DEMARCATING KILIS AS A BORDER TOWN: COMMUNITY, BELONGING AND SOCIAL MOBILITY AMONG SOCIO-ECONOMIC STRATA ON THE SYRIAN BORDER OF TURKEY

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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This study focuses on the impact of border on the cultural and economic landscape of Kilis, a town which has been identified as nowhere in Bilad al-Sham but as a border town after the establishment of Republic, inconspicuous for a long time, yet recently gained prominence with the eruption of Syrian crisis in 2011 as opposed to other Eastern and Southeastern border towns. The overriding question of the study concerns the ways in which the border influences the life prospects of dwellers. Through the lens of ethnographic research and oral history, it explores belonging and social mobility among various socio-economic strata within the context of transition from Ottoman rule to the Republican regime in order to reveal culturally informed strategies of border dwellers in coming to grips with new border contexts. It is suggested that the border perspective will move the social analysis beyond "methodological territorialism" that encapsulates it into the idea of nation-state as unit of analysis and provide a theoretical framework that

explores the social change at the intersection of local, national and transnational processes. From the vantage point of border, this study aims to highlight that the maneuvering capacities of dwellers in navigating territorial, cultural and economic boundaries nevertheless reproduce local power and inequality structures. It also demonstrates that social reproduction and social mobility strategies of families in Kilis are incorporated in broader cultural, social and economic transformation of Turkey long before globalization processes started to put limitations to the state sovereignty and territorial control.

Keywords: Social Mobility, Belonging, Border Sociology, Border Town, Kilis

ÖZ

KİLİS'İN SINIR KASABASINA DÖNÜŞMESİ: TÜRKİYE'NİN SURİYE SINIRINDA TOPLULUK, AİDİYET VE SOSYO-EKONOMİK TABAKALAR ARASINDA SOSYAL HAREKETLİLİK

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Bu çalışma Bilad-üş Şam'da bir kasabayken Cumhuriyet'in kurulmasıyla birlikte sınır yerleşimine dönüşen, uzun süre göz önünde olmayıp diğer Doğu ve Güneydoğu sınır yerleşimlerinden farklı olarak 2011'de Suriye krizinin patlak vermesiyle önem kazanan Kilis'te sınırın kültürel ve ekonomik etkilerine odaklanmıştır. Çalışmanın ağır basan sorusu sınırın kasaba sakinlerinin hayat beklentilerini nasıl etkilediğidir. Çalışma, etnografik araştırma ve sözlü tarih merceğinden bakarak, yeni sınır durumlarının üstesinden gelmede sınır sakinlerinin başvurduğu, kültürel ilişkilerin şekillendirdiği stratejileri ortaya çıkarmak için Osmanlı yönetiminden Cumhuriyet rejimine geçiş bağlamında sosyo-ekonomik katmanlarda aidiyet ve sosyal hareketliliği incelemektedir. Sınır perspektifi, toplumsal incelemeyi bir analiz birimi olarak ulus-devlete hapseden 'metodolojik teritoryalizm'den kurtararak toplumsal değişimi yerel, ulusal ve uluşaşırı

süreçlerin parçası olarak irdelemeyi mümkün kılan bir teorik çerçeve sunar. Çalışmada sınırın bakış açısından hareketle Kilis sakinlerin teritoryal, kültürel ve ekonomik sınırlar arasında manevra yapma kapasitesinin yerel iktidar ve eşitsizlik yapılarını yeniden ürettiğini açığa çıkarmayı amaçlanmıştır. Ayrıca Kilis'teki ailelerin sosyal yeniden üretim ve sosyal hareketlilik stratejilerinin küreselleşme süreçlerinin Türkiye'de devlet egemenliği ve teritoryal kontrolüne kısıtlamalar getirmesinden çok önce ülkenin kültürel, sosyal ve ekonomik dönüşümünün parçası olduğu gösterilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Hareketlilik, Aidiyet, Sınır Sosyolojisi, Sınır Kasabası, Kilis

To Nejat
(Paramaz Kızılbaş)
and all the beautiful people
who fought beyond borders
whose imagination knew no bounds

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their networks. Kırkayak collective in Gaziantep offered me the opportunity to take a breath when I was so engulfed by the challenges of my fieldwork as well as hearty and enjoyable conversations. They also motivated me for finishing the thesis with the promise of new social and research projects to be engaged collectively. I am thankful to all.

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INTRODUCTION

Borders demarcate nations. They produce belonging. Borders delimit our worlds and give meanings. They define our places in society, to where and whom we feel attached. But they also offer challenges. We push ourselves beyond our borders and seek to free ourselves from limitations, to change our lives in a better direction or at least manage a life that we think is worth living. This study aims to highlight the place of borders in our lives, by pointing to an actual border setting at the southeastern margins of Turkey. In this study, I present the story of the transformation of Ottoman Kilis into a border town, as told from the perspective of its dwellers. Drawing on historical and anthropological approaches, I explore the processes and dynamics that transformed the place into a border town and underline its historicity.

This study focuses on the impact of border on the cultural and economic landscape of Kilis, a town which has been identified as nowhere in Bilad al-Sham,[1] but as a border town after the establishment of Republic, inconspicuous for a long time, yet recently gained prominence with the eruption of Syrian crisis in 2011 as opposed to other Eastern and Southeastern border towns. The overriding question of the study concerns the ways in which the border influences the life prospects of town dwellers. Border affects socio-economic strata by introducing new territorial, cultural and economic barriers that they have to accommodate. The first set of questions concerns the ways in which the border shapes the living of socio-economic strata by severing and shifting their cross-border ties. In what ways the border-induced changes such as loss of land properties, shifting routes of trade and status of goods crossing the border, binational relations of kinship affect families at the border? How these changes alter the class and status relationships among the strata themselves?

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[1] Bilad al-Sham historically refers to the geographical region which is also known as the Levant or Greater Syria.

Yet, this study is structured around an overriding question that allows room for the structure (border) and agency (dwellers) dialectics. The impact of the border on dwellers from various strata is not only constraining, but it is also enabling them. This study adopts a framework that inquires the impact of border on dwellers as well as dwellers' capacity to manipulate and circumvent it, providing room for portraying them beyond as being mere victims of state policies. It argues that dwellers can utilize the border as an economic resource, by seeking shelter across and evading legal liabilities to the state and its territorial control. Thus, the main objective of the thesis is to recognize and make visible the struggles and adaptations of dwellers to the border.

While border introduces new distinctions, it also offers new opportunities of encounter and contact across the border. Therefore I argue that the second set of questions that should be asked must highlight the ways in which socio-economic strata adjust to the border by developing new networks and connections. What sorts of mechanisms and linkages they develop to rely on? How do they manipulate and circumvent the territorial as well as cultural and economic barriers? In what ways these shifts in the cross-border ties contribute to the social stratification structure?

A town is not just designated a border town by being adjacent to the border but as it is argued by Buursink, "it also came into existence because of the border" (Buursink 2001: 7-8). The processes and dynamics at the border regulates the border-crossing of people, animals and goods in ways to enable their movement or halt it and thus, produces different mobilities and enclosures for socio-economic strata, which they have to accommodate in various ways. I assume that mobility/enclosure at the border inflict its dwellers with values, practices and relationships that are not found in anywhere else in the nation-state and create "the border experience" (Martinez, 1994) that is often marginalized by social analyses.

Through the lens of ethnographic research and oral history, I explore belonging and social mobility among various socio-economic strata within the context of transition from Ottoman rule to the Republican regime because it will help me to reveal the impact of border on the cultural and economic landscape of Kilis. The aim of the study is to account the social change with the shift of Kilis, an Ottoman inland frontier and a resettlement area for Arabic, as well as Kurdish and Turcoman tribes accused by the Ottoman central power

of "political banditry" (Soyudoğan, 2005) into a modern nation-state border. For substantiating my research question, I introduce a theoretical framework that explores the social change in a border town at the intersection of local, national and transnational processes. I suggest that the border perspective will move the analysis beyond "methodological territorialism" (Schendel, 2005b) that encapsulates the social analysis into the idea of nation-state as unit of analysis. From the vantage point of border, I will demonstrate that social reproduction and social mobility strategies of families in Kilis are incorporated in broader cultural, social and economic transformation of Turkey long before globalization started to put limitations to the state sovereignty and territorial control.

Research problem

Kilis border town, a small province in southeastern Turkey has become known lately worldwide due to the extensive news coverage of the Syrian conflict by the world media. Located at the Turkish-Syrian border and presently contiguous to a territory of war and mass demolition, the name of this border town, as well as other towns on the border, probably circulates among the UN staff, international NGO employees, government officials and state bureaucrats. When a flow of migrants along Turkish border started, the prefabricate camp in Kilis located at the zero point on the border is turned into a showcase for the Turkish government in order to present the world that it does whatever it can to take care of the human crisis and to accommodate its guests.[2] The names who paid a visit to Kilis camp for Syrian migrants in 2012 include UN special envoy for Syria and former UN general secretary Kofi Annan, UN goodwill ambassador Angelina Jolie and the then prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The visit of Erdoğan seemed to target the attention of world politicians concerned with the plight of Syria as he gave a speech to the migrants, heralding them their victory against the Assad regime in Syria and warning Bashar al-Assad.

In contrast to the global attention transforming Kilis into a hub of movement, the incoming of outnumbering Syrian migrants simply accentuates for the town dwellers their sense of

[2] The governmental policy foresees a special regulation registering the Syrian migrants as temporary guests, since Turkey does not accept refugee from the Eastern countries but only allows the asylum-seekers to stay in satellite cities.

containment at the border. A local man picturesquely explains it to me by imagining the town as a place squeezed by two pales at the opposite corners of the town's administrative boundaries with its adjacent city Gaziantep in the north-northwest. He refers to two villages, both named Kazıklı, meaning literally "with pales" in order to portray the town as a territory nipped from its two corners as if impaled and made into a confined place because once you enter the town's boundaries, you have nowhere to go because of the enclosing border with Syria. He says: "we are squeezed between two Kazıklıs".

The increase of "global flows" shapes every corner of the world but in different ways. Globalization creates new spatial inequalities that highlights class disparities beneath them despite its promise towards a borderless world. Although the world is shrinking through a web of communications and exchanges, and geographical movements across the globe seem to defeat the territorial borders of nation-states, there are a great number of people with feelings of confinement and immobility at border geographies in an increasingly globalizing world. Border scholars Hillary Cunningham and Josiah Heyman suggest that the theme of mobility is intrinsic to the questions of power, justice and inequality (Cunningham & Heyman, 2004: 294). For them, mobility, as well as enclosure are "vital to the exploring relationships of differentiation across space" (Cunningham & Heyman, 2004: 295). I believe that these points are illustrated in the above-mentioned feeling of being squeezed, expressed by the local man in Kilis.

I have carried out a field research in Kilis town between January 2011 and June 2012. The Syrian uprising that broke out in March 2011, three months after I started my field research had been a challenge for me that made me think more about the sense of containment prevalent among Kilis dwellers. The dwellers depicted the town as devoid of industrial investment and vibrant cultural life, especially after the urban elites had deserted. The border is portrayed as a physical hindrance, an obstacle to the industrial development of the town because, without infrastructure and good highway connections to its surrounding ports and business clusters, it lacks the viable conditions for attracting investment. Kilis was for the dwellers a socio-economic and a cultural margin. Culturally, town dwellers have as much attachment across the border as they have with their co-nationals. Economically, cross-border trade can be a viable option for livelihood and a better life and yet it puts them into jeopardy of criminalization.

As the Syrian opposition grew larger in their struggle to depose of the Assad regime, I bewilderedly kept a close watch on the reactions of local residents. While the national media coverage highlighted the armed conflict and civilian deaths, the dwellers of Kilis continued to argue that these news included exaggeration and there were no such grave conflicts. Eventually, the arguments get varied in that the protests went beyond purpose and the son Assad was actually a good leader, that imperialist forces wanted to create trouble in order to realize their Great Middle East Plan and that Turkey is being trapped by these forces. The prime minister's statement that the Syrian unrest was their internal affairs aggravated local fears that the government's attitude would hinder the cross-border trade, which was the source of livelihood for a significant part of dwellers. Hence, the incoming of Syrian migrants as well as solidarity actions by local and international NGOs with Syrian opposition in Kilis was met with the resistance of the town community.

Soon after I finished my field study and left the town, the Turkish government closed its border with Syria for security reasons and banned the exit of Turkish citizens. In the Kilis case, it is possible to observe that the globalization framework created new conflicts and spatial arrangements that the town dwellers now have to accommodate to. Thus, the emphasis on the global flows and border crossings highlighting mobility may overshadow how these movements enclose spaces of exchange and livelihoods and produce immobility for certain groups.

Not only trade relations, but also other sorts of cross-border exchanges, relations of trust, straddling forms of living such as cross-border labouring or land tenure, kinship, familial alliance and ethnic affinity historically characterized the Kilis border. Transborder movement was part of everyday life, making the dwellers differ from a broader population that is not located adjacent to an interstate border. Then why the town dwellers are engulfed in a strong sense of containment? Though paradoxical it may seem, the border experiences of dwellers cannot be understood without superimposing their sense of containment with the porosity of the Kilis border. This is a question worth to think about, indicating how volatile and vulnerable life at the border could be.

Historical and ethnographic context

Kilis is today a border town with a population of about 130.000 located on the Turkish-

Syrian border and hosts ethnically Turcoman, Arab and Kurdish groups with kinship bonds extending to the Syrian side. In the Ottoman Empire, Kilis was an inland frontier for these nomadic tribes, sedentarized by the central authority since the late seventeenth century (Kasaba, 2004). Kilis region also marked the beginning of the Arab provinces of Ottoman Empire, as distinguished from the Anatolian lands. While the Turkish-Syrian border was delineated between Turkey and France with the Ankara Agreement of 1921, it has been disputable for the Turkish side since the beginning. According to Güçlü, the political boundaries of Syria did not exist prior to the Sykes-Picot agreement, known as a secret alliance between Britain and France in 1916 to define their spheres of influence (Güçlü, 2006: 641). But the boundary line nearly corresponded to the assumed linguistic and national boundary of the Turkish area, though it was far northern at its initial demarcation.

When the deputy Ali Cenani from Ayıntap (Gaziantep) made his speech in 1922 on the disputed borderline, he addressed the squeezing of Kilis town by the demarcation of the border. "The line passing just by five kilometer south of Kilis town has rendered that country almost paralyzed", he said.[3] The border demarcated in 1921 had torn apart the former Ottoman land from the emerging Republic of Turkey and abandoned north Syria, as well as some of the Kilis agrarian fields to the French Mandate. The provisional delineation of the border was substituted in the meantime by a frontier better suited to the needs of the Turkish side and special regulation of border crossing allowed large landowners to have access to their propriety at the Syrian side. The final delimitation of the border could only be completed with the restoration of Antioch to Turkey in 1939. Big landowning families could continue to claim proprietorship over their lands left at the Syrian side and harvest their crop until their lands was confiscated by the Syrian Baath Party rising in power in 1954 within the context of agrarian reform.

However, the Turkish-Syrian border remains highly contentious in terms of international politics. Regarding the border dispute, the issue was never resolved in the nationalist imagination of linguistic unity because of the significant Turcoman population left in North Syria, particularly in Aleppo and its vicinity. However, the Cold War policies of 1950s

[3] Minutes of Closed Session of TGNA, Volume 3, Legislative Year III, 15.6.1922, p. 425.

Source: http://www.houshamadyan.org/en/mapottomanempire/vilayetaleppo.html

Map 1. Kilis district (*kaza*) annexed to the province (*vilayet*) of Aleppo at the beginning of the 20th century Ottoman Empire.

embraced the border and reinforced it with the wiring and mining of the whole boundary line except Samandağ of Antakya. The rise of Baath Party in Syria as it won a significant number of parliamentary seats accelerated the political tension between the countries. The background to the tension was US-led Cold War against the Soviet Union and the American quest to build a transnational security organization in the Middle East against Soviet impact (Baş, 2012). The international relationship between Turkey and Syria was caught in crisis in 1957 and Turkey dispatched troops to its border. Nevertheless, both Turkey and Syria realized that they would not be able to win without allies in a potential close combat and the political tension is loosened.

It is not possible to access the documentation about the mining of the border during 1956-1959. The Turkish government declared that mining of the border was intended to stop smuggling, citing a high-profile incident when smugglers shot two customs agent dead (Köknar, 2004). Nevertheless, the smuggling alone does not explain why the mine laying continued for three years, especially taking into account that illegal trade has actually increased in volume and value after the mining of the border. Moreover, more mines are laid again after the 1980 coup (Özgen, 2010). The mine laying is responsible for many deaths and maiming at the Kilis border.

The Kurdish question and water dispute are two other major issues of political tension. The water dispute goes back to the 1970s as Turkey started the construction of water dams within the context of the Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP) (Olson, 1997). After Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Marxist-Leninist insurgency, PKK found shelter in Syria in the late 1970s, the two issues were played by the countries as trump cards to each other. Yet, Turkey's concern with securing its border against the 'dangerous population' actually dates back to the 1920s and 1930s, and archival sources show that Turkey is quite disturbed with the settlement of deported Armenians, insurgent Kurdish as well as Assyrian and Yazidi emigrants along the Syrian border with Turkey (Altuğ & White, 2009). The Kurdish question between Turkey and Syria found a resolution with the signing of the Adana agreement in 1998 and led Syria to deport the Kurdish leader.[4] But the emergence of the

[4] For instance, Aras and Polat believe that the shift of internal politics towards democratization on the Kurdish issue rather than military solution contributed to the regional peace (Aras&Polat, 2008).

Kurdish movement in Syria and recent declaration of autonomous zones by the Democratic Union Party (PYD) seem to resurrect Turkey's security concerns at its border.

In the light of this brief historical overview, I suggest that international relationships and state politics make the Turkish-Syrian border highly unsettled. I do not only refer to the impact of international politics, but also to the spillovers of internal politics of the states respectively on these borderlands. Despite the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) efforts to mend the fences with Syria until an uprising broke out there, the relationships between Turkey and Syria have been characterized by boundary disputes, political tensions and alienation, as well as political negotiations, cooperation seeking and diplomatic bonds. As part of the Middle Eastern geography, the Turkish border with Syria is characterized by authentic multiculturalism (Doğruel, 2013), ethnic hostility and religious sectarianism created by nation-state context (Altuğ, 2002), political geographies of ethnic and political divisions (Tuncer-Gürkaş, 2014) and a cosmopolitanism based on multiple and controversial ways of remembering and forgetting the Armenian genocide of 1915 (Biner, 2010).

Hence, the case of Kilis affirms the argument that the border is not a homogeneous unit and there can be many borderlands along a geopolitical frontier with particular and distinct border cultures (Donnan&Wilson, 1999). This borderland is distinguished from other places along the Turkish-Syrian border as a strong case of assimilation and stability in terms of the ethnic and political conflicts surrounding it. These features of the Kilis borderland make the struggles and adaptations of local inhabitants to sustain their cross-border ties in the Middle Eastern political geography even more significant.

Ethnographic setting

Local discourses and narratives in Kilis town draws on a historical ethno-symbolism (Canefe, 2002) that utilizes myths of origins and ancestry of Turkish people and memories of a distinct Muslim Anatolian society. Local historical accounts emphasize the Turkification and conversion to Islam in the region.[5] These accounts also underline the

[5] For instance, according to Ekrem, a local historian, the Turkification of Kilis region was due to a Karahanlı prince as he defeated the Byzantine dominion and the settlement of his retinue Turcoman tribes, while the conversion of the locals to Islam happened under the Ottoman rule

history of Islam as an integral part of the local culture and urban identity with references to the burial ground of the companions of the prophet Muhammed as the town hosts several graveyards of Muhammed disciples dead in the first Islamist conquests in the region. These accounts point to the suppression and assimilation of ethnic and religious identities to the national unification and erasure from the popular imagination of the cultural and historical legacy leftover from the Christian communities.

The Armenians of Kilis were deported following the 1915 Deportation Law and the Jewish community had completely left by the late 1960s, possibly following the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1967. The "1915 events" are taboo-like secrecy in Kilis and the former Armenian population is generally referred within the context of French occupation as the forced migrants came back to the town to reclaim their homes. The former Jewish community is much more vividly remembered as they used to live in the town as long as the old generation could witness but these memories are often accompanied with the anecdotes of conversion of Jewish community members to Islam.

The religious assimilation is also apparent in the cultural domination of Sunnite Islam, alienating the Alawite identity. The assimilation of Alawite Turcomans in the Kilis region has its historical roots in their settlement in the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. İlbeyli Turcomans of Kilis are among the tribes converted to Sunnite Islam with strong tribal bonds and identification due to their relatively recent settlement (Aydın, 2012: 11). Turcoman villages are located eastwards, where Kilis lowlands are converging with the Turcoman-dominated plain of Gaziantep, though these lowlands are studded with Kurdish and Arab population as well.

The local discourses and narratives on ethnic and religious assimilation are frequently employed by the local notables as well as politicians to address the nationalistic sentiments and mobilize the votes of constituency. As it is stated, the field research and the interviews I have conducted for one and a half year contextualized with the Syrian uprising which broke out in March 2011.

There are few other events that functioned as political landmarks for the field research. I

after the conquest of these lands with the Mercidabık War in 1516. But, Aydın (2011) argues that the Turcoman tribal identity was originally quite dissimilar than the modern Turkish ethnicity.

can enumerate the general elections of June 2011 and the Uludere massacre taken place at the very last days of 2011.[6] The campaign speech given by the then prime Minister Erdoğan in Kilis during the electoral campaign addressed the local identity of the town as homeland to the religious martyrs of Islamist war and indicated these religious figures as guiding the 'national cause' of AKP.[7] Nevertheless, the ethnographic material collected during the electoral campaign and about the repercussions of the Uludere massacre in local discourses uncovered latent tensions between the Turkish and Kurdish communities and its superimposition on the older tensions between the rural and urban or the peasants and landowning notables.

Theoretical Premises of Research

Border studies constitute a theoretical background to this study. However, as Paassi (2011) argues, this scholarly literature is not yet an integrated field of study. As the researchers of border, we cannot refer to a 'border theory' as much groundedly as we may speak of the state theory or theory of social classes. Border studies has been revived as an interdisciplinary realm of investigation under the impact of globalization, but mainly adopted anthropological approaches prioritizing conceptual boundaries rather than territorial borders or even embracing a theoretical framework that puts the territorial borders out of sight. Moreover, as studies on border are proliferating, the understanding of borders are perpetually changing and diverging depending on the research problems addressed and eventually become part of theorization. But research on border is still empirically compartmentalized, largely deprived of historical and comparative studies.

Thus, the theoretical premises of this research stem from a conceptual framework, which combines the arguments produced from within border studies, oral history and social stratification theories in order to bridge the theoretical gaps that border studies alone cannot

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6 In Uludere, 34 border villagers, mostly children, returning from Iraqi borderlands with their load of smuggled gasoline were killed in an air bombing by Turkish military at the end of December 2011. Allegations suggested that a massacre took place as the smuggling was well known by the military patrols at the border and the strike was purposeful.

7 "Başbakan Erdoğan Kilis'te konuştu", *Sabah*, 8.5.2011; available at http://www.sabah.com.tr/Gundem/2011/05/08/basbakan-erdogan-kiliste-konusuyor?paging=1 downloaded on 19.8.2011.

yet cover. The anthropological approaches to border fall short of providing tools for analyzing power and inequality structure inherited from the Ottoman social order in transition to the Republican regime, as well as its transformation with the demarcation of border. Hence, oral history and sociology of social stratification are methodological imperatives of this study as they substantiate historical analysis with the concept of socio-economic mobility among strata.

Borders and boundaries

I use the term "border" in order to refer to the territorial and, in the case of Kilis, political boundary. Political border drawn between two nation-states is necessarily territorial and cartographic, i.e. delineated on a map. As opposed to the term "frontier", border encloses neighborhood, communities and nations and turns them into territorially bounded units. As Strassoldo argues, frontiers are "areas of growth into "virgin" territories" (Strassoldo, 1980: 50). Famously known by Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis, the term of frontier is used to denote the territorial expansions of civilizations and empires (Baud&Schendel, 1997). In other words, frontier does not signify limit or barrier, but openness, expansiveness and dynamism.

However, opposition between two terms, border and frontier, does not mean that the border is uncontested, unchanging and impenetrable. Border studies demonstrate that nation-states sustain their strategy of territorializing state power, albeit by re-scaling their territorial sovereignty on sub-national and supra-national levels (Schendel, 2005b). Hence, borders are continually changing as well. So, border does not necessarily refer to nation-state boundary and depending on territorial politics of nation-states, newly demarcated borders may not be shown on a cartographic map of political geography, as, for instance, in the case of the borders of European Economic Area. In other words, we may speak of political and economic, as well as cultural and legal borders.

To distinguish between nation-state border and economic as well as cultural border, I prefer to denote the latter as boundary. As Migdal suggests, the term "boundary" is more than a line bisecting a geographical space. Boundaries "signify the point at which something becomes something else, at which the way things are done changes, at which "we" end and "they" begin" (Migdal, 2004: 5). Borders are constantly changing because they are

constellation of territorial, cultural, economic and legal boundaries. The demarcation of border is a process of bordering, a process through which "the categories of difference or separation are created" (Newman, 2006: 148). But, although cultural, political and economic boundaries are associated with territorial borders, they are not necessarily juxtaposed, which explains the perpetual change, the constant redrawing of border. Bordering processes condition the penetrability or impenetrability of territorial boundaries and leave room for interaction, contacts, and face-to-face relationships. New networks emerge around borders, while the old ones tend to dissolve. Hence, I define border as space of encounter as well as separation.

Social mobility

I draw on oral history approach in order to underline my methodological premises related to social mobility. Border historians turn to oral history in order to "reconstruct the historical self-images and perceptions of social groups in the borderland and the impact of these on people's political, economic, and cultural behavior" (Baud & Schendel, 1997: 242). In this study, I adopt oral history as a theoretical perspective to inform social stratification analyses with particular emphasis on social mobility, which is brilliantly illustrated by the works of Bertaux and Thompson (1997). The social mobility can be defined as the movement up and down the stratification (Kerbo, 2006).

The overly changing nature of borders and border policies differentially allowing and hindering the border-crossings generate a context of unequal power relations in which the social hierarchies of class, status and prestige fluctuate. Arbitrary border policies allocate unequal risks to various strata but they normalize them as consequences of living at the border (Cunningham & Heyman, 2004: 294). Therefore, this study adopts an analysis of social stratification structure with the aim of determining the parameters of social mobility rather than describing the class positions and identities. Oral history approach to social mobility helps to unravel family histories, which are "such extraordinarily rich sources of hard information directly relating to the construction of social trajectories [of social mobility]" (Bertaux, 1989: 85). According to Bertaux, the key concept to the analysis of social mobility is *transmission*.

Oral history approach relies on case histories of families in order to trace the social status

as construed as a property of family groups, which is transmitted among generations (Bertaux & Bertaux-Wiame, 1997). Rather than individuals, parent-offspring relationships are inquired. Bertaux and Thompson (1997) define social mobility in terms of regular patterns such as intergenerational occupational transmission, role of marriage, access to education and housing as cultural capital. While these patterns constitute the vertical mobility paths of families by transmitting their economic and cultural capital to their offspring, I also add the conversion of capital held in one form to another as an aspect of horizontal mobility.

Conversion of one type of capital into another, Bourdieu argues, occurs only if the latter is "more profitable or more legitimate in the current state of instruments of reproduction" (Bourdieu, 1998: 277). For Bourdieu, there are four types of capital, including economic, cultural, social and symbolic. But he considers the economic and cultural capital possessed by individuals as the most important. Bourdieu emphasizes that cultural capital is heritable and critical to the reproduction of social standing among individuals. This type of mobility, usually neglected by other models of social mobility can also shed light on various conflicts between various groups among social strata (Weininger, 2005).

Social stratification

As I argued, this study espouses the anthropological approaches on border in order to explore the relationship between space, culture and power in Kilis town. But such an exploration should be framed within the context of local power and inequality structures that are latent in that particular geography. Although the cartographic mapping make the territorial boundaries appear as crossing deserted plateaus and mountains, wide and barren fields without human trace, borders are not demarcated on blank space. The demarcation of border intervenes in the social stratification structure at a geographic location and alter forms of identification and belonging. The anthropological approaches and tools address these questions within the framework of transnationalism, problematizing the firm place of nation-states in social theory. Unless one does not want to fall into anachronism, a historical study of border regions needs to work on the concepts and ideas brought by novel anthropological approaches in the light of 'conventional' questions of state, social classes and inequality. This does not mean that there are no overlaps, common themes and debates.

But I assume that anthropological approaches on border should be combined with a conceptual framework drawn from the sociology of social stratification.

Social stratification refers to a hierarchy and inequality of ranking among social groups in the society. It incorporates institutional processes that creates these hierarchies and inequalities as well as mobility mechanisms that shift them. Classification among social groups can be done according to a set of categories: namely, the degree of inequality, rigidity of the stratification system, ascriptive traits and degree of status crystallization (Grusky, 1994). A Marxian tradition, informed by the theories of Marx as well as Weber, has long produced numerous work to bring the class and status groups within a single analytical framework. Bourdieu's reproduction theory (1984) has made a great leap forward to straddle the division between class and status, by incorporating the notion of distinction and taste and defines classes on the basis of their internalized dispositions -or tastes- rather than objective conditions of existence. While this study adopts Bourdieu's approach to social mobility in terms of reproduction and conversion, it nevertheless embraces the concept of 'strata' as a key concept of analysis in order to address the unresolved division between class and status groupings.

The study on the demarcation of Kilis border town a theoretical backdrop informed by the Ottoman social stratification system as it lies at the roots of class structure of modern Turkey. The Ottoman historiography conceptualizes the Ottoman social stratification as Asiatic, with peculiar ascription and achievement criteria than those existing in Western Europe. This trend treats the Asiatism as an intermediate formation in the transition of advanced agrarian society (Grusky, 1994: 9). For example, Şerif Mardin (1967) is a proponent of this approach, tracing the origins of contemporary class structure in Turkey back to the Ottoman social order. Mardin conceptualizes the Ottoman social order in a dichotomy of the ruling class and the ruled class, the latter mainly being the peasantry. According to him, the most important shift in the Ottoman stratification structure had been the Land Code of 1858 allowing private proprietorship of the state lands. The private proprietorship of land had led to the emergence of a new class of landowners as ruling class in the provincial Ottoman. An important aspect of Ottoman social stratification was its rigid nature as expressed by the ruling class' concern for “everyone keeping his proper place” (Mardin, 1967: 129).

Mardin argues that the nascent Turkish regime has largely preserved the Ottoman social stratification structure split by a historical dichotomy between the ruling and the ruled, as well as intra-group conflict among the ruling elite. The provincial rulers in the Ottoman Empire are regarded by the Ottoman historiography as "notables" playing role as intermediaries between central authority and the local population (e.g., Hourani, 1968). For these scholars, the feudal relationships, such as large landholding, which are inherited by the Republican State complicates the analysis of social stratification structure in terms of capitalist classes.

A second trend in Ottoman historiography explores the unfolding of Ottoman history on the basis of the mode incorporation of Ottoman Empire into the capitalist world economy (Keyder, 1991; Masters, 2010). These studies, in turn, aim to define social classes in terms of production relationships and ownership of the means of production. The tension between the two trends resides in the definition of social stratification structure in the Ottoman order. Khoury tries to bridge the two trends by discussing the definition of local notables as a class with respect to property or its relationship to the means of production as well as to the social position of its constituents (Khoury, 1990: 219).

Yet, Khoury discusses the notables as a class per se, but “class in formation” by emphasizing the significance of the social standing together with the ownership of the means of production and the patronage relationships which put to their disposal a wider range of benefits and services than the landownership would. He accepts that holding the offices at provincial bureaucracy was far more decisive for the notables in consolidating their class position, acquiring the private property on a large scale and attracting their clientele. Şerif Mardin distinguishes between stratum and class, by defining the class based exclusively on economic criteria (1967: 112). For example, he designates the class consciousness as the stratum consciousness based exclusively on economic criteria, while the stratum involves broader interests and ideology. Mardin adopts the five categories of status awareness, stratum awareness, stratum affiliation, stratum consciousness and stratum action in order to analyze the subjective aspects of social stratification.

Limited studies focus on the cultural and gender aspects of local notables in Turkey. For instance, Karadağ studies the social reproduction strategies of local notables in Gaziantep

by incorporating Bourdieu's analyses of taste and social distinction. Her work is inspirational in bringing the interrelations of class and status in a framework that allows us to see how an economically privileged group develops a distinctive style of life and veils its economic domination by its social capital. She also uses the notions of distinctive lifestyle and taste to detail how the old notables distinguish themselves from the new wealth. Her study provides room for analyzing the reciprocal relationships and gift economy between the notables and sharecropping peasants and in what ways these relationships thwart the upward mobility of new wealth in a hierarchy of prestige until the introduction of market economy breaks the 'traditional' barriers.

In the light of this brief overview, this study underlines the role of local notables, the status of peasantry, and shifting relationships on land tenure as well as patronage in the transition to the republican regime. My analysis pays particular attention to trace the shift of 'traditional' relationships based on reciprocity and kinship to scrutinize the ways in which these relationships continue to be effective, informing new power and inequality structures in market economy.

Presentation of the study

I will elaborate further on the theoretical background of the above-mentioned conceptual sources in Chapter I in order to explore the ways in which socio-economic strata in Kilis manipulate and circumvent territorial, cultural and economic boundaries. In this chapter, I will provide a critical review of scholarly literature problematizing the gap between 'traditional' and new border studies, the latter emerged within the context of globalization and drawing on anthropological approaches that conceptualize the borders as loci of practices that may reveal the workings of power relations as well as their subversion. By putting forth first the valuable contribution of Raimondo Strassoldo, (1977, 1982) a leading border sociologist, I argue that he has actually anticipated some of the criticisms launched by contemporary border scholars to traditional border studies and advocating for a research agenda beyond methodological territorialism and problematizing the center-periphery model in sociological canon.

Then I give an account of seemingly divergent anthropological trends on border studies: first, the conception of borders as liminal spaces and second, the conception of borders as

state margins. I evaluate these trends on the basis of their strength and weaknesses in order to propose a historical-sociological approach to border research. Lastly, I review the Turkish literature on border in order to highlight main themes and questions. I suggest that limited research on Turkish borders accentuates mostly the transnationalism context by drawing on anthropological approaches to the questions of citizenship and inclusion/exclusion, although this study area is a promising one with the emergence of recent contributions informed by historical and sociological, as well as anthropological perspectives.

Chapter II will introduce a discussion by showing how the setbacks, opportunities and dilemma that I came across in the field shaped my research question as well as strategy. My discussion will indicate that the border context impelled me to rely on ethnographic research and oral history as the method of study as well as embrace a reflexive anthropology establishing an intimate rapport with the town dwellers to proceed with the research. I will explain that the initial interviews and encounters serendipitously change the research question, by leading me to explore the ways in which border shift the meanings of illegality, wealth and work as well as shape cultural and legal belongings. I will emphasize how cultural conservatism and secrecy that dominated the field made the 'entry to the field' more difficult, resulting in a self-reflexive attitude that shed light not only on the ways in which I established contact with the town dwellers, but also on the border experiences of dwellers while trying to accommodate territorial, cultural, legal boundaries. Lastly, I will address the ethical issues that stem from establishing an intimate relation with dwellers and by pointing to the ways that these relationship might enlarge, as well as restrict my research scope.

The objective of the last three chapters is to present the empirical analysis of belonging and social mobility among three strata, each being devoted a separate chapter. In Chapter III, it will be argued that subjective perceptions and evaluations of traditional notables about the shift in their status as old wealth culminate in their experience of falling from grace since the 1960s. I will first provide a background in order to clarify the definition of local notables by providing a theoretical discussion about notables and inner distinctions between traditional landed and trade notables. Then, I will explore in which ways traditional landed notables acted upon their vested interests in land and highlight their

political and economic repercussions, leading to their stigmatization as traitors during the Independence War against the French occupation and to their sense of decline when their landed estates at the Syrian side were confiscated by the rising Baathist regime.

By carrying out a discussion about whether the local notables could be considered as early capitalists, I will indicate that these families could benefit from new opportunities in the circulation of goods and gold as the border transit regime allowed them to access their landed estates and the trade markets in northern Syria and yield an economic accumulation. Thus, I will show that local notables had to embrace illegal means of economic accumulation and accept what was once disgraceful for them in order to reproduce their social standing, while this process irrevocably undermined the social capital that traditional landed notables relied on to distinguish themselves from trade notables, the latter being more adept in seizing new opportunities of illegal trade. Finally, I will give a short account of the ways in which their sense of falling from grace culminates in a nostalgic attachment to a home place, which is imagined as part of the city of Aleppo. This chapter will conclude that local notables, constituting the old wealth of the town and in comparison to the new wealth, were not criminalized as lawbreakers due to the domination of traditional agrarian production based on large landholding and paternal relations of patronage until the 1960s.

Chapter IV will focus on the growth of shadow economy along Kilis border and explore the social and economic conditions of the rise of new wealth since the 1960s. Introducing first the story of a former smuggler who turned into a philanthropic businessman, I will develop my discussion by drawing on a theoretical framework on transnational shadow economy and show from the vantage point of businessman's story that illegal trade enabled socio-economic mobility and partly replaced the economic redistribution mechanisms of the state by providing a regular salary in a border town lacking employment opportunities.

I will detail how town dwellers took benefit of the protective measures during the import-substituting industrialization period of 1960-1980 by reckoning rents to the illegal entry of consumer goods as well as gold and foreign currency. I will support these points by focusing this time on the story of an extended middle-class family influential in local politics, which grew rich from poor rural background to own a transport company and other enterprises. From the vantage point of family story, I will show that the illegal trade

of gold as well as consumer goods promoted upward mobility by undermining structural constrains of social stratification and shifted social and urban landscape of the town by embedding local economy into national and transnational shadow networks. Lastly, I will dwell upon the ways in which transnational shadow economy shifted community norms and values, allowing the normalization of illegal accumulation as rightfully gained wealth as well as transforming the meaning of border into a mere economic resource in the eyes of town dwellers, which led them to disregard strong kinship ties when their economic livelihood is threatened.

Chapter V is the last one devoted to empirical analysis of the ways in which urban and rural poor turned into border hamals and normalized their engagements in illegal trade. First, by introducing a theoretical framework for discussing whether the rural poor of Kilis could rely on the petty-commodity production in agriculture, I will highlight the historical conditions in which rural poor emancipated themselves from the paternal relationships of patronage established with large landholders, which, yet, were quickly replaced by large-scale entrepreneurs that drew on traditional power structures based on land tenure and kinship. I will argue that illegal trade at border gave rise to a border economy, with the mining of border from the mid-1950s onwards raising the stakes for large-scale entrepreneurs as well as military and customs officers and local bureaucrats, and turning the unofficial regulation of illegal crossings by these actors into a lucrative business.

Then drawing on the cross-border trade regulations officially introduced in Kilis border in the mid-1990s, I will inquire how the blurring of legal and illegal realms permitted town dwellers to yield differential profits and reckon upon a semi-legal, small-scale trade. I will demonstrate that the remittent profits during the post-1980 period makes the urban and rural poor completely depended on the small-scale trade since, in the absence of patronage by large-scale entrepreneurs, urban and rural poor are increasingly exposed to the dangers of criminalization and punishment by law enforcement and being unable to pay criminal fines, dangers of growing economic indebtedness. Lastly, I will point to the ways in which the urban and rural poor historically relied on kinship relations to maintain cross-border alliance between families as a social network and to normalize their exchange practices deemed illegal by local authorities. To conclude the chapter, I will suggest that small-scale trade helped the urban and rural poor to establish themselves as protagonists of their own

'success stories', as they conceived themselves boastfully as independent "patrons" making their own money, although the profits yielded from illegal trade were unequally distributed between upper and lower strata as well as among the poor.

Conclusion Chapter will highlight main findings by drawing on the overriding debates of the study, with particular emphasis on social trajectories of socio-economic strata and their stories of social mobility and belonging.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: EXPLORING COMMUNITY AND CHANGE FROM THE BORDER PERSPECTIVE

> Traditionally, border studies have adopted a view from the center; we argue for a view from the periphery. ... Rather than focusing on the rhetoric and intentions of central governments, we look at the social realities provoked by them. (Baud&Schendel, 1997: 212)

Recent revival of studies on borders and boundaries has been largely influenced from the impact of globalization and proliferated in the academia with the concomitant questions of identity, culture and space. A multi-disciplinary realm drawing on history, anthropology, sociology, political science and geography today characterizes the border studies. The processes of globalization and their analyses have contributed to the conflation of territorial and conceptual borders, the question of territorial sovereignty and identities, and cultural unity and difference within the same framework (Kolossov, 2005). Also, the new concepts and ideas related to borders are appropriated by border scholars as conceptual tools of analysis for old questions within new contexts. I suggest that such revisits to the border studies might provide contributions to a more complex and enriched analysis of "state-society relationships", which are framed in the scholarly literature by the still influential center-periphery approach.

This thesis study recognizes the valuable contribution of border studies in analyzing social stratification and change. In this chapter, I will review the scholarly literature on border studies with a critical eye towards delineating the main threads and conceptions of border as "peripheral" areas. A cultural turn in border studies, which challenged the conventional notions of identity, culture and territory has questioned the 'traditional' studies on border on the grounds that they reproduced the state-centric perspective with their classical themes such as cross-border cooperation and regional economic integration. The so-called traditional studies are informed by border sociology, as coined by Wilson & Donnan (1999) which has been mainly concerned with developing a theoretical framework beyond the center-periphery model. Although the novel approaches to border studies regard the

questions posed by border sociology as outdated. I argue that a critical review of traditional works would reveal that they offer early interventions and critical insights to the debate by problematizing a dualist understanding of state-society relationships.

This chapter firstly introduces the border sociology as developed by the particular contribution of Raimondo Strassoldo, an Italian border scholar and protagonist in studies on European borders. Secondly, I will discuss two overriding anthropological approaches in recent border studies, namely the liminality and borders-as-margins themes and single out their strengths and limitations for this study. Then, I will frame my discussion within the framework of "community studies" and underline the spatiality of border regions, embedded in networks of symbolic and economic exchanges. Last section will be devoted to border studies in Middle Eastern/Turkish context.

2. 1. Border Sociology: The Early Contribution of Raimondo Strassoldo

When the political geographer David Newman (2003) has pinpointed the development of border studies in the 1990s, he did nevertheless point to a center-periphery model implicated in his systemic approach putting the borders on a world scale of hierarchical networks:

> Border studies have come a long way during the past decade. From the study of the hard territorial line separating states within the international system, the contemporary study of borders focuses on the process of bordering, through which territories and peoples are respectively included or excluded within a hierarchical network of groups, affiliations and identities (Newman 2003: 13).

The influence of world-system theory is discernible in his writing. The advent of world system theory in border studies has been as a major breakthrough especially among political geographers, thanks to scholars like I. Wallerstein and others. The geographer Kolossov (2005) argues that a synthesis of world system theory and studies of identity boundaries has been effectual in the achievement of border studies during the 1990s:

> It is based, first, on a combined analysis of the role of a given boundary in the whole system of world boundaries at different territorial levels –from global to local. Many geographical studies focused on the newest objective trends in economic development –such as the deepening international division of labour and the improvement of transport and telecommunications. These processes were interpreted as the creation of global networks based on hierarchical relations of

domination between center and periphery (Kolossov 2005: 613-4)

But it was a body of sociological writings on borders and boundaries that problematized the functionalist-structuralist tradition viewing the society as a closed, self-contained unit, the image of nation-state being its hallmark. Raimondo Strassoldo, an Italian sociologist, has been pioneer in reviewing the sociological canon in order to problematize its conception of societies as self-contained systems "whose boundary interactions with other societies and the environments are relatively uninteresting" (Strassoldo, 1980: 44). Strassoldo aimed at developing a systems-oriented sociology of boundaries in order to abandon this closed-system model in favour of complex, open and interpenetrated systems. He thus regarded the concept of boundary, referring both to territorial and conceptual borders, as essential to the general theory of systems (1982).

The main theoretical concern in Strassoldo's writings is the problematization of center-periphery model dominating in the sociological understanding of society and change. The center-periphery model, according to Strassoldo, draws on Durkheim-Malinowsky-Parsons tradition conceiving the society or societal system as an isolated and closed system delimited with absolute boundaries like a biological organism (1982: 252). A corollary to this conception of society is regarding the dynamics of change as endogenous. For Strassoldo, this thinking of Western science inevitably leads to the incarnation of society as the nation-state. In other words, this conception assumes a naturalized relationship between society and territorial state.

Based on a genealogy of Western thinking, Strassoldo criticizes the culturalist -he coins it as culturologist- and dualist tendencies underlying beneath the center-periphery model (Strassoldo, 1980). He underlines the culturalist tendencies with reference to the Western obsession with the idea of center. As reflected in the Western architecture and urban planning, Western thinking regards the space as unicentric: "polarized by one center from which everything else radiates and is measured and which posits a negatively defined periphery" (Strassoldo, 1980: 55). To Strassoldo, the culturalist tendencies are clearly evident in the analyses by the Western sociological tradition about the social reproduction of society, in which the central structure of values and norms play important role for the maintenance of society.

He refers to Edward Shils as the clearest articulation of this approach, reminding his much-quoted opening sentences: “The society has a center. There is a central zone in the structure of society” (Shils, 1975; cited in Strassoldo, 1980: 40). To Shils, the center or central zone is a realm of values and beliefs. The central values are zone of attraction because the society holds them as sacred and also, because they are being promoted by the ruling elite. Shils' view is an integrative model based on consent and shared meaning that are essential for the integration of society. For Shils, as the distance from the center increases, the effectiveness of integration in the periphery decreases (Shils, 1975; cited in Strassoldo, 1980: 40). So, it is important to note an inner differentiation and existence of external parts autonomous from the center within his view of the social system, though he assumes a paradigmatic model in which the center (the whole) determines the periphery (the parts).

Strassoldo suggests that the development of large-scale technological systems of production, transportation and communication also supported Western thinking and pave the way for the centralization of power in the modern state. However, the consequences of this thinking for him is to disregard “the relationship of social systems with other social structures, to underplay the importance of larger units of which national societies are only subsystems, to underrate the problems of formation and (possible) dissolution of national societies and to exaggerate the assumptions on internal integration and external autonomy” (1982: 260). The dualism of center-periphery is particularly inadequate in investigating the economic processes and misleading since it spatially identifies the center with developed and the periphery with underdeveloped. Strassoldo's primary concern is to overcome the limitations and weaknesses of closed-system model that center-periphery approach instantiates and develop an open model with system-environment interaction with no absolute boundaries.

He points to the lack of interest in boundaries as proper objects of analysis and research problematics. The available bulk of studies are generally offered from the political science perspective that refers to national-geographical borders with particular emphasis on minority and ethnic questions. So, he draws on a wide range of literature including theories of symbolic interactionism and social network, world system theory of Wallerstein and Luhmann's theory of world-society, as well as the frontier thesis of Turner, in order to develop his “theory of boundaries”. In his critical reviews (Strassoldo, 1980, 1982), he

discusses in what ways these sociological works imagined the social system and change with reference to social as well as spatial boundaries. Strassoldo's aim is developing a systems-oriented sociology of boundaries, which he outlined in his "The Study of Boundaries: A Systems-Oriented Multidisiplinary, Bibliographical Essay" (1977) and focused on the boundary processes as a source of social change.

Strassoldo (1982) formulates the relationship between boundary processes and social change with particular emphasis to social interactionism theories of Simmel, de Greef and Mayhew. From Simmel, he derives the idea that social boundaries are a social fact and they have spatial implications. De Greef and Mayhew inspire him to think about the interaction and overlapping between spatial and functional (social) boundaries as source of social change. The contribution of these theories is the idea that the societal sub-systems and different ways to relate to their respective environments creates internal differentiation as well as tensions within a system, which can be overcome by change, i.e. growth and expansion of the system. These contributions culminate in Strassoldo's view of social groups and societies as complex and internally differentiated open systems, whose functional and spatial boundaries interact and intersect each other variously. The nation-state, as a territorially bounded society is not necessarily the single unit of analysis. In his own words,

> to focus on boundaries means to be aware of the fuzziness of social systems and groups, to become critical of the claim of "core areas" to partition all of reality among themselves, to become sensitized to the differentiation between centers and peripheries and to the epigenetic and random processes that result in the expansion of communities. It is a good antidote to any organismic view of society and of history as the inevitable evolution towards the nation-state (Strassoldo, 1977: 86).

In brief, his analytical framework posits the spatial and social boundaries at the interplay with each other and explains the tensions and dynamics of social life through the exploration of boundary processes; i.e. their emergence, making and disappearance.

Strassoldo has developed his methodological agenda on boundary studies within a context dominated by the drive for European unity after the Second World War and revival of localism and regionalism, all accentuating the transboundary processes and cross-border cooperation between territorial states. It is not surprising therefore that he studied the interstate levels of integration across European borders and asserted three models of border

situations on the basis of their porosity and degree of cross-border interaction (Strassoldo, 1989). He situated the border zones as different from the core areas -adopting Wallerstein's terminology-, but he relativized the peripheral situation of border. To put it differently, he defined the "periphery" as a border situation forged by the closed border policy of states, which turned the border into a static, stagnant area beyond the metropolitan region. Most state borders, however, have some degree of openness and porosity.

To conclude, Strassoldo's discussion outlined here may not be a complete rupture from the center-periphery approach, but it harbingers an early contribution to the more sophisticated analyses of world system from the border studies perspective. It also gives clues about the emergence of new research agenda and concerns among border scholars as of the 1990s under the impact of globalization. The "boundary problematic" introduced by Strassoldo challenges the conventional sociological studies that take the nation-state as naturalized, unchanging unit of analysis and directs attention to the dynamics of change created by border-making processes. In this regard, Strassoldo's discussion gives insights how the border perspective can move sociology scholars beyond the "methodological territorialism", a term coined by border scholar Willem van Schendel to illustrate the colonization of sociological imagination by the idea of nation-state as preconstituted, naturalized, unchanging scale of analysis (Schendel, 2005: 5).

2.2. Theoretical Debates in Border Anthropology

Border sociology, evolved in the 1960s and 1970s lost its salience and could not make progress as an integrated 'area of study'. On the other hand, the erosion of Cold War divide between West and Eastern Bloc with the collapse of former Soviet Union and communist regimes at the turn of the 1990s and the accelerating globalization revived the anthropological perspectives and ethnographic standpoints in border research (Paasi, 2011: 17). The theories of globalization particularly stirred among the border scholars a critical geographical thinking and new spatial consciousness. In this section, I outline two overriding anthropological approaches to borders; namely, as liminal spaces and as margins.

2.2.1. Borders as liminal spaces

Globalization theories revealed the fluidity of cultures, places, and identities as interstate borders became more permeable to the global flows, a term emphasized by globalization theorists such as Arjun Appadurai (1990) and Manuel Castells (1996). They addressed the shrinking of the globe with the enhanced global mobility of people, commodities and ideas and the decentered nature of global processes. The arguments followed that the accelerated circulation of information, services and ideas throughout the globe intensified the deterritorialization of state sovereignty, human diasporas and even actual places. The globalization perspective revealed the emerging spaces of encounters and mobility which are not nationally bounded and underlined the 'trans-national' context. According to Gupta and Ferguson, for instance, the more sophisticated communications and information network and better means of transporting goods and people created a transnational public sphere, which may forge new forms of solidarity and identity that are not spatially bounded (1992: 9). For these scholars, this did not point only to "the partial erosion of spatially bounded social worlds", but also to "the growing role of the imagination of places from a distance" (Gupta&Ferguson, 1992: 12). Thus, the rise of transnational spaces and communities was suggestive of the loss of a naturalized relationship between territory, nation and identity, as well as multiple belongings embedded in more than one locality. These ideas shifted the focus of social analysis towards the fluid and multiple nature of identities.

The research on the Mexican-US border informed by globalization theories has promoted a "cultural turn" in border studies (Vila, 2003; Donnan&Wilson, 1998; Alvarez, 1995). I use here the cultural turn rather loosely to indicate these criticisms elaborated by Marcus and Clifford (1986) that promoted an anthropological writing similar to literary genres and situated the anthropologist's research experience as textually constructed meanings. A corollary to the cultural turn in social theory is the adoption of "border" as a category criticizing worn-out essentialist conceptions of culture, rooted in the Westphalian ideal of nation-state.

Roberto Alvarez argues that the study of border or, as often referred, borderlands constituted a new genre, "a basis upon which to redraw our conceptual frameworks of

community and culture area" (Alvarez, 1995: 447). The new borderlands genre highlights the mobility across borders and posits the borders as spaces of transition and encounters where different identities and cultures came across. As Heyman and Campell (2007b) argue, the inquiries of the Mexican-US migration and cultural flows had an exclusive contribution to this new genre. These studies became almost a model adopting the border as an image for the liminal space between two nation-states, which nestles a mingling and multiplicity of identities. They enhanced the quest for hybrid cultures as accelerated flows and mobility crisscross the borderlands and endowed the border cultures with a subversive potential defying the ideologies of nation-state.

The new borderlands genre tends to employ the concepts of border, borderland and boundary, often redundantly in a single framework, with the aim of distinguishing between their literal and conceptual uses and forging a new perspective to the border studies. The concept of borderlands is employed to designate a liminal area where the researcher is able to observe the shifting boundaries between gender, race and ethnicity as the accelerated flows and transnational mobility crisscross these areas. The notion of boundary has a particular use to designate the borders between class, gender and race.

Fredrick Barth's (1969) conception of ethnicity forming at the boundaries of different ethnic groups has been a major source of influence. Instead of defining ethnic identity as a set of features shared by the member of groups, Barth has looked at the interaction processes through which ethnic identity is maintained and re-confirmed. Borrowed from Barth, boundaries acquire an analytical power in anthropological debates of culture and identity without any necessary reference to the geographical borders, which leads to an approach called by Alvarez (2005) as "a-literalist" in contrast to its literal use.

The a-literalist approach has come under criticisms on several grounds. Criticisms point out to the adoption of research on US-Mexican border almost as a paradigmatic model for border studies in general and tendency to homogeneize the borders (Grimson, 2006; Vila, 1997). Grimson argues that the paradigmatic status of US-Mexican border gives way to a new ethnocentrism, while it also encourages the denaturalization of juridical borders and essentializes social identities. Vila emphasizes the employment of border-crossing as a metaphor for unravelling the question of border subjectivities by giving it privilege over

the enclosure experience among border dwellers. Donnan and Wilson (1999) remind that the conception of borderlands has turned into an image that is not necessarily referring to a geographical border area and could be employ for the study of connections between cultures wherever these connections are found. These scholars denounce the tendency of this model to focus on social boundaries on geographical border to the expense of hiding the latter out of sight.

These criticisms contend the borderlands genre by underlining the significance of geographical borders impinging on the daily life on the daily life in an age arguably towards a borderless world. This genre has emerged within the globalization context and emphasized the ideas of cross-border mobility and cultural hybridity. The criticisms contest it by putting emphasis on fragmentation and difference (Vila, 2000), conflict and growing inequality (Grimson, 2006), control and enclosure (Heyman&Cunningham, 2004), reterritorialization (van Schendel, 2005a) and spatial reproduction (Heyman and Campell, 2009), immobility and entrapment (Yael Navaro-Yashin, 2003) at the border zones. They propose a more balanced framework to reveal the interplay between geographical borders and social boundaries.

Criticisms also address the paradigmatic status of Mexican-US border anthropology, neglecting the relevance of national belongings and identifications in global context. Vila's ethnographic account of Mexican-US border, illustrate that the border lies among the Mexican Americans living in diverse locations of the US as a constant reminder of their difference, giving to Mexicans living on the border a meaning of their identity as ethnicity and nationality simultaneously (Vila, 1997: 178). Similarly, the border geographer Anssi Paasi asserts that the territorial borders are central to the national ideological apparatus aiming to rejuvenate the state dominion over its citizens (Paasi, 2011: 21). Paasi, thus, urges the border researchers to pay attention to the role of practices and discourses which produce and reproduce the national borders in the discursive realm of state power. The 'boundaries are everywhere' thesis, as he calls, omits the role of borders to strengthen the national community as a bounded unit (Paasi, 2011: 22). In short, his view underlines that the borders have became diffused rather than eroded and their changing meanings within the global context deserve much more attention.

The ethnographic studies reveal that material objects, people and even funerals crossing the border can have symbolic value enforcing the distinction between members and outsiders (Reeves, 2007; Pelkmans, 2006, Parizot, 2008; Vila, 2000). Unlike the above-reviewed a-literalist approach, these studies emphasize the border-crossing and increased interaction might actually reinforce the social boundaries. It goes without saying that the a-literalist approach posits the sole border enforcer as the state as it privileges the border-crossing and transgression of cultural boundaries. Vila rightfully reminds the evidence from research demonstrating that most Mexican Americans living in the US do support a closed border (Vila, 2000). To put it differently, the criticisms of the culturalist assumptions underline the bias that the transnational flows across the border breed the multiplicity of cultural belongings while they indicate to the function of territorial borders in giving rise to what Paasi (2011) calls as border-producing identity narratives.

Yet, it is worth reminding that the themes and issues raised by the new borderlands genre are still relevant in broader border studies as an interdisciplinary realm. The borderlands genre has introduced to the border studies a constructivist view of transnationalism with a particular emphasis on the daily interactions of people making up the transnational spaces and communities. Also it has put forth border as an analytical category to capture the transnational flows from below and emancipated the scholarly inquiry from the state-centric conceptions of territory, nation and culture.

2.2.2. Borders as margins

I have mentioned in my review of the borderlands literature that this approach ascribes a subversive potential which calls the state sovereignty in question. It is true that the globalization process rendered border studies with a new impetus as more transnational flow of goods, people and ideas tends to overcome international borders and erode state sovereignty. Yet, further studies of border warn against quick assumption of the erosion in state sovereignty and argue instead in favour of analyzing more attentively the changing relationship between sovereignty and territory. A borders-as-margins approach posits the borders as state margins and view them as windows for the researcher to explore broader processes of state sovereignty, nationalism and territorialization. Also, while this approach problematizes the subversive capacity of border populations vis-a-vis state power, it

embraces the knowledge of their transgressive experiences and practices at the state margins as indispensable for a critical inquiry of the state-imposed definitions of illegality.

Borders are often simultaneously geopolitical, socioeconomic and cultural margins. They might be excluded from state resources or they could be marginalized by the shared culture of the nation because of the closer affinities across the border rather than with the broader society. Moreover, this approach adopts the research at the margins as an epistemological shift indicating "an analytical placement that makes evident both the constraining, oppressive quality of cultural exclusion and the creative potential of rearticulating, enlivening, and rearranging the very social categories that peripheralize a group's existence" (Tsing, 2004; cited in Galemba, 2013: 277). Border zones do not only constitute margins, but they are also marginalized. Border as state margins approach offers a framework that would not only challenge marginality discourses. It also demonstrate the ways how these discourses could be assimilated by the state institutions as well as border dwellers to accommodate various interests (Obeid, 2010). These studies point to the cultural constructedness of borders as margins and its implications for social theory. For Veena Das and Deborah Poole, the ethnographic exploration of marginality and border construction offers "a unique perspective on the sorts of practices that seem to undo the state at its territorial and conceptual margins. Such margins are necessary entailment of the state." (Das&Poole, 2004: 4).

Janet Roitman's ethnography of illegal trade and gang-based road banditry at the Chad Basin, a geographical border junction among Nigeria, Niger, Camerun, Chad ve Central African Republic states, employs similar perspective to challenge the researcher's own analysis categories regarding the cross-border activities that do not conform to the state regulations of market economy. The adoption of state notions of illegality is a major impediment to understand how unregulated economic exchanges and financial relations emerge in the first place. The analysis of these activities deemed as criminal requires the widening of our scope beyond moralizing and stigmatizing definitions to capture their content. The ethnologist should recognize that "the transgression of physical frontiers (e.g. national borders) and conceptual boundaries (e.g. spoils becoming licit wealth) is critical to productive activity and the production of new forms of knowledge about the possibility of such activity" (Roitman, 2004: 16-17).

The illegalization of cross-border exchange practices by the law enforcers in fact contributes to the marginalization of poor border dwellers. Rather than its functions of providing security and order, it "enhances vulnerability; legitimizes exploitation; and justifies accumulation, extraction, and violence" (Galemba, 2013: 276). Yet the border dwellers might instrumentalize illegality in order to escape the more risky economic engagements and create alternative strategies of livelihood. Ethnography at the state margins may illustrate how the border dwellers negotiate their understanding of (il)legality (Baud&Schendel, 1997), they navigate the boundaries between legal and illegal realms (Galemba, 2003) and the notions of legitimacy and an ethical conduct partake in their engagement in economic activities deemed illegal by the state (Galemba, 2008, 2012b; Roitman, 2006). Heyman and Campell direct their attention to the shifts and plays of discourses surrounding corruption among border actors and put forth cogently how they underline the border culture: The corruption at the Mexican-US border is regarded to be driven by a foreign culture, stigmatizing the Latino/Mexican populations even though the US agents engage in corrupt actions (Heyman & Campell, 2007b: 208). They argue that the US border enforcers that are not familiar with the border culture mostly fall prey of such brokering arrangements.

Ethnography at the state margins may also contribute to our knowledge of state territorialization and sovereignty by focusing on the goods and people that weave in and out of legality. For instance, studies on post-colonial states of Asia demonstrate that Westphalian notion of nation-state and its borders as impenetrable barriers were virtually non-existent until recently, as revealed by Wong's research on cross-border movements between Indonesia and Malaysia –transgressive crossings yet not stigmatizing Indonesians as illegal until 1963 (Wong, 2005). This is why Abraham and Schendel defines illegality as a "form of meaning produced as an *outcome* of the effect of a criminalized object moving between political, cultural, social and economic spaces" (Abraham & Schendel, 2005: 16). Inquiring state efforts to criminalize the flows escaping its control reveals that the state is never able to monopolize regulatory practice (Baud & Schendel, 1997). These inquires point to the competing regulatory authorities at border regions, which do not necessarily undermine state power (Abraham & Schendel, 2005; Roitman, 2004a; 2004b).

Researches may inquire how state notions of illegality and border surveillance might

contribute to our understanding about the fluidity of rebordering processes (Abraham & Schendel, 2005) and the way these practices redress ethnic, class, gender and sexual boundaries. The latter is mostly addressed in terms of a tension between the state control and implications of its evasion, which is played out in the language of cultural and gender identities. Cheater's article (1998) on sexual and gendered identities of Zimbabwean female traders crossing borders highlights the overlap between the patriarchal control over gender identities and state efforts to control its border. As the economic crisis pushes most Zimbabwean women to opt for small-scale trade across the border as a livelihood strategy, this mobile population constitutes the dangerous citizens for the state. Similarly Ana Alonso (2005) suggests that the spatial politics of security on the border not only as a state effect but also establishes state sovereignty in gendered ways, discriminating between the outlaw men and women, and unnaturalizing the latter.

These studies discuss the porosity of border and transgression of boundaries as integral to the state functioning in a global system (Schendel, 2005; Gupta, 1995; Roitman, 2004, 2007; Reeves, 2007; Das & Poole, 2004; Galemba, 2008). The border surveillance does not intend to effectively hold the frontier line against illegal intruders but to regulate these flows. The border enforcement is necessary for the perpetuity of state sovereignty and its territorial entity, rather than the obstruction of illegal entry of goods and people. The tight controls and strict regulations may be even more effectual in forging the conditions of illegality and informal economy (Andreas, 2000; cited in Galemba, 2008). The political scientist Peter Andreas reminds that the state monopolize the power to criminalize and set the rules of the game by defining the content of illegal (Andreas 2011).

This discussion is very much complemented with the debate regarding the illegal, informal and small-scale economic activities, as well as forms of wealth erupting alongside the borders. Researches pinpoint the importance of sub- and transnational regimes of accumulation as a critical connection among local economies, transnational flows and mediating state institutions.

These studies focus on non-state channels utilized by border dwellers to resist the formal market sanctions and regulations, to manipulate, undermine and undo the state regulatory authority rather than drawing on an ideal notion of moral economy and locate resistance

as exogeneous to the market and state. Roitman is particularly critical of the notion. She argues that the unregulated exchanges could enforce the state power even it pluralized the regulatory authorities. According to Roitman (2004a), the distinction between state regulatory authority and state power is necessary. For example on Chad Basin, the authority figures evading the state are unemployed military disbanded from the mercenary, customs officers, big traders and local chiefs linked to bureaucracy and politics; controlling the access to wealth and employment. These authority figures collected taxes at the customs or markets at the border regions, redemption prices and tribute money, protection fees, payments for safe delivery of goods and established an autonomous fiscal base.

Thus, as these unregulated activities replace the state-led economic redistribution of wealth, it is misleading to call them informal or illegal. Roitman suggests that informal markets are erroneously regarded as emerging in nascent capitalism or "unproductive" economies, although they cannot be dissociated from dominant forms of production and distribution channels (Roitman, 1990). Carolyn Nordstrom asserts drawing on her extensive research on war profiteering and illegal trade that non-state relations of exchange and power weave across illegal, semi-legal and informal markets at once (Nordstrom, 2000: 36). The fact that these activities are catalyzed through non-state channels does not mean that they weaken state power, but they co-exist as two different realms of authority and socioeconomic organizations (Nordstrom, 2001: 219).

So, this perspective employs a conception of state as variously constructed by historically-situated and differentially positioned actors (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 106) and diffused relations of power (Roitman, 2004b). Roitman explicitly distinguishes between these unregulated activities and the moral economy as autonomous and dissenting relations flourished where the state power cannot establish its order (Roitman, 2006: 265). Such states of illegality rather constitute "a mode of establishing and authenticating the exercise of power over economic relations and forms of wealth, giving rise to political subjects who are at once subjected to governmental relations and active subjects within their realm" (Roitman, 2006: 264). They problematize the "subversive" nature of illegal practices and exchanges and urges to carefully delineate the limits of anti-state resistance on the basis of rigorous investigation (Galemba, 2013).

In sum, “borders as margins” approach draws on the post-modern theories of power -such as biopolitics and affect- in order to inquire into the micro-realities of the state-society relations. Study of border dwellers’ everyday struggles to manipulate and circumvent the border offers insight to the state actions to impose its control and regulation over them and contributes to our understanding of translocal processes through which the state is experienced (Wilson & Donnan, 1998; Gupta, 1995; Das, 2004). Veena Das conceptualizes the state margins in both territorial and conceptual sense to analyze how the state is experienced and undone through its illegibility. Her viewpoint inspires to think of border regions as state margins, where the heavy state apparatus with its border customs and military control, oscillating between being vigilant and complicitious, makes the state utterly illegible for the border dwellers and therefore manipulated.

A major criticism to the borders as margin approach is its analytic bias that forces the actions of state power as well as border dwellers' to fit into a domination-resistance scheme. Heyman and Campell (2007a) oppose this analytical framework by emphasizing the oblique actions of human individuals indirectly confronting and evading the state power and its institutions. Drawing on an ethnography on ramshackle, mobile and uneasy to discern settlements of Mexican migrants near by the US-Mexican border, called *colonias,* the authors argue that the relationship of colonia dwellers with the US population census agents, challenged by the complex and provisional nature of the settlement forms and zigzag behaviour of migrations back-and-forth resist their placement into a domination-resistance framework. The reluctance of colonia settlers to cooperate with the US agents, their limited competency in English, the hard-to-discern nature of the dwellings and continually shifting dwelling environment result in difficulties to estimate the accurate population census among Mexican migrants living in the US.

Although the migrants engage in illegal alternatives of labour employment and border-crossing defying the dominant actors -that is, state regulations-, their acts do not generally consist of intentional claims of resistance, but simply fear and distrust for the US law enforcement and survival efforts in a new social context that they are not much cognizant of. Hence the authors advocate for an analytical framework to capture the oblique, improvised and mobile actions indirectly related to power situations, which they call slantwise, and to handle these behaviours and actions with greater subtlety within a

framework that hinge upon both resistance and domination. To put it differently, they do not deny that the slantwise actions of migrants could be orchestrated in resistance or internalization of domination, but these would be consequences or effects, rather than explanatory causes.

To conclude with, I reviewed in this section two approaches, namely, the borders as liminality and as margins that give the concept of border an analytic priority to develop a research agenda on questions of identity, citizenship, territoriality and state power. These approaches add to our understanding of national, ethnic, gender and sexual identities since borders alter these identities in ways not found elsewhere. They provide insights to the working of state power at the level of everyday life, as well as to the practices that challenge and undo it. Though these two approaches oscillate between a perspective that views the state power either as eroded or enforced at the border regions, they both point to the functions of border control and surveillance operating not only at politico-juridical level of regulating population flows but also at level of meaning construction (Wilson&Donnan, 1998). In brief, border studies focus on mobilities and enclosures in a globalized world to explore borders not only as political and economic barriers and prospects, but also as social and moral systems.

2.3. Reintroducing Historical-Sociological Approach to Border Research

The above-reviewed anthropological perspectives in border studies may fall short of providing answers to the conventional sociological questions about social stratification and change. The constructivist view to the borders offers perspective for symbolic and cultural processes involved in reproduction of borders. They provide tools to conceive how they are reproduced at the center rather than peripheral border zones and by state's efforts through a set of practices and discourses. By underlining the role of identities, symbols and meanings circulating through transnational flows, they contribute to our understanding of how borders are "rebordered and debordered" (Staudt & Spener, 1998, quoted in Heyman & Cunningham, 2004: 292). Yet, as it focuses on the symbolic reproduction, it de-emphasizes the "real" relations between individuals, producing borders as social spaces. On the other hand, the view of borders as state margins provides a framework for the multiple configuration of social dynamics at the border impinging on the heart of states,

but it tends to simplify it on the basis of a dichotomy between internalization of domination and resistance to it.

As Schendel argues, the historicity of border spaces is essential to understand how social relations at borders are continually being reconfigured (Schendel, 2005b: 9). Globalization creates new spaces and territorialities through transnational flows that the states have to deal with at sub-national and supra-national scales. The increasing prominence of cross-border cooperation, regional economic integration and new border management with supra-national institutions illustrate a politics of scale, as Schendel (2005b) coins, that the states are engaging in order to reassert their territorial sovereignty. Thus, analyses of globalization as de-territorialization and re-territorialization requires an understanding of the ways in which transnational flows are mediated by the states. The states are compelled to re-design their technologies of border surveillance as in the case with EU-led Frontex, set new schemes of immigration and naturalization and facilitate the international trade by appealing to multilateral bodies and arrangements. State powers in globalizing context wobble between tighter control and increasing permeability at the borders. Schendel argues that these policies have significant repercussions at the border regions, by turning them into "spaces of engagement" where various domains of power and profit are overlapped. Thus, transborder arrangements highlight the function of border societies to ease or impede them.

The historicity of border spaces can be revealed by inquiring how they "act as pivots between territorial states and transnational flows (as well as between separate flows)" (Schendel, 2005a: 62). Border scholars emphasize that border communities are not passive recipients of such flows but they are part of a social system straddling the border that regulate and restructure these flows (Schendel, 2005b; Alvarez, 1995). The mere emphasis on state governance and transborder flows tends to obscure the border communities and their incorporation among the particular dynamics influential at border regions. It is this ongoing, dialectical process among border communities, territorial states and transnational flows that give distinctive characteristics to a border place on an international boundary. This viewpoint undermines the simplistic counterposing border communities vis-a-vis the state.

Border scholars thus warn against the danger of homogeneizing distinct localities along the border and suggest the ongoing, dialectical process at the territorial boundaries generating border spaces. The borderland concept in this context signifies the "existence and impact of a border on the human landscape" (Newman, 2003: 19). It denotes a border location embedded within networks straddling across the geopolitical boundary between two or more states (Baud&Schendel, 1997; Wilson&Donnan, 1998). Baud and Schendel uses the metaphor of accordion in order to portray the borderland as contracting and expanding ties radiating at the two sides of the territorial boundary in response to various contentions and strife raised by state politics and transnationalism. It accentuates the dual role of borders as dividing and uniting at the same time. Boundaries not only separate social groups but also they tempt them to interact thanks to spatial proximity and social affinity. This is one major reason why the interstate conflicts and tensions affect the border communities most.

Oscar Martínez (1994) categorizes interactions that promote or inhibit the cross-border relations into models depending on the nature and degrees of contact. These models allow an observation at the variations in the level of interaction, which signify for Martinez the changing degrees of transnationalism from low at the alienated borderlands to high at the integrated borderlands. However, the border communities of contiguous states may not follow upon these models of interaction and their deviation from them may illustrate instances of border dynamics at play. For instance, the level of interaction at particular border locality can be more intense than the international relations normally promote or the dwellers are willing to endanger themselves with border-crossings unsanctioned by the states.

Because a "historical consociationality" (Wong, 2005) often govern the cross-border movements rather than a border logic, border communities can appropriate the territorial boundaries for their own political agendas and as Sahlins' study of Franco-Spanish border at Cerdanya valley suggest, they can play off one state against other (Sahlins, 1998). The contingent and unintended nature of transborder arrangements that mediate between the state politics of scale and transnational flows turn the border regions into contentious zones with unique social dynamics and historical development.

Borders are not only clusters of cross-border ties that evolve across space but also time. Alvarez puts particular emphasis on the "specific permanence and longevity of border people in forming lasting social bonds and in political economic struggle" that is disregarded by most anthropological studies of border (Alvarez, 1995: 462). Cross-border networks and ethnic ties may sustain themselves even after the imposition of new territorial boundaries, a condition renowned for J.W. Cole and Eric Wolf's study of Italian Tyrol as *The Hidden Frontier* (1974). The authors describe how the ethnic and nationalist loyalties could be strongly maintained in two villages in north Italy that was initially part of Australian Tyrol before its transfer to Italy in 1919. On the other hand, the delineation of new geopolitical boundaries may also instigate the emergence of new networks and confrontations across border communities.

Baud and Schendel (1997) proposes the historical study of border in terms of its life cycles in order to reveal what effects the emergence of a new boundary had on the region it bisects. As the border evolves in time, predated social and economic networks persist, decline and disintegrate. The "infant borderland" is characterized by close kinship links with immature development of national identities. The second stage of "adolescent borderland" starts to weaken the social and economic ties though they are not yet dissolved. In the "adult borderland" stage, social and economic networks come to conform to the contours of the delineated boundary and cross-border relations gain problematic status. When the political importance of a border decreases, new supra-national networks of trade may be promoted by the state in a "declining borderland". Border-induced networks completely disintegrate in a "defunct borderland" and new networks replace them in a geography with no physical barriers.

Similarly, geographer David Newman (2003) underlines the processes through which borders are demarcated and delineated for a historical perspective to the border dynamics and nature of cross-border networks. These processes are likely to define the management and degree of permeability of the border. Territorial boundaries generally do not match the imagined territorialities of border communities and this is precisely why, as Newman argues, border dynamics rise and contest. The demarcation of boundary lines involves not only geographic mapping and plotting but it sets the parameters for demarcation. It draws on the state politics of territoriality, its rules and regulations about inclusion and exclusion

and their instantiation as cultural differences. Newman reminds that the demarcation of a border may alter the power settings among the border community enclosed by it (Newman, 2003: 22). Border dwellers may benefit or lose unequally from being enclosed. Law enforcement, local elites and lower-strata border people may be aligned differently in relation to the bordering process or depending on their participation/exclusion from the decision-making. As illustrated by the colonial settings, the demarcation process may shift the power configurations among state, local elite and border people based on collaboration or confrontation with colonial powers.

Finally, border towns and cities are proper settings to observe the changing configurations of power relations and to inquire into the historicity of border spaces. Paul Nugent (2012) in a comparative study of border towns claim that these places provide "a telling insight into the geographies of wealth and power" (Nugent, 2012: 557). As Nugent suggests, border towns offer an understanding to the ways in which the new and hybridized form of governance at border oscillating between tighter control and increased permeability. Urban settings at the border may come out in a diverse range: as industrial-military plants like small-arms factories of Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier and maquiladora plants of US-Mexican frontier; as casinos and heroin refineries on Thai-Burmese frontier; as smugglers' districts on Benin-Nigeria or Spanish-Morocco frontiers; as prostitution brothels at Czech-German and US-Mexican frontiers or as refugee enclaves in a number of borders (Schendel & Itty, 2005). Border towns may act as hubs or entrepots for the re-routing of international and clandestine trade, as it is particularly highlighted by the African context (Nugent, 2012; Roitman, 2004b). They make visible the networking around the border necessary for transborder arrangements.

Border towns can also make visible the historical trajectories of urbanization in the periphery or emergence of new urban forms at the center or at their outskirts. Geographies of US-Mexican border are exemplary with the emerging districts of prostitution as well as shanties known as colonias. Curtis and Arreola (1991, 1996) does not only survey the spatial effects of new economies at the border creating prostitution districts but they also underline the iconic images of border towns due to the flowing population, goods and signs swirling around them. For example, the naming of the red-light districts as zones of tolerance or shortly, *zonas* illustrate how far the unsavory adult entertainment is associated

with these border towns, though they are not more common than in any large Mexican city (Curtis & Arreola, 1996: 361).

Border towns may accentuate various life styles, representations and policies in clash with each other. Pelkmans' ethnography of Batumi in Georgia (1996) inquires in which ways the flows of new images, ideals and goods circulate into the city after the fall of iron curtain with Turkey and opening of border collides with the ongoing nepotism and state control inherited from the former Soviet rule. He dedicates a chapter on a number of state construction projects accelerated in late 1990s in order to provide insight to the uneasy sociopolitical change. To note another example, the urban settings at US-Mexican border are spatial embodiments of crime and impoverishment in the eyes of larger American public. Critical ethnography, on the other hand, reveals the uneven development carving out these spaces, turning the farmers into real estate entrepreneurs that capitalize on the nonexistent zoning laws in colonias (Hill, 2003). Therefore, historical surveys of the border towns may direct the researcher's attention on the inner contradictions and tensions of community-building and the social reproduction of class positions in changing border settings. Border towns point not only to slantwise perspectives and actions that the subaltern engage for improvising, adapting, seeking for social mobility but also to the elite's behaviours.

2.4. Studying Borders in Turkey and Middle East: Challenge of Limited Research

The Middle Eastern context is not much informed by the novel approaches in border studies. The Middle Eastern borders are usually associated with stereotypical assumptions.[8] It is assumed that Middle Eastern borders are artificially drawn by colonial powers and they are characterized by kinship and ethnic affinities and illegal transactions among border communities. Scholarly literature also tends to identify these borders by the vast discrepancy between territorial borders and social boundaries (Brandell, 2006) and the

[8] I believe that such views reify Middle Eastern borders and partially recognize the truth. These are not necessarily the sole characteristics of the Middle East, nor do these disparities among political, social and economic domains only exist there. For instance, strong kinship ties, arguably typical in the Middle East, are even more dominant in Central Asia where Ferghana Valley delineates Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan borders –a fact exposed by the very recent border closures in 1999 in this post-Soviet geography (Megoran, 2004; Reeves, 2007).

illegal transactions such as contraband which arise from the mismatch between borders and economic domains they delineate (Nordstrom, 2011). Territorial and social boundaries of Middle East are not subject to rigorous investigation and do not attract as much interest as the well-established schools of African and European border studies or the developing research tradition on Asian borders. The achievements of scholarship on the latter three regions, as well as on the US-Mexican border, benefit from the advantages of comparative studies (Baud&Schendel, 1997; Nugent, 2012; Asiwaju, 1994), whereas it is not possible to draw comparisons with the Middle East.

The same goes for Turkish borders. Limited research will not allow me for a review, but I will at least draw affinities and divergences between the scholarly literature about Turkish context and broader border studies. Earlier studies on Turkish borders have been influenced from the state-centered perspective, underlying the state's politics of nationalism with particular emphasis on Kurdish ethnic question and a strategist approach (Özgen, 2004a). They highlighted the role of state borders and state rhetorics on shaping the boundaries of citizenship. Studies concerning the Kurdish-populated border geographies have been largely framed by debates of Asian mode of production, dependency school and world system theory developed on the basis of center-periphery model (Akyüz, 2013: 109).

More recent studies draw on ethnographic researches and archival resources, as well as discourse analysis. I have asserted that the conception of borders as liminal spaces encourages transnationalism analyses on the basis of border-crossings and cultural hybridity. The Turkish context on the contrary highlights nation as the main mode of identification at the border, though multiple legal and cultural belongings may emerge to interact with it. Against the globalization theories which underline the importance of global flows and culture over the nation-state, I refer here to the scholars arguing that nations and their boundaries continue to draw the distinctions about inclusion and exclusion, about members and outsiders (Dragojlovic, 2008). Transnationalism in the Turkish context is much concerned with the tensions and contradictions in relation to citizenship and exclusion questions.

Among these works, Ümit Cizre (2001) discusses the boundary-making processes in the

discursive realm of state and shows that the state conception of citizenship boundaries and territorial borders are superimposed. The immutability of Turkish borders as the hegemonic idea is revived against PKK, the Kurdish Marxist-Leninist insurgency and its supposedly aim to change the boundaries, though most Kurdish people, Cizre alleges, do not support an independent Kurdish state. The boundaries of national identity was used to be secured with reference to a specific notion of national security and thus, continuously reproduced by domesticating the community inside against a potential threat (İçduygu&Kaygusuz, 2004). Yet, intrusion of global ideas and forces has made possible an ethnic-oriented definition of Turkish identity and the shifting of territorial and mental boundaries, advancing further the claim for the cultural-political rights of Kurdish people. Her article reiterates the fact that the territorial borders of nation-state acquires new meanings rather than getting undermined within the globalization framework.

Kaşlı and Parla (2009) focuses on border control as mechanism for the state extending its sovereignty across border with reference to the transborder mobility of Bulgarian Turkish immigrants and their recognition by Turkish state. The back-and-forth mobility of Bulgarian Turkish immigrants through the border in fact reveals the nature of border control as a mechanism used by the state to extend its sovereignty across border. The research on the Bulgarian Turkish migrants also suggests how their dislocation experience is further enhanced by their seasonal migration to Turkey as domestic labour following their return back to Bulgaria as soon as the Communist Jivkov government fell over in 1989 (Parla, 2005). The Turkish state, in other words, takes advantage from the migrants' stay with temporary residence permit or giving them invented status so that they have to return and use their votes in the national elections of Bulgaria on the basis of their Turkish ethnic affiliation. These studies adopt new themes such as globalization of domestic politics, deterritorialized sovereignty, inclusive exclusion, dislocation experiences of transnational migrants.

The Turkish literature also provides historical analyses of the boundary processes (Kaşlı 2014; Özgen, 2006, 2007a). Drawing on discourse analysis of local newspapers and in-depth interviews with dwellers of Edirne, Kaşlı investigates how the discursive borders between Turkey and Greece and social boundaries among various locally resident ethnic groups of the city interact and shift over time. For instance, the demarcation of Greek-

Turkish border has rendered the Greek population left in Turkey the minority status, while constituted the "others" of Edirne. But, the EU accession process shifted the meaning of territorial border as well as the boundaries of citizenship reinforced against the irregular transit migrants as the new other in the city. The changing status of interstate borders with EU integration here accounts for the boundary processes. A more insightful geography about the boundary processes under the impact of globalization is Central Asia. As the borders of former Soviet Republics are opened with the fall of Iron Curtain, the global flows of goods and people refashion ethnic, religious and gender identities (Hann&Beller Hann, 1998; Pelkman, 2006; Akyüz, 2013, 2014). For instance, the discursive use of the "cheap and flimsly" Turkish goods circulating Georgian border markets after the re-opening of the border in the 1988 might show how the social boundary between Turkish and Georgian people is reproduced (Pelkmans 2006). Increased interaction at the border brings about new inequalities at the intersection of ethnic, gender and class identities (Akyüz, 2013; Özgen, 2007b).

There are exceptions to the overriding debates of identity with reference to transnationalism, Hatay at the Turkish-Syrian border being the typical research for placing arguments of triumphant cultural hybridity and multiculturalism under the impact of globalization (Stokes, 1998; Doğruel, 2013). Stokes' account of Arabesk in Hatay suggests that this popular musical genre articulating the minority and majority borderlander experiences leads to the weakening or dilution of the national identity. The fact that performers of Arabesk musicians are openly gay or transsexual, also mirror the gendered representation of border as an impotent product of state. Doğruel discusses the cultural pluralism revived at the intersection of local, national and global processes, especially after the start of EU accession. Both articles follow the premises of globalization theories reviewed in this chapter and point to the paradoxical tendencies of the globalizing world, namely universalism and particularism.

Finally, transnationalism is also investigated in terms of 'globalization from below', i.e. everyday interactions and networking on the ground among ordinary people. Researches on the undocumented or illegal transit migration through Turkey as a transit country – mostly entering the country across Turkish-Iranian borders – enabled by the globally articulated ethnic kin relations (İçduygu&Toktaş, 2002) and on the shuttle trade between Russia and Turkey suggest (Yükseker, 2007) the agency of 'ordinary' people in facilitating

the global flows of goods and people, as well as signs and images.

The transnationalism debate in Turkish context prioritized the boundary processes redefining national and cultural belongings as well as the shifting meanings of territorial boundaries, turning the scale for cultural analyses though attentive to the fragmentation, difference and new forms of inequalities created by globalization context. Among these studies, research on geographic border settings that are insightful on state sovereignty, nation-building and politics of territorialization are far from satisfying but it is a promising sub-area clinging on the borders-as-margins approach. In addition to Kaşlı and Parla (2009) and Özgen (2007a) reviewed above, more recent border ethnographies of transboundary informal economies and geographical mobility point to the emergence of new territorialities and sovereignty practices as in the case of Kurdish communities at the triple borders of Iran, Iraq and Turkey (Özcan, 2014) and Syrian Kurdistan (Yıldız, 2014) indicating to the fragmented nature of territorialities and sovereignties that may be superimposed on each other. Yıldız's study on the arrested mobility of Iranian Shi'i pilgrims across Iran, Turkey and Syria with the breaking out of Syrian conflict introduces the reader with the recent re-routing of informal trade on this geography and its carving out new sovereign formations by Kurdish liberation movement as well as pro-Islamist brigades of Nusrah and ISIS fighting against Assad government in Syria.

In this regard, Neşe Özgen's scholarship deserves special attention. A leading scholar and pioneer in studies of Turkish borders, she bridges the gap between borders-as-margins approach and 'community studies'. Her study on shifting regimes of property and accumulation in Ardahan at Turkish-Georgian border reveals the border-induced political and economic changes on land property and wealth creation (Özgen, 2007c). This border geography has been delineated first by the Ottoman-Russian and national liberation wars, and second by the new Baku-Tibilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, both dramatically affecting the proprietorship on land. Özgen follows the story of a large landholding family, which was initially accused of treason against the nationalist forces of liberation in complicit with the Georgian and yet, the exiled family was allowed after the Second World War to claim their property and procure a title deed on the land to the expense of dispossessing the peasants. In the 1990s, the heirs yet generated more earnings from the compensations for the condemnation of their property because of the pipeline and planned dam constructions

expelling the peasants holding and laboring the land and rent it to the shepherds. The property and wealth accumulation, according to Özgen, lies at the root of nation-building and citizenship formation in Ardahan, reinforcing the Turkish identity but paving the way for an injured citizenship among the landless peasants.

Özgen enlarges the scope of sociological research into the border geographies by directing her attention to the changes in socially stratified structure of border towns, engaging various socio-economic strata in transnational trade (2004b, 2007b). Her research charts a history of smuggling at the Turco-Syrian and Turco-Iraqi borders and periodizes the social change in terms of shifts in the mode of accumulation that the smuggling trade is articulated with. These historical periods refer to the changes in class structures, emergence of new socio-economic status and alterations in kinship and community bonds within the town population, as well as across border. She details a field study demonstrating how the demarcation and development of borders induce new transboundary networks and forms of interaction and doom the old ones to disappear. To put it differently, her study discusses to what extent these border geographies can function what Schendel calls as spaces of engagement that facilitate transborder arrangements between local forces of power and transnational flows.

Finally, studies on border-making is a newly developing realm of investigation with rigorous historical research on Greek-Ottoman border (Gavrilis, 2008), Ottoman-Iranian border (Ateş, 2011) and Turkish-Syrian border (Altuğ and White, 2009). These studies do not only shed light on the modern phenomena such as public hygiene and sanitary surveillance at play in the consolidation of border, but also the local dynamics, actors and mechanisms having role in border-making. Ateş brilliantly discusses how the outbreak of cholera derives the Ottoman government to build on the Ottoman-Iranian frontier a sanitary cordon to prevent the Iranian Shi'i pilgrim traffic to bury their corpses to Iraqi shrine cities and pushes the Ottoman rule to set its border with the land of Shah. Gavrilis' study of Ottoman-Greek border reveals the cooperation among border guards of two states to fend off possible conflicts after the demarcation of an independent Greek state in 1832 and points to the power mechanisms such as brokerage in sustaining the security and stability of the borders. Altuğ and White focuses on the birth of Turco-Syrian border as a process involving the border populations used as leverage in the international relations. In a

compelling survey of bilateral relations during the 1920s and 1930s, they demonstrate that the "dangerous populations" such as deported Armenians and expulsed Kurdish insurgent tribes, as well as Assyrians and Yazidis of Turkey played significant role as they were settled in Syria by the French Mandate along the border, while the Turkish state in turn gave its support to the Arab gangs resisting the French occupation.

2.5. Concluding remarks

This chapter provides a critical review of the scholarly literature on border studies and goes over main themes and debates, suggesting the analytical use and significance of border and boundary concepts for social theory. Border studies have made important contributions to the globalization and identity theories, but their utmost achievement is to make the idea that geographical borders are proper object of research rather than mere backdrop widely accepted.

Border studies suggest an anthropological perspective from the periphery against the state-centered analysis. I distinguish the two anthropological approaches in contemporary border studies. The liminality approach utilizes a cultural study of borders and boundaries and conceptualizes the borderlands as spaces for mingling and multiplicity of cultural identities. The criticisms addressed to liminality approach for its a-literalism and overemphasis on border-crossing as a metaphor for identity formation adjust this approach to restore its operationality for border studies. The contribution of liminality approach for this study is to provide a research framework that conflate territorial and conceptual boundaries. The borders-as-margins approach is primarily focused on the territorial borders as research sites and regard them as windows opening to the broader studies of nation-building, citizenship, state sovereignty and territoriality. Here the concept of borderland is employed to tell about the impact of a border on the human landscape and point to the social space of border-induced networks. The contribution of borders-as-margins approach for this study is not only to introduce an epistemological shift from the state-centered perspective towards the periphery, but also to reveal the power mechanisms that peripheralize a group's existence.

Nevertheless, both approaches suffer from a resistance-internalized domination dichotomy, rather than placing border studies in a continuum that hinge upon both

resistance and internalized domination. The borders as geographical, socio-economic and cultural margins do not have to fit necessarily within this dichotomy, as most of the behaviours and actions of border dwellers are oblique and improvised without the intention to oppose state ideologies or challenge state regulations and control. Border dwellers rather navigate, manipulate and evade the territorial and conceptual (legal, social) boundaries. These approaches provide tools for inquiring into the power contexts in which the border dwellers navigate territorial and conceptual boundaries, but they fall short for investigating border-induced changes on social stratification. Thus, this study takes part with the scholarly interest to promote a historical-sociological approach to border studies and highlight the insights that these studies might provide in analysis of social stratification and change in border towns.

CHAPTER III

MAKING FIELDWORK ON THE BORDER: SETBACKS, OPPORTUNITIES AND DILEMMAS

Making fieldwork on border is worth mentioning about the difficulties it contains. Borders, as margins of the nation-state, are also marginalized in official and popular discourses. Depicted as stuck in traditional community relations and undeveloped infrastructure, the borders are stigmatized as sites escaping the state order and open to corruption and illegal practices. The borders are also stigmatized by border dwellers. In Kilis, for instance, most of the dwellers also associate the border with its illegal trade and informal economy. Kilis dwellers notoriously name their efforts to earn a livelihood at the border as "smuggling" and place it at the center of their border perceptions, as if it is the only distinctive characteristics of this border. In other words, borders bring their own ideologies, stories and ways of interaction that the border researcher must delve into in order to explore what living at the border meant to the border dwellers. This might prove rather challenging when they are not legible in the official and archival records, sources of information are not cooperative or secrecy dominates among the dwellers.

My research consists of an ethnographic study on belonging and social mobility processes among various socio-economic strata at territorial margins of nation-state. Anthropologists classify ethnography as a genre of storytelling, reminding that our ethnographic works are also narratives transforming the sense of fragmentation, contingency and dislocation experienced in the field (Bruner, 1986; Rapport 2000). This study is a story about my own experience and understanding of the people and border life I observed. It locates the agency of town dwellers in accommodating themselves to the border on the foreground against the view of border dwellers as being mere victims of artificial territorial boundaries drawn by colonial powers in the Middle Eastern context. I explore different strategies adopted by various socio-economic strata to navigate territorial, as well as cultural and legal boundaries.

The eighteen-month field study involved several setbacks to deal with as well as

opportunities. In this chapter, I will give a detailed account of my field experience and discuss how setbacks and opportunities of the fieldwork framed my research. My discussion will indicate that the border context has imperatives that determine the research question as well as strategy. I will demonstrate that I had to rely on ethnographic and oral history approaches as well as a reflexive anthropology establishing an intimate rapport with the town dwellers to proceed with the research. In this vein, I will first provide an overview about the ways I draw on ethnographic research and in-depth interviews as the method of the study.

Kilis, as the provincial hinterland of Ottoman Aleppo before the demarcation of the border, remained a moderately big town after it became annexed to the city of Gaziantep. The town bears the traces of a highly stratified social structure inherited from the Ottoman landholding class and agricultural production. The cultural and architectural inheritance of long-established notables is still present, though notable families have lost their social and economic power since the 1960s. Even though these families remained among the wealthy strata of the town, I realized their feelings of decline should be interpreted as part of their social mobility experiences with the demarcation and consolidation of the border.

Moreover, the meanings of illegality, wealth and work in Kilis are inflicted by a border culture that was difficult for me to penetrate at first and understand because of my own ideological baggage. Practices and values regulating the illegal economies of border among dwellers were unintelligible to me at the beginning. These setbacks and preliminary research prompted me to revise my original research question on ethnic and religious identities among extended families with cross-border kinship ties. The historical context that inform the identity formation in this border region indicated that this question should be addressed by a genealogical study of family histories through Ottoman archives. From the original question, I moved towards an inquiry about the ways border-induced changes in class and status transform the meanings of illegality, wealth and work as well as shape cultural and legal belongings. As I will explain this process as the serendipity in the field, I intend to reveal how the content of these interviews and initial encounters in the field have contributed to reframe my study.

Not only interviews with the local notables, but also events and encounters provided

insights about socially stratified structure of Kilis town. As I made efforts to find out interviewees, conversations with town dwellers from various social backgrounds impelled me to decide about whom to interview, how to approach them and what information could I get from them. As I will explain in the following sections, striving for entry in the field made me more self-reflexive, thinking over how my presence as a researcher and the questions that I posed were received. Lastly, I will address the ethical concerns about establishing an intimate rapport with the dwellers, by underlining in what ways these relationship might enlarge, as well as restrict my research scope.

3.1. Method of Study: Ethnography of Border and In-depth Interviews

This study takes part with the border studies approach that aims developing a perspective from the margins to the larger processes of nationalism, state power and transnational economy. Border studies adopt ethnographic research, participant observation, in-depth interviews and narrative methodology for the scientific inquiry 'from below'. Also, border studies encourage ethnographic scrutiny in order to reveal contestations among various states of belonging (Migdal, 2004), understandings of illegality (van Schendel & Abraham, 2006) and political imaginations of territoriality (Mbembe, 2000). Thus, ethnography can offer a critical inquiry working against dominant discourses of nationalism, law and order, and state sovereignty. As detailed in the following sections, the fieldwork conducted between January 2011 and June 2012 draws on these qualitative approaches in order to inquire the ways social mobility processes at the border pave the ground for critical belongings, enabled by wealth creation through illegal means. Since cultural conservatism and secrecy is determinant in the town life, entry and access for the outsider researcher proves difficult. This is an important reason why participant observation data is necessary.

So, as the method of study, I rely on field study supported by in-depth interviews, archival research, as well as trope analysis. In the total, I could conduct 45 recorded (voice recorded and note-taking) interviews, including more than one person in few cases. The number is basically determined by the setbacks that I explain below, in accessing interviewees. Yet, it should be noted that I have stopped looking for interviewees when the interactions and ongoing interviews provided enough information about these underrepresented groups and saturated my interpretations about the social dynamics in the field. In other words, I have

put an end to the field study when I realized that the entry to the field was a constant effort, continually reconstructing it.

The interviewees are recruited from a social composition including four socio-economic strata: namely, the old wealth, new wealth and middle strata and urban and rural poor (See Appendix A for Interviewee Profiles and Explanatory Notes for In-depth Interviews). I define the old wealth as traditional landed and trade notables, a status distinction which I discuss in length in the Chapter III on the notables. The new wealth comprises of extended families that are usually -but not necessarily- from rural background and moved up among the ranks of urban middle class. As a shortcoming, I could not recruit interviewees among the small circle of new wealth, which started to make investments in Istanbul since the mid-1960s and settled there all together after the 1980 coup. I try to meet this deficit by giving a profile of new wealth in Istanbul, by introducing the story of barber in Chapter IV on new wealth. As I will discuss in Chapter IV, members of new wealth in Istanbul and extended families from rural background living in Kilis experienced upward mobility through the same mechanisms and wealth-generating practices during the 1960-1980 period of import-substituting industrialization. Middle strata also includes urban middle-class families, whose social reproduction strategies are based on education and urban employment. Finally, I classify the urban and rural poor as lower strata. These interviewees are usually the offspring of independent peasant families or families working at the landlord's household as domestic and casual labourers.

The study recruits in a wide arrange of interviewees among local notables, chieftains, tradesmen and shopkeepers, professionals and intellectuals, border villagers and urban poor. They also include a few former mayors and parliamentarians, which contributed to my understanding how local political dynamics articulated with the broader border politics. Interviews with officers at governmental and semi-public institutions added to the information about the socio-economic structure and dynamics of social change. Regarding the sectoral composition, the background of interviewees mainly covers agriculture, trade and transport sectors.

I had also informal dialogues with groups of high school students, women gatherings and border villagers. As I worked a semester at a vocational high school as a substitute

philosophy teacher at the 11th grade, I had the chance to make occasional conversations, especially at the beginning of the semester about the city of Kilis and how they perceived being a border dweller. I have attended social organizations of women NGOs, home gatherings and outdoor tea parties which introduced me to the socially stratified life the town and status distinctions among various groups as well as occasional talks on various social mobility and livelihood strategies (See Photograph 1). Finally I have paid visit to border villages of Kurd Dagh where I was accompanied either by a local man, also father of my friend from Istanbul or a young trader, who guided me through his own networks. His sociability helped me to introducing myself as researcher. My friend's father was also a relative of the newly elected AKP deputy from Kurd Dagh. These conversations were very fruitful to me for observing how the Kurdish ethnic community in these villages interpreted the order of things in relation to the border economy and to the overall governmental policies represented by the triumphant AKP.

When I could not conduct recorded interview, the interactions and encounters on the field have kept a vigilant eye to the subaltern voices. They range from casual labourers, unemployed youth, women peddlers and border villagers. Though smuggling and contraband trade is regarded as licit, the interviewees could be reluctant to speak about it. Ranking at the lowest of the social ladder had the most to fear. This was most obvious with the female peddlers who traveled occasionally to Syria by crossing the border gate with their passports, the shopkeepers in the arcade shops selling smuggled cigarettes, teas and other perfumery and cosmetics items, the peasant population at the border villages and the male heads of poor families which were 'hired' by the tradesman in order to carry his load from Syria to Turkish territories usually through the mined frontier. So as seen in the gender and age distribution of interviewees given by Table of Interviewee Profiles, the social composition of the interviewees underrepresented particularly female peddlers among these groups, since voice recording or note taking was not possible. Female interviewees among the new wealth and middle strata is also underrepresented since the social mobility strategies among these families mainly drew on illegal trade activities carried out by male members.

There had been many cases which I could not take personal information such as age and current profession. But the dialogues which gave me important clues about the

A social gathering organized by two NGOs of women in order to meet women villagers. (My photos.)

Photograph 1. Breakfast with women at a village.

interviewees' position and status as well as insights about the history and facts about unregulated border trade and its impact on the socio-economic structure of the city. Thus I prefer to give the birth year intervals of five years in order to classify the interviewees along the age groups. Regarding the age scale, the old wealth typically included the oldest age groups, birth years ranging between 1920 and 1955 with the exception of Latife born in 1911. The birth year intervals ranges between 1930 and 1975 for the new wealth and middle strata as they have been interviewed principally about the shadow economy of import-substituting industrialization period of 1960-1980, except an old-generation women who could give information about her father's involvement in smuggling livestock as early as the 1940s and a younger transport company owner. The age distribution among the urban and rural poor is almost even as the interviews were concentrated both around the agrarian labour structure until the 1960s and the cross-border trade introduced in the mid-1990s. But the ethnographic data offered by the encounters and exchanges of conversation with these unrepresented groups will be used.

Recorded interviews were likely to take the form of oral histories about social and economic life. As interviewees were reluctant to talk about the present situation, they were more inclined to tell about the past in order to avoid, for instance, revealing their involvement in illegal trade. While urban notables and new rich gave account of their family life and social history of the town, border peasants and urban poor narrated their struggle of subsistence and change in their relationship with the landowning class. The border peasants were afraid of the law enforcement and military surveillance at the border.

I approached the oral testimonies with the intention of exploring the social mobility processes. Oral testimonies give insight to social mobility processes among various strata by putting forth their subjective perceptions and evaluations in shaping their life choices that quantitative approaches could not reveal. Oral historians Daniel Bertaux and Paul Thompson (1997) argue that narrative accounts also exceed survey method in revealing the crucial importance of local context. While social mobility processes in Kilis town could be analyzed in conformity with regular patterns of mobility, they critically diverge in terms of subjective perceptions and evaluations and local structures of opportunities. For instance, the economic accumulation in Kilis town may yield opportunities for making money for the male head of household in a very short span of time without significant

outcome in terms of upward mobility. Fast buck could be as easily spent as it is earned. Yet, it has important repercussions among the border dwellers, by shaping their aspirations and conducts. Thus narrativity adds great power in explaining the reproduction, transformation, emergence or disappearance of class and status in border context.

For this study, family histories in shaping the social trajectories are particularly relevant for the queries on the old wealth (local notables) that pass on patrimonial status as family property. Also, the conversion of capital (from economic to cultural or vice versa) as a trajectory of social reproduction account for the old wealth. In the case of Kilis, the familial histories particularly account for the local notables that depends on their patrimonial wealth as well as paternalistic relationships of agrarian production. But they also shed light in what ways the new wealth as well as the lower strata diverge from expected social trajectories of class reproduction, i.e. in cases that the occupation is not transmitted between generations.

Since I have met with difficulties in conducting recorded interviews, I have complemented them with snippets of responses (Vila, 2000: 254) and micro-narratives (Doevenspeck, 2011) in order to uncover hidden narratives beneath the dominant stereotypes and prejudices and to approach the everyday experiences and practices at the border. Such pieces of conversations are employed by border studies in inquiring the narrative construction of boundaries, identities and belonging at the border (Paasi 2003; Vila 1997, 2000; Doevenspeck, 2011; Pelkman, 2006; Flynn, 2007). Putting emphasis on narrativity does not necessarily mean to employ narrative methodology. Rather than applying a procedural set of techniques to relate small-scale stories to wider context of narratives, border studies work with local narratives in order to disclose the 'border talk', i.e. in what ways dwellers talk about the border, which issues and problems they bring to the foreground, why these are being told and not the others. As I will refer in the analysis chapters of this study, the border talk in Kilis town included issues about the demarcation of border and local resistance against the French occupation, trade activities connecting Kilis with trade and finance centers in the region, the use of border as economic resources, and cross-border marriages and kin relationships.

I utilize these narrative accounts generated by the encounters, as illustrated by my account

of a local sheikh of smugglers' sharia below, in order to address the issues that the respondents are not willing to express in their interviews. The town dwellers usually avoid the tell about the issues that might offend a specific family, as in the case of property transfer between families accused of treason and new proprietors or put someone at risk of exposure because of his/her engagement in illegal trade. These fragmented narrative accounts I have gathered in the field also indicate to the everyday and oblique strategies that the town dwellers rely on in confronting the border and customs control as well as in sustaining their life.

I argue that these conversations tend to be organized by tropes, illustrating the working of dominant discourses and stereotypes among the dwellers. Tropes are powerful because they allege to be true and they push out of sight how they are constructed and reproduced (Townsley, 2001). There are mainly four recurrent tropes that these narratives address: treason of notables in complicity with the French, Kilis as little Beirut during the 1960-1980 boom of cross-border trade, border as *ekmek kapısı* (gate to livelihood) and kinship. These are significant landmarks to guide the researcher in problematizing local narratives, by revealing the contradictions, inconsistencies and distortions. As I will focus on how these four tropes make the dwellers talk about certain issues in structured ways, I will be also able to reveal what they push out of sight, silence or disregard. In this vein, narrative accounts can disclose the shifts in power relations that are experienced in everyday life.

My primary sources of data other than oral testimonies and narrative accounts are field notes recording the data obtained through participant observation and archival sources, including newspapers and official documents. I refer to my field notes that I have taken regularly in order to contextualize the fieldwork with reference to exceptional events that might shift the perceptions of dwellers, to trace the encounters that helped me to reframe the research question and give a thick description of field observations. Bourdieu pertinently points to the need such recording "to absorb a 'reality so pressing, so oppressive' that it constantly threatened to overwhelm the novice ethnosociologist" (Wacquant, 2004: 403) I took systematic notes during the fieldwork that I have interrupted only for a break of one month. They constitute the primary data together with the recording of the interviews.

I will support my discussion with reference to a purposive sampling on local and national newspapers in order to study the criminalizing discourses and their possible effects shaping the experiences of border dwellers. During the fieldwork, I have tried to follow regularly daily news appearing on local papers. There are four local newspapers in Kilis, among which two of them dates back to the early Republican period. Although they tend to sound like tabloid press publishing mainly the news circulated by the local police department of anti-smuggling, they reveal the differences of opinion and established alliances among various positions of political adherence. The websites of these newspapers provide virtual forums for readers expressing comments and thus, they give clues about the public opinion of local community. This study will also draw archival sources, including international treaties, laws and regulations about border control and customs as well as smuggling, and minutes of parliament meetings. These documents will shed light to the official discourses related to controversial issues of border management, definition of border as a legal category and criminalization of transgressive activities.

As mentioned above, the field notes recorded the exceptional events that contextualized the research. I simply refer to the Syrian uprising broke out in March 2011 and its repercussions on Kilis border. Ethnographic studies argue that exceptional events should be taken into account in order to unveil their irrevocable effects in reshaping the memory (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). Also, borders "involve a diversity of actors, practices and discourses that can be spatiotemporalized and better grasped through events" (Radu, 2010: 410). Borders are dynamic and perpetually changing spaces due to state policies, international politics and global movements. Thus, events such as closing of border gate are crucial in the remaking of border space.

I put emphasis on the recording of events because, following Donnan & Wilson, impact of political crises on the international plane can be readily seen in borderlands (Donnan & Wilson, 2010). During the time period I conducted the fieldwork, Kilis town witnessed a series of exceptional events that helped to attract my attention to the extent local processes could interact with broader national politics. The shift in the politics of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) from zero problem with neighbours to the support of Syrian opposition against Assad government have underlined a new context.

An illustrative case is the riot of Syrian taxi drivers in February 2012, succeeding to block the entry of Turkish drivers along the Syrian border gate for more than a week. The source of animosity was actually an amendment in the smuggling law requiring collection of oil taxes over four times crossing abroad in a month that the government was trying to put into force more fiercely, especially after Uludere incidents.[9] Both Turkish and Syrian taxi companies driving passengers across the border and earning from the same contraband trade of gasoline were reacting the regulation. But according to locals from Kilis, Syrian taxi owners and drivers presumed that the amendment was targeting them, since the Turkish government turned his back on their government (from this event, it was possible to deduce clues about the clientelistic relationships between the beneficiary of border economy at the Syrian side and Assad government). This case brilliantly illustrated how local questions could be embodied in the international politics and vice versa.

In this study, the names of interviewees have been changed in order to protect their privacy, as well as safety and only the names mentioned in archival sources are explicitly stated.

3.2. Serendipity in the Field: Research Question Revised

As I started the field study, I had a research plan based on a preliminary research and pilot interviews made few months ago before I got settled in Kilis at the end of 2010. I was intended to explore the ethnic and religious identities at both sides of the Turkish-Syrian border within the framework of border studies. I would inquire identity formations among notable families as various ethnic and religious groups interact with each other at Kilis border, including the Turcoman, Kurdish and Arab kin relations straddling the border as well as the Armenian community in Aleppo that was deported in 1915 from Kilis. The fact that a significant part of deported Kilis Armenians live in nearby Aleppo, where Kilis traders are now in contact, made the inquiry of border interaction more intriguing. Nevertheless, initial interviews and encounters prompted me to reframe the research. I will explain this process below as this account will provide a rich backdrop to the research

[9] See the statements of the State Minister Hayati Yazıcıoğlu, "Kaçakçılıkla mücadele için istihbarat müdürlükleri kuruluyor", *Zaman*, 16.12.2011. Turkish companies also organized protests against the enforcement of the regulation by making references to the government's statements about Uludere incidents.

problematic.

My initial assumptions in the light of preliminary research and scholarly literature suggested that Turkish context highlights nation as the main mode of identification at the border, though multiple legal and cultural belongings may emerge to interact with it. My reasons for designing a research on the ethnic and religious identities through surveying notable families were twofold: first, the security concerns and second, the hegemonic position of notable families over the town community. The complicity of state agents in border economy, the vigilance of border enforcers or dwellers against outsiders and controversial issues such as ethnic question may raise security concern for the ethnographer at the border (Donnan & Wilson, 2010).

Not only is the ethnographer concerned with her own safety, but also her respondents. Also, there may be cases where exposure of information could be an embarrassment for the respondents. These concerns prevailed in my field. For instance, asking questions about ethnicity would be, apparently, a problem as I had been told by a Kurdish young man from the close-by city of Maraş, staying in Kilis for his graduate studies in the university. To him, the border-crossings of PKK guerillas with the help of smuggler peasants would peril my residence or survey at the border villages. "Terror", as the Kurdish question has been named in Kilis was a sensitive issue. I had been told by many that "there is no terror in this town", meaning that Kurdish guerillas and their political organizations had no political activity in this vicinity. It also implied that Kurdish movement could not gather support among the Kurdish population which makes up a significant percentage of the total town community. Still, it was true that the border was occasionally exposed to the guerillas' crossing and rumors spread that smugglers at the border villages guide them to traverse the mined zones.[10] Thus, my effort to shape the research taking into account the safety concerns failed.

Initial interviews disclosed the suppression and assimilation of ethnic and religious differences by the Muslim Turkish identity in Kilis borderlands. For instance, the thesis of

[10] "Kilis'te PKK'li teröristler yakalandı", Kilis Postası, 14.11.2011; available at http://www.kilispostasi.com/haber/kilis-te-pkk-li-teroristler-yakalandi/7158, downloaded on 10.10.2013.

"Kurdified Turcoman tribes"[11] dominated in Kilis despite the discontent of Kurdish people from rural background to whom I had conversations. Unlike Kurdish peasants, member of notable families whose names were mentioned in the Kurdish historiography tended to neglect it or just did not know about it. I would soon discover that these families had a traumatic past due to the infightings and conflicts of their forefathers with the Ottoman central power when they commanded over the sub-provinces of Aleppo, including Kilis. Canbolatoğulları, Daltabanzade and Hacı Ömeroğulları (Rışvanzade) families, for example, had to survive the wrath of the Ottoman central power as they strived to expand their administrative rule or arguably, for reasons of banditry.[12] Some families, such as Canbolatoğulları, had its members exiled by the Ottoman administration.

On the other hand, notable families had been silent regarding the former presence of non-Muslim communities. The remnants of this past have been almost completely demolished: the Armenian Protestant, Armenian Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches now are completely destroyed and the Synagogue only stands but in ruins.[13] The properties left behind the deported Armenians are unspoken, except well-known Çağlasyan mansion turned out into public facility used by ÇATOM (multi-purpose social center). The 1915 correspondence of the Directorate of Tribal and Immigrant Settlement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs gives clues about the abandoned properties confiscated in Kilis.[14]

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11 See for instance, the article to awidely distributed local magazine by a historian from Kilis; Öztürk, M. (2009) "Çalkaya (Cukanlı) Köyünden Hatırladıklarım", *Zeytin Dalı*, Kilis Kültür Derneği Kilis Şubesi Yayın Organı, 6 (56): 6-9.

12 See Demir (2012), Kıvrım (2008), Çolakoğlu (1991), Soyudoğan (2005).

13 See Bebekoğlu S. & Tektuna, M. *(2008).* Gülcü & Gündüz (2009) states the number of churches as four with reference to the 1890 Ottoman Yearbook of Aleppo.

14 The lists acknowledge the place that the Armenians had in town life, as they enumerate an olive mill, three bakeries, three inns, 93 stores, 395 houses as well as poplar and olive groves, gardens, and vineyards among real estate properties they had to leave. For the total monetary value of all Armenian properties in Kilis, see Çetinoğlu. Taner Akçam and Ümit Kurt's work on *Kanunların Ruhu: Emval-i Metruke Kanunlarında Soykırımın İzlerini Aramak* (*The Spirit of Laws: Seeking the Traces of Armenian Genocide in the Laws of Abandoned Property*, 2012) critically discuss the confiscation process by the Committee of Union and Progress and regard it as evidence of Armenian genocide. While the Abandoned Properties lists also register the deportation of 3879 Armenians from Kilis, Armenian historian Raymond Kevorkian (2011) cites the number of population as 7966 on the basis of Patriarchate's Census in 1913. Gülcü & Gündüz (2009) suggests that it is probable that the Catholic Armenians were not deported from Kilis, but the numbers they give with reference to the Archives of Turkish General Staff does not match with those of Directorate of Tribal and Immigrant Settlement.

Kilis Armenians had important place in commercial and educational life and a considerable part of them ranked among the wealthiest sections of the town (Günver, 2003; Eroğlu et al, 2007). My interviewees, on the other hand, have occasionally mentioned about Armenian gardeners, coachmen and domestic workers that they, as big landowning families, needed to employ as helpers for the chores of the mansion and homestead (*çiftlik*). Rarely, there had been conversation about the artisanal abilities of the Armenian community. But they were usually silent about their past presence and the cultural heritage they have left over.

The widespread narrative about the Armenian community among town locals highlights "their complicity with the French" during the Occupation of 1919-1920, as Armenians refugees came back to the town with the occupying troupes. This narrative also dislocates the reason for their deportation in the timeline of events and places it after the Occupation. In other words, it posits the blameworthiness of Armenians as if they were doomed to get deported anyway since they would collaborate with the French forces. Locals of Kilis would typically say that they deserved what they got, while admitting that the goods could be taken with the bad as well.

Another obstacle for the inquiry of identity construction among urban notables is that most of the families have migrated to the metropolises, abandoning the town to the few eldest generation. Their numbers were so decreased and the composition of town elite has remarkably changed that is was difficult to identify the old notables. In the end, the identity question ended up a complicated one in this border region and required a genealogical study of identity through Ottoman archives rather than ethnographic research. This would probably drive the direction of research away from a study of border and focus for instance on the post-memories of State violence[15].

As I lived through hardship to find interviewee, I kept establishing contact with more locals to get immersed in my research field. The town elite, I had conversations with, included both notable and tradesman families and their narration about Kilis history revealed to what

[15] See for instance Altuğ's dissertational study (2011) for an inquiry of post-memories of deported Armenians and other Christian communities, Jewish migrants as well as expelled rebellious Kurdish tribes in Syria that were displaced by the processes of Turkish nation-building.

extent the border influenced shifts on the layers social stratification. Later on, I would be able to integrate these narratives as the history of Kilis turning from the rural hinterland of Syrian Aleppo into a border town and problematize its impact on border dwellers and their sense of belonging. But it was the "smuggling narratives" that have eventually guided me in making up the whole picture and impelled me to explore the social change in this town at the intersection of local, national and transnational processes.

My first astonishment was when I listened to my interviewee Mustafa, an elder man of 75 years old, whom I have been told that he knew "Kilis culture" well and could inform me about it. When I asked the town dwellers about interviewing the notables, I was recommended prominent figures with particular interest in local history or culture among the town elite. I would later discover that he was born at a border village of Kilis, member of an extended family with relatives in Syrian border villages and his family, whom he had broken off, is an influential one in local politics. My intention to interview him was listening to the social history of Kilis.

My interviewee, probably to attract my attention with a gripping story, spontaneously introduced that they used to smuggle gold bullions at the border. The conversation veered off completely in a new direction. I could not help myself in asking subsequent questions that would enter into the details of his story. At the end of conversation, I had written down several pages of notes that would give a glimpse to the gold smuggling from Switzerland to Beirut in Lebanon and to Kilis across the Syrian border, which is then transported to Grand Bazaar of Istanbul. While this account induced fears of getting adrift by such accounts to an unknown direction regarding the research, I gave ear to similar accounts.

As I further established contact with dwellers standing out in the town life such as Yeşim, among the oldest female shopkeepers and owner of a coiffeur saloon, I succeeded to establish contact with a few tradesman families who made their wealth through cross-border trade. Because Yeşim's father was a former smuggler died at a young age, Yeşim had to start working as an early age as 14 and did the hair of women singing at the local night clubs to an audience mostly composed of smugglers. Inquiring the transformation of urban landscape in the town, I have interviewed two sisters of old generation, who had their old stone houses with yard (*havuş*) demolished in order to erect arcades of store,

accommodating many retail shops.[16] As owners of arcade, they were from a smuggler family and witnesses of contraband trade that took place across the border several decades ago. Yeşim also mediated between me and a former piggybacker (*sırtçı*)[17] from a border village, which rose to a small local entrepreneur in fueling station business. My visit to him informed me that the growth of illegal economy was effective in the quicker dissolution of landholding relations in the 1950s.

Occasionally, I came across with other border villagers who were formerly involved in carrying contraband goods across the border. With the help of a retired teacher to whom I met in Kilis and developed friendship, I had the chance to visit the border village in which she was born and raised. We had the company of an elder widow woman who still earned her living by doing small-scale trade and trying to steer undeclared goods she carry with her through the border gate. She was a fellow of my friend from her village of birth. She had many acquaintances at the border village we are headed to and at the others we passed by. Thanks to her, we were hosted by her acquaintances from her generation, former smugglers from border villagers and listened to their exchange of recollections about smuggling business.

Rarely, my encounters with the locals were accompanied with obscure, unusual, even uncanny accounts: murders committed in Kilis related to the rent-distribution conflicts, a six square meter exchange office in the downtown that could provide large amount of loan to a bank in cash, illicit money flowing to Middle East via Kilis as part of drug trafficking. They were certainly not verbalized in a plausible and overt way as I expressed here. These were bits of dialogues that I could not comprehend whether it is reliable, how deeper one could enter into or what background it had. They were disconnected and fragmented pieces that I was able to connect to each other in time.

Although I was gradually given the hints in the conversations with the locals, I just realized that there is a strong connection between their social mobility expectations and their border experiences when I completed my ninth month at the field: as I entered the classrooms of

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16 As I will detail further below, Behire and Tijen gave information about the 'embourgoisement' of trade notables, especially striving to acquire status with housing.

17 They were called as piggybacker because they carried heavy loads of smuggled good sometimes, up to 120 kilograms on their back by crossing through the mined zone of the frontier.

11th grade vocational school students. I have applied for teaching as a substitute teacher and I was given duty at one of the biggest secondary schools in Kilis giving vocational education to 1,350 students, to give philosophy lessons for a semester. I spared time to meet with the students on my first week in the classroom and asked them what living in this town had meant to them. They complained that it was a small place, they had no social surroundings and conservative town society put a lot of pressure on them.

Following these answers, I asked them what living in this *border town* had meant to them. In this turn, they told with great enthusiasm that the border was something good to have and thanks to it, they could have a good livelihood in this town. In few classes, there were students who said proudly that they could guide me in crossing the border covertly near the gate. I had a total 226 students including a handful of girls. A great part of them were from low-income family background, where the male head of family worked as shopkeeper, worker, agricultural laborer or small-scale subsistence farmer. Among their fathers, I estimate that the number of running a little shop in an arcade to sell contraband goods like tea, cigarette and kitchenware or street vendors were considerably high. I had even a student who did not attended frequently to class in order to drive to Aleppo and make shopping for his uncle's perfumery and cosmetics store in the arcade. Surprisingly enough, having not turned the minimum driving age -18 years old in Turkey- yet, he faced no problem at the border checks at the wheel.

Students' apparent excitement to tell how they could make a living thanks to the border made me think that their excitement stems from the knowledge that town dwellers circumvented the law by crossing the border with undeclared goods or carrying them across the mines. Longtime after I finished with teaching, I heard that there were students who accompanied their smuggler elders in crossing the mined fields at border villages. They were usually on drugs to overcome the fear of crossing the mines or getting caught by border surveillance. Small-scale traders with low-income level acknowledged smuggling, almost proudly, as illegal. They were not ashamed of it. Though being a childish exposure, the very publicity of the information that the border and smuggling was conceived as the main livelihood in the town had surprised me.

Long-time stay in the field is advantageous in making the anthropologist ready "for

unexpected things randomly happening in front of her" (MacClancy, 2002: 6). The fieldwork is serendipitous in bringing fortunate chance events that the researcher is not in quest of. Adopting the commonsensical principle of ethnographic researches as the anthropology discipline would suggest, the researcher should open herself up to the opportunities offered by the field. My encounter with students shook my self-preserved attitude regarding the illegal cross-border trade and dwellers' perception of it. Before, I was trying to locate myself at a safe distance to "smuggling narratives", listening to them as side issues, anecdotes for a researcher in the field but not constituting the content of primary material to investigate. My curiosity and eagerness to listen to these narratives conflicted with my desire of abstention from them. I was afraid of finding myself researching smuggling and asking questions that would engender the risk of coming to the attention of local authorities, border patrols or smugglers themselves. These actors could become uneasy with inquiries that would reveal their complicity or the security weakness at the border, or else, they would not want to get pointed to.

My worries about security proved plausible as I observed in the border villages located at zero point on the border, where military stations patrolling the border are practically within the village or quite dominant with a panoptic view of it. For example, as I took photograph of a small playground just next to the border fences at a village and a military station, two soldiers came after me and my friend, a teacher and a local of Kilis driving me to that village, and asked about my intention to take the picture of border (See Photograph 2). Apparently, it was forbidden to take the photograph of the border since it could expose a sort of border map to the enemy. What the military guards said had more or less this rationale as far as I could understand. Thanks to my friend being a native, he talked to them and convinced that we were just passerby and ignorant of the prohibition.

But it was with my students that I realized to what extent smuggling is normalized in the eyes of border dwellers and illegality, implied by smuggling, is interpreted differently than the outsiders would conceive. Yael Navaro-Yashin (2003) in her ethnography of North Cyprus, explores how normalizing discourses work on the border space constituted by the "no man's land" area and urban ruins that are left from the conflict between Cypriot Greeks and Turkish military after the latter's invasion of the island in 1974. According to her, the anthropologist should counter the natives' point of view in normalizing such disruptive

Photograph 2. Playground on the border.

The playground is almost contiguous to the minefield, set apart by wired fences and a red stop sign. My camera locates a youngster peasant standing near to the fences with his sheeps, which have already göne out of the frame to grass.

experiences such as living at the border. Hence, such zones of illegality –for instance, forbidding trespassing- might reveal how normalizing discourses operate in ordinary people's lives.

Smuggling or small-scale trade, which the State does not sanction as lawful but does not completely forbid either, can be also analyzed in terms of motivations and strategies of border dwellers in dealing with the risk and uncertainty engendered by the State (Doevenspeck & Mwanabiningo, 2012). The instability and arbitrariness generated by state policies, as in Kilis border, further complicates the lives of border dwellers in adapting themselves to new forms of spatial mobility, confinement and surveillance created by border. As the town community perceives the border gate as a means of subsistence, this trope clearly illustrates how smuggling is normalized. The enthusiastic answers of my secondary school students could be considered as a reflection of this normalization that the anthropologists should work against.

3.3. People, Events, Encounters: The Field as a Site of Negotiation

The border is an intriguing research place for those whose knowledge of border consists of international airport and passport check. Border is not just the boundary line where the state apparatuses of surveillance and control are seated, it is also a lived space with social ties straddling over it. But as far as it evokes disorder, corruption and illegality for the outsiders as well as researchers, it also risks appearing as an exotic field site. "Going to the field", as we usually say, remains the distinctive characteristics of anthropology since it implies that the necessary experience of becoming an anthropologist (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997). But the notion of field is not without its ideological baggage. As Gupta and Ferguson argue, the idea of "field" as "not home" stems from the colonialist desire to explore subjugated communities and cultures in their 'natural state' (1997: 7). This original separation of the field from home have left the legacy to the anthropology the heroic journey of the West to the Other –that is, to the field as the only way to encounter the difference. The field, associated with Other, would appear as an uncivilized site in the eyes of researcher. They remind us how our stories of entry and leaving the field actually rebuild the radical differences between home and the field.

Thus I am reminded about the critical appraisals of anthropological theory in order to

review the people, events and encounters that I came across with in the field. Clifford and Marcus paved the way for critical anthropological theory with their work *Writing Culture* (1986) where they pointed out to the "repatriation of ethnography back home". According to them, the ethnographic researches shifted away from the colonial gaze to the differences within the First World and started to focus on the Third World migrants, people of colour, minorities and other subaltern subjects. This shift has also constituted an interpretive turn, problematizing the assertions of objectivity and representation. The idea of observing social reality at a distance to attain the objectivity is criticized by the authors, which argue for the dialogical and polyphonic ethnographies. As they suggest, the ethnographer can only produce an "objective" account of social reality textually and in collaboration with her respondents. In other words, the lived experience can only be expressed from the ethnographer's perspective, which requires a self-reflexive attitude. These critical reviews of the anthropology discipline suggested that the ethnographer and the research subjects have not fixed positions, but rather they construct each other.

Critical anthropological theory puts the ethnographer to the foreground as a research object and opposes the notion of field as a given set of relationships. It assumes that the field is constructed upon the terms set by the researcher, local people and the events developing, restricting or twisting researcher's perspective. The field is reconstructed as the researcher negotiates her options in each instance. To elaborate this point, I will narrate my experience of field entry, which was a continual effort till the end of fieldwork. In the light of this critical tradition, I incorporate subjective experiences as part of research process and analysis. In this vein, I also discuss how I tried to locate myself and my interviewees, sometimes jeopardizing my researcher identity.

3.3.1. Striving For Entry: Continually Constructing the Field

While I turned my focus on belonging and social mobility in border context, my inquiries addressed how the cross-border trade is criminalized by the State and how different strata cope with it. The range of interviewees extended from the notable families to the nouveau riches and middle class, to the low-income dwellers, both urban and rural. It also included tradesmen or piggybackers who were engaged in illegal trade. These encounters introduced an "ethics of illegality" (Roitman, 2006) that regulated the realm of illegal economy. My

encounter with Urup Ismail is an exemplary one. Based on hearsay, I have been told that Urup İsmail was the sheikh of smugglers' sharia, sort of smugglers' guild who administered justice regarding the disagreements and conflicts among themselves. I will quote hear a rather long account that would illustrate kinds of encounter I have come upon in striving to establish contacts with local dwellers and becoming involved in their daily routines.

I have been sitting within one of the arcades line up on the main street of the town, on a tiny shop run by a young man and waiting for Urup İsmail for opening his shop next to ours, which he uses as an office to run his daily affairs. Urup İsmail, famous by his nickname,[18] is known as the sheikh of "Smugglers' sharia" that acquired its legitimacy long time ago among the town population. Smugglers' sharia is not mentioned much in Kilis. I presumed it as an old-dated association, active in the pre-1980 coup period. The man I came to speak should be one of the remaining members. The fact that I did not know the meaning of his nickname transferred from Arabic to the vernacular Turkish made him rather mysterious. I tried to prepare myself for the meeting by making estimations about his personality and outlook: someone arousing respect and appearing competent in administering things. Eventually, I was told that he came. The young man, who allowed me to wait in his shop, saved himself from the desk he was stuck behind. Handicapped, he could walk with difficulty.

It is not unforeseen to say that Urup did not have the appearance I expected for. About his seventies, this old man, walked into his shop jerkily to his sides, with a long, laced black *aba* (a loose-fitting sleeveless garment) pushed carelessly into his waist and worn a red and white *kefiyyeh* in his head, typical in Arabic culture and partly, in Southeastern edges of the country. He welcomed us together with his son to the shop. He seemed clearly uncomfortable that I came to meet him in particular. But he could ingeniously manage the situation by warding my questions off with his original diplomacy and inserting between the breaks "I liked this girl very much, buster".[19] Also, I was most welcome because I was a "lady" (*hanım)*.

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[18] I have changed the name as well as the nickname of my interviewees for ethical reasons. Urup is a deformative version of the Arabic word *urub*, meaning a quarter. The word in the vernacular is mostly used for a quarter gold coin (*urup altın).*

[19] *Ben bu kızı çok sevdim, lan!*

He was crouched down on a stool in the midst. He seemed unconvinced why I came to speak with him. I told him that I was conducting a research on border and wondering about how it affected the living and social relations with Syria. Defeating my attempts to ask questions, even making his reluctance obvious when he turned on the small TV on the wall still kept up the conversation. I learned that he murdered a man, though "it was shameful to let such things be known". He had run away the town in order to escape the law. As he continued to tell: "I have wandered around the Syrian deserts for fifteen years, my girl and that's why I would become sick straight away whenever I take off this one on my head [indicating his *keffiyyeh*]".[20]

I have been pertinaciously groping after every detail that might prolong the conversation. The matter raised with my question about the photographs on the wall. Most of them were black-and-white pictures. His father's picture was that drawing one. Not a real picture. And the others? I thought, they might be his relatives. His grandfather, his uncles. But Urup's son replied that they were all pictures of former smugglers, including those who committed murder. "Yet", his son assured about the murdered ones that "they all deserved it, they were always unrighteous".[21] Then his father, Urup made an abrupt theatrical gesture. He opened his right hand palm toward me and showed his four fingers. He then took his hand to his mouth, and said "this", touching his middle finger to his tongue. His wet finger indicated his mouth. Later, he said "and this" again, this time his fingers held near his belly, pointed downwards: "If you control them, nothing happens to you".[22] Not the banal content of what he tried to tell me, but the fact that this man sitting on his stool comfortably looked into my eyes and pointed his sex organ fairly highlighted my unease. As it were, I have given ear to what I should not actually have. As it were, my gender was an excess. The thought that I was in a place where I was supposed not to be suffocated me.

Yet I kept sitting without knowing what purpose it would serve. I have been in Kilis long enough to suppress my uneasiness and wait –sometimes, for nothing. A bit later on, fortunately, he received several guests in his shop. As the arcade shops lost their attraction

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[20] *Suriye çöllerinde on beş yıl gezdim kızım, o yüzden bu başımdakini çıkarsam hemen hasta olurum*

[21] *Hepsi hak etmiştir, hep ölen haksızdır.*

[22] *Bunlara hakim olursan sana hiçbir şey olmaz.*

and run out of business, they have turned into contact offices rent by men who are used to sustain their socialization outside the domestic realm. A polyvocal conversation had been going on. When Urup İsmail pointed at one of his guests and told me he was talking on the phone to a deputy to the parliament –probably of Kilis-, I directed my attention to him and his phone conversation. The man who called the deputy was asking jokingly the latter "to get Urup İsmail off their backs". The government's Syria policy created obstacles to the transnational trade and regional economy. In fact, Urup's son, employed as a driver in a transport company, could not receive his salary for two months together with his colleagues when the trade with Syria came to a halt.

I have just witnessed a lobbying arranged and developed then and there by calling the deputy. No one happens to be there incidentally apart from me. Everybody had called a deputy on his mobile, was up before the governor or the mayor to speak to him hastily and tried to fix his affairs with public officers informally, apart from me. This time I felt a weird enthusiasm for being able to witness it. My persistence to sit in that shop had provided insights how the local interests at stake with the declining border economy could become engage in broader national politics. Though he could ward my questions off, I could manage to listen from him that the border trade was a source of living. Throughout the conversation, he also implied that the State overlooked the smuggling in the East parts of Turkey. To him, the State was treating Kilis town a stepchild with comparison to the Eastern cities –that is, Kurdish-populated borderlands where Kurdish actors beyond the border could be powerfully involved in the regional economy. His guests have redrawn the boundaries of what is social licit and what is not about the smuggling, admitting it as an unlawful practice.

I believe that this account of encounter with Urup İsmail reflects curiosity, indeterminacy and hesitations that we, as researchers, experience in the field in to deal with the reluctance of town dwellers to speak to us. These fractures are constitutive elements of the field experience, which would be neglected if the researcher adopts a genre of autobiographical writing, producing a coherent field story in dialogue with the researched 'others' (Hazan &Hertzog, 2012: 2). This genre of writing would presuppose a conscious state of mind about the ethnographer in the field, able to define every seconds what she is going through during the fieldwork, which is not realistic. As ethnographers, we are not able to reflect on

what is happening before us just right now and our memories of the field are likely to contain numerous instances in which we have felt inapt and helpless.

Hence, the critical anthropology argues that the field is not a set of bounded relationships that begin and end, where you could enter and leave. Rather it is constructed by the ethnographer in her attempts to "accommodate and interweave sets of relationships and engagements developed in one context with those arising in another" (Amit, 2000: 6). The normalization of "smuggling" as part of border experience, which my high school students made me realize, demonstrates in effect the clash between cultural norms and values about smuggling I have brought from 'home' and the ones dominating in Kilis town. The stigmatization of unregulated border trade as smuggling had been influential in both contexts, but meant differently. Does not the fieldwork constitute the experience of ethnographer, going through clashes between what is beyond her comprehension and what is eventually deciphered? This is why Rapport suggests that 'going to the field' is an experiential and cognitive movement rather than a physical one (Rapport 2000: 73).

The smuggling narratives I have listened to involved respondents such as shopkeeper, village imam, the old lady pilgrim in the neighborhood, retired teacher or secondary school student, all of which defined their practice of earning income as smuggling either at a certain period of time or as a life-long career. Smuggling had been described as a profession and in comparison with thievery, while the latter is regarded as a shameful act. As I gave ear to them, I discerned the broader context in which the social and economic ties across the Turkish-Syrian border could be sustained and yet criminalized by the New Republic after the decline of Ottoman Empire. In this vein, these conversations put forth different ways of coping and adapting the delineation of the border, introduced in the lives of border dwellers not just as a geographical disruption to the movement, but also an as a juridical category. By setting the terms of illegality, the State criminalizes unauthorized border-crossings as illegal and declares the crossing visitor to a kin as transgressor, the asylum-seeker as fugitive and the objects moving across the border as smuggled. These conversations, on the other hand, indicated to what extent the State notion of illegality could be continually negotiated as well.

3.3.2. Self-Reflexivity and Orientation in the Field

I have already mentioned that my initial interviews with notable families had driven me towards the unspoken, implicit or uncanny side of the local context. The revision in the research question was not guided alone by the setbacks and opportunities effectual in the fieldwork, but the curiosity about neglected issues that people sounded reticent among which "smuggling narratives" lied at the core. The critical anthropology directs its attention to the subjective disposition of the researcher to examine the painful, protected or secretive aspects in the fieldwork and this experience should be incorporated into the ethnographic data rather than obscured: the ethnographer should learn to value her shadow casting upon the field (McLean &Leibing, 1997). Thus, this anthropological literature points out beyond the explicit and underline the need for the researcher to realize her feeling, intuition and experiential thoughts, as I revealed in my encounter with Urup İsmail.

The emotional involvement in the field may give rise to inner conflicts that the researcher had to overcome, which in turn help to build knowledge about her field of study. My journey from home to the field can be best depicted in Cedric Parizot's words, who favours the privileged ethnographic perspective acquired with personal attachments to the locals during his fieldwork on Bedouins in both Israeli and Palestinian settlements. He suggests that emotional involvement and the difficulty he encountered while moving between different conflicted worlds provided him with a certain depth of understanding that he could not have reached if I had maintained controlled detachment (Parizot: 2012: 131). For instance, I would not be able to realize that I had initially adopted the State's category of illegality regarding the border economy as deviant and illegitimate along with a biased judgment against border dwellers engaged in this trade.

Sharing feelings, thoughts or experiences of living on a borderline zone of isolation, confinement and conservatism helped develop relations of empathy and companionship with several local dwellers. When I have learned that these people were engaged in the trade of contraband goods in the past or they were still doing small-scale trade of undeclared goods, I had been shaken to find it out. For instance, my biggest surprise was when I have listened from Cemal, a retired teacher in his mid-sixties, with whom we have been exchanging pleasant conversations about news on the national agenda, books and life

concerns in his little stationery shop, that he used to sell smuggled guns in the shop of a relative, who is notoriously remembered in the following decades as a leading mafia chief involved in large-scale smuggling and, allegedly, political murders in collaboration with Turkish and foreign intelligence. As I saw him untailored for engaging illegal businesses, I did not expect him to be involved in it, albeit in his youth.

The trade activities that local dwellers told as smuggling were initially beyond my comprehension because of my normative judgments about them. I had a rather black-and-white picture discriminating between those who are engaged and those who are not. The fact that I had met with that retired teacher, the old pilgrim lady or the grocery man in the neighbourhood and secondary school students and developed emotional attachment to them subverted my biased perspective. As I acquired friends among the locals, I could gain more insight about the background of illegal economy and the signifying practices that were pushed out of sight. While some of them were civil servants, who were outsider in this town though they were working for seven to nine years, the rest were native and at the periphery of town elite, yet in connection with various social circles. Together with Cemal, these people help me in bridging the gap between my cultural world as an outsider and their own. As Paul Rabinow assumed in his *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco* about his host and guide Ali, any of these people "was taking realms of his own world and interpreting them for an outsider" by spending time in a "liminal, self-consciousness world between culture" (Rabinow, 1977:34). They included middle class literates, low-middle class artisan and youth employed in low-paid or precarious jobs.

Ayyuş was an educated architect and researcher in her early fifties, who had returned to the town after her years of work in a big city and had been carrying out restoration projects as part of her ambition for the cultural preservation of local history. She introduced me not with the architectural heritage both in the town center and the countryside, but also the social history of Kilis that she had been long inquiring. Her career as a local architect in cultural preservation and restoration projects had been exposing her to the struggles waged among the potential contractor firms, municipality and governorate for rent distribution. Thus, our conversation could give hints about the priorities of State actors regarding the urban management and clientele relations between State actors and regional entrepreneurs –most of them were not local, but from nearby larger cities.

Halil was a 40 years old primary school teacher and sociable man with many acquaintances in the town, including his childhood friends from nouveau rich families. He had also relatives from a border village involved in smuggling by starting as piggybackers. His own curiosity and intuition offered insightful conversations about the most secretive aspects of illegal economy. Necla and Sevinç were the young siblings in their twenties, whom I have met via their brother in my former workplace. They were employed respectively as a substitute teacher in primary education and a contract worker in the state hospital. They were from a border village at *Kürt Dağı* region –the region is known as Kurd Mountain in the vernacular. This region is an old settlement for Kurdish nomadic tribes on the highlands extending from North Syria towards Kilis border and included the villages lying on the southwestern part of the borderline. Thus, it continues to occupy the popular imagination as the geographical homeland for the Kurdish population, despite the hegemonic discourse of "Kurdified Turcoman tribes" and though village populations could be heterogeneous due to inter-ethnic marriages. My friendship with them was strengthened by visits to the border village where their parents lived. I have had not only the opportunity to meet with their kin villagers and listen to the contraband trade on border, but also the chances of observation regarding the political sensitivity about the "Kurdish question" and its subtle effects on local politics.

Hatice was a restaurant worker in her mid-twenties from a poor family, with relatives at a border village and in Aleppo. Her late father was a small-scale smuggler, crossing often to the Syrian side and took a Syrian woman as a second spouse as soon as he made money. Though Hatice and her four siblings were angry with their father's second family, Hatice was proud of her father as a smuggler. Occasional visits to her family's home also enabled me to observe the sociological profile of low-income families.

Finally, Hüseyin was a 43 years old upholsterer and second hand furniture dealer, whose shop was haunted by a rich variety of people, including local bureaucrats and civil servants, middle class families and university students. He was an able man to put his networks available for social gatherings either for religious, political or entertaining purposes. Thanks to his love of theatre and past experience as theatre player in the city of Istanbul, he had few occasions to invite theatre groups from Istanbul to take the stage in the town. As an active supporter of the ruling AKP party and member of a local religious community,

he was in contact with the local administration of the party organization as well as AKP parliamentary elected for two terms in Kilis until, allegedly, he had to withdraw his candidacy after the rumors of corruption in relation to the 'underworld' of the border economy.

Nevertheless, the emotional involvement during the fieldwork might also become restrictive. It may impel the researcher to observe the social reality through the lenses of individuals she gets emotionally attached and loose a critical perspective. Still, I believe that personal attachment with locals from so different backgrounds offered to me a broader scope to the internal dynamics at play among socio-economic strata, by revealing inner tensions and sectarianism, while getting pulled into these clashes necessarily afforded an intersubjective objectivity. Emotional involvement also raises ethical questions regarding the relationship that the researcher establishes with her interviewees and informants. Critical anthropology argues for the self-disclosure on the part of researcher in the field for a polyvocal authorship and transparency in exposing her identity during the fieldwork. As the border ethnographers suggest, however, this might prove useless if the locals try to manipulate the researcher to make her produce a 'scientific account' in line with their political interests (Manos, 2010) or risky by exposing the researcher to the estrangement and exclusion (Vila, 2003). Indeed, my reluctance for disclosing religious and political opinions had been well-grounded, especially after the reaction of Yeşim, the owner of coiffeur saloon. Yeşim, though not covered, was a devotedly religious woman who used to read quran in her workplace when it was not haunted by the customers. I had the habit of stopping by the salon at the town center, even though I had no need of her service and used to exchange conversation with her and Yeşim's friend, an old lady from the notables -and owner of an arcade whom I had interviewed- frequently visiting Yeşim at her workplace. Once, while we were speaking sweet nothings, I came across with Yeşim's persistence to take a reply for her question whether I believed in the hereafter. As I could not give the right answer that she likely expected, I met with her reaction. Yeşim, learning that I am an unbeliever, gave her negative opinions about me, as well as my parents and I did not go ever back to her saloon.

3.3.3. Dilemma of Becoming Insider: Researcher's Identity Contested

While complete self-disclosure was not possible in the field, ethnographic research at Kilis border town still required 'intimate' relations with the interviewees and informants, eased by my teacher identity at the expense of my researcher identity. When I came in Kilis at the beginning of 2011, I opted for staying with a lecturer in Kilis University where about six thousands students were registered. Having her as the housemate turned me into a teacher, which connoted both secondary and tertiary education in the eyes of the local dwellers. They founded strange the fact that I have been conducting a research in a place as an outsider –I had no relatives or marriage connection in the town- where I had no stable employment or tenure either. So, they filled the gaps with an explanation seemingly plausible that I have been a teacher. Also, teaching in high school for a semester had further strengthened it.

The secretive attitude of border dwellers in talking about the illegal cross-border trade could be only avoided when they invited me to an 'insider' position, a family friend or a close acquaintance and complicated my relationship with them. Thus, I was not often able to register the interviews by a voice recorder -occasionally, I have been bluntly refused. In such cases, they turned out into bits of conversations, small talks and encounters rather than coherent and uninterrupted in-depth interviews, making me a guest welcomed with goodwill rather than a researcher.

Still, this position could also afford insider information that I would not be able to gather otherwise. For instance, my subsequent visit to 78 year-old Asiye, doing a small-scale trader to contribute to the living of her family, encouraged me to accompany her in a trip to Aleppo. I was longing for seeing Aleppo but I was afraid of the armed conflicts expanding in Syria at the end of 2011 due to the harsh measures taken by Assad government against protesters. On the other hand, she needed a companion to be able to carry the heavy load of goods despite her advancing age. Not only did she need me because of the weighty load, but she also had to have a company to be able to cross all her goods by making the custom officers believe that some are mine. Besides, it was a physically compelling trip for her to go alone since she had to go by using the cheapest means possible –that is, by making bargain with the passing-by drivers to share the ride, with the shared

taxis, and motorized rickshaws in the countryside- and walk around too much for a shopping at the best price possible.

Thanks to her guidance, we strolled throughout the narrow alleys of Souk Madina in Aleppo, historic bazaar now burnt out by the civil war in Syria and the marketplaces in the old city. She had acquaintances in the city and so, our Turkish hosts, who were descendants of a wealthy notable family from Kilis, welcomed us at a poor suburb during our overnight stay. The two-day trip to Aleppo provided a chance to glimpse at the custom declaration processes at both sides, as well as the border-crossers trying to circumvent them.

In regard to the critical questions whether ethnographers exploit the intimacy as an investigative tool however self-reflexive they can be (Amit, 2000), the anthropologist Michael Herzfeld argues that having an intimate rapport with informants is the goal of good ethnography (2009b). To achieve it, the ethnographer should be able to enter the zone of "cultural intimacy". For Herzfeld, this is not merely defined by the familiarity of that culture. Also, this is a zone of "internal knowledge whereby members of a society recognize each other through their flaws and foibles rather than through their idealized typicality as heroic representatives of the nation" (2009b: 133). Although Herzfeld's argument emphasizes it as particularly relevant for a study of nationalism, I suggest that it applies to the localisms and micronationalist tendencies as well. Herzfeld illustrates his thesis by referring to the embracement of ridiculing jokes by local communities as national flavour of humour and identity. There are several such jokes or witty sayings about the natives of Kilis, especially underlying their slyness.[23]

Moreover, according to Herzfeld, the secrecy, as it is socially constituted, required to be performed in the public space in order to be understood to exist (2009a: 136). Thus, acting with discretion could be effective if only one conveys signals to those in the know should understand in a way that others would not realize what is happening. In other words, for

[23] One of the most popular jokes told by Kilis locals is the story of a man from Kilis and a snake put together in a sack. The snake would then begin to cry out that the man from Kilis is biting him. In the Turkish vernacular, it goes as follows: "*Kilisliyle yılanı bir çuvala koymuşlar. Bir süre sonra yılan bağırmaya başlamış: Kilisli beni sokoor*". The omission of verb suffixe "-y" is typical in the local dialect and, it is alleged, resonates with the Armenian dialect. Turcologist from Kilis assumes it as traces of Oğuz and Kipchak dialect of nomadic Turcoman tribes settled in Gaziantep-Kilis region (Arslan-Erol, 2010). But I should note that my observations reveals this dialect as particularly dominant among urban community of Kilis, rather than rural.

establishing an intimate rapport with the locals, one needed to be aware of the cultural codes or gestures of this private communication. Herzfeld gives an account of his failure to do it with reference to his ethnography of Cretan villages (2009b). There, his sheep stealing friends lure him to go raiding with them. As one of the villagers comes to pick him up from the coffeehouse where Herzfeld waited, he makes a slight nodding gesture to call him. Herzfeld asks him for confirmation and reciprocate verbally to an unspoken gesture. By failing to reciprocate appropriately in the public, he proves to be indiscreet and imprudent, likely to put his fellows at risk. I will further discuss it by giving an example about my own failing attempt with a shopkeeper.

One of my friends, teaching in a primary school of Kilis for four years, took me in order to assist my research to an arcade shop selling contraband cigarettes and other goods. He knew the shopkeeper and expected him to talk about how this 'border business' is running. Thus, he introduced me and demanded the shopkeeper with these words to tell about it. The shopkeeper did not reacted and replied back by saying that he would tell to him and not me. With frustration, I thought over and over why he did not tell *me*. What should I do in order to make them speak to me?

The field notes taken by the researcher register clearly these moments of confusions and self-questioning because "we interpret our confusions primarily in personal terms, as signs of inadequacy, rather than in terms of cultural disjunctures" (Lederman, 1990: 87). As I realized long after, the obstacle to the communication was the way we asked the shopkeeper about his 'business'. My friend also named some villages or zones at the border where smuggling could take place by transgressing the border surveillance. He and his brothers in Gaziantep wanted to engage in small-scale trade by driving through the border gate but they failed to enter it as locals of Kilis seized the benefits of dwelling at the border by deterring outsiders from it. It was my friend's failure and not mine, as he had exposed the insider information in the public –that is, before my presence and the shopkeeper refused to talk because of his indiscreetness. But, one can also assume that he still needed to justify the small-scale trade as the principal means of earning in this border town by referring to a comparison between two countries, by presuming the corruption, disorder and incivility to the opposite side of the border.

Thus being insider in Kilis requires knowing when to keep quiet as well. Following Herzfeld, I would argue that the community in this border town is partly constructed by the townsmen covering up the flaws and foibles of their fellows by keeping silent about them. The act of denouncement, for instance, is regarded as socially illicit and strongly despised in the town and the denouncer can be severely punished, even to death –though the cases of denouncement are not rare. The question whether I am from Kilis, which I believed it was posed as part of an acquaintance ceremony actually has not only a literal meaning. It also implies whether I have insider information about living at a border town. But it is only at the end of my fieldwork I have realized it.

To what extent the researcher can assume an insider identity, present there only for the fieldwork? The insider/outsider divide is contested by critical anthropology theories with the repatriation of ethnography back home. The anthropologist, no more ally of colonialism, explores her own society in which she lives. The anthropologist's position depends on the historical contexts in which she conducts her ethnography and her relationship with the research subjects is continually negotiated, as discussed above in this chapter. Border ethnographer Pablo Vila reminds that insider/outsider question is even more complicated regarding the border studies (Vila, 2003). The border ethnographer is both insider and outsider, as the border is a complex collusion between 'us' and 'them'. While I have been an outsider with no kin, marriage or employment relation in Kilis town, my national identity afforded an insider position due to the Arab hostility rooted in Turkish society. In particular, the flux of Syrian migrants to the border cities has shifted my position to an insider as the town dwellers reacted unfavorably and shared their feeling of 'us' with me by expressing their despise against them.

It is worth questioning whether my occasional preoccupation with smuggling narratives may have limited the scope of my research. If I had been not been so much preoccupied with disclosing them, I could have thought of asking questions, for instance, about the transformation of cross-border kinship relations. On the other hand, as I inquired smuggling practices, new questions came up in the interviews: Syrian brides rising in number with the 2009 visa exemption agreement, the controversies about the border transit regime allowing the landowners to cross to Syrian side, the evolution of commercial agriculture and sharecropping relations and shifts in the mechanisms of border surveillance

could be enumerated. These interviews opened horizons beyond the commonplace and mythic narratives of National Pact,[24] which I listened when I asked the dwellers what the border has meant to them.

3.4. Concluding Remarks

When I have first decided to conduct a research on ethnic and religious identities at Kilis border, I had the idea in mind to explore the narrative construction of identities as border studies literature suggested. My research question was informed by the arguments about processes of identity formation at the border, in which the border actors reinforced ethnic and religious differences in order to identify the other as well as to define themselves. I intended to inquire how the cross-border interaction shaped identity formation, in what ways these relationships undermined or accentuated ethnic and religious identities. In this regard, my research question was shaped within the framework of new problematics raised by the globalization agenda of border studies, underlining the questions of culture and identity.

But as I have discussed in this chapter, my field experience reorganized main questions of the study by incorporating the question of identity into the broader framework of bordering processes. Rather than taking the impact of border on cultural landscape, the field study impelled me to focus on the multiple processes of bordering interacting each other. Border dwellers in turn accommodated themselves to the cultural, territorial and economic boundaries by relying on various strategies. The point I want to underline is that the identity was not the overriding question for border dwellers. They talked about economic problems, class tensions and political controversies. Their interviews underlined military violence, stigmatization, criminalization, and other sorts of problems associated with the border, which hindered what the dwellers might see as a worthwhile life.

On the other hand, the field experience disclosed beneath the secretive attitudes of town dwellers not only their concerns about maintaining their status, protecting their economic

[24] For example, I have heard several times the following story about the demarcation of border: While the borderline is supposed to pass by Nübül town at the southward of the actual frontier, it is demarcated to the north, passing by Tibil (Öncüpınar) where the border gate is located today because of an Armenian woman intervening by paying a bin of gold to French soldiers.

interests and eluding law enforcement, but also about building a strong sense of community on the basis of their common experience of living at border. Moreover, their sense of attachment straddled the border and encompassed dwellers of the Syrian side, to whom they referred as kins whether or not related by blood. The interviews underlined how border dwellers tended to navigate across ethnic and religious differences without necessarily mingling with them or distinguishing themselves, but simply for the sake of doing business.

In this respect, the field experience culminated in the idea that the border is not only a barrier that distinguished border communities along ethnic and religious lines, but it is an opportunity for earning livelihood, realizing aspirations and establishing bonds of trust, reciprocity and affinity.

CHAPTER IV

FALL FROM GRACE: TRADITIONAL NOTABLES OF KILIS

Kilis town cannot be compared to the spectacular ancient city of Aleppo which was covered by UNESCO's list of world heritage sites - though today it is wretched by the war in Syria. But the old town center still retains imprints of regional architectural texture with stone monuments, narrow streets, stone-laid barrel-vaulted passages and blind alleys. The urban sprawl has engulfed the old town and the derelict buildings by recycling them into the urban development, making the ancient architecture (except the restored monumental buildings) appear like a ramshackle. Until recently, the town landscape was a testimony to the lineage and patrimony of local notables rooted in the late Ottoman era. Presently, it seems to attest notables' fall from grace. This chapter explores the notables' experience of falling from grace at the southeastern margins of Turkey and its repercussions on their sense of belonging. The local notables in Kilis embody the town's historic identity in their recollections of family biographies better than any other strata.

The local notables in Kilis constitute the old wealth that dominates the economic and cultural life as well as local politics till the 1960s. But the old wealth does not form a homogeneous group. It was crosscut by inner tensions, particularly between traditional landed notables and trade notables. This chapter aims to understand in what ways border induce changes lead the notable families to experience the downward mobility. It reveals that the traditional landed notables, rather than trade notables, suffer from the sense of falling from grace. "Falling from grace" is used by Katherine S. Newman's study on the downward mobility that the American middle class experiences, failing their commitment to the American dream (1999). But it is not a mere figure of speech. In fact, Newman invites the reader to take into account that downward mobility is a hidden dimension of American society because it does not fit to their cultural universe. So, the middle class going down the social ladder not only has to cope with the economic hardship but also has to cope with falling from grace; that is, "losing their proper place". The downward mobility affects the perceptions and values of the individuals experiencing it and these alterations

Source: Mehmet Gülmez/Atlas Magazine

Photograph 3. Kilis town.

extend over to the whole social net of family. This chapter discusses the downward mobility experienced by the local notables in terms of their feeling of such dislocation which pushes them to embrace the values and practices which they once found to be disgraceful. The fact that the wealth creation through illegal means is normal and is even aspirational among the local notables is illustrative.

The demarcation of Turkish-Syrian border in 1921, despite succeeding amendments of the frontier line, meant that Kilis town had to abandon fertile agricultural lands and move to landed estates across the border at the Syrian side. It also shifted regional economy between Kilis and Aleppo, as well as cultural bonds of attachment. I have focused in this chapter on the inner tensions and distinctions among local notables under the new historical context imposed by the border. Firstly, I have introduced the notable families and have described, their distinguishing characteristics with reference to the scholarly literature to provide a definition. This introduction clarifies the division among the notables and demonstrates that the traditional landed elite denied the status of notability to the trade notables.

The following sections point to the ways in which traditional landed notables act upon their vested interests in land and its political as well as economic consequences. Their desire to secure their landed estates indulges them to pursue their interests within the context of border disputes and negotiate the annexation of Kilis town with the French Mandate Syria. The consequence is the stigmatization of the notables as traitors and putting their entitlement to citizenship at risk. The disintegration of large-scale landholding and the loss of their landed estates at the Syrian side are coercive conditions that force the landed families to converse their capital held in one form to another in order to reproduce their social standing. The traditional landed notables consider it as decline. The capital accumulation through illegal means in Kilis as of the 1960s is the significant factor that leads to the experience of falling from grace among traditional landed notables and distinguishes them from their counterpart elsewhere. Finally, the chapter explores the ways in which their sense of falling from grace culminates in a nostalgic attachment to a home place, which is imagined as part of the city of Aleppo.

4.1. Who Represent the Notables? Problems in Identifying Notable Families

The access to local notable families had not been an easy process. As for my initial months

in the field, I was challenged with several setbacks in identifying which families are viewed as the notables. It seemed unusual, because I assumed that these families constituted the local rulers in the Ottoman social order and they kept their power with the transition to Republican regime. Here, the ethnographic account of Michael Meeker (2000) about notable families of town, a provincial district of Trabzon is worth remembering. Meeker tells at the very beginning of his field research how the conversations with local people and state officials lead him to reveal that two families dominated the public life of the town over a century and this was a fact acknowledged to a certain extent by the locals as well (Meeker, 2002: 5). This is not the case with Kilis town. I will first introduce in this section a theoretical framework to discuss in what ways the notables constitute the upper stratum with reference to the scholarly literature on Middle Eastern historiography and social stratification.

One major setback in identifying the local notables is the changing demographics of the town. The urban center received a large number of rural migrants from nearby villages in the last four decades, while the notable families tended to move out of the town for seizing better education and investment opportunities in the cities. The rural migrants do not distinguish the old wealth from the new rich in ascendancy in the 1970s and the following decades. The majority of town dwellers identify the wealthy families possessing the economic and political influence as the notables. The young generations are brought up with the stories about the notable families that they heard from their elders and embrace their elders' feeling of repugnance from the notables as their own experiment. The elders' recollections reveal a long-established tension between the rural and the urban until recently, which is rooted in the late Ottoman social stratification structure. The interviewees' recollections at the border villages reveal that they used to live in dire straits of sharecropping by cultivating the lands of notable families and the latter were influential patrons protecting the peasants' interests and needs. Thus, they help us to distinguish the old wealth and the perpetuation of their traditional paternalistic domination over the rural during the formative years of the Republic.

On the other hand, the urban natives of the town tend to contain the definition of notables as limited with traditional landed notables. The wealthy families of mercantile origin distinguish themselves from landed notables, calling them *eşraf* and name themselves as

esnaf (tradesmen), even though they have been incorporated among the ranks of notables at the turn of the twentieth century.[25] Occasionally, families whose elders were assigned to higher posts within local bureaucracy might tend to conceal it by claiming their origin as farmer or tradesman, if their elders have made their fortune by abusing their authority or by getting involved in lucrative business like gold smuggling. In short, while the traditional landed notables and trade notables compose the old wealth of the town, the inner distinctions among them are maintained singling out the *esnaf* families (trade notables) from the *eşraf*. The following sections will elaborate further on the *eşraf* identity as well as the political contention at the historical background of the distinction between *eşraf* and *esnaf*. This distinction is important to understand why traditional landed notables, rather than trade notables, experience a strong sense of falling from grace.

4.1.1. Question of Notables as Early Capitalists in Kilis

This chapter draws on the "politics of notables" as a paradigm to explore the old wealth and their social mobility strategies in Kilis town. The notion "politics of notables", asserted by scholars of Middle Eastern history such as Hourani, Khoury and Dawn, relies on that the urban politics of the Ottoman provinces can be understood if it is seen in terms of a politics of notables or to use Max Weber's phrase, a 'patriciate' (Hourani, 1993: 87). The local notables derived their sources from their control of land and land tax, urban real estate, local handicrafts, trade and *evkaf* (*waqf* properties). The notables implied a political class in the Ottoman Empire, as they could play a certain political role as intermediaries between government and people and –according to Hourani, within certain limits- as leaders of urban population.

In the Ottoman historiography, the notables can be also called *ayan*, referring to the local governors assigned by the central authority with the duty of tax farming for the Ottoman treasury. The notion of *ayan* began to be used for the local governors identified with the abuse of the ruling authority, public office or tribal power for arbitrary government, imposition of extra taxing and embezzling waqf property with the deterioration of tax system and mostly signified a certain era in the Ottoman history. The alternative notion of

[25] Beyhan, an old-generation women from trade notables has particularly emphasized the distinction between *eşraf* and *esnaf,* reclaiming her family's mercantile origins.

eşraf, derived from the Arabic plural of the word "*şerafet*" (the dignified ones), does not have such a political connotation or historical reference similar to the notion of ayan, but it is equivalently used for signifying the notables. However, both notions are value-laden concepts and ascribe a moral quality or essence.

To commence my discussion about the notables as early capitalists, I should first introduce the question how Hourani-Khoury paradigm defines the notables as a class in sociological terms. The significance of this question is twofold: firstly, it will provide me with a theoretical framework to understand the socially stratification in Kilis town inherited from the late Ottoman Empire and the continuum between two different phases of history, namely the Ottoman and the Republican era and secondly, it will help me to explore how the local notables in Kilis reproduced their social position.

When Khoury (1990) revisited his own discussion about the paradigm, he reexamined it in terms of a class analysis based on his research on Syrian geography. For Khoury, the class analysis could be helpful for understanding the nature and behaviors of urban notables after the introduction of the 1858 Land Code which allowed the private ownership of the land and the rise of a landowning-bureaucratic class. Here, the class was defined in terms of its relationship to the means of production as well as to its social position of its constituents (peasants, artisans etc.). However, he asserted that despite their ascendancy, the notables could not be sharply defined as a class formation in the late Ottoman era since the private ownership of the land was not yet consolidated until the French Mandate and the evidence available did not "justify the conclusion that property rights became the main source of power" (Roded 1986, 380-81; quoted in Khoury, 1990: 221). In other words, the notables could not be defined as a class in full Marxian sense.

Therefore, two points are important to define the notables as a class. First, the notables evolved from the late Ottoman traditional order to a modern one. For both Khoury and Mardin, the private landownership plays a significant role in changing the social stratification structure of the Ottoman society and characterizes this transition. Whether the private landownership on land fostered a commercialized large-scale agricultural production is another question that I will address later on. Second, the private ownership of land is not sufficient to define the notables. The notables also benefited in holding

offices in local bureaucracy and engaging in patron-client relationships in order to sustain their social standing or status in a hierarchy of power and domination.

Although these approaches indicate that the notables are an "Ottoman" element, they suggest the continuity of notables' significance after the demise of Ottoman Empire. The notion of "politics of notables" is particularly used to denote the continuing significance of the notables as a class in the late Ottoman and post-Ottoman hierarchy of power and domination, and allows to investigate the incorporation of new actors in its perpetuation.[26] Not all scholars agree with Khoury and Mardin about the perpetuation of the notables in modern Turkey. The historian Keith Watenpaugh argues that politics of notables perpetuated in French Mandate Syria but it disappeared as a viable technique to comprehend center – periphery relations in Turkish Anatolia as of the mid-1920s -except perhaps in parts of Kurdistan (Watenpaugh, 2003: 278). On the other hand, studies of local politics in the formative years of Turkish Republic demonstrate the penetration of traditional patron-client relationships to the party politics under the single party regime (Sayarı, 2011). These relationships took the form of political clientelism and party patronage that played a greater role after the emergence of multi-party politics.[27] Although the extent to which local notables maintained their domination within the context of party patronage should be explored further, these studies allow extending the politics of notables as a viable paradigm to the Republican period. This chapter does not aim at analyzing center – periphery relations through the politics of notables but it intends to show that the notables remain influential in Kilis border town until the 1960s. Hence I have enlarged the scope of Watenpaugh's statement to Kilis town and argued in this chapter that the politics of notables in Kilis town is perpetuated by the incorporation of a new middle class in the 1920s and the traditional landed notables maintain their position in the social hierarchy

[26] The notion is inserted by Hourani with his 1968 "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables" article referred above. The most consistent form of the politics of notables was found in Greater Syria and Hijaz (Gelvin, 2006).

[27] As the landholding notables climbed up along the vertical ties of party politics, they were more strongly represented in the parliamentary system. The party-directed patronage allowed it to rule over the peasants by being influential over the distribution of public resources to them as "favors" like employment opportunities, favorable treatment from state officials finding medical care in Ankara or collective goods such as infrastructure building and price subsidies for agricultural products (Sayarı, 2011: 9).

though they had to share their power and domination with this emergent middle class.

Now, did the private ownership of land pave the way to the large-scale commercialized agriculture and to the emergence of notables as early capitalists? This is a highly contentious debate in the scholarly literature. The main contention area is the nature of land tenure in the late Ottoman era. Extensive historical research indicates that the late Ottoman agricultural system was dominated by small-scale subsistence farming and the large-scale landholding was exceptional because possession of state-owned (*miri)* land was not actually allowed (Keyder, 1991). An exception to the Ottoman land tenure was the evolution of *çiftlik*, farms that turned state-owned land into privately owned properties in the nineteenth century. They evolved when the Ottoman treasury started leased out state-owned land by public auction in order to overcome its financial constraints. But this was the case of opening up of uncultivated and waste land, where *çiftlik* remained again the legal property of state.

Among the landlord-managed estates, the large-scale commercial exploitation was seen only in certain regions which are particularly exposed to the enlarging world economy. Halil İnancık suggests that the plantation-like farms relying on the exploitation of peasants as sharecroppers evolved where "leaseholders were economically motivated to maximize their revenues under the impact of an expanding external market" (İnalcık, 1991: 113). The tax and rent collecting landlords were able to "enclose" after the land code of 1858 in exceptional cases like Syria and Iraqi provinces. Thus, the conditions of agricultural production and landlord-peasant relationship were not generally transformed into an exploitative one. Drawing on İnancık's study, Çağlar Keyder argues that the independent status of peasantry was largely protected. Agricultural exports, unexpectedly, did not originate from the landlord-managed estates, but were derived from peasant surpluses.

The opponents of this view assert landholding notables as an exploitative class as 5% of the families living in the countryside owned 65% of the total land at the beginning of new Republic (Köymen, 2009: 26). The commercial agriculture was a particular source of wealth during the wartime period between 1938 and 1945 and it had been the large-scale farmers who benefited most from the agricultural support programs rolled out in the following decades. We are reminded by the fact that the landholding class continued to

seize peasants' surplus by using non-market mechanisms as well. The landholding notables were in relationship with the peasants as merchants and moneylenders and the peasants could never manage to subsist independently. Most peasants were tenants or sharecroppers on landlord-managed estates and half of their crop was seized by the landlords using their paternalistic domination and economic and political influence. Moreover, the amount of land owned by the most of peasantry was so small that it did not suffice to the small-scale subsistence agriculture and made the peasants dependent on the landlords.

So it is plausible to question whether agricultural production was commercialized in Kilis town. Large-scale landholding was no exception in this region. Private possession became prevalent especially after the 1858 Land Code that recognized the existing *de facto* distribution of land ownership (Karadağ, 2005: 62). As mentioned before, oral and written accounts of Kilis locals indicate that the notable families seized private possession of large lands by bidding public auctions of tax farming and 'usurping' the land of debt-ridden cultivators. Research shows that investing in land became a rampant tendency among merchants and moneylenders who wished to enjoy the status of landowners in northern Syria (Bouchair, 1986: 102). Thus, 70 to 80 per cent of the villages in the region belonged to large-scale landowners by the early twentieth century. Anecdotes of elder peasants that I listened to at certain border villages support the existence of large landholding. They highlight that peasants particularly in fertile lowlands used to labour on the landlord-managed estates rather than rely on subsistence farming. As sharecroppers, they had lived in dire straits till the 1960s.

However, there is no evidence to show that organization of agricultural production was totally altered. The city of Aleppo and its rural hinterland was exposed to external markets. The city of Aleppo got fully enmeshed with the world capitalism towards the end of the nineteenth century, which made the city further integrate into the economy of Ottoman heartland in Anatolia (Masters, 2010: 292). But, international trade was largely held by non-Muslim merchants. Agricultural trade between Aleppo and its hinterland remained internal. Commercialization of agriculture made land a lucrative source during the nineteenth century and not only local notables, merchants and highly placed officials, but also upper class peasants acquired land (Karadağ, 2005: 62). The notables of Aintab (today, Gaziantep), for instance, did not adopt a market-oriented production in their estates, neither

invested in modern techniques of farming (Karadağ, 2005: 110). Notable families in Aintab retained most of their revenues from landed *rentiers*. Thus the private ownership of land seems not to initiate a shift in the organization of agricultural production.

Still, the distinctive feature of local notables in Kilis is their ability to diversify their revenue-bringing ventures and their access to the trade markets in the post-Ottoman Greater Syria where they continued to sell their crop. As early as the 1940s, the interviewees' recollections reveal the illegal trade of gold as well as other products across the newly demarcated borders with Syria. The official documents and minutes of national assembly document the efforts of state authorities to press the issue as "smuggling" and take preventive measures during the early Republican period. These archival sources as well as interviews demonstrate that members of local notables could circumvent the border regulations by abusing their rights of crossing the border and gathering their crop afforded to them as entitled landholders. On the other hand, the border peasants were seldom ever immune to the charges of smuggling.

In conclusion, the local notables constituted the old wealth until the rise of new rich in the 1960s. They did not fit into the definition of capitalist class in full Marxian sense because the large landholding did not alter the production mode. But as I have discussed in the following sections, landed estates in Syria offered the landowning families to seize the opportunities of investing in trade, particularly through 'illegal' means. First, they could sell their produce in Syria for higher prices by circumventing the border transit and customs regulations. Normally, the border regime allowed them to harvest their produce at the Syrian side on the condition that they would bring them back along the border of Kilis and sell them on the domestic market. Second, they could engage in the lucrative gold trade, by bringing the gold clandestinely to Kilis. In this vein, I have argued below that local notables were early capitalists insofar as they could use the border transit regime as source of economic accumulation and seize new opportunities in the circulation of products and money.

4.1.2. Eşraf *Identity in Kilis Town: Traditional Landed Notables*

The *eşraf* identity among the urban middle strata in Kilis town implicates the traditional landed notables with vested interests in the Ottoman social order. It does not include the

trade notables and the new wealth emerged in the 1960s. This section introduces *eşraf* identity from the viewpoint of town dwellers. The dwellers held morally-laden and seemingly contradictory definitions of *eşraf,* regarding them as both despots and modernizers. I assume that their accounts help to a better understanding of why *eşraf* identity remains limited with the traditional landed notables.

The interviewees among the urban middle strata agree that traditional landed notables composed "the *eşraf* system" in which certain families were interconnected mostly with kinship and marriage relations and were headed by feudal landlords who maintained a prosperous urban life due to their domination over the agrarian countryside. According to them, the *eşraf* system came to an end in the 1960s. That is to say, the *eşraf* status lost its distinctive attributes that used to characterize the traditional landed notables. Also my interviewees among traditional landed families admit that the distinction between themselves and tradesman families was abolished in the 1960s. These aspects will be further explored in the following sections in relation to the disintegration of large-scale landholding. It suffices to say that when it is referred to *eşraf* families, it meant the traditional landed notables composed of highly placed military-bureaucracts, ulama and secular leaders "whose power might be rooted in some political or military tradition, the memory of some ancestor or predecessor; or in the '*asabiyya* of a family or of some other group which could serve as its equivalent; or in the control of agricultural production through possession of malikanes or supervision of waqfs" (Hourani, 1993: 89) in the late Ottoman era. This definition of *eşraf* assumes the persistence of this status until the 1960s and excludes the wealthy families of mercantile origin as well as other well-educated professionals, artisans and bureaucrats that emerged in the eve of new Republican regime among the ranks of notables.

The most elaborate opinions about *eşraf* are expressed in the works of local intellectuals from urban educated middle and upper strata, whose generations witnessed the late Ottoman or early Republican period. This is particularly true for *History of Kilis* by Kadri Timurtaş, published in 1932, which includes eyewitness accounts of their social milieu. Timurtaş, a lawyer and chronologically distant descendant of a high-ranking governor served in the Ottoman court addressed in his work the social and political history of notables. Yet, his work is also helpful in revealing the subjective opinions and moral

judgments about these strata as well as providing historical background on the basis of factual information, even if not within a scholarly discipline. According to Timurtaş, large-scale landholding is the ultimate distinguishing characteristic of *eşraf*, but it is not the only one. As mentioned in the previous section, families of tradesman origin acquired large lands by buying the low-price bids after the Land Code of 1858. The *eşraf* is also regarded as landholding despots (*mütegallibe)*, leaned towards seeking dominance, usurpation or unfair profiting and patronage.

His definition of *eşraf* replaces the class of ayan that used to refer to the military-bureaucrats assigned by the central authority as district governors –such as *sancak beyi*, *voyvoda* or *mütesellim*- and heads of cavalry (*mutarasarrıf*) entitled to appropriate the land and liable to collect tax.[28] The *eşraf* families did not hesitate to take away the land and real estate forcibly from the people. It was likely that they would seize a village in which they stepped out by purchasing a small plot of land. Their sole occupation was leading the way of their adherents to the governmental offices and getting with their affairs done. They used to buy up the tax auctions cheaply and thus obtain large amounts of land. His point of view is far from neutral. *Eşraf* members, for Timurtaş, even seemingly intimate and polite in their relationship to each other, were in effect hypocrite since they detested each other in pursuit of their personal interest and in competition among themselves.

On the other hand, *eşraf* implied a moral quality or essence for Timurtaş as well. The above mentioned characteristics pointed to what *eşraf* had become rather than what it really was. As he writes, the *eşraf* members in Kilis town were people embodying an inborn nobility, and intellectual and moral cultivation (Timurtaş, 1932: 86). They had a refined tradition of personal dignity and kindness. Generosity, caring for the poor and complaisance with the governmental authority constituted major signs of notability (*şerafet),* derived from the Arabic word *eşraf.* But eventually, as Timurtaş assumes, the notion of notability lost its original purity.

The ambivalent opinion about *eşraf* put forth by Timurtaş is still prevalent among the educated urban middle class in Kilis, though the latter does not ascribe a moral essence to

[28] See Kıvrım (2008) in for the evolution of ayan in Kilis.

the *eşraf* identity. While my interviewees refer to *eşraf* as despots, they also indicate to the dignified and reputed people who assumed a progressive role among the town community. They refer to the erudite and learned members among the *eşraf* in order to sustain their viewpoint and mention about their role as educators in the town. Most scholars and teachers in late Ottoman religious establishments were recruited among the *eşraf*. The known turcologist Necip Asım Yazıksız writes about her childhood memories[29] that the town was a seat of poets and scholars teaching in local madrasahs where he took lessons. The town accommodated several schools[30] providing religious and scholarly education at the end of nineteenth century and the logic courses in the town earned such a reputation that they were attended by students from elsewhere. As Timurtaş's account reveals, the nineteenth century saw the rise of ulama families in the town which gained reputation and recognition as notables due to their advancement in scholarship and wisdom (Timurtaş, 1932: 90).

The urban middle class in the town believes that *eşraf* led the town community in embracing the Kemalist modernizing reforms and eased the transition from old dynastic order to a new republican regime. Because *eşraf* members were well-educated, they could adopt to the reforms more readily (Çolakoğlu, 1991). I suggest that *eşraf*'s acceptance of the reforms stems from high degree of adaptation to changes in its relation to the central authority. The scholarly literature indicates that the transformation from the Ottoman state into new Republic in the periphery was not without contention. The authoritarian adherents of radical reformism and Westernization achieved dominance over others in the bureaucracy and imposed the legitimacy of their rule on a principle other than religion and dynasty by oppressing the opposition (Keyder, 1999; cited in Durakbaşa et al., 2008: 24). Though the political contention between the *eşraf* and the emergent notables in Kilis inflicted a heavy blow on the *eşraf,* it continued to maintain their social position among the town community. The ulama families and descendants of dynasty maintained their

[29] Yazıksız, born in 1861, tells that he left the town for further education in Damascus and Istanbul in his thirteenth. His childhood then refers to the years between 1861 and 1874. This short memoir is published in *Türk Yurdu* periodical in 1927.

[30] Kilis had 1,456 Muslim students in primary schools (*sıbyan mektepleri*), 75 students in the secondary school (*rüştiye)* and 108 students in 24 madrasahs in the years 1891/1892. There were also 285 students in 7 non-muslim schools. Muslim schools where 285 students were educated in the years 1891/1892. See Aleppo in Ottoman Provincial Annuals edited by Eroğlu et al. (2012).

prestigious place among the *eşraf*, particularly with reference to their pioneer role in adopting the modernizing reforms.

Ottoman religious schools of the town are regarded as the trademark of the town's modernity at that era, although many of them are not preserved in terms of architectural heritage. This is particularly significant, reminding that the Republican reforms have discredited these establishments with a closing act in 1925. Particularly, the old naqshbandi lodge attests the modernity of the town in the eyes of local dwellers. Built in 1858 and losing its function in 1925, the courtyard of the lodge where the tombs of two successive sheikhs are located, is flocked every Fridays by local visitors, mostly women who come to pray for their wishes and dole out food to the poor. The late sheikh, educated in medicine, was known as adept in poetry –her wife was reportedly adept as well. But his son took over after his father's death and he is most popularly known. He is remembered as pioneer to welcome the hat reform outlawing religious headgears by putting on a hat right away. Thus, the lodge would not be closed by Atatürk, the founder of state. An interview with a member of traditional landed notables[31] illustrates how the sheikh is regarded not only as a pioneering figure but also as an influential one. The interviewee mentions the sheikh as his grandfather, since sheikh's and his families are related with bonds of marriage:

> For example, when the hat reform in Turkey was first introduced in Kastamonu city, all mayors and muslim scholars of Kilis gathered upon the news that someone called Atatürk banned the headwear and replaced it with hat. My deceased grandfather was already prepared. He had very good relations with Atatürk after all. One of the two lodges that were not closed in Atatürk's time in Turkey is this one, the other one being the lodge of İsmail Agha community in Istanbul. My late grandfather, reacts that what you call hat it is just this at the end and taking off his headwear, he puts on a felt hat. After that, the hat is used first and the utmost in Kilis town compared at the country level since the sheikh effendi had put it on. My grandfather, the late, put on that hat till he died.[32]

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31 Rauf, born in 1951, descendant of a former local governor.

32 *Mesela Türkiye'de, Kastamonu şehrinde şapka devrimi ilk olduğunda, bütün Kilis'in belediyeleri, hocaları toplanıyor: Efendi efendi, Atatürk diye bir şey çıkmış sarığı kaldırmış şapkayı yapmış diye. Dedem rahmetli hazırlıklı. Zaten Atatürk'le ilişkileri son derece iyi bir kişi. Türkiye'de Atatürk zamanında kapatılmayan iki tane tekkeden biri bu, bir tanesi de İstanbul'daki İsmail Ağa Cemaati. Dedem rahmetli "ya çok garip şapka dediğiniz de şu değil mi?" diyor. O zaman sarığı çıkarıp fötörü takıyor. Ondan sonra Türkiye'de ilk ve en çok şapka Şeyh efendi taktı şapkayı diye Kilis'te kullanılıyor. Dedem rahmetli de ölünceye kadar o şapkayı giyerdi.*

Actually, the sheikh, taking over from his father, ended his religious mission himself and stopped to hand it down to his successor in 1925 so as not to contravene the closing act (Şahin, 1999: 27). But my respondents attribute such a great reputation to the lodge that they wrongly remembered it as remaining open after the closing act of 1925.

The transition from the Ottoman social order to the new republican regime brought significant changes in the social composition of notables. The emergence and incorporation of a middle class of professionals, bureaucrats and traders into the politics of notables was made possible under the conditions fostered nationwide by Kemalist cadres. The new regime sought to create a national bourgeoisie by eliminating non-Muslim elements of international trade. National modernization is led by the pursuit to radical reformism and Westernization, while purging the religion and dynasty elements of the old order. The following section explores in what ways this political transition formed a background to the distinction between *eşraf* and *esnaf*.

4.1.3 Historical Background to the Distinction between Eşraf *and* Esnaf

The period between World War I and World War II witnessed the rise of a new middle class of educated professionals, bureaucrats, merchants and moneylenders in Aleppo and its province. Concerning Kilis town, this new middle class emerged and it was incorporated into the politics of notables thanks to the Independence War fought against the Entente States as well as the Ottoman Sultanate. While this time period gave way to the emergence of political patronage relations under single party led government, the *eşraf* tried to contain and control the rise of the emergent middle class, which in turn distinguish itself from the traditional landed notables by embracing their mercantile origin. This section explains that the distinction between *eşraf* and *esnaf* or preferably, traditional landed notables and trade notables, is rooted in the political contention among themselves emerged during the Independence War and its aftermath.

The political contention typically took place within the context of transition from the Ottoman social order to new Kemalist regime that is supported by the emergence of a new middle class. Historical studies on the Mandate-era Syria shows that an urban middle class composed of lawyers, doctors, schoolteachers, bureaucrats, international merchants, bankers and their families rose among the notables in fighting against the French Mandate

(Watenpaugh, 2003: 259). The wave of Arab nationalism rose in the interwar period among the intellectual circles of Aleppo and backed this new middle class in their incorporation into the politics of notables. But they were nevertheless contained and controlled by traditional landed elite. This is also relevant for the rural hinterland of Aleppo.

In Kilis town, the period between WWI and WWII witnessed the rise of a new middle class, which constituted the trade notables. This period also reflects the development of political patronage relations as the single-party regime led by Republican People's Party (RPP) sought the support of notables (Sayarı, 2011). The emergent trade notables were also mobilized into politics notables, though the traditional landed notables succeeded at large to contain their vertical mobilization with the backing of local bureaucracy. Since it is the accounts of Independence War that makes political contention between the traditional landed notables and the trade notables visible, my discussion will focus on the wartime history.

A research on local notables conducted in four Anatolian cities observes that the Independence War is regenerated in the formation of urban identity, spatial organization and urban iconography, while it becomes an important reference in the discovery of local history (Durakbaşa et al., 2008: 26). The visit of Atatürk to the town while he was the 7th Army Commander in the WWI[33] is remembered and mentioned in my conversations with the notables and educated urban middle strata as a significant event starting the local resistance. His words about the astuteness of Kilis locals at this visit is popularized as a source of pride and frequently referred in these conversations. The narratives told about the liberation from the foreign occupation are incorporated in the formation of the town's identity.

A wartime history written mainly by local historians/scholars[34] is popularized through extensive coverage in local newspapers and websites such as the local publicity pages of governorate, and occasional academic events. These written accounts of wartime actors

[33] Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) came to Katma station annexed with Kilis, as the Ottoman army lost the war against the British in Syria battlefront and met the notables in Kilis to convince them to mobilize a local resistance in 1919. Historical resources record it as the beginning of first militia groups (İnce, 2004).

[34] Çolakoğlu (1991), Beşe (2009), Gülcü (2012), İnce (2004), Öztürk (2005).

and state archives –usually of General Staff- are nationalistic accounts that start Republican history with the Independence War, however they neglect the ideological and political foundations of new regime in the late Ottoman history. These accounts do not give clues of how the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) leaded a provincial 'grassroots' politics, particularly organizing the artisans and traders around the Turkish nationalist tenets (Canefe, 2002: 144). Thus, when Unionist regime needed to eliminate non-Muslim populations which held the trade relations with international markets in order to ensure the creation of a national bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1987), the emergent trade notables as well as the traditional landed notables would support the Unionists in the province. There are reasons for assuming that these strata are involved in extending Unionist policies of Armenian deportations to Kilis town and seized their abandoned property.[35] In short, by the time of Independence War, the traditional landed notables consisted of Muslim, together with few wealthy merchants among the Jewish population in the town.

The town saw successive occupations of British (1919) and French (1919-1921) troops at the end of WWI. The war accounts in written sources depict factionalism between the traditional landed and trade notables, beginning with the mobilization of local resistance against the French Occupation. Initially, both traditional landed notables and trade notables sponsored the local militia against the French. The Islamic Union (*Cemiyeti İslamiye)*, for example, was organized in several cities and districts of the Ottoman territory.[36] However, the French Occupation following the short acquisition of the town by British troops marked a divergence among the notables. The armed resistance recruited from aghas and merchants, as well as several members from the traditional landed notables. Yet hesitations or distrust dominated among the latter and they abstained from joining the armed mobilization. Families moved to Aleppo during the heyday of occupation in order to be secure. Thus the traditional landed notables are considered as collaborator of the Entente states or deserter of war.

For Latife, old-generation woman from the traditional landed notables born in 1911, the

35 See Kevorkian (2011: 610).

36 Gülcü (2012) denotes that the organization, established in Berlin, had branches in Anatolia, Syria and Egypt. The local branch in Kilis first mobilized the militia groups watching for the security of neighbourhoods (İnce, 2004).



Photograph 4. French Occupation in 1919.



Photograph 5. French Occupation in 1919.

The tents of French troops in front of the former customs building. Photographs (above and below) seem to point to the same location from two different angles. (Photos taken from anonymous sources in the social media.)

wartime and its aftermath represent a period of rift among the town community. She calls the period as "the time of Kuvayi Milliye" and she believes that the hatred among the common people against their seniors did not exist before. The time of Kuvayi Milliye serves as a litmus test for distinguishing the traditional landed notables from the trade notables who gained power and influence with their wartime mobilization.[37] The latter's children today believe that their parents represented the "people" as opposed to the deserter traditional landed notables. The divergence among the traditional landed notables and emergent notables evolved into the political contention in the aftermath of French withdrawal: the power struggle over controlling the candidates for parliamentary politics, executives in local bureaucracy and party politics as well as local associations.

The political tension escalated when a school principal and a doctor who did not join the armed mobilization in Kilis were found guilty of the charges and were dismissed from public service. The Law Article 854 about the civil servants who did not join the national struggle was proposed by Ahmet Remzi Güres, a war veteran from Kilis elected as Gaziantep deputy and his colleague Mazhar Müfit Kansu, another war veteran and deputy (Çolakoğlu, 1991). Though the charge against the doctor was eventually dropped by a higher decision committee of 1928 reviewing the investigation, the conviction of the school principal was conclusive. The school principal was influential in curbing the power of his opponents in taking over the board of local associations[38] and local governing bodies such as mayoralty and provincial council. He was influential in bringing the traditional landed notables members in power within the local party branch of RPP as well. His struggle to restrain the ascendancy of a wartime hero, a member of new notables, would be effective as he would get backed up by the city and district governors. He would be also supported when he forced down his opponent to step down –though elected– from his office of mayor and replaced with a new election by a traditional landed notables' member. Thus, he became the target in the midst of the political contention incited between the traditional landed notables and new notables.

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[37] According to Çolakoğlu, the political contention among the notables was a conflict of interest that has been alienating for the lower strata and with long-lasting destructive effects (1991: 300).

[38] Associations such as Teachers' Union (*Muallimler Birliği*) and Reserve Officers Mutual Aid Society (*İhtiyat Zabitleri Teavün Cemiyeti*).

The wartime history and its stigma on the traditional landed notables conceal the emergence of a new middle class into the ranks of notables in the popular imagery of town community. These new notables were particularly empowered by their mobilization in the local militia and successfully draw political support upon patronage relationships established under the rule of single-party regime. Still, both factions of notables continued to come up with mayors and parliamentary deputies in the following decades. These relationships would help them to maintain their ties with the central authority of the newly-founded Republic and further strengthen their social and economic influence in the province. While the new notables took support from the rising wave of Turkish nationalism, they presented themselves as representatives of the people opposing the rule of old notables. Therefore, the popular imagination of *eşraf* remained intact and limited with the traditional landed notables despite a new social composition.

4. 2. The Story of an *Eşraf* Mansion: Unwanted Citizens, Muted Histories

There is a strong consensus among the town community in silencing the unsettling aspects of wartime history. Long after starting my fieldwork, I realized that despite the prominence of memories about Independence War in the references to local history and urban identity of the town, my interviewees selectively detached certain controversial events and never mentioned about them. I traced unspoken aspects of wartime history upon the controversial story of a mansion transferred from a traditional landed family to another family of trade notables. The memories that condemn member of traditional landed notables with treason during the French Occupation at the end of WWI (1919-1921) have been muted in order not to offend the notables' descendants. The traditional landed notables tried to claim their vested interests in their landed estates left across the newly demarcated border in the midst of warfare and they eventually faced the risk of denaturalisation and confiscation of their properties. Although very few of them had been actually convicted by the new Kemalist Regime, the traditional landed notables are still remembered with this stigma of being a traitor. The silencing of unpleasant memories further stigmatizes their parents as collaborators of enemies or traitors, rather than making them fall into oblivion. My discussion asserts that the wartime memories constitutes a material force in the present to question the traditional landed notables’s claims of hegemony, while it also puts out of

sight the property transfer between traditional landed notables and the trade notables.

The "National Struggle" fought against the foreign occupation in the town is central in the conversations with the dwellers about the local history. Border studies show by drawing on Maurice Halbwachs' notion of collective memory that personal memories are always constructed and located in the social context. Border regions are particularly crucial sites for the recovery of national memory, as well as its contestation and re-negotiation (Zhurzhenko, 2011). Yet, the retrieval of memory is selective and the construction of collective memory implies a consensus on what should be remembered and how. The wartime history revolves around the heroic resistance fought against the French troops. These memories draw on a 'patriotic Turkish nationalism' where the Independence War remains pivotal to the founding myths of the nation.[39] Thus it discriminates the participants of local armed resistance from the deserters, by putting its stigma on the latter.

The disclosure of this stigma was possible as I revealed the story of a mansion that had been first confiscated from a traditional landed family and then bought by a member of trade notables. I visited this mansion for interviewing the heir to the trade notable family. It was a two-floor stone house with a courtyard and elegant details, built in traditional architectural style of the region. My interviewee Şükrü was polite to show me around as the house was recognized among the fine architectural examples of the town's cultural heritage. Şükrü's family had owned it since 1926, when his grandfather bought it.[40] Long after I interviewed him, I discovered that the house had a different story that was not revealed to the outsiders. According to the hearsay, the house was confiscated from the old proprietor family when a member had been charged of treason by the notorious trials of Independence Tribunal (*İstiklal Mahkemesi*) in the aftermath of Independence War. The

[39] I borrow the term from Nergis Canefe (2002) who defines a patriotic Turkish nationalism as ideological founding of an ethno-religiously distinct Turkish nation in its homeland Anatolia. According to Canefe, it denies the late Ottoman roots shaping its own core ideas and rejects the historical continuum between Ottoman imperial and Turkish national histories. For Canefe, "there was a tradition of patriotism and communalism bordering on nationalism in the late-Ottoman period, which then led to the formation of and idiom and movement of patriotic Turkish nationalism during and after the Turkish Independence War" (Canefe, 2002: 145).

[40] Despite Şükrü's reminiscence that his grandfather bought the house in 1926, it should be noted the Law Article1064 declaring the denaturalisation of former citizens convicted of treason and the confiscation of their properties was issued in 1927 (See Beşe, 2012).

old proprietor was performing his duty as a district governor under the French occupation. He was included among the list of 150 convicts who had been subject to denaturalisation and their properties were expropriated. He had to desert the town and live in Aleppo.

The controversial story of the mansion was intriguing enough to attract my attention. Curiously enough, none of my interviewees mentioned about it. As referred below, I talked to several members of this family. Only Nihal, the bride of the family in her mid-sixties, had mentioned about the mansion. As a daughter of a governor at a Western Anatolian city came to Kilis only after her marriage in 1975, she was rather assimilated into the town life and she continued to live even after her husband's early death. She was sensitive about the recognition of the house by her husband's family name and claimed the property. She even showed me the title deed but did not mention ever why the house passed into other hands. Ironically, his father-in-law's house, also an old stone mansion where she continues to reside, stood back to back to their old confiscated house.

The family, from traditional landed notables, had several mansions with indoor and outdoor passages connecting them and they almost formed a bloc of buildings on a parcel surrounded by streets. Being neighbor to the new proprietors appears to have kept the feeling of offense for having their property lost for unjustified reasons. At least, this was my impression. For instance, I observed that she kept an eye, intentionally or unintentionally, on the modifications and repair work on her family's old house made by new proprietors as she had mentioned it during my visit at her house. As I visited Şükrü, the current proprietor of the house, he hinted at how the roof insulation work had become a concern for the neighbors and the municipality officers came to check the removal of old Marseille tiles.

Another member of old proprietor family told that the house was told of as an abandoned property of Armenians -yet, another intriguing aspect of the story that I would not be able to explore further. But there had been no conversation about the family's dispossession of the house. Not only the family, but also other town dwellers abstained from speaking about it. But, these memories still impinge on daily life so powerfully. An interview with Celal, a self-taught historian born in 1963, proves that the town dwellers tend to regard the disclosure of these memories almost as scandalous. I visited him at the university library

where he was employed and thanks to his job, he had access to the Ottoman manuscripts, which were mostly religious texts with few exceptions of diaries. The university library aiming at compiling a documentation center on local history received book and manuscript donations from the locals. As I asked him about the local notables, he recalled a testimony about the notables' cooperation with the Entente Powers written in a diary manuscript. The diary recorded a meeting during the British Occupation of Kilis[41] held by the American Red Cross Commission[42] with the local notables in the town. He would not be able to show me the manuscript, since the center would not reveal these resources in order not offend the grandchildren of notable families. Still, he mentioned about the author's feelings of resentment when he witnessed the notables' wishes from the committee to make sure that Kilis should stay annexed to Aleppo for the security of their landed property.

Though the strong ties with Aleppo did not severed, the town was annexed with Aintab (Gaziantep) district in 1911. But the controversies over the administrative division were principally caused by the new geopolitical situation in the Middle East. The Entente Powers had been foreseeing the establishment of an Arab state in the Ottoman Syria and Iraq under their auspices. Thus, the desire of notables for securing their landed estates in a country under the auspices of Entente states would be regarded as cooperation with external powers and a disgraceful intention. My encounters with members of notable families provide insight to what extent they could be affected from the stigma of their elders, as the wartime allegations of collaboration grew serious.

The old proprietors of the mansion had another relative targeted by the similar charges: the school principal mentioned above. He held his post during the French Occupation was found guilty of desertion from the Independence War. When I met his grandchild Faik, a member of traditional landed family in his early sixties to interview, I had not any knowledge about it. He was very cautious in choosing his words and yet, he did not let me

41 The British troops occupied the town at December 6, 1918 and handed down the control to the French in October 1919 as foreseen in the Skyes-Picot agreement of 1916 concerning the sharing of Middle East region.

42 The Red Cross Commission cited in Turkish sources is probably the same with what Watenpaugh indicates as the King-Crane Commission assigned with the US president Wilson in 1919 by the duty of gauging local opinion in contested areas where the British and French states have imperialist claims (see Watenpaugh 2005).

record or write down our conversation. As I explained him about my intention to learn about family history, he proposed to provide me with a "general framework". Then, he mentioned about his grandfather's memoirs from his unpublished dairy. He told that his grandfather was charged since he was carrying his administrative duty during the Occupation. Yet, his grandfather was among the few influential figures of local resistance and another kin from his family, a timar holder who commanded 500 cavalry against the French and had great contributions. My interviewee would recommend me that I should take into account these contributions as well in order to make the thorough evaluation of wartime history. I should also add that he would not be able to meet my request to have a copy of the dairy.[43] The way in which he received my demand for interview made clear for me that this notorious past could be a moral burden for the family.

My interviewee's grandfather was in fact member of Mar'ashli, one of large landholding families of Aleppo that took part in the Syrian National Congress at the end of World War I fighting for independence against the French Mandate (Watenpaugh, 2005). He had a rural mansion in Kilis, where the family held large lands. The anecdote about his heroic participation in local resistance against the French probably referred to his activities as part of the secret committee of Islamist Union, forming nationalist gangs to fight the French army in the early 1920s (Mizrahi, 2003). These gangs made raids to the French Army bases in north Syria and took refuge at the Turkish side of the border. The stigmatization of notables with nationalistic accounts makes these histories muted and unintelligible. These nationalistic accounts also disregards the fact that the family histories of local notables are straddling the border and it is difficult to categorize them as part of 'national history'.

Apparently, several other members of traditional landed notables faced allegations of treason for deserting the local armed resistance against the French troops during the occupation as well. These people had to leave the town because of their fear of conviction and they could be at ease after the 1938 Amnesty. The town elite tended not to speak about the wartime memories that could be embarrassing for the traditional landed notables. But an interviewee of mine, Ekrem, a local historian born in 1935 brought up the issue. He reported about a member of traditional landed notables who had to desert from the town

[43] Several references to the dairy can be found in Çolakoğlu 1991.

and then came back. He mentioned from him as traitor and named him within the list of 150 convicts –in fact, only the former district governor of the town was involved in the list:

> Now, after Atatürk fought the Independence War, they made up a list in Ankara in Republican era. There were 150 people. There were people not only from Kilis, but also from Istanbul, Ankara and everywhere in Anatolia where betrayal of the country occurred. I even saw someone. He came after the war [possibly the WWII]. He used to publish a local newspaper here, Hududeli Newspaper. I had talked to him and he said he did not betray. Of course, there is contention back then, so supposedly the commanders coming here expelled him in order to seize his properties.[44]

As the above quotation illustrates, despite little number of convictions, the image of the traditional landed notables as collaborator of the enemy remains. It seems that wartime mobilization questioned the claims of traditional landed notables to a position of hegemony in the town with reference to their desertion from the independence war. Even though the traditional landed notables continued to enjoy their status of notability together with the trade notables, the wartime allegations of collaboration left its mark on them. Two members of traditional landed notables are known to survive convictions and legal penalties such as denaturalisation, confiscation of property and ban from official duty. Still, this stigma is generalized to the traditional landed notables who had deserted the armed resistance against the French occupation. The wartime memories are likely to contribute to the traditional landed notables's experience of falling from grace. They also hide from the sight the transfer of estates between traditional landed notables and trade notables. Whether there was any abandoned property of the deported Armenians among the transferred estates is another question that could not be addressed within the scope of this chapter.

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[44] *Şimdi Atatürk bu Kurtuluş Savaşını yaptıktan sonra Cumhuriyet devrinde Ankara'da bir liste yapmışlar. Orada sade Kilis'ten değil, İstanbul'dan, Ankara'dan, Anadolu'da vatana hıyanet yapan her yerden yüz ellilikler içinde var. Ben hatta birini gördüm. Harpten sonra geldi. Hududeli gazetesini çıkarırdı burada. Onunla konuştum. O hıyanet yapmadığını [söyledi]. Tabii o zaman çekişme var ya. Ondan dolayı mallarına el koymak için güya kendisini buraya gelen kumandanlar onu sürdürmüşler.*

4. 3. Struggling for Maintaining Status Distinctions

The division between traditional landed and trade notables does not only consist of a political rift. It is also accompanied with a symbolic struggle in maintaining status distinctions. The traditional landed notables calls upon lineage and patrimonial heritage in order to display its status. As the recollections of interviewees illustrate, traditional landed notables families also entered a symbolic battle with trade notables in the field of culture and consumption in which the latter could compete better. This competition among the notables would be the precursor of a broader cultural transformation associated with the money economy rather than paternalistic domination in the 1960s, which will be addressed in the Chapter IV on the rise of new wealth.

Lineage is a distinctive source of prestige for the traditional landed notables. Members of these families can retrace their genealogy to at least a span of five generations and mention the accomplishments of their great grandfather. These families generally owe the respect and recognition to the philanthropy of their ancestor. As large landholders, these families had to rely on the paternalistic domination over the labourers working on their farm (Karadağ, 2009: 537). The traditional organization of agricultural production required hard work both for farming and domestic chores. The perpetuation of a hidden domination was needed for making poor peasants work for the landlord as sharecropper or renter on the land or as domestic servants, which meant practically a scanty livelihood for these poor peasants. Thus, the landlord provided care and protected their needs in return for their submission. The paternalism usually included charity activities to the community level as well. The landlord, particularly the local governors, built mosques, baths, bazaars and foundations for the town.

The interviews reveal that land was the major source of wealth for these families. Large landholding could require the head of the family to closely supervise farming. So there was a second mansion in the farm, other than the one in the town. While the farm mansion would temporarily host the family, the urban residence was permanent. Some of my interviewees still stay in their urban mansions. These are two-story stone buildings with courtyard (*havş*), made by artisans skillful in stonemasonry and they are typical examples of residential architecture of the Ottoman Aleppo.

According to the interviewees' recollections, these mansions accommodated an inner division between female and male spaces. In big mansions, the living space was composed of several rooms, together with the kitchen and toilet surrounding the courtyard. This space, called *haremlik*, was for women, children and female guests, and family's living when there was no presence of other women. *Selamlık* was an extension but separate space reserved for the male members of the household, where they ate and received their guests. In some houses, a revolving cupboard between kitchen and selamlık helped to serve the meal to the male guests and provided privacy to both gendered spaces. Some head of households were more prominent, so their rooms received distinguished guests including local administrators, high officials and member of notables where the audience could exchange conversations about current issues of local agenda. Having a room (*oda sahibi),* as it is called, was a significant sign of notable status and access to clientelist networks.

Trade notables who became apparent at the turn of the twentieth century also called themselves as old families of the town. But unlike the traditional landed notables, their family histories usually started with their grandfather who had made a wealth enough to buy the mansion that would be their natal house. A comparative study on the relationship between housing and mobility in Britain and France suggest that housing is a pre-eminent symbol of status and identity for English aristocratic families and a country house could thus be viewed by the newly wealthy family as an asset to the upward mobility among the ranks of nobility (Bertaux-Wiame and Thompson, 1997: 134-135). For instance, the recollections of two sisters, Behire and Tijen, whose uncle was a known gold trader in the 1950s illustrate such property transfer between traditional land notables and merchant families. Their relative had bought the old eye hospital building, run by the Armenian community until their deportation, from a traditional landed family that already put it in use as a dwelling house.[45] Still, paternalistic relationships and traditional habitus of old wealth could thwart the attempts of trade notables to convert their economic capital into social capital (Karadağ, 2005: 23). Furthermore, the sense of deep-rooted attachment to

[45] I observed that the old wealth was not likely to sell its ancestral patrimony, which explains why the property transfer concerned a building abandoned by the Armenians. The 1915 correspondence of the Directorate of Tribal and Immigrant Settlement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs gives clues about the abandoned properties confiscated in Kilis. For more detail see Çetinoğlu 2009.

the houses found in the traditional landed notables lacked among the trade notables. Most of these mansions are demolished by the succeeding generations themselves in the rush to convert the old houses to modern apartments, stores and business offices. Others are left to slow degradation.

The housing in Kilis composed a continuous and dense architectural structure with narrow streets and stone-laid, barrel-vaulted passages (*kabaltı)*, surrounding the block of dwelling. The typical architectural feature of these houses were their isolation from the surrounding (Bebekoğlu&Tektuna, 2008). Thus a house located at the end of blind alleys was more valuable. The outer walls climbed up to 2.5 meters to detach the interior from the street and if the façades directly faced the street, no window was open on either floor (*tabaka)*. Notable families sustained a hierarchy of prestige not only with their economic power but also with a distinctive lifestyle and taste considered to be 'modern' since the end of the nineteenth century (Karadağ, 2005: 21-22). The growth of modernization at the end of nineteenth century made the adaptation of Western lifestyles and tastes a field of competition between traditional landed and trade notables and its impact is first seen on the changes in the inner space of home. The opening of regular or oriel windows with latticed screens on the upper floor is illustrative of this impact.

The trade notables could welcome the changes transforming the sphere of privacy even more quickly. The recollections of interviewees show that although they lived in traditional joint households, the gender-segregated division of space had blurred with the transformation of haremlik and selamlık respectively into the living room and the reception room. Together with the wave of urban development in the 1960s, they could even modify the old mansion into an apartment house. The forenamed house that was confiscated by the local authorities when the proprietor was convicted by Independence Tribunal and bought by a trade notable family is illustrative. During my visit to the mansion in order to interview Şükrü, the heir to the mansion who kept residing there, he showed me around. Şükrü's father had made several modifications to accommodate two families, father and son, under the same roof and modified the two-floor mansion into two flats. As Şükrü told in details what modifications were made, some were massive to change the original features. For example, the old floor covering, made by a traditional building material called

Source: website of Kilis governorate.

Photograph 6. Narrow streets and stone houses

(Above) One of the few surviving stone-laid, barrel-vaulted passages (*kabaltı*) in the town center with a dwelling house on its top.
(Below) A notable house donated by the proprietor to a charity NGO.

Source: http://www.paylasimalemi.com

Photograph 7. A notable house.

kursümbül[46] was replaced by cement and the old indoor marble stairs leading to the middle of downstairs hall (*sofa)* was supplanted by a narrow cement stairway at one side in order to cut off the upper floor from below.

Traditional landed or trade notables, women played particular role in transmitting new cultural values in the everyday life. They were exemplary in representing the proper ways of being 'modern' which is associated with the body, social class and consumption patterns and thus, became arbiters of social distinction (Karadağ, 2009: 543). Although the public space is highly segregated on the basis of gender in the early Republican period in the provincial cities compared to the centers, the changing fashions of clothing and interior decoration reflects the shift in tastes. The memories told by notable women themselves illustrate how they were eager to keep up with the changing fashion of clothing.

At the early Republican period, these women used to order fabric from Istanbul and Aleppo and shop for clothing and shoes from Aleppo, a city being under Fmirrorrench Mandate that could provide access to Western goods. An important sign for the refashioning of taste was the realm of consumption for displaying the lifestyle. An example would be the demand for decorative furniture. For instance, full-length and framed decorative mirrors with elegant motifs of birds or leaves carved on the solid wood came into vogue, as told by several interviewees.[47] Particularly the mirrors with a trough at the bottom –called, mirror with jardiniere (*bahçeli ayna*)– were the most favoured.

The recollections of interviewees emphasize that at the first decades of the new Republic, as young girls and married women, they were not yet allowed to go shopping and it was the duty of head of the household to purchase the daily food and send it home with the help of a male servant. They were seldom allowed to trips to Aleppo with the company of a male member of the household and visit to relatives. But their greater participation to social life contributed to the refashioning of lifestyles and tastes. For Latife, born in 1911, who

[46] This material was obtained by mixing the domestic solid waste burned in the bath furnaces (*külhan zibili*) with slaked lime and water and used for surface coating as well. Bebekoğlu and Tektuna indicate that artisants used to make colored patterns on this flooring which was washable and corrosion-resistant (Bebekoğlu&Tektuna, 2008: 170).

[47] Yüksel, an old-generation woman married to a man of trade notables about her mid-seventies, has also shown her furnitures bearing the signature of fine carpentry and woodworking as she kept her closet and mirror, as well as other furnishings.

tells that her family descends from Kırım aristocrats granted land in Kilis by the Ottoman government, the fashion of clothing in the town indicated a state of being civilized, mostly associated with urbane manners of living and opposed to the rural. She tells how she was received by the notable families of Bursa in 1942, the year she went as a newly married young woman, as the following: "I came to Bursa as a newlywed. Now imagine that they think of Kilis as a village and my entire dowry was tailored and came from Aleppo. They were so stylish."[48]

They revealed the visiting days (*kabul günleri)*, outdoor social gatherings or refashioning of traditional rites into new forms such as cinema weddings as utterly modern practices. The adoption of these modern practices among the notable women could help to reproduce social cohesion among their stratum and extend class boundaries to other social segments (Aswad, 1974: 10). As I was invited in few visiting days organized by notable women, I observed that their visiting pattern was more frequently determined by intermarriage relations connecting the families to each other, while they also joined the organizations of their middle class peers. Memories of gathering habits illustrate how these social occasions allowed women to reproduce boundaries of distinction. Interviewees' recollections implicated how parks could transform into the iconic spaces of modernity in the provincial localities,[49] where status distinctions could be performed publicly:

> They did not serve tea or coffee in Ayşecik Park[50] before. You could just go and sit there. The place of notables and the place of normal families are separate. I mean, they adopted this opinion as such. They used to do it automatically. In fact, there was no one who cherished them particularly. They thought themselves as superiors, as if we are not worthy of them. They think they cannot sit with us and they go and sit at place they are worthy of. But there is no one to tell them, "you are from such a good family, so you should sit there" really. They just accustomed themselves to do it at a young age.[51]

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48 *Bursa'ya gelin geldim. Şimdi Kilis deyince köy zannediyorlar ve benim bütün çeyizim Halep'te dikildi geldi. Çok şık şeyler.*

49 Can, 2013; Demir, 2006.

50 Also known as women's park, it is built in the late 1930s by the district governor clearing the ruins of the old mosque and cemetery at the town's center seems to have served such function. Interview with Gencay, born in 1929.

51 *Bu Ayşecik Parkı önceden çay kahve yoktu. Yalnız gidip oturulurdu. Onların, eşrafın yeri ayrı, normal ailelerin yeri ayrı. Yani kendilerini böyle şey etmişlerdi artık. Onlar kendiliklerinden yapıyordu bu işi. Onlara ayrı bir değer veren yok. Onlar kendilerini yüksek görüyorlar. Yani ben*

Photograph 8. Ayşecik Park.

Ayşecik Park today accommodates a privately-owned tea garden and there is no other similar park, except the small openness with banks at the roadsides used by men. (Anonymous source in social media.)

bunlara layık değilim. Ben bunlarla oturamam gibisinden kendilerine layık olan yere gidip oturuyor. Yoksa sen çok iyi bir ailesin, sen şuraya otur diyen yok. Küçük yaşta kendilerini öyle alıştırmışlar.

The shift in lifestyles and tastes became also apparent in the transformation of urban spaces. In late 1960s, the number of cinemas was seven and they welcomed theatre plays, concert of vocal artists at the harvest seasons, and indoor and outdoor movie screenings. They made new socio-economic strata visible as well. The notable families were denizens of foreign movies in City Cinema, also known as *Ebe Hanımın sineması* after the woman who was the daughter of a traditional landed family and whose education was midwifery. On the other hand, middle and lower class women could also go watch Turkish movies either in the remaining big hall of the old demolished church reconstructed as a movie theatre or elsewhere. The old hall also greeted "weddings in cinema" that came later in fashion. The guests would be entertained during the wedding by watching a movie scheduled by the cinema after the bridal ceremony.

Photograph 9. A ticket to City Cinema. (Anonymous source in social media).

4.4. Beyond the Border: *Eşraf* Losing Ground

Although the land was a lucrative estate, the wealth creation among the landed notables did not originate mainly in the large-scale agriculture during the early Republican era. The increase of trade did not alter the organization of agricultural production but it would afford the landed notables the chances of diversifying their revenue-bringing ventures and access to the trade markets in the post-Ottoman Greater Syria where they continued to sell their crop. Interviewees' recollections from as early as 1940s reveal illegal trade of gold and

other products across the newly demarcated border with Syria. I will trace the shift of internal regional trade with Aleppo into a cross-border trade through these interviews, as well as through official documents. I assume that exploring the development of cross-border trade would reveal social mobility strategies among the traditional landed andotables. Cross-border trade promoted the trade notables and the traditional landed notables' started to lose ground to them. The trade notables could quickly adapt to the situation due to the intergenerational occupation transmission. That is, they had already learn how to trade from their fathers. Still, as I elaborate on the patterns of cross-border movement, I will be able to portray the possible ways that the traditional landed families, though limited in number, could overcome the traditional barriers against their conversion to trade.

Also the traditional landed notables literally lost their landed estates at the Syrian side when their properties were expropriated by the government in the 1960s within the context of agrarian reform. They define it as a major relapse in their economic prosperity. The development of cooperative relations with Syria recently raised the prospects of the traditional landed notables to reclaim their properties left in Syria after forty years of struggle. The families took legal actions while they also addressed the government their petition to recover their landed estates confiscated by Syrian government in the 1960s.

4.4.1. Passavant Gates, Illegal Trade and 'Golden' Opportunities of Border

The demarcation of international border and break up from French mandate Syria constitutes a major shift in the internal regional trade between Kilis and Aleppo. Before the delineation of border, trade in Aleppo was based on the import of European manufactured goods and export of agricultural commodities. Locally produced merchandise of handicraft industry, as well as sheep, cattle, wool and butter brought from Southern Anatolia constituted important items of commerce (Bouchair, 1986). The dislocation of southern Anatolia meant the loss of a large trade area for Aleppo. It also marked a decline in the traditional industry, together with further European economic penetration with the Mandate regime. However the interviewees' recollections demonstrate that the regional trade persisted despite the border demarcation, turning it into an illegal trade that the state authorities were helplessly trying to regulate.

The state authorities were concerned to take preventive measures against the "smuggling" practices by indicating the unauthorized and uncontrolled movement of goods at the border gates as early as 1931. The year is marked by one of the renowned reports by Şükrü Kaya, the minister of internal affairs upon his inspection tour to southern and eastern provinces of newly founded nation-state. As he recorded, contraband trade grew in the last couple of years to the degree of compensating Aleppo's loss of its northern and eastern hinterland with the border and almost reviving the city as a trade and industrial center.[52] Kilis received the smuggled goods of salt, flint, silk fabric, gas oil and sugar, with oil and sugar having the highest percentage of contraband in the town.

The minister's report also stated that the significance of border gates that served as the access points for proprietors and peasants to work on the landed estates at the Syrian side. A specific transit regime with a transire document (called *passavant*) was agreed upon by two countries[53] to regulate the border crossings of landholders with their labourer as well as their pack animals and equipment required for farming. According to Kaya, the number of daily crossers could amount to five thousand people when the fields would be ploughed or reaped. As the report would illustrate, the demarcation of border meant that the landed estates of most notable families were left on the Syrian soil. The travel permit granted to the household heads as the landholder the cross-border movement in order to gather their harvest (See Photograph 8). Also, it generates for the landholder the conditions of circumventing the passavant regulations for yielding extra revenues of trade until the unilateral decision of Turkey to close the passavant gates in late 1966.

Family members frequently indicated that they continued to visit their farms at the countryside, often extending their trip to the city of Aleppo though they needed to issue a passport and visa for such longer distances. The passavant gates helped the landholding notables to abuse their rights as proprietor to cross the border in two ways: by manipulating passavant regulations to sell their crop at Aleppo or by buying up some goods from Syrian

52 The State Archives of the Prime Minister's Office (BCA) 180/244/6, 5.12.1931.

53 The full text Convention of Friendship and Good Neighbourly Relations Between France and Turkey signed in 1926, also known as Jouvenel-Aras Agreement, can be found in the League of Nations Treaty Series available at the World Legal Information Institute webpage http://www.worldlii.org/int/other/treaties/LNTSer/1926/242.html.



T.C.
G.antep...Vilâyeti
Kilis.....Kazası

Sayı: 784

PASAVAN

Turunu Nevser salih oğlu

Bu pasavan / /95 Tarihine kadar mu
Kızı siber Eşi Naim Kızı Oğlu Muhlis
Salih O salih O Münire

1-Soyadı Salih Oğlu Özadı Ayşe
2-Baba adı Muammer
3-Doğum yeri Halep Doğum tarihi 914
4-İkametgâhı
5-Nüfusa kayıtlı olduğu: a)Vilâyet G.antep
b)Kaza Kilis
c)Mahalle veya köyü Aşit
d)Cilt No. 21/6 S. No.
6-Arazisinin bulunduğu yerler: Halfetli köyü
a) Tarla Miktarı 2330 D.
b) Miktarı
c) Miktarı
d) Miktarı
7-Geçeceği kapunun ismi: Şehit mehmet ,seve
«Pasavanlılara gösterilecek kapu arazisine en yakın olan tek Kapudur.»
8-Beraberinde götüreceği eşhasın adedi: Üç
«Bu eşhas için liste eklenecektir.»
9-Beraberinde gidecek aile efradı Beş
Pasavan Sahibinin sağel İşaret parmağı izi
12-7-1959 da alındı

10-Beraberinde götüreceği:
a) Ziraat alât ve vasıtaları
Cinsi dört tekerlikli Miktarı Bir
Cinsi araba Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
b) Canlı hayvanların
Cinsi At Miktarı üç
Cinsi Beyir Miktarı iki
Cinsi Merkep Miktarı bir
Cinsi katır Miktarı iki
c) Tohumluluğun
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
d) Akaryakıtın
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
Cinsi Miktarı
Pasavanın veriliş sebebi: arazi sahibi
Pasavanı veren makam :
Pasavanın veriliş tarihi: 12/ V /1959
Mühür ve İmza
Pasavanlıların Pasavan kapusundaki
Çıkış Tarihi / /95 Giriş tarihi / /95
/ /95 / /95
/ /95 / /95
/ /95 /95
Girişler ve çıkışlar kapu memurunca imzalanacaktır.)
Basıldığı Yer: (IŞIK Matbaası, Gaziantep)

الجمهورية التركية
الولاية .....
القضاء .....
رقم الاجازة ٤٦٤

اجازة حدود

تعتبر هذه الاجازة لغاية ٢١/ ٧/ ١٩٥٩

صاحب الاجازة

١ ـ الاسم ... الكنية ...
٢ ـ اسم الاب ...
٣ ـ محل الولادة ... تاريخ الولادة ...
٤ ـ محل الاقامة ...
٥ ـ محل قيده في النفوس أ) الولاية ... ب) القضاء ...
ج) ...
د) رقم دفتر الاساسي ... رقم الصحيفة ...

٦ ـ موقع الاملاك
أ) ... مقدارها ...
ب) ... مقدارها ...
ج) ... مقدارها ...
د) ... مقدارها ...
٧ ـ اسم المخفر المخصص للمرور ...
(يجب ان يكون مخفر واحد ويكون اقرب مخفر لموقع الاملاك)
٨ ـ عدد الاشخاص المرافقين له
(ينظم جدول باسماء هؤلاء الاشخاص)
٩ ـ اسماء افراد اسرته المرافقين له ...
بصم ابهام يد اليمنى
لصاحب الاجازة

١٠ ـ الاشياء التي يستصحبها
أ) الادوات الزراعية
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
ب ـ) الحيوانات
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
جنسها ... عددها ...
جـ ـ) البذار
جنسه ... مقداره ...
جنسه ... مقداره ...
جنسه ... مقداره ...
جنسه ... مقداره ...
د ـ) المحروقات
جنسها ... مقدارها ...
جنسها ... مقدارها ...
جنسها ... مقدارها ...
سبب منح الاجازة ...
اسم المقام الذي منح الاجازة ...
تاريخ اعطاء الاجازة ٢٦/ ٥/ ١٩٥٩
الختم الرسمي
التوقيع

تاريخ مرور صاحب الاجازة من المخفر
تاريخ الدخول ١٩٥ / / تاريخ الخروج ١٩٥ / /
١٩٥ / / ١٩٥ / /
١٩٥ / / ١٩٥ / /
١٩٥ / / ١٩٥ / /
(على الموظف المختص التاشير بالدخول والخروج)

Source: Personal archives of Muhlis Salihoğlu.

Photograph 10. Passavant document.

markets to smuggle back to the country. Though as late as the 1966, the parliamentary question raised by the deputy of Hatay regarding the circumvention of passavant regulations is illustrative of its nature. The passavant agreement permitted to the landholders domiciled within five kilometers of either side of the border to cross the border without declaring the harvested crop at the customs. Thus, the deputy assumes that if the crop is sold at the foreign market, the transit agreement would be misapplied and the price difference between two countries would generate extra gains for the landholder-trader.54

On the other hand, the landholders could also abuse it by writing up the total market value of the their crop and buying the fictitious amount from the Syrian markets at longer distances than prescribed in order to cross them to the Turkish side without customs clearance. He would poignantly indicate the smuggling at the border as one of the gravest ill eating into the Turkish economy:

> Now, [the landholders] have to apply to the Passavant Commission in proportion to the amount of cultivated land according to the available Passavant Agreement. Then there will be a committee for setting the estimation. This committee will go and make a rough estimation. It will set 300 [kg.] of cotton instead of 100 per hectares and four or five times more for the wheat where it is not possible to harvest 20 to 40 kilos per hectares. In terms of paddy, it will set four or five times more and therefore, despite the fractional amount yielded, [the landholders] will buy crop from the market and here and there and they will bring Turkish goods to Syria, whereby they will enormously engage in smuggling. My dear friend, this smuggling affair is not something to be neglected as it climbs over billions [of Turkish liras].

Even though it is not possible to gather data about which families among notables were involved in contraband, the interviewees' recollections suggest how they were able to yield high gains from their landed estates. Female members of the family do not have full knowledge of their father's or husband's running of affairs but all of them told that they used to earn a good deal of money from the sales of produce. The families often had a deputy (*vekil),* responsible of watching over the farming and selling of the produce, and sent the yield to the family.

The illegal gold trade was another yet subtler means of yielding extra benefits from cross-

54 Parliamentary question by Talat Köseoğlu, Millet Meclisi Tutanakları (Proceedings of National Assembly) 2nd Period, Vol. 2, Session: 34, p. 375, 12.6.1966.

border movement. Within the framework of peripheral transformation in the late Ottoman era, the increased trade did not yield the market-oriented agricultural production on the landlord-managed estates, but "it did allow various well-placed officials to benefit from new opportunities in the circulation of products and money" (Keyder, 1991: 5). This argument could be extended to the early Republican economy at the border, where certain members of notables could take advantage of their social and economic power. Needless to say, the gold trade was strictly regulated by the state until its trade has been liberalized by the neoliberal governments of the 1980s.

Until the end of WWII, the farmer notables used to sell their produce in exchange for old Turkish silver coins and gold pounds. The Ottoman currency system in Syria was kept in place after the break out, especially after the devaluation of French franc in 1926 (Bouchair, 1986). With the loss of value in silver coins in 1935, Aleppian merchants demanded their payment solely in gold, which probably meant the augmentation in the volume of gold circulation. The interviews reveal the smuggling of gold in bullions was already in place in the late 1930s. Asuman, a woman of trade notables born in 1922 remembers that her father put the smuggled gold out of sight by hiding the gold through her clothes when she was a child. She used wear a waistcoat tailored for that purpose with pockets on her back for placing gold bullions under her casual cloths:

> Well, they [my parents] made me to go to Aleppo. My parents used to go. I was little, about seven or eight years old. The officers liked me. They used to come and check [the cartridge]. My father told me to wear it; they would make me wear a kind of smock. On the smock, they would all line up the gold bars. They [the officers] would not search me. However, there were bars under my shirt. The officers would take me on their lap and kiss and let me go. They would not meddle. Indeed, they would not let anything to pass at some other time. Since they [the officers] liked me, my late father, he used to line them on my back. You see, I was little and I remember it.[55]

The gold trade generated wealth and prospects for gentrification for the trade notables.

[55] *İşte beni eletirler [iletirler] Halep'e. Babamlar giderlerdi. Ben de küçüğüm işte. 7-8 yaşındayım. Beni severler memurlar. İnerler yoklarlar. Babam da giy derdi. Bana bir önlük giydirirler. Önlüğün altına sade [sadece] altın dizerdi babam. Sade dizerdi. Beni aramazlardı, halbuki göyneğin altında altın var. Memurlar ha derlerdi, beni kucaklarına alır, öper öper bırakırlardı. Karışmazlardı. Halbuki bir şeyi geçirmezler ya amma. Beni severler deyi, benim arkama dizerdi rahmatlık. Küçüğüm, bak aklıma gelir.*

Behire and Tijen, born respectively in 1933 and 1940, told that their uncle was able to buy from a traditional landed family the old eye hospital building left over from the Armenian population. The way they depicted the old stone building with two courtyards and fountains suggests that the house was exceeding the mere function of dwelling and it would be a source prestige and admiration. The interviews also hint at the ways in which traditional landed families benefited from the unobtrusive circulation of gold across the border. Among the interviewees, many remember their father and husband's frequent travel to Aleppo, Damascus and Beirut. But as Hikmet, an elderly woman of traditional landed notables above her eighties recalls it was not the male members of the household but their men, working for their patrons, who carried the smuggled gold.

4.4.2. "Dear Prime Minister": Negotiating for Landed Estates Left at Syrian Side

The interviewees' recollections and the heated debates in the parliament illustrate how much the loss of these properties had been significant to the traditional landed notables. My discussion in this section follows the long history of this dispute of land with Syria from the viewpoint of traditional landed notables. I assert that traditional landed notables shifted to adopting the victimizing language of border citizens in order to negotiate their claim over their properties in Syria, rather than negotiating their *eşraf* privileges by calling upon their lineage and patrimony.

Until the start of Syrian civil war, Prime Minister Erdoğan was seen as the architect of peaceful relations between two countries and was expected to provide the solution for this long standing dispute. An open letter by a member of traditional landed notables addressing the Prime Minister shows that the anticipations of "real estate victims" had been excited by his Syrian diplomacy. Bahadır, a member of traditional landed family born in 1956 and proprietor of landed estate in Syria, had written an open letter addressed to the Prime Minister that "real estate victims were expecting him to herald them the good news" in early 2010. Though he gave me detailed information, he also provided me a copy of his letter. There he put the case with reference to the long history of this messy problem. The lands owned by Turkish citizens were disputatiously confiscated by the Syrian government in the mid-1960s. When the Turkish government reciprocated it by seizing the Syrian properties in Turkey, Syrian government compensated their citizens by redistributing the

properties confiscated from Turkish families. But the Turkish citizens who used to own properties in Syria could not recover them. Their efforts proved inconclusive until the issue is reconsidered by AKP government to settle the mutual exchange of confiscated properties. As Bahadır wrote, it was to the knowledge of families that about half of two billion hectares alleged by Turkish citizens as their own properties were covered by the settlement of an international agreement with Syria.

While I have been conducting the interviews with local traditional landed notables, the gradual rise of popular unrest in Syria pushed the prospects for exchange to uncertainty. According to the hearsay, the exchange of properties between two states was agreed, but the negotiations were not completed when civilian unrest broke out in Syria. The hopes of interviewees for the exchange were already broken when I listened to them. Still, I could observe how much the recent negotiations have raised the expectations to boost the forty year long struggle of the families. As rightful proprietors, they could welcome the chances for sudden prosperity once again: they estimated the real estate value of these fertile agricultural lands to be 30 to 50 billion dollars in total. Bahadır indicates that 3,800 families were victims of property loss.

My interviewee Ayhan, a women from traditional landed traditional landed notables, hoped to receive at least a share from the rent incomes collected by the Turkish General Directorate of National Real Estate in exchange of her confiscated property in Syria. She believed that the rightful proprietors as old landholders who even paid tithe (*aşar*) to the Syrian government for their agricultural produce should be entitled to have their share from the rent income.[56] The confiscated properties of Syrian citizens in Turkey are rented by the General Directorate to the farmers since 1966 and collected in a bank account in their name. But the Turkish government refuses to distribute the rent income among the Turkish families in order not to violate the rights of Syrian proprietors.

The Syrian government relied on the 1958 Land Act for the confiscation of the landed

[56] The proceedings about the speech of foreign affairs minister Fuad Köprülü confirm that Syrian government started to take tithe from Turkish landholders in the early 1950s in reciprocation of land taxes taken from Syrian citizens by the Turkish government. TBMM Tutanakları (Proceedings of Turkish Grand National Assembly) TGNA, Vol. 17, Session 4, p. 123, 14.11.1952.

estates owned by Turkish citizens. But the actual seizure of the land took several years. Nevertheless, the recollections of interviewees define it as an abrupt happening which they did not expect and had a negative impact to the prosperity of their family. Apart from their real estate value, these lands were a source of income yielded from the agricultural produce. Most traditional landed families had their men in Syria looking after the farm, harvesting and selling it on the market in the name of landholder. The detailed and rather dramatic story told by Hikmet is exemplary in indicating how the news about the loss of landed estates was received by traditional landed families. Hikmet, as a daughter of a rooted and reputed Ottoman dynasty family, almost mourned for the loss:

> We had a helper called Hamparsum. Since we had our olive grove in Syria, he looked after it and brought the yield. One day he came to give the news. I opened the door; I had my flat on the top of İşbank building. He said, "Come my girl". I went downstairs. In the past, we could not speak so freely to our male acquaintances. I said, "Go ahead effendi". He said "you might send your step son". He had found a buyer for the olive harvest. "Tomorrow, I will give your money. Let him come and take. I said, "I have no step son". My elder son was fourteen years old. He took him for my step son. My elder son was brown and his father was blond. Anyway, he presumed that he was my step son. He said, "No". Now, we left it over there that day. But I was delighted. We would receive some 6,000 liras and 6,000 liras was big money forty years ago. Oh my! I was so delighted. The kids were little and we would have a sizeable amount of money. It became evening. My mother-in-law and my sister-in-law were with us. We all went to my parents to pay a visit in the evening. Here, Raika [her helper] was also with us. She made coffee for us. We were sitting. I cannot forget that day. I remembered it recently, the other day I lost my sleep over it. Well, I had the coffee noggin in my hand and I was drinking it so heartily. Just then, my elder brother came and came upstairs. Everyone's fortune is told. Mine [the noggin] was still in my hand. He said, "Did you hear the news?". They replied, "What?". We all had our estates there. He said, "Today, the Syrian government seized them. It is over". I mean that day, all of a sudden. I mean, I cannot forget that day. I told to myself, alas, I am dead. I flipped my hand unwittingly. I should have flipped it hard because of the pain. Somehow, my ten fingers were all black the other day. All that property and 6,000 liras had gone. We could not get the money back either. Life has gone by just like that.[57]

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[57] *Bizim de bir Hamparsum diye Suriye'de olduğu için zeytinlerimiz, o bakar alır gelirdi. Ondan haber geldi o gün. Kapıyı açıverdim, işte İş Bankasının üstünde oturuyorum. Gel kızım gel dedi. İndim aşağıya. Eskiden de çok serbest, tanış konuşulmaz ya. Buyur efendi dedim. Üvey oğlunu yollasan dedi. Yarın zeytini, alıcı bulmuş, yani toplamak için. Paranızı vereyim. Alsın gelsin. Benim dedim, üvey oğlum yok dedim. Büyük oğlum 14 yaşındaydı, bu küçük oğlum da 9 yaşındaydı. Onu üvey oğlum zannetmiş. Büyük oğlum o esmerdi. Baba sarışındı. Üvey oğlu zannetmiş adam. Yok dedi. Şimdi o gün o şekilde kaldı kızım. Ben de sevindim. O zamanki parayla bize 6000 lira para verdiler. 6000 lira büyük bir paraydı 40 sene evvel. Aman sevindimki*

The interviewees mention about the recent efforts to reclaim their properties but few have memories about the reactions to the outcomes of Land Reform by the Syrian government in the 1960s. In fact, the Syrian Land Reform had been a matter of debate addressed by the parliamentary discussions at the early 1950s. A member of local traditional landed notables, elected as Gaziantep deputy brought the issue of land dispute with Syria to the agenda of National Assembly as early as 1952.[58] Though his main concern was the difficulties that the landholders were having over the exercise of their full rights of proprietorship in Syria, it is understood from his speech that the Syrian land reform was already revealed as a potential threat. He raised the question whether the Syrian government had enacted a law for the redistribution of land to the peasants, if the law was binding for the Turkish landholders as well and what diplomatic attempts were made by the government. The Minister Foreign Affairs would reply that the Syrian government was planning to distribute the state-owned lands and Turkish landholders should be better to renew their registry at the Syrian land offices as an added precaution. These debates were heated anew in the mid-1960s after the reciprocation of Turkish government with the confiscation of Syrian properties in Turkey and the unilaterally closing of passavant gates.

Especially the confiscation of Syrian properties in Turkey was the target of controversial debates accusing the government for redundant retaliation against the Syrian government seizing few Turkish properties. The debates were culminated in a motion of no confidence introduced by the Republican People's Party (RPP) in opposition and supported by other opposition parties against the Justice Party government in 1968.[59] The deputies proposing the motion argued that the Syrian government set a limit of size regarding the lands owned

çocuklar da küçük, elimizde büyük bir para olacak. Akşam oldu. Kayınvalidem de var, görümcem de. Bizdeler. Hepimizin annemgile oturmaya gittik. Gece oturmasına gittik. Bu Raika da ordaydı. Kahve pişirdi getirdi bize. Oturuyoruk. Hiç unutamıyorum o günü yani. Daha yeni önceki gece uykum kaçtı aklımda o. Ondan sonra elimde böyle, çok iştahla içiyorum böyle kahveyi. O sırada kardeşim dışardan geldi. Yukarıya çıktı. Herkesin kahve fincanı okunmuş. Benimki elimde daha. Duydunuz mu dedi? Ne dediler? Hepimizin malı çünkü orda. Bugün Suriye'de hükümet el koydu, bitti dedi. Yani o gün. Birdenbire kızım. Yani ben o günü de unutamam. Birden eyvah öldüm dedim. Aha elimi şöyle etmişim. Acıdan nasıl vurmuşsam ki. Şu on parmağım ertesi günü simsiyah. O kadar mal gitti, o para, o 6000 lira da gitti. Onu da alamadık. Hayat öyle geçti gitti.

[58] TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi (Proceedings of Turkish Grand National Assembly), TGNA, Vol. 17, Session: 4, p. 122-127, 14.11.1952.

[59] TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi (Proceedings of Turkish Grand National Assembly) National Assembly, Vol. 28, Session: 74, p. 17, 10.6.1968.

by foreigners within the context of land reform and nationalized only the surmounting amount of one's estate. Thus, a limited number of families had been affected. However, the Turkish government confiscated all properties of Syrian citizens in Turkey without investigating the matter thoroughly and provoked the reaction of Syrian government to enlarge the scope of land reform. A short time before the motion, a member of traditional landed notables from Kilis, elected as RPP Gaziantep deputy for Republican Senate had posed the same question to the government as well as criticized the closing of passavant gates for retaliation purposes.[60] The Justice Party government rejected the allegations by stating that the number of Turkish citizens filing complaint for their landed estates in Syria accrued to such a level that the confiscation of all Syrian properties was not enough to cover the equivalent number. In all these debates, the deputies had underlined the victimhood of border citizens who had to earn their living from their lands at the other side of the border.

The notables of Kilis expected that as the government diverged from the old politics and initiated cooperative policies, a compensation for the victims such as the exchange of confiscated properties among the two states could be probable. Unfortunately, the relapse of Turkish international politics with Syria into hostility again failed these expectations and added to the experience of traditional landed notables of falling from grace.

4.5. "We lived like a cicada and they worked like ants": New Encounters among *Eşraf* and *Esnaf*

The start of disintegration of large-scale landholding in the 1950s had already forced the traditional landed notables to adapt themselves to new conditions of living. Hence, they had to assume new strategies of upward mobility in order to secure their social position. Ironically enough, the social reproduction of their class identity as traditional landed notables required them to cross over the boundaries of distinction with the trade notables and embrace alliance with them rather than competing with them. Lacking any occupational heredity, the traditional landed notables families could only safeguard their

[60] TBMM Tutanakları Dergisi (Proceedings of Turkish Grand National Assembly) Republican Senate, Vol. 45 Session: 31, p. 1012, 8.2.1968.

position by reconverting their capital held in one form into another. Investing in trade, urban employment, out-migration and marriage are the principal means of social reproduction for traditional landed notables.

Even though traditional landed notables maintained middle and upper class positions among the native Kilis community, they experienced the cost of change as downward mobility. The story of Ferit, the member of traditional landed notables, illustrates the experience of "falling from grace" among their stratum as the boundaries between *eşraf* and trade *esnaf* fade away, inducing the former to embrace what was once disgraceful for them. His telling his life story with reference to the famous parable of Aesop fable about cicada and ant signifies his regret for the delusion that traditional landed notables' privileges would be everlasting and his admiration of the new wealth's success in upward mobility.

I have interviewed Ferit at his office in a dentist clinic where he works. He squeezed our meeting in between his consultations. As he remarked, he had to continue working at this age -he was born in 1939- and he ascribed the reason to his shortsightedness in planning his future. He supported his statement by showing me the pictures hanging on the wall of his office. The pictures were the stills of a movie shooting in 1965 showing Ferit on his own Harley Davidson motorcycle as part of a rebel youth gang with some movie stars. His aspiration to appear on movies made him quit his medicine education in Ankara, which he regrets a lot today. Later on, he could only advance in dentistry by getting re-enrolled for university education in Istanbul. Ferit exemplified the decline of the traditional landed families with the disintegration of large landholding in the countryside, which was much addressed by Turkish film industry with the caricatured figures of spendthrift heirs of wealthy notables. His story also illustrates how the members of traditional landed notables eventually had to reconvert their economic power to social capital by getting university education in order to obtain urban employment to safeguard their position.

The traditional landed notables are the *rentier* class. Unlike the trade notables, they did not have the occupational heredity and turning themselves to traders without the necessary skills and aptitude was difficult. The trade notables could take advantage from the intergenerational occupation transmission by handing down "the family business" to the

offspring. That is why my interviewees among the merchant notables described their lineage as *esnaf* family. The traditional landed notables seem to benefit from the opportunities offered by the shift of regional economy into an illegal border trade as additional income. It is only with the start of disintegration of large-scale handholding in the 1950s that these families were forced to adapt themselves to new conditions of living. As Ferit remembers, once he and his friends had found one of their fellows who started working odd as they were not used to it.

For early generations, education was the symbolic capital required for sustaining paternalistic relations. Children of traditional landed notables used to receive their primary education at local madrasahs. The junior high school was opened in 1915 and the senior high school was established only as late as 1958 in Kilis. The young generation had to move out of the town after the secondary education and receive high school education elsewhere as in the case of Ferit who had graduated from Kabataş High School in Istanbul. The early generations used to receive university education abroad. There were few Sorbonne graduates among the leading families, who wanted to be *au courant* with modern mores. Especially for members of ulama families, their role as teachers enhanced their influence over the local community by associating religion and education. Local madrasahs were educational establishments that combined the teaching of Islamic canon with lessons of grammar, letters, inheritance law and logic. In other words, their interest in education secured symbolic profits for landowner notables (Karadağ, 2005: 146). Nevertheless, the agricultural income would barely sustain the expenses of university education and a separate household in Istanbul or Ankara in the 1960s, as Ferit notes. He recalls that his father had to sell a roomful of cotton in order to afford the payment of school expenses of his elder brother.

Ferit believes that the division of the large lands among their heirs was the principal reason behind economic decline. His remarks resonate with the scholarly literature about the land tenure in Turkey. The prospects of traditional landed families for sustaining their class position were closely related with the process of rural change in the 1950s (Karadağ, 2005: 113). The agrarian policy of Democrat Party in power targeting the development of peasantry, together with the rural migration to the cities, caused the collapse of sharecropping arrangements on the land. The US-granted Marshall aids were channeled to

the mechanization of farming and import of tractors. Moreover, the migration to the urban settlements provided the opportunities for employment in the labour market, turning the peasants into seasonal and wage-labour. The landholders could not find tenants to make sharecropping arrangements. Furthermore, they also had to deal with the growing unrest among their tenants, who tried to reclaim the land.

The fragmentation of land among the heirs as a patrimony after the father's death increased the tendency of selling it off. For Ferit, it meant the wasting of large, fertile agricultural lands and vineyards away as they are sold piece by piece for covering their education and living expenses in the city. This shift in land tenure also marks a decline in the familial meaning of land as status indicator. The Ottoman pattern of inheritance could be contrasted to the English gentry who could retain the patrimony undivided by handing down through male primogeniture to a single heir (Bertaux-Wiame & Thompson, 1997: 133). On the other hand, the Ottoman waqf system aimed to secure the proprietorship of the land as patrimony and its bequeathing to all heirs as inheritance. The pattern of inheritance did not allow the inheritance of all property by one child and divided the land into parcels. The land was not considered as an economic patrimony to be sold, but as a paternal patrimony to be kept.

Ferit's life story dramatically contrasts the old wealth with the new rich and put emphasis on the new encounters between them. He describes retrospectively their living as one of luxury, even lavishly and inconsiderately. His reference to his life story by drawing on the parable of cicada that enjoyed the day and did not save up anything for later is asserted as the reason of economic decline. His youthful memories of summer holidays as he came back from summer schools revolves around partying of traditional landed notables' children in their farm houses, riding horses or ostentatious motorcycles. The moral resolution of his life story into the parable of cicada, however, stems from the rapid ascendancy of new wealth. The members of traditional landed notables like Ferit witnessed the climbing of lower strata through the ladder of upward mobility in a shorter time than one's lifetime and without the occupational transmission of elder generation. For example, he mentioned that the son of the gardener who used to work for his relative succeeded to make enough fortune to start buying lands in Istanbul along the well-trodden highway to the airport in the mid-1960s. The real estate investments of the family make them among

the top ranking businesses in the city today.

According to Ferit, wealth accumulation obtained by illegal trade helped the lower strata climb up the social ladder to an unprecedented scale and the traditional landed notables declined. This implied for him a subversion of the social order and the beating of lower strata over the old wealth, as his reminiscence of a local hearsay demonstrates. The hearsay goes that the new wealth now boasts of their Mercedes cars while comparing themselves to the traditional landed notables who used to ride their motorcycles in the town. Ferit states the reason for the decline of traditional landed families as their inability to engage in illegal trade, which they regarded as shameful:

> [It ended like that] because there was the habit to use up what is on hand rather than earning it and it has been divided up as inheritance, and because these gentlemen could not engage in smuggling, as smuggling was a disgrace for them. My father did not let us wear nylon socks. The nylon socks came from Syria and we could not wear it. Although our village and land was just along the borderline and our employees, majordomo and sharecroppers were smuggling, we could say, "Here, have this 100 liras and buy for us too so that our share gets invested". We did not say or rather, we got embarrassed. Therefore, they won ten to one or hundred to one. We could just earn one for hundred and we could not keep up. Later on, those who received education did not turn back to Kilis. He became a doctor and stayed in Istanbul. He became a lawyer and stayed in Istanbul. Or else, he moved to Adana as he was engaged in trade business.[61]

It is worth noting that Ferit's reference to the upward mobility of fellow townsmen is significant in showing reshuffling of social insignia of status and how the lower strata once denied of respect and reputation achieve them. Although he knows that the new wealth has made their fortune from the illegal trade and enterprises, he presents their ascendancy as an achievement by mentioning the parable of cicada and ant. For him, traditional landed notables' children used to rejoice in summer holidays with their pocket money from their parents' while their friends in town worked. Ferit tells that he had once asked his close

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61 *Zaten böyle bir çalışarak kazanma değil de hazırda oturup yeme alışkanlığı varken ve bu da miras yoluyla parçalanınca ve bu beyler de kaçakçılık da yapamadıkları için çünkü onlara göre ayıptı. Bir naylon çorap giydirmedi babam bize. Suriye'den o zaman naylon çorap gelirdi, biz giyemezdik. Bizim köy tam hudutta olduğu halde, bizim arazinin olduğu yer kendi elemanımız, vekilharcımız, yarıcımız kaçakçılık yaparken biz diyemezdik ki kardeşim şu yüz lirayı da bizim için al, bizim de hissemiz gitsin gelsin. Demedik, daha doğrusu utandık. Dolayısıyla onlar kazandı. Bire on, bire yüz. Biz yüze bir, yüze beş kazanınca tevercinin kefesi dağıldı. Sonra okuyan tekrar Kilis'e dönmedi. Doktor oldu, İstanbul'da kaldı. Avukat oldu, İstanbul'da kaldı. Ticaret yaparken Adana'ya taşındı.*

friend engaged in smuggling business why the latter did not let him own a share as well. Thus, the traditional landed notables embraced what they did once consider as shameful and thus, undermined the long-established distinction between traditional landed and trade notables.

The confession made by Hikmet, my interviewee from a traditional landed family, that they used "not to give away their daughters for marriage to a smuggler" points out that the new wealth is now reputed among the traditional landed notables. For instance, Hikmet's son, whom I interviewed as well, is a lawyer who defended smuggling cases prosecuted by the local authorities after the 1980 coup in Kilis. Marriage is the strongest indication of the shift in the traditional landed notables' perception regarding the new wealth, as well as the dissolution of traditional norms and habitus that used to thwart attempts of new wealth to convert their economic power into the social or cultural capital. Under the new circumstances, the role of marriage proves effectual for the traditional landed notables in establishing alliances with trade notables and safeguarding their class position.

Ferit's experienced downward mobility dramatically because metropolitan social networks provided new encounters among the members of old and new wealth.[62] Ferit was among the founders of Kilis Culture Association in Ankara and Istanbul. After a while, the new wealth in Istanbul left to set up another association called Kilis Vakfı (Kilis Foundation). The latter comes to the fore among the benevolent associations of Kilis migrants with broader philanthropic activities such as sponsoring education and boarding of native students in the cities, and relief for poor and donation for public school buildings in the native town and has a wider outreach through various uses of media. The foundation, chaired by a prominent *nouveau riche* known for his mafia-esque connections, mostly recruits from the new wealth who had to desert the town as they were criminalized and were sued as smugglers by the military government after the 1980 coup. Members of new wealth had to carry their investments to the cities in order to launder their "illegal

[62] Though the interviewees emphasize the metropolitan cities as migration destination, it is worth noting that Gaziantep city has the biggest migrant population, probably with a lesser yet remarkable proportion of the notable families. See, the Turkish Institute of Statistics Address-Based Population Registration System database for the destination cities with highest rate of Kilis migrants for 2011, respectively: Gaziantep 89,918; Istanbul 35,934; Ankara 5,307, Adana 5,164; Mersin 4,097; Antalya 3,394, İzmir 3,199; Bursa 1,587.

businesses" since there was no investment area in the town where big entrepreneurs could not maintain a low profile. Ferit had acquaintances with them.

Reproduction strategies among traditional landed notables consist of conversion to trade and mobility through education and marriage. Also the urban migration provides traditional landed families the opportunities for more rewarding employment and access to the social networks of new wealth and thus, it constitutes part of reproduction strategies. Despite Ferit's emphasis on the fragmentation of inherited lands, land tenure in Kilis is still dominated by large landholding (Kesici, 1994). Yet, no families among traditional landed notables are involved in commercial farming. Among my interviewees, only one is engaged in large-scale commercialized agriculture but he is a descendant of trade notables.

For most interviewees, the conversion to trade required a generational leap and the grandchildren of the landholders now have consolidated their investment in trade business. For instance, the nephews of Ayhan, a woman of traditional landed traditional landed notables born in 1924, run their business in the Grand Bazaar today. Ayhan states that she had gone through financial difficulties after their landed estates were seized by Syrian government. She complains that lots of contraband goods were coming to Kilis across the border, but her husband could not do the trade since he was not familiar with it. The traditional landed notables' experience of falling from grace consists in their coping with the reproduction of their class position under new circumstances. As they had to acknowledge the upward mobility of new wealth, they also recognized the respect and reputation that they once denied to them. The illegal cross-border trade as of the 1960s is the significant factor that leads to the subjective experience of decline among traditional landed notables.

4.6. "There was no border": Nostalgia for the Home-place

The large rate of out-migration and the rapid transformation in the town has probably made the questions of roots and belonging more pertinent. Whether left behind or residing out of the town, the elder generation of notables has a more acute nostalgia of the past in contrast to my interviewees from other strata. The interviews reveal the nostalgic memories of past lives which accentuate on lineage and patrimony, as previously discussed, as evidences of roots and belonging. I will delve into these memories once again, this time to elaborate the



Source: Bebekoğlu & Tektuna (2008).

Map 2. Historic downtown.

notables' imagination of hometown as place of belonging. The interview excerpts in this section show that the notables build their self-identity on the perception that their town has a common social world and refined culture with the city of Aleppo.

The nostalgic experience does not only define the past time as lost and mourned, but it also invokes a longing for home. The word nostalgia, of Greek etymology combining *nostos* (home) and *algos* (pain), originally implies the longing for a lost home and the pain from its irrevocable lost (Malpas, 2012: 163). Nostalgia is a stronger disposition "when social change is rapid enough to be detectable in one lifetime; at the same time, there are must be available evidences of the past - artefacts, images and texts - to remind one of how things used to be" (Yeoh and Kong, 2006: 57). Kilis town has gone through a rapid transformation with its imprint on the urban landscape in the 1970s, together with the growing urban sprawl around the historic downtown. In a tour around the old town center, it is still possible to locate the remains of old mansions and inns used as industrial workshops for soap or olive oil making. Deteriorated in form or completely demolished, these monuments cannot be further destroyed nowadays due to the recent regulations concerning the cultural preservation of historic sites. The nostalgic return to the past is closely related with the notables' need to identify history as belonging to them and to which they belong.

The members of notable families residing in the town center lives in midst of the ruins of their past legacy. It is their ancestry who had contributed to the town development. The proof of their roots to which they refer to render their identity as traditional landed notables cogent is inscribed all over the place. Interviewees mentioned occasionally about the mosques, baths, inns and foundations that were built by their grandparents. They gave me detailed itineraries for helping me to get there and see on site the places that they were talking about. Their memories recalled the building used by their great grandfather as the government house or as madrasah. The fact that the family's past is embedded in the urban landscape clearly turns these buildings into a testament of their rootedness and generates an entrenched attachment. Therefore, the town's loosing of its historical identity is likely to enhance the notables' experience of falling from grace, with the corrosion of everything that they have assumed to belong to their heritage and made their town a homeplace.

Perhaps, this is why I observed that a new politics of nostalgia is being been fueled recently

among the notables. This is a politics of nostalgia consisting of returning to the past and preserving the cultural legacy of the town, though in an attempt to fabricate the place as one of tourist attraction and turning it into a showcase of history with exclusive emphasis on concrete edifices, facades and visual qualities of historic buildings.[63] A program launched for raising the interregional tourism activities between Turkey and Syria was expected to contribute to the town's development by taking advantage from the increased geographical mobility across the border until it fell into abeyance with the breaking of the popular unrest in Syria and relapse of Turkish policies of cooperation with Assad government.

As the interviewees' recollections reveal for a yearning for lost home, they also point to an alternative imagination of place that differs from the hegemonic representations of the town as a territorially bounded space. The imagined place of belonging in the notables' memories is not a bounded territory within the confines of state border. But it extends across the border to their farm house they slept and to the shops and streets of Aleppo they enjoyed visiting. In other words, the imagined homeplace continues to be a geographic extension of the city of Aleppo for decades after the demarcation of state border. Nevertheless, it should be noted that this imagination of place revealed by in the notables' nostalgic memories is incommensurable with the contemporary notion of transnational space constituted by cross-border migrations.

Border studies underline the possibility for multiple belongings in the contemporary age as the means of communication and transport invade the sacred spaces of home and locate them in transnational space (Morley, 2001: 432). But the imagined homeplace of the notables cannot be conceived through the angle of transnationality. This notion implies transgression of the national boundaries or of the threshold to a different nationality. In the notables' recollections of the past, the border is simply not perceived as the border as limit, the imagined threshold to another entity. As the notables' plea to the American Red Cross Committee to stay annexed with the Syrian Aleppo demonstrate, the border is not only imposed by the state powers, but also negotiated by local actors. The borders are subject

[63] For instance, the interview with Cemil, a former senator dwelled mostly upon his ideas of promoting the town's development through cultural, religious and health tourism by taking advantage of the town's assets in terms of historic heritage and Mediterranean microclimate.

to continuous change and negotiation. Even when the borderline is already materialized for the border dwellers, the meanings over the place and relations across the border can be repeatedly redefined (Wilson and Donnan, 1998: 21). Virtually, the border did not exist for the notables till they felt the bonds attaching them to the other side of the border were severed, their life world was constrained and their homeplace turned into something that was not used to be. According to Vefa, member of a trade notable born in 1943,

> [The beginning of illegal trade] happens upon the mid-1950s after the mining of the border zone. After all there was no border among us. There was no border between Kilis and Aleppo.[64]

When I asked him the demarcation of border in the early 1920s, he replied as follows:

> No, there was not any [border]. After all, Aleppo was annexed with Kilis; it was an Ottoman province. There was exchange of good and trade business. For example, silken fabrics came up from there, sine satin, enver satin etc. There were lots of name for it. There was no border. They used to bring good from Aleppo to sell them in Kilis and bring goods from Kilis to sell them in Aleppo, just like you go and sell to Antep.[65]

The excerpt from the interview of Vefa illustrates the periodization that most of my interviewees have made in order to draw a distinguishing line. The notables usually emphasize the mining of the frontier zone, in setting the beginning of changes concomitant with the border. For example, a former senate member whom I interviewed in Ankara, assumes that the frontier zone is mined by the Democrat Party government as the consequences of misguided policies toward their town. The notorious labelling of the border town as smugglers' city led the government to take preventive military measures and to mine large pieces of fertile agriculture lands, though the trade activities of local dwellers did not deserve such labeling. As the quoted excerpt exemplifies, the notables called these economic activities "exchange" or trade for subsistence rather than (market-oriented) smuggling. According to them, the illegal practices that could be called as smuggling began only after the mining of the border. But it should be noted here the gold

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64 [Kaçakçılığın başlaması] *mayınlı saha döşendikten sonra 1954-56'lara rastlar. Zaten ondan evvel de aramızda sınır yoktu bizim. Kilis'le Halep arasında sınır yoktu.*

65 *Hayır o zaman yoktu. Zaten Halep Kilis'in, Osmanlının vilayetiydi. Mal değiş tokuşu, ticaret yapılırdı. Oradan mesela ipek kumaş gelir; sine satin, enver satin isimleri çoktur. Hudut yoktu. Buradan Antep'e gidip satar gibi Halep'ten getirir Kilis'te satarlar, Kilis'ten götürür Halep'te satarlardı.*

trade is completely out of picture in the view of notables. Thus, with the border, according to the interviewees, the town was transformed into a geographically squeezed and economically curbed place.

Their recollections then reveal nostalgia about the good old days of their town life when there was no border. Their memories cover the convivial meetings of extended family members, often living in joint households or the hosting of other notable families, enjoying the countryside at the farm trips, picnics in the gardens and the vintage or cooling off during the hot summer around the pond on the courtyard of the house. These memories reveal the innermost feelings about domestic life and also indicate a remembrance of their being, a remembrance about how they used to be. The good old days were the times when the notables felt they prospered. Frequent references to the affluence, well-being and comfort are significant in the favouring of the past against the present. A short excerpt from the interview with Gencay, a woman from trade notables, is illustrative:

> [Domestic chores] were a great burden. We had large lands. We had two horses for plough. We had also a man who used those horses and plowed the field. He took them in the morning and brought back in the evening. He tied them up. We did not see any of it. I mean they used to do it. We had a steward at the door and he did all. We never carried the burden. How should I tell? Those days were so good.[66]

Nostalgia is revealed in the notables' interviews as the yearning for a lost time. As Malpas argues, it typically implies an estrangement from the past, especially from the childhood. It is as if the return to the past haunts individuals more often when the temporal distance increase –and typically, the nostalgic experience becomes more common among older people (Malpas, 2012: 167). Yet, these memories are also related with a sense of place. Events, people and all sorts of details rebuilt by memories are inextricably bound up with site of their happenings, from where they leap up and come to mind in a nostalgic experience. Their childhood reminiscences mark all these sites as places of memories. For example, the memories of Latife, about his father buying her the baby doll that she wanted so much reveal the days past in Aleppo:

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[66] *Çok ağır işti. Bizim çok arazimiz vardı. Evde ayrıca çift denilen iki tane at vardı. Bir de o atları kullanan, tarlayı sürmeye giden adam vardı. Sabahleyin gelir onları alır götürür, akşam üzeri geri getirir. Yerine bağlar. (Biz) onların hiçbirini görmedik. Yani adamlar yapar, kapıda bir uşağımız var yapar. Biz o sıkıntılara girmedik. Ne bileyim nasıl anlatsam, çok güzel günlerdi.*

> Now, we were in Aleppo and there was a shop called *Oeuvres de Pac*. Baby dolls that you could rock it to sleep or cry were all along the shop window. I used to sneak out and go to the shop, and I used to put my head on the window to stare at them. How childish! I could not think about asking to my parents to buy one for me. One day my father saw me there. "What are you doing here?", he asked. I was looking at the baby dolls. He said, "Shall I buy one for you?". I was surprised. "Come on, then! Which one do you want?" I liked the third one in the row. I do not know how much gold it cost. But he paid quite a lot and bought it.[67]

The home indicated in Latife's memories is an apartment flat in Aleppo where her family temporarily settled in 1919. As she told, other local notables of Kilis, together with her family had moved to Aleppo to stay during the tumultuous period of French Occupation. Notables' recollections show that these families shared the same social world with the Aleppine notables. The male family members attended the same high schools as there was no lyceum in Kilis town and had trade business with common associates. Notable women had ordered fabric from the same shops and joined in invitations of Aleppine families:

> We used to go a lot [to Aleppo]. For example, I was six or seven years old. I had little siblings. We lived in Aleppo for a year and a half when the French occupied Kilis. [My father] had rented an apartment flat in the best locality. We had our farm in Syria after all. Everything we had came from there. Anyway, we went there [to Aleppo]. … Now my parents were in contact with important families of Aleppo. There were a prominent one, called Hasip Effendi's family. They would go to his reception.[68]

In some cases, distinguishing between notable families in Kilis upon the patrilineal origin might be a bias obscuring the roots of the family in both places. Several families in Kilis had established kinship relations through marriage with Aleppine families, as in the case of Latife's grandmother who came to Kilis upon her marriage. The male members of younger cohorts could also endure the practice of taking a woman from Aleppine notable

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67 *Şimdi Halep'teyiz, orada Ovr dö pak diye bir mağaza var. Vitrininde boydan boya bebekler var, şu uyuyup şey eden, ağlayan. Evden kaçarım, gider vitrine başımı koyup o vitrine bakarım. Çocukluk yani, al demek aklıma bile gelmez. Bir gün babam gördü beni orada. Ne yapıyorsun dedi. Bebeklere bakıyorum. Sana alayım mı dedi. Şaşırmışım. "Gel öyleyse içeri" dedi, "hangisini istersin?". Baştan beri üçüncü bebeği çok beğenirdim. Valla kaç altındı bilmem. Epey bir para ödeyerek aldı.*

68 *(Halep'e) Çok giderdik biz. Mesela ben altı, yedi yaşındayım. Bir tanesi 6 aylık, bir tanesi kırklık. Kilis'e Fransızların geldiği zaman biz Halep'te bir buçuk sene oturduk. [Babam] en güzel yerinde bir apartman dairesini tutmuş bize. Zaten çiftliğimiz Suriye'de. Her şeyimiz ordan geliyor. Oraya gittik ... Şimdi Halep'in büyük aileleriyle konuşuluyor, Hasip Efendiler diye meşhur bir aile var. Onun gününe gidecekler.*

as an eligible spouse, when their wives had died. Or else, the kinship relationships could be sustained through polygynist practices of male members of notable families. Ayhan, a notable woman born in 1924, has four aunts in Aleppo since her grandfather had espoused his fifth wife, Ayhan's grandmother, in Aleppo. When she was a child, Ayhan was told that his grandfather used to sleep overnight alternately in Kilis and in Aleppo.

In these memories, the notables deploy a different image and meaning of their homeplace than those dominating in the present. Being notable for instance is implicated not only in the lifestyles and tastes that were associated with being civilized, modern and cultured, but also in living in such a place. For Latife, "Kilis used to be a civilized place". Notables considered their homeplace as more modern in the past while the city of Aleppo, fully integrated with the world capitalism at the early twentieth century, was for them the symbol of modernity. The words from Duran, though almost a Freudian slip, would support my assertion. As he explains when there was no border between Kilis and Aleppo, he tells that "Aleppo was a province of Kilis, a province of the Ottoman Empire". Indeed, Kilis was then annexed with the province of Ottoman Aleppo. The notables' bonds extending across the border, strengthened by their proprietorship of landed estates, trade and kinship relations are likely to undermine the imagination of their homeplace as curbed by a geographical boundary.

4.7. Concluding Remarks

This chapter has focused on the historical context imposed by the border and in what ways it shifted the class and status relationships among local notables. I have shown that the demarcation of border may be both beneficial and disadvantageous to the local notables. As traditional landed notables tried to influence the demarcation of border upon their vested interest in land -their properties were mostly located in north Syria- and demanded to be annexed with Aleppo at the fall of Ottoman Empire, they became accused as traitors and engendered by the risk of loosing basic citizenship rights. This period has a deep impact on traditional landed families, causing several members, accused or under investigation, to leave to Aleppo and dividing among close kins. On the other hand, the Independence War and its local mobilization created the conditions for an emergent middle class to become involve in the politics of notables and helped families of mercantile origins

to gain political power. These families, as trade notables, shared power with traditional landed notables, though they could not topple them in the local bureaucracy and party politics.

This chapter have also discussed whether local notables could be designated as early capitalists in relation to the nature of land tenure. Local notables could benefit from a border transit regime in order to reap their harvest on their landed estates at the Syrian side on the condition that they would bring their produce and sell in the domestic market. The discussion concluded that large-scale landholding did not result in the commercialization of agricultural production, but the notables capitalized on the border transit regime to yield differential revenues from the selling of their produce in foreign markets and engage in gold trade. The closing of Passavant gates and the confiscation of landed estates by the Syrian Baath Party in rule constituted a major blow to the local notables whose properties were left in Syria. With the disintegration of large landholding in Kilis countryside, the traditional landed notables are obliged to pay the cost of reproducing their class position by embracing what was once graceful for them: by circumventing the law. Trade notables more easily accommodated because of the intergenerational occupational transmission. The other options for local notables in order to preserve their social standing was conversion of economic capital to social capital, i.e. education, out-migration and urban employment, as well as marriage. Most of notable families left the town and settled in metropolises.

Memories of notable families in this chapter have indicated to a nostalgic image of their home town, which refers to the recollections about their life in their homestead in the rural Aleppo or their visits and participation in social life of Aleppo city. They have underlined that the meaning of living in Kilis for local notables signified a modern, urban and cultured place because they shared a common world with Aleppo. These memories attested to the fact that local notables are the repositories of urban history in the provinces and their feeling of falling from grace is inevitably reflected on the urban decay, as they no longer have the determination or power to protect the historic heritage.

It is also argued that the political division between traditional landed and trade notables was accompanied by a symbolic struggle to maintain status distinctions. While moral

qualities ascribed to the members of traditional landed notables were influential markers of social distinction, trade notables could compete better in the field of culture and consumption. Notable families espoused distinctive lifestyles and tastes considered to be modern and entered into competition with each other, where women played a leading role in their transmission. The following chapter will show that the ascendancy of new wealth topples the social position of traditional landed notables which they tried to secure against the trade notables. While the traditional landed and trade notables were not stigmatized as lawbreaker, the new wealth needs to restore its self-image as that of philanthropist businessmen, imitating the old wealth in generating social capital with charity activities in the town and thus, naturalizing their dramatic ascendancy.

CHAPTER V

SHADOW ECONOMY AND RISE OF NEW WEALTH

This chapter will focused on the growth of shadow economy along Kilis border and the rise of new wealth since the 1960s. I will first start with the case of a former smuggler from Kilis whose 'success story' of becoming a decent wealthy businessman in order to introduce the new wealth of the town. The new wealth of Kilis becomes visible in the post-1980 period, especially by benefiting from the state incentives promoted by the Özal government to subsidize the export-led growth. I will develop my discussion by introducing a theoretical framework on transnational shadow economy in order to demonstrate from the vantage point of businessman's story that illegal trade enables upward mobility and secure welfare unequally among socio-economic strata in the town.

Then, I will shift into the 1960-1980 period of import-substituting industrialization in order to trace back the roots of wealth generation in Kilis. My analysis will problematize what the political scientist Peter Andreas calls "illicit globalization" (Andreas, 2011; cf. Tagliacozzo, 2007). Andreas argues against the strong conviction among the globalization scholars that the nation-states lose their control over illegal transnational business transactions in an increasingly globalizing economy. A historical approach, however, reveals that neither the dimensions nor the magnitude of illicit globalization cannot be credibly demonstrated to have augmented since the last century and "transnational organized crime is simply a new term for an old economic practice" –i.e. smuggling (Andreas, 2011: 406). Despite their diversity, these transactions actually have the same features of circumventing the law enforcement by using unregulated and unauthorized channels of circulation and moving across the borders in ways to elude detection and comprehension. In this vein, I will argue that the growth of transnational shadow economy foreshadowed the neoliberal trade liberalization in Turkey.

This chapter aims at offering a reading of the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) period from the perspective of Kilis border. The characteristics of this period were the management of economy by the state in order to protect the domestic manufacturing

bourgeoisie from international competition and secure a redistribution of income to constitute a domestic market (Keyder, 1987: 150-151). Thus ISI referred to a social welfare regime with the central role of state in allocating scarce resources. This period was characterized by the imposition of strict regulation on the circulation of foreign exchange as well as high import tariffs and quotas in order to provide the favourable conditions for domestic industrialization.

Diverging away from approaching the development of informal/illegal markets as failure of state policies, this chapter will demonstrate how dwellers were incorporated into the redistributive logic of shadow economy, took benefit of the protective measures by reckoning rents to the illegal entry of consumer goods as well as gold and foreign currency and made their living in a border region that lacked opportunities for regular employment and a secure salary within the framework of ISI-based development. I will support these points by focusing this time on the story of an extended middle-class family influential in local politics, which grew rich from poor rural background to own a transport company and other enterprises. From the vantage point of family story, I will show that the illegal trade of gold as well as consumer goods initiated a pattern of vertical mobility that moved rural families among the ranks of middle urban strata and overcame the structural constrains of social stratification in the town. The sections will detail the shifts in the social and urban landscape as well as the scaling up of local economy to the domestic market.

Also, this chapter will address the cultural mechanisms through which economic accumulation throug illegal means could be socially accepted as wealth. I develop this argument by drawing on the community norms and values, including ethical principles and religious references that regulate and normalize illegal practices of trade. Last section will give an overview of the present condition of shadow economy with reference to the local reactions against the transfer of Syrian guests from Hatay to the border camp in Kilis. It is suggested that the town has lost its salience in the post-1980 period with the leaving of new wealth and declining profits margins in cross-border trade have rendered the keeping of border gate open even more important for the locals. The local reactions also illustrate in what way the trope of 'border as gate to livelihood' organizes the narratives about the cross-border trade as normal practices of everyday life, while reinforcing at the same time the social boundaries between local dwellers and Syrian migrants despite strong kinship

bonds and close contact across the border. This case illustrates the moral legacy of transnational shadow economy in Kilis town that this chapter will analyze in detail.

5.1. Story of Barber: Smuggler, Crime Boss and Businessman

> No one can call me heroin dealer and arms dealer. I grew out of barbering in the same way as Vehbi Koç grew rich out of grocery and Sabancı grew rich out of porterage.[69]

These words came out in a published interview from a Kilis native a decade ago, an alleged crime boss notoriously known for dealing gold, heroin and arms with connections to international underworld and later recognized as a decent businessman after he is been cleared of all corruption charges with minor criminal fines. The reference to Koç and Sabancı, two most-richest capitalists in Turkey, is meaningful. These two figures are suspected to grow rich thanks to the state patronage, governmental incentives and favours in the first half of Republican Era, while there is a strong public conviction that they are the exemplary figures of hard-working and astute businessmen, which earned their wealth by their own efforts. Their careers were success stories of men who scaled up from the lowest occupations –being a grocer or a porter- to the top positions in the business. As such, their stories are supposed to be a moral for greedy individuals that dream to strike it rich, teaching them to work hard for deserving it. But also they promised the possibility of becoming rich for everyone who aspired and committed to work for it.

The barber, as he assumed this nickname, had moved to İstanbul where he continued his investments in lodging industry after he was cleared of the charges prosecuted by the military government of the 1980 coup. Now heading Kilis Vakfı (Kilis Foundation)[70] in İstanbul, he is well known in his native town for his philanthropic activities conducted via the foundation, such as sponsoring the education and boarding of native students in the

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69 "*Bana kimse eroinci, silahçı diyemez. Vehbi Koç bakkalıktan, Sabancı hamallıktan zengin olduysa, ben berberlikten gelmişim*." Faruk Mercan, "Bankama izin verilseydi şimdi bir numaraydım", *Zaman*, 4.6.2002; available at http://arsiv.zaman.com.tr/2002/06/04/haberler/h12.htm

70 A benevolent association of Kilis migrants established in 1993 mostly recruiting among the new wealth that had to desert the town after the 1980 coup. I have been told by the town dwellers that the military government hampered the legitimacy of their smuggling business by criminalizing them and obliged them to leave the town to re-settle their business in Istanbul. The efforts to establish their reputation as absentee notables through philanthropy seemed to be successful.



Photograph 11. Minaret adding as philantropic activity.

A modern minaret, supplemented to the old one, is donated by the barber in the late 1970s. (My photo.)

cities, and poor relief and donation for mosque repairment, public school and university buildings. He makes frequent appearances in his hometown and he is held in high esteem by the local authorities.

The barber is the most popular name among the benevolent businessmen who were based in İstanbul but known for their charity work in their native town. His wealth is not inherited nor enabled by the occupational transmission from his father. The nickname barber remained with him from his adolescent youth when he worked as apprentice to his father's barber shop and is suggestive of his success climbing the social ladder from bottom up in span of lifetime, after the early death of his father. Also it was the obvious indicator of his past, where he did come from, arousing curiosity how he could make such a fortune by beginning his businessmen career as a barber's apprentice. He succeeded to make his wealth, unsanctioned according to law enforcement bodies during the decade of 1980s, accepted as normal and just establish his social position as a decent businessman.

This transformation of image was also relevant for the broader new wealth of the town that prospered from smuggling since the 1960s. As a former mayor and parliamentary of Kilis indicated, the brigadier general of Martial Law Command in Gaziantep gave the town dwellers suspected of smuggling hard time and picked up almost everyone, leading eventually to the outmigration of the wealthier. A former smuggler interviewee complained that the military government raiding on the new wealth pictured them as *baba*, meaning both father and crime boss in Turkish. When the newspapers resurrected the serious allegations of a transnational underworld relations reaching out the then Prime Minister in late 1980s, Kilis would be mentioned as "little Sicilia" because of the many Kilis natives were involved among the "bosses" who made prominent appearance in the latest news coverage and had kinship and marriage relations to each other, including the barber.[71]

The news covered that the barber confronted several times after the coup the charges of gold smuggling, money laundering, fraudulent export and instigation to murder and when faced with arrest warrants, he stayed in Switzerland where he had residence permit and had never been convicted of these charges.[72] Upon one of his returns to Turkey, being pardoned

71 "Kilis "Küçük Sicilya": Babaların 13'ü Kilisli", *Milliyet*, 13.12.1988.

72 Çetin Yetkin, "Türk Mafyasının Kasası İsviçre 1-7, *Milliyet*, 28.8.1989 – 3.10.1989.

by then Prime Minister Turgut Özal, the only penalty he would get was a fine of 100,000 Turkish Liras for the violation of the law regarding the protection of the value of Turkish currency thanks to the amendment –though the charges of gold smuggling initially threatened him for a possible prison sentence of 20 years.

The barber's name reappeared after the recent exposure of a police operation of bribery and corruption on December 17, 2013 capturing the headlines and putting the current AKP government under pressure to declare it as a dirty plot to terminate its administration. The allegations pointed at a money laundering and gold smuggling ring between Turkey and Iran, involving several sons of cabinet ministers, leading businesspeople close to the government and executives. Reza Zarrab, a young Iranian businessman and gold dealer was implied as ringleader, exporting $6 billion worth of gold from Turkey by dodging economic sanctions against Iran the last year and distributing his Turkish partners $60 million for enabling the money transfer through the accounts of real or front companies in Turkey.

Following the scandalous leak of the visuals and telephone recordings about the anti-corruption probe, the barber's name was mentioned as the person who introduced the Iranian businessman with the Minister of Interior Affairs, forced to resign together with the other two cabinet members a week later after the probe hit the headlines. Thus a variety of columnists drew probable links of similarities and continuity between the anti-corruption probe and a series of investigations concerning money laundering and gold smuggling by a Turkish-Bulgarian ring in the late 1980s, in which the barber was alleged to have a more pivotal role.[73] The ring was implicated in smuggling of nearly 450 tons of gold from Turkey to Switzerland, where a Lebanese-Armenian trader-moneylender was allegedly the ringleader of the Lebanese connection. The ring was also suspected to launder illicit money for financing the drug and arms trafficking, as the illicit money was transferred back in the form of gold and foreign exchange smuggled into Turkey via the

[73] Uğur Dündar, "Ürkütücü Gerçeği Açıklıyorum", *Sözcü*, 21.12. 2013. Aykut Erdoğdu, "Dostluğun Mimarı Berber Yaşar çıktı", *Birgün*, 23.12.2013. Ahmet Kahraman, "Berber Yaşar'ın Dönüşü", *Yeni Özgür Politika*, 21.12.2013. Semih Hiçyılmaz, "Özal'dan Erdoğan'a Hortum İstikrarı", *Evrensel*, 24.12. 2013.

Bulgarian border.[74]

It was argued that the gold smuggling in the first three years of the decade, benefiting from the price differentials between two countries, was a huge detriment to the Turkish economy. A bulk of foreign currency transfer could be also shown as pre-financing payments for fraudulent export from Turkey, as an investigation of fraudulent export suggested $55 million worth of transactions had been made. The ring members also benefited from the tax rebates in exchange of the currency transfer much needed supposedly by the Özal government in order to finance the country's development –the gold and foreign exchange market were newly liberalizing in the late 1980s Turkey and their influx, arguably, was a necessity.[75]

A corruption scandal blown wide open with the news of the Prime Minister Turgut Özal's meeting in Zurich with prominent Turkish and Lebanese underworld figures –about whom arrest warrants or red notice were issued by Turkish judicial authorities - and outstanding Turkish businessmen including the soon to-be CEO of a Turkish public bank.[76] The barber was alleged to organize the meeting for bringing the Lebanese-Armenian trader with the Turkish Prime Minister together. Later on, the barber would confirm the meeting without revealing its context and assert that the Prime Minister asked the Lebanese-Armenian gold dealer, who was the top trader of the world in those days according to the barber, to set up the wholesale gold market in Turkey, the proposal being refused by the gold dealer.[77]

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74 Sağlam (1991: 63) argues that Bulgarian government facilitated he illegal traffic of gold and foreign currency across its border by established a company for taking a comission of USD 50 for a kg of gold or 1‰ for currency transactions.

75 According to Webb and Öniş tax rebates worked as subsidies because "first, the subsidy rate was not related to the total amount of taxes paid by the exporter and could exceed it. Second, the rebate scheme was introduced before the value added tax; when the actual value added tax rebate was added, the prior rebate scheme remained as a pure subsidy" (Webb&Öniş, 1994: 157).

76 The news resurfaced in 1989 but the date of meeting is not clear. The article series published in *Milliyet* did not state the date of meeting, but gave place to the statements of Lebanese trader confirming the meeting. An article by Erbil Tuşalp in *Birgün* declared the meeting was in summer 1985. See Erbil Tuşalp, "Otel Odası Pazarlamacıları", *Birgün*, 24.9.2005.

77 See *Zaman*, 4.1.2002. In fact, the allegations went far beyond and it was argued that the Prime Minister also proposed him dual citizenship and incentive to let him open a bank in Cyprus, while the gold dealer declined the proposals of his proponent. The barber claimed that the Lebanese-Armenian trader did not have any illegal business with Turkey and he sold gold to the Turkish Central Bank during Özal years. Though the governments attempted to liberalize the gold

The money laundering had broader repercussions in the Swiss press. The muckraked news indicated that the money laundered in Swiss banks by the Lebanese connection was over $2 billion. The corruption upheaval toppled the Minister of Justice, seemingly destined to be the next president of Switzerland, from her post, though ironically she was a supporter of the anti-corruption law foreseeing the transparency of banking accounts and several other measures. She had to resign in early 1989 after the allegations that she tipped off her husband about a potential money laundering investigation regarding the Lebanese trader's company, where her husband was the vice chairman. The Lebanese trader received no conviction in Switzerland, but he had to move to Dubai after the reforming of Swiss banking system, ending the country's status as safe haven for illicit money.

5.2. Wealth Generation in the Margins of Economy and State

Our knowledge of the barber's story will be always limited with the tip of iceberg exposed in the Turkish media, a knowledge merely surrounded by inconclusive police investigations and parliamentary inquiries, and ambitious journalistic accounts with bits and pieces from intelligence reports about 'the deep state'. Nevertheless, it is plausible to suggest on the basis of hearsay evidence I collected during the field study that the economic accumulation in Kilis allowed the growth of conditions for the new rich to move up the social ladder and to acquire an unprecedented success in the eye of their townsmen. Thus from the vantage point of the barber's story, I aim at providing an insight into the wealth generation in Kilis. My intention is not to prove the 'fraudulent ways' that the new wealth of Kilis have resorted, but to provide a framework for exploring the possible trajectories of its social reproduction. The wealth generation in Kilis town was connected with the expansion of transnational shadow networks along the Turkish borders, which moved the local actors to transnational scale after the introduction of post-1980 neoliberal policies. As illustrated by the barber's story, the new wealth deserted the town and Kilis lost its salience as a crossing point after the military coup.

The interviews with the town locals indicated that there was already a trafficking of gold and foreign currency in place before Özal years, traded legally to Beirut, then smuggled

market in 1984, the Central Bank owned the monopoly status until 1989 (Sağlam, 1991).

from to Istanbul via Kilis border.[78] The gold money in return was clandestinely transferred via the same route. Beirut was renowned then as a major center in the international gold trade since the 1950s and "Switzerland of the Middle East" thanks to the adoption of the Swiss-style Bank Secrecy Law in 1956 (Gates 1989: 19). The national gold and foreign currency market, with its heart at Grand Bazaar in Istanbul was largely underground in the pre-1980 period, as their purchase as well as trade was strictly regulated by state tariffs and impositions.[79]

The gold-jewelry shops in the Bazaar not only provided smooth dealings of gold trade, but also "run a parallel banking catering system, on the demand side, mainly to businesses seeking illegal foreign exchange and on the supply side, to people wanting to quietly convert foreign exchange they were bringing to Turkey" (Naylor, 2004: 201). This banking catering system also served as a monetary deposit based on trust, whereby the international money transfers could be made clandestinely.[80] Thus the system was feasible for smugglers aiming at transferring drug money, as well as other immigrant workers seeking a better exchange rate and evading to pay tax for importing their remittances.

The allegations that the barber's relationship with the Lebanese trader dated back to the early 1960s seems to confirm the interviewees' claims about the illegal gold trade across Kilis border. The barber had business relations with his father in Beirut, whose international reputation as a gold dealer attracted smugglers from Turkey as well until the

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[78] This is also supported by the research on gold trade in Turkey. Drawing on the interviews with exchangers from Kilis origin in the Grand Bazaar, Sağlam points to the leading role of Kilis traders in facilitating the national and transnational gold traffic. But in the early 1980s, the transnational gold trade mainly consisted of collecting the low-purity Iranian gold in domestic market and processing it to gold of standard value. Still, the traffic of gold coming across Syria continued until the Syrian government restricted the entry of precious metals along its borders in the mid-1980s (Sağlam, 1991: 63).

[79] It is not possible to estimate the volume of gold sold out in the Bazaar before the trade liberalization, but the underground sales of the Bazaar reached about 200 to 250 tonnes between 1980 and 1982 (Sağlam, 1991).

[80] I presume that the unregistered exchange office-jewelry shops in the town functioned similarly, by selling foreign exchange at the market rate and facilitating the money transfers outside the confines of state regulations. As a recent anecdote told by a Kilis local implies, few exchange offices could also have the capacity to serve as a monetary deposit based on trust. The local townsman witnessed that a five square-meter small office could deliver his friend, to whom he accompanied, a bulk of money after his friend gave a password to the shopkeepers. No exchange apparently had been made, but his friend received some money.

father and son moved to Switzerland in the mid-1970s with the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war. According to the hearsay evidence in the press, the barber was doing trade with senior and junior Lebanese traders and controlled the gold and foreign currency traffic from his office in Grand Bazaar, where Kilis businessmen were amongst the major players of the market in the 1970s, as my interviewees asserted.

On the other hand, the barber's story illustrates the fact that the border regions like Kilis town is not marginal. As Roitman showed us in her study on the economic accumulation in Chad Basin (2004b), the wealth generation on state margins depends on wider commercial and financial relations at the metropolitan centers. The barber's cohort are involved among the new class of entrepreneurs rising on the national horizon with the introduction of neoliberal economic policies by Özal after the military coup, which led to the substantial growth of the income gap between the rich and the poor in Turkey. The rise of new wealth is problematized in by the scholarly and media discourses.

The scholarly discourse tends to regard the corruption as an anti-thesis of free market development, a disease associated with the mentality of state authorities and needed to be cured particularly in the underdeveloped and developing countries. Öniş, for instance, assumes that the Özal legacy in the post-1980 era signified the feeble commitment to the rule of law and norms of a democratic polity and the irresoluteness for establishing the legal infrastructure for a well-functioning liberalized market economy (Öniş, 2004). The problem with this approach is its lack of comprehension that the intermingling of the state regulations and formal economy with the criminal networks and informal markets is the characteristics neoliberal governance (Roitman, 2004c; Nordstrom, 2000; Galemba, 2013). Just as the Turkish interim government after the military coup of 1980 expanded its fiscal base by subsiding an export-led growth, while undermining the social and economic rights to the expense of widening the income gap, other neoliberal states of the "Third World" abetted the economic activities of criminal networks in order to finance their development.

On the other side, the corruption issue is mostly studied in Turkey by journalistic accounts, which gave extensive reference to the police and intelligence reports and indicated the relationships between state bureaucrats and 'mafia' as the causes of corruption (Hatip-Karasulu, 2005). These accounts adopted a more critical perspective towards the so-called

free-market ideal. But, they assumed a notion of the state "as a unitary, preordained actor" (Galemba, 2008), even though they implied the pluralization of regulatory authority within the state, indicating the infiltration of 'mafia' into the state bodies. Carolyn Nordstrom (2000) defines these types of economic activities as shadow economy. However, the shadow economy, as Nordstrom argues, is based on vast extra-state networks expanding across all the world's countries (Nordstrom, 2000: 36). This does not mean to say that these networks are not working through and around formal state institutions. But Nordstrom encourages us to conceive the shadow economy as more formalized, integrated and bound by rules of conduct than we tend to think.

She also objects to the distinction between state and non-state, formal and non-formal power relations, reminding that in markets and people's lives what we regard as criminal and illegal activities are closely integrated with mundane efforts of earning livelihoods (Nordstrom, 2000: 40). To adapt Nordstrom's argument to the case of gold smuggling through Kilis border, it would not be true to discuss it as a distinct sphere of activity, separate from the lives of peasants who carried it with them by sneaking across the mined zone, or the relatives of local bosses who are entrusted to keep the smuggled goods in deposit until their shipping to the next destination, or the drivers who deliver these goods to the bigger bosses in the cities.

So far I have introduced a framework for discussing how the wealth generation in the margins is encouraged and facilitated by the reconfiguration of governmental relations in the post-1980 era. The following section will explore the growth of shadow economy during the import substitution period and demonstrates how the nascent markets of Kilis town are articulated with the transnational flows of goods and money. I will focus in the following section exclusively on the story of an extended middle-class family influential in local politics, which grew rich from poor rural background to own a transport company and other enterprises. The family's story will allow me to trace the history of gold smuggling as well as other contraband to the 1960s. Drawing on the family's story, I will demonstrate that the illegal gold trade initiated a pattern of vertical mobility that moved rural families among the ranks of middle urban strata and overcame the structural constrains of social stratification in the town.

5.3. The story of Koyuncu Family: Growth of Shadow Economy during Import Substituting-Industrialization

Koyuncu family owned a large apartment building in the town center. The ground floor of the apartment building was used as the office of the transport company for national and international shipping. A door at the rear connected the spacious office place floored with old furniture to a very large kitchen, turned into an almost charitable soup kitchen every Fridays because of the usual regulars showing up after the Friday prayer at the mosque and occasional visitors in need for a hot soup. The whole building accommodated the households of several brothers from Koyuncu family. So the extended family practically lived together. The proximity of the apartment building to the largest mosque of the town made the company office a popular place of socializing, as Rıdvan, the buffet owner across the three-way intersection with a full sight of both the apartment building and the mosque told me. I had the habit of dropping by the shop on my way to the town center from time to time for the sake of tea offered by the owner and a small talk. Though a humble and meek man, he used to lose his temper when he started talking about country's agenda. These were the times when the conversation led up to Koyuncu family.

The buffet owner could not stand the sight of town dwellers crowding into the company office to ingratiate themselves with the family members. He was annoyed by the fact that several families in the town prospered from the shadow economy with the help of political patronage relations. Koyuncu family, which grew rich from peasant origin to local entrepreneurs, was an influential one in local politics. Some of its members held eminent positions in the local organization of AKP, party in power, although the family was known as the loyal adherent of a former center right party until the death of family head, the elder of several brothers and the chairman of local party branch. A resident of the border village, where Koyuncu family had its origin, remembers vividly that when the family head hosted in the village party leader in the mid-1990s, who happened to head the cabinet as well, women of the village had gone sick for laboriously cooking food and honouring their important guests.

İsmail, an elder brother of Koyuncu siblings to whom I met in the company office was a man who kept the traditional clothes and wore baggy trousers, reminding the social

background of the family despite its upward mobility. The family, as previously mentioned, had its origin in a border village where Arabic and nomadic Turcoman tribes with Kurdish relatives due to ethnically mixed marriages were settled.[81] The demarcation of Turkish-Syrian frontier turned these populations into extended families with kinship relations straddling the border. The elder brother indicated the family was a stockbreeding agha family, though it became impoverished with the loss of lands and cattle after the Second World War. He did not abstain from telling that the family was involved in trading contraband gold before the military coup of 1980. The gold trade across the border is known to date back to the 1940. The gold trade remained regional at the beginning: it circulated from Beirut to Aleppo, where the local gold dealers sold it to buyers from Turkey. The family business began with their father and consisted of taking the delivery of contraband gold at the border and carrying it to the city of Gaziantep. These were 31 ounce (about a kg) gold bullions officially traded from Switzerland to Beirut and clandestinely trafficking to the Syrian inlands and across the Turkish borders. With the 1970s, the family started to deliver the gold to Istanbul Grand Bazaar, where entrepreneurs from Kilis established their business and the gold market expanded to a national level.

But I gathered the family's story particularly by interviewing another member who moved away from his family, being offended by a kinship discord years ago. Mustafa, repairing clocks in an arcade store, differed from his brothers in terms of political view and outlook. The interview offered broader perspective to explore the growth of a semi-legal market that brought major changes on the social stratification in the town and its urban landscape, as he probably felt less attachment to his origins and more independence to speak out. Mustafa remembers that he was reckless in his early adolescent youth to shuttle across the border for smuggling jackets left over from Levantine citizens and earlier presence of Western soldiers. The village was a small one with 14 households. The interviewees' recollections indicated the seesaw movement of villagers across the border before the mining of frontier zone. Mustafa remembers that he received as a young adolescent took 2.5 to 5 Liras for each delivery of gold crossing the border –when a kilogram of gold cost 5,000 Liras. Three kilometers between the border villages at different sides of the frontier

[81] The elder brother indicated that the family had migrated from Iraq to Raqqa and then settled in this village in his grandfather's time and assumed their ethnic origin as Arab.

and kinship relations made possible frequent deliveries. He picked up the delivery left at bottom of a border stone, used to mark the frontier line until the late 1950s, and drove it to the local jewelry dealer on an old Russian husky motorcycle, perfectly steering along the village roads. The local jewelry dealer would convey it to its next destination. The local gold dealers kept account and Mustafa received his accumulated earning once in few months.

Smuggling across the border was a dangerous business since the illegal crossings could inflict armed clashes between soldiers patrolling the border and the villagers. But the danger threat peaked with the planting of land mines, turning a width of 400 to 800 meters along the frontier line into a death field. The price of gold per kg as well as the earning of porters, called sırtçı (literally translated as piggybackers since the hired porters carried the load on their back) went higher and higher. Also, the volume of gold trafficking significantly increased, with the great majority of bullions smuggled into Turkey crossing Kilis border and a slight percentage circulating across other points on the Turkish-Syrian frontier. The price of a kg rose to its double in the 1960s and saw a steady increase in the 1970s.[82] A porter could earn 100 Liras for the load he carried –usually it did not matter what the type of load it was. Mustafa's brothers assumed the position of a local gold dealer and their share of gain mounted to 600 to 700 Liras per kilogram, minus the bribe given to the border patrolling soldiers. For Mustafa, this meant to assume the position of a boss administering the gold trade in contrast to the status of a porter whose labour force was employed by someone else, though the Syrian trader and final Turkish buyer actually arranged the details of commerce. In late 1970s, about 300 to 400 kg of gold crossed the border daily, often by porters who shuttled on wheel back and forth across the border gate rather than sneaking into the fenced mined field.

The story of Koyuncu family illustrates the rapid upward mobility of a lineage from rural background into the ranks of urban middle class by appropriating the kinship and political patronage as an asset and developing the father's occupation of smuggling into a family business. The family filled a significant position in local politics, entangled in an urban

[82] The rise in price (TL) of an ounce of gold (31,10 gr) every five years is as follows in the regulated domestic market: 6 in 1950; 9.25 in 1955; 16 in 1960; 14 in 1965; 21.50 in 1970; 80.50 in 1975; 1,835 in 1980 (Sağlam, 1991)

economics of reconstruction and clientelism of social assistance. During the fieldwork, I observed that the political clientelism were effectual in the distribution of rents tied to the urban development as well as of social assistance benefits. The family's move into the ranks of middle class needs to be fitted within the broader picture of the gold traffic from Switzerland to Istanbul via Beirut and Kilis, complemented with the flow of foreign currency –the gold money- that reached Switzerland through the same route. Enver, a former gold smuggler and fellow villager of Koyuncu family, expressed in his interview, not only the role of Kilis townsmen in Grand Bazaar, but he also gave a glimpse to the concomitance of gold and foreign currency trade:

> We used to scale the Bazaar up and down. Once, I saved my money on the safe box of a fellow townsman until the goods that I had bought on loan would be sold… He came a bit late. I filled the box with German marks and American dollars until he came. I collected a wad of currency in the Grand Bazaar of Istanbul.
>
> You take away gold from here and exchange it with foreign currency there.[83]

The smuggled gold was sold in Istanbul in exchange of foreign currency and the latter clandestinely circulated to Switzerland by taking it out of Kilis border.[84] Except the yearly 500 to 600 kg of gold production, the overwhelming majority of national gold market was fed by contraband trade during the period 1960-1980 and only in the last years of the period lower-quality Iranian coins and gold bars entered along the borders of the country (Sağlam, 1991: 65). This made Kilis natives major national dealers of gold trade closely intertwined with the underground foreign exchange market and among them, few could even wriggle out as crime bosses running business with their transnational counterparts.

As the barber's story demonstrates, the gold trade is a useful case to reveal the subtle and hazy connections between transnational crime organisations and small-scale cross-border trade. As Yükseker discussed within the context of informal trade between Turkey and

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[83] *Çarşıyı biz indirir kaldırırdık. Borca aldığım mal satılıncaya kadar ben birisinin kasasına para koydum. ... O biraz geç geldi. Gelene kadar kasayı mark dolarla doldurdum ya. Bir çuval mark dolar topladım Kapalıçarşı'da İstanbul'da.… Burdan altın götürürsün, ordan döviz alırsın.*

[84] Drawing on his interviews with exchangers from Kilis origin, Sağlam states that the traders of Kilis used to sell the gold to Jewish exchangers in Doğubank Office Block in exchange of foreign currency (1991: 63). My interviewees, on the other hand, only pointed to the Grand Bazaar. Constrasting these accounts, I assume that the exchangers in Doğubank performed their role until the mid-1960s before the Grand Bazaar gained significance.

Russia, transnational informal trade is open to concentration of capital and monopolization (Yükseker, 2003: 67-68). Thus they can lead to the emergence of crime organisations, which able to acquire the monopoly or semi-monopoly rent and take advantage of patronage relations with the state and use of violence, operating in high-risk areas where they have few competitors. Within this larger context, the subjective perceptions of Koyuncu family testify the tendencies toward concentration of capital and monopolization even more dramatically. As profit rose from increasing business and the involvement of long-distance legal and illegal buyers, border dwellers in such lucrative businesses got less likely to abide by redistributive norms and created family monopolies around their respective enterprises (Galemba, 2012a: 10). The family grew their business of gold from a regional small-scale trade up to the underground domestic market. Mustafa's words hinted how he and his brother benefited of the local structures of opportunities and established themselves as local entrepreneurs, exploiting the labour of their fellow villagers: "We got promoted and we moved the 'company' from the village here [to the town]".[85]

Koyuncu family illustrates that the gold trade was significant in the moving of rural families into the ranks of middle urban strata, which grew richer under the auspices of new wealth. So, the social mobility of the family should be understood as part of the shift in social stratification structure that gave rise to the new wealth, gradually undermining the economic and symbolic status as well as political dominance of the old wealth. The enrichment with the gold trade marked the involvement of rural families among the middle urban strata with nicknaming the coveted status of richness.

As Sarah Green argues, gold signifies for border dwellers in a state of flux, as well as for broader Eurasian people, the most obvious embodiment of richness and a stable means of preserving the family wealth (Green, 2009). For instance, a former help from rural background who work for an enriched gold trader succeeded to yield enough fortune to own a stone courtyard house, which is still named after him.[86] This example illustrates the

85 *Biz terfi ettik, köyden şirketi buraya getirdik.*

86 Here I rely on my interview with Ata, a member of extended families with Syrian relatives from a border village.

emergence of new wealth that could move up the social ladder bypassing the regular patterns of mobility such as the intergenerational occupational transmission or access to education.

The following section will extend the analysis of these mobility patterns to the town landscape and domestic market, by focusing on the decline of traditional industry, the urban development and the scaling up of local economy to the national level. I will depict how the unregulated flows of goods transformed the town landscape into a border zone speckled with high-walled warehouses of transport companies, small shops, arcade of stores and houses used as bulking and diffusing points. Besides, I will underline how the shadow economy of 1960-1980 forged a local semi-legal market, bringing informal and illegal activities together and dependent upon the commercial and financial relationships with the cities.

5.4. Kilis as "little Beirut": Growth of Shadow Market in the Town

Koyuncu family was not only involved in the gold trade but it was also engaged in contraband of several goods circulating from Beirut to the Turkish border. The family moved to the town and restored its business in an arcade shop, by selling the contraband goods coming from Beirut. The interviewees' recollections point to the entry of consumer goods along the borders, breaching the high tariff walls of Turkish economy before the trade liberalization of the 1980s. The trade liberalization in Beirut had transformed the city into an "open market" facilitating the circulation of Western and Far Eastern exports into the inlands of Southeastern Turkey. The Baathist subsidies also contributed to the reduction of price in exported goods and allured Kilis traders for the scaling up their business.

The family began to bring contraband goods from Syrian Aleppo and sell them to the customers that visited the town from other cities. Mustafa revealed that while he appeared to be selling the tableware at the forefront receiving the customs, the rear side of the store remained as coordinating point where his brothers run the gold business and ensured its distribution. These goods were sold to the domestic tourists that were driven to the town on bus tours for its famous contraband bazaar. The level of appeal that the town's shops reached led the local residents to name Kilis as "little Beirut", turning the town into an

open market, even though these goods were deemed as *kaçak* when they crossed the town's boundaries. The customers had to afford the risk of getting caught by police patrols and getting deprived of what they had. However, the goods could be freely sold and bought in the arcade shops that blossomed along the main axis of the town in the late 1960s.

5.4.1. Shadow Economy Carving Out New Urban and Social Landscape

The overflow of goods accelerated the introduction of money economy and transformation of urban landscape, which irrevocably undermined the historic identity of the town that the old wealth was most attached.[87] The first arcade, called Adalet Çarşısı, was built by the town municipality in 1967 on Cumhuriyet Street, the main avenue of the town dividing the old center developed in circular form into two hemispheres and it aimed at responding the need to provide a marketplace for goods coming across the border and sold by street sellers at several corners.[88] Adalet Çarşısı accommodated 36 shops in the two-storey building and started to bring yearly rental income of 115,000 Liras by the time the total trade of the town was estimated as 50 million Liras (Konyalı, 1968). The second arcade erected by a known smuggler and received by the astonishment of town dwellers according to an interviewee, since the owner of the building could accomplish what was done by the municipality by relying on his own resources.

The introduction of money economy also interrupted the intergenerational occupational transmission by eradicating the old artisanship already in decline. The town had 75,092 residents in 1965, the rural and urban population being almost in half shares.[89] In 1968, the trade had already a major share involving one-third of the population according to the records of town's chamber of commerce, ranked after the laboring in agriculture.[90] The industry was largely traditional, mostly consisted of small-scale factories and workshops for olive oil and grape molasses, as well as silk textile with handloom weavers. The growth

87 For the historic identity of the town, see Bebekoğlu and Tektuna, 2008; Taşçıoğlu, 2013.

88 My interviewee İhsan used to be employed as a worker at the directorate of technical works at the municipality in those years and thus, had a first-hand knowledge.

89 Urban population: 38,095; rural population: 36,997 according to the 1965 Population Census by Turkstats.

90 Konyalı (1968) does not state the year of Chamber of Trade Records: agriculture 30%, trade 28%, artisanship 26%, service sector 2% and industry 14%.

of contraband trade had an adverse effect on traditional artisanship, including soap making, stone masonry, tannery (*tabaklık-sepicilik*), sack making (*çuvalcılık*), coppersmithing, blacksmithing, saddle making (*saraçlık-palancılık*), rug weaving, shoemaking (*yemenicilik-köşkerlik*), plow making (*sabancılık*), wickerwork (*hasırcılık*) and crafts like radio and watch repairing which were already in decline. The interviewees' recollections indicate that the majority of craftsman abandoned their vocations, and rented a shop in the newly constructed arcades in order to do trade.

The traditional trade-artisanal area, located on the southern hemisphere to the downward of Cumhuriyet Street, had an integrated structure with the old urban texture composed of bazaars, mosques and bathhouses.[91] The building of Adalet Çarşısı on Cumhuriyet street was a precursor of the pulling the trade life along the middle of historic town center. In the following decade, more contraband goods hit the shops in the arcades that are lined up on the main street of the town. The old two-storey stone houses with courtyard located on the street were doomed to be demolished in order to be replaced by cement buildings. The number of shops in the arcades climbed up to 424.[92]

As a well known border scholar Neşe Özgen remarks (2004b), the owners of arcades in Gaziantep and Kilis were local notables and the merchants-moneylenders. The building of arcades was concomitant with the rapid urbanization, often accommodating the shops on the downstairs of a high-rise apartment block. The urban planning of 1967 accelerated the rapid urbanization as the road building works destructed the historic texture by widening narrow alleys and streets and the succeeding municipal administrations sustained similar

[91] An axis that vertically parted from Cumhuriyet Street along the road to Sabah Pazarı (a fixed wet market), where the biggest old covered bazaar demolished in the mid-1930s was located, accommodated the artisanal shops (Akdemir&İncili, 2013). Thus it is understood that the old trade and industrial area was developed around the big covered bazaar and stretched out to the southeastward, that is, on the direction of Odunpazarı Street and Hasanbey Bathhouse. In the present day, the latter spot still bears the traces with the shops of ironsmiths, bladesmiths, tinsmiths and a traditional shoemaker. The interviewees' recollection indicate the location between the Grand Mosque and Tuğlu Bathhouse as another marketplace, which was called little bazaar. The town square where the old Tekye mosque was located at its southern corner could also accommodate a marketplace with the stalls of goods.

[92] The number taken State Istatistics of 1990, cited in Ökkeş (1994). I assume that the number had not been changed since the late 1970s because any of the buildings was not demolished after the 1980 coup. Nevertheless, Mustafa stated the number of shops as 700 to 800. He might have included the shops outside the arcades.



Map 3. Urbanization in the historic downtown.

Source: This map is reproduced by the author on the basis of the maps provided by Bebekoğlu and Tektuna (1998). The red colored plots show the concrete buildings, while the grey ones are traditional dwellings. As it could be easily discerned, the concrete buildings are mainly concentrated along the main axis of the town, following the road building works with the urban planning of 1967.

decisions of urban development by expropriating several monumental domestic dwellings for demolition (Bebekoğlu and Tektuna, 2008; also see above Map 3). In terms of familial meaning of housing, this meant the symbolic detachment of the lineage located at the paternal house and the old dwellings came to be "treated primarily as a form of investment, an economic patrimony whose transmission to younger generations is expected to be carried out through the sale of the house itself and its conversion into liquid capital" (Bertaux-Wiame&Thompson, 1997: 133).

My interview with the nephews of the abovementioned gold trader revealed that the urban development turned into a drift promoted by their neighbors, local merchants and even municipality employees. The drift was actually enhanced by the economic conditions of the 1970s under which the high inflation forced the money earners to opt out of gold and foreign currency as a means of stabilizing value. The strict regulations of these markets led to the reckoning of rents to them and the sale and rental transactions for residential properties and arcade shops were made with foreign exchange and gold rather than national currency.

The custom of buying gold for the newlyweds is a known cultural practice in Turkey as a wedding gift as well as a form of financial support offered in communal solidarity for helping the establishment of the new household. The gold signifies for people not only a desirable good but also money, even if worn on the skin (Strathern, 1975; cited in Green, 2009). The circulation of gold and foreign currency across the border made them more readily available in Kilis town and helped to shape the dwellers' lives and senses of value. The interview with the nephews, Behire and Tijen, exemplified the shift from paternalistic relationships based on traditional production to money economy. The two sisters, whose father was an artisan, not only witnessed the enrichment of family as their uncle was engaged in gold trade but also actually watched over the gold traffic. The recollections of the elder sister stated that she was trusted the load of gold with her husband in order to put out of sight before it had been shipped to the next destination. Unlike women pinned a piece of gold onto her wedding dress, she could change the gold bars between her hands in order to pile them up to a corner of her house.

Each sister having their stone houses demolished for the construction of arcades could catch the trend lately towards the end of decade and regretted their delay for not having reaped the benefit of it. The local contraband trade almost stopped after being busted by the military raids after the 1980 coup and the shops were left idle or the rentals were not satisfying (See Photograph 10). They had brilliant memories about how much worth the rental income of the shops were and should have been in gold. Whether they had given by the building engineer an accurate floor space for their property occupied a significant part of the conversations among themselves during the interview. The conversations underlined their understanding of wealth and culminated in the confession of elder sister that she would have been a smuggler as a profession if she were a man. This shift in the urban and social landscape of the town was clearly connected with the growth of domestic underground market of gold and foreign currency as well as informal sector, particularly in Istanbul.

5.4.2. Scaling up the shadow market from local to national

The local economy was increasingly enmeshed with longer-distance buyers in the domestic market. This was conditioned in two ways: either the potential buyers or consumers themselves from different cities visited the town or Kilis traders established commercial links with these cities. A wide range of items crossing the border started to circulate in the domestic market: kitchen utensil with crystal glassware, porcelain tableware and assorted cutlery, high quality household electrical appliances and electronic goods including Phillips and Japanese-branded radios and tape players, perfumery and cosmetics goods, cigarette paper, playing cards, weave beads and other indispensable goods of daily life including watches and straps, eye glasses, lighters, nail clippers and stationary.

The boom created by the arcades was dramatic enough to stir Mustafa resembling the town to Paris, as source of inspiration for its nineteenth century arcades. According to an interviewee, the town used to receive some 20 to 30 buses of domestic tourists thanks to its famous arcades in the 1970s. For Walter Benjamin, the Parisian Arcades constituted an important aspect of experiencing the urban public life of the century (Benjamin, 2002). The arcades of Kilis town were certainly incomparable to Parisian luminous, spacious and elegant architecture. The arcades of the town also lacked the significant features

Photograph 12 and 13. Idle shops in an arcade

Some arcades have almost left abandoned except few shops rented by quilt makers (above). Motorcycles, commonly used by Kilis dwellers are parked within the arcade (below). (My photos.)

highlighted by Benjamin: strolling, window-shopping and observing. The customers were there on purpose and to buy contraband goods.

They even did not have the chance to observe the goods, if they wanted, for instance, to buy a small arm. As a former shopkeeper told, when a potential customer demanding a small arm came to the shop, he used to make the customer wait in order to ask another fellow townsman who is a known dealer. The fellow townsman took the pistol from a hidden place behind the racks where goods in sight were aligned. He returned back to the shop with the pistol and took the customer to a vacant place so that the customer could get a shot.

The arcades of the town and the goods in them still promised a mass consumption experience that Benjamin outlined in his Arcades Project. The influx of foreign goods that were not available to the consumers in the formal domestic market or only available for high prices due to tariff walls forged the consumption experience in the passageways crowded by domestic tourists. From the viewpoint of consumers visiting to the town, the goods in the shop racks seemed to embody the Western or Japanese industrial development and the level of quality, compared to 'shoddy' domestic goods. Border scholars demonstrated that the material objects circulating across the border act as symbolic vehicles as they embodied national or transnational identifications,[93] a fact that should have fueled the demand to obtain 'foreign' goods for cheaper prices. Several interviewees, including Mustafa told that they were involved in selling domestic merchandise on the arcade shops and the latter were paid higher prices than their real value because the customers surmised them as foreign. The sales were well to make Mustafa earn in a gainful day an amount equivalent to the shop rental in the arcade. This could be the reason why the consumers visiting the town for its 'free contraband market' could easily be cheated by domestically produced lower-quality or quality merchandise brought from Istanbul

[93] See Reeves, 1999; Yükseker 2007; cf. Pelkman, 2006. For Yükseker, the flow of signs associated with Westerns values accompanied the flows of goods from Turkey through informal trade and helped their entry to the nascent capitalist markets of former Soviet Republics in the 1990s. On the contrary, Pelkman's ethnography of Turkish-Georgian border explores how the cheap and flimpsy Turkish goods flowing to Ajaria contributed to the redrawing of boundaries between "us" and "them". Pelkman calls calling these markets as "treacherous" because they embodied "the disillusionment with the capitalist change and the massive influx of new consumer goods" (Pelkmans, 2006: 172)

wholesalers and fraudulently sold to their customers.[94]

Kilis shopkeepers and traders not only brought merchandise from Istanbul, but they also supplied contraband goods to other cities, particularly the informal sector of Istanbul concentrated in Eminönü district. Mustafa's interview revealed that the family used to send contraband goods to Istanbul hidden in secret places of a car, bought by a trader which would sell these goods to a wholesaler and eventually, these goods would be put on mobile stalls by the street sellers of Eminönü. For example, the profit range for the Schneider pens smuggled across the border and transported to Istanbul would be %20 after reducing the expenses, and the traders benefited the competitive advantage of selling them for almost half the price when the same pens are legally exported and put to the sale on the national market. Kilis traders could also invoice these goods in order to avoid a police investigation when necessary. They could ask the importer company which sold the same good to domestic market officially to make out an invoice in exchange of a certain price.

In the 1970s, the border gates and seaports gained prominence over the mined frontier. In 1975, the number of passport owners in the town reached the number of 27,000, almost one third of the population.[95] The signing of trade agreement with Syria in 1974[96] increased the number of transport companies. The trucks shipped to Syria local agricultural products (pine nut, pistachio, olive oil), consumer goods and parts (hoover, electrical plugs for household appliance, chandelier glass), textile products (carpet, prayer rug, fabric and garment), raw materials and semi-manufactured products (processed cattle intestine and catguts).[97] Still, these companies were implicated in the unregulated trade as the foreign

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94 For example, Alaattin, a shopkeeper in a partly deserted arcade told that they used to sell domestic goods rather than smuggled ones. Alaattin also recounted how the contraband goods could be easily sold in the arcade shops as the shopkeepers negotiated bribes with the law enforcement officers.

95 1977 Turkish National Grand Assembly Research Report dated on January 28, 1977 of the Parliamentary Comittee no. 10/14 on the cleaning of minefields and distribution of land among landless peasants; see TNGA minutes, 4th period, 4th session, 1977. The town population was exactly 92,759 dwellers.

96 The first trade agreement signed on September 17, 1974 designated the goods allowed for exportation and importation until the end of 1982. For details see the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Syria published in Official Gazette No. 17785, 17.8.1982.

97 The information of trade with Syria largely draws on my interviews with Mahmut, a young member of traditional landed family owning an international taxi company; Yasin, a middle-class

exchange regime strictly controlled the entry of currency.[98] They were also suspected to smuggle goods on their way back, by hiding cigarettes in particular in secret places of the trucks.

Just like the gold trade, the contraband of consumer goods from Beirut became increasingly connected with the transnational shadow economy whose actors were large-scale traders. The early examples of fraudulent export, usually associated with the neoliberal period, were observed. The interviewees' recollections suggested that the entrepreneurs, including several from Kilis, produced the paperwork at the border customs for the transit shipping of goods from Beirut to Iran, except that the latter never crossed the border.

The goods circulated to Kilis and nearby cities as they were shipped by the small boats landing on the shores of the gulf of Alexandretta. There are numerous stories told by former smugglers about eluding the coast guard by buoying the contraband goods on the sea or when caught, simply getting rid of them by throwing into. But the large bulk of these goods were smuggled into Turkey by ships docking at Mersin port and transported to cities like Istanbul. As early as 1970, the ratio of contraband to domestically produced goods found in the local shops of the town was estimated about 20%.[99]

5.5. Morality of Smuggling

Despite the civilian and state efforts for launching industrial enterprises, Kilis town failed to lead an industrial development during the import-substituting industrialization and it lacks ever since state investments on industrialization.[100] The accounts introduced in this

tradesman dealing with white sale and wholesale trade; and Murtaza, a young transport company owner carrying the goods of industrialists in Gaziantep to Middle Eastern countries.

98 The interview with the former head of Kilis Chamber of Commerce and Industry emphasized for example the Decree No. 17 regarding the Law No. 1567 on the Protection of the Value of Turkish Currency. The resolution requires the import of value received in exports within three months and its exchange on a Turkish bank within 10 days. See Decree no. 17 issued by Cabinet Decision 6/763 and published in Official Gazette on August 11, 1962.

99 See the statements by the Minister of Customs and Monopoly Ahmet İhsan Birincioğlu in TGNA minutes, 28th legislative term, volume 5, 3rd period, 1st session, May 26, 1970. However, deputies taking the floor reminds that the contraband trade in volume tends to increase in the last decade and harms the Turkish economy in great deal.

100 A significant attempt for industrial investment in the town was a public-private joint venture of oil factory in the mid-1950s (Çolakoğlu, 1995). The project fell behind and cancelled by the succeeding government. The only state investment in the town was alcohol (*suma)* factory of Tekel built in 1944 and privatized in 2004. The development thrust consisted of modernizing

chapter suggest that transnational shadow economy sustained in Kilis a distinctive redistributive mechanism largely controlled by large-scale entrepreneurs within a context where the state failed to promote public and local investments in industrialization and offer employment opportunities to the town community. Though illegal, town dwellers regard cross-border trade activities are as legitimate. For instance the barber's 'success' is a standing promise for the middle and lower strata of Kilis town. His success does not only consist of his moving up the social ladder by running an astute business strategy, but also of achieving the transformation of his image from a crime boss to a decent businessman, whose philanthropy is rewarded by highly-placed state officials with presented honor plates. His frequent visits to the town, appearance in local media coverage and congregation with town authority invited to Istanbul for social dinners he hosts; all give clues about the delicate balance between secrecy and transparency that the town locals try to keep. Adapting Galemba's words, while Kilis natives keep their businesses secret in order to avoid competition and the anger of higher level authorities not involved in the bribe network, they also maintain visibility to ensure community support and sustain the image of legitimate work (Galemba, 2012a: 11).

Roitman argues that the unregulated trade and gang-based banditry designates an ethical realm where "one evaluates the nature of licit practice, as well as representations of the self and self-conduct" (2006: 265). The main point here is that the banditry activities cannot be conceived in terms of a juridical morality that distinguishes between right and wrong, good and bad. To put it differently, she suggests that the moral values that regulate these activities cannot be understood within the framework of universal principles about the human nature. Roitman is guided here by the definition of ethics asserted by Michel Foucault as she contrasts it with the concept of morality. Foucault's notion of ethics refers to the subjectivation within the power relations, to "a mode of questioning about the self and the construction of the self in the world" (Roitman, 2006: 267). In the light of her arguments, I do not consider the economic practices of trade in Kilis as lying beyond the realm of justice and morality. These practices are governed by the community norms and

agriculture under the auspices of Marshall Plan in the 1950s. According to 2011 data, there are 30 industrial enterprises in the free industrial zone and 250 workplaces –mostly motor mechanics- in small industrial site (Taşkesen et al., 2011)

values. Following Roitman, I argue that these norms and values draw on local power structures, state regulations, code of smuggling and religious references, rather than moral principles.

My interviewees do not consider smuggling as a unitary category, but they distinguish it in terms of legitimate and illegitimate practices. For instance, an old generation woman from traditional landed notables suggest that even though Kilis locals were involved in smuggling gold and consumer goods in the past, it was fortunate that they did not engage in heroin trade. Other interviewees include small arms trade as an activity to be avoided. My interview with a former smuggler reveals the comparison o smuggling with theft:

> In our view smuggling is an honorable crime, but you have to serve time in prison with men who committed infamous crime like adultry. You go without fear, defeat the military and earn your own money. You do not cheat somebody of his rights. Nobody mess with the smuggler, they make him representative of the inmates. [Smugglers] take information from inside [prison administration]. He has not any slighest harm to someone. He has not any harm to the state. It is only a crime regarding taxation.[101]

The same interviewee also considers smuggling in terms of distinctions between helal (religiously lawful) and haram (religiously unlawful): "We used not to bring playing card because it is gamble and breaks up families. We used not to bring heroin and small arms because it was religiously unlawful and for fear that we would not do well".[102]

The distinction between helal and haram makes the religious reference clearly visible. But it is not possible to fix these categories either. For instance, when I visited few border villages in company with Hamit (see Photograph 11), a twenty-six years old astute trader, doing cigarette and oil trade, we stopped in the village where my companion was grown up. His father was an imam and he served his function for years in the mosque of the village. İmam was a beloved man among the peasants in the village as well as nearby villages because he used to go with them to smuggling across the minefields. We were

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[101] *Bizim görüşümüzce kaçakçılık şerefli bir suç ama zina gibi yüz kızartıcı suçlar işleyen adamlarla yatıyorsun. Korkmadan gidiyor, askeri tepeliyor, kendi paranı kazanıyorsun. Kimsenin hakkını yemiyorsun. Kaçakçıya kimse dokunmuyor, onu koğuş sorumlusu yapıyorlar. İçerden bilgi alıyor. En ufak kimseye zararı yok. Devlete de zararı yok, sadece vergi açısından bir suç.*

[102] *Kağıt kumar, ev yıkıyor diye iskambil kağıdı getirmezdik. Dinen haram, işimiz rast gitmez diye uyuşturucu, silah getirmezdik.*

Photograph 14. A moment of break in a border village of *Kurd Dagh*.

Our host, the mukhtar of the border village in *Kurd Dagh*, a highland border region in eastward Kilis, asked permission for a break from our conversation. Hamit (on the left) in company with me to the border village and the mukhtar (on the right) are lined up to perform their prayer at each side of a young imam, Hamit's friend who joined us along the way. (My photo.)

hosted by my companion's family friend.

Our host moved into conversation with my companion and complained about difficulties the border villagers experience and said: "Okey, [smuggling] is unlawful by religion. But when your are in it and you endure its difficulties so much, you come to the point of questioning in which way it is unlawful".[103] My young companion Hamit replied by repeating his father's words. For his father, the imam, smuggling was not religiously unlawful but detested (*mekruh*). Mekruh is distinguished from religiously lawful and unlawful and it denotes the practice of soul (*nefis*) upon which the believer has to decide not to do it. So, these accounts suggests that smuggling should be considered as an ethical practice.

Lastly, I will mention about the codes of smuggling. The codes of smuggling in Kilis have again religious connotations. As stated in the Chapter II on methodology with reference to my encounter with Urup Ismail, there is a "smugglers' sharia" that used to determine the codes of conduct regarding the smuggling activities. Sharia was highly active during the import-substitution period. It also used to secure the perpetuation of smuggling activities by defining the rights and liabilities of individuals engaged in these activities. Why did the smugglers name their own codes as sharia? I believe that it was not related with their intention to make these codes as valid as the state laws are supposed to be. It probably refers to the decisiveness of resolutions made by sharia, as the saying that 'the finger cut off by sharia will not get hurt' suggests. As my encounter with Urup İsmail shows, I was not able to learn about sharia from its enforcers. But I had the idea that it was a guild-like organization recruiting the smugglers who proved themselves as reliable.

The realm of unregulated trade practices puts forth the trust relationships because they lack a legal framework or because traders cannot rely on institutional state mechanisms (Yükseker, 2004; Atalay, 2012). Smugglers in Kilis had to count on trust relationships in doing trade with Aleppo merchants and among themselves. The harsh punishments forestalled the prevention of behaviours harming the trust relations among smugglers such as denouncement of smuggling activity to the law enforcement, breaking one's word and

[103] *Tamam [kaçakçılık] haram da, işin içinde olup bu kadar çilesini, kahrını çekince de nesi haram diyorsun.*

cheating. At the same time, sharia compensated for the loss of partners or the injuries of peasants working for their boss. An interview with a retired teacher who had knowledge of sharia explained its role as follows:

> [The rights of] smugglers who invest in share of a joint business should be protected. For example, when he is shot by a bullet, his treatment in the hospital. [Sharia] will tell the smugglers who have taken this injured man to the job to take care of his family. Sharia used to gather and make its call in order to prevent victimhood.[104]

My interviewee also emphasized that sharia offered patronage to the lower stata by using its relationships with local bureaucrats and politicians.

These examples highlight which practices are considered as legitimate livelihood strategies and which values and norms support them. The meaning of smuggling in Kilis town does not originate in the transgression of law but it stems from its organization on the community level. The distinctions about legitimate/illegitimate practices are not moral statements because they do not judge it right or wrong. But they are ethical principles that regulate the realm of illegality and the smugglers are expected to follow them.

5.6. Shadow Economy and the "Normal Order" of Border

As the Syrian conflict grew and the migrants began to pile up at Turkish border, the Disaster and Emergency Management (AFAD) governed by Turkish Prime Ministry decided in early 2012 the shift of Syrian refugees in Hatay to Kilis town and a camping ground at the zero point to the border is ordained to be built in order to 'host' them. The news has been quickly heard in Kilis and met by the local 'civil society' with discontent. The local representatives of opposition parties and semi-governmental trade and agricultural bodies, as well as the local transit shipping and passenger transportation companies and drivers were present at a meeting with the governor and mayor in order to express the civil society's discontent about the coming of Syrian migrants.[105] They pointed

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[104] *Kaçakçılıktan hisse yiyenlerin [hakkı korunur]. Mesela kaçağa giderken mermi yemiş, onun hastanede bakımı. Onu işe götürenlere bu adama hastanede bakacaksın, ailesine bakacaksın derler. Bu gibi mağduriyeti önlemek için şeriatlar olurdu.*

[105] See details of four-hour meeting in *Gazete Kilis*, 5.1.2012; available in http://www.gazetekilis.com/kilisliler-suriyeli-multecileri-istemiyor/ and downloaded on 17.5.2013. The civil society organisations of the town also met the protests of Islamist NGOs in solidarity with Syrian opposition that took place in the town in May and July 2011 with harsh reactions and

that the border gate constituted the main source of livelihood in the town. Their complaint was that the indwelling of rebels against Syrian government so near to the border would incite Assad's anger and prompt him to close the gate. For town dwellers, keeping the border open was vital in order to sustain the local economy.

Actually, their discontent was shared by broader community of shopkeepers who struggled to earn a living by small-scale contraband across the border despite the decreasing profit margins particularly in the last decade under the fragile conditions created by global economy. Several reasons were speculated: any attack to the border camp committed by a lunatic supporter of Syrian regime or PKK fighters deterred of crossing to the Turkish side of the border in this region until now could bring Turkey on the brink of war. Plus, lending an ear to the rumours circulating across Hatay, the town dwellers suggested that the Syrian migrants were indulged in stealing and prostitution and their coming were of no good. But for the middle strata of the town, the main concern was economic. The transportation and trade and retail sector composed the lion share of income distribution.[106] Not only the shipping and transportation companies did yield revenues from the flow of goods and passengers across the border, but also shopkeepers took benefit from the price differentials between the two countries.

Still the means of livelihood mainly depended on the illegal trade across the border associated with the informal sector. According to a local entrepreneur, there were about fifteen registered companies in the town licensed for international transport, usually carrying the load of Gaziantep factories to the Middle East. These companies were implicated in the contraband of goods that would be worth of carrying in the hidden places (*zula*) of their vehicles like cigarettes, automobile spare parts and drugs in their way back to Turkey. But, the majority of the traffic was due to the registered passenger taxis as well as civilian cars which work as unregistered companies of families by putting several cars

resilience. My interview with Bahri, the speaker of May demonstration, a lawyer and volunteer of Humanitarian Relief Foundation (İHH) in Kilis was manhandled by the drivers of the passenger transportation companies rallying against the solidary protests.

106 In 2000, the gross domestic product of the town is distributed as trade (37%), agriculture (32.8%) and industry (10.8%) (Bayraktar, 2003). According to the 2003 Data of Kilis Chamber of Trade and Industry, 30% of total registered companies (counted as 1004) work on food production and trade, while 10% operate in shipping and transportation sector. However, the latter dropped in the last decade.

alternately for the use of border crossing in order to bring goods from Syria.[107]

The drivers usually drove to Syria with empty tanks so that they could fill it with cheaper Syrian gasoline and immediately sell the unconsumed remainder. They could carry contraband goods hiddenly or without declaring at the customs, thanks to the complicity of officers. Not only the pricy items, but also Ceylon tea, Syrian chips and chocolates, cheap housewares and trifles, Chinese-made electrical appliances and imported underwear, cosmetics and perfumes of poor quality were put to sale in the store racks, next to the better quality goods so that the middle-class public employees and university students could buy what they needed among the offered options. None of these purchases would be taxed. The unregistered jewelry-currency exchange offices concentrated at a district in the town center complemented this untaxed economy.

Nevertheless, all these economic practices formed the 'normal order' for the town dwellers. The illegality of smuggling goods and circumventing the customs law was regarded as socially acceptable. Especially cigarettes carried to nearby city of Gaziantep could be seized by the gendarmerie or police who stop the cars for suspicion of contraband. Yet, the cigarettes were sold everywhere in the town, at the stores or stalls of itinerant street traders who used to wait at their usual stop and in most of the grocer's stores in the neighborhoods with no obstruction. As you are stepping out your apartment, there was a chance for running across an errant boy on his motorcycle with a used sport bag between his legs frequenting the neighborhood grocers to ask whether his smuggled cigarettes were needed. The town dwellers rightfully questioned the selling of contraband goods within the town with ease, while these items were treated as contraband and seized at the road blocks by the police patrols outside the provincial boundaries. The demand of town dwellers was that the door to their means of living should not be closed. That is, they expected that the local authorities should overlook the illegal trade, albeit they do not sanction it.

[107] The interview with a taxi company owner revealed that there were about 11 to 12 registered companies in total. But there are more unregistered companies than registered since the applications to the authorization certificate for passenger transportation was first ceased and then annually limited by 5% of total number of registered companies in the previous year (see the circular of Ministry of Transport in 29 December 2006, no B.11.0.KUG.0.10.00.02/275-31997). The companies have to compete with Syrian taxis, allegedly paying less for registration in their country.

Thus, the local reactions to the worrisome decision of transferring Syrian migrants to the town could make sense with reference to the trope of border as gate to livelihood. The middle strata's fear about the closing of the border gate -in Turkish, the word "gate" is the same with "door"- implied their concern with losing the access to the means of earning income from illegal cross-border trade, promising to yield some extra gaining both for dwellers as well as custom officers. The border dwellers classified all sorts of economic practices in the town as "smuggling", whether be it informal or illegal, large-scale or small-scale, crossing goods from the customs gate or across the minefields at the border. When the border dwellers declared their concern about the closing of the border gate, they actually meant the whole borderland.

Kapı (the door) in Turkish figurative speech also means *ekmek kapısı* (literally, the door to bread), the place where one can earn income or living. Thus when the border dwellers suggest that the border gate is their place of earning a living, they actually make a strong claim that no one should mess with their bread. They consider the smuggling as business, and being smuggler as job. As an owner of transport company and spokesperson of the initiative of company owners suggested, every region had "its own boon" and in Kilis, being a border zone, the dwellers had the right to make the most of it, i.e. make use of privileges and benefits of the smuggling. The dwellers asked for the maintenance of status quo because, they believe, this is what they are used to ever since. Hence, the local reactions to the incoming of Syrian migrants give insights to the mechanisms through which the economic and political stability could be sustained so far, though underlying at the same time how economic interests, cultural affinities and political agendas were delicately lined up in a geography of tensions.

5.7. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have focused on the economic, cultural, as well as political mechanisms by which the economic accumulation through illegal means provides upward mobility and becomes socially accepted as rightfully earned wealth in Kilis town. I have discussed in what ways transnational shadow economy created a redistributive logic providing employment and altered the social stratification and occupational structure during the import-substituting period. The illegal trade activities involved the participation of notable

families, large-scale entrepreneurs, extended families with rural background, artisans and border villagers. The cross-border trade filled the lack of investments and smoothed the workings of uneven capitalist development by providing employment.

As the case of Kilis suggests, contrary to the public convictions that neoliberal regime promotes corruption by undermining moral values, economic accumulation through illegal means is a morally-laden realm regulated by ethical principles and rules of conduct. It may also have religious connotations. On the other hand, the redistributive logic of illegal trade was also limited since the economic accumulation tended to create family monopolies and establish connections with transnational organized crime. The story of Koyuncu family reveals the significance of local power structures in terms of patronage and kinship in facilitating monopoly tendencies. So, to what extent smuggling, as town dwellers term, constituted a 'moral economy', as they manipulated and circumvented the state regulations of gold and foreign exchange market and import tariffs in order to capitalize on the price differentials, rates of foreign exchange and demand structures? The following chapter will address this question with reference to the urban and rural poor strata. It will discuss the ways patronage and kinship shaped their participation in the shadow economy of border and how they constituted themselves within these relationships.

CHAPTER VI

URBAN AND RURAL POOR BECOMING BORDER *HAMALS*

This chapter provides a historical analysis of the illegal trade from the viewpoint of lower strata as it reveals the practices and meanings that they invoked for normalizing their engagement in illegal practices. The urban and rural poor found in the unregulated trade the means to emancipate themselves from the paternal relationships that were based on large landholding and kinship during the import-substituting industrialization period. But the paternalistic domination was replaced by the patronage of large-scale entrepreneurs, reaping the profits of unregulated trade by hiring the poor as porter. Yet, the economic boom in the 1970s helped the latter to make money and establish themselves briefly as independent "patrons", despite the dominance of large-scale entrepreneurs, which acted as local dealers collecting the goods from the small-scale traders and distributing to the domestic market.

The cross-border trade regulations introduced in the mid-1990s revived the transnational shadow economy and allured the poor despite its declining profit margins and arbitrary risks within the context of neoliberal policies, which transformed a secure salary into a privilege rather than right, undermined the peasantry and created a welfare regime based on assistance dependency and political patronage. The chapter shows that the kinship relations proved as resilient and versatile ways, allowing cross-border alliance among families and normalizing the exchange practices, deemed illegal by local authorities.

The chapter also explores the subjective perceptions and evaluations of the poor underlying their engagement in unregulated trade in order to reveal the "cultures" of unregulated trade. It demonstrates that the poor embraced the unlawful practices "to create what they see as a worthwhile life, or a way of life worth living and fighting for" (Galemba, 2012a: 8) rather than the urge to rise to wealth or make money hand over fist. I suggest that the cultures of unregulated trade are not only dictated by an economic rationality, but they also draw on community and kinship norms and habits. The poor creatively appropriated the governmental policies that sought to regulate or ban these trade relations and hegemonic

discourses that marginalized their involvement in these activities. However, they also gave consent to the status quo, by assimilating that the means to their living were unlawful and by normalizing their unequal access. Rather than rejecting it, they chose to capitalize on it in order to yield differential profit as the stronger law enforcement at the border increases the trade revenues. Furthermore, the remittent profiteering by large-scale entrepreneurs kept the prospect of upward mobility alive for the poor.

6.1. Independent peasantry in Kilis

As discussed in the Chapter III Section "Question of Notables as Early Capitalists", the large landholding was not conducive to the commercialization of agriculture in Kilis town. But the economic patronage of landlords were so strong that they dominated the town life until the land tenure did not sustain their class position any longer. Not only the peasants but also the small merchants were dependent on the landlords for the on-credit dealings that were made in the time of harvest (Altuğ, 2002: 83). I argue that the decline of paternalist relations in agrarian production is crucial to understand in what ways living conditions of lower strata had changed. Since the town life was basically organized by agrarian economy, I extend my discussion of previous chapter to the question of peasant status and explore it by drawing on the oral interviews with the rural dwellers. Despite the theoretical controversy over the transition to capitalism in the agrarian sector, the scholarly literature agrees on the increase of petty-commodity production in the agriculture after the Second World War (Keyder, 1989). Yet it should be noted that the shifts in the land tenure and peasant status in the Southeastern Anatolia is highly debatable. Did the sharecropping agreements completely dissolve in the town and had the peasantry been emancipated from their dependency on the landlords on the basis of petty-commodity production?

The agrarian studies emphasized the complex processes after the Second World War by which the mechanization of agricultural production and the rural migration to the cities led to the decrease of sharecropping arrangements between the landlords and the peasants (Karadağ, 2005). It is also argued that the mechanization of agricultural production helped to make the petty-commodity production among the peasants dominant. Çağlar Keyder suggested that the consolidation of state control on land against the seizure attempts by the landlords and the land reform in 1945 helped the peasants to enlarge their landholding,

with the incoming of tractors that opened new fields to agriculture. (Keyder, 1989). This tendency was counterposed by the growing technical capacity of large-scale landholders with tractors, pushing the peasants out of the land and transforming them into seasonal and wage labour or simply unemployed. The passavant regime promoted the vested interests of *eşraf* families on their land left in Syria and ensured their peasants' dependency on landlord-managed estates as sharecroppers, labouring in return for modest provisions usually paid in kind and for protection under patronage relations. If expelled from their lands, the peasants were forced to provide wage labour for the landlords for salaries barely sufficient to subsist. My interviewees Hayrullah and Şükriye, an old couple at a border village in lowlands Kilis, described it as follows:

> We used to go weeding for 2,5 liras. We worked all day, sticking three dry breads under our armpits. If you can cook pilaf, you are like *agha*s and *pashas*. Soup is rare, it is a strong meal.[108]

As Keyder claims, the peasant landholding constituted an exception in this region: the landlords supported by the political power largely maintained their proprietorship on land and the petty-commodity production remained limited (Keyder, 1989: 733). In the case of Kilis town, it is plausible to suggest that the mechanization of agriculture did not lead to the domination of petty production, but rather its coexistence with sharecropping as well as wage labour.

The sharecropping in Kilis established the contract between the landlord and the tenant peasants as a patron-client relationship, which often comprised beyond the mere economic interest. The landlord lent seeds or livestock in exchange of unpaid labour of the client peasant and the harvested produce was shared between them. The contract was usually based on sharing the produce in halves, a legal arrangement that was justified by the Ottoman manorial system: "You take the grain from the stack and you divide in halves".[109] Nevertheless, the landlord tended to hold a stronger position when the landlord lent the seeds or engaged in usury by giving loan to the peasant. The interviewees indicated that the peasants' obligations to the landlord were not merely economic:

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[108] *2,5 liraya yolmaya giderdik. Bütün gün çalışırız. 3 kuru ekmek koltuğumuzun altına. Pilav yaptığın zaman ağasın, paşasın. Şorba bulunmaz, kuvvetli yemek.*

[109] *Kömeden alır bideriyi, ortadan bölersin.*

> You cannot build a house unless the *agha* allows you to build it. You plant a tree and you become a proprietor. Even the house does not belong to you. If he [the *agha*] says to move, you move.[110]

Keyder argues that the sharecropping was already constrained by the early 1960s with the Southeastern region populated by Kurdish sedentarized tribes (Keyder, 1989: 733). Kilis geography accommodated a significant number of Kurdish as well as Arab and Turcoman tribes. But the interviewees' recollections indicate that the sharecropping arrangements were not only dominant among the populations governed within the tribal economic organization, but it was also relevant in the estates managed by the descendants of Ottoman military-bureaucrats and ulama families. The interviewees recalled that they crossed in the early 1960s through the passavant gates to work on the landlord's estate in Syria: "We used to go to Syria for harvesting grapes in exchange for a basket of grape. All [the land] belonged to the *agha*."[111]

Keyder acknowledges, on the other hand, that in cases where the sharecropping arrangements coexisted with petty-production, the mechanization process made possible the opening up of new lands and helped the sharecroppers to establish themselves as independent peasants. The coexistence of landlord-managed estates and peasant lands would generate tension between the landlords tending to enclose new land and the peasants striving to establish their full rights of possession on their new and former fields. Karadağ's study on local notables of Gaziantep reveals the stories about the belligerence of peasants in the 1960s from the viewpoint of landed families that were having hard times to understand why the peasants wanted to reclaim lands from them (Karadağ, 2005: 117).

Drawing on this scholarly debate, I argue that the dissolution of sharecropping arrangements was facilitated in Kilis town by two factors. First, the demarcation of border impaired the ties that Kurdish *agha*s[112] and other landlords had with their estates by

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110 *Ağadan izin almadan ev yapamazsın. Ağaç dikersen mülk sahibi olursun. Ev bile senin değil. Göç derse göç.*

111 *Suriyeye bağ kesmeye giderdik bir zembil üzüme. Hep ağa malıydı.*

112 The archive sources indicated that Okçu İzzeddin district (known as *Ekrad-ı İzzeddinli*) of Aleppo, where Kurdish tribal leaders dominated ruled as *mir-i liva* (the district governor) until the late Ottoman era, was left within the border of French Mandate Syria with the demarcation of Turkish-Syrian frontier. Some sources suggested that the word *Ekrad* (the plural of Kurd in Arabic) implied the Turcoman nomadic tribes living in Kilis region under the rule of Şeyh İzzeddin

rendering them absentee and enabled the sharecropper peasants to reclaim the lands under the new political context of the 1960s. As an interview with the *mukhtar* of an eastern border village demonstrated, the landless Arab peasants could also own land by making informal proprietorship agreements with the absentee landlords to buy the land for nominal rates. The lands of absentee landlords at the Turkish side of the border could not be rented or sold pursuant to the retaliation in kind made against the Syrian government that had confiscated the estates of Turkish citizens left in Syria after the land reform of 1958. Second, as mentioned above, the pattern of inheritance did not allow the possession of large landholding among the heirs of notables. As the mechanization was not conducive to the commercialization of agricultural production either, the management of estates did not remain as an option for reproduction of class position among the heirs and they tended to sell their plots.

The data about the land tenure in Kilis shows that the large landholding remained significant even as late as 1990, with the 6% of the landholder families owning one third of the total arable land (Kesici, 1994: 136). Despite the controversial status of proprietorship on land, this data implies that the mechanization of agricultural production in the 1960s did not change the structure of land tenure dramatically, though it led to an increase of small proprietorship among the peasants. In 1990, half of the landholder families only held a plot of a size equal or below 0.5 hectares, with the average plot size being 0.1 hectare for 112 villages of Kilis. The small size of the plots indicated that the farming household could not benefit from the mechanization in its full potential and had to divide its forces among several plots in case that it owned more than one. Following Köymen's discussion on self-sufficient peasantry in the 1930s, the size of the land sufficient for a rural household to subsist should be at least 0.7 to 1 hectares (Köymen, 2009: 29). Thus, the land with such small sizes would not be enough for rural families in Kilis to compensate their labour.

Begh in sixteenth century (Akis 2002, 2004; Öztürk, 2005), though the Kurdish historiography assumes that Ekrad-ı İzzeddinli were Kurdish tribes; see the letter of Kurdish tribal leader Şeyh İsmailzade Hacı Hannan Agha, addressing the presidency of Grand National Assembly in 1922 for the asking the consideration of their inclusion along the Turkish border as the Turkish government negotiated with French Mandate the revisions of newly delineated border (Bayrak, 2012).

Photograph 52. Mudbrick houses in a lowland village.

The mudbrick houses are still preserved in the lowland villages near the border. (My photo.)

The fact that the outmigration in Kilis villages started in the 1950s actually supports this view. The rural migration consisted of the movement from the countryside to the town center and to a nearby city, Gaziantep, where migrants sought for employment opportunities in urban settings, particularly in the second half of the 1960s. Also, the peasants could offer their labour seasonally, moving every year to the fertile plains of Hatay-Maraş rift valley for cotton and pepper hoeing and harvesting.[113] According to Keyder, the migration pattern in the rural Turkey did not require the small proprietors to sell their plot and they tended to rent it out to the middle-sized owners. In this way, they could maintain the ownership of land while leaving their villages seasonally or permanently. The landless peasants, in turn, were likely to lease the land of small proprietors. Thus, these tenancy arrangements were dissimilar to those made between the landlords and peasants, where the former benefited from a specific economic patronage and domination.

It can be concluded that the peasantry of Kilis achieved an independent status vis-à-vis the market relations, as it was emancipated from its dependency on the paternalistic relations of agricultural production in the 1960s. But the small proprietorship of land remained limited or insufficient for the subsistence of rural families. Hence, they were driven to the shadow economy that had been growing alongside with the newly emergening wealth accumulation strategies. Like the dwellers of border villages, rural migrants in the town sought for benefiting from the income-generating activities linked with contraband trade. The increasing ratio of urban to rural population in Kilis as of the mid-1960s and the acceleration of the migration wave in the following decade demonstrate that the shadow economy boosted the economic prospects for the rural families (Kesici, 1994). But the shadow economy quickly developed new dependency relations for the rural and urban poor, drawing on the traditional paternalistic and patronage relations.

[113] Kesici states in his research dated 1990 that some 800 rural families, that is above 4,000 population were involved in the seasonal migration (Kesici 1994: 62). He further remarks that rural families also used to seasonally migrate to these plains for putting their livestock on pasturing.

6.2. Border Economy and New Relations of Dependency

Hüseyin the porter was *agha*. Can you imagine a porter turned *agha*?[114]

Mevlüt seemed yet astonished as these words came out of his mouth. He forgot me and lost himself in talking to Cemal next to him, also present for my research interview. Cemal, a retired teacher, helped me by asking Mevlüt for his participation in the interview. As I sought to interview the border dwellers for their involvement in the growing shadow economy during the import-substituting industrialization (ISI) period, Cemal suggested that Mevlüt would be good source to give ear to since he used to work as a piggybacker for the large-scale entrepreneurs. He could give first-hand information about the patronage relations in which the poor had been pulled into. In fact, his statement about Hüseyin the porter was a clear illustration that the border did not only function as a means of upward mobility, but also shifted the power relations in the region. The high profit margins raised the stakes on border and prompted the official as well as non-official figures of authority to control the illegal crossings.

The unregulated trade in Kilis border dated back to the consolidation of border. According to the minister of internal affairs Şükrü Kaya, the high number of border-crosser peasants that went to work on the Syrian fields in plough and harvest times implicated their involvement in practices of 'smuggling'.[115] The peasants tended to smuggle goods on the belt wrapped around their waist or on their packsacks. Kaya was also convinced at the end of his investigations that there were individuals mingling in the laboring peasants but employing themselves in smuggling. The interviewees' recollections also supported Kaya's observation that the passavant regime of border crossing enabled the growth of contraband as early as the 1930s.[116] Hayrullah and Şükriye, the old peasant couple from a lowland border village told that they used to pay a small amount of bribe to the guards of passavant gates in order to have a clearance without submitting the permit and labored in the fields across the border, while sneaking a few contraband goods on the way back. The

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114 *Hamal Hüseyin ağaydı. Hamaldan ağa mı olur?*

115 The State Archives of the Prime Minister's Office (BCA), 180/244/6, 5.12.1931.

116 Here I draw on my interview with İlyas, old villager man, living at a border village in a one-storey comfortable concrete house with a well-groomed lawn in his yard, an indication of his upward mobility as a piggybacker.

payoff for their labour was so low and usually in kind. So the contraband could yield extra income for the rural families. But the poor ones were unlikely to engage in large-scale trade and their practices basically consisted of exchange of their own products with their basic needs.

Research on post-colonial borders in Africa illustrates that the local exchange could evolve within the context of colonial history, while the colonial powers tolerated the porosity of borders with financial disincentives rather than severe measures of criminalization for the sake of bringing the region under their control as regional economies were penetrated by merchant capital (Wilson&Donnan, 1999). Studies on post-colonial borders often neglect the repercussions of colonial past on the border communities, but they still reveal a history of control and regulation by dwellers over the border traffic and the emergence of a common identity, encompassing border communities by drawing on their residential claims and everyday struggle to fight against economic marginality and insecurity (Flynn, 1997; Doevenspeck&Mwanabiningo, 2012; Galemba, 2012a). Flynn, for instance, argues that a sense of territorialization could be entrenched among border communities within the context of exchange across the border (Flynn, 1997).

Similarly, the colonial domination in Syria during the interwar period was likely to allow the growth of shadow markets in Aleppo provinces. While the Turkish authorities were determined to thwart smuggling practices across the border, reports from the region suggested that the French Mandate was reluctant to settle down the disturbances caused by local dwellers trespassing of the border.[117] The demarcation of border, customs tariffs and imposition of French monetary system impaired the inland trade by weakening the merchant class in Northern Syria (Bouchair, 1986). But Aleppo still continued to receive the agricultural product and livestock from Euphrates basin. The interviewees' recollections indicate that big flocks of sheep and cattle and olive oil were imported by Kilis smugglers to French-Mandate Syria.[118] As mentioned in Chapter III, the notables

117 See 1923 report of Gaziantep governorship detailing the measures to be taken against smuggling cited in Öğüt 2010: 35 at the footnote 39. Altuğ&White (2009) argued that the Turkish government and French Mandate intentionally overlooked the tribal banditry in order to capitalize on the instability of the border for extending their political influence beyond it.

118 For instance, Zeynep, an elder women from an extended family which used to live at a border village remembers vividly how his father and uncles used to smuggle livestock to Syria.

having their estates across the border circumvented the passavant regime in order to put their agricultural produce in the Syrian market. Thus, the agricultural produce of Kilis was smuggled to Syria as well. In turn, the high tariff barriers imposed by the French Mandate made specific goods such as coffee, sugar, gas oil, European fabric and British tailored jackets go on the black market in Kilis town.

As mentioned in the previous chapter on the emergence of new wealth and middle strata, family monopolies emerged to control the unregulated trade insofar as the shadow markets for contraband produced more lucrative businesses for them. The traditional paternalistic relationships on land tenure also supported these family monopolies. Kilis had been a frontier zone edging the Arab provinces of Ottoman Empire, where large confederacy of tribes were governed as chiefdoms. For instance, both the *Ekrad* of Okçu İzzeddinli (Kurds of Okçu İzzeddinli) and İlbeyli Turcomans of Aleppo organized into territorial entities of sanjaq-chiefdoms rather than simple lineage systems and could contain ethnically or religiously different segments of both nomadic and resident tribes (Soyudoğan, 2005; Öztürk, 2005).[119] As Martin van Bruinessen discussed about the persistence of Kurdish tribes in the modern Middle East, the administrative centralization since the late Ottoman period had a diminutive effect on large tribal confederacies as they turned eventually into large and more homogenous tribes, and large tribes turning into smaller ones (Bruinessen, 2002: 7). The Ottoman policy of resettlement in the sixteenth and seventeenth-century disaggregated the Turcoman, Arabic and Kurdish nomadic tribes notoriously known of banditry or accused of its committing in Aintab and Kilis as well as broader areas of Syria, Iraq and other Kurdish emirates by expelling them to Arab or western provinces like Rakka and Adana, though they kept returning back. But the tax farming system persisting till the nineteenth century in the region secured the power of tribal chieftains, which tended to impose their rule as district governors. Thus, they often had to confront with the central

[119] Though the word *ekrad* is the plural form of Kurd in Arabic, its ethnic implication is controversial. The nationalist historiography argues the *ekrad* of Kilis were Turcoman (Öztürk, 2005; Akis, 2002). Soyudoğan's study suggests that Okçu İzzeddinli tribes were basically Kurdish nomads, but it was not unusual for the tribes organized into a chiefdom to include or assimilate different ethnic groups, particularly because the latter sought shelter among other tribes when they escaped from the resettlement places (Soyudoğan, 2005: 90). It is very likely that Okçu İzzeddinli tribes included Turcoman lineages as well.

Ottoman administration.

In the late Ottoman and early Republican era, we find the status of tribal chieftains degraded in Kilis town and ranked after the ulama and dynasty descendants. But few still retained their power as *agha* among the local community and their extended families, with a loyal clientele around them. They could capitalize on the unregulated flows across the border, as illustrated by the case of Mustafa's family. To remind, Mustafa's father was likely to be a leading lineage of an Arab tribal chieftainship resettled to Rakka (where it moved from Iraq according to İsmail, another family member), from where they migrated to Kilis. At least, his family genealogy aligned with my discussion here.

The border people may have the advantage of living at the edge of two differential legal and economic systems. Border studies document their interstitial power to benefit themselves in controlling and regulating cross-border movement (Flynn, 1997). Their locatedness at the border granted them the force to impose an unofficial toll for the non-locals or distant-range entrepreneurs and to serve them as guide through the minefields or mountain passes shielded from view and mediate between them and local customs/gendarmerie officers by providing brokerage services in negotiating the bribe. They were called *vasıta* (mediater) in Kilis town, according to Mevlüt and Cemal. Nevertheless, few studies focus on the ways in which the cross-border ties are enmeshed within local power structures, kinship and community norms.

Bruinessen rightfully indicated that the tribal chieftains were best placed to conclude such profit-sharing arrangements without being apprehended at once (Bruinessen, 2002: 16). My interview with Vahab, an old-generation *agha*, served as mayor in the mid-1980s and parliamentary deputy in the early 1990s revealed that the chieftains could guarantee economic security and access to wealth not only for its lineage, but also for local people through clientelist relationships. The local rumours implicated that the chieftain retained his power through the involvement in contraband. In the light of interviewees' recollections, the local power figures in the town engaging in the border economy of contraband comprised not only the tribal chieftains, but also village headmen (mukhtars, locally called *kiya*). The mukhtars had a privileged place to make profit-arrangement with the military or acquire an informal toll from the contraband road crossing through their

villages.

As Janet Roitman discussed about the gang-based road banditry at the tri-bordered Chad Basin, the emergence of such 'traditional' power figures caused the pluralization of regulatory authority over cross-border movements recognized as legitimate, whether official or nonofficial, and they became the final arbiters of employment and enrichment for local dwellers (Roitman, 2004b: 426; see also Roitman, 2004). She developed her argument against the backdrop of African economies that immersed into the world economy in neoliberal era. However, the nonofficial figures of authority in Kilis town tended to employ the political patronage relations for its clientele and developed more intermingled relationships with the state politics by actually taking part in it within the context of the shift to neoliberalization policies. As the chieftain told about his serving as mayor in the post-military coup period, he sponsored the wage payments of municipality workers drawing on his own funding, while the municipality was the major employer in the post-military coup context of budget shortage in the public sector and sharp decline in contraband.

A study on the cross-border ties between Palestinian Bedouins settled in self-governing enclaves and Israeli-occupied territories reveals that the border crossings were organized as an informal border economy motivated by profit-seeking and facilitated by border-crossing workers, smugglers, employers and state institutions (Parizot, 2014). The border economy not only refers to new types of economic activities peculiar to the border but it also indicates to an "industry of crossing" (Hernandez-Leon, 2008; cited in Parizot, 2014) where formal and informal entrepreneurs as well as state officials are involved in the process of regulating cross-border movements. The growth of transnational flows forged border economies in which all parties involved struggled to increase their shares within the context of profit-sharing arrangements, the shares particularly rising as the border gets more impermeable. The mining of the Turkish-Syrian border from the mid-1950s onwards raised the stakes of border economy and turned it into a complex organization.

As the border economy in Kilis went more lucrative, it brought out figures whose power stemmed from their role in making profit-sharing arrangements or in guaranteeing their maintenance on behalf of the official border patrolling agents. *Emanetçi* (trustee) and

muhbir (informant) were two such figures pointed to perform their role in a more complicated border economy. *Muhbir* reported the border traffic that went unnoticed by the military posts and yielded a share from the contraband goods seized by the gendarme. But they also brokered profit-arrangements between large-scale traders and gendarme officers and they actually took part in the contraband convoys crossing the border. *Emanetçi* was trusted the bribe money by the gendarme officers until they left the town since they could not deposit it in a bank or have it present. Neşe Özgen wrote that the *emanetçi* people could prosper to the degree to own an arcade store in Gaziantep and Kilis (Özgen, 2004: 21). Mustafa's interview informed that these figures were possibly preferred by the gendarme officers based on trust and confidentiality relationships already established by the former profit-sharing arrangements for the crossing of contraband among them. In Mustafa's words, "they [the military] took their savings from us. We used to help them [in keeping their money] in case that they are caught."[120]

On the other hand, the border economy also helped the ascendancy of new figures of authority that imitated as well contested the traditional paternalistic power.[121] These figures established their authority as *kiya* or *agha*, as they got enriched through contraband although they did not possess the characteristics of kiya or they had not any descent of a tribal chieftain. *Kiya* was a traditional paternalistic figure inherited from the early Republican times when the local administrations lacked legal framework or public budget. The interviewees' recollections hinted that the *kiya* was likely to be the tribal chieftain or head of wealthy families who could establish their authority due to the patronage relations with their client peasants and afford financing the needs of the village or hosting the village guests. Thus, the *kiya* was expected to possess the features of notables with recognition, respect and generosity, needed for developing paternalistic relationships of dependency over its clients. However, the fact that the contraband enabled the rise of smugglers from

120 *Askerler birikmiş parasını yanımızda alır. Belki tutulur diye biz ona yardım da ederdik.*

121 I am indebted this idea to Ömer Özcan (2014) whose study on Kurdish smugglers in Yüksekova, the southeastern corner of Turkey suggests that the unofficial road blocks by Kurdish peasants in order to collect toll from the crossing smugglers could be interpreted both as repudiation and mimicry of the state sovereignty. Galemba interprets in the same vein the erection of checkpoints at the border by the Mexican smugglers as mimetically reproducing the relation between territory, power and identity (Galemba, 2012c).

Photograph 16. Idle military watchtower.

The interviewees believed that the transfer of border patrol from the gendarmerie to the infantry in the early 2000s untightened the surveillance. (My photo.)

poorer background into figures of authority led to the creation of new relations of dependency in which the enriched smugglers had made themselves elected as *kiya* or assumed the position of *agha*.

The rise of smugglers from poor or rural background among the ranks of local notables meant the undermining of structural constrains thwarting the upward mobility among different strata, detailed in Chapter III on local notables. The interviews with lower strata revealed the hatred among them against the old stratified structure based on large landholding. For instance, there were stories about the anonymous wrecking of the ancient tombs belonging to the notable families in the old cemetery of the town before its resettlement to the outskirts or demolition of the notables' houses by the 'populist' municipality as a sign of disfavoring the notable strata. These stories acted to bring out the hatred or discontent of the lower strata against the notable families. Thus, the rise of new figures of authority could be considered as the transfer of local power that both contested and mimicked the traditional paternal relationships.

Mevlüt recalls that the smuggler *agha* established a patronage relationship with the piggybackers who carried his load across the minefields, which was reminiscent of the relationship between the landlord and sharecropper. The piggybacker who worked for the *agha* could be defined as not only his employee but also helper that was responsible for running errands for him, making his barbecue and waiting on his table while he was sipping his *raki* alone or in company of his guests. The *agha* in return provided protection for his helper by covering the expenses in cases of injury or taking care of his family during his imprisonment. These patronage relations offered the poor border dwellers that endangered themselves by sneaking into the minefields security against military patrols or detonation of undetected mines, which could be landed by the gendarme officer or rival smugglers in cases of disagreement. Still most piggybackers had to undertake the risk of mine detonation even though the smugglers' convoy was led by a guide across the minefield. They usually treaded a footpath around the military post with which an agreement was settled (Özgen, 2004). But the lack of patronage could expose them to larger risks of injury, as the salience of former smugglers with prosthetic legs among my interviewees indicated.

Whether under patronage or not, the poor border dwellers were likely to carry the goods

ordered by longer distant-range buyers. The growth of contraband emancipated the border peasants from the dependency relationships based on the traditional organization of agricultural production. But, as Neşe Özgen indicated in her discussion about the political economy of Syrian and Iraqi borders, it also led to the proletarianization among the lower strata (Özgen, 2004). The poor dwellers were incorporated in the unregulated trade as *hamals* and entangled in new patronage relationships with the large-scale traders. As the salience of border gate increased in the mid-1970s, the small-scale trading allowed the poor to make money, which allowed, in their point of view, establishing themselves as "patrons". For example, Asiye, a seventy-eight year old peddler that used to go trading in the 1970s with her husband, recalled the thriftless spending of his husband at Aleppian casinos: "I am the patron and my husband is spending the money". A border villager assumed his position as patron in his interview, as he grew up to hire a group of piggypackers to smuggle goods across the minefields for long-distance buyers. These patrons, however, were doomed to fail in climbing up the social ladder as they usually lost their winnings or they were cheated by some adversaries. The military coup of 1980 impeded the unregulated trade and led to the growing out-migration from the rural, though the cross-border trade regulations introduced in the mid-1990s allured the poor anew.

6.3. Cross-Border Trade: Blurring the Boundaries of Legal and Illegal

I consider the cross-border trade as the epitome of the blurred boundaries between legal and illegal realms, characterizing the neoliberal regime of accumulation. The cross-border trade regulation was initially introduced in 1985 in Ağrı within the context of neoliberal urge to promote the inflow of foreign currency and oil commerce with Iran, which was already underway since the late 1970s (Öztürk, 2006). The trade regulation was stretched out to the eastern and southeastern borders of Turkey before long and it underwent several modifications in the following decades. The cross-border trade was a special trade regime, allowing a limited volume and value of trade on the basis of local needs and population of border city. It excluded the items of international export and import and transit trade, while banning the marketing of imported goods nationwide. In other words, the traders could only sell their imported goods in the local market within the city district.

However, the cross-border trade boosted the transnational shadow economy along Turkish

borders in the form of profiteering by large-scale entrepreneurs as well as politicians and bureaucrats. It could be argued that the Özalist principle of "economic punishment for economic crime" (Öniş, 2004) allowed the blurring of boundaries between legal and illegal in neoliberal era, as it offered rent-seeking enterprises room for maneuver. On the other hand, the replacing of prison sentences with penalty fines enabled the urban and rural poor of Kilis town to get freed of their bonds of dependency to the large-scale entrepreneurs, while rendering them more vulnerable to growing debts as they could not afford the pecuniary penalties and losing their goods to the custom officers.

The complicity of the state officials facilitating the unregulated activities and border traffic and the neoliberal state offering a legal structure to these activities further complicates the subject under study. Though seemingly paradoxical, while the neoliberal state provided legal framework to unregulated trade practices, it did not alter the fact that "they are still deemed either formally illegal or based on fraud" (Roitman, 2004). I suggest that the dominant discourse on the cross-border trade fails to recognize it within the framework of neoliberal governance and shadow economy. The international congress on the cross-border trade held in Kilis and sponsored by the governorship and the Chamber of Trade and Commerce in 2010 is exemplary.[122] The congress compiled numerous papers that put the blame on the misuse of regulations by traders. The papers adopted the state's notion of illegality and assumed an ideal practice of cross-border trade by stating the problems in its implementation. As Abraham and van Schendel would argue, these studies failed to recognize that there could be no such universally shared definition of illegality from which corrupt behaviours deviated (2005: 8). These scholars indicated that multiple competing authorities interact at the border zones and the illegal status of circulating goods was constantly renegotiated.

The research drawing on border studies analyzed the implementation and practices of formal cross-border trade by situating its perspective on border dynamics. Their analyses offered the room to observe multiple contesting authorities involved in the distribution of 'illegal' profits (Kolay, 2012), the cultural processes promulgating 'illegal' practices of

[122] See the proceedings e-book *1. Uluslararası Sınır Ticareti Kongresi Bildiriler Kitabı* published by Kilis 7 Aralık University; available at http://iibf.kilis.edu.tr/bordertrade/files/Kongre_kitapcigi.pdf

transnational economy as legitimate (Özgen, 2004; 2007) and the construction of 'official' boundaries for circulating goods as product of multiple and contingent judiciary acts informed by political, economic and social processes (Bozçalı, 2010, 2014). The arrangement of oil commerce into the cross-border trade enabled its shift into a pipeline on wheels in the 1990s, allowing the long-distance truckers to carry and sell excess oil in their tank. The high percentage of taxes on oil (and cigarette) levied by Turkish state had made it a remunerative one. Two pipelines on wheels, built with the Iraqi Kurdistan and Azerbaijan, particularly promoted the cross-border trade as a lucrative business as the Turkish state permitted the drivers, including the busmen and local commuters, to carry oil in oversized tanks until this practice had been abolished in 2001. The state eventually decided completely to put an end to the oil trade at the turn of millenium.[123]

The research on the oil trade showed that the state not only regulated it, but also legalized the smuggling by readjusting the limits that the drivers could carry (Bozçalı 2010, Özgen, 2004). It was argued that the legal framework that enforced or ended the cross-border trade was often illegible because the state enacted it with memorandums and directives (Bozçalı, 2014). At the Iraqi border, the state opted for compensating the loss of trade with Iraq after the Gulf War with oil trade and breached the UN sanctions by allowing the truck drivers to sell the excess fuel in their tank within the framework of international human aid delivered to Iraq. The arrangement also promoted the governorships as regulatory authorities, where the truck drivers had to apply in order get license. In 1995, Şırnak governorship benefited from its regulatory power to establish a foundation and levy tax from the crossing truck drivers.

In 1999, Turkish Petroleum International Company was established to force the truck drivers to sell their oil and monopolize the marketing of oil coming from Iraqi Kurdistan nationwide. However, the cross-border trade regulations banned the sale of imported good outside the city boundaries. The company also included the Şırnak deputy of the ruling party and the brother of ex-mayor as partners and thus called politics into the oil trade (Kolay, 2012: 142). All these developments did not prevent, however, that these practices

[123] Özgen (2012) argued that the unregulated oil trade along the Turkish borders was not extinguish but changed form after 2003, following the US invasion of Iraq.

were officially deemed as illegal. The parliamentary debates, official reports and speeches delivered to the public recorded the oil trade period as causing remarkable economic losses due to smuggling or its sale on the informal markets.[124] Still, it was acknowledged that the definition of 'smuggled' oil was not easy to clarify. A parliamentary investigation on oil contraband in 2005 stated that "the definition of fuel oil entering along the borders with tax exemption or reduction resulting from certain local and regional tax immunity allowed by the governmental decrees concerning cross-border trade would come to mean pushing the limits of legal definition".[125]

The cross-border trade was reframed in the 2000s by a shift in the security perception of the state and its anti-corruption agenda. The decade of 2000s saw consecutive amendments and modification in the legal framework of cross-border trade and anti-smuggling. After the ending of oil commerce in 2001, new decrees and communiqués regulated the cross-border trade, which basically reiterated the clauses of abated regulations. The major difference consisted of the addendum and alterations that were taken as precautions against the misuse previously experienced. For instance, the fuel oil –as well as other goods that were previously subject to smuggling- was excluded from the items that could be traded and the regulatory authority was centralized by replacing the governorships with the Undersecretariat of Foreign Affairs.

It was argued that the ending of oil commerce was originated in Turkey's discontent that Kurdish regional government in Iraq benefited from oil proceeds (Kolay, 2012). Bozçalı's ethnography in local courts on Van exposed the fact that the local judiciary system could

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124 The State Minister Tunca Toskay held a press conference in 2002 announcing that the allowed quotas of fuel oil carried across Habur and Nahcıvan gates were exceeded many times more than official limits and the smuggling could not be prevented. He also added that oil trade should be banned; see "Motorine sınır ticareti yasağı", *Milliyet*, 16.8.2002. The Minister of Financial Affairs Kürşat Tüzman spoke in the parliamentary assembly that the cross-border trade diverted from its original purpose after the inclusion of fuel oil trade, which costed of a tax loss of 3.5 billion USD during the period of 1997-1999; see TGNA minutes, 24th assembly, 1st session, P. 219, 21.1.2003.

125 See, p. 36 in the report on "Research and determination of measures to be taken against the harms of oil smuggling to human and environment health" prepared by the parliamentary committee built on June 16th, 2005 with no. 10/238. According to the report, all transactions of fuel oil were legal, but it was untaxed and placed on the informal market. It also pointed to the overlapping of legal and illegal by reporting the fraudulent trade as "mixing chemicals to the legally circulating oil in order to dilute it and raise the profit margins".

be manipulated by political motives. He detected a dominant conviction among the judiciary personnel that the oil (and cigarette) trade financed the terrorism related with PKK (Bozçalı, 2014). Bozçalı also suggested that the same conviction dominated the government, setting off a series of amendments concerning the 50 year-old anti-smuggling law during the period 2003-2008. In some cases, the cross-border trade practices could be interrupted by police operation and governmental probe under the rubric of fighting against corruption that prevailed after the heightening of relations with EU and IMF. This was particularly true for Kilis.

The interviews revealed that the cross-border trade lived its heyday after the 1996 regulation was legislated.[126] The regulation permitted to the town dwellers to benefit from a specific customs regime in which the traders of both sides could import or export certain amount of goods with reduced taxes. The cross-border trade quickly turned into a lucrative business for the region, allowing the urban poor as well as middle strata to engage in bringing goods as much as they could carry on their bags or car trunks and yield profit due to price differentials. However, a notorious anti-corruption operation against the border customs in the summer of 2000, called Parachute, interrupted the trade.

Hence, the regulations appeared as an employment opportunity or a side income for the town dwellers. The Chamber blamed the poor legal infrastructure for the malfeasance. According to the former general secretary of the Chamber, the cross-border trade regulations were not based on mutual agreement between Turkey and Syria anyway. He indicated that the formally regulated trade rules were violated by special directives and confidential circulars of the public authorities as well as transgressed by the traders taking advantage from the legal "loopholes":

> There was not actually a cross-border trade agreement reciprocally signed. Turkey enforced it unilaterally by issuing cross-border document and permit for the compliance to quota. We have told at the time that this would be a problem.[127]

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[126] The 1996 regulation sanctioned 13 border cities as well as their neighboring districts to enjoy the provision of cross-border trade. This regulation was modified in 1998 by abandoning the clause of "neighboring city". See the cabinet decrees on December 26, 1996 with no. 96/9025 and on June 4, 1998 with no. 98/11160.

[127] *Aslında Suriye'yle karşılıklı imzalanmış bir sınır ticareti anlaşması yoktu. Türkiye tek taraflı olarak sınır ticaret belgesi ve kotaya uygun izin yazısı düzenleyerek bunu gerçekleştirmişti. Biz*

After its interruption for a decade, the amendments made in the cross-border regulation to prevent the malfeasance drastically diminished the profit margins of unregulated trade, though they did not exclude it as a business option for local dwellers. While the Turkish government enacted the regulations unilaterally without reciprocation, the protective economy of Syria had not ever allowed a reciprocal agreement on cross-border trade. The signing of free trade agreement between the countries, ratified in 2007 and forestalling a gradual remitting of all custom taxes, ruled out the cross-border trade as a feasible option for Syria all together. Thus, the Turkish government continues to maintain the cross-border trade regulation in effect, though not any local trader in Kilis have ever since made a trade license application according to the Chamber.

6.4. "The Border Gate Will Not Be Ever Closed": Border Commuters in Neoliberal Order

In February 2012 when the popular upheaval entered the second year in Syria, the conflicts between local opposition forces and Syrian army were heightened and pervaded into the seven-kilometer away Syrian border town Azaz. Syrian troupes engaged in heavy gunfight and bombing against the town. As the clashes of arms broke out at the opposite side of the border, I expected that the drivers and peddlers crossing the border for small-scale trading would cease to commute across it. In fact though declining, the daily cross-border commuting continued despite the successive deaths of two small-scale traders and a transport company driver from Kilis in crossfire in the opposite Syrian town. The killing of a 63-year old woman peddler illustrated that the urban poor kept shuttling across the border to make a living out of it no matter what it happened. A condolence visit to the house of the deceased informed about the social profile of the border commuters.

In an outskirt poor neighborhood, the relatives and neighbors of the deceased told me that she turned a deaf ear to his son's preaching to her mother not to go. Mother of six children, she wanted to cover the lack of home fixtures for his elder son prepared to be married and earn some pocket money for his daughter studying in a Western Anatolian university according to the female community in the house. Heading to Aleppo, she would sell the

söylemiştik o zaman sorun çıkar diye.

grave leaves she picked up from the vineyard to her acquaintances and buy from the Syrian local market any goods that she could sell door-to-door with a low profit margin in Kilis neighborhoods or she would deliver to an arcade shop in return of payment -called by the locals as 'hire' (*kira*), since these commuters did not own the goods but they were simply hired for carrying them.

The deceased woman typically exemplified the women who had to earn a living as they were widowed, divorced or obliged to contribute to the household income and commuted across the border for this purpose. Those who used to cross the border since long time usually had their husband involved in small-scale trade during the heyday of economic boom in the 1970s and thus, were lucky enough to make savings enough to build a shoddy cement house in the town as well as in the village of origin or on the small vineyard land of the family.

Despite the escalating violence along the Syrian border, the townspeople held their firm convictions that the border gate would never be closed and small-scale trading across border would keep up their livelihood.[128] A semi-legal trade is likely to constitute part of multiple work strategies needed to make a living at the border (Galemba, 2012a: 10). This kind of trade was forged by neoliberal policies in Turkey as they introduced "the cross-border trade" regulations in several border cities, including Kilis in the mid-1990s. It was undertaken in the town as the primary or secondary activity by casual, precarious or minimum wage male workers as well as women helping their family to make the ends meet, with little or no investment money for a small-scale venture as a sole trader or as a hired carrier. NGO and local bureaucracy representatives estimated that about 1000 to 1,500 families made their living directly out of it.

The neoliberal policies revived the transnational shadow economy by providing the legal framework that extenuated the security measures and penalties, if not completely abolished, against the unregulated economic activities deemed illegal. But the state's concern with the security of its territorial boundaries resulted in whimsical decisions and brought frequent changes in border surveillance as well as customs regulations. The town

[128] Öncüpınar border gate of Kilis has been closed to the crossing of Turkish citizens in July 2012.

mayor stated in his interview that the arbitrary policies of border acted as the barometer for the applications of urban poor filed at the municipality for employment and social assistance. Any changing measure regarding the customs regulation and border security could be translated into the increase or decrease of applicants depending on its effect in small-scale trading.

The town was rumored to harbor an army of unemployed and low-income dwellers fell outside the insurance coverage.[129] The social assistance and temporary employment schemes by municipality and governorship, associated with clientelistic relations between town dwellers and authorities, were not sufficient to provide secure and permanent access to a living above poverty level, though they generated a response.[130] For example, the Social Assistance and Solidarity Foundation provided the in-kind assistance regularly to 4,200 families and run a soup kitchen where up to 325 families availed of it during the winter times. During my field study, I observed that the appointment decision to the Provincial Directorate of Central Employment Agency mattered a great deal among the AKP followers in the town and became a point of contention, as each group of followers competed to exert their influence upon the new director to make him favour their own social networks for job placements.

The dependency on social assistance was also relevant in the border villages. The rural poor made their living by the small-scale subsistence agriculture or casual and seasonal laboring that barely yielded revenues. The impact of globalization on agriculture led to the dismantling of supportive mechanisms for peasantry (Keyder&Yenal, 2011). The diminishing of price support schemes and repealing of agricultural subsidies had adverse impact on the local agriculture by devaluing the price in agro-industrial products such as

[129] The unemployment rate is recorded %10.1 in 2011. The number of Green Card holders is 31,656, the overwhelming majority being in the town center and the villages affiliated with the central district. The provincial director of Central Employment Agency stated that their number recently fell into decrease from 45,000. The number of Green Card holders climbed over the coverage rate of social security, being 19,458 dwellers in the town paying their insurance premium.

[130] In a study of the transformation in Turkish welfare regime, Ayşe Buğra and Çağlar Keyder states at the social assistance responses to the new poverty are prone to the clientelistic relations between citizens and political authorities, as “a number of largely unstructured and often traditionally rooted institutional arrangements define the area of social assistance” (Buğra&Keyder, 2006: 219).

olive, pistachio and grape in particular, which the peasantry relied on in dry farming. The decrease in price of grape, for instance, was even more dramatic after the privatization of Tekel factories, the foremost buyers of grape cultivated by local producers.[131] The privatization of Tekel Suma factory in 2004 even frustrated the farmers engaged in large-scale commercial agriculture, as my interviewee complained that he had to rip off 10,000 grape seedlings after its transfer to the private sector. The town center continued to receive rural migrants in the last decade despite its lack of employment opportunities.[132] Thus, the rural poor turned to the contraband of cigarettes and livestock across the minefields whenever they could.

The interviews with the deputy governor and state institutions[133] put forth that the cross-border trade construed a means of livelihood for the town dwellers. My interviewees' preference of these terms over 'smuggling' and the shift in the language away from emphasizing the illegal practices seemed purposeful as they probably assumed their position as state officers talking to a graduate student from Ankara and avoided to admit the violation of law under their jurisdiction. But the urban and rural poor strata assimilated the state notion of illegality by calling their practices of income generation as "unlawful". Galemba (2012a) argued in her study on Guatemalan-Mexican border that the unequal access to such semi-legal trade is the key to understand "the cultures of contraband" beyond the price differentials between two countries. Why the poor dwellers of Kilis were engaging in more risky and less lucrative ventures with the thread of confronting law enforcement or even death? Border scholars suggested that the enforcement of law and illegal practices of trade justified each other in the context of a balance between security and profit (Heyman, 2007; Galemba, 2013). The heightened border security would decrease the competition among the border dwellers and yield more profit. While the local government and broader border policies selectively enforced surveillance barriers and legal

131 "Tekel stopped its support purchases from farmers at advantageous prices", says Abdullah Aysu, chairman of Farmers' Unions Confederation (Aysu, 2013). The statement of Kilis deputy Mehmet Nacar about the amount of fresh grape produce bought by the local Tekel factory in 1999 points to the public sector as the foremost buyer; see TGNA minutes, 21st period, 2nd legislation year, 7th assembly, p. 10, 14.10.1999.

132 Kilis İl Çevre Durum Raporu, Kilis Governorship Provincial Directorate of Environment and City Planning, 2011.

133 See Appendix A for the names of state institutions interviewed.

penalties against illegal crossings in Kilis town, they also provided space for border dwellers to resist, manipulate or transgress them.

6.4.1. Profiteering From Cross-Border Trade

When my inteviewees from the Chamber told about the implementation of cross-border trade in Kilis, they expressed their frustration with the practice. Though officially sanctioned and formally regulated, the trade underwent an abrupt cessation with an anti-corruption operation. My interviewees resembled the operation to the military coup of September 12, 1980 in order to highlight its adverse effects. According to the former head of Chamber, the operation made the border gate cease to be an international port. Öncüpınar gate of Kilis remained as an A-grade crossing point, allowing to the custom procedures for international import-export and transit trade as well as for goods declared by small-scale traders as personal belongings. What my interviewee probably implied was that the favorable conditions for large-scale entrepreneurs to trade on the legal loopholes had vanished. For example, the entrepreneurs from Gaziantep diverted away their direction from Kilis to Cilvegözü gate of Hatay or Habur gate of Şırnak to ship their goods or to make the transit trade to the Middle Eastern countries.[134]

The Parachute operation, true to its name, aimed a secretly held raid by the centrally appointed officers to a prominent businessman from Gaziantep with its industrial facility in Kilis as well as local bureaucrats in Kilis and Gaziantep.[135] The investigation involved the custom directors and governors in both cities, customs director of Habur and undersecretaries of trade and agriculture ministries. The operation included in a series of successive anti-corruption probes targeting upstart tycoons and high-placed bureaucrats. The probes received extensive coverage in national newspapers, indicating that the state budget suffered a loss of TL 3.5 quadrillion from unrighteously placed export-import subsidies to fraudulent trading. The businessman and his several company employees were

[134] According to my interviewees as well as testimonies of transport company owners, the Syrian government steered the international trade between two countries through Cilvegözü gate by indirect incentives such as avoiding to charge extra fees and smoothing strict technical regulations in order to favour the Nusayri community at the border. In Habur gate, on the other hand, the Kurdish community

[135] See the news report: "Bir isim bir operasyon", *Yeni Şafak*, 23.8.2000 and Aydın, Murat (2000) "Operasyonun adı var", *Aksiyon*, no. 309.

accused of fraudulent export of sugar, banana, tea, rice and oil and siphoning of TL 500 billion from the public treasury. The probe eventually enlarged to merge with other probes targeting local entrepreneurs in Kilis, accused mainly of fraudulent export of sugar.[136] The cases brought against them were eventually dismissed or timed out and the businessman from Gaziantep served a minor time.

The news detailed that the businessman did not only exploit the cross-border trade regulations, but also abused the inward processing and transit trade regimes.[137] The inward processing was introduced as a modification in the export incentive regime after the signing of Customs Union between EU and Turkey in 1996.[138] With the inward processing, the exporters could benefit from the tax exemption or reimbursement if they imported raw materials in order to process them and export the final goods. The regime subsidized the exporters in import duties and value added tax (VAT) during importation. Besides, the regime offered the exporters the subsidized prices for domestic raw materials if they guaranteed their processing and the exportation of final goods. On the other side, the transit trade regulations exempted the exporters from paying import-export taxes and customs duties. The businessman cheated export tax fraud by abusing these trade regimes and sold the goods in domestic market though he pretended to export them. The authorizations and paperwork for fraudulent transactions involved the accomplice of state authorities and customs officers.

The businessman was also suspected of oil smuggling in the hiding places of truck trailers. The newspapers covered the allegations that the businessman run a daily traffic of 150 trucks, suggesting an oil trade bringing in nearly TL 2.5 billion of unlawful profit.[139] The public prosecutor investigating the profiteering occurred in a span of six years commented that the investigated sugar business was less risky and more remunerative than heroin trade.[140] The news coverage highlighted that the domestic sugar producers were implicated

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136 "Paraşütte yeni tutuklamalar", NTVMSNCB, 8.5.2001. available at http://arsiv.ntvmsnbc.com/news/81588.asp

137 Baransu, Mehmet (2000) "Paraşüt açılmadı", *Aksiyon*, no. 288.

138 The Processing Regime put force on January 1st, 1996 via Decree No. 95/7615.

139 "Bürokrat Avı", *Hürriyet*, 31 May 2000.

140 "500 trilyonu aşabilir", *Hürriyet*, 30 May 2000.

among countless anonymous reports that informed the state authorities against the ongoing profiteering at the border gates.[141]

The Parachute operation interrupted the cross-border trade in Kilis but it did not extinguish it. The regulations of cross-border trade remained in effect, though amended in the late 2000s. So, I do not consider the anti-corruption discourse, rampant in the early 2000s, as a tool to fight malpractice and profiteering. This discourse served to bring such wealth generation practices under control in order to ensure the fair competition in the market, as the news about the sugar or banana companies complaining about the profiteering at Öncüpınar customs implicated. The anti-corruption discourse particularly took effect in restructuring of the public sector after the financial crisis of 2001 and ensured the continuation of neoliberal policies, abatting its destructive repercussions (Bedirhanoğlu, 2007: 1250).

For the border anthropologist Galemba, the unregulated trade across Mexican-Guatemalan border constituted a neoliberal politics of invisibility, with the local authorities turning a blind eye to the illegal crossings at border zones that lost their significance as an international gate: The officers could not investigate the crossing trucks "unless the smugglers are not caught in the action" (Galemba, 2013: 7). This politics reduced the duty of Mexican officials technically to validate whether the truckers had the authorization from the customs directorate at the region or capital city. In this vein, I suggest that the law enforcement at Kilis border appeared to function there not to terminate the unregulated trade but to take it under control, although several legal reforms were undertaken to prevent smuggling and corruption under the auspices of neoliberal governments after the 2001 crisis.

6.4.2. Expectations for Earning a Living at the Border

The semi-legal trade evolved after the introduction of cross-border trade regulations differed from the transnational shadow economy of the ISI period as the lower strata had to undertake the risk, though their labour could be still exploited by the large-scale

[141] Also it was reported that a banana export group complained about the unjustified profits. "Gaziantep'e İnen 'Paraşüt'-1: Muzun dayanılmaz cazibesi", *Yeni Şafak*, 6.1.2000.

entrepreneurs. In the absence of patronage, the lower strata faced several hardships, including downswings, bankruptcy and imprisonment. While the neoliberal policies blurred the boundaries between legal and illegal realm by regulating the "cross-border trade", they ensured its unequal access by various strata. The regulations since the mid-1990s not only took the unregulated trade under control by turning a blind eye to the lower strata's struggle to earn their living, but also sustained an income differentiation among them. The unequal access to trade constantly fed the prospects for upward mobility for the lower strata, although the few, not necessarily from rags-to-riches, could prosper. The lower strata recognized the unequal access as a discriminatory practice, but tried to fight it by improving their chances on the basis of their social networks.

The low-income dwellers of the town recalled the initial practices of cross-border trade as "sugar period". The sugar business not only prospered the local entrepreneurs, but also small-scale traders commuting every day back and forth in order to collect sugar from the opposite Syrian border town Azaz. My interviewees[142] told assertively that sugar was unloaded from each car crossing back the border. They did not have the particular knowledge about the modifications in the legal framework that initiated or ended the cross-border trade. But they were conscious of the policy that encouraged the custom officers to disregard the overcharging of car trunks with undeclared Syrian goods. According to of a young commuter, "the smuggling was set free" in that period:

> This government enforced the Customs Laws as soon as they came into power. You probably know that. Now, the legal right of any person is three kilos of tea and five kilos of sugar because the Customs Law is made. The cigarettes are banned. That is to say, before the Customs Law is made, the border crossings were set free. I unloaded the car myself. We used to take out a ton of sugar from the car.[143]

Besides the trunk, every hole under the hood could be stuffed with sugar sacks. My interviewees recorded that a kilo yielded one lira of net gain. Thus, a commuter could earn

[142] Serdar, Hamit and Talip were young small-scalers who provided much information about cross-border trade.

[143] *Bu iktidar geldi ilk Gümrük Yasasını çıkardı zaten. Bilginiz vardır. Gümrük Yasası çıktığı için şimdi bir kişinin yasal hakkı üç kilo çay, beş kilo şekerdir. Sigara falan yasaktır. Gümrük Yasası çıkmazdan önce zaten geçişler serbestti yani. Ben kendim boşaltıyordum arabayı. Bir ton şeker çıkartırdık arabadan.*

TL 1000 in a trip.[144] The gainful trade raised the prospects of upward mobility for a larger population in the town, attracting even the small business owners and employees for additional income.

The sugar period, as my interviewees called, reintroduced the unregulated trade as a mundane effort of earning living for broader low-income strata. Even though they had to sell their goods to local large-scale entrepreneurs, collecting the sugar in their high-walled garages near the beltway to the border gate and shipped to the domestic market in trucks, they were not dependent on the patronage relationships to find an employment. Still, the lower strata had to rely on political patronage in order to ease the customs control at the border gate. According to Serdar, a subcontract employee at the public hospital and small-scale trader, the deputies could pull votes from a large constituency when they put pressure on the customs officers to turn blind eye to the border crossers with undeclared goods:

> It [the border control at the gate] was so tight for a couple of days just after the elections. I saw it with my own eyes. A deputy came to the customs area. He asked to the customs director, "[do you realize] why the military posts did not work". I was there. [The customs director said], "they bring so much sugar". The deputy raised his hand and slapped in the face of customs director. I saw it with my own eyes. He [the deputy] wandered around and came back, "do your duty right or you have got no business here". He slapped him in public and sent back. Then the gate was opened and the crossings was set free. No inspection! I mean, a deputy can make the gate work if he wills.[145]

The loss of profits with the decline of sugar trade was swiftly replaced by another remunerative business: "Now, the sugar is over and the cigarettes business started. Not anybody could bring three cartons of cigarettes at that time. Today one can bring fifty cartons."[146] The town dwellers kept commuting across border in order to bring Ceylon tea, cigarettes, mobiles, automobile spare parts, home hardware and catchpenny goods. The oil

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144 The interviewees calculated their gain as if the Turkish Lira was not redenominated by the time. The Lira is revaluated with the removal of six zeros in 2005.

145 *Tam seçim üstü birkaç gün çok sıkı oldu. Ben bunu gözümle gördüm; milletvekili geldi, Gümrük Meydanına. "Gümrük Müdürüne niye karakollar çalışmadı" dedi. Ben oradayım işte. "Bu kadar şeker getiriyorlar" falan dedi. Milletvekili elini kaldırdı, Gümrük Müdürüne tokadı indirdi. Ben bunu gözümle gördüm. Gitti dolandı, "görevini yapıyorsan yap, senin burada işin yok" dedi. O kadar halkın içinde adama tokadı vurdu, yerine gönderdi. Ondan sonra kapı açıldı serbest oldu. Muayene yok. Yani bir milletvekili istediği gibi kapıyı çalıştırabilir istedikten sonra.*

146 *Şimdi hocam, şeker bitti sigara başladı. O zaman kimse üç karton sigara getiremezdi. Şimdi elli karton getiren var.*

trade consisted of selling the extra oil in car's tank. The regular gas tanks were changed with bigger ones until the legal amendments occasionally banned them. These cars with higher road clearance allowed carrying up to 100 liters of oil, doubling the size of oil that regular tanks can contain. Female peddlers were helped by their dresses and topcoats in order to brace cartons of cigarettes with laces on their legs and arms. They also tended to buy and resell women underwear, cotton domestic cloths, cosmetics and perfumes of poor quality.[147] The hidden places of cars could be used not only to carry these goods, but also to sneak parakeets out of sight, which yielded more profit than the catchpennies. The lifting of visa requirements between two countries in 2009 further endorsed the cross-border trade as a rampant opportunity of earning money. With the cross-border trade, Kilis developed a symbiotic relation with the Syrian border town Azaz, located at seven kilometers away.

Similar to Kilis, Azaz was economically dependent on the unregulated trade and the town dwellers were involved not only in selling goods to the Turkish traders, but they also provided out-of-sight places for buyers to store their goods in the hidden slots of their car. The garagists, as they were called, let the drivers use the high-walled rustic courtyards as garage to store their goods. Usually, the garagists fetched the order of traders from outside for a small commission. Storing goods in the car in sight could put the Turkish traders in jeopardy of getting imprisoned in Syria. The garages were not only places where the drivers could store their purchase but also stay overnight in their car when they to wait for the shift of the customs officer that their garagists had contact with or for the ending of a high-ranking officer's spot check at the customs. Thus, the initiation of cross-border trade narrowed the range of transnational economy down to the distance of seven kilometers, which the dwellers commuted as much as the regulations allowed.

The old dated anti-smuggling law was amended and replaced first by a liberal penal doctrine in 2003 within the context of EU accession (Bozçalı, 2014). The 2003 law enforced the cash fines for smuggling and the traders could avoid jail time. When a new law in 2007 legislated, it restored the penalty of imprisonment as well as the confiscation

147 *For example, Leyla, a women married to and divorced from a Turkish man, still living in Kilis told that she was among the pioneers bringing cosmetics goods from Syria. When I interviewed her, she used to commute to Aleppo and peddling the city streets in order to sell her Avon products that she carried from Kilis.*

of vehicles used in smuggling.[148] Accordingly, the traders faced a jail time between one to five years for smuggling goods across the customs, the imprisonment being severed if the goods were smuggled across the border zone. If committed oil smuggling, the trader would face the penalty with a minimum level of two years. Despite these penalties, however, the local dwellers continued to commute across the border with undeclared goods in exceeded quotas.

The quotas sanctioned by the regulations of cross-border trade for the goods that a passenger could bring were so low to allow the small-scale traders yield a profit. To name few, a passenger could only carry a kilogram of tea and 400 cigarettes (two cartons of cigarette packs) at the customs as personal belonging. My interviewees stated the net gain for a kilo of tea as TL 2 and for a cigarette carton as TL 2.2.[149] According to them, the allowed quota was not even enough to cover the expenses, including the departure fee of TL 15. Thus, the trade would simply render profit if the trader abused the allowed quota. Ignoring the officially sanctioned quotas, the traders groped for a limit at the optimum reached as the result of long-lasting disputes at the customs, the traders arguing for their rightfulness to pass with undeclared goods in order to earn a living. The words of Talip, a young small-scale trader reflected this viewpoint: "The guy brings five or ten cartons of cigarettes. They take it away from him. He brings home the bread out of it. Is this not a pity?"[150] In the absence of patronage, their business was jeopardized by the risk of getting confiscated. They could not afford bribing the officers, so they had to count on their network, taking advantage of the confusion due to the crowd and disarray, trying to intimidate or make them pity for not seizing the smuggled goods in their cars, bags or beneath their cloths. My interviewees told several cases in which the customs officers were mobbed by a furious crowd and the managing officer was manhandled.

An informal conversation at the border customs would also confirm it. The customs

148 The Anti-Smuggling Law no. 5607 replaced the Law no. 4926, published in the Official Gazette no. 25173 on July 19, 2003. The new law appeared in the Official Gazette no. 26479 on March 31, 2007.

149 A carton of Winston cigarettes was sold in the arcade shops for TL 28 by summer 2011. The price of a pack in the regular market was TL 5.5.

150 *Adam getirmiş beş karton, on karton sigara; tutuyorlar, onu alıyorlar. Adam evini onunla geçindiriyor, yazık değil mi?*

building located entry of no-man's land appeared neglected with no signs directing the visitors inside. I was not able to find the director's office with which I had an appointment unless the secretary guided me away within the building. I was not even sure about the title of the person to whom I paid a visit since I was only given a name on my prior phone call. As I introduced myself, he told me that it was not possible for him to give me information since he was a public officer. Yet, he assured me that he could answer my questions informally. He was called by the officers as chief. So I assume that he was the chief of Smuggling and Information Office at the customs since he mentioned this was his previous duty in the late 1980s before he had got appointed to Kilis. The anonymity within the building was intentional. The highly-placed officers had to be invisible in order to escape the fury of traders. Most of the officers used to live in Gaziantep rather than renting a flat in the town for security reasons. The chief complained that the town dwellers saw the border gate as their own courtyard and they did not acknowledge the state authority. When he tried to enforce the regulations, he could run up against a townsman pulling his knife. According to him, the dwellers had the habit of crossing the border as the first thing in the morning as if they were going to the coffeehouse after they woke up.

Nevertheless, when caught out by the customs officers, the traders were not reported to the police. The customs officers, rather than taking criminal action against the traders, held the goods and moved it the customs warehouse. The traders then could claim their goods from the warehouse at a particular day during weekdays, but they had to cross first to the Syrian side with the retrieved goods and they would try to enter anew. When they retrieved the goods, they also had to take the risk to get them goods lost either the Syrian or Turkish customs. Recently, the traders had to pay additionally a warehouse rent of TL 50, which worked practically as a penalty for the traders, leading them to leave their goods without ever reclaiming. On the other hand, the traders always brought up against the danger of coming to the officers' attention. When caught out, their cars could be towed away, followed by a lawsuit brought against the owner. But, the interviews implied that the customs officers tended to overlook the small amounts, a tendency indicating to the legitimacy of small-scale trade as a means of livelihood. According to Bahtiyar, a young worker, the cars could come to the attention of officers, but they used to let the peddlers pass. But in the absence of patronage relations, the seizing of their goods or the fines

imposed exacerbated the economic woes and growing debts of lower strata, especially for initiators in carrying goods in exchange for a hire.

Young man had left his job as molder in a workshop, where he was daily paid TL 20 since his salary "did not save the day" in order to smuggle goods across the border for a trader. I had run into him in a stationary shop that I paid visit most of the time I was passing by. While the shop was a place to drop by for having tea and a nice chat with the owner, it was haunted by the poor urban dwellers to have their papers Xeroxed and get help from the stationer for filling the application documents for Green Card, a free health benefit scheme provided to the poor not covered by the public health insurance. The shop was right across the building where the Green Card office was accommodated and the stationary was a caring man, not declining the help requests. It was easy to tell at a glance that the worker and his young wife standing next to him with a little baby in her arms appeared poor. As the stationery knew about my research, he made them sit in order to let me ask my questions in haste. The young man had just started to bring parakeets and aquarium fishes across the border for a trader in exchange for TL 50. More remunerative goods like tea and cigarettes could be carried by experienced carriers for TL 150.

He used to cross the border by making a car stop to pick him up, since the pedestrians were not allowed to walk across the no-man's land between two gates. He went to Azaz town to collect the order and then came back across the minefield near the gate towards morning. He could carry at a time two big nylon bags, each containing a thousand of small aquarium fishes in smaller bags. As soon as he crossed the mined land, a car arranged by the trader would pick him up. To him, the officers let the peddlers cross into Kilis through the gate because they regarded them as "wretch" living in dire straits. But he had to turn back the other way around, across the minefield in order to escape the cameras at the gate. The peddlers were only porters. Since they did not own the goods, the loss would be covered by the trader if the peddler was caught out. But without the patronage, they or their family had to stand to the financial difficulties when served a fine or jail sentence. After a short while, I dropped by the stationery and learned that the young man had been caught in the act. The stationer told me that he did not have to pay for the loss of the goods with him, but he had been sentenced to a substantial pecuniary fine for violating the passport law, which he could not afford to pay it by any means. The young man desperately came to the

stationer, which helped him to write a petition to the governorship for asking to be pardoned.

The peddlers could not afford bribing the officers, so they had to take advantage of the confusion due to the crowd and disarray, trying to intimidate or make the officers pity for not confiscating the smuggled goods in their cars, bags or beneath their cloths. Left with their own means, they could only engage bringing goods in small-scale. Although the customs officers tended to turn a blind eye to them, the crossing of undeclared goods was not without difficulty. The way that the customs officers treated the lower strata border-crossers during the inspection offended them. The plastic bags of the peddlers were cut by the officers for better inspection. The officers could ask them for body search or take their coats off. The way they treated the peddlers was likely to offend them and reveal the unequal access to cross-border trade in the viewpoint of lower strata, as my interview with a woman peddler brought it up. In her seventies, she was still commuting to Azaz for small-scale trade at infrequent intervals though moved to Gaziantep city long time ago. She had not any pension left from her late husband and she maintained her life in a one-room basement flat thanks to his brother who owned the two-store building.

I remember that, sat on a pillow on the cement floored ground, I was having chat with her when she was sitting on the bed with extended legs. My visit was to check on her since I heard that she had severe back pain. She spoke about her fears to have a possible surgery for the hernia at the middle of her back, since the surgery would impair her movements and put her back from peddling. Then she started to tell about the unfair treatment she was receiving at the customs gate. She lost her 10 kilos of tea to the officers last time she was returning from Azaz. She said offendedly that the customs officers cut her tea packs while they let the trucks with smuggled goods pass. The conviction that the large-scale entrepreneurs could have their trucks passed unsearched by the border customs prevailed among the lower strata. Nesim, a border peasant engaged in smuggling cigarettes across the border expressed it in a rather racy manner: “The gate is a camel, an elephant. The company blatantly makes the biggest haul. But the officer catches the poor wretches like us and he happens to do his duty.”[151]

[151] *Kapı bir deve, bir fil. Yutttuğunu yutuyor, yutamadığını bırakıyor. Şirket hamuduyla götürüyor.*

The lower strata commuters were aware that the transport companies unequally traded on the profits of border trade as they could afford bribing the customs and covering the damages of getting caught. The small-scale traders regarded the amendments in the legal framework of cross-border trade as arbitrary changes in the border policies which could be enforced both by the government or local authorities. In the words of Talip:

> I suppose, it was three years ago. [Crossing to] Syria was allowed once every three days in 2008. Afterwards, the daily entrance and exit by car was set free in the last two years. But after the parliamentary election [in 2011], it was regulated back as once a week. You can cross by car once a week and everyday on foot.[152]

My interviewee Talip did not know that the last restriction on the frequency that the personal and company vehicles might go abroad was not a formal ban. A decree enforced by the cabinet in the early days of 2011 aimed at stopping oil trade smuggled in the vehicle tanks by imposing a fixed tax of TL 150 for the unconsumed oil if they went abroad more than once in a week and four times in a month.[153] For the small-scale traders as well as owners of passenger transportation companies, this practically meant a strict limitation on their movement and an obstacle to their engagement in trade. Talip explained it as follows:

> For example, we used to commute everyday. About 100 to 150 liras was left daily. Now you drive and with a bit of oil, you can only yield up to 300 to 400 liras. If you gain 150 liras everyday, it makes 750 liras a week. When it was everyday, opportunities were better. You brought and sold, and you went back again the next day. We had an occupation after all. Now we do not have it either. You go once a week and you are idle.[154]

Thus, the small-scale traders found convenient to organize among themselves to form informal 'companies' to overcome such restrictions. They collaborated with their relatives or acquaintances and as profit-sharing partners, they shifted their cars so as to get around

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Memur bizim gibi garibanları tutuyor, çalışıyorum oluyor.

[152] *Herhalde üç yıl önceydi, 2008'de üç günde birdi Suriye. Ondan sonra son iki yıl içersinde arabayla her gün giriş çıkış serbest oldu. Milletvekili seçimlerinden bir gün sonra haftada bire çıkarttılar arabayla. Arabayla haftada bir, yayan da her gün geçebiliyorsun.*

[153] Decree no. 2011/2595, published in the Official Gazette no 28170, on January 11, 2012.

[154] *Mesela biz günlük gidip geliyorduk. Yüz, yüz elli lira par kalıyordu günlük. Şu an gidiyorsun, biraz gazla atıyorsun üç yüz. Dört yüz lira para kalıyor. Her gün yüz elli kazansan haftada beş gün yedi yüz elli eder. Her gün imkan daha iyi idi. Getiriyordun satıyordun ediyordun, ertesi günü tekrar gidiyordun. Hiç yoktan uğraşımız oluyordu. Şimdi o da yok. Haftanın bir günü gidiyorsun, altı günü boşsun.*

paying the tax.

The small-scale traders tended to run their business by taking on debt, especially when they were engaged in retail trade of cigarettes. Thus, the small-scale trade run on the basis of debt economy not only in Kilis but also in other parts of southeastern border of Turkey. In Yüksekova, for instance, the rising penalties and growing risk of getting caught recently led the cigarette traders not to use carriers despite the profit margins in unregulated trade from Northern Iraq had increased (Özcan, 2014). Thus the carriers had to pay for the goods themselves and took the risk for the possible losses. The wholesale trade of cigarettes in Kilis consisted of its trafficking across the minefields and its sale to the local shops or its transportation to Gaziantep where local shop owners bought the goods. The border villagers needed to undertake the security and financial risk: they owned the goods on credit, crossed the minefield at night in order to pick up the goods from Syrian peasants at the border, left at a predetermined point at the border and transported them at daylight by using side roads to Kilis or Gaziantep. If they got caught out, then, unable to pay off the debt, they would have become more dependent on the unregulated trade to pay it by leaving unpaid another.

The arbitrary border policies and absence of patronage to cover their financial losses forced them to count on their own networks to survive the rise and fall of trade. The town dwellers were usually involved in the unregulated trade because of its intergeneration transmission as an occupation. In some cases, they could draw on their parents' networks and take advantage of these relationships to have a smoother access to unregulated trade. Hamit, for instance, benefited from his father's connections at the border customs. His father was a loved *imam* in the border villages where he used to work, thanks to his integrity not only as *imam* but also as smuggler, joining his fellow peasants in smuggling across the minefield. He presently served as *imam* in a mosque near the customs, remained at the former rest area accommodating prospective pilgrims going to Mecca by road. This mosque was presently frequented by the customs officers during prayer time and the *imam's* good relations with them helped Hamit's business: the departure and custom declaration procedure was made easier for him.

Hamit and his brother run a small grocery shop where they also received potential

customers looking for cheap oil. Although the Syrian conflict caused the rise of oil prices, it was still profit-bringing for the commuters due to the price differentials. For instance, the oil was "cheaper than water" in Syria, the price being one lira per liter.[155] The grocer in my neighbourhood told that he could easily sell the oil for TL 3.5 per liter to his potential customers, with an increase in price due to the added up profit of the commuters carrying the oil for him. Hamit and his brother commuted to Azaz alternately, one or the other left to look after the shop, to bring cigarettes as well. He had started to commute across the border since he was seventeen, to carry oil in bins on a hand truck and he had made money since then to own a house and cars, including a modified one with a bigger gas tank. It was the time when the violent clashes in Syria reached out Azaz and the town was being bombed by the Syrian fighter jets for the first time that I wondered how much longer he could pursue the trade across border. He was quite satisfied with the state of business and expressed his conviction that the border gate will not be closed depite the increasing tide of the conflicts. He went in partnership with a fellow townsman and rented a cabstand place from the municipality. Planning soon to open it, he explained that he could presently afford individually to run three taxis.

The fact that Hamit's business went well illustrated how the unequal access to trade could differentiate the prospects of living a better life for the lower strata. My interviewees thought that the prospects for upward mobility depended on the courage and luck that anyone engaged in "smuggling" could had. Not necessarily from rags-to-riches, the unregulated trade could provide a middle-class lifestyle for the families with lower strata background. Serdar living at the next door in Kilis was exemplary. He used to commute to Azaz since his youth. He lived in a housing estate, first built by the municipality to provide accessible housing for the lower strata, but then turned into a project that the middle-class profited from the favourable terms of sale. The housing accommodated mostly families with male head working in the public sector or employed in regular jobs with social security. Teachers and police officers were outstanding among the housing population.

Serdar and Arzu owned a flat that was furnished in accordance with the middle-class taste: a large guest room equipped with elegant sofa set with wooden engraved frames, buffet

[155] By the summer 2011, a liter of oil price was TL 4.23 in the regulated market.

and low tables. The couple owned a foreign brand car that Serdar used for carrying oil, cigarettes and other tradable goods. The couple could afford going to the private clinic in the town every time their little boy was sick. As I was conscious of his husband beating her occasionally, I realized that her marriage was regarded by her parents as a good chance for her to maintain better living standards than that her family could provide. Arzu's mother used to come to my flatmate for house cleaning once in a while and she seemed to endeavour fulfilling her duty as a good mother to find a good chance to marriage all her daughters. Serdar was a young man who could establish himself as the head of a family with soon-to-be five members. Arzu had fallen pregnant for her fourth child -one being deceased when he was too little- at the time I was living there. Until he found a blue-collar job as a desk worker provided by a subcontracting company in the state hospital, he had survived though times and had been both in Turkish and Syrian jails for short times.

For him, finding a job with social security was probably more decisive in establish a more stable course of action in small-scale trade. Serdar continued to do small-scale trading while he worked at the hospital. His night shifts allowed him to commute to Azaz in the rest of the day. Although he could cross the border once a week in order not to pay the tax, he was able to earn money more than his minimum wage that he received from his hospital job. While his wage was near TL 650, the trade yielded monthly about TL 1000. A secure job permitted him to assess the risks imperturbably and remain low profile, avoiding to draw the attention of custom officers as much as possible. His interview reveals that the Turkish customs sought to take it under control, allowing the lower strata to earn money while keeping the trade definitively small-scale:

> If you lose a couple of cigarette [packs], it is not a big deal. But if I go by car and my 5 million worth of goods are all seized and they sue you, then I cannot compensate it in a year. There is a difference between losing the goods and losing the goods. The guy [customs officer] came and took some of my tea and let me go. That is nothing. He checked my car and he did not take anything. People bring parakeet for a hire of 100 liras. You take it and bring here and you get 100 liras. The inspector heard the bird call as he passed by. He looked at my face. I did not say anything. He had checked the car. He came back. He put the notebook on the floor. He leaned down and looked and he noticed the bird from below. As he saw the bird, he told me to open the trunk. I opened the trunk. He took my five kilos of tea away and threw it to the warehouse. If he had not seen the bird, he would not

have taken away anything.[156]

Serdar also gave his opinions about the nature of unregulated trade:

> You have the crank or the carburetor. He says, for example, "Take it [an automobile spare part] and you will have fifty or hundred million [liras]. Not all men would take it. It is risky. If the inspector notices it, he will not let it go. It is a profitable business but it is risky. You need to have such a place in your car to carry it. For example, he saw the bird in mine and he took five liras worth of tea. That depends. Bit of luck and vigilance. Not everyone is tailored for it. It is not everyone's business.[157]

As the above excerpt indicates, the unregulated trade was encouraged by both Turkish and Syrian traders and entangled the traders, commuters and state officials of both sides in a symbiotic economy. As it is suggested in this section, the cross-border trade regulations enforced by the Turkish governments unilaterally constituted a phase of neoliberal politics, promoting the profiteering through fraudulent exports and turning a blind eye to the unregulated small-scale trade as a means of livelihood for the lower strata border communities. Even though the regulations of cross-border trade required a complex procedure of application and paperwork, the small-scale traders in Kilis could engage it without necessarily going through it. The small-scale trading run on the basis of debt economy and jeopardized the traders with risk and uncertainty, promising the upward mobility to the lower strata but granting only differential access.

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156 *İki üç tane sigara yakalatsan bu önemli değil. Ama bir de ben arabamda gittim; beş milyarlık eşyayı tutup da sıfırlayıp seni mahkemeye verirlerse, onu bir senede çıkaramazlar. Mal yakalatmadan yakalatmaya fark var. O gün adam geldi benim üç beş kilo çayımı aldı git dedi. Bu bir şey değil. O gün benim arabamı muayene etti. Dönmedi, bir şey almadı. Papağan getiriyorlar oradan kirayla yüz liraya. Oradan alıyorsun buraya getiriyorsun yüz milyon para alıyorsun. Muayeneci oradan geçerken kuşun sesini duydu. Benim yüzüme baktı, ben bir şey demedim. Muayene etmişti. Geri döndü, geldi. Defteri yere koydu. Eğildi baktı, alttan kuşu gördü. Kuşu gördü ya, "bagajı aç" dedi. Bagajı açtım. Beş kilo çay aldı, götürdü ambara attı. Kuşu gördü ya, yoksa bir şey almayacaktı.*

157 *Krank var, karbüratör var. Adam diyor ki "şunu götür, al sana elli milyon, yüz milyon". Bunu da her adam alıp götürmüyor. Riskli. Onu Muayeneci görürse kesinlikle bırakmaz. Karlı iş ama riskli. Onu götürebilmek için ona göre arabanın yeri olmalı. Mesela, bizde kuşu gördü, elli liralık çayı aldı. Belli olmuyor yani. Biraz şans,biraz uyanıklık. Orada herkesin yapacağı iş değil.*

6.5. Giving Bribes, Taking Brides: The Politics and Economy of Kinship Among the Poor

As mentioned in the preceding chapter, the arrival of Syrian migrants triggered the discontent among town dwellers and overshadowed the cross-border kinship ties that they laid much emphasis on. But, the interviews were likely to highlight that the open-border policy with Syria increased encounters between two communities since the mid-1990s. They revealed the border as a space of flows where goods in return of bribes, greetings and brides were exchanged. As a scholar of the Central Asian porous borders suggested, "encounters with 'the law' are frequently negotiated through appeals to common ethnicity or religion, or trumped through the law-dissolving agency of the bribe" (Reeves, 2007: 73). Kinship and marriage bonds both normalized and strengthened the exchange practices across the border deemed illegal by the authorities.

I address the shift of kinship to a material strategy and discursive tool for the lower-strata town dwellers in navigating legal as well as social boundaries. While the interviewees' recollections about the import-substituting period revealed the significance of kinship relations in facilitating the cross-border exchange, the conversations about kinship in the open-border policy period laid emphasis on the social boundaries between Turkish and Syrian societies. According to the interviewees, the open-border policy between two countries had increased encounters and forged a common economy. However, curiously enough, they also tended to emphasize the backwardness of Syrian society and reinforce the 'Arab perception' of local community.

Before the news about the Syrian migrants was communicated, my conversations with the town dwellers highlighted the cross-border kin and marriage relations, presumably heightened by the recent open-border policy of Turkish government. First, it was puzzling for me to observe the shift in local speeches about the Syrians from kin to unwanted guests. But in a post-research visit to the town for a week of translation job in an international NGO in October 2012, I had the chance to witness a shift of perceptions among the locals that had kinship relations with the coming migrants or had contact with them.

Kilis proved to be one of the border towns where the Syrians depended on their kinship

ties in establishing themselves as migrants living outside the camp (Özden, 2013: 3). The Syrians had already started to work in local cafes and eating houses and in the fields as agricultural labourers. The local marketplace was enlivened thanks to the shopping needs of Syrian families. The visit to the town also gave me the chance to pay a visit to the salesman of second hand store whom I used to frequently visit and chat during the field study. He was busy than ever and received Syrian customers who came to the depot-like shop to pick up, for instance, a needed furniture for their home or an old television to cheer their prefabricated house in campsite. Despite our conversation was interrupted by the arrival of potential customers, I kept inquiring from him about the reactions regarding the overgrowing presence of Syrian migrants. He solved the puzzle for me as he said: "Do not pay too much attention [to what they say about the Syrians]! We are kin in the end".[158] The recurrent trope of "cross-border kin communities" did not signify a turnabout among the local community about the Syrian migrants. The discontentment and cultural tensions were reported to continue (Dinçer et al., 2013). Nevertheless, it implied the need for a more sophisticated understanding of kinship relations across the border.

Cross-border exchanges, often expedited by the ethnic or kin relations, may reinforce social boundaries rather than undermining them. But few studies thoroughly examined the changes in kinship relations catalyzed by the re-bordering processes. Parizot's study on the cross-border ties among Palestinian Bedouins remained in Israeli-occupied Negev and self-governing Palestinian enclaves indicated that the kinship relations could act as an economic favour rather than social belonging "in a highly unstable political and spatial context, where borders are constantly redrawn and the statuses of people are redefined in ways that have often broadened the gap between cross-border "partners" (Parizot, 2008: 70). Parizot wrote that the smugglers, for instance, needed tighter coordination for their activities between divided territories. As Israeli state increased security measures after the Oslo process of 1994, the legal or illegal crossings to the Israel across the separation line required the invitation or networking of a Bedouin kin, raising new trans-border configurations of power and heightening the perceptions of difference and even social distance among the kin.

[158] *Bakma sen! Akrabayız sonuçta.*

I have above discussed the persistence of paternalist relations within the context of transnational shadow economy. In the same vein, I argue here that that the growth of shadow markets helped the reproduction of kinship relations rather than their decline. The field observation and interviews hinted at the ways in which the mining of the border and the enhancement of contraband in value affected these relations. As mentioned above, the extended families in Kilis could be derived from the chiefdoms or tribal confederacies which were actually territorially-based socio-economic organizations, rather than simple lineages. Though the administrative centralization renders them smaller and more heterogeneous, their engagement in contraband and tendency to establish family monopolies around their illegal businesses resulted in the persistence of tribal ideology[159] as a social and economic unit.

Before its mining, the border could be crossed by walking through the stones barely marking the frontier line, especially at the mountainous Kurdish region where the military patrols could be eluded more easily in comparison to the lowland villages. Kurdish peasants used to slink across the border to Bilbilê (also Bulbul in Arabic) town of Afrin in order to exchange their eggs and crops with goods like medicine and soap. The contraband trade rapidly evolved in the 1960s to make the poor border dwellers thrive beyond the dire straits they used to live in. A former Kurdish smuggler who was now running a grocery shop in the town expressed that he bought his first car in his eighteen and no fellow villager had ever seen so much money. His adolescent youth was full of memories about border crossings on foot in order to stay at the Syrian village of their relatives for weeks, work in the fields driving their tractors in exchange of hospitality. As the words of Müşir, a former smuggler, illustrate, after the consolidation of border with fences and landmines, the kinship relations shifted into business connections and the exchange practices among kin were shaped by money economy, though trust remained an important component:

> The kin bring the goods but on commission. We brought everything we could. The traders waited for us in Kilis and usually [they came] from the west. One can also work jointly with a kin. If you do not have money, the kin gives you the capital and

[159] See Bruinessen (2002) for his statement that the tribe members share an ideology of common descent, endogamy (parallel cousin marriage) and segmentary alliance and opposition.

simply gets a commission. But only the kin would do that.[160]

The Turkish-Syrian borderlands attested the significance of kinship and affinity for business relations across the border, not necessarily restricted with the unregulated trade. In Hatay, for example, the ethnic communities across the border utilized their "bonding" and "bridging" capital to promote their business relations beyond the constraints of ethnicity and religion (Doğruel & Karakoç, 2013: 8). In Kilis, new alliances among kin established by cousin marriages helped to maintain the trade as family business. As I observed among my interviewees, not only the Turkish traders crossed to the Syrian side, but also the Syrians came to the town in order to sell the goods that they brought in with them. For the lower strata of both sides, the relatives across the border constituted a social network to facilitate the border crossings, providing grounds for arrival, lodging and contacts for making exchanges.

Though the kinship bonds were weakened by the regressed trade across the border after the military coup, the town dwellers believed that they were heightened with the open-border policy of Turkey. Turkish governments mended the fences with Syria in the late 1990s with the cease of water dispute and ending of Syrian support to PKK, the Kurdish Marxist-Leninist insurgency.[161] Nevertheless, the opening of geographical border may not automatically contribute to the opening of social boundaries. While it encouraged the local discourses on the pluralistic openness and multiculturalism of Hatay (Doğruel & Karakoç, 2013), it tended to magnify the perceptions of difference among border communities in Kilis. As a conversation with a local white goods distributor married to his Syrian cousin revealed, the corruption of the Syrian bureaucracy and concomitant obstacles to the cross-border trade were interpreted as a major concern in the recent times.

The protocols and agreements signed between Turkish and Syrian authorities were the

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[160] *Akrabalar mal getiriyor ama komisyonla. Getirmediğimiz hiçbir şey kalmadı. Kilis'te bizi tüccarlar beklerdi; genellikle batıdan [gelirlerdi]. Akrabayla ortak da çalışılır. Paran yoksa akraba sermayeyi verir, sadece komisyonu alır. Ama sadece akrabalar yapar bunu.*

[161] The signing of Adana agreement in October 1998 was effectual in Syria's deportation of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and the water dispute eventually turned into a technical issue (Zafar, 2012). Scholars also argued that the changing state policy of Kurdish issue towards desecuritization and democratization, particularly with the AKP's rule contributed to shift of Turkish-Syrian relations toward cooperation and interdependence in securing regional peace (Aras&Polat, 2008).

result of two countries converging on political and economic cooperation since the late 1990s. The Free Trade Agreement, signed in 2004 and ratified in 2007, was followed by a number of partnership agreements in the fields of energy, tourism, military training, study missions, technology exchange and security. Apparently, the convergence between two countries proved fruitful in heightening the border crossings as well as cross-border kinship relations. During the conversations with town dwellers on border life, the Syrian brides shined out as a popular topic that they wanted to put emphasis on. In 1999, Kilis governor heralded the signing of a protocol with Aleppo governorship in facilitating the exchange of greetings in religious holidays by sanctioning the temporary residence of families at the other side of the border.[162] The protocol was enacted few years later and since then, the Turkish and Syrian families took turn each holiday to cross the border by showing their identity card only and stay for two to three days in their relatives' home.[163] In 2009, two countries signed a visa exemption agreement, which further promoted the border crossings. Thanks to these regulations, the families could avoid the tumultuous and chaotic meetings happening through the wire fences and benefited the loose customs control in engaging small-scale trade, crossing the border gate in their way back with undeclared goods. But the contribution of these protocols was principally the heightening of kinship relations and the increasing number of Syrian brides according to the interviewees.

The conversations underlined the complaisance of Syrian brides in settling their lives in Kilis town, wedded to a Turkish man and the 'backwardness' of Syrian society. Also, they pointed out that the practice of polygamous marriage was still legally in effect in Syria, as four places for spouses in the marriage certificate was allocated for the husband. Accordingly, the young Syrian women would readily accept to leave their native town since they would be emancipated from the familial and state oppression against women and as entitled Turkish citizens after three years of official marriage, they would eventually gain freedom that they did not ever have in Syria. These emphases were complemented by the comments on the corrupt business environment in Syria. Among the town dwellers

[162] "Bayramlaşmada tel örgü engeli kalkacak", *Yeni Şafak*, 15.6.1999.

[163] This implementation was stopped in 2011 after the breaking out of Syrian unrest for reasons of security and I could not observe the crossing of the families in successive holidays though my prolonged stay in the town covered them.

Source: Reuters

Photograph 14. Celebrating visa agreement.

A delegation of Turkish and Syrian bureaucrats lifts up a barrier at Azaz border gate near Kilis in order to celebrate the visa exemption agreement signed in 2009. This picture so vividly illustrates the open-border policy of Turkish government for the local authorities in Kilis that some of them refered to this picture in order to explain their confusion with the sudden shift of Turkish-Syrian relations into deterioration.

engaged in cross-border trade, the belief that the Syrian customs officers encroached to reap personal profit from the "duties" paid by the Turkish crossers was prevalent. They suggested that the duties were going to the officers' pocket rather than to the state revenues in Syria as the officers compensated their poor salary and social protection with extra profits.

The interviewees told that each car was charged about 1,500 to 2,000 Syrian pounds[164] or 65 to 70 Turkish Liras for their crossing regardless of the load they had with them. Also, they complained that they had to bribe the officers for any formal paperwork required for entering the country such as issuing triptyque (customs permit for temporary transportation of a motor vehicle) and travel insurance. The company owners protested the arbitrary practices of Syrian customs and border control that lacked their counterpart in the Turkish side. As I learned from my interviewees, the Turkish and Syrian local authorities tended to enact regulations and practices regarding the customs and border protection in line with the principle of equal treatment in return. That is to say, if the other party imposed a favorable or unfavorable practice regarding the opposite country's citizens, the latter was expected to put the same practice in effect. The authority of Kilis and Aleppo governorships over the border gates allowed them to coordinate these practices. But there were many exceptions that the Turkish company owners groused about such as the overtime pay that the drivers had to give to the Syrian officers on Fridays and Saturdays, declared as the official weekend. They argued that Turkish drivers had to pay a couple of times more than the drivers entering the country across the Syrian-Jordanian border and the Turkish side entirely lacked it.

These complaints indicated to the complex organization of border economy prevailed in the twin Syrian town of Azaz. Moreover, the Turkish traders had to rely on the garagists, which brokered the profit-sharing arrangements with the Syrian officers. They intervened as the traders' "*alaqat"* (in Arabic, connection, intermediary) when they had any problems with the Syrian police or customs officers, especially in order to avoid the fearsome threat of prison. An oversize gas tank, for instance, could be an occasion for the Syrian police to levy a heavy fine. Then, the garagists mediated and settled a solution at the end of long and

[164] During the year 2011, a Turkish Lira was about 32 to 36 Syrian pounds.

tedious bargains on the amount of bribe. The garagists in such cases could assume responsibility and cover full or equal share of the demanded bribe.

For Kilis locals, these practices, combined with the declining profit margins in cross-border trade culminated in the perception of Syrian state as corrupt and thus, backward. For Turkish traders, the border economy at the Syrian side was in sharp contrast with the Turkish side where a deterrent and punitive policy waited them. Even though the better-off traders breached this policy by bribing the Turkish customs officers, they assumed the Syrian side as corrupt rather than their own and ignore the fact that the border economy straddled along both. The effective enforcement of border control on the Turkish side was particularly effective after the anti-corruption operations against border customs and local authorities. Border studies rightfully pointed out that the state intervention to combat illegal practices does not function to stop the transgressors to engage them, but "enables the state to selectively instill fear and assert sovereignty" (Galemba, 2013: 280). It also serves to sustain status quo among different power groups, while vindicating the upper layers of the state bureaucracy. As Akhil Gupta's study on the discursive construction of state in the public culture demonstrated, the discourse of corruption circulated by the national and local media may inform symbolic representations of the state, reflecting the expectations of accountability both from the state officials and the local groups. The local bureaucracy and discourses of corruption together construct the state as an "imagined translocal institution with its localized embodiments" (Gupta, 1995: 389). Similar to the convictions of Indian villagers that informed Gupta's study, the public culture in Kilis town seemed to distinguish between multiple layers and distinct locales and centers that constituted the state and confine the corrupt practices with the local authorities in contrast with the dominant perception of the corruption in Syrian regime.

This did not exclude the possibility that the Syrian government could be engaged with transnational institutions and agendas promoting policy reforms towards transparency and accountability, particularly in effect during the neoliberal era. But Kilis locals were certainly not in the scope of such discourses. Hence, the encounters of Turkish traders with the Syrian officers and locals heightened their perceptions of difference that the traders construed it not only as characteristic of Syrian state, but also Syrian society. Despite the emphasis on kinship relations, these encounters highlighted in the view of Turkish traders

the cultural gap between two societies.

I am reminded here about the negative stereotypes and images of Arab identity historically produced and reinforced by mutual nationalisms. The scholarly resources pointed to the emergence of these negative stereotypes and images incorporated into the production of nationalist discourses in order to raise 'nationalist consciousness' (Watenpaugh, 2005).[165] The political and cultural influences informed the Turkish images of Arab distortedly depicted as Bedouin, traitor, womanizer, uneducated, unreliable, undemocratic and submissive (Watenpaugh, 2005: 53). Hence, it was no surprise that these images are reworked to draw social boundaries between two communities, when the news about the coming of Syrian migrants circulated among Kilis locals. In those days, several interviewees repeated the rumors that they heard of the unreliability and lack of honour of Syrian migrants for their abandoning of homeland in wartime, tendency to misbehaviour outside the camps and unchastity of migrant women debauching the gendarme.

These social boundaries could even constitute the battle lines within a household as in the case of discord between Asiye and her daughter-in-law. Her daughter-in-law, a Syrian woman relatively elderly for first marriage, was the second spouse of Asiye's son. For Asiye who had been engaged in small-scale trade for forty years, the stepping out beyond the Turkish customs in order to cross to Syria meant to step on the Arab side, which clearly indicated her distance to them: "[After the passport check by the Turkish customs] we take our passport and we go and enter along the Arabs' [territory].[166] His son, an outsourced worker in a high school fire room, was abandoned by his first spouse and mother of his children as she ran off with another man. Thus, Asiye had to arrange her son's second marriage by using her social network in Aleppo to find a Syrian woman whose bride price would be more affordable compared to her Turkish counterparts. She seemed to never get along with her daughter-in-law although she had arranged the marriage herself. Her regret and discord would make her daughter-in-law in her eyes almost automatically Arab,

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165 For example, Watenpaugh indicates that the newspaper *Halab*, a major publication of the early twentieth century promoting Arabic nationalism in the late 1920s depicts "Turk" as "an ill-mannered individual, replete with onerous character flaws, intent on defying modern civilization, intellectually deficient and morally corrupt" (2005: 10).

166 *[Türk gümrüğünde pasaport kontrolünden sonra] Onu alır, gideriz Araplara gireriz.*

though she came from an ethnically mixed familial background with a Turcoman mother and Kurdish father.

Certainly, the fact that the open-border policy and increased interaction might reinforce the social boundaries among border communities with longstanding trade and kinship ties, they still should be explored by addressing the entrenched hostilities between Arab and Turkish nationalisms and the working of nationalist ideologies on the community level. Nevertheless, as the discussion of this section aimed to indicate, the cross-border marriages and kinship relations proved to be the resilient and versatile ways in maintaining alliance between families at either side of the border. They normalized the border crossings, did efficient work of networking among lower strata for sustaining the exchange practices and helped the reproduction of kinship as a social and economic institution. In the light of this discussion, one can anticipate that new alliances among border communities built under highly unstable circumstances might alleviate the cultural tensions created by large influx of migrants, though at the cost of further isolation and estrangement among the dwellers deprived of such allying ties.

6.6. Concluding remarks

In this chapter, it is argued that the dependency of lower strata on the paternalistic relationships of agricultural production was replaced by new dependencies based on community and kinship norms and connections across border. While the sharecropping arrangements between the landlords and peasants declined in the rural, the petty commodity production in agriculture remained limited and pushed the peasantry to the urban settlements. Still, the rural poor could yield income from the unregulated trade, though they were largely incorporated into the growing shadow economy as labourers employed by large-scale entrepreneurs. The increasing profit margins created an industry of crossing at the border, which was controlled by official as well as non-official authority figures.

In the previous chapter, I have raised the question in what ways illegal economic practices, constituting a redistributive mechanism and simultaneously giving way to monopolistic tendencies could be regarded as moral economy. Here I elaborate further on this question by highlighting few aspects with an exclusive focus on the everyday strategies that the poor

rely on in coming into grips with new border contexts. In this chapter, it is demonstrated that the poor dwellers eventually emancipated themselves from the patronage relationships of large-scale entrepreneurs to the expense of losing their protection against the law enforcement at the border. The lack of patronage exposed them to the dangers of criminalization and penalization, both prison sentences and penalty fines, and getting into debt. The cross-border trade regulations of neoliberal regime, by opening room for semi-legal but small-scale trade activities, contributed to the individualization of coping strategies among the poor and undermined the potentials of cross-border trade to guarantee the collective right of livelihood. Thus, in the neoliberal period, shadow economy did not only promote unequal access among various strata, but also resulted in the income differentiation among the poor.

Yet, this chapter also pointed out to the cross-border kinship and alliance between families which proved as resilient and versatile ways of sustaining illegal exchanges practices. Although the open-border policy of Turkish government facilitated the border commuting and forged a symbiotic economy among the border dwellers at both sides, it reinforced the perception of difference and social distance. The poor, however, employed the kinship relationships and cross-border marriage as a material strategy to navigate the geographical as well as social boundaries and a discursive tool to fight their criminalization and marginalization by local authorities.

As revealed in this chapter, kinship and alliance relationship across border were incorporated into the complex organisation of border-crossings into a lucrative business, yielding profits from brokerage arrangements among large-scale entrepreneurs, tribal lineages as well as military and customs officers, which regulated these crossings. These relationships also informed manly cultures that forged a sense of attachment tested by loyalisms and betrayals of fellow townsmen joined in a smuggling venture. The discussion of this chapter shed light on the maneuvering capacities of poor dwellers in crafting everyday tactics and strategies, which nevertheless reproduced the local power and inequality structures.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

When I have decided to go to Kilis town in order to conduct a fieldwork at the border setting, I wanted to have a story to tell to as a graduate student of sociology in return, let alone a substantial dissertational study. Indeed, I had a story after I finished the field research. I could tell for hours to anyone who was asking about Kilis how I have striven for entering 'the field' and managed to penetrate the secretive world of locals, making them talk about how they survived mine explosions, how they suffered from the militarized border security compelling them to issue a permission even to labour on their own land at the border, how they could smuggle so much goods in the hiding-places of a car at once, how they had a quarrel with the Syrian women that their husbands brought from Aleppo as second wives. My field story is not only a physical journey to the border, but also a cognitive one because of their stories. In this border town, everyone had their stories to tell. Elder members of notable families, village men, widow women, even high school students, anyone can give a vivid testimony how the border impinged on their daily life without even being aware of it. I believe that, in all these stories, one can find how town dwellers make themselves the protagonist of their stories as they come to grips with various contexts set by the border.

In this study, I tried to interpret how their stories turn 'abnormal' situations into normal ones and, thus, give border its historicity. The discussion of this study has problematized the notion of border as enabling mobilities and producing closures, while pointing out that the border inflicts subjectivities, values and practices in a way that is not found elsewhere in the nation-state. I have indicated the ways in which socio-economic strata manipulated and circumvented the territorial, cultural and legal boundaries and shifted the meanings of illegality, wealth and work. Here I want to develop some evaluations.

My field research has revealed the ways in which the border dramatically shaped subjectivities of Kilis dwellers, extending its impact to all strata including the elites. For instance, Kilis dwellers were stigmatized in various ways: notable families as usurpers and

traitors, new wealth as crime bosses, and the urban and rural poor as lazy and having the habit of making money with little effort. Moreover, the infamous identification of Kilis town with illegality and disorder affected every local, particularly those settled in the metropolitan as well as Anatolian cities. In Chapter IV on new wealth, I have pointed to the delicate balance between secrecy and transparency that the Kilis migrants in Istanbul try to keep in order to ensure community support and sustain their image of decent businessmen. Philanthropic activities are a major source of legitimization for these businessmen. Not all businessmen have a high profile, unlike the barber, a former smuggler who was implicated in gold smuggling, money laundering and fraudulent export in the 1980s and eventually gained social recognition as a decent businessman after he had been released of all charges, as mentioned in Chapter IV. The new wealth, which turned their entrepreneurial ventures in Istanbul into stable businesses since the 1960s are well-known in their hometown for their charity activities. But they tend to keep a low-profile otherwise.

As reflected in the barber's words, comparing his self-made success with the two richest capitalists of the country, Koç and Sabancı, the new wealth of Kilis is defensive and alert. To remind, the barber stated that he cannot be blamed of being a heroin and arms dealer, since he had grew rich out of barbering in the same way as Koç and Sabancı rose to wealth from modest economic backgrounds. As stated in Chapter IV on new wealth, the field study revealed that the gold trade during the 1960-1980 period created an enrichment among families from rural backgrounds, as the nicknaming of enriched locals as "rich" illustrated. However, as the case of the barber illustrated, the new wealth tended to obscure the roots of their wealth. For instance, barber put forward his humble roots as barber rather than highlighting his financial achievements.

As a major finding of the study, the transformation of Ottoman inland frontier into a modern nation-state border has dramatic impact on the social stratification structure in Kilis town. However, as suggested in the Chapter II on Methodology, the social mobility processes in Kilis town critically diverge in terms of subjective perceptions and evaluations as well as local structures of opportunities, though they could be analyzed in conformity with regular patterns such as intergenerational occupational transmission, role of marriage, access to education and housing as symbolic capital. The in-depth interviews with Kilis locals offered four broad stories of social mobility and belonging that I have organized into

three chapters. These stories reveal in what ways the local structures of opportunities bring forth class sentiments (and injuries) among various socio-economic strata and the cultural and economic capitals of the family are transmitted between generations. They also indicate that Kilis locals adopted the navigation across the territorial, cultural and economic boundaries as social mobility strategies, which both secure the social reproduction of status and lineage and result in the abrupt changes in social stratification structure.

First story concerns the decline of notables. The notables, including both traditional landed families and trade families composed the old wealth of the town and they experienced a feeling of downward mobility though they dominated economically, politically and culturally until the 1960s. The label of notable; that is, *eşraf* is ascribed by the locals as well as notables themselves only to the traditional landed families for historical and normative reasons. The study showed that the sense of falling from grace is particularly experienced among *eşraf* rather than *esnaf*; that is, trade notables. The interviews indicated that the traditional landed and trade notables competed with each other in political and cultural terms. Politically, as traditional landed notables demanded that Kilis should stay annexed with Syria and abstained to a large extent from getting mobilized in armed gangs fighting against the French occupation, they were stigmatized as traitors and faced the danger of losing their entitlements to basic citizenship rights. Thus the traditional landed notables were forced to share their dominance with the trade notables which gained power during the Independence War against the Allied countries. Culturally, the traditional landed notables competed with trade notables in the field of culture and consumption. Although the trade notables could more easily adapt Westernized tastes and lifestyles, as they lacked the deep attachment to lineage and patrimony prevalent among traditional landed families, the latter did not lose their status. The paternalistic relationships based on large landholding and patronage largely thwarted the conversion of economic capital held by trade notables to cultural capital and achieve the social status of traditional landed notables. However, the gradual introduction of money economy as of the 1950s and the rise of new wealth in subsequent decades changed the situation and culminated in the feeling of decline among traditional landed notables.

The interviews also indicated how the traditional landed and trade notables coped with

their feeling of decline: seeking access to education and urban employment, migrating to cities, seeking alliances with the new wealth through marriage are the principal means of social reproduction among traditional landed notables. Although the traditional landed families also embraced illegal trade as much as trade families did, the sense of decline was too strong among the older generations of traditional landed notables because, this study showed, they had to embrace what was once disgraceful for them: that is, circumventing the law in order to engage in illegal trade.

Second and third stories concerning the rise of new wealth as well as the rise of extended families from rural background among the urban middle class in the 1960s can be read together. The study demonstrated the growth of shadow economy in Kilis, which enabled upward mobility to the new wealth and several extended families from rural background as they relied on paternal relations of patronage and kinship. I adopted the term shadow economy in order to describe various sorts of income-generating practices that are not regulated along the state and market channels. These practices encompass legal, semi-legal, illegal and informal activities and they are enabled by transnational networks operating outside the state institutions, although in complicity with the local authorities and state bureaucrats.

The interviews indicated that the local and regional markets of gold, foreign exchange and consumer goods at Kilis border were connected with the financial and trade centers like Beirut, Istanbul and Zurich as well as with the transnational crime organizations long before the neoliberal trade liberalization after the 1980 coup. These economic practices partially constituted a redistributive dynamics providing income and employment for town dwellers. But the emergence of family monopolies around their enterprises resulted in equal distribution of the profits reaped from illegal trade and led to an economic accumulation. This economic accumulation was initially criminalized by hegemonic discourses of politics and media but it was socially accepted later on as rightfully earned wealth as a consequence of neoliberal policies to finance the export-led growth on the basis of 'economic punishment for economic crime' principle. It was in this context that new wealth and extended rural families experienced their rise.

Shadow economy also undermined the traditional industry based on agricultural

production and artisanship, changed the occupational composition in the town and altered the urban landscape. However, it also strengthened relationships of patronage and kinship and contributed to the emergence of new authority figures in Kilis. Local chieftains and heads of extended families that became rich with illegal trade assumed their authority by imitating the old notables as well as contesting them. They employed the dwellers from poor strata by engaging them in a patronage relationships in which the entrepreneurs patronized and dominated the poor by demanding their labour not only in carrying their goods across the minefields but to look after their errands. They also exercised political influence over them and recruited them as potential voters for the political parties they supported.

Fourth concerns the transformation of rural and urban poor into border *hamals*. The petty-commodity production in agriculture was not enough to subsist the rural poor in Kilis and they were largely dependent on landholders holding large-scale of lands. The large-scale landholding and sharecropping arrangement between landlords and peasants started to decline in the 1950s and illegal trade across border yielded small gains for the peasants. However, while the growth of shadow economy liberated them from the paternal relationships of patronage established with large landholders, they quickly became dependent on large-scale entrepreneurs, which relied on tribal chieftainship and kinship. The new patronage relations provided the lower strata protection from law enforcement and alleviated the risks of criminalization as well as physical injury across the minefield.

Shadow economy declined after the 1980 coup and large-scale entrepreneurs, namely the old and new wealth moved to the cities like Istanbul, Ankara and Gaziantep. But it was revived by the cross-border trade introduced by the government in the mid-1990s, which allowed a semi-legal small-scale trade. The lower strata commuted across border almost daily in order to earn their living -and they did until the Turkish government closed the border gate with Syria in July 2012 for security reasons. This small-scale trade yielded an extra income for them, sometimes equal to their salary. But in the absence of patronage by large-scale entrepreneurs, they were increasingly exposed to the dangers of criminalization and punishment by law enforcement and being unable to pay criminal fines, dangers of growing economic indebtedness.

Remittent profits during the neoliberal period such as the made the urban and rural poor completely depended on the small-scale trade. The interviews showed that border commuters from lower strata dwellers were aware of the unequal distribution of profits from cross-border trade, even though it was a specific trade regime regulating the trade activities presumably under equal terms for all the traders. Lower strata commuters could not afford bribing the customs and covering the damages of getting caught or losing their goods. Since they tended to individualize the risks in the absence of patronage, the profits yielded from small-scale trade was unequally distributed among the poor as well. Still, the small-scale trade during the 1970s and in the last decades helped the urban and rural poor to establish themselves as protagonists of their own 'success stories'. My interviewees, both male and female boasted about establishing themselves as patrons who made their own money.

These stories point to the ways in which the border context shifted the meanings of illegality, wealth and work as well as shaped various cultural and legal belongings. These meanings also varied among different socio-economic strata. For instance, embracing the illegal means of economic accumulation was once construed as disgraceful for the traditional landed notables because they relied on lineage and patrimony of their ancestors. Wealth for them was not achieved, but it was ascribed by status. Thus although they were engaged in illegal trade in order to reproduce their social standing, they felt it as losing their proper place. On the other hand, the old wealth were not stigmatized as lawbreaker as the new wealth were. The new wealth lacked the social capital to establish recognition and respect as notables and they were criminalized. So they needed to needs to restore their image as philanthropist businessmen, imitating the old wealth by making charity activities in the town and turn their economic accumulation as socially accepted wealth.

For middle and lower strata, engagement in illegal trade replaced a regular employment and it was normalized as work. For instance, the smugglers' sharia which determined the codes of conduct for illegal trade imitated a guild organization and therefore established smuggling as an occupation. The interviews also indicated to the intergenerational transmission of smuggling as an occupation as a normalized pattern of social mobility. However, these strata also gave consent to the status quo, by assimilating that the means to their living were unlawful, although they saw it as legitimate and they tended to

individualize the risks of criminalization and stigmatization by state policies.

These accounts revealed how Kilis locals dramatize themselves as protagonists of their own 'success stories'. I tried to discuss in detail how the local artisans and sharecropper peasants were emancipated from paternal relations based on agrarian production and recruited by large-scale entrepreneurs as border *hamals.* Nevertheless, the town dwellers boastfully asserted themselves as "patrons" although profits reaped from the shadow economy were unequally distributed between upper and lower strata as well as among the poor. The rural and urban poor could yield extra earnings and in some cases, they managed to compensate their low salary with trade gains. Also, the fact that remittent profits from the shadow economy were possible kept the expectations for earning a decent living from the border alive. Nevertheless, as the discussion of Chapter V on the urban and rural poor showed, the prospects of upward mobility for the poor were likely to be hindered by structural constraints and short-term gains might be easily swept by arbitrary policies of border and customs control as well as international tensions.

The border context underlined new mobility opportunities as the town dwellers creatively appropriated in different historical periods the governmental policies that sought to regulate or ban the trade relations. The border dispute and negotiations with the French Mandate in the 1920s resulted in a specific border transit regime called Passavant, allowing the entitled landholders to labour on their land and harvest their crop. So the Passavant regime promoted the vested interests of traditional landed notables and allowed many notable families in Kilis to sustain land tenure in Syria. But, Passavant regime also allowed notables to capitalize on the regime to yield differential revenues from the selling of their produce in foreign markets, although they were supposed to bring their produce along the Turkish borders for their own consumption or selling in the domestic market. Border-crossing regime also allowed them to engage in gold trade.

On the other hand, strong families in the rural took advantage of high tariffs imposed by the French-Mandate in order to sell several contraband items in the black market. The breaking up of southern Anatolia from Aleppo did not prevent the perpetuation of inland trade between Kilis and Aleppo, but turned it to an illegal trade criminalized by the state authorities as early as the 1930s. Rural families smuggled big flocks of sheep and cattle

and olive oil to northern Syria, while they brought contraband items such as coffee, salt, flint, European fabric and tailored jackets, gas oil and sugar.

Town dwellers manipulated the protective measures of import-substituting industrialization period of 1960-1980 by reckoning rents to the illegal entry of consumer goods as well as gold and foreign exchange. Neoliberal policies further allowed rent-seeking enterprises to maneuver and reap high profits. The traders benefited from various state subsidies to promote an export-led growth in the countries since the1980s. Although these practices were associated with the Özal period when the Prime Minister Turgut Özal headed the government for the 1980s, they continued in different forms through the 1990s, this time making the state itself an actor manipulating its own regulations and blurring the boundaries between legal and illegal realms. Town dwellers continued to circumvent for instance the regulations of cross-border trade, a specific customs regime allowing border cities to benefit from tax reduction or exemption in import or export.

Although Turkish and Arab nationalisms are strong at the border, the study showed that Kilis dwellers navigated these boundaries by relying on cross-border kinship and alliances between families. However, the meanings of these relations were ambivalent and changing across different socio-economic strata as well. The interviews demonstrated that the notables had great difficulties to claim their Syrian connections and kinship relations because of their stigmatization as traitors. Most of their relatives were left in Syria because of the political campaign run against the absentee notables who left Kilis to leave in Aleppo and who did not get mobilized in national gangs during the French Occupation. Thus when notables claimed their kin relations, they tended to emphasize their Turkish identity or their contribution to Independence War, testifying to their nationalistic sentiments.

The cultural boundaries among notables was likely to be undermined only with reference to the past, reveal as a nostalgic attachment to the home town, which was imagined as a geographical extension of the city of Aleppo. As Passavant regime promoted cross-border movement and maintenance of strong patrimonial ties with Aleppo and its countryside, the border did not constituted a territorial barrier for them until its mining and confiscation of their landed estates by Syrian government. In-depth interviews with notables tended to involve a nostalgic return to the past and evoked their memories of farm and social life in

rural Aleppo or the city center. Notables depicted Kilis town as a civilized, modern and cultured place because they associated it with the city of Aleppo, a modern and cosmopolitan city integrated with world capitalism at the late Ottoman era.

Cross-border kinship and marriage alliances proved as resilient and versatile ways of sustaining and normalizing illegal exchanges practices for middle and lower strata. Extended families used it as an asset to maintain illegal trade. Since without a legal framework, risks of getting cheated were high and traders had to rely on their bonds of trust and affinity. Extended families used kinship in order to keep their enterprises as family business, particularly through cousin marriages, which indicated to the persistence of tribal lineages. Kinship relations sustained by the loyalty to a chieftain, though weakened in Kilis, help him to rise as an authority figure with the power to make profit-sharing agreements with military officers.

However, the study also demonstrated that the open-border policy of Turkish government, especially during AKP rule, reinforced the perception of difference and social distance, although it facilitated the commuting across border and created a symbiotic economy among the border communities at both sides. Local reactions to the transfer of Syrian migrants from Hatay to Kilis in early 2012 was illustrative. Local business and shop owners in particular strongly opposed to their transfer. Even the news anticipating their coming were enough to evoke negative stereotypes and images about Arab identity and reinforced cultural boundaries between communities. That is, locals of Kilis tended to disregard the kinship relations when they believed that their means of living was threatened.

But the poor employed kinship relationships and cross-border marriage as a material strategy to navigate the geographical as well as cultural boundaries and a discursive tool to fight their criminalization and marginalization by local authorities. The poor commuters relied on their kin as business network and for temporary stays across the border. So, these relations helped them to normalize their border crossings in the eyes of local authorities.

I underlined in this study the resilient and versatile strategies adopted by Kilis dwellers in coping with various types of stigmatization and criminalization. Town dwellers meticulously crafted relations of reciprocity, alliance and kinship in order to sustain their living under the conditions that threatened their everyday routine. The discussion of this

study accentuated how dynamics and processes at the border may easily shatter their lifetime efforts to build a stable life. As discussed by this study, illegal or informal practices may partly replace redistributive mechanisms in complicity with state authorities in neoliberal regimes, as illustrated by the cases of the erupting informal sector with transition to capitalist economy in post-Soviet countries (Pelkmans, 2006), emergence of local agrarian economies and illegal trade in Latin America within the context of multinational free trade agreements like NAFTA (Galemba 2008, 2012a, 2012b), illegal trade and gang-based road banditry in African borders (Roitman, 2004, 2006) and professionalization of the informal economy of border crossings at Israeli checkpoints (Parizot, 2014). In my view, the lack of mistrust or unrest among the AKP voters suggests the normalization of illegal or informal economic practices as redistributive mechanisms with the transition to the neoliberal regime turning the right to a secure salary into a privilege, undermining peasantry and promoting a welfare regime based on assistance dependency and political patronage.

The case of Kilis demonstrated how dwellers sought to determine their own destiny rather than expecting solutions from the government at a locality where the state failed to promote public and local entrepreneurship and provide employment to the town community. It has also underlined that illegal practices cannot be necessarily considered as wrongful because they are regulated by an ethics drawing on the local power structures, state regulations, code of smuggling as well as religious values. I suggest that the case of Kilis can inspire one to think about the post-1980 cultural transformation boosting the pragmatic ideals of 'turning the corner' associated with the Özal legacy and give insights to the question of economic justice, revealing the lower strata's income-generating practices.

Furthermore, the case of Kilis highlighted the ways in which local power and inequality structures are reproduced by the everyday, oblique and improvised strategies of dwellers and demonstrated that the 'traditional' structures facilitated transnational networks of capitalism. My discussion demonstrated the continuing social and economic significance of local notables in the early Republican regime as an aspect of social stratification structure inherited from the late Ottoman social order. As detailed in Chapter III on local notables, these families sustained their power until the 1960s, even though they had to share it with a new middle class, emerged within the context of rising Turkish nationalism

during the World War I and local mobilization against the occupation of Allied forces. It is demonstrated that notable families not only maintained their status on the basis of their lineage and patrimonial heritage, but also dominated the public life upon the paternalistic organization of agrarian production. The persistence of the social and economic power of local notables has some implications for scholarly literature on Turkish modernisation and capitalist development. Yet, while recent studies on local notables address the persistence of local notables in cultural and political terms, as in the examples of Karadağ (2005) and Meeker (2002) cited by this study, they do not address its economic repercussions.

The Keyder vs. Köymen debate on the capitalist relationships originating in large landholding largely excluded the role of border at southeastern margins of the newly established Republic. As I reviewed Keyder's main arguments, he carefully delineates the exceptional characteristics of the Ottoman Middle East regarding the conditions of agricultural production. He suggests that even though the landlord-peasant relationship was an exploitative one, landlord-managed estates did not tend to export their agricultural produce. The findings of this study seem to contradict this by pointing to the ways in which notable families yielded differential profits from agricultural and gold trade by manipulating and circumventing the border transit regime and customs regulations. While Keyder admits that well-placed bureaucrats seized new opportunities of the circulation of products and money, I extend this argument to the whole group of local notables in Kilis.

Furthermore, I suggest that the perpetuation of power of these families was remarkably effective in the transformation of the regional economy into a lucrative cross-border trade from the 1960s onwards as they pioneered in capitalizing on the border transit regime. The perpetuation of their power is also significant in terms of relations of patronage. As argued in Chapter V on the urban and rural poor, the perpetuation of relation of patronage until the 1960s, disguised in the form of charity and gift economy, prepared the conditions for the rise of chieftains or heads of extended families, muhktars as well as peasants who turned rich with illegal trade as authority figures. These authority figures both contested and imitated local notables in maintaining paternal relations with the rural poor and patronizing them as the latter earned their livelihood as hired porters carrying goods across the mined border. Nevertheless, these patronage relationships between the authority figures and peasants differed from landlord-peasant relationships in that the former was governed

by money economy.

I aimed to contribute to border studies within the Middle Eastern context by illustrating culturally informed strategies of border dwellers in accommodating various boundaries set by the nation-state. The case of Kilis underlined the perpetuation as well as reinterpretation of paternalist and patriarchal relations within modern contexts. The narrative accounts of town dwellers also construe the border life in gender terms. I believe that the visual media and literary texts such as movies, documentaries and literature also convey meanings and images about border, which inform popular imaginations about life at the border. It is not surprising that the social realism tradition in Turkish literature and cinema[167] told the plight of poor male peasants at the Southeastern borders of Anatolia, which are injured, maimed or exploited by the village chieftains while carrying smuggled goods across the minefields. For instance, the well-known movie *Hudutların Kanunu* (Law of the Border), written and directed by Ömer Lütfi Akad in 1966, portrayed Yılmaz Güney as the protagonist of the story, a poor peasant who is caught between an oppressive local agha and a military officer committed to terminate smuggling and ends up dying at the minefields. There is only one female character in the movie, a young school teacher from urban middle-class background, who tries to dissuade Yılmaz Güney's character from smuggling.

Similarly, narrative accounts in Kilis depict the border life with reference to the plights that men have to survive. Women can tell their stories about early marriage, domestic violence, leaving their parental home, being unable to get along with their Syrian brides, managing a living after the spouse's death, taking care of the grandchildren after the fleeing of their mother with another man but these stories do not dominate the narrative construction of their identities as Kilis locals. The manly world of smuggling further marginalize their stories as women.

To conclude, I argue that the discussion of this study may inform novel methodological approaches elaborated here about the integration of Middle Eastern societies with global

[167] Social realism, focusing on the problems of social classes and aiming at a realistic representation of society, became influential in the Turkish literature and cinema since the 1960s. The short stories of Şevket Bulut, including *Kaçakçı Şahan* (1970), the story of a peasant smuggler giving to the book its title exemplifies how border life and the plight of poor border dwellers became a noteworthy topic for social realist authors.

processes, by focusing on how the border communities come to grips with new border contexts. Situating their perspective on Middle Eastern borders, researchers can learn from intriguing strategies devised by ordinary citizens to maintain their living as well as 'hidden mechanisms' informing these strategies that the state may not register.

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APPENDIX A. INTERVIEWEE PROFILES AND EXPLANATORY NOTES FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

# of inter-views	Substitute Name	Gender	Status/Occupation	Birth year Intervals	Location of interview	Date of interview (day/month)	Interview referred in
I. Old Wealth							
1	Yüksel	female	trade notable, housewife	1925-1930	town center	22.2.2011	Chapter IV, p. 114
2	Ayhan	female	traditional landed notable, housewife	1920-1925	town center	5.11.2011	Chapter IV, p. 124, 133, 140
3	Hikmet	female	traditional landed notable, housewife	1925-1930	town center	25.3.2011	Chapter IV, p. 123,125, 132
4	Rauf	male	traditional landed notable, pharmacist	1950-1955	town center	14.4.2011	Chapter IV, p. 98
5	Ferit	male	traditional landed notable, dentist	1935-1940	Istanbul	22.4.2011	Chapter IV, p. 128-133
6	Şükrü	male	trade notable, farmer	1940-1945	town center	17.1.2011	Chapter IV, p. 105-106, 112
7	Latife	female	traditional landed notable, housewife	Born in 1911	Istanbul	20.7.2011	Chapter IV, p. 101, 114, 138-140
8	Beyhan	female	trade notable, housewife	1925-1930	town center	15.4.2011	Chapter IV, p. 89
9	Vefa	male	trade notable, retiree	1940-1945	town center	13.5.2011	Chapter IV, p. 137
10	Asuman	female	trade notable, housewife	1920-1925	town center	20.5.2011	Chapter IV, p. 122
11	Gencay	female	trade notable, housewife	1925-1930	town center	9.3.2011	Chapter IV, p. 138
12	Behire & Tijen (sisters)	female	trade notable, passage owner	1935-1940	town center	23.5.2011 and 4.6.2011	Chapter IV, p. 111, 122, 163
		female	trade notable, passage owner	1930-1935	town center		
13	Mahmut	male	traditional landed notable, international taxi company owner	1975-1980	town center	21.10.2011 and 4.2.2012	Chapter V, p. 167
14	Faik	male	traditional landed notable, retiree	1950-1955	town center	27.4.2011	Chapter IV, p. 107
15	Nihal	female	traditional landed notable, veterinary	1945-1950	town center	2.4.2011	Chapter IV, p. 106
16	Bahadır	male	traditional landed notable, farmer	1950-1955	town center	26.2.2012	Chapter IV, p. 123-124
II. New Wealth and Urban Middle Strata							
17	Zeynep	female	rural family background, housewife	1925-1930	Gaziantep	7.3.2012	Chapter VI, p. 186

18	Mustafa (Koyuncu family)	male	rural family background, retiree	1935-1940	town center	19.5.2011 and 23.5.2011	Chapter III, p. 64; Chapter V, p. 155-156, 158, 159, 161, 164, 166, 155-156, 160, 164, 166, 167, Chapter VI, p. 188, 190
19	İsmail (Koyuncu family)	male		1930-1935	town center	26.11.2011	Chapter V, p. 154, 188
20	Enver	male	rural family background, owner of gas station	1935-1940	town center	17.6.2011	Chapter V, p. 157
21	Alaattin	male	rural family background, shop keeper	1945-1950	town center	25.7.2011	Chapter V, p. 166
22	Yasin	male	middle class family of mercantile origin, owner of a white goods store and wholesale shop for Syrian passengers	1960-1965	town center	15.11.2011	Chapter V, p. 167
23	Vahab	male	rural family background, chieftain of a Kurdish tribe of Syrian origin and former deputy and mayor	1930-1935	town center	14.4.2011	Chapter VI, p. 188
24	Ata	male	rural family background, muhktar	1950-1955	town center	4.12.2011	Chapter V, p. 158
25	Murtaza	male	rural family background, cross-border transport company owner	1975-1980	town center	25.1.2012	Chapter V, p. 167
26	Urup İsmail	male	rural family background, sheikh of smugglers' sharia	1945-1950	town center	7.1.2012	Chapter III, p. 70-73, 75; Chapter V, p. 172
27	Cemil	male	middle class family, lawyer and former senator	1940-1945	Ankara	6.6.2011	Chapter IV, p. 136
28	Bahri	male	middle class family, lawyer	1970-1975	town center	2.11.2011	Chapter V, p. 173
29	Ekrem	male	middle class family, local historian	1930-1935	town center	21.5.2011	Introduction, p. 9; Chapter IV, p. 108
30	Celal	male	middle class family, local historian	1970-1975	town center	16.5.2011	Chapter IV, p. 106
31	Yeşim	female	middle class family of mercantile origin, shop keeper	1965-1970	town center	occasional visits during March-June 2011	Chapter III, p. 64-65, 78

32	Cemal (interviewed with Mevlüt)	male	middle class family, retired teacher	1950-1955	town center	27.07.2011 and 21.10.2011	Chapter III, p. 75, 76; Chapter VI, p. 185, 188
III. Urban and Rural Poor							
33	Serdar	male	subcontract employee at public hospital and small-scale trader	1980-1985	town center	26.08.2011	Chapter VI, p. 205, 206, 214-216
34	Asiye	female	Small-scale trader	1930-1935	town center	29.08.2011 and 26.12.2011	Chapter III, p. 79; Chapter VI, p. 193, 225
35	Leyla	female	Small-scale trader	1965-1970	town center	11.3.2012	Chapter VI, p. 207
36	Hamit	male	Grocer and small-scale trader	1980-1985	town center	16.1.2012	Chapter V, p. 170, 171, 172; Chapter VI, p. 205 , 213-214
37	Mevlüt	male	retiree	1930-1935	town center	27.07.2011 and 21.10.2011	Chapter VI, p. 185, 188, 192
38	Talip	male	Small-scale trader	1985-1990	town center	14.12.2011	Chapter VI, p. 205, 208, 211-212
39	Müşir	male	Grocer	1970-1975	town center	13.2.2012	Chapter VI, p. 219
40	Rıdvan	male	buffet owner	1970-1975	town center	occasional visits during September 2011-February 2012	Chapter V, p. 154
41	Bahtiyar	male	Small-scale trader	1975-1980	town center	19.1.2011	Chapter VI, p. 209
42	Hayrullah & Şükriye (husband and wife)	male	border villager	1940-1945	Border village	13.3.2012	Chapter VI, p. 180, 185
		female	border villager	1945-1950	Border village		Chapter VI, p. 180, 185
43	İlyas	male	border villager	1940-1945	Border village	20.3.2012	Chapter VI, p. 185
44	Nesim	male	border villager and small-scale trader	1975-1980	Border village	15.3.2012	Chapter VI, p. 211
45	İhsan	male	Retiree worker	1925-1930	town center	12.5.2011	Chapter V, p. 160

IV. Governmental and semi-public institutions (conducted during April-May 2012)

45 Kilis Chamber of Industry and Trade (individual interviews with head of chamber and general secretary)
46 Social Security Institution Provincial Directorate
47 Turkish Employment Agency Provincial Directorate
48 Provincial Directorate of Agriculture
49 Provincial Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity
50 Deputy Governor (responsible from Customs)
51 City Municipality (Mayor)
52 Chief at Provincial Customs Directorate

V. Informal dialogues

53 11th grade students at vocational high school. Discussions during introductory conversations at the beginning of and throughout the Fall semester 2011.
54 Occasional gatherings with women: tea party, indoor women's day organization and other social events by two women NGOs, home gatherings, etc.
55 Group of peasants in border villages of Kurd Dagh: Though I was accompanied by a local man who assisted me in introducing myself by speaking them in Kurdish, they refrained from talking. I collected narratives of village history and difficulties of being a border dweller. The visits included four villages in the early weeks of August 2011.

APPENDIX B. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Şenoğuz, Hatice Pınar
Nationality: Turkish (TC)

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	Boğaziçi University Sociology	2004
BA	Boğaziçi University Sociology	2000
High School	Saint Benoit, İstanbul	1993

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2009-2010	Social Policy Forum Research Center, Boğaziçi University	Research Assistant
2007-2009	International Relations Office, Boğaziçi University	Erasmus advisor

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English, French

PUBLICATIONS

1. “Sahanın Gölgeleriyle Baş Etmek: Türkiye-Suriye Sınırındaki Kilis'te Kaçakçılık Anlatıları” (Coping with the Shadows of the Field: Smuggling Narratives in Kilis on the Syrian border of Turkey), *Gaziantep Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, January, (forthcoming, 2015)
2. "Ahlaki Ekonominin Sınırları: Kilis'in Gölge Ekonomisi ve Yeni Zenginleri" (Borders of Moral Economy: Shadow Economy of Kilis and New Wealth), *Toplum ve Bilim*, H. Pınar Şenoğuz, Latife Akyüz and Seda Altuğ (ed.) “Border Studies in Turkey” October Issue no. 131, (forthcoming, 2014)
3. “Türkiye-Suriye Sınırında Bir Kasabadan Sözlü Tarihle Sınıra Bakmak” (Looking at the Border Through the Perspective of Oral History in Border Town on the Syrian Border of Turkey), in *Sınır ve Sınırdışı: Türkiye'de Yabancılar, Göç ve Devlete Disiplinlerarası Bakışlar*, Didem Danış and İbrahim Soysüren (ed.), Istanbul, Notabene, 2014

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

1. Memories of Border: Stories of Marginality and Smuggling at a Turkish Border Town at Syrian Frontier, Memory and Culture: VII. International Conference of Culture Studies, Culture Association & Bilkent University, 5-7 September 2013.
2. "City of Smugglers": Illegality, Trade and Citizenship at a Turkish Border Town on the Syrian Frontier, American Anthropological Association, 13-18 November 2012.
3. "Türkiye-Suriye Sınırında Bir Kasabadan Sözlü Tarihle Sınıra Bakmak" (Looking at the Border Through the Perspective of Oral History in Border Town on the Syrian Border of Turkey), Thinking About Borders, IFEA, 9 January 2013.

GRANTS AND SCHOLARSHIP

1. Turkish Scientific and Technological Research Council (TÜBİTAK) Grant for Supporting International Scientific Activities, November 2012.
2. METU Grant for Scientific Research Projects BAP Project no. 07.03.2011.109
3. Training Workshop on Alternative Research Methodologies II training scholarship, South-South Exchange Program on History of Development (SEPHIS) and Southeast Asian Studies Regional Exchange Program (SEASREP), 20-31 October 2008, Metro Manila, Philippines

MEMBERSHIP

EastBordNet European Cooperation for Science and Technology COST IS0803 Research Network

APPENDIX C. TURKISH SUMMARY

ÖZET

Bu çalışmanın çıkış noktasını sınır durumunun genellikle verili kabul edilmesini sorgulamak oluşturmuştur. Bir sınır kasabasında yaşayan topluluklar da sanki sınır her zaman orada varmış gibi sınırın varlığını doğallaştırma eğilimdedir. Oysa bir yerleşimin sınır kasabasına dönüşmesi daha önce sınır tarafından bölünmeyen bir coğrafi bölgede, teritoryal bir ayrım çizgisinin belirlenmesiyle yaratılan çeşitli dinamikler ve süreçlerin tarihsel ürünüdür. Sınır insan ürünüdür, yapaydır; mekânsal tahayyülümüzü değiştirmekle kalmaz, insan, meta ve hayvanların geçişini düzenleyerek mekânsal hareketimizi de başkalaştırır.

Çalışmanın temel sorusu, sınırın, sınır boyunda yaşayan toplulukların gündelik hayatına nasıl nüfuz ettiğiyle ilgilidir. Çalışmanın amacı, Osmanlı yönetimince "siyasi eşkiyalık"la (Soyudoğan, 2005) suçlanan Arap aşiretlerin yanı sıra Kürt ve Türk aşiretlerin de iskân edildiği iç hudut bölgesinin, modern ulus-devlet sınırına dönüşmesiyle yaşanan toplumsal değişimi açıklamaktır. Bu doğrultuda, Bilad-üş Şam'da bir kasabayken Cumhuriyet'in kurulmasıyla birlikte sınır yerleşimine dönüşen, uzun süre göz önünde olmayıp diğer Doğu ve Güneydoğu sınır yerleşimlerinden farklı olarak 2011'de Suriye krizinin patlak vermesiyle önem kazanan Kilis'te sınırın kültürel ve ekonomik etkilerini incelemektedir. Yaşanan toplumsal değişimi etnografik araştırma ve derinlemesine görüşmelerden yararlanarak, kasaba sakinlerinin gözünden anlatıyorum. Kilis'in kültürel ve ekonomik manzarasındaki değişimi açığa çıkarmak için çeşitli sosyo-ekonomik tabakalar arasında aidiyet ve sosyal hareketliliği soruşturuyorum.

Bu soruşturmayı yürütürken, sınır çizilmesinin kasaba sakinlerinin hayat beklentilerini derinden şekillendirmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda sınıra adapte olmaya çalışan bu topluluk içinde çeşitli öznellik ve stratejileri ürettiğini ileri sürüyorum. Dolayısıyla bu çalışma sınırın, çeşitli sosyal tabakalara etkisi açısından salt bir engel yerine geçmeyip, geçimlerini sağlama, daha iyi bir hayat beklentilerini gerçekleştirme, güven, karşılıklılık

ve yakınlık bağları kurma fırsatı sunduğu varsayımı üzerine temellenmiştir. Sınır çizme süreçleri insan, hayvan ve metaların geçişini onların hareketlerini mümkün kılacak veya durduracak şekilde düzenler; dolayısıyla sosyo-ekonomik tabakaların uyum sağlaması gereken farklı coğrafi açılma ve kapanmaları doğurur.

Araştırma iki soru dizisi etrafında yürütülmüştür. Ilk soru dizisi sınırın, sınır aşırı bağları kopararak ve değiştirerek sosyo-ekonomik tabakaların hayatını nasıl şekillendirdiğine ilişkindir. Toprak mülkiyetinin kaybı, sınırı geçen ticaret güzergahları ve malların statüsünün değişmesi, iki uluslu akrabalık ilişkilerinde olduğu gibi, sınırın yol açtığı değişimler aileleri nasıl etkilemiştir? Bu değişimler tabakalar arasında sınıf ve statü ilişkilerini nasıl farklılaştırmıştır? Bu sorular pratikte sınırın kasaba sakinlerinin gündelik hayatına nasıl dayatıldığına yöneliktir. Ikinci soru dizisi sosyo-ekonomik tabakaların yeni ağlar ve bağlantılar geliştirerek sınırı nasıl uyum sağladıklarına ilişkindir. Ne tür mekanizma ve bağlardan yararlandıklarını soruyorum. Teritoryal, kültürel ve ekonomik sınırlar arasında nasıl manevra yapıyorlar? Sınır aşırı bağlardaki bu değişimler sosyal tabakalaşma yapısına nasıl katkıda bulunuyor?

Bu çalışmayı yürütürken iki hedef gözetiyorum. Birincisi, sınır topluluklarının devlet politikalarının salt mağduru olarak tahayyül eden popüler bakışa karşı, bu toplulukların sınırın çizilmesiyle ortaya çıkan mücadele ve uyum sağlama süreçlerinin altını çizmek istiyorum. Bu amaçla Kilis kasabası sakinlerinin sınırı nasıl manipüle edip sınır düzenlemelerini nasıl atlattığına odaklanıyorum. Bununla birlikte, sınırda yaşayanların failliğine işaret etmek, sınıra uyum sağlamada bütünüyle onların belirleyici olabildiği anlamına gelmez. Aksine sınırda yaşayanlar yerel iktidar ve eşitsizliklere maruz kalır ve pratiklerine bu yapılar etki eder. Şu halde ikinci hedefim, yerel iktidar ve eşitsizlik yapılarını vurgulayarak Osmanlı sosyal düzeninden Cumhuriyet rejimine geçişte bu yapılardaki kopuş ve süreklilikleri dikkate almaktır. Kilis örneği, kasabada sosyo-ekonomik tabakaların sınırı manipüle edip atlatmak için dayandığı sınır aşırı bağların yerel iktidar ve eşitsizlik yapılarının altını oymak yerine bu yapıları yeniden ürettiğini göstermiştir.

Tezin ana argümanı, sınırdaki coğrafi hareketlilik ve kapanmanın, sınıra ulus-devletin

başka yerlerinden farklı, sosyal incelemelerin çoğunlukla marjinalleştirdiği, anlam, pratik ve ilişkiler yüklüyor olmasıdır. Keza sınırdaki bu anlam, pratik ve ilişkilerin Türkiye'nin kültürel ve ekonomik dönüşümüne dahil olduğunu da iddia ediyorum. Çalışmanın teorik çerçevesi, Kilis'in bir sınır kasabasına dönüşmesini incelemek amacıyla sınır çalışmalarına yaslanıyor. Sınır perspektifi sosyal teoriye egemen olan metodolojik teritoryalizmin ötesine geçmemize yardım eder. Başka bir deyişle, bu perspektif kültür ve toplumun teritoryal sınırlara sahip birimler olarak ele alıp, ulus-devleti kaçınılmaz olarak verili, değişmez bir analiz ölçeği gören varsayımına karşı çıkar. Sınır çalışmaları sınırı devlet politikaları ve uluslararası ilişkiler açısından analiz eden devlet-merkezli teorilerin ötesine geçip devlet-toplum ilişkilerinin daha incelikli analizlerini üretmeyi amaçlar. Devletin çeperlerinde topluluk ve sosyal değişimi incelerken işlerliği olan yerel, ulusal, uluslararası süreçleri görmemize imkân tanırlar.

Sınır çalışmaları sınır çekilmesini sürekli bir sınır çizme süreci, yani ayrımların yapıldığı bir süreç olarak tanımlayarak inşacı bir yaklaşım benimser. Sınır çizme süreçleri, teritoryal sınırın çizilmesine ek olarak devletin düzenini tahsis edebildiği, vatandaşların uyum sağlamak zorunda kaldığı kültürel, ekonomik ve yasal ayrımlar da yaratır. Ayrıca sınır çalışmaları, sınırı bir karşılaşma ve ayırma mekânı olarak incelemek için antropolojik yaklaşımlar sunar. Devletlerin kültürel, siyasal ve ekonomik milliyetçilikleri ayrımlar yaratır ama sınırda yaşayanlar sınır üzerindeki sosyal ağlar ve bağlantılarını kullanarak bu ayrımları manipüle edip etrafından dolaşabilir. Gelgelelim, sınır çalışmalarının başlıca eksikliği, sınırda yaşayanların pratiklerini ya devlet iktidarının altüst edilmesi ya da onun yeniden üretilmesi olarak kavramsallaştırma eğilimidir. Bu sebeple sınır sosyolojisinin sınırların etkisini yerel iktidar ve eşitsizlik koşullarını dikkate alarak, sınır topluluklarının hem teritoryal hem de kültürel ve ekonomik sınırlarda nasıl emprovize ederek, uyum sağlayarak bu sınırları atlatabildiklerini incelemek gerektiğini savunuyorum.

Metodoloji açısından antropolojik yaklaşımlar Osmanlı sosyal düzeninden Cumhuriyet rejimine geçişte miras alınan iktidar ve eşitsizlik yapılarını analiz edip, bu yapıların sınırın yarattığı değişimler doğrultusunda nasıl dönüştüğünü inceleyecek araçlar sunmakta yetersizdir. Şu halde, sözlü tarih ve sosyal tabakalaşma sosyolojisi, metodolojik olarak

olmazsa olmazdır. Amacım Kilis kasabasındaki sosyal tabakalaşmanın analizini sunmak değildir. Fakat sınır kaynaklı değişimleri gösterip sınırların etrafından dolaşma biçimlerinin kasabadaki sosyo-ekonomik tabakalar arasındaki sınıf ve statü ilişkilerini nasıl farklılaştırdığını göstermek için arka plan bilgisi olarak sosyal tabakalaşma yapısına bakmak gereklidir. Sınırın nasıl bir ekonomik kaynağa ve sosyal hareketlilik mekanizmasına dönüşebildiğini göstermek için sosyal tabakalaşma yapısına bakmak gerekir. Bundan hareketle, sosyal statünün ailelerin mülkiyeti olarak nasıl kurulduğunu takip edebilmek için aile tarihlerine odaklanarak sosyal hareketliliğe ilişkin niteliksel analiz yöntemini kullanıyorum.

Sözlü tarih yaklaşımı, çeşitli sosyo-ekonomik tabakaların öznel yargı ve değerlendirmelerinin niceliksel yaklaşımların ortaya çıkaramadığı hayat tercihlerini nasıl şekillendirdiğini vurgulamaya yardımcı olur. Görüşmecilerin geçmişe yönelik anlatıları yerel bağlamın önemini ortaya çıkarmakta hayatidir. Bu anlatılar sosyal hareketlilik süreçlerine kuşaklar arası meslek aktarımı, evliliğin rolü, eğitime erişim ve sembolik sermaye olarak konut edinme gibi düzenli pratikler açısından işaret etmekle kalmayıp, bu süreçlerin öznel algı ve değerlendirmeler, yerel imkânlar yapısından önemli ölçüde nasıl farklılaştığını da açığa serer.

Kilis'in kaçakçılar şehri olarak damgalanmasından ötürü sakinlerinin ketum tutumu sahaya girmeyi güçleştirdi ve saha deneyimim hem araştırma yöntemini hem araştırma sorusunu şekillendirmiştir. Sınır koşulları araştırmayı sürdürebilmek için kasaba sakinleriyle samimi bir bağ kurmayı gerektiren özdüşünümsel bir antropolojiyi benimsemeye itti. Derinlemesine görüşme, arşiv taraması ve mecaz (trope) analiziyle desteklenen bir saha çalışmasına yaslandım. Ocak 2011 ve Haziran 2012 arasındaki bir buçuk yıl boyunca sürdürdüğüm, on sekiz aylık bir saha çalışması yaptım. Kilis'e gidişimden üç ay sonra Suriye'de patlak veren ayaklanma ve silahlı çatışma araştırmamın bağlamını oluşturuyor. Suriye bağlamının Kilis sakinleri arasında hareketsizlik ve tutulmuşluk hissini güçlendirerek sınır kapısının kapanması ve geçim kaynaklarını yitirecekleri korkusu saldığını belirtmem gerekir. Dolayısıyla sahadaki deneyim sonuç olarak beni sınırın hem yasadışılık, refah, çalışmanın anlamının nasıl değiştiğini hem de

kültürel ve yasal aidiyetleri nasıl şekillendirdiğini incelemeye itti. Özellikle Kilis'te farklı sosyo-ekonomik tabakaların yeni sınır durumlarıyla baş etmede ürettiği öznellik ve stratejilere odaklanmamı sağladı. Bu yüzden aidiyet ve sosyal hareketlilik bu çalışmanın düzenleyici kavramlarıdır.

Çalışmanın başlıca bulgusu, Osmanlı iç hududunun modern ulus-devlet sınırına dönüşmesinin Kilis kasabasında sosyal tabakalaşma yapısında çarpıcı bir etki yaratmış olmasıdır. Ne var ki kasabadaki sosyal hareketlilik süreçleri gerek öznel algı ve değerlendirme gerek yerel imkânların yapısı açısından ciddi biçimde farklılık göstermiştir. Çalışma kapsamında geleneksel toprak ve ticaret eşrafı, yeni zenginler, orta tabakalar, kent ve kır yoksulları olmak üzere dört tabaka üyeleriyle derinlemesine görüşmeler yaptım. Bu görüşmeler dört ana sosyal hareketlilik ve aidiyet hikâyesi sunuyor. Bu hikâyeler yerel imkânlar yapısının sosyo-ekonomik tabakalar arasında ne tür sınıf duyguları (ve yaraları) ürettiğini, ailenin kültürel ve ekonomik sermayesinin kuşaklar arasındaki aktarılma biçimlerine ışık tutmuştur. Keza Kilislilerin teritoryal, kültürel ve ekonomik sınırlar arasında manevra yapma pratiklerinin, hem statü ve neslin sosyal olarak devam ettirilmesini güvence altına alan hem de sosyal tabakalaşma yapısında keskin değişikliklere yol açan sosyal hareketlilik stratejileri olarak benimsendiğine işaret ediyor.

Birinci hikâye eşrafın inişe geçmesini anlatır. Eşraf (hem geleneksel toprak sahibi aileler hem tüccar aileler) kasabanın eski zengin tabakasını oluşturmuş, 1960'lara kadar ekonomik, siyasi ve kültürel egemenliklerini sürdürmekle beraber aşağı hareketlilik duygusunu deneyimlemiştir. Eşraf tanımı gerek yerliler gerek eşrafın kendisi tarafından tarihsel ve normatif sebeplerle yalnızca geleneksel toprak sahibi ailelere verilmiştir. Görüşmeler geleneksel toprak ve ticaret eşrafının kendi arasında siyasal ve kültürel bakımlardan rekabet halinde olduğunu göstermiştir. Siyasal olarak, geleneksel toprak eşrafı I. Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra Kilis'in Suriye'ye bağlanmasını istemiş, Fransız işgaline karşı *Kuvayı Milliye* güçlerinde silah altına girmekten büyük ölçüde kaçınmıştır. Bu yüzden hıyanet suçlamasıyla karşı karşıya kalmış, sahip oldukları temel vatandaşlık haklarını kaybetme tehlikesiyle yüz yüze gelmiştir. Yine geleneksel toprak eşrafı İttifak devletlerine karşı Kurtuluş Savaşı sırasında egemenliğini ticaret eşrafıyla paylaşmak

zorunda kalmıştır. Kültürel olarak, geleneksel toprak eşrafı ticaret eşrafıyla kültür ve tüketim alanında da rekabet halindedir. Ticaret eşrafı Batılılaşmış beğeni ve hayat tarzlarına daha kolay uyum sağlayabilirken, geleneksel toprak sahibi ailelerde yaygın olan nesil ve baba mirasına derin bağlılıktan yoksun oldukları için başlangıçta bu ailelerin statüsüne erişememiştir. Büyük toprak sahipliği ve patronaj (himayecilik) dayalı pederşahi ilişkiler ticaret eşrafının sahip olduğu ekonomik sermayenin kültürel sermayeye dönüştürülmesine büyük ölçüde mani olmuş, geleneksel toprak eşrafı sosyal statüsünü yitirmemiştir. Bununla beraber, 1950'lerden itibaren para ekonomisinin yavaş yavaş kasabaya girmesi ve ilerleyen dönemlerde yeni zenginlerin yükselişi durumu değiştirerek eşraf tabakasında aşağı hareketlilik deneyimine, özellikle geleneksel toprak eşrafında derin bir itibar kaybı duygusuna yol açmıştır.

Geleneksel toprak eşrafının yaşadığı itibar kaybı, gözden düşme duygusu Osmanlı sosyal düzeninden devralınan tabakalaşma yapısının değiştiğine işaret etmektedir. Osmanlı sosyal tabakalaşma yapısının en belirgin özelliği Şerif Mardin'e göre yönetici sınıfın "herkesin kendi yerini bilmesine" yönelik ilgisidir (Mardin, 1967: 129). Geleneksel toprak eşrafı sosyal basamakları inerken yalnızca ekonomik güçlüklerle başa çıkmak zorunda kalmamış, aynı zamanda kendi ait olduğunu düşündüğü yeri kaybetmekle de başa çıkmak zorunda kalmıştır. Görüşmeler ayrıca geleneksel toprak ve ticaret eşrafının aşağı hareketlilikle farklı baş etme yöntemlerine işaret etmiştir: Eğitime erişim ve kentsel istihdama ulaşma çabası, şehre göç, yeni zenginlerle evlilik yoluyla ittifak kurma geleneksel toprak eşrafının başlıca sosyal yeniden üretim araçlarıdır. Geleneksel toprak sahibi ailelerin tıpkı ticaret eşrafının yaptığı gibi yasadışı ticareti benimsemiş olmalarına karşın, bu ailelerin yaşlı kuşak üyelerinde düşüş duygusu çok güçlüdür çünkü bu çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu üzere, kendilerinin utanç verici bulduğu bir şeyi, yasadışı ticarete soyunmak için yasanın etrafından dolanmayı benimsemek durumunda kalmışlardır.

1960'lardan itibaren gerek yeni zenginlerin yükselişini gerek kırsal arka plandan gelip kentli orta sınıfa yükselen ailelere ilişkin hikâyeler birlikte okunabilir. Bu hikâyeler Kilis'te pederşahi himayecilik ve akrabalık ilişkilerine yaslanan yeni zenginler ile kırsal

arka plandan gelen geniş ailelerin yukarı hareketliliğini mümkün kılan gölge ekonomisinin büyümesini açığa çıkarmıştır. Gölge ekonomisi terimini, formel devlet ve piyasa kanallarınca düzenlenmeyen gelir getirici pek çok faaliyeti tanımlamak için benimsiyorum. Bu faaliyetler yasal, yarı yasal, yasadışı ve enformel pratikleri kapsar ve yerel yetkililer ile devlet bürokratlarıyla işbirliği içinde olmakla birlikte devlet kurumlarının dışında iş gören ulusaşırı ağlar sayesinde mümkün olur.

Bunlara ek olarak, görüşmeler Kilis sınırındaki yerel ve bölgesel altın, döviz ve tüketim malları piyasalarının 1980 darbesinden sonra gerçekleşen neoliberal ticaret liberalizasyonundan çok önce gerek Beyrut, İstanbul, Zürih gibi finans ve ticaret merkezleriyle gerek ulusaşırı suç örgütleriyle bağlantı içinde olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Bu ekonomik pratikler kısmen kasaba sakinleri için gelir ve istihdam sağlayan bir yeniden bölüşüm dinamiği oluşturmuştur. Fakat ailelerin kendi ekonomik girişimleri etrafında tekel oluşturmaları yasadışı ticaretten edinilen kârların eşitsiz dağılıp bir ekonomik birikimin yaratılmasıyla sonuçlanmıştır. Bu ekonomik birikim başlangıçta siyaset ve medyaya hakim söylemlerce kriminalize edilmiş, fakat ilerleyen dönemde 'ekonomik suça ekonomik ceza' ilkesi uyarınca ihracat temelli büyümeyi finanse etmeye yönelik neoliberal politikaların sonucu olarak toplum nezdinde hakkıyla kazanılmış servet kabulü görmüştür. Bu koşullar altında yeni zenginlerle geniş kırsal ailelerin yükselişi deneyimlediği görülür.

Gölge ekonomisi aynı zamanda zirai üretim ve zanaatkârlığa dayalı geleneksel sanayiyi çökertmiş, kasabadaki iş dağılımını değiştirmiş ve kentsel görünümü başkalaştırmıştır. Yine de Kilis'te himaye ve akrabalık ilişkilerini güçlendirip yeni otorite figürlerinin ortaya çıkmasına katkıda da bulunmuştur. Yasadışı ticaretle zengin olan yerel şefler ve geniş aile reisleri eski eşrafı gerek taklit ederek gerek onlara itiraz ederek otoritelerini koymuştur. Bu figürler, yoksulları yalnızca mayınlı sahadan mal taşıtmakla kalmayıp onları ayak işlerine de koşturarak emeklerini talep ederek istihdam edip, patronluk yaptıkları ve yoksullar üzerinde hâkimiyet kurdukları himayecilik ilişkileri geliştirmiştir. Keza yoksullar üzerinde siyasal nüfuzlarını kullanarak onları destekledikleri siyasal partilere potansiyel seçmen olarak toplamışlardır.

Dördüncü hikâye kır ve kent yoksullarının sınır hamallarına dönüşmesiyle ilgilidir. Tarımdaki küçük meta üretimi Kilis'te kır yoksullarının geçimini sağlamaya yeterli değildir. Kır yoksulları büyük ölçüde geniş toprak sahiplerine bağımlıdır. Büyük toprak sahipliği ve toprak sahipleriyle köylüler arasındaki yarıcılık sözleşmesi 1950'lerden itibaren inişe geçmiş, sınırdan yasadışı ticaret köylülere küçük kazançlar sağlamıştır. Ne var ki gölge ekonomisinin büyümesi köylüleri büyük toprak sahipleriyle kurulan himayeciliğin pederşahi ilişkilerinden kurtarırken, köylüler çabucak aşiret ağalığı ve akrabalığa dayanan büyük tüccarlara bağımlı hale gelmiştir. Yeni himayecilik ilişkileri kolluk kuvvetlerine karşı aşağı tabakalara korunma sunarken kriminalizasyonun yanı sıra mayınlı sahada fiziksel yaralanma risklerini de hafifletmiştir.

Gölge ekonomisi 1980 darbesinden sonra daralmaya başlamış, büyük tüccarlar, yani eski ve yeni zenginler İstanbul, Ankara, Gaziantep gibi şehirlere göç etmiştir. Bununla birlikte, gölge ekonomisi 1990'ların ortalarında hükümetin yürürlüğü soktuğu, sakinleri sınır şehirlerine ithalat ve ihracatta vergi indirimi veya muafiyetinden yararlanmasına izin veren özel bir gümrük rejimi olan "sınır ticareti"yle yeniden canlanmıştır. Sınır ticareti Kilis sınırında küçük çaplı yarı yasal faaliyeti olarak müsamaha gösterilen, böylelikle yasadışı pratiklerin alt tabakalar açısından kontrol altına alındığı bir uygulama olarak iş görmüştür. Aşağı tabaka Türkiye hükümeti 2012 Temmuz'unda Suriye'ye sınır kapısını güvenlik gerekçesiyle kapatana kadar geçimini sağlamak için neredeyse her gün sınırda mekik dokumuştur. Bu küçük ölçekli ticaret onlara fazladan, bazen maaşlarına denk bir gelir sağlamıştır. Yine de büyük girişimcilerin getirdiği himayecilik ilişkisinin yokluğunda aşağı tabaka giderek kolluk gücünün kriminalizasyon ve cezalandırması tehlikesine ve para cezalarını ödeyemeyeceği için büyüyen ekonomik borç tehlikesine daha fazla maruz kalmıştır.

Neoliberal dönem boyunca inişli çıkışlı bir şekilde kâr elde edilmesi kır ve kent yoksullarını bütünüyle küçük ölçekli ticarete bağımlı kılmıştır. Görüşmeler aşağı tabaka sakinler arasından sınırda mekik dokuyanların sınır ticaretinin faaliyetlerin sözüm ona tüm tüccarlar eşit koşullar altında düzenleyen özel bir ticaret rejimi olmakla birlikte yarattığı kârın eşitsiz dağılımının farkında olduğunu göstermiştir. Sınırda mekik

dokuyanlar gümrüğe rüşvet vererek yakalanmanın veya eşyalarını kaptırmanın getirdiği zararı kapatabilecek güçte değildir. Himayecilik ilişkisinin yokluğunda riskleri bireyselleştirme eğiliminde olduklarından, küçük ölçekli ticaretten gelen kâr da yoksullar arasında eşitsiz olarak dağılır. Buna karşın, 1970'ler boyunca ve son dönemlerde küçük ölçekli ticaret kır ve kent yoksullarının kendilerini kendi 'başarı hikâyelerinin' kahramanı olarak kurmalarına el vermiştir. Görüşmecilerim, ister erkek olsunlar ister kadın, kendilerini kendi paralarını kazanabilmiş patronlar olarak kurabilmekten övünç duymuştur.

Bu hikâyeler sınırın yasadışılık, servet ve çalışmanın anlamının nasıl farklılaştığı kadar çeşitli kültürel ve yasal aidiyet biçimlerinin nasıl şekillendiğine de işaret etmiştir. Bu anlamlar sosyo-ekonomik tabakalara göre farklılık göstermiştir. Sözgelimi, ekonomik birikim edinmenin yasadışı yolları, atalarının nesli ve mirasına yaslanan geleneksel toprak eşrafı açısından önceleri utanç verici olarak görülmüştür. Onlar açısından servet edinilen bir şey değildir, statüyle gelir. Dolayısıyla kendi sosyal konumunu yeniden üretmek için yasadışı ticarete atılmış olmakla birlikte, toplumsal düzende ait olduklarını düşündükleri yeri kaybettiklerini düşünmüşlerdir. Öte yandan, eski zenginler yeni zenginlerin olduğu gibi yasa kırıcı olarak damgalanmamıştır. Yeni zenginler eşraf olarak tanınırlık kazanıp saygı uyandıracak sosyal sermayeye sahip değildir ve kriminalize edilmişlerdir. Bu yüzden kasabada hayır işleri yapıp ekonomik birikimlerini toplumsal olarak kabul görmüş bir servete dönüştürmek suretiyle eski zenginleri taklit ederek hayırsever işadamı görüntüsü vermek durumundadırlar. Orta ve alt tabakalar için yasadışı ticarete atılmak, düzenli istihdam yerine geçerek çalışma olarak normalleşmiştir. Örneğin, yasadışı ticaretin etik kurallarını düzenleyen ‘kaçakçılık şeriatı’ bir lonca örgütlenmesine öykünüp kaçakçılığı bir meslek olarak kurmuştur. Keza görüşmeler kaçakçılığın bir meslek ve sosyal hareketliliğin normalleşmiş bir pratiği olarak kuşaklar arasındaki aktarımına işaret etmiştir. Ne var ki bu tabakalar geçim kaynaklarını meşru görmekle birlikte, onların kanunsuz olduğunu içselleştirerek aynı zamanda statükoya cevaz vermektedir ve devlet politikalarının getirdiği kriminalizasyon ve damgalanma riskini bireyselleştirme eğilimindedirler.

Bu anlatımlar Kilis yerlilerinin kendilerini kendi 'başarı hikâyeleri'nin kahramanları olarak nasıl dramatize ettiğini açığa çıkarmıştır. Yerel zanaatkârlar ve yarıcı köylülerin tarımsal üretime dayalı pederşahi ilişkilerden özgürleşip büyük girişimciler tarafından sınır hamalları olarak nasıl istihdam edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, kasaba sakinleri gölge ekonomisinden yaratılan kârın gerek üst ve alt tabakalar arasında, gerekse yoksulların kendi içinde eşitsiz olarak dağılmasına rağmen övünçle "patron" olduklarını anlatmıştır. Kır ve kent yoksulları bazı durumlarda fazladan kazanç elde edebilmiş veya düşük ücretleri ticaretin getirileriyle telafi etmeyi başarmıştır. Aynı şekilde gölge ekonomisinden inişli çıkışlı bir kazanç seyretmesi, sınırdan onurlu bir geçim sağlama beklentisini canlı tutması mümkün kılmıştır. Yine de, yoksulların yukarı hareketlilik ihtimalinin yapısal kısıtlamalarla sınırlı olması muhtemeldir ve kısa dönemli kazançlar hem sınır ve gümrük kontrolüne yönelik keyfi politikalar hem de uluslararası gerilimler sonucunda kolayca silinip süpürülebilir.

Sınır koşulları kasaba sakinlerinin farklı tarihsel dönemlerde ticaret ilişkilerini düzenlemeyi ya da yasaklamayı öngören hükümet politikalarını yaratıcı bir şekilde kendilerine çevirdiği ölçüde yeni hareketlilik imkânlarının altını çizmiştir. 1920'lerde Fransız Mandasıyla sınır ihtilafı ve yürütülen müzakereler, toprak sahiplerinin sınırın Suriye tarafında kalan topraklarını ekip mahsulünü toplamasına izin veren, Pasavan adlı özel bir sınır geçiş rejimiyle sonuçlanmıştır. Şu halde Pasavan rejimi geleneksel toprak eşrafının Osmanlı sosyal düzeninde kazanılmış haklarını teşvik etmiş, Kilis'teki eşraf ailelerinin Suriye'de toprak sahipliğini sürdürmesine fırsat tanımıştır. Fakat Pasavan rejimi aynı zamanda eşrafın mahsulünü kendi tüketimi veya yerli pazarda satmak için Türkiye sınırları içine taşımakla yükümlü olduğu halde yabancı pazarlarda satarak pazarlar arası fiyat farklarından kazanç elde ederek rejimden kendi menfaatine yararlanmasına da imkân sunmuştur. Keza sınır geçiş rejimi altın ticaretine girmelerine de izin vermiştir.

Diğer taraftan, kırsaldaki güçlü aileler de çeşitli kaçak malları karaborsada satmak için Fransız mandası tarafından konan yüksek gümrük tarifelerinden avantaj sağlamıştır. Anadolu'nun güneyinin Halep'ten kopması, Kilis ile Halep arasındaki iç ticaretin

sürdürülmesine engel olmamış, ama bu ticari ilişkiyi devlet yetkililerinin henüz 1930'larda kriminalize ettiği yasadışı ticarete dönüştürmüştür. Kırsal aileler Kuzey Suriye'den kahve, tuz, çakmaktaşı, Avrupa kumaşı ve ceketleri, gazyağı ve şeker gibi kaçak mallar getirirken, oraya büyük küçükbaş sürüleri ve zeytinyağı taşımayı sürdürmüştür. Fakat Suriye hükümetinin 1958'de çıkardığı toprak yasasına dayanarak ilerleyen yıllar içinde Türkiye vatandaşlarının Suriye'deki gayrimenkullerine el koyması, başta geleneksel toprak sahibi aileler olmak üzere eşrafın önemli ölçüde ekonomik güç kaybına uğramasına sebep olmuştur. 1960'lı yılların ortalarında Türkiye hükümeti kendi vatandaşlarının Suriye'deki mülklerinin müsadere edilmesine misilleme olarak Türkiye'deki Suriyelilerin gayrimenkullerine el koymuş ve tek taraflı olarak Pasavan kapılarını kapatmıştır.

Kasaba sakinleri 1960-1980 ithal ikameci sanayileşme döneminin korumacı önlemlerini gerek tüketim mallarının gerek altın ve dövizin yasadışı girişine rant gözüyle bakarak manipüle etmiştir. 1960-1980 dönemi Kilis'teki ekonomik faaliyetler, siyaset bilimci Peter Andreas'ın (2011) "yasadışı küreselleşme" diyerek küreselleşmeyle beraber ulus-devletlerin yasadışı ulusaşırı iş hareketleri üzerinde kontrolünü yitirdiği tezine getirdiği eleştirileri destekler mahiyettedir. Andreas, tarihsel bir yaklaşımla geçtiğimiz yüzyıldan bu yana yasadışı ticari işlemlerin ne boyutlarının ne de hacminin arttığının inandırıcı bir şekilde ispat edilemeyeceğini, "ulusaşırı örgütlü suçun eski bir ekonomik pratiğe [kaçakçılığa] verilen yeni bir ad olduğunu" ileri sürmüştür (Andreas, 2011: 406). 1960-1980 ithal ikameci sanayileşmenin özellikleri yerli üretici burjuvaziyi uluslararası rekabetten koruyup yurtiçi piyasayı yaratacak gelir dağılımını güvence altına almak amacıyla devletin ekonomiyi idaresidir. Dolayısıyla bu dönem kıt kaynakları dağıtmada devletin merkezi rolüne işaret eden bir sosyal refah sistemine atıfta bulunur. Bu dönemi yerli sanayileşme için en uygun koşulları yaratmak amacıyla gerek dövizin dolaşımına getirilen katı düzenlemeler gerek yüksek gümrük tarife ve kotaları konması nitelendirmektedir.

Bu dönemde Kilis kasabasındaki yasadışı ticaret faaliyetleri İstanbul gibi şehirlerdeki finans-ticaret semtleri ve yeni yeni palazlanan kayıt dışı tüketim malları piyasasıyla iç içe

geçmiştir. Carolyn Nordstrom (2000) yasal, yarı yasal ve yasadışı piyasaları kesen ekonomik faaliyetleri gölge ekonomisi olarak tanımlar. Nordstrom'a göre gölge ekonomisi dünya üzerindeki tüm ülkeleri kapsayan geniş devlet-dışı ağlara dayanmaktadır. Bunu söylemek, bu ağların formel devlet kurumları aracılığıyla ve onların etrafında iş gördüğünü reddetmek anlamına gelmez. Fakat Nordstrom'a göre gölge ekonomisi düşünülenden daha formalleşmiş, entegre ve kurallara bağlıdır. Bu faaliyetler formel ve formel olmayan güç ve iktisadi ilişkiler arasındaki ayrım üzerinden okunamazlar. Kaldı ki Nordstrom'a göre piyasalarda ve insanların hayatlarında kriminal ve yasadışı faaliyet olarak gördüğümüz etkinlikler geçim kazanmaya yönelik alelade çabalarla yakından ilişkilidir (Nordstrom, 2000: 40). Nordstrom'un argümanını Kilis sınırı bağlamında yorumlamak gerekirse, yasadışı ticareti mayın sahasına gizlice sokularak kaçak malları taşıyan köylülerin ya da yerel patronların bir sonraki teslimat yerine kadar kaçak malları saklamaları için emanet ettiği akrabalarından veyahut da bu malları şehirlerdeki büyük patronlara taşıyan şoförlerin hayatlarından ayrı, farklı bir faaliyet alanı olarak yaklaşmak doğru olmayacaktır.

Neoliberal politikalar rant peşindeki girişimlerin manevra yapıp daha yüksek kârlar elde etmesine de fırsat tanımıştır. Tüccarlar 1980'lerden beri ülkede ihracata dayalı büyümeyi desteklemek için verilen çeşitli devlet teşviklerinden faydalanmıştır. Bu pratikler Turgut Özal'ın 1980'li yıllarda hükümete başkanlık ettiği dönemle özdeşleştirilmekle beraber, 1990'lar boyunca bu kez devleti kendi koyduğu düzenlemeleri kendisinin manipüle ettiği, yasal ve yasadışı alanlar arasındaki ayrımları muğlaklaştıran bir aktör haline getirerek farklı biçimlerde süreklilik göstermiştir. Örneğin, kasaba sakinleri sınır ticareti düzenlemelerinin etrafından dolaşmaya devam etmiştir.

1990'larda yürürlüğe sokulan sınır ticareti düzenlemeleri, Kilis gümrüğünü Gaziantep ve Kilis'teki büyük çaplı ticari girişimleri odağı haline getirerek büyük vurgunlar yaratılmasının zemini hazırlamıştır. 1996'da Avrupa Birliği ile Türkiye'nin imzaladığı Gümrük Birliği kapsamında ihracatı özendirmek için yapılan değişikliklerle birlikte, sınır ticareti düzenlemelerinin yanı sıra dahilde işleme rejimi, transit ticaret düzenlemeleri gibi politikaları da manipüle eden büyük çaplı girişimciler ihraç etmeleri gereken malları iç

piyasaya satarak devletin vergi teşviklerin ciddi kazançlar elde etmiştir. Bu düzenlemeler büyük girişimcilerin vurgunlarına izin verirken alt tabakaların geçimlerini kazanma mücadelesine de gözünü kapayarak sınırdaki ticari faaliyeti mayınlı sahadan geçişlerle yürütülmesi yerine sınır kapısına çekerek kontrol altına almayı da mümkün kılmıştır. Bununla birlikte, sınır ticareti düzenlemeleri gelir dağılımındaki makası açmayı sürdürmüştür. Yine de bu yarı yasal ticari faaliyetlere eşitsiz erişimin alt tabaka içinde sıfırdan zengin olmasalar da içlerinde çok azının refah düzeyinin yükselmesiyle, yukarı hareketlilik beklentisini sürekli olarak beslediği öne sürülebilir.

Türk ve Arap milliyetçiliklerinin sınırda güçlü olmasına karşın, Kilis sakinleri aileler arasında sınır aşırı akrabalık ve ittifak ilişkilerine yaslanarak kültürel sınırlar arasında gezinebilmiştir. Ne var ki bu ilişkilerin anlamı da müphemdir ve sosyo-ekonomik tabakalara göre değişim gösterir. Görüşmeler eşrafın hain olarak damgalanmasından ötürü Suriyelilik ve akrabalık bağlarına sahip çıkmakta büyük güçlük yaşadığını ortaya koymuştur. Fransız İşgali döneminde Halep'te yaşamak üzere Kilis'te mevcudiyeti olmayan, *Kuvayı Milliye* içinde silah altına girmeyen eşrafa yönelik yürütülen siyasi kampanyadan ötürü akrabalarının çoğu Suriye'de kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla eşraf akraba ilişkilerini açıkladığında ya onların Türk kimliğini ya da onların milliyetçi bağlılıklarına tanıklık edercesine Kurtuluş savaşına katkılarını vurgulama eğiliminde olmuştur.

Eşraf içinde kültürel sınırların altı ancak geçmişe referansla oyulabilmektedir. Eşraf görüşmeleri Halep şehrinin coğrafi bir uzantısı olarak hayal ettikleri memleketleri Kilis'e nostaljik bir bağlılığı açığa çıkarmıştır. Pasavan rejiminin sınır aşırı hareketi, Halep ve kırsalıyla babadan kalma güçlü miras bağlarının korunmasını teşvik ettiği ölçüde, sınır 1950 sonlarında Türkiye tarafından mayınlanana ve Suriye hükümeti eşrafın gayrimenkullerine el koyana kadar, sınır eşraf açısından teritoryal bir engel teşkil etmemiştir. Eşrafla derinlemesine görüşmeler geçmişe nostaljik bir dönüş içermiş, kırsal Halep veya şehir merkezindeki çiftlik ve sosyal hayat anılarını canlandırmıştır. Eşraf Kilis'i geç Osmanlı döneminde dünya kapitalizmiyle bütünleşmiş modern ve kozmopolit bir şehir olan Halep'le özdeşleştirdiği için medenileşmiş, modern ve kültürlü bir yer olarak tarif etmiştir.

Sınır aşırı akrabalık ve evlilik ittifaklarının orta ve alt tabakaların yasadışı değişim ilişkilerini süreğen ve çok yönlü sürdürme ve normalleştirme biçimleri olduğu ortaya çıkmıştır. Geniş aileler bu akrabalık ve ittifaklardan yasadışı ticareti sürdürmede kazanç olarak faydalanmıştır. Yasal çerçevesi olmadığı için bu ticaret pratiklerinde dolandırılma riski yüksektir ve tüccarlar güven ve yakınlık bağlarına sırtını yaslamak durumundadır. Geniş ailelerin girişimlerini aile işletmesi olarak koruyabilmek için akrabalığı, özellikle aşiret bağlarının devam ettiğini gösterir şekilde kuzen evliliklerini kullandıkları görülmüştür. Kilis'te zayıflamakla birlikte aşiret reisine bağlılık yoluyla sürdürülen akrabalık ilişkileri, aşiret liderlerinin jandarma subaylarıyla kâr ortaklığı anlaşmaları yapacak güçte otorite figürleri olarak yükselmelerine yardım etmiştir.

Bununla beraber, çalışma aynı zamanda Türkiye hükümetinin, özellikle Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) yönetimindeki açık kapı politikasının sınırın iki yakasındaki gidiş-gelişleri kolaylaştırıp iki topluluk arasında sembiyotik bir ekonomi yaratmasına rağmen, farklılık ve sosyal mesafe algısını güçlendirdiğini ortaya çıkarmıştır. 2012 başlarında Suriyeli göçmenlerin Hatay'dan Kilis'e transfer edilmesine yerelde verilen tepkiler aydınlatıcıdır. Özellikle yerel iş ve dükkan sahipleri transfere güçlü bir şekilde karşı koymuştur. Göçmenlerin gelişine dair haberlerin duyulması bile Arap kimliğine yönelik negatif stereotip ve imgelerin canlanmasına ve topluluklar arası kültürel sınırların güçlenmesine yetmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, Kilis'in yerlileri geçim yollarının tehdit altında olduğu kanısına kapıldıklarında akrabalık ilişkilerini göz ardı etme eğiliminde olmuştur.

Gelgelelim, yoksullar akrabalık ilişkileri ve sınır aşırı evlilikleri hem coğrafi hem kültürel sınırlar arasında gidip gelebilmek için maddi bir strateji ve yerel otoritelerin kriminalize etme ve marjinalleştirme pratikleriyle mücadele edecek söylemsel bir araç olarak benimsemiştir. Yoksul çerçiler ticaret yapabilecekleri ağ ilişkilerini kurmada ve sınırın ötesindeki geçici konaklamalarda akrabalarına yaslanmıştır. Bu yüzden bu ilişkiler yerel otoritelerin gözünde onların sınır geçişlerini normalleştirmeye yardımcı olmuştur.

Bu çalışma Kilis sakinlerinin çeşitli damgalanma ve kriminalizasyon biçimleriyle baş etmede benimsedikleri direngen ve çok yönlü stratejilerin altını çizmektedir. Kasaba sakinleri gündelik rutinlerini tehdit eden koşullar altında geçimlerini sürdürebilmek için

karşılıklılık, ittifak ve akrabalık ilişkilerini özenle örmüştür. Çalışma, sınırdaki sosyal dinamik ve süreçlerin istikrarlı bir hayat kurma yönündeki ömür boyu gösterilen çabaları nasıl kolayca sarsabildiğini vurgulamaktadır. Sovyetler Birliği sonrası ülkelerde kapitalist ekonomiye geçişle birlikte ortaya çıkan kayıt dışı sektör (Pelkmans, 2006), NAFTA gibi çokuluslu serbest ticaret anlaşmaları çerçevesinde Latin Amerika'da yerel tarım ekonomisi ve yasadışı ticaretin ortaya çıkışı (Galemba 2008, 2012a, 2012b), Afrika sınırlarında yasadışı ticaret ve çetelere dayalı yol soygunculuğu (Roitman 2004, 2006) ve İsrail kontrol noktalarında sınır geçişlerinin kayıt dışı ekonomisi (Parizot, 2014) örneklerinde görüldüğü gibi, yasadışı veya kayıt dışı pratikler neoliberal rejimlerde devlet yetkilileriyle işbirliği içinde kısmen yeniden bölüşüm mekanizmalarının yerine geçebilmektedir. Kanımca, Türkiye'de de güvenceli maaş hakkını bir ayrıcalığa dönüştüren, köylülüğün altını oyan, yardım bağımlılığı ve siyasi patronaja dayalı bir refah rejimini teşvik eden neoliberal rejime geçişle birlikte yasadışı veya kayıt dışı ekonomik pratikler yeniden bölüşüm mekanizmaları olarak normalleştirilmiştir.

Kilis örneği sakinlerinin devletin kamu ve yerel girişimciliği teşvik edip kasabaya istihdam sağlamakta başarısızlığa uğradığı yerde hükümetten çözüm beklemek yerine kendi kaderini çizmeye uğraştığını göstermiştir. Ayrıca, yasadışı pratiklerin zorunlu olarak yanlış olarak nitelendirilemeyeceğinin altını çizmiştir. Zira bu pratikler yerel iktidar yapıları, devlet düzenlemeleri, kaçakçılığın kuralları ve dini değerlere dayanan etik bir anlayışla düzenlenmiştir. Bundan hareketle Kilis örneğinin 1980 sonrasında Özal mirasıyla özdeşleştirilen pragmatik 'köşeyi dönme' ideallerini destekleyen kültürel dönüşüm hakkında düşünmek için ilham kaynağı olabileceğini, alt tabakaların gelir yaratma pratiklerini ortaya sererek ekonomik adalet sorusuna içgörüyle bakmamızı sağlayacağını savunuyorum.

Dahası, Kilis örneği yerel iktidar ve eşitsizlik yapılarının sakinlerinin gündelik, dolambaçlı ve emprovize stratejileri tarafından nasıl yeniden üretildiği belirtip 'geleneksel' yapıların kapitalizmin ulusaşırı ağlarını kolaylaştırdığını göstermiştir. Erken Cumhuriyet döneminde geç Osmanlı sosyal düzeninden miras alınan sosyal tabakalaşma yapısının parçası olarak yerel eşrafın sosyal ve ekonomik önemi devam etmiştir. Bu aileler

güçlerini Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında yükselen ulus inşa süreci ve İttifak Güçleri'nin işgaline karşı yerel seferberlik çerçevesinde ortaya çıkan yeni orta sınıfla paylaşmak zorunda kalsa da, etkinlikleri 1960'lara kadar sürmüştür. Görüşmeler eşraf ailelerinin soya ve baba mirasına dayalı statülerini korumakla kalmayıp, tarım üretiminin pederşahi örgütlenmesine dayalı olarak kamusal hayata da egemen olduklarını ortaya koymuştur. Yerel eşrafın sosyal ve ekonomik gücünün devam etmesinin Türkiye modernleşmesi ve kapitalist gelişme üzerine akademik literatür açısından bazı çıkarımları bulunmaktadır. Ne var ki yerel eşraf üzerine yapılmış yakın tarihli incelemeler Karadağ (2005) ve Meeker (2002) örneklerinde olduğu gibi, kültürel ve siyasal açılardan yerel eşrafın kendini sürdürmesini ele alırken ekonomik etkilerine eğilmemiştir.

Keyder ile Köymen'in büyük toprak sahipliği temelinde kapitalist ilişkilerinin gelişimine yönelik tartışmaları yeni kurulmuş Cumhuriyet'in güneydoğu çeperlerinde sınırın rolünü büyük ölçüde dışarıda bırakmaktadır. Keyder temel argümanlarında Osmanlı'da Ortadoğu'nun tarımsal üretim koşulları açısından ayrıksı özelliklerini dikkatle belirtmiştir. Keyder'e göre (1991) geç dönem Osmanlı tarım sistemi küçük meta üreticiliğe dayalıdır ve geniş toprak sahipliği istisnaidir çünkü 1858 toprak yasasının özel mülkiyetin önünü açtığı yönündeki iddiaları karşın, gerçekte Osmanlı yönetimi miri toprakların mülk edinilmesine izin vermemiştir. Osmanlı toprak mülkiyetinin istisnası devlet topraklarını on dokuzuncu yüzyılda bireysel mülkiyete dönüştüren çiftliklerin ortaya çıkışıdır. Çiftlikler Osmanlı hazinesinin mali darboğazı aşmak üzere miri toprakları açık arttırmayla kiralamasıyla birlikte gelişmiştir. Ne var ki bu durumda dahi kiralanmak üzere tarıma açılmamış, mevat (ölü) topraklar kullanıma açılmış, çiftlikler devletin yasal mülkiyeti olarak kalmıştır.

Toprak sahiplerinin işlettiği mülklerde geniş ölçekli ticari sömürü yalnızca büyüyen dünya ekonomisine maruz kalan belirli bölgelerde görülmüştür. Halil İnancık köylülüğün yarıcı olarak sömürüldüğü plantasyon türü çiftliklerin, "kiracıların ekonomik olarak genişleyen dış pazarın etkisi altında gelirlerini maksimize etmeye güdülendiği" yerlerde ortaya çıktığını ileri sürmüştür (İnalcık, 1991: 113). Vergi ve kira toplayan toprak sahipleri, toprağı Suriye ve Irak vilayetleri gibi istisnai örneklerde "çitleyebilmişti".

Dolayısıyla tarım üretiminin koşulları ve toprak sahibi-köylü ilişkisi genel olarak bir sömürü ilişkisine dönüşmemişti. Keyder İnancık'ın çalışmasına dayanarak köylülüğün bağımsız statüsünün büyük ölçüde korunduğunu ifade eder. Beklenenin aksine tarımsal ihracatlar toprak sahiplerinin işlettiği mülklerden çıkmayıp köylülerin artığından ileri gelmiştir.

Bu görüşün karşıtları, Cumhuriyet'in erken dönemlerinde toprak sahibi eşrafın kırsalda yaşayan ailelerin yüzde 5'ini oluşturan sömürücü bir sınıf olarak toplam toprağın yüzde 65'ine sahip olduğunu ileri sürmüştür (Köymen, 2009: 26). Ticari tarım özellikle 1938-1945 arası savaş dönemi boyunca servetin başlıca kaynağıdır ve ilerleyen yıllarda yürürlüğe sokulan tarım destek programlarından yararlananlar da büyük çaplı üretim yapan çiftçiler olmuştur. Ayrıca toprak sahibi sınıf piyasa dışı mekanizmalarla köylünün artığına el koyduğunu hatırlamakta fayda vardır. Toprak sahibi eşraf köylülerle hem tüccar hem tefeci olarak ilişki içindedir ve köylüler bağımsız olarak kendilerini idame ettirmeyi hiçbir zaman başaramamıştır. Köylülerin çoğu toprak sahiplerinin mülkünde kiracı veya yarıcıdır; toprak sahipleri mahsulün yarısına pederşahi tahakkümün yanı sıra ekonomik ve siyasal nüfuzlarını kullanarak el koyar. Üstelik köylülerin sahip olduğu toprak miktarları öyle azdı ki küçük meta üretimine yeterli değildir ve bu durum köylülüğü toprak sahiplerine bağımlı hale getirir.

Ayrıca bu tez çalışması eşraf ailelerinin nasıl sınır transit rejimi ve gümrük düzenlemelerini manipüle edip etrafından dolaşarak tarım ve altın ticaretinden ücret farkına dayalı kâr elde ettiğine işaret ederek Keyder'in argümanlarıyla çelişki içinde görünmektedir. Keyder yüksek mevkideki bürokratların ürün ve paranın dolaşımından gelen yeni fırsatlara el koyduğunu kabul ederken, ben bu argümanı Kilis'teki tüm yerel eşrafa yaygınlaştırıyorum. Bunlara ek olarak, bu ailelerin gücünü sürdürmesinin, bu ailelerin sınır transit rejiminden faydalanmaya öncülük ederek bölgesel ekonominin 1960'lardan itibaren kârlı bir sınır aşırı ticarete dönüşmesinde kayda değer ölçüde etkili olduklarını ileri sürüyorum. Güçlerinin devamı aynı zamanda patronaj ilişkileri açısından da önemli olmuştur. Patronaj ilişkilerinin hayırseverlik ve armağan ekonomisi görünümünde 1960'lı yıllara kadar sürdürülmesi, aşiret reisleri veya geniş aile reisleri ve

muhtarların yanı sıra yasadışı ticaretle zenginleşen köylülerin otorite figürü olarak yükselmesinin koşullarını hazırlamıştır. Bu otorite figürleri kır yoksullarıyla pederşahi ilişkilerin sürdürülmesinde ve kır yoksullarının mayınlı sınırdan eşya taşıyan hamallar olarak geçimlerini sağlamasıyla onlara patronluk taşlanması konusunda yerel eşrafla hem çekişmiş hem de onları taklit etmiştir. Bununla beraber, otorite figürleri ve köylüler arasındaki bu patronaj ilişkileri para ekonomisiyle yönetildiği ölçüde toprak sahibi-köylü ilişkisinden farklılaşmıştır.

Bu tez sınır çalışmalarına Ortadoğu bağlamında sınır sakinlerinin ulus-devletin çizdiği çeşitli ayrım çizgilerine uyum sağlamada yerelin kültürel repertuvarından beslenen stratejileri örnekleyerek katkı sağlamayı amaçlamıştır. Kilis örneği pederşahi ve patriyarkal ilişkilerin modern koşullarda sürdürülüp yeniden yorumlandığının altını çizmektedir. Kasaba yerlilerinin anlatımları sınır hayatını toplumsal cinsiyet açısından da anlamlandırmıştır. Sinema filmleri, belgeseller ve edebiyat gibi görsel medya ve edebi metinlerin de sınırdaki hayata ilişkin popüler tahayyülleri besleyen anlam ve imgeleri yansıttığına inanıyorum. Türkiye'de edebiyat ve sinemadaki toplumcu gerçekçilik geleneğinin Anadolu'nun güneydoğu sınırlarında mayın tarlalarından kaçak mal taşırken yaralanan, sakat kalan ya da köyün aşiret liderleri tarafından sömürülen yoksul köylü erkeklerin halini anlatması şaşırtıcı değildir. Sözgelimi Ömer Lütfi Akad'ın 1966'da yazıp yönettiği meşhur Hudutların Kanunu filmi, Yılmaz Güney'i hikâyenin kahramanı olan, baskıcı yerel ağa ile kaçakçılığı bitirmeyi kafasına koymuş bir jandarma subayı arasında kalıp sonunda mayın tarlasında ölen yoksul bir köylüyü resmetmektedir. Filmdeki yegâne kadın karakter kentli orta sınıftan gelme, Yılmaz Güney'in canlandırdığı karakteri kaçakçılıktan caydırmaya çalışan genç okul öğretmenidir.

Benzer bir şekilde Kilis'teki anlatımlar sınır hayatını erkeklerin atlatmak zorunda olduğu zor durumlara atıfta bulunarak betimlemektedir. Kadınlar erken evlilik, ev içi şiddet, baba evinden ayrılma, Suriyeli gelinleriyle geçinememe, eşlerinin ölümünden sonra evi geçindirme, başka bir adamla kaçan annelerinin bıraktığı torunlara sahip çıkma hikâyelerini pekâlâ anlatabilir ama bu hikâyeler Kilis yerlilerinin öyküleştiği kimlik kuruluşuna egemen değildir. Kaçakçılığın erkek dünyası kadın hikâyelerini daha da

marjinalleştirmiştir.

Sonuç olarak bu tez çalışmasının ortaya koyduğu tartışmanın, Ortadoğu'da sınır topluluklarının yeni sınır durumlarıyla nasıl baş ettiğine odaklanarak, Ortadoğu toplumlarının küresel süreçlerle entegrasyonuna hakkında burada değerlendirilen metodolojik yaklaşımları besleyebileceğini öne sürüyorum. Araştırmacılar perspektiflerini Ortadoğu sınırlarına yerleştirerek sıradan vatandaşların gerek geçimlerini sağlamak için icat ettikleri ilginç stratejilerden gerek devletin kayıt altına alamadığı bu stratejileri besleyen 'saklı mekanizmalar'dan öğrenebilir.

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