CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN TURKEY: A CASE OF EMANCIPATORY-CRITICAL SECURITY THINKING AND PRACTICE

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ABSTRACT

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN TURKEY: A CASE OF EMANCIPATORY-CRITICAL SECURITY THINKING AND PRACTICE

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This thesis studies the issue of emancipatory agency in Critical Security Studies through the empirical case of Conscientious Objectors in Turkey. Trying to formulate a more practical way of looking into counter-hegemonic agency in Critical Security Studies, this study suggests the use of the concept of acts, and *acts of dissidence* in particular in a way to move away from the pre-occupation with great events and patterns to more daily ruptures and cracks in the given. The research frames Conscientious Objectors in Turkey as an agent of emancipatory-critical security thinking that aims to go beyond statist and militarist understandings of security and promote the idea of 'security without militarism'and 'security as emancipation'.

Keywords: Critical Security Studies and emancipation, agency, acts, Turkey, conscientious objection

ÖZ

ÖZGÜRLEŞTİRİCİ – ELEŞTİREL BİR GÜVENLİK ANLAYIŞI VE UYGULAMASI ÖRNEĞİ OLARAK TÜRKİYE'DE VİCDANİ RED

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Bu çalışma Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarında özgürleştirici faillik konusunu Türkiye'deki Vicdani Red hareketi üzerinden incelemektedir. Bu tez Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları kapsamında pratik uygulamaya daha yatkın bir faillik anlayışının geliştirilebilmesi için eylem, özellike görüş ayrılığı-muhalif eylem, kavramını sunmaktadır. Bu şekilde faillik merkezini büyük olay ve kalıplardansa gündelik direniş hareketlerinde, hegemonyada oluşan kılcal çatlak ve fisürlerde aramanın uygunluğunu anlatmaktadır. Araştırma Türkiye Vicdani Red hareketini, bu bağlamda, özgürleştirici-eleştirel bir güvenlik failliği olarak ele almakta ve bu hareketin güvenliği devletçi ve militarist güvenlik anlayışının ötesinde geçilip özgürleşme temelinde güvenlik ve militarist olmayan güvenlik anlayışı çerçevesinde ele aldığını savunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları ve özgürleşme, faillik, eylem, Türkiye, Vicdani Red

To My Beloved Parents

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

FIGURES

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party, Turkey
CSS	Critical Security Studies
CO	Conscientious Objection
CoE	Council of Europe
COr	Conscientious Objector
ECHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR	European Court of Human Rights
EU	European Union
LGBT	Lesbian Gay Bisexual and Transgender
MGK	National Security Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OYAK	Armed Forces Trust and Pension Fund
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
SKD	Association of War Resisters
TCK	Turkish Penal Code
TSKGV	Foundation for Strengthening the Turkish Armed Forces
UN	United Nations
WOMP	World Order Models Project
YÖK	High Education Board

INTRODUCTION

For every boy and man who lives in Turkey, there are certain points in life that mark transitioning from one phase to another: from childhood to being a teenager, from a teenager to a grown-up, and finally from a grown-up to a man. As with most cultural categories stemming from the societal memory codes, these phases are often marked with social incidents, bodily rituals and legislative benchmarks. While circumcision denotes the first step in the child's evolution into a man, the final step is seen as the completion of one's compulsory service in the military as required by law (Selek, 2008).

Upon the return of the person from the barracks, his family would most likely say: "Now that the military service is out of the way, and that you have become a man, you should get a good job and get married." It is deemed as the last step before the male embarks upon the real life struggle. The service is one of the themes that almost every Turkish man has a story about, thus can converse with one and another even if they do not have anything in common or have met each other for the first time.

This study's author experienced a different kind of an encounter with the institution of military service. When he returned to Turkey from his Master's education in Sweden, he went to the registrar's office in his new university where he would start his Ph.D education. However, there was a complication with his registration as he seemed to have missed the deadline for enrolling for his military service, and unless this was undone, the university would not be able to complete his registration officially. The complication had occurred because of a miscommunication with military authories about the postponement of his service due date while he was doing his post-graduate education abroad.

The author then had to wait for about two months for this complication to be resolved in the court because all male citizens who do not report to the military before the due date are supposed to provide a defense statement

explaining the reason of their absence. This is then forwarded to the relevant judicial authorities to see whether there are grounds for prosecution. The author remembers missing sleep at nights, not knowing how his future would unfold, with or without a Ph.D, feeling anxious, very insecure and completely unprepared mentally to go and serve in the army. This was his first time when he engaged with the military apparatus, and he remembers feeling lost and helpless because of the way he felt when he went to the military recruitment center: staff was not helpful, communication was not open, and the entire interaction seemed cold and harsh. In the end the case was resolved and he was able to continue his Ph.D education and postpone his military service until its completion. However, the feeling of anxiety and insecurity remained within and motivated him to academically become motivated to look into the intersection between personal security, the military existence in Turkey, and issues of counter-hegemonic change. As the readings evolved, the issue of personal security versus national security began to stand out for him even more, and it was at this junction that the author decided to explore the initial working research question: what is there to investigate on the matter of personal and alternative security understandings in Turkey?

The issues of individual security and national security developing at the expense of the former resonated well with the author's personal experience and the readings led him to concentrate on the literature of Critical Security Studies (CSS), especially that of the Welsh School with its emphasis on the idea of 'security as emancipation'. This concept is addressed in detail below, yet it will be useful to point out its distinctive quality shortly. CSS's understanding of security as emancipation necessitates human beings be freed from constraints like human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, environmental degradation, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarization of society, economic deprivation and armed conflict at the state and the sub-state level (Bilgin, 2005b:26). This is so because security as emancipation strives for the removal of all physical, ideational and structural barriers against the invention and realization of an actor's potential in its life, its becoming a political being with a voice, a say (Booth, 1991, 2005, 2007). Given that, it suggests for a revised understanding of security that takes into account a multitude of referent objects

for security, from the individual to communities, from the state to the globe. It also atrtributes great importance to 'being able to become political' because individual or groups can only improve their security by being allowed to intervene in the world around them.

Given that political edge, the appeal of security as emancipation is always played out in sites of struggle in which transformatory powers of agents compete with each other (Huysmans, 2006a:6). This is why suggesting theorising as a form of political agency is seen as only the first step in CSS (Bilgin, 2005b:60). The necessity to take emancipatory action to the ground is crucial for CSS by engaging with the reality by locating sites of counter-hegemonic resistance, suggesting policies and thus empowering alternative agents.

However, in this sense, not everyone who thinks or writes on security achieves the same effect because there are structural constraints and opportunities deciding on the level of 'mobilization of knowledge, status, public support, media coverage, etc' (Huysmans, 2006a:9). Given that, the main criticism directed to approaches of security as emancipation has been that, in an environment where state-centrism has become the norm and what states think is right as security goes, how it can be possible to promote non-hegemonic actors' agenda for security in a structure where such efforts are not appreciated. How might it be possible for less 'powerful' actors to make their audience recognize their actorness and project their vision of thinking about and doing security to the security common sense that exercises disciplinary restraint.

CSS advocates the agency of intellectuals, scholars, social movements and civil society in thinking and writing about alternative ways of doing security. CSS nominates scholars and intellectuals of critical security as the organic intellectuals for critical security theorising who are supposed to use their "specialist information" to "compare the justifications of the (hegemonic) regimes with actual outcomes" (Wyn Jones, 1999:160). Thinking, writing and theorising on security is considered as practice by CSS by creating new security discourses. However, given the criticism above, CSS needs to think and produce more on ways how to take emancipatory action to the ground. Such a research agenda requires an agency-focused sociological account targeted at the

transformatory power that could be 'translated into political strategy, tactics and how change can be produced in the presence of asymmetrical power relations' (McSweeney, 1999).

This is then context that motivates this study: CSS expects emancipatory change to come from within and through civil society, yet, in those contexts where common sense notions about security are so entrenched in the society, how would emancipatory transformation be possible?

It was at this theoretical puzzle that the author found it useful to draw from his own experience again and look at the role of the military values in the Turkish society that might come face-to-face with individual security concerns. The motivating context, in this sense, was found in the institution of the military service and the ones who do not comply with that: conscientious objectors (COrs).

The Constitution of the Turkish Republic, Article 72 lays the groundwork for "the duty to the homeland", and in fact places an obligation on *every* Turkish citizen, irrespective of their gender, to fulfill their responsibility to their country:

> "The duty to the homeland is every Turk's right and obligation. The law shall regulate how the duty will be fulfilled, either in the Armed Forces or in the public sector, or how it will be considered as already done."[1]

The exact regulation of the compulsory nature of the military service for every male citizen is provided in Article 1 of the Military Service Act No. 1111: "Every man who is a citizen of Republic of Turkey, is obligated to do his military service by this law".[2]

Turkey obviously is not the only country in the world that has the institution of compulsory military service. The abolition of this practice in many European countries is in fact a recent development. However, the distinctive quality of the presence of compulsory military service in Turkey is also reinforced with the fact that there is a foundational idea for the Republic of

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[1] http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm, accessed on 1 August 2013.

[2] http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/kanun/1111_as.kanunu.pdf, accessed on 1 August 2013.

Turkey with the break-away from the Ottoman past: "Every Turk is born a soldier." This idea of being a military-nation has been very dominant in the Turkish public and political imaginary, coupled with two military coups, one on 27 May 1960, the other on 12 September 1980.[3] Until very recently, the main lines of Turkish politics were determined in a joint board that comprises of the executive and members of the military top cadre. Called as the National Security Council, this board identified priority policy areas for the government to carry out and until the Justice and Development Party's (AKP) rule, military personnel were very powerful in setting the agenda in the Council. It was even argued that the executive in Turkey comprised of two branches, the MGK and the Council of Ministers, with the former having a more decisive say (Sakallioglu, 1997:157). The importance of the MGK was that it served the army to institutionalize its oversight in politics (Michaud-Emin, 2007:31). Even after the reforms that made MGK more civilian in terms of its composition, some scholars suggest that the presence of the working groups, which are involved in research and production of documents and briefings in specific interest areas required by the military (Jenkins, 2001:50).

Turkey is a country with a large army, who is the employer of some 720.000 people, and is currently the second biggest army in NATO, and eleventh most "powerful" army in the world.[4] With its trustworthiness among the public hitting rates such as 72 per cent[5], despite the recent investigations and prison sentences given to some of its former top-level generals on the charges of

[3] For a detailed examination of the military-nation for Turkey, please see: Aysegul Altinay, 2004. The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey, New York: Palgrave Macmillan; Gareth Jenkins, 2007. "Continuity and change: prospects for civil-military relations in Turkey", International Affairs, 83:2, 339-355; Zeki Sarigil, 2009. "Deconstructing the Turkish Military's Popularity", Armed Forces and Society, 35:4, 709-727; Nilufer Narli, 2011. "Concordance and Discordance in Turkish Civil-Military Relations, 1980-2002", Turkish Studies, 12:2, 215-225; Zeki Sarigil, 2011. "Civil-Military Relations Beyond Dichotomy: With Special Reference to Turkey", Turkish Studies, 12:2, 265-278.

[4] http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-listing.asp, accessed on 1 August 2013.

[5] "Orduya ne kadar guveniyoruz?" [How much do we trust the army?], Vatan, 23 February 2013, http://haber.gazetevatan.com/orduya-ne-kadar-guveniyoruz/517055/1/gundem, accessed on 1 August 2013.

attempting to overthrow the government[6], the military has a firm power base in the country. It is also noteworthy that there is a process carried out by the ruling AKP, to limit the presence of the army only to the barracks. The examples of this have been AKP's vetoing certain military high-ranking generals who did not agree with AKP policies being promoted, curbing Article 35 of the Statute of the Armed Forces which was used as the pretext for past coups so as to take away this power from the army.

There is, however, also a different story to tell here, a road less traveled (Altinay, 2004:87), a crack within that militarist system that first surfaced in Turkey back in 1989. Since then, there have been at least two hundred twelve people, as of 20 May 2013, who declared what they call their "conscientious objection" (CO henceforth). This less travelled road is the path of certain individuals, comprising of both men and women, who did not choose to conform to the rest of the society in Turkey and publicly declared their objection and refusal to the institution of compulsory military service. They are the conscientious objectors (COrs henceforth). The men among them declared that they would not go and fulfill their duty, and women announced they stood in solidarity and they would not participate in the reproduction of this system either. The declarations were made on the basis of the argument that being part of an army contradicted these people's personal beliefs, ideas, ideals or convictions.

Turkish law currently does not leave any space for such a refusal as there is no way other than medical and mental unfitness, homosexuality, working at least three years abroad, and other compassionate reasons such as having lost a brother in the military. The right to CO, in international law, is granted by Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, again Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 10 of the Charter of

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[6] There have been two cases, called "Ergenekon" and "Balyoz", which sentenced many top-ranking officers of the Army to life-time or long-term imprisonment on the charges of attempting to carry out a coup and to disrupt the government's activities. For a brief summary and the final ruling of the Ergenekon case, please see "Turkey Ergenekon case: Ex-army chief Basbug gets life", BBC News, 5 August 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23571739, accessed on 16 August 2013. For the Balyoz case, please see "Balyoz davasinda karar aciklandi" [Ruling announced on the Balyoz case], BBC Turkce, 21 September 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2012/09/120921_balyoz_update.shtml, accessed on 16 August 2013.

Fundamental Rights of the European Union, and finally Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It could be argued that by virtue of Article 90 of the Constitution, which specifically states that in cases where there is a contradiction between international law and national law, the former takes precedence over the other, hence the right to CO needs to be treated as if it already is incorporated into the domestic legal system. The only condition where Turkish law grants the right of CO is a decree by the Council of Ministers issued on 5 July 1993 (93/4613) that rules over Turkish citizens living abroad with dual nationality: "Conditions on the Acceptance of the Fulfillment of the Military Service of citizens with multiple citizenship" (Altundis, 2011:152). Second paragraph of the law provides for the right to CO for these citizens:

> "Those who completed their military service duty in civilian institutions, either because there was excessive supply or that they did not want to do it on the basis of their beliefs, as regulated by that state's domestic laws, will be accepted as having done their military service."

Therefore, the declaration of the CO is an "unlawful" act according to the Turkish law because it is the violation of the Military Service Act and also Article 72 of the Constitution. COrs, in turn, whenever they made contact with the state apparatus, have been arrested, compelled to report to their military unit, put on their uniform even by force at times, and serve their duty. Some of them had to endure very poor living conditions in military prisons on the charges of insubordination. Some were tortured, humiliated and confined to solitude. When they were released from prison, they would be taken to their military unit once again, where they would reiterate their objection, and the process would start anew.

Some of them and their activist supporters were prosecuted, imprisoned or fined on the basis of the old Article 155 of the Turkish Penal Code, now Article 318, which illegalizes every attempt to encourage evading military service, desertion or causing alienation of the public from military service institution. Media outlets were also punished in case they broadcasted programs that covered the story of CO in Turkey. Famous cases of COrs, such as Osman Murat Ulke (Ossi), Mehmet Bal, Mehmet Tarhan, Enver Aydemir, Halil Savda, Muhammed Serdar Delice and Yunus Ercep, have been the cases where CO

became publicly visible and debatable. The fact that some of the COrs took their cases to the European Court of Justice, argued in defense of their right to expression, thought and belief, and have recently won, makes the issue more popular also within the international community, especially in Council of Europe and the European Union.

These two hundred twelve people and their wider support group have been active in the Turkish political arena, although at the margins of it, since the early 1990s. They had to cope with difficult life conditions such as trying to hide from state control, being unable to travel freely, and also putting up with accusations of being a traitor or a terrorist because they refuse to go and serve in the army. Some of them have been imprisoned, released and re-imprisoned for so many times that six to seven years of their lives have been irrevocably confiscated. However, the movement is still active, and has just established its Association of Conscientious Objection.

It is at this very juncture of prosecution, imprisonment, civil death as in having to go underground in order not to get caught in the cycle of repetitive imprisonment and re-imprisonment and state's firm punitive control around the CO movement that this study takes an interest in it. Despite the state's harsh reaction and corporeal punishment, their relatively small existence in terms of manpower and volume of participation, and the strong character of militarism in many layers of social life, why are COrs and the CO movement still on the field, and can they achieve what they seek to? Is it possible that some Turkish citizens exercise a right that does not exist in the domestic law? Given the pervasiveness of militarism in Turkey, it can be argued that their potential for agency is limited and will not be able to achieve its goals, so what is the point?

Problem statement and Motivations

This study departs from the questions posed above and also takes a curious attitude towards the empirical puzzle that is presented by the case of Turkish COrs: How can it ever be possible for this movement to achieve the

abolishment of the compulsory military service and other goals as they might describe. “Wondering as a research attitude” (Guerrero, 2013:25) enables the researcher to ask questions on why something is presented as given or under what conditions this givenness can be problematized. Given the lack of conventional power elements such as size, a localized existing idea to pin down to, alliances with other strong social movements, and public support, are COrs not reaching for the stars here?

The overall objectives of the COrs and the CO movement, and the empirical puzzle about the agency they pose, also inform this study in a more theoretical outlook that matches with the empirical realities of the case at hand. The problem here is one that arises in situations where, in the absence of the dominant discourses and actors’ commitment to an alternative idea outside of the common sense, how it would be possible for agents of this approach to organize themselves as valid actors within the eyes of the audience/community and to be influential or have a presence that plays a transformatory role when it comes to the subject matter they problematize. In other words, how can they materialize their agency in a way that it resonates with the rest of the society and thus catches on to lead to a different kind of reality? Although militarism has been a part of the common sense in Turkey for quite some time now, COrs refuse to abide by this norm by coupling their basic objection with more general political approaches, such as anti-militarism and anti-statism, seeking to transcend the hegemonic codes of security and political culture in their society.

The COrs refusal to the institution of military service, arms training, learning how to kill and die, or their anti-war and anti-violence stance are some of the important issues that relate to an individual’s security and the security of the environment around her/himself. They are also themes explored by Security Studies International Relations (IR). However, the link between the CO and security are not exclusively limited to traditional insecurities that pertain to the world of militarist means and ends. An analysis of the CO declarations and the agency that the CO movement has operationalized, suggests that COrs problematize first and foremost the intervowenness of militarism with statism, i.e. the primacy of state as a referent object in policy making. There is a strong emphasis on the individuality of each person, her/his valuable existence and

her/his right to self-realization. There is also a commitment to think for the well-being of other referent objects in life, such as the environment or ethnic communities, rather than securing only that of the nation-state.

In that way, CO offers much deeper insights for the case of one particular school in Security Studies, which is Critical Security Studies (CSS). These insights might start with a rejection of statism and militarism, but they do not stop there. CSS is activated on an innovative conceptualization of security: security as emancipation, which strives for the removal of all physical, ideational and structural barriers against the invention and realization of an actor's potential in its life, its becoming a political being with a voice, a say. COrs' strong emphasis on the power of their inner beings, of their consciousness and their reasoning, and the critiques they direct to the way security and politics are done in Turkey point to a different kind of reality, one that prioritizes emancipatory politics. COrs, in turn, can be presented as agents of two interrelated ideas: security without militarism and security as emancipation. What this study means by security as emancipation will be discussed at length in the following chapters, but for the moment it would be sufficient to hint at the following observations, which show the relevance of CO to CSS and how CSS can promise a framework to understand CO:

- A multiplicity of referent objects in politics and security thinking and doing;
- A multiplicity of security issues on the agenda: environmentalism, fight against genderism and discrimination of minorities, human self-fulfillment;
- Renouncing militarist values and ways as the best path forward to resolve insecurities;
- A claim to become political subjects through changing the rules of political participation and acting, which used to be denied to certain groups and movements, and thus deepen our security understanding.

Looking at the agency of the COrs and analyzing its potential as a player in or contributor for transformation and change will also inform the discussion

on agency that has surfaced as an important issue in the literature of CSS. The criticisms directed at CSS, as they will be explained in detail in the next chapter, form the following question: How might it be possible for critical non-hegemonic actors to make the audience accept their actorness? Or taking one step forward, how to project their vision of "thinking about and doing security" to the security common sense exercising disciplinary restraint? Who will bring about the new way of doing this alternative security and politics?

Therefore, the puzzle at hand can be also presented as follows: in the absence of the dominant discourses and actors' commitment to the idea of security as emancipation in a traditional security structure, how it would be possible for CSS-oriented agents, who are most often said to be the voice of the powerless, the weak and the victimized (Wyn Jones, 1999:159, Basch, 2004) to organize themselves as security actors within the eyes of the audience/community and to be influential or have a presence when it comes to questions of (in)security?

Research Question

Within the framework set by a hegemonic security structure that has become common sense, how might it be possible for counter hegemonic actors, such as the COrs, to formulate their political agency in order to bring about an alternative way out of the existing insecurities, a.k.a militarism? The objectors, who for different reasons refuse to fulfill their military service obligations imposed upon them by the state, are counter-hegemonic agents seeking to vocalize an alternative view of security critical of the dominant Turkish security thinking: security without militarism. Once emancipation is defined as a process of eliminating physical and human constraints stopping human beings from what they would freely choose to do and invent themselves in whichever way they desired (Booth 2007), the security agenda becomes broad enough to even include processes of becoming a political claim-maker through the termination of the compulsory military service.

By combining these two concerns, this study aims to offer two insights at the same time that characterize proper research design: emphasizing the research's novelty, "either by adding a new case study to an already existing methodological framework or by proposing a new framework." (Salter, 2013:15). For the first, by analyzing the empirical case of the CO in Turkey and examining its agency, it will be adding a new case study to an already existing theoretical framework, in other words, the CSS. It will be attempting to contribute to the answer of how can actors of everyday ordinary life be influential in security matters important to them vis-à-vis the hegemonic system, be it a statist, militarist or an oppressive one. The innovative side of this study in that regard is the introduction of the concepts of acts of dissidence, which offer us researchers the possibility to look at daily ruptures, sites of resistance and cracks caused by ordinary, small scale acts of objection. The main argument thus emerged as follows:

"While thinking about agency of the CO, and in general in CSS, the agency of actors that are characterized by a relatively smaller power to speak in any given setting, should be analyzed in a process-based approach in order to break away from the intellectual obsession to prove and show causal, big-bang change as in examples of norm diffusion theory."

For the second question of adding a new framework, thus enriching the theory at hand, this study intends to re-open the concept of emancipation and answer to some of the criticisms that have been directed to CSS: that the latter's conceptualization of emancipation is not an all-inclusive one; it works for one actor's emancipation at the expense of the other; and that equating security with emancipation causes the latter to be corrupted with the negative discursive baggage brought about by the concept of security, which has historically been associated with states and militaries. These are discussed further below. However suffice to say for the moment that by examining CSS's notion of emancipation and those of other critical authors such as Jacques Rancière, Alain Badiou, Etienne Balibar, Alex Honneth and Ernesto Laclau, this study aims to show the compatibility with various other definitions of emancipation, and the unfulfilled potential already present in CSS's emancipation. Therefore, the auxiliary argument here evolved as follows:

"Security as emancipation is about inventing humanity and undertaking self-realization, and in this process, the acts of everyday actors, who are not counted for and are thus dissatisfied with the way things are done, play an important part as a continuous source of resistance that refuses imposed identities, re-name and re-shapes them in a tactical way."

Applied to the hard case at hand of the COrs in Turkey, this study found out that there is a great deal of match between the discourse and actions of Turkish COrs with the idea of security without militarism and security as emancipation. The COrs argue for a broader security understanding that is not bound to a statist-militaristic security understanding, and in fact, at times, they suggest the dissolution of the state for the promotion of individual liberties and freedoms. Moreover, they dispute the primacy of the state apparatus to have the monopoly over speaking on how to think and act on security. They claim to already possess that right to speak on whichever subject they wish by virtue of being an individual. Therefore, they advise for a multitude of referent objects for security, from the individual to the environment or to communities, while they downplay the importance of military security completely.

Secondly, their agency can be contextualized as everyday acts of dissidence, small ordinary resistance movements that do not conform to the common sense and create noise and discomfort in thew public opinion or in the state's discursive structure. The research showed that they first begin with dis-identifying themselves from imposed identities on them, such as being a natural born soldier as a Turk, or being a mother who is supposed to bring up more soldiers for her country. Second, they act out on the presupposition that, as individuals of this community, they have the right to become political and make their voices heard in order to first expose the problem they want to reveal, and secondly to make the point that it is not only state, but also individuals which have the quality of becoming political agents. By doing so, they also present an alternative way of thinking about how to be political in a certain environment, even on matters that runs against the entrenched notions about the military and the state. This, in turn, feeds back into the way CSS contextualizes agency, in the sense that civil society can still deliver transformation as expected by the CSS, but it might take place gradually and through ordinary acts of daily dissidence.

The research, especially the study on the social media outlet, also has shown that these acts need to be always accounted for in a process where a multitude of actors interact all the time. The Turkish CO case has displayed that the influence of international organizations and the ruling AKP government's de-militarization agenda have been influential factors that should be thought together with the effect of the CO movement.

Methodology

First of all, there is a need to make it clear how this study treats research. As with all inquiries in Critical Security Studies, this study too treats research, "writing and public engagement as inherently political", meaning they are related to questions of justice, power and authority, and that research is a way to undertake "an active engagement with the world." (Salter, 2013:2). Adopting a critical inquiry, it sees agency in the world as a possibility to be found everywhere, across a multitude of agents such as individuals, groups, states, ideational structures, etc… (Salter, 2013:2). The study, in that sense, is a kind of agency on its own, because the decisions we take during the research design, the topic, the way we ask the questions, our empirical choices, all empower certain choices while silencing other ones. This is why it is important not to rely too much on concerns of replicability, but rather pay more attention to the fact that the knowledge stemming out of this research is a politically-situated knowledge(s) (Haraway, 1988; Guillaume, 2013:29). Pertaining to a school of post-positivist framework, critical security students assert that we can never be completely free from the effects of our ideological commitments or past experiences that shape our thinking (Blakeley, 2013:164). It is important to stay informed that the research and its findings are part of a larger conversation that has multiple layers and a much bigger picture. Therefore, the study cannot provide an all-encompassing complete picture and also should not attempt to do so because the researcher is aware that there were choices made in the research design (Johnson, 2013:70). In this understanding, the most we can do is to attain high levels of coherence, consistency and clarity through the employment of

reflexivity. While asking our questions, while interpreting the answers, personal interference will always be there, but being aware of this and staying away from positivistic claims to pure objectivity is already being one step ahead.

The research conducted for this study consists of two sets of information gathered by two different processes:

1. Fieldwork based on gathering insights into the worlds of the COrs and CO activists[7], through in-depth semi-structured interviews with ten key individuals. This was backed up with another set of interviews conducted with fourteen COrs, published in the book "Pinar Öğünç, 2013. *Asker Doğmayanlar [Those who were not born soldiers]*, Istanbul: Hrant Dink Vakfi Yayinlari". Some of the interviews conducted by Aysegul Altinay (2004) in her "*The Myth of the Military-Nation: Militarism, Gender, and Education in Turkey*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan", have also been used. Appropriate credit has been provided by references when these published interviews were used. There were also two private correspondence carried out with two COrs who live abroad, Ugur Bilkay and Bilal Damla. Their input was treated as an informative angle, but it was unfortunately not possible to conduct an interview with them for logistical problems.

2. A textual analysis into

    a. all the CO declarations (211 of them) that can publicly be found, for relational frequency analysis in forms of word and theme clouds, analysis of interviews with different COrs in media outlets,

    b. and a social media presence analysis that takes Twitter as its data pool and analyzing every Tweet that has been sent since early 2008 to the first week of August with two hash tags, (same word different spelling in Turkish- #conscientiousobjection) #vicdaniret

[7] CO activists refer to individuals who themselves have not become COrs because they had already completed their military service by the time they acquainted with the idea of CO, or that they had different ideas about the place of violence and armies in life in the past.

or #vicdanired, in order to conduct a sentiment analysis and track any changes in the public opinion on the issue of the CO.

The first leg of the research has been conducted with ten face-to-face semi structured interviews with COrs and CO activists in Istanbul and Izmir. The base of the movement is currently in Istanbul and many COrs live there as a result of employment opportunities, the benefits of living in a big city where one can go unnoticed to the authorities more easily. Izmir was also an important choice as it is the city where the first organized CO movement had started.

As semi-structured interviews, each participant was asked a basic set of questions but conversation also drifted to different directions where the respondent chose to share personal experiences or narrating interesting anecdotes. The interviewer felt free to alter the sequence of the questions according to the nature of the conversation and probed for more information through active listening skills if needed, such as nodding, acknowledging responses, or expressing puzzlement (Fielding and Thomas, 2001:246). By doing so, the researcher meant to adapt the interviews to the respondent's level of "comprehension and articulacy" and avert repeating the same questions if they were already answered in bulks (Fielding and Thomas, 2001:246-7). For the consistency of themes and questions, direct check questions were also used (Wilkinson, 2013:139), such as "What do you specifically object to in your CO?" or "What does security or being secure mean to you?"

The interviews were recorded on a recording device, but levels of attribution were established at every each of them. That is to say, participants were asked whether they were happy to be named in the study or subsequent publications, or they would prefer to remain anonymous or as members of the movement, or that the interview would be completely off the record (Blakeley, 2013:165). All ten interviews agreed beforehand to be named and to be recorded, and five of them asked for the transcription to be sent to them before the study went public. The interaction between the interviewer and the

interviewee was also kept to a minimum in order to achieve the most uninterrupted answers as much as possible.

After the interviews, they were transcripted verbatim and translated into English, and this has familiarized the researcher with the interview material even more in depth (Blakeley, 2013:167). Then thematically similar segments across the interviews were identified and retrieved. Coding was used in a simple way by identifying key words such as militarism, gender, women, human rights, Kurdish, freedom and emancipation, security.

The second part of the study concentrated on Twitter as a site of public opinion and can be accepted as a reliable source of information given the popularity of Twitter in Turkey and the extensive use of this social media outlet by Turkish people, as it was exemplified in the recent Taksim square – Gezi Park protests.[8] More than 9800 tweets were analyzed in this part of the study, classified under different categories using certain code words. The categories used to gather each tweet under a cluster were: Militarism, Kurds and military service, the influence and involvement of European institutions, LGBT members, religious reasons for the CO, general information dissemination, anti-CO statements, declaring CO for other reasons in other words using CO to object to exams, to taxation or using the concept humorously for political satire, generally positive and supportive tweets, and tweets that frame CO as a human right. The rest of the tweets were branded as off-topic as these concerns summarized the key aspects of the CO presence on the web.

The results provided interesting observations as in the case of the influence of European institutions' involvement in one particular case where a COr appealed to European Court of Justice which practically obligated Turkey to make arrangements for the recognition of the right to CO as a freedom of expression and conscience.[9] After the announcement of the

[8] "Social media plays major role in Turkey protests", Sophie Hutchinson, 4 June 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-22772352, accessed on 2 August 2013.

[9] Ercep vs Turkey, 43965/04

verdict and the sentencing of Turkey, the usage of Twitter with the hash tag at hand peaked at an unprecedented rate. It also coincides with the Minister of Justice and Minister of National Defense commenting that Turkey was preparing groundwork for an arrangement on conscientious objection.[10] These results were important in putting the CO activism in Turkey into a processual context and treating it as part of a bigger network.

Limitations

One major limitation for the study has been the inability to reach out to more COrs for a first-hand interview, especially that of the newer generation, such as the High School Anarchist Federation, which is formed of high-school students who also declare their CO even though there is no pressing matter of military service for them in the near future. One reason for this has been the inability to get the personal contacts of these individuals. The other was about the fact that the timeframe of the fieldwork that was allocated to conduct interviews with the COrs from recent generations coincided with the Taksim Gezi Park protests. The latter refers to a series of public protests that took place in late May and June 2013 in Istanbul. It started as an environmentalist protest to oppose the development of a rehabilitation plan for a park central to Istanbul. However, soon, upon the excessive use of force by the police against the protestors, the demonstrations became motivated by political criticisms against the AKP government. It was during this phase that the recent generation of COrs would be met and interviewed. The fact that most of these individuals were not reachable because they participated in full-time sit–ins in the Gezi Park disrupted the timetable allocated to these interviews. In short, they were simply physically not reachable.

[10] "Vicdani ret konusunda flas aciklama [Breaking statement on conscientious objection], Aksam, 29 March 2013, http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/vicdani-ret-konusunda-flas-aciklama/haber-181822, accessed on 11 August 2013

This inability was also rooted in the nature of the life of the COrs as most of them are tired of reminiscing about their traumatic experiences that they had during their imprisonment. Osman Murat Ulke was one of them, and despite the importance of his case as a pioneer in taking CO to ECtHR, it has not been possible to include him in the study. Likewise, Mehmet Bal, another interesting figure as a former nationalist individual who later renounces militarism and becomes a COr, could not be reached. The more recent COrs were also difficult to include because either some of them were still in prison, or that they were not to be contacted because they wanted some tranquility in their lives.

Outline

The study starts with an overview of security studies in order to discuss and contextualize Security Studies in a categorical way to simplify and crystallize the added value of CSS. The second chapter introduces the theory of norm diffusion with an aim to discuss to what extent norm diffusion, which is the most common tool to be used in such kind of studies, can be used to study the agency of COs, and to point out where the theory of norm diffusion falls short in explaining the influence and presence of actors of smaller power. Chapter 3 deals with a re-take on the concept of emancipation in order to sketch out the importance of defining emancipation as a process of self-realization and politicization, and also to find sites where CSS's formulation can be refined and resolved with other existing approaches to emancipatory politics. The conceptualizations of Booth, Rancière, Badiou, Laclau and Balibar offer important insights in this section. Chapter 4 introduces the concept of acts and acts of dissidence specifically as a way to study everyday resistance movements of actors of small power and presence. It aims at providing an analysis of how to understand the agency of the less powerful actors and how their influence and presence can contribute to transformatory politics they might strive for. Chapter 5 introduces the concept of militarism and contextualizes it in Turkey to see to what extent militarism has penetrated Turkey. It is intended to provide a background on what militarism really means across political, social, economic

and ordinary-daily layers it might sink into. The last chapter, in turn, brings together all the theoretical tools gathered in previous chapters and immerses them with the empirical data gathered on the case of CO in Turkey. COrs are presented as agents of the idea of security without militarism and security as emancipation. By doing so, this last chapter also aims to frame COrs as a force in Turkish politics that exemplifies how speaking where one is not allowed is an example of active agency who act out of the presupposition that they already have a voice and it has to be heard. Therefore, it also deals with questions of political subjectification and deepening security.

CHAPTER 1

SECURITY STUDIES DIFFERENTIATED

The area of study that is called Security Studies mainly revolves around two streams, one traditional and one critical, and everything in between them. Generally speaking, traditional security studies has argued that the only powerful actor capable of altering (in)securities for referent objects of security is the state due to its monopoly over the legitimate use of violent means and its better ability to mobilize relatively more affluent, accumulated resources compared to non-state actors lacking this efficiency. It has been advocated that the way modern politics is organized privileges nation states as the only important actors and as such 'security is about the state and state is about security' (Buzan, 1998:37). What is more, this state-centric security approach has valued military-focused interpretations of security problems, paid utmost attention to threat identification and vulnerability (Hoogensen and Stuvoy, 2006:220) and a zero-sum mentality in dealing with other referents.

Critical approaches to security, in turn, grew out of the dissatisfaction with the record of Traditional or Cold War Security Studies in theorizing and providing security at least for the past fifty years. In response, there have been, even during the Cold War but more significantly in the post-Cold War era, many critical lines of thought which objected to these premises of traditional security studies and argued for a security understanding based on the commonality of security for multiple referents, a multidimensional and broader conception of security. Critical Security Studies, in turn, builds over this intellectual heritage and will be explained in detail later. However, for now, suffice it to say for the moment that CSS is characterized by its argument that security is emancipation, thus is inclusive of a broad range of issues from the point of view of many referent objects pertaining to many dimensions of social life. Therefore, it is interesting to point out that in an environment where state-centrism has become

the norm and what states think is right as security goes, the following questions are inevitable for any student of critical security theorizing: who will act in cases where states are unable or unwilling to provide security for referent objects other than themselves? How to promote non-state actors' broadened (not only military-focused) agenda for security in a hegemonic security structure where such efforts are not appreciated? How might it be possible for other actors to make their audience accept their actorness, let alone projecting their vision of thinking about and doing security to the security common sense exercising disciplinary restraint? These are some introductory questions that motivate this study.

Such questions become much more intriguing if one takes into account the fact that they presume the existence of a viable and communicative environment of public debate which involve open channels for any actors to participate in the political processes. That is to say, chances for political agency by the civil society are taken for granted as if every society offers the same amount of political openness and an equal level of democratic culture. However, it is common knowledge that this is not the case. In societies where channels of political participation are limited for non-state actors, the problem of counter hegemonic agency becomes much more problematic.

Accordingly, there have been calls from within the CSS itself (Wyn Jones, 1999; Booth, 1997:114) or from other strands of critical security theorising (McSweeney, 1999; Huysmans, 2006a:6-9, Bigo, 2006:84) for a move towards a more sociological account of security that would focus on matters of agency and its mutual constitution with the structure. It has been argued that not all actors in the society has the same effect while speaking of security (Wyn Jones, 1999:154) and this is why abstract ideas about emancipation and theoretical efforts for that matter are only the first step which need to be followed up by other forms of practice taken on the ground (Bilgin, 2005b:60).

This theoretical chapter introduces Critical Security Studies within the context of a general overview of Security Studies since the beginning of the Cold War. The aim of this chapter is to create a discussion around the concept of security in respect to referent objects, issues included in the security agenda, the relationship between theory and practice. The main argument of this chapter is

that CSS is the most 'realistic' way of approaching today's insecurities at the individualistic, societal, national, international or global levels with its:

- broadened and deepened security understandings
- idea that security is emancipation,
- notion of constitutive theory, which are explained below in the literature review section.

It also aims to introduce the critiques brought to CSS in terms of its political agency capabilities on the part of the transformatory power of civil society, social movements, intellectuals and scholars.

Next section aims to introduce Security Studies in a systematic way by employing a comparative approach to traditional/Cold War Security Studies and critical approaches to security, with special emphasis put on Critical Security Studies on the basis of the Aberystwyth School. This part is also intended to present the justification for the selection of CSS as the theoretical tool of this study.

1.1 An Outlook at Security Theorizing

In the security literature, there have been many categorizations under different names. The classification offered above, namely traditional and critical security studies, has been preferred by Ken Booth (1997) and Richard Wyn Jones (1999:94) so as to indicate a commitment to the distinction formulated by Horkheimer (1982) between traditional and critical theory. Moreover, Keith Krause (1998:299) used the terms mainstream, traditional, orthodox and neo-realist interchangeably, versus critical security studies (Bilgin, 2005b:19). Bill McSweeney (1999), in turn, opted for a categorization under the labels of objectivist approaches to security and sociological approaches to security. Pınar Bilgin offered to classify security studies historically under the categories of Cold War Security Studies and post-Cold War thinking on security (2005:16-63).

What all these groupings have in common is that the first group refers to a security thinking based on statism, a military-focus, the importance of preserving the status quo and an objectivist understanding of social phenomena, whereas the second group is characterized by a multiplicity of referent objects of security, the multidimensionality of the security agenda that is inclusive of but not limited to the military sector, an appreciation of the normative nature of all theories, and the socially constructed nature of social phenomena.

Before analyzing each of these streams, it should be noted that since the end of World War II, there have been examples of both lines of thought, even during the Cold War itself. That is to say, there were critical/alternative views being voiced as early as the late 1960s, while there have been much traditional theorising in the post-Cold War era too (Bilgin, 2005b:16-22). The reason why these classifications are being employed is by no means an attempt to overlook historical continuities, but to render the field easier to grasp for students of security theorising. The benefit of historical categories is their capture of the fact that with the end of the Cold War, scholars found more room to pay attention to a broadened security agenda in addition to the military dimension, even though such opinions had been advocated for some time then. The advantage of a distinction between traditional and critical security studies is their ability to single out some approaches that came after the end of the Cold War, claimed to criticize Cold War security studies, yet still could not overcome the dominance of state-centrism. However, such classifications need to be considered together, for, after all, there is a particular insight in each of them, which is the aim of the next sub-section. Here, traditional and critical security theories will be explored in depth in terms of their answers given to the questions of 'whose security and how to provide security?'

1.1.1 Traditional Security Studies

As it was mentioned above, traditional security studies are characterized by:

- *prioritization of states over other possible referent objects*: Traditional security studies are state-centric, which 'could be defined as treating the state as the central actor in world politics and concentrating on states' practices when studying international phenomena' (Bilgin, 2005b:17). In this sense, they have a normative disposition favouring 'the concentration of all loyalty… at the level of the sovereign state' (Booth, 1998:52). In other words, the answer to the question of whose security is the state. By extension, this also relates to the justification given to state-centrism by suggesting that the nation-state alone possesses the necessary power tools in providing security.

- *ensuring the survival of one's own existence against external threats, even sometimes at the expense of that of others:* Highly relying on the neo-realist outlook, traditional security studies underline threats emanating from the outside only, thus overlook the insecurities existing within a state's border. In this framework, states cope to survive in a structurally anarchical world in which they are the only agents capable enough of producing security for them. In that effort, their options are limited by the existence of the security dilemma (Herz, 1950) and the absence of any higher authority than the nation-state itself (Waltz, 1979). In other words, security is claimed to consist of a zero-sum game because officials can never be sure of the intentions of other leaders (Morgenthau, 1948).

- *resorting to primarily military means to ensure this provision of security*: In addition to an overemphasis on the importance of military deterrence and defence of the borders, traditional security studies emphasized 'militarised solutions to problems that could have been addressed through non-military means' (Bilgin, 2005b:18). Among the most elaborated themes have been the arms race (Kaufmann, 1956; Mearsheimer, 1989; Brennan, 1961), nuclear deterrence (Steinbruner, 1978; Betts, 1983; Jervis, 1989; Huth, 1988; Hoag,

1961; Mearsheimer, 1983, Kissinger, 1956), striking capabilities, military postures (Levy, 1984) and game theory applications to military scenarios (Schelling, 1966). Militaristic solutions for the elimination of threats are in turn the answer of traditional approaches to the question of how to provide security.

- *presenting the conditions of the world we live in as naturally given, open to objective inquiries*: According to the traditional approaches to security, the world is out there to be objectively studied. This is why theories formulated within this school of thought have projected themselves as explaining the real situation while abstaining from contemplating on how things ought to be. By doing so, they have claimed to offer scientific knowledge about international phenomena because they worked with testable hypotheses and repetitive patterns dictated by the international distribution of power. This is where traditional security studies, with their realist outlook, have accumulated a character that is crucial to every powerful theory: becoming common sense, thus immune to being questioned. They were, in a sense, the only theoretical tools that mattered when one wanted to study international phenomena, including security affairs (Booth, 1997:83-120). In effect, security studies became heavily preoccupied with threat identification, quantitative studies, and governmental policy advices.

Consequently, traditional security studies has a limited range of referent objects, a restricted spectrum of issues to analyze, an objectivist perspective towards social phenomena, and most importantly, the claim to intellectual hegemony which has resulted in the exclusion or downplaying of any other ways of providing security other than those envisioned by it.

1.1.2 Intellectual Heritage leading up to the formation of Critical Approaches to Security

Even during the Cold War, which was the heyday of the traditional approaches to security, there were examples of alternative ways of theorizing on security that departed from the mainstream state-centric, military focused understandings. This section aims to review these alternative approaches in an

attempt to highlight the continuity of dissident voices of security understanding through decades.

Ken Booth (2007:59-65) identifies the World Order School as one of these critical voices designed during the Cold War. It was in the beginning of the 1960s that Richard Falk and Saul Mendlowitz wrote that while war had been taken as an inevitable and constant variable in world politics by many individuals, it could actually be eliminated through ideas of common humanity, peace plans, non-violence, democracy and justice (Booth, 2007:60). The World Order Models Project (WOMP), as argued by Mendlowitz, was a forum for scholars and political activists around the globe who took an interest in moving towards a more just world order through research, education, dialogue and action (Mendlowitz 1975 quoted in Booth, 2007:61). What is significant about WOMP is that by renouncing the opinion that security is a zero-sum game that can be won through military means, it underlined the importance of adopting a multidimensional approach consisting of poverty, social injustice and war. The latter was to be built upon 'world order values', the most prominent of which are listed as non-violence, economic justice, humane governance, ecological sustainability and human rights (Falk, 1992:56-103 quoted in Booth, 2007:61). Even though WOMP has been criticised for ignoring the power factor in operationalizing the necessary agents in defying the military logic of the Cold War, this is a general critique targeted against critical approaches to security, which builds on a narrow conception of political agency and theory and practice relationship that is going to be discussed in detail later on. WOMP should be regarded as one of the first intellectual project that went to the field and tried to persuade individuals for the cause of agency beyond states and transnational social movements to promote non-traditional agendas of security.

Secondly, although not as ambitious as WOMP in eradicating war altogether, the idea of 'Alternative Security', formulated in Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament (1982), put forward the notion of common security. The latter rejected the zero-sum mentality to security and argued that in the case of nuclear presence, both sides would lose if nuclear confrontation escalates and that security must be sought and maintained not against one's adversaries, but with them (Bilgin, 2003:204). The argument is that survival can be realized only

if it is sought jointly rather than on a threat of mutual destruction (Independent Commission, 1982:ix quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:20). Common security was formulated as an attempt to suggest that nuclear deterrence and the constant danger of total annihilation were not viable means to achieve security. It also asserted that the mere absence of war did not guarantee peace and security, while the establishment of social justice and the elimination of structural violence would make humanity head towards a phase of history in which basic human needs are not risked at the expense of militarization and statism.

A third intellectual tool was put forward under the framework of Peace Studies and Peace Research. While it started with the goal of eliminating war, in time it evolved into adopting a broader agenda in the 'domains of theory, research, practice and activism' (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002:241 quoted in Booth, 2007:65) in the sense of preventing conflicts and wars through the establishment of stable peace (Boulding, 1978). The remarkable contribution of peace research was its promotion of a 'maximal approach' to peace (Bilgin, 2005b:21), which meant more than the absence of war included the establishment of the necessary conditions for social justice by the removal of structural causes of insecurity (Galtung, 1971, 1996:9). The idea of structural violence drew attention to economic and social patterns of global exploitation such as poverty, hunger, imperialism and colonization, which subjected the majority of the world population to various insecurities, including but not limited to the military sector. Therefore, by adopting a multitude of referent objects such as individuals, social groups and the whole humanity (Bilgin, 2005b:21), peace research offered a positive conception of peace that is informed by structural factors of oppression and insecurity (Galtung, 1969:171). It also recommended its students to get involved with empirical works in the field, promote peace education through the role of intellectuals (Dunn, 1991) and learn by doing (Booth, 2007:66).

In addition to these approaches that emphasized the importance of exceeding a state-centric mentality, there were dissident voices raised from the perspective of the Third World. The impact of the idea of structural violence did have a resonance in the Third World security thinking in the direction of an emphasis to be put on development and the North-South divide. Caroline

Thomas (1987:1) argued for a more comprehensive approach of security for the Third World that would accommodate economic, political and environmental issues at the same time. While her focus was on the restructuring of the international economic system that discriminated against the majority of the Third World countries, she also pointed to the insecurities these societies were facing in terms of basic human needs such as nutrition or health care.

A secondary perspective from the Third World underlined the argument that whereas in the developed West threats were conceived to originate from outside the state, in most parts of the Third World, threats came from inside, which rendered Western concepts of security of 'limited analytical utility for Third World context (Ayoob, 1986 and Azer and Moon, 1988 quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:24). In other words, while traditional security studies were state-centric, their centrism did not offer the best lenses to study the insecurities that the Third World nation-state had been facing since it had not been the outside which posed threats to the state, but it had more often been the inside. Consequently, while some segments of the Third World security thinking pointed out the importance of economic inequalities in creating new insecurities disregarded by the West, others advocated a closer focus to be placed on the processes of nation-building rather than short-term oriented military issues of armament or nuclear deterrence (Al-Mashat, 1985:33 quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:24).

In sum, the critical intellectual heritage formulated during the Cold War that is distinctive from the premises of traditional security studies suggested the adoption of a multiplicity of referent objects ranging from the individual to humanity (whose security?), the realization that insecurities that were visible in our daily lives necessitated a multidimensional approach exceeding the military sector (how to provide security), and a sensitivity being paid to the Western-centric approaches' contextuality. These were important developments that should be considered as counter hegemonic movements questioning the legitimacy of the security common sense that ruled the Cold War period in the name of mainstream approaches. Given the atmosphere of fear of the Cold War and the close relationship that existed between the academia and governmental policy incentives, the surfacing of these approaches become more and more valuable.

The next sub-section will move on to introducing critical approaches to security theorizing in the post-Cold War period that made use of this existent intellectual accumulation. However, it should be noted that not all the perspectives that are going to be discussed below share the same level of commitment to the transcendence of state-centrism, of the military-focused, or of the objectivist outlook to social phenomena. Whereas they all argued for a re-conceptualization of security different from that of traditional security studies, their ways of doing so differed from each other. It is thus the aim of the next sub-section to discuss these differences.

1.1.3 Critical Approaches to Security in the post-Cold War era

The main themes to be discussed in this section should be organized in relation to the concept of broadening security, which is to include different focus points in addition to the military, seek to reveal their relationships and to take into account appropriate referent objects that operate within these new areas (Bilgin, 2005b, 25).

1.1.3.1 Barry Buzan's Sectoral Approach

The starting point for the new critical security approaches was then the introduction of new issues to the security agenda, such as economic, political, environmental affairs. While the alternative approaches developed during the Cold War highlighted the importance of this interrelationship between different dimensions, it was Barry Buzan, this time as a scholar within the discipline of Security Studies, in his revised edition of People, States and Fear in 1991, who expressed the necessity to look beyond the monopoly of states as referent objects and of military issues in the security agenda. He offered to broaden the security agenda to five sectors, namely economic, environmental, military, political and societal, in order to be able to grasp the multidimensional character of security.

His argument was that Cold War security studies had become over-engaged with military and national security concerns and this had resulted in failing to account for overlapping and linked threats emanating from different sectors. Without denying the importance of military issues, Buzan moved to introduce new threats to the security agenda with 'many potential referent objects … as one moves down through the state level to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of the international system as a whole' (Buzan, 1991:26).

Even though Buzan's approach was useful in bringing in several other dimensions of security other than the military sector, his account has been criticized for reserving primacy to state among other referent objects. He advocated that since states had the monopoly to legitimate use of violence and commanded a large range of power capabilities in the realm of policy-making, national security should be treated superior to the concerns of other referent objects (Bilgin, 2005b:33-35).

1.1.3.2 Ken Booth's Security as Emancipation

It was in the same year with Buzan that Ken Booth published his work where he introduced his argument "security is emancipation". In making his case for a broadened security agenda, Booth proposed to include 'all those physical and human constraints which stop them (humans) from carrying out what they would freely choose to do" (1991:40). As it might be understood from this wording, Booth argued for a broadened security agenda that would not only include many more dimensions of an individual's life, but also bring about a different conceptualization of security.

In case one adopts this emancipatory view of security in a way to remove all the constraints an individual faces while trying to fulfil his/her potential, one would also find the opportunity to link the past, present and future of security thinking because insecurities defined as physical and human constraints stopping human beings from carrying out what they would freely choose to do so implies that the choices that are made today or in the past might set in motion some

dynamics that might later on become restrictive for what one will choose to do freely in the future. That is to say, a short-term mentality cannot be employed while thinking and doing security. This broadening move exceeds bringing in new sectors or trying to catch their interrelationships. It actually amounts to defining security as a process to be strived for constantly, rather than taking it as a static condition to increase or decrease in quantity momentarily.

Here the concept security as emancipation requires more elaboration. Booth defines emancipation as 'the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view to freeing people… from contingent and structural oppressions' (Booth, 2005:181). Building on the intellectual heritage offered by peace research and the growth of a universal human rights culture, Booth introduces, not power or order, but the concept of emancipation as the tool to produce true security (Alker, 2005:191). The concept is originated in the Latin word 'emancipare' which means the action of setting free from slavery or tutelage (Wyn Jones, 2005:216). In an attempt to show the inability of the status quo in providing security, Booth makes use of Horkheimer's critique of the modern capitalist system, which suggested that the latter limits the individual's potential for autonomous action and that state's bureaucratic apparatus and the mass media as two perils of the modern system rendered human beings to a state of slavery to the economic structure (Horkheimer, 1982:237). In turn, Booth takes this lead and turns it into something bigger by arguing that not only capitalism, but also other 'world-constructing ideas' such as patriarchy, proselytising religions, statism/nationalism, racism or consumerism, have been acting as restraining structures over the lives of individuals (Booth, 2007:21-27). Therefore, security as emancipation necessitates human beings be freed from constraints like human rights abuses, water shortage, illiteracy, environmental degradation, lack of access to health care and birth control, militarization of society, economic deprivation and armed conflict at the state and the sub-state level (Bilgin, 2005b:26), while at the same time staying at a state of critical awareness so that the current deeds done in the name of security provision do not compromise the possibility of alternatives in the future. In emancipatory politics, one cannot be confined to choosing between prescribed alternatives, but he/she has to include the possibility of calling entirely new possibilities into being (Dillon, 1996:5, 30-

31). These issues will be further elaborated below in the section on Critical Security Studies.

This new tendency to broaden the agenda of security studies and bring in new referent objects was not welcomed by all scholars of security thinking. The most prominent example of this objection was brought about by Stephen Walt who stated that a broader security agenda would 'risk expanding security studies excessively' (Walt, 1991:213), undermine the importance of military threats that still persisted even in the aftermath of the Cold War and that the multiplicity of security dimensions would be harmful to the intellectual coherence of security studies. The last point, as Walt argued, would make it harder for security analysts to 'devise solutions to any of the important problems (Walt, 1991:213).

1.1.3.3 The Theory of Securitization

Following the critics against broadening, the theory of securitization developed by Ole Waever should be introduced. Waever argued that broadening the security agenda should be prevented because doing so might produce a counterproductive effect and jeopardize the solution of security problems at hand. This is because security, as a term, carries with it a pack of historical connotations backpack, which plays out in 'a field where states threaten each other, challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their independence, and so on' (Waever, 1995:50). Historically speaking, security has to do with 'defence and the state' (Waever, 1995:47), a sense of 'urgency, state power claiming the legitimate use of extraordinary means, a threat seen as potentially undercutting sovereignty (Waever, 1995:51). It is associated with 'conflictual, zero-sum, militarized mind-sets… rendering intractable the issue at hand' (Bilgin, 2005b:28). In other words, Waever raises a warning against putting more and more issues to the security agenda because once they are 'securitized', these issues become taken out of the normal realm of politics and put into the security language where they are no longer treated as just problems, but turn into existential threats that require the mobilization of extraordinary measures by official channels. He defines securitization as the state

claiming a special right when a certain development is named as a security problem and that power holders trying to use 'the instrument of securitization of an issue to gain control over it' (Waever, 1995:54). When an issue is securitized, then ordinary checks and balances over the actions of the government on this particular area no longer operate because it is moved up in policy priorities and the extraordinary methods of dealing with it have been mobilized (Huysmans, 2006a:26).

By rejecting the objective existence of threats in the outside world as it has been portrayed by traditional security studies, the theory of securitization treats security as a speech act. That is to say threats to security do not exist outside the discourse produced by the agency of the state elites who utter security in reference to a particular issue (Waever, 1995:55 quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:29). This linguistic focus transforms the role of language from one of representation to performativity, meaning security discourses make reality be perceived and comprehended in a particular way, a security way (Huysmans, 2006a:24). Given that, Waever is against broadening the security agenda and that he focuses on the agency of state elites alone who transforms an issue into a security problem by saying that it is. In order to prevent this from happening, Waever proposes to de-securitize issues at hand and try to solve them in the realm of normal politics where security language is not employed (Buzan et al., 1998:209).

In sum, Waever's approach is critical of the traditional security understanding in pointing out the subjective nature of security threats, yet it objects to broadening the security agenda for the reasons mentioned above. The critics to securitization theory are formulated in terms of its narrow security agenda and its choices for agency. First of all, even though it makes sense that state elites could broaden the agenda and thus attempt at controlling the issue through extraordinary measures, this should not prevent other non-state actors from broadening their security agendas since their aim could well be to challenge 'the statist concerns… and to seek to address their own and others' concerns that have been marginalized by states' (Bilgin, 2005b:29). It has also been argued that states do not have to always rely on traditional practices while addressing broadened security concerns and that in case state's agency is dismissed per se, then this would amount to leaving a useful tool in terms of capability

mobilization (Bilgin, 2005b:32). Another critique is securitization theory's failure in contextualising securitization in a constructivist way by taking into account only the securitizing act, but not the reaction of the audience which receives this act. Therefore, it has been argued that securitization theory should pay more attention to how speech acts are reacted upon since language and meanings work two ways (Weldes et al, 1999).

1.1.4 Critical Security Studies

Based on the argument of security as emancipation, Critical Security Studies (CSS) grew out of the discontent and dissidence with the way security had been thought, practiced and written about in the mainstream security literature. Students of CSS adopt this angle because they are not satisfied with the traditional approaches and that unless alternative ways are worked on and necessary precautions are taken, this dissatisfaction may grow in the future (Bilgin, 2005b:43).

A CSS approach would start with posing the question "Whose security?" because handling security critically amounts to accepting the assumption that there is a multiplicity of referent objects: individuals, societies, gender, environment, social groups, collectivities, states, nations and so forth. But this would only be the beginning, for more importantly, this critical approach needs to go on with providing alternative ways on how to and through what means are best suitable to ensure generating security for the referent object under consideration. In order to emancipate the subject from the setbacks of the current insecure situation and exceeding the sheer boundaries dictated by the status quo, this new school of thought recognizes the necessity to look beyond the existing codes of the common sense. A critical approach to security would imply an inherent realization that there have been many 'forgettings' in the sense that what has been consolidated by strategic studies so far resulted in the downplaying or ignoring of some referent objects and multiple concerns of insecurities (Wyn Jones, 1999:107). CSS thus aims to reveal the existence of a particular "framework of language, including definitions, images, rhetorical devices,

metaphors, etc… that makes, creates and sustains a specific view that legitimizes and reifies it, making it, in a sense, real" (Booth, 2007:241). By doing so, it aims to create new horizons and new intellectual discourses within which actors such as thinkers, decision-makers, institutions or simple individuals could be enabled to imagine alternative ways to security provision. In this sense, Critical Security Studies builds on a commitment to break away from the promise of objectivity and the positivistic claim to explain reality of mainstream schools of security. [11]

In other words, CSS is determined to break down restrictions within the discipline, laid down by the intellectual common sense, which has so far proved inefficient to overcome global insecurities such as poverty, hunger, environmental degradation, global warming, climate change, human rights abuse. The students of CSS find their perspective the most powerful because it comes from an observation derived from a simple look around: the system does not work for the security of the majority of the global population.

It should be noted from the beginning that the main idea fundamental to CSS is informed by Critical Theory (CT) itself, which rests upon the premise that problem-solving theories are different than critical theories (Horkheimer 1982).

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[11] Klein, B., (1994). Strategic Studies and World Order, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, R. W. Wyn Jones, R., (1995)."Travel Without Maps: Thinking About Security after the Cold War", in M. J. Davis (ed.), Security Issues in the Post-Cold War, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 196-218; Campbell, D. (1998). Writing Security: United States foreign policy and the politics of identity, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Williams, M. C., (1998) "Identity and the Politics of Security", European Journal of International Relations, 4(2):204-225; Buzan, B. & Waever, O. & de Wilde, J., (1998). Security: A new framework for analysis, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner,; Weldes, J. & Laffey, M. & Gusterson, H. & Duvall R., (1999). Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Wyn Jones, R. (1999). Security, Strategy and Critical Theory, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; McSweeney, B., (1999). Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Farrell, T., (2002). "Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Programme", International Studies Review, 4(1):49-72; Booth, K. (2004). "Special Issue on Critical Security Studies", International Relations, 18(1); Dunne, T. & Wheeler, N. J., (2004). "We the Peoples: Contending Discourses of Security in Human Rights Theory and Practice", International Relations, 18(1):9-23; Booth K. (2005). Critical Security Studies and World Politics, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,; Bilgin, P. (2005). Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, London: Routledge; Huysmans, J. (2006). The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, the New International Relations, New York: Routledge; Booth, K. (2007). Theory of World Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Krause, K. & Williams, M. C., (1996). "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods", International Studies Quarterly, 40:229-254; Krause, K. & Williams, M. C., (1997). Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Krause, K. (1998). "Critical Theory and Security Studies: The Research Programme of "Critical Security Studies", Cooperation and Conflict, 33(3):298-333.

That is to say, while a problem-solving theory takes the existence of both its referent objects and the problem under inquiry as granted, a critical theory would seek to go beyond what we have been used to regard as normal, constitutive of the common sense, and ever-existent. Thus, Critical Theory is by no means pro-status quo, on the contrary, it aims to expose hidden patterns, forms and structures of social exclusion, domination and hierarchy that render our way of thinking, imagining and acting limited. In a nutshell, an approach based on Critical Theory would problematize, historicize, and question the common sense regarded by individuals and societies regard as naturally imposed.

Critical Theory does that because it relies on the Coxian understanding of theory is always for someone and for some purpose (Cox, 1981:182). That is to say, the common sense that has come to be internalized by human beings today has managed to exist because there are pro-status quo actors maintaining and constantly reinforcing it because they have vested interests in its continuity. Critical Theory, in turn, establishes right from the start the normative disposition inherent to all theories, including its own.

Following the Gramscian understanding of hegemony, the current common sense further continues to exist with the consent of the agents living within it, either because they are content with it or they are co-opted into it since it commands a considerable level of objective appearance. A theory, structure or an institution is the most powerful when the agents operating within it stop questioning its historicalness and socially constructedness and take it for granted. Accordingly, the common sense helps sustain the status quo by 'making situations of inequality and oppression appear as natural and unchangeable (Forgacs, 1988 quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:50-51). Therefore, Critical Theory sets on exposing the construction of discursive limits and disciplinary reifications[12] that prevent us from imagining a different mindset as to how to theorize our object of inquiry (Booth, 1997:111).

[12] Reification refers to a process of representation and experience in which a human-made object or situation becomes seen as a factual given that exists externally and independently from the agencies that produced it.(Huysmans, 2006:4).

Lastly, CSS owes to Critical Theory for the latter's logic of immanent critique, which is the idea that already existing orders have within themselves potentials for a better life (Horkheimer, 1982:213). Immanent critique is crucial to CSS because for a theory that necessitates the establishment of linkages between yesterday's, today's and tomorrow's (in)securities, it is highly important to stay critical at all times and investigate ways to get closer to a state of emancipation, even though a perfect solution is never possible. However, this is where immanent critique becomes an indispensible tool since it motivates the security analyst to always question the status quo.

These connections to previous critical theorising are materialized in different ways in CSS. As it has been mentioned above on Booth's emancipatory theorizing, CSS students advocate the broadest security agenda possible in accordance with the path leading to emancipation. Saying that, not only military threats, but also many other dimensions of insecurities pertaining to social life are incorporated into the security agenda of CSS students. The idea of broadening then necessitates the inclusion of a multitude of referent objects as mentioned above.

Equally important is CSS's move to deepen security, which is defined as 'the idea that security in world politics is essentially a derivative concept' (Booth, 2007:150). Deepening is mostly mistaken for the inclusion of more referent objects other than the state (Booth, 2007:157), yet it actually comes from the commitment of CSS to the notion of situated knowledge, which basically sets to reveal the links between one's conception of security and his/her political worldviews (Seidman and Alexander, 2001:2). That is to say, as Booth argues (1997:91), 'how we conceive international politics is at the root of the meanings we make of security'. Therefore, the main goal of deepening is to show that theories, opinions or discourses are never 'objective reactions to the world out there, but are rather from somewhere, for someone and for some purpose' (Booth, 2007:150).

In an attempt to reveal linkages between the theorist and the theory, CSS argues that traditional security studies was a product of particular historical context of the Cold War period (Bilgin, 2005b:19). Ken Booth, by giving

examples of the time when he was a student of International Relations, states that students, 'having been brought up on the state-centric and militarized news media and popular culture of the Cold War… (were) primed to believe that a theory of …'diplomats and soldiers" explained world affairs' (1997:93). Moreover, the ideas questioning the morality or rationality of the nuclear strategy, he argues, were 'ignored completely or dismissed as irrelevant or lacking in realism or soft on communism' (Booth, 1997:94). Thus, as far as both International Relations and Security Studies are concerned, their development 'should be understood within the context of the Cold War fears and policy incentives in the West in general and the United States in particular' (Bilgin, 2005b:19). CSS advises to question these connections so that the common sense can be relaxed to enable the broadest possible cluster of opportunities to exist for individuals to seek human emancipation. This is possible if multiple referents, with their own derivative security conceptions and the awareness that they are indeed derivative, are allowed to co-exist with each other in the security thinking. In cases where alternatives or choices are not so available to individuals because of certain security discourses 'close off certain possibilities whilst opening others' (Dalby 1990:4-29 quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:47), they would not be able to 'do what they would freely choose to do' because the range of choices would be limited. Therefore, CSS advises its students to analyze the formation of dominant security discourses, as well as that of the alternative or critical ones currently present or formulated in the past (Pettman, 2005:159).

The notion of security as a derivative concept can also be inversed in the sense that, if one's worldviews influence the way one conceives security, then it should also be possible for these conceptions to feed back into how one interprets politics. After all, theories feed back the reality that they themselves offer to explain (Bilgin, 2001). That is to say, from the perspective of deepened security, a particular security understanding or theory can inform individuals' conception of the world, which brings the debate to the matter of constitutive theory. As Steve Smith argues, theories 'tell us what possibilities exist for human action…, they define not merely our explanatory possibilities, but also our ethical and political horizons' (1996:13). CSS rejects the traditional theory and practice relationship that treats the two as distinct realms and proposes a mutual synergy

between them: ‘theory arises out of practice, practice is shaped and modified as a result of theory, and theory develops in light of practice’ (Booth, 2007:198). Students of security thinking, for example, can reinforce, but also change, the conditions of insecurities and in accordance with Marx’s Feuerbach, the aim is to change the world but not understand it (Hoffman, 1987). In sum, CSS students should be ‘self-conscious about the normative and mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice in their thinking and writing rather than feeding back into the system hiding behind a notion of objectivity’ (Bilgin, 2005b:51; Huysmans, 2006b:31-32). This is where CSS advocates the agency of intellectuals, scholars, social movements and civil society in thinking and writing about alternative ways of doing security.

Such a move is remindful of Gramsci’s distinction between traditional and organic intellectuals (1971:9). Taking after Horkheimer’s Critical versus Traditional theory, Gramsci’s organic intellectuals ‘articulate and organize the interests and aspirations of a particular social class’ (in the case of security this is counter-hegemonic perspectives), while traditional intellectuals play a role in ‘producing and reproducing the hegemony that provides (legitimation) to the prevailing patterns of domination’ (Wyn Jones, 1999:154). CSS nominates scholars and intellectuals of critical security as the organic intellectuals for critical security theorising who are supposed to use their ‘specialist information’ to ‘compare the justifications of the (hegemonic) regimes with actual outcomes’ (Wyn Jones, 1999:160). Thinking, writing and theorising on security is considered as practice by CSS by creating new security discourses.

The idea that theories are constitutive of reality and theorising is practice has been criticized by scholars outside CSS. Statements like in CSS, ‘theory and political action are conflated and theory is given a moral dimension as if theory in itself possesses some kind of moral agency’, or ‘theory in itself does not have any agency’ (McCormack, 2010:47-48), or that it is only a political decision involving real men and women that can have agency for change are among the most prominent ways of framing this critique.

CSS replies to that by pointing out that these critiques regard the concept of politics, practice and theory from an objectivist and statist point of view. It is

true that governments are not primarily interested in abstract notions of security or politics for that matter, but they are more drawn to power (Chomsky, 2006 quoted in Booth, 2007:199). Booth argues governments 'use knowledge gained from academic inquiry instrumentally, to strengthen their position', with a bureaucratic eye rather than a scholarly one. He also accepts the fact that government practitioners consider academics having to offer little because 'they lack the expertise and especially the privileged access to knowledge of the insider' (Booth, 2007:199). In cases where they are made insiders are cases where they help governmental practitioners win (Booth, 1997:97) because theories that sustain those in positions of power are likely to catch on within the dominant discourse and remain as such (Weldes, 1999:18, quoted in Bilgin, 2005b:52, Wyn Jones, 1999:149). This is why CSS proposes its students to see practitioners of security as more than governmental officials and broaden their audience in a way to include civil society, intellectuals and social movements. This does not amount to say that the agency of the state is dismissed by the CSS. Quite the contrary, CSS values the material power base of the state and disregarding the transformatory power of such an agency would be counterproductive for the cause CSS has been promoting. However, in order for CSS to adopt a broadened security perspective, it is essential to make use of agents other than the state simply because, first, 'states are not always able to fulfil their side of the bargain' in providing security to their citizens and second, 'there are already agents other than the state on the security field' which are better equipped and qualified to cope with non-military threats than the nation-state (Bilgin, 2005b:54-55).

CSS goes on by acknowledging that it is in the realm of 'political practice that critical theories meet the ultimate test of vitality' (Fraser, 1989:2, quoted in Wyn Jones, 1999:145). It is clear that the attempts of creating or, as in the case of Peace Research, re-vocalizing an alternative security discourse based on non-statism and non-military-focus are going to be strongly resisted. In other words, the appeal of security as emancipation is always played out in sites of struggle in which transformatory powers of agents compete with each other (Huysmans, 2006a:6). This is why suggesting theorising as a form of political agency is seen as only the first step in CSS (Bilgin, 2005b:60). The necessity to take

emancipatory action to the ground is crucial for CSS by engaging with the reality by locating sites of counter-hegemonic resistance, suggesting policies and thus empowering alternative agents.

Such a research agenda requires an agency-focused sociological account targeted at the transformatory power that could be 'translated into political strategy, tactics and how change can be produced in the presence of asymmetrical power relations' (McSweeney, 1999). To put it differently, an agency-oriented analysis would help constitutive theory to constitute through the application of the abstract into the struggle between emancipatory and conservative vision of security (Huysmans, 2006a:6). In this sense, not everyone who thinks or writes on security achieves the same effect because there are structural constraints and opportunities deciding on the level of 'mobilization of knowledge, status, public support, media coverage, etc' (Huysmans, 2006a:9). In sum, CSS offers a way to theorize about the insecurities faced everyday, and the way ahead lies in assessing the agency potentials of the actors operating within a particular security structure.

1.2 Conclusion

This chapter discussed how security theorizing has developed since the Cold War according to two main streams of theoretical approaches: traditional and critical security understandings. While traditional approaches to security are characterized by the primacy granted to the state as the only security referent object, the importance of ensuring survival against external threats, resorting to primarily military means for security provision, and an objectivist outlook to the world. In return, critical approaches to security started off with broadening the security agenda to other sectors than only the military, and then expanded to include other referent objects of security such as the individual, the society, or humanity. Critical Security Studies, mainly developed by the Welsh/Aberystwyth school formulated the concept of "deepened security" which argues that security is a derivative concept because all the actors possess situated and conditioned knowledge about the world. Therefore, every theory and opinion

about security is never objective, but they are, in line with Critical Theory, for someone and for some purpose. Moreover, the understanding of security as emancipation is the added-value of CSS because it enables the security agenda to expand as much as it priotizes becoming a political being and intervening into the world around oneself as a security concern and tool. By aiming at the removal of structural and physical barriers against the realization of one's potential, security as emancipation enables us to tailor security differently for different contexts and referent objects.

The main criticism brought against CSS is its conceptualization of agency. CSS suggests civil society and intellectuals to generate change in the society and bring about emancipatory politics. However, not everybody in the society possesses the same power to speak or act. There are cases where common sense notions about security are so entrenched in the society that emancipatory transformation is very difficult to discern. Therefore, there is a great need to investigate where it might be possible to locate that agency and bring it forward.

The next chapter introduces and discusses the literature on norm diffusion, which is the tool often used in the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations in explaining how and through which processes change is brought about. It is an important tool in identifying the main actors of the diffusion process, as well as the structural constraints against and opportunities for the possibility of change. Although at a first glance, this literature might seem useful in explaining how emancipatory norms might be imported, it will be argued that However, it will be argued that norm diffusion still falls short when it comes to provide an alternative way of thinking about critical-emancipatory agency, especially in the Turkish case of the CO. This is because of the nature of the CO norm in Turkey, as well as norm diffusion's pre-occupation with large scale, traceable change. It will be argued that there is a need to move away from such large-scale approaches and concentrate more on daily activities of resistance and dissidance, which will be later expolored in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2

NORM DIFFUSION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

"Even the smallest person can change
the course of the future"

Galadriel, from Lord of the Rings

This chapter aims to introduce the concept of norm diffusion with its theoretical outline and its use in empirical cases in respect to how it has been studied in the literature. The main goal of undertaking such an effort is, first, to introduce how norm diffusion is conceptualized and what kind of an understanding it bears in its core, and secondly where it comes short for the analysis this study contemplates. That is to say, by providing awareness on the focal points of norm diffusion theory, this chapter yields the necessary methodological and ideational tools to pinpoint where norm diffusion perspective might fall short when applied to the agency of conscientious objectors. In doing so, the most important questions characterizing norm diffusion and the factors of applicability of the theory to empirical cases will have been identified before the COrs is examined.

The chapter's disposition is as follows. First, norm diffusion as a term is defined. Then it is analyzed as a process in respect to its stages, the identification of the actors involved, the analysis of their motivations in engaging in this process and the strategies and mechanisms employed, and the exploration of the conditions for a norm's successful diffusion or rejection. In each of these subsections, examples from empirical studies will also be provided to exemplify its applicability into daily-life situations. Last, the added value of norm diffusion is assessed vis-à-vis its applicability to the case of COs.

2.1 Norm Diffusion: Definitions

This study adopts a definition of norms that exceeds, but still incorporates the neo-liberal institutionalist or regime theory approach which argues that norms only facilitate co-operation among self-interested actors and that they constrain the behaviour of states, but do not affect their identities or interests (Checkel, 1999:84; Klotz, 1995). Norms, in the limited sense, have three qualities:

1. They are prescriptive standards of behaviour trying to create regular and coherent practices,
2. They involve a feeling of obligation and embody a sense of appropriateness about proper behaviour (March and Olsen, 1998:943-969),
3. They incorporate collective expectations regarding proper behaviour of actors, in a given context and/or with a certain identity (Björkdahl, 2002:40).

Therefore, norms are patterns of behaviour and they refer to the way an appropriate behaviour ought to be. This prescriptive oughtness is the distinctive quality of norms compared to ideas, opinions or institutions (Björkdahl, 2002:43). This oughtness, in turn, is influential upon the actor to which the norm is directed, i.e. the norm-taker, to the extent that the latter's preferences and interests, even its identity is altered with the presence of existing normative order or the adoption of a new norm. This is the constructivist interpretation of normative change. Thus comes the norm definition: intersubjective understandings that constitute actors' interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe how appropriate behaviour ought to be by expressing values and defining rights and obligations (Björkdahl, 2002:43).

When it comes to organize norms, there are two main categorizations highlighted in the literature. The one, formulated by Kratochwil (1989:26), categorizes norms under the labels of constituting, regulating and enabling actors and their environment. Manners (2000:31) suggests three main categories under which he deals with norms: moral, social and utilitarian norms. Moral norms,

being prescriptive and bearing oughtness (Finnermore and Sikkink, 1998:891), do not relate to rationality or optimizing behaviour (Shannon, 2000:295), but they point to the distinction between the moral and the immoral (Spruyt, 2000:67). Social norms, labelled as constitutive or taken-as-granted (Spruyt, 2000:68), are central for the construction of an actor's identity and its interests (Shannon, 2000:294-5). They make group members accept and play by certain rules that imposes predictability to their behaviours and credibility to their statements (Spruyt, 2000:68). It is through socialization into this way of behaviour that the actor becomes a member of the group and thus the norm becomes a constitutive element to its identity and preferences. Finally, utilitarian norms serve to functional purposes, regulate behaviour, reveal information, reduce uncertainty by institutionalizing conventions and signal expectations (Spruyt, 2000: 69). Manners argues (2000: 32) that generally norms accommodate these three characteristics altogether. In sum, when considered together, Kratochwil's constitutive norms are Manners's social norms, while regulating norms are utilitarian norms, and enabling norms fall somewhere in between moral norms by providing legitimacy through morality and social norms by conferring identities and thus relevant capabilities with this identity.

Diffusion, on the other side of the coin, refers to a process whereby there occurs a transmission or spread of one actor's ideas, information or institutions to another actor(s) (Checkel, 1999:85). When applied to norm diffusion, this process stands for a transfer of certain codes of appropriate behaviour from an actor to another one through various means. There is a need to specify how this process takes place, under what conditions it is realized and why norm promoters, who are called as norm entrepreneurs, initiate the new norm, or norm-takers accept it, and through which mechanisms or strategies diffusion happens. Norm entrepreneurs are norm promoters who try to convince a critical mass of actors to embrace new norms (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). They possess solid understandings about the appropriate behaviour under consideration and they select a persuasive idea and invest energy in developing a norm in order to modify behaviour so as to improve the normative context in which the norm entrepreneur and the norm-taker both operate (Björkdahl, 2002:59). These actors engage in a dynamic process of agenda setting through their ideational and

material power capabilities and they aim to alter the behaviour of others in line with the new norm they are promoting.

2.2 Norm Diffusion: A process

The literature varies in its conceptualization of the diffusion process, yet often a consensus can be found in organizing it into three phases (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:899):

- Norm emergence: the phase where a norm is created out of an issue or a problem. A discourse about its validity is formed to make sure that the norm is no longer denied and is at best not rejected (Shmitz, 2002:20)
- Broad norm acceptance, i.e norm cascade, diffusion, socialization: the stage where a considerable amount of actors accept the norm's validity and starts behaving accordingly.
- Internalization or institutionalization: the phase where norm compliance becomes automatic, rule-consistent behaviour is ensured, and the norm itself becomes a part of the new norm-takers' identity rather than a rhetorical commitment.

However, before moving on to analyzing each of these stages in detail, a closer look towards the norm diffusion literature is needed because it will summarize the differences that scholars working on this particular subject have put forward. This is necessary to show because these differences and criticisms drive norm diffusion theory further and underline its focal points or shortcomings.

The literature on norm diffusion is often covered in reference to two perspectives called the first and the second wave (Cortell and Davis, 2000). The first wave consists of the studies that were undertaken in the first half of the 1990s generally, and they are characterized by an examination of good norms at the expense of how some undesirable, but still important, ideational formations have been created (Capie, 2008:638, Legro, 1997:34). As it has been argued by Acharya (2004:242), the first wave writings 'speaks to a moral cosmopolitanism'

in the sense that the promoted norms have a universal appeal such as banning the use of land mines, protection of whales (Peterson, 1992), global racial equality and intervention against genocide (Klotz, 1995), or simply the promotion of human rights or democratization (Sikkink, 1993, Shmitz, 2002). This also implied an indirect dichotomy between global and local norms, which implied a moral/normative hierarchy favouring the former over the latter.

Moreover, the situations where the newly promoted norm might have had influence, but did not in the end, were not accounted for. They are often criticized for focusing on cases where norm diffusion worked and that the circumstances under which "the dog did not bark" (Checkel, 1998b:339) have not been explored. However, it has been argued that norm diffusion studies should also account for a range of different results achieved, ranging from total displacement of old norms and replacement of them with the newly promoted ones, to 'outright rejection and evolutionary and path-dependent forms of acceptance that fall in between' (Acharya, 2004:242). This school concentrated on providing information on how norms were initiated in the first place. It focused on 'an evolutionary or a genealogical approach to norms as new ideas that are primarily adopted by norm entrepreneurs driven by principles or self-interest' (Garcia, 2003:20-1, Capie, 2008:639). In other words, this approach was preoccupied with the motives and causal mechanisms employed by norm entrepreneurs while failing to account for how local or norm-takers' political structure or agency may condition normative change (Acharya, 2004:240-2, example given as Finnemore, 1993).[13] It also had transnational agents, whether as individual entrepreneurs or social movements, as its key actors in a way to put an overemphasis on the importance of international prescriptions compared to those deeply rooted and influential at regional, national or sub-national levels (Acharya, 2004:242, Legro, 1997:32). While states and domestic institutions have been portrayed as norm-takers, transnational actors and NGOs have played the role of the norm entrepreneur.

[13] This failure has been identified in the following second wave writings: Risse-Kappen, 1994, Cortell & Davis, 1996, Checkel, 1998b and 2001.

The second wave, in turn, sought to bring the local agency back. In an attempt to make up for the shortcomings of the first wave, scholars of norm diffusion studies pointed out that even though a norm might enjoy a broad international consensus on its utility and legitimacy, this does not automatically amount to its being smoothly adopted in a local setting. Because 'ideas do not float freely' (Risse-Kappen, 1994), imported norms are never considered against a blank slate (Capie, 2008:639, Krastov, 2009:296). That is to say, the norm that is being promoted by the entrepreneur tries to penetrate into an already institutionalized or "normalized" environment where it is highly likely to find already settled, clashing or complementary norms or practices of behaviour. In the norm diffusion terminology, this is defined as normative match or normative fit. As Checkel argues:

> " … [cultural match is] a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, legal system (constitution, laws, judicial codes) and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative agencies)" (1998a:4).

While the entrepreneur tries to bring the new norm into agenda through its cognitive and material tools, it has to deal with already embedded alternative norms or practices. These alternative norms or practices, in turn, have been defining and prescribing certain types of behaviour in this particular setting. New norms never enter a norm vacuum but instead engage in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:897). The new norm can become settled or institutionalized when it takes its part in the norm structure, often at the expense of already existing patterns of behaviour. This is what the norm literature calls a normative clash (Björkdahl, 2002:52-3, Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:897, Checkel, 1999:87) and may culminate in different levels of norm diffusion:

- radical norm transplantation / displacement through effective entrepreneurship (Farrell, 2001:65). The process of 'normalization' for the newcomer norm is never a simple one as it requires skilful agency by the entrepreneur particularly in settings where a longstanding prescription clashes with the new norm (Fujii, 2004:100),

- localization of the new norm, which will be dealt below, but still can be shortly defined as substantial modification of the new norm in a way to resonate with the local normative order,

- rejection of the new norm because of the essential and indispensible character of the locally hegemonic norms or beliefs.

Therefore, the level of the normative clash, or 'the relative strength of pre-existing domestic norms, traditions, organizational culture against the influence of the prospective new norm' (Capie, 2008:639, Legro, 1997:32-36, Grugel, 2007:46) is one of the factors which is decisive in the level of norm diffusion.

The structure does not always have to be counterproductive. In cases of a normative fit, the new norm finds support and comfort in the existence of an already constructed and settled norm (Farrell, 2001:65). Even though this is not a prerequisite for norm diffusion, it is helpful for the success of the process that the social or the cultural characteristics of the norm adopter match with the new norm. It is then more preferable for the norm entrepreneur when a cultural understanding that social entities belong to constructs a tie between the two (Meyer and Strang, 1993:490). Manners labels that as a cultural filter (Manners 2002 p.245), which affects the influence of norms and the extent of political learning and adaptation in potential norm followers.

The normative fit, even though it may exist by its own, needs to be either constructed or brought to the attention of the norm-receiver. This may happen when the norm entrepreneur picks up a complementary or supportive norm and then frames it in order to create a normative fit with its new norm. For example, an actor may try to frame the norm of prevention of human suffering in a way to resonate closely with the concept of humanitarian intervention in order to empower the latter with legitimacy and attractiveness. This is raising a normative fit to counterweight a potential normative clash such as humanitarian intervention VS the principle of sovereignty.

The second wave does not focus on only good norms and it also tries to deal with situations where harmful ideas were also diffused as the way ahead for

any given group. For example, the proponents of the genocide in Rwanda had to teach the Hutu population that genocidal killing was 'normal' in the sense of being an acceptable and legitimate cause of action (Fujii, 2004:99). Even though the society in Rwanda had a normative appeal against not killing neighbours, the genocidal leaders transformed the normative environment so that these actions which would normally be considered as abnormal could be viewed as legitimate.

It is now in order to proceed with a close examination of norm-diffusion stages. Defined as a life cycle of a norm by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:895), the stages of idea selection and norm initiation overlap with norm emergence stage. Then come the phases of diffusion as broad acceptance or norm cascade or socialization; and next internalization or institutionalization.

2.2.1 Norm Emergence

2.2.1.1 Idea Selection

Idea selection is the stage where the norm entrepreneur chooses an idea it feels inspirational and regards as appropriate. Naturally, the entrepreneur is surrounded by a dozens of those. However, there is a number of factors which motivates the norm-promoter to lean towards a particular idea.

Identity of course comes at the forefront. As long as the desired norm has the same value-based resonance and frequency with the entrepreneur's own ideas, it is more likely to be chosen. Secondly, this idea should be a logically "operate-able" belief that may be turned into practice and thus make it spread. This is actually an extension of the necessity that the idea and its features should match the characteristics of the problem the entrepreneur wants to tackle (Björkdahl, 2002:60). It will be more useful if the entrepreneur recognizes a certain normative fit, time and space-wise, between this idea and the existing structure, but it is not obligatory. It might be the case that the entrepreneur is willing to revolutionize the structure, thus is ready to face firmest normative clashes.

The idea selection phase does not always happen so deliberately since it might be the case that first, the contours of the topic at hand needs to be clarified. This is what happened in small arms control case, whose norm emergence phase was divided between first a knowledge-generation process, then followed by the acknowledgment of the problem (Garcia, 2003:6). While the first stage was accomplished by scholars and arms control practitioners and the arms trade epistemic community (Garcia, 2003:7), the second phase took place within the institutional setting of the UN General Assembly. The creation of expert knowledge that will later on lead the way for collective action dominated the first step in the emergence of the small arms control norm (Krause, 1998). Pioneering studies filled in for the lack of knowledge concerning the problems concerned to the spread and proliferation of small arms and placed the issue as a new topic on the international agenda in respect to accountability, transparency and transfers to sub-state groups in ethnic conflicts. (Garcia, 2003:9). It was argued that the presence of excessive weapons increased the severity of conflicts in Pakistan or Rwanda. These mostly scholarly efforts resulted in linking small arms control to issues of illicit arms trade, proliferation of ethnic, sectarian and civil conflicts, and the propensity for armed conflict (Garcia, 2003:14-15). Therefore, non-state actors took the lead in small arms control and created an issue out of it through the accumulation of expert knowledge.

2.2.2 Norm Initiation

Norm initiation is the phase where the entrepreneur takes the idea and creates it as an issue. This is the act of framing, which needs to be performed in a persuasive and credible way in order to confer meanings and normative attributes to this idea. It is the stage where the entrepreneur is crucial since it makes the norm emerge by setting the agenda, associating it with certain attributes to make it persuasive, legitimate and attractive to be considered appropriate and desirable. Calling it as a soft power resource, Björkdahl defines (2002:61), taking after Michael Barnett (1999), a frame as follows: a device used to help fix meanings, organize experience, alert others that their interests and possibly their identities

are at stake, propose solutions to ongoing problems. Thus, it is through a frame that a norm entrepreneur empowers the idea with a prescription of appropriate behaviour. Norm advocates highlight and create issues by using language that names, interprets and dramatizes them (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1999:268).

Frames are created by the entrepreneur through their language and speech acts. In this way, it shapes the idea in a certain interpretive way backed up with a certain context to refer to certain meanings, symbols and other means of cognition. It is the framing act where the entrepreneur and the structure engage in an interaction because the former associates certain symbols and various attributes currently available in the normative structure to its catchy idea in order to render it attractive and appropriate. In return, the structure is the environment in which the entrepreneur is offered with such complementary frames at its disposal. The structure, when the time comes, can also be altered by the new frames and cognitive units crafted by the entrepreneur.

When it comes to identify framing acts, Björkdahl (2002:89-93) offers three types of framing acts:

- *Diagnostic framing*: identification of the problem

For example, while trying to diffuse the norm of regional cooperation to Southeast Europe (SEE), EU declared it aims to create a situation in which military conflict will become unthinkable and thereby to extend to SEE the area of peace, stability, prosperity and freedom which the Member States have created in the last fifty years (Erol, 2006:21). EU's objective is to pursue stability, security, and prosperity in the Western Balkans through region's progressive integration into the European mainstream without the risk of renewed instability in a directly adjacent region. Most pressing problems or threats stemming from the region are security threats regional by nature: trafficking in drugs, human beings, flourishing of Balkan-based organized crime and corruption, constant flow of immigrants, lack of social capital exemplified in the low level of trust among the SEECs to each other, poor regional infrastructure linked to disappointing records of energy interdependence, unsatisfactory respect to minority rights and inadequate attention to integrating multiculturalism, return of displaced persons, economic problems relate to formal and informal barriers to

regional trade, black-grey market-based economy, high rates of unemployment (Erol, 2006:22).

- *Prognostic framing*: suggestions for solutions or appropriate strategies and instruments for the problem.

For example, in trying to diffuse the norms of social inclusion and social citizenship to Mercosur and its member states, the Commission of the EU frames problems like poverty and unemployment in Argentina as closely associated with the lack of social welfare programmes and the low level of social inclusion (Grugel, 2007:50). Or to follow the example above, concerning these regional soft security threats, the Union argues that concerted action is indispensable and that addressing these threats will be successful only if Western Balkans countries and the EU work together. These problems are regional in nature and they thus require regional action. In this regard, the Union advocates regional co-operation as the solution to these challenges (Erol, 2006:23).

- *Motivational framing*: framing the idea in order to motivate the audience by creating resonances with moral obligations, success stories, other desirable practices of existing normative structure or cost-benefit analysis.

Again to follow the SEE example, to exemplify the incentives to impose further attraction to regional co-operation, EU appeals to certain narratives or success, some cost and benefit analyses and big carrots. The Commission argues that the EU is built on a deeply rooted foundation of regional cooperation and based on its own experience of the benefits of this notion, that political understanding, economic and social prosperity all depend on it, it believes the countries of Western Balkans would benefit significantly from closer cooperation. In a similar way, the EU claims it is itself a model for overcoming conflict and promoting reconciliation through close co-operation to achieve common goals. It also makes use of certain cost benefit analyses. For example, it is argued that it is not a rational use of resources that each country in the region tackles organized crime on its own. The biggest motivational frame, however, is the linkage the Union created between regional co-operation and deeper relations

with itself, even to the extent of giving full membership prospect to potential norm followers (Erol, 2006:24).

Similarly, to pick up the example of Mercosur, EU links social reform, greater social inclusion and citizenship to growth, competition and personal security, in an attempt to enable these norms more attractive to the local audience. It further contextualizes the adoption of these developments within the negotiations of a free trade agreement with Mercosur by reiterating them as a constant 'mantra' in each meeting (Grugel, 2007:54).

In sum, norm initiation is a cumulative effect of framing activities, which stand for all cognitive and material tools used to project the idea of the norm entrepreneur into a normative context and thus expect norm-followers to rise and be persuaded, adopt the norm and thus crate a "norm cascade" (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:902), which will be analyzed in the next section.

2.2.3 Diffusion and Socialization Phase

For the diffusion stage, both the entrepreneur and the potential norm followers need to be mutually investigated since the strategies that the entrepreneur uses and the way they are used are very influential in the degree of acceptance of the followers, while the latter's characteristics may also inspire the entrepreneur to choose certain strategies over the others. The socialization process by which potential norm followers become actual norm receivers depends on the strategies, image and framing acts of the entrepreneur, as well as on the extent of the normative match and of the cultural filter.

2.2.3.1 Factors related to norm promoters

Considering first the entrepreneur, it would be useful to elaborate on what strategies it could employ during the actual diffusion process. These strategies refer to the ways with which norm promoters make the potential followers adopt

the new norm. These mechanisms are persuasion, individual advocacy, social pressure, cognitive framing, emulation, making use of reputation and good example representation, teaching, discourse generation, political rhetoric, information creation, expertise, professional training, lobbying, coalition-building to name the most prominent ones (Garcia, 2003:37). These strategies vary along a spectrum of persuasion, argumentation, and manipulation to coercion. In that sense, they may be singled or bundled. Those characterized by persuasion or argumentation stand for interactive, more learning-oriented, interest or preference-changing strategies in the absence of overt coercion (Checkel, 2001:562, Björkdahl, 2002:101). However, for an entrepreneur to benefit from these social mechanisms, it has to be regarded as a well-placed, righteous and legitimate actor by the norm-takers in using these strategies.

Towards the other edge of the spectrum come more coercive strategies which range from manipulation to coercive norm diffusion. The latter consists of pressure, arm-twisting, penetration, sanctions and shaming (Björkdahl, 2002:102). These mechanisms are employed to promote appropriate behaviour in norm's direction through the distribution of rewards, incentives and punishments (Flockhart, 2005:48). They are asocial processes leading to compliance with the norm through mimicking or limited change and do not often culminate in internalized diffusion. Thus, they may not be as successful as the communicative means are because if the followers are not persuaded for the appropriateness of the new norm by heart, they might not lead to the next stage of internalization where the norm becomes settled, i.e the interests and preferences of the follower had changed (Payne, 2001:41).

For example, Manners suggests (2002:244-5) certain ways for norm diffusion for EU to export its model of regional integration:

Contagion and overt diffusion: Contagion is the model where there is almost no deliberate entrepreneur, but rather the norms are diffused unintentionally because other actors wish to imitate the norm representative. Contagion takes place by virtue of the follower's intrinsic belief in the appropriateness and desirability of the norm. Naturally, the entrepreneur is still in the game since it is thanks to the entrepreneur's successful and virtuous representation and implementation of the

norm that potential followers aspire to it. Manners puts forward Mercosur's adoption of regional integration in that sense (Manners, 2002:244). David Coombes (1998:237-238) explains this by referring to how the EU leads by "virtuous example" in exporting its experiment in regional integration. Overt diffusion refers to the physical presence of the entrepreneur in norm-followers' environment may result in diffusion, resulting from both symbolic and substantial normative power (Manners, 2000:35). The existence of epistemic communities and informational networks may result in the generation of policy-relevant information or the communication of success stories to praise the benefits of norm-adoption by social learning (Krastov, 2009:297).

Informational: This type of diffusion comes to being with strategic communications, as it has been exemplified by EU's declarations or policy initiatives. This refers to discourse generation, political rhetoric, information creation.

Procedural and Transference: Diffusion is realized through institutionalized relationships. For example, inter-regional cooperation agreements, membership to an organization or simply EU's enlargement lead to such diffusion. Transference refers to exchanging goods, trade, providing assistance or aid. Manners labels this as carrot and stickism or conditionality which facilitate diffusion. Another example can be given in the free trade negotiations between EU and Mercosur which provided the forum for both actors to constantly meet and discuss on issues of social inclusion and non-exclusionary citizenship. EU, in turn, developed strategies by giving policy advice, establishment of common research agendas, funding NGO projects addressing issues of human rights, democratization, social equality, poverty reduction public gestures of encouragement and civil society cooperation (Grugel, 2007:52-4). The establishment of "Chaire Mercosur", a new research centre where academics and policy-makers from both regions meet and interact in support of the negotiation process is another striking example of this diffusion mechanism.

Naturally, the selection of these strategies and the means they are materialized in the actual cases very much depend on the identity of the

entrepreneur at stake (Björkdahl, 2002:101). If the entrepreneur's identity does not resonate with communicative behaviour, then one cannot expect it to employ argumentative persuasion. In another way, the promoter may not be able to meet the potential followers in suitable fora, or simply the norm-receivers may not regard the entrepreneur as legitimate as enough to be advocating this particular norm. This is a logical extension of the prerequisite that the entrepreneur or a normative power actor needs to be considered legitimate in order to successfully represent and diffuse the norm. Potential followers will only conform to the norm if they see it as something appropriately framed and communicated, thus desirable. A precondition for that is to regard the entrepreneur as just and well placed to be able to advocate the norm (Bjorkdahl, 2002:61). As an extension of that, if there are several norm entrepreneurs, the one with 'stronger international endorsement, greater legitimacy, more effective organization and logistical support' is likely to gain an advantage (Krastov, 2009:302). One other criterion is capabilities for the strategy selection. Logically, one actor cannot employ coercive methods if it is simply not able to do so materially because of lack of resources or the incapacity to capitalize resources into practices. Some strategies or tools may not be available to the entrepreneur because either the nature of the problem does not allow them or the potential norm followers cannot be reached through these tools.

Following the evaluation of the norm entrepreneurs in the diffusion process, one may wonder what incentives an entrepreneur possesses in order to initiate norm promotion. It is obvious that the process is long, costly and requires a lot of energy invested for the normative penetration to the place into the existing structure. In the literature four main points of motivation seem to be underlined: empathy, ideational commitment, altruism and self-interested behaviour (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:898,).

Empathy can be observed when entrepreneurs show an interest in the welfare of others even if this has no effect in their own material well-being. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:898). Altruism, on the other hand, refers to promoting or advocating norms to benefit others even at the risk of harm to the entrepreneur (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998*:* 898). Ideational commitment consists of a high moral conviction on the part of the entrepreneur who firmly

believes that the attributes of the promoted norm represent ethical righteousness. Lastly, norm entrepreneurs may engage in norm diffusion for the purpose of promoting self-interest. These interests may also be collective ones which benefit both the entrepreneur and the potential norm followers. The issue of interest in motivating the entrepreneur to diffuse a norm is actually a crucial subject since the more a norm seems to promote the entrepreneur's self-interest exclusively, the less likely it is diffused among the third parties. The important question here is why some actors choose to conform and accept the new norm. This relates to the other side of the diffusion process: norm-followers.

2.2.3.2 Factors related to norm-followers

There are many reasons why an actor prefers to conform to the new norm. Finnemore and Sikkink organize them in three headings (1998:903): legitimation, conformity and esteem. When one entrepreneur frames an idea and tries to sell it as a new norm, the targeted norm-receiver may choose to accept it in order to show that it has adapted to the social environment, to prove that it belongs to this normative structure (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:903). This process is called conformity and it stands for the norm-receiver's desire to take part in the normative group it sees as desirable and attractive. This also relates to the norm-taker's motivation to adopt the new norm because it either believes in the appropriateness of the norm itself or the actor promoting it. The influence and popularity of either the norm promoter or the norm itself may produce diffusion, which is also referred to as the prominence factor in the literature (Garcia, 2003:24). The International Committee of Red Cross's prestige has often been argued to make a big impact on the adoption of the ban on the use of land mines (Garcia, 2003:24).

Another reason is to increase domestic or international reputation. Norm-followers may reason that others will think better of them if they conform to this norm. Actors under domestic turmoil or insecure of their international status might feel compelled to adopt a new norm (Garcia, 2003:24). One other motivation can be found in what is called the external shock, or the world-time

context (Farrell, 2001:82, Legro, 2000:263). This refers to situations where major wars, depression, economic crises or radical changes undermine the legitimacy of existing norms, empower or disable existing or new entrepreneurs. Germany and Japan's shift of militaristic strategic cultures after the heavy defeat in WWII (Berger, 1998), or the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait enhancing the adoption of the norm of small arms control are common examples from the literature (Garcia, 2003:25-26). In times like these, reality becomes more confusing, contradictory and fuzzy that potential norm taker seeks predictability and innovation in the new norms (Fujii, 2004:100). It has been argued that in times of crises, the American government leans towards stricter state building measures that empower the executive branch, while in the post-crisis period, these new powers are withdrawn (Freidberg, 2000:30-2 quoted in Farrell, 2001:84).

It might as well be the case that the near environment of the norm-receiver adopted the new norm altogether and that there is a high peer pressure upon this particular norm-receiver. In order to get rid of this pressure, shame or guilt, the actor may simply opt for adoption of the new norm. This is what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:903) labels as esteem. When Mali issued the Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in Western Africa, it was later signed by sixteen other regional states banning arm activities for three years (Garcia, 2003:24).

Legitimation, in turn, overarches these two by referring to a combination of esteem and conformity in the sense that the domestic constituents of the norm follower will believe that their government is a legitimate one by conforming to a set of desirable behaviour. They will also be impressed by the esteem condition because they shall have a strong belief in the appropriateness of their governments by looking at what other actors think of their country (Garcia, 2003:24).

2.2.3.3 Factors related to the characteristics of the promoted norm

Defined as a norm's robustness in the literature (Legro, 1997:35), there are certain characteristics that a norm needs to possess in order for it to be communicated successfully and be appreciated as positively as possible to facilitate the diffusion: specificity, durability, concordance.

Specificity refers to how clear and elaborated a norm's roles, prescriptions, rules, restraints and obligations are or can be understood. In other words, it hints at the level of the agreement among the actors involved on what to do as recommended by the norm. The clearer the prescription of a norm, the more likely norm takers will follow it (Fujii, 2004:100). For example, while trying to lay down the rules and recommendations of the small arms control norm in the UN, the Program of Action negotiated in the General Assembly ended up only as a politically binding document and emerged as an example of soft law (Capie, 2008:641). It stated that states would take action 'where appropriate' or 'on a voluntary basis', which then made Human Rights Watch call the program as one of ironic inaction. Moreover, when interviewed, many foreign ministry officials who joined the meetings on behalf of ASEAN member states in order to negotiate a common position on this norm, admitted that they had little or no knowledge of the subject (Capie, 2008:644). The later led to the minimalization of the norm in ASEAN in respect to its being linked to only transnational activities rather than including domestic activities as well.

Secondly, durability stands for how long this norm has been in effect and whether it commands a long-standing legitimacy or not (Legro, 1997:35). This directly relates to level of this norm's institutionalization which decides whether violations to the norm are punished so that the norm is reinforced and reproduced. Again, to follow the small arms example, even after ten years of its norm initiation phase, this idea had little consensus on any aspect in 1998 and states had been behaving as if there were no norms on that matter (Capie, 2008:641-2). Only was it after the initiation of the Program of Action in the UN, followed by many annual reports and conferences held up until 2006 that the

consensus on the existence of the problem of small arms proliferation extended to the acceptance of the norm itself (Krause, 2004:25). Before, states who had rhetorically committed themselves on paper to follow small arms control did not provide compliance reports as required by the Action Plan, thus not abiding by the norm's requirements (Capie, 2008:646).

Lastly, concordance refers to how widely accepted and affirmed the promoted norm is. This concerns whether the norm is taken for granted or there are special conditions introduced or requested for its acceptance and compliance (Legro, 1997:35). Again on the small arms control example, when Vietnam took floor to inform the UN Conference on small arms participants on ASEAN's common position in 2001, the speech stressed the need for any instrument to take into account 'different situations, capacities, and priorities for each region' of the world and that norm compliance should not interfere with political independence and the right to self-defence (Capie, 2008:644). These special conditions pointed out a low level of concordance for ASEAN concerning the small arms control norm, which in the end made the diffusion of this norm into this particular region a limited one restricting norm compliance only on transnational issues.

Another example was provided by Legro (1997) in his comparison between the norms of not attacking to merchant ships by submarines, the ban on strategic bombing on civilian targets, and the ban on the use of chemical weapons, all promoted during the interwar years. During the WWII, while the first two norms were violated, chemical weapons were not used. A part of the explanation offered by Legro for this variation is the differences these three norms had in terms of specificity, durability and concordance. For example, while the rules regulating submarine warfare stood out relatively durable, almost going as back as to the Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and that it had been repeatedly brought up in many international conferences during the interwar years. Moreover, in1936 the norm was strengthened with the London Protocol on Submarine Warfare. However, the protocol included some ambiguities in respect to the definition of merchant ships or what a combatant party was (Legro, 1997:39). In terms of concordance, prior to WWII, rules regarding submarine warfare had been ratified by a total of forty-eight states, including all major powers and combatants of WWII (Legro, 1997:40). Compared to that, the norm

of not using strategic bombing against civilian targets enjoyed much less stability and specificity since there was no agreement on what a civilian target was and that a low level of concordance because of the absence of a finalized agreement to accept also decreased the likelihood of successful diffusion (Legro, 1997:41). Finally, on the matter of chemical weapons, prohibition against the use of poison was influential for centuries and that the Geneva Protocol in 1925 formalized the norm, ratified by most members of League of Nations., except for Japan and the USA. It was a simple and fair protocol, with very few grey areas (Legro, 1997:42), while these two opt-outs by major powers and the principle that Britain and France applied the terms only vis-à-vis those who also ratified it, decreased the norm's concordance. These different levels of norm robustness is explanatory for the failure of the first two norms with low levels of specificity, durability and concordance, whereas chemical weapons was the most strong one in all three aspects.

Naturally, a norm's durability and concordance relates to the level of cultural filter / normative match it enjoys. The latter is one of the most important topics discussed in the second wave of the normal diffusion literature because it is one of the most important factors in evaluating whether a norm will be accepted wholesale or partially, or with modifications, or will be rejected all together. Next section is intended to address the concept of localization, which refers to the grey area between the total acceptance of the new norm and its outright rejection.

2.2.4 The Localization Phenomenon

As it has been mentioned above, sometimes the new norm may not find the best of circumstances to diffuse into a new area because the locally hegemonic normative order is constitutive of the norm-taker's identity, or the organizational culture is too powerful, or domestic interests or institutions at the micro level clash with the prescriptions of the new norm (Legro, 1997, Capie, 2008:638-9). However, instead of rejecting the new norm altogether, the local norm-takers may choose to build congruence with local practices and ideas so as

to tie the newcoming norm to the dominant normative order without disrupting the essential norm hierarchy inherent to the latter. In this sense, localization is 'a framework that explains how norms are contested, adapted and incorporated into a new context' (Capie, 2008:639, Acharya, 2004:241).

However, localization should not be interpreted as the mere assessment of the existential fit between domestic and outside norm in a dichotomous range of outcomes such as rejection or acceptance. It rather points out to a process of congruence building between foreign norms and local beliefs and practices whereby the former gets incorporated to local ones (Acharya, 2004:241). Localization is preferred over rejection since actors may learn new norms in the very process of resisting them, as this resistance is overcome as long as learning proceeds incrementally (Risse and Sikkink, 1999:17-35). Having said so, the potential of diffusion strategies selected for a particular norm should also strive for the creation of localization opportunities rather than strictly enforcing wholesome adoption. Nevertheless, it might well be the case that by localizing global norms, local actors seek to strengthen, not replace existing institutions (Acharya, 2004:246). This may never lead to the desired normative change since the reinterpreted foreign norm serves to reinforce the primacy and indispensability of the local norm by being rendered inferior to it.

Moreover, localization is more than framing strategies because it usually starts with 'a reinpretation and re-presentation of the outside norm even to the extent of reconstituting this foreign norm' in a way to build congruence with a pre-existing local normative order (Acharya, 2004:244). In cases where there is a strong normative clash between the highly institutionalized local order and the foreign norm, localization seems rational unless 'existing institutions have already been discredited to the extent that local actors may seek to replace them' (Acharya, 2004:247). The abandonment of female circumcision in Kenya was already demanded domestically by the time transnational norms and norm promoters started the campaign, and this contributed to the adoption of the new anti-circumcision norm (Keck and Sikkink, 1998:62). Localization is more likely o occur when there are influential insider players who can prevail over those emanating from abroad with foreign norms (Capie, 2008:640). That is to say, working through a local agent significantly increases the likelihood of a norm

being diffused, or at least being localized. Acharya (2004:249) gives the example of the non-provocative defence norm being tried to diffuse in the Soviets, which was facilitated by the Soviet defence community coming up with framing stories from the Soviet history that allegedly always prioritized defence.

A typical example of localization has been offered by ASEAN's approaches to the ideas of common security and small arms control (Capie, 2008) which were both transformed and modified so that they would become more congruent with established regional practices underlining the principle of sovereignty, non-interference and organizational minimalism on the top of the regional normative order.

To start with the common security case, when it was first introduced as a new policy direction to ASEAN by Canada and Australia, it conflicted with some of organization's core norms. First of all, common security was proposed to the region on the same terms with the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE) with its organizational structure. This was in contradiction with the so-called 'ASEAN way' which highlighted 'organizational minimalism and a preference for informal and nonlegalistic approaches to cooperation' (Acharya, 2004:256). Secondly, the common security mentality would require dealing with regional states along with major outside powers because security was to be sought globally and this presented another hardship since the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) that ASEAN hold dear to it necessitated a minimal role to external powers (Acharya, 2004:256). Some ASEAN officials argued that the CSCE model and the common security understanding were suitable for European conditions and they did not resonate with either ASEAN's or South Asian identity. This hinted at the lack of a positive image on the success story being promoted. Furthermore, there was not so much specificity and concordance on common security norm itself, as ASEAN officials stated that this norm would not be beneficial to South Asia because the latter did not present a single security threat, but a multiplicity of them. That is to say, those who opposed the norm were not aware of the simple fact that common security was itself a norm that prescribed dealing with multi-sectoral threats together by targeting their root causes by taking humanity as the referent object. The first

effect of this normative clash was dropping the CSCE model with its legalistic and organizational requirements and praising the ASEAN way as the road ahead.

With the help of a prestigious insider local agent, the ASEAN Institute for Security Studies (ISS), common security understanding was reframed as 'cooperative security' with its emphasis put on the rejection of deterrence-based security systems while excluding links between domestic processes and regional security issues (Acharya 2004:257). A rejection of any deterrence mentality resonated well with ASEAN's policy of not organizing itself as a regional collective defence system. However, by agreeing to the inclusiveness of outside powers in regional security matters, ZOPFAN was broken since cooperative security perspective was institutionalized in ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The latter was established as a way to promote external security dialogue, but at the same time it reinforced the importance of the principle of non-interference and the pacific settlement of disputes, which had been fundamental to ASEAN member states. The fact that ARF did not have a permanent secretariat or did not oblige member states to engage in confidence building measures legally was also harmonious with the organizational minimalism norm. In sum, common security norm was reinterpreted in a way not to disturb the core values of ASEAN found in non-interference, non-military cooperation and organizational minimalism. The presence of a prestigious insider agent like ASEAN-ISS, the resonance between common security and anti-deterrence and non-military mentalities contributed to the localization of this foreign norm.

A very similar situation applied to the small arms control norm again within the context of ASEAN. When the norm initiation process was going on in the UN, ASEAN wanted to adopt a common position, yet the final result was a narrow interpretation of small arms concept so as to link it to only transnational crime and counter-terrorism issues, while remaining silent on discussions of internal politics such as military and police complicity in unlawful weapons transfer (Capie, 2008:640). Linking the new norm to transnational issues creating problems for regional security might have encouraged action by virtue of serving as diagnostic and prognostic frames, yet this proved to be a very limited perspective by silencing the debate in matters that related to internal affairs and political sovereignty (Capie, 2008:650). The solutions offered for contributing to

small arms control were stricter customs, tougher policing and closer intelligence cooperation, which were all territorial and sovereignty-oriented remedies reflecting the dominant local normative hierarchy. The lack of an insider norm promoter and the presence of major Western powers as the major entrepreneurs did not help the norm to easily diffuse without modifications to it.

Having dealt with the norm-senders and the norm-receivers' roles in the diffusion stage and the normative structural effect in respect to localization possibilities, a portrait of interaction is needed in order to finalize the process. Such a portrait is useful because of identifying the necessary conditions required for the diffusion or the socialization or the norm cascade to take place, thus obtaining a study model for empirical cases. The extent of success depends on the overlap between the means the entrepreneur employs and its legitimacy in using them, the frames it constructs, the degree of contextual match / cultural filter, the perception of the potential norm follower regarding the appropriateness of both the norm promoter and the norm that is being introduced to address a local problem, and the norm's intrinsic qualities of robustness. A high level of success refers to a turning point generation of a momentum which empowers the new norm into a more widely accepted practice. Therefore, the requirements can be summarized as follows:

The identity and the capacity of the entrepreneur need to be legitimate and appropriate with the nature and attributes of the norm in order to create a righteous image of norm diffusion. Norms held by actors that are viewed as representatives of successful and desirable models have a bigger chance to diffuse (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:906). This, in turn, depends on mostly the perception of norm-followers that the norm is promoted not just for the sake of the entrepreneur's self-regarding interests, but also for the sake of appropriate behaviour. The norm-receiver also needs to notice an overlapping relationship between the entrepreneur and the norm that is being diffused.

If normative clashes can be minimal, conformity is then facilitated. A normative fit with a positive cultural filter would be highly beneficial (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:908) and is usually created through different types of linguistic frames. A match between the problem that the entrepreneur and the followers wish to address is equally helpful. In that sense, transitionary or

insecure actors would be more receptive to new norms if they are desirably framed. Björkdahl also argues (2002:122) in favour of critical state adoption, meaning a norm cascade is more easily formed if key actors (regional powers, big powers, benevolently perceived actors) are convinced. Norms with high levels of specificity, durability and concordance find it easier to diffuse.

In cases where normative clash is high and there is a prestigious insider norm promoter, localization is more preferable to immediate rejection of the new norm.

Therefore, the following questions need to be closely examined for the application of the norm diffusion study modal:

- Is the identity of the focus group consistent with the norm to be promoted, if so, is it also regarded so by the norm-taker audience?
- In cases where the newly promoted norm is alien to the local normative order, have norm entrepreneurs engaged in a knowledge / discourse-creation phase to decide on the contours on the topic at hand? If so, has expert knowledge and epistemic communities been incorporated to this process?
- What kind of framing activities have been preferred by norm promoters? How do they resonate with the local normative order?
- What kind of strategies are employed by the norm entrepreneurs: social or asocial? Do the norm followers see norm promoter actors well placed and legitimate enough to command persuasive social communication tools, or are the norm entrepreneurs able to exercise asocial strategies given their power bases and opportunities/restraints exercised by the normative structure?
- How are norm promoters viewed in the targeted norm follower society: as an insider or an outsider? Are they considered to act purely on self-interest, or has the appropriateness of the norm been communicated to and well-received in the norm follower group?

- What is the level of robustness for that particular norm in terms of specificity, durability and concordance?
- What can be the reasons for the potential norm followers' acceptance of the norm: domestic or international legitimation, international pressure through esteem, or persuasion by the norm's necessity?
- How strong and resilient is the locally dominant normative order to prevent the diffusion of the promoted norm? How constitutive is the local normative order for that particular society's identity claims? What is the chance of localization compared to outright rejection?

2.2.5 Internalization and Institutionalization

The internalization phase is the last stage in the life cycle of a norm. Internalization can be observed when the norm is vastly accepted. The level of conformity is so high that the norm adapters are no longer adopters, but they are normal actors who have internalized this new appropriate behaviour which is not so new anymore either. The norm achieves a taken for granted quality which makes conformance with the norm almost automatic (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:904).

During this internalization phase organizational platforms and institutions matter gravely. The recent norm followers, who have now internalized the new norm, alongside the norm entrepreneurs, constitute the agents of institutionalization (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:902). From that moment onwards, once the norm takes part in the normative context, violations to it or denials need to be justified since the norm is now widely accepted. There should, accordingly, no longer be counter-claims against the validity of the recently established norm. The latter, in turn, deepens its roots as long as it induces practices. This is because the practice and the norm are mutually constitutive and mutually reinforcing (Björkdahl, 2002:63).

Lastly, in order to see whether institutionalization has taken place or not, organizational and procedural changes, new or adopted policies and programs, the new norm's appearance in domestic political discourse, and state policies can be traced (Björkdahl, 2002*:*136, Cortell and Davis, 2000: 70-2).

2.3 Norm Diffusion: Where does it fall short?

For actors lacking the material power base of the state, there are few tools that can be employed while creating and empowering an alternative discourse counteracting against the common sense. The literature on norm diffusion, in turn, draws attention to the process by which counter-hegemonic agents trying to bring in a new norm, has to deal with already embedded alternative norms or practices inherent to the dominant ideational and material structure. New norms never enter a norm vacuum but instead engage in a highly contested normative space where they must compete with other norms and perceptions of interest (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:897). For example, if the idea of security is emancipation or security without militarism (the case of conscientious objectors) is taken as new candidate norms that critical security agents are trying to promote, then the norm diffusion literature directs us first to identify the common sense elements of the dominant security structure. Then for the framing stage, the discourse produced by the counter-hegemonic agents and their alliances with other actors should be studied to reveal which supportive ideas and practices they relate themselves to: an initial mental exercise will point to the norms of human rights, individual security, freedom of conscience, freedom of expression, right to personal integrity for the case of conscientious objectors.

However, although the theory of norm diffusion is widely used to understand and explain how a certain way of doing things become accepted in any given setting, it appears to be based in a limited understanding, especially for the case of the agency of less powerful actors. On the basis of its characterization, there are a few points where norm diffusion remains too preoccupied with intentionality, causal change and structural constraints.

When discussing strategies of diffusing a norm by the norm initiator, the literature suggests persuasion, advocacy, social pressure, framing, emulation, lobbying, etc. All of these tools operate under the assumption that the actor, who employs them, does so intentionally and purposefully. These actors in question are considered as determined norm-entrepreneurs that engage in diffusing behaviour because they clearly have an already decided aim to become the initiator. They have an agenda to render their norm settled in the eyes of the audience. They devise strategies, either social or asocial, either persuasive or coercive, and they move to make diffusion happen.

While this purposefulness and intentionality is valid for most situations, it does not always have to be the case. When it comes to examples such as Turkish COs, it is true that there is a social movement, no matter how small and dispersed it is, that strives for the diffusion and institutionalization of the norms of anti-militarism and CO in Turkey. CO might arise out of an internal conviction of an ethical nature inspired by religious or humanitarian/political ideals. It generally happens when there is a desire not to take part in a military activity that is believed to be inconsistent with personal or communal convictions. Therefore, while some parts of the movement are suitable for the use of norm diffusion as an explanatory tool because there is an organized movement that works for the legal recognition of the right to CO, there are also other aspects of the phenomenon that are purely personal and do not possess any political perspective or approximation of an organized goal.

Even though the chapter on CO will reveal that later on, it will suffice to say for the moment that the common recurring reasons given for CO in the interviews by the COs are: refusing to train in killing another human being because of the sacredness of the right to life, both as a religious and a secular commitment, objecting to a militarized and violent way of life that aims to solve problems by removing and destroying obstacles, disagreeing to give and receive orders in any sort of official hierarchy, rejecting of the myth that declares “Every Turk is born as a soldier”, refusing to abide by discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation, and rejecting to engage in a fight related to the Kurdish issue.

There are some clear parts of the CO movement, which are a close match for the modal suggested by norm diffusion, such as establishing civil society organizations to generate domestic and international support for the CO campaign or taking individual cases to the European Court of Human Rights, or engaging in non-violent civil disobedience in forms of public declarations, marches, street theatres, excursions and hunger strikes. They are purposeful and intentional. However, there are also other aspects that do not relate to bigger political achievements and are purely of personal nature. Yet again, even though they might not seem related to these bigger political projects, these personal fights are still political. Following the motto of Carol Hanisch that "the personal is political" (Lee, 2007:163), in the sense that "there are political dimensions to private life" (Rosen, 2000:196), this study treats politics as it occurs "in many more places and takes more forms than most mainstream commentators and strategists imagine" (Enloe, 2009:86). Personal struggles that do not necessarily belong to bigger political projects might still have transformatory effect, and this will be explained in detail in Chapter 4 on the concept of acts of dissidence. However, these personal resistance movements are not covered by the norm diffusion model, even though they still contribute to the promotion of anti-militarism or the idea of security without militarism. The relevance of those small daily activities or trivial acts of dissidence that have no clear target is going to be explored in the chapter on acts.

Moreover, as mentioned above, norm diffusion theory requires the norm-initiator to be considered by the norm-taker as legitimate, genuine and representative of an identity that is typical with the norm in question. Taking our example of Turkish COs, in the eyes of the public opinion, it does not matter for whichever reasons the objectors are exercising their non-existing right to CO. They are referred with all sorts of derogative labels such as infidels, traitors, lazy men, free riders, unpatriotic citizens, less than a man, cowards, "faggots", etc. Therefore, irrespective of the nature of the objection, the objector's identity is viewed as something it is not, disingenuous and sinister. Moreover, their rejection is considered purely self-informed and self-interested. As such, norm diffusion theory would not hold the odds of a successful diffusion very high, thus reducing the importance of already existing fissures and cracks in the common

sense, i.e. anti-militarist practices such as CO because simply the audience is biased and does not listen.

On a related point, norm diffusion places too much of an emphasis on the conditions of norm-entrepreneurs and followers and the structure they operate in, so as to trace the amount or volume of change as accurately as possible. That is why there are all kinds of different levels of diffusion, ranging from low acceptance to localization to full institutionalization. However, even though this differentiated approach enables certain flexibility, it still is highly focused on seeing and tracing visible, linear and causal change. Through acts of framing and the exploration of the level of a normative fit, norm diffusion is a theoretical tool that links actors together in a causative way. That is to say, it tries to weigh material and ideational power capabilities of the norm-initiator, assess their potential impact within structural constraints, look into whether the proposed norm is durable, concordant and specific, and also question how acts of diffusion are received by the norm-takers.

CO enjoys neither concordance, nor specificity or durability. Norm diffusion theory would claim that in a country like Turkey where militarism has been portrayed as a given, a norm such as CO cannot be argued to have deep roots. There is no institutional practice that might point to a long-existing tradition of CO, and there is no consensus or specificity on what CO is exactly among the objectors. While some of them are religiously motivated, some are concerned around the Kurdish issue and defend a more selective CO. Some go as far as total objection, which is the outright rejection of all statist mechanisms, whereas some limit their objection to training of arms. Norm diffusion's preoccupation with tracing causal change, i.e. one party visibly changing the other, or its tendency to focus on big-bang kind of changes in the normative structure of societies are the factors why norm diffusion will not present a comprehensive analytical tool to understand the agency of Turkish COs. Where it can be useful is to trace how, for example, the decisions of the European Court of Justice on matters of CO in Turkey changed the landscape for norm diffusion. Another way of using norm diffusion in that sense could be to look at how the anti-militarist rhetoric of "we will not be anybody's soldiers", invented by the CO movement in Turkey, travelled and diffused among the wider segments of

the Turkish civil society that participated in anti-war rallies against the intervention to Iraq and Syria. However, without the inclusion of everyday acts of resistance, the analysis of emancipatory agency of the CO movement in Turkey would be left incomplete.

It is, in turn, the aim of Chapter 4 to complement the work of norm diffusion through the concept of acts, and specifically acts of dissidence. While the concept of acts will be extensively discussed in this following chapter, it would be useful to finish this part by summarising the next theoretical move. In a nutshell, the argument is that the agency of less powerful actors in any given setting can be studied more sensibly by moving away from the happening of big events and big changes to adopting an approach that investigates small acts of resistance, fissures and cracks in the common sense and tactical practices. The advantage in this manoeuvre is that by abandoning an overemphasis on traceable change, linearity and causality, the added value of these small daily acts can be incorporated in the analysis. This would then enable us to fully appreciate efforts of creating awareness on a certain topic, generate influential presence that poses constant counter-hegemonic challenges. This is the move that is explained in Chapter 4 on acts.

However, before moving on to the chapter on acts, it will be useful to have a discussion of the concept of emancipation because the link between acts and emancipatory security agency is to be found in the political claim-making of the acts, which is also an integral part of emancipation. Therefore, there is a need to bring up how emancipation is connected to becoming a political subject and how this is relevant to CSS's understanding of security as emancipation. This is the intention of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

EMANCIPATION RE-VISITED

"Fairness, justice and freedom are more than just words,
they are perspectives…"

V in "V for Vendetta".

The aim of this chapter is to present the concept of emancipation in an analytical way so as to engage in a deeper discussion on what emancipation brings to the understanding of 'security as emancipation' in CSS. Security, being a contested concept, becomes even more complex when coupling with the notion of emancipation, which is again another term that is both comprehensive and at the same time considerably abstract to grasp.

It has been argued by scholars both within the CSS project and those from other critical security understandings that the real test of emancipatory politics, or the understanding of security as emancipation, should always be tailored to suggest ways of how individuals and groups can be freed from oppression (Booth, 2005:182). As Wyn Jones stated (1999:145), the distinctiveness of an approach equipped with critical theory should be its orientation towards emancipatory *practice*, in line with Marx's thesis of understanding and changing the world. A CSS student himself, Joao Nunes suggested that the accomplishments of CSS are "arguably modest" when it comes to engage with "practical transformative politics" and "informing political change" (2012:346-8).

Another line of critique has been that the equation of 'emancipation' and 'security' in the Critical Theory sense of the word cannot be sustained because the latter's conceptualization of emancipation deals with matters of violence and

resistance to a large extent, "some even to the point of valorising the violent potentialities associated with emancipatory struggles" (Peoples, 2011:1115). That is to say, violence, even emancipatory violence, cannot be accommodated in a theorization which gives equal voice to both security and emancipation. Peoples traces this 'error' in that Booth incorporates and includes the terminology of Critical Theory "without much sustained reference to the origins of that terminology (Peoples, 2011:1117). Booth's response to that is found in his *Theory of World Security*, where he defines working with multiple critical approaches altogether as "pearl fishing", which refers to the Arendtian concept of being pragmatic and taking bits and pieces of all helpful theories to incorporate in his theory of critical security (Booth, 2007:39-41).

Moreover, security as emancipation has also been criticized for not addressing the question of whether emancipation can be realized at nobody's expense (Aradau, 2004:401-2). The main argument of this line of critique is that while some parts of the society are emancipated, would that amount to making others insecure? However, Booth actually answers to such criticisms by suggesting that if there is any kind of oppression at play, then emancipation cannot be said to exist and that this would amount to 'false emancipation' which takes emancipatory politics of one part at the expense of that of the other (Booth, 2007:113). As an extension of that reply, this chapter aims to present the similarities in the way CSS formulates emancipation with the one that has been developed in critical social and political theory.

This is where the question of why exploring emancipation further is really necessary comes along. A critical evaluation of the concept of emancipation should inform the study as to what kind of issues are covered by the understanding of security as emancipation, and to identify which sites can be targeted as avenues of practical transformative change. This chapter, in turn, is intended to first display the close link between emancipation and being political, and then secondly extending the agenda of security to becoming political because security is emancipation and emancipation is security. In other words, exploring the link between emancipation and becoming a political subject is a primary concern for this chapter because this very connection will decide whether or not security, as defined as emancipation, covers political insecurities, stemming from

the inability of becoming a political agent, as part of its agenda. Some of the questions that bear significance for this study are: What is so distinctive about the concept of emancipation that security is equated to it? What are the theoretical and practical advantages of making such a move? What are the implications of marrying security to emancipation in terms of security agency in the empirical realm?

The argument constructed in this chapter follows a threefold analysis. The first line of argument is that emancipation in CSS is a normative, value-loaded concept that claims to prescribe a better world, a theory of progress like that of the Enlightenment, without being confined only to a Euro-centric, liberal argument. Here CSS's conception of emancipation and its move towards the invention of humanity through emancipation will be discussed.

Secondly, emancipation is politics and politics is emancipation, in the sense that emancipation is the process of people, communities and other micro-level entities becoming political subjects. Emancipation is their process of intervening in the world to understand it and to challenge and mould it to attain self-invention and realization. In that sense, emancipation is personal, the personal is political, and everybody is entitled to pursue emancipation by virtue of being a human being.

Third, built on the second statement, emancipation does not happen at a given definite moment, but it rather is a process, based on real world experiences, that never ends. In other words, emancipation is a perspective that constantly guides political behaviour through immanent critique as a philosophical anchorage that informs both practice and action (Booth 2005:182). Because it is about practice and action, it is found in real world situations and experiences, real lives of individuals, but it takes different shapes in each context. That is Booth's emancipatory realism (2007:6). Immanent critique also includes exploring how we can form "transformative possibilities in the form of ideas and actors in particular contexts that have the potential to change" (Nunes, 2012:352).

This chapter will discuss the aforementioned threefold argument in respect to the main scholars who wrote extensively on emancipation, and in

comparison to how CSS conceives the term in its own rationalization. In this way, the formulation of emancipation in CSS by Booth and Wyn Jones will be explored closely with the writings of Badiou, Habermas, Laclau, Ranciere, and Balibar on what emancipation is and what it entails.

3.1 What is emancipation? : a theory of progress and "a better world"

Emancipation was not always the same politically charged concept that is today, with its tones revolving around freedom from oppression, resistance, and political struggle. The word of emancipation itself derives from the Latin word *emancipare*, meaning "the action of setting free from slavery or tutelage" (Wyn Jones, 2005:216). In this early usage of the word, emancipation was present in Roman law where it indicated a son or a wife being released from the legal authority of the *pater familias*, the father of the family (Bingham et al, 2010:27). While *–ex* meant away, *mancipum* referred to ownership, emancipation pointed at the relinquishment of somebody from the authority of another (Bingham et al, 2010:27).

Therefore, even in its historical origin, emancipation denoted an act of freeing an individual, that is the subject matter of emancipation, from a source of authority. The object of emancipation has varied in different eras: while it was about religious tolerance in the 17th century, emancipation was used more in the context of freeing slaves from oppression in the 18th century. Then the 19th century usage of the word was in line with the emancipation of women and workers (Bingham et al, 2010:27) and the 20th century witnessed emancipation being associated with independence from colonial rule and the continuance of the emancipation of women and of working classes from capitalist structures (Hewlett, 2007:1). In sum, the meaning of emancipation underwent several changes: from a relationship between individuals like father and son or slave and master, to a top-down liberation act, and then to a process of "self-liberation of the non-privileged" (Pieterse, 1992:8).

Booth argues that the modern concept of emancipation was shaped during the Enlightenment, driven with the goal of struggling against particular oppressions such as "monarchical despotism, religious intolerance, ignorance and inequality" (2007:111). Therefore, as we know it, it was with late 17th and early 18th century that emancipation began to signify more than the mere act of freeing an individual from the authority of another. Emancipation became a denominator for a better world, a process of progress for more liberal living conditions and freedom from oppression. This is what Booth calls as emancipation's positive side, which rendered the concept identifiable with political programmes for a better world, which he characterizes as, marked with "liberty, progress, controlling nature, pursuing equality and the perfectibility of humanity" (Booth 2007: 111).

To repeat his famous quote, Booth defined this new emancipation as follows:

> "Emancipation is the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from those physical constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do so. War and the threat of war is one of those constraints, together with poverty, poor education, political oppression and so on…" (Booth, 1991: 319).

The general characteristics of this definition was by no means the invention of the CSS. For example, Wertheim (1983:11) labelled emancipation as the "liberation of creative human potentialities from suffocating social structures".

This move for a better world is not unique to only CSS, but is shared with many of the wider critical approaches to security, even when they do not identify themselves as related to emancipation. For example, Wyn Jones, by quoting Eric Bronner, argues that the Frankfurt school critical theory has been defined as "a cluster of themes inspired by an emancipatory intent (Bronner 1994:3, as cited in Wyn Jones 2005:216). For Jones, any theory or statement that critically takes on the status quo inherently possesses some kind of emancipatory intent in them.

RBJ Walker underlines a similar point, albeit without saying emancipation, where he discusses the formation of a critical discourse about security. He argues that this discourse about security

> "engages with contemporary transformations of political life, with emerging accounts of who we might become, and the conditions under which we might become other than we are now without destroying others, ourselves or the planet on which we all live." (Walker 1997:78)

Regarding this quote above, Wyn Jones suggests that since there is an implicit notion of "improving" on the present and the possibility of moving toward a "better world", this is an emancipatory approach as well. (Wyn Jones 2005:217).

It is the progress and the constant strive towards a better world that produces true security, as suggested by Booth. He argues that the mere use of power or the preservation of order alone are not security generators, but that emancipation, and thus the move towards a better world are what take humanity to true security (Booth 1991:319).

What does this progress and this better life or better world look like? Booth proposes that emancipation in that sense is "the project of creating conditions for the pursuit of what it might be to be a human being, as opposed to merely being human." (Booth 2007:257). Therefore, in accordance with his definition of 1991, emancipation is about every kind of social phenomena that an individual might choose to express her/his self. Emancipatory intent and action should be diverted to areas where people and collectivities can be freed from "contingent and structural oppressions" (Booth 2005:181). This is what CSS calls as greater human self-realization, simply referring to the potential that every individual possesses and should deserve to realize in her/his own lifetime (Alker 2005:192). To repeat from the previous chapter, by taking the human being as its referent object, CSS seeks the emancipation of individuals towards their self-realization.

In view of these definitions, emancipation becomes a wide and generic perspective, a guide that directs individuals and collectivities towards seeking a certain type of action. Booth then brands emancipation as the *theory and practice* of *inventing humanity* because it acts as a horizon-definer towards "the growth of a universal human rights culture" that creates the available space for individuals to explore and realize their own beings (Booth 2005:181).

It is then clear that CSS comes from a departure point where security theorists see the way the world operates as something essentially wrong, and thus should be subjected to immanent critique and finally changed. At this point there is no need to repeat the legacy of Critical Theory and that of the Frankfurt School for CSS. However, suffice to say that emancipatory knowledge and interest is born out of a political concern to change one's immediate and wider environment, as immanent critique suggests. Alker argues, it is "an attitude which is formed in the experience of suffering from something man-made, which can be abolished and should be abolished" by "depotentialising (disempowering and oppressive) psychological, social and ecological structures by potentialising (empowering and enhancing) ones" (Alker, 2005:199). He adds that this "special qualitative kind of becoming free", which he says is the practical meaning of emancipation, consists in the individual's self-willed transformation from an undesired place to a wanted and needed environment (Alker, 1996:333).

The emphasis on moving away from man-made insecurities through a self-initiated transformation is very interesting in explaining how actors of small or no conventional power resources can make an impact on their immediate and wider environment, which is the question this study attempts to answer. As it will be explored in the next chapter on acts of dissidence, the frustration and disappointment that one feels towards her/his options for acting to get out of the predicament she/he currently us, is the point of origin for emancipation, and for attaining security. It is these personal efforts and smaller acts of resistance that penetrate through the cracks of the problematized system and widen them in time to make them visible.

This framework also fits with the way emancipation is conceptualized by CSS. Booth argues that emancipation has three roles (Booth 2005:182, 2007:112):

1. a perspective, a philosophical anchorage for knowledge and action, and a test for saying whether something is true or should be taken seriously. This is required because without guiding principles and ideals, inventing humanity will not be possible as "traditional power elites and their

oppressive common sense will perpetuate human wrongs, and humanity will never be what it might become" (Booth 2005:181);

2. a strategic unending process where individuals and collectivities should constantly employ immanent critique to intervene in the world, decide on changing targets and thus become political claim-makers. Booth says that "it is strategic in the sense that it is concerned with bringing about practical results, and it is a process because it can never be completed" (Booth, 2005:182);

3. a guide for tactical goal setting and practical resistance against oppression, in the sense of picking and choosing where to channel these emancipatory ideas and possibly create an impact upon the status quo.

As the threefold argument of this chapters unfolds, it is possible to realize that there is a great deal of overlap between them and CSS's roles for emancipation. While the first point refers to emancipation being a guide for action, a test-paper to stay consistent through claims for a better and secure world, the second argument relates to emancipation being a process whereby people, communities and other micro-level entities become political subjects with claims, demands and obligations. The third point converges with emancipation's role as a guide for tactical goal setting because emancipation, even though is a universal concept, is after all about real world experiences of real people.

The rest of this chapter will deal with the second and the third argument respectively, but with comparisons being drawn between CSS's formulation of emancipation and those of other significant authors who have written extensively on questions of emancipation outside of the security realm. The works of Badiou, Balibar, Laclau and Ranciere are among the main inputs for taking into consideration different dimensions of emancipation, and their contributions are quite valuable in refining CSS's conception of emancipation in terms of emancipation being an empirical process of subjectification.

3.2 Emancipation as an empirical process of becoming subjects

3.2.1 Becoming subjects

The concept of emancipation, since its origins, has been about a change in the individual's status, be it emancipation from slavery or emancipation of women from male domination. In the political sense of the word, emancipation is a change in the state of being, it is about becoming an autonomous, free human subject. That is to say, emancipation is an inherently political concept, it implies a route through which individuals are made into political claimants. However different authors suggested different ways of becoming this new autonomous human subject, who is political, who has a voice and a say in her/his society.

Etienne Balibar argues that emancipation is political to its core with its focus on the "defiant actions of ordinary people taking centre-stage" (Hewlett, 2007:117). In a very parallel argument that is being made in the following chapter, Balibar is referring to the instances where human beings take initiative for their own situations and start acting to earn political freedom. He adds:

> "any process of progressive political transformation is… bound up with the process of subjectivation, which is indeed intimately part of all politics.. It is with the struggle for emancipation and transformation that participants become more autonomous subjects." (Hewlett, 2007:120)

Balibar's position is very similar to that of the CSS in that he believes in the definition of politics as politics of emancipation. What Balibar understands from the process of subjectivation is the ultimate removal of all impediments and barriers from the realization of equality and freedom. By prioritizing self-determination of human beings, he implies that the presence of a universal right to inclusion in the political sphere is highly important as "no-one can be emancipated by an external entity" or an outside agency (Balibar, 1997:22, quoted in Hewlett, 2007:119).

However, Balibar seems to suggest a direct shift from becoming a human subject to becoming the citizen, which enjoys a series of political rights and

privileges that the state offers. In his *the Infinite Contradiction* (1995:152), he states that "after the subject comes the citizen… there is no doubt that with the revolutionary event the subjectus irreversibly cedes his place to the citizen".

What Balibar hints at here is that the political subject, as Hewlett argues, is an individual who becomes subject through political rights deferred to her/him by the modern state's human rights systems (Hewlett, 2007:126). This would raise the question of how to bring about emancipatory change in the absence of these rights granted and related to the state. Put it differently, "rather than emancipation and transformation leading to the formation of a more self-realized human being", Balibar seems to opt for human subjects who rely too much on the political rights that come with being a citizen of a state (Hewlett, 2007:126-7).

Balibar's attachment to the provisions offered by the state is rooted in his original conceptualization of emancipation. Balibar argues that emancipation needs to go hand in hand with *equaliberty*, which is the inseparable combination of equality and freedom (Hewlett, 2007:119). Balibar traces this concept back in the French Revolution and in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. This Declaration was essential in the foundation of the French nation-state and the institution of 'the citizen', both of which rely on the concept of equaliberty (Aradau, 2006:7). In his Masses, Classes, Ideas, he suggests that historically equality and liberty are found together, and the in the absence of one the other cannot be found either (Balibar, 1994:48). That is to say, in cases where an obstacle undermines conditions of liberty, then subjects do not enjoy equality. Claudia Aradau simply summarizes the situation as "[U]nfreedom is therefore identical to inequality as freedom is identical to equality" (Aradau 2006:8).

Balibar argues that this set of civil liberties and individual and collective powers, that form equaliberty, are "the democratic rights that are more or less recognized and guaranteed in the framework of modern states" even though they are sometimes lost and then reclaimed (Balibar, 1994:210). The realization of these rights is the proposition of equaliberty, which is the assurance of the provision that "the universal right to political activity and recognition" is for every individual in all forms of settings where collective organization is present

(Balibar, 1994:212). Balibar is adamant in this proviso because it is the individual's task to carry her/himself to the becoming of a subject or an agent of politics. He believes it is impossible to indefinitely exclude any kind of social group of social question from the condition of equaliberty, as has been the case with slavery, women's emancipation or colonization.

Then the question of what will happen to individuals who are struggling to become political subjects, but are simply deprived of the tools and avenues to do so? In other words, how do we deal with cases where equaliberty does not exist because political action is simply not possible? Aradau gives the example of the French banlieue riots in 2005 as an instance of the absence of politics proper. The riots were initiated by victims of state stigmatisation, who were subjected to continuous and arbitrary police control as well to race and class discrimination, and who could not organize themselves as political subjects, which is the first step towards emancipation (Aradau, 2006:8).

In cases where oppression is made visible, as in the case of the riots, then the next step is finding *the universal element* which the dissident can identify with for the redefinition of its relationship to the dominating party. In this example, it was the rioting youth's relationship to the French state that needed to be redefined through a new *universal* because formal citizenship alone was no longer satisfactory for the rioters.

That is where Aradau brings in Balibar's concept of 'politics as civility'. Civility in Balibar's theorization "creates the space in which politics takes place and eliminates the extremes of violence without suppressing all violence and revolt" (Balibar, 1997:47, cited in Hewlett, 2007:122). This space is where actors feel at ease to take actions without having to resort to the extremes of violence. It is generated in "the field of institutional creation, with its collective, practical dimension and its legal, symbolical one" (Balibar, 1998:15, cited in Aradau, 2006:9). That is to say, it is a political question of how to construct this condition of civility with the necessary institutions that secure its smooth operation. In the case of the French riots, politics of equaliberty fought against police's arbitrary violence, while politics of civility needed to create and implement the institutional requirements that redefines the relationship between

the rioters and the state apparatus (Aradau, 2006:9). If the conflict is mediated only through the use of police channels or other facets of state's power flexing, then it becomes impossible to speak about the presence of space of civility, as in the case of the French riots. This results in a hopeless cycle where politics of equaliberty cannot function and politics of violence come into play, ruling out any possibility of becoming a political subject (Aradau, 2006:9). Therefore, emancipation, change and civility need to happen all together, otherwise the absence of one leads to the absence of the others.

Critiques that relate to Balibar concentrate on his theory being too specific in that it only functions in a modern state environment with rights and the conditions of civility being provided by the state apparatus. Balibar proposes that "the history of struggles for emancipation is not one of demanding unknown rights but one of enjoying rights which have already been declared" (Balibar, 2002:6, cited in Aradau, 2004:403). However, concepts like equality or liberty, which are notions closely related to emancipation and individuals becoming subjects have not always been framed in this way. Equality and the disruption of ordinary politics for the sake of emancipation is indeed a central theme in another French scholar, namely Jacques Rancière. However, his notion of equality is not a passive one as in Balibar's, in the sense that subjects do not wait around to be granted equality, but that they act on it as a presupposition. Therefore, Ranciere's equality is an active equality, rather than a passive one (May, 2008) and it sheds a great deal of light into how individuals or entities might disrupt the order to become political subjects, i.e. subjectivation.

Rancière's theory of politics, equality and emancipatory action mainly focuses on the story of the disadvantaged and the silent in any given setting, and his initial focus group was the working class. His point of departure was a disagreement with the Althusserian principle that the working class should be led by an elite revolutionary cadre. In the classical Marxist argument, since the party elite is enlightened by Marx's historical materialism, they are well positioned to see through the ideological shackles of capitalism and can thus develop a "truly scientific analysis of history and society" to show "what kind of political action will liberate [the working class] from oppression (Deranty, 2010:3-4). Because the working class cannot grasp the realities of its own plight, it needed to be

guided by leaders and organizational pioneers, such as the Communist Party, who would raise the proletariat awareness in them. Althusser defined the restrictive ideology of capitalism as the act of intepellation, "a form of consciousness produced by institutions to constrain the individual's capacities for thought and action, thereby ensuring the preservation of the capitalist relations of production (Althusser, 2008:44-51, cited in Tanke, 2011:66).

Rancière objected to this conceptualization because he believed such an understanding still implied a kind of social domination, this time at the hands of the elite who claims to lead the communist revolution. Another type of a social hierarchy, this time in favour of the party organization and its gatekeepers, aims to make the working class into "passive masses whose words and acts are meaningless" (Tanke, 2011:66). Opposed to this framework, Rancière proposes that human beings are equal in their intellectual and discursive capacities, thus making it unnecessary for any kind of leaders to tell them what to think, say or do (Deranty, 2010:6).

By suggesting that "the same intelligence is at work in all the acts of the human spirit" (Rancière, 1991:18), Rancière underlines the condition that equality is a presupposition, making the expressions of ordinary individuals an object on inquiry. Equality, in his theorization, is not something that is received by a source of authority, be it a government or a state (May, 2010:70). Mainstream political theories assume that equality is granted to the individual by the state apparatus, in a way that it *happens* to the citizens. Equality itself comes to human beings from a source external to them (May, 2010:70). This is what Rancière strongly opposes, and he suggests an active conceptualization of equality where individuals already act on the presupposition that they already are all equal and that this is their natural condition, not something that they are later awarded by an external locus of authority. In a nutshell, his approach is the statement of both the "right of the ordinary person to be listened to and a celebration of the usefulness of learning from what the ordinary person has to say" (Hewlett, 2007:86).

An example to this can be given from the recent series of public protests that happened in Istanbul, Turkey where the reconstruction and rehabilitation

plans of a central park in the centrum met a great deal of public criticism motivated by environmental concerns. While the government planned to demolish the park and build a replica of an historical Ottoman barracks structure, a solidarity movement mainly motivated by environmentalist concerns gathered in the park and occupied the area in order to prevent the removal of trees. They did not ask the government if they had an equal say in this matter, or they did not wait to be acknowledged as a legitimate party to this decision-making. The initial phase of the protests was simply about taking over the park as a public space. They simply went to the park and started to live in tents assuming that they were entitled to do so from the very beginning. They claimed the ownership of the park while the government insisted that the decision had already been made and that rehabilitation plans would go as planned. This is an example of the active equality as a presupposition, in Rancière's understanding. The protestors did not wait to receive for the confirmation of their equal say in this matter.

It can be argued that their motivation was in the end the government's acknowledgment of their objections and the withdrawal of the reconstruction plans. As May argues, the protest could also be understood not as a presupposition, but as a *goal* to be treated equally by others, as a tactic to *receive* equality to be distributed to them (May, 2010:72). While this would be correct, this does not invalidate that the onus of the equality claim here was the protestors, not any source of authority that granted them the right to have a say in the matter. They in the end did not ask to be treated as equals, they already acted as if they were equals. As May (2010:72) suggests, they took themselves to be equal to those who made the decisions, acted together as a collective initiative out of the equality presupposition. Their action intended to demonstrate that since all are equal, "anyone could in principle occupy a different position from the one they do in fact occupy" (Davis, 2010:79). The protestors, who were mainly high school and university students and young professionals, decided that that day they would play the role of decision-makers, who later denied them this right and dispersed the protests through violent police intervention.

Therefore, Rancière's understanding of equality rests upon a distinction between asking to be treated equally so as to be equal, and requesting to be dealt with equally by acting as if one is already equal (May, 2010:73). The difference

is where the source of equality originates: the people or the distributor of claims, i.e. the state.

Here, several concepts of Rancière needs to be explained so that the value of his approach to equality, politics and emancipatory action can be appreciated. First of all, Rancière often talks about the concept of *demos*, which is "the people conceived as a supplement to the parts of the community, the count of the uncounted" (Rancière, 2011:5). The words of the count of the uncounted is the operative phrase here as it hints at the fundamental point in Rancière's philosophy. The demos, in Rancière's interchangeable words the sans-part, are the segments of the society that strives to gain visibility, presence and influence. It is the collective subject that exists by resisting to those who tell them that in that particular society roles have been allotted, functions have been distributed, and that places have been already reserved and agreed in the name of all parts. The demos, in turn, comes into being when it "contests the assumptions about who belongs, what capacities they possess, and what roles they can occupy" (Tanke, 2011:44). In other words, the demos challenges the assumption that some 'qualified' people are eligible to speak on certain matters while the others are simply not. They are the count of the uncounted because they do not have a recognized existence within that particular social hierarchy and their egalitarian claim in that sense seeks to highlight the arbitrariness of that situation because it is based on a "fundamental wrong of their non-recognition" (Davis, 2010:81).

Secondly, Rancière develops the concept of 'police', which replaces the notion of political system in his theorization. A police order, Rancière argues, is any system that is hierarchical (May, 2010:71). In his book Disagreement, he defines the police order as "a system of distribution and legitimization" (1999:28):

> "[The police as politics] is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution".
>
> In a more recent piece, he articulates that the police is:

> "the configuration of the political community as a collective body with its places and functions allotted according to the competences specific to groups and individuals." (Rancière, 2011:3)

Then Rancière explains that this police is not the ordinary "petty police" that we have come to encounter in our daily lives, who wields weapons and suppress workers or unruly student movements (Tanke, 2011:45). It refers to a hierarchical politics of the current order, based on the presumption that some are more suitable to govern and some are not (May, 2010:71). The police order is the ensemble of how the rules of the governing system determines what roles are available, and to whom they are reserved, and which roles are allowed to say what to which extent. In his Ten *Theses on Politics*, he summarizes that the police's role as "the partition of the sensible" [*le partage du sensible*], which is "a general law that defines the forms of part-taking" (Rancière, 2001:6). In other words, it is the sensible is the general organizing principle of the community, like democracy, elections, government and how to address political problems by using these tools. It is the way the terms of the debate in a society is designed so that "the views and demands of the less powerful cannot be understood, or sometimes even formulated" (Hewlett, 2007:100).

The police in that sense is the system that denies the uncounted, the underprivileged the ability to take part in politics with a claim of equality (Tanke, 2011:45). The police is the definition of "the allocation of ways of doing, ways of being, and ways of saying", the assignment of bodies to particular places and tasks, the decision of what can be said and what cannot, and which discourse is understood as speech and which other is viewed as noise (Rancière, 1999:29).

The struggle taken by the demos against the existence of the police is what Rancière calls as democratic politics, or politics proper. In democratic politics, social hierarchies, the police, is seen as a social construct rather than a natural given, thus possible to change. The demos takes action against the existing social hierarchy in the name of its own equality (May, 2010:72).

However, then comes the question of what happens to the actions of the demos? Do we take it for granted that their actions out of the equality presupposition are heard and implemented? Rancière here introduces one of his

most influential concepts: the disagreement (*mesentente*). Given the abstract character of the notion, it might be a sensible way to exemplify the case of disagreement. Todd May gives the same example used by Rancière, the case of slavery in ancient Athens:

> "when slaves make these noises, they certainly sound as if they are speaking. But the elites or the oligarchs cannot recognize these sounds as speech, because they cannot recognize their authors as speaking beings. If those same noises were uttered by someone they recognized as an equal, they would understand them as human speech. To put the point another way, those at the top of the police order do recognize the uttered noises as sounds that would be words, but cannot be because of who is uttering them. … And the reason for this is that they do not recognize the other as capable of forming words and chains of words similar to their own" (May, 2010:74).

This situation is what Rancière calls a disagreement. It is not a debate or a discussion where the parties involved who, put forward their ideas and claims, confront each other in terms of their valid arguments. It is rather a conflictual situation about "who speaks and who does not speak" because "there is not even an agreement on what a sense means" (Rancière, 2011:2). Rancière argues that those who are comfortable with the status quo cannot understand the claims of the demos, and this is the biggest challenge directed at communicative theories, such as that of Jurgen Habermas (Hewlett, 2007:96). Disagreement concerns who has the right to speak, who is entitled to have the privilege of making sense, and more deeply who already has the capability of speaking. It is not about competing views over an issue, or clashing interests and visions, it is purely about the conflict between who "act in the name of their equality (and those in solidarity with them) and the social order that presupposes their inequality" (May, 2010:73). It is the same principle Rancière objects in the Althusserian conception of the working class: the demos is not worthy of being heard, it is not capable of understanding and vocalizing its own interests, and thus needs the latter to be protected and secured by the wise.

Democratic politics is then confronting the police and exposing the disagreement. When the disagreement is challenged, the demos invokes its equality, acts on its basis, asserts it and then faces whether it will be recognized or not. This confrontation is called "a wrong" by Rancière. It is the situation

where the equality of the demos is asserted, but the police does not recognize it as being equal (May, 2010:75), and this is exposed and displayed. As Rancière explains it:

> "Wrong institutes a singular universal, a polemical universal, by tying the presentation of equality, as the part of those who have no part, to the conflict between parts of society." (Rancière, 1999:39, cited in May, 2010:75).

What Rancière means by this singular universal is the universality of the presupposition of equality explained above (May, 2010:76). It is through the enactment or the display of a wrong that politics takes place. The wrongness of the situation stems from the failure of the police order to recognize this singular universal (May, 2010:75). However, it is not about victimization, one party awaiting acknowledgment and compensation (Rancière, 1999:39, May, 2010:75). To reiterate the position presented before, the responsibility of recognizing equality rests with the demos, who act its presupposition, express their equality theatrically, and display for everybody to realize that the police order has been denying it (May, 2010:75-76).

It is also singular because it is different in any particular case and in any particular police order just like how Booth describes emancipation taking different shapes in different corners of the world depending on the local realities, but in line with the general spirit of emancipation. The universal here is that every each of us is capable of knowing what is best for us and which way we would like our lives to go. Again, as Booth conceptualized it, confronting a wrong is the emancipatory practice of inventing humanity, fulfilling the potential each of us inherently possesses and wishes to realize without being obstructed by structural (police order's in Rancière's terminology) constraints. If everybody is "capable of constructing a meaningful life alongside others", then we should be able to think for ourselves and create lives in any significant way we may wish (May, 2010:76). That is the common point that CSS's emancipation shares with Rancière. In Booth's own words:

> "… one should as far as possible seek to pursue actions that create a virtous circle of security and emancipation. This occurs when the pursuit of security promotes emancipation (reducing the threats that impose life-determining conditions of insecurity on individuals and groups) promotes

> emancipation (freeing people from oppression and *so giving them some opportunity to explore being more fully human*)… (emphasis added) (Booth, 2005:183).

Therefore, confronting a wrong, refusing who we currently are, is the first step in inventing who we might become.[14] It is the process of refusing one's current position in any given setting, act out of the presupposition of equality and claim a new role which was already present within the possibilities of the political imaginary, but was simply not recognized by the police order. This process of becoming a collective subject emerging with a new role is the phenomenon of subjectivation. Rancière describes it in the following lines:

> "By *subjectification* I mean the production through a series of actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the reconfiguration of the field of experience." (1999:35)

Therefore, as Tanke infers from this paragraph, subjectivation is composed of two related moments: at the first stage the subject dis-identifies itself from the "identities, capacities, desires, and interests" that the current police order defines (Tanke, 2011:67). It begins with the exposure of a wrong, therefore it is a negative move in the sense that it aims to reveal the police order's failure to acknowledge equality of all. Next comes the second phase, which is the positive side of subjectivation, where we elaborate on the "bodies and voices [that are] not identified in the distribution of the sensible" (Tanke, 2011:66-67). Prior to the process of subjectivation, Rancière argues there is only domination where the demos just live in the roles that are designed for them by the police order (May, 2010:78).

It is through the process of subjectivation that a "new we" emerges and it reconfigures the field of experience in Rancière's words. Therefore, it is an empowering, emancipatory occurrence, but one needs to be careful about placing any kind of causal links between the emergence of this new "we" and the

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[14] A similar argument was made by Michel Foucault in Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power", in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, Vol 3, ed. by James D. Faubion, New York: The New Press, 2000, 326-348, p.336. Please see Tanke, 2011:69.

reconfiguration of the social field. Rancière warns against a possible pitfall in this framework by saying that subjectivation emerges "not *from* but *within* a democratic movement" (May, 2010:78). That is because Rancière is not interested in analyzing the results of democratic politics, but is rather keen on exploring the potential of confronting a wrong out of the presupposition of equality. May finds the reason of this reluctance to deal with the consequences of subjectivation in the following argument.

If Rancière were to focus on results, that would amount to holding the value of disagreements and confrontations of a wrong hostage to the context in which they are undertaken (May, 2010:78). If a democratic politics strives to create the change it wishes to make happen, but fails in the end because, say, the police order is too embedded in the social reality, then this movement will be "a failed, but nevertheless a democratic movement" (May 2010. 78). If the end-point of the movement is what matters the most, then this would amount to ignore everything that happened during subjectivation:

- the first instance of subjectivation, i.e. the refusal of currently existing identities, and the rupture this creates,
- then the second instance of taking in new rules that did not exist before,
- and the final new state of being where the demos has arrived after having gone through both of these steps. The change realized by the demos throughout these points is what constitutes democratic politics. It thus does not happen to people, but it is something *they do* (May, 2010:79).

Even if the movement fails to create the changes it foresees, it still introduces changes to the lives of those who took part in the democratic politics, including those who might come to the same position later and use the past experiences of the previous demos as a starting point (May, 2010:78).

While this in-between process is one of the strengths of Rancière's theory, it has also attracted many criticisms. For example, Zizek argued that by skipping the end-points has allowed Rancière to avoid addressing the violence often involved in the process of the reconfiguration of the police order (Zizek, 2008:418-9, cited in Davis, 2010:94). Calling democratic politics as democratic

explosions, or intermittent moments of political uprisings, Zizek asks the question of how these movements will inscribe their presence into the current order. In other words, what happens to them when they are reabsorbed into the police order they claim to reconfigure? (Zizek, 1999:238, cited in Davis, 2010:94).

Davis summarizes Rancière's position as explaining the moment of interruption of the given order, while skipping the phase of inscription and institutionalization, which is more thoroughly investigated in Alain Badiou's emancipatory action theory, which will be introduced below. However, for the moment, the most important question to be asked about Rancière's conception is his "silence" on what will be the main key points in any real struggle in the sense that if the process if subjectivation is successful, then why did the police order suddenly accept the display of the wrong and give in? (Davis, 2010:96). However, as it has been said before, Rancière's account is more tailored to tell the story of the disadvantaged and how democratic politics occur outside of the classical conventional liberal democratic conventions. His emphasis on the importance of democratic politics and the confrontation of a wrong presents a valuable challenge to today's modern liberal democracies where we take it for granted that the governing principle of our time is an all-inclusive ethos. Rancière in that sense reminds us that "no social arrangement is likely to be good enough, that every social arrangement is in principle open to disruption by egalitarian politics" (Davis, 2010:100). This is indeed the gist of the concept of immanent critique in CSS: there is always room for further improvement if one is to adopt emancipation as a constant perspective to strive for. However, this does not mean to imply that emancipation is a blueprint for an ideal society, it rather underlines the importance of criticizing the current order "on the basis of the unfulfilled potential that already exists within it – that is through a form of immanent critique (Wyn Jones, 2005:220).

Another critique brought against Rancière is that his theory does not take into account the motivational role of affect and the disrespect felt at the personal level by the demos. Davis argues that Rancière's analysis of the wrong and the uncounted demos seems rationalistic and ignore the affective dimension as a "motive force for subjectivation" because there is politics of non-recognition at

play by the police order (Davis, 2010:97). However, this critique misses an important point in Rancière's theorization that equality is an empowering positive conception. In other words, the operation of equality does not depend on the recognition of the source of authority. Rancière does not deny that the demos feels frustrated with the way roles have been currently allocated. Nor does he overlook the possibility that the sheer dissatisfaction felt by the demos for being uncounted motivate it to act out on the presupposition of equality. However, he makes it clear that non-recognition is not about "victimization" (1999:39). The reason why he does not place the affective frustration created by non-recognition to the centre of his theory is because his onus of equality is the people, not an external validating agency. The affective dimension does play its part, but it is not the main element in Rancière's theorization.

On the other hand, Axel Honneth's theory is all about the affective dimension. He argues in favour of a theory of social recognition of identity as the avenue for the realization of emancipatory potential, offers an interesting point. His approach suggests that the struggle for recognition in a given setting and the attempts to become visible in the society form emancipatory action because disrespecting identities or ignoring them will bring about "a sense of a threatening loss of personality… [and as a result] shame, anger or indignation" (Honneth 1994:263, quoted in Wyn Jones, 2005:226). What Honneth underlines here is the need felt on some part of the community to be heard and to be recognized as a valid member of the community.

His theory of recognition suggests that there are some essential values that human life depends on: self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. (Honneth, 1995:xi, cited in Davis, 2010:97). If these are not recognized, then the individual or the group feels 'disrespect' as a form of exclusion, ranging from being ignored to physical violence (Davis, 2010:97). Therefore, the personal discomfort felt by individuals in the face of non-recognition is an integral part to their identification of the need for emancipation. It furthermore acts as a motivation to engage in this kind of practice.

In order to understand the theory of recognition and its usefulness, there is a need to go back to the essentials of Critical Theory and underline one point.

Max Horkheimer, in his Traditional and Critical Theory, suggested that for a theory to become critically useful, it needed to trace back some of its main elements back in the social reality that it sits upon. That is the promise of immanent critique, whereby existing potentials are currently sought in line with a guiding principle, such as emancipation. This is what Honneth calls the pretheoretical praxis, meaning that the critique elaborated by Critical Theory can be rediscovered in social reality (Honneth, 1994:256). Critical Theory is thus treated as the "intellectual side of the historical process of emancipation" (Horkheimer, 1982:215) because it needs to show that there is emancipatory intent in the society and Critical Theory simply picks up on this and intellectualizes that. In sum, the existence of a pretheoretical practice of emancipation legitimizes the normative stance of the Critical Theory.

This is the necessity to base theory on real-world experiences. Critical researchers need to look at worldly experiences where individuals or collectivities are striving to earn recognition of their existence and fight for their identities. In other words, there should be an engagement in this critical project to "engage in a comprehensive way with the 'reality' of security", with "real people in real places" (Nunes, 2012:351, Wyn Jones, 1996:214). Accounting for what security provides or what being secure is does not depend on a pre-designed understanding, but it actually is to be continuously rediscovered in the empirical cases of real people. This is what Ken Booth refers to: "being empirical without being an empiricist" (Booth, 2007:246, Nunes, 2012:351).

In line with this argument above, Honneth's theory of struggle for recognition as a political subject highlights an important point. Emancipation in this sense does not create political subjects from scratch. The process of emancipation requires an object to be emancipated, a social identity to already exist so that it can be recognized and respected. The emancipatory act itself might constitute the point where this entity organizes itself and becomes a political subject, or that it simply becomes aware of its potential. However, this does not preclude the necessity that there should already be some frustration and dissatisfaction with the way this particular identity is being treated in its community. In Honneth's words,

> "… the moral experiences subjects have when their identity claims are disrespected constitute a pretheoretical resource with reference to which one can show that a critique of the societal relations of communication is not entirely without a foundation in social reality" (Honneth, 1994:268).

Undoubtedly, the struggle for recognition is a universal concept and that it can also be used by groups who do not fit with the normative claims of emancipation, i.e move towards a better world. Honneth gives the example of the development of neo-Nazi groups in Germany, whose identity claims come at the expense of other groups in the same society (Wyn Jones, 2005:226). This is where Booth's first role for emancipation should be taken into account: a philosophical anchorage that serves as a test-paper in sifting through identity claims to be emancipated. Moreover, as Aradau rightly suggests, through the invocation of universalist principles such as equality, Rancière's emancipation addresses everybody in the community not in a secessionist way, but as the expression of the "self-affirmation as a joint-sharer in a common world" (Rancière, 1995:49, cited in Aradau, 2004:403).

Alain Badiou's conceptualization of emancipation takes a similar position in the sense that for him, the way to understand the world and to achieve self-realization, that is emancipation, begins with intervening in it (Hewlett, 2007:28). He suggests that politics in its true meaning is something momentous, eruptive and emancipatory in that [it] "seeks to rupture the dominant state of things" (Badiou, 2003:82, cited in Hewlett, 2007:50). Badiou's theorization departs from the same point with Rancière in that politics for him is about the politically non-existent, or the uncounted, to become visible in a situation where the dominant structure does not allow for this to happen. To quote Badiou (2007:176): "Every radical transformational action originates in a point, which, inside a situation, is an evental site". The words of evental site is his way of branding an "abnormal multiple", whose elements are not presented in the sitation, and which is situated "on the edge of the void" outside of the common sense (Badiou, 2007:175). Therefore, Badiou, like Rancière takes a close interest in the case of the uncounted in any given society. He also shares with CSS the same point of view for emancipation not being a blueprint for the society, but "a movement that seeks to abolish or dislocate the dominant state of affairs" (Power and Toscano, 2010:95-96).

The points of difference for Badiou from Rancière or Balibar is that he is purely interested in moments of change, that he calles as 'events', that come to exist thanks to contingency and chance. An event (*évènement*) is the momenteous change and its consequences to which individual subjects commit actively and partake in its happening. Individuals become subjects by committing themselves to this event, which is the phenomenon of fidelity according to Badiou. Fidelity is to be faithful in gathering together and distinguishing the becoming legal of a chance (the happening of the event) (Badiou, 2007:232). He argues that "human beings can only become subjects when acting in a way that is faithful to an event" (Hewlett, 2007:24). In his key work, *Being and Event*, he summarizes the process of subjectivation as the action taken by singular beings in fidelity towards a happening, in a collective way, at the end of which they come out as members of this new collective that is visible and new, unlike the invisible, non-existent former singularities:

> "[I]t would be a case of a concrete family, all of whose members were clandestine or non-declared, and which presents itself (manifests itself publicly) uniquely in the group form of family outings. In short, such a multiple is solely presented as the multiple- that-it-is. None of its terms are counted-as-one as such; only the multiple of these terms forms a one." (Badiou, 2007:175)

An event is a "purely haphazard" happening, "the unpredictable result of chance and chance alone" (Hallward, 2003:114). However, he underlines the importance of the human agency that contributes to the occurrence of that transformation. He believes that change happens when individuals and groups commit themselves to a certain type of happening and that they stick to this engagement in fidelity through "thick and thin, often in the face of criticism, derision, marginalization, and sometimes punishment (Hewlett, 2007:52).

Similar to Honneth's dimension of affect, Badiou's conceptualization of political action includes the personal motivation one feels towards a particular occurrence in history where she/he chooses to act on it out of a feeling of personal commitment. It is in a way an amorous relationship towards the event that leads to individuals' intervention (Badiou, 2007:232). Hewlett also describes his theory as inspiring and hopeful for emancipatory politics because his position is that "the unexpected can happen, that change is possible" (Hewlett, 2007:37).

However, the use of Badiou's framework is limited for emancipation in CSS because his argumentation leaves little space for social scientists to understand how an event happens. In an interview, he makes the following case: [we should not wait for or try to anticipate an event] "for it is of the essence of the event not to be preceded by any sign, and to surprise us by its grace… everything begins in confusion and obscurity (Hallward, 2003:115). Therefore, if the event happens by pure chance and that it cannot be inferred (Badiou, 1988:215), then this would amount to say that social scientists should not bother to understand the world. If the only factor deciding a rupturing event's occurrence is chance, then this would leave no room for any kind of understanding of these exceptional disruptive moments (Hallward, 2003:footnote 15). The event, and acting in fidelity towards it is a form of agency, but Badiou does not regard this as the normal course of things because it is through a random encounter with the event that individuals decide to act in the first place (Hewlett, 2007:53-54).

3.2.2 Emancipation as a process

The second issue with security as emancipation is with the latter being a process rather than a momentary happening, which has a beginning and an end and can be brought to completion like a project. Therefore, it is more of a direction than a destination, and that even though a more emancipated order is brought about, there will always be some unfulfilled promise with the adoption of emancipation as a processual perspective (Wyn Jones, 2005:230). Emancipation in CSS is not a one-way route that leads to a fully emancipated end-point, but it is a "localized" (empirical), and "unfinished process" (Nunes, 2012:353).

The concept of emancipation being a process has important implications for the way we theorize emancipatory action and agency in the CSS. The first ramification of this conceptualization is a recurring theme in this study: emancipation is a never-ending project that constantly employs critique against the order in which we live in. This has been discussed in the previous sections.

The second important result of a processual approach to emancipation relates to the how emancipatory agents emerge in an oppressive regime. CSS's understanding of emancipation suggests that there are critical voices in any kind of dominant structure, already present and already working to penetrate through the cracks and arbitrariness of the system. That is to say, even though a more emancipated system is created, the agents of this transformation were present in the less emancipatory system of the past, they were part of the uncounted, in Rancière's terminology. This ideational framework, where traces signs of emancipatory action through a certain period of time prior to the coming of the more emancipated order, is very useful in understanding the identity claims of the agents of critical security. In other words, this amounts to suggest for an intersubjective identity formation process on the part of the oppressor and the emancipated. This understanding is the opposite of a Badiouean approach which argues that emancipatory politics, i.e. the event, emerges with no warnings or cautions or signs of any kind as it is purely coincidental.

Ernesto Laclau (2007:1) warns against a classical error one might make in identifying the emancipatory transformation as "an absolute chasm, a radical discontinuity". By calling it the dichotomic dimension, Laclau states that the classical conception of emancipation made an argument in favour of the presence of a complete rift between pre-emancipation and after-emancipation phases. His reasoning is formed of the following steps (Laclau, 2007:4-17):

1. If the newly created, more emancipated social order is one of rationality, liberty and equality, then we have to accept that the founding act of this new order is also rational, libertarian and egalitarian;

2. If the founding act is accepted as a rational egalitarian emancipatory move, then so must be some parts of the social order that is to be overthrown, "because the agent of emancipation has to be one whose identity is prevented by an existing oppressive regime", thus making it imperative that the "identity of the oppressive forces has to be in some way inscribed in the identity searching for emancipation";

3. Then, if the founding act of the more emancipated order is conceived as "the victory over the irrational forces of the past – forces which have no

> common measure with the victorious new social order"- this act cannot represent a discontinued tradition that did not exist in the previous system. Otherwise the founding act would be a contingent one, so will be the more emancipated order. "There is no emancipation without oppression and there is no oppression without the presence of something which is impeded in its free development by oppressive forces" (Laclau, 2007:1).

In sum, Laclau's point is that emancipatory intent arises out of a dissatisfaction with the structures around the agent and that this very confrontation between the doer and the dominant structures around it point to emancipation happening in a process, but still never ending completely because there are always unfulfilled potential in every system. The emancipated and the new world it helped shape always bear traces of the old order. This is also why each emancipatory path looks different from each other because the empirical realities of one case are different than the other, and might require the employment of different tactics in each different case.

This chapter set out to argue that emancipation is about becoming a political entity, with the right to speak up on any issue one might to have an opinion on, and then act on it because as individuals we inherently possess this capacity. If emancipation is defined in such a way that it points to inventing oneself, humanity and how to attain self-fulfilment, then the security agenda becomes wide enough to incorporate situations where becoming political is prevented and denied, as in the case of the CO movement in Turkey. Emancipation as such also denotes a process of subjectification, entities becoming political beings. They realize this through first dis-identifying with and rejecting their imposed identities dictated by the *police*, then they re-name and re-claim new identities, engage in everyday resistance tactics. By exposing the wrong which was done to them, they act as if they already possess the right to do so without waiting for a confirmation of that right. In this way, Rancière's conceptualization of emancipatory politics offers a very suitable framework for analyzing the agency of the dissatisfied agents in any given setting. While Balibar and Badiou's approaches offer useful insights into emancipatory politics, like Badiou's event or Balibar's equaliberty, Rancière's argumentation is

particularly useful in systematically and categorically examining the agency of critical sectors of the society. The next chapter, in turn, will deal with how to think about this very notion of everyday resistance through ordinary acts and how they contribute to the emergence of transformatory politics they wish to generate.

CHAPTER 4

RE-THINKING AGENCY: INTRODUCING ACTS IN PROCESSES

"We are the people that rule the world.
A force running in every boy and girl.
All rejoicing in the world."

Empire of the Sun – We are the People

"I found it is the small everyday deeds of ordinary folk
that keep the darkness at bay. Small acts of kindness and love."

Gandalf, from the Hobbit

4.1 Agency in Critical Security Studies and its critiques

As it was mentioned in the previous chapters, the main criticism directed to approaches of security as emancipation has been that, in an environment where state-centrism has become the norm and what states think is right as security goes, how it can be possible to promote non-hegemonic actors' agenda for security in a structure where such efforts are not appreciated. How might it be possible for less 'powerful' actors to make their audience recognize their actorness and project their vision of thinking about and doing security to the security common sense that exercises disciplinary restraint. After all, even CSS scholars point out that not all actors in the society has the same effect while speaking of security (Wyn Jones, 1999:154) and this is why abstract ideas about emancipation and theoretical efforts for that matter are only the first step which need to be followed up by other forms of practice taken on the ground (Bilgin, 2005b:60).

Agency in CSS is formulated through scholars and intellectuals of critical security as the organic intellectuals for critical security theorising who are supposed to use their "specialist information" to "compare the justifications of the (hegemonic) regimes with actual outcomes" (Wyn Jones, 1999:160). Thinking, writing and theorising on security is considered as practice by CSS by creating new security discourses. However, scholars outside CSS have criticized this idea that theories are constitutive of reality and theorising is practice. Statements like, in CSS, 'theory and political action are conflated and theory is given a moral dimension as if theory in itself possesses some kind of moral agency', or 'theory in itself does not have any agency' (McCormack, 2010:47-48), or that it is only a political decision involving real men and women that can have agency for change, are among the most prominent ways of framing this critique. In other words, such critiques argue that CSS is a normative theory and not a sociological one.

To repeat the main need for CSS to rework some of its approaches to agency, it will be useful, without discarding the importance of the constitutive theory, to work on an agency-focused sociological account targeted at transformatory power that could be 'translated into political strategy, tactics and how change can be produced in the presence of asymmetrical power relations' (McSweeney, 1999). To put it differently, an agency oriented analysis would help constitutive theory to constitute through the application of the abstract into the struggle between emancipatory and conservative vision of security (Huysmans, 2006a:6).

4.2 The need for an alternative conception of agency

Behind those critiques lies the assumption that agency and the path to change requires the actor to possess 'a certain type of power prioritized by a certain and particular discourse' (Bleiker, 2000:134), which takes its roots in the patterns of modern social and political thought, specifically in International Relations and Security Studies.

Being heavily influenced by the realist tradition in IR, traditional security studies reserve the capability and the right of agency exclusively to the state because of two reasons. First, it is argued that as an objective situation that exists in the world waiting to be analyzed, international affairs revolve around the state, which is the only valid and efficient political organization created by man. In other words, realism and traditional security studies merely present the conditions of the world, i.e. the prevalence and abundance of the state, as a naturally given entity, open to objective inquiry. By doing so, they have claimed to offer scientific knowledge about international phenomena because they worked with testable hypotheses and repetitive patterns dictated by the international distribution of power. This is where traditional security studies, with their realist outlook, have accumulated a character that is crucial to every powerful theory: becoming common sense, thus claiming immunity against questioning. Strategic studies in security studies, and Realism in IR, were in that sense very dominant, and were the most common and the most promoted theory for a long time (Booth, 1997:83-120). In effect, security studies became heavily preoccupied with threat identification, quantitative studies, and governmental policy advices.

And the second reason is that the state alone possesses the power resources needed to create action in world politics. Being interrelated with the objectification of the state in world affairs, attributing exclusivity to the state in mobilizing agency has been justified on the grounds that the power tools required to cause change are commanded by the state alone. Therefore, for a long time the focus of analysis has been on great international events or the deeds of prominent statesmen and governments (Bleiker, 2000:186). The study of diplomacy, nuclear and conventional arms race, security dilemma and international negotiations have constituted the main task of traditional security studies.

Moreover, this discursive and academic preference can be traced to the observation that modern social and political thought has been preoccupied by a concern with order rather than disruption.[15] According to Isin:

> "This state of affairs often values routine over rupture, order over disorder, and habit over deviation. … It appears that to describe, explain or account for those routines by which humans order their social and political relations is more important than their ruptures or breaks. The predominant focus has become the way in which people conduct themselves and routinize certain habits in their bodies, develop certain behaviours, and follow certain rules. It seems that social sciences in general and social and political thought are oriented towards understanding orders and practices and their conditions of possibility" (2008:20).

What Isin here highlights is a tendency in political science and international relations to prioritize the analysis of repetitive, easily-observable and patternized activities conducive to the strengthening of existing structures at the expense of the study of daily or mundane occurrences that might represent an anti-order stance. As an example, security studies as strategic studies was first and foremost interested in a fixed understanding of international relations from within they can understand strategic, calculative practice. Although it looks at highly disruptive practices – such as war, it paradoxically looks at patternized, predicable practices. Since the state is the naturally objective referent object and that it alone possesses the necessary and efficient material capabilities, its supremacy in matters of agency in world politics and security studies is an important part of the present order at hand. Given the statist outlook to agency and the prevalent preoccupation with order seeking actions, any type of agency that rises with a claim to change this condition would be first discarded because it does not deal with the order, and second it would be considered as marginal or powerless enough not to be appreciated. For example, this is one of the reasons why non-statist approaches to security, which had claims to multiple referent objects and epistemologies of (in)securities, were being formulated even in the 1960s, but they still had to wait in their own out-of-the-discipline corners before

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[15] For a detailed account, see T. Schatzki, The site of the social: A Philosophical Account of the Constitution of Social Life and Change, Pennsylvania State University Press: University Park, PA, 2002; 'A New Soceitist Social Ontology', Philosophy of Social Sciences, 33(2), 2003, 174-202.

the deficiencies of the traditional security studies became apparent at the end of the Cold War.

This preference or tendency towards order seeking behaviour or statism operates as a discursive regime. It has exercised a disciplinary power by deciding on what can be talked, thought or written about as influential agency. In any given setting, it can be argued that the production of the dominant discourse is organized and socialized to the newcomers to the scene, which ends up creating 'systems of exclusion where one group of discourses is elevated to a hegemonic status while others are condemned to exile' (Bleiker, 2000:135). By imposing a normative preference for the preservation of orders, this academic tendency resulted in studies and analyses being directed to statist and systemic inquiries because nation-states and the inter-national system was the order of the day. While International Relations entered a phase of statism and Realism, deeds performed by non-state actors have been marginalized to the extent that their efforts aiming to create change in world affairs were deemed as inefficient and powerless to do so. In other words, as a result of the crystallization and the objectification of the inter-national system as "the order", non-statist presences and agencies have been discarded as unimportant or insignificant by this discursive regime.

However, then, one should raise the question of how it can be possible to explain the following situation: how do subjects or aspiring actors organize themselves, become claimants of audience and action under unexpected circumstances, especially within a relatively short period of time? (Isin, 2008:17). Accordingly, those actors who lack official endorsement or the necessary power capabilities required by the dominant understanding of agency could not be imagined to successfully engage in 'claim-making' and 'right-taking' in a way to facilitate their quest for change. In other words, the question of how subjects can become claimants when they are least expected or anticipated to do so cannot be answered within the logic of the traditional outlook to agency (Nyers, 2008:161). The grass roots movements of the Arab Spring, the mass protests in East Germany leading up to the fall of the Berlin Wall, or 'the political movement organized by non-citizens in Canada with extremely precarious status asserting themselves as political by publicly making

claims about rights, membership, freedom and equality' (Nyers, 2008:161) cannot be explained by prioritizing order over disorder, state over non-state actors, material power over disruptive discursive breaks. The question appears as the difficulty in developing theoretical tools to theorize, locate and account for this unexpected factor. The next section introduces the concept of acts of dissidence as a way out of this question.

4.3 Cracks, Fissures and Interruptions: Creative Acts of Dissidence

The first step towards devising an alternative approach to agency, without having to be confined with the shortcomings of the conventional perspectives, would be to 'shift away from great events to less spectacular daily influences that shape people's lives and theorize these largely inaudible forces' (Bleiker, 2000:174). For example, if one were to take up the example of Security Studies and the practice of security in daily life, he/she would be exposed to the dominant authority of traditional approaches to security with militarism and statism. This might even seem like the common sense when security is concerned, but still, it should not automatically rule out the presence of fissures or interruptions within this hegemonic discourse. Even during the Cold War, which was the heyday of the traditional approaches to security, there were examples of alternative ways of theorizing on security that departed from the mainstream state-centric, military focused understandings like World Order Model Projects, the idea of Common Security, Peace Studies and Peace Research. That is to say, both in practice and in the study of this practice, there were dissident voices that aimed to move away the logic of traditional approaches to security. These are to be viewed as what can be termed as cracks, fissures, practices of dissent (Bleiker, 2000:173-4), interruptions, interferences, and fragmentations to the dominant way of thinking.

These moments of "irregularities" underline a stipulation that even though the present way of doing things might seem omnipresent or part of the common sense, there are different alternatives to this, developed in every given

setting. Moreover, even if they might be seen inefficient, unimportant or trivial because they do not directly result in rapid revolutionary transformation, they still matter a great deal in explaining new ways of acting politically that are not so easily captured by conventionally looking at political agency (White, 2008:44). There are cases where actors with little power and no authority to be political stand up and intervene in the process, like the Tank Man in China, creating cracks and fissures within the hegemonic discourse, but the modern conception of agency does not generally make room for dissidence or resistance to be theorized as effective agency. The acts that have been accepted as actually political are reserved for situations where there is some kind of institutional power back-up that grants agency to that effort, as opposed to movements trying to resist the dominant regime despite their deprivation of formal power or authority (Lugones, 2003:15). Those less powerful agents are framed as active subjectivities by Maria Lugones (2003), who argued that they are those actors who resist oppressive social worlds and seek to develop and nurture counter-socialities (Drexler, 2007:10).

These critical deeds represent the wish of 'those actors to act, to take a stand, interrupt their everyday routine and be creative' and their capacity to try to 'enact freedom' because they are highly dissatisfied with the way things are done in a particular given setting (Drexler, 2007:13). In other words, they are the actors who consider that a break from the present order is vitally needed. The context for action within the current setting cannot offer them the necessary tools or strategies to help create the change they wish to see happen, either because they are denied any recognition as a legitimate voice, or that they do not possess the material power to become visible in the eyes of their audience. As a result, facing a breakdown in the capacity to recognize the path of action, these actors face a 'genuine encounter that poses the question of how to act' … 'exposing the need to develop new and creative responses to those occasions where we no longer recognize the context of action' (Isin and Nielsen, 2008:4, White, 2008:46). That is to say, while some actors might be pro-status quo and wish to preserve existing routines and habit, some others may feel the obligation to break with the present and 'engage in projective activity as they seek to imagine

alternative futures for a problematic present' (Emirbayev and Mische, 1998:1006).

4.3.1 The significance of 'the Act'

Engin Isin and Greg Nielsen (2008) developed this framework of claim making and social transformation pushers without status or substance in terms of acts of citizenship. Even though their formulation is on the matters of citizenship, it still epitomizes a theoretical way to design alternative ways of conceiving agency.

Their analysis is based on the notion of the 'act', through which subjects with or without citizenship status would constitute themselves as citizens, or even further as 'those to whom the right to have right is due' (2008:18). By holding a difference between an activist citizen and an active citizen, Isin (2008:38) argued that while activist citizens engaged in writing new scripts and create a new scene, active citizens just follow pre-existing ones and do not go beyond the already existing roles of a regular citizen that are pointed out by the law. Activist citizens tend to come from 'the most disenfranchised and the least audible' sections of the society, who act out of the claim to have the right to have rights (Cote-Boucher, 2008:217).

Before incorporating acts to new ways of thinking about agency, it would be desirable to examine the concept of the act itself to point out some differences it already embodies from the conventional assumptions we hold on matters of agency and action. First of all, Isin suggests that in English, the words 'act' and 'action' cannot be used interchangeably or else the meaning of the phrase is changed (Isin, 2008:21). There are very few pieces in the literature that deals with a differentiation between act and action, and the most important of these argues that 'while both acts and action concern doing rather than happenings, acts are different kinds of doings than actions' (Ware, 1973:404). When used as a noun, an act refers to a deed or a performance but not to something done, as it can be exemplified by the phrases of acts of courage, acts of generosity, acts of

forgiveness, etc… (Isin, 2008:22). On the other hand, actions are specifically intended to indicate a doing involving movement and motion. What is important for actions is that there be action (Ware, 1973:408). Acts, as it can be inferred from their usage in acts of courage or forgiveness, can underline a process of doing, or an operation as well as a moment of the process (Isin, 2008:22).

Departing from its usage in daily life, Isin suggests that:

> "acts should be conceptualized as 'a class of phenomena that indicate *transcendent qualities* of an action (emphasis added), whereas an action indicates a deed, a performance, something that is done" (2008:25) … and that "while acts have a virtual existence, action is always actual" (2008:36).

Therefore, acts have a virtual existence that can be actualized. Following the example provided by Reinach, Isin exemplifies this distinction by comparing 'acts of forgiveness' as a general category, and 'actions that actualize this forgiveness', like writing a letter expressing one's forgiving someone for something. Therefore, action is not needed for acts to be investigated. Isin explains this by pointing out that it is possible to analyze acts by looking at certain actors who 'may come into being by being implicated in acts that we can identify as acts of forgiveness or citizenship (Isin, 2008:25).

Going back to the efforts of some actors who are dissatisfied with the current way of doing things and are trying to bring about change to remove this dissidence, acts can be presented as an agentic tool expressing the need to be heard. In other words, the act is a creative move that emerges 'negatively as a consequence of the breakdown of our capacity to recognize how we should act' (Isin, 2008:5), and positively, as the creation of new ways of acting to make up for the deficiency to behave towards requirements of change. If acts are to be framed within discourses of agency, they should refer to the cases where there is a process of interfering with the hegemonic discourse because this is a space where subjects with no formal authority or institutional back-up have formed momentums to break with the dominant script. Given that, the essence of an act, as different from regular practices or behaviour, is that 'an act is a rupture in the given' (Isin, 2008:25). It represents a creative break within the dominant script

with the purpose of enabling a subject a claimant of rights or obligations to act or speak where they are not typically allowed or expected to do so.

For example, within the framework of acts of citizenship, non-status migrants are seen as a threat, a risk or a victim while at the same time they are deprived of their potential of agency, actorness, political participation or capability of making claims and demanding rights (Nyers, 2008:164). These migrants are denied to have political voice and have been rendered as silent subjects. Given the political practice has been that the realm of politics is reserved for only formal status holders of citizenship, they are denied access to political participation or even political vocalization. For example in Canada, self-organized action committees of these migrants and refugees have resorted to organizing themselves against detentions and deportations (Nyers, 2008:162), or by launching unexpected delegation visits to the offices of Immigration Canada in order to refute 'the dominant idea that refugees are passive objects who should have no political say in their own fate' (Walters, 2008:192). Therefore, those without the formal recognition to speak up have been trying to act politically by organizing street protests, occupying office in a way to take rights in areas where they are not expected to do so. In order to initiate new beginnings and enact themselves as political subjects, creative ways of agency have been invented in cases where the existing patterns of action have proved inefficient.

J. M. Drexler gives a clear example of how a group of activist women in Seattle in 2001 organized a campaign against typical toys for little girls by 'affix(ing) stickers saying, "this is offensive to women and girls," onto various magazines, posters, Barbie dolls, easy-bake ovens' whereas this would have been seen as an attempt whereby 'they are not convincing anyone of anything, in fact they are probably alienating more people than not, because their approach is so 'invasive', apolitical and vandal (Drexler, 2007:7-8). Under the traditional approaches to being political or undertaking agency, this behaviour would not be considered as effective action since it does not automatically culminate in a visible, clear-cut change on the part of the sellers and buyers of these toys. Moreover, such a change should undoubtedly be attributed to the group of women's doing for their agency to be considered.

Nevertheless, the literature on acts aims to target these moments when certain deeds and doings create a rupture within or break from the present dominant script and creates a new scene through which formerly powerless entities are enacted as political subjects, or agents. In other words, acts are the moments where actors are self-constituted out of desperation to act and to break within the current status quo because the latter is seen as problematic and creating dissidence. Just like in the case of non-status migrants, who are very rarely portrayed with positive or affirmative features, enacting themselves as political subjects with 'the capacity of autonomy, self-representation, claim-making', obligation-taking (Nyers, 2008:166). This is a process whereby actors become produced by the act, they perform acts and simultaneously produce themselves through what can be termed as *the act of dissidence*. Investigating the act, therefore, is not examining what kind of a world is created by the act, but the world in which the act becomes aware of itself, constitutes the subject as the actor and a claimant of rights (Bakhtin, 1991:30-1, quoted in Isin, 2008:30). To enact oneself refers to what Hannah Arendt conceptualized as 'to act', which meant both 'governing and beginning,' (Arendt, 2005, p. 321) that is 'to set something in motion and also to begin not just something new but also oneself as that being that acts to begin itself' (Arendt, 1958:177, quoted in Isin 2007:90).

Acts of dissidence may be rooted in speaking up for the desire of being heard, but they represent something more. These acts are significant because they are both the means through which subjects constitute themselves as political actors and they move issues out of a particular setting to replace the latter with a new scene. By challenging the way things have been done in a habitual way, the act expresses the limits of the dominant script and brings those limits under scrutiny as an issue of contestation (Huysmans, 2010:4). The act's value cannot be found in its acceptance or conditions of success or its traditional authority/capacity to speak. Doing so would amount to adopting the aforementioned way of theorizing power and change which has so far been dominantly related to the concepts of order, statism and structuralism in social sciences and especially International Relations. Instead of ignoring those moments where unanticipated subjects enact themselves as politically significant agents, one needs to resort to the rupturing scene of the act in order to be able to

understand and theorize the emergence and occurrence scenes that lead to interruptions, cracks and fissures within the dominant script.

4.3.2 Acts of dissidence: Tactical acts vs Strategic acts

Acts of dissidence in this sense can be contextualized with neither traditional power sources of hegemonic or institutional back-up, nor with the commitment to causal analysis which is the manner in which agency in global politics has come to be theorized (Bleiker, 2000:211). These fissures and cracks and ruptures created by the act, and the emerging scene in which the subject constitutes itself as a claimant of right to speak, to act, are not tools that are devised to produce causal change. They are rather of *tactical nature*, different than 'strategic forms of dissent where agent and the target can be separated and the attempt is usually made to articulate a causal relationship between them' (Bleiker, 2000:212). Bleiker explains the difference between tactical forms of dissent with its strategic forms:

> "Strategy envisages how an identifiable agent (such as a political march) exerts influence on an identifiable target (such as a change in policy desired by the march). … tactical forms of resistance have no clearly specified target, no visible place to exert influence… (for example) a critical and environmentally aware consumer… who refuses to buy milk that is bottled in non-reusable containers. At first sight, such a localised protest act seems to be void of political significance. … Where is the target…? Is it the supermarket? Is it the retailer? Or authorities who fail to impose sufficient environmental standards?" (Bleiker, 2000: 212-3).

The concept of tactic offers some new perspectives on the matter of small dissident movements and their significance in our daily lives, similar to the way the concept of acts contribute to our understanding of alternative ways of agency. Tactical agency is characteristic of attempts that target dominant processes that deeply penetrate to many layers of social life. This is why tactical movements do not perceive their adversaries 'in a space that is distinct, visible and objectifiable' (Bleiker, 2000:213). Given that, they are brought to existence in a world much bigger than their mere significance. However, this does not rule out the tactic or the act's impact as a crack or a rupture in the given script. Those

interrupting acts exercised by subjects who lack the formal status or common sense expectation to act, are constitutive moments generating the capacity to act politically and to be considered, treated as subjects with voice, rights and responsibilities. This rupture in the given is the instance when 'something however small and seemingly marginal, is changed, possibly for the first time' (Walters, 2008:192). Therefore, tactical action is meant for the agents who resort to acts of dissidence because, one way or another, they are dissatisfied with the dominant script and wish to make an impact on it even though their singular existence and action is trivial compared to the magnitude of the problematized process. The tactic represents an attempted crack within the existing discursive order. Just as Lugones (2003) contextualized it, tactics continuously strive at 'manipulating its environment in order to create opportunities for social change (de Certeau, 1984:xlvi-xlvii, quoted in Bleiker, 2000:213).

The combination of the concept of acts of dissidence and tactic results in rupturing events that create subjects to whom the right to have rights is due within the given script, no matter how insignificant and small they might seem, especially from the lenses of the traditional look at agency and change in International Relations. It is through a temporality perspective that the transformative potential of tactical actors are appreciated (Bleiker, 2000:213). In sum, there is no need to seek immediate causality, thus equally no room for the theoretical preference to ignore the efforts of actors with seemingly small power. The best way to analytically frame these tactical acts of dissidence is to regard them as part of an enabling process that creates new subjectivities and that seeks to create a counter-balancing effect vis-à-vis the existing dominant script. For example, again to take up the example of the non-status migrants, the activists, through their discursive rejection of the term "illegal", managed to replace the term illegal with non-papers (sans-papiers) or non-status migrants, which meant the removal of the negative connotation from their reference noun. These immigrants do not only lack citizenship rights, but are also openly denied the opportunity to express themselves as political beings since their identity has historically been excluded from the political domain (Walters, 2008:162-3). By marching and expressing out loud their refusal if the distinction between good and bad, legal and illegal migrants, citizen and non-citizen for being entitled to

have rights, these subjects accomplished to create a significant change because the term illegal migrants was replaced with the neutral term of non-paper status. Although in this example, their target can be considered to be visible and distinct in a particular space, i.e. the Canadian government, they still were part of a process that aimed at the creation of a new discursive regime which would not reserve the right to have rights or be political to citizens only. Call it cosmopolitanism, globalization or just the rule of human rights, these acts of dissidence fall under a process that seeks to de-throne the hegemony of the territorial mentality of citizenship and the nation-state. In other words, these acts, while they lack in the capacity to act and produce causal immediate change, they make up for it by claiming to have the right to act even though the consent of those to whom this power, that of the state apparatus and the public opinion, is not existent. Power, in that way, is not only a constraining or a repressive force, but it is also something 'enabling, like an opportunity, an instrument of resistance (Bleiker, 2000:129).

However, one should neither ignore nor overemphasize the potential of these tactical acts of dissidence. Those practices cannot be the only forms of agency that leads to the accomplishment of change on their own. It might be sensible to argue that those acts are of much smaller significance compared to that of the big events happening in world politics everyday. However, as it has been mentioned before in the beginning of this chapter, there are cases where actors with little or no power in its conventional sense gained visibility and became claimants and possessors of rights. Their significance should be best evaluated when they are framed as part of an alternative script that presents itself as a *process*. Processes are occurrences that 'consist of an integrated series of connected developments unfolding in programmatic coordination' (Rescher, 2000:22) that 'produces a change in the complexion of reality' (Jackson and Nexon, 1999:302). These are various contexts in the shape of ongoing processes that facilitate the way how acts of dissidence become effective. This does not mean that acts on their own, and the rupturing moment that creates the new scene with new subjectivities, are no longer of great importance. Nevertheless, for the sake of conducting a more focused empirical analysis, the political significance and effect of acts of dissidence need to be contextualized within existing

alternative scripts that become more visible through the actualization of these acts. After all, acts of dissidence may not always be located within a given community for two reasons. First, they refer to transcendent qualities of particular actions, and second, the dominant script might downplay the new subjectivities that realize themselves through acts. This calls for a closer look at the way processes are theorized in order to fully grasp their contribution. The next section explains why processes are important for the development of a critical approach to agency in terms of their offer for a way out of the obsession with order, reified entities and substances.

4.3.3. The Promise of Processes: Substantialism and Relationalism

International Relations and the sub-discipline of Security Studies, under the influence of the Realist tradition and especially neo-Realism, have been for long preoccupied with the state and the international system. They are treated as corporate identities, which are unitary, self-organizing and homeostatic structures, distinct from other entities (Wendt, 1999:224-5). Their features and preferences are structurally determined, but in essence, they are driven by the same derive for power accumulation, with no distinction among them as black-boxes, in the sense of an ontological assumption regarding an entity's essence (Clunan, 2000:97-8, quoted in Guillaume, 2009:73). The international system is crystallized with the territorial mentality of nation-states, whose existence and interests are taken for granted, and the relations between those entities do not change their nature or identities.

This is a clear example of the epistemological choice called substantialism. It "maintains that the ontological primitives of analysis are 'things' or entities' and that all the relations should be regarded as happening between those entities" (Jackson and Nexon, 1999:291). In other words, substantialism departs from the point that the main unit of analysis is substances, as is the case, for example, with rational-actor models (Emirbayev, 1997:281-2).

Taking international relations as the domain of nation-states' exclusive interactions and reserving the agency to statist conceptions of action and systematic change is one of the most common examples given to the substantialist thinking. Central to this approach is the assumption that entities under inquiry have always existed with fixed identities irrespective of spacio-temporal dimensions. The social world consists of fixed entities which interact to produce outcomes and this is the general linear reality in substantialism regarding change in a direct, causal way (Abbott, 1988:170 quoted in Guillaume, 2007:744-5).

Central to substantialism is the concept of reification which refers to a process of representation and experience in which a human-made object or situation becomes a factual given that exists externally and independently from the agencies that produced it (Huysmans, 2006a:4). In our daily language and also in social sciences, reifications are very easy to come by. Reification is argued to be very typical in human thought and expression because of two main reasons. Firstly, the centrality of substantialism to Western philosophy makes reification abundant. The biological human being is the entity of departure in modern social thought and it has become common sense to think about entities as 'overgrown versions of such biological individuals, (making us) accustomed to think that social entities have essences like biological individuals' (Abbott, 1996:860, quoted in Jackson and Nexon, 1999:299). Society, nation, state or groups have been reified as if they have a corporeal body of their own by virtue of consisting of the individuals forming them. Secondly, according to Norbert Elias, the language we use has biases towards reification (1970:111-2, quoted in Jackson and Nexon, 1999:300). Elias argues that constant change or movement is expressed with an isolated object being at rest, then implicating it in an action that signifies its movement and thus change. Elias gives the example of the wind or the flowing water, that is perpetually blowing or flowing, but is often spoken about to be blowing momentarily (Elias, 1970:112, quoted in Emirbayev, 1997:283).

Substantialism as such is characterized by its tendency to take reifications granted and to accept the existence of entities before relations. However, there are some social phenomena which cannot be explained by employing this kind of

a logic only because, for example, the actors at hand or the movements in question might not be accompanied by contextualizing forces or occurrences which enable them to be more influential than they would have been on their own. That is to say, placed within surrounding forces and mediating processes, entities can gain new identities or features through engaging in relations with other entities or processes. For instance, before the actual fall of the Berlin Wall, there were noteworthy public protests and migration movements from German Democratic Republic (GDR) to Federal Republic of Germany for more than a decade. However, it was not just the power of street rallies and public demonstrations in a socialist state that contributed to the GDR's regime to unify with West Germany. There were some processes already at work that magnified the influence of the popular acts of dissidence. Bleiker points out (2000:131-2) these were Gorbachev's New Thinking and the new Soviet administration's recognition of right to self-determination of each nation, West Germany's economic attraction in a growing, liberal, interdependent global economy, and the internal power struggles within the GDR's own Politburo. In effect, a series of international processes and discursive formations, like the inability to uphold the territorial logic of Cold War politics by virtue of the penetration of communication means through radios and TVs across national borders, helped the 'emergence of a regime-hostile world view, which in turn, created the precondition for the successful revolution of 1989' (Bleiker, 2000:180). A substantialist approach would not be sufficient in explaining how this transformation happened because a linear causal way cannot be established here. A process-based approach with its prioritization of relations and ties, instead of an exclusive emphasis on substances and entities, then, might prove more accurate to analyze situations where change is brought in a long temporal perspective through a web or relations. These configurations and clusters of relations are the units of analyses that attribute meaning, significance and identity to social units involved in the transaction (Emirbayev, 1997:287). The latter is seen as a dynamic, unfolding process happening in a period of time, and the relations happening as part of this process give rise to entities with changing roles in time and space. Processes comprise of an organized cluster of occurrences that are linked to one another in an identifiable temporal series

(Rescher, 1996:38, quoted in Guillaume, 2007:744). This is the ontological point from where relationalism and process-based approaches depart.

Process-based approaches are characterized by a prioritization of process over substance, relation over separateness, and activity over passivity, like the international system being defined as a process rather than a territorially delimited space (Guillaume, 2007:742). A process-based approach avoids reification or 'static-ization' of social units because as far as actors move across the dynamic process they operate in, they relate to various different units in different times and in different spaces, which makes the interaction a dialogical one enabling constant change in the identity and preferences of the units. Situated within the flow of time, human agency can be thus reconceptualised as 'a temporally embedded process of social engagement, informed by the past (its habitual aspect), oriented toward the future (to imagine alternative possibilities), and toward the present (the effect of the contingencies of the moment)' (Emirbayev and Mische, 1998:963). Therefore, for process-based relational approaches, the notion of change is integrated into the very fabric of the social phenomena. Things are not assumed as independent existences present prior to any relations, but they gain their beginning with the relations they are engaged in (Cassirer, 1953:36, quoted in Emirbayev, 1997:287), and what comes out are new actors with new identities and new relations, just like how the act creates a rupture in the given, creates a new scene while also beginning itself as a new subjectivity (Abbott, 1996:863). The process changes relations within the group implicated in itself, even sometimes the composition of the group (Jackson and Nexon, 1999:303).

In sum, the advantage of incorporating the concept of relationalism and the emphasis on processes is to adopt the epistemological condition enabling to theorize change as an ever-present phenomenon in social affairs. Entities operating within processes contribute to the change that happens in a long period of time, within this process itself, and through forces that are not always material and visible and are of different capabilities and natures according to the relation they are engaged in. Rather than resorting to linear immediate causality, entities, through their acts of dissidence, help alternative scripts to emerge within existing processes.

In such a way, process help acts become more meaningful, otherwise they risk being too thin when it comes to present their agency power. Acts are important, as they create new subjectivities, and this is an asset in itself, but their empowerment is facilitated by their placement in a process, where they can resonate with similar ideas and patterns that are out of the dominant script.

Consequently, this chapter argued that acts, with their significance of

- rupturing the given,
- creating a new scene
- and staying at that scene through the initiation of themselves as new claimants of rights,

represent the main methodological tool to theorize an alternative way of agency that is not bound to conventional understandings of power and change. Considered together with tactical action placed within existing alternative discursive scripts, acts of dissidence help us understand the occurrence of unexpected moments when rights are demanded, obligations are undertaken, and hegemonies are challenged through either small daily events or organized acts of disobedience. Rather than being confined to linear causal perceptions of change engendered by fixed substances, acts of dissidence underline the importance of the emergence of new self-constituted actors whose existence is facilitated by alternative discursive scripts operating as longitudinal processes. Those actors use various tactical agency tools in different temporal settings, in respect to different units with whom they engage in relations. Thus, power is defined in processual terms in order to appreciate its dialogical nature and its shifting character as opposed to substantialist fixity demanding the possession of clear-cut material power capabilities for the sake of bringing change.

CHAPTER 5

MILITARISM IN TURKEY

Before moving on to the application of all the theoretical tools to the hard case of the CO in Turkey, there is a need to contextualize Turkish conditions and see to what extent militarism, as in Rancière's police, sets roles, determines forms of appropriate behaviour, allows or forbids actors to have claims on particular topics. Once the pervasiveness of militarism is better understood, then the agency of the CO movement in Turkey through acts of dissidence can be assessed more fairly. This is also supported by the norm diffusion literature which points out the importance of localized norms and their conducive or detrimental effect to the newly introduced norm. Should militarism be very influential in Turkey, then this would make it harder for anti-militarist norms to penetrate the society and find themselves a place in the public debate. However, as the chapter on acts argued, this does not point to impossibility, but rather to an increased level of difficulty.

The first time a civil society initiative in Turkey applied to the necessary authorities for permission for the establishment of the Association of War Resisters in Izmir, Turkey, they were asked to provide a statement of purpose indicating the function of their newly found association. This is the standard procedure that applies to every newly found civil society organization in Turkey so that state authorities and the local governorship can approve the aim of the association. One of the key aims listed in that statement of purpose document by the founders of the association was to be against militarism and war. This clause proved to be problematic for the governorship's office and they sent back the statement of purpose in order to be revised. The official response given to the founders for the refusal was that this clause could not be accepted because there was no militarism in Turkey.

This story is an example of the lack of awareness around issues of militarism in Turkey. It has not been a concept that is frequently talked about, be it in academia, newspapers, avenues of public discussion, or at the governmental level. While the reasons for that will be discussed below, let it suffice for the moment to say that this is firstly because of a misunderstanding about what militarism really means, and secondly because militarism in the national public imaginary does not always have negative connotations. The second reason largely rests on the myth that the military and military service have been cultural, natural and given characteristics of the Turkish nation. They have come to define certain unique characteristics of the Turkishness because Turks are a "military-nation" (Altinay, 2004)

This study argues that militarism does exist in Turkey to a large extent and it is a pervasive ideology that has sunk in across many layers of daily life. Given that, before discussing the emancipatory potential of the CO movement in Turkey, there is a strong need to discuss what militarism really means, in general and in the Turkish context, and what it tells us about the normative assumptions of the country, in its security culture, in its definition of Turkishness and Turkish citizenship. Militarism's importance cannot be overlooked in the Turkish context because it functions as what Rancière refers as the police, the system that determines who can talk on what issues and who cannot, who has the right to speak, and who can claim which pre-determined or pre-allowed roles in a given situation. It prescribes and sanctions a distinctive set of behaviour and reactions among a choice of alternative actions. This chapter, in turn, argues that without a clear understanding of what militarism entails in Turkey, it will be difficult to conduct a thorough analysis of the security agency of the CO movement in Turkey.

First, the chapter introduces how militarism is defined and discussed in the literature. This section will mainly deal with a feminist literature that problematizes militarism and exposes its links to nation-state, genderism, patriarchy and hegemonic masculinity that comes with it. The second part of the chapter addresses the shape militarism has taken in Turkey. This second section revolves around the myth of the military-nation, its links to nationalism and hegemonic masculinity in Turkey, and how this inter-connectedness is

transmitted in the Turkish education system. The chapter in the end introduces which areas of the daily life we can see the intrusion of the military sphere to the civilian sphere and why such a pervasive theme has not been more frequently picked up in the Turkish academia.

5.1 Definitions

Militarism, as is many other –isms, points to a system of principles, a tendency, a way of doing things, a set of related concepts and ideals. In a nutshell, militarism is an combination of the word military with the suffix –ism, and thus can refer to a variety of related things: If generated from military as in the noun "the military", then it would hint at being pro-military, supporting it and favouring the noun that the suffix –ism denotes. If militarism comes from "military" the adjective, then it would amount to preferring military means and military things to other contenders. In fact, militarism are both and these two approaches are by definition connected.

Indeed the literature on militarism follows a similar approach in analyzing the term and the debate is shaped around three main themes of different levels: "the military as a social institution, militarism itself as an ideology, and militarization as a social process" (Altinay, 2004:2). What is important for this study is the last two, militarism as an ideology and militarization as a social process.

First, 'militarism as an ideology' is an idea frequently picked up by feminist scholar Cynthia Enloe. By pointing at militarism's power as a system that influences and shapes ideas and beliefs, Enloe underlines the often neglected power of militarism in any given society: the power to become common sense and forgetting about the social constructedness of the ideology.

To start with a working definition, Enloe suggests:

> "Like any ideology, militarism is a package of ideas. It is a compilation of assumptions, values, and beliefs. When any person – or institution or community – embraces militarism it is thus embracing particular value

> assertions about what is good, right, proper and about what is bad, wrong, and improper. … accepting a distinctive package of beliefs – about how the world works…" (Enloe, 2004:219)

Therefore militarism is not a given, it is an ideological choice adopted by certain actors, willingly or not. It sets priorities, passes judgment on the appropriateness of choices, and assumes certain statements about the nature of the human beings and the world. What is distinctive about militarism as an ideology is then what it suggests as the right and wrong kind of behaviour. In that sense, militarism is a set of ideas and structures that glorifies "practices and norms associated with militaries." (Altinay 2004:2, Chenoy 1998:101). That is to say, in the face of societal or personal problems, militarism's answer would be to seek solutions through the use of force, employment of a hierarchical order for disciplined action, and act in a friend-enemy mind frame that depends on the 'we' vs 'the outside' mentality. When military values are considered to be the dominant values of the society, or if they are promoted as such, they go through a process of glorification and thus become the hegemonic values of that particular order. This glorification in turn constitutes certain power relationships that "privilege certain ways of knowing, being and acting and that give voice to only certain people's experiences and agendas." (Alexander, 2010:71; Nayak and Suchland, 2006:469) That is to say, when these values become influential in the society, they also begin to shape the civilian sphere, which is normally separated from the reality and conditions of the military sphere (Altinay, 2007).

In the literature on militarism, the concept sometimes appears to have different varieties: civil or social/civil militarism (Berghahn, 2005; Shaw, 1991), and political militarism (Berghahn, 2005; Ben-Eliezer, 1998). The interference to and moulding of the civilian sphere in line with military values is the common theme among social and civil militarism. It deals with the question of "how far the categories, mentalities, and modes of operation of the military have percolated into society at large." (Berghahn 2005:73) Political militarism refers to the militaristic political decision-making. That is to say in policy-making, foreign relations in particular, are determined by the primacy of military considerations, i.e. the generals having the final authority (Berghahn 2005:73).

These variations point to different levels of the blurriness of relations among the army, politics, and society in any given setting (Ben-Eliezer, 1998; Adelman, 2003:1122). While political militarism might indicate the presence of a de facto military regime, social and civil militarism are characterized by the "institutionalized expression of military traits and values" like order, discipline, hierarchy, use of force, be courageous and decisive, and prone to self-sacrifice (Adelman, 2003:1122). These values and traits can be a range of "militarist core beliefs", and Enloe lists the predominant militarist affirmations as follows:

> "Armed force is the ultimate resolver of tensions, human nature is prone to conflict, having enemies is a natural condition, hierarchical relations produce effective action, a state without a military is naïve, scarcely modern, and barely legitimate, in times of crisis those who are feminine need armed protection, in times of crisis any man who refuses to engage in armed violent action is jeopardizing his own status as a manly man." (Enloe, 2004:219)

Therefore, it has been established that militarism refers to a process by which glorification of military values takes place and their interference to and shaping of the civilian sphere is facilitated. With a negative outlook to militarism, Ann Scales defines it as:

> "… the pervasive cluster of forces that keeps history insane: hierarchy, conformity, waste, false glory, force as the resolution of all issues, death as the meaning of life, and a claim to the necessity of all that." (Ann Scales, 2005:371)

In its basic form, militarism denotes being pre-occupied with war and being ready for it, but it is much more than what actually happens during war. Etymologically speaking, militarism emanates from the French word "militaire" or in English "military", which comes from the Latin word "militaris" that describes "being related to war and soldiery." (Altinay, 2007) This close engagement with war and "the readiness for it" is a very common theme in militarist societies. If political efforts and resources are spent on war waging, then this would indicate that this particular society or the institution is engaged in militarism (Reardon, 1985; Alexander, 2010:71). For example, for Michael Mann (1988:124), militarism is "the amalgamation all the approaches and institutional formations that describe war and war preparations as a normal and desirable social practice." (Altinay, 2007) This preparedness for war and being

ready for it are important additions to the definition of militarism so as to also overcome equating militarism with only a war context. On this matter, Altinay quotes Alfred Vagts's (1959:15): "militarism develops the most during peace rather than war time". This angle is also what Cynthia Enloe (2004:219) describes as follows:

> "…it is not enough to talk about militarism. We must talk about – monitor, explain, challenge – those multilayered processes by which militarism gains legitimacy and popular and elite acceptance…"

By the same token, if militarism is more than war, then anti-militarism must be more than just objecting to war. Anti-militarism is to a large extent being against war, there should be no doubt about this (Selek and Sonmez, 2007). However, it also includes various processes that contribute and maintain the existing glorification of military values and their shaping of the civilian sphere. Pinar Selek and CO activist Oguz Sonmez describe anti-militarism along the following lines:

> "Anti-militarism is a consistent stance against war. It is not being against some particular wars, but it entails being anti-war entirely. It rejects war without distinguishing between just and unjust wars. However, it also objects to the production and transfer of war materials, nuclear or weapons of mass destruction, militarization of the space, strategies for military organization and hierarchies under the pretext of "terror", that increasingly interfere with the "civil" life and make it more dangerous, civilianization of the military industry and the militarization of the economic structure. An anti-militarist person will not only not fight, but will also reject learning how to kill, serve in the military or its auxiliary establishments." (Selek and Sonmez, 2007)

In a nutshell, the logic of war is still inherent to militarism, but the latter exceeds the boundaries of the military/war realm. War is undoubtedly a crucial feature of militarism, "the apex, the climax, the peak experience, the point of all the investments, training, and preparation" (Sjoberg and Via, 2007:7). Some authors even described it as "the manifestation at every level of policy – military and otherwise – of the logic of war." (Ann Scales, 2005:371)

However, militarism is a broader term than war, it encompasses war-related activities and the preparation for it, but it penetrates into the general social, political and the daily life. Sjoberg, Via and Enloe describes militarism as a phenomenon "without a starting and an ending point" because "militarism

pervades societies before, during, and after the discrete event that the word "war" is usually used to describe." (Sjoberg and Via, 2010:7)

Compiled together, militarism is an ideology, it is a set of institutional arrangements and everyday practices, and it rests on a constant "mobilization of society to prepare for, support, and fight wars", confusing the boundaries between war and peace, and military and civilian life. (Adelman, 2003:1123, Berghahn, 2005:70) Militarism is studied as an ideology, but there is also need to look at the processes through which it has become diffused, institutionalized and become invisible (Sunbuloglu, 2013:3). This process is called militarization.

5.2 Militarism and Militarization

The concept of militarism has often been used together, and frequently interchangeably, with 'militarization'. In its narrow usage, militarization can refer to armament (Shaw 1991, Altinay 2007). As mentioned above, Cynthia Enloe describes militarism as an ideology, as a cluster of beliefs, values and ideas, while militarization, she argues, is a "multitracked socio-political process by which the roots of militarism are driven deep down into the soil of a society" (2004:219-20). It is more than just proliferation of weapons across borders or actors. In that sense, militarization can be defined as the process of militarism's diffusion and institutionalization (Altinay, 2007; Chenoy, 1998:101).

Therefore, it is possible to think of militarism as an abstract process, whereby militarization embodies its materialization in physical and discursive life. Militarization would then be the process by which "military practices are extended into the civilian arena" (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:258; Sjoberg and Via, 2010:7). It denotes a shift in the society's way of doing things that facilitate the legitimation of the use of force, the organization of large standing armies and the allocation of greater resources for military purposes (Lutz, 2002:723). An example of that would be how military contracts are being sought after by companies or that university programs are re-arranged so as to feed graduates

into ‘lucrative military sectors’, or how labour and resources are allocated to military purposes.

Militarization is a process that goes beyond arms and wars and their frequency. It sinks in across different layers of the social life and refers to the adoption of militaristic values such as believing in the value of hierarchy, obedience, and the use of force, by individuals or societies (Enloe, 2007:4). While militarism involves these military values to have the capacity to influence social change, militarization draws attention to “material and discursive nature of military dominance.” (Lutz, 2002:735) Militarization then is the social process in which civil society organizes itself for the production, maintenance and reproduction of violence (Geyer, 1989:79; Lutz, 2002:723). That is why feminist authors have argued that most militarization occurs and most militarized people are outside the confines of militaries as they are traditionally understood: in schools, popular culture, clothing , etc… (Enloe, 2005, Via, 2010:47)

If militarism and militarization occurs mostly outside the boundaries of militaries, then their effect should clearly be visible in social life, in ordinary daily details. One of these areas is where militarism prescribes a hierarchy of gender roles in the society and thus enforces a gender regime where hegemonic masculinity overrides other forms of masculinity and renders femininity to a secondary role depicted by weakness, emotions, and an entity to be protected. The link between militarism and gender regimes is the focus of the next section.

5.3 The link between militarism and gender

The last point about militarism maintaining, feeding on, and reinforcing constructed gender roles in a given society is explored at length by feminist scholars. Cynthia Enloe (1993:246) stated that militarism, which pervades global politics, is not a gender-neutral process happening automatically. Far from it, militarism foresees certain types of distinct behaviour performed by both women and men. While men are supposed to prove their manhood by being tough, challenging and prone to aggression (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:118), women

are typically portrayed as “mothers, wives, and caregivers bearing and raising sons to send off to war to fight for their nation.” (Alexander, 2010:71). They are the ones who are expected to willingly sacrifice their sons for the sake of the land (Sunbuloglu, 2009:62-3).

In this sense, gender is a relation of differentiation , inequality and power, that is reinforced by the existence of violence (Cockburn, 2012:9). A male-dominant gender order is an inherent characteristic of militarism. Historically speaking, militaristic behaviour has been a way for men to prove their manhood by being courageous, aggressive, precise, strong and fearless (Hooper, 2001:81; Huston, 1983:271; Sjoberg, 2006; Via, 2010:44). In the old days, masculinity was conditional on participating in wars as a source of prestige, while the modern nation-state masculinity is regulated through conscription and defending the nation as male soldiers of the country (Sunbuloglu, 2012:16; Horne, 2004: 27). In this way, modern nation-state updates and modernizes the way masculinity was conceived in the past. This is because militarism emerged and gained power with the conception of conscription and citizen-armies, which are two main characteristics of the modern nation-state (Sunbuloglu, 2013:1). As long as the idea that the nation and the country is subject to external and internal threats, it will be easy to conscript male citizens and thus reinforce the relationship between masculinity and militarism. While redefining “proper masculinity and sexuality” (Enloe 2000), militarism also marginalizes anybody “but the male heterosexual – the only category of person seen fit for the full citizenship conferred by combat” (Lutz, 2002:724).

This order has multiple faces that is visible in so many corners of the daily life. Idealized militarized masculinities are social, but they are also physical, where militaries emphasize the soldiers’ physical strength, particularly upper body strength, by means of training exercises and certain areas of specialization within militaries. (Via, 2010:44) One of the most visible avenues where militarist masculinity is institutionalized and mass-communicated is through the practice of military service.

Speaking in the context of the modern nation-state, the profession of soldiery is confined only to the male citizens, except for certain exceptions in the

world such as Israel, North Korea, or Cuba. Historically speaking, men have been drafted into citizen armies based on the myth of "the heroic male", which refers to the dissemination of a warrior culture resting on the male genetic-biological possession of "the necessary toughness for war" (Selek, 2008:125). The hegemonic masculinity preached by militarism in that sense are the very values that are sought in men to be come soldiers and they can be listed as follows:

> "men with unbreakable will, having superior virtues to risk death and pain for protecting one's honour, being fearless, being physically strong as to cope with all the sufferings with the necessary discipline and training, having a character that is not so easily influenced by hardships, engaging in competition to achieve the best, a liking in adventure that is fearless and not risk-averse, being capable of taking decisions independently, having the "male sexual power", caring about "patriarchial" protective values" (Sancar, 2008: 156; Higate and Hopton 2005).

Military service is designed "make men develop these qualities", and it is by not a coincidence that "physical training and shaping the body" through the wearing of the uniform and the same-type haircut is one of the most distinctive elements of military service (Sunbuloglu, 2009:64). However, this practice creates a gender regime that hides gender hierarchies and inequalities. The system of inclusion and exclusion works two-ways. On one hand, it highlights the qualities that men need to perform in order to be considered as real men, and on the other, because women are excluded from conscription given their 'inability to become soldiers', it leaves femininity out of the military norms (Sancar, 2008:154). Women, as Enloe demonstrates, are expected to carry out different roles mentioned above: mothers, carers, officers who are responsible for non-fighting roles. Societal gender norms that are diffused through militarism and the practice of military service determine what acceptable and hegemonic masculinity is in the eyes of the state, as well as they do the same for the case of femininity (Sunbuloglu, 2009:59).

It is at this very conjuncture Altinay explains that compulsory military service is only limited to "the defense of the country", but it also regulates the citizenship function between men and women, and the state (Altinay, 2007). Military service is a historical construct, and as Charles Tilly (1984)

demonstrated, it is closely linked to the inter-connected processes of war-making and the formation of the nation-state. The latter generated a different kind of a war-making through the citizen-armies, the first example of which was France in the beginning of the 19th century (Altinay 2007). It was through the establishment of the concept of "nation" and "nationalism" that conscription and citizen-armies were enabled. Through the discourse of 'the nation and the land being in danger', it was men, and only men, who were called upon to keep the country safe. As Joane Nagel explains:

> ""If the concept of "love to one's country" is evoked, especially during times of a political "crisis", in other words when the nation's existence is "in danger", it becomes a siren that very few man can stay indifferent to." (Nagel, 1998:252; Sunbuloglu, 2012:16-7)

Therefore there is a strong link between a certain type of masculinity, the state, and military service relations. Since serving in the army is often framed as "the most sacred duty", as is the case in Turkey, men are privileged with "a first-class citizenship" (Enloe 1993 and 2000; Altinay 2007). Some authors devised the concept of "patriarchal militarism" to denote that relationship between privileged masculinity and militarism (Kaplan 1994:124, Alexander, 2010:71). Women in this construct, patriarchal militarism, perform two roles: sacred motherhood, especially mothers of soldiers who are willing to sacrifice their sons for the sake of the land, and in exceptional circumstances warriorship, like Sabiha Gökçen, a Turkish woman pilot, also the first woman war pilot in history (Altinay 2004, Sunbuloglu, 2009:62-3).

While the first role is valid at all times, the second is conditional upon permission and need (Altinay, 2007). Feminist scholars question and problematize women's exclusion from military practices, but they refrain from suggesting that the solution is to be found in women's conscription into the army. They rather underline the importance of "the civilianization of social life, men and masculinity because militarism hurts women just as much as it hurts men" (Altinay, 2007). Militarism also leaves out those men who do not comply with the norms of hegemonic military masculinity: the disabled, or the homosexuals, and as the next chapter will display, the COrs.

5.4 Militarism in Turkey

On the basis of the arguments above, in order to see to what extent militarism and militarization are present in the Turkey case, there is a need to ask the following questions: are military values glorified in Turkey, in the face of problems are military solutions seen the best way out, is the distinction between the civilian and military realm blurred through the latter's interference into the former, are gender roles rendered hierarchically according to military norms, are military staff influential in political decision-making processes, is there a war discourse that creates urgency and necessity for military service and military norms, is militarism not analyzed and investigated by the Turkish academia? This section will answer these questions respectively in the Turkish context, and it argues that the answer to all of them is yes, thus pointing to militarism and militarization being highly influential in Turkey. It even commands a status of normalcy, which means that militarism is not genuinely questioned in Turkey, in a way to sustain the example given in the introduction of this chapter: 'there is no militarism in Turkey'. This part begins with looking at how military values are glorified and what this amounts to for the Turkish civilian realm.

5.4.1 The myth of the military-nation and military's glorification

Military values are not only glorified in Turkey, but they are immersed into the conceptualization of what Turkishness means. One of the most important themes around the place of the military and military values for Turkish culture and the national identity is the idea of the "military-nation" (Altinay, 2004). This concept refers to a discourse that was developed in the post-1930s by the state apparatus, about the Turkish nation being a timeless military nation. Its motto is "Every Turk is born a soldier", which is very commonly used in the official Turkish history-writing, daily conversations, educational textbooks, newspaper columns, and naturally the barracks (Altinay, 2009:1245). Both the idea of the military-nation and its motto have been since then integrated into the curriculum

of education, into the self-identification of the Turkish military, and into the givenness and unquestionable status of compulsory military service.

Aysegul Altinay (2004) wrote at length about, as she puts it, this "myth of the military-nation" was formulated staring from the early years of the Turkish Republic. She argues that many state officials, be military or civilian, and academics or politicians, they all highlighted this understanding of "the military-nation" which has come to be one of the constitutive elements of the post-1930s nationalism in Turkey. Altinay gives an example to this from Ataturk, by quoting his adopted daughter, Sabiha Gokcen:

> "We are a military nation. From the youth to the elderly, from our women to our men, we are a nation created as military." (Sabiha Gokcen 1996:125, quoting Ataturk)." (Altinay, 2009:1245)

The idea of the military-nation rests on the assumption or claim that Turks have always been characterized with being good soldiers and that they have always been naturally military-prone people. This 'heroic tale' has been made an integral part of the primary and elementary school education, in compulsory courses like "Social Knowledge" or "Citizenship and Democracy". Sunbuloglu argues that:

> "Starting from the early years of the Republic, textbooks at schools preach to male pupils "the military spirit" that is "a legacy to them from their ancestors" and which is "a unique characteristic for the Turks." (Sunbuloglu, 2009:62)

The thesis of the military-nation was therefore framed and presented as a cultural given, a natural condition because being part of the military is an indispensable quality to the Turkish nation, something to be proud of for the Turkish culture: every Turk is after all born as a soldier. (Altinay and Bora, 2002:143) This new framing has certain consequences for the immediate present and for future generations. Altinay and Bora (2002:143) argue that in a period when compulsory military service was not internalized yet in the society, and that the level of desertion was high in the aftermath of the War of Independence, this new way of conceptualizing military service as a cultural trait must have been a strategic choice. When the military quality of the nation was given an ever-existent timeless conception, it served to hide the recently introduced

conscription mechanism of the newly found Turkish state. Thirdly, it led to the understanding that military service is a "non-negotiable, non-debatable concept" (Altinay and Bora, 2002:143, Sunbuloglu, 2013:3). If one was to problematize military service, this would also amount to question Turkish culture itself. The remnants of this arrangement is still in force today as there is a clause in the Penal Code against alienating the public from military service by speaking against it. Fourthly, it made it more difficult to contemplate a non-military civilian sphere since everybody is inherently military.

The military-nation, as it is taught, comprised of all the members of the Turkish community who were part of a military structure and that being a soldier was not a private profession. One example of this can be found in a report entitled "Militarism in Textbooks", issued by Istanbul Bilgi University, Department of Sociology, the Centre of Sociology and Educational Studies (SECBIR) in May 2012. This study analyzes different textbooks across primary education in Turkey and traces signs of militarism. The construction of the military-nation is one of the main findings of the report, and a striking example taken from one of the approved textbooks is given below.

After asking the students what they can say about the importance of the army for their country, the textbook underlines the issue of the military-nation and gives the following illustrative information box. The contents of the box are written as if the famous Hun Emperor, Mete Khan, also known as Modu Chanyu, was telling them:

> "I am Mete Khan, the Hun Emperor. It was during my reign 2200 years ago that the Turkish army was founded. Central Asian steppes, where we used to live, necessitated that everybody among our people was a soldier. Under the rule of commanders, everybody from the women, to the old and the young, was part of a military structure. Soldiery was not a private profession. The people as a whole was ready to fight at all times. That is why the tradition of the military-nation was the general characteristic of our people. I arranged the Turkish army in units of ten and I made it easier to control" (SECBIR, 2012:4)

This 'fact box' is intended to give the students the message that Turkish people have always been organized in military lines and that becoming a soldier is not an extra effort for them. The usage of language also rests on a militaristic understanding with the environment in the sense that the reason why Turks were

"ready to fight at all times" was because of the hardships of the Central Asian steppes. Therefore, the external and the environment is presented as hostile and aggressive, ready to threaten the existence of the Turkish people.

There is another visual presented in the report, just below this fact box. It shows a drawing where the background is red in Turkish flag, with the crescent moon and the star, with the folk symbols of the howling wolf, and the horse that stands up victoriously. To the left there are two soldiers in old military uniforms, while the other two to the right are modern soldiers with camouflage and modern weapons. This illustration is intended to pass the understanding that Turks have always been soldiers, whether at present or in the past, and this is confirmed by affirmative and 'glorified' symbols from the War of Independence that led to the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic. The wolf, in turn, is a symbol of the national folk tales of Central Asian Turkic tribes.

A few lines under this box, there is another one giving some brief information after asking the students to do a research about why Turkey celebrates 30 August as the "Holiday of Victory":

> "The history of the Turkish army equals the history of the Turkish nation. … Historically speaking every Turk throughout each Turkic state was ready for war and soldiery was not seen as a private profession." (SECBIR, 2012:5)

The promotion of the idea of the military-nation has been done not only in textbooks, but also by prominent civilians or academic. Altinay and Bora (2002:143) gives the example of the historian Halil Inalcik:

> "The Turkish nation preserved its quality as a military-nation since the beginning of time… If Turks are always at the forefront of history in the world, this is thanks to its undefeatable national trait, the military characteristic, and its power to fight for its rights and independence." (Inalcik, 1964:56)

Another example given by the same authors is a book prepared by the Ministry of Culture and the Ankara Chamber of Commerce in 2000, entitled "the Turkish Army". The then-Chief of Staff, Huseyin Kivrikoglu, wrote the introduction of the book: "Turks, who are known as the military-nation, has won many triumphs throughout history, and founded many states." (Altinay and Bora, 2002:143). It is also interesting to note that the book was published by the

Ministry of Culture, and not the Ministry of Defense or by the Turkish Armed Forces. This is again because of the assumption that being military is a cultural trait of the Turkish nation, an inherent quality of everybody living in Turkey.

The resulting effect of this understanding was to grant the army a supra-political space, exempted from many channels of political accountability, and a feeling of exclusivity that was translated into the army being able to do as it pleased and as it deemed fit. Altinay argues that from 1930s onwards, the military and the military service were defined as a cultural and racial characteristic of the Turkish nation (2010:89). By calling Turks as naturally prone to military activity, military service thus became an ahistorical trait of the nation, and by doing so placed the institution of the military on a very privileged, untouchable and granted apolitical space.

This position of the army was also inscribed in the law. Before it was changed in July 2013, Article 43 of the Turkish Armed Forces' Internal Statute said the Forces were "above and beyond all political views", which now only forbids members of the Armed Forces from getting involved in political activities.[16] The old version of the law was highly problematic as it placed military outside of politics, but to a level that was also above it (Can, 2010:230).

Article 35 of the same Statute was the legal provision which the Army based its military coups: "The duty of the Armed Forces is to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey, as determined by the Constitution." The new article clearly takes the power to carry out a coup away from the Army:

> "The duties of the Turkish Armed Forces are to protect the Turkish homeland against threats and dangers emanating from abroad, preserving and consolidating military might in a way to generate deterrence, carry out tasks appointed to it by the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and to contribute to the provision of international peace."

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[16] "Askerlik Tanimi ve 35. Madde degisiyor [The definition of the military service and Article 35 are changing], Hurriyet daily, 27 June 2013, accessed on 2 July 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/23597523.asp. The most recent of the Statute can be accessed via: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.4.211&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearch=

For a long period of time, the army was the most trusted organization in Turkey by the public, despite the fact that it conducted two clear-cut coup d'états. However, the army has historically taken a very special place in the imaginary of the Turkish nation. The same report on textbooks mentioned above gives an example through a direct quotation from Ataturk where he explains why the Turkish military deserves "special care" and is of "utmost importance":

> "Our army is the undefeatable guarantee of the systematic work we have been carrying out in order to realize the ideals of Turkey and of the Turkish land. [addressing the Turkish soldier] There have never been another soldier whose heart is cleaner and stronger than yours. …Our heroic army is the only guardian of the state's independence, and the life of the nation and the country. That is why it is of utmost importance that our military be organized with special care." (SECBIR, 2012:4)

The army is also portrayed by the militarist-nationalist discourse as a constituent of a modern-Western identity that does not include any "stained" nationalism that might stem from ethnicity or religious references (Altinay and Bora, 2002:141). In this way, the army is equipped with a normative superiority because it prescribes the right kind of nationalism and as such determines Turkish history while also protecting it. After all, Turkish history comprises of conquests and wars, and "martyrdom" is the primary glorified concept on the account of the Turkish army (Altinay and Bora, 2002:141).

In a country where the army occupies such an important place in the public imaginary, the institution of the compulsory military service was naturally a glorified practice. As Altinay explains in depth (2004), the Turkish nation was equated with the military nation, which relied on "the myth of Turks as a military-nation since the dawn of history". Military service has been seen as a process of learning and being ready for life, a site of education that made male citizens into real men by teaching them how to adhere to proper masculinity norms. As one of Altinay's interviewees explained (2004:62):

> "[in military service] you learn all about discipline, you learn what discipline means, how to respect someone and all that… If you haven't been through military service and learned about paying respect, you simply don't care."

In a similar way, the textbook of the National Security Knowledge course from 1995 for high-school students stated that:

> "Military service, the most sacred service to the nation and the homeland, prepares young people for real life situations. A person who does not perform military service cannot be useful to himself, his family or to his nation."[17] (Altinay, 2004:70, 2010:90).

Another significant finding of the report issued by SECBIR on militarism in textbooks is that the military is very frequently praised, and that Turks being inherently military has led to the conclusion that this is also their sacred quality, almost as the only way to become an effective, true citizen. One of the textbooks has another fact box that outlines three most important qualities of the Turkish army: "full obedience to every order, quick and accurate decision-making, full accuracy at hitting targets." (SECBIR, 2012:6). More interestingly, serving in the military service is framed as the only way through which a citizen can contribute to her/his country's 'defense'. The following hypothetical conversation, taken a the textbook, among three students is very illustrative of the militarization of the link between citizens and the state.

One of the female students, Zeynep, is asking her friends about their opinions about a TV show she recently saw: a factory owner questioning why he should be paying tax to the state while he is the one who spends so much time for his work and does not have time for his family. His reasoning is what the state has got to do with anything given its zero contribution? Okan, a male student, concurs with the factory owner, while Ece, another female student, points to the provision of electricity and water to the factory by the state, the construction of roads for goods' transportation, and the protection of the family and the security of the factory owner. Then Zeynep says while the War of Independence was won in solidarity between men and women, now women are not currently conscripted. Since military service is a very sacred national duty, women should be conscripted too, she says. Okan says this does not make any sense because women cannot serve in the army as they are not as strong as men. Ece disagrees and says "our country always needs to be ready for defending itself, and that is why women should also receive military training. This is the only way that every

[17] This course was discontinued from the academic year of 2012-2013. Please see "Milli Guvenlik Dersi Kaldirildi" [The course of National Security Knowledge has been cancelled], Hurriyet, 25 January 2012, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19765864.asp, accessed on 4 August 2013.

citizen can become able to serve in the defense of the country." (SECBIR, 2012:8)

There are three themes that are relevant to the militarism debate in Turkey. The first one is the suggestion coming from a female student that women should also be subjected to compulsory military service. The second one is that serving in the military is the only way to defend the county, and the link is made to how the War of Independence was won. By doing so, the authors of the text militarized the issue of taxation by framing it with the necessity to defend the country. That is another finding that the report suggests: non-military issues and figures being associated with military values (SECBIR, 2012:6). That is the textbook definition of militarism.

The third theme, in turn, relates to the necessity of defending the country. The tone of the text and the line of argument in the end lead to every citizen having to go and receive military training because otherwise they, as citizens, cannot contribute to the defense of the nation. This way of reasoning presupposes the existence of external threats that target the country and the nation and thus immediately brings up the issue of national defense. This argument echoes militarism's preoccupation with war and war preparedness, i.e. "the amalgamation of all the approaches and institutional formations that describe war and war preparations as a normal and desirable social practice" (Mann, 1988:124, Altinay, 2007). Indeed, the suggestion that Turkey is always under threats posed from outside of its borders is a frequent theme found in the same textbooks and also in the public debate. The SECBIR report gives a clear example of this understanding, where one of the textbooks illustrates a visit by a captain to a classroom for a career day-like event: Captain Volkan is asked by the students whether the country would be defenseless again if they did not have a strong army. He replies that their country is located on a very important spot in the world, and that there have always been those who want to possess these lands, and they always will. (SECBIR, 2012:9) The presence of enemies emanating from outside of country borders is often given as a justification of the necessity of the army and that as Ataturk stated, every citizen needs to be ready to fight at all times. This is because sometimes Turkey's natural resources attract external hostile powers, or at other times, those states considering Turkey to be a

threat to them because of its 'big economic power' engage in activities to make it lose its power and damage its national security (SECBIR, 2012:9).

When conducting research on militarism in Turkey, Altinay also approached military personnel who were employed to deliver the contents of the course of "National Security Knowledge" in high-schools. She says she was often asked why she took an interest in a course that was regarded by the students as an easy course to pass, a formality (Altinay, 2013:9). Altinay underlines the importance of this question by pointing at how deep was the presence of soldiers in civilian schools, how it was not problematized at all, or the very problematization of it appeared really puzzling.

Despite the recent reforms that aim to confine the presence of military to the borders of the barracks, it is important to bear in mind that since the foundation of the republic, the importance of the army and of the military training has been frequently created, re-created and imposed on Turkish citizens through education and cultural practices. As Altinay shows, the history textbooks of the early decades of the Turkish Republic makes many glorifying references to the military character of the nation (2010:88):

> "[the] Turkish nation is the nation with the most developed military spirit ... A nation with high military spirit is a nation with a history of civilization; one that embodies deep and far-reaching knowledge. It is natural that the Turkish race, which has been the ancestor of all major civilizations since the dawn of humanity, perfected this spirit."[18]

The prevalence of militarism has also been very present in the more petty sides of daily life. It is common knowledge, especially in more rural areas of Turkey, that young male members of the society will not be seen as ready to embark on life before they complete their military service. In the same way often marriages are postponed until the completion of the army duty (Altinay, 2004:67). As one Turkish citizen, who started his military duty, who wanted to get out of it because of his anti-militarist, humanist and leftist inclinations, who ate very minimal food and who eventually got a certificate of unsuitability for

[18] Altinay cites this paragraph from Tu ̈rk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti [Turkish Historical Research Foundation] (1934) Tarih IV [History IV], 2nd edn, Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, pp. 344–5.

military service, explained it: "[parents] do not give their daughters hand in marriage to those who have not yet been to the army. Those who do not go to the military are not deemed as man" (Mater, 1999:35).

Another example is the fact that job ads in newspapers or on websites make it an essential requirement that male candidates have already completed their military service. Ferda Ulker, one of the woman COrs explained the situation in her own words:

> "Nobody is immune to the effects of militarism… We question militarism in so many ways, but it is so embedded in our everyday lives that it is very difficult to free ourselves of its effects and to start talking with a new language." (Altinay, 2004:92)

Another example of the pervasiveness of militarism in daily life was experienced by the author of this study, when he wished to take up the issue of Conscientious Objection as a Ph.D dissertation topic and was not sure whether this would create any problems in the future in terms of securing position in Turkish universities. It is common knowledge that some rather critical and 'delicate' issues might not be so tolerated in institutions or departments where organic relations between the education institution and the state run deep. This was also supported by one of the interviewees of the study:

> "The issue of conscientious objection, academically speaking, was a troublemaker. There were some students in … University who translated a piece entitled 'the History of Conscientious Objection' into Turkish. In return, the instructor of the module accused them of being traitors. That is to say, even providing information was seen as a crime, an act of treason even in the academia." (Oguz Sonmez, personal interview).[19]

As it has been discussed above, militarist practices are not only limited to ideological formations, institutional arrangements or textbooks. There is much more to it, especially in the shape of militarization of the society, the blurring of the distinction of the civilian and military spheres. There are certain practices and habits that seem to be natural in the daily life, but they actually emanate from militaristic values, such as military parades during national holidays, or the taking of a nationalistic-militaristic oath by students in primary school every

[19] The name of the university has been omitted here.

morning before class[20], or the glorification of martyrdom and death over life and peace in the educational system. To trace these interferences into the civilian realm is the aim of the next section.

5.4.2 Blurring military and civilian spheres

There are two main areas where civilian and military spheres have been clearly blurred in Turkey: reflections of military presence in daily life activities, and civil-military relations in the political system. While the former refers to socio-economic conditions of the country, and to the ordinary acts of daily behaviour, the latter has to do with the set-up of the Turkish democracy, and the increased influence of the military upon democratic decision-making processes through institutions such as the National Security Council. This section will look at how the military sphere breaches into the civilian sphere in daily occurrences, as well as how the military developed itself into an economic power that has a highly privileged situation in the market. The civil-military relations in politics, in turn, is dealt with in the next chapter where the CO movement and the recent demilitarization process of the AKP government is discussed. This choice has been made in order to provide a more integrated context to show where the ongoing demilitarization process is taking Turkey from and to.

5.4.2.1 Military in the socio-economic world

Militarization of the Turkish society can be traced in different avenues of the daily life. For example, in primary, elementary and high schools, sports classes are conducted in a way to train students in how to march like a soldier.

[20] This practice has been recently abolished by the 'democratization package' undertaken by the AKP government, please see "Andimiz ve kamuda basortusu kaldirildi" [The oath and the veil in public sector has been abolished], *Hurriyet*, 8 October 2013, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/24874592.asp, accessed on 18 October 2013.

Moreover, national holidays that are dedicated to the youth or to the children are celebrated with military parades and disciplined mass shows in stadiums (Altinay, 2009:1246). Altinay also makes note of the fact that most monuments and sculptures in the public space predominantly take after military incidents or characters, and the names given to universities reminisce of military occasions, such as dates of the liberation of Turkish cities from occupation after World War I.

Another example of thus blurriness is the fact the way National Security Knowledge course used to be conducted before it was abolished in January 2012. In this course designed for high school students, currently serving or retired officers would come to civilian high schools and often would teach with their uniform on, in a very dominant, harsh and disciplined way. I, myself, remember being a student back in high school where I was expected to rise in the classroom as soon as the instructor, an army officer with his uniform, would walk in, and then salute him in the way soldiers in the barracks do. I also remember him using a metal stick while teaching, both as a way to point at things on the map, but also occasionally hitting on the desks with it or threatening to hit fellow students with it should they make noise during the class. His way of addressing the class was very direct, almost patronizing, and not open to questioning.

It is also possible to observe military facilities and presence directly in contact with civilian life in cities. For example, there are military guesthouses and gated communities designed for military staff in town centers, where civilians are not allowed to go in unless coming to see a certain somebody living in these lodges (Sunbuloglu, 2013:8, Altinay, 2009:1245). Military guesthouses, in turn, are off limits to civilians.

However, one of the clearest examples of the military breach into civilian sphere can be found in the economic activities of the army foundations. There are two branches of the army that function as economic entities and bring in profits while enjoying many legal exemptions and privileges. They are the Armed Forces Mutual Fund [OYAK], established in 1961, and the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSKGV) established in 1987.

OYAK was founded for the provision of social security to military personnel (Akca, 2004: 230–4; Karabelias, 2008:466). Over time it developed into an economic success story and there have been studies recently carried out OYAK to explore what is called "the militarization of the market" in a way to signal the presence of the military in economics. However, before these studies, the issue was not explored. With the exceptions of the works of Akca (2004) and Parla (1998), the military's role in the country's civilian economy has been left almost completely unexplored (Demir, 2005:676).

OYAK, over time, turned into "a conglomerate consisting of vast holdings in Turkey's civilian economy", with activities such as supermarket chains to real estate, from insurance to tourism. (Demir, 2005:678). Back in 2005, it was ranked in the top three conglomerates in the country. Karabelias states that OYAK's success owes it to a set of "unique and unprecedented subsidies and legal priviliges":

> "OYAK is exempt from corporation tax, all other kinds of income tax, special income tax collected from all organizations who withhold dues and fees from members, all sales and excise taxes, the state stamp tax imposed on all legal transactions." (Akca, 2004:246-8; Karabelias, 2008:466)

OYAK enjoys from other special arrangements that are not possessed by any other firm in the market. For example, its members, who are army regulars, defense ministry employees, etc., pay compulsory fees from their salaries. It also enjoys further privileges to protect it from market risks, such as "enabling it to transfer any of its loss-making or bankrupt companies to the state." (Demir, 2005:678) All these privileges have granted OYAK a unique position where the Fund and the military managed to protect themselves from the consequences of economic crises or unstable economic flows, "while the rest of the society had no such safety net." (Demir, 2005:679). Therefore, OYAK's status and its operations point to a profit-oriented establishment at the expense of market equilibrium (Parla, 1998:241, Kuru, 2012:40).

Some authors even argued that the presence of the military in the market results in various problems in both public and private spheres of the economy. Demir (2005:681) states that there is no public disclosure regarding the military's

access to classified economic decisions, either directly through the National Security Council, or indirectly through its own institutional means. Demir gives the example of the devaluation of February 2002 where the military was informed in advance of the depreciation of the Turkish lira by forty per cent, "and was preceded by a sharp fall in the stock market together with skyrocketing interest rates which reached as much as 5,000 per cent in the inter-bank money market." (Demir, 2005:681). Since OYAK also had a bank back then and also a brokerage firm, the value of this intelligence cannot be overlooked.

A similar situation applies to the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces [TSKGV]. It is exempted from "corporation tax, stamp tax with regards to its transactions, and inheritance and transfer taxes regarding all donations and assistance it receives." (Karabelias, 2008:466). This is the foundation that has shares today in research and development companies that are the key players in Turkey's defense industry market: ASELSAN, HAVELSAN, and ROKETSAN. Senesen underlines the status of similar foundations, the Defense Industry Development and Support Administration Directorate (DIDSAC) and the Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF) that are designed to manage and finance modernization of the defense industry through "taxes levied on alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, petroleum products, lotteries, and corporation taxes." (Senesen, 2002:399-400).

Lastly, concerning the widening public deficit over the years, the military has managed to keep its largest share in the central expenditure despite, first, the deteriorating public budget balance, and second, reducing spending in the areas of education, health and public investment (Demir, 2005:676, Senesen, 2002). Moreover, until 2003, all military spending was exempted from the auditing of the Turkish Court of Accounts.

All in all, the socio-economic presence of the military in the civilian realm exemplifies its privileged position in a way to distort the separation between the two realms. Karabelios (2008) and Parla (1998) summarize the situation as follows:

> "… the aggrandizement of the financial power of the armed forces led to "an organic integration of military capital with private capital, both local

and foreign, blurring [thus] the lines between the private and public economy, and between the economic and the political." (Karabelios, 2008:467; Parla, 1998:49)

5.4.3 Militarism in academic inquiries in Turkey

Given this centrality of militarism in Turkey, one would expect it to come up frequently in the ideational lexicon of the country. However, militarism has been absent for a long time from public discussions, and that it enjoyed "a lack of academic curiosity and scrutiny" (Altinay, 2004:2; Insel and Bayramoglu, 2004). Altinay brands this understanding that militarism and its militarization process are seen as normal, legitimate, given and inevitable as "methodological militarism" (Altinay, 2009:1248). She argues that militarism, even when it was addressed, was dealt with only in terms of the military-civilian relations in politics and democratic institutions.[21] There were some others in the past that followed a similar path, and they did not take a critical approach towards Turkey's military coups. (Altinay, 2009:1249) There are certain patterns identifiable in most of these studies.

Altinay starts by showing that some of the scholars wanted to argue that "the coup had valid reasons". Calling it as "one of the most common examples of methodological militarism in studies about military-civilian relations", this attitude, Altinay says, is about shifting the blame of the coups and that of military's interference to politics on the civilians (Altinay, 2009:1249). By presenting the cups as inevitable and legitimate, these scholars moved to remove

[21] For main studies of this kind, please see W. Hale, (1994). *Turkish Politics and the Military*, New York: Routledge; M. Heper and A. Güney, (1996)."The Military and Democracy in the Third Turkish Republic," *Armed Forces and Society* 22:4, 619-642; J. Salt, (1999). "Turkey's Military 'Democracy", *Current History*, 98:625, 72-78; T. Jacoby. (2003)."For the People, Of the People and By the Military: The Regime Structure of Modern Turkey," *Political Studies*, 51, 669–685; T. Demirel, (2004). "Soldiers and Civilians: The Dilemma of Turkish Democracy," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40:1, 127-150; Ü. C. Sakallioglu, (2004). "Problems of Democratic Governance of Civil Military Relations in Turkey and the European Union Enlargement Zone," *European Journal of Political Research* 43:1, 107-125; A. Güney and P. Karatekelioğlu, (2005). "Turkey's EU Candidacy and Civil–Military Relations: Challenges and Prospects," *Armed Forces and Society*, 31:3, 529-549; E. Aydinli, N. A. Özcan and D. Akyaz. (2006), "The Turkish Military's March Toward Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 85:1, 77-90;

militarist tendencies that come with all coups. Altinay gives many examples and a few of them are listed below:

> "The fact that the army often takes over in politics is because political system often gets blocked. When the army sees that the country's main causes are not attended to or worse, when the country is at the brink of civil war because of irreconcilable approaches, it was inevitable for it to carry out the coup." (Heper, 1987:161, in Altinay, 2009:1249)

> "It should be noted that if the army did not intervene on 27 May [1960], the public order would continue to deteriorate and could lead to civil war." (Hale, 1996:105) … "If politicians were more decisive and acted quickly and in unity… this coup's necessity and legitimacy would cease to exist. However, in reality, they did neither, therefore the military coup [12 September] became an inevitable consequence." (Hale, 1996:208, in Altinay, 2009:1249)

A secondary theme in methodological militarism is the rhetoric of "the coup was a success" (Altinay, 2009:1250). This group of authors make reference to the coup's establishment of 'order', ending 'terror', and its neutrality in carrying out the coup:

> "Military rule between 1972-3 succeeded in ending terror and establishing order and law to a certain extent in daily life. Therefore Turkey was saved from political violence and had some space to breathe." (Hale, 1996:182, in Altinay, 2009:1250)

Altinay also underlines that researchers who consider coups to be successful have tended to downplay their 'unintended' or 'unanticipated' consequences, in the sense that the violence that people had to suffer during the coups has been ignored (Altinay, 2009:1251).

A third theme is "Turkish coups are different than other coups", and it relates to the army returning to "democracy" by handing the power back to the civilians rather than promoting its own interests (Altinay, 2009:1252):

> "The Turkish army has generally been the guardian of democracy as suggested by the original Kemalism, and it has tried to act rigorously and neutrally while performing this duty. This is what distinguishes the Turkish army from the ones in either Latin America or the Middle East." (Heper, 1987:161, in Altinay, 2009:1252)

The fourth theme Altinay suggests is to render a special status to the Turkish army by playing up either the idea of the military-nation discussed above, or the suggestion that different than other places in the world the Turkish

Republic was founded by soldiers, or that the army is the most trusted institution by the public in Turkey, or that Turkey's location brings along special geopolitics that necessitate the presence of a strong army (Altinay, 2009:1252). However, Altinay argues that this mentality seems to miss the arguments that most nation-states are founded by wars and militaries, and that militaries often are the most trusted institutions in many countries (Altinay, 2009:1251-2). Moreover, the people's trust in the military does not have to necessarily mean that they sanction its role in politics. According to an opinion poll conduced in November 2007, when asked whether "sometimes a military regime would be better than a civilian government to solve country's problems," 23 percent of the respondents in Turkey said "yes," while 64 percent replied "no." (Kuru, 2012:42)

In sum, militarism is defined by the Turkish Language Institution as "the phenomenon of the military in a country being extremely powerful" and "the tendency to solve every problem through military means, and thus prioritize armed forces".[22] With the importance adhered to the idea of the military-nation, the sacredness and the givenness of the military service, the promotion of the discourse of external threats and internal enemies such as 'terrorism' (Sevinc, 2006:298), and militarization of the socio-economic life, Turkish case seems to be under the influence of both military and militarism. The military has been powerful in politics until very recently, and also the prioritization of military solutions to non-military problems confirm this assessment. Although changes, which will be discussed in the next chapter, have been introduced to the role of the military to the civilian sphere, militarism is still strong in Turkey. However, this does not mean that militarism goes unchallenged or unchanged. Discussions around anti-militarism, the rising anti-war rhetoric in the civil society, and specifically the CO initiative should be seen as steps developing towards the disruption of the givenness of militarism in Turkey. These issues are discussed at length in the next chapter.

[22]http://www.tdk.gov.tr/index.php?option=com_gts&arama=gts&guid=TDK.GTS.5287463f4c5312.76988404, accessed on 18 October 2013.

CHAPTER 6

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION IN TURKEY AS EMANCIPATORY-CRITICAL SECURITY THINKING AND PRACTICE

"Taking on responsibility knowing it will weigh you down
Freedom is a possibility only if you're able to say no"

The Whitest Boy Alive – 1517

"These versions of violence
Sometimes subtle, sometimes clear
And the ones that go unnoticed
Still leave their mark once disappeared"

Alanis Morissette - Versions Of Violence

As previously mentioned, this study treats conscientious objectors (COrs) as agents of first, the idea of security without militarism, and second, the idea of security as emancipation in line with the CSS meaning of the word. The argument built in this chapter follows a two-step move. In the first part, it explains how the CO movement and COrs relate to the idea of security without militarism in Turkey, and by doing so how they make a move to remove the limits placed by militarism on how to think about and practice security. This first step repeats the question of most critical approaches to security: whose security and what/how security? In line with this thinking, the COrs represent the agency of:

- First, those who refuse the primacy, supremacy, and exclusivity of the state as *the* referent object of security, who wish to extend the referent object status to a multitude of entities, the individual being the first and

foremost, and those who seek to broaden the agenda of security to also non-military sectors;

- Second, the achievement of security without military means and tools, thus also refuting the privileged role of military institutions as the sole security provider, the security doer and the security thinker/expert.

The second step of the argument follows the achievements of the first one and further builds on it. When the boundaries placed by militarism on how to think about and do security are removed, *currently existing* alternative ways of theorizing and making security in Turkey become more visible. In framing the CO movement and the COrs as agents of the idea of security as emancipation, this study presents COrs as active parties to a cause that claims political presence, a right to have a say, and a chance to invent themselves in the way that they wish to it happen. By seizing the right to act politically and talk in matters that the state does not normally allow them to speak on, COrs not only highlights the possibility of adopting a different understanding of security in Turkey, but they also attempt at transforming the way politics are seen and are dealt with in the society. They thus deepen security and ways of behaving politically simultaneously.

This second step also relates to how the movement of CO came out as a dissatisfaction with the way security is thought and done in Turkey. Building on the theoretical tools gathered by the previous two chapters on emancipation and acts, this section will match the empirical case of the COrs in Turkey with the terminology of security as emancipation and practical agency in critical security studies. The line of argument unfolds in the following moves:

Militarism in Turkey functions as what Rancière calls *the police*, the accumulation of all the governing principles that decides on the range of the conceivable roles in the system, to whom these roles can be granted and to what extent and in which sense they can speak. This has been explained above in the previous chapter on militarism in Turkey.

Presuppositions that every Turk is born as a soldier, or that military service is a sacred given are *reifications* and command armours of

unquestionability. The Constitution and the law that regulates conscription obligate every male citizen with serving in the military and receive the appropriate training. The social contract embodied in the constitution is said to have already resolved all social negotiations and in the end defined all male citizens as soldiers, in a pre-designed role of masculinity that excludes alternative forms such as homosexuals, the disabled, and women.

Militarism as the police also does not leave room for other than those involved in the militarist institutions to speak about the nature of compulsory military service by banning any form of critique to that institution by penalising them through the crime of "alienating the public from military service" (Turkish Penal Code Article 318) or "weakening the resilience of the army". Therefore, those wishing for a different kind of politics, for a different way of thinking and doing security are rendered to the status of *the uncounted* because their voice is silenced first through the disciplinary restraint of the militarist common sense, and secondly by the regulatory boundaries of the law.

Faced with that *dissatisfaction*, members of the society with anti-militarist motivations feel the need to come up with *new and creative ways of acting*. They first refuse their imposed identities, i.e. a natural born soldiers, or a natural born mother to produce sons for the military, and then second they take up political agency through acts of dissidence in the form of non-violent direct action, for emancipation from militarism. In doing so, they affirm the existence of their political voice, thus become *political subjects through active equality* without waiting around for the state apparatus' confirmation.

They create *ruptures* in the police system because those who are not supposed to speak up do speak up in a non-violent manner. Their request for a non-militarist security understanding exposes *the wrong*, i.e. the presupposition that militarism is a natural given in Turkey. Visible cases of *disagreement* arise because their demands for a non-militarist way of life is "conceived" and "framed" as attempts to alienate the public from the military service and then weaken the resilience of the state.

Their actions are of *tactical nature*. Even though they march for and request the recognition of the right to CO, they make it clear that this is just a

strategic choice, a tool, in the way towards the removal of all the facets of antimilitarism from their lives. They thus fight against a *process*, i.e. militarism, that manifests itself in life in various ways, but cannot be physically touched. Tactical action is adopted because although the dominant process, militarism, has penetrated so many layers of social life, it is still not visible as a monolithic bloc.

Lastly, by broadening the referent object of security to a multitude of entities such as the individual or the nature or the people, and by also including non-military sectors in their demands, COrs disseminate the idea of *security without militarism.* Simultaneous to that is their becoming political subjects on a topic where they used to be not allowed to talk or comment. They thus strive towards emancipation and prioritize the existence of the possibility of everybody to *choose their own destiny and their own self-realization path* as they deem fit. They thus become agents of the idea of *security as emancipation*.

6.1 Conscientious Objection: Definitions

First there is a need to define the concept of CO for the sake of clarity. The objectors are the citizens who, for different reasons, refuse to fulfil their military service duty imposed upon them by the state. It is the refusal of the individual to receive training in the military, carry weapons and use them, on the basis of her/his moral choices, religious beliefs, philosophical views or political convictions (Baskent, 2010:98). Amnesty International's official definition is as follows:

> "Amnesty International defines as a conscientious objector any person liable to conscription for military service or registration for conscription to military service, who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuses to perform armed service or to any other direct or indirect participation in wars or armed conflicts. This definition is equally applicable to persons who refuse to serve in all wars and to persons who refuse to participate, directly or indirectly in particular wars or armed conflicts." (MDE 15/49/99:2)

The first organized reaction to military service was realized by the Quakers movement in the 17th century (Bozatay, 2011:153). Then the first specific law on the CO was passed during the World War I in Denmark, which was followed by Britain (Zurcher, 2010:45). CO is a comprehensive phenomenon in the sense that it covers a multitude of concerns from philosophical motivations to political convictions (such as being an anarchist, socialist or liberal), or religious beliefs (such as pacifist Christians, Muslims or Jehova's Witnesses). That is to say CO is in a way a flexible and liberating concept because it is allows people to travel to different ideational and empirical avenues as their conscience pleases. It is an inclusive line of thought because it does not discriminate between reasons of objecting to the military service. As one of the main activists in the Turkish CO movement says: "We do not question anybody's reason for CO. We accept everybody as a COr if that person identifies her/himself as such." (Oguz Sonmez, personal interview) One of the most known figures of the Turkish CO movement, Tayfun Gonul, similarly describes the CO only on the basis of the person's conscientious convictions:

> "In cases where serving in the military and joining the army is against the person's conscientious convictions, no power can impose on them the obligation of 'compulsory military service'. This right is called the right to 'conscientious objection', which has become widespread after the Second World War and has gradually become an integral part of human rights regime. The right to conscientious objection is a necessity of natural law and the Turkish Republic has implicitly accepted it by signing the Human Rights Declaration…" (Gonul, 1989)

However, there are levels of CO in terms of the consequences one has to face after the declaration of the objection. While CO to compulsory military service in Turkey is prosecuted and the subjects might face long-term prison sentences, other levels of objection that derives from grounds of conscience might not receive the same severity. An example might be given from the compulsory course on "religious and moral knowledge" offered in elementary and high schools in Turkey. Some parents object to their children getting this education on different grounds: non-Sunni families, non-believer families, or

parents who simply do not think this course is a good idea for their children.[23] While the consequences of this disobedience are somewhat less harsh because the conflict is confined to the school ground and then often turn into a battle of law between the Ministry of Education and the family at hand, the implications do not match those that result from the CO to military service. Although both objections stem from a philosophy of refusal, they require different levels of political determination in terms of the punishments involved (Baskent, 2010:55).

Going back to the last sentence in Amnesty's definition of COrs, it refers to 'selective objectors' who refuse to participating in military training or any military activity in certain situations while not having any opposition or staying indifferent in others. An example of this is the Kurdish Conscientious Objection Movement in Turkey [*Kürt Vicdani Ret Hareketi*] which refuses to serve in Turkish Armed Forces, but do not object, for instance, the armed struggle of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). For the scope of this study, selective objectors are excluded because their stance does not sit with a consolidated anti-militarist ethos, and are then not suitable to be classified as agents of the idea of security without militarism. The CO movement and the COrs covered within this study also participate in the debate on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, yet they object to every kind of militaristic choice or glorification in that sense.

CO is a commitment, usually publicly declared, for the objector to bind her/himself not to participate in different processes of the militaristic existence. In that sense, it does not amount to a strike, where the protestors are negotiating the conditions under which they would join the military (Baskent, 2010:102). It is a solemn declaration to completely stay away from the militarist system. This element of declaration and making the act of objection visible in public through an open, accessible and audible statement is an important element in the political quality of the CO. More on that will be discussed further below.

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[23] "Zorunlu Din Dersi Yine Mahkemeden Dondu" [Compulsory Course on Religion Overturned Again by the Court], 17 December 2010, http://www.bianet.org/bianet/egitim/126667-zorunlu-din-dersi-yine-mahkemeden-dondu, accessed 16 February 2013.

The literature on the objectors is concise when compared to many other marginal groups upon whom social and political scientists have been writing, like immigrants, religious or ethnic minorities. Most of the early information departs from discussing the religious or secular grounds out of which conscientious objection has developed as a notion to refuse to serve in the military in Western countries, especially during the World Wars and the Vietnam War.[24] There are some other studies analyzing the emergence of conscientious objection as a political right in general[25] or in some countries, mostly Western

[24] C. Cohen, "Conscientious Objection", Ethics, 78:4, 1968, 269-279; Central Committee for Conscientious Objectors, Handbook for Conscientious Objectors, Philadelphia: Larchwood Press, 1968; E. R. Cain, "Conscientious Objection in France, Britain, and the United States", Comparative Politics, 2:2, 1970, 275-307; D. Malament, "Selective Conscientious Objection and Gillette Decision", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1:4, 1972, 363-386; D. A. Peppers, "War Crimes and Induction: A Case for Selective Nonconscientious Objection", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 3:2, 1974, 129-166; M. Wiberg, "Grounds for Recognition of Conscientious Objection to Military Service: The Deontological- Teleological Distinction Considered", Journal of Peace Research, 22:4, 1985, 359-364; N. I. Agoy, "Regulating Conscientious Objection in Norway from the 1890s to 1922", Peace and Change, 15:1, 1990, 3-25; C. Eller, Conscientious Objection and the Second World War: Moral and Religious Arguments in Support of Pacifism, New York: Praeger, 1991; N. Ingram, "The Circulaire Chautemps, 1933: The Third Republic Discovers Conscientious Objection", French Historical Studies, 17:2, 1991, 387-409; W. von Bredow, "Conscription, Conscientious Objection and Civic Service: The Military Institutions and Political Culture of Germany, of 1945 to the Present", Journal of Political and Military Sociology, 20:2, 1992, 289-303; R. W. Goossen, Women Against the Good War: Conscientious Objection and Gender on the American Home Front 1941-1947, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997; M. Levi, Consent, Dissent and Patriotism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; L. Bibbings, "Images of Manliness: The Portrayal of Soldiers and Conscientious Objectors in the Great War", Social Legal Studies, 12, 2003, 335-358; H. E. Aarek, "Conscription and Conscientious Objection in the Experience of Norwegian Friends", Quaker Studies, 11:1, 2006, 7-33; M. Matthews, Smoke Jumping on the Western Fire Line: Conscientious Objectors during World War II, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006; A. Schinkel, Conscience and Conscientious Objections, Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2007.; J. M. Glen, "Secular Conscientious Objection in the United States: The Selective Service Act of 1940", Peace and Change, 9:1, 2009, 55-71; R. C. Neufeldt, "Tolerant exclusion: expanding constricted narratives of wartime ethnic and civic nationalism", Nations and Nationalism, 15:2, 2009, 206–226.

25 G. A. Ruesga, "Selective Conscientious Objection and the Right Not to Kill", Social Theory and Practice, 21:1, 1995, 61-81; E. Marcus, "Conscientious Objection as an Emerging Human Right", Virginia Journal of International Law, 38, 1997, 507-545; M. F. Major, "Conscientious Objection to Military Service: The European Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee", California Western International Law Journal, 32:1, 2001, 1-32; A. J. Sciarrino and K. L. Deutsch, "Conscientious Objection to War: Heroes to Human Shields", BYU Journal of Public Law, 11, 2004, 59-104; K. Musalo, "Conscientious Objection as a basis for Refugee Status: Protection for the Fundamental Right of Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion", Refugee Survey Quarterly, 26:2, 2007, 69-78; H. Takemura, International Human Right to Conscientious Objection to Military Service and Individual Duties to Disobey Manifestly Illegal Orders, Berlin: Springer, 2009

liberal democracies[26], yet none of these two group of literature makes a specific link to the security setting of their societies. Although not necessarily following the exact theoretical points formed above, the most interesting studies have been conducted regarding Israeli conscientious objectors. They mainly trace how agents in the Israeli society have been trying to break away from their highly militaristic hegemonic structure by seeking the right to selective[27] or total conscientious objection through judicial mechanisms and public movements in the political arena.[28]

Before moving on to the analysis of what the aims of the COrs are, one should set the context within which the CO movement flourished in Turkey. That is to say, the empirical reality of the Turkish political arena and the normative imaginary needs to be examined briefly so that militarism's layers of penetration into the social life can be comprehended. This is the aim of the next section.

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26 C. Mellors and J. McKean, "Confronting the State: Conscientious Objection in Western Europe", Security Dialogue, 13, 1982, 227-239; C. C. Moskos and J. W. Chambers II (eds.), The New Conscientious Objection: From Sacred to Secular Resistance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993; Conscience and Peace Tax International, Military Recruitment and Conscientious Objection: A Thematic Global Survey, 2005, www.cpti.ws; I. Baudisch, "Germany v. N. Decision No. 2 WD 12.04", The American Journal of International Law, 100:4, 2006, 911-917; Gary Wilson, "Selective Conscientious Objection in the Aftermath of Iraq: Reconsidering Objection to a Specific War", The International Journal of Human Rights, 12:5, 2008, 665–688.

27 Selective conscientious objection refers to cases where individuals do not object serving in the military, but objects to do so in specific wars or territories, or when they think the conflict is not a just one to participate in.

28 R. Linn, "Conscientious Objection in Israel During the War in Lebanon", Armed Forces & Society, 12, 1986, 489-511; M. Keren, "Justifications of Conscientious Objection: An Israeli Case Study", International Journal of the Sociology of Law, 26, 1998, 121–137; S. Helman, "Negotiating obligations, creating rights: Conscientious objection and the redefinition of citizenship in Israel", Citizenship Studies, 3:1, 1999, 45-70; R. Linn, "Soldiers with Conscience Never Die-They are Just Ignored by their Society. Moral Disobedience in the Israel Defense Forces", Journal of Military Ethics, 1:2, 2002, 57-76; Special issue on Conscientious Objection, Israel Law Review, 36, 2002; R. Friedman, "The challenge of Selective Conscientious Objection in Israel", Theoria, 53:109, 2006, 79-99; A. Gaynor, "Neither Shall They Train for War Anymore: Reflections on Zionism, Militarism, and Conscientious Objection", NWSA Journal, 18:3, 2006, 181-190; H. Aviram, "How Law Thinks of Disobedience: Perceiving and Addressing Desertion and Conscientious Objection in Israeli Military Courts", Law & Policy, 30:3, 2008, 277-305.

TIMELINE OF TURKISH CO MOVEMENT

- Late 1989-1990: CO entering the political discourse of Turkey, although through very niche publications – Tayfun Gonul and Vedat Zencir's declarations
- Gonul and Zencir prosecuted in civilian courts, Gonul getting a prison sentence, to be later turned into a fine, Zencir acquitted
- January 1993: The first organized, institutionally supported CO declarations: Six declarations organized by Association of War Resisters (SKD)
- July 1993: International Conscientious Objectors' Meeting held in Izmir
- Fall 1993: SKD closed down by governor's office, Osman Murat Ulke (Ossi) going to Germany to receive training with peace activists
- December 1993: A TV debate featuring COrs on HBB is prosecuted for alienating the people from the institution of military service. Civilians prosecuted in military courts for the first time for CO purposes.
- September 1995: Ossi declares his CO on international peace day
- 1996: Ossi's first imprisonment for "insubordination". Ossi later meets Mehmet Bal, a former nationalist, in prison, who will later be released to resume his military service
- October 2002: Mehmet Bal sends his declaration of CO to media sources while he is a soldier
- 2004: Istanbul Militurizm: A form of activism where participants are taken around the city to visit militarist buildings, monuments and symbols and engage in discussion, street theatre and workshops. First female COrs declare their objection
- May 2005: Izmir Militurizm: Ferda Ulker and Ercan Aktas CO. Mehmet Tarhan imprisoned.
- January 2006: European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) sentences Turkey on the case of Osman Murat Ulke vs Turkey, on the violation of Article 3 of the European Charter of Human Rights: freedom from torture
- May 2008: CO movement among high-school students
- 2009: The establishment of the CO Platform for Peace
- 2009: Inan Suver declares his CO
- 2010: Kurdish CO movement gains momentum. (is out of this study's context because it is not an anti-militarist movement. They can be classified as selective objectors)
- 2010: Nationalist and Islamist COr: Muhammed Serdar Delice
- July 2011: ECHR sentences Armenia in the case of Bayatyan vs Armenia for violating Article 9 of Europ.Charter of HR, i.e. freedom of expression and conscious.

6.2 Security Aims of Conscientious Objectors: Anti-militarism, multiplication of referent objects and the primacy of the individual's life

This section aims to present the case of the CO as an agent of the idea of security without militarism, which consists of two main interrelated tenets. While the first one focuses on the acceptance of a multitude of referent objects and agenda items for security, and the glorification of human life, the second one is characterized by an opposition to violence in all forms, but mainly to war, which threatens the lives of individuals. Therefore, the first and the second elements are inevitably interconnected:

1. A non-statist conception of security that prioritizes human life and humanity above all other concerns and extends the security agenda to include a multitude of referent objects and issues such as the environment, gender or religious or ethnic communities. The state and its armed forces are seen as the main source of insecurity. This is what Altinay also calls as resisting to define themselves as members of states, resistance to contribute to discriminations based on gender, race, class, ethnicity and religion, and resistance to participation in the destruction of nature (2004:107-8).

2. An anti-militarist and anti-war stance that is characterized by non-violent and non-hierarchical action, pacifism and mutual trust.

6.2.1 Anti-statist conscientious objection: promotion of a multitude of referent objects

For the first element, a common theme in the CO activism and the CO declarations is the refusal to hurt or kill another human being, or to receive training in exerting violence on another individual. There is a great deal of

emphasis on each human being's right to live, free from pain and torture. The COrs argue that this right is often exercised against the apparatus of the state which forces individuals to participate in the army, receive the training to use arms on other individuals and possibly end up doing some actual fighting if the person is deployed to the areas where the Turkish state is clashing with the PKK. The declarations also bring up a variety of different referent objects for security, such as the nature or the Kurdish community in Turkey, who are claimed to be hurt and oppressed by the state's national security policies.

On the issue of the human being appearing as the main referent object, one of the COrs suggest the following:

> "I am objecting to the compulsory military service, whatever the motivations are: faith, ethnic identity and commitments, sexual orientation, economic reasons, or simply "I do not care about anything, I am myself and nothing else is binding on me." (Ercan Aktas, personal interview)

Another objector makes a strong emphasis on the sacredness of every individual life from an upsetting experience he went through:

> "[referring to an incident that happened in Lice, Diyarbakir where a fourteen years old girl, Ceylan Onkol, was killed because of a bomb shell that fell near her while she was cattle herding[29]] The mother of Ceylan Onkol said she picked up pieces of her daughter and collected them on her skirt. This moved everybody. I was so moved by that speech that I declared my CO by associating myself to Ceylan Onkol. "I am 15 yrs old, a young person at the same age with Ceylan Onkol, and I do not want my friends, my peers to die. Therefore, I will not serve in the army because I don't want Ceylan to die. I will not be a part of this militarist culture." (interview with Ilayda Erkus in Ogunc, 2013:168)

The common trait in the CO declarations that base themselves in the refusal to kill human beings is that they take the individual to be the ultimate referent object and celebrate what they see as alive and valuable in each human being:

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[29] "Lice'deki patlamada ölen Ceylan Önkol soruşturmasına takipsizlik" [Decision not to prosecute on the case of Ceylan Onkol who died in the explosion in Lice], Zaman, 5 April 2013 http://www.zaman.com.tr/gundem_licedeki-patlamada-olen-ceylan-onkol-sorusturmasina-takipsizlik_2074220.html, accessed on 5 April 2013.

> "They want me to learn how to kill. … My stance on this is very clear, because I will not kill human beings. I am ashamed of the existence of killing human beings as a thought. Every individual is more alive, more related to life and more substantial than any values created by humanity."[30]

When the declarations of CO that primarily concern themselves with refusing to kill other human beings, the following idea map appears in terms of the density of the words used: "(I)-consciously-refuse-(to)-kill-any-human-(beings)"

Figure 1: Word cloud of declarations for human being as a referent object

In a similar situation Hayri Kamalak, a COr whose son, Volkan Kamalak died in his unit during his military service and was assumed to have committed suicide[31], said:

> "Everybody should ask themselves this question: The love for your country or the pain you suffer because of losing your child? We have to make a decision here. Which country, which homeland? Whose state is this? Whose government is this? Who serves whom? We are letting twenty years old young men die in the name of love for our country. Who will be accountable for this? … While I am in pain because of having lost my child, there is no place for love to the country where human life is not

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30 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=45401&ArsivSayfaNo=1, accessed on 4 March 2013.

31 "Sehit Dernegi Kisla Olumlerini Sorguluyor" [The Association of Martyrs Questions Deaths in the Barracks], Radikal, 10 September 2012, http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/pinar_ogunc/sehit_dernegi_kisla__olumlerini_soruyor-1099781, accessed on 27 December 2012.

> valued. First of all, there should be a society that values human beings and life." (Interview with Hayri Kamalak in Ogunc, 2013:182)

The statement by Hayri Kamalak gives a clear example of why COrs get motivated to declare their objection and puts up a resistance against the supremacy of military values and institutions. Kamalak makes it clear that the common understanding of sacrificing one's child in the name of his love for the country, which is part of the discourses of martyrdom, takes the state as its referent object because the life of the individual is spent in "the defence" of the state. Kamalak wishes to give the message that if human life is not valued and appreciated in a given setting, then the fact that the state is preserved becomes meaningless. Therefore, he makes a move to place the human being as *the* referent object of security while undermining the exclusivity and supremacy of that of the state.

It is in the recent years of the CO movement that objectors with Islamic concerns began to gain more visibility. The non-statist perception of security and the primacy adhered to the human life as the referent object is also inherent in their expressions. For example, a pundit, Sami Kocaoglu, from Islamist daily *Yeni Safak* wrote the following:

> "Theoretically speaking, in this country where the large majority is Muslim, conscientious objection should be supported the most by those who belong to the religion of Islam. For Muslims, getting this right is not only about 'freedom', but it is also a religious obligation. … [especially] if your holy book holds killing somebody in vain equal to killing entire humanity, and that taking somebody's life would cause an eternity in hell… and that is why the right to conscientious objection concerns first and foremost devout religious Muslims of this country.[32]" (Goker, 2008:333).

Another interesting case was brought forward by a COr who is a Protestant pastor. In his declaration of CO, he problematized the primacy of the military sector in that the money that is spent by Turkey on armament highly exceeds the expenditure on societal dimensions:

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[32] "Vicdani Ret Hakki ve Islam, [The Right to Conscientious Objection and Islam], Yeni Safak, 28 May 2004, http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=1&ArsivAnaID=19872, accessed on 14 January 2013

> "I must express my objection to the militaristic understanding, which has dominion over all civilian institutions and organizations in Turkey, first and foremost over the society in general and the education system. The fact that more resources are being spent on arms purchases compared to the amount spared for human needs such as education, health, culture and arts is very problematic. I also oppose to the internal war/clash that has claimed thousands lives along with the armament race." (Kerem Koc, personal interview)

Kerem's declaration makes two important references: first putting the society and human beings' as key referent objects of his worldview. This relates to the idea of security without militarism as he clearly opposes to the control of civilian institutions by militaristic understandings. He also wishes to depose army's primacy in budget expenditure in a way to make these resources allocated to the benefit of the entire society. This attitude can be commonly found in other CO declarations as well. For example, a woman COr, Kumru Gok, stated that her objection was for "all the creatures of the world.[33]" Oguz Sonmez, a long-time CO activist and the person who maintains the website of the Association of War Resisters in Turkey states that they even have "documentation on animal rights, just to give an example of how comprehensive their movement is." (Sonmez, personal interview)

The theme map on the basis of the declarations that had religious overtones is as follows: "(I)-consciously-object-against-military service-(and)-war-(as)-(a)-Turkish-Muslim-(and)-there is no-other-(authority)-(than)-Allah."

[33]http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=62882&ArsivSayfaNo=1, accessed on 14 January 2013

Figure 2: Word cloud of declarations with Islamic considerations

Similarly, when the Izmir Association of War-Resisters was found [IKSD], it did not limit its operation only to the promotion of the right to CO. According to the members of the association, it worked on a variety of issues such as "the democratization of the country, human rights, environment, racism, sexism and discrimination, relations with Greece, the Cyprus issue, and especially the ongoing war resulting from the Kurdish problem" (Usterci and Yorulmaz, 2010:169). The Association aimed at presenting a firm anti-war stance by calling both sides of the conflict into non-military ways of conflict resolution through the slogan of "neither military service nor the mountains!"

An example of that referent object diversification was provided by the COr Ahmet Karayay. In his CO declaration his central referent object was the environment and the insecurity he deemed urgent was the degradation of the nature and the Earth:

> "I find it highly irrational that world's nations and governments spend millions of dollars worth of resources on arms proliferation and strengthening of the armies instead of sparing these resources for the rehabilitation of our aged planet that cannot reverse the damage humanity has been inflicting upon it for centuries. As human beings, we have to be

well informed about preserving this planet because we do not have an alternative place to live.[34]"

Kerem Koc also makes a reference to his objection of the internal war going on in Turkey, which is the Kurdish issue. In that, he is not immersed in a complete anti-militarist understanding because he also expresses that he is actually not against the idea of an army as "We need to be protected against attacks from outside [of our borders]" (Kerem Koc, personal interview). However, still, he places a strong emphasis on the fact that many people lost their lives during the fight against the PKK.

The position adopted by women COrs also presents a close match with the idea of security without militarism as they wish to open up the security agenda and enlarge it so that it no longer turns a blind eye towards the hardships imposed on them by militarism. Cynthia Cockburn argues that feminists have been suggesting a variety of ways to undermine militarism even in the processes of daily life: "withholding defence taxes, protesting against military contracts for university research, protesting the use of toy weapons in nursery school", and also the CO (Cockburn, 2010:x-xi). The ensemble of all these forms of resistance point to something more than just refusing the compulsory military service, but it amounts to providing a new meaning to security from a feminist perspective. The same is easy to trace in women COrs' declarations and statements.

In a nutshell, the position of women COrs can be easily contextualized as a move to place the issue of gender, and the problems of women in Turkey into the security agenda. Altinay identifies certain main topics among women COrs, two of them relevant to the anti-statist security agenda that comprises of multiple referent points and issues (2010:97-9):

1. "Conscription should be understood as part of the larger militarist structure and CO as an opposition to militarism and all its faces, and not simply an objection to compulsory military service."

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34 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=45401&ArsivSayfaNo=1, accessed on 14 January 2013

2. “Whether perpetrator or victim, subject or object, women play many different roles within a militarist structure and that CO means the rejection of these roles.”

For instance, Merve Arkun, one of the most active women COrs, explains her situation as one of the bodies and identities over which militarist policies are conducted. By rejecting her position within the militarist system, she believes that she is also exposing the pre-defined roles allocated to different sexes by the militarist understanding. The chapter will later discuss the policies of rejecting imposed identities and inventing new ones through active agency. However, it is still important to point out that Merve’s way of pointing at an alternative reality where gender norms are more relaxed, breaks away from the limits of militarism:

> “[militarist culture’s policies] are usually conducted over women, as in the example of regarding women as the “honour” or “purity” of the homeland and the soldiers are protecting its borders. Or conferring to women the role of producing male subjects to go and serve in the army, or not to cry after their children who die during their duty.” (Merve Arkun, personal interview)

The theme map of the declarations that concentrate on a gender awareness is as follows: “(I)-as a woman-declare-(that I)-object-(to)-the military’s-war-(and)-woman-being-its subject-(and)-the state-(being)-masculine”

Figure 3: Word cloud of declarations with gender awareness

This is one of the unique characteristics of the Turkish CO movement: the inclusion of women who "have begun to explore how they can pry apart conscientious objection from the privileging of masculinity." (Enloe, 2009:87). Declaring themselves as a COrs despite the fact that they, as women, are not conscripted, is a sign of the Turkish woman CO activists' wish to tackle militarism at every corner of their lives. As it has been introduced in the previous chapter, there is a close link between gender and militarism in the sense that the latter prescribes certain roles to certain gender roles. Turkish woman CO activists, in turn, reject being "the mothers" or "wives" or "girlfriends of soldiers". By challenging militarism's gender roles, they also object to the sacredness of military service and its privileging of the hegemonic masculinity as the most effective type of citizenship.

Going back to the issue of being anti-statist, the interviews held with COrs share a common story about how the objectors view the concept of security in Turkey. This common theme underlines the trade-offs and undemocratic principles that the state makes its citizens accept in return for the provision of security.

It would be methodologically easier to take a paragraph from the interviews and examine it in detail:

> "The existing conception of security is unfortunately focused on military means and arms. But still, I would not think that the protection of my personal life, or the preservation of my existence is about security. Not with the way the concept is currently discussed. Because when uttered, security reminds me of state's conception of security, i.e. armed forces and secure borders. It is so because security as a concept has a lot to do with the notion of borders, with us being in constant fear and having to live in that state. It is the notion of 'we are surrounded by enemies', 'we need to be protected from the man on the street because they are thieves or murderers'. That is why the police and the army exist. This is where the state reproduces itself. And it is so prevalent even in the minimal level. The state produces a security problem by claiming that in order for you to survive, you need to seek shelter in the state because you are scared and vulnerable. Actually the state does not create a security problem, it creates a problem of existence." (Merve Arkun, personal interview)

As it can be inferred from the first sentence, the current security understanding in Turkey is viewed too much focused on the role of the military

and military means by the COrs. What Merve hints at here is that the state, in the name of providing security to its citizens within its borders, gets to regulate life as it wishes. It can allocate the roles as it pleases, like in the case of males becoming soldiers and women confined to the function of producing more children for the maintenance of the system. It can determine how flexible the roles are or are not, as in the example of forcing gay men into revealing their sexuality, deeming them "rotten", unfit for military service; or as exemplified in the case of women who are the 'honour' or the 'purity' of the homeland, vulnerable and in need for protection. It is through the provision of security that the state and the army enjoy a privileged position in terms of commanding power and being subject to checks and balances. According to Merve, the state, far from generating security, creates a problem of existence because its existence undermines the security of some of its citizens.

A similar case was argued by Ercan Aktas who draws attention to the binary choice citizens have been told to choose from: "democracy vs security". He argues that people tend to go for the security option, because "it follows the classical modernist paradigm of first security, then democracy, rights and justice" (Aktas, personal interview). What Ercan believes is that this kind of security turned into violence and oppression for the rather critical members of the Turkish population. That is why he tries to "avoid and minimize his interaction with the state as much as he can and he says the space where he does not have to deal with the state is where he feels most secure" (Aktas, personal interview).

Mehmet Tarhan, another COr whose case made into the mainstream media because of the interesting combination of his identity as a Kurdish gay Alawite objector, also takes on this debate of security vs rights and order. In problematizing the value of order that is created at the expense of justice and rights, Tarhan builds on his own personal experience of being tortured at the military prison. He makes an ironic comparison to expose the shortcomings of a trade-off understanding between rights and security:

> "I suppose the most secure places in the world are prisons, but does that mean we should turn the entire world in a big prison? Armies might provide security, but we need to ask the question of at what cost. We need

> to have a serious discussion on whether living in security paranoia and keeping these institutions and continuing the war really make sense or not." (Tarhan, personal interview)

Ersan Ugur, another well-known COr, makes an analogy between the state's creation "myth" of security with a ghost. When he remembers his lessons in elementary and high-school, his teachers would say: "Turkey is surrounded by internal and external enemies", and this, according to Ersan, is the example of how the state "implants" the fear that human beings in the society are not safe, so that they will accept the "state's oppressive regime that consumes their material and manpower resources…" (Ersan, personal interviews). He adds:

> "…the state convinces you that you need security, and expects your silent obedience in return for its security provision. Or it expects you to be content with the amount of information the state offers. If the state says we have enemies, then we have them, no need for questioning. … If we were living in a communal life, the we would cope with the problems of co-existence, but as long as the state exists, this will never happen."

Again in Ersan's formulation, we see that the humanity is taken as a referent object while state's monopolization in knowledge production and reifications, as in the case of being surrounded by internal and external enemies, are found highly problematized. This is the same argument made in the previous chapter on emancipation where the uncounted, who is not accepted to have a voice in politics, refuses to stay content with this situation and proposes new beginnings. The strategies and the practical agency of the COrs and the CO movement will be investigated in detail further below. Suffice to give one last example here for the moment for the same argument: Serdar Tekin, another CO activist who was in the movement since the foundation of the first association of war resisters in 1992, makes a similar observation:

> "Security for me is the decrease of the state and its control. Freedom starts where individuals tell the state to just stop. That is why popular events such as Gezi Park rallies are incidents that promote my security." (Tekin, personal interview)

6.2.2 Anti-militarist and anti-violence conscientious objection: rejection of "war" and hierarchical orders, and promotion of non-violent action

The second tenet of the idea of security without militarism on the part of the COrs manifests itself in their refusal to engage in the "war", by which they refer to the multi-level and multi-intensity clashes between the Turkish state and the PKK, and also by their rejection of taking and giving orders in a way to fully adopt ways of non-violent action in their lives. Naturally, being opposed to the "war" requires also not wanting to kill fellow human beings, but some of the COrs are specifically against any violence exerted in the areas where Kurdish citizens are residing. As one COr pointed out, these activists believed "there had been so many deaths and so much pain in these regions that going to the army would actually mean to legitimize these." (interview with Kemal Acar, in Ogunc, 2013:186)

A typical example can be given from a COr who explicitly identifies himself as Kurdish and announce his objection first and foremost on the grounds of not wanting to carry out violence against "his own people":

> "I refuse to be a soldier of this state which oppresses and denies my people. I refuse to shoot a bullet to my people. I refuse to burn our villages. I refuse to be a child killer. To go to the military service is to approve of the murders and the pain, it is to preserve the rule of the dominant class. It is to provide legitimacy to this dirty war that the state wages against its Kurdish population. I do not approve of these killings, of this pain and of this dirty war. That is why I am refusing to be a soldier. I refuse it because I believe it will contribute to the creation of the peace environment." (Acar, in Ogunc, 2013:185)

When we break this statement down, one of the first elements is the objection being associated with his Kurdish identity and a refusal to be a part of the Turkey-PKK fightings. By refusing to be a soldier, many COrs expressed that they aimed to drain the manpower of either sides of the conflict, even if it means one person less in the fight.

Yavuz Atan, one of the other well-known COrs and a member of the core team who established the magazine "Amargi" back in early 1990s in Izmir, points out that indeed one of the first concerns they had when they launched the

magazine was to make the statement that there was a ‘war’ in ‘Kurdistan’. In line with Kemal Acar’s argumentation, Yavuz states that the declaration of their CO was also intended to set a clear position for themselves against the war and that by not cooperating with the state and its militarist tool, they would not be responsible for the continuance of the war (Atan, personal interview). The same uneasiness ran strongly among the members of the Association of War Resisters, when it started the campaign called “We are facing *the war*”, in order to produce visibility, discourse and activism on the Kurdish issue (Aktas, personal interview). Merve, in the same way, emphasizes the importance of her wish to make a statement on the “war” as a priority in her CO declaration. She explains one of her main motivations for the declaration as undertaking “a political move to stop the war by rendering CO visible” (Arkun, personal interview).

The theme map that arises out of the analysis into the declarations that emphasize the refusal against the “war” on the Kurdish issue is as follows:

“(I)-(as a)-Kurd,-object-against-the state’s-Republic of Turkey’s-war-(and)-Roboski-(and)-the military-(through)-(my)-free-conscious.”

Figure 4: Word cloud of declarations with Kurdish agenda

The second common theme running through most of the COrs is the importance adhered to the concept of the non-violent action. While some of the COrs started their political activism by taking part in illegal organizations or in guerrilla movements, they in different ways went through an ideational

transformation and in the end came out to eliminate all relations of domination and violence and endorse acting non-violently.

One of the most active CO activists, Coskun Usterci, went to prison for getting involved in armed leftists organizations in pre-1980 period. He explains his own journey from seeing violence and aggression as legitimate ways of generating change to rejecting them through his transformation in prison. Coskun believes that the reason why the public did not support the 'revolutionary left' in the aftermath of the 1980 coup was that the society must have found the constant state of armed struggle between the left and the "fascists" quite disturbing:

> "Politics that were carried through violence must have narrowed the public sphere so much that the public was de-politicized… We realized that the society was alien to us because violence influenced it very negatively." (Usterci, personal interview)

Halil Savda went through a very similar process after he went to prison on the charges of being a member of the PKK. He states that because of the torture and physical mistreatment he was subjected to in prison, he came to realize that "supporting or taking part in violence did not promote societal justice, freedom or equality." (Savda, personal interview) On the contrary, Savda believes that PKK's long-lasting military resistance resulted in the consolidation of nationalism and in ultra-nationalist feelings to gain a stronger base in the daily social life. When he was taken to his military unit, he said that he was not going to do his military service. When asked why he would not, he replied that he was a COr, and was thus against violence, and that he did not want to be part of a military organization (interview with Savda in Ogunc, 2013:95).

The counter-violence stance is by no means reserved to those who participated in processes of violence in the past. For example, Ayse Girgin, a woman COr, contextualizes her refusal of violence as follows in her declaration:

> "I am sorry to be living in a world where authority, hierarchy and violence are dominant elements. We encounter these features of militarism everyday as various forms of violence…. As a woman, I refuse

> all relations of domination, gender discrimination, and all forms of violence. I refuse violence with all its faces."[35]

There was an interesting case back in October 2006 where the commitment of the COrs to anti-violence was tested. A Turkish citizen, Hakan Ekinci hijacked a plane as he was being expelled from Albania. He wanted to give a message to the Pope that he was Christian and thus did not want to serve in a Muslim army.[36] Ugur Yorulmaz, one of the first COrs gave an interview to a Turkish daily about Hakan Ekinci's actions and said that "[his] actions of violence through hijacking a plane and endangering hundreds of lives cannot be condoned by the philosophy of the CO because the latter refuses every kind of relations that sanctions dying or killing." (Goker, 2008:317)

Being against violence includes, but also goes beyond physical violence. Most of the COrs, while they make it explicitly clear that they are opposed to any form of material violence, some of them also feel the need to underline more subtle ways of exerting violence. For example, Ercan Aktas states that he finds any institution, be it the state or the PKK, that is "hierarchical, based on orders and commands and asks your obedience as inherently violent" (personal interview). Ersan Ugur, on the other hand, thought taking or giving orders did not go along with his personality and that was one of the reasons why there was no way he could go and join his military service (personal interview). Similarly, Vedat Zencir, the second COr in Turkey, declared that he was determined and resolved not to let violence or taking and giving orders into his life because they were in direct contradiction with his personality (interview with Zencir in Ogunc, 2013:35). Enver Aydemir, a COr with Islamic motivations said in a parallel way that he could not stand somebody stronger than him, with more resources and authority, imposing something on him (interview with Aydemir in Ogunc, 2013:121). Yavuz Atan suggested that he was against every kind of arrangement

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35 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=36286&ArsivSayfaNo=1, accessed on 4 February 2013

36 "Askere gitmemek icin ucak kacirdi! [He hijacked a plane in order not to go to the military service], Radikal, 4 October 2006, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=200520, accessed 25 March 2013.

that creates domination over something and disrupts its internal balance, and that is why he did not want "particular institutions to be created for the establishment of order and then start hurting and killing people under that authority." (Atan, personal interview)

This notion of non-violence was also directly integrated into the line of activism of the CO movement. As many other social movements, CO activists employed strategies of civil disobedience to gain visibility and attention, but their point of distinction was also the way they organized their own association and the decision-making processes. Ferda Ulker, a feminist COr, argues that from the very start of the anti-militarist CO movement, they believed violence should be questioned and transformed in all its forms, including the working method of their groups:

> "In fact, all meeting methods and ways of decision-making that human beings use involve violence. Generally, there are a few people in these meetings who know the subject matter and they set the terms of the debate while and the others merely follow. Or not everybody gets a say in these meetings… We were looking to devise and exemplify ways which would enable everybody to participate equally in the decision-making process." (interview with Ulker in Ogunc, 2013:108)

One of the decision-making methods that the movement frequently used and promoted was consensus. Usterci claims that all relations in these gatherings include "a majority-minority relationship, where the latter's rights are not always upheld." (Usterci, personal interview) However, consensus in that sense initiates a different kind of decision-making protocol to bypass that power relation. It also, according to Usterci, involves "social learning through socialization and active listening on both sides." The end result, although it takes long to reach, always comes out satisfactory to all parties involved as everybody is entitled to break the decision-making process through the institution of veto. In that way, non-violent action decided through consensus should not cause any further injustice as it genuinely attempts to solve a confrontational situation by striking a balance between the actors coming to the table as equals (Baskent, 2010:22). Through the invocation of the veto and preventing the debate from going any further, every individual is entitled and equally obligated to resist injustices.

6.3 Conscientious Objection as inventing oneself: security as emancipation

The previous section argued that the CO movement and the objectors themselves act as agents of the idea of security without militarism. The focus was on the multiplicity in referent objects of security, a broader non-militarist agenda for security concerns and a general anti-war anti-violence stance in social life.

Although this alone indicates the existence of an already present understanding of a different security in Turkey, these arguments alone will not make the COrs a genuine agent of Critical Security Studies because the latter's point of merit is found in its equalization of security with emancipation and in a deepened understanding of security that points at the links between the political structure, the power it allocates to actors, and who gets to do in terms of security thinking and understanding. This section, in turn, analyzes Turkish COrs under the lenses of emancipation defined as becoming a political subject, inventing oneself and removing the barriers that prevent individuals from achieving what they would freely choose to do.

The disposition of this section is as follows. First, the emphasis on the need for self-realization, having a say in political matters, and the chance to personally invent life's potential is located among the COrs as agents of the idea of security as emancipation (Booth, 2005:181). Secondly, COrs will be framed as Rancière's "the uncounted" because of the militarist system not allowing them to express opinions on an issue they attribute great importance. Their voice is silenced because first trying to even think about not going to the military is not part of the common sense imaginary, and secondly it is prosecuted by law. The next step is to contextualize the agency of the CO by looking at what kind of activism they employ, what acts they appeal to and what methods they use in becoming a political actor in the security debate. These forms of agencies together form the acts of dissidence, and they express the limits of the dominant script and exposes them under scrutiny (Huysmans, 2010:4) while they also assert a natural demand of those to whom the right to have right is due (Isin,

2008:18). COrs will be analyzed under three categories that match the theoretical tools of emancipation:

- *dis-identification with imposed identities by militarism*: that is the first step of creating who we might become (Tanke, 2011:44), through the public declarations of the refusal to comply with reifications, i.e. human made objects and situations becoming a factual given (Huysmans, 2006a:4);

- *re-naming and re-claiming a new identity, starting oneself anew through the ruptures created*: developing new ways and creative responses because the current context does not allow critical voices (Isin and Nielsen, 2008:4, White, 2008:46)

- *becoming political subjects through the declaration of the CO and the continued everyday resistance to display the wrong* (Hewlett, 2007:86, Rancière, 1999:39): starting counter socialities and active subjectivities (Drexler, 2007:10, Lugones, 2003:15) that exercise ordinary, less spectacular daily life influence rather than emphasizing on great events (Bleiker, 2000:174)

This section also deals with the strategic and also tactical nature of the CO's acts of dissidence as their activism deals with both an immense abstract structure, militarism, that has worldly manifestations, and also with the immediate target of abolishing compulsory military service. This part of the section will also analyze the process of subjectification, i.e. becoming new and creative, politically active entities, of the COrs, which in the end gives them the chance to live the life they desire and assert their active equality.

While the first refers to the case of a tactical act, the second is a clear example of strategic behaviour because there is an identifiable agent that asks for a policy change (the CO movement) and an identifiable target (conscription) (Bleiker, 2000:212). It will be argued that the communicative action of the COrs often falls short of what they set out to accomplish because of the disagreement by the army or the state. However, that does not amount to disregard the

achievements of their agency, but is rather an analytical tool into assessing the empirical reality of Turkey.

The chapter will close with an evaluation of the transformative influence that CO can be argued to have generated. This assessment is done through the coupling of interviews with COrs, with a thorough social media analysis, mainly built on Twitter, that comprises of a content examination. The latter aims to identify how CO has been understood by the larger population and to see if there has been any change in the public opinion as to how CE is perceived. The achievements will be discussed in a processual understanding where a multiplicity of factors bring about a certain amount of transformation, partially generated by the effect of the agency of the COs. It is a non-substantialist, non-causal, non-rapid transformatory process that involves a certain period of time and the input of many different actors (White, 2008:44, Guillaume, 2007:744-5).

6.3.1 The emphasis on self-realization in the CO understanding

In line with Booth's argument on emancipation being a process enabling self-empowerment and self-realization, many CO declarations and personal stories seem to flag up the significance of it is an expected consequence of defining oneself as a conscious being to demand liberty to be able to take independent decisions and exercise conscious judgment. It might also be the case that because the nature of the military order removes any avenues of self-expression and aims at the monotypization of the recruits, the COrs make a strong case for the channels stay open for their self-expression, thriving and realization.

For example, Yavuz argues that his desired state of security is where "people can co-exist without having to live under control or oppression while selecting various lifestyles they might want to fulfil" (Atan, personal interview). For Mehmet Tarhan, embarking upon a personal adventure of self-realization characterizes our existence. His conceptualization of self-realization sits well

with that of CSS because Tarhan adopts a sophisticated understanding of fulfilling one's potential in life:

> "Self-realization, nowadays, might be understood as career-development and similar other concerns, but it actually refers to making ourselves present and existent as a whole with our rights. The counter-argument for militarist security has often posed the question of 'what if they attack your mother or your sister, what will happen then?. I can understand the rationale behind this question, but security does not comprise of only these concerns, it also includes the condition where my mother and my sister live in freedom. In other words, security is freedom, it is emancipation." (Tarhan, personal interview).

What these two personal statements share is a commitment to be empower the individual with the ability to choose a lifestyle for her/himself and being able to also maintain and sustain it through the free exercise of human rights. When asked about what being secure entails for him, Ercan Aktas replied without hesitation that that secure space for him was where he could express what he thought freely and where he could become more collective through other like-minded people (Aktas, personal interview). Again the reference to freedom of expression and the liberty to choose a certain lifestyle, in that case living collectively with other peers, is what marks these CO stories get in line with the concept of emancipation. According to Ercan, the use of his right to object was his way of exercising freedom to deem something as right or wrong as a human being. Another COr, Mehmet Od, pointed out the same point in his CO declaration: "I believe life is meaningless if the individual is not able to follow what she/he feels, misses and imagines."[37]

Halil Savda makes a very similar comparison by calling his CO as a personal journey for him, "an attempt for self-purification". As mentioned above, Savda was a former member of the PKK, but he later renounced the use of violence for political purposes. However, he states that:

> "…no matter how hard you resist against militarism, it is promoted and imposed on a daily basis so strongly that you cannot escape. That is why the attempt to resist is what matters here and it has single-handedly been the

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37 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=36286&ArsivSayfaNo=1, accessed on 30 April 2013.

expression of all my personal views." (interview with Savda in Ogunc, 2013:102)

On the option to choose among different ways of lifestyles, the first COr Tayfun Gonul had pioneering observations even as early as in 1989. In his statement where he explains why individuals might choose to become COrs, he puts forward a variety of reasons, all of which point to a different path one might want to follow in her/his lifetime:

"People's conscientious convictions can be formed by a multitude of factors. For example, some might refuse to take part in a military institution or use weapons because they are Christian, Buddhist, Taoist, or Jehova's Witnesses. Or it can be non-religious and that politically speaking, one can be against all kinds of violence, all kinds of hegemony and the institutionalization of violence as a pacifist. A radical Muslim who considers himself to be a soldier of God might not want to serve in the "secular" state. … One does not always need to have radical political or religious views. There could be those who think the army should exist and that it is useful, however military service does not get along with his personality, and that the army should comprise of professionals… It can also be caused by practical reasons: not wanting to part with your partner, not wanting to take a break from your career or leave the business you just established…." (Gonul, 1989)

Self-realization and the fulfilment of one's potential does not always have to come from, traditionally speaking, a liberal perspective because having the ability to choose among a variety of lifestyles can be materialized in so many different conditions. Given that argument, COrs with Islamic motivations also refer to the importance of not having to being bound by certain impositions of the militarist system. This can also be covered by the desire to self-realization if that is what the individual wants to realize in her/his life. For example, Inan Mayis Aru, in his CO declaration, states that: "I will not put humiliating ranks on my shoulders… I will not be bound to any orders apart from Allah.". Similarly, Enver Aydemir, another religiously motivated COr argues that the compulsory military service amounts to the limitation if the human will in its most basic sense:

"[Making people] die, kill, commit a certain period of their lives for something [like the military service] is completely playing God. These choices intervene with Allah's prerogative. That is why compulsory military service does not have a place in Islam." (interview with Enver Aydemir in Ogunc, 2013:126)

Kerem Koc, the COr who is a Protestant pastor serving in Antalya, places his choice to fulfil his life as a father and a spouse, and also the accomplishment of his duties as prescribed by the Bible, as primary reasons of his objection:

> "Military service prevents me to carry out my natural duties as a spouse and a father. It is stopping me from making a living for my family, being with them to protect them, cherish them and love them. This would put not only me, but also my spouse and my child in material and emotional precarity. Moreover, it would keep me away from sparing Sundays as a day of worship for God…" (Kerem Koc, personal interview)

Therefore, there is a strong element of self-realization and personal fulfilment in undertaking the CO. The stress placed upon the individuality of the act comes from the centrality of the notion of conscience in the objection (Toker Kilinc, 2010:61). It stands for the individual's move to take control of her/his own life in order to preserve his moral integrity through the declaration of a certain position vis-à-vis the system. Therefore, by becoming resolved to demand the right to live the life they desire, and by declaring this desire through the expression of an objection to do things in a certain way, individuals display the need they feel to act in accordance with their own conscious. This condition of non-compliance with the rules of the system, or the police in Rancière's terminology, exposes a mismatch between the individual's conscious convictions and the legally enforced duties created by the system (Toker Kilinc, 2010:62). If the case is such that the law does not only allow these 'disobedient' individuals to express their discontent, but also prosecute them as in the Turkish case, then what options do the dissatisfied parts of the society have? The next section deals with this question by first treating the COrs as the demos, the uncounted in Rancière's language, who contest the exclusive eligibility of the state authority to speak on matters of militarism, and thus exposes the fundamental problem, or wrong, in the denial of their voice to be heard (Tanke, 2011:44, Davis, 2010:81).

6.3.2 Conscientious objectors as the uncounted: individuals aspiring to speak politically

As previously mentioned, the concept of demos, or the uncounted, defines the existence of a collective that contests the assumptions about who belongs, what capacities they possess, and what roles they can occupy" (Tanke, 2011:44). It challenges the assumption that some 'qualified' people are eligible to speak on certain matters while the others are simply not. The latter's voice is silenced, ignored or punished for having a voice in the first place. The uncounted, in turn, targets this fundamental wrongness by activating their naturally possessed active equality and acting to expose this wrongness by appealing to a universal, which is in that case the freedom of expression and conscience.

The case of the CO in Turkey fits well into this framework for two main reasons. First of all, it is very difficult to bring up concerns and problems pertaining to the military as an institution because military service occupies an important place in the social imagination, as it has been discussed in the section on signs of militarism in Turkey. To repeat some of them, the myth of "every Turk is born a soldier", or the emphasis on the ahistorical military character of the Turkish nation, and the fact that male citizens are not able to secure good jobs or are not seen as viable candidates for marriage prior to the completion of their military service are among many symptoms. Therefore, there are deep-running convictions within the social imagination and the common sense of the Turkish society that take compulsory military service as a given (Toker Kilinc, 2010:71).

In addition to this auto-censorship and peer pressure that might be inflicted by those around us, there are further safety measures placed by the state on the unquestionability of the army's supreme position. The Turkish Penal Code (TCK) Article 318, which used to be Article 155 before 1 June 2005, explicitly forbids activities that could discourage citizens from completing their military service. With the recent changes introduced to it on 11 April 2013, Article 318,

which regulates the crime of "alienating the public from military service", currently reads as:

> "Those who advise or encourage others, who are yet to undertake their military service, in a way to deter them from undertaking this service or make those who are doing their military service become deserters, will be sentenced to prison from six months to two years. If the act is done through press or publications, then the sentence is increased by half."[38]

This article has been used so frequently against many activists, authors, publishers and journalists that it has become another way of making people involved exercise auto-censorship well before the activity reaches the public level. For example, Dogan Ozkan, an activist from the Commission of CO, the Association of Human Rights, Istanbul branch, was prosecuted and sentenced to five months in prison because of his statements that alienate the public from military service. His sentence was then turned into a fine. Another example was a correspondent from the daily *Ulkede Ozgur Gundem*, a pro-Kurdish publication, who had to cope with seven trials asking a total of twenty-one years of imprisonment for having published news stories and interviews in the issue of CO (Goker, 2008:297). The editor of the same daily and its owner were also taken to court. Columnist Perihan Magden had to face a lawsuit asking for a three-years sentence because she wrote a piece entitled "CO is a Human Right" in 2005 in a magazine.

One of the earliest examples of the use of this article against members of the media was in 1993 when a private TV channel HBB broadcasted a program where the chairman of the Association of War International (SKD), Aytek Ozel, and a COr, Menderes Meletli, were interviewed. The producer of the program and the reporter were tried in military court upon the indictment of the office of the General Chief of Staff for alienating the people from the institution of military service. While the reporter and the producer received two months prison sentence, the chairman of the SKD was given a year and fifteen days.[39] It was

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[38] http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=1.5.5237&sourceXmlSearch=&MevzuatIliski=0, accessed on 28 May 2013.

[39] For more examples of these trials, please see http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=6&ArsivAnaID=41609

also striking that a civilian penal code article, which had not been used for over sixty years, was put within the scope of the military judicial system now and led to civilians being tried in military court (Usterci and Yorulmaz, 2010:170). This practice was later ended in 2003 by making it no longer possible for military courts to try civilians. The nature of the military courts with judges wearing military uniforms must have seemed intimidating for civilians, some of whom already expressed their objection to become soldiers, and thus were not suitable or legal to be tried in a military court to begin with. Military court hearings are conducted by two military judges and one officer, who does not have to have an education in law. The composition of the court with the presence of that officer might lead to the violation of the right to a fair trial because of that member's lack of judicial education (Baskent and Atan, 2010:107).

Article 155 and 318 were not activated only for members of the media. It also targeted COrs themselves because of their public declarations. In fact, Tayfun Gonul and Vedat Zencir, the first two COrs in Turkey, were tried by Article 155, but in a civilian court. While Vedat was acquitted, Tayfun received a three-months prison sentence, which was later turned into a fine. After the HBB ruling, Vedat Zencir says as the SKD, they went to speak to lawyers to challenge the legality of the trial of civilians in military courts, but none of the practitioners seemed to see this as a problem (interview with Zencir in Ogunc, 2013:41). The invocation of TCK 318 affected the majority of the cases of CO declarations.

The exercise of Article 155 and 318 thus acted as a strong deterrent against either potential COrs who were intimidated by the hardships they might have to endure once they made their declarations, or members of the media or academics who wanted to promote the cause of CO, but just could not face the consequences.

Coskun Usterci, who was an active member of the SKD back then explains the fear that followed this series of events as follows:

> "People understood that declaring their CO came with a heavy price and this prevented them from coming out in the open and confirm their COr status. They would often argue, yes I would like to be a COr, but I am not a hero. So they would rather stay as evaders or deserters, but still support our anti-militarist work." (Usterci, personal interview)

Another early COr Ugur Yorulmaz made the same observation: ""[on matters of censorship in the media] For something to be discussed, it first needs to be known. How is that possible?" (Altinay, 2004:111) Ersan Ugur, himself a COr, who actively worked on the awareness campaigns of the CO movement as a digital designer, shares the same observation:

> "In order for CO to become more public, we need to be able to use the media efficiently, but of course we do not have such a capability. Because members of the press themselves had very unpleasant experiences, like investigations and lawsuits being filed against them because they had written on CO… It was during Mehmet [Tarhan]'s detainment that some MPs from the European Parliament and some human rights organizations wanted to issue a statement to support him. Since I was the designer, I had to call newspapers to ask if they would publish it. After consulting their lawyers, they all refused. … We went to ATV's building and protested in front of it by biting on toy dogs in an attempt to attract attention and become newsworthy. The guy with whom we were in contact in the channel was later fired for 'organizing and assembling us there.' (Ersan Ugur, personal interview)

Halil Savda, who is also being currently tried on the charges of alienating the public from military service, says:

> "TCK Article 318 should be abolished as soon as possible. I should not be prosecuted or imprisoned for criticizing the army or militarism, just like in the case of criticizing the government."

In sum, COrs are a clear example of the uncounted by virtue of their inability to speak and be heard on a subject matter they wish to make an impact. Then, if they are not happy with the way things are done, and that they are not even allowed to talk about it, their situation is characterized with dissatisfaction with the existing alternatives to act. Therefore, the CO movement the COrs felt the need to develop and implement new ways of acting and creative manners of reacting. Hoping to create a rupture within the given (Isin, 2008:25), they moved to apply strategies of everyday resistance where they moved small marginal things, probably for the first time and made an impact (Walters, 2008:192). The next section deals with the contextualization of CO agency in terms of acts of dissidence.

6.3.3 CO agency as acts of dissidence: public declarations, acts of dis-identification and re-naming, launching new starts

Since acts are the process of doing, the transcendent qualities of an action, while action itself is always something done (Isin, 2008:25), it will be logical to look for acts of dissidence in the ensemble of the cases where there is a process of interfering. In a nutshell, this section examines the activism of the CO in terms of the ruptures it creates, the methods it uses during that, and the transformation it generates around and within itself.

6.3.3.1 CO as a public declaration: from the individual to the public sphere

The first step in starting one's own agency is to move from the individual space into the public space through an open act of declaration or expression. This is one of the theoretical and practical necessities of CO because the commitment not to be involved in militarism's machinery and not go to military service needs to be communicated in order for it to become a recognized act of civil disobedience. If one was to remain in the personal space and did not make her/his objection public, then there would be no way of telling the difference between an evader/deserter and a COr. In terms of its legal consequences, Hulya Ucpinar, a CO activist and also the lawyer of Osman Murat Ulke, highlights the criminality of taking your objection to the public level:

> "The problem starts at the point where the moral conviction, whose consequences exclusively concern that individual's private life, enters the public sphere as an expression of that person's free will. This moral conviction does not constitute a crime as long as it remains hidden inside that individual. As soon as it starts to interact with the public sphere, however, the moral conviction becomes a crime that leaves the individual susceptible to prosecution and punishment." (Ucpinar, 2010:242)

This was the discussion Vedat Zencir had with his flatmate Orhan Atis, who struggled a lot to not to serve in the military, and was in the end given a certificate of unsuitability on the basis of psychological unfitness. Vedat suggests that Orhan's case was not CO as "he eventually compromised with the state" and

did not do his military service based on medical reasons (interview with Zencir in Ogunc, 2013:36). Vedat's point relates to a situation where after the public declaration, the COr becomes much more visible and out there. This results in that person having to be prepared to put up a resistance very frequently because with the commitment undertaken publicly, your responsibilities also for the movement increase (interview with Zencir in Ogunc, 2013:37).

Similarly Mehmet Tarhan underlines the importance of the declaration that distinguishes the COr and attaches her/him to a larger network:

> "If you do not see CO as a political phenomenon, then you simply do not turn up for your military service without needing to make your declaration public. The problems I encounter because I am a COr are not different than those of a deserter or an evader … The network you gain out of your declaration might also provide you protection. Imagine a deserter getting caught, he will not enjoy the support of his network and might thus have to endure a worse treatment." (personal interview)

The declaration of the CO is a solemn vow where the person promises not to undertake certain actions no matter what happens. Ferda Ulker calls this "declaring one's own ability to cope with whatever fighting against militarism might cause in one's life" (interview with Ferda Ulker in Ogunc, 2013:109). Given the definition of conscious as a concept, CO has a strong individualistic character without any doubt. However, the moment the declaration is made, the act then moves into another arena and gain a political status. This is because of two reasons: one, it becomes a part of or buys into the discourse of the national or international CO movement; and secondly it usually comes with the expression of the desire for another kind of world. For the first one, Cynthia Cockburn (2010:x) sees the link that is constricted between the COr's declaration as an act of self-salvation, and its integration into a wider culture of organization as something conducive. As Mehmet Tarhan suggests, as a political subject, the CO says that she/he dreams of a different kind of politics, and then she/he promises not to be part of the army and eliminate other militaristic elements from their lives (interview with Tarhan in Ogunc, 2013:65). If politics is seen as a technique to transform the world, then CO amounts to a political act in a militarized country such as Turkey. If it were not a political act, then the COr

would not be different than an evader or a deserter (Serdar Tekin, personal interview, Baskent, 2010:34-5).

What does the declaration amount to exactly in a country like Turkey where problematizing military service might cause prosecution and punishment? In cases where the freedom of expression is limited, CO will automatically constitute a double crime. First of all, the laws that ban military service from being problematized reach the declaration before it is actualized in the action of not going to the military service. This is the double criminality of the CO: alienating the public from military service by TCK 318, and actually not going to the military service and be punishable by Article 1, Law 1111 regulating conscription in Turkey: "Every male citizen who is a national of the Turkish Republic is obligated by this law to do his military service".[40]

Moreover, in 1990s when CO declarations were not so many in number as they are today, the declaration of the CO was an open-ended commitment in that there was a great deal of unpredictability waiting that person, simply because there had not been so many examples before. COrs did not know which one of them would be detained and prosecuted, and which others would have a more relaxed life being ignored by the state. Halil Savda interprets the latter option as a deliberate policy of the military so that the COr does not gain any further visibility through media campaigns and organized network protests (Halil Savda in Ogunc, 2013:98). Osman Murat Ulke, or as he is known by his nickname Ossi, is remindful of the same fact, and his observation is really interesting as his case was the first big one that resulted in a cycle of imprisonments, then the case being taken to the European Court of Human Rights, where the Court came up with the concept of 'civil death', meaning the COr having to live constantly with the fear of getting arrested, serving his time, getting sent to his unit, refusing and getting imprisoned again. Ossi remembers the phase just before his declaration as follows:

> "Auto-censorship would be an understatement. To decide for the CO and declaring it is an act which would shape the rest of your life. Moreover,

[40] http://www.asal.msb.gov.tr/kanun/1111_as.kanunu.pdf, accessed on 3 March 2013.

> back then, we did not have so many precedents, therefore we did not know the extent of the pressure we would be subjected to, there was no maximum that we could foresee. That is why we had to face up to being deprived of all the securities of a "regular" life." (Baskent and Atan, 2010:112)

Altinay, and many other COrs, argue that even though the declaration of the CO might be a very risky and daring act, it might still translate into one of the most liberating and emancipating experiences of political agency (Altinay in Ogunc, 2013:7). In addition to the organizational network that the declaration might win for the COr, it also represents the person's objection to the deprivation of her/his will. The declaration is a self-affirmation that the COr refuses to become an object and acts as an active subject in politics (Savda in Ogunc, 2013:101). It also provides the COr a space to seek shelter in and survive without contradicting oneself. Coming from a PKK background, Ercan Aktas expresses his relief when he wanted to renounce violence, but could not decide where he could stand until he became familiar with the concept of CO:

> "…militarism is a problem for me. Violence and the concept of the state are problems for me. If I am criticizing this, then I cannot be a part of it. CO in that sense was such a relief to me. It enabled me to clarify where I stood and express myself. That is how I have been living since 2004 without contradicting myself."

In a similar manner, Ersan Ugur suggests that with the declaration the COr moves to a much more legal area because you simply make your reasons for not going to the military service public and from then on, you are out there:

> "You actually move to a more legal area, because instead of trying to come up with thousands of ways to evade the service, you just say that you are not going and here are my reasons. You are out there. I believe by doing so you shift from an area that was hidden to a place where you are visible and exposed, thus more secure." – "The day I made my declaration, I put forward my legitimacy, and I do not care if there will ever be a legal arrangement for the CO. But naturally, for the society to get de-militarized, CO should become a legal right available to everybody."

The commitment and obligation that comes with the declaration of CO are by no means small. First of all, it is something that you need to renew from time to time, and also "it does not go away once you make your declaration public. It stays with you." (Ugur Yorulmaz in Altinay, 2004:110). The lifetime

effects are felt by the COrs in many dimensions of the social life. For example, Vedat Zencir compares it to taking a life-time mortgage because of the practical everyday difficulties that the COr has to live with: "you think that you can get caught any minute, you cannot go apply for a driving licence… I had to live for ten years in Antalya as a fugitive. You live in constant paranoia." (Zencir in Ogunc, 2013:43)

The state makes use of technological tools and surveillance systems to trace the existence of the COrs and that is why objectors usually retreat to a space where they interact minimally with the state apparatus. This evasion ranges from not having a bank account to not using free medical care services, from not having a mobile phone number under your name to not being able to get ID card. For a long time, the names of the COrs would come up on background checks that the police and the gendarmerie would conduct by using a common database. It was only after Ossi's case in 2006 that this control mechanism was abolished because the ECtHR decided against Turkey and criticized the constant fear that COrs would have to live through once their cycle of arrests, imprisonment and military court hearings started. Until then, the declaration of CO would cause COrs like Ercan to "never dare to be late to go home or travel between cities during night time as there was the problem of appearing as a military service evader in ID based background checks" (Aktas, personal interview). Yavuz went through the same experience of constant paranoia and a high level of alertness: "… whenever you are in a new place, you bring up the navigation system and check the streets which look safe to get home through the security checks" (personal interview).

Mehmet Tarhan also underlines the magnitude of the problem by listing the hardships that the COr faces almost everyday:

> "You become dependent on others, but when they release you from prison, they let you go and expect you to go abroad illegally. But outside is also another prison… I have neither a passport, nor an ID because if I go to the Directorate of Civil Registration and Nationality, I would be arrested. You cannot benefit from health care, can't receive mail or send out a parcel. You do not have a bank account. The place you live in is rented on your partner's name, and your phone is registered under your sister's name. If you fancy someone, you have to come clean because

> tomorrow you can be arrested and make the national news." (personal interview)

That is also why most COrs end up in economically very dependent positions because they are not able to find regular employment and will have to explain their situation again to every new employer. Ercan's case in this sense attests to how narrow the options are for a COr after the declaration:

> "After I got out of prison, I sent my CV to the national recruitment agency. I received so many letters and interview invitations, I went to all of them, but nothing happened. Then somebody in the end told me: Ercan, I am coming from a leftist background myself, I am a socialist too. I would advise you not to try these things in vain. Don't try to find employment like that. Go and try to figure out what you can do on your own. Then with my family we started the convenience store business. … I now completely ruled out working for somebody. It is simply not going to happen, as they also inquire about your military service status." (personal interview)

In sum, the declaration of CO is a political act targeting the public opinion. If it was only aimed for the army's audience, then one could simply write a letter and inform his military unit. Morover, after the declaration, the machinery of the everyday life restarts and could encounter the COrs unexpectedly everywhere. COrs are people who find integrity in life through the disintegrated and irregular nature of their own lives. As Mehmet Tarhan said to an army officer in a TV show: "Thanks to you we have figured out every way possible to live semi-legally in this country." CO in that sense ruptures the everyday ordinariness of the social life.

The next step in the argument is how the declarations and activism are received by the *police*. According to Rancière those who are comfortable with the status quo cannot understand the claims of the uncounted because they do not recognize the other party's voice as having a voice or making sense (Rancière, 2011:2). As it was mentioned above, it is not a debate or discussion where the parties involved present their ideas and work it out in a communicative way. It is rather the dominant authority seeing the uncounted as not worthy of being heard and not capable of understanding and vocalizing its own interests. This is the case of the disagreement and these sites are important to locate because they then necessitate the uncounted to devise and implement new ways of agency and activism in order to appeal to a larger universal value in the society because they

are simply not able to act, vocalize and be heard their discontent with the status quo.

6.3.3.2 Cases of Disagreement

This sub-section is intended to exemplify occasions of disagreement where the message that the uncounted is trying to disseminate cannot be heard or understood by the dominant power, and as a result of that, the latter frames the critical agency in different ways to distort its original message and the points of its discontent.

Merve Arkun gives an example from one of the protests conducted in front of the prison where Inan Suver, a recent COr, was being held. The description of the scene and the interpretation of the CO activists here by the military authorities alone attest to the distorting power of militarism in one side understanding the message of the other:

> "[during protests against Inan's imprisonment] …soldiers surrounded us and they pointed their guns at us because a ranking officer told them to do so. We continued to protest, but then were asked to stop, but we did not. Then a soldier ran up to me, took my papers away and tore them apart, including our banner. It was a very interesting moment. While we protested the imprisonment of our friend, who declared his CO in the name of peace, they first put him in jail and then they threatened us with their guns outside. … It was a very funny, satirical scene, you announce that you want peace and you find soldiers pointing their guns at you in return." (personal interview)

The theory of acts of civil disobedience such as the declaration of CO and the subsequent activism that supports it is based in the feeling of empathy on the wider public (Baskent, 2010:51). The protestors are hoping here to evoke a feeling of "this might as well happen to me too", in a way to hope that the message is received clear and direct. However, as the case above exemplifies, the state of disagreement is significantly high among the parties involved. This was also the case with the protest of Bergama villagers who objected against the activities of a gold mining firm in their village, or the Saturday Mothers who stage a sit-in in central Istanbul every Saturday for an hour to draw attention to their children's fate, who got lost during state custody since early 1980s. These

other activist groups were also blamed to be either PKK terrorists or traitors (Baskent, 2010:51). The same situation happened to Ilyada Erkus, the youngest COr in the world at the age of fifteen, who was suggesting that there should be no state for humanity's sake. He says people would call him a terrorist and because terrorism's first connotation in Turkey is PKK, they would also ask him if he were a member of the organization (Erkus in Ogunc, 2013:167). When he was putting up stickers for the Labour Day, 1 May at his schools, he was then called a 'revolutionist' who didn't believe in Allah. Ilyada says he was really surprised by this because the question he was expecting was why he was putting up stickers for 1 May in the first place (Erkus in Ogunc, 2013:167).

A similar case of disagreement was at play when the Association of War Resisters (SKD) was founded in Izmir in 1992. One of the aims uttered in the statute of the association was to be against militarism. However, as Vedat Zencir states, the police department who was supposed to confirm the statute of the Association asked this point to be removed from the text because Turkey did not have any militarist establishment anyway, so this clause was really unnecessary (Zencir in Ogunc, 2013:35). This is a classical example of the disagreement situation because one of the crucial concerns of the SKD was deemed unnecessary because the police department really did not understand or did not want to acknowledge what the Association wanted to communicate here.

In one of the cases of a nationalist-Islamist COr, Muhammed Serdar Delice, there was another interesting example of a disagreement. In his petition to the court, Muhammed Serdar wanted to be set free so that he could see his wife and his family. With that in mind, he wrote a letter addressed to the court and stated:

> "I do not care about the army, CO, Turkey or anything else. I missed my kids and my wife. I do not have any resilience left in me. Please have mercy once in your lives." (interview with Muhammed Serdar Delice in Ogunc, 2013:159)

What the court selectively picked from his statement was that he did not care about CO, and put this in the indictment to weaken his position in the hearing. Military courts seem to produce a great deal of disagreement of such kind. Another example is civilians being tried in military courts where they

clearly refuse to become a soldier on conscientious grounds, and thus never become a soldier in the first place (Ucpinar, 2010:245). In his hearing, Ossi made this very remark:

> "I maintain that the military court has no legal right to try me. I never became a soldier. Therefore, I have won the trial from the start: it will not change my attitude and thus will fail in its purpose." (Altinay, 2004:101)

Consequently, the channels of communication in the issue of CO have clearly not been very open and there has been a high level of disagreement. This leaves the COrs and the CO movement frustrated because they cannot see a way out of this impasse, and will thus have to engage in the creation of new ways of acting that might work better for the transformation they wish to see happen. The next section, in turn, focuses on the creative and new forms of activism that the CO movement employed in their campaigns. The main points of interest here are the strategies of dis-identification of imposed identities, creating a rupture and renaming and reclaiming a new identity within that rupture so as to come out as a political subject on the other end of the process.

6.3.3.3 Acts of dissidence: dis-identification, renaming, reclaiming, and starting new beginnings

Typical examples of an act of dis-identification can be found in many CO declarations. Their main character is to refuse the imposed identity on them by the militarist system as the first step to create who they might want to become. For example, Kazim Birdal Tufekci rejected his role as an automatic soldier and insisted that he was only a human being:

> "I do not see myself as a soldier of the Turkish Republic and I refuse all the lawsuits and investigations beforehand. I am neither a deserter nor an evader. I refuse the compulsory military service and I declare my CO. Rather than living as a fugitive, or running off to seek shelter, I am

> explaining to you the truth and the fact that I am a human being in front of the public opinion."[41]

Here the most important move made is the rejection of the imposed identity and saying no to a relation of control. This strategy has been used very frequently by the COrs because they want to expose the wrong that is being forced on them.

For example, throughout his repetitive imprisonment, Ossi made the same argument:

> "I kept refusing the charge of insubordination, because I had refused to be a soldier. If I am not a soldier, how can I be guilty of "insubordination"? And I am not at all a deserter. I never accepted those charges and asked for my release." (Altinay, 2004:101)

On this case of military courts trying civilians, CO activists seem to have spent a lot of activism to draw attention to the wrong in the judicial mentality. Serdar Tekin, who was also prosecuted under Article 318, says that they refused to give testimonials in court, contested the latter's legitimacy, and that they just wanted to be given the chance to talk and convince the judges. This was their way of trying to enable the word and conceptions of CO to enter into public circulation (personal interview). Similarly, when Oguz Sonmez was tried on the charges based on Article 318, he appeared in court and defended himself by saying that alienating the public from military service was actually a good deed. He used the court as a platform to disseminate knowledge and draw attention to the movement. Surprisingly, he was also acquitted.

Some of these confrontations have also acquired a light-hearted tone, which is also another way for the CO movement to put forward their agency in a non-conventional novel way. In his declaration, Enver Aydemir wrote that everybody is born as a baby, and nobody is born as a soldier, in a direct way to refute the myth of every Turk being born a soldier. During his court hearing, there was a motion from the defense asking for the expert opininon of a

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41 http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=2&ArsivAnaID=62882&ArsivSayfaNo=1, accessed on 6 July 2013.

gynecologist to decide whether when human beings are born, they are soldiers or babies (Ogunc, 2013:14). Halil Savda remembers hearing the same story when he was a little boy from his mother:

> "I would hear soldiers every morning saying "Every Turk is born as a soldier". … I would see them wearing boots, the same uniform. I think I wanted to take an example by them. I remember asking my mother: 'Where are my boots, my weapon and my camouflage? Was I not born as a soldier? My mom paused, then smiled and said to me: "You weren't born as a soldier. You had no clothes when you were born. You were like everybody else, naked."

Enver Aydemir also staged one of the typical everyday resistance movements by rejecting an imposed identity on him through the procedures of conscription. When a notice letter arrived asking him to report to the police about an issue related to military service, he went down to the police station and reported to the officer on duty and said:

> "I cannot be your soldier." They said: "What on earth are you talking about?" They were surprised, they had never heard anything like it. The officer handed me a piece of paper and told me: "Just take this and don't talk to me". It was a notice for me to go turn up in my military unit in three days. If you take it, then you undertake the responsibility. I said: "I cannot take this, why would I take something that I don't accept?" Then the officer told me: "Then write a petition saying that you don't accept it, that you decline." I wrote: "I don't want to be a soldier of this state and thus I decline taking this notice" (interview with Aydemir in Ogunc, 2013:120).

Among women COrs, the politics of dis-identification are also very common. For example, Inci Aglagul (Altinay, 2004:115) argued that in her declaration she wanted to write that she did not want to be used by the military and that she did not agree to send her son or brother to the army, in a defiant way to what is normally expected of Turkish women: a sacrificing mother/sister who is proud of their children or brother serving for his country.

There have been acts of dis-identification by gay COrs as well. On the issue of gay men being exempted from the military service, the military gives out a certificate of unfitness for the service to these individuals after a series of psychological tests, personal statements and observation of behaviour. In the past, there were different procedures, like asking for visual material depicting the person in question having intercourse, or a body cavity search, which were very

invasive and degrading. However, they seem to be no longer in use after a series of national and international campaigns and also news sources covering the story in an embarrassing way for the military.[42] However, the certificate of unfitness is still called in slang the "pink" certificate or getting the status of "rotten", which is a derogatory way of calling somebody unsuitable for the military service (Biricik, 2010). Mehmet Tarhan often made it explicitly clear that even though he had the chance to get out of his military duty by playing on his being gay and thus getting a 'rotten certificate', he never intended to do that because he refused to brand himself as rotten, and he took this as a sign that the militarist system itself was a rotting order (personal interview).

The rotten certificate is also given to other candidates of military service who display symptoms of antisocial personality disorder, which is the new strategy of the army to make COrs get this certificate and be dropped from the list of "insubordinates" (Ersan Ugur, personal interview). Halil Savda says he was offered to take such a certificate, but he refused to acknowledge another imposed identity on himself that would also negate his COr status. He wanted to be rid of his military duty just because he was a COr (personal interview).

Another everyday form of resistance used by both Mehmet Tarhan and Ercan Aktas were to use a procedural acceptance of the duty of military service for the use of other purposes. Basically, when soldiers are supposed to report to their unit in another town, they are given some allowance to spend for the travel. The envelope and the money in it are given to the soldier-to-be and he is expected to sign a paper confirming that he received the money. Both Tarhan and Aktas refused to be handed this envelop because it would amount to implicitly accepting to report to their units. When they realized that if they did not take the money, the junior officers would get in trouble, they accepted the envelopes, but did not report to their units and spent the money as they deemed fit. While Tarhan donated the money to an LGBT organization to be used "against the

[42] Turkish military denies asking for 'photo proof' of homosexuality, Hurriyet Daily News, 19 November 2010, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=military-complains-to-german-press-council-for-gay-allegations-2010-11-14, accessed on 7 May 2013.

discrimination of the Turkish Armed Forces against LGBT individuals", Ercan spent it with his family. (Tarhan in Ogunc, 2013:72, Ercan personal interview).

Acts of dis-identification were also expressed through corporeal manifestations. While the soldier-to-be refuses to wear arms or carry armour, the military in turn does not hesitate to resort to force him through crude power to make him comply with the dress code of the barracks. In this way, the CO exposes how arbitrarily and lavishly the army can flex its muscle and employ crude power against individuals (Cockburn, 2010:x). Every time a COr is brought to his military unit or to his cell in prison, he is forced to wear his military uniform or the prison uniform. Ossi and Mehmet Tarhan were among the well-known figures who refused to wear uniform (Baskent, 2010:35). When Ossi was taken to a prison in Ankara and was asked to wear the prison uniform, he said that he was sent to jail because he had refused to wear the military one. Therefore, it was impossible for him to accept the prison uniform (Altinay, 2004:96-7). Likewise, in Mehmet Bal's case, when the uniforms were put on him by force, he would take them off at the first availability he could find as soon as his shackles were removed (Altinay, 2004:104-5). "Because Bal also refused to stand to attention during headcount, his ankles were cuffed to simulate the pose." (Usterci and Yorulmaz, 2010:174) This exercise of power in the military setting can be seen very common, and it was also displayed in the case of Enver Aydemir, who was held down by ten people so that they could put on his uniform by force. His hair was cut and his beard was shaved. Aydemir says that when he saw himself on the mirror, he cried because the person he saw was "a stranger, another person" (Aydemir in Ogunc, 2013:121). The use of the body as a site of resistance is also common among COrs. For example, Inan Suver went on a hunger strike to ask to be transferred to the section of the prison where political prisoners were held. His act was the refusal of the imposed identity on him, ridding him off his status as a conscious being who was imprisoned because of his beliefs. In a very similar way, Mehmet Tarhan went on hunger strike a number of times in order to protest against the arbitrary treatment, torture and beatings in prison.

The use of the bodies was not limited to sites of statehood such as the prison or the court. Street theatres public demonstrations with dramatic

expressions were often used to earn more visibility to the CO movement. For example, in 1993, a street performance was held in Izmir in order to remind people of "their responsibility in wars around the world on the anniversaries of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs" (Altinay, 2004:94). They exploded a fake bomb in a central park dedicated to 'human rights' and lay down on the ground as "dead" people, with their faces painted in black and white. They also stopped passersby and asked them to reflect on their responsibility in "the war machine". The activists would stop people on the street, put a leaflet in their hands and say "You are responsible!" The Militurizm event, which was held for three years in Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara was another example of this alternative new agency methods. It is defined as an interesting combination of tourism and protesting, and it was designed to take a group of people around a city to participate in excursions, protests, concerts and getting informed about militarist presence in their environment (Baskent and Atan, 2010:94). Among the places to visit were symbols that signify statist/militarist presence[43], like important military zones, bases, military museums, companies that provided weapons and equipment to the army, martyrs' cemeteries, big train stations from where usually young males were bid farewell to their military unit, etc… The motto of the event was to "remove the invisibility dust from the COrs" as the movement wanted to gain more visibility while providing first-hand knowledge of militarist presence to the participants and to the people who lived around these neighbourhoods (Ersan Ugur, personal interview). Also, for example, in Izmir the group went to the old neighbourhoods where Jews and Armenians used to live, in order to underline the links between militarism and racism (Usterci, personal interview). One interesting visit that comes out in the interviews with those who participated in the Istanbul leg of the event was the one paid to Gulhane Military Medical Academy. This institution is known as the authority that decided on the cases of gay men who were deemed unsuitable-"rotten" for military service. During that visit, a cart of apples was left to the reception of the

[43] Like the monument of Tahsin in Konak, Izmir, who is allegedly the first person who shot a bullet in the Turkish War of Independence (Ercan Aktas, personal interview). Another similar example is visiting Besiktas Square, Istanbul where old cannons are constantly on display in the middle of the square. The visitors would bring butterfly shaped decorations and evil eye beads and bow-ties ti hang on these old weapons.

Academy in order for them to sort out the rotten ones from the fresh ones. Inci says that the aim was to expose the existing codes of militarism through mockery and confrontation (interview with Inci Aglagul in Ogunc, 2013:81).

Lastly, this section will discuss the new beginnings that COrs start through acts of dissidence. As it can be remembered from the section on acts, while these acts are realized as a process of interference, the entities undertaking them also become political subjects during the performance of the acts themselves. They act through an active equality that they see in them and thus move to speak on security and political matters even though they are not deemed as qualified to do so by the dominant structure.

The declaration of their COs and the move they make to the public sphere is crucially important for the COs, as it has been shown above. Ercan Aktas, for instance, is aware of the ruptured space that the COs are creating and he seems to attribute a great deal of importance in that crack created within the militarist system:

> "By declaring our CO, we are actually creating a practical situation. I think there is law and regulations, etc. but then there is the reality of life itself. Law never covers this reality in its entirety. For example, the state cannot control everything; there will be certain spaces where it has no dominion over. We are one of these spaces, Ercan is one of these people that the state does not currently control. … This space has become our lifestyle now, and it is also a political space." (personal interview)

Yavuz Atan also backs up Ercan's observation about that breathing space for the COrs that they created through their organization:

> "It was not difficult for me to continue my life after the declaration because we were an organized group. We created a new life-space for us. For example, we were doing leather business and selling accessories on the street. The working method was much more suitable for us. We were working just about enough, not more. …" (personal interiew)

The methods and discourses that the COrs have created throughout their activism introduced new ways of undertaking political agency in Turkey. For example, in order to protest the Roboski incident, where a government drone against the PKK killed many citizens on the southern border of Turkey, Halil Savda started a march of peace from Roboski to Ankara. In his equal

problematization of the use of violence on both Turkish and the PKK side, he wanted to promote the language of pace and anti-violence:

> "There was a state of serious clashes in Turkey in the period before September 2012. Everyday soldiers were killing guerrillas and vice versa. The government employed a stark language of warfare, and so did the PKK. They were attempting at defeating the other militarily. … The media was covering the operations everyday, but only in the military sense, underlining TSK's operations against the guerrilla. … This was an environment where the language of peace was being silenced and drowned. This resulted in the impossibility to act on the part of all the human rights activists, anti-militarists and the actors who wished for a just and honourable peace in Turkey and who wanted liberties and freedoms to grow. The march humbly brought the language of peace back to the front, especially in the social media." (personal interview)

Back in mid 1990s, Ugur Yorulmaz wished to leave a question mark in the Turkish political imaginary through his CO (Altinay, 2004:109). By showing the way for other alternatives than the compulsory military service, the CO movement really opened up an alternative praxis space in Turkey. Halil Savda sees their movement successful, simply because in the past people would try to put on excessive weight, or give away their kidneys, or go underground so that they would be exempted from military service (Savda in Ogunc, 2013:102). The CO movement and Halil's personal stance was trying to show that there were other alternatives as well, and this was a new opening for Turkish anti-militarists. It also provided an avenue for critical individual or groups who could not fit in the existing organizations and were looking into SKD's non-violence discourse, their anti-hierarchical decision making processes, or anti-authoritarian relations (Usterci, personal interview). Even in the area of military service, the CO movement succeeded in influencing one military prosecutor who reviewed Mehmet Bal's declaration and saw it protected under the "right to conscious and expression" and stressed that it was "everybody's duty to preserve world peace anyhow" (Altinay, 2004:105).

The emergence of the COrs as new political subjects directly relate to their perception of themselves as active subjects, as in the case of Rancière's active equality who did not wait confirmation from the state to see whether their agency was acknowledged or not. The acts they undertook were already framed as if they were allowed to speak on these security and political matters. For

example, Mehmet Tarhan argues that for him, providing a perspective for other individuals who might want to be informed about alternatives to military service is highly important. However, while doing that he did not see the state apparatus as the source of legitimacy in the distribution of these rights. He acted on these rights as if they were already there because Tarhan proposes that "human beings have rights deriving from natural law and they possess those rights by virtue of simply existing" (personal interview). Making oneself a whole with her/his rights denotes taking back things from institutions and establishments that claim to exercise these rights on people's behalf. That is to say, according to the COrs, everybody is entitled to the right to refuse to die or to kill, and this does not indicate a legal procedure, but rather a right that human beings possess since they are born (Baskent and Aytac, 2010:175). This process implies an unbreakable individual who confronts the state system through her/his hyper-autonomy and act very unpredictably according to existing norms. It involves a strong, self-aware person, who wishes to share his vision with others (Serdar Tekin, personal interview.

Now, the last point of discussion for this chapter is whether we can contextualize the agency of the COrs and the CO movement as tactical acts, in the sense that they do not have clearly specified targets or a visible place to exert influence, as opposed to strategic behaviour which is more like a rally that has clear-cut desires for a policy change.

At the first glance, it looks like CO has a clear target and an obvious policy change desire. Therefore, it should be categorized as strategic behaviour, so falling a bit far from the concept of acts of dissidence. However, a closer look into the discourse and the practice of the CO movement will prove that the choice of the removal of compulsory military service is just a strategic choice in the struggle for anti-militarism. This is the same logic that Booth introduces when he suggests agents of critical security understanding to behave empirically, meaning identifying areas where transformation towards emancipatory politics can start and take off from there. As we have seen in the concept of process, causal and linear big-bang like change is rare in the political arena. A shift towards less spectacular events and actors would also give us the chance to

understand change and transformation, but in a more interconnected, relational and complex way.

Given that, the CO movement sees the abolition of the institution of military service and the recognition of the right to CO as a very first step in the fight against militarism. In the event of the realization of these goals, this will be a one-step triumph in the long process of making anti-militarism and emancipatory politics work. They will be considered as freedom gains which were previously hijacked by the state (Baskent, 2010:58). Behind this understanding lies the realization that the termination of the militarist system cannot happen overnight and that it requires a long process of gradual transformation. As Yavuz explains it:

> "Since the militarist system in Turkey was going on for long years, we wanted to expose and attack the system in its most fragile part which most people did not even question or understand. They would claim it to be the strongest point of the system, but it actually is very easy to be wounded. Because what is very stretched takes the hardest blow, and the blow does not stay small once it is inflicted." (personal interview)

Being an anarchist, Merve Arkun also brings up the issue of choosing CO as a strategic first step, but the overall struggle being against militarism and the concept of power:

> "I know the adversary: it is power, and its institutionalized form as the state. Power is not only state's domination over us, or what the army exercises. It is also done by men to women. It has penetrated human beings' reflexes. That is why my struggle is not only against the state or the military, but against the concept of power. However, the most material form of this happens to be the state and the military service for the moment. When the state takes a step, then we will ask for the next one." (personal interview)

Halil Savda , Ferda Ulker and Inan Mayis Aru also underline the difficulty in achieving all their goals at once, and CO being a strategic choice only:

> "CO is the façade of the struggle, but it is about the struggle for being anti-war and anti-militarist in essence." (Savda in Ogunc, 2013:103)

> "The CO movement is not a struggle that is carried out only against the "compulsory military service." As women, we have more say and weight on this matter than just supporters. CO is the name of the direct stance

> one takes against militarism and all its expressions." (Ferda Ulker, CO declaration)
>
> "Our basic concern has never been only CO. Our problem is with militarism." (Inan Mayis Aru, in Ogunc 2013:136)

Therefore, given that anti-militarism is a much more comprehensive goal with not so visible targets and action plans, it is possible to argue that the CO agency has also been tactical in its struggle against militarism. Such tactical behaviour has been successful in carving itself a strong presence in the political imaginary. The inclusion of references to the concept of CO in the military legal documents through the cases of Ossi and Mehmet are major accomplishments of the movement (Altinay, 2004:110). Others emphasize the recognition of the declaration of CO as part of the "freedom of conscience and expression" in the Prosecutor's Statement of Mehmet Bal's case in October 2002. In another way, as Halil says: "there has been progress in the sense that when asked on the street 'What is CO?', people say "those who don't want to go to the military service." It took years for this awareness to develop" (Savda in Ogunc, 2013:100).

Yavuz sees their achievements in a large processual context where the CO movement has contributed to the transformation they wished to see happen:

> "Concepts like anti-militarism, anti-war stance, CO, we managed to include these terms in Turkish political struggle literature. This is a clear achievement… We started something anew and observed its journey causing change. When I saw change, I do not mean that us alone, or the movement alone caused it. It was accompanied with the capitalist need to revise the Turkish army, to realize the switch into the professional army. When these issues were not in the agenda, we raised them. Secondly, we created an awareness for the anti-militarist struggle. We said to Tayyip Erdogan, through a letter passed on to him by Bulent Arinc, that if you are today debating the tutelage regime, we are not going to be modest about this because you partially owe this to us." (personal interview)

Yavuz's statements indicate the importance of putting the CO movement and everyday resistance through acts of dissidence into a framework that would exacerbate the effect of their political agency. The significance of everyday ordinary acts and the agency of actors with small power has been a frequent theme of this study. However, as Chapter 4 argued, these acts are better understood when they are contextualized within a process that they touch, interact and dip-in and out. There are certain other factors, a network of players

and actors and ideational structures that surround these acts of dissidence and their agents. After all, social relations never happen in a power vacuum, and that all actors operate in a social environment composed of a multitude of relations. In Turkey, in terms of the processual context of demilitarization, there are two aspects that deserve highlights in providing momentum to the movement of de-militarization: the influence of international institutions, especially the European Court of Human Rights and the EU, and domestically, the AKP government's policies of limiting the presence of the military to the barracks so that it cannot interfere with politics.

Yavuz gives credit to COrs' agency in AKP's ability to talk about the military tutelage so freely. The only way to verify this link would be to hear this assessment being expressed by official AKP sources, which has not happened and is not expected to happen given the distance the government has placed between itself and the CO movement. On 22 November 2011, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a statement that ruled out any legal arrangement that would lead to a provision in the law for CO:

> "Any regulation on the matter of conscientious objection has never been in the agenda of our government. News that came out on this issue do not amount to anything more then speculations. Military service has always been regarded as one the most sacred duties in these lands and for this nation. When we call our soldiers as "Mehmetcik", this means "Little Muhammed". We take military service as "the House of the Prophet". … We have never allow the seriousness of the institution of military service to be weakened, and we never will."[44]

If the government has never taken the issue of CO to its agenda, then it is difficult to explain why a minister from the AKP government made a public statements indicating that some provisions were being worked on for the provision of CO. This statement came slightly before Erdogan's remarks on the matter. The Minister of Justice, Sadullah Ergin said:

> "The European Court of Justice argues our legal system punishes the COr once for not fulfilling his military service, and that the punishment is

[44] "Basbakan Erdogan'dan vicdani ret aciklamasi [Statement on conscientious objection by Prime Minister Erdogan], Hurriyet, 22 November 2011, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/19303120.asp, accessed on 11 August 2013.

> executed, but the act is repeated and the punishment follows again. ECtHR ruled against Turkey because punishment has been recurring for the same act and this situation violates the principle of fair trials. Therefore, we are basing our work on this violation."[45]

The explanation given by the Minister of Justice for the work being carried out for CO does not appear to be a case of granting the actual right of the CO. What Ergin here refers to is an arrangement that will prevent COrs from being punished and re-punished in a repetitive circle that resulted in the case of the civil death. The issue of CO is also tied up to the ruling of ECtHR alone, and does not take into account the CO movement or the individuals implicated in the process of imprisonment or in the lawsuit in ECtHR. If external actors such as the ECtHR have a vertain degree of leverage on the AKP government, then this needs to be included in the analysis of the COrs in Turkey.

6.3.4 The Influence of International Organizations and AKP in the process of demilitarization

The agency of the COrs and the CO movement in Turkey take after the methods and gains of its international predecessors, such as the movement in Germany, Spain or Israel. Back in 1993, when the Association of War Resisters in Izmir organized ICOM, the activists involved in its preparation benefited from this experience greatly in terms of learning more on organizing the CO movement. It provided them a "sense of empowerment" since they knew that they were part of an international movement that had strong roots in the past (Altinay, 2004:90). However, this international presence and modeling has not been limited to learning from previous experiences. The influence of international institutions has made a big difference in making especially the government sources make the effort and learn what the matter was all about in CO.

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[45] " 'Vicdani ret' geliyor" ['Conscientious objection' is on its way], Hurriyet, 15 November 2011, http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/-vicdani-ret-geliyor/siyaset/siyasetdetay/15.11.2011/1463080/default.htm, accessed on 11 August 2013.

The Council of Europe (CoE) in that sense has been a very significant actor that provided international leverage to the CO movement in Turkey. CoE has passed a number of resolutions in the past fifty years regarding the right to CO: 337 on 27 January 1967, 816 on 7 October 1977, 1518 on 23 May 2001, and 1742 on 11 April 2006 (Rumelili et al, 2010:5). Article A.1 and A.2 of Resolution 337 on the Right of Conscientious Objection, reads as follows:

> "1. Persons liable to conscription for military service who, for reasons of conscience or profound conviction arising from religious, ethical, moral, humanitarian, philosophical or similar motives, refuse to perform armed service shall enjoy a personal right to be released from the obligation to perform such service.
>
> 2. This right shall be regarded as deriving logically from the fundamental rights of the individual in democratic Rule of Law States which are guaranteed in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights."[46]

While Article A.1 outlines the basic definition of CO as it has universally been accepted, the second clause bears great importance as it ties the right to CO to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The recognition of the right to CO and the provision of the civil service alternative, on the basis of Resolution 337, has become a prerequisite for CoE membership (Altundis, 2011:154-5). With following recommendation decisions by the Parliamentarians' Assembly of the CoE, the issue of CO has been kept as an important agenda item for the members of the Council. For example, Recommendation 1742, issued on 11 April 2006, Article 8 re-called:

> "that the right of conscientious objection is an essential component of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as secured under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights."[47]

The same recommendation, Article 11.1 made a call for the Council of Ministers of CoE to introduce the right to CO into the ECHR. The latter has a clause that excludes military service or its civilian alternative as a form of forced

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[46] http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta67/ERES337.htm, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[47] http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta06/EREC1742.htm, accessed on 11 August 2013.

labour. Article 4 on the prohibition of slavery and forced labour, sub-clause 3 includes the following provision:

> "[For the purpose of this Article the term "forced or compulsory labour" shall not include] any service of a military character or, in case of conscientious objectors in countries where they are recognised, service exacted instead of compulsory military service;"[48]

The Recommendation of the Parliamentarians' Assembly of CoE advises the alteration of this sub-clause in order to remove military service and the alternative services to it from the exemptions.

The turning point for the CO movement in Turkey has been the decisions of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which rules with ECHR, allowing individuals from states party to the Convention to apply to the Court for violations of their rights regulated by the Convention, should the domestic judicial processes fail to address their concerns. There have been five significant cases of COrs where ECtHR ruled against Turkey as of August 2013: *Osman Murat Ulke vs Turkey (39437/98)* on 24 January 2006[49]*, Yunus Ercep vs Turkey (43965/04)* on 22 November 2011[50], *Feti Demirtas c. Turquie (5260/07)* on 12 January 2012[51], *Savda c. Turkey (42730/05)* on 12 June 2012[52], *Mehmet Tarhan c. Turquie (9078/06)* on 17 July 2012[53].

The Court here followed a gradual approach in its interpretation of the Convention according to the right to CO. In 2006, in *Ulke vs Turkey*, the Court

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[48] http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[49] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-72146#{"itemid":["001-72146"]}, accessed on 13 August 2013.

[50] http://ebco-beoc.org/sites/ebco-beoc.org/files/attachments/PR_Chamber%20II%20judgment%20Ercep%20v.%20Turkey%2022.11.2011.pdf, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[51] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/Pages/search.aspx#{"fulltext":["5260/07"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["001-108617"]}, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[52] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx#{"itemid":["001-111414"]}, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[53] http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-112199#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-112199%22%5D%7D, accessed on 11 August 2013.

ruled that the violation against Osman Murat Ulke was only Article 3, which covers prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment. It was significant that the Court did not extend its ruling on Article 9 that deals with freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Therefore, the ruling sentenced Turkey for the repetition of punishment for Osman Murat Ulke, which it defined as the civil death.

The ruling still had a major impact on the CO movement in Turkey as it ignited public debate with people from different circles beginning to discuss CO (Usterci and Cinar, 2010:2-3). It made it clear to the public opinion that there was no escape from a final decision and that CO would make its way through Turkey somehow (Sureyya Evren[54] cited in Goker, 2008:312). It was later in 2011 that in the case of *Yunus Ercep vs Turkey*, a Jehova's Witness, that the Court ruled in favour of Ercep on the grounds of the violation of Article 9. This was a legal innovation that the Court had realized in a previous ruling, *Bayatyan vs Armenia*, which was directly cited in *Ercep vs Turkey*. The change in the Court's attitude was also marked by one of the conclusions of the ruling: Turkey was invited to enact legislation concerning conscientious objectors and to introduce an alternative form of service.[55] Here ECtHR ruled that the reality of life moved faster than law and that the right to CO was recognized by all member states of CoE except for Azerbaijan and Turkey (Oguz Sonmez, personal interview). Since Ercep vs Turkey, all other cases have also referred to Article 9. Also, since Ulke's case, Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers issues bi-annual reports on Turkey's response to comply with the decisions of the ECtHR in the cases of CO where Turkey has been sentenced. The final timeframe for Turkey to finalize its arrangements was December 2011; however, Turkey has not still taken any formal steps and informs the Committee of Ministers that the work is still in progress (Ogunc, 2013:13-4).

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[54] "Siyasetin cekilmesi ve erksizlesme" [The regression of politics and disempowerment], Birgun, 6 February 2006.

[55] ECHR, Turkey Country Profile, www.echr.coe.int/Documents/CP_Turkey_ENG.pdf, accessed on 11 August 2013.

It was after the announcement of the ruling on *Ercep vs Turkey* that the Minister of Justice Sadullah Ergin declared the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Justice were working on the issue and that it would be submitted to the Prime Minister's office shortly.[56] However, the existence of these preparations was later denied by Prime Minister Erdogan (Altundis, 2011:153). It was also a significant move that the Military Court of Malatya made a reference to *Bayatyan vs Armenia*, but interpreted the decision as not being applicable to Muslims, and reserved its scope only to non-Muslim minorities. The latest comment from the government came on 29 March 2013, declaring that "ECtHR's decisions were currently not possible to apply as it can only be possible once the army has been professionalized and conscription has been abolished."[57] However, ECtHR decisions in the end made a very big impact because it came from an institution that is normatively allowed to speak on such matters and is also legally recognized to have binding decisions by virtue of Article 46 of the ECHR. This article provides that contracting states undertake to abide by the Court's final decision. As Halil Savda suggests, the decisions of the Court made it possible for the CO to be discussed in politics, and that if asked, every MP will know about this concept, maybe even know about the number of the COrs (Savda in Ogunc, 2013:100).

European Union, in turn, picked up on ECtHR's decision and integrated it to the progress reports issued for Turkey since 2006, specifically in relation to *Ulke vs Turkey* decision. The subsequent reports also made note of the case of Jehova's Witnesses, like the case of *Ercep vs Turkey*. An example can be given from 2010:

"Judicial proceedings against conscientious objectors on religious grounds continued. Public statements on the right to conscientious objection have led to convictions. Implementation of ECtHR judgments regarding conscientious

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[56] "Vicdani Ret"te flas gelisme" [Breaking news on "Conscientious Objection"], CNN Turk, 15 November 2011, http://www.cnnturk.com/2011/turkiye/11/14/vicdani.rette.flas.gelisme/636728.0/index.html, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[57] "Vicdani ret konusunda flas aciklama [Breaking statement on conscientious objection], Aksam, 29 March 2013, http://www.aksam.com.tr/siyaset/vicdani-ret-konusunda-flas-aciklama/haber-181822, accessed on 11 August 2013.

objectors is still pending. Turkey has adopted no legal measures to prevent repetitive prosecution and conviction of conscientious objectors. Several members of the Jehovah's Witness's community face court cases as conscientious objectors"[58]

The effect of the international presence and pressure can also be observed in CO's debatability in the public sphere by ordinary citizens. There are many different ways as to how to study public opinion. This study uses Twitter as a forum to sample public opinion and to trace changes into the way CO has been discussed. The next section introduces the methodology and the results of this analysis.

6.3.5 The issue of Conscientious Objection in Twitter

Twitter is a social networking tool that is reflective of the public trends and top agenda items in Turkey, firstly because it is very popular in Turkey, and also a culture of debate and discussion has already been established over Twitter among Turkish users. There are eight million tweets submitted everyday by Turkish users, with ninety-two tweets sent every second.[59] The number of Twitter users in Turkey and Internet users in respect to the last three years is as follows[60]:

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[58] Turkey 2010 Progress Report by European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[59] "2013 Twitter Turkiye Profili" [2013 Profile of Twitter in Turkey], http://blog.monitera.com/2013/02/2013-twitter-turkiye-profili.html, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[60] Internet users statistics have been taken from the Turkish Statistical Institute, the dataset of "Science, Technology and Information Society". Since the total population number for 2013 has not been released yet, the number has been projected on the basis of the increment from 2011 to 2012. Twitter user numbers for 2013, 2012 and 2011 have been collected from the following web sites respectively: http://blog.monitera.com/2013/02/2013-twitter-turkiye-profili.html, http://www.teknoblog.com/infografik-turkiyede-twitter-kullanimi-ne-durumda-41563/ http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/markets-by-country/10-europe/87-turkey, all accessed on 11 August 2013.



Table 1: Internet and Twitter users in Turkey 2011-2013

Therefore, as of mid-2013, the ratio of Twitter users to Internet users is around twenty-five per cent, with 9.600.000 Turkish Twitter users. Given with the frequency of the usage of this social platform, Twitter appears as an interesting data source for social scientists in Turkey.

The way to conduct research on Twitter is through the use of websites such as Tweet Charts, Topsy or simply running an advanced search on Twitter. For this study, all three of these websites have been used to find the most extensive range of tweets that were submitted with the the hashtag #vicdaniret(d). In total, the number of Tweets analyzed with these hashtags is 10100, from 23 May 2008 to 5 August 2013. May 2008 is the time to which one can go as far as possible in the past for Twitter searches.

The first step in the analysis was to group the tweets in a thematic way according to some coding words. After sampling more than fifty random tweets from every year, the following categories seemed logical to adopt and have been

used to cluster the rest of the tweets, while also excluding some others that did not fall into the scope of this study. The groups can be summarized as follows:



Table 2: Frequency of thematic categories of tweets with #conscientiousobjection

According to the data presented above, the majority of the tweets on CO between May 2008 and August 2013 were related to information dissemination of the concept or a positive support statement to it without linking it to or framing it with other ideas. It can also be argued that the majority of tweeter users who were active on the matter of CO were in favour of the idea, while ten per cent of the tweets had a negative tone in them.

Another interesting result is the low percentage of the link to the international organizations' and institutions' presence in CO in Turkey. The low

percentage of tweets from this angle is very significant because when the volume of tweets is broken down into years, there is a drastic leap in mid-late November 2011 at an unprecedented volume, when first the Minister of Justice announced the legal work being prepared on the issue of CO in Turkey on 14-15 November 2011, and second the ECtHR announced its decision on the *Ercep vs Turkey* on 22 November 2011.

The changes in the volume of tweets on CO can be demonstrated as follows:



Table 3: Number of tweets sent on CO from Jan 2008 to August 2013

Therefore, it is clear that something encouraged Twitter users into expressing themselves intensely in 2011, and this factor made the subject remain in the agenda of Twitter users for the two subsequent years. In order to locate this factor, there is a need to break down the volume of tweets in 2011 into months:



	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec
Number of Tweets per month in 2011	0	0	0	1	67	10	28	18	103	87	5504	491

Table 4: Number of tweers on CO per month in 2011

As this graph shows, there is some increased activity in May, which can be explained by 15 May internationally being the Day of Conscientious Objection. However, the most significant increase is observed to take place in November, when the volume of tweets increases sixty-three times in month, from 87 to 5504. Therefore, the next step would be to see which days might point to a significant event in the month of November:



Table 5: Daily number of tweets on CO in November 2011

As the graph shows, there is a great deal of tweets submitted on 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18th of November, and then again another surge observed on 22 November 2013. The drastically increased activity between 14-18 November is easy to contextualize because on 14 and 15 November, Minister of Justice Sadullah Ergin made statements about the preparatory work being carried out for the regulation of CO in Turkey. This attracted a considerable amount of attention both in the media, both in written and visual outlets. The topic was debated across many televised discussion programs hosting military personnel, COrs, academics and other opinion leaders. It should not come as a surprise that

following a Minister's statement on CO, there has been an increase in the volume of the public debate in the consequent days. Mehmet Tarhan credits this to the influence AKP holds over the public opinion in the sense that the latter follows the direction showed by the government (Tarhan, personal interview).

22 November, in turn, is the day when ECtHR announced its decision on *Ercep vs Turkey* and sentenced Turkey on the basis of violating Article 9 of the ECHR that regulates freedom of thought, conscience and religion. As it was mentioned above, this was the first case, following the Court's decision on *Bayatyan vs Armenia*, when ECtHR ruled that the opposition to military service constituted a situation that "attracts the guarantees of Article 9".[61] The Court's ruling decided that in cases where "the objection is motivated by a serious and insurmountable conflict between the obligation to serve in the army and a person's conscience", Article 9 would apply to grant this freedom to that individual. After the announcement of that decision, tweets quadrupled over one day.

These findings attest to two main factors that surround the agency of the COrs: the influence of the international organizations, and the role of the AKP government and its approach to militarism. While the former is explained above, the latter also deserves some attention in order to provide the features of the process in which the CO movement undertakes its agency.

Since the first AKP government, there have been many reforms introduced to the Turkish political system with a view to downgrade the presence of the military in the social political sphere, and in the end completely terminate this presence. The first steps were taken through reforms approved by the Parliament for the sake of harmonization with the EU enlargement criteria in line with decreasing the presence of the National Security Council (MGK) and of military's interference in civilian politics. Some of these examples can be summarized as follows:

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[61] "The absence of an alternative to military service in Turkey is in breach of the right to conscientious objection", ECHR Press Release, 254 (2011), 22 October 2011, p.2, http://www.ebco-beoc.org/node/199, accessed on 11 August 2013.

- 6th EU Harmonization Reform Package
    - Removing Secretary-General of National Security Council (MGK) from the Cinema, Video and Music Products Supervisory Board;
- 7th EU Harmonization Reform Package:
    - Ending the practice of prosecuting civilians by military courts, especially in respect to crimes stemming from violations of Turkish Penal Code Article 153 (encouraging soldiers into rebellion and disobedience), 155 (alienating the public from the institute of military service), and 161 (undermining national resilience);
    - Changing Article 5 of the MGK Statute, making the Council convene once every two months rather than every month, and enabling the Prime Minister or the President to call the Council into meeting, excluding the Chief of Staff from that power;
    - Abolishing Article 19, removing the possibility of MGK asking for open access and secret documents from private legal entities, Ministries or public institutions;
    - Abolishing Article 9 and 14 that allowed MGK to oversee the application of the decisions taken in the Council, by the government;
    - Narrowing the scope of Article 4 and 13 that regulated the functions of the Council and that of the Secretary-General
    - Changing Article 15 that reserved the position of Secretary-General to higher ranks in the army on the recommendation by the Chief of Staff, giving that power to the Prime Minister for nominating also non-military officers, and conditionalizing it to the President's approval
- 8th EU Harmonization Reform Package:

- Abolishing the practice of MGK Secretary-General nominating a candidate to Radio and Television Supreme Board
- Removing Secretary-General of MGK from Communications Higher Board
- Abolishing the practice of General Staff electing a member for the High Education Board (YÖK)
- Ending the nomination of a member to the High Education Board [Yuksekogretim Kurulu] by the Turkish General Staff

- Changing Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Statute that was used for the latter to carry out coups, in a way to define the army's duty as defending the country against external threats, reinforcing deterrent military power, carrying out tasks appointed for missions abroad and contributing to international peace;[62]

There were also two cases that public prosecutors brought against high ranking army officers, including one of the former Chief of Staff: Ergenekon and Balyoz cases where army members were accused of attempting to conduct a coup, and have recently received prison sentences ranging from life-time to an average of a couple of decades. Notwithstanding the debates surrounding the legality and legitimacy of these cases, they would not be possible to imagine ten years ago. However, on the other hand, there are arguments made against the AKP's demilitarization process in the sense that it merely replaces the military tutelage with stronger police control over the society with a traditionalist and conservative outlook.[63]

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[62] "Cumhurbaskani Gul'den 35. Madde degisikligine onay" [President Gul approves the change introduced to Article 35], Radikal, 30 July 2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/darbe_gerekcesi_35_madde_degisti-1144140, accessed on 11 August 2013.

[63] "Çevik Kuvvet: Genç, muhafazakâr ve itaatkâr" [Anti-riot forces: Young, conservative and obedient], Radikal, 4 June 2013, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/genc_muhafazakar_ve_itaatkar-1136152, accessed on 11 August 2013.

Still, it can be safely argued that the military tutelage has been greatly undermined in Turkey, even though the norms of patriarchy and militarist glorification still persist in different fora. As Ersan Ugur says:

> "In the past, the military always took the final decision. I mean if something were to be done, then the military would have the final say. However, now, the prime minister can say that the military will just wait for the government's orders on the peace process with the PKK. Before no civilian authority could say anything as such. However, the militarist policies have not been defeated as we are now in a police state, which makes it debatable as to whether demilitarization actually takes place or not. It looks like only the locus of power has shifted [from the military to the police]." (personal interview)

All in all, the momentum that is generated by the European Union and the ECtHR, coupled with AKP's own agenda to confine the military to the barracks, has mainly set the parameters of the process within which the CO agency has been taking place in Turkey. The influence of international organizations has surely made CO more visible in the public and paved the way for the debate to institutionalize in the public imaginary. Even though ECtHR and the EU contributed greatly to this transformation, it was still the everyday resistance movements and acts of dissidence that resulted in COrs taking their cases up to the Court and finally reaching the point where CO became so visible and established in the public debates. The same goes for the AKP government's demilitarization manoeuvres, which certainly shaped the way the society has been seeing the military, the existence of the CO movement should be contextualized as part of the same process that leads to the exclusion of the army from social and political spheres. The acts of the CO movement created ruptures in the hegemony of militarism and so did the decisions of international organizations, and the political choices of the AKP government.

CONCLUSION

This study has departed from the puzzle that in contexts where common sense notions about security are so deeply entrenched in the society, how counter-hegemonic agents, who wish to bring about a different kind of thinking and doing security, can enable their political agency influential and effective. In a society like Turkey where militarism manifests itself in so many layers of social life, how might it be possible for actors of small power capabilities to challenge the system and contribute to the emergence of transformatory politics that they wish to see happen?

Critical Security Studies are characterized by a multiplicity of security referent objects, and the understanding of security as emancipation. Ken Booth, in his initial work in 1991, suggested that security agenda needed to include all physical and human constraints that might stop humans from carrying out what they would freely choose to do (Booth, 1991:40). Emancipation for him is the invention of humanity with the aim of freeing human beings from various oppressions, and emancipation and emancipation alone can produce true security. Emancipation's added value can be found in its applicability for different actors at different times. Moreover, it also sets a compass for the current deeds done in the name of security provision so that they do not compromise the possibility of future alternatives. The last point refers to the Critical Theory heritage of CSS because it recognizes that security thinking and practices are always coming from situated knowledges and that what seems normal and reified include the oppression and forgetting of many other alternative realities. This is the concept of immanent critique transmitted to CSS from Critical Theory. That is to say, existing orders already have within themselves the potential for a better life. Emancipatory politics should constantly be employed in a way to continuously move towards a better and more secure future.

However, CSS literature received criticism on two main streams. The first one is related to CSS's conceptualization of agency and how emancipatory intent can be realized in political practice. CSS expects change to emanate from

within, through civil society, intellectuals, and academics. Thinking of and writing on security, according to CSS, is a kind of agency. While this has some explanatory power, a more agency-focused sociological account that brings about transformatory power is needed in order to see how political strategies and tactics can be used in the presence of asymmetrical power relations (McSweened, 1999). Since not everybody in the society has the same potential of influence or even having a voice, CSS is in need of providing a more practical agency roadmap with emancipatory intent.

This study has treated these problems as issues of Critical Security Studies, and especially the issue of agency in this framework. While CSS expects emancipatory change to come from within through civil society and constitutive thinking, this presents an unease on the side of emancipatory actors on the field to act because some contexts are much harder to operate in, in terms of the level of saturation of traditional security concerns into the common sense. By taking the hard case of Conscientious Objection in Turkey, this study has aimed to, first, frame the objection movement as an agent of CSS, and second, analyze how the CO movement has sought to be influential through everyday acts of dissidence. By doing so, two aims have been taken into consideration: first, applying the case of the CO to the theoretical framework of CSS, which has not been attempted before, and thus enrich the theory's applicability to different social phenomena. The level of match here has proven to be high with the CO's ideals for a multiplicity of referent objects for security, the prioritization of the individual as the ultimate referent point, a broad agenda for security concerns, and a deepened understanding of security in the sense that the way security is tought and acted upon also reflects the way politics are conducted and maintained. By refusing to abide by limitations placed upon them to speak on security matters, COrs present a different type of politics where also actors of the everyday are actively seeking to provide inputs to security thinking and politics.

The second aim has also been to enrich CSS in terms of its conceptualization of security as emancipation, and this relates to the second stream of critique targeted at CSS. While the latter has been criticized for not elaborating enough on the concept of emancipation, this study also intended to show that a critical exploration of emancipation across scholars who worked on

the concept points to similarities and common themes between CSS and the wider literature of emancipation: CSS's emancipation as self-realization and the removal of barriers against this, and Rancière's conceptualization of emancipatory politics.

For the first one, Chapter 3 displayed the close link between emancipation and becoming a political being, and while doing so, it aimed to underline a crucial point for the understanding of security as emancipation: if this connection is established, then it will determine whether or not security defined as emancipation addresses political insecurities as a result of the inability of becoming a political agent. In this way, the chapter argued that emancipation is personal, and it is political, because the personal is at the end political itself. Everybody should be entitled to pursue self-realization and self-invention by virtue of being a humen being.

This also relates to Rancière's emancipatory politics. Arguing that all human beings, how ordinary they might be, have a right to be listened, Rancière suggests people should pre-suppose their equality with each other and act on that disposition. By doing so, they would be showing that everyone could occupy a different position from the one they currently occupy (Davis, 2010:79). This equality is claimed by what he calls 'the uncounted', those who strive for visibility in the society because they are denied to certain roles and voices. By acting on their active equality, the uncounted challenge assumptions that only some chosen and allowed people are eligible to speak on certain matters while other are forbidden to do so.

This hierarchical system of role-determination and distribution is what Rancière calls as 'the police'. This police system is the set of rules and practices that determine which roles can say what and to what extent, and which other roles are denied to have voice. The police system also creates situations where even if the uncounted makes claims and speaks on unallowed matters, those comfortable with the status quo may not hear or understand these claims. This is called a 'disagreement', and it is up to the uncounted to expose this disagreement and the wrong that is done to them. This is the context where the equality of the uncounted is asseted and claimed: the exposure of wrongness. It is through the

refusal of imposed identities that one might begin to invent oneself and create space for self-invention. This understanding is in line with CSS's conceptualization of emancipation. As much as the uncounted exposes the disagreement and the wrongness, and it claims new identities that were previously not allowed for by the police, it engages in a process of political subjectification. The latter is initiated by one's dis-identification itself from imposed identities, moves forward with the exposure of the wrong in public through everyday resistance tactics. Rancière also points out that even if the emancipatory move fails, it still introduces changes to the lives of those involved, including those who might come to the same position later and use past experiences of the uncounted as a starting point (May, 2010:78).

This gradual method of studying emancipatory politics, in turn, has also provided a map for a new way of applying CSS into hard cases through the identification of the uncounted, their strategies of dis-identification, re-naming and re-claiming, and tactical everyday resistance as in acts of dissidence. Rancière's framework is especially useful in systematically and categorically examinig the agency of critical parts of the society.

Going back to the issue of agency in CSS, Chapter 4 introduced the concept of acts of dissidence in junction with a processual understanding so as to break away from the pre-occupation of mainstream approaches with clear-cut, causal, and linear patterns of change. The literature on acts underlines a tendency in social sciences, and in international relations in particular, to grant primacy to the analysis of repetitive and foreseeable activities at the expense of the study of ordinary daily movements. Looking at patternized, predictable practices, this tendency has also focused on the power of the modern state as effective agents, and overlooked the situations where actors of less conventional power resources aspire to contribute to emancipatory change. The literature on acts then asks the question of how it might be possible to account for actors which become claimants of rights and action under unexpected circumstances (Isin, 2008:17). In a similar way to the uncounted who are not allowed to claim rights and responsibilities on certain matters, the issue of how subjects can become claimants when they are least expected is where acts operate.

Thinking on acts suggests shifting away from great events to less 'important' daily, ordinary influences. The latter refers to cases where actors with little power and no authority to be political stand up and intervene in the status quo. They create cracks and fissures within the hegemonic system by acting on their dissatisfaction with the way things are done in any particular setting. In other words, they feel the need to break away from the present order because the latter does not leave any room for them to help create the change they wish to see happen. The act is a creative move that emerges out of the frustration felt by the uncounted because of its inability to act. It thus comes up with new ways of acting by creating a rupture in the given (Isin, 2008:25). These acts of dissidence are the tools through which subjects constitute themselves as political actors. They refer to the process by which the enactment of the act creates a new scene with a new political being in place. These acts are also of tactical nature because they target dominant processes that deeply penetrate many layers of social life. They do not aim to exert influence on an identifiable agent, but they are designed to manipulate their environment constantly in oder to create opportunities for social change (Bleiker, 2000:213). Therefore, tactical acts of dissidence do not need to seek immediate causality, but they are to be contextualized in a larger processual structure that might accentuate their penetration. Operating with processes enable the researcher to look for change tendencies in a long period of time outside of the logic of big spectacular events that prioritize immediate causality. Processes are what empower acts to create a new scene and new claimants of rights and responsibilities.

The explanatory power of the acts of dissidence in a tactical way within processes also point to the areas where the approach of norm diffusion outlined in Chapter 2 falls short of giving an answer to the issue of agency in CSS. First of all, norm diffusion places too much emphasis on intentionality and purposefulness on the part of the norm initiator. However, this is not always the case with acts of tactical nature, or personal fights that still result in unintended results that contribute to the emergence of emancipatory politics. Following the principle of the personal being political, this study takes into account even the little cracks and fissures that ordinary people cause in the dominant script through their everyday resistance movements. The latter is not covered by the

norm diffusion literature even though they might still contribute to the promotion of anti-militarism or the idea of security without militarism. Norm diffusion theory misses out on these ordinary acts of resistance because of its interest in tracing causal change between identifiable actors.

A secondary element where norm diffusion explanatory model might not be entirely suitable for the study of the CO from an agency point of view is that norm diffusion theory necessitates that the norm-initiator is considered by the public as having a legitimate identity compatible with the norm at hand. However, the CO in Turkey are seen with a variety of derogative labels such as indifels, traitors, lazy people, free riders, anti-nationalists, less than a man, etc… Given that norm diffusion theory would not have the possibility of a successful diffusion very high in that sense. In a nutshell, norm diffusion's pre-occupation with tracing causal change, in the sense of one party changing the other, or its tendency to focus on big-bang kind of changes would leave the analysis of the CO movement in Turkey as a security agent incomplete by virtue of not taking into account ordinary acts of dissidence and resistance. However, it might still prove useful in looking at how, for example, the discourse of anti-war stance has diffused among the Turkish society in demonstrations against interventions against Iraq or Syria, and how this rhetoric of "we will not be anybody's soldiers", which had been invented by the CO movement, was later picked by wider segments of the anti-war civil society movements. It could also be used in looking at how the impact of European Court of Human Rights decisions influenced the CO movement in Turkey.

Before bringing together all these theoretical tools and applying them to the case of the CO in Turkey, this study opted to have a background chapter on militarism in Turkey in order to contextualize Turkish conditions and see to what extent militarism, as in Rancière's police, sets roles, determines forms of appropriate behaviour, allows or forbids actors to have claims on particular topics. As the norm diffusion literature suggests, an already localized norm might make it both easier and harder for newly promoted norms that interact with the localized one. Chapter 5 argued that militarism does exist in Turkey to a large extent and it is a pervasive ideology that has sunk in across many layers of daily

life. By doing so, it prescribes and sanctions who has the right to speak, and who can claim which pre-determined or pre-allowed roles in a given situation.

Being both an ideology and a social process, militarism refers to a set of institutional arrangements and everyday practices that strive for the continous mobilization of society to prepare for, support, and fight wars, confusing the boundaries between war and peace, and military and civilian life. It glorifies practices and norms associated with militaries that come to interfere and mould the civilian spehere in a militarist understanding. It signifies a close engagement with war and being ready for it. Even though was might be its pinnacle, militarism is also about the penetration of the civilian sphere by institutionalized military values. This militarist process, called militarization, is about the material and discursive nature of military dominance (Lutz, 2002:735). Militarism also enforces certain types of distinct behaviour performed by both women and men. While men are supposed to prove their manhood by being tough, challenging and prone to aggression (Peterson and Runyan, 1999:118), women are typically portrayed as "mothers, wives, and caregivers bearing and raising sons to send off to war to fight for their nation." (Alexander, 2010:71). In the Turkish example too, militarism blurs the distinction between the civilian and military realm, regulates gender roles hierarchically according to military norms, and reserves a special place for military service and the army as a natural, timeless, cultural trait of the Turkish nation: 'a military-nation whose every child is born a Turk'.

Crafted in early 1930s, the idea of the military-nation argues that Turks have always been characterized with being good soldiers and that they have always been naturally military-prone people. This idea, since its conception, has been transmitted to younger generations through compulsory courses in all levels of pre-university education. It renders military service a cultural-national duty that should not be debated given its naturalness. By doing so, it not only reinforces and reifies a certain type of masculinity in Turkey that discrimates against the disabled or the gay community, it also grants the latter sacredness and patriotism, something it denies to women by limiting their function only to mothers or carers.

However, militarist practices are not only limited to ideological formations, institutional arrangements or textbooks. For example, in primary, elementary and high schools, sports classes are conducted in a way to train students in how to march like a soldier; or national holidays that are dedicated to the youth or to the children are celebrated with military parades and disciplined mass shows in stadium. The military's breach into the civilian economic sphere through the Armed Forces Mutual Fund and the Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces are also discussed as privileged institutions that enjoys various exemptions in tax collection or legal arrangements, giving them a distinc advantage over civilian firms and economic players. In academia too, there has been a lack of interest in issues of militarism in Turkey, and the focus remained limited to the military-civilian relations taking place in political decision-making processes.

Looking back on the hard case, the uneasy situation with which Turkish COrs have to cope with is still in place today. One of the most recent examples is the case of Onur Erdem, who began his military service back in January 2006, left his unit in April and was arrested in July 2006 for desertion. After a series of releases and arrests, and ten months in prison, he tried to seek asylum in Greek Cypriot Administration on the ground of freedom of conscience. Upon the refusal of his claim, he was returned to Istanbul on 11 July 2013, and was arrested. Erdem expressed his objection in 2011, declaring that he did not want to be part of the "ongoing war in his country" and would refuse resuming his military training.[64] He is not the only one who officially claimed asylum on the grounds of CO. COr Ugur Bilkay succeeded in obtaining asylum in Italy, while COr Bilal Damla put his claim in the United Kingdom, and is currently being detained in a refugee camp near Heathrow, London waiting for his case to be decided on. For Onur Erdem's case, the Association of CO, recently founded to provide institutional presence to the cause, made a public statement, stressing

[64] "Vicdani Retci Onur Erden'e ozgurluk" [Freedom to COr Onur Erden], Demokrat Haber, 13 August 2013, http://www.demokrathaber.net/guncel/vicdani-retci-onur-erdene-ozgurluk-h21840.html, accessed on 13 August 2013.

that as COrs, anti-militarists and anti-war activists, they were on the streets and stood in solidarity with Onur.

CO's activism and its presence have not waned in the last twenty years despite its criminalization, prosecution and other forms of practical ways of discouragement. The point COrs are making is that every ordinary member of the community in Turkey is entitled to have conscious convictions that can be defended in the public arena without necessarily possessing the right to do so.

Moreover, COrs undermine the militarist tutelage in the country, along with the effect of supranational bodies such as ECtHR or the EU, or the influence of AKP's policies of limiting military's presence to the military realm. COrs and CO activists act as forces of emancipation because they have a vision for "a better world" and ideals of self-realization. They wish to emancipate themselves from the limitations of the militarist system that surrounds them, and by doing so they hint at and vocalize a different kind of politics where glorification of military values is no longer applicable. By enacting themselves as political beings, they operationalize agency by merely living in this community and speaking up on matters where they are not allowed to do so. They expose the injustice done to them, problematize the imposed identities attached to their beings and invent and re-claim new ones in the form of subjectification. By doing so, they remove the barriers dictated on their lives in an attempt to provide for another reality, i.e. emancipatory transformation. They act out of the frustration that currently existing roles for political agency are closed and very limited, especially in respect to Article 318 - alienating the public from military service, of the Turkish Penal Code.

By problematizing the "givenness" of the institution of military service, they also speak on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, on matters of armament, transition to professional army, the role of the state in providing security for its citizens in a trade-off with democracy, rights and freedoms, and the gender hierarchy created by militarism which glorifies military masculinity while describing femininity as something to be protected and as weak. They underline the importance of being more inclusive in respect to a multitude of referent objects for security and a variety of non-military topics and sectors.

Lastly through acts of dissidence in the form of everyday resistance and tactics of dis-identification and active political agency, they create ruptures in the given order. Their objections and activism are not expected, are often unwelcome, and they are the means of enabling themselves politically. Once the move of security as emancipation is adopted, emancipation is politics and politics is emancipation, and that Rancière framework of understanding the agency of the dissatisfied is adopted, then the case of CO in Turkey appears as a valid example of emancipatory-critical security thinking and practice. It should also be argued that the agency of the CO movement is mostly tactical in nature as it targets militarism as a process, but selects the realization of the recognition of the right to CO as a strategic priority, in line with CSS's emancipatory realism.

Naturally the agency of CO is not the only source of transformation that is going on in Turkey. As this study suggests, such change or transformation happens in a process, and it is not linear or does not happen in a big-bang manner. The agency of this movement of small power and capabilities must be situated in a context where:

- international organizations such as the ECtHR or the EU make binding interventions on matters of militarism, or/and
- the AKP government promotes a policy of restraining the military to the civilian sphere. The importance of these two inputs has been shown through the Twiter analysis provided above.

The next step in this research would be to undertake a bigger project that aims to reveal more examples of non-statist and non-militarist security understandings in Turkey, both from or pre-Republican period. The exploration of already existing potentials and silenced possibilities is what Critical Theory is best at. The current study would also fit in this wider project as a starting point for the de-myhtification of the fact that security is and has to be militarist, and should be spoken about by the state only. This study and the possibility of the wider project it might evolve into also presents an opportunity in saying more on the issue of agency in CSS, which is often misunderstood or misconceptualized by its critics who accuse CSS for having no theory of practical agency and change. The concept of emancipation and a categorical method of working with

critical agency, as in the case of this study, should stand as an interesting point of departure for further enrichment of the CSS project. Lastly, in the case of CO being regulated in the Turkish law, which is likely to happen one way or another given the binding decisions of the ECtHR, it would be another academically intriguing point to explore where the CO movement's agency will evolve to in the next steps of undermining and abolishing militarism's multiple faces in social phenomena.

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TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Bu çalışma Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe önemli bir yer tutan Güvenlik Çalışmaları ekseninde gerçekleştirilen bir araştırmanın sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Araştırmanın temeli, herhangi bir toplumda, güvenlikle ilgili bazı varsayım ve yaklaşımların toplum çapında, söylemsel ve uygulama alanlarında sahip olabileceği hegemonik güç karşısında, alternatif ve eleştirel güvenlik anlayışı temelinde şekillenen diğer güvenlik failliklerinin nasıl gerçekleştirilip, etkili kılınabileceği sorusu üzerinde şekillenmiştir. Türkiye örneğinde düşünecek olursak, militarizmin ve devlet merkezciliğin hayatın birçok alanına nüfuz etmiş olması nedeniyle, anti-militarist ve devlet dışı bir güvenlik anlayışının hangi yollarla gerçekleştirilebileceği and değişime açık siyaset ve politikaların nasıl ilerletilebileceği soruları bu çalışma için öne çıkmıştır.

Güvenlik Çalışmaları literatürü, genel ve basitleştirilmiş bir söylemle Geleneksel Güvenlik Çalışmaları ve Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları adlı iki düşünce sistemi etrafında şekillenmiştir. Uluslararası İlişkiler disiplininde, özellikle Soğuk Savaş dönemi süresince hakim olan realist ve neo-realist kuramların da büyük etksiyle, Geleneksel Güvenlik Çalışmaları şu unsurlar çerçevesinde şekillenmiştir: Devlet güvenliğinin diğer güvenlik birimlerin (bireyler, sosyal gruplar, toplumlar, çevre vs...) güvenliğinden, devletin güvenlik sağlama kapasitesinin de diğer birimlerin güvenlik sağlama kapasitelerinden daha önde tutulması; anarşik uluslararası sistemde, güvenlik ikilemi prensibi çerçevesinde, her devletin kendi güvenliği ve varoluşunu diğer ülke ve güvenlik birimlerinin varoluşundan üstte tutup, kazan-kaybet mantığıyla hareket etmesi; bu varoluşun askeri odaklı güç unsurlarının artırımı yoluyla garanti altına alınması; halihazırda varolan ve hakim durumdaki güvenlik yapılarının doğal ve objektif gerçeklikten kaynaklanan dış dünyadaki tehditlere cevap vermesi ve değişime yatkın olarak değerlendirilmemesi.

Ancak geleneksel güvenlik çalışmalarında, özellikle Soğuk Savaş'ın son dönemlerine doğru tespit edilen belli başlı eksiklikleri gidermek, disiplinde yeni

açılımlar sağlamak ve diğer çalışma alanlarındaki gelişmeler ışığında güvenlik kavramını yeniden sorgulamak amacıyla eleştirel ve alternatif güvenlik çalışmaları ve güvenlik çalışmalarında yeni yaklaşımlar geniş bir çatı altında boy göstermeye başlamıştır. Bu yeni kuramların önde gelen özellikleri şöyle sıralanabilir: Devlet ya da ulusal güvenliğin sağlandığı her durumun otomatik olarak vatandaşların, bireylerin, toplulukların ya da toplumların güvenliğini de sağlayamaması, daha da önemlisi belli noktalarda devlet otoritesinin bu diğer analiz birimlerinin güvenliklerini tehdit edici hale gelmesi; bunun uzantısı olarak, çeşitli güvenlik sorunlarında "kimin güvenliği?" ve "nasıl güvenlik?" sorularının gündeme getirilmesiyle güvenlik için birden çok analiz biriminin ve güvenlik alanının var olduğu; güvenlik analiz birimlerinin ve güvenlik konularının genişletilmesi; hakim güvenlik anlayışının farklı güvenlik alternatiflerini göz ardı ettiği; yine hakim olan güvenlik anlayış ve yapısının uluslararası toplumun çoğunluğunun lehine işlemiyor olması ve değişimin gerekliliği ve yaratılabilmesi; güvenlik sorunlarının söylemler ya da dilsel çerçeveler yoluyla sosyal inşa sürecinden geçerek tehdit haline getirilmeleri ve böylece objektif değil, değişime açık sübjektif ve inşa edilmiş gerçekler haline gelmeleri. Eleştirel güvenlik çalışmalarının en temel noktası, geleneksel güvenlik yapıları içerisinde yer bulamayan, ancak yine de küresel nüfusun büyük bir kısmının hayat koşullarını yaşanmaz hale getiren bir dizi güvenlik sorununu ve analiz birimini gündeme getirmek ve güvenlik kavramının bu şekilde tekrar düşünülmesi gerekliliğinin altını çizmektir.

Ken Booth'un başını çektiği Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları, Welsh veya Aberystwyth okulu olarak adlandırılmakta ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası etkisini daha fazla hissettiren eleştirel güvenlik yaklaşımlarında önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Booth'a gore güvenlik birey, toplum ve diğer güvenlik analiz birimlerinin özgürleştiği oranda gerçekleşen, bu aktörlerin özgürlüklerinin sağlandığı, geliştirildiği ve sürekli genişletildiği bir ortamda var olan bir kavramdır. Askeri ve devlet merkezli güvenlik anlayışından uzaklaşarak birçok farklı konuyu ve güvenlik aktörünü konu edinen Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları bu özgürleşme sürecini güvenlik sağlama sürecinin merkezine oturtması nedeniyle önem kazanmıştır. Özgürleşme, Booth için insanlığın ne demek olabileceğinin keşfi sürecidir ve bireylerin kendi potansiyellerini gerçekleştirmelerinin önündeki tüm

engellerin kaldırılması çabalarının tümüne özgürleşme süreci denir. Gerçek güvenlik ancak özgürleşmeye doğru gidildiği ölçüde yakalanabilir.

Özgürleşme anlamında güvenlik anlayışının bir diğer katkısı da üretilen tüm güvenlik kuramlarının ve uygulamalarının her daim belirli bir kesimin doğruları ve kısıtlı bilgisi dahlinde üretildiğinin altını çizmesidir. Booth'a göre, heryerde mevcut ve içkin bir eleştirellik (immanent critique) temelinde hareket eden araştırmacı, her yeni ulaşılan güvenlik sonucu ve durumunun daha da ileri gidebileceğini aklından çıkartmamalıdır. Ancak özgürleşme yolunda atılacak sürekli adımlar sayesinde daha güvenli bir ortam yaratılabilinir. Bu özgürleşme süreci ve özgürleştirici politikaların oluşumu da Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları için sivil toplum, entelektüeller ve akademisyen ile kanaat önderlerinin çabaları sonucu gerçekleşebilir. Güvenlik alanında düşünme, kuram oluşturma ve bu konuda bilgi paylaşımı yapmak Eleştirel Güvenlik anlayışının faillik yaklaşımının temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Booth'un oluşturduğu Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları yaklaşımı ana iki temelde eleştirilere maruz kalmıştır. Birinci eleştiri özgürleştirici politikaların siyasi ve sosyal alanda nasıl hayata geçirileceğine değin bir anlayışı temsil etmektedir. Bu anlayışa göre herhangi bir toplumda değişim sağlamak amacıyla yola çıkan aktörler ve statükocu diğer taraflar arasında güç farkı olabilir. Sonuç olarak tüm aktörlerin söylem ve hareketlerinin aynı ölçüde dinlendiği ve dikkate alındığı söylenemez. Bu anlamda özgürleştirici politikaları uygulamaya sokmak isteyen aktörlerin ne gibi siyasi stratejiler ve araçlar kullanabilecekleri Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları tarafından detaylı olarak incelenmemiştir. Başta da belirtildiği gibi, özellikle geleneksel güvenlik anlayışı temelinde toplumda yaygınlık ve görünürlük kazanmış ve normalleşmiş yaklaşımlar karşısında özgürleştirici güvenlik söylemlerinin failliğe nasıl aktarılabileceği konusunda Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarının yeni araştırmalara ihtiyaç duyduğu gözlemlenmektedir.

Bu eleştiriye bir cevap aramak ve Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları kapsamında hegemonya karşıtı faillik yaratma çabasında olan güvenlik aktörlerinin bu failliklerini nasıl gerçekleştirebilecekleri sorusu bu çalışma kapsamında Türkiye'de Vicdani Red hareketi çerçevesinde örneklendirilmiştir.

Bu anlamda Türkiye Vicdani Red ve anti-militarizm hareketi öncelikli olarak Eleştirel Güvvenlik Çalışmalarının öngördüğü hususlara uygun bir fail olduğu gösterilmiştir. Devlet dışı analiz birimlerine yapılan vurgu, askeri sector dışındakiş diğer güvenlik konularına verilen önem, şiddet karşıtı kişisel mücadele yoluyla siyasete yeni yollarla dahil olma çabası ile özgürleşme yolunda siyasi aktör olma iddiası gibi özellikler Vicdani Red hareketine dahil bireyleri Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları faili olmaya yetkin kılmaktadır. Kendilerine empoze edilen bir takım kimlik öğelerini red etme ve yenilerine sahip olma iddiası yoluyla vicdani retçiler ve bu hareket içinde yer aktivistler yeni bir siyasey tarzına ve yeni siyasi aktör olma yollarına işaret etmektedirler.

İkinci eleştiri ise özgürleşme kavramına bu denli büyük önem atfeden bir kuram olarak Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarının bu kavram üzerinde detaylı bir tartışmaya girmemesi yönündedir. Bu anlamda bu çalışma özgürleşme kavramını siyaset bilimindeki tartışmalar ile beraber detaylı olarak ele alarak Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarının temel argümanı olan özgürleşme temelinde güvenlik yaklaşımına kavramsal katkı yapmayı da amaçlamıştır.

Bu çerçevede özgürleşme kavramı ile siyasal bir aktör olma arasındaki yakın ilişki esas alınmıştır. Bu ilişkinin sağlıklı bir şekilde kurulabilmesi Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır çünkü eğer bu ilişki sağlanabilirse, o zaman siyasi hak ve taleplere sahip olma konusu da güvenlik çalışmaları altına alınabilir demektir. Bireysel ve toplumsal güvenlik için önemi büyük olan bu yaklaşım özgürleşme ve güvenlik arasındaki ilişkinin temelini oluşturmakta, feminizmin temel yaklaşımlarından olan kişisel olanın aynı zamanda siyasi olduğu anlayışının da altını çizmektedir. Sonuç olarak kişilerin kendi potansiyellerini geliştirmelerine imkan tanınması ve çevrelerindeki dünyayı şekillendirmek için siyasi adımlar atmalarının önünün açılması özgürleşmeye giden yolda mihenk taşları olarak görülmektedir. Bu anlamda siyasi hak ve talep sahibi olabilmek ve bu anlamda sesini duyurabilmek güvenliğe giden yolda vazgeçilmez adımlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır.

Özgürleştirici politikaların sahada nasıl gerçekleştirilebileceği hususuna gelince, bu konuda özgürleşme literatüründen Jacques Rancière'in yaklaşımı bu çalışma için çok yararlı araçlar sağlamıştır. Rancière'e gore sıradan tüm

vatandaşlar birbirleriyle fikir beyan etmek ve dinlenmek açısından eşit konumdadır. Bireyler bu eşitliğin var olduğunu farz ederek ve bilerek davrandıkları ölçüde kendilerine izin verilmeyen konularda bile kendilerine layık görülmeyen kimlikleri giyerek konuşma ve davranma yetisine sahip olurlar. Rancière sesi az duyulan ya da belli konularda ses çıkartması uygun bulunmayan toplum kesimlerine 'sayılmayanlar' adını vermektedir. Bu sayılmayan kesim aktif eşitlik ilkesi çerçevesinde hareket ederek kendinden beklenmeyecek ve bir nevi hakkı olmayan konularda söz sahibi olduğu iddia eder ve bunun onanmasına gerek duymadan bazı davranışlarda bulunur.

Kimin hangi konuda konuşup konuşamayacağını, hangi rollerin kimler için uygun ve müsait olduğunu belirleyen sistemler bütününe Rancière 'polis' adını vermektedir. Ancak bunun günlük hayattaki polisle bir alakası yoktur. Rancière'in polis sistemi kimlerin hangi konularda söz sahibi olup olmayacağını anlatan beklentiler, inanışlar ve farzlar bütünüdür. Sayılmayanların yapması gereken polisin kısıtlayıcı yapısını ve kendilerine yapılan haksızlığı göz önüne sermektir. Bu anlamda sayılmayanların beklenmeyen çıkış ve hareketleri polis ve statükü yanlısı taraflarca bazı zaman anlaşılamaz ya da görmezden gelinir. İşte sayılmayanların takınması gereken tavır kendilerine yapılan bu haksızlığı gözler önüne sermektir. Bunun ilk yolu sayılmayanlara empoze edilen kimlik ve aidiyet anlayışlarının reddedilmesidir. Bu tavır Eleştirel Güvenlik Anlayışı'ndaki özgürleşme anlayışı ile de birebir benzerlik göstermektedir çünkü kişinin kendi potansiyelini gerçekleştirmesinin ilk adımı halihazırda üzerinde bulunan kısıtlayıcı aidiyetleri reddetmesinden geçer.

Sayılmayanlar kendilerine yapılan haksızlık ve yanlışı toplum içerisinde direniş ve görüş ayrılığı taktikleriyle göz önüne sermeye çalışır. Rancière'e gore bu taktikler tam olarak başarıya ulaşmasa bile bu adımı atan kişilerin hayatlarında bir değişim yaratacağı gibi, gelecekte de aynı yola başvurabilecek kişiler için hazır bir başlangıç noktası oluşturmaktadır.

Rancière'in bu özgürleştirici siyaset modeli Eleştirel Güvenlik Anlayışı'nın gerçek hayattaki failliği için de yararlı bir metod sunmaktadır. Öncelikle sayılmayan kesimin tespiti yapılmalı, daha sonar kendi üzerilerinden atmaya çalıştıkları aidiyetler incelenmeli, daha sonra kendilerine biçtikleri yeni

yaratıcı kimlik ve rollere bakılmalı, ve tüm bu süreçte günlük fikir ayrılığı ve direnme hareketlerine de büyük önem verilmelidir. Bu anlamda çalışmanın dördüncü bölümü görüş ayrılığı-muhalefet eylemleri (acts of dissidence) kavramını öne çıkartmaktadır.

Günlük görüş ayrılığı-muhalefet ve direniş eylemleri failliğe yeni bir bakış getirmenin temel taşını oluşturmaktadır. Buna gore sosyal bilimler ve özellikle Uluslararası İlişkiler literatüründe düzen, kalıplar ve tekrar eden öngörülebilir kavramlarla ilgili bir saplantı vardır. Bu aynı yaklaşım modern devleti de en yetkin fail olarak görmektedir ve bunun dışında kalan diğer aktörlerin çaba ve hareketlerini incelemekten uzak durur. Bu anlamda 'eylem' kavramı üzerinde oluşan bu yeni literature kendisinden beklenmeyen zamanlarda kendisinden beklenmeyen hak ve ödevleri kendine hak gören aktörlerin eylemlerini kendine konu edinmektedir. Etrafındaki yapının ve diğer aktörlerin karşı çıkışına ve geleneksel anlamdakş güç öğelerinin eksikliğine rağmen bu failler nasıl olur da kendilerini dikkate alınacak hak sahipleri haline getirebilirler sorusu eylem literatürünün temel prensipini oluşturmaktadır.

Bu anlamda eylem üzerine tahayyül etmek büyük olay ve hareketlerden daha küçük ve kılcal günlük eylemliliklere doğru yönelmeyi öğütlemektedir. Bu kılcal eylemlilikler hegemonic sistemde küçük çatlak ve fisürler yaratırlar ve çıkış noktaları halihazırda bulnan davranış ve faillik şekillerinden duydukları memnuniyetsizlik ve yetmemezlik halidir. Bir başka deyişle içinde bulunulan durumdan çıkmak temel amaçtır çünkü Rancière'in de dediği gibi bu sistem toplumun belli kesimlerine hareket alanı bırakmayarak onların failliliklerini kısıtlamaktadır. Bu muhalefet ve direniş eylemi yaratıcı bir davranış olarak ortaya çıkar ve yeni faillilik şekillerine işaret etmeye çalışarak içinde bulunduğu ortamda yeni koşullar üretmeye gayret eder. Bu eylemlerin gerçekleştirilmesi yoluyla o sayılmayan denilen aktörler kendilerini yeni bir siyasi varlık, hak ve ödev sahibi taraflar olarak tanımlarlar.

Bu eylemler doğaları gereği taktiksel eylemlerdir çünkü büyük süreç ve sistemlerle mücadele ederken bu sistem ve süreçlerin hayatın birçok kesimine çoktan nüfuz ettiklerini idrak edip onları sürekli bir manüpülasyon ve yıpratma sürecine sokmaya çalışırlar. Bu şekilde süreçsel bir anlayış içerisinde değişime

katkı yapabileceklerine inanmaktadırlar. Bu anlamda görüş ayrılığı-muhalefet ve direniş eylemleri bir anda ve çabuk gerçekleşmeyen, ve sebepsellik prensibinden ayrı duran değişim süreçlerine odaklanırlar. Süreç kavramı içerisinde ele anınan bu eylemerin sonuçlarının uzun vadede ortaya çıkması ve eylemin hemen ardından etkisi görülmese de kılcal düzeyde bir takım değişimlere yol açtıklarının gösterilmesi eylem literatürünün bu çalışmaya katkısını oluşturmaktadır.

Bu anlamda büyük, hemen gözlenebilen ve sebepsellik ilişkisi içinde oluşan değişim anlayışlarından uzaklaşma eğilimi, genel olarak faillik ve değişim konusunda büyük açıklayıcı role sahip olan norm yayılımı literatürünün de işlenmesinş ve eleştirilmesini gerektirmiştir. Normal koşullarda yeni bir normun, mesela özgürleşme anlamında güvenlşk anlayışının, yeni bir ortamda yeşerebilmesi ve kalıcı olabilmesinin yollarını norm yayılımı literatürü belli safhaların izini sürerek açıklayabilir. Norm yayılımı kuramı bunu yaparken normun özelliklerine, norma sahip çıkıp onu bir nevi yeni ortama sokmaya çalışan norm girişimcilerinin niyet, taktik ve özelliklerine, ve yine normu kendi bünyesine katabilecek potansiyel norm takipçilerinin kimliklerine bakar, halihazırda var olan diğer normların yeni norm ile olan olumlu ya da olumsuz ilişkisini inceler.

Ancak bu çalışma için norm yayılımı literatürünün bazı sebeplerden dolayı yetersiz kaldığı görülmüştür. Birincisi norm yayılımı literatürü tarafların bilinçli bir şekilde ve isteyerek her hareketi yaptığını farz eder, oysa ki eylem literatünün katkısı da göz önüne alındığında günlük yapılan ve kişisel olsa da, kişisel olanın politik olduğu önermesinden yola çkarak yine de siyasi sonuçlar doğuran davranışların bazen istem ve plan dışı geliştiği görülmektedir. Norm yayılımı kuramı bu çabaları ele almamaktadır. Bu bağlamda norm yayılımı kuramı kesin, kararlı ve kolayca görülebilen aktörlere karşı olan ilgisi sonucunda muhalefet ve direniş eylemliliklerine yeterince önem vermemektedir. Ayrıca vicdani red hareketinin incelenmesi açısından da norm yayılımı kuramı yetersiz kalabilmektedir. Norm yayılımını kolaylaştıracak faktörler arasında norm girişimcilerinin nasıl görüldüğü ve tavsiye edilen normun bu ortamda ne kadar zamandır yer aldığı, normun içeriğinin açıklığı ve diğer var olan normlarla olan ilişkisi yer almaktadır. Bu unsurlara bakıldığında vicdani red hareketinin

girişimcileri toplumda 'vatan hainleri, tembel adamlar, korkaklar, beleşçiler, adam olmayanlar' olarak görülmesi norm yayılımını oldukça güçleştirmektedir. Ancak yine de bu literatürün faydalı olabileceği alanlar saptanmıştır. Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nin vicdani red ile ilgili verdiği kararlar neticesinde bu normun Türkiye hukukuna dahil edilmesi olasılığı bunlara bir örnek olarak verilebilir. Bir diğer çarpıcı örnek de savaş ve şiddet karşıtı olarak vicdani red hareketi tarafından geliştirilmiş olan 'Kimsenin Askeri Olmayacağız' sözünün daha sonra daha geniş sivil toplum kesimlerince Irak ve Suriye'ye müdahale seçenekleri tartışılırken gösterilerde kullanılmış olmasıdır. Yine 2013 Haziran ayında gerçekleşen Gezi Parkı olaylarında yine bu söylemin tekrar canlanmış olması da norm yayılımı perspektifinden incelenebilir.

Halihazırda var olan normlardan ve Türkiye Vicdani Red Hareketi'ni Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları'na uygun bir faillik örneği olarak tanıtırken, Türkiye'de özgürleşme ve güvenlik tartışmalarının ortasında yer alan bir başka kavram da çalışmanın bir diğer önemli ayağını oluşturmuştur: militarizm. Militarizm ve militarizasyon Türkiye'de hayatı yakından ilgilendirip birçok alanını şekillendiren kavramlar olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Militarizm en kısa şekilde askeri değerlerin toplumda yüceltilmesi, sivil ve askeri alanlar arasındaki ayrımın bulanıklaşması ve savaşın, şiddetin, ölümün ve savaş hazırlığı ile savaşçılığın övülmesi sürecidir. Militarizmin uç noktası sürekli bir savaş ve şiddet ortamı içinde olmak ise de, militarizm savaştan çok daha derin bir askerileşme sürecine işaret eder. Militarizm askeri vesayetin hayatın türlü alanlarına sirayet etmesini ve belli rol ve hareketlerin ya da sorunlara bulunacak çözümlerin askeri bir mantık içerisinde şekillendirilmesine tekabül eder. Bu bağlamda erkeklere asker olma, güçlü olma ve koruma vazifelerini verirken, kadınlara ve bunun dışında kalan erkeklikl tiplerine de ikincil bir statü tanır. Kadınlar ve kadınlık asker anneliği, fedakar eş ve korunması gereken varlık olarak tanımlanırken, askerlik özellikleri taşımayan engelli ya da eşcinsel gibi hegemonic maskülenliğin dışında kalan erkeklikleri de yok sayar, hakir ve zayıf görür.

Militarizmin bu tanımları Türkiye'de geniş bir uygulama alanı bulmaktadır. Özellikle 'ordu-millet' kavramının devlet eliyle kültürel ve düşünsel hayatın neredeyse ayrılmaz bir parçası haline getirilmesi, 'her Türk

asker doğar' anlayışının eleştirisinin bile yapılmasının suç olması miitarizmin Türkiye'de ne denli köklü bir varlığın olduğuna işaret eder. Eğitim ve askerlik yoluyla yeni nesillere aktarılan ordu-millet anlayışı askerliği tarih dışı bir kavram olarak tanıtmakta, onu Türk ulusunun kültürel doğal bir parçası haline getirmekte ve böylece tartışmaya açık bir sosyal inşa olduğu gerçeğinin üzerine örtmektedir. Ordu-millet anlayışı ordunun toplumdaki yerini sağlamlaştıran, sivil alana müdahalesini kolaylaştırıp meşrulaştıran bir unsure olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Askerliğe biçtiği özel rol ile de askeri erkekliği yüceltmekte, diğer cinsiyet rollerinin tahayyülünü zorlaştırmaktadır.

Ancak militarizm sadece ideolojik söylemlere ya da eğitimsel süreçlerle sınırlı değildir. Çocukların beden eğitimi dersinde askeri tertipte yürütülmesi, bayramların askeri tören ve tertiplerle kutlanması, askeriyenin ekonomik alanda OYAK ve Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı gibi kuruluşlarla başka kurumlara tanınmayan ayrıcalıklarla faaliyet göstermesi, ordu harcamalarının yakın zamana kadar Sayıştay denetiminden muaf tutulması, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu'nun eski siyasi karar verme süreçlerinde oynadığı başat rol, Kürt sorununa uzun yıllar askeri olmayan herhangi bir çözüm stratejisin geliştirilmemiş olması, ve bunun gibi birçok örnek militarizmin Türkiye'de ne denli derine nüfuz ettiğinin göstergeleridir.

Tüm bu kuramsal tartışmalar ışığında Türkiye Vicdani Red hareketi Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları'na uygun bir örnek fail olarak bu çalışmanın konusu olmuştur. Öncelikle vicdani red hareketinin özellikleriyle Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarının gündemi arasında bir paralellik kurulması gerekliliği ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu bağlamda Vicdani Red hareketi askeri olmayan güvenlik ve özgürleşme temelinde güvenlik anlayışlarının temsilcisi olarak tanıtılmıştır. Birincil olarak, vicdani retçiler ve aktivistler devletin ve askeriyenin güvenlik sağlama çabalarında akla gelen ilk özne olma durumunu reddetmektedirler. Vicdani Red hareketi, Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarına uygun olarak, bireyi, çevreyi, toplumu, kadınları, ve insanlığı güvenlik referans noktası olarak almaktadır. Aynı zamanda ordunun güvenlik alanında tek söz sahibi olmasını eleştirmeleri nedeniyle de Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarına yakın durmaktadırlar.

Vicdani Red hareketinin özgürleşme temelinde güvenlik anlayışı ile ilgili olan bağına gelince, bu bağ şöyle kurulmaktadır: Türkiye'de askerlik yapmamak ve askerlik hakkında olumsuz konuşmak yasayla cezalandırılmaktadır. Bu anlamda vicdani retçi ve anti-militaristler Rancière'in polis sistemi tarafından sayılmayanlar statüsünde görünmektedirler. Halihazırda var olan kimlikleri bu gibi konularda fikir sahip olmalarına izin vermemektedir ve bu seçeneksizlik içerisinde siyasi bir aktör olarak ortaya çıkmaları yasayla engellenmiştir. Vicdani Retçiler ve anti-militaristler bu anlamda kendilenden beklenmeyen yaratıcı bir şekilde muhalif eleştirilerini ve direnişlerini toplum önünde açıkça ortaya koymaktadırlar. Bu anlamda var olan siyasi seçenekleri kendi elleriyle çoğaltmakta, siyasi aktör olma iddiası taşımakta ve kamu tartışmalarına taraf olmaktadırlar. Rancière'in önerdiği model çerçevesinde 'doğal olarak asker' ya da 'askerliği ve militarist değerleri sevmek' gibi kendilerine empoze edilen aidiyetleri reddetmektedirler. Siyasi anlamda eylemliliklerini vatandaş ve insane olmaya dayandırırken, şiddet ve hiyerarşiden uzak faillik örnekleri sergilemekte ve böylece militarizmden kurtulmayı öğütlemektedirler. Yasa karşısında cezalandırılmalarına rağmen Türk militarizm hegemonyasında vicdani red ve anti-militarizm üzerinde kılcal çatlaklar oluşturarak kendilerini siyasi aktör durumuna getirmektedirler. Militarizm ile bir süreç gibi uğraşarak onun hayatın her alanındaki yansımalarına meydan okumaktadırlar. Böylece hem kendi potansiyellerini gerçekleştirme yolunda ilk adımı atmış olmakta, hem de geliştirdikleri yeni roller ve yeni siyasal söylemle de yeni ufuklar açmaktadırlar. Kendi hayatlarını ve izleyecekleri yolları kendilerinin çizmelerinin gerekliliğini de belirten vicdani retçiler ve anti-militaristler, özgürleşme kavramıyla iç içe geçmiş durumda görünmektedirler. Tüm bu sonuçlar Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmalarındaki özgürleşme anlamında güvenlik prensipine bire bir uyan direniş eylemlilikleridir.

Türk Vicdani Red hareketi aynı zamanda savaşı, hiyerarşiyi ve şiddetten arınmış eylemliği savunmasıyla beraber Eleştirel Güvenlik Çalışmaları failliğine uygun görünmektedir. Eylemliliklerinin tarzı yenilikçi ve yaratıcıdır, ki bu da eylem literatürüyle uyum göstermektedir. Sokak tiyatroları, şiddetten arınmışlık eğitimleri, Militurizm adı altında gerçekleşen günlğk hayatta militarizmin izlerini takip eden geziler düzenlemek bu yaratıcı yeni faillik şekillerine örnek

oluşturmaktadır. Süreçsel bir şekilde ele anınan bu eylemler, Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi'nin Türkiye'yi vicdani red düzenlemesi yapmaya zorlayan kararlarının etkileri ve Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin askeri vesayeti değiştirmye yönelik reformları ile daha da anlamlanmaktadır. Özellikle Avrupa İnsan Hakları Mahkemesi kararları ile hükümetten gelen vicdani ret açıklamalarının sosyal medyada yarattığı patlama bu faktörlerin özgürleştirici politikalar ve faillik açısından ne denli yararlı olduğunu da göstermiştir.