November 1927-27 September 1930)
<p>VI. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tevfik Rüştü Aras (The Republican People's Party)</p>	(4 May 1931-1 March 1935)
<p>VII. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal (1934 onwards Atatürk) (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tevfik Rüştü Aras (The Republican People's Party)</p>	(1 March 1935-1 November 1937)

<p>I. Bayar Government</p> <p>President: Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: Celal Bayar (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tevfik Rüştü Aras (The Republican People's Party)</p>	<p>(1 November 1937-11 November 1938)</p>
<p>II. Bayar Government</p> <p>President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: Celal Bayar (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Şükrü Saraçoğlu (The Republican People's Party)</p>	<p>(11 November 1938-25 January 1939)</p>
<p>I. Saydam Government</p> <p>President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: Refik Saydam (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Şükrü Saraçoğlu (The Republican People's Party)</p>	<p>(25 January 1939-3 April 1939)</p>
<p>II. Saydam Government</p> <p>President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Prime Minister: Refik Saydam (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Şükrü Saraçoğlu (The</p>	<p>(3 April 1939-9 July 1942)</p>

Republican People's Party)	
I. Saraçođlu Government President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party) Prime Minister: Şükrü Saraçođlu (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Şükrü Saraçođlu and Numan Menemenciođlu (The Republican People's Party)	(9 July 1942-9 March 1943)
II. Saraçođlu Government President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party) Prime Minister: Şükrü Saraçođlu (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Numan Menemenciođlu and Hasan Saka (The Republican People's Party)	(9 March 1943-7 August 1946)
Peker Government President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party) Prime Minister: Recep Peker (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hasan Saka (The Republican People's Party)	(7 August 1946-10 September 1947)
I. Saka Government President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party) Prime Minister: Hasan Saka (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Necmettin Sadak (The	(10 September 1947-10 June 1948)

Republican People's Party)	
II. Saka Government President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party) Prime Minister: Hasan Saka (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Necmettin Sadak (The Republican People's Party)	(10 June 1948-16 January 1949)
Günaltay Government President: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party) Prime Minister: Mehmet Şemsettin Günaltay (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Necmettin Sadak (The Republican People's Party)	(16 January 1949-22 May 1950)
II. Menderes Government President: Celal Bayar (The Democratic Party) Prime Minister: Adnan Menderes (The Democratic Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuat Köprülü (The Democratic Party)	(22 May 1950-9 March 1951)
II. Menderes Government President: Celal Bayar (The Democratic Party) Prime Minister: Adnan Menderes (The Democratic Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuat Köprülü (The Democratic Party)	(9 March 1951-17 May 1954)

Party)	
III. Menderes Government President: Celal Bayar (The Democratic Party) Prime Minister: Adnan Menderes (The Democratic Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuat Köprülü (The Democratic Party)	(17 May 1954-9 December 1955)
IV. Menderes Government President: Celal Bayar (The Democratic Party) Prime Minister: Adnan Menderes (The Democratic Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fuat Köprülü and Ethem Menderes (The Democratic Party)	(9 December 1955-25 November 1957)
V. Menderes Government President: Celal Bayar (The Democratic Party) Prime Minister: Adnan Menderes (The Democratic Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Fatin Rüştü Zorlu (The Democratic Party)	(25 November 1957-27 May 1960)
I. Gürsel Government President: Cemal Gürsel Minister of Foreign Affairs: Selim Rauf Sarper	(30 May 1960-5 January 1961)
II. Gürsel Government President: Cemal Gürsel Minister of Foreign Affairs: Selim Rauf Sarper	(5 January 1961-20 November 1961)

<p>VIII. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Cemal Gürsel</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Selim Rauf Sarper (The Republican People's Party) and Feridun Cemal Erkin</p>	<p>(20 November 1961-25 June 1962)</p>
<p>IX. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Cemal Gürsel</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Selim Rauf Sarper (The Republican People's Party) Feridun Cemal Erkin</p>	<p>(25 June 1962-25 December 1963)</p>
<p>X. İnönü Government</p> <p>President: Cemal Gürsel</p> <p>Prime Minister: İsmet İnönü (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Feridun Cemal Erkin</p>	<p>(25 December 1963-20 February 1965)</p>
<p>Ürgüplü Government</p> <p>President: Cemal Gürsel</p> <p>Prime Minister: Suat Hayri Ürgüplü (Independent)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hasan Esat Işık</p>	<p>(20 February 1965-27 October 1965)</p>
<p>I. Demirel Government</p> <p>President: Cemal Gürsel and Cevdet Sunay</p>	<p>(27 October 1965-3 November 1969)</p>

<p>Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The Justice Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (The Justice Party)</p>	
<p>II. Demirel Government</p> <p>President: Cevdet Sunay</p> <p>Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The Justice Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (The Justice Party)</p>	(3 November 1969-6 March 1970)
<p>III. Demirel Government</p> <p>President: Cevdet Sunay</p> <p>Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The Justice Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (The Justice Party)</p>	(6 March 1970-26 March 1971)
<p>I. Erim Government</p> <p>President: Cevdet Sunay</p> <p>Prime Minister: Nihat Erim (Independent)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Osman Olcay</p>	(26 March 1971-11 December 1971)
<p>II. Erim Government</p> <p>President: Cevdet Sunay</p> <p>Prime Minister: Nihat Erim (Independent)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ümit Haluk Bayülken</p>	(11 December 1971-22 May 1972)
<p>Melen Government</p>	(22 May 1972-15 May 1972)

<p>President: Cevdet Sunay and Fahri Korutürk</p> <p>Prime Minister: Ferit Melen (The National Reliance Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ümit Haluk Bayülken (Independent)</p>	April 1973)
<p>Talu Government</p> <p>President: Fahri Korutürk</p> <p>Prime Minister: Naim Talu (Independent)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ümit Haluk Bayülken (Independent)</p>	(15 April 1973-26 January 1974)
<p>I. Ecevit Government</p> <p>President: Fahri Korutürk</p> <p>Prime Minister: Bülent Ecevit (The Republican People's Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Turan Güneş (The Republican People's Party)</p>	(26 January 1974-17 November 1974)
<p>Irmak Government</p> <p>President: Fahri Korutürk</p> <p>Prime Minister: Sadi Irmak (Independent)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Melih Esenbel (Independent)</p>	(17 November 1974-31 March 1975)
<p>IV. Demirel Government</p> <p>President: Fahri Korutürk</p> <p>Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The Justice Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (The</p>	(31 March 1975-21 June 1977)

Justice Party)	
II. Ecevit Government President: Fahri Korutürk Prime Minister: Bülent Ecevit (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Gündüz Ökçün (The Republican People's Party)	(21 June 1977-21 July 1977)
V. Demirel Government President: Fahri Korutürk Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The Justice Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil (The Justice Party)	(21 July 1977-5 January 1978)
III. Ecevit Government President: Fahri Korutürk Prime Minister: Bülent Ecevit (The Republican People's Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Gündüz Ökçün (The Republican People's Party)	(5 January 1978-12 November 1979)
VI. Demirel Government President: Fahri Korutürk Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The Justice Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hayrettin Erkmen (The Justice Party)	(12 November 1979-12 September 1980)

<p>Ulus Government</p> <p>President: Kenan Evren</p> <p>Prime Minister: Bülend Ulusu (Independent)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İlter Türkmen (Independent)</p>	<p>(20 September 1980-13 December 1983)</p>
<p>I. Özal Government</p> <p>President: Kenan Evren</p> <p>Prime Minister: Turgut Özal (The Motherland Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Vahit Halefoğlu (The Motherland Party)</p>	<p>(13 December 1983-21 December 1987)</p>
<p>II. Özal Government</p> <p>President: Kenan Evren</p> <p>Prime Minister: Turgut Özal (The Motherland Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mesut Yılmaz (The Motherland Party)</p>	<p>(21 December 1987-9 November 1989)</p>
<p>Akbulut Government</p> <p>President: Turgut Özal</p> <p>Prime Minister: Yıldırım Akbulut (The Motherland Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mesut Yılmaz, Ali Bozer, and Ahmet Kurtçebe Alptemuçin (The Motherland Party)</p>	<p>(9 November 1989-23 June 1991)</p>
<p>Yılmaz Government</p> <p>President: Turgut Özal</p> <p>Prime Minister: Mesut Yılmaz (The Motherland Party)</p>	<p>(23 June 1991-20 November 1991)</p>

Minister of Foreign Affairs: İsmail Sefa Giray (The Motherland Party)	
VII. Demirel Government President: Turgut Özal Prime Minister: Süleyman Demirel (The True Path Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hikmet Çetin (The Social Democratic Populist Party)	(20 November 1991-25 June 1993)
Çiller Government President: Süleyman Demirel Prime Minister: Tansu Çiller (The True Path Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Hikmet Çetin, Mümtaz Soysal, Murat Karayalçın (The Social Democratic Populist Party), and Erdal İnönü (The Republican People's Party)	(25 June 1993-15 October 1995)
Çiller Government President: Süleyman Demirel Prime Minister: Tansu Çiller (The True Path Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Coşkun Kırca (The True Path Party) and Deniz Baykal (The Republican People's Party)	(15 October 1995-5 November 1995)
Çiller Government President: Süleyman Demirel Prime Minister: Tansu Çiller (The True Path Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Deniz Baykal (The Republican People's Party)	(5 November 1995-12 March 1996)

<p>Yılmaz Government</p> <p>President: Süleyman Demirel</p> <p>Prime Minister: Mesut Yılmaz (The Motherland Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Emre Gönensay and Tansu Çiller (The True Path Party)</p>	<p>(12 March 1996-08 July 1996)</p>
<p>Erbakan Government</p> <p>President: Süleyman Demirel</p> <p>Prime Minister: Necmettin Erbakan (The Welfare Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Tansu Çiller (The True Path Party)</p>	<p>(08 July 1996 - 30 June 1997)</p>
<p>Yılmaz Government</p> <p>President: Süleyman Demirel</p> <p>Prime Minister: Mesut Yılmaz (The Motherland Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İsmail Cem (The Democratic Left Party)</p>	<p>(30 June 1997 - 11 January 1999)</p>
<p>Ecevit Government</p> <p>President: Süleyman Demirel</p> <p>Prime Minister: Bülent Ecevit (The Democratic Left Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İsmail Cem (The Democratic Left Party)</p>	<p>(11 January 1999-28 May 1999)</p>
<p>Ecevit Government</p> <p>President: Süleyman Demirel and Ahmet Necdet Sezer</p>	<p>(28 May 1999-18 Nov 2002)</p>

<p>Prime Minister: Bülent Ecevit (The Democratic Left Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: İsmail Cem and Şükrü Sina Gürel (The Democratic Left Party)</p>	
<p>Gül Government</p> <p>President: Ahmet Necdet Sezer</p> <p>Prime Minister: Abdullah Gül (The Justice and Development Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Yaşar Yakış (The Justice and Development Party)</p>	(18 Nov 2002-11 March 2003)
<p>Erdoğan Government</p> <p>President: Ahmet Necdet Sezer</p> <p>Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (The Justice and Development Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Abdullah Gül (The Justice and Development Party)</p>	(14 March 2003 – 29 August 2007)
<p>Erdoğan Government</p> <p>President: Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Abdullah Gül</p> <p>Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (The Justice and Development Party)</p> <p>Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ali Babacan and Ahmet Davutoğlu (The Justice and Development Party)</p>	(29 August 2007 – 6 July 2011)
<p>Erdoğan Government</p> <p>President: Abdullah Gül</p> <p>Prime Minister: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (The Justice and</p>	(6 July 2011- 28 August 2014)

Development Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Ahmet Davutoğlu (The Justice and Development Party)	
Davutoğlu Government President: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Prime Minister: Ahmet Davutoğlu (The Justice and Development Party) Minister of Foreign Affairs: Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu (The Justice and Development Party)	(29 August 2014-present)

APPENDIX B

TURKISH SUMMARY

Özde de belirtildiği gibi; bu çalışma Türk Dış Politikası'nda 1983 ile 1999 arasında yaşananları açıklamak amacıyla yazılmıştır. Çalışmaya temel gösterilecek kuramsal bir açıklama bölümüyle başlanmıştır. Bu bölümde, uluslararası ilişkiler disiplininin iki ana akımından biri olan liberalizmin bir alt başlığı olarak nitelendirilen neo-liberalizm anlatılmıştır. Daha çok Anglo-Amerikan merkezli bir ideoloji olan liberalizm, uluslararası ilişkiler literatürünün egemen ideolojilerindedir. Felsefi temelleri 17.yüzyıl düşünürü John Locke'a kadar ulaşan liberal düşünce geleneğinde, insan hakları, hukukun üstünlüğü, demokrasi ve bireyler arasında eşitlik ön plandadır. Ekonomik anlamda, refaha ulaşmanın en iyi yolunun piyasa kapitalizmi olduğunu iddia eden liberalizmin üç ana varsayımından bahsedilir: temel liberal savların temel sosyal aktörler ve onların güdülerini içermesi, devlet ve sivil toplum arasındaki ilişki ve devletlerin uluslararası sistemde geliştirdiği strateji ve yaptığı seçimlerin şartları. Bir alt başlık olarak neo-liberalizm ise devletlerin göreceli kazançtan çok mutlak kazançlara ulaşmak için uluslararası işbirliğinden faydalanılarak çabalamaları yönünde bir öğretilde bulunur. Temel soru olarak anarşik düzende işbirliğinin nasıl başlatılacağı ve sürdürüleceği söz konusudur. Dünyada neo-liberal dönüşümün sebepleri olarak; İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın devletler üzerinde bıraktığı katastrofik etkiler ve yine Dünya Savaşları'nın ardından Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin küresel ekonomide dominant bir güç olarak ortaya çıkışı verilebilir. Bu çalışma, liberal düşünce anlamında bir alt başlık olan neo-liberalizm temelinde kurgulanmıştır.

Sosyal bilimlerde, bir dönemi anlayabilmek için her zaman bir önceki dönemi bilmek gerekir. Bu yüzden, öncelikle 1980' e kadar olan Türk Dış Politikası zamanın ruhunu aktarabilmek ve zamanın ruhunun nasıl bir devinim içerisinde olduğuna işaret etmek üzere anlatılmıştır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluşundan İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonuna kadar yaşananlar ilk bölümde, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan 1980'e kadar olanlar da ikinci bölümde açıklanmıştır.

İkinci olarak, Turgut Özal liderliğindeki Anavatan Partisi dönemi; üçüncü olarak ile Mesut Yılmaz liderliğindeki Anavatan Partisi dönemi özellikle dış politika yapımı noktasında neo-liberal anlayış göz önüne alınarak açıklanmaya çalışılmıştır. Dördüncü ve son olarak, iki lider arasında bir karşılaştırmaya gidilmiş ve bu tezin asıl sorusu olan Mesut Yılmaz'ın Turgut Özal'ın başlattığı reform sürecini devam ettirip ettiremediğine etkileşimci ve dönüşümcü liderlik olarak sınıflandırılan liderlik tipleriyle bağdaştırılarak yanıt aranmıştır.

Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti her daim uluslararası politik aktörlerin ilgi odağı olmuştur. Yer aldığı coğrafi konum itibariyle, Asya, Avrupa ve Orta Doğu arasında geçiş sağlayan önemli bir köprü vazifesindedir. Cumhuriyetin ilk yıllarından beri süregelen bu söylem, 1980'lere gelindiğinde yerini bölgesel güç olma arzusuna bırakmıştır. Politik anlamda güçlü olmanın ancak güçlü bir ekonomiyle başarılacağını düşünen Turgut Özal, o yıllarda tüm dünyada etkinliğini artıran neo-liberal ekonomik anlayış, özellikle Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ve İngiltere gibi dünyanın önde gelen güçlü devletlerinin siyasi ajandalarında yer almaya başladığını görmüştür.

Ekonominin liberalleşmesi; ünlü "Bırakınız yapsınlar, bırakınız geçsinler." sözünden hareketle devletlerin ekonomiye yaptıkları müdahalelerin en aza

indirgenmesiyle başlar.¹⁵⁴ Böylece ‘homo economicus’ felsefesi uyarınca ekonomide özel teşebbüsün daha fazla söz sahibi olduğu, mülkiyetin öne çıkarıldığı, rekabet ortamının olduğu bir serbest piyasa ekonomisi düzenine geçilir.¹⁵⁵ Turgut Özal o dönemde Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde ekonomi alanında tamamladığı yüksek lisans eğitimi sırasında dünyada gerçekleşen bu ekonomik değişim programını takip edip, Türkiye’ye döndüğünde göreve başladığı Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı’nda meydana getirmek istemiştir. Türk siyasi tarihinin en radikal ekonomik paketi olarak da değerlendirilen ve 24 Ocak Kararları olarak da nitelendirilen ekonomik paket 1980 yılında uygulamaya konmuştur. Ekonomik paradigmayı değiştirmeyi amaçlayan bu pakette, Türk ekonomisi serbest piyasa anlayışı, kar maksimizasyonu ve rekabetçi fiyat politikalarıyla küresel ekonomiye entegre edilmek istenmiştir. Yabancı sermayenin ülkeye girişine ilk defa bu denli izin verildiği kararlarda kambiyo rejimi serbestleştirilerek döviz giriş çıkışının önü açıldı.

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı’nın deyişiyle;

Özal Türk dış politikasına ekonomik boyutu getiren kişidir. Bugüne kadar daha çok siyasi ve güvenlik endişelerinin hakim olduğu yaklaşım tarzı var iken Özal’la birlikte dış politikaya ekonomik unsur eklenmiştir ve bugün onunla birlikte o zamandan itibaren ekonomi Türk dış politikasında daha fazla belirleyici bir rol almaya başlamıştır bu da iyi bir şeydir diye düşünüyorum.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Originally: “Laissez-faire, laissez-passer” in French, and “Let them do, let them pass” in English.

¹⁵⁵ “Homo economicus, or Economic human, is the concept in some economic theories of humans as rational and narrowly self-interested actors who have the ability to make judgments towards their subjectively defined ends.” Retrieved from: http://www.princeton.edu/~achaney/tmve/wiki100k/docs/Homo_economicus.html

¹⁵⁶Hüseyin Bağcı, “Türkiye’ye Soğuk Savaş Sırasında Biçilen Elbise Artık Dar Gelmektedir.”, in *Mülakatlarla Türk Dış Politikası (4)* (eds. Habibe Özdal, Osman Bahadır Dinçer, and Mehmet Yegin, (Ankara: USAK, 2011).

Prof. Dr. Gülistan Gürbey'in düşüncesine göre de;

Özal, özgürlükçü serbest piyasa ekonomisi ile demokrasinin birbirini tamamlayacağı inancındaydı. Dünyanın serbest ticaret ve ekonomi sistemi yönünden geliştiği görüşünden yola çıktığı için, ekonomik ve siyasi açıdan Türkiye'yi bu gelişmeye yaklaştırmaya çalışıyordu. Özal'ın kullandığı 'değişim' veya 'dönüşüm' kavramı, ekonomik değişimi ve devlet sisteminin ve siyasi sistemin yeniden düzenlenmesini içeriyordu.¹⁵⁷

Ekonomide yaşanan tüm bu gelişmelerden sonra, Turgut Özal'ın 1983 yılında kurduğu Anavatan Partisi'nin iktisadi amaç ve hedefleri de neo-liberal yönde şekillenmiştir. Parti programının İktisadi Politika başlıklı ikinci bölümünde yer alan açıkça belirtilen ifadelerle partinin iktisadi genel hedefleri şu şekildedir:

İktisadi gelişmenin hızlandırılması ve sosyal dengenin iyileştirilmesi; fertlerin kabiliyet ve çalışmalarına göre gelişme arzularının teşvik edilmesi; gruplar arasındaki gelir dağılımı farklılıklarının pratik ölçüler içinde azaltılması; bölgeler arası gelişmişlik farklılıklarının asgariye indirilmesi, fakirliğin kaldırılarak refahın yaygınlaştırılması; iktisadi gelişme politikamızın esasını teşkil eder. Toplumdaki çeşitli grup menfaatlerinin bir bütünün tamamlayıcı unsurları olduğuna, bunların ahenkli bir şekilde millî menfaatler çerçevesinde birbiriyle telif edilebileceğine inanırız. Ekonominin tabii kanunları içinde gelişmesini sağlamak üzere, ülke menfaatleri doğrultusunda müdahale ve tehditlerin asgariye indirilerek, rekabet şartlarının hakim kılındığı serbest pazar ekonomisinin uygulanması ekonomik tercihimizdir. Büyük halk kitlelerine yeterli, kaliteli ve ucuz mal ve hizmet sunulmasının en iyi şekilde bu sistem içerisinde mümkün olabileceğine inanıyoruz. Dış borçlanmayı ve dış yatırımları karşılıklı menfaatlerin dengelenmesini öngören bir anlayış içerisinde faydalı buluruz.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁷ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010), 81-82.

¹⁵⁸ <http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198>

Belirlenen bu hedeflere ulaşmanın yolları da şu ilkelerle mümkün olabilecekti:

- Tasarrufların teşviki; tasarrufların ve kaynakların verimli ve süratli bir şekilde kullanımıyla, yatırım ve üretim artışının, istihdam imkânlarının geliştirilmesi,
- Dış ödemeler dengesinin istikrarlı ve sürekli çözüme kavuşturulması, ihracatın artırılarak, millî gelir içindeki payının yükseltilmesi; dış müteahhitlik, taşımacılık,
- Enflasyonun çok düşük seviyelerde tutulması,
- Fiyat istikrarının sağlanması, İktisadi, mali, para ve kredi politikalarında karar bütünlüğünün sağlanması ve uygulamanın ahenk içinde yürütülmesi.¹⁵⁹

Ekonominin liberalleşmesi siyasetteki liberalleşmeyi de beraberinde getirdi. Aktif dış politika yapımı olarak adlandırılan yeni bir metot Türk siyasi tarihinde Atatürk'ten sonra en çok Turgut Özal ile yer almıştır. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin dış politika konusunda da aynı ekonomide olduğu gibi uluslararası platformda yer alması gerektiğini savunan Özal, yabancı devletlerle olan ilişkilerde son derece cesur hamlelerde bulunmuş ve krizleri fırsata çevirmeyi bilmiştir. Bu konuda verilen en büyük örnek olan 1991 Körfez Krizi, Turgut Özal'ın yetki özerkliği konusunda eleştirilmesine rağmen başarı gösterdiği dış politika kararlarının başında gelir. 1980'li yıllarda zamanın ruhunda var olan Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Ermeni Sorunu iki devletin ilişkilerini bir miktar sekteye uğratsa da; Turgut Özal'ın dış politika yapımında takındığı pro-aktif ve işbirlikçi tavır, doğaldır ki Türkiye'nin Amerika Birleşik Devletleri ile olan ilişkilerini zirveye taşıdı. Ekonomik anlamda Amerikan Başkanı Ronald Reagan'ın İngiltere Başbakanı Margaret Thatcher ile eşzamanlı olarak başlattığı neo-liberal akım, Turgut Özal'ı etkilemiş ve bu ekonomik düzenin Türkiye'de de yerleşmesi için adımlar atmasına sebep olmuştur. Körfez Krizi de iki devletin birbirine en çok yaklaştığı olaylardandır. Amerika Birleşik Devletleri'nin Türkiye'den; Irak'a yönelik hava hareketinde kullanılmak üzere Türk hava sahasını

[604151%20ANAP%20PRORAMI%201983/198604151%20ANAP%20PRORAMI%201983%20198604151.pdf](http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198604151%20ANAP%20PRORAMI%201983/198604151%20ANAP%20PRORAMI%201983%20198604151.pdf)

¹⁵⁹<http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/eyayin/GAZETELER/WEB/KUTUPHANEDE%20BULUNAN%20DIJITAL%20KAYNAKLAR/KITAPLAR/SIYASI%20PARTI%20YAYINLARI/198604151%20ANAP%20PRORAMI%201983/198604151%20ANAP%20PRORAMI%201983%20198604151.pdf>

ve Adana'daki İncirlik Üssü'nü açması ile sınıra asker kaydırılması istekleri karşılırken; Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri'nin itirazları sonucunda bölgeye asker gönderilmemiştir. Savaşın ilerleyen dönemlerinde Birleşmiş Milletler kararı olan Irak'a yönelik uluslararası ambargo kararına da uymuş, Kerkük'ten Yumurtalık'a gelen boru hattını da kendi iradesiyle kapatmıştır. Yani Türkiye savaşa fiili olarak katılmasa da tarafını belli etmiştir.

Turgut Özal, 14 Nisan 1987'de Avrupa Birliği'ne yaptığı tam üyelik başvurusu ile Batı'yla olan ilişkileri bir adım daha ileri taşımaya arzu etmiştir. Avrupa Birliği içersinde yer almak Türkiye'yi daha demokratik ve çağdaş bir ülke olmaya zorlayacaktı. Aynı zamanda da Türkiye'ye büyük bir ekonomik pazar ve önemli bir stratejik ortak sunmuş olacaktı. Özal için ekonomik liberalizasyonun ve diğer reformların amacı, Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyeliğin şartlarını yerine getirmektir. Türkiye'nin Yunanistan ile olan ilişkilerinde dönüm noktası Turgut Özal'ın Andreas Papandreou ile birlikte başlattığı yakınlaşmadır. Avrupa Birliği'ne tam üyelik başvurusunun hemen ardından Ocak 1988'de Davos'ta gerçekleşen Dünya Ekonomik Forumu'nda bir araya gelen Özal ve Papandreou bu uzlaşma sürecini başlatmışlardır. Davos Süreci olarak adlandırılan bu süreçte güven ve güvenlik artırıcı önlemler, gerilim azaltma önlemleri ve iyi komşuluk muamelesini içeren bir protokol imzalanmıştır. Bu çabalar Kıbrıs sorunu ya da kıta sahanlığı sorununu çözemese de özellikle sivil toplum örgütlenmesi anlamında önemlidir.¹⁶⁰

Türkiye'nin yüzünün Batı'ya dönük olduğu kadar Doğu'ya da dönük olması gerektiğini savunan Özal, özellikle Orta Doğu ülkeleriyle ikili ilişkiler kurulmasını son derece önemsemiş ve bu bölgelerle kurulan iyi ilişkilerin Batı'yla bütünleşmede önemli bir araç olduğunu belirtmiştir. Batı dünyasıyla birlikte İslami sermayenin de Türkiye'de bulunmasının iyi olacağını söyleyerek, birçok Orta Doğu bankasının İstanbul'da şube açmasını teşvik etmiştir. Orta Doğu dışında

¹⁶⁰Maria Ikonomaki and Genco Orkun, *Greek-Turkish Rapprochement: the Role of Decision Makers*, (2000).

ayrıca Orta Asya Türk Devletleri ile işbirliği içinde bulunmuştur. Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon Ajansı (TİKA) gibi bugün yaklaşık 110 ülkede faaliyetlerine devam eden Türkçe konuşulan ülkelerle ekonomik, siyasal, sosyal ve kültürel kalkınmaya yardımcı bir kurum olarak 1992 yılında kurulmuştur.¹⁶¹ Orta Doğu ve Orta Asya ile birlikte Balkanlara da daha önce verilmeyen önemin verilmesi akıllara şimdilerde Dışişleri Bakanı Ahmet Davutoğlu ile anılan fakat aslında Turgut Özal ile birlikte 1990'larda görülen Yeni Osmanlılık tartışmalarını getirmiştir. Bu akım, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin dış politikasının Osmanlı mirasçısı devletlerde daha etkin rol oynamasını öngörür. Bu açılımlar Özal'ın çok yönlü politikaları çerçevesinde değerlendirilse de, Mesut Yılmaz'ın da Bosna Hersek'te yaşanan katliam karşısındaki kararlı tutumu ve gerekirse askeri yardım gönderilebileceği açıklaması göz önüne alındığında; Anavatan Partisi'nin genel anlamda muhafazakar liberal bir parti olması Yeni-Osmanlılık tartışmalarının sürmesine sebep olmuştur.

Dış politika alanında tüm bunlar yaşanırken, Turgut Özal iç politikayı da liberalleştirme yoluna girmiştir. Öncelikle eskiden beri süregelen 'kutsal devlet' anlayışını yıkmak istemiş, insanların devlet için değil, devletin insanlar için var olduğunu söylemiştir. Özal'ın devlet anlayışı ve bürokrasi hakkındaki düşünceleri şu şekilde belirtilmiştir:

Özal'ın bir diğer söylemi ise, sık sık seçilmişlerin, atanmışlara önceliğinden söz ederek, bunun yanında askeri bürokrasiyi de, sivil siyasetin denetiminin altında olması için girişimlerde bulunuyordu. Bununla birlikte, Özal'ın cumhurbaşkanlığı seçilmesi de, devletin seçkinlerden alınıp halk katına çekilmesini talep ve iddialarında daha mütevazı davranmasını sağlama yönünde bir girişim olarak görülebilir.¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ <http://www.tika.gov.tr/tika-hakkinda/1>

¹⁶² Mustafa Erdoğan, *Türk Politikasında Bir Reformist: Turgut Özal*, In İhsan Sezal (ed.), *Devlet ve Siyaset Adamı Turgut Özal*, (İstanbul: Çetin Ofset, 1996), 20-27.

Düşünce hürriyeti, din ve vicdan hürriyeti ve teşebbüs hürriyeti Özal'ın en çok önem verdiği hatta bir anlamda Özal'la bütünleşmiş olan üç özgürlük alanıdır. Her ne kadar demokrasinin gelişmesi ve insan haklarının korunması taraftarı olmuş olsa da, açıklanan raporlarda aksinin görüldüğü de olmuştur.¹⁶³ Din ve ibadet özgürlüğü konusunda da, Özal kendisini dindar Müslüman bir devlet adamı olarak tanımlamış ve en doğru olanın herkesin dinini ve ibadetini dilediğince yaşayabilmesi olduğunu söylemiştir.¹⁶⁴ Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası'nın şeriat veya komünist yönetimin kurulmasını engelleyen ve bu konuda ceza öngören 141. ve 142. maddelerini kaldırmış; devletin yalnızca şiddeti cezalandırabileceğini ve ne kadar karşı olunursa olunsun farklı düşüncelere müdahale edilemeyeceğinin altını çizmiştir.

Türkiye'nin dünyayla olan bütünleşmesinde iletişim araçları olmaksızın istenilen hedeflere ulaşılamayacağını düşünen Özal, ilk olarak telefon problemini çözmek istemiştir. Taha Akyol'un Milliyet'te yayımlanan yazısından bir bölüm konunun Özal için ne kadar önemli olduğunu gözler önüne sermektedir:

Yıl 1984; Türkiye'de telefon sahibi olmak büyük sorun; yıllarca sıra bekleniyor... Böyle bir ülkede ekonomi, ticaret, turizm, hele de dışa açılma başarılabilir mi? İktidara yeni gelmiş olan Başbakan Turgut Özal, ocak ayında, PTT Genel Müdürü Emin Başer'den bir yılda sorunu çözmesini istiyor.

- Telefon sorun olmaktan çıkacak, telefon hatlarında bilgisayar iletişimi sağlanacak!

Emin Başer, "Yapabiliriz, teknik kapasitemiz var" diyor.

- Şimdiye kadar niye yapmadınız? Başer üç engelin bulunduğunu anlatıyor: DPT'nin plan disiplini, Maliye'nin döviz ve kur talimatları, Ulaştırma Bakanlığı'nın yatırımlar konusundaki katı anlayışı...

¹⁶³ *Cumhuriyet*, 19 Şubat 1987, 25 Şubat 1989, 30 Temmuz 1989, and 23 Kasım 1989.

¹⁶⁴ M. Sait Yazıcıoğlu, "Özal'ın İslam Anlayışı ve Dini Özgürlükler", in *Kim Bu Özal?: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet* eds. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, (İstanbul: Boyut, 2001).

Özal derhal bu üç kurumun bakanlarını telefonla arıyor; PTT Genel Müdürü Başer'in istediği inisiyatifin verilmesini söylüyor ve Başer'e de diyor ki:
- Emin Bey, bir yılda bu hedeflere ulaşamazsan seni görevden alırım; bunu da bil!

Ve Türkiye bu şekilde bir yıl içinde iletişim devrimini başarıyor!
Bugün telefon, bilgi iletişim ağı, dış ticaret, turizm gibi alanlarda nereye geldiysek, bunun temelinde iletişim devrimi vardır.¹⁶⁵

Özal'ın cumhurbaşkanlığına adaylığı ve ardından 9 Kasım 1989'da göreve başlamasının ardından, 15 Haziran 1991'de yapılacak olan parti kongresine kadar ANAP'ın başına Yıldırım Akbulut genel başkan olarak seçildi. Kongrenin hemen ardından, Mesut Yılmaz Akbulut'u yenilgiye uğratarak 23 Haziran'da genel başkan ve başbakanlık görevine nail oldu. Faruk Bildirici'nin Mesut Yılmaz hakkında yazmış olduğu Hanedanın Son Prensi isimli kitabına göre; Mesut Yılmaz'ın genel başkanlığa seçilmesinde Semra Özal'ın büyük desteği olduğu çünkü Semra Hanım'ın parti içerisindeki muhafazakar kesimden çok fazla haz etmediği, onun yerine liberal görüşte ve görünüşte olan isimleri partinin başında görmek istediği biliniyordu. Bu yüzden de Turgut Özal'a genel başkanlık için; genç, eğitilmiş yabancı dil bilen ve çağdaş ve liberal bir görünüme sahip Mesut Yılmaz'ı öneriyordu. Turgut Özal her ne kadar Yılmaz'ı lider olmak için yeterince cesur olmadığı konusunda eleştirse de Mesut Yılmaz her şeye rağmen 1991'de altı aylığına, 1996'da üç buçuk aylığına ve 1997-1999 arasında bir buçuk yıllığına olmak üzere üç kez Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin başbakanı olmuştur.¹⁶⁶ Görevde bulunduğu yıllar boyunca Mesut Yılmaz'ın şanssız bir döneme denk geldiğini söylemek çok da yanlış olmaz. 1990'larda Türkiye'nin içine düştüğü politik istikrarsızlar ülkenin hem iç hem de dış politikada gerilemesine yol açmıştır. Yüksek öğrenimini de Almanya'da tamamlayan Yılmaz, yine de Avrupa Birliği'ne

¹⁶⁵ Taha Akyol, "Özal Devrimi", *Milliyet*, Nisan 18, 2004, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/-/taha-akyol/siyaset/yazardetay/18.04.2008/518314/default.htm>

¹⁶⁶ Faruk Bildirici, *Mesut Yılmaz ve ANAPlı Yıllar: Hanedanın Son Prensi*, (Ankara: Ümit, 2002).

üyeliğe yönelik çalışmalara hız kesmeden devam etmiştir. Türkiye'nin AB'ye tam üyeliğinin, Cumhuriyet tarihinin en önemli projesi olduğunu belirten Yılmaz AB'ye üye olunamaması durumunda, Türkiye'nin çağdaşlığı yakalama iddiasının büyük darbe alacağını da söylemiştir.¹⁶⁷

12 Aralık 1997'de gerçekleşen Avrupa Birliği Lüksemburg Zirvesi'nde Türkiye'nin aday ülkeler listesine alınmamasının ardından Mesut Yılmaz'ın toplantıları boykot etmesi ve birlikle olan ilişkileri askıya almasıyla Türkiye-AB ilişkileri tarihin en düşük seviyesine gerilemiştir.¹⁶⁸ Siyasal diyalogsuzluk politikası olarak da adlandırılan bu dönem, Lüksemburg Zirvesi öncesi Helmut Kohl ve diğer altı Hıristiyan Demokrat Parti liderlerinin Brüksel'de yaptıkları açıklamada Türkiye'nin Müslüman çoğunluklu bir ülke olduğu için Avrupa Birliği'ne alınmayacağı ibaresinden hareketle başlamıştır. Zirve sonucunda gerçekten de Türkiye'nin birliğe adaylığının kabul edilmemesi Mesut Yılmaz'ın Hitler'in ünlü "Lebensraum" politikasındaki yaşam alanı ifadesini kullanması ve Almanya Dışişleri Bakanı'nın da Yılmaz'a Amok Koşucusu benzetmesi yapması iki ülke arasındaki gerginliği tırmandırmıştır.¹⁶⁹ Yaklaşık iki yıl süren bu siyasal diyalogsuzluk, 1999 yılında Almanya'da Sosyal Demokrat Parti ve Yeşiller Partisi'nin birlikte iktidara gelmesinin ardından yumuşamış ve Helsinki Zirvesi ile son bulmuştur. 11-12 Aralık 1999'da gerçekleşen Helsinki Zirvesi'nde Türkiye'den istenen özellikle demokrasi ve insan hakları konularındaki reformlar koşuluyla adaylık statüsü kazanılmıştır. Türkiye'nin hem iç hem de dış politika gündemini meşgul eden olayların başında gelen Kürt sorunu, Avrupa Birliği'ne başvuru sürecinde de söz konusu olmuştur. Mesut Yılmaz'ın Aralık 1999'da Diyarbakır ziyaretinde yaptığı konuşmada "AB'nin yolu Diyarbakır'dan geçer." ifadesini

¹⁶⁷ *NTVMSNBC*, "Uluslararası standartlara uyulmalı", December 21.

¹⁶⁸ Luxembourg European Council, 12–13 December 1997, Presidency Conclusions, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/032a0008.htm

¹⁶⁹ *Hürriyet*, "Terbiyesiz Alman", Retrieved from <http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=-8993>

kullanarak durumun farkındalığına dikkat çekmiştir.¹⁷⁰ PKK'nın terörist eylemleri sonucu Türk otoritelerinin askeri müdahaleye mecbur kaldığı olaylarda terör örgütü üyesi olmayan sivil Kürt kökenli vatandaşların da zarar görmesi üzerine Türkiye, insan hakları ihlalleri konusunda Avrupa Birliği'nin reform isteklerinin odağında olmuştur. Avrupa Birliği konusundaki çabalar dışında, Diplomat Onur Öymen ve dönemin Dışişleri Bakanı İsmail Cem'in büyük katkılarıyla Yunanistan'la ilişkiler konusu Mesut Yılmaz önderliğinde yeniden gündeme gelmiştir. 1996'da gerçekleşen Kardak Krizi iki ülke arasındaki tansiyonun bir anda yükselmesine rağmen, bu kriz iki taraf için de fırsata dönüştürülmüş ve sivil diplomasinin değer kazanmasına sebep olmuştur. Nisan 1992'de başlayıp 14 Aralık 1995'e kadar süren Bosna Savaşı, büyük kayıpların yaşandığı son yüzyılın önemli olaylarından. Sırpların Bosnalı Müslümanlara karşı yaptığı Srebrenista Katliamı olarak da adlandırılan vahim olayın da patlak vermesiyle, Mesut Yılmaz uluslararası toplumun harekete geçmesi gerektiği ve olası bir örgütlenmede Türkiye'nin de asker yollayacağını ifade etmiştir. Nihayet Aralık 1995'te yapılan barışı koruma (peacekeeping) operasyonu ile savaş sona erdirilmiştir.¹⁷¹

Tezin ana araştırma sorusu olan Mesut Yılmaz'ın Turgut Özal'ın başlattığı reform sürecini devam ettirip ettiremediğinin yanıtını aramak adına, liderlik tipleri alanında uzman ve aynı zamanda Amerikan Başkanı Roosevelt'in yaşam öyküsünü yazan James Macgregor Burns'un oluşturduğu ve daha sonra akademisyen Bernard M. Bass tarafından geliştirilen liderlik sınıflandırmasından faydalanılabilir. Bu yüzden, Turgut Özal ve Mesut Yılmaz'ın devlet adamı kimlikleri karşılaştırılırken, dilimize etkileşimsel lider (transactional) ve dönüşümcü lider (transformational) olarak çevrilen bu liderlik sınıflandırmasına referans verilmektedir.¹⁷² Etkileşimsel liderlikte genel olarak işleri doğru bir şekilde yapma amacı vardır. Etkileşimsel lider

¹⁷⁰ Hikmet Özdemir, *Turgut Özal Biyografisi*, (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Press, 2014).

¹⁷¹ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/unmibh/>

¹⁷² Veysel Bozkurt, Geleceğin Toplumu, Dönüşümcü Liderlik ve Turgut Özal, in *Kim Bu Özal?: Siyaset, İktisat, Zihniyet* eds. İhsan Sezal and İhsan Dağı, (İstanbul: Boyut, 2001).

var olan düzeni olduğu gibi muhafaza edip daha iyiye götürme dürtüsüyle davranır. Risk almanın tercih edilmediği, hata yapmaktansa tedbirli davranmanın daha iyi olduğu görüşünün hakim olduğu bir düşünce yapısını içinde barındırır. Dönüşümcü lider ise; mevcut düzeni günün ihtiyaçlarına göre değiştirmeyi düşünür. İşleri doğru yapmak yerine doğru işleri yapmak düşüncesine sahiptir. Risk almaktan korkmadığı gibi krizleri fırsata çevirme düşüncesine sahiptir. Dönüşümcü lider çoğu zaman karizmatik liderlerdir, bu yüzden kitleleri peşinden kolayca sürükleyebilir. Bu liderlik sınıflandırmasında, Turgut Yılmaz dönüşümcü lider özelliğine sahipken Mesut Yılmaz için de etkileşimci lider demek de çok yanlış olmayacaktır. Türk siyasi tarihine dönüşümcü özellikleriyle damgasını vuran üç liderden biridir Turgut Özal. Prof. Dr. Gülistan Gürbey'in de altını çizdiği üzere, "Atatürk döneminde Türk ulus-devletinin kurulmasıyla ulus devlet fikri başarıyla gerçekleştirilmiştir; Adnan Menderes döneminde Türkiye İkinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra başarıyla Batı bloku sistemine bağlanmıştır. Özal döneminin en belirgin özelliği, Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş'tan küreselleşmeye geçiş sürecine uyum sağlamasıdır."¹⁷³ Mesut Yılmaz için ise ihtiyatlı ifadesini kullanmak yerinde olur. Kararlarını her zaman büyük bir dikkatle ve ihtiyatla alması ile ciddi duruş ve söylemleri onun en önemli siyasi özelliklerinin başında gelir.

Bu çalışmanın araştırma sorusu olan Mesut Yılmaz'ın Turgut Özal'ın başlattığı reform sürecini devam ettirip ettiremediği sorusuna cevap ararken yapılan analizler sonucunda, sözü geçen reform sürecinin Mesut Yılmaz döneminde Turgut Özal döneminde olduğu kadar aktif yaşanmadığı görülür. Mehmet Ali Birand'ın yapımcılığını üstlendiği televizyon programı 32. Gün'de Turgut Özal'ın da özellikle belirttiği gibi "Mesut Bey bir parça statükocu bir parti liderliğini tercih etti."¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Gülistan Gürbey, *Arızalı Demokrasilerde Dış Politika: 1983-1993 Özal Dönemi'nde Türkiye'de Toplumsal Talepler ve Karar Süreçleri*, (Ankara: ODTU, 2010), 15.

¹⁷⁴ Mehmet Ali Birand, Turgut Özal Röportajı, *32.Gün*, Kanal D, Mart 15, 1993.

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Demirdöven
Adı : Duygu
Bölümü : Uluslararası İlişkiler

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BETWEEN 1983 AND 1999: COMPARISON OF TURGUT ÖZAL AND MESUT YILMAZ IN THE PERIOD OF TRANSITION AND TRANSFORMATION OF TURKEY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: