

IBN KHALDUN'S CONCEPTION OF DYNASTIC CYCLES AND
CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CHANGE:
A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

METİN YÜCEKAYA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2014

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science

Prof.Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science

Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev

Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev (METU, IR)

Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat Tanrıseven (METU, IR)

Assist. Prof. Dr. Hakan Övünç Ongur (TOBB ETU, PS)

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Metin Yücekaya

Signature :

ABSTRACT

IBN KHALDUN'S CONCEPTION OF DYNASTIC CYCLES AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

Yücekaya, Metin

M.Sc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. A.Nuri Yurdusev

December 2014, 121 Pages

This thesis intends to nurture the argument that Ibn Khaldun's thought on rise and fall of dynastical polities introduces a distinct approach to the field of International Relations. Throughout the paper, it is argued that Ibn Khaldun's perception about the world, history and politics is less normative but more scientific. However, it is also claimed here that despite the similarities on politics and cyclical history and even transition concept with realist such as Gilpin, Modelski, Kennedy, Khaldun's definition of change brought a great innovation to the field. This study firstly examines contemporary Realist approaches to power shift and their key concepts briefly. In the second section, original concepts of Ibn Khaldun are going to be explained and detailed, and it is argued that Ibn Khaldun's definition of power merge and support the material capability face of the power with the concept of asabiyyah. Therefore, asabiyyah should be taken into account while discussing motives behind rise and fall of the powers in the history. Finally, mechanism of rise and decline of polities in Khaldun's thought that differentiate him from contemporary theories will be investigated.

Keywords: Power Shift, Global Leadership, Asabiyyah, Umran, Cycle of Powers

Öz

İBN-İ HALDUN'UN HANEDANLAR DÖNGÜSÜ KAVRAMI VE ÇAĞDAŞ ULUSLARARASI SİSTEM DEĞİŞİMİ TEORİLERİ: KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZ

Yücekaya, Metin

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. A.Nuri Yurdusev

Aralık 2014, 121 sayfa

Bu tezde, İbn-i Haldun'un hanedanların yükselişi ve düşüşlerine dair görüşlerinin, günümüz uluslararası ilişkiler çalışmalarında da geçerli olduğu, ve getirdiği yeniliklerle uluslararası sistemin dönüşümünü daha iyi analiz etmemizi sağladığı öne sürülmektedir. Bu çalışma boyunca, İbn-i Haldun'un, dünya, tarih ve politika üzerine görüşlerinin normatif olmaktan çok bilimsel olduğu görüşü savunulmuştur. Tarih, politika ve sistem dönüşümlerine dair çağdaş üç teorisyen Modelski, Gilpin ve Kennedy'nin benzer görüşleri olmasına rağmen, tez, Haldun'un değişim kavramının alana yeni açılımlar getirdiğini savunmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, çalışmanın ilk kısmında sistem değişimleri konusundaki çağdaş realist teoriler ele alınmıştır. İkinci kısımda ise İbn-i Haldun'un önemli kavramları tanımlanmış ve onun düşüncesindeki döngüsellik tarif edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Özellikle Haldun'un asabiye kavramıyla, güç kavramının maddi ve maddi olmayan yönlerini tanımlayarak getirdiği yenilikler tartışılmıştır. Son olarak ise Haldun'un düşüncesindeki devletlerin yükselişi ve düşüşü mekanizması ve onu çağdaş teorilerden ayıran yönleri açıklanmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Güç Kaymaları, Küresel Liderlik, Asabiye, Umran, Döngüsel Tarih.

To My Wife

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to express his deepest gratitude to his supervisor Prof. Dr. A. Nuri Yurdusev for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

The author would also like to thank the examining committee members Prof. Dr. Oktay Fırat Tanrısever and Assistant Professor Hakan Övünç Ongur for their comments, suggestions and critiques.

I am thankful to my friends Muhammet Burak Delibaş, Gülşen Kaya, Mehmet Can Palancı, Şükrü Çıldır, with whom I shared much throughout the writing process of this thesis. They were always ready to help me whenever I needed them.

My thanks are also due to Burcu Babayiğit, Burak Erdiñ, Tekin Baykız and Çağdaş Özeniş, who sincerely supported my efforts to finalize this study

Last but not least, the author is grateful for patience, unconditional support and understanding of his wife, Şeyda, during the process of writing this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ	v
DEDICATION.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	x
LIST OF FIGURES.....	xi
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS.....	xii
CHAPTER	
1.INTRODUCTION.....	1
2.CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ON THE RISE AND FALL OF POWERS.....	9
2.1. Presenting Three Modern Theories	9
2.2. Possibility of Long Cycle in International Relations and Modelski.....	11
2.2.1 Basic Concepts of the Theory.....	14
2.2.2. Dynamics of the System and the Role of Global Wars	18
2.3. Hegemonic Stability Theory	22
2.3.1. The Concept of Hegemony and Hegemonic Theories.....	23
2.3.2. What is System? And what is State?	24
2.3.3. States as Rational Calculators	28
2.3.4. Process of Decline/Change.....	29
2.4. Economy vs. Strategy: Kennedy's Narrative on Rise and Fall of Great Powers	33
2.4.1. Miraculous Rise of Europe.....	35
2.4.2. An Impossible Duty: Economy and Strategy Balance	36
2.5. A Brief Roundup	38

3.CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: INTRODUCTION TO IBN KHALDUN.....	42
3.1. Historical Background	42
3.1.1. Time and Space Context	44
3.2. Conceptual Guideline.....	50
3.2.1. Umran: From Badawa to Hadara	52
3.2.2. Asabiyyah: The Engine of Social Transformation.....	58
4.CYCLICAL UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS IN MUQADDIMAH	63
4.1. Organic Life Analogy and Phases of State	64
4.2. Role of Asabiyyah.....	67
4.3. Role of Religion.....	70
4.4. Role of Material Power	74
4.5. End of Asabiyyah and Fall of State	77
4.5.1. Problems Regarding Asabiyyah.....	77
4.5.2. Structural Problems.....	80
4.6. Innovative Contributions of Khaldunian Understanding of Dynamic Politics	81
4.7. Comparative Assessment of Ibn Khaldun and Modern Theories	87
5.CONCLUSION.....	93
REFERENCES	100
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY	108
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	121

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1 Long Cycle Theory.....	20
Table 2 The Long Cycle Theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory	32
Table 3 The Long Cycle Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory and Kennedy's Approach of the Rise and Fall of Great Powers	41
Table 4 Contemporary Theories on International System Change and Ibn Khaldun's Dynastic Cycle	92

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE

Figure 1 Indifference Curves	26
------------------------------------	----

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

GPS	Global Political System
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IR	International Relations
LCT	Long Cycle Theory
UN	United Nations
U.S.	United States of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of the discipline, International Relations (IR) theorists have tried to answer number of questions. One of them, probably the most important one, is about the causes that lie behind war and shifts in international politics (Burchill & Linklater, 2005, p. 7). Different answers to this question create different schools of thought within the discipline. In addition, diversification over the question has also been seen within these specific schools as time passes, as the atmosphere of the world politics changes. For example, the Realist School began with claiming a correlation between the behaviors of the nation states and the human nature in 1940's. The enormous destructive effect of the Second World War weakened the notion of implicit good will of human and their adherence to international laws (Burchill & Linklater, 2005, p. 8). The primary question therefore at that time was: Are human beings are trustworthy and absolutely good? The answer of the Realists was a definite no. They offered a worldview which may have been difficult to accept for some, but its strength and security lay in its objectivity and belief in cold hard facts; a huge contrast from more "emotional" (hence incalculable) views. As such Realism became the popular school in International Relations literature of that era. However, Realism's evolution did not stop then and there. A new branch emerged among realists under the political atmosphere of the Cold War who stressed the impact of the international structure upon the state policies. Comparatively stable portraits of international politics during the Cold War era led to widespread questioning of the multipolar structure during the pre-war times. New challenges brought new searches for solutions.

Cyclical (or we may refer to them as "dynamic" since their focal points are the change and its nature) theories of international politics are also outcomes of these challenges. In the 1970's, mostly after the Vietnam War, students of International

Relations began to discuss the possible decline of the United States from its status as a global power (Kupchan, 2001). The negative after-effects of the Vietnam War, the economic turbulence of the global system, the rapid rise of some states such as Japan, China and Germany lead to increased overall study and a more dynamic understanding of international politics in the USA.

All of these developments also raised more questions against structuralist theories that stressed the stability of the bipolarity. However, such objections to the assumptions of structural stability theories have diversified through the years. Some theories challenged the idea of anarchical architecture of international politics and claim the existence of hierarchy (Kohout, 2003, p. 52; Kugler & Organski, 1980, p. 173). Some others, despite the acceptance of the anarchical structure and instability of the multipolarity of the international system, denied the stability of the bipolarity (Gilpin, 1981; Thompson W. , 1986). They proposed a unipolar or hegemonic international system as a more stable system (Gilpin, 1981; Keohane, 1980; Modelski G. , 1987; Thompson W. , 1986).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, theories on the rise and fall of powers were excluded from the literature for a while. The United States and the international order designed by the U.S. and allies were announced as the last victor in history (Fukuyama, 1992). However, the 9/11 events and mortgage crises starting in the mid 2000's brought former discussions on decline of the US back to the fore. Yet, former explanations applied to new situations needed to be reconsidered. Therefore, contemporary theories on the rise and fall of a power began to be criticized while scholars of the discipline searched for new and distinct explanations. Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), with his masterpiece *Muqaddimah*, attracts the attention of the students of International Relations as a new and original resource for the debate.

Power transition theories gained a great deal of attention in the International Relations literature in 1970's and 1980's particularly because of the problems that the U.S. economy experienced and the rapid rising of states such as China during those years. Similarly, today, discussions about it are emerging again with questions such as; is there a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity in the international system? Is China emerging as a challenger or next hegemon while America's power

decline globally? Are regional power structures changing with new actors like Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia or Turkey entering the fray? Realist School, Political Economy and World System theories have been sub-schools of IR leading the debates on power transition. All of them have also tried to utilize Ibn Khaldun's thoughts in his masterpiece *Muqaddimah* to strengthen their claims on the issue; particularly Political Economist and Marxists foundations on Ibn Khaldun and his ideas about the transition from *badawa* to *hadara* help to expand their works. However, not only Marxist but indeed Realists also compare Ibn Khaldun's importance for International Relations with prominent thinkers of the school such as Thucydides and Machiavelli. All of these schools which study power transition phenomena differ not on factors which lead to the wielding of power but rather their own priorities.

Similarly, the starting point of this study is closely related to the debates over power transition that has been sparked in early years of the third millennium. This study is an attempt to understand the transformations which may have been missed by the contemporary approaches of the international system in this so-called transition period, with the help of alternative perspectives. Accordingly, the main theme of the study outlines how power transitions among states and the rise and fall of players in regional scales can be handled with a non-western paradigm.

So why Ibn Khaldun then? There are three reasons to strongly consider Ibn Khaldun's thoughts in this study. First, it is thought that it would be beneficial to observe the ideas of a non-western mind, because nearly all theories on the subject are western oriented. Since the power centers shift from western to eastern societies/states, it is necessary to dissect and examine the approaches societies which are presumed 'non-western'. Evaluating the rising powers through western lenses only would be an incomplete assessment.

Secondly, it is argued in this study that rise and fall of a state cannot be comprehended perfectly or in its entirety without a reference to state-society relations, since state-society relations have become more and more complicated in our age than in early centuries of modernity. Such an approach overlaps with Khaldun's method to study issues. He does not draw a line between state and society

though he puts the state in the core of his theories on politics. He utilizes several concepts regarding a society in his assessments on rise and fall of states. Considering the marked influence of the Information Age, similarly, we live in an era where societies of states finally went beyond their historically passive role (in International Relations) during the 19th and 20th centuries and begin to affect the international politics and policy makers. However, this point should not be confused with concerning the individual as a unit of analysis of International Relations studies (Yurdusev, 1993), because it is stressed throughout the study that the core (or we may call it as 'unit') of political works of Khaldun is the state (dynasty). Therefore, this study does not exclude the state in a post-modern approach while discussing the Khaldun's approach.

The third reason for putting Ibn Khaldun forward as the primary subject of this study is the possible similarities in the political atmospheres between Khaldun's time and our new millennia. During Khaldun's lifetime (long before and after), Northern Africa was found to be in a historical and actual decline in terms of politics. This decline was as a result of the Reconquista movement of Christian allies. Khaldun investigates the perception of regression among the Muslim community. He also tries to find the reason behind the short-lived states and passing the power from one hand to another with a high rate of frequency. So, it is possible to claim similarities between these political perceptions of societies at that time and in today's world. Theories about the decline of the liberal order bring back the perception about the decline of Islamic societies in Khaldun's era. Furthermore, comparative descent of proponent states of a liberal order in world economic and political scenes introduces us to similarities with fast power changeovers in the 14th century North Africa.

Theories studied in this paper are the Long Cycle Theory of George Modelski, Robert Gilpin's Hegemonic Stability/War Theory and Paul Kennedy's approach in the book of Rise and Fall of Great Powers. The reasons behind choosing these theories will be discussed in the beginning of the related chapter (Chapter 2), but, previous to that, a brief explanation of such politically-oriented theories is warranted. Specifically, Khaldun's narratives on the issue are also politically-

oriented; hence, this similarity makes the comparison between them easy. For example, the World System Theory of Immanuel Wallerstein uses economics as the main theme. Although Ibn Khaldun qualifies economics as basic elements of social life, he based his explanations about the rise and fall of polities on societal events. Therefore, Wallerstein's theory is not included in this study. Similarly, it may be thought that Toynbee's narrative on rise and fall of civilizations (Toynbee, 1988) should be covered here, because he can be nominated as the first in the contemporary literature who studied and introduced Khaldun to the Western World. However, the scope and main theme of Toynbee's studies exceeds the International Relations discipline and it needs history, sociology and even anthropology perspectives to assess his arguments. Thus, the author of this thesis is obliged to exclude his explanations as well.

Another reason to have a preference for these theories is their state-centric attitudes that can be seen in their political narratives. While Khaldun merges the society and state in his explanations about politics and problematize the origin of the state on the one hand, he still uses the state as the main actor of the political scene. Therefore class-based Marxist and Dependency theories or individual based liberal theories are also excluded. Wallerstein, though he takes modern state system considerations into his analysis, mostly focuses on class relations at the international level and capitalist economy.

Lastly, the realistic scientific method of Ibn Khaldun has also an indirect impact on choosing these theories. Similar to these modern theories and different from some idealist/liberal ideas, Khaldun portrays inter-state relations in a very severe light. However, there are still important differences between them that should be looked at. Therefore, it should not be inferred from this study that Ibn Khaldun belongs to Realist School of International Relations. This would be an anachronic and misguided assessment. Such a study as this presents an important chance to demonstrate the differences between (realist) scientific methods of Ibn Khaldun and theories in question that are accepted as members of Realist School of International Relations discipline. After all, despite the fact that Khaldun's realistic methodology

and Realist IR are not exactly the same, they provide us with more resources for a comparison than most other modern approaches.

In this paper, moreover, it is not to be purported that Ibn Khaldun's understanding of the rise and fall of powers is presenting a better explanation than the modern ones. On the contrary, this study tries to demonstrate similarities, on the one side of the coin, between the modern dynamic theories of International Relations and Khaldunian understanding and disparities present on the other side. It is also believed that such an attempt will give an opportunity to create new theoretical dialogues on the topic.

This thesis consists of four main chapters. In the first chapter, three modern studies on rise and fall of powers are summarized. The chapter begins with a detailed explanation of the Long Cycle Theory of Modelski. Historical perspective of Modelski and origin of Long Cycle in international politics, his understanding of system, features of said system and disparities between other systemic approaches, meaning of cyclicity, essential of global leadership and its challenger, function and operation of system and the role of wars are the main elements which will be explained in detail.

Following the investigation of the Long Cycle Theory of Modelski, secondly, Gilpin's hegemonic stability/war theory will be examined. The section starts off with a presentation of the epistemological understanding of Gilpin. After arguing how Gilpin's rationalist approach shapes his theory, the concept of hegemony and history of other hegemonic theories will then be discussed. And the section will be concluded with comments on the role of Rational Choice Theory in his approach and the peculiar side of his theories.

Kennedy's work 'Rise and Fall of Great Powers' and his arguments of economy-strategy will be discussed lastly in this chapter. The first part of this heading consists of the reasons for Euro-centricism in Kennedy's approach and its critics. Furthermore, what Kennedy refers to as the inevitable (deterministic) problem of great powers; that imbalance between economy and strategy will be discussed. And finally a comparative summary of these three theories will be

presented. This summary will play a facilitator role in the comparing of these theories within Khaldun's approach, the main subject of the study.

The main objective of the second chapter of this paper will include an examination of the dynastic cycle of powers as it pertains to Ibn Khaldun. As such, Ibn Khaldun's approach to rise and fall of power in politics will be deconstructed and used as a guideline for the two sub-headings which will follow. The first of these guidelines is a proper historical context with which to comprehend Khaldun's theory in a more insightful way. In this part, features of geography and political atmosphere of the era in which Khaldun lived and their impacts on his studies will be discussed. The second part is shared for conceptual background. This part involves interpretations of some of the more confusing concepts of Khaldun in *Muqaddimah*. The aim of such a conceptual background including *asabiyyah*, *hadara*, *badawa* and *umran* is in order to clarifying the vital concepts of Khaldun's theory and demonstrate how they are used throughout the study.

The third chapter basically consists of three main parts. The first part looks at how Khaldun's cyclical history understanding operates in the light of historical and conceptual backgrounds that are discussed in previous chapter. Within this context, roles of material power, religion and *asabiyyah* in Khaldunian understanding of politics will be examined. Original aspects of Khaldun's theory and innovative contributions he has made to today's International Relations literature will be briefly analyzed in the second part of this chapter. A broader discussion about his contribution is the theme for the concluding section. Lastly, in the third part of the chapter, a comparison between Khaldun's theory and three modern theories is presented. Such a comparison is aimed at elucidating Khaldun's most novel concepts, to be discussed in the next chapter.

Chapter five is the concluding chapter. The chapter covers the overarching aim of the study and, its methodology briefly. Furthermore, the question of what new insights Khaldun offers new to International Relations literature in general and power transitions studies in particular will be responded to.

Last but not least, another point that should be remembered throughout this thesis is that the concepts ‘state’, ‘polity’ and ‘dynasty’ are used interchangeably. Some claim that ‘state’ is a historical and modern concept and may object to its usage in this essay (Yurdusev, 2006). However, this study will go on to interpret and explain the concepts of ‘devlet’ in Turkish and ‘dawlah’ in Arabic in order to provide an understanding of these political phenomena in Khaldun’s era. These concepts have been used in their original languages since the pre-modern era. Furthermore, most appropriate English translation of these words is ‘state’. That’s why the author of this thesis prefers to use the concept of ‘state’ to correspond the dynasty despite the fact that it is not possible to talk about a ‘Westphalian’ state in Khaldun’s time. Additionally, the Aristotelian concept of ‘polity’ is also used in some parts of the paper.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEMPORARY THEORIES ON THE RISE AND FALL OF POWERS

2.1. Presenting Three Modern Theories

Before introducing the understanding of Ibn Khaldunian terms of this study and comparing his ideas with the modern ones, in this chapter, three of the contemporary theories on international system change will be presented. These three theories will be covered one by one and the main arguments they present will be summarized after each heading.

It is, naturally, possible to extend the scope of such a comparison and add to number of theories on the topic. However, within the framework of this study, Long Cycle Theory, Hegemonic War/Stability Theory and Rise and Fall of Great Powers Approach are preferred for certain reasons. First, it is important to examine several of the similarities between scientific approaches in order to compare contemporary scholars' and Ibn Khaldun's thought. During the preliminary research of the study, it was soon recognized that Khaldunian understanding of 'science' and 'scientific' is mostly realist (not 'R'ealist). Despite his emphasis on God's will throughout the *Muqaddimah*, because he was a devoted Muslim and also owing to the religious atmosphere during his era, he bases the arguments about political change on real and continuing human actions. Furthermore, he criticizes prominent thinkers of Islamic worlds such as Averroes and Al-Farabi because their arguments on politics are not realistic but philosophical (Khaldun, 2011, p. 204; Korkut, 2008, pp. 547-548). Such a scientific understanding simplifies a comparative investigation of contemporary Realist theories on political transformation and Ibn Khaldun.

Secondly, it is inferred from the related parts of the Muqaddimah that, Khaldun's political theory presumes the 'polity' (state) as not class or gender-centric at its fundamental level; using neither class or gender as its main unit of currency. By not bartering in such a currency brings the Khaldunian view on political change closer to a Realist explanation, rather than Marxist or Post-Structuralist traditions. Nevertheless, it does not mean that Ibn Khaldun takes state and politics in the same way as Statist Realists do. In this chapter comparing Khaldun and contemporary theories, this differentiation will be discussed.

As one of three contemporary theories that are presented here, primarily, Modelski's Long Cycle Theory (LCT) occupies a central position for comparison. In comparison with two other theories, LCT questions more complicated sights of political change. Therefore, investigating the LCT also requires looking at those comprehensive concepts. In this context, firstly, substantial concepts of LCT and their contents should be discussed. While debating the concepts of this theory on the one hand, also presented here are the disparities between equivalents of said concepts in conventional theoretical approaches.

In the second part of this LCT section, the hypothesis that is based on the defined concepts above proposes an auxiliary tool to understand long term international politics being discussed. The questions within this theoretical debate that are being posed: Why is it necessary to study International Politics from a long term perspective? Also: Why the Long Cycle Theory is worthy of such a study? It is hoped that answers to these questions will reiterate the main themes and characteristics of the theory.

Secondly, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) debate begins with a discussion about the epistemological background of Gilpin's theory. Moreover, in this part of the study, hegemony definition of liberal theorists, taken as members of the same epistemological school but who reach divergent outcomes by moving the same starting point of the study, will be covered. As a continuation of the discussion, the assumptions of these theories based on the Rational Choice Theory will be summarized and their relevance to Gilpin's theory is stated.

Additionally, Gilpin's propositions on 'state', 'system', 'elements of system' and their 'operating mechanisms' are argued in that part. HST aspects of these concepts are argued by comparing with conventional systemic theories and two other theories are to be covered in this study. The main comparison of the theories is actually done at the end of the chapter. However such simple and short comparisons make it easy to understand the distinct outcomes of Gilpin's theory.

Another theoretical approach under this chapter is Kennedy's work on rise and fall of great powers trying to demonstrate the balance between economy and military strategy. This section starts with a brief introduction about the effects and results of the political and academic atmosphere on his theory and Eurocentrism of Kennedy's theory, at which point his understanding of the systems are questioned. Due to the subject of the study, the aim here is to answer the question that why/how do states ascend and descend and to present the similarities and disparities of his thoughts on the topic in comparison with two other theories.

A brief comparison among all three theories and their critics are given in the final section of the chapter and basic differences are highlighted again. Such a comparative summary should be thought as a guideline to compare these modern theories with the thesis of Ibn Khaldun on the rise and fall of powers, which constitutes the essence of the study.

2.2. Possibility of Long Cycle in International Relations and Modelski

Long Cycle Theory of International Relations briefly asserts that modern global political system operates in a cyclical order since the 16th century (Modelski G. , 1987; Modelski & Morgan, 1985, pp. 396-398). This is a very brief and abstract definition of the theory. However, we need to clarify some concepts of the theory to understand it accurately. Modelski, pioneer of the theory, describes the main tenets of his thesis in his book *Long Cycles in World Politics* (1987) and demonstrate which questions should be answered in order to comprehend the logic of Long Cycle. Global Political System and its difference from conventional European State System,

global leadership, its challenger, global wars, and evolution of system are included in the main concepts of this theory.

Modelski, within the LCT framework, firstly defines what the global political system (GPS) is. For his theory, a GPS is a set of relationships dealing with and comprising the problems and developments at global level. (Modelski G. , 1987; Modelski & Morgan, 1985, pp. 394-395; Modelski G. , 1978, p. 214). The GPS is above all other political systems such as national or regional ones. Therefore, the conventional realist narrative on great power system is not necessarily the same with the Modelski's global political system (Modelski & Morgan, 1985, p. 396), since the literature on great power systems and their internal rivalries boils down to the relations between European leading powers and their competition to dominate all continental politics.

Consequently, by understanding the separation between the conventionally accepted system notion in International Relations literature and Modelski's GPS, the characteristics of these two systems are clearly differentiated. Systemic operational mechanisms and their dominant approach in conventional theories are the numbers of the poles (great powers) in the system and balance of power behavior (Waltz, 1979). According to that understanding, the system is referred to as bipolar if two states possess more than half of the entire capabilities in the system. If the numbers of these powers rises to three or more, then the system becomes a multipolar one (Thompson W. , 1986, pp. 590; 598-608; Waltz, 1979). Systemic stability is also a matter of the ongoing debate. Waltz and his followers assert that the bipolar structure of the international system is more stable while others claim that the multipolar structure is comparatively more stable since the flexibility of alliance formations builds up a high deterrence capacity within the system. However, the Long Cycle Theory offers something new outside of both these discussions that it is not the anarchy but hierarchy of the main structure of the modern world political system. According to this hypothesis it is not the emerging relative balance due to bipolarity that makes the system more stable but the global political transaction operating in a (unipolar) hierarchical order. That distinction, according to Modelski, requires a leadership as

all social systems do (Modelski G. , 1987; Parsons, 1991). The GPS needs leadership to properly operate and this need is eventually filled by one of the powers.

According to Thompson, fundamental factors to identify the major actors, disagreements about who are the main actors emerging under the light of these factors, and diverse explanations on reasons and results of the competition between these actors are each among the differences between conventional systemic theories and the LCT. As he indicates in his theory, Kenneth Waltz appreciate the main actors of the system according to relative power capacities in International System, theorists of Long Cycle add the capacity to reach whole globe and to involve most global issues as a criterion to assess a state as a major actor of system (1979). For the theorists of the Long Cycle, concisely, since the competition is one of a global scale one, the capability to reach the global resources and to fight a global war can be the only evaluation scale among the actors of the system (Thompson & Modelski, 1989). An effective and strong sea power over the oceans, for instance, is an indispensable data to determine the global actors, Conventional Neo-Realist approach does not make a point of it and focuses on the total capacities of each actor. Such disparities among the evaluation criteria also create diversification about the identities of the historical great/global powers.

Waltzian theory does not take a historical position to rate the relative power capabilities and only focuses on the current status quo (Thompson W. , 1986, p. 614). However, the Long Cycle Theory does not limit its approaches to system and leadership competition within a current picture of international politics but it covers all the history of the modern state system since the late 1500s to explain the system and the global competition. It is so significant that recognizing the differences between the perceptions of the LCT and Conventional Neo-Realism about the time and space scale, in order to appreciate the operating mechanisms.

Despite the methodological similarities for using the historical approaches, the Long Cycle Theory also distinguishes from other world-system theories on long term politics and change. The LCT stresses the 'political ontology' of the system while the Modern World System Theory of Wallerstein and dependency theories, for

example, put forward its economic origins and reduce the political side of the system to a secondary position.

2.2.1 Basic Concepts of the Theory

Prior to explaining how the Global Political System emerges and its evolution through the historical period, it is necessary to continue to define other essential concepts of the theory. As previously indicated Modelski claims that global political system is a social system and needs leadership. The leadership, in this context, is not only limited to the superiority in terms of power capacity. Its importance comes from the fact that the leadership assigns the institutional mechanisms and priorities of the system. Modelski points out: ‘Agenda setting’ in terms of defining the global problems and identifying priorities among responsibilities of the leadership, ‘mobilization’ as ability to provide coalitions and cooperation constituting the basics of the system, ‘decision-making’ in the meaning of capacity for the appearance of a decision-maker concerning the direction of the system in times of turbulence (mostly global wars), and lastly ‘administration’ as a service to provide survival and operation of the new system (Modelski G. , 1987).

This is a definition of leading power particular to the Long Cycle Theory. Mainstream International Relations theories do not install such functional tasks and responsibilities on great powers. However, the LCT does not deny the importance of the relative power capabilities. On the contrary, it acknowledges the decisiveness of the power disparities between the states and also suggests that that superior position brings extra responsibilities and duties on the leading power’s shoulder. Those listed functions above are both a means for the global leader to realize its own ends and responsibilities that are installed by the global order on it intentionally or unintentionally.

Another point that should be taken into consideration here is who or what fills the leadership position. For Modelski, as indicated before, the system that is referred to as the Global System started with the emerging of the nation states. Therefore, he

claims that it is not possible to speak of a global domination or leadership during the era of the pre-nation-state systems. Perceptions that empires acknowledged themselves as a “world” already does not mean that they had the capacity to reach the remotest corners of the globe which we live on. Moreover, they were not the global actors operating politics at the global level. Accordingly, the leadership position has always been filled by a nation-state since the beginning of the system. Any challenge posed by another nation state initiates the global political competition. In the light of all this information, the nation-state and the Global Political System together constitute an inseparable whole. Modelski describe the correlation between state and the system (Long Cycle) as a two-way relationship (Modelski G. , 1978, p. 224). While the nation-state is a pre-condition to generate a global power system, motivation to access such a power capacity also provides the expansion of the national polities on world political maps.

Certain characteristics of states move them to an advantageous position against the contenders in the competition for leadership. Without exception all leaders since the emerging of the global political system in 16th century, possess all those conditions in one way or another. The first of these conditions is possessing an insular location (Modelski G. , 1987). According to Modelski’s theory, sea power is the most crucial prerequisite to project the power around whole globe and global leadership (Harkavy, 1999, p. 947; Modelski & Thompson, 1988, p. 3). A state that is emerged on a major waterway uses this important advantage to control the conventional communication and trade ways. This advantage of control is like a pre-condition on the way of getting economic superiority which is covered later. And so, one of the primary features of the great economies in the modern global system is having the capability to develop their own trades in a secure way and to impose decisive limitations on other actor’s trade by holding direct or indirect control over the global scaled trade routes. Furthermore, states possessing insular or peninsular geographical location hereby have a whip hand advantage over others in leadership combat such as natural security barriers (e.g. sea, ocean). It is clear that such a security advantage is a crucial factor for ensuring both social cohesion and external security. Modelski indicated England as the best example among the global leaders to demonstrate the importance of this kind of geographical advantage

Secondly, societies who have contended leadership throughout history have been cohesive and open to outside world and other societies as well as coalitions (Modelski G. , 1987). Similar to location factor, one of the common features of leading states of global politics is having one of the most open societies to the external world and highest rate of the societal and intellectual cosmopolitanism. These societies are, with a confidence based on the internal cohesion, often courage enough to take part in various actions all over the external world and more open to new alliances. In the case of the rise of the United States, one of the determinant factors for taking over the global leadership from the hand of European great powers was the possession of a social system and societal structure that allows for an influx of immigrants, constituting the significant proportion of the intellectual capital (mostly Jews) who were running from the war and oppression in Europe at that time, to integrate into the more open and more free American society. Societal openness attracts the intellectual capital that provides to the state with an opportunity to forge ahead in all fields. German physicists running away from Hitler's policies and contributing to the development of science in the U.S. and its global projects is a clear example of this situation.

Economies of the world's leading states, thirdly, have always been the most advanced and innovative of within that period of the history. However, economic superiority in this context does not mean only a GDP greatness but figures largely into productivity and innovation (Modelski G. , 1987). The efficient use of resources and marketing the products in the quickest and most profitable way within a capitalist economic structure are also among the determinative factors of economic superiority (Modelski G. , 1978, p. 216). Modelski states that freedom of action and having a functioning capitalist economy pursued by specialists separated from the political field are also among the common elements of the leading powers of global system. Such an economic structure plays a facilitator role for the global scale political actions of a state. Likewise, a high political standing of a state in the global political system provides opportunities for the development and expansion of its economies.

Last but not least, the leading states of the global political system have always succeeded in the fabrication of all these three favorable attitudes with an effective political organizational structure (Modelski G. , 1987; Rosecrance, 1987, p. 290). The leadership claim of a state, that cannot administer the comparatively strategically superior fields, inevitably fails. That's why all the islander nations could not be the global leader despite their location advantage or the fact that Germany could not lead the global politics against its striking economic leap in late 19th century and early 20th century. Above all, the test for success of a political structure is the war. Modelski reflects on this topic (1980):

The function of the politico-strategic organization of the world powers has been the ability to maintain the global order of their choice. In practice, this has meant the ability to fight and to win global wars that decided the issue of world leadership. Global wars were the test of the ability for effectively combining the factors of world leadership...

In explaining the global political system and global leadership of world politics, it is also significant to define another principal concept of the theory that is a challenger; or secondary power. The LCT proposes that world politics is a stage of inherent competition for the leadership even during non-conflict periods. This competition is between the leader of the system and an unsatisfied challenger. The challenger is the next most powerful state in the global political scene and mostly it is historically a landlocked state in contrast to leader (Modelski G. , 1987). The challengers of the global political competition throughout the history have never been an islander state with the exception of Spain. Spain's insular location is only one of the leadership qualities. Its failure in the leadership competition is mainly due to the being ineffective in other fields like economy and political stability.

In contrast to the leading powers, these challengers have historically struggled with domestic instability and revolutions or upheavals. These problems exhaust the national resources from within instead of the global arena. Similar to the U.S.'s case about the mass migration issue above, moreover, these countries do not get migration; on the contrary they lose their intellectual capital through migration. All

of these unfavorable developments reflect the negative outcomes mostly in technological and economical fields (Modelski G. , 1987).

Challengers historically possess a huge size of economy in the history. In the absence of the innovative development, backwardness of productive actions, and a sustainable and rational economic administration, these states fall behind in the economic side of the global competition.

2.2.2. Dynamics of the System and the Role of Global Wars

Global wars and the evolution of international systems are related notions in this respect. The attempt to clarify these concepts can also be a beginning to an introduction of how the Long Cycle Theory operates. As indicated above the essence of the theory is that the history of modern world politics is a competition between world leadership, which then determines and governs system and its immediate challenger. The competition is not a political and military rivalry; it is an evolutionist selection process. This evolution both evaluates the states for leadership and system, itself, that evolves to a certain condition which is capable of survival in a new environment. Selection process is an ongoing process. Changes and transformations in this process affect the survival struggle and have a direct impact on the outcomes. The question here is why does a system experience a selection process? The answer is that a system needs to transform itself too because it needs to adapt to the new environmental conditions of political transformation (Modelski G. , 1987; Thompson W. , 1988). During this transformation, there occurs a new selection possibility for the leadership as a vital element for the system. Global wars are the determinants of this selection process (Modelski G. , 1987).

Global wars are breakpoint of the selection process. That kind of war also diverges from others. Global wars exploit a significant amount of state's material and human capacity. Moreover, they are the most devastating wars of all. Global wars are also the beginning point of the cycles of leadership in global politics:

Within that cycle, the global war constitutes the first of four phases, the initial phase of selection; the next phase, the honeymoon period, as it were, is the time when the

world power's writ runs far and wide, its position beyond challenge; the world economy flourishes and political problems are administrative rather than constitutive. But this second phase of the cycle comes to an end too; as the legitimacy of its position erodes, the world power loses its hold on the system. Challengers arise in the political and economic spheres and move competitively to claim their share of the limelight. Generations pass and forget the achievements of the global war and postwar reconstructions, so that people see in all this little else than the clash of selfish interests. At this point, world politics begins to drift into disarray, even chaos. "The center cannot hold," leadership loses cohesion, and the instinct for the common good that nourishes coalitions falls prey to narrow interests and short-sightedness. On four previous occasions, an era of world war resolved this situation and reconstituted the political structure. Global wars may thus be seen as wars fought over succession to world leadership (Modelski & Morgan, 1985, p. 401).

Thompson also defines the global war while differentiating it from other wars. "Global wars are fighting to decide authority arrangement of the global political system" (Thompson W. , 1988). As Thompson states here, that global wars, determinants of the selection process, have a constitutive role aside from their huge destructive impacts. It is undisputable for the theory that result of the global wars has an impact on the direction and character of new global regulations. According to Modelski's understanding of selection process, the victorious state of the war is the one that manages to demonstrate the best reaction to the new arrangements of the new era. That is those who fail to adapt to the new arrangements inevitably become the losers. From this perspective, constitutive and determinant side of the global wars for the new global order and its actors can be evidently realized in spite of the loss of a great number of people and huge amount of resources. However, it should not be overlooked that the wars do not play a revolutionary role in the transformation of the system but an evolutionary role. The previous system with all features is not totally removed but evolves into new realities and a new phase (Modelski G. , 1996, p. 321; 2005).

Despite the crucial role of global wars in the beginning of leadership cycle, Long Cycle Theory is not a global war theory essentially but a leadership cycle theory (Kohout, 2003, p. 55). What is implied by the leadership cycle is, changing of leading state of the global politics periodically and the transformation of the system itself. The historicity factor is crucial here because stressing the importance of time

separates the Long Cycle Theory from the conventional Neo-Realist Theory. Furthermore, a historical continuum of the system and repetitive features of it are essential elements of the Modelski's theory.

All leadership cycles, according to Modelski's theory, proceed in hundred-year episodes. Modelski does not take this duration in a deterministic and unchangeable way but in fact the historical experience of the global system gives us such an outcome. According to his theory global system went through four stages since its beginnings. Each episode overlaps with a new global order structure. During this hundred-year period that is provided by a global order, the leading power tries to realize its own political agenda and to ensure the continuity of the system. That system can sustain itself as long as it is capable to keep the changes at the non-destructive level. However, failure of the structure of the system to respond to alterations within the system provokes significant challenges. There occur global wars after a hundred-year of global stability and a new global leader and global order emerges after these global conflicts. These episodes move cyclically and are composed by four phases mentioned above. Modelski argues the existence of three global leaders and four different global wars since 1494 to the 20th century (Modelski G. , 1978, p. 217; 1987; Kohout, 2003, pp. 54-55; Danilovic, 2002, p. 81).

Table 1 Long Cycle Theory

Theory	Definition of Dominance	Role of Wars	Cycle Period	Reasons of the Rise	Reasons of the Collapse
The Long Cycle Theory	Leadership	Determinant of both the leading state and the characteristics of the new system.	Since 1500's / 100-year episodes	1. Insular Location 2. Cohesive and open society 3. Innovative economy 4. Efficient political organization	

As indicated before, global leadership passes from one to another in a cyclical way and each leadership corresponds to a cycle and so global order transforms. Each cycle does not only include the military superiority of a single state. These leaders, at the same time, determine the basic mechanism of the eras coinciding with their cycles. These mechanisms can be the scientific inventions, instrumental or material activities and praising various legal norms. For example, the era of Portugal leadership is known as the uptrend of the ocean navigation and exploration of the new worlds. In this process beginning with Portugal, several other states adapted to new attitude of the system at that phase and joined the transoceanic colonization struggle.

Free navigation in North Sea, banking and establishment of the financial system were highlighted features of the Netherlands leadership. The main agenda of the era, free navigation, was not confined to the North Sea but achieved to be a global norm over the sea routes and global trade in a little while. Moreover, it would not be a hyperbole to claim that since various other states were impressed by the success of the banking system in the Netherlands and tried to copy them, today we have a global banking system.

First cycle of England promoted free trade regimes and security of Low Countries against the domination of any European state. Modelski takes those regulations that sustained throughout the British leadership with the Vienna Convention as not a balance of power mechanism but an outcome of praxis leadership agenda. Britain continued to play a decisive role on the global scale by introducing a new mode of production (industrialization) and norms about accessing the raw material sources.

The latest example of that kind of leadership and decisive actor in the global politics is the United States of America. America was on the side of the winner coalitions in two world wars which can be defined as the most destructive global wars in history. Her success to adapt the new conditions, unique geopolitical location, exceptionally open societal structure and economic innovation provides the United States the opportunity to rise up the leading status in the global politics. During this era, the United States established the new order on the norms of free

market economy, liberal democracy, human rights and UN regime. These norms, since then, have been accepted as global values by other actors in the system.

Modelski's work on global political system and cyclical theory has an abundance of detailed points for our aims in this study. For instance, he primarily defines a global system and locates the global political system as a sub-system of it. Furthermore, he describes and distinguishes the operation of both system and mechanism of this operation elaborately. However, it is the global leadership cycles and factor behind the cycles argued by Modelski that is investigated issues in this study. The most significant parts of the Modelski's theory to compare it with Ibn Khaldun's approach are his understanding of the global system and mechanisms of global leadership transition between states.

2.3. Hegemonic Stability Theory

The most striking points of Gilpin's theory are its epistemological background and innovative conceptualization. Rational Choice Theory, a reflection of the positivist methodology, which is usually applied in the Science of Economy, is a convenient mean for the Hegemonic Stability Theory of Gilpin. He acknowledges the states as rational actors similar to corporations in Economy and bases his assessments about the competition of states in the international system on that positivist epistemology.

In this positivist perspective, rational actors (human for microeconomics, corporations for macroeconomics and states in our field) intend to maximize their interests. The maximization process requires simply a cost-benefit analysis. The rational actors that are supposedly having all information prefer the most profitable choice among all options. Likewise, Gilpin suggests these rational calculation mechanisms influence the behaviors of the states in the international system. Although this system has a limiting impact on states' behaviors, those limits do not cease rationality of the actors. In this regard, such a sharp epistemological standing separates Gilpin from both the conventional neorealist and other theories working on the rise and fall of states like Modelski.

2.3.1. The Concept of Hegemony and Hegemonic Theories

The notion of hegemony is one of the examples that demonstrate the conceptually innovative side of Gilpin's theory. It is imperative to look at the works of a Marxist intellectual, Gramsci's works, for the origins of the use of hegemony as a prescriptive concept (Anderson P. , 2007). Followers of Antonio Gramsci's expanded the fields that use hegemony by applying the concept in other disciplines like economy and sociology. Thereafter, the concept standing on class analysis also entered the International Relations literature. However, what is most interesting is that, realists and liberals as well as Marxists also started to use 'hegemony' in the following years (Eralp, 2012). These theories, naturally, haven't stressed the class dimension of the concept but they debated within the context of hierarchical international economic and political structure.

Both liberal and realist schools revive and raise the theory of hegemonic stability in 1970's into prominence. Origins of defense of Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) by Liberal school come from the success of free market economy and the American example (Keohane, 1980). For these theories, world economy (of course a free market economy) creates stability and order within a structure based on hegemonic relations. The Marxists, on the one hand, have denied the claims about stability and order by establishing aspects of those kinds of relations. They have advocated that an economic structure based on capitalist states and hegemony of corporation over people leads to more income inequality and instability. Realists approach to hegemonic stability theory is full of assumptions about the political order despite the fact that they borrowed the concept from world economy studies. Hegemony in realist theory relies principally upon the unipolarity of the international system and the power gap between superior hegemon in this system and in others. Both in the Realist School and other schools there is an ongoing debate and criticisms over how the hegemon use the advantage of this power gap. Does hegemons 'abuse' their superiority? Is a benevolent hegemon is possible? If it is, how can we redefine the hegemony? These are among the questions in the recent

literature on the topic. The theory concerning our works is the Theory of Hegemonic War (Hegemonic Stability) of Robert Gilpin within the Neo-Realist School.

2.3.2. What is System? And what is State?

Gilpin dealt with the issues in his various studies (Gilpin, 1975; 1987) Yet, *War and Change in World Politics* (1981), his tour de force, constitutes the basics of our study. He explains the purpose of the book and his theory by exploring these questions (1981, p. 2):

These contemporary developments and their dangerous implications raise a number of questions regarding war and change in international relations: How and under what circumstances does change take place at the level of international relations? What are the roles of political, economic, and technological developments in producing change in international systems? Wherein lays the danger of intense military conflict during periods of rapid economic and political upheaval? And, most important of all, are answers that are derived from examination of the past valid for the contemporary world? In other words, to what extent have social, economic, and technological developments such as increasing economic interdependence of nations and the advent of nuclear weapons changed the role of war in the process of international political change? Is there any reason to hope that political change may be more benign in the future than it has been in the past?

In this masterpiece, Gilpin, defines the international system, states as units creating the system and occupying the hegemon statue within the system prior to explaining the how hegemonic stability and hegemonic war theory operates in a cyclical way. According to him, the international system is an outcome of mutual relations between actors and a battleground for these actors to secure and enhance all of their interests. Competing for interest maximization in the system occasionally causes troubles that can be solved in accordance with relative power capacities. Gilpin highlights similarities between the domestic structures and the international system and hegemons of international system function like governments in domestic ones. Gilpin expands his analogy between domestic and international systems to other concepts such as domestic law and international law, authority and hierarchy of prestige (Danilovic, 2002, pp. 79-80).

Furthermore, according the Gilpin, the state simply provides with an organizational structure that assumes security and wealth for its stakeholders in

return for revenue. If a political organization could not fulfill this function, it cannot be referred to as a state. Although Gilpin views the state as an autonomous and united structure, he also questions this presupposition. He continues his analogy between domestic and international systems on the property right issue. For him, the state has a tendency to be jealous and defend itself from other like-minded humans. It is the territory of the state. All states behave in the international arena with the help of norms developing to secure their properties. The main questions at that point are what are the interests or ends of a state as a legal entity and who sets those interests. Realists, in fact, do not go in to the details of this question and they simply take the state as granted and suggest that the main objective of a state is security and/or power maximization. However, Gilpin touches upon these questions in his book (1981, pp. 18-19):

Strictly speaking, states, as such, have no interests, or what economists call "utility functions," nor do bureaucracies, interest groups, or so-called transnational actors, for that matter. Only individuals and individuals joined together into various types of coalitions can be said to have interests. From this perspective the state may be conceived as a coalition of coalitions whose objectives and interests result from the powers and bargaining among the several coalitions composing the larger society and political elite.

Moreover, Gilpin rejects the idea that concepts of national security and power promoted by Realists and Liberals' prosperity and stability are separable. States, he suggests, do not make an absolute choice among them but trade them off. "The individual (or state) will not seek to achieve one objective at the sacrifice of all others but will seek to find some optimum position on the set of indifference curves."(Gilpin, 1981, p. 20)




Figure 1 Indifference Curves (Gilpin, 1981, p. 21)

In this regard, Gilpin sorts the primary ends of a state in the modern era as:

1. To control over a certain territory
2. To increase its impact over other states behavior
3. To have a strong influence over the world economy and trade.

Similar to Modelski, Gilpin grounds his theory on the hypothesis of the comparatively hierarchical structure of international relations while not denying the claims of the Structural Realists on anarchy. Understanding of the hierarchy in Gilpin's thought is not an absolute control but he claims that only a relative control or a control effort over the international system is feasible. In an anarchic structure that states do not accept a superior authority over themselves, therefore, it is not possible to speak of an international government like the one in domestic political systems. These functions are performed by great powers in accordance with their relative power capabilities. This situation proves the impact of power disparities on maintaining the international system. Accordingly, such distribution of power can

create a hegemonic order in which a state dominates the system and other actors, a bipolar system or a multipolar system based on the balance of power mechanism (Danilovic, 2002, p. 79; Gilpin, 1981, p. 29; Levy, 1985)

In modern times, the nation states as hegemon occupy the top of that hierarchical system in order. However, this system is not limited to modernity; on the contrary its existence goes to pre-modern times too. Gilpin handles the concept of hegemon differently from Gramsci's and Modelski's usage, and he claims that we can see precedents of hegemon in ancient Greek city-state systems for the first time. Gilpin claims that basic characteristics of an international system have stayed unchanged for centuries since the ancient times and it is still a competition for more prosperity and power (Gilpin, 1981, p. 7; 1988). Hegemon is not an economic tyranny or colonist but has comparative superiority over other units in the system in terms of capabilities (e.g. military, economic). The beginning of the superiority is the victory in last hegemonic war and perception of superiority in a post war period is explained by Gilpin with the notion of 'prestige'.

Prestige, for Gilpin, is the perceived power capacity of a state by others. According to this definition, other units in the system acknowledge the superior capacity of the hegemon without the need to use it (1981, p. 31). As experienced in historical sample cases, the superiority of the hegemon in military and economy proved in previous systemic war e.g. United States in World War II. Subordinate states demonstrate consent and participate in the rules of the hegemon during peace periods within the hierarchy of prestige. Gilpin, in this regard, associates "prestige" with the 'authority' in national political systems. For him, the international system is the fruit of hierarchy of prestige (1981, p. 30). As indicated before, this hierarchy is directly related with the relative power distribution. Power disparity provides with legitimacy to the hierarchy of prestige in the international system and compels inferior states to obey and follow the norms of superior ones. Despite the fact that there are other reasons behind this obedience for Gilpin (such as common interests, class relations), the main determinant of the hierarchy of prestige is disparities in material power distribution. "Prestige is the reputation for power, and military power in particular" (Gilpin, 1981, p. 31).

The chief qualification of “prestige”, as indicated above, is enforcing the other states to accept the claims and demands of a superior state and achieving influence over their political behaviors without necessarily using any of their power capabilities. Therefore, prestige is mostly related with the perception of a state about another’s power. If this state considers the power of the other is greater than its own and irresistible, it concedes to other’s demand. In terms of transitions of power systems, if any state thinks itself to be in a more advantageous position respecting the relative power to other states, it seeks away to alter the system and abandon its subservient role.

It is the ‘consent’ in the hierarchical structure that is the lynchpin in Gilpin’s Hegemonic Stability Theory. Therefore, the termination of this conceding to others’ rules and mechanisms determined by the hegemon is the reason for the system being pulled into an unstable situation. The new system beginning with the victory of the last hegemonic war then degenerates and ends. This phenomenon repeats cyclically throughout the history. The primary question raised up here is why does the stable system spoil and why does the consent erode over time?

2.3.3. States as Rational Calculators

We can find Gilpin’s answers to the above question with five significant assumptions. Gilpin’s theory has a hardcore positivist epistemology. Within the framework of this epistemology, he responds to these questions with the help of Rational Choice Theory. Gilpin sorts these five main assumptions that underpin the hegemonic stability theory in his book as follows (1981, pp. 10-11):

- *An international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system.*
- *A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an expected net gain).*
- *A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.*
- *Once equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.*
- *If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.*

The primary motivation of the secondary states which concede to the present operation of a system and diverse distribution of capabilities under the hierarchy of prestige is that expected profit of changing the system is still less than the obtained from the present order. Gilpin stressed here that states do their plan to change the system on the possibility of winning the probable war in the feasible future. As these propositions suggest, states continuously calculates the options before deciding the stability of the system or change. States takes a step towards change or abstain from changing the system with respect to the results of a comparison between their relationship with the system and net profits and the probable cost/profit of a system change.

Afterwards, Gilpin asserts that states achieve a system change with altering the distribution of the material capabilities. New reclamations over a land, new alliance compositions, changing political relations and structural transformations of economic status quo trigger the systemic change. However, these efforts for change cannot be sustained perpetually. Actors of the international system can maintain these alteration efforts up to the point that marginal cost equals or exceeds the marginal profits. The hypothesis of state's reluctance to alter the system if there is no marginal profit from to do so does also inherently embody the idea that if a feasible profit becomes clear when the system change, rational actors try to materialize it. The answers of the question above should be responded to at this point. Why do states content with a system then try to get out of the hierarchy at some point? The ongoing system constructed according to capability distribution composition after the last hegemonic war. Although hegemon, in this composition, distributes public good by securing the system and maintaining the stability, it is the most beneficial actor in the system too.

2.3.4. Process of Decline/Change

Developments related to three factors can alter the present distribution of capabilities and that transformation undermining the consensus on present hierarchy and undermine the consent of the states. These developments are environmental

change¹, changes in the character of international system and domestic shifts inside a certain state (e.g. switch of governing elite). Such changes may have a devastating effect over the inferior states' consent to the status quo. The emerging idea as a consequence of an uneven economic and military growth is that composition of power distribution has changed and current obtaining of profit does not reflect the new composition. So, the state supposes its ranking in the hierarchy of prestige is not what it should be and ask for system change.

Another development inducing the demand of change from states is transformations in the structure of the system. Accordingly, the change occurring outside the state but affecting the structure of the system may have a direct impact on any new power composition and encourage this state to alter the system. A bipolar system, for instance, may transform to a multipolar system with the rise of a new power. In this case, the state, one of the poles in the bipolar system may act with the perception that it can get more profit from a new system than the current one.

Thirdly, alterations of domestic dynamics of states may trigger the systemic change too. For example, the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and Hitler's coming to power in Germany were among the factors inciting debate over international system and change demands. These domestic transformations, in time, grew stronger with that kind of international level demands.

The capacity of hegemon to cope with the challenges while maintaining the system is decisive as well as the willingness or reluctance of other states for the future of the system. During hegemonic decline, it is hard to compensate the disruptions for the hegemon and it faces to lose its superior position. The hegemon state faces with two main obstacles in this respect. First, necessary economic transformations are mostly blocked by economic realities. Second, it is hard to get required societal support.

Gilpin suggests that the cost of maintaining the status quo increases more than the economic capacity of hegemon and its development after the equilibrium settled in the system. Furthermore, for him, hegemon needs to have economic agility

¹ For Gilpin, environmental changes is an uneven growth in military and economic capabilities.

and flexibility for requiring transformations as challenger state(s) does to protect the status quo. Since the social and economic systems of the hegemon state are more mature, it is closed to improvements and less flexible against the troubles. It is also hard for the society of hegemon to catch the innovative breakthroughs in other societies. Moreover, according to economic theories, economic growth and expansion of mature societies, is more limited and slow because it's service-intensive character in comparison to industrial or agriculture-intensive ones.

Since the society burdens the costs of economic transformation underlined above and a probable military fight, the capacity of societal dynamics is also crucial for hegemon state to cope with challengers. Societal approach to the decisions about state's foreign policy also transforms over time as well as economic structure. This transformation usually concludes as society tries to maintain their status quo at a minimum cost. Radical economic changes are resisted by the society because some people and interest groups may suffer seriously from such a transformation. Furthermore, coping with the systemic challenges requires human costs as well as the economic expenditures if a war seems as the solution of the disequilibrium. In such a situation, citizens of the hegemon have usually negative attitudes toward the war in the long run and they demonstrate unwillingness to compete with the challenger. This is the Achilles' hill for the hegemon.

Gilpin put forward some external factors of decline as well as these internal ones. Primary external cause of the hegemonic decline is the rising cost of the maintaining stability of system. It is a controversial argument. Gilpin, with this claim, asserts that the hegemon tries to distribute public goods at the expense of its own interests. This claim is the main opposition argument of the critics of the hegemonic stability theory (Grunberg, 1990, pp. 439-444).

The rising demand of system change coming from the other powers in the system and retreat of the capacity of hegemon to overcome the problems and defiance coming from the challenger creates a tension. Hegemonic Stability Theory suggests that such tension in the international system can only be settled by a hegemonic war and Gilpin sites Thucydides on the issue. Throughout the history hegemonic wars resolve this tension. Hegemonic wars a specific class of wars

concerning the all parts of the system with its results and creating a new order. Unresolved disequilibrium emerged in the system in time and is the main reason behind the hegemonic wars. According to Gilpin, characteristics of Hegemonic War (1988, p. 592):

The first is that a hegemonic war is distinct from other categories of war; it is caused by broad changes in political, strategic, and economic affairs. The second is that the relations among individual states can be conceived as a system; the behavior of states is determined in large part by their strategic interaction. The third is that a hegemonic war threatens and transforms the structure of the international system; whether or not the participants in the conflict are initially aware of it, at stake is the hierarchy of power and relations among states in the system.

Table 2 The Long Cycle Theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory

Theory	Definition of Dominance	Role of Wars	Cycle Period	Reasons of the Rise	Reasons of the Collapse
The Long Cycle Theory	Leadership	Determinant of both the leading state and the characteristics of the new system.	Since 1500's / 100-year episodes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Insular Location 2. Cohesive and open society 3. Innovative economy 4. Efficient political organization 	
Hegemonic Stability Theory	Hegemony	Hegemonic wars threaten/transform the structure of the international system and settle the tension in the system	Since the ancient Greek City States / There is no time period	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Change in the composition of power distribution 2. Transformation in the structure of the system 3. Alterations of domestic dynamics of a state e.g revolution 	Cost of maintaining the status quo increases more than the economic capacity of the hegemon

That's why they should be investigated in a distinct understanding. According to theory, hegemony is the side starting the war as preemptive attack and after all the dust settles, a third party outside the war or less damaged participant of it emerges as next hegemon. New order will be designed by this new hegemon. Hegemon and the challenger of the former order were exhausted in terms of economy and military capacity. Moreover, they will have lost most of their social capital and human resources.

Consequently, Gilpin employs rational decision-making mechanisms borrowed from economic theories to unveil the stability and change of the international system. The actors are content with the rules imposed by the hegemon as long as they cannot foresee a marginal benefit to change the system. When any possible changes offer up some potential opportunities for them, they will demand the transformation of the system. And if the hegemon lacks enough flexibility and capability to respond to those demands, the system goes into bipolarity and hegemonic war becomes inevitable. War functions as settlement mechanisms in this process. Gilpin claims his theory of hegemonic stability has been prevailing since the time of Thucydides' narrative on war between Athens and Sparta (1988). The antinomy between the fear of coming from constant nature of human and expectancy has been staged such a cycle throughout history.

2.4. Economy vs. Strategy: Kennedy's Narrative on Rise and Fall of Great Powers

When Kennedy, as a historian, published his masterpiece *Rise and Fall of Great Powers* (1988), the ongoing debate was on the comparative economic decline of the United States. Economic rise of the countries like Japan, Germany and later on, China, decreased the proportion of the United States in the world economy that it had held during the Cold War. As in Modelski and Gilpin cases, International Relations studies in the US during the 1980s were mostly dominated by the debates over a probable decline of the United States and long term power struggles. The predominant idea in Kennedy's theory is that superiority in the power competition

is not permanent, because superiority and leadership requires various costs and size of these costs increase exponentially over time. He defines this phenomenon as a balance between economy and military strategy. The origins of this situation go back to emergence of the nation states and European State System.

It would be fair to suggest that devastating impacts of growing military expenditures, expensive military bases all around the world, deployments of thousands of troops, and so called “space wars” on the American economy are very significant for the beginning of these theories. Although, three years later, not the most powerful state as theory predicts, but its challenger collapsed, the rise of China since 1990’s afterwards brought the theory in academic debate agendas.

It would be beneficial to recall the scientific standing of Kennedy at this point, because it is the basic rationale for his approach that we will be examine here. Kennedy is a realist, and he, naturally, sees inter-state relations as a power struggle. What he argues in his book is the background of these power struggles, transformations and historical changes. Within this realist perspective, for Kennedy, elements of power (currency of inter-state relations) are material assets. These are economy and military capacity.

Kennedy stresses Eurocentrism in his book because of its subject and counts the reasons in the first chapter. The primary reason of Eurocentric in the book, according to him, is that great powers structures in modern terms emerged in 1600s for the first time in the history, and they are outcomes of the rise of Europe against rest. He tries to explain the backwardness of Islamic World and China with some cultural and organizational causes and the book doesn’t really have any interesting details. As such, critics who are opposed to his book and hypotheses mainly cite this point (Black, 2008, p. 2). Such a Eurocentric assessment and comparing the power struggles in modern fiscal and military terms means limiting the competition between the actors within the borders of Europe (Black, 2008, pp. 2-3).

2.4.1. Miraculous Rise of Europe

In “Rise and Fall of Great Powers”, Kennedy unveils the European miracles with the help of some Enlightenment concepts. It is important to underline this point carefully in comparing Kennedy’s study with the essential book of our study; Ibn Khaldun’s “Muqaddimah”. In Kennedy’s approach, the reasons which lay behind the European rise comparing to other worlds are: laissez faire economics, intellectual pluralism and decentralized structure, which then serves to enable the political competition. It is this competition which creates more investment and development possibilities, and generates a cycle between the most successful ones. For Kennedy, it is hardly possible to observe such attitudes in non-Western countries. Therefore, they rarely participate in this political competition in modern era. He goes further and analyze these shortcomings essentially as the results of Islamic Shari’ a (Islamic Law).

Kennedy points out the late 1500s as the beginning of this cyclical picture, and it appears more clearly in European decentralized structure. The cycle began with the Habsburg initiatives to transform their comparative superiority over Europe to absolute dominance. Beside its greatest military power in Europe, huge size of its soil, the greatness of the amount of collected taxes and leading position in the transoceanic colonialism race encouraged Spain to realize its ambitious over Europe. However, it was not a sustainable initiative. After all such an attempt provokes counter coalitions. Even the Catholic France, in Thirty Years War, adopted a policy against Spanish expansionism with the Protestant states side by side (Kissinger, 2006, pp. 50-57). Spain was defeated and its rapid rise was slowed by French-led coalition. Holland took over the ‘first among equals’ position after Habsburg Spain, and this trend then continued through with France and Britain.

The ‘first among equals’ phrase is one of the main point differentiating Kennedy from Modelski and Gilpin. Kennedy does not make such claims, unlike Modelski and Gilpin and their belief in hegemony of an absolute power. Therefore, Kennedy would suggest the functions of the system have not been determined by a hegemon. On the contrary, the main mechanism of the system is balancing the most powerful and expansionist state in Europe. This is a common thought in the Realist

School. Kennedy stands closer to the pioneers of Neo-Realist Theory. Unlike Gilpin, he does not offer unipolarity as a more stable structure because he believes that an absolute unipolarity is historically not possible in the European state system. Whenever a single state attempt to dominate the continent and others encountered with serious alliances and long fights with these alliances exhausted its energy.

2.4.2. An Impossible Duty: Economy and Strategy Balance

Kennedy, in his own words, wrote a book not on economic or military history but instead aimed to demonstrate the linkage between these two phenomena. The main determinant of the rise and fall of great powers in this competition is fiscal or military capacity of either participant alliances or individual states to conduct a longstanding war (both cold and hot conflicts). In other words, the winners of a political and military conflict are mostly the states demonstrating enough capacity to utilize more and long-time resources. Therefore, distribution of capabilities among states is the primary determinant of the system's functions. Yet, this distribution does not continue constantly. Some powers fall behind while others rise (Kennedy P. , 1988, p. xv):

The triumph of any one Great Power in this period, or the collapse of another, has usually been the consequence of lengthy fighting by its armed forces; but it has also been the consequences of the more or less efficient utilization of the state's productive economic resources in wartime, and, further in the background, of the way in which that state's economy had been rising or falling, relative to the other leading nations, in the decades preceding the actual conflict. For that reason, how a Great Power's position steadily alters in peacetime is as important to this study as how it fights in wartime.

Despite the essence of the book describes this cyclical process with the link between economy and strategy, Kennedy also stresses an interesting point that allows this picture. It is possible to define this point as domestic developments of states. States forge ahead in comparing to others as a result of uneven growth. Innovative advances are the reasons behind the uneven growth. These advances provide wealth and prosperity to the states. In a zero-sum game, according to Kennedy, such an advance of an actor is a loss for another, because the distribution of aggregate amount of power and structure of the system changes. Military capacity must

increase in parallel with the economic prosperity to defend it. However, states tend to spend more to defend their wealth while they are getting richer. As a consequence, the amount of overall innovation decreases dramatically over time (Danilovic, 2002, p. 80).

If a state begins to decline economically, it will eventually decline militarily. In that economic resources are necessary to create a strong military capacity, and military capacity is necessary to protect economic welfare, it is possible to claim the reverse interrelation exists for a decadent state. An economically declining state begins to make concessions from its military power, thus for a state in a militarily and economically declining situation it would be inevitable to lose the fight against the one which demonstrates to utilize greater amount of material resources.

Kennedy's theory claims such a cycle continues in the modern state system. The huge ambitions of Habsburgs were counter-balanced and ultimately defeated by a great coalition that possessed and utilized resources beyond its own. After such a defeat and lost of its military capacity, it was hardly possible for Spain to protect the security and the control of economic resources. A similar situation was also true for France. Since it could not achieve to employ enough resource in age-long wars, despite its enormous army, it was inevitable to lose against the British-leading coalition. More recently, Kennedy's thesis tested in WWI and WWII. The U.S.'s entrance to the devastating 4-year long war provided to use greater amount of material resources to the Allies, which determined the outcome of the First World War. This same situation was repeated in the Second World War. All of these examples demonstrate the importance of material resource capacity for winning or losing of wars. However, rational planning of resources during war time is additionally significant for Kennedy, because it is not possible, in the long run, for a state to survive that sacrifices all its resources for a single war. Domestic problems may arise in such a situation and it would create destructive consequences for that state.

2.5. A Brief Roundup

In this section, there will be a summing up of three contemporary theories, in order to build groundwork for a comparison with Ibn Khaldun's approach. Franz Kohout and Torbjorn Knutsen are two scholars studied on comparative works on modern theories of international political change. Particularly, Knutsen's comparison (Knutsen, 1999) constitutes a substantial source for this study. However, his assessments (Knutsen) do not cover Kennedy's approach but rather touches upon thoughts of scholars such as Toynbee and Wallerstein, who are not included in our study.

Kohout, in his comparative study, divides theories on change in two parts: hegemonic and pluralistic theories (2003). Modelski and Gilpin's theory are among hegemonic theories category designed by him. Similar to Knutsen, Kohout excludes Kennedy and his work. In this summary, we try to make use of J.L Richardson's assessments in addition to Knutsen and Kohout.

One of the differences between these theories is the time period that they claim to be applicable. The Long Cycle Theory and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers approach of Kennedy starts the process with the rise of the West and nation states. According to them, it is not possible to mention the concepts of great power and global political system before the modern era. All of these concepts and institutions are the results of political and technological developments which were first experienced in Europe and they have gained a global nature over time. Gilpin, yet, argues that hegemonic war/stability theory has existed in likely international system since ancient Greek city state system, despite his acknowledgement of the innovative dimension of the nation state. He supports his continuity idea over the character of international politics with the notion of human nature which is borrowed from Thucydides. Since states seek for power and domination, for Gilpin, modern era is no different than the Ancient Greece.

All three scholars put states forward as the main units of the system. In Modelski's theory, unlike others, global political system means more than just inter-state competition and has sub-functional structures. Such an approach is clearly

distinct from conventional Realist perspective, because mainstream Realist Theory sees the structure of international system as an outcome of distribution power. Kennedy and Gilpin stand closer to this main stream realist perspective, and highlight existing power capabilities of states and their competition. They avoid defining the system with more different attitudes. All three theories exclude the domestic structures and regime types in their explanations. Despite they briefly mention some domestic factors of leadership or hegemony position (e.g Gilpin's theory); it does not change their understanding of taking the state structures as given and undifferentiated.

Modelski and Gilpin offer a hierarchic system rather than absolute anarchy. This approach is a challenge to conventional Realist Theory. Hegemon or global leading states have a decisive impact on system's operation and basic mechanisms. Furthermore, these states enjoy a monopoly over power distribution. Modelski distinctively emphasize the role of sea power. Since the global leadership requires operating on a global scale, according to him, the only way to make it possible is sea power -recently air force- (Modelski G. , 1987). Only sea power allows for trading over long distances and military mobilization. States, then, project their global power through sea power (Rosecrance, 1987). Gilpin indicates that sea power and continental power difference between hegemon and the challenger but he does not ascribe a determinant role to the sea power. Kennedy, unlike his contemporaries, defines the great powers as not hegemon or global leadership but as 'first among equals'. As indicated in Kennedy's section, he does not accept the unipolarity of international system. He claims that attempts to create such a unipolar system create rival coalitions and would never be successful. Historical pioneer powers in his theory, such as Habsburg Spain, Netherland and England, were not totally decisive and complete dominance over the system. Britain was closed to create its own hegemony after 1815, but challenging states and state groups emerged within the system and did not allow for it.

An intensive Eurocentricism is common in all three theories. However, Modelski claims that his theory points out a larger phenomenon than European state system. According to him, historical realities lie behind the emergence of great

powers in Europe. It is not a divine destiny. U.S. already changed the situation in 20th century. Gilpin's narrative about the modern era, despite the fact that his historical generalizing is behind the European case, overlaps with European political history and struggles in Europe. Gilpin, in contradiction with Modelski, claims that only two hegemonies have existed in modern era: Britain and the United States. However, Modelski's chronological global leader states are: Portugal, Netherland and Britain (in two different epochs) and finally the United States. Kennedy inevitably underlines the European state system. His narrative and theory is mostly on great power rivalry in Europe. Habsburg Spain, Netherland, France and Britain are the leading great powers in a chronological order. Lastly, the United States took over the dominant position in power competition.

Global war, hegemonic war or great wars are definitions of these three theories to define the beginning points of the cycles. In all theories, these kinds of wars have a decisive effect on the next system (Knutsen, 1999, pp. 8-10; Levy & Thompson, 2010). The winner of the system, regulate and design next order. Modelski stresses the determinant role of war over leadership cycle despite he avoid the war theory unlike two others. The correlation between war (military strategy) and economy, for Kennedy, decides the destiny of great powers. He gives the attention to the outside the battleground-aspects of war with the idea of winning a war related with the amount of the employing material resources. Gilpin's theory is sometimes named as Hegemonic War Theory since the theory argues the inevitability of a war between hegemon and the challenger. A third party arises as hegemon as an outcome of such wars. For example, Macedonia rose after the war between Athens and Sparta. Additionally, the United States took the leadership of global political arena after two Europe-based world wars.

After the brief explanations of three contemporary approaches to change of international politics, we can move the focus of the study, Ibn Khaldun's thoughts on the rise and fall of states and we can compare and contrast the similarities and diversities. Genuine features and characteristics of Khaldun's time, environment and his concepts are taken into consideration while doing such analysis. Therefore, it

would be more useful to begin this session by explaining the impact of time and environment on his thoughts and conceptualization.

Table 3 The Long Cycle Theory, Hegemonic Stability Theory and Kennedy's Approach of the Rise and Fall of Great Powers

Theory	Definition of Dominance	Role of Wars	Time/Cycle Period	Reasons of the Rise/Change	Reasons of the Collapse
The Long Cycle Theory	Leadership	Determinant of both the leading state and the characteristics of the new system.	Since 1500's / 100-year episodes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Insular Location 2. Cohesive and open society 3. Innovative economy 4. Efficient political organization 	
Hegemonic Stability Theory	Hegemon	Hegemonic wars threaten/transform the structure of the international system and settle the tension in the system	Since the ancient Greek City States / There is no time period.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Uneven growth and change in the composition of power distribution 2. Transformation in the structure of the system 3. Alterations of domestic dynamics of a state e.g revolution 	Cost of maintaining the status quo increases more than the economic capacity of the hegemon
Kennedy's Approach of the Rise and Fall Great Powers	Great Power (First among equals)	Decide the new 'first among equals'	Since the rise of Europe in 1500s / There is no time period.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Uneven growth as the result of economic innovation 	Imbalances between economy and military strategy

CHAPTER 3

CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND:

INTRODUCTION TO IBN KHALDUN

Among the objectives of this study is to show the validity of Khaldun's approach on the rise and fall of polities in contemporary age. However, it is also important to avoid falling into anachronism trap. As proposed by Suleyman Uludag in his *Muqaddimah* translation (2011), this will be an injustice to Ibn Khaldun. If we try to adapt his arguments to today's conditions without any assessment on his times and environment, it would not be fair to judge his theories as they would seem incongruent with contemporary cases. However, we may also miss his universal and trans-historical ideas if we only consider him as an outdated 14th century thinker. To avoid similar mistakes in this study, his era in history and geographical origins will be handled in detail. Furthermore, this study also tries to unveil his concepts that have trans-historical importance within the integrity of *Muqaddimah*. It is not a biographical work but instead it is a preliminary research. It is only after such an introduction, would an apprehensible groundwork be created to study Ibn Khaldun's ideas on the rise and fall powers for today's students and researchers.

3.1. Historical Background

Before analyzing Khaldun's theory and his significant conceptualizations, to avoid making mistakes mentioned above, it would be helpful to examine the temporal and spatial features of the time in which Khaldun lived. Such a temporal and spatial examination both allow us to comprehend his ideas in his own era and also demonstrate the importance of studying his ideas attentively in our time. This examination is additionally crucial to give Khaldun's ideas a place in International Relations literature. Since concepts of political life in Khaldun's era were dissimilar

to contemporary ones, it requires a rigorous investigation to utilize his ideas on today's International Relations debates without removing him from his own context. A comparative study (similarities and dissimilarities) between political environment of Khaldun's world and the contemporary world is a compulsory occupation to substantiate these goals. Only in this way, will it be possible to adopt his ideas to today and benefit from them. This comparative study would also be an answer to the question of needs Ibn Khaldun's perspective today.

The difference between these two historical eras is unavoidable as Khaldun already underlines this point in his *Muqaddimah*. However, it is also likely to establish parallels between some certain periods of time by taking inspiration from the standpoint of Khaldun on not a linear but cyclical flow of history. The most difficult side of creating historical analogies is the concern for missing the spirit of a given time. On the one hand, efforts to catch the repetitive phases of history, and on the other hand, concerns about missing the evolutionary side of the history make such a study harder. However, it seems essential to create such analogies particularly in Political Science field for carrying classics to our time.

The question of what the term 'historical analogies' implies should be responded to at this point, because it is quite likely for one to confuse it with the issue of spatial similarities or differences below. One of the main disparities between historical (temporal) and spatial comparison is that temporal comparisons mostly focus on abstract and mainstream perceptions. In other words, it is not possible to prove the historical direction of a time period concretely. Only the outcomes of events provide us a chance to test it. Here we start the comparison with identifying the direction of the historical flow at that time. Only by such identification allows us to compare zeitgeist of Khaldun's era, and our time.

Furthermore, the spatial perception of our world is not exactly the same with Khaldun's era. There are various disparities from the institutionalizations related to society, to the boundaries of political organizations. Nevertheless, similar to temporal disparity, it is possible to form analogies in terms of the relations between different political entities or institutions of his world and ours. As it can be understood here, concrete intuitions and localities are utilized means in spatial comparisons. Space is

not just a place where one is located. Man-made institutions and structures are complementary elements of the space. Since the spatial comparisons are based on perceptible datum, there would be more differences and fewer similarities in such a comparison than the temporal comparisons between two historical periods. What must first be done in such a situation is to identify the elements fulfilling similar functions and focus on them. What is trying to be done in the spatial comparison below is to create a manual for demonstrating the existence of institutions that fulfilling similar functions.

Besides a projected temporal and spatial analogy, overlooking how Khaldun's idea is handled in the literature in comparison to other thinkers who are widely accepted today can be a useful tool to transfer his ideas in our time. However, the owner of such an effort should be careful not to define him through the lenses of other thinkers and ignore his originality. There is an ongoing literature on the similarities and disparities between Khaldun's thought and the ideas of scholars who have huge influence over International Relations literature like Machiavelli, Thucydides, Hobbes and Marx (Fida, 1998; Kalpakian, 2008, pp. 361-362; Goodman, 1972).

These temporal and spatial parallelisms will be dealt in the next parts of the study. Before moving to this, it should be remembered once again that these parallelisms do not mean absolute sameness, but rather similarity to some extent. Reassessment of Khaldun's thought in this way is not inspired by the idea of a stationary character of history from seven hundred years but from recurrent cyclical adventure of humankind with ongoing alterations as claimed by Khaldun himself.

3.1.1. Time and Space Context

Ibn Khaldun was a scholar and jurist in the 14th century Islamic North Africa. During his lifetime, he undertook several duties on these subjects in several countries. He had a chance to observe closely the historical developments that were going on in North Africa and Andalusia at that time. Not only did his scholarly sojourns but also his governmental duties provide him with a significant advantage to

study the political and social environment of that era (Fromherz, 2010, pp. 60-97; Cox, 1996, pp. 157-158).

3.1.1.1 . Temporal Comparison

The main theme of the 14th century for the North African Muslims was that it was an era of regression (Cox, 1996, p. 157). That regression was against both the ‘other’ Christianity and internal problems. It was also the time in the Muslim societies to search for an answer to the question of why we had declined as a result of Reconquista. It would not be wrong to claim that these searchings and perceptions for decline was the spirit of Khaldun’s time. The perception of the North African and Andalusian societies regarding their era was part and parcel with the reason for their eventual defeat and decline. Ibn Khaldun directly reflects the mental atmosphere of his time about the negative direction of the historical flow (Cox, 1996; Khaldun, 2011, pp. 20-21). One of the points argued in this study is that the reason lies behind Ibn Khaldun’s handling of the political rise and decline issue, in association with the time phenomenon, are the political experiences in his time. The source of Ibn Khaldun’s motivation to think firstly on declining of the glorious Islam Ummah, and then about power transitions all around North Africa should be searched in these historical experiences.

So Ibn Khaldun spent his life in an era that is similar to today’s Western world in which societies intellectually debate on which power centers or civilizations rise and whether international system changes or not. “He enable us to examine how a differently constituted mind confronted similar problems to those we now face and what factors shaped his understanding of response to these problems”(Cox, 1996, p. 157). From this point of view, it is possible to manifest the validity of Ibn Khaldun’s thoughts for today’s world. Since the Western-based political system became universal, concerning parties from a probable transition of Western-originated system is not limited to the Western World. Therefore, assessing such a great transformation wave (similar to North African experience in Khaldun’s era) only thorough the Western lenses is not enough and credible to understand both the reason of

transformation or decline and clues of the new order. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun's thoughts about his time, as a non-western mind, should be taken in to consideration in studies on change.

Comparison of temporal imaginations should be without absolutizing them. Therefore, it is important to remember Khaldun's own approach to the issue in *Muqaddimah*. He suggests that all things on earth go through a constant transformation and change (Khaldun, 2011, pp. 88-91). Therefore, creating an analogy between two different time periods cannot be a random comparison. Each era may stand for various different meanings or historical experiences by geography. For example, comparing the stable atmosphere in the 1960s because of the Cold War's frozen impact with the perception of change in Khaldun's era does not seem logical. Additionally, similarities between two time periods do not mean all elements belonging the previous time period stayed unchanging; one of the primary elements here would be the space.

3.1.1.2 . Spatial Comparison

The meaning attributed to space in this study is beyond a random place in which living or staying. Accordingly, space involves all concrete entities, beings and institutions at a given time. It is essential to identify the basic institutions and their feature of Khaldun's time for a comparison regarding the space and present similarity and distinctness.

If we analyze Khaldun's era in space context, we can see that North African people were far away from the unity of two-three centuries ago and divided many rival polities. The political picture of Northern Africa and Andalusia at that time, during the time of great empires all around the world in the 14th century, seemed dispersed with many ruling dynasties and their rivalries (Dursun & Hassan, 2008; Hassan, 2011; Fromherz, 2010; Rosenthal F. , 1984; Watt & Cachia, 2011). Such a dispersed image and many small political entities brought unique feature to the political relations. It is quite important to clarify a methodological matter before go into detailed feature of these relations. Ibn Khaldun lived ages before the emergence

of Westphalian state system. Therefore it is not possible to talk about a state in modern sense for his time and particularly English usage of 'state' rather than Turkish or Arabic may cause confusion. However, within this study, the concept of state is used to define these political entities in terms of their functions in political life, because 'devlet' in Turkish or 'dawla' in Arabic, sometimes, had been used in state of 'dynasty' and 'empire'. Furthermore, sui generis political fragmentation in North Africa at that time and relations between all these parties seem similar to our state-rich times.

Ibn Khaldun does not speak of the details of political interrelations in his study. He rather claims that political alterations possess a nature as well as other changes in our world and his aim is explaining the causation of that nature (Cox, 1996, p. 165). That's why it would be possible to define the characteristics of these relations by deducing them from narratives contained in history books. The prominent outcome of this entire interrelation network is constant domestic and external conflicts and competitions. Participating parties of these conflicts are small political entities which are mentioned previously. Both internal dynastical antagonism and rivalries between states (polities) destabilize the region (Say, 2011, pp. 107-108).

North Africa has been a fertile field for political studies because of its dispersed and decentralized composition in the age of great empires in Muslim world. When the web of relations aroused from such political fragmentation and instability historically investigated, it is realized that political character of the region is closer to the comparatively anarchical structure of entities in modern era, rather than comparatively hierarchical empire systems. Ibn Khaldun also benefited from that kind of environment, and raised significant thought on politics. North Africa, with its fragmented political structure at that time, resembles modern state system or Italian and Greek city states systems.

Similar to temporal comparison, it shouldn't be thought that spatial analogies mean absolute sameness or dissimilarity. In this study, it is tried to analyze the political institutions in a space regarding their functions. Therefore, it should be always remembered that spatial analogies quite dependent on geography as well as

the temporal analogies and they are time oriented. If we compare not the political structure of the 14th century North Africa but instead era of Imperial China with modern times, it would not be possible to reach the similar conclusions. Likewise, a political display of Anatolia during pre-Ottoman principalities (*Beylikler*) era seems similar to the North Africa in Khaldun's time while Ottoman period Anatolia was quite different in terms of its centralized and united composition.

3.1.1.3. Personal Comparisons

There have been much debate about similarities between Khaldunian thought and important names of eras mentioned above as their historical experience parallels. There have been similarities, first, between him and Ancient Greek historian Thucydides in terms of his style to study the science and arguments on tragic cyclical move of human nature (Goodman, 1972; Strange, 1995; Dale, 2006). Firstly, Thucydides lived in an era that glorious Greek system turned to collapse after last hegemonic war. Under such conditions, Thucydides applied empirical methods and physical proofs and avoided metaphysical statement to explain this war and motivations of both side. Causality is at the forefront in his expressions. Ibn Khaldun also employ empirical laws instead of metaphysical explaining while narrating the collapse of Andalusia and its afterwards with full of political rivalry and competition between politics and dynasties. Cause and effect relationship is crucial for him too (Caksu, 2007). Even Khaldun begins *Muqaddimah* with his critics about historian in Islamic world because of their mistakes in handling with historical events (Gibb, 1933, p. 25). One of the main arguments in his criticisms is that social order as physical ones has certain functional laws and earlier historians of Islamic worlds missed these laws in their studies. *Muqaddimah*, for him, introduces a new science 'ilm al-'umran' discovering these laws (Ardıç, 2008; Chabane, 2008).

Ibn Khaldun has been investigated many times in the literature regarding his scientific standing (Sunar & Yashlıçimen, 2008; White, 2009). Despite some studies portray Ibn Khaldun as a pure realist, it doesn't seem convincing to acknowledge him as a complete positivist since the positivism as scientific school developed in

later centuries and Ibn Khaldun has a strong religious side (Gibb, 1933, pp. 27-28). While him examining the overall political and social transformation and particularly the rise and fall states (dynasties) in the Muqaddimah, yet, he benefits from basically empirical knowledge and praise such a methodology.

Secondly, Khaldun has frequently been compared to Machiavelli in terms of his method, conceptualizations about establishment and progress of a state (Elmalı, 2003; Kennedy J. , 2011; Strange, 1995). For example, both of them claim that a state revive and expand with the help of a religion. Furthermore, Machiavelli's concept 'virtue' is often compared with Khaldun's 'asabiyyah' (Kalpakian, 2008, p. 361; Strange, 1995). However, in this study, it is thought that there is little evidence to accept virtue and asabiyyah as comparable concepts. The comparisons are not limited with only conceptual aspects. It is also claimed that the Italian state system and struggle for sovereignty in Italia bear a resemblance to Khaldun's era, and the issues that is handled by these two thinkers and their solutions for the problems of their time share similarities. Yet, some others assert that Khaldun's normative interpretations about the statecraft and Machiavelli's pragmatism are poles apart (Say, 2011).

Finally, Hobbes and Khaldun have continuously been compared. Hobbes, with the influence of turbulent years of his era, claimed that humans have bestial instincts and may damage each other and therefore a higher authority to provide among people is necessary (Hobbes, 2010, pp. 133-137). Same definitions can be seen in Khaldun's work. Yet, Khaldun's works are wider than Hobbes' arguments on social existence of humans and their need for higher authority, and claim not only fear but a need for cooperation to survive, which brings together humans under an authority.

Comparing him with not only significant classics for today's IR literature but also prominent scholars of Islamic Political Science literature, puts Ibn Khaldun in a unique position in entire Islamic world and history (Rosenthal F. , 1984; Rosenthal E. I., 1962). Since Khaldun criticized prominent Muslim philosophers including particularly Al-Farabi, some assessments thinks him in Ghazali and anti-rationality

ecole². However, this study argues that that claim is not completely right, because he does not refute the rationality and rational methodology while criticizing the philosophers. On the contrary, he claims that philosopher like Al-Farabi says so little (or nothing) about the nature of political life or they mostly repeat normative and unrealistic notions if they do mention (Korkut, 2008; Rosenthal E. I., 1962). On the other hand, he is separated from the philosophers and rationalists (particularly Mutezile School) on creed-based (itikadi) issues (Arslan, 1987, pp. 469-471). Prophecy, for example, is a rational necessity as state ruler for Neo-Platonic scholars in Islamic world. However, Khaldun objects this statement. He gives some societies lie Zoroastrianists that have a ruler despite the fact that they are not Muslim and believers of Prophet. If the prophet was a rational end, all societies that have ruler would believe in Prophethood (Khaldun, 2011, pp. 215-216)

It is not among the aims of this study to rupture his thought from its own historical context and to embed in modern theorists. On the contrary, the idea that Khaldun, in his own context and with his original thoughts, is valuable and valid as much as names accepted today as a reference is supported here. In the next parts of the study, it is examined how main concepts handled within the integrity of Muqaddimah to interpret his thoughts, in order to interpret his thoughts, and enlighten today's developments.

3.2. Conceptual Guideline

To conduct a thorough analysis on Ibn Khaldun, and Muqaddimah, that was written ages ago and in a language other than English or Turkish, requires a conceptual guideline, as well as historical background. There are three reasons for this. First of all, the meanings of concepts change in time even in their original language. This is a crucial mistake for studies on such classics with today's perspective like ours. Social, political and language structure of Arabic in the years that Khaldun wrote the Muqaddimah was not exactly the same with their counterparts today. Phenomena that have developed within the social and linguistic

²Ghazali's anti-rationalism is still problematic idea since some scholars claims that Ghazali criticize the rationalism but do not deny human reason.

reality context of those years and their modern day equivalents cannot be understood by using them randomly. It is a methodological necessity to enlighten this conceptual confusion in such a scholarly work.

Secondly, the danger of translation confusion between the original language of classic piece and the language of studies on it requires an elaborate definition of concepts. Sometime it is really difficult to find translation for some significant concepts in other languages of Khaldun since the *Muqaddimah* was written in Arabic (Kayapınar, 2008). That's why some, as in the case of Suleyman Uludag translation of *asabiyyah* (2011), prefers to leave the concepts as they are and try to explain their functions instead of a direct translation.

Thirdly, there are some difficulties peculiar to the *Muqaddimah* and necessitate a conceptual guideline to comprehend the concepts accurately, because Ibn Khaldun uses some concepts that are basic for his theory in several different meanings in several different places (Kayapınar, 2008, p. 378). For example, the word 'umran' uses to define both the entire social life and also only urban life. Therefore, a conceptual guideline before going into details of Khaldun's understanding of the rise and fall of powers is a necessity to prevent any confusion or mistake.

In addition to the explanation of why a conceptual introduction is required, it is also important to indicate which problems occurs if there is no such a guideline and what ways we should follow to overcome these challenges. Some of flaws while reassessing Ibn Khaldun to understand contemporary facts appear as either to remove him totally from his historical environment or to confine only that historical context. It is crucial at that point to clarify concepts that will help us to avoid such mistakes and figure out the Khaldun's thought on rise and fall of powers. One of the points we should pay attention here is that Khaldun used some concepts in several meanings in diverse places. That's why it will be helpful to look *Muqaddimah* in a holistic perspective. Moreover, such a perspective demonstrates that there is no contradiction between original meaning and trans-historical meaning and of Khaldunian concepts.

In his thesis on the rise and fall of powers and cyclical history, Khaldun applies several substantial and original concepts such ‘umran’ and its types, ‘asabiyyah’ and types of asabiyyah and diversification of politics and ruling structures will be described in the following sections. Order of these concepts is a conscious preference to simplify the next one with previous one’s description. To define these complementary concepts is indispensable to comprehend Khaldun’s theory and compare it in the following chapters with modern theories.

3.2.1. Umran: From Badawa to Hadara

Suleyman Uludag, in the beginning of his Muqaddimah translation, denotes Arabic origin of the world ‘umran’ as developed and flourishing –town- (Khaldun, 2011, pp. 112-113). In translations to Western languages, it is used as civilized and urbane (Chabane, 2008, pp. 328-329; Kayapınar, 2008, p. 388; Khaldun, 2011, p. 113). Despite the fact that Ibn Khaldun himself use umran in such meanings, the meaning of ‘umran’ has a wider scope in the context of science of umran founded by him as he claimed.

It would not be wrong to suggest, then, that Ibn Khaldun uses the concept of ‘umran’ as technical term in the meaning of concretized sum of human’s all social and economic activities in the world. He claims that it is necessary for humankind to live together and interact with his own kind.

However, the power of the individual human being is not sufficient for him to obtain (the food) he needs, and does not provide him with as much food as he requires to live... Thus, he cannot do without a combination of many powers from among his fellow beings, if he is to obtain food for himself and for them. Through cooperation, the needs of a number of persons, many times greater than their own (number), can be satisfied (2005, p. 45).

Therefore, ‘umran’ is a notion that contains either civilized or uncivilized or urban(e) and nomadic divisions. The main goal of these human activities and social interactions are to survive. Khaldun, herein, defines the umran and ‘the science of umran’ as:

Consequently, social organization is necessary to the human species. Without it, the existence of human beings would be incomplete. God's desire to settle the world

with human beings and to leave them as His representatives on earth would not materialize. This is the meaning of civilization, the object of the science under discussion (2005, p. 46).

Such a definition of umran widens the scope of Ibn Khaldun's study. That's why he sorts several other disciplines as sub-branches of Science of Umran which he describes in the Muqaddimah. This definition of umran is also directly related to the issue of political change that is subject of this study. Since we identify the umran as the aggregate of all human actions and man-made institutions, the politics, a way of interactions among human, is naturally included by this concept. Umran, furthermore, not only contains the politics but also has a decisive impact over it. Mobility and the unsteadiness of human behaviors, bring innovation to both the umran in its entirety and political institutions and political interactions. Consequently, nature of politics never stays stable and unchanging (Yıldız, 2010).

Moreover, umran is not a machine that includes all human activities and, at the same time, stores them by dissociating from each other. All sub-elements of umran, from politics, trade to ethnicity and technological developments are in a constant interaction with one another. Therefore, studying politics requires not ignoring all other realities regarding the umran.

Ibn Khaldun, after defining the concept of umran, claims that he introduced a new science about this phenomenon. According to him, this is the first attempt in the history to create such a science (Khaldun, 2005, p. 9; Kayapınar, 2008). He gives us the clues about the importance of empirical information and reality in his thoughts while explaining why such a scientific initiative is required. Prior to introducing the science of umran, according to Khaldun, history had been studying as closest discipline to fulfill its function. However, he does not approve the methodology of historical studies at that time and claims that it is not possible to generate and transfer the reliable knowledge by this route (Khaldun, 2011, p. 38). Consequently, historical narratives of the majority of classic Muslim scholars are full of inaccuracies. Khaldun, after identifying all these inaccuracies in Muqaddimah, concludes a methodological innovation. A scientific basis can be founded with the help of this new methodology. A primary principle of this new methodology is looking at, in

logical accordance of investigating events, with the recognized nature of umran. Ibn Khaldun intends by science of umran that a science introduce the laws and regulations of social life/order as natural sciences do. Factual knowledge about the human interactions and their outcomes, first of all, must fit with this nature.

Khaldun investigates umran in two branches as badawa and hadara (Meriç, 2004). Therefore, it is more than being progressed or civilized. Prior to discussing the qualities of ‘badawa umran’ and ‘hadara umran’, it is needed to explain what separates them from each other. It would be a mistake to think that Ibn Khaldun utilize these concepts so as to divide the rural and urban or nomadic life, and civilized life regarding the dictionary meaning of these terms. These separations are not the definitions produced by Khaldun itself, but the outcomes. Khaldun (2005, p. 91), first of all, claims that “differences of conditions among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living” (Khaldun, 2005, p. 91). According to this description, therefore, there are economical disparities between badawa and hadara. However, this is the only one of the differences between two types of umran. One such difference, for instance, is quality and quantity disparities of things in badawa and hadara umrans. Regarding the definition of these concepts by Khaldun which are explained in depth below, there is a qualitative/quantitative scarcity and abundance separation between them. Accordingly, the number of people and the amount of the people interactions are fewer in badawa than in hadara umran. The qualitative assessments also demonstrate the similar results. The intensity and the quality of interactions are also equally limited in badawa in comparison to hadara. The trade network of an individual who makes his living by selling his goods in badawa and his trade logic are not same with the one of hadara. The same situation is also valid for foodstuffs and clothing. In hadara, there is a surplus of food and clothing while people of badawa barely meet the basic requirements of life (Kayapınar, 2008; Khaldun, 2011). It is possible to vary the examples, but here the point to be noted is that the distinction between hadara and badawa is more depth than their dictionary meanings. Subsequent to define umran as whole social life and science of umran as a science presenting the laws of this social life, we can move on with hadara and badawa in details.

3.2.1.1 . Badawa Umran

First meaning of “badawa” is to talk about tribal nomads living in deserts (Arslan, 1987). However, Khaldun expands its meaning in *Muqaddimah*. Badawa, for Khaldun, is the origin of social life (Yurdusev, 2003, p. 61). Badawa, according to this definition, is prior to hadara. In other words, the adventure of human communities eventually reaches to hadara starting from badawa. It is mostly argued that badawa means country life or nomadic life peculiar to Arabs. However, Khaldun uses the badawa umran in different terms within his own approach. According to Khaldun, badawa is concerned for who are outside the core of the mulk. So, Bedouins in Khaldun’s thought do not live only in deserts but also in villages and towns. At this point Kayapınar’s definition ‘being outside’ for badawa (Kayapınar, 2008, p. 385) introduce an important and distinct perspective for our study. The state of ‘being outside’ will be studied deeply while explaining the concept of asabiyyah and rise of polities.

The concept of badawa umran corresponds to country life in some parts of the *Muqaddimah*. While introducing the conditions that are particular to the badawa umran, especially, some features of the nomadic lifestyle is remarked upon. However, remarking upon these features do not change the reality of Khaldun’s term ‘badawa umran’ is evolved to become a concept which exceeds its first meaning.

The living conditions of badawa umran are more challenging than hadara (Khaldun, 2005). Therefore, people living in such conditions need some capacities that are not required to live in hadara umran. The most essential one is courage. According to Khaldun (2011, p. 330), people of badawa umran is accustomed to wild nature and probable attacks from other residents of their umran, and are always on alert to defend themselves. Humans in such an atmosphere naturally became braver to fight and put up resistance when attacked. Consequently, such courage to fight presents them many advantages in the way of acquisition of power (mulk).

The loyalty to order establishing rules of life in badawa umran is more sincere and unconditional. That’s why Khaldun claims (2011, pp. 331-332) that naturally

binding rules without any severe higher authority do not have any negative impact on people's courage and creation. Since the political hierarchy in badawa umran consists of only a chief (reis) and its followers (the rest of the community), a class society does not occur. Moreover, members of the society, except the primacy of chief, are more equal on decision making mechanism than ones who live in hadara umran (Rosenthal E. I., 1962, p. 87). This kind of classless society, on the other hand, reduces the quality and quantity of constant interactions.

Despite all these positive qualities listed above, Khaldun asserts that badawa umran is not desired by humankind or the point where people tries to reach, because badawa umran is a statue of being the outside of the state of power and wealth. Since people have natural tendency to acquisition of power and wealth, they desire not to stay at badawa umran but to reach to a hadara life or mulk as soon as possible.

3.2.1.2. Hadara Umran

'Hadara' is a state in which we see diversification of economic activities from badawa and surplus value and over production (Arslan, 1987; Kayapınar, 2008; Khaldun, 2005). The superiority of production both quantitatively and qualitatively is natural for hadara. It can be easily recognized that the superiority is not limited with economic field but also experienced in all social compartments. In contrast with badawa, social interactions are more complex in hadara umran. Additionally, cumulative sums and intensity of human interactions are far greater.

Hadara umran is usually experienced in large cities (Arslan, 1987, p. 105). The concentration of social interactions and economics activities is directly proportional to the size of the population. On the other hand, it feeds the population growth too, because surplus and diversity of products consistently attract the greater number of people. Commerce and public service are common in hadara and these kinds of ways of living do not exist in badawa, but are peculiar to the hadara umran. Furthermore, equivalent of hadara umran in Khaldun's era is mostly living in cities which are protected with big castles and walls (Arslan, 1987, p. 116; Khaldun, 2011, p. 330). Additionally, an army always stands ready to fight against the threat to the

city. All of these feel people in hadara more secure about their commodities and life. The same situation cannot be thought for hadara, because people have to provide the security on their own in badawa conditions. After all, as indicated above, hadara umran is not necessarily equal to city life or urbanization.

Hadara umran is subsequent to badawa (Khaldun, 2005). The original and prior one is badawa. Epistemological roots of badawa in the dictionary already mean premise or primary (Khaldun, 2011). However, being subsequent does not mean the extinction of the primary (Khaldun, 2011). The coexistence of badawa and hadara is natural and so these are two realities regarding the economic and social life. The secondary, hadara umran, is desired point for humans since hadara provides people security, wealth and power, in other words mulk.

If we reconsider Kayapınar's definition for badawa (2008), we can describe hadara, in contrast to badawa, is being at the core of the mulk. Therefore, this provide to opportunities to profit from facilities of the mulk. Prosperity and security are the primary facilities. There is desire in human nature toward to wealth and power, and therefore, people of badawa umran aim to reach and own the hadara umran.

As a part of social life politics is also dissimilar in hadara than badawa umran. As it is explained in badawa section, leadership in badawa mostly occurs thorough the allegiance of people to a prominent member of community. There is no absolute obedience by law. Members of community declare their loyalty to one of the members (mostly decided in accordance with the nobility criteria based on blood ties) and this person is elected as leader (reis). In hadara the mulk or state power is at issue. The leadership is protected by law or state force in hadara and obedience to these rules is a burden for every single part of the society. In hadara umran, the leader possesses a security mechanism to defend him and the state structure. These mechanisms repress the society too (Khaldun, 2005, pp. 330-331).

In conclusion, two main disparities between hadara and badawa umran are identified here. Firstly, there is quantitative and quality difference between them in social and economic fields. And secondly, hadara umran means being in the center of

wealth and holding the power in contrast to badawa that is the phase of being outside of the prosperity and state power. Ibn Khaldun responses the question of what is the motivation behind the desires of people in badawa towards hadara. The concept of asabiyyah is the core of his theory and the motivation triggering badawa people to acquire the power.

3.2.2. Asabiyyah: The Engine of Social Transformation

One of the most controversial but also the most original concept of Ibn Khaldun is asabiyyah. Several different usages of asabiyyah in Muqaddimah complicate identifying what exactly it is. Arabic origin of asabiyyah ‘asabe’ means paternal relatives of a person and paternal ancestry (Arslan, 1987, p. 118; Khaldun, 2011, p. 94). It had been in use in Arab history to define people’s sense of support the other in their own tribe or clan. It is such a strong sense that the crucial point is not righteousness or unrighteousness of the person, but rather only coming from same lineage. Since there is no boundary to back up one’s own ancestry, it would not be wrong to define the concept of asabiyyah as “fight for your own blood in any case’. Despite the fact that some hadith pundits claim that Prophet Muhammad prohibited the asabiyyah, a concept unique to Arabic culture, Ibn Khaldun is so radical as to state that asabiyyah is a key factor behind the achievement of Islamic cause.

Ahmet Aslan claims that Khaldun firstly uses the term of asabiyyah as all kind of solidarity among the paternal relatives (Arslan, 1987). Secondly, asabiyyah means solidarity feeling among people in badawa (Arslan, 1987; Kayapınar, 2008). Badawa, as indicated above, has very tough environmental conditions, and therefore people need to stay together to defend themselves from all kind of threats. Asabiyyah is the main sense behind this togetherness. And thirdly, asabiyyah is the motor to handle the mulk. As understood from these definitions, Khaldun took the asabiyyah as a social phenomenon from family to a state structure (Arslan, 1987).

Arnason and Stauth (2004, p. 34) criticize defining the asabiyyah as only a social cohesion. Instead, they offer “a capacity for collective will-formation and

commitment to sustained action, rather than simply a high degree of social cohesion”. Goodman demonstrates various usage of asabiyyah by Khaldun in Muqaddimah. He begins with the role of asabiyyah within a family, and concludes with establishing of a state and political change. For Goodman (1972, p. 251), Khaldun introduces a concept to social studies that is similar to ones in natural sciences. “Like the matter of physical science, 'asabiyyah is a lowest common denominator, the irreducible substrate of all forms of political change”.

Kayapınar begins his definition attempts of asabiyyah with a categorization. He firstly explains the ‘conventional’ meaning of asabiyyah. At that point, he stresses two related concept: qabila and lineage (nasab). Asabiyyah primarily exist among qabila members and “main source of it is the unity of lineage” (Kayapınar, 2008, p. 380). This kind of usage was common in pre-Islamic Arab society.

To be more explicit, during the pre-Islamic Arab world, which is called Jahiliyya (time of ignorance) in the Islamic terminology, assabiyya had been understood as a spirit of unity and solidarity that unites all the members of a qabila around a notion of descending from a common ancestor. It is a social and psychological spirit that drives the (male) members of that qabila to act together against an external threat or to attack another qabila even if it does not pose a threat, which was not uncommon in the lawless deserts of pre- Islamic Arabia (Kayapınar, 2008, p. 380).

However, he argues that it is not possible to describe a pure and “absolute” lineage, therefore he agrees with Apak, and claims that “belonging to a lineage is not a biologic reality but a psychological belief” (Apak, 2004, p. 21; Kayapınar, 2008, p. 380)

His second category regarding to definition of asabiyyah is about the technical usage of the concept by Ibn Khaldun in Muqaddimah. His interpretation of Muqaddimah starts asabiyyah in badawa. However, asabiyyah is not a simple result of badawa. It has an end. The end of asabiyyah is mulk. Badawa people desire to get the power and wealth of hadara, that’s why a feeling to be in solidarity to reach this end occurs among them. One asabiyyah occurs people begin to act collectively to a determined political ends.

Once generated, however, it is assabiyya that causes people to act collectively, almost exclusively in political matters. It can be claimed that until assabiyya comes

into existence people are passive and determined by external stimulus, while after assabiyya they become active and determinant in their environment. More explicitly, to be exposed together to difficult conditions does not automatically and immediately create response, i.e., collective political action. Rather, it creates a ground on which assabiyya is generated and it is assabiyya, in turn, that leads them to act collectively. As Ibn Khaldun repeatedly underlies, no serious collective (particularly political) action can take place without assabiyya: “. . . assabiyya gives protection and makes possible mutual defense, the pressing of claims, and every other kind of social activity” (Kayapınar, 2008, pp. 385-386)

Peter Turchin’s definition (2007, p. 91) also highlights the social role of asabiyyah for human groups possessing it: “Asabiyyah of a group is the ability of its members to stick together, to cooperate; it allows a group to protect itself against the enemies, and impose its will on others”. He claims that Khaldun details the reasons of asabiyyah’s emerge and stress the role of environmental and climatic impact of desert and temperate geographical zones over human behaviors.

Franz Rosenthal, Süleyman Uludag and other interpreters of Muqadimmah bring more or less similar explanations to asabiyyah. However, there are some common mistakes in literature on Muqaddimah that will be discussed in this study. First of all, all these scholars admit the transcendental meaning of asabiyyah other than conventional and limited meaning; however, they avoid redefining the concept and bringing it to our time. They all, explicitly or implicitly, think that asabiyyah is still particular to the Arabic and nomadic culture. Therefore, their asabiyyah description mostly states the badawa phase of the concept. However, this thesis argues that, asabiyyah does not end after badawa, although it begins within badawa umran. Khaldun does not claim such an end either. His detection about asabiyyah after badawa is that the solidarity to take over the power weakens when the task is fulfilled not totally disappears.

While Khaldun refers to this meaning of asabiyyah, he transforms it into a technical concept in Muqaddimah. Since it is hard to find out what it really is as a technical term, authors prefer to stress its functions instead translating directly into both Turkish and any other European languages. Interpretation of asabiyyah varies

by translation of Muqaddimah into several European languages. Kayapinar notes some of these translations³:

It has been translated into Western languages as “group feeling”, “esprit de corps”, “esprit de clan”, “gemeinsinn”, “nationalitätsidee”, “corporate spirit”, “feeling of solidarity”, “group solidarity”, “group will”, “communal spirit”, “social cohesion”, “martial spirit”, “solidarity”, “striking power” and “social solidarity”(2008, p. 378)

Although all these translations of concept point out one side of asabiyyah, they could not be exact equivalent of this concept; the essence of the Muqaddimah. However, in two of the main sources of this study, Rosenthal, translate asabiyyah as ‘group feeling’ while Suleyman Uludag opts to leave as asabiyyah. (Khaldun, 2011; 2005). Even the words such as solidarity, group solidarity and nationalism are used to translate it. It is preferred to use the concept as it is in this study but still needed to be defined. This defining could be realized only by explaining the functions of asabiyyah. All these functions demonstrate us how the concept is differentiated and diversified by Ibn Khaldun.

Asabiyyah was not only transformed to a technical notion but also expanded in meaning by Ibn Khaldun. He achieved this by claiming two types of asabiyyah exist. Asabiyyah subject to blood ties (lineage) and related with being ally are two types of it according to Khaldun (2011). Prior type is the basic definition of asabiyyah and it means the solidarity based on lineage. This type of asabiyyah is mostly seen in tribal societies or nomads. Yet, asabiyyah can appear not only by blood tie but also something similar to it which led people to cooperate with each other. Allies and coalitions can be counted the examples of this definition (Arslan, 1987; Apak, 2004; Kayapinar, 2008; Khaldun, 2011). Apparently, Khaldun tries to demonstrate the possibility of asabiyyah’s different meanings among other societies aside Bedouin Arab tribes.

Despite that it is an uneasy attempt to clarify asabiyyah with its meaning in dictionary, many significant views on its functions put forward recently. ‘The main

³Kayapinar also stated owner of these concepts: “Franz Rosenthal (group feeling), De Slane (esprit de corps), Vincent Monteil (esprit de clan), Von Kremer (gemeinsinn and nationalitätsidee), H. Ritter (feeling of solidarity), M. Halpern (group solidarity), S.H. Bahsh and H. Shirvani (communal spirit), Hourani (corporate spirit), Aziz el-Azmeh (group will), Ernest Gellner (social cohesion and martial spirit), Erwin Rosenthal (solidarity and striking power), D.S. Margoliouth (clannishness) and M. Mahdi (social solidar- ity)

engine of operation of social orders' and 'driving force to establish a state' are among the interpretations of the notion. Moreover, some scholars claims that Khaldun identify first samples of modern nationalism in pre-modern era (Kayapınar, 2008, p. 383; Simon, 1999, p. 149). They consider that asabiyyah is basic factor lying behind nation formation and even they use them as synonyms. Here we share the ideas with Uludag and Kayapınar. According to them, asabiyyah is a term stating the acting together towards end at economic and political arena and it exceeds the meaning of nationalism. So it would be more convenient to think nationalism as a recent form of asabiyyah.

Asabiyyah is also a prerequisite for birth, growth, the prosperity of a state, and source of strength against the others. The end of asabiyyah is mulk (Khaldun, 2005, pp. 107-108). It is transformed in every phase and when the mulk is obtained, asabiyyah begins to disappear. Such a cyclical process is the essence of Khaldun's theory and will be examined in further detail.

CHAPTER 4

CYCLICAL UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS IN

MUQADDIMAH

The cyclical rise and fall process of dynasties, as defined by Khaldun's philosophy contains significant originality in and of itself. Some may find a cyclical understanding too deterministic in regards to explaining the decline and rise of states with only one metaphor or with binding the issue to very limited time periods. The questions that should be asked here are how Khaldun handles the issue and what are the phases of these cyclical understanding of political transformation.

Differentiation of societies with regards to their closeness to, or distance from the center of power and wealth is indicated in the previous chapter of this study. As in Khaldun's definition, badawa and hadara qualities play key roles in any explanation about the emergence, maturation, rise and decline of a polity (state). It is possible to clarify both the emergence of states and their desire to obtain more and more power and wealth after their very formation only by understanding the basic features of badawa, hadara and asabiyyah. It should also be remembered that the cyclical theory of Khaldun could not be realized if badawa and hadara do not possess peculiar political and economical conditions.

It is natural for the people of badawa, who sustain their daily life with limited facilities, to desire the abundance, comfort, security and wealth instead of scarcity and harshness. Khaldun states (2005) that people of badawa umran are so courageous as to risk fighting to reach such an end. The return of the mulk means more power and more prosperity for them. Such desire of these people, inherent to being human, has an active role in the formation of polities. This statement brings us to the main hypothesis of this study. Accordingly, Khaldun locates the human factor and asabiyyah, a human-specific concept, in his explanation of rise and fall of states,

despite the fact that contemporary theories on this phenomenon totally exclude, or handle in a very limited way the human factor.

4.1. Organic Life Analogy and Phases of State

Khaldun prefers the life span of humanity metaphor to explain the organic process of the rise and fall of states. According to him, each state (dynasty in his time) has a birth, adolescence, senility and decease phases similar to humankind. Khaldun also connects, aside from this metaphor, human and state with a generational explanation of the states' existence. Accordingly, dynasties (polities) survive for four generations. First generation is the founding generation. People who belong to this generation play crucial and active roles in the formation process of the state and their level of esprit de corps is highest among all generations (Rosenthal E. I., 1962, p. 88). Since this generation ensures the existence of the polity under very difficult conditions, they do not forget their previous harsh life outside of the mulk and protect the state (Khaldun, 2011, p. 346; 393). The state continues to rise as long as this first generation exists. The second generation experiences the peak of a polity. This generation remembers the straits on the way of the formation of the state and obtaining the mulk to the extent of what they have learned from the previous generation. Their sense of cohesion is still comparatively strong although there is a decline in comparison to first generation. With the help of this sense of unity (asabiyyah), they increase the wealth and power of the state. At this peak point of the state, however, several positive qualities particular to the first generation such as courage begin to disappear (Khaldun, 2011, p. 346; 394). Disappearance of such positive qualitative is also a precautionary signal of a decline from the peak for a dynasty. During the third generation, determination to win, courage and savagery totally disappear and rulers are not interested in the issues like the maintaining of their dynasty, future of the state since they are addicted to luxury and debauchery. Rulers of this era either completely forget the difficulties their ancestors experienced or ignore them all. This is the phase that senility begins to come upon the state and turns its face towards total collapse. Khaldun states that the deterioration of a state

occurs during the fourth generational epoch, that he does not emphasize much, as in the third one.

Beside this generational explanation Khaldun also describes five phases of a state's life span (2011, pp. 399-401). First of all is the phase of victory and invasion. A dynasty or a state, during this phase, defeats the other dynasties and takes over the mulk and their wealth. Asabiyyah reaches the highest point at this phase; this will be discussed under the heading of the role of asabiyyah. It would not be wrong to claim that this phase of a state corresponds to the first generation explained above. In the second phase, the dynasty consolidates his sovereignty and dominion over society. A victorious dynasty, in this phase, restrains and discharges many groups which cooperate itself during the struggle. The third phase of a state can be named as the golden age of a dynasty. In this phase, the ruler focuses on increasing his own and his states' wealth and tries to build huge monuments and buildings. A great and intensive luxury and flashiness stand out. However, rulers do not consider new victories and conquests as necessary anymore. Suleyman Uludag translates this stage as the phase of rest and leisure (Khaldun, 2011, p. 400). Holding a large and fortified army and being proud of this feat are among the features of this stage. Moreover, there is an atmosphere in the state that is confidential for the allies and defiance to the enemies. In the Fourth phase of the state, rulers or ruled content with what they had acquired before and do not add anything new. There are no new conquests and also rulers do not put in effort to develop the state's treasury. Peaceful relations and many alliances with other rulers and states are preferred instead of war and conflict. Rulers of this stage take all the advantage of the comfort of established order designed by their predecessors with imitative methods. Rosenthal characterizes this stage as the phase of decline while Uludag prefers to use the concept of stagnation. Absence of any social, administrative or economic progress, or at least attempts toward progress, is an inertia indication that takes the state back into secondary position after its rivals. The last phase of a state is the stage of its fall. Khaldun asserts that consumption and luxury excessively increase in this phase. Furthermore, employment of incapable person within the dynastical administration becomes prevalent and all these inadequate executives and luxury dependency push the state to collapse. The state or dynasty is, at the end of this phase, removed by a society

that possesses a stronger *asabiyyah*, savagery and greater will towards *mulk* (Khaldun, 2011, p. 350).

Khaldun associates these generations and stages with certain time periods with the help of historical analogies. He calculates the duration of a generation as 40 years and claims that the dynasty (polity/state) comes down in the world after 120 years (Arslan, 1987; Kayapınar, 2008; Khaldun, 2011). Such temporal limitations are found to be deterministic by some scholars (e.g. Suleyman Uludağ). They criticize Khaldun's approach by giving contradictory samples of states which survive a lot more than 120 years such as Ottoman Empire. According to Uludag (Khaldun, 2011, pp. 394-395), however, it should not be ignored that Khaldun leaves some room for such contradictions in *Muqaddimah*. Khaldun, on the one hand, tries to give a historical context; and on the other hand indicates the possibility of renewing *asabiyyah* and postponement of the collapse.

Suleyman Uludag's view on this issue is not shared in this study. It is true that Khaldun tries to catch a historical mean and support his claim with historical evidences. However, precedents both in Islamic and non-Muslim world demonstrate the contrary inferences. It is thought that Khaldun highlight such temporal factors under the impact of his time and recent history of his region. It should also be noted that critics of this issue do not dispute the importance of the original approach of Ibn Khaldun on the rise and fall of states, the main theme of this study.

The many faces of this description over the rise and fall of states naturally reflect the spirit of Khaldun's era. Some scholars claim that explanations based on generations should be taken as specific to the era of dynasties; they think that such explanations do not fit with modern political structures and states (Lacoste, 2012). In this thesis, however, it is argued that the logical outcome of Khaldun's philosophy is beneficial to elucidate the political cycles after his time too and his arguments cannot be localized with his geography and terminated by his time. It would be correct to claim that these phases are valid not only for mediaeval dynasties but also today's modern states and their societies.

Historians (Toynbee, 1988; Turchin, 2007) also identify that societies both in pre modern and modern era, fall in a stagnant situation after they reach their ultimate goals (mostly power and wealth). This situation occurs both for individuals and in structural mechanisms too. As indicated in the second chapter, mature and leading economies experience a structural stagnation at a point and have troubles to settle with new circumstances (Gilpin, 1981; Kennedy P. , 1988; Knutsen, 1999; Modelski G. , Long Cycles in World Politics, 1987). Societies of such states may prefer not to fight with new challengers and give up their comfort and mostly they do. Consequently, it would be inevitable to fall back for superior one to rise for the challenger.

Another point that should be remembered here is that Khaldun, besides introducing the human factor as a criterion for the long term success of states, frequently underlines the nature of human in Muqadimmah similar to Thucydides. Since there are unchanging aspects of human nature, it would be a logical proposition to assert that elements of human nature playing crucial role on rise and fall of states stay unchanging in ages. Therefore, Ibn Khaldun's approach to power transition between political structures is still relevant and comprehensive to understand the recent developments in international politics.

4.2. Role of Asabiyyah

The role of asabiyyah, the concept which includes the human factor of Khaldun's theory, is crucial for the understanding of rise and fall of states in Ibn Khaldun's thought. Strengths and weaknesses of asabiyyah are as vital as determining who the conqueror and the conquered is. A significant part of Khaldun's theory is based on this logic. Khaldun sees asabiyyah - the main instrument of transition from being outside the power to the being in core of power, namely, obtaining the mulk- as the primary factor for this achievement.

The genesis of asabiyyah is a natural end of being in the harsh conditions of badawa, and being outside of the mulk; according to Kayapinar's definition (2008). It is a sense that occurs instinctively among people and leads them to act together in

acquiring the mulk. Khaldun, while describing the outcome of asabiyyah, claims a dichotomic relation between power (mulk) and asabiyyah itself. Accordingly, a strong asabiyyah paves the way for the mulk and contrarily, owning the power and wealth has a negative impact over asabiyyah and weakens its effectiveness.

It is one of Khaldun's essential findings that asabiyyah is also a matter which goes through organic stages of life –from birth to death; similar to his cyclical understanding of history and all social phenomena. Asabiyyah plays its primary role during the formation and ascent periods of states. Given that asabiyyah means a sense or consciousness of a community's cooperative action towards a certain end, each society that wills to have mulk and create their own society naturally has to possess such a feeling of togetherness and communal effort. Khaldun explains this in *Muqaddimah* with the example of victory on the battlefield, although impacts of asabiyyah over the rise and fall of polities are not limited with only wars and conflicts. Yet, war is not the only way to handle or expand the mulk. War is just one side of the societal and political scene, which is why it would not be wrong to claim that asabiyyah contributes to the societies in many social and political matters other than war. Rapid and effective economic organization and developments, for instance, are also tightly related social issues with asabiyyah too.

It is also very hard to suppose that asabiyyah's function ends after the establishment of the state. This is because there is no limit to the will of humankind toward power and wealth. It is clear that a society which emerged in a certain region and time, and had a state and strong asabiyyah, ultimately aims at being the strongest and wealthiest, and standing against other dynasties or states. The state rises in power to the extent that it managed to achieve such will and it achieves power to the extent permitted by its asabiyyah strength. Khaldun underlines the issue as:

Once group feeling has established superiority over the people who share (in that particular group feeling), it will, by its very nature, seek superiority over people of other group feelings unrelated to the first. If the one (group feeling) is the equal of the other or is able to stave off (its challenge), the (competing people) are even with and equal to each other. (In this case,) each group feeling maintains its sway over its own domain and people, as is the case with tribes and nations all over the earth. However, if the one group feeling overpowers the other and makes it subservient to itself, the two group feelings enter into close contact, and the (defeated) group feeling gives added power to the (victorious) group feeling, which, as a result, sets

its goal of superiority and domination higher than before. In this way, it goes on until the power of that particular group feeling equals the power of the ruling dynasty. Then, when the ruling dynasty grows senile and no defender arises from among its friends who share in its group feeling, the (new group feeling) takes over and deprives the ruling dynasty of its power, and, thus, obtains complete royal authority. (2005, p. 108)

Khaldun narrates the role of asabiyyah by way of state formation and by providing continuance of its reign as above. Additionally, he interconnects the loosing of the effect of Asabiyyah and the fall of a state. As it is indicated before, asabiyyah has a limited lifespan like individuals, so it dies eventually. When asabiyyah begins to weaken, according to Khaldun, the order of a state collapses and it begins to decline too. The question here is: why does asabiyyah erode or disappear with time?

The answer of the question is actually hidden in the question of how asabiyyah originates. Asabiyyah originates in a society, according to Khaldun, as a natural outcome of being outside the power and wealth and living in harsh conditions. Therefore, it begins to lose its effects gradually when all these conditions disappear, in other words this society reaches a state of comfort and wealth. Since objectives have been met and the mulk is obtained, there is no reason anymore for a strong asabiyyah.

Another question that should be asked here is: why cannot all societies develop an asabiyyah that is strong enough to reach victory and mulk, although they live in harsh conditions and outside the power and prosperity? Or, why does not asabiyyah lead to the same outcomes at any time or place? To this point, Khaldun puts forward two explanations. First, some societies prefer to be content with what they have already obtained at some point in their struggle for the mulk (Khaldun, 2005, p. 351). Luxury and self-indulgence at that point discourage, demoralize the society and destroy the asabiyyah that is fundamental to the absolute victory and complete control of mulk. It is not possible to have mulk and gain more power for such societies (Kayapınar, 2008; Khaldun, 2011). Secondly, some societies lose their asabiyyah capacities because of living under oppressive rule of other societies. A huge oppression destroys some human abilities like resistance or possessing the mulk

(Khaldun, 2011, p. 352). Therefore, such societies under oppression could not create necessary sense of asabiyyah and own mulk despite maintaining their life in the harsh conditions of badawa. Khaldun cites Jews under Egyptian rule as an example of this issue.

Khaldun's deterministic idea about disappearance of asabiyyah and the fall of states in time have been criticized. However, Khaldun claims that the overall comprehensiveness of asabiyyah can be expanded by generating new asabiyyahs and it is possible to prolong a state's life by this way. He tries to preserve the rationality of his thesis against criticism of fatalism with this explanation.

Asabiyyah is very significant for Khaldun's theory, in other words it would be true to claim this concept lies behind all man-made political transformations in Khaldunian understanding. Asabiyyah's impact in Khaldun's thinking reflects in many fields and phases of political life of such societies' search for power and their victories such as, creating a state structure and maintaining its unity, in innovating their asabiyyah when it faces the risk of disappearing as well as in the defeat and elimination by other societies if they cannot innovate their sense of asabiyyah.

4.3. Role of Religion

Ibn Khaldun lived in a time when the effect of religion was very intensive. Therefore, it would not be expected of him to skip or miss the role of religion in social political events (Arnason & Stauth, 2004; White, 2009; Goodman, 1972). Khaldun, so, provides a role for religion in the rise and fall of states too. This role can be investigated by two tiers. First is the answer to the questions of there being an impact of religion over asabiyyah or a related side of religion with asabiyyah and if so, how the impact plays a role on the rise and fall of states. Second one is Khaldun's approach to the religious character of politics and state regime.

It is necessary to explain what Khaldun's notion of religion is prior to investigating these two tiers. Religion, according to Ibn Khaldun, is equal to Islam, the only true faith for himself. Despite the fact that he gives many examples about

asabiyyah or several sides of politics from non-Muslim societies, he does not mention non-Muslim samples about the role of religion on politics. Similar to the mainstream Islam understanding, religion is not limited with some types of worships or rituals for Khaldun either. Religion continues its existence as a lifestyle containing all fields from politics to economy to law. Therefore, it is inevitable to handle the religion for Khaldun as an embedded part of the process of the rise and fall of states.

Suleyman Uludag, in his footnote on this issue in his translation of *Muqaddimah* (2011, p. 378), claims that Khaldun's understanding of religion can be interpreted as not simply religion but also a worldview or ideal. According to such an interpretation, Khaldun intends to stress that it is vital for a state not to be subject to Islam only but to have a coherent ideal which can direct the whole society to a certain end. This interpretation is not shared by Gibb (1933) or Rosenthal (1962) but it is still a worthy suggestion to think it over.

Ibn Khaldun discusses the role of religion in the formation and ascendance processes of a state in two different perspectives. According to Khaldun, firstly, if a society (state) owns a religious cause and it also relies upon a strong asabiyyah, and it defeats the other states and expands its mulk (Khaldun, 2005). The point of 'relying upon an asabiyyah' here is very crucial, because Khaldun claims in *Muqaddimah* that a religious cause could only be propagated by relying on an asabiyyah. Asabiyyah is still a prerequisite here. Rosenthal (Rosenthal E. I., 1962) defines Khaldun as a realist because of this approach. The role of religion here is increasing the effect of asabiyyah. Khaldun states that a strong asabiyyah owning society can bring together stronger and outnumbered societies with the help of a religious cause.

When people (who have a religious coloring) come to have the (right) insight into their affairs, nothing can withstand them, because their outlook is one and their object one of common accord. They are willing to die for (their objectives). (On the other hand,) the members of the dynasty they attack may be many times as numerous as they. But their purposes differ, in as much as they are false purposes, and (the people of the worldly dynasty) come to abandon each other, since they are afraid of death. Therefore, they do not offer resistance to (the people with a religious coloring), even if they themselves are more numerous. They are overpowered by them and quickly wiped out, as a result of the luxury and humbleness existing among them, as we have mentioned before. (2005, p. 126)

Another role of religion in the rise of states is about its unifying effect among the members of a state's society. According to Khaldun, the only way to establish a rule over larger areas and populations is unifying their hearts and minds for a common end. Otherwise people enter into a rivalry because of worldly desires and follow other ways for achieving other aims (Khaldun, 2005, pp. 125-126). These are fatal controversies for a state and mulk. Khaldun claims that only a religious cause can remove such problems. (Khaldun, 2011, p. 378)

Secondly, Khaldun raises the religion factor over state administration and politics in regime type debates. He divides these regime types in two. These are rational politics and religious politics (caliphate) (Khaldun, 2011, pp. 410-422; 570-571). He does not only divide politics but also defines these different political ways of ruling. Furthermore, he criticizes a third method of politics that is utopic state visions of Al-Farabi and Averroes immediately before defining his divisions (Arslan, 1987; Khaldun, 2011, p. 571; Korkut, 2008). Despite the fact that these philosophical approaches offers a state in which rational capacities of all people are considered and expected behaviors are compatible with these capacities and there is no need for a ruler, Khaldun finds it unrealistic at least. Because, while Khaldun describe being in social life as natural for humans, he also underlines their earthly sides may create problems against one another. Therefore people need to choose a leader or ruler to solve their problems and conduct the administrative duties on behalf of them.

Subjection to a ruler is also a natural process for Khaldun. This subjection and state ruling actualize in two ways throughout the history. Khaldun identifies them as rational politics and Shar'i politics (Caliphate). Khaldun, contrary to expectations from him as a hardcore Sunni/Maliki faqih (legist), does not define non-sharia ruling methods as unnatural. Rational politics is also natural for him. In some parts of Muqaddimah he equals rational politics and mulk. However, caliphate is not equals to mulk, because the caliphate (ruling according to the Shari'a Law) organizes all the compartments of mundane life by considering people's salvation in the afterlife while rational politics or mulk takes only the earthly interest into account (Khaldun, 2011, p. 420; Rosenthal E. I., 1962, p. 94).

The basic feature of rational politics is that its rules are determined and performed by humans. It is clear that rational politics is a secular way in comparison to caliphate. In the process of determination of the rules, it is highly possible that a person dictates his own interest and condition to others. Therefore, Khaldun claims that Shari'a is more advantageous for humans since Allah set the rules of Shari'a and he knows necessities and interests of people in this life and the afterlife better than anyone (Khaldun, 2005, p. 421).

Moreover, he also divides the rational politics into two groups. The first one is the regime type based on total injustice and oppression. Cruelty and force are the main characteristic of this type of polity. Furthermore, the ruler's personal interest and desires come first instead of public interest (Khaldun, 2011, p. 570). It is natural for this polity and ruler to be extraordinarily prosperous, having a huge army and oppressing its subjects with excessive taxes to finance all these expenditures. According to Khaldun this kind of polity is the most common one in the world. For him, even the Islamic governments after the first four caliphs were all in this category.

The second type of rational politics, even though it is based on mulk and obtained by force too, considers public interest first and its rules are more logical and built on common interests (Khaldun, 2005, p. 570). This type of polity is better than the first one according to Khaldun's understanding. However, since these kinds of polities do not consider the afterlife of people and prioritize the rules of Allah, Muslim scholars do not approve and welcome such governments.

It is important at that point to clarify a confusing matter about rational politics. Rational politics does not mean an absolute laicism in today's context. It may contain today's secular understanding but it is not possible to speak of a secular state in Khaldun's time. All the rulers of that time claimed their reign was based on the rules of Allah. However, we can clear this confusion by looking at issues of Islamic history. Accordingly, caliphate, despite continuing its religious authority, lost its broadly accepted status among ummah and consultation peculiarity during its election with the beginning of Umayyad Dynasty which turns into sultanate that is, descended from father to son. Furthermore, as Khaldun states that while caliphate of

first four caliphs was built on modesty, following caliphs or sultans and governors or relatives in state administration maintained their rule in luxury and prosperity. All these developments are symptoms of mundane life in universal Islamic teaching and against the Sharia law despite the fact that ruling laws are based on Qur'an formally. Thus, Khaldun defines such polities in the category of rational politics not in Sharia.

Ibn Khaldun values Sharia above rational politics. A true Sharia regime is the name of a polity that secures both this life and after life of people and actualizes the will of Allah above people. As indicated above, in classical Islamic thought and Ibn Khaldun's understanding religion and world cannot be separable. Religion (Islam) is a phenomenon containing entire life. In this context, politics as a humane activity cannot be thought as independent from such a comprehensive reality. Islam surely speaks of politics in one way or another just like it promotes kindness, alms (zakat) or prohibits the alcohol or interest (riba).

Asabiyyah has a role in the emergence of caliphate or religious administration by gaining the victory. However, since a state is formed as a result of victory with the help of asabiyyah and continues with this absolute asabiyyah force will turn into a cruel and oppressive rulership eventually, Religion or Caliphate has a transformative impact over such a polity. Caliphate, according to Khaldun, brings the order of Allah that is, it prohibits the cruelty against humans and therefore it is best for the mundane life of people too.

4.4. Role of Material Power

The non-material explanations of rise and fall of powers particular to Ibn Khaldun' and contrary to contemporary theories of International Relations were handled so far. However, it should not be inferred from these explanations that Khaldun totally excludes the material elements of power in his theory, because he stresses the importance of economic wealth and military power for the victory of a state or society in several parts in Muqaddimah:

It should be known that any royal authority must be built upon two foundations. The first is might and group feeling, which finds its expression in soldiers. The second is

money, which supports the soldiers and provides the whole structure needed by royal authority. (2005, p. 246)

In the chapter of “wealth (luxury) gives at first additional strength to dynasty”, Khaldun claims (2005) that mulk and economic prosperity increase the number of societies and attract significant number of migrations with better economic conditions. These developments also raise the number of fighter for this state. Suleyman Uludag does not agree on that issue with Khaldun in his *Muqaddimah* translations. In a footnote, Uludag claims that Khaldun’s explanation on the issue is meaningful in his time, but development is related with advance technology and qualified man power in today’s world instead of number of population or military (Khaldun, 2011). Suleyman Uludag’s criticisms are not widely shared in this study. However, he states, in examples to support his criticism against Khaldun, that population remains stable or decreases in developed countries and even population growth seems as an obstacle in the face of development. Although his suggestions seem correct in theory, this evidence about development or stagnation are more close to Khaldun’s approach on politics in decadence because of luxury dependency rather than population problems. Furthermore, Khaldun points out here the positive impact of wealth over population during early stages of a state. For example, the difference between the United States and Switzerland is as a result of the size of the market depending on population rather than qualified man power or technological superiority. Another point missed by Uludag is that one of the advantages of increasing in wealth for a state is attracting the educated and qualified man potency from all over the world. This situation was same in Khaldun’s era too. Andalusia at that time or Istanbul later on was the center of attraction for scholars, engineers and technicians from diverse geographies. Similarly, the United State and Western European states or Japan doubled their human capital from different continents.

Another issue covered in a different title in *Muqadimmah* of Ibn Khaldun is winning the wars and capacity of armies. According to Khaldun, capacity of armies depends on two factors. First is the size of armies and second is the quality of weapons. In the view of Khaldun, similar to the victory in wars, expansion and

longevity of states is also associated with the preponderance of people connected to asabiyyah and accordingly their fighting prowess against big armies.

Thus, the expansion and power of a dynasty correspond to the numerical strength of those who obtain superiority at the beginning of the rule. The length of its duration also depends upon it. The life of anything that comes into being depends upon the strength of its temper. The temper of dynasties is based upon group feeling. If the group feeling is strong, the (dynasty's) temper likewise is strong, and its life of long duration. Group feeling, in turn, depends on numerical strength, as we have stated. (Khaldun, 2005, p. 130)

It is absolutely true that these evaluations contain facts of Khaldun's time. The impact of the size of army on the total military capacity today is less than his era. Under the influence of technology, the quality of weapons takes precedence over their number.

Ibn Khaldun doesn't reject the view of the size of army and superiority of their weapons. However, he gives more importance to the point of how this financial capability is used by military and political leadership. According to him, the capacities of men who run the war and successfully implement of stratagems are as important as the larger number of armies and superiority of weapons for winning the wars.

In the issue of winning the wars, Khaldun also points out whether or not one of the belligerents has more homogenous military structure or not. If there is an army belonging to a single asabiyyah on the one side and an army consisting of several different asabbiyahs on the other side, the first will win the war according to Khaldun. The army belonging to a single asabiyyah has more solidarity to defend each other. As it is mentioned in the asabiyyah question, the sense of being together up to risk their life for each other overpowers the ones that do not have asabiyyah or having dispersed asabbiyyah.

Khaldun does not stress the war much in his theory. Although, he gives an implicit role in the issue of taking the mulk, war is not one of the primary determinant activities of societies and politics. Such approach of Khaldun presents us vital clues about the Khaldun's political understanding. Furthermore, it is appoint that separates Khaldun from the modern theories that nearly equals inter-state relations with war and conflict.

4.5. End of Asabiyyah and Fall of State

According to Khaldun, states like people will also disappear one day. He discusses the issue in a deterministic way. “Dynasties have a natural life span like individuals” (Khaldun, 2005, p. 136). However, he doesn’t depend on only this determination but also analyzes the points which cause states to destroy. Khaldun presents great numbers of titles about the collapse of states. In *Muqadimmah*, these titles seem disorganized because they are not in the same part but they are handled when the occasion arises. In this study, the events which led to the collapse of states would be grouped under two headings; first the troubles regarding asabiyyah and second the structural reasons.

4.5.1. Problems Regarding Asabiyyah

As for Ibn Khaldun, asabiyyah bearing vital role for the foundation and rising of a state also causes collapse of the state when harmed or weakened. Then arises this question: Why does asabiyyah weaken and cause states to collapse in time? Although the reasons were briefly remarked under the role of asabiyyah, we shall underline the reasons for this in a more detailed manner. This essay asserts four reasons causing the collapse of states depending on deterioration of asabiyyah in *Muqaddimah*. They are analyzed respectively.

Initially, as asabiyyah means the motivation for obtaining state or property, it clearly triggers competition amongst people/society. During the foundation stage of a state, a society possessing asabiyyah prevails over the other, toppling the existing state and gaining power. This community possessing asabiyyah desires to enlarge its property and territory. However, according to Ibn Khaldun, there are some crucial obstacles regarding this matter on some regions due to the existence of a great number of different asabiyyahs within narrower regions. These asabiyyah types initially resist against prevailing asabiyyah and, if they lost at first time, they portray some insurgencies within time (Khaldun, 2005, p. 130). Unless administrators of the

state possess a more efficient asabiyyah, they fail to cope with such kind of challenges and the state becomes jeopardized.

With regard to this matter, Khaldun (2011, pp. 386-387) makes a comparison between North Africa, Egypt and Syria where political authorities have dominated for a long time. In his opinion, Byzantine and Iran Empires had dominated those territories (Syria and Mesopotamia) by their asabiyyah and constructed more homogeneous communities. Hence the Islamic state encountered no crucial resistance during conquering and succeeding conquest of these territories. But the case for North Africa was not the same. In North Africa, particularly Barbaries and a wide range of tribes, asabiyyahs caused severe drawbacks for states both during conquest and dominance periods.

As remarked many times before, luxury prosperity and comfort are practices which deteriorate asabiyyah. Although Khaldun expresses this situation as luxury addiction of dynasty members and state administration, it can be currently translated as overconsumption and deficient production. Adverse effect of luxury over asabiyyah and the life span of the state occurs in two ways: first is the community's attainment of a comfortable state and second is the failure in the collection of fiscal input necessary for the state due to the decrease in production vis a visa consumption increase.

Khaldun remarks that the prominent adverse effect of Luxury and prosperous life is impairment of the striving power within communities. In the aftermath of a state's foundation, members of that asabiyyah attain prosperity and comfort and they progressively withdraw from the period when they strived and they begin to enjoy their new life style. However, it is a fact that there will be a challenger aiming to possess this property and mulk all the time. Societies are therefore always required to stand ready for encountering and fighting with such an enemy. However the community addicted to luxury does not prefer fighting to its own comfort and this case causes the state to be defeated during wars leading to its ageing and destruction.

Moreover, keenness on luxury consumption is resulted from spending the state's resources on these secondary aspects instead of aspects that are primarily

needed. Squandering more than the needs in the state administration, which occurs as showy dresses of dynasty members, feasts and gifts in the time of Khaldun, and society's abandonment of production for effortless profit affects state's finance negatively. The money that is allocated to these vital aspects including military expenditures, which is necessary to the survival of the state, is reduced. Reduction of this economic share diminishes both the size and quality of the army thus weakening the state.

According to Ibn Khaldun (2011), another factor that influences *asabiyyah* and therefore existence of the state is the quality of the relationship between rulers and the ruled. We could grasp that there are two dimensions in that relationship between state governor (sultan or any other regime) and society from Khaldun's description. The first one is how the state treats society and the second is how society benefits from the property (*mulk*) that is, wealth production.

Harsh treatment by the state government of its society is a method that harms the *asabiyyah* feeling in the society which sustains the state (Khaldun, 2011, p. 418; 549). Primarily, intimidation from hardness in a society which is governed in this way turns into a permanent temperament and it becomes a society whose resistance is broken. We could exemplify this with treatments of colonial empires in their colonies and change of behavior in the societies after the slavery institution. For a society that lives under permanent pressure, since occupation of another government and the capture of its state would not make any difference, the society does not show any effort to resist it.

Another negative consequence of harsh treatment is that subjects or citizens hold a grudge against existing administration and state structure, and they make efforts to get rid of this government in any opportunity. *Asabiyyah* and resistance do not fade away. We could consider them as domestic rebellions. In the case of Arab Spring, societies' attitudes towards the governors who govern them cruelly could be an example of this argument.

Another aspect of the relationship between state and society is the share of wealth that is allocated to the society or given to the people (Khaldun, 2011, p. 548).

If the governor devotes all the wealth to himself (or in modern state, governing elites among themselves), and does not part with some of this wealth to his people, he could not ensure their loyalty to the state and the governor. Thus, according to Ibn Khaldun, a wise governor should give wealth to his citizens, which means share the prosperity and wealth with them. A state or governor who behaves in this way could get support from the society in war or in any political decision or action. Societies are satisfied to live under the administration of this kind of governor and run the risk of fighting for him.

The last situation which causes the decline and disappearance of the state, which depends upon *asabiyyah*, is an indirect factor which increases beyond the state's control. When a state and its society's *asabiyyah* does not completely disappear but begins to decline, the forthcoming danger for the state is facing a community which has a stronger *asabiyyah* (Khaldun, 2005). If this challenger acts on a religious invitation, it becomes a stronger and more dangerous threat. In this case, this state which could normally survive is defeated and begins to disappear. Such a situation sometimes becomes true in the state's internal structure. If the impulse, which is the glue that holds society together, declines and more narrow emotions arise, a segment of society can revolt against the state.

4.5.2. Structural Problems

The reasons which cause the state's decline and disappearance, except *asabiyyah*, are overgrowth of the state in its geography/capacity. For several reasons; economic problems arise from higher tax rates that cannot be fully collected.

Two factors of the state's growth and development are geographical obstacles. Either they have adequate *asabiyyah* to provide the state's activity in their large lands or they do not. The necessary condition for the spread of the authority of the state is a sufficient number of *asabiyyah*; it is also not possible for the state to have a number of *asabiyyah* that is less than sufficient for expansion (Khaldun, 2005; Rosenthal E. I., 1962). These kinds of activities jeopardize the existence of the state because protecting the center of the state will be difficult for them.

States in the beginning are usually successful, both in terms of amount and efficiency, in collecting duty. Although the community and *asabiyyah* numbers are few in number, this tax is enough for the community. However, this situation eventually deteriorates because the state's military and other spendings increase and its tax collection mechanism is corrupted. In this situation, states generally, by raising the existing tax rates or by placing new taxes, work to fix financial statements or to meet the needs of the state. However, by raising these new taxes too much begins to harm commerce and production with time and this is the one of the worst scenarios for the state (Khalidun, 2011, pp. 540-541). The state, which is caught in this vortex, goes backward and begins to collapse with time.

Khalidun on the subject of the regression of states suggests primarily *asabiyyah* and related subjects as the causes, but that there is not just one reason. In this paper, from the *Muqaddimah*'s diverse parts, in reference to the last periods of the states and periods of regression, these findings have been debated under diverse titles. These concepts presenting the rise of the state will be able to give a reason for results to the contrary with time to the subject at hand.

4.6. Innovative Contributions of Khalidunian Understanding of Dynamic Politics

After explaining Khalidun's cyclical sense of history and the logic of the issue of rise and fall of states, it is necessary to look briefly at what sort of contributions and opportunities Khalidun offers to the current IR literature. We can summarize shortly what subjects Khalidun finds that are different and original solutions to today's problems in three sections. Firstly Khalidun suggests an approach in which material and non-material elements are evaluated together. Secondly, he includes the human factor and the nature of human indirectly in these explanations not in a passive but rather active way. He introduces us, thirdly, to a wide range of viewpoint from the formation of a state until its struggle in an international system.

One of the innovative contributions which Khalidun's theory brought to the field is that, beside the material side of power and change such as economic and

military capability mostly handled in contemporary theories, he introduces a non-material cause of shifts in the political sphere. Here it is important to attract attention to the point that this study does not agree with some works which claim Khaldun's approach is entirely non-material and deny the importance of economy. Because, Khaldun claims welfare as a beneficial factor for the expansion/growth/advancement based on *asabiyyah*. However, he stressed that devotion to wealth and luxury damages the *asabiyyah* and obstructs its end -handling the *mulk*-(Khaldun, 2011). Thus, the empiricist character of Khaldun should not be ascertained while assessing his thoughts on political change. Such an assessment is possible only as a result of handling the universe in a holistic way which is one of the important topics of Islamic science philosophy discussions.

In the integrity of the universe, human and all other social activities about human society are a whole. This is an understanding which works simultaneously with every sort of material equipments which are set, made or obtained by human beings as well as human abilities which are not concrete such as cooperation, solidarity, courage and leadership. Therefore, in actual and scientific works about state and politics it is necessary to think of and get more than just material data (Pasha, 2011). Khaldun's approach presents us with such a way of thought.

We can give Khaldun's opinions about war, one of the political actions, as an example of the fact that he has formed his theory by evaluating these non-material and material factors together. While Khaldun mentions about the number of the soldiers and about the superiority of the weapons under the heading of "how a war is won", he emphasizes the fact that all these are not enough at all and he also emphasizes the importance of different tactics, of a good leadership and sense of solidarity to reach a successful conclusion at war. It would not be right to think that this situation is valid only in the conditions of the pre- modern era. Because, despite the high capacity in weaponry and army, the failure of America-the super power of the last century-in Vietnam and the 2003 Iraq War may be explained with the lack of similar qualities. Furthermore, the lack of information about the places and cultures where these wars were carried out, the misguided leadership and absence of

solidarity in the American army about the aim of the war should be accepted as reasons for losing the war.

After purporting that economic prosperity avails state authority, Ibn Khaldun thought that this wealth and richness would cause corruption in societies and rulers. That is why succeeding wealth while averting corruption is the most important point that government and authorities should take care of. This is probably the reason why Khaldun sees caliphate superior to other politic regimes. Since caliphate has religious rules and the ruler is Allah who knows the best weak and strong points of humans, he has probably put some rules in place that protect humans from error.

Consequently, the approaches of Ibn Khaldun toward politics and state authority cover all the material and non-material elements, while his social approaches cover all problems. The adaption of this philosophy in international relations is necessary and possible. Yet, perceiving the cycle in the international system as the state of change in economic status quo would not be true. Whether the scenario about China comes true or not is dependent on this. Being such an economic giant, China will never be able to be a serious rival to the US or Western Countries in the competition of being the global power without transforming this enormous economic power into the set of values that will help have a say in the international area and making its whole community and authorities believe in it.

The other original innovation of Ibn Khaldun in political science and international relations, specifically in the studies about the rise and fall of countries, is considering the human factor. This contribution is not only about non-material elements that are mentioned above. The proposition about humanity and its nature is the essence of Khaldun's hypothesis.

There are explanations about human nature in the beginning of modern international relations literature, too. Representatives of classic realism and idealist school attempted to generalize the consequence of the governmental relations basing upon the human nature. However, these studies remain limited to data of absolute characteristics of human nature. In the meantime, the only phenomenon that is investigated in these studies is the reasons of war in international scene. These

studies are the attempts at explaining the wars by human nature. Therefore, they avoid explaining many political and social changes except wars.

Ibn Khaldun engages human factor in all political levels of explanations about the formation, rise and fall processes of a state including wars. For him, formation of states is a result of the sum of the people's will towards power and prosperity and passion or courage which has occurred under the harsh condition of *badawa*. The action resulted from the sum of these two phenomena is described with the concept of *asabiyyah* by Ibn Khaldun. *Asabiyyah* is a human-specific notion and active in all man-made political developments. Therefore, it would not be wrong to say that all explanations that do not regard humans as the main important factor are deficit comments about politics and inter-state relations for Khaldunian approach. Ibn Khaldun already criticizes his Muslim or non-Muslim contemporary philosophers and predecessors about this point. For him, these scholars have missed two realities. One of them is a body of rules regarding the universe that affects and determines the entirety social life. Khaldun names it as *umran* and claims to establish the science on it. Second is the human factor that is both affects *umran* and is affected by *umran*. Precedent scholars briefly touched upon these issues with either philosophical or utopia explanations or conservative and populist explanations.

Ibn Khaldun investigates even the emergence of states with the analogy of human life and describes the lifetime of dynasties with human generations. The human factor has an impact on the fall of states, because humans determine the difference between possessing the wealth or power and successfully utilizing this wealth and power. Decadence is inevitable for states that cannot combine this wealth/power with the sense of *asabiyyah* (and with a religious/ideological cause if possible). Both humane and material reasons of this collapse are detailed above.

Khaldun handles the human factor which has an important role in the formation, rise and fall of a state in a different way. Modern theories do not mention the human factor in their explanation like Khaldun did, due to scientific sensitivity. However, this phenomenon should be investigated by getting out of the positivist scientific observation of these contemporary theories, because, one of the shortfalls of positivists is doing social science without the human element. Such an

understanding excludes the main object of 'social' in the explanations of social issues. Ibn Khaldun here brings us a significant initiative to close the gap in modern social sciences and particularly in the International Relations discipline.

Most studies on Ibn Khaldun's thought about the rise and fall of powers concentrated on internal developments of a polity. However, this study claims that it is possible to apply his ideas not only to intra-state developments but also inter-state relations. While doing so, the internal side of a state's rise is not denied. Contrarily it is assumed here that the Khaldunian understanding of a state's rise integrates the internal factors with the external ones. Therefore his ideas are valid for inter-state relations as much as intra-state.

Khaldun's holistic approach to internal growth and advancement in inter-polity relations distinguishes him from contemporary theorists. These modern theories put uneven growth rates in the first place among the factors that lead a state to grow relative to others. However, they leave unclear those impulses which provide such uneven growth. Khaldun, on the contrary, handles the puzzle from this point onward. *Asabiyyah* plays a determinant role to nurture his theory.

Being outside the mulk, or authority; prosperity and wealth in other words, generate a sense of solidarity for a group of people (Khaldun, 2005; 2011). Societies create awareness about their backwardness (state of Bedouin) and overcome it only with the help of this sense of solidarity, *asabiyyah*. *Asabiyyah* lies behind all the developmental steps on the way to the seizure of mulk. The polity, on the way of progressing process to the mulk which began with *asabiyyah*, continues to grow internally and expand externally.

As indicated throughout this paper, studies about Khaldun's view on the rise and fall of states mostly handle his ideas as only a means to explain the dynastical changes in pre-modern societies or establishment of a polity and process of consolidation of its authority. Thus, it is concluded in this study that *asabiyyah* will disappear after the existence of the state with its all dimensions. Whereas according to Ibn Khaldun (2005, p. 108), *asabiyyah* would demand more and more if luxury and the feeling of having enough wealth do not create an obstacle. This approach

also demonstrates that it is natural for a society to have aims beyond a state creation. It is an absolute conclusion at this point that the beginning of a tension between political entities is inevitable, because polities -immediately after establishment- try to expand at the expense of others. The expansion based on *asabiyyah* continues until the polity confronts with a state possessing equal strength and *asabiyyah* (Khaldun, 2011, p. 350).

The integrative structure of Khaldun's approach to rise and fall of powers – he integrates the internal and external development- and his distinct contribution to International Relations literature is the main point that distinguishes him from contemporary scholars. Khaldun starts the process of moving to leadership from the very beginning of the emergence of a polity. He treats the internal (self) resurgence of a polity as premise of its competition with other political units. Such an approach puts forward a new and comprehensive international politics that combines conventional structural assumptions with the domestic factors to understand change and transformation in/of politics. It is observed that Khaldun gives a detailed deconstruction of the 'backwardness' and 'uneven growth' assumed by long cycle or power transition theories without giving enough importance to their causes and outcomes. This is the expected result of Khaldun's understanding of history based on causality chains (Caksu, 2007; Dale, 2006). Therefore, we can observe Khaldun's tendency to deepen the causes of a social/political phenomenon at that point too. He suggests *asabiyyah* the cause of political development as a social process and starts the causality chain of this development with *asabiyyah*.

Ibn Khaldun's integrative approach provides us a set of advantages to evaluate the issue of rise and fall states. Firstly, Khaldun exhibits the domestic reasons of change in a state's capacity while contemporary theories are content with only their relative capacity comparisons. Although Paul Kennedy tries to demonstrate some internal developments about the fall of state, he is also slightly loyal to the comparison of relative capacities. Said modern theories, moreover, have interest in great powers only, whereas Khaldun introduces to International Relations studies a chance to explain why some states do not achieve the great power status with his holistic and integrative perspective.

4.7. Comparative Assessment of Ibn Khaldun and Modern Theories

This part will present a comparative analysis of three modern international theories mentioned before and the perspective of Ibn Khaldun (about international relations). This analysis will precisely provide the original contribution of Ibn Khaldun for the discipline explained under the previous title. This comparison will also give a chance to evaluate comparatively some assumptions briefly summarized in the title of “Modern Theories” with the prominent assumptions and conceptions of Ibn Khaldun’s original theory. Within this comparison, not only will their differences highlighted but also their similarities.

The first issue for comparison is the time dimensions of all approaches. Modern theories limit themselves mostly to the modern era and European historical narratives. However, it is obvious that it is not possible to create a comprehensive and global explanation for the rise and fall polities by limiting the historical analysis with only the modern era and European history. Khaldun brings us new geographies and new historical moments to evaluate the cyclical history in depth.

However, it is possible to say that the giving approaches of Khaldun are limited to his own cultural region and historical experience. As also stated in the Introduction, the approaches of Ibn Khaldun are a series of conceptions which touch upon the disregarded points of modern theories, but bring new insights (to international relations) as well as modern ones. But it does not mean to claim that his approaches are the absolute and the best explanation (of the current international relations).

Modern international relations theories have a euro-centric overview particularly at their perceptions on time and space. By regarding the historical experiences of European states, they make some generalizations for international relations, states and the rise and falls of the states. However, to understand power-shifts and systemic changes in current world politics, we need to have alternative paradigms rather than just euro-centric ones. This necessity led us to study on Ibn Khaldun. In this sense, he provides us with two advantages. One of them is that he

examines the (some historical) transformations experienced in a different region other than the European continent. So, it is not exaggerated to claim that these transformations could give us some clues for addressing current global problems.

The second advantage is that Khaldun avoids using a unilateral perspective in his theory, albeit limited one. His study includes some significant information about diverse cultures and regions from Andalusian Spain, North Africa, Egypt, and Syria to Anatolia, Iran and Turkestan. Although today it is possible to draw only one Islamic civilization border over the maps of all these regions, during the period of Khaldun they did not have a unitary structure. At that time, even today perhaps, it was impossible to consider the region of North Africa with Anatolia and Iran to be a part of the same system. Therefore, it is possible to speak of innovativeness of explanatorinnes of a theory that contains a larger cultural and political geography in comparison to modern theories that limit their interest to only Europe or the Western World.

The subject on which Ibn Khaldun ('s views) shows the closest resemblance to modern theories, can be described as the centrality of the state while examining politics, especially inter-societal politics. Even though they diverge from each other with regards to how states behave in the international arena and how this influence their policies, for both Khaldun and the modern theories, state is the main actor of politics. According to Khaldun, the state is an inevitable necessity. While explaining the reason of this necessity, Khaldun discusses the human need to live collectively, along with his/her requirement for security (Arnason & Stauth, 2004; Khaldun, 2005; Rosenthal E. I., 1962). Here, we see a more elaborated explanation than what modern theories, especially the ones that realist and liberal schools, offer. Above all, Khaldun points out that humans are knowingly and willingly going to cooperate with other communities due to their need for living collectively, without rejecting their need for protection from nature and other people. This is a realistic explanation which neither unilaterally reduces humans to the position of '*homo hominilupus*', nor naively depicts them as guardian angels.

Placing states to the centre of analysis, more or less defines the object of interstate relations, which is the power struggle between states, or considering the era

that Khaldun had lived, the power struggle between dynasties. Khaldun and the three modern theories that are discussed in this paper do not diverge much on this subject. As all three theories put forward, subtly or explicitly, the states' have an urge to have the biggest portion of the property (power or wealth). While Gilpin (1988; 1981) treats this urge as an inevitable rational behavior, Khaldun departs from this approach by utilizing the notion of human nature. Since in Gilpin's understanding rational calculations might end up in retreats, which in a way converts states into impeccable machines, while Khaldun's description of human nature and temperament is open to making mistakes and greed, which may lead to the end of the state.

However, as mentioned previously, state is not a given for Khaldun. The three modern theories do not discuss the historicity of state's existence. For these the state has always been there. It does not matter how or why it emerged. Yet, Khaldun discusses these issues since for him, state emerges for a reason. As mentioned above, it arises due to the two fundamental requirements of human beings, which are security and fulfillment of vital necessities for survival. Khaldun only takes class discrimination as a given while problematizing the state. Yet for him this does not constitute a normative problem. For most other classical Islamic thinkers, having different stratas of wealth and power within a society is a natural phenomenon, as it is for Khaldun.

Another point where Khaldun and modern theories diverge is the answer they give to the question "Which type of states?" Khaldun, both as a consequence of the era he lived and as a requisite of his scientific understanding, puts forward a political system wherein all states, regardless of their power or wealth, act together. All three theories that we discussed, as a result of their association with the realist school, only consider the rivalry among major powers in their analysis. Since small states are not considered to be significant actors on a global scale, or more specifically within the context of European states system, examining their impact and influence is deemed unnecessary for these theories. Yet, Khaldun's approach examines state and society as a totality, and contrary to the big state/small state classification of modern

theories, he categorizes states as successful or unsuccessful in line with their respective objectives.

Later on, another point which should be examined with the issue of state is that Ibn Khaldun's explanations about decline and the fall of states are more deterministic than the three modern theories of this study. The assumption that states will eventually fall like human beings is very deterministic approach. Modern theories in the study are not deterministic to this extent and they solely discuss the conditions of a possible fall. It is however possible to infer a deterministic approach about the inevitable deterioration of economy-strategy balance in Kennedy's work (1988). Khaldun's determinism is mostly the result of developments in his region and time. Therefore, this determinism should be carefully criticized today before introducing his thoughts in our International Relations literature.

Modern theories in this study, as it is indicated in the first chapter, shelter a strong system emphasis. They all agree on the determination of system over states' strategies despite their discordance about the operation of the system. It is hardly possible to speak of a system with its modern meaning in Khaldunian understanding. However, it should not be ignored that the state, as the core of his political narratives, is not an excursive actor and does not act in a limitless plane in Khaldun's theory. Khaldun's offer instead of system is the intersubjective interaction in *umran*. He proposes an *umran* portrait that has a huge impact on the behaviors of societies and states on the one hand, and is influenced by them on the other hand. States are not independent from the natural rules of *umran* and the historically formed rules that are the result of intersubjective interactions (Cox, 1996; Pasha, 2011). Khaldun claims that policy makers, active advisors of politicians and scholars of political science should know the limiting impact of *umran* over societies and state and also conduct their policies or science according to these natural facts. Those who do not pay attention to these facts are mostly utopic philosophers or sycophants who try to please their masters.

One of the differences between the three modern theories and Ibn Khaldun's approach on the rise and fall of states is their interpretations of the role of war. For modern theories war is essential and in a determinant position in any political scene.

They acknowledge war as an unavoidable end for both the system they describe and the behaviors of the states. Victory in a war for a state means either imposing itself as a leader/hegemon or a great power. However, Khaldun doesn't see war as a big decision mechanism, despite the fact that war is an important situation in the way of accessing mulk. Losing or winning a war as an important part of political events has an effect on the rise or fall of states. However, it is more important for Khaldun to ascertain whether states or societies who have power a result of winning a war, had asabiyyah before the time of the war.

Furthermore, Khaldun describes, beside war, the situations which cause problems and weakens a society. As discusses above, these situations include social degeneration and the spreading of dependency on consumption and prosperity. For societies which are weak in such normative points, it is inevitable to lose both in the battleground and in any other social and political fields. It is impossible to see such a normative evaluation in the three theories we discussed. Such a difference is a natural result of Khaldun's evaluation of politics which is based on human nature.

Table 4 Contemporary Theories on International System Change and Ibn Khaldun's Dynastic Cycle

Theory	Definition of Dominance	Role of Wars	Time/Cycle Period	Reasons of the Rise/Change	Reasons of the Collapse
The Long Cycle Theory	Leadership	Determinant of both the leading state and the characteristics of the new system.	Since 1500's / 100-year episodes	1. Insular Location 2. Cohesive and open society 3. Innovative economy 4. Efficient political organization	
Hegemonic Stability Theory	Hegemon	Hegemonic wars threaten/transform the structure of the international system and settle the tension in the system	Since the ancient Greek City States / There is no time period.	1. Uneven growth and change in the composition of power distribution 2. Transformation in the structure of the system 3. Alterations of domestic dynamics of a state e.g revolution	Cost of maintaining the status quo increases more than the economic capacity of the hegemon
Kennedy's Approach of the Rise and Fall Great Powers	Great Power (First among equals)	Decide the new 'first among equals'	Since the rise of Europe in 1500s / There is no time period.	1. Uneven growth as the result of economic innovation	Imbalances between economy and military strategy
Ibn Khaldun's Dynastic Cycle	Mulk	One of the phase of obtaining the mulk and power	The is no beginning / 120-year long cycles	1. A strong asabiyyah 2. Religious/Ideological cohesion 3. Superiour material power (soldier, money)	1. Luxury dependency 2.Erosion of asabiyyah 3.Oppressive ruling 4.Countering by a stonger asabiyyah

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Does Liberal Order decline? Are there any changes in global power relations? These are among the most debated issues in social science disciplines such as International Relations, Political Science or Economics. Such issues are not only being debated on global level. Significant political transformations at regional level are in progress currently. The global political scene experiences that new emerging actors replace the old masters of international politics who establish the rules and such a rise of these actors begins at the regional levels and reach the global level by the of their lifespans. For example, while the Security Council of the United Nations (with five permanent members that are the United States, Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) reflects the power distribution of those years, it cannot represent the current political balance anymore. Therefore, policy makers had to create new (informally alternative) mechanisms like G-7, G-8 and lastly G-20.

Change is a continuing act and it is natural. As Khaldun states (2005), everything in the universe is in a constant transformation and alteration. However, history taught us that there are certain periods in which pace of change is higher. Today, we are witnessing similar time period that change occurs in a very fast way. In the meantime, we see that theories, trying to foresee the direction such transformations, lose their validity in a very short time. Theories that do not have a dynamical understanding about politics become obsolete even faster. Under such circumstances, we need alternative approaches which are not originated in a single world view or policy center. Because it is perfectly recognized that Western oriented explanations of today's International Relations literature can enlighten the only limited aspects of global level political developments. Above all, unveiling the non-western scientific sources becomes more crucial since the emerging actors that

transform the international political system are not western unlike the 1945 transformation.

This thesis, for that reason, aims at comparing the current theories on the power transition debate that started in 1970's for the first time and reawakened in 2000's with an alternative approach. In this context, cyclical historical understanding of 14th century North African scholar Ibn Khaldun and three contemporary theories that are Modelski's Long Cycle Theory, Gilpin's Hegemonic Stability/War Theory and Paul Kennedy's Rise and fall of Great Powers piece are presented comparatively. The research question of the thesis is what Khaldun proposes that is and different about power transition than others. In the answer of this question, the thesis underlines two important points. First is the original side of Khaldun's theory. And second is the innovative contribution of Khaldun into current International Relations literature to comprehend the recent international political developments.

The answers of the research question are investigated with a certain method in different chapters throughout the thesis. Structure of the study consists of mainly three parts:

1. Introducing the modern theories and their main propositions
2. Creating the necessary conceptual guideline and a historical background of Khaldun's approach
3. And finally, presenting the Khaldun's cyclical understanding of politics and its comparison with three modern theories that are discussed in the first part.

In accordance with this plan, a detailed introduction of modern theories is handled in the first chapter. Moreover, basic assumption, historical perspectives and the proposition of all three works are examined one by one. In the summary of the chapter, a comparative outline was extracted as groundwork to compare them with Khaldun's approach.

Third chapter links the first chapter with third chapter and acts as manual for the next chapters that handles the Ibn Khaldun's theory. Unusual concepts and their meaning in this study were presented in third chapter. Because, it would not be

possible to develop an innovative interpretation over Khaldun's thought without such a conceptual guideline. The chapter particularly aims at demonstrating the denotations of *asabiyyah*, *umran*, *badawa umran* and *hadara umran* in this study. Additionally, the answer of the question why Khaldun's thoughts are valid in today's political climate is answered. Furthermore, it is argued in this chapter that parallels between the political atmosphere of Khaldun's era and today, similarities between political structure in Khaldun's region at those times and today's modern international structure entail investigating Khaldun's thought in contemporary International Relations literature.

Later on, Khaldun's cyclical understanding of politics and history was discussed in the fourth chapter. In this context, the ways Khaldun lays out his reasoning that affect the rise and fall of polities and roles of material power, religion, and *asabiyyah* on this cyclical perspective were discussed. It is important to demonstrate the status of state and way of handling the state-society relations in Khaldunian understanding. Moreover, a comparison of Khaldun and modern theories placed in this chapter. Such a comparison eased to clarify the original contribution of Khaldun for power transition studies.

After these research phases this study comes to the conclusion that Ibn Khaldun offers three innovative ideas about rise and fall of powers. Firstly, he does not exclude the material or non-material side of power and politics. Such an approach is novel for current International Relations literature. Yet, three divergent perspectives dominate the contemporary IR literature. The first is that there are those who are totally interested in material power of states through mostly historical understandings. Such theories settle only with taking a status quo's picture into account with their explanations. They do not care much the origin, dynamic flow and future of the status quo. Secondly, some theories criticize the first kind of approaches in terms of unit and level of analysis, but they also use materialistic datum in their analysis. Marxism could be given as an example of this kind of approaches. And finally, there are also some approaches that completely deny the materialistic explanations about politics and focus on the textual construction or deconstruction. In short, literature is divided into several approaches around the structure-agent

debate. However, Khaldun cannot reach those extreme points. He utilizes a new method that merges them both into the 'reality' of social life. He links the numerical greatness of the power of an army with the societal solidarity and *asabiyyah*. He evaluates the economical development with both its advantages and disadvantages for a state and society. Therefore, all these things disperse separate him from contemporary theories.

This thesis argues for the inclusion of the human factor into power transition debates as a second innovative contribution of Khaldun. Neither the theories handled in this study nor the others such as Organski's Power Transition Theory, Wallerstein's World System Theory and Goldstein's Long Cycles Theory (we can add many other names in this list) consider the 'human being' or notions related with humans as a determinant element of their political narratives. However, Khaldun's realism starts at this very point. Scientific (or political) approaches that exclude the 'human' (agent) or 'umran' (structure) are evaluated as 'unrealistic' by Ibn Khaldun. Such approaches can be a philosophical utopia or a work to please rulers for him. He does not separate the structure and agent in his explanation regarding the social and political life. Therefore, it makes sense not his handling the military achievements and economic developments with the human factor and impacts of *umran* over them.

Asabiyyah plays an important role at this point. With the help of this concept it becomes possible to include the human factor in a scientific study. Although its definition varies in many studies or languages, *asabiyyah* is described, as previously stated, as a societal impulse that affects the political (social) change and transformation. Its occurrence is directly related with being outside the *mulk* (power and wealth) and living under harsh conditions, and also it aims at reaching and taking over the power. Khaldun acknowledges that such an impulse is natural and particular to human beings, and he makes the human one of several independent variables in political studies and explanations.

Khaldun's integrative approach on rise and fall of polities is his third original contribution for International Relations discipline. He starts the process of rise and fall from the formation of a state. Such an approach requires examining both internal developments of a state and structural (*umran*) developments in an integrative way.

Ibn Khaldun, by questioning the issue of rise and fall from the historical meaning of state existence, serves to demonstrate the impact of factors that are conventionally not given. Inclusion of non-material elements and the human factor can only be possible with such a holistic, in depth, large-scaled and integrative perspective.

The roots of such an integrative perspective should be searched in classical Islamic science and thinking on universe. Scholars and philosophers of classical Islamic thought (from Al-Kindi to Al-Farabi and Mulla Sadra) look at the universe as whole from each single piece to the galaxy systems and to the creator God. Therefore, Khaldun, as a medieval representative of Islamic science of law-fiqh, investigates the politics with a multilayer method starting from human being, state and reaching up to state systems and umran. And this innovative understanding of science offers a new opening for unit and level of analysis debates in International Relations.

It is possible to comprehend some of the contributions of all these innovative approaches for studies on modern international political developments. Primarily, it should be admitted that there are now more effective actor than conventionally accepted great powers in the international scene and therefore, more comprehensive alternative thesis should be developed to understand the future of international politics perfectly. Furthermore, it should always be remembered that examining the particulars of the way of being a great/dominant/hegemonic power is precious as much as studying a 'given great power'. Within this context, developments of regionally emerging states should meticulously be observed and more depth and large scaled researches should be created to foresee the global reflections of these rising processes.

Moreover, it is argued in this study that we need more than the given datum to present worthwhile assessments about the rise and fall of states. For example, the different status of Pakistan and South Korea's or France's cannot be explained by looking only to quantitative abundance in population. Similarly, sometimes even the nuclear capacity does not concretely mean the military superiority as in case of Turkey and Pakistan. Therefore, scientific works on this issue should unveil some

certain qualitative (or non-material) elements of politics and society that turn the numbers into effective tools.

As indicated in the introductory chapter, this study does not claim that Khaldun's understanding of rise and fall is the best or the most perfect thesis. On the contrary, it is argued that his theory presents a precious alternative to complete missing point of current theories in understanding the quickly changing political developments of new millennium. The consciously skipped issue in the study is testing Khaldun's view with case studies. Because we believed that a conceptual guideline enables further studies on cases and only after such a conceptual map, it would be possible to apply Khaldunian understanding of political change to the contemporary cases.

REFERENCES

- Al-Azmeh, A. (2003). *Ibn Khaldun An Essay In Reinterpretation*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Anderson, E., & Chase-Dunn, C. (2005). The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. In C.-D. C. Anderson E. N, *The Historical Evolution of World-Systems* (pp. 1-19). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Anderson, P. (2007). *Gramsci: Hegemony, Doğu Batı Sorunu ve Strateji*. (T. Günersel, Trans.) İstanbul: Salyangoz.
- Apak, A. (2004). *Asabiyet ve Erken Dönem İslam Siyasi Tarihindeki Etkileri*. İstanbul: Düşünce Kitabevi.
- Ardıç, N. (2008). Beyond 'Science as a Vocation': Civilisational Epistemology in Weber and Ibn Khaldun. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 36, 434-464.
- Arnason, J. P., & Stauth, G. (2004). Civilization and State Formation in the Islamic Context: Re-Reading Ibn Khaldun. *Thesis Eleven*(76), 29-47.
- Arslan, A. (1987). *İbn-i Haldun'un İlim ve Fikir Dünyası*. Ankara: Vadi Yayınları.
- Beyer, C. (2009). Hegemony, Equilibrium and Counterpower: A Synthetic Approach. *International Relations*, 23, 411-427.
- Black, J. (2008). *Great Powers and the Quest for Hegemony*. New York: Routledge.
- Burchill, S., & Linklater, A. (2005). Introduction. In A. L.-S. Scott Burchill, *Theories of International Relations* (pp. 1-28). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bussmann, M., & Oneal, J. R. (2007). Do Hegemons Distribute Private Goods? : A Test of Power-Transition Theory. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51, 88-111.
- Caksu, A. (2007). Ibn Khaldun and Hegel on Causality in History: Aristotelian Legacy Reconsidered. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 35, 47-83.

- Chabane, D. (2008, September). The structure of 'umran al-'alam of Ibn Khaldun. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 13(3), 327-344.
- Chan, S. (2008). *China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory*. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Colaresi, M. (2001). Shocks to the System: Great Power Rivalry and the Leadership Long Cycle. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45, 569-593.
- Corbin, H. (2010). *İslam Felsefesi Tarihi* (Vol. 1). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Cox, R. (1996). *Approaches to World Order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dale, S. F. (2006). Ibn Khaldun: The Last Greek and the First Annales Historian. *International Journal Of Middle East Studies*(38), 431-451.
- Danilovic, V. (2002). *When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Denmark, R. A., Friedman, J., Kalls, B. K., & Modelski, G. (2000). *World System History The social science of long-term change*. London: Routledge.
- Dursun, T., & Hassan, Ü. (2008). *İbn-i Haldun'da Uygarlıkların Yükselişi ve Düşüşü*. İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları.
- Elmalı, O. (2003). İbn-i Haldun ve Machiavelli'nin Realist Siyaset Kuramları. *EKEV Akademi Dergisi*, 15, 133-142.
- Eralp, A. (2012). Hegemonya. In E. A. Eralp, *Devlet ve Ötesi: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Kavramlar* (p. 155). İstanbul: İletişim yayınları.
- Fida, M. (1998). Ibn Khaldun's Theory of Social Change: A Comparison with Hegel, Marx and Durkheim. *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 15, 25-45.
- Fromherz, A. J. (2010). *Ibn Khaldun, Life and Times*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Fukuyama, F. (1992). *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Avon Books Inc.

- Gibb, H. (1933). The Islamic Background of Ibn Khaldūn's Political Theory. *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, University of London*, 7(1), 23-31.
- Gilpin, R. (1975). *U.S Power and the Multinational Cooperation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. New York: Basic Books.
- Gilpin, R. (1981). *War&Change in International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1987). *The Political Economy of International Relations*. Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Gilpin, R. (1988). The Theory of Hegemonic War. *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 18(4), 591-613.
- Gilpin, R. (1996). Economic Evolution of National Systems. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40(3), 411-431.
- Goldstein, J. S. (1985). Kondratieff Waves as War Cycles. *International Studies Quarterly*, 21(4), 411-444.
- Goldstein, J. S. (1988). *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*. Ann Arbor: Yale University.
- Goodman, L. E. (1972). Ibn Khaldun and Thucydides. *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 92(2), 250-270.
- Grunberg, I. (1990). Exploring the "Myth" of Hegemonic Stability. *International Organization*, 44(4), 431-477.
- Harkavy, R. E. (1999). Long cycle theory and the hegemonic powers basing networks. *Political Geography*, 18, 941-972.
- Hassan, Ü. (2011). *İbn Haldun Metodu ve Siyaset Teorisi*. Akara: Doğu Batı yayınları.
- Hobbes, T. (2010). *Leviathan*. İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları.
- Ikenberry, G. J. (2001). *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

- Irwin, R. (1997). Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 33(3), 461-479.
- Jian-Shu, C. (2007). Cyclical Logic in the Transition of Hegemony: Modeski's Long Cycle Theory in International Relations and its Weakness. *Journal of World Economics and Politics*(12), 24-32.
- Kalpakian, J. (2008). Ibn Khaldun's Influence on Current International Relations Theory. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 13(3), 357-370.
- Kayapınar, M. A. (2008). Ibn Khaldun's Concept of Assabiyya: An Alternative Tool for Understanding Long-Term Politics? *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 36, 375-407.
- Kegley, J. C., & Raymond, G. A. (1989). The Long Cycle of Global War and the Transformation of Alliance Norms. *Journal of Peace Research*, 26(3), 265-284.
- Kennedy, J. (2011). Prophets armed: Muhammad Ibn Khaldun and Niccolò Machiavelli. *Theology*(114), 101-107.
- Kennedy, P. (1988). *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Keohane, R. O. (1980). The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes in 1967-1977. In R. M. Ole R. Holsti, *Change in the International System* (pp. 131-162). Boulder: Westview Press.
- Khaldun, I. (2005). *Muqaddimah*. (F. Rosenthal, Trans.) Princeton N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Khaldun, I. (2011). *Mukaddime I*. (S. Uludag, Trans.) Istanbul: Dergah.
- Kim, W. (1992). Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo. *World Politics*, 45(1), 153-172.
- Kissinger, H. (2006). *Diplomasi*. (I. H. Kurt, Trans.) Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.
- Knutsen, T. L. (1999). *The Rise and Fall of World Orders*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Kohout, F. (2003). Cyclical, Hegemonic, and Pluralistic Theories of International Relations: Some Comparative Reflections on War Causation. *International Political Science Review*, 24(1), 51-66.
- Korkut, Ş. (2008). Ibn Khaldun's Critique of the Theory of al-Siyâsah al-Madaniyyah. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 36, 547-570.
- Kugler, J., & Organski, A. F. (1980). *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kupchan, C. (2001). Introduction: Explaining peaceful power transition. In C. A. Kupchan, E. Adler, J.-M. Coicaud, & Y. F. Khong, *Power in transition: The peaceful change of international order* (pp. 1-17). New York: United Nations University Press.
- Kwon, R. (2011). Hegemonies in the World System: An Empirical Assessment of Hegemonic Sequences from 16th to 20th Century. *Sociological Perspectives*, 54(4), 593-617.
- Lacoste, Y. (2012). *İbn Haldun: Tarih Biliminin Doğuşu*. (M. Sert, Çev.) İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları.
- Levy, J. S. (1985, April). Theories of General War. *World Politics*, 37(3), 344-374.
- Levy, J. S., & Thompson, W. R. (2010). *Causes of War*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Machiavelli, N. (1997). *Hükümdar*. İstanbul: Şule Yayınları.
- Meriç, C. (2004). *Umrandan Uygarlığa*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Messier, R. A. (2008). The Worlds of Ibn Khaldun: introduction. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 13(3), 275-277.
- Modelski, G. (1978, April). The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 20(2), 214-235.
- Modelski, G. (1987). *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Modelski, G. (1996). Evolutionary Paradigms for Global Politics. *International Studies Quarterly*, 40, 321-342.

- Modelski, G. (2005). Long-Term Trends in World Politics. *Journal of World-System Research*, 11(2), 195-206.
- Modelski, G., & Morgan, P. (1985). Understanding Global War. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 29(3), 391-417.
- Modelski, G., & Thompson, W. R. (1988). *Seapower in global politics, 1494–1993*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Modelski, G., & Thompson, W. R. (1999). The Long and the Short of Global Politics in the Twenty First Century An Evolutionary Approach. *International Studies Review*, 1(2), 109-140.
- Nizamuddin, A. M., & Sentürk, R. (2008). The Sociology of Civilisations: Ibn Khaldun and a Multi-Civilisational World Order. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 36, 516–546.
- O'Brien, P. P. (2007). Review Article: Warfare and the Rise and Fall of National Power. *War in History*, 14(2), 265–278.
- Okumuş, E. (2009). *Osmanlı'nın Gözüyle İbn Haldun*. İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık.
- Organski, A. F. (1968). *World Politics*. New York: Knopf.
- Organski, A. F., & Kugler, J. (1980). *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Parsons, T. (1991). *The Social Systems*. London: Routledge.
- Pasha, M. K. (2011). Ibn Khaldun and World Order. *Innovation and Transformation in International Relations*, 56-70.
- Pijl, K. V. (2009). *A Survey of Global Political Economy*. Sussex: University of Sussex.
- Pines, S. (1970). Ibn Khaldūn and Maimonides, a Compararison between Two Texts. *Studia Islamica*(32), 265-274.
- Rosecrance, R. (1987). Long Cycle Theory and International Relations. *International Organization*, 41(2), 283-302.

- Rosenthal, E. I. (1962). *The Theory Of The Power-State: Ibn Khaldun'S Study Of Civilization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rosenthal, F. (1984). Ibn Khaldun in His Time. *International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology*, 40, 14-26.
- Say, S. (2011). *İbn Haldun'un Düşünce Sistemi ve Uluslararası İlişkiler Kuramı*. İstanbul: İlk Harf Yayınları.
- Sayrs, L. W. (1993). The Long Cycle in International Relations: A Markov Specification. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(2), 215-237.
- Simon, R. (1999). *Ibn Khaldun: History as Science and the Patrimonial Empire*. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado.
- Snidal, D. (1985). The limits of hegemonic stability theory. *International Organization*, 39(4), 579-614.
- Spengler, J. J. (1964). Economic Thought of Islam: Ibn Khaldun. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 6(3), 268-306.
- Strange, S. (1995). Political Economy and International Relations. In e. K. Booth and S. Smith, *International Relations Theory Today* (pp. 154-174). Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Sunar, L., & Yashçimen, F. (2008). The Possibilities of New Perspectives for Social Sciences: An Analysis Based on Ibn Khaldun's Theory of Umrân. *Asian Journal of Social Science*, 36, 408-433.
- Thompson, W. (1986). Polarity, the Long Cycle, and Global Power Warfare. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 30(4), 587-615.
- Thompson, W. (1988). *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approach to World Politics*. Columbia SC: University of South Carolina Press.
- Thompson, W. (1992). Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition. *World Politics*, 45(1), 127-152.
- Thompson, W. R. (1990). Long waves, technological inovations and relative decline. *International Organization*, 44(2), 201-233.

- Thompson, W. R. (2006). Systemic Leadership, Evolutionary Processes, and International Relations Theory: The Unipolarity Question. *International Studies Review*, 8, 1–22.
- Thompson, W. R. (2009). *Systemic Transitions Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Thompson, W. R., & Modelski, G. (1977). Global Conflict Intensity and Great Power Summitry Behavior. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 21(2), 339-376.
- Thompson, W. R., & Modelski, G. (1989). Long Cycles and Global War. In M. I. Midlarsky, *Handbook of War Studies* (pp. 23-54). Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
- Toynbee, A. (1988). *A Study of History*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Turchin, P. (2007). *War and Peace and War The Rise and Fall of Empires*. New York: Plume.
- Vayrynen, R. (1893). Economic Cycles, Power Transitions, Political Management and Wars between Major Powers. *International Studies Quarterly*, 27(4), 389-418.
- Volgy, T. J., & Imwalle, L. E. (1995). Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(4), 819-834.
- Walker, R. B. (1987). Realism, Change, and International Political Theory. *International Studies Quarterly*, 31(1), 65-86.
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Politics*. Addison-Wesley.
- Watt, W. M., & Cachia, P. (2011). *Endülüs Tarihi*. (C. E. Adıgüzel, & Q. Şükürov, Trans.) İstanbul: Küre Yayınları.
- White, A. (2009). An Islamic Approach to Studying History: Reflections on Ibn Khaldun's Deterministic Historical Approach. *Intellectual Discourse*, 17(2), 221-244.
- Wylie, D. (2008). Decadence? The Khaldunian cycle in Algeria and South Africa. *The Journal of North African Studies*, 13(3), 389–401.

- Yıldız, M. (2010). İbn-i Haldun'un Tarihselci Devlet Kuramı. *FLSF (Felsefe ve Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi)*(10), 25-55.
- Yurdusev, A. N. (1993, March). 'Level of Analysis' and 'Unit of Analysis': A Case for Distinction. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies*, 22(1), 77-88.
- Yurdusev, A. N. (2003). *International Relations and the Philosophy of History A Civilizational Approach*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Yurdusev, A. N. (2006). 'Uluslararası İlişkiler' Öncesi. İ. Dağı, A. Eralp, E. Keyman, N. Polat, O. Tanrısever, F. Yalvaç, et al. içinde, *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Temel Yaklaşımlar* (s. 19-20). İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmada, çağdaş uluslararası sistem dönüşüm teorileri ile İbn-i Haldun'un hanedanların yükselişi ve düşüşü üzerine geliştirdiği tezler karşılaştırılmış ve ana sorunsal olan 'İbn-i Haldun, günümüzün Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe önemli yer kaplayan güç geçişleri ve sistem dönüşümleri hakkında yeni neler önermektedir?' sorusunun cevabı aranmıştır. Bu soruya ve konuya varılmasını sağlayan unsurların başında da Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe 1970'lerden sonra ama özellikle de yeni bin yılın başlangıcıyla artan 'Batı'nın gerilemesi ve diğerlerinin yükselişi' tartışmaları vardır. Bu tartışmadan hareketle, bu tez, sadece hangi güçlerin yükseldiği ve gerilediği konusunun değil, aynı zamanda bu tür geçiş ve dönüşümlerinin sebeplerini açıklamanın da önemli olduğu düşüncesinin bir ürünüdür. Çağdaş teorilerin güç dönüşümleri ele alış yöntemleri ve içeriklerinin, yeni yüzyıldaki güç dönüşümleri açıklamada tam bir başarı kazanamadığı düşüncesi tezin çıkış noktasıdır. Bu kapsamda yeni ve farklı medeniyet havzalarının da bu konuya bakış açılarını literatüre taşımak ve günümüz akademik ve politik çevrelerinin konu üzerindeki tartışmalarına zenginlik kazandırmak amaçlanmıştır.

Bu kapsamda çalışma giriş ve sonuç kısımları dışında, üç ana bölümden oluşmaktadır. İkinci bölümde aşağıda belirtilecek nedenlerle seçilmiş üç çağdaş teori olan Modelski'nin Uzun Döngü Teorisi, Gilpin'in Hegemonik İstikrar Teorisi ve Kennedy'nin Büyük Güçlerin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü konusundaki yaklaşımı ele alınmış ve temel argümanları sıralanmıştır. Üçüncü bölüm ise dördüncü bölümde ele alınacak olan İbn-i Haldun'un döngüsel tarih anlayışı ve hanedanların yükselişi ve düşüşü konusundaki tezlerini daha iyi anlamak amacıyla, Haldun'a ve çalışması Mukaddime'ye dair tarihsel ve kavramsal bir arka plan sunmaktadır. Son ana bölümde ise Haldun'un siyasal merkezlerin yükselişi ve düşüşü konusunda yenilikçi

yaklaşımları ve bu yaklaşımların, kendilerini belirleyen etmenlerle ilişkileri incelenmiş ve çalışmada ele alınan üç çağdaş teori ile olan fark ve benzerlikleri ortaya konmuştur.

Çalışmanın amacı giriş ve sonuç bölümlerinde ifade edildiği üzere, Haldun'un konu hakkındaki yaklaşımlarının tek ve mutlak doğru olan yaklaşımı bize sunduğu değil, aksine literatürdeki mevcut tartışmaların eksik yönlerini tamamlayıcı nitelikte olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu kapsamda çalışmanın giriş kısmında şu sorulara cevap verilerek çalışmaya başlanmaktadır: Neden uluslararası sistem dönüşümü konusu? Neden İbn-i Haldun ve çalışmaları? Ve neden bu üç çağdaş teori?

Öncelikle uluslararası sistem dönüşümleri ve güç geçişleri üzerine bir tez çalışma yapılmasının sebebi, günümüzde Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürü ve bir takım siyasal çevrelerde süregelen Batı'nın gerilemesi ve Batı dışı toplumların güç kazanması ve bunun nedenleri tartışmasının yeni cevaplara ihtiyaç duyduğu düşüncesidir. Buna göre Amerika'nın bir asırdan fazladır sürdürdüğü ekonomik üstünlüğün yakın gelecekte Çin'e geçeceği öngörülerini başta olmak üzere, Batı dışı toplumların nasıl ve hangi nedenlerle yükselişe geçerken Batı toplumunun ise nasıl ve hangi nedenlerle düşüşte olduğu tezi, çağdaş teorilerin tam anlamıyla cevap veremedikleri bir soru olarak düşünülmektedir. Bu sebeple güç kaymaları ve sistem değişimleri üzerine yeni yaklaşımların literatüre kazandırılması, akademinin ve siyasal karar alıcıların işlerini kolaylaştıracak bir araç olabilir.

İbn-i Haldun'un neden bu noktada öne çıktığı sorusunun ise temel olarak iki cevabı vardır. Bunlardan birincisi, Haldun'un yaşadığı, eserini yazdığı ve eserlerini etkileyen tarihsel dilim ve coğrafyanın yapısıdır. Çalışmanın üçüncü bölümü esasen bu sorunun da cevabını sunmaktadır. İkinci olarak ise Haldun'un konuyu incelerken kullandığı bilimsel metodun, çağdaş teorilerle kıyaslamada büyük kolaylıklar sağlamasıdır. Haldun, çalışmasını zamanında çok yaygın olan ideal devlet ve siyaset üzerine yazılan felsefi eserlerden farklı olarak, hatta yer yer onların metodunu eleştirerek, gerçekte ne olduğu üzerine inşa etmiştir. Bu yaklaşım, Haldun'un bilimsel metodunun, günümüzde de geçerliliğini, ve bu metodla elde edilen sonuçların, çağdaş teorilerin sonuçlarıyla kıyaslanmasını kolaylaştırmaktadır.

Son olarak ise neden bu üç çağdaş teorinin seçildiği konusu giriş kısmında belirtilmiştir. Bu üç çalışmanın da Haldun'un yaklaşımı ile kıyaslamada bize sunduğu avantajlar bu noktada etkili olmuştur. Öncelikle tezde, Haldun'un hanedanların yükselişi ve düşüşünde, siyasetin ve devletin kendisinin merkeziliği önceleyen bir yöntemle sahip olduğu vurgulanmış ve dolayısıyla kendisi ile kıyaslanacak çalışmaların da benzer şekilde siyaseti, güçlerin yükselişi ve düşüşü konusunda öne çeken yapıda olmasına özen gösterilmiştir. Bu sebeple, Wallerstein'ın yoğunlukla ekonomi temelli Dünya Sistem yaklaşımı ve benzeri bağımlılık teorileri ile Toynbee gibi medeniyetlerin yükselişi ve düşüşünü Uluslararası İlişkiler literatürünün ötesinde disiplinler aracılığıyla tartışan yaklaşımı dışarda bırakılmıştır. Bu kapsamda yapılan literatür çalışmaları sonucunda, Haldun'un yaklaşımının, literatürde karşılaştırılması için Uzun Döngü Teorisi, Hegemonik İstikrar Teorisi ve Kennedy'nin Büyük Güçlerin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü eseri tezde ele alınmıştır.

Çalışmanın ikinci kısmında bu çağdaş üç teori sırasıyla ele alınmış ve ana tezleri tartışılmıştır. Bu kapsamda ele alınan ilk teori Modelski'nin 1980'lerin başında ortaya koyduğu Uzun Döngü Teorisi'dir. Bu teorinin incelenmesi kapsamında öncelikle, Modelski'nin geleneksel realist yaklaşımdan farklı olarak geliştirdiği ve tezin özünü oluşturan kavramlar tanımlanmış, daha sonra ise tezin hipotezi ele alınmıştır. Ele alınan başlıca kavramlar: Küresel Siyasal Sistem, liderlik, meydan okuyucu güç, küresel savaşlar ve sistemin evrimidir.

Bu kavramlardan ilki olan Küresel Siyasal Sistem, Modelski'nin teorisinde, geleneksel Realist sistem kavramından farklı olarak kullanılmıştır. Modelski bu kavramda, öncelikle, geleneksel Realist anlayışın aksine sistem kavramına tarihsellik kazandırmıştır. Bu kapsamda Modelski, sistemi modern ulus devletlerin ortaya çıktığını iddia ettiği 16. yy'dan başlatma ve günümüze kadar getirmektedir. Küresel Siyasal Sistem'in bu tarihselliği içerisinde kritik unsur ulus devlettir. Ulus devletin varlığı böylesi bir sistemi mümkün kılmış ve sistem de ulus devletin yaygınlık kazanmasında rol oynamıştır. Küresel Siyasal Sistem'in ikinci bir orjinal yanı ise, geleneksel Realist sistem anlayışından farklı olarak göreceli bir hiyerarşik yapıya sahip olmasıdır. Modelski, anarşik yapı anlayışını bu noktada eleştirir. Çünkü Modelski'ye göre, Küresel Siyasal Sistem, 16.yy'dan bu yana her dönemde bir lidere sahip

olmuştur ve bu lider bir ulus devlettir. Bu ulus devletin sistem içindeki liderliğinin başarısı, sistemin devamlılığını sağlamaktadır. Bu kapsamda, liderin hem siyasal sistemin devamı için yükümlülükleri hem de sistemden en büyük çıkarı elde etme özelliği vardır. Sistem hem lideri hem de sistem içindeki ikincil unsurların çıkarlarını görece tatmin ettiği müddetçe stabil olarak devam etmektedir. Sistemin başlangıcı son küresel savaşa giderken, dönüşümü ve sonu da yine küresel bir savaşla mümkündür. Bu iki savaş arası dönemde sistem işleyişine bir sosyal sistem olarak devam etmektedir.

Sistemin en önemli unsuru ve Modelski'nin teorisinin ikinci önemli kavramı da liderliktir. Liderlik, Modelski'ye göre, bir sosyal sistem olan Küresel Siyasal Sistem için kaçınılmaz bir gerekliliktir ve bu liderlik pozisyonu sistem içerisindeki ulus devletlerden biri tarafından doldurulmaktadır. Modelski, liderin sistem içerisindeki işlevlerini 4 ana başlıkta toplamaktadır. Bunlar; küresel sorun ve öncelikleri tespit anlamındaki 'gündem oluşturma', sistemin işleyişinin devamını sağlamak için gerekli 'mobilizasyon', sorunların çözümü sürecinde belirleyici olma yetisi anlamında 'karar alıcılık' ve sistemin işleyişi içerisinde gerekli unsurları sağlayıcılık anlamında 'yönetim'dir. Modelski liderlik pozisyonunu işgal edecek devletlerin bir takım ortak özelliklerini de sıralamıştır. Buna göre Küresel Siyasal Sistem'in tarihi içerisinde liderlik rolündeki devletler, ada devleti olma, açık bir topluma sahip olma, ekonomik öncülük ve siyasal sistemin sorun çözme kapasitesine sahip olgun bir yapıya sahip olması gibi dört temel özelliğe haizdirler.

Sistemin liderle beraber diğer bir unsuru da lidere meydan okuyan bir gücün varlığıdır. Bu güç sistemde liderle beraber büyük bir ekonomik ve askeri kapasiteye sahiptir. Lider için sayılan dört temel özelliği genellikle taşımazlar ve lider statüsündeki devletin aksine daha çok iç sorunlarla boğuşurlar. Bu tür sorunlar, meydan okuyan gücü, hem sistemin işleyişi sırasında hem de küresel savaşta, lidere karşı güçsüz kılmış ve ikincil bir pozisyona itmiştir.

Modelki'nin temel kavramlarından diğer ikisi ise aynı zamanda, sistemin işleyişini açıklayan kavramlardır. Bu nedenle küresel savaş ve sistemin evrimi gibi kavramlar anlatılırken, sistemin işleyişi de anlatılmış olacaktır. Modelski'nin Uzun Döngü Teorisi, lider ve meydan okuyan güç arasındaki rekabeti sadece ekonomik ve

askeri rekabet olarak almaz, aynı zamanda bu rekabet, sistem içerisinde ‘evrimsel’ bir rol oynar. Bu evrim süreci hem liderlik pozisyonundaki devletin seçilmesi için hem de sistemin kendisi için belirleyici ve dönüştürücü bir rol oynar. Sistemin evrim süreci içerisinde geliştirdiği yeni çevresel ortam ve bu ortama devletlerin uyumu sistemin işleyişinin önemli parçalarındandır. Burada sorulması gereken soru neden sistem ve sistemin unsurları böylesi bir evrimsel sürecin içerisinde geçmelidir. Bu sorunun cevabı ise sistem içerisindeki siyasal yapının yeni dengelerle dönüşüme uğramasıdır. Örneğin yeni güç dağılımı bu siyasal yapıyı dönüştürecektir. Böylesi bir dönüşüm eski yapıya göre oluşmuş sistem düzeneklerinin ve unsurlarının kendileri yeniden konumlandırmalarını gerektirecek ve çevresel dönüşüme en iyi uyum sağlayanlar öne çıkarken, uyum konusunda sıkıntı yaşayanlar geride kalacaklardır. Böylesine bir eleme sürecinin belirleyici son noktası ise küresel savaşlardır.

Küresel savaşların, evrimsel süreç içerisindeki rolleri mutlak belirleyicilik durumudur. Buna göre yeni şartların getirdiği gerginlik ve uyum süreci ancak savaş gibi, sert bir sosyal gerçeklikle çözülebilir. Savaş bu anlamda mevcut sistemin ve liderlik yapısının sonunu tayin ettiği gibi, yeni kurulacak olan sistem ve liderliğin de başlangıcı olacaktır. Bu anlamda küresel savaş, diğer savaşlardan ayrılmaktadır. Thompson’ın ifadesiyle küresel savaşlar sadece iki devlet arasındaki çıkar rekabetinin sonucunu belirlemekle kalmaz, aynı zamanda küresel yönetimin ve yeni küresel düzenin düzenlenmesinde söz hakkının kime ait olacağına da karar verir. Küresel savaşın bu önemli rolüne rağmen, Uzun Döngü Teorisi bir savaş teorisi değildir. Daha geniş anlamda bir siyasal sistem ve tarihsel dönüşüme işaret eder.

Modelski, yukarıda tanımlanan sistem ve işleyişini açıkladıktan sonra, tarihsel örneklemeyi de yapar. O’na göre, 1500’lerden bu yana gelişen küresel sistem 4 aşamadan geçmiştir ve bu aşamaların her biri başka bir liderlik durumuna tekabül eder. Portekiz’in küresel ulaşım ağlarındaki hakimiyeti ile başlayan liderliği, Hollanda, iki dönem Britanya İmparatorluğu ile devam etmiştir. Son küresel lider olarak ise karşımıza Amerika Birleşik Devletleri çıkmaktadır. Bu liderlikler, Modelski’ye göre, salt bir askeri üstünlük değil, aynı zamanda sistemin önceliklerini ve işleyişi de belirleyen yönetici vasıflar taşıyan bir liderliktir.

Çalışmada ele alınan ikinci çağdaş teori ise Gilpin'in yine 1980'lerin başında ortaya attığı Hegemonik İstikrar Teorisi'dir. 1970'lerde hem liberal hem de Marksist okulun temsilcilerin dillendirdiği hegemonya ve hegemonik istikrar kavramlarına, Gilpin, yeni bir bakış açısı kazandırmıştır. Gilpin bu çalışmasında pozitivist bilim metodolojisini kendisine rehber edinmiş görünmektedir.

Gilpin öncelikle sistem ve devlet kavramlarını tanımlar ve daha sonra sistem içerisindeki hegemonik durumu açıklar. O'na göre devlet herşeyden önce devlet, paydaşlarına gelir (vergi) karşılığı güvenlik ve refah sağlayan organizasyonel bir yapıdır. Bu yapı paydaşların çıkarlarını temsil etmektedir. Sistem ise bu tür organizasyonel yapıların oluşturduğu ve birbirleriyle iletişim kurarak sosyalleştikleri yapının adıdır. Devletler bu yapı içerisinde hareket ederlerken, yapının kısıtlarını tabidirler. Bu Neo-realist anlayış Gilpin'de de hakimdir. Bu kısıtlar içerisinde devletlerin çeşitli amaçları vardır ve bu amaçları optimum düzeyde gerçekleştirmeye çalışırlar. Bu amaçları şöyle sıralar Gilpin: toprak edinme, diğer devletler üzerindeki etkisini artırma ve küresel ekonomik hayatı domine etme. Bu hedefler arasındaki seçim Gilpin'e göre, birini diğerine tercih etme yoluyla değil, ancak aralarında bir denge kuracak şekilde işler.

Gilpin'in sistemi ve devlet ile ilgili temel iki yaklaşımı ise şöyledir. Öncelikle devletler rasyonel aktörlerdir ve çıkar maksimizasyonu hedeflerler. Bu anlamda Gilpin, iktisat teorilerinden Rasyonel Seçim Teorisi'ni, Uluslararası İlişkiler alanına taşır ve kullanır. Rasyonel aktörler olarak devletlerin çıkar maksimizasyonu peşinde koşması, klasik Realist anlayışta anarşik bir yapı ortaya çıkarır. Bu anlayışa göre ulusal siyasal sistemlerdeki gibi bir üst otorite yoktur ve devletler herhangi bir yetkilerini bu otoriteye devretmezler. Dolayısıyla aralarındaki anlaşmazlıklar genelde çatışmalar yoluyla çözülür. Gilpin, Neo-Realizm'e yakın durmasına rağmen, bu konuda farklı bir anlayış getirmektedir. O'na göre sistem her zaman anarşik değildir. Sistem oluşumunda daha fazla kapasite sahip olan devlet ona çıkar ve sistem üzerinde hegemonyasını kurar. Hegemonik düzen bir anlamda tek kutuplu bir özellik taşır ve diğer yapılardan daha istikrarlıdır. Bu anlamda hegemonya, maddi kapasite üstünlüğüne dayalı bir tür otoriteyi ifadeyi etmektedir. Bu otoritenin kendisini, diğerlerine kabul ettirmesi için her zaman güç kullanmasına gerek yoktur. Diğer

aktörlerin hegemonun otorite ve isteklerine güç gerektirmeden boyun eğmelerine algıyı Gilpin, prestij olarak tanımlar. Diğer aktörlerin, hegemonyanın kapasitesinin üstünlüğünü anlamaları ve rıza göstermeleri prestijin devamını sağlar. Bu rızanın sona ermesi ise sistemi istikrarsız bir duruma iter ve sonunda hegemonik bir savaşa sebep olur.

Sistemin işleyişini belirleyen beş temel argümanı vardır Gilpin'in. Öncelikle Gilpin'e göre rasyonel hareket hiç bir devlet eğer bir çıkar elde edeceğini görmez ise sistemin değişimi için herhangi bir girişimde bulunmaz. İkinci olarak bir devletin sistemi değiştirme gayretinde bulunması, o devletin beklediği karın, sistemin değişmesinin getireceği maliyetten fazla olmasına bağlıdır. Üçüncü olarak ise, sistemi değiştirme girişiminde bulunan devlet, bu girişimini siyasi, ekonomik ve toprak konularında marjinal maliyetin, marjinal karı yaklayacağı ve geçeceği noktaya kadar sürdürür. Bir noktada marjinal maliyet ve kar eşitlenince dördüncü argüman gerçekleşir. Daha fazla değişim ve dönüşüm girişi olmaz ve sistem istikrarlı hale gelir. Ancak bu durumda sistemin devam etmesinin maliyeti, getirisinden daha hızlı bir artış göstereceğinden, zamanla sistem tekrar istikrarsızlığa evrilir. Bu durum ise beşinci argümana götürür bizi. Şöyle ki, dengede ve istikrarlı olmayan sistemin yerine yeni bir sistem kurulur ve yeni güç dağılımı yapısı bu sistem içinde kurumsallaşır.

Bu argümanlar üzerine bina edilen güç kaymaları ve sistem dönüşümü, sürekli olarak tekrar eder. Gilpin bu tarz bir güç kaymasının modern siyasi dönem dışında Antik Yunan'da da görüldüğünü iddia eder. Atina ve Sparta arasındaki rekabeti, hegemonik istikrar teorisiyle açıklar. Modern dönemde ise ulus devletler bu tür bir rekabetin içindedirler ve döngü devam etmektedir Gilpin'e göre.

Tezin incelemeye aldığı diğer bir çağdaş yaklaşım da Kennedy'nin 1980'lerin sonunda yazdığı Büyük Güçlerin Yükselişi ve Düşüşü adlı eserinde dile getirdiği, ekonomi-strateji dengesi bağlamında ele alınan güçlerin yükselişi ve düşüşü konusudur. Kennedy, kitabında güçlerin yükselişi ve düşüşünü temel olarak 'aşırı genişleme' kavramıyla açıklamaktadır. Bu kavramın detaylarında ise 'askeri strateji' ile 'ekonomik büyüklük' arasındaki dengenin, zaman içerisinde ve savaşların etkisiyle nasıl evrildiği vardır.

Bu kapsamda Kennedy öncelikle büyük güç kavramının ve bu güçlerin yükseliş ve düşüşlerinin başlangıcını, Modelski'ye benzer şekilde modern ulus devletlerin çıkış tarihi olarak kabul ettiği 16. yy'a götürür. O'na göre modern anlamda büyük güç kavramından bahsetmek ancak Avrupa özelinde ve Avrupa Devlet Sistemi içerisinde mümkündür. Kennedy bu anlamda modern devleti verili olarak ele alır ve bu devletler arasındaki ilişkiyi ve güç kaymalarını konu edinir. Sistem vurgusu biraz ikinci planda kalsa da Kennedy, sistemi bu üç çağdaş teori arasında Neo-Realist anlayışa en yakın şekilde ele alan akademisyendir. Çünkü O, Gilpin ve Modelski'den ayrı olarak tek kutuplu ve görece hiyerarşik bir sistem öne sürmez. O'nun tezinin özü de bu durumun tam tersini iddia eder. Büyük güç sistemleri, hiç bir zaman tek kutupluluğa evrilmez. Çünkü böylesi bir olasılık belirdiğinde, sistemdeki diğer büyük güçler, fazla büyüyen devlete karşı koalisyonlara girer ve etki alanını sınırlar.

Bu noktada Kennedy'nin düşüş ve yükseliş kavramlarını ve işleyişleri nasıl ele aldığı incelenmelidir. Kennedy öncelikle devletlerin, diğerlerine göre öne çıkmasını sağlayan sebepler arasında 'eşitsiz büyüme'yi gösterir. Bir devlet herhangi bir sebeple, ekonomik ve askeri alanda diğerlerine göre ciddi atılımlar içerisinde girer ve bir anlamda 'eşitler arasında birinci' konumuna yükselir. Ancak, bu statü kalıcı bir statü olmaz. Çünkü ekonomik kalkınmayı, bu kalkınmayı kısıkanan diğer aktörlerden korumak için bu devlet askeri yatırımlar yapmak ve savaşlara girmek zorunda kalabilir. Savaşa girmese dahi ciddi büyüklükte ordular beslemesi gerekir. Bu durum ise devlet için bir ikilem yaratmaktadır. Zira devlet hem ekonomik refahı hem de güvenliği aynı anda sağlıklı bir şekilde götürme kapasitesine mutlak olarak sahip değildir. Birisinin öncelenmesi, diğerinden taviz anlamına gelir. Zaman içerisinde devlet çok fazla askeri harcama ve savaşla yıpranarak, ekonomik alandaki üstünlüğünü kaybeder ve düşüşe geçer. Kennedy, bu durumu biraz kaçınılmaz olarak görmektedir. Bu döngü her yükselen devlet için tekrar etmektedir.

Çağdaş üç teorisinin güç kaymaları ve sistem dönüşümleri hakkındaki yaklaşımları ele alındıktan sonra, çalışmanın üçüncü kısmı İbn-i Haldun'un teorisine giriş kapsamında tarihsel ve teorik arka planı ele almaktadır. Öncelikle ele alınan konu tarihsel arka plandır. Çalışmada tarihsel arka plan ikiye ayrılarak ele alınmıştır. Bu kapsamda öncelikle Haldun'un yaşadığı çağın psikolojik siyasal atmosferi anlatılmış

ve günümüze hangi noktalarda ışık tutacağı dile getirilmiştir. Sonrasında ise Haldun'un yaşadığı coğrafyanın siyasal yapısının durumu tartışılmış ve neden şimdi İbn-i Haldun sorusuna verilecek bir cevap olarak ele alınmıştır.

Öncelikle Haldun'un yaşadığı çağdaki psikolojik atmosferin bir tür 'çöküş' ve 'geri çekilme' psikolojisi olduğunu söylemek mümkündür. Uzun yıllar Kuzey Afrika ve Endülüs İspanyası üzerinde mutlak hakimiyet yürüten İslam toplumları, reconquista hareketi sonrası, gerilemeye başlamıştır. Bu gerileme hem toprak kaybı anlamındadır hem de siyasal dirliğin sağlanması anlamındadır. Haldun işte böylesi bir atmosferin içinde, kendi deyimiyle gördüklerinin ve yaşadıklarının çocuğu olarak eserini kaleme almıştır. Yaşadığı çağda kaybolan dirlik ve 'öteki' olarak kabul edilen Hristiyanlık karşısında alınan mağlubiyetler Haldun'u düşüş ve yükselişin nedenleri sorusuna yönelten ilk unsurlardandır. Bu açıdan Haldun'un yaşadığı dönem, yeni bin yıl başında başta Batı olmak üzere dünyada akademisyenlerin sıklıkla tartıştığı, yeni dünya düzeni ve 'ötekiler' karşısında gerileyen Batı tartışmalarının yarattığı ortamı anımsatmaktadır.

Siyasi coğrafya olarak ise, Haldun'un yaşadığı coğrafya, Kuzey Afrika, çeşitli hanedanlar ve bedevi kabileler arasında parçalanmış, birlik görüntüsü arzetmeyen, parçalı bir yapı olarak karşımızdadır. İmparatorluklar çağı olarak kabul edilebilecek bir dönemde bu kadar ciddi parçalanmış siyasal hatlar, Haldun ve eseri için bir labaratuvar görevi görmüştür. Bu açıdan da Haldun'un yaşadığı dönem, siyasal kurumlar ve coğrafya açısından, günümüz devlet yapısını ve devletler arası rekabeti andıran ve benzer sebep-sonuç ilişkilerinin görülebileceği bir yapıyı önümüze sermektedir. Bu iki nokta Haldun'un neden böylesi bir tezin konusu olduğu sorusuna cevap olmakla birlikte, Haldun'un getirdiği argümanların arka planını da ortaya koymaktadır. Bu kısımda Haldun ve dönemini, dönemimizle 'zamansal' ve 'mekansal' açıdan karşılaştırma yapmanın yanısıra, literatürde sıkça görülen diğer (çoğunluğu batılı) düşünürlerle de kıyaslamalar yapılmıştır.

Kavramsal arka plan ise Haldun'un teorisinin özünü oluşturan temel kavramlar olan umran, bedavet, hadaret ve özellikle de asabiyyet kavramlarının tanımlanması ve nasıl kullanıldığının incelenmesidir. Bu kapsamda bu çalışma umran kavramının Haldun tarafından orjinal anlamını aşkın bir kavrama dönüştürüldüğü tartışılmıştır.

Haldun'a göre umran, insanların ve onların hem birbirleriyle hem de tabiatla olan ilişkilerinin tamamını, insan eliyle oluşturan kurum ve yapıları, ilişki biçimlerini ele alan ve hem insan tarafından etkilenen hem de insanın davranışlarını etkileyen yapıdır.

Bedevi ve hadari umranlar ise bu umran kavramı altında yer alan ve çeşitli açılardan farklılık gösteren iki farklı umran türüdür. Haldun'un bu iki kavramı da sözlük anlamlarından daha öte anlamlarda kullandığını görüyoruz. Bedevi umran konusunda Haldun'un konumuza dair asıl yaklaşımının, Kayapınar'ın ifade ettiği gibi 'gücün ve mülkün dışında kalma hali' olduğu bu çalışmanın öne sürdüğü görüştür. Hadari umran ise bunun tersine gücün ve mülkün merkezinde olma ve ondan faydalanma anlamına gelmektedir. Hadari ve bedevi umranlar temelde ekonomik farklılıklarla ortaya çıksalar da sadece nicel değil, bir takım niteliksel ve sosyal farklılıklar da taşımaktadırlar. Hadaret refah, rahat ve güvenliği ifade ederken, bedavet ise kıt kaynaklarla geçinme ve güvenlik için sürekli tetikte olma halidir.

Haldun'un bu iki farklı umran tanımlamalarından sonra ortaya sürdüğü en orijinal nokta ise, bedevi umranda yaşayan insanların, hadari umrana ulaşmayı hedef edinmeleri konusundaki görüşüdür. O'na göre bedevi umranda yaşayanlar, bu hallerinin sürekli olmasını istemezler. Hadaretin refah ve zenginliğinden ve özellikle de güvenliğinden faydalanmak için, hadari toplumlardan bu üstünlükleri elde etmeye çalışırlar. Bunu da genelde başarırlar ve hadari toplumları mağlup ederler. Tam da bu noktada bu galibiyet ve mağlubiyetin sebebini Haldun asabiyyet kavramı ile açıklar.

Asabiyyet, Haldun'un kullandığı en orijinal kavramlardan birisidir. Haldun bu kavramı da yine sözlük anlamından değiştirerek ve genişleterek kullanmıştır. Sözlük anlamında baba soyuna dair kan bağı anlamına gelen asabiyyet, İbn-i Haldun tarafından iki farklı şekilde ele alınmıştır. Öncelikle Haldun kan bağı anlamını kullanmaya devam etmiştir. Neseb asabiyyeti'nin bu anlamda en yaygın olarak bedevi toplumlarda görülür. Haldun ikinci olarak ise sebep asabiyyeti kavramını öne sürer. Bu kavramla asabiyyet herhangi bir kan bağına gerek kalmadan, bir ülkü

birlikteliği anlamına gelir. Dolayısıyla, asabiyyet, sosyal dönüşümlerin arkasındaki ana güç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Bu kavramsal tanımlamaların ve açıklamaların ardından Haldun'un döngüsel tarih anlayışı ve hanedanlarının düşüşü ile yükselişini nasıl ele aldığı tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışma modern teorilerle farklılıklarını ve orijinal yanlarını ortaya koyarak yapılmıştır. Buna göre Haldun, bir hanedanın ve siyasi yapının yükselişini, o yapının ortaya çıkışından itibaren ele almaktadır. Çağdaş teorilerin devleti verili olarak ele almalarından farklı olarak, Haldun siyasal kurum ve yapıların varlıklarını sorunsallaştırır. Yükseliş bir toplumun devlet ve benzeri bir otorite kurmasıyla başlayan bir süreçtir. Bu süreci Haldun, organik yaşam ve özelde de insan ömrü ile özdeşleşmiştir. Ona göre nasıl ki bir insan doğar, büyür ve ölür ise siyasal yapılar ve onların üstünlükleri de benzer şekilde aşamalardan geçer. Yaşadığı dönemde hanedan yönetimlerinin bulunmasından dolayı Haldun bu süreci hanedanın dört nesli ile sınırlar. Ona göre nesiller zaman içerisinde, gücü elde etmeyi sağlayan asabiyyet bağını kaybeder ve düşüşe geçerler. Sonunda da yok olurlar. Peki asabiyyet neden kaybolur? Bu sorunun en temel sebebi olarak Haldun rahata düşkünlüğü ve devletin genişlemede son noktaya ulaşmasını gösterir. Buna göre refah, güvenlik ve zenginlik içerisindeki bir toplum zamanla, kendisini o noktaya getiren ülkü birlikteliğini kaybeder. Aynı zamanda aşırı büyüyen devlet de toplumsal olarak çok çeşitli bir yapıya kavuşacağından, merkezden uzak noktalardaki birlikteliği ve düzeni sağlaması gittikçe zorlaşır. Bu tür aşınmalar, asabiyyeti zayıflatır ve devlet ihtiyarlamaya ve çökmeye yüz tutar. Haldun, baskıcı idarenin ve bir toplumun kendinden daha güçlü bir asabiyye sahibi toplumla erken karşılaşmasının da düşüşe sebep olacağını öne sürer.

Haldun, ikinci ve yukarıdaki yaklaşımına paralel olarak, çağdaş teorilerin ya değinmemeyi tercih ettiği ya da çok az değindiği bir noktayı da teorisinin merkezine koymaktadır. Haldun, yükseliş ve düşüşün sebeplerini açıklarken, iç ve dış gelişmeleri birbirinden ayırmadan birbirinin devamı ve öncülü şeklinde ele alır. O'na göre siyasal yapı hem kendi içerisinde hem de diğer siyasal yapıların bulunduğu bir tür sistem (umran) içerisinde işleyiş halindedir. Dolayısıyla bu işleyiş bütüncül bir şekilde ve birbirinden ayrılmadan ele alınmalıdır.

Haldun'un yaklaşımındaki üçüncü orjinal nokta ise insan faktörünü, siyasal açıklamalarının ve dolayısıyla devletin yükselişi ve düşüşü konusunun da merkezine oturtmasıdır. Kurduğunu iddia ettiği umran ilmi ve umran kavramını tanımlarken belirttiği gibi, umran insanın gerçekleştirdiği etkileşimleri ve kurduğu yapıları da içerir. Buna göre, bir tür insan etkileşimi olan siyaset ve insan yapımı kurum olan devlet ve bunların geçirdiği dönüşümler de failden yani insandan bağımsız ele alınamaz. Ancak umran konusunda da açıklandığı üzere, siyasal ve sosyal gelişme olayların sonuçları üzerinde insanla birlikte insanı sınırlayan sistemin yani umranın da belirleyici rolü vardır. Bu sistem yani umran iklimden, coğrafik yapıdan, siyasal yapılara kadar herşeyi içerir. Bu açıklamalardan da anlaşılacağı gibi, Haldun çağdaş teorilerin değinmediği üç temel alternatif nokta ile güç kaymaları ve sistem dönüşümleri açıklamalarına önemli yenilikler getirmektedir.

Son olarak, bu üç temel noktadan hareketle, Haldun'un yaklaşımı ile çağdaş teoriler arasında dokuz fark tespit edilmiştir. Bunların başında ele alınan zaman dilimleri gelmektedir. Çağdaş teorilerin tamamı genellikle modern döneme ve ulus devletler dönemine dair açıklamalarda bulunmuşlardır. Haldun ise çalışmasında böylesine bir zaman sınırından bahsetmemektedir. İkinci olarak, çağdaş üç teori Batı kökenli ve açıklamalarda Avrupa-merkezli iken, Haldun, bu iki unsurun dışında bir düşünürdür ve açıklamalarının merkezinde Avrupa yoktur. Üçüncü olarak, Haldun çağdaş teoriler gibi siyasal açıklamalarının merkezine devlet diye tabir edebileceğimiz siyasal kurumu koysa da, bu üç teorinin vurgulamadığı şekilde, toplum-devlet ilişkisini sorunsallaştırmıştır. Dördüncü olarak, Haldun'da devlet verili değildir ve devletin yükseliş ve düşüş hikayesi ortaya çıkışı ile başlar. Beşinci nokta ise Haldun, çağdaş teoriler gibi devletler arasında güç kapasiteleri bakımından ayırım yapmaksızın değerlendirmeler yapmaktadır. Altıncı olarak ise İbn-i Haldun'da insan faktörü çok belirgindir. Siyasal açıklamalar ve teoriler insan faktöründen bağımsız düşünülemez O'na göre. Bir diğer nokta ise, Haldun'un açıklamalarında takındığı görece daha determinist tutumdur. Haldun devletlerin çöküşünü, İnsan'ın ölümü gibi kaçınılmaz görmektedir. Sekizinci nokta Haldun'un, çağdaş teorilerdeki sistem algısından farklı olarak, sadece devletlerarası ilişkiyi değil, sistemin içerisine evrendeki tüm doğal ve insan yapımı unsurları dâhil etmesidir. Ve son nokta ise Haldun'un savaşlar konusundaki yaklaşımıdır. Çağdaş teoriler, güç kaymaları ve

sistem dönüşümleri konusunda savaşların rolünü öncelemektedirler. Ancak Haldun, savaşı sadece bir sonuç veya sonuca giden aşamalardan sadece biri olarak görür. O'na göre yükseliş ve düşüşü etkileyen sosyal, psikolojik ve siyasal faktörler, savaştan daha belirleyicidir. Hatta savaşın sonucu dahi bu faktörlere bağlıdır.

B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

- Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü
- Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü
- Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü
- Enformatik Enstitüsü
- Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı :

Adı :

Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : IBN KHALDUN'S CONCEPTION OF DYNASTIC CYCLES AND CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE ASSESSMENT

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ