

ARENDR AND MARX ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LABOR AND
FREEDOM

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MESUDE UĞUR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

DECEMBER 2014

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

ARENDRT AND MARX ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LABOR AND FREEDOM

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December 2014, 78 pages

The aim of this study is to examine the relation between labor and freedom in the philosophy of Arendt which is in contrast to the relation between labor and freedom in the philosophy of Marx. My first motivation for comparing the relation between labor and freedom in the philosophies of Arendt and Marx is to understand whether labor is a form of slavery or freedom. And secondly, I try to understand whether Arendt's conception of freedom which opposes freedom to labor, thereby excluding the relation between freedom and labor, and reduces freedom to "acting politically in the public sphere" is sufficient to understand freedom.

In doing so, I question and critically assess the rigid ontological distinctions that Arendt makes between labor, work, and action as well as between the private and political spheres. As my exposition of Arendt's book *The Human Condition* in my thesis will make clear, Arendt's understanding of freedom puts it in strict opposition to necessity and thus labor. Focusing on Arendt's criticism of Marx's understanding of labor, I argue that labor and work cannot be so clearly separated. Further, Arendt sees action as the mode of human experience in which freedom is exercised, and action is dependent on work since it is work creates a world wherein

action is possible. If we consider that work and action are related and that labor and work cannot be so strictly separated, we see that Arendt's strict opposition between labor and freedom does not work.

Keywords: Arendt, Marx, labor, work, freedom.

ÖZ

ARENDETT VE MARX'TA EMEK VE ÖZGÜRLÜK İLİŞKİSİ

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Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Barış Parkan

Aralık 2014, 78 sayfa

Bu çalışmanın amacı Marx'ın felsefesindeki emek ve özgürlük ilişkisine tezat olan Arendt'in felsefesindeki emek ve özgürlük ilişkisini incelemektir. Arendt ve Marx'ın felsefelerindeki emek ve özgürlük ilişkisini kıyaslamadaki temel motivasyonum emeğin bir kölelik mi yoksa özgürlük biçimi mi olduğunu anlamak. Ve ikincil olarak, Arendt'in özgürlüğü emeğin karşına koyan, dolayısıyla özgürlük ve emek arasındaki ilişkiyi dışlayan ve özgürlüğü "kamusal alanda politik olarak eylemeye" indirgeyen özgürlük kavramının özgürlüğü anlamak için yeterli olup olmadığını anlamaya çalışıyorum.

Bunu yaparken, Arendt'in özel ve kamusal alan arasında yaptığı ayrımın yanı sıra emek, iş ve eylem arasında yaptığı katı ontolojik ayrımı sorgulayıp eleştirel bir şekilde değerlendiriyorum. Arendt'in *İnsanlık Durumu* kitabını yorumlamamın tezimde açıklığa kavuşturacağı gibi, Arendt'in özgürlük anlayışı özgürlüğü zorunlulukla dolayısıyla da emekle katı bir karşıtlık içinde konumlandırır. Arendt'in Marx'ın emek anlayışına yaptığı eleştiriye odaklanarak emek ve işin bu kadar keskin biçimde ayrıştırılamayacağını savunuyorum. Ayrıca, Arendt eylemi özgürlüğün icra edildiği insan deneyimi biçimi olarak görür ve eylem işe bağlıdır, çünkü eylemin mümkün olduğu bir dünyayı yaratan iştir. Eğer iş ve eylemin

birbirleriyle ilişkili olduğunu ve emek ve işin bu kadar keskin biçimde ayrıştırılmayacağını göz önünde bulundurursak, Arendt'in emek ve özgürlük arasında kurduğu katı karşılığın işlemediğini görürüz.

Anahtar kelimeler: Arendt, Marx, emek, iş, özgürlük.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply indebted to my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Dr. Barış Parkan for her guidance, encouragement, comments and advices throughout my thesis. I also wish to thank other members of jury committee, Prof. Dr. Ş. Halil Turan and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Çetin Türkyılmaz for their invaluable criticisms and advices.

I also wish to thank Selma Aydın Bayram, who helps me organize page setup.

Finally, I wish to thank my family for their endless patience. Specially, I wish to thank my niece, Rozin Kardelen and my nephew, Cankat Jiyan whose innocent smiles help me endure the world which loses its innocence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIRASIM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	ix
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. ARENDT'S CONCEPTION OF VITA ACTIVA.....	7
2.1. Vita Activa.....	7
2.1.1. Labor, Work, Action.....	9
2.1.1.1. Labor.....	9
2.1.1.2. Work.....	16
2.1.1.3. Action.....	20
3. THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE REALMS.....	27
3.1. The Public and Private Realms.....	29
3.1.1. The Antiquity.....	29
3.1.2. The Public Realm and the Private Realm.....	33
3.1.2.1 The Private Realm.....	33
3.1.2.2. The Public Realm.....	35
3.2. Rise of the Social.....	37
4. ARENDT'S CRITIQUE OF MARX.....	41
4.1. Marx's Theory of Labor and Freedom.....	43
4.1.1. Marx's Theory of Labor.....	43

4.1.1.1. Alienated Labor.....	49
4.1.2. Marx's Theory of Freedom.....	51
4.2. Arendt's Critique of Marx.....	55
4.2.1. Critique of Labor and Freedom.....	55
4.2.2. Critique of Marx's Project of Revolution.....	58
5. CONCLUSION.....	60
REFERENCES.....	64
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY.....	67
B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU.....	78

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Hannah Arendt is a philosopher of the twentieth century, whose philosophy is always at the center of discussion and criticism. What makes Arendt's philosophy controversial is her claim that the three activities of human being corresponding to certain modes of existence, at the same time correspond to certain forms of politics. For Arendt, labor corresponds to slavery, work corresponds to technocracy, and action corresponds to politics of plurality and freedom. The problematic side of her theory is that the activity of labor and action (freedom) belong to different realms, thus precluding each other. However, it is not clear how *zoon politikon* could provide for his/her needs without labor.

Arendt is also one of the prominent critics of modernity, so much so that her entire philosophy can be read as a critique of modernity. It would be a fairly accurate portrayal of Arendt's approach to modernity to call her "an archeologist of political philosophy". Arendt, while trying to diagnose the modern era and write a prescription to its endemic diseases, excavates Antiquity, in particular ancient Greek society. She constitutes her theory of freedom in reference to the philosophy of Aristotle and his conception of citizenship. Arendt interprets Aristotle in a prescriptive way, in the sense that she overlooks the negative aspects of Aristotle's political philosophy while using his conceptions. To illustrate, she ignores that Aristotle's conception of labor corresponds to the affairs of slaves and women or that Aristotle considers slavery as natural. Arendt can also be described as an important critic of modernity, institutions of modernity and politics of modernity which render the "individual" helpless. She focuses on the dark side of modernity that is claimed to be an era of free, rational and equal individuals in her philosophy to understand its devastating effects on humanity. This motivation is the reason that she objects to being called a 'philosopher' and wants to be known as a political theorist who dwells on the facts which humanity faces in the modern era, rather

than focusing on the problems which the atomistic individual is exposed to. However, what Arendt does in her studies cannot be considered as only political theory; it is obvious that to conceptualize and discuss the issues of humanity or the individual deeply instead of studying them as empirical facts makes Arendt's studies part of political philosophy.

The name of her major work "*The Human Condition*" is a cue for us to notice her motive to grasp the picture of humanity in the modern era. Further, Arendt's motivation to locate humanity at the center of her philosophy is also what grounds her aim to construct a communitarian approach to politics instead of an individualistic one. But although Arendt tries to construct her theory of freedom on a communitarian ground, she does not take the individual out of her theories completely. What she tries to justify is not an absolute communitarian theory of politics, but a political theory that establishes the public realm for equal individuals whereby they can manifest their uniqueness by acting politically. In other words, Arendt's philosophy is an account of plurality which does not put aside the individual.

Marx is one of the main philosophers whom Arendt targets when criticizing the problems of contemporary society. She accuses him of associating freedom with labor. For Arendt, Marx's mistake lies in his failure to differentiate between work and labor. However, what Marx clearly says about labor is that labor forms consciousness. This does not necessarily mean that labor is the constitutive element of freedom under all conditions. But, it is the constitutive element of consciousness regarding of conditions, whether it be free consciousness or alienated consciousness. This suggests that labor constitutes free consciousness while being performed freely and alienated labor constitutes alienated consciousness. From Arendt's criticism of Marx it can be inferred that Arendt reads Marx's conception of labor in terms of her own conception of labor. She considers labor in the Marxian sense as merely the expenditure of biological energy to survive.

This study aims to focus on Arendt's remedial view of freedom in contradistinction to Marx. Arendt constructs her theory of freedom in relation to

action and in opposition to labor, because she considers labor as slavery. In contrast, Marx, who is at the center of her critique, considers labor as a constitutive element of consciousness, and thus freedom, but it must be stated that what Marx considers as freedom is labor performed freely. In this sense, throughout my thesis I will try to answer the question “Is labor a form of slavery or freedom?” by examining Arendt’s theory of freedom in contrast with that of Marx. Secondly, I intend to analyze Marx’s idea of freedom which can be defined as self-actualization through labor. My motivation for understanding freedom in the philosophies of Arendt and Marx is that they tackle the concept of freedom in the practical realm and in the communal sense, although their perspectives oppose each other when it comes to how they make sense of free activity in the practical realm.

In the second chapter of my thesis, I will examine one of the significant conceptions of Arendt, *vita activa* in detail. While analyzing this conception, I try to understand what Arendt means by labor, work and action which she puts in a hierarchical order. Additionally, I will examine the role of the conception of *vita activa* in Arendt’s critique of modernity, the modern individual and modern society. The types of human activity which constitute *vita activa*, for Arendt, at the same time, inform us about the relation between human being and nature and this situation is related to slavery or freedom, therefore it is worth examining the relation between human being and nature in any condition of human being that Arendt mentioned in her book, *The Human Condition*.

Firstly, in chapter two, I analyze labor and its relation with freedom in the Arendtian sense. I think it is also significant to analyze labor in order to understand Arendt’s critique of modernity through her analysis of phenomena such as jobs and consumption. Moreover, it is necessary to point out whether Arendt’s comprehension of *animal laborans* corresponds a group of people or human beings in the condition of labor to understand both her critique of Marx and the criticisms directed at her. In the second part of Chapter Two, I will try to interpret the second type of human activity, work which represents the instrumental life of the human being. Subsequently, the other concept, *homo faber* which means human being who

creates a permanent world by instruments, will be analyzed. Understanding Arendt's notion of work, I think, enables us to evaluate Arendt's central critique of Marx that he does not differentiate between labor and work. The last part of the chapter Two includes an examination of action which gives an account of freedom in the context of natality, speech and deed. While analyzing action, I will try to manifest the distinction that Arendt makes between whoness and whatness. It should be emphasized that whoness establishes uniqueness which is a crucial characteristic of the individual who speaks and acts. I also tackle Arendt's view of equality and uniqueness, because her approach to them denotes that Arendt's conceptualization of freedom embodies a plural society of unique individuals.

In Chapter three, I will examine Arendt's differentiation between the private and public realms since this distinction is the second criterion for freedom, according to Arendt. For Arendt, the annihilation of the distinction between these two realms is the annihilation of freedom. If the activities of the private realm spread to the public realm, then the border between the private and public realms disappears. The public realm becomes occupied by necessities and policies concerning these necessities. Arendt calls the annihilation of the distinction between the private and public realms "the rise of the social". The social realm is the realm of mass society where unpredictable human deeds are replaced with predictable conformist behaviors; thus the rise of the social signifies the end of freedom. One can understand that the existence of the social realm is overtaking of political activities by economic ones because economic activities contain a certain regularity and therefore they are predictable, according to Arendt.

In chapter four, I will try to evaluate critically Arendt's critique of Marx. In the first part of this chapter I will examine Marx's conceptions of labor and freedom in the framework of the question of how Marx relates freedom to labor. While trying to answer this question, first of all, I will discuss Marx's conception of human nature, because Marx thinks that to labor consciously is an inherent characteristic of human being as a species being. I will try to understand Marx's perspective that bases human nature upon objective powers and labor because these two phenomena

serve to explain the process of transformation of human nature. While satisfying his/her needs through his/her labor, the human being changes both his/her inner nature and the society which s/he lives in.

Further, I think it is crucial to clarify the prevailing idea in the works of Marx that “the base structure determines the superstructure”¹ to assess Arendt’s critique of Marx that he relates freedom to deterministic activities of human being which are about necessities. Marx claims that the issue of how the human beings meet their needs is simultaneously the issue of how they understand reality. In other words, how human beings produce for their needs determines their consciousness since, as I have mentioned above, labor is conscious production.

Secondly, I will examine Marx’s notion of freedom. Marx defines freedom as objective life of human species; that is to say, freedom is the objectification of one’s subjective reality through conscious activity of species being, namely labor.² It is this view of freedom held in Marx that Arendt criticizes. However, in Marx’s view, labor does not necessarily enable freedom. Labor itself should first be free in order to enable freedom. In contrast, oppressed labor is a kind of bondage rather than freedom. This distinction indicates another kind of labor -alienated labor- which results in domination. As labor is a tool of constituting social relations, alienated labor constitutes alienated and distorted social relations. To evaluate Arendt’s critique of Marx’s notion of freedom based on labor, I think it is important to note this distinction between (free) labor and alienated labor that Marx makes.

The last section of the fourth chapter is about Arendt’s critique to Marx’s conception of freedom. Arendt’s main objection to Marx is that he does not differentiate labor and work and he claims that labor creates a world of permanent things. Secondly, Arendt rejects Marx’s project of freedom which relates freedom

¹Marx, K. *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/pol-econ/preface.htm>.

² Marx, K. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm>

with economic power for the laborers. Arendt opposes Marx's idea that laborers should gain economic power to gain political power. Her opposition can be interpreted in the sense that Marx annihilates the distinction between the private and public realm by glorifying the proletarian characteristics of human beings. Arendt strictly differentiates the realm of economic affairs from the realm of political affairs and she associates freedom with political affairs. According to Arendt, human beings as laborers (as *animal laborans*) cannot emancipate themselves; they merely create policies regarding production and consumption. Labor is the activity of needs of consumption, thus it is not possible to create a permanent world a truly political world through labor as Marx claims.

To sum up, I think contrasting Arendt's philosophy of freedom which excludes labor with that of Marx's which puts labor at the heart of theoretical discussion guides us on the road to freedom.

CHAPTER II

ARENDT'S CONCEPTION OF VITA ACTIVA

2.1. *Vita Activa*

Arendt establishes her political philosophy by combining two techniques. First, she refers to the past, particularly antiquity, and secondly she engages in conceptual analysis by making distinctions between certain fundamental conceptions. It is undeniable that all of Arendt's conceptions directly or indirectly refer to Antiquity. For the sake of example, Arendt's basic conceptions such as action and freedom stem from the idea of citizenship in ancient Greece. Likewise, Arendt's notions of the public realm and the private realm are rooted in two terms of Antiquity, respectively the *polis* and the *household*. A further point is that examining any of Arendt's conceptions necessitates having knowledge of other conceptions and Arendt's distinction between these concepts. For the sake of clarity, it will be helpful to give the example that it is not possible to understand the idea of freedom without understanding the distinction between the concepts of labor and action, and secondly, it is not possible to understand the distinction between these concepts without understanding the distinction between the public realm and the private realm.

To understand the concept of freedom in Arendt's philosophy, first of all, Arendt's conception of *vita activa* should be examined since this conception offers two explanations of what freedom is and what freedom is not. To deal with the problem of freedom, Arendt centers her estimation of freedom on an investigation of whether the acts of human beings are political or not. When presenting her account of *vita activa*, Arendt contrasts two conceptions of freedom. The first, which she opposes, is the dialectical conception that is associated with Marx and Hegel and which sees freedom as emerging from a dialectical unity with acts related to essential necessities and economic interests. The second is a reformulation of the

theory of freedom which underlines the possibilities of freedom in contrast to the idea which looks for these possibilities within ending interaction with material necessities—i.e, labor.

In her book *The Human Condition*, Arendt differentiates between *vita contemplativa* and *vita activa* and she uses the term '*vita activa*' to denote the active side of human experience. Referring to this differentiation, the very nature of the human condition is such that the contemplative side of life is always dependent on the active side.³ The contemplative side is dependent on labor, which refers to the production of necessities to maintain biological life; it is dependent on work which refers to the creation of an artificial world which human being lives in; and it is dependent on action, which refers to the political organization of human beings through which they live together.⁴ However, according to Arendt, when *vita activa* loses its original political meaning after the collapse of the polis, contemplation remains as the unique way of free life. Arendt claims that after the collapse of the polis, philosophers begin to conceive of freedom as freedom from political action in contrast to ancient definition of freedom as freedom from the necessities of life.

The basic theoretical premise behind Arendt's notion of *vita activa* is that it is crucial to differentiate three main activities of human being in order to decide whether they are political activities or nonpolitical ones because, being political or not is a criterion of classifying human activities in relation to freedom. In her article "Freedom and Wordliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt", Kateb underlines the importance of this relationship as follows: "Freedom exists only when men engage in political action."⁵

The notion of *vita activa* also plays an important role in Arendt's account of totalitarianism as it is developed to shed light on which activity transforms human

³Baehr, P (ed.), *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, p. 167

⁴*Ibid*, p. 167

⁵Kateb, G. "Freedom and Wordliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt", p. 142

being into a mass man and society into mass society. In *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*, Margaret Canovan regards these premises as the basis of Arendt's criticism of Marx in the general sense that he does not make a differentiation between the activities of human being and subsequently he bases his theory of freedom upon the economic activities of human being which lead to a totalitarian society dominated by slavery to essential needs.

Briefly, Arendt's differentiation of activities of human being aims to construct the groundwork of her theory of freedom. She makes hierarchical distinctions between three types of activity within the experiences of human being. These experiences of human being are labor, work and action.

2.1.1. Labor, Work and Action

Arendt's conception of *vita activa*, mentioned above, is at the same time a hierarchical framework of stages characterizing the animalistic condition and the humanistic one. Arendt identifies the animalistic condition as being dependent on nature and the humanistic one as being independent of and free from nature. In this regard, the three types of human activity -labor, work and action- are characterized as animalistic and humanistic.

Each of these three experiences of human being corresponds to one of the human conditions: labor to biological life, work to worldliness, and action to plurality (Arendt, 1998. 7).

2.1.1.1. Labor

In this section the discussion will point out the notion of labor and Arendt's analysis of the notion of labor.

Labor is a prominent conception discussed in social and political philosophy because it is a phenomenon that has an effect on almost all social and political facts. On the surface, it can be said that all struggles, in particular the struggle for freedom, are ultimately grounded on the struggle circulating around labor, for this reason, most political philosophers tackle the phenomenon of freedom in relation to

labor. Although the relation between labor and freedom is pivotal in social and political thought, philosophers have two sharply opposed approaches regarding whether labor is a form of freedom or slavery. Although many philosophers write about labor, here I will focus on the philosophers whose writings about labor constitute a ground for Arendt's theory of labor.

The discussion of labor in philosophy began within ancient philosophy and this discussion about labor in ancient philosophy basically focused on division of labor⁶ in parallel to the structure of ancient Greek society where a crude division of labor can be seen. In ancient Greek society, there was a sharp distinction between the activities of the *household* and those of the *polis* and between the members of the *household* and the *polis*. Noticeably, those were a member of the household and at the bottom of the hierarchical organization of society, namely women and slaves, were not allowed to concern themselves with acts of the *polis* and those who were admitted as members of the *polis* did not subject themselves to the acts of the household.

One of the ancient philosophers writing about labor that I want to pay attention to is Plato, because Plato's approach to labor has influenced Arendt's criticism of labor. Plato, in his book titled *The Republic*, which is about the ideal society/state, addresses labor in association with need and sees division of labor as necessary to live together in an ideal society. In the context of the correlation between labor and needs Plato states that "The origin of a city lies, I think, in the fact that we are not, any of us, self-sufficient; we have all sorts of needs."⁷

And Plato defines the city on the framework of division of labor as follows:

Different individuals, then, forms associations with one person to meet one need, and with another person to meet a different need. With this variety of

⁶Although the term division of labor is used for industrialized society and it means professional specialization of tasks of cooperating workers, I used this term for antique society where a division of roles was seen and can be interpreted as a primitive division of labor.

⁷ Plato, *The Republic*, p. 51

wants they may collect a number partners and allies into one place of habitation, and to this joint we give the name 'city' don't we?⁸

Plato constructs his ideal society/state in which citizens meet all their needs based on a division of labor, locates everybody in a deterministic position to construct an ideal state. Located in a certain position, everybody supplies for clearly defined necessities of society. Arendt rejects such kind of a deterministic political organization and action. For Arendt, such strictly determined activities contradict freedom which includes the characteristic of unpredictability.

The second philosopher whom Arendt refers to in her theory of labor is Aristotle. Arendt traces Aristotle's differentiation of three ways of life and his notion of freedom while she is making her differentiation between three experiences of human being and building her theory of freedom. Aristotle differentiated human activities as political and nonpolitical. Political activities were performed in the *polis* while nonpolitical, namely economic activities were performed in the *household*. He considered political activities as the activities of free citizens and nonpolitical ones as the activities of the members of the *household* who would not be citizens. Arendt, similar to Aristotle, thinks that free human being is wo/man who liberates himself/herself from the activities related to needs and acts politically.

Aristotle, in his book *Politics*, makes a differentiation between the household and the state and also between the members of household as slaves and free men:

The parts of household management correspond to the persons who compose the household, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its fewest possible elements; and the first and fewest possible parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children.⁹

And he defines the state as follows:

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ Aristotle, *The Politics, Book I*

...since the nature of a state is to be plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an individual; for the family may be said to be more one than the state, and the individual than the family.¹⁰

And he adds that “Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state.” (p.31)

It is worth noting that Arendt borrows the conception of the household and that of plurality in the context of politics from Aristotle. Labor, for Arendt, is one of the necessary conditions of humanity as other conditions of the tripartite of human being’s activity. However, Arendt locates labor at the bottom in her hierarchical definition of the human condition.

Labor is about the necessities of the biological life of human beings. In other words, in the activity of labor, human being produces only for his/her primary, namely vital needs which maintain her/his biological life. Labor is the means of producing the essential necessities of the body in the life process. According to Arendt, the life process which is the progress of generation and decay is circular, similarly the activity of laboring through which biological life is reproduced, pursues the cycle of life (Arendt, 2000, 170) and the circularity of bodily functions. Thus the activity of labor is lifelong and repetitive. Furthermore, Arendt relates labor to toil and trouble¹¹ and this toil only ceases at the end of life because labor is the activity that endures throughout life. Relating labor to toil, trouble and necessities, Arendt reduces labor to the condition of the animal. For Arendt, labor is the burden of life. As a type of activity that is the exact opposite of action which vindicates the human condition constituting a ground for freedom, labor denies the above-mentioned human condition. Life in the condition of labor, according to Arendt, is far removed from humanistic life in the sense that humanity as *animal laborans* is the slave of necessities and consumption, however reasonable human life is constructed on freedom which labor is opposed to. Although labor is related

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Baehr, P., (ed.) *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, p. 171

to toil and trouble, it can also involve happiness; however this happiness is futile as labor itself, since it produces nothing permanent but it reproduces the process of labor. Happiness that arises from labor is the state of resting after toiling, since this happiness is in the cycle with toiling as well the cycle of labor with consumption. It does not produce anything but the process of labor itself. In this sense, Arendt defines the happiness of labor as follows: “The blessing of labor is that effort and gratification follow each other as closely as producing and consuming, so that happiness is a concomitant of the process itself.”¹²

Arendt sees the happiness of labor as an outcome of the cycle of toiling rather than lasting bliss independent of the process of labor. It must be made clear that such a blessing is related to an animalistic instinct of being alive in the cycle of labor. In Arendt’s wording, the cycle of labor and consumption makes the activities of producing routine.

Based on these ideas a connection can be made between Arendt’s notion of labor and the phenomenon of job in the modern age. Labor is the activity triggered by the biological necessities imposed by nature as well as the artificial necessities imposed by social process.¹³ Within the life of the modern age, Arendt’s ideas about the function of labor resembles the function of jobs which modern people hold for earning a living. Human being in the modern age does any job to satisfy her/his necessities. Although what are considered necessities in the modern age are more complicated than merely biological necessities, they nevertheless function in the same way as biological necessities in that they put human beings inside a never ending cycle of production and consumption until the end of life, namely death. What Arendt disdains as labor is the activity of producing for consumption. Martin Levin tries to clarify Arendt’s approach to labor and its relation to the modern age as follows:

¹² *Ibid*, p. 172

¹³ M. Canovan, *Hannah Arendt: A Reinterpretation of Her Political Thought*, p. 127

What Arendt is identifying here is all activities done in bondage to necessity, i.e., performed under the compulsion of providing the necessities of life. All such activities Arendt calls laboring. What is unique about the modern age, according to Arendt, is that mere life has itself been elevated to the highest good and consequently, laboring which sustains that life has become dominant activity.¹⁴

And he adds: “What are essentially household or private activities (laboring) in Arendt’s terminology, have taken over the public realm.” (1979, p.524).

Arendt’s objection to labor is not merely about the laborer; rather it is about all those having a lifestyle that consists of laboring and consuming. In this respect, from an Arendtian perspective, in the modern era it is not only the laborers but also white-collar are in the repetitive cycle of production and consumption. For Arendt, this is the triumph of labor and the laborer in the modern age. The mentality of the activity of labor causes even those jobs which are forms of intellectual production to become cyclical and routine activity to earn money and maintain life. The point stressed here is that all activities of human being are imprisoned into the cycle of producing and consuming in the condition of labor. For Arendt, free man should be independent of the necessities which cause toil and trouble because freedom means liberating oneself from the burden of life.

The products of labor are consumption oriented products. Arendt considers that the products of labor are means of consumption, they are not durable. About the products of labor, Arendt says: “Although they are man-made, they come and go, are produced and consumed, in accordance with the ever-recurrent cyclical movement of nature.”¹⁵ Citing Locke’s theory of labor, Arendt states that the products of labor, namely goods for consumption, are of short duration and if they are not consumed, they will decay.¹⁶ For Arendt, laboring and consuming function cooperatively to produce biological life. According to Arendt, labor which

¹⁴ Martin, L. “On Animal Laborans and Homo Politikon in Hannah Arendt: A Note”, p. 524

¹⁵ Arendt, H. *The Human Condition*, p. 96

¹⁶ Baehr, P., (ed) *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, p. 171

produces merely for biological life is unproductive. In this sense, for Arendt, productivity means producing something permanent.

Moreover, Arendt sees human beings in the condition of labor as *animal laborans*. Human being as a laborer produces merely to survive. With reference to the very nature of *animal laborans*, Kateb, quoting from Arendt directly, says that “animal laborans lives only to die.”¹⁷ And he adds “...he turns everything, including what is meant to last, into the stuff of consumption. He devours the world; time devours him.”¹⁸

The aim to only survive is animalistic rather than humanistic. Arendt, in parallel with antiquity, thinks that labor is the situation of enslavement to necessities and this enslavement is innate in the condition of human life.¹⁹ Being enslaved by the necessities of life, in particular biological life, human being in the condition of labor, namely *animal laborans* is not a free wo/man, rather s/he is slave (of necessities).

Buckler, referring to Arendt, claims that Arendt sees the existence of human being at the level of labor as worldless and herd-like.²⁰ The world, according to Arendt, is different from the earth in sense that the world gains the characteristic of durability through the products of work, whereas the earth is given environment. The human being tries to overcome worldlessness through the activity of work. The world does not only have the characteristic of permanency, it also enables the human being to strive for immortality by leaving behind something that can outlive his/her death. By creating a permanent home for human beings, work creates the world and a space for political activities to be performed. In this context,

¹⁷ Kateb, G. “Freedom and Wordliness in the Thought of Hannah Arendt”, p. 144

¹⁸ *Ibid*

¹⁹ Arendt, H. *The Human Condition*, p. 83

²⁰ S. Buckler, *Hannah Arendt and Political Theory*, p. 87

worldliness as overcoming wordlessness of labor is a prominent characteristic of work, which will be further discussed in the next section.

Thus, Arendt's critique of labor should be read as a critique of modernity in the sense of the destruction of the human world by the domination of economic necessities. In the condition of labor, the human being becomes a prisoner of the act of consumption and subsequently s/he loses the world. Producing the products which lack of durability, the *animal laborans* cannot yield something permanent, consequently s/he lives worldless life. It is the earth that human beings live in.

According to Arendt, labor is a road to mass society and subsequently to totalitarianism. Although Arendt's concept of mass society is discussed in the next chapter, I believe that the correlation between labor and mass society should be mentioned here understand Arendt's criticism of labor. As a consequence of economic activity, namely labor, people exhibit a banal behavior with a tendency of behaving automatically. On the contrary, in the case of political activity people act instead of behaving.

2.1.1.2. Work

The second kind of human experience (activity) is work. In a basic sense, work is the activity of fabrication, the fabrication of an artificial world. In other words, the activity of work is the activity of creating an artificial world consisting of durable things. According to Arendt, the work of our hands is different from the labor of our body in the sense that through work the lasting things constituting the world we live in are produced. The process of work consists of two categories as means and ends. 'Work' refers to both an end and a means in this process. It is an end because the process of work aims at and ends with the product. And as a process, work is a means to produce this end.

The products of work, according to Arendt, are permanent products, since they are not for consumption but for use. However, this permanent product does not enable the creation of an artificial world of absolute durability because it is created for use. In this context, Arendt says: "The durability of human artifice is not absolute; the

use we make of it even though we do not consume it, uses it up.”²¹ Through using things, the products of work do not perish; but what perishes by use is durability, therefore the artificial world created is not absolutely durable (Arendt, 1998, p. 137). If the products of work are not used, they will return to the natural process from which they come (Arendt, 1998, p. 136). Moreover, the products of work give the world stability and solidity, since they are, in contrast to the products of labor, permanent things. For Arendt, this durability of the things gives things objectivity, namely the relative independency from their users for a while. These permanent things create the material objectivity of the world. Human beings, in accordance with her/his endless needs, can consume and annihilate all the products of labor, whereas they cannot consume and annihilate the products of work.

Furthermore, Arendt defines the human being in the condition of work as *homo faber*. Arendt, referring to Benjamin Franklin, defines wo/man in the condition of work, namely *homo faber*, as a “tool-maker”²². The underlying point is that *homo faber* as tool-maker puts a distance between her/himself as s/he creates a world distinct from the earth.

Human being as *homo faber* does not produce merely the physical world, s/he also produces the social and cultural world. In this respect, human being as *homo faber* produces something permanent intentionally. Producing intentionally and producing durable things are significant differentiations between *animal laborans* and *homo faber*, as producing something durable intentionally enables *homo faber* to overcome the condition of worldlessness that *animal laborans* cannot surpass. This distinction puts the experience of work in a higher rank than the experience of labor. By the same token, creating an artificial world and overcoming the condition of worldlessness makes human being free from nature²³.

²¹ Arendt, H. *The Human Condition*, p. 136.

²² Arendt, H. *The Human Condition*, p.144

²³ The state of being free from nature does not mean freedom in Arendtian sense, therefore I prefer the expression of independent from nature instead of free from nature.

Although the experience of work makes human being independent from nature, it is not freedom because it is instrumental. That is to say, in the experience of work, human being creates because of her/his intentions and goals, therefore the activity remains instrumental. Determined by her/his intentions and goals, the experience of work is far from freedom.

Additionally, *homo faber* destroys nature to create something permanent. To illustrate, s/he damages a tree to obtain wood and subsequently table. As a result of the action of destroying nature, *homo faber* becomes master of nature. The activity of work is different from the activity of labor, in the sense that in the activity of labor human being as *animal laborans* is dependent on nature to supply for her/his essential necessities and is therefore a servant of nature. In the activity of work, on the other hand, human being as *homo faber* is independent of nature, because s/he uses nature to create an artificial and permanent world where s/he controls the stability of her/his life and nature, therefore s/he becomes master of nature.

Another reason that Arendt locates work on a higher scale in the hierarchy than labor is the repetitive character of labor. Although in the process of labor producing should be repetitive to maintain the life cycle, in the activity of work the process of producing finishes when the thing is produced, since the thing as product of work is permanent, not consumable. Once again, this repetitive characterization of labor makes labor different from work. The activity of work has a definite beginning and an end, whereas labor as a cyclical process of biological life has neither a beginning nor an end (Arendt, 1998, 143). It also should be clear that the characterization of work that has a definite beginning and end is unique among the activities of human beings. Action, the third and highest activity of human being, has a definite beginning; however it does not have a definite end because in its very nature it is unpredictable.

The activity of work is differentiated from the activity of labor in the sense that work has an objective aspect. Labor, as a cyclical process of biological life, is about subjective needs and wants of human being, however work as a process of fabrication of things is about the objective aims of human beings (Arendt, 2000, p.

175). Through work human being creates an objective material world. In other words, human being produces consumable products to sustain her/his life in the activity of labor, but s/he produces the tools, instruments and social institutions to fabricate an artificial world.

However, it may be argued that the use of tools blurs the sharp distinction that Arendt tries to maintain between labor and work because, unlike other animals, the human being uses tools even when laboring for biological survival. This is a point that Marx would emphatically draw attention to. Arendt is aware of this objection, but she nevertheless insists on the distinction claiming that tools function differently in the activities of labor and work. In the case of labor tools help reproduce labor and consumption. However, in the case of work the aim of producing and using tools is creating an artificial world of things through which the life of the human being is stabilized. In other words, *animal laborans* uses tools to facilitate his/her process of reproduction of his/her life rather than to construct a world. On the other hand, *homo faber* produces and uses tools to create a durable world.

The distinction between work and labor becomes even more tenuous with the introduction of machines in the place of tools, because when work is performed through machines, the means-end distinction which is the main characteristic of the activity of *homo faber* breaks down. Arendt is aware of this problem, but she addresses it as an opportunity to further her point that, with the rise of the social, we have become a society of laborers as a whole. She observes that with the introduction of machines, work processes begin to get performed in the mode of laboring. She writes as follows:

... all tools of workmanship remain the servant of the hand, whereas machines indeed demand that the laborer should serve them, adjust the natural rhythm of his body to their mechanical movement. In other words, even the most refined tool remains a servant unable to guide or replace the hand; even the most primitive machine guides and ideally replace the body's labor.²⁴

²⁴ Baehr, P., (ed). *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, p. 176

In this passage Arendt analyzes the differentiation between labor and work in context of the relation between the process and machines. According to Arendt, in the process of labor the laborer becomes labor as a part of machine. Put differently, the laborer serves to complete the work of the machine. S/he is servant of machine. However, in respect to the process of work, the condition is the exact opposite. The machines are servants of the hands of worker. The machines serve to complete the work of the workers. As a conclusion, in the process of labor the machine has supremacy over the laborer, but in the process of work the worker has supremacy over his/her tools and instruments.

2.1.1.3. Action

Once again, neither biological activity of human beings, the domestic form of activity, nor mechanical activity of human beings, the social form of activity, does correspond to the meaning of freedom; it is the political activity of human being, action, which constitutes a ground for freedom.

Action is the third form of experience of human being. Since it is the experience that enables freedom, it is the highest form of the human condition. Arendt simply defines action as “to act, to take an initiative and to begin” (Arendt, 1998, p.177). Put differently, action is the moment of beginning a new thing; a new thing which did not occur before.

Arendt has invented her own word, ‘natality’, to refer to this beginning for human being. That is to say, natality is the inception of action whereby the human being starts something different from the established things. In the condition of natality human being is the newcomer who begins something new. From an Arendtian viewpoint, the birth and death of a human being are not simple events; rather they are related to a world where individuals appear as unique and unrepeatable entities.²⁵ Arendt sees natality as the principle of freedom. Natality is the condition in which a new thing is brought into being that is different from everything that

²⁵ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 97

already exists. In this sense, this new thing is unique. In addition, it is unpredictable.

Additionally, for Arendt, action does not only have this simple definition; it also has a comprehensive meaning which includes the terms speech and being with the other. Without these two terms 'to act' does not mean freedom. Speech, similar to action, is a fundamental way of revealing ourselves. In other words, these two notions give an answer to the question "who are you?" Here, it is important to note that "whoness", which refers to distinctiveness, is different from "whatness". It is not possible to explain whoness; it is not explicable even to the human being himself/herself because of every human being's uniqueness. Nevertheless, it is possible to distinguish it from whatness. Whatness is about the characteristics of a human being constructed in social relations. Whatness is the deterministic side of human being; it refers to the characteristics that human being shares with others whereas whoness is a person's distinctive side. For this reason speech and action are necessary for revealing whoness. Action and speech are deeds through which human being surpasses whatness. In "Political Freedom and Political Action" Grafstein characterizes whatness as "the fulfilling of roles, structured relationships and genetic codings."²⁶

Through the answer to the question "who are you?", human being makes himself visible, exposes his/her activities, his/her intention under them and in what sense s/he resembles others or differs from others.

In other words, through speech and action we can confirm ourselves. Word and deed are two means of exhibiting our identity which is common with others and distinct from others.

In this sense, both action and speech are related to two aspects of human plurality, namely equality and distinctiveness. Equality refers to the similarity between human beings which helps them understand each other; contrarily distinctiveness is

²⁶ Grafstein, "Political Freedom and Political Action", p. 467

the uniqueness which represents “whoness”. Distinctiveness is also the basis of storytelling. As each human being is unique, the whoness of each person constitutes a distinct story. There is a reciprocal relation between storytelling and distinctiveness, which is an important element of constructing reality—objective reality for human beings....

According to Arendt, with the help of speech, in addition to action, we can appear to the human world, since we reveal ourselves (1998, p.176). Frazer, citing Arendt, claims that speech is what makes man a political being.²⁷ In this context, the conception of politics, in particular being political is inseparable from that of speech. What differentiates the human being from the animal, namely, what changes human being's animalistic nature into a humanistic one is speech. However, speech is more than the physiological ability to speak. In fact, it is a way of disclosing one's distinction among equals. Revealing herself/himself through speech, the human being exhibits her/his distinctiveness, namely her/his uniqueness. In this respect, Arendt stresses that speech corresponds to the fact of distinctness and is the actualization of human condition of plurality, that is, of living as a distinct and a unique being among equals.”²⁸

In addition, Arendt says that “Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead of merely being distinct.”²⁹

Although speech and action as bases of freedom are in a mutual relationship, the significance of these two deeds differ in relation to revelation and beginning. In other words, speech and action contribute to freedom in different ways. Action contributes to construct freedom and speech contributes to disclose it. As Arendt says;

²⁷Frazer E., “Hannah Arendt: The Risks of the Public Realm”, p.205

²⁸ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 178

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 176

This disclosure is who somebody is implicit in both his words and his deeds; yet obviously the affinity between speech and revelation is much closer than that between action and revelation, just as the affinity between action and beginning is closer than that between speech and beginning, although many, and even most acts, are performed in the manner of speech.³⁰

In the light of this quotation, it is obvious that the role of speech is a more considerable factor than that of action in establishing freedom, in spite of the fact that action and speech establish freedom in reciprocal relation. Freedom is both related to beginning a new thing and revealing, but revealing has a significant role associated with the subject of action. To that extent, Arendt says that in the absence of speech, action loses not only its characterization of revealing but also its subject.³¹ An action without speech is no longer an action because there is no subject who acts in such an action. Losing its subject, namely its whoness, an action also loses its meaning. This condition of losing meaning distinguishes action from work in the sense that without a subject an object of work can still be perceptible, while action is not. The annihilation of whoness is also the annihilation of the distinctiveness of the human being. Losing their distinctiveness, human beings perform merely their social roles. That is to say, they do not act rather they behave.

Besides speech, another term that illuminates action is “being with the other”³² which refers to plurality and the public sphere. I will explain the conceptions of plurality and the public sphere in the next chapter; however I believe that I should point out the notion of “being with the other” in this chapter, which includes action, because it has a significant role in grounding action. Being with others, in its most general sense, means living together. However, Arendt speaks of being with others as a hallmark of her theory of action in the sense that the relation between people who live together is something more than a mere relation. Instead, it consists of the

³⁰ *Ibid*, p. 178

³¹ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 178

³² Arendt uses the term “other” instead of being with the other.

words and deeds of people who live together. The underlying point is that Arendt tries to differentiate being with others in the condition of action from that of the condition of labor and that of the condition of work. Although both in the condition of labor and in the condition of work living together is possible as well as in the condition of action, in the former two conditions living together rests on, respectively, necessity and instrumentality. There is no doubt that speech and deed, which serve to constitute action, namely freedom, are not valuable in the absence of the others, whereas laboring and working do not gain value in reference to others in the same way. In the condition of labor, the product of laboring has value because of necessity and the product of work has value because of instrumentality rather than the presence of others. Action, on the other hand, is the existential condition which necessitates the presence of the others. Arendt puts this as follows: “Action, as distinguished from fabrication, is never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act.”³³ In this remarkable passage, Arendt dwells on the political aspect of action, and thus a new light on the political meaning of freedom. For Arendt, freedom is a matter of publicity rather than individuality. Publicity is the frame that enables freedom.

Further, human being, in the condition of action, is in direct communication with “the other”. This direct communication does not have a homogeneous character, but a heterogeneous one, including both conflicts and intentions besides stories. It is this heterogeneous characteristic of being with others in the activity of action that lays the foundation of unpredictability. Unpredictability is the result of making room for the emergence of a self undefined by the categories of society. Homogeneous interaction turns human beings into predefined patterns in the fabric of the society. Conversely, heterogeneous interaction contributes to unpredictability, thus enabling the expression of the uniqueness of each human being. In the case of unpredictability, it is the faculty of making promises and keeping promises that constructs regularity in an unpredictable future.

³³ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 188

Further, unpredictability makes it possible for action to generate stories. Stories generated through action, begin as the life story of a newcomer through togetherness of deed and speech. Every story influences another story, as every human being affects and is affected by another in interaction with him/her. Stories also tell about their subjects. Nevertheless, nobody is either the initiator or the author of her/his life story since birth, as the beginning of life process, takes place independently of our will and it constructed under interaction with the other. Story is the way of revealing of himself/herself for human being, according to Arendt. In other words, story, in particular storytelling is a tool of constructing objective reality of the subject through remembering, since without remembrance of others reality remains subjective. Storytelling records events and actions that contribute to both the reality and the distinctiveness of human beings by reminding us of the past.

The process that the activity of action carries out is an irreversible process. The irreversible character of action poses problems in interactions among people. Put differently, the negative deeds of a human being in the condition of action are irreversible; there is no remedy for the outcomes of such deeds. Arendt offers the deed of forgiveness to overcome negative outcome of action, in particular irreversible characterization of action. Arendt states that the way to handle irreversibility of action is “the faculty of forgiving”.³⁴ For Arendt, the act of forgiving helps human being amend the negative outcomes of action. The faculty of forgiving enables the forgiven human being to stay in the condition of action and pursue the activity of action

Making promises, keeping promises and the faculty of forgiving are the bases of the Arendtian sense of the social contract. Without keeping promises and forgiving, the continuance of the unpredictable and irreversible nature of action is not possible. The faculty of forgiving helps human being overcome the irreversibility of actions and promising helps human beings to overcome the unpredictability of

³⁴ Brenkert, G. G. “Freedom and Private Property in Marx”, p. 237

action. Promising founds a basis for the maintenance of interaction. The faculty of forgiving serves to reanimate the communication between people.

We may conclude this section, the section about action, by a quotation from Robert Grafstein: “Arendt, in short, identifies action with freedom by identifying it with natality, a new beginning with an unpredictable identity.”³⁵ Grafstein also emphasizes the association between freedom, namely action and the public realm. To take place, action requires the public realm.

³⁵ R. Grafstein, “Political Freedom and Political Action”, p. 467

CHAPTER III

THE PUBLIC AND THE PRIVATE REALMS

In this chapter, I focus on the spatial aspect of freedom, the public sphere and that of slavery, the private and social sphere and the distinctions between them in Arendt's political philosophy. The analysis of the hierarchical activities of *vita activa*; labor, work and action, makes it necessary to examine the differentiation between the private and the public spheres, since every activity of *vita activa* corresponds to one of the two spheres, namely the private sphere or the public sphere.

To understand how Arendt connects freedom to the public sphere, first of all, we may begin with the ideas of freedom which Arendt does not adopt. Arendt's major rejection is about Marx's idea of freedom which rests on a relation with labor. Arendt's criticism of Marx's theory of freedom is the central discussion of the next chapter thus in this chapter I try to overview Arendt's criticism of the ideas which tackle the phenomenon of freedom in an individualistic view.

In the article titled "*What is Freedom*" in her book *Between Past and Future*, Arendt strictly rejects the idea of inner freedom, for inner freedom is irrelevant to politics (146). Inner freedom, in its most general sense, means avoiding external coercion. Put differently, it means doing whatever someone wants to do without being hindered. It is a passive state of "freedom".³⁶ Arendt's deepest objection to the idea of inner freedom is that inner freedom does not require anyone else; rather it necessitates the absence of other people. For this reason Arendt sees inner freedom as an estrangement in which inner experiences replace outer worldly experiences. On the other hand, Arendt's notion of freedom, political freedom, requires the presence of other people. Political freedom is based on the interaction

³⁶Arendt's notion of freedom excludes such kind of freedom namely passive form of freedom, because for Arendt freedom means being active politically within interaction in the public sphere.

between equals and through this interaction the equals have an opportunity to exhibit their distinctiveness. As a matter of fact, for Arendt, freedom and its opposite cannot be understood without the existence of “the other”. To be with others, the human being needs an environment and this environment is the public sphere. Arendt’s notion of freedom requires living together in a political organization in which human beings have an interactive relationship and manifest their uniqueness through deeds and words. Closely related to this point, inner freedom does not have the capacity to manifest itself because it lacks word and deed, and more importantly, the others to be manifested to.

One of the philosophers who sees freedom in an individualistic view is Kant. According to Kant, freedom is a matter of will, as he distinguishes between pure and practical reason, and associates freedom with practical reason, which he defines as the faculty of will. For Kant, freedom is a capability of constructing a moral law and acting according to this law³⁷. In this respect, Kant’s notion of freedom is about the individual. Kant’s account of freedom ignores communal characteristic of human being and holds that an isolated atomistic individual can attain freedom. Kant rejects the idea that freedom is about behavior in the empirical world. For Kant, rather, it is about acting in noumenal world, namely constructing moral law.

This analysis of freedom, which is based on publicity and plurality, precludes Kant’s comprehension of freedom as a fact of individuality. In addition, Arendt’s formulation of the phenomenon of freedom as “acting politically” challenges Kant’s interpretation of freedom as being independent of experience.

Further, Arendt identifies freedom in sharp contrast with necessity which can be redefined as freedom from necessity. Arendt’s free wo/man evades the activities through which s/he supplies for his/her needs. This view of freedom also poses Arendt’s criticism to Marx in the sense that Marx links freedom with necessities.

³⁷ Kant, Critique of Practical Reason

However, Arendt misunderstands Marx's theory of freedom because Marx, in contrast to Arendt's idea, rejects the domination of necessity in human life.

3.1. The Private and Public Realms

Arendt's differentiation between the public and private spheres is parallel to her differentiation between political and nonpolitical activities of human being and subsequently, the condition of freedom and slavery. Arendt's distinction between the private sphere and the public sphere constitutes a significant explanation of the concept of freedom in the Arendtian sense because Arendt thinks that human being can be free only in the public sphere. Likewise, this distinction presides an explanation to the question of why the human being is not free in the private realm.

To begin, we first take a brief look at Arendt's analyses of Antiquity through which she develops her theory of the distinction between the private and public realms.

3.1.1. The Antiquity

Arendt makes a differentiation between the private sphere and the public sphere in reference to the distinction between household and the *polis* in ancient Greek society which Aristotle examined in his philosophy elaborately.

Aristotle's political philosophy aims to investigate the nature of the good life in parallel to his whole philosophy which is an examination of the nature of the things. Aristotle constructs political organization by separating the household including the family and the *polis* referring to the state in a hierarchical form and he regarded the state as a way of achieving the good life.

For Aristotle, the *household* and the *polis* fulfill opposite functions while completing each other. The function of producing in the realm of necessity is performed in the household and participation in politics in the realm of freedom takes place in the *polis*. In other words, the household is the realm of economy and the *polis* is the realm of politics. Aristotle thinks that the family as a part of the household, in its nature, has to function to provide for the fundamental needs; and the state, in its nature, has to enable political activities.

Aristotle's conception of the household concerns to the unequal relationships such as the marital relationship between husband and wife, the parental relationship between father and child and lastly mastership between master and slave. For Aristotle, these unequal relationships are natural. By nature, wife is subject to her husband, the child is subject to his/her father and the slave is subject to his master for the sake of the sustainability of the family, namely the household. Household, as a realm of necessity, is a necessary condition for the *polis*, because the free man of the *polis* supplies his necessities from the activities of the household, namely labor. In this sense, family is the mechanism of not only reproducing essential life in the household but also producing political life in the *polis*. Without labor of family the free man of the *polis* cannot release himself from necessities of life. Aristotle's hierarchical distinction begins with the household and households turn out to villages and the villages turn out to the state. In this section, I just deal with the household and the *polis* because the separation between the household and the *polis* has a prominent influence on Arendt's distinction between the private and public realms. Now let me overview Aristotle's conception of the *polis*.

Aristotle's book titled *The Politics*, in particular the first book, as mentioned above, tries to answer the basic question of Aristotle's political and ethical philosophy which is "How does a man achieve good life or happiness?"³⁸ Aristotle begins the first book of *The Politics* by a remarkable definition of the city as follows "every state is an association of persons formed with a view to some good purpose."³⁹

In this short quotation Aristotle defines the state as a body of people who desire and try to attain the good life, namely virtuous life. The *polis* is the environment that permits the human being to achieve her/his final goal, the good life.

³⁸Aristotle's ethical philosophy cannot be separated from his political philosophy although they seem different to each other. His ethical philosophy examines happy life and his political philosophy examines good life. In fact, Aristotle connects happy life to the good life. For Aristotle, to achieve happy life is to achieve good life and good life is about being virtuous. A wo/man cannot have good life without virtue and without good life s/he cannot be happy.

³⁹Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 25

Aristotle constructs his theory of the *polis* with reference to his definition of man as *zoon politikon*, in other words political man. For Aristotle, the *polis* is the community of political men who rule the city together with a consensus resulting from communicative deliberation.

Although the *polis* is composed of the households, it also is opposed to the household. This establishes a vital problem for us in terms of the relation and distinction between the *polis* and the household, which is the question of how an organization can be opposed to its constituent parts. In other words, how can the *polis* be the domain of freedom although it consists of the households which are the domain of domination? We can establish the problem as: How can the man, the master of the household, at the same time, be a free man of *the polis*? To deal with this problem, Aristotle resorts to essentialism. He thinks that the unequal relationships of the household are natural and subsequently slavery and property are also natural. For Aristotle, free man of the *polis* should have slave and property in order to have leisure time which is necessary to act freely. Slaves provide for the needs of the free man of the *polis* through their labor.

The *polis* is the instrument of citizenship. Aristotle sees the citizen as a free man of the state, namely the *polis*. Aristotle calls the free man of the *polis* as *zoon politikon*. For Aristotle, *zoon politikon* means “man is a political animal by nature.”⁴⁰ Man can be free merely as a citizen of the state by acting politically. Aristotle defines the *polis* as a way of achieving good life.

Arendt analyzes antiquity in reference to Aristotle. According to Arendt, life in the ancient world was separated into two realms, namely the private realm and the public realm. The private realm correlates to life in the household which is related to basic production of needs of life. In contrast to the private sphere, the public sphere correlates to the political life of the ancient world which excluded the activities of the household. The master of the household who did not have to produce to meet the biological needs of life could participate in the political

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Politics*, p. 28

activities of the *polis*. However, other members of the household apart from the master, i.e., slaves and women could not participate in political life. In the ancient world, according to Arendt, what was related to economic life, in other words, to producing and consuming for the needs of life was not political, rather it was economic. The distinctive characteristic of household was that in the household people lived together under the control of needs, this was a necessary condition of life, since the maintenance of the species and maintenance of life of the human beings necessitated togetherness with one another. However, in the public realm togetherness of people was not related to necessities. On the contrary, it was a togetherness of free equal individuals. The life in the polis was the realm of freedom. Political activities were part of the realm of the polis which enabled people to speak and make decisions about the *polis* freely. Necessaries were part of the household which forced people to reproduce essential life in the ancient world, according to Arendt.

The *polis* was different from the household in the sense that in the realm of the *polis* merely equal people were recognized. In other words, only people who could participate in the political life of the *polis* were considered to be equal citizens of the polis. Contrary to the polis, the household was the center of inequalities. Being free meant not being under the domination of both other ones and the necessities of life. Freedom also meant not to dominate anyone else. These two conditions of freedom explain why there was no freedom in the realm of the household, because the master of the household dominated over other members of the household and he was not free; other members of the household, slaves and women, were dominated by the master of the household therefore they were not free either. The master of the household became free when he left the household in which there was no freedom and participated in the political realm in which everybody was free.⁴¹

After this brief overview of Arendt's analysis of antiquity, I would like to turn to Arendt's analysis of the private and public spheres, since an understanding of the

⁴¹ See Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, chapter 2

differentiations between them is crucial to an understanding of freedom and its relation to publicity.

3.1.2. The Private Realm and the Public Realm

3.1.2.1. The Private Realm

The private realm, first of all, is the realm of privacy. Life in the private realm in contrast to that of the public realm, which automatically means plurality, means isolation from others. This isolation is not necessarily physical although physical isolation is possible in the realm of privacy. Arendt does not reject the reality that to live together is a necessary condition for human being as a social being in human conditions. However, living together which is the necessary outcome of being social does not differentiate human being from an animal. Arendt, referring to Aristotle's conception of *zoon politikon*, sees human being as a political entity rather than only a social one. Living together does not necessarily include interaction. In this respect, the isolation that Arendt points out is political which means being out of the sight of the public. Meanwhile the human being is not in sight of the public what s/he does cannot be seen and what s/he speaks cannot be heard by other members of the public. What s/he does and speaks concerns only himself/herself (Arendt, 1998, p. 180)

The crucial difference that separates the private realm from the public realm is that the former deprives the human being from the reality of others. Arendt states that:

To live an entirely private life means, above all, to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others, to be deprived of an "objective" relationship with them that comes from being related to and separated from them through the intermediary of a common world of things, to be deprived of the possibility of achieving something more permanent than life itself.⁴²

As seen in this quotation, Arendt, noting certain distinctions between the private realm and the public realm, says that without an objective relation with others

⁴² Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 58

which the private realm lacks we cannot attain objective reality. As a matter of fact, human being has a sense of reality even in the isolation of privacy; however this reality is subjective, in other words this reality comes from just himself/herself, and it lacks verification by others. Such subjective reality is an inadequate reality. The human being as a political entity needs verification of his/her reality through interactive relationship with others.

The second characteristic of the private realm is that it is the realm of necessity. Arendt defines the affair of the private realm, labor as biological activity of the body. It is the activity that is finished after labor and it does not leave a new product behind. The thing produced in the process of labor is consumed to survive. The products of the process are annihilated at the end of the labor process. The aim of the activities in this process is related to necessity. To illustrate, human beings need to speak or do things for the sake of necessity. Put differently, people speak to each other and act to satisfy their necessities. In this context, it can be said that, the basic humanistic characteristics of human being, namely speech and deed, become instrumental in the process of labor.

The private realm is the arena of the domestic affairs and property. To that extent, Arendt sees the family as a representative form of the private realm (p. 59). Family is the first kind of circular life. The aim of life of the family is merely to preserve and reproduce the biological existence of the members of the family. The mechanism of family performs its function of reproduction and preservation of its members in two ways. It fulfills its function of reproduction by procreation and that of preservation by labor. While analyzing the functions of the family, in the general household, Arendt, in contrast to Aristotle, who also dwells on the function of procreation, underestimates this function. She gives weight to its second function, the function of preservation. The household maintains the presence of its members through supplying their essential biological needs by laboring. The domestic affairs of the family provide for the daily needs of the members which sustain essentiality of family. The mechanism of family does not only supply its members' biological

needs but also safety for them. The human being feels secure and safe from the strangers outside of the family.

The third prominent characteristic of the private is that it is a realm of domination. Domination in the private realm does not necessarily mean direct domination, but it can also be indirect domination. It is slavery of necessity. The private realm is the realm of inequalities, economic affairs, property, and economic interests. In the realm of economic necessities, interests and affairs; relationships between the rulers and ruled are reinforced through oppressive social mechanism, including, as we shall see in section 3.2, conformity.

I may conclude this section as that the key point about Arendt's conception of the private realm is that she sees this realm as the realm of subjectivity. For Arendt, what belongs to the private realm is embraced by subjectivity. In this sense, basic phenomena of the private realm such as labor, property, consumption are related to subjectivity.

3.1.2.2. The Public Realm

The public realm, in its basic meaning, refers to being seen and heard by other people in the publicity (Arendt, 1998, p.50). By this simple definition of the public realm, Arendt means a space of discursive interaction.

The public realm is the domain of political activities. The man in the private realm who is the slave of economic affairs and essential necessities turns into a free citizen of the public realm through action. The people in the public realm are free and equal citizens. The public realm is the place of citizens who are independent of economic affairs, in other words, who are not subject to essential needs. The people in the public realm transcend the relations of submission and domination. Accordingly, the public realm does not enable merely a social body of people; rather it creates an arena for political interactive participation. The social organization of people without interaction of people is not a public realm.

The public realm is the realm of recognition. Arendt points out the significance of “the other” in the public realm without which we lack reality. The presence of others who see what we see and hear what we hear assures us of the reality of the world and ourselves.⁴³ Arendt argues that being aware of our own reality and of the reality of the world with the help of others makes the public realm more important than the private realm, because the private realm is the realm of isolation. However “the other” is insufficient for freedom in the public realm, since in order to be recognized by someone else, we should communicate with others, accept or reject the ideas of others and act with others. In this respect, recognition necessitates togetherness which means acting, discussing with each other rather than mere presence of the other. It is clear that, by “the other” Arendt means being in interaction with the other.

The most prominent characteristic of the public sphere is that it is the realm of plurality. Plurality is possible in this realm in two manners; first through interaction and secondly through disclosure of distinctiveness. Through interaction the wo/men communicate with each other. This communication enables the wo/man to disclose her/his uniqueness. In this sense, this communication in the public realm is different from communication in the activities of the private realm. The activities of labor and work do not necessitate communication. Even if they include communication, it is an instrumental communication. In these activities the human beings communicate to provide essential needs, rather than for disclosure of their distinctiveness. However, in the public realm communication is not an instrument, the human beings communicate for the sake of interaction and disclosure. Through disclosure the human being can exhibit his/her “who”ness. The revelation of whoness is the main characteristic of action in the public realm. About the interwovenness of plurality and uniqueness Kauner says: “The condition of action is plurality, and plurality is unique to man. Plurality, as Arendt conceives it, combines the sameness of the species and the diversity of individuals.”⁴⁴ With the

⁴³ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 50

⁴⁴ J. Kauner, “Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt’s Concept of Political Action”, p. 724

help of acting and speaking, individuals in the public sphere overcome sameness and show his/her distinctiveness which results in plurality.

The public realm is the common world in which the human being not only liberates himself/herself from the isolation of the private realm but also escapes from conformity.

Understanding freedom in relation with action, Arendt locates it in the public realm. Likewise, Arendt locates labor in the private realm. The location of work is more complicated since the activity of work does not take place in the public realm, but its products do. Work makes possible the creation of a public realm which is necessary for action, but work is in the private realm.⁴⁵

Characterizing the private realm as a realm of necessity and the public realm as a realm of freedom, Arendt regards the distinction between these two realms as an important prerequisite of freedom.

Arendt defines the social realm as the annihilation of the separation between these two realms which seriously threatens our freedom and humanity, and sees this annihilation as a crucial defect of modernity. This point will be further elaborated on at the end of the following section.

3.2. The Rise of the Social

The transition of the activities of the household, namely the private sphere, into the public sphere results in what Arendt calls “the rise of the social.” The rise of the social destroys both the private realm, where human being provides her/his biological needs through labor, and the public realm, where human being achieves freedom through action and speech.

The rise of the social ruins the realm of intimacy, the private realm as well as the public realm. The private realm acquires considerable reputation through the rise of social; however, its nature, being the realm of meeting the essential biological

⁴⁵ Benhabib, S., *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt*, p. 124

needs of life, does not change. The social is the realm where dependency on merely biological life comes into prominence and the activities related to survival are allowed to appear in the public realm (Arendt, 1998, p.46).

After the transition of labor into the public sphere, the characteristic of the public sphere alters in accordance with the characteristic of labor. The public sphere, by means of the increase of the consumption that is the outcome of the increase of productivity of labor, loses its political characteristic. According to Arendt, while human labor is more productive in the public realm, their capacity for action and speech degenerate because the rise of the social realm expels the expression of individuality (which is what action and speech are about) from the public realm to the private realm (1998, p.49). As a result of this, human being begins to behave rather than act. In other words, human being performs social roles which are determined instead of fulfilling of unpredictable action. Since behaviors are constructed and manipulated through a calculation of what are defined as human beings' interests and social roles, human deeds lose their characteristics of unpredictability. In modern societies, unpredictable and free human actions are ignored as abnormalities that deviate from the norm instead of being perceived as an expression of individuality or whoness.

Not surprisingly, the destruction of the public realm results in destruction of plurality, as the prominent characteristic of the public realm is plurality. As mentioned above, the rise of social causes people to behave. The main characteristic of human beings' existence is formed by behavior instead of action and this change also alters the human condition which is related to action, namely plurality. As a result of behaving, the human beings lose their distinctiveness in conformity. The life of the human beings turns out to the fabrication of monotype behaviors. The plurality of the publicity turns into homogeneity. The question "who are you" becomes a trivial question instead, consumption becomes a way of representing oneself. D'Entreves, who reads Arendt's political philosophy as a criticism of modernism, referring to Arendt, defines the modern age as follows:

It is the age where history as a natural process has replaced history as a fabric of actions and events, where homogeneity and conformity have replaced plurality and freedom, and organized loneliness has replaced all spontaneous forms of human living together.⁴⁶

Thus the main outcome of the rise of the social is mass society. According to Arendt, mass society and its political organization replace the political action of the public realm, and politics operates in a way that is fully compatible with the conformity of mass society. The rise of mass society, the social realm, equates all the members of the society and embraces all these “equal” individuals. This brings about indirect domination over individuals. The individuals of mass society internalize the submissive relations and obey hegemonic order voluntarily.

As indicated before, the rise of social namely, the annihilation of the border between the private and the public realms is a pavement to authoritarianism and totalitarianism. The rise of the social which brings about the conformity creates a society of people who just conform and this society of conformist people is ruled by one-man or one reason, namely authoritarianism or totalitarianism. For Arendt, totalitarianism is a threat to the political society of human beings. It dissolves the political characteristic of not only the public sphere but also the political wo/man. It transforms political society into mass society and political subject into mass individual.

Although I pointed out Arendt’s characterization of the private realm as the realm of necessity above, the private realm has another prominent characteristic for Arendt. The explanation of this characteristic is that it creates a realm for privacy to be hidden from the visual field of others.⁴⁷ This hidden realm provides a safe area against the outer world. The evaporating of the border between these two realms abolishes privacy.

⁴⁶ D’Entreves, M. P., *The Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt*, p. 29

⁴⁷ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 59

This is another important point on which Arendt is highly critical of Marx and his communistic vision. Communism calls for the abolishment of private property, whereas for Arendt, the preservation of the private sphere is crucial for the possibility of freedom. At this point, it is important to note that Arendt's conception of privacy concerns something much more important than what is commonly understood by the concept of "private property". Arendt points out that capitalism also threatens to destroy privacy in this sense. In this respect she does not see a significant difference between capitalism and communism since the private/public distinction is abolished in both systems as economic (i.e., household) concerns dominate the political. For Arendt, the importance of private property is not about the accumulation of wealth; it is about protecting human beings against what she calls "worldlessness". Depriving human beings of a place of their own or a private sphere leads to totalitarianism as it turns them into a mass animal, leaving them no place to hide.

Totalitarianism distorts the plurality of political society because of the invasion of the public realm by the activities of the private realm. It also demolishes the boundary between the public and private realms which coexist with strict borders. The individual who pursues economic interest substitutes the free citizen of the public realm as a result of the rise of social.

While Arendt's distinction between the private and public realms provides unique society into contemporary mass society, this distinction also seems problematic. Thinking Arendt's separation between the private and the public realm (also the social realm), it is questionable whether it is possible to construct a pure public sphere which enables human being to act freely. Frazer, in her article called "Hannah Arendt: The Risks of the Public Realm", constructs the problem in the following terms: "The domains such as domesticity, intimacy, economy, fabrication, reproduction are not just modes of human conduct, but they coexist with political action and interaction..."⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Frazer E., "Hannah Arendt: The Risks of the Public Realm", p. 210

CHAPTER IV

ARENDT'S CRITIQUE OF MARX'S VIEW OF LABOR

In the last chapter of my thesis, I critically evaluate Arendt's critique of Marx's theory of labor as regards the relation of freedom to labor. In the first part of this chapter I will analyze Marx's theory of labor and freedom. In the second part I will try to consider the problematic points of Arendt's critique of Marx.

Arendt's attempt to construct the idea of freedom is grounded on a critique of modernity, in particular those ideas of modernity which consider economic and social activities of human beings, instead of political ones, as a touchstone of freedom. Arendt's critique of modernity with its stress of the loss of the public realm, the rise of the social and the victory of *animal laborans*, as I have mentioned before, accounts for social forms of life arising on economic activities, the road to mass society and subsequently totalitarianism.

Arendt, in her theory of freedom that tackles freedom in the context of action and the public sphere offers two explanations for freedom; one concerns what freedom is and the other concerns what freedom is not. In this respect, the concept of action can be the answer to the question of what freedom is, and the concepts of labor and work can be the answer for the question what freedom is not. To understand Arendt's critique of Marx, I think the question of what freedom is not should be answered first. Before turning to Arendt's answer to this question, I think it is important to elaborate the main points of Arendt's critique of Marx. Arendt's criticism of Marx can be examined in two aspects. First, Arendt criticizes Marx's approach to labor as a form of emancipation which enables the human being to reach his/her highest capacity. The second point, related to the first one, is that Arendt objects to Marx's project of revolution in the sense that the laboring class will attain political power to have economic power, namely the collective ownership of the means of production through revolution. Arendt rejects Marx's

idea that the proletarians' acquisition of economic power is a means of social change from slavery to freedom.

Although Arendt criticizes Marx's conception of freedom which is related to labor, her idea of freedom has some common ground with Marx's idea of freedom. Let me note certain affinities between these two approaches to freedom. First of all, both Arendt and Marx tackle the phenomenon of freedom in the practical realm. Arendt centers her theory of freedom on (political) action. For Arendt, the free human being represents an individual who acts politically in the public realm. On the other hand, Marx stresses the role of laboring in constructing freedom. For Marx, labor as a kind of creativity, inherently includes freedom; through labor, the human being creates his/her objective reality. Neither Arendt nor Marx adopts a theoretical view of freedom.

Secondly, Arendt, like Marx, rejects an individual form of freedom. As I have detailed in the second chapter, Arendt sees individual freedom as a kind of estrangement, because an isolated individual cannot realize his/her objective powers. For Arendt, freedom requires the political organization of people. Likewise, Marx thinks that wo/man cannot gain freedom without gaining the freedom of his/her species. First of all, Marx, by the most prominent notion of his systematic philosophy, species being, claims that the human being is a social entity rather than individual; thus the freedom of the human being is a social issue.⁴⁹ For Marx, laborers as members of a social class can emancipate humanity from the inhumane conditions of capitalism.

After these similarities between these two approaches to freedom, I want to return to Marx's notions of labor and freedom and the relation between these two notions

⁴⁹Arendt uses the term political rather than social to denote the communal characteristic of freedom. She underrates the social characteristic of freedom, since she thinks that it is irrelevant to political activities, however her conception of political freedom is similar to Marx's emphasis on the social nature of freedom. Both Arendt and Marx refer to the communal characteristic of freedom. A second point that should be clarified is that what Marx in his book *On The Jewish Question* criticizes as political emancipation does not correspond Arendt's notion of political freedom.

which poses a considerable distinction between the theories of freedom in the philosophies of Marx and Arendt.

4.1. Marx's Theory of Labor and Freedom

Marx is one of the major philosophers of the nineteenth century who tries to give an account of freedom. In his philosophy, Marx tries to trace freedom in social life in two ways. Firstly, Marx analyses the capitalist form of society through dominated labor to understand why people, especially laborers are not free. Secondly, Marx tries to construct another form of society, namely socialist society where people are free through labor. In this sense, labor is the key conception of not only Marx's criticism of the capitalist mode of production and society but also of his theory of the historical transformation of society from the capitalist form to the socialist one. Moreover, Marx's philosophy of freedom does not only analyze the theoretical background of freedom; he also tries to illuminate the road to freedom in practical life clearly.

The main task in Marx's philosophy is to harmonize freedom with labor. In other words, his conception of freedom is inseparable from that of labor. Marx explains the relation between labor and freedom in his book titled *The Grundrisse* where he defines freedom as the "self-realization and objectification of the subject, whose activity is labor." (p. 124). The philosophy of Marx examines freedom in its relation with labor, wherein his focus on the questions of "when labor constitutes freedom" and "when labor causes slavery" also points to a distinction between the realm of freedom and the realm of necessity.

4.1.1. Marx's Theory of Labor

Marx's analysis of labor is rooted in his focus on the notion of human nature. The conception of human nature takes an important place in the philosophy of Marx, because it also makes an explanation for other important conceptions such as species being, objective activity, and alienation.

The conception of human nature evokes the notion of a human being who has a rigid unchangeable inner structure. However, human nature, for Marx, is not something which has a strict form, rather it is something shaped through social relations and the material world in any historical time. It is also changeable in parallel to the change in the structure of society. It is obvious that Marx's understanding of human nature refers to the construction of consciousness in accordance with the alterations in the social structure. More importantly, the alteration of human nature and the changes in social structure have a reciprocal effect on each other. Human being, concurrently, makes alteration in his/her human nature while s/he changes the structure of society.

Additionally, human nature includes needs as well as powers to provide for these needs in all historical epochs. The powers of human beings develop and become sophisticated in parallel with the changing needs of human beings from primitive to complicated ones. Needs of the human being and powers to satisfy these needs are pivotal instruments to change and remake society and history. Marx claims that (wo)man, first of all, should be able live to make history and to live, (s)he must meet (her)his needs and lastly (s)he does have to means of production to supply (her)his needs.⁵⁰ Put differently, the basis of life, according to Marx, is needs and the problem of how to obtain these needs. Approaching human nature in the sense of needs and means to satisfy these needs, Marx concludes that economic life determines other aspects of life such as political, legal and religious life. In other words, Marx defines economic life as the base structure of society and political, legal, religious and philosophical life as the superstructure of a society. He claims that “base structure of a society determines superstructure of the society”⁵¹, because for Marx, labor has a societal characteristic, namely it is about the social relations of production, a tool of reproducing social relations, and an element of economic

⁵⁰ Pierson, C. (ed.) *The German Ideology* in *The Marx Reader*, p. 99-100

⁵¹ Marx, K. *Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1850/pol-econ/preface.htm>. (Accessed 1st November 2014)

life. The mode of production determines the self, namely consciousness of the producer. This determination is the result of the social characteristic of labor.

Marx's position about human nature leads to the accusation that he is deterministic about the human being and freedom. Arendt is one of his accusers who claim that Marx locates freedom in a deterministic realm, namely the economic realm. If we examine Marx's systematic philosophy in detail, we can see that an approach to human nature that sees human nature as shaped and changed by needs and the method of supplying for these needs through social relations includes an answer to the debatable question about Marx's project of human emancipation—whether he is deterministic about human being or not. I will evaluate Arendt's critique in detail in the second part of this chapter; thus now I would like to turn to the relation between human nature and labor.

The basic activity of the human being to supply for his/her needs is labor. Labor is the activity of creating something new from materials given in nature. When human being creates something new from nature, s/he becomes aware of herself/himself and aware of the changes s/he makes on nature. In other words, satisfying his/her needs through labor enables him/her to realize himself/herself, because labor is a conscious activity. The human being, unlike animals, plans his/her object of production in his/her mind before producing it in the outside world. In other words, human beings produce with an intention and not merely instinctively. Therefore, labor is a process that involves not only physical but also mental endeavor. In this respect, according to Marx, production is not only a way of surviving for a human being, but also a way of creating oneself, one's environment and one's world. It can be deduced from such an explanation of labor that the fact of how the producer produces the products is also the fact of how the producers understand the world and life. In his book *Alienation*, Bertell Ollman conceptualizes Marx's characterization of labor as “an interactive with nature by means of body and mind.”⁵² In this context, labor is an action through which

⁵² Ollman, B. *Alienation*, p. 97

human being begins to have a dialectical and reciprocal relation with nature. From this relation it is comprehensible that, in the activity of labor, human being not only changes nature but also himself/herself. And the change through labor is objective change, because in labor the human being objectifies his/her subjectivity. Human being who labors can externalize his/her inner needs, and further, s/he actualizes her/his potential powers to satisfy her/his needs.⁵³

In the activity of labor, the human being becomes master of nature. However this does not mean that s/he can do anything s/he wants to nature. Wo/man cannot distort nature, because nature is the source of her/his needs. Human being is aware of the fact that s/he cannot survive without nature, and s/he reaches this consciousness through labor.

According to Marx, labor is an activity of self- production which makes human being a species being. In other words, the human being creates himself/herself as a species being and the world s/he lives in through her/his labor. By the notion of ‘species being’, Marx refers to the distinctive characteristics of human life activity. Referring to species (wo)man, Marx asserts that “free, conscious activity is man’s species character”.⁵⁴ Thus, the term ‘species being’ refers to consciously producing a livable world. In other words, the species character of human being’s life emphasizes the purposive and conscious nature of the activity of wo/man as a species being. Labor is a way of creating humans’ inner nature, namely the species life of human being.

When viewed in this light, we can see that for Marx, labor is the positive constitutive element of human nature. But while this analysis of labor reveals the emancipatory potential of labor for human being as a species being, Marx does not simplistically assume that labor is always emancipatory. Marx is also aware that

⁵³ Andrew, E. “Work and Freedom in Marcuse and Marx”, p. 244

⁵⁴ K.Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm>

labor can turn into a form of slavery depending on the mode of production and social relations at a given historical period. In *Capital*, such an analysis of labor as unfree activity takes place through his analysis of the commodity form.

According to Marx, the commodity gains the characteristics of labor through which it is produced. So the examination of the basic characteristics of the commodity which is produced through labor is simultaneously the examination of labor.

Marx analyzes labor in *Capital* through analyzing two considerable characteristics of the commodity form as use value and exchange value. Examining the features of commodity as use value and exchange value helps us understand how labor constructs human consciousness in both a positive and negative manner.

Marx defines the useful labor as follows “The labor, whose utility is thus represented by the value in use of its products, or which manifests itself by making its product a use value, we call useful labor.”⁵⁵

From Marx’s definition of useful labor one can understand that the materials turn into use objects by the help of labor and they, as objects, gain use value. Use value is an essential characteristic of a commodity. Objects of labor as use-values are produced “to satisfy human wants of some sort or another.”⁵⁶ Any product of labor, first of all, should fulfill some need or want of human beings in order to gain a use value. Marx thinks that each commodity has a use value because of productive activity of a definite kind and the definite aim of labor⁵⁷. In other words, the use value of each commodity is different. Thus, human beings should exchange their products to satisfy their necessities because they cannot produce objects for all of their wants

In addition to use value, a second essential characteristic of commodities is that they also have an exchange value. In contrast to use value, exchange value occurs

⁵⁵ Tucker, R, C. The Marx Engels Readers, p. 308

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p. 303

⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 309

in its relation to other commodities. Exchange value is the quantitative characteristic of a commodity whereas use value is about quality.⁵⁸ More accurately, exchange value expresses a relation among commodities. In *Capital* Marx examines how objects produced for use can attain an exchange value in relation to each other while both the products and the processes of labor producing them are qualitatively different. He answers this question by identifying socially necessary labor time as what all commodities exchanged in the capitalist market have in common. Thus exchange value of a commodity expresses (while also concealing) the abstract labor embodied in a commodity.

The exchange value influences all social relations of human being, according to Marx. Further, this abstract labor (or exchange value) is the basic mechanism of capitalism for the accumulation of surplus value, particularly the accumulation of capital. In capitalism, the capitalist purchases not only all means of production but also the labor power of the laborer. In other words, labor-power appears as a commodity in the market, and like all commodities, it also has a use-value and an exchange value. This is a process of commodification which results in the waged labor and waged laborers. The capitalist pays a wage to the laborer, which is supposed to represent the exchange-value of his/her labor-power. This exchange-value, like other exchange-values, is determined by the amount of socially necessary labor time required for its production (in other words, it is equivalent to the exchange-value of the commodities required for the maintenance of the laborer's life.) The use-value of labor-power, on the other hand, is labor itself, which is capable of producing more value than it needs to consume to maintain its existence (and which is what the capitalist pays the laborer). As we will see below, this distinction that Marx makes between labor-power and "labor in use" is an important one which Arendt ignores when developing her criticism of Marx.

The process of commodification of the object of labor is at the same time the process of alienation of the laborer. The process of alienation is the distortion of the

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 304

mutual relation between (wo)man and nature whose impacts can be also seen on the relations between wo(man) and (her)his product, between him/her and the process of production, between him/her and (her)his species being and lastly between (s)he and other human beings. Ollman characterizes alienation as “the capitalist version of human nature.”⁵⁹ In the condition of alienation human being loses his/her objective relation with the product s/he produces. S/he does not produce according to her/his intention, but s/he produces for a mere aim; to increase the quantity of commodities, subsequently quantity of capital.

For human being, labor is a means of realization of his/her powers, talents and life of species being, namely conscious life activity. However, labor fulfills this function when the laborer labors freely. On the other hand, labor turns a means of oppression under domination. Marx sees this kind of labor as alienated labor.

4.1.1.1. Alienated Labor

Alienation is a situation in which the potential of the laborer to recreate his/her nature is stifled, because labor in the situation of alienation is dominated by someone other than the laborer. The process of production is no longer under the laborer’s control and intention. Under domination, oppressed labor creates a false consciousness which distorts the reality of the human being. This reality is also the reality of the world. Thus, the laborer begins to understand the world s/he lives in and his/her physical and social environment, with a false consciousness. That is to say, in the case of alienation the productive activity yields a distorted picture of the world to the producer, because labor as conscious activity becomes mechanistic activity. As a result, all social relations of human beings become oppressive, as if an invisible power represses all of his/her faculties.

The objects which the laborer produces become an alien power against the laborer. The laborer has to sell his/her labor power in order to survive. Additionally, the laborer becomes a slave of the products s/he produces. The laborer also loses

⁵⁹ Ollman, B. *Alienation*, p. 74

control of the entire labor process and s/he begins to deal with just one stage of the process as labor is performed according to the intentions of others. Loss of control over the entire labor process is the result of division of labor and it categorizes people according to their role in the process of production. This results in alienation among laborers, because laborers as separated from each other see other laborers apart from themselves as enemy or at best as rivals.

Although labor is a constitutive element of human essence, alienated labor turns the laborer into an animal. In the condition of alienation, labor becomes torture from which human being tries to escape, while the animalistic side of human beings makes human being feel at home and free. Animalistic needs become prior for human being while humanistic needs as creativity through labor lose their importance. Under alienated labor human beings is far removed from his/her human nature as freedom.

Being the owner of the means of production and buying labor power, the capitalist controls the process of production and determines how the product is produced. The worker becomes an automat in the determined process of production. The distortion of reality that alienation brings about is not only related to economic realities but it is also related to social realities. The human being feels helpless and hopeless towards the misery s/he feels and transfers his/her potentials to god or other metaphysical entities.

Unfree people cannot control the forces and conditions of their life besides the process of labor. They think that the incidents which they are subjected to are caused by chance or curse. Brenkert summarizes such a condition as following “people come to consider the conditions and forces which determine their lives to be simply natural aspects of their environment, to be manifestation of fate and chance rather than objects of possible rational directions.”⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Brenkert, G. G. “Freedom and Private Property in Marx”, p. 126

This above-quotation is an example of religious estrangement which results in underestimating and ignoring one's own powers. The religious estrangement is the condition that human being feels helpless towards circumstances. As a result s/he sees her/his potentialities as a strange power against herself/himself.

The obstacle to living in a free society created by the capitalistic mode of production is not just alienated labor. The more important element of subjection in capitalist society which is the cause of alienated labor is private property. Now we should look at this element, private property. The term '-property-' in Marx's philosophy is about the resources of production such as land and capital. Another term of Marx related to property is 'private property' and it refers to the control that some individuals have over these resources of production. The fact of private property is closely related to alienated labor. In the capitalist form of society the means of production are taken from laborers and owned forcibly by the bourgeois class. This ownership of means of production brings about the dominated control of the bourgeois over the process of production. Needless to say private property constructs the ground of alienated labor and in this way oppression. The laborer does not plan the object of his/her labor anymore, s/he does not even have any idea about the whole of labor, since s/he takes place only in one stage of the process of labor as a result of division of labor. The other detrimental impact of the private property related to alienation is that the fact of private property separates human beings as owners and non- owners of means of production and their interest are strictly opposite. In this case the owners and non –owners see each other as alien and hostile.⁶¹

4.1.2. Marx's Theory of Freedom

Marx is an important philosopher who devotes not only his systematic philosophy but also almost his whole life to the issue of freedom. Marx uses historical materialism as a methodological device in order to construct his theory of freedom. Although he embraces the Hegelian approach of dialectic through which Hegel

⁶¹ Brenkert, G. G. "Freedom and Private Property in Marx", p. 125

tries to understand the progress of consciousness, Marx deviates from this tradition in the context of idealism. He rejects Hegel's idealistic approach to dialectic; afterwards he adopts and develops a materialistic one. Marx's conception of historical materialism can be understood as the development of society through the development of modes of production. In *German Ideology*, written with Engels, Marx explains how the mode of production changes historically.

For Marx, freedom is about the life of the human species. Human being will be a free human being when s/he improves his/her capacities until s/he reach the highest capacity. Thus, s/he lives the objective life of human species. Put differently, human being cannot be free unless s/he does act consciously in the life of species being. This activity of human species is labor. Such activity is also a vehicle of transformation of the historical circumstances of society. Labor as a form of freedom is a significant fact that results in historical development in societal structure, because labor does enable laborers not only to change themselves but also change the world they live in. In this sense, the notion of freedom in Marx's philosophy refers to the emancipation of the human species.

Marx, in the book titled *The Holy Family*, which is written with Engels, defines freedom as "the positive power to assert his truly individuality."⁶² In this definition, although Marx identifies freedom in sense of individuality, individuality refers to (wo)man who uses (her)his powers to reach the capacity of the species being's life. As I said before, Marx rejects the individualistic form of freedom and he celebrates communal characteristic of freedom. For this reason, the term individuality means integration and manifestation of individual to the society through conscious activity of species being. Furthermore, the powers to assert one's individuality truly refer to the potentialities of human beings to change. Potentiality to change refers to historical change of (wo)man and society through labor. In this respect, labor is a necessary condition for freedom. Without labor human being cannot objectify his/her subjective reality.

⁶² Marx, K. *The Holy Family*, Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-family>

For Marx, freedom necessitates “free activity of labor” rather than “just labor” because the conception of labor in Marx’s theory of freedom has a double meaning as “activity of freedom or bondage”⁶³ in accordance with its circumstances. If it is dominated, it will be activity of bondage, but if it is acted freely it will be activity of freedom.

Additionally, Marx’s prescription of freedom is hidden in his notion of private property. Marx’s formulation of this prescription is in its simplest meaning as “abolition of bourgeois property.”⁶⁴ What Marx means by bourgeois property is private property in the Marxian sense. Abolition of private property emancipates alienated labor from the conditions of alienation and oppression, thus laborer. It is obvious that Marx does not want the abolition of labor through the abolition of private property, instead he intends the abolition of alienated labor by which human being as laborer becomes a slave of laboring. (Free) labor exists in communist form of society. What communist society bestows upon the human being is not the absence of labor, namely the right of slothfulness, rather it is labor emancipated from oppression through which human being achieves his/her highest capacity of species being. As I mentioned above, alienation distorts the self-realization and objectification of human being which s/he gains through labor. Abolition of private property ensures the abolition of distortion of self-realization. Distortion of self-realization is a kind of false consciousness that helps the oppressor, because human being with false consciousness sees oppressing relations as natural and submits to oppression voluntarily. However freedom means, for Marx, gaining control over the conditions of one’s own life and improving one’s faculties. In the existence of private property, the owners of private property decide how, when and where the laborer works. The decision about work is out of the worker’s will, hence the control over the process of labor is out of the worker’s will. It is unconscious, uncontrolled, involuntary and irrational activity. For Marx, the existence of private property is historical as other social facts, therefore the reality of private property

⁶³ Andrew, E. “Work and Freedom in Marcuse and Marx”, p. 242

⁶⁴ Engels F. and Marx, K. *The Communist Manifesto*, p. 48

can be changed by human beings. The abolition of private property is only possible in a communist form of society which is to be reached through a revolution. Marx summarizes this idea by stating that “The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations.”⁶⁵ Abolishing private property enables the elimination of the oppression over labor. As a result, in the communist form of society, division of labor, which is a kind of oppression, is cancelled as a consequence of abolition of private property.

As we conclude this section about the relation between freedom and labor in the Marxian sense, we can say that Marx criticizes modernity in terms of the capitalist form of society and its fundamental devastating outcomes upon the human beings. Labor, as Marx interprets it, can be a tool of not only freedom but also of oppression. It depends on who has the means of production, whether the worker class or the bourgeois class. While Marx tries to seek for freedom, firstly, he traces the condition of the subjection of labor in the capitalist form of society and subsequently the condition of freedom in the communist form of society.

The phenomenon of freedom in the philosophy of Marx is related to the activity of labor, the products of labor and social relations constituted as an outcome of labor. In the capitalist form of society, the social relation between human beings turns into a relation between commodities. In this sense, it is clear that the relations of human beings in the condition of alienated labor is similar to the relations that Arendt defines as animalistic and instrumental relations seen in the conditions of labor and work. As the worker in capitalism is condemned to work only ensure the continuance of his/her biological life, his/her condition corresponds to labor in the Arendtian sense. In addition, the instrumentalization of human labor in the service of capital parallels Arendt’s discussion of why the condition of the worker is not completely free. To exacerbate the problem, the capitalistic end to which human labor is subjected is not the creation of a world in the Arendtian sense but the accumulation of capital for its own sake since in capitalism commodities are

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 57

produced not for their use value but for their exchange value. Capitalism thus creates a cycle of production and consumption, which is how Arendt characterizes the condition of labor. Here we see that the phenomenon of the worldlessness that Arendt criticizes has more to do with the capitalistic mode of production. Then the rise of the social or the emancipation of labor and its invasion of the political arena.

For Marx, the analysis of the road to alienated labor which becomes an outer power over laborer and a means of oppression also can be a prescription of freedom for an oppressed society. Thus, Marx, first of all, endeavors to understand capitalistic mode of production which subjugates labor greedily, to construct a free society in his systematic philosophy.

4.2. Arendt's Critique of Marx

If we return to Arendt's answer to above-mentioned question, namely what freedom is not, as I mentioned above, Arendt sees labor and work as slavery instead of freedom. I think there is a sharp distinction between the approaches of Arendt and Marx to the notion of labor, since I read Arendt's whole philosophy as a rejection of labor and that of Marx as dignifying of labor. This distinction brings Arendt's two criticisms to Marx, the labor freedom relation and the projection of revolution, closer to each other.

4.2.1. Critique of Labor and Freedom

Arendt, in the chapter of *The Human Condition* called "Labor" criticizes Marx for not differentiating labor and work which are different according to her, and for seeing labor, which is the condition of biological life as condition of permanent things.⁶⁶ Arendt puts her critique into words as:

The modern age in general and Karl Marx in particular, overwhelmed, as it were, by the unprecedented actual productivity of Western mankind, had an almost

⁶⁶Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, chapter 3

irresistible tendency to look upon all labor as work and to speak of the *animal laborans* in terms much more fitting for *homo faber*.⁶⁷

Arendt's argument about this critique is that Marx uses the term labor as a production of worldly life. In other words, for Arendt failing to differentiate between labor and work, Marx attributes the characteristics of work to labor. However, Arendt thinks that labor cannot produce worldly life since what is produced as a result of labor is biological life, namely wordless life.

Secondly, Arendt makes a distinction between labor and work in the sense that labor has animalistic characteristics. However, this distinction does not seem to work. For example, even the simplest laboring activity requires the use of tools which are products of work. In addition, as Marx points out, human labor is different from animal production in that even in a paradigmatic laboring activity such as farming human being transforms nature, which means that labor also can be seen as contributing to the creation of a human world. Use of tools and transformation of nature through labor are the main reasons why human labor as distinct from animal labor it has a historical character and cannot be kept strictly distinct from work.

And secondly Arendt in the section of "Labor" in her book objects that Marx holds that labor is a form of freedom. She thinks that labor as a condition of essential needs precludes freedom since in the condition of labor human being is in the realm of necessities

The main characteristic of labor in the philosophy of Marx, namely conscious intended activity arises as an answer to Arendt's critique of Marx. And freedom in the Marxian sense means conscious alteration in human nature. For Marx, what makes human being conscious is labor. And what makes change in human nature is labor. For this reason labor is the constitutive element of freedom. Further, the sort of labor --whether it be alienated labor or non-alienated labor-- determines conscious.

⁶⁷ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 87

Although Marx does not make a distinction between work and labor in Arendt's sense, he distinguishes labor from alienated labor and relates alienated labor to the absence of freedom (emancipation) and labor (that is not alienated labor) to emancipation.⁶⁸

Marx says that;

As a result of alienated labor, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions –eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is human becomes animal.⁶⁹

Needless to say, alienated labor, in contrast to non-alienated labor which makes human being a conscious species being, causes false consciousness. In the alienated form of labor, according to Marx, the production (commodity) which the laborer produces becomes independent from himself/herself. As a result, laborer creates himself/herself as a commodity. Social relations of the alienated human being become means of supplying products. At this point, being produced consciously is a significant characteristic of labor in the Marxian sense; the loss of this characteristic turns conscious activity of labor to unconscious activity of labor. In this context, labor creates human being as a species being but alienated labor creates an alienated human being who gives priority to his/her animalistic needs. Because Arendt considers Marx's conception of labor in an absolute biological sense, she sees only one dimension of Marx's laborer, namely the alienated laborer, who dedicates herself/himself to her/his biological needs. Marx thinks labor creates free consciousness when labor itself is free. But the sort of labor which makes the laborer a slave of biological life is alienated labor which is not free, but rather under domination. It can be said that Arendt falls into trap of reduction which she accuses Marx of. She sees only one side of Marx's phenomenon of labor instead of the whole. Arendt reduces Marx's phenomenon of labor which has two dimensions

⁶⁸ K.Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*. Retrieved from <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/preface.htm>

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

as free labor and alienated labor to a one dimensional namely animalistic one. To put it another way, what Marx characterizes as labor power and the way it is utilized in capitalism as abstract labor for the purpose of extraction of surplus value correspond to Arendt's characterization of labor. Marx does not make a distinction between labor and work, but his distinction between labor power and labor indicates that he is conscious of the type distinction that Arendt has in mind. But Arendt rigidly separates work and labor whereas for Marx surplus labor can turn into work or even action under unalienated conditions. Arendt mostly ignores the possibilities of this fluid transformation; when she does acknowledge it in one passage in *The Human Condition*, she categorically denies it, but her arguments on this point are obscure and not sufficiently supported.⁷⁰

Consumption, like production, is a vital part of life. Accordingly, consumption and production mutually influence each other. However, they determine each other according to the mode of production. In the capitalist mode of production consumption determines needs (consumption), whereas in the socialist mode of production needs determines production. In this context, there is no doubt that the fact of consumption has two opposite aspects as positive and negative. Marx does not reject the needs of human beings. What Marx rejects is the domination of the necessity of needs over all aspects of life. Likewise, Arendt also criticizes the domination of needs over political life. A distinct point between Marx and Arendt's approach to the relation between needs and consumption is that Marx rejects the domination of needs while Arendt tries to sidestep the reality of having to satisfy these needs and claims that it should not be a concern of politics. However, labor is also necessary process to reach the public sphere. Without supplying for the essential needs of life it is not possible to act freely in the public sphere.

4.2.2. Critique of Marx's Project of Revolution

The second criticism of Arendt to Marx is that Marx relates freedom with labor, namely he puts freedom in the realm of economy instead of that of politics. Arendt

⁷⁰ Arendt, H., *The Human Condition*, p. 133

claims that Marx, while trying to his projection of revolution, thinks the laborers cannot gain political power without gaining economic power. Arendt's second critique of Marx is closely related to the first one.

In addition, Arendt trivializes labor rigidly. Referring to labor, she points out that labor does not have the capacity to create a permanent world and when its products are consumed there remains nothing. However, Arendt's assumption seems to be fallacious. What is remaining after labor is the historical alteration of human nature and structure of society. To illustrate, when we look history of wo/man even the most primitive epoch of history we can see that the human being of antiquity, who domesticates the brutal animal of nature and cultivates without any permanent instrument in the Arendtian sense, progresses in history through changing his/her nature besides the world s/he lives in and physical nature. This evolution of labor which makes historical change in societal structure is the ground of Marx's projection of revolution. This is a second argument for why we cannot make such a differentiation between labor and work as Arendt did.

As a conclusion of this chapter, I will argue that labor does not preclude freedom; rather, it is the activity that constitutes freedom. Labor per se is not the condition of necessities as Arendt understands it. Arendt's definition of labor with reference to our biological needs and animal existence only puts it out of history. It is this characterization of labor that raises the problem that labor excludes freedom. If we consider Arendt's account of labor, I tend to believe that anything related to human being is historical rather than merely ontological or conceptual, since human being itself is historical.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In my thesis, I have tried to trace the phenomenon of freedom in the context of a basic question of political philosophy: “How does the human being attain freedom in her/his life?” While trying to answer this question, I eliminated the liberal individualistic account of freedom and focused on more communal accounts of freedom, because freedom is a social characteristic of human being. One can object to this statement in the sense that there are also inner obstacles to be free. However, I think that these inner obstacles also come from social relations if they are not about mental functions. The philosophers who are in favor of individualistic versions of freedom consider freedom to be a matter of free will or adopt an individualistic ethical approach. Kant is one of the philosophers who tackle freedom as a matter of will and morality. Kant identifies the phenomenon of freedom in a basic sense in relation to autonomy and the faculty of decision-making which grounds morality. Kant’s notion of the good will can be interpreted as an individualistic account of freedom, because this notion enables human being to act according to his/her will independently of experience.

Correspondingly, I believe that freedom includes a feeling of responsibility for others and contact with others; thus the atomistic isolated individual cannot be the subject of the issue of freedom.

In my endeavor to understand freedom as a communal or political concept, I first turn to Hannah Arendt’s theory of freedom. Arendt basically identifies freedom as action in the public sphere. I examined Arendt’s theory of freedom in the first two chapters of my thesis. In the former, I analyzed Arendt’s differentiation between different types of human activity –labor, work and action—in detail; and in the latter, I analyzed her differentiation between the private and public realms. My analysis circled around certain questions as: “Is it possible to separate labor and

work as strictly as Arendt did?”, “Is a pure public realm purged from labor and work possible?” The first question is related to Arendt’s differentiation between labor, work and action, and the second question is connected with the differentiation between the private and public realms.

Differentiating the activities of human being as labor, work and action, Arendt claims that these activities correspond to certain basic human conditions. Labor corresponds to the circularity of biological life, work to the permanency of the instrumental life and action to the life of plurality amongst distinguished individuals. Additionally, Arendt identifies these human activities as political or nonpolitical activities on the path to freedom; nonpolitical activities put barriers on the road to freedom and political ones construct the route to freedom. In this sense, labor and work are nonpolitical activities; it is action as a political activity that stands for freedom. Arendt deduces the formulation of freedom from her differentiation between labor, work and action. According to Arendt, there should be a strict separation between these activities of the human being in order to preserve and sustain the realm of freedom. However, this prescription poses problems. Arendt tries to banish politics and lifestyles related to necessity and economic activities from the realm of freedom. Yet, what Arendt banishes from the realm of freedom are not only policies or lifestyles associated with necessity but also necessities themselves. The question that Arendt’s view gives rise to can be formulated as: How could free wo/man provide for his/her necessities without the products of labor and work? We may detail this question as: how is s/he fed without food, sheltered without construction? The second problem is about Arendt’s definite separation between labor, work and action, in particular between labor and work. Defining labor as the expenditure of biological energy in order to survive and work as an end- governed activity engaged in for the purpose of constructing of a world, Arendt contends that the human being cannot create permanent things through labor. However, I believe that what is remaining behind labor (which Arendt overlooks) is the historical evolution of the consciousness of the human being and social structures. Of course, this evolution is not readily apparent; it was Marx and Hegel’s dialectical analysis of labor that made it clearly

visible. Arendt, however, seems to ignore this dialectical analysis when criticizing Marx.

Further, in Arendt's view, the phenomenon of freedom has particular characteristics such as natality, plurality, visibility, disclosure, uniqueness and equality. If we try to reformulate Arendt's definition of freedom in context of these properties, it should be something like the following: A new beginner who acts to disclose his/her uniqueness in the field of vision of other equal individuals in the plurality of the public sphere, is free. Such a definition of freedom assumes a public realm purified from necessities and instrumentalism which is why Arendt tries to keep labor and work out of the public realm. However, there is no doubt that it is not possible to extract the activities concerning labor and work out of the public sphere in modern society where the structure of society has become complicated as a result of what Arendt called "the rise of social". If Arendt's *zoon politicon* is not an atomistic individual, which we know it is not, s/he has to have involvement with both the realm of the private and the realm of the political. Here, it is important to note that it is not difficult to separate labor and action in ancient Greek society where the social life is primitive, therefore the border between labor and action is explicit.

Secondly, I tried to evaluate Arendt's critique of Marx, because this criticism can be seen as definitive of freedom for Arendt, in the sense of what freedom is not. To evaluate Arendt's critique of Marx's theory of freedom, I examined Marx's theories of freedom and labor, since Marx linked freedom with labor. I tackled Arendt's criticisms in terms of two main topics. The first is her criticism of Marx for not differentiating between labor and work and seeing labor as producing permanent things. Moreover, Arendt labels labor as animalistic activity and blames Marx for considering labor in humanistic sense. However, Marx thinks that labor, even in its primitive mode, is a form of transforming nature and societal structure through using tools and in this context it is different from animal labor. Furthermore, Marx differentiates human labor from animal labor in the sense that while human labor is a conscious activity, animal labor is instinctive activity.

Another feature that constitutes Marx's differentiation human labor from animal production is that animal produces just for needs but the human beings can continue to produce after they provide for their needs. Most importantly, Marx's distinction between labor-power and labor in use, and the way in which the use-value of labor is exploited in capitalism yields a different kind of insight into the problems of mass society and consumerism which Arendt does not sufficiently acknowledge. In short, Arendt ignores the subtleties of Marx's theory of labor and tackles Marx's concept of labor from her own point of view rather than Marx's approach.

Arendt's second criticism is about the relation between labor and freedom that Marx establishes. According to Arendt, labor is a form of slavery, namely slavery to essential necessities; thus it cannot be a form of freedom as Marx claims. Arendt criticizes Marx for locating freedom in the realm of economy in which every activity of human being is guided by the goals of production and consumption, instead of the realm of politics. For Arendt, labor is a tool of massification because labor as motivated by necessities cannot act freely whereas action that is the basis of freedom is independent of any necessity and instrumentality.

My criticism of Arendt's conception of labor is that she degrades labor to mere biological process of survival; therefore she ignores its capacity to transform the nature of human being. Arendt considers the condition in which labor is performed as labor itself. She does not regard whether labor is performed under oppression, (I mean not only direct oppression but also indirect oppression), or in the condition of freedom. I believe that consumption in modern society which Arendt defines as "to produce to consume" is an indirect form of oppressed labor.

My own view is that although freedom opposes necessity, it does not necessarily oppose labor because labor cannot be reduced to mere biological or physiological power to provide essential necessities as Arendt did.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

“Emek kölelik midir yoksa özgürlük müdür?” sorusu çerçevesinde yaptığım bu çalışmada Arendt’in emeği özgürlükle karşıt ilişki içinde değerlendiren iddiasını Marx’ın emeği bir özgürlük biçimi olarak gördüğü iddiası ile kıyaslayarak özgürlük ile emek arasındaki ilişkiyi anlamaya çalıştım. Bu iki filozofun özgürlük ve emek arasındaki ilişkiye dair iddialarını incelerken şöyle bir yol izledim: Öncelikle Arendt’in *vita activa* kavramı ile dile getirdiği insanın üç etkinliği; emek, iş ve eylem; arasındaki hiyerarşik ilişkiyi incelerken Arendt’in neden emeği kölelik biçimi, eylemi özgürlük biçimi olarak gördüğünü anlamaya çalıştım. Çalışmamın ikinci kısmında Arendt’in özgürlüğün ikinci ölçütü olarak gördüğü özel alan ve kamusal alan ayrımını değerlendirdim. Üçüncü bölümde ise Marx’ın emek ve özgürlük olguları arasındaki ilişkiye dair savını ele alarak Arendt’in Marx’ın emek anlayışına yaptığı eleştiriyi eleştirel bir şekilde inceledim.

Arendt siyaset felsefesinde Marx gibi modernite eleştirisi yapmakla birlikte, eleştirisine farklı bir noktayı dayanak yapar. Marx, moderniteyi kapitalist üretim biçiminin esir aldığı emek sonucunda oluşan sömürü ve yabancılaşma durumları ile ilişkili olarak eleştirir. Arendt, modernite eleştirisini üretim ilişkileri üzerinden yapan Marx’ın tersine, modernite eleştirisini tüketim (toplumu) üzerinden yapar. Arendt, tüketim toplumu üzerinden modernite eleştirisi yaparken eleştirisinin hedefine öncelikle Marx’ın emek anlayışını koyar. Arendt’in Marx’a yaptığı temel eleştiri insanın döngüsel yaşamını sağlayan emek ile süreklilik arz eden bir dünya yaratan iş arasında bir ayrım yapmayarak iş için geçerli olan kalıcı bir dünya yaratma özelliğini emeğe atfettiğidir.

Bu çalışmada Arendt’in emek ve özgürlüğe dair tezlerini incelemek için kendisini insanın üç etkinliğini detaylarıyla analiz ettiği *İnsanlık Durumu* adlı eserine

başvurdum. Arendt bu eserinde insan etkinliğini *vita activa* ve *vita contemplativa* diye ayırır ve insan hayatının aktif yönünü vurgulamak için *vita activa* kavramını kullanır. Arendt özgürlük felsefesini temellendirdiği bu eserinde antik Yunan toplumunun yapısını referans alan Aristoteles'in politik felsefesini örnek alarak insanın yaptıklarını Aristoteles gibi politik ve apolitik olan diye ayırır. *Vita activa* üç temel insan etkinliğini içerir; emek, iş ve eylem. Bu üç insan etkinliği insanın yaşadığı zamandan bağımsız olarak var olan zorunlu etkinliklerdir. Bu üç insan etkinliği aynı zamanda insanın bulunduğu durumunun da göstergesidir. Arendt'in insan etkinliğini emek, iş ve eylem diye hiyerarşik bir şekilde ayırmasının altında yatan neden insan etkinliklerini politik ya da apolitik olduğunu belirleyip bu etkinliklerin özgürlük ile ilişki içinde tanımlayabilmektir, çünkü Arendt'e göre özgürlük politik bir olgudur.

Emek (labor), Arendt'e göre, *vita activa*daki insan etkinliği hiyerarşisinin en altında bulunur. Emek insanın hayatını devam ettirmek için yaptığı döngüsel bir etkinliktir. Bu etkinlikte insan sadece hayati ihtiyaçlarını karşılamayı hedefler. Tüketim odaklı bu etkinlikte insan tüketim ürünleri üretir, bu tüketim ürünlerinin ömrü tüketim etkinliği ile sınırlıdır bu nedenle bu etkinlikte kalıcı hiçbir şey üretilmez. Arendt bu insan etkinliğini yerine getiren insanı *animal laborans* olarak adlandırır. Arendt için *animal laborans* emek-tüketim kısır döngüsü içinde esirdir, bu nedenle emek insanı özgürleştirmez hatta köleleştirir.

Emek olgusu, Arendt için, aynı zamanda totalitarizme giden yolu açar. Temsili demokrasi ile yönetilen modern toplumda totaliter rejimin nasıl ortaya çıktığını, özgür, rasyonel birey olduğu iddia edilen modern insanın neden bu totaliter yönetimlere boyun eğdiğinin yanıtını emek olgusunda bulmuştur Arendt. Arendt'e göre sürekli tüketim için üreten insan basmakalıp davranışlarda bulunarak konformizmin tuzağına düşer, insani özelliği olan eylemde bulunmayı bir yana bırakır, böylece Arendt için çoğulcu olmak anlamına gelen politik toplum kitle toplumuna, özgür birey ise monotip insana dönüşür. Eylemde bulunmayı unutan insan banalleşerek totaliter rejimlerin baskısına hem rıza gösterir hem de totaliter rejimlerin suç ortağı olur. Emegın egemen olduğu toplumun kaçınılmaz kaderi kitle

toplumu ve bunun sonucu olarak totaliter yönetimler özgürlük alanı olan kamusal alanı ortadan kaldırır. Herkese açık olan kamusal alanda konuşarak ve eylemde bulunarak özgürleşebilen insan emeğin baskın olduğu alanda sadece hayatın zorunlulukları ve bunları elde etmek için gerekli olan ekonomik ilişkilerle ilgilidir, bundan dolayı eylemde bulunmak yerine bireysel çıkarların gerektirdiği davranışlar sergiler.

Arendt insanlık durumunu anlatan hiyerarşisinde insanın ikinci etkinliği olarak işi (work) tanımlar. İş, Arendt'in en sade tanımıyla insanın kalıcı bir dünya yaratma etkinliğidir. İş kategorisinde insan emek kategorisindekinin tersine süreklilik arz eden ürünler aracılığıyla kalıcı bir dünya yaratır kendisi için, çünkü iş ürünleri tamamen tüketilmek yerine kullanılmak için üretilir. İş ürünleri süreklilikleriyle dünyaya değişmezlik ve sağlamlık kazandırır. Arendt iş kategorisinde bulunan insanı tanımlamak için *homo faber* ifadesini kullanır. *Homo faber* Arendt için araç yapan anlamını taşımaktadır. *Homo faber* yaptığı araçlarla *animal laborans*ın mahkûm olduğu yeryüzünü (earth) dünyaya (world) dönüştürür. Emek kategorisinde de iş kategorisindeki gibi araçlar kullanılır, fakat emek kategorisinde kullanılan araçlar emeğin yeniden üretilmesi yani emeğin döngüsel karakterinin devamı için araç iken; iş kategorisinde kullanılan araçlar hem araç hem de sonuçtur. *Homo faber*, yeryüzünü dünyaya sadece yaptığı araçlarla aracılığıyla dönüştürmez, bunun yanı sıra kültürel ve toplumsal bir yapı yaratarak da bu dönüşümü sağlar.

İş kategorisini emek kategorisinden ayıran ikinci önemli karakteri ise iş kategorisinde bulunan insanın yani *homo faber*in belli bir hedef gözeterek üretmesidir. İnsan, emek kategorisinde hayatta kalmak için üretirken iş kategorisinde ise kurulu bir düzen için üretir.

İnsanın iş kategorisinde belli bir hedef gözeterek ve kalıcı materyaller üretmesi nedeniyle Arendt iş kategorisini üçlü insanlık durumu hiyerarşisinde daha üst bir basamağa konumlandırmıştır.

Emek kategorisinde doğaya bağımlı olarak yaşamını sürdüren insan iş kategorisinde ürettiği kalıcı aletlerle doğaya karşı bağımsızlığını kazanır fakat insan henüz özgürleşmemiştir, çünkü iş araçsal bir etkinliktir.

Sonuç olarak Arendt, emek ve iş arasında mutlak bir ayırım yapmak gerektiğine inanır, çünkü yukarıda da belirttiğim gibi, emek kategorisinde insan sadece yaşamak için kısa ömürlü yaşamsal materyaller üretirken iş kategorisinde yaşadığı dünyanın kalıcılığı için süreklilik arz eden materyaller üretir. Emek ve iş kategorilerinde araç ve makinelerin kullanılması Arendt'in bu iki kategori arasında yaptığı katı ayırımı müphem hale getirir. Araçların kullanımı Arendt'in hayvani diye adlandırdığı emek konusunda yanıldığını gösterir, çünkü insanlar en basit ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için bile diğer hayvanlardan farklı olarak araçlar kullanırlar. Başka bir deyişle, insanlar biyolojik ihtiyaçları için de araçlar kullanırlar. Fakat araç kullanımının emek ve iş kategorilerinde farklı amaçlarla yapılması Arendt'in bu iki kategori arasında yaptığı keskin ayırımı ısrar etmesine neden olmuştur. Emek kategorisinde araçlar emeğin kendisini ve tüketimi yeniden üretmek için kullanılırken iş kategorisinde araçlar süreklilik arz eden bir dünya yaratmak için kullanılır. Yine de bu iki insan etkinliğinde yani emek ve iş kategorilerinde araç yerine makinelerin kullanılması Arendt'in bu iki etkinlik arasında yaptığı ayırımı temelinin Arendt'in bahsettiği kadar sağlam olmadığını gösterir. İş etkinliğinde araç yerine makine kullanılmasıyla Arendt'in işe atfettiği ve emek ile iş arasındaki ayırım için en önemli ölçüt olarak gördüğü araç-amaç olma durumunu ortadan kalkar. İş etkinliğinde makinelerin kullanılmasıyla da iş etkinliğinin araç-amaç olma karakterinin ortadan kalkmasıyla iş etkinliği emek etkinliği gibi uygulanır. Bu durum Arendt'in toplumsallığın yükselmesiyle artık herkesin emek tarzında çalıştığı savını doğrulasa da Arendt'in bu iki etkinlik arasında yaptığı keskin ayırımı, yukarıda da söylediğim gibi, müphemleştirir. Arendt'in emek ve iş etkinlikleri arasında yaptığı ayırımı son bir kez değerlendirmek istersek şu sonuca varabiliriz: Arendt, iş etkinliğinde süreklilik arz eden araçlar sayesinde kalıcı bir dünya yaratmayı ve belli hedef gözeterek üretmeyi referans alarak iş etkinliğinin emek etkinliğinden üstün olduğunu düşünür. Bu üstünlüğün de keskin bir ayırım ile belirtilmesi gerektiğini düşünür. Emek

etkinliğini düşünürsek insanların en basit ihtiyaçlarını karşılarken bile alet kullanmak zorunda kaldıklarını görebiliriz böylece emek ve iş etkinlikleri arasında böyle keskin bir ayrım yapılamaz.

Arendt'in *vita activa* üçlüsünde hiyerarşinin en üst basamağına yerleştirdiği etkinlik eylemdir çünkü eylem özgürlüğe varoluş zemini sağlayan etkinliktir. Arendt eylemi kısaca “yeni bir şeye başlama, eyleme” olarak tanımlamaktadır. “Yeni bir şey”den Arendt'in kastettiği ise daha önce olmayan, daha önce bir eylem olarak uygulanmayandır. Arendt İnsan için yeni bir başlangıç olarak doğumu varsayar, çünkü doğumda kendinde öncekilerden ve var olan herkesten farklı yeni bir insan doğar. Bu nedenle doğum yeni bir başlangıca olanak verdiği için sadece eylem etkinliğinin değil aynı zamanda eylem etkinliğinde vücut bulan özgürlüğünde temelidir. Eylem doğumla oluşan yeni başlangıcın karakteristik özelliği olan biricik olma ve öngörülemezlik özelliklerini taşır.

Eylem etkinliği Arendt için aynı zamanda konuşma (speech) ötekiyle olma (being with others) ve etkileşim içinde olma (interaction) anlamına gelmektedir. Ötekinden izole edilmiş ve konuşmadan arınmış eylem insanı özgürleştirebilecek bir eylem değildir, hatta böyle bir faaliyet Arendtci anlamda eylem bile sayılamaz.

Konuşmanın ve ötekiyle etkileşimin eylemde ve dolayısıyla özgürlük olgusunun oluşumundaki rolüne değinmek gerekirse; konuşma eylemle birlikte insanın kendisini açığa çıkarmasına yardımcı olur. “Kimsin” sorusunun cevabını eylem ve konuşma aracılığıyla verir insan.

“Kim”lik (whoness) olgusu “ne”lik (whatness) olgusundan farklıdır. “Kim”lik insanın kendisine bile açıklanabilir değil çünkü “kim”lik insanın bireye özgü, bireyi eşsiz yapan şeydir fakat yine de eylem ve konuşma aracılığıyla insanın “ne”liğinden ayırt edilebilir.

“Ne”lik insanların ortak karakterlerini dile getiren kavramdır. Başka bir deyişle, insanların toplumsal ilişkiler sonucu kazandıkları karakterlerdir, belirleyici ve tahmin edilebilirdir. Özetle, “kim”lik bireye karşılık gelirken “ne”lik insana karşılık gelmektedir, yani “kim”lik insanın özgün bir birey olarak diğer insanlardan

farklılığını kurabilmesiyle; “ne”lik bu bireyin diğer insanlarla ortak özelliklerine referans verir. Eylem ve konuşma sayesinde insanlar “ne”liği aşır kendi “kim”liklerini gösterebilirler.

Konuşma ve eylem ayrıca çoğulculuğu (plurality) inşa eden eşitlik (equality) ve farklılıkla (distinctiveness) da yakından ilişkilidir. Eşitlik insanların birbirlerini anlamayı kolaylaştıran benzerliği ifade eder. Öte yandan farklılık “kim”liği temsil eden “yegâne”liği (uniqueness) işaret etmektedir.

Farklılık aynı zamanda hikâye anlatıcılığının (storytelling) da altını çizer. Her insan birey olarak yegâne olduğu için kimliği aracılığıyla oluşturulmuş kendine has bir (hayat) hikâyesi vardır. Bu kendine has hayat hikâyesi insanın ölümsüzleşme aracıdır aynı zamanda. Emek kategorisinde yaşamsal ihtiyaçların kölesi olan insan iş kategorisinde kalıcı bir dünya yaratır fakat yine de bu iki kategoride “ne”liği aşır “kim”liğini gösteremez, böylece öldüğünde geriye kendisine ait hiçbir şey kalmaz. Ancak insanlık durumunun üçüncüsüne tekabül eden eylem kategorisine geçtiğinde eylem ve söz ile yaratılan kendine has yaşam öyküsüyle “ne”liği aşır ölümsüzleşebilir.

Eylem ve söz her ne kadar birlikte özgürlüğü temellendirseler de bu iki olgunun özgürlüğün inşasına katkıları farklıdır. Eylem özgürlüğü inşa ederken söz bireyin kendisinin ifşasıyla özgürlüğe katkıda bulunur. Fakat özgür insan sözü yitirse özgürlüğünü de yitirmiş olur, çünkü söz yitimi aynı zamanda eylemin öznesinin de yitimi demektir. Öznenin olmadığı durumda özgürlükten bahsetmek mümkün değildir.

Özgürlüğü inşa etmek için söz ve eylem yeterli değildir, özgürlük için insanın ihtiyaç duyduğu diğer şey başkalarıdır. Arendt’e göre özgürlük başkaları ile etkileşim halinde politik eylemle özgürlüğünün önündeki engelleri aşır özgürlüğe ulaşabilir. Özetle, özgürlük Arendt için çoğulcu bir şekilde politik eylemde bulunmaktadır.

Tezimin birinci bölümünde Arendt’in *vita activa* kavramını detaylı bir şekilde inceledikten sonra, ikinci bölümünde Arendt’in özgürlüğün ölçütü olarak kabul

ettiği özel alan ve kamusal alan ayrımını inceledim. Arendt üç temel insan etkinliğini hiyerarşik bir zeminde betimlerken bunların her birinin belli bir alanda konumlandırır. İnsanın ekonomik kaygılarına tekabül eden emek etkinliğini özel alanla, politik varoluşuna denk gelen eylemi ise kamusal alanla ilişkilendirir. İş etkinliğinin kendisi özel alanla ilişkiliyken iş ürünleri kamusal alanın zemin bulabileceği kalıcı dünya yarattıkları kamusal alanla ilişkilidir.

Arendt politik eylem diye adlandırdığı özgürlük iddiasının temelini diğer ayağını oluşturan özel alan ve kamusal alan ayrımını antik Yunan toplumunu, daha doğrusu antik Yunan toplumunun yapısını felsefesinde irdeleyen Aristoteles'in felsefi kavramlarını referans alarak yapmıştır. Aristoteles'in insanların gündelik etkinliklerini politik olan ve politik olmayan (ekonomik olan) diye ayırdığı ve bu etkinlikleri konumlandığı hane ve polis ayrımını incelemek Arendt'in özel alan ve kamusal alan ayrımını anlamamıza olanak sağlayacaktır.

Aristoteles mutlu/etik yaşamın özünü irdelediği politik felsefesinde toplumsal örgütlenmeyi hane ve polis şeklinde ayırarak tanımlar. Hane yaşamının devamını sağlayan ihtiyaçları sağlamayı kapsayan ekonomik etkinliklerle ilişkiliyken polis özgür yurttaşların politik etkinlikleriyle ilgilidir, Aristoteles'e göre. Hanenin doğal bileşenleri olan kadınlar, çocuklar ve köleler politik etkinliklerin yürütüldüğü polise girme hakkından yoksundurlar. Öte yandan, özgür yurttaş sayılan yetişkin erkekler hane yaşamının gerektirdiği gereksinimleri karşılama etkinliklerinden azade olup yurttaşlığın gereği olan politik karar verme süreçlerinde söz hakkına sahiptirler.

Aristoteles'in bu ayrımını analiz ettikten sonra yeniden Arendt'in özel alan ve kamusal alan ayrımını neden yaptığını sorusuna dönecek olursak bu soruyu en iyi şekilde yanıtlamak için öncelikle Arendt'in özel alan ve kamusal alan ile ne demek istediğini anlamamız gerekir.

Özel alan, Arendt için, özneliğin alanıdır. Bu ifadeyi biraz daha açmak gerekirse; insanların kendi öznel gerçekliliğini başkalarının tasdikiyle nesnel bir gerçekliğe dönüştürmeden yoksun kalmaktır özel alanda olmak. Özel alanın temel

karakteristiđi zorunluluđun, gizliliđin ve baskının var olma zemini bulduđu alan olmasdır. Özel alan gereksinimin sađlandđđ alan olması nedeniyle zorunluluđun alanıdır. Daha önce de belirttiđim gibi Arendt kölelik biçimi olarak gördüđu emek etkinliđini özel alanla ilişkilendirir. Son olarak özel alanın diđer ayırt edici özelliđi baskının var olduđu bir alan olmasdır. Özel alanda var olan baskı dolaysız bir baskıdan ziyade gereksinimlerin sađlanması için gereken zorunlu emeđin verdiđi eziyet ve bu emek sonucu oluřan eřitsizlik aracılıđıyla oluřan dolaylı bir baskıdır. Dahası, özel alan, insanın ve ailenin dıřında kalanlara kapalı olması nedeniyle mahremiyetin ve gizliliđin alanıdır. Özel alana mahkûm olan birey kendi gerçekliđini teyit edecek olan başkalarından izole olduđu için aynı zamanda öznelliđe de mahkûmdur.

Arendt'e göre kamusal alan özgürlüđün eylem aracılıđıyla zuhur ettiđi alandır. Kamusal alanın temel karakteristiđi görünürlük, etkileřimin ve tanınma alanı olmasdır. Kamusal alan her řeyden önce bireylerin başkaları tarafından görüldüđu ve duyulduđu bir alandır. Başkaları tarafından görülmek ve duyulmak insanlara kendi öznel gerçekliklerini ve içinde yařadıkları dünyaya dair gerçekliđi ötekilerin dođrulaması olanađını verir. Böylece öznel gerçeklikleri nesnel bir gerçekliđe dönüşür. Dahası, kamusal alan bireyin diđer insanlarla eřitlik zemininde kurduđu iletiřimle hem kendi farklılıđını gösterebildiđi hem de ötekilerle olan benzerliđi sayesinde ötekini anlayarak etkileřim içinde olduđu bir zemindir. Kamusal alanda insanlar arasındaki etkileřim politik eylemler sayesinde vücut bulur. Özel alanda emek ve iř etkinlikleri nedeniyle sadece biyolojik ihtiyaçları ve ekonomik çıkarları için kurulan iletiřime mahkûm olan insan kamusal alanda bu tarz iletiřimi ařarak diđer insanlarla birlikte eřit bir katılımla etkileřimde çođulcu bir politik eylemde bulunur. Böylece insan baskı ve itaati ařıp özgürlüđe ulaşır. Kamusal alanın zuhur etmesine olanak verdiđi “bir arada”lık (togetherness) sadece insanların sosyal varlıklar olarak bir araya gelmesi deđildir, tam tersine eřit bir katılıma ve etkileřime olanak veren “bir arada”lıktır. Özgür bireylerin politik bir aradalıđına tekabül eden kamusal alan çođulcu bir siyaset alanı anlamına da gelmektedir. Bu bağlamda, Arendt'in özel ve kamusal alan ayrımı demokrasi tartışmaları temelinde yapılmaktadır. Arendt'in dile getirdiđi çođulcu politik eylem aracılıđıyla insanların

özgürleşmesine olanak sağlayan kamusal alan temsili demokrasiyi reddedip bunun yerine katılımcı bir demokrasi anlayışını savunmaktadır.

Özetle, Arendt özel alanda öteki insanlardan izole bir şekilde yaşayıp mahkûm olduğu öznelikten birey ancak kamusal alanda ötekilerle birlikte çoğulcu ve eşit bir şekilde katıldığı politik eylem aracılığıyla kendini kabul ettirerek kurtulabilir. Bu nedenle, Arendt'e göre özel alan ve kamusal alan arasında bir ayrım yapılmalıdır, aksi takdirde bu iki alan arasındaki sınır ortadan kalkar ve böylece özgürlük de ortadan kalkar.

Arendt kamusal alan ve özel alan arasındaki sınırın ortadan kalkmasının toplumsalın yükselmesinin (rise of the social) sonucu olduğunu söyler. Arendt toplumsalın yükselişi diye adlandırdığı durumu kısaca özel alana ait etkinliklerin kamusal alanı işgal etmesi olarak tanımlar.

Toplumsalın yükselişi hem mahremiyet alanını yani özel alanı hem de özgürlüğün alanı olan kamusal alanı deforme eder. Toplumsalın yükselişi, Arendt'in özel ve kamusal alan ayrımı göz önünden bulundurursak, üçüncü bir alan yani toplumsal alan olarak yorumlanmalıdır. Özel alana ilişkin etkinliklerin yani emeğin ve özel alana ilişkin örgütlenme biçimlerinin kamusal alanda ortaya çıkmasıyla birlikte kamusal alanın karakteri emeğin karakterine benzeyerek değişir. Böylece kamusal alan, emeğin üretkenliğinin kamusal alanda artması sonucu tüketimin de kamusal alanın öncelikli etkinliği haline gelmesiyle birlikte çoğulcu ve politik olma özelliğini yitirir. Kamusal alan eylemde bulunan özgür yurttaşların arzı endam ettikleri bir alan olmaktan çıkıp sadece tüketim kültürünün yarattığı belli davranış kalıplarına mahkûm olan insanların boy gösterdikleri bir alan olur. Eylemek yerine belli davranışlar gösteren insan konformizm içinde kaybolarak kendi "kim"liğini yitirir.

Toplumsalın yükselişinin diğer bir sonucu da tüketimin yarattığı kitle toplumdur. Kitle toplumu kamusal alanı işgal ederek politik alanın katılımcı yurttaşlarını baskıya rıza gösteren itaatkâr bireylere dönüştürür.

Arendt'in özel alan ve kamusal alan ayrımını inceledikten sonra tezimin üçüncü kısmında Arendt'in Marx'ın emeği özgürleşme aracı olarak gördüğü tezine yaptığı eleştiriyi eleştirel bir şekilde ele aldım. Arendt'in Marx'a yaptığı eleştiriyi irdelemen önce Marx'ın emek ve özgürlüğe dair savlarını gözden geçirilmesi gerektiği inananak tezimin üçüncü bölümüne Marx'ın emek ve özgürlük teorilerini inceleyerek başladım.

Marx'ın emek teorisi Feuerbach'tan aldığı insan doğası kavramı ile yakından ilişkilidir. Marx emeğin insan doğasına içkin bir şey olduğunu dile getirmektedir. Marx'a göre insan doğası gereksinimler ve bu gereksinimleri sağlayacak olan yetilerden oluşmaktadır. İnsanın gereksinimleri ve bu gereksinimleri karşılamaya yarayan yetileri toplumsal değişimin temel taşıyıcılarıdır. İnsanın bu yetileri zamanla değişen gereksinimlerine paralel olarak değişip gelişmektedir. İnsanın ihtiyaçlarını karşıladığı etkinliği emektir. Emek, Marx için, insanın doğada verili olandan bilinçli bir şekilde yeni bir şey yaratmasıdır. İnsan emeğiyle doğada verili olandan yeni bir şey yaratırken, bu yarattığı üründe kendisini gerçekleştirerek kendisini ve bilincini de yeniden yaratır. Bu bağlamda, Marx emeği insanın yaratıcı, bilinçli bir etkinliği olarak görür. Dahası, Marx insanın nasıl ürettiği sorunsalını aynı zamanda dünyaya nasıl baktığı sorunsalı olarak görür, bu nedenle Marx'ın emek teorisi özgürleştiren emeğin yanı sıra yabancılaşmış emeği de kapsamaktadır. Yabancılaşmış emek insanın ürettiği ürüne, üretme sürecine, kendisine ve diğer insanlara yabancılaşmasını ifade eder. Emekçi ürettiği ürün üzerinde hâkimiyetini yitirir, kendisi ürün tarafından kontrol edilmeye başlar. Emeğin baskı altına alındığı yabancılaşmış emekte insan dünyayı yaratılan yanlış bilinç (false consciousness) ile anlamaya çalışır.

Marx'ın özgürlük anlayışı insanın emek etkinliğinde kendi yetilerini kullanarak türsel varlığının (species being) gerektirdiği kapasiteye ulaşması anlamına gelmektedir. Bu bağlamda Marx'ın perspektifinde emeğin özgürlüğü inşa etmesi öncelikle emeğin kendisinin özgür olması gerektiği anlamına gelmektedir. Baskı altına alınmış, iş bölümüyle emekçinin kontrolünden çıkmış emek etkinliği insanı özgürleştirmekten ziyade bir köle, yani ücretli işçi haline getirir. Özetle, Marx

emeđi sermaye ile iliřkisi iinde analiz ettiđi felsefesinde ancak zgr emeđin insanı zgrleřtirebileceđini, bunun iin de ncelikle sermayenin zel mlkiyetle baskı altına aldıđı emeđin sermayenin baskısı altında kurtarılmasını gerektiđini savunmaktadır.

Arendt'in Marx eleřtirisine dnecek olursak; Arendt, Marx'ı emek ve iř kategorileri arasında bir ayırım yapmayarak iř kategorisine iliřkin olan kalıcı Őeyler retme zelliđini emeđe atfetmekle eleřtirir. Arendt emek etkinliđinde retilenin hibir kalıcılıđı olmayan tktim rnleri olduđunu dile getirir. Fakat Marx'ın da dediđi gibi insan emeđini hayvanların yaptıđı retimden ayıran Őey; insan retirken bilinli bir Őekilde iinde yařadıđı toplumu ve dođayı deđiřtirir. Belki bu hala Arendt iin kalıcılık ieren bir Őey deđildir ama gerek Őu ki tarihsellik iinde hibir Őey katı bir deđiřmezlik iinde kalamaz. Tarihe, hatta tarihin en ilkel dnemine, baktıđımızda dođada yanı bařındaki hayvanı evcilleřtiren ya da herhangi, Arendt'in deyiřiyle, kalıcı bir alet kullanmadan tarım yapan ilk ađ insanın da kendi dođası ile birlikte iinde yařadıđı toplumu ve dođayı deđiřtirerek tarihte ilerlediđini grrz. Bundan anlařılmalıdır ki insanın emeđinden, hatta hibir aracın kullanılmadıđı en ilkel emekten geriye kalan yine de tarihsel olarak geliřen toplumsal yapıdır.

Sonuç olarak Arendt'in Marx'ın emek kavramına eleřtirisi Arendt'in emeđi sadece biyolojik ihtiyaları karřılayan bir olgu olarak ele almasından kaynaklandıđını dřnyorum. Emeđi sadece yařamsal ihtiyaların sađlandıđı etkinlik olarak gren Arendt emeđin insan dođasını dnřtren bir sre olduđunu gz ardı ediyor. Dahası, Arendt Marx'ın insanları insani dođasından kopararak sadece hayvani ihtiyalarını sađlamaya mahkm eden yabancılařmıř emek kavramını gz ardı ederek Marx'ın emek kavramını bir btn olarak ele almak yerine tek bir boyutuyla ele almıřtır. Btn bunlara ek olarak, zgrlk zorunluluk karřıtlık iinde olabilir ama bu durum zgrlđn emeđi dıřlayacađı anlamına gelmez.

APPENDIX B

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Uğur
Adı : Mesude
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): ARENDT AND MARX ON THE RELATION
BETWEEN LABOR AND FREEDOM

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: