

EXPLAINING COLD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASES OF
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESSES

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ABSTRACT

EXPLAINING COLD PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: THE CASES OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AND JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESSES

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This thesis analyzes the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes in terms of peace-making, the nature of the peace treaties, and peace-sustaining from the Arab perspective. These peace processes have not gone much further than ‘cold peace’ dashing the hopes for a ‘real peace’ in the region. This thesis argues that the ‘cold peace’ phenomenon evident in the cases of Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes is the reflection of the autonomy of the state since the authoritarian state structure provides these states with the capacity to act at the expense of the societal forces in the domestic context. In this respect, this thesis highlights ‘domestic state autonomy’ and ‘regional state autonomy’ as enabling factors both in the peacemaking and peace-sustaining processes. Although Jordan enjoys more limited domestic state autonomy when compared with Egypt, both of the states were endowed with enough autonomy which enabled them to make peace with Israel at the expense of their people

regardless of the efforts by the Egyptian and Jordanian state to sell the decision of making peace with Israel by propagating the peace dividends.

The stalled peace-building processes in the Egyptian and Jordanian cases due to the unachieved normalization of relations with Israel display the fragility of the peace processes. However, these two peace treaties are still valid regardless of the political confrontation between the parties, the prevalent anti-Israeli public opinion, and the anti-normalization campaigns, because sustaining peace with Israel has become a foreign policy orientation and thus a part of regime maintenance policies in both of the two cases.

KEYWORDS: Cold Peace, Egypt, Jordan, Peace Process, State Autonomy.

ÖZ

ORTADOĞU'DA SOĞUK BARIŞI AÇIKLAMAK: MISIR-İSRAİL VE ÜRDÜN-İSRAİL BARIŞ SÜREÇLERİ ÖRNEKLERİ

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Bu tez, Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçlerini, Arap bakış açısından, barış yapımı, anlaşmaların içeriği ve barışın devamlılığı üzerinden analiz etmektedir. Bu iki barış süreci de bölgede 'gerçek barış'a yönelik umutları boşa çıkararak 'soğuk barış'tan öteye gidememiştir. Bu bağlamda, bu tez, Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçlerinde görülen 'soğuk barış' kavramının devletin otonomisinin bir yansıması olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Zira söz konusu ülkelerin otoriter yapısı, devlete iç bağlamda toplumsal güçler pahasına hareket etme kapasitesi sağlamaktadır. Bu nedenle, tezde 'devletin içsel otonomisi' ve 'devletin bölgesel otonomisi' kavramları, barış yapımı ve barışın devamlılığı süreçlerini imkânlı kılan faktörler olarak vurgulamaktadır. Ürdün'de devletin içsel otonomisi Mısır'a kıyasla daha sınırlıdır, ancak her iki devlet de İsrail ile barış imzalama kararlarını halklarının gözünde kabul edilebilir kılmak maksadıyla yaptıkları 'barış primi' propagandasından bağımsız olarak, halklarına rağmen barış yapabilmelerine imkân sağlayacak kadar otonomiye haizdir.

Her iki örnekte de İsrail ile ilişkilerin normalleşmemesinden ötürü sekteye uğradığı görülen barış inşasına dair tecrübeler, aslında barış süreçlerinin ne kadar kırılgan olduğunu göstermektedir. Öte yandan, İsrail’le yapılmış olan bu iki barış anlaşması da taraflar arasındaki siyasi anlaşmazlıklara, mevcut İsrail karşıtı kamuoyuna ve normalleşme karşıtı kampanyalara rağmen geçerliliğini korumaktadır, çünkü İsrail ile barışın devamı, her iki örnekte de, bir dış politika yönelimi ve dolayısıyla rejimin devamlılığı politikalarının bir parçası haline gelmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barış Süreci, Devlet Otonomisi, Mısır, Soğuk Barış, Ürdün.

To My Parents and Sister

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FTA	Free Trade Agreement
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
MACs	Mixed Armistice Commissions
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organization
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SU	Soviet Union
UAR	United Arab Republic
UN	United Nations
UNEF	United Nations Emergency Forces
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
UNSTO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US	United States
USITC	United States International Trade Commission
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organization

1. INTRODUCTION

The Middle East is a region overwhelmed by war and conflicts, be it inter-state or intra-state, of different scales.¹ It is fair to say that of all, the enduring Arab-Israeli conflict is the most chronic one affecting the whole region in every aspect. Understanding Middle East is not possible without understanding the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the very heart of which lies the Palestinian-Israeli question. Equally important is understanding the phenomenon of peace in the region. After series of war in 1948, 1956², 1967 and 1973, followed by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978 and 1982, the Second Lebanon war in 2006, Gaza war in 2009, and most recently in 2014, the Arab states and Israel are still in an enduring state of war for more than six decades. Meanwhile, the only exception to the state of war between Israel and the Arab states is the two peace processes resultant of the treaties signed with Israel by Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994.

It was not until the year 1977, when Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat visited Jerusalem, peace negotiations had ever been grasped as a way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. After the historic visit by Sadat to Israel and his declaration of the peace initiative in the Knesset in November 1977, the negotiations between the two states took place under the brokerage of the US. Eventually, the Camp David Accords were signed by the Egyptian President Anwar Al-Sadat and the Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin on 17 September 1978. These accords finally led to the 1979 Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty. The bold step of making peace with Israel during the Cold War years cost Egypt,

¹ The prevalence of war and conflict in the Middle East does not mean that the region is 'exceptional'. In fact, 'Middle East Exceptionalism' is used to underline the unique characteristics of the region regarding persistence of authoritarian regimes, lack of economic and social development, conflict and war-proneness. However, research have displayed that the causes of conflict in the region are not unique to the Middle East, but shared by most of the other developing regions of the world. For a detailed analysis, see Mirjam E. Sørli, Nils Petter Gleiditsch, and Håvard Strand, "Why Is There so Much Conflict in The Middle East?", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.49, No.1, (February 2005), pp. 141-165.

² This war is generally referred as Suez Canal Crisis or the Sinai War in the literature. It was not limited to Israel and Arab States, but an offensive war waged by the France, Britain and Israel against Egypt. However, it is fair to include it among the Arab-Israeli wars.

once the leader of Pan-Arabism, a lot in terms of its regional power. It was condemned for making peace with Israel and was isolated from the Arab League. Nevertheless, no other Arab State, including Saudi Arabia which has always been a competitor for the Arab leadership, was able to fill Egypt's place as a regional power. Therefore, the Egyptian membership of the Arab League and its leading role in the regional politics was restored in 1989 during the Mubarak period. In this respect, it is fair to regard Camp David Accords as a milestone since it changed the dynamics of the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular and the regional political dynamics at large.³ However, the most important result of this separate peace with Israel was that it has been regarded as a blow to the comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict since Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab front against Israel has weakened the Arab hands. On the other hand, it led the peace, instead of war, to be seen as a way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴

The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty in 1994 did not come as a big surprise as did the Egypt-Israel peace. This was mainly because Jordan has been a modest country allied with the

³ Within the literature, the Middle East Peace Process is generally discussed with reference to the Madrid Conference and the subsequent Oslo Peace Process denoting the Palestinian Israeli peace negotiations. On the other hand, there are few scholars like Eisenberg and Caplan who start the peace process in the region with Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 in his capacity as the Egyptian President. See in Laura Zittrain Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, *Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: Patterns, Problems, Possibilities*, 2nd Edition, Indiana Series in the Middle East Studies, (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010), p.253.

⁴ The 'humiliating' defeat of 1967 Six Day War revealed Arab states the fact that beating Israel militarily would hardly be an option. Therefore, promoted by the superpowers (mainly the US), a comprehensive approach to peace began to be discussed by the Arabs, in the early 1970s for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In fact, owing to the differences of opinion among the Arab states, it seemed a difficult task to achieve. Nevertheless, if peace has ever been seen as an option to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, it would be a 'comprehensive peace', not a separate one. On the other hand, Israel favored a 'gradual approach to peace' as opposed to the comprehensive approach defended by the Arabs. Israel insisted on a step-by-step approach to peacemaking that could be applied to the entire Arab-Israeli conflict or a component of it. The gradual approach, in its basic premises, means the breaking up of the Arab-Israeli conflict into 'negotiable pieces', whereas the comprehensive approach calls for the overall resolution of the conflict beginning with the Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied after the 1967 War. When the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict is considered, adopting a gradual approach seems to be the most appropriate way of dealing with the conflict. However, the opponents of the gradual approach assert that it is buying time for Israel to continue settlements in the occupied territories as long as it delayed and in the end postponed the final-status talks in the Palestinian-Israeli track. As a consequence, after Egypt's separate peace with Israel, which was a reflection of the gradualist approach, it became the predominant paradigm in the process.

West and has always pursued modest policies towards Israel. However, more importantly, Middle East of 1990s was a region where peace was in the air since the 1991 Madrid Conference. The conference attempted to bring together and encourage the negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians as well as the front-line Arab countries of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Therefore, the Jordanian-Israeli peace was achieved under the legitimacy of the Oslo Peace Process which included the direct negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians and started in 1993. Unlike the Egyptian-Israeli peace which owed a lot to the United States (US) mediation led by the US President Jimmy Carter, Jordanian Israeli peace was an outcome of the efforts of late King Hussein and his political mate, Yitzhak Rabin, the prime minister of Israel.

These two peace treaties raised the hopes for the prospects towards a comprehensive peace in the region for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand, and dashed the hopes for a 'real peace' as long as they remained 'cold' on the other. Within this framework, elaborating on the two peace processes is of vital importance for understanding the likelihood of a lasting phenomenon of peace in the region. In this respect, this research is dedicated to analyze Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes predominantly from Egyptian and Jordanian perspectives. Such analysis helps one to identify the similarities and differences between the two peace processes both in the peace-making and peace-sustaining processes, which eventually enables one to grasp the relations between the parties to the peace as well as the role of external actors and regional dynamics as well as the possibility of a comprehensive regional peace.

1.1. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Designed to analyze the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes, this research takes the Arab perspective as its framework without denying the importance of the Israeli dynamics. Nevertheless, since the peace is made with the same common 'enemy', it turns out to be more significant to underline the differing Arab stance in the process.

Why does this research choose these two cases? First, within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace treaties are the only existing peace agreements in the region. Although the Arab Spring, which has started at the end of 2010, has fuelled a lot of discussions regarding the future of these peace processes, it is highly likely that the parties will stick to these peace agreements in the short to midterm. Second, although much attention has been drawn towards war and conflict in the Middle East, less attention is focused on understanding the dynamics of peace between Israel and its two neighboring Arab states, Egypt and Jordan. Third, it is widely recognized that these two peace processes have so far ended up as cold peace processes, but the reasons why these two states made peace with their decades-old adversary and why these processes turned out to be far away from the desired ends deserves further elaboration. Fourth, it is important to seek what kind of lessons learned could be inferred from these processes for the future peace agreements in the region.

The research seeks to find out the answers to the following questions: What were the reasons that drove Egypt and Jordan to make peace with Israel? What were the similarities and differences between the two peace treaties that came into being within a decade and a half difference? What were the reflections of the nature of the peace treaties on the peace-sustaining process? How did the normalization processes evolve in two different cases? Despite the differences between the two processes, why has both of the processes ended up as ‘cold peace’ processes? What have been the impediments to achieving ‘warm peace’? What are the prospects for the transformation of the ‘cold peace’ into a ‘warm peace’? What are the prospects for achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East?

Under the light of these questions, this thesis elaborates peace-making as a foreign policy behavior and peace-sustaining as a foreign policy orientation. Within this framework, it is portrayed that different international and regional contexts (even though they share similar domestic contexts, though not entirely) and different reasons have led Egypt and Jordan to the same foreign policy behavior of making peace with Israel.

However, after signing the peace treaty with Israel, both peace processes, albeit different prospects for normalization, remained as cold due to the similar reasons. In this respect, this thesis argues that these peace processes are reflection of the nature of foreign policy making in Egypt and Jordan, where the autonomy of state plays a vital role.

The peacemaking took place in different international and regional contexts. Egyptian-Israeli peace was made within the Cold War context, when Pan-Arabism was in decline, albeit not dead. In spite of the Arab solidarity displayed during and after the 1973 October War, especially the oil embargo implemented by the OPEC countries, Egypt's separate peace with Israel was regarded as the final blow to the Pan-Arabism. On the other hand, the Jordanian-Israeli peace came to being within the Post-Cold War context where there was euphoria for peace in the region as well as a new regional context which experienced a paradigm shift after the 1991 Gulf War. However, there were similar domestic contexts in both cases in terms of the fiscal crisis of the state, economic liberalization, limited political reform.

Egypt and Jordan had different drives for making peace with Israel. In the Egyptian case, there was a shift in the ideology of the regime from Pan-Arabism to pragmatism and pro-Soviet neutralism to pro-American neutralism. In addition, there was also a shift from Arab socialism to economic liberalism which was reflected in the *Infitah* policy. For Egypt, the Palestinian cause was a regional factor easy to manipulate. For Jordan, there was no dramatic shift in regime's ideology. Peace with Israel has always been viewed possible by the Hashemite regime. The Palestinian factor was decisive in Jordan's domestic context and thus the legitimacy of PLO-Israel peace negotiations was almost a requirement. Eventually, both peace treaties aimed at ensuring regime survival.

Egypt and Jordan were both able to realize the peace treaties at the expense of the public opinion since the state can act autonomously from the social forces. Although the degree of state autonomy and capacity as well as the nature of states (Jordan is a constitutional monarchy based on the traditional sources of legitimacy whereas Egypt is a centralized bureaucratic authoritarian state) differs in two cases, they have similar characteristics

like the prevalence of authoritarianism that made it possible both to achieve the peace treaties as well as to sustain it.

The peace treaties were based on different visions delineated by the contexts they were signed. For Egypt, since getting back Sinai, was *sine qua non*, the peace treaty predominantly referred to the organization of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, security arrangements like the creation of demilitarized zones, and ensuring peacekeeping forces of the United Nations. On the other hand, owing to the nature of conflict between Jordan and Israel as well as the regional context, the peace treaty between the two concentrated on normalization of political, economic and social relations.

In terms of peace-sustaining, in both cases, the regimes used peace dividends to 'sell' the peace with Israel to their publics. However, the public opinion remained anti-Israeli. Although the Pan-Arab ideology declined as a tool utilized by the regimes in foreign policy, people were still attached to the Pan-Arab causes which are manipulated by the primary organized opposition to the regimes, the Islamists (mainly Muslim Brotherhood) with an anti-Israeli discourse. Besides, the euphoria created by the governments following the peace treaties soon turned into dysphoria when the benefits of the peace has not reached to the populations and such dissatisfaction played into the hands of the anti-normalizers. However, the anti-normalization campaigns by the opposing social organizations have not been influential enough to annul the peace treaties. It was not only the populations that were unable to internalize the peace, but also the regimes faced major political stalemates in sustaining the peace processes. Nevertheless, despite the unachieved normalization between the parties, the peace treaties are still valid and have overcome several drastic events, wars and uprisings in the region. Furthermore, it can be said that the peace with Israel has become a foreign policy orientation and thus part of regime maintenance policies.

Against this background, this research, in its broadest sense, intends to contribute first to understanding the nature of peace in the Middle East in reference to the already-signed peace treaties and the subsequent peace-building experiences. Second, it aims at

elaborating the role of state autonomy in analyzing peace-making and peace sustaining processes in the particular cases of Egypt and Jordan. The stalled peacebuilding experiences in the Egyptian and Jordanian cases show us how much flawed these processes, in fact, are. The reasons behind this reality bring in the notion of the autonomous state which could make decisions and act accordingly irrespective of the societal forces at the domestic context and if so, regional dynamics at the regional context. Therefore, state autonomy appears as the main enabler in the peace-making and peace-sustaining processes and the defining character of the nature of these peace processes.

1.2. THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Within the scope of this thesis, first of all, it is necessary to identify the nature of the peace processes between Egypt and Israel as well as between Jordan and Israel. These peace processes have conventionally been identified as ‘cold peace’ by several scholars of different origin, be they Western, Israeli or Arab. In order to validate this assumption, it is deemed necessary to dig into the peace studies in order to better grasp how peace can be described. Secondly, since this research recognizes state autonomy as an enabler in the peacemaking and sustaining processes, and more importantly, as a phenomenon which defines the nature of these peace processes, how the notion of state autonomy is discussed in the literature as well as its relevancy for the context of this thesis is examined.

1.2.1. THE NOTION OF COLD PEACE

To begin with, this research deals with ‘peace’ as a ‘process’ including peace-making, peace-building and peace-sustaining encompassing diplomatic, economic, social and cultural relations and cooperation. Therefore, there are two things that require

mentioning. First, peace is a process, not an outcome.⁵ Second, peace is not an absolute condition, and there are degrees of peace.⁶ Taking peace as a process necessitates a focus on the real meaning of ‘peace’ which is beyond just a ‘state of no war’. Thus, it includes the negative aspect of ‘no war’ together with positive aspects of having normal relations with the former adversary.

The distinction between negative and positive peace is first made by Galtung in the peace studies literature. He defines negative peace as the “absence of violence, absence of war”⁷ whereas positive peace as “the integration of human society”⁸. Stating that negative peace and positive peace are two separate dimensions of peace, Galtung underlines that achieving one does not require the other. However, he favors positive peace since it encompasses long-term remedies, it is preventive and optimistic. Galtung extended his notion of peace via his enlarged definition of violence in 1985.⁹ He contends that violence exist because of the structure of society and is embedded in the social, cultural and economic institutions of the society. Hence structural violence includes various types of political, economic and social unjust situations which deny people their very fundamental rights like poverty, hunger, discrimination, gender inequality and psychological alienation. In this respect, positive peace corresponds to a condition in which any kind of exploitation, inequality and injustice and thus structural violence are eliminated.¹⁰ With the introduction of ‘structural violence’ and ‘positive peace’, Galtung connects the peace, conflict and development studies. However, Galtung has been criticized for downgrading international peace to ‘negative peace’,

⁵ Galia Press-Barnethan, *The Political Economy of Transitions to Peace: A Comparative Framework*, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).

⁶ James P. Klein, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Peace Scale: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Non-Rivalry and Peace”, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 25, 2008, pp. 67-80.

⁷ Johan Galtung, “An Editorial”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.1, No.1, 1964, p.2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Johan Galtung, “Twenty-five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.22, No. 2, pp.141-158.

¹⁰ David P. Barash and Charles Webel, *Peace and Conflict Studies*, (Thousands Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002), pp.6-7.

expanding ‘positive peace’ to a condition which is illusionary and hard to achieve as well as dragging peace researchers into entirely different fields of expertise like development studies.¹¹ Nevertheless, Galtung’s positive peace has brought in a vision which attempts to conceptualize peace and seeks to find out how to realize peace as an ideal rather than aims at just resolving conflicts through political mechanisms.

Within this framework, different scholars have come up with different categorizations of peace. Boulding, in his categorization, proposes ‘stable peace’ and ‘unstable peace’ as variants of peace.¹² ‘Stable peace’ corresponds to the situation where the probability of war is unthinkable by both of the parties whereas ‘unstable peace’ witnesses interruptions by war despite the fact that peace is regarded as a norm. He suggests that the major condition for stable peace is that the countries concerned should not be thinking of any changes, except by mutual consent. Minimum level of intervention, if not none, by one country to other’s internal affairs -so that the sovereignty and the integrity of each country could be ensured- is offered as a second condition to stable peace.¹³

George put forward three types of peace: Precarious peace, conditional peace and stable peace. By ‘precarious peace’, he meant “the temporary cessation of hostilities when one side remains dissatisfied with the status quo and continues to see force as a legitimate means of changing it.”¹⁴ In this case, it is the rule of immediate deterrence that applies, meaning that one party tries to deter the other party, which is planning an attack, with the threat of retaliation. He includes the Arab-Israeli conflict and the India-Pakistan

¹¹ Kenneth E. Boulding, “Twelve Friendly Quarrels with Johan Galtung”, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 14, No.1, 1977, pp.75-86. and Kenneth Boulding, “Future Directions of Conflict and Peace Studies”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol.22, No.2, (1978), pp.342-354.

¹² Kenneth E. Boulding, *Stable Peace*, (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978).

¹³ Kenneth E. Boulding, “Moving From Unstable Peace to Stable Peace”, available at <http://www-ee.stanford.edu/~hellman/Breakthrough/book/pdfs/boulding.pdf>

¹⁴ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 47.

conflict in this category. In case of ‘conditional peace’¹⁵, the parties are more eager not to engage in activities that could be perceived as mounting an attack by the other party. Although there may be a conflictual relationship between the parties, the conflicts are less acute and heated. The peace between the parties is maintained in accordance with general deterrence, meaning the parties refrain from using force as a tool of resolving conflicts. George places the US-Soviet relationship during the Cold War in the category of conditional peace. He mentions the diplomatic crises between the US and the SU over Berlin and Cuba during the Cold War in order to illustrate that infrequent though crises may occur between the parties, but could be solved by dissuading each other from resorting to use of force in line with the general deterrence strategy. When it comes to ‘stable peace’, George stresses that states rule out the possibility of using or the threat of using military force as a way of settling disputes. In this case, the European Union is offered as the best example. However, George does not clarify the conditions of the transition from precarious to conditional and then to stable peace.¹⁶ Besides, his categorization is primarily based on the threat assumptions of the parties.¹⁷

Kacowicz distinguishes between negative peace, stable peace and pluralistic security communities¹⁸. Negative peace is a situation where there is only an absence of war, but on an unstable basis and maintained through threats and deterrence. In stable peace, there is not an expectation of violence, but this does not rule out the expectation of war,

¹⁵ Kacowicz places conditional peace somewhere between normal (Miller’s categorization) and precarious peace. See in Arie M. Kacowicz, Yaacov Bar-Siman Tav, Ole Elgström (ed.s), *Stable Peace Among Nations*, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 2000), p.21. However, Bengsston interprets conditional peace as almost equivalent to normal peace which includes societal conduct and normalization. See in Rikard Bengsston, *The EU and The European Security Order: Interfacing Security Actors*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.25. Eventually, the author doubts if such an extrapolation is possible from the assumption of George and Bennett who coined the term and originated their variations of peace mainly from the threat assumptions, especially the precarious and conditional peace.

¹⁶ Kacowicz, et.al., *Stable Peace Among Nations*, pp.19-20.

¹⁷ Mona Fixdal, *Just Peace: How Wars Should End*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p.41.

¹⁸ The concept is inspired from Karl Deutsch’s concept of security community denotes, in its basic premises, to the group of people among whom there is the reassurance that they will not resort to physical violence for the settlement of disputes among them, but utilize institutionalized procedures of non-violence. See in Karl W. Deutsch et.al, “Political Community and The North Atlantic Treaty Area”, *International Political Communities: An Anthology*, (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p.2.

small though it is. Furthermore, peace is maintained via consensus. Pluralistic security communities share common values, norms and political institutions. In this advanced stage of stable peace, member states have confidence in each other in terms of abandoning war as an option for resolving disputes in case they arise.¹⁹

Klein et. al. offer three core zones as ‘rivalry’, ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’ along the peace scale which can be considered as a linear continuum. At the one extreme of the continuum lies rivalry whereas at the other extreme lies positive peace. They place negative peace between militarized rivalry and positive peace. In case of negative peace, states take into account the use of force as one of other possible responses which could be diplomacy or economic coercion. Besides, there is also dissatisfaction from the status quo, by one or both of the states. In terms of diplomatic relations, despite formal recognition of each other and the peace agreement, there are no or few other agreements in place. The diplomatic relations are pursued under the shadow of not fully resolved conflict(s) and subject to continued hostility reflected in verbal conflict. Positive peace corresponds to the situation where war among parties is not considered as an option and disputes of low significance are resolved through peacefully within institutionalized mechanisms of diplomacy. They name the highly consolidated state of positive peace leading to the development of shared norms and values and/or integration as pluralistic security communities.²⁰

Benjamin Miller, in his work on “Where and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace”, identifies three phases of regional peace: cold peace, normal peace and warm peace.²¹ ‘Cold peace’ refers to the situation where there is a

¹⁹ Kacowicz, et.al., *Stable Peace Among Nations*, pp.22-23.

²⁰ Klein, James P., Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Peace Scale: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Non-Rivalry and Peace”, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 25, 2008, pp. 67-80.

²¹ Benjamin Miller, “Where and How Regions Become Peaceful: Potential Theoretical Pathways to Peace”, *International Studies Review*, Vol.7, (2005), pp.229-267. In his later works, he underlines two types of peace as ‘cold peace’ and ‘warm peace’ and then denotes two types of warm peace, which are ‘normal peace’ and ‘high-level peace’. However, this research chooses to utilize its first classification as ‘cold peace’, ‘normal peace’ and ‘warm peace’. See in Benjamin Miller, *States, Nations and The Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press,

formal peace agreement and established diplomatic relations. It is the state of war that is eliminated. Yet, the main issues of the conflict remain unresolved. In this respect, the danger of resorting to war is still present since it is more of a peace between governments, rather than people.²² The parties refrain from using military force in their relations and prefer to solve their problems, when they arise, and mitigate confrontations via diplomatic means.²³ ‘Normal peace’ includes a lower likelihood of war among the parties compared to the ‘cold peace’. It means that war can still occur among the parties, but under the circumstances where drastic changes occur in the domestic politics of each state like regime change. In this phase, the main issues, if not all, in the conflict have been resolved, and the peace is started being internalized by the people due to the development of transnational ties and interdependency. Although ‘normal peace’ involves the normalization of relations between the parties, the main channels of communication and diplomacy are owned by the governments.²⁴ ‘Warm peace’ is the last phase when all the issues in the conflict are resolved, war has become unthinkable between states and peace has been fully internalized by the people.²⁵ In case of conflict between the parties, since the non-violent means of resolving conflicts are institutionalized, there is no possibility of resorting to armed violence by the parties in the foreseeable future.

The categories mentioned above are not an exhausted list. What is more, most of the categories mentioned above share similar characteristics. Negative peace by Boulding as well as by Klein et al, precarious peace by George, and cold peace by Miller corresponds to the same phenomenon. In a similar vein, stable peace by Boulding as well as George and Kacowicz, positive peace by Klein et al and warm peace by Miller denote to the

2007), pp.45-48 and Benjamin Miller, “Contrasting Explanations for Peace: Realism vs. Liberalism in Europe and the Middle East”, *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol.31, No:1, (2010), pp.134-164.

²² Miller, “Where and How Regions Become Peaceful”, pp.231-232.

²³ Miller, “Contrasting Explanations for Peace”, p.136.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p.137.

²⁵ Miller, “Where and How Regions Become Peaceful”, pp.231-232.

same situation of fully resolved conflicts, consolidated and deepened diplomatic relations and increasing interdependence. Under the light of these categorizations, this research adopts Miller’s categorization since his differentiation between cold, normal and warm peace is much more relevant for the Arab-Israeli context. Since neither Egyptian-Israeli nor Jordanian-Israeli peace processes have brought about cooperative good friendly relations, Miller differentiated between cold and warm peace. However, there is also the need to identify another category between cold and warm peace, where Miller’s normal peace fit well, because the transition from cold peace to warm peace in both cases is to be complicated and a category of normal peace is helpful for analytical purposes.

TABLE 1: Miller’s Categorization of Peace

Indicator	Cold Peace	Normal Peace	Warm Peace
Main issues in the conflict	Mitigated –some resolved	Resolved	Resolved (no more relevant)
Communication	Intergovernmental	Intergovernmental and highly developed transnational ties	Institutional mechanisms
Diplomacy	Diplomatic recognition Statements expressing conflicts	Diplomatic relations	Diplomatic coordination
Agreements	Peace negotiations Peace agreements	Nascent functional agreements and integration	Extensive functional agreements
Contingency war plans	Still present	Possible	Absent
Probability of return to war	Present	Possible, but not likely	Unthinkable

Source: adopted from Miller, “Where and How Regions Become Peaceful, p.232.

In reference to the indicators listed above (Table 1), it is fair to say that both Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes fall between cold peace and normal peace since the normalization²⁶ processes are not full-fledged.²⁷ Therefore, at the end of the day, what remains as a fully achieved stage turns out to be cold peace.

For the Egyptian-Israeli case, Israeli withdrawal from Sinai was the main issue in the conflict between Egypt and Israel. It was resolved with the 1978 Camp David Accords and the subsequent 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. In line with the treaty, Israel completed its gradual withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula by 1982. Israel not only withdrew its military forces from Sinai, but also abandoned its settlements, infrastructure and oil fields in Sinai. Nevertheless, the return of Taba, a small town in the north of Gulf of Aqaba, became a source of friction between Egypt and Israel for almost seven years since both parties claimed rights on the town. The dispute over Taba threatened to damage the relations between two countries until it was submitted to an international committee. Eventually, the committee decided in favor of Egypt and Israel returned Taba to Egypt in 1989. On the other hand, despite the issues of bilateral concern, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict had adversely affected the relations between Egypt and Israel. Although the diplomatic relations constructed after the peace treaty have gone beyond diplomatic recognition, they have experienced ebb and flow of mistrust. The suspension of intergovernmental relations have become a recurring phenomenon of the bilateral relations as evidenced in the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian Intifada in 1987 and 2000 when Egypt recalled its ambassadors back.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty indicated normalization of relations, with a weaker emphasis compared to the Jordanian case, though, after the resolution of the main issues

²⁶ In line with Miller's categorization, normalization, means bringing relations between states to normal and stable conditions and corresponds to the process of transforming cold peace to normal peace.

²⁷ Identifying the 'anti-normalization campaigns' against Israel in Egypt and Jordan as the most important indicator of hostility, Rachwani claims that the existing peace with Israel is even in a lower position than cold peace. See in Manar Rahwani, "Making the Peace Work: Bridging the Gap Between Hopes and Deeds", *The Atkin Paper Series*, (London: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence –ICSR, King's college London, January 2010), p.5.

of conflict regarding Sinai. Several bilateral agreements were signed in reference to cultural affairs, transportation, communications and trade. However, they were all under the heavy influence of political relations and neither of them could go beyond the texts. The rigor that the parties have shown in preserving the military-security regime established through the peace treaty has not been pursued in terms of normalizing relations. Once considered as strong peace dividends, bilateral trade and tourism could not survive being highly limited. The bilateral trade has been far from the desired level and predominantly limited to the oil and gas sector. Besides, the oil export of Egypt to Israel gradually decreased and left its place to natural gas with the 2000s. What is more, the Egyptian gas deal with Israel has been subject to great debates within the Egyptian Parliament. This displays how an economic matter could become a governmental issue when Israelis concerned. The situation was no better in tourism. In spite of the fact that the number of Israeli tourists visiting Israel remained low, the number of Egyptian tourists visiting Israel has remained even lower. Even though there were times when security was a concern due to regional developments, the main reason has been the psychological barrier originating from the years of antagonism. In addition, the US initiative of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) designed to promote trade between Israel and its peace partners, Egypt and Jordan achieved less than anticipated. Although the business environments in Egypt and Israel support the initiative, there is a strong opposition not only at the societal level, but even at the governmental level led by the Muslim Brotherhood because of the Israeli involvement. However, the benefits of QIZ agreement in terms of job creation and increasing Egyptian exports to USA especially in the textile sector eradicates the possibility of abrogation of the agreement not likely in the near future. Besides, QIZ agreement is a US initiative and US involvement in the agreement also makes it an issue of Egyptian-US relations. Overall, it is important to note that all these efforts of normalization are restrained by the anti-normalization campaign in Egypt. The popular opposition to normalizing relations with Israel is led by ideological opposing groups like Islamists and leftists as well as professional associations, unions and syndicates.

Against this background, the communication and relations between Egypt and Israel is predominantly intergovernmental which is also not immune from confrontation. This does not mean that there are no other channels of communication like economic interaction, but it is more of 'interaction' rather than cooperation or interdependence despite the 35 years of peace. What is more, Israel has been far from being a 'normal' party for Egypt. It is almost impossible to find any official data regarding the trade or tourism between two countries as if no interaction is taking place. The ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a fuel for the anti-normalization campaign is an important factor. However, in line with the argument of this thesis, the autonomy of the Egyptian state as a significant factor for making and sustaining peace has much to do with the lingering unsuccessful normalization. The difference and distance between state and society has made Egyptian people to grasp the peace with Israel as a governmental peace. Therefore, as posited by Stein, the issue of anti-normalization as a consensus between the government and opposition where each party plays its part, but refrains from crossing the red lines.²⁸

Eventually, it is hard to claim the probability of war is high between Egypt and Israel. It may not be impossible, but it is not likely. It is not because that Egypt and Israel have a normal peace, but due to the fact that preserving state of no war is in the interest of the both parties. More importantly, from the Egyptian point of view, it is important to recall that the main reason behind Egypt's peace with Israel was the shift in the state ideology. Egypt's adoption of a pro-Western stance and its alliance with the US in the aftermath made its peace with Israel as an important component of its foreign policy.

When the Jordanian-Israeli peace is concerned, one faces, more or the less, a similar situation with the Egyptian case in terms of the problems faced during the normalization process. The Jordanian-Israeli peace process was not about recovering all the land Jordan lost to Israel during the 1967 War, because Jordan cut its ties with the West Bank including East Jerusalem in 1988, which eased the peace negotiations. There are two

²⁸ Ewan Stein, *Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and Foreign Policy from Nasser to Mubarak*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2012).

strips of land, the Nahrayim/Baqura area and Zofar/Al-Ghamr area, where Jordanian sovereignty was ensured and recognized by Israel with the peace treaty. In addition, the peace treaty organized the equitable share of water from Yarmouk and Jordan rivers. Apart from that, the crux of the agreement was putting end to the claims of 'Jordan is Palestine' through the recognition of the Jordanian sovereignty in its territory. Compared with the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty had much more prospects for the normalization of relations. At the one hand, it was due to the regional environment which was conducive to peace and created by the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The optimism of peace in the region was fed by the vision of Middle East as a region of economic cooperation and integration. The peace treaty, itself, reflected aspects of normalizing relations. Unlike the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, mechanisms for good neighborly relations in terms of economic cooperation, cultural and scientific exchange, tourism, transportation, civil aviation, environment, energy, health and agriculture were referred relatively in detail in different articles. On the other hand, when the Jordanian-Israeli relations are concerned, Jordan has always been a reluctant party in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Covert though they may be, the parties had relations with each other. However, following the peace treaty, the established diplomatic relations have suffered political setbacks after the assassination of Rabin and Netanyahu's coming to power.

The impact of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was even higher on the political confrontations between Jordan and Israel when compared with the Egyptian case, mainly because of the great portion of the Palestinian population within the country. Recalling of ambassadors is also a practice of the Jordanian state. Jordan recalled its ambassador from Israel during the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 (until 2005) and during the Gaza War in 2009 (until 2012) and most recently in November 2014. One of the other sources of conflict between the parties has been East Jerusalem. Jordan disengaged from East Jerusalem for the declared purpose of leaving it to the Palestinians as a would-be capital for their future state. Besides, Jordan's historical role in the preservation and maintenance of the Holy Muslim shrines was recognized by Israel with the peace treaty. However, Israeli political actions in East Jerusalem has caused several political friction

between the two states since the mid-1990s (i.e. the opening of the Western Wall Tunnel in 1996, building Jewish settlements in Har Homa in 1997, and lately the escalating violence because of Israeli actions on the Al-Aqsa compound).

Apart from the political confrontations between the governments, the prospective normalization of relations of mid-1990s has not escaped the similar fate of frustration as in the case of Egypt. Having much more prospects for 'the better', Jordanian-Israeli relations in terms of bilateral trade and tourism did not produce the expected outcomes. There is an increase in the mutual commerce since the peace treaty, but it is not a constant increase. For instance, the volume of trade between Jordan and Israel almost doubled from 2000 to 2007, but decreased by one third by 2013. In addition, the number of Jordanians visited Israel is %8 of the number of Israelis visited Jordan. In case of QIZs, since Jordan's experience with the QIZs has been almost 15 years, Jordan has profited much more than Egypt did. Like Egypt, Jordan's benefits are consolidated in increasing exports to the US, and increase in employment. However, three fourths of the workers in QIZs are foreign workers predominantly from Southeast Asia, which meant digression from the original purpose of creating jobs for the local people. Besides, as in the case of Egypt, there is a tendency to bypass the Israeli involvement, which is reflected in the efforts for decreasing the amount of the Israeli input in the goods produced. On the other hand, the QIZs provided only modest increase in the Jordanian-Israeli bilateral trade.

As in the case of Egypt, both the unresolved Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the anti-normalization campaign in Jordan stigmatizing the people who make trade or pursue any type of interaction with Israel are impediments to the normalization of relations between the two countries. People continue to see the peace with Israel as king's peace and the peace is sustained due to state's autonomy. Nevertheless, though not impossible, a war between Israel and Jordan is highly unlikely bearing in mind the historical position of Jordan in the conflict as an unwilling fighting party.

Recalling the indicators of Miller, it can be said that both in case of Egypt and Jordan, the main issues of bilateral concern in their conflict with are resolved, but the continuing Palestinian-Israeli conflict turns out to be a source of instability in bilateral relations. The communication in both cases remains predominantly intergovernmental despite the present commercial exchange. Diplomatic recognition is achieved, but diplomatic relations are not without problems. Calling ambassadors back from Israel is not rare in both cases. Finally, the possibility of war exists as a probability, but not likely. Therefore, the peace processes remain cold and flawed.

1.2.2. DOMESTIC STATE AUTONOMY AND REGIONAL STATE AUTONOMY

During the 1980s and 1990s, with the attempts of ‘bringing the state back in’ to the social sciences, the notion of state autonomy has been one of the issues that has been discussed. Before this debate led by Krasner, Skocpol, Evans and Rueschemeyer, the potential of the state autonomy formulated under the concept of ‘relative state autonomy’ was debated within the Marxist literature. State autonomy has been a rather controversial issue in the Marxist theory of state. Classical Marxism does not problematize the issue of state autonomy since it conceives ‘state’ as the instrument of the dominant class to reproduce a mode of production and serve the benefits of this class in the long run. Marxists see state as an extension of society. According to the Marxist conception of the capitalist state, the capitalist class, which owns the modes of production, utilizes state as an instrument for dominating the rest of the society. Therefore, state protects the particular interests of the capital owning class. Marx and Engels, in the Communist Manifesto refer to the executive of the state as “a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie”²⁹. Therefore, the interests of the state are identical with that of the bourgeoisie. Another aspect of Marxism that precludes the state autonomy is economic determinism, which denies ‘the political’ the

²⁹ Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, (London, New York: Penguin Books, 1967), p.82.

possibility to be independent from the economic. Economic determinism or economism is a key feature of classical Marxism. It rests upon the espousal of the axiom that base determines the superstructure. This means that base, which constitutes the forces and relations of production, carries a fundamental causal influence on the formation of the superstructure denoting to politics, law and religion. Marx underlines the relationship between the base and superstructure as:

In the social production of their lives, men enter into relations that are specific, necessary and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society- the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life.³⁰

Nevertheless, Marx recognized a limited possibility of state autonomy under certain circumstances. In his work on *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*³¹, Marx discusses the *coup d'état* in France in 1851 when Louis Bonaparte seized power by using state forces. With the coup, Bonaparte succeeded in obtaining a significant degree of independence from the bourgeoisie and also acting against its interests. Nevertheless, Marx underlines that at the end of the day, the Bonapartist state served the long-term interests of the capitalist state despite having acted against the will and immediate interests of the bourgeoisie. Bonapartism is referred as “a form of state in which ‘the general interest’ has separated off from any specific class interest”³².

Although the Bonapartist state was introduced as an exceptional case, it is fair to say that it enabled the discussions of the state autonomy within the Marxist theory. Within this framework, Poulantzas as a neo-Marxist introduced the concept of ‘relative state autonomy’. The aim of developing the concept was to overcome economic determinism

³⁰ Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1904), p.11.

³¹ Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon*, (Dodo Press, 2009).

³² James Martin (ed.), *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law and The State*, (London, New York: Verso, 2008), p.13.

and the conventional Marxist reductionism which sees state as an instrument of domination. The starting point for Poulantzas for the reformulation of the Marxist theory and the relative autonomy of the state is his separation of the political sphere from the economic one.

The relative autonomy of the state posits that although the state functions in favor of capitalism in general, it is independent from the interests of the dominant class since it is not controlled by any class. For Poulantzas, the interests of the capitalist class and the functions of the state do not always have to coincide.³³ Therefore, at times state can act independently from the dominant capitalist class, which may be against the short-term interests of this class, but compatible with its long-term interests and hegemonic domination.³⁴ Furthermore, he underlined that state is not an isolated set of institutions, but it is an arena where the class struggles and political compromises take place. And this feature shapes the structure of the economy.³⁵ The instrumentalists (or the plain Marxists)³⁶ have been criticized since they posit that finance capital dominates the state and therefore, the state does not have the autonomy to act against the capital class.³⁷

In the mid-1980s, state was reconceptualized around the Weberian definition with a move away from the pluralist and Marxist perspectives. The previous research on state,

³³ Ibid, p. 12.

³⁴ Nicos Poulantzas, *Political Power and Social Classes*, (London: NLB ; Atlantic Highlands [N. J.]: Humanities Press, 1975), pp.190-191.

³⁵ The first debate began between Miliband and Poulantzas and later on Laclau became involved. See Nicos Poulantzas, "The Problem of The Capitalist State", *New Left Review*, I/58, (November-December 1969), pp.67-78, Ralph Miliband, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Poulantzas", *New Left Review*, I/82, (November-December 1973), pp.83-92, Ernesto Laclau, "The Specificity of the Political: The Miliband-Poulantzas Debate", *Economy and Society*, Vol.4, No.1, (1975), pp. 87-110. Nicos Poulantzas, "The Capitalist State: A Reply to Miliband and Laclau", *New Left Review*, I/95, (January-February 1976), pp 63-83.

³⁶ Miliband argues that although there is a gap between the state and society, the gap is closed because the governing class has direct social and economic links with the capitalist class. Therefore, even when the state is relatively autonomous from the capitalist class, the institutions of the state meets the needs of the capital making state the instrument of the capitalist class. This is called instrumentalism. See Ralph Miliband, *The State in Capitalist Society: The Analysis of the Western Power System*, (New York: Basic Books, 1969).

³⁷ Clyde W. Barrow, *The Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist*, (Wisconsin, London: The University of the Wisconsin Press, 1993), p.26.

as described by Skocpol, was characterized by society-centrism where state was mainly defined as the arena of social conflict. Therefore, in the defense of the new statist approach, Skocpol dichotomized the study of state as state-centered versus society-centered approaches, the former denoting to the new wave of Weberian reconceptualization of state and the latter to pluralist and Marxist approaches. Taking state as the central explanatory variable, the new statist perspective perceived state as an institution and a bureaucratic apparatus. Within this framework, it was argued that the state was an actor, which had its own interests that do not always reflect the interests of the society. “In this approach’s ideal case of a strong state, autonomy from society was assumed to endow the state with the capacity to act to fulfill its interests.”³⁸ Therefore, the autonomy of the state alludes to the ability of the state to develop its own interests which are independent of or even against the will of the varying societal interests. The notion of autonomy is not considered as a totality, meaning that “the state can be autonomous in certain domains, and dependent in others.”³⁹

Skocpol criticizes Marxist analysis of state since it analyzes state as the agent of the dominant class. Skocpol views state as an autonomous body which is “in competition with the other groups in society for the control of the resources”⁴⁰. She stresses:

[...] the fatal shortcoming of all Marxist theorizing (so far) about the role of the state is that nowhere is the possibility admitted that the state organizations and elites might under certain circumstances act against the long-run economic interests of a dominant class, or act to create a new mode of production.⁴¹

³⁸ Karen Barkey and Sunita Parikh, “Comparative Perspectives on The State”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 17, (1991), p. 525.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 526.

⁴⁰ Stephen Hobden, *International Relations and Historical Sociology: Breaking Down Boundaries*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 73.

⁴¹ Theda Skocpol, *Social Revolutions in the Modern World*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.37.

Therefore, by proposing state autonomy and capacity as key to understand state-society relations as well as individual-level political activity⁴², she defines state autonomy as: “States conceived as organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social groups, classes, or society.”⁴³ She also underlines that “state autonomy is not a fixed structural feature of any governmental system”⁴⁴. It may exist in a governmental system and then cease to exist. This is due to the fact that crises may lead to the autonomous actions by the states and also states’ ‘structural potentials’ may change over time. In this respect, states may pose ‘weaker’ or ‘stronger’ tendencies toward autonomous action contextually or depending on the structure and capacity of the state.

According to Weber, “states are compulsory associations claiming control over territories and the people within them.”⁴⁵ Therefore, as asserted by Weberians (as well as neo-Weberians), state can act independent of its publics and pursue policies which reflect the demands of neither powerful classes nor the interests groups. Weber claims that state is not resultant of class struggle since modern state preceded capitalism.⁴⁶ Such approach to the history of the state is adopted by Skocpol (and also Tilly). When Weber defined state as: “human community which (successfully) lays claim to the *monopoly of legitimate physical violence* within a certain territory, this ‘territory’ being another of the defining characteristics of the state”⁴⁷, he underlined that boundaries have been

⁴² The individual political activity corresponds to the activity by the individual actors with differing interests and different levels of expertise that make up the bureaucratic state structure. See in Theda Skocpol, “Bringing The State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing The State Back In*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

⁴³ Ibid, p. 9.

⁴⁴ Ibid, p.14.

⁴⁵ Quoted in Theda Skocpol, “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (ed.s), *Bringing The State Back In*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p.7.

⁴⁶ David Held, *The Political Theory and The Modern State: Essays on State, Power, and Democracy*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 41.

⁴⁷ Max Weber, *Political Writings*, Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp.310-311.

important concerns for the states in relation to each other. From this point onwards, Skocpol argues that “the geopolitical framework of state action pre-existed capitalism and allowed the state to act as an independent actor.”⁴⁸ Therefore, the geopolitical characteristics of the state action endow state with autonomy both from civil society and its own history preceding capitalist development. Nevertheless, Skocpol did not deny the role of capitalism in transforming the state and the international system of states and added that states contributed to the capital accumulation on national scale whereas the international system of state did so on world scale.⁴⁹ Concluding from Hintze, Skocpol also mentioned the importance of the international dimension of state behavior to understand its structure.

State autonomy which derives from the territoriality and centrality is related to the formation of the state. As claimed by Tilly, state is one of the different forms of polity in Western Europe, and it has become the dominant organization in Western Europe because of wars. Tilly explains the formation of states in Western Europe with his renowned assumption as “war made the state and the state made war”⁵⁰. This means that fighting wars necessitated building standing armies and thus required resources. This led to “bargaining, cooptation, legitimation and sheer coercion between the state makers and the societal forces, with society as the losers in the struggle being forced to pay”⁵¹. Therefore, states got stronger *vis-à-vis* the society and were able to impose their will on the society through developing extraction mechanisms like taxation and coercion. Resultant was a system of states in Western Europe which became the dominant political organization in the whole world.⁵²

⁴⁸ E. Fuat Keyman, “Problematizing the State in International Relations Theory”, Claire Turenne Sjolander and Wayne S. Cox (ed.s), *Beyond Positivism: Critical Reflections on International Relations*, (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), p. 158.

⁴⁹ Ibid, p.159.

⁵⁰ Charles Tilly, “The Reflections on the History of European State-Making”, Charles Tilly (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p.42.

⁵¹ Barkey and Parikh, “Comparative Perspectives”, p.528.

⁵² Faruk Yalvaç, “Devlet”, Atilla Eralp (ed.), *Devlet ve Ötesi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p.40.

Mann contends with this argument in terms of the way states acquired autonomy in response to the military pressures, but for him, state as the reflection of the centralized political power came out of the intersecting multiple sociospatial networks of power (ideological, economic, military, and political) is able to set boundaries around the society.⁵³ Therefore, he emphasizes that the autonomy of state originates from its “territorially centralized form of organization”⁵⁴. Then he differentiates between two types of state power, one despotic, the other the infrastructural power. By despotic power, he means the ability of the state elites to take action without engaging in any negotiation with the civil society since there has not been any institutionalized mechanism to do so. He notes that the despotic power is usually referred as the ‘autonomy of power’ in the literature. He gives the examples of Chinese and Roman empires where the emperors possessed virtually unlimited powers. He added the monarchs of the early modern Europe to that category, too. He also underlines the Soviet state elites having substantial despotic power despite their proposition of themselves as the agent and protector of the interests of the masses.⁵⁵ Then Mann introduces ‘infrastructural power’ in order to explain the capacity of the state, especially in the contemporary capitalist democracies, to penetrate civil society to implement political decisions.⁵⁶ Thus, infrastructural power is more about negotiation and coordination with the society. State acquires its autonomy via its organizational capacity which is based on territorial centrality. When compared with other social groupings, state has the advantage of exploiting its centrality which enables it to perform effectively its activities. Therefore, “the capacity of the state to extract resources is closely linked to the willingness of the population to accept these burdens. Thus, IP (infrastructural power) is fundamentally negotiated power, its core features being the capacity for social

⁵³ Michael Mann, *Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD1760*, Vol.1, (Cambridge, New York, 1986), p.2.

⁵⁴ Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”, John A. Hall, *States in History*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p.109.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, p.113.

⁵⁶ *Ibid*, p.118.

penetration, resource extraction and collective coordination.”⁵⁷ Lukas portrays the difference between despotic and infrastructural power as: “Whereas despotic power is power *over* society, infrastructural power is power *through* society.”⁵⁸ The relationship between the despotic and infrastructural power is not that of ‘either/or’. To be more precise, a state can have despotic and infrastructural power at the same time. When states possess more despotic power in comparison to infrastructural power, they become more autonomous and when they have more infrastructural power, they become less autonomous.⁵⁹

TABLE 2: Mann’s Two Dimensions of State Power

		Infrastructural Coordination	
		Low	High
Despotic Power	Low	Feudal	Bureaucratic
	High	Imperial	Authoritarian

Source: Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State, p, 115.

Western conception of state came into being under certain historical conditions. This brought in a different formulation of state-society relationship. Therefore, the state autonomy in the Western context is different from the state autonomy in the non-Western world. For instance, European state makers were able to set their own boundaries and their state structures evolved in response to their own historical experience whereas state elites in the non-Western world, more precisely the Third

⁵⁷ Linda Weiss, “Infrastructural Power, Economic Transformation and Globalization”, John A. Hall and Ralph Schroeder (ed.s), *An Anatomy of Power: The Social Theory of Michael Mann*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.172.

⁵⁸ John Lucas, “The Tension between Despotic and Infrastructural Power: The Military and the Political Class in Nigeria, 1985-1993”, *Studies in Comparative International Development*, Fall 1998, Vol.33, No.3, p.91.

⁵⁹ Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State”, p.109.

World, inherited pre-determined boundaries and state structures. In addition, state makers in the developing world faced different societal realities like the division of societies along the tribal, kinship and religious lines. Therefore, they had to exert much more coercion and utilize different mechanisms like patron-client relationships rather than extraction to remain in power. In this respect, their inability to establish and maintain effective state administration apparatuses made them turn to rely more on what Mann called despotic power. However, these facts do not eradicate the possibility of the use of terms for explaining state autonomy in the non-Western world. When it comes to the Middle East as a region, the use of the term, state autonomy is still possible. The authoritarian state structures in the Middle East are in line with what Mann called the despotic power of the state which enables the explanation of states autonomy from the society. Almost all Middle Eastern states enjoy varying degrees of state autonomy, at the domestic context, first and foremost, due to their authoritarian state structure. In authoritarian states, power is highly concentrated and centralized. Containing opposition, excluding challengers or integrating different groups and mobilizing people are used for maintaining power. The methods used to achieve the purpose of maintaining power can range from “terror and brute force (the stick) to economic inducement (the carrot) and from the use of personal, ethnic or group affiliations to the compulsory membership of carefully constructed unions and professional associations designed to keep all those at work in the modern sector strictly in their place”⁶⁰. In addition, rentier state structure disables the development of mechanisms where the society can call the state to account for its policies and actions. Therefore, this reality feeds more authoritarianism and thus more autonomy of the state in the region.

Hobson differentiates between the “domestic agential state power” and “international agential power of state”.⁶¹ By domestic agential state power, he means “the ability of the state to make domestic or foreign policy as well as shape the domestic realm, free of

⁶⁰ Roger Owen, *State, Power and Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East*, Third Edition, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.27-28.

⁶¹ Hobson proposes “international agential power of the state” as a novelty in the second state debate within the Weberian Historical Sociology. See John M. Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp.1-14.

domestic social structural requirements or interests of the non-state actors”⁶². He explains that when states have low domestic agential power, they are compelled to act in conformity with the domestic non-state actors or structures. At the other extreme, when states have high domestic agential power, they can act autonomously from domestic non-state actors or structures. This, in fact, is what corresponds to the state autonomy in the Weberian conceptualization, in reference to the institutional and organization aspects of the state. Then he defines international agential power of the state as “the ability of the state to make foreign policy and shape the international realm free of international structural requirements or the interests of international non-state actors”⁶³. According to Hobson, when states have high international agential power, they can resist, oppose or constrain international structures and the logic of inter-state competition. Therefore, the degree of international agential power of a state from high to ‘none’, determines both states capability to act at the expense of international structures and constrain the logic of inter-state competition. States with no international agential power, for instance, have to passively conform to the international structures and logic of anarchy.⁶⁴

Against this background, similar to the differentiation made by Hobson, this thesis makes a distinction between ‘domestic state autonomy’ and ‘regional state autonomy’. In this context, domestic state autonomy is defined as the state being autonomous from the social forces at the domestic context, which is in conformity with the Weberian concept of state autonomy. Regional state autonomy is defined as state’s ability to act independent from regional dynamics, other regional states or non-state actors. Regional state autonomy originates from a state’s capacity composed of its geography, history, economic and military capability. The concepts of state autonomy and state capacity are closely related and are sometimes melted in the pot of state strength as in the case of Mann’s analysis of infrastructural and despotic powers of the state. “Capacity is defined here as the state’s ability to implement strategies to achieve economic, political, or social

⁶² Ibid, p.5.

⁶³ Ibid, p.7.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

goals in society. The state may acquire capacity through institutions such as bureaucracy, or through resources such as external ties to entrepreneurs and finance capital.”⁶⁵ In this thesis, state capacity is considered embedded in the clientalist relations of state as the distributor of the rents accruing to the state as foreign aid, workers remittances, and other types of revenues resulting from the non-productive means in the domestic context.

Within this framework, this thesis argues that the domestic state autonomy of the Egypt and Jordan enabled them to make peace with Israel at the expense of their societies, the masses and the opposing power blocs (i.e. Muslim Brotherhood in both cases). This domestic state autonomy (higher in the Egyptian, limited in the Jordanian state) has also enabled these states to sustain peace with Israel as their foreign policy orientation regardless of the anti-normalization movements and campaigns or in other words create a sort of ‘peace consensus’ where the role of government and the sphere that the opposing blocs could act are defined. On the other hand, the regional state autonomy played a decisive role in determining the time of making peace with Israel. Egypt, enjoying a high regional state autonomy, was able to make peace during the Cold War at the expense of the regional dynamics which were geared towards an anti-Israeli stance. Jordan, on the other hand, with a low regional state autonomy was highly susceptible to the regional currents and had to wait for the legitimacy of the Oslo Accords for making peace with Israel. Last, but not the least, it is important to note that domestic and regional state autonomy are important factors in enabling peacemaking and peace sustaining, but it is not the main reason why Egypt and Jordan made peace with Israel. However, state autonomy is the defining factor on the nature of the peace processes.

⁶⁵ Barkey and Parikh, “Comparative Perspectives”, p. 526.

1.3. RESEARCH DATA

This research is primarily based on secondary sources: history, politics, international relations, foreign policy textbooks and articles about Middle East in general, Egypt and Jordan in particular. In addition, biographies and autobiographies of the prominent political figures and leaders of the day are utilized to grasp the vision of the leaders and their elites who played important roles in the making of peace, among which can be counted: *In Search of Identity*, the autobiography by Anwar Sadat, *Uneasy Lies The Head*, the autobiography by King Hussein, *The Rabin Memoirs* by Yitzhak Rabin, *Keeping Faith* by Jimmy Carter, *The Camp David Accords* by Muhammed Ibrahim Kamal, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* as well as *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967* by William B. Quandt, *Peacemaking: The Inside Story of 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty* by Abdul Salem Majali, Jawad Al Anani, and Munter Haddadin. In addition, speeches by the leading figures of the peace process as the reflections of intentions and tool for diplomacy and mobilization are scrutinized within the framework of this research like the historic speech by Anwar Sadat in the Knesset in 1977.

The official web sites of the state institutions of Egypt, Jordan and Israel such as the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of trade and commerce are utilized for obtaining information and data. However, among all, Israeli official web sites provided the most well organized and open data, especially in terms of bilateral relations. When compared, Jordan is doing relatively good compared to Egypt. However, finding data particularly about bilateral trade and business relations between Egypt and Israel as well as Jordan and Israel is a hard task if not mission impossible. This is mainly because trade and business with Israel remains a taboo for the Egyptians and Jordanians. Therefore, data regarding any business relations is omitted from statistics.

Apart from other news agencies and newspapers, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, *Al-Ahram Online*, *Egypt Daily News*, *Jordan Times*, *Al Jazeera*, and *Al Arabiya* have been frequently searched for gathering relevant information and data for conducting this research. Other institutions, the works of which are followed constitute Middle East Report (MERIP),

Centre for Strategic Studies located in University of Jordan (CSS), The Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES), Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

An early fieldwork before the Arab Spring was conducted in August 2010 in Jordan. Interviews with academics and writers like Yusuf Mansour (Jordan Times, Envision Consulting Group), Nawaf Wasfi Tell (the director of the Jordan Center for Strategic Studies of the day), Marwan Kardoosh (editor of Jordan Business), and Nasim Barham (University of Jordan) were conducted. I also had the privilege to interview with H.E. Dr. Jawad Al-Anani, the former deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and one of the few people who was part of the negotiations during the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace. Due to the regional conjecture which turned upside down with the Arab Spring in 2011, fieldwork in Egypt or further fieldwork in Jordan was not possible because of the security reasons.

1.4. THE CONTENT

The thesis is comprised of six chapters. This first chapter is devoted to introduction and the sixth chapter to conclusion. The second chapter is designed to elaborate on the development of the autonomous state in Egypt and its foreign policy. In this respect, the state formation in Egypt is examined as the historical context where the nature of state, state-society relations and thus the autonomy of the state are shaped. Following the discussions on the nature of the state in Egypt in terms of state capacity, domestic and regional state autonomy and state ideology as the defining factors in shaping the behavior of the state, this chapter also looks at elites and the president in order to understand how the clientalist relations are formulated and how this affected the formation of state actions. Then, foreign policy decision-making as the reflection of the state's autonomous power exercise is examined. It is claimed that the Egyptian state enjoyed a high degree of domestic autonomy from its people as well as regional autonomy which enabled Egypt to make peace with Israel as early as 1979 compared to

Jordan. Furthermore, its state capacity and autonomy facilitated its transformation of state ideology from Pan-Arabism to Egypt First, from Arab socialism to economic liberalism and from positive neutralism to pro-Western stance. Within the scope of the chapter, foreign policy orientation of the Egyptian state starting with the presidency of Nasser is also scrutinized. In addition to analyzing the characteristics of foreign policy in Egypt, the chapter aims at providing the background for understanding the developments that lead to peace with Israel by looking at Egypt's relations with Israel since the establishment of the state of Israel until the signing of the peace treaty in 1979.

The third chapter is devoted to analyze the peace process between Egypt and Israel under the framework of the road to peace, the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Peace Treaty, and the stalled process of peace-building. The road to peace part encompasses Sadat's peace initiative in 1971, the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt in 1972, and Sadat's secret peace initiative in 1973. It also includes the 1973 October War as an instrument to persuade the US and Israel for peaceful settlement as well as the open door policy and the peace incentives. The historic visit by Sadat to Jerusalem is put forward as the final milestone that paved the way for peacemaking. The role of leadership in making peace in regard to Sadat, Begin and Carter is also mentioned. After the discussions on the content of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, the reasons for the 'cold peace' are examined in regard to issue of normalization of relations with Israel. Finally, the peace dividends are investigated in terms of foreign aid and debt relief, military expenditure, tourism, bilateral trade, and Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs). It is argued that although the unachieved normalization of relations with Israel led to the stalled peace-building, but did not threatened peace-sustaining as a foreign policy orientation.

The fourth chapter addresses the development of the autonomous state in Jordan and its foreign policy over the same dimensions that are utilized in the Egyptian case as state formation, state capacity, state autonomy, state ideology, the elites and foreign policy decision-making. It is intended to display the susceptibility of Jordan to regional developments in relation to its state structure and specialties deriving from its

demographic composition and how these factors limited its foreign policy choices. The chapter also aimed at displaying Jordan's limited state capacity, limited domestic and regional state autonomy. As a result, these realities compelled Jordan to adopt a pro-Western, moderate and pragmatic state ideology which shaped its relations with Israel. By looking at Jordan's relations with Israel, it is revealed that the Kingdom had been a reluctant party in the persistence of hostility against Israel and was able to pursue covert relations with Israel until the 1994 Peace Treaty. Jordan could not dare to make peace with Israel before the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords due to its limited regional autonomy and the defining role of the Palestinian factor in its domestic politics and regime survival.

The fourth chapter is dedicated to delve into the peace process between Jordan and Israel. The chapter first discussed the context that paved the way for peace-making in respect to the 1991 Gulf War and the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. The regional context defined by the euphoria of peace was completely different from the Egyptian case providing Jordan with the legitimacy to make peace with Israel. The legitimacy that Jordan sought was offered by the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords without jeopardizing the regime survival in making peace with Israel. The Hashemite regime achieved its peace with Israel due to the convenient regional context and the peace dividends promised to the population regardless of its limited state autonomy. Nevertheless, the Jordanian-Israeli peace process could not escape the fate of 'cold peace' regardless of the high prospects of normalization reflected in the 1994 Peace Treaty due to the similar reasons evidenced in the Egyptian case. Therefore, these reasons are investigated in reference to anti-normalization movement and the unachieved peace dividends. The chapter displays how the expected economic benefits of foreign aid, debt relief, decrease in military expenditure, bilateral trade and QIZs have remained highly limited dashing the hopes for a 'warm peace', but as in the case of Egypt, the stalled peace-building experience did not jeopardize peace-sustaining as long as it remained as foreign policy orientation.

2. THE EGYPTIAN STATE AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

Being the largest Arab country, Egypt has played a central role in Middle Eastern politics, and it is a prominent actor of the Arab world. It is the birthplace of Pan-Arabism, and also one of the leading Islamist movements, Muslim Brotherhood. After the 1952 Free Officers' Coup, it became the linchpin of revolutionist and revisionist trends in the region. During the Cold War, with its charismatic leader Gamal Abdel-Nasser, it not only carried the banner of Pan-Arabism, positive neutralism and Arab socialism, but also turned out to be a key member of the Non-Aligned Movement. It also became the leader of the Arab front in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In line with its quest of leadership in the Arab world, it grew into the primary defender of the Palestinian cause of national homeland and the right to self-determination.

Egypt has a pivotal role in regional politics. Egypt's foreign policy behavior, which had the impact of shaping regional politics, owed a great deal to its leaders, but not limited to that. Nasser as a leader influenced masses in Egypt, Arab world and the Third world. However, although Sadat lacked Nasser's charisma, he also broke grounds in terms of making peace with Israel, cutting Egypt loose from the Soviets and establishing cordial relations with the US. Therefore, what seemed as bold moves of the leaders, in fact, derived from its domestic and regional autonomy, which was shaped during the state formation. One of the other reasons about the centrality of Egypt in the Arab world is about the capacity of state which is delineated by its geography, demography, military capability and economy.

Within this framework, this chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the development of the autonomous state and the Egyptian foreign policy. It probes into state formation as the historical process where state and society relations are formulated and gave rise to the autonomous state. Therefore, domestic and regional state autonomy are discussed in

relation to state capacity and state ideology as the main components of the nature of the state. In addition, the role of leadership and elites as well as foreign decision making, both in terms of how foreign policy is formulated and how it reflects state autonomy is elaborated. Following, the foreign policy orientation of Egypt since the Nasser period is examined. Lastly, Egyptian-Israeli relations since the establishment of the state of Israel until the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is signed in 1979 are highlighted.

2.1. STATE FORMATION IN EGYPT

The formation of the ‘modern’ state in Egypt starts with the rule of Mohammed Ali (1805-1848)⁶⁶. His reforms in military, economy, politics and culture earned him the title of the ‘founder’ of the modern Egypt.⁶⁷ With the quest of “establishing an independent hereditary dynasty at the expense of the weakened Ottoman state”⁶⁸, Mohammed Ali’s state-building efforts affected the formation of the Egyptian nation as reflected in the lines by the renowned Egyptian historian Marsot: “[...] Mohammed Ali Egyptianized Egypt although he himself did not plan to do that and never knew he had done it”⁶⁹. Therefore, the efforts of Mohammed Ali should be viewed as more of state-building rather than nation-building, but without doubt, these state-building efforts had contributed to the development of the Egyptian nation and nationalism. When Egyptians began taking place in administration, army and navy, they started developing a sense of belonging to the state. Later on policies of the monarchy, the British presence and

⁶⁶ Albanian in origin, a commander in the Ottoman army, arrived Egypt in charge of evacuating the French after the occupation by Napoleon in 1798. Due to his success in the expedition, he became the Ottoman governor (*wali*) of Egypt in 1805.

⁶⁷ Panoyatis J. Vatikiotis, *The History of Egypt* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolsan, 1969), Henry Dodwell, *The Founder of Modern Egypt*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1931).

⁶⁸ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, Second Edition, (Boulder Colo, Westview Pres, 2000), p.66.

⁶⁹ Afaf Lutfi Sayyid Al-Marsot, *A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present*, Second Edition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.77.

regional developments, particularly the Palestinian question would all shape Egyptian nationalism.

Within the state-building efforts of Mohammed Ali, inspired from the Western models, particularly the French, a hierarchical structure in government and administration was set up. The old concessionary system established by the Ottoman Empire and carried out by autonomous social groups and elites was abolished and a centralized bureaucracy was established. The new centralized bureaucracy brought advantages to and strengthened the power of the ruling groups at the expense of the majority of the population. The monopoly of Mamluks and Turks in the cadres was broken down with the new administrative elite. This new elite was composed of ‘technocrats’ who were trained in Europe. The industrialization efforts brought in the Western technology, know-how, new skills and scientific knowledge via people (Europeans) who throughout time became part of the elite fabric. The armed forces were reshaped in the European style and Mamluks in the army were disposed. The new army was composed of Egyptian peasants (*fellahin*) commanded by the officers trained in Europe and the officers training school in Egypt founded by him. Egyptian *ulema* was deprived of power, too. It was not only the confiscation of the *waqf* land, but their loss of control of education and even justice that left *ulema* with less power. The government established schools as well as introduced new civil codes that replaced *sharia*. The Egyptian economy became an export-oriented economy with the introduction of the ‘Egyptian cotton’ and Egypt was integrated to the world economy.⁷⁰ To secure his government, Mohammed Ali, made use of household elite⁷¹. By relying on ethnic and family ties, he tried to create loyalty and solidarity between him and his elites. This also enabled him to maintain control over state institutions and the society. “Once again, in Egyptian history, a personally dependent

⁷⁰ Robert Mabro, *The Egyptian Economy (1952-1972)*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p.7; Charles Philip Issawi, “Egypt Since 1800: A Study in Lop-sided Development”, *Journal of Economic History*, Vol.21, No.1, March 1961, pp.4-5.

⁷¹ Composed of his relatives by blood, his in-laws, mainly composed of military man from his hometown, Kavala, freed white slaves or Mamluks and people who were affiliated to him/his family via private agreements. Of all, the most important posts and offices were allocated to his family members. For more, see F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedives (1805-1879): From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1999), p.23.

elite helped to make one-man rule possible.”⁷² Mohammed Ali concentrated all the governmental powers in the hands of the ruler. The ruler had an army, could impose tax, confiscate land, decide the process of the goods, buy the goods from the villagers at a price he fixed and sell them to the European markets, order arrest and imprisonment without the need to state a reason. His subordinates only had the power he delegated to them and could do nothing without his permission.⁷³ As a consequence, all these changes and developments⁷⁴ starting with the rule of Mohammed Ali had created a modern state in Egypt, and throughout time, state became the motor of change and development. This was a legacy of Mohammed Ali and his dynastical heirs to the future generation of rulers in Egypt.

Starting with the Napoleon invasion of Egypt in 1798, the interaction with Europe, particularly, France and Britain had a significant impact on the formation of the state in Egypt. What began as modeling and utilizing from the Europeans in the state-building process turned into a dependency as their influence increased. Besides, the privileged position of the Europeans in the economy as well as the army and their cooperation with the monarchy turned out to be the main source of public discontent in the country. Within this framework, the opening of the Suez Canal⁷⁵ in 1869 marked one of the most

⁷² Ibid, p.27.

⁷³ Ibid, p.28.

⁷⁴ The transformation did not come out of nothing, so bearing in mind the continuities as much as changes are crucial in analyzing the nineteenth century social and economic structures in Egypt. As underlined by Cuno, Egypt’s own past is as important as its interaction with Europe to understand the developments in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See in Kenneth M. Cuno, *The Pasha’s Peasants: Land Tenure, Society and Economy in Lower Egypt, 1740-1858*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p.198.

⁷⁵ During the reign of Khedive Said, the former French diplomat Ferdinand de Lesseps established the Suez Canal Company and then got the concessions from the Said to build up a canal in Suez that would unite Mediterranean and Red Sea. The construction lasted ten years (1859-1869). The Suez Canal was formally opened in 1869 during the reign of Ismail, who engaged in several other infrastructure projects ranging from building bridges to widening and deepening harbors and paving roads. The costs of the canal construction and the other infrastructure projects multiplied by the Khedives excessive spending on presents and bribes for the Ottoman Sultan exceeded state revenues. As an export oriented economy predominantly based on the export of cotton, Egypt experienced a decrease in the state revenues either due to the end of Civil War in the US, which was a major cotton supplier in the world. Therefore, Khedive Ismail appealed to the European powers for loan. Throughout the time, the debt relations with the

seminal events in the history of Egypt as the canal became the center of the vested interests of France and predominantly the British. Despite the economic shares the French and the British had in the canal company, the canal provided the British with the shortest route to its most important colony in India.

More than Mohammed Ali strived for independence from the Ottoman Empire the power of which was in decline, Egyptian people struggled against the British to achieve their independence. The British presence unparalleled to its influence in the country continued undefined until its declaration of protectorate over Egypt in 1914. Before, Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 in response to the Urabi revolt⁷⁶, a popular movement against the British and the dynasty. When the First World War broke out, Egypt's position as a privileged Ottoman province under the British military occupation changed into a British protectorate, because the British and the Ottomans were fighting on opposite sides. With the end of the First World War, British confronted another national upheaval⁷⁷ aimed at independence. In response, by 1922, Egypt was declared

Europeans brought in dependence. Khedive Ismail eventually sold his shares in the canal, which did not have much economic significance, but meant a lot in terms of politics.

⁷⁶ Under the leadership of a colonel, Ahmad Urabi, Egyptian officers protested their paycuts and forced the khedive to dismiss his war minister in 1881. This was followed by the dismissal of the entire cabinet. This led to a series of riots and a devastating fire in Alexandria. All of these named after Ahmed Urabi, as the Urabi movement. It is referred as a nationalist movement since it was opposed to the government that the people held responsible for the increasing influence of the Europeans, particularly, the British. The slogan "Egypt for the Egyptians" spread over Egypt as the voice of the dissidents who were not content with the British dominance and its associate dynasty. Fearing the overthrow of the *khedivial* family, Khedive Tawfiq turns to Ottomans or the British to send him troops in order to ensure the security of the dynasty. The British felt compelled to intervene since their vested interest in Egypt, predominantly the Suez Canal. The movement came to an end when Britain defeated Urabi's troops and occupied Cairo on 14 September 1882 and Egypt became a 'veiled protectorate'. See in Arthur Goldschmidt Jr and Robert Johnston, *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, Third Edition, (Lanham, Maryland, Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2003) p.8.

⁷⁷ After the signing of the 1918 Armistice, the Wafd Party asked from the British to send representatives to the Paris Peace Conference. The request was turned down by Britain and Said Zaghlul (the leader of the Wafd Party) and three others leaders were arrested and sent to exile. This unleashed the national sentiments and a nationwide upheaval broke out. When the situation went out of control, Britain had to allow Zaghlul and his colleagues to go to the Paris Peace Conference. The national revolt was significant in terms of Egyptian history and nationalism. Ghazali Harb, puts forward that the Egypt's struggle for independence in 1919 and the following quest for constitutional order should not be evaluated in isolation from the international political developments. He states that the emergence of the new world order after the First World War influenced the developments in Egypt. The fourteen points of Wilson, especially the right of self-determination was a source of inspiration for the Egyptian people. Osama El-Ghazali Harb,

independence and its status as a British protectorate was abolished unilaterally by the Britain.⁷⁸ The British influence reduced their presence, if not influence, acting as advisors in the ministries, other government positions and defense realm as well as maintaining a high commissioner. During the interwar years, Britain felt the need to renegotiate the 1922 declaration due to the Italian expansion in Ethiopia. Then 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty⁷⁹ was signed between Egypt and Britain. Reassuring the independence of Egypt and the British military presence⁸⁰ in the Canal, the treaty entitled the British to defend Egypt in case of an attack.⁸¹ The treaty was in force until 1956 when the British withdrew from the Canal.

The Egyptian Free Officers seized power in July 1952 with a bloodless military coup. They dethroned the King, deposed the politicians who supported the king's regime and maintained close ties with the Europeans, they tried to deprive the wealthy landowners and industrialists from their powers via land reforms and confiscations. They changed the regime from constitutional monarchy to republic in 1953. Eventually, they managed to negotiate with the British to end the occupation and achieved the full independence of Egypt in 1956. Therefore, the military coup of the Free Officers has been recalled in the Egyptian political history as the July Revolution of 1952. The revolution did not lead to a democratic regime and instead, Egypt became a popular authoritarian state with the policies of Nasser. In addition, Egypt emerged as a hegemon carrying the banner of Pan-

“No Less Than Egypt's Due”, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, Issue No.732, 3-5 March 2005, available at <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2005/732/op2.htm>, (accessed 30 May 2012).

⁷⁸ This could hardly be regarded as full independence because of the ‘reserved points’ clause about the foreign relations, communications, military and the Sudan. In line with the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreement of 1899, Sudan was a condominium of Egypt and Britain between 1899-1956. However, the most of the power of administration remained in the British hands.

⁷⁹ For the full text of the agreement, see “The Treaty of Alliance between His Majesty, In respect of the United Kingdom and His Majesty, The King of Egypt”, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol.31, No.2, Supplement: Official Documents, (April 1937), pp.77-90.

⁸⁰ The treaty limited the British presence to 10.000 troops in the Canal during the peacetime. However, by they year, 1939, there were 55.000 troops in Egypt and the Sudan. See in Goldschmidt and Johnston, *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, p.89.

⁸¹ Cleaveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, p.194.

Arabism at the regional level, and a leading member of the non-aligned movement at the international level. The state formation process of Egypt could be said to continue during the Nasser period with the institutionalization of the new revolutionary regime, but what Nasser and the Free Officers overtook was a state with the territory, nation, army, bicameral constitutional political system, bureaucratic institutions, and a developing economy.

2.2. THE NATURE OF STATE IN EGYPT

Among other Middle Eastern states, Egypt has always been regarded as a state where the borders of 'state' and 'nation' coincide and where there is a long experience of statehood. The natural borders of the state and the homogenous population, who have a common socio-political identity, if not national, have decreased the permeability of the Egyptian state. Throughout the time, this has become a factor for stability. The long tradition of statehood as a factor for continuity and stability even at times of change enabled the regime in Egypt to consolidate easily and become the major regional power, if not always the hegemon.

After the July Revolution in 1952, with the regime established by Nasser and his comrades, Egypt became an authoritarian state. Nasser monopolized the power in his hands and chose to share it with whom, when, and how. His charismatic leadership and the military rule that he established brought in stability and therefore, he did not feel the need to establish additional institutional props.⁸² The Nasserite regime, rested on repression and the Pan-Arab nationalism as a source of legitimacy to ensure internal stability. His making use of the sources of media like his phenomenal radio broadcasting in *Sawt-Al Arab* (the Voice of Arabs-Egyptian radio station) earned him popularity, too. Nasser's populist authoritarian regime enjoyed "internal legitimacy and stability

⁸² Hrair R. Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir: A Study in Political Dynamics*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), p.227.

uncommon in the world of developing nations”⁸³, which mainly derived from his foreign policy moves rather than his success in the internal politics. This externally acquired charismatic legitimacy began to erode with the dissolution of the United Arab Republic after Syria’s secession and the catastrophic involvement in the Yemeni civil war (known as Egypt’s Vietnam), even before the defeat of the 1967 June War. Before that, the Nasserite regime had begun to face large amount of political stress in the mid-1960s. This was mainly because of the lack of implementing a clear ideology of Arab socialism in domestic political and economic context as well as the failure of the policies developed within the framework of Arab socialism. When these were utilized by the organized opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime lacked developed organizational structures for conflict resolution in domestic politics other than using repression.⁸⁴

The problems that Egypt confronted in the 1970s after the death of Nasser did not pop up overnight. They were the remnants of the Nasserite rule in the 1960s. A rapidly increasing population, itself, in a country of scarce sources could easily turn into a problem hard to deal with. However, during the Nasser period, the scarce sources of the state were directed to the heavy industrialization projects and maintaining a large military.⁸⁵

Repression, coercion and intimidation were the main tools of the authoritarian regime in Egypt starting with the Nasserite regime. However, no matter how authoritarian a regime could be, it necessitated public support. The repressive tools were important for the regime to control. However, sustaining the regime rested mostly upon the patronage networks. The regime denied access to the legal opposition and provided its backers with access to the state resources.⁸⁶ This main characteristic of the Egyptian state-

⁸³ Ibid, p.226.

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 227.

⁸⁵ Ibid, p. 225.

⁸⁶ Maye Kassem, *Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rule*, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), p. 4.

repression and clientalism- is summarized by Soliman as: “It is almost a universal law that authoritarian regimes live by the carrot and the stick; that is by distributing some material benefits to select segments of the population and using harsh repression whenever necessary.”⁸⁷

According to Springborg, political clientalism in Egypt dated back to the Mohammed Ali Dynasty and even before that to the Mamluks. Therefore, it has been a feature of the Egyptian politics for centuries.⁸⁸ What changed with Nasser with regard to the patron-client relations was the dynamics. With the introduction of the agrarian reform, the imbalance in the relationship between the patrons and the clients changed into a relatively balanced one in terms of the ownership of wealth.⁸⁹ With Nasser, there was a transition in terms of the recruitment of the elite from land ownership to strategic personal contacts.⁹⁰ In fact;

What began as a small coterie of fellow colonels and majors rapidly became amorphous, sprawling elite of officers, bureaucrats, professors, *ancien regime* politicians, and others who had to be brought into the picture as Nasser and his comrades were faced with the task of ruling.⁹¹

The economic liberalization started with the *Infitah* during the Sadat period restructured the relationship between clientalist networks. However, this did not change the notion that the regime rested upon the patronage networks in order to legitimize and maintain itself. Bearing in mind the cost of economic liberalization on the population, it is fair to say that the regime turns to rely more on these networks.

⁸⁷ Samer Soliman, *The Autumn of Dictatorship: Fiscal Crisis and Political Change in Egypt Under Mubarek*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011).

⁸⁸ Robert Springborg, “Patterns of Association in The Egyptian Political Elite”, George Lenczowski (ed.), *Political Elites in the Middle East*, (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 87.

⁸⁹ Ibid, p.88.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p.94.

⁹¹ Ibid, p.92.

2.2.1. STATE CAPACITY

The geographical location of a country, its demographic dynamics, its natural resources and economic capability defines the state capacity of that country. State capacity is important in understanding state-society relations as well as defining the foreign policy of a country. Egyptian domestic and foreign policy-making is limited by its socioeconomic structure and its dependency on external sources (finance capital, technology, markets and arms).⁹² Egypt is located in the North Africa bordered by the Mediterranean Sea to the north, Sudan to the south, Red Sea to the East and Libya to the west. It shares borders with Israel and Gaza Strip to the northeast. It is a transcontinental country due to having Sinai Peninsula which is located in the Southwest Asia. Egypt is segregated by deserts and swamps from its neighbors. Thus its geographical location and natural barriers provide Egypt with ease to control and rule.⁹³ Since the river Nile gives life to Egypt, it is of great strategic value for Egypt. Hence securing the waters and the flow of the Nile is a major concern for Egypt.⁹⁴ Due to the historical friendly relations with Sudan, Egypt has long enjoyed security and stability in its southern borders.⁹⁵ In contrast to its southern borders and the resultant passive foreign policy, its eastern border turned out to be its active line of foreign policy and a window to the regional politics mainly due to her neighboring Israel. The construction of the Suez Canal has enhanced the geopolitical importance of Egypt in relation to Europe, South Asia, and East Africa since 1869. Then the creation of the SUMED pipeline along the Suez Canal in 1977 together with aerial and maritime port facilities increased the value of Egypt, for the Middle Eastern trade in particular and the world trade at large. Above all, the geostrategic and geopolitical significance of Egypt rested mainly upon the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula. The Suez Canal as the battlefield of the 1957 Suez War is an

⁹² John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*, (Princeton, New Jersey, Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 4.

⁹³ Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, *Egypt*, p. 169.

⁹⁴ Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, "Egyptian Foreign Policy", *Foreign Affairs*, Issue: 56, No:4, (1978), p.715.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

important waterway connecting Mediterranean to the Red Sea enabling an easy access to the Indian Ocean. It is also an important route for oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments from the Persian Gulf to Europe and North America and south bound shipments from North Africa and countries along the Mediterranean Sea to Asia. The SUMED pipeline is the only alternative route nearby to transport crude oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean if ships were unable to navigate through Suez Canal. Fees collected from operation of these two transit points are significant sources of revenue for Egypt. The Sinai, the loss of which during the 1967 Six Day War turned out to be a matter of conflict with Israel, not only in terms of national prestige, but also due to its oil reserves.

In terms of demographics, Egypt is the most populous country in the Arab World. According to the 2010 World Bank statistics, the population of Egypt is around 82.06 million⁹⁶. % 31 of Egypt's population is below the age of 15 and % 63 is between the ages of 15-64.⁹⁷ The young large population has been one of the facts that have made Egypt 'major' in the regional power play. The % 90 of the Egyptian population is composed of Sunni Muslim whereas the % 10 is Christian including Coptic Christians, Armenians and Maronites.

Egypt is a lower middle income country where GDP per capita is around \$ 6.600, and a growth rate around % 1.8. The budget deficit is %13.3. Both the rate of unemployment and inflation is over % 10, and one-fifth of the population is living below the poverty line. The leading sector as the source of state revenues is the services (% 45.8), followed by industry (%39.5), agriculture (%14.4). Half of the labor force is employed in the services sector whereas one third is employed in the agriculture sector, followed by one fifth in the industry. Egypt's main export commodities are crude oil, petroleum products, cotton and textiles together with the metal products, chemicals and processed food. Her

⁹⁶ "Egypt, Arab Republic Data", World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic> , (accessed 08 June 2014).

⁹⁷ Population Growth (Annual), <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.0014.TO.ZS/countries/EG?display=default>, accessed 08 June 2014.

main export partners are US, Italy, India, Spain, Saudi Arabia, France and Libya. Egypt import machinery and equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals, wool products and fuels from US, China, Germany, Italy and Saudi Arabia.⁹⁸



Figure 1: The Political Map of Egypt

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/egypt_map.htm (accessed on 10.07.2014).

In terms of resources, Egypt has oil and natural gas. “Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa and the second largest dry natural gas producer on the continent following Algeria.”⁹⁹ According to the BP statistics, the proved oil reserves of Egypt is 3,9 billion barrels by the year 2013. The daily production of oil is 714.000 barrels per day whereas the daily consumption is 757.000 barrels.¹⁰⁰ The oil fields in Egypt are

⁹⁸ Egypt, CIA Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/eg.html>, (accessed 08 July 2014).

⁹⁹ EIA Egypt Analysis Brief, US Energy Information Administration, available at <http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG> (accessed on 01 July 2014).

¹⁰⁰ These numbers are as of year 2013. See in *BP Statistical Review of World Energy*, June 2014, p. 6, 8, 9, available at www.bp.com. (accessed on 01 July 2014).

located in the Gulf of Suez, the Nile Delta, Western Dessert, Eastern Dessert, Sinai and the Mediterranean Sea. It is anticipated that the oil production in Egypt will decrease in the long run despite the moderate increase in recent years from smaller new production at smaller fields.

Egypt's dependence on foreign aid has been posited as one of the most significant limitations in its foreign policy. The total US assistance to Egypt has been around \$1.5-2.00 billion annually for the last decade. For the Fiscal Year of 2014, the Congress has approved of \$1.3 billion Foreign Military Assistance and \$ 250 million in Economic Support Funds to Egypt.¹⁰¹ According to the World Bank Statistics, for the year 2013, the GDP of Egypt is \$ 272 billion.¹⁰² For the year 2013, the total US aid to Egypt was \$ 1.477 billion.¹⁰³ Therefore, the US aid to Egypt constitutes approximately % 0,5 of its GDP. In this respect, there are experts like Ahmed el-Naggar from the Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, who thinks that US aid to Egypt is unnecessary since it corresponds to a very small amount of country's GDP and Egypt can give up the aid and put an end to its dependence on the US.¹⁰⁴ However, the value of US aid to Egypt is far beyond the numbers. The US economic assistance to Egypt has several components. Besides the cash transfer, the assistance supports several projects in various sectors like agriculture, education, government, health, industry and trade.¹⁰⁵ In addition, according to the World Trade Organization (WTO) statistics, US ranks third among the Egyptian

¹⁰¹ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt in Transition", CRS Report for Congress, 08 February 2012, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>, (accessed on 08 July 2014).

¹⁰² Egypt, Arab Republic Data, World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/egypt-arab-republic>, (accessed on 20 July 2014), and for the sectoral statistics see Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry, Egyptian International Trade Point, http://www.tpegypt.gov.eg/Statistics/Egyptian_USA.pdf, (accessed on 20 July 2014).

¹⁰³ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and US Relations", CRS Report for Congress, 05 June 2014, available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>, (accessed on 20 July 2014).

¹⁰⁴ Doaa Farid, "US Aid Unnecessary: Expert", Daily News Egypt, 6 July 2013, <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/07/06/us-aid-unnecessary-expert/> (accessed on 25 July 2014).

¹⁰⁵ US ODA to Egypt, Recipient Country Assistance by Sector, US Official Development Assistance Database, <http://usoda.eads.usaidallnet.gov/query/do>, (accessed on 25 July 2014).

trade partners in terms of both imports and exports.¹⁰⁶ The positive approach to the impact of the foreign assistance on the Egyptian economy sees it as a means of enhancing development, because the financial assistance helps the country to modernize its infrastructure, improve its productive capacity, and develop management skills and capability to meet consumption demands. A negative approach underlines that it discourages domestic production and does not really lead to the development of the economy since it imposes values and patterns which are alien.¹⁰⁷ In fact, the dependence of Egyptian economy on the US foreign assistance is not a phenomenon that started with the Sadat era. During the Nasser period Egypt was heavily dependent on the US food aid of PL 480.¹⁰⁸ Since its inception, Egypt is one of the largest beneficiaries of the US food aid.

2.2.2. DOMESTIC STATE AUTONOMY

Egypt can be regarded as a ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian state’¹⁰⁹. Bureaucratic authoritarianism is a concept used by Guillermo O’Donnell in his analysis of Latin American states. According to O’Donnell, bureaucratic authoritarian state is

¹⁰⁶ Egypt Country Profile, World Trade Organization, <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=EG>, (accessed on 25 July 2014).

¹⁰⁷ Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Dependent Development and US Economic Aid to Egypt”, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol.18, No.2, (May 1986), p.121.

¹⁰⁸ The Public Law 480 (PL 480) or the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act was signed in 1954 by the President Eisenhower. The bill simultaneously created the Office of Food for Peace. The bill aimed at helping the food-deficient and cash-poor countries to import food from the US and pay it in their own currencies rather than in US dollars. By this way, these countries were able to save foreign exchange reserves. Besides, the bill also helped the US to dispose of its costly domestic agricultural surpluses by creating a secondary foreign market.¹⁰⁸ The name of the law was changed during the Kennedy administration as “Food for Peace” and was revised in 1966. It was subjected to change in 1990 and 2008. Today, it is regulated under three titles with specific objectives and provides assistance to countries at a particular level of economic development. For more information, see “Food Aid Programs”, FAS Online, <http://apps.fas.usda.gov/excredits/foodaid/title%201/pl480ofst.html>, (accessed on 20 July 2014).

¹⁰⁹ See John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*, (Oxford, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp.6-12.

exclusionary and non-democratic both politically and economically. Repression and coercion turn out to be state's primary tools to achieve control over the population. It aims at creating depoliticized society where the existence of individual is confined to a privatized daily-life. The state rests upon the coalition of military elites and the upper bourgeoisie and technocrats. These elites mostly have opposing interests since the military elites are more nationalist and less capitalist whereas the upper bourgeoisie and technocrats have transnational links with foreign enterprise. In addition to this inherent tension between the state constituencies, the bureaucratic authoritarian state lacks legitimacy since the political mediation mechanisms between the state and society are absent. Therefore, the excluded masses become a threat for the reason of state which is based on social domination. Such fear reproduces the weakness of the state as it chooses to rely more and more on firmer social control. In order to overcome the lack of legitimacy, the bureaucratic authoritarian states have introduced corporatism. Corporatism serves as a tool for controlling associations and unions, but is destined to fail, because it cannot fill the absence of state society mediation.¹¹⁰

Within this framework, Egypt shares several characteristics of the bureaucratic authoritarian state of O'Donnell.¹¹¹ The bureaucratic authoritarian regime in Egypt is based on the alliance between the state, military and the businessmen (or selected segments of the bourgeoisie as Fahmy calls) who are linked with foreign business interests. Military is the supporter and the guardian of the presidential regime and has special relationship with the executive¹¹². The military is engaged in economic activities

¹¹⁰ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966-1973, in Comparative Perspective*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1988), pp.1-38; Ninnette S. Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt: The State-Society Relationship*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 26-28.

¹¹¹ For further discussions, see Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, pp.3-20.

¹¹² Executive is superior to other powers. Although in theory both legislation and judiciary is independent, in practice they are dependent on the executive. In addition, the president, as the head of the executive is endowed with enormous powers by the constitution. The former ruling party National Democratic Party (NDP) had uncontested power in state politics, too. The party represented a single party within an authoritarian state, which officially is based on multi-party system. Although NDP was founded in 1978 during the Sadat era, it represented a centrist state legacy since the Nasser era represented by Liberation Rally (1952-56) first and continued with National Union (1956-62), and Arab Socialist Union (1962-76).

which have growingly increased since Nasser. These economic activities included “manufacture of armaments and wide range of industrial products and public utilities”¹¹³. However, during the Sadat and Mubarak periods, there was an effort to depoliticize the military and civilianize the cabinet and other political and administrative units. The businessmen represent the other component of the ruling coalition. The businessmen who have close relations with foreign corporations mainly via the joint businessmen associations. The most important of all is the Egyptian-American joint businessmen association. These people are close to the president and are represented in the Parliament. On the other hand, the businessmen allied with the state do not have a political culture of their own and are not independent from the state. Their staying in the place is at the discretion of the president.¹¹⁴

The colonial legacy (the creation of the state and its institutions, which underlines the distinctions between the rulers and the ruled, is another factor in defining state autonomy in Egypt. Although in the Egyptian case, the artificiality of the state and the imposition of the state and its institutions are not as acute as it is in the case of Jordan, the country’s encounter with colonialism did play a role. The authoritarian nature of the state contributed into the preservation of such distinction, and also strengthened the position of the state/regime vis-a-vis the people in terms of decision-making and social engineering. Coercion as an apparatus of the state is used to suppress opposition and keep society away from politics. State as the distributor of wealth grew irresponsible to people and utilized patronage networks to buy public support. In case of any public discontent, the state is able to suppress it via its authoritarian apparatus or if it is not able to use coercion as a tool or coercion is far from being helpful, then it grants some rights or material benefit to the discontented to release public tension.

Eventually NDP is dissolved on 16 April 2011 after the Egyptian mass protests which started on 25 January 2011 and led to the resignation of Mubarak on 11 February 2011.

¹¹³ Fahmy, *The Politics of Egypt*, p. 243.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, pp. 242-243.

Within this framework, another factor that nurtured the authoritarian state structure and thus enabled state autonomy in the Middle East in general and Egypt in particular is the rentier state structure. The rentier state model is generally seen in the oil-exporting economies of the developing world, of which the Middle East is a part. The main characteristic of these oil-exporting countries in the Middle East is their dependence on the export of a single resource, oil. However, it is important to state that rentier economy is not unique to the oil-exporting countries and rent is not only the income accruing from exporting oil. Rent can be in the form of portfolio, external capital, quasi-rents, natural resources and location rent. In this respect, Beblawi uses the term ‘semi-rentier’ economy in order to describe the Arab states remaining in the region when the oil-rich countries are categorized as rentier states. These economies also have low productivity. However, they may have been said to have a more balanced state since they rely on different type revenues from different sources unlike the rentier states which depend on the export of a single commodity.¹¹⁵ Within this framework, according to Beblawi, Egypt falls in the category of semi-rentier economy.¹¹⁶

In Egypt, Richter and Steiner identify six categories of rents. First one is the ‘raw material rents’, which are the revenues from exporting oil or natural gas. Second one is ‘location rents’ which are the revenues from traffic routes or transportation facilities like the Suez Canal or the SUMED¹¹⁷ pipeline. The third type of rent is the ‘strategic rent’ which are the foreign assistance in the form of military or budgetary aid that directly accrues to the state budget. The US aid to Egypt can be counted as strategic rent. Forth

¹¹⁵ In fact, the rents of the oil state have accrued to the non-oil producing states through migrant workers’ remittances, transit fees and aid. See Giacomo Luciani, “Allocation vs. Production States: A Theoretical Framework”, Giacomo Luciani (ed.s), *The Arab State*, (London, Routledge, 1990), pp. 65-84 and Hazem Beblawi, “The Rentier State in the Arab World”, Luciani (ed.s), *The Arab State*, pp. 85-98.

¹¹⁶ Hazem El Beblawi, “Economic Growth in Egypt: Impediments and Constraints (1974-2004)”, Working Paper No.14, World Bank Commission on Growth and Development, 2008, http://www.growthcommission.org/storage/cgdev/documents/gc-wp-014_web.pdf, (accessed on 02 June 2012).

¹¹⁷ It is the pipeline that carries crude oil along the Suez Canal with the capacity of 2,5 billion barrels a day. It enables the transport of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea. See "Sumed", *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/573171/Sumed>, (accessed on. 03 June 2012).

are the ‘political rents’ in the form of donations to the government institutions. Fifth are the ‘workers’ remittances’ and sixth are the tourism revenues.¹¹⁸ After the rents accrued to the state, they are distributed by the government in line with the neo-patrimonial distribution mechanisms prevalent in the state.

2.2.3. REGIONAL STATE AUTONOMY

At the regional level, Egypt can act autonomously from other regional powers and politics. Egypt’s geopolitical realities, demography, culture and history are factors contributing to its regional autonomy. In this respect, Egyptians see themselves as the natural leaders of the Arab world. Nasser thought that Egypt should impose its hegemony in the Arab world and achieve it via constantly active foreign policy. Sadat, on the other hand, believed that it is not such need for imposition. Egypt does something and the Arab world follows it. That’s why he was not very much concerned about the isolation of Egypt in the Arab world. Nasser and Sadat, compared to Mubarak were much more ambitious in terms of regional hegemony. Sadat can even be considered as too optimistic and a dreamer. Mubarak was less concerned about regional hegemony, but he still felt threatened by others for leadership in the region. For instance, when Iraq began to appear as a runner for regional leadership, Mubarak was worried about Egypt’s role. He and his political elite were uncomfortable that Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, was spending too much time in Iraq.¹¹⁹

The most prominent example of the state autonomy of Egypt at the national and regional levels turns out to be the peace with Israel. Having led four wars in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Egypt achieved making peace with Israel despite the ongoing Cold War and the bipolar international system. Egypt was the first Arab

¹¹⁸ Thomas Richter and Christian Steiner, “Politics, Economics, and Tourism Development in Egypt: Insights into the Sectoral Transformations of a Rentier State”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol.29, No.5, 2008, p.943.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p.56.

state to sign a peace treaty with Israel. Therefore, Egypt was able to make that foreign policy at the expense of isolation from the Arab world, the indicator of which was the suspension of Egypt's membership in the Arab League. However, Egypt was readmitted after a decade before any other Arab state made peace with Israel. In addition, Sadat was able to persuade the Egyptian public which was anti-Israeli and pro-Palestinian. The Egyptian-Czech arms deal in September 1955 was a similar foreign policy move. It was a turning point in the Middle Eastern politics during the Cold War. It ended the Western monopoly on arms transfer in the region by inviting the Soviets.

2.2.4. STATE IDEOLOGY

During the Nasser period, there were three interrelated ideologies that was internalized and promoted by the Egyptian state. Two of these ideologies, Pan-Arabism and positive neutralism were about the foreign policy of Egypt whereas Arab Socialism was devoted to the transformation of the Arab-Egyptian society. Pan-Arabism was influential in organizing predominantly regional politics. Positive neutralism was a response to the block politics of the Cold War.¹²⁰

During the Sadat period¹²¹, Pan-Arabism was in decline and Egypt adopted a 'pro-Western neutralism'. It is fair to call it 'neutralism' since Egypt did not get involved in any formal pacts with the US or any Western camp. With the end of Cold War, and thus block politics, the notion of 'neutralism' lost significance and therefore, the orientation of Egyptian foreign policy is regarded as pro-Western. In terms of Pan-Arabism, first, the military defeat of 1967 Six Day War and then Egypt's separate peace with Israel were regarded as the two major blows to the ideology. In this respect, although Pan-Arab norms were still present and influential at the public opinion level (both Egyptian and Arab) and utilized by the government as part of political discourse, it was no more

¹²⁰ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, p.97.

¹²¹ The shift in the ideology of the state with the Sadat period is elaborated with details in the next chapter.

the ideology of the state. In line with the demise of Arab socialism as the guiding ideology for the economic development of the country, and the adoption of *Infitah*, the restructuring of the country in both domestic politics and foreign policy changed toward pragmatism and less constrained by ideology as it is defined in the Cold War context.

2.2.4.1. PAN-ARABISM BEFORE NASSER

Having lived its heydays during the Nasser period and his foreign policy moves, Pan-Arabism was not an Egyptian creation. The emergence of Arab nationalism dates back to the nineteenth century, when Ottoman rule was in decline. Arab nationalism as a “political protest and a cultural renaissance”¹²² associated with identity and protest was a romantic intellectual movement. Its association with independence and statehood came with the Arab revolt led by Sharif Hussein during the First World War. Having provided the rulers of Jordan and Iraq, the Hashemites upon their historical role in Arab nationalism, claimed leadership to Pan-Arabism. With the emergence of the Baath party in Syria in 1947, the Hashemites started losing their leadership of Pan-Arabism to the revolutionary republican forces in Egypt, Syria and Iraq.¹²³ During the interwar years, Pan-Arabism was culminated with the Zionist challenge and the 1936 Palestinian strike. Afterwards, the political non-involvement in the Palestinian issue was transformed into the regionalization of it (mainly as an Arab one), and placed it at the heart of Pan-Arabism. Over time, Pan-Arabism was associated with the “demand for independence, and freedom from foreign control, the struggle against Zionism, and the desire for Arab unity.”¹²⁴

¹²² Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*, p. 57.

¹²³ F. Gregory Gause, III, “Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East”, *Journal of International Affairs*, (Winter 1992), Vol.45, No.2, p.445.

¹²⁴ Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics*, p.82.

Before Nasser, Egypt was part of the minimalist camp (together with Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Lebanon) that opposed unification.¹²⁵ Egypt assessed its role as a stability provider in the Arab affairs without jeopardizing its national interest.¹²⁶ Thus, in the wake of the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, Egypt was not only reluctant, but also opposed the involvement in the war. Despite some opposition blocks in the parliament who defend an ‘Insular Egypt Strategy’, the reluctance of the Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashi was mainly due to the fact that Egyptian army was not ready for any war. Barnett regarded Egypt’s involvement in the 1948 war as a symbolic move rather than a strategic one. He claimed that King Farouq’s decision of sending troops to Palestine was aimed at preventing any potential domestic unrest that could be led by the Muslim Brotherhood and would target his prestige and legitimacy to the throne. His other concern was a regional one. King Abdullah of Transjordan could become the patron of the Palestinian issue and result in diminishing the prestige of Egypt and him as the king.¹²⁷ On the other hand, Doran in his book, *Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question*, argues that since Egyptian foreign policy before the Nasser period was driven mainly by regional concerns (Middle East international relations) rather than domestic ones, Egypt’s intention to intervene in the 1948 War was due to its quest for maintaining its dominant power in the Arab world through its leadership of the Triangle Alliance (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia).¹²⁸ Regarding the inter-state relations in the region, Doran asserts that what Egypt reckoned to serve best to its interest (its fight against colonialism, namely the British) was containing what he called Turco-Hashemite Entente (Turkey, Jordan, Iraq) which was perceived as pro-British.

¹²⁵ The maximalist camp composed of Transjordan, Iraq and Syria, saw unification or federation as a viable solution to the overcome the problems of incongruity between the nation and state as well as getting rid of the remnants of colonialism. See in *ibid*, p.73.

¹²⁶ *Ibid*, p.76.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 90.

¹²⁸ Michael Doran, *Pan-Arabism Before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p.163.

However, the 1948 Palestine War had disastrous results both for the Egyptian army, the parliament and the king. Egyptian army suffered from human and material losses. The Prime Minister Al-Nuqrashi was killed by the Muslim Brotherhood while trying to ban the movement. Muslim Brotherhood accused the king and his parliament of the defeat and fuelled the public discontent against the monarchy.¹²⁹

2.2.4.2. NASSER'S DOCTRINE OF THREE CIRCLES AND PAN-ARABISM

Nasser viewed that Egypt's destiny was drawn by its geographic position on earth, its being at crossroads of the African, Arab and Islamic worlds. With his doctrine of three circles, Nasser underlined that it is Egypt's historic mission to shape the events or play a key role in the African, Arab and Islamic worlds.¹³⁰ Lustick asserts that Nasser's policy was, in fact, confined to the pan-Arab cause since he did not have a defined African policy, on the one hand and after crushing the Muslim Brotherhood, at home, he was without an Islamic policy, on the other hand.¹³¹ His Pan-Arab policy was based on ensuring Egyptian hegemony in the Arab world via a unified Arab state under the leadership of Egypt from the Atlantic to the Gulf.¹³²

For Dekmejian, among the three circles, without doubt, the Arab circle was the most significant one for Nasser due to his own statement in his biography, *The Philosophy of The Revolution*, as "this circle (the Arab circle) is as much a part of us as we are a part of it, that our history has mixed with it and its interests are linked with ours. [...] We have

¹²⁹ Marsot, *A History of Egypt*, pp.121-122.

¹³⁰ Ernst B. Haas, *Nationalism, Liberalism and the Progress, Volume 2: The Dismal Fate of New Nations*, (New York: The Cornell University Press, 2000), p.97.

¹³¹ Ian S. Lustick, "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political 'Backwardness' in Historical Perspective", *International Organization*, Vol.51, No.4, (Autumn 1997), p.667.

¹³² Ibid.

suffered the same hardships, lived the same crises [...]”¹³³. In addition to the common historical experience, Nasser claimed that the Arab nation was exposed to the same conditions and problems at that time and would be in the future. Their enemy was the same: foreign influence materialized with the Western imperialism of the past and its ongoing influence mainly via the presence of Israel. He viewed Middle East as a whole where the Arab nation was divided by the imperial powers into artificial borders. Therefore, he presumed Arab unity as an “inevitable process of nature”¹³⁴, the achievement of which required leadership and that leadership was a “historical responsibility”¹³⁵ vested upon the shoulders of Egypt.

Having participated in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Nasser viewed Arab disunity as the main reason for the Arab defeat in the war. If only Arabs united, could they be freed from foreign domination. Thus, the main drive for Arab unity for Nasser was ensuring Arab independence from foreign domination and colonialism and security. In fact, Nasser’s understanding of Arab nation rested on language and history rather than religion. Being a Muslim was not among his primary criteria for being part of the Arab nation.¹³⁶ On the other hand, he did not totally deny religion as part of his pan-Arab discourse. Nasser’s ideology was not completely secular. Ajami named it ‘semisecular’, meaning that he grasped the power of Islamic institutions and traditions and tried to make use of them in order to garner support for his regime and ideology (nationalism and socialism).¹³⁷ In Nasser’s rhetoric of Arab nation and nationalism, religious

¹³³ Gamal Abdul Nasser, *The Philosophy of The Revolution*, (Buffalo, 1959), pp.59-62, quoted in Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, p. 103.

¹³⁴ Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, p.105.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ James P Jankowski, *Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic*, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), pp. 30-35.

¹³⁷ Fouad Ajami, “On Nasser and His Legacy”, Review Article, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol.11, No.1, (1974), p.41.

affiliations were present as a political reference, but remained marginal.¹³⁸ He was wary of using religious references contextually.

Nasser's rhetoric about Islam and his initiatives and actions towards the Islamic circle in regard to his three circles doctrine was shaped by limitations stemming from two contexts. One is the regional context shaped by the intra-Arab rivalry within the Middle East state system. There were conservative monarchies headed by Saudi Arabia that were against Nasser's Arab socialism and thus Arab nationalism. Although Nasser's Arab socialism had nothing to do with the atheist communism of the Soviet Union, they did not like it and perceived it as a challenge to their regime which derived its legitimacy from the Islamic affiliations. And they were aligned with the US camp to preserve their regimes. The second one is the internal context. Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist rhetoric constituted the main opposition and thus challenge for Nasser's regime. When Nasser crushed the Brotherhood in 1954, he almost turned away from his quest for hegemony in the Muslim world. The attention attached to his earlier attempts like sponsoring Islamic Conference and the international Islamic coordinating office centered in Cairo decreased overtime.¹³⁹

Ayubi recognizes Pan-Arabism as a reactive rather than a proactive doctrine since it was developed in order to respond to the challenges by the 'other', whether it is the Ottoman Empire, the British or the Zionists.¹⁴⁰ However, the adoption of Pan-Arabism in the 1950s was an initiative by the Nasser, which meant the utilization of Arab solidarity and if possible unity in order to struggle against imperialism.¹⁴¹ Therefore, the difference between Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism has to be recognized in the sense that Pan-Arabism is a form of Arab nationalism which envisions the unity of all Arabs living in different states.

¹³⁸ Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, p.34.

¹³⁹ *Ibid*, pp.36-37.

¹⁴⁰ Ayubi, *Overstating the Arab State*, p. 146.

¹⁴¹ Jankowski, *Nasser's Egypt*, p.38.

The unification of Egypt and Syria under the name of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958 can be regarded as an experiment of Pan-Arabism. According to the Nasser, the unification represented the “nucleus state” of the Arab unity that Pan-Arabism was striving to achieve.¹⁴² In addition, the interests of the Nasserite regime in Egypt coincided with the US interests by the late 1957 in terms of containing the communist threat in Syria. What concerned Nasser about the possible communist Syrian regime was the probable Soviet control of Syria that could challenge the leadership of Egypt in the Arab world.¹⁴³ For Syria, the relatively new formed Baath party which was vulnerable to challenges inside and outside Syria sought to come over its weaknesses via the patronage of Nasser¹⁴⁴ whose “image personified the proud Arab who fearlessly stood up to Western imperialism”¹⁴⁵. Thus, the charisma of Nasser turned out to be one of the most important factors for the unification. In terms of public opinion, the people in both Syria and Egypt supported the unification. Syrian masses were much more enthusiastic, though. Being suspicious about the Baath movement and the other activities by the communists including the Syrian Communist Party, Nasser put forward the condition that all the political parties in Syria should be banned if Syria was willing to unite with Egypt.¹⁴⁶ Eventually, Syria complied with Nasser’s condition.¹⁴⁷ Yemen followed the suit and joined the union.

¹⁴² Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, pp.105-107.

¹⁴³ Rami Ginat, *Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From Independence to Dependence*, (Brighton, Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), p. 197.

¹⁴⁴ The communists in Syria who were competing with the Baathists were, in fact, did not favor any kind of unification other than the unity of the proletariat. However, after the popularity Nasser gained following the Suez War, they wouldn’t choose to deny unity with Egypt under Nasser. Thus, they supported a loose federation formula for the unification. Besides, they even explicitly supported the idea in order to put pressure on the Baathists. Their estimation was that neither Baathists nor Egypt would go for unification. For more information, see Ginat, *Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism*, p.197.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, p.198.

¹⁴⁷ It was the idea of Syrian Baathists rather than Nasser to form the UAR and again it was the Arab nationalists in Iraq who declared their willingness to become part of the UAR, too. See in Peter Sluglett, “The Cold War in the Middle East”, Louise Fawcett (eds.), *International Relations of The Middle East*, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.52.

At the very first sight, no other match could have been for Nasser's Arab socialist regime to unite, but Baathist Syria. Nasser was elected as the president of the UAR¹⁴⁸ and a new constitution was adopted. However, merging two states was not an easy task. What brought the union to an end was the unachieved integration of the two societies, which were different from each other. Since there was not enough time to study and figure out the needs of each society, policies that would suit both societies could not be developed. Meanwhile, Nasser's Egypt was accused of dominating Syrians and not giving them a fair share of power in the army or civilian administration. This negative perception of the Nasser and his comrades was fuelled when Nasser set up a repressive apparatus and appointed a Syrian army officer, Abd al-Hamid Sarraj, who became Nasser's man in Syria, as the head of intelligence. Owing to the increasing popular discontent¹⁴⁹, Syria seceded from the union in 1961. Even after that, Nasser continued using the name 'United Arab Republic' for Egypt in order to carry on the spirit of the Arab unity and win back Syria or any other Arab state. It was Sadat who changed the name of the country to 'Arab Republic of Egypt' in 1971. At the end of the day, the dissolution of the union was a blow both to the Pan-Arabism and the positive neutralism of Nasser.

2.2.4.3. POSITIVE NEUTRALISM

In response to the onset of the Cold War, characterized by the bipolar conflict between the capitalist West and the socialist East, some of the newly independent states in Asia and Africa, declared their distance to and non-involvement in any bloc conflict. Known

¹⁴⁸ During the formation of the UAR, the Soviets tried to build up close relations with Nasser and simultaneously they supported the communists in Syria and Iraq both overtly and covertly. The Soviet policy shifted from supporting positive neutralism of Nasser to supporting communism in the region. See in Ginat, *Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism*, pp.204-205.

¹⁴⁹ It was after passing the July Laws, the socialization decrees, which turned private enterprise into nationalized and state-owned enterprise that the social discontent peaked.

as the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)¹⁵⁰, the formal organization and establishment of the movement took place at the Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State in Belgrade, 1961 which came out of the initiative of the President Tito of Yugoslavia. However, the origins of the movement dated back to the Asia-Africa Conference held in Indonesia, 1955, known as the Bandung Conference. During the Cold War, NAM had an undeniable influence on the Middle East. After the Bandung Conference in 1955, Nasser became one of the major leaders of the NAM. He was elected in 1964 and acted as the Secretary General of the NAM until his death in 1970. After ensuring the consolidation of the revolutionary regime at home, Nasser sought to secure its regional position as a hegemon. In the meantime, his interaction with the non-aligned leaders like Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia influenced Nasser in adopting positive neutralism as an ideology shaping its relations with the superpowers and to a certain extent its intra-regional relations.¹⁵¹

His positive neutralism was mainly rested upon the denial of the spread of Western influence in the Middle East without hesitating to flirt with the Soviet bloc. Nasser benefited from this strategy on various occasions. When World Bank, Great Britain and the US refused to supply him with the money he needed for the construction of the Aswan Dam, he turned to the USSR and was able to get the financial aid. Similarly, during the 1956 Suez War, Egypt this time turned both to the US and the USSR against Britain, France and Israel. Therefore, Nasser's positive neutralism lived its heydays during the UAR. However, with the dissolution of the union, the delicate balance that

¹⁵⁰ What brought together the leaders of the 29 states all over Asia and Africa was mainly their former colonial past, and their quest for ensuring their independence through resisting any type of domination by the major powers. The movement, living its heydays during the Cold War, was associated with the names of the Sukarno of Indonesia, Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia, Nasser of Egypt and Nkrumah of Ghana, who had been named as the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement. The movement still exists today, but it has lost its significance with the end of Cold War. See the website of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), <http://www.nam.gov.za/> (accessed 11.07.2014).

¹⁵¹ Nonalignment is generally used interchangeably with neutralism. Brecher makes a distinction between 'nonalignment' and 'neutralism'. He claims that non-alignment as political status is nothing more than a declaration of being free from any blocs or alliances. However, neutralism corresponds to a positive attitude towards bloc conflicts which involves active policies to reduce tension among blocs and maintain peace. In this respect, he sees non-alignment as the first and the passive stage of neutralism. For more detailed analysis, see Michael Brecher, *The New States of Asia: A Political Analysis*, (London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963), pp.111-122.

Nasser favored and strived to achieve within positive neutralism began to tilt towards the SU after the dissolution of the UAR. The Nasserite regime became so pro-Soviet by the mid-1960s that Egypt did not refrain from supporting the SU invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which was completely at odds with the Bandung spirit.¹⁵² According to Ginat;

Nasser's decision to embrace neutralism soon after he established his hegemony was not an abrupt change or the product of original thought- it was actually the renewal of a policy that had been artificially terminated by self-motivated forces. Neutralism suited the social and political climate of post-World War II Egypt.¹⁵³

Nasser's pragmatism was evident in the selective nature of his neutralism¹⁵⁴. When foreign affairs where he did not have any political interest were concerned, he maintained an indifferent stance towards to the East or the West. However, when his political interests were at stake in an issue of foreign affairs, he competed for hegemony as in the case of Syria. In Arab affairs, his maneuvers were intended to gain from the power rivalry between the Western and Eastern blocs. By playing one superpower against the other he would ensure the support of one and "immunity from effective retaliation". "For Nasser, the greatest danger stemmed from the possibility that he would be maneuvered into a position of opposing both power blocs at the same time."¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Ginat, *Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism*, p.18.

¹⁵³ *Ibid*, p.16.

¹⁵⁴ Ginat identifies different types of neutralisms that Egypt experienced during the Cold War such as "calculative/pragmatic nationalist neutralism" (1943-4, 1950-2), "passive neutralism" (1944-7), "anti-Western neutralism" (1950), "positive neutralism" (1958-61), "pro-Soviet positive neutralism" (1954-8, 1961-7), "pro-Soviet neutralism" (1967-72). In addition, within the non-aligned movement, he makes a distinction between Nasser's positive neutralism and Tito's negative neutralism. Nasser's positive neutralism envisioned an independent foreign policy but did not refrain from manipulating the inter bloc rivalry to his own advantage. However, Tito's negative neutralism refused to make any commitment to the either of the power blocs let alone alignment. For the discussion, see in *ibid*, p.215.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid* , p.207.

2.2.3.4. EGYPT FIRST

During Sadat period, there was a shift from Pan-Arab nationalism to Egyptian nationalism. Sadat changed the name of the state from ‘United Arab Republic’ to ‘Arab Republic of Egypt’. This move of restoring Egypt’s historical legacy can be counted as an inclination towards Egyptian nationalism. The process of de-Arabization was culminated with the signing of the Camp David Agreement and the recognition of the state of Israel. However, this de-Arabization did not occur as the denial of the Arab identity, but rather it was more about shifting the emphasis from the ‘Arab’ to ‘Egyptian’. In regard to what comprises Egyptian national identity, several references were made ranging from geographical and historical to cultural and religious. In terms of geography, Egyptian national identity was defined with African, Asian, Mediterranean and Nile-related aspects. A historical reference rested upon the Pharoanic, the Greco-Roman, the Coptic-Christian and the Islamic characteristics of the Egyptian national identity.

What is adhered as Pan-Arabism, positive and Arab socialism as the ideological principles of the Egyptian state during the Nasser era went through an overall transformation during the Sadat era. Pan-Arabism with Arab unity at its heart suffered a lot after Egypt’s unsuccessful unity efforts among which are the collapse of the United Arab Republic with Syria in 1961 and then the abortion of the federation with Syria and Iraq first in 1963. Egyptian unsuccessful intervention in the Yemeni war and the defeat in the 1967 War put Pan-Arabism into severe crisis. Despite the failures and defeats, Pan-Arabism has transformed into a resource drainer. Therefore, it was no longer the right paradigm to solve the problems of Egypt or the right ideology to defend in regional politics. Having lacked the charisma of Nasser, Sadat did not throw away Pan-Arabist goals and discourses overnight. He was vigilant and prudent in not putting the cat among the pigeons. Therefore, he tried to re-establish relations with Arab countries based on cooperation with the primacy of securing Egyptian interests. This approach to regional Arab politics, in fact, bore its fruits during and after the 1973 October War when Sadat was able to ensure the support of the oil-rich Arab countries. The historic event of the oil

embargo of 1973 was perhaps the last example of the Arabs acting in unity. He also underlined this issue in the October Working Paper in 1974, which was issued for laying out the systematic principles of *Infitah* (Open Door Policy) through capitalizing on the victorious spirit of the October War:

The Arabs' natural wealth has become a source of power to them after having once been a cause for covetousness and greed from the rest of the world. The idea of Arab nationalism has at the same time matured, emerging from the framework of enthusiastic slogans which gave rise to much controversy, to a trend towards possible practical measures despite disagreement over many other issues. Egypt being the heart of the Arab nation has to bear responsibility in preserving, consolidating and promoting that constructive tendency, particularly in the field of economic cooperation.

Political unity as an ultimate aim has not lost its value, but perhaps the most important thing that we have to realize today is that the road to that political unity may be long. We have to follow that road and spare any opportunity for cooperation without exploiting it.¹⁵⁶

Positive neutralism, as mentioned before, was a strategy of playing two superpowers against each other and getting as many benefits as possible. For a while, it was a beneficial strategy, but after the cut of the US food aid to Egypt within the framework of PL 480 in 1964 by President Johnson, the strategy turned out to be of no use, because Egypt lost the US and there were no more two superpowers to play against each other.¹⁵⁷ It is questionable if Sadat really foresaw the collapse of the USSR¹⁵⁸, but he was aware of the US power and influence, and decided that the right camp for Egypt to survive was the Western camp led by the US. At the time he became the president of Egypt, the state was in a dire situation. The military capability of the country was suffering after the 1967 June War and also the intervention in the Yemeni civil war. The economy was not only war-torn, but also the heavy industrialization projects had drained the economy. The loss of Sinai and the closure of the Suez Canal were other major blows to the

¹⁵⁶ Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat, *The October Working Paper*, April 1974, p.43, available at http://sadat.umd.edu/archives/written_works.htm (accessed on 20 July 2014).

¹⁵⁷ Shimon Shamir, Jon B. Alterman (ed.), *Sadat and His Legacy: Egypt and The World, 1977-97*, (On the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of President Sadat's Journey to Jerusalem), (Washington: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998), p.76.

¹⁵⁸ Saad Eddin Ibrahim, an Egyptian academician and intellectual who defines himself as a pan-Arabis, pan-nationalist, a Nasserite and a leftist recalls a moment when Sadat underlined "Soviet is going to collapse, and it is going to collapse because of its internal bureaucracy". See in Saad Eddin Ibrahim, Alterman (ed.), *Sadat and His Legacy*, p. 91.

economy. Arab socialism of Nasser that Sadat called the “socialism of poverty”¹⁵⁹ could no longer provide solutions for the Egyptian economy. The way to pick up the pieces of the economy passed from opening up, namely turning into an outward-looking capitalist economy and integration to the international economy. For this, he needed US support. Therefore, all his policy efforts were geared towards winning the US support since he came to power at the time when Egypt had no diplomatic relations with the US. His relations with the SU -until he expelled the Soviet advisors from Egypt in 1972 and the abrogation of the friendship agreement in 1976- were all tactical to serve his ultimate aim of developing relations with the US. His decision of making peace with Israel was also in line with this strategy. He launched the 1973 October War to get Sinai back to secure his legitimacy by restoring Egypt’s national pride. In fact, he launched the war to make peace with Israel, and when making peace with Israel, he wanted to negotiate from an advantageous position. That’s why he aimed at a limited victory during the 1973 War. He launched a surprise attack against Israel, because his calls for peace were not taken serious either by the US or Israel.

Against this backdrop, under Sadat, Egyptian state ideology had been restructured, which played an important role in reshaping the foreign policy. It was his strategic vision to become an US ally after Israel in the Middle East that determined his other policy moves at home as well as abroad. Therefore, the shift in the Egyptian foreign policy towards ending the state of war and making peace with Israel can be viewed as the natural outcome of Sadat’s and his core political elites’s ‘Egypt First’ ideology that prioritizes Egyptian interests over the Arab ones, but more than that aligning with the capitalist West.

After Sadat, during the presidency of Mubarak, Egyptian state ideology did not experience a shift. Mubarak chose to follow the path Sadat had charted out. He preserved the peace with Israel and the close relationship with the US, the essentials of the Western-oriented state ideology. The economic and political liberalization processes

¹⁵⁹ Shamir, Alterman (ed.), *Sadat and His Legacy*, p.77.

were with ups-and-downs without major deviations from the *Infitah* policy. After Mubarak resigned on 11 February 2011 following the historic popular protests that started on 25 January 2011 in Tahrir Square, it was anticipated that the way politics conducted and policies made would change in Egypt. Despite the three and a half years that passed since “25 January Revolution”¹⁶⁰, it is still early to assess what kind of a change Egypt is going and will go through.¹⁶¹

2.3. THE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN EGYPT

According to Heikal, in Egypt, decision-making powers are held by one individual, the head of the state, the president. For Heikal, this is mainly because there is not any objective constraint imposed by the constitution on the decision-making process, which has been the case for most of the Third World countries, to which Egypt was not an exception.

Whoever he may be- traditional ruler, charismatic leader, dictator – this individual is the final arbiter on all major policy matters. While he may delegate some powers in certain internal domains, such as agricultural and industrial development, he will retain full decision-making powers in two areas: Foreign policy and defense.¹⁶²

He goes further and states that the president could make use of the mechanisms like the cabinet or as in Nasser’s time, the RCC for discussion or consultation, but these

¹⁶⁰ In Egypt, and the Arab World, the popular protests and the governmental changes occurred in Egypt are generally referred as “25 January Revolution”. It was also called “Freedom Revolution”, “Rage Revolution”, “Youth Revolution”, “Lotus Revolution” and “White Revolution”. Although the author of this thesis refrains from calling these changes in Egypt as revolutionary since she thinks that time is needed to assess to what extent these changes are revolutionary, she chooses to follow the Egyptian and Arab pattern and refers to that historic event as “25 January Revolution”.

¹⁶¹ After Mubarak’s downfall, the country went through the rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (12 February 2011-30 June 2012) and the presidency of Mohammed Mursi (30 June 2012-30 June 2013). When Mursi was removed by a military coup headed by General Abdal Fattah El-Sisi on 3 July 2013, Adly Mansour, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt was declared as the interim president. Following the 2014 presidential elections, Abdal Fattah El-Sisi has been serving as the sixth president of Egypt since 8 June 2014.

¹⁶² Heikal, “Egyptian Foreign Policy”, p.714.

mechanisms could hardly lead up a decision, which in the end was the discretion of the leader.¹⁶³ In line with the argument of Heikal, Hinnebusch does not deny the centrality of the leader in the decision making process. He also sees the lack of objective constitutional constraints and the underdeveloped nature of institutionalized checks and balances as reasons for the ‘strong’ leaders endowed with grave and seemingly limitless authority. In addition, he claims that the rudimentary interest and pressure groups or opposition free the leader from constraints in foreign policy making. Besides, the presence of patrimonial structures ensures loyalty to the leader and creates dependency. In this sense, rather than being shaped by the public opinion, the leader himself shapes it.¹⁶⁴ Although this denotes a personalization of the foreign policy making in most of the Middle Eastern states, foreign policy making is more than the solo performance of the leaders. Despite the degree of authority, a leader may enjoy, their autonomy is defined by various different factors, be it regional, international or domestic. The leaders act within the autonomy of the state and the limits of the regime which are defined contextually and contingently. As underlined by Shama:

The autonomy of state of domestic constraints was even more compounded in its handling of foreign relations. In contrast to other Arab leaders who had to carefully monitor their constituencies’ wishes and be alert to their reservations, Egyptian leaders could pursue foreign policy relations in almost perfect immunity. An Egyptian academic was right when he said that Mubarak is the *sayyid* (the sovereign) ... He does not have to justify himself.¹⁶⁵

In Egypt, the institutional organization that the played a role in the foreign policy decision making is composed of Presidency and other institutions that advise the president such as the National Defense Council (formerly National Security Council), the General Intelligence Agency, the National Specialized Councils, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. The Presidency “is a large establishment with

¹⁶³ Ibid, p.715

¹⁶⁴ Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East*, p. 113.

¹⁶⁵ Nael Shama, *Egyptian Foreign Policy From Mubarak to Mursi: Against the National Interest*, (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 55.

important research and information functions, and even has its own military forces”¹⁶⁶, and has an exclusive role in the foreign policy decision making. In fact, the discretion of the president outweighs the flow of information of other bodies involved in the foreign policy making process in spite of not being totally independent from them. “The role of other institutions (like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the military establishment) was confined to information gathering and advice in the pre-decision stage and execution in the post-decision stage.”¹⁶⁷ Therefore, the utilization of other bodies and the Presidency has been a matter of the choice of the president. The degree of the discretion may have changed from leader to leader, but during the eras of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, the president enjoyed almost a monopoly of decision making in Egypt.

Under the presidency of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak, foreign policy-making swung between “one man show” as in the case of Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and “leader-staff group” reflected in the presidency.¹⁶⁸ The president dominates the decision-making mechanism. Other bodies and personnel that have roles in the decision-making are all subordinate to the president. He can ask for information and advice, he can take them into account or not, he decides and then orders its implementation. Hence “these advisors are appointed by the leader and have no autonomous power base”¹⁶⁹. The influence of people in the decision-making mechanism does not stem from their position in the hierarchy, but their personal relationship with the president. For instance, Mohamed Heikal’s influence in Nasser’s regime was deriving from his closeness and friendship with Nasser, not from his position as the editor in chief of *Al-Ahram*, which became the think tank of the regime. In a similar vein, during the Mubarak regime, Osama al-Baz enjoyed a privileged position due to his high status as the president’s political advisor, not his capacity as the first undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹⁶⁶ Nazih N. Ayubi, *The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat*, (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991), p.314.

¹⁶⁷ Shama, *Egyptian Foreign Policy*, p.54.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 55.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

During the first years of the Nasser period (1952-55), the RCC had a role in formulating foreign policies, but this role was limited to Nasser's dominance. They would have to accept Nasser's way when there was a difference of opinion between the members of the council and Nasser. The centralization of the foreign policy making in Egypt continued during Sadat period. Sadat is usually described as having made the foreign policy as more of his reserved area. It was only two people who were informed about the expulsion of the Soviet personnel from Egypt. Moreover, it was only one person who knew about Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. Without doubt, these created tensions between the institutions, officials and the President. Three foreign ministers resigned during Sadat's period since they were not able to tolerate being bypassed and marginalized in foreign affairs. Foreign Ministers Ismail Fahmy and Mohamed Riad resigned before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem whereas Ibrahim Kamel resigned just hours before Sadat signed Camp David Accords.

"If Nasser and Sadat were policy 'movers', Mubarak seemed in comparison to be cautious, systematic 'manager'."¹⁷⁰ Nasser's decision to break the Western monopoly of supplying arms to the Middle Eastern states, nationalize Suez Canal, unification with Syria, Sadat's 1973 October War with Israel and his peace with Israel can be counted as the indicators how these two leaders' realized foreign policy moves. While conducting such moves, Sadat and Nasser displayed similar clear-cut styles. About the expulsion of the Soviet advisors, Sadat did not do it slowly like reducing the numbers of the personnel gradually. He made a public announcement that he would expel the Soviets within a week and 15.000 to 20.000 people were expelled in a week.¹⁷¹ Similarly, Nasser also behaved in a similar way when he asked the UNEF to withdraw from Sinai in 1967.

¹⁷⁰ Bahgat Korany, "Egypt: Between Overstretch and Pivotalness in its Foreign Policy", Maurice A. East, *Diplomacy and Developing Nations: Post-Cold War Foreign Policy-making Structures and Processes*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 162.

¹⁷¹ There has not been an official Soviet or Russian data about the number of the Soviet officials left Egypt in 1972. Different sources provided different numbers. For the discussion, see Isabella Ginor and Gideon Remez, "The Origins of a Misnomer: The 'Expulsion of Soviet Advisers' from Egypt in 1972", Nigel J. Ashton (ed.), *The Cold War in the Middle East: Regional Conflict and The Superpowers, 1967-73*, (New York: Routledge, 2007), pp. 136-163.

2.4. PRESIDENT AND THE ELITES

The 1952 July Revolution which came with a military coup by the Free Officers led to the social and political transformation of Egypt. Lacking a clear agenda, Free Officers adopted six goals in transforming Egyptian politics: “the eradication of imperialism, the abolition of feudalism, the eradication of monopoly capital, the establishment of social justice, the building of a strong national army, and the establishment of democratic rule”¹⁷². After the coup, Nasser as the leader of the Free Officers movement did not choose to restore the civil order since he thought that the restoration of the civil order would bring back the same old incapable and corrupt elites. Therefore, Nasser intended to establish a social democracy where class differences and privileges were abandoned under the auspices of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) which was the renamed version of the Free Officers Executive Committee. Later on established was the Liberation Rally as a political structure in order to mobilize different political factions, which in practice was not able to do so. Thus, the ‘social democracy’ of Nasser’s became a nationalist, populist, authoritarian regime with new patterns of privilege.¹⁷³

The RCC was mainly composed of the officers organized under the Free Officers’ Movement, who mainly conducted the coup of July 1952.¹⁷⁴ Beginning with the forth cabinet in June 1953, the RCC members started getting key cabinet positions¹⁷⁵ and thereafter they entered into the bureaucracy. The objective was to replace the unreliable elites of the old regime and create a circle of loyalty. All the strategic posts like the

¹⁷² Nadia Ramsis Farah, *Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations and the Development*, (Cairo, New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008), p.71.

¹⁷³ Ibid, p.72.

¹⁷⁴ The core members of the RCC were the ones who maintained the close ties before the coup: Gamal Abdul Nasser, Abd al-Hakim Amir, Salah Salim, Gamal Salim, Kamal Al-Din Husayn, Hasan Ibrahim, Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi, Anwar al-Sadat, Khalid Muhyi al-Din, Zakaria Muhyi al-Din, Husayn al-Shafi’i, Ahmad Anwar, and Kamal al-Din Rif’at. After the coup additional members were involved in the RCC as Muhammad Nagib, Ahmad Shawqi, Abd al-Mun’im Abd al-Rauf, Lutfi Wahid and Yusuf Sadiq. See in Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, p.28.

¹⁷⁵ The cabinets under the premiership of Ali Mahir (July 1952) and Mohammad Nagib (September and December 1952) were all composed of civilians. See Dekmejian, *Egypt Under Nasir*, p.171.

presidency, and the premiership were allocated to the ex-officers as well as the key ministries like Defense, Local Administration, Military Production, Ministry of State and Ministry of Interior (just once headed by a police officer).¹⁷⁶

After the revolution, Naguib served as a prime minister and then with the declaration of the republic in 18 June 1953, he was elected as the president. The Free Officers led by Nasser, in fact, wanted to make use of the reputation of Naguib to earn the revolution respectability and maintain the national integrity. However, there was a power struggle between Nagib and Nasser almost from the beginning. Nasser during the period 1953-54 consolidated its power by establishing a power elite composed of his fellow officers and thus increasing the militarization of the elites. Ousting Naguib from power, and following that, all the pro-Nagib civilians from the cabinet was the end of this struggle. By September 1954, the military component of the power elite reached % 52.1. This was the first time when the numbers of the officers exceeded the civilians.¹⁷⁷

When regime adopted etatism and undertook heavy industrialization under the ISI strategies in the early 1960s, due to the increasing need of technical expertise, the number of the civilians in the ruling elite began to increase.¹⁷⁸ However, the military presence of the elites increased once again following the 1967 June War.¹⁷⁹ Therefore, if being an officer was the first determinant for becoming part of the power elite, the second determinant was about the position of the officer in the Free Officer's movement

¹⁷⁶ Some other ministries Foreign Affairs, Industry, Tourism, Agrarian Reform, High Dam, Information, Scientific Research, Communications, Planning, Supply, Social Affairs, Youth, Labor, Education, Waqfs, Culture and National Guidance (headed by ex-officers after 1958) were occupied either by civilians or by ex-officers. The Ministries of Justice, Public Works, Housing and Utilities, Irrigation, commerce, Agriculture, Treasury and Higher Education were headed by civilians. Dekmejian explains it with the fact that these ministries required more technical expertise and thus were not suitable for ex-officers. However, even within the ministries of civilian leadership military presence and thus control was not absent. See in *ibid*, pp.172-173.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid*, p.174.

¹⁷⁸ The military component in the power elite declined from % 47.1 in September 1962 to % 36.3 in March 1964. See in *ibid*, p. 175.

¹⁷⁹ The military presence in the new cabinet under the premiership of Nasser increased to % 65.4. See in *ibid*, p.178.

as well as his personal relationship with Nasser. Whereas officers close to Nasser enabled cabinet and higher-level positions, less close ones became party leaders, entered into presidential bureaucracy or involved in the army.¹⁸⁰ Within this framework, it is fair to portray, governance in Egypt during the Nasser period as ‘stratocracy’ where the military enjoyed a significant power and influence in politics.¹⁸¹

During the Nasser period, in line with the commitment of the regime to industrialization, engineering as an occupational background was over %20 of the total leadership. It was followed by law and then economics and business. With the adoption of socialism, the path to the power elite was closed for the businessmen.¹⁸² The political elites were bounded by an ideology of revolutionary nationalism. After the 1952 Free Officers’ Revolution, the elites agreed upon no further radical changes and preserving the status quo in order to maintain the interests of the establishment they had built. The elites, civilian or military, was Egyptian nationalist and Pan-Arabist after 1955. After socialism was adopted official state ideology in 1961, the elites started to identify themselves with the new ideology.¹⁸³ Arab Socialism, itself, as an official ideology underlined harmony rather than conflict. In this respect, the differences among the elite stemmed from circumstances not uphold of an ideological conviction.¹⁸⁴

The transformation of the Egyptian power elite after the 1952 Revolution did not take place until the rivalry between Nasser and Naguib had not been resolved on behalf of Nasser in 1954. After ousting Naguib from power and the pro-Naguib civilians, Nasser and his collaborators managed to control the state bureaucracy. As asserted by Moore, “they insulated the country from any competing power center, either inside or

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, pp.190-191.

¹⁸¹ Ayubi, *The State and Public Politics in Egypt Since Sadat*, p. 253.

¹⁸² Ibid, pp.200-202.

¹⁸³ Ibid, pp.210-211.

¹⁸⁴ Clement Henry Moore, “Authoritarian Politics in Unincorporated Society: The Case of Nasser’s Egypt”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.6, No.2, (January 1974), p. 197

outside.”¹⁸⁵ Second, he interchanged the positions of the ministers in the cabinet occasionally so that bureaucracy was deprived of developing autonomy from the president. However, in the case of army, one could say that Nasser lacked the control he had in the bureaucracy since his close friend and vice-president Abdel Hakim Amer enjoyed autonomy ruling the army.¹⁸⁶ Dekmejian even described the degree of autonomy Amer enjoyed as Amer’s transforming the army into his personal fiefdom.¹⁸⁷ Sadat, in his autobiography, *In Search of Identity*, was going to define the ‘Amer issue’ as the soft belly of the Nasserite regime and Amer, himself, as the soft belly of Nasser.¹⁸⁸

The unsuccessful economic efforts of ISI led to a decrease in economic growth. Coupled with the burden of 1967 War and the involvement in the Yemeni Civil War, Egypt got into an economic impasse. This had reflections in the new power struggle among the elites, either. There were two main factions among the bureaucratic elite. One opted for the privatization of the economy and the rule by the free market mechanisms as the only way to cut loose from the inefficiencies of the public sector, and the heavy involvement of the state in the economy, primarily industrialization. In addition, they defended the attraction of foreign investment. Therefore, rapprochement with the West, namely the United States, and the peace with Israel were proposed as the resolution for the country’s economic problems. On the other hand, the second faction called for the extension of the state’s involvement in the economy and thus centralization. Besides, they were for maintaining the Soviet aid and end Israeli occupation in Sinai by military action or

¹⁸⁵ Ibid, p.195.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p.196.

¹⁸⁷ When Nasser attempted to limit the autonomy Amer enjoyed by establishing the presidential council, which would undertake the examination of the promotions to the superior ranks in the army, he confronted the refusal of the initiative by Amer. He did not want to relinquish his authority over the promotions, which lied at the heart of his patronage network. Nasser gave up eventually by justifying his decision on the fact that Amer’s men would support Nasser and be loyal to him since Nasser’s losing power would not secure their position. See in Allain Roussillon, “Republican Egypt Interpreted”, M. W. Daly (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Egypt: Volume 2, Modern Egypt From 1517 to the End of the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge, New York, Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p.349.

¹⁸⁸ Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1978).

comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The power struggle among the elite would come to an end with Sadat's coming to power on behalf of the first faction.¹⁸⁹

With the Sadat period, Egypt was steered into a new direction in economic and political terms. The main continuity with the Nasserite regime was the tradition of a strong ruler. Once again, the power was concentrated in the hands of the president who had the authority to dismiss the parliament as well as appoint and dismiss the ministers. He also had the right to rule by decree. As Sadat came to power, he granted amnesty to the political prisoners, the majority of whom were the members of the Muslim Brotherhood. Sadat depended on the support of the Muslim Brotherhood to dislodge the Nasserite elite¹⁹⁰. He rearranged the power relations among the elite to build a new coalition in favor of a liberal, market-oriented economic system. Relying on the legitimacy of the limited success of the 1973 War and having gained Sinai back from Israel, Sadat embarked upon *Infitah* (Open Door Policy).¹⁹¹ This process led to the elimination of the Arab Socialist Union and then formation of new political parties in 1977. The so-called 'political liberalization' targeted the implementation of economic liberalization rather than establishing a multi-party democratic system. In this sense, political liberalization served as a safety valve to silence opposition to Sadat's policies. In fact, the opposition to Sadat's economic policies came from the Nasserite social base of presidents, workers and students. As a result, the change in economic policies and limited political liberalization did not lead to the total transformation of the bureaucratic authoritarian state structure. What changed were the power relations and elite coalitions. Repression and coercion were still the tools of the Egyptian state. Starting with Sadat's trip to

¹⁸⁹ Farah, *Egypt's Political Economy*, p. 76.

¹⁹⁰ The inner core of the Nasser's elite including Ali Sabry, Sami Sharaf, Sharaawi Goma'a were the enemies of Sadat. The 'moderately prestigious civilians' among whom could be counted Mahmoud Fawzy, Aziz Sidky, Sayed Marei that Sadat could rely on were not many, but not inexistent. With the fear of being challenged, Sadat refrained from recruiting prestigious elites to his ruling cadres, both in the government and the party. See in Springborg, "Patterns of Association", p.92.

¹⁹¹ Before *Infitah*, in 1971, he issued a law which enabled and encouraged Arab and foreign investment. See in Farah, *Egypt's Political Economy*, p.77.

Jerusalem in 1977, the peacemaking process with Israel alienated some of the allies of the Sadat regime like the Muslim Brotherhood and radical Islamists. In order to curb the increasing opposition from the Islamists, Sadat opted for coercion and arrested more than 3.000 people, not only the Islamists, but also people from far right to the far left. This eventually paved the way for Sadat's assassination in 6 October 1981 by an Islamist extremist from Al-Jihad.¹⁹²

Mubarak period marked continuity with Sadat's policies rather than change. Despite the release of prisoners from the Sadat period, the regime grew more illiberal unlike the expectancies toward more liberalization. From mid-1980s onwards Egypt began facing economic crisis due to the decrease in oil prices, which had a direct effect on the Egyptian oil revenues and an indirect effect on the workers' remittances. Besides, the external debt had almost doubled during from 1980 to 1991. Throughout the 1980s, Egypt had a conflictual relationship with the international financial institutions and the foreign donors. However, Mubarak tried to capitalize on the geopolitical significance of Egypt to impose its own terms. That resistance to international pressures made things worse in terms of economy. Therefore, it was after the 1991 Gulf war that Egypt was able to experience a relative relief. This was mainly because certain amount of its external debt was written off and the remaining was rescheduled. This led to a deal with the IMF and World Bank to embark on economic reforms through a Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The inflationary and recessionary effects of the SAP had negative effects on the majority of the population, who were poor and whose struggle to make a living was unproportional to their contribution in the economy. However, the wealthy were advantaged by the increasing entrepreneurial opportunities provided by the privatization and the growing private sector.¹⁹³

¹⁹² Ibid, pp.77-79.

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 80 and Guciamo Luciani, "The Oil Rent, The Fiscal Crisis of The State and Democratization" in Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy Without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, (London, New York, I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp.149-150.

In 1990s, a new capitalist class emerged from the top bureaucratic elite and the new business elite from the private sector. The privatized state assets, which continued as monopolies, were given to the chosen members of the elites. There was no competition and thus the profits were high for the acquirers. In addition, new landed elite was created as a result of the tenancy regulations and the redistribution of the land. Most of the landed and industrial elite joined the dominant party National Democratic Party (NDP) in which there was a high representation of the business elite. The rural elite were also integrated in to the flanks of NDP. ¹⁹⁴

During the Mubarak period, despite the slow pace of the economic reforms, there was an increasing development of private sector activity originating from the *Infitah* policies of Sadat. Even though the business elite (entrepreneurs and merchants) provided support for the Mubarak regime, they showed little interest in political participation and no intention to pose a political challenge to the NDP dominance.¹⁹⁵ During the Nasser period, the old bourgeoisie was eliminated with the nationalist populism from power and the danger of return to such populism led the business elite to denationalize to preserve their interests. Their preference of investing abroad rather than at home was an indication for that.¹⁹⁶ Overall, “the privatization process created an industrial and rural elite dependent on the state access to public economic sources.”¹⁹⁷

2.5. FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION OF EGYPT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

There are two main shifts in the foreign policy of Egypt, one with the rule of President Nasser and the other President Sadat. Compared to these shifts what is experienced with

¹⁹⁴ Farah, *Egypt's Political Economy*, pp. 81-82.

¹⁹⁵ Roger Owen, “Socio-economic Change and Political Mobilization: The Case of Egypt”, Ghassan Salamé (ed.), *Democracy Without Democrats?*, (London, New York: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1994), p.193.

¹⁹⁶ Luciani, “The Oil Rent”, p.151.

¹⁹⁷ Farah, *Egypt's Political Economy*, p.80.

the rule of Mubarak can be regarded as a continuity with the Sadat era. Dessouki regards these shifts as a ‘foreign policy restructuring’ since they correspond to significant policy changes in orientation culminated in ‘new set of commitments and alliances’.¹⁹⁸

During the Nasser period (1956-1970), Egyptian foreign policy was marked by pan-Arabism and non-alignment (or positive neutralism). Having freed Egypt from British domination with the 1952 Free Officers coup, Egypt committed to pursuing an independent foreign policy without being patronized by either of the Cold War superpowers, United States (US) or the Soviet Union (SU). This is reflected in the positive neutralist stance Egypt adopted during the 1950s and 1960s against the US and SU and the active role it played in the nonaligned movement. However, Egypt’s nonalignment did not prevent Egypt from playing the superpowers against each other in line with its interests. In this respect, Egyptian foreign policy during the Nasser period can be regarded as pragmatic and ideological at the very same time. The pragmatism was more applicable in relation to its foreign policy toward the superpowers at the international level whereas its foreign policy in the region is guided by the ideology of Pan-Arabism. However, this does not mean that the Pan-Arab ideology was not utilized for pragmatic purposes. Furthermore, as put forward by Hinnebusch: “If Nasser’s Pan-Arabism was initially an instrument of Egypt’s foreign policy that enhanced its power and autonomy, it soon turned into a constraint.”¹⁹⁹

The foreign policy of Egypt experienced a major shift with the Sadat’s coming to power. The restructuring of the Egyptian economy with the *Infatih* (Open Door Policy) and its restructuring of stance against the superpowers by moving away from the SU toward the US was very much interconnected and took place at the very same time. The revolutionary foreign policy behavior of Egypt, which altered regional dynamics in

¹⁹⁸ Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, “Regional Leadership: Balancing off Costs and Dividends in the Foreign Policy of Egypt”, Bahgat Korany and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki (ed.s), *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization*, (Cairo, New York: The American University Press, 2008), p.167.

¹⁹⁹ “Raymond Hinnebusch, “The Foreign Policy of Egypt”, Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (ed.s), *The Foreign Policies of the Middle East States*, (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), pp.91-114.

terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict, occurred during Sadat's presidency: Signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979. This watershed event was more than a bold foreign policy move made by a president who had nothing to lose, but had to secure US aid to survive his country. In fact, Egypt's separate peace with Israel was part of the restructuring toward opening which was taking place at the domestic and international level.²⁰⁰

There were not any fundamental changes in the foreign policy orientation during the Mubarak period. Mubarak intended to preserve the status quo in Egypt's relations with the US and Israel. Mubarak strived to safeguard his regime, which was perceived to be under threat with the US insistence on democratization, by improving its relations with Israel.²⁰¹ Qualifying Industrialization Zones (QIZs)²⁰² agreements in 2005 provided the window of opportunity for that purpose. He also tried to balance his pro-Western stance with engaging in cooperation with the EU and Far East powers like China and Japan. Simultaneously, he strived to mend the breach with other Arab states as well as the Islamic states, starting with ensuring Egypt's readmission to the Arab League in 1989 after ten years of suspension of its membership following Egypt's peace with Israel.

After the downfall of Mubarak in 2011, neither during the rule of Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) nor Mohamed Morsi, Egypt experienced a fundamental change in its foreign policy orientation. During his one tenure of the president, Morsi perpetuated Mubarak's foreign policy that he and his main power base Muslim Brotherhood denounced for decades. He continued relations with US and preserved Egypt's dependence on the US. Despite not being verified, Morsi was said to agree on a deal with the military according to which the army would retain "its institutional and

²⁰⁰ Bahgat Korany, "The Cold Peace, The Sixth Arab-Israeli War, and Egypt's Public", *International Journal*, Vol.38, No.4, The Middle East After Lebanon (Autumn 1983), p.656.

²⁰¹ Shama, *Egyptian Foreign Policy*, 196.

²⁰² QIZs are zones of free trade established to promote economic cooperation with Israel. "As per the rules of origin, manufacturers must ensure that 35% of the product's value be manufactured in an Egyptian QIZ, of which a minimum of 10.5% must be Israeli inputs." See "QIZ Egypt", <http://www.qizegypt.gov.eg/Default.aspx>, (accessed on 05 August 2014). This issue is elaborated in Chapter 4.

economic privileges in exchange for allowing MB (Muslim Brotherhood) to play a leading role in the emerging political order”²⁰³. Regardless of all the speculative discussions and announcements that peace with Israel would be revised²⁰⁴, no any change occurred about the relations with Israel. In fact, it was not realistic to expect a significant change in the foreign policy of Egypt when it was occupied with domestic turmoil in line put forward by Shama: “Generally speaking, unfinished revolutions will produce little change in foreign policy in the short-run, while revolutions that lead to significant transformation on the way to democratic, nationalist, or theocratic rule are more likely to produce significant foreign policy change.”²⁰⁵

2.6. EGYPT’S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

Egypt and Israel were officially in a state of war since the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948 until they signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in 1979. Among its Arab neighbors, Egypt was the most threatening enemy for Israel since it was the leading Arab nation in the previous campaigns both in terms of military capability and its political power and influence over the other Arab states. In this respect, Egypt was crucial for any future peace settlement with Israel.

2.6.1. 1948 WAR: AL-NAKBA²⁰⁶

Britain was not able to reconcile the Palestinian and Jewish communities during its mandate.²⁰⁷ Hence, the British cabinet brought the matter to the United Nations (UN) in

²⁰³ Shama, *Egyptian Foreign Policy*, p.222.

²⁰⁴ David K. Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian Party Threatens to Review Treaty with Israel”, *New York Times*, (12 February 2012), p.A12.

²⁰⁵ Shama, *Egyptian Foreign Policy*, p.235.

²⁰⁶ *Al-Nakba* is an Arabic word meaning “The Catastrophe”.

February 1947. Then on 29 November 1947, the UN passed its renowned resolution (UNSCR 181), addressing the issue of partition of Palestine into two states, one Arab and the other, Jewish. The resolution also envisaged a special international regime for the administration of the city of Jerusalem. The Arabs rejected the plan whereas the Jews accepted. Afterwards, the Palestinians initiated a campaign of violence to protest and prevent the partition plan from being implemented. On 15 May 1948, a day after the state of Israel was declared, the Arab armies intervened in the conflict and launched the first full scale Arab-Israeli War. Egypt, Syria and Jordan launched an invasion campaign in Palestine backed by Iraq and Lebanon. Therefore, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, once a conflict between communities, was elevated to the inter-state level. The war with intervals lasted until the armistice agreements in January 1949.²⁰⁸ The Arab forces were defeated, Israel enlarged its territory far beyond the 1947 UN Partition Plan envisaged, including the % 60 of area allocated for an Arab state and the UN proposal for a Palestinian Arab state was buried. Transjordan took hold of West Bank and East Jerusalem. Egypt captured the Gaza Strip. Armistice agreements were signed between all the parties except the Iraqis and Palestinians: Egypt on 24 February 1949, Lebanon 23 March 1949, Jordan 3 April 1949, and Syria 20 July 1949.²⁰⁹

Egyptian-Israeli armistice talks started in Rhodes, Greece on 13 January 1949, mediated by the UN acting mediator for Palestine, Ralph Johnson Bunche and lasted six weeks. Egypt felt compelled to sign an armistice agreement with Israel, because the Egyptian army was beaten badly by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Despite the territorial gain of Gaza Strip²¹⁰, Egyptian forces had hard times in Fallujah where their four thousand

²⁰⁷ The British Mandate of Palestine covered the land in the west of the Jordan River from 1920 to 1948. It was formally confirmed by the League of Nations in July 1922.

²⁰⁸ Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945*, Second Edition, (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), pp.12-13.

²⁰⁹ Benny Morris, *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 375.

²¹⁰ It should be noted that for the sake of preserving the Palestinian character of Gaza, Egypt neither annexed Gaza Strip nor claimed sovereignty over it unlike what Jordan did with West Bank in 1950. Therefore, Egypt did not recognize Jordan's claims over West Bank and demanded Jordan's expulsion from the Arab League following its annexation of West Bank. See Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "The Middle

troops were trapped. Therefore, Egypt was afraid that Israel could re-launch attacks against Egypt, conquer Gaza Strip and get into Sinai again. In case of an Israeli attack, Egypt did not have any confidence in its Arab neighbors for help. In addition, Egyptian monarchy felt restless since the fate of the regime was in the hands of the military and military was war-weary.²¹¹



Figure 2: 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine



Figure 3: 1949 Armistice Line

Source: Israel and The Palestinians, Key Maps, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/static/in_depth/world/2001/israel_and_palestinians/key_maps, (accessed on 10.07.2014).

Israel thought that peace was imperative, because Israeli troops were also tired of war and economy was harmed by the years' long war conditions. Israel was aware of its troublesome position in the eyes of the international community since IDF moved

East: The Foreign Policy of Egypt in the Post-Sadat Era”, *Foreign Affairs*, Issue 60, No.4, (Spring 1982), p.769.

²¹¹ Morris, 1948, p.375.

beyond the frontiers of the Jewish state that the UN marked with the 1947 Partition Plan. What is more, an agreement with Egypt was necessary due to the importance of Egypt for the Arab world. Therefore, an agreement with Egypt could pave the way for further agreements with the other Arab states. “An agreement with Cairo was seen as crucial to Israel’s acceptance in the Middle East and in the international community (it was not yet a member of the UN).”²¹²

The negotiations took place as informal talks between the Egyptian and Israeli delegations and the trilateral talks containing the UN mediator Bunce who helped the parties to exchange proposals and pass their comments about their proposals. Bunce also “tried to mobilize US pressure on Israel to soften its positions. But Israeli diplomats in Washington and Lake Success, New York, managed to parry the pressure and, in fact, elicited countervailing pressures by the United States on Egypt to reduce its demands, especially in relation to Beershaba”²¹³. Eventually, the negotiations led to an agreement between the two states on 24 February 1949. The parties pledged not to launch a military action against each other. The demarcation line agreed to be the 1906 border except that Gaza Strip was included within the Egyptian territory.²¹⁴

2.6.2. 1956 SUEZ WAR

After the Armistice Agreements in 1949, the demilitarized zones between Egypt and Israel as well as Syria and Israel became a source of conflict between the parties. The problem in both cases was similar. The parties disagreed on the meaning of the term. Israel argued that it retained sovereignty over these areas where the restrictions about weapons and military personnel were implemented. On the other hand, Egypt and Syria

²¹² Ibid, p.376.

²¹³ Ibid, p.377.

²¹⁴ For the full text of the agreement see, Egypt-Israel Armistice Agreement, 24 February 1949, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/Israel-Egypt%20Armistice%20Agreement.aspx>, (accessed on 10.07.2014).

claimed that demilitarization covered restrictions on arms and military personnel, but had left the issue of sovereignty unresolved. Therefore, Israel could no way enforce sovereignty in these areas. The clashes between the parties did not only take place at the diplomacy table, but also military clashes erupted when Israel wanted to enforce sovereignty in these areas.²¹⁵

The negotiations between Egypt and the Britain over the British base in the Suez Canal began by the early 1954. During the process of negotiations, Nasser exploited his control over the army and police to play the sabotage groups against the British in the Canal Zone. By this way, he intended to put the British feet to the fire so that they would agree to withdraw from the Canal. Nasser achieved his goal when the agreement, envisaging the evacuation of all British forces from the Canal within 20 months, was signed on 19 October 1954. According to the agreement, the British bases in the Canal Zone were to be operated by the British civilian contractors for seven years. Britain preserved its interests in the Canal by reserving its right to occupy the Canal in case of an attack against Egypt, any other Arab state or Turkey depending upon Egypt's concurrence. By the end of March 1956, all the British troops evacuated the Canal Zone denoting the end of the British (military) occupation of the last 74 years.²¹⁶

Israel felt very uncomfortable with the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, because the evacuation of the canal from the British troops could be a threat to the Israeli security via enabling the movement of Egyptian troops into Sinai. In order to eradicate such possibility, Israel started secret actions via its spies and planned to blow up installations frequented by Westerners in order to persuade British to maintain their military presence in the Canal. When Israeli efforts came to the light, Egypt arrested the Israeli spies and executed them. Afterwards, Israel launched a massive raid into Gaza which caused major Egyptian casualties. It was a show of force and strength by the Israeli government

²¹⁵ David Tal, "The 1956 Sinai War: A Watershed in the History of Arab-Israeli Conflict", Simon C. Smith (ed.s), *Reassessing Suez 1956: New Perspectives on the Crisis and its Aftermath*, (Hampshire, Burlington, VT, 2008), pp. 136-137.

²¹⁶ Peter Mansfield, "Nasser and Nasserism", *International Journal*, Vol. 28, No.4, The Arab States and Israel, (Autumn 1970), p.675.

to its people after the spy incident. Israel justified the raid as a response to the Palestinian *fedayeen* attacks backed by Nasser. Being cognizant of the military weakness of Egypt, Nasser sought for arms and concluded an arms pact with the SU. Tensions escalated as neither US nor Britain accepted to finance the Aswan High Dam. Eventually, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in July 1956.²¹⁷

Israel, Britain and France undertook a coordinated attack against Egypt in October 1956. Israel intended to destroy the blockade of shipping through the Tiran Straits to the Gulf of Aqaba imposed by Egypt. France's purpose was to ensure its presence in Algeria. France believed that Nasser's regime was supporting the revolt in Algeria, which broke out in 1955. Therefore, France wanted to teach a lesson to Egypt and thought that that a military defeat would compel the overthrow of Nasser. This was an objective shared by Israel, too. Britain's drive to be part of the "Tripartite Aggression" was to come over the humiliating behavior of a 'imperial possession' and secure the passage through the Suez Canal, which was a matter of international order and securing British national interests.²¹⁸ Israel invaded Gaza and Sinai whereas the Anglo-French troops occupied the Canal and Port Said. The War came to an end with the pressure of the UN, US and SU in lead. Britain, France and Israel were compelled to accept the UN cease-fire. Britain and France evacuated the canal and Israel did the same in Gaza and Sinai. However, Israel managed to ensure the passage of her ships through the Gulf of Aqaba. UN Emergency Forces (UNEF) was stationed in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt to serve as a buffer.²¹⁹

Suez War was a military defeat, but a political victory for Nasser, which earned him a great reputation as the leader of the Pan-Arabism. It was the last war where the imperial powers were involved to preserve their possessions and interests in the region. After the Suez War, the diplomatic relations between Egypt and Britain were broken down.

²¹⁷ Charles Smith, "Arab-Israeli Conflict", Louise Fawcett (eds.), *International Relations of The Middle East*, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp.222-23.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Marsot, *A History of Egypt*, p.136.

Following the end of the British military occupation of the Canal, the British presence in Egypt was drastically reduced as the British- owned campaign were nationalized. The relations between Egypt and Britain were restored in 1962 in spite of their different stances in the Yemen War. Their relations gradually improved as Britain lost its imperial control and influence in the east of Suez.²²⁰

Israel anticipated that the war would put it in a better strategic position in the region. However, the war distanced Israel further from its Arab neighbors by confirming the Arab suspicions that Israel posed a continuous threat to the security of the Arab World.²²¹ Israel's image as an aggressive and expansionist state, also led to a dramatic change in the rhetoric of Nasser. Just after the Suez War, Nasser explained to the American Ambassador in Cairo, Henry Byroade: "Before the war, Egypt was the only country in the Arab World where people were not particularly interested in Israeli problem. But today, popular indifference has given way to hate."²²²

2.6.3. 1967 JUNE WAR: THE GREAT SHIFT

The 1967 June War, which is also known as Six Day War, is a watershed event in the history of the Middle East. It corresponds to a great shift in the Arab-Israeli conflict in general and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. It has also altered the inter-Arab politics to a great extent. The causes of war are a matter of discussion. The conventional political and historical account revolves around the view that Nasser planned an attack against Israel to defeat it, but was shot before launching the attack. On the other hand, another account of history that attributes the outbreak of war to a deliberate decision assert that Israel initiated the war to expand its territories. However, Louis and Shlaim argue that "the June 1967 War was not the result of deliberate planning, and was still

²²⁰ Goldschmidt and Johnston, *Historical Dictionary of Egypt*, p. 88.

²²¹ Tal, "The 1956 Sinai War", p 134.

²²² Quoted in *ibid*, p. 146.

less a grand design on the part of any of the participants, but was rather the result of a crisis slide, of a process that no one was able to control.”²²³ From the Egyptian side, James stress that “Nasser made war neither by accident nor by design. He took a set of actions primarily aimed at reaping political gains, but he was well aware that they carried a high risk of precipitating military hostilities”²²⁴. These set of actions included the deployment of Egyptian troops in the Sinai, close to the Israeli border in response to the Soviet intelligence report (on 13 May 1967) which informed about Israeli troops deployed on the Syrian border. On 16 May 1967, Nasser requested the removal of the UNEF from the Sinai and then on 22 May 1967 closed the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping.²²⁵ The three moves of Nasser aimed at impressing the Arab public and deterring Israel from attacking Syria. In fact, he was well aware of the risks. He told the Supreme Executive of the ASU: “Now with our concentration in Sinai, the chances of war are fifty-fifty. But if we close the Strait, was will be one hundred percent certainty.”²²⁶ Additionally, Nasser announced his closing of the Straits of Tiran in a speech in front of the pilots at the Egyptian air base in Bir Gafgafa in Sinai as: “The Jews threaten war- and we say *ahlan wa sahlan* (welcome). We are ready!”²²⁷ Having felt that another Arab coalition among Egypt and Syria was formed to attack, Israel counted these steps, especially the final one, as a cause for war. On 5 June 1967, Israel launched a war which lasted six days and end up with an unprecedented defeat for Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

Until the 1967 War, the inter-Arab rivalry was more acute than the Arab conflict with Israel. The regional environment before the 1967 June War was threatening for Nasser.

²²³ “Introduction”, William Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p.6.

²²⁴ Laura M. James, “Egypt: Dangerous Dillusions”, Louis & Avi Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, p.56.

²²⁵ For more details about the escalation of the crisis, see *ibid*, pp.58-74.

²²⁶ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 172.

²²⁷ Quoted in Avi Shlaim, “Israel: Poor Little Samson”, Louis and Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, p.27.

The tensions stemming from the Arab Cold War escalated after the pro-longed war in Yemen. Despite the heavy cost of the war for Egypt, the competition between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two rivals, increased during the war in Yemen. By this way, Nasser was not only at odds with Saudi Arabia, but also its superpower patron, the US. The farther Nasser got from the US, the closer it got to the SU. In addition to the regional pressures stemming from the Arab Cold War, Nasser also faced challenges from the Arab radicals in Syria, Iraq and Palestine, who criticized Nasser for sacrificing the Arab cause of liberating Palestine for his revolutionary and populist aims.²²⁸ In addition, the Baath regime, which came to power in 1966 in Syria, started pushing Nasser towards a war for liberating Palestine. Meanwhile, Nasser was under pressure to rescue the Syrian regime.²²⁹ By the way, Nasser suspected if the Syrian regime was trying to drag him into a war with Israel²³⁰ whereas Syrian regime doubted whether Nasser would leave it alone in case of a war with Israel. Simultaneously, Jordan was also accusing Egypt of being coward and “of hiding Israelis behind the skirts of the UNEF in Sinai”²³¹. At the end of the day, Nasser had to preserve his credibility in the Arab world and at the international arena as well as at home.

Israel launched its attack to Egypt on 5 June 1967 in the morning, and within few hours destroyed most of the Egyptian air force. By 8 June, the entire Sinai Peninsula was occupied by Israel. Eventually, Egypt agreed on a ceasefire in the evening of the same day. The extent of the devastating defeat was far more than any Egyptian could imagine.

²²⁸ Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics: Dientagling Myth From Reality”, Louis and Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, pp.285-286.

²²⁹ SU had pressed Egypt to ally with the new regime in Syria. Therefore, Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Pact was established in November 1966. In this respect, Egypt was compelled to go to Syria’s aid in case of an Israeli attack.

²³⁰ There had been military clashes on the borders between Syria and Israel before the 1967 War. These clashes escalated on 7 April 1967. Hafiz Assad, Syrian Minister of Defense and the Commander of the Syrian Air force, sent six Syrian MiGs against Israeli air forces. Seeking for the chance to teach a lesson to the new Syrian regime, Israel shot down the six MiGs. This was very humiliating for Syria and the Arab world accused Nasser of not acting in accordance with the defense pact between Egypt and Syria. For more, see David M. Lesch, “Syria: Playing with Fire”, Louis and Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, pp.88-89.

²³¹ Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p.236.

Having been overwhelmed by and taking the full responsibility of the defeat, Nasser announced his resignation. However, due to the popular demand, Nasser withdrew his resignation and stayed in power. Then he discharged the Commander of Egyptian Air force, Amer, Defense Minister, Badran, Minister of Interior, Fathi Radwan, and the Head of General Intelligence, Salah Nasr, from office. The defeat of the war, and thus the insecurity of Nasser brought in substantial change in the regime. The legitimacy of the Nasser's regime was predominantly depended on its populist achievements. His regime had been under great stress with his socialist policies. By 1965, Nasser's regime was indeed in great crisis because of his populist state capitalism. The way out to crisis was a restructuring, but it turned out to be a burden especially for the lower middle and working classes "whose income and standards of living declined considerably and threatened regime's populist coalition"²³². The debate between pro-Western right and pro-Soviet left grew fierce. The need for the Soviet assistance to reconstruct the armed forces tilted the balance of power within the regime in favor of the left-wing headed by Ali Sabri. The voice of the Nasser regime, Heikal's *Al-Ahram*, became less supportive of the new government policies. The Islamists become more vocal as the popular support for the Palestinian *fedayeen* increased and the Pan-Arabism suffered a blow.²³³

One of the most important consequences of the Six-Day War is the rapprochement between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Once a rival of the Saudi King, Nasser swallowed his pride and admitted that Saudi aid was vital for him to rebuild his army and finance the costly War of Attrition with Israel²³⁴. Nasser's reluctant relationship with Saudi Arabia turned into a close relationship during the Sadat era. According to Gerges, with Sadat coming to power, two pivotal states of the Arab world, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, played a

²³² Fawaz A. Gerges, "The Transformation of Arab Politics: Disentangling Myth From Reality", Rogers & Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, p.285.

²³³ James, "Egypt: Dangerous Dillusions", pp.77-78.

²³⁴ War of Attrition started just after the 1967 War, and lasted until the ceasefire on 7 August 1970. The Arab policy formula of three no's, which prevented recognition, negotiation and peace with Israel, preclude diplomatic efforts for ceasefire after the 1967 War. Therefore, Nasser thought that getting Sinai back could only be achieved via military means. Large-scale bombardment along the Suez Canal, commando raids and aerial warfare constituted the War of Attrition.

significant role in the empowerment of the social forces in favor of conservative religious ones. Furthermore, he claims that the oil money paved the way for the Saudi model, and thus political Islam to become widespread.²³⁵



Figure 4: 1967 June War

Source: “How 1967 Defined the Middle East”, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6709173.stm>, (accessed on 10.07.2014).

After the 1967 June War, the Arab League gathered in Khartoum, Sudan in August 1967. During the summit, Arab states agreed on the political settlement with Israel based on no recognition, no negotiation, no peace agreement, known as the “three no’s” as

²³⁵ Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics “, pp. 308-309.

well as insistence of the Palestinian rights on the land of Palestine.²³⁶ The summit also resolved the financial needs of the confrontation states to rebuild their armed forces by sharing the money of the oil-rich states. Thus, the confrontation states –Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO- became the primary Arab foreign aid recipients in the Middle East.²³⁷ Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya agreed to provide Egypt with \$ 250 million annually.²³⁸ During the years 1974-78, % 30 of the Arab aid was given to Egypt so that Egypt could become the main recipient of the Arab aid. It was followed by Syria with % 15 and Jordan with %7.²³⁹

In terms of Arab politics, the 1967 Six Day War changed the regional balance of power towards pro-American Middle Eastern allies (of the day) like Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran. In addition, it undermined the capability of the state-centric Pan-Arab front to liberate Palestine. This led to the rise of non-state actors who became the vanguard of the Palestinian cause in particular and the Arab cause in general. “Rhetorically and literally, Egypt could no longer afford to play a dual role as a state and a revolution and reached a rapprochement with the “reactionary” Arab regimes; it voluntarily surrendered its revolutionary function to the Palestinian *fedayeen* who, for a fleeting moment after the defeat captured the Arab imagination.”²⁴⁰ In addition, scholars like Ajami referred to

²³⁶ William B. Quandt, *Peace Process: American Diplomacy and The Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967*, Third Edition, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press; Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), p.46

²³⁷ Other Arab (League) states like Yemen, Sudan, Somalia and Mauritania as well as non-Arab Muslim countries like Pakistan were also subject to Arab foreign aid. For more, see Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p.25.

²³⁸ Micheal N. Branett and Jack S. Levy, “Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt 1967-72”, *International Organization*, Vol.45, Issue.3, (Summer 1991), p.383.

²³⁹ When Egypt signed the peace agreement with Israel in 1979 and insulated from the Arab aid, the total amount of the Arab foreign aid for the confrontation states remained as it is despite the distribution. The amount Egypt used to get was divided among the other confrontation states. Therefore, Syria started to get %30 of the aid whereas Jordan got %21 and PLO % 11.4. As a result, this redistribution of the oil wealth had been one of the most significant features of the regional Arab system. By the 1980s, with the prolonged Iran-Iraq war, Iraq became the main recipient of the Saudi and Kuwaiti aid although the Arab aid in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict was in decline. This was due to the decreasing priority of the conflict with Israel in the eyes of the Arab states. Therefore, the Arab aid ceased to exist after 1987. See in Waterbury, *Egypt of Nasser and Sadat*, pp.414-420; Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, p.26.

²⁴⁰ Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics”, p.312.

the 1967 Arab-Israeli War as the Waterloo of Pan-Arabism by because it started the retreat of Pan-Arabism since the Arab solidarity it championed could not win the war against the Zionist enemy and take back the homeland of the Palestinians.²⁴¹ However, it is necessary to underline that what retreated after the 1967 War was Pan-Arabism as a political project, not a popular sentiment.²⁴²

Regarding international consequences, UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 242 on 22 November 1967, which was adopted unanimously.²⁴³ It is fair to say that the resolution has been one of the most referred and quoted resolutions of the UNSC. The preamble of the resolution refers to “the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security”²⁴⁴. The article one of the resolution calls upon:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.²⁴⁵

The omission of the article ‘the’ before the territories created an ambiguity and different interpretations by the parties. Arabs, in line with the principle ‘inadmissibility of the territory by war’ interpret the clause as the Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied during the 1967 War. Therefore, they see withdrawal of Israel to pre-1967 borders as the condition for peace. It is claimed that the French version of the resolution supports this interpretation: “*Retrait des forces armées israéliennes des territoires*

²⁴¹ Fouad Ajami, “The End of Pan-Arabism”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 57, No.2, (Winter 1978/1979), p.357.

²⁴² Gerges, “The Transformation of Arab Politics: Dientagling Myth From Reality”, p.303.

²⁴³ There were number of drafts proposed for the resolution including US, USSR, UK and a joint proposal by India, Mali and Nigeria. It was the UK draft proposed by Lord Caradon, the British ambassador to the UN that the UNSCR 242 is based on.

²⁴⁴ S/RES/242 (1967), <http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7D35E1F729DF491C85256EE700686136> , accessed on (15 July 2014).

²⁴⁵ Ibid.

occupés lors du récent conflit”, meaning “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict”. The expression “*des territoires occupés*” is said to be corresponding to “the territories”. However, during the 1382nd Meeting of the UN Security Council on 22 November 1967, which convened for the discussion of the resolution, the French representative, Mr. Bernard, stated that the French expression indisputably corresponds to “occupied territories” leaving no room for ambiguity as it is in the English text.²⁴⁶ Israeli interpretation takes into account the English text as the original text and stresses that the resolution does neither call withdrawal from ‘all’ territories nor ‘the’ territories. About the French version, Israel thinks it should be interpreted according to the English one, not the reverse. Despite the discussions of ambiguity about ‘territories occupied’, the expression of “territories occupied in the recent conflict” is clear enough to denote the Arab territories Israel occupied during the 1967 War when assessed within the rationale of the resolution.

Besides, Israel does not view the acquisition of ‘the’ territories as ‘acquisition by war’, because the 1967 War should be evaluated as self-defense and thus these territories are legitimate gains of Israel. Although Israel bases its claims of self-defense on the fact that the 1967 was a pre-emptive strike, there was hardly any evidence that the Arabs were going to attack Israel. Even if there was, to what extent it could be considered within the right of self-defense is highly disputable. What is more, neither the UN Security Council Official Records of the meeting of the Resolution 242 nor the Resolution itself indicates recognition of the legitimacy of Israel’s self-defense. Israel also insisted that the provision about the establishment of “secure and recognized borders” necessitates agreement between the parties. Therefore, Israel tie the issue of withdrawal from occupied territories to a certain extent its discretion about ‘secure borders’.²⁴⁷ However,

²⁴⁶ Para. 111, S/PV.1382 (OR), 1382nd Meeting, *Security Council Official Records*, New York, 22 November 1967, <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/9F5F09A80BB6878B0525672300565063>, (accessed on 20 July 2014).

²⁴⁷ For more about the Israeli interpretation of the Resolution 242, see Ruth Lapidot, “Security Council Resolution 242: An Analysis of Its Main Provisions”, <http://jcpa.org/text/resolution242-lapidot.pdf>, (accessed on 20 July 2014).

again, during the UNSC meeting for the Resolution 242, Mr. Kuznetsov, the representation of the USSR underlined:

We understand the decision taken to mean the withdrawal of Israel forces from all, and we repeat, all territories belonging to Arab States and seized by Israel following its attack on those States on 5 June 1967. This is borne out by the preamble to the United Kingdom draft resolution [S/8247] which stresses the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war". It follows that the provision contained in that draft relating to the right of all States in the Near East "to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries" cannot serve as a pretext for the maintenance of Israel forces on any part of the Arab territories seized by them as a result of war.²⁴⁸

Although the resolution recognizes possible border modifications in line with future agreement among the parties to the conflict, what it attributes to "secure and recognized borders" are the borders guaranteed with the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Above all, despite its ambiguities, the UNSC Resolution 242 has become the *quid pro quo* for peace in the region.²⁴⁹

Finally, 1967 War marked a turning point in the history of the Arab- Israeli conflict since the Arab states were no more able to deny the existence of the state of Israel. Furthermore, they now had their own border problems with Israel. Before the war, the problem of the territories in Palestine was a high priority Pan-Arab concern. However, following the war, what mattered most especially to Egypt, Syria and Jordan was the territories they lost to Israel. This marked a shift in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict from non-recognition of the state of Israel to the problem of boundaries.²⁵⁰ Sela defines that shift as "paradigmatic"²⁵¹ since the conflict had changed from a cultural, religious and ideological dispute to a more normal and thus manageable one. Such evaluation could be rendered reasonable only when it is limited to the state (inter-

²⁴⁸ Para. 119, S/PV.1382 (OR), 1382nd Meeting, *Security Council Official Records*, New York, 22 November 1967, <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/9F5F09A80BB6878B0525672300565063>, (accessed on 20 July 2014).

²⁴⁹ Charles D. Smith, "The United States and the 1967 War", Louis and Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War*, p. 185.

²⁵⁰ Sela, *The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict*, 80

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, pp.26-27.

governmental) level. In regard to that shift after the 1967 War, it is important to point out that the frontier states were quicker to accept the legitimacy of the state of Israel and ‘normalize’ the conflict by prioritizing the pragmatic concern of regaining the occupied territories.

UN Secretary General U Thant appointed Gunnar Jarring, Swedish Ambassador to the SU, on 23 November 1967 as the UN Special Envoy in order to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 242. His shuttle diplomacy continued until 1973 without any results. Except Syria which denounced UNSCR 242²⁵², Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Israel accepted participating in the diplomatic efforts by Jarring. However, as early as 4 January 1971 when the report of Jarring was presented to the public, it was obvious that the differences of opinion between the Arabs and Israelis would prevent the parties to compromise for peace. The Arabs were not willing to be part of any direct negotiations with the Israelis in line with the three ‘no’s of the Khartoum Declaration and the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the pre-1967 borders was a prerequisite for the Arabs. On the other hand, Israel was keen on direct negotiations and no withdrawal without conditions.²⁵³

Due to the failure of the Jarring mission to implement UNSCR 242 and the heated conflict along the Egyptian-Israeli border within the War of Attrition, US Secretary of State William P. Rogers proposed a peace plan on 9 December 1969. Although the proposal did not regard the 1949 Armistice borders as final political borders, it emphasized that a peace between Israel and Egypt requires “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from UAR territory to the international borders between Israel and Egypt which existed for over a half century”²⁵⁴ in return for a specific and binding commitment of

²⁵² Syria conditionally accepted UNSCR 242 in March 1972.

²⁵³ “The Jarring Mission, First Phase, Excerpts from Report by Secretary General U Thant”, S/10070, 4 January 1971, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/3%20The%20Jarring%20Mission-%20First%20Phase-%20Excerpts%20from.aspx>, (accessed on 30 July 2014).

²⁵⁴ “Statement by Secretary of States, Rogers”, 9 December 1969, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/9%20Statement%20by%20Secretary%20of%20State%20Rogers-%209%20Decemb.aspx>, (accessed on 30 July 2014).

Egypt to peace with Israel. Nasser accepted Rogers' plan whereas Israel rejected.²⁵⁵ Nasser's acceptance of Rogers' Plan can be interpreted as a signal that Nasser was ready for a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the acceptance of the state of Israel and the acknowledgement of the role of the US as the dominant power in the region. On the other hand, Nasser saw diplomacy as not enough to recover Sinai. That's why he launched the War of Attrition. Besides, growing portion of the Egyptian political elite began to think that SU would not supply Egypt with the necessary offensive weapons for the recovery of the Sinai. This brought in the conviction that it was the US that held the cards to a peaceful solution in the region.

In fact, the endeavor to attract US attention started with the War of Attrition. Afterwards, the Egyptian policy of war and peace with Israel was in accordance with attracting US attention. Because Egypt lost the US, one of the two poles of its policy of positive neutralism during the Johnson administration with the cut of the US food aid mainly because of the Egyptian insistence on its involvement in the Yemeni civil war or more precisely its foreign policy of revisionism which reached its peak with its involvement in the Yemeni civil war. When US grasped that Egypt would never be an ally, US sacrificed Egypt risking to push it into the Soviet's lap. After the 1967 June War disaster, things got worse for Egypt when it had to face the requirement to rebuild its armed forces to regain Sinai. The inward-looking economy of Egypt was exhausted with the ISI development and welfare state policies. The economic situation corroded with the catastrophic effects of the wars. With an economy which was on the brink of bankruptcy, Nasser knew it very well that the SU was not the alternative of the US, but he had no other choice than turning to SU for assistance and run the risk of increasing Soviet influence in the country.

²⁵⁵ For reasons of Israeli rejection, see "Israel Rejects the Rogers Plan", Cabinet Statement, 22 December 1969, <http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/MFADocuments/Yearbook1/Pages/10%20Israel%20Rejects%20the%20Rogers%20Plan-%20Cabinet%20Stateme.aspx>, (accessed on 30 July 2014).

2.7. CONCLUSION

After the 1952 Free Officer's military coup, Egypt became a republic in 1953. However, the revolutionary changes did not bring in a more democratic regime, and with Nasser's presidency Egypt became a popular authoritarian state, which transformed into a bureaucratic authoritarian state over time where the president enjoys a monopoly of power and discretion to make foreign policy. Repression and coercion have been utilized for maintaining control and keeping society away from politics. The regime also relied on patronage networks to ensure public support for the sake of sustaining its survival. As a semi-rentier economy, Egyptian state became the distributor of wealth which led to the irresponsibility to the people. The encounter with colonialism during the state formation played a role in the distinction between the ruler and the ruled, and authoritarianism strengthened the distinction between the state and the people in regard to policy-making and social engineering. Therefore, the state in Egypt enjoyed a high degree of autonomy from its people. In addition to the domestic state autonomy, Egypt could act autonomously from other regional powers and politics. Egypt's geopolitical realities, demography, culture and history translated into state capacity contributed to its regional autonomy, which enabled Egypt to make peace with Israel at the expense of isolation from the Arab world.

In terms of state ideology, Nasser's revisionist Egypt became a pro-status quo state after Sadat. The decline of Pan-Arabism after the 1967 June War, Egypt adopted a 'pro-Western neutralism' and relinquished its revolutionary and revisionist foreign policy. The end of block politics after the Cold War, resulted in the transformation of neutralism to a pro-Western orientation. At the same time, Sadat restructured its domestic policy towards outward-looking economy under *Infitah* and with limited political liberalization without jeopardizing the authoritarian nature of the regime. He also reoriented Egyptian foreign policy towards the US and made peace with Israel in 1979. All these moves were revolutionary, but not in the Nasserite sense. With Mubarak, Egypt sustained its status quo position until the 25 January 2011 regime change. What kind of a change the Egyptian Spring has brought in the country other than the downfall of Mubarak is a

matter of time and future studies. Within the scope of this thesis, what enabled the shift in the state ideology during Sadat period and its shift in foreign policy in terms of making peace with Israel is the autonomy of the state at the national and regional levels in line with its authoritarian structure which was shaped during the state formation.

3. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

Egypt was almost bankrupt when Sadat took over presidency in 1970. The economic crisis and the dramatic socio-economic conditions was part of a broader picture. There was the humiliation after the 1967 defeat and the loss of Sinai. There was an ideological bankruptcy, too. Pan-Arabism was in decline, not only after the 1967 War, but also after the unsuccessful unity schemes and the dissolution of the UAR. Arab socialism, heavy industrialization and the ISI strategies also collapsed. The US was totally lost with the cancellation of the food aid in 1966 and there was only the SU as a superpower to receive aid. Thus, positive neutralism as a tool of foreign policy was not available to make use of since there no two rival superpowers to play against each other. Within this context, what Egypt went through with Sadat was an overall change to save Egypt from an overall bankruptcy. Within this framework, as referred mostly in the literature, the separate peace with Israel was not a simple response the dire economic needs via securing US aid. Making peace with Israel was part of this overall transformation and ensuring domestic survival.

In this context, this chapter is designed to elaborate on the peace process between Egypt and Israel in terms of peacemaking and peace-sustaining. This chapter is composed of three main parts. The first part under the heading of the 'road to peace' looks at the main steps taken by Egypt for the purpose of making peace with Israel. In this respect, Sadat's peace initiative in 1971, the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt and Sadat's secret peace initiative in 1973 are elaborated. Then how the 1973 October War was waged by Egypt as an instrument to persuade the US and Israel for peaceful settlement is examined. Following, the open door policy initiated by Sadat is considered together with the peace incentives as motivation for peace. The historic visit by Sadat to Jerusalem is posited as the final milestone that paved the way for peacemaking. The role of leadership in making peace in regard to Sadat, Begin and Carter is also mentioned. In the

second part, the content of the 1978 Camp David Accords and the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty is reviewed. The third part is devoted to the study of the developments after the peace treaty. Within that framework, regional and domestic reactions to the peace treaty are put forward. It is followed by the examination of the Egyptian-Israeli relations due to the issue of normalization. Finally, the peace dividends are investigated in terms of foreign aid and debt relief, military expenditure, tourism, bilateral trade, and Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs).

3.1. THE ROAD TO PEACE

The years between 1971 and 1973 were marked by efforts mainly from the Egyptian side towards reaching a peaceful settlement with Israel. To succeed in making peace with Israel, President Sadat first chose to try diplomatic means before launching war against Israel in 1973. He revealed his commitment to achieve full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders in his peace initiatives of 1971 and 1973. However, he had already prioritized Egyptian interests over the Arabs' with his 'Egypt First' ideology. In line with it, getting Sinai was a matter of great importance for him. Nonetheless, until the last days of the negotiations that led to the 1978 Camp David Accords, the separate peace with Israel seemed not an issue of concern. However, Kamel, the last foreign minister of Sadat, mentioned that during the negotiations, Sadat asked him what they should do if they reached a good agreement with Israel and other Arab states refuse to accept.²⁵⁶ Therefore, although separate peace with Israel was not the thing Sadat intended to achieve, it was an option that occupied his mind.

²⁵⁶ Mark A. Bruzonsky, "Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.38, No.1, (Winter 1984), p.86.

3.1.1. SADAT'S PEACE INITIATIVE IN 1971

When Sadat came to power on 15 October 1970, the cease-fire regarding the war of attrition between Egypt and Israel within the Rogers Plan was still in force. The ninety day cease-fire was about to end in November 1970. In order to keep the Rogers plan alive, Sadat wanted to extend the cease-fire for another ninety days. He convened Egyptian National Security Council and shared his will about the extension of the cease-fire. Upon the Egyptian application to the UNSC, Rogers Plan was renewed. Before the renewal, backed by the US, Israel had claimed that Egypt had violated the plan by “advancing SAM sites on the west bank of the Canal”²⁵⁷, which was under Israeli occupation. However, Sadat rejected the claim by saying that both banks of the canal were Egyptian territory. Israel continued its claim even after the renewal of the cease-fire for jettisoning the plan, because the plan envisioned the Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories during the ninety day’ period.²⁵⁸

Sadat mentioned several times that 1971 was going to be a ‘year of decision’ at the end of which he would decide what he would opt for war or peace, and first he tried peace through diplomacy. On the day when the second ninety day period supposed to end, 4 February 1971, in his address to the Egyptian National/People’s Assembly, Sadat announced what he called the ‘New Egyptian Initiative’.

We demand that during this period of withholding fire, a partial withdrawal of the Israeli troops on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal will be realized as a first step in a timetable to be laid down with a view to implementing the rest of the provisions of the Security Council Resolution.

If this is realized during this period, we are ready to start at once in clearing the course of the Suez Canal in order to reopen it for international navigation and to serve world economy.

We believe that by this initiative, we transfer the efforts of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring from ambiguous words to defined measures for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution.

²⁵⁷ Anwar Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, (New York : Harper & Row, 1979), p. 276.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 276-277.

[...]Ceasefire or resumption of fighting is not the problem. The problem is the liberation of the various Arab territories and restoration of the legitimate right of the Palestinian people. This is the cause for the sake of which we give everything without reserve or hesitation, to the end of the road.²⁵⁹

The initiative, as it is announced to the Egyptian National Assembly, adhered to maximalist Arab demands of Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied during the 1967 War. Therefore, Sadat did not seek for a separate peace with Israel (at the expense of/ without preserving the Palestinian rights). Despite the fact that they were all critical of Sadat and his policies, three Egyptian foreign Ministers of Sadat's presidency - Mahmoud Riad, Ismail Fahmy and Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel²⁶⁰- confirmed that Sadat remained committed to the common Arab position in terms of a comprehensive peace in the region. They also refrained from stating that Sadat was seeking for a separate peace with Israel before the Camp David Accords of 1978.²⁶¹ However, the way Sadat narrated the initiative in his autobiography made it seem as a proposal in which Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was a sufficient condition for Egypt to restore its relations with the US and make peace with Israel.²⁶² At least, it appealed to the Israelis that way.

The initiative came as a surprise for the Egyptian political elites in particular and the world at large. Since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it was the first time that an Arab official had expressed the possibility of making peace with Israel. Sadat gave thirty days to the US, SU and the UNSC to respond to his peace initiative. However, Sadat received no response till the end of the thirty day which was 7 March 1971. Willian

²⁵⁹ Statement by President Anwar El-Sadat Before The National Assembly, Cairo, 4 February 1971, available at <http://sadat.umd.edu/archives/speeches/AAEJ%20Speech%20to%20Nat%20Assemb2.4.71pdf.pdf>, (accessed on 05 June 2013).

²⁶⁰ Mark A. Bruzonsky, "Interview with Mohammed Ibrahim Kamel", *Middle East Journal*, Vol.38, No.1, (Winter 1984), pp.85-98.

²⁶¹ Mordechai Gazit, "Egypt and Israel- Was There a Peace Opportunity Missed in 1971?", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.32, No.1, (Jan 1997), p.106.

²⁶² See in Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 279.

Rogers paid a visit to Egypt on 4 May 1971 to declare that the US was supporting Sadat's stand and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir had, before the initiative, sent a message to the US that Israel was ready to negotiate any proposal coming from an Arab leader.²⁶³ However, in the end, neither the US nor Israel took any action in response to the initiative.

3.1.2. SENDING THE SOVIETS BACK HOME

Sadat signed the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 27 May 1971. After the 1967 defeat, Nasser had twice proposed the SU the conclusion of such a treaty, but he was rejected. However, the offer came from the Soviets in May 1971, because the Soviets were worried about Sadat's actions towards eliminating the Nasserite elite. They thought that they might lose Egypt.²⁶⁴ Sadat responded the Soviet offer with an affirmative answer with the hope of speeding up Soviet delivery of arms. More importantly, when Sadat's peace initiative in February 1971 fell on the deaf ears, Sadat turned to the Soviets. He very well knew that the treaty would help him to attract US attention, and it did. The treaty underlined increased economic, scientific-technological, cultural, political and military cooperation between Egypt and the USSR. The parties agreed that they would concert each other in case of threats to the peace and security of their peoples so that they could cooperate in removing the threats. The parties also concurred that they would not enter into alliances or take part in the actions against other party.²⁶⁵

For long, Sadat had been disappointed with the Soviets' repeatedly letting him down. As mentioned before, despite his diplomatic initiatives, waging war against Israel remained

²⁶³ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p.281.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, pp.283-284.

²⁶⁵ Yaacov Ro'i, "The Soviet-Egyptian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty", *From Encroachment to Involvement: A Documentary Study of Soviet Policy in The Middle East (1945-1973)*, (Jerusalem: Keterpress, 1974), pp. 550-552.

as an option of last resort. To wage war, Sadat needed arms, and the Soviets were his main supplier. The Soviets has promised Sadat for sending weapons during his visit to Moscow in February 1972. Months after his second visit to Moscow in April 1972, he received a message from the SU via their ambassador in Egypt. When Sadat saw that there was no mention about the arms Sadat was waiting for, he was frustrated. He told the Soviet ambassador that he had just decided that the Soviet military experts should leave within a week. He also added that the experts could either leave with their equipment or sell them to Egypt. He mentioned in his autobiography that he was not only tired of Soviet's not keeping their promises, but also their view of Egypt as a country in their pocket. In addition, he perceived the way Soviets treated Egypt as an insult to the Egyptian national pride. Therefore, he wanted to show them that Egypt's will was Egyptian, no one could patronize Egypt. Besides, the SU had to understand its place as a friendly country, but nothing more than that.²⁶⁶ He also knew that the Soviets would not let him to wage war against Israel. Therefore, he needed to get the freedom of action by drawing away from the Soviets. Eventually, 15.000 Soviet military experts left Egypt in July 1972. In fact, Egypt's total break up with the Soviets did not happen before 1976 when Sadat cancelled the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR. He could not cancel the treaty before 1976 since he was in need of the Soviet arms for the war he was going to launch in 1973.²⁶⁷

Sending the Soviets back home was not a mere reactive decision by Sadat. It was part of his deception plan. Sadat knew that his expulsion of the Soviets was going to be considered as an indication of abandoning the military option. Even Kissinger was not able to grasp Sadat's intentions until the war broke out. It was only King Hussein who had rightly sensed Sadat's intention and warned the Americans that Sadat could be planning a war despite the distance he placed with the Soviets. The other part of Sadat's deception plan was composed of psychological warfare that he initiated together with Assad. By utilizing media he had announced several times that he would wage war

²⁶⁶ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, pp. 229-231.

²⁶⁷ Halliday, *The Middle East*, pp. 119-120.

against Israel. He also massed troops along the canal to give the impression that he was going to attack Israel. However, when each time nothing came out from his moves, everyone including Israel thought that his words could not be trusted.²⁶⁸ When Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was asked after the October War in 1973 why he did not mobilize his troops on time, he answered: “Sadat made me do it twice at a cost of ten million dollars each time. So when it was the third time round, I thought he was not serious, but he tricked me.”²⁶⁹

3.1.3. SADAT’S SECRET PEACE INITIATIVE OF 1973

President Sadat’s National Security Advisor Hafiz Ismail and President Nixon’s National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger met in New York on 25-26 February 1973. Ismail presented the Egyptian proposal which was based on an ‘overall settlement’ to be achieved in stages. The first condition was based on Israeli withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders in line with the negotiations between the parties. Ismail underlined that Egypt was ready to accept any agreement reached by Israel, Palestinians and Jordan in the West Bank. In Gaza, a settlement should be ensured in line with the recognition of Palestinian right of self-determination. As long as the Egyptian-Israeli peaceful settlement was concerned, Egypt expected the respect to its sovereignty over its land including Sinai, some parts of which could be demilitarized in respect to Israeli security concerns. In return, Egypt would end the state of war against Israel and recognize Israel’s existence, independence and territorial integrity. It would also guarantee free passage in international waters including Suez Canal and end of boycott against Israel. Egypt also offered to ensure that the Egyptian soil was not used as a base by any individual or organizations, the acts of which threatened the security of Israeli citizens. Ismail additionally noted that the normalization of relations (establishing diplomatic relations, free trade and tourism) between Egypt and Israel would be realized after the

²⁶⁸ Joseph Finklestone, *Anwar Sadat: Visionary Who Dared*, (London, Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.84-86.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid*, p. 85.

conclusion of the comprehensive settlement. Egyptians also emphasized that the negotiations should be conducted and completed in a short space of time due to preserve the status of Egypt in the Arab world so that it would not suffer isolation. This meant that Egypt was in favor of completing the bilateral negotiations with Israel and had Sinai returned by the end of 1973, and expected that the settlement of the Egyptian-Israeli conflict would be pattern followed by Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians so that a comprehensive peace could be achieved. Kissinger remained tough in response and stressed that the Egyptian proposal would not be sufficient enough to initiate a process, because Israel had become superior compared to its Arab rivals throughout the time.²⁷⁰

Having regarded the Egyptian proposal as far-reaching, but one-sided, Kissinger informed Yitzhak Rabin, the Israeli ambassador to the US. Rabin's response was much more positive than Kissinger's, because for Rabin, it could be an opportunity to get Egypt out of the war equation and secure Israel with best terms. Prime Minister Golda Meir was on the same page, too. However, she was much more concerned about getting new arms from the US.²⁷¹ Eventually, both the US and Israel played for the time and the Egyptian enthusiasm faded away without getting a concrete response to the proposal. Sadat was highly disappointed and that last unsuccessful attempt constituted the final nail in the coffin of Sadat's diplomatic efforts for peaceful settlement. He concluded that "it was impossible, as I have always said, for the United States (or, indeed, any other power) to make a move if we ourselves didn't take military action to break the deadlock."²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Uri Bar-Joseph, "Last Chance to Avoid War: Sadat's Peace Initiative of February 1973 and Its Failure", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.41, No.3, (July 2006), pp.545-548.

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, pp. 549-550.

²⁷² Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 238.

3.1.4. THE 1973 OCTOBER (*YOM KIPPUR/RAMADAN*) WAR

Sadat decided that October would be the best time to wage war against Israel, because in 1973, *Yom Kippur* coincided October. *Yom Kippur*, which was also known as the Day of Atonement, was the holiest day of then the year for the Jewish people. On that day Jews were fasting all day and praying in synagogues. It was a time when the whole country was closing down. Therefore, an attack on that day would not only come as a surprise, but also would be hard to counter due to the difficulty of a quick call up for the soldiers.²⁷³ *Ramadan*, the holiest month for the Muslims, coincided October in 1973. That's why the 1973 War was also known as the *Yom Kippur* or the *Ramadan* War.

What Sadat planned from the beginning was a limited war. In December 1972, during the secret mission by King Hussein and his aide Zaid Rifai to Cairo, Sadat told Rifai:

I know I am not a Tarzan. I realize my limitations. I am not good at blitzkrieg. The Israelis are good at blitzkrieg. I will fight a war of political reactivation and not of military liberation. I will wage a limited war; cross the canal, secure a bridgehead and stop. Then I will ask the Security Council to call for a ceasefire. This strategy will ensure my victory in the battle, cut my losses and reactivate the peace process.²⁷⁴

All he needed was a quick war that would enable him to cross the canal. By making use of a surprise military attack, he was planning to acquire military superiority which would provide him with the required advantage on the diplomacy table for getting Sinai back. In addition, he would prove the US that Egypt was strong and the shaper of the regional politics and thus could be an important ally.

Before going to war, Sadat had ensured that the whole Arab world would back him. He lobbied for the war he was going to wage against Israel, but never talked about a specific date. In addition to getting financial and troop support from the Arab countries, he was also backed by the OPEC members led by Saudi Arabia during the war with the oil

²⁷³ Finklestone, *Anwar Sadat*, p. 102.

²⁷⁴ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p. 364.

boycott. The OPEC members incrementally reduced the oil output reaching to 25 %. They did not supply USA and the Netherlands that they perceive as the most sympathetic to Israel with oil and declared that they would continue the boycott until the Palestinian demands were met. The boycott led to the 1973 Energy Crisis and the hikes in the oil prices. It ended in early 1974 without any tangible gains in terms of the Palestinian cause, but it helped Sadat to get the political leverage he sought for. It was the first and the last time that oil was used as a weapon for the political purposes.²⁷⁵ Last, but not the least, it was achievement in terms of mobilization for the Pan-Arab cause and a reflection of Arab solidarity after the severe blow to the ideology in 1967.

Sadat made a joint plan with Syria. The Syrian army would be involved in the war to liberate the Golan Heights. Assad did not like the idea of a limited war and he complained when Sadat crossed the canal and stopped during the war, which enabled Israel to concentrate all of his forces against Syria. Jordan was left out from the planning of the war. During the war, Jordan did not open a front, but supported Syrian forces by deploying troops.

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian aircraft flew low into Sinai and killed Israeli troops, who were totally caught unprepared. The well-trained and well-equipped Egyptian troops crossed the canal. The initial Egyptian attack against Israel achieved more than the Egyptians expected. It was even unthinkable for Israel. Egyptian forces succeeded in firmly establishing in the east bank of the canal. Israel suffered a great blow with hundreds of its tanks crushed and many Israeli aircraft was shot down. Dayan had to call for the withdrawal of the Israeli army to more defensible lines on the second day of the fighting.²⁷⁶ After three days, Israeli forces were mobilized to halt the Egyptian offensive and then drove back the Egyptian forces and crossed the canal into Egypt. Meanwhile, Israel also succeeded in repulsing the Syrian attack and pushing Syria back to the pre-ceasefire lines. The fightings continued until the 25 October 1973, when an agreement

²⁷⁵ Halliday, *The Middle East*, p. 275.

²⁷⁶ Finklestone, *Anwar Sadat*, pp. 105-106.

on cease-fire was achieved under the aegis of UN. Before that, UN called for ceasefire on the 22 October with the joint proposal by the US and the SU and the UNSC resolution 338 was adopted. In line with the resolution, the Security Council;

Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its part;

Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.²⁷⁷

Two other UNSC resolutions 339 and 340 followed suit to end the war. Following the 1973 War, first Sinai disengagement agreement titled “Separation of Forces between Israel and Egypt” was signed on 18 January 1974. The agreement envisaged not only cease-fire, but also separated two parties militarily on Sinai with a 20 miles north-to-south line on the east of the Suez Canal. Israeli forces moved to the east side of the line whereas Egypt moved to the west. The remaining/ vacant area cleared of military forces of Egypt and Israel was left to the United Nations Emergency Forces (UNEF). The agreement was more of a military formula to separate the Egyptian and Israeli military forces rather than a political agreement.²⁷⁸ “This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement, it constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference”²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ S/RES/338 (1973), 22 October 1973, <http://unispal.un.org/unispal.nsf/0/7FB7C26FCBE80A31852560C50065F878>, (accessed on 05 March 2013).

²⁷⁸ Ismail Fahmy, *Negotiating Peace in the Middle East: An Arab View*, (Beckenham, Kent: Croom Hell, 1983), p. 132.

²⁷⁹ Separation of Forces Agreement between Egypt and Israel, January 18, 1974, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Israel-Egypt+Separation+of+Forces+Agreement+-+1974.htm> (12 February 2013).

Egypt and Israel signed another disengagement treaty on 4 September 1975 titled “Interim Agreement Between Egypt and Israel”. With reference to the previous disengagement agreement, the UNSCR 338 and the Geneva Conference, the agreement aimed at serving as a medium to a lasting peace via ensuring the cease-fire and precluding each party from resorting to the use of military force. The agreement enlarged the UN buffer zone and envisaged that Israel pulled further east. In return, Egypt was to ensure the safe passage to the Israeli merchant ships through the Suez Canal.²⁸⁰

3.1.5 THE OPEN-DOOR POLICY (INFITAH)

The open-door policy (*infitah*) was initiated with the October Paper in October 1974. The month ‘October’ was chosen on purpose in reference to ‘victory’ of the 1973 October War. The policy was initiated after the 1973 October War, but the discussions among the political elite in terms of which road to take –socialist or capitalist- to save the Egyptian economy dated back to the late years of Nasser. Egyptian economy had gone bankruptcy after the collapse of the socialist policies and wars in the late 1960s. With Sadat coming to power in 1970, the socialist path to development was abandoned, because Sadat was in favor of liberal policies. He thought that saving Egyptian economy was only possible via attracting foreign direct investment either from within or without the Middle East. Therefore, in order to consolidate power, he eliminated the Nasserite elite, which were against him. Sadat’s *infitah* eroded the two basic pillars of the Nasser’s regime: corporatism and monopolistic state capitalism. However, it was up to question to what extent he made it intentionally.

The main objective of the *infitah* was to attract foreign investment and achieve capital accumulation since it was not possible to improve the economic situation through

²⁸⁰ Interim Agreement Between Egypt and Israel, September 4, 1975, available at <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Interim+Agreement+between+Israel+and+Egypt.htm>, (accessed on 12 February 2013).

Egypt's own resources. The increasing oil revenues in the oil-rich Arab states following the oil boom (the increase in the oil prices) turned out to be the opportunity to be seized by Egypt. However, without restructuring the economy, neither the opportunities nor the liberalization policies brought in lucrative results. It led to an inflation which resulted in a significant decrease in the purchasing power of low and fixed income strata. "The prices of food items, for example, rose from 120.8 % in 1973 to 209.9 % in 1976 (an increase of 73 %) with 1970 as the base year."²⁸¹ Besides, the imports quadrupled between the years 1973 and 1975 due to the liberalization of trade. The export of cotton was far from meeting the demand for the imported wheat, the price of which increased almost 400 %.²⁸² Besides, until the 1977, the foreign capital investment in the Egyptian economy was far below the level needed and desired. The value of the US investment corresponded not more than the 4 % of the total value of the industrial projects approved by the Egyptian government. The scarcity of the foreign investment derived from several reasons including the complexities of the Egyptian bureaucracy, the lack of the feasibility studies, poor infrastructure and the probability of war with Israel.²⁸³

With the implementation of the *Infitah* policies, Egypt began to display more characteristics of a rentier state. By the end of 1970s, the oil exports, workers remittances, Suez Canal and tourism revenues drew away other sources of foreign exchange. On the other hand, these incomes as sources of foreign exchange were very much dependent on the regional and international context rather than the *infitah* policies. Oil price hikes in 1973 increased oil revenues which brought in increases in the Arab foreign aid and employment of more workers led to increase in workers' remittances.²⁸⁴ Despite the military expenditure to sustain the War of Attrition (1969-70), there were other damages to the Egyptian economy, which was the destruction of the

²⁸¹ Ibrahim Karawan, "Foreign Policy Restructuring: Egypt's Disengagement from the Arab-Israeli Conflict Revisited", *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.18, Number 3, October 2005, p.328.

²⁸² Ibid, pp.328-329.

²⁸³ John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*, pp. 144-145.

²⁸⁴ John Waterbury, "The 'Soft State' and The Open Door: Egypt's Experience with Economic Liberalization, 1974-1984", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 18, No.1, (October 1985), p.67.

cities along the canal. Egypt, like most of the Arab states, whether oil states or non-oil states, got its share from the oil boom following the 1973 War.

According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) figures, the Egyptian economy achieved a real GDP growth rate of 9 percent on annual average during the period 1975-78—higher than ever before and after. In current dollar values, Egypt's total GDP increased from \$ 9.015 billion in 1974 to \$ 14.850 billion in 1978. This rapid economic improvement was the outcome of a sharp increase in the volume of rental incomes, namely, workers' remittances; massive foreign aid from Arab oil-rich states and, since 1975, also from the United States; the incomes of the Suez Canal dues following the reopening in June 1975; and increasing tourism revenues.²⁸⁵

This only provided a temporary relief to the Egyptian economy since it did not stem from any structural change in the economy. Less than anticipated, though, the influx of foreign resources facilitated the way out from stagnation following the 1967 War. However, with its lower priority in the distribution of welfare, the *Infitah* policies did not lead to improvement in the socio-economic conditions of the ordinary Egyptians. It increased the inequality among the rich and poor in favor of the rich.²⁸⁶ Although the foreign aid helped to maintain subsidies in the basic goods throughout the 1974 and 1975, the high inflation and stagnant wages led to increasing public dissent leading to riots. On 1 January 1975, industrial workers (from Helwan iron and steel complex) rioted in downtown Cairo with the slogans: “Hero of the (canal) crossing, where is our breakfast?”, “Sadat, your government are thieves and you are blind” and “We work full-time and the government robs the country full-time”.²⁸⁷ The consumer demand increased after the 1973 October War, but the imports of the basic commodities like wheat, flour, sugar, and oil was not able to meet the demand. After the 1975 riots, Sadat ordered the allocation of from the budget to increase the imports of the basic commodities. However, it was not enough to appease the public dissent. Egypt was able to resist the

²⁸⁵ Gad G. Gilbar and Onn Winckler, “The Economic Factor of The Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Cases of Egypt, Jordan and Syria”, Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman (ed.s), *Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution?*, (Brighton, Protland: Sussex Academic Press, 2006), p.192.

²⁸⁶ Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr, *Egyptian Politics under Sadat: The Post-populist Development of an Authoritarian- Modernizing State*, (London, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 272-288.

²⁸⁷ A.I. Dawisha, *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy*, (New York: Macmillan Press, 1976), p.188.

IMF stabilization measures until the year 1976. When Egypt had to borrow an emergency loan of \$ 130 million, it was compelled to adopt the reform measures in return. Accordingly, on 18 January 1977, the Minister of Finance, Dr. Abd-Al-Moneium Al-Qaissuni announced the cut in government subsidies on sugar, flour, rice, oil, bottled gas, cigarettes and beer. The very next day, on 19 January 1977, riots broke out in Egyptian cities of Cairo and Alexandria spread to Mansoura, Quena, Suez, Aswan and other urban areas. The participants in the riots included industrial workers, civil servants and students. Having been bewildered with the scale of the riots, Sadat responded to the riots with coercion. The army was deployed in the streets and curfew was imposed. Hundreds of people were killed and injured during the riots. Eventually, Sadat regime cancelled the cuts in the subsidies, but it was not followed wage increases for the public sector employees.²⁸⁸

3.1.6. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE PEACE: PEACE INCENTIVES

The US aid that Egypt was to acquire had been counted among the most important economic incentive –even the most important incentive of all- for making peace with Israel. Ibrahim Kamal disagreed with that proposition since he thought that Egypt could get more aid from the Arab states than the aid provided by the US if Egypt was not isolated from the Arab world because of the peace treaty.²⁸⁹ During the Nasser period, Egypt was supported with aid in order to ensure its presence in the Arab world. However, after the defeat of 1967 War, with Sadat coming to power, the oil-rich Arab states started paying Egypt to stay out of the Arab politics and by the US to opt out from the Arab-Israeli conflict by stopping hostilities with Israel.²⁹⁰ In fact, the Arab aid never

²⁸⁸ Melvin A. Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin: The Domestic Politics of Peacemaking*, (Boulder Colo.:Westview Press, 1983), p.6.

²⁸⁹ Bruzonsky, “Interview with Mohammed”, p.92.

²⁹⁰ Nazih N. Ayubi, *The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat*, (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1991), p.329.

reached to the level Sadat had anticipated, and was declining yearly.²⁹¹ Therefore, choosing the peace camp, even at the expense of the Arab aid, seemed much more beneficial to Sadat. Even though securing a substantial amount of US aid was curial, more important was ensuring US support which could open more doors in terms of improving the economic situation of Egypt such as easy relations with other Western donors and the international financial institutions like IMF and World Bank as well as the attraction of Western investment.

The end of state of belligerency with Israel would lead a reduction in the defense expenditures of the Egyptian state enabling that amount of money to other development projects. Besides, Egypt had lost the oil fields in Sinai after the 1967 War. The loss of Sinai ripped Egypt apart from the oil revenues as well as developing new oil field in the west bank of the Canal. Combined with the loss of Suez Canal revenues, the damage to the Egyptian economy totaled billions of dollars annually.²⁹² Not only the loss of Sinai, but also the continuing state of war with Israel resulted in a decline in tourism revenues as well. Therefore, by recovering Sinai Egypt would attain new sources of revenue.

3.1.8. LEADERSHIP: SADAT, CARTER, BEGIN

Sadat was known to be a man of great self-confidence and never hesitated making bold moves. He always wanted to be the Arab peacemaker. He wanted to be the great Arab leader who changed the path of history by making a comprehensive peace with Israel. He knew that it was the US who was holding the 99 per cent of the cards regarding the peace in the Middle East, because it could put pressure on Israel. Therefore, he needed to show the US how important Egypt was for the region and for the US. Sadat was also a man of big gestures and theatricals. For that reason, he was not believed and thought to be dramatizing when he said that he would go to Israel for peace. However, Sadat

²⁹¹ Ibid, p. 325.

²⁹² Gilbar and Winckler, "The Economic Factor", p. 191.

always referred to the psychological barrier between the Arabs and the Jews as the main obstacle to peace. Therefore, he intended to break that psychological barrier with his visit to Jerusalem.

Sadat viewed Carter as an honest man, an honest man to himself and an honest man to others. Sadat underlined Carter's honesty as the main reason why he did not have any difficulty in his conducts with Carter. Sadat expressed: "I find that I am dealing with a man who understands what I want, a man impelled by the power of religious faith and lofty values-a farmer like me."²⁹³ Carter also accepted that Sadat and him had "an easy and natural friendship" since they first met and they trusted each other, and everyone else, including the news reporters were aware of their close relationship.²⁹⁴

Sadat and Begin had shared similarities in terms of background. Both were military men and discredited leaders who struggled hard for power and legitimacy. In terms of their attitudes regarding advice, both treated advisers with certain disdain. Despite their similarities, they had differences. Sadat and Begin met several times before the Camp David talks. During these meetings (e.i. Ismailiya meetings in December 1977), Carter grasped the conflictual stances of the two leaders and their differences in profile. Sadat was more inclined to compromise compared to Begin. Mohammed Ibrahim Kamal, Sadat's Foreign Minister during the Camp David talks, underlined that among the three, Sadat, Begin and Carter, Begin was the ones who was sticking on the ground and refusing any pushes to any directions.²⁹⁵ Accordingly, Carter concluded that the more often Sadat and Begin met, the more likely they would clash. For that reason, he avoided direct contacts between the two during the initial working sessions of the Camp David talks. Carter met separately and individually with Begin and Sadat.²⁹⁶ Again, Kamal portrayed the pattern of negotiations as: "Carter was making concessions to Begin and

²⁹³ Sadat, *In Search of Identity*, p. 302.

²⁹⁴ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: The Memoirs of a President*, (New York, London: Bantam Books, 1982), p.284.

²⁹⁵ Bruzonsky, "Interview with Mohammed", p. 90.

²⁹⁶ Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin*, pp.210-212.

came to Sadat and Sadat was making concessions to Carter and so on...²⁹⁷ At the end of the day, the success of the negotiations owed a great deal to the US President Carter as a decisive mediation, and the trust Sadat had in him. When the hands were shaken following the signing of the treaty, Sadat praised Carter by saying that he was “the man who performed a miracle”²⁹⁸.

3.1.7. SADAT’S HISTORIC VISIT TO JERUSALEM

The US together with USSR in support was promoting to convene an international conference under the auspices of the UN to discuss the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This constituted the subject of Sadat’s address to Egyptian Parliament on 9 November 1977. During his address, for the first time he explicitly declared his willingness to go to Israel for peace. He stated:

I am ready to go to Geneva- and I do not conceal this from you who are the representatives of the people and I say it in the hearing of our people and of the Arab nation. You heard me saying that I am prepared to go to the ends of the earth if my doing so will prevent any of my officers or men being killed or wounded. I really am ready to go to the ends and Israel will be amazed to hear me say that we do not refuse them- I am prepared to go to their very home, to the Knesset itself and discuss things with them.²⁹⁹

His words caused outrage in the Arab world, mainly in the ‘rejectionist front’ composed of Syria, Libya, Iraq and Algeria. He was subject to opposition at home as well. His Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Fahmy resigned. Despite the shock that his words created in Egypt, Israel and elsewhere, it was thought that Sadat was making an empty promise. However, Sadat’s approach was welcomed in Israel, because Israel was willing to circumvent the idea of gathering an international conference in Geneva. Begin was

²⁹⁷ Bruzonsky, “Interview with Mohammed”, p. 90.

²⁹⁸ “1979: Israel and Egypt Shake Hands on Peace”, BBC On This Day, 26 March 1979, http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/26/newsid_2806000/2806245.stm.

²⁹⁹ “President Sadat’s Address to the Egyptian Parliament”, Harry Hurwitz and Yisrael Medad (ed.s), *Peace in the Making: The Menachem Begin- Anwar El-Sadat Personal Correspondance*, (Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing, 2011), p. 6.

pleased with the possibility that such conference could be avoided with the bilateral move with Egypt. Sadat's speech was immediately responded by Menachem Begin. Two days later, on 11 November 1977, he addressed the Egyptian people via Israel's Arabic language radio:

Citizens of Egypt, this is the first time that I address you directly, but it is not the first time that I think and speak of you. [...] We wish you well. There is no reason whatsoever for hostility between our peoples. [...] We, the Israelis, stretch out our hand to you [...] It will be our pleasure to welcome and receive your president with the traditional hospitality you and we have inherited from our common father Abraham. And, I, for my part, will of course be ready to come to your capital, Cairo, for the same purpose: no more wars- peace, a real peace and forever.³⁰⁰

The process was followed with Begin's official invitation on 15 November 1977 and Sadat's acceptance. By the way, in the absence of diplomatic relations between Israel and Egypt, the messages and letters were conveyed through the US ambassador to Israel (Sam Lewis) and US ambassador to Egypt (Hermann Frederick Eilts).

Sadat arrived in Jerusalem on 19 November 1977. That was unprecedented moment in the history of the Middle East. It was the first time ever that an Arab leader was visiting Israel. There was fear and suspicion in the air. Israelis were wary of a military plot whereas the Egyptian delegation had the fear of being shot down. All the fears and suspicion faded away as Sadat came out of the plane. He was even able to make jokes with Ariel Sharon, who was the Commander of the 143rd Division during the 1973 October War. Sadat turned to Sharon and said: "Here you are! I tried to chase you in the desert. If you try to cross my canal again, I'll have you locked up." Sharon laughed and said: "No need for that. I am glad you are here. I'm minister of agriculture now."³⁰¹

The very next day, on 20 November 1977, Sadat delivered his historic speech in the Knesset. During his speech he underlined his peace proposal as follows:

³⁰⁰ "Begin Broadcasts Directly to the Egyptian People", *ibid*, p. 7.

³⁰¹ Yehuda Avner, *The Prime Ministers: An Intimate Narrative of Israeli Leadership*, (New Milford, London, Jerusalem: The Toby Press, 2010), p.461.

First; ending the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

Second; achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian People and their right of self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.

Third; the right of all states in the area to live in peace within their boundaries, which will be secure and guaranteed through procedures to be agreed upon, which provide appropriate security to international boundaries, in addition to appropriate international guarantees.

Fourth; commitment of all states in the region to administer the relations among them in accordance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter, particularly the principles concerning the non-resort to force and the solution of differences among them by peaceful means.

Five; ending the state of belligerency in the region.³⁰²

When Begin spoke after Sadat in the Knesset, he underlined the historical Jewish connection to the land of Israel in response to the territorial demands expressed by Sadat, but he also stressed Israel's willingness to enter into negotiations on all issues.³⁰³

3.2. CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY

After 12 days of intense negotiations, the Camp David Accords were signed between the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin on 17 September 1978 and witnessed by the US President Jimmy Carter in Camp David in the US. Camp David Accords (see in APPENDIX A) were composed of two accords. The first accord was "The Framework for Peace in the Middle East". It included a preamble and three major sections which set guidelines for the settlement in the West Bank and Gaza Strip involving Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people. The second accord, entitled "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt" defined the procedures for the gradual withdrawal of Israel from Sinai within specified periods of time.

³⁰² "Sadat Addresses the Knesset in Jerusalem", Hurwitz and Medad (ed.s), *Peace in the Making*, p. 26.

³⁰³ "Begin Addresses the Knesset After Sadat", *ibid*, pp.29-36.

“The Framework for Peace in the Middle East” recognized the UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for the future negotiations among the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was stated that peace could be achieved by “respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of violence.”³⁰⁴ To enhance security, parties could agree on taking special security arrangements such as “demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures of monitoring and other arrangements”³⁰⁵. According to the accord, the future of West Bank and Gaza Strip was to be decided in three stages. At the first stage, Egypt and Israel would decide on transitional arrangements for the full autonomy of West Bank and Gaza Strip which would last maximum five years. Palestinians would be entitled to elect their own self-governing authority (administrative council) and as soon as the elections were over, Israeli military government and civilian administration would withdraw from these territories. At the second stage, Egypt, Israel and Jordan would determine the powers and responsibilities of the elected self-governing authority and representatives of Palestinians might be included. Israeli armed forces would withdraw, but would be redeployed to the specified security locations. To ensure local security local police forces composed of Jordanians and Israelis might be established. The third stage foresaw five years’ transitional period after the establishment of the self-governing authority for the determination of the final status of West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations to define the final status were not to begin later than the third year of the transitional period. Within this framework, the Palestinians ‘would participate’ in the determination of their own future by getting involved in the negotiations together with Egypt, Jordan and Israel. Finally, during the transitional period, a committee, composed of representatives from Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Palestinian self-governing authority, would be established. The committee would monitor the admission of the displaced Palestinians from West Bank and Gaza during the 1967 War. The first accord also called for the

³⁰⁴ Preamble, The Framework for Peace in the Middle East, *Camp David Accords*, 17 September 1978, See in Annex A.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

peaceful settlement of disputes between Egypt and Israel. Parties would negotiate in order to conclude a peace treaty within three months. In addition, in order to be able to establish normal relations, the parties should fully recognize each other, abolish economic boycotts and guarantee that each country's citizens enjoyed equal protection of law in other's jurisdiction. United States was invited to the peace talks whereas UN Security Council would be asked to endorse the peace treaties.³⁰⁶ However, there was not explicit reference to the Palestinian right of self-determination or the creation of a Palestinian state. The issue of East Jerusalem was not mentioned, either.

The second accord as the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt" underlined that the all principles of the UNSC Resolution 242 applied to the dispute between the two countries. It was agreed that the treaty would be implemented three years after the signing of the treaty if not agreed otherwise. Israel would withdraw from Sinai and Egypt would exercise full sovereignty within its borders internationally demarcated to the mandate Palestine. Israel would retain its right of free passage through Suez Canal, Gulf of Aqaba and Straits of Tiran. The accord also specified limitations on the stationing of Egyptian, Israeli and UN forces in Sinai. After the completion of interim withdrawal and the signing of the peace treaty, Egypt and Israel would engage in diplomatic, economic and cultural relations.³⁰⁷

The Camp David Accords led Sadat and Begin to winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 1978 and paved the way for signing the peace treaty. The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed in Washington DC on 26 March 1979 by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and witnessed by the US President Jimmy Carter. The peace treaty eventually ended the official state of war between Egypt and Israel. In adherence to the Camp David Accords, Israel would withdraw its military forces from Sinai and deploy them along the internationally recognized border. Israel would also abandon its settlements, military bases, infrastructure and the oil fields in

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

³⁰⁷ "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Israel and Egypt", *Camp David Accords*, 17 September 1978, See in Annex A.

Sinai. The peace treaty was composed of nine articles, one annex setting the procedures of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and security arrangements and another annex related to the formation of normal relations between the two states. By this way, Egypt became the first Arab state that officially recognized the state of Israel.

3.3. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS AFTER THE PEACE TREATY: DYNAMICS OF COLD PEACE

Sadat was heavily criticized for making peace with Israel. The separate peace with Israel would harness the possibility of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East since neither the Israelis nor the Arabs would be willing to put in the necessary efforts for such vision. Sadat, in fact, thought that despite the criticisms, sooner or later other Arab states would follow his steps to make peace with Israel. If war was not a possibility without Egypt, then their only choice would be to jump in the peace camp.

3.3.1. REGIONAL REACTIONS TO THE TREATY

Sadat was harshly criticized because of his peace with Israel in the Arab world. Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, stated in a rally in the West Beirut: “Let them sign what they like. A false peace will not last.”³⁰⁸ Sadat’s peace with Israel cost him the expulsion from the Arab fold. With the Baghdad Resolution issued by the Arab League on 31 March 1979, Egypt was condemned for making a separate peace with Israel which was forbidden in the previous Arab summits. Besides, Egypt’s unilateral move was regarded as a betrayal to the Arab cause of liberating the land of Palestine and a severe blow to the Arab solidarity. Arab states agreed to cut their diplomatic, political and economic relations with Egypt. Egypt’s membership of the Arab League was suspended, and the League’s headquarters was moved from Cairo to Tunis. Arab states also agreed on

³⁰⁸ “1979: Israel and Egypt”, BBC On This Day.

cutting Arab financial and oil aid to Egypt.³⁰⁹ Among the Arab states, Saudi Arabia was in favor of a less severe punishment. Therefore, neither the deposits of the Gulf states in the Egyptian Banks were drawn out nor the Egyptian expatriate workers were expelled. The disbursements for the joint ventures with Egypt were not completely cut off, but slowed down. New projects were even initiated, limited though, like the opening of the Faisal Islamic Bank in Cairo in July 1979.³¹⁰

The impact of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty to the Middle East regional order had revealed itself in the collapse of the Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria alliance, which had influenced the regional politics to a great extent after the 1973 October War. The collapse of this alliance together with the removal of the Egypt from the military equation in the Arab-Israeli conflict had provided Israel freedom to act on its own in the Levant under the disguise of protecting its own security.³¹¹ It is generally underlined in the literature that Israel would never dare to invade Lebanon if she had not made peace with Egypt. Having Egypt out of the conflict and closing the western front in a possible war enabled Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982,³¹² and in a similar vein the Israeli raid on the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

Meanwhile, by proposing the US with the logistical facilities and training opportunities, Sadat tried to help the US in their attempt to rescue the hostages in Tahrán in 1979. He wanted to underline that Egypt was indispensable for the US in the Middle East. By this way, he also intended to convey the vitality of Egypt for any US strategy in the region and thus, he wanted to persuade all the Arab states that they needed Egypt more than Egypt needed them. His mediation efforts of convincing the US to sell the AWACS surveillance aircraft to Saudi Arabia was a reflection of his attempts to show Egypt's

³⁰⁹ M. Cherif Bassouni and Sholomo Ben Ami (ed.s), *A Guide to Documents in the Arab-Palestinian/Israeli Conflict: 1897-2008*, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009), p. 148.

³¹⁰ Ayubi, *The State and Public Policies*, p.325.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, pp.327-328.

³¹² Bruzonsky, "Interview with Mohammed", pp.87-88.

importance for the Arab world.³¹³ On the other hand, Sadat was more than confident in terms of Egypt's isolation in the Arab world. He believed that sooner or later the Arab states would readmit Egypt to the Arab fold, because an Arab world without Egypt would not be possible. Sadat also made use of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) for finding a way to restore its relations with Iraq which was one of the leading mobilizers of the anti-Camp David camp. Sadat condemned the war between Iran and Iraq with reference to the Islamic identity of the two states. However, this did not preclude Sadat from sending weapons and ammunitions to Iraq upon her request, and it eased the tensions on the Egyptian-Iraqi relations.³¹⁴

Sadat's attempts to restoring relations with the Arab states were pursued by Mubarak after his death. During the Mubarak period, the visit by Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the PLO to Egypt and the readmission of Egypt to the Islamic Conference Organization in 1984 also contributed to the improving image of the Egypt. The diplomatic relations with Jordan were also re-established in 1984. The political contacts with Morocco, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states were strengthened. The restoration of the diplomatic relations with the Gulf states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) took place in the Arab Summit in Amman in November 1987. During the Arab Summit in Casablanca in May 1989, Egypt was re-admitted to the Arab League. Egypt also became a member of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) which was founded in February 1989 with the participation of Iraq, Jordan, North Yemen and Egypt. Strategic and economic in scope, the initiative could not survive after the 1991 Gulf war.³¹⁵

³¹³ Ayubi, *The State and Public Policies*, p.328

³¹⁴ Ibid, pp.328-329.

³¹⁵ Ibid, pp.330-331.

3.3.2. DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT

During his presidency, Sadat provided the Islamists, who had been suppressed during the Nasser period, with cultural and ideological autonomy in return for their political support. He also backed Islamists as an alternative to the leftists who could pose a challenge to his authority. Sadat had always been wary of the leftists and Nasserists with the will of plotting against him. However, it was the Islamists enjoying the freedom granted by him that was mobilizing as a powerful opposition. 1 June 1976 dated intelligence memorandum by the US described it as: “The Moslem Brotherhood seems recently to have grown in influence, especially in the military and in the government agencies. Supported by money (and arms as well) from Libya, its long-term aim is to exploit the shortcomings of Sadat’s regime.”³¹⁶ Although Sadat began to realize the power of the Islamists mainly due to their mobilization among the youth at the universities, he was still not aware of the fact that they had infiltrated to the army.

In order to maintain his power, Sadat attempted to prevent any rival power center to acquire the strength that might challenge him. He even excluded Hosni Mubarak, his vice-president and of whom he spoke highly most of the time, from Camp David talks, because at that time Mubarak was opposed to Sadat’s peace efforts beginning with his visit to Jerusalem in 1977. Before the approval of the Camp David Accords in the Parliament on 14 October 1978, he changed the composition of his government and appointed a new Prime Minister, Mostafa Khalil.³¹⁷ He also strengthened his authority over the military by appointing new senior commanders. Such moves guaranteed the approval of the peace accords and his power as the president, but he began to lose control of the domestic situation as he grew more coercive by the 1980s. He arrested many of his critics from different sections to strengthen his hold of domestic politics, but these resulted in more discontent.

³¹⁶ “Egypt: Sadat’s Domestic Position”, *Interagency Intelligence Memorandum*, 1 June 1976, Approved for Release, (CIA Historical Collections Division, 13 November 2013), p.6, http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/1821105/1976-06-01.pdf

³¹⁷ Friedlander, *Sadat and Begin*, pp. 239-240.

On 30 July 1980, Knesset adopted the *Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel*. According to the law, the boundaries of the city of Jerusalem would remain as it was after the 1967 War and the united Jerusalem would be the capital of Israel. The law attracted worldwide criticism. The UN adopted a Security Council Resolution 478 in 1980, reiterating the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and expressing its deep concerns over the law in terms of the future of peace and security in the region. The resolution by stipulating that the enactment of the *basic law* was a violation of international law and was incompatible with the previous UNSC Resolutions,

Determines that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, which have altered or purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem, and in particular the recent “basic law” on Jerusalem, are null and void and must be rescinded forthwith.³¹⁸

There was an outcry of anger throughout the Islamic world in response the law, but Sadat’s reaction was extraordinarily calm.³¹⁹

Israel bombed and destroyed Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad in Iraq on 6 June 1981 due to the claim that the reactor was designed to produce nuclear weapons. The bombing took place just after two days when Sadat and Begin met in Sharm El-Sheikh. It appealed to many Egyptians and Arabs as if Sadat and Begin conspired the attack. They thought that if Begin did not tell about it to Sadat and take his approval, how he could dare to take such an action. Although Sadat denied all the critics and stated that he did not have any knowledge about the attack, the event severely harmed Sadat’s position at home and in the Arab world.³²⁰ Afterwards, Sadat’s passive attitude against the large-scale Israeli air-raid against the PLO headquarters in Beirut in July 1981 and

³¹⁸ S/RES/478, “Resolution 478 of 20 August 1980”, United Nations Security Council, <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/DDE590C6FF232007852560DF0065FDDB>, (accessed on 05 July 2014).

³¹⁹ Finklestone, *Anwar Sadat*, p. 270.

³²⁰ *Ibid*, 271.

following the escalation of the situation to a direct confrontation between the PLO and Israel³²¹ was interpreted as provocation by the radical Islamists.

All these resentments eventually led to the assassination of Anwar Sadat on 6 October 1981 during the annual 6 October military parade commemorated the Egyptian crossing of the Suez Canal in 1973 War. The assassination plan was prepared and executed by Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The assassin, Lieutenant Al-Islambouli, was a young artillery officer. The assassination revealed the infiltration of radical Islamists into the military. In addition to Sadat, 11 others were killed and 28 were wounded during the gunshots. His Vice President Hosni Mubarak survived slightly injured and became the president of Egypt. Mubarak ruled Egypt for 30 years. His early actions of suspension of 6 October parades and expansion of the security forces were the indications of his governing style: avoiding risks that could endanger his regime. On 6 October 1981, when he addressed the nation to announce Sadat's death, he said:

We say to the late leader that we will stand as one solid front behind all the banners he had raised. Oh, people of Egypt, I hereby declare in the name of the great soul passing away and in the name of the people, its constitutional institutes and its armed forces, that we are committed to all charters, treaties, and international obligations which Egypt has concluded, and that we would not stop pushing the peace wheel in compliance with the mission carried by the leader.³²²

Mubarak did stick to the peace treaty with Israel, but never visited Israel except the occasion of Rabin's funeral in 1995. He pursued good relations with the US and became a key US ally.

³²¹ Fatah, a faction of PLO carried out an attack by hijacking a bus on Israel's Coastal highway near Haifa in 1978. The attack resulted in the death of 38 Israelis and 71 wounded. In response Israel launched Operation Litani in March 1978 and invaded the south of Litani River for destroying the PLO infrastructure. PLO withdrew to the north of the river. Israeli operation was condemned internationally. Upon the UNSC Resolution 425, Israel withdrew from South Lebanon and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) was established and deployed in the South Lebanon. See Asher Kaufman, "From Litani to Beirut- Israel's Invasions of Lebanon 1978-85: Causes and Consequences", Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (ed.s), *Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, (New York: Routledge, 2010), p.29.

³²² "Excerpts from the Vice-President's Statements", *New York Times*, 7 October 1981, <http://www.nytimes.com/1981/10/07/world/excerpts-from-the-vice-president-s-statement.html>, (accessed on 06 March 2013).

3.3.3. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS: STILL PROBLEMATIC

Following the treaty, full diplomatic relations between Egypt and Israel were established on 26 February 1980. Israel opened an embassy in Cairo and a consulate in Alexandria whereas Egypt opened an embassy in Tel Aviv and a consulate in Eilat. In order to enhance relations between the two countries and strengthened the peace process, additional 50 normalization agreements were signed by the parties.³²³

Although Israel completed its withdrawal from most of the Sinai in 1982, the return of Taba, which was a small Egyptian town in the north of Gulf of Aqaba, turned into a controversy and a threat to damage relations between Egypt and Israel. Egypt claimed sovereignty over the land whereas Israel stated that the maps of the area were incorrect and the land belonged to Israel. When the parties were unable to reach an agreement, the issue was submitted to an international committee and in the end, the committee decided in favor of Egypt. It was 1989 when Israel finally returned Taba to Egypt in accordance with an agreement signed between the parties.³²⁴

3.3.3.1. REPEATED PRACTICE OF RECALLING EGYPTIAN AMBASSADORS

Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was considered as the second blow after Sadat's assassination to the peace process. Prime Minister Begin ordered the Operation Peace for Galilee for fighting against the Palestinian militants who were attacking Israel from Lebanon. The operation ended up with the invasion of Lebanon up to Beirut and resulted

³²³ "Israel-Egypt: A review of Bilateral Relations", Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2003, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Foreign%20Relations/Bilateral%20relations/Israel%E2%80%93Egypt-%20A%20Review%20of%20Bilateral%20Ties> , (accessed on 06 March 2013).

³²⁴ Joel Brinkley, "Signing of Agreement With Israel Turns Over Last of Sinai to Egypt", *The New York Times*, 27 February 1989, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/02/27/world/signing-of-agreement-with-israel-turns-over-last-of-sinai-to-egypt.html>

in the massacres of thousands of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps and Lebanese Shiites. In response, the Egypt's first ambassador to Israel, Saad Murtada was recalled to Cairo for consultations. However, the appointment of a new ambassador took almost four years. These foreign policy moves by Mubarak was appreciated in the Arab world and contributed to the normalization of relations with the Arab states.

Egypt's second ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Bassiouni was appointed in 1986. He stayed in that position during the 1987 *Intifada* until 2000 when the Second (al-Aqsa) *Intifada* broke out. Besides, when Israel launched its largest military operation, Operation Defensive Shield in 2002, to West Bank after 1967, Egyptian government decided to suspend its inter-governmental relations with Israel with the exception of diplomatic channels coping with the Palestinians. It took Egypt another five years to appoint a new ambassador to Israel. Egypt's stance was a show of the fact that Israeli military offensive against the Palestinians was not a concern of Israelis and Palestinians, but would have repercussions in the wider Arab world.

3.3.3.2. PEACE AND (ANTI)NORMALIZATION

Sadat, especially in his last years, took a hard line against the rejectionists that fuelled public dissent. Popular opposition to the peace with Israel was much more vocal in the post-Sadat era since they enjoyed much freedom. Mubarak chose to allow controlled demonstrations of solidarity with the Palestinians after the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and during the *Intifada* in 1987-1993, because they were not deemed to be direct threats to the regime. At the very same time, the Egyptian government did not take a firm official position in encouraging or discouraging relations with Israel. Stein portrays the issue of anti-normalization as a consensus between the government and the opposition, each playing its part without crossing the red lines. To prove his argument, he gives the example of the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Sha'b*, representing left-wing opposition. When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the newspaper criticized Egyptian foreign policy with Israel in line with the peace treaty. It illustrated the treaty as a trap by Israel which tied

Egypt's hands while enabling Israel to continue its regional aggression and expansion. The paper called for public and governmental support to the Palestinian and Lebanese people, but did not ask for military action against Israel by the government.³²⁵ He adds that when Mubarak came to power in 1981, "he allowed the question of Israel to become once again an issue upon which intellectuals and groups could campaign, write and mobilize."³²⁶

Not all Egyptians are against normal relations with Israel, but it is fair to say that there is a powerful social norm, which opposes normalization. Universities boycott Israel, but there have been Egyptian students who go to Israel on fellowships in Israeli academic centers. Egyptian academics also meet with Israeli counterparts in private research centers if not at universities in Cairo. There have been writers and journalists who visited Israel. For instance, Ali Salem, a playwright, visited Israel in 1994 and wrote a book entitled *A Trip to Israel*, but then expelled from the Writers' Union.³²⁷ There are ideological opposition groups like Islamists or the leftists who are against the peace with Israel. The mainstream Islamist opposition perceived Zionism as economic and cultural imperialism that necessitates resistance. Furthermore, they attribute high priority to religious solidarity with the Palestinians who are the carriers of resistance banners against Israel. The leftists, sharing the Islamist perception of Zionism as imperialism, advocated the societal campaign against Zionism, and argued that the government should deal with Israel through diplomatic channels.³²⁸ Apart from the ideological opposing groups, anti-normalization is a stance adopted by most of the professional associations, unions and syndicates. The state-sponsored Writers' Union is one of the leading organizations that defy normalization of relations with Israel. An intense debate

³²⁵ Ewan Stein, "The 'Camp David Consensus': Ideas, Intellectuals and the Division of Labor in Egypt's Foreign Policy Toward Israel", *International Studies Quarterly*, (2011), 55, p. 751.

³²⁶ Stein, *Representing Israel*, p.160.

³²⁷ Iman A. Hamdy, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations: Reflecting Regional Fluidity", Enid Hill (ed.), *Discourses in Contemporary Egypt: Political and Social Issues*, Cairo Papers in Social Sciences, Vol.22, No.4, (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2000), pp.79-80.

³²⁸ Stein, *Representing Israel*, p. 175.

was initiated by Alaa Al-Aswany, who was a member of Writers' Union and whose bestseller book *Yacoubian Building* was published in Hebrew in the website of the Israel- Palestine Center for Research and Information, based in Jerusalem, without consulting the author. The issue was indeed beyond the copyrights and intellectual theft. Al-Aswany was against the translation of his book into Hebrew due to his rigid position in rejecting normalization with Israel.³²⁹

A similar situation was experienced within the Egyptian Journalist Syndicate. When Hala Mustafa, the editor of Al-Ahram's Democracy Review and a member of the Journalist Syndicate invited then Israeli ambassador Shalom Cohen to her office in September 2009, she was subject to fierce criticism from the members of the syndicate which viewed it as a sign of pro-normalization stance and threatened her with expulsion from the syndicate.³³⁰ On the other hand, limited and less in number though they may, there are social efforts that back normal relations with Israel. Some prominent intellectuals like Lutfi Al-Khuli, a writer who supported the Palestinian cause and once an opponent of Sadat's peace initiative, Salah Bassiouny, ex-ambassador and lawyer, and Abdel Monem Said, director of Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies established the Cairo Peace Society (CPS)³³¹. The group included not only intellectuals, but also businessmen. CPS ensured government backing, not openly though, and maintained links with Peace Now in Israel. They even announced a common declaration about the foundations of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East.³³²

³²⁹ "The Yacoubian Building in Hebrew", *The Guardian*, Books Blog, <http://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2010/nov/09/the-yacoubian-building-in-hebrew>; "Egypt Author Protests Hebrew Translation of Novel", 29 October 2010, *Al Arabiya News*, <http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/10/29/124172.html>, (accessed 03 March 2013).

³³⁰ Rachele Klinger, "Normalization with Israel? Not here", *The Jerusalem Post*, 04.02.2010, <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Normalization-with-Israel-Not-here>, (accessed on 05 March 2013).

³³¹ CPS was affected from the atmosphere of the Al-Aqsa Intifida and the increasing tensions although they defended Palestinians. Some members froze their membership or distanced themselves. See Nadia Abou El-Magd, "Normalisation Group Fractures", *Al-Ahram Weekly Online*, Issue. 504, 15-25 October 2000, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2000/504/pal64.htm>.

³³² Hamdy, "Egyptian-Israeli Relations", p.80 and Stein, "The Camp David", p.751.

The issue of anti-normalization campaign is a serious setback to the peace between Egypt and Israel. It casts a shadow on and in certain cases prevents economic cooperation, cultural exchanges or even diplomatic relations. However, it is not an issue to be solved easily. Although the degree and extent of anti-normalization may vary due to the political context, it will continue as long as the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was not resolved on peaceful and just terms. Another point that requires being underlined is the Egypt's position in the Arab world. Egypt has always been devoted to the leadership of the Arab states. From Nasser to Sadat, Sadat to Mubarak, Egypt always wanted to be the leading Arab states whose opinion is always asked and role respected and not stolen. Being the first Arab state to sign peace with Israel, Egypt wanted others to follow, but at the same time it wanted to have a say in their dealings with Israel. Although Mubarak appreciated Jordan's peace with Israel, he was wary of the normalization process between Jordan and Israel with the fear of being bypassed.

After the 25 January Revolution in Egypt, one of the prominent issues that were discussed was the future of the Egyptian-Israeli peace. Both Israelis and the West were feared that the peace treaty might be at stake especially after the announcements made especially by the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates that the treaty should be frozen, revised or cancelled. It had reflections at the governmental level, too. The Eilat incident took place in August 2011. Unidentified gunmen attacked Israeli soldiers and civilians near the Red Sea resort town of Eilat, which led to the escalation of violence. Afterwards, Israel launched air raids on the Gaza Strip and pursued gunmen across the Egyptian border, killing 6 Egyptian soldiers. This led to a diplomatic crisis between Egypt and Israel and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) which in power at the time of events had hard times in appeasing the public anger toward Israel. When Morsi became the President of Egypt in May 2012, Israel was suspected his aims in terms of the peace treaty due his ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Morsi did not support the abrogation of the treaty, but expressed that it could be reviewed. The future of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty became issue for discussion within Egypt, in the Arab world and West, too. During the interview that King Abdullah II of Jordan

gave to Washington Post in October 2012, he underlined that there was a very strong possibility that Egypt would break the peace treaty.³³³

Meanwhile, members of Egypt's Revolutionary Youth Union filed a lawsuit against the President Mohamed Morsi, Prime Minister Hisham Qandil and the Foreign Minister Mohamed Amr for the abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel. The prosecutors argued that the militant groups in Sinai constituted a threat for national security and the peace treaty, which limited Egypt's military presence in Sinai, ties the hands of Egyptian state in ensuring order and security in Sinai. However, the court dismissed the lawsuit due to the fact that the issue was a matter of sovereignty which could only be decided by the president of the republic.³³⁴

In fact, the relations between Egypt and Israel seemed to get better after the ouster of the President Morsi, because Israel did not like him due to his connections with the Muslim Brotherhood and their connections with Hamas. Egypt and Israel were said to be in military cooperation to clean up Sinai from the jihadist terrorists. It was argued that the military operations that Egypt conducted in August and September 2013 were in cooperation with Israel. The issue of Egypt's limited military presence was a matter of discontent not only at the public level, but also at the political level. And after Morsi's removal from power, Egypt and Israel seemed to find a way for dialogue and cooperation over Sinai. Israel permitted an increase in the Egypt's military presence in Sinai due to their mutual interest over the security of Sinai. Israel was also said to deem such permission very reasonable and far better than renegotiating the treaty.³³⁵

³³³ Lally Weymouth, "Jordan's King Abdullah on Egypt, Syria And Israel", *The Washington Post*, 24 October 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2011/10/24/gIQAejhRDM_story.html.

³³⁴ "Only President Can Annul Peace Treaty With Israel: Egypt Court", *Ahram Online*, 30 October 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/56807/Egypt/Politics-/Only-president-can-annul-peace-treaty-with-Israel-.aspx>.

³³⁵ Adam Entous and Charles Levinson, "Israelis, Egyptians Cooperate on Terror", *The Wallstreet Journal*, 13 August 2013, <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324085304579010990544276768>, "Israel and Egypt Forge New Ties Over Sinai", *Al-Monitor*, 13 September 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/israel-egypt-ties-direct-exclude-us.html#>

Within the last few years, various opinion polls were conducted in Egypt to take the pulse of the Egyptian people in regard to the changes taking place in the country since the 25 January Revolution, and one of the issues of concern was the peace treaty with Israel. According to the public opinion poll conducted by the International Peace Institute in New York in September 2011, 70 % of the Egyptians were in favor of maintaining peace with Israel in terms of diplomatic relations and the legal state of the treaty. When it came to the issue of selling natural gas to Israel, 56 % of the Egyptians opted for canceling the gas deal whereas 36 % defended renegotiation of the gas deal. Only 4 % of the Egyptians thought that the gas deal should be maintained as it is.³³⁶ On the contrary, the survey by Pew Research Center pointed out different results. It underlined that 54 % of the Egyptian people were in favor of the cancellation of the peace treaty with Israel whereas 36 % thought that the treaty should be maintained. Above all, despite the discussions about the future of the peace treaty at the public and governmental level, the abrogation of the treaty is not likely although the revision of it has a more likelihood. Nevertheless, due to the primacy of maintaining internal stability, a major change in the foreign policy orientation of Egypt is not expected to occur. In addition, the peace treaty with Israel is not a mere issue of bilateral Egyptian- Israeli relations. It has much to do with Egyptian-US relations, which any government and president that came to power regardless of ideology would dare to alter.

3.3.4. PEACE DIVIDENDS

Peace dividends refer to the economic benefits of peace, which served as the main tool for persuading the elites and the public to peace. Aside from the motivation for peace, this section seeks to identify to what extent the Egyptian economy benefited from its peace with Israel by looking at foreign aid and debt relief, the status of military expenditure, the level of tourism between Egypt and Israel as well as bilateral trade.

³³⁶ “Public Opinion in Egypt”, International Peace Institute, New York, 19 September 2011, <http://www.ipinst.org/images/pdfs/egyptpoll-september2011.pdf>.

Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) are also evaluated within the framework of boosting economic interaction between the two countries.

3.3.4.1. FOREIGN AID AND DEBT RELIEF

Before and during the Camp David talks, Sadat had aimed at ensuring a foreign aid equivalent to that of Israel. Although he was not able to acquire that amount of aid, Egypt has become the second largest recipient of the US foreign assistance after Israel since the 1978 Camp David Accords. The rationale behind the release of aid to Egypt was political. US intended to reward Egypt for making peace with Israel and the continuation of aid aimed at ensuring the maintenance of the peace and dissuading Egypt from any action that could harm the American interests in the Middle East. Despite the fact that the US does not have permanent military bases in Egypt, the US forces were able to access and deploy equipment in the strategic military posts in Egypt and these privileges granted to the US were due to the foreign aid.³³⁷ Egypt supported the US fight against global terrorism and its Operation to Afghanistan in 2001, but opposed its invasion of Iraq in 2003. However, it opened up its air space to the US and granted the US ships with the free and priority passage through the Suez Canal. Egypt also helped US with the interrogation of the terrorist suspects and offered intelligence support.³³⁸

Egypt acquired temporary debt relief when the Paris Club³³⁹ countries rescheduled Egypt's debt of \$ 10 billion of its debt in 1986-1989.³⁴⁰ Then after the 1991 Gulf War,

³³⁷ William Quandt, *The United States and Egypt: An Essay on Policy for the 1990s*, (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1990), p.33.

³³⁸ Lloyd C. Gardner, *The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and The United States From the Rise of Nasser to Fall of Mubarak*, (London: Saqi, 2011), pp.175-180.

³³⁹ Paris Club (Club de Paris), established in 1956, is designed to assist the resolution of the debt problems of the developing nations. It is composed of 19 permanent member countries, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. See <http://www.clubdeparis.org/> .

³⁴⁰ Joe Stork, "Rescheduling the Camp David Debt", *MER 147*, Vol. 17, (July/August 1987), <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer147/rescheduling-camp-david-debt>.

due to Egypt's efforts during the war, US erased \$ 6.6 billion of Egypt's debt. US was not the only one, the bilateral lenders followed suit. By this way, Egypt's total debt forgiven reached the amount of \$13 billion, which reduced its debt to \$ 29 billion in 1991. In addition Egypt acquired an exceptional grant of \$ 3.6 million in order to compensate its economic losses deriving from the war. In May 1991, Paris Club agreed on further decreasing Egypt's debt as part of the implementation of an IMF standby arrangement and a World Bank structural adjustment program.³⁴¹ Recently, there has been a debate about the relief of \$1 billion of Egypt's debt, which exceeds more than \$ 3 billion to the US after the 2011 revolution.³⁴²

Since the start of the aid program, the US has invested almost \$ 75 billion in Egypt. Today more than half of the foreign assistance that Egypt receives is coming from the US. As indicated in the table below, since the year 1998, the US economic assistance to Egypt is gradually decreasing in line with the US policy of reducing economic aid to both Egypt and Israel.³⁴³ The only exception is the amount of economic aid in 2003. Egypt received an additional Economic Support Fund of \$ 300 million according to the Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. Nevertheless, the US military aid to Egypt is almost constant with \$ 1.3 billion.³⁴⁴

³⁴¹ Heba Handoussa and Nemat Shafik, "The Economies of Peace: The Egyptian Case", Stanley Fisher, Dani Rodrik and Elias Tuma (ed.s), *The Economics of Middle East Peace*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: The MIT Press, 1993), pp.26-27.

³⁴² Steven Lee Myers, "To Back Democracy, US Prepares to Cut \$ 1 Billion From Egypt's Debt", New York Times, 3 September 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/04/world/middleeast/us-prepares-economic-aid-to-bolster-democracy-in-egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

³⁴³ Jeremy M. Sharp, "Egypt: Background and US Relations", *CRS Report for Congress*, (Congressional Research Service, 12 May 2009), p.29.

³⁴⁴ Jeremy M. Sharp, "US Foreign Assistance to the Middle East: Historical Background, Recent Trends and the FY2011 Request", *CRS Report for Congress*, (Congressional Research Service, 15 June 2010), p.5.

TABLE 3: US Assistance to Egypt

	Economic	Military	IMET	Total
FY1948-FY1997	\$ 23.288,6	\$ 22.353,5	\$ 27,3	\$ 45.669,4
FY1998	\$ 815,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,0	\$ 2.116,0
FY1999	\$ 775,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,0	\$ 2.076,0
FY2000	\$ 727,3	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,0	\$ 2.028,3
FY2001	\$ 695,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,0	\$ 1.996,0
FY2002	\$ 655,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,0	\$ 1.956,0
FY2003	\$ 911,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,2	\$ 2.212,2
FY2004	\$ 571,6	\$ 1.292,3	\$ 1,4	\$ 1.865,3
FY2005	\$ 530,7	\$ 1.289,6	\$ 1,2	\$ 1.821,5
FY2006	\$ 490,0	\$ 1.287,0	\$ 1,2	\$ 1.778,2
FY2007	\$ 450,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,3	\$ 1.751,3
FY2008	\$ 411,6	\$ 1.289,4	\$ 1,2	\$ 1.702,2
FY2009	\$ 250,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,3	\$ 1.551,3
FY2010	\$ 250,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,9	\$ 1.551,9
FY2011	\$ 249,5	\$ 1.297,4	\$ 1,4	\$ 1.548,3
FY2012	\$ 250,0	\$ 1.300,0	\$ 1,4	\$ 1.551,4
FY2013	\$ 241,0	\$ 1.234,3	\$ 1,7	\$ 1.477,0
Total	\$ 31.561,3	\$ 43.043,5	\$ 47,5	\$ 74.652,3

Source: Adopted from Figure 4, Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations”, CRS Report for Congress, 05 June 2014, available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf> , (accessed on 20 July 2014), p.14.




Figure 5: US Assistance to Egypt

Source: Adopted from Figure 4, Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt: Background and US Relations”, CRS Report for Congress, 05 June 2014, available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf> , (accessed on 20 July 2014), p.14

3.3.4.2. MILITARY EXPENDITURE

By the late 1970s, the military expenditure of Egypt corresponded 12 % of the GNP (Gross National Product) and the arms of import was 2 % of the GNP. After the Camp David Accords, the military expenditure reduced to 7.2 % of the GNP, but the arms import increased to 5 %. The increase in the arms import has much to do with the military assistance provided by the US. The money Egypt spent on importing arms from the US alone in the first ten years of the post-Camp David period amounted to \$ 13 billion, which is more than the twice of the amount Egypt spent in 1954-1974. Although Egypt was taken out of the equation of the Arab-Israeli conflict and ended the state of war with Israel, the US wanted Egypt to have a well-developed, modernized military

capability as the safeguard of the US interests in the region.³⁴⁵ As in shown in the table below, the value of military expenditure has gradually decreased since 1990.

TABLE 4: Egyptian Military Expenditure

Year	Value (% of GDP)	Value (% of Government expenditure)
1990	4.66	21.8
1995	3.89	14.4
2000	3.19	- *
2005	2.85	10.4
2010	2.14	6.9

* data is not available for 2005. [12.9 (as of 2002)]

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Data Base and World Bank Military Expenditure Data

The US has provided annual military assistance of \$ 1.3 billion and there will probably be no changes about the amount in the coming few years since US has announced in 2007 that it would provide Egypt with the military aid of \$ 13 billion over a ten-year period. The US military aid to Egypt is composed of acquisitions, upgrades to the existing equipments and follow-on maintenance contract.³⁴⁶

³⁴⁵ Handoussa and Shafik, “The Economies of Peace”, pp. 25-26.

³⁴⁶ Sharp, “US Foreign Assistance”, pp. 4-6.

3.3.4.3. TOURISM

The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel provided the peoples of the two countries with the opportunity to visit each other's country. However, the number of Israelis visiting Egypt has remained low whereas the number of Egyptians visiting Israel is even lower. The distrust is still an issue between the Egyptian and Israelis in tourism. In contradiction to the theory, an average Egyptian citizen is in fact not free to visit Israel.

El-Nawawy describes the situation as:

Before going to Israel, they would have to be interrogated by the Egyptian intelligence service, and in most cases would be denied. I believe that even average Egyptian citizens were allowed to Israel freely without any governmental restrictions, they still would not consider visiting Israel. I cannot imagine an Egyptian family, for example, taking a weekend vacation in Tel Aviv. Why? Because of the psychological barrier that has been created by years and years of antagonism with Israelis; a barrier that was strengthened by the Egyptian and Arab news media at large, which have enforced Arab stereotypes about the Israelis as invaders of Arab land. Many Egyptians stereotype Israelis as heartless, aggressive and stingy. Many Egyptians cannot even imagine watching an Israeli soap opera on television, let alone visiting Israel.³⁴⁷

TABLE 5: The Number of Israeli Tourists to Sinai, Egypt

Year	Number of Tourists
2003	320.000
2004	397.000
2005	264.000
2006	191.000
2007	260.000

Source: Based on the data in D. Maoz, "Warming up Peace", p.67

³⁴⁷ Mohammed El-Nawawy, *Israeli-Egyptian Peace Process in the Reportings of Western Journalists*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing, 2002), p.19.

Outside the Nile Valley, Sinai is the premier tourist destination in Egypt. When Sinai was under Israeli occupation it was one of the most favorable beach resorts in Israel. After Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai in line with the peace agreement with Egypt, it continued to being a preferred destination by the Israelis. However, the number of the Israeli tourists visiting Sinai in particular, and Egypt in general remained limited and far below from expectations.³⁴⁸ Despite the issue of normalization, tourism between the two countries has suffered from regional phenomena like *Al-Aqsa Intifada* and the Arab Spring which led to the increase in security concerns. Incidents like the Ros Burka Beach Disaster in October 1985 where an Egyptian soldier killed 7 Israeli tourists, the terrorist attacks in October 2004 where 30 people, 13 of which were Israelis, were killed, and similar terrorist attacks that have taken in Sinai in 2004, in Sharm El-Sheikh in 2005 had a negative impact on tourism in Egypt.

3.3.4.4. BILATERAL TRADE

Egypt and Israel signed a trade agreement in 1980 which was put into effect in 1981. The agreement allowed the Most-Favored Nation (MFN)³⁴⁹ treatment of trade between the parties. According to the agreement, each party was to charge the other with the tariff rate of a commodity that was defined in its customs schedule. Since both states were members of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), “these tariffs were the same as those charged by each party on imports from third countries with which each

³⁴⁸ D. Maoz, “Warming Up Peace: An Encounter Between Egyptian Hosts and Israeli Guests in Sinai”, Omar Moufakkir and Ian Kelly (ed.s), *Tourism, Peace and Progress*, (Cambridge:MPG Book, 2010), pp. 65-82.

³⁴⁹ Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment has also been referred as normal trade relations. It corresponds to a status meaning that the state which is subject to MFN treatment is offered the same advantages as the state that grants the status. It is a method of economic relations which prevents discriminatory treatment in an international trading organization or multilateral trade agreements. Trade equality among partners is guaranteed through the principle that countries can export or import goods without facing discriminatory duties. For more, see “Most-Favored-Nation Treatment”, Encyclopedia Britannica.

had an MFN agreement³⁵⁰. The agreement also included the formation of a bilateral committee between Egypt and Israel which was to gather annually in order to enhance bilateral trade between the countries.

The first years after the withdrawal of Israel from Sinai worked well in terms of developing economic cooperation. Hundreds of Egyptian businessmen applied to the Israeli embassy in Cairo to investigate business opportunities with Israel. Similar enthusiasm was shared by the Israeli businessmen. One of the leading industrial and commercial firms in Israel, the Koor Company, opened an office in Cairo. And the trade between Egypt and Israel developed well from almost point zero to the volume of \$ 85 million. Egypt permitted Israeli participation in the international trade fair and the international book fair in 1981 and 1982, which were held annually. However, within two years' time, problems emerged. Businessmen in contact with Israeli embassy started being filtered by the Egyptian government. "Those who persisted were summoned to the security services for a more thorough investigation of working with Israel even if it meant forfeiting money that had already been invested."³⁵¹ When it came to the issue of international trade fair, Egyptian government started saying that they would not be able to guarantee the safety and the security of the Israelis who would attend the fair, and did not allow Israelis to attend the fair in 1983. The souring economic relations starting from 1983 was mainly due to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Thereafter, the volume of trade between Egypt and Israel fell to \$ 12 million by the year 1990.

In fact, the real trade as noted by Dowek, was larger than the official statistics display. Over the years, the Egyptian businessmen found ways to bypass the authorities like the utilization of third-country businessmen as middlemen. Israeli goods were first exported to the third country and then sent to Egypt with the certificate saying that the goods were

³⁵⁰ Paul Rivlin, *Economic Policy and Performance in the Arab World*, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), p. 184.

³⁵¹ Ephraim Dowek, *Israeli-Egyptian Relations (1980-2000)*, (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2001), p. 194.

manufactured in the third country.³⁵² Although the author of this thesis has not found credible evidence whether such trend still takes place, there is a discrepancy between the official statistics of Egypt and Israel declared to the UN Trade Statistics Branch.³⁵³

TABLE 6: Egypt’s Bilateral Trade With Israel (in million US \$)

YEAR	EXPORT (total)	IMPORT (total)
2000	265,972,457	23,845,673
2005	17,140,036	14,583,068
2010	67,993,491	78,641,759
2011	56,411,535	84,272,382
2012	58,523,964	104,115,009
2013	47,992,406	93,411,708

Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data/

The trade relations between Egypt and Israel has never been developed to the desired level mainly due to the political frictions and remained limited to the oil sector and by the mid-2000s to natural gas. In terms of oil, Egypt is exporting oil to Israel since November 1979 in line with its commitment during the Camp David talks in 1978. By the year 1995, Egyptian oil supply constituted one third of Israel’s oil imports, but the number decreased throughout the time and became one eighth by the year 2000.

³⁵² Ibid, p.196 and Ephraim Kleiman, “Is There a Secret Arab-Israeli Trade?”, *Middle East Quarterly*, Vol.5, No.2, (June 1998), pp. 11-18.

³⁵³ See in UN Comtrade Database, <http://comtrade.un.org/>.

Egypt and Israel signed a gas deal, worth of \$ 2,5 billion in 2005, and renegotiated in 2008. With the gas deal, Egypt guaranteed the supply of % 40 of Israel's gas needs by Egypt for 15 years. The deal was backed by the Egyptian government due to the memorandum of understanding between Egypt and Israel with reference to the 1979 Peace treaty, the dispute could hardly be commercial. Under the gas deal, Egyptian-Israeli Company East Mediterranean Gas (EMG) sold gas to Israel.³⁵⁴ EMG was founded by Hussein Salem, who was a former intelligence chief and a close associate of Mubarak. The gas deal had always sparked heated debates within the parliament, because EMG was selling underpriced gas to Israel. In 2008, EMG was paying \$ 1.5 per unit (million btu). In the same year, the Japan was exporting gas for \$ 12.5 per unit whereas Germany was exporting gas from Russia for \$ 8 to \$ 10 per unit. Although the gas prices were lifted up to \$ 2.3 per unit in 2009 and \$ 3 in 2010, the prices were far below the market prices when compared to the numbers worldwide. It was calculated that in 2008, Egypt received the revenue which was below \$ 100 million from its gas export to Israel whereas it could have made \$ 770 million.³⁵⁵

After the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, the gas pipeline was subject to several attacks by the radical jihadists groups preventing the supply of gas to Israel. In addition, the gas deal had become a source of public discontent. Therefore, it was cancelled in March 2012. Moreover, Hussein Salem, who is in exile in Spain, was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment and charged with millions of dollars for the misuse of public funds. He was not the only one. Sameh Fahmi, the Oil Minister of Mubarak was also sentenced for 15 years and \$ 2.3 billion. However, he was ordered retrial.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ "EGM's international shareholders said that the Egyptian oil and gas companies act as third-party guarantors of their government's obligations to supply 7 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Israel". See "EGM: Egypt didn't halt gas merely over money", *Haaretz*, 2 April 2012, available at <http://www.haaretz.com/business/emg-egypt-didn-t-halt-gas-merely-over-money-1.426814>, (accessed on 03 March 2013).

³⁵⁵ Amelia Smith, "Egypt's Lost Power: The Hidden Story of Egypt's Oil and Gas Industry", *Middle East Monitor*, 9 June 2014, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/media-review/film-review/11990-egypts-lost-power-the-hidden-story-of-egypts-oil-and-gas-industry>, (accessed on 06 July 2014).

³⁵⁶ "Retrial of Mubarak-era Official in Egypt-Israel Gas Case Starts Sunday", *Ahram Online*, 26 January 2014, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/0/92585/Egypt/Retrial-of-Mubarakera-official-in-EgyptIsrael-gas-.aspx>, (accessed on 06 July 2014).

TABLE 7: Israel’s Natural Gas Imports From Egypt

YEAR	TRADE VALUE (in million US \$)
2008	30, 033,000
2009	205,168,000
2010	272,776,000
2011	115,919,000
2012	7,247,000

* Natural gas is in gaseous state

Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data/

During Morsi’s presidency, Egypt was subject to electricity cuts due to the shortages of natural gas in Egypt. Energy shortage was one of the reasons of Morsi’s unpopularity among a large portion of Egyptian society. The energy shortage stemmed from the decrease in the natural gas production driving from the poor investment in extraction capabilities. The managing director of the Egyptian Regulatory Agency, Hafez El-Salmawy stated: “Production has dropped to 5.2 billion cubic feet a day. Egypt needs 6.5 billion cubic feet per day to function properly.”³⁵⁷ For that reason, Egypt turned to Israeli gas to meet its daily demands. Egypt would pay at least four times more per unit compared to the price it had exported gas to Israel for the Israeli gas. However, there has not been any gas deals made with Israel so far.

³⁵⁷ “Egypt Turns to Israel to Address the Shortage of Natural Gas”, *Al-Monitor*, 23 March 2014, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/egypt-gas-israel-sisi-economy-shortage.html#>, (accessed on 06 July 2014).

3.3.4.5. QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONES (QIZS)

Having been intended to building up a platform to support the Middle East Peace Process, the US Congress authorized the creation of QIZ in 1996 with an amendment to the 1985 US- Israel Free Trade Area Implementation Act. QIZs are also aimed at boosting trade between Israel and its peace partners Egypt and Jordan. Additionally, QIZs intended to provide means to contribute to the economic improvement of the parties by creating employment. Egypt signed the QIZ agreement in 24 December 2004 and entered into force in February 2005. From then on, QIZ zones were established in Egypt in five regions: Greater Cairo, Alexandria, Suez Canal, Central Delta and Upper Egypt (Beni Suef and Al-Minya). More than 700 companies are operating in the QIZs in Egypt with 100.000 workers, most of which are Egyptians. 80 % of the QIZ companies are engaged in textiles and clothing, and it is followed by the foodstuff with the ratio of 3%. Other sectors included in the QIZs are footwear, leather products, organic chemicals, pharmaceuticals and plastics.³⁵⁸

With the agreement, the goods manufactured in designated industrial areas with the required Israeli input, which has to be at least 10.5 %, have the duty-free access to the US market. Originally, the mutually agreed ratio by Egypt and Israel was 11.7 %, but it was lowered to 10.5 % in 2007.³⁵⁹ Furthermore, since 2012, Egyptian government has been striving to reduce the Israeli content amount to 8 % in order to benefit Egypt's raw material sector.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁸ "Egypt-US Relations: Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs)", American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, http://www.amcham.org.eg/resources_publications/trade_resources/egypt_us_relations/QIZs11.asp (accessed on 01 August 2014).

³⁵⁹ "Qualifying Industrial Zones", Office of Textiles and Apparel (OTEXA), US Department of Commerce, <http://web.ita.doc.gov/tacgi/fta.nsf/6b2bbf77ad031a928525737d0053e0b1/5ce31ab4d9c7268585257497004b6324?OpenDocument>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

³⁶⁰ Bassem Abo Alabass, "Egypt in Talks with Israel, US to Adjust the Terms of QIZ Deal: Minister", *Al-Ahram Online*, 24 September 2012, <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/53712/Business/Economy/Egypt-in-talks-with-Israel,-US-to-adjust-terms-of-.aspx>.

TABLE 8: Total Egyptian Exports to the USA (Trade Value)

Year	Total Exports From QIZs	Overall Total Exports
2008	\$ 872,1 million	\$ 1, 255 billion
2009	\$ 948,1 million	\$ 1, 633 billion
2010	\$ 958 million	\$ 1, 547 billion
2011	\$ 1,009 billion	\$ 1, 819 billion
2012	\$ 963,4 million	\$ 2,015 billion

Source: United Nations Comtrade Database, www.comtrade.un.org/data/ and American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt, http://www.amcham.org.eg/resources_publications/trade_resources/egypt_us_relations/QIZs11.asp

It is fair to say that QIZs has an important share in the Egyptian trade policy in general especially for the ready-made garments industry. The US is the largest export market for Egyptian exports³⁶¹, so enjoying duty free access to the US market turns out to be crucial for the Egyptian exporters. Moreover, US market is the only main market where Egyptian exporters do not enjoy duty free access. Egypt has concluded free trade areas with the rest of its main trading partners like European Union, Arab countries, and African countries. For this reason, QIZs play an important role for Egypt to gain a free access to the US market, especially when US's preferential expansion of its Free Trade Areas to Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Oman. The table below displays that the share of total Egyptian exports from QIZ-based factories to the USA is more than 50 % of the total Egyptian exports (including petroleum and related products) to the USA. QIZs caused controversies in the Egyptian Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood bloc in the parliament had portrayed the QIZ agreement as a serious threat to the national

³⁶¹ January 2014 Statistical Bulletin, Central Bank of Egypt, <http://www.cbe.org.eg/English/Economic+Research/Publications/>. (reached 06 March 2014).

security. President Husni Mubarak silenced the opposition by personally guaranteed the protocol. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the agreement Egypt's mufti Ali Jum'a was asked for opinion and he declared that it was in line with the Islamic Law. The strongest support to the agreement came from the business communities of Egypt and Israel. The labor union leaders viewed the agreement as an opportunity for the creation of new jobs in the industry whereas the anti-normalization bloc including politicians, intellectuals and students remained hostile to the agreement.³⁶² However, after years, the government appointed by the Muslim Brotherhood president is now seeking for expanding the QIZs.³⁶³ After the downfall of Hosni Mubarak in 2011, the QIZ agreement was expected to be cancelled. Despite the debate it created because of the Israeli involvement, the agreement still remains unbroken.³⁶⁴ Bearing in mind the benefits of the agreement in terms of job creation and increasing Egyptian exports to the US especially in the textiles sector, the abrogation of the agreement has become a gamble that no one in the Egyptian parliament would dare to play.

Except the quick boom in the job creation in the textile sector and the increase in the exports to the US in the non-petroleum products, the impact of the QIZs on the Egyptian economy has remained limited. One of the reasons for that has been the relative small pace of time since the agreement has been implemented. Compared to the Jordanian experience with the QIZs which began five years earlier than the Egyptian experience, more time is needed to evaluate the real impact of the agreement on the Egyptian economy. Another reason turns out to be the business environment in Egypt, which has many complications that deters investment in the Egyptian QIZs. According the *World Bank Doing Business Report*, Egypt ranks 128 (out of 189) in terms of the ease of doing

³⁶² Vikash Yadav, "The Political Economy of the Egyptian-Israeli QIZ Trade Agreement", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol.11, No.1, (March 2007), pp. 74-75.

³⁶³ Wael Gamal, "QIZ: Egyptian Jeans under the Patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood", *Al-Ahram Online*, 19 January 2013, available at <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContentP/4/62748/Opinion/QIZ-Egyptian-jeans-under-the-patronage-of-The-Musl.aspx>, (reached 06 March 2013).

³⁶⁴ Alabass, "Egypt in Talks with Israel".

business.³⁶⁵ For instance, it is hard to obtain construction permits in Egypt since it is costly and takes long time. There are also several other permits that one has to get via dealing with several governmental agencies. Besides, due to the requirement of Israeli input, QIZs turn out to be highly vulnerable to the political developments. The 2008-2009 Gaza War, which broke out with the Israeli Operation Cast Lead, precluded the provision of Israeli inputs to Egyptian firms. Hence, Egyptian firms were unable to meet the demands of their contractors with the US importers.³⁶⁶ The economic difficulties in the textile sector in Israel in the last few years have been a challenge for meeting the input requirement, either. On the other hand, lowering the ratio of the Israeli inputs in the products to be exported to the US can act as a short-term solution. In addition, Egyptian government can play a positive role in easing the conditions for doing business in Egypt and provide a more conducive environment for doing business.

3.4. CONCLUSION

Egypt peace with Israel in 1979 was realized under the Cold War conditions, where there was not any structural change in the international system that could enable such a shift in the foreign policy orientation. The regional context was still dominated by hostility against Israel, not providing any Arab state with a possible rapprochement with Israel, let alone a peaceful settlement. Although the domestic context was tried to be shaped by the Egypt First ideology which envisioned the prioritization of the Egyptian interests over the Arab, the anti-Israeli sentiment was still prevalent and strong among the Egyptian people. Under such circumstances, Egypt was able to make peace with Israel due to high degree of autonomy it enjoyed at the domestic and regional levels.

³⁶⁵ The ease of doing business is calculated as the simple average of the percentile rankings on each of the topics- a starting business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. See *Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Short and Medium-Size Enterprises*, (Washington: World Bank Group Corporate Flagship, 2013), p.12.

³⁶⁶ Ahmed F. Ghoneim , “To What Extent Should Egypt go Deep in Its Free Trade Area with the United States if Any!”, *Journal of World Investment and Trade*, Vol. 9, No. 2, (April 2008), pp. 163-186.

The main reason why Egypt chose to make peace with Israel was the shift in the state ideology to ensure domestic survival. Even for a state like Egypt which enjoyed high degree of state capacity and autonomy did not mean a low level of vulnerability. The Egyptian economy on the brink of bankruptcy carried high political risks for the regime. The way out from the dire economic and thus political conditions required an overall transformation of the state ideology. Therefore, Sadat saw the survival of Egypt in the hands of the US and the involvement in the Western camp. He viewed US as more powerful than the SU, and for Sadat, the road to stirring up the Egyptian economy passed from attracting foreign investment in particular and integration to the international economy in general. For this reason, he had to change the reality of being a state at war and make peace with Israel. In order to make peace with Israel, he required US support. To acquire US support, he had to ensure that Egypt was the most important country in the region and the vital would-be ally of the US in addition to Israel, but how? First, he tried diplomacy. He was taken serious neither by the US nor by Israel. Then he felt compelled to resort to war. He launched the 1973 October War against Israel. In fact, the war was needed for him for another reason: to guarantee domestic legitimacy by recovering Sinai. Securing US aid via war and then peace with Israel was another important incentive. However, despite its material contribution to the Egyptian economy, US aid was more important in terms of a symbol of vested economic interests between the two countries as well as alliance in foreign policy. Therefore, the indirect benefits of the aid rather than the direct, and the non-material benefits rather than the material were much more important. In addition to the economic incentives that drove the regime to make peace with Israel, the peace dividends of foreign aid and decrease in the military expenditures and the resultant increase in the socio-political conditions of the Egyptian people were used for promoting peace. The economic benefits from the interaction with Israel as a result of the peace were not really part of the propaganda of the state. This was the reflection of the perceived benefits from being at a state of no war rather than having more economic cooperation with Israel. This stance in fact was evident in the 1979 Peace Treaty which was more occupied with the issue of security rather than the normalization of relations.

Despite the 35 five years that passed since the 1979 Peace Treaty, the peace between Egypt and Israel remained 'cold'. Both of the two countries have been keen to avoid any disturbance regarding the military-security regime established by the peace treaty. They have maintained contact between officials even at the height of political tension. However, both the level of economic cooperation as reflected in the limited bilateral trade between the two countries as well as tourism remained limited. Besides, there is an important portion of the Egyptian society is against the normalization process with Israel. Nevertheless, sustaining peace with Israel has become a foreign policy orientation of Egypt not only in terms of its relations with Israel, but also the US.

4. THE JORDANIAN STATE AND ITS FOREIGN POLICY

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, has always been a ‘constitutional monarchy’ with a bicameral political structure where there is a Senate (House of Notables), the members of which are appointed by the King and a Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives/Lower House) which are elected by popular vote. It is a developing country with its approximately six million people, majority of which is Sunni Arab. Jordan is not a country that has steered Middle Eastern politics. However, its influence is not proportional to its size. As a creation of colonialism, Jordan has struggled a lot to create and consolidate a nation-state within artificial borders. However, it has managed to survive so far despite its limited natural resources, heavily dependence on foreign aid. Its geostrategic significance in terms of lying at the heart of the Fertile Crescent and being an element and defender of moderation. In line with the fact that more than half of its population is composed of Palestinians, the Kingdom was not only an actor in the Palestinian-Israeli question, but also has been an important player of it.

Despite being a moderate country in the Middle East, Jordan is susceptible regional developments. This defines Jordan’s limited regional autonomy which compels it to pursue a foreign policy which can be best described as ‘walking a tightrope’. However, this does not mean that it has not driven away to the extremes denying its pro-Western moderate stance. Overall, Jordan’s foreign policy has generally been marked by its pro-Western ideology and pragmatism, which enabled the Kingdom to pursue relations with Israel, covert though, until its peace with Israel in 1994. It is important to understand Jordanian foreign policy in terms of state formation and the nature of state in order to understand its relations with Israel. In this respect, this chapter delves into the Jordanian foreign policy and its development as a state with limited domestic and regional autonomy, first by looking at the formation of the Jordanian state and then the nature of the state by examining state capacity and autonomy. After analyzing the structure of

elites and foreign policy decision making, a panorama of Israeli-Jordanian relations are provided in order to better comprehend the road to its peace with Israel.

4.1. STATE FORMATION IN JORDAN

Sharing the same fate with other post-colonial states, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had been founded on artificial boundaries drawn by the European imperial powers. In 1921, the Emirate of Transjordan³⁶⁷ under the throne of Amir Abdullah bin al-Hussein (later King Abdullah I, a member of a 'Hashemite clan'³⁶⁸ and younger brother of Faisal³⁶⁹, son of the leader of the Arab revolt, Sherif Hussein ibn Ali) was created by the British government as a British Mandate. Having acquired its independence from the British Mandate in 1946, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan acquired its current name in 1949.

Jordan was one of the most artificial states in the Middle East, because the land called 'Transjordan' during the mandate period had never been a separate polity and home for a nation before the territory was carved out from the Ottoman Empire and became a mandate under British rule. However, eventually a sense of nationhood and national identity had been developed within the Kingdom. Although it was King Abdullah I, who founded Jordan from the British Mandate of Transjordan, it was King Hussein bin Talal who led political development and completed the process of building state institutions of

³⁶⁷ It was geographically equivalent to today's Kingdom of Jordan. "Transjordan" was a word used to refer to the part of Palestine "across the Jordan", precisely the far eastern part of Jordan River.

³⁶⁸ The Hashemites, or "Bani Hashem," is the name of the tribe that the Prophet Mohammed is a member. The name of the tribe originates from the name of the great grandfather of Prophet Mohammed, Hashim. Thus, the Hashemites, the royal family that rules Jordan are the direct descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali bin Abi Talib, who was also the Prophet's paternal first cousin and the fourth caliph of Islam. The Hashemites Ali and Fatima had two sons: Al-Hassan and Al-Hussein. The direct descendants of their eldest son, Hassan, are known as *Sharif s* (nobles), while the descendants of Hussein are called *Sayyids* (lords). The royal family of Jordan, the Hashemites, is descended through the Sharifian branch of lineage. For more information, see http://www.Kinghussein.gov.jo/hash_intro.html

³⁶⁹ King Faysal I was appointed as the King of Iraq.

Jordan.³⁷⁰ Having enjoyed the advantages originating from being a dynastical monarchy, the history of Jordan has been marked by stability and continuity. Compared to the other states in the Middle East even Iraq, which was the other Hashemite monarchy led by another Hashemite King, Jordan was regarded as a success story throughout the history in terms of regime continuity since its inception. When stability and continuity is concerned, being a monarchy could be a contributive factor, but not an adequate reason itself. For instance, Iraq was also a monarchy when it was founded. However, Iraqi history was overwhelmed by several coups, counter-coups and political violence, which was not the case for Jordan. Therefore, there have been other factors contributing to the continuity and durability of the Hashemite regime. First of all, although it was a colonial creation, it developed good relations with its colonizer. According to Alon, this was mainly because Britain was not intrusive in the Jordanian case. Amir Abdullah was a successful ruler and so was Glubb Pasha, the founder and the commander of the Arab Legion. The British who took active part in the formation of the Jordanian state and army had developed cultural awareness and good relations with the locals. Therefore, the relations were based upon mutual interests based on cooptation rather than coercion. These good relations continued after Jordan acquired its independence in 1946 from the British. Even after hard times, when Jordan refused to take part in the Baghdad Pact and dismissed Glubb Pasha and freed Arab Legion from foreign elements, Jordan's relations with the British did not deteriorate in the long run. Jordan successfully retained its collaboration with the West and preserved its vital geopolitical and geostrategic importance in the eyes of the Western powers. Having been neither part of the socialist nor the radical pan-Arabist camps, during the Cold War, Jordan served as a buffer state especially for the socialist states in the Middle East and also as a moderating element in the Middle East Peace Process.³⁷¹ In the end, its good relations with the Britain gave way to cooperative relations with the US which replaced Britain during the Cold War.

³⁷⁰ Curtis R. Ryan, *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*, (Boulder, London: Lynne Publishers, 2002), p.5.

³⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.6

Second, the Hashemite regime achieved a successful integration of the local tribes into the state formation process.³⁷² This was another important reason for its success in ensuring the continuity and stability of the state. Rather than coercive subjugation of the tribes to the regime, the tribes were integrated into the state-building process and treated as actors in the formation of the state. The regime's relations with tribes were maintained through less violence and more cooptation compared to the other experiences in the region. This historical process resulted in the vested interests of the tribes in the survival of the Hashemite regime. The tribal sheikhs who became part of the collaborative elite of the state developed good relations both with the ruling Hashemite family and the British during the mandate period. And the regime rewarded the tribes as the backbone of the Hashemite regime with a significant degree of autonomy. Throughout the time, this integration process transformed the tribes into a nation and gave them a political role to play. In this respect, it is fair to say that what has been viewed as a natural inclination about Bedouins as loyal supporters of the Hashemite regime, in fact, stems from the historical process of state-building during the years of the British Mandate. Therefore, tribes did form the backbone of the Hashemite state and it still does. In addition, tribalism is a significant component of both Jordanian national identity and politics.³⁷³ By this way, Jordan has become a modern state with Western institutions and also many traditional features, namely a 'hybrid state', as termed by Dodge.³⁷⁴

At the very first sight, Jordan seemed to be created for the purpose of satisfying the ambitions of a prince, Amir Abdullah, who was left without a territory to rule after the First World War. Previously, the land of Jordan was a more of a camping area for the nomadic tribes without a power center, economic surplus, defined boundaries or a nation. When Abdullah came to Transjordan, what he confronted was a tribal tiny

³⁷² In this respect, Jordan's experience with the tribes was contrary to what is experienced in Iraq, Palestine, Syria and Saudi Arabia. See in Yaov Alon, *The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State*, (London, New York: I.B. Taurus, 2007), p.148.

³⁷³ Ibid, pp.1-2.

³⁷⁴ Ibid, p.151.

population, without a natural political center and a sophisticated political culture. Eventually he succeeded in transforming the traditionally rebellious Bedouins into the military backbone of the country.³⁷⁵ However, during the British mandate, Amir Abdullah, later King Abdullah I, achieved in building not only a dynasty, but also a state and a nation with a legitimacy to rule as an outsider.³⁷⁶ King Hussein, during his reign of 46 years, was successful in consolidating the state and the nation despite its heavy dependence on the major international powers, the challenges of the regional conjuncture and its vulnerability at home mainly in reference to the Palestinian population. The seeds of the Jordanian state with all its institutions and elites were sown during the British Mandate. From the day it was named as a British mandate in 1921 to 1957, Jordan's main patron was Britain. In the early 1920s, the British monthly aid to Jordan was £ 5.000. This aid reached to £ 100.000 by the mid-1920s, 2 million by the 1940s and 12.5 million by the 1957.³⁷⁷ The first shift in Jordan's external source of revenue came with the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 when the US replaced the Britain as the principal financial sponsor of the kingdom. The amount of the annual US aid to Jordan reached \$34 million in 1958 from \$ 1.4 million in 1951. "By 1970, Jordan had received over \$700 million in US assistance. Jordan ranked second only to Israel in terms of per capita American aid."³⁷⁸

The Jordanian state consolidated during the reign of King Hussein. However, he confronted several threats to the foundations of the monarchy: 1955 widespread demonstrations, 1956 and 1968 attempted coups, 1958 the overthrow of King Faisal (Hussein's cousin) in Iraq, 1970 civil war, tensions with the PLO throughout the 1970s

³⁷⁵ Asher Susser, "The Jordanian Monarchy: The Hashemite Success Story" in *Middle Eastern Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, ed. by Joseph Kostiner, (Boulder Colo: Middle Eastern Monarchies, 2000), pp.88-89.

³⁷⁶ Alon, *The Making of Jordan*, p. 3-4.

³⁷⁷ Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 25(1), (March 1992), p. 74.

³⁷⁸ Lawrence Tall, "Jordan", Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (ed.s), *The Cold War and the Middle East*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 104.

and bread riots in the late 1980s.³⁷⁹ He both utilized coercion and co-optation to overcome these crises, but having grasped the role of Jordan as a buffer state, he walked well the tightrope in foreign policy making and guaranteeing domestic stability. Jordan had been neither the part of the socialist nor the radical pan-Arabist camps. Such stance assisted Jordan in perpetuating its strategic relations with the West, from where it acquired considerable political and economic support. The natural outcome of the good relations with the West was having mild, if not good, relations with Israel. By this way, the kingdom turned into a moderating element in the Middle Eastern politics at large and the Middle East Peace Process in particular. These strategic concerns rooted in the reign of King Abdullah I and their reflections continued during the rule of King Hussein.

4.2. THE NATURE OF THE STATE IN JORDAN

Naming Jordan as a ‘civic myth monarchy’³⁸⁰, Kamrawa identifies three sources of power that the state rules during the state formation. The first source of power is the royal family. The legitimacy of the Jordanian monarchy and the royal family’s claimed right to rule, in fact, stems from a ‘myth’ which has been constructed via the reinterpretation of history. The second source of power is the civil service, the primary source of employment and the regime’s main instrument to build up its base of support via patronage networks as well as a channel to infiltrate into opposition. The third source of power is the the *mukhaberat* and the armed forces, which stands as the guarantor of the security of the state against any challenge from within or without.³⁸¹

³⁷⁹ Mehran Kamrawa, *The Modern Middle East: A Political History Since First The World War*, Second Edition, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2011), p.312.

³⁸⁰ Kamrawa asserts that despite the similarities that they share with other monarchies (oil monarchies), Kamrawa identifies Jordan and Morocco as ‘civic myth monarchies’. For more, see Mehran Kamrawa, “Non-Democratic States and Political Liberalisation in the Middle East: A Structural Analysis”, *Third World Quarterly*, Vo.19, No.1, (March 1998), pp.63-85.

³⁸¹ Although these power sources have been one of the common features that civic myth monarchies shared with oil-monarchies, they had different characteristics and dynamics. For instance, the royal families in the oil-monarchies rely on the traditional authority to rule rather than myths. The civil service turns out to be an agent of welfare rather than a source of employment. The control that the royal family

Since the very beginning of the state-building efforts, Jordan was institutionalized as a neopatrimonial rentier state. The ruling family made use of the external state revenues to buy the support of the ruled. As put forward by Brynen, “coercion becomes less important as political legitimacy is, in a very real sense, ‘purchased’ through economic rewards”.³⁸² Since the neopatrimonial state structure favors persons, it is proposed as the one of the main reasons why civil society or any other type of formal associations did not grow in Jordan.



Figure 6: Political Map of Jordan

Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/jordan_map.htm

has over the armed forces is stronger in the oil monarchies. See in Kamrawa, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 312.

³⁸² Rex Brynen, “Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan”, *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 25(1), (March 1992), p. 74.

4.2.1. STATE CAPACITY

Jordan is lying at the heart of the Fertile Crescent between Israel, Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia. This strategic location together with its political importance due to the Arab-Israeli conflict has always been a reason for being considered as a buffer state either by the external powers and the Arab States as well³⁸³, which resulted in acquiring large amounts of foreign aid. During the Cold War being neither in the socialist or the pan-Arabist camps, it was supported by the capitalist Western regimes. Even during the Iran-Iraq war, despite its refusal of getting involved in the Western alliance, Jordan achieved in exploiting its vitality for Iraq. Iraq was suffering under the blockage of its port in the Gulf and Jordan became the sole transit route for Iraq. As a consequence, a destabilized Jordan would not serve the interest of the external powers because it would badly-affect the regional stability and reversely change the balances in the region. These all prove the importance of Jordan's geographical location as a factor for the continuity of regime in Jordan, especially in economic terms, particularly relieving aid.

4.2.1.1 DEMOGRAPHICS

According to the World Bank statistics, the population of Jordan is around 6,459 million by the year 2013.³⁸⁴ Jordan has a homogenous population majority of which is Arab and Sunni Muslim (% 92) compared to the heterogeneous populations of the many Arab countries in the Middle East. In addition to Arabs, there is a minority of Circassians (%1) and Armenians (%1). There are also Christians (% 6), majority of which are Greek Orthodox living in the country.³⁸⁵ This can be seen as a factor for stability not disturbed

³⁸³ Susser , "The Jordanian Monarchy", p.87.

³⁸⁴ Data by Country, World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

³⁸⁵ There are also Greek Catholics, a small Roman Catholic community, Syrian Orthodox, Coptic Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox and a few Protestant denominations, mostly found in Amman and several small Shi'a and Druze populations. See in Jordan, CIA Factbook,

by domestic opposition. However, the Sunni majority does not necessarily mean unity within Jordan. There are Palestinians, Bedouins, East Bankers, each representing divergent interests. In fact, it is these divergent interests that the Hashemite regime succeeded in exploiting for its legitimacy and continuity. Despite its relative homogenous population, these divergent groups enabled the state to found a neo-patrimonial networks to co-opt different interests and different groups.

Despite the unavailability of the accurate numbers regarding the Palestinians in Jordan, it is generally claimed that more than half of the population is of Palestinian origin.³⁸⁶ According to the data of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees, out of the 5 million registered Palestinian refugees, more than 2 million reside in Jordan. Around 370.000 Palestinians live in refugee camps in Jordan.³⁸⁷ Not all, but most of the Palestinian refugees have full Jordanian citizenship. The refugees originally from the Gaza Strip whose number is around 120.000 to 140.000 have not been granted citizenship. They are eligible for temporary passports, but they do not have full citizenship rights like the right to vote or employment in the government. The passports are issued for two years and can potentially be used as an international travel document for entrance into countries other than Jordan.³⁸⁸

Throughout the history, there have been two major exoduses from the land of Palestine: one after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and the second in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. During the first exodus around 700.000 Palestinians fled their homes or expelled. Of these Palestinians, “about one-third to one-half fled to West Bank and between 70.000 and

<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/jo.html> and also see The People of Jordan, <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/people.html> (accessed 03 June 2012).

³⁸⁶ Kamrawa asserts that ‘at least’ % 60 to 70 of the Jordanian population is in Palestinian origin. Kamrawa, *The Modern Middle East*, p. 317.

³⁸⁷ “Jordan”, UNRWA Official Website, <http://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work/jordan>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

³⁸⁸ For more about Gazans in Jordan, see Oroub El-Abed, “Immobile Palestinians: Ongoing Plight of Gazans in Jordan”, *Forced Migration Review*, Issue 26, (August 2006), pp.17-18, available at <http://www.fmreview.org/issues>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

100.000 to Transjordan”³⁸⁹. After the 1948 War, when Jordan extended its sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, unlike its Arab neighbors, it provided the Palestinians residing in the West Bank or fled to East Bank with full citizenship. During the second exodus, after the 1967 June War, around 200.000 Palestinians fled to East Bank.³⁹⁰ Jordan accepted these Palestinians and granted them citizenship. However, a small group of Palestinians from Gaza were accepted as refugees, but not given Jordanian citizenship.

When Jordan disengaged from and relinquish its claims on West Bank in 1988, the Palestinian refugees residing in the West Bank lost their Jordanian nationality and citizenship. During the 1991 Gulf War, there were approximately 400.000 Palestinian workers in Kuwait. Most of these workers were from West Bank and had a Jordanian nationality. When Jordan and PLO did not implicitly sided with Kuwait against Iraq, Kuwait ended the residence permits of the 250.000 Palestinian workers. 200.000 of these Palestinian workers were Jordanian nationals and returned to Jordan. Rania El-Yasin, now the Queen of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was among these returnees. Upon their arrival, the rights of Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin were recognized.³⁹¹

Jordan was the first and only Arab country that granted the Palestinians full citizenship. The reason why Arab countries refuse to grant Palestinians citizenship was due to their willingness of preserving the Palestinian national identity and reminding Israel its responsibility towards the Palestinians it expelled or cause to flee. Majority of the Palestinians have been well integrated into the Jordanian society. Palestinians generally dominate the private sector whereas they are not adequately represented in high ranks of government. They are not employed in the highest ranks of the security and defense establishment, either. However, there have been prime ministers and ministers of

³⁸⁹ “Stateless Again: Palestinian Origin Jordanians Deprived of Their Nationality”, *Human Rights Watch Report*, (New York, 1 February 2010), p.8, available at <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2010/02/01/stateless-again-0>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

³⁹⁰ Benny Morris, *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881-2001*, (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), p.336.

³⁹¹ “Stateless Again”, *Human Rights Watch*, p. 10.

Palestinian origin, who were, in fact, from the notable families rather than ranks of refugees.³⁹² On the other hand, the Bedouins who comprise the Transjordanian population, also known as East Bankers, mostly living in the southern part of the country are the backbone of the Hashemite regime. They are provided with the key government posts and positions in the military. Therefore, they are perceived as the most loyal citizens of the kingdom. “However, as their extensive participation in the riots of 1989 demonstrated, this loyalty is based more on the strength of economic patronage than on blood ties and kinship.”³⁹³ Similarly, during the protests in Jordan after the Arab Spring, it was again the Transjordanians that took part in the demonstrations. Palestinians refrained from participating in the demonstrations with the fear of further marginalization by the regime.³⁹⁴ Overall, there is an ever-existing schism between the Palestinian and Transjordanian elements of the Jordanian nation, which necessitates arbitration as well as co-optation by the regime.

4.2.1.2. ECONOMY

Jordan is not a resource rich country. The minerals that have commercial value are potash and phosphates.³⁹⁵ Jordan can be regarded as an oil poor country.³⁹⁶ Besides,

³⁹² Beverly Milton-Edwards and Peter Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, Second Edition, (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.2.

³⁹³ Kamrawa, *Modern Middle East*, p.317

³⁹⁴ Lamis El Muhtaseb, “Jordan’s East Banker-Palestinian Schism”, Expert Analysis, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF), April 2013, <http://www.peacebuilding.no/Regions/Middle-East-and-North-Africa/Publications/Jordan-s-East-Banker-Palestinian-schism>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

³⁹⁵ The top five sectors that have the largest share in the Jordanian domestic exports for the year 2009 are garments with 831 million US \$, fertilizers with 784 million US \$, pharmaceuticals with 471 million US \$, potash with 447 million US \$, and phosphate 382 million US \$. Therefore, potash and phosphates turned out to be the largest fourth and fifth sectors relatively in the Jordanian domestic exports. The statistics are available at <http://www.jedco.gov.jo/joomla/images/export%20brief/Jordan%20Domestic%20Exports.pdf>, (accessed on 06 August 2014).

³⁹⁶ By the year 2009, the local oil and gas production in Jordan is around 163 thousand tons of oil equivalent (toe) corresponding to the % 3.3 of Jordan’s energy needs. Therefore, Jordan relies on import

water scarcity together with the availability of the land for cultivation is the other natural barriers for the development of the Jordanian economy.³⁹⁷ The resource scarcity coupled with the need to ensure the availability of military establishment resulted in the aid dependence of the country. Against the backdrop of the Arab-Israeli conflict and being a frontline state, Jordan's economic and thus political survival rested upon foreign aid. Until the 1960s, United Kingdom (UK) was the main donor of Jordan. During the Cold war years, United States (US) replaced UK and during 1970s and 1980s, significant amount of aid accrued to Jordan from the oil-rich Gulf monarchies, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as the leading countries.³⁹⁸ The second important source of the Jordanian economy is the workers' remittances, which is also the second important source of foreign exchange earnings after foreign aid.³⁹⁹ Jordan's economic heavy dependence on the external sources has made it a rentier economy as asserted by Brand⁴⁰⁰ or a semi-rentier state as widely referred in the literature. With such economic structure, Jordan is vulnerable to the regional and international political developments including economic fluctuations.

of oil and gas to meet its energy needs. It imports oil predominantly from Iraq and Saudi Arabia whereas it imports natural gas from Egypt. For more information, see The Annual Report 2009, The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, <http://www.jordaneqb.org/library/634448546702153750.pdf>. In addition, Jordan is said to have vast reserves of oil shale which is over 50 billion of geological reserves. See in Yousef Hamarneh, "Oil Shale Resources Development in Jordan", Natural Resources Authority, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, (Amman, 1998), (revised and updated by Jamal Alali and Suzan Sawaqed, 2006), http://www.nra.gov.jo/images/stories/pdf_files/Updated_Report_2006.pdf. Jordan is in search of utilizing its oil shale reserves. It has recently finalized a deal for the first oil shale power plant in the country. See in Taylor Luck, "Jordan Finalizes Deal For Its First Oil Shale Plant", *Jordan Times*, 02 June 2012, <http://jordantimes.com/jordan-finalises-deal-for-first-oil-shale-plant>.

³⁹⁷ Mary Nazzal, "Economic Reform in Jordan: An Analysis of Structural Adjustment and Qualified Industrial Zones", April 2005, available at <http://www.lawanddevelopment.org/docs/jordan.pdf>, p.3.

³⁹⁸ Hani Abu-Jabarah, "The Economics of Peace: Jordan", in *The Economics of the Middle East Peace Process*, ed. by Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, Elias Duma, (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1993), p.182.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid*, p.183.

⁴⁰⁰ Laurie A. Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization in a Rentier Economy: The Case of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", Iliya Harik and Denis J. Sullivan (ed.s), *Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East*, ed. by (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), p.168.

World Bank categorizes Jordan as upper-middle income developing country.⁴⁰¹ Jordanian economy is predominantly services oriented. Jordan's 86.2% of workforce are employed in the services sector, 10.1 % in industry and 3.7 % in agriculture. The main service industries are construction, trade, transport and logistics, publishing, information technology and telecommunications, financial services, real estate, education and tourism. The agricultural activities' share in the economy is small due to the quantity of arable lands in the country. On the other hand, manufacturing has been well developed in the country and makes an important contribution to the economy. The Free Trade Agreement with the US played an important role in the development of the manufacturing sector as well as the Qualifying Industrial Zones.⁴⁰² The predominance of service sector is an important point distinguishing Jordan from some countries with the similar per capita income. On the one hand, this stemmed from the general lack of raw materials and other sources and the huge share of trade in goods. On the other hand, it is very much due to the central role played by government. Since the state received large amounts of aid, service sector turned out to be one of the most important tools used by the governments to distribute it.⁴⁰³

In Jordan, the state has a narrow domestic tax base. Domestic tax indeed constituted less than 60 percent of the government revenue until the mid eighties.⁴⁰⁴ The increase in the domestic tax as a government revenue coincides with the implementation of SAP after 1988 economic and financial crisis. The significant increase in domestic taxes intersects with the 1996 adjustment program after the eradication of the detrimental effects of the Gulf War to the Jordanian economy and the relative stability stemming from the

⁴⁰¹ "Data by Country", <http://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan>, (accessed on 06 August 2014).

⁴⁰² "Jordan Economic Structure", *Economy Watch*, 16 March 2010, http://www.economywatch.com/world_economy/jordan/structure-of-economy.html, (accessed on 06 August 2014).

⁴⁰³ Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1998), p. 192.

⁴⁰⁴ Saif, Ibrahim (co-worked with Aymen Khalayleh, Fayez Suyyagh, Mohammed Khasawnah, Radi Atoum), "Understanding the Reform Process: The Case of Jordan", Second Draft, Global Development Network, (August 2004), p. 5.

authoritarian attitude of the government against the domestic unrest and opposition to its policies in 1996. Therefore, the narrow domestic tax base together with the aid's being the dominant government revenue of the Jordanian state is an important indicator for displaying the state's discretion on allocating state benefits. Social notables receive direct rewards from the state and in return they mediate the allocation of local services in their areas and constituencies.⁴⁰⁵

Private sector in Jordan was heavily dependent on state and had a comprador nature. In the pre-reform era, due to the external sources (aid, remittances) available to the state, government did not exert any pressure on the private sector and responded to their demands throughout the time. Until the time of reforms, private sector was not considered as a source of revenue by the government. In fact, the private sector was satisfied with its position, role and endowments. Private sector was able to access funds through personal relationships, which caused an informal relationship between the private and public sectors. This was indeed the blurred relationship between these sectors, which turned out to be one of the most significant characteristics of a rentier economy. The private sector itself was composed of people well connected to the state apparatus.⁴⁰⁶ It is worth noting that the demographic changes throughout the history in Jordan had considerable impacts on the business community. Jordan absorbed human influxes stemming from regional conflicts, the most important of which is the Palestinians. This not only increased the mobility and the flexibility of the Jordanian business community, but also enriched the potential of the private sector.⁴⁰⁷

With the development efforts in mid 1970s, government realized the necessity of having a strong private sector. In spite of the endeavors of the government in 1970s through the development plans to have a more stronger private sector with the worker's remittances accruing to the economy, private sector remained dependent on state. State has

⁴⁰⁵ Ibid, p.6.

⁴⁰⁶ Ibid, p.6.

⁴⁰⁷ Zayd J. Sha'sha, "The Role of the Private Sector", Rodney Wilson(ed.), *Jordan: Politics and The Economy*, (London: Routledge, 1991), p.81.

undertaken initiating basic infrastructure projects and encouraging large-scale productive projects to encourage private sector to engage in. However, these efforts did not result in the expected outcomes since these projects were too big to be supported by the private sector.⁴⁰⁸

4.2.2. DOMESTIC STATE AUTONOMY

In Jordan, rent is mainly in the form of external capital which accrues to state as aid and quasi-rents which accrues to the private sector in the form of remittances.⁴⁰⁹ In this respect, Jordan has a different economic structure in terms of its heavy reliance on external aid and workers' remittances which caused some allocation mechanisms to occupy a more significant role especially in socio-political realm such as subsidies. By this way, Jordan's economy is generally placed in the rentier economy model. In a rentier economy, state is heavily dependent on external sources of income where the income has little or no basis in indigenous production and domestic extraction mechanisms like taxation.⁴¹⁰ Within that framework, rent can be broadly defined as "any income not originating from the productive activity of the concerned unit, the flows and dimensions of which are not directly linked to the beneficiary's activity"⁴¹¹.

It is important to underline the distinction between rentier states and rentier economies. According to Brand,

In rentier states, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar, revenues from oil extraction is quite substantial and directly accrue to the state whereas in rentier economies the rent does not

⁴⁰⁸ Ibid, p.81.

⁴⁰⁹ Warwick Knowles, *Jordan Since 1989: A Study in Political Economy*, (London, New York : I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 8.

⁴¹⁰ Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization", p.168.

⁴¹¹ Michel Chatelus and Y. Schmeil, "Towards a New Political Economy of State Industrialization in the Middle East", IJMES, no. 2 ,1984 as cited in Rentier State ed. by Beblawi and Luciani, p.53. (quoted by Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization", p.170.)

directly accrue to the central government [...] in a rentier economy, the role of the state as recipient and dispenser of rent income is far smaller than in a rentier state⁴¹²

Brand puts Jordan⁴¹³ in rentier economy due to the five characteristics that can be observed in the Jordanian economy, which are the heavy reliance of Jordanian economy on foreign economic aid and worker remittances, the major disequilibrium in trade balances that reflects itself as a trade deficit in Jordanian economy, the budget deficit, the level of consumption and investment that are well above the country's GDP, and finally the weakness of the indigenous economic productive forces.⁴¹⁴ These characteristics of a rentier economy are the imbalances that the Jordanian economy suffered from on the eve of the 1989 crisis. However, since these are structural rigidities of Jordanian economy, Jordan still experience these imbalances.

The lack of domestic production together with the dependency on external revenues, either aid or remittances is the fundamental weakness of the Jordanian economy. It is this dependency that makes Jordan vulnerable to the regional and international political conflicts and economic fluctuations. The political developments determine the attitude of its donors towards Jordan. During the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan reaped the benefits of the war both through the aids it received from the US and the increasing trade relations with Iraq. However, during the Gulf War, it was terribly affected because of its political stance. Sided with Iraq, Jordan was out of the US coalition and Jordanian economy confronted devastating developments such as the cut in US aid and economic blockages. Besides, in 1980s economic recession in the Middle East not only meant a substantial decrease in the aid, but also in workers' remittances. In Jordan, since the state revenues are primarily dependent on aid, and workers' remittances, rather than production, the decision-makers are less constrained by the interest of the domestic actors. The extent to

⁴¹² Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization", p.168.

⁴¹³ Jordan is also defined as a 'semi-rentier state', which is in compliance with the characteristics of the rentier economy. However, describing a state as 'semi-rentier' is generally due to its being a 'non-oil state'. Within this framework, Jordan is also labeled as a "semi-rentier state".

⁴¹⁴ Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization, p.169.

which decision-makers are constrained by the domestic actors is the continuity of the regime support and existing network of social coalitions.

4.2.3. REGIONAL STATE AUTONOMY

Jordan, as a small state, does not enjoy much autonomy both in terms of state-society relations and regional dynamics. Its heavy dependence on external resources makes it susceptible to the external developments at the regional or international level. Its being susceptible to the dynamics of a volatile region compels Jordan to implement a moderate and flexible foreign policy, which should be carefully measured in order to maintain the security, stability and the development of the country. In addition, the developments about the plight of the Palestinian people are always a matter of concern for Jordan, sometimes as an issue of foreign affairs and sometimes domestic politics. Jordan was not able to take part in the Western initiative of Baghdad Pact in 1955 or US-led coalition against Iraq during the Gulf War since it was not able to act against the domestic public opinion owing to its domestic vulnerability. Besides, Jordan had to participate in the 1967 June War reluctantly because of its limited regional autonomy as well as domestic. Jordan's peace treaty with Israel in 1994 despite the domestic anti-Israeli public opinion displayed state autonomy at the domestic arena. On the other hand, it had to wait until the regional environment was ripe enough to digest its move towards peace despite the Egypt's separate peace with Israel in 1979. Besides, it was in desperate need of the legitimacy that the Oslo Accords provided to go its separate way.

4.2.4. STATE IDEOLOGY

The Hashemite lineage has been the main element of the ideological discourse of the regime as well as regime's legitimacy. This ideological discourse provided the Hashemites with the right to rule the land, which was not the ancestral land of the Hashemites, and its people, to whom the Hashemites were indeed alien. In addition, the

state of Jordan was an artificial state which was the product of colonial work after the First World War. The Hashemites are the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed through his daughter Fatima and her husband Ali bin Abi Talib, the fourth caliph of Islam.⁴¹⁵ Sharif Hussein bin Ali, the Amir of Mecca, the leader of the Arab Revolt during the First World War was the father of the King Abdullah I, the first king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This has become the main tenet of the ideological discourse of the Hashemite regime concerning its claim of custodianship of the Holy Shrines in the East Jerusalem and its attempts for the Arab unity.

It is hard to identify the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan with a single ideology. Instead, the monarchy rests upon variety of ideologies, “partly Arab nationalism, Islamic conservatism, tribal patrimonialism, pre-Islamic glorification and partly Western modernism”⁴¹⁶. Naming this as “authoritarian pluralism”, Moaddel asserts that state meant different things to different segments of the society. Different state apparatuses utilized different ideological discourses. However, at the end of the day, the Hashemite regime remained non-ideological, neutral in its encapsulation of heterogeneous ideologies. This diversity enabled the monarchy to pursue different policies at the regional level, which sometimes appeared to be contradictory. Participating in the 1967 War against Israel, siding with Iraq against the Western coalition in the 1991 Gulf war, signing peace with Israel in 1994 can be counted among these contradictory policies. In addition, due to this ideologically neutral stance of the Hashemite regime, Moaddel claims that Jordan is an exceptional case in comparison to Algeria, Egypt, Iran and Syria, where states adopted rigid ideological predispositions.⁴¹⁷ Within this framework, Jordanian state ideology can be regarded as pragmatism. During the Arab Cold War, and the heydays of Pan-Arabism, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan did not belong to the revisionist camp. It sometimes acted in line with the Pan-Arabist tide. That was, too, an outcome of its pragmatism.

⁴¹⁵ For more information about the Hashemite lineage, see http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/hash_intro.html

⁴¹⁶ Mansoor Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Syria*, (New York, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002), p. 27.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid, pp.27-28.

This non-ideological stance of the regime gave the regime the room for maneuver for walking the tight rope in conducting its foreign affairs. In the domestic realm, it has been easy for the regime to co-opt with opposing groups and play different social constituencies against each other. For instance, in contradistinction to the many Islamists movements in the Middle East, Jordanian experience with the Islamists has been predominantly peaceful and non-violent. The largest and the most influential Islamist movement in Jordan is the Muslim Brotherhood, which has enjoyed not only a legal status since its inception, but also cooperative relations with the Hashemite regime. Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has been moderate since its inception as a charitable organization, but it has also been included in the social and political life via a ‘cooperation game’ in which the interests of both Muslim Brotherhood and the regime are secured. Hence, as pointed out by Mufti, Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan would not be as moderate as it is now if the state in Jordan was an “ideological or that Muslim Brotherhood party-based”⁴¹⁸. The lack of a strict ideology of state together with its ‘authoritarian pluralism’ enabled the cooperative spirit of the relations between the Hashemite regime and the Muslim Brotherhood.

The pragmatism of the Hashemite monarchy enabled its dialogue with Israel even before the formation of the Israeli state. Its pro-Western stance also made such contact inevitable, too. As early as King Abdullah I of Jordan saw the necessity of developing relations with Israel. He believed that the stability in the region could only come with adopting a pragmatic attitude towards Israel. He envisioned that Israel was there to stay and the national interest of Jordan would eventually require peace with Israel. Although his early death⁴¹⁹ did not allow King Abdullah I to realize his vision of peace, it became the dream of his grandson, King Hussein, who saw the peace with Israel as the “crowning achievement” of his reign. King Hussein not only internalized his

⁴¹⁸ Malik Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Liberalization in Jordan”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.32, No.1, (February 1999), p.103.

⁴¹⁹ King Abdullah I of Jordan was assassinated by a young man (who was also killed there by the royal guards) in Haram Al Sharif/Jerusalem in Friday prayers in 1951.

grandfather's vision of peace, but also his way of dealing with Israel via secret negotiations, even before the 1967 June War. For this reason, it was more of a matter of 'when' rather than 'if' to make peace with Israel in the Jordanian case.

4.3. THE MONARCH AND THE ELITES

Since the rule of King Abdullah I, the Hashemite regime tied itself to the support of the tribes and staffed its military and bureaucracy with the members of the prominent families of these tribes. Since then, "the Hashemite family has been operating as an honest broker among tribes and prominent families"⁴²⁰. The need to preserve the neutral stance of the Hashemite family towards the tribes was the main drive in strategic decisions. The kings and heirs have not married into Jordanian tribal society. Hence, the spouses of the kings have been members of the Hashemite family, foreigners or the Palestinians. Furthermore, when a new government was formed or appointments to the senior administrative posts were concerned, king was careful to maintain a delicate balance between tribes and regions.

For the Hashemite family, the ruling dynasty, the two main rules of the playing with the tribal coalitions was rotation and expectation. High ranks in the military as well as the senior posts in the bureaucracy and government were delivered to members of different tribes based on rotation. By this way, the Hashemite family prevented any tribe to acquire the power that they could challenge the monarchy. In addition to that, it is ensured that all the prominent families occupy important posts so that their expectations are satisfied.⁴²¹ There are sheikhly tribal families which dominated Transjordan in 1946, and they still enjoy a prominent and privileged status such as Abdul Huda, Abu Taya, Adwan, Badran, Fayiz, Hashim, Jazi, Khuraysha, Majali, Qassim, Rifai, Shurayda, Tall and Tarawnah. At the moment, third generation from these families is part of the power

⁴²⁰ Alon, *The Making of Jordan* p.154.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

elite in Jordan.⁴²² For instance, Samir Al-Rifai acted as a prime minister during King Abdullah I, and his son Zeid Al-Rifai was not only a prime minister of King Hussein, but also a close friend. Zaid Al-Rifai's son Samir Zaid Al-Rifai hold the position of prime minister during King Abdullah II's reign. In addition to the Transjordanians (East Bankers), non-Arab Circassians had prominence in the Jordanian political elite. Circassians in Jordan emigrated from Caucasus in the late nineteenth century and were settled in Amman and its neighborhood. With the 1920s, they allied with the Hashemite regime and served in important government posts. Al-Mufti family is one of the most prominent of the Circassian families.

Political elites, in Jordan play a very significant role in the continuity of the Hashemite regime. To consolidate his power and sustain the legitimacy and support of the Hashemite regime, King Hussein relied on a patronage system. Since the Jordanian Constitution enables King Hussein to appoint principal government officials, he used this authority as a critical lever. He rewarded those who were loyal to him and the Hashemite regime, neutralized opponents, and removed incompetent elements. The power structure of the Hashemite regime, with the King Hussein at the center, was composed of cabinet ministers, members of the royal family, the palace staff, senior army officers, tribal sheikhs, and ranking civil servants. Within this structure, King Hussein assigned many Transjordanians⁴²³ to central posts. Transjordanians had a significant place in the existing power structure in Jordan. Most of the palace staff and top civil, judicial, and military officials of King Hussein were mostly Transjordanians. Bedouins constituted the most important element of the Jordanian army whereas East Bank Jordanian elite held the key positions in the civilian and military power structure.⁴²⁴ There was also a Palestinian presence on the periphery of power. However, the Palestinians were excluded to a certain extent from substantive decision-making

⁴²² Ibid, p.155.

⁴²³ The term "Transjordanians" is used interchangeably with "East Bank Jordanians" meaning "Non-Palestinian Jordanians". In fact, East Bank Jordanians are not one ethnicity, and comprise a great many groups that came to Jordan in the last 200 years including Bedouins.

⁴²⁴ Shmel Bar, "The Jordanian Elite-Change and Continuity", Asher Susser and Alyeh Schumuelevitz (ed.s) *The Hashemites in The Modern Arab World*, (Frank Cass and Co: London, Oregon, 1995), p. 221.

positions. This caused the alienation of the Palestinian community and served as a potential source of political instability.

Tribal sheiks had a significant role in Jordanian political life, because a great portion of the Jordanian population is composed of tribes. Since the reign of King Abdullah I, tribal sheiks were given economic and political benefits and granted internal autonomy in order to gain loyalty to the regime. During the endeavors for founding a modern nation state, these tribal sheiks played an important role in solving disputes among tribes and settling nomadic people. Naturally, as the tribesmen settled, the importance of these sheikhs began to decrease. By the late 1970s, regime undertook some measures to diminish the roles of the tribal leaders. First of all, the Council of Tribal Sheiks, created in 1971 in order to serve as a channel for dialogue, was removed in 1973. The main functions of this body such as managing the allocation of land and defending tribal elites were overtaken by the Royal Court. Second, the tribal laws granting judicial autonomy to the tribes in 1936 were abolished in 1976. Third, tribes gradually lost the opportunities offered them in government posts. Fourth, tribal influence in the army shrank as the dependence of the Hashemite regime on tribal sheiks declined. Fifth, since Jordanian cabinet became more and more technocratic, the criterion of tribal affiliations faded away.⁴²⁵

The reason behind this policy of the Hashemite regime lied in the intent to replace the tribes and the army as the military backbone of the regime by a new generation of intellectuals. After the 1970-71 Civil War in Jordan, the fears of the regime brought the need to gain the support of East Bank Jordanians and young Palestinians by widening the base of public support and enfranchising the urban East Bank Jordanians and Palestinians. As a consequence, the traditional role of the tribes as members of a socio-political regime and their status as being the central supporters of the regime declined as they were replaced by urban East Bank Jordanians.⁴²⁶ On the other hand, since the early

⁴²⁵ Ibid., p. 222-223.

⁴²⁶ Ibid, p. 221.

1950s, King Hussein had appointed Palestinians who were supportive of the Hashemite monarchy to certain positions. By the 1970s, he permitted an increasing number of Palestinians from families that are not traditionally aligned with Hashemite family to be co-opted into government service. From 1980s onwards, the distinction between Transjordanians and Palestinians began to be less emphasized, mainly because the Palestinians of the East Bank have been officially accepted as Jordanian citizens. Palestinians continued to hold an important place in society as leading merchants, financiers, professionals, educators, and technocrats.

During the 1970s, due to the new economic planning, it was assumed that the private sector would play an active role in the development effort. Despite its increasing role in economic life, the dependency of private sector on the state continued. Bearing in mind that the private sector was dominated by Palestinians, this dependency on state created a closer relationship with the regime as well. On the contrary, the declining role of the Bedouins not only caused replacement of their posts and status within the regime by Palestinians, but also caused growing discontent among Bedouins. Moreover, the change that appeared initially in 1970s was solidified in favor of Palestinians with the economic liberalization process that began in 1989. All these changes in the position of the actors in economic and political life brought in disappointment among the ones whose role lost its significance. However, the King succeeded in ensuring the survival of his regime by shifting coalitions and introducing political liberalization as a safety valve of the regime to unease tensions among the disadvantaged.

When King Abdullah II ascended the throne in 1999 after his father's death, he concentrated his efforts on modernizing Jordanian economy by promoting free-market economy, making Jordan a regional trade center and a leader in US-led Arab coalition.⁴²⁷ When he established the Economic Consultative Council (ECC) in December 1999, he created a new component of the elite. The members of the ECC were comprised of businessmen of the same generation with King Abdullah II, and were

⁴²⁷ Lamis Andoni, "Report From Jordan: King Abdullah: In his Father's Footsteps?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 29, no.3, (Spring 2000), pp.80-83.

socialized during the economic crisis of late 1980s and the Middle East Peace Process. This new guard of the elite fit well the new King's priorities. However, they reflected the continued privileged status of the certain families in Jordan. They either belonged to the rich families of Palestinian descent like the Masri's or traditional tribal families.⁴²⁸ Overall, the power elite of Jordan are small and marked by continuity. The first pillar is composed of the members of the Royal family, Royal advisors to the King, the Royal Court Head, Military Security and Intelligence Chiefs and the Prime Minister. The second pillar encompasses the cabinet ministers, heads of other important state institutions, police chiefs, Minister of Interior, Speaker of the Lower House, the Governor of the Central Bank, and ECC members. The third pillar includes tribal chiefs, religious leaders, heads of professional associations, big businessmen, heads of important NGOs, prominent opposition figures, prominent journalist and academics.⁴²⁹

4.4. FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING IN JORDAN

The King enjoys a high prominence in foreign policy decision making. The 1952 Constitution of Jordan delegates the responsibility of "administrating all affairs of the state, internal and external"⁴³⁰ to the Council of Ministers. However, the authority of ratification and promulgation of the laws fall into the responsibility of the King.⁴³¹ The Council of Ministers can initiate foreign policy decisions despite the fact that the King has the authority to alter, endorse or hold back the endorsement of foreign policy decisions. Historical practice has displayed that there has been a decline in the foreign policy directives by the Council of Ministers. In a similar vein, the Ministry of Foreign

⁴²⁸ André Bank and Oliver Schlumberger, "Jordan: Between Regime Survival and Economic Reform", Volker Perthes (ed.), *Arab Elites: Negotiating the Politics of Change*, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), pp.40-43.

⁴²⁹ For detailed analysis, see *ibid*, pp. 44-49.

⁴³⁰ Article 45, *The Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, 1 January 1952, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html, (accessed on 1 August 2014).

⁴³¹ Article 31, *The Constitution*.

Affairs has become the body of implementation rather than formation of foreign policy. After 1989, the political liberalization process has been perceived to challenge the autonomy of the King in foreign policy decision making, but the King continued to be the main architect of the foreign policy. However, the parliament became more vocal about expressing their views on the foreign policy moves. In addition, although public opinion has influenced foreign policy decision making in Jordan at certain times such as the 1991 Gulf war, the influence of domestic interest group has remained limited.⁴³²

No matter how much monopoly the King enjoys in making foreign policy, he does not decide or act in complete isolation. He has a small cadre of advisors composed of the individuals he trusts and the officials from the Royal Court (*Diwan Al-Malaki*), which provides the “the necessary political and administrative link between his Majesty the King and the Central Government, the armed forces and the security services”⁴³³. The Royal Court has a key role in defining governmental policy and launching initiatives.⁴³⁴ It is composed of stratified elite including the members of the royal family, notables and tribal leaders. The influence of the court depends on the degree of the personal relationship of the senior members of the court with the King. It is important to note that even though the rank of the chief of the Royal Court is equivalent to that of a cabinet minister, on several occasions, the chief of the court could have more power than the prime minister.

⁴³² Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, pp. 67-70.

⁴³³ The Royal Court Offices, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/royal_offices.html, , (accessed on 1 August 2014).

⁴³⁴ Jordan has three competing branches of the executive: the Council of Ministers, the Royal Court and the Bureau of Intelligence (the *Mukhabarat*). See Ann-Kristin Jonasson, “Is Monarchy Compatible with Democracy? The Constitutional Framework and Royal Initiatives for Democracy in Jordan”, Elisabeth Özdalga and Sune Persson (ed.s), *Contested Sovereignties: Government and Democracy in Middle Eastern and European Perspectives*, (İstanbul: Sweedish Research Institute, 2010), p.166.

King Hussein ascended throne at the age of eighteen and reigned for forty seven years, twenty-five of which was under martial law.⁴³⁵ Becoming the King of a highly vulnerable and unconsolidated state in a restless regional environment, where the issue of foreign policy becomes a matter of life and death for Jordan, he maintained his ultimate control over foreign policy. His close circle of political advisors could be counted on fingers of one hand, including members of the Hashemite family like his brothers Prince Hassan and Prince Mohammed and his cousin Sharif Zeid bin Shaker and friends like Zaid Al-Rifai, who was also a member of one of the most influential families in Jordan. The people King Hussein consulted was neither limited to the royal family nor the notable families in Jordan. For instance, he had unusual close relations with the deputy head of Mossad, Efraim Halevy. His relations with Halevy turned into a friendship. He trusted Halevy and asked for his advice about matters which were even not directly related to Israel.⁴³⁶ In a similar vein, King Hussein also had close relations with Jack O'Connell, the CIA Station Chief in Amman in 1967-1971. The King found him entirely reliable. Their mutual honesty with each other enabled the continuation of their relationship even after O'Connell retired from CIA in 1971. He became the family lawyer of the Hashemite family and the adviser to the Jordanian government.⁴³⁷ O'Connell was the man who provided King Hussein unofficially with the US intelligence that Israel was going to attack Egypt on the eve of the 1967 June War.⁴³⁸

⁴³⁵ Throughout the Jordanian history, martial law was first declared in April 1957 due to an attempted coup against the King until November 1958. It was re-introduced after the 1967 June War and lifted in 1992.

⁴³⁶ Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan: The Life of King Hussein in War and Peace*, (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2008), p. 540 and also see Efraim Halevy, *Man in Shadows*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2006).

⁴³⁷ *Ibid*, pp.230-231.

⁴³⁸ See Jack O'Connell with Vernon Loeb, *King's Counsel: A Memoir of War, Espionage and Diplomacy in the Middle East*, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2011).

4.5. FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION IN JORDAN: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

The ultimate goal that Hashemite monarchy is striving to achieve in domestic and foreign policy is the survival of the Hashemite regime. In fact, regime survival is a concern for most of the Middle Eastern states, but it is an issue of high stakes for Jordan. Therefore, what contradicts its pro-Western inclination like its not aligning with the West in the cases of Baghdad Pact in 1955 and 1991 Gulf War as well as its waging war against Israel in 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli Wars do not stem from any shifts in its state ideology. The main reason of these anomalies is its effort of balancing between external and internal threats to its survival, because the Jordanian state is highly vulnerable not only domestically, but also regionally. Within this framework, the argument by Brand that the main drive in Jordanian foreign policy is the maintenance of budget security, predominantly by securing foreign aid is correct, but it is incomplete.

Brand, in her analysis on foreign policy of Jordan, particularly Jordan's alliance making behavior, asserts that the budget security has been the main drive in Jordanian foreign policy making. By budget security, she means ensuring the flow of external financial aid to the Jordanian economy. The budget security approach has been a great contribution to foreign policy analysis of Jordan. However, despite the high relevancy of the argument, budget security is one of the sources that ensure the sustainability of the Hashemite regime. According Bouillon, the example that defies the explanation of the budget security approach is the Jordanian foreign policy choice during the 1991 Gulf Crisis. Bouillon claims that Jordan chose to side with Iraq despite the risk of a cut in foreign aid from the US and the Gulf countries and thus, this choice could only be explained by the internal dynamics.⁴³⁹ On the other hand, having not denied the importance of the internal dynamics in Jordan's stance during the 1991 Gulf Crisis, Brand continues to claim that

⁴³⁹ Markus Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope: Jordanian Foreign Policy From the Gulf Crisis to the Peace Process and Beyond", George Joffé (ed.), *Jordan in Transition: 1990-2000*, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp.1-22.

King Hussein decided as a response to the pro-Iraqi public opinion, but with the drive of budget security.⁴⁴⁰

According to Bouillon Jordanian foreign policy has been built upon two main concerns: one is securing foreign aid, on which Jordanian economy is highly dependent and the second one is ensuring internal stability. Within this framework, to sustain the Hashemite regime the Jordanian foreign policy has to pursue a delicate balance between the international, regional and domestic dynamics.⁴⁴¹ He underlines that Jordan's stance in the 1991 Gulf Crisis was very much in line with internal stability and economic security concerns.⁴⁴² It is important to note that Jordan's foreign policy during the Gulf War does not correspond to a shift in Jordanian foreign policy orientation. Therefore, it is more of an exception rather than a shift. Although it was not in accordance with its pro-US stance, it was in line with its pro-Iraqi stance.

Against this backdrop, the formal shift in the foreign policy of Jordan was its peace with Israel in 1994. Although Jordanian pro-Western state stance required mild relations with Israel, the relations were in a state of ebb and flow most of the times, because despite all the covert dialogue, Jordan was formally in a state of war with Israel. Jordan was not able to jump the train of peace after Egypt signed peace with Israel in 1978, because Jordan would not be able to bear regional isolation due to its limited regional autonomy. In addition, the Palestine question was not an issue of regional politics for Jordan as it was in the case of Egypt. It was at the same time an internal affair for the country since half of its population was of Palestinian origin.

Compared to other Arab states, the relations between Jordan and Israel can be regarded as moderate mainly after the 1967 war. Jordan had neither been the part of the socialist

⁴⁴⁰ Laurie A. Brand, *Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations: The Political Economy of Alliance Making*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), s.284-295.

⁴⁴¹ Bouillon, "Walking the Tightrope", pp.1-2.

⁴⁴² *Ibid*, p.19.

nor the radical pan-Arabist camps.⁴⁴³ In fact, this was the strategy adopted by the Hashemite Kingdom so that the kingdom could act as a buffer state against the socialist states in the Middle East. This assisted Jordan in perpetuating its strategic relations with the West, from where it acquired considerable political and economic support. However, Jordan could not escape acting in accordance with the pan-Arab sentiment sometimes in response to domestic or regional demands to secure its survival. 1967 Six Day War with Israel was not an exception to that. Even before that during the Suez Crisis of 1956, Hussein's commitment to Arab nationalism, which was more of a pragmatic stance due to the pro-Nasserite public opinion as well as regional, he offered to open a second front against Israel siding with Nasser, but Nasser dissuaded him.⁴⁴⁴

Palestinians and the Palestine question constitute another important factor that shapes Jordanian foreign policy. The outbreak of the *Intifada*⁴⁴⁵ in 1987 marked a significant point in the Jordanian foreign policy. After the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the *Intifada* underlined the Palestinian people's right to self-determination. It was no more possible for Jordan to speak on behalf of the Palestinian people or represent them in negotiating peace with Israel. The tenth communiqué of the Unified National Command of the uprising issued on 11 March 1988 was an indicator of this reality. The communiqué called for resisting against Israel as well as its collaborators and the Jordanian regime. It also called for the West Bankers to resign from the Jordanian parliament and align with people.⁴⁴⁶ King Hussein was highly frustrated with the communiqué and regarded as a "horrible sign of ingratitude". Upon the communiqué, Adnan Abu Odeh, who was a Palestinian from Nablus and a close political advisor of King Hussein, proposed the King the idea of disengagement from West Bank. He stated his conversation as:

⁴⁴³ Ryan, *Jordan in Transition*, p.5.

⁴⁴⁴ Avi Shlaim, "Jordan", W.M. Roger Louis and Avi Shlaim (ed.s), *The 1967 Arab-Israeli War: Origins and Consequences*, (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 99.

⁴⁴⁵ The Palestinian uprising called *Intifada* was ignited when an Israeli truck killed four Palestinians from Jabaliyah, the largest of the eight refugee camps in the Gaza Strip.

⁴⁴⁶ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, pp.464- 467.

I asked the king: “Would you make peace with Israel without the recovery of the whole of the West Bank?” He answered saying no. I then asked him: “Would you make peace with Israel without recovering East Jerusalem?” He said no. I then said to him: “Do you think that the Israelis would make peace with you on the basis of the return of the whole of the West Bank and East Jerusalem?” He thought a little and said no. I said to him: “Then let us be frank, by doing this we cannot make peace with Israel”. He did not comment. [...] I then said: “Don’t you think it is time to consider a disengagement from West Bank?” He said: “But to leave it to whom?” I said: “You leave it to nobody; you leave it to the PLO.” [...] ⁴⁴⁷

King Hussein did not respond to Abu Odeh’s suggestion. In the meantime, the Arab League convened in Algiers on 7-9 June 1988 to address the *Intifada* and agreed to support it with all means including financial aid. PLO was once again recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians. King Hussein had to accept that it was PLO’s right to negotiate on behalf of the Palestinians. It was once again revealed that it was high time for Jordan to dismantle the two banks.

After the Algiers Summit, Ministry of Occupied Territories was abolished on 1 July 1988. A new department named Palestinian Affairs Department was established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the same responsibilities. On 28 July 1988, five-year West Bank Development Plan was terminated by the Jordanian government with the reason “to allow the PLO to assume more responsibility for this area”⁴⁴⁸. The Chamber of Deputies was dissolved with a royal decree on 30 July and thus West Bank Palestinians would no longer be represented. On 31 July 1988, King Hussein with an address to the nation declared the disengagement from the West Bank.⁴⁴⁹ To quote from King’s speech:

[...] Lately, it has transpired that there is a general Palestinian and Arab orientation which believes in the need to highlight the Palestinian identity in full in all efforts and activities that are related to the Palestine question and its developments. It has also become clear that there is a general conviction that maintaining the legal and administrative links with the West Bank, and the ensuing Jordanian interaction with our Palestinian brothers under

⁴⁴⁷ Quoted in *ibid*, p.465, and stated in Ashton, Nigel, *King Hussein of Jordan: A Political Life*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp.250-251. It should be underlined that elites from King’s inner circle like Zaid Al-Rifai denounced that it was only Adnan Abu Odeh’s idea. He claimed that the idea was shared and discussed among King advisors.

⁴⁴⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p.469.

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid*.

occupation through Jordanian institutions in the occupied territories, contradicts this orientation. It is also viewed that these links hamper the Palestinian struggle to gain international support for the Palestinian cause of a people struggling against foreign occupation. [...] Since there is a general conviction that the struggle to liberate the occupied Palestinian land could be enhanced by dismantling the legal and administrative links between the two banks, we have to fulfill our duty, and do what is required of us. [...]⁴⁵⁰

The declaration of the disengagement meant not only the dismantling of legislative and administrative links between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank, but also the change of the legal status of the West Bank residents with a Royal Decree. The Jordanian citizenship of the West Bank residents was nullified with the Decree. This corresponded to an estimated 800.000 Palestinians.⁴⁵¹ The Palestinians who migrated to Jordan after 1948 and acquired the status of 1948 UNRWA-registered refugees in the West Bank refugee camps were excluded from the Decree. Additionally, around 2 million Palestinians remained Jordan citizens, because they were residing in the East Bank. Since the change came with a Royal Decree, it was totally King's decision resting upon his constitutional powers.⁴⁵² He grounded his decision on his belief of the future state of Palestine and its people. He claimed that the 1950 unification of the West and East Bank occurred in accordance with the wishes of the Palestinian representatives and since the PLO was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people both by the Palestinians and the Arab states, then he respected the will of the Palestinians, their national identity and right of national self-determination.⁴⁵³

The disengagement decision was welcomed by East Bankers. The US was disappointed in the sense that Jordan, which was an easy partner to negotiate, was out of the peaceful resolution of the Palestinian question. The Israeli right also did not like the idea of having been compelled to deal directly with the PLO. For the Labor party, the Jordanian option which envisaged the unification of West Bank and Gaza Strip under the

⁴⁵⁰ King Hussein, "Address to the Nation", Amman, 31 July 1988, http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/88_july31.html, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

⁴⁵¹ In fact, this number varies in different sources from 750.000 to 900.000.

⁴⁵² Uri Davis, *Citizenship and the State: A Comparative Study of Citizenship Legislation in Israel, Jordan, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon*, (Berkshire, UK: Ithaca Pres, 1997), pp.74-75.

⁴⁵³ King Hussein, "Address to the Nation".

framework of a confederation with Jordan was buried.⁴⁵⁴ Therefore, it seemed to strengthen Likud's 'Jordan is Palestine' argument. The US was also skeptical about the intentions of PLO in terms of peace. However, UK appreciated the decision since it provided the basis for the PLO to negotiate as the legitimate entity for statehood. Prime Minister Thatcher underlined her hope that the decision would lead PLO to adopt a more realistic attitude to come to terms with Israel. In fact, PLO recognized UNSC resolutions 242 and 338 in November 1988 raising further hopes in line with Thatcher's wishes.⁴⁵⁵ In the end, the unilateral disengagement from West Bank had shaped both the foreign policy of Jordan as well as PLO's policy for nationhood. It is important to note that the disengagement facilitated Jordan's peace with Israel since the only issue it would have to discuss would be ensuring Kingdom's borders.

These events display that in line with its survival strategy, Jordan had always been a reluctant party to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It had been in relation with Israel before and after the formal declaration of independence of the Israeli state. Since the unification of the two banks and even after the declaration of the disengagement from West Bank, Jordan had been at the heart of the Palestinian and Israeli question. And the Palestinian question was an important concern for the Kingdom's foreign policy

4.6. JORDAN'S RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

The relations between Jordan and Israel could be characterized in line with Jordan's pragmatic foreign policy making. Jordan remained within the anti-Israeli policy of the

⁴⁵⁴ 'Jordanian Option' was based on the Allon Plan proposed by Yigal Allon, in an article published in Foreign Affairs. The plan never became an official governmental policy although it was submitted to the Israeli government in July 1967. Nevertheless, the plan became an unofficial doctrine of the Labor. It visualized a partial withdrawal from West Bank based on the negotiations with Jordan. The withdrawal was to be delianated by 'defensible borders' for Israel where Israel would retain populated areas of West Bank and build settlements it dares strategic, including Jerusalem. See in Marwan Muasher, *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation*, (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 2008), p.20 and Yehuda Lukacs, *Israel, Jordan, and the Peace Process*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1999), p.9.

⁴⁵⁵ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, pp.252-253.

Arab world, and officially there was a state of war between Israel and Jordan until the peace treaty was signed in 1994. The establishment of the diplomatic relations between Jordan and Israel came after the official termination of the state of war between the two states with the peace treaty. However, until that time, Jordan pursued predominantly covert communications and relations with Israel.

After the 1948 War, UN was stationed in the Middle East as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) for peacekeeping purposes. UNTSO appointed military observers to Mixed Armistice Commissions (MACs) for monitoring the cease-fire lines formed after the 1949 Armistice Agreements⁴⁵⁶. One of them was the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan/Israel Mixed Armistice Commission (HKJ/I MAC). Since it was charged with supervising the truce between Israel and Jordan and examining border incidents between the two countries, it was liaising between the local area commanders of two countries. Therefore, Hupp posits HKJ/I MAC as one of the informal channel of communication between Jordan and Israel. In addition, she underlines that the US served as the second conduit for secret communication between Jordan and Israel. Regardless of the public hostility, the two states were willing to cooperate covertly.⁴⁵⁷ Therefore, the US ambassadors acted as messengers between the two governments, intensified in the 1960s, during the Johnson administration. Another channel of communication was formed after the first meeting of King Hussein with an authorized Israeli representative (Yaacov Herzog, the general director of the prime minister's office) at the house of the king's doctor in London in 1963.⁴⁵⁸

⁴⁵⁶ Since there were four Armistice Agreements, four MACs were established for monitoring each of the four truces: Jordan/Israel MAC, Egypt/Israel MAC, Syria/Israel MAC and Lebanon/Israel MAC. The MACs were located on the cease-fire lines, but headquartered in Jerusalem. For the functions and powers of the MACs, see "United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine: Functions and Powers of The Mixed Armistice Commissions", A/AC.25/W/39, 7 March 1950, available at <http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/7D8DAE7E5B351E37852573C60067CC5B>

⁴⁵⁷ Clea Lutz Hupp, *The United States and Jordan: Middle East Diplomacy During the Cold War*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), pp.118-119.

⁴⁵⁸ Steve Posner, *Israel Undercover: Secret Warfare and Hidden Diplomacy in the Middle East*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), p.158.

4.6.1. 1948 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR: *AL-NAKBA*

The first encounter between King Abdullah I, the Amir of Transjordan at that time and Chaim Weizman, the Zionist leader who would become the first president of Israel took place in London in 1922. Abdullah proposed Weizman that he would support the Balfour Declaration⁴⁵⁹, which envisioned Palestine as a Jewish homeland, in return for his recognition as the ruler of Palestine. The first meeting did not result in any fruitful solutions. However, throughout the communication between the two parties, Amir Abdullah offered the idea of a ‘Semitic Kingdom’, comprised of the land of Palestine and Transjordan, where Arabs and Jews were treated as equals under the monarchy of Abdullah. This offer was no way acceptable for the Jewish leadership in Palestine. They were in favor of establishing good relations with Amir Abdullah, but did not want to be his subjects. Abdullah’s contacts with Jews continued until his death in 1951.⁴⁶⁰

Following the 1947 UN Partition Plan, the Jewish Agency accepted the plan since it recognized and ensured the establishment of an independent Jewish state. However, the Palestinians and the Arab League states renounced the plan and persistently rejected its vision of an independent Jewish state. In response to that development, Amir Abdullah changed his vision of ‘Semitic Kingdom’ into a peaceful partition of Palestine between Transjordan and Jewish Agency. He aimed at eliminating Hajj Amin Al-Husseini, the leader of Palestinian national movement as an obstacle to his expansionist intentions. Al-Husseini, defying the Jewish statehood, was of the idea to claim sovereignty over the whole of Palestine under an Arab state. On the other hand, Amir Abdullah was seeking

⁴⁵⁹ It was a letter from the British Foreign Secretary of James Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, the leader of the Jewish community in Britain. In the letter Balfour addressed Rothschild as: “His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.” For the full text of the letter, see the “Balfour Declaration”, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/middle_east/israel_and_the_palestinians/key_documents/1682961.stm, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

⁴⁶⁰ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p.26.

to realize his claims on the Arab part of Palestine as envisaged in the UN Partition Plan next to a Jewish state. Due to their dislike of Al-Husseini, Britain favored Amir Abdullah provided that he would respect the land allocated to the Jewish state with the Partition Plan. Abdullah's contacts continued with the Jewish Agency in that respect.⁴⁶¹

Abdullah's vision of peaceful partition of Palestine with the Jewish Agency crippled due to the increasing tensions and fighting in Palestine. The influx of refugees to Transjordan pressured Amir Abdullah and his Arab Legion for participation in the fightings. It grew extremely hard for him to sustain the position of his army out of the areas allocated to the Jewish state with the Partition Plan. The Arab League states were wary of the secret contacts of Abdullah with the Jews and a possible resultant cooperation and they wanted to control Abdullah's quest for territorial aggrandizement and regional hegemony. The Arab League decided to get prepared for the invasion of Palestine on 15 May 1948, the day after the British Mandate of Palestine expired and Abdullah was appointed as the commander-in-chief of the Arab forces. Arab Legion of Transjordan was the most developed and organized Arab army of the day, in which most of the hopes of liberating Palestine was vested. Meanwhile on 10 May, Golda Meir went on a mission to Amman to warn Abdullah, not to be part of the Arab coalition of invasion reminding him their agreement on an independent Jewish state in Palestine and annexation of the Arab part of Palestine by Transjordan. Abdullah explained that he had no choice but to take part in the coalition. For Israel, the only possible friend proved his unreliability by not keeping his promise based on tacit agreement.⁴⁶² On 15 May 1948, Jordan waged war against Israel with Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq.

After the war ended, Jordan signed armistice agreement with Israel on 3 April 1949. The 1949 Rhodes Armistice Agreement with Israel legitimized Jordan's annexation of West Bank and secured its position in the East Jerusalem with some territorial concessions. According to the UN Partition Plan, Jerusalem was to be under an international regime,

⁴⁶¹ Ibid, pp.27-28.

⁴⁶² Ibid, pp.28-29.

denying claims by neither Israel nor any Arab state. However, both the partition of Jerusalem as well as the armistice demarcation line was the product of secret negotiations between Transjordan and Israel. Therefore, Transjordan turned out to be the one of the two beneficiaries of the 1948 War with grabbing the land of West Bank East Jerusalem. The other beneficiary was Israel since it was able to enlarge its borders beyond the Partition Plan. Having been defeated, the Egyptians also succeeded in taking hold of the Gaza Strip. Amir Abdullah proclaimed the unification of the West Bank and East Bank came with a resolution passed unanimously in the parliament in 1950. His claim on West Bank was rejected by all the Arab League states and was only recognized officially by Britain and privately by Israel. King Abdullah I's vision attracted atrocities not only from the Arab states in the Middle East, but also from his own government, which resulted in several criticisms in the cabinet as well as resignation of prime ministers.⁴⁶³ Unable to realize his Greater Syria dreams, King Abdullah I, at least, achieved his strong desires for expansion in Palestine. Hence, Jordan seemed to enhance its long-term economic prospects with the inclusion of the fertile land of West Bank, which was relatively developed.⁴⁶⁴ The political picture was also altered with the influx of refugees after the 1948 war as well as the Palestinian population with the annexation of West Bank. The number of the Palestinians in the Kingdom amounted to 700,000, half of which were refugees and the others residents of the West Bank.⁴⁶⁵

King Abdullah I was willing to protect his enlarged kingdom via making a peace settlement with Israel. His efforts almost reached a breakthrough in February 1950 with a draft agreement between Jordan and Israel. However, he was not able to move forward because of his commitments in the Arab League, which he had already acted against with its annexation of West Bank and thus subjected to harsh criticism. For this reason, he suspended talks with Israel. He renewed them again and continued until his death, but could not achieve in peaceful settlement with Israel. He tried to manage his dialogue

⁴⁶³ Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.8-12.

⁴⁶⁴ Milton Edwards and Hinchcliffe, *Jordan: A Hashemite Legacy*, p.31.

⁴⁶⁵ Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein*, p.10.

with Israel regardless of the anti-peace faction in his government as well as the pan-Arab opposition. However, he was assassinated on 20 July 1951 during the Friday prayers at the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.⁴⁶⁶ Having witnessed his grandfather's assassination at the age of fifteen, King Hussein was traumatized, but chose to follow his grandfather's and mentor's steps, in his conduct with Israel.

4.6.2. 1967 JUNE WAR

King Hussein was overwhelmed by the Israeli raid on the Samu village in Hebron in West Bank on 13 November 1966. He did not expect such an incident to occur since he was engaged with secret dialogue with Israel for the last three years with the hope of finding a path to peaceful settlement of the conflict between the two countries. In fact, Israel did not have any reasons to attack Jordan as Yitzhak Rabin, himself, stated. Rabin underlined that Israel was aware of the King Hussein's efforts to preclude Fatah from attacking Israel from West Bank. He also admitted that the consequences of the Israeli raid to Samu unintended. However, King Hussein was far from calming down, because the raid had tilted the precarious domestic balance within the Kingdom to the detriment of the Hashemite regime. The King was subject to the harsh criticism of the PLO and the Palestinians for not admitting the Arab military forces to Jordan to be stationed on the Israeli border. Therefore, the King felt betrayed by the Israelis for taking advantage of his good intentions and honesty in developing peaceful relations. King Hussein was taking a high risk in pursuing a secret with Israel. He was risking his life with reference to the fact that his grandfather, King Abdullah I, was assassinated with the revelation of his secret dialogue with Israel. Besides, Israel had promised that it would not attack Jordan during the negotiations. For this reason, King Hussein thought that Israel could never be trusted and his fears that Israel sought for occupying West Bank at the expense of the survival of the Hashemite regime were not groundless. He was also disappointed with the US reaction. Although Johnson administration condemned the Israeli raid and

⁴⁶⁶ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, pp.36-39.

assured the King that the US provide military assistance for which Jordan asked. However, Jordan was not satisfied with the military aid the US provided although he did not express it to the US. Under these circumstances, King Hussein was so wary of Israel and doubted about the US support to the Kingdom, he felt compelled to cooperate with the Pan-Arab front led by Nasser. The cooperation led to permitting Iraqi and Syrian troops to enter into Jordan as well as transferring the command of the Jordanian armed forces to Egyptian generals.⁴⁶⁷

Jordan was a reluctant belligerent in the 1967 June War.⁴⁶⁸ Although King Hussein was not willing to go to war⁴⁶⁹, he could not get away from acting with the other Arab nations with the fear of domestic unrest.⁴⁷⁰ Ashton regards King Hussein's decision to participate in the 1967 June War with Egypt is widely regarded as "the greatest the calamity of his reign"⁴⁷¹. With the war, Jordan had to witness the annihilation of its air force and the destruction of the 80 percent of its armored forces. Seven hundred Jordanian soldiers were killed during the war and six thousand soldiers were wounded or missing. Territorially, Jordan lost half of the Kingdom: West Bank, which was occupied after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war as well as East Jerusalem. Economically, the loss of West Bank cost Jordan nearly 40 percent of its GNP, half of its industry and one quarter of its arable land. The Kingdom also suffered the loss of highly educated and skilled population. Besides, the loss of East Jerusalem was not only significant in terms of its symbolic importance in terms of the national discourse of the Hashemite regime, but also the loss of tourism revenues. The influx of the 300.000 refugees to the East Bank,

⁴⁶⁷ Shlaim, "Jordan", pp.99-125; Shlaim *Lion of Jordan*, pp.225-254.

⁴⁶⁸ Meanwhile, before the outbreak of the war, King Hussein passed the US intelligence he acquired from CIA officer Jack O'Connell that Israel was planning to attack Egypt to Nasser. However, Nasser did not take it serious due to his lack of confidence in King Hussein.

⁴⁶⁹ Avi Shlaim regards it as a miscalculation since he finds King's explanation that he did not have any other choice as unconvincing. See in Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p. 619.

⁴⁷⁰ Russel E. Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005).

⁴⁷¹ Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, p.120.

regardless of the assistance provided by the UNRWA, was a heavy economic burden for the Kingdom in terms of feeding, shelter and employment.⁴⁷²

On the other hand, having fought with its Arab brothers, Jordan proved itself in the Arab world and accepted to the society of the Arab states. Jordan seemed to eliminate the open and aggressive critics in relation to its right to exist. Since the 1967 defeat was a major blow to Pan-Arabism, the differences between the conservative and revisionist camp appeared to wither since all the Arabs had to face the burden of the defeat. Besides, the best of enemies Nasser and King Hussein turned into best of friends. Nasser was said to be impressed by the support and heroic stance of the King, the reality that Jordan fought the war shoulder to shoulder with Egypt. From that day onwards, Nasser stated that he was ready to stand by Jordan and share anything he had, including the last loaf of bread. In addition, due to the long-term good relations between the US and Jordan, Nasser thought that the US would try to assist Jordan in overcoming the difficulties of the defeat. Therefore, Nasser encouraged and recommended King Hussein to negotiate with the Americans to compensate its losses and for a peaceful settlement in the West Bank provided that Jordan refrained from separate peace with Israel.⁴⁷³ With their new alliance, Nasser and King Hussein formed an axis of moderation in the region. As the monarch of a kingdom which was highly susceptible to the regional politics, King Hussein, with the support of Nasser, could have a chance to invite the other Arab states to follow his moderate path leading to ending the state of belligerency with Israel and recovering occupied territories with peaceful means. In this respect, King Hussein utilized the political cover that Nasser provided to him when he negotiated with the US and Israelis, and also opposing the PLO calls for reviving the armed struggle against Israel. The good relations with Nasser had positive reflections at the domestic context in terms of sustaining the legitimacy of the regime which suffered a disastrous defeat.⁴⁷⁴

⁴⁷² Ibid; Shlaim, "Jordan", p. 124 and Gad G. Gilbar and Onn Winckler, "The Economic Factor of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: The Cases of Egypt, Jordan and Syria", Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman (ed.s), *Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution?*, (Brighton, Portland, 2006), p. 192.

⁴⁷³ Mahmoud Rifai (The Egyptian Foreign Minister), *The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East*, (London: Quartet, 1981, p.46 quoted in Shlaim, "Jordan", p.125.

⁴⁷⁴ Ibid, p.125.

With 1967 Khartoum Conference (and agreement), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Libya started providing aid to Jordan annually so that she could strengthen its military as a confrontation state. “Aid from Arab countries amounted to US \$ 105 million in 1967 and US \$ 130 million in 1968.”⁴⁷⁵

The defeat of 1967 War was a blow to the pan-Arab nationalism, and fuelled Palestinian nationalism leading to the organization of Palestinian resistance movements. The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) founded in 1964 grew out of the 1967 defeat. The Palestinian militant groups (*fedayeen*) multiplied causing discomfort in Jordan not only because of their attacks to Israel, but also targeting the Hashemite regime as well. The frustrations among the Palestinian population increased and vocal nationalist Palestinian groups challenges the King with an explicit intention of overthrowing. In August 1970, when Israel and Egypt signed a cease-fire to end the War of Attrition, which lasted almost three years, Palestinians were worried if this could lead to negotiations for peace that they would be left out. The militant Palestinian groups like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)⁴⁷⁶ and the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation Palestine (PDFLP) attempted to overthrow King Hussein. This was going to be the first step in forming a radical Arab front against Israel.⁴⁷⁷ In order to curb the social unrest and exert authority, took action against the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970. The armed conflict lasted almost a year and resulted in several casualties. These clashes that overwhelmed the domestic politics of Jordan were regarded as the civil war of 1970, which is also known as Black September. After the bloody clashes between the Palestinian guerillas and the Jordanian army, the Palestinian militants were defeated by the Jordanian army. Events settled down with the Cairo Agreement in 1970 between King Hussein and Arafat, the leader of PLO, but PLO had to leave Jordan to Lebanon. During this armed conflict, in line with its loyalty to the

⁴⁷⁵ Basma Bint Talal, *Rethinking an NGO: Development, Donors and Civil Society in Jordan*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p.54.

⁴⁷⁶ Events triggered when PFLP hijacked two Western airliners and brought the planes to Jordan. See in Lucas, *Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan*, p. 19.

⁴⁷⁷ Charles Smith, “The Arab-Israeli Conflict”, Louise Fawcett (ed.), *International Relations of The Middle East*, (Oxford, New York, 2005), p. 227.

King and his regime, Muslim Brotherhood supported the Jordanian government.⁴⁷⁸ When the domestic politics of Jordan was overwhelmed with civil war in 1970 because of the Palestinian guerillas fighting against the Jordanian army, Jordan benefited from the support of US, United Kingdom and Israel in deterring Syria that was helping Palestinian guerillas.⁴⁷⁹ While the Jordanian-Syrian relations grew tense, once more the Jordanian need for its Western allies was underlined. Additionally, Jordan suffered some loss of Arab aid due to the civil war since some of its Arab donors raised their conditions for aid. “Kuwait suspended financial assistance in 1971 and Libya cut off aid completely.”⁴⁸⁰ Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia continued supplying Jordan with \$ 41 million per annum.

After the civil war, in order to garner support for his regime from East Bankers and to divert the attention of the Palestinians in the West Bank from PLO, King Hussein proposed his plan of “United Arab Kingdom” in March 1972.⁴⁸¹ The plan was based on a federation model for the unification of West Bank and East Bank. There would be regions of Palestine (West Bank) and Jordan (East Bank) with their own parliaments and elected governors. Each region would be autonomous in handling local affairs. For dealing with the matters of economy, defense and foreign affairs, there would be a national parliament. The King would be the head of the state and commander in chief of the armed forces. Amman would be the capital of Jordan and the United Arab Kingdom whereas East Jerusalem would be the capital of Palestine. Nevertheless, his proposal was ignored by the Arabs and the Israelis. Syria and Egypt harshly opposed. Sadat went further by breaking diplomatic relations with Jordan.⁴⁸²

⁴⁷⁸ Noyon, *Islam, Politics and Pluralism*, p.86.

⁴⁷⁹ “From 1967 to Civil War”, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*,
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/306128/Jordan/23334/From-1967-to-civil-war>

⁴⁸⁰ Bint Talal, *Rethinking an NGO*, p. 55.

⁴⁸¹ The idea of ‘United Arab Kingdom’ was similar to ‘Labor’s Jordanian Option’ in its basic premises.

⁴⁸² Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, pp.161-163.

4.6.3. 1973 OCTOBER WAR AND 1978 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

When the 1973 Arab-Israeli War broke out, Jordan was reluctant to go to war. It was left out the Trilateral Alliance of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, so it did not take place in the planning phase of the war. During the war, even the wind started blowing in favor of the Arabs, upon the call of Egypt, Jordan refused to open a front against Israel and sent a single armored division to support Syria in the Golan Heights. Jordan's reluctance to open a front and minimal effort was mainly due to its limited military capability stemming from the 1967 war and the civil war destruction. Thus, it was hard to assert that Jordan went into the 1973 War. As a result, Jordan was excluded from the post-war negotiations.⁴⁸³

In the Rabat Summit in 1974, PLO was recognized as the 'sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people'. By this way, PLO was provided with the legitimacy that it sought for and also the recognition of its territorial claims to the West Bank. Fearing from the possibility that these could result in developments to the disadvantage of Jordan, King Hussein opposed to the decision, but could not resist the pressure from other Arab states as well as the promised annual aid of 300 \$ to Jordan. After the Rabat Summit, it was obvious that West Bank was no longer Jordanian. Thus, King Hussein adopted a policy of self-sufficiency which is mainly focused on the concern if the East Bank would become a substitute homeland for Palestinians due to their increasing population. By the way, throughout the 1970s, the economic situation was so good in Jordan that 1973 October war with Israel did little damage to the Jordanian economy. Nevertheless, the total amount of the grants by the oil-rich Arab states declined dramatically by 1984 owing to the decrease in the oil prices and its subsequent results as budgetary problems in the oil-producing states.

When Egypt signed the peace treaty with Israel in 1979, Jordan was expected to join the peace camp, but despite the pro-Western image of King Hussein and Jordan's moderate

⁴⁸³ Curtis R. Ryan, *Inter-Arab Alliances: Regime Security and Jordanian Foreign Policy*, (Gainesville: University Pres of Florida, 2009), pp.73-83.

relations with Israel, Jordan did not sign a peace treaty with Israel. Instead, Jordan like most of the Arab states denounced Egypt's behavior. At that time, Jordan was not able to take a chance on breaking from the Arab camp and making peace with Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. This could lead to the isolation of Jordan like Egypt. However, Jordan was not on the point of bearing such isolation since its economy was very much dependent on the Arab aid from the oil-rich Arab states. Besides, Jordan would be left at the mercy of its revisionist neighbors, Syria and Iraq, which had the potential to pose direct and indirect security threats to the Kingdom.⁴⁸⁴ Whereas Egypt suffered isolation because of the Camp David Treaty, frontline Arab states like Syria and Jordan acquired more aid owing to the decision of the Arab League. The decision was indeed a reward for the anti-Israeli stance of the Syria whereas it aimed at discouraging Jordan from signing a peace agreement with Israel following Egypt and going against Arab consensus.⁴⁸⁵

Having gained Arab appreciation and support for not jumping in the peace camp after Egypt, Jordan experienced hard times in his relations with the US which reacted aggressively to Jordan's rejection of Camp David Accords. In order to force Jordan to change its behavior, the US threatened the country with the cut of economic aid and restriction of arms supplies. Carter administration also underlined that the US might not provide any protection for the country in case of an Israeli attack. King Hussein responded by saying that Jordan could search for alternative sources. He also charged US with being Janus-faced. The US was encouraging the Islamic resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan whereas it did not recognize the just cause of Palestinians in their resistance to the Israeli occupation of their land. Therefore, the relations between Jordan and the US grew extremely tense. Jordanian aid by the US was cut half, \$ 40 million in 1978 to \$ 20 million in 1980. Carter administration also ignored Jordan's request to buy F-16 aircrafts. King Hussein was very frustrated with the US stance and

⁴⁸⁴ Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process" in *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, ed. by Ilan Peleg, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 163.

⁴⁸⁵ Ryan, *Jordan in Transtion*, p.51.

met with Carter in 1980. During the talks, King Hussein underlined Jordan's need for arms. He also expressed that he rejected Camp David Accords and there was a need for gathering an international conference under the auspices of UN to deal with the question of Palestinian self-determination. In fact, King Hussein was very much disappointed with the Camp David Accords and its being brokered by the US. He felt betrayed and marginalized. He also thought that he did not have importance for the US as much as Egypt did.⁴⁸⁶

4.6.4. LONDON AGREEMENT

King Hussein and his Prime Minister Zaid Rifai met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, Israeli Political Director General of Foreign Ministry Yossi Beilin and Deputy Director of Mossad Efraim Halevy in London in April 1987. The meeting resulted in a draft of a general framework for holding an international conference to address the resolution of the Palestinian question, which was known as London Agreement. It was agreed that the UN Secretary General should invite the five permanent members of the UN Security Council together with the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to negotiate peaceful resolution. It was also agreed that the negotiations should be based on resolutions 242 and 338. The agreement envisaged that the international conference should not impose any solutions, but should leave it to the discretion of the parties in negotiations, which would be held in bilateral committees. The bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians should be held among the Israeli and joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegations. The London Agreement would first be proposed to the Israeli and Jordanian governments. Upon their approval, it would be recommended to the US.⁴⁸⁷

⁴⁸⁶ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, pp. 410-411; Ashton, *King Hussein of Jordan*, pp.247-249.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid*, pp.446-449.

During that time, the internal schism between the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir from Likud and Peres from Labor sealed the fate of the London Agreement. When Peres told Shamir about his meeting with King Hussein and the London Agreement, Shamir was not thrilled. In the meantime King Hussein informed and Beilin briefed US Secretary of State George Schultz about London Agreement. On the other hand, Shamir did not like anything about London Agreement. He was not in favor of an international conference that would pressure on Israel and the Arabs for resolution. For him, the UN auspices meant the presence of PLO which he did not want. Furthermore, Shamir was not alone in his dislike with the agreement. All the Likud ministers shared his dislike. Shamir's resolution of the Palestinian question rested upon the toppling of the Hashemite monarchy and replacing it with a Palestinian regime dependent on Israel. When Peres presented the agreement in the Israeli inner cabinet, he faced harsh opposition. He continued his lobbying for the agreement at home and abroad, but this time he was accused of exceeding his powers by Shamir. The tensions between Shamir and Peres increased and at the end of the day, the agreement was dead. Meanwhile, Shamir met King Hussein in July 1987 in London to dissuade him from the idea of holding an international conference. For this, he claimed that convening an international conference under the auspices of UN would bring in Soviet participation which was hostile against Israel. Soviet participation would not be beneficial since they were opposed to Jordan in terms of ideology, either. During the meeting, he also expressed the importance of the survival of the Jordan for Israel. Shamir wanted to calm the King down. He knew that the King was worried about the extremist Likud views of 'Jordan is Palestine' which envisioned expelling Palestinians from West Bank to East Bank. Therefore, he assured the King that 'Jordan is Palestine' had nothing to do with his party and government.⁴⁸⁸

London Agreement eventually became a missed opportunity. Ali Shukri, the Director of King Hussein's private office described the Jordanian view as:

⁴⁸⁸ Ibid, pp.450-455.

[...]It (London Agreement) was a beautifully crafted plan, but Shamir buried it. Hussein believed that it was inner fighting within the Israel government that shut it down. Whether it was the rivalry between Likud and Labor, or Shamir and Peres, it was shut down. It was also a clear message for the Americans that Israel was not ready to discuss peace. We were ready, but the Israelis shut it down. The collapse of the London Agreement left Hussein completely in cold. [...] ⁴⁸⁹

The failure of Peres to persuade his government was a great disappointment for King Hussein. Therefore, he lost all his credibility in the eyes of the King. He no more trusted in Peres. He even did not meet with Peres until the conclusion of the Oslo Accord in 1993.

4.7. CONCLUSION

Despite its limited economic liberalization and its political liberalization, which lagged behind the economic one, processes that started in the late 1980s, Jordan is an authoritarian state. Although it is a constitutional monarchy, Jordan displays the characteristics of ‘monarchial absolutism’ since it gives wide range of powers to the King who is the head of the state and immune from any liability and responsibility. In addition, he is not only the head of the all three branches, legislative, executive and judiciary, but also the supreme commander of land, naval and air forces. King also enjoys the right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate and dismiss the Prime Minister, which has almost become a habitual respond to any type of popular dissent. The Hashemite regime rests upon a neo-patrimonial system, where divergent interests and groups are co-opted, to sustain its legitimacy and support. Within this system, the King rewards loyalty to him and the Hashemite regime, neutralizes opponents, and removes incompetent elements. Such a system was easy to realize and pursue in a rentier economy which is based on heavy reliance on foreign economic aid and worker remittances, and a narrow production. This patronage networks includes Bedouins as the most important element of the Jordanian army and East Bank Jordanian elites holding key positions in the civilian and military power structure. Within this network, being the

⁴⁸⁹ Ibid, p.453.

intelligentsia and the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, Palestinians constitute the periphery of the system. However, Palestinians role at the periphery of the neo-patrimonial role began to change due to the increasing importance of the private sector for the regime as a result of economic liberalization. At this point, it is important to note that neither all the Bedouins are supporting the Hashemite regime at all times nor all the Palestinians are against the Hashemite regime.

Within this framework, Jordan's limited state capacity, its authoritarian structure, rentier economy and the neo-patrimonial coalitions provides the regime with only limited state autonomy both at the domestic and regional levels. Such reality compelled Jordan to adopt a pro-Western, moderate and pragmatic state ideology. Despite exceptional devotions to Pan-Arabism, which was part of its pragmatism, Jordan has stuck to its state ideology. Jordan's not participating in the US-led coalition against Iraq in 1991 Gulf War at the expense of jeopardizing its good relations with the US and the Arab participants of the coalition is an example where state could not act autonomously from the pro-Iraq domestic public opinion. In this case, the Palestinian factor also comes into play as a constraint on the state autonomy since the PLO explicitly supported Iraq in the war. The covert dialogue Jordan pursued with Israel during the reign of King Abdullah I as well as during the reign of King Hussein especially starting from the 1960s was again because of its limited domestic state autonomy. King Hussein never acknowledged its contacts with Israel neither at the domestic nor at the regional arena, which would not only threaten King Hussein's life, but also result in regional isolation that Jordan could not dare to afford. When Jordan's peace with Israel is concerned, Jordan was not able to make formal peace with Israel until the Middle East Peace Process began in 1991 and the PLO agreed on the Oslo Accords with Israel in 1993.

5. JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE

1994 Peace Treaty with Israel enabled Jordan to restore its occupied land and ensured an equitable share of water from the Yarmouk and Jordan rivers. Furthermore, the peace treaty is considered to be the end of the claims of “Jordan is Palestine”. Jordan managed to restore its image in the eyes of its Western donors and allies after The Gulf War. By this way, it also ensured a substantial amount of debt release despite the fact that it was below its expectations. The peace treaty, both the resultant of the vision of the “New Middle East” and was thought to be the reinforcing it, too. Under the peace euphoria starting with the 1991 Madrid Conference and strengthened with the Oslo process, the “New Middle East” is characterized by economic cooperation and integration. Inspired from the European experience, economic cooperation and integration envisioned to lead to political stability. Articulated by Israel’s foreign minister and peace negotiator Shimon Peres, this vision aimed at remapping the political identities of nationalists, be they pan-Arab or Zionist. Pointing to one common enemy, poverty, the mother of all extremism in the region, Peres built his vision of peace on the effects of economic development and cooperation, which would eventually spill over to politics.

The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty came to being under the zeal for regional peace. It was not brokered by the United States (US) and came totally out of the direct negotiations between Jordan and Israel. Against the backdrop of the legitimacy provided by the direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis in the Oslo process, King Hussein was able to achieve his life-long dream of peace with Israel, which he shared with his political mate, Yitzak Rabin, the prime minister of Israel. However, the normalization of the relations between the two countries, which was inherent in the peace treaty, itself, entered into a stalemate after the assassination of Rabin and the Likud headed by Benjamin Netanyahu coming to power. The promise of the peace treaty as the ‘peace

dividends' were never realized. Under the shadows of the anti-normalization movement in Jordan and the reluctance of Israel to continue the peace process with the Palestinians, the peace between Jordan and Israel remained 'cold' even after two decades. Thus, the peace treaty defined by the King Hussein, himself, as the crowning achievement doomed to remain as the 'king's peace'.

This chapter is dedicated to understand the reasons for peace as well as its outcomes predominantly from the Jordanian perspective. It seeks to understand why the peace treaty was signed in 1994, not before. Trying to find out what the factors and imperatives were leading to the peace treaty, the paper also examines the reasons why the peace was not able to lead to the normalization of relations between the two countries. Within this framework, the road to peace is elaborated in terms of the regional/international context and the domestic context composed of the role of the leadership, economic factors and their reflection on domestic politics. Then the status of the political and economic relations between the two countries is analyzed with reference to the anti-normalization movement at the popular level and political confrontations at the governmental level. The chapter pays attention to the issue of 'peace dividends' which were viewed as the only key to the normalization of relations and the melting pot for the 'cold peace'.

5.1. THE ROAD TO PEACE

The Middle East of early 1990s was of a region where the hopes of decades' old conflicts could eventually end with peace flourishing. However, before the euphoria of peace created by the Madrid Conference in 1991, it is important to highlight the paradigm shift in the Middle East regional context. Abdel Salam Al Majali, who was the head of the Jordanian delegation during the bilateral negotiations with Israel and the signatory of the peace treaty, asserted that the shift in regional political paradigms after the Gulf War was an important factor in understanding peace in the Middle East in the 1990s. He stated:

Before the Gulf War, Israel was the gateway into the Middle East, especially when it came to protecting and overseeing oil reserves in the region. However, the Gulf War brought the West directly (and physically) into the region so the way Israel was perceived began to change, and in order to maintain stability in the region, the peace process was spurred on.⁴⁹⁰

According to Majali, such shift in western and mainly US perceptions was not only about Israel, but also Jordan, too. Jordan's stance during the Gulf War fuelled the discussions on Jordan's being an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. In the post-Gulf War context, peace with Israel provided Jordan with a more fertile ground to lobby for its cause and gain credibility.⁴⁹¹

5.1.1. 1991 GULF WAR

When the Iraqi-Kuwait crisis broke out in 1990 with the Iraqi allegation that Kuwait was stealing Iraqi petrol via slant drilling, King Hussein's first response was to mediate the confrontation and eventually reach an 'Arab solution'. For him, the invasion of an Arab country by another was unthinkable and the conflict could be resolved through diplomacy. Otherwise, any foreign intervention in the region would lead to destruction of Iraqi economic and military capabilities and devastation of Kuwait.⁴⁹² Since 1979 Jordan was engaged in good relations and economic cooperation with Iraq. During the Iran-Iraqi war (1980-1989), Jordan reaped the benefits of the war both through the aids it received from US and the increasing trade relations with Iraq. In addition, Jordan was the major thoroughfare for Iraqi imports and exports. Therefore, the transportation of the goods from the port of Aqaba to Iraq was a significant source of revenues for Jordan. The resource-poor and energy-dependent Kingdom also benefited from the subsidized Iraqi

⁴⁹⁰ Interview with Abdel Salam Al Majali, "Behind the Curtains", *Jordan Business*, December 2009, p. 38.

⁴⁹¹ Ibid.

⁴⁹² Jamil E. Jreisat and Hanna Y. Freij, "Jordan, The United States, and The Gulf Crisis", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Winter/Spring 91, Vol. 13, Issue (1-2), pp.101-116.

oil. It was heavily dependent on Arab aid from the oil-rich Arab states and had workers in the Gulf, the remittances of whom constitute an important share in Jordan's income. By the year 1990, "Iraq was the largest source of Jordan's imports (17.3 %) and the main destination for its exports (23.2 %) as well as its main source of oil"⁴⁹³. However, Jordan's efforts for mediation did not work. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, King Hussein denounced it. However, he also refused to join the US-led coalition against Iraq, Operation Desert Storm.

On 6 February 1991, when King Hussein appealed for a cease-fire in the war against Iraq, he also declared that the allied effort was 'against all Arabs and Muslims and not against Iraq alone' and was intended to assert 'foreign hegemony' in the Middle East.⁴⁹⁴ The American response was swift and threatening. In the end, the result of such stance for Jordan was a cut in foreign aid and suffering from the sanctions enforced against Iraq. Politically and economically, Jordan was worn out striving to stay in defense between Iraq (its greatest trading partner) and the US (its greatest donor) allies.⁴⁹⁵ Such stance deprived Jordan not only from Western aid, but also from the Arab one. This cost increased with the disappearance of the Aqaba port revenues due to the embargo against Iraq and the decrease in the workers' remittances because of the expulsion of the Jordanian workers from the Gulf monarchies, and the diminishing tourism revenues stemming from the war conditions. All these economic losses worsened the economic situation in Jordan which had already been in crisis since 1989.⁴⁹⁶ On the other hand,

⁴⁹³ Economic Intelligence Unit 1991, s.28 quoted in Ryan, Curtis R., "Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process", Ilan Peleg (ed.) *The Middle East Peace Process: Interdisciplinary Perspectives*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 167.

⁴⁹⁴ *New York Times*, 7 February 1991, quoted in Ibid.

⁴⁹⁵ See the historical evolution of Jordanian- Iraqi relations in Curtis Ryan, "Between Iraq and a Hard Place: Jordanian-Iraqi Relations", *Middle East Report*, No.215, Summer 2000, pp.40-42.

⁴⁹⁶ See detailed analysis in Warwick Knowles, *Jordan Since 1989: A Study in Political Economy*, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp.80-81.

King Hussein gained great support within Jordan, even from the opposition, which was historically opposed to western political influence in Jordan.⁴⁹⁷

Meanwhile, King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir met secretly in King's residence in London on 5 January 1991, ten days before the war broke out. Both King Hussein and Shamir knew that the war was inevitable. For this reason, they discussed their would-be situations during the war. King Hussein asked for assurance from Shamir that Israeli jets would not fly over Jordan in case of war. Shamir promised so in return for the King's pledge that Jordan would not permit Iraqi planes to fly over Jordanian airspace to attack Israel. By the way, Israel did not take part in the US coalition against Iraq due to the will of the Arab states.⁴⁹⁸ In addition, before that, during a meeting with the US President Bush in December 1990, Shamir raised the issue of Jordan. He stated that he understood the US anger at Jordan because of its pro-Iraq stance, but the US should also grasp the difficulty of King's situation. He told Bush that Arafat's support for Iraq had left King Hussein without any other choice, but support Iraq. If the King had moved against Saddam Hussein, he could not have prevented a Palestinian rebellion against him in the Kingdom. Hence, he recommended US to look beyond the Gulf Crisis and help King Hussein to remain the Western camp rather than forcing him to turn to Iraq. Having been impressed by Shamir's defense of the Hashemite Kingdom, US did not change its hostile behavior towards Jordan.⁴⁹⁹ Nevertheless, both Shamir's defense of Jordan and the secret meeting between King Hussein and Prime Minister Shamir revealed the mild relations between Israel and Jordan before the official end of state of belligerency between the two countries.

Jordan's not aligning with the US led-coalition against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, was, in fact, an exception in the Jordanian foreign policy rather than a change. Although

⁴⁹⁷ Lamis Andoni, Jillian Shwedler, "Bread Riots in Jordan", *Middle East Report*, No:201, Israel and Palestine: Two States, Bantustons or Binationalism?, October-December 1996, p.41.

⁴⁹⁸ Samuel Segev, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict Under President Bush", Meena Bose and Rosanna Perotti (ed.s), *From Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H. W. Bush*, (Westport: Greenwood Publishing, 2002), p. 125.

⁴⁹⁹ Ibid.

Jordan's stance in the Gulf War was referred as alignment with Iraq in some part of the literature⁵⁰⁰, what Jordan did was remaining neutral rather than siding with Iraq. The public opinion in Jordan was pro-Iraq since Saddam Hussein was very popular among the Jordanian population owing to Saddam's Arab nationalist discourse, his criticism towards the West and his anti-Israeli militant stance. In response to domestic pressures resulting from the pro-Iraqi public opinion, when Jordanian diplomatic efforts failed to deter the war, King Hussein was not able to jump to the US camp. Eventually, having realized that the new world order in the aftermath of the Cold War was without doubt is going to be shaped by the US, and having annoyed US with its non-alignment, Jordan was quick to participate in the Madrid peace conference in 1991 and then signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1994.⁵⁰¹

5.1.2. 1991 MADRID PEACE CONFERENCE

The US victory after the 1991 Gulf War provided George H. W. Bush administration with the political leverage to initiate the peace process in the Middle East. In addition, the end of Cold War (although formally the SU was still existing, but it was in the process of dissolution) led to the end of rivalry between the US and the SU. Therefore, it was much easier for the US to persuade the radical Arab states, were persistently opposing peace negotiations with Israel, for peace negotiations without the SU as their patron. Besides, when PLO leader Yasser Arafat had denounced violence and accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the US engaged in open dialogue with Arafat. Arab states seemed ready to cooperate with the US as the victor of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War. Among the Arab states, Syria was the most important for the US since Hafiz Assad could undertake the role once Sadat had done. Syria's rigid stance in terms of Golan Heights and achieving peace gradually was a concern. When Syria

⁵⁰⁰ Richard J. Harknett and Jeffrey A. Vandanberg, "Alignment Theory and Interrelated Threats: Jordan and the Persian Gulf Crisis", *Security Studies*, Vol.6, No.3, (Spring 1997), pp.112-53.

⁵⁰¹ Curtis R. Ryan, "Jordan First: Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations And Foreign Policy Under King Abdullah II", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 26, Issue.3 (Summer 2004), pp. 43-62.

accepted participating in the peace negotiations, Lebanon followed suit. For Jordan, peace talks could be a window of opportunity to restore its image in the eyes of the US after its nonalignment with the US coalition during the 1991 Gulf War. Israel viewed the negotiations as a means of achieving Arab recognition of the state of Israel. By the way, before the Gulf War, Israel had asked from the US a loan guarantee of \$ 10 billion for the absorption of Soviet Jews in Israel. The US did not want to provide Israel with the loan guarantee without a political gain. The US wanted to make use of the loan issue to moderate Israeli position in the peace negotiations. The delay of the loan guarantee by the US created tensions between the US and Israel on the eve of the Madrid Peace Conference. In addition, Israel rejected direct negotiations with the PLO. US President George H.W. Bush and the State Secretary James Baker found a formula of forming a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian delegation did not include any official members of the PLO, only academicians and professionals from West Bank and Gaza Strip were present. Besides, no residents from East Jerusalem were part of the delegation owing to Israeli insistence. However, they were in touch with the PLO leadership in Tunis. The liaison officer of this communication was Faisal Hussein, who was a resident of East Jerusalem and an unofficial PLO activist in West Bank, but he was in Madrid as a member of steering committee which was there to monitor the Palestinian delegation.⁵⁰²

The Madrid Conference was held 30 October-4 November 1991 in Madrid and co-sponsored by the US and the SU. The foundation of the conference was expressed by the US President George H.W. Bush in his opening remarks:

What we envision is a process of direct negotiations proceeding along two tracks, one between Israel and Arab States; the other between Israel and Palestinians. Negotiations are to be conducted on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The real work will not happen here in the plenary session, but in direct bilateral negotiations. This conference cannot impose a settlement on the participants or veto agreements; and just as important, the Conference can only be reconvened with the consent of every participant. Progress is in the hands of the parties who must live with the consequences.

⁵⁰² Avi Shlaim, *Iron Wall*, (London, New York, 2000), p. 484-492.

Soon after the bilateral talks commence, parties will convene as well to organize multilateral negotiations. These will focus on issues that cross national boundaries and are common to the region: arms control, water, refugee concerns, economic development. Progress in these fora is not intended as a substitute for what must be decided in bilateral talks; to contrary, progress in the multilateral issues can help create an atmosphere in which long-standing bilateral disputes can more easily be settled.

For Israel and the Palestinians, a framework already exists for diplomacy. Negotiations will be conducted in phases; beginning with talks on interim self-government arrangements will last for five years; beginning the third year, negotiations will commence on permanent status.⁵⁰³

Throughout the conference, the parties did not conduct serious negotiations, and retain their traditional positions, but at least they agreed to remain in dialogue. It is agreed that bilateral negotiations would start in December 1991 and the multilateral negotiations would take place in Moscow in January 1992. The bilateral talks, having gained momentum with Yitzhak Rabin's election as the prime minister in June 1992, yielded results with the Clinton administration. Israel engaged in direct negotiations with the Palestinians when the negotiations were not moving forward due to the Palestinians delegations need for the approval of Arafat. The alternative secret bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians took place in Oslo in 1993 and ended up with the Declaration of Principles which was signed by Israel and the PLO on 13 September 1993 in Washington. Following, a series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords were put into force: 1993 Oslo I Accord (Declaration of Principles on Interim-Self Government Arrangements), 1994 Cairo Agreement (Agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho Area), 1995 Oslo II Accord (Taba Agreement/The Interim Agreement on West Bank and Gaza Strip), 1997 Hebron Protocol, 1998 Wye River Memorandum, 1999 Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum. After the 1993 Declaration of Principles, King Hussein decided to move forward with direct talks with Israel for peace independent from the Madrid framework. In the beginning, King Hussein was indeed annoyed for being excluded and not being consulted by the either party. However, later on, what was frustrating the Hashemite King turned out to be an opportunity for realizing the peace

⁵⁰³“Remarks by Mr. George Bush, The President of the United States”, The Madrid Conference Opening Speeches, 30 October 1991, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/mfadocuments/pages/remarks%20by%20mr%20george%20bush-%20president%20of%20the%20united.aspx> , (accessed on 01 August 2014).

with Israel which he had in mind for a long period of time as well as reinstating its links with the West after the political catastrophe of the Gulf War.⁵⁰⁴ In case of a peace with Israel, Jordan was far from being judged for entering into bilateral negotiations with Israel and selling out the Palestinian cause.⁵⁰⁵

5.1.3. MOTIVATIONS FOR PEACE: ‘PEACE DIVIDENDS’

Peace with Israel turned out to be a way to restore its image in the eyes of its Western donors. The first peace dividend for Jordan would be the debt relief and aid. Jordan suffered from an economic crisis in 1989. The cuts in the foreign aid after the Gulf War of 1991 deprived Jordanian economy from servicing its foreign debt. The Persian Gulf States cut of their aid to Jordan and forced the country to reschedule its \$ 7.3 billion foreign debt. Jordan also hoped that its \$ 700 million direct debt to the US would be forgiven.⁵⁰⁶ In order to restructure its economy in line with the structural adjustment program it made with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Jordan needed foreign capital inflow in the form of foreign aid and foreign investment. Peace with Israel could help Jordan to attract foreign investment as well as secure foreign aid.⁵⁰⁷

Second peace dividend for Jordan would be the decrease in the military expenditure. Since its inception, Jordan had to secure a standing army due to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Besides, if the border threats with Israel were removed, Jordan would be able to reallocate the money it spent on arms to economic development. For a country with

⁵⁰⁴ Marwan Kardoosh, “Jordan, Israel and Palestine: Looking Beyond The Economics”, *Daily Star*, 27 July 2002, available at <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Jul/27/Jordan-Israel-and-Palestine-Looking-beyond-the-economics.ashx?searchText=Kardoosh%20Marwan#ixzz1KcQG4vZI>

⁵⁰⁵ Ryan, “Jordan in the Peace Process”, pp. 163-166.

⁵⁰⁶ “The Peace Dividend For Israel and Jordan”, *Businessweek*, 7 August 1994, <http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1994-08-07/the-peace-dividend-for-israel-and-jordan> , (accessed on 01 August 2014).

⁵⁰⁷ Abu-Jabarah, “The Economics of Peace: Jordan”, p. 195.

limited economic sources, decreasing military spending and diverting the sources away from military would be an important motivation.

The third peace dividend for Jordan is about the expatriates. By the 1990, almost 35 % of Jordan's work force was employed outside the country. 86 % of the expatriate workers were employed in the Arab Gulf states, 85 % of which was in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.⁵⁰⁸ Restoration of the political prestige in the eyes of the US would easily result in restoration of the relations with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, two important allies of the US in the region. Thus, Jordanian expatriate workers would not be threatened to be expelled from the countries they worked. This eventually would stabilize labor markets, contribute to the decrease or control in the unemployment rate. The financial impact would be securing the foreign exchange rates since the workers remittances are one of the most important sources of foreign exchange reserves.

The fourth peace dividend would be increasing tourism revenues. New projects like building hotels and spas along the Jordanian-Israeli border in the Dead Sea as well as attraction of tourists to the desert city of Petra as well as Wadi Rum (where the Lawrence of Arabia was filmed) would be realized. The increase in the tourism revenues and the foreign investment would be a source of currency and facilitate the creation of the new job opportunities. With the peace, Jordan would be able to make use of the Israeli ports of Haifa, Ashdod and Eilat to boost tourism.⁵⁰⁹

The fifth peace dividend would be the regional economic integration. If a comprehensive peace was achieved in the region, it would pave the way for regional economic integration. By this way, economies in the region would complement each other and able to make use of the resources region-wide. Some countries in the region are oil-rich, some are endowed with other minerals whereas some others have water sources. Hence, a conflict-free region with cooperative economic relations would result in the efficient

⁵⁰⁸ Ibid, p. 189.

⁵⁰⁹ Kardoosh, "Jordan, Israel and Palestine".

use of resources for the benefit of all. In addition, free movement of factors of production like labor and capital would contribute to the efficient operation of market forces.⁵¹⁰ In addition, regional economic cooperation would facilitate regional infrastructure projects, too. Such projects in transportation, communications, water and power would contribute to regional development.

5.1.4. ECONOMICS AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Economics is vital for preserving the political stability in Jordan. As a country highly susceptible to the regional developments, the regional economic recession in the 1980s had a debilitating effect on the Jordanian economy. The decline of oil prices in 1982 in international markets terribly hit oil-exporting countries and led to the decline in the oil revenues. According to the statistics, “the combined oil revenues of three principal Gulf oil-exporting countries- Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates (UAE)- fell from \$186 billion in 1982 to \$ 57.6 billion in 1985”⁵¹¹. Besides, Iran- Iraq war (1980-88) caused disruptions in regional trade and finance. The loss of investor confidence in the region because of the Iran-Iraq war resulted in a capital flight especially from the Gulf and closure of the local offices of some international banks.⁵¹² The decline in oil revenues led all the governments in the Arabian Gulf to reduce their spending on infrastructure and other development projects. This resulted in a significant decline in the number of immigrant workers making their living in the Gulf. In return, this hit the economies of states like Jordan, in which one of the main sources of economy is labor remittances of expatriate workers. On the other hand, the richer oil-producing Arab Gulf

⁵¹⁰ Abu-Jabarah, “The Economics of Peace: Jordan”, p. 196.

⁵¹¹ Quoted from Shireen T. Hunter “The Gulf Economic Crisis and its Social and Political Consequences, Middle East Journal, 40 (Autumn 1986), pp.593-613 in Fred H. Lawson, “Managing Economic Crises: The Role of The State in Bahrain and Kuwait”, Studies in Comparative International Development, (Spring 1991), p.43.

⁵¹² Fred H. Lawson, “Managing Economic Crises: The Role of The State in Bahrain and Kuwait”, Studies in Comparative International Development, (Spring 1991), pp.43-44.

States cut back their economic assistance to non-oil producing states, which put further strains on the economy of the state's dependent on foreign aid like Jordan.

Against this backdrop, between the years 1981-87, Jordanian economy was suffering from a growing deficit. This was mainly stemming from the imbalance between decreasing external grants on the one hand and increasing state expenditures on the other. Eventually, Jordanian economy started suffering from an economic crisis in 1989. To find a way out, Jordan adopted the economic readjustment program recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Accordingly, Jordan adjusted the prices of certain goods and commodities like fuel, alcoholic drinks, cigarettes, natural drinks and carbonated drinks to cope with the budget deficit by increasing the resources of the treasury and controlling expenditure. When the price increases followed by the cuts in the subsidies on bread, sugar, rice and milk and raises in taxes, social unrest erupted. Demonstrations started in April 1989 in Maan, where the resided the most loyal element of the Hashemite monarchy, the Bedouins, and soon spread to all the towns in southern Jordan. Hence, initial economic liberalization process triggered discontent by shifting focal point of the regime from public to private sector. Indeed, East Bank nationalist circles were displeased with the periodic influx of the Palestinian immigrants, because they feared that Palestinians who dominated the private sector would marginalize the Jordanians employed in the public sector and security services in their own countries. They also suspected that King Hussein might re-organize his power base in favor of Palestinians by avoiding Jordanians.⁵¹³

The dissatisfaction unleashed by the protests compelled the King to initiate political liberalization. The process was a top-down process and there was a near total absence of mass politics.⁵¹⁴ It started with holding parliamentary elections in 1989. With the limited political open-up, the King managed to rebuild social stability with shifting coalitions and base of support. “[...]in the end, the regime had emerged with a far more solid base

⁵¹³ Malik Mufti, “Elite Bargains and the Onset of Liberalization in Jordan”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol.32, No.1, (February 1999), pp.123-124.

⁵¹⁴ *Ibid*, p.102.

than before.”⁵¹⁵ Moreover, King’s stance in the Gulf war against the Western coalition earned him a great popularity and legitimacy at home. Enjoying such popularity, King used both the economic and political liberalization processes to broaden its base of support. This pro-Hashemite coalition, bringing together different elites from bureaucracy, business and military, managed to create the common interest of making peace with Israel with the hope for new economic gains and opportunities. The euphoria easily passed on to the people with the discourse of ‘peace dividend’.

On the other hand, there was an opposition to the peace process, mainly organized by the dominant Islamist movement of Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political representation in the cabinet, the Islamic Action Front. They protested the peace via street demonstrations and releasing statements in the cabinet or via the professional associations. Ten professional associations (engineers, doctors, lawyers, dentists, nurse, veterinarians, pharmacists, writers and geologists) released a collective statement that they denounce peace with Israel and refuse to open dealings or cooperate with their counterparts in Israel. The opposition bloc against the peace in the parliament was composed of leftists and Arab nationalists led by the Islamists. They claimed that the peace deal was not good, and the peace process was moving too fast. They also accused the government of not taking into account the views in the parliament as the representatives of the Jordanian people who were not ready for the peace. Via a collective statement, they also argued that Palestinians were left alone with Israel, getting stronger after making bilateral peace with its Arab counterparts. In the end, the Hashemite regime managed to override the opposition relying on its supporting coalitions.⁵¹⁶

⁵¹⁵ Ryan, “Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process”, p. 169.

⁵¹⁶ Ryan, “Jordan in the Middle East Peace Process”, pp. 169-170

5.1.5. LEADERS: KING HUSSEIN AND RABIN

The leadership played an important role in the peacemaking process. The achievement of the Jordanian-Israeli peace owed a great deal to the personal diplomacy, trust and harmony between the two leaders, King Hussein of Jordan and the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. Colonel Ali Shukri, the director of King Hussein's private office and Efrahim Halevy, the deputy head of Mossad were the two influential figures in the back channel diplomacy. In addition, during the peace negotiations, the delegations of Jordan and Israel worked in harmony, too. According to Al Majali, he and his counterpart in the Israeli delegation, Elyakim Rubinstein developed relations based on understanding and transparency. By regarding Rubinstein as an "extremely honest man", Majali explained the relationship between the two in his own words as:

We developed such a rapport that if he received instructions from his side that he felt would negatively affect us, he would come and tell me. During the negotiations, we would meet privately and exchange ideas, with each reflecting what their side was looking for in the negotiations before we retreated to our respective camps to relay the information to our delegations.⁵¹⁷

The peace treaty was the result of the well-managed secret negotiations and the coherency between the delegations under the leadership of King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin who strongly believed in peace between Jordan and Israel. During the negotiations for peace, the personal relations between King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin developed to an extent that the relations between the two countries after the peace almost depended on the relations between the two leaders. Both Hussein and Rabin came to view the relations between the two countries from the prism of their perceptions of each other. They paid little attention to what was going on at the governmental level owing to their belief that they could come over any problem arising through their personal contacts. In practice, their approach worked, unhealthy though, making the two 'trouble-shooters' in the peace process.⁵¹⁸

⁵¹⁷ Interview with Abdel Salam Al Majali, "Behind the Curtains", *Jordan Business*, December 2009, p. 40.

⁵¹⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p. 556.

The confidence that the two leaders had in each other was prominent in solving the problems during the peace negotiations as well as peace sustaining until the assassination of Rabin. This can be exemplified in solving of the first crisis between the two states after the peace treaty. A week after Jordan's first ambassador to Israel Marwan Muasher took his office, the Israeli government made a decision to expropriate 134 acres of land in East Jerusalem to build Jewish settlements on 28 April 1995. In fact, the issue of Jewish settlements was postponed to the final status negotiations with the Oslo Accords. However, neither the Palestinians nor the Arabs expected Israel to initiate building new settlements.⁵¹⁹ The decision came as a big surprise and an embarrassment to Jordan. Having been disturbed by the Israeli decision, Madeline Albright, the US permanent representative to the UN, asked Rabin about the decision during her visit to Israel. Rabin claimed that the lands to be expropriated were an extension of Jewish neighborhoods and the Palestinians would be compensated. Reducing the land expropriation and building new Jewish settlements to a matter of financial compensation was indeed a political cover for a huge obstacle for resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Israeli stance in response to the Jordanian efforts to persuade Israel to cancel the decision was clear: The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty limited Jordanian position in East Jerusalem to religious issues. Jordan tried to explain via diplomatic contacts that the decision was not only hampering the prospect for future negotiations in the resolution of the Palestinian Israeli conflict, but also threatening the normalization efforts of the Jordanian government such as passing laws in the Parliament to end Israeli boycott.⁵²⁰

At this juncture, King Hussein wrote a five pages long letter to Prime Minister Rabin on 21 May 1995 underlying that the issue of Jerusalem was not only important for the

⁵¹⁹ It should be noted that Israeli actions in regard to the issue of Jewish settlements continued against the will of the international community and in contradiction to the Fourth Geneva Convention. According to the Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, "The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies". See *IV Geneva Convention Relative To The Protection Of Civilian Persons In Time Of War Of 12 August 1949*, www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/xsp/.ibmmodres/.../ATTXSYRB.pdf, (accessed on 06 August 2014), p.185.

⁵²⁰ Marwan Muasher, *The Arab Center: The Promise of Moderation*, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2008), pp. 44-47.

Palestinians, but also to Jordan as well as to the all followers of the three monotheistic religions. Despite being official, the language used by the King reflected sincerity and his close relations with Rabin:

I am thus completely at a loss to understand why now should the Government of Israel contribute to its further serious deterioration by unilateral action in Jerusalem and the confiscation of even an inch of Arab land. With all due respect my friend, this should not stand and we seek your wisdom, courage and farsightedness to reconsider urgently and fully the action and repercussions and to act accordingly, recent events at the Security Council notwithstanding.⁵²¹ [...]

Dear Prime Minister, the peace camp to which both of us belong, deserves no less than your considered and immediate action to restore faith to its adherents and to retrieve the advantages which have been given to skeptics and the enemies of peace by recent developments.

I have written frankly and candidly my friend, because you have grown to expect I believe, no less from a fellow builder of peace dedicated to it and deeply concerned and committed to realizing it for all our future generations.⁵²²

According to Muasher, although there were other factors like the opposition of the Arab members of the Knesset to the decision, the letter by the King played a major role in the decision of Rabin to suspend the decision.⁵²³ The crisis and the way it was handled and resolved was a show of the good personal relations between King Hussein and Rabin, but it also displayed that the relations between Jordan and Israel were far more complex than Israel had perceived until that time.

On the day, Rabin was assassinated by a right-wing Jewish at a peace rally in Tel Aviv, on 4 November 1995, King Hussein's hope for a better future with Israel was dashed. King's words during Rabin's funeral reflected the importance he attributed to Rabin and peace.

⁵²¹ The UN Security Council met on 17 May 1995 to discuss the issue. However, a resolution to condemn the expropriation of land in Jerusalem was not achieved due to the US veto.

⁵²² "King Hussein's Letter to Prime Minister Rabin Regarding the Jerusalem Land Expropriation Issue", Appendix 1, Muasher, *The Arab Center*, pp.271-273.

⁵²³ *Ibid*, p. 48.

Let's not keep silent. Let our voices rise high to speak of our commitment to peace for all times to come and let us tell those who live in darkness, who are the enemies of light... This is where we stand. This is our camp. We are determined to conclude the legacy for which my friend fell as did my grandfather in this very city when I was with him as a boy. He was a man of courage, a man of vision and he was endowed with humility. And, standing here, I commit before you, before my people in Jordan and before the world myself to continue to do the utmost to ensure that we shall leave a similar legacy.⁵²⁴

On the day of the Rabin's funeral, King Hussein told Randa Habib⁵²⁵, the journalist, "It is fate that I return to West Jerusalem for the first time to bury a friend. I feel that I have buried peace. I was so used to having him by my side."⁵²⁶ Even after the funeral when the grief that King Hussein and Queen Noor showed during the funeral as a sign of their intimacy they had with the Rabin family attracted anger in some parts of the Arab world, King Hussein never apologized for his behavior.⁵²⁷ He told Randa Habib;

This man had become a friend. He was a real military man, a man of his word. We understood each other well, for I too am a military man. Sometimes, we disagreed, as was the case during the peace negotiations. Yes, our voice rose in anger, but, when we reached a mutual agreement, we gave our word and stuck to it. This is what I loved about him, and this is what we will no doubt miss.⁵²⁸

King Hussein's words that "I have the impression that today I have also, in some way, buried the peace"⁵²⁹ were reflection of his pessimism for the future of peace between Jordan and Israel after Rabin.

⁵²⁴ "The Speech by King Hussein of Jordan", *Eulogies at Rabins's Funeral*, <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/eulogy.html>, (accessed on 06 August 2014).

⁵²⁵ She was a French journalist of Lebanese origin. She covered news about war, politics and economics about the Middle East. She was also the director of the Amman Bureau of Agence French Pres since 1987. She was with the Jordanian delegation in the Rabin's funeral.

⁵²⁶ Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p.10.

⁵²⁷ Queen Noor, *Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life*, (New York: Miramax Books, 2003), p.384.

⁵²⁸ Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p.11.

⁵²⁹ Quoted in Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p.560.

5.2. THE PEACE TREATY

Jordan and Israel signed the Washington Declaration on 25 July 1994. The declaration represented the official termination of the state of belligerence between Jordan and Israel. Three months later, on 26 October 1994, a full-fledged peace treaty was signed between the two countries at the southern border crossing of Wadi ‘Araba. The treaty aimed at laying a firm foundation for a just, long lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East, based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Being composed of 30 articles, five annexes and six maps, the treaty covered the areas of international boundary, security, freedom of passage, places of historical and religious significance, refugees and displaced persons. The treaty also addressed the normalization of relations between the two countries. To this end, various areas for cooperation have been outlined in the treaty such as trade, transportation, tourism, communications, culture and science, energy, environment, agriculture, navigation, civil aviation, police cooperation in combating crime and the development of the Jordan Rift Valley and the Aqaba-Eliat region.⁵³⁰

The peace treaty recognized “the middle of the main course of the flow of Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers”⁵³¹ as the borderline between Jordan and Israel. The boundaries delimited via the treaty including the maritime boundaries in the Dead Sea and Gulf of Aqaba. Additionally, special regimes between two states set up for two areas: Baqura/Naharayim and Al-Ghamr/Zofar. Recognizing the Jordanian sovereignty over these areas, Israel obtained the right of using the land for a period of 25 years.⁵³² By this way, Jordan obtained its territories occupied (excluding West Bank) by Israel after the 1967 war.

⁵³⁰ *Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty*, <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html>, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

⁵³¹ *Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty*, Annex I (a) Jordan-Israel International Boundary, Delimitation and Demarcation.

⁵³² For more information, see *Jordan-Israeli Treaty*, Annex I (b) Baqura/Nahariyim Area, Annex I (c) Al-Ghamr/Zofar Area.

In respect to the security of the each country and its population, Jordan and Israel committed to refrain from any act like the use or the threat of using conventional or non-conventional weapons that can harm the people. Each party also undertook to ensure the prevention of entry, stationing and the operation of any individual, group or entry that intends to engage in hostile acts to one of the parties affecting adversely the security of their people. In terms of security cooperation, Jordan and Israel agreed to cooperate in combating terrorism and transnational crime as well as preventing and combating cross-boundary infiltrations. A vision of a secure and peaceful region free from hostile coalitions and weapons of mass destruction, conventional and non-conventional weapons characterized by renunciation of the use of force was put forward. This vision was supposed to be realized by tools like regional conferences and working groups.⁵³³

Due to its scarcity, water sharing has been a significant issue in Middle Eastern politics. The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty included a detailed sharing regime of the water from Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers. Jordan Valley, incomparable to its size, has been an important part of regional politics since the water has been shared by Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Israel and West Bank.⁵³⁴ The sixth Article and Second Annex of the peace treaty was dedicated to the water sharing regime in terms of season, storage, quality and the development of future water sources. The establishment of Joint Water Committee was regulated with the treaty for enhancing cooperation in analyzing the water quality, storage and improving the efficiency of water usage. According to the treaty, Israel secured 25 million cubic meters (MCM) from the Yarmouk River, 12 MCM during summer time and 13 MCM for the winter. Jordan was to get the rest of the flow after Israel's share was pumped. From the Jordan River, Israel was to pump 20 MCM water to Jordan in return for the 20 MCM water Jordan additionally was to concede to Israel from Yarmouk River during the winter time. During the winter time, Jordan was entitled to

⁵³³ Jordan-Israeli Treaty, "Article 4: Security"; Dona J. Stewart, *Good Neighborly Relations, Jordan, Israel and the 1994-2004 Peace Process*, (London, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), pp.30-39.

⁵³⁴ Dona Stewart, *Good Neighborly Relations: Jordan, Israel and the 1994-2004 Peace Process*, (London, New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007), p.55. For the detailed analysis of the international efforts for establishing a water sharing regime among the co-riparian states of the Jordan Valley, see David J. H. Philips, Shaddad Attili, Stephan McCaffrey, John S. Murray, "The Jordan River Basin: 1. Clarification of the Allocations in the Johnston Plan", *Water International*, Vol.32, No.1, (March 2007), pp. 16-38.

store minimum average of 20 MCM of the floods of Jordan River with the Yarmouk. Jordan was also entitled to get 10 MCM desalinated water from Jordan River.⁵³⁵ Overall, while Israel ensures the 25 MCM water from Yarmouk with an additional 20 MCM, the amount of water Jordan was to get from Yarmouk was not specified, which would depend on the annual flows as well as the water sharing regime between Jordan and Syria. Thus Jordan's gain from the sharing regime is 30 MCM from the Jordan River plus an unspecified amount of water from Yarmouk.⁵³⁶

With peace treaty, Israel recognized Jordan's special role in the Muslim holy shrines in Jerusalem. It was stated in the Article 9 of the treaty titled that:

1. Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.
2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.⁵³⁷

However, the article seemed to be tricky since its wording was vague. What kind of a 'high priority' would be provided to Jordan was of question. During the negotiations King Hussein had demanded the recognition of the Hashemite status in Jerusalem. In this respect, it seemed to be a gesture to the will of King, but obviously the second paragraph of Article 9 was far from providing any clear and legally binding role to Jordan. On the other hand, by this way, Jordan secured its role in case the permanent status talks take place. This later led to a controversy between PLO and Jordan.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁵ Article 6 and Annex II of the Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty.

⁵³⁶ Beaumont estimates the amount of water Jordan would utilize from Yarmouk as around 165 MCM per annum. For detailed analysis see, Peter Beaumont, "Dividing the Waters of Jordan River: Analysis of the 1994 Israel- Jordan Peace Treaty", *Water Resources Development*, Vol.13, No.3, 1997, pp.415-424. Also see in Sharif S. Elmusa, "Jordan-Israel Water Agreement: A Model or an Exception?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.24. No.3, (Spring 1995), pp.63-73.

⁵³⁷ "Article 9: Places of Historical and Religious Significance and Interfaith Relations", *Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty*.

⁵³⁸ Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p.24.

Palestinians feared that Palestinian claims would be endangered due to the provisions of the peace treaty. Although King Hussein tried to assure Yasser Arafat that “Jordan would relinquish custody when Palestinians obtained sovereignty over Jerusalem”,⁵³⁹ Palestinian worries continued.

Concerning the refugees and the displaced persons, the treaty underlined that the parties are committed for bilateral efforts to resolve the problems of the displaced persons and refugees. Recognizing the complexity of the problems, a quadripartite committee including Egypt and the Palestinians would be established to address the grievances of the displaced persons. For the refugees, with respect to the international efforts led by the United Nations, the necessity multilateral efforts were underlined. However, much of the issue was dependent on the permanent status talks of the Palestinian issue.⁵⁴⁰

In terms of the normalization of the relations between the two countries, the treaty foresees the establishment of not only diplomatic relations, but also economic and cultural relations.⁵⁴¹ The crux of the peace treaty was the references made to cooperation, partnership and joint projects between Jordan and Israel. The vision of peace reflected in the treaty held prospects for normalization.⁵⁴²

5.3. JORDANIAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS AFTER THE PEACE TREATY: DYNAMICS OF COLD PEACE

In October 1994, Jordan completed its bilateral negotiations and signed the peace treaty with Israel. When it came to the ratification of the treaty in the parliament, the

⁵³⁹ Stewart, *Good Neighborly Relations*, p.10.

⁵⁴⁰ Article 8: Refugees and Displaced Persons, *The Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty*.

⁵⁴¹ Article 5: Diplomatic and Other Bilateral Agreements, *The Jordan- Israel Peace Treaty*.

⁵⁴² Robert Satloff, “The Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty: A Remarkable Document”, *Middle East Quarterly*, March 1995, pp.47-51, also available at <http://www.meforum.org/240/the-jordan-israel-peace-treaty>

opposition including Islamists, secular left and pan-Arabists was mobilized against the treaty. As the signatory of the treaty and the prime minister, Abdel Salam Al Majali, himself, became the target of criticism by the opposition. Refusing to pursue a lobbying campaign in the parliament to persuade people to depend on Al Majali and his ministers, he preferred letting people decide. Al Majali and his government succeeded in receiving 41 votes of confidence during the voting. After signing the peace treaty, the number of the confidence votes rose to 52. He admitted: “the support that my government received was stemming from the faith Jordanians had in King Hussein’s leadership”⁵⁴³ Eventually the peace treaty was ratified on November 6, 1994. The treaty passed with 54 votes against 23 in the parliament, but fuelled the antagonism between the government and the opposition.⁵⁴⁴ Heavily criticizing the peace with Israel, Muslim Brotherhood opposed the government policies towards the “normalization with the ‘Zionist Enemy’ and weakening of the Islamic religious guidance.”⁵⁴⁵ Muslim Brotherhood organized street protests against the peace treaty and USA providing support to Israel.⁵⁴⁶

In the absence of a comprehensive Middle East peace, the Hashemite regime considered it hard to garner public support for the bilateral peace treaty with Israel. No matter how much autonomy the regime enjoy in making foreign policy decisions, it was critical for the regime to acquire public support. Therefore, rather leaving it to the government, King Hussein, himself, led the campaign to mobilize support. King’s leadership in the campaign displays not only the criticality that was attributed to the treaty, but also aimed at precluding large-scale opposition. As long as the treaty was shown as ‘King’s treaty,

⁵⁴³ Interview with Abdel Salam Al Majali, “Behind the Curtains”, *Jordan Business*, December 2009, p. 40.

⁵⁴⁴ Ryan, *Jordan in Transition*, pp.28-29.

⁵⁴⁵ Mansoor Moaddel, “Religion and the State: The Singularity of the Jordanian Religious Experience”, *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol.15, No.4, Summer 2002, p.554 and Jillian Schwedler, *Faith in Moderation: Islamist Parties in Jordan and Yemen*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.169- 176.

⁵⁴⁶ Emile F. Sahliyah, “The State and the Islamic Movement”, *Journal of Church and State*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 2005, p.118 and Ellen M. Lust-Okar, “Divided They Rule: The Management and Manipulation of Political Opposition”, *Comparative Politics*, Vol.36, No.2, (January 2004), p.171.

opposition to the treaty would mean opposition to the king, which was unprecedented in the Jordanian history.⁵⁴⁷

The arguments posed by the regime to convince masses for the peace treaty with Israel could be summarized in four headings. First, the treaty was portrayed as the most viable foreign policy option and a strategic opportunity to recover from the post-1991 Gulf War isolation. Second, the argument which was proposed during the 1960s by the Israelis that ‘Jordan is Palestine’ was proven null and void since the treaty ensured the sovereign state borders of the kingdom and Israel recognized Jordan as it was. In addition, it was asserted that Jordan was beneficial from the treaty, because she regained its rights in land and water. Third, the treaty denoted the future multilateral negotiations to resolve the multilateral issues concerning refugees and economic cooperation among Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Palestinians. Fourth, Jordan would economically benefit from the treaty in various ways like aid, investment, and trade.⁵⁴⁸

5.3.1. PEACE AND (ANTI)NORMALIZATION

In the ceremony of the Washington Declaration, Yitzak Rabin addressed King Hussein: “Today, our handshake has attracted the flashbulbs of journalists, but, in the future, their interest will wane because it will become something normal.”⁵⁴⁹ The peace treaty, itself, became something normal, but the normalization of the relations with Israel has not occurred after a decade and a half. As the vision of the “New Middle East” began to fade away following the assassination of Rabin, election of Benjamin Netanyahu as the prime minister, the Likud party coming to power and the deadlock in the Oslo process, the anti-normalization forces in Jordan began to institutionalize.⁵⁵⁰

⁵⁴⁷ Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, “Normalization and Anti-Normalization in Jordan: The Public Debate”, *Middle East Review of International Relations*, Vol.5, No.3, (September 2001), p.58.

⁵⁴⁸ Ibid, pp.58-59.

⁵⁴⁹ Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p. 24.

⁵⁵⁰ Russel E. Lucas, “Deliberazation in Jordan”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.14, No.1, January 2003, p140.

Mobilized by the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the anti-normalization movement/campaign by making use of the civic organizations and professional associations intended to forbade interaction with Israel. Despite being headed by the Islamists, the movement also included leftists in Jordan. The opposition by the Islamists to the normalization of relations with Israel was based upon the religious ideology of liberating the Islamic lands of Palestine and Jerusalem from the Zionist enemy, Israel. However, the Islamists did not refrain from utilizing the leftist rhetoric that the Palestine was economically and territorially exploited by Israel.⁵⁵¹ The movement included the leftists, but the number of the Islamists exceeded the leftists.

The anti-normalization campaign predominantly expands its influence through the professional associations⁵⁵². These associations⁵⁵³ in Jordan worked as guilds since any person who is willing to practice one of these professions has to register in the respective association.⁵⁵⁴ If not, the company that hired the unregistered person could be punished. The Union of the Professional Association has an Anti-normalization Committee which was established to maintain an organized action against the ‘normalizer’s with Israel. What is considered as an action of ‘normalization’ is not limited to doing business with Israel. Any person who is attending an international conference where there were Israeli participants or any person, who is visiting Israel for tourism or other personal purposes,

⁵⁵¹ Farooq Mitha, Esq., “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of ‘Cooperation’”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol.XVII, No.2, (Summer 2010), p.114.

⁵⁵² For more information about professional associations, their role in the Jordanian social and political life as well as their links and relations with the Islamists, see Penelope Larzilliere, “Political Commitment Under an Authoritarian Regime: Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as an Alternative Arena in Jordan”, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol.6, Issue.1, 2012, pp.11-25.

⁵⁵³ Especially after the 1997 elections, when Islamists were represented by only 6 MPs in the parliament, their political strength and influence shifted to the professional associations from parties and thus, this led to the politicization of the professional associations, an element of civil society. See in Curtis R. Ryan. “Civil Society and Democratization in Jordan”, Working Paper 7, *Knowledge Programme and Civil Society in West Asia*, (The Hague, Amsterdam: Humanist Institute for Cooperation with the Developing Countries and the University of Amsterdam, 2010), p.21.

⁵⁵⁴ Scham and Lucas, “Normalization and Anti-Normalization”, p. 56.

can be judged by the relevant bodies of the associations and found guilty as a reason for expulsion from the association. When the person expelled applied to the Higher Court of Justice, the expulsion may be cancelled due to the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty. However, even if the individual is not expelled from the association, his reputation would be tarnished and he could hardly find work.⁵⁵⁵

The anti-normalization committee also regularly issues ‘Black Lists/List of Shame’⁵⁵⁶ of the Jordanians who engage with Israel including businessmen who does business with Israeli counterparts. There are people who engage in doing business with Israel regardless of the blacklisting, but whereas the influential business figures could manage to stand against the anti-normalization tide, the situation with the middle-class businessmen has not been that easy. Thus, in general Jordanians refrain from supporting normalization with Israel or at least choose not to display their supportive stance in order to preserve their economic and social standing in the society.⁵⁵⁷ The anti-normalization committee was declared illegal for several times and its members were intimidated and even imprisoned.⁵⁵⁸

5.3.2. POLITICAL CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN

Despite the popular anti-Israeli sentiment, the Hashemite regime, itself, had political hardship with the Israeli government, either. The events occurred in the late 1996 and 1997 badly damaged the confidence between Jordan and Israel. The tunnel issue, Netanyahu’s insistence on new Jewish settlements in the East Jerusalem, the killing of

⁵⁵⁵ Farooq Esq. Mitha, “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship: The Reality of ‘Cooperation’”, *Middle East Policy*, Vol.XVII, No.2, (Summer 2010), p.114.

⁵⁵⁶ The lists are available on internet. See <http://www.freearabvoice.org/ArabZionstConflictInJordan.htm> (accessed on 10 March 2013).

⁵⁵⁷ Mitha, “The Jordanian-Israeli Relationship”, p.115.

⁵⁵⁸ Penelope, Larzilliere, “Political Commitment Under an Authoritarian Regime: Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as an Alternative Arena in Jordan”, *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol.6, Issue.1, 2012, p.17.

school girls by a Jordanian soldier, killing of Israeli security officers in Amman, the attempt by Israel to assassinate Khaled Mis'hal was the most significant ones.

The assassination of the Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 had a great psychological impact on the Jordanian-Israeli peace. King Hussein would never be able to develop such cooperative relations with any other Israeli prime minister. When the Israeli elections for prime minister were to take place in May 1996, there were two candidates: Shimon Peres from Labor and Benjamin Netanyahu from Likud. King Hussein was always suspicious about Peres, and after the failure of the 1987 London Agreement, he never trusted in Peres in anything at any time. These suspicions went well with the rivalry between Peres and Rabin so that Peres was excluded during the peace negotiations between Jordan and Israel. In this regard, King Hussein favored Netanyahu to Peres.⁵⁵⁹ Although he presented himself as neutral, he invited Netanyahu to Amman in the wake of the elections, which was argued to affect the outcome of the elections in favor of Netanyahu due to King Hussein's popularity in Israel.⁵⁶⁰

Netanyahu announced the opening of the 'Western Wall Tunnel, which was an ancient tunnel close to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on September 25, 1996. The tunnel, itself, was not of great importance, but its symbolic and psychological impact on the Palestinians and Jordanians was immense. Claiming that Israel was violating the peace treaty where Israel respected the kingdom's special role and in Muslim Holy Shrines in Jerusalem, King Hussein himself was very much disappointed by the attitude of Netanyahu to whom he paid tribute when elected. The result was a 3-day long riots and clashes by the Palestinians spreading to entire West Bank and Gaza. 14 Israeli soldiers and 54 Palestinians were killed during the clashes. King Hussein adopted a tough line with Netanyahu. US President Clinton's mediation efforts worked well in convening

⁵⁵⁹ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p. 565.

⁵⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p.566.

King Hussein Arafat and Netanyahu at a platform to calm down the tensions. Nothing prospective came out of the meeting.⁵⁶¹

On February 24, 1997, Israel announced that it was going to build Jewish settlements in Har Homa, in East Jerusalem.⁵⁶² According to the peace between Jordan and Israel, “there could be no unilateral changes in East Jerusalem prior to a final agreement between Israel and Palestine”.⁵⁶³ This was against the peace treaty which recognized Jordanian rights in East Jerusalem, and obviously a blow to the spirit of peace that Rabin and Hussein strived to create.

King Hussein wrote a personal letter to Netanyahu expressing that he would not be able to go with a friend and a partner with Netanyahu “when I see the intent to destroy all I worked to build between our peoples and states”.⁵⁶⁴ King Hussein warned Netanyahu of an “inevitable violent resistance” by the Palestinians provided that Netanyahu continued with the decision of building settlements in East Jerusalem. The letter was delivered on 9 March 1997. Few days later, the letter was publicized by Netanyahu on March 11, 1997 in the Israeli papers where he responded to King’s letter accusing him of a personal attack and claiming that he inherited a (peace) process which had already been failing.⁵⁶⁵

The strained relations between Jordan and Israel with the settlement issue further tensed with the killing of Israeli students by a Jordanian soldier. In fact, the children headed by a teacher were on an excursion to Baqura⁵⁶⁶. As soon as the school girls got off the bus

⁵⁶¹ Ibid, p.569-570.

⁵⁶² Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p.32.

⁵⁶³ Ibid, p.33.

⁵⁶⁴ Serge Schmemmann, “King Hussein Rebukes Netanyahu for ‘Intent to Destroy’ Peace Plan”, *New York Times*, 12 March 1997, available at <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E04E1DD1339F931A25750C0A961958260&pagewanted=all>

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶⁶ It is known as Naharayim by the Israelis and it is a site on the border between Jordan and Israel where the Yarmouk River flows into the Jordan River. According to the peace treaty, the land was under the

on the 13 March 1997, a Jordanian soldier opened fire killing seven of the school girls and wounding six others. King Hussein immediately returned from Madrid to Amman just after the attacks. Meanwhile, “Crown Prince Hassan immediately expressed his sorrows and distress at the killings and promised a full investigation”⁵⁶⁷. Investigation committee including an Israeli colonel was formed immediately.⁵⁶⁸ In order to offer their condolences, King Hussein together with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu visited the families and relatives of the victims. The visit was very well received in the Israeli public, by the West and eased the tensions between King Hussein and Netanyahu. It was only the some who opposed the peace with Israel in the Jordanian as well as the Arab public that could not understand the reason of King’s visit and supported Ahmed Ad-Daqamseh⁵⁶⁹, the perpetrator of the attack.⁵⁷⁰ He was eventually tried and sentenced to 25 years’ imprisonment by a military court. On September 22, 1997, “Two security officers in the Israeli Embassy in Amman were shot by an unknown assailant.”⁵⁷¹ King Hussein denounced the attacks and declared them as ‘sad and shameful’.

sovereignty of Jordan with Israeli private landownership rights and property interests. Hence, a temporary special applied to the land. For detailed information, see Annex 1(b) of the Jordan-Israel Peace Treaty, available at <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/peacetreaty.html> or <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Process/Israel-Jordan%20Peace%20Treaty%20Annex%20I>, (accessed on 10 March 2013).

⁵⁶⁷ “History, Jordan” (revised by Nur Masalha for this edition), *The Middle East and North Africa 2004*, 50th Edition, Regional Surveys of the World, (London: Europa Publications, 2004), p.632.

⁵⁶⁸ Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p.34.

⁵⁶⁹ The release of the Ad-Daqamsah became an issue of discussion between Israel and Jordan on 14 February 2011 when the Jordanian Minister of Justice Hussein Mjalli supported the protests for the release of Daqamsah. Israel denounced the behavior of Majalli as a Minister of Justice and regarded the release of Daqamsah unacceptable. Jordan conveyed the message to Israel that there was no such plan by the government. For more info see, “Jordan Minister calls for release of soldier who killed seven Israeli school girls”, *Haaretz*, 14 February 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/jordan-minister-calls-for-release-of-soldier-who-killed-seven-israeli-school-girls-1.343400?localLinksEnabled=false>, “Jordan killer of the seven girls won’t be released”, *Jerusalem Post*, 15 February 2011, <http://www.jpost.com/DiplomacyAndPolitics/Article.aspx?ID=208382&R=R1>, Mohammed Ben Hussein, “Mjalli urges pardon of Jordanian convicted of killing schoolgirls”, *Jordan Times*, 15 February 2011, <http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=34515>. For more news about the issue see, The News Portal, <http://thenewsportal.net/?p=776455>, (accessed on 10 March 2013).

⁵⁷⁰ Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, p.35.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.35 and also see “Israeli Embassy Guards Shot in Jordan’s Capital”, *The New York Times*, 23 September 1997, available at <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/23/world/2-israeli-embassy-guards-shot-in-jordan-s-capital.html>, (accessed on 10 March 2013).

On September 25, 1997, there was an assassination attempt to Khaled Mis'hal, a Hamas leader by two Israeli Mossad agents. The two Mossad agents, carrying false Canadian passports sprayed a poison into his ear while passing on the street. Mis'hal's life was saved by the antidote and the formula of the poison supplied by Israel in response to the ultimatum by King Hussein who threatened Israel with revoking the peace treaty and closing the Israel embassy in Amman as well as the US mediation. To make Israel pay for the insult to Jordan as well as display public his determination the king refused the official visit by Israel for apology. Besides, there were allegations that the assassination attempt happened with the consent of King Hussein. In order to prove the innocence of Jordan in this incident, King Hussein demanded the release of the Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, who was sentenced to life-time prison in Israel. He was released, but not deported due to the agreement between King Hussein and the Israeli government. In addition to Sheikh Yasin's return to Gaza, Jordan also guaranteed the release of seventy Palestinian and three Jordanian prisoners.⁵⁷² On the other hand, Jordan released the two Mossad agents to Israel after obtaining the guarantee that "Israel would implement all the causes of the peace treaty between the two countries"⁵⁷³.

Itamar Rabinovich⁵⁷⁴, in his book, *Waging Peace*, pointed out the reasons why the Jordanian-Israeli peace could not achieve the normalization as:

The Hashemite regime had no qualms about the effect of normalized relations with Israel in its own domestic sphere or about Israel's playing a regional role at the expense of some of Jordan's rivals. But the course of events in recent years has made this policy untenable. Rabin's assassination, public resistance at home, the failure of the anticipated 'peace dividends' to materialize and the general decline of peace diplomacy forced King Hussein to turn down the volume on peace and normalization.⁵⁷⁵

⁵⁷² Habib, *Hussein and Abdullah*, pp. 35-40.

⁵⁷³ *Ibid*, p.40.

⁵⁷⁴ Israel's former chief negotiator with Syria (1992-95) and Israel's Ambassador to the United States (1993-96).

⁵⁷⁵ Itamar Rabinovich, *Waging Peace: Israel and the Arabs 1948-2003*, (New Jersey, Oxfordshire: The Princeton University Pres, 2004), p. 296.

Despite all the political confrontation Jordan had with Israel constantly, none has reached the extent to challenge the decades old strategic cooperation between the two countries.⁵⁷⁶ Even after King Abdullah II ascended to the throne, it was a matter of discussion what would happen to the peace with Israel under the new king. King Abdullah II, having grasped the importance of his father's political legacy, declared that he would continue efforts to preserve the peace with Israel and so he did. However, neither the efforts of the late King Hussein and nor were the efforts by his son, King Abdullah II, could not achieve the normalization of the peace.

Following the Arab Spring in 2011, the Kingdom also witnessed protests at home calling for reform. The protests also externalized anti-Israeli public sentiment. For instance, fearing the spillover of the attacks against the Israeli embassy in Cairo on 09 September 2011⁵⁷⁷, Israel evacuated its embassy staff in Amman before the planned demonstrations of 15 September 2011. The demonstrations were led by the leftists and Islamists who gathered near the Israeli embassy in Jordan and demanded the closure of the embassy and the expulsion of the ambassador.⁵⁷⁸ The Israeli Ambassador, Daniel Nevo, returned to Amman on 16 September 2011 after the protests.⁵⁷⁹ In addition, Walid Obeidat was appointed as the new ambassador of Jordan to Israel on 08 October 2012 by King Abdullah II. When the post remained vacant for two years since Jordan's former ambassador to Israel, Ali Al-Ayed left the post in order to be appointed as the Minister of Information in mid-2010. The vacancy of the post has been evaluated as the sign of frustration by Jordan stemming from the stalled Palestinian-Israeli peace talks. Walid

⁵⁷⁶ Alexander Bligh, *The Political Legacy of King Hussein*, (Sussex Academic Press, 2007), p.199.

⁵⁷⁷ Thousand protestors forcibly entered into the Israeli embassy in Cairo on 09 September 2011. Following the attack, 85 staff of the embassy returned back to Israel whereas only the Israeli deputy ambassador remained in office. See in "Egyptian Protestors Break Into Israeli Embassy Building", *BBC News*, 10 September 2011, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14862159> (accessed on 10 March 2013).

⁵⁷⁸ "Israel Evacuates the Jordan Embassy Amid Protests in Amman", *The Guardian*, 15 September 2011, available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/sep/15/israel-evacuates-jordan-embassy-amman> (accessed on 10 March 2013).

⁵⁷⁹ Joel Greenberg, "Israeli Ambassador Back in Jordan", *The Washington Post*, 16 September 2011, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2011-09-16/world/35273935_1_israeli-embassy-embassy-compound-ambassador (accessed on 10 March 2013).

Obeidat, who is a career diplomat, is also the member of one of the largest northern tribes of Jordan. Mr. Obeidat undertook the responsibility of being the new ambassador of Jordan to Israel regardless of the threats by his tribe of disowning him.⁵⁸⁰ He presented his credentials to the Israeli government on 17 October 2012 and denied the reports about the stance of his tribe against him regarding his new post.⁵⁸¹

In the meantime, one of the most important areas of confrontation between Jordan and Israel became East Jerusalem. Since the beginning of year 2012, Israel prevented Jordanian experts from engaging in maintenance work in the Al Aqsa Mosque (*Al-Haram Al-Sharif*) and allowed its soldiers to enter in the mosque with military uniform. Israel also carried out construction works on the road to Moroccan Gate. Jordan denounced Israeli stance and regarded these unilateral acts as the breach of the peace treaty.⁵⁸² The opposition led by the Islamic Action front became more vocal in terms of calling for the Jordanian government to freeze the peace treaty with Israel when a bill envisioning the application of Israeli sovereignty over Al-Aqsa Mosque was debated in the Israeli Knesset. Although Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu opposed the bill and no vote was envisaged after the debate, but the tensions was not totally de-escalated.⁵⁸³ Due to the increasing escalation of violence on the Al-Aqsa compound, Jordan continued its

⁵⁸⁰ “Jordan Appoints Israel Ambassador After Two Year Break”, *BBC News*, 09 October 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19882615> (accessed on 09 October 2013).

⁵⁸¹ Hani Hazaimah, “Ambassador to Israel Committed to Serving His Country”, *Jordan Times*, 09 October 2012, available at <http://jordantimes.com/ambassador-to-israel-committed-to-serving-his-country> (accessed on 10 March 2013), and “Obeidat Presents His Credentials As Ambassador to Israel”, *Jordan Times*, 18 October 2012, available at <http://jordantimes.com/obeidat-presents-credentials-as-ambassador-to-israel> (accessed on 10 March 2013).

⁵⁸² “Israeli-Jordanian Tensions over Breaches of Wadi Araba Treaty”, *Middle East Monitor*, 23 October 2012, <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/news/middle-east/4488-israeli-jordanian-tensions-over-breaches-of-wadi-araba-treaty>, (accessed on 01 August 2014); and also see “Jordan Warns Israel against Building East Jerusalem Hotels”, *Al-Akhbar English*, 2 May 2012, <http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/6885>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

⁵⁸³ “Jordan Opposition Calls for the Israel Peace Treaty to be Frozen over the Al-Aqsa Debate”, *The Guardian*, 25 February, 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/25/jordan-opposition-israel-peace-treaty-al-aqsa>, (accessed on 01 August 2014).

calls to Israel for de-escalation. However, Israeli inaction in this respect led Jordan, once more again, to recall its ambassador Walid Obeidat from Israel on 5 November 2014.⁵⁸⁴

5.3.3. PEACE DIVIDENDS: DASHED HOPES

Although Jordanian economy benefited from the peace-building vision, despite some tangible benefits, the vision was far from being realized. Even the benefits of the peace have not been felt by the people and therefore, the peace was not internalized by the people and doomed to remain as king's peace.

5.3.3.1. FOREIGN AID AND DEBT RELIEF

After the peace treaty, critical amount of Jordan's debt was written off by the Western governments. US cancelled \$ 700 million debt of Jordan in early 1995 whereas UK relieved Jordan of £ 46 million during the same year. The total debt release of Jordan amounted to \$ 883 million.⁵⁸⁵ In fact, US Congress was reluctant to relieve such amount of debt and Israel had to lobby for it. This can be explained with the fact that Jordan-Israel peace was not brokered by the US and was not a top priority on the US agenda about the Middle East peace process and instead came from the own initiatives of the countries.

Jordan acquired a significant amount of aid from the US which was annual grant of \$ 250 million. When compared to the aid Egypt received after the peace treaty, which was

⁵⁸⁴ Areej Abuqudairi, "Jordan, Israel in Row over Jerusalem", *Aljazeera*, 26 November 2014, available at <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/jordan-israel-row-over-jerusalem-20141126111752648706.html>, (accessed on 15 November 2014).

⁵⁸⁵ Gad G. Gilbar and Onn Wickler, "The Economic Factor of the Arab-Israeli Peace Process" in *Arab-Jewish Relations: From Conflict to Resolution?*, ed. by Elie Podeh and Asher Kaufman, (Brighton, Portland: Sussex University Press, 2006), p. 201.

\$ 2.3 billion⁵⁸⁶, the aid Jordan received is quite humble, but when the size of the state is born in mind, the amount of the aid may be seen reasonable.

In 1997, US economic aid to Jordan was \$150 million and military aid \$75 million. In 1999 and 2000, Jordan received an additional economic aid of \$ 300 million (\$200 million economic and \$100 million military aid) in accordance with the Wye Agreement brokered by US and concluded between Israel and Palestinian Authority in order to revive the Oslo process in 1998. In the year 2003, Jordan received an emergency aid of \$700 million in order to offset the adverse effects of the war in Iraq. The US aid to Jordan came in the form of cash transfer, economic aid, military aid and agricultural aid.⁵⁸⁷

TABLE 9: Annual US Aid to Jordan Since the 1991 Gulf Crisis (in US \$ million)

Fiscal Year (FY)	Economic Assistance	Military Assistance	Total
1991	35,0	21,3	56,3
1992	50,0	20,6	70,6
1993	35,0	9,5	44,5
1994	28,0	9,8	37,8
1995	28,9	8,3	37,2
1996	36,1	201,2	237,3
1997	120,4	31,7	152,1
1998	151,2	76,6	227,8
1999	151,4	71,6	223,0
1999 (Wye)	50,0	50,0	100,0
2000	151,7	76,6	228,3
2000 (Wye)	50,0	150,0	200,0
2001	151,7	76,7	228,4

⁵⁸⁶ Egypt still receives an annual aid of average \$ 2 billion (both civilian and military), make it the second great largest recipient of aid after Israel in the Middle East. See in <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/29/us-egypt-usa-aid-idUSTRE70S0IN20110129>

⁵⁸⁷ US Assistance to Jordan, available at <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/new/aboutjordan/uj1.shtml>

2002	151,6	77,0	228,6
2002 (Suppl.)	100,0	25,0	125,0
2003	251,0	200,4	451,4
2003 (Suppl.)	700,0	406,0	1.106,0
2004	252,3	208,9	461,2
2004 (Suppl.)	100,0	0,0	100,0
2005	251,6	209,0	460,6
2005 (Suppl.)	100,0	100,0	200,0
2006	249,1	210,9	460,0
2006 (Suppl.)	50,0	0,0	50,0
2007	245,0	209,1	454,1
2007 (Suppl.)	10,3	45,0	55,3
2008	361,4	301,2	662,6
2008 (Suppl.)	200,0	50,0	250,0
2009	263,5	238,1	501,6
2009 (Suppl.)	150,0	0,0	150,0
2010	363,0	303,8	666,8
2010 (Suppl.)	100,0	50,0	150,0
2011	362,0	303,1	665,1
2012	460,0	303,7	763,7
2013	564,404	288,437	852,841
2014	700,0	303,8	1.003,8
Total	7.024,6	4.637,3	11.661,9

Source: Jeremy M. Sharp, “Jordan: Background and US Relations”, CRS Report, 8 May 2014, available at <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33546.pdf>

5.3.3.2. MILITARY EXPENDITURE

Decrease in the military expenditure was one of the expected peace dividends of the Jordan-Israel peace. According to the statistics of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the military expenditure of Jordan in 1995 was almost half of its military expenditure during the Gulf War in 1991. However, by the year 1996 Jordan’s military expenditure increased to \$646 million from US\$ 486 in 1995. The

increase continued constantly until the year 2006 to \$ 843 million. This increase may not only stem from the political confrontations with Israel, but the other threats Jordan is facing from inside as well outside the country, mainly the lasting conflict in the region as a whole like the war in Iraq. By the year 2007 a sudden increase to \$1.177 was witnessed. This sudden increase can be explained with the issue of security invading a more significant area in the agenda of the country especially after the terrorist attacks of 2005 in Amman.

TABLE 10: Military Expenditure of Jordan

US \$ Million (constant as of 2009)												
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Value	[919]	[731]	[612]	[780]	[636]	[667]	[668]	[488]	[646]	[667]	[723]	741
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Value	761	747	724	835	775	770	843	1.177	1.331	1.404	[1.363]	
As a Percentage of GDP												
Year	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Value	[9.4]	[9.1]	[7.8]	[10]	[6.9]	[7]	[6.7]	[4.5]	[6]	[6.1]	[6.3]	6.3
Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	
Value	6.3	5.9	5.4	6	5.1	4.8	4.8	6.1	6.3	6.1	-	

Source: SIPRI Data base, available at <http://milexdata.sipri.org/result.php4>

5.3.3.3. TOURISM

Following the peace treaty, a boom was expected in the tourism sector in Jordan and a lot of investment accrued to Aqaba and Petra, the most attractive sites of Jordan, with this purpose. The expectations had a right since the number of the Israeli tourists totaled to 100.000 in 1995 over almost zero in 1994. The situation with the European and American tourists was almost as no less hopeful. The number of the European and North American tourists rose from 204.000 in 1993 to 359.000 in 1995.⁵⁸⁸

TABLE 11: Number of Visitors to Museum and Archeological Sites*

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
No. of visitors	1.142.883	1.301.876	750.433	591.421	627.486	1.274.407
Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
No. of visitors	1.645.702	1.439.449	1.975.627	2.877.602	2.686.63 3	No statistics available

Source: Jordan in Figures, Department of Statistics (DOS), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, available at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm

* The museum and archeological sites include; Jordan Museum of Archeology, Folklore Museum, Madaba Museum, Baptism Site, Church and Map, archeological sites in Jarash, Petra, Aqaba, Um Qeis, Ajlun, Rum and Mount Nebo.

However, throughout the time, Jordan confronted the fact that most of the Israeli tourists, (even the American and European) came to visit Aqaba or Petra within a day without staying overnight, because the Israeli city Eliat is just two-hour' drive from Petra and even closer to Aqaba. Thus, the huge investments in tourism in Aqaba and Petra turned out left the investors without financial benefits. The occupancy rate in the

⁵⁸⁸ Waleed Hazbun, "Mapping the Landscape of the 'New Middle East'", in *Jordan in Transition: 1990-2002*, ed. by George Joffé, (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 337.

hotels is 50% if not less than 50%. In addition, tourism sector in Jordan is highly affected from the regional developments especially in regard to the Palestinian issue. For instance, Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000 in West Bank and Gaze affected the tourism sector very badly. On the other hand, Professor Bahram claims that the adverse effects of the phenomenon of same-day visits were more than the Intifada.⁵⁸⁹

TABLE 12: Number of Hotels and Beds in Jordan

Year	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
Hotels	211	247	278	298	310	314
Beds	21,941	26,295	29,002	32,001	32,658	33,475
Year	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Hotels	322	198	205	197	203	204
Beds	34,471	27,631	28,640	27,956	29,444	29,880

Source: Jordan in Figures, Department of Statistics (DOS), The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, available at http://www.dos.gov.jo/home_e.htm

Within a decade (1999-2009), the statistics display that the number of the tourists more than doubled despite the immense decrease in 2001-2003 period. The decrease maybe due to the security reasons stemming from the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the resultant prejudices towards the region as well as the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000. When the statistics about the number of the hotels and beds is analyzed, there was a constant increase until the year 2005. However, by the year 2009, the numbers of the hotels turn out to be less than the ones in 1998 whereas the numbers of the beds are as many as the ones in the year 2000. This means that the expectations in the development of the

⁵⁸⁹ Interview with Prof. Nasim Bahram, Amman, 17 August 2010. Professor Bahram is a scholar at the Geography Department in Jordan University,

tourism sector as a whole did not meet the expectations and thus with the decrease in the investments some hotels had to close down.

The statistics about the tourism receipts also reveal the fact that the boom after the peace treaty did not last long. The tourism receipts grew only 4% whereas the growth rate in 1995 and 1996 was 14 %. This does not mean that the tourism sector died out in Jordan. The statistics about the number of the tourists denote a re-activation, but this growth can hardly be associated with the peaceful relations with Israel. On the other hand, what is obvious is that there is Israeli tourism in Jordan, but almost no Jordanian tourism in Israel. For this, there are two reasons. One is the disinterest in Jordan to go to Israel, heavily driven by the anti-Israeli public opinion. Second, Israel is making extremely hard, if not impossible, for the Jordanians to get a tourist visa. The situation is not better for the Jordanians working with Israeli counterparts in various civilian initiatives. For the year 2013, the number of Jordanians visited Israel was 18,000 whereas the number of Israelis that visited Jordan was 218,000.⁵⁹⁰

5.3.3.4. BILATERAL TRADE

By the end of the 1990s, the annual total trade between Jordan and Israel was JD 69 million. The imports from Israel was JD 21 million whereas the domestic exports constituted JD 38 million and JD 10 million were the re-exports. In 2008, these numbers climbed to JD 146 million in imports, JD 98 million in exports and JD 21 million in re-exports, totaling the volume of JD 265 million.⁵⁹¹ This increase may be evaluated as a boom within a decade, but when the numbers compared to foreign trade figures of Jordan, it hardly turns out to be a boom.

⁵⁹⁰ David Schenker, "It's Been 20 Years Since One Of The Middle East Peace Process's Biggest Success Stories", The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 23 October 2014, available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/its-been-20-years-since-the-israel-jordan-treaty-2014-10> (accessed on 25 November 2014).

⁵⁹¹ Interview with Riad Al-Khouri, "Yields of The Peace Dividend", *Jordan Business*, December 2009, pp.45.

TABLE 13: External Trade of Jordan with Israel

Year	Total Import	Total Export	Total Trade
2000	\$ 66,678,324	\$ 92,370,160	\$ 159,048,484
2001	\$ 111,425,104	\$ 111,971,968	\$ 223,397,072
2002	\$ 125,842,096	\$ 136,699,264	\$ 262,601,424
2003	\$ 133,902,160	\$ 108,025,768	\$ 241,927,928
2004	\$ 164,675,562	\$ 116,160,246	\$ 280,835,808
2005	\$ 156,158,150	\$ 118,300,225	\$ 274,458,375
2006	\$ 139,425,342	\$ 132,244,833	\$ 271,670,175
2007	\$ 148,433,866	\$ 154,162,056	\$ 302,595,922
2008	\$ 205,696,173	\$ 166,313,166	\$ 372,009,339
2009	\$ 130,883,747	\$ 117,195,258	\$ 248,079,005
2010	\$ 88,984,944	\$ 96,068,402	\$ 185,053,346
2011	\$ 96,042,296	\$ 113,317,972	\$ 209,360,268
2012	\$ 100,362,322	\$ 125,335,994	\$ 225,698,316
2013	\$ 87,470,276	\$ 113,072,053	\$ 200,542,329

Source⁵⁹²: The table is based on the information available from UNCOMTRADE database. (the reporter country being Jordan and the partner country being Israel), Website: <http://comtrade.un.org/data/>

⁵⁹² It is important to note that the statistics reported to the UNCOMTRADE database are much (almost one third) higher than the statistics of the Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation (JEDCO) available at <http://www.jedco.gov.jo/joomla/>

The trade between Jordan and Israel remained modest despite the increase after the peace treaty. It is fair to say that QIZs contributed to the increase. The trade between Jordan and Israel in 2004 was nearly six times more than it was in 1997. Israel's exports to Jordan increased from \$21 million in 1997 to approximately \$133 million in 2004. Israel's imports from Jordan increased from \$12,5 million in 1997 to \$51 million in 2004.⁵⁹³

In terms of the trade balance, the picture has been in favor of Israel according to the statistics. Although the increasing number of the exports and imports reveals the increasing level of interaction between Israel and Jordan, it was very limited. When we look at the trade balance between Jordanian exports and imports, it is seen that Jordan still suffers a structural trade imbalance.

Resting upon his experience in the peace negotiations with Israel, Jawad Al-Anani states that during the negotiation process, Israel was very optimistic about and a keen supporter of free trade, opening borders and abolishing restrictions. However, after the peace treaty, Israeli fears started dominating its policy about trade with Jordan. Israelis were worried if the cheaper Arab products would invade their markets and replace their products especially in manufacture and agriculture. Manufacturing was expensive in Israel due to the high labor costs. Agricultural goods were also expensive despite the developed technology. Hence, Jordanian and Palestinian goods entering into the Israeli markets could constitute a challenge for the Israeli economy in terms of unfair competition. This turned out to be the reason why Israel did not open West Bank and Gaza markets for direct exports from Jordan. Even after the peace treaty, Jordan was unable to export to the West Bank directly, but only via Israel. On the other hand, Jordan could receive exports from West Bank. Al-Anani underlined that between the years 1967-1991 the exports from West Bank totaled to \$ 2.3 billion, which was almost a net trade deficit for Jordan since it was unable to export directly to West Bank. On the other

⁵⁹³ Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred Prados, and Jeremy Sharp, "Qualifying Industrial Zones in Jordan and Egypt", CRS Report, (United States Congressional Research Service, July 7, 2006), p.6.

hand, Israel was not alone in its fears since the Arabs had the fear that Israeli investments would dominate the Arab economies since Israel did not only have the Jewish capital inside Israel, but also have access to the international Jewish capital. These fears from the both sides began to chase like shadows in the bilateral trade relations between the countries.⁵⁹⁴

Mainly due to the impact of the anti-normalization campaign and anti-Israeli sentiment, the Jordanian business activity in Israel is still clandestine and remains highly modest. On the other hand, Israelis have not been eager to increase its trade relations with Jordan, either. The hopes of open trade relations may be considered to be active in the first years after the peace treaty especially with the initiatives of influential businessmen like Dov Lautman from Israel and Omar Salah from Jordan, but even their initiatives faded away throughout time.

5.3.3.5. QUALIFYING INDUSTRIAL ZONES (QIZS)

Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) as a form of Export Processing Zones (EPZs)⁵⁹⁵ intends to promote export expansion as an efficient tool for growth together with encouraging open trade.⁵⁹⁶ QIZs in the Middle East (currently in Jordan and Egypt) derived from the US-Israel Free Trade Area (FTA) Implementation Act of 1985. The designation of QIZs between Israel and Jordan as well as Israel and Egypt was authorized by the US Congress in 1996. The QIZ agreement was signed at the Doha

⁵⁹⁴ Interview with Jawad Al-Anani, Amman, 18 August 2010. Jawad Al-Anani was the last Chief of the Royal Court under the late King Hussein. Having served as minister in several cabinets of the Jordanian government, he was the senior member of the Jordanian delegation to the Middle East peace process.

⁵⁹⁵ The idea of having geographically isolated areas where taxes are low and to attract manufacturers and investors was developed by USAID officials and economists from the Arthur D. Little consulting firm in the beginning of 1950s. EPZs first experimented in Puerto Rico and then deployed to Taiwan, South Korea and Dominique Republic. For further information, see Pete Moore, "QIZs, FTAs, USAID and the MEFTA", *MER 234: The Bush Team Reloaded*, Vol.35, No.234, Spring 2005, MERIP, <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234>.

⁵⁹⁶ Marwan A. Kardoosh and Riad Al-Khoury, *Qualifying Industrial Zones and Sustainable Development in Jordan*, Jordan Centre for Public Policy and Research Center, September 2004, p.3.

summit in November 1997 and entered into force in 1998. The agreement was based on the idea that if the joint ventures between Israel and Jordan (as well as Egypt) comply with the regulation, they would enjoy duty free access to the US market.⁵⁹⁷

Today there are thirteen QIZs in Jordan including one single-factory zone. Majority of the QIZs are owned by the private sector. Only three of them are owned by the government.⁵⁹⁸ Out of the thirteen, seven QIZs are operational. These are the Al Hassan Industrial Estate (Irbid), Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II Industrial Estate (Al Karak), Al-Tajamout Industrial Estate (Amman), Ad-Dulayl Industrial Park (Zarqa), Jordan Cyber City (Irbid), Al-Qastal Industrial Zone(Amman) and El-Zay Ready-wear Manufacturing sub-zone (Zarqa). The QIZs established and expected to be operational in the future are: Gateway QIZ (northern Jordan- Israel border), Aqaba Industrial Estate (Aqaba) and the Mushatta International Complex (Amman).⁵⁹⁹ The dominant sector in the QIZs is the textile industry due to the fact that US quotas and customs tariffs are very high in textile, investors want to make use of the duty-free access to the US market predominantly in this sector.

According to the regulations of the QIZs, “a minimum of 35 % of the exported good’s value must be composed of local content: 11.7% of this must be Jordanian and 8 % must be provided by Israeli manufacturers (7 % for high-tech products); the remainder to reach the 35 % value-added requirement can come from Jordan, the US, Israel, and/or the West Bank and Gaza.”⁶⁰⁰ In addition, there are two more options for the input requirements. First one indicates that each of the Jordanian and Israeli manufacturers

⁵⁹⁷ Metri Fayeze Al Mdanat, *The Fiscal and Economic Impact of Qualifying Industrial Areas: The Case of Jordan*, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, presented to the University of Gottingen, 2006, p. 8.

⁵⁹⁸ Jordan Industrial Estate Corporation (JIEC) established in 1980 under the Ministry of Trade and Industry in order to promote the development and growth of industrial sector in Jordan. This entity is in fact has financial and administrative autonomy and owns the Al Hassan Industrial Estate and Al Hussein Bin Abdullah II Industrial Estate.

⁵⁹⁹ Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs), Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor of Israel, <http://www.tamas.gov.il/NR/exeres/2124E799-4876-40EF-831C-6410830D8F02.htm>

⁶⁰⁰ Kardoosh and Al-Khouri, *Qualifying Industrial Zones*, p.3.

must “contribute at least 20 % of the total production cost⁶⁰¹ of manufacturing goods in the QIZs”⁶⁰² Second option is the combination of the options mentioned above meaning that one partner meets the minimum content requirements of 35 % and the other partner provides the 20 % of the total cost production.⁶⁰³ Against this background, the domestic economy is to provide infrastructure, utilities (e.g. electricity, water) and local labor force and receives jobs, wages, tariffs from the utilities, taxes and foreign currency earnings in return. In addition, all companies operating in the QIZs are exempt from not only customs tariffs, but also paying income and social security taxes.⁶⁰⁴ Foreign investors are also allowed to obtain full ownership or control of plants within the QIZs.⁶⁰⁵ In line with these requirements and regulations, QIZs were to promote economic cooperation among the former “enemies”, contribute their economic development and growth. QIZs are also aimed at job creation, industrial development, technological transfer and investment.

At the very first glance, QIZs seemed to fit Jordan’s goals of overcoming its economic constraints and integrating into the world economy via trade liberalization and increasing productivity through specialization.⁶⁰⁶ With the QIZs, there has been a significant increase in the exports of Jordan to the US. It created jobs and created Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Despite the relative success in the field of increasing exports, job creation and receiving investment, neither in terms of the development of the Jordanian economy nor in terms of promoting cooperation between Israel and Jordan, QIZs remained limited.

⁶⁰¹ Production costs are supposed to include material, wages and salaries, design and depreciation of capital investment.

⁶⁰² Al Mdanat, *The Fiscal and Economic Impact*, p.9.

⁶⁰³ Ibid, p.9.

⁶⁰⁴ Nazzal, “Economic Reform in Jordan”, p.12.

⁶⁰⁵ Marwan Kardoosh, “QIZs: A Promising Beginning for Arab-Israeli Economic Cooperation”, *Daily Star*, 26 August 2002, available at <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/Aug/26/QIZs-a-promising-beginning-for-Arab-Israeli-economic-cooperation.ashx?searchText=Kardoosh%20Marwan#ixzz1KcOaetHF>

⁶⁰⁶ Kardoosh and Al-Khoury, *Qualifying Industrial Zones*, pp.5-6.

a. Exports

The exports of the QIZs in Jordan has jumped from US \$ 2.4 million in 1999 to almost US \$ 1.4 billion in 2006 as indicated in TABLE 14. Relying on the data from United States International Trade Commission (USITC), Bolle (et.all) state:

Between 1998 and 2005 Jordan moved up from the United States' 13th to 8th largest trade partner among the 20 Middle-East North African (MENA) entities. In 2005, US exports to and imports from Jordan totaled an estimated \$ 1.9 billion: US exports, at an estimated \$ 646 million, were 1.8 times their 1998 level; US imports, at \$ 1.3 billion, were 80 times their 1998 level.⁶⁰⁷

TABLE 14: Exports of QIZs in Jordan

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007 (Jan-Sep)
Exports From QIZs (US \$ Million)	2,4	25,1	150,3	381,7	586,6	920,0	1.011,2	1.456,9	1.169
Growth Rate (%)	-	945,8	498,8	153,9	53,6	56,8	9,9	16,8	- 19,7

Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) and MIT Bulletin⁶⁰⁸

⁶⁰⁷ Mary Jane Bolle, Alfred B. Prados and Jeremy M. Sharp, "Qualifying Industrial Zones in Egypt and Jordan", *CRS Congress Report*, July 5, 2006, p.3

⁶⁰⁸ The table is compiled up from the data available online in the website of the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT). See in <http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=37&Search=MIT+Bulletin> Since the data available on the MIT website starts from the year 2003, the data about the years 1999-2002 is utilized from the research done by Mdanat depending on the data acquired from MIT. For the data between 1999-2002, see Al Mdanat, "The Fiscal and Economic Impact", p. 42.

b. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

QIZs were beneficial in terms of FDI. The duty-free access to the US market was not a privilege that could be enjoyed by the rest of the world. Thus, investing in Jordan opened the door for the US market for the investors Far East countries as well as European ones. In this respect, QIZs attracted FDI.⁶⁰⁹ It wasn't only the duty free-access to the US market, but also the prospect that investors can shift from operating under the QIZ agreement to Free Trade Agreement (FTA) without difficulties. The research revealed that almost 79 % of the investors were from Far East countries like China, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka whereas investors from USA, Canada and Europe constitutes the 8 %. Israeli investors did only have a 2.6 % share and the Jordanian investors 8 %.⁶¹⁰ This meant that all the profits by the investors went overseas.⁶¹¹ On the other hand, QIZs were designed to encourage local and Israeli investors to invest not only in the QIZs but in improving relations through interaction and cooperation. Hence, QIZs have far from meeting such expectation.⁶¹² Besides, as a challenge to the current position of the FDI, as soon as the US quotas and customs duties are lifted, which is supposed to happen by the year 2012, investors would shift to work under FTA since they will not have to meet the input requirements and dealing with Israeli counterparts.⁶¹³

Another limitation about the QIZs turns out to be the fact that significant number of the manufacturing activity is non-QIZ. Kardoosh and Al-Khoury assert that only 14 of the 58 companies in the Al-Hassan Industrial Estate (by the year 2004) meet the provision of

⁶⁰⁹ Yusuf Mansur, "Does Liberalising Trade Increase FDI?", *Jordan Times*, 31 July 2007, available at <http://www.jordantimes.com/index.php?news=1125&searchFor=QIZs> .

⁶¹⁰ Al Mdanat, "The Fiscal and Economic Impact", p. 137.

⁶¹¹ Interview with Yusuf Mansur, (economist, CEO at EnConsult, columnist at Jordan Times), Amman, 14 August 2010.

⁶¹² Al Mdanat, "The Fiscal and Economic Impact", p. 137.

⁶¹³ *Ibid*, p. 138.

QIZs. They state “local operations subcontracted by the Israeli firms, moving some of their production lines to Jordan to take advantage of the cheaper labor and costs”⁶¹⁴

c. Employment and Labor Force

QIZs contributed to creating new jobs, which is of great importance for a country like Jordan where there are 50 000 new entrants in the labor force each year and unemployment is still a problem. For the year 2009, the unemployment rate (of the total labor force) was 12.9.⁶¹⁵ QIZs turned out to be a source of employment especially for the people from the rural places. And 70 % of the employed local Jordanians turned out to be women.

Despite these positive aspects, the number of the local Jordanian workers has still been limited due to the fact that foreign workers outweigh the local workers. The migrant foreign workers have been mainly from East Asia and Indian subcontinent including China, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.⁶¹⁶ According to the data in TABLE 14, the discrepancy between the number of the local and foreign workers was larger during the first years of the QIZs. However, the number of the foreign workers is still high despite the decrease in the number of the local workers especially after the year 2002. The first reason is counted as the high turnovers among the local workers which correspond almost to three months. This was not only the result of the low wages, but also due to the fact that majority of the workers were women who were working for supplying themselves with the money they needed and then quit working. This reality, in fact, has been manipulated by the companies to import foreign workers with lower wages. When the Jordanian government lifted the work permit fee for the foreign workers in 2004, it

⁶¹⁴ Kardoosh and Al-Khouri, *Qualifying Industrial Zones*, p.15.

⁶¹⁵ World Development Indicators, World Bank, available at <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS/countries/JO?display=default>

⁶¹⁶ Kardoosh and Al-Khouri, *Qualifying Industrial Zones*, p.25.

became even more profitable and thus attractive for the companies to hire foreign workers.⁶¹⁷

TABLE 15: Labor Force and Value of Investment in QIZs in Jordan

Year	Employment			Employment (%)		Value of Investment (US \$ Million)
	Local	Foreign	Total	Local	Foreign	
1999	1.400	2.600	4.000	35	65	13.0
2000	2.500	4.084	6.584	37,9	62,1	43.0
2001	13.300	5.700	19.000	70	30	171.0
2002	13.867	9.636	23.503	59	41	190.0
2003	16.175	12.464	28.639	56,4	43,6	189.0
2004	16.770	13.243	30.013	55,8	44,2	203.0

Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade⁶¹⁸

Another reason was the issue of training. According to the investors, Jordanian workers are unskilled and it is more profitable to have workers from East Asia where the workers are more skilled. Thus, the investors find it more rational to hire skilled foreign workers rather than providing local Jordanians with vocational training since investing in people who are tend to leave work is not profitable.⁶¹⁹ Jordanian government tried to solve this problem by providing vocational training to the Jordanians, but it proved not

⁶¹⁷ Interview with Yusuf Mansur, (economist, CEO at EnConsult, columnist at Jordan Times), Amman, 14 August 2010.

⁶¹⁸ The table is formed with the data in the works of Al Mdanat and Saif which are sourced from Ministry of Trade and Industry. In fact, there have been slight differences which can result in one to two points in the percentages. In order to be consistent and since the data used dates back to 1999, the numbers are utilized from the research done by Al Mdanat. See in Al Mdanat, *The Fiscal and Economic Impact*, p. 43 and Ibrahim Saif, "The Socio-economic Implications of the Qualified Industrial Zones", Center For Strategic Studies, University of Jordan, (Amman, 2006), p. 34.

⁶¹⁹ Al Mdanat, *The Fiscal and Economic Impact*, p.144.

to be meeting with requirements of the jobs in the QIZs.⁶²⁰ Having foreign workers in QIZs is not only a challenge to the labor force in Jordan in terms of employment, but also the savings by the workers went outside Jordan. Also the technology transfer and know-how to local workers has not happened.

d. Closure of the companies

It has been recorded that some of the companies were closed down. The number of the companies closed down was 10 out of 60 at the beginning of 2005. The first reason for that was that the relatively small companies had been adversely affected by the international competition. The second reason was the financial constraints whereas the third reason was the technical mistakes or arson and resultant fires. The fourth reason was the change in the name of the companies. The companies that change name found it more profitable to reopen to have access to more facilities and benefit more from rules and regulations and credits from the banks. Fifth, some companies aimed at making use of QIZs benefits and after meeting their needs, chose to close down. The sixth reason turned out to be the opening of new QIZs in Egypt where there was a better infrastructure and lower production costs. Seventh were the tiring bureaucratic procedures which resulted in delays in approving the orders of investors leading to disincentives for the investors.⁶²¹

The closure of the companies in the QIZs could have undesirable negative impacts on the Jordanian economy especially in terms of the reputation of the investment climate. From an optimistic point of view, this may result in promoting local investment and encouraging local entrepreneurs with incentives to invest in QIZs.

⁶²⁰ Ibid, p.145.

⁶²¹ Ibid, p.52.

e. Overall Assessment of QIZs

QIZs have been beneficial for the Jordanian economy in terms of increasing exports especially to US, employment and foreign exchange earnings. However, there is little evidence of technological transfer as well as industrial transformation facilitation.⁶²² Bearing in mind the hesitancy of the local investors to take part in the QIZs and the Israeli investors' lack of interest, QIZs are still far from meeting the purpose of fuelling the economic cooperation and facilitating normalization between Jordan and Israel. In terms of regional economic cooperation, the situation is no better. Arab countries are hesitant to invest in QIZs either.

Despite the doubts about the future of the QIZs stemming from the challenges especially posed by the opening of new QIZs in Egypt and the discussions about the benefits of these zones for the Jordanian economy, some experts think that the local economy can still benefit from QIZs. These zones have created more than 11.000 jobs for the local people. In addition, QIZs have the potential to “have positive spillover on the economy, by creating networks of suppliers to the companies surrounding the zones and by using other related services”⁶²³. There is also the argument that Jordan can benefit more from these zones in case of the application of some fiscal measures like lifting tax exemptions for the companies operating in the QIZs because the privilege of quota and duty-free access to the US market is a greater incentive for the investors rather than tax exemptions.

⁶²² Marwan Kardoosh, and Riad Al-Khouri, “QIZs and Sustainable Development in the Middle East”, *Daily Star*, 27 December 2004, available at <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Business/Middle-East/Dec/27/QIZs-and-sustainable-development-in-the-Middle-East.ashx?searchText=Kardoosh%20Marwan#ixzz1KcNN0rCg>

⁶²³ Al Mdanat, *The Fiscal and Economic Impact*, pp.139-140.

5.3.3.6. REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION

In the mid-1990s, the discussions about regional economic cooperation revolved around the idea of a Benelux arrangement among Israel, Jordan and Palestinians. This arrangement was inspired from the successful model of Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg in terms of overcoming the constraints and limitations of being a small country through integration. This model was not possibly applied to the Middle East. The main reason was the unresolved political conflicts. Riad Al-Khoury asserted that Israel was trying to pursue a policy of regional economic cooperation without peace. Besides, according to him, creation of a common market and economic cooperation was viewed as a substitute for resolving political conflicts and extending political rights to the deprived. However, without political commitments, it would not be possible to endure peace solely based on economic cooperation.⁶²⁴ Sharing the same vision with Al-Khoury, Marwan Kardoosh claims that such economic cooperation has the potential to overcome the constraints of the Palestinian economy and thus discontent. This would contribute to the normalization of relations which is impeded predominantly by the Palestinians and the supporters of the Palestinian cause. However, such integration project is destined to be elusive in a context where Palestinian-Israeli conflict persists.⁶²⁵

a. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Conferences

One of the outcomes of the Madrid Peace process was the regional economic integration. There were four conferences held between the years 1994-1997. These conferences aimed to integrate Israel in the region via establishing economic cooperation. The first conference took place in Casablanca in 1994 with the participation of heads of state or their representatives from 61 countries. Out of this conference came

⁶²⁴ Interview with Riad Al-Khoury, “Yields of The Peace Dividend”, *Jordan Business*, December 2009, pp.44.45.

⁶²⁵ Kardoosh, “Jordan, Israel and Palestine”.

out the Middle East Economic and Strategic Group. The establishment of the supposedly permanent institution was to achieve Israel's integration to the region, the prerequisite of which was lifting the Arab boycott of Israel. Despite the boycott of the Syria and Lebanon of the meeting, Casablanca achieved in creating the euphoria for economic cooperation and ended up with 150 development projects as well as establishment of Development Bank, a Regional Council of Tourism and a Regional Office for Trade and Business.⁶²⁶ One of the projects proposed in Casablanca Conference was a canal linking the Red Sea and Dead Sea was proposed and later re-discussed in the Amman Conference. A project of a major highway from Egypt to Syria via Israel was also offered.⁶²⁷

The second conference was held in Amman in October 1995. The place was chosen symbolically to display the institutionalization of peace after the Jordan-Israel peace treaty. There were around 2.000 participants as the heads of governments and business leaders from the region, North America, Europe and Asia. In addition to activate the spirit of Casablanca and its institutionalization efforts of regional economic cooperation, Amman Conference promoted expansion of private sector investments. 137 development projects were presented with the expectation of \$ 1.2 billion foreign investment. Despite the hesitant stance of Egypt towards the pace of normalizing relations with Israel, the conference was a success from the Jordanian perspective.⁶²⁸

Despite the hesitancy from the Likud government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, and Egypt's stance against rapid normalization before the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is settled, the third conference convened in Cairo in 1996. Almost one third of the 1.400 participants were Egyptian and differing from the two previous conferences, most of the participants were businessmen rather than government officials. The focus of the

⁶²⁶ Bahgat Korany, "The Middle East Since the Cold War: Torn between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics" in *International Relations of the Middle East*, ed. by Louise Fawcett, (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 65-66.

⁶²⁷ Kardoosh, "Jordan, Israel and Palestine".

⁶²⁸ Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan*, p.359.

conference was diverted on purpose from regional economic integration and Israeli inclusion to region's integration with the global economy. However, Israel came up with 162 projects totaling \$27 billion investment.⁶²⁹

The fourth conference in Doha was managed to take place in 1997 with the participation of 850 businessmen from formally 65 countries. Opposition and rejection to convene the conference came with the excuse of the unreasonable political attitude of the Likud government towards the peace process in the region. However, the US pressure and carrots (like the reduction of a great amount of debt of Yemen) worked against the opposition. The participation from Arab countries were very low (9 out of 22). Syria, Lebanon, Palestinian Authority, Egypt, Morocco and Saudi Arabia were among the countries that did not participate in the conference. The participation profile was the indicator of the success of the Doha Conference, which turned out to be "last nail in the coffin of regional projects of economic integration"⁶³⁰The only tangible outcome was the QIZs between Israel and Jordan. Eventually, MENA conferences ended with the project proposals that will not be materialized in the near future and the dream of regional economic cooperation were dead with the political stalemate in the peace process.

b. Economics of Peace

The peace treaty was ambitious in setting the vision for economic cooperation not only between Jordan and Israel, but also region-wide. There were dozens of bilateral and multilateral development projects under the supervision of Crown Prince Hassan and the Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. These projects were supposed to change the regional dynamics via economic prosperity felt by each and every individual in the region, which in return would fuel people's belief in peace. Thus, the issue of economic

⁶²⁹ Korany, "The Middle East", p.67.

⁶³⁰ Ibid.

cooperation was given high priority by the parties since it was grasped as the only route for normalization.

With the peace treaty, there had been specific benefits for the Jordanian economy, but nothing even slightly better had been felt by the ordinary Jordanian citizen after the peace. Worse, the per capita income decreased and unemployment grew. Neither the development projects were not implemented nor were the Palestinian markets opened up to Jordanian trade.

According to Shamir, the blame for the failure of the peace-building process is on both parties. Israel was not able to invigorate the political system to implement economic cooperation plans and projects. Application of excessive security measures curbed the motivation of the Jordanians especially in trade. When the internalization of the peace did not take place in Jordan by the people, and the bureaucracy displayed suspicions towards Israel, Israel was no better in internalizing the peace which was reflected in myopic policies unable to create new methods of cooperation.⁶³¹ The situation in Jordan was ironic, too, at the popular level since the people who vowed to protest Israel and hold the banner of anti-normalization were the ones complaining from the absence of peace dividend. Concerning the Palestinian factor, Shamir stated that Israeli politicians tend to see the peace with Jordan independent from the Palestinian problem. On the other hand, Jordanian government was insistent not to understand that its tolerant behavior towards the presence of Hamas in Jordan resulted in problems in the Jordanian-Israeli relations leading to crisis on certain occasions as in the case of the assassination attempt towards the Hamas leader Khalid Mishal.⁶³²

As a conclusion, economic cooperation between Jordan and Israel has not yet reached the level intended. After a decade and a half, “peace dividend” seems far from an assurance in the minds of the Jordanian people. As put forward by many scholars, it is

⁶³¹ Interview with Shimon Shamir, “Peace Immobilized”, *Jordan Business*, December 2009, p.42.

⁶³² *Ibid*, p.43.

going to be the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, mainly the Palestinian-Israeli question that would enable economic cooperation in the region. Marwan Kardoosh, Jordanian economist and the editor of the magazine of Jordan Business, expresses the fact as: “Only when there is a final settlement in the Middle East including the establishment of a viable Palestinian state and a permanent solution of the refugee question will there be a ‘real’ meaning to the concept of a ‘peace dividend’.”⁶³³

5.4. CONCLUSION

The peace with Israel was a strategic move driven mainly by the political concerns. The regional context which was driven by optimism for peace was very influential in achieving the Jordan-Israel peace. The 1991 Madrid Conference and the formation of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation provided Jordan with the opportunity to reinstate its stance in the Western camp after the prestige loss it experienced following the Gulf War, having sided with Iraq. Thus, the peace with Israel did not initiate, but strengthened the restoration of relations with the West, especially with the US. On the other hand, without the legitimacy stemming from the direct negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, Jordan would not be able to sign the peace treaty with Israel. Bearing in mind the fact that more than half of the Jordanian population is of Palestinian origin, the Palestinian factor in Jordanian politics is almost a matter of life and death. Even after the peace treaty, the anti-normalization movement in Jordan drove its strength out of the Palestinian population and the pro-Palestinian and thus anti-Israeli sentiment. How much ironic it may seem since Palestinian population is grasped as a challenge to the *raison d'état* of Jordan by the Jordanians of East Bank origin and the regime, the anti-Israeli sentiment (maybe more than the pro-Palestinian) is prevalent in Jordan. And this fact brings in the necessity of walking in the tightropes for the Hashemite regime in its foreign policy making predominantly when Israel is concerned. On the other hand, despite the legitimacy of the Palestinian negotiations with Israel, what enabled King

⁶³³ Kardoosh, “Jordan, Israel and Palestine”.

Hussein to sign the peace treaty was the popular support he had from the people as the monarch. Without doubt, King Hussein acquired such support with the coalitions that he established within the country and the efficient management mechanism that gave him the room to play one another.

The political climate under which Jordan and Israel signed the peace treaty was unique in the sense that military confrontation was neither envisioned by Jordan nor by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, where Jordan was no more than a reluctant and unfortunate party. This political climate was reflected in the peace treaty, too, because demilitarized zones and international peacekeeping forces were not addressed in the peace treaty as issues of security. So the peace treaty was built upon the vision of peace-building rather than conflict resolution or management.⁶³⁴ In addition, the realization of the peace treaty and the resolution of political problems after the peace treaty as a prospect for normalization were indebted to the great harmony and mutual trust enjoyed by King Hussein and Yitzhak Rabin, the two men of peace. What was crystal clear is that these two leaders were not alone in their dreams of peace. They worked with staff who shared the same beliefs and even if not shared the same beliefs at least had a great trust in their leaders. Although King Hussein did not get along well with Shimon Peres since he does not view him as a man of his word, Shimon Peres was the architect of the peace vision of the 1990s in the Middle East, a man left in the shadow of Rabin as the peace achiever.

Within this political framework, there were certain economic imperatives for Jordan to sign the peace treaty with Israel, which turned out to be the tangible benefits for the country like the debt release, foreign aid, foreign investment, trade and tourism revenues. On the other hand, despite the economic drivers for peace, the endurance of the peace was mainly dependent on the economic benefits that were supposed to result from the peace. While making peace with Israel, King Hussein was aware of the importance of the psychological factors, the image of an enemy in the minds of the

⁶³⁴ Interview with Shamir, "Peace Immobilized", p.42.

Jordanian people. The only way to cope with it would come with the so-called 'peace dividend'. As a consequence, the measurement of success of the 'normalization' would be the material gains felt by the Jordanian people that came with the economic cooperation with Israel. In spite of the zeal the peace dividends created, they were never realized. Although increased, bilateral trade never reached the level intended. Besides, the joint ventures like the Red Sea- Dead Sea Canal and joint Aqaba-Eilat airport remained on the table. QIZs, designed to establish economic cooperation, integration and interdependence with Israel, has still been far from realizing its reason of formation. Limited though, Jordan benefited from the QIZs in terms of increasing exports to US, employment, foreign investment and earnings. However, QIZs has not attracted significant Israeli investment and technological transfer.

In conclusion, the peace between Jordan and Israel still remains as a 'cold peace' after 20 years since the treaty was signed with the prospects for a warm peace. Even the importance King Abdullah II attributed to the economics during his reign and his declared commitment to preserve the peace could not help peace dividends to remain as dashed hopes. Relying upon the importance of the Palestinian factor in Jordanian politics, the normalization of the relations between the two countries are tightly tied to the settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as framed in the Oslo Accords. The Jordan-Israel peace, once more, reveals the necessity of achieving a comprehensive peace in the Middle East for normalizing relations with the Arabs and Israelis at the political level to reap the benefits of economic cooperation.

6. CONCLUSION

Despite the differences in the international, regional and domestic contexts, both Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes ended up as ‘cold peace’. This means that in both of the cases, the communication between the parties remained highly intergovernmental, despite the achievement of diplomatic recognition, diplomatic relations were not immune from problems, recalling ambassadors was not rare at times of political confrontations, and normalization of relations have not been fully achieved due to the limited economic and cultural exchange. Therefore, this thesis argues that the ‘cold peace’ phenomenon is the reflection of the autonomy of state. Domestic state autonomy provides the state with the freedom to act autonomously from the public dynamics whereas regional state autonomy yields independent actions from regional dynamics. The domestic state autonomy derives from the historical process of state formation where the state-society relations are formulated. The encounter with colonialism played an important role in the delineation of the ruler and the ruled. Domestic state autonomy originates from the authoritarian nature of the state which is interconnected with its rentier structure. Coercion as an apparatus of the state is used to suppress opposition and keep society away from politics. State as the distributor of wealth grew irresponsible to people and utilized patronage networks to buy public support. In case of any public discontent, the state is able to suppress it via its authoritarian apparatus or if it is not able to use coercion as a tool or coercion is far from being helpful, then it grants some rights or material benefit to the discontented to release public tension. Consequently, the authoritarian state structure enables the decision-maker with the largest room for maneuver with the least responsibility to the people, and foreign policy remains the reserved area of the principal decision-maker, be it the president or the monarch, and his elites. Although the state does not enjoy an absolute

independence from society, it is highly autonomous so that it could make decisions and act accordingly in line with its interests. However, this autonomy does not rule out the possibility of acting in line with the general public opinion when regime survival is at stake. Both Egypt and Jordan, first being a republic and the latter a constitutional monarchy, are authoritarian and semi-rentier states and thus autonomous states. Jordan enjoys more limited domestic state autonomy when compared with Egypt. However, both of the states were endowed with enough autonomy which enabled the Egyptian and the Jordanian state to make peace with Israel at the expense of their people regardless of the efforts by the Egyptian and Jordanian state to sell the decision of making peace with Israel by propagating the peace dividends.

In addition, domestic state autonomy not only enabled making the peace, but also sustaining it. The predominantly anti-Israeli public opinion in Egypt and Jordan and the strong anti-normalization campaign constitutes the main obstacle to the normalization of the relations and as a result, a warmer peace. However, these social dynamics are not influential enough to cause the abrogation of the peace treaties since they have not reached the extent to endanger regime survival. Within this framework, the state was able to establish a sort of consensus with the social groups involved in the anti-normalization campaign. The consensus was about the delineation of red lines between the government and the civil society about the peace treaties. The government has turned a blind eye to the anti-normalization campaign as long as they do not engage in actions that could jeopardize the main political achievement of the peace treaty, which are the formation and the maintenance of the security regime between the parties. That consensus has enabled state's autonomous actions in terms of interaction with the former enemy and sustaining peace within the framework of predominantly intergovernmental communication and limited economic interaction.

Regional state autonomy was an important enabling factor in the peacemaking. The difference between Egypt and Jordan in terms of regional state autonomy is reflected in the timing of the peace accords with Israel. To be more precise, the 15 years' time difference between the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace treaties is

determined by their degree of regional state autonomy. Egypt, due to its larger state capacity defined by its political, military and economic capabilities, and the historical role it played in the regional politics, was able to initiate the peace process as early as the mid-1970s. Egypt was even able to utilize war as an instrument for peace with the 1973 October War. It was capable of bringing the two superpowers in confrontation at the time of *détente* during the Cold War. On the other hand, Jordan had to wait for 15 years after Egypt signed a separate peace treaty with Israel in 1979, due to its limited regional autonomy. Although Jordan's importance in regional politics is far beyond the size of the country, it is still a small country which is highly susceptible to regional dynamics due to its low state capacity compared to Egypt in terms of political, military and economic capabilities. Therefore, it was not able to risk regional isolation as Egypt did. Despite its covert diplomacy with Israel during the reign of King Abdullah I and King Hussein, Jordan had to wait for the convenient regional environment for making peace with Israel.

For Egypt, the main reason behind peacemaking was the shift in the state ideology whereas for Jordan, the decisive factor was the regional context. What Sadat inherited from Nasser, when he came to power in 1970, was a war-torn state both economically and ideologically. The Egyptian involvement in the Yemeni Civil War in early in 1960s had devastating effects on the Egyptian economy even before the 1967 June War. Besides, the heavy industrialization projects under Arab socialism had worn the Egyptian economy out. In this respect, the defeat Egypt experienced during the 1967 June War proved to be catastrophic for the Egyptian economy. The way out from an economy on the brinks of bankruptcy was the transformation into an outward-looking economy. Although it was Sadat who initiated economic liberalization under *Infitah* in 1974, the discussions had started during the last years of Nasser. For Sadat, Egypt's future lied in the integration to the world economy and the attraction of foreign investment. The ideological bankruptcy originated from the decline of Pan-Arabism mainly after the 1967 June War. Before that, the dissolution of the UAR in 1961 had weakened Pan-Arabism as a viable ideology. Egypt was humiliated after the defeat in the 1967 June War and lost Sinai. The loss of Sinai not only meant a loss of territory, but

also an important economic asset. All of these developments led to the prioritization of Egyptian interests over the Arab ones under 'Egypt First'. It was not hard to persuade the public that Egypt had sacrificed enough for the Arabs and the Palestinians, and it was high time to think the Egyptian people first. To ensure domestic survival, Sadat had to achieve the overall transformation of the Egyptian state not only in political and economic terms, but also by relinquishing the revisionist foreign policy of Nasser. In order to achieve this overall transformation, Sadat had to align with the US. Regardless of the ongoing superpower rivalry under the Cold War, he had viewed the US as more powerful, and he was aware of the power of Israel that it derived from being the ally of the US in the Middle East. He was also cognizant that in order to secure US support, he had to come to terms with Israel.

For Jordan, such shift in the ideology was not a concern in its peace with Israel. Unlike Egypt, Jordan had always been pragmatic and Western-oriented, which enabled it pursue a dialogue with Israel. There had been exceptional cases in the history of the Jordanian foreign policy which contradicted its pro-Western stance such as its waging war against Israel in 1948 and 1967, its refusal to take part in the 1955 Baghdad Pact and in the US coalition against Iraq during the 1991 Gulf War. However, these anomalies derived from its attempts of balancing between the internal and external threats to its survival. Regime survival is a concern in most of the states in the Middle East. However, for Jordan, it is much more acute related very much to artificiality of the Jordanian state. This reality made Hashemite monarchy to stick to pragmatism more than any other state, in this case, Egypt. Against this backdrop, what enabled Jordan to make peace with Israel was the Middle Eastern regional context. The Middle East of the early 1990s was a region of hope towards peace due to the peace euphoria created by the 1991 Madrid Conference. After the US emerged as the victor from the Cold War superpower rivalry, with the 1991 Gulf War, it promised to be the shaper of the Middle Eastern politics. For that reason, the US intention to initiate the peace process in the region resulted in solid steps to realize peace. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations between the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict began with the Madrid Conference. For Jordan, equally important was the Palestinian factor to jump in the peace camp. Jordan needed the legitimacy of the

Palestinian-Israeli bilateral negotiations and the resultant 1993 Oslo Accords to make peace with Israel. The Palestinian factor is an internal problem for Jordan, because half of its population, if not more, is of Palestinian origin. The Palestinian factor has become part of the survival of the Hashemite monarchy. For decades, Jordan is striving to disprove that 'Jordan is Palestine'. That assumption is not only a propaganda tool of the Israeli right to avoid the resolution of the Palestinian conflict via territorial compromise, but also a demographic reality endangering the future of the Hashemite regime in Jordan. Within this framework, Palestinian factor is a matter of life and death for Jordan whereas for Egypt, it has been an instrument for regional hegemony. Egypt has also utilized the Palestinian cause for legitimacy at home, but its extent is incomparable to the Jordanian case.

The nature of the peace treaties also affected the nature of the peace-building efforts in terms of normalization. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was mainly built upon conflict resolution due to the high importance of guaranteeing the issue of non-aggression. The main issue was ensuring security via demilitarized zones in Sinai. Additionally, the status of Sinai was addressed in detailed annexes. For Egypt, regaining Sinai was of great importance so was the step-by-step withdrawal of the Israel. The main element in the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty is recognition and respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and the right to live in peace. There was a reference to the promoting good neighborly relations as well as cooperation. Developing normal relations in terms of diplomatic, economic and cultural relations were weakly addressed throughout the treaty, only found in the annexes under the name of the "Protocol Concerning Relations Between the Parties", which was composed of three short articles with general statements.

On the other hand, the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty was established with the vision of peace-building rather than merely ending the state of belligerency between Jordan and Israel and securing the recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty was a reflection of the optimism for achieving comprehensive peace in the region and the vision of 'New Middle East' based on peace

and economic integration. Therefore, there was much more emphasis on ‘cooperation’ rather than ‘security’. In addition, at the time of signing the peace treaty, Jordan and Israel had already fought their last war for almost three decades ago. Therefore, the common understanding of security had already been present, thus leaving not much to discuss during the peace negotiations and military confrontation was envisioned neither by Jordan nor by Israel. Compared to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, there was much more emphasis on the promotion of cooperation between the parties on the grounds of as trade, transportation, tourism, communications, culture and science, energy, environment, agriculture, navigation, civil aviation and combating crime.

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty came out of the 1978 Camp David Accords which encompassed two framework documents, one about the formation of the Palestinian self-governing authority and the other about the bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel. However, the formalizing of the first accord was not a precondition for the second one reflecting the fact that the Palestinian question was not an existential matter of survival for Egypt. However, despite the vitality of the Palestinian question for Jordan, there was just one reference to the Palestinians in regard to the issue of the refugees and the displaced persons. It was about the formation of a quadripartite committee including Egypt and the Palestinians to address the grievances of the displaced persons. Apart from that everything about the Palestinian refugees were left to be solved in the permanent status negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. When the issue of East Jerusalem was concerned, there was no reference in the 1978 Camp David Accords about the city. Due to the historical role Jordan had in East Jerusalem, the issue was addressed, vaguely though, in the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty. Israel recognized the special role of Jordan in the Muslim holy shrines in East Jerusalem. However, the treaty formally put an end to the claims of ‘Jordan is Palestine’. This was ensured not only via the recognition of territorial integrity, and sovereignty but also with the principle stated in the treaty as: “involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted.” (Article 2, Para.6). This principle eradicated the possibility of transfer of the Palestinians from Israel to Jordan, which also applied the way around.

It is also important to note that the US role in the achievement of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was decisive and determining whereas it was much more symbolic in the Jordanian-Israeli Peace Treaty, because there were not much issues that could lead to controversy between the parties in the latter case. Besides, the relations between Prime Minister Yizhak Rabin and King Hussein were much more harmonious than the one between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and President Anwar Sadat.

For sustaining peace, the development of vested political interests is important, but not sufficient. Even if vested interests in the economic cooperation are created by the government decision and followed by the support of business communities, it is not enough to create a fertile ground for normalization. This will lead either the political interaction or the economic to remain as an elite process. Unless the benefits of these political and economic processes are felt by the ordinary people, namely the man on the street, the normalization of relations, the must of the peace-building, will remain as mission unaccomplished. This is the main lessons learned from the two unique peace processes in the Middle East.

Despite the fact that the Jordanian-Israeli peace had more prospects for a warm peace, it could not escape from the fate of becoming a 'cold peace'. The common fate of the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes derived from the unachieved normalization processes, but more importantly from the nature of the peacemaking processes. Like most of the other foreign policy decision, making peace was done at the expense of the public opinion, so they remained as foreign policy of the state, and not internalized by the people. Any 'separate peace' is destined to end up 'cold' given the unachieved overall resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The comprehensive peace which means the resolution of all matters of dispute between all the parties to the conflict is a must. Therefore, peace in the Middle East could only be achieved by the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as well as the conflict between Israel and other frontline states of Syria and Lebanon followed by the normalization of relations with Israel by the other Arab states. The inexistence of the comprehensive peace in the

region has been posited as the main reason for the unsuccessful normalization processes. This is correct, but it is incomplete. As long as governments remain irresponsible to their publics and the benefits of economic cooperation are not felt by the average citizen, the peace treaties will continue to remain as the king's, president's or elite's peace.

Both Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes have displayed similar problems in terms of normalization of relations. In both cases, an important portion of the public remained opposed to the peace treaties and normalization of relations with Israel. Professional associations and unions including intellectuals consistently opposed interaction with Israel and led the anti-normalization camp. The reason why the broad segments of Arab population are hostile to Israel derives from the widespread belief that the Israeli state is an illegitimate entity from the beginning. Besides, Israel is viewed as an occupier of the Palestinian land with the intention of further expansion and thus is an aggressor. According to such perspective, a state like Israel cannot possess good intentions towards Arab people. For that reason, in the eyes of the Arab people, a peace treaty is a mere intergovernmental political construction, the implementation of which is the responsibility of the governments, not the people.

In addition to the similar experience with the anti-normalization camp, the economic benefits from the peace processes remained limited. Both countries received annual aid from the US as a reward for making peace with Israel. Total US aid to Jordan (both economic and military) did not exceed \$ 200 million annually until the 2000s. This number is quite small when compared with the annual aid of nearly \$ 2 billion to Egypt. However, when the sizes of the countries are considered, the disparity between the amounts is understandable. However, during the 2000s, Jordan has obtained additional aid from the US in line with the regional context such as the 2003 Iraq War. In a similar vein, both countries have been granted debt relief during hard times. The military expenditures of both countries decreased after the peace treaties, but arms import increased in accordance with the annual US military aid. The US was cautious in supplying both countries with the enough military assistance to guarantee the defense capabilities of its allies in the region, where war and conflict were not rare. Tourism, in

both Egyptian and Jordanian cases, has been far below the expected levels. The number of Egyptian and Jordanian tourists visiting Israel has been far less than Israeli tourists visiting Egypt or Jordan. Trade with Israel was in Egyptian and Jordanian cases were promising in the first years of the peace. However, the enthusiasm faded away over time due to the anti-normalization campaigns, and the trade almost remained clandestine. QIZs as a US initiative to promote economic cooperation in the region in addition to aid was good in theory, but remained limited in practice. QIZs have been beneficial for both Jordanian and Egyptian economies in terms of increasing exports to the US as well as creating new jobs and increasing foreign exchange earnings. However, they are still far from meeting the purpose of fuelling the economic cooperation and facilitating Jordanian-Israeli and Egyptian-Israeli normalization. Arab countries remain hesitant to invest in QIZs whereas Israeli investors lack interest. Egypt agreed on the QIZ agreements six years after Jordan. Therefore, more time is needed to evaluate both the overall impact of QIZs on the Egyptian economy and the future of the initiative. Nonetheless, after 15 years' experience, Jordan is confronting the closure of companies in QIZs which has negative effects on the investment climate.

Apart from the similarities between the two cases, it is important to note that in the Egyptian case, the main economic benefit did not originate from developing relations with Israel. It was the result of aligning with the United States. The orientation of the state ideology towards a pro-Western line coupled with the liberalization of economy under *Infitah* to attract foreign investment and boost development enabled Egyptian state to reap economic benefits. The US aid in particular, and support in general have been the motor of Egyptian economic improvement. And peace with Israel was part of this overall design. Therefore, despite the propagated gains from the peace with Israel by the government, Egyptian decision-makers themselves did not expect much from the treaty, apart from the end of belligerency, ensuring security in the eastern border and regaining the land of Sinai. When Sadat was assassinated just after two years from the completion of the peace treaty, Mubarak chose not to risk much for the sake of normalizing relations with Israel. Even in authoritarian states like Egypt, pursuing normalization without broader public cooperation proves to be difficult. However, in the absence of astute state

policy towards pushing the peace process towards normalization, large segments of the Egyptian public remained ideologically against the peace with Israel. Besides, the economic benefits related to the peace process have not reached to the Egyptian people enhancing the pre-existing opposition and leading the anti-normalization process to take hold.

Apart from the two separate peace treaties with Israel, the comprehensive peace in the Middle East remains elusive. After the stalled Oslo process, the revival of the Palestinian-Israeli peace talks took place with the US initiative in Camp David in 2000 and ended up with no agreement and followed by the outbreak of the *Al-Aqsa Intifada*. The global and regional priorities changed significantly in the 2000s. US operation to Afghanistan in 2001 in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the subsequent US invasion of Iraq in 2003 drew the attention away from the Middle East Peace Process. The dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict changed as well. Upon the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, Abu Mazen became the president of the Palestinian Authority. Israeli disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2005 fuelled the Palestinian fears that Israel was striving to strengthen its hold in West Bank. Then, short after the Hamas victory in the 2006 elections, the Palestinian ruling authority was divided into two as Hamas in Gaza and Palestinian Authority in West Bank. This also led to the sub-division of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict to the Hamas-Israeli conflict and Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Hamas-Israeli conflict is a hot conflict where there are frequent military confrontations. International efforts to restore the peace process such as the Annapolis Conference in 2007 were unable to create the momentum of the 1991 Madrid Conference. Meanwhile, there were also regional efforts like the 2002 Arab Initiative proposed by the Saudi King Abdullah, which was endorsed by the Arab League. The initiative offered peace and normalization of relations in exchange for Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. It also advocated the establishment of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip with East Jerusalem as its capital. The initiative was almost the summary of what the peace efforts have so far tried to achieve. It represented the Arab approach to the comprehensive peace in the Middle East, but Israel did not show much interest and no any tangible steps have been taken. Middle East in

the twenty first century has witnessed several wars: 2003 Iraq War, 2006 Lebanon War, 2008 and 2014 Gaza Wars. The US Secretary of State John Kerry started another peace initiative in 2013 to revive the Palestinian-Israeli talks, but it stalled when Hamas and the Palestinian Authority declared that they concurred with the formation of a unity government, and followed by another war in Gaza in 2014.

The regional political landscape has changed with the 2011 Arab Spring which started with the mass demonstrations against the Zayn El-Abidine regime in Tunisia and spilled over to the region. It led to toppling authoritarian presidents in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as well as a civil war in Syria. Bringing in a time of great uncertainty, Arab Spring has raised questions for the future of the present two peace treaties in the region, predominantly the Egyptian-Israeli peace owing to the political fluidity in Egypt after the 25 January Revolution in 2011. The Jordanian-Israeli peace was a matter of less concern since the monarchy seemed to have coped well with the winds of change unleashed by the Arab Spring. However, the current tensions in East Jerusalem have resulted in the recalling of the Jordanian ambassador from Israel, a move to protest Israeli actions in the Al-Aqsa compound. In Egypt, after President Morsi was ousted with a military coup in June 2013, the relations with Israel looks better under the presidency of Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. The recent tacit cooperation between Egypt and Israel in fighting against the jihadists in Sinai has disproved the discussions regarding the abrogation of the peace treaty. When the current domestic situation in Egypt is concerned, the existential reason of securing internal stability is likely to preside over restructuring foreign policy. Thus, a change in the Egyptian foreign policy orientation is not anticipated in the short-run. Fragile though, both the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace treaties are likely to survive in the near future, but under current circumstances, the possibility of a comprehensive peace in the Middle East does not carry much hope.

In conclusion, the experiences from the Egyptian-Israeli and Jordanian-Israeli peace processes reveal the fact that the dynamics of the peace processes are shaped by the nature of foreign policy making in these countries marked by the autonomy of the state.

Most of the Middle Eastern states share similar characteristics of authoritarian state structure despite varying degrees of state capacity and autonomy and thus have similar tendencies in foreign policy making. For this reason, it is highly likely that any peaceful settlement of conflicts will result in ‘cold peace’. To be more precise, when the Arab-Israeli conflict is concerned, any possible peace agreement with Israel by Syria (given the end of current civil war) and Lebanon is doomed to end up with cold peace, because the state autonomy will enable these countries to make peace with Israel and sustain it. However, the normalization of relations will not be achieved even if the Palestinian-Israeli question is resolved since the peace-building requires the internalization of peace by the people that can be materialized by ensuring that the economic benefits of peace are felt by the ordinary citizens. This, for sure, requires democratic governance. Without doubt, such claim necessitates future research on different case studies.

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APPENDICES

A. THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (17 SEPTEMBER 1978)

1. The Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israel conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

- The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.
- After four wars during 30 years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.
- The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the parliament, government and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.
- The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.
- To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.
- Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability and in assuring security.
- Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neighborly relations. They recognize that for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a

basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

a. Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

b. Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

c. When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached in the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate right of the Palestinian peoples and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

- i. The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.
- ii. Submitting their agreements to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.
- iii. Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

iv. Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

d. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

e. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

f. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt-Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the U.N. Charter.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months from the signing of the Framework a peace treaty between them while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view the achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors - Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the U.N. Charter. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- a. full recognition;
- b. abolishing economic boycotts;
- c. guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participated in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure respect or the provisions. They shall be requested to conform their policies an actions with the undertaking contained in this Framework.

*For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin*

*For the Government of
the Arab Republic of Egypt
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat*

*Witnessed by
Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America*

2. Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them:

It is agreed that:

- The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.
- All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.
- Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

1. the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;
2. the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;
3. the use of airfields left by the Israelis near al-Arish, Rafah, Ras en-Naqb, and Sharm el-Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use only by all nations;
4. the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;
5. the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and
6. the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 km. (30 miles) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km. (12 miles) to 40 km. (24 miles).

In the area within 3 km. (1.8 miles) east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

Border patrol units not to exceed three battalions will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed:

1. in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and

2. in the Sharm el-Sheikh area to insure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east of El-Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

*For the Government of
the Arab Republic of Egypt:
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat*

*For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin*

*Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America*

B. EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY (23 MARCH 1979)

Preamble

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of settlement of the Arab- Israeli conflict in all its aspects

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty; in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel":

ARTICLE 1

The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3)

ARTICLE 2

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

ARTICLE 3

The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

- They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence.

- They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries.

- They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

ARTICLE 4

In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE 5

Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations, Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

The Parties consider the Strait of the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE 6

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligation of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE 7

Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

Any such disputes that cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE 8

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE 9

This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of Sep1975.

All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty sbe regarded as an integral part hereof.

The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

*For the Government of
the Arab Republic of Egypt:
Muhammed Anwar al-Sadat*

*For the Government of Israel:
Menachem Begin*

*Witnessed by:
Jimmy Carter,
President of the United States of America*

Annex I : Protocol concerning Israeli withdrawal and Security Arrangements

Appendix to Annex I : Organization of Movements in the Sinai

Annex III : Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties

C. THE JORDANIAN-ISRAELI PEACE TREATY (26 OCTOBER 1994)

Preamble

The Government of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Government of the State of Israel:

Bearing in mind the Washington Declaration, signed by them on 25th July, 1994, and which they are both committed to honor;

Aiming at the achievement of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace in the Middle East based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 in all their aspects;

Bearing in mind the importance of maintaining and strengthening peace based on freedom, equality, justice and respect for fundamental human rights, thereby overcoming psychological barriers and promoting human dignity;

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognizing their right and obligation to live in peace with each other as well as with all states, within secure and recognized boundaries;

Desiring to develop friendly relations and co-operation between them in accordance with the principles of international law governing international relations in time of peace;

Desiring as well to ensure lasting security for both their States and in particular to avoid threats and the use of force between them;

Bearing in mind that in their Washington Declaration of 25th July, 1994, they declared the termination of the state of belligerency between them;

Deciding to establish peace between them in accordance with this Treaty of Peace;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1: ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE

Peace is hereby established between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the State of Israel (the "Parties") effective from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 2: GENERAL PRINCIPLES

The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law governing relations among states in time of peace. In particular:

1. They recognise and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
2. They recognise and will respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;

3. They will develop good neighbourly relations of co-operation between them to ensure lasting security, will refrain from the threat or use of force against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means;
4. They respect and recognise the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the region;
5. They respect and recognise the pivotal role of human development and dignity in regional and bilateral relationships;
6. They further believe that within their control, involuntary movements of persons in such a way as to adversely prejudice the security of either Party should not be permitted.

ARTICLE 3: INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY

1. The international boundary between Israel and Jordan is delimited with reference to the boundary definition under the Mandate as is shown in Annex on the mapping materials attached thereto and coordinates specified therein.
2. The boundary, as set out in Annex I (a), is the permanent, secure and recognised international boundary between Israel and Jordan, without prejudice to the status of any territories that came under Israeli military government control in 1967.
3. The parties recognise the international boundary, as well as each other's territory, territorial waters and airspace, as inviolable, and will respect and comply with them.
4. The demarcation of the boundary will take place as set forth in Appendix (I) to Annex I and will be concluded not later than nine months after the signing of the Treaty.
5. It is agreed that where the boundary follows a river, in the event of natural changes in the course of the flow of the river as described in Annex I (a), the boundary shall follow the new course of the flow. In the event of any other changes the boundary shall not be affected unless otherwise agreed.
6. Immediately upon the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, each Party will deploy on its side of the international boundary as defined in Annex I (a).
7. The Parties shall, upon the signature of the Treaty, enter into negotiations to conclude, within 9 months, an agreement on the delimitation of their maritime boundary in the Gulf of Aqaba.
8. Taking into account the special circumstances of the Naharayim/Baqura area, which is under Jordanian sovereignty, with Israeli private ownership rights, the Parties agreed to apply the provisions set out in Annex I (b).
9. With respect to the Zofar/Al-Ghamr area, the provisions set out in Annex I (c) will apply.

ARTICLE 4: SECURITY

- a. Both Parties, acknowledging that mutual understanding and co-operation in security-related matters will form a significant part of their relations and will further enhance the security of the region, take upon themselves to base their security relations on mutual trust, advancement of joint interests and co-operation, and to aim towards a regional framework of partnership in peace.
- b. Towards that goal the Parties recognise the achievements of the European Community and European Union in the development of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and commit themselves to the creation, in the Middle East, of a CSCME (Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Middle East).
- c. This commitment entails the adoption of regional models of security successfully implemented in the post World War era (along the lines of the Helsinki process) culminating in a regional zone of security and stability.

2. The obligations referred to in this Article are without prejudice to the inherent right of self-defence in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

3. The Parties undertake, in accordance with the provisions of this Article, the following:

a. to refrain from the threat or use of force or weapons, conventional, non-conventional or of any other kind, against each other, or of other actions or activities that adversely affect the security of the other Party;

b. to refrain from organising, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party;

c. to take necessary and effective measures to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party do not originate from, and are not committed within, through or over their territory (hereinafter the term 'territory' ^a includes the airspace and territorial waters).

4. Consistent with the era of peace and with the efforts to build regional security and to avoid and prevent aggression and violence, the Parties further agree to refrain from the following:

a. joining or in any way assisting, promoting or co-operating with any coalition, organisation or alliance with a military or security character with a third party, the objectives or activities of which include launching aggression or other acts of military hostility against the other Party, in contravention of the provisions of the present Treaty.

b. allowing the entry, stationing and operating on their territory, or through it, of military forces, personnel or materiel of a third party, in circumstances which may adversely prejudice the security of the other Party.

5. Both Parties will take necessary and effective measures, and will co-operate in combating terrorism of all kinds. The Parties undertake:

a. to take necessary and effective measures to prevent acts of terrorism, subversion or violence from being carried out from their territory or through it and to take necessary and effective measures to combat such activities and all their perpetrators.

b. without prejudice to the basic rights of freedom of expression and association, to take necessary and effective measures to prevent the entry, presence and co-operation in their territory of any group or organisation, and their infrastructure, which threatens the security of the other Party by the use of or incitement to the use of, violent means.

c. to co-operate in preventing and combating cross-boundary infiltrations.

6. Any question as to the implementation of this Article will be dealt with through a mechanism of consultations which will include a liaison system, verification, supervision, and where necessary, other mechanisms, and higher level consultation. The details of the mechanism of consultations will be contained in an agreement to be concluded by the Parties within 3 months of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

7. The Parties undertake to work as a matter of priority, and as soon as possible in the context of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security, and jointly, towards the following:

a. the creation in the Middle East of a region free from hostile alliances and coalitions;

b. the creation of a Middle East free from weapons of mass destruction, both conventional and non-conventional, in the context of a comprehensive, lasting and stable peace, characterised by the renunciation of the use of force, reconciliation and goodwill.

ARTICLE 5: DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER BILATERAL RELATIONS

1. The Parties agree to establish full diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange resident ambassadors within one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. The Parties agree that the normal relationship between them will further include economic and cultural relations.

ARTICLE 6: WATER

With the view to achieving a comprehensive and lasting settlement of all the water problems between them:

1. The Parties agree mutually to recognise the rightful allocations of both of them in Jordan River and Yarmouk River waters and Araba/Arava ground water in accordance with the agreed acceptable principles, quantities and quality as set out in Annex II, which shall be fully respected and complied with.
2. The Parties, recognising the necessity to find a practical, just and agreed solution to their water problems and with the view that the subject of water can form the basis for the advancement of co-operation between them, jointly undertake to ensure that the management and development of their water resources do not, in any way, harm the water resources of the other Party.
3. The Parties recognise that their water resources are not sufficient to meet their needs. More water should be supplied for their use through various methods, including projects of regional and international co-operation.
4. In light of paragraph 3 of this Article, with the understanding that co-operation in water-related subjects would be to the benefit of both Parties, and will help alleviate their water shortages, and that water issues along their entire boundary must be dealt with in their totality, including the possibility of trans-boundary water transfers, the Parties agree to search for ways to alleviate water shortage and to co-operate in the following fields:
 - a. development of existing and new water resources, increasing the water availability including co-operation on a regional basis as appropriate, and minimising wastage of water resources through the chain of their uses;
 - b. prevention of contamination of water resources;
 - c. mutual assistance in the alleviation of water shortages;
 - d. transfer of information and joint research and development in water-related subjects, and review of the potentials for enhancement of water resources development and use.
5. The implementation of both Parties' undertakings under this Article is detailed in Annex II.

ARTICLE 7: ECONOMIC RELATIONS

1. Viewing economic development and prosperity as pillars of peace, security and harmonious relations between states, peoples and individual human beings, the Parties, taking note of understandings reached between them, affirm their mutual desire to promote economic co-operation between them, as well as within the framework of wider regional economic co-operation.
2. In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties agree to the following:
 - a. to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations, to terminate economic boycotts directed at each other, and to co-operate in terminating boycotts against either Party by third parties;
 - b. recognising that the principle of free and unimpeded flow of goods and services should guide their relations, the Parties will enter into negotiations with a view to concluding agreements on economic co-operation, including trade and the establishment of a free trade area, investment, banking, industrial co-operation and labour, for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations, based on principles to be agreed upon, as well as on human development considerations on a regional basis. These negotiations will be concluded no later than 6 months from the exchange the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

c. to co-operate bilaterally, as well as in multilateral forums, towards the promotion of their respective economies and of their neighbourly economic relations with other regional parties.

ARTICLE 8: REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS

1. Recognising the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict in the Middle East, as well as the contribution made by them towards the alleviation of human suffering, the Parties will seek to further alleviate those problems arising on a bilateral level.

2. Recognising that the above human problems caused by the conflict in the Middle East cannot be fully resolved on the bilateral level, the Parties will seek to resolve them in appropriate forums, in accordance with international law, including the following:

a. in the case of displaced persons, in a quadripartite committee together with Egypt and the Palestinians:

b. in the case of refugees,

(1) in the framework of the Multilateral Working Group on Refugees;

(2) in negotiations, in a framework to be agreed, bilateral or otherwise, in conjunction with and at the same time as the permanent status negotiations pertaining to the territories referred to in Article 3 of this Treaty;

c. through the implementation of agreed United Nations programmes and other agreed international economic programmes concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement.

ARTICLE 9: PLACES OF HISTORICAL AND RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE

1. Each party will provide freedom of access to places of religious and historical significance.

2. In this regard, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, Israel respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Muslim Holy shrines in Jerusalem. When negotiations on the permanent status will take place, Israel will give high priority to the Jordanian historic role in these shrines.

3. The Parties will act together to promote interfaith relations among the three monotheistic religions, with the aim of working towards religious understanding, moral commitment, freedom of religious worship, and tolerance and peace.

ARTICLE 10: CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

The Parties, wishing to remove biases developed through periods of conflict, recognise the desirability of cultural and scientific exchanges in all fields, and agree to establish normal cultural relations between them. Thus, they shall, as soon as possible and not later than 9 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, conclude the negotiations on cultural and scientific agreements.

ARTICLE 11: MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND GOOD NEIGHBOURLY RELATIONS

1. The Parties will seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance based on shared historic values, and accordingly undertake:

a. to abstain from hostile or discriminatory propaganda against each other, and to take all possible legal and administrative measures to prevent the dissemination of such propaganda by any organisation or individual present in the territory of either Party;

b. as soon as possible, and not later than 3 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, to repeal all adverse or discriminatory references and expressions of hostility in their respective legislation;

c. to refrain in all government publications from any such references or expressions;

d. to ensure mutual enjoyment by each other's citizens of due process of law within their respective legal systems and before their courts.

2. Paragraph 1 (a) of this Article is without prejudice to the right to freedom of expression as contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

3. A joint committee shall be formed to examine incidents where one Party claims there has been a violation of this Article.

ARTICLE 12: COMBATING CRIME AND DRUGS

The Parties will co-operate in combating crime, with an emphasis on smuggling, and will take all necessary measures to combat and prevent such activities as the production of, as well as the trafficking in illicit drugs, and will bring to trial perpetrators of such acts. In this regard, they take note of the understandings reached between them in the above spheres, in accordance with Annex III and undertake to conclude all relevant agreements not later than 9 months from the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 13: TRANSPORTATION AND ROADS

Taking note of the progress already made in the area of transportation, the Parties recognise the mutuality of interest in good neighbourly relations in the area of transportation and agree to the following means to promote relations between them in this sphere:

1. Each party will permit the free movement of nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither party will impose discriminatory taxes or restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.

2. The Parties will open and maintain roads and border-crossings between their countries and will consider further road and rail links between them.

3. The Parties will continue their negotiations concerning mutual transportation agreements in the above and other areas, such as joint projects, traffic safety, transport standards and norms, licensing of vehicles, land passages, shipment of goods and cargo, and meteorology, to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

4. The Parties agree to continue their negotiations for a highway to be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat.

ARTICLE 14: FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION AND ACCESS TO PORTS

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 3, each Party recognises the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial waters in accordance with the rules of international law.

2. Each Party will grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other Party. Such access will be granted on the same conditions as generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations.

3. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either Party through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE 15: CIVIL AVIATION

1. The Parties recognise as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the multilateral aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (The Chicago Convention) and the 1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement.
2. Any declaration of national emergency by a Party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other Party on a discriminatory basis.
3. The Parties take note of the negotiations on the international air corridor to be opened between them in accordance with the Washington Declaration. In addition, the Parties shall, upon ratification of this Treaty, enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a Civil Aviation Agreement. All the above negotiations are to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 16: POSTS AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS

The Parties take note of the opening between them, in accordance with the Washington Declaration, of direct telephone and facsimile lines. Postal links, the negotiations on which having been concluded, will be activated upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties further agree that normal wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite, will be established between them, in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations. The negotiations on these subjects will be concluded not later than 9 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 17: TOURISM

The Parties affirm their mutual desire to promote co-operation between them in the field of tourism. In order to accomplish this goal, the Parties — taking note of the understandings reached between them concerning tourism — agree to negotiate, as soon as possible, and to conclude not later than three months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, an agreement to facilitate and encourage mutual tourism and tourism from third countries.

ARTICLE 18: ENVIRONMENT

The Parties will co-operate in matters relating to the environment, a sphere to which they attach great importance, including conservation of nature and prevention of pollution, as set forth in Annex IV . They will negotiate an agreement on the above, to be concluded not later than 6 months from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 19: ENERGY

1. The Parties will co-operate in the development of energy resources, including the development of energy-related projects such as the utilisation of solar energy.
2. The Parties, having concluded their negotiations on the interconnecting of their electric grids in the Eilat-Aqaba area, will implement the interconnecting upon the signature of this Treaty. The Parties view this step as a part of a wider binational and regional concept. They agree to continue their negotiations as soon as possible to widen the scope of their interconnected grids.
3. The Parties will conclude the relevant agreements in the field of energy within 6 months from the date of exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 20: RIFT VALLEY DEVELOPMENT

The Parties attach great importance to the integrated development of the Jordan Rift Valley area, including joint projects in the economic, environmental, energy-related and tourism fields. Taking note of the Terms

of Reference developed in the framework of the Trilateral Israel-Jordan-US Economic Committee towards the Jordan Rift Valley Development Master Plan, they will vigorously continue their efforts towards the completion of planning and towards implementation.

ARTICLE 21: HEALTH

The Parties will co-operate in the area of health and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within 9 months of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 22: AGRICULTURE

The Parties will co-operate in the areas of agriculture, including veterinary services, plant protection, biotechnology and marketing, and shall negotiate with a view to the conclusion of an agreement within 6 months from the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

ARTICLE 23: AQABA AND EILAT

The Parties agree to enter into negotiations, as soon as possible, and not later than one month from the exchange of the instruments of ratification of this Treaty, on arrangements that would enable the joint development of the towns of Aqaba and Eilat with regard to such matters, inter alia, as joint tourism development, joint customs, free trade zone, co-operation in aviation, prevention of pollution, maritime matters, police, customs and health co-operation. The Parties will conclude all relevant agreements within 9 months from the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty.

ARTICLE 24: CLAIMS

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE 25: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting, in any way, the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.
2. The Parties undertake to fulfil in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument inconsistent with this Treaty. For the purposes of this paragraph each Party represents to the other that in its opinion and interpretation there is no inconsistency between their existing treaty obligations and this Treaty.
3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositories of such conventions.
4. Both Parties will also take all the necessary steps to abolish all pejorative references to the other Party, in multilateral conventions to which they are parties, to the extent that such references exist.
5. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.
6. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE 26: LEGISLATION

Within 3 months of the exchange of ratifications of this Treaty the Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary in order to implement the Treaty, and to terminate any international commitments and to repeal any legislation that is inconsistent with the Treaty.

ARTICLE 27: RATIFICATION

1. This Treaty shall be ratified by both Parties in conformity with their respective national procedures. It shall enter into force on the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. The Annexes, Appendices, and other attachments to this Treaty shall be considered integral parts thereof.

ARTICLE 28: INTERIM MEASURES

The Parties will apply, in certain spheres, to be agreed upon, interim measures pending the conclusion of the relevant agreements in accordance with this Treaty, as stipulated in Annex V.

ARTICLE 29: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.
2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE 30: REGISTRATION

This Treaty shall be transmitted to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at the Arava/Araba Crossing Point this day Heshvan 21st, 5775, Jumada Al-Ula 21st, 1415 which corresponds to 26th October, 1994 in the Hebrew, English and Arabic languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of divergence of interpretation the English text shall prevail.

For the State of Israel
Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister

For the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
Abdul Salam Majali, Prime Minister

Witnessed by:

William J. Clinton
President of the United States of America

List of Annexes, Appendices and Other Attachments

Annex I:

1. International Boundary
2. Naharayim/Baqura Area
3. Zofar Area

Appendices (27 sheets):

- I. Emer Ha'arava (10 sheets), 1:20,000 orthophoto maps
- II. Dead Sea (2 sheets), 1:50,000 orthoimages
- III. Jordan and Yarmouk Rivers (12 sheets), 1:10,000 orthophoto maps
- IV. Naharayim Area (1 sheet), 1:10,000 orthophoto map

V.Zofar Area (1 sheet), 1:20,000 orthophoto map

VI.Gulf of Eilat (1 sheet), 1:50,000 orthoimage

Annex II: Water

Annex III: Crime and Drugs

Annex IV: Environment

Annex V: Interim Measures

Agreed Minutes

D. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Sütalan, Zeynep
Nationality: Turkish (TC)
Date and Place of Birth: 19 May 1981, İstanbul
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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
PHD	METU International Relations	2015
MSc	METU Middle East Studies	2006
BS	Marmara University Political Science and International Relations	2003
High School	Adnan Menderes Anatolian High School, İstanbul	1999

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2014- Present	ORSAM (Ankara)	Assistant Editor
2005-2011	Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism (Ankara)	Concept Specialist
2005 (February- May)	Border Prefectures Cross-Border Cooperation Network of Prefectures of Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey (Orestiada, Greece)	Turkish Representative
2004-2005	TASAM (İstanbul)	Assistant Expert

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Beginner Arabic

PUBLICATIONS

1. “Book Review”, [Review of the book on *The Arab Uprisings: The Unfinished Revolutions of the Middle East* by Marc Lynch], *Ortadoğu Etüdleri*, Vol.5, No. 2, January 2014, p.165-171.
2. “Book Review”, [Review of the book on *Our Last Best Chance: The Pursuit of Peace in a Time of Peril* by King Abdullah II of Jordan], *Ortadoğu Etüdleri*, Vol.5, No.1, July 2013, p.183-188.
3. “Kitap İncelemesi Serisi: 8”, [Review of the book on *The Road to Tahrir Square: Egypt and the United States from the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak* by Lloyd C. Gardner], *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 5, No.54, (June 2013).
4. “Kitap İncelemesi Serisi: 2”, [Review of the book *Egypt’s Political Economy: Power Relations in Development* by Nadia Ramses Farah], *Ortadoğu Analiz*, Vol. 4, No.47, (November 2012), pp. 107-112.
5. “Future Trends in Terrorism”, *Analysis and Strategies to Counter the Terrorism Threat*, ed. by M. Uğur Ersen and Mustafa Kibaroglu, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series-E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol. 89, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011), pp.138-150.
6. “Terrorism Overview: History and Causes”, *Analysis and Strategies to Counter the Terrorism Threat*, ed. by M. Uğur Ersen and Mustafa Kibaroglu, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series-E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol.89, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2011), pp. 1-17.
7. “Ürdün’de Değişimi Anlamak”, Review Article, *Ortadoğu Etüdleri*, Vol. 2, No.2, January 2011, pp. 191-206.
8. “Current and Future Trends in Terrorism”, *COE-DAT Newsletter*, Vol.3, Issue 16, July-September 2010, pp.37-49.
9. “The Causes of Terrorism”, *Organisational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism*, ed. by Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series-E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol.43, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), pp.1-13.
10. “Major Ideologies Motivating Terrorism and Main Characteristics of Terrorism”, *Organisational and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism*, ed. by Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, NATO Science for Peace and Security Series-E: Human and Societal Dynamics, Vol.43, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2008), pp. 13-23.

11. "Greater Middle East and Egypt" in *Büyük Ortadoğu Projesi: Yeni Oluşumlar ve Değişen Dengeler* ed. by Atilla Sandıklı and Kenan Dağcı, (İstanbul: Tasam Yayınları, May 2006), pp.249-267.

12. "The Energy Policy of European Union and Turkey", *Stratejik Öngörü*, No. 3, Autumn 2004, pp.106-117.

13. "The Greater Middle East Perspective of Egypt", *Stratejik Öngörü*, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp.66-71.

14. "The Politicization of Hizballah", *Stratejik Öngörü*, No.1, May 2004, pp.72-82.

CONFERENCE PAPERS AND ACADEMIC PRESENTATIONS

1. "NATO's Policy on Defence Against Terrorism", *Counter-Maritime Terrorism Course*, MARSEC COE, Aksaz-Marmaris, 01 April 2014.

2. "Trends in Terrorism", *Counter-Maritime Terrorism Course*, MARSEC COE, Aksaz-Marmaris, 31 March 2014.

3. "Strategic Communications and Defense Against Terrorism", *Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat NATO Advanced Training Course*, Algiers/Algeria, 26 October 2011.

4. "Terrorism, Media and Public Information Management", *Future Trends and New Approaches in Defeating the Terrorism Threat NATO Advanced Training Course*, Algiers/Algeria, 25 October 2011.

5. "Strategic Communications in Defence Against Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism: The Dynamics, Trends and Future Aspects of Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Podgorica/Montenegro, 29 September 2011.

6. "Crisis Management and Defence Against Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism: The Dynamics, Trends and Future Aspects of Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Podgorica/Montenegro, 28 September 2011.

7. "NATO's Defence Against Terrorism Policy", *Defence Against Terrorism: The Dynamics, Trends and Future Aspects of Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Podgorica/Montenegro, 27 September 2011.

8. "NATO's Defence Against Terrorism Policy", *Analyzing Different Dimensions and New Trends in Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Kiev/Ukraine, 26 May 2011.
9. "Crisis Management and Terrorism", *Analyzing Different Dimensions and New Trends in Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Kiev/Ukraine, 25 May 2011.
10. "Crisis Management and Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism Course*, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 04 May 2011.
11. "NATO's Defence Against Terrorism Policy", *Defence Against Terrorism Course*, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 02 May 2011.
12. "Future Trends in Terrorism", *Terrorism Experts Symposium*, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 04 March 2011.
13. "Future Trends in Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism: Conceptual Approach in Combating Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Belgrade/Serbia, 26 November 2010.
14. "Strategic Communications in Combating Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism: Conceptual Approach in Combating Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Belgrade/Serbia, 25 November 2010.
15. "NATO's Defence Against Terrorism Policy", *Defence Against Terrorism: Conceptual Approach in Combating Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Belgrade/Serbia, 22 November 2010.
16. "Future Trends of Terrorism", *Eastern Mediterranean Conference*, Ankara/Turkey, 28 September 2010.
17. "NATO's Role in Combating Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism Course*, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 12 May 2010.
18. "Future Trends in Terrorism", *Defence Against Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Amman/Jordan, 07 January 2010.
19. "Terrorism Overview: History and Causes", *Defence Against Terrorism NATO Advanced Training Course*, Amman/Jordan, 03 January 2010.

20. "Trends in Terrorism: An Analysis", Analysis and Strategies to Counter the Terrorism Threat NATO Advanced Training Course, Tirana/Albania, 23 April 2009.
21. "Terrorism Overview: History and Causes", Analysis and Strategies to Counter the Terrorism Threat NATO Advanced Training Course, Tirana/Albania, 20 April 2009.
22. "Global Terrorism and Border Security", Border Security Control Course, Partnership for Peace Training Centre, Ankara/Turkey, 03 December 2008.
23. "Border Security in Defence Against Terrorism", Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 14 October 2008.
24. "Causes of Terrorism: An Overview on Different Dimensions", Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 13 October 2008.
25. "Causes of Terrorism: An Overview on Different Dimension", Social and Psychological Aspects of Terrorism and Countering the Ideology of Terrorism Course, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 28 April 2008.
26. "Global Terrorism and Threats to International Borders", Border Security Control Course, Partnership for Peace Training Centre, Ankara/Turkey, 24 April 2008.
27. "Border Security in Defence Against Terrorism", Defence Against Terrorism Course, Centre of Excellence Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara/Turkey, 18 April 2008.
28. "Global Terrorism and Threats to International Borders", Border Security Control Course, Partnership for Peace Training Centre, Ankara/Turkey, 05 December 2007.
29. "Globalization and Political Economy of Reform in Jordan", Sixth METU Conference on International Relations: Middle East in Global and Regional Perspectives, Middle East Technical University, Ankara/Turkey, 15 June 2007.
30. "Major Ideologies and Main Characteristics of Terrorism", Organizational and Psychological Profile of Terrorism NATO- Advanced Training Course, Skopje/Macedonia, 22 October 2007.
31. "Causes of Terrorism: An Overview on Different Dimensions", Organizational and Psychological Profile of Terrorism NATO- Advanced Training Course, Skopje/Macedonia, 22 October 2007.

32. "Global Terrorism and Threats to International Borders", Border Security and Transborder Crimes NATO- Advanced Training Course, Tblisi/Georgia, 26 February 2007.

33. "Amman Bombings", NATO-MD Terrorism Experts Symposium, Ankara/Turkey, 10 November 2005.

E. TURKISH SUMMARY

Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçleri, uluslararası, bölgesel ve dâhili bağlamdaki farklılıklarına rağmen, ‘soğuk barış’ olarak sonlanmıştır. Soğuk barış, taraflar arasındaki düşmanlığın resmi bir anlaşmayla sonlandırıldığı ve diplomatik ilişkilerin tesis edildiği, ancak ilişkilerde uyuşmazlığa sebep olan sorunların tamamıyla çözülememiş olduğu ve normalleşmenin tamamlanamadığı duruma karşılık gelmektedir. Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçlerine baktığımızda, taraflar arasındaki savaş durumunun resmi bir barış anlaşmasıyla sonlandırılmış, diplomatik tanınmanın sağlanmış ve diplomatik ilişkilerin tesis edilmiş olduğunu görmekteyiz. Ancak taraflar arasındaki temel sorunların önemli ölçüde çözülmüş olmasına rağmen özellikle Filistin-İsrail meselesi kaynaklı problemlerin taraflar arasındaki ilişkileri halen tehdit ettiği gerçeğiyle karşılaşmaktayız. Buna ek olarak, taraflar arasındaki iletişim, büyük oranda hükümetler arasında sınırlı kalmıştır. Öte yandan taraflar arasındaki diplomatik ilişkiler sorunsuz olmadığı gibi siyasi uyuşmazlıklar sırasında büyükelçilerin geri çağırılması da az rastlanır bir durum değildir. Bu çerçevede ilişkiler, ekonomik ve kültürel etkileşimin sınırlı kalmış olması sebebiyle normalleşmemiştir. Bu bağlamda, bu tezde gerek Mısır-İsrail ve gerekse Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçlerinin birer soğuk barış olmasının, devlet otonomisinden kaynaklandığı ileri sürülmektedir.

Devletin içsel otonomisi, devlete toplumsal dinamiklerden bağımsız hareket etme imkânı sağlamaktadır. Devletin bölgesel otonomisi ise devlete bölgesel dinamiklerden bağımsız hareket etme kapasitesi vermektedir. Devletin içsel otonomisi, devlet-toplum ilişkilerinin şekillendiği ve devletin oluştuğu tarihi süreçten kaynaklanmaktadır. Kolonyalizm tecrübesi, söz konusu devletlerde ‘yöneten’ ve ‘yönetilen’ ayrımının belirlenmesinde son derece önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Devletin içsel otonomisi, devletin rantiyer yapısıyla yakından ilişkili olan otoriteryen doğasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Baskı ve zor, devletin muhalefeti sindirmesinde ve toplumu siyasetten uzak tutmasında temel bir araç olmuştur. Zenginliğin dağıtıcısı konumundaki devlet, zaman içerisinde halkına karşı sorumsuz hale gelmiş ve patronaj ağlarını kullanmak suretiyle toplumun desteğini satın almaya çalışmıştır. Toplumsal hoşnutsuzluk zamanlarında devlet,

otoriteryen aygıtlarını kullanmak suretiyle bu hoşnutsuzluğu baskılamıştır. Baskıyı bir araç olarak kullanamadığı zamanlarda ise devlet, toplumsal tansiyonu düşürmek için halkın memnuniyetsiz kesimine bazı haklar bahşetmiş, sınırlı özgürlükler ya da maddi faydalar sunmuştur. Sonuç olarak, otoriteryen devlet yapısı, karar alıcılara, halkın istek ve arzularına karşı minimum sorumlulukla büyük bir hareket serbestisi tanımıştır. Böylelikle dış politika, cumhurbaşkanı, monark ve elitlerine, yani başat karar alıcılara özel bir alan haline bürünmüştür. Devlet, her ne kadar toplumdan mutlak bir biçimde bağımsız olmasa da önemli ölçüde otonomdur. Bu da devlete kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda halktan bağımsız karar alabilme ve bu kararlar doğrultusunda hareket edebilme imkânı vermektedir. Öte yandan, devletin otonomisi, özellikle rejimin devamlılığının tehdit altında olduğu zamanlarda kamuoyunun istekleri doğrultusunda karar alma ve hareket etme ihtimalini bertaraf etmemektedir. Hem bir cumhuriyet olan Mısır hem de anayasal bir monarşi olan Ürdün yarı-rantiyer yapılarıyla otoriter ve dolayısıyla otonom birer devletlerdir. Mısır ile karşılaştırıldığında Ürdün, daha sınırlı bir içsel otonomiye sahiptir. Ancak İsrail ile yaptıkları barışı halkın gözünde meşru kılmak amacıyla yürüttükleri ‘barış primi’ propagandasına yönelik çabaları bir tarafa bırakıldığında, her iki devlet de halklarına rağmen İsrail ile barış yapmalarını mümkün kılacak kadar otonomiye sahiptir.

Ayrıca, devletin içsel otonomisi sadece İsrail’le barış yapmayı değil, yapılan barışın devamlılığını sağlamayı da mümkün kılmıştır. Mısır’da ve Ürdün’de İsrail karşıtı olan kamuoyu ve İsrail ile ilişkilerin normalleşmesine karşı çıkan normalleşme karşıtı hareket, İsrail ile imzalanan barış anlaşmasıyla tesis edilmiş olan barışın ‘sıcak barış’a evrilmesinin önündeki en önemli engeli teşkil etmektedir. Ancak barış karşıtı bu sosyal dinamikler, rejimin devamlılığını tehdit edecek seviyeye ulaşmadığından mevcut barış anlaşmalarının feshedilmesine sebep olacak düzeyde değildir. Bu çerçevede, devlet, normalleşme karşıtı harekette yer alan toplumsal gruplarla bir çeşit konsensüs tesis etmeyi başarmıştır. Bu konsensüs, hükümet ve sivil toplum arasında kırmızı çizgilerin belirlenmesi suretiyle gerçekleşmiştir. Hükümet, normalleşme karşıtı hareketin muhalefetini barış anlaşmasıyla elde edilmiş olan siyasi başarıyı tehdit etmediği sürece göz ardı edebilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, barış anlaşmasına taraf devletler arasında

güvenlik rejiminin tesisi ve devamlılığı, barış anlaşmasının en önemli siyasi başarısı olarak zikredilebilir. Ayrıca bu konsensüs, eski düşmanla ilişki kurmak, barışın devamlılığını sağlamak, özellikle hükümetler arasındaki iletişim ve sınırlı ekonomik ilişkilerin sürdürülmesi açısından devletin otonom olarak hareket etmesini mümkün kılmıştır.

Devletin bölgesel otonomisi ise özellikle barış yapımı sürecinde önemli rol oynamıştır. Devletin bölgesel otonomisi açısından Mısır ile Ürdün arasındaki fark, barış anlaşmalarının zamanlamasında ortaya çıkmaktadır. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, Mısır-İsrail barış anlaşması ile Ürdün-İsrail barış anlaşması arasındaki 15 yıllık zaman farkını belirleyen temel etken devletin bölgesel otonomisidir. Mısır, siyasi, askeri ve ekonomik kabiliyetleri ve bölgesel siyasetteki tarihi rolü nedeniyle daha büyük bir devlet kapasitesini haizdir. Bu nedenle de henüz 1970'li yılların ortalarında İsrail ile barış sürecini başlatabilmiştir. Ayrıca Mısır 1973 Ekim Savaşı'nı barış için bir araç olarak kullanmayı da başarmıştır. Hatta öyle ki 1973 Ekim Savaşı'yla dünyanın iki süper gücü konumundaki ABD'yi ve Sovyetler Birliği'ni, Soğuk Savaş'ın yumuşama döneminde karşı karşıya getirebilmiştir. Öte yandan, Ürdün, İsrail ile barış yapmak için 1979 yılındaki Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nın üzerinden on beş yıl geçmesini beklemek zorunda kalmıştır. Bunun sebebi ise Ürdün devletinin sınırlı bölgesel otonomisidir. Her ne kadar Ürdün'ün bölge siyasetindeki önemi, ülkenin büyüklüğünün çok ötesinde olsa da Ürdün, küçük bir devlettir ve Mısır ile karşılaştırıldığında devlet kapasitesi hayli sınırlıdır. Bu nedenle de Ürdün, bölgesel dinamiklere ve gelişmelere son derece duyarlıdır. Dolayısıyla Ürdün'ün Mısır gibi bölgesel bir izolasyonu kaldırması mümkün olmamıştır. Gerek Kral I. Abdullah ve gerekse Kral Hüseyin döneminde İsrail ile yürütmüş olduğu gizli diplomasiye rağmen Ürdün, İsrail ile barış yapabilmek için bölgesel ortamın uygun olmasını beklemek durumunda kalmıştır.

Mısır'ın İsrail ile barış yapmasının arkasındaki temel neden, devlet ideolojisindeki yön değişikliğidir. Ürdün açısından ise belirleyici olan bölgesel bağlam olmuştur. Enver Sedat, 1970 yılında Mısır'ın başına geçtiğinde kendisine Cemal Abdülnasır'dan kalan

mirası gerek ideolojik gerekse ekonomik açıdan savaştan zarar görmüş bir ülkeydi. 1967 Haziran Savaşı'ndan önce, 1960'lı yılların başında Mısır'ın Yemen İç Savaşı'na dâhil olması, Mısır'ın ekonomisi üzerinde yıkıcı etkilerde bulunmuştur. Buna ek olarak, Arap sosyalizmi çerçevesinde girilen ağır endüstrileşme projeleri, Mısır ekonomisini çok yıpratmıştı. İflasın eşiğine gelmiş bir ekonomiyi kurtarmanın yolu ise dışa açılmaktan geçmekteydi. Her ne kadar açık-kapı politikası (*Infitah*) çerçevesindeki ekonomik liberalleşme, Sedat döneminde gerçekleştirilmiş olsa da ekonomik liberalleşmenin gerekliliği üzerinde tartışmalar, Nasır'ın son yıllarında başlamıştı. Sedat'a göre Mısır'ın geleceği, dünya ekonomisiyle entegrasyondan ve yabancı yatırımların ülkeye çekilmesinden geçmekteydi. İdeolojik iflas ise 1967 Haziran Savaşı'nın ardından düşüşe geçen Pan-Arabizmden kaynaklanmaktaydı. Aslında daha önce Mısır ve Suriye'nin birlikte kurmuş oldukları Birleşik Arap Cumhuriyeti'nin 1961 yılında dağılması, Pan-Arabizmin uygulanabilir bir ideoloji olmadığını ortaya koymuş ve ideolojinin bir hayli zayıflamasına neden olmuştu. Mısır, 1967 Haziran Savaşı'nda aldığı büyük yeniliden sonra Sina Yarımadasını kaybetmiş ve küçük düşmüştü. Sina'nın kaybedilmesi, bir toprak kaybı olmanın ötesinde, önemli bir ekonomik değer de kayıydı. Tüm bu gelişmeler, 'Önce Mısır' politikası çerçevesinde Mısır'ın çıkarlarının Arap çıkarlarından daha önemli bir konumda değerlendirilmesine neden olmuştur. Mısır halkını, Mısır'ın Araplar ve Filistinliler için yeterince fedakârlık yaptığına ve Mısır'ın artık öncelikle kendi halkını düşünmesi gerektiğine ikna etmek zor olmadı. Sedat'ın içeride kendi rejiminin meşruiyetini ve rejimin devamlılığını sağlamak için Mısır devletinin topyekûn dönüşümünü gerçekleştirmesi gerekiyordu. Bu dönüşüm, sadece siyasal ve ekonomik alanlarla sınırlı değildi; Nasır'ın revizyonist dış politikasını da terk etmek gerekiyordu. İşte bu topyekûn dönüşümü gerçekleştirmek için Sedat, ABD'yle yakınlaştı. Soğuk Savaş çerçevesinde devam eden iki süper güç arasındaki rekabete karşın, Sedat, ABD'nin Sovyetler'e kıyasla daha güçlü olduğu kanaatindeydi. Ayrıca İsrail'in gücünün ABD'nin Ortadoğu'daki müttefiki olmasından kaynaklandığının farkındaydı. Benzer şekilde, eğer ABD'nin desteğini istiyorsa İsrail ile anlaşması gerektiğini biliyordu.

Ürdün için, Mısır örneğinde olduğu gibi devlet ideolojisinde bir yön değiştirme söz konusu değildir. Mısır'ın aksine Ürdün, kurulduğundan beri pragmatik ve Batı-yönelimli olmuştur ki bu da İsrail ile gizli de olsa bir diyalogu olmasını mümkün kılmıştır. Ürdün'ün dış politika tarihinde, 1948 ve 1967 yıllarında İsrail'e savaş açmak, 1955 yılında Bağdat Paketi'nin ve 1991 tarihindeki Körfez Savaşı'nda Irak'a karşı ABD'nin başını çektiği koalisyonunun dışında kalmak gibi ülkenin Batı yanlısı duruşuyla çelişen istisnai durumlar olmuştur. Ancak bu durumlar birer anomalidir ve Ürdün'ün, rejimin devamlılığını garanti altına almak için iç ve dış tehditleri dengelemeye çalışma çabalarının ürünüdür. Rejimin bekası ve devamlılığı, Ortadoğu ülkelerinin pek çoğunun temel endişesidir. Ancak Ürdün için bu endişe, ülkenin yapaylığıyla da ilgili olarak çok daha hayati bir durum arz etmektedir. Bu gerçeklik, Haşimi Monarşisi'ni pragmatizme daha çok tutunmaya iten temel etkidir. Bu çerçevede, Ürdün'ün İsrail ile barış yapmasına olanak sağlayan bölgesel bağlandı. 1991 yılında toplanan Madrid Konferansı'nın yaratmış olduğu barış coşkusu nedeniyle 1990'lı yılların başında Ortadoğu'da umut hâkimdi. ABD, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki süper güç rekabetinden zaferle çıktıktan sonra 1991 Körfez Savaşı'yla birlikte Ortadoğu siyasetini şekillendirecek aktör olduğunu gösterdi. Bu nedenle de ABD'nin bölgede barış sürecini başlatma niyeti barışı gerçekleştirmek adına somut adımların atılmasıyla sonuçlandı. Madrid Konferansıyla birlikte Arap-İsrail çatışmasının tarafları arasında çok-taraflı ve ikili görüşmeler gerçekleştirilmeye başlandı. Bu çerçevede, Ürdün için Filistinliler'in barış kampına katılması eşit derece de önemliydi. Filistin-İsrail ikili görüşmeleri ve akabinde gerçekleşen 1993 Oslo Barışı, Ürdün'ün İsrail ile barış yapması için gerekli olan meşruiyetin altyapısını sağladı. Zira Filistin Meselesi, Ürdün açısından sadece bölgesel bir dinamik değil, aynı zamanda ülkenin iç siyasetini de son derece yakından ilgilendiren bir konuydu. Bugün, Ürdün nüfusunun en az yarısı Filistin kökenlidir. Dolayısıyla Filistin faktörü, Haşimi Monarşisi'nin devamlılığının adeta bir parçası haline gelmiştir. On yıllar boyunca Ürdün, Ürdün'ün Filistin olmadığını kanıtlamaya çalışmıştır. 'Ürdün Filistindir' sloganı, sadece İsrail Sağ'ının Filistin meselesinin çözümünden kaçmak için kullandığı bir propaganda aracı değil, aynı zamanda Ürdün'deki Haşimi rejiminin geleceğini tehdit eden demografik bir gerçekliktir. Bu nedenle de Filistin faktörü, Mısır açısından bölgesel hegemonya tesisi için bir araç iken

Ürdün için ölüm kalım meselesidir. Mısır, ayrıca, Filistin davasından iç siyasette meşruiyet kaynağı olarak faydalanmıştır, fakat Filistin meselesinin Mısır iç siyasetine etkisini, Ürdün ile kıyaslamak olası değildir.

Barış anlaşmalarının mahiyeti, taraflar arasındaki ilişkilerin normalleşmesine yönelik barış inşası çabalarını da etkilemiştir. 1979 Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması, taraflar açısından saldırmazlık konusunu garanti altına almanın önemine binaen ağırlıklı olarak çatışma çözümüne yöneliktir. Anlaşmanın en temel meselesi, Sina Yarımadası'ndaki silahsızlandırılmış bölgeler vasıtasıyla güvenliği sağlamaktır. Ayrıca, Sina'nın statüsü meselesi, anlaşmanın eklerinde ayrıntılı bir şekilde ele alınmıştır. Mısır açısından, Sina'yı geri kazanmak ve İsrail'in Sina'dan çekilmesi son derece önemlidir. Barış anlaşması çerçevesinde İsrail aşamalı bir şekilde Sina'dan geri çekilmesini 1982 yılı itibariyle tamamladı. İsrail, Sina'dan sadece askeri kuvvetlerini çekmekle kalmadı ve yarımadadaki yerleşimleri ile petrol çıkarmaya yönelik altyapısını da terk etti. Ancak Akabe körfezinin kuzeyinde bulunan Taba, gerek İsrail gerekse Mısır'ın kent üzerinde hak iddia etmeleri sebebiyle neredeyse yedi yıl boyunca siyasi uyuşmazlık konusu olmuştur. Taba, kentin statüsüyle ilgili meselenin uluslararası bir komisyona sevk edilmesine kadar taraflar arasındaki ilişkileri tehdit etmeyi sürdürmüştür. Sorun, söz konusu komisyonun Mısır lehine karar verip Taba'nın 1989'da Mısır'a verilmesiyle çözümlenmiştir.

Bu çerçevede Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nda temel hususun, tarafların birbirlerinin toprak bütünlüğünü, egemenliğini ve barış içinde yaşama hakkını tanıması ve bunlara saygı göstermesi şeklinde belirtmek mümkündür. Söz konusu anlaşma, iyi komşuluk ilişkileri ve taraflar arasında işbirliği geliştirmeye de değinmekteydi. Anlaşmada, taraflar arasında diplomatik, ekonomik ve kültürel ilişkiler geliştirmek vasıtasıyla normal ilişkiler tesis etme konusuna yönelik vurgu ise anlaşmanın genelinde bir hayli zayıf kalmıştır. Bu konuya anlaşmanın, üç maddeden ve çok genel ifadelerden müteşekkil "Taraflar Arasındaki İlişkilere Yönelik Protokol" başlıklı ekinde değinilmiştir. Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nın akabinde taraflar arasında kültürel konulara, ulaşma,

iletişime ve ticarete ilişkin pek çok anlaşma imzalanmıştır. Ancak bu anlaşmalar, siyasi ilişkilerin gölgesinde kağıt üzerinde kalmaktan öteye gidememiştir. Dolayısıyla tarafların askeri güvenlik rejimi tesisinde gösterdikleri özen, ilişkilerin normalleşmesine yansıyamamıştır.

Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması, Ürdün'ün 1967 Savaşı'nda kaybettiği toprakların geri alınması hususuna ilişkin değildir. Ürdün, 1967 Savaşı'nda Doğu Kudüs'ü ve Batı Şeria'yı kaybetmişti. Ancak 1988'de Doğu Kudüs dâhil Batı Şeria ile ilişkilerini tamamıyla koparmış olması sebebiyle Ürdün'ün bu topraklar üzerinde herhangi bir hak iddiası kalmamıştı. Bu durumun Ürdün'ün İsrail ile yürüttüğü barış görüşmelerini kolaylaştırdığını söylemek mümkündür. Dolayısıyla Ürdün açısından barış anlaşmasının en önemli sonucu, Ürdün devletinin toprakları üzerindeki egemenliğinin İsrail tarafından tanınması suretiyle 'Ürdün Filistindir' iddialarına bir son vermiş olmasıydı.

Öte yandan, 1994 Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması, sadece Ürdün ve İsrail arasındaki düşmanlığın sona erdirilmesi ile toprak bütünlüğü ve egemenliğin tanınması hususlarını esas alan bir vizyondan ibaret değildir. Aynı zamanda barışın inşasını hedefleyen bir anlayışa dayandırılmıştır. Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması, bölgede kapsamlı bir barışın gerçekleşmesine yönelik iyimserliğin ve barış ile ekonomik entegrasyona dayanan 'Yeni Ortadoğu' vizyonunun yansımasıdır. Dolayısıyla anlaşmada 'güvenlik'ten ziyade 'işbirliği' vurgulanmıştır. Buna ek olarak, barış anlaşması imzalandığı sırada, Ürdün ve İsrail neredeyse otuz yıl önce birbiriyle savaşmayı bırakmıştı. Bu sebeple, taraflar arasında ortak bir güvenlik anlayışı zaten mevcuttu. Ne Ürdün ne de İsrail diğerinden kaynaklanabilecek askeri bir çatışmayı tahayyül ediyordu. Bu anlamda Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması ile kıyaslandığında, Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nda taraflar arasında, ticaret, ulaşım, turizm, iletişim, bilim ve kültür, enerji, çevre, tarım, sivil havacılık ve suçla mücadele temelinde işbirliğinin teşvik edilmesi ve geliştirilmesine yönelik daha çok vurgu yapıldığı görülmektedir.

Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması, biri Filistin Özerk Yönetimi'nin kurulmasına, diğeri ise Mısır ile İsrail arasındaki ikili barışa ilişkin iki çerçeve belgesinden müteşekkil 1978 Camp David Anlaşması'ndan doğmuştur. Camp David Anlaşması'nda yer alan çerçeve belgelerden ilkinin hayata geçirilmesi, ikincisinin gerçekleşmesi için ön koşul değildir. Bu da Mısır için Filistin Meselesi'nin çözümünün varoluşsal bir sorun olmadığını göstermektedir. Öte yandan her ne kadar Filistin Meselesi, Ürdün için hayati önem arz etse de Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nda Filistinliler'e mülteciler ve yerinden edilmiş kişiler bağlamında sadece bir maddede değinilmiştir. Söz konusu maddede yerinden edilmiş insanların sorunlarını gidermeye ilişkin, Mısır'ın ve Filistinliler'in yer aldığı dördü bir komite oluşturulması öngörülmüştür. Bunun dışında, Filistinli mültecilere ilişkin sorunların tamamının çözümü, Filistinliler ile İsrail arasındaki nihai statü görüşmelerine bırakılmıştır. Doğu Kudüs meselesine gelince, 1978 Camp David Anlaşması'nda bu soruna değinilmemiştir. Ürdün'ün Doğu Kudüs'teki tarihi rolüne binaen ise Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nda muğlak da olsa Doğu Kudüs konusundan bahsedilmiştir. Zira bu anlaşmayla İsrail, Ürdün'ün Doğu Kudüs'te yer alan İslami mabetler üzerindeki himaye rolünü tanımıştır. Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nın, Ürdün açısından en önemli sonucu, 'Ürdün, Filistin'dir' şeklindeki iddialara bir son vermiş olmasıdır. Bu, sadece İsrail'in Ürdün'ün toprak bütünlüğünü ve egemenliğini tanımasından kaynaklanmamaktadır. Söz konusu anlaşmanın ikinci maddesinin altıncı paragrafında yer alan "tarafardan herhangi birinin güvenliğine zarar verecek şekilde kişilerin gayri iradi dolaşımına izin verilmeyecektir" prensibi, Filistinliler'in İsrail'den Ürdün'e, ya da tersi istikamette, transferi olasılığını ortadan kaldırmıştır.

Bu çerçevede vurgulanması gereken bir diğ hususu da ABD'nin söz konusu barış süreçlerindeki rolü oluşturur. Mısır-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nın yapılmasında ABD'nin rolü bir hayli belirleyiciyken, Ürdün-İsrail Barış Anlaşması'nın imzalanmasında ABD'nin rolü daha ziyade semboliktir, çünkü ikinci durumda taraflar arasında daha az ihtilaf söz konusudur. Ayrıca liderlerin rolü göz önüne alındığında, başbakan İzhak Rabin ile Kral Hüseyin arasındaki diyalog, Başbakan Menahem Begin ile Cumhurbaşkanı Enver Sedat arasındaki diyaloga kıyasla daha iyidir.

Barışın devamlılığı için karşılıklı siyasi çıkarların geliştirilmesi önemli olmakla birlikte, tek başına yeterli değildir. Ekonomik alanda hükümet kararıyla geliştirilen işbirliği, iş çevreleri tarafından desteklense bile normalleşme için uygun bir ortam yaratmaya yetmeyecektir. Bu da siyasi ya da ekonomik ilişkilerin seçkinlerin yürüttüğü bir süreç olmasından öteye gidemeyecektir. Dolayısıyla siyasi ve ekonomik ilişkiler sürecinden kaynaklanacak faydalar, sıradan insanların yaşantılarına sirayet etmediği sürece barış inşasının olmazsa olmazını teşkil eden ilişkilerin normalleşmesini başarıya ulaştıramayacaktır. Bu, her iki barış sürecinden çıkarılacak en önemli derstir.

Her ne kadar Ürdün-İsrail barışı gerçekleştiği zaman itibarıyla, Mısır-İsrail barışına kıyasla, sıcak bir barışa dönüşme konusunda daha çok umut vadetmişse de ‘soğuk barış’ haline dönüşmekten kurtulamamıştır. Her iki barış sürecinin de ‘soğuk barış’ olarak ortak kaderi, tamamlanamamış ya da başarıya ulaşamamış olan normalleşme sürecinden, ama hepsinden önemlisi, barış yapma şeklinin doğasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Diğer pek çok dış politika kararı gibi barış yapma kararı da halka rağmen verilmiş ve böylece halklar tarafından içselleştirilemeden, devletin dış politikasıyla sınırlı kalmıştır. Dolayısıyla Arap-İsrail uyuşmazlığının topyekûn olarak çözülüp Ortadoğu’da kapsamlı bir barışın tesis edilmediği her durumda yapılacak herhangi bir müstakil barış, ‘soğuk barış’la sonuçlanmaya mahkûmdur. Tüm taraflar arasındaki her türlü sorunun çözülmesi anlamına gelen kapsamlı barış, Ortadoğu için olmazsa olmazdır. Bu nedenle, Ortadoğu’da barış, Filistin-İsrail sorunun, İsrail ile Suriye ve Lübnan gibi diğer cephe devletlerinin uyuşmazlıklarının çözümü ve tüm Arap devletlerinin İsrail ile ilişkilerinin normalleşmesiyle sağlanabilir. Bugüne kadar bölgede kapsamlı bir barışın olmaması, normalleşme süreçlerinin başarısızlığının en önemli nedeni olarak öne sürülmüştür. Bu doğrudur, ancak eksiktir. Hükümetler halklarına karşı sorumsuz oldukça ve taraflar arasındaki ekonomik işbirliğinin yararları ortalama vatandaşa sirayet etmedikçe, barış anlaşmaları, kralın ya da cumhurbaşkanının ya da seçkinlerin barışı olmaya devam edecektir.

Gerek Mısır-İsrail ve gerekse Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçleri, ilişkilerin normalleşmesi açısından benzer sorunlara işaret etmektedir. Her iki örnekte de halkın önemli bir kesimi barış anlaşmalarına ve/veya İsrail ile ilişkilerin normalleşmesine karşı çıkmıştır. Meslek odaları, sendikalar ve hatta entelektüeller, normalleşme karşıtı kampın başını çekmektedir. İsrail ile ticaret başta olmak üzere herhangi bir ilişki yürütenler damgalanmakta ve küçük düşürülmektedir. Bunun nedeni, Arap halklarının geniş bir kesiminin İsrail'in kurulduğu andan itibaren gayri meşru bir teşekkül olarak algılanmasından kaynaklanmaktadır. Ayrıca İsrail bu insanlar tarafından Filistin topraklarında yayılmacı bir işgalci ve dolayısıyla saldırgan olarak görülmektedir. Bu bakış açısına göre, İsrail gibi bir devlet, Araplar'a karşı iyi niyet besleyebilir olamaz. Bu nedenle de Arap insanının nazarında İsrail ile imzalanmış olan barış anlaşması sadece hükümetler arasında inşa edilmiş siyasi bir yapıdır ve bu anlaşmanın uygulanması da halkın değil, hükümetin görevidir.

Her iki barış sürecinde de normalleşme karşıtı kamptaki benzer tecrübeye ek olarak, barış süreçlerinin ekonomik faydaları beklenenin ya da öngörülenin çok gerisinde kalmıştır. Hem Mısır hem de Ürdün, İsrail ile barış yapmalarına karşılık olarak ABD'den yıllık yardım elde etmiştir. ABD'nin Ürdün'e yıllık toplam yardımı (hem ekonomik hem de askeri), 2000'li yıllara kadar 200 milyon doları geçmemektedir. Bu miktar, ABD'nin Mısır'a her yıl yaptığı 2 milyar dolarlık yardımın yanında bir hayli azdır. Ancak her iki devletin büyüklüğü karşılaştırıldığında söz konusu farkı anlamak kolaylaşmaktadır. Yardım programının başlangıcından itibaren ABD'nin Mısır'a yaptığı ekonomik yardım 75 milyar doları bulmuştur. Bugün Mısır'ın almakta olduğu dış yardımın yarısından fazlası ABD'den gelmektedir. Ancak 1998 yılından itibaren ABD'nin Mısır'a yapmakta olduğu ekonomik yardım azalmıştır. Bunun nedeni de ABD'nin hem İsrail'e hem de Mısır'a yaptığı ekonomik yardımları azaltmaya yönelik siyasetidir. İstisnai olarak, 2003 yılında Mısır, ABD'den 300 milyon dolarlık bir ek yardım elde etmiştir. Benzer şekilde, 2000'li yıllarla birlikte Ürdün, 2003 Irak Savaşı'nın bölgede yaratmış olduğu istikrarsızlığa binaen ABD'den ek yardım alabilmiştir. Öte yandan, ABD'nin Mısır'a yapmış olduğu askeri yardım ise neredeyse 1.3 milyar dolar olarak sabitlenmiştir. Aldıkları ekonomik ve askeri yardımın yanı sıra,

Mısır'ın da Ürdün'ün de dış borçlarının bir miktarı silinmiş ya da ertelenmiştir. Örneğin, 1991 yılındaki Körfez Savaşı'nın ardından ABD, Mısır'ın 6.6 milyar dolarlık borcunu silmiştir. ABD dışındaki borç veren ülkelerin de benzer bir tutum takınmasıyla 1991 yılında Mısır'ın 13 milyar dolarlık borcu affedilmiş, ülkenin dış borcu 29 milyar dolara düşmüştür. Ayrıca Mısır, savaş sırasındaki zararlarını tazmine binaen de 3.6 milyar dolarlık fazladan yardım elde etmiştir. Her iki ülkenin de askeri harcamaları, barış anlaşmalarının imzalanmasından sonra azalmıştır; ancak silah ithalatları ABD'nin yıllık askeri yardımı doğrultusunda artmıştır. Çatışmanın ve savaşın eksik olmadığı Ortadoğu'da ABD, her iki ülkeye de müttefiklerinin savunma kabiliyetlerini teminat altına alacak ölçüde askeri yardım yapmaya özen göstermektedir.

İsrail ile turizm, gerek Mısır ve gerekse Ürdün örneğinde beklenen seviyelerin oldukça altındadır. İsrail'i ziyaret eden Mısırlı ve Ürdünlü turistlerin sayısı ise Mısır'ı ya da Ürdün'ü ziyaret eden İsraili turistlerin sayısından bir hayli düşüktür. Mısır ve İsrail arasındaki turizm ilişkisinde karşılıklı güvensizlik hala önemli bir yer işgal etmektedir. Ayrıca Mısır'da İsrail'i turist olarak ziyaret etmek isteyen az sayıdaki Mısırlı da pek çok prosedürle uğraştırılarak İsrail'e gitmekten adeta caydırılmaktadır. İsraili turistlerin Mısır'da en çok tercih ettikleri yerlerden biri Sina'dır. Zira Sina, İsrail işgali altındayken İsraili turistlerin gözde tatil beldelerinden biri haline gelmişti. Fakat barış anlaşmasının ardından Sina'yı ziyaret eden İsraili turist sayısı beklentilerin çok altında kalmıştır. Ayrıca Sina'da gerçekleşen ve İsraili turistlerin hayatını kaybettiği terör saldırıları, iki ülke arasındaki turizmin sekteye uğramasına neden olmuştur. Bölgesel konjonktüre bağlı gelişen olaylar, örneğin El-Aksa *Intifadası* ya da Arap Baharı, Mısır ve İsrail arasındaki turizmi doğrudan etkilemektedir.

Ürdün'de barış anlaşmasının ardından turizmin artacağına yönelik beklentiler sebebiyle özellikle Petra ve Akabe'de çok miktarda altyapı yatırımı gerçekleşmiştir. Bu beklentilerin çok da haksız olmadığını belirtmek gerekir. Çünkü 1995 yılında Ürdün'ü ziyaret eden İsraili turist sayısı 1994'teki sıfır seviyesinden 100,000 rakamına ulaşmıştır. Ancak bu ziyaretlerin genellikle günübirlik olması, Akabe ve Petra'ya

yatırım öngördükleri kazancı elde edememelerine neden olmuştur. Ayrıca 1999-2009 yılları arasında Ürdün'ü ziyaret eden turist sayısı ikiye katlanırken 2001-2003 yılları arasında bir hayli düşmüştür. Bu durumu, 2001 yılı sonrası bölgede meydana gelen güvenlik kaynaklı sorunlara bağlamak mümkündür. 2013 itibariyle Ürdün'ü ziyaret eden İsraili turist sayısı 218,000'ken İsrail'i ziyaret eden Ürdünlü turist sayısı 18,000'dir. Bu bağlamda, Ürdün'de İsrail kaynaklı bir turizm olgusundan bahsetmek mümkünken İsrail'de Ürdün kaynaklı bir turizmin varlığından bahsetmek olası değildir. Bunun iki nedeni vardır. Birincisi, Ürdünlüler genelde İsrail-karşı olan fikirleri sebebiyle İsrail'i turist olarak ziyaret etme konusunda bir isteğe sahip değildirlir. İkinci olarak ise İsrail, ülkesini ziyaret etmek isteyen Ürdünlüler'e vize vermek konusunda oldukça isteksiz bulunmaktadır. Bu durum, İsraililer ile çeşitli sivil girişimlerde birlikte çalışan Ürdünlüler için bile geçerlidir.

İsrail ile ticaret ise hem Mısır hem de Ürdün örneğinde barışın ilk yıllarında bir hayli umut vadederken, normalleşme karşıtı hareket nedeniyle ilk yıllardaki heves ve coşku zamanla ortadan kaybolmuş, İsrail ile ticaret neredeyse gizli kapaklı yürütülür olmuştur. Mısır-İsrail ticari ilişkileri, taraflar arasında 1980 yılında imzalanmış olan ticaret anlaşmasının akabinde başlamıştır. Ticaretin ilk yılları, ekonomik işbirliğinin zaman içerisinde gelişmesine yönelik gelecek vadeder nitelikteydi. Mısır ile İsrail arasındaki ticaret, ilk yılında, sıfır noktasından 85 milyon (ABD) dolarlık bir seviyeye ulaşmıştı. Fakat İsrail'in 1982 yılında Lübnan'ı işgal etmesiyle birlikte taraflar arasındaki ekonomik ilişkiler bozulmaya başladı. 1990 yılında ise Mısır-İsrail ticaretinin hacmi 12 milyon dolar seviyesine gerilemişti. 2000 yılı itibariyle Mısır'ın İsrail'e toplam ihracatı, 260 milyon dolar seviyelerine ulaşmışken, 2013 yılı itibariyle bu değer 47 milyon dolar seviyesine düşmüştür. Mısır- İsrail ile ticari ilişkiler, daha çok petrol ve doğalgaz ile sınırlı kalmış, 2000'li yıllarla birlikte Mısır'ın İsrail'e petrol ihracatı azalırken doğalgaz ihracatı artış göstermiştir. 1995 yılı itibariyle Mısır'ın İsrail'e ihraç ettiği petrol, İsrail'in toplam petrol ithalatının üçte birini oluştururken bu oran, 2000 yılı itibariyle sekizde bire gerilemiştir. 2005 yılında imzalan ve 2008 yılında gözden geçirilmiş olan Mısır ile İsrail arasındaki doğalgaz anlaşması ile Mısır, anlaşmanın imzalandığı tarihten itibaren on beş yıl boyunca İsrail'in doğalgaz ihtiyacının % 40'ını karşılamayı taahhüt etmekteydi.

Fakat söz konusu doğalgaz anlaşması, Mısır Parlamentosu'nda pek çok tartışmaya neden olmuştur. Bu da Mısır'da ekonomik bir mevzunun söz konusu İsrail olduğunda nasıl siyasi bir konuya dönüşebildiğini göstermektedir.

Ürdün örneğine baktığımızda, barış anlaşmasından sonra İsrail ile ticaretin arttığını söylemek mümkünse de bunun istikrarlı ve sürekli bir artış teşkil etmediğini vurgulamak gerekir. 1990'lı yılların sonu itibariyle Ürdün-İsrail ticareti 95 milyon dolarlık bir hacme ulaşmıştı. 2004 yılına gelindiğinde ise bu oran, 1997 yılına göre neredeyse altı kat artmıştı ve 2008 yılında iki ülke arasındaki ticaret hacmi 370 milyon dolar seviyesine gelmişti. Bu artışın Ürdün'de kurulan nitelikli sanayi bölgelerinden kaynaklandığını söylemek yerinde olacaktır. Öte yandan Ürdün ile İsrail arasındaki toplam ticaret hacmi, 2000-2007 yılları arasında neredeyse ikiye katlanmışken 2013 yılı itibariyle üçte bir oranında azalmış ve 200 milyon dolar seviyesine gerilemiştir. Sonuç olarak, barış anlaşmasının imzalanmasından sonra Ürdün'de İsrail ile ticaret yapmaya yönelik büyük bir ilgi mevcutken bu ilgi zamanla azalmıştır. Bunun en önemli nedenlerinden biri, Ürdün'deki normalleşme karşıtı hareketin İsrail ile ticaret yapan iş adamlarını karalamaya yönelik kampanyadır. Bir diğer önemli neden ise İsrail yatırımlarının, İsrail'in uluslararası Yahudi sermayesine ulaşabilirliği nedeniyle Arap yatırımlarını domine edeceğine ilişkin korkulardır.

Bölgede ekonomik işbirliğini artırmaya yönelik bir ABD girişimi olan nitelikli sanayi bölgeleri, teoride iyi olmakla birlikte pratikte sınırlı kalmıştır. Nitelikli sanayi bölgeleri, özellikle ABD'ye yapılan ihracatın ve döviz gelirlerinin artması ile yeni iş olanakları sunması açısından hem Ürdün hem de Mısır ekonomileri için oldukça kazançlı olmuş, ancak hala ekonomik işbirliğini artırmak ve Ürdün-İsrail ve Mısır-İsrail ilişkilerinin normalleşmesini sağlamak amacına ulaşamamıştır. Arap ülkeleri nitelikli sanayi bölgelerine yatırım yapmak konusunda çekingen davranırken İsraili yatırımcılar da söz konusu bölgelere yeteri kadar ilgi göstermemektedir. Mısır, nitelikli sanayi bölgelerine ilişkin anlaşmayı Ürdün'den altı yıl sonra imzalamıştır. Bu yüzden nitelikli sanayi bölgelerinin Mısır ekonomisi üzerindeki genel etkisini ve girişimin Mısır'daki geleceğini

değerlendirmek için zamana ihtiyaç vardır. Ürdün'ün nitelikli sanayi bölgelerine ilişkin on beş yıllık tecrübesi göz önüne alındığında ise, nitelikli sanayi bölgelerinin Ürdün halkı için yeni iş olanakları yaratmış olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Ancak zaman içerisinde bu bölgelerde istihdam edilen işçilerin yaklaşık dörtte üçünün Güneydoğu Asya kökenli yabancı işçilerden oluşması, nitelikli sanayi bölgelerinin yerel halk için istihdam yaratma amacından bir sapma olarak değerlendirilebilir. Öte yandan, Ürdün'deki yatırım ortamının söz konusu bölgelerdeki şirketlerin kapanmaya başlaması sebebiyle olumsuz etkilendiğini söylemek mümkündür. Tüm bunların yanı sıra, gerek Mısır'da gerekse Ürdün'de söz konusu bölgelerdeki üretimde anlaşmalarca tayin edilmiş olan İsrail dahlini *bypass* etmeye yönelik bir eğilim mevcuttur. Bu bağlamda nitelikli sanayi bölgelerin, Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail ticaretinde son derece mütevazı bir artışa neden olduğunu belirtmek yerinde olacaktır.

Her iki örnekteki benzerlikler bir yana bırakıldığında, Mısır özelinde temel ekonomik kazancın İsrail ile tesis edilen ilişkilerden ziyade, ABD ile yakınlaşmaktan ve işbirliği içine girmekten kaynaklandığını belirtmek gerekir. Bu noktada ABD'den alınan ekonomik yardımın Mısır ekonomisine katkısı önemli olmakla birlikte Mısır açısından ekonomik yardım, İsrail ile yapılan barışın en önemli kazanımı değildir. Daha açık bir ifadeyle, Mısır'ın barış sürecinden kazançlı çıkmasını sağlayan, devlet ideolojisinin Batı-yanlısı bir çizgiye kayması ile özellikle yabancı yatırımı ülkeye çekmek ve kalkınmayı sağlamak için *İnfitah* çerçevesinde gerçekleştirilen ekonomik liberalleşmedir. Bu süreçte, ABD ekonomik yardımı ve desteği, Mısır'da ekonomik iyileşmenin ve kalkınmanın motoru olmuştur. Bu kapsamda, İsrail ile barış ise büyük bir dizaynın sadece bir parçasıdır. Dolayısıyla hükümet tarafından siyasi söylemin bir parçası olarak propagandası yapılan barış kazanımları bir yana, Mısırlı karar alıcıların kendileri barış anlaşmasından İsrail ile savaş durumunun sona ermesi, doğu sınırlarının güvenliğinin sağlanması ve Sina'nın geri alınması dışında çok fazla bir edinim beklememekteydiler. Enver Sedat'ın barış anlaşmasının imzalanmasından iki yıl sonra bir suikasta kurban gitmesi, Hüsnü Mübarek'in İsrail ile ilişkileri normalleştirmek pahasına çok da fazla risk almamayı seçmesine neden oldu. Mısır gibi otoriter devletlerde bile kamuoyunda konsensüs sağlamadan ve halkın desteğini almadan bir

normalleşme süreci başlatmak ve bunu sürdürmek bir hayli zordur. Öte yandan barış sürecini normalleşme yönünde devam ettiren özenli ve dirayetli bir devlet politikası olmadan Mısır toplumunun önemli bir kesimi, ideolojik olarak barış anlaşmasına karşı olmayı sürdürecektir. Ayrıca barış süreciyle alakalı ekonomik kazançların hala Mısır halkına sirayet etmemiş olması, toplumdaki muhalefeti körüklemekte ve normalleşme karşıtı hareketin kök salmasına neden olmaktadır.

İsrail ile imzalanmış olan bu iki müstakil barış anlaşması haricinde Ortadoğu'da kapsamlı bir barışın imkânı ve geleceği hala belirsizdir. Sekteye uğramış olan Oslo Barış Süreci'nin ardından, Filistin- İsrail barış görüşmeleri, ABD'nin girişimiyle 2000 yılında Camp David'te gerçekleşmiş, ancak görüşmelerin sonunda herhangi bir anlaşma sağlanamamıştır. Bunu, aynı yıl El-Aksa *İntifadası* takip etmiştir. Öte yandan 2000'li yıllarda küresel ve bölgesel öncelikler önemli ölçüde değişmiştir. 11 Eylül 2001 terör saldırılarından sonra ABD'nin 2001 yılında Afganistan'a yönelik olarak düzenlediği harekâtın ve 2003 yılında Irak'ı işgalinin ardından dikkatler, Ortadoğu Barış Süreci'nden uzaklaşmıştır. Diğer taraftan, Filistin-İsrail çatışmasının dinamikleri de değişmiştir. Yaser Arafat'ın 2004 yılında vefatının akabinde Mahmud Abbas, bilinen diğer adıyla Ebu Mazen, Filistin Otoritesi'nin başına geçmiştir. 2005 yılında İsrail'in Gazze'den çekilmesi, Filistinlilerin İsrail'in Batı Şeria'daki varlığını güçlendirecek olmasına yönelik endişe ve korkularını artırmıştır. Hamas'ın 2006 yılı seçimlerinde kazandığı zaferin ardından Filistin yönetimi, Gazze'de Hamas ve Batı Şeria'da Filistin Otoritesi şeklinde ikiye bölünmüştür. Bu da Filistin-İsrail meselesinin Hamas-İsrail çatışması ve Filistin Otoritesi-İsrail uyuşmazlığı olarak ikiye bölünmesine sebep olmuştur. Hamas-İsrail çatışması, askeri olarak karşı karşıya gelmenin sık sık tecrübe edildiği sıcak bir çatışmadır. Barış sürecini hayata döndürmek adına atılan uluslararası adımlar, 2007 yılında düzenlenmiş olan Annapolis Konferansı örneğinde görüldüğü gibi 1991 Madrid Konferansı ruhunu canlandıramamıştır. Barışın tesis edilebilmesi adına bölgesel düzeyde de girişimler gerçekleşmiştir. Bunların içinde en kayda değer ise 2002 yılında Suudi Arabistan Kralı Abdullah'ın önerdiği Arap İnisiyatifidir. Bahse konu inisiyatif, İsrail'in 1967 Haziran Savaşı öncesindeki sınırlarına geri çekilmesine karşılık olarak İsrail ile barış ve ilişkilerin normalleşmesini öngörmektedir. Girişim, Batı Şeria ve Gazze'de

Doğu Kudüs başkenti olmak kaydıyla bağımsız bir Filistin Devleti'nin kurulmasını da savunmaktadır. Bu kapsamda, Arap İnişiyatifi'nin bugüne kadarki barış çabalarının hedeflerinin bir özeti şeklinde değerlendirmek mümkündür. Ortadoğu'da kapsamlı bir barışa, Arap yaklaşımı olarak nitelendirilebilecek olan inisiyatife, İsrail hiçbir biçimde ilgi göstermemiş ve bu sebeple de konuyla ilgili herhangi bir somut adım atılamamıştır. Ortadoğu, yirmi birinci yüzyılda pek çok savaşa sahne olmuştur: 2003 Irak Savaşı, 2006 Lübnan Savaşı, 2008, 2012 ve 2014 Gazze Savaşları. 2013 yılında ABD Dışişleri Bakanı John Kerry, yeni bir barış girişimi ile Filistin-İsrail görüşmelerini yeniden başlatmayı hedeflemiş, ancak bu görüşmeler de önce Filistin Otoritesi ve Hamas'ın bir birlik hükümeti kuracaklarına yönelik açıklamaları ve ardından da 2014'te İsrail'in Gazze'ye yönelik başlattığı operasyonla birlikte sekteye uğramıştır.

Tunus'ta Zeyn-el Abidin rejimine karşı ayaklanmalarla başlayan ve akabinde bölgedeki diğer ülkelere de sıçrayan Arap Baharı ile birlikte bölgenin siyasi resmi önemli ölçüde değişmiştir. Arap Baharı, Tunus, Mısır ve Libya'da otoriter cumhurbaşkanlarının devrilmesiyle Suriye'de ise halen devam etmekte olan iç savaşla sonuçlanmıştır. Bir belirsizlik sürecini beraberinde getiren Arap Baharı, Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçlerinin de sorgulanmasına neden olmuştur. Özellikle Mısır'da 25 Ocak 2011 tarihinde gerçekleşen "devrim"le birlikte siyasi zemin iyice kayganlaşmış ve Mısır-İsrail barışının geleceği çok tartışılmıştır. Ürdün-İsrail barışı, Haşimi Monarşisi'nin Arap Baharı'nın estirdiği değişim rüzgârlarına nispeten daha dirençli bir görünüm sergilemesi sebebiyle daha az sorgulanmıştır. Ancak Doğu Kudüs'te yükselen tansiyon nedeniyle Ürdün, büyükelçisini 2014 yılının Kasım ayında geri çekmiştir. Ürdün, bu diplomatik hamlesi ile İsrail'in El-Aksa Mescidi'ne yönelik tutumunu protesto etmeyi amaçlamıştır. Mısır'da ise Cumhurbaşkanı Mursi'nin 2013 yılının Haziran ayında askeri bir darbeyle devrilmesinin ardından cumhurbaşkanı olan Abdülfettah El-Sisi döneminde, İsrail ile ilişkiler eskiye göre daha sorunsuz görünmektedir. Hatta Mısır'ın, Sina'daki cihatçı gruplarla mücadele özelinde İsrail ile söze dökülmeyen bir işbirliği olduğundan bahsetmek dahi mümkündür. Bu da Mısır'da Hüsnü Mübarek'in devrilmesiyle artan Mısır'ın İsrail ile barış anlaşmasını feshedeceğine yönelik siyasi söylentileri ya da toplumsal beklentileri boşa çıkarmıştır. Bugün Mısır iç siyasetinin mevcut durumu

düşünüldüğünde ülkenin içinde güvenliği ve istikrarı sağlamanın dış politikada radikal bir değişiklik yapmaya baskın geleceğini söylemek mümkündür. Bu nedenle, kısa vadede Mısır'ın dış politika yöneliminde bir değişikliğin söz konusu olması muhtemel görünmemektedir. Kırılgan ve birçok noktada sorunlu da olsa Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçleri, yakın gelecekte de var olmaya devam edecektir; ancak mevcut koşullar altında Ortadoğu'da kapsamlı bir barışın gerçekleşmesi olası görünmemektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Mısır-İsrail ve Ürdün-İsrail barış süreçlerinden kaynaklanan tecrübeler, barış süreci dinamiklerinin, ülkelerdeki dış politika yapım süreçleriyle yakından ilişkili olduğunu ve dolayısıyla dış politika yapımının önemli bir karakteristiği konumundaki devlet otonomisiyle de bağlantılı olduğunu ortaya koymuştur. Diğer bir ifadeyle, bu tezin temel argümanında da vurgulandığı gibi incelenmiş olan müstakil barış süreçleri, birer 'soğuk barış' örneğidir ve 'soğuk barış' da devletin otonomisinin bir yansımasıdır. Ortadoğu'daki devletlerin çoğu, farklılık arz eden derecelerdeki devlet kapasitelerine ve otonomilerine rağmen, benzer otoriter yapıları haizdir ve bu yüzden de dış politika yapımında benzer eğilimler sergilemektedir. Buradan hareketle, bölgedeki çatışmaların barışçıl çözümlerinin soğuk barışla noktalanması olasıdır. Arap-İsrail çatışması/uyuşmazlığı özelinde düşünüldüğünde, İsrail ile yapılacak herhangi bir olası müstakil barış anlaşmasının, örneğin Suriye (mevcut iç savaşın bittiği varsayıldığında) ya da Lübnan tarafından, soğuk barışla sonlanması kuvvetle muhtemeldir; çünkü söz konusu devletlerin halka rağmen karar alabilme ya da hareket etme serbestisi olarak özetlenebilecek devlet otonomileri, İsrail ile barış yapmalarına ve bunu devam ettirmelerine imkân verecektir. Ancak bu devletlerin İsrail ile ilişkileri, Filistin-İsrail Meselesi çözülmeden normalleşmeyecektir. Öte yandan gerçek bir barışın inşası, halkların bu barışı içselleştirmesini gerektirdiğinden, normalleşmenin olmazsa olmazlarından biri de barışın özellikle ekonomik kazanımlarının, toplumsal olarak hissedilmesidir. Barışın kazanımlarının halka yansiyabilmesi de demokratik yönetimi gerektirmektedir. Şüphesiz, bu iddia, başka örnek durumlar üzerinde araştırmalar yapılmasını gerektirmektedir.

F. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

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