A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RELIGION-STATE RELATIONS:
A CASE STUDY ON TURKEY AND IRAN

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis compares religion-state relations in Turkey and Iran by adopting a historical perspective. Mainly, the thesis explores the kinds of historical trajectories, international developments and cultural elements which generated distinct religion-state relations in these two national contexts. It argues that the main determinants of this relation derive from the varying degrees of institutionalization of the religious establishments. The historical analysis reveals that, the Turkish state inherited a type of state tradition in which religion was strongly controlled and incorporated to the state structure. Conversely, in Iran, especially after Safavid period, the state tradition was marked by the relative autonomy of the religious establishments from the state. The thesis also analyses the influence of international factors on religion-state dynamics. It reveals that direct international factors have been more influential in the Iranian case whereas in Turkish case indirect factors played a more decisive role. The thesis also argues that it is misleading to point the differences between Shi'a and Sunni sects in an essentialist manner to explain the different paths these two countries followed.

Keywords: Turkey, Iran, Religion and State, State Formation.

ÖZ

DİN-DEVLET İLİŞKİLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI BİR ANALİZİ: TÜRKİYE VE İRAN ÖRNEKLERİ

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Bu çalışmada Türkiye ve İran'da din-devlet ilişkileri tarihsel bir çerçeve içerisinde karşılaştırılmaktadır. Temel olarak, çalışma, bu iki ulusal bağlamda farklı din-devlet ilişkilerini üreten tarihsel izleği, kurumsal farklılıklar, uluslararası ilişkiler ve kültürel unsurlar bağlamında tartışmaktadır. Çalışmanın iddiası iki ülkede din-devlet ilişkilerinin farklılığını üreten temel belirleyicinin dini yapıların farklı düzeyde kurumsallaşması olduğudur. Tarihsel tartışma göstermektedir ki Türkiye'de gelenek, kontrol ve eklemlenme üzerinden ilerlerken, İran'da ise Safavi dönemini istisna tutarsak göreli özerklik şeklinde tezahür etmiştir. Çalışma aynı zamanda uluslarası bağlamın bu kurumsallaşma düzeylerine yansımasını da tartışmaktadır. Bu anlamda, uluslararası bağlamın etkileri İran'da doğrudan iken, Türkiye'de bu etki dolaylıdır. Çalışma iki ülke arasındaki temel farkı mezhepsel aidiyetlere indirgeyen bakışa karşı çıkmaktadır.

Keywords: Türkiye, İran, Din-Devlet İlişkileri, Devlet Oluşum Süreçleri

This thesis is dedicated to my wife Irmak and our son Ali Derya

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Önce un davası sonra din davası gelir[1]

1.1 Statement of the Problem

This thesis aims at understanding the distinguishing characteristics between the state religion relations of Turkey and Iran that emanate from the historically different social and political experiences. The formation of these characteristics, in these two contexts is explored in relation to the dynamics underlying the process of their becoming centralised states throughout the period between 15th to 20th centuries. For the Iranian part, the period covered in this thesis, almost 300 years from the foundation of Safavid empire to the end of Reza Shah's reign, was the period which saw the change of three dynasties –Safavid, Qajar and Pahlavi, a total transformation of sectarian identity of society- from Sunni to Shi'a- and also multiple reorganisations of the state structure and the religious establishment. For the Turkish part, the thesis covered the period from the foundation of the Ottoman state to the death of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. Throughout this period; Anatolian peninsula faced gradual centralisation of the state and then the transformation from the empire to the republic. Yet the state and the religion in general terms, have managed to survive as two important sources of power to the present with only minor interruptions. The length of the period covered in this thesis should be considered as an effort to take this continuation into consideration. The analysis of this continuity will also be helpful in explicating the gradual evolution of both state and religious institutions, making it easier to understand the modern era. This study examines the relation of continuity and change within this long historical trajectory.

The recent past, that is the period after 1940s in Turkey, which is marked by the multiparty politics and, the period after 1940s in Iran which is marked by first the reign of Muhammad Reza Shah and then the Islamic Republic of Iran years, are not included in the assesment within the main body. This limitation is put forward since the main focus of the thesis is on the historically deeper causes of the religion and state formations of the two realms. The current formations are considered to be conditioned more throughly by the developments of the early centuries rather than by the developments of the last half of the twentieth century. The transformative impacts of the developments in the near past are considered not to have been impacted into the current religion and state formations as deep as those experienced in more than three centuries. Another reason of this temporal limitation is that, especially after 1980s both in Turkey and in Iran immense

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[1] Anonymous

socio-political transformations took place. There emerged a huge amount of literature on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The amount of the literature makes it practically very hard to cover both the century before the 1940s and the following decades within the boundaries of this thesis. Yet the last part of the thesis aims at presenting a brief analysis of the current developments.

It is important to note that during their historical trajectories, those two countries followed various policies regarding religion and state relations. These policies are similar on many grounds. Nevertheless, certain socio-historical conditions developed along significantly different paths, and at last, resulted in a "religiously motivated" revolution in Iran and a peculiar "secular" state in Turkey. The questions arise as to the reasons behind this difference and why different modes of religious institutionalism occurred in these countries. Is it only because of the distinct sectarian identities of these countries? Is it a result of different institutionalization of religious establishments? Is it because of international factors or are there different reasons? I believe that the answer to these questions requires a comparative analysis of the Turkish and Iranian historical trajectories, considering the peculiarity of different religious and sectarian identities as well as differential modes of institutionalization of religion in relation to the state. International factors also played their role, directly or indirectly, in this differentiation. The focus of attention of comparison in this thesis are the centralisation processes of the Turkish and Iranian states, the extent of international factors, the degree of the power of religious establishment in shaping the socio-political life, and the adaptation of the ideology to changing conditions.

The thesis mainly focuses on three aspects of the social sphere; institutional, international and ideological. Main arguments of the thesis develop as such: Firstly, the main determinants of the relations between state and religion derive from the varying degrees of institutionalization of the religious establishments. The analysis reveals that, the Turkish state inherited a type of state tradition in which religion was strongly controlled and incorporated to the state structure. Conversely, in Iran, especially after Safavid period, the state tradition was marked by the relative autonomy of the religious establishments from the state. The second line of argument suggests that the explanatory power of sectarian differences between Shia and Sunni sects are small. Consequently, there emerges a need to inspect material, political and international factors to understand the different paths these two countries followed. Thirdly, consistent with Kamran Matin's conceptualisation that "the historical development of every society is fundamentally co-constituted by its international relations,"[2] the analysis reveals that the international factors played their roles in various aspects. As will be discussed later on, direct international factors- such as wars and invasions- have been more influential in the Iranian case. Also related to the first argument, Iran had a more fragile and interrupted state structure as a result of these direct international impacts. In terms of the Turkish part of this comparison, the thesis reveals that indirect international factors, namely the impact of western influences and ideologies

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[2] Kamran Matin, (2013), *Recasting Iranian Modernity International Relations and Social Change*, New York: Routledge, 145.

such as nationalism played a more decisive role. The thesis also claims that trans-border relations of these two countries have played a significant role in their construction of their religious identities. These processes have also impacted on religion state relations.

In order to evaluate these arguments, using comparative methodology is critical. As will be debated below, without a comparative perspective it is hard to ascertain specificity of the isolated cases. The next part of the present chapter presents a brief analysis of comparative historical methodology and why Turkey and Iran are chosen as the cases of comparison.

1.2 Comparing Turkey and Iran

The validity of the use of the comparative method in both history and political science is well known. Early examples of the comparative social analysis date back to ancient Greece when Aristotle was exploring the ideal constitution in his Politics treatise.[3] Without doubt, comparative history is one of the most convenient ways of understanding historical phenomena. Skocpol and Somers aptly commented that: "As long as people have investigated social life, there has been recurrent fascination with juxtaposing historical patterns from two or more times and places."[4] In order to understand social structures and their transformations, historians always look at diverse cases. By comparing and contrasting historical experiences occurring in different economic, social and geographical settings, social scientists hope to explore the general rules and exceptions of the historical and political sphere and unravel the uniformities and variations in this sphere. In other words, a comparative study would facilitate an explanation and interpretation of the diverse experiences of societies, nations, cultures and other significant macro social units. As Peter Kolchin noted, there are basically three major advantages of comparative history. Firstly, "comparison can create an awareness of alternatives, showing developments to be significant that without a comparative perspective might not appear so". Secondly, "scholars seek to explain historical differences and peculiarities weighing and eventually isolating variables responsible for particular conditions." Finally, academics seek to recognize common patterns and make "historical generalizations" through comparative work."[5] Barrington Moore wrote in the preface of his pioneering comparative work "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" that, a comparative study might also check out and disprove the existing explanations emerged as a result of reading only about a specific land.[6] It is only through a comparative method that existing explanations can be further developed or criticised.

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[3] Dirk Berg-Schlosser in the very introduction of his work "Mixed Methods in Comparative Politics: Principles and Applications", asserts that "since the time of Aristotle, comparative politics and comparative method have been considered by many authors to be the "royal way" of political science."see Dirk Berg Schlosser. (2012), *Mixed Methods in Comparative Politics: Principles and Applications*, London: Palgrave Mc Millan, 1.

[4] Theda Skocpol & Margaret Somers. (1980), "The Uses of Comparative History in Macrosocial Inquiry," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. (22) 21, 74.

[5] Peter Kolchin. (1983), "Comparing American History," *Reviews in American History* (10) 4, 65.

[6] Barrington Moore. (1993), *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston: Beacon Press: xix.

Skocpol classify three categories of making comparative history. These are <u>Macro-Causal Analysis</u>, <u>Parallel Demonstration of Theory</u>, and <u>Contrast of Contexts</u>. <u>Macro-causal Analysis</u> deals with grand theoretical questions. In other words, it uses comparative history to make claims concerning macro-level structures and processes. It mainly uses the method "for the purpose of making causal inferences about macro level structure and processes" and this sort of comparative methods carry out "hypothesis testing through multivariate analyses."[7] In this method, comparison is used "to test the validity of existing theoretical hypotheses and to develop new causal generalizations to replace invalidated ones."[8] The two of the well - known examples to this method is `Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy` written by Barrington Moore and `States and Social Revolutions` written by Theda Skocpol herself.

Second category in comparative history is the <u>Parallel Demonstration of Theory</u>. This approach seeks to pose generalizable theories that can be demonstrated across cases of comparative histories. "The point of the comparison is to assert a similarity among the cases – similarity, that is, in terms of the common applicability of the overall theoretical arguments."[9] Hence the focus of this approach is to find similarities between cases in order to "persuade the reader, that a given… theory can repeatedly demonstrate its fruitfulness-its ability to order the evidence-when applied to a series of relevant historical trajectories."[10] Political Systems of the Empires written by Shmuel Eisenstadt can be seen as an example to this type of comparative method.

The third logic of comparative analysis is the <u>Contrast of Contexts</u> approach. This approach does not aim to generate new hypotheses. Skocpol and Somers define the basic characteristics of this approach as follows:

> [
> W]hat matters more in the Contrast-oriented type is that the historical integrity of each case as a whole is carefully respected… each a complex and unique sociohistorical configuration in its own right. For much of the thrust of this variant of comparative history is to suggest that particular nations, empires, civilizations, or religions constitute relatively irreducible wholes, each a complex and unique sociohistorical configuration in its own right. [11]

The pioneering example of this type of comparative study is the `Nation Building and Citizenship` written by Reinhard Bendix and `Islam Observes` written by Clifford Geertz.

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[7] Skocpol & Somers. "Uses of Comparative History:" 175.

[8] *ibid*., 182.

[9] *ibid.,* 177.

[10] *ibid.,* 176.

[11] *ibid*., 178.

Although this thesis does not aim to utilise a strict comparative methodology, its approach is closer to 'the contrast of context approach'. This thesis analyses religion and state relations of Iran and Turkey, by contrasting those to each other. By following Skocpol's definition that "the task of the contrast-oriented comparative historian is facilitated when maximally different cases within given bounds are chosen for comparison."[12] In other words, it is worthwhile to compare societies which have enough in common "within given bounds" but "maximally different cases" in order to make a contrast oriented comparison. Iran and Turkey, I argue, with their distinct and similar qualities meet these criteria of comparative method and prove to be appropriate units of analysis. The following part delineates the similarities in the historical trajectories, and then discusses the comparative literature which focuses mostly on the differences.

As mentioned above, even a brief look at the history of Turkey and Iran illustrates that these countries share more than being "exceptional cases"[13] in the Arab Middle East. These two countries offer a productive ground in order to compare religion and state relations. There is a huge amount of academic and popular literature that compares Iran and Turkey from various aspects. Before discussing the main themes explored in the literature to date, I will give a brief account of the similarities that has popularized this comparison.

Roy Mottahadeh begins the preface of the Turkish edition of his book on Iranian cultural history covering a wide period between early Middle Ages and 20th century, "The Mantle of the Prophet : Religion and Politics in Iran", with a quote by Kaşgarlı Mahmut: "Tatsız Türk bolmas, başsız börk bolmas."[14] As this quotation reflects, not only have Iranian and Turkish cultures been informed about each other since early periods, but they also took part in the establishment of several states by acting together. This tradition of Iranian and Turkish cooperation continued during most of their respective history. Safavid, Qajar and Ottoman dynasties are similar in the sense that they are Turkic and nomadic in origins. They are intermingled to an extent that Ahmet Ağaoğlu, a nationalist intellectual of the early 20th century claimed that "Iranian history, has been, for a thousand years, a branch of Turkish History."[15]

Thus, it can be argued that historically and culturally, the common grounds of these two cultures of Rumi and *Nasreddin Hodja* or Molla Nasreddin in Iranian terms have always been more apparent than the lines that separate them. Even during frosty and conflictual periods on the grounds of their differing Shi'a and Sunni sectarian identities, these two cultures have always remained intertwined. The Iranian language, Persian, was for long time an elite language for Ottomans. Even after the Language Revolution of the early republic, Persian and 'Persianized' Arabic words continued to exist in Turkish. Also related with the topic

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[12] *ibid.,* 179.

[13] Israel should be added to these countries after the second half of 20th Century.

[14] Roy Mottahadeh, (2003), *Peygamberin Hırkası İran'da Din ve Politika, Bilgi ve Güç*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, xvi.

[15] Georgeon, Francois. (2006), *Osmanlı Türk Modernleşmesi (1900-1930)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 135.

of this thesis it is interesting to note that a great majority of the religious words in Turkish are taken from Persian. For example, Instead of Arabic *salah* and *vadu*, Persian *namaz* and *abdest* are used for praying and ablution. Selim I and Shāh Ismā'il I, the two rulers in the time of Ottoman-Safavid wars in the 16th century, might be given as the most obvious and commonly emphasized example of this cultural intimacy. During that period, Selim I, the Sultan of Ottoman Empire, wrote collected poems – *Dīvān* - in Persian while Iranian ruler Shāh Ismā'il wrote poems in Turkish by using a pen name Hatayi.[16]

As inheritors of different ancient civilisations, those two cultures were islamised from the 7th to 11th century. After a brief period of belonging to the same Islamic sect, their religious paths diversified during the sixteenth century. Safavid period marked the Shiitization of Iran. Yet, their similarities continued in that they became the leading states of their respective sects. Iran turned into the largest state containing the most numerous minority sects in the Muslim World and the Ottomans -through the most parts of the 13th to 20th centuries- continued to be the largest state in the Sunni Muslim World. Their rulers legitimized their authority by means of these leading positions. Especially, in later eras, these similarities further intensified. Modern Iranian and modern Turkish contexts are also similar in this respect but of course within certain limits. They were the neighbours of strong Western states and they were integrated into the world economy at the same time. Although they did not experienced direct colonisation, they faced economic and political suppressions during much of the modern period. In fact, their modernization periods were initiated concurrently. Both countries transferred their political systems from monarchy to constitutionalism in similar periods; during the constitutional Revolution in Iran in 1906 and in Turkey in 1908. As the inheritors of strong empires, their modernisation experiences entered a new phase after the first quarter of the 20th century. In this new phase, their similarities became more concrete. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Shah Reza Pehlevi, the elites who led the mission of modernization, and attempted to transform their societies via similar reform movements. These features form a visible likeness between Turkey and Iran and separate them from Western countries as well as from North Africa and the Middle East countries where modernization has been initiated, rather lately, through the practices of colonization.

As the above parts show historical trajectories of Iran and Turkey are similar in many respects. Yet in parallel with Skocpol's conceptualisation, they have "unique features working out of putatively general social processes."[17] In regard to religion state relations, which are the subject matter of this thesis, these

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[16] For an elaborate discussion on what is called "Turko-Persian tradition" see Bernard Lewis, *Iran in History,* In his lecture Lewis claims that Persian Islam rather than the original Arab Islam was brought to the Turks first in Central Asia and then Turkey. He goes further to claim that "the center of the Islamic world was under Turkish and Persian states both shaped by Iranian culture." Yet Halil İnalcik in his article analyzing Turkish and Iranian political thoughts by focusing on Kutadgu Bilig claims that Turkish traditions are separate from Indo-Iranian traditions. See. Halil İnalcık. (1993), "Turkish and Iranian Political Theories and Traditions in Kutadgu Bilig," in H. İnalcik, *The Middle East and the Balkans under the Ottoman Empire: Essays on Economy and Society*, Bloomington: Indiana University Turkish Studies and Turkish Ministry of Culture Joint Series; Bernard Lewis. (2001), "Iran in History," *Middle Eastern Lectures*, Moshe Dayan Center.

[17] Skocpol & Somers. "Uses of Comparative History," 178.

unique features also intensify. First of all, majority of Iran and Turkey's population followed different sects of Islam. There is a literature that attributes political consequence to this sectarian difference. Secondly, they are inheritors of different empire traditions. Starting from roughly 19ᵗʰ century both Iran and Turkish states aimed at modernisation, but their paths diverged as a result of the differences in their social and political structures. In terms of state power they are different. Turkey is considered as having a strong state tradition in relation to Iran. Needless to say they have different ethnic and religious demographics. Next part of this chapter discusses the lines of literature that focuses on these differentiations reflected in historical trajectories of Iran and Turkey.

1.3 Literature Comparing Turkey and Iran

Once the similarities are taken into account, one should not wonder about the popularity of comparisons between these two states, which are not limited to academic studies but also found in popular discussions. Six main repetitive lines of comparison can be distinguished in these comparative works. The first one involves the comparison of their modernisation attempts by mainly focusing on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah. This line of comparison was mainly popular in 1960s and 1970s, yet there are also more contemporary examples. In the peak era of modernisation and secularism theories, these two countries were compared in terms of their relations with modernity. These works mainly focused on the ways in which the modernising elites transformed their states from a traditional country to a modern one. I will refer to such studies under the heading of Modernisation Literature. The second line of comparison mainly focuses on their sectarian structure. The Shi'a-Sunni divide and its reflections on the political thought have been analysed in this context and they are still popular. I prefer to use the term Essentialist Religio-Cultural Literature to refer to such literature since they are likely to present sectarian differences as fixed and homogeneous identities. Fourth line of comparison in the literature can be labelled as Non-essentialist Religio-Cultural Literature. As its title suggests, this line of literature also deals with religious structures, mostly interaction of religion with the political sphere, yet they do not focus their subject in a fixed way. In these comparative works, religion is not considered as the essence that determines the political developments but a domain interrelated to other social domains. I refer to the fifth line of comparative works in the literature as Institutional-Economic Comparisons. This group of works mainly focus on the institutional structures of Iran and Turkey. They analyse the ways in which different institution building processes and distinct institutionalisation of economic sphere manifested its appearances in the historical trajectories of Iran and Turkey. Finally, one can identify a distinct Current Political Literature which focuses on the ongoing political developments in these two countries.

In the remaining part of this chapter, I will review the literature by first looking at why these comparisons became popular at certain times. Then, when appropriate, I will address the weaknesses and strengths of these lines of comparisons. Since the subject matter of this thesis is religion and state relations, I will start with "Religio-Cultural Comparisons" which are more prone to focus on religious differences.

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1.3.1   Essentialist Religio-Cultural Comparative Studies

As mentioned above, throughout a great part of their history, Iran and Turkey were the most important representatives of their respective sects namely; Shi'a and Sunni. This is why, those who want to understand the impacts of sectarian understanding in the Muslim world began their work with the comparison of these two states. Thus, the differences those social structures embody in terms of sectarian identities have become the most commonly discussed theme within Iran-Turkey comparative literature. Apparently, a significant degree of importance has been attributed to the difference between these two sects including the historical and potential political consequences it generates in academic as well as popular literature. The common conclusion of this academic and popular work mainly concerns the differences attributed to the Shi'a and Sunni political traditions in terms of the political outlook. Many scholars consider these differences between the Shi'a and Sunni political traditions as the main lines of distinction within the Middle Eastern geography in general and between Turkey and Iran in particular.

Putting comparative works on Iran and Turkey aside, culture and identity one can argue, are not concepts with which most political sciences are comfortable.[18] Comparative political works are of no exception to this general tendency. A group of researchers considers culture and identity as mere epiphenomena to economic and political organisation, whilst others assert that "culture makes almost all the difference."[19] Focusing on culture and religion to compare two different cases has its own merits and flaws. Marc Howard Rose identifies five contributions that cultural analyses have made to comparative works. First of all, culture frames the context which politics occurs. Second, it helps to link individual and collective identities. Third, it defines boundaries between groups and organises actions within and between them. Fourth, it presents a structure to understand the motives and actions of others. Lastly, culture provides resources for political organisations.[20] Without doubt, these five dimensions can generate important insights as one analyses the role of culture and religion in shaping the historical trajectory of countries. Yet, there are also risks of focusing on culture and identity on comparing two different cases. Most important one of these risks is to consider culture and identity as fixed and homogeneous entities. When comparison cases cover Islam, or a sect of Islam as the sole basis of an individual or national identity, the risk of fall into the trap of Orientalism also emerge. In this part, I will discuss first why the cultural comparisons dominate the comparative attempts of Iran and Turkey and then explore whether or not, or how far these comparative attempts have orientalist tendencies.

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[18] It is remarkable to note that the discipline of International Relations is taking lead to this kind of thinking.

[19] David Landes (2000), "Culture Makes Almost All The Difference," in Lawrence E. Harrison, Samuel P. Huntington (ed) *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, New York, Basic Books.

[20] Marc Howard Ross, (2012), "Culture," in Mark Irving Lichbach,Alan S. Zuckerman (ed) *Comparative Political Analysis, in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 136-137.

First, the reflections of the Islamic revolution of Iran aroused interest in Islam and its impact on political structures. Attempts to understand this exceptional case of a religious revolution in Iran turned into attempts to understand Shi'a. In this sense, it is not unusual to look at differences between Shi'a and Sunni sects. In other words, the questions that stem from the revolution began to be evaluated within the context of the Shi'a vs. Sunni dichotomy. These evaluations suggested that the revolution was the natural consequence and outcome of the Shi'a political tradition, which is considered as revolutionary in essence. Especially, authors such as Michael Fischer, Samih K. Farsoun, Mehrdad Mashayekhi and even a structuralist such as Theda Skocpol emphasized this Shi'a character of the revolution to a great extent.[21] It is interesting to note that Skocpol revised her general theory of revolution and added a cultural perspective by focusing on the impact of Shia ideology. Her article "Rentier State and Shia Islam in Iranian Revolution" is very much debated in this respect.[22]

As a natural consequence of attributing a revolutionary characteristic to Shi'a, the Sunni sect began to be debated from this perspective. The historical Shi'a-Sunni dichotomy was now debated in terms of their relations with the political sphere. Which sect is more prone to mass movements? Which is more statist? These questions were asked in both academic and popular domain and answered through the lens of the Iranian Revolution. More recently, especially after the Iraqi invasion, this Shia-Sunni dichotomy gained further salience and has been transferred to international politics. This perspective, led by eminent scholars and strategists such as Juan Cole and Vali Nasr, portrays the competition between Shia and Sunni as the main axis of conflict from 1990s onwards.[23] All these dichotomic ways of looking at the Middle East has created a good domain for comparative works.

The second factor that brought the issue of Shi'ism and Sunnism to the center of the research agenda was the so-called cultural turn in social sciences.[24] Sectarian structures have been considered at length in a period when the theories that put emphasis on the cultural differences, such as postmodernism, started to dominate the social sciences on conceptual grounds. As a result, this issue has been discussed as the stable and fixed essence lying beneath the political culture; or to put it another way, sectarian features considered as the

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[21] Michael J. Fischer, (1980), *Iran from Religious Dispute to Revolution*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Samih Farsoun and Mehrdad Mashayekhi, (1992), *Iran: Political Culture in the Islamic Republic*, New York Routledge.

[22] Theda Skocpol, (1982), "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society*, (11) 3 May, 1982.

[23] Vali Nasr, (2006), *The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future*, New York, London: WW Norton Company, Juan Cole, (2002), *Sacred Space and Holy War The Politics, Culture and History of Shi'ite Islam*, New York: I. B. Taurus, Juan Cole, (2006), "A 'Shite Crescent'? The Regional Impact of the Iraq War," *Current History*, Vol. (105) 693, 2006. For a brief discussion of this line of thought see. Bayram Sinkaya, (2007), "Şii Ekseni Tartışmaları ve İran," *Avrasya Dosyası*, (13)3 and Sami Zubaida, *The Question of Sectarianism in Middle East Politics*, https://www.opendemocracy.net/sami-zubaida/question-of-sectarianism-in-middle-east-politics

[24] For a debate on Middle East Studies after "Cultural Turn" see roundtable (2014), "Whither Social History?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (46)2.

ground upon which the political culture is built. This point of view also dominates the comparative literature on Turkey and Iran.

In addition to these general factors, a conjectural change in Turkey intensified these comparative attempts. After the National Security Council decisions on 28 February 1997, issues concerning religion became exceptionally popular. In this period, Turkish secularism was debated in various ways with "Will Turkey become Iran?" being a popular question in this regard. Many columnists discussed the issue around this specific question. In this context, especially the opinion leaders from the "liberal" wing presented the differences between Sunnism and Shi'ism as factors preventing the actualization of such a political prediction. Taha Akyol's book "Türkiye ve İran'da Mezhep ve Devlet" became the quintessential example of this line of thought. Although not presented in such a clear cut manner, a great amount of newspaper articles and popular books touched on this comparison.[25]

Akyol's book is a good example to the cultural comparisons. Since his book is semi-academic, he is more direct in explaining his ideas on the cultural differences between Shi'a and Sunni political thought. This directness in explaining its thesis makes the analysis of this work as worthwhile since Akyol acknowledges at the very beginning of his book that his aim is to provide an answer to the question Will Turkey be Iran?. His answer is simple. Turkey is not going to be Iran since Iran and Turkey are dissimilar in terms of at least three aspects. First, the understanding of the political authority in Iran is different from that in Turkey. Akyol claims that, historically, Shi'a political culture has had a strong tendency to regard political authority as illegitimate. There has been a frustration between the Shi'a clergy and the political authority. He argues that this specific culture facilitated the Islamic Revolution. Yet, in the Ottoman Empire, the principle of the 'obedience to the ruling elite' generated a strong culture that sustained the supremacy of the political authority. Second, the author asserts that the degree of the authority of the clergy was distinct in two cases. In the Sunni Ottoman Empire, clergy was at state's service; members of clergy were state officers. Yet in Iran-Shia culture, the clergy was an autonomous power and according to Shi'a political tradition disobedience to clergy is disobedience to God. Akyol concludes that since the clergy in Turkey has had no such authority, there will not be an Islamic Revolution.

Most of the comparative works on the Shi'a and Sunni political trajectories mainly revolve around these themes that are presented in a straightforward way by Akyol. The Shi'a tradition of rebellion versus the

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[25] Another figure whom stressed this difference –via her book "İki Ülke İki Devrim," İstanbul: Say Yayınları- is Nevval (Çizgen) Sevindi. Although this sectarian difference is not presented in such a clear cut manner in academia, it continued to remain as an significant topic, To name a few see, Sena Karasipahi, (2009), "Comparing Islamic Resurgence Movements in Turkey and Iran," *The Middle East Journal*, (63),1, J. Francois Bayart, (1995), "Republican Trajectories in Iran and Turkey: A Tocquevillian Reading," in Ghassam Salame (ed) *Democracy without Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World*, London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 282-283. And also see. Taha Akyol, (1998), *Türkiye ve İran'da Mezhep ve Devlet*, İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, which is a study located between academic and popular levels.

Sunni quietest attitude and as a result autonomous (from the state) Shi'a clergy versus a dependent (on the state) Sunni clergy can be found as the most emphasized dichotomies. Although these arguments have some legitimacy, it is difficult to agree that they are comprehensive enough to explain all aspects of the reality. For instance, significant exceptions to such straightforward readings can be found with respect to historical trajectories. As the historical trajectories this thesis covers show, at various historical moments, Shia clergy worked hand in hand with the rulers and whereas quieter Sunni counterparts rebelled under difficult social conditions. Above all, one must bear in mind that no sect represents a coherent social unity. There are important dimensions determining the historical paths, such as; rural/tribal/urban, religious/secular, left/right, class, educational and regional differences. Moreover, it would be wrong to claim that sectarian identities can emerge autonomously and remain unchanged. Through the course of history, religious identities, as with other identities, have been produced, reproduced and maintained through interaction with other identities.

Putting these in perspective, another question arises. <u>Why does a comparison between Turkey and Iran always embody the religious and sectarian differences of these countries? Why are these differences considered to be the main level of analyses?</u>

Taking political and ideological backgrounds in which these approaches are embedded into consideration can provide some answers. As mentioned above, those who focused on the sectarian differences between Turkey and Iran took one side in a once popular Turkish political debate concerning whether Turkey would become Iran. In particular, the opinion leaders from the 'liberal' political wing put forward the differences between Sunni and Shi'a as the factors preventing the actualization of such a political prediction. On the back cover of his book Akyol wrote unreservedly that "Sunni Ottoman sharia paved way to a secular republic whereas Shia Iranian Sharia paved way to a theocratic republic."[26] Although the contribution of adding culture and religion to the comparative works are discussed above, it is hard to consider Akyol's culturally deterministic line of thought as convincing. The attempt to understand the histories of those two countries only in relation to the differences between Shia and Sunni and to comment on their future trajectories without taking into consideration the economic and political factors and international dynamics seems to remain inadequate. One can rightfully ask such questions as: <u>Why is Shi'a the dominant sect in Iran? Why a certain interpretation of Shi'a has become dominant, although the Shi'a sect consists of various interpretations within itself?</u> Barrington Moore illustrates the problematic of isolating culture, in his classical work, "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" stating that

> Culture or tradition is not something that exists outside of or independently of individual human beings living together in society. Cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history…..To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied,

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[26] See Akyol, *Türkiye ve İran'da Mezhep ve Devlet,* fourth cover.

sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against a wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology.[27]

At the very beginning, I mentioned that academic works have also focused on the difference between the Shi'a and Sunni sects; yet in a more refined way. The way in which Theda Skocpol analyses the Iranian Revolution of 1979 illustrates this approach. In order to analyse her position in this debate, it is worth presenting a brief overview of her theory. In her well-known book "States and Social Revolutions", Skocpol undertakes structural analyses of the French, Russian and Chinese Revolutions and investigates the causal factors of these three events. She insists that the comparative historian should able to find a comparable structure in social revolutions. Her structural approach denies any possibility of intention as a constitutive factor of revolutions. Change is to be explained by the very structures of the society; the nature of the state, its relation to the indigenous classes, and its competition with the other states. A specific combination, or rather coinciding of the politico-military crisis of the state and popular upheaval results in a social and political transformation. Her aim is to explicate the causes of this crisis and the uprising, and to show that there is a general pattern in the revolutions[28]. The book was written in 1979, the same year in which the Iranian Revolution occurred. It was one of the major events of the 20th century and in Skocpol's words: "came as a surprise to outside observers which included American friends of the Shah, journalists, political pundits, and social scientists including those like me, who are supposed to be experts on revolutions".[29] The revolution actually fit into Skocpol's definition that "social revolutions are rapid, basic transformations of a society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below."[30] However, Skocpol's three cases were agrarian-bureaucratic monarchies, as opposed to Iran, a Third World dictatorship and a rentier state. According to Skocpol, peasant upheavals were crucial in classical revolutions, especially in Chinese and Russian revolutions, but in the case of Iran, it was the urban community that revolted. Perhaps, more interestingly, what Skocpol had considered as a necessary for the weakening of the state, namely international pressures or a military defeat of the state, were absent in the Iranian Revolution. The revolution succeeded in spite of the Shah's huge war machine. All these points were carefully observed by Skocpol, and in her article "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution" she tried to explain the inconsistencies between the dynamics of this revolution and her general theory of revolutions.

Skocpol emphasized in States and Social Revolutions that revolutions are not made but that rather they happen. Yet, in 1982, after the Iranian revolution, she spoke of the Iranian revolutionary people as follows:

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[27] Moore, *Social Origins of the Dictatorship and Democracy*: 486.

[28] Theda Skocpol, (1979), *States and Social Revolutions a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

[29] Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," 265.

[30] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*: 4.

"Their revolution did not just come; it was deliberately and coherently made".[31] In one of the two arguments she used in order to explain the specific characteristic of the Iranian Revolution, she refers to Shi'a Islam. In her words, what is crucial in the making of Iranian revolution is Shi'a Islam, "because of a culture conducive to challenges the authority....historically woven into fabrics of social life".[32] Her words on Iranian Revolution are worth quoting:

> ... the sorts of moral symbols and forms of social communication offered by Shi'a Islam in Iran can sustain the self-conscious making of a revolution. No innovative revolutionary propaganda retailed to "the masses" overnight, in the midst of a societal crisis, can serve this purpose. However, a world-view and a set of social practices long in place can sustain a deliberate revolutionary movement.[33]

So why does Skocpol choose Shi'a political culture as one of the main axis of difference and determinant? It is clear that her approach does not stem from a strict position taking within the ideological debates circulating in Turkey, as in the case of other figures referred above. In other words, she does not take a side in the debate concerning whether Turkey will become like Iran. The cultural medium, dominated by concepts such as pluralism, the clash between civilizations, identities, and the dialogue between civilizations can constitute one side of the answer to the question. Nevertheless, one can find a more comprehensive answer if the "Orientalism" debate is taken into consideration. In other words, the ways in which the west looks at the east can be explanatory. As Edward Said wrote in 'Orientalism', the European academic tradition, as well as fine arts and literature, have their own flaws when looking at the east. One of the most important of these flaws is placing religion, at the center of the analysis; in this case, Islam. Said criticized the orientalist view on the Middle East as follows:

> Even the ones whose specialty is the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the Koran to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. Islam, or a seventh-century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is assumed to possess the unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, imperialism, and even ordinary politics. [34]

In accordance with the critique of Said, one can realise that there is a tendency to overemphasize the religious and sectarian structures in Western or even Turkish authors' observations of Iran. As mentioned above, this thesis does not argue that differences in religion and sects have no explanatory power. They should not be seen as mere epiphenomenon to economic and political developments. Since this thesis basically deals with religion and state relations, such differences will also be taken into consideration. As

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[31] Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," 267.

[32] *ibid.,* 275.

[33] *ibid.*, 275-276.

[34] Edward W. Said, (2001), *Orientalism Western Conceptions of the Orient*, Noida: Penguen Books, 301.

discussed above focusing culture as a tool for comparison has its own merits. Indeed, there is extensive literature that explores the role of religious and sectarian differences to explicate different historical paths.[35] Sectarian differences seem to play a role in creating different historical trajectories in Turkey and Iran. Yet, limiting the causes of completely different forms of religion-state relations to the differences between Shia and Sunni traditions cannot provide us with a satisfactory explanation.

1.3.2 Non Essentialist Religio-Cultural Comparative Studies

There are also some comparative studies focusing on religion yet manage to avoid essentialist-orientalist understanding of religion. Especially after 1990s, with the increasing influence of critical scholars such as Edward Said or Stuart Hall, a new way of thinking about identities in social sciences began to rise. Identities in general, have begun to be understood as "not an essence but rather a positioning"[36] positioned by history and politics. This rather novel and refined approach allowed researchers to analyse religion without essentialising it. Specifically, Aziz al Azmeh's book "Islams and Modernities" should be noted here. He claims that "there are as many Islams as there are situations that sustain it,"[37] supporting the view that different sorts of religious identity formation is possible under different circumstances. Hence this new line in the literature shows the ways in which religious identities are related with different spheres of political and historical domains.

One of the examples of these ways of thinking in the literature comparing Turkey and Iran can be found in Elizabeth Shakman Hard's article "Contested Secularisms in Turkey and Iran" Shakman rejects what she calls 'fixed lenses of European and American approaches to religion and politics'. She claims that this way of thinking constraints western responses to religious and political developments outside the west. Shakman Hard offers a non-essentialist reading of recent rise of Islamic politics in Iran and Turkey. She argues that what is considered as rise of Islamism in these countries can be understood as a public opposition against authoritarian secularist tendencies. Yet they are not religious in the sense that they emanate from a pure religious essence. On the contrary, they present secularist tendencies. Using the conceptual framework posed by Nilufer Göle,[38] Shakman Hard claims that the Green movement and the Justice and Democracy Party are similar in the sense that they "endorsed alternative models of separation and accommodation between politics and religion. Representing variations of non-theocratic politics they have sought to contest and refashion secularism."[39] Briefly, Shakman Hard claims that Islam, whether Shi'a or Sunni, is not an

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[35] Timur Kuran is a leading scholar on this issue, He wrote a wide array of articles on this issue. To name a few, Timur Kuran, *(*2002), *İslâm'ın Ekonomik Yüzleri,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları; Timur Kuran, (2009), "The Economic Impact of Culture, Religion and the Law," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.* (71)5

[36] The concept belongs to Stuart Hall.

[37] Aziz Al Azmeh, (1993), *Islams and Modernities*, London: Verso, 1.

[38] See Nilüfer Göle, (2014), *Modern Mahrem: Medeniyet ve Örtünme,* İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

[39] Elizabeth Shakman Hurd. (2008), "Contested Secularisms in Turkey and Iran," in E. S. Hurd (ed) *The Politics of Secularism in International Relations*, Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press.

obstacle to secularism. Religious movements in both Iran and Turkey can be understood as representatives of alternative modernity.

Another work that compares rise of religious politics in Turkey and Iran is Güneş Murat Tezcur's "Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: the Paradox of Moderation". Tezcur focuses on the trajectory of the Reform Front (RF) in Iran and that of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in Turkey from the beginning of 1990s to 2005. From the framework of "moderation theory", he scrutinizes how far these two movements, RF and JDP, fit into the theory. He argues that although these two movements were moderate in ideology, it cannot be easily claimed that this ideological shift turned into a behavioral shift. In other words, moderation of these two post Islamist movement did not lead them to become fully democratic in the sense that they promote human rights or embrace total transparency. In addition Tezcur, tried to answer the question why RF failed but JDP succeeded in terms of gaining political power. According to him this difference in political trajectories lies in the respective political culture and ideology of existing regimes in Turkey and Iran.

Analyses of the above reviewed two works can show us the ways in which a non-essentialist explanation of Islamic based political movements is possible. In both contexts, neither Shi'a nor Sunni political cultures are emphasized as the essences which determine the political outcomes. On the contrary, they are reviewed in terms of similarities. The differentiation of their trajectory does not lie whether or not they are Sunni or Shi'a but in the political culture they work in. This political culture is the modern ideology of nation states for both Iran and Turkey.

In terms of religion state relations, Birol Başkan is another scholar who contributes to the comparative studies in Iran and Turkey. Başkan develops a conceptual framework at the beginning of his thesis and utilises this framework in a wide array of comparisons.[40] His work is mainly based on the relations between state and religious institutions during the state building era. He analyses the different trajectories of different countries by looking at the levels of incorporation of religious institutions into the state apparatus. According to Başkan, during the state building process, states either incorporate religious institutions into its apparatus or exclude them. In this context Turkey and Iran can be considered as two ideal types: Turkey as an example of total incorporation and Iran as an example of total exclusion.

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[40] Birol Başkan, (2014), *From Religious Empires to Secular States: State Secularization in Turkey, Iran and Russia*, Routledge: New York, Birol Başkan, Religious Institutions and State Building: Incorporation vs. Exclusion, Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Submitted to the Graduate School, The Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 2006. Birol Başkan, *State Secularization and Religious Resurgence: Diverging Fates of Secularism in Turkey and Iran, Politics and Religion*, available on CJ02013. Doi: 10.1017/S1755048313000059. Birol Baskan, (2013), "State Secularity and Its Impact on Societal relations in Turkey and Egypt," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, (35)2.

Başkan gives two basic reasons for this diversification. Firstly, during the state building process in 1920s, ruling elites of Turkey felt more threatened than their counterparts in Iran. Thus, they chose to incorporate religious institutions, which could be a focus of religious opposition, into the state. Secondly, the relatively strong institutional capacity of the state in Turkey made this incorporation process successful. On the contrary, the relatively weak state in Iran and the relatively strong internal organization of the religious institutions led to exclusion. Başkan goes further claiming that the reason behind the strong Islamic opposition in Iran during the 1970s was the exclusion of the religious institutions.

Başkan's work is highly important in gaining an understanding of the structure of religion and state relations during the first half of the 20th century. The differences between the level of institutional capacities of the Iranian and Turkish states were extensively presented in the modernization literature. The differences between the internal organizations of Shi'a and Sunni ulama were mentioned in the Essentialist Religio-Culturalist literature. Yet, this does not limit the explanatory power of Başkan's work in which the novelty lies in his attempts to theorise these popular arguments in a clear cut and academic manner by going beyond the essentialist and modernist assumptions. However, certain limitations can be identified. Firstly, the time frame that was explored –mainly the 20th century- remains relatively limited. The aberrations and exceptions are also neglected -as in any Weberian ideal typing-, and the impacts of the international relations are not taken into analysis.

1.3.3 Modernization Literature

As discussed above, there is a vast amount of literature on Iran and Turkey that tries to explain the difference in their historical trajectories by looking at their sectarian differences. However, there are exceptions to these comparative studies. In most of these exceptions Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah are compared with regard to their modernization attempts. As J. François Bayart claims, comparing Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah is a classic in political science.[41] Such studies highlighted, the similarities between these two figures rather than their differences. This perspective was especially popular in 60s and 70s and the literature mainly included studies conducted within the parameters of the modernization theory.[42] Indeed, this line of thought mainly discussed the exemplary function of European modernization on non-European societies, and the

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[41] J. Francois Bayart, "Republican Trajectories," 287.

[42] Mohammad Homayounpor, (1978), "The Process of Modernization in Iran and Turkey: The Era of State Building," unpublished PhD Submitted to New School for Social Research; Rebecca Joubin Aghazadeh, (1993), "Science, Rationalism and Positivism as the Basis of Secularism and the Disestablishment of Islam: A Comparative Study of Turkey and Iran," unpublished PhD Submitted to the American University; Serhan AFACAN, (2011), "Devletle Yazışmak: Türkiye ve İran Sosyal Tarihçiliğinde Dilekçeler," *Türkiyat Mecmuası,* (21); Celal Metin, (2011), *Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme: Türk Modernleşmesi ve İran (1800- 1941)* Ankara: Phoenix; Touraj Atabaki, (2004), "The Caliphate, the Clerics and Republicanism in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks," in E. J. Zürcher And Touraj Atabaki (ed) *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernisation in Turkey and Iran*, 1918-1942, New York: I. B. Tauris; Touraj Atabaki. (2007), "Time Labour Discipline and Modernization in Turkey and Iran" in Touraj Atabaki (ed), *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and State in Turkey and Iran*, I.B. Tauris: London; Richard F. Pfaff, (1963), "Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran," *The Western Political Quarterly*, (16) 1; Tolga Gürakar, (2012), *Türkiye ve İran: Gelenek, Çağdaşlaşma ve Devrim,* İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 2012.

influences of this European modernization on Turkey and Iran. "Men of Order- Authoritarian Modernization under Reza Shah and Ataturk" edited by Touraj Atabaki and Erik j. Zürcher, can be considered as an example to this line of comparison.[43] In the preface of their book, the authors analysed the similarities between the periods of Ataturk and Reza Shah, within the framework of the modernization theory. According to the authors, European modernization was considered as a model in both countries. Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah transformed their own rural, traditional, agricultural communities into an urban, secular, industrialized society. In this process personal and institutional differences resulted in different levels of modernization. Mustafa Kemal, as the inheritor of a more developed institutional legacy from the Ottoman Empire, was more successful in his attempts to modernize his country. Reza Shah did nothing but follow in his footsteps. The emerging difference between Iran and Turkey overwhelmingly stems from the varying levels of modernization. This line of comparison focuses on important points and generates a valuable insight. Yet, I argue that it also has certain flaws.

First, as the critiques of modernization theory claim, studies of this kind carry the risk of falling into the trap of ethnocentrism.[44] As they compare modernization attempts of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah, they consider the western experience as the example of the universal pattern. The actions of Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal are evaluated in terms of their proximity to this so-called universal pattern. In other words, the Iranian and Turkish experiences are judged by the values and standards of the western historical path. For example, Homayounpor claims that the framework of political, economic and social development that was built in Iran and Turkey, were a "prominent feature of a process which originally began sometime in the seventeenth century and from there spread to other regions and continents."[45] Rebecca Aghazadeh, after writing a long chapter summarizing the thoughts of western rationalists and positivists, compared the speeches of Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah to see the extent to which these speeches fit into the western thought. This hierarchical relation between the already modernized west and the modernizing Iran and Turkey can be considered as problematic in itself. Furthermore, another problematic hierarchical relation is being constituted between Turkey and Iran. Celal Metin's book entitled "Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme: Türk Modernleşmesi ve İran" is a quintessential example of such a hierarchical relation constructed among Turkey and Iran. Metin focuses on the imitation relation between Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal explaining that most of the reform attempts in the Reza Shah Era stemmed from this relation. As a result of its closeness to the modern west, Turkey became a forerunner of modernisation. He claims that it is impossible to consider Reza Shah and Ataturk as equals despite Reza Shah's attempts to follow and imitate Ataturk.[46]

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[43] E. J. Zürcher and Touraj Atabaki (2004), (ed) *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization in Turkey and Iran, 1918-1942*, New York: I. B. Tauris.

[44] See. Dean C. Tipps. (1973), "Modernisation Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, (15)2; Howard J. Wiarda, (1981), "the Ethnocentrism of the Social Science Implications for Research and Policy." *The Review of Politics*, (43)2.

[45] Mohammad Homayounpor, "The Process of Modernization in Iran and Turkey," 9.

[46] Celal Metin, *Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme,* 319.

This point of view neglects the domestic dynamics of Iranian society and portrays it solely as an imitator. Note that, Metin uses loaded adjectives such as the "primitive" motives of Iranian society, at another point in his book.[47]

Second, most of the authors who undertake this sort of comparison are prone to neglect the pre-modern period. As a starting point to their comparison they tend to take the Tanzimat era in the case of Ottoman Empire and the early Qajar movements of modernization in the case of Iran. In terms of the Turkish case the Ottoman classical age or Safavid period are not taken into account. A number of studies do not even take the pre 20th century period into consideration. Richard F. Pfaff's classic article "Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran" is an example of such a framework. He argues that in "both Shiite Iran and Sunni Turkey … society as late as 1900 was little different from society a millennium earlier. Islam had literally frozen the basic pattern of society in each country".[48] Such an argument oversees important dynamics such as the early modernization attempts, the incorporation of Iranian and Turkish economy into capitalism, consequent transformations in the social structures and the impacts of nationalist ideologies. Pfaff can be criticised in terms of the contribution he makes to the dissemination of orientalist motives.[49]

Without doubt, not all attempts to compare Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Period contain such fallacies. There are various works that go beyond the modernization paradigm. For example, John R. Perry's article "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran" focuses on the inner dynamics by not neglecting the antecedent experiences. He claims that the ancient regimes of Iran and Turkey are the key to understanding the respective success of language reforms. Perry points to one general difference between the modernizations programs of Turkey and Iran. According to him Turkey's problems were, or were seen to be, simple. There was one villain, the Islamic Ottoman past, one goal, independent westernization, and one method which were to persuade the masses to see things just as simply. Neither Reza Shah nor the Iranian intellectuals managed to simplify Iran's problems in this way, either for themselves or for the masses. The catalogue of villains included Britain and Russia as well as traditional Islam, but none of them could be antagonized outright.[50] Serhan Afacan's article in the Turkiyat Journal can also be considered to avoid the common fallacies. He compares Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Periods by looking at the petitions sent from segments of Turkish and Iranian masses to their official institutions. By doing so, Afacan concentrates on the relations between state and society, which is a largely neglected issue in the modernization literature.

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[47] *ibid*., 297. .Serhan Afacan points out this usage of pejorative language in his review of the book. Afacan, Serhan. (2012), "Kitap Değerlendirmesi: Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme: Türk Modernleşmesi ve İran (1800- 1941)," İnsan ve Toplum (2) 3.

[48] Richard F. Pfaff. "Disengagement from Traditionalism," 80.

[49] The use of concepts such as traditionalism is also criticized by the critiques. Samuel Huntington noted that "modernity and tradition are essentially asymmetrical concepts. The modern ideal is set forth, and then everything which is not modern is labelled traditional. Samuel P. Huntington, (1971), the Change to Change: Modernisation Developments and Politics, *Comparative Politics* (3) 3, 293.

[50] John R. Perry. (1985), "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies,*(17) 3.

1.3.4 Institutional –Economic Comparisons

Although largely dominated by cultural and modernization approaches, comparative studies on Iran and Turkey are not limited only to those studies conducted from these perspectives. There are also institutional and economic comparisons; some bilateral, and others being multilateral, adding another national context to the comparison, usually Egypt.[51] "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran" by Hootan Shambayati can be given as an example to these comparisons.[52] In his article and dissertation, Shambayati focuses on the sources of government revenues and their impacts on the political sphere. He claims that what distinguishes the Iranian experience from its Turkish counterpart is the existence of oil revenues in Iran, which makes it a rentier state. He considers that this condition attributed a degree of autonomy to Iranian state and resulted in Islamic activism and the Iranian Revolution.

Another comparative attempt that focuses on the economic and institutional dimensions is Esra Çeviker Gürakar's PhD thesis, which compares the diverse transformation of the economic institutions in Turkey and Iran.[53] Gürakar adopts a theoretical framework which she calls "clash of paths" and analyses the relations between political and economic institutions, the role of informal institutions in building the economic paths and the transformative impacts of interaction between different economic paths. She mainly focuses on the post-World War II era and follows the transformation of economic institutions until the 1980s.

Although this line of comparison is not of primary relevance for the subject matter of this thesis, above mentioned works still provides us with useful insights about different economic paths and impacts of them to religion state relations. This thesis also uses economic differences and similarities in Iranian and Turkish historical trajectories when applicable. Especially the variations of the sources of revenues for religious establishments are considered as important in order to analyse the relative autonomy and dependency of these establishments.

1.3.5. Current Political Comparisons

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[51] To name a few, Charles Issawi, (1981), "Egypt, Iran and Turkey 1800-1970: Patterns of growth and development in disparities," In P. Bairoch, and M. Levy-Leboyer (ed), *In Economic Development since the Industrial Revolution*, New York: St. Martin's Press, Sami Zubaida, (2000), "Trajectories of Political Islam: Egypt, Iran and Turkey," *The Political Quarterly*, (71)

[52] Shambayati, Hootan. (1994), "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran," Comparative Politics, (26) 3

[53] Esra Çeviker Gürakar, (2011), Institutions and Economic Development: An Analytic Narrative Approach to Turkish and Iranian Cases. Unpublished PhD dissertation submitted to Marmara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Iktisat (ING) Anabilim Dalı

There are studies that compare the religious movements between Turkey and Iran which can be categorized under this heading of "Current Political Comparisons." Especially after JDP's coming into power in Turkey and the rise of Kurdish movement, the political structure of Turkey has more frequently become a source of academic interest. Iran at the same time encounters similar problems such as rise of ethnic nationalism and the Green movement. In this respect, the works comparing military and bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey and similar dual structure of the Iranian regime are also chosen as cases of comparison.

One scholar who compares Turkey and Iran by focusing on current political developments is Hootan Shambayati. Shambayati in his article written in 2004 compares constitutional structures of Iran and Turkey and discuss the role assigned to the judiciary in the two systems. He claims that Iran and Turkey are similar in the sense that their political structures combine both authoritarian and democratic practises. In these countries sovereignty is divided between elected sources of power and unelected bodies which he called "guardians of the regime". In Iran, this is reflected in the Parliament and the supreme leader, whereas in Turkey, it is embedded in military bureaucratic apparatus. According to Shambayati, in both countries judiciary is positioned as an integral mechanism to serve for maintaining the needs of guardians. He analyses the trial of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Gholamhussein Karbaschi within this paradigm. He claims that their imprisonment shows the position of judiciary in the struggle between elected and non-elected sources of power. [54]

Mustafa Suphi Erden is another scholar who compares Turkey and Iran through citizenship formations. Although he analyses the nation building processes of Iran and Turkey and covers the period from the late 19th Century to the 1980s, his main aim is to understand current particular political configuration of citizenship and ethnicity.[55] He argues that the main determinants of Turkish citizenship are the state tradition inherited from the Ottoman past, ethnic-cleansing of the non-Muslim subjects and assimilation of Kurds living in Turkey. However, it is the weak state structure and strong societal movements; -in addition to the provincial autonomous movements- that constitutes the main tenets of Iranian citizenship. As a result, he claims that Turkish ethnicity is the main base of national identity of Turkey, whereas Iranian national identity is much more inclusive. He claims that this pattern continues after the 1980s for both countries.Various top level leaders of government and military in the Islamic Republic are Azerbaijanis who can speak Azeri as well as Persian. This demonstrates a clear contrast to the case in Turkey. It would be quite difficult, if not impossible, to find Kurdish high level bureaucrats or military, who could speak both

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[54] Shambayati, Hootan. (2004), "A Tale of Two Mayors: Courts and Politics in Iran and Turkey, "*International Journal of Middle East Studies.* (36)

[55] Erden asserts that "If the major ideas of this thesis can be used to observe historically connected patterns of politics and ideas in current Turkey and Iran or if they can point out questions that worth discussion on current Turkey and Iran, then they can be considered to make sense," see Mustafa Suphi Erden,(2010), Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey and Iran, Unpublished PhD dissertation submitted to The Graduate School of Social Sciences, The Department of Sociology, Middle East Technical University, 235.

Kurdish and Turkish. Consequently, the citizenship in Islamic Republic can be considered still more inclusive in comparison the citizenship in Turkey. [56]

To sum up current political comparisons mainly focus on processes at the level of inner politics. The rivalry in the political arena and the citizenship rights are the two subjects that are popular as far as current comparative attempts regarding Iran and Turkey concerns. Next part of the chapter will focus on depicting a general picture of different types of analysing religion-state relations.

1.4 A Review of Religion-State Relations

This dissertation aims to compare Iran and Turkey in terms of the relations between state and religion. As mentioned at the very beginning of this chapter, the usefulness of a comparative approach has been recognized since Ancient Greek times. In fact, the theme of this work, the relations between religion and state, can also be traced back to early periods. The infamous execution of Socrates for "failing to acknowledge the gods that the city acknowledges" provides an example of the relationship between state and religion. In fact, ancient history is full of examples of various kinds of relations between the state and religion. Modern history is no exception since such relations and power struggles continued to exist during the modern ages. Although the relationship between state and religion varies to a great extent, three models can be extracted. On the one hand, there are theocracies in which religion seems to dominate the political sphere. As can be exemplified with the famous words of Ayatollah Khomeini "religion is politics, politics is religion". On the other hand, there are states that try to stamp out all religious aspects from the political sphere. In the Erfurt Congress in 1891 Freidrich Engels called for; "the [c]omplete separation of the church from the state. All religious communities without exception are private associations … They are to be deprived of any support from public funds and of all influence on public schools."[57] However, most of the relations fall into the middle of these two opposing positions. The place and the role of religion in the society have always created social and political conflict. With French conceptualisation *La Guerre des Deux France*[58] continued to exist not only in France but within most of the modern states.

As discussed above, there is reasonable amount of literature comparing Iran and Turkey. Although this literature does not mainly focus on religion and state relations in these two countries, it is interesting to note that main currents in religion state debates shows some parallels with this literature. Three main axes can be identified in the religion-state literature. First, there are cultural approaches, which are similar to cultural comparative approaches to Iran and Turkey. These approaches, in essence, postulate a correlation between the specific religious and sectarian structures and the structure of the states. In this sense, they mainly focus

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[56] Erden, "Citizenship and Ethnicity."

[57] Quoted in Jack Conrad, (2007), *Fantastic Reality: Marxism and the Politics of Religion*, London:JC Publications and November Publications, 298.

[58] The war between the two Frances.

on the differences between Islam and Christianity. Second, there are studies of state-religion relations, which can be considered within the framework of modernization. Proponents of this approach, mainly concentrate on modernization and its relation with religion. Put most simply, the secularization theory refers to the notion that societies become less religious as a result of modernization. Third approach looks at the role of interests and institutions in order to understand the relation between religion and state. In other words, this approach tries to understand the economy of religion. For them, the relationship between state and religion is neither determined by an unchanging essence as the culturalists assume, nor it is unilinear as the modernists assume. Yet, it is produced and reproduced during the interaction. In the section, I will discuss the pros and cons of these approaches and identify the position of my work in relation to the accumulated literature.

1.4.1 Culturalist Approaches to Religion-State Relations

A number of scholars claim that the differences between Islam and Christianity have much to do with the dynamics of state-religion relations. Most of them portray Christianity as a religion more open to secularization but portray Islam as distanced. The phrase "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's" is referenced to explain the relations between Christianity and the state. According to the proponents of this approach, Christianity essentially postulates a separation between state and religion whilst Islam essentially rejects such a separation. In other words, in Islam; religion and state (din u devlet) are inseparable. At the very beginning of his book "Muslim Society", Ernest Gellner wrote that "Islam is the blueprint of the social order. It holds that a set of rules exist, eternal divinely ordained, and independent of the will of the men which defines the proper ordering of the society."[59] Bernard Lewis is another scholar who claims that there is no distinction between politics and religion in Islam. After analysing the Christian political and religious tradition, and referring to the biblical phrase presented above, he claims that in "Islam and Judaism there is no equivalent distinction."[60] Samuel Huntington describes state-religion relations from a similar perspective, yet he adopts a subtler conceptualisation. For him, secularism as a specific type of state-religion relations stems from the historical trajectory of -what he calls- the western tradition. To explicate further, it is apt to quote from his famous treatise "The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order":

> Throughout Western history, first the Church and then many churches existed separate from the state. God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual authority and temporal authority had been a prevailing dualism in Western culture. Only in Hindu civilization were religion and politics as clearly separated. In Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior partner. The separation and recurring clashes between church and state that typify

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[59] Ernest Gellner, (1981), *Muslim Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1.

[60] Lewis, Bernard. (2010), *Faith and Power: Religion and the Politics in the Middle East*, Oxford University Press: New York, 45. For a discussion of Lewis's way of understanding Islam see Edward W. Said. (2007), *Medyada İslam Gazeteciler ve Uzmanlar Dünyaya Bakışımızı Nasıl Belirliyor?* İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

Western civilization have occurred in no other civilization. This division of authority contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West.[61]

In fact, it is not only the western, liberal and conservative intellectuals who can be considered as adopting a culturalist approach. For example, Gilbert Achar, a Lebanese intellectual and socialist writer, in his famous article "Eleven Thesis on the Current Resurgence of Islamic Fundamentalism" wrote that "[t]here has been no eruption of Islam into politics. Islam and politics have always been inseparable, as Islam is a political religion in the etymological sense of the word. Thus, the demand for the separation of religion and state in Muslim countries is more than secularist: it is openly anti-religious." [62]

Such arguments can be considered as involving reductionist and essentialist elements. They are prone to accept monolithic essences -such as western world or Christianity, consequently neglecting the ongoing heterogeneity in them. Unfortunately, they also fail to see the diversity of the state religion relationships in the Muslim World. How far putting Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Indonesia and Iran into the same basket is convincing? Such arguments also tend to overlook the historical evolution of Islam itself. It is difficult to claim that Islam, in itself, has a state theory from the very foundation. One should bear in the mind that the idea of the Islamic state is novel and product of modernity. It is historically constructed.[63] Even a brief look at the history of Islam shows us that various clashes between politics and religion did occur. The Muslim world, if one chooses to use such a term, hosted various distinct examples to the separation of religion from politics. In fact, Ira Lapidus shows the early examples of "secular" states in the Muslim world as follows:

> In fact, religious and political life developed distinct spheres of experience, with independent values, leaders, and organizations. From the middle of the tenth century the effective control of the Arab-Muslim Empire had passed into the hands of generals, administrators, governors, and local provincial lords; the Caliphs had lost all effective political power. Governments in Islamic lands were henceforth secular regimes- Sultanates - in theory authorized by the Caliphs, but actually legitimized by the need for public order. Henceforth, Muslim states were fully differentiated political bodies without any intrinsic religious character, though they were officially loyal to Islam and committed to its defense.[64]

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[61] Samuel Huntington, (2003), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order*, New York: Simon Schuster Paperbacks, 70.

[62] Gilbert Achar, (2004), *Eastern Cauldron: Islam, Afghanistan and Palestine in the Mirror of Marxism*, London: Pluto Press, 49.

[63] See Mohammed Ayoub. (2008), *The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World,* Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 67 Also see A. A Naim, (2008), *Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

[64] Ira M. Lapidus, (1975), "The Separation of State and Religion in the Development of Early Islamic Society," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (6).. See also Nazih Ayyubi, (1991), *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, London: Routledge. Ayyubi especially in the "The Theory and Practice of the Islamic State" chapter of the above mentioned book discusses the ways in which Islamic state evolved through the course of history and how ulama gradually developed an Islamic theory of politics according to the needs of the rulers.

This study also aims to highlight the varying degrees of state-religion relations by referring to Iranian and Turkish experiences. It recognises the fact that neither Iran nor Turkey emerged as fully secular states in any part of their historical trajectory; but also they were never fully governed by the rules of religion. By showing how the state-religion relations vary among two Muslim countries, this dissertation aims to go beyond the assumptions of the above mentioned studies.

1.4.2   Modernist Approaches to Religion State Relations

The modernization theory dominated social sciences throughout the greater part of the 20th century. In general, this theory postulates an ongoing struggle between the traditional and the modern, and foresees a transformation of traditional structures to modern ones. Hence, religion, as the quintessential form of tradition, is expected to lose its importance in the modernization process. In other words, industrialization, urbanization and mass education will naturally diminish the influence of religion on social as well as private life. This process is called secularization which is a dominant approach in understanding religion and state relations for modernists. For a vast majority of social scientist who believe in modernization, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, secularization, like modernization, was considered as a unilinear, inevitable and irreversible process. Yet, it is important to note that identifying a single theory of secularization in the literature would be difficult. One widely referenced definition of secularization is provided by Peter L. Berger. He defined secularization as "the process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols."[65] On the other hand, Jose Casanova highlights three basic characteristics of secularization as the decline of religious beliefs and practices, the privatization of religion, and differentiation of secular spheres.[66] All these characteristics indicate a certain degree of separation or emancipation of state from religion. Consistent with the major postulates of modernization theory, secularization is also deemed as global and unilinear.

Secularization theory was a dominant approach around the 1950s and 1970s, but starting from the 1980's, it began to be heavily criticized. It is argued to have lost its explanatory power to a great extent. Especially, the ongoing popularity of religious practice in the United States of America, the growth of religiously motivated wars especially in the Middle East and the emergence of New Age currents all over the world are indicated as factors diminishing explanatory power of the secularization theory. The defenders of the secularization thesis predicted none of these developments. Religion, which was once claimed to have come closer to extinction, came back to the scene and put its mark on political events. For instance, Jose Casanova began the first chapter of his famous book 'Public Religions in the Modern World' by asking: "Who still

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[65] Peter L. Berger. (1990), *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of Sociological Theory of Religion*. New York: Anchor Books: 107.

[66] Jose Casanova, (2012), *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press,

believes the myth of secularization?"[67] Peter L. Berger rejected his own early ideas in the Sacred Canopy and gave his edited book the title: 'Desecularization of the World'. He claimed that "the assumption we lived in a secularized world is false …a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled "secularization theory" is essentially mistaken." [68]

For the subject matter of this thesis, one of the most important problems of the secularization thesis is the binary structure assumed between the state and religion. For the proponents of the secularization thesis, the ideal state should not bear an ideological and religious identity. In this sense, the Iranian and Turkish states and most of the other states in the Middle East are aberrations. However, I will show the ways in which the modern Iranian and Turkish states utilized religious discourses in various ways. Both these states made use of religion to pursue their needs, for legitimacy, survival and power. In the Turkish case, the Presidency of Religious Affairs can be seen as an example to the Turkish state's attempts to institutionalize religion in order to control its population. Although it was relatively autonomous, the Iranian state of Reza Shah contributed to the creation of a religious morality. By the end of the 1970s, the Iranian state was obtained by a fraction of clergy. Inconsistent with the assumptions of the secularization theory the Iranian Revolution resulted in the establishment of a kind of theocracy. By 2002, the Turkish state began to be governed by an Islamist rooted political party. These experiences and outcomes challenge the unilinear understanding inherent in modernist approaches and secularization theory.

1.4.3 Religious Economy Model: the Role of Interest and Institutions

Since the secularization theory has lost its explanatory power, a number of theories have been developed to understand the role of religion in the modern world. These are divided into two groups; religious economy or rational choice. The religious sphere is understood using an analogy of economic theory in which there are buyers and sellers in the religious market and they are rational actors. Just as a commercial market in which different actors compete to attract consumers, religious economies consist of actors and organizations (church and clergy) seeking to attract consumers. In this sense, religions are considered as organizations in competition with each other for followers and they pursue their institutional interests like states. Thus, there is no unidirectional and irreversible way leading to secularization. Similar to the fluctuations in the economy, the role of religion also fluctuates. Since the role of institutional interests of the state and religion vary during different cultural and historical periods, it is not easy to claim that there is a predetermined area of conflict or cooperation between these two sides. The levels of cooperation or conflict are to be determined by the level of institutional interests of these two. Also, again similar to the dynamics of the market, the more pluralistic the religious market, the more people (consumers) are able to find something to suit them.

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[67] *ibid*., 11.

[68] Peter L. Berger. (1999), "The Desecularization of the World a Global Overview", İn Peter L. Berger et al (ed) *The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics*, Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 2.

Competition leads to a more religious social sphere. Beginning in the 1970s, this perspective was developed by the works of Rodney Stark, William Sims Bainbridge, Roger Finke, Laurence Iannaccone, and others.[69]

The religious market theory is criticized on many grounds. One of the most fundamental criticism is directed towards its portrayal of actors as rational agents. For example, Steve Bruce emphasizes the crucial difference between religion and consumer products in that a person does not change their religious beliefs when a new one emerges. People have a far deeper and enduring attachment to our religious choices, than to other market goods, such as cars or washing machines.[70] Secondly the Religious Market theory has limited explanatory power in terms of non-Western religions or folk beliefs. It fails to explain non-exclusionist and un-organized religions such as Buddhism. Although the religious market theory claims to propose universal assumptions, it is closer to explaining the rise of religion in the United States.[71] Related to this, the Religious Market theory also fails to explain the rise of religion in Muslim countries. These countries have the least pluralistic religious markets, yet are overly religious. There is no competition but they have the most religious social sphere.

It is hard to claim that the Religious Market theory mostly focuses on Muslim Societies. Yet exceptions exist. One of the most interesting of these exceptions is the comparative work of Anthony Gill and Arang Keshavarzian on Church-State relations in Iran and Mexico. Gill and Keshavarzian argue that in order to understand the role of religion in the modern era, one should focus on the interest of the actors in the religious market. They are positioned at the very opposite sides of the culturalist approaches to religion-state relations. They chose a Catholic and a Muslim country as the least similar examples "to illustrate how variation in cultural tradition plays a relatively limited role in church-state conflict."[72] They show the ways in which religion and state seek to maximize their control over the population, gaining further revenue and

[69] Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge, (1987), *A Theory of Religion*. Rutgers University Press; Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, (2000), *Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human Side of Religion,* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press; R Finke, and R Stark, (1988), "Religious Economies and Sacred Canopies," *American Sociological Review* (53); Laurance R. Iannaccore, (1998), "Introduction to the Economics of Religion," *Journal of Economic Literature* (36)

[70] Bruce, Steve. (1993), "Religion and Rational Choice: A Critique of Economic Explanations of Religious Behavior," *Sociology of Religion*, (54) 2. In another piece which Bruce wrote he indicates that not only the consumers but also the sellers are bounded by their attachments. "If a car dealer find he is not making a profit he will change franchise to another brand, or even get out of car sales altogether. When Liberal Protestant churches find their membership falling they do not become Catholic or give up religion altogether. More likely … they will continue in the old ways and persuade themselves that their product is too good for the public." Bruce, Steve. (2006), "Rational Choice Theory," in Steve Bruce and Steven Yearley (ed) *Sage Dictionary of Sociology*, London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 253.

[71] Alles, Gregory D. (2000), "Religious Economies and Rational Choice: On Rodney Stark and Roger Finke, Acts of Faith," in Michael Stausberg (ed) *Contemporary Theories of Religion: A Critical Companion*. New York: Routledge, 96.

[72] Gill, Anthony & Keshavarzian, Arang. (1999), "State Building and Religious Resources: An Institutional Theory of Church-State Relations in Iran and Mexico," *Politics Society,* (27): 3.

attempting to reinforce their autonomy. These authors argue that, in both countries the level of conflict and cooperation does not depend on any ideational factors but rather on interests.

Although specific problematics of the above mentioned three approaches to religion state relations are considered valuable, this thesis does not directly adopt one of them. Instead this thesis adopts an eclectic approach to religion state relations, rather than looking through the lenses of a specific paradigm. The necessity of this approach is a result of the content and structure of the thesis. The historical context of this thesis will cover both modern and pre modern periods. It also emphasizes the impacts of the international context, institutional change and ideology throughout a long period of time. This makes it hard to directly adopt one of the above mentioned approaches. Firstly the research area of the secularization theory is largely limited to modern ages. However this thesis covers a time period in which religion is institutionalised and the power of it rose. Thus, it is hard to assume that religion diminished its power for the early period this thesis covers. Secondly, the main question of the culturalist approach to religion state relations -that is whether some religions are more prone to secularism- is also considered inadequate for the subject matter of this thesis. Because two sides of the comparison consist of Muslim countries. The Christian Islam Dichotomy in which culturalist approach works are not applicable to the content of this thesis. Thirdly, basic focus of the religious market theory which is the reasons of the religious revival is not applicable in thesis finished in 1940s.

Yet all three approaches, in some respects, are relevant to the historical trajectories covered in this thesis. First of all, although not as straightforward as the Christian vs Islam dichotomy, there is a literature that considered Shi and Sunni political thought as different in regard to religion state relations. The thesis asserts that this way of thinking hides as much as it reveals. As discussed above and throughout this thesis, it is problematic to assume that Shia and Sunni political cultures are ahistorical essences of the related societies. Shia and Sunni establishments acted differently in different settings of different historical moments. Secondly, secularization theory is found relevant for the modern period of both Iran and Turkey. Although their level and intensity varied, both countries faced a period in which the role of religion has gradually diminished. This is clear especially for the last period of this thesis, that is to say Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and Reza Shah Pehlevi periods. Lastly religious market theory contributes to the research question of the thesis. As the above discussed Gill and Keshavarzian article exemplifies, the level of conflict and cooperation does not depend on any ideational factors but rather on interests.

1.5 The Significance of the Study and Its Content.

This thesis compares Turkey and Iran in a historical context attempting to analyse the historical trajectories that resulted in different relationships between religion and the state for these countries. It mainly focuses on three aspects of the social sphere; institutional, international and ideological. Dividing the social sphere into different aspects poses certain challenges and limitations. Parts of the social sphere are interrelated but also they remain distinct at particular points in time, making it difficult to define the exact borders. In order

to overcome the practical difficulties, this dissertation employs the following strategy. In the first four chapters after the introduction, a historical narrative is established, focusing on the evolution of religion state relations in both Turkey and Iran, without drawing a strict line between the three areas mentioned above.[73] In the last chapter, these three areas will be analysed by referring to their impacts in the religion state relations. This strategy will allow us to see the historical trajectory in continuity and in its totality.

As I discussed above, there is a vast literature comparing Turkey and Iran on many grounds. There are also various ways of analysing the relations between religion and the state. To compare Iran and Turkey cultural, modernization and institutional approaches are all utilized and to some extent, these approaches refer to religion state relations. In this section, I will specify my position against these approaches, present my main arguments and emphasize the points which distinguish my work from existing literature.

First, as mentioned above, cultural approaches to the relations between religion and state dominate the literature. <u>This dissertation mainly asserts that the differences between the Shi'a and Sunni sects are overemphasised.</u> Having stated this, I do not totally ignore the role of ideational structures since they do matter in the sense that they are a part of structure that bound the Sunni and Shi'a ulama which also "molds the rhetoric, form and intensity of the conflict."[74] Following Zubaida's line of thought I believe that religion in the sense of faith, observance and theology does account for in certain conditions but not in every aspect of communal life. In this regard, the central divide between Shi'a and Sunni is not necessarily religious. These labels become communal markers; membership and allegiances do not depend on religious adherence. Thus, Shi'a and Sunni never constitute monolithic structures.[75] Throughout the following chapters I will discuss the doctrinal debates including the historical context in which these debates occurred. I will also address both institutional and ideological fragmentation of the ulama. To reiterate, no sectarian identity emerged from the middle of nowhere and remain unchanged. So, one of the main arguments of this dissertation is that; an essentialist sectarian analysis of the Iranian and Turkish history cannot yield accurate and useful results. I argue that, against the essentialist arguments that over emphasize this sectarian difference, the Shi'a and Sunni identities as others, are produced, reproduced and maintained through interaction with other identities through the course of history. By employing such and assumption, I aim to overcome the essentialist tendencies existing in the cultural literature.

Secondly, I consider the institutionalization of both religion and state as an important avenue important to compare the Iranian and Turkish experiences. That is to say, it is necessary to look at the material factors that construct the structure within which state and religion evolve and become institutionalized. In this sense,

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[73] Yet, a brief summary regarding the developments in these three spheres will be given at the end of each chapter.

[74] *ibid.,* 435

[75] Sami Zubaida, "Politics and Society in Iraq in the 20th century," quoted from his talk in Massachusetts Institute of Technology on 03/05/2005.   http://video.mit.edu/watch/politics-and-society-in-iraq-in-the-20th-century-9927/

I focus on the <u>modes of institutionalization of the religion against the state</u>. Hence one of the main arguments of the thesis is as follows. I argue that throughout the most of the Ottoman history, religion was firmly attached to state. This tradition also continued during the early Republican period. On the contrary, after the Safavid Period, in which religion and state were closely related, the Iranian experience exhibits a religious sphere that is more autonomous. In terms of institutional differences, I support the similar methodology of Birol Baskan, who focuses on this control and autonomy dichotomy, in his words inclusion and exclusion, is one of the main differences for the divergence of religion state relations in Turkey and Iran. I also show the aberrations that occurred both in the pre modern era -especially during the Safavid period- and in the modern era during the reign of Reza Shah.

Thirdly, as a student of international relations, I observed that what has been lacking in most of the efforts to compare religion state relations of Turkey and Iran is the interaction between international factors and domestic factors. The analysis of this interaction not only shows what kind of relations there are but also their degree. These two countries not only fought with and invaded each other's territories, but also faced various foreign invasions and engaged in other wars. Russia, England, Greece (for Turkey) and Afghan (for Iran) were the major international powers that influenced the religion state relations of Iran and Turkey. The wars with these countries had direct impacts; such as ruining the power of the state and changing the demography. They also had indirect impacts, including the facilitation of religious institutionalization. Thus, the famous phrase "wars make nations" can be developed: "wars not only make nations but also make religions". Yet wars and invasions are not the only factors that impacted upon the domestic sphere. The impacts of international ideologies and incorporation of capitalism are two other important factors that can be consider as influencing the dynamics of state- religion relations in these countries. In this regard, the thesis aims to overcome the blind spots to focus solely on domestic levels when making a comparison.

In International domain, the factors reflected in the religion state relations of both Iran and Turkey are similar yet their levels are different. I divide international factors into three parts. Firstly, <u>international, demonstrated its influence directly through war or invasions</u> and thus is the most important element. Secondly, <u>the impact of western influences such as incorporation into capitalism and the western ideologies such as enlightenment and nationalism are influential</u>. Thirdly, <u>these two countries trans-border relations are important in religion state relations of these countries.</u>

For the first part, wars and invasions both countries share their parts. These conditions created historical moments when the state structures of these countries were either collapsed or remained fragile. The analysis reveals that, as a result of these wars Iranian state, compared to its Turkish counterpart, had always had a more fragile and interrupted structure. So it can be considered as a 'weaker' state compared to its Turkish counterpart.

Turkish state was more directly influenced by the second set of international dynamics. The religious demography of the Ottoman Empire was hugely transformed as a result of nationalism. The wars with Serbs Greeks and the Balkan wars, the forced migration of Armenians and the Greek Turkish population exchange can be understood by looking at the ideology of nationalism. Due to the state of nationalism in the Turkish case, Anatolia became a more homogenized Muslim territory. For Iranian Plateau we cannot observe of such a comprehensive transformation. This transformation of course, had its repercussions on religion state relations.

Thirdly, international influences stem from the relations between Turkey and Iran. As I mentioned in the very beginning, the peoples of these two countries did act together in many historical events and they did found a number of states together. As recall Ağaoğlu's suggestion that: "Iranian history has been, for a thousand years, a branch of Turkish history." Yet, this does not mean that they have always had a cooperative relationship. Especially 17th century Otoman-Safavid Wars had direct effects on both countries religious structures. As a result of this competition, these two countries build their sectarian identities accordingly. These relations between Iranian and Turkish rulers re-emerge during the modern period, this time between Reza Shah and Atatürk. These relations were not hostile, yet it had its impact on state structures of Iran and Turkey.

Last but not least, social sciences in Turkey and in Iran are very much likely to remain over-politicized when compared to their western counterparts. Studies focusing on the religion-state relations are not an exception to this case. Going one step further, it might be argued that, together with the effect of Iranian Revolution and the Rule of Justice and Democracy Party, the religion state relations began to be more intensely and frequently discussed in relation to the popular rank. Therefore, together with the studies covering the issue of ethnicity, they are overtly politicized in both the Turkish and Iranian contexts. The reasons behind this politicization are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Yet, the comparative works carry the potential to go beyond the inner political debates. By critically exploring the similarities and differences, one can avoid the limitations put forward by the inner ideological paradigms and thus constitute a more analytical perspective. I believe that my comparative work will contribute to the debates since it will be positioned outside of this over-politicized arena.

This dissertation is composed of six chapters, including the introduction and conclusion. The second chapter gives a chronological review of history of Iran starting from a discussion on the roots of the Shi'a-Sunni debate up to the beginning of 20th century. Firstly, Safavid era, the time period in which the Shi`itization of Iran began, is assessed by focusing on the characteristics of the relations between the Safavid rulers and the religious institutions. Secondly, the Qajar period is examined by analysing the ways in which the religious establishment emerged as a social power. It is claimed that three main factors paved way to this institutionalization. First are the characteristics of the Qajar state; namely its fragile-tribal structure and lack of legitimacy. Second, the alliance between state and religious establishment against the common threat of

the new religious movements and third; the ideological impact of the Usuli-Akhbari debate. Finally, the chapter discusses two important historical events; the Tobacco Boycott of 1891 and the Constitutional Revolution of 1906. The impacts of these events in terms of the religion-state relationship are also examined.

The third chapter addresses the relations between the state and religion throughout the modern history of Iran. Starting from the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, it explores the historical process that paved the way to Reza Shah's rise to power. Then, the chapter depicts the general characteristics of the era by mainly focusing on the arbitrary structure of his reign. Subsequently, it analyses the religion-state relations during the early period of Reza Khan. Two important turning points have been identified for this analysis; the Republican Crisis and the Conscription Law. The chapter shows the ways in which these two turning points resulted in the victory of the religious establishment. The chapter progresses by exploring how the relation between the state and the religious establishment evolved through the course of the late period of the reign of Reza Shah. The analysis benefits from the following three sub-division spheres; Legal-Institutional, Ideological-Symbolic and Economic. Finally, the chapter analyses the ulama's reactions to the transformations that took place in these respective eras and it will also depict the reasons that lie behind these reactions

The fourth chapter reviews the relations between the state and religion throughout Ottoman history from a historical perspective. It covers the period between the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Abdulhamid II era. It starts with an exploration of the religious structure of Anatolia and discusses the ways in which its heterodox structure, with all its complexity, evolved into a more institutionalized structure. To unpack this process, the foundation of *Seyhulislamlik* and its evolution is analysed. Then, the chapter focuses on the dynamics of Ottoman rulers' strategies of legitimation. Religious, as well as non-religious ways of legitimating are analysed paying special attention to the Ottoman Safavid Wars and their impacts on the religion-state relations of the countries involved in the wars. It is claimed that the Ottoman-Safavid Wars are of crucial importance in terms of the establishment of their sectarian identities. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the late Ottoman era, roughly from the 18th century, focusing on the process of modernization and its impacts on the structure of the state. The transformations in the educational and judicial sphere, which took place as a result of westernization, are discussed by particularly concentrating on the position of the ulama regarding these transformations. In this sense, the ulama's divergent attitudes to the new developments are analysed. Furthermore, the structural causes of these divergent attitudes are discussed. Finally, the era of Abdulhamid II is evaluated in terms of its impact on future developments.

The fifth chapter addresses the religion state relations during the modern period. Starting with the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), it analyses the intellectual debates, most importantly the positivism debate, and scrutinizes the positions of ruling elites of CUP in this context. Then, it depicts the ulama -CUP relations by focusing on the conservative and reformist factions among them. Next, it analyses the religion state relations during the War of Liberation. It focuses on the dual power structure of the era

and explains the ways in which religion is used by both sides as a source of legitimacy. In the second part, this chapter analyses the republican era and the transformations it brought about in legal-institutional, symbolic-ideological and economic spheres. In the legal sphere, the focus is on the abolition of the caliphate and creation of the Directorate of the Religious Affairs. In the symbolic ideological sphere, the transformation is analysed with respect to the relations with religion. In the economic sphere, the ways in which ulama was incorporated into the state apparatus is discussed. Finally, the theme delineates the recurrent themes of religion state relations during the republican era.

In the final chapter a thorough analysis of the similar and diverse aspects of religion state relations in Turkey and Iran is undertaken. In doing so, the historical trajectories of the countries are the arena in which the evolution of the state and religious institutions take place. The problem is mainly discussed on three levels; ideological, international and institutional. In conclusion I present my findings from these three levels of analysis on religion-state relations and reflect on these findings in the context of the literature.

RELIGION AND STATE IN IRAN: EARLY PERIODS

2.1 Introduction

One can assert that in popular domain, Iran is one of the first and foremost countries in the world that its name somehow invokes religion. [76] It has become a mainstream view both in the western world and beyond. Image of Iran, for most, apparently resembles the bearded face of Khomeini with his traditional religious clothes, wearing his black turban and cloak, or a veiled woman walking behind her husband. Academic field is of no exception. Even a brief look at academic works on Iran would show us that there are very few books or essays written without giving special attention to religion.

In this chapter religion is considered as an important tool to understand the history of Iran as well. Yet it is going to be analysed from a social context, a context that allows for one to go beyond the essentialist assumptions regarding the issue. In consistent with Barrington Moore's proposition, "cultural values do not descend from heaven to influence the course of history."[77] On the contrary, they are interacted with different spheres of social phenomena and allied with different sources of social power. So this chapter aims to approach religion as a cultural appearance which institutionalises, deinstitutionalises, converges and diverges during the course of the history.

Following this framework, this chapter discusses the religion-state relationship during the early modern ages of Iran. Starting with a discussion on early perspectives of religious scholarship about Iran, the chapter presents a brief background to Shi`a political doctrine. Then it follows a historical scheme. Firstly, Safavid era –as the time period in which Shi`itization of Iran began- is assessed by focusing on the characteristics of the relations between Safavid rulers and religious institutions. Secondly, Qajar period is examined by analysing the ways in which religious establishment emerged as a social power. It is claimed that during the era, three main factors paved way to this institutionalization. First one is the characteristics of the Qajar state; namely its fragile-tribal structure and lack of legitimacy. Second is the alliance between state and religious establishment against the common threat which are new religious movements, and third is the

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[76] I did a basic research while writing this part. I wrote Iran and Religion to JSTOR and search in the titles by January 2013. There came 72 articles. When I did it for Pakistan there came 26. For Turkey 11 and a bigger size Christian country Philippines came just 6.

[77] Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship,* 486.

ideological impact of Usuli-Akhbari debate. Finally, the chapter discusses two important historical events: Tobacco Boycott of 1891 and Constitutional Revolution of 1906. Impacts of these events in terms of religion-state relationship are also examined.

2.2 An Interpretive Perspective of Religious Scholarship about Iran

The history of Western scholarship on Iran has been following two consecutive trends.[78] In the early periods of Iranian Studies, Iran was studied with a major emphasis on Persian language. Persian-reading `Orientalists` of the colonial period focused more specifically on philological and literary subjects. The reasons of this focus lies in the colonial interests. Persian was widely used in South Asia, and especially during the era of Mongol Rulers it had become the official language of India. When the first relations between West and the region were established and subsequently the colonial rule began to rise, colonizers found Persian as the language of culture and science in wide part of the sub-continent. Hence, they depended on Persian as the *lingua franca* in order to govern India. With Persian being the administrative language of India, it turned out to be a vital impetus for both orientalists and the colonial officers of the period to learn Persian. Hence to work on the structure and literary aspects of the language became the main theme during the era. The eminent orientalist works of the era, were basically as follows Sir Thomas Herbert's short Persian- English Dictionary to Sir William Jones` Grammar of the Persian Language London 1770 including the editions and translations of Sadi`s Golestan, Ferdowsi`s Shehname and Hafez`s poems, the literary works dominate the academic field. [79] Yet, British colonial rulers' decision to rule India by using English- accordingly English became the administrative language of the region- gave way to non-literary Iranian studies. Social and economic subjects started to gain attention. In accordance with social science trends of the era, anthropological studies dominated the field. Especially after the 19th century, interest and attention began to be focused on theories about the Arian roots of Iranians. Yet, religion in Iran –as the subject of this part- still remains largely neglected. Indeed, it can be attributed to sectarian identity of Iranians. As adherents of Shi`a Islam, Iran always carry a minority status in Islam and this minority status reflected itself in the field of academics too. Most of the early orientalist works focuses on Sunni Islam and Shi`a belief system was underestimated if not totally neglected. The reason for this state of affairs is described by Marshall G.S Hodgson in his three-volume seminal book "The Venture of Islam. Conscience and History" in a World Civilization as follows:

> Western scholarship entered the Islamic scholarship above all by three paths: First, there were those who studied the Ottoman Empire. They came to it usually in the first instance from the viewpoint of the European diplomatic history; such scholars tend to see the whole of Islamdom from the political perspective of Istanbul, the Ottoman capital. Second there were those, normally British, who entered the Islamic Studies in India so as to master Persian as good civil servants or at least they were inspired by Indian interests, for them the imperial transition of Delhi tended to

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[78] I am indebted to Dr. Ali Ansari for this insight.

[79] See Encyclopaedia Iranica Great Britain x. `Iranian Studies in Britain the Islamic Period`.

be culmination of Islamicate History. Third, there were the Semitists, often interested primarily in Hebrew studies, who were lured into Arabic… All path were at one in paying relatively little attention to the central areas of the Fertile Crescent and Iran, with their tendency towards Shiism; areas that tended to be most remote from Western penetration.[80]

This position –although there are considerable exceptions such as Bernard Lewis and Henri Corbin-[81] continued until the last quarter of the 20th century. It can be claimed that after Shi`a adherents emerged as actors of social power in Iran, the importance of Shi'a studies began to rise. Most importantly, Iranian students and academics who were working on western universities showed a rising interest to the field, producing a range of new Ph. D. dissertations and original works. It is intriguing here, to note that, thanks to Pahlavi scholarships which are a direct result of booming oil revenues and the rising GNP, Iran became the world leader in the number of students studying abroad. [82] Furthermore as a result of the growing tension between the state and the religious establishment, the scholarship went beyond the Shi'a Studies but more directly involved religion-state relation which is the subject matter of this chapter. Shahrough Akhavi`s "Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran" (1980), Hamid Algar`s "Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906" (1969) and Said Amir Arjomand`s "The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shiite Iran From the Beginning to 1890s" (1984), all of which I used extensively in my research are the products of this period. Especially after the Arab Spring, there has been a growing interest in Shi`a politics, sometimes reaching to the level of obsession. However, as a topic, it is beyond the scope of this chapter. Hence, suffice it to say that, once misunderstood and neglected arena of Shi`a studies came into surface with a direct focus on political dimensions. Both in the Western Academia and in the Middle East studies, Iran and Shi`a politics became very popular. It seems, the developments of the current years have contrasted with Sayyid Mohammed Rizvi`s opinions. Rizvi as an angry Shi'a scholar denouncing the ignorance about Shi`a, in academic field claimed:

> When we focus on the **study of Shí'ism** by the Orientalists, the word "misunderstood" is not strong enough; rather it is an understatement. Not only is Shí'ism misunderstood, it has been ignored, misrepresented and studied mostly through the heresiographic literature of their opponents. It seems as if the Shí'ites had no scholars and literature of their own. To borrow an expression from

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[80] Hodgson, G. S. Marshall.(1974), *The Venture of Islam, Conscience and History in a World Civilization,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 39.

[81] Bernard Lewis`s Ph.D. Dissertation is about Ismaili Shi`a which although not exactly similar to Iranian Shiism yet another important Shi`a community *The Origins of Ismailism,(1975),* AMS press: New York, It was first published in 1940. In addition, Henry Corbin is another well known academic who wrote widely on Shi`a Islam. Most important works regarding the subject are (1977), *Spiritual Body & Celestial Earth: From Mazdean Iran to Shi'ite Iran*. Princeton University Press, (1994), *The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism*. Omega Publications: N.J., and also his *History of Islamic Philosophy* gives considerable place to Shiite world. It is important to note that it was translated and published in the English speaking world by Institute of Ismaili Studies. Furthermore, interestingly, its translation to the Turkish is done by Huseyin Hatemi –an important Turkish academic of Shiite origin. Henri Corbin. *History of Islamic Philosophy*. The Institute of Ismaili Studies: London in Turkish *Islam Felsefesi Tarihi*. Iletisim Yayinlari:Istanbul. 2010.

[82] During 1970s one in every nine foreign students in America was Iranian. See Jennifer M. Bavifard,(2010), Examining Perceptions of Experiences of Iranian College Students in the Post 9/11 Context. Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis Submitted to State University of New York at Buffalo. 24.

Marx, "they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented," and that also by their adversaries.[83]

2.3 A Brief Historical and Cultural Background to Shi'a Political Doctrine

In many respects, Shi`a thought constitutes one of the most important aspects of Iranian culture since the Safavid Rule in the sixteenth century. Shi'a not only presents cultural elements with its rituals and practises, but also has its own impacts on Iranian political sphere. Therefore an adequate investigation of state-religion relations in Iran, requires an examination of historical and cultural background which generates Shi`a political doctrine. Analysing early Shi`a history in detail is not necessary for this study and it is also hard to achieve. However, for an examination of 19th and 20th century religious atmosphere in Iran, one needs to have a basic knowledge of this background. For the purpose of this part, I will address basic tenants of Shi`a doctrine, in particular, of the antecedents of *Ithna Ashariyya* Shi'a, the only part that concerns Iranian political sphere. [84]

Shi`a doctrine is primarily based upon five pillars. The first three are known as `the principles of religion` and in many respects, parallel to Sunni thought. They are; belief in the unity of God [*tawhid*], the mission of the prophets (*nobowwa*) belief in the after world and in the system of reward and punishment [*ma`ad*]. The other two pillars which are called `the principles of the school` can be seen as a source of conflict with Shi`a and Sunni school of thoughts. They are belief in divine justice [*adl*] and the belief of the sacred nature and guidance of imams [*imamate*].[85]

The most distinct and politically most used part of Shi`a Islam is, beyond dispute, *imamate*. The concept literally means 'to lead' and 'to guard', hence *Imam* becomes the leader-guardian of the Islamic community and his aim is the guidance of mankind. In order to be more specific, it is worth quoting Algar`s definition, *imamate* "… is an institution of a succession of charismatic figures who dispense true guidance in comprehending the esoteric sense of prophetic revelation."[86] In other words, the theory of imamate has made the *Imam* as the practical equal of the prophet. Historically, adherents of Shi'a rejected the principle of electing the caliph from among the Prophet Muhammad's companions. They claim that Muhammad's kin had a priority to be the leader. So, they believed that Ali ibn Abu Talib, both the cousin and son in law of Muhammad, was the divinely appointed leader of Muslims and the only legitimate successor of Muhammad. After his death, Shi`a adherents believe that imamate is transmitted to his descendants. So Ali is succeeded by his son Hasan ibn Ali yet abdicated the caliphate to Muawiah ibn Ali Sufyan. Especially

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[83] Sayyed Mohammed Rizvi, (1999), *Shi`ism: Imamete and Wilayat,* Al-Ma'arif Books: Ontario, 4.

[84] Through the course of history, Shi`a has divided into many branches. The largest sects of the 20th century are  Ithna ashariyya known as twelvers, Ismaili and Zeidi. Among these three Ithna ashariyya is the largest one. Shi`a origins of Alevi, Nusairi and Druze sects are a heavily debated theme in the literature.

[85] See Encyclopaedia Iranica, Shiite Doctrine.

[86] Hamid Algar,(1969), *Religion and State in Iran: 1785-1906,* University of California Press: Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2.

after the infamous Karbala massacre, differentiation and distinction of Shi`a as a separate sect, which opposes Sunni caliphate, became more clear. Although they did not have the legitimate power of Islamic state, a considerable amount of people continued to follow Shi`a imams. For *Ithna Ashariyya* Shia the rightful leadership had passed from Ali ibn Talib to a 12 divinely appointed successors. The line of *imamat* survived until the `occultation` [87] of Al Mahdi -last of the twelvers-in 941 AD. According to Jafar al Sadiq who is the sixth imam of Shi`a and one of the early founders of Shiite jurisprudence, *imam*`s attributions are as follows.

> [imam] …is a pillar of God's unity [*tawhid*]. The imam is immune from sin [*khaja*] and error [*dalal*]. The imams are those from whom "God has removed all impurity and made them absolutely pure" [Qur`an, 33:33] they are possessed of the power of miracles and of irrefutable arguments [*dala`il*] and they are for the protection of the people of the earth just as the stars are for the inhabitants of the heavens. They may be likened, in his community to the ark of Noah: he who boards it obtains salvation and reaches the gate of repentance. [88]

As seen from the quotation above, *imam*s were perceived as infallible and nearly omniscientific. They were considered as the absolute protectors of the people and also the religion. During the first three centuries of Islam, Shi'a imam*s* were `visibly present on earth`, yet the situation has changed after the `occultation` of the last *imam* Al Mahdi. According to dominant line of thought in *Ithna Ashariyya* line of Shi'a, since Al Mahdi is absent, ulama or religious scholars played their role as the protectors of religion.[89] In other words, the Mahdi has been represented on earth, according to the consensus of the Shiite ulama', ulama`s duty is to `actively participate in the social and political arena on behalf of the Hidden Imam in order to implement Islam as a total way of life. `[90] Only ulama deserve and only they have the privilege to comprehend and interpret the implied meaning of sacred texts. It is interesting to note that before the `occultation` of Al Mahdi, there was relatively little social power of Shi`a sect. Following Shagrough Akhavi`s line of thought one can claim that Shi`a organizations, institutions and political thought have mainly emerged after the occultation of the last imam. Moreover, Shi`a states were established in various parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Fatimid Dynasty was founded in 909 in Tunisia; in 969 their power reached into Egypt. The Zaydi state in Tabaristan,[91] the Shi`dynasties of Morocco are also examples of Shi`a political power. Kufa

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[87] The death of eleventh imam who apparently had no son, produced a serious crisis, which was finally solved by the doctrine of `occultation`. For Ithna Ashariyya Shi`a, Al Mahdi did not die rather hidden by God. He will reappear and bring justice to the world before the resurrection day. This is called `occultation`.

[88] Said Amir Arjomand. (1984), *The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi'ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 35.

[89] Although ulama`s role as being the protector of religion is the dominant line of thought and also the basis of *Velayat-e Faqih* [Guardianship of Jurists], there are other approaches to the issue. I try to analyze one reflection of the debate in Iranian religious sphere namely Usuli&Akhbari discussion. For an elaborate discussion of other approaches, see Adel Hashemi-Najafabadi, (2008), "The Shi`i Concept of Imamate and Leadership in Contemporary Iran: The Case of Religious Modernists,", *Studies in Religion*, (40).4.

[90] *ibid.*, 4

[91] Historical name of Southern coasts of Caspian Sea.

in Iraq, Aleppo in Syria and Qumm in Iran also emerged as early centres of Shi`a influence.[92] Yet it is hard to claim that before Safavid`s coming into power and conversion of Iran to Shiism, organizational and institutional structure of the Shi`a were built.

I would like to note here that, before the Safavid period, Shi`a political thought of the early period had transformed radically. Unlike the current views about pro-resistance Shi`a political culture, which I discussed in the introduction, quietist and apolitical tendencies were the dominant approaches during the era. Armed rebellion, as a way to exert influence over the state, was forbidden by most imams. Jafar Al Sadiq pointed out that "the imam was not expected to revolt against the existing illegal government, and rebellion without his authorization was unlawful.``[93] In addition to that, imams were in favour of working in the service of rulers. Musa el Kazim, the Seventh Imam, asserted "Verily the group of men who associated with the ruler and whom the believers take as their refuge are secure on the Day of Resurrection." [94] Practising *Taqiyye* [95] was also encouraged. Politically harmless and passivist predispositions were widespread. Contrary to famous *Velayat-e Faqeh* Theory of Ayatullah Khomeini, neither Shi`a *ulama* nor the rulers did assert a right to exert their power to beyond their sphere of influence. Indeed there are two interesting examples that can show us the relations between religion and state in the early periods. In the first instance, Buwayhids, a dynasty of Shi`a origin gained control over the center of Abbasid Caliphate. Yet they did not replace Sunni caliphate with a Shi`a one. Secondly, Hamdanids, also a dynasty of Shi`a affiliation gave formal allegiance to the Abbasid Caliphate. These instances show us that, at least in the early periods, Shi`a political thought was not very eager to gain state power. Henri Corbin has also addressed the impact of Safavid`s on Political thought of Shi'a. According to him [Safavid Shiism] "gave birth to something like an official clergy, exclusively concerned with legality and jurisprudence to such a point that original Shi`ism, in its essence Gnostic and theosophic, has, so to speak hide himself. "[96]

There is no need to prove the importance of the Safavid period in Iranian and Shi`a history. I will explore the era briefly below, yet it is worth noting in passing, Safavids as the architects of the orthodox Shi`a institutions in Iran, were originally coming from a mythical Gnostic Sufi order, namely Safaviyya, yet evolved into principal agents of Iran's religious transformation.

2. 4 Safavid Empire: Shi`itization of Iran

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[92], Shagrough Akhavi, (1980), *Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period*. State University of New York Press: Albany, 5.

[93] Qutoed in Arjomand, *The Shadow of God* , 330.

[94] *ibid*., 331.

[95] Dissimulating ones faith to assure survival

[96] "Pour une Morphologie de la Spiritualite Shi`ite,` Eranos-Jachrbuch (Zurich), XXIX (1960) 69. Quoted in Algar *Religion and State in Iran,* 5.

Adim Sah Ismail Hakkin sirriyim, Cumle gazilerin men serdariyim
Anamdir Fatima atam Alidir, Men oniki imamin da piriyim. [97]

As can be seen from the above epigraph, Safavid understanding of religion is quite different from what can be labelled as orthodox Shi`a doctrine. Attributing divine status or quasi divine character to the leader had no place in traditional *Ithna Ashariiya* Shi`a. Such ideas were seen (and still are) as deviant doctrines more specifically named as *ghulat*.[98] These sorts of ideas, one can find similarities with messianic movements, had been the motivating force behind many social and political movements in a great part of Islamic history. Yet it is hard to claim that they were welcomed by traditional religion, be it Shi`a or Sunni. So what happened? What are the motives behind this conversion? How did the Safavid rulers get over tensions resulting from the contradictory natures of their heterodox belief and *Ithna ashariyya* Shi`a? How did they gain legitimacy among their subjects? How come after the long term Sunni domination, Iranians converted to Shi`a Islam? In what way or manner Safavids achieved to transform the religious structure of the country? [99] This part explores these questions. I think the answers to these questions would provide a basis for an analysis of religion and state relations in Safavid Iran.

The question what led Shah Ismail to declare Shi`a as the state religion cannot be fully explained. Nonetheless, we can speculate about it. Two motives might be cited. Firstly, they needed a cohesive and standard religious system in order to govern the country. With Arjomand`s conceptualization, `reason of state` was operative. Safavid Empire was in need to rationalise the form of political domination into an enduring and stable structure suitable for the administration of a centralised empire.[100] This need was incompatible with the Sufi line of thought which as a sort of extremism made harder, if not impossible, to govern its adherents. Second motive was that, main enemies of Safavids namely the Ottomans were Sunni. Hence Sunni Islam would not be an operative tool if they aimed to separate themselves from their arch enemies.[101]

As a result of destructive Mongol invasion of 13th century, Iran and Anatolian regions were in a state of decentralization. Historically important Sunni centers were devastated and classical religious institutions were in a state of turmoil. In the absence of a centralized and hegemonic power, Sufi orders enjoyed

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[97] My name is Shah Isma'il. I am God's mystery. I am the leader of all these ghazis. My mother is Fatima, my father is 'Ali; and eke I am the Pir of the Twelve Imams. Two verses from a poem of Shah Ismail famous Safavid ruler. Translated to English by V. Minorsky. Transcription from Arabic Letters is mine. V, Minorsky. (1942), "The Poetry of Shah Ismail I," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, (10)4

[98] An Arabic word means `exaggerator` or `extremist` it is normally used for heterodox Shi`a schools.

[99] Although it was a short period and had little impact on population, it is apt to mention Ilkhanid Khan Oljaitu also known as Muhammad Khodobandeh (D.1316). He converted to Shi`a Islam and rule Iran for 7 years as a Shi`a leader.

[100] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God,* 210.

[101] Rula Jurdi Abisaab, (2004), *Converting Persia, Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire*, I.B. Tauris: New York, 139.

enormous prestige and power. New orders emerged as well as old ones advanced their belief systems all over the Middle East. In this period of Sufi revivalism, Sufi orders such as *Qalandariyya*, *Haydariyya*, *Kubrawiyya*, *Suhrawardiyya* and *Mawlawiyya* acquired supremacy and increased numbers of their adherents. [102] As has been pointed out Safavid dynasty were coming from a Sunni Sufi order founded by Sheikh Safi ad-Din (d. 1336). Although they are literally Sunni, similar to most orders of their time, they have Shi`a tendencies. It is important to note here that nearly all Sufi orders in this era were showing some kind of respect for the family of prophet and twelve imams. Especially guilds related with Sufi orders adopt Ali as some sort of Patron Saint. The cult of the shrines of the putative descendants of Ali was also widespread. Mashhad and Qum were the two loci of these shrines. It went to that extent that a respected Sufi of the 14th century Sayyid Haydar Amuli could say `true Shi`ism is Sufism, true Sufism is Shi`ism`. [103] These Sufi orders which *Safawiyya* is amongst them, created "a bridge between Sunni and Shi`a schools of thought and prepared the ground for the spread of Shi`ism."[104] Hence it may be argued that there was a population in Iran before the rise of Safavids, who are already available for the Shi`a school of Islam. At least a religious eclecticism was widespread which paved the way for Shi`a convergence.

Yet, although, the permeability between Shi`a and Sufi orders with Shi`a tendencies, is accepted, still the question remains. How did Safavids become the legitimate rulers and how did they transform the religious structure? At first, Safavids based their legitimacy to their military power,[105] as the *murshidi kamil* of Safavid order they had the military support of Qizilbash tribes. [106] Also ancient theory of divine rights of Persian kings was in their favour. [107] When Shah Ismail as the leader of Safavids, crowned in 1501 as a 15 year old boy, at least most of the population living in Iran followed the mainstream Sunni school of Islam. Already some Shi`a adherents were living in Iran especially in Qum and Mashhad, even in Tabriz, the city in which his coronation took place, two-thirds of the population was Sunni. Coercion might be one side of the explanation. In coronation ceremony of Shah Ismail when he proclaimed *Ithna Asheriiya* Shi`a as the state religion, he replied "if the people utter one word of protest, so help me God Almighty, I will draw my

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[102] For an exceptional discussion of 13h century Middle East in regards to religious sphere, see Ahmet Karamustafa, (1994), *God`s Unruly Friends, Dervish Groups in the Islamic Later Middle Period, 1200-1550*, University of Utah Press: Salt Lake City.

[103] Quoted in Seyyed Husein Nasr,(1984), *Traditional Islam and the Modern World*, Routledge:London, 68

[104] Seyyed Husein Nasr, "Religion in Safavid Persia," *Iranian Studies*, (7)1, 271. Yet Hamid Algar rejected this idea of close resemblance of Sufism and Shi`a schools of thought. For his discussion on the issue and his polemic with Nasr, see Hamid Algar, "Some observations on Religion in Safavid Persia," *Iranian Studies*, (7)1.

[105] In the first part of the epigraph, Shah Ismail emphasized his military support by saying `I am the leader of all these Ghazis`.

[106] The Turkic tribes which are adherents of heteredox Islam are called Qizilibash mainly because of their distinctive red headgears. Increasing centralization of Ottoman Empire resulted in marginalization of Turkish tribes in Ottoman political system. This paves the way of their support to the Safavid Shahs. Alevi poetic tradition in which `going to the shah` theme is widely used is a characteristic of this period.

[107] With Roger Savory`s words `this ancient pre Islamic theory was taken out of the closet, dusted off and reinvested with all its former splendour as the Zillulhah-I fi arz or Shadow of God upon earth` Roger Savory, (1974), "The Safavid State and Polity," *Iranian Studies*, (7) 184.

sword and leave none of them alive"[108] It appears that conversion by using violent methods against Sunni and subsequently Sufi population of Iran became a part of their policy. As Hamid Algar aptly pointed out "[Safavids] in order to impose Shiism on the Sunni majority of Iran, Sunni ulama were obliged to execrate the first three Caliphs, and the recalcitrant among them were immolated; the tombs of Sunni saints and scholars were violated; and Sunni mosques were desecrated".[109] Another example of the pressure on Sunnis was their exclusion from tax exemption.[110] Arjomand named Safavid`s religious policy as ruthless and analyses four pillars of it, eradication of millenarian extremism, persecution of popular Sufism, suppression of Sunnism, and, finally propagation of *Ithna Ashariyya* Shiism.[111] So comes the second part of the transformation. Safavids needed Shi`a religious sources and ulama in order to spread their official religion. The situation was terrible. Shah Ismail himself apparently received little if any theological Shi`a training. There was neither enough resource nor religious scholars to propagate newly proclaimed state religion. Only after an inquiry that a book including the preliminary teachings of twelver Shiism was found in the library of a Qadi and was made the basis of new religion. No competent Shi`a jurist was to be found for the first years of the Safavids. [112] So Safavids invited ulama from historical centers of Shi`a, most importantly from Jabal Amel region of Lebanon. These scholars which are called Amelis because of their place of origin had their own reasons to migrate to Iran. First, there was a decrease in the opportunities within the Sunni Ottoman education system; second, their ability to implement and legally spread their Shi`a belief system was abided by Ottoman`s Sunni religious institutions.[113] Amilis were ranging from simple mullahs who fulfilled small religious duties for ordinary men to leading religious authorities who institutionalised Shi`a thought in Iran. They worked as juridical consults and also as army judges. The form of Shi`a, they were propagating was distinct from mythic understanding of religion in which Sufi orders were operating. This had two outcomes. First, they achieved to harness the power of Sufi orders among which, in the beginning, Safavids were one of them. Second they curbed the power of prominent Sunni ulama families who controlled important religious and state offices. Hence their efforts helped Safavid dynasty to shape its dynastic authority. To sum up, conversion of Iran from a Sufi dominated, Sunni environment to a Shi`a state was achieved largely in Safavid period. Throughout this period, Iranian masses encountered with more institutionalised and organised instances of religious sphere. As new religious institutions were established, the relation between state and religion was launched. To illustrate the importance of this transformation Juan R. Cole asserts that

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[108] Quoted in James Buchanan, (2012), *Days of God: the Revolution in Iran and Its Consequences,* John Murray (publishers): London, 90.

[109] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 291.

[110] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God* 121.

[111] *ibid.*, 109.

[112] *ibid.*, 106.

[113] Abisaab, *Converting Persia,*139.

The Safavid conquest of Iran and promulgation of Twelver Shi'ism represented the most startling cultural revolution in the Islamic world for centuries. Neither the Ottoman Turks nor the Mughal Timurids did nearly as much to change the religious beliefs of the people they ruled. The rise of Twelver Shi'ism is comparable in scope—though emphatically not in content—to the Protestant Reformation in Europe. In both Protestantism and Safavid Shi'ism, regional rulers' desire for political autonomy coincided with the wish of a clerically led group, branded heretics, to establish new religious institutions. Bloody religious and political wars ensued, dividing a cultural area (western Europe, southwest Asia) that had previously been religiously more uniform. [114]

It is worth noting in passing that, the similarities of the Safavid Empire and Ottomans were great in this period. As Arjomand pointed out, in the sixteenth and the most part of seventeenth century, the structural relationship between the religious and political institutions in Shi`a Iran did not differ appreciably from the *caesaropatist* pattern to be found in the Sunni Ottoman empire.[115] Shi`a ulama coming to an alien environment and facing more severe competitive groups, namely Sufi orders and Sunni ulama, depended more on state power to survive. As a result, religious organizations turned into the adjuncts of state.[116] An indicator of this transformation can be seen in the position of *Sadr*, the official who controlled religious affairs and institutions on behalf of Safavid dynasty. *Sadr* legally appointed the chief dignitary of the religious classes similar to Ottoman Sheikh ul Islam. Algar records the main aim of the position as follows, `Sharia courts and their judges were subordinate to the *divanbegi* (the supreme official in non religious jurisdiction) and the *Sadr* was instrumental in bringing about this subordination.[117] The dominance of the state over the ulama is an important characteristic of this era. So it is also surprising to see that, contrary to the popular understanding of Iranian ulama as the self –reliant social power against the state power, Safavid experience shows us that religion was offered to Iranian masses as a state sponsored enterprise.[118] This state led institutionalism at the expense of Sunni Islam and Sufi orders, paved the way to homogenizing once multi vocal religious sphere of Iran. Only after the Sunni Afghani`s invasion of Iran in 1722, Iranian religious sphere once again became the home of diverse line of thoughts.

2. 5 Qajar Rule and Re-institutionalization of Religious Establishment

In 1722 Afghan invaders led by Shah Mahmud Hotaki, who was a former Safavid vassal in Afghanistan, captured Safavid capital Isfahan and killed the last Safavid monarch, Shah Hussein. This invasion marked the end of Safavid the period. Moreover, it had disastrous effects on Iran in many respects. On the international domain, rivals of Iran namely Russia and Ottoman Empire took advantage of the invasion and

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[114] Juan R. I. Cole,(1988), *Roots of North Indian Shi`ism in Iran and Iraq, Religion and State in Awadh 1722-1859*, University of California Press: Berkeley, 22.

[115] Arjomand, *The Shadow of God* 85-100

[116] By doing so they established their own church like Henry VIII. I am indebted this insight to Dr. Birol Baskan.

[117] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 21.

[118] Nikkie Keddie also accepts this unaccustomed practise of giving state superiority before religion. She pointed that. `This claim by the Safavid rulers looks aberrant to us today partly because we are accustomed to a Twelver practice that accords only the mujtahids, and not any temporal ruler, some of the charisma of the imams`. In (1969), "The Roots of Ulama`s Power in Modern Iran," *Studia Islamica,* (29), 42.

seized territories. Domestically, the invasion not only destroyed the state structure but also disrupted the cultural and religious life in Iran. It ruined the newly emerged Shi`a institutional structure. Yet, interestingly, the following Qajar period brought about a restructuring in the religious institutions and gave rise to the re-emergence of the ulama, but this time as an independent social power. There is a consensus in the literature on the significance of Qajar era, because the way religion-state relations shaped in this era has had impacts on the modern period. Ulama, in this era, emerged not only as a religious class and also as the big landowners and traders. Their dominance on government and more importantly on masses grew.[119] In this context, Qajar era can be seen as a background for the subsequent Pahlavi period. Qajar epoch was characterised by both the emergence of new religious currents, as well as by the new philosophical discussions within the Shi`a thought. Also it was the time of considerable social movements such as the Tobacco Revolution and Constitutional Revolution of 1906. These movements had repercussions on the sphere of religion as well. On the one hand, religious actors mobilised by the course of events; on the other hand they were influenced by the circumstances. Rather than giving a chronological account of this period, I will discuss the main issues that specifically pertain to the religion-state relations. Accordingly, I will first begin with giving an account of the instutionalization of religious class. Then I will proceed to the reasons and bases of ulama`s emergence as an independent social power. I will argue that the fragility of Qajar State and their lack of religious legitimacy were the two factors resulted in ulama`s rising power. I will also refer to certain ideological factors, which I consider as being important in ulama*'s* construction as an independent power. Whilst Usuli-Akhbari debate supported religious institutionalization; the emergence of new religious currents paved way to alignment of state and religious establishment. Lastly, I will give an account of the religious structure's involvement in the important events of the era.

2.5.1 Impacts of Afghan Invasion and Religious Establishment

First and the foremost reason that lies behind the ulama`s re instutionalization and emergence as an independent social power, can be understood by looking at the disastrous impacts carried out by Afghan invaders. Only after referring Afghan invasion, one can grasp subsequent developments. Sir Percy Pykes, in his seminal book `A History of Persia`, describes the scene prior to the formation of the Qajar Dynasty, vividly. I think his picturesque depiction deserves to be quoted at length: [120]

> Khorasan was ruled by the unfortunate Shah Ruh but in reality broken up among a number of independent chiefs. At Mashhad the two sons of the monarch, Masrullah Mirza and Nader Mirza fought for power…Mashhad was next sized by Memish Khan of Chinran, a petty Kurdish chief, who held it for five years until the authority of Shah Rukh was restored by Timur Shakh, the Durraini monarch who retained the suzerainty established by his father. Of the independent rulers, Ishak Khan Karai was the most celebrated… Ishak Khan gradually carved out province for himself and became a power in the Land. In the south of the province, Mir Hassan Khan of Tabas… held a distinct bordering on the Lut and played a leading part in Khorosan… Kian was under an Arab ruler descended from the Khuzayma: Turhiz was ruled by another Arab family of Mishamat tribe.

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[119] See Algar, 1969: Keddie, 1969; Arjomand, 1984; Chehabi, 1990.

[120] It is a classic in Iranian studies to quote from Sir Percy Pykes.

Zafarunlu Kurds governed in Kuchan and Shadilli Kurds in Bujhnuk. Sabzawar was held by a chief of the Ghilicci a Turkish tribe, and finally Sistan was ruled by by a petty chief who claimed Keidenian descent. We now turn westward to Kurdistan. The descendants of the ancient Karduchi maintained almost complete independence on the Persian side of the frontier…of whom the most powerful was Khusru Khan Vali of Ardalan... From Sinna his capital, he ruled a large district. .. Baluchistan at this period was ruled by Nassir I, .the great, who reigned from 1750 to 1793 and whose sway was acknowledged as far west as Bampur. He was entirely independent. The rest of Persia had been the cook-pit for the various pretenders to the throne, who had fought power as far north as the Caspian Sea and as far south as the Persian Gulf.[121]

As seen from the above quotation, Iran was in a complete administrative turmoil in the wake of the Afghan invasion. Religious sphere was also similar. Shi`a ulama of Iran had to leave Iran and most of them settled around the holy Iraqi city of Karbala which was then under Ottoman rule. The Sunni Afghani tribes acted as sworn enemies of Shi`a. They confiscated all religious endowments, discouraged Shi`a rituals such as Muharrem ceremonies and closed all religious seminaries. Isfahan, the capital of Safavid Iran, which was a center of learning with forty eight colleges and hundred sixty two mosques in the beginning of 1700s, was devastated.[122] As a symbolic act, Afghan Rulers `ranked the non Muslims in an official edict socially above the Shiite majority.[123] A more brutal expression of their attitude against Shi`a can be seen in the massacres they carried out throughout Iran. Nearly all Shi`a dominated cities faced some sort of bloodshed. Once, all the Shi`a inhabitants of Qandahar were annihilated. [124]

After nearly 70 years of chaos, Qajars, with the backing of Turkic tribes, gained power and achieved to reunify Iran. They had to deal with the problem of governing Iran, which was inhabited by ethnically and culturally diverse groups. In terms of religious structure, the scene was a mess. First of all, as mentioned above, Safavid religious institutions were destroyed. There was neither a religious homogeneity nor a hierarchy of clerics. Yet this turned out to be positive for the ulama in some respects. Firstly, they came to a position in which they had to rely on their own financial resources for survival. So, as opposed to Safavid period, in which they relied on state, they needed to transform their income strategies. Wilhem Floor depicts this transformation as follows, "Thus, freedom from the state for the religious class came at a price. For endowments and stipend, which formed the backbone of their revenues, were not available to them anymore. Because of this breakdown religious professionals had to find new ways to survive economically."[125] New strategy was to turn their faces to masses in order to gain revenues. Collection of *khums* and *zakat* from the

[121] Sir Percy Sykes, (1915), *A History of Persia*, London: Mc Millan and Co. Limited, 256.

[122] Juan R. I. Cole, *Roots of North Indian Shi`ism,* 21.

[123] See Aptin Khanbaghi.(2006), *The Fire, the Star and the Cross: Minority Religions in Medieval and Early Modern Iran*. I.B. Tauris: London.

[124] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 29.

[125] Wilhem Floor, (2001), Economic Role of the Ulama in Qajar Persia, in Linda S. Walbridge (ed) *The Most Learned of the Shi`a: The Institution of Marja` Taqlid*, Oxford University Press: New York, 59.

adherents of Shi`a, was the novel strategy of religious institutions for economic survival.[126] This practice formed the basis of their economic independence.

Secondly, in relation to this, Shi`a clerics became the only organizers of the religious life of masses. Need of financial revenue resulted in the popularization of religious thought. Muharram processions, *rawda khanis* and *ta`ziya* were invented or re-invented as ways of popularizing religion.[127] Through these rituals, to which masses were actively participated, religious sphere was expanded.[128] This paved the way for clerics to increase their influence in the social context. In this context, the Shiite ulama, incorporated many of the features and practises of popular Sufism into the official belief system during the seventeenth century. These developments eliminated the rivalry of the Sufi Shayks as popular religious leaders and enabled the emergent Shiite hierocracy in Iran to control the daily religious life of masses to an extent unknown in other Islamic lands.

2.5.2 Fragile State, Lack of Legitimacy and Religious Establishment

Combining with the impacts of Afghan invasion, fragility of state can be seen as another important reason for ulama`s emergence as an independent social power. Keddie aptly asserts that weak state structure and decentralisation almost usually facilitates a strong religious leadership.

> The power and pretensions of religious leaders generally flourish most in periods of political weakness and decentralization witness medieval Europe and the decentralized periods in Japan and China when the Buddhist church and monasteries flourished.[129]

Increasing influence of Iranian religious leadership during the Qajar era fits this pattern. Keddie also asserts that one of most important obstacle to the establishment of a strong state is Iran`s mountainous topography. In addition to the topography, segmented social structure, relatively underdeveloped urbanization and great distances between population centers, were also preventing emergence of an effective state.[130] Abrahamian is another scholar who puts an emphasis to the topography and segmentation. He clearly depicts Qajar Iran as follows,

> Rugged terrain, mountain ranges, deserts, long distances, barren soil, shortage of rain, and lack of large concentrations of water all combined to fragment the population-estimated at about five million in the I850s -into small and isolated units: into secluded villages, insular towns, and nomadic clans. The peasantry, forming about 60 per cent of the total population, were divided into some 15,000 villages, some of them walled. Even a century later, when the 5 million had nearly

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[126] Khums literally means one-fifth. It is a religious obligation in Shi`a Islam to contribute one fifth of certain income to charity. It is most usually given to religious clerics.

[127] Muharram –first month of Islamic Calendar, marks the infamous Karbala Massacre. *Rawda-Khani* is the act of narrating of Karbala and *Ta`ziya* is the theatretical re-enactment of the same event.

[128] For an account of Shi`a religious rituals in late Qajar period see Kamran Aghaie, (2005), "Religious Rituals, Social Identities and Political Relationships in Tehran under Qajar Rule, 1850s-1920s," in Robert Gleave (ed) *Religion and Society in Qajar Iran*, Routledge: New York, 373-393.

[129] Keddie, "The Roots of Ulama`s Power," 45.

[130] *ibid.,* p. 36.

quadrupled, the mean size of an agricultural settlement was no more than 265 persons. The urban residents, constituting less than 10 per cent of the whole state, were concentrated mainly in twelve isolated fortified cities: Isfahan, Tehran, Tabriz, Mashhad, Kashan, Kirman, Yazd, Kirmanshah, Qazvin, Shiraz, Hamadan, and Rasht. And the nomads, perhaps as much as 30 per cent of nineteenth-century Iran, were segmented into at least 250 'independent tribal units' dispersed throughout the land.[131]

Apparently, the tribal structure of the state was another important determinant. After years of centralisation carried out by Safavids, Afghan invasion caused the reassertion of tribal element to the Iranian political sphere. After years of turmoil and tribal wars, Iranian plateau was divided within itself. This tribalization, obviously, had its reflections on the religious sphere. Qajars were of nomadic descent and for them, the administration of a country was far more complex than that of a tribe. The leaders of the Qajars were facing the tasks of building their bureaucratic-administrative apparatus and the legitimacy of their rules. The tribal background of Qajar leaders provided neither the legitimacy nor the administrative structure necessary to rule a country. Iran's rulers had to break away from their tribal mode of administration, and transform their images from the leaders of a tribe to the leaders of a nation. Yet, as Abrahamian points out, it is hard to claim that, even at the late periods of Qajar Rule, they achieved this transformation. Qajar Shah`s titled themselves as Shah-in Shah, the Asylum of Universe, the Subduer of Climates, the Guardian of the Flock, the Protector of the Unfortunate, the Conquerer of Lands: the Shadow of God and so on.   Their powers were assumed as limitless. Yet, practically they lack effective instruments to enforce their power. State bureaucracy was both very small in number and inadequate. Army consisted of Qajar tribe`s members in addition to 4000 Georgian slaves. By the end of the 19th century, this small army became even smaller. Tribal forces were discharged and the number of Georgian slaves was limited to 2000.[132] Tribal structure also showed its reflection in the appointment of the officials. Qajar shahs, more than often, selected governors from the tribal leaders. So it was usually hard to dispose them even when they were ineffective. Tribal leaders were "virtual kings within their own tribes governing without the intervention of outside authorities, administering their own laws, collecting their own taxes and being only nominally subject to the central government."[133]

As a result, Qajar authority on the religious sphere was also limited. Religious administrators, who were appointed by the government, had little, if any, influence. Masses most often recognized the authority of civil clerics. Independent clerics were considered as the true interpreters of religious law. Abrahamian gives two examples to illuminate how this pressure between independent religious clerics and government appointed ones resulted in a popular discontent. Once, a Qajar Shah sent an unpopular governor to Kashan without consulting to local powers. The local cleric immediately denounced it which caused a popular

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[131] Ervand Abrahamian, (1974), Oriental Despotism: the Case of Qajar Iran, *International Journal of Middle East Studies,*(5)1, 14.

[132] *ibid.*, 9-12.

[133] *ibid.*, 11.

turmoil. The cleric was sent to the capital. Yet his opposition to the government continued to the extent that he openly denounced the Shah as an 'oppressor of the people'. The Shah this time afraid of a possible religious riot and demonstration in Tehran thus pardoned the cleric and sent him back to Kashan. The Shah also dismissed the unpopular governor and appointed a new one. In another instance, this time a different Qajar Shah, raised a statue of himself. He was condemned by the clerics because of violating the Islamic law against statues of human beings. As a result of popular disturbances, he was forced to abandon and finally removed his statue.[134]

In addition to the fragile structure of Qajar state, lack of the religious legitimacy of Qajar rulers is also important to understand religion-state relations of the era. Qajar Shah`s did not have the religious background which Safavid dynasty enjoyed. Unlike Safavid claim that their ancestors are coming from Musa Kazim the forth imam, Qajars were unable to claim descent from imams. So they regarded ulama as one of the main sources of their legitimacy. Algar describes, Agha Muhammed Khan, the founder of Qajar dynasty as a pious sovereign. He not only "refrained from ordering executions on Thursday evenings (a time worthy of respect because of its proximity to Friday)" but also strictly prohibited wine-drinking and opium use[135]. In addition to these symbolic acts, more direct signs of showing respect to ulama were widespread. For example, during the reign of Fath Ali Shah, second member of Qajar dynasty, the inhabitants of Qum (which was, and still is, an important center of Shi`a) were exempted from taxation. Another method of gaining support from ulama was the "regular allotting of sums of money among them" and inviting leading clerics to their capital and showing great respect`. [136] These reliance of ulama as a source of authority also resulted in increasing influence of religious establishment.

2.5.3 Usuli-Akhbari Controversy and Doctrinal Solidification of Ulama

In addition to above mentioned structural factors which led to institutionalization of religious establishment, ideological factors also played a role. Qajar period had come upon a series of developments in religious thought. These developments apparently had political implications and impacted upon the institutionalization of religious sphere. On the one hand, there were doctrinal debates within Shi`a Islam which had its historical roots. On the other hand, there had more recently emerged religious currents among them Babi and Bahai Schools. Although these intellectual trends originated from diverse backgrounds and supported by different societal groups, they all caused a similar end. Developments of the era, to some extent, led to the ulama assuming a greater role in social life. It is a widely accepted issue in the literature that, the institutionalization of religious sphere cannot be conceived without referring to doctrinal debates of Qajar era. Usuli-Akhbari debate was one the most important debates of the period.[137] Although it was a

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[134] *ibid.*, 12.

[135] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran,* 42.

[136] *ibid.*, 49.

[137] Algar, 1969, Arjomand 1984, Keddie 1969, Muazami 2003 emphasize the importance of Usuli-Akhbari debate.

theological debate, which surely had connotations about the deep questions of Shi`a, its importance lies more in its political outcomes. Only after the previously dominated Usuli School declined and the influence of Akhbari School increased, ulama could emerge as an independent power.

The Usuli-Akhbari debate was mainly about the extent and type of Shi`a religious leadership. Both schools depended on Quran and hadith as the main source of religious knowledge. Yet their interpretations were different. Akhbaris relied more on textual sources; they focused on the use of inductive techniques to arrive at religious rules. They rejected reasoning as a tool of religious scholarship. They considered that "what is derived from traditional sources always has precedence over what is derived from the use of reason."[138] As a result, according to Akhbari line of thought, ulama is restricted in the jurisprudence to only those areas in which there is an explicit tradition. All other cases are the subject of secular courts. Moreover, laymen, for Akhbaris could make their own decisions on religious matters. Obviously, people need ulama for religious issues but only for interpreting religious texts and make them understandable. Religious scholars are not sources of emulation. So Akhbari ulama are more like a medium between the religious sources and masses. As Behrooz Moazami explains "[the relation between ulama and the masses]… was not a strictly top-down relationship, and did not imply a vast connected network and hierarchy."[139] So what makes the institutionalization of religious sphere possible is the domination of Usuli school of thought over Akhbaris.

Usulis, on the other hand, emphasized the importance of logic and practical reasoning. According to them, a religious scholar could use his reason in theological issues. So he could deduce laws from textual sources to solve any problematic whether or not it is specifically mentioned in Quran or hadith. In other words, Usuli ulama had the power to give *fatwas* [140] and hence "to intervene in social areas from which the more restrained Akhbari school would refrain"[141] All adherents of Shi`a were supposed to choose a *mujtahed* [142] and follow him in religious matters. Ordinary people were abiding by the judgements of their *mujtahed*. This shift in theory led to more practical ends. Organizational side of religious sphere has transformed. *Taqlid* and *Marja-e Taqlid* were introduced to Shi`a school of thought.[143] The ranks of *Hujjet-ul Islam*, *Ayatollah* and *Grand Ayatollah*, which led to present day hierarchy, were also introduced.[144] As a result of

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[138] Moojan Momen,(1985), *An Introduction to Shi`I Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi`ism*, Yale University Press: New Haven and London, 223.

[139] Behrooz Moazami, (2003), The Making of State, Religion and the Islamic Revolution in Iran (1796-1979) unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation submitted to the New School University, 177.

[140] Legal opinion about a religious issue

[141] Moojan Momen, (21013), Usuli, Akhbari, Shaykhi, Babi: the Tribulations of a Qazvin Family, *Iranian Studies*, (36)3, 317.

[142] A mujtahed is an Islamic scholar who is competent to interpret religion.

[143] Taqled means emulation, Marja-I Taqled means source of emulation.

[144] Hujjatul Islam literally means proof of Islam, Ayatollah literally means sign of God. These are the signs of ranking among Islamic scholars in Shi`a.

this institutionalization, Usuli ulama were able to direct themselves considerable amounts of money flow from the Iranian masses which apparently resulted in more social power and more sovereignty. "The Usuli movement assured the independence of religious authority from the political authority and consequently the autonomy and autocephaly of the Shi'ite clergy. Furthermore, it assured a large measure of financial autonomy for the religious institution through the authorization of the collection of religious taxes on behalf of the Hidden Imam."[145]

Keddie noted that this transformation gave the religious clerics in |Iran "a power beyond anything claimed by the Sunni ulama."[146] Hence it resulted in one of the main differences between Turkey and Iran in terms of religion.

2.5.4 Babi Movement and Religious Establishment

Babi movement was undoubtedly the most important religious movement in Qajar Iran. The movement finally evolved to a new religion called Bahai religion, which today has five to six million adherents all over the world. Yet, the movement arose as a school of thought in Iranian Shi`a which posed a threat to ulama`s social power. In its early phases, it impacted upon the religious sphere of Iran but finally, far from weakening the ulama power, resulted in enhancement of their political strength. After the movement`s defeat, the ulama further consolidated their power, As Firouz Kazemzadeh remarked,

> the close cooperation between the mulla`s and the government in opposing the Babi-Bahai movement, was almost entirely to the advantage of the clergy which increased its hold on the Shah and the bureaucracy and stigmatised as Babi any Persian who dared to open his mind to Western influence. [147]

The origins of the movement go back to a young Iranian merchant, Sayyid Ali Mohammed Shirazi (1819-1850). Ali Muhammed initially claimed he was the gateway to the Hidden Imam and took the title Bab (the gate). He gathered around himself a group of disciples and started to disperse letters throughout Iran and surrounding countries to spread his message. His message to represent the divine will could not be tolerated by ulama for two reasons. First, his doctrines constituted *bidat* [148]which is certainly forbidden in Shi`a. Secondly, If Bab was the gate to Hidden Imam-and finally the Hidden Imam himself, then ulama`s religious power coming from the deputies of Hidden Imam could not continue. This tension becomes definite when one of the early converts proclaimed from a Shiraz mosque: "I bear witness that Ali Muhammad is the remnant of God"[149]. Subsequently, ulama issued a death fatwa against Bab and charged him of blasphemy.

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[145] Said Amir Arjomand, (1981), "Shi`ite Islam and the Revolution in Iran", *Government and Opposition*,(16) 3, 296.

[146] .Keddie, "The Roots of Ulama`s Power."45.

[147] Quoted in Mansoor Muaddel, (2005), *Islamic Modernism. Nationalism and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse*, The University of Chicago Press: London, 105.

[148] Reprehensible innovations in matters of faith

[149] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 138.

He was detained and placed under house arrest. Yet, his message spread throughout Iran, leading to an increase in the number of his adherents.

Babi claims were not limited to religious sphere. Demand for social justice and equality were among the major themes. Mansoor Moaddel quotes some as follows: "Ownership is a social corruption [the accumulation of wealth] by a small group when the majority deprived of it is the worst corruption. You the oppressed people of Iran… arise."[150] Babis also advocated the equality of rights for men and women and called for the abolition of polygamy. Moreover, they were early supporters of abolition of veil which also caused a great reaction among the traditional ulama.[151] These ideas gained considerable support among masses. Especially, Gilan, Mazandaran and Khorasan became the headquarters of the movement. People in these cities refused to pay taxes and in a particular example they attacked to prisons to free those who are prisoned because they could not pay their taxes. Considerable number of ulama –mostly from the lower ranks- was also adhered to the movement[152]. According to Moaddel in its peak times "total strength of the movement was estimated at nearly one and a half million, about 20 per cent of the country`s total population."[153]

Babi movement presented probably the biggest threat to the authority and to the monopoly of the ulama. It also jeopardized state interests by proclaiming social order and equality. As a threat to both state and Orthodox religion, the movement was brutally suppressed. Bab was executed in 1850 and his adherents were either killed or imprisoned. Although persecution failed to destroy Babism as a whole, its social power was greatly diminished. Moazami calls this suppression as the bloodiest episode of Iran in 19th century.[154] In this bloody episode, ulama were the winning side. Iranian ulama, siding with state apparatus, consolidated their power in some respects. Religious courts were strengthened; the number of endowments under the control of ulama had rose and also some state lands were given to the ulama. Also as a symbolic act, Mirza Abdulqasim, who gave the fatwa for massacre of Babi`s became the son-in law of Qajar Shah. So it can be claimed that the Babi movement and its bloody suppression resulted in a real empowerment of religious

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[150] *ibid.,* 105.

[151] One of the important figures of Babi movement was Qurat-il Ain (Solace of the Eyes). As a woman poet, debater and orator she is considered as one of the first and foremost leaders of feminism in the Middle East during the 19th century. Her execution made her a key figure not only among adherents of Babi belief but also among the Middle Eastern women. It is interesting to note that Halide Edip Adivar in her memoirs, `Turkish Ordeal`, refers her as follows, [Before giving her famous Sultanahmet speech} "Then I repeated to myself the words of Quret-ul-Ain, that great Babi woman who died for her ideal uttering these simple and beautiful words in Persian: "Oh, raise me from the earth that from the heights I may look upon the world." Halide Edip Adivar, (1928), *Turkish Ordeal: Being the Further Memoirs of Halide Edip*, The Century Co: London & NewYork, (The copy I have reached does not have page numbers yet the quotation is taken from the 15th page of the 4th part)

[152] Among the higher ranks, one mujtahed, Aga Sayyed Husein Turshizi also converted and became a Babi. Cited in Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 147.

[153] *ibid.,* p.105.

[154] Moazami, "The Making of State*,"* 172.

apparatus. Suppression of Babi movement resulted in orthodoxy defined itself again heterodox movements. During this process the orthodox ulama were reorganised as the primary institutional body of the religious sphere.

2.6 Religious Sphere on the eve of the Pahlavi

2.6.1 Ulama-Bazaar Alliance and Tobacco Boycott

In order to fully understand the religion-state relations in Qajar Iran, one needs to consider the long run alliance between the religious establishment and traditional middle class, in other words, the famous *ulama-bazaar* alliance. This alliance is widely discussed in the literature and mostly regarded as one of the critical factors that caused 1979 Revolution. The importance of the alliance is two fold: On the one hand, it allowed ulama to constitute a strong back up by which they can force ruling elites in tune with their own political agenda. On the other side, it enabled *bazaaris* to rely on a social power that fits to their economic interests. Tobacco boycott can be seen as an early example of this alliance.

The second half of the 19th century marked the pinnacle of growing western impact in the Middle East. Iran was no exception. This influence had reflections on two aspects; firstly Western economic penetration strained the traditional Iranian market. Secondly, the cultural penetration threatened the religious establishment. These two sided influence resulted in a transformation in the Iranian society. First of all, a new intelligentsia with modern aspirations began to emerge. They put their mark to the following Constitutional Revolution. Secondly, new social classes were formed or reformed in accordance with the changing social structure. They characterised the 20th century political developments. Most important of these social classes was the newly emerged *bazaaris*. Due to its ties with the traditional economy and more importantly with the traditional Shi`a ideology, it became known as the traditional middle class in later years. Abrahamian associates this reformed class *bazaaris* with western economic threat. He asserts that – as a result of this economic threat- traditional merchants of Iran emerged as a "broad state wide force conscious for the first time, of its common personality."[155]

The technological developments of the era also facilitated this emergence. Telegraph, publication of newspapers and the inauguration of postal system, narrowed distances between the urban centers. As such, these developments integrated the local traders to the Iranian economy to the extent which never happened before. On the other hand, the common difficulty they experienced while competing with the western goods, the concessions given to western powers by Qajar rulers and their refusal to erect protective tariffs also strengthened their common ties. These newly emerged middle class forged an alliance with religious establishment. Indeed, close ties between the clergy and newly emerged bourgeoisie is a widely encountered norm in traditional societies. Arjomand quotes Max Weber in this issue: "The elective affinity between

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[155] Ervand, Abrahamian, (1982), *Iran between Two Revolutions*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 59.

bourgeois and religious powers, which is typical of a certain stage in their development, may grow into a formal alliance against the feudal powers; this happened rather frequently in the Orient.[156] In Iranian context this alliance is cemented by the common threat coming from the West.

As mentioned above Tobacco crisis and the following boycott can be seen as the quintessential instance of this alliance. To summarise the course of events briefly, it was caused by Naser al Din Shah sale of another concession to an English company called Imperial Tobacco Cooperation. Conditions of the concession included 25,000 pounds personal gift to the Shah, an annual rent of 15,000 to the state and a 25 per cent share of the profits for Iran.[157] In return, ITC gained a fifty yearlong monopoly over the exportation and distribution of tobacco. The opposition of the merchants to the concession started without delay, right after the concession was granted. Especially in Shiraz, the main tobacco-growing region- merchants closed down their shops. Thanks to the above mentioned technological improvements, this shutdown rapidly spread into other bazaars, leading to a general strike. Merchants of the leading cities particularly, Tehran, Isfahan, Tabriz, Mashad, Qazvin and Yazd gave support to the merchants of Shiraz and close their shops which paralyzed the market in these towns. To show a sign of dissatisfaction, The *Ulama* stopped teaching in religious seminaries. They went as far as issuing a religious order "declaring the use of tobacco in any form to be tantamount to war against the Hidden Imam." The fatwa was so influential that even in the royal harem nobody smoked it. The general strike turned into a consumer boycott and the use of tobacco was decreased to a great extent. Even in the royal court tobacco consumption has waned. Eventually, the shah had to cancel the concession. [158]

Tobacco Boycott shows that *ulama-bazaari* alliance emerged as a considerable social power capable of affecting the course of political life. It can be considered as the first successful mass movement in modern Iran's history and led to the defeat of the Qajar rulers. Algar sees ulama`s act "against the state in order to defend national interest." [159] On the other hand Moazami, Keddie and Moaddel emphasize more on materialistic reasons. Moaddel shows that there were "those among the ulama who refused to participate in the movement because of their economic ties with Qajar rulers."[160] Moazami emphasizes the reciprocal relationship between ulama and bazaar. As discussed in the above parts, ulama emerged as an independent social power during the Qajar period. Yet their financial independence from the state was mainly a result of their access to religious taxes. But this income was dependent on the economic wealth of Iranian masses.

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[156] Arjomand, "Shi`ite Islam and the Revolution," 298.

[157] Numbers are taken from, Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions,* 73. According to Algar, *Religion and State in Iran,* 206, `ITC was to pay the Iranian government a total amount of 15 million pounds`.

[158] Moin paints a vivid picture of the events. See Baqer Moin, (1999), *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah,* I.B. London: Tauris Publishers, 3-5.

[159] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 205.

[160] Mansoor Moaddel, (1992), "Shii Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-1892," *Sociological Forum*, (7) 3, 463.

Moazami claims that "the voluntary character of the religious tax and the informal manner of its payment, at least theoretically gave the taxpayers some influence over the ulama`s worldly positions."[161] Mehdi Mozaffari also emphasizes the structure of this relationship. He describes the relationship as follows: "Through his financial contributions the Bazari has made himself largely the guarantor of the financial independence of the ulama vis-à-vis the state. In return, the ulama often interpret Islam to conform with the interests of bazaaris".[162] The structure of relationship also had a role in the developments of the era. Keddie also emphasizes on non-religious reasons of ulama`s involvement into tobacco boycott. She claims that support of the ulama had more direct reasons especially in Shiraz as it "reflected their ties to merchant families and merchant guilds and their interest in tobacco grown on their private or vaqf land" [163] Whatever its reasons are tobacco movement shows one of the first instances of this long-lasting alliance. Abrahamian aptly asserts that it "was a dress rehearsal for the forthcoming Constitutional Revolution," [164] which is the subject of next part.

2.6.2 Constitutional Revolution and Ulama

> We owe everything to clergy; History shows that in the past millennium it was always the clergy who led to popular and revolutionary movements. It was the clergy who always produced the first martyrs. It was the clergy who always defended the oppressed against the money worshippers.
>
> Ayatollah Khomeini`s speech. (1989)[165]

The Constitutional Revolution of Iran has proven to have a tremendous importance for both Iran and the Middle East region. It was one of the first attempts of the Middle Eastern masses to replace their traditional political systems with a western-style constitutional monarchy. It caused radical transformations that later affected Iranian political and social sphere. It was the first time when certain notions such as *tajadod* (modernization), *demokrasi* (democracy), taraghi (progress), *kommiteh* (committee) and *mashrutiat* (constitutionalism) entered the political lexicon. According to many, it marked the end of the medieval period in Iran. It was a grave social movement in the sense that, as Atabaki puts it, "Tabriz during the Constitutional Revolution was similar to Paris during the French Revolution."[166]

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[161] Moazami, "The Making of State", 219.

[162] Mehdi Mozaffari, (1991), "Why the Bazar Rebels", *Journal of Peace Research*, (28)4, 381.

[163] Quoted in Moaddel, "Shii Political Discourse," 464.

[164] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 73.

[165] Quoted in Ervand Abrahamian, (1993), *Khomeinism Essays on the Islamic Republic*, Berkeley: University of California, 88.

[166] Touraj Atabaki, (1993), *Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and Autonomy in Twentieth Century Iran*, British Academy Press: New York, 32.

The role of religion in the Constitutional Revolution of Iran generated much academic debate. One side of the debate overemphasized the clergy`s role in the course of events as they considered the revolution as being led by religious establishment. The other side asserts that clergy betrayed the revolution.[167] It is not only an academic debate, but a political one. As Abrahamian discusses in his book `Khomenism: Essays on Islamic Republic`, the ways in which the Iranian regime –Islamic Republic of Iran- following Khomeini`s above quoted line of thought- puts clergy as the leader of the revolution. They assert a historical description of events, to show how clergy "valiantly resisted imperialism, feudalism, and despotism."[168] By using history, Abrahamian shows, the regime tries to give itself populistic as well as religious legitimacy. [169] In this section, as a first step, I will briefly address the reasons that led to the Constitutional Revolution. Then I will explore the course of events. Finally, I will discuss the ways in which the constitution shaped the future development of the religious institution.

As mentioned above, the growing western influence had influences on two dimensions. First, as a result of economic integration class structure was reformed. Specifically, such an effect proved its importance in the bazaar case. Bazaar emerged as a cohesive social class following its interests. Subsequently, they build an alliance with clergy. Secondly, as a result of the ideological interaction with the west, a new fraction of middle class emerged. They were employed in new occupations and they had novel aspirations. Despite their diverse origins, these members of intelligentsia `shared a common desire for fundamental economic, political and ideological change. [170] The intelligentsia, so to say, including well known members such as Sayyid Jamal al-Din Afghani, considered, nationalism, secularism and constitutionalism as the three important means for a western style development. Nationalism would make Iran powerful against the Imperial agenda of western states, secularism would invalidate traditional power of ulama and constitutionalism would eliminate reactionary power of the monarchy.[171] Their ideas reflected both particular and social levels. For instance, in1896, an assassinator who was instigated by the anti-shah ideas of Al- Afghani murdered Nasır ed-Din Shah. More importantly, for the first time in the history of Iran, opposition groups began to be formed by recruiting members of this new intelligentsia. Of these groups, the following ones were to play important roles in the revolution: the Secret Society (*Anjuman-I Makhfi*); the

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[167] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran* and Abdulhadi Hairi, (1977), "Why did the Ulama Participate in the Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909,"`Die Welt des Islams: New Series*, (17)4. focus on clergy`s positive role in the revolution. Nikkie Keddie, (1969), "Background to Revolution: 1900-1905,"*Middle Eastern Studies*,(5)1, also asserts that ulama gave ideological direction to all states of the process. On the other side, there are Said Amir Arjomand, (1981), "The Ulama`s Traditionalist opposition to Parliamentarism: 1907-1909," *Middle Eastern Studies*,(17)2, 1981 and Nadir Sohrabi, (1965), "Historicising the Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran and Russia: 1905-1908,"*American Journal of Sociology*, (100)6. Ervand Abrahamian, (1979), "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (10)3 follows a middle way.

[168] Abrahamian, *Khomeinism,* 91.

[169] *ibid.,* 92.

[170] Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, 61.

[171] *ibid*., 62.

Secret Center (*Markaz-I Ghaybi*); the Social Democratic Party (*Hizb i Ijtimayun-I Amiyun*); and the Revolutionary Committee (*Komiteh-I Inqilabi*).[172]

In the economic sphere, western impact showed its results. Although Tobacco Boycott resulted in the cancellation of the concession, The British kept on benefiting from further concessions. the D'arcy oil concession in 1901, which resulted in the first significant exploitation of Iranian oil, can be given as an example to such policies. The absence of income revenues increased the intensity of financial problems and also caused a wide discontent among Iranian masses. This rising discontent turned into a nationwide protest in the first months of 1904. The tension between the ulama-bazaar alliance and the royal court came to a peak.

International developments also played their role during the era, the war between the Czarist Russia and Japan and following this, the Russian Revolution of 1905 also gave impetus to the Iranian opposition movement. It was important for the most underdeveloped regions, as well as Iranians, that an Asian power had defeated a major European power. As Keddie briefly explains:

> Many considered it significant that the only Asian power with a constitution had defeated the only western power without one, and constitutions came to be looked upon as "secret of strength "of western governments. In Iran, as in number of Asian countries, treatises explaining constitutions and their virtues begun to circulate, and news of Japanese victories was happily and rapidly spread. [173]

The initial spark came when the governor of Tehran tried to lower sugar prices by punishing two of the leading sugar importers. They were bastinadoed in public for putting up the price of sugar. One of the merchants that were punished was a highly respected old merchant. He had a good reputation among both bazaar and ulama. He financed the repair of the central bazaar and also built three mosques in Tehran. When the news of the punishment was revealed in the Tehran Bazaar, it caused a great discontent. A significant number of Iranians, including two thousand merchants, guild leaders, theology students and members of the ulama protested the punishment and took sanctuary at the mosque.[174] They had basically three demands: enforcement of the Shari-ah, replacement of the governor and the formation of a House of Justice (*Adalatkhaneh*). The shah declined the demands and used violence to press demands. Protestors were violently oppressed: twenty two lost their lives and over one hundred suffered injuries. From that point on, as Abrahamian asserts, "ulama openly compared the Qajars to the notorious Yazid, the Sunni leader who had killed the Shi`I martyr Imam Hussein."[175] The court replied that demands are intolerable, "One minister

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[172] *ibid.,* 75-80.

[173] Nikkie Keddie, (1983), "Iranian Revolutions in Comparative Perspectives," *The American Historical Review,* (88)3, 586.

[174] Two significant Mujtaheds of the era were heading the *ulama* Tabatabai and Behbehani.

[175] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 83.

even added that if the ring leaders were unsatisfied with conditions in Muslim Iran they should immigrate to such non-Muslim democratic countries as Germany."[176] This led to an increase in the number of protestors. This time, fourteen thousand people led by the merchants took sanctuary in the garden of the British Legation. Finally the protesters demanded not just the formation of a House of Justice but also a Constituent National Assembly to draft a written constitution. The Shah, being confronted with a general strike in Tehran and more importantly, threatened by the Iranian community in Baku with sending "armed volunteers", could not decline the demands any longer. Almost one month after the first protestors took refugee in the Legation; Muzaffar ed Din Shah was prompted to issue a decree promising constitution. In October 1906 an elected assembly whose delegates were mostly merchants and members of the ulama convened and drew up a constitution. The constitution put strict limitations on royal power and gave wide powers to the elected parliament.

The Iranian Constitution of 1906 followed by a supplementary part- Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 1907- had been `legally` in effect until 1979. In terms of religion-state relations it had interesting impacts. It is interesting to note that, although religious establishment emerged as a separate political entity before the constitution, it was the first time they were officially recognised. Constitution and more importantly Supplementary Laws of 1907 can be seen an as important phases for the institutionalization of ulama. Moazami asserts that "through these processes ulama as a constitutionally recognised social and political entity with certain rights and privilege *officially* (italics mine) entered the evolving political arena."[177] First Article of the Supplementary Law-by defining an official religion- puts the religious character of the Constitution: "The official religion of Persia is Islam, according to the orthodox Ja'fari doctrine of the Ithna 'Ashariyya (Twelve Imams), which faith the Shah of Persia must profess and promote."[178] More important was the second article of the Supplamentary laws. In terms of religion state relations it is worth quoting in length:

> At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Consultative Assembly, established by the favour and assistance of His Holiness the Imam of the Age (may God Hasten his glad Advent!), the favour of His Majesty the Shahinshah, of Islam (may God multiply the like them!), and the whole people of the Persian Nation, be at variance with the sacred rules of Islam or the laws established by His Holiness the Best of Mankind (on whom and on whose household be the Blessings of God and His Peace).
>
> It is hereby declared that, it is for the learned doctors of theology (the 'ulama) – may God prolong the blessing of their existence! – to determine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to the rules of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at all times exist a committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the requirements of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner. The 'ulama

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[176] Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution," 405.

[177] Moazami, "The Making of State*,"* 214.

[178] The 1906 Constitution and the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of 1907 were taken from `Foundation for Iranian Studies`. Web. 02.Feb.2013

and Proofs of Islam shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of Twenty of the 'ulama possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recognize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters the decision of this ecclesiastical committee shall be followed and obeyed and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!).

As seen above quotation Parliament was named `the Sacred National Consultative Assemby`. Its authority relied on `favour and assistance of His Holiness the Imam of the age` and more importantly ulama was accepted as the official body to reject or accept the decisions taken by the Assembly. To accomplish these aims, to form an Ecclestial` Committee` was proposed. This Committee had not been formed until 1979, yet, it still can be seen as an indicator of religious establishment` s power. Ulama`s rights and duties on judicial affairs are also mentioned in the Supplementary Law. According to the second part of article 27 `the judicial power, by which is meant the determining of rights. This power belongs exclusively to the ecclesiastical tribunals in matters connected with the ecclesiastical law, and to the civil tribunals in matters connected with ordinary law` Also it is claimed in the article 17 that `The Supreme Ministry of Justice and the judicial tribunals are the places officially destine for the redress of public grievances, while judgement in all matters falling within the scope of the Ecclesiastical Law is vested in just mujtahids possessing the necessary qualifications.`

Hence to summarise, in terms of religious institutionalisation, 1906 Constitution and the Supplementary Laws of 1907 can be seen as the final phase before Reza Shah`s coming into power. Religious establishment emerged as an important source of power both organizationally and officially. It continued to enjoy its power until Reza Shah consolidated his power. Next chapter analyses the characteristics of the new era, main characteristic of which, Abrahamian`s words aptly describes "what emerged in the 1920`s was not a reestablishment of the old despotism but the establishment of a new absolutism armed with such modern coercive institutions as a standing army and a nationwide bureaucracy."[179]

2.7 Summary of the Major Developments of the Era
Putting aside the emergence of sectarian divisions within Islam, this part of the thesis covers roughly four century. As has been debated above, starting from the foundation of the Safavids until Reza Shah's rising to power, Iranian plateau faced with various developments both in international, institutional and ideological domains. The purpose of this section is to summarise the developments occurred in these above mentioned domains. By giving an illustration of each domain, I aim to prepare a guideline for the final chapter in which these developments will be discussed in comparison to the Turkish case.

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[179] Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution," 386.

2.7.1 Ideological Developments of the Era

In terms of religion state relations, this period can be considered as one of the most important eras of Iranian history. This significance stems from various reasons. First of all, this period marked the beginning of shiitization of Iranian society. Safavids, as a relatively unimportant Sufi order, leaded this transformation in the sectarian identity of Iranian masses. This transformation has impacted upon the religious as well as the political landscape of Iran. However, it was not a unilinear process. The mythical aspects of the Safavid understanding of Shi'a sect had transformed by time. In other words, the heterodox and decentralised nature of the early Safavid period had gradually transformed into a more centralised and orthodox understanding of Shi'a. Especially, after the dead of Shah Ismail as the founding father of Safavid dynasty, this process continued to increase drastically. The heterodox understanding of Shia was modified to meet the demands of a centralising state. As a result, the charismatic-heterodox rule of Shah Ismail was transformed into a form of orthodoxy by time. This transformation evolved to an extent that Iran became the leader of orthodox Shi'a understanding in the world.

Another important ideological development of the era is the famous Usuli-Ahbari debate of the succeeding Qajar period. This debate was mainly about the role of Shi'a ulama. On the one side of the debate there were Akhbari's, who claim that the role of ulama is restricted to the areas in which there is an obvious religious tradition. On the other side there positioned Usulis, who argue that ulama can use their reason to solve religious problems. Usuli ulama did not need to openly reference religious tradition in order to make ijtihad (religious reasoning). Usuli success in this debate had profound political implications. Members of Usuli ulama ensured political powers that surpass the traditional role of clergy. It became one of the main causes of the differentiation between Sunni and Shi'a in terms of the role attributed to ulama.

Last important ideological development of the era was the emergence of new religious movements in the 19th century. Especially Babi and later Bahai religious currents arose as an ideological rival against orthodox Shi'a belief system. Major themes contained in these movements were the demand for equality and social justice as well as the opposition to veiling and polygamy. As discussed above, in its early phases these themes were impacted upon the religious sphere of Qajar Iran, yet finally they were defeated by the orthodox ulama. This bloody suppression of the new religious movements was to a great extent, a product of an alliance between state and orthodox Shi'a. Hence, these movements elevated both ideological and institutional power of orthodox Shi'a.

As can be derived from this summary, religion as an ideology has transformed to a great extent during the historical trajectory of Iran. This transformation is directly related to historical political processes and yielded historical political results. For example, as analysed above, the transformation of heterodox Sufi religious ideology to an orthodox Shi'a sect cannot be understood without taking the requirements of centralization into consideration. Moreover, one must take into account that the Usuli Akhbari debate

revealed the characteristic needs of Qajar ulama. Living in a weaker state than its Safavid predecessors, it is understandable that Qajar ulama demanded for more institutional power. The Usuli victory over Akhbari can be understood in relation to this demand. Finally, ulama and state alliance against new religious movements of 19th century showed that, contrary to the commonly portrayed picture of Shi'a ideology as revolutionary and autonomous, it can be modified to a state allied pattern when needed.

2.7.2 International Developments of the Era

As discussed in the introduction chapter, international developments can be divided into three parts. First part is wars or invasions that Iranian plateau faced through the historical trajectory that this chapter covers. Second part is the impact of international ideologies such as enlightenment and nationalism. Third part is the trans-border relations of Turkish and Iranian states. These three parts, albeit differ in their influences, took place and impacted upon the religion state relations during the era.

Starting from the 16th century, Iranian plateau faced various invasions and wars. The period before the Safavids coming into power was the Timurid Empire which was founded by central Asian originated Turco-Mongol dynasty. The Timurid Empire was founded as a result of the infamous Mongol invasions of Iran and Anatolia. The legacy of destructive invasion of the Mongols had resulted in a state of turmoil in Iran. The classical religious institutions as well as the state apparatus were largely devastated. This absence of centralised power structure gave way to Sufi orders, such as Safavids, to gain enormous power. Hence, it can be claimed that from the very beginning of the formation of Iranian religious structure, international developments played their role. Secondly, the post Safavid period experienced the Afghan invasion. A new external invader, this time coming from a Sunni power, devastated the newly emerged centralised state of Safavids. This invasion not only gave way to an administrative turmoil but also ravaged the recently emerged Shi'a religious institutions. Afghan governance discouraged Shi'a religious rituals, closed seminaries and committed various Shi'a massacres. After the 70 years period of Afghan rule, Qajars managed to gain power and reunite Iran. However, this time what emerged was not a strong and centralised state such as Safavids but a fragile state which neither had religious legitimacy nor military tools to assert an ideological hegemony. As a result of this fragile structure of the Qajar state, a strong religious institutionalisation took place.

Another important international development is tied to the flow of international ideologies. This chapter shows how 18th and 19th centuries marked a period of great change in Iran. It is hard to claim that Iranian social structure experienced a total transformation like the European states. The relative homogeneity of ethnic and religious demography of Iran restrained the impacts of nationalism. In contrast to Ottoman territories, Iranian plateau had limited number of ethnic and religious minorities. The largest non-persian ethnic group was Azerbaijani Turks; yet they were the members of the ruling dynasty. They, to a large

extent, felt themselves as Iranians[180] So Iran had a better record of nationalist revolts in 18th and 19th century than the Ottoman territories. However, it is similarly hard to overlook the influence of western international ideologies on Iranian historical trajectory. A new intelligentsia with modern aspirations began to rise in this period. This new social class played its role in the constitutional Revolution of 1906. To say the least, the ideology of constitutionalism is itself a western ideology. Russian Revolution of 1905 also had an effect on the developments of the Constitutional period. It drew attention of Iranian masses and gave impetus to Iranian opposition movement. Yet, interestingly this internationally influenced movement resulted in the first official recognition of Shi'a ulama as a separate political entity. As mentioned above, it is apt to claim that Shi'a ulama, one way or another, put its mark to the constitution.

In addition to the impacts of international ideologies, the historical trajectory that this part of the thesis covers, also discusses the early instances of western economic penetration to Iranian market. As discussed above, tobacco movement is a direct result of this western penetration. First instances of the famous ulama-bazaar alliance can be found in Tobacco movement.

Last part of the international factors can be detected in Turkish Iranian trans-border relations. These trans-border factors also shaped the ways in which religion-state relations evolved for both Iran and Turkey. Especially Ottoman Safavid wars of the 16th century have considerable importance in this respect. As a result of the mutual interaction between Ottomans and Safavids, the rulers and ulama of these states managed to define and institutionalize their religious ideologies. This institutionalisation was achieved with respect to one another through wars of 16th century.

2.7.3 Institutional Developments of the Era

As discussed throughout the chapter, the period covers the foundation and further institutionalisation of Shi'a religious establishment. While it took different shapes in different historical periods, this institutionalisation had three levels: the proliferation of the Shi'a faith as the dominant sect in Iran; the solidification of the doctrine and the emergence of financial and political autonomy of Shi'a ulama. It is worth noting here that the Safavid understanding of religion state relations followed a different trajectory than its successor states. Safavid State maintained ideological control through its realm by prohibiting the emergence of autonomous religious institutions. Contrary to the succeeding Qajar era, the Safavids exemplified caesaropapist tendencies in religion state relations. These tendencies had enormous similarities with its Ottoman counterparts. Safavid State had the sole authority over religion; the Iranian ulama in this

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[180] This tradition continued until the foundation of Pahlavi dynasty. Touraj Atabaki argued that "contrary to what one might expect, many of the leading agents of the construction of an Iranian bounded territorial entity came from non-Persian-speaking ethnic minorities, and the foremost were the Azerbaijanis." Touraj Atabaki, Recasting Oneself, Rejecting the Other: Pan-Turkism and Iranian Nationalism (2001), in Erich J. Zürcher and Willem Van Schendel (ed). *Identity Politics in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity and Labour in the Twentieth Century*, I.B. Tauris: London, 65.

period can be considered as servants of state. Hence, it can be claimed that the proliferation of Shi'a sect in Iran was achieved as a state centred initiative.

First instances of the doctrinal solidification of the Shi'a ideology in Iran were also apparent in this period. As has been shown, the heteredox understanding of Islam in early Safavid periods evolved into a more orthodox understanding by time. Yet for the full-fledged solidification of the doctrine, Qajar period took the lead. As debated above, Usuli-Akhbari debate is of great importance in this respect. This solidification was also going in concert with the third level of institutionalisation of the Shi'a religious establishment; which was the emergence of financial and political autonomy of Shi'a ulama. The relative weakness of the Qajar state and lack of religious legitimacy of the Qajar rulers resulted in Qajars' inability to control the religious sphere as much as its predecessors. This autonomy of the religious establishment emerged as the distinctive characteristic of state religion-relations and become one of the main differences between Turkish and Iranian historical trajectories. The course and repercussions of this characteristic will be analysed in the succeeding chapter

CHAPTER 3

RELIGION AND STATE IN IRAN MODERN PERIOD

3.1 Introduction

This chapter mainly addresses the relations between state and religion throughout the modern history of Iran. Starting from the Constitutional Revolution of 1906, it explores the historical process that paved the way to Reza Shah's coming to power. Then, the chapter depicts the general characteristics of the era by mainly focusing on the arbitrary structure of his reign. Afterwards, it analyses the religion-state relations during the early period of Reza Khan. Two important turning points have been identified for this analysis. The first one is the Republican Crisis and the second one is Conscription Law. The chapter shows the ways in which these two turning points resulted in the victory of the religious establishment. The chapter progresses by exploring how the relation between state and religious establishment evolved through the course of Reza Shah's late period. The analysis benefits from three sub-divisions: Legal-Institutional Sphere, Ideological-Symbolic Sphere and Economic-Social Sphere. In addition, the chapter analyses ulama's reactions to the transformations that took place in these respective eras. It will also depict the reasons that lie behind these reactions. Finally the developments of the era are summarised in ideological, international and institutional levels.

3.2 From Constitutional Revolution to Reza Shah

A thorough survey of the rise of Reza Shah to absolute power in Iran is beyond the scope of this study. Yet it is necessary to note some characteristics of the era that pave way to his coming power. As briefly mentioned in the third chapter, the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was the result of complex social and political processes which have its roots in the historical development of Iran. The process embodied political, economic and social dimensions. During the era a restructuring of Iranian political sphere has occurred and new alliances between social groups were built. More importantly, Iranian masses for the first time in their history gained the electoral right and a `democratic` rule. But, the period following the Constitutional Revolution was marked by disintegration and chaos. Mainly, two factors brought the downfall of constitutional law and resulted in the subsequent turmoil. First one is the Anglo Russian Entente of 1907, which divided Iran into two spheres of influence, and the second one is the death of the Muzaffareddin Shah. Succeeding Qajar monarch, Muhammad Ali Shah with the help of Russians, reversed the constitutional rights. In 1908, the Parliament was bombed by the Cossack Brigade.[181] Active participants

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[181] The Persian Cossack Brigade was an elite force formed by Nasir Al Din Shah in 1879. It was modeled after Russian army. During the years prior to I World War it was the most effective military force in Iran and has played a significant

of the Constitutional era were arrested and some of them were persecuted. Those who were not arrested and persecuted fled the country. Yet the Shah`s actions itself also gave rise to resistance. On the one hand masses in Tabriz stood against what is called 'the Russian-Qajar conspiracy' and rebelled against it. A constitutionalist army from Gilan and Isfahan started a march to the capital. Finally they occupied the capital and deposed Muhammad Ali shah. Ahmad Shah was put on the throne and constitutional rule was restored. Yet the turmoil was not totally over and constitutional rule did not continue without interruption.

In 1911, Iranian Parliament appointed an American citizen Morgan Shuster as Treasurer-General. In order to reform the financial structure of Iran, Shuster, began to curb and tax the wealth of royal attendants. Moreover he began confiscations of the properties and the lands of elites. In a while he confiscated the properties of one of the ex-Shah`s brother. Russia as response to this, -under the pretext of Shah`s brother being a Russian citizen- demanded Shuster`s dismissal. Parliament rejected the demand. Yet a Russian supported cabinet coup D'état shut down the Parliament. Shuster was dismissed and forced to leave Iran. In 1914, Parliament was reopened just before the World War I had started. Although Iran officially declared neutrality in the war, it had no forces to back up this declaration. So World War I also reinforced the disorder and chaos in Iran. As a result of the war foreign penetration increased, this time in the form of direct occupation. During the war, both Russian and Ottoman troops occupied respectively northern and western Iran, while in the south British military presence increased. The Iranian government was weak and ineffective to the extent that it could not prevent the separatist movements. A self declared Soviet Socialist Republic of Gilan was followed by Azerbaijan Democratic Party which had similar aims. Nevertheless, there were also factors which helped to shape the events in favour of Iran. In 1917, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia marked the end of direct Russian interference to the Iranian political affairs. In addition, German and Ottoman powers were eliminated from the political sphere as a result of their failure in the war. In this context, British emerged as the sole imperial power. This led to the Anglo Persian treaty of 1919. According to treaty, Britain guaranteed its access to the Iranian oil fields and in return it promised 2 million pounds loans, munitions and equipment for army, and building railroads. The treaty was denounced by the Iranian masses. Subsequently, a wide array of social groups including the merchants and the members of the provincial movements, protested against the treaty. The Ulama were also active in denouncing the agreement. The leading ulama in Karbala published fatwas against the British. The reaction against the British was enormous. According to Abrahamian two highly ranked members of the ulama pronounced in favour of the Bolsheviks.[182] The government was unable to convene the parliament to ratify the treaty.

In the middle of this deteriorating situation, Colonel Reza Khan entered the scene. On February 21, having won the support of gendarmerie –and most probably the British, he marched into Tehran with his force of

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role in politics. The future Shah, Reza Khan was also a member of this elite cavalry. For a detailed discussion of Cossack Brigades see Stephanie Cronin, (1997), *The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State*, I.B. Tauris: London.

[182] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 114.

three thousand men. Reza Khan arrested prominent politicians, "assured the shah that the coup d'état was designed to save the monarchy from revolution" and forced him to appoint Seyed Zia Tabatabai as the prime minister and himself as the commander of the army.[183] In 1921, Reza Khan became the minister of war and consolidated his power over the military. His accomplishments in modernising the army and suppressing separatist movements also reinforced his position. In 1922, he was appointed as the prime minister. In December 1925, the constitution was amended by removing the Qajar Dynasty and by giving the throne to Reza Khan and his descendants. Four months after the amendment, Reza Khan was crowned as Reza Shah Pahlavi in April 1926.

As Jaleh Pirnazar asserts, the rise of Reza Khan to absolute power in Iran had both international and domestic grounds. Favourable international circumstances involved mainly two elements. Firstly, the British aimed to protect Iran from a Bolshevik sort of revolution and also intended to protect its economic-political interests. The political sphere consisting of a powerless Qajar Dynasty and a factionalised parliament were not effective to reach these aims. So, it was a stable central government that best served their interests. Secondly, an insecure and decentralised Iran was also an object of fear for Soviets. They believed that, only a strong and authoritarian rule could be an alternative to the imperial interests of the British. Moreover for the Soviets, this position had a doctrinal reason. Reza Khan was considered as a modern social force `a representative of Iranian Bourgeoisie hostile to the landowning aristocracy and therefore "a step forward" in Iran`s historical development.[184] In accordance with favourable international sphere, domestic factors also played their role. Growing factionalism in the Parliament fostered the weakening of the regime. This weakening caused both the Parliamentary and non-parliamentary forces to rely on the sole organised social force; the army. Reza Khan, the single person that was able to master the army, was seen as the only alternative to consolidate the political authority of the government.[185]

3.3. General Characteristics of the Era

There is room in Iran for only one shah-and I will be that Shah

Reza Shah[186]

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[183] Mohammad Gholi Majd claims that these two had not even met before the night of the coup. He asserts that all had been arranged by the British. Mohammad Gholi Majd,(2000), Resistance to the Shah: Landowners and Ulama in Iran, University Press of Florida: Florida, 2. Nikkie Keddie discusses British involvement into the coup and concludes that `in the case of Reza Khan while it is true that help from Britons on the scene was important to his rise, it is equally true that he was never the tool of the British that some Iranian saw in him. (1999), *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan*, Mazda Publishers: California, 80.

[184] Jaleh Pirnezar, (1980), Political Movements and Organizations in Iran 1890-1953, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, Near Eastern Studies:University of California Berkeley, 128.

[185] *ibid.,* 128-129.

[186] Quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 63.

Reza Shah, by all means, was a military dictator. The basic democratic rights were denied during his reign. All the aspects of the society were subject to centralisation, and the military firmly controlled the Iranian's lives. Yet, he was also the `quintessential moderniser`.[187] His era witnessed betterment in the basic symbols of modernization such as the rate of literacy, women's rights, transportation and industrialization. In his book *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*, Homa Katozian tries to create a comparative theory of state, society and politics. He proposes nineteen theses first of which is about the arbitrary rule in Iran. According to him "Iran has been an arbitrary society where there has been no state, social class, law and politics as observed in European History and explained and analysed by European theorists."[188] For sure, this thesis -and the following ones- can be considered to carry `orientalist` motivations or assumptions.[189] Yet, at least for the period of Reza Pahlavi, arbitrary character of the ruling was more or less apparent. In the literature, this arbitrary character is widely discussed and considered as one of the most significant differences of the early period of Iranian and Turkish modernisations. These differences are to be elaborated in the following chapters. This part specifically discusses the ways in which this arbitrary rule was performed and it focuses on how this period differs from the earlier ones.

As mentioned in the preceding parts, when Reza Shah came into power, central government of Iran was ineffective and under nearly total imperial control. Central government to a great extent had lost control outside the capital. The separatist movements were flourished and the tribal as well as the other local sources of power were active. The country was in a long run turmoil and chaos. The political scene in Iran could best be described as disintegration and international domination. In this context, Reza Shah rose and created a strong army and suppressed the ethnic and tribal sources of power. As Keddie explains "Reza`s work to create a strong modern national army and his successful campaigns against political and tribal autonomy brought a unification to Iran unknown under the Qajars or previously."[190]

Yet as a result of his achievement of bringing order, and especially following his consolidation of power, the state began to be identified with Reza Shah. He did not delegate his authority. His words in 1926 can demonstrate his way of approaching to politics. Less than a month after he was crowned, he stated that 'the people of Iran begged me through the Constituent Assembly to take charge of this country" and he claimed that "before me the Iranian state was just an empty word … In Iran, the king of the country has to force the

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[187] "Enlightened Despot" would be another concept to describe him. For a descussion on the ways in which Iranian intellectuals of the era created the myth of saviour in order to hail Reza Shah see Ali Ansari, (2012), *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, Cambridge University Press: New York, 65-83.

[188] Homa Katouzian, (2006), *State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis*, I.B. Tauris: London, 2.

[189] Robert Carver, in his review of another Katouzian book, *the Persians: Ancient Medieval and Modern Iran*, also remarked orientalist assumptions of the author. Media Source: 03 Dec.2009 http://www.thetablet.co.uk/review/476 06.Feb.2013.

[190] Keddie, Nikkie. (1998), *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan*, California. Mazda Publishers, 84.

cabinet to work and familiarise the parliament with its duties. He also has to force the merchants, landowners, urbanites and even peasants to work."[191] Any political power and political figure, having the potential to compete with him, were immediately suppressed. He had an extensively authoritarian attitude towards governance. In 1927 he started by outlawing the Communist and Socialist parties, then he continued with other ones. Even the Progress Party, which had supported him to a great extent, was replaced by a new party which first called as New Iran and as `Progressive Party`. This new party was very similar to the Fascist Party of Italy and also resembled the Republican People's Party of Turkey. The New Party's support to Shah was evident in their slogans which was `God, Shah and Country`[192]. Yet in 1932, it was also outlawed   on the pretext that it "promoted dangerous republican sentiments."[193] He reduced "Parliament and the Cabinet to rubber stamps."[194]   Reza Shah`s distrust in the institutions clearly illustrates the arbitrary rule in Iran. Hedayat Mokhber describes the situation as follows:

> Under Reza Shah`s rule, no one had any independent power. Every business had to be reported to the Shah, and every order issued by him had to be carried out. Unless there is some degree of independence responsibility would be meaningless… and there would be no statesmen with a will of his own.[195]

Two cases are especially important in demonstrating the scope of this arbitrariness. First one is Reza Shah`s enforced acquisition of the agricultural property. During his reign, Reza Shah acquired great amounts of land from the big landlords and from the state property in order to increase his own wealth. Ann Lambton notes that although these lands were legally purchased or exchanged for other property, the process was more similar to confiscation. She adds that "the holder was forced to exchange his property for property elsewhere, not always of equivalent value". So the whole process can be seen as "a cloak for virtual confiscation."[196] A French newspaper went as far as describing the Shah "as the land eating animal."[197] Many tribal leaders were dispossessed which eventually caused a resistance to Shah`s policies.  Muhammad Taqizadeh describes Shah`s appetite for property as follows "[the Shah] took the whole of Mazandaran. He liked to take for himself any agricultural property that was good and valuable"[198] He became the biggest

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[191] Quoted in Mehrzad Boroujerdi, (2003), Authoriterian Modernization in Iran, in Stephanie Cronin (ed) *The Making of Modern Iran State and Society under Reza Shah, 1921-1946*, Routledge:London, 148.

[192] Pirnazar, "Political Movements and Organizations," 164.

[193] M. Reza Ghods, (1991), "Government and Society in Iran 1926-34," *Middle Eastern Studies*, (27)2, 220

[194] *ibid.,* 219.

[195] Quoted in Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran,* 315.

[196] Mohammad Gholi Majd, (2000), *Resistance to Shah, Landowners and Ulama in Iran*, University Press of Florida: Florida, 36.

[197] Quoted in Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran,* 319.

[198] *ibid*., p.319.

feudal landlord in the country. At the end of his reign, "he became the wealthiest man in Asia at least on par with Japanese empire which ruled Japan for over 1000 years"[199]

Secondly the traces of his arbitrary behaviour can be found in the 1933 oil agreement. The agreement was a continuation of infamous D'Arcy concessions of 1901. It provided an additional 32 years oil concession to the British which resulted in grave harm to the country and Shah`s own prestige. Amin Jaikal describes the harms given by the D`arcy and 1933 agreements to the Iranian economy as follows. "[The influence of oil to Iranian economy were] for all practical purposes, negligible, and that the industry remained economically divorced from and rest of the Iranian economy. The only major connecting link between oil and the domestic economy was provided by payments of royalties, taxes and dividends to the government."[200] This situation not only had negative economic repercussions, but also deteriorated Shah`s own legitimacy. As discussed above, British support to Shah`s coming into power is a widely discussed theme in the Iranian political sphere. Thus, this agreement effectively disseminated the belief among the Iranian masses that Shah had been under the influence of the British. This turned out to be one of the major factors behind the rise of the nationalist leader Musaddiq later on, who a nationalist leader who rejected agreement. As Abrahamain claims, `this agreement of 1933 was to plague Anglo-Iranian relations for the next two decades.` [201]

Reza Shah`s economic initiatives can also be considered as the reflections of his arbitrary rule. During his reign, all the economic initiatives were taken by himself. The economy was centralised at the expense of provincial centers. As Ghods argues "no person of consequence … could carry on his affairs without a seat in Tehran."[202] As a result of this centralization, traditional commerce centers like Isfahan, Meshed or Tabriz lost their power to a large extent. The biggest economic initiative of his time, the Trans-Iranian railway, was also a personal project. It had little economic benefit for the country. It had symbolic – as a symbol of Iranian modernization- and military-as against the Soviet threat- importance, yet, it mainly increased the wealth of Reza Shah used. "The railroad brought the produce of the Caspian provinces to the South for export: by 1940 the Shah owned at least 3.000.000 acres in that region… it drained the North's wealth to the South, and largely into the Shah`s coffers."[203]

One can look at history and find many examples of arbitrary ruling practises in Iran. Yet the combination of the arbitrary character of social power and the modernization policies distinguishes Reza Shah from his predecessors. Katouzian discusses the ways in which this new arbitrary rule differs from former instances.

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[199] Majd, *Resistance to Shah,* 3.

[200] Amin Jaikal. (1980), *The Rise and Fall of the Shah*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980. 39.

[201] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 144.

[202] Ghods, "Government and Society in Iran," 220.

[203] *ibid.,* 222.

He mentions three respects. First, as a result of the modern technology, the application of arbitrary rule was much more effective and absolute than it had been before. All apparatuses of security were under Shah's command. There was a modern police force and more importantly an enduring army. In urban centers, there was also a political police force whose job was to get information about the political activities. "There was literally nowhere to hide … even in high society, whenever someone uttered the slightest word of criticism, he would be strongly suspected of being an agent provocateur and would be met with heavy and uneasy silence."[204] Secondly, as a result of Constitutional Revolution there was a "systematic body of civil, criminal and administrative laws, and a large judicial and administrative body to implement them."[205] Yet, torture and official murder were also widespread. As soon as Reza Shah ordered to eliminate someone, be it a powerful minister or a tribal leader, it was executed immediately. Especially after the protests over the European style hat, many people were executed without trial. Third difference between the newer and older form of arbitrary rule is that there was no longer any recognised facility of meditation or cool-off. Neither the intervention by respectable elders nor the traditional strategies of self protection (such as taking sanctuary in sacred places) were respected by the Shah.

To conclude this part, it is also worth quoting from Reza Shah's own characterization of his era. When in 1941 Iran was invaded and Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favour of his son, he gave a farewell speech to parliament. His way of seeing his own rule is reflected in his last statement to his cabinet.

> Gentlemen! I am leaving the country soon, and must say something that you should know. No one has ever had any appreciation from me for his services, and no one was ever thanked or rewarded by me, although some excellent services were rendered. Do you know why? The reason is because this country has no opposition. My decision were all made and carried out without you…with regard to my plans and ideas, the secret of my success was that I never consulted anyone. I studied the problems quietly, and without showing why I was interested. But last year for the first time in my life I tried to change this way, and consulted the Higher War Council…if I had not done so, I would not now find myself in this situation. [206]

3.4 Religion and State under Reza Shah- Early period

As the `quintessential moderniser`, Reza Shah sought to achieve two basic goals. First he tried to transform the primitive industrial structure to a modernised-at least semi modernised- one. This included the industrialization in the economic sphere and the commercialization in the agricultural system. Secondly, he aimed to expand the power of state over all the segments of the society. To achieve this, he needed administrative and economic centralization and more importantly a political unification. These two processes embodied in itself the elimination of non-state powers, and undoubtedly ulama were the most important element among them. Suppressing ulama`s power was important also because they were the

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[204] Quoted in Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran,* 315-316.

[205] *ibid.,* 316.

[206] Ansari, M. Ali. (2003), *Modern Iran since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*, (Second Edition) Pearson, Longman: Malaysia, 72-73.

securers of the traditional ideologies which were incompatible with Reza Shah`s vision. Reza Shah could not depend on religious legitimacy, since unlike Safavid`s he did not have a religious background. Also unlike Qajars he did not have a tribal legitimacy. So he depended on the army as the most significant power which successfully legitimised his actions. As Ali Ansari put forward "He did not have a tribe so he set out to forge one."[207] Yet relying solely on army would be ineffective in implementing his ideology which is labelled by Mehrdad Boroujerdi as "autocratic secular nationalism.". His strong preference of the secular system of government is clear in his following words: "There is no doubt that religion and politics are two holy principles whose precise details should be known and observed by all enlightened leaders. However the mixing of two … weakens religion and leads to the decline of politics."[208]

Yet the process was not straightforward. To understand the relations between the state and religion, Reza Shah`s reign should be divided into two stages. The first period is between 1921 -1925 and coincides with his attempts to consolidate his power. Second period is from 1925 to 1941, during which he suppressed the religious institutions to a great extent. This section deals with the early period. In the first part of his reign Reza Khan used the `traditional bribe and divide 'tactics.'[209] So in order to discuss the period thoroughly, Reza Khan's use of this method has to be elaborated. Then, the republic crisis and the conscription law, the two important events which forced Reza Khan to directly face with ulama, is to be discussed. These two events are particularly important since they elaborate our understanding of the characteristics of the religion and state relations throughout the first part of Reza Khan`s rule.

As briefly mentioned above, the first part of the religion state relations during the Reza Khan period coincides with the Reza Khan`s consolidation of power. Although he emerged as a strong figure on the political arena of Iran with the 1921 coup, the Qajar Dynasty was still in power. Ulama as a political group constituted a significant force in the community. Reza Khan, first as the minister of War and later as the prime minister, tried to obtain ulama`s support in order to supress Qajar Dynasties power. Above all, he was well aware of the fact that obtaining the support of ulama, necessitated gaining the support of their traditional ally; the bazaaris. Through his agents, he established good relations with the prominent members of the bazaaris. Restoring the order in the capital city had also reinforced his relations with bazaar. He urged the merchants to send petitions to Ahmad Shah (ruling Qajar Monarch) to appoint him as the prime minister. The petition illuminates the power bases that Reza Shah relied on, so it is worth to quote in length.

> For the sake of Islam and Iran,

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[207] *ibid*., 34.

[208] Quoted in Boroujerdi, "Authoriterian Modernization in Iran," 147.

[209] Faghfoory, Mohammad H. (1987), "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran: 1925-1941," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (19): 414.

The deterioration of overall political, social and administrative condition of the country has ruined the prestige of Iran and the Iranians in the world. The world looked down at us and saw no hope in our ability to manage our affairs. No patriotic Iranian could tolerate this situation. It was in such a situation that H.H. Reza Khan took the affairs of the country in his able hand, re-organised the army and administration, revived the religion and put an end to corruption, irreligiousness and prostitution. We are unable to reward him for his numerous services. Therefore, we the undersigned, wholeheartedly thanks His Excellency Reza Khan and support him in his attempt to bring progress to the country and wish him success.

Signed 256 Merchants of the Bazaar of Tehran[210]

This petition received attention and consequently the ulama came to regard him as a suitable candidate to become the prime minister. In October 1923 members of Parliament including a significant number of ulama supported him against the other candidates. After Reza Khan`s appointment as the Prime Minister, Ahmad Shah left the country.

His explicit expression of his devotion of Islam also helped to gain bazaaris and ulama`s support. In the month of Muharram of 1922, he arranged a mourning procession in the mosque of the Tehran Bazaar. It was a great public event and the demonstration greatly impressed the ulama as well as the bazaaris and ordinary people. "It was the first time that a high official of ministerial rank had so humbly associated with the rank and file devotees of the martyred Hussein in commemorating the Imam`s martyrdom."[211] It was also important that the participating ulama "was respectfully hugged and kissed by Reza Khan and were paid at the end of the ceremony."[212] It was not the only instance of symbolic act to show his respect to Islam. He further assured his position by the pilgrimage to Najaf holy Iraqi city. Iraqi ulama had also supported him in return for his attempts to mediate between Najaf ulama and King Faisal of Iraq. Especially Muhammad Husain Na`ini, one of the great Ayatollah`s of Iraq, gave Reza Khan a sword which was believed to have belonged to Abbas, a brother of Imam Husssein. [213] The approval of Na`imi sustained Reza Khan's legitimacy and popular support.  Fasting during the month of Ramadan and declaring a day of national mourning for the bombing of Mecca and Medina by the Saudi regime in 1925, also reinforced ulama`s support for Reza Khan.[214]

Reza Khan not only engaged in symbolic acts in order to gain ulama`s support but also found more direct ways of `bribing` ulama. He gave expensive presents to ulama. On one occasion in 1925, Reza Khan

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[210] Mohammad H. Fagfoory,. (1978), The Role of the Ulama in twentieth century Iran with particular reference to Ayatullah Haj Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kahsani, Unpublished PhD dissertation submitted to University of Wisconsin-Madison, 63.

[211] *ibid.,* 62.

[212] *ibid.,* 62.

[213] Faghoory also asserts that "rumours spread throughout the country that Reza Khan had dreamed of "His Holiness `Abbas` who had honoured Reza Khan by granting him of his own sword. Thus in the eyes of many, Reza Khan became one who had blessed by the Holy Abbas." Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations," 419.

[214] Boroujerdi, "Authoriterian Modernization in Iran,"154.

presented four expensive diamond rings to four important members of ulama.[215] Reza Khan also used religious sentiments to dispose Qajars from the dynasty. Members of the ulama, who were still loyal to Qajars then, turned to Reza Khan when a portrait of Ahmad Shah in Paris wearing a European style hat was distributed in Tehran. In the portrait, Ahmad Shah accompanied a group of French women. Reza Khan`s men quickly distributed the portrait and caused a great deal of anger among the ulama.[216]

One can assume that Ulama also had their own reasons to support Reza Khan during this era. First of all, Reza Khan`s success in bringing order and establishing security to Iran was supported by the masses as well as the ulama. Suppression of the rebellious groups in Khorasan, Gilan and Khuzistan strengthened his position. Ulama "reasoned that the attempts made to unify the country by Reza Khan needed to be supported, for a unified Iran could best preserve the interests of Islam."[217] So ulama as the defenders of Islam and Iran `be nami Islamiyat ve Iraniyat` strongly supported Reza Khan.[218] Another important reason for ulama`s support to Reza Khan stemmed from the fear of Bolshevism. In other words, Reza Khan was seen as the strong man to prevent the spread of bolshevism to Iran.

Two events are important to show the basic characteristics of religion-state relations during the early period of Reza Khan. First one is the republican crisis and second one is the conscription law. In the early period, these are the most serious confrontations of Reza Khan with the ulama. Both were, to some extent, resulted in the `victory` of religious establishment. Reza Khan was forced to retreat from his early positions. They are important to demonstrate the ulama`s power during the era. Next part discusses the importance of these events and analyses the ways in which they impacted upon the religion state relations.

3.4.1 The Republican Crisis

Before analyzing the Republican crisis of 1924, depicting the major actors of the period would be useful. The major actors of the period were diverse. They included the Qajar Dynasty, the groups in the parliament, the tribal chiefs, bazaaris, ulama and Reza Khan. As mentioned Ahmad Shah as the leader of the Qajar Court was in Europe for a while. Tribal chiefs, although they were then still active, were losing their power gradually as a result of Reza Khan`s military actions. Political configuration in the Parliament which included the Socialist, traditionalist and nationalist groups did not have a real social base. On the one hand there were the traditionalists depending on ulama and bazaaris, on the other hand there was newly founded

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[215] Muhammad H. Faghfoory, (1993), "The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran 1925-1941," *Iranian Studies*, (20)3-4, 278.

[216] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 421.

[217] Pirnazar, "Political Movements and Organizations," 138.

[218] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 421

Revival Party depending on the military power of Reza Khan. Socialists were a minority group which only had an influence among the trade unions, teachers and the journalists etc. [219]

In this configuration Reza Shah instigated a campaign to transform Iran into a republic. Indeed, it was not the first time in Iran when transforming the regime type into a republic was discussed. At the beginning of 1920s, especially after the 1921 coup, it was already being discussed. Yet the fear of tribal disorder and disintegration prevented further discussions. Main disadvantage of the transformation was considered as the risk of tribal chaos since it was considered that tribes "who accorded the monarchy some prestige, refusing to acknowledge the sovereignty of a president, and taking advantage of the situation to loot and pillage town and countryside."[220] This was also considered as the risk for state structure because the Bolshevik army could penetrate. Newly founded Bolshevik regime could use the disintegration as a pretext to invade the southern parts of Iran.

Yet this time, as a result of Reza Khan`s military efforts, tribal powers started to decrease. Separatist movements of the northern Iran, which to some extent had Bolshevik tendencies, were also suppressed. In addition to these, growing unpopularity and weakness of Qajar court were also evident. Especially after his recent journey to Europe, Ahmad Shah was commonly described as `Ahmad the wandering trader` (*Ahmada-e Allaf*).[221] It was a sign of increasing distrust of Iranian masses in Qajar monarch. All these factors led to a new discussion about the transformation of the regime type. Early in 1924, a powerful press campaign in support of republicanism begun. Articles in favour of republicanism published daily without any prevention. The campaign was not only against the monarchy, but also against the religious classes whom was considered as one of the major causes of Iran`s `backwardness`. To understand the extent of this campaign, it would be apt to quote length, one of the articles from *Iranshahr* a prominent journal of the era:

> Today almost all of Europe, including Russia, has adopted the republican system of government. There is no doubt in our minds that in the modern age the republican form of government is the best system of government. But while we have no doubt on the merits of republicanism, we must admit that republicanism is not an end in itself but only a means to higher end-that of destroying royal and clerical despotism in order to lead the masses toward a social revolution. You will understand the need for such a revolution if you look at the minority party in the Majles. These clerical deputies have been elected by exploiting public ignorance, fears, backwardness, and superstitions. It is high time we eliminated the power of the monarchy. Once we have done so, we can turn our attention onto more reactionary power of the parasitical clergy. [222]

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[219] For a discussion of political configuration of Parliament during the era see Pirnazar, "Political Movements and Organizations," 106-166.

[220] Vanessa Martin, (2003), "Mudarris, Republicanism and the Rise to Power of Reza Khan, Sardar-Sipah," in Stephanie Cronin (ed) *The Making of Modern Iran State and Society under Reza Shah, 1921-1946*, Routledge:London, 65.

[221] Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran,* 289.

[222] Quoted in Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 133.

During the press campaign an important event occurred in the neighbouring Turkey. On March 3 1924, Turkish Parliament abolished the caliphate. It also reinforced the fears of the ulama. Republicanism associated with some sort of secularism in the minds of the prominent ulama. Indeed, opponents of the republicanism were not only ulama and merchants. A small but influential numbers of liberals opposed republicanism since they were afraid of Reza Khan`s power. The republicanism was considered, as it turned out, as a plan of Reza Khan to gain more power.[223] Mohammad Taqi Bahar a renowned Iranian poet wrote in a short poem: "In the guise of republicanism, He [Reza Khan] is knocking the door of *Shahi*, We are ignorant and greedy enemy is canny." [224]

The Parliament met to discuss the proposal to eliminate monarchy and established a republic in 22 March 1924, under such conditions. It naturally created controversy. Of the 117 deputies, only 32 supported republicanism. 56 deputies demanded the abdication of Ahmad Shah and monarchical leadership of prince Firuz, while 29 deputies rejected it.[225] One of the representatives of the ulama in the Parliament, Sayyid Hasan Mudarris, declared that "an attack on the monarchy was an attack on the holy shari`a."[226] No agreement was sustained. Meanwhile, outside the parliament, opposition to republicanism expanded promptly. Tehran merchants, the traditional ally of ulama, closed the bazaar. A parade coming from the central mosque, gathered near the Parliament building and started to shout slogans such as: "We follow the rules of the Quran-we don't want a republic" and "we want to follow Islam-we don't want a republic."[227] Another group of demonstrators who supported the republic, gathered on the other side of the parliament. Apparently their numbers were very small as they were largely composed of the members of the recently formed trade unions, intellectuals and `civil servants who were given a day off in order to "express" their republican sympathies. [228] Violence spread between the two sides. Police force who was supporting the republicans beat a mullah.

The Parliament, unable to resolve the crisis, demanded a government intervention. Reza Khan, as the prime minister, was summoned to the Parliament. Yet, his car was surrounded by the demonstrators and stoned by them. When he finally reached the parliament he took the action. A member of the Parliament, a mullah called Sheikh Mahdi Sultan, who was preaching against republicanism was first beaten and then arrested by him. Yet the situation did not get any better. Demonstrations continued and Reza Khan himself was

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[223] Martin, "Rise to Power of Reza Khan," 70.

[224] Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran,* 288.

[225] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 417.

[226] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 134.

[227] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 417.

[228] Ervand Abrahamian, (1968), "The Crowd in Iranian Politics: 1905-1953, *Past & Present,* (41). 201. Abrahamian also asserts that, although their numbers were very small, this republican demonstration can be considered as the first modern crowd in history of Iran, for it was organised by political parties and its participants were members of the new classes.

physically assaulted by the masses. As a result, a few dozen were killed or injured. The Parliament protested to Reza Khan about the incidents. Understanding that the situation was getting worse, Reza Khan decided to retreat. He apologised both to the ulama and the members of the Parliament and promised the release of all who had been arrested by the police. Moreover he made a pilgrimage to Qum. From there, he issued a declaration which expresses his loyalty to Islam. "My aim has always been to protect the grandeur and welfare of Islam ... It would be more beneficial for the country if all efforts should be concentrated on reforms, the strengthening of foundations of the faith."[229] After his return from pilgrimage he publicly admitted that republicanism created "social confusion" and also announced that the "institution of constitutional monarchy was the best bulwark against Bolshevism" and arrested "nine communist activists-all of them were Armenians."[230]

In return, leading ulama of Tehran and Qum issued a declaration. The declaration said:

> Representation for a republic which was not suitable for the country had been made when the Prime Minister came to Qum, we demanded that he stop his agitation … He complied with our request. May God grant that the people of Iran appreciate the value of this act and give full thanks for this concern.[231]

The failure of republicanism clearly showed the ongoing power of ulama. Reza Khan had the support of army and press in addition to a considerable force in the Parliament. He succeeded in most of his military efforts but, still, there was still an area in which he could not penetrate. Ulama still had the power to organise masses and still had the capability to unite when they felt threatened. Yet, surprisingly, republican crisis turned into an advantage for Reza Khan. Ahmad Shah sent a telegram to the Parliament that he no longer had confidence in Reza Khan. So he was forced to resign from the Prime Ministry. His quitted immediately and created a power vacuum. The commanders of the army dispatched telegraphs to the Parliament demanding Reza Khan's immediate return. His supporters in the Parliament also continued propagating against the Qajars. In the press, a propaganda campaign was mounted. Qajars were accused of failing to develop the country during their 150 years rule. Ali Dashti, a renowned journalist of the period, wrote an article entitled "the Motherland's father went." [232] In order to gain support of the ordinary people, Reza Khan ordered a ceremony to establish a relief fund for the unfortunate.[233] A fortunate accident for him came

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[229] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 418.

[230] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 134.

[231] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 418.

[232] Katouzian, *State and Society in Iran,* 286-289.

[233] Martin, "Rise to Power of Reza Khan," 73.

in July 1924. American Consul was assassinated while photographing a religious ceremony.[234] Martial Law was declared. Ramifications of this assassination were huge. It was under these circumstances that Reza Khan was called back and became prime minister once again. This time, he did not attempt to transform the regime type but changed the dynasty and crowned himself as the Reza Shah Pahlavi.

3.4.2 Conscription Law

When, on December 15 1925, Reza Shah took his imperial oath, the prestige of religious establishment was at its peak. Republican crisis showed that his power was vulnerable against ulama's pressure. So he adopted a strategy of appeasement. By every means, the oath itself reflected the power of ulama. Reza Shah stated that "I swear on the Quran and by everything that is holy to me that I shall dedicate all my strength to the independence of Iran … I shall work for the propagating of our faith. To this end I implore the assistance of Allah and the cooperation of the ulama of Islam."[235] His inaugural speech was also full of religious themes. He assured ulama of his devotion to Islam and his respect to the religious orders. One of the first orders of Reza Shah, as the monarch, was to ban alcohol and gambling in Iran. He stated "Moreover since the evil practices are against the basic principles of Islam, I order that all the liquor stores and gambling centers throughout the country be closed."[236] Reza Shah`s coronation ceremony can also be considered as an indicator of ulama`s continuing power in Iran. As Abrahamian states, Reza Shah crowned himself "much in the fashion of his heroes Napoleon and Nader Shah. It was rumoured that at the coronation the speaker of the Majlis stepped forward to bestow the crown, but he took it in his own hands, declaring this is not something someone else can place on my head." [237] The crown was delivered to shah by both the minister of Court and the aged mullah of Khoi. This was also a symbolic gesture to ulama.[238] During the early phases of his reign as the Shah, he frequently visited the prominent mullahs in Tehran to consult them on the state affairs. A few months after his coronation, he made his first pilgrimage to Masshad. One can argue that the first year of his reign passed without any important clash between him and the ulama. Reza Shah clearly attempted to maintain and strengthen his relations with the religious community.

The first major clash between Reza Shah and ulama occurred with the introduction of the Conscription Law in 1927. As mentioned before, army was the main pillar of Reza Shah`s regime. Yet by the beginning of

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[234] This event is called saqqa-khaneh (public place for drinking water) killing. Robert W. Imbrie –American consul of Tehran-was killed when he was photographing a saqqa-khaneh. It was reported that a bahai was blinded after drinking from the well. His sight was miraculously came back after he had repented and made a donation to Shi`a Imams. Imbrie was taking photographs of the crowd next to the saqqa-khaneh. He was identified as a Bahai and accused of having poisoned the well. He was beaten to dead by the mob. For a detailed account of the events see Zirinsky, Michael P. (1986), "Blood, Power and Hypocrisy: The Murder of Robert Imbrie and American Relations with Pahlavi Iran", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (18).

[235] Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 424.

[236] *ibid.,* p.426.

[237] Abrahamian 2012 *op cit.,* p. 65.

[238] Ali Ansari, (2003), *Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After*, (Second Edition) Malaysia: Pearson, Longman, 42.

1925 the army had less than 50.000 officers.[239] With the exception of the Cossack brigades, which was commanded by Reza Shah, Iranian army was dependent heavily on the tribal power. These tribal powers were serving under the leadership of their tribal chiefs and called into the field for only specific campaigns. They were by no means an institutionalised army on which a national state could rely. So, by introducing compulsory universal male military service, Reza Shah not only attempted to increase his power, but also attempted to create a modern centralised force for a modern national state. Another aim of the universal conscription was to create nationalist sentiments among the masses. According to Arjomand creating a modern army meant "not only the penetration of the rural and tribal society by central state but also a considerable increase in national integrity."[240]

The Law exempted students of the religious schools.[241] Yet there were a few criteria. First, the students of the religious schools had to involve in their professions full time, had to successfully complete their studies, and needed to obtain permission in order to make independent judgements while interpreting the religious law. More importantly they had to pass an examination which was conducted by a government appointed committee. Giving the state who was eligible for exemption, resulted in a consequence that ulama did not like.The law gave the power to the state "to draft into military service those elements among the ulama whom it felt were acting against the regime`s policies."[242] Also the law was opposed by ulama on the grounds that two years in the service of a secular institution might weaken the believer`s allegiance to religion.[243] Another major factor that caused dismay among the ulama was the status of the non-Muslim communities. Traditionally, the non-Muslims were not allowed into the army. During the discussions in the Parliament, a prominent ulama Sayyid Hasan Mudarres rejected the bill by stating "although bearing arms was a religious duty of the Muslim, non-Muslims were under no obligation and should not be compelled to serve in the army." On the other hand, the Zoroastrian Deputy, Arbab Kaykhusraw, made a speech which claims Zoroastrians` "right and desire to share equally in the burdens as well as the privileges of citizenship." Stephanie Cronin asserts that although there were considerable number of Armenians serving in the army, "the government's insistence on the general participation of the non-Muslim minorities and the public and

[239] Stephanie Cronin, "Conscription and Popular Resistance in Iran, 1925-1941," (1998), *International Review of Social History*, (43) 454.

[240] Arjomand, Said Amir. (1988), *Turban for the Crown the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, New York: Oxford University Press, 71.

[241] The law was harsh and severe even for its era. It `imposed liability for military service on all males on reaching the age of 21, with certain definite exceptions of which the most important were clerics and religious teachers, religious students and certain defined categories of men on whom others were dependent. The period of service was 25 years, divided into three categories: six years' active service, of which two were to be spent with the colours and the remainder in immediate reserve; thirteen years' reserve service; six years' service in the local guard (only to be called out in time of war). Reservists were to come up for training each year for varying periods. The men taken for service with the colours in any one year were to be chosen by the drawing of lots from among those liable for military service." Cronin, "Conscription and Popular Resistance," 455.

[242] Akhavi, *Religion and Politics,* 37.

[243] Martin, "Rise to Power of Reza Khan," 69.

official recognition of this participation represented a complete break with the past and symbolized the triumph of nationalism over religious and communal identity."[244]

Unsurprisingly the ulama acted against the conscription. They began to express their resentment towards the law. Declarations were issued. According to one declaration, the duty of the ulama was to preserve the integrity of Islam As such they should be exempted from military service. The military should be filled with the "rank and file" people who could offer the state no other valuable services. [245] A number of prominent mullahs took sanctuary in Qum. Once more, the traditional alliance between the ulama and the bazaar became apparent. Tehran, Isfahan and Shiraz Bazaars were closed. Meanwhile street demonstrations against the law took place.

Reza Shah once more had to comply with the ulama. He sent his prime minister to Qum to negotiate. He also sought for religious justification for the law. In a letter to a prominent mullah, Sheikh Nurullah, Prime Minister Mukhbir Al Saltana Hedayat wrote:

> There is a strong need for maintenance of order and security of the Islamic government … You may come to Tehran and discuss the details. The government has the power to open the bazaars of Isfahan and Shiraz by the use of force, if necessary. But our concern for the ulama`s respect and status entitles us to end the dispute through negotiation. [246]

Finally ulama and Reza Shah reached to an agreement. Government signed a declaration accepting ulama`s demands. There were auxiliary issues such as; government censor against press about the religious matters and prohibition of drinking wine or gambling. Yet two of the demands were significant. First demand was the revision of the conscription law by the next Parliament. Second demand was the "Five high-ranking mujtaheds to form a committee to supervise the Parliament."[247] None was implemented. Indeed the latter article was the order of the constitution. As discussed in the previous chapter, the second article of the Supplementary Laws of 1907 defined a body of religious clerics to supervise the Parliament. Yet it was not carried out beforehand. As matter of fact, it was never carried out. Yet after the 1979 Revolution, a new form of religious supervision was implemented for not only the Parliament but also whole spheres of life.

The Conscription Law marked the beginning of a new era. Reza Shah`s consolidation of power opened a new phase in the relations between religion and state in Iran. It was the last time that he submitted to ulama`s pressure. From 1927 onwards, the government began to make crucial attempts to modernise the administration, the judicial system and the education. Moreover Reza Shah himself did not hesitate to use

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[244] This discussion was taken from Cronin, "Conscription and Popular Resistance," 454-455.

[245] Faghoory, "The Role of the Ulama," 71.

[246] Quoted in Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 425.

[247] Cronin, "Conscription and Popular Resistance," 468.

force against religious establishment. In 1929 David Williamson from US embassy reported. His report shows the methods utilised by Reza Shah in the new era hence worth quoting in length.

> The Shah is continuing his quiet but effective war against the clergy. His methods are simplicity itself. An influential mullah or dervish is secretly seized and conducted to a prison far from his native city. It is remarked that very often those so abducted never return. Among the prominent men that have disappeared in this way is Modarres. Others said to be in Halat (Kalat) near Mashad are Agah Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai`e, once Ambassador to Turkey, and Nasr al-Islam, both important politicians and leaders of anti-government opinion. The age-old oriental method of governing by the silent dagger and subtle poison are against evoked. [248]

Conscription Laws (discussed above) not only created a centralised army but also created a novel economic-social dynamic. As Cronin asserts "with its emphasis on uniformity, regularity, discipline, impersonal relationships and ''measured time` (the army prepared) its peasant conscripts for the new demands of industrial capitalism."[249]

Next part discusses the ways in which the relation between state and religious establishment evolved through the course of Reza Shah's late period. It is divided into three subdivisions Legal-Institutional Sphere, Ideological-Symbolic Sphere and Economic-Social Sphere. As Gill Keshavarzian asserts, judiciary, education and taxation are the key battlegrounds of church-state conflict. Specifically, during the period of state building, states try to enhance their authority over these areas over which religious establishment traditionally have the control. The basic requirement for an effective state requires the ability to enforce laws. In this context, a rival source of power can not be tolerated. Sphere of education is another area of conflict since both the state and religious officials have the common interest in controlling the education. To sustain a long term political stability, states need to teach the children to respect the laws and imbue them a sense of citizenship. On the other hand, for the religious establishment, education serves one of the basic means of teaching religious norms and practises by means of guaranteeing their long term adherents. This leads to a confrontation. Taxation is also considered as an important area of conflict between church and state. Both state and church need revenues. Collection of religious taxes and also registering property are traditional ways for religious officials to gain revenues which results in a confrontation with the state.[250]

One can add symbolic and ideological confrontation to the above mentioned areas of confrontation. In order to survive, both the religious establishment and the state are in a constant search for legitimacy. This also causes strife between two.

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[248] Quoted in Mohammad H. Fagfoory, The Impact of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925-1941, *Iranian Studies,* Vol. 26, No. 3-4, 1993. P. 280.

[249] Cronin, "Conscription and Popular Resistance," 470

[250] Gill and Keshavarzian, "State Building and Religious Resources," 440-441.

3.5 Legal-Institutional Domain

3.5.1 Judiciary Reforms

In the Shi`a judicial system a theoretical distinction between customary (Urf) and canon (Shari`a) law already existed. *Urf* law consisted of matters affecting the state and its administration; however all other domains including civil and personal matters were under the command of Shari a law. In practice, as a result of unstable governments –more specifically because of above discussed weak state structure- nearly all judicial authority were given to ulama. [251] Ulama's power in judicial matters was enormous. In addition to their judicial work, they acted as public notaries who witnessed and authenticated all sorts of documents.

It is no doubt that a modernised centralised and strong state, which Reza Shah aimed to establish, needed to take the matters of judiciary into its hands and to break the power of ulama. At a gathering of lawyers and judges in the beginning of 1928, Shah declared his view on judiciary as such: "The prestige of a nation depends on the quality of its justice. I expect you the most honourable conduct that will at once bring justice and prestige to our country."[252] To initiate a reform, Ali Akbar Davar, who has a law degree from University of Geneva, was appointed as the Minister of Justice. He began to reorganise Ministry of Justice and prepared for a judicial reform. First attempt of judicial reform began in 1928 when the Parliament authorised the government to enforce a new civil code. The main purpose of this action was to provide a uniform basis for the application of Shar`ia. Until then, ulama had interpreted religious law individually. As Majid Mohammadi asserts "the interpretations of the Shari`a by the ulama not only conflicted with the decrees of state courts but also differed among them."[253] This is totally contradictory to basic tenets of a modern and centralised state structure. So the government declared their claim of eliminating various independent interpretations and creating a systematic basis for the law. A legal code developed in that same year abolished the implementation of extreme punishments such as lashing and stoning. Ulama opposed to this, yet no big problem occurred. Moreover, in the same year, a new law regulating the requirements for employing judges was legislated. According to this new law, a judge had to have the following qualities. First of all, judges had to pass courses including logic, *fiqh*[254], general fundamental law, wealth and ownership law, political history, the constitutional law, commercial law, principles of trade, and law governing treaties between Iran and foreign governments. In addition, all members of religious courts were expected to obtain a written permission from a higher Shi`a cleric in order to function as a judge. Sunni judges were also expected to be approved by Sunni clerics.[255]

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[251] Akhavi, *Religion and Politics,* 39.

[252] Quoted in Ghods, "Government and Society in Iran," 224

[253] Mohammadi, *Judicial Reform and Reorganization*, 95.

[254] *Fiqh* basically means Islamic Jurisprudence and *Usul* means the study of the origins, sources, and principles upon which *Fiqh* is based.

[255] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 282-283.

In 1929, a new legislation on judiciary was introduced. Accordingly, the authority of religious courts became limited to the matters of marriage and divorce. More importantly, the religious judges were employed and paid by the Ministry of Justice. Two years later, in 1939, marriage and divorce were also moved under the jurisdiction of the ministry of justice. As a result of this amendment, all marriage and divorce contracts had to be registered by the ministry of justice.[256] Another step was taken in 1936. 1928 law on the employment of judges was amended. The new law set specific standards for those who could be involved in judiciary a) All Applicants must hold a degree from the faculty of Law or an accredited foreign university: b) Those judges who do not hold such a degree must pass an examination instituted by the ministry of Justice to demonstrate their knowledge of Iranian and some European Laws.[257]These newly appointed judges expanded and the power of ulama decreased even in the provincial parts and in the historically religious centres such as Qum and Mashhad.[258]

In 1939, another important amendment on the judiciary was made. The new article stated that no cases may be referred to a Shari' a court unless the authorisations of the state courts and of the office of attorney general were granted. These actions followed by the final abolition of Shari a courts and by the adoption of European model civil code in 1939. The introduction of the European model penal code in 1940 marked the final phase of judiciary reform. As a matter of fact, these new codes gave significant concessions to the old religious laws. For instance, the polygamy continued and the right to file for a divorce retained at men. Yet still, in three significant areas, the power of religious laws weakened: First the legal distinction between Muslim Iranians and non-Muslim ones was abolished; the capital punishment was restricted to murder, treason and armed rebellion and more importantly the modern form of punishment was favoured over the corporal punishments. Physical punishments such as amputation were outlawed. By 1940 the ulama`s monopoly over the judicial system came to an end.

A further step was taken by the gradual elimination of ulama`s power in the Parliament. US vice consul to Iran A. Wallace Treat reported in 1929 approximately forty percent of the deputies in the sixth Majlis were real or pseudo clerics. The number in the present Majlis (seventh Parliament in between 1928-1930) aggregates some 30 percent, of which number only six were recognised, turban wearing mullahs. Treat also added that those mullahs in the seventh Parliament "are there out of prior approval by the government, therefore represent no element of opposition." [259] More interestingly in the eleventh Parliament which met in 1935, no prominent member of ulama took place.[260] So between 1926, the year Reza Shah had crowned, and 1935, the ulama power in the Parliament decreased from forty percent to zero.

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[256] Yet Polygamy was not outlawed.

[257] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 284.

[258] Mohammadi, *Judicial Reform and Reorganization*, 92.

[259] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 286.

[260] *ibid.,* 286

Yet it is worth note in passing that although ulama`s power on judiciary was erased and a new European model law was implemented during the era, it is hard to claim that a rule of law existed in practice. As a result of Reza Shah`s arbitrary rule, judiciary was not able to preserve its independency from him. During his reign, political trials were only shows of justice; most of the political prisoners were kept in jail without trial and were even executed. As Mohammadi asserts, "The authoritarian state during Reza Shah Era acted as all country was property of the king and his clique and all citizens were his subjects. There was not rule of law, but rule of a few powerful figures who had the military and police in their hands."[261]Given this atmosphere by the end of Reza Shah's rule, we may suggest that corruption and insecurity on judicial domain was prevalent.

3.5.2 Education

Another series of reforms which curbed the influence of ulama was the modernization attempts of the sphere of education. During Reza Shah`s reign, modern, secular and a European model of education expanded throughout Iran. Secularization of the education also trimmed the power of the religious establishment. Moreover, it created new cadres for further modernization. Although the 1911 Constitution had secured a compulsory education, it is hard to claim that the constitutional provision was successful to reach its goals. The weakness of the central government, the lack of funds and well trained teaching staff rendered its enforcement impossible in practice. The state did not even regulate the qualifications of teachers. Being a schoolteacher only required a good conduct of language and being over 20 years old.[262] In 1924, there were only 1943 schools throughout Iran. Some 96 000 students were enrolled in these schools. The literacy rate was only five per cent.[263] So when Reza Shah came to full power in 1926, Iran`s educational system was underdeveloped and overwhelmingly under the influence of ulama.

Reza Shah`s concern of building a modern Iran and curbing the influence of ulama, naturally, made education, one of the most important areas of interest from the very beginning. According to Reza Shah, education and military were the main pillars for the national unity.[264] Hence, his first attempt was a combination of these two pillars. He created a military academy at the very beginning of his rule. In addition to that, a school for training personnel for Ministry of Justice was established in 1922. These were followed by Teacher`s Training College and School of Medicine. In 1935 the law for the establishment of University

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[261] Mohammadi, *Judicial Reform and Reorganization,* 87.

[262] Rudi Mathee, (2003), "Transforming Dangerous Nomads Into Useful Artisans, Technicians, Agriculturalists: Education in the Reza Shah Period," in Stephanie Cronin (ed) *The Making of Modern Iran State and Society under Reza Shah, 1921-1946*, London: Routledge, 125.

[263] Faghoory, "The Role of the Ulama," 75.

[264] Reza Arasteh, (1960), "Growth of Modern Education in Iran," *Comparative Education Review,* (3)3, 37.

of Tehran was approved by the Parliament. The Shah, himself, laid the foundation stone for the university in 1935.[265]

Elementary education was also restructured by means of a new 6 year program which involved thirty hours of instruction per week. The new curriculum included subjects such as Persian, religious instruction, arithmetic, history and physical education. For girls, the curriculum was simpler and was supplemented by the courses on sewing and drawing. There were already private schools enrolling female pupils before Reza Shah, but during his reign their numbers were increased. In addition to those, public schools for girls were established. The number of boarding schools for girls also expanded. In 1935, the use of modern school uniforms and mixed schooling was introduced.[266]

Between 1928 and 1930 a series of decrees were passed, increasing the government control over the religious schools. One of the most significant among these codes was the Law of Uniformity of Dress. According to law, students of religious schools who wished to be exempted from wearing European style dress should take an examination before a government instituted board. So, once again, the privilege of deciding on who could be a religious student was given to the government.[267] This was a heavy setback on the independence of the ulama. The intervention of state in religious education went further. Government attempted to standardise and restructure the curricula of the religious schools. In 1930, textbooks began to be prescribed by the Ministry of Education. These centralization attempts of the government succeeded to a great extent. During the same period, the number of students, studying in religious schools declined sharply, from 5984 in 1925 to 785 in 1941. [268]

These numbers demonstrates that Reza Shah`s educational reforms marked a break with the previously religiously dominated educational structure. During this era, new educated and modernised elite was created. A new professional-bureaucratic intelligentsia emerged as a result of this new educational system. However, despite these improvements, over ninety per cent of the rural population in Iran was still illiterate by 1941.[269]

3.6 Symbolic-Ideological Domain

Reza Shah`s attempts to curb the influence of the religious establishment, has repercussions on the symbolic-ideological domain as well. One of the most emphasized acts of the government during his rule was the alteration of the dress codes. Regulations on the dress codes were a direct attack not only upon the position

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[265] *ibid.,* 76.

[266] Mathee, "Transforming Dangerous Nomads,"125.

[267] For a detailed discussion on the Law of Uniformity of Dress, See Akhavi, *Religion and Politics,* 40-55.

[268] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 145.

[269] *ibid.,* 145.

and influence of ulama, but also upon the sphere of religion in general. They were also, of all of Reza Shah`s modernisation policies, the one most contributed to his unpopularity among the Iranian masses. As briefly mentioned above, the mullahs were forced to abandon their religious clothes. Those who were unwilling to abandon their clothes were allowed to keep them only after their qualification as a cleric was approved by the Ministry of Education. As a result the numbers of ulama wearing religious clothes decreased substantially. Yet, this law had an unanticipated consequence. According to Ansari, "[ulama] now remained the one social group permitted to wear the turban and grown, thereby distinguishing them from the rest of society Reza Shah inadvertently created a formidable opposition complete with an identifiable social marker."[270] For the laymen, another unpopular decision was the introduction of the so called Pahlavi Hat. In 1927 the government decided to institute Pahlavi Hat similar to French kepi as the official hat for the Iranian men. The hat was particularly unpopular among the religious masses since touching the ground with one's forehead was now become physically impossible. The hat turned the regular praying to a difficult task. On December 1928, the Parliament went further and approved the Uniform Dress Law. The text of Law was as follows:

> Article 1. All male Iranian subjects who are (not) required to wear special clothing in conformity with service in the government shall wear uniform clothing within the country: and all government employees, whether civil and official, shall, when on government duty, wear civil or civil or juridical clothing, as officially prescribed, and at other times they shall wear the uniform attire

Although certain exemptions were granted to ulama and Christian clerics, the code itself was by no means easy to implement. Especially, rural parts of Iran resisted against the law. A more radical jump was the abolition of the veil. By outlawing veil and introducing modern-European style dress for women, Reza Shah took the most fundamental step in the modernisation of the visible aspects of Iranian society. The aims of this policy were obvious; by forcing Iranians to dress like Westerners, Reza Shah hoped that they would begin to think like them. Moreover, uniformity in dress was expected to generate uniformity in manners.[271] As Houchang Chehabi aptly put it, "In sum Iranians would be more willing to imagine themselves as a community, to paraphrase Benedict Anderson, if they all looked alike."[272] An important event revealing the symbolic significance of the dress codes occurred in 1928. It was also one of the first disputes between Reza Shah and ulama over the issue of veiling. In 21 March 1928 (Iranian new year and according the tradition the day in which the murderer of Ali bin Talib was killed for retaliation) Reza Shah`s female relatives decided to go Qum. Reza Shah`s wife was also among that group. She was wearing a "donned transparent chador". Some clergymen protested them. Ayatollah Mohammad Befki personally spoke to the queen and asked: If you are not a Muslim Why did you come to the Shrine? If you are a Muslim why did not you wear

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[270] Ansari, *Modern Iran Since 1921,* 48.

[271] Ansari claimed that "The Dress code, ...not only served the interests of national unity but in its uniformity it also reflected then Shah's affection for all things military" *ibid.,* 48.

[272] Houchang Chehabi, (1993), "Staging the Emperor's New Clothes: Dress Codes and Nation-Building under Reza Shah," *Iranian Studies*, (26)3-4, 225.

a modest dress? The answer was provided by Reza Shah. Shah directly came to Qum from Tehran, entered the shrine with his boots and whipped the clergy who had protested his wife.[273]

However the law was implemented in practice gradually. At first, the veiled women were not allowed to frequent the public places. Female teachers were among the first who unveiled. Armenian, Zoroastrian and Baha'i minorities also played pioneering roles on the implementation of law. Meanwhile the modernists launched a campaign against veiling. For example, a play called Mah-Par, which demonstrated the disadvantages and hypocrisies of veiling, put on the stage. It is interesting to note that the main female actor, who unveiled during the play, was actually a Christian woman.[274]

Reza Shah`s visit to Turkey was regarded as significant on this issue. According to Houchang Chehabi, Reza Shah impressed with the social and economic progress achieved in Turkey, accelerated the pace of cultural reform in Iran. As a result, "the frenzy of western European window-dressing … increased to a fever point [after] his return."[275] First, restaurant owners and bath keepers were ordered not to serve to veiled women. Then, between1936 and his abdication in 1941, the veiling ban was enforced by using Police and Gendarmerie. This enforcement led to a great discontent. In addition to the opposition of the ulama, the majority of Iranian masses had strong reservations about the ban. One observer described the ban of veiling by resonating it "to law compelling Western women to go topless." [276]

Attacks on the religion and ulama`s power were accompanied by a strong trend of criticism of Islam. Although no direct attack was launched on Islam as a religion, a growing number of government backed authors advocated the idea of the disestablishment of religion from the social and political sphere of the nation. Rastakhiz (resurrection), one of the most prominent journals of the period under study, suggested that religion was a personal issue. Thus, it should not be used for political purposes. "Interests of the nation must be placed above the interests of religion … It is only in this way that we can unite and that our religions will not be able to divide us and separate from each other."[277] Ulama were also considered as being responsible from the backwardness of Iran. Another article in the same journal asserts that "Today we have built a strong army, and established internal security. However the root of our backwardness is still with us. It is the class of the mullahs. If this root is not attacked and destroyed soon, whatever we have accomplished

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[273] Chehabi after depicting the event asserts that "Reza Shah was still cautious. When king Amanullah and Queen Soraya of Afghanistan visited Iran on their return trip from Europe in June 1928, the Afghan Queen was unveiled whereas Reza Shah's wife would not face King Amanullah, whose enthusiasm for Westernization was lead to his overthrow by conservative rebels in early 1929." *ibid.,* 213.

[274] Houchang Chehabi, (2003), "The Banning of the Veil and Its Consequences," in Stephanie Cronin (ed) *The Making of Modern Iran State and Society under Reza Shah, 1921-1946*, London: Routledge, 197.

[275] *ibid*., 198.

[276] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization," 92.

[277] Faghoory, "The Role of the Ulama," 83.

will fade away". Interestingly, Rastakhiz pointed Turkey as a successful example on this issue and urged the government to follow its footsteps with these terms: "It may seem difficult at first, but it will not be more difficult than in Turkey which was once the seat of the Caliph."[278] These opinions were reflected not only in the government backed journals, but also by the prominent intellectuals of the era. For example, Ahmad Kasravi who had been a member of ulama class in the past was writing about the influence of ulama:

> Instead of creating a democratic state, our mullahs encourage the people to pray a supernatural authority. … And worst of all, they preach an antidemocratic political theory, claiming that power and sovereignty belongs to the imam not to the people. [279]

Periodicals such as Rastakhiz and intellectuals such as Kasravi fostered the establishment of an anti-ulama atmosphere towards the end of Reza Shah`s reign. Yet Reza Shah, well aware of the fact that in the absence of an appealing ideology embraced by the masses, religion would continue to be the dominant ideology. Since it was the age of nationalism, the ideal solution was to raise and disseminate the sentiments of nationalism against religion. Yet, this nationalism also had to successfully transcend the Islamic heritage of Iran. As a result, the glories of pre-Islamic Persian empires were idolised. The most significant manifestation of this emphasis on the pre-Islamic past was the change of the name of the country. In 1934, it changed from Persia to Iran. The change took place in order to highlight the primordial Aryan origin of the nation. According to Abrahamian "[Iran] was associated with recent Qajar decadence and referred to the province of Fars only, the former invoked ancient glory and signified the birthplace of the Aryan race."[280] Reza Shah's personal adaptation of the surname Pahlavi, after the ancient language that had evolved into modern Persian, illustrates his explicit emphasis on the ancient history. Moreover, Reza Shah replaced the traditional Muslim Calendar with a new one which started the year on March 21, the ancient Persian New Year. Names of Islamic months were also replaced with Zoroastrian names.[281]

In addition to the above mentioned attempts to curb ulama`s power and secularise Iran, Reza Shah also took another direct symbolic action by abolishing traditional Shi`a customs such as ta`ziya. As discussed in the third chapter ta`ziya was one of the most important rituals of Shi`a. Through active participation of the masses to ta`ziya rituals, religious sphere was expanded into daily lives of Iranians. This naturally had maintained and had increased the influence that the ulama had on the social sphere. This is one of the reasons that lied behind the ban of the ritual. Yet, another reason can be the `brutal` nature of the ritual. Especially traditional flagellation rituals such as *talwar zani* and *zanjeer sani* were contradictory to Reza Shah`s

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[278] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization," 80.

[279] Quoted in. Faghoory, "The Role of the Ulama," 85

[280] Abrahamian, *Iran between Two Revolutions*, 143.

[281] For an interesting discussion on transformation of measurement of time in Iran and Turkey, see Atabaki, "Time, Labour Discipline,"

commitment to westernization.[282] Allowing the foreign tourists to visit main Isfahan mosque and famous Mashhad shrine and increasing the legal marriage age for women to fifteen can be considered as the other signs of his commitment to westernisation.

3.7 Economic Sphere

Reza Shah`s policies on secularization and against the power of religious classes were not only limited to the symbolic and legal spheres but also impacted upon the economic sphere. Yet one can claim that, depicting the economic sphere is much harder when compared to scrutinizing the previous realms.

As previously discussed, transformations in the legal and symbolic spheres not only curbed the prestige and the ideological power of the religious classes but also their economic wealth. Modernization process directly and indirectly influenced the scope of ulama's power on the economic sphere. New social classes emerged as a result of these changes. The process took the ulama`s traditional ways of living from its hands. For example, the new judiciary system, with its cadres coming from modern education, excluded ulama from judiciary. Additionally, transformation of the education and transition to a modern system during the era casted out ulama from another traditional occupation thus took one of the main sources of their income away.

As mentioned in the above chapters, the Shiite clergy in Iran –unlike their Sunni counterparts- is perceived as an independent class having their own economic means. The expectation of Mahdi in Shiite belief, and the privilege of being the representation of the expected Mahdi play a role in perceiving clergy significantly different than in the case of the Sunni belief. On the other hand, these privileges were not granted by drawing only on the theological or ideational factors. Ulama`s position in social structure was historically determined by their practical deeds. As M Reza Ghods stresses, their participation to government bureaucracy, their familial bonds with the elite which were formed through marriages, their controlling power upon the funds and their ability of constructing and managing irrigation canals all had impacts on this positioning.[283]

As Reza Shah came into power, this social economic-positioning began to change. First of all, Reza Shah directly attacked the economic foundations of ulama. In 1933, the government implemented a new law which aimed to control the administration of religious endowments. These religious endowments were in the forms of farms, houses, shops and lands, which were attached to shrines and mosques. The government, by appointing itself as the supervisor of religious endowments, took the control of huge parcels of lands which previously belonged to ulama or religious establishments. According to Law "any properties whose

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[282] *Talwar zani* and *Zanjeer zani* are the acts of self-flagellation. While the former is practised by using sword the latter is practised by using chain.

[283] Ghods, "Government and Society in Iran," 16.

administrators were unknown came under the direct supervision of the Department of Endowments at ministry of Education" the Law also authorised that "revenues derived from endowments must be spent on maintenance and repair of historical monuments, schools, holy shrines, hospitals and other charitable organizations."[284]. Roy Mottahadeh cited from Isa Sadik`s 1931 dated Dissertation that these religious endowments produced a 40-50 million qran revenue by that time.[285] One of the biggest of these vaqfs was the land and other forms of property attached to the Shrine of Imam Reza, in Mashad. Hamid Algar quoted from Lord Curzon that "in 1890, the income derived from just property vaqfs attached to the shrine of Imam Reza totalled at 60 000 tomans"[286] It was one of the most profitable areas of business for its age. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the state of being an independent class required independent economic sources. For Ulama, the administration of endowments was among the most significant tools in this sense. Moreover by losing the administration of religious endowments, the ulama also "lost a channel of regular communication …with a considerable segment of the urban population."[287]

In addition to that, a new law regarding the economic sources of ulama's power was issued in 1932. The Registration of Documents and Property Act resulted in the elimination of "by far the largest source of legitimate revenue for the mujtaheds and the lower clergy". After the law passed, ulama no longer functioned as registrars and notaries of official documents including contracts, testimonies and property titles. The loss of this occupational revenue further weakened the institutional power of Ulama. As Banani writes "As a consequence of Law of 1932 many members of clergy were forced to abandon the robe and seek secular employment."[288]

In addition to the above mentioned direct attacks on ulama`s economic power, government's attempts of modernisation seized their power indirectly. Reza Shah attempted to create a secular, non-tribal and an industrialized state. Using state-capitalism as a method, Shah tried to set up the infrastructure that was necessary to reach his aims. During the era, state built railroads, renewed the bureaucracy and directly invested in the industry. By the end of 1930s, sixty-four industrial plants were to be founded and twenty per cent of the national budget was to be allocated to the industrial progress.[289] So the supreme position of the religious class in Iranian society, which can be attributed to the traditional structure and relationships of pre-modern Iran, started to change with the modernization. New social relations, coupled with the emergence of new elites, resulted in the decline of ulama's power and prestige. On the one hand civil servants,

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[284] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 289.

[285] Mottahedeh, *Iran`da Din ve Politika,* 221.

[286] Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, 14.

[287] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 290.

[288] Quoted in. Gill and Kashavarzian, "State Building and Religious Resources," 447.

[289] Asef Bayat, (2004), "Sinif Ulustan Vazgecebilir mi? Iran`da Milliyetci Modernlesme ve Emek," in Willem van Shendel&Erik J. Zürcher (ed) *Orta Asya ve Islam Dunyasinda Kimlik Politikalari: 20. Yuzyilda Milliyetcilik, Etnisite ve Emek*. Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 242.

university professors, teachers and bureaucrats emerged as the new elites, on the other hand, though a limited scale, a new working class was created as a result of industrialization. These new social groups, which was born out of transformations of Reza Shah`s era, differed from the traditional segments of society. Not only they had different educational backgrounds but also in terms of social relations, political tendencies and belief systems they were different. Hence ulama had difficulty to reach to these new segments. The concepts such as nationalism and citizenship began to substitute religious allegiance. Consequently, ulama began to lose their main source of income, that is to say religious taxes, gradually.

3.8 Ulama`s Reaction to Policies of Reza Shah

Dar kaf-i sheer-i nar-i khunkhare'ie / ghayr-i taslim o riza koo chare'ie.[290]

Politics of modernization during Reza Shah's reign impacted upon both ulama's social prestige and professional-economic status. New bureaucracy created during the era added with the growing power of Shah`s new tribe which is army gave the state enormous power to deal with possible opposition of religious classes. Hence, as mentioned in the previous sections, these dynamics of the era caused religious classes, at least to some extent, loose the social power they used to have before 1920s. As discussed above, two important events of confrontation occurred especially during the first years of Reza Shah`s reign. Republican crisis and Conscription Law reflected ulama`s reactionary attitudes against the state and in turn Reza Shah retreated from his original position to some extent. However as he consolidated his power, Reza Shah started to hold a strong grip on different segments of society on which ulama had the strongest influence. Despite several measures taken by Reza Shah to eliminate the influence of ulama in the Iranian society, it is hard to claim that there was a strong opposition against these policies.

This part will specifically analyze the reactions and the attitudes of ulama towards the characteristics of the era and will depict the reasons that lie behind these reactions. I will first start by analyzing the structural determinants that yielded ulama`s attitudes. Mainly two factors have to be unpacked because they are considered as influencing ulama's reaction and attitudes to a great extent. The first one is the lack of homogeneity amongst the ulama, which led to the absence of an organised opposition. The second one is Reza Shah`s use of religious morality against ulama, which prevented a fully-fledged opposition. After discussing these two structural features, this section will proceed to discussing the main patterns of reactions against Reza Shah`s policies. For a limited time period, especially during the first years of Reza Shah`s reign, the opposition was centered in the Parliament. Especially, as discussed above, Republican Crisis and Conscription Law can be seen as examples of this pattern. However after a time period, as the government

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[290] In the hands of the bloodthirsty lion what can be done but submission. The unknown poet is doing a word game *taslim o riza* means both submission by will and submission to Reza. Faghoory claims that the above poem was the slogan of the ulama especially after 1929. According to Faghoory, this poem reflects "the passivity and lack of resistance toward the government's policies on the basis of their own weakness and government's strength." Faghfoory, "The Ulama-State Relations in Iran," 431.

consolidated its power gradually, the parliamentary opposition ended. It is important to note that, in order to suppress the opposition; Reza Shah did not hesitate to arrest and murder the influential members of opposition in the Parliament such as Ayatollah Sayyid Hasan Modarres.[291] Resistance outside the Parliament was usually sporadic and it was easily suppressed by using coercive measures. A typical reflection of ulama's resistance outside the Parliament was the disturbance of Imam Reza Shrine in Mashad. As a response to the laws forbidding the wearing of brimless hat and veiling, mass demonstrations took place around the Imam Reza Shrine in 1935. The demonstrations were suppressed by the army by using heavy force. The army unusually entered into the shrine. Many hundreds were wounded or killed by the government forces. Also after the suppressing the demonstration, the government undertook an inquiry and executed the administrator of the shrine.

Although parliamentary opposition and Mashad uprisings were important, it is still hard to claim that there was an organised opposition against the policies. The lack of a strong opposition from the religious classes to the dictatorial rule of Reza Shah and his efforts against clergy can be attributed to several factors. First of all, ulama lacked the necessary homogeneity to organise themselves and resist against the dictatorial policies. No matter what position they took against Reza Shah`s policies, ulama's actions can hardly be considered as unified and homogeneous during this era. One and foremost reason of this heterogeneity was the Shi`a theology which accepts different scholars as sources of imitation. Contrary to Sunni-Ottoman state tradition, there was no supreme caliph position in Iran, which could efficiently stand above all the other religious scholars. As a matter of fact, this lack of homogeneity dated back to the period of Conscription Law. For example Reza Shah had the full support and cooperation of some fractions of the ulama, who defended the Conscription Law as a form of Religious War (Jihad). In addition to Conscription Law, ulama continued to exist as fractured during the other campaigns of reform. Even the most anti-religious reforms of Reza Shah, dress codes, were welcomed by a considerable fraction of religious classes. It was reported from Iranian Azerbaijan that in 1936, in less than one week, thirty ulama abandoned their religious clothes. In Kerman, one of the most prominent leaders of Shaykhi sect declared his support on government reforms to unify the dress.[292] Ulama failed to organise a political leadership. Especially the divisions within the higher echelons of the clergy reflected itself among the lower or middle ranking ulama. To quote from Wallace Treat`s report on state department:

> There is no central or coordinating church organization upon which would be dissidents might draw for support. Different districts in the same city or different cities and villages in the provinces

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[291] The Islamic Republic of Iran portrayed Modarres as the quintessential instance of ulama who resists against the dictatorial rule of Reza Shah. According to Khomeini, " Modarres remains as history is alive". According to *Ettela'at* –semi official newspaper of Islamic republic- Modarres is the epitome of the clergy's "struggle against despotism and imperialism" Abrahamian critisizes this portrayal of Modarres and highlights the significance of turning points during which, Modarres supports Reza Shah. See, Abrahamian, *Khomeinism,* 101-105. Yet Along similar lines with official historiography of Islamic Republic Iran, Akhavi argues that Modarres`s arrest and murder in 1928 marked the end of ulama opposition in the Parliament. See p Akhavi, *Religion and Politics*, 59.

[292] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 304.

follow their own mullah neither is there any outstanding church figure as such whose personality might bring the diverse church elements together. This factor of general dislocation, taken together with the passivity of Persian character, makes for a situation which from the outset has favoured the government. [293]

In addition to the lack of homogeneity among the ulama, Reza Shah's use of religious morality hindered the development of an organized opposition. In addition to bans on alcoholic drinks during the early periods of his reign, government kept campaigning against what they called moral sins. 1929 campaigns against prostitution can also be considered as an example to Reza Shah's use of religious morality. By doing so, Reza Shah positioned himself as the defender of moral values as well as of the religion. As Pirnazar asserts, ambivalent attitude of the government to the religion and its emphasis on moral values convinced religious masses that the primary target of the state was not religion itself but a certain part of ulama that were deemed as reactionary and backward. As discussed in the section on symbolic-ideological domain, written media was widely used to reinforce this line of thought. Hence, Iranian masses tended to believe that the main antagonism was not a religious one. Masses were, to a large extent, convinced that Reza Shah did not tolerate ulama since he considered them as obstacles to modernization and progress. As a result of this belief, ulama could not manage to mobilise the masses in the name of religion.[294]

Behrooz Moazami is another scholar who emphasises Reza Shah`s efforts on reinforcing religious morality. Contrary to the common view, which focuses on Reza Shah`s antagonistic attitude against religion, Moazami suggests a different reading of the events. He asserts that, the period between 1925 and 1941 is crucial to understand later developments in Iran. During the era, although modern laws and policies challenged the organizational power of ulama and their control over the financial resources, still ulama`s influence on the society continued to exist. According to him Reza Shah encouraged the development of a national religious morality as a part of national identity. He argues that, it was this religious morality which in turn led to the Islamic Revolution of 1979.[295]

As Faghoory noted, three main patterns of attitudes were common amongst ulama against the policies of Reza Shah. Firstly, some parts of ulama overtly resisted against the modernization policies of the era. Secondly, some followed quietist attitudes and preferred to isolate themselves from the society. Lastly some accommodated and cooperated with these policies. As discussed above, the resistance against policies of Reza Shah was suppressed by using force, and this had major impacts on the ulama's diverse responses. In addition to the arrest and murder of Seyed Hasan Modarres and bloody retaliation of 1935 Mashad uprisings, influential members of ulama were arrested, exiled and executed. Associates of Shaykh Bulbul, including

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[293] Wallace Treat to State Department 16 January 1928, Desp # 739, Rec Gr. 891. 404/14. quoted in Faghoory, "The Impact of modernization." 305-306.

[294] Pirnazar, "Political Movements and Organizations," 90-92.

[295] Moazami, "The Making of State*,*" 243-287.

Shaykh Mohammed Kafai, Aga Husein Kumi and Sayyed Nuri-al Din Huseini were arrested and exiled, as a result of their protests against government reforms. The dictatorial and oppressive nature of the regime was frustrated the ulama so deeply that, the prominent ulama "feared that Reza Shah would do the same to the Islam and the ulama that Ataturk and Bolsheviks had done in Turkey and Soviet Russia- that is to sink them in the sea or place them before the firing squad."[296]

Under these circumstances, ulama compelled to adopt appropriate strategies to cope with the state. The passivist and the quietest attitudes became prevalent among a significant portion of ulama. Especially, ulama coming from the higher echelons of religious classes, chose to get detached from politics. They literally retired from the politics and devoted their time to religious scholarship. Losing their sources of income, as a result of Reza Shah`s reforms, they had to rely on the income coming from the voluntary religious contributions. The efforts that apolitical Muhammad Haeri showed in order to build a religious center equivalent to Iraqi religious centers, can be considered as examples of these quiete attitudes. Indeed, while taking this quietest attitude, they relied on a specific concept of Shi`a theology –discussed in the previous chapter-which is practice of *taqiyya*.[297] Interestingly Moin Baqer in his biography of Khomeini "Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah" puts the future leader of the Islamic revolution to this category. It is worth quoting the passage which illustrates the quietist attitudes of ulama living under Reza Shah by drawing on the portrait of Khomeini as a young apolitical mullah:

> During this time Khomeini did little to provoke the wrath of the determined Shah and the secularist politicians who drove his programme of reform. He was for one thing still too junior, and for another he was content to go along with the passive attitude of the majority of the ulama and adopt the Shi`I practice of taqiyya or dissimulation which permits people to deny their faith in order to continue its practice. This highly pragmatic doctrine has allowed the Shi`a in time of danger to trim their sails, reverse their positions or simply to lie in the interests of self-preservation and, when prudence demands, it is called upon by event the most single minded devotees. Given the brutality with which Reza Shah was implementing his policies-with imprisonment and death often the reward for those who crossed him- most of the ulama preferred to bide their time. [298]

Yet, as referred in the beginning of this section, the resistance and quietist attitudes were not the only strategy that ulama adopted in order to cope with the rule of Reza Shah. A considerable segment of the religious classes adapted to the new environment by abandoning their clerical jobs and by becoming government officers. Especially, abandoning the garbs and turning the efforts to acquire new skills and a modern education was common among the younger fragments of the ulama. As Faghoory notes, in this process these sections gained prominence in the new professions, specifically in law, education politics and state

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[296] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization,".310.

[297] Mottahedeh claims that building a religious center in Iran is the result of growing nationalistic tendencies among Iranians. They no longer wanted to depend on Iraqi centers for religious education. So interestingly, as Reza Shah is promoting nationalism, Qum emerged as an indirect result of policies of Reza Shah. Mottahedeh*, Iran`da Din ve Politika, 215.*

[298] Baqer Moin, (1999), *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah,* I.B. London: Tauris Publishers, 56.

administration. For example, a prominent *mujtahed* and a former *madrasah* teacher Sayyed Mohsin Sadr al Ashraf was appointed as Ministry of Justice in 1933. In one instance, Sadr al Ashraf recruited fifty young mullahs from his hometown and appointed them as officers for the bureau of registration.[299] Education was another field that former religious classes were employed. Faghoory reports that a considerable number of ulama found jobs in the field of education and became teachers of Persian Literature, Arabic and religion.[300] Indeed these instances demonstrate that the regime was actually willing to accept ulama as government officials. More importantly, they also illustrate the fact that, a section of the ulama`s was willing to work with the government of Reza Shah.

3.9 Summary of the Major Developments of the Era

This part of the thesis covers roughly a period of forty years. It starts from the developments of the constitutional revolution, which marked the rise of Reza Shah in Iranian political sphere, continues throughout his reign and ends with his dethronement. To put it very briefly, the chapter revolves around the politics of religion-state relations throughout a period in which Reza Shah was an important actor. As mentioned in the introduction parts, the developments in international, institutional and ideological domains are to be analysed in respect to their reflections on religions state relations. The purpose of this section is to briefly depict the developments occurred in these above mentioned domains.

3.9.1 Ideological Developments of the Era

As mentioned throughout the second chapter, the conversion of Iranian masses to Shi'a sect is greatly achieved during the Safavid period. Qajar period marked the evolution of Shi'a doctrine to a more orthodox understanding. Especially after the Usuli-Akhbari debate of the 18th century, this solidification had intensified. As a result of these developments, Shi'a ulama extended its freedom to construe on non-religious as well as on political matters. In addition to this symbolic motive, Iranian Constitution of the early 20th century also shows that Shi'a ulama -as the bearers of the doctrine- started to occupy an important position in legal sphere.

The reign of Reza Shah can be divided into two periods. In the early period which coincides with the Reza Shah's consolidation of power, ulama were ideologically consistent in backing the Shah. His success in bringing order and establishing security to Iran as well as the fear of Bolshevist threat made ulama give their ideological support to the Shah. Reza Shah replied to this ideological support by a series of symbolic acts. He did not hesitate to explicitly state his devotion to Islam. He organised and attended mourning processions during the Muharram. However, these examples do not suggest that ulama and the Shah did not come into confrontation in this period. The Republican Crisis of 1924 and the Conscription Law of 1925 were the

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[299] Faghoory, "The Impact of Modernization." 306-308.

[300] *ibid.,* 309.

instances of a form of antagonism. In both of the crisis, ulama showed their aversion to the Shah by using their ideological power over masses. At the end, their pressures resulted in cancellation of plans.

However with the Shah's consolidation of his power, things began to change. Shah attempted a series of reform attempts on legal, economic and ideological-symbolic spheres. In terms of ideology, specifically the reform in symbolic sphere should be mentioned. Shah used a two sided strategy to curb the ideological influence of ulama. Firstly, he proposed nationalism as an ideology to the masses against the religious ideological power of ulama. He started to emphasize pre Islamic culture of Iran. One of the most important instances of this ideological shift towards nationalism was the change of country's name from Persia to Iran in 1934. Secondly, he campaigned for a new understanding of religion which is separated from worldly affairs. Government backed intellectuals started to advocate disestablishment of Islam from social and political sphere. It is important to note that Reza Shah and his supporters did not directly attacked Islam itself. Conversely they seem to be defenders of moral values as well as religion. As mentioned above they executed campaigns against prostitution or ban on alcoholic drinks in the name of morality. They emphasized that their aim was to curb the ideological power of ulama, who were considered as obstacles to modernisation.

These strategies were successful to a considerable extent. Ulama were divided ideologically. This ideological heterogeneity of the ulama also gave way to a fragmentation within the ulama. During this period, while a relatively small fraction of the ulama tried to oppose reform attempts, and suppressed by military force, a great majority of them chose either cooperate with the regime or took passivist and quitest attitudes. It is important to note that, as argued during the introduction, the portrayal of the ulama as revolutionary force seems to render inadequate for explaining this historical period.

3.9.2 International Developments of the Era
Main international actors that influence the political sphere of Iran in this period were Russia, Britain, partly United States and Turkey. To put it in historical perspective, from 1905 to 1917, Russia directly intervened in domestic politics of Iran. 'The Russian Qajar conspiracy' against the Constitution can be considered as one of the main instances of Russian interference into the Iranian political sphere. However after the Bolshevik Revolution, it lost its power to interfere Iran. Britain continued to exercise power on Iranian politics. Its support on Reza Shah's coming into power and 1933 Oil agreement can be seen as examples of British involvement into Iran. As discussed through the chapter, Reza Shah' coming into power and his abdication are directly related to international developments. He was a member of Cossack brigades which was modelled after Russian Army. He was supported by Britain when coming into power and he was forced to resign by the Soviet and British forces in 1941. Turkey on the other hand, as an international actor, played its role indirectly in this period. Ottomans, after their failure in the First World War, were eliminated from political sphere. Yet their successor Turkish republic, although indirectly, continued to influence Iranian political sphere. Especially during the Republican Crisis of 1924, reform attempts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk

were highly referenced by ulama. Reza shah was deemed as following Atatürk's foot-steps and secularise Iran. Hence ulama rejected Shah's aim to declare Iran as a republic.

As can be seen from above, these international factors not only affected political sphere but also impacted on religion state relations. Another important international development of the era was the emergence of the city Qum. After the demise of the Ottoman Empire, Britain started to rule Iraq. Iraqi Shi'a ulama, uncomfortable under the rule of a non-muslim country, migrated to Iran. This coincides with the rise of Reza Shah's nationalistic ideology. The Shah planned to create an alternative centre of Shi'a against Najaf inside Iran. These developments resulted in the emergence of Qum as a central locus of Shi'a educational system. This allowed ulama to restructure the local seminary system into a central educational body with its own hierarchy. The ranks such as Hujjet-ul Islam, Ayatollah, Grand Ayatollah and Marja-e talked were systemised from within this new body.

3.9.3 Institutional Developments of the Era

Institutional developments affecting religion-state relations in this period can be analysed in two sections. First one starts from the Constitutional revolution and ends with Reza Shah's consolidation of power. In this era, to a great extent, the relations followed the tradition of the Qajar period before twentieth century. State structure was quite fragile. There was a limited bureaucracy and an inefficient army. State was mainly dependent on tribal powers. During most of the era, the country was under international influence; either in a form of invasion or indirect intervention. In this era, the state's authority on religious sphere was quite limited. As a result, religious establishment continued to exert its ideological as well as political influence over Iranian masses. As mentioned above, the Republican Crisis of 1921 and the Conscription Law can be considered as the reflection of the power structure between state and religious establishment.

After Reza Shah's consolidation of power, these relations started to change. To reiterate Abrahamian's words that describes the novelty of the period "what emerged … was not a reestablishement of the old despotism but the establishment of a new absolutism armed with such modern coercive institutions as a standing army and a nationwide bureaucracy."[301] This absolutism was prone to struggle with all sources of power it deemed as a threat to its authority. Thus, autonomous ulama were suppressed by force when needed. Ulama failed to organise a political leadership against the regime's suppressive policies. In addition to this use of brute force, there were other reasons that reduced ulama's institutional power. Especially, the reform attempts on economic and legal spheres yielded authority for state, and its effect went far beyond the Qajar period. These reforms, to a considerable extent, took away ulama's traditional positions and sources of income from their hands. As discussed above, ulama's political power greatly faded away and majority of them started to follow quitest attitudes against regime policies.

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[301] Abrahamian, "The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution," 386.

However, it is interesting to note that some of the regime policies, although indirectly, resulted in the re-institutionalisation of ulama. One of these policies was referred to in the international developments section. As a result of British invasion of Iraq, a considerable amount of ulama was migrated to Iran and transformed the city of Qum to an important centre of Shi'a education. In addition, dress codes can also be considered as another indirect factor that resulted in the re-institutionalisation of ulama. They were, for sure, introduced with anti-clergy motives yet resulted in an increase in numbers of ulama. As a result of the exemption of mujtahids from the dress codes, more religious students were given the right to make ijtihad. Also, dress codes or the exemption from it resulted in another development: first time in the history of Iran ulama became the only group that have legal right to wear turban and grown. Hence, it emerged as a distinct social group with an identifiable marker. In other words, it is not easy to claim that institutional manifestations of ulama state relations were in a unilinear direction within the era.

CHAPTER 4

RELIGION AND STATE IN TURKEY: EARLY PERIOD

4. 1 Introduction

This chapter reviews the relations between state and religion throughout the Ottoman history from a historical perspective. It covers the period between the establishment of the Ottoman Empire and the end of the Abdulhamid II era. It starts with exploring the religious structure of Anatolia and discusses the ways in which its heterodox structure, with all its complexity, evolved into a more institutionalized one. To unpack this process, the foundation of *Seyhulislamlik* and its evolution is analyzed. Then, the chapter focuses on the dynamics of Ottoman rulers' strategies of legitimation. Religious, as well as non-religious ways of legitimizing is analyzed by paying special attention to the Ottoman Safavid Wars and their impacts on the religion-state relations of these countries. It is claimed that Ottoman-Safavid Wars are of crucial importance in terms of the establishment of their sectarian identities. Subsequently, the chapter discusses the late Ottoman era, roughly from 18th Century afterwards, by focusing on the modernization and its impacts on state's structure. The transformations in the educational and the judicial sphere, which took place as a result of westernization, are discussed by particularly focusing on ulama's positions regarding these transformations. In this sense, ulama's divergent attitudes to the new developments are analyzed. Furthermore, the structural causes of these divergent attitudes are discussed. The era of Abdulhamid II is also evaluated in terms of its impact on the future developments. Finally, the developments of the era are summarized, focusing on the ideological, international and economic levels.

4.2 Religion, Society and State: Early Ottoman period

It is no easy task to write on early Ottoman history. The well-known shortcomings of analyzing remote ages persist; moreover, the fragmented structure of the region during the period has been an obstacle for the written sources to reach our time. Particularly, writing on the relations between state and religion has its own problems. Neither religion nor the state was institutionalized and both were in a state of gradual transformation during the era. Furthermore, all types of religious and sectarian forms as well as heterodox lines of belief were co-active. However, the obstacles referred above did not hinder the popularity of the era; it was discussed and analyzed within both academic and popular levels throughout the 20th century. If we scrutinize the popular level, we can identify significant amount of novels covering that time period.

Osmancik by *Tarik Bugra* and *Devlet Ana* by Kemal Tahir are the most noted ones.[302] To the discussions on the academic level, the debates among Herbert Gibbons, Fuat Koprulu and Paul Wittek can be given as the most important examples. A detailed analysis of these debates is well beyond the aim and scope of this part. Yet I believe that without a brief summary of the period it would be difficult to understand the subsequent periods, in which the relations between state and religion got more institutionalized. Indeed, the very roots of subsequent forms and organizations of religion and state lie in this era. In the words of Kate Fleet "the period is one in which much stays the same, much changes slowly and much emerges new from chrysalis like fusion of cultures." [303]

According to Ahmet Yasar Ocak, history of Anatolia has five periods. These are respectively Hellenization, Romanization, Christianization, Islamization and Westernization periods.[304] The early Ottoman era was marked by the Islamization. In this period, on the one hand, Ottomans attempted to transform and homogenize the parts that constitute Ottoman power; on the other hand they Islamize other ethnic and religious groups to a large extent. In 1071, which is considered as the beginning of Turkish migration to Anatolia, the religious structure of Anatolia was as follows: Greeks, Gregorian Armenians, Monophysite Jacobites, Suryanis and Syriac speaking Christians. Kurds became Muslims before the time of Arab occupation and they were harboring considerable number of Yezidi. The religious understanding of nomadic Turks was somewhere in between Islam and Central Asian beliefs; so it can be considered as being highly heterodox. To a great extent, these communities were ruled by political leaders who are at the same time religious leaders. In other words, they were under the command of religious mystic leaders called *Ata*, *Dede*, *Baba*, *Abdal*. The religious orientation of early Ottomans is a much debated subject. As mentioned above many of the settled subjects of Anatolia were Christians. It was also possible to detect Shi`a influences among nomadic Turks. As can be understood from the religious revolts against the rulers such as; Babai revolt in 1240 and the succeeding Cimri revolt, strong Messianic ideas were dominant. Yet especially around the urban communities, Orthodox Sunni ways of believing were also common. Sufi sects of all sorts were organized throughout Anatolia. Quoting from Rudi Paul Lindler there was also "wandering specialists in comparative religion." [305]

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[302] Publication dates of these two novels are close to one another Osmancık (1973) and Devlet Ana (1967). Both these novels have been popular since their publication. Mainly because of the political views of their authors they also became subjects of political debates during 1970s. For a detailed discussion on these genesis myths also covering the above mentioned novels and with a touch on these political debates see: Murat Belge. (2008), *Genesis: Buyuk Ulusal Anlati ve Turklerin Kokeni*, İstanbul: İletisim yayinlari.

[303] Kate Fleet. (2009), "Introduction," in Kate Fleet (ed) *The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol 1. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071-1453*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 120.

[304] Ahmet Yaşar Ocak. (2009), "Social Cultural and Intellectual Life 1071-1453," in Kate Fleet (ed) *The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol 1. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071-1453*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

[305] Rudi Paul Lindner. (2009), "Anatolia, 1300-1451," in Kate Fleet (ed) *The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol 1. Byzantium to Turkey, 1071-1453*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.120.

Starting from the Mongol invasions of 1200s, Anatolian political geography was in turmoil. An immediate result of this invasion was the scattering of Turcoman tribes to the borders of Byzantium. These border regions became a place of asylum for both intellectuals and warriors. Since strong Mongolian troops cornered them, they had to follow a policy of expansion towards Byzantium. The religious ideology adopted was 'Gaza' -Sacred war against Byzantium. In this context, Ottomans were shined as the closest *beglig* [306]situated around the borders of Byzantium. Mainly two factors facilitated the rise of Ottomans: Firstly, Mongolian raids in the eastern Anatolia and secondly the *Gaza* ideology. Of course one can add the appeal of plundering for the nomadic tribes. Various forms of social organizations, which emerged through the course of four centuries, starting from 11th century to until 15th century, bring about enlargement of Ottoman territories and in turn resulted in Islamization of Anatolia. Following Asikpasazade`s conceptualization Fuat Koprulu divides these social organizations into four parts: *Gaziyani Rum*, *Baciyani Rum*, *Abdalani Rum* and *Ahiyani Rum*. [307] With the centralization of Ottomans, these semi-formal social organizations evolved into different forms. The first period of rule of Sultan Orhan marked the emergence of early examples to religious establishment. First central mosques and religious educational centers emerged during his rule. This era can also be considered as the period in which Sunni character of the state began to rise. The developments of the subsequent era such as; the foundation of Janissaries and more importantly the creation of *Seyhulislamlik* were also indicators of a more centralized and a Sunni dominated statehood.[308] Nevertheless one should bear in mind that Ottomans did not succeeded in building a centralized state and the institutions required for centralization until the 15th century. Up until then, Ottoman parts of Anatolia, more or less, was ruled by feudal lords under Ottoman sovereignty. These feudal lords were Muslims, or were converted to Islam. However, there were even Christian lords among them as well. To quote from Colin Imber`s famous work on Ottomans "not until 1453 Ottoman Emirates became a Sultanate" In other words it was not until the era of Sultan II Mehmed, Ottomans achieved a full-fledged institutionalization of a state structure.[309] Hence to understand state-religion relations of Ottomans one must put more emphasize on the classical age.

4.3 Seyhulislam and Beyond: Ottoman Religious Institutions during the Classical Age

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[306] Small Municipalities governed by begs.

[307] For a brief account of these social organizations see: Fuat Köprülü. (1992), *The Origins of Ottoman Empire*, Gary Leiser (ed), New York: State University of New York Press

[308] Partial attempts of institutionalization in the early period, especially during the rule of Bayezid, were hindered by an unprecedented outside factor. Timurlenk who had founded a strong empire in Central Asia and Iran, trounced Ottomans in war of Ankara and captured sultan Bayezid. This was followed by a twenty year period in which, central government fall apart and members of Ottoman Dynasty fought among them. One of the most important events regarding the relations between state and religion occurred during this era. A religious man hailing from an important religious family –Shaikh Bedreddin-rebelled against Ottoman rule in western Anatolia. This rebel showed its impact on later periods and intensified Ottoman efforts to institutionalize religious sphere. For a brief discussion on the impacts of the revolt on Ottoman Religious System see. Heath W. Lowry, (2003), *The Nature of the Early Ottoman State*, State University of Albany: New York Press. 138-140.

[309] For an analyses of this institutionalization see. Colin Imber. (1997), *Ebu's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition*, Stanford: Stanford. University Press

It is a commonly accepted view that the era of II Mehmed (1444-1446 then 1451-1481) is one of the most crucial periods in terms of the institutionalization of the state. Hence early instances of religious institutions are also products of this era. Basic reasons of this institutionalization are as follows. First of all, the era was marked by a state of conflict between the centralized and the feudal power structures. As a result of this conflict, Ottomans succeeded in eliminating the power of feudal lords. The Execution of Candarli Halil Pasha just after the conquest of Constantinople is usually seen as an instance of this. With the Conquest of Constantinople, Byzantine state institutions came also under the control of Ottomans. [310] In addition, *Fatih Kanunnamesi*, which is also another well-cited example of attempts of institutionalization, was written in this period. Still, it would be wrong to argue that the institutionalization of the relations between state and religion is peculiar to this period. Important developments that put their marks regarding the realms of state and religion occurred before and after this period. For instance, the foundation of –one of the most emphasized example of Ottoman religious institutions- *Seyhulislislamlik* was dated to the era of II Murad (1421-1451). On the other hand, the Caliph title was incorporated to Ottoman state structure during the era of Selim I (1512-1520). Otttoman-Safavid wars, which are of crucial importance regarding the institutionalization of religion-state relations -and also consequential for the subject matter of this thesis- were the products of the same era. The period following Selim I to Suleyman (1520-1566) is noteworthy in this regard, especially during the reign of Suleyman this institutionalization of the religion is crystallized to a great extent. As the referred examples suggest, grasping the topic at hand fully, requires us to attend the changes in the institutions rather than listing the changes in a temporal order. Accordingly, the following parts do not make up a basic chronological review but builds up an analysis of institutions which have importance regarding the relation between the state and the religion. To do so, I will reflect on the historical circumstances that played a role in this institutionalization. As a first step, Ottoman ulama and its institutional form *Seyhulislamlik* will be discussed. In this regard, the era of Abusuud (1490-1574) will be emphasized as the quintessential example of this institution. Afterwards, Ottoman – Safavid Wars and their relation to this institutionalization will be scrutinized. The Caliph title and the ways in which the Ottoman Dynasty constituted its religious legitimacy will be analyzed in this context.

Basically, Ottoman religious market had various facets. At the very heart of it, there were ulama. In the Ottoman state- different from Iranian states historically- ulama have always been a part of the imperial structures. The importance of ulama stemmed from giving the basic services on two important fields; namely education and jurisdiction, as well as their role of defending Ottoman legitimacy against various threats. These threats to legitimacy came either from an international subject such as other Muslim states or from

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[310] The relation between Ottomans and Byzantium is a well-debated topic. Some scholars went further to claim that Otttoman state is a direct continuation of Byzantium- Nicholas Iorga as the author of the book *Byzantium after Byzantium* is the most famous of these scholars. For a brief summary of these debates see Cemil Oktay. (2001), "Bizans Siyasi İdeolojisinden Osmanlı Siyasi İdeolojisine," in (ed) Mehmet Ö. Alkan *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Tanzimat ve Meşruiyet'in Birikimi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

the inner religious currents which had the potential to threaten the Ottoman religious legitimacy. In order to succeed in preventing the threats and to perform in harmony with the state at the same time, ulama had to adjust their structure. Firstly, they had to have a hierarchical structure to prevent inner schism. This structure was constituted by the 16th century. Secondly, they had to be economically dependent to the state. Again the 16th century is considered as the age in which this dependency manifested itself. It is apt to quote from Madeleine Zilfi who is the well-known scholar on Ottoman ulama: "By the sixteenth century, virtually all legal scholars who presided over a medrese classroom or a sheriat court in the Turkish speaking areas of the empire along with imperial appointees everywhere were ranked, graded and pensioned under central state auspices."[311] To re-emphasize, during the early phases of the Ottoman rule there were no such a hierarchical and structured institution. Ulama evolved as a hierarchical and state sponsored institution in time. In other words in accordance with the centralization of Ottoman state, the impact of ulama increased gradually. *Seyhulislam* was located at the very peak of ulama hierarchy. Hence we need to pay a specific attention to *Seyhulislamlık* in our endeavors to understand the relations between state and ulama. It is also important in the sense that, unlike Iranian counterpart, through this institution ulama directly linked to the state.

As mentioned above, *Seyhulislam* is at the very peak of Ottoman religious institution. The extent of *Seyhulislam's* power could be derived from the comparisons drawn between *Seyhulislam* and Pope by the western scholars. He was appointed legally by the Sultan, considered as equal to grand vizier and were respected more than the grand vizier. His job was to answer, and to issue *fatwas[312]* for religious questions. A few points could be highlighted regarding the emergence of *Seyhulislamlık*. First of all, since it was the *Gaza* ideology used as a source of legitimacy, it is not hard to grasp the sources of this religious institutions' power. Especially, the wars that took place with the other Muslim states increased the need for religious legitimation. Yet, before *Seyhulislamlık* was established, the state authorities had to seek religious legitimation through decentralized *fatwas*. *Seyhulislamlık*, by embodying the role of centralized legitimation, meets a practical-political need. The relation between Ottoman and Karamanoglu[313] can be given as an example to this point. During the era of II Murad, just before the foundation of *Seyhulislamlık*, *fatwas* were issued against Karamanoglu Mehmed beg. In order to issue a war, II Murad needed religious legitimacy against Karamanoglu. So he sent an Arabic letter formulated in question form to various Arabic ulama. The letter was basically as such: Ottomans were in a preparation of war against infidels. In cooperation with Byzantium, Karamanoglu beglik attacked Ottomans. The aim of the beglik was to destroy Ottomans. Hence is it permitted to fight against the beglik which did all these instances of infidelity? Such letters, which were formulated like an indictment were sent to various ulama-at the foremost Egyptian

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[311] Madeleine C Zilfi. (2006), "Ottoman Ulama," in Suraiyya N. Faroqhi (ed) *The Cambridge History of Turkey Vol.3 the Later Ottoman Empire (1603-1839)*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 210

[312] Legal opinion or interpration about issues pertaining Islamıc Law.

[313] One of the Anatolian begligs centered around south central Anatolia from 13th century to 1483.

ulama, and waited for a *fatwa* to be issued. Regarding the question, five different *fatwas* were taken from ulama who were members of various schools of *fiqh* and then Ottoman ulama issued a fatwa to support these fatwas.[314] Needless to say, this process was quite impractical, and it demonstrates why the Ottoman state needed an institution such as *Seyhülislamlik*, holding the power to issue coherent and practical fatwas when needed.

For sure, the only explanation for the institutionalization of *Seyhulislamlik* is not the challenge of getting a *fatwa* from abroad. Centralizing their structures was a natural response of growing states. Moreover, the Ottoman Civil War (1402-1413) starting after the Timurid invasion showed II Murad that centralization is a requirement for the state. In addition, Seyh Bedreddin rebellion, also occurred at the same period, revealed the importance of being able to cope with an alternative religious authority when needed. However, it is important to note that *Seyhulislamlik* was not seen as a significant institution when it was first founded. As Pixley has noted the historians of the era such as Asikpasazade, denounce the institution to a great extent. Another important indicator of the relative insignificance of the institution can be understood by looking at the salary of the early *Seyhulislams*. First *Seyhulislam* Molla Fenari's salary was just 30 *akce*.[315] It was the Fatih period that the significance and the salary of the Seyhulislam rised. Fatih not only increased the salary of *Seyhulislam* but also devoted a part of his *kanunname* to this institution. However, despite their economic empowerment, it is not easy to claim that *Seyhulislams* emerged as a significant bureaucratic power during the early stages. Generally accepted view about the institution is that, it was Zenbilli Ali Efendi's period that acted as a turning point regarding the significance of the institution. He was in office for 23 years during both Sultan Bayezid's (1481-1512) and Selim I's (1512-1520) reigns. The fundamental importance of this era lies in the fact that *Seyhulislams* started to have administrative duties. Starting from the first half of the 16th century, the task of appointing religious bureaucracy such as, *Kadiliklar,*[316] which until then was in Sultans' hands, passed to *Seyhulislams.* [317] In other words, from then onwards *Seyhulislams* transformed from high level clerics who are issuing *fatwas* according to situations into administrators of the religious bureaucracy.

Another important turning point of the institutionalization can be considered as the 30 year period of Abussuud Efendi. It is also a fundamental period illuminating the relations of the institution with the political authority. Colin Imber in his famous book "Ebu 's-su'ud: The Islamic Legal Tradition", in which he discusses the relations of state with the religion during the classical era, labeled the period as the quintessential

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[314] Ramazan Boyacıoğlu. (2001), "Osmanoğullarının Karamanoğlu İbrahim Bey Aleyhine Aldığı Fetvalar," in Kemal Çiçek(ed), *Pax Ottomana / Studies in Memoriam Prof. Dr. Nejat Göyünç,* Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 651.

[315] Michael M. Pixley (1976), "The Development and Role of the Seyhulislam in Early Ottoman History," *Journal of American Oriental Society*, (96) 1

[316] A fraction of ulama working as Islamic Judges.

[317] Halil Inalcik, (2001), *Ottoman Empire the Classical Age,* London*:* Orion Publishing Group 172

example of the Ottoman legal tradition.[318] In this legal tradition on the one hand there is a set of religious rules represented by the word shari'a, whereas on the other hand there is *qanun* represented by the personal authority of Sultan. There are various examples of conflict in this dual structure. Quoting from 16th century historian Theodore Spandenous would show us an early instance of this conflict. Spandounes tells us how Bayezid appointed a *sanjak* governor as market inspector in Istanbul, in order to provide him with an income while he was out of office. As a market inspector he disobeyed a decree of the judge of Istanbul, Yusuf Kirmasti (1494-8), claiming that since he received his authority directly from the Sultan, the judge had no jurisdiction. When after a furious contretemps, the judge tried to prosecute him, no one would give evidence against the market inspector, whereupon the Sultan "deprived the said judge of his office, and issued a command that no one should have power and authority over slaves who received a salary from the Sultan, and this command has been observed until today."[319]

The importance of Abussuud lies in his ability to constitute a middle way between these two traditions. Indeed the process that brings him to power can be considered as a reflection of this tension, in other words the tension between the secular and the religious. Ottoman *Seyhulislams'* power manifested itself in their lifelong career. Since its foundation, until the era of Abussuud, no *Seyhulislam* was dismissed from the office. Abussuud's appointment to the office following the dismissal of Koca Civilizade, during the era of Suleyman I, was the first instance of its kind. One of the reasons that resulted in Koca Civilizade's dismissal is considered as his Sufi tendencies and their contradiction with the orthodox tendencies of the sultan. Yet a more common interpretation is that, a discussion about *Vaqf* turned to be the main area of conflict between Sultan and Koca Civilizade. To be more precise, Civilizade, emphasized the anti-usury values of Islam and rejected cash *vaqf* endowments. Personal view of the Sultan was that cash *vaqf* endowments were beneficial to Ottoman economy. Abussuud's *fatwa* on this issue was as such "abolition of income from interest would lead to the collapse of many pious foundations, a situation that would harm the Muslim Community"[320] So Abussuud by issuing this fatwa not only manage to become the new *Seyhulislam* but also brought a novel way of going beyond the Islamic law. In other words he valued practical requirements beyond abstract religious law. And this determined the direction of state religion relations of the Ottoman period. [321]

The 30 year period of Abussuud is the final stage of the evolution of the institution. *Seyhulislamlik*, evolved from an obscure role which even Asikpasazade, one of the early historians on Ottoman history had not

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[318] Quoting from him "One Personality in particular stands out as the representative of this order, and this is the jurist Abusuud (c 1490-1574)," Imber, *Ebu 's-su'ud,* X.

[319] Colin Imber. (2002), *The Ottoman Empire 1300-1650: The Structure of Power*, New York: Palgrave Mc Millan, 245.

[320] Pamuk, Sevket. (2004), "Institutional Change and Longevity of the Ottoman Empire," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, (35) 2. 233.

[321] For a detailed account of this debate see. Jon E Mandaville. (1979), "Usurious Piety: The Cash Vaqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (10) 3

mentioned, to one of the most crucial institutions of the Ottoman state. Yet, even during the era of Abussuud, despite his most powerful status among other *Seyhulislams*, it is not easy to claim the *Seyhuislam* was one of the primary decision makers of the state policy. The institution was always intertwined with politics and had difficulties to fulfill its prime duty, which, at least literally, was to control the coherence of law with İslam. The power of *Seyhulislam* was not indeed an institutional power but more a power stemmed from *Seyhulislams* personal relations with Sultans. [322] In other words *Seyhulislamlik* as an institution always remained attached to ruling class. As opposed to its counterparts in Iran-high echelons of ulama-*Seyhulislams* never found the chance to pursue an independent policy or act decisively. During the 500 years of its history 131 *Seyhulislam* were dismissed in Ottoman Empire. The average period in office for the *Seyhulislams* was about 3, 5 years. [323] Usually they were sent into exile after they were dismissed from their office. Yet execution was also an option.[324] On the other hand, occasionally they took part in different echelons of ruling class and dynasty against the sultan. Abdulaziz (1861-1876), V Murat (1876) and Abdulhamid II (1876-1909) are among the Ottoman sultans who were dethroned by a *fatwa* from the *Seyhulislams.*

To sum up, religion-state relations in the Ottoman state centralized and institutionalised gradually. Obscure, heterodox-like state of the first stages centralised itself and *Seyhulislamlik* as an institution accommodated the situation. So, the structure of the institution and the evolution of its relations with the state are crucial in order to understand the Ottoman state tradition. As Zılfı emphasized, "among other things, they suggest a profound investment in designating who would and who would not be- standard bearers of Ottoman Islamic Orthodoxy."[325]

4.4 Religious Legitimacy during the Classical Age

State and legitimacy are two closely related concepts. State as we know from the famous definition of Weber "upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order". What makes the state different from the other sources that use physical power is its legitimacy. So it can be claimed that legitimacy stems from the mutual relationship between ruler and the ruled. In this sense, religion usually emerges as one of the major methods to gain legitimacy. Traditionally religion "is the source of macro loyalty, because it generates the widest bonds of commonly held values."[326] Ottoman state, as

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[322] Pixley, "The Development and Role,"196.

[323] Islam Ansiklopedisi, Şeyhülislamlık. 93.

[324] There are at least three executed Seyhulislams Ahizade Hüseyin Efendi (1634) Hocazade Mes"ud Efendi (1656) and Feyzullah Efendi (1703)

[325] Zilfi, "Ottoman Ulama" 209

[326] One must bear in the mind that religion on the one hand used as a source of legitimacy for the rulers yet on the other hand used as a tool of revolt. As Sheikh Bedreddin revolt exemplifies, this can be an heterodox –alternative view of religion. However mainstream-orthodox views can also be a source for revolt. Quoting from Edmund Burke would be apt. "Indeed there is a popular ideology of social protest in M. E. which centered upon the application of Sharia by a

debated above, used Gaza as a religious ideological pattern since from its beginning. Hence for Ottoman state, to a considerable extent, legitimacy was based on religion. Ottoman rulers, in order to win acceptance from their subjects, used religion which had a basis for establishing legitimacy in two ways. First, the ruling power of the sultan was in itself bearing a religious facet. In other words the authority of the ruler has a "sacred" character. Most of the pre-modern societies are similar in this respect. Society-whether religious or not-has the tendency to believe the sacredness of the ruler. Marks Bloch called this as "Mystique of the Royalty". Bloch described the situation of the Europe in the Middle Ages as follows:

> In every country, in those days [the Middle Ages and early modern period], kings were regarded as sacred, and in some countries at least were even believed to possess miraculous healing powers. For many centuries the kings of France and England used to "touch for scrofula," that is, they claimed to have the power, simply by their touch, to cure people suffering from this disease, and their subjects shared a common belief in their medicinal powers.[327]

In this respect, Ottoman rulers' sacredness stemmed from the fact that they were considered as the defender of faiths. Especially after Selim I, with the so-called transfer of caliphate from Abbasids to Ottomans, the assumed sacredness of Ottoman rulers reinforced. Yet, the coherence of Ottoman claims of caliphate is widely discussed in the literature. The quote below is one of the first instances of this debate.

> First, that the Egyptian dynasty of Abbasid Caliphs was spurious: or at least, not proven. Secondly, that the Ottoman Sultans, not being descended from the Arab tribe of Quraysh, are barred from all competency to acquire title. Perhaps a third ground may be added, viz., that the office is not hereditary; and that therefore, even supposing one Ottoman Sultan to become Caliph, there is no hereditary right created by that incident.[328]

In addition to James William's claims, there are other indications that the Ottoman claim of being a legitimate successor of caliphs, were debated. For example William Muir ended his well-known book "the Caliphate its Rise and Decline" with Ottoman conquest of Egypt. [329] Moreover, Ottoman was not the only dynasty that claimed the caliphate. There have always been other dynasties that claim the caliphate.[330] Yet all these legal-religious shortcomings did not result in a loss of Ottoman's religious legitimacy. Ottomans continued to use the legitimacy arising from the claim of caliphate, especially when they felt threatened.

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vigilant Muslim Ruler" (1989 47-8) quoted in Sami Zubaida, (2009), "Political Modernity", in Muhammad Khalid Masud et al (ed), *Islam and Modernity: Key Issues and Debates,* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 61

[327] Quoted in Hakan Karateke and Maurus Reinkowski (ed), (2009), *Legitimising the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power.* Leiden: Brill, 113.

[328] Interestingly this piece, as can be understood from its title as supportive Ottoman claims of caliphate.. James William, A vindication of the Ottoman Sultan's title of 'Caliph': shewing its antiquity, validity, and universal acceptance, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Collection, (1877)

[329] Indeed Muir caliphate ended with Abbasid Dynasty. Last sentence of the book was as such. "The caliphate ended with the fall of Baghdad. The illusory resuscitation by the Mameluks was a lifeless show; the Osmanly caliphate, a dream." William Muir, (1892), *the Caliphate Its Rise Decline and Fall.* The Religious Tract Society: Oxford,. 594.

[330] One of these is Moroccon Dynasty. For a detailed discussion see Abderrahmane el-Moudden, The Idea of the Caliphate between Moroccons and Ottomans. *Studia Islamica*, No. 82. 1995.

Specifically religious legitimacy was used in the 16th century against Muslims, in the 18th century against Non-Muslims and in the 19th century against both to non-Muslims and Muslims.[331] That is to say, 'Mystique of Royalty' in addition to the claims of caliphate, constituted the legitimacy of Ottoman Sultans.

Still, the legitimacy during the Ottoman-Classical era did not only stem from the religious-Islamic ideology. As Hakan Karateke discusses, although religion was an important part, Ottoman attempts of gaining legitimacy were closely related with non-religious concepts. The debates on the origin of the dynasty can be considered as an instance of these relations. As Karateke mentions, on the one hand the dynasty linked itself directly to the Oghuz Khan, on the other hand, it linked itself to Japeth the son of the Noah. Besides, more universal figures of legitimacy were also used. These figures were sometimes neither Turkic nor Muslim. For instance, especially during the era of Mehmed II, there were debates on linking Ottoman Dynasty to Commenian Dynasty.[332] More interestingly, in 1517, in a letter to Memluk ruler just before the conquest of Egypt, Selim I wrote as follows: "It has been revealed to me that I shall become the possessor of the East and West, like Alexander the Great… You are a Mamluk, who is bought and sold; you are not fit to govern. I am a king descended through twenty generation of kings."[333]

As mentioned above, it is not easy to claim that religion was the only source of legitimacy for Ottoman rulers. In addition, religious legitimacy was constructed, reconstructed and transformed in accordance with the changing situations. Moreover, the search for legitimacy had an impact on Ottoman religious structure and identity. "When rulers legitimize themselves, they give an account of who they are"[334] In the Ottoman context one of the turning points of this transformation is the Ottoman-Safavid Wars. Selim I and Ismail as the rulers of Ottoman and Safavid states had similar identities as Turkish and Muslim rulers. It was, to a great extent, after these wars that Ottomans and Safavids constituted their own specific identities. In other words, it was only after these wars, Sunni and Shi'a institutions emerged respectively in the Ottoman and Safavid states.

As discussed in the third chapter Safavid period is of major importance in terms of religion and state relations. In this era, Iran, until then ruled by Sunni rulers, started to be ruled by a heterodox ruler. Shah Ismail who was a charismatic ruler, in Weberian terms, took control over Iran. It is not easy to claim that Iran in this era became a Shia state, yet roots of Shiitization of Iran lies in this era. This Shiitization, to some extent, was a result of Ottoman-Safavid wars. This period is also important for Ottomans as well. Although Ottoman state always was a Sunni state, a full-fledged Sunni Orthodoxy was a result of this mutual

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[331] Madeleine C. Zilfi. (1993), "Medrese for the Palace: Ottoman Dynastic Legitimation in the Eighteenth Century,"*Journal of the American Oriental Society*, (113) 2, 184.

[332] Commenians are a Byzantium Dynasty. Karateke and Reinkowski, "*Legitimising the Order,* 24-25.

[333] *ibid.,* 25

[334] *ibid.,* 152.

interaction. In other words, Ottomans constructed a systematic theology during the 16th century. Mark Dressler describes the process as follows: Both Ottoman and Safavid rulers were searching legitimacy through mystical speculation and personal charisma. When this legitimacy started to be challenged by Safavids, Ottomans started to lose support of a considerable amount of its population. Especially, nomadic or half-nomadic Turcoman tribes swing their loyalty to the Safavids. Thus Ottoman rulers started to perceive these masses as objects of persecution. This process of persecution needed an ideology and required Ottomans to label these masses as infidels. So according to Dressler, "the promotion of the picture of Kızılbas and Safavids as religious "other" must have supported the establishment of legalistic Sunnism as orthodox Ottoman doctrine. Proclamation of one's own orthodoxy and *takfir* of the "other" are two corresponding actions.[335]

Certainly, there were other factors that gave material support to the process. Sunni scholars of Kurdish, Azeri and Arabic origin, who escaped from Iran, were also crucial for Ottomans to constitute Sunni Orthodoxy. Particularly, anti-Sunni activities of Sah Tahmasb accelerated this process.[336] In this regard, it is similar to Safavid's attempts to bring Shite scholars from Lebanon, in order to build a Shiite orthodoxy which is discussed in the second chapter.

4.5 Religious Establishment in the Late Ottoman Period

18th and 19th centuries are ages of westernization and modernization. Debates on Ottoman westernization centered on certain themes, of which most emphasized has been the place and function of religion. In this context, religion is considered mostly in opposition to modern life. So the attitude of Ottoman ulama is deemed, to a great extent, as reactionary. According to this line of thought, which was also carried to post the 1923 period, most of the reforms were prevented by Islam as an ideology and by the religious institutions as the bearers of this ideology. So ulama versus modern reforms duality emerged as one of the major analytical tools to depict 18th and 19th Centuries. The debates held on printing are a famous example to this duality. It is widely claimed that Ottoman ulama resisted against printing under the pretext of Islam and that did great harm to Ottoman intellectual life.[337] It is true that the ulama-janissary alliance hindered some attempts of reformation. Especially during the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) this alliance hindered military

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[335] Marcus Dressler, (2005), "Inventing Orthodoxy: Competing Claims for Authority and Legitimacy in the Ottoman-Safavid Conflict" in Hakan Karateke (ed) *Legitimising the Order: The Ottoman Rhetoric of State Power.* Leiden: Brill.

[336] For a discussion on anti-Sunni policies of the era see. Rosemary Stanfield Johnson, (1994), "Sunni Survival in Safavid Iran: Anti Sunni Activities during the Reign of Tahmasp I," *Iranian Studies.* (27) 1-4.

[337] R.C Repp. (1972), "Some Observations on the Development of the Ottoman Learned Hierarchy", in Nikkie Keddie (ed) *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, Berkeley: University of California Press; Niyazi Berkes. (1998), *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, New York: Routledge; Bernard Lewis. (1968), *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press. Interestingly Necip Fazil Kısakürek-a well-known Islamist figure- was amongst these scholars who think that ulama is responsible for the delay in printing. He claimed in his book *Yolumuz, Halimiz, Caremiz* "Matbaaya kufur fetvasi verilmistir. Ilmi kitapla baglayiniz hadisi dururken." Quoted in Mustafa Armagan, Tayyip Erdogan ve Matbaa Savaslari, Zaman Gazetesi, 06, Mayis 2006.

reforms and also played their part on the dismissal of Sultan. Yet, this line of thought is not the only one regarding the relations between ulama and state. According to another paradigm, ulama were always a part of reforms; they even pioneered reform initiatives.[338] Proponents of this paradigm usually give the instances of religious figures like Ahmad Cevdet Pasa who pioneered reform movements. As can be seen, the religious institutions' and their agents' attitudes toward reform have been widely debated issues. Not surprisingly, my aim is not to provide a clear answer to the relationship between religion and reformation. What I will try to do in this part is to give an account of the ways in which modernization attempts that took place in these centuries interact with the religious institutions; more specifically with ulama. In order to do so, first I will show that ulama's response is not homogeneous, that is to say, both reactionary and supportive fractions in religious institutions co-existed. Then I will discuss the rationales behind different actors' actions and show that these rationales are more materialistic then ideological. More importantly, I will emphasize the fact that they transformed over time. In other words I will try to avoid the framework in which the ulama are stereotyped as reactionary and ideological. I think this retrospective line of thought is often misleading and conceals more than it reveals.

4.5.1 Early Reform Movements and Ulama

As mentioned above parts, starting from the early period ulama gradually gain importance. In this context, especially after the Safavid-Ottoman wars they became in an exceptionally privileged position. To understand more briefly we can have a look at institutional structure of ulama during the classical period. Above all members of ulama consisted a great majority of educated Muslim elite. They also had crucial power as the masters of law and also educators. Moreover, as the above parts mentions *Seyhulislams* had supreme power. Similar to other members of ruling elites they are exempt from tax. Yet, different from

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[338] H.A.R. Gibb, H. Bowen, (1969), *Islamic Society and the West,* London: Oxford University Press; Uriel Heyd, (1993), "the Ottoman Ulama and Westernization in the time of Selim III and Mahmud II," in Albert Hourani et al, (ed) *The Modern Middle East a Reader*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. Although his perspective is a bit different, Ismail Kara can be added to this list. According to him Ottoman modernization as a whole can be understood as a religious reform movement.

Kapikulus, who are also major components of ruling elites, they are not considered as slaves.[339] So their goods cannot be confiscated in any given circumstances. Their positions in Vaqf administrations and related revenues are also other indicator of their relative importance. Indeed the beginning of 18th century can be seen as a time period in which ulama's power was at its peak.

On the other hand, this very age marked the first modernization and westernization attempts. It is widely accepted that with the first military defats of 18th century resulted in first modernization attempts. Especially after the Karlowitz (1699) and Pasarowitz (1718) treaties, following a humiliating defeat against Habsburg Monarchy of Austria, Ottoman administrative structure began to be criticized. Modernization attempts of Peter the Great in Russian Empire also set an example to Ottoman elites. Quoting from Findley, Ottomans, during the era, was the "only major empire of the pre-modern Islamic world to survive with institutional continuity and a degree of sovereignty into the era of modernization."[340] Only way to maintain this institutional continuity and sovereignty was through reform. So, first military attempts of reform gradually evolved into different segments of administrative structure. These early attempts of reform were carried out by westerners or converts. [341] One of the most famous of these westerners is French Huguenot Rochefort. He proposed a plan to bring about a group of western engineers to work for the Ottoman Army. Moreover, first Ottoman fire brigade was set up by a French convert Ahmed Gercek born as Louis David in 1720.

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[339] R. C. Repp quoted from Suleiman Al Kaffawi. The quotation is in the era of Sultan Suleyman and between Rumeli Kazaskeri Ibn Fenari ve Grand vizier Ibrahim. Although it is long for foot note it is important in the sense that it shows difference between ulama and the other fractions of ruling elites. "Among (the stories about Ibn Fenari) is that one day he was in the imperial diwan, hearing a case at law and acting as judge. He delayed in (giving) the decision so that the truth of the case might become plain beyond doubt. That case was known to the vizier Ibrahim Pasha, "the Slain ", who said: "0 Mulla, this case is incontrovertible and I am witness to it; it leaves no room for delay ". (Ibn FenJri) said: "Your testimony is unacceptable under the Shari'a ". The vizier was horrified and said: " Why is my testimony not acceptable ? ", to which he replied : " Because you are an unmanumitted slave ". The vizier rose and went in to the Sultan; he was held in great esteem by Sultan Sulayman Khan. He complained to him and wept, saying: " May God make you immortal, 0 Sultan. Mulls Ibn Fenari has dishonoured and disgraced me in the imperial diwan, saying thus and so. The honour of your slaves, the viziers, is as the honour of your exalted person ". Sultan Sulayman al-Ghazi-upon whom be mercy-said: "O Ibrahim, this is a matter determined by law. The Mulla whom you name is one who always speaks the truth, who is not to be moved in matters of faith, and who never flatters anyone. This is the province of the holy 'ulamd', and I stand in awe of it. But as for you, I this day free you, wherefore go to him and say: ' The Sultan has freed me ; my testimony is acceptable ' ". (Ibrahim Pasha) returned to the imperial diwan and said: "0 Mulla, the Sultan has freed me; my testimony is acceptable ". (Ibn Fenari) said 'No' and (Ibrahim Pasha) said 'Why ? '. He said: "This is but allegation. Either the Sultan must affirm this before me or I must have clear evidence ". Then (Ibn Fenari) went in (to the Sultan) to submit the cases to him and (the Sultan) affirmed the manumission. The aforementioned Mulla thereupon drew up the document of manumission for that vizier and gave it to him the next day in the presence of the leading men in the imperial diwan, saying: " Take this, your document of manumission. Now your testimony is acceptable ". And this (i.e. his humiliating Ibrahim Pasha by giving him his document of manumission in the presence of the diwdn) was an odder piece of daring than the first (i.e. his having raised the matter of Ibrahim Pasha's status in the first place)".' R. C. Repp, (1968), "A further Note on the Devshirme," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London*, (31)1, 139.

[340] Carter Findley, The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East, Studia Islamica, LVI p. . quoted in Selim Deringil. (1993), "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in Late Ottoman Empire," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* (35)1, 6.

[341] Still it is hard to claim that these movements of westernization are a unilateral act of imitation. In some aspects Europeans imitate Ottoman agenda. *Turquerie,* which emerged in 17th century Europe can be seen as an indicator of this . For a detailed account of this trend see. Nebahat Avcioglu, (2011), *Turquerie and the Politics of Representation 1726-1876*, London: Ashgate Publishing.

Another French convert Count de Bonneval, was officially recruited in the Ottoman administration and was tasked with reforming Ottoman Artillery according to European Military order. These reform movements of De Bonneval bring about one of the first instances of modern education in Ottoman, which is the *Hendeshane*[342] in Uskudar. For his achievements, De Bonneval was rewarded with appointment as Pasha. [343] Another European Baron de Tott and a Scottish convert Campbell also carried out important military reform attempts. As can be seen these reform attempts of early period are mainly technical and limited, they are also carried out by non-Muslims, so their relations with religious institutions are limited.

This era continued until a major campaign of military reform started, during reign of Selim III (1789-1807). The series of reforms carried out by Selim III which resulted in 1807 Janissary riots and dismissal of the Sultan himself, can be seen as the first confrontation of ulama and other fractions of ruling elite during the modern period. Ulama's position during this era can be considered as reactionary. Mehmed Ataullah-Seyhulislam of Sultan Selim- his preceptor Mehmed Munib and *Qadi* of Istanbul Muradzade Mehmed Murad supported the dismissal of the Sultan. These figures and many more members of ulama considered reform movements of sultan as *b"idat*[344] and imitation of infidels and cursed them publicly. Yet still it is hard to think of these reactions as purely ideological. In an ongoing power struggle between Janissary and sultan they took sides with Janissary. Especially after the consolidation of power of Mahmud II (1808-1839) these reactions, coming from ulama side, were mitigated. Interestingly, during this period ulama did not reacted against the abolition of Janissary troops. [345]. Besides, numerous members of ulama directly supported the action. *Qadi* of Istanbul of the era –Kececizade Mehmed Efendi showed his support to abolition in a poem written for Mahmud II:

> "The father of the sultan is told to be a friend of God
> Based on this fact and his warding of the soldiers
> Why should not his son be inferred as the greatest pole
> It is in his time, by his inconceivable order, the corps were abrogated." [346]

Yet it is hard claim that ulama as a whole supported reform movements of Mahmud II. Although indirectly, a considerable fraction of ulama continued to show their discontent. One of the major developments of the

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[342] *Hendese* means geometry, *Hendesehane* can be considered as an early example of engineering faculty.

[343] Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 45-50; Alan Palmer, (1994), *The Decline and Fall of the Ottoman Empire*, New York: Fall River Press,1775-1790.

[344] It means innovation and novelty in linguistic ters. Yet, religiously it always carries a negative connotation.

[345] Richard Chambers. (1972), "The Ottoman Ulama and the Tanzimat," in Nikkie Keddie (ed) *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 35.

[346] Peder-I Padisah-dehre velidir derler/ Vaka`i def-I levend ile idup istidlal/ Ya nicun oglu olmaya kutbu azam/ Bitti asrinda ocak gibi emr-I muhal quoted in Elcin Arabaci, A Quest for Legitimization of the Ottoman State or Modernization of Islam in the Early Nineteenth Century Ottoman "Center" The Reasons for the Abolition of Janissaries and Modernization of the Ottoman Army From the Perspective of an Alim-Bureucrat Historian Sahaflar Seyhi Mehmed Es`ad Efendi

era was the compulsory dress codes. Mahmud II ordered all civil servants to wear fez and also banned the wearing of wadded turban (sarik). Specifically, after when it became compulsory for the ulama, they reacted strongly. Sultan renounced his decision after the war with Russia and ulama were given an exemption from dress codes. An unintended consequence of this decision was a further divergence of ulama from other civil servants. Thus ulama emerged as more visible class with their own dress codes. As Richard Chambers aptly puts: "Their turbans and flowing gowns became a symbol of ulama conservatism and set them apart as a class of Muslim `clergymen` in a state and society that was becoming less Islamic and more secular" [347] Another area of contestation between ulama and sultan was in cultural domain. Mahmud II ordered the production of his personal portrait and ordered them to be displayed in certain government offices. This decision was against the Islamic proscription of creation of images of living beings. Ulama also opposed this decision harshly.[348]

On the other hand starting from 18th century most of the ulama actively supported these reform movements. For example, *Seyhulislam* issued a *fatwa* which approved introduction of printing press in Ottoman lands in 1727. Above mentioned deeds of Baron de Tott were also approved and encouraged by Seyhulislam. As mentioned above both Selim III and Mahmud II were approved by a considerable fraction of ulama. Among these Velizade Mehmed Emin and Tatarcik Abdullah were prominent supporters of Selim III. Mehmed Tahir (1825-1828), Abdul-Vehab (1821-22, 1828,1833) ve Mustafa Asim (1818-1819, 1823-1825, 1833-1846) were the *Seyhulislams* that supported Mahmud II. Moreover, approving reform attempts of sultans and their military-civil advisors were not the only role played by ulama during the era. Some even went further to propose reform plans. For instance, Tatarcik Abdullah, advised sultan Selim III to import foreign experts and scholars in order to reach western military standards. In addition he also suggested establishing institutions for the sake of translation of foreign technical articles. Molla Kececizade Mehmed Izzed proposed a more brave and profound set of advices. In 1826, right after the abolition of Janissaries, he proposed a memorandum which includes his reform plans. His propositions include a reorganization of public administration, fixed salary for civil servants, building a consultative assembly in which both ulama and state officials take part. More interestingly, he emphasized the importance for Muslim population to involve in trade and industry and offered various ways in order to do so. State should grant loans to newly established businesses, also it should guarantee not to impose taxes for three years. Moreover, in order to decrease the size of exportation, state should establish factories –they should be established in the periphery since wages were lower. In addition to these, consumption taxes should be placed for luxury goods and especially luxury houses. It is interesting to note that a member of clergy proposed an extensive reform plan ten years before the Tanzimat. This plan shows that ulama cannot be seen as mere reactionaries to reforms.[349]

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[347] Chambers, "The Ottoman Ulama and the Tanzimat,"37.

[348] Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulama and Westernization," 34.

[349] *ibid.,* 29-30.

As revealed above, ulama's position against reform attempts was not homogeneous. There were both pro-reform and reactionary factions of ulama. At this point, one important question arises; what are the reasons causing this heterogeneity? In the first place, members of ulama themselves were not holding equal positions since there was an explicit difference between ulama's lower and upper segments. This hierarchical difference, when added to the masses' perception of upper segments as being corrupt, caused a serious discontent. Heyd describes the state of medrese students as follows: In 1830s and 1840s there were about 5000 medrese students only in Istanbul. These students were undernourished or were only able to eat a meal in a day. Most of them were not young but they could not manage to marry. They had to wait for years in order to get appointed to a post. Moreover, they no longer believe that appointments were based on merit rather than on patronage. A student, especially if he was coming from the provincial parts of the country had to wait around 10 to 20 years and also must succeed on examinations to become a member of ulama. Yet, if the student was from an upper family or if he was the son of upper ulama, he could become a member as early as he was six years old. [350] Another point of difference was regarding the ethnic identities of ulama. It is claimed that Arab ulama was not able to ascend the hierarchical ladder. As Selim Deringil proposes, there were Turkish, Kurdish and Albanian *Seyhulislams*, yet there were no Arab *Seyhulislams*. [351] Interesting enough, one of the most important examples of religious opposition was rooted in the Arabian Peninsula and was leaded by Arab ulama. The Wahhabi movement emerged in Nejd in 18th century and led by a İbn Saud family. The most basic characteristic of Wahhabism was its tendency to label all recent developments as *bida't*. In this sense the movement can be seen as an ideological reaction to reformism. On the other hand, it can also be considered as an early example of Arab nationalism.[352] Another line of thought frames Wahhabism as the manifestation of factionalism among ulama. David Deans Commins comments in his book "Islamic Reform: Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria" is a good example to this kind of approach. In the book, he argues that Wahhabi ulama was located in the middle of the hierarchical structure; between the upper ranks who work with state and the lower ranks who got stuck in the periphery. According to him (Wahhabis) "… also shared a common position in the ranks of the ulama, namely middling status, modest wealth and local posts, but not official posts or the most prestigious local posts. These men stood a cut below the high ulama that monopolized the most important religious posts an accumulated great wealth."[353] Hence, ulama in this era had a hierarchical structure organized by complex intermingled criteria

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[350] *ibid.,* 35.

[351] Selim Deringil, Interview with Nese Duzel, Taraf Gazetesi. 29.03.2010.

[352] Many resources link the sources of Arab nationalism to Wahhabism, yet, it would be wrong to claim that Wahhabis were nationalist -in the modern sense of the term. Wahhabis did not have an agenda of establishing an Arab state; but they argued that the corruption of Ottomans was due to its deviation from the pure Islam. However, Wahhabis could be considered as nationalist in a way, since they argued that the prime actor of pure Islam supposed to be Arabs. For a discussion on this issue, please see: Elie Chalala, (1986), "Central Issues in the Debate on Arab Nationalism," The *Ucla Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, (2).

[353] David Deans Commins, (1990), *Islamic Reform : Politics and Social Change in Late Ottoman Syria*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47.

involving the ethnic and status qualities of its members. Its fractured structure played an important role in the heterogeneity of the reactions generated against reform attempts of the era.

The period preceding Tanzimat was marked by the reforms carried on by Selim III and Mahmud II. The question that confronts us at this point is the extent to which these reforms reflected the dynamics of ulama-state religions. Basically, we can trace four dynamics. Firstly, as mentioned above, Ottoman ulama lost a strong ally; Janissaries. Secondly, the transformation in the administrative and organizational structure weakened ulama's material power. Due to their loss of Waqf revenues, their partial autonomy was damaged. The *seyhulislams* of the era were also integrated into the bureaucratic structure with the establishment of Bab-i Mesihat. This integration also ruined their influence. Thirdly, civil bureaucracy was reorganized and strengthened, rendering the religious posts less appealing than it was before. Abolishment of the Kapıkulu system, the confiscation for non-religious officials, introduction of job security and regular salaries made non-religious bureaucratic career more popular than ever. As a consequence, being a member of religious class lost its popularity especially among the talented youth. Lastly, opening of new military and bureaucratic schools and establishment of Tercume Odasi (Translation Bureau) nurtured new elite. These new elite began to dominate the political scene of the era and caused the exclusion of medrese graduates.
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As can be seen, the reforms had differential influence on the various political and social groups in the Ottoman Empire. Ulama, as one of the most important of these groups, already started to lose its traditional authority in the era preceding Tanzimat. However, the Tanzimat period intensified this tendency to a great extent.[355] Yet ulama did not give a homogeneous reaction to this loss of power and status. One faction resist against this transformations yet another faction continued to support rulers.

4.5.2 Tanzimat Era: Dualism or Integration.

Tanzimat period is one of the most important points in the history of Ottoman modernization. Escalating centralization and control could be considered as the basic features of this period. During Tanzimat, the individual and isolated reform endeavors of the preceding periods gained momentum and got institutionalized. The power of bureaucracy and the realms under its control grew rapidly.[356] The cadres of

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[354] Chambers, "The Ottoman Ulama and the Tanzimat, 35-36.

[355] Ismail Kara offers a different analysis of the period. According to him, the period until the abolishement of Janissary corps was marked by the state's attempts to gain ulama's support. State needed this support against Janissaries' power. In other words state carried out a 'divide and rule' strategy between Janissary and ulama whom were two potential focus of opposition. However, in succeeding Tanzimat era, state no longer needed ulama's support. An important reason for this was the emerging cultural dimensions of administrative reforms. According to Kara, the state started to figure that the cultural reforms could not be carried out with the ulama. Ismail Kara. (2005), "Turban and Fez: Ulama as Opposition," in Elizabeth Özdalga (ed) *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, Oxford: Routledge:, 164-165.

[356] At the end of 19th century, there were nearly about 500.000 civil servants.

this bureaucracy as well as some new sectors of business formed the modern middle class who had a pivotal role in the modernization and reformation movements. Considering the religion-state relations, the most frequently emphasized quality of this period is the dualism it created in the social realm. This dualism had flourished in the preceding reform movements; however, it shifted into a new phase in Tanzimat period. This dualism generally refers to a state of competition between what is (considered as) modern and traditional. To put it differently, it was the end result of a competition between 'the secular' –which represented the modern- and 'the religious' –which represented he tradition-, operating on the realms of culture, education, law and politics.[357] The most significant repercussions of this fracture was observable in the cases of the domains where the institution of religion always had power on , such as education and law. Nevertheless, it is important to note this dualism thesis creates certain blind spots in our understanding of the period. First of all, In accordance with the above discussed early era, it is difficult to claim that the Ulama developed a homogeneous attitude. Moreover, the modern institutions did not develop by totally abstracting themselves from the religious references and contents. Especially, Abdulhamid period following Tanzimat was marked with modernization endeavors as well as the existence of a strong religious tones and emphasis.[358]

The influence of early reform period on ulama is significant for a number of reasons. As referred above, ulama had weakened in many aspects. However, if the other institutions of its rank are taken into consideration – abolishment of Janissaries, feudal systems' (local notables) loss of power etc.-, there weren't any social fraction that somehow continued its authority else than ulama. Beginning from the Tanzimat period and in the years that followed, this authority diminished gradually on the realms of education and law.

As referred earlier, schools without a religious content had started to flourish in the early modern period. However, the sphere of education was still under the authority of the institution of religion. The first systematic attempts of modernizing the education took place in the Tanzimat period. Nevertheless, it is problematic to frame this modernization as a fully secular process or as being completely devoid of religious references. For instance, when the formation of council of education was being debated, Sultan Abdülmecit (1839-1861) explained the goals of education as: "to disseminate religious knowledge and useful sciences, which are necessities for religion and the world so as to abolish the ignorance of the people."[359] After being formed, the council expressed its own views with a similar emphasis: "It is a necessity for every human

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[357] Niyazi Berkes (1998), Richard Chambers (1972), Ilber Ortayli (2005), Serif Mardin (1993)

[358] One may argue that this is the reason why the Islamists in Turkey reject the post-Tanzimat period, yet, they respond positively to Abdulhamid II's period.

[359] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 173.

being to learn first his own religion and that education which will enable him to be independent of the help of others and then to acquire useful sciences and arts."[360]

In this period, the primary education (sibyan mektebleri) continued to stay under the authority of the institution of religion. However, Ruştiye schools, as an intermediate degree between the primary and higher education were established in this period. In 1850, five Rüştiye schools began giving education in Istanbul. In the years that followed, new ones opened in the Ottoman provinces. One of the significant impacts of these schools was deriving from the fact that they required professional educators. Therefore, two 'teacher schools', first for the men (darul muallimin) then for women (darulmuallimat), were established. These schools were representing the emergence of teaching as a secular profession. In this period, not much was done for the primary education. Around 1860s, Mithat Pasha, with the support of Namık Kemal, attempted to open modern primary schooling in Danube, yet, these schools did not disseminate into the other regions of the Empire. Hayrettin Pasha's endeavors of modernization in Tunisia did also fail. [361] The modern education system in the Ottomans was mainly structured on the higher education level. In the early modern period, a number of novel modern institutions, in addition to the military engineering schools which were established as a response to military failures, were opened. School of military medicine and military academy can be given as two examples to these initiatives. The most influential one among these new institutions was the Mektebi Mülkiye which was opened in 1859 to train civil servants.

Roderic H.Davidson mentions six ways of getting a westernized and modernized education in the Empire during this period. Without doubt, the first one of those was the newly established modernized schools. However, non-formal education, especially in the earlier periods, also had an important role. In that sense, most of the westernized intellectuals of the period, regardless of the formal degrees the hold, were autodidact (self-educated). Ahmet Vefik Pasha, Ali Pasha, Munif Pasha, and for later periods Ziya Gökalp, who worked on philosophy and French sociology during his exile, can be considered as examples to this feature of the period. The second means of getting secular education was foreign schools. The leading ones were French catholic schools and together with the other foreign schools they occupied a large place in the education system of the late 19th century. In the beginning of the 20th century, there were 500 French Catholic, 675 American, 178 English schools on the lands of Ottoman Empire. In addition to these, there were various German, Italian, Austrian, Hungarian and Russian schools. However, these schools were mainly established in the Arab regions and their pupils were mostly Christian. The third channel of westernized education was to get education in Europe. After 1834, the government started to send young students to Western Europe periodically. Initially, these students were the graduates of the military schools, yet, the graduates of the civil schools were articulated to this mobilization soon. The Ottoman bureaucrats who received this

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[360] *ibid.,*173

[361]Roderic H. Davison, (1963), "Westernised Education in Ottoman Turkey," *Middle East Journal,*(15)3, 297.

European education made up an important part of the new modern elite.[362] The last means of getting westernized education was an indirect one. They were the schools of Jews, Greeks and Armenians, who made up an important portion of the Ottoman population then. These schools prospered immensely especially during the late 19th century. These schools were getting considerable material and educational support from abroad. For instance, Alliance Israilite was helping Jewish schools, University of Athens and Greek community was supporting Greek schools and Russia was partially sponsoring Armenian schools.

Hence, it can be claimed that with the extension of westernized and modern schools, ulama's monopoly on education started to decrease. Yet in this era it is hard to claim that religion was totally eliminated from educational sphere. Although new and modernized schools were opened and became popularized among people of all nationalities in the Empire, still religious schools continued to exist. So the situation in the educational sphere was more an amalgamation of religious and modern themes. With reference to Kemal Karpat it was "quasi-secular". [363]

The second social domain on which ulama lost its power and the dualism got intensified was the realm of judiciary. As referred earlier, in the Ottomans, as in the case of Iran, there was a system depending on the Sultans' charge both in the religious and secular spheres of life. However, a secular and westernized jurisdiction field, in other words a jurisdiction field that is not directly rooted in *sharia*, emerged with the Tanzimat. It is important to note that the jurisdiction system created by the Tanzimat was not completely devoid of religious references. What Tanzimat fostered was a legislation field that operated in parallel with the religious institutions of the late 19th century. In this period, many laws of the Sharia were codified. In Sami Zubaida's terms, these attempts could be considered as the 'etatization of law.'[364] Nevertheless, it is still difficult to suggest that, this endeavor happened to be fully successful.

The most crucial change in the Ottoman legislation system brought by the Tanzimat Edict was the formation of an impersonal and institutional structure. The foremost difference between the new system and the previous one which depended on the distinction between law and Sharia is the right of giving a decision above the sacred law by personal evaluation that was accorded to the law administrators. However, the primary aim of Tanzimat was the establishment of a system in which the administrator himself was bounded by the law. Actually, the discourse of 'equality before the law' was one of the most important gains of the Tanzimat period. This idea of equality embraces not only the cases between the ruler and the ruled but also the cases between the various fractions of the ruled. Interesting enough this discourse did receive the reaction

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[362] They can be considered as the most debated western group. As Davison is quoted from an Ottoman statesman they were seen as "Syphilized not civilized".*ibid.*, p. 297.

[363] Kemal Karpat. (2000), "Historical Continuity and Identity Change or How to be Modern Muslim, Ottoman and Turk," in Kemal Karpat (ed) *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, Leiden: Brill, 51.

[364] Sami Zubaida. (2003), *Law and Power in the Islamic World*, London New York: I.B. Tauris 121-158.

of the Ulama as well as the non-Muslim religious authorities. Ulama opposed to this new law on the ground that it was not compatible with the sharia law- They considered equalization the status of non-Muslims to that of Muslims in a Muslim country is unacceptable. As Davison suggests, the discourse of "now we can`t call a gavur a gavur" is a very good example to the points of emphasis of this opposition. [365]

On the other hand, the reaction was also fostered by the perception that this change was a result of European actors' impositions. However, the most interesting point is the reaction of non-Muslim authorities. Without doubt, the prime reason for that was the democratization of the compulsory military service, which could be avoided by payment in practice. However, another concern of these non-Muslim religious authorities was about their possible loss of the power they hold against their own members. The extract below explains this situation more clearly.

> 'The Greek Hierarcy, fearing the loss of their primacy among the Non-Muslims, disliked not only this invasion of traditional prerogative, but also the general emphasis put on equality ` The state puts us together with the Jews` some of the Greeks were reported to have said […] It is quite probable that the Greek Metropolitan of İzmit uttered the wish attributed to him as the Hatti Humayun was put back into its red satin pouch after the ceremonial reading at Porte: ` Insallah-God grant that it not be taken out of this bag again`.[366]

As evidenced until this point, both Ulama and non-Muslim religious authorities opposed to the novelties brought by Tanzimat. The codification and institutionalization attempts following this period intensified these reactions. This endeavor, which first started in the realm of commercial law, reached its peak at the time of the establishment of commercial tribunals in 1847. These tribunals were composed of ten Muslim ottomans, 10 non-Muslim ottomans and 10 foreigners and they were tied to the Ministry of Commerce. Allowing non-Muslims as witnesses was another feature of these tribunals. This allowance is derived from the old Sharia dictum that commercial men are free to manage their own affairs. Yet it can also be considered as a sign of secularization tendency. In that sense, commercial law can be seen as a deviation from the old legal system composed of sharia and law[367]. Nevertheless, without doubt, the changes implemented in the realm of penal code created the most important cleavages.

The first reformation attempt corresponds to Mahmud II period; however, that was mainly regarding the trials of state officials. The two reform endeavors in 1840 and 1850 was finalized by the establishment of a new penal code in 1858 which was heavily inspired by 1810 French penal code. The fact that the law was imported from a Christian country concerned the ulama, yet, this concerned was overcome by certain 'make

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[365] For an elaborate discussion on the subject see Davison Roderic. H. (1993), "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century", in Albert Hourani et al (ed) *A Modern Middle East a Reader,* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

[366] Zubaida, *Law and Power*, 127.

[367] *ibid.,* 130.

up' regulations. The first item of the law emphasized that the aim was not to abolish the sharia but to regulate the authorities' rights of making laws. Especially, the parts of the Sharia covering the 'Qiyas' issues were kept intact. In other words, we can argue that, in practice, the law embodied this periods' feature of the existence of a dual structure. Another facilitator of this dual system was the Ottoman legislation system's fractured structure. The law was implemented in the secular (or better lay) Nizamiya and Adliya courts, which were peculiar to Tanzimat period. However, the religious references in the codes were allowing the complainants to carry their cases to sharia courts. This dual structure abolished only after the establishment of Divani Ahkami Adliye in 1868. This court had the highest rank, and it was under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, not that of the Seyhulislam.[368]

Another legal regulation that took place in this period was concerning the civil law. Firstly, to imitate the French law was offered as an option, yet, this idea was left aside later on. According to Zubaida, "It was judged that the adoption of European codes in such a sensitive area, in which the sharia had strong claims, was to invite potent opposition."[369] Therefore, the codification of the sharia law according to the Hanafi school of thought was aimed.

A commission, guided by one of the important figures of the period, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, began to write[370] Mecelle[371.] This commission accomplished an important task by producing 16 books. Mecelle's significance derives from the fact that it was the first codification of Sharia in the world. Although it was criticized for being too strongly tied to Hanafi school of Fiqh, being extremely rigid, and for not being able to respond to the needs of a society in transition, its long term, validity can be given as an example to its strengths[372]. Mecelle's another feature is its attempt of combining the religious and the secular, as well as the traditional and western, in an interesting way. For instance, the principle of contractual liberty upheld in Roman *law*

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[368] *ibid.*, 131-132.

[369] *ibid.,*132

[370] One of the important figures of this period, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha, was Ulama. Şerif Mardin explains Ahmet Cevdet Pasha's involvement with the Tanzimat as such: " It was because Resid Pasa saw that the increasing power of the state in legislative and judicial matters would bring it into conflict with the Ulama that he decided to prepare the ground for an eventual compromise between the Ulama and the Porte. In 1262 (A.D. 1855-56), while engaged in the preparation of regulations concerned with the carrying out of reforms, he made a request to the office of the Seyhulislam that there be sent to him a young Alim of superior intelligence, great learning and liberal bent. It would seem that Resid Pasa hoped in this fashion to establish continuous liaison between the office of the Seyhulislam and the Porte. The name of the young man who was dispatched to him on this occasion was Ahmed Cevdet, who was, in time, to fulfil Resid Pasa's wish of arranging a compromise between statute law and religious law." Şerif Mardin. (1961), "Some Explanatory Notes on the Origins of the Mecelle," *The Muslim World*, (51) 4, 274.

[371]Originally Majallati Ahkami Adliye-the Book of Rules of Justice

[372] Dora Glidewell Nadolski claims on Mecelle that "The real weakness of the Majalla lay in its rigidity; since its provisions were based on un- changeable principles of the Islamic religion it could not be adapted to the needs of a rapidly changing society. Although its compilers tried to codify principles that would fit the needs of the people, their sources were limited. They restricted themselves to the principles and opinions of the Hanafi jurists and could not make use of the opinions of jurists of other school" Dora Glidewell Nadolski. (1977), "Ottoman and Secular Civil Law**,"** *International Journal of Middle East*. (8)4, 524.

aspacta sunt servanda, has its parallel in the shari'a principle, derived from the hadith: *Al-Muslimun 'ala shurutihim*, the Muslims are bound by the conditions they stipulate.[373] Like Ahmed Cevdet himself, who was from the ulama but also a west-facing reformist, Mecelle embodied both religious and modern components. We can also suggest that Mecelle, carried the dual feature of the period in itself.

To conclude, on the one hand, Tanzimat was representing an interesting synthesis of modernity and tradition. On the other hand, it was representing an institutional ambiguity. One side of this ambiguity was deriving from the existence of a religious sphere and the traditional Ulama representing this sphere. The other one side was occupied by a reformist ulama attempting to bridge tradition and modernity. Lastly, there was also a newly rising secular reformation tradition. Since the social was marked by severe conflicts, it is hard to suggest that an established institutional structure emerged during this period. When education system is considered, the existence of both religious and secular schools was an explicit quality of Tanzimat. The field of jurisdiction was even more complicated than the field of education. Secular law codes, codified religious law, non-codified religious law, secular courts, religious courts, office of *seyhülislam* and ministry of justice coexisted. What followed this complexity and ambiguity, as in the case of Reza Shah's coming to power in Iran, was the rise of another form of autocracy and absolutism, namely Abdulhamid II.

4.5.3. Abdulhamid II and Religious Establishment

Regarding the religion-state relations of the late Ottoman era, Abdulhamid II has a specific position. This position is seen as an "aberration in, if not a reaction to reform process of the early eras".[374] Modernization is considered as diminishing the power of religious institutions; yet, such an association do not exist in this period. Turkish Islamists have considered Abdulhamid II as a great Muslim Caliph who did not fit into basic characteristics of the of post- Tanzimat era. Especially, they emphasise the myth suggesting that sultan Abdulhamid had protected Palestine from the Jews quite frequently. In this regard, the book "Ulu Hakan Abdulhamit Han" written by famous Turkish Islamist Necip Fazil Kısakürek is important. [375] A very good reflection of their keen interest is shown in their attitude on religious persona of the sultan. Any reference against this persona is highly criticised. Tarihin Arka Odası – a popular history show screened on Turkish TV- can be given as an example to this observation. In the programme, remarks about sultan Abdulhamid II which indicate that he was a drinker have aroused great indignation among Turkish Islamists.[376]

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[373]Sami Zubaida, *Law and Power*, 134.

[374] Meliha Benli Altunışık and Özlem Tür. (2005) *Turkey Challenges of Continuity and Change*, London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 6.

[375] Necip Fazil wrote a drama about II Abdulhamid. This anti-Semitic, drama begins with a discussion between the jewish representatives and Sultan about the issue of Palestine. Sultan rejected Jew's demands. In the last part we see that Sultan was dethroned by the same Jews. Necip Fazil Kisakurek, (1965), *Ulu Hakan Abdulhamit Han*, Ankara: Buyuk Dogu Yayinlari.

[376] See Mustafa Armagan, Abdulhamit icki icer miydi? Zaman, 18 Ocak 2009.

On the other hand, it is clear that Abdulhamid II was a part of a general paradigm of modernization of Tanzimat. Some of the most important-and permanent- steps were taken during his reign. Among these were upgrading infrastructure, building railways, improving telegraph and post offices; moves on institutionalization on modernization in agriculture. In addition to these concrete steps, as a continuation of Tanzimat Period, further reform movements to modernize the educational and legal spheres were achieved in this period. During the era, number of modern first schools rose from 200 (in 1877) to 18, 938 (in 1898). At the end of the 19th century 40 000 students were studying on Secondary schools. According to Carter V. Findley, 50000 to 100000 officials were working for the state in that era. The numbers are quite impressive. For example by the 1880s for example alone had 467 officials which were far more greater than German Empire.[377] Bernard Lewis`points out that "Abdulhamid was far from being the blind, uncompromising, complete reactionary… he was willing and active moderniser" According to him "it would not be an exaggeration to say that it was in these years of the reign of Abdulhamid that the whole movement of the Tanzimat-of legal administrative, and educational reform-reached its fruition and its climax."[378] Stanford Shaw is another expert who finds roots of Abdulhamid II period in the Tanzimat era. For him, during the last era of his reign, Abdulhamid II he was afraid of assassination and dethrone and lost his early reform perspectives. Yet "even then the institutions of legislation and administration established by the Tanzimat and reinvigorated during early years of Abdulhamid continued to pour out … gradually completed the work of modernising the Ottoman system.[379] In terms of reformist perspective, the era of Abdulhamid II can be seen as a direct continuation of Tanzimat period and Abdulhamid II was the leading proponent of modernization.

Regarding the relations between state and religion, Abdulhamid II era had its own peculiarities. Some points are worth mentioning. First point to consider is the highly debated emphasis on caliphate and pan Islamism during this era. These policies- though encouraged by the sultan-to a certain extent, emerged at the last periods of Tanzimat. [380] They emerged as tools for renewal and change and of course as a tool for the struggle against west. In other words, military and political superiority of European powers made Islam and

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[377] Carter V. Findley. (1980), *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922. Princeton New Jersey.* Princeton University Press, 234.

[378] Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 179.

[379] Stanford J Shaw.& Ezel Kural Shaw. (1977), *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume 2, Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 221.

[380] *Khulasat el Burhan fi ita`at al –Sultan* (The Essence of the Proof Concerning Obedience to Sultan) is the document, written by Seyhulislam Abdulwahhab effendi in Arabic. Mahmud II ordered it and it declared that for all Muslims obedience to the Ottoman Sultan is a religious duty. This declaration later was used by Abdulhamid II. Tufan Buzpınar. (2005), "The Question of Caliphate under the Last Ottoman Sultans," in Itzchak Weisman and Fruma Zachs (ed) *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Regeneration,* New York: I.B. Tauris, 24. Also see Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 261.

its repertoire more effective[381]. Furthermore, the number of Ottoman non-Muslim minorities gradually decreased in the period. Greek, Serbian, Rumanian and Bulgarian subjects of the Empire gradually gained their independence throughout the course of the 19th century. For instance, in this period, the percentage of Christians in the population had decreased 40 to 20 percent. As a result, Ottoman Empire became an overwhelmingly Muslim country. Having lost his confidence to the "unity of ethnic elements of the empire, in other words *ittihadi anasir,*" sultan started to develop a new ideological tool.[382] Panislamism, an ideology which claims the unity of all Muslims under one state, became a convenient tool for domestic politics. Additionally, Panislamism and caliphate was also utilized for international politics. There were quite a large Muslim population living under British colony of India, Russian dominated Central Asia and these populations. Actually, this case is an example of a very "modern" use of ideology.

Secondly, Abdulhamid II used Islamic symbolism more than its predecessors. As Berkes points out, "the most conspicuous feature of the period, when compared with that of the Tanzimat, was the prevalence of outward religiosity"[383]. For example, Abdulhamid II banned the –highly criticized -Tanzimat practise of the public display of Sultans' portraits. Inconsistent with his above mentioned fear of assassination, Abdulhamid II extensively utilised Friday Prayer Ceremonies for public approval. Moreover, he built large number of mosques all around the empire and named them after himself or his ancestors. The religious cities of Mecca and Medina were also given special attention and developed accordingly. Furthermore, as an indicator of Islamic symbolism, Abdulhamid II bought religious or considered so- subjects. More religious and Arabic courses were also added to the school curricula. So, Islamic orientation in education became an important feature of the era.[384]

Attempts of homogenization can be considered as another characteristic of this era's religion-state relations. These attempts can also be seen as a continuation of centralization attempts of Tanzimat era. Yet, Abdulhamid II period differs from Tanzimat era in regard to religious nature of centralization. As mentioned above Meclisi Meşayih and Bab-I Meşihat –dating back to II Mahmut period- were the facilitators of this centralization. These two instruments are widely used for controlling Sunni-Muslim religious structure. Moreover, throughout the period of Abdulhamid II, non- Sunni subjects of the Ottoman Empire gradually

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[381]In this regard, Nikkie Keddie makes an analogy between pan Islamism and the Nationalistic Movements. see, Nikkie Keddie. (1969), "Pan-Islamism as Proto-Nationalism,"*The Journal of Modern History*, (41)1. Kemal Karpat also agrees her in this issue. "this was in fact, a form of nationalism in Islamic garb and a transformational process of widespread scope" Kemal Karpat. (2001), *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith and Community in the late Ottoman State*, New York: Oxford University Press, 18.

[382] E. J. Zürcher. (2010), "The Importance of Being Secular: Islam in the Service of the National and Pre- National State," in Celia Kerslake et al (ed) *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century*, Oxford: Palgrave Mc Millan, 58.

[383] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 259.

[384] Selim Deringil. (1999), *The Well Protected Domains, Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1907*. London: IB. Tauris.

indoctrinated into Sunni-Hanafi understanding of Islam. Alevis-even Safiis- were encouraged to convert to Sunni-Hanefi. Accordingly, state undertook the task of planning and implementing conversions. Especially Shiite population living in Arab region was chosen as the first priority. In this regard, it must be noted that Shiite ideology was considered as a threat. Although, Iranian wars of the Selim-Ismail era had come to an end, Iran-and Shiite masses- was still considered as a major enemy. According to Selim Deringil, most important reason of this is that the Shiite threatened the potential ruling role of Ottomans. [385] In addition, the British attempted to undermine the religious influence of Abdulhamid II by supporting Shi'A religious scholars.[386] Various methods were used in order to Sunnitise the Shiite population. Among these were the following: Sending Sunni ulama from Istanbul to the region, banning the entrance of Iranian religious scholars to the region, sending bright boys from the region to study at medreses of Istanbul and then send them back to the region as religious clerics. Also, Shii religious rites, particularly those performed on the Ashura (the 10th of Muharram), were also to be forbidden as they "spread excitement among the population."[387]

Having covered the peculiarities of the era, it is important to note that the period can be seen as a preceding period for the later periods. Firstly, it was an era when the empire started to lose its non-Muslim subjects. This tendency will increase with the subsequent developments, specifically wars and migrations in the first quarter of the 20th century. Gradual transformation of Anatolian demography started with the Hamidian era. Thus, homogenisation throughout the subsequent periods and the state-religion related repercussions of this transformation can be dated back to the Hamidian period. Secondly, Abdulhamid II's emphasis on pan Islamism continued in the following CUP period. Despite the rise of nationalism within the Ottoman territory, CUP emphasized pan Islamic themes to a great extent. These themes continued to operate even in the republican era, as a bond between the Kurdish and Turkish ethnicities. Thirdly, there are great similarities between Abdulhamid II and the following eras in terms of the above mentioned bureaucratic tradition. Both state bureaucracy and state control of the population intensified during this era and this intensification continued in the following periods. According to Kemal Karpat especially in terms of educational policies, CUP and the Republican era were the direct inheritors of the Abdulhamid II era. He suggests that the republican regime adopted the Abdulhamid II's basic policy on education which involved indoctrination through education. The era of Abdulhamid II, CUP and the republican era were similar to each other in this respect.[388] Finally, when the management of religion is concerned, Abdulhamid II can be seen as a direct predecessor of the following periods. His attempts of centralising the religious sphere, what

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[385] Selim Deringil, (1991), "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdulhamid II (1876-1909)", *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* (23)3, 348.

[386] *ibid.,* 349.

[387] *ibid.,* 346-350.

[388] Karpat, *Historical Continuity and Identity,* 50.

Zürcher calls "bureaucratising Islam" and his use of religion for state's goals was followed by his precursors.[389] In both these terms, his era anticipates the succeeding patterns.

4.6 Summary of the Major Developments of the Era

This part of the thesis covers roughly six hundred centuries. It starts with the debates surrounding the foundation of Ottoman Empire and ends when the Committee of Union of Progress took power. Throughout the chapter, the evolution of both state and religion structure is analysed by focusing on ideological, international and institutional levels. During the historical trajectory, it is claimed that there is more a continuity than a discontinuity in regard to religion state relations. This section will summarise the manifestations of this evolution.

4.6.1 Ideological Developments of the Era

Ideological developments of the era can be divided into two historical periods. First one is the pre-modern period. It consists the time period starting from the foundation of the Ottoman Empire and concluding the modern era which is marked by Tanzimat. Most important characteristic of the period can be considered as the evolution of a religious doctrine. Similar to its Iranian counterpart, this evolution was closely associated with the centralisation of the state in Turkey as well. As discussed throughout the chapter, this is largely the consequence of the centralization of the religious authority under the name of Seyhulislamlık. This institution has played an important role in defining Ottoman religious orthodoxy. *Fatwas* of Abussuud against heterodox Shi'a, as referred to above, can be considered as an example to the attempts of drawing a clear line between what should be considered as Islam and what should not. Also in accordance with this transformation from heterodoxy to orthodoxy, a novel synthesis of religion-state relations began to emerge. Specifically, the era of Abussuud marked this synthesis. As debated above, religious doctrine and practical requirements of the state were brought together in a way which does not allow clear cut separation of religion and state. This chapter and the following chapters describe the ways in which this tradition has continued throughout the succeeding periods of the Ottoman Turkish history.

Second part of the ideological developments regarding the religion-state relations of the era covered the late Ottoman period. In 18th and 19th centuries, which are deemed as the ages of modernisation, the role and place of religion was highly debated. This chapter shows that regarding the ideological developments, late Ottoman period reveals a two sided characteristic. On the one hand, the solidification of the religious doctrine continued. Mecelle, as an attempt to codify Islamic law, can be considered as an instance to this solidification. Moreover, Abdulhamid II's reign was marked by outward religiosity. The continuing emphasis on caliphate and pan-Islamism also yielded the power and prestige of Islamic symbols. On the other hand, as a result of modernization, ulama's ideological authority started to diminish gradually. Ulama

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[389] Zürcher, "The Importance of Being Secular," 64.

started to lose their ideological hegemony as a result of reforms in education and judiciary. Also, new secular ideologies, such as positivism, began to spread throughout the Ottoman Empire. These developments led to an ideological fragmentation within the ulama. A part of the ulama supported reform attempts whereas another part strongly opposed them. The reign of Abdulhamid II also intensified this fragmentation.

4.6.2 International Developments of the Era

International developments of classical and late Ottoman eras had deep impacts on religion state relations. As mentioned above, Seyhulislamlik, as the main institution representing the state of religion state relations during the Ottoman age, emerged as a result of the international requirements. The wars that took place with other Muslim states increased the need for religious legitimation. This resulted in a need for a central religious body to legitimise Ottoman wars with its enemies. In addition to this, decentralisation of the authority as a result of Timurid invasion and specifically rebellions in the name of Islam, such as Seyh Bedreddin, revealed the importance of coping with alternative- national or international- religious authorities. Hence, these international processes have resulted in centralisation and institutionalisation of Ottoman religious sphere.

Another important international development of the classical age was Ottoman-Safavid Wars. These wars had affected directly both Iranian and Turkish religious structures. As discussed above, both sides of the conflict built their sectarian identities accordingly. In other words, this conflict enabled Shah Ismail to spread Shi'a sect in Iranian territory. On the other hand, as a result of this rivalry Selim I and his successors managed to establish a more institutionalised Sunnism in Anatolia.

In order to extract the international influences of the late Ottoman period clearly, one should look at the reform attempts. This era was marked by reform attempts aimed at modernisation and westernisation. International developments of the era, especially, the defeats against Russia, France and even Mehmet Ali Pasha of Egypt showed the rulers of the Ottoman Empire that without imposition of European models it was hard to exist. So, the original motive for these reforms was undoubtedly to build an efficient and modern western style army. However, as mentioned above, this process soon spreaded beyond the realm of military. The attempts of reform on judiciary and educational spheres, which was traditionally left to religious establishment once, created a new dichotomy between ulama and secular bureaucracy. It also generated a fragmentation between the reformist and the conservative factions of ulama. Hence as discussed throughout the chapter, these reform attempts emerging from the international processes, created a new dynamic to religion state relations of the era.

Another factor that influenced religion state relations of the late Ottoman era was ethnic nationalism. The emergence of ethnic nationalism as an ideology in Ottoman territory was strongly linked to the international developments of the period. Especially during the 19th century, this often called as 'the age of nationalism', Ottoman state, as well as the other European states, influenced by the nationalistic ideology. With the

proliferation of ethnic nationalism, Ottoman *millet* system was gradually diminished. Greek, Serbian and Bulgarian subjects of the empire gained their independence. In this period, Ottoman religious demographics had transformed dramatically and the empire became overwhelmingly Muslim. In this period, Abdulhamid II developed new ideological tools in order to keep Muslim subjects of the empire away from the ideological challenges brought by nationalism. In other words, reinvention of the caliphate and Panislamism were used to prevent –specifically- Arabs and Kurds to carry out a struggle for independence against the Ottoman state. As debated above, these tools were also utilised for international politics. Especially, Muslim population living in Russian dominated Central Asia and the British colony of India were addressed. Next chapter shows that these themes, albeit with different emphasises, continued to operate in succeeding periods.

4.6.3 Institutional Developments of the Era

As debated above, this era is the main period when institutionalisation of both state and religious establishments took place. The quintessential example of this institutionalisation is *seyhulislamlık*. As mentioned in the ideological developments parts, *seyhulislamlık* is important in the sense that it defines and solidifies main tenets of ideology. Yet, it carried out bureaucratic and administrative duties which were also important. Throughout the classical ages, in accordance with the centralisation of the state, these duties gradually developed. The evolution of the *seyhulislamlik* from a small scale and relatively powerless institution to a centre of power above other religious institutions is an important characteristic of the classical era.

During the late Ottoman period, this tradition continued, albeit with nuances. As discussed throughout the chapter, this era is marked by the modernisation and reorganisation of the state structure. The chapter discussed that, against the well-known portrayal of ulama as a reactionary force against this reorganisation attempts, a considerable faction of ulama somehow supported these reforms. In other words, they continued to legitimise state actions. In addition, these reform movements also caused the centralisation of the religious sphere. Through two institutions, that is Bab-i Mesihat and Meclis-i Mesayih, Ottoman state continued to exert its influence over religious sphere. The reign of Abdulhamid II was also significant in terms of religion state relations. Although the era was marked by the dominance of Islamic symbolism and use of Panislamism, which are considered as political acts rather than religious acts, on the institutional level it is not different from Ottoman religion state tradition. In this sense, Abdulhamid II's attempts of centralising religious sphere, bureaucratizing Islam and his use of religion for state's goals was followed by his successors. In both these terms, Ottoman religion-state tradition anticipates the succeeding patterns.

CHAPTER 5

RELIGION AND STATE IN TURKEY: MODERN PERIOD

5.1 Introduction

The question of where to put a dividing line to the Turkish history has always been a matter of debate for Turkish historians. When it comes to the religion-state relations, which is the subject matter of this dissertation, the debate further intensifies. A great amount of scholars working on Turkish History saw the period starting from 1923 as a dividing line between the old and the new Turkey. This old and new dichotomy implies religious and secular adjectives respectively. According to the supporters of this line of thought, with the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923, a new era began in the history of Anatolia. This new era marked a secular and modern-nation state whereas the preceding eras were marked by a reactionary and Islamist state structure. In fact, even a brief look at the names of the articles and books written during the period shows us that this line of thought was dominant. "The Passing of Islam in Turkey", "Allah Dethroned", "Is Turkey a Mohammedan Country?" were all written about the secularization reforms of Turkey during the republican era.[390] Of course, the republic and its secularization attempts brought about fundamental changes to Turkish society. All attempts, from putting *Laiklik* to the constitution to the various reform attempts to reorganize religious sphere put their marks to the era. In this regard, republican era is quite specific. Yet, one also must bear in mind that no transformation can occur without a historical legacy. Putting aside the recurrent themes in religious state relations, that this dissertation discusses, this fact remains. Neither modernization nor secularization of the public sphere started with the republic. As discussed in the previous chapters, Tanzimat and later Abdulhamid II periods were crucial in terms of their modernization policies. Furthermore, nation state and parliamentary politics can be dated back to 1908, when Committee of Union and Progress took power. Debates over positivism, modernism and westernization which are important in terms of the relations between state and religion are the legacies of

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[390] Lilo Linke. (1937), *Allah Dethroned: A Journey through Modern Turkey* New York: Alfred A Knopf; Capt. C. D. Brunton. (1930), "The Passing of Islam in Turkey," *English Review (*50); Pierre Crabites. (1930), "Is Turkey a Mohammedan Country?" *Moslem World* (20).

this period. Hence it can be claimed that there is a certain political and ideological continuity between the CUP rule and the republican era.[391]

This chapter addresses the religion-state relations during the modern period. Starting with the foundation of the Committee of Union and Progress, it analyses the intellectual debates, most importantly positivism debate, and scrutinizes positions of ruling elites of CUP in this context. Then, it depicts the ulama -CUP relations by focusing on the conservative and reformist factions among them. Next, it analyses the religion state relations during the War of Liberation. It focuses on the dual power structure of the era and explains the ways in which religion is used by both sides as a source of legitimacy. In the second part, this chapter analyses the republican era and the transformations it brought in legal-institutional, symbolic-ideological and economic spheres. In the legal sphere, the focus is on the abolition of the caliphate and the Directorate of the Religious Affairs. In the symbolic ideological sphere, the transformation is analyzed with respect to the relations with religion. In the economic sphere, the ways in which ulama incorporated into the state apparatus is discussed. Finally, the theme delineates the recurrent themes of religion state relations during the republican era.

5.2 Ideologies vs Religion: CUP as Opposition

The Intellectual legacy of Committee of Union and Progress has been frequently discussed in relation to a distinct question, popularized by Tarık Zafer Tunaya: How can this state be saved (Bu devlet nasıl kurtarılır)? However, one might very well argue that this attempt is oversimplification of the issue, since CUP, which puts its mark to the late 19th century and early 20th century, was at the heart of various intellectual debates. To be more precise, ideological debates of the era in the world such as constitutionalism, westernization, modernism and positivism were at the agenda of the organization. Each of these debates is related to the relations between state and religion in varying degrees. Yet, the debate on positivism can be seen as the most related one. Positivism rejected metaphysical and theological thinking; thus, in a way, it proposes an anti-religious way of governance. In this respect, positivist tendencies of CUP are highly emphasized in the related literature. Scholars writing about CUP, particularly Şükrü Hanioğlu, tends to portray CUP's and its leader's ideology as positivists.[392] According to this line of thought, positivism, biological materialism and social Darwinism are the grounding ideologies of the CUP leaders. Both in the

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[391] Both Feroz Ahmad and Erik J. Zürcher see the period of CUP as turning points for Turkish History, Ahmad wrote "the twentieth century opened for Turkey on 23 July 1908" Ahmad, Feroz. (1993), *The Making of Modern Turkey,* London and New York: Routledge, 31. Zürcher also named the second part of his book as "The Young Turk Era in Turkish History (1908-1950)", E.J. Zürcher. (1994), *Turkey- A Modern History*. London, New York: I. B. Tauris.

[392] Just to mention a few examples see. M. Şükrü Hanioglu. (1985), *Bir Siyasal Orgut olarak Osmanli Ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jön Türklük,* Istanbul: İletişim Yayinlari; M. Şükrü Hanioglu. (2005), "Blueprints for a Future Society Late Ottoman Materialists on Science, Religion and Art," in Elizabeth Özdalga (ed) in *Late Ottoman Society The Intellectual Legacy.* London: Routledge Curzon; M. Şükrü Hanioglu. (2013), "Kemalizmin Tarihi Kokenleri," in *Turkiye'de Demokrasi Islam ve Laiklik* Ahmet T. Kuru Alfred Stepan (ed) İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari; Also see Ahmet T. Kuru. (2009), *Secularism and State Policies toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

early periods and after, these ideologies became the road maps that determined the deeds of CUP leaders. Hanioğlu defines positivism as follows: "Mid-nineteenth century materialism ... placing science at the core of new and rational civilization, usually entailed rejection of all competing truths both philosophical and religious." Accordingly CUP's relationship with religion was under the impact of this paradigm. Furthermore, Hanioğlu states that the organization was under the impact of 'cult of science'. Its leaders were severely anti-religious. This anti-religiosity stemmed from the idea that religion -most importantly organized religion- is the archenemy of the social progress.[393] The arguments of Hanioğlu and of those who equated the CUP's ideology with positivism are plausible to a certain extent. As I have discussed above, particularly after Tanzimat, the emphasis on science gradually increased. In this sense, the era of Abdulhamid II can also be considered as science dominated. CUP was not an exception to this trend. As a matter of fact, considering that mostly they lived in exile in Europe, CUP's founding fathers and those who followed their lead, emphasized popular lines of thoughts of the era. Above all, the very name of the organization can be seen as a definition of positivism. The founding father of the organization Ahmet Riza (1859-1930) is a great fan of August Comte to the extent that he wanted to name the organization from the famous slogan of him which is *ordre et progrès* (Intizam ve Terakki).[394] Early journal of the organization *Mesveret* and the periodicals related to the organization such as *Serveti Funun* (1891-1942) *Ulum Iktisadiye ve Ictimaiye* (1908 1910) pioneered introducing positivist line of thinking to the Ottoman readers. [395] In these periodicals, works of both Comte and other positivist thinkers were translated and related debates were held. Ahmet Rıza, writing for *Mesveret* journal, went further than just translations and debates. He used the Positivist calendar which was invented by Comte himself-and considered as a symbol of positivism- in *Mesveret* journal.[396] One can find traces of positivist impact not only in the content of the journal but also in deeds and connections of its writers. As an instance, at the celebration of 26th issue and 20th year of Ottoman Constitution, the writers organized a meeting at Café De Voltaire in Paris, to which famous positivists of the era such as Pierre Lafitte and Ernest Delbet attented. In the same meeting, Ahmet Rıza's insistence on not wearing fez was considered as a reflection of his hostility to Islam and to the associated objects.[397] There are other signs that support Hanioğlu's argument about the relation between positivism and CUP. For instance, the founding fathers and ideologues of the Committee showed many instances of positivist line of thought in their writings. Especially, Ahmet Rıza and Dr. Abdullah Cevdet pioneered in

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[393] Hanioğlu, "Blueprints for a Future Society,"27.

[394] The members in Istanbul refused the name order and progress and changed order to union. Murtaza Korlaelci. (2009), "Positivist Dusuncenin İthali," in Mehmet Ö. ALKAN (ed), *Tanzimat ve Meşrutiyetin Birikimi,* İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 215.

[395] For a detailed discussion on the philosophical debates on these journals see. Fatih Tastan, Philosophical Movements in Ottoman Intellectual Life at the Beginning of the 20th Century and Their Impact on Young Turk`s Thought. Unpublished PhD Thesis 2013 METU.

[396] Nader Sohrabi, (2011), *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 55. Mesveret journal is important in the sense that it carries a superscription that says it is the media organ of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress.

[397] Hanioglu, *Bir Siyasal Orgut olarak,* 228.

this respect. In addition to them, Besir Fuat- who is well known for his scientific suicide- is also remembered in this respect. Their positivist reputation precedes them and they are still referred as quintessential positivists. [398]

According to those who analyzed CUP in relation to its positivist tendencies, hostility against religion and centrality of science are considered as the primary connection between Unionists and their successor Kemalists. There is a striking parallelism between Dr. Serafettin Magmunı -who is famous for his abandonment of poetry because it's anti-scientific- and Mustafa Kemal whose famous motto is "our true mentor in life is science."[399] Yet, one must bear in mind that, putting aside the early instances, it is not easy to claim that CUP was a total positivist organization. First of all, the organization widely used the religious symbols. Even the inauguration oath of the organization carries a great deal of religious symbolism. The text of the oath contains phrases such as "I swear to my religion, to my conscience and to my honour, this organization which primary aim is to work on the elevation of Islam and progress and union of Ottomans."[400] It was not easy for the cadres who had been cultivated during the political climate of the reign of Abdulhamid II, to be strict positivists. Putting this fact aside, in a political arena in which Islam is the main paradigm of political discourse, it was also a primary necessity to use Islamic discourse in order to appeal to the society. [401]

While analyzing CUP, solely looking at the political tendencies of its members may lead to an oversimplification. Above all, members of the organization were not a homogeneous mass. On the one hand there were the above mentioned founding fathers, yet on the other hand there were members such as Mehmet Akif (Ersoy) and Said Nursi whose Islamic tendencies were apparent. The main link between the Islamists and other members of the organization was the opposition to Abdulhamid II. One must bear in mind that, during the reign of Abdulhamid II, Said Nursi, an important Islamist, was forcibly sent to the mental health institution, and he said his famous motto "long live hell for all tyrants" during the same period. In this sense,

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[398]Especially Besir fuat and Ahmet Rıza, even today, are still debated. For example, Ahmet Davutoglu did not hesitate to give their names in a parliamentary debate. "Benim karşı çıktığım elitizmdir. Elitizm de nedir? Açın, büyük bir literatür var. Beşir Fuat'ı okudunuz mu, Beşir Fuat'ı?Fransa'ya gidip birtakım ideolojik çalışmalardan sonra kendi toplumuna yabancılaştığı, bir anlamda-yine de saygı duyarım- büyük bir arayışın ismidir ama intihar eden Beşir Fuat'ı ya da Ahmet Rıza'yı... Döndüğü zaman Meclisi Mebusan Başkanı olmuştur. Ama halkla yaşadığı gerilimi bilirmisiniz Ahmet Rıza'nın, materyalizm ve pozitivizm çerçevesinde?" TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı 23. Dönem. 4.YasamaYılı 130.Birleşim 07.http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_g_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=20717&P5 =H&page1=68&page2=68. July-07-2010.

[399] Hanioglu, "Blueprints for a Future Society,"32. Also for a detailed discussion of ideological roots of Kemalism see Hanioglu, "Kemalizmin Tarihi Kokenleri." One can find examples of this line of thought in Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* 231.

[400] "Dinim vicdanim ve namusum uzerine yemin ederim ki esas maksadi Islamiyetin tealisine ve Osmanlilarin ittihad ve terakkisine calismaktan ibaret olan bu cemiyet" Quoted in Kazim Karabekir, *Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 1896 1909,* (2000), Istanbul: Emre Yayinlari, 518.

[401] Zana Çıtak. (2004), Nationalism and Religion: A Comparative Study of the Development of Secularism in France and Turkey, Unpublished PhD Thesis Boston University Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 149.

the relation between the ulama and the CUP is a neglected issue in the literature.[402] In fact, CUP can be considered as a coalition of various fractions of society. Many members of ulama were supporting Abdulhamid II, yet CUP also managed to get support from a considerable faction. In the literature, Ismail Kara is an exception on this issue. He, in his article "Turban and Fez: Ulama as Opposition", analyses the rapprochement of ulama and CUP. According to him although on initial consideration this rapprochement seems odd, one must take into consideration of the political agenda of the era as well as ulama*'s* heterogeneous body, in order to understand this rapprochement. It was a reciprocal relationship. CUP wanted to take advantage of ulama's social reputation and political power, in turn ulama were critical of Abdulhamid II who uses them as sources of legitimation and dissatisfied with their decreased status. In this context, a significant faction of ulama showed their opposition to the sultan and did not hesitate to reproach CUP.[403]

Indeed, the rapprochement of ulama can be seen an indicator of a transformation process within the CUP. In this era, a new group who were disappointed with the positivist emphasizes of members such as Ahmet Rıza, started to come out. This transformation also paved way to a faction of ulama to reproach to CUP. This faction showed their discontent with Abdulhamid II by issuing pamphlets which criticized the sultan and emphasized the importance of participation to CUP. One of the most famous of these pamphlets was issued by Hoca Hayret Efendi. Hoca Hayret Efendi directly addressed sultan and questioned his religious legitimacy. He commented on the well-known hadith which claims that it is a religious duty for Muslims to obey their leaders. Hoca Hayret Efendi claimed that these leaders mentioned in the hadith (Ulu'l Emr) were not sultans or rulers of any sort but they were the members of ulama.[404] From a similar vein, Mehmet Kadri Nasih (1855-1918), another member of ulama, addressed his colleagues as such:

> O turbaned gentlemen, who help cruel people and speak untruthfully! ... Let us eliminate lies and hypocrisy let us admit the truth. ... if you are incapable of understanding by yourselves the seeds of depravity that the scoundrels, protected and favoured by Abdulhamit with the express purpose

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[402] The History of Turkish modernisation most usually analysed by focusing on modernist secular classes. In this sense religious classes are neglected. A typical instance of this neglect can be found on Enver Ziya Karal's Ottoman History. Throughout this 592 pages book ulama was mentioned in only two pages. In order to exemplify this point of view I would like to quote it in its original language. Karal while analysing 1908 , argues that "Ulama sınıfından cahil ve tutucu hocalar, şeyhler dervişler ve daha bu gibi havadan sudan bilgilerle hayatını düzene sokanlarda Meşruiyet'I içten beğenmemekte idiler. Kendileri gibi olanların önceki yenilik hareketlerine karşı göstermiş oldukları tepkiyi gösteriyorlardı."Enver Ziya Karal. (1999), *Osmanlı Tarihi IX. Cilt, İkinci Meşruiyet ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 56

[403] İsmail Kara. (2005), "Turban and Fez: Ulama as Opposition," in Elizabeth Özdalga (ed) *Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy*, Oxford: Routledge. Also İsmail Kara in his book, shows the ways in which Sheikh or religious orders reapproach to the CUP. see İsmail Kara. (2008), *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde Bir Mesele olarak İslam 1*. İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları, 245-246.

[404] Aranızdaki Ulu'l Emre itaat ediniz. Alpaslan Demir Taner Arslan, Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyetine ait Imamet ve Hilafet Risalesinin Muhteva ve Sekil acisindan incelenmesi. *Gazi Turkiyat Dergisi* Vol.5. 2010. p. 5.

of undermining the morals of the population are spreading by word and deed, how can it be possible to explain this to you.[405]

In consequence, it is hard to claim that CUP was an anti-religious and totally positivist organization. Although there were members of the organization who were positivist, it also had an Islamist and reformist fraction. The fragmentation of ulama taking place in the Tanzimat era -discussed in the preceding chapter- continued in this period as well. Religion-state relations during the CUP period can not be understood without taking this fragmentation into account.

5.3 CUP in Power: Religion and State Relationship during Its Rule

Committee of Union and Progress ruled Ottoman state from 1908 to 1918. This 10 years period marked the transformation of 600 years monarchy to a modern ruling regime. Although wars and ethnic conflicts dominated a large part of the era, centralization starting from Tanzimat continued. Incorporation of the religious apparatus to Ottoman State, in other words bureaucratization of the religion, as discussed in preceding chapter, continued to grow. These attempts of centralization and institutionalization progressed especially after CUP's consolidation of its power. By the same token, reformist and conservatist factionalism of ulama became more visible. The primary dynamic of the relation between state and religion reflected itself in this divide. To a great extent, this era was characterized by reformist ulama*'s* ideological support of CUP and conservatists' opposition. In this part, I will discuss the ways in which religious sphere fragmented in itself and how this fragmentation influenced and influenced by the relations of state and religion.

By all means, most important event of the era regarding the relation between state and religion is the 31 March incident. It occurred just after the 1908 Constitutional Revolution and realized by a coalition including a faction of ulama and military. One of the most dominant themes of the incident was the application of sharia and struggle against atheism. The coalition managed to govern the capital for a few days, yet at last they were defeated. The incident resulted in dethronement of Abdulhamid II and consolidation of the power of CUP. Analyzing the incident in detail is beyond the limits of this dissertation. Suffice it to mention that, even during this incident, in which religion was the main theme, CUP managed to get a strong support from ulama. For example, Nadir Nadi witnessed that a significant group of ulama showed their support on CUP and condemn Abdulhamid II for persecution of religion during his rule[406]. During the 31 March incident, the application of *Shari'a* was demanded explicitly, yet ulama showed its support to CUP. This showcases that the organization managed to recruit supporters from a fraction ulama.

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[405] Taken from Mehmet Kadri Nasih's work El ulama veresetul enbiya (scholars are inheritors of prophet) Quoted in Kara, "Turban and Fez," 191. For the continuation of this debate see Nurullah Ardıç. (2012), *Islam and the Politics of Secularism, the Caliphate and the Middle Eastern Modernization in the Early 20th Century*, London: Routledge 100-107.

[406] Nadi, Yunus. 1327/1909. *Ihtilal ve Inkalab-i Osmani*. Istanbul: Cihan, 62-64. In Sohrabi, *Historicising*, 1415.

Another characteristic of the era was the revival of the intellectual life. As a consequence of the dissolution of Abdulhamid II era's strict censor, various social groups started publication to disseminate their ideas and find social support. In this era of public debate and openness, various issues that were previously ignored or approached only cautiously began to be debated openly. The future of Islamic institutions, constitutionalism and forms of government were the popular subjects of the era. Within this context, reformist and conservatist ulama did not hesitate to reflect their views. According to Amit Bein this factionalism reflected itself even on the debates over secondary problems. For instance, a little semantic issue sparked a debate in 1908. The debate started with an article written by Mustafa Sabri who was a well known member of ulama. According to him, using the term *Kuvve-i Teşriye* to describe the legislative power was inappropriate. Even if the parliament had legislative power, its power could not be described by a term which denotes Sharia. This could lead to a false belief among the masses that the laws issued by Parliament were comparable to divine law. Mustafa Sabri added that this term was chosen deliberately and it was an example of profanity. Moreover as ulama was the only power who has the right to interpret Sharia, use of the term could be seen as a sneaky attempt in order to undercut ulama*'s* power. According to Manastırli İsmail Hakkı, a member of ulama supported CUP, there was no need to oppose the choice of term. Because the term, Kuvve-I Teşriye, was chosen for very pragmatic reasons. For him, constitutionalism was a recent phenomenon for Ottoman masses, and a great extent of the population was to be aware of its structure. So, the aim of the choice was to teach masses new form of government, by using a well-known term.[407] This seemingly insignificant polemic is important to show the ways in which ulama factionalized among themselves.

Another popular subject of debate in this era was the caliphate. As discussed in the preceding chapter, the reign of Abdulhamid II was an era when caliphate was emphasized in a way that had never been witnessed before. Yet, CUP had its own agenda to overcast the emphasis on caliphate. There were two practical reasons for such an agenda. Firstly, they wanted to delegitimize the ancient régime of Abdulhamid II. Secondly, they wanted to prevent the sultan from being a threat to their rule. Reformist ulama, had their own reasons to oppose caliphate. According to members of reformist ulama, one of the main reasons lying behind the economic, political and military backwardness of the Ottoman Empire, was the mystical teachings of Sufi communities. To be more precise, Sufi teachings of patience and fatalism infiltrated into the Ottoman political and military establishment caused backwardness. These teachings should be given up and be replaced with hard work and action[408]. According to reformist ulama, the only way to get over this problem was to emphasize material world instead of spiritual one. Accordingly, as Nurullah Ardıç states, "The

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[407] Amit Bein. (2011), *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama, Turkish Republic Agents of Change and Guardians of Tradition*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 37-39.

[408] The well known verses of Mehmet Akif (Ersoy) is important to show this line of thought popular among Islamists. *Alınız ilmini Garb*'ın, *alınız* san'atini; Veriniz hem de mesâînize son sür'atini.

solution to this problem of the *ummah* laid according to modernist Islamists, in the reawakening of Muslims, which would start with the reformation of the caliphate into a temporal authority."[409]

CUP cadres took a similar position with that of the reformist ulama on the issue. Indeed, this coalition between CUP and reformist ulama on framing of caliphate and the nature of religious institutions is of primary importance in order to understand the dynamics of state and religion of the era. In the end, it was this coalition that managed to transform old Ottoman religious structure to a considerable extent. CUP's attempts to reorganize religious education can be given as an example to this transformation.[410] Hence, it would be apt to quote from the debates on this issue. One of the most important members of conservatist ulama İsmail Hakkı defines caliphate as follows:

> The Islamic Caliphate is both a religious authority and a temporal rule, it is the best post of government in contemporary civilization and the highest of religious posts. It is based on justice and taqwa (religious wisdom), and bounded by the laws of religion and principles of the sharia. The caliph is the authority over religious affairs and the ruler over temporal matters.[411]

On the other hand, the representative of reformists Elmalılı Hamdi (Yazır) objected the view by saying: "All in all, the seyhulislam is no more than a civil servant working for the government ... this is how Islam views the caliph: he is equal to any one of his poor and ordinary subjects; any other interpretation is absurd,"[412]

This long lasting intellectual debate can be seen as an example illustrating the factionalism among the members of ulama. It also shows CUP's relation with religion. In this respect, contrary to the positivist readings on CUP period, we can argue that the organization was successful in getting support from a considerable faction of ulama. Indeed, this support was mutual. CUP's eminent power resulted in a significant change in the power structure within the ulama. Reformist ulama, supporting CUP, were awarded by getting assigned to the administrative positions in the religious establishment. Musa Kazım, a staunch supporter of CUP, was appointed as *Seyhulislam* in 1910 and in the same year Mustafa Hayri Efendi was appointed as the minister of Islamic endowments. These were not just symbolic posts. By these assignments, reformist ulama gained the power to control administrative and financial aspects of religious establishment. As one can expect, conservative ulama harshly opposed to these new appointments. Different strategies were taken up in order to take the upper hand in this opposition. On the one hand, conservative ulama

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[409] Ardıç, "*Islam and the Politics of Secularism,*" 152.

[410] For the reorganization of religious education see Bein, *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama,* Chapter 4. "Remaking and Unmaking of Religious Education," 51-77.

[411] Quoted in Ardıç, "*Islam and the Politics of Secularism* 155.

[412] Elmalılı Hamdi (Yazır) (1878-1942) continued his reformist tendencies during the republican era. Ardıç, "*Islam and the Politics of Secularism* 169.

spreaded rumours about the infidelity of reformist ulama,[413] on the other hand they more directly targeted CUP's headquarters. In the middle of this tension, in 1911, CUP responded to conservatist by warning them to keep their distance from politics. The organization also reminded them "to be mindful that they were public officials on the government payroll and therefore should not intervene in the internal politics of the state." [414] That response to these oppositions actually shows another aspect of the CUP's relation with the religious establishment. At the end, as similar to historical trajectory of Ottoman state and future Turkish republic state administration was eager to control religious establishment.

5.4 War of Liberation and Religious Sphere

After the I World War and defeat of Ottoman armies, CUP rule crumbled. Most of its leaders were put into prison or forced to escape. Ottoman Empire lost a great deal of territory and seriously weakened. The territories which still remained in Ottoman hands were under occupation and state was hardly a functional entity. Moreover, the remaining state power was divided between İstanbul and Ankara governments. So there emerged a dual power structure. During this period of chaos and turmoil, social forces suppressed by CUP rule managed to reemerge. Within these forces, there were the conservative ulama and sultan himself reemerged as political actors. Religion also became more visible and instrumental. There are various reasons for this. First of all, war periods naturally pave way to an increase in religious feelings. Specifically, for Ottomans in World War I and the following War of Liberation, religious sources of legitimacy such as martrydom and jihad were widely used. It is interesting to note that, contrary to above discussed debates on the nature of caliphate, CUP did not hesitate to call for jihad at the beginning of war. On the other hand demographic transformations emerged as a result of war. These transformations also paved the way to a more religiously homogenized Anatolia. The vehement forced migration of Armenians during the war and the immigration of Muslim Masses bring about a homogenization in Anatolia that has never occurred before. This homogenization reached its peak with the Greek-Turkish population exchange after the war of liberation.[415] In this era, Turks and Kurds as the biggest ethnicities living in Anatolia mobilized also around Islamic themes. It must be noted that Armenian-Turkish and Greek-Turkish conflicts carry a certain amount of religious legitimacy for both sides. Indeed, religious content of the era can be understood by looking at the name of the war which is *Milli Mücadele*. The name *Milli*, here, means religiously bonded people, not

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[413] The most popular of these was about Musa Kazım being a godless freemason. Bein, *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama,* 87.

[414] *ibid.,* 88.

[415] The number of Armenians living in Anatolia during the era is a subject of debate. Zürcher notes the number of Armenians as 1,500,000 which roughly corresponds to 10% of the population living in Anatolia. On Greek-Turkish population exchange numbers are clearer. 900,000 Greeks are exchanged with 400,000 Turkish people. E. J. Zürcher, (1994) *Turkey- A Modern History.* London, New York: I. B. Tauris.

nation in the modern sense of the word.[416] Anatolia was also described as the "heartland of Islam" (Islamin harimi ismeti)[417] Moreover, primary text of the War of Liberation, National Oath (Misak-ı Milli) also centred on religious distinction. The first article of the Oath claimed that "the territories inhabited by the Muslim Majority form and indivisible whole."[418]

In this respect one can claim that Islamic solidarity and Islamic legitimacy are the prominent ideology of the War of Liberation. Both İstanbul government and Ankara Government used Islamic themes more than their predecessor CUP era. Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu in his well-known article "Parameters and Strategies of Islam State Interaction in Republican Turkey" shows the Islamic content during the War of Liberation as follows:

> During the War of National Independence (1919-1922, which preceded the founding of the republic, Islamic discourse was used as a unifying theme to rally the local Anatolian notables, religious leaders, and the peasantry. The pragmatic manner in which secular nationalists recruited Islam for legitimation is illustrated by the way in which they presented the war against occupying Western forces and the Ottoman state: as a jihad, or holy war.[419]

In order to put emphasis on this unifying theme, Ankara Government took a series of symbolic and legal actions. For example, one of the first laws passed by Ankara government was a law banning alcohol throughout the country. Although the ban resulted in a considerable decrease in alcohol related tax incomes, it was defended on the grounds that Turkey was a religious nation. [420] There were no non-Muslim members in the Parliament and around twenty per cent of it consists of ulama.[421] Mustafa Kemal himself gave religious speeches and tried to gain support from ulama. In one of his speeches, opening of Erzurum Congress he said the following:

> Finally my wish is that, May the God, who makes our wishes true, give the victory to our noble nation – who is the protector of this holy land and the holy religion of Islam and the dynasty and the great caliphate, until the day of judgment. May the God, gives us victory for the honor of beloved prophet Muhammed.[422]

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[416] Kavmiyet was the word meaning nationality in modern sense. A member of Parliament Hamdullah Suphi (Tanrıöver) said that "I am a man against Kavmiyet but not Milliyet" Mustafa Baydar, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver ve anıları (İstanbul: 1968) quoted Çetinsaya, Gökhan. (1999), "Rethinking Nationalism and Islam Some Preliminary Notes on the Roots of Turkish Islamist Synthesis in Modern Turkish Political Thought" *The Muslim World* (89) 3, 361-362.

[417] Zürcher,"The Importance of Being Secular," 58.

[418] Nurullah Ardic, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism,* 249.

[419] Ümit Cizre Sakallıoğlu. (1996), "Parameters and Strategies of Islam State Interaction in Republican Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (28) 2.

[420] For a detailed study on the ban, see Onur Karahanoğulları. (2008), *Birinci Meclisin İçki Yasağı Men-i Müskirat Kanunu*, Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.

[421] Quoted in Birol Başkan, Unpublished PhD. P. *op cit.,* p. 72.

[422] En son olarak niyazim sudur ki, cenabi vahibulamal hazretleri habibib ekremi hurmetine bu mubarek vatanin sahip ve mudafii ve diyaneti celile i ahmediyenin ila yevmul kiyam harisi esdaki olan millet necibemizi ve makam saltanat

This was not the only instance that Mustafa Kemal emphasized on religion. He did not hesitate to gives religious sermons in the mosques. In a mosque in Balikesir, he delivered a Friday sermon in which he praised Islam as a progressive religion[423]. In addition to his own attempts, his religious supporters such as Mehmet Akif (Ersoy) and Eşref Edip (Fergan) also delivered speeches to the masses full of religious themes. Also Celal (Bayar) was propagating in Western Anatolia with the nickname of Galip Hodja.[424]

As mentioned above, during the War of Liberation there was a dual power structure in which two powers, Ankara government with the Parliament and Istanbul government with the Sultan coexisted with each other and competed for legitimacy. This competition had also religious contents. In this context, specifically, during Damat Ferit Cabinet was in power, Istanbul government opposed Ankara government by using a hard religious rhetoric. Their opposition went to such extent to claim them as religiously illegitimate. The infamous *fatwa* issued by Durrizade Abdullah Efendi –*Seyhulislam* of the era-is the most well known example of this. Seyhulislam in his *fatwa* declared that Ankara Government's leadership is nothing but bandits and no faithful Muslim should support them, also it is a religious duty to fight them. Ankara government response was to get counter-fatwas from its supporter ulama. The Mufti of Ankara –the future head of Presidency of Religious Affairs- Rıfat (Borekci) issued a fatwa declaring that because Istanbul is occupied by foreign powers, fatwas issued by Seyhulislam is not valid. 153 members of ulama also supported the Mufti of Ankara in this respect. [425] In this war of discourses the Ankara Government also managed to get support from the ulama of Bursa which is an important center of religious establishment. They also declared parallel views. According to this fatwa:

> (It was) the duty of all Muslims to help rescue the caliph from captivity in Istanbul by the enemies of Islam, who had killed Muslim soldiers and innocent Muslims in Christian courts according to Christian law, and who were striving to destroy Islam by invading different parts of the country and massacring their inhabitants any fatwas issued by Muslims who were captives of Christians, such as that of the Seyhulislam, did not have to be obeyed.[426]

Mustafa Kemal and the Ankara Government not only get religious support from Sunni ulama, they also managed to get the support of religious orders. These orders specifically, Naqshbandi, Bektashi and Mawlawi orders supported the Ankara Government. Members of these orders also took part in Parliament.

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ve hilafeti kubrayi masum ve mukaddesatimizi dusunmekle mukellef olan heyetimizi muvaffak buyursun.Translation is mine. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, Nutuk, p. 933.

[423] According to Hanioğlu it was the only Friday sermon ever delivered by a Turkish head of the state. Şükrü Hanioğlu, *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 145.

[424] Ali Sarikoyuncu. (2007), *Milli Mucadelede Din Adamları*, Ankara: Diyanet İsleri Baskanligi Yayinlari, 27-28.

[425] Ardıç claims that the reason of looking for the support of additional 153 members of ulama probably stems from the aim to reinforce the prestige of Rıfat Borekci. Ardıç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism*, 251. Rıfat (Borekci) received death sentence because of his fatwa. He became one of the rare membres of ulama who received death sentence. See Ali Sarikoyuncu, *Milli Mucadelede Din Adamları*, 171.

[426] Ardic, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism*, 251.

[427] These orders, particularly Bektashi and Mawlawi orders, not only gave religious legitimacy to the Ankara Government but also gave material and manpower support during the war.[428]

5.5 The Republic of Turkey

The War of Liberation ended with the Armistice of Mudanya in 11 October 1922. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey and its representative the Ankara Government signed the Armistice with English, French, Italian and Greek States. The signing of a Permanent Peace Treaty was postponed. As a result of this, there emerged a tension between the Ankara Government and the Istanbul Government. They both wanted to protect their rights and interests for future treaty. The Grand National Assembly made the move. On November 1, 1922, it abolished the Ottoman Sultanate and established itself as the sole representative of Turkish interests. Although, from 1908 there was a parliament in Ottoman soil, this marked a new era in the history of Anatolia. This transformation reflected not only a limited political change but also new phase in religion state relations which is the subject this thesis analyses.

5.5.1 Religion State Relations during the Early Republican Period

Early republican period, to a great extent, resembles to its predecessor Ottoman State. Most important of these resemblances are centralization in state structure and control in religion. In this respect new republic can be considered as state control of religion.[429] For example Erik Zürcher states on early republic: "Their secularism meant not so much the separation of church and state as the subjugation and integration of religion into the state bureaucracy."[430] One can find many instances of this during the 1920s and 1930s. Directorate of Religious Affairs, one of the largest and best financed government departments is the main body designed to control religious sphere. Members of ulama, in this context, became "paid employees of state". State also controls religious education and decide, to a great extent, who is member of ulama and who is not. The ways in which the state controlled religious sphere will be discussed below, including the creation of an "official Islam". What I will do in this part is to explore the historical trajectory of the relations between state and religion during the early republican era. In so doing I will investigate three domains where these relations established or consolidated. In accordance with the Iranian chapters, I have divided these domains as Legal-Institutional, Symbolic-Ideological and Economic.

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[427] According to Lewis, some orders continued to support Istanbul government. Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* 405.

[428] Specifically on the role of Bektashi religious orders, see Hülya Küçük, (2002), *The Role of Bektashi's in Turkey's National Struggle*, Leiden: Brill. A semi academic book which is specifically popular among Islamists see. Kadir Mısıroğlu, *Kurtuluş savaşında Sarıklı Mücahitler*, (1969), İstanbul: Sebil Yayınları.

[429] For examples of the control paradigm. See Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey;* Binnaz Toprak, (*1981), Islam and Political Development in Turkey,* Leiden:Brill; Orhan Özgüç, (2013), "The Paradox of Turkish Secularism," *Turkish Journal of Politics,* (4)1; Erik J. Zürcher, (1994), *Turkey a Modern History,* New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd.

[430] Zürcher, *Turkey a Modern History*, 233.

5.5.2 Legal-Institutional Domain

I explored Legal-Institutional Domain in Iran mainly under two categories. First one is legal sphere second one is educational sphere. Yet, I will investigate Turkish experience by adding two additional sub-categories. The abolishment of Caliphate which marks an important transformation in religious establishment and the foundation of Directorate of Religious Affairs which can be seen as one of the most important point of contrast between Turkish and Iranian experiences.

5.5.2.1 Abolition of Caliphate and the Directorate of Religious Affairs

New republic on the one hand attempted to divide religious sphere and the state, on the other hand continue to entail religious motives. The earliest and prominent example of these religious motives emerged just after the foundation of Republic. The revision of *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye*[431] in 29 October 1923 declared the founding of Turkish Republic. Second article of it stated openly that "The religion of Turkish Republic is the religion of Islam. This open statement also repeated in 1924 Constitution.[432] This was the first contradiction against the divide of religious sphere and state. In addition, at the walls of Grand National Assembly, which is the sole representative of legal sphere, there is a Quranic verse "Manage your affairs in consultation with each other."[433] Moreover, Parliamentary oath was highly religious and members of the Parliament took office by giving this oath.[434]

On the other hand, simultaneously, prominent religious institutions of the Ottoman State transformed and abolished. On 3 March 1924, a series of transformative laws were signed by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The Law of Union of Education (Tevhid-I Tedrisat Kanunu) which abolished *medreses* and the law on the establishement of the Directorate of Religious Affairs are both equally important in terms of the relations between state and religion. With these laws institutional and, to some extent mental structure of the old regime, began to be transformed radically, and "basic institutions and grounds of the new nation state has been established".[435] They will be discussed below, yet starting with the most prominent one, which is the abolishment of caliphate, would be apt.

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[431] Fundamental Law of Turkey from 1921 to 1924.

[432] Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin dini, dini islamdır. There was only one proposal which draws attention to this contradiction prepared by Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu) and Falih Rıfkı (Atay). For the debates during the parliament about the subject see Murat Akan, (2005), The Politics of Secularization in Turkey and France beyond Orientalism and Occidentalism, Unpublished PhD Thesis submitted to Columbia University.

[433] Emrehum Şura Beynehum.

[434] Mete Tunçay, (2005), *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde Tek Parti Yönetimini Kurulması, 1923-1931*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfi Yurt Yayınları.

[435] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,*

Caliphate, as illustrated in preceding chapter, was captured by the Ottomans during the early 16th century, yet in 19th century it was reinvented. In this context, specifically, Abdulhamid II attempted to use the caliphate for political and military motives. Even though, these attempts did not lead to a full fledged victory, yet to some extent they became successful. Turkish War of Liberation was also an example of this. Specifically, Egyptian and Indian Muslims, supported Turkish war of Liberation financially. Certainly Turkey's being the center of caliphate played its role in this support. The leading cadres of the War of Liberation were also aware of this fact. They reiterated frequently that they fought the war on behalf of the caliphate and the aim of it was to protect caliphate.

Putting these aside, the new Republic has its own rationales to abolish this institution. These rationales range from pragmatic reasons to ideological ones. As a matter of fact, Mustafa Kemal himself in his famous Speech emphasized pragmatic reasons. According to him, material sources of new Turkish Republic are not sufficient to govern whole Muslim World. In other words, Turkey does not have enough power to carry out the responsibilities, coming with the caliphate. [436]

Zana Çıtak counts three other rationales lying behind the abolishment of Caliphate. Firstly caliphate was identified with the Ottoman sultanate. It historically meant government. There was already a government in Turkish Republic; there is no need of caliphate. Caliphate without governing powers was nothing but absurd. Secondly, Caliphate is practically useless. It brought no good to Ottoman state. Muslim *ummah* did not recognize the caliphate and even if they recognize it nationalism became a more useful ideological tool for, that is to say the caliphate did not prevent Muslims to turn back to Ottomans. Thirdly, it is unescapable that the existence of caliphate will lead to a power struggle. This power struggle between the government and the caliphate is against the nature of Nation-state. As Çıtak asserts, this is the real rationale that brings the abolishment of caliphate. [437] In accordance with this fact, those who oppose the one party rule of the new republic directly went near the caliphate tried to get support from him. "Kemal thus wanted to repress a potential political challenge to his rule by destroying a "spiritual" institution that he saw as a political locus of opposition." [438]

Mete Tunçay added two extra reasons for the abolishment of caliphate. First, non Sunni elements of Anatolia, specifically Alevis, regarded caliphate as a tool of suppression. Hence, new republic tried to gain

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[436] "Sultası umum dünya müslümanlarına şamil olmak lazım gelince, bütün mevcudiyetini ve menabi-I kuvvetini halifeninn emir nehyine hasr etmekle Türkiye halkının omuzlarına tahmil edilecek yükün ne kadar ağır olacağını insaf edip düşünmek lazım gelmez miydi." … Millete şunu da ihtar ettim ki, kendimizi cihanın hakimi zannetmek gafleti artık devam etmemelidir. Hakiki mevkimizi dünyanın vaz,iyetini tanımamaktaki gafletle, gafillere uymakla milletimizi sürüklediğimiz felaketler yetişir!" *Nutuk,* Ankara, 432-33.

[437] Çıtak, "Nationalism and Religion," 236.

[438] See Ardıç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism*, 307. Ardıç argues that this political conflict continued. According to him, the ban of Progressive Republican Party in 1925 for reconstituting the caliphate and Ataturk's emphasis on those who wanted to reconstitute caliphate in his famous Nutuk in 1927 are the indicators of this ongoing conflict.

support of them by abolishing the institution. Secondly, and more importantly, Mustafa Kemal wanted to show his power to the masses and nothing was a more suitable sign of power than abolishing this hundred years of institution. [439]

Yet one should bear in the mind that the abolishment of caliphate was not a move against religion. At least it was not presented as such. It was defended within the territory of religious argumentation. It is claimed that true Islam contradicts with the caliphate as an institution. Its abolishment is a move to return true Islamic way of governance. [440] In this context, the minister of Justice Seyid Bey, who is also a member of ulama, openly claimed that religion contradicts with caliphate. According to him "Islam is a thoroughly democratic religion and it does not accept the privilege of anyone" he went forward in his argumentation and made an Islamic defense of religion by saying: "The nation cannot be represented … This is what Kuran-i Kerim insist on. It says that Muslims manage their own affairs among themselves with consultation. [441]

These religious argumentations are important to show that why the New Republic is not anti-religious but trying to control the religious sphere. The Directorate of the Religious Affairs can also be analyzed within this context. By using the Directorate, the New Republic utilized a new mechanism for controlling religion and by using this mechanism it found the chance to reinterpret religion and manage it. [442] The words of Ahmet Hamdi (Başar) so aptly describe this situation.

> We should not evict religion from public life; on the contrary, we should perpetuate it by giving it into the hands of revolution. We can not attain our goals by destroying mosques and building People's Houses. We should make our voice heard by the people who gathered in the mosques. We should transform mosques in a way that they work as modern People's Houses. [443]

Hence one can understand that the republic wanted to utilize religion in order to modernize society.

The Directorate of Religious Affairs was established by the Act dated 3 March 1924. The structure of the Directorate according to the Act is as follows. According to the first article of the Act, Directorate of

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[439] Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin,* 72.

[440] Bein, *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama,* 156.

[441] Quoted in Akan, "The Politics of Secularization," 162.

"Millet hiçbir zata vekalet vermez. Millet diyor ki, hayir kendi işimi ben kendim göreceğim… Kuranı Kerim de bunun cevazına sarahat derecesinde işaret ediyor. (Müslümanların işi kendi aralarında meşveretle görürler) diyor."

[442] According to Zürcher the directorate in many ways can be considered as the direct continuation of Ottoman tradition to control religious sphere. He points out that " the republic actually increased the state's hold over religion, as the directorate was given sole responsibility of religious guidance " and imams and muftis were were transformed into civil servants." These debates will be elucidated in the last chapter. Zürcher. "The Importance of Being Secular," 55-68.

[443] "Bizde dini cemiyetin dışına atmak değil, bilakis inkilabın emrine vererek yaşatmak lazımdır. Camileri yıkıp terkedip onların yerine halkevleri yapmak suretiyle hedefimize varamayız. Her zaman camide toplan halka oradan sesimizi duyurmak oraları modern halkevleri haline koymak." İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde,* 52.

Religious Affairs authorized to oversee "all cases and concerns of the Exalted Islamic Faith which relate to beliefs and rituals of worship. According to article three, "Its head was to be appointed by President on the recommendation of the Prime Minister." According to article four, "the office of the Directorate was attached to the Prime Minister. According to the article five, its responsibilities included the "administration of all mosques … as well as the appointments and dismissal of all imams, hatibs, vaizs, seyhs, muezzins, kayyims and all other employees of a religious character. [444]

As can be seen from the Act, administrative functions of the institution are wide. Yet, on the contrary of this wide range of administrative functions, the state has limited its ability to emerge as an autonomous source of power. From the beginning of its foundation, the state undertook various measures to prevent the Directorate from gaining political power. First of all, it was configured accordingly: not as a political body but an administrative one. In other words, not placing the institution in the hands of a ministry which is a political institution, "ruling elite both took religion under their control and at the same time tried to break the potentially sacred significance of the Diyanet"[445]

The naming of the Directorate as Diyanet is also another indicator of limiting its ability to emerge as an autonomous political power. It is worth noting that:

> The term diyanet was carefully chosen in legislative discussions to express religious affairs in the sense of matters of personal piety over its potential alternative diniye, which could have implied the new institution's religious responsibilities in the fields of economy, society, policing and education, which are intentionally distributed to other branches of government. The choice of the narrower term diyanet negated institution's involvement in these fields and signified a new delineation of the parameters of religion as consisting solely of beliefs and ritual worship. [446]

In these respects, the Directorate aimed to deal with personal functions of religion more than its social functions. Republican elites indicated this actuality in their speeches. For example, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, in 1926, delineated state's relationship with religion as such "From the perspective of the state, religion is worthy of respect and is innocent only when it stays in the private conscience".[447] General principle of the republic was to take religious matters, especially when they are related with the politics, to its own hands. In other words, religious affairs were controlled by different branches of the state structure to prevent emergence of an autonomous religious sphere. As an example of this, Ministry of education was responsible

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[444] Translations are quoted from Prof. Dr. Ömer Faruk Gençkaya's personal website. http://genckaya.bilkent.edu.tr/

[445] İştar Gözaydın, Gözaydın, İştar B. Religion, "Politics and the Politics of Religion in Turkey," Occasional Paper 121, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung für die Freiheit, 13. Also İştar Gözaydın, (2014), "Bourdieu ve Din," *Cogito*, (76), 399.

[446] Mona Hassan, (2011), "Women Preaching for the Secular State: Oficial Female Preachers (bayan vaizler) in Contemporary Turkey," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (43), 454.

[447] Çıtak, "Nationalism and Religion," 232.

for religious education. The management of endowments was taken from the hands of ulama and given to the Directorate General of Foundations.

Yet, in practice, the deeds of the Directorate of Religious Affairs were not limited to private sphere. It fulfills social duties. Ahmet Hamdi Akseki, an important member of ulama who also worked as the head of the directorate, describes social duties of the directorate as follows. According to him the republican elites aimed to create "good citizens" feeling themselves responsible to the state. "To promote love of homeland, the sacredness of the military and the civil service, respect for love and order and hard work for the development of Turkey," among the citizens were among the main duties of the directorate. [448] Later, with the 1982 constitution, these duties were carried to constitutional level. 136th article of the constitution defines one of the duties of the directorate as "promoting and consolidating national solidarity and unity". [449]

Many examples of utilizing the directorate for social purposes can be found in the early republican era. Mete Tunçay quoted a religious fatwa about Turkish aviation industry.

> Q: Turkish Plane society was constituted by the government and it is certain that no state can protect itself without air force. So, for creating a squadron of planes with the aim of the protection of the Turkish nation and the state, is it religiously allowed to give (money) to Turkish Plane Society?
>
> A: Yes- Rıfat (Börekçi) the Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. [450]

By the same token, the Directorate continued to follow political and social interests of the nation state both in national and international arena. [451] In June 2007, European Institute for Security Studies aptly described the Directorate as "a state run body whose members are carefully selected and vetted by the authorities and who, in good Ottoman tradition, preach a very pro-state interpretation of Islamic tenets."[452]

5.5.2.2 Judiciary Reforms

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[448] Ahmet Hamdi Akseki (1945) *Müftü ve Vaizlerin Ödevleri hakkında Gerekli açıklama (A Necessary Comment on the Duties of Muftis and Preachers)* Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı Yayınları: Ankara pp.3-22 quoted in İştar B. Gözaydın, (2008), "Diyanet and Politics," *Muslim World,*(98), 223.

[449] *ibid.,* 9.

[450] "TC Tayyare cemiyeti hükümetçe musaddak bulunmasına ve kuva-yi havaiyesi mütevafik olmayan devletlerin muhafaza-I mevcudiyet edemeyecekleri muhakkak olmasına binaen Türk Millet ve devletinin muhafazası için tayyare filosu teşkiline sarfedilmek üzere mezkür Tayyare Cemiyetine vermeleri şer'an caiz olur mu?

-ElCevap OLUR (Diyanet İşleri Reisi Rıfat) see. Tunçay, *Tek Parti Yönetiminin,* 224. For the full reference see İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesi'nde*, 136.

[451] On the international role played by the Directorate of Religious affairs see. İştar B. Gözaydın, (2010), "Religion as Soft Power in the International Relations in Turkey," http://www.psa.ac.uk/journals/pdf/5/2010/1365_1228.pdf, 2 15 April 2014; Zana Çıtak. (2010), "Between 'Turkish Islam' and 'French Islam': The Role of the Diyanet in the Conseil Francais du Culte Musulman," *Journal of Ethnic and Mıgration Studies*, (36)4.

[452] Posch, Walter (2007) Crisis in Turkey: Just another bump on the road to europe? Occasional paper published by European Union Institute for Security Studies. No. 67 quoted in Gözaydın, "Diyanet and Politics (2008), 9.

Ottoman legal sphere, in accordance with its Iranian counterpart, had only a semi-religious structure. As discussed in the previous chapters, rulers of both Ottoman and Iranian states had their right to decide on the matters affecting the state and its administration. In other words, there was system depending on the sultan' charge both in secular and religious spheres of life. It was also possible to religiously legitimize practical matters of administration. Ottoman ulama also were active in softening Islamic law when needed according to state's needs. Abussuud's famous *fatwa* against the anti-usury laws of Islam, or ulama*'s* support for legitimizing Ottoman's wars with other Muslim states are the examples which are discussed in the preceding chapter. In addition, especially, during and after the Tanzimat period, on the one hand Islamic law begins to be codified and on the other hand a jurisdiction field that is not directly rooted in sharia began to emerge. Hence one can claim that religious content of jurisdiction was already in decline when we come to the republican period. Yet civil war and penal codes are still to a great extent, exception this process. This duality continued to survive during the early republican period. As Niyazi Berkes points out before the abolishment of the caliphate, a new family law was drafted. According to this draft, following the Ottoman Millet tradition, Muslims, Christians and Jews were subject to their religious laws. The basic content of this draft consisted marriage and divorce issues. According to "the needs of time" several opinions from several Islamic law schools, such as Shafi, Hanefi and Maliki, were preferred to the Hanafi opinions, which most of the Muslim subjects of Anatolia belong. For example, in accordance with Shafi opinion, coercion was accepted as making a marriage invalid. This opinion was chosen to protect women's rights. However, it was the traditional Islamic law that dominated the draft. Polygamy, an important subject in terms of women rights, was not abolished. This draft was debated during 1923-1924, yet, it was never passed by the Parliament. Indeed, this draft was not very different from Mecelle and its only aim was to soften the strict family laws of Islam.[453]

Mustafa Kemal, declared his opinon of this draft in 1 March 1924. The following words marked the signal of a completely new era in terms of Islamic law.

> The important point to free our legal attitude, our codes and our legal organizations immediately from principles dominating our life that are incompatible with the necessities of the age… the direction to be followed in civil law and family law should be nothing but that of Western civilization. Following the road of half measures and attachment to age old beliefs is the gravest obstacle to the awakening of nations.[454]

Therefore it can be seen that the aims of the ruling elites of the new republic was not to create a new amalgamation of Islamic and Western Law. The New Republic will not hesitate to eradicate Islamic Law. This is a radical break from Ottoman past. Accordingly, related measures were taken. In March 1924, the Ministry of Justice was reorganized and the remaining sharia courts were completely abolished. In 1925, a

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[453] Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, 468-469.

[454] *ibid.,* 470.

new law school was established in Ankara, in the capital of the new Republic. Swiss civil code and Swiss Code of Obligations were also adopted with some minor alterations.[455] As a result, Polygamy was abolished. Recently, a new penal code adopted from Italian Penal code was came into effect. With these reforms, an important step to secularize private sphere was taken.[456] In addition, with the 1928 constitutional amendments, the parliamentary oath was secularized. The religious phrase *vallahi* was replaced with a non-religious one "on my honour". In 1931, the principle of *laiklik* was included to Republican Peoples Party's program and finally with the 1937 amendments it was included into the Constitution.

5.5.2.3 Educational Reforms.

The traces of the above mentioned duality, which had been Tanzimat period's legacy, can be seen on the domain of education. On the one hand, there were relatively recent non-religious schools. On the other hand, ulama dominated the religious schools. Ziya Gökalp describes this plurality as follows:

> In this country there are three layers of people, differing from each other in civilization; the common people, the men educated in medreses, the men educated in secular schools. The first still are not freed from the effects of Far Eastern civilization: the second are still living in eastern civilization: It is only the third group which has had some benefits from Western Civilization. That means that one portion of our nation is living in an ancient, another in a medieval, and a third in a modern age ... How can be a real nation without unifying this threefold education?[457]

As in the case of the legal domain, the new republic did not hesitate to end this ambiguity, and solved it in 1924 with the introduction of the Law of Unification of Education (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu). According to the Law, medreses (the total number of 479) which used to be under the control of Ministry of Religious Affairs were closed. Additionally, private schools, foreign schools and the schools governed by local governments were closed. These steps marked the beginning of the monopolization of educational sphere.

Religious education was of no exception to this monopolization. In this respect, 1924 was a clear point of separation in terms of religious education. As an immediate result of the new law, religious schools managed by the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Foundations were released from this institution's authority and were instead assigned to the Ministry of Education. In addition to that, all science and education institutes—military academies were exception—were brought under the authority of the Ministry of Education. Also,

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[455] Interestingly, although the new law was taken from Swiss code it bears more radically modern aspects. "Contrary to the Swiss Civil Code authorizing judges in the absence of laws to rule in accordance with social tradition and precedents, Turkish code however, required the judge to examine the realted 'scientific' data and procedings only, deliberately preventing judges from referring to social traditions possibly mended with Islamic elements." Tolga Köker. (2009), "The Establishment of Kemalist Secularism in Turkey," *Middle East Law and Governance* (1) 2, 17.

[456] It is interesting to note that in Europe, long after the law and its institutions were secularized and separated from the church, family issues such as marriage, divorce, contraception and abortion continued, and still continue, to be politicized in religious terms. Sami Zubaida, *Law and Power in the Islamic World*, 147.

[457] Quoted in Iren Ozgur, (2012), *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith Politics and Education*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 33.

a theology faculty was established under the supervision of Ministry of Education. Moreover, in order to educate religious personnel, 30 imam-hatip schools were established in various city centers. While doing so, the new republic not only brought schools under control but also the teachers of the old system. A considerable number of the old Ottoman ulama were assigned to the Ministry of Education and to the newly founded faculty. 16,000 students of religious studies, educated in old schools, were also transferred to new schools. [458]

The implementation of the reforms in educational sphere was similar to reforms in legal sphere in the sense that it was an evolutionary process. During the early years of the Mustafa Kemal's rule, before the declaration of Republic, there was sympathy in the Parliament towards improving the ongoing education system. Religion was considered as an important element of education. For example, the first Minister of Education, Rıza Nur supported both religion courses in all levels of education. Moreover he supported the school prayers.[459] Another indicator to the gradual character of the reforms is the decree that was passed for the improvement of the medreses in 1921. Mustafa Kemal himself approved the program and even donated money to it. Yet as it happens, similar to the above discussed family law draft of 1920; these programs were abolished and in three years republic choose to close medreses.

However, religious education was not abolished but was put under the supervision of state. According to 1924 program of education, religious classes were placed to the curriculum of all primary and secondary schools. It was limited to an hour in a week. This curriculum was applied until 1927. Its application gradually loosened and then the classes were totally taken out of the curriculum. Religious education was compulsory also for the teachers' school. Besides, according to 1926 program of national education, if needed, teachers could work as preachers. Also they could lead prayers for the morning and evening prays. [460]

The Law of Unification of Education was important in various aspects. Its impact continues even today as it still is the subject of major debates. [461] Especially, Islamic opponents of the republic usually interpreted it as a sign of the new republic's anti religious character. Yet one must bear in mind that, in the coming years, religious education has continued to operate under the state provision to a great extent.

5.5.3 Symbolic Ideological Domain

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[458] Başkan, "Religious Institutions and State Building," 24.

[459] A.S. Müftügil, "Compulsory Religion Education and Religious Minorities in Turkey," unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Amsterdam, School for Cultural Analyses, 66.

[460] It is interesting to note that although the religious education was abolished in the city centers in 1930, it continued to exist in village schools until 1939. Turgay Gündüz, Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Dönemi Din Eğitimi ve Öğretimi Kronolojisi (1923-1998) *Uludağ Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, No. 7. Vol 7. 1998.

[461] For a recent instance of these debates, see parliamentary question submitted by Altan Tan. http://www2.tbmm.gov.tr/d24/2/2-1234.pdf 07/02/2013.

The reforms of Republic were not limited to the legal sphere and education. At the same time, state led transformation attempts which can be considered as symbolic took place. The adoption of Latin alphabet, introduction of western style dress, changing the weekly holiday from Friday to Sunday can be given as examples to such symbolic transformations. All these reforms were important in the sense that their aim was to erase the visibility of traditional religious signs and to approach to western civilization. In this sense, they are significantly different from the Ottoman reform movements. Şerif Mardin conceptualizes this with the following words: "for the Turkish revolutionaries the symbolic system of society, culture seems to have had a relatively greater attraction as a target than the social structure itself. And within culture religion seems to have been singled out as the core of the system."[462] That is because they have been widely debated during the era and continues to be debated today.[463]

One of the most contestable of these symbolic reform attempts was the Hat Law of 1925. Turkish ruling elites had similar motives with their Iranian counterparts on this issue. These motives were basically as follows: Firstly, it was a necessity to -at least visually- homogenize a country which had been diverse in ethnic, religious and tribe terms. Second motive derives from the unique structure of these two countries' relationships with the west. Both Turkey and Iran managed to protect their independency against the colonial western world. Yet, both were aware of their structural fragility against it. Hence, they both aimed to be considered as the equal members of the civilized world. To reach this aim, they felt themselves obliged to accept both structural and formal aspects of western civilization. Dress was one of the most substantial elements of this civilization. Finally, directly related to the subject matter of this dissertation, the new republic aimed to break the power of ulama which they interpreted as the symbol of tradition. Mustafa Kemal himself explained the Hat Law as related to a general modernization and civilization problem. He frequently emphasized this aspect in his speeches: "the headgear problem, which does not have any actual importance, has a special value for Turkey which has decided to enter into the company of modern civilized nations."[464] However, as discussed in section on Iran, for a significant portion of Turkish society, the Hat Law was considered as a sign of infidelity due to this civilization emphasis.

First of all, wearing a hat was considered as a sign of infidelity and thus rejected because it was perceived as imitating the Christians. Moreover, similar to the motives of their Iranian counterparts, the religious masses in Turkey found it impractical since touching the ground with one's forehead was now become physically impossible. The hat turned the regular praying to a difficult task. The republican elites utilised a

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[462] Şerif Mardin. (2006), *Religion Society and Modernity in Turkey*, New York: Syracuse University Press, 196.

[463] There is huge, mostly Islamist, literature about this symbolic transformation. One can note the movie Minyeli Abdullah as the most popular one of these. Although the movie is set in the Egypt, one can easily understand that it represents Kemalist period. In the movie a member of ulama who rejected wearing hat was executed. Also Hayrettin Karaman in his autobiography "Bir Varmış Bir Yokmuş" wrote that all his childhood was marked by the stories of the Hat Law. Hayrettin Karaman, (2008), *Bir Varmış Bir Yokmuş*, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık.

[464] Yasemin Doğaner. (2009), "The Law on Headdress and Regulations on Dressing in the Turkish Modernization,*" Bilig* (51), 37.

twofold strategy. On the one hand, they got approval of the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the time. The Ministry claimed that "Religiously Islam has no special form of apparel there are no verses of the Holy Quran or words of Prophet Muhammad. It is pleasurable right for an individual to delude as s/he likes … Any Muslim citizen can wear any clothing and hat as s/he likes."[465] On the other hand, they used force whenever they considered as necessary. The implementation of the Hat Law showed that republican elites could be harsh and brutal towards those who did not care about the law. All these mass upheavals were suppressed and around 70 people was executed. [466] It was one of the most costly reform attempts of the era. In this regard, it would be apt to quote from words of Lyman Mc Callum, a contemporary of the era. "Kemal Pasha's aide told some of us this year that this was the most difficult and most fundamental of all Kemal's reforms. After the Turk's had crossed that ditch there was no reform that he could not have forced on them."[467]

Language Reform can be given as an example to the symbolic reform as well. [468]. Language reforms date back to the late 19th century and early 20th century. During the era, as it happened in Iran and in Central Asia, simplifying native languages by eliminating foreign words and phrases was a trend. In Turkey, Omer Seyfettin and the writers gathered around the Young Pens (Genç Kalemler) magazine initiated a movement which favored a simplified form of Turkish accessible to masses. Yet as usual, first example of state led reform attempts came through military. The Turkification of military manuals can be seen as the first signifier of the language reform. [469] However, the new republic embarked on fully a fledged reform in 1928. The movement of pure Turkish (Öztürkçe) started as a state initiative. In consistence with the priorities of the dominant ideology of the era, that is to say the ideology of nationalism, language began to receive high attention. The Ottoman alphabet was replaced by the Latin alphabet via the law passed on 1 November 1928. Moreover, Society for Research on Turkish Language (Türk Dili Tetkik Cemiyeti) was founded in 1932.[470] This association aimed at the purification of Turkish language. One can argue that the language reform proved to be successful to a great extent. It had an enormous affect on the Turkish Language. The alphabet was changed and the language was purified from Persian and Arabic words to a certain degree. Yet, the

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[465] *ibid*., 47.

[466] Çağlar Keyder, (1987), *State and Class in Turkey, A Study in Capitalist Development* London and New York: Verso, 84.

[467] Yumul, Arus. (2010), "Fashioning the Turkish Body Politics in Celia Kerslake et al (ed.) *Turkey's Engagement with Modernity: Conflict and Change in the Twentieth Century,*" Oxford: Palgrave Mc Millan, 352

[468] Language reform is not limited to the Alphabet change. Turkification of the religious texts and Turkce ezan is also a part of it. In this regard, it is more symbolic than educational.

[469] John R. Perry. (1985), "Language Reform in Turkey and Iran," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (17) 3, 297.

[470] Name of the institute was changed to *Turkish Language Research Institute* in 1934, and then it became the Turkish Language Association in 1936.

name of famous book by Geoffrey Lewis which refers to the language reform, "Catastrophic Success", can be recalled at this point, since this reform still continues to be debated. [471]

Another important symbolic reform attempt of the era was the Turkification of the language of religion. In fact, as most of the other reform attempts of the era, one can date such reforms back to the late Ottoman modernization. Since the reforms were directly related to the dominant ideology of the era, nationalism, it is apt to quote from one of the fathers of nationalism; Ziya Gökalp. [472] Gökalp wrote in 1918 that:

> A country where in Turkish the call to prayer is said,
> The meaning of his prayer the villager can understand
> A country in whose schools the Turkish Qur'an is read
> Everyone, young and old, understands the Guide's command
> Oh Turkish son, there is your homeland."[473]

In consistence with the ideas of Gökalp, the new Republic, attempted to translate the basic religious texts to Turkish as a first step. These attempts of transformation can be dated back to Ottoman era since religious texts were translated to Turkish back then too. Yet, those texts were used as auxiliary texts in religious education. More fully fledged attempts of translation were either opposed by social collectivities or by the religious institutions.[474] To suppress such responses; new republic used the same tactic once again. In order to get religious legitimation, it aimed to get the support of the religious institutions which were integrated well into the state apparatus. For instance, Rıfat (Borekci) the Head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs gave a declaration on the issue of translation. He stated that, he and his colleagues "are of the opinion that a complete translation and commentary of the Holy Quran are necessary. We think that such a translation and commentary will be very auspicious and useful for our nation" [475] Right after this declaration, which showed the support of at least one faction of ulama, arrangements considered necessary were done. The Directorate religiously legitimized and the Parliament gave the financial support to the assigned ulama. Mehmet Akif (Ersoy) was contracted to compose a translation of Quran. Muhammed Hamdi (Yazir), another important member of ulama, was assigned to write an interpretation of Quran. Babanzade Ahmet

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[471] Kadir Mısıroğlu a renowned Islamist author declared as late as 1993 that "Dear Youth! Today, our nations's number one problem is not inflation or the anarchy in south-eastern Anatolia! Nor is it the fact that Cyprus is on the point of being lost! What is more important than all of these is the terrible devastation of our language!" Misiroğlu quoted in Geoffrey Lewis, (1999), *Turkish Language Reform a Catastrophic Success*, New York: Oxford University Press, 167.

[472] Ziya Gökalp is one of the most important thinkers whose thoughts directly influenced Mustafa Kemal. (1876-1924) Kemal Atatürk emphasized the impact of Gokalp in his thoughts with the following: "Benim ruh bedenimin babası, Ali Rıza Bey, heyecanlarımın babası Namık Kemal, fikirlerimin babası ise Ziya Gökalp'tır." see. Orhan Karaveli, *Ziya Gökalp'i Doğru Tanımak: Türklük hem Mefkürem hemde Kanımdır,* İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 14

[473] Bir Ülke ki camiinde Türkçe Ezan okunur / Köylü anlar manasini namazdaki duanin/ Bir ülke ki mektebinde Türkçe Kuran Okunur / Küçük Büyük herkes bilir buyruğunu Huda'nın Ey Türkoğlu, İşte senin orasidir vatanın quoted in M. Brett Wilson. "The First translations of the Qur'an in Modern Turkey. (1924-1938)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (41), 421.

[474] Amit Bein discusses these early attempts in his book. Bein, *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama,* 116-118.

[475] *ibid.,* 119.

Naim translated a collection of hadiths into Turkish. Mehmet Akif did not complete his translation of Quran fearing that it might be misused in the state policy of Turkification of the language of worship. Yet, the other authors finished their jobs and their works became successful. Muhammed Hamdi's (Elmalılı Hamdi Yazır) commentary of Quran is still popular.[476]

In 1930s, another important step was taken to achieve the Turkificaton of religious language, and it concerned the ezan. In 1932, Turkish recitation of ezan began in Istanbul and a year later the practice spread to all Turkey. In 1941, Turkish ezan was made compulsory by the government. According to the article 526 of the Turkish law, those who recited the ezan in Arabic would be punished with up to three months of imprisonment. Turkish recitation of ezan continued to be –especially among religious fractions- as an indicator of early Turkish Republic's cruel intentions against religion.[477] However, Mehmet Akif's fears on Turkification of the language of Turkish were not materialized; ezan continued to be recited in Turkish until 1950's.

5.5.4 Economic Domain

The new Republic's attempts to transform the sphere of religion were not limited to the legal or symbolic spheres. It also showed its impacts on the economic sphere. In fact, the transformations of the era had complex consequences because they had both direct and indirect impacts. On the one hand, as a consequence of Ottoman modernization, non religious spheres of education had emerged. Hence, new social segments, such as secular bureaucracy, gradually gained power. With this empowerment of new social segments and their domination of administrative sphere, religious ulama started to lose much of their power. In other words, by losing their prestige, deriving from their being sole representative of intellectual class, ulama started to lose their economic sources. Especially with the gradual secularization of legal and educational sphere, they lost their occupational positions. The changes that took place in 1924 were important in this respect. As discussed above, Ministry of Religious affairs and Pious Foundations were abolished in 1924. Their duties were divided between two directories; The General Directorate of Religious Affairs and the Directorate of Religious Affairs. With this administrative change not only the status of religion decreased from a level of Ministry to a level of directorate but also the linkage between religious institutions and the foundations were cut off. If we consider that religious foundations controlled 15 % of the land in Turkey at that time, we can grasp the extent of the economic power that religious institutions lost by such changes. Another important transformation affecting the economy of religious institutions was the abolishment of

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[476] According to Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, Akif finished the translation yet did not give it to authorities because of the above mentioned fears. See. hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=235465

[477] Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also claimed that Turkish ezan was a cruel act. See his speech in the Parliamentary group meeting in October-9-2013. http://www.akparti.org.tr/tbmm/haberler/kategori/grup-konusmalari/407

religious orders in 1925. Their property was confiscated upon their closure. So, the only available fund for ulama remained either an official salary or the contributions of citizens. [478]

Therefore, religious ulama who lost their sources of income gradually became state employees. As discussed in the previous chapter, bureaucratization of religious institutions actually started during the Ottoman era. Especially, Abdulhamid II showed special effort to incorporate religious sphere into the state. Yet, with the republic, religious sphere almost entirely became a part of state apparatus. Biographical information about the late Ottoman ulama shows us the extent of this incorporation. Sadik Albayrak in his biographical survey on late Ottoman ulama, "Son Dönem Osmanlı Ulaması" (Late Ottoman Ulama) informs us on 161 members of ulama and their occupational positions after the closure of religious schools and courts.   Of these members of ulama, 52 were employed in the Directorate of Religious Affairs, 12 were employed in the Ministry of Education, 21 were employed in the Ministry of Justice, 7 were employed in the University and 51 were retired in pension. Of the remaining 18, 3 left the country, 4 faced trial and only 3 of them had no job or income. [479] These numbers illustrates the way in which state's attempts to incorporate religious sphere continued during the republican era.

5.6. Summary of the Major Developments of the Era

This part of the thesis covers the period from CUP's coming into power until the end of 1940s. During this forty years period, Turkey experienced enourmous changes in almost every facets of life. The changes brought by nationalism as well as the impacts of Balkan Wars, First World War and succeeding War of Liberation can be counted as the major international developments of the era. In addition, the foundation of the Turkish Republic can be considered as the main institutional change. This great change had also influenced religion-state relations. Ideological debates within the religious sphere and state's ideological challenge to the religious sphere were also important in order to understand the developments of the era. As in the case of the preceding chapters, such encompassing developments will be summarised separately.

5.6.1 Ideological Developments of the Era

In order to discuss ideological developments, one can simply divide the era into two parts, those before and after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. As debated above, the era of CUP was marked by fragmentation of the religious sphere. This fragmantaion was to a great extent a legacy of the early periods. In other words, the popular debate of the late Ottoman era between reformist and the conservatist ulama continued during the CUP period. Forms of government, constitutionalism, the future of Islamic institutions

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[478] Köker, "The Establishment of Kemalist Secularism," 19.

[479] Başkan, "Religious Institutions and State Building," 24. In addition Hülya Küçük in his article "Sufi Reactions against the Reforms after Turkey's National Struggle" shows that most members of the ulama got support from state during the early republican era. Hülya Küçük, (2007), "Sufi Reactions against the Reforms after Turkey's National Struggle," in Touraj Atabaki (ed), *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and State in Turkey and Iran*, London I.B. Tauris. Moreover, Amit Bein figured out how a significant portion of old ulama received state support in Bein, *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama*, 151-192

and the caliphate were the popular subjects that were debated during the period. As discussed above, contrary to positivist readings of CUP period, even a brief look at the debates shows us that CUP managed to get support from an important part of the ulama. It is important to note that this was not a pure ideological support. Reformist ulama were awarded by getting assigned to administrative positions in the religious institutions.

During the War of Liberation, this fragmentation continued. Although Islamic themes were popular during the era, it is hard to claim that these discourses unified ulama. There emerged a dual power structure in which Ankara government and Istanbul Government competed for religious legitimacy. Both sides managed to get support from a faction of ulama.

With the foundation of Turkish Republic, this fragmentation has come to a new phase. In order to prevent religious forces from challenging the authority of the state, newly founded secular Turkish Republic devised certain ideological tools which were organized around certain themes. Most important one of the ideological tools which Turkish state used against religion, borrowing from Umit Cizre-Sakallıoğlu- "revolved around an understanding of Double Islams." Indeed, as debated above, CUP period also used similar themes against its opposers in the religious sphere. However, it is interesting that a government which aimed secularisation, to emphasise religion as a source of legitimacy. For example, Mustafa Kemal himself expressed many times that Islam, if one grasps well, is a very progressive religion. "Our religion is fitting reality, intellect and logic" and it is "the most reasonable and the most natural religion." [480] It is implied that a faction of ulama had distorted Islam and made it reactionary, orthodox and unprogressive. Also according to him, Islam "in real sense" was not against "laiklik". [481] Accordingly, he portrayed all reactionary elements as being stemmed from the historical experiences of Muslims. "Starting from Umayyad era, including the Ottomans, rulers politicized Islam and used it as a tool of administration. Ulama, at least a faction of it, helped the rulers in this regard."[482] So, it was implied that regaining the original essence of Islam required hard work. [483]

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[480] Quoted in Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters and Strategies," 236.

[481] A newspaper article of the era defines the relationship between the Koran and temporal affairs as such." The Koran is the Religious Book of Islam and such deserves respect and veneration. It is a holy book and its object is to sustain the conscience of Muslims. But the Koran does not interfere with the temporal affairs of the individual, which it leaves to experience, necessity and the general progress of humanity." Quoted in Gavin D. Brockett, (1995), Islamic "Reaction" to the Turkish Revolution: A Framework for the Social History of the Atatürk Era (1923-1938). Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of History, Simon Fraser University, 100.

[482] In 1923, Mustafa Kemal in a talk with Konya youth clearly describes this line of thought. "Dört halifeden sonra din daima vasıta-i siyaset, vasıta i menfaat vasıta i istibdat yapıldı. Bu hal Osmanlı tarihinde böyle idi Abbasiler Emeviler zamanında böyle idi ... böyle adi ve sefil hiylelerle hükümdarlık yapan halifeler ve onlara dini alet yapmaya tenezzül eden sahte ve Imansız alimler tarihte daima rezil olmuşlardır. Quoted in İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde*, 46.

[483] Various reform attempts of the early republican cadres can be understood as a part of this hard work. Religious Turkism of Ziya Gökalp, 1928 Regious Reform Proposal led by İsmail Hakkı Demircioğlu and above mentioned attempts on Turkification of religious texts, all aimed to reach to the so called "Real Islam" See. Dücane Cündioğlu,

In other words, in ideological sphere, the ruling elites of the republic were trying to transform and use religion, rather than aiming to break its power entirely. In this sense, "Rather than being banished from the public political sphere, Islam came to rest at the center stage of politics." [484]

5.6.2 International Developments of the Era

Throughout the period under scrutiny in this chapter, various international factors were active. As mentioned in the first chapter, international influences are not limited to direct impacts of wars and invasions. Internationally proliferated ideologies such as nationalism can be considered as an aspect of such impacts. Both CUP and the early Republic had influenced by these above mentioned international processes. Balkan wars, First World War and the War of Liberation all are related to those above mentioned factors and caused enourmous changes in the very nature of Anatolia. These transformations had repercussions on the religion state relations of the country.

Most important of these changes was the transformation of religious demographics of the country. A key implication of this demographic change was the lessening of religious diversity and increase of homogeneity. As of 1913, an official population statistics shows that the population living in Anatolia was around 15.3 million. However, 1927 statistics shows the number as 13, 6 million. It seems that the population decreased by 1, 9 million people. The actual decrease was probably more than this estimate suggests. Two factors should be taken into consideration; there was already a natural increase during the period to be taken into account. Moreover, there was a flow of Muslim migration to Anatolia as a result of Ottoman territorial losses in this period. [485]

According to Kemal Karpat, the Muslim population living in Anatolia fell by 18% in the period between 1914 and 1922. Yet, non-Muslim population decline was more dramatic. Before the World War I, non-Muslim population constituted around 18 % of Anatolian population. Yet after the War- according to 1927 statistics- this population decreased to 2.8% of the Anatolian population.[486] As mentioned above, the Greek-Turkish population exchange and forced migration of Armenians are the two factors that changed the religious composition of Anatolia. Hence, founding elites of the new republic operated under these demographic circumstances. Indeed, the treaty of Lausanne -the founding treaty of Turkish Republic- which officially ended the war, indicates this new demography. Turkey recognized non-Muslims as legal

Türkçe Kur'an ve Cumhuriyet İdeolojisi, Kitabevi: İstanbul. 1998, Yasin Aktay, *Türk Dininin Sosyolojik İmkanı,* İletişim Yayınları:İstanbul, 2011. İsmail Kara, *Cumhuriyet Türkiyesinde bir Mesele Olarak İslam*.

[484] Cizre-Sakallıoğlu, "Parameters and Strategies," 236.

[485] Başkan, "Religious Institutions and State Building," 218.

[486] For a discussions on this transformation see. Kemal Karpat, 2006, *Osmanlı'da Değişim, Modernleşme ve Ulusallaşma*, Ankara İmge Kitabevi yayınları.

minorities. This means that religion became a criterion for a common identity of a majority group. In other words, religious affiliation and national identity became closely connected. [487]

The Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations was also another treaty in which religious affiliation was an important variable. According to this convention, Muslims in Greece and Greek orthodox in Turkey were subject to change. [488] The basic criteria chosen was neither ethnicity nor race; but religion. In addition, religion also became a factor in choosing migrants admitted to Turkey. For instance, Muslim populations of Caucasus and Balkans were permitted to migrate to Turkey, whereas Christian Gagauz Turks were not admitted.[489] Hence, it can be claimed that masses who are not ethnically Turks but religiously Muslims were considered within the concept of Turkishness whereas ethnic Turks who were non-Muslims were rejected. This shows the ways in which being a Muslim became a primary condition for being a Turk and how being a non-Muslim became an obstacle.[490]

Hence, one can claim that founding elites of the republic, whatever their ideas about religion was, operated within the limits of more homogenized Muslim Anatolia. This demographic structure conditioned by the international factors, determined the Turkish state's relations with religion in this period.

5.6.3 Institutional Developments of the Era

As revealed in the analysis, a series of reform attempts were carried out during the CUP and the early Turkish Republic. These reform attempts in legal, economic and symbolic spheres influenced religion-state relations of the period.

First of all, the legal sphere was organized in opposition to the religious sphere. In other words, state banned the use of religion for political purposes. Effective after 1920, Hıyanet Vataniye Law stated that it was against the law to use religion as a tool for politics. In 1925, articulating religious themes into party programs made illegal. In 1926, with the infamous article 163 of the constitution, the state outlawed politically motivated religious activity and banned the establishment of organizations that aimed to create an Islamic Republic strictly. In addition, with the 1938 Law of Association (Cemiyetler Kanunu), the state also

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[487] For an elaborate discussion on these see Özgüç, "The Paradox of Turkish Secularism,"

[488] Excepting the Greek Orthodox of Istanbul and Muslim population of western thrace.

[489] Kemal Kirişçi states that Although Turkish state emphasized language and ethnic affilliation in regard to its immigration policies, "actual practice reveals a striking preference for admitting immigrants with Sunni and Hanefi religious background". see Kemal Kirişçi. (2000), "Disaggregating Turkish Citizenship and Immigration Practices," *Middle Eastern Studies* (36), 3.

[490] For a debate on borders of Turkishness including its relations with religion see Mesut Yeğen, (2011), *Müstakbel Türk'ten Sözde Vatandaşa*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları..

prohibited the formation of societies based on religion, sect and religious orders. [491] In addition to these, the new Republic also set up legal provisions to guarantee the preservation of symbolic attempts. As mentioned above, the articles against the recitation of Ezan in Arabic or the articles against the opposition to the Hat Law can be considered as examples of these legal provisions. At times, these legal provisions were implemented strictly, yet, at other times their application was loose. In other words, from time to time, the new Republic threatened members of ulama and punished them. However, at some other instances, it sought for ways of reconciliation. For instance, Mustafa Kemal directly threatened ulama during the debates of the abolishment of Sultanate.[492] Notwithstanding this, the new Republic did not hesitate to reproach ulama when needed. For example, Ahmet Hamdi (Akseki), who was once incarcerated for being a member of a secret organization aiming to use religion for political purposes, became the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs not long after this accusation. [493]

In addition to the above mentioned legal provisions, the new Republic controlled religious sphere administratively as well. The method of this control varied from incorporating the religious institutions to the state to bribing religious ulama. Indeed, as discussed in the fourt chapter, this can be seen as a legacy of the Ottoman past. However the Directorate of Religious Affairs was the major institution in this respect. In addition, another novelty of was the state's abolishement of the religious institutions which were deemed hard to incorporate and control. For instance, the Law on the Abolition of the Religious orders was issued in 1925.

One must bear in mind that, one of the main aims of the law was to show that no alternative basis of religion would be tolerated. The timing of the law also demonstrates this motivation since it was issued just after the Sheikh Said uprising, which was amalgamation of both religious and ethnic motives. The Menemen incident and the state's reaction this incident also showed the ways in which state acted against threats by the

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[491] Yücel Demirer. (2012), "Modernleşen Türkiye'de Din," in Faruk Alpkaya and Bülent Duru(ed) *1920'den Günümüze Türkiye'de Toplumsal Yapı ve Değişim,* Ankara: Phoneix Yayınları, 255, Also see Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey,* 466.

[492] The most well known example of Mustafa Kemal's threatening of ulama was during the debates of the abolishement of sultanate. He conveys his vews as follows:

Gentlemen I declared "neither the sovereignity nor the right to govern can be transferred by one person to anybody else by an academic debate. Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and to maintain their rule for more than six centuries. It is now the nation revolts against this usurpers, puts them in their right place and actually carries on their sovereignity. This is an actual fact. It is no longer a question of knowing whether we want to leave this sovereignity in the hands of the nation or not. It is simply a question of stating an actuality, something which is an already accomplished fact and which must be accepted uncondintionally as such. And this must be done at any price. If those who are assembled here, the Assembly and everybody else would find this quite natural, it would be very appropriate from my point of view. Conversely, the reality will nevertheless be manifested in the necessary form, but in that event it is possible that some heads will be cut off. Ardiç, *Islam and the Politics of Secularism*, 263.

[493] Bein, *Turkish Republic Ottoman Ulama,* 163-166.

religious orders.[494] By abolishing the religious orders, state prevented one source of power that can threat its monopoly over the religious sphere. Hence, by doing so, it got one step closer to being the sole provider of the religious services in this period.

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[494] For a brief analyses of the Sufi reactions against this see Küçük, "Sufi Reactions Against the Reforms," and for an analyses of the Menemen incident see Umut Azak, (2007), "A Reaction to Authoriterian Modernization in Turkey the Menemen İncident and the Creation and Contestation of a Myth: 1930-1931," in Touraj Atabaki (ed) *The State and the Subaltern: Modernization, Society and State in Turkey and Iran*, London I.B. Tauris.

CHAPTER 6

IRAN AND TURKEY CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES

6.1 Introduction

In this part, I will discuss the similar and different features of religion-state relations in Turkey and Iran. In so doing, I will refer to the historical trajectories which I analysed through the last four chapters. There are basically three levels of analyses in which these differences and similarities are constituted: international, institutional and ideological. As one can deduce from the historical chapters, these three levels can intermingle and remain distinct at certain points. For instance, on the one hand, institutional differences between these two countries do emerge due to the religious identities of these societies. On the other hand, these institutional structures themselves become the agents of religious change. In other words, religious institutions as well as other institutions play their role in transformation of religious sphere. Referring to famous words of Marx, one can argue that the states of Iran and Turkey –and the historical structures they form "....make their own history, but they do not make it as they please: they do not make it under self-selected circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past."

The issue of international influences is even more complicated. Both countries had to experience the international influences in three different ways. First of all, both had to fight in wars –with varying degrees of involvement- and had to deal with their influences on religion-state relations. Their religious and ethnic demography was shaped historically as a result of victories and losses. To a certain extent, these two states' structures got interrupted, weakened or gained strength as a result of such direct and indirect influences. Secondly, since 18th century –and especially in 20th century- they were faced with the international –that is to say; western influences. Enlightenment philosophy, nationalism and capitalism[495] had impacts on their state-religion relations. In fact, all institutions of the classical period –including state and religion- went into a period of transformation due to their influences. States restructured in this period, and religion –due to external pressures- had to revise itself accordingly. Thirdly, the relationship between these two neighbouring nations had impacts on the state-religion relations. Safavid-Ottoman Wars and the relationship between Rıza Shah and Mustafa Kemal are both considered as having major influences on the development of state-religion relations.

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[495] To clarify the general impact of capitalism to the religion state relation Zubaida''s words are highly relevant "It is capitalism that ushers in diverse process of social transformation, which are not merely cultural imitation, but solvents of old social and cultural patterns … produce different patterns of cultural and political transformations, depending on local, historical and cultural conjectures." Sami Zubaida. (2011), *Beyond Islam a New Understanding on the Middle East*, London: I. B. Tauris, 6.

Another factor determining the state-religion relations is the different sectarian identities their societies carry; that is to say Shi'a and Sunni identities. State and international conditions both played a role in the acceptance and dissemination of these two sects. But, after they were absorbed and institutionalised, they started to play their own parts in the religion-state relations and in the divergences in these two countries' paths. Yet, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, their role has often been exaggerated. To a great extent, the differences between Shi'a and Sunni sects and their reflection on the religion state relations have been overemphasized in the literature.

To conclude, the three main factors which shaped the state-religion relations stem from institutional, ideological and international domains. Their differences and similarities, as well as their distinct combinations created two different structures and trajectories. The following sections aim to address these issues thoroughly by giving references to the body of the thesis where necessary.

6. 2 Institutions and Religion

As two non-colonised states of the region, Iran and Turkey are usually proud of their state traditions. As a result of this non-colonization they inherit rich political traditions and a continuous bureaucratic class which are dedicated to this state tradition. This proud continued during the most part of the 20th century. Their ruling elites and also the popular classes usually referred history of their states and bureaucracy beyond their actual foundations. The famous 2500 year celebration of the Persian state in 1971 by the Mohammad Reza Shah is one of the examples of this.[496] Turkish Army, as one of the most important institutions of the Turkish state tradition, dates its foundation as the 209 BC when Mete Khan had acceded to the throne. This longevity and power of state traditions are extensively referred to in both academic and daily literature.[497]

Yet, when a comparison is made between Turkey and Iran, it is widely claimed that Turkish state tradition is relatively more strong, stable and continuous than its Iranian counterpart. Especially the modernization literature which I discussed in the introduction chapter is an example of this line of thought. In addition to that, a great deal of the literature that compares Turkey and Iran, especially those dealing with the

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[496] 1971 Celebrations was a big event to which lots of Kings and Head of States were joined. These celebrations were not only condemned for its extravagancy and the burden to the Iranian budget but also for Mohammed Reza Pahlavi's depiction of himself as the predecessor of Cyrus the Great. The act was largely unwelcomed by the Islamists. Ayatollah Khomeini also explicitly condemned him for doing so. Interesting enough, dating the history of Iran back to the Cyrus continued under the Islamic regime. Muhammad Ahmadinejad also did so. For details see M. Ali Ansari. (2012), *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

[497] A widespread consensus exist in the literature that both Turkey and Iran have strong state traditions. Especially in the international relations literature these countries –sometimes Egypt is also added- are considered as the most institutionalised countries of the Middle East. Among the scholars of political science, this argument has also found great currency. The works of Metin Heper, Şerif Mardin and Kemal Karpat exemplifies this line of thought for Turkish case.

institutional structures, also emphasized the strength of Turkish state structure more. To reiterate, late Qajar and Ottoman history usually analysed in this context.[498] For the 20th Century historical context a similar discourse continues. For example Shambayati argues that rentier structure of the Iranian state in the second half of the 20th century is the main difference between Turkish and Iranian states. According to him, oil revenues produced a deep cleavage between Iranian state and society and resulted in the destruction of the Iranian state.[499] Erden, in his dissertation comparing the differences of the citizenships of Iran and Turkey adopts a similar approach. For him the most striking feature in the history of state formation in Turkey and Iran is the existence of a "strong state in Turkey vis-à-vis a weak society" and a "strong society in Iran vis-à-vis a weak state". While the "strong Turkish state" manages to realize its "modernization project" in a greater extent than that of Iran, "the strong Iranian society" shows a stronger resistance to the projects of the "modernizers" than that of the Turkish society. Hence, such differences in their inherited state structure and bureaucratic experience resulted in the formation of different nation states and distinct citizenships structures. [500]

Such an insight proves to be extremely useful, the implications of these two state traditions on to the religious institutions are scrutinised. By the same token, one can easily recognise that religious institutions in Iran are more autonomous and stronger in relation to its Turkish counterpart. As a part of strong society, Iranian ulama were able to build a strong hierarchy and autonomous sources of revenue. Başkan, in his dissertation comparing state building practises in Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's period, reached to a similar conclusion.[501] For him, there are two ideal types in the relations between state and religion. State either incorporate the religious apparatus into its structure or exclude it. In this regard, Turkish and Iranian experiences are revealed as the instances of these ideal types. The basic dynamic, which determines the characteristics of the state religion relations through the Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal periods, is this inclusion-exclusion dichotomy. The institutional capacity of the states (strong or weak) and the internal organization of the religious organizations (economically autonomous or not) are the parameters that determine this ends.

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[498] Zubaida mentions that the Ottomans had a considerably developed state organization in comparison to the Qajars. While the Ottomans had well organized and differentiated standing army divisions, the Qajars relied on tribal levies. The bureaucracy in the Ottomans was well developed while the Qajars "did not have a regular bureaucracy beyond the aristocratic court functionaries and their servants" Sami Zubaida, (1989), *Islam, the People and the State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East,* London: Routledge**,** 138-139. In agreement with Zubaida, Parsi mentions the bureaucracy and army as the two pillars of the nation state in Turkey. He considers these two institutions as the representatives of the continuity of the Ottoman state structure. On the contrary, Parsi adds, that "central bureaucracy was never strong" in Qajar Iran. See R Parsi,. (2000), "Reforming Society: Intellectuals and Nation-Building in Turkey and Iran," in Almut Höfert and Armando Salvatore(ed) *Between Europe and Islam - Shaping Modernity in a Transcultural Space*, Preses Interuniversitaires Européennes, Brussels, 109.

[499] Shambayati, "The Rentier State."

[500] Erden, "Citizenship and Ethnicity in Turkey and Iran."

[501] Başkan, "Religious Institutions and State Building."

The historical narrative constructed in this dissertation also reveals similar dynamics. The analysis demonstrates that the incorporation of the Turkish state to the religious apparatus started from the classical Ottoman period and continued during the modern era. There are various reasons why state followed this path. First of all, the centralization naturally requires a higher degree of institutional capacity. This capacity naturally extends into the religious domain. As discussed in the fourth chapter, the foundation of the *Şeyhulislamlik* during the reign of II Murat can be seen as an example to this extension. *Seyhulislamlik* first emerged as a small scale and powerless institution. Yet, it gradually developed and grew stronger with the centralization of the state. It finally emerged as a centre of power above the other religious powers. *Seyhulislamlik* especially during the reign of Selim (the Grim) and Suleyman (the Lawgiver) has reinforced its relations with the ruling power, namely the sultans. *Seyhulislamlik* was the quintessential instance of religious institutions and emerged as a significant bureaucratic power with administrative duties in this era. For example, starting from the first half of the 16th century, the task of appointing religious bureaucracy such as; *Kadiliklar* is given to the *Seyhulislamlik*. Also in this era, *Seyhulislams* transformed from high level clerics who are issuing *fatwas* according to situations into administrators of the religious bureaucracy. The era of Abussud is also important to understand the evolution of the *Seyhulislamlik*. Recall the debate between Koca Civilizade, and Abussuud -referred to in Chapter four- about the cash vaqf. It shows the ways in which the religious apparatus works in accordance with the needs of the state in that period. This continued to be so even when the results of this connection are contradicted with the basic orders of the religion. Abussud directly issued a *fatwa* according to the practical needs of the state giving permission to usury in order to protect state's interests. By doing so, he valued practical requirements beyond abstract religious law. Hence, long before the era of modernization, as the *seyhulislamlik* shows, the religious apparatus began to be incorporated into the state apparatus. In relation to this inclusion, religious institutions played their roles to legitimize and protect the ruling power through the classical period.

This diminishing of the autonomy and inclusion of the religious institutions to the state apparatus continued and further intensified during the modern period. In accordance with the Linda Darling's observation on early modern Mediterranean World, Ottoman experience of modernity can also be defined "as the successful subordination of all sources of authority to the power of rulers."[502] What made this possible was the increase in rules' power by means of the proliferation of the educational institutions and means of transportation. In this sense, the early phases of Ottoman modernization during the reigns of Mahmud II and Selim III are also important. As debated in the fourth chapter, contrary to the common explanations of the period, a great fraction of ulama supported the sultans during their quest for reform. Sultans succeeded to gather the religious legitimacy from a considerable faction of the ulama during this period. Another important institution developed in this period is *Bab-i Mesihat*. As a result of the establishment of *Bab-i Mesihat*, the inclusion of the *seyhulislamlik* to the bureaucratic structure progressed further. Another institution rooted in

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[502] Darling, Linda T. (2008), "Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, (38) 4.

the same period, yet developed in the reign of Abdulhamid II, was *Meclis-i Mesayih*. It was founded as a parliamentary like institution for the leaders of the religious tekke's. Although it's main objective was claimed to be mutual consultation and record, these objectives transformed by time. By this institution, state started to decide who would and who would not be the head of the *tekkes* and started to appoint them. So, *Meclis-i Mesayih* became one of the main apparatuses of the state to control religious institutions staying out of its bureaucratic structure.[503] Another important tool that Abdulhamid II used to utilise religion in his pursuit of controlling the population was -the reinvention of- the caliphate. By the caliphate and the ideology of panislamism, Abdulhamid II intervened directly to nearly all parts of the religious sphere. Having obtained these tools, state tried to keep Muslim subjects away from the ideological challenge brought by nationalism. State also found a source of additional legitimacy in order to control these subjects. As discussed in the same chapter, this era also marked the invention of new political methods for non-Sunni Muslim subjects of the empire. In this era, Alevi and Shi'a masses were tried to be indoctrinated to Sunni Hanefi school of thought by education. Religious clergy of this Shi'a and Alevi masses was also tried to be controlled by using various tools.

The period of Committee of Union of Progress can also be considered similar in this regard. Although there is a divide between ulama which can be labelled distinctly as reformist and conservatisms, after its coming to power CUP managed to control a major faction of the ulama. In other words, contrary to the positivist readings on CUP period as discussed in the 5th chapter, the era was marked by a mutual relationship between the reformist ulama and the CUP. Reformist ulama, supporting the CUP, were awarded by appointments to the administrative positions in the religious establishment. As similar to the historical trajectory of Ottoman and future Turkish republic state, administration was eager to control religious establishment during this era. The following period of the War of Independence was marked by a dual state structure; İstanbul Government under the impact of Sultan and Ankara Government of the nationalists. Different factions of ulama chose their sides according to this dual state structure and the conflict of power emanated from it. Both parts of the struggle managed to find ways to legitimise ulama. Yet, the Republican era was the period in which the control of the state over religious institutions was most visible. In this era, state abolished caliphate. Nevertheless, by the help of the Directorate of Religious Affairs, a much more powerful institution was founded. The directorate was given the sole responsibility of religious guidance. Having found the directorate, the state managed to achieve centralization and full control of the religious sphere. First time in the history of Anatolia all mosques, at least formally, were started to manage by the paid employees of the state. Additionally, having founded the theology faculty and imam hatip schools within the ministry of education, state also monopolized the religious education. A considerable number of Ottoman ulama were also assigned to either to the directorate, ministry of education or the theology faculty. Hence, they became the paid employees of the state.

We cannot speak of such uninterrupted centralization and control attempts for the Iranian case. Safavid period was a period when the state had the sole authority over religion. Safavids had heterodox roots and they forced their control over other religious identities in the Sunni Iranian geography. Shah Ismail became the controller of the religious sphere in Iran by using both his military power and divine like ideological legitimacy. Other groups, which tried to save their autonomy and members of Sunni sects, were taken under control by means of tax fines and ideological pressures. In this sense, Safavid Iran shows a clear example of caaseropapist features. Iranian and Ottoman tradition were very much alike in this period. In other words, like in the Ottoman case, the religious sphere was under the control of the state authority in the Iranian case. However, post-Safavid period do not show same features. Qajar dynasty, gaining power after a short Afghan invasion, was not able to sustain the same level of authority on the religious sphere. This lack of legitimacy on the religious sphere and the fragility in the state's structure stemming from the ongoing wars enabled the emergence of an autonomous sphere. Especially the heterodox flows of 18th and 19th century, and the ideological transformation that took place in Shi'a did also contribute to the emergence of the above mentioned autonomy.

Similar features are observable in the modern Iran. Reza Shah was a dedicated modernist and applied policy in favour of centralization, yet he was never able to control the religious sphere as much as Turkish state did. A number of reasons can be addressed. Firstly, the institutional capacity of the state was not as developed as its Turkish counterpart's. It is important to refer the comparison Zürcher makes between Reza Shah and Mahmud II periods.[504] Secondly, the religious institutions had a much more developed structure in Iran than it was in Turkey, making their control more difficult for authorities. The long lasting autonomy of the religious sphere enabled religious institutions to accumulate capital and to establish their own hierarchy. However, Reza Shah was not totally unsuccessful in his attempts to control this sphere. Especially Reza Shah's power was consolidated after 1925; important fractions of the religious actors were taken under the control of the Iranian state. As referred to in the third chapter, some of these figures were employed as state officials, whilst the others preferred to adopt a quite attitude.

As discussed above, a comparison of historical trajectories delineates the dimensions of control and autonomy as the basic features differentiating Turkish and Iranian experiences. As similar to Başkan's thesis mentioned above, Turkish state incorporated and so controlled the religious institutions; whilst Iranian state excluded them and rendered the Iranian religious institutions autonomous. Although this general look explains a great deal, it fails to explain some important historical turning points. In the Safavid period, one can identify a significant difference in terms of state-religion relations compared to the rest of the Iranian

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[504] For a comparison of the period of Reza Shah and Mahmud II see E. J. Zürcher. "Institution Building in the Kemalist Republic: The Role of People's Party," in E. J. Zürcher And Touraj Atabaki (ed) *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernisation in Turkey and Iran, 1918-1942,* New York: I. B. Tauris, 2004.

history. As discussed in chapter three, this period was marked by an attempt of control. State and religion was articulated to a significant extent and the religious institutions had no autonomy in this period. Secondly, one should not belittle the control attempts of Reza Shah Period. Above all, we should not disregard the fact that in each relation between state and religion, there is a degree of control attempt. In this respect, we can argue that Riza Shah actually tried to control ulama by using many strategies. This strategy did not involve a direct incorporation, yet he pursued his aim by bribing or by providing means and positions to the Ulama members who stayed closer to him. These attempts were widespread for the first half of Reza Shah's reign. Interestingly, his policies eventually, albeit indirectly, contributed to the creation of autonomous and hierarchical structure for religious institutions. Dress codes can be considered as a clear example at this point. They were introduced with an anti-clergy motivation but indirectly, they contributed to its institutionalization because an exemption was made that, whoever has icaze-permission to make ijtihad- is exempt from dress codes. So it enabled ulama to issue icazes to more religious students. Number of ulama increased and emerged as a bounded group. To reiterate words of Ali Ansari "[ulama] now remained the one social group permitted to wear the turban and grown, thereby distinguishing them from the rest of society … Reza Shah inadvertently created a formidable opposition complete with an identifiable social marker."[505] As a result of dress codes, state has indirectly reinforced emergence of the religious ulama as a distinct social group.

As discussed in chapter three, control and autonomy dichotomy fails to be clear cut also in other instances of Reza Shah's relations with ulama. For instance, Reza Shah's policies led to the emergence of the city of Qum as the central locus of ulama and turned it into the most important centre of Shi'a ulama. In fact, this development took place more as a consequence of international developments during the reign of Reza shah. Shah decided to provide a place to ulama of Iraq who were running away from the British. This decision led to restructure the local seminary system entirely into what later became known as the Hawzeh-e Elmieh. In fact, the learning centres in Qom, which are considered as traditional, were actually developed during the 1930s. They allowed the ulama to collect Khums and zakat from the faithful and refined their establishments into a stratified hierarchy of ordinary preachers, hujjet-ul Islams and ayatollahs and grand ayatollahs, and lastly the marja-e takleds. Once again, we can see that what is considered to be traditional hierarchy of Shi'a ulama was the invention of modern era and Reza Shah's policies.[506]

To conclude, there is a significant difference between Iran and Turkey in terms of state-religion relations. The historical trajectory of these countries shows us that for Turkish experience state rulers tended to incorporate religious institutions into the state yet for Iranian experience they remained autonomous. However, as the analysis of the earlier period demonstrates, this process was not a linear and uninterrupted process. State and religious institutions interacted throughout the history and this interaction sometimes

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[505] Ansari, *Modern Iran since 1921,* 48.

[506] See Ervand Abrahamian, (1989), *Radical Reformers: The Iranian Mujahedeen*, New York: I. B. Tauris.

yielded unanticipated results. Policies of Reza Shah which contributed to the institutionalization of ulama, regardless of his initial intention, can be given as the instances of this. One must bear in the mind that there is an intriguing linkage between state making and religious making whether the rulers of the state aimed to exclude or include the religious sphere.

6.3 The Impact of the International: State and Religion

Both Iran and Turkey is located geopolitically at the intersection of east and west. Bridge –connecting west and east- is a frequently used metaphor for each national context. Under such circumstances, it would be a mistake not to see the influence of the international domain on these two nations' pathways. Without doubt, these influences reached into the state-religion relations at certain points. The historical analysis of this thesis shows that the international factors can be divided into three parts. At certain points, the 'international' demonstrated its influence directly through war or occupancies and thus can be considered as the most important element. In addition to that, the two nations' incorporation into west-centred capitalism and their trans-border relations can be seen as influential factors and require a through revisiting.

Both countries had their fair share of war-occupancy experiences in both classic and modern periods. These conditions created historical moments when the state structures of these two countries were either collapsed or remained fragile. As discussed above, this weakening had influences on religious sphere and became an important factor determining the trajectory of religion-state relations. Recall that these moments of fragility were more pronounced in Iranian history. In other words, compared to its counterpart Turkey, Iran had a more fragile and interrupted structure. The Iranian territory had faced –at least- three big occupations during the time period that this dissertation covers. As a result of those interventions, it experienced the change of authority figures/dynasties each time. First, Safavid occupation changed the sectarian structure of the country all together, and created a brand new one. Thus, it can be considered as the most important intervention among others. Second, Afghan occupancy resulted in Sunni-Shi'a conflict, yet the structure became fully Shi'a then and thus managed to protect itself. As a result of this invasion, Safavid dynasty was collapsed and Qajar, who would never be as strong as its predecessor, replaced the authority. Thirdly, Russian and English invasions ruined the Qajar's rule and paved the way to the emergence of Pahlavi dynasty. This invasion also built a ground upon which a modern state can be built for the first time. Lastly, Russian and German interventions took place under the Second World War conditions and replaced Reza Shah with his son Muhammad Reza. On the other hand, Ottomans and Turkey has not faced with invasions and interventions which were powerful enough to change the dynasties and state structures. The only exception is the War of Independence that took place at the beginning of the 20th century. However, this period did not last long and the new authorities managed to take over the lead without damaging the state structure too deeply. These invasions had impacts also on the demographics of the countries. Therefore, one can argue that international conflicts and invasions were a more important factor in weakening the state structure in Iran. In this regard, they had more influence on the trajectory of state-religion relations in Iran than they had on Turkey.

Nevertheless, if we look from another perspective, it becomes apparent that Turkey actually dealt with the reflections of these wars on state-religion relations. They were responsible for social transformations which created significant outcomes in late 19th and early 20th century. As discussed in the 4th and 5th chapters, the ideology of nationalism for instance, can be considered as an international factor and was responsible for the decline in non-Muslim population and some other related demographic changes. In other words, Ottoman-Turkish territory, which had a significant non-Muslim population size, experienced a considerable religious homogenization starting from the 19th century. Migration flows from Anatolia, which intensified due the independence of Serbia and Greece, the Balkan wars, are examples showing such a demographic transition.

Post World War I circumstances also contributed to this demographic change. Forced migration of Armenians living in Anatolia and the following Greek population exchange transformed the religious composition of Turkey irreversibly. Both can be considered either as direct consequences of wars or as projects exercised under circumstances enabled by war itself. Another influence of these wars is that they created an implicitly or explicitly recognized feeling of religious solidarity. Especially the War of Independence depended not only on the ideals related with nation and freedom but also on a 'Muslim mission' requiring a resistance towards the invasion of unbelievers. As discussed in chapter five, this motivation had impacts on the Turkish state structure as well as on the development of citizenship. The establishment of the Directory of Religious Affairs, which was an institution to reproduce the religious doctrines supported by the founding elites, was also related with the above mentioned demographic changes.

Secondly, the influence of international factors can also be traced in the process following the integration of these two countries to the west-centred capitalism. On the one hand capitalism did transform the state structures. On the other hand, it fostered the emergence of new social classes and new class allegiances. For instance, Bazar had represented the commercial bourgeoisie in the early period, positioned together with ulama and emerged as a focal point of authority. Tobacco incident and the Constitutional Revolution process, as discussed in the third chapter can be also be given as important examples. Recall that Bazaaris supported ulama economically and enabled the autonomy of its position in relation to state. It is difficult to find such examples in the Turkish case. Above all, the demographic transitions mentioned above resulted in the disappearance of commercial bourgeoisie which was mostly composed of non-Muslims. This increased the Turkish state's power recognizably when compared to the Ottoman period. To be more precise, this development was indirectly influential in sustaining state's successful control over religion.

Thirdly, another international factor that influenced the religion state relations of these countries can be found in the trans-border relations of the religious institutions which went beyond the borders of the nation states. It yielded a sphere of autonomy to the ulama living especially in Iran. Shi'a masses living in Iraqi side of the border was a great advantage for Iranian ulama. Shi'a ulama were at home in the religious sense

on both sides of the border. Historically, there has been much movement between Iranian and Iraqi sides of the borders. Iranian critics of Qajar Shahs often took refuge to Karbala. The existence of a strong Shi'a community and of the learning centres in Iraq, no doubt, facilitated the survival of Shi'a ulama during this time. Moreover, the Ottoman rulers were happy to encourage political independence of Shi'a ulama living in Iraq Vis a Vis their political rivals; Iranian rulers provided they do not threaten their own interests. The tradition was maintained after the Ottoman successor state, Iraq.[507]

Another point to consider with regard to international influences is the relations between Iran and Turkey. The peoples of these two countries did act together in many historical events and they did found a number of states together. In daily life, Ottoman-Iranian border is frequently referred as the oldest border of the territory. Nevertheless, these factors do not necessarily mean that they always had a cooperative relationship. Especially 17th century Ottoman-Safavid wars, symbolized by Battle of Chaldiran particularly, had direct effects on both countries' religious structures. As discussed in chapter four, the conflict between two rulers of Turkish and Muslim origin created an important resolution. One can argue that these two countries defined and institutionalized their religious ideologies with respect to one another's. To be more precise, Shah İsmail–of Sufi origin- spread Shia in Iranian territory through his competition with Selim I, whilst the same conflict enabled Selim I to establish a more institutionalized Sunnism in Anatolia. This conflict continued even after the reigns of these two figures and both sides continued to build their sectarian identities accordingly.[508]All these factors led to the emergence of Ottoman Empire and Iran as the strongest representative of Sunni Islam and Shi'a Islam respectively.

Another case of conflict, which had reflections on the religion-state relations, took place in the modern period. The relationship between Reza Shah and Mustafa Kemal is widely recognized as being imitative. Nevertheless, this imitation relationship had influences on the religion-state relations. The endeavours to secularize the Turkish society –especially the abolishment of Caliphate- raised suspicions among Iranian ulama. Reza Shah could have followed the same steps. Thus, ulama associated Republic with secularization and opposed to the foundation of a Republic in Iran. The Republican Crisis of 1924, as discussed in chapter 4, emerged as a result of this perspective. This development also allowed Reza Shah to declare himself as a monarch, signifying the change of administration/government structure which will mark Iranian history in 20th century.

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[507] Malise Ruthven, (2012), *Islam a Very Short Introduction*, New York: Oxford University Press, 70-71.

[508] Yet true especially for Safavid period Anatolia hosted a considerable amount of people who has allegiance to Safavid Shah's. For a debate on Alevites with the Safavid Shah's see Ayfer Karakaya Stump's dissertation specifically Chapter 4 "Subjects of the Sultan, disciples of the Shah: Formation and transformation of the Kizilbash/Alevi Communities in Ottoman Anatolia," unpublished Ph.D, History and Middle Eastern Studies, 2008. Impacts of Safavid Wars to Ottoman Religious ideology see Ahmet Yaşar Ocak, (2001), *Türkler Türkiye ve İslam*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

To conclude, the above mentioned international factors acted differently in the Iranian and Turkish case. As the historical chapters clearly demonstrated, they played an important role in creating different trajectories of state-religion relations. The overwhelming emphasis of the cultural and modernisation approaches discussed in the introduction part hinders us to see the influence of international conditions and actors. Nevertheless, as this thesis showed, the national policies are not solely determined and enacted within clear cut borders. In other words, the religion-state relations are not/were not shaped within a clearly separated national territory, independent of the international dynamics.

6.4 The Impact of Ideology: The Revolutionary Shi'a

The prevalence of the cultural comparisons of Iran and Turkey addressed in the introduction chapter. The differences which the culturalists line of thought attributed to the Shi'a and Sunni traditions in terms of their relations with the state are analysed and the prevailing assumptions behind this are discussed. Putting aside the conjectural reasons, main reason of this prevalence can be seen as the orientalist discourse still dominating the academic arena. This part is basically a contribution to the critique of culturalist assumptions. As mentioned throughout the thesis, Shi'a "political thought" is widely considered as an essential basis to understand Iranian history. Yet the historical trajectory contained in this thesis, shows us that doctrines are not fixed and unchanging codes independent of their social context. The Shi'a and Sunni sects are of no exception. In this part I will re-visit the impact of doctrine by extracting the two related myths -the unchanged doctrine of Shi'a and the revolutionary ulama as the keepers of the doctrine.

To begin with, one must bear in mind that here have always been a variety of different ways of interpreting doctrine in the history of Islam. Even in the strictly forbidden acts, such as usury, Islamic scholars have found ways to legitimise it when needed.[509] These are usually called Hile-i Seriyye and there is wide literature showing its instances in the history of Islam. Moreover, the change of the doctrine has not been limited to the acts of Hile i Seriyye. The doctrine itself has transformed throughout the history. This is true especially for Shi'a. As discussed in the third chapter, Usuli-Akhbari debate is of great importance to understand this change. This debate resulted in a novel understanding of ulama's relations with social and political affairs so hugely impacted on modern Shi'a political thought. To reiterate briefly, the debate was about the role of ulama in the absence of the imam. Do they merely rely on textual sources or do they engage in independent reasoning? Are ulama merely knowledgeable men on legal issues or are they sources of imitation in the absence of imam? Usuli won the debate and led to the creation of a new typology of ulama that has a great autonomy in his religious reasoning. More importantly, it created a political leader equipped with religious power. The well emphasized political Shi'a ulama is the result of a 19th century political debate so it relatively new in Shi'a doctrine. One should also note that this theological debate occurred as a result of very material practical reasons. As discussed in the third chapter, the debate was a direct cnsequence

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[509] Rodinson describes how the ban on interest as one of the most important orders of Islam was reinterpreted for the sake of trade in his book Maxime Rodinson, (1979), *Islam and Capitalism*. Austin: University of Texas Press.

of Messianic heterodox schools of thought such as Babi and Baha'i. The ulama lost their power against these new schools of thought but by means of this debate, it found a chance to reinforce its position.

Another well emphasized distinction between Shi'a and Sunni political thought is in the relative contrast attributed to the concepts such as *sehadet*. As discussed in the first chapter, Shi'a is argued to emphasize *şehadet* more than Sunni. This relative contrast is considered as a reason for the Iranian Islamic revolution. By the same token, the flattellation rituals of the Shi'a are usually referred to. Both in popular and academic literature, these rituals are considered as an indicator of Shi'a masses' tradition of resistance and opposition to the ruling elite. One of the most important turning points of Iranian Revolution was the 40-day (Arba'een) cycle of mourning and the demonstrations following this period. These demonstrations were suppressed bloodily by the army and then another 40 day mourning had begun. These cycles are also considered as demonstrating how strong the relation of the Shi'a masses with the *sehadet*. This culture of *sehadet* is rooted to the early ages of Islam. Hussein is the first martyr and his tradition is followed by Shia. [510] Yet as this thesis has shown, this line of thought attributing Shi'a a revolutionary character does not represent Shi'a historical trajectory. Many contrary examples can be given throughout the history. The Iran –Iraq war is one of the most cited examples. During the War, Iraqi Shi'a under a Sunni ruler fought against the Iranian Shi'a. Moreover, throughout the historical period covered here, one can find numerous other examples against the revolutionary character of Shi'a. As shown in the third chapter, especially during the reign of Reza Shah, most of the Shi'a ulama -the representatives of the Shi'a political though- did not hesitate to cooperate with the state. Those who did not cooperate with the state mostly followed "quietest attitudes". Perhaps most intriguing first hand witness of these quietest attitudes was the most revolutionary member of the Shi'a ulama. The conversation between Ayatollah Khomeini and a high level member of Iraqi ulama shows us that this myth of revolutionary Shi'a does not represent the actual conditions. In order to persuade his Iraqi counterpart to oppose against the secular regimes, Khomeini gave the example of Sunni ulama in Turkey. It is apt to quote his words:

> When I was in exile in Turkey, I went to one of the Turkish villages - I can't remember its name - and the people of that village told me that when Ataturk embarked on his un-Islamic actions, the Turkish Ulama got together in the village and began their own activities to counter his designs. In response, Ataturk surrounded the village and killed forty of those Turkish Ulama. I felt a sense of shame when I heard this. I thought to myself: these were Sunni Ulama, but when our religion of Islam was endangered they sacrificed forty lives. Yet at this time when a great danger threatens our religion, none of the noses of the Shi'a ulama bleeds, not mine, not yours nor anybody else's. This is indeed a cause of shame.[511]

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[510] Hüseyin as Sayıd al-Shuhada (the Lord of the Martrys) olarak anılır.I discussed in the introduction part there are considerable scholars that identify Shi'a with revolution. I also mention Juan Cole's words as an example of this line of thought. "the ritual mourning of Imam Huseyn carried with a dual message, of patient perseverance in the truth even unto matrydom, and of courageous battle with steel against tyranny." See Cole, *Sacred Space and Holy War,* 21.

[511] Moin, *Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah*, 142-143.

This quote suggests us that the difference between Sunni and Shi'a is neither essential nor fundamental. It is very political and it emerged as a direct result of political developments.[512] The historical trajectory analysed in this thesis showed how far these seemingly doctrinal differences are tied to social-political and historical contexts. Quoting from Zubaida "Religion is inherently neither an opium of the masses nor revolutionary calls again injustice but rather changing ideologies which strengthen and other times weaken the established order." This is valid both for Shi'a and Sunni.

6.5 Reflections and Questions on Contemporary Turkey and Iran

The major findings of this dissertation derive from an analysis of a long historical period beginning from the classical ages to the 1940s. To give even a brief account of the succeeding developments are very much beyond the limits of this part. What I do in this part is very roughly to mention some points and to ask questions about the implications of the findings of this thesis on contemporary developments. I believe the conceptual framework utilised within this study provides tools to further investigate the recent interaction between state and religion in both Turkey and Iran. Also it contributes our understanding of modern Middle East which is marked by crisis and conflicts. It is hard to grasp the recent bloody Shi'a Sunni conflict without looking at the historical trajectories of these countries. Knowledge of the historical antecedents undoubtedly contributes to our understanding of current conflicts.

In the period, succeeding the analyses of this dissertation both Iran and Turkey undergone many political and social transformations. These transformations have impacted on various aspects of both society and state, and more importantly on religion and state relations. On the institutional domain, both countries witnessed continuity and change. In Iranian side, as for the religion and state relations, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 challenged the political sphere. This challenge is not only important for Iran but also marks a crucial moment for modern politics, in the sense that it pictures a novel way of religion and state relations. First time in the modern history, a revolution is led by a member of clergy. Iran after the revolution was regarded as one of the two theocracies in the modern world.[513] A new political structure, Velayat-i Faqih, as a system which gives the custodianships of the people to a religious jurist was founded.[514] This new system had influences on two different spheres. Firstly, it can be claimed that ulama-society relations were negatively affected. Especially after the first decade in which revolutionary feelings was at their heights, Iranian Thermidor began. These eras were characterised by instances of political struggle and

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[512] For the transformation of the myth of Karbala. See. W. M. Floor.(1980) "The Revolutionary Character of the Iranian Ulama: Wishful Thinking or Reality?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, (12) 4, 1

[513] The other one being the Vatican.

[514] It is important to note that Velayat-i Faqih is not only a religious institution but also a political institution. Political aspects of the institution became more visible after the death of Ayatollah Homeyni. The election of Ali Hamaney as its successor is a good example to this observation. Iranian constitution required the supreme leader to be Grand Ayatollah, Yet Ali Khamanei was a lesser degree molla. The elective commitee did not elect a Grand Ayatollah but amended the constitution and elected Hamanei as the supreme leader. For an innovative political reading of the post-revolutionary history of Islamic Republic see Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*.

economic crisis brought by Embargo and the economic burden of recently finished Iraqi War. It is not unusual for Iranian masses to blame ulama for the failure of politics because ulama are the most visible segments of the society and are seen as the ruling class. Under these circumstances, their social as well as spiritual legitimacy has decreased. Secondly, and more important to the context of this dissertation, ulama lost a considerable extent of its autonomy under the Islamic republic. Velayati Faqih also became a controlling authority over ulama. The ulama's religious verdicts on public issues are subjected to approval of the Velayat i Faqih. Also the donations of the masses started to be controlled and put under the permission of Velayeti Faqih. To recall, this is the first time after the Safavid period when ulama started to lose their autonomy before the masses. Ironically, this happened under the rule Islamic Republic.

For the Turkish side, one can claim that the state's incorporation of the religious sphere continued. This incorporation gradually grew and resulted in a huge expansion of the religious sphere as whole. A simple look at the budget and personnel number of the directory of religious affairs demonstrates the growth of this domain. Especially after the 1980 coup, in addition to Directory of Religious Affairs, Divinity Faculties, Imam-Hatip schools, compulsory religious classes in primary and secondary schools, and official Qur'an courses continued to proliferate. One should bear in mind that all these apparatuses are fully funded and controlled by state.[515] Yet in addition to the expansion of state funded religious field, a non-official religious field also continued to grow. In this period, new religious orders started to emerge and the old ones continued to grow both in number of its adherents and their visibility. This is considered as a threat by the military and bureaucratic elite and a reorganization of the religious field was aimed with the 1997 military memorandum. Yet to no avail. By 2002 a new political party with Islamist roots – Justice and Development Party (JDP) gained majority in the parliament and started to govern Turkey. By 2014, in an intriguing turn of events, JDP, as an Islamist rooted government started a war against the biggest of these non-official Islamist orders -namely the Fethullah Gulen group. They are blamed for establishing a "parallel structure" within the confines of the Turkish state. What is interesting here is that one can see the traces of Turkish state's old tradition. What Kemalist elite did in 1920s with establishing the Law of Tevhid'i Tedrisat and the Directorate of Religious Affairs was reinvented. Against the Fethullah Gülen movement, state attempts to monopolise religious sphere. Two recent developments can be given as examples to this monopolisation endeavours. Firstly, the parliament passed a law to ban university entrance preparatory schools/courses. Although the law is defended on the basis of the principle of equality of education, the law was mainly designed against the educational facilities of Gulen movement which is seen as a source of religio-political threat.[516] Secondly, by means of a very recent amendment, the state gained the monopoly of publishing

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[515] For a work discussing the enlargement of religious sphere by focusing mainly on the period of Justice and Development Party see Mustafa Şen. (2010), "Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party," *Turkish Studies*, (11)1

[516] See Berna Aslan's interview with Tuğba Tekerek for the analogy between Tevhid'I Tedrisat Law and JDP's attempt to close down preparatory schools. http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber-cemaat-in-hic-bitmeyen-sinavi-141182/

Risale'i Nurs, which are the main textual sources of movements. I do not want make through generalizations because they are very recent, yet Turkish state seems to incorporate religious sphere. [517]

In international arena both countries continued to be rivals in terms of religion. Especially after the dissolution of Baghdad Pact (1955-1979) as a result of Iranian Revolution, the oldest rivalry in the Middle East took intensity and once more reflected in religious terms. Although not bloody and fierce as 17th century wars, Iran and Turkey once again emerged as the most powerful countries of Sunni and Shi'a. Both in Iraqi political turmoil and Syrian Civil War, Turkey and Iran took sides according to their sectarian identity. So one can claim that the both Iran and Turkey played their roles in the Shi'a Sunni divide in the region which escalated like it has never been in the modern ages. The ongoing bloody civil war in Syria is an interesting context in which Shi'a and Sunni divide understood in relation to history. Ottoman Safavid wars are also memorised in this context. For example, Islamic State of Iraq and Levant do not hesitate to call Iraqi Shi'a government as Safavids. Historical memory is also vivid in domestic politics. The naming of the newest Istanbul Bridge as the Selim (the grim) in honour of the Ottoman Sultan famous for his wars with Iran indicates the perceived historical continuity between modern Iran and the Safavids. This historical memory is also vivid in Iranian side. I personally witnessed Iranian Sunnis-not of Turkish origin but Beluch-called themselves as *Osmani* meaning Ottoman. Alleged Iranian involvement in the Turkish Alevis is another popular subject that points out the continuity of historical trajectory.

In sum, the conceptual framework which this thesis deals with can offer valuable insights into both domestic and international developments. State and religion continued to interact in both countries. At the very first glance there seems to be tendency through convergence than divergence in both Iranian and Turkish sides. Yet further research and time is needed to reflect on future trajectories closely. Whether Iranian ulama will gain back its autonomy or whether unofficial religious sphere will continue to exist in the Turkish case can only be understood by time. Nevertheless, from a vantage point located outside the boundaries of recent developments, one can more easily analyse the future. It is also similar for international arena. As the ongoing conflict in the Middle East demonstrates, the impacts of the historical memory of Shi'a Sunni divide continue. The ways in which Iran and Turkey will position itself with respect to this divide can be grasped only through addressing the politics and history.

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[517] Another recent development of the state's incorporation of the religious sphere was the Mele (Molla in Kurdish) Reform of the 2012. According to this reform The Directory of Religious Affairs employed 1000 traditionally educated molla. These mollas are mostly living in Kurdish regions of Anatolia. It is interesting to note that this reform movement succeeds the alternative Friday prayers as a part of Peace and Democracy Party's civil disobedience campaign. So one can claim that, when state perceived a threat coming from the religious sphere, it does not hesitate to incorporate.

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A. TURKISH SUMMARY

1. Giriş

Bu çalışmada İran ve Türkiye'de din-devlet ilişkilerinin farklı siyasal ve tarihsel deneyimlerden kaynaklanan farklı karakteristikleri tartışılmaktadır. Bu farklı karakteristiklerin oluşması 15. ve 20. Yüzyıllar arasında bu iki ülkenin merkezileşme dönemlerine tarihlendirilmiştir. Tezin İran kısmı için, bu tez içeriğinde kapsanan tarihsel aralık Safavi İmparatorluğu'nun kuruluşundan, Rıza Şah'ın İktidar Dönemi'nin sonuna kadar olan dönemi kapsamaktadır. Bu dönem, İran tarihinde üç hanedanın değiştiği, toplumun mezhepsel aidiyetinin kökten bir şekilde dönüştüğü ve devlet yapısı ve dini kurumlar arasındaki ilişkinin farklı biçimler aldığı bir dönemdir. Öte yandan tezin Türkiye kısmı için, Osmanlı kuruluş tartışmalarından başlayarak Mustafa Kemal Atatürk Dönemi'nin sonuna kadar olan dönem incelenmiştir. Bu dönem içerisinde Anadolu Yarımadası kademeli bir merkezileşme ve sonrasında imparatorluktan cumhuriyete bir dönüşüm ile yüzleşmiştir. Öte yandan devlet ve din bu uzun dönemler boyunca genel anlamıyla iki önemli iktidar kaynağı olarak varlıklarını sürdürmeye devam etmişlerdir. Bu çalışma sözkonusu dönüşüm ve devamlılığı bu uzun dönem içerisinde araştırmayı amaçlamaktadır.

İran ve Türkiye tarihinin daha yakın dönemleri- kabaca 1940 sonrası- tezin ana gövdesine dahil edilmemiştir. Merkezileşme ve ulus-devlet oluşum süreçlerinin din –devlet ilişkilerine yakın dönem gelişmelerinden daha doğrudan bir biçimde etki ettiği düşünülmüştür. Buna ek olarak yakın dönemin kendine has tartışmalarını teze eklemenin üreteceği pratik zorluklar da incelenecek dönemi genişletmemenin bir diğer nedeni olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Yine de tezin en sonunda tezde incelenen dönemin sonrasına dair özet niteliğinde bir tartışma bulunmaktadır.

Çalışma temel olarak toplumsal alanın üç boyutuna yoğunlaşmıştır: **Kurumsal, Uluslararası ve İdeolojik boyutlar**. Bu boyutlar ile ilgili, temel olarak üç noktanın önemli olduğu görülmüştür. İlk olarak din devlet ilişkilerinin yapısını belirleyen temel önemde bir unsurun, dini yapıların kurumsallaşma düzeyleri olduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. **Tezin analizi göstermiştir ki Türkiye özelinde devlet geleneği dini kontrol etmeye ve içermeye dayanan bir yönelime sahiptir. Öte yandan İran'da, özellikle Safavi İmparatorluğu dönemi sonrasında geçerli olmak üzere, gelenek, dini kurumların devlete karşı özerk bir yapı sergilemeleridir**. İkinci olarak, çalışma, ideolojik açıdan **Şiilik ve Sünniliğe atfedilen siyasi belirlenim farklılıklarının açıklayıcı olmadığını göstermektedir**. Maddi, siyasi ve uluslararası faktörler, ideolojik faktörler üzerinde açıklayıcı güç sahibidirler. Üçüncü olarak çalışmada Kamran Matin'ın "her toplumun tarihsel gelişimi temelde onun uluslararası ilişkileri tarafından eş kurulur" kavramsallaştırmasına uygun bir

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biçimde dış faktörlerin önemi teslim edilmeye çalışılmaktadır.[518] Bir başka deyişle, tez, uluslararası ilişkilerin de din devlet ilişkilerinde kurucu rolünü araştırmaktadır. Tez boyunca tartışıldığı üzere, **iki ülke arasında uluslararası faktörlerin ürettiği temel farklılık bu faktörlerin doğrudan ve dolaylı niteliklerinden neşet etmektedir**. Savaş ve işgal gibi doğrudan uluslararası faktörler İran örneğinde ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu doğrudan etkilerin sonucu olarak İran'da devlet yapısı daha kırılgan ve dönemsel olarak bölünmelere açık bir yapı serdetmiştir. Öte yandan bu karşılaştırmanın Türkiye ayağı için uluslararası faktörlerin dolaylı etkilerinin daha belirleyici olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Batı etkisi ya da milliyetçilik benzeri ideolojik etkiler, Türkiye örneğinde, daha belirleyici gözükmektedir. Tez ayrıca iki ülke arasındaki sınır-aşan ilişkilerin de iki ülkenin dini kimliklerinin oluşumu için temel önemde olduğunu iddia etmektedir.

Tezin yapısı temel olarak altı bölümden oluşmaktadır. İlk bölüme Türkiye ve İran karşılaştırmaları literatürünün tartışılması ile başlanmıştır. Bu literatür içerisinde tekrar eden beş temel izlek tesbit edilmiştir. İlk karşılaştırma izleğinin temel teması Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ve Rıza Şah'ın modernleşme çabalarını karşılaştırmaktır. Bu izlek "**Modernleşme Literatürü**" olarak isimlendirilmiştir. İkinci karşılaştırma izleği temel olarak bu iki ülkenin mezhepsel yapılarına bakmaktadır. Şiilik ve Sünnilik farkı ve bu farkın siyasi yansımaları bu literatürün tartıştığı konular arasındadır. Bu izlek temel olarak mezhepsel yapıları değişmez özler olarak görmekle malüldür. Bu izlek, araştırma nesnesini dini kültürel temalar olarak seçtiği ancak bu tartışmayı özcü bir biçimde yaptığı için "**Özcü Dini-Kültürel Karşılaştırmalar**" olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Yine dini yapılarla ilgilenen ancak araştırma nesnesine özcü ve sabit bir biçimde bakmayan bir üçüncü izlek daha vardır. Son dönem literatüründe ön plana çıktığı görülen bu izlek "**Özcü olmayan Dini Kültürel Karşılaştırmalar**" olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Bir diğer izlek ise Türkiye ve İran'da kurumsal yapılara bakar. Bu izlek "**Kurumsal Ekonomik Karşılaştırmalar**" olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Bu izlek temel olarak iki ülke arasında farklı kurum oluşturma süreçlerini ve bu süreçlerdeki farklılıkların siyasi alana yansımalarını tartışmaktadır. Son olarak ise literatürde yakın dönem siyasetinin karşılaştırılmasına dayanan bir son izlek ise "**Çağdaş Karşılaştırma Çabaları**" olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır.

İlk bölümün ikinci kısmı ise Din-Devlet ilişkilerine dair genel literatürün bir tartışması olarak yazılmıştır. Bu literatür temel olarak üç parçaya ayrılarak tartışılmıştır. Bunlar **Din-Devlet İlişkilerine Kültürelci Yaklaşımlar**, **Din-Devlet İlişkilerine Modernist Yaklaşımlar** ve **Dini Ekonomi Modeli** olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Tez içerisinde tek bir yaklaşım takip edilmemiş bu üç yaklaşım da çeşitli derecelerde kullanılmıştır. İlk bölümün son kısmı tezin içeriğinin özgünlük ve katkısının tartışılmasına ayrılmıştır.

Tezin takip eden dört kısmında din-devlet ilişkilerine dair genel ve analitik olmasına çalışılmış bir tarihsel anlatı kurulmuştur. Bu anlatı hem İran hem de Türkiye kısımları için kabaca modern ve pre-modern dönem olarak isimlendirilen ikişer kısmı içermektedir. İran kısmı için basitçe Şia siyasi doktrininin temel bir

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[518] Kamran Matin, *Recasting Iranian Modernity International Relations and Social Change*, New York: Routledge, 2013. s.145

tarihsel tartışmasının peşine İran'ın toplumsal yapısının çoğunluğunun Şii mezhebini benimsediği dönem olan Safavi hanedanı döneminin din-devlet ilişkileri tartışılmıştır. Takip eden Kaçar hanedanı dönemi özellikle işgaller, devletin kırılgan yapısı, hanedanın meşruiyet problemleri temele alınarak tartışılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak dönemin dini-ideolojik tartışmaları, yeni dini hareketler ve dini kurumların bu eksende dönüşümleri de ayrıca tartışılmıştır. Pehlevi yönetimini önceleyen dönemin Anayasa devrimi ve Tütün boykotu gibi din-devlet ilişkilerine yansıyan tarihsel dönemeçleri de bu kısım içerisinde ayrıca tartışılmıştır. Bu kısım dönemin, önemli dönüşümlerinin ideolojik, uluslararası ve kurumsal isimleri ile üç ayrı başlıkta tartışılması ile son bulmaktadır.

Tezin üçüncü bölümü **İran'da din devlet ilişkilerinin modern dönemini tartışmaktadır**. İlk olarak Anayasa devriminden Rıza Şah'ın iktidara gelmesine kadar olan dönemin temel gelişmeleri kısaca özetlenmiş, akabinde dönemin genel özellikleri Rıza Şah'ın hükümet etme biçimi ve bunun din-devlet ilişkilerine yansımaları eksene alınarak analiz edilmiştir. Kısım içerisinde Rıza Şah dönemi ikiye ayrılmıştır. Erken dönem, özellikle Cumhuriyet Krizi ve yeni Askerlik Yasası gibi dönemin din-devlet ilişkileri üzerinde belirleyici şekilde etkili olan iki olayının tartışılmasına ayrılmıştır. İkinci kısım ise üç ana başlıkta incelenmiştir. Bunlar **Yasal-Kurumsal Alan**, **Sembolik İdeolojik-Alan** ve **Ekonomik Alan'dır**. Din adamları sınıfının Rıza Şah döneminin siyasi gelişmelerine tepkileri de ayrı bir başlık olarak ele alınmıştır. Tezin üçüncü kısmı dönemin önemli dönüşümlerinin ideolojik, uluslararası ve kurumsal isimleri ile üç ayrı başlıkta tartışılması ile son bulmaktadır.

Tezin dördüncü kısmı **Türkiye'de din-devlet ilişkilerinin erken dönemini** tartışmaktadır. İlk olarak Osmanlı kuruluş döneminin toplumsal yapısı, özellikle dönemin dini karakteristikleri ve devlet oluşum süreçleri ile bu karakteristiklerin etkileşimi ekseninde incelenmiştir. Devamında Osmanlı klasik dönemi ve dönem içerisinde dini kurumların oluşumu tartışılmıştır. Özellikle dönemin en önemli dini kurumu sayılabilecek **Şeyhulislamlığın** ortaya çıkışı ve geçirdiği tarihsel dönüşümler din-devlet ilişkilerinin bir temel göstergesi olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Yine klasik dönem içerisinde dini meşruiyet de bir başka başlık olarak analiz edilmiştir. Geç Osmanlı Dönemi üç ayrı başlık altında incelenmiştir. **Erken Reform hareketleri ve din adamları sınıfı arasındaki ilişki**, **Tanzimat dönemi eklemlenme ve ikilik tartışmaları** ve **II. Abdülhamit Dönemi dini kurumlarla ilişkiler**. Tezin dördüncü kısmı da dönemin önemli dönüşümlerinin ideolojik, uluslararası ve kurumsal yansımalarının tartışılması ile son bulmaktadır.

Tezin beşinci kısmı Türkiye'de din-devlet ilişkilerinin modern dönemini ele almaktadır. Bu kısım temel olarak iki ayrı bölüme ayrılmıştır. İlk bölüm Cumhuriyet öncesi İttihat Ve Terakki dönemi din-devlet ilişkilerini incelemektedir. İttihat ve Terakki'nin iktidarı ele almasından önceki dönem, örgütün entellektüel kökenlerininin tartışılması ve özellikle positivizm tartışmaları üzerinden tartışılmıştır. Bu temel noktalara ek olarak örgütün iktidar döneminde dini kurumla kurdukları ilişkiler de bu tartışmaları baz alarak incelenmiştir. Beşinci kısım içerisinde bir diğer başlık ise I. Dünya Savaşı ve İstiklal Harbi'nin ürettiği ikili iktidar yapısıdır. Bu ikili iktidar yapısının dönemin din-devlet ilişkilerine yansımaları da bu kısım içerisinde

tartışılmıştır. Tezin beşinci kısmının ikinci bölümü ise Cumhuriyet dönemi din-devlet ilişkilerini tartışmaktadır. Bu dönem de Rıza Şah Dönemi ile benzer olarak üç ana başlıkta incelenmiştir. Bunlar **Yasal-Kurumsal Alan**, **Sembolik-İdeolojik Alan** ve **Ekonomik Alan'dır.** Halifeliğin Kaldırılması ve Diyanet İşleri Teşkilatı'nın kurulması dönemin din-devlet ilişkilerini belirleyen temel önemde gelişmeler olarak ayrıca incelenmiştir. Tezin beşinci kısmı da dönemin önemli dönüşümlerinin ideolojik, uluslararası ve kurumsal düzlemini üç ayrı başlıkta tartışılması ile son bulmaktadır.

2. Tezin Bulguları

Bu kısımda Türkiye ve İran'da din-devlet ilişkilerinin benzer ve farklı yanları tartışılacaktır. Bu yapılırken birinci ve altıncı kısımlar arasında tartışılan tarihsel izleğe referans verilecektir. En başta belirtildiği gibi, çalışmada, sözkonusu benzerlik ve farklılıkların kurulduğu alanlar üç temel başlıkta tartışılmıştır. Bunlar Uluslararası, Kurumsal ve İdeolojik alanlardır. Tarihsel tartışmalar göstermektedir ki bu üç alan zaman zaman içiçe geçebilir, zaman zaman ise ayrıksı kalabilirler. Söz gelimi bir tarafta kurumsal yapıların farklılıkları bu iki toplumun dini kimlikleri üzerinden anlaşılabilirken öte yandan bu kurumsal yapılar tam da bu dini kimliklerin dönüşümünde rol alırlar. Bir başka deyişle, Karl Marx'ın meşhur sözüne atfen şu söylenebilir: İran ve Türkiye'de devlet onun kurucusu olduğu tarihsel yapılar "kendi tarihlerini kendi belirlemediği koşullarda yapmışlardır."

Uluslararası etkilere bakıldığında durumun daha az karışık olmadığı anlaşılabilir. İki tarihsel deneyim çeşitli şekillerde uluslararası etkiler ile karşılaşmışlardır. Çalışmada bu etkiler üçe bölünerek tartışılmıştır. **İlk olarak, iki ülke de savaşların, farklı derecelerde de olsa din-devlet ilişkilerindeki etkileri ile başetmek zorunda kalmışlardır.** Hem İran'ın hem de Türkiye'nin dinsel ve etnik demografileri tarihsel olarak bu savaşlardaki zafer ve yenilgilerin bir sonucu olarak şekillenmiştir. Yine bu tarihsel süreçte yaşanan savaşların sonucu olarak bu iki ülkenin devlet yapıları kesintiye uğramış, konsolide olmuş ya da zayıflamıştır. **İkinci olarak, büyük oranda 18. Yüzyıl sonrasında ve özellikle 20. Yüzyıl'da olmak üzere iki ülke de uluslararası etkinin savaş dışı biçimleri ile karşılaşmışlardır.** Batı kökenli unsurlar Aydınlanma Felsefesi, Milliyetçilik ve Kapitalizm çeşitli derecelerde bu iki ülkenin din-devlet ilişkilerinde yansımalarını bulmuşlardır. Esasen, klasik dönemin bütün kurumları dini kurumları ve devleti de hesaba katarsak, bu yukarda sayılan faktörlerin etkisiyle temel dönüşümler geçirmişlerdir. Başka bir deyişle hem devlet hem din bu uluslararası unsurlar nedeniyle kendilerini yeniden yapılandırmak durumunda kalmışlardır. **Üçüncü olarak ise, İran ve Türkiye'nin iki komşu ülke olarak kendi aralarındaki ilişkiler de din-devlet ilişkilerini etkilemiştir.** Osmanlı-Safavi Savaşları ve Rıza Şah ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk arasındaki ilişkiler din devlet ilişkilerinin gelişimi noktasında temel önemde gözükmektedir.

İki ülkede din devlet ilişkilerini belirleyen bir diğer faktör, bu iki ülkenin taşıdığı mezhepsel kimliklerdir. Bir başka deyişle bu iki ülkenin toplumsal ve kısmen devlet düzeyinde taşıdığı Şii ve Sünni kimlikleridir. Devletlerin yapısı ve uluslararası etkiler bu iki farklı mezhepsel kimliğin sözkonusu ülkelerin toplumları tarafından kabulü ve yaygınlaşması anlamında rollerini oynamışlardır. Öte yandan bu mezhepsel kimlikler

de kendi kurumsallaşmalarını tamamladıktan sonra çeşitli oranlarda uluslararası ve bölgesel siyasete etkide bulunmuşlardır.

Sonuç olarak kurumsal, ideolojik ve uluslararası alanlar bu iki ülkede de din-devlet ilişkilerini biçimlendiren temel alanlardır. Bunların benzerlik ve farklılıkları iki ülkede farklı yapılar ve tarihsel izlekler üretmişlerdir. Takip eden kısımda bu alanları tezin tartıştığı biçimde özetlemeye çalışacağım.

2.1. Kurumlar ve Din

İran ve Türkiye Ortadoğu'nun sömürgeleşme deneyimi yaşamamış iki ülkesi olarak çoklukla devlet gelenekleri ile gurur duyarlar. Zengin bir siyaset kültürü ve kesintisiz devam eden bir bürokrasi geleneği, iki ülkede de, bu gururun çokca vurgulanan örnekleri olarak görülebilir. Tezin girişinde modernleşme literatürü ismiyle tartışılan genel düşünce çizgisi Türkiye'de devlet geleneğini İran'a göre nisbi olarak daha kesintisiz, güçlü ve sağlam olarak çizer. Bu literatüre ek olarak kurumsal yapılarla ilgilenen kurumsal ekonomik karşılaştırmalar literatürü de Türkiye'de devlet geleneğine vurgu yapan bir diğer düşünce çizgisidir.

Bu devlet gelenekleri karşılaştırmaları iki geleneğin dini alan ile ilişkisi üzerine bize bir şey söyler. İran'da dini kurumlar Türkiye'deki muadillerine nisbetle daha özerk ve güçlü olarak görülmüşlerdir. İran'da din adamları sınıfı daha güçlü bir toplumsal dokunun üyeleri olarak güçlü bir hiyerarşi ve özerk gelir kaynakları edinebilmişlerdir. Rıza Şah ve Mustafa Kemal Atatürk dönemleri bu temel farklılığın görünür olduğu dönemler olarak ön plana çıkmaktadırlar. Çok basitçe şöyle denebilir, din-devlet ilişkilerini Türkiye ve İran'da iki ideal tip üzerinden okuyabiliriz. İçermeci ve dışarda bırakan devlet tipleri. **Türkiye'de devlet dini kurumları içermiş, İran'da ise dışarda bırakmıştır. Bu süreci belirleyen iki temel dinamik vardır. Birincisi devletlerin kurumsal kapasiteleri, ikincisi dini kurumların iç organizasyonlarıdır.**

Bu tezde kurulan tarihsel izlek bu yapının sadece modern dönemle kısıtlı olmayacağını da göstermektedir. Türkiye'de dini kurumların devlet tarafından içerilmesinin tarihi Osmanlı klasik dönemine kadar sürülebilir. Klasik dönemde devletin bu içermeci davranışının bir kaç nedeninden bahsedilebilir. İlk olarak merkezileşmenin doğal bir sonucu olarak kurumsal kapasitenin artması sayılabilir. Bu kapasite arttırımı zamanla dini alana da kaymıştır. Çalışmanın dördüncü kısmında tartışıldığı gibi şeyhulislamlık kurumunun evrimi bu durumun bir örneği olarak görülebilir. Şeyhülislamlık görece küçük ölçekte ve güçsüz bir yapı olarak ortaya çıkmış ancak zamanla devletin merkezileşmesine paralel olarak daha merkezi bir kurum olmaya doğru evrilmiştir. Özellikle klasik dönemin güçlü hükümdarları olan I. Selim ve I. Süleyman Dönemler'inde Şeyhülislamlık yönetim görevleri olan önemli bir bürokratik yapı olarak tekamül etmiştir. Yine tezin aynı kısmında tartışılan, dönemin önemli din adamları ve şeyhülislamları olan, Ebusuud Efendi ve Koca Çivilizade arasındaki para vakıfları tartışması da kurumun devlet çıkarları ile ilişkisini gösteren bir diğer örnek olarak tartışılmıştır. Bu tartışmada Ebusuud Efendi'nin para vakıflarına izin vermesi, devlet çıkarları sözkonusu olduğunda dini emirlerin esnetilebileceğine dair önemli bir gösterge olarak görülebilir.

Bir başka deyişle dini alanın önemli kısımları bu dönem içerisinde sadece devlete eklemlenmekle kalmamış meşruiyet sağlayıcı özneler olarak iş görmüşlerdir.

Dini alanın özerkliğinin azalması ve devlete eklemlenmesi modern döneme yaklaştıkça artan bir hızla devam etmiştir. Erken dönem Akdeniz dünyasına dair bir gözlemi Osmanlı'ya uyarlarsak Osmanlı modernleşmesi de bölgenin diğer modernleşme örnekleri gibi "bütün farklı iktidar biçimlerinin başarılı bir şekilde yönetici güce tabii kılınmasını içerir."[519] Bunu mümkün kılan ise yöneticilerin güçlerinin gelişen iletişim ve teknolojileri ve yeni eğitim kurumları yoluyla konsolide olmasını sağlayan dönemsel gelişmelerdir. Bu anlamda II. Mahmud ve III. Selim Dönemleri özellikle önemli sayılabilir. Tezin dördüncü kısmında tartışıldığı gibi din adamları sınıfı, ciddi oranda, bu sultanların reform girişimlerini desteklemiştir. Bu da dönemin genel okumasının hilafına dini kurumun klasik dönemden getirdiği yönetici sınıfı destekleme alışkanlığını sürdürdüğünü gösterir. Dönemin kurumsal anlamda bir diğer önemli gelişmesi ise Bab-ı Meşihat'ın kurulmasıdır. Bununla birlikte Şeyhulislamlığın bürokrasiye eklemlenmesi bir kademe daha ileri gitmiştir. Yine aynı dönemde kurulmuş ancak II. Abdülhamit'in iktidarında gelişimini tamamlamış temel önemdeki bir diğer kurum ise Meclis-i Meşayih'dir. Başta devlet dışı dini kurumların liderleri için oluşturulmuş bir meclis olan bu kurum zamanla devletin tekkelere müdahale etmesinin bir aracı haline dönüşmüştür. Osmanlı bürokrasisi Meclis-i Meşayih aracılığıyla bu devlet dışı kurumların yöneticilerini belirlemeye başlamıştır. II. Abdülhamit'in dini alanı kontrol çabalarının bir ideolojik ayağını ise dönemin Panislamizm düşüncesi oluşturur. Bu ideolojik aracı kullanarak devlet Osmanlı'nın Müslüman Tebaasını milliyetçilik tarafından oluşturulan ideolojik tehdit karşısında kendi yanında tutmaya çalışmıştır. Buna ek olarak yine bu dönemde devlet ülkenin heteredoks sayılan dini gruplarını eğitim aracılığıyla ortodoks yapıya eklemlemeye çalışmıştır.

Tezde modern dönemin başlangıcı olarak alınan İttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (İTC) Dönemi ve devam eden erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi arasında bir süreklilik gözlemlenmiştir. İTC göreve gelir gelmez din adamları sınıfının önemli bir fraksiyonunun desteğini ele geçirmeyi başarmıştır. Bu fraksiyonun İTC'ye desteği karşılıksız kalmamış ve dini alanın yönetici pozisyonlarında kendilerine yer bulabilmişlerdir. Yani denilebilir ki İTC, selefleri olan Osmanlı tarihsel geleneği ve halefleri olacak olan Türkiye Cumhuriyeti ile tutarlı olarak dini alanı içerme ve kontrol etmeye devam etmiştir. Dönemi takip eden İstiklal Harbi'ni tanımlayan karakteristik ise ikili iktidar yapısıdır. Ankara ve İstanbul hükümetlerinin iktidar için savaştığı bu dönemde iki grup da kendilerini destekleyecek din adamlarını bulmakta zorlanmamışlardır. Cumhuriyet Dönemi, dini alanı içerme çabalarının en yoğun olarak görülebileceği dönemdir. Devlet bu dönemde bir Osmanlı Klasik Dönemi kurumu olan halifeliği kaldırmış ancak yerine son derece güçlü bir bürokratik kurum olan Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nı getirmiştir. Başkanlık dini alanın tamamına yakını üzerinde söz sahibi olacak bir yapı olarak planlanmıştır. Devlet, Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığını kurarak dini alanın

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[519] Linda T. Darling, "Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterrenian World," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Sayı: 38. No: 4. 2008

merkezileşmesinde bir merhale daha geçmiştir. Anadolu tarihinde ilk defa olmak üzere bütün camiler- en azından formel olarak- devletin maaşlı çalışanları tarafından yönetilmeye başlanmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak İlahiyat Fakülteleri ve İmam Hatip Okullarının açılması ile devlet dini eğitim tekelini de eline almış olmaktadır. Bu dönemin önemli bir özelliği ve sürekliliği gösteren bir diğer gösterge ise Osmanlı din adamları sınıfının önemli bir kısmının Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı ya da İlahiyat Fakülteler'inde istihdam edilmek sureti ile devletin maaşlı çalışanı haline gelmesidir.

İran devleti için bu düzeyde kesintisiz bir içerme ve kontrol çabasından bahsedemeyiz. Tezde incelenen ilk dönem olan Safavi dönemi devletin dini alan üzerinde temel otorite olarak varolduğu bir dönemdir. Safaviler heteredoks kökenleri olan bir tarikat olarak İran Platosu'nun o dönem büyük oranda Sünni olan toplumsal yapısı üzerinde kendi kontrollerini dayatabilmişlerdi. Safavi hükümdarı Şah İsmail bir taraftan askeri gücünü diğer taraftan ise "kutsal" personasını kullanarak ideolojik meşruiyetini toplumsal düzeye yaymayı becermiştir. Bu anlamda Safavi dönemi İran tarihinde *caaseropatist* eğilimlerin ön planda olduğu bir dönem olarak görülebilir. Dini alan büyük oranda devletin hakimiyeti altında idi. Bir diğer deyişle bu dönem için konuşursak Türkiye ve İran gelenekleri benzer olarak nitelendirilebilirler. Öte yandan takip eden Kaçar Dönemi için benzer özelliklerin baskın olduğunu söylemek mümkün görünmemektedir. Kaçarlar tarihlerinin hiç bir aşamasında, dini alanda, aynı düzeyde iktidar kuramamışlardır. Bu meşruiyet eksikliği ve devlet yapısının görece kırılganlığı dini alanın özerkliğini destekleyen unsurlar olarak ön plana çıkmışlardır. Özellikle 18. ve 19. Yüzyılların heteredoks akımları ve yine aynı dönemde Şiilik içerisinde yaşanan ideolojik dönüşümlerde yukarıda bahsedilen özerkliği destekleyen diğer faktörler olarak sayılabilirler.

İran tarihinin modern dönemi için de benzer özellikleri gözlemlemek mümkündür. Rıza Şah inanmış bir modernist olmasına ve merkezileşme siyasetini politikalarının merkezine koymasına rağmen, dini alanı, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devletinin yapabildiği düzeyde kontrol etmeyi becerememiş görünmektedir. Bu durumun bir kaç nedeninden söz edilebilir. İlk olarak, İran Devletinin, Türkiye'deki muadili kadar ileri bir kurumsal kapasiteye sahip olduğu söylenemez. İkinci olarak, dönem itibariyle, İran'da dini kurumların yapısının Türkiye'ye oranla çok daha gelişmiş olduğu açıktır. Kurumların uzun süren özerkliği, sermaye birikimine ve kendi iç hiyerarşilerinin oturmasına sebep olmuştur. Bu özerklik geleneği devletin dini alanı tam anlamıyla kontrol etmesini engelleyen temel faktördür. Yine de, bu hususta, Rıza Şah'ın tam anlamıyla başarısız olduğu da söylenemez. Şah özellikle gücünü konsolide ettiği 1925 sonrasında dini alana Kaçar döneminde hiç olmadığı kadar yayılmayı başarmıştır. Bu dönemde, Şah, din adamları sınıfını büyük oranda bastırmış ve kendisine tabii kılamadıklarını ise pasifist kalmaya zorlamıştır. Burada ilginç bir nokta olarak belirtmek gerekir ki daha sonraları İran Devrimi'nin liderliğini yapacak olan Ayetullah Humeyni de bu dönem din adamları sınıfının pasifizmi savunan üyelerinden bir tanesi idi.

Tez boyunca tartışılan tarihsel izleğin gösterdiği gibi dini alanın içerilmesi ve özerkliği Türkiye ve İran'ın din-devlet tarihsel ilişkilerindeki temel farklılık olarak görülebilir. Ancak bu temel ikilemin açıklayamadığı

tarihsel dönemeçler de vardır. Sözgelimi Safavi Dönemi buna bir örnek olarak görülebilir. Buna ek olarak Rıza Şah döneminin kontrol çabaları da küçümsenmemelidir. Yine ilginç bir şekilde Rıza Şah dönemi politikaları dini kurumlar için bir düzeyde özerkliğin ve iç hiyerarşinin kurumsallaşmasına da yol açmıştır. Kıyafet Yasaları buna bir örnek olarak verilebilir. Kesinlikle din adamları karşıtı amaçlarla çıkarılmalarına rağmen yasaların, Rıza Şah ve yönetici elitler tarafından, istenmeyen sonuçları olmuştur. Bu dönemde, dini kıyafetleri giyme serbestisinin sadece din adamları ile kısıtlanması sonuç olarak din adamlarının kendilerini belirgin toplumsal göstergeler ile toplumdan ayırmalarına yol açmıştır. Bir başka deyişle Kıyafet Yasaları'nın sonucu olarak din adamları toplumun diğer katmanlarından ayrı bir sosyal sınıf olarak ortaya çıkmışlardır. Buna ek olarak, yine Rıza Şah Dönemi, Kum şehrinin de önemli bir dini merkez olarak ortaya çıktığı bir dönemdir. Şah İngilizlerden kaçan Şii din adamlarını desteklemiş ve bu şehre yönlendirmiştir. Bu sınıf yeni bir dini eğitim sistemi ve hiyerarşi kurmuştur. Yani bir kez daha vurgulamak gerekir ki Şahın politikaları her ne kadar tersini amaçlasalar da dini alanın özerkliğini arttıracak sonuçlara yol açmışlardır.

2.2. Uluslararası Etkiler: Devlet ve Din

Hem İran hem de Türkiye yaygın bir şekilde, coğrafi olarak doğu ile batının kesiştiği noktalar olarak tarif edilirler. Doğu ve batıyı birleştiren bir köprü olma metaforu iki ülke için de sıklıkla kullanılır. Bu koşullar altında uluslarası etkilerin iki ülke için de temel önemde olduğu açıktır. Hiç kuşkusuz bu etkiler belirli düzeylerde iki ülkenin din-devlet ilişkilerine de yansımaktadır. Bu tezin tartıştığı tarihsel çerçevede uluslararası etkiler üçe ayrılmaktadır. İlk olarak, bazı tarihsel dönemler için uluslararası etkilerin kendisini direk savaş ve işgaller biçiminde gösterdiği gözlenebilir. İkinci olarak bu iki ülkenin toplumsal yapılarının batılı düşünce akımlarından etkilenmeleri ve kapitalizme entegrasyonları bir diğer uluslararası faktör olarak sayılabilir. Son olarak ise iki komşunun sınır aşan ilişkileri de bir başka uluslararası boyut olarak görülebilir.

İki ülke de hem klasik hem de modern dönemlerde olmak üzere savaş ve işgaller ile karşılaşmışlardır. Bu tarihsel dönemeçler iki ülkenin devlet yapılarına zayıflama ya da çöküş anları olarak yansımıştır. Yukarıda da tartışıldığı gibi bu devlet yapısının kırılganlığı ya da güçlülüğü din-devlet ilişkilerini etkileyen temel bir unsur olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu anlamda, uluslararası unsurların da sonucu olarak İran'da devlet yapısı, genel bir çerçevede, daha kırılgan bir yapı arzederken, Türkiye'de daha güçlü görünmektedir. İran platosu tezin kapsadığı dönem içerisinde en az üç büyük işgal ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu dış müdahalelerin sonucu olarak çeşitli hanedan değişiklikleri ile karşılaşmıştır. Safavilerin getirdiği büyük dönüşüm ülkenin mezhepsel yapısını kökten bir dönüşüme uğratmıştır. Buna ek olarak Afgan işgali büyük dinsel yarılmalara yol açmıştır. Safavi hanedanını yıkan bu işgal, akabinde Kaçar Hanedanının iktidara gelmesi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Modern dönemde Rus ve İngiliz işgalleri Kaçar Hanedanı'nı yıkmış ve Pehleviler'in iktidara gelmesi ile sonuçlanacak bir dönemi başlatmıştır. Son olarak İkinci Dünya Savaşı koşullarında Ruslar ve İngilizler yine bir müdahalede bulunmuş ve Rıza Şah'ı hükümdarlığı oğlu Muhammed Rıza Şah'a bırakmak zorunda bırakmışlardır. Öte yandan Türkiye ve selefi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu her ne kadar çeşitli savaş ve işgallerle yüzyüze kalsa da hanedan değişimi ve devlet yapısı anlamında İran kadar büyük

dönüşümler yaşamamıştır. Bunun temel bir istisnası Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin kurulması ile sonuçlanacak olan İstiklal Harbi'dir.

Bir başka açıdan bakıldığında Türkiye'de din-devlet ilişkilerinin gelişimi de savaş ve işgallerden etkilenmiştir. Ancak bu etkiler uluslararası ideolojilerin etkisi ile beraber düşünüldüğünde daha anlamlı olmaktadır. Özellikle yükselen Milliyetçilik düşüncesinin sonucu olarak Osmanlı'dan ayrılan, ayrılmak zorunda bırakılan, azınlıklar Anadolu'nun dini demografisinin değiştirmesinde rol oynamışlardır. Yine benzer saiklerle gerçekleşen Anadolu'ya yönelik Müslüman göçleri de aynı sonuçlara yol açmıştır. Bunlara özellikle Birinci Dünya Savaşı ve sonrasında zorunlu Ermeni Sürgünü ve takip eden dönemin Türk-Yunan Mübadelesi'ni de eklemek gerekir. Bu etkilerin sonucu olarak Osmanlı ve halefi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde çoğunluğu gayrimüslimlerden oluşan ticaret burjuvazisi son derece zayıflamıştır. Bu durum burjuvazinin yokluğunda orantısız olarak toplumsal güç kazanacak bir devlet yapısını da beraberinde getirmiştir. Bir başka deyişle rakipsiz kalan devlet toplumsal alana doğru rahatça genişleyebilmiştir. Bu durumun bir sonucu olarak devletin dini alanı kendine eklemlemesi de kolaylaşmıştır.

Hem İran hem Türkiye için din-devlet ilişkilerini etkileyen uluslararası faktörlerin etkili olduğu bir üçüncü alan ise iki ülke arasındaki sınır-aşan ilişkilerdir. Tarihsel olarak, özellikle İran din adamları sınıfı için bu sınır aşan boyut son derece etkili bir koruma anlamına gelmiştir. Şöyle ki Osmanlı-İran Sınırı'nın Irak tarafında güçlü Şii merkezleri bulunmaktadır. Bu durum İranlıların kendilerini dini olarak sınırın iki tarafında da son derece rahat hissetmelerini sağlamıştır. Kaçar Şahları'nın dini muhalifleri gerektiği zaman sınır dışına çıkarak kendilerini korumaya alabilmişlerdir. Bu gelenek yirminci yüzyılın ikinci yarısında dahi devam etmiştir. Ayetullah Humeyni 1963'de İran'dan sürüldüğü zaman-kısa bir Türkiye deneyiminin ardından- Irak'ın önemli bir Şii merkezi olan Necef'e göç etmiş ve 15 seneye yakın bir süre buradan İran'daki bağlılarına hitap etmeye devam etmiştir. Bu durum Şii din adamları sınıfının devlet karşısında özerkliğini destekleyen bir diğer unsur olarak görülebilir.

Bunlara ek olarak iki ülkenin birbirleri üzerindeki etkilerini de hesaba katmak gerekir. Her ne kadar Türkiye-İran sınırı sıklıkla bölgenin en eski değişmeyen sınırı olarak ön plana çıkarılsa da iki ülkenin tarihsel olarak her zaman işbirliği içerisinde oldukları söylenemez. Özellikle klasik dönemin Osmanlı-Safevi savaşları iki ülkenin de dini geleneklerinin oluşmasında temel anlamda rol oynamışlardır. Tezin dördüncü kısmında tartışıldığı gibi iki ülke de kendi mezhepsel-dini kimliklerini bu karşılıklı çatışma üzerinden kurmuşlardır. Osmanlı'da Sünniliğin, Safaviler'de Şiiliğin kurumsallaşması biraz da bu karşılıklı rekabetin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Modern dönemde de bu karşılıklı etkinin devam ettiği gözlemlenebilir. Özellikle Mustafa Kemal ve Rıza Şah dönemleri bu anlamda temel önemdedir. Tezin üçüncü kısmında tartışıldığı gibi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin halifeliği lağvetmesi ve peşinden gelen sekülerleştirici edimleri İran'da din adamları sınıfı arasında ciddi anlamda kuşkuların yükselmesine yol açmıştır. İran'da 1924'de patlak veren Cumhuriyet

krizi bu kuşkunun bir yansıması olarak ortaya çıkmış ve sonuç olarak Rıza Şah'ın kendini "Şah" ilan etmesi ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu anlamda İran Devleti'nin geleceğini de belirleyecek bir yönetimsel fark, iki ülkenin karşılıklı ilişkilerinin dolaylı bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

2.3. İdeolojinin Etkisi

İran ve Türkiye'ye bakılırken Kültürelci karşılaştırmaların yaygınlığı ilk kısımda tartışılmıştı. Bu kültürelci karşılaştırmaların Şiilik ve Sünniliğe nasıl siyasi farklar atfettikleri ve devlet ile ilişkileri bu farklar üzerinden okudukları da ayrıca gösterilmişti. Bu okumanın arkasındaki varsayımlar, bir takım dönemsel gelişmeler bir tarafa bırakılsa, temel olarak "oryantalist" söylemin bir uzantısı olarak açıklanabilir. Tezin çeşitli noktalarında gösterildiği gibi bu söylem İran tarihini açıklamak için Şii siyasi düşüncesini temel açıklama aracı olarak almaya meyyaldir. Değişmez dini doktrin ve onun koruyucusu olan Şii din adamları sınıfı bu okumanın iki sac ayağını oluştururlar Oysa tezde incelenen tarihsel izlek bu oryantalist okumanın büyük oranda açıklayıcı olmadığını göstermektedir. **Tezde doktrinleri toplumsal bağlamın dışında değişmez ve sabit özler olarak görmenin, açıkladığından daha çoğunu ortada bırakan bir çaba olduğu iddia edilmiştir**.

İslam tarihi içerisinde her zaman bir doktrini yorumlamanın çeşitli yolları bulunmuştur. Müslüman din adamları faiz gibi son derece sıkı konulmuş dini yasakları bile meşru kılacak yollar bulabilmişlerdir. Bu yollar İslam tarihinde genel olarak Hile-i Şeriye diye isimlendirilirler. Hayatın pratik koşulları ile doktrinin çatıştığı noktalarda doktrinin kenarından dolaşmak amacıyla üretilen bu çözümler İslam tarihinde yaygınlıkla gözlemlenebilir. Ancak doktrinlerin kendileri bu Hile-i Şeriyye'lerden bağımsız olarak da dönüşmüşlerdir. Özellikle İran Şia'sı için bu durumun tarihsel örnekleri tez içerisinde tartışılmıştır. Özellikle ikinci kısımda tartışılan **Usuli-Ahbari** tartışmaları bu dönüşüme temel bir örnek olarak verilebilir. Bu tartışmaların sonucu olarak Şii din adamlarının toplumsal ve siyasi alan ile ilişkileri kökten bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir. Kabaca hatırlatmak gerekirse, tartışma "İmamın" yokluğunda din adamlarının rolünün niteliği ile ilgilidir. Bu durumda din adamları sadece yazılı metinleri yorumlamakla mı yetinecekler yoksa bağımsız akıl yürütebilecekler mi? Din adamları sadece din hakkında bilgili adamlar mıdır yoksa taklit mercileri olarak kabul edilebilirler mi? Bu sorular tartışmanın seyrini belirleyen temel noktalardır. Ancak Usulilerin tartışmayı kazanması sonrasıdır ki dini akıl yürütmede daha büyük bir özerkliği olan yeni bir din adamları sınıfı ortaya çıkmıştır. Yine akılda tutmak gerekir ki bu tartışmalar son derece pratik toplumsal koşulların sonucudurlar. Bir başka deyişle dönem içerisinde etkin olan Mesiyanik heteredoks dini akımların ortaya çıkışı ile direk ilişkili bir şekilde gündeme gelmişlerdir. **Bir başka deyişle şu denilebilir ki çokça ön plana çıkarılan siyasi Şii din adamları sınıfı, 19. Yüzyıl'ın bir teolojik tartışmasının doğrudan bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır**.

Şiilik ve Sünnilik arasında bir diğer ayrım noktası şehadet gibi bazı kavramların Şiilik ve Sünnilikte farklı derecelerde etkili olduğuna dair bir ön kabulden kaynaklanır.Bu görüşe sahip olanların iddialarına göre Şii kitlelerin şehadet vurgusu bir direniş geleneği ve devrimci bir yapı oluşturmuştur. 1979 İran Devrimi'ni

mümkün kılan da bu yapıdır. Bu tezin tartıştığı tarihsel izlek bunun tersini gösteren bir çok örnek ile doludur. Özellikle üçüncü kısımda tartışıldığı gibi Rıza Şah döneminde yaygın olarak pasif eğilimler gösteren din adamları Şii direniş kültürü vurgularına karşı bir karşı örnek olarak görülebilir. Öte yandan yine tezin çeşitli kısımlarında gösterildiği gibi Sünni din adamları da her şart ve koşulda tamamen devlete biat eden özneler olarak görülemezler. Sünni din adamları sınıfının devlete karşı muhalefet ettikleri örnekler vardır. Sonuç olarak ne Sünnilik ne de Şiilik temelde devrimci ya da pasifist olarak okunabilirler. Sami Zubaida'nın din üzerine sözlerini bu kültürelci okumalar karşısında akılda tutmak gerekir: "**Din içsel olarak ne kitlelerin afyonudur ne de adaletsizliğe karşı bir devrimci çağrıdır. Kurulu düzeni bazen güçlendiren bazen zayıflatan ve bu süreçte kendileri de dönüşen bir ideolojiler bütünüdür.**"

3. Yakın Dönem Türkiye ve İran Üzerine

Tezin temel bulguları, iki ülke için de, klasik dönemlerden 20. Yüzyılın ilk yarısının sonuna kadar uzanan bir tarihsel dönemin tartışması üzerinden kurulmuştur. Takip eden dönemin başat tarihsel dönemeçlerinin basitçe bir özetini yapmak bile bu kısmın boyutunu fazlasıyla aşan bir çaba olacaktır. Yine de bu tezde kullanılan kavramsal çerçevenin tezin kapsadığı dönemin sonrası için de açıklayıcı olduğu noktalar olduğu unutulmamalıdır. **Özellikle mezhepsel çatışmanın bu düzeyde yoğunlaştığı bir dönemde kendi mezheplerinin tarihsel lideri konumunda sayılabilecek iki ülke olan Türkiye ve İran'ın din-devlet ilişkilerinin gelişimini tartışmak hiç şüphesiz bugünü anlamak için de yol gösterici olacaktır.**

Tezin kapsadığı dönemin sonrasında hem Türkiye hem İran siyasi ve toplumsal düzeyde önemli değişimler geçirmişlerdir. Bu dönüşümlerin yansımaları genelde toplum ve devlet yapısı üzerinden, özelde ise din-devlet ilişkileri üzerinden seçilebilir. Kurumsal alanda en temel değişiklik 1979 İran Devrimi'nin ürettiği yeni kurumsal yapıdır. Bu yeni kurumsal yapı sadece İran özelinde değil genel din-devlet ilişkileri teorisinde de bir özgünlük olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Çağdaş tarihte ilk olarak din adamları sınıfı tarafından yönlendirilen bir devrim başarıya ulaşmıştır. Bu devrimin sonucu olarak, İran çağdaş dünyanın iki teokrasisinden biri haline gelmiştir.[520] *Velayet-i Fakih*, yani din adamlarının siyasi alan üzerindeki vesayeti, devrim sonrası İran'ın temel bir özelliği olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu yeni sistem din-devlet ilişkilerini özellikle iki temel alanda tamamen değiştirmiştir. İlk olarak toplumsal meşruiyet anlamında din adamları sınıfı ile İranlı kiteleler arasındaki ilşkiler tamamen olumlu sayılamayacak bir şekilde evrilmiştir. Özellikle devrimi takip eden ve devrimci duyguların yüksek olduğu ilk on yıldan sonra bu ilişki şöyle bir dönüşüm geçirmiştir: Siyasi mücadelelerin, devrim sonrası ambargo'nun ve İran-Irak savaşının sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan ekonomik yükler din adamları sınıfının toplum gözündeki toplumsal ve manevi değerini azaltmıştır. **Din adamları sınıfı bir taraftan toplumun en görünen sınıfı olduğu için diğer taraftan toplum nezdinde yönetici sınıf olarak görüldüğü için bu başarısızlığın müsebbipleri olarak görülmüşlerdir.** İkinci ve daha da önemlisi, İran tarihinde daha önce pek görülmemiş bir biçimde din adamları sınıfı bu

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[520] İkincisi Vatikan'dır.

dönemde özerkliğini büyük oranda yitirmiştir. ***Velayet-i Fakih* sadece siyasi süreçler üzerinde değil aynı zamanda dini alan üzerinde de bir kontrol aracı olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.** Din adamlarının kamu hayatına dair fetvaları, kurumun onayına tabii hale getirilmiştir. Buna ek olarak kitlelerin geleneksel olarak din adamları sınıfına yaptığı bağışlar da *Velayet-i Fakih* tarafından verilecek izne tabii kılınmıştır. İlginçtir ki İran tarihinde Safavilerin yıkılışından sonra ilk olarak din adamları sınıfı bu düzeyde bir özerklik yitimi ile karşılaşmışlardır. Bu durumun adı "İran İslam Cumhuriyeti" olan bir devlet döneminde olması ilginç görünmektedir.

Tezin kapsadığı dönem sonrası Türkiye'si için ise tezin tarif ettiği genel izleğin devam ettiği söylenebilir. **Bir başka deyişle devletin dini alanı içerme çabası, tezin temel olarak incelediği tarihsel dönemin sonrasında da sürmektedir**. Bu içerme aynı zamanda dini alanın genişlemesini de beraberinde getirmiştir. Devletin dini alana müdahalesinin temel aracı olan Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı'nın bütçe ve personel sayısına basitçe bakmak dahi bize bu genişlemenin boyutlarını göstermektedir. Başkanlığın faaliyetlerine ek olarak İlahiyat Fakülteleri, İmam Hatip Okulları, zorunlu din dersleri ve resmi Kur'an kursları da bu dönemde yaygınlaşmaya devam etmiştir. Daha yakın dönemde devletin dini alanı kontrol çabalarının bir diğer örneği ise Gülen Hareketi ile çatışmanın ortaya çıkardığı yeni durumdur. Devlete entegre olmamış en büyük İslamcı gruplardan biri- belki de en büyüğü- olan hareket 2014 itibari ile hükümet ile ters düşmüştür. Bu noktada devletin klasik refleksini gösterdiği söylenilebilir. Dini siyasi bir tehdite karşı tekelleşmeyi ön plana çıkarmak refleksinin bu çatışma içerisinde iki ayrı yansıması gözlemlenebilir. Birincisi devletin, Gülen hareketinin toplumsallaştığı temel alan olan üniversiteye hazırlık dershanelerini kapatması ve yine hareketin yurtdışı okullarını devletleştirmeye yönelik hazırlıklar yapmasıdır. İkinci olarak ise devletin, Gülen hareketinin entellektüel olarak temel kaynak metni olan Risale-i Nur Kitapları'nın basımını Kültür Bakanlığı eliyle denetlemesidir.

Uluslarası alanda iki ülke birbirine rakip olmaya devam etmişlerdir. Bu rekabet kısmen kendini dini siyaset anlamında da göstermektedir. 17. Yüzyılın Safavi-Osmanlı Savaşları kadar doğrudan ve şiddetli olmasa da çeşitli düzeylerde bu rekabet canlı görünmektedir**. Yakın dönem bir örnek olarak Suriye İç Savaşı sürecinde hem İran hem de Türkiye'nin kendi mezhepsel aidiyetleri ekseninde saf tutmaları gösterilebilir.** İlginçtir ki bu kanlı iç savaş Şii-Sünni rekabetinin tarihsel çağrışımlarının da çokça hatırlatıldığı bir bağlam sunmaktadır. Sözgelimi Irak ve Şam İslam Devleti (İŞİD) Irak'ın, Şii'lerin baskın olduğu hükümetine, Safaviler diyebilmektedir. Ya da Türkiye için inşa edilmesi planlanan son İstanbul köprüsüne Safavi Savaşları ile meşhur 1. Selim (Yavuz) un isminin verilmesi yine bu tarihsel hatıraları ön plana çıkaran bir diğer örnek olarak görülebilir. İran için de bu hatıraların ayrıca canlı olduğu söylenebilir. Bu çalışmanın yazarı Türklük ile herhangi bir etnik bağı olmayan İran vatandaşı bir Belucun kendisine sadece mezhepsel olarak Sünni olduğu için Osmanlı dediğine şahit olmuştur. Türkiye Alevilerinin bir fraksiyonu arasında, son derece kısıtlı sayıda olsa da, İran Şiiliği ile ortak kökenlerin vurgulanması da tarihten taşınıp bugün de devam eden bu tarihsel yarılmanın diğer örnekleri olarak görülebilir. Bu çalışma, bu kök salmış tarihsel yarılma içerisinde İran ve Türkiye'de din-devlet ilişkilerinin nasıl gelişeceği sorusuna

cevap vermek iddiasında değildir. Bu soruların cevapları siyaseti tarihsel bağlamı hesaba katarak tartışacak başka çalışmaların ortaya çıkması ile mümkündür.

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