

REVISITING IMMANENCE AND *CONATUS* IN SPINOZA

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **REVISITING IMMANENCE AND *CONATUS* IN SPINOZA**

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This thesis focuses on the concept of immanence in Spinoza's philosophy and its importance in explicating theory of knowledge and *conatus*. While accounting for immanence, it will seek not only his metaphysics but also a critical discussion of transcendence and emanation. After the metaphysical system behind his philosophy is explained, his defense of necessitarianism will be emphasized. In this study, under the light of these, a coherent interpretation of Spinoza's solutions, how these relate to his theory of knowledge and striving, will be investigated.

**Keywords:** Spinoza, immanence, understanding, striving

## ÖZ

### SPINOZA'DA İÇKİNLİK VE VAROLMA ÇABASINA YENİDEN BAKIŞ

Yaylın, Berk

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu çalışma Spinoza'nın felsefesinde içkinlik kavramına ve onun anlama ve varolma çabasını açıklamadaki önemine odaklanmıştır. İçkinliği açıklarken Spinoza'nın sadece metafiziğine değil aynı zamanda aşkınlık ve içkinlikle de birlikte eleştirel bir tartışmasına bakacaktır. Felsefesinin arkasındaki metafizik sistem açıklandıktan sonra zorunluluğun savunulmasına vurgu yapılacaktır. Bu çalışmada, bu söylenenlerin ışığında ve Spinoza'nın çözümlerine tutarlı bir yorumla tüm bunların nasıl Spinoza'nın bilgi ve varolma çabası ile ilgili kuramıyla ilişki içinde olduğu incelenecektir.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Spinoza, içkinlik, anlama, varolma çabası

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

In this work, the main source was Shirley's version of *Ethica*. It is abbreviated as E. Nevertheless, at some places Curley, Elwes and White translations are referenced as well. Apart from the specifically provided page numbers in the work, the following abbreviations are extensively used:

A	Axiom
D	Definition
L	Lemma
Post	Postulate
C	Corollary
Dem	Demonstration
S	Scholium

For instance, EIIP13L7 denotes seventh Lemma of thirteenth Proposition of the second book of *Ethica*.

Besides *Ethica*, no abbreviations are used for editions or translations for the works mentioned but they remain in extended form in italics.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Born to a Jewish family in Amsterdam in 1632, the lens grinder, polishing lenses with “Jewish hands”, Baruch Spinoza become one of the foremost thinkers in the early modern era of philosophy.<sup>1</sup> He is ascribed many thoughts to the point of oxymoronism amongst which he could be called as a God intoxicated man and a systematic atheist (Bayle, 1965, p. 288).<sup>2</sup> Although there is a line of thought in contemporary philosophy history which derives its roots from the Cartesian *cogito* and extends to some offshoots of phenomenology, still there is an alternative to such route. In Lloyd’s words, “if to read Descartes is to read what we ourselves are, to read Spinoza is to get glimpses of what we might have been—of possibilities of self-consciousness that run against the grain” (1994, p. 169). We can easily grasp the sentence, that is, not from an individual perspective but another one, through which we see how individual and his/her relations emerge. However, the list cannot be confined to philosophical relations between Descartes and the another Faustian-souled thinker, Spinoza, but also extends to most contemporary idealist philosophies as well (Delahunty, 1985, p. 2). In that respect, and in general, Spinoza’s philosophy seems to be a solid alternative to Cartesian tradition. Yet, its power does not stem from being a crutch or a fix. It begins with a whole new variety of concepts and mechanism to understand and interpret what revolves around us. Nevertheless, it stands not totally distinct from more ancient roots, such as Stoicism, Judeo-Christian philosophies in general but by contorting and redefining, it radically alters these old views and concepts. A proper reading of

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<sup>1</sup> This is taken from the beginning line of Borges’ poem which, wholly, translates as the translucent hands of the Jew.

<sup>2</sup> In fact, he would even show dismay at his alleged piety and atheism. Though he rejected miracles as such, this disenchantment can be interpreted as preceding a re-enchantment of Nature, embodied in *Deus sive Natura*. Proceeding from that, he may even be said to propose salvation derived from *amor dei intellectualis* rather than more traditional ways of spirituality and religiosity of his age.

Spinoza, thus, requires to bear in mind the digressions from the previous philosophical conceptualizations.

Apart from the content, one of the beauty and difficulty in reading and thinking on Spinoza, in fact, derives from the same point. Each proposition with its scholia, corollaries, proofs and lemmas are so strongly interconnected so as to build up a whole, a whirlwind, without even intervening in the process.<sup>3</sup> This was a deliberate strategy for Spinoza, according to Nadler, and it was first explored and experimented with in the first appendix of *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being* (Nadler, 2006, p. 36).<sup>4</sup> Nonetheless, it also provides clarity and smoothness on the side of the scholar or any reader because one can readily start from any position, and later find his/her own way with respective definitions, axioms and so on.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, it also puts a burden on the reader as well as he dwells on the concepts regarding not only their particularity but also in its totality, that is necessarily with other propositions. In contrast to Bergson's encountering a "battleship of a dreadnought class", Della Rocca suggests that *Ethica* is "surprisingly accessible" indeed, even without "the forbidding landscape of propositions and demonstrations" (2008, p. 10). In my opinion, any serious student will admit this double ended sword of elegance and difficulty in studying Spinoza.

As it is the case in any other philosopher, each interpreter of Spinoza "seizes some one element in Spinoza's thought" (Hampshire, 2005, p.175). Proceeding from such a point is not only unavoidable but also it unleashes *tours de force* in developing

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<sup>3</sup> But some of the concepts are inevitably alien to English and most of the other European languages. So, the fragile paths to understand some of them are inevitably obscured and broken (Martineau, 1882, pp. 107–8).

<sup>4</sup> He experimented with dialogues and prose. The first of the dialogues is between Love, Understanding and Wisdom and second is between Theophilus and Erasmus (Spinoza, 2002, pp. 46–50).

<sup>5</sup> Though this initially seems to obscure the questions that it intends to resolve even more, his philosophy carries its own antidote (1965, p. 301).

distinctive styles and thoughts in history of philosophy.<sup>6</sup> My humble aim and the essential starting point is to bare Spinoza as a philosopher of immanence. Later other features of his philosophy can be derived from such initiative point. Amongst the most crucial philosophers who interpret Spinoza basing on immanence and philosophy of difference is undoubtedly Deleuze. He captured Spinoza not only in terms of providing a backbone to his own philosophy but also as a distinct form of philosophy to be read, taught and interpreted. Even in his minor doctoral thesis, *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza*, Deleuze tries to put Spinoza in a framework in which through immanence of the single substance, whole existence becomes a plane of expression. In addition to that, aforementioned, he also tried to explicate philosophy of Spinoza in its own terms such as he did in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*. However, in the thesis, my position does neither include Deleuzean conceptualization in understanding Spinoza in its totality nor endeavoring to find a connection between Spinoza's and Deleuze's philosophy. My attempt will be mainly confined to Spinoza's texts and will not directly extend to other great works. In that, I try to derive different frames of work in interpreting Spinoza without betraying integrity and continuity of the main problems, and, Deleuze's interpretation, as with many others, will be used, yet his distinct flavor in style and problematization of Spinoza will be spared. Thus, also their central focus will be left aside unless it will be related to the current topic at hand.

I will maintain that immanence in Spinoza could be most faithfully read from a necessitarian perspective which can still be defended. In addition, active/passive affections with its relation to adequate/inadequate ideas are not strongly separated from each other. This move does not only agree with immanence but also reckons rejection of an unbounded free-will and final cause. In doing that, the main text will be *Ethica* and especially its first three books and with a short addition from the fourth. For *Ethica*, I shall use two different translations, which have minor differences. These are Curley and Shirley translations. Elwes and White translations are also used whenever needed (in the case of differences and variances). Moreover, under the case

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<sup>6</sup> Badiou gives various examples from the history of philosophy with differing interpretations such as Hegel, Marx, Althusser, Guérault, Macherey and Negri. He also emphasizes the immense variety in fundamental reference to Spinoza (2011, p. 39).

of any conceptual ambiguity, I shall return back to the Latin version of the book. All Latin words, phrases and sentences and Elwes translations are taken from Rudolf Meijer's website which is a treasure for any apprentice of Spinoza's philosophy.

As Spinoza is one of the philosophers of immanence, first book is of utmost importance as it lays down the ground on which all other definitions, axioms and propositions make sense; as a result, it forms the essence of the second chapter. Without it, rest of his statements both on the nature of mind, body, emotions and desire would be inexplicable and ungrounded at best. Thus starting from the first part, my main intention is to explore not only what substance means for Spinoza but why it is important in different senses. These various senses involved are through infinity, naturalism, principle of sufficient reason (PSR), essence and parallelism, to name a few.<sup>7</sup> Throughout the thesis, I will focus on only some of these concepts of Spinoza. So, in the first chapter, immanence and Spinoza's ontological triad (substance, attributes and modes) will be explained and his substance monism will be evaluated.

Third chapter will be devoted to the necessitarianism. Distinguishing it from determinism, I will inquire into different senses of necessity from a causal standpoint which is an essential point for, especially, the upcoming parts in Spinoza's theory of understanding and affections (emotions). Although my general view is to conflate different senses of necessity into a unity, a faithful reading impedes that interpretation to be fully realized. After delving into *natura naturata* and *natura naturans*, I will turn to criticisms of necessitarianism and, later, its relation with essence. The main source of this chapter varies from first three book of *Ethica* to several interpretations

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<sup>7</sup> Amongst these, principle of sufficient reason (PSR) has a central importance since Spinoza used it on the background of nearly all proofs of propositions although they seem hidden. As a result, it needs to be defined and begs more attention. In second proof of EIP11, he starts with the sentence "for everything a cause must be assigned either for its existence or for its nonexistence" (2002, p. 222). The importance here lies in the account not only given in one way but two way. It arises as a byproduct of Spinoza's commitment to intelligibility, which is heavily related to naturalism (Della Rocca, 2008, p. 4). In the next chapters, I will support with additional explications concerning PSR and the question at hand because each use of PSR has a different bearing.

of Nadler, Lin etc. The responses and interpretations in this chapter, however, are probing rather than conclusive.

Second book of *Ethica* can be rightfully said to be reserved to the examination of mind and basis of understanding. In a manner, it comes the second in order and supposition, after the settling down of immanent substance, attributes and modes. As being limitations in nature, both in body and thought, our knowledge of ourselves rests on the knowledge of nature. Setting three different types of understanding, I will concentrate mainly on the division between first type and second type, namely of imagination and rational knowledge in the fourth chapter of the thesis. I contend that third type of understanding is roughly an extension of second type of understanding which is in accord with multiple interpretations. However, as with the previous section, PSR will also lead us there in understanding the chain of cause and effect and common notions. This is reflected in the concept of infinity which is helpful in underlying some compelling views of proper and improper understanding. I will mention some pivotal themes to be connected in the later chapter to build the relationship between activity and adequacy. In that sense, there will be continuity between this and the later chapter sections or more accurately this continuity is constructed upon the similar senses that are discussed in the first section to bring forth light to the second section, that is, on theory of knowledge.

Fifth chapter revolves around linking second book of *Ethica* to third and fourth by the conceptual connectivity between understanding, desire and *conatus*. In *Ethica*, yet, there are different translations of desire and striving which are not uncommon for other concepts throughout the book. Furthermore, basic affections (*laetitia*, *tristitia* and *cupiditas*) also bear dissimilar meanings when compared to ancient (Aristotelian and Stoic) and early modern (mainly Descartes). And, each varies with regard to the divisions made in pertaining to mind and mind-body, being conscious and unconscious and relating to activity or passivity. Even before explaining different senses of desire, he delves into polar description of a calculus of affections whose basic elements are pleasure/joy and pain/sorrow. At this section, my aim is not to

untangle how Spinoza advises us to refine our mind to achieve an ethical and peaceful life through encouraging active affections in contradistinction to passive ones but to illustrate the connection of desire and *conatus* with understanding and immanence. One of the central discussion is between Deleuze and Macherey concerning joyful passive affections (or joyful passions). In its link to *conatus*, affections and his theory of understanding together forms the fundamentals of his project and his fourth and fifth book, which I will not include in the thesis.<sup>8</sup> I will only try to lay these foundations.

In such body of work, hence, I shall widen the nexus of relations between immanence, theory of knowledge and *conatus*, so that it is plausible to realize and recognize desire and other affections without resorting to transcendence and non-natural frameworks. To be able to arrive at such discernment, yet, I believe this relation could only be *fully* realized by expounding and relocating his reading of theory of knowledge extensively of which this thesis accomplishes only a portion but not whole of it.

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<sup>8</sup> In fact, two of his works have shown that project. In his incomplete *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, he unhesitantly puts the cardinal aim as to achieve human perfection (Spinoza, 2002, p. 6). *Ethica*, despite not clearly put, can be said to presented to cultivate happiness and blessedness as well (Clatterbaugh, 1999, p. 130).

## CHAPTER 2

### IMMANENCE

As being the foundation of his philosophy, as explicated in first part of his epitome, *Ethica*, almost all of the immediate dealings in Spinoza are deeply embedded in the idea of God, or substance. So, the first section will be devoted to the idea of God or for my purpose, in a contemporary sense, his conceptualization of immanent substance. Yet, for an extended explanation of his view of immanence, it is not less than necessary to define his three pillars on which his whole metaphysical system depends. These three pillars are substance, modes and attributes. All of the three contain the seeds of his ontology and without any critical exposition it would be built on shaky grounds.

#### **2.1. Transcendence, Emanation and Immanence**

When it comes to mentioning Spinoza and immanence, one of the first relevant philosopher is Deleuze. His historical reading of immanence is essentially important in expounding its conceptual itinerary. He contrasts immanence and transcendence and even goes further to argue how even emanation, especially in the Neo-Platonist tradition, it falls short in bridging the gap and alleviating the problems in transcendence and transcendentalist views. However, apart from that introductory passage this comparison leaves not much space for other historical figures, because my main objective is to focus on Spinoza's own philosophy and initial responses without being swayed by attempts to incorporate his philosophical outlook into various projects.

Before attempting to enter into Spinoza's related philosophical parlance, I shall briefly go over conceptual distinctions of immanence from transcendence and emanation. Though difference between immanence and transcendence is much articulated, its comparison with emanation is relatively less evaluated. For that reason, I shall go over

some of the main aspects of that difference between immanence and emanation as well.<sup>9</sup>

Transcendence can be roughly defined as the doctrine that there is a gap between what accessible as represented in this world is and what real is, presumably in another world. It has offshoots both from ontological and epistemological standpoints but I would like to focus more on the ontological distinction with respect to Spinoza's philosophy. With a little political and religious undertone, May explains transcendence ontologically and epistemologically as standing "outside or above", and he gives Judeo-Christian God, transcending the world the human experience (2005, p. 27).

He also adds that there are various forms of transcendence and religious or political ones are only amongst these many manifestations of that philosophical tendency. Under this tendency philosophers' role is secured by grasping what is "real" to overcome the distinction between this world and another (e.g. Forms or Ideas).<sup>10</sup> In this bridging the gap, philosopher operates to bring the knowledge which is either distilled from this world to reach an abstract form or directly taken from another world. The difference between such distillation and direct grasp is pointed out by denoting that transcendence does not necessarily stem from or, in a sense, limited to conceptualizations concerning God. May exemplifies dual transcendence in Descartes to clarify that point:

For Descartes, the human subject requires assistance, an assistance that can be provided only by God. So the seeds of God are built into the subjectivity to which doubt has reduced Descartes, but God's being also transcends that subjectivity. Epistemologically, the human subject is first: it is the seat of knowledge. Ontologically, however, the subject follows in God's wake, since God both grants and guarantees the experience of the subject. (2005, p. 28)

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<sup>9</sup> A more in-depth reading on such emanation and efficient causality can be found in Gueroult's writings on Spinoza (i.e. *Dieu*). For the discussion of relating to emanation and its different kinds, see Suarez's writings on efficient causality but it seems that there is no direct reference to him by Spinoza or at least there is no "hard evidence" (Pereira, 2007, pp. 187–188).

<sup>10</sup> Forms and/or Ideas are usually attributed to Plato's philosophy as if there is a direct evidence, yet that alleged attribution only comes from a common thread in a variety of interpretations. Even it can be defended that there are several views of Plato's ontology, especially mentioned by Henry Jackson comparing *Phaedo* and *Republic* with *Parmenides* (1997, pp. 104–5).

In showing that transcendence cannot be identified with a single form but a recurring theme, a set of solution to a group of philosophical problems, we can be more aware of its presence in multiple contexts. We can argue that there are three commitments to address transcendence legitimately. First of these is that there should be at least two different substances realized. Second, there must be a type of relation between them, usually one is representative of the other. And third is that there must be an ontological priority and a hierarchical system in positing such a system.<sup>11</sup> In the case of Forms, for example, not only our world represents the other or Forms partaking in objects or thoughts (a distinct plane and a relation) but also ours is inferior to the plane of Forms.

Although transcendence is not directly exposed or mentioned in each of these philosophers line of thinking, we might bring out a particularly more important concept in relation to transcendence, that is, separation and participation.<sup>12</sup> In *Parmenides*, part that is identified as Parmenides' Criticisms of the Theory of Forms, concerning the relation between characters separate in themselves and separate participating in other being, the writing emphasizes necessary separation of unity and the others. In 130d, Parmenides questions the extent of variety of characters—"a character that again other than the sorts of things we handle" (Plato, 1997, p. 8). If it were, then logically we may postulate the different plane of characters that are almost as much populated as ours which is perceived and grasped through senses. Though it would be hard to deem it absurd, definitely it leads to an aberrant dualism in which physical entities have one-to-one instances or characters in the plane attributed to Theory of Forms. In this case, it seems to be impossible to distinguish these both worlds let alone their ontological priority. Parallel to that, Parmenides asks "does each thing that gets a share get a share of the whole character, or of a part?" (1997, p. 8). Two points deserve mentioning. Things must be at multiple places at the same time and each character should be divisible without losing its quality. For the second point,

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<sup>11</sup> May put two commitments yet I propose that at least there must be a kind of relationality before superiority. Otherwise it becomes perfectly plausible to conceive two distinct substances without any relation but one has a higher ontological position than the other.

<sup>12</sup> Though there are a variety of problems which are, at least overtly discussed in Plato's *Parmenides*, for the sake a more focused and compressed approach I draw out problem of separation and participation.

Parmenides puts a strong counter-argument in which Forms change characteristics when they partake. For example, “largeness” itself becomes smaller after the act of division (1997, p. 9). Even after that Plato through Parmenides speaks of different ways that Theory of Forms bears. Plato further investigates even if there would be such participation how it could be possible or we have knowledge of them.<sup>13</sup>

One of the responses mostly arising due to drawbacks of the transcendence in conceiving relations between planes is emanation.<sup>14</sup> It first originated as a part of Neo-Platonism in the medieval philosophy. By emanation, despite the gradually bridged gap between planes or substances, there still remains a separation and hierarchy between them. Roughly, Armstrong defined it as “the manner in which the lower hypostases, proceed from the One” (1937, p. 61).<sup>15</sup> Deleuze pointed out its difference from transcendence by arguing emanation still holds that the same kind of thing, basically, “remaining in itself” (1990, p. 171). In fact, this “remaining in itself”, in a sense, guarantees the continuity of creation without participating in others. There is a source whereby all other things are created and these created things have ontological proximity to the source. Although at each level this source is expressed to a certain extent and this expression is gradually weakened as it gets ontologically farther than the source, creator and created division is maintained. As expected this source is mostly apprehended as God in the religious traditions in the medieval world. Difference of emanation is not only confined to the aforementioned separation but also to the content of the separated sides — created and creator, emanative cause and effects. According to Deleuze’s reading of Plotinus, “an emanative cause is superior not only to its effect but superior also to what it gives the effect” (1990, p. 172). Hence, we may even understand a prior mode of division between them. This ensures “a double genesis of the given and what receives it”. Only through that, a relation of

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<sup>13</sup> For a type of relationship see 132df and for its epistemological attainability see 133b-133d.

<sup>14</sup> Armstrong agreed with Brehier’s translation of that term as “procession” instead of emanation. In that, it alleviates vagueness better.

<sup>15</sup> In the same article, hypostases is defined as being produced by “a spontaneous and necessary efflux of life or power from the One, which leaves their source in itself undiminished” (A. H. Armstrong, 1937, p. 61).

superiority of an emanative cause is conceivable. Yet one might still ask what kind of a relation is this? How could we identify such superiority? According to Deleuze's interpretation of Plotinus, the reception from the giver does not wholly exhaust the given form through the giver and only in that "the giver is above its gifts as it is above its products, particable through what it gives, but imparticable in itself or as itself, thereby grounding participation" (1990, p. 171). This participation is realized in the emanative process itself. In fact, this emanative process is realized with unbroken unity that "it is precisely because there is nothing within the One that all things are from it: in order that Being may be brought about, the source must be no Being but Being's generator in what is to be thought as primal act of generation" (Plotinus, 1991, p. 361). Another related feature concerning the series of outflows, which is explained by Plotinus in a hierarchy cascading down from Divine Intellect to vegetal principle, is that nothing "is completely severed from its prior" (1991, p. 362). Thus, there is an ineludible order in the emanation of things. Each has a lower rank than the former yet still they share the identity of the prior. In other words, as Plotinus states:

There is from the first principle to ultimate an outgoing in which unfailingly each principle retains its own seat while its offshoot takes another rank, though on the other hand every being is in identity with its prior as long as it holds contact.<sup>16</sup> (1991, p. 362)

However, this ranking directly bypasses some of the ontological and epistemological difficulties concerning transcendence especially related issues. This aim is also pointed out by O'Meara as follows:

Plotinus thus came to the conclusion that we must postulate, over and beyond divine intellect, an ultimate cause which would be absolutely simple, the 'One'. In drawing this conclusion Plotinus not only separated himself from his Platonist and Aristotelian predecessors; he also believed himself to be in a position to throw light on some crucial but obscure passages in Plato's dialogues. (1993, p. 45)

Though this ranking and hierarchical order resides (and it is not limited to theology either), it seems that at first, problems that are aforementioned in the transcendence, separation is overcome. Theory of emanation and Plotinus in particular at that point can be followed within the previously mentioned Criticisms in *Parmenides* as well (Plato, 1997, p. 213). Firstly, the concept principle and presenting One as not a Being resolves the separation problem because rather than a making a division in the characters what is attempted at emanation is positing the principle in a way that there

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<sup>16</sup> In the translation, MacKenna used the term principle which can also be identified with form of being.

is an ordered but impartible outflow. Hence, not only this principle backs the given from severing the connection with the prior, the giver, but also participation and divisibility problem is solved since there is a conceptual (being/character to a principle) and softened process (without any radical dualism). Nonetheless, the centrality of the core idea is preserved and left untouched. It is even developed further whereby it can be told that “the distinguishing characteristic of emanation is radiation from a centre”. Moreover, “if the centre, as here, is removed, we have no longer emanation but immanent omnipresence” (A. H. Armstrong, 1937, p. 62). This explication, in fact, gives us idea about how the philosophical shift might have occurred.

When it comes to immanence, there are several central notifications throughout *Ethica* despite sometimes being implicit, that is in terms of causation. But first of all without delving into its relation to causation by a head start, we should first examine what Spinoza himself wrote about place of immanence. He states that “God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things”.<sup>17</sup> Apart from grammatical connotations, the word “transient” can be used in a variety of ways and amongst them there are “immediate”, “transitional”, “passing over” etc. If it is possible to take the meaning as involving a type of relationship that precludes necessity, then we should also equate transient as contingent but, as it will be clarified in the coming sections, I think that it is not fair to take its meaning through such line of thought. That leaves us with the option of interpreting “transient” as “non-immediate” and “non-transitional” or proximate.<sup>18</sup> This rather stable and “immediate” cause is God and called as immanent in thinking with the dynamical relation to transient. Immanence stays the

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<sup>17</sup> “*Deus est omnium rerum causa immanens, non vero transiens*” (Spinoza, n.d.). As it is of special importance, I also compared with Curley’s translation which is identical. While he probably still references *Ethica*, in Letter 73, he says “...God is the immanent cause, as the phrase is, of all things, and not the transitive cause. All things, I say, are in God and move in God...” (2002, p. 942).

<sup>18</sup> “Since some things must have been produced directly by God (those things, in fact, which necessarily follow from his absolute nature) and others through the medium of these primary things (which other things nevertheless cannot be or be conceived without God), it follows, firstly, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of things directly produced by him”. This is where Spinoza equates efficient cause and proximate cause as they will be used more frequently. I purport that this change of concepts from *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* to *Ethica* arises to showcase where specifically he stands in relation to older traditions. As far as there are no remote cause involving the process and the creation left within the substance itself, the alleged hierarchy does not contradict immanence (2002, p. 233).

same throughout the process of creation of all things for Spinoza. Why is it for all things? Spinoza gives two reasons:

- 1) “All things that are, are in God, and must be conceived through God, and so God is the cause of the things that are in him, which is the first point”
- 2) “There can be no substance external to God; that is, a thing which is in itself external to God” (2002, p. 229)

In the former reason, Spinoza puts forward the inclusiveness of God, that is, whatever is created is contained necessarily in itself not just “remaining in itself”. Deleuze emphasized that point elegantly by saying that “A cause is immanent, on the other hand, when its effect is ‘immanent’ in the cause, rather than emanating from it” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 173). In the latter, he emphasizes that there is no outside of that inclusiveness—one that which could be overcome. If there were, then definitely we can say that, according to Spinoza, it must be of the same nature as the substance and that, as a result, contradicts with EIP5.<sup>19</sup>

So, from the outset, it seems fair to interpret EIP18 as having two distinct premises which do not only combine to form an argument against transiency of God (or substance) but also each distinguishes Spinoza’s immanence from emanation and transcendence, respectively. In addition to that, although it can be deemed to be clear and distinct, it is impossible to have a proper idea of substance with imagination that it is limited by a thing of similar nature (i.e. another substance). However, I will return to and elaborate on that problem during the problems in attributes as the distinction demands a greater attention than mere definitions of substance and attributes.

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<sup>19</sup> By the same nature, Spinoza means that similar either in attributes or in affections. Further explanation is granted along with EIP4. Yet, EIP5 is translated differently in proofs. In Shirley, it reads “if they are distinguished only by a difference of attributes, then it will be granted that there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute” whereas in Curley it stays “if only by a difference in their attributes, then it will be conceded that there is only one of the same attribute” (1994, p. 87, 2002, p. 219). I think that impossibility of the multiple substances are given more appropriately in the Shirley’s translation because the emphasis on the relation between substance and attribute is pointed out more clearly which is essential in his substance monism.

## 2.2. Substance (*Substantia*)

Spinoza's definition of substance begs for an explanation that not only need to be clarified in its own context but also in terms of distinguishing from previous conceptualizations which include both modern and scholastic thought. Spinoza defined substance in EID3 with the following words "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that the conception of which does not require the conception of another thing from which it has to be formed" (2002, p. 217).<sup>20</sup> This definition basically gives us how he tried to prove a necessity, or we can say at this point his peculiar form of ontological proof. In that, it only seems that we derive its necessity directly without any further premises. One can question whether it is legitimate or not. It is in itself and *causa sui*, but unlike other ontological arguments Spinoza put it in different sense which necessarily rejects many substances (thus multiple Gods) because the substance cannot be caused to exist through another substance or any affection in EIP6 (2002, p. 219).<sup>21</sup> From this at first, we can grasp two related points, one is that it exists by itself and the other is that there is a formation which cannot be thought not to exist or cannot be conceived as not existing, as far as it is generated by itself, as aforementioned. In other words, he summed it up EIP7 in a different terminology: "its essence necessarily involves existence; that is, existence belongs to its nature" (Spinoza, 2002, p. 219).<sup>22</sup> He even solidifies his thesis by making a connection between essence as including existence, *causa sui* and infinity by stating EIP8S1 that "since in fact to be finite is in part a negation and to be infinite is the unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature, it follows from

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<sup>20</sup> To conceive is translated from the Latin word *concipere* which is also sometimes translated as to understand (and to perceive albeit infrequent). It also reflects the relationship between act of conceiving and conception both in Latin and English. Yet, here I think neither to understand nor to perceive meet the original *concipere* because to conceive also has synonyms such as to form or to get pregnant with.

<sup>21</sup> Though it is of utmost importance to bear in mind that both *affectio* and *affectus* are translated as affection (while *affectus* means affect in third book); nonetheless, first conveys a meaning related to being modifications of a substance—generally identified as mode and second means changes that a body undergoes through an external affect. Although they have obviously distinct meanings, the verb that they are originated from is *afficere* which can be translated as to affect, and that also denotes the spectrum the concept is utilized through his metaphysical and physical system. On the other hand, in third book, *affectus* stands for affect, emotion or feeling, though the last is not common (Deleuze, 1988, pp. 48–9).

<sup>22</sup> Inversed of this position is also given in EIA7 as "If a thing can be conceived as not existing, its essence does not involve existence" (2002, p. 217).

Proposition 7 alone that every substance must be infinite” (2002, p. 219). Yet he does not discern thinker or conceiver and the thing thought or observed. The reason for that is simply, unlike both in infamous formulation *cogito ergo sum* and his exposition of Cartesian philosophy, the absence of a division in the substance itself but only in its affections (Spinoza, 2002, p. 129). By that, still, it is the reason, embedded in the definition, that we can conceive substance as necessarily existing. Whether it is a legitimate postulation or not, as mentioned, can be decided with the fact that how we conceive substance and in so far as it stays distinct from other substance (if any). Thus, in any proof of Spinoza, even in definition of substance, some references to other proofs or corollaries along with further propositions are required.

In proving there is single substance, EIP2 and EIP4 are of extreme importance. It does not only form the basis of one substance but also it consolidates the previous explication of substance and adds on to its definition; “Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common” and “two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of the affections of the substances” share a similar characteristics which go hand in hand also with the non-differentiating form of substance. They both contend, via different ways, that substances, apart from its affections and attributes, are indistinguishable.<sup>23</sup> For that reason, a substance can only form a basis of inner differentiation without carrying a discernible mark for external comparison (with another substance). It is both through substance perspective (inner perspective or *sub specie aeternitatis*) and things perspective (external perspective). Former is because of ontological reason and the latter is due to epistemological reason. Simply such failure of differing from another substance grounds not only the basis in Spinoza’s (substance) monism but also explains another conception of substance when compared with his predecessors.

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<sup>23</sup> Though attributes can be roughly defined as ways of conceiving the essence of substance, it is used as if they are things or general categories in substance to indicate that without these ways it is impossible to distinguish two or more substances from each other.

A relatively difficult yet immensely important part concerning substance comes from discussion and proving his substance monism. Through examining EIP4-5, it is possible to arrive at four categories which is basically a crossing of the two possibilities. In first column possibilities are monism and pluralism concerning substance and the second is that whether there are shared attributes and/or affections or not. The following table shows crossings and categories:

*Table 1 – On Substance Monism*

	<b>Shared Attributes or Affections</b>	<b>Totally Distinct Attributes or Affections</b>
<b>Single Substance</b>	X	Spinoza’s position
<b>Many Substances</b>	Against EIP4 and EIP5	Against EIP8, EIP11 and EIP14

It is clear, since there is just one substance, why any substance monism prevents shared attributes or affections.

Existence of many substances cannot be true because either it is ontologically or epistemologically indistinguishable. As sufficient reason for ontological indistinguishability was given, I shall move to EIP4’s proof which reads that “nothing exists external to the intellect except substances and their affections”. It is perfectly reasonable to ask what this is supposed to mean since there might be several ways to interpret that line. I think it is convenient to suppose this as merely involving the fact that there is nothing outside substance and substance’s affections (including both attributes and modes). Yet, this, in return, is expressed through the perspective of the intellect.<sup>24</sup> Spinoza ends EIP4 with “therefore, there can be nothing external to the intellect through which several things can be distinguished from one another except

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<sup>24</sup> Although Spinoza does not give any evidence in *Ethica* that attributes can be interpreted from a subjectivist point of view, emphasis on intellect “has led some commentators to believe that the attribute is not itself a real thing or nature, but rather simply a way of perceiving things” (Nadler, 2006, p. 58). My position is, on the other hand, an objectivist’s because, for Spinoza, the intellect, here, denotes what could be discerned without any reference to this or that subject. Bennett expresses this as a *way of being*. I shall target it later.

substances or (which is the same thing) the attributes and the affections of substances” (2002, p. 218). For Spinoza, we can say this exhausts all possibilities for existence of multiple substances.

In the first row under the distinct attributes or affections, we see Spinoza’s own position.<sup>25</sup> Aside from the first six propositions in the first book, EIP8 forms an extension of the previous propositions where its infinity also consolidates its necessary existence as single substance.<sup>26</sup> As infinity is crucial for substance monism and, I shall show, for immanence, there need to be a peculiar form of necessitarianism to establish a compatible causal framework.

For the last quarter, apart from direct rejection of many substances, in EIP8, it says that “substance cannot exist as finite, for it would have to be limited by another substance of the same nature, and that substance also would have to exist”. So, he continues “there would exist two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd”. Spinoza concludes that “therefore, it exists as infinite” (2002, p. 219). Bearing EIP8 in mind, adding EIP14 as a premise to our scheme, will lead us to impossibility of distinct attributes or affections in multiple substances as well. According to him:

Since God is an absolutely infinite being of whom no attribute expressing the essence of substance can be denied, and since he necessarily exists, if there were any other substance but God, it would have to be explicated through some attribute of God, and so there would exist two substances with the same attribute, which is absurd. (2002, p. 224)

So, he arrives the conclusion that substance monism or existence of single God due to that necessary incorporation of infinite attributes. Moreover, although there can be several criticisms made about that point, and indeed there are ones, infinitely many attributes could overcome the problem of multiple substances.

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<sup>25</sup> I will also investigate how attributes and affection relate to each other. Whether these affections are modes within a single attribute or just things that can be expressed with different attributes will also be evaluated in section on modes.

<sup>26</sup> In *Ethica*, it is not rare to see this strategy. In most proofs, the necessity is constructed owing to regressions and progressions through the scheme of *more geometrico* but this, I think, liberates from being similar or identical to a linear work.

### 2.2.1. Infinity of Substance

In this section, I shall expound the views of Spinoza on substance's infinity in comparison to some other philosophers, though when medieval and Catholic philosophy contained there would be other large number of philosophers involved as well which are explained by Ariew. This conceptual nexus can hardly be fully captured even in a historiographical approach to Spinoza (1990, pp. 20–23). Yet, it is not our concern at this point. Rather than directly delving into criticism of these conceptualizations of infinity, I will focus on the interrelations between these different senses of infinities first. In these I have two aims. First is to demonstrate that infinity has rather put a distinctive turn in Spinoza such that his concept of substance and its development despite being perceived as similar is radically different from other concepts of substance. Second is that I argue it is not only helpful to grasp his sense of infinity in order to have a proper understanding of substance but also it is of absolutely necessary to introduce different types of understanding types. Hence, his metaphysical system is not favored one-sidedly.

Main texts for Spinoza's opinions on infinity are first book of *Ethica* and his Letter 12 (Letter on Infinity) which is written to Meyer in 1663 (2002, p. 757). Since there are numerous connections, including methodological, between infinity and substance, even understanding, there will be other sources included as well without being as much referenced.

Spinoza delves into the different kinds of infinity even from the start of first book. In the second and explication of the sixth definition in first book of *Ethica*, it can be said that he proposes roughly two distinct types of infinity with regard to the extent.

A thing is said to be finite in its own kind [*in suo genera infinita*] when it can be limited by another thing of the same nature. For example, a body is said to be finite because we can always conceive of another body greater than it. So, too, a thought is limited by another thought. But body is not limited by thought, nor thought by body. (Spinoza, 2002, p. 217)

Along with this proposition it reads "'absolutely infinite,' not 'infinite in its kind'" (2002, p. 217). Although his aim in that explication is to discern God (as the substance) from attributes, the underlying conceptualization leads to absolute and

relative, that is “infinite in its kind”, types of infinities. Furthermore, there is also infinity and finitude in terms of a kind, namely infinite in its own kind and finite in its own kind. Yet, these two types under such categorization (i.e. infinite or finite of its own kind) cannot be extended to “absolutely infinite” because as far as something is absolutely infinite, it is neither limited by its own kind not by any other kinds.<sup>27</sup> In that sense, Spinoza only asserts three types of infinite/finite categories whereby substance and attributes are conceptually distinguished. The following table aims to demonstrate them out of four possibilities.

*Table 2 – Infinite and Finite in Kinds*

	<b>Absolute</b>	<b>Relative</b>
<b>Infinite</b>	Absolute Infinity	Relative Infinity
<b>Finite</b>	Absolute Finitude	Relative Finitude

Substance, for Spinoza, is absolutely infinite; nonetheless, one might ask whether it is roughly the same thing to put it in terms of relative infinity? In a certain sense, it is the same thing insofar as to say that a substance is only limited (which is obviously unacceptable for Spinoza) or confinable by its own kind, any probability of its being limited can be expressed as relative because the limit itself only acts on boundaries of the same kind of substance. So for substance itself, the followings express the same thing: substance is absolutely infinite and substance is relatively infinite (because there is no other substance).<sup>28</sup> Nonetheless, for Spinoza, as there are infinite attributes of substance which expresses infinite essence in its own kind, definitely attributes stay as relatively infinite, distinguished from absolutely infinite. In that manner, it is important to read that infinity with EIP8 as it necessarily links substance monism to

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<sup>27</sup> At first it may seem to be redundant to place a difference by saying neither it (substance) is limited by its own kind nor by any other kind because if there is nothing of the same kind of substance that limits each other, as it is the case for Spinoza, there could neither be modes nor attributes which are absolutely infinite. Solely from bearing substance in mind, this idea might hold but in terms of being more general for the upcoming sections on attributes and modes as well, it is not redundant obviously.

<sup>28</sup> This distinction would pose a more serious ontological problem if there were multiple substances for Spinoza.

infinity. Hence, besides distinguishing itself from relative infinity in attributes, substance gives us a sufficient reason to conceive it as absolutely infinite because the only way of a proper conceptualization of substance entails that it is single.<sup>29</sup>

A deeper inquiry into infinity is brought into light in his Letter 12 to Meyer. To begin with, he set out three different problems in discussing infinity, or three failures. Firstly, he points out the neglect to discern infinite by its own definition, as in the case of ontological proof, and infinite due to having a cause which is infinite (2002, p. 787). Regarding that point, and to two other points as well, it is plausible to claim that Spinoza does not argue for or against a specific adequate or inadequate type of infinity but only a problem regarding the inquiry into infinity. Moreover, Spinoza invokes a traditional view which consists “in itself” and its negation as a limit to an extent. Secondly, “there is the failure to distinguish between that which is called infinite because it is unlimited, and that whose parts cannot be equated with or explicated by any number, although we may know its maximum or minimum” (2002, p. 787). He demonstrates this point to Meyer by two non-concentric circles. Distance between points, which takes place on the respective circles one being smaller than the other, varies. Although, geometrically, maximum and minimum also accompanies these varieties regarding unequal lines in the scheme, Spinoza adds that inequalities are infinite (2002, p. 790). This demonstration puts forth three different arguments. The first is that lines connecting the dots on the non-concentric circles can be represented by numbers but their size despite being quantitative cannot be equated by them, as aforementioned. In other words, the inequality relation between them cannot be reduced to a size or number but only to a ratio. And the second is that despite confined and determined with maximum and minimum, there still is infinite variety in inequality. Third and the last problem concerning failure in discussing infinity is “the failure to distinguish between that which we can apprehend only by the intellect and not by the imagination, and that which can also be apprehended by imagination” (2002, p. 787). By this Spinoza makes a further epistemological point that can be

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<sup>29</sup> In other words through the PSR, the criterion to call it relative is absent since it is both infinite (in itself) and unbounded, that is, unlimited by any of its own kind or as it includes all other kinds.

subtle and inferable. That is we can apprehend every imaginable idea or thing by intellect; nevertheless, reverse is not the case. In that Spinoza draws a boundary for the imagination and sets it under the possible apprehending power of intellect. However, connection between these two will be elucidated in the chapters and they are not the issue of that ontological inquiry.

Spinoza distinguished Descartes' and his own opinion on infinity on the basis of whether or not it is possible to be conceived with "a finite intellect", which, later, Spinoza not only, did not adhere to but also strongly rejected. Furthermore, considering his philosophical legacy, this seems to be inconvenient and incoherent with his theory of understanding. Though it cannot be guaranteed that whether Spinoza had changed his mind—from a Cartesian viewpoint to a different one—or not, at least, his final consideration is not a direct Cartesian one. Meyer's preface to *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* suggests that there is a continuity in Spinoza's thought and former view should be thought as "only on behalf of Descartes" (Ariew, 1990, p. 18). In preface, Meyer states that:

we must not omit to mention that assertions found in some passages, that this or that surpasses human understanding, must be taken in the same sense (i.e., as giving only Descartes's opinion). This must not be regarded as expressing our Author's own view.<sup>30</sup> (2002, p. 120)

In its totality, it is parallel to Wolfson's pronouncement whereby it is required to assume that there are historical continuities especially when the ideas in question remain common themes in both medieval and modern philosophy.

A question still remains: why is it important to immanence? Spinoza came up with two types of causation which are related to substance and modes but, for Spinoza, I aim to show that these seemingly different lines, in fact, are equal and one. I shall endeavor to explicate that point in terms of necessitarianism in the following chapter.

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<sup>30</sup> This position can be generalized for what he has written on the Cartesian philosophy. A serious reader needs to find an accurate stratagem in investigating both *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* and *Cogitata Metaphysica* because looking at *Tractatus Theologico Politicus* and *Ethica* does not always indicate satisfying answers for his philosophy. Thus, we should only consult these secondary sources with caution and abandon any views purely based on them unless they agree with his primary works (Parkinson, 1954, pp. 6–7).

Otherwise, I claim that it would be impossible to discern his metaphysical system from emanation and transcendence properly.

### **2.2.2. (In)divisibility of Substance**

If we had to identify three strongly interrelated line of thought in the formation of substance, they would be monism, infinity and indivisibility of substance. Hence, in this brief section, I shall move on to problems presented by Bennett and some of the opponents that Spinoza mentioned in EIP15S. But firstly, we should have a look at where Spinoza referred to divisibility. The term divisible first appears in the EIP13 but to divide is hinted in EIP12. He demonstrates the indivisibility of substance:

If it were divisible, the parts into which it would be divided will either retain the nature of absolutely infinite substance, or not. In the first case, there would therefore be several substances of the same nature, which is absurd. In the second case, absolutely infinite substance can cease to be, which is also absurd. (2002, p. 224)

The first case is absurd because there should be more than one substance which has been demonstrated false in several ways and the second case, that it will not retain its nature, is again absurd due to failure to exist.<sup>31</sup>

After that, in EIP13C, it reads that , after the proof of indivisibility of substance, “from this it follows that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, is divisible” (2002, p. 224).<sup>32</sup> Besides corporeal substance, which he also touches in EIP15S, he does not turn back to the problem of divisibility.

Through the same order as Spinoza focused, the first proposition concerning divisibility is EIP12. In that, he lays down the problems in conceiving of attributes when they express a divisible substance. The discerning part of EIP12 is that “in the first case each part will have to be infinite and self-caused and consist of a different

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<sup>31</sup> Although it seems quaint, there is a parallel use in third proof of EIP11. It says “to be able to not exist is weakness...” or “...to lack power...” (1994, p. 92, 2002, p. 222).

<sup>32</sup> “*Ex his sequitur, nullam substantiam et consequenter nullam substantiam corpoream, quatenus substantia est, esse divisibilem*” (Spinoza, n.d.). He alludes to corporeal substance. It is indicated and discussed at length in Bennett.

attribute; and so several substances could be formed from one substance, which is absurd” (2002, p. 223). The last phrase, i.e. “consist of a different attribute”, especially underlines the previous propositions (EIP4 and EIP5) since if there were (an)other substance(s) with same attribute(s), then it would be impossible to distinguish them. Apart from this emphasis on attribute, proof of EIP13 also utilizes same line of thought.

Turning back to corporeal substance in his major work, unlike in *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, we are struck with the fact that he did not utilize this term much in *Ethica*. Only EIP13, EIP15 (and Letter 12) include the term corporeal substance. With EIP12, I also expounded EIP13. Corporeal substance, both in EIP15 and Letter 12, is invoked in the divisibility debate. One might ask whether it is another type of substance since if there were another substance for Spinoza both the previous propositions and the triadic qualities of substance (monism, infinity and indivisibility) would lose its tenability. To spare corporeal substance, the first move would be to interpret it as an attribute. I think that this response is successful because interpreting it as an infinite immediate mode or infinite mediate mode would be impossible, let alone it be a finite mode.<sup>33</sup> This claim makes sense especially in EIP15S where Spinoza endeavors to respond to rejoin his opponents. It says “firstly, they think that corporeal substance, insofar as it is substance, is made up of parts, and so they deny that it can be infinite, and consequently that it can pertain to God” (2002, p. 225).<sup>34</sup> About divisibility, we can draw two arguments against the postulation of substance in terms of corporeality. First argument against corporeal substance is based on the premise—similar to the other—that corporeal substance is divisible. In that case, then, these divided parts are either infinite or finite. So, they claim “if the former, then the infinite is made up of two finite parts, which is absurd. If the latter, then there is an

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<sup>33</sup> These terms will be explained in the later sections. Also, Spinoza states that “furthermore, in proposition 14 we showed that apart from God no substance can be or be conceived, and hence we deduced that extended substance is one of God's infinite attributes” (2002, p. 225).

<sup>34</sup> I only take this argument since it is the only related argument and other assertions by opponents seem trivial.

infinite which is twice as great as another infinite, which is also absurd” (2002, p. 225).<sup>35</sup> For this argument, a further assumption is made:

Again, if an infinite length is measured in feet, it will have to consist of an infinite number of feet; and if it is measured in inches, it will consist of an infinite number of inches. So one infinite number will be twelve times greater than another infinite number. (2002, p. 225)

It conveys an aforementioned pigeonholing technique to compare infinities. Second argument against divisibility comes from God’s perfection. “Since God, they say, is a supremely perfect being, he cannot be that which is acted upon. But corporeal substance, being divisible, can be acted upon. It therefore follows that corporeal substance does not pertain to God's essence” (2002, p. 225). Spinoza reminds that both arguments arise from the same assumption, which is corporeal substance (attribute) is divisible. Contrary to common idea, he denied divisibility of the corporeal substance. Such divisibility presumes that it is composed of “bodies or parts as that a body is composed of surfaces, surfaces of lines and lines of points”. However, he deems it as contradicting with denying the existence of vacuum (2002, p. 226).<sup>36</sup>

Yet, even though he confined the absurdity for those who particularly dismissed vacuum, he would reject the responses on the presupposition that vacuum cannot exist in any metaphysical system. This absence of vacuum is developed in *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae* more fully as a part borrowed from Cartesian philosophy, but it is summed up in Bennett. He explains with an example of pebble.<sup>37</sup>

We should start with the region, and explain away the statement that there is a pebble in it. If there is (as we should ordinarily say) a pebble in region R, what makes this true is the fact that R is pebbly, where "pebbly" stands for a certain monadic property that a spatial region can have. If the pebble moves (as we should ordinarily say), what makes this true is the fact that there is a continuous change in which regions are pebbly: The so-called movement of a pebble through space is like the so-called movement of a panic through a crowd. Nothing literally moves, but there is a change in which people are calm and which are agitated. And if the pebble were to be annihilated, what would really be happening is that a region ceased being pebbly and no adjoining region became pebbly; the going out of existence of a pebble is like

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<sup>35</sup> The pre-Cantorian conception of infinity is again echoed in that reformulation of opponents’ arguments. Although a much deeper historical and conceptual research needs to be conducted, at least for Spinoza and his opponents, we can say infinity, as they use it, is radically different than ours.

<sup>36</sup> Apparently he has Descartes in mind when writing this because he both denied the existence of vacuum and accepted divisibility of corporeal substance.

<sup>37</sup> Proposition 2 of Part 2 with reference to *Principia* “extension without corporeal substance; that is, body without body, which is absurd” (2002, pp. 147, 152).

the going out of existence of a blush or a panic or a freeze - nothing goes out of existence, but something alters. (1996, pp. 70–1)

We can grasp such a space is a body rather than a container for a body. A body, thus, only changes some traits or qualities when space is considered. And this vacuumless ontology is interwoven with indivisibility.<sup>38</sup>

### **2.3. Attribute (*Attributum-Attributa*)**

Attribute is the second most divergent and controversial definition in Spinoza. He defines it in EID4 as “that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence” (2002, p. 217). Attributes, for Spinoza, are of utmost importance not only because it is a paramount term for the proper understanding of substance but also for explicating theory of causation in his metaphysical system. As substance has eternal and infinite essence which arises through its absolutely infinite nature, Spinoza argued that there must also be infinite number of attributes each of which expresses the ways of perceiving substance. Spinoza also states that attributes insofar as they express eternal essence of substance are eternal (2002, p. 230).

In addition to that, we may derive that attributes are infinite, yet Spinoza does not assert that it is as in the same sense of substance. Since it is previously mentioned, there does not need to be an elucidation of that point but only clarification. Even though attributes stay infinite, they are only relatively infinite because as there are infinite number of attributes, all attributes are limited by something of its own kind or, putting in aforementioned term, relatively infinite in Table 2.<sup>39</sup> Yet Spinoza explained that attributes’ closure does not undermine their expressivity of substance, in contrast to being substance. He has written that:

From this it is clear that although two attributes be conceived as really distinct, that is, one without the help of the other, still we cannot deduce therefrom that they constitute two entities, or two different substances. For it is in the nature of substance that each of its attributes be conceived through itself, since all the attributes it possesses have always been in it simultaneously, and one could not have been produced by another; but each expresses the

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<sup>38</sup> With some references to epistemology, such as “things of reason”, we may find analogous discussion of that in his *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being* (2002, p. 44).

<sup>39</sup> A short textual evidence can be found, in terms of infinity of their essence, in EIP10S (Spinoza, 1994, p. 90, 2002, p. 221)

reality or being of substance. So it is by no means absurd to ascribe more than one attribute to one substance.<sup>40</sup> (2002, p. 221)

### 2.3.1. On the Number of Attributes

With that said, one of the most argued aspects of Spinoza's ideas on attributes is whether there is really a sound basis for him to assert that there are infinite number of attributes; in other words, are there really infinite ways to conceive the essence of substance? Throughout *Ethica*, and in the first book mostly, he postulates that there are only two attributes open to human nature.<sup>41</sup> These are extension and thought or *extensa* and *cogitans*. In EIP6, as mentioned, he presented the "By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence" (2002, p. 217). Professedly one of the most fruitful discussion concerning attribute in Spinoza's philosophy is mentioned by Bennett. He claims that "there are reasons to think that by this Spinoza did not mean anything entailing that there are more than two attributes". Here, "this" refers to attributes and he lists three related reasons:

- (i) Thought and extension are the only two attributes that play any active role in the Ethics.
- (ii) The role of infinity in Ethics 1p14d shows that Spinoza takes 'God has infinite attributes' to entail that God has all the attributes. This entailment does not hold when 'infinite' is used in our way; so Spinoza's meaning for the term differs from ours, and the question is, 'How?' One possible answer is that he used 'infinite attributes' to mean 'all (possible) attributes', so that Nature's having infinite attributes is consistent with its having only two.
- (iii) Spinoza has a solid, intelligible reason for saying that Nature has all attributes: If there were an attribute—a basic way of being—that was not instantiated, nothing could explain this fact, and that conflicts with explanatory rationalism. There is on the other hand no respectable reason for Spinoza to say that Nature has (in our sense) infinitely many attributes. (Bennett, 1996, pp. 64–5)

Truth of (i) is evident. Spinoza does not specify any other attribute as an active ingredient in his philosophy, as mentioned before. (ii) causes problem firstly because EIP9, even though Spinoza stated otherwise, cannot be extracted from EID4. Even if it were derivable, one may rightfully argue that there are no sufficient reason to

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<sup>40</sup> Curley emphasized that "one may be conceived without the aid of the other" in its translation (1994, p. 90).

<sup>41</sup> Again, in *Ethica*, Spinoza only mentions two attributes even though he argued that there are infinite attributes arising from the nature of substance. As far as thought and extension can be conceived by human, I think it is possible to state that these two attributes, but not more according to Spinoza, are open to human understanding as he also mentions in EIIA5.

conclude substance, as being absolutely infinite, necessarily has infinite number of attributes. Just thinking and extension are sufficient to express its infinite essence and does not diminish its reality. Yet, in EIP11, only in the proposition itself, it is posited as having “infinite attributes” but in the proof no specific references are given. At that point, it is difficult to attain a decisive end. In dedicating a full section to whether there are infinite or just two attributes, Bennett argues that “it is that Spinoza used ‘infinite’ as a virtual synonym for ‘all’: he took ‘God has infinite attributes’ not merely to entail ‘God has all attributes’ but to be equivalent to it” (1984, p. 76). Although as Bennett expounded Spinoza’s way of understanding infinity as pre-Cantorian, it is plausible to tackle the problem from a different angle.<sup>42</sup> Suppose that a thing  $x$  can be conceived under two attributes—thought and extension. Then, with regard to EIP9, we should say  $x$  has the same level of reality as substance because it has an essence that is conceivable under all attributes.<sup>43</sup> Yet, I have serious doubts that Spinoza would agree with it, at least on the basis of expression.

Another debate is why he distinguished between attributes and substance. I concede that his motivation to distinguish between substance and attribute is simply due to the fact that substance is not only limited to the human nature that we are exposed to.<sup>44</sup> Rather, it is a way of being, as Bennett would say (1984, p. 61). Added to that, there are infinite attributes. The latter point warrants the reality of substance as well which is thoroughly examined in first book and Letter 9. In Letter 9, he exemplifies such reality by inviting us to think on an imaginary creature (2002, p. 782). A chimera certainly appears as an idea which pertains to thinking attribute but definitely it does not have a correspondent in extension. In overall, it has less reality than an owl. By that point he also demonstrates, at least, there do not need to be necessary correspondences between attributes. On the epistemological side, then, an

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<sup>42</sup> According to Cantorian infinity theorem,  $x$  and  $y$  have exactly the same number of elements in  $x > 7$  and  $y > 9$  which Spinoza did not hold. Nevertheless, Bennett defends that Spinoza’s position can be told from Letter 81. Yet, I think it better makes sense with interpreting Spinoza’s conception of number.

<sup>43</sup> EIP9 reads “The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it has” and refers back to EID4 or definition of attribute. Nonetheless, it is more accurate to interpret EIP9 as an auxiliary postulate or axiom since it is not immediately clear how the former is derived from the latter (2002, p. 221).

<sup>44</sup> Thus, its centrality cannot be reduced to a mere epistemic conceptualization.

dissimilarity between infinite attributes and that are open to human nature is inevitable and on the ontological side that is, not only substance is ontologically prior to attributes but also in the case of acceptance of their equality it would give rise to the identical problems of substance dualism. However, we cannot rush directly to their distinctness as too obvious. Even it might be the case, he still needed to explicate that point to de Vries in Letter 9 with reference to EID3 and EID4:

By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that whose conception does not involve the conception of another thing. I understand the same by attribute, except that attribute is so called in respect to the intellect, which attributes to substance a certain specific kind of nature. (Spinoza, 2002, p. 782)

Bennett gives us a chasm of interpretations, which is “between ‘two substances could not share all their attributes’ and ‘two substances could not share any attribute’”. However, this point, I think, does not stem from indistinguishability due to accidental states of substance or accidentality outside attribute (1984, pp. 68–9). This chasm is echoed in Leibniz as Nadler points out. It is worth mentioning because it underlies a difficulty in distinguishing substance and attribute. Spinoza defended that there cannot be multiple substances because if it were then they would only be different with respect to either attributes or modes (from EIP4 and EIP5). At the first part of the proof, he says “if they are distinguished only by a difference of attributes, then it will be granted that there cannot be more than one substance of the same attribute”.<sup>45</sup> Inversely, Leibniz questions this possibility by denoting that this proposition is true only insofar as substance has a single attribute, that is, single way of being because, only in that sense, the whole substances become indistinguishable from one another (unless any of the substances are expressed with multiple attributes).<sup>46</sup> So, through that vein, one might ask whether it is possible to comprehend or envisage multiple substances sharing some attributes without having the same attributes altogether especially when provided that there are more than one attribute (Nadler, 2006, p. 61). This account presents two conditions: in the first, as Leibniz states, if substance can only be distinguished on the basis of attributes or affections of substance, then only single shared attribute of the same sort might lead to a problem since we cannot

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<sup>45</sup> Curley translation, here, gives the meaning more appropriately as mentioned before.

<sup>46</sup> In terms of Bennett’s formulation, it means equality between two substances sharing all their attributes and two substances sharing one attribute.

distinguish these substances; in the second, even beyond that, unless there are single attributes pertaining to a substance, still, we can rationally explain the existence of shared attributes as it is depicted in the Table 1.

At first sight this counter argument seems to hold nonetheless I think Leibniz omits two vital elements in definition of substance. First is, as aforementioned, attributes are perceived by intellect (ontologically) and second the intellect perceives it as constituting the essence of the substance. In that, the relationship between substance and attribute cannot be captured by set and subset but rather a thing and its ways of expression. And, as a result, attributes allow us to conceive as constituting the essence of substance. If sharing attributes along multiple substances were possible then it would have led to an indecisive position whether we perceive as constituting a different essence of another substance or just simply conceived through another attribute. Substance does not contain attributes as it is but only prior to them.

A further general objection to Leibniz's criticism can be made from view mentioned in EIP14. Central figure of thought in the proposition is absolute infinity, as aforementioned. Since they do not share all attributes because they would be totally the same, at least one of these substance would lack some attributes or a minimum of one. This results in the elimination of absolute infinity from the definition of substance. In addition, if we assume the opposite, for were it relative infinity, it could be that there is a possibility of multiple substances because a relatively infinite substance (or God) might include only some of the infinite attributes while still remaining infinite. Even at that point the same counter-argument haunts the probability to understand multiple substance to share some attributes. It can be presented because there are no arguable ways that whether one can distinguish between essences of a variety of substances through different attributes or not without contradicting EID4 which reads "By attribute I mean that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence". Thus, we might conclude that is not a valid form of interpretation of Spinoza.

### 2.3.2. Parallelism of Attributes<sup>47</sup>

Attributes can be esteemed not only for the central position it occupies in relation to substance and modes but also for the primary importance for the causal and the rest of the metaphysical system. For that reason, I shall now focus on the problem of parallelism. He first hints the non-interactionist framework of attributes in EIP10.<sup>48</sup> It reads:

For it is in the nature of substance that each of its attributes be conceived through itself, since all the attributes it possesses have always been in it simultaneously, and one could not have been produced by another; but each expresses the reality or being of substance.<sup>49</sup> (2002, p. 221)

Spinoza, starting from EIIP5 and EIIP6, it is stated that ideas about God and individuals are recognized insofar as he is a thinking thing (2002, p. 246). This has, in fact, two tenets. First is that God is explicated in infinite ways and thinking is only one aspect of it. And he produces ideas in the attribute of thinking. Second, an epistemological one, is, as the idea of him is concerned that we can only be capable of recognizing this feature, in a sense, through thinking as thinking things. This also brings in a multitude of problems because unless there are any interaction between attributes, then there would be totally different lines of causation according to Spinoza.<sup>50</sup> If there were multiple lines of causation, then at least there would be various laws or multiple natures either from the substance or from an affection of substance. So, how could they be reconciled? In fact, these criticisms can be evaluated through his own metaphysical system, let alone criticisms based on our own observations such as how vision or sensation occurs.<sup>51</sup> Nonetheless, these problems

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<sup>47</sup> Both parallelism and parallelity are used but parallelism appears more frequently. In addition to that, it is crucial to bear in mind neither are employed by Spinoza.

<sup>48</sup> As I will explain later non-interactionism stands for the idea that affections in each attributes only affect each other in and through the same attribute, and cannot interfere with another attribute.

<sup>49</sup> It is debatable whether we can derive non-interactionism only from EID3 and EID4. But through the definition of attribute, the essence of substance is expressed in a non-interacting route.

<sup>50</sup> He writes this in EIIP2 clearly and distinctly. It reads that “the body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else)” (2002, p. 279).

<sup>51</sup> Assume that I see a building. In modern sense, what we mean is that the light is reflected from that building into our eyes and later into a vision of that building. That building, now, can immediately give rise to an idea in my mind such as, through resemblance, my apartment in childhood. In that sense,

are resolved with the Spinoza's proposition EIIP7 whereon he states that order and connections of ideas are the same as the order and connection of things (2002, p. 247). He tries to prove it through the EIA4 which merely puts the idea that knowledge of an effect is followed from cause.<sup>52</sup> It still requires an explanation besides EIA4, because although it explains knowledge which bases on a single line of causation, which cannot provide sufficient reason, by itself, to argue for the sameness of the lines in two distinct attributes.<sup>53</sup> Yet, still, it would be problematic to underestimate or abandon that proposition. Rather, we may think, it is not sufficiently backed up in *Ethica*. This needs to be examined in both ontological and epistemological senses. In giving only EIA4, one part of his epistemology is explicated but its relation to previously constructed metaphysical system is not properly reflected. Nevertheless, it can, at least, fit properly with four steps. First is that, according to EID4, EIP11 and later in EIIP1 and EIIP2, attributes express infinite and eternal essence of God. Through that, we can immediately tell that (as far as) the same essence of substance is expressed in this or that attribute. Second is that nothing in nature is contingent, according to EIP29. He also adds that "God is the cause of these modes not only insofar as they simply exist, but also insofar as they are considered as determined to a particular action" (2002, p. 234). It emphasizes the lawfulness and order both in the existence and determination of modes under attributes. Third is based on, as Spinoza also mentioned earlier, EIA4. Fourth sums up the previous three points in a sense but only in conjunction with them, it might be deemed to be provable what EIIP11 necessitates.<sup>54</sup> In later propositions, the position in EIIP11 is consolidated.

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even in this trivial visual image, it seems perfectly plausible to defend that physical or extensional caused mental events.

<sup>52</sup> At first sight, for Delahunty, even the use of EIA4 "seems queerly irrelevant to the theorem it is intended to prove" (1985, p. 198).

<sup>53</sup> By things, here, I think he means an extensional mode. There is some of the debate around that issue and it will be clarified to an extent in section about modes.

<sup>54</sup> Similar propositions are mentioned in Spinoza's refutation of interactionism by Cramer. Although EIIP2 is on the focus, he goes back to EIA4 and EID5. Even Cramer construes the relation between mode and attribute in relation to parallelism; he conveys that "EIDef5[EID5] tells us that a mode is to be conceived through that in which it is, namely, the substance of which it is an affection. This, however, amounts to saying that a mode is to be conceived through that which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of a substance, viz., through an attribute of that substance (EIDef4[EID4])" (1999, p. 33).

### 2.3.3. Non-Interactionism of Attributes

In the light of all these, then, for Spinoza, there are only causal connection within the same attribute but as their order and connections rests on the same ground. That is why the single substance is a necessary ground for causation. Roughly, the table below represents parallelism and non-interactionism in Spinoza.<sup>55</sup>

Table 3 - Parallelism<sup>56</sup>

	Object $x$	Object $y$	Object $z$
Attribute I – Extension	$x$ 	$y$ 	$z$
Attribute II – Thought	$x^i$ 	$y^i$ 	$z^i$
Attribute III	$x^{ii}$ 	$y^{ii}$ 	$z^{ii}$

In the table, the whole column under the object  $x$ ,  $y$  or  $z$  are considered as modes each of which are realized under different attributes. In the next section, I will delve into how object/thing and mode differs. The same columns does not accommodate any causal mechanism, that is to say, neither  $x$  determine  $x^i$  to act nor causes it to exist in this or that way. Even if there were a non-linear line of causation in the table such as  $z^i$  follows  $y$ , Spinoza would totally reject that. The same possible line of causation applies not only to  $x^i$  and  $x^{ii}$  but also to  $y$  and  $z$ . Nevertheless,  $x$  causes  $y$  to exist and similarly  $x^i$  relates to  $y^i$  and so on. If we are to look at through this scheme, we have to assume that order and connection between  $x$  in each row (under each attribute) are,

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<sup>55</sup> Parallelism means neither a pre-established harmony as in the case of Leibnizian metaphysics or nor and independent series of causal relations. Nadler warns against this misunderstanding (2006, p. 146). In addition to it, Cook also regards “two series of causes and effects running parallel to each other” as misleading because “there is only one series of modes which can be understood under the attribute of thought (as a series of ideas) or under the attribute of extension (as a series of physical things and events)” (2007, p. 91).

<sup>56</sup> This table does not entail existence of  $x$  are expressed in all attributes *necessarily*. Rather object  $x$  is schemed here hypothetically to denote possible expressions under attributes. Otherwise, for instance, our mind would contain ideas of objects in different attributes, as Nadler defends. Of course, that is not a wholly contradictory position and could be argued for unless Spinoza’s response to Letter 64 involved acquisition of knowledge is not limited to ideas of ideas and ideas of bodies (Nadler, 2006, p. 142).

in fact, same. This is examined by Della Rocca and Delahunty. According to Delahunty, any argument for an Identity Thesis would be proven wrong because as he denotes:

If my mind is identical with my body and if my body causally interacts with another body, say mode of extension A, then it follows that my mind causally interacts with mode of extension A. But such interaction goes against Spinoza's oft-repeated ban on causal interaction between attributes. (Delahunty, 1985, p. 197; Rocca, 1993, p. 186)

Yet, such equality only transgresses parallelity if and only if "the relevant causal context are transparent".<sup>57</sup> At first sight, this brings contrast between immanent and transitive cause. As EIP10 and EIIP6 also state, rather than understanding through in finite modes themselves, we should turn to the conceptual importance of substance.<sup>58</sup> In that vein, in Table 3,  $y$  does not cause  $y^j$  to exist but there is an idea of  $y$  in God (or conceived through substance) which exactly is  $y^i$ . However,  $y^i$  only brings forth  $z^i$  not  $y$  or  $y^{ii}$ . By this, we may bypass shortcomings of identity thesis without totally abandoning it.<sup>59</sup>

#### **2.4. Modes (*Modus-Modi*)**

"By mode I mean the affections of substance, that is, that which is in something else and is conceived through something else" (2002, p. 217). The first exposition of mode(s) by Spinoza, thus, can be understood both in terms of his metaphysical system and theory of knowledge. The former could be defined as affections of substance and the latter as the mediate cause when read with EIA4 and EIA5. This idiosyncratic use of modes can be directly incorporated neither into medieval nor into modern thought. This is pointed out by Bennett and Curley. Bennett states that mode had been used as in a quality like item, similar to a blush of face rather than a face. In addition to this, his underlying of the common understanding also involves that modes are "often thought not as a universal but rather particular as a property of instance" (1996, p. 67). The point he makes and the ongoing itinerary of the same kind of use of mode does

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<sup>57</sup> Parallelity is also used instead of parallelism although it is significantly less common.

<sup>58</sup> EIIP6 emphasizes the expression *under the attribute* which can be regarded as a textual evidence.

<sup>59</sup> This is exemplified in EIIP20 by simply putting substance as a immediate connection rather than causation between attributes.

not hold water unless we consider it in relation to substance and substance monism. On the other hand, Curley attributed Spinoza that when there are two distinct senses in which we understand the relation between substance and mode, as having independence and dependence relation and/or subject-predicate relation, Spinoza intends to “emphasize the fact” that “what is the subject of predication is not an independent entity” (1969, p. 37). So, Bennett says:

Although he agrees that his challenge has been met, Curley is not convinced that Spinoza really did mean to advance the metaphysic which I have attributed to him, and he stands by his theory that Spinoza thinned out the meanings of "substance" and "mode". (1996, p. 69)

#### 2.4.1. Infinite Mode(s)<sup>60</sup>

Before touching on some of the problems and discussions concerning modes, I think we need to take a further look on categories of modes, derived from Spinoza’s metaphysics. There are two kinds of modes, which are infinite and finite. For the infinite modes, Spinoza literally mentioned them in one place in the *Ethica*; it is in fourth book which is not yet related to the distinction that I had made. Nonetheless, it is perfectly plausible to construe infinite and finite modes basing on the basics of metaphysical system of Spinoza.<sup>61</sup> Through EIP21 to EIP23, we can recognize some hints. In EIP21, he briefly weaves necessity and substance’s nature. Even from the formulation of the proposition, he makes a distinction between absolute nature of any attribute of God and things that follow it. He tries to prove the necessity of infinity and eternity—what follows from the absolute nature of the substance. Yet, it does not give much idea unless it is explicated by EIP22, even if there are no proof but rather an amendment and elaboration of the former. It reads that “what follows from some attribute of God, insofar as the attribute is modified by a modification that exists necessarily and as infinite through that same attribute, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite” (2002, p. 231). An extra term is introduced, namely modification, which is used as the same of affection. If we put these two propositions and one proof,

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<sup>60</sup> By modes in plural form, I do not mean plurality of infinity modes *per se*, but different groups of infinite modes. An explanation of the impossibility of the former is given by Koistinen on the basis of having impossible and compossible system of modes (2003, p. 294).

<sup>61</sup> They are not directly stated in *Ethica* and derived only in conjunction with *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*.

I think that we may find three terms which are absolute nature of any attribute of God or substance, things follow from absolute nature of any attribute of God or substance and a modification that exists necessarily and infinite through the same attribute. In addition to this explication, Spinoza clarifies by introducing EIP23 by demonstrating that also the inverse must be true.<sup>62</sup>

#### 2.4.1.1. Immediate Infinite Mode(s)

Apart from the absolute nature of any attribute of God or substance which is an attribute, the rest could be categorized on the basis of immediacy. In that sense, two different kinds of infinite modes could be conceded, which are either immediate or mediate. Nadler sums it up in the following lines:

Some of these follow as a kind of spontaneously generated, co-eternal, and inseparable effect from the power of God or Nature alone; these are Nature's first effects. Others follow from Nature only in conjunction with these first effects. They, too, are necessary and eternal; but, unlike the first effects, they do not follow from substance and its attributes alone.<sup>63</sup> (2006, p. 88)

If a thing *directly* follows from absolute nature of any attribute of God necessarily and eternally, then it arises as the immediate infinite mode.<sup>64</sup> This is signified particularly by EIP21. Rest (of infinite modes) are composed of “those infinite modes that follow from an attribute only in so far as it is already modified by some mode (that is, by an infinite immediate mode)” (Nadler, 2006, p. 89).<sup>65</sup> This is called the “mediate infinite

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<sup>62</sup> Apart from the necessary existence through absolute nature of any attribute of God, he demonstrates that “very mode which exists necessarily and as infinite must have necessarily followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite” (2002, p. 231).

<sup>63</sup> A possible response would be to pose whether the distinction between first and others can be taken as immediacy relation. A quick explanation to that is to avoid a hierarchical metaphysical system which I believe Spinoza was successful to a certain extent. Otherwise, such a hierarchy would only point out non-naturalistic and rather non-immanent ontology. First or primary and others or secondary division would, in that case, cease to undermine the attitude of Spinoza which is devoid of hesitation to go against the grain.

<sup>64</sup> It can be rightfully asked whether it is plausible to conceive multiple immediate infinite modes. In other words, could we imagine it in a plural form? Some of the clarifications I shall make would help.

<sup>65</sup> We can question Nadler's view on the two points. First is about what he has written in the parenthesis. How does he infer that modifications as mentioned by Spinoza is indeed infinite immediate mode? Second is whether this modification has the same nature as a mode. Second could be responded owing to the fact there are only substance, attributes and modes. Neither substance nor attributes cannot

mode”. Both have different interpretations. This is taken from *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*:

This essence is to be sought only from the fixed and eternal things, and at the same time from the laws inscribed in these things as in their true codes, which govern the coming into existence and the ordering of all particular things. Indeed, these mutable particular things depend so intimately and essentially (so to phrase it) on the fixed things that they can neither be nor be conceived without them. Hence, although these fixed and eternal things are singular, by reason of their omnipresence and wide-ranging power they will be to us like universals, i.e., the genera of the definitions of particular mutable things, and the proximate causes of all things.<sup>66</sup> (2002, p. 27)

A correlate does not stand out to expound immediate infinite mode in *Ethica*. At each instance, in each mode, this essential ordering is repeated. Spinoza posited that there is almost a principle hovering above finite modes to both govern the relations between these modes and play a role in constitution of finite modes. This leads to interpreting immediate infinite modes as natural laws which can be realized under different attributes; in this case, thought and extension. However, from this perspective, the problem occurs when we question the place of mediate infinite mode. Is it just a secondary natural order? Could it differ from fundamental laws? Are they physical or logical? According to Curley, the thesis that every infinite mode of the attribute of extension, for instance, “follows either directly from the absolute nature of the attribute of extension or indirectly from some other infinite mode which follows from the nature of extension” is parallel to “every scientific law relating to extended objects can be derived either directly from the fundamental laws governing extended objects *or* from a finite series of nomological propositions which terminates ultimately in the fundamental laws” (1969, p. 59).<sup>67</sup> As a first remark, he proposes that these infinite modes could be conceived as laws. As a second remark, in that case, although there might be totally distinct ways to derive them, this does not necessitate a contradiction

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modify attributes. Hence, this must signify nature of a mode. Returning to first after the second, the modification can either be signified by infinite or finite mode. What is in question is an infinite mode so we can cross out finite modes. Nevertheless, at this point, there is a minor hole in his derivation since there are no sufficient reasons to tell whether it is immediate or not. With that said Curley also agrees with Nadler in that it should entail that infinite mode of some sort can be derived indirectly by the modifications of absolute nature of attribute (1969, p. 59). Additionally, both infinite and finite modes are used in plural because of variety of expressions in attributes.

<sup>66</sup> By universals, Spinoza does not make reference to any kind of universality (or universal validity).

<sup>67</sup> From this, I understand whether these laws are logical or physical. Although *causa* and *ratio* are equated in his philosophy, I agree with Bennett to interpret it in favor of physical causation (1996, p. 61).

or even variety between laws. If it were, then the latter case would not “terminate ultimately in the fundamental laws”. To speak in modern terms, we can assert that it is impossible to have a chemical law which contradict with physical laws or vice versa.<sup>68</sup> To sum up, infinite modes can be interpreted as laws and this, as Curley also states, does not lead to a problematic position but only two ways of understanding them.

Similar yet another interpretation of Spinoza’s immediate infinite modes are intellect and will for thought or thinking attribute and motion and rest for extension or extended attribute.<sup>69</sup> It is tenable to posit them as similar to laws because, as mentioned in *Tractatus*, they are inscribed in finite modes. In addition to this, immediate infinite modes as laws and intellect and will or motion and rest are not mutually exclusive. However, a deeper scrutiny would come up with elements that hinders equating laws and these principles.<sup>70</sup> It is debatable whether laws can be reduced to *explanans*, in modern terms, whereas both motion and rest and intellect and will could be taken as merely explaining the particular modes. Even it might be asked that whether it is plausible to direct a criticism to Spinoza for neglecting a proper distinction between laws and explanations in that sense.<sup>71</sup> Yet, still, on deciding whether Spinoza’s immediate infinite modes are more of a law or a principle, a wider outlook is on demand. I think that we can only decide on that in conjunction with the position of

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<sup>68</sup> A tangential question still stands: Is it likely that Spinoza was a reductionist in that sense? Roughly, my idea is that laws should reflect principles or commonalities that echoed in each because their essences could be attained with different senses which can be hinted at EIIP7. This is also mentioned in Koistinen as it is stated in footnote 59.

<sup>69</sup> He mentions motion and rest in conjunction and in several places, even preceding *Ethica*—in *Short Treatise* and *Principia Philosophiae Cartesiana*. But in *Ethica*, it is traversed with connotations to bodies. In EIIP13L3 it says that “bodies are individual thing which are distinguished from one another in respect of motion-and-rest, and so each body must have been determined to motion or rest by another individual thing, namely, another body, which is also in motion or at rest” (2002, p. 252).

<sup>70</sup> By principles, I meant both motion and rest and intellect and will.

<sup>71</sup> A philosopher of science demands such a decision or even a reconciliation imperatively. But I think Spinoza would deny such a distinction because explanation already entails that we know the cause(s) which, in modern terms presupposes laws.

mediate infinite modes in explaining the places of both immediate infinite modes and finite modes in Spinoza's metaphysical system.

#### **2.4.1.2. Mediate Infinite Mode(s)**

Besides the possibility that mediate infinite modes an alternative interpretation to them as secondary order or laws can be derived from Letters 63 and 64. Amongst those four questions, the last one issues an important point in the division of immediate and mediate infinite modes. In Letter 63, Schuller's (originally posed by Tschirnhaus) question is formulated in this way: "I should like to have examples of those things immediately produced by God, and of those things produced by the mediation of some infinite modification" (2002, pp. 917–9). In response to him, Spinoza gives a short example with some references to *Ethica*.<sup>72</sup> The examples are "in the case of thought, absolutely infinite intellect; in the case of extension, motion and rest". Furthermore, "an example of the second kind is the face of the whole universe, which, although varying in infinite ways, yet remains always the same" (2002, p. 919). Now, first part contains immediate infinite modes and second includes mediate infinite modes. If we can think of principles and explanations has a lawful side, then there is no further need to reconcile infinite immediate mode(s) as principles or as laws. The tendency to conceive of immediate and mediate as connected is not misleading; on the contrary, there is a continuity. In that case, face of the whole universe is conditioned on motion and rest and intellect and will. What is crucial here is that, I think, the lawfulness side of the motion and rest and intellect and will should also be taken into account when Spinoza mentions these principles.

#### **2.4.2. Finite Modes**

Aside from two types of infinite mode(s), there are finite modes. Returning to EIP21, EI22 and EIP23, there is another obvious problem for philosophy of Spinoza: how can finite modes exist? Since in these three propositions, it is reverberated that only

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<sup>72</sup> EIIP13 is the related proposition.

the infinite and eternal can follow from what is necessary of the nature of attributes.<sup>73</sup> So, it is not only the case that finite modes exist as contingent but they are not existing at all. To overcome this problem, without violating PSR, we may think of the gap as irrelevant because infinite and finite modes coexist but not causally connected or they are connected and the gap does not exist because finite modes follow from mediate infinite modes.<sup>74</sup> Both can be defended but the former cannot function unless there is a harmony between infinite and finite modes which ensures that order and connection between both of them are the same. In the second, we can roughly say that mediate infinite modes can be interpreted as a link to overcome this gap. The face of the whole universe is both divisible which allows discrete finite modes to exist as well and consists of a collection of modes. This issue is important for Spinoza's necessitarianism and it will be followed with an attempt to link together in the chapter on necessitarianism.

In terms of infinity and finitude, both immediate and mediate infinite modes could be categorized under the relative part. Immediate infinite modes are infinite but since Spinoza does not necessarily posit them as single, it is conceivable that there are multiple modes as well. How could it be possible if we were to identify immediate infinite modes as laws or as intellect and will or motion and rest? In fact, for Spinoza, it is clear that there are multiple modes because they can be realized under different attributes although they have same order and connections of things. Nevertheless, when mediate infinite modes are in question, there seems to an aberrant condition appearing. If mediate infinite modes pinpointed as the face of the entire universe, then, also assuming the necessitarianism (and reflected in EIP29), how can it be argued that there might have been (or simply *is*) another face of the whole universe which, as aforementioned, is totality of every modes? This view omits one of the essential ingredients of the metaphysics of Spinoza, that is, that modes are to be viewed as affections of an infinite and eternal attribute of substance. Thus, the problem

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<sup>73</sup> It is called the modal transfer principle (Newlands, 2013).

<sup>74</sup> We can also derive that from EIP16, with EID6. Even it is possible to conceive EIP16 precedes EID6 as it gives an explanation of the definition.

disappears because there are various faces of the whole universe in total under different attributes (e.g. whole thoughts in thinking attribute and whole bodies in extension). This opens the way to the relative infinity of the mediate infinite modes both because it is not a substance and it can be limited with another modes which are definitely of its own kind.

Yet the previous solution is embedded in another assumption that needs confronting with definitions of modes from a different angle—transattributes. The problem of whether we are to understand modes as traversing various attributes or just determined to exist under a single attribute is also related to the previously mentioned relative infinity.<sup>75</sup> The problem arises because there is not any open exposition in Spinoza about the relation between modes and attributes in that sense. For a resolution, it is inescapable to turn into interpretations. This two perceptions on modes is examined by Bennett. From these two types of modes or more accurately categories to explicate modes, for the first, that is, traversing different attributes, he coined the term transattribute mode. Bennett endeavors to extract a meaningful explanation of mode with parallelism of attributes and mode-identity thesis related to it.<sup>76</sup> He references EIIP7S which is reported before to demonstrate that in fact since thinking substance and extending substance are one and the same, it directly follows that modes, as affections of the attributes, must also demonstrate the same logical conclusion which entails that any mode of extension is one and the same with its “corresponding mode of thought” (1996, p. 80).<sup>77</sup> In a sense, we might call that they are entangled. From

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<sup>75</sup> A more esoteric reading of this might involve modes which are expressed under attributes that are not overtly mentioned but hinted in first book. It is esoteric because it enables modes existing under every attribute even beyond thinking and extension.

<sup>76</sup> Mode identity thesis, according to Bennett, bases on the idea that since attributes express essence of the substance and indeed it is different expressions of substance; thus body and mind are modes which are identical. He also adds that “my mind is a mode, my body is a mode, and my mind is my body, so the mode that is my mind is the mode that is my body, and so the ‘affection’ or quality or state which, added to extension, yields the whole nature of my body is the very one which, added to thought, yields the whole nature of my mind” (1996, p. 80).

<sup>77</sup> He made an addition saying that from two attributes being of one and the same substance we cannot infer mode of extension is identical with a mode of thought. He does not give a further argument what that really means but I think that he made such a remark because it is not given whether there is a one-on-one match or not.

this, Bennett conjectures there are transattribute modes which affirms the appearance single mode under different attributes. Even though this seems reasonable and in harmony with textual evidence (e.g. EIIP7), it would pose difficulties concerning infinite modes because there would both be single mediate infinite mode and immediate infinite mode. Nevertheless, this results in substance and attributes as indiscernible in terms of infinity. Second type of thinking about modes involves the claim that they can only pertain to certain attributes. It does not equate a mode with a thing. In other words, a thing does not denote a mode insofar as a thing can be understood in multiple ways (both in *res extensa* and *res cogitans*), yet both ways, in fact, refer to one and the same thing. Hence, if I say table, it necessarily means that it is the extended thing, not the thought. Nevertheless, in that assertion, one might claim to be culpable of neglecting textual evidence for it is to proclaim that mode identity thesis which bases on EIIP7 does not hold.<sup>78</sup> As a response, it is valid to assume two modes as identical in expression of an essence yet still differing in their being as modes. It does not violate Spinoza's metaphysical system in general. The equality of modes that Bennett mentions is viable only when EIIP7 is in question.<sup>79</sup> Apart from one problem that mentioned earlier (regarding absolute and relative infinity of substance and attributes), there can also be a barrier to regard modes as transattribute since attributes are prior to modes and that priority, in terms of Spinoza's conceptualization, is not reflected in transattribute differentiae concerning modes. If for example, a human body as an extended being is considered as a transattribute mode, then there would at least be no priority relation in the first place between attributes and modes.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, unless they (*modi*) are regarded as different

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<sup>78</sup> In Latin it is written as “*Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res*” with addition of that “*sed duobus modis expressa*” (Spinoza, n.d.). Translations show total agreement.

<sup>79</sup> In his own words: The doctrine is that each mode is a mode under all of the attributes; we should think of the mode that constitutes my body not as a complex quality that includes extendedness but rather as a complex quality that can be combined with extendedness and also with thinkingness. The modes are transattribute, logically speaking; i.e. each is combinable with thought and with extension, and any other attributes there may be (1996, p. 80)

<sup>80</sup> A side note is on demand at this point. The rejection of transattribute modes does not lead to a simultaneous rejection of panpsychism which is the view that there are minds of the non-living entities as far as mind is idea of body. Rather, it is conceptual difference between an entity (or thing) and a mode. Della Rocca stresses that with the help of Identity Theory (1993, p. 190).

expressions in attributes, it would be redundant albeit not impossible to pronounce “not only that the human Mind is united to the Body but also what is to be understood by the union of Mind and Body” (2002, p. 251). Nadler submits to rejection of transattribute modes. In his defense of priority of substance and distinction from attributes, he states that according to EIP5, “there is no difference of attribute under different modes”, and this results in “one single nature devoid of any numerical or qualitative quantity” when modes are taken out from attributes (2006, p. 63). So, he built a connection between attribute-mode similar to the case we mentioned, also parallel with substance-attribute relation. Though it is not directly related to the attribute-mode discussion, he bridged substance-attribute and attribute-mode with regard to their similarity.

Another fruitful discussion on modes began with a bifurcation of apprehension of modes. First of these is as Curley remarks, and Bennett references that “the Cartesian distinction between substance and mode, as we have seen, involved two elements: a distinction between independent and dependent being and a distinction between subject and predicate” (1969, p. 37). Yet, in Spinoza, as Bennett comments, we can think of predicates as modes, given his substance monism. So, for Bennett these distinctions might be interpreted in a sense so that they coincide towards which Curley is not sympathetic. Curley also reminds that it is common sense in seventeenth century philosophy to use mode in such a way. Second is more obscure because it leads to different varieties or manifestations as well. Joachim, also as cited in Curley, elaborated on this issue:

The subject-matter of philosophy, the Real, falls apart into two great divisions:—that which is in itself, and that which is in something else. ‘That, which is in itself’, i.e. that, the reality of which is self-dependent, is what Spinoza calls ‘Substance’: ‘that, which is in something else,’ i.e. that, whose reality is dependent, is called a ‘mode’, or state of Substance. We begin therefore with the antithesis of Substance and its states or modifications —a more precise formulation of the popular antithesis of thing and properties, the metaphysical (though not the co-extensive) correlate of the logical antithesis of subject and predicates. (1901, pp. 14–15)

We can summarize this second important point as either “that which is in-itself” and “that which is not in itself” or that which can be “classified as an instance of a quality” (Bennett, 1996). In that sense, take a human body; that same body might either run or walk or sit. It might move in a variety of ways without jeopardizing its unity and

identity.<sup>81</sup> Running, walking and sitting, thus, is differentiated only in terms of being an instance to some property. Similar relation can be thought to be found in Spinoza's definition of substance and mode. If this is deemed to be possible, as there is single substance and given that only affections of that substance differ, then, certainly, all these modifications relate to each other in a sense.<sup>82</sup> Parallel to that, we could not propose an ultimate yardstick to distinguish between quality-like items and particular items (i.e. a body and running of a body). Yet, in my opinion that is similar to Bennett, this does not pose a problem for Spinoza, because a quality-like item and particular item can only be divided in terms of degree but not of kind. Out of these two different sense (and combination of them) of conceiving the relationship between substance and mode, Curley "thins out" to include only the first, that is, division via independence and dependence. Hence, subject-predicate relation is neglected. The solution he proposes fits to finite modes in Spinoza's own metaphysical system that is mentioned in definitions part in the first book.

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<sup>81</sup> I do not intent to use it in reference to any kind of identity theory, only to denote its cohesiveness as such.

<sup>82</sup> In the first book, affection and modification are used in a very similar manner yet Spinoza used modification in EIP22 and EIP23 to underline the mediate changes *under* attributes, whereas using the term affections the change pertains to the substance most of the time.

## CHAPTER 3

### NECESSITARIANISM

Although Spinoza uncompromisingly put his necessitarianism as an important element of his metaphysics, it has not been paid much attention but only its unsettling tone which is recognized and reported by Oldenburg even in the *Tractatus Teologico-Politicus*. In the second half of first book (especially EIP29 and EIP33), Spinoza firmly established his position in reply to Oldenburg in Letter 75 (Garrett, 1991, p. 191).

#### 3.1. Determinism and Necessitarianism

In order to have a proper understanding of necessitarianism, a prior move to discern it from determinism should be made. Determinism entails that an effect is the result of at least a cause and it cannot be the case that a thing is undetermined both in terms of its existence or its course of action.<sup>83</sup> That a thing is undetermined is in no way tenable and conceivable for Spinoza. Nevertheless, necessitarianism adds to this definition. It involves not only “everything (whether it be infinite or finite) causally determined to exist as it is and to bring about the effect it does but also that the causal order of nature could not possibly have been otherwise than it is” (Nadler, 2006, p. 106).<sup>84</sup> Hence, we can say necessitarianism involves a strictly based causal necessity.<sup>85</sup> In general, that strictness of causal necessity is dispersed all over first

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<sup>83</sup> By action, I do not mean any reference to activity since, in that context, the action does not have to follow from the very nature of the thing itself or, more accurately, I did not intent to put such emphasis.

<sup>84</sup> We should bear in mind that there is severe use of PSR. In giving an account we give that on the basis of both having a reason for a mode’s existence and sufficient reason for its impossibility of nonexistence. On the surface, for Spinoza’s philosophy, I contend that we can say necessitarianism equals to determinism plus PSR.

<sup>85</sup> According to Nadler, in this strong necessitarianist position, Spinoza identified causal with logical necessity and because of this, “not only are the essences and laws of things an absolutely or logically necessary effect of Nature, but so too is the world of existing things” (Nadler, 2006, p. 106). On the

book in *Ethica* and echoed in subsequent books. For convenience and as a part of presenting the overall system of causation, we may take a look at EIP28 and EIP29 although, in their proofs, he appropriates previous propositions. Spinoza characterizes two types of thinking about causality which are demarcated in the following sentence.

Since some things must have been produced directly by God (those things, in fact, which necessarily follow from his absolute nature) and others through the medium of these primary things (which other things nevertheless cannot be or be conceived without God), it follows, firstly, that God is absolutely the proximate cause of things directly produced by him". (2002, p. 233)

Thus similarly when we say that God is the efficient cause of all modes and at the same time there are causal chains of finite modes, there seem to be a discrepancy in his system of metaphysics.<sup>86</sup> Problem is that there are seemingly distinct ways of causation in Spinoza's system. First is that substance is the cause of all things and second is the material and mental causality between them. Second is with reference to finite things themselves, each in a causal relation to another. Deleuze coins the terms vertical and horizontal to denote them, respectively. He argues that "only God is a cause" but the figures of causality (not modes) under the power of God "are themselves various". In that, he gives examples of "cause of itself, efficient cause of infinite things, efficient of finite things in relation to one another" (1988, p. 54).

Deleuze defends, thus, Spinoza, in speaking of *causa immanens*, as having a single line of causation which can be identified as being immanent, although Spinoza, in EIP18, contrasts *immanens* with *transiens*.<sup>87</sup> Yet if we assume that there are two distinct lines of causation, say vertical and horizontal, then there would not be sufficient reason for them not to contradict.<sup>88</sup> As a result it may lead a thing to have

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other hand, there is also a little consensus on what necessitarianism entails in Spinoza, or whether he hold a strong or moderate necessitarianist position (Garrett, 1991, p. 191).

<sup>86</sup> More accurate description needs reference to *nexus infinitus causarum*, as Spinoza says, which translates as infinite chain of causes. Apparently, he used this terms to denote infinite chain of finite modes.

<sup>87</sup> Bennett translated these terms as indwelling and crossing over, respectively (1996, p. 113).

<sup>88</sup> A related point is brought about by Della Rocca in arguing against a finite mode is following absolutely from God. With the help of PSR, he invokes an aberrant question: "what prevents the attribute in question from giving rise to other finite modes as well?" in which the limiting conditions can neither arise through modes, attributes or even substance (2008, p. 71).

different causes for its existence or an affect it produces at the same time which seems absurd. Hence, it leaves us with the solution that God, as *causa immanens*, either has dual effects or that, as Deleuze argues, efficient causality of substance and apparently infinite causal chain of finite modes are, in fact, the same processes.

*Table 4 – Deleuze’s Horizontal and Vertical Causation*

<b>Horizontal</b>	<b>Vertical</b>
Between modes	Between substance and modes
Delineates causal chain	Delineates generation
Emphasizing <i>Natura Naturata</i>	Emphasizing <i>Natura Naturans</i>

### **3.2. *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata***

In EIP29S, he emphasizes this distinction between concepts of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*. By *natura naturans*, he means that which is conceived through itself and existing in itself.<sup>89</sup> In a way attributes of substance must express the eternal essence of it without “needing anything beyond itself” (1994, p. 57, 2002, p. 234). In that sense, *natura naturata* delineates the being of infinite essence which exists in itself. On the other hand, there is *natura naturata* which expresses a totally different idea. In *natura naturata*, Spinoza underlines the effects that follows from the affections of substance or modes in distinction to expressions directly from nature of substance and attributes. The difference is explained in EIP29S.

All that follows from the necessity of God’s nature, that is, from the necessity of each one of God’s attributes; or all the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in God and can neither be nor be conceived without God. (2002, p. 234)

In addition to that he speaks of two different kinds of *natura naturata* which pertain to general and particular things. Spinoza specified general as “all the modes which depend immediately on God” in *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*. By particular, he means “all the particular things which are produced by the general mode” (2002, p. 58). These two subcategories of *natura naturata* are rather obscure

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<sup>89</sup> *Natura naturans* can be literally translated as naturing nature and *natura naturata* as natured nature. Whereas such a translation does not designate much in the unraveling and understanding the concepts.

at first sight because the boundaries of each are not well-developed. Does the first division involve an implicit account of immediate and mediated dependence on God?<sup>90</sup> If it is, then what kind of relation, at that point of the system, between the elements that are immediate and distant or remote is involved? Even in the second category there are ambiguities. For example, what a general mode is is left unexplained. Are they the same as infinite modes? Spinoza does not explicate them in the *Short Treatise* and *Ethica*. It is a hiatus in the literature and it can be said, in fact, in *Ethica*, there is no such division between general and particular types of *natura naturata*. An intuitive approach might lead us to identify first type of the *natura naturata* as dealing with infinite modes and second type as dealing with finite modes.<sup>91</sup> This, then, leaves us with at least an opportunity that makes sense.<sup>92</sup>

As in Table 4, turning back to and looking through Deleuze's terminology, I assert that vertical causality can be conflated in favor of horizontal. Thereby two effects occur in causation. First is that the separation itself vanishes so that there are no further strongly defined vertical and horizontal as two distinct categories but rather as one united category. Second is because this separation become obsolete, that remaining united category at least has to have some conceptual comprehensiveness to, at least, encompass both. Yet, as I contend that we can interpret Spinoza as a naturalist in that sense. So, this new category is at least more similar to horizontal one, though we may still conceive of substance as being the efficient or proximate cause.

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<sup>90</sup> As any mode or attribute independent of God cannot be thought, this leaves only the mentioned possibilities.

<sup>91</sup> Though it is perfectly possible to conceive mediate infinite mode(s) as general *natura naturata* and particular *natura naturata* as each finite modes, I dodge that identification intentionally since it depends on another deeper inquiry on that topic.

<sup>92</sup> "Turning now to universal *Natura naturata*, or those modes or creatures which immediately depend on, or have been created by God—we know only two of these: motion in matter, and intellect in the thinking thing" (1994, p. 58). In Shirley's and Wolf's translation, instead of intellect, it reads understanding (1963, p. 58; 2002, p. 58). Because in the EIP31, Spinoza builds upon this topic with the use of intellect in Shirley edition, I stick to the Curley's translation. Yet, I could not find a Latin version of this text to compare this term. A further point worth mentioning related to terms is that though universal and general can be used synonymously, general is a better choice due to epistemological connotations with the former.

In doing that, it could also be held in mind that this conflation is paralleled by combination of two necessities, as mentioned, that is, causal and logical necessity.<sup>93</sup> While Spinoza does not hold a strong division between these two, he posits a difference between immanent and transient cause (*causa immanens* and *causa transiens*).<sup>94</sup> Here the immanent cause forms the basis in which other (transient causes) either forestalls or encourages a variety of effects to come into existence. It differs from vertical and horizontal immensely because only in terms of different line of causation the latter principle could execute and could be understood. On the other hand, in immanent and transient, as far as all things dwell on substance, there might be only emphasis on different perspectives without being essential. A well-tailored example exactly needed for the assertion about substance providing the basis is given by Nadler. He explains two different forms of causation, by borrowing two terms from Aquinas, that are, *causalitas secundum esse* and *causalitas secundum fieri*. Nadler gives the following example:

The sun is a *causa secundum esse* of its light and heat; when the fusion reactions in the sun stop, so will their effects. By contrast, a builder is a *causa secundum fieri* of a house. Once the house is built, the builder does not need to continuously work to keep the house in being; rather, the completed house (the effect) has an ontological independence from the activity of the builder (the cause). (2006, p. 79, 2008b, p. 62)

By the same manner, substance continually supplies its affections or modes under different attributes in terms of causation but modes are cause of each other not as in *sub specie aeternitatis* but only for a certain duration and scale. In that, we adequately perceive two ways of the expression of the same causation.<sup>95</sup> In theory of knowledge chapter, I shall endeavor to show how this brings forth epistemological connotations.

In the light of these, then, a question arises: Why did Spinoza embrace the distinction between existence and essence unless there is not a single line of necessity but more? An immediate response would be historical. It is because one may say, despite all the

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<sup>93</sup> This is paralleled by real and formal distinction (*distinctio realis et distinctio formalis*). Deleuze reads Spinoza's real distinction as Scotus' formal distinction.

<sup>94</sup> Spinoza states in *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* that "if the thing be a created thing, the definition, as we have said, must include its proximate cause" (2002, p. 26)

<sup>95</sup> Additionally, one is conceived through essences and the other through existences. These are both adequate from second and third modes of knowledge in EIP40 (2002, p. 267).

digressions he made, he borrowed concepts from preceding scholastic philosophers and corresponding heritage.<sup>96</sup> Especially his usage of existence seems quaint. Wolfson presented it as a common thread of this philosophical era. He says “to assert therefore of such a thing that it is existent is simply to attribute to it an accidental quality, just as to say of a black or white thing, that it is black or white” (Wolfson, 1962a, p. 124). But at least in contemporary philosophy, this usage is rarely encountered. If we diverge from the historical side and reevaluate the above sentence, the historical link between them would be clear. Wolfson used existence as an accidental quality which means that if something’s essence does not involve existence or its existence is accidental to its essence, and that points out the separability of existence and essence, then it exists contingently (1962a, p. 189). This point seems to be only compatible with at least two lines of causation.<sup>97</sup> Nonetheless, in terms of the aforementioned point, I contend this contingency could only be understood in terms a single necessity. As Spinoza holds substance monism and all in fact are either attributes and affections or modifications of that substance then what Spinoza really means is that only modes in different scale or degrees that are ephemeral changes in existence. In that we can conceive of a necessary being which exists but it exists without its essence necessarily involving existence. In being an affection of substance having followed through necessary causal line, it had to exist, determinately, that is for a certain duration under certain condition. When all the individual beings’ relations and affections are involved, which can be glimpsed under a certain type of understanding, that individual being, as it expresses substance, can be posited as eternal.<sup>98</sup> So, the contingency can be thought only in a historical sense. In EIP24C also, Spinoza states that “it is not their essence which can be the cause of either their existence or their duration, but only God, to whose nature alone existence pertains”

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<sup>96</sup> It can also be stated that his alleged atheism stems from inverting the same line of thought: God is only an expression that he borrowed from previous philosophies without the imitation of the content.

<sup>97</sup> The problem here is to avert non-corresponding causation or to prevent resorting back to emanation which presumes a vertical hierarchy.

<sup>98</sup> Eternal and ephemeral are not used to denote necessary and contingent which is common sense. In fact, I claim that both are necessary.

(2002, p. 232).<sup>99</sup> If it is understood through *sub specie aeternitatis*, then even modes under different attributes are necessary. But at the same time their necessity does not come from their own *essence* as they are not wholly representative of substance. Then, EIIA1 coheres with the first book because as man is a mode, and this position, especially, does not pose a direct threat to the necessitarianism.<sup>100</sup>

### 3.3. Criticisms of Necessitarianism

At that point, I shall move to criticisms of necessary causation or laws from a Spinozan standpoint. These are dependence, probability, contingency and miracles (Lin, 2014, p. 166).<sup>101</sup> Of these four, the most problematic criticism for Spinoza is dependency, that is, there are background conditions of an effect to follow. This problem is based on the assumption that there are multiple conditions that need to be supplied in order for a specific effect to follow from an efficient cause. If I try to boil water at 100 degrees Celsius, it would be a success only if a series of conditions are present (e.g. 1 atm pressure, sea level etc.). In that, the criticism argues that there are no efficient causation *per se*, but only the effect *depends* on certain conditions as it depends on the efficient cause. Thus, the claim call for disdain for necessity. At least, there is not a single particular cause, or as Lin remarks, it is *a* cause rather than *the* cause (2014, p. 175). A clarification for this point can be found in the definitions of second book, and later in EIIID1 and EIIID2 especially. It reads:

1. I call that an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through the said cause. I call that an inadequate or partial cause whose effect cannot be understood through the said cause alone.
2. I say that we are active when something takes place, in us or externally to us, of which we are the adequate cause; that is, when from our nature there follows in us or externally to us something which can be clearly and distinctly understood through our nature alone. On the

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<sup>99</sup> Its practical side can be sought in the conceptual difference between terminate (*terminare*) and determine (*determinare*). Determination does not lead to termination. Former is positive and comes from within, whereas latter, on the contrary, which limits, comes from outside. Yet there is always a struggle of power between them. Thus, “the inner unconditional affirmation of existence is, in actuality, at the same time completely conditional” (Schrijvers, 1999, p. 69).

<sup>100</sup> Some interpretations take not as a mode but transattribute mode. At that point in the discussion, it does not entail a contradiction.

<sup>101</sup> Contingency and miracle can also be aimed at determinism.

other hand, I say that we are passive when something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause. (2002, p. 278)

In both definitions, there are two ways that we can make sense. The first is that Spinoza separates adequate and inadequate (or partial) sharply. The second is that there are rather degrees that divide them—adequate and inadequate causes. The first point could be defended and in fact more suitable to Spinoza because of PSR.

- 1) In the absence of cause A, effect B cannot follow.
- 2) In the absence of effect B, cause A could not have been present.<sup>102</sup>

Here it can be told that dependence should be considered as a serious problem because of the second point. Turning to the example, if the water does not boil, then conclusively it could not be 100 degrees Celsius. However, it is possible to imagine numerous cases in which water boils and it is not 100 degrees Celsius. It is not convenient to call that water boils at 100 degrees Celsius is contingent because there are still variety of causes which provide an explanation in differing degrees.

The second position, that there are rather degrees of passivity and activity as Spinoza states in the second point of definition, stands as more tenable yet it should bear PSR. How can there be such a response? At this point, a definitive answer could be made by asserting *the* cause as a collection of that background conditions.<sup>103</sup> Hence, if all the background conditions are satisfied, then the effect must follow. Only then, background conditions, or its elements, are, in its totality, in accord with PSR. That also leads to another practical difficulty. That is to what degree a cause is active or passive amongst other background conditions. Yet, it might be argued that that solution only proposes that cause supplants background conditions. Such a refinement would beg for particular instances and conditions rather than general ones “on a very

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<sup>102</sup> In that scheme, it is assumed that from A, B necessarily follows in accordance with EIA3. Here, in order to stay grammatically correct at least, I shifted the modal verb to past tense inflection yet it is not intended to be emphasized.

<sup>103</sup> The metaphor of sun and the builder in *causalitas secundum esse* and *causalitas secundum fieri* could also be applied here because sun both concerns and nurtures all the particular instances. So, we can say they are dependent on the sun and the rest entails the most likely or most active of the efficient causes.

small or a very large scale” (Adkins, 2009, p. 93). Thus, a generalized resolution, even if it might be plausible for the problem, needs further inquiry and that is outside of the limitations of that chapter.<sup>104</sup>

The second criticism of necessitarianism comes from a more contemporary point of view, namely the probabilistic causation. It might be insisted that a cause will only participate in the occurrence of an effect partially. It differs from dependence in the sense that there are not only multiplicity of causes but the nature of laws simply yield only a probability distribution in the formation of effect (Lin, 2014, p. 167). A further remark should be made that cause(s) themselves produce single effect with a probability value for its occurrence or multiple effects, each of which has various probability values attached.<sup>105</sup> Probabilistic causation, thus, offers genuinely probabilistic natural laws, leading to non-necessary effects (2014, p. 167). Unanimously, it could be asserted that Spinoza would reject probabilistic causation because it violates PSR.<sup>106</sup> Delahunty explicated it as the first problem of necessitarianism that arises from the falsehood of determinism itself, in contradistinction to the second which stems from an unsound derivation from determinism to necessitarianism (1985, pp. 162–3). This second problem is said that the effect follows from a cause but it might not have been, which means that there are no sufficient reason but only a statistical account of the event. Furthermore, this

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<sup>104</sup> Spinoza responds this situation only with a minor definition. In his own words, on individual things, he says “If several individual things concur in one act in such a way as to be all together the simultaneous cause of one effect, I consider them all, in that respect, as one individual” (2002, p. 244). If we accept that definition for causality, then it leads to problem on essences of that individuals or how we can have possible adequate understanding about them.

<sup>105</sup> Spinoza would agree with production of a single effect with multiple causes, calling it an individual in a sense, according to EIID7.

<sup>106</sup> A historical correlate for this rejection can said to be demonstrated by Copenhagen interpretationists of quantum mechanics and Einstein. While Einstein rejected the probabilistic causation, Copenhagen School defended that quantum mechanics can be interpreted with probability.

indicates not a dependency to background conditions but stems from the laws themselves.<sup>107</sup>

Third criticism involves contingent laws. This view revolves around the idea that the causal necessity is “something far short of logical or absolute necessity”. Lin clarifies it by saying that “the force, energy, or power encompassed by a given state of the world necessitates its future states, but not with the same strength that the premises of a logically valid argument entail its conclusion” (2014, p. 167). In that we may imagine a different set of causal laws although the initial conditions may be equally set to ours. There might be several interpretations concerning Spinoza’s rejection of contingent laws. As mentioned before both in terms of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, he could reject such contingency.<sup>108</sup> First, in terms of *natura naturans*, the laws cannot be otherwise because it follows from the necessity of God. Spinoza states in EIP17S:

Others take the view that God is a free cause because –so they think- he can bring it about that those things which we have said follow from his nature –that is, which are within his power- should not come about; that is, they should not be produced by him. But this is as much as to say that God can bring it about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles, or that from a given cause the effect should not follow, which is absurd. (2002, p. 228)

And by *natura naturata*, that is unless we reject that immediate infinite modes are laws, as mentioned, the laws cannot be contingent either due to immediacy arising from the nature of God or from ruling principles in different attributes. It was already clear from the substance and modes relationship. In fact the term contingency has been used ambiguously. In EIP33S, he equates contingent with possible. In the first scholium, it reads:

For a thing’s existence necessarily [necessarium] follows either from its essence and definition or from a given efficient cause. Again, it is for these same reasons that a thing is termed “impossible”[impossibile]- that is, either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction or because there is no external cause determined to bring it into existence. But a thing is termed “contingent”[contingens] for no other reason than the deficiency of our knowledge. For if we do not know whether the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or

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<sup>107</sup> Even if it could be said that there is a possible world in which different laws govern nature or God decrees in any other way, Spinoza would reject such a possible interpretation because actual world is the possible world (Koistinen, 2003, pp. 286–7).

<sup>108</sup> Not being *natura naturata* does not prevent necessitarianist stance because what is necessary does not *only* comes from the definition or the nature of the thing but also from interaction.

if, knowing full well that its essence does not involve a contradiction, we still cannot make any certain judgment as to its existence because the chain of causes is hidden from us, then that thing cannot appear to us either as necessary or as impossible. So we term it either “contingent” or “possible”. (2002, p. 236)

This position is close but not the same to what he had followed in EIIP31 which maintains that “all particular things are contingent and perishable” (2002, p. 263).<sup>109</sup> This position is even more radically expressed in EIVD3. It defines particular things *are* contingent as far as there is nothing in the thing’s essence that includes or excludes its existence. So, in terms of essence we find that particular things are not necessary but that does not necessitate that it does not have to exist because there is the second part of the context which refrains us from arriving at a quick conclusion. If the necessity is explicated through the causal chain, we immediately conceive that, in terms of causal processes, particular things are not only determined but also necessarily exist.<sup>110</sup> In order to prevent confusion, Bennett identified necessity with regard to causal processes as inevitable. In either way, this view brings clarity to *natura naturans* and *natura naturata* in the discussion of contingency.

The last criticism to necessitarianism are miracles. This entails the intervention of God at some point whereas for the rest it is assumed that either causation is put forward as strong as a logical necessity or could be understood as weaker than logical necessity. In both ways, medieval philosophers mainly deemed miracles as possible and even, it can be said, necessary in order to consolidate God’s freedom manifested in causation. As it is clear from EIP17S, as said before, such a presumption cannot be satisfied by Spinoza. He equates God’s freedom and his necessity by conflating them in favor of necessity, rebuffing the comparison of God *only just* having a higher degree of power and freedom than a king in EIIP3S (2002, p. 245). Thus, it would be impossible for miracles to happen in such a system of metaphysics. Apart from that metaphysical

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<sup>109</sup> But possible is addressed as formally separate from contingent in EIVD4.

<sup>110</sup> While Bennett also denied that there are contingent truths for Spinoza, he proposed that it is resolvable with explanatory rationalism but with a trade-off. This challenge, according to him, is that any sufficient reason might not be found on a particular thing, that is limited to a part of the sequence of causal chain, but only through the whole chain considered as the totality of the sequence (1984, p. 117). Even though it is a challenge, it is equivocal whether it robs the metaphysical system of elegance.

rejection, there are some other passages in *Ethica* as well.<sup>111</sup> Moreover, invoking PSR again, we can immediately deem miracles as absurd because, as said before, we cannot find any sufficient reasonable ground to explain the successful of an event which brought forth out of a miracle.<sup>112</sup>

Besides the problem of dependence, Spinoza's metaphysical system confronts the criticisms that are posed against necessitarianism successfully. After that point I shall move on to the essences as one meaning of the necessity is determined on the basis of essences as in EID1.

### 3.3. Essence and Necessitarianism

There are two different connotations of necessity whereby they are explained in opposition to contingency and possibility as mentioned before (EIP33S1). Yet, a more refined distinction within necessity is also made by Spinoza in EIP8S2—under the demonstration of the necessity of single nature substance that eliminates all other possibilities. He separates two kind of derivation from Note 4 which is, in fact, conjunction of Note 2 and 3. In the former, he stresses the expression of a thing or a concept through the definition of it whereas in the latter he emphasizes existence through definite cause.<sup>113</sup> This distinction is crystallized in an example:

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<sup>111</sup> “*Atque hinc fit, ut qui miraculorum causas veras quaerit, quique res naturales ut doctus intelligere, non autem ut stultus admirari studet, passim pro haeretico et impio habeatur et proclametur ab iis, quos vulgus tamquam naturae deorumque interpretes adorat*” (Spinoza, n.d.). Its translation in Shirley is that “he who seeks the true causes of miracles and is eager to understand the works of Nature as a scholar, and not just to gape at them like a fool, is universally considered an impious heretic and denounced by those to whom the common people bow down as interpreters of Nature and the gods” (2002, p. 241). This point that Spinoza made also have echoes in his political philosophy and he investigates thoroughly in *Tractatus Teologico-Politicus*.

<sup>112</sup> It might be rightfully claimed that intervention of a miracle could be interpreted as similar to substance generating modes by its own nature. Nevertheless, emergence of miracles are not uniform and caused by God without any necessity but by pure freedom of will which is contingent. In other words, at least, from the standpoint of Spinoza, we cannot accept God's nature as incoherent, for in the case of miracles God violates its own nature, becoming incoherent (Lin, 2014, p. 176). An alternative in Spinoza's *Tractatus Teologico-Politicus*, from epistemological point of view is summarized by Huenemann (2014, p. 20)

<sup>113</sup> Here, we can understand definite cause as efficient cause through particular affections of substance, or modes.

If, for example, in Nature twenty men were to exist (for the sake of greater clarity I suppose that they exist simultaneously and that no others existed in Nature before them), in order to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will not be enough for us to demonstrate the cause of human nature in general; it will furthermore be necessary to demonstrate the cause why not more or fewer than twenty men exist, since (Note 3) there must necessarily be a cause for the existence of each one. But this cause (Notes 2 and 3) cannot be contained in the nature of man, since the true definition of man does not involve the number twenty. (2002, p. 221)

In the light of all this, we can read the logic behind EIP25 and EIP26 as God being the cause in two senses; namely, efficient cause of essence and existence. Hence, necessity in terms of them, albeit still requiring nothing less than strong necessity, are of different sort.<sup>114</sup> As stated before, Spinoza rejects contingency altogether. But here, if we interpret him as a superessentialist, that is to conflate all efficient causes to essences and as a result claiming that “all of a thing’s properties are essential to it”, then there would only be essences and this leads to two contradictory textual evidences (Lin, 2014, p. 180).<sup>115</sup> First, in order to propose essences as sole cause of modes, immediate infinite modes cannot exist either as laws or as principles. This is *prima facie* so because, in extension, motion and rest or physical lawfulness do not have a function and, in thought attribute, intellect and will would be redundant. A further look reveals another reason, that is, there are, at least, modes whose existence is not derived from its essence such as human body. An example could be read in the proof of EIIP30:

The duration [indefinite continuance of existing] of our body does not depend on its essence, nor again on the absolute nature of God, but it is determined to exist and to act by causes which are also determined by other causes to exist and to act in a definite and determinate way, and these again by other causes, and so ad infinitum. (2002, p. 263)

Spinoza’s reasoning could be extended to include other bodies, as each body is a composite of simple bodies. Nadler proclaims that bodies “communicate their motions to each other” via “the ratio of motion and rest” via various ways such as a relatively stable ratio of speed, direction etc. (2006, p. 139). Second, there would not be distinct mediate infinite mode because there would be essences. The face of the universe, then,

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<sup>114</sup> There is no decision between contingent and necessary based on that such as being the efficient cause of essences are included but those that come into being with distinct causes are not. In response to Garrett, Curley&Walski tried to overcome strong necessitarianist position and establish a moderately necessitarianism by positing that following conditionally from something that is absolutely necessary does not end up in necessitarianism (1999, pp. 246–8).

<sup>115</sup> In fact, personally, I am inclined to interpret Spinoza as the opposite, i.e. essences are just certain relative fixed relations but that position also lack textual evidence.

is the face of the essences which exists. In such a world, combining necessitarianism and superessentialism, contrary to what Spinoza contended, there would be no difference between essence and existence. This would undermine difference between substance, attributes and modes radically and would make Spinoza's whole philosophy prone to Bayle's criticism.<sup>116</sup> Third, if we assume that there exists only distinct essences, then it would lead to an impasse in theory of knowledge because it is impossible to arrive at common notions with total distinctiveness.<sup>117</sup> At least, as a result, it would be impossible to attain adequate ideas. Last but not least, superessentialism does not leave any room for genuine immediate infinite modes (in both attributes—motion and rest in extension and intellect and will in thought) because, then, every aspect of a singular thing could be exhausted with its essence in that they can be considered *condition sine qua non*.

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<sup>116</sup> Bayle's criticism to Spinoza involves if men are modalities of God (or substance), then modes of certain behaviors of man also applies to God. In other words, as Curley states "all kinds of moral enormities must be predicated directly of God" (1969, p. 12). Bayle speaks of God that "hates himself, he asks favors of himself and refuses them, he persecutes himself..."; he further ridicules and rejects Spinoza (or rather such an interpretation) in the footnote (1965, p. 312).

<sup>117</sup> I contend that it could be rightfully said that this point of rejection concerning superessentialism puts Spinoza, at least in that interpretation, in a special place when compared to other views in essence.

## CHAPTER 4

### THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE<sup>118</sup>

In the introduction, Parkinson claims in the beginning of his work on Spinoza's epistemology that, in fact, apart from his ontology, his theory of knowledge also plays an important role in his overall philosophy; nevertheless, it "has been largely neglected" (1954, p. 1). This is what I have also done so far and unfortunately for the rest as it is not a work that can explicate his theory of understanding, and it is not even my aim here either. Main purpose is to touch upon the epistemological issue to show the essential link to his ontology and on what grounds an immanent account of *conatus* could be explained. Having that said, Spinoza begins to form his theory of knowledge (or epistemology) from the first book. Even at the axioms, it is possible to hint at that point. In EIA5, it says "things which have nothing in common with each other cannot be understood through each other; that is, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other" (2002, p. 218). Even though this is an axiom and he cannot give a proof of that point, it is perfectly clear that this axiom has potential to be an underlying element both in ontology and epistemology. In fact, this, being an axiom, could be read along Parkinson's claim that Spinoza was neither led to a metaphysical system through epistemology nor arrived at a theory of understanding through metaphysics. Rather, these two areas are "interwoven in his mind from the very first" (1954, p. 1).<sup>119</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> The related book in Spinoza comes with the title "Of The Nature and Origin of The Mind". The Latin word for understanding comes from *intelligere*, to understand, which I interchangeably used with a similar connotation in Theory of Knowledge. Although *intelligere* and *cognitare* do not have the same meaning, they both encapsulate understanding as a general class of mind's activity. Additionally, *cognitio* in *cognitione causae* is translated as knowledge by Shirley and Curley. So, I have put to title Theory of Knowledge which can said to be more faithful. But one apparent difficulty in knowledge is that it seems to underline only adequate ideas. For this reason, I also adopted theory of knowledge and theory of understanding as interchangeable as well.

<sup>119</sup> Both contrary to Parkinson and common view that puts his ontology before his epistemology, Gullam-Whur, in her controversial biography of Spinoza, claimed that "his theory of knowledge preceded and underpinned his doctrine". She continues that with saying that "it rested on certain deeply rooted guiding assumptions, one of which he had probably never questioned and the other which he

To start with, when we postulate God or substance as *causa sui*, basically we mean two things. One is that unlike other things or affections, it is not created or affected by any other things. This has two reasons as well; first is that there is nothing external to it to cause it to exist or be annulled and second is that it is absolutely uncaused. Second one concerning the substance is rather a positive one. That implies simply that substance has the relation to itself in a way that a cause is related to an effect (Wolfson, 1962a, p. 129). Insofar as, for Spinoza, an explanation of an effect involves the cause, we can say that designating substance as uncaused seems to be problematic because if it were the case, then definitely it wouldn't satisfy a proper or adequate explanation, and contradicts with EID3. Hence, I contend that it is more reasonable to argue for *causa sui* in a positive sense.

The beginning of his theory of knowledge depends on EIP30 and EI31 with an addition of EIA5, as mentioned before. God or substance is the source of his epistemology similar to his ontology. The definition of intellect is put amongst other types of activities such as will, love and desire.<sup>120</sup> In that, Spinoza argues that intellect relates to *natura naturata* not to *natura naturans* because it is just one of these types. Even before that in the explanation of attributes as expressing the essence of substance, the thinking attribute can be said to be forming the basis of epistemology despite leaving most of the part to second book. These propositions in first book establish the ontological scheme underlying theory of understanding. In EIIP1, he continues to settle the ontological frame by positing that God is a thinking thing. Yet, still he does not link it to understanding *per se*. Only with explication of EIID3, it

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would within the next five years re-invent" (2000, p. 77). These refer to identification of logical, metaphysical necessity and equating natural and mathematical order.

<sup>120</sup> Both in EIP30 and EIP31, Spinoza employed intellect in act, according to Shirley translation; however, in Curley version, it reads actual intellect. It seems that Curley translation fits better because the contrasting sentence in EIP31 in Shirley and Curley are translated as intellect in potentiality and potential intellect respectively. Moreover, the Latin words, *intellectus actu* and *intellectus potentia* are on the side of affirming Curley's translation. Yet, they are both utilized to underline clarity of perception.

seems plausible to hint at the active relationship between mind and thought as its object.<sup>121</sup>

#### **4.1. Individual Non-Existing Things and Error<sup>122</sup>**

Before delving into different types of understanding for Spinoza, I shall briefly examine the relationship between possibilities of ideas about non-existing things as pointed out in EIIP8. This proposition is crucial because of the following:

- 1) There is not any privileged attribute in the sense that an attribute  $x$  is the source of others.<sup>123</sup>
- 2) “The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body-i.e., a definite mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else” (2002, p. 251).

If this can be generalized, which is highly apparent because of EIIP7, then each body, which are the objects of ideas, has a corresponding idea. It can also be interpreted as an analogous to mode-identity thesis.

- 3) As a result, there must also be a body corresponding to a specific idea.

Nonetheless, it obviously is counter-intuitive in a pejorative sense. If we accept that, then we should also abandon the boundaries between fictional and non-fictional. Moreover, imagination loses its meaning. Yet, in fact, an answer to this question is given in the section on attributes with regard to EIP9. When we come to resolve the epistemological status of them, Spinoza, in EIIP8, states that the ideas of individual non-existing things must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God. In these ideas, we might come up with false or improper conceptions although they are all in God

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<sup>121</sup> In most of the places it gets confusing to figure out whether or not Spinoza used idea (*ideatum*), particular thought or mental object distinctly. Thus, I take them as meaning the same for the time being. Yet, there is also a strong digression on the formation of that thought or mental object as he mentioned in EIIP49S2, that is, that Spinoza does not concede to the inactivity of ideas as dead images or static mental representations.

<sup>122</sup> Here what is meant by individual is taken from Spinoza’s definition in EIID7.

<sup>123</sup> This can be decided on the basis of whether Spinoza’s whole metaphysical system can be regarded as materialistic or not. If other attributes supervenes upon extensional, then his philosophy can definitely be called materialism.

since he is an infinite thinking thing. I contend that it is not impossible to understand fictional elements as having falsely categorized by mind, were they to be posited as extensionally present. It means that rather than treating singular thoughts which are ideas of non-existing individual things as falsely conceived or improper, we might think of their judgments as improper or confused. This brief addition assumes distinction between entities of imagination (*entia imaginationis*) and entities of reason (*entia rationis*) and builds upon it (2002, p. 243). This addition is mentioned by Spinoza in EIIP17. He says:

At this point, to begin my analysis of error, I should like you to note that the imaginations of the mind, looked at in themselves, contain no error; i.e., the mind does not err from the fact that it imagines, but only insofar as it is considered to lack the idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines to be present to itself.<sup>124</sup> (2002, p. 257)

By this, Spinoza opens up a space to disclose imagination (*imaginatio*) and error.<sup>125</sup> At that point, it is critical to point out that there are also imaginary and real understanding of the intellect about the same issue. One of this can be perfectly demonstrated by infinity.

#### **4.2. Adequate and Inadequate Understanding of Infinity**

Spinoza intends to show that his opponents have arguments on infinity which depends solely on an imaginary understanding, as it has been mentioned in section on substance. To start with, in EIP15S and Letter 12, he has dealt with different kinds of infinity and how we can apprehend them or in which sense these are involved in expounding whether variety of things are divisible or not. From an ontological point of view, they have been already mentioned. In terms of his theory of knowledge, in a broad sense, our understanding of infinity (and divisibility) can be categorized on the basis that whether it is abstract or not. Spinoza emphasizes this by saying:

However, if you ask why we have such a strong natural tendency to divide extended Substance, I answer that we conceive quantity in two ways: abstractly or superficially, as we have it in the imagination with the help of the senses, or as Substance, apprehended solely by

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<sup>124</sup> As Spinoza rejects a separate faculty of affirmation that is external to the idea itself, concepts such as judgment and acceptance should be used with caution. Thus, I used judgment due to absence of a more suitable word.

<sup>125</sup> To fix a misunderstanding in Spinoza, we should mention that imagination is not error *per se*. On the contrary, it is to be treated as a power of mind, albeit being totally dependent on ideas. It only leads to error if and only if what Spinoza says in the previous quotation is satisfied (2002, p. 257).

means of the intellect. So if we have regard to quantity as it exists in the imagination (and this is what we most frequently and readily do), it will be found to be divisible, finite, composed of parts, and manifold. (2002, p. 789)

A short clarification is needed. Here quantity is treated as being capable of perceived via imagination. Not only quantity but also several other concepts such as measure, time and number are utilized in a way to understand things not in reality but in their practicality. Thus, by pointing out the error in “perpetrating the grossest absurdities”, Spinoza divides imagination and intellect not as relating to different classes of concepts but penetrating into varying perspectives, that is imaginary or real, concerning the same concept. He summarized this variation by specifying which modes of thinking the latter entails.

Quantity in abstraction from Substance and separating the efflux of Duration from things eternal, there arise Time and Measure: Time to delimit Duration and Measure to delimit Quantity in such wise as enables us to imagine them easily, as far as possible. Again, from the fact that we separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself, and arrange them in classes so that we can easily imagine them as far as possible, there arises Number, whereby we delimit them. Hence it can clearly be seen that Measure, Time and Number are nothing other than modes of thinking, or rather, modes of imagining. (2002, p. 789)

In the light of this, Duffy contrasts Spinoza with some of the former and latter philosophers about the condition of understanding infinity of divisibility. By explicating and examining Letter 12’s reading of Hegel, Duffy stresses two concepts, namely actual infinity (*infinite actu*) and bad infinity (2006, p. 21). Hegel endeavors to overcome two distinct things by the common denominator—bad infinity. First is that by explaining bad infinity, he accounts for the infinite nested in the finite and second, by contrasting it with actual infinity, he tries to achieve a proper conceptualization of actual infinity, which is via negation of negation. What, then, is that bad infinite? Briefly and in his own words, it is:

Before us we have the infinite; of course, this infinite is transcended, for another limit is posited, but just because of that only a return is instead made back to the finite. This bad infinite is in itself the same as the perpetual ought; it is indeed the negation of the finite, but in truth it is unable to free itself from it; the finite constantly resurfaces in it as its other, since this infinite only is with reference to the finite, which is its other. (Hegel, 2010, p. 113)

Yet, Macherey rejects this solution or allegedly better expression of Hegel with holding a division between two differing infinity types as Spinoza did. Hegel interprets Spinoza’s conception of infinite in Letter 12 as a bad infinite, “contrary to Spinoza’s actual remarks” and employed an alternative according to the dialectical

logic.<sup>126</sup> Adversely, Macherey does not argue that bad and actual infinity are contradictory, or more accurately, each being the negation of other, rather he contends that they are “one and the same thing as perceived respectively from the point of view of the imagination and from that of reason” (Duffy, 2006, p. 26). The alternative to Hegelian view is that we can understand bad and actual infinity as inadequate and adequate infinity without negation but with affirmation. Spinoza excludes negation in two senses about the infinity. Firstly, he puts it succinctly in EIPS1 that “to be finite is in part a negation and to be infinite is the unqualified affirmation of the existence of some nature” (2002, p. 219). Secondly, affirmation of actual infinite means, as it is the affirmation of immanent cause, also of the affections of the substance. Even in the *Short Treatise*, we can witness seeds of a similar account of affirmation as a part of an idea or an affection of substance rather than a negation in truth and falsity (2002, p. 79). And further in EIIP48, he rejects any will or volition apart from the idea itself entails.

### **4.3. Rejection of Volition and Free-Will<sup>127</sup>**

Rejection of free-will is one of the essential ingredient of immanence because if we accept it, then we should also accept that there is power to act without reason and without a sufficient reason for action on behalf of the actor or a thing acted upon. So a non-natural or non-causal force is allowed which is exempt from the forces of nature in a sense. I argue that immanence without rejection of volition or free-will cannot be maintained.<sup>128</sup> Not much surprisingly, I contend that only through a proper understanding of immanence we can grasp adequate nature of struggle and striving.

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<sup>126</sup> Basically, it can be said that Hegel does not attend to the fact that the example of non-concentric circles are purposefully given to specify the difference between circumferences. Macherey states that “in his geometric example, if Spinoza had wanted only to represent the idea of a finite quantum that nevertheless contains an infinity of parts and exceeds any assignable number, he would not have needed this precision, but this simplification would have at the same time led to the inevitable reduction of this infinite to an extensive relationship between the two elements, a relationship envisioned negatively, thus in a manner inadequate to the very nature [nature même] of the thing” (2011, p. 139).

<sup>127</sup> This brief section will exclusively deal with human free-will but not God. Thus, for that reason, I shall omit EIP32 and related propositions for the time being, including detailed inquiry into the questions in Appendix to first book.

<sup>128</sup> Freedom and free-will should be discerned; former is defined in EIVP73 and is a necessary counterpart of a life guided by reason while latter should be treated under freedom to decide and choose without any apparent cause.

So, without the rejection of free-will, to turn back to beginning, it is a weak attempt to support immanence and relate it to human understanding without submitting a privileged conception of human.

For Spinoza, divine purposiveness, free-will and volition goes together because all depends on an ignorance of causes and inversion of the natural order. Furthermore, these two reasons arise from the very similar root as denying (rational) explanations and regarding them as self-sufficient in the sense that they can be *causa sui*. Thus, Spinoza asserts that the view only lends itself to attributing nature an order which can only be realized by affinity between our behavior and events in nature. In desiring and wanting certain effects to follow, ignorant man embraces final causes (*causas finales*) which Spinoza equates to nature's processes "completely upside down [*naturam omnino evertere*], for it regards as an effect that which is in fact a cause, and vice versa" (2002, p. 240). Besides this ignorance and inversion of natural order, Spinoza also points out that a false line of reasoning and questioning occur in the proponents of such doctrines. He shows an example in Appendix.

For example, if a stone falls from the roof on somebody's head and kills him, by this method of arguing they will prove that the stone fell in order to kill the man; for if it had not fallen for this purpose by the will of God, how could so many circumstances (and there are often many coinciding circumstances) have chanced to concur? Perhaps you will reply that the event occurred because the wind was blowing and the man was walking that way. But they will persist in asking why the wind blew at that time and why the man was walking that way at that very time. (2002, p. 241)

This might provoke an opposite view because it seems to utilize, *prima facie*, PSR by adapting a reasonable ground for an event to occur or a mode to exist.<sup>129</sup> Nevertheless, the whole line of reasoning stems from an infected assumption which takes that God acts with a purposiveness which is guided by a similar motivation to human beings.

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<sup>129</sup> Della Rocca puts an additional remark elegantly and compellingly. He says "Thus x, the finite mode in question, is necessarily in the midst of a series of finite causes and effects. But, we are supposing, x nonetheless outstrips other modes in importance to God. Why does God privilege x in this way instead of privileging some other finite mode, say, certain of x's causes or x's effects? x is neither the culmination of the series of finite modes, nor is it the starting point. So those natural reasons for privileging are not present" (2008, p. 85).

From this, it is inferable that they are fraught with problems and Spinoza considers them as arising from “figments of human imagination” (2002, p. 240).<sup>130</sup>

Starting from EIIP48 and EIIP49, Spinoza focuses on the fundamentals of his rejection of free-will not from a cosmic perspective but from a human one. As every finite modes are definite and determinate, that is, they follow from other finite modes which pertain to attribute of thinking. As mind exists part of the infinite intellect of God, a mind interacting or perceiving ideas means that “God—not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is explicated through the nature of the human mind, that is, insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind—has this or that idea” (2002, p. 250). By this, Spinoza does not only proposes an argument against free-will but also to an “absolute faculty of understanding, desiring, loving, etc.” (2002, p. 272).<sup>131</sup> One might unduly ask why it is the case that, then, we do not affirm or accept all ideas in our minds instantaneously but rather have volition over them. In EIIP49, Spinoza does not deny affirmation of an idea altogether but only in relation to certain other ideas.<sup>132</sup> Thus, we can say unless affirmation or negation of ideas come from somewhere else rather than the ideas themselves, which Spinoza embraces, “will and intellect are nothing but the particular volitions and ideas” (2002, p. 273).<sup>133</sup> Of human being, this is largely neglected and the whole process is purported to arise with a distinct capacity of free-will—affirming or negating. Spinoza rejects this view and states that “Men are deceived in thinking themselves free, a belief that consists only in this, that they are conscious of their actions and ignorant of the causes by which

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<sup>130</sup> He unanimously showed that his opponents have severely skewed and one sided axiomatic but he did not give sufficient account on why they are just figments of imagination.

<sup>131</sup> By absolute what he means is outside the territory of causal relations between ideas or thoughts, not obsolescence of whole mental faculties. In other words, we still understand, desire and love, but they are only “universals which we are wont to form from particulars” which are neither transcendent nor transcendental (2002, p. 272).

<sup>132</sup> In fact, this affirmation is necessitated in order to properly understand an idea because of EIID2 and can be said to form one of the pillars of his theory of understanding. To conceive properly is to conceive of essence.

<sup>133</sup> It is also related to certainty whereby he contrasts to mutilated or fragmentary ideas in EIIP29. This will be briefly investigated in next section.

they are determined” (2002, p. 264). By saying that, he also makes a distinction between error and ignorance in which the former entails idea (or node of ideas) that include falsity but the latter lacks the related conscious ideas at all.<sup>134</sup>

#### **4.4. Three Types of Knowledge**

All assertions of Spinoza’s theory of knowledge of the confusion of human mind are firmly rooted from EIIP19 to EIIP30 even though there have been tangentially related propositions before them. Firstly, he made a strong division; namely, between an external body and body of an agent.<sup>135</sup> In addition to that, we have components that are essential to the composition of a body and components that are not.<sup>136</sup> Secondly, as demonstrated in EIIP19, human mind only knows his own body through ideas of affections of the body. This implies that human mind does not know affections of the body in its entirety.<sup>137</sup> Similar to that, as God has idea of a body as its mind, Spinoza states:

Since the human mind does not know the human body- that is since the knowledge of the human body is not related to God insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human mind- therefore, neither is knowledge of the mind related to God insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human mind. (2002, p. 260)

From this proposition also, we can say, there follows another conclusion, that is, the mind knows itself neither totally nor properly because it is both the case:

- 1) Mind does not have proper knowledge of body
- 2) Mind is the idea of the body or body is the object of idea constituting mind (EIIP13).

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<sup>134</sup> Here, I cannot go into detail what the contents of a theory of consciousness that Spinoza’s philosophical system might entail. The term consciousness is even problematic, in that sense in Spinoza because it usually refers to a different kind of mental faculty—totally distinct from ideas. Hence, what I mean by consciousness, here, is an idea of idea of modes. In the next chapter an alternative view to it will be mentioned.

<sup>135</sup> By body of agent, I mean a person’s body and by external body which is external.

<sup>136</sup> Through EIIP13D, it can be understood.

<sup>137</sup> It is derived from EIIP19.

This results in EIIP23 and with the addition of components of body which are not essential, it leads to EIIP24.

The aforementioned strong division between body of oneself and an external body is, in fact, shown as untenable in terms of mind. In EIIP16, Spinoza puts it this way:

All the modes wherein a body is affected follow from the nature of the body affected together with the nature of the affecting body. Therefore, the idea of these modes will necessarily involve the nature of both bodies. So the idea of any mode wherein the human body is affected by an external body involves the nature of the human body and the external body. (2002, p. 256)

But since it is imperative that we perceive external thing by ideas of affections to our bodies, we do not also have adequate knowledge of external things.<sup>138</sup> This is called knowledge from casual experience.<sup>139</sup> Also acting as an instance of him parting from medieval philosophy, one of the example he has given on inadequate knowledge is universals.<sup>140</sup> “It obscures more than it reveals” (Adkins, 2009, p. 93).<sup>141</sup> Unlike previous connotations to universals, Spinoza explained universals in a way including numerous particular entities of modes that overwhelm human capacity to deal with them, albeit:

not entirely, of course, but still to the point where the mind can imagine neither slight differences of the singular [men] (such as the color and size of each one, etc.) nor their determinate number, and imagines distinctly only what they all agree in, insofar as they affect the body.<sup>142</sup> (1994, p. 140)

However, still, according to Spinoza universals act as abstractions to contain totality of individuals which makes it oblivious to differences and determinations of particular

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<sup>138</sup> Spinoza, unlike in previous propositions, enunciates another term, i.e. duration. Duration is “the indefinite continuance of existing” (2002, p. 244). It is indefinite because it can neither totally be determined by the thing’s existence or its efficient cause. In corollary to EIIP31, it reads that all particular things are contingent and perishable so that we only have some adequate knowledge of them.

<sup>139</sup> A more direct and faithful translation from Latin by Elwes includes the expression “knowledge from the mere suggestions of experience”. In Curley, it stands for “knowledge from random experience” (1994, p. 141).

<sup>140</sup> They are part of transcendental terms or concepts such as entity, thing and something (*ens, res, aliquid*). Curley translates them as Being, Thing and Something. Former fits better when Latin version borne in mind.

<sup>141</sup> But still he cannot be considered as a nominalist either.

<sup>142</sup> Shirley translation contains the phrase “unimportant differences of individuals” to stand for *singulorum parvas differentias* which, I believe, does not give the proper idea.

things so that it can be confusing (2002, p. 21). Della Rocca summarizes this point in mind's inability to discern two separate things "by having an idea that is just of one of the objects and an idea that is just the other of the objects" (2008, p. 113). Certain universal notions, thus, are placed under the confusion that Della Rocca mentions.

How, then, does Spinoza find a way out? A way to certainty, or at least, an explanation for the conditions of adequate knowledge should be explicated. Not until EIIP38, he gives us any hints on the conditions of adequate knowledge. His adequate knowledge in theory of understanding arises from a similar point as mentioned in inadequate knowledge. It is inevitable that ideas emerge both from affected and affecting body; thus, the ideas are proper only when there is commonality between these two bodies.<sup>143</sup> As he has claimed that we can neither perceive our own body or an external body adequately, its possibility, epistemologically, comes in these two senses, that is, mind perceives the common thing adequately "and does so both insofar as it perceives itself and insofar as it perceives its own body or any external body" (2002, p. 265). Spinoza first addressed common notions (or more accurately "notions common to all men in that context") in EIIP38.<sup>144</sup> The common notions are accessible through lengthy discussion of the nature of bodies in EIIP13, especially from EIIP13L2. Two pillars of Spinoza's demonstration of EIIP38 are these:

- 1) Mind has the idea common to the body which is its object, and an external object insofar as it has affections of that external body (through EIIP12).
- 2) God has both the ideas which "constitutes the human mind" and of external body. And their order and connection are one and the same (EIIP7).

Thus from that commonality between bodies, which are common to other things as well, he concludes that, necessarily, there follows adequate ideas (2002, p. 265). EIIP39 appears as its subset and its significance amounts to application of adequate

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<sup>143</sup> He references to EIIP12 which is also mentioned by Della Rocca as pancreas problem (2008, pp. 108–9).

<sup>144</sup> Two points worth mentioning here. Firstly, notions mean ideas for Spinoza as mentioned in both Shirley and Curley translations—*notiones omnibus hominibus communes* (1994, p. 138, 2002, p. 265). Secondly, it becomes a full-blown philosophical concept only in EIIP40.

ideas to human body and mind in particular to emphasize capabilities and limitations of human understanding.

Hence, what we have, here, is inadequate knowledge, that is imagination (*imaginatio*), and adequate knowledge that arises from common notions.<sup>145</sup> “Opinion, imagination or first kind of knowledge”, as he puts, stems either from disorganized perceptions or from symbols (e.g. universals). Ideas that arise via common notions, second kind of knowledge, is made possible owing to reason (2002, p. 267). And for the rest of the adequate ideas, from reason, Spinoza expounds, in EIIP40, that they follow from other necessary ideas in mind. This point is especially crucial from the point of view of distinction of activity and passivity which I shall explicate in the next chapter. Nonetheless, Spinoza does not end the variety of knowledge only by positing the existence of the two. He postulates another type of knowledge; namely, intuition.<sup>146</sup> Because “this kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things”, with particular things in mind, Spinoza argues this is formed through *interrelations* rather than *intra-relations*. So, he amounts this kind of knowledge to the “common property of proportionals” which stems from a relationship of relationship (2002, pp. 267–8). At this point we might say that there is rather a difference of degree between second and third kind of knowledge, that is reason and intuitive knowledge, when compared to the difference between first and second types of understanding—imagination and reason because there is no such difference of order and adequacy in the intuitive knowledge and reason except their level degree. These are represented and summarized in the following table concerning types of knowledge in Spinoza.

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<sup>145</sup> It seems perfectly plausible to be convinced on stating that conceiving through intellect and having an adequate understanding are the same which is defined as reason in EIIP40. Regarding this, I have not yet found any contrary textual evidence.

<sup>146</sup> In Latin version, it stays as *scientia intuitiva*. Besides the same translation by Elwes, i.e. intuition, Curley deciphered it as intuitive knowledge in which it is exhibited as a type of knowledge rather than a faculty.

Table 5 – Three Kinds of Knowledge

Adequate Ideas	Third Kind of Knowledge	Intuitive Knowledge ( <i>scientia intuitiva</i> )
	Second Kind of Knowledge	Common Notions ( <i>notiones communes</i> )
Inadequate Ideas	First Kind of Knowledge	Knowledge by Casual Experience ( <i>experientia vaga</i> )
		Symbols <sup>147</sup> ( <i>signa</i> )

With regard to its relation to necessitarianism, it is of utmost importance to remember that minds are also certain modes (or affections of substance). As a result of this as necessary in all senses of the word, i.e. eternal and non-contingent, we can link immediate and mediate infinite modes to theory of knowledge. Immediate infinite mode penetrates every other modes which entails that there are common notions in every modes either under extension or thought. Then, any knowledge concerning immediate infinite modes are necessarily adequate (EIP46). Another kind of infinite mode aforementioned is mediate infinite mode, which is also identified by Spinoza as face of the whole universe. It is no less an element of necessitarianism of Spinoza than immediate infinite modes, as mentioned before. Because in its entirety, it is a result of the whole chain of causes, which is, itself, not only determined but also necessary, the face of the whole universe come into being through inevitable events. With EIP47, we arrive necessary adequate knowledge of the infinite essence which manifests itself readily through mediate infinite mode. Finite modes, however, pose problems when combined with EIP36 because:

- 1) If there are finite modes that follow necessarily (from infinite modes) and we have adequate knowledge of them, then how could inadequate understanding

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<sup>147</sup> It reads “sign” in Curley version.

come into being in the first place?<sup>148</sup> (with respect to Finite Modes in Chapter 2)

- 2) Were inadequate ideas originate with the same necessity as adequate ideas, how could we attain adequate ideas?

His position becomes vulnerable not only in terms of our means of attaining adequate knowledge but also with regard to whether or not there is any proper criterion to distinguish truth from falsity.<sup>149</sup> This will be briefly responded in the next chapter.

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<sup>148</sup> This point is not left unattended and Spinoza since in EIIP36 he proclaims “inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas” (2002, p. 264).

<sup>149</sup> The same question is invoked in Parkinson. According to Spinoza, as it reads in EIIP43, true idea cannot be doubted at all and it is the yardstick of both truth and false (1954, p. 10). But I think the bosom of question is in the first part that is attaining adequate knowledge, which, in turn, accounts for the problem of truth as well.

## CHAPTER 5

### *CONATUS*

Spinoza's theory of understanding, his concept of desire and *conatus* are strongly interconnected. Rather than revealing various ways of connection, I will mainly focus on a single itinerary which is ingrained in his general metaphysical scheme and extends to *conatus*. The examination of desire dates back to his first manuscript, *Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well-Being*. In his interpretation of Aristotle's will and desire, he discerns two basic kinds of desire (*cupiditas*), namely as good will (*voluntas*), when it is inclined to good and as bad will (*voluptas*) when it is inclined to evil. In both, the common part in their constitution is that "desire depends on the ideas of its objects, and that this understanding must have an external cause" (2002, p. 84). Spinoza holds that view and builds upon this which he puts in EIIA3:

There are no modes of thinking, such as love, desire, or whatever is designated by the word affects of the mind, unless there is in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, desired, and the like. But there can be an idea, even though there is no other mode of thinking. (Spinoza, 1994, p. 113)

This closeness between desire and knowledge, that they both pertain to an external thing or idea or more accurately they are *of* or *about* things, also evokes a problematic relationship. Bennett claims that it is undecidable to speak of affects as causes or states (1984, p. 254). In other words, he asserts that we cannot decide whether affects *cause* certain effects to occur or are just these certain effects themselves (i.e. affects are the actual results). For Spinoza, this does not seem to pose a serious problem because, in *Ethica*, several places are devoted to the latter meaning starting with EIIIP11S.<sup>150</sup> A further complication begins with EIIID1 and EIIID2 because it seems that there is not any clear line to draw to distinguish understanding and feeling. They both stress

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<sup>150</sup> By stating EIIIP59, Bennett probably hints to the sentence "and now I think I have explained the principal emotions and vacillations that arise from the combination of the three basic emotions-desire, pleasure, and pain - and have clarified them through their first causes" (2002, p. 310). But it is highly controversial to ascribe the view that pleasure and unpleasure, in his own words, *cause* upward and downward fluctuations.

adequate or inadequate causes or understanding to delineate certain level of activity or passivity so that action and passion lend themselves to be expressed both in ideas and emotions or affections.<sup>151</sup> Nevertheless, this inseparability of two distinct categories turns out to be a power of Spinoza's philosophy. Since we cannot account for a shift from inadequate idea to adequate idea and vice versa in such a philosophical scheme, we can only conceive them as interacting with each other as different modalities. This also brings forth two prior questions (before desire and understanding) about activity-passivity in relation to theory of understanding and activity-passivity in relation to affections.<sup>152</sup> Spinoza connects these activity-passivity with understanding in the EIIP3 without any further need of explication. Yet, its relation to affections demands clarification.

### **5.1. Activity and Passivity**

Activity could be broadly defined as “a kind of self-causation which links up nicely with notions of self-determination, self-government, autonomy, self directedness, and agency” (Den Uyl, 2008, p. 47). So, we can say, activity feeds many different philosophical areas in the philosophy of Spinoza varying from philosophy of mind to ethics and politics. Whereas passivity entails that “something takes place in us, or follows from our nature, of which we are only the partial cause” (2002, p. 278). LeBuffe expounds it even further by appealing to human activity and passivity thesis. According to him, human activity thesis requires “wherever a human mind is a total cause of some effect, or in other words, wherever it has an effect which follows from ideas clear and distinct in it, that effect will be its own perseverance in being” whereas human passivity thesis entails whenever human mind “has an effect which follows from ideas confused in it, that effect will follow from an activity, which, if the mind were a total cause, would have the effect of its perseverance in being” (LeBuffe, 2010, p. 133). Both thesis are in fact two sides of the same coin because they underline the

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<sup>151</sup> This will be defined and explicated in the next section.

<sup>152</sup> The *active* in the active and passive and action/activity should not be confused. The former notes a specific state which stem from the essential properties of the thing, whereas the latter means a certain behavior or doing which might either come from internal or external to the nature of that thing.

fact that perseverance in being calls for an *active* activity rather than a passive one.<sup>153</sup> Additionally, here, distinction between complete and partial cause is ambiguous. If it means that human mind could be the complete cause *per se*, it is neither possible as horizontal nor as vertical causation because human mind is a finite mode. Then, it seems that we cannot merely mention “from its own nature” as in the case of *causa sui*. One of the crucial aspect at this point is to bear in mind that activity and passivity does not necessarily entail a specific set of affections such as joy should be understood under active affections and sadness under passive affections.<sup>154</sup>

Human beings are nothing close to a “kingdom within a kingdom” (*imperium in imperio*), and as any entity in the nature (here, we can say a collection of modes under certain attributes), it is subject to external and natural constraints or effects.<sup>155</sup> For that reason, this external encounters produces effects on human beings.<sup>156</sup> And this leads to production of affections in human beings, as finite modes. Before delving into different sorts and aspects of affections that are produced in body and mind, Spinoza distinguishes two broadly defined categories of affections which hinges on the elicited effects. These are pleasure and pain.<sup>157</sup> And according to Spinoza, they are merely

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<sup>153</sup> Previously, action was thought to be inclining towards mind rather than body, so that mind was privileged in terms of action. It was a manifestation of both dualism with interactionism and free-will. Unlike Aristotle and Descartes, Spinoza claims that it is no less absurd to regard mind as influencing the motions of the body than to regard body as influencing the mind (Wolfson, 1962b, pp. 190–1).

<sup>154</sup> Den Uyl’s choice of words, however, seems to match these two (i.e. active as pleasurable and passive as unpleasurable) to which I do not adhere. Passive states (*passionibus*) and passive transitions (*passiones*) are distinct concepts yet passion include both of them—both senses Bennett have mentioned. Hence, he embraces that the positive psychology promotes “the life-producing, maintaining, or enhancing actions and conditions insofar as those conditions concern the psychological” in opposition to “decline, decay and death”. (2008, p. 29)

<sup>155</sup> For Lord, as she elegantly expressed, third book of *Ethica* “is a diagnosis of what it is to be a finite mode, constantly interacting with other finite modes – not on the level of knowledge, but on the level of feeling” (2010, p. 84).

<sup>156</sup> In EIIIP3, he does not specifically emphasize that they are of a separate human nature (2002, p. 282).

<sup>157</sup> The Latin of these terms are *laetitia* and *tristitia*. Yet these two terms have immensely large sets of translations. While Shirley translation, to which I have mostly been faithful, approves the terms pleasure and pain along with Elwes, the most frequent use belongs to Curley—joy and sadness—which is also welcomed by Della Rocca (2008, p. 153; 1994, p. 161, 2002, p. 285). The term joy is also hold by White but changed sadness into sorrow (2001, pp. 107–8). Bennett proposes more general but

transitions of mind, not body. When considered with their bodily counterparts, these are named cheerfulness and melancholy, respectively (2002, p. 285).<sup>158</sup> All former terms in these sentences denote a greater perfection or completion, and the latter terms refer to lesser perfection (or completion). For the sake of brevity, I will not delve into wide spectrum of affections and emotions that can be derived from joy and sadness. Spinoza have written on them, generating and explaining various sorts of emotions. Rather than dealing with them as Spinoza did from EIIIP16 to EIIIP50 and Definitions of the Emotions at the end of the book, my aim is to explain their ground and relationship with activity and passivity. *Prima facie*, it seems all affections depend on inadequate ideas because nonproportionately large number of propositions are allocated to mere investigation of passive affections, whereas only EIIIP53 to EIIIP59 are allotted to active affections and its conditions.<sup>159</sup> However, I suggest that there is not a chasm between active and passive or that they are strongly disconnected; rather, they are continuous. To overcome them as wholly separate concepts, we may look into discussion about joyful passive affections in Duffy.

## 5.2. Joyful Passive Affections

The last site in the previous section on understanding points out a topic of wide interest in Spinoza's philosophy. That central debate concerning immanence and affections is the one between Macherey and Deleuze concerning the difference in interpreting Spinoza concept of joyful passions or joyful passive affections.<sup>160</sup> Before continuing forward, an essential step needs to be taken to underline a conceptual difference between them. In EIIIP1 and EIIIP3, Spinoza defines active and passive states which

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uncommon names; these are pleasure and unpleasure (1984, p. 254). From now on, I will mainly stick to Curley's translation—joy and sadness.

<sup>158</sup> Again, here, I took Curley version of the translations although, this time, Shirley has also put them as alternatives to titillation and anguish.

<sup>159</sup> Although, in the next section, passions and passive affections differ in two different philosophers' corpus, here we can deem it as same.

<sup>160</sup> Spinoza equates impotence with passion (*impotentia seu passio*). This is further aroused by servitude (*servitus*) in fifth book (2002, p. 381; Wolfson, 1962b, p. 184).

stem from adequate and inadequate ideas respectively.<sup>161</sup> In addition to that, he also mentions in corollary to EIIIP1 “that the more the mind has inadequate ideas, the more it is subject to passive states [*passionibus*]; and, on the other hand, it is the more active in proportion as it has a greater number of adequate ideas” (2002, p. 279).<sup>162</sup> Nevertheless, there is a distinct set of variables for Spinoza and these are also defined in the EIII as pleasure and pain (*laetitia* and *tristitia*) as mentioned. As a further step, he constructs each emotion out of these two and their combinations with accompanying ideas. But at this point this stays out of our focus and demands another study. In P11 he diverges from most philosophical traditions to explain them in an ethological manner. He states:

We see then that the mind can undergo considerable changes, and can pass now to a state of greater perfection, now to one of less perfection, and it is these passive transitions [*passiones*] that explicate for us the emotions of Pleasure [*laetitia*] and Pain [*tristitia*]. So in what follows I shall understand by pleasure “the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection,” and by pain “the passive transition of the mind to state of less perfection. (2002, pp. 284–5)

Although Spinoza defines these fundamental affections as passive, at the end of the third book he contends that joy is not exhausted under the passive affections together with sadness. As a result, roughly, we get this table with respect to joy-sadness and active-passive.

*Table 6 – Activity-Passivity and Joy-Sadness*

	<b>Joy</b>	<b>Sadness</b>
<b>Active</b>	Joyful Active Affections	X
<b>Passive</b>	Joyful Passive Affections/ Joyful Passions	Sad Passive Affections

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<sup>161</sup> EIIIP3 reads that “The active states [*actiones*] of the mind arise only from adequate ideas; its passive states depend solely on inadequate ideas” (2002, p. 282). Nevertheless, I contend that there are no sufficient reasons given to eliminate the possibility of shifting from passive to active states. The reasons for such an interpretation will be demonstrated via discussion between Macherey and Deleuze as written by Duffy. Thus, although this claim does not agree with a *prima facie* reading of *Ethica*, it still stands as a tenable position since the opposite is not warranted.

<sup>162</sup> Passive action and passion are used interchangeably.

In that table concerning their relationship we may conceive two different lines of thinking. First is that there are affections that changes the mind either to a more or less perfect state. And second is that these aforementioned relationship of arising as adequate or inadequate ideas. At that point we may regard two different interpretations in explaining transitions with each of the interpretations also diversify in themselves. These two interpretations come out from Macherey's and Deleuze's explication of Spinoza's theory of relations and also concisely and succinctly put by Duffy as well. The reason that upper right cell is left empty is simply because of EIIP58 and EIIP59. Insofar as mind realizes capacity to act is augmented, it has joy (or pleasure). In addition to that, an activity is active when follows from thing's own nature. As the things own nature cannot lead to its own demise (understood from EIIP4 and EIIP6), which entails that it is sad, it cannot be both active and has a sad affection. Thus, it follows that there are no sad active affections.

Macherey, in *Introduction à l'Ethique de Spinoza*, puts the first question fully open in the following words:

Can the soul be completely active, without at all being passive, or does it rather find itself permanently placed between the two extremes of passivity and activity, following regimes which make it lean sometimes to the side of activity, sometimes to that of passivity? And then what are the thresholds which swing one of these regimes into the other?<sup>163</sup> (Duffy, 2011, p. 52; Macherey, 1995, p. 20)

No matter we call it as soul or mind, he questions whether active and passive (*actiones* and *passiones*) blend into each other. A possible alternative which is implicit is that there are two coexisting lines of affective life which involves activity and passivity separately. In other words, there are corresponding ideas both active and passive in a single mind. But that possible alternative, despite plausible, seems weak because one should have both adequate and inadequate idea that leads oneself to be active and passive at the same time and it lacks both the interaction and accumulation of adequate or inadequate ideas as being modes of attribute of thinking. In other words, both adequate and inadequate ideas are given. As a result, then, it seems that second part of the question that Macherey issues (on thresholds) demands greater attention as we

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<sup>163</sup> I took that part from Duffy's own translation in the article from French.

may take the first question relatively clear. In fact, it is perfectly plausible to reformulate the question to this: which mechanisms amount to swinging of these regimes?

Macherey tries to point out singular things and their affective life, similar to one mentioned above. He identifies this life with ideas, passions and activity, each following other, transforming to diverse forms to assemble a single line. These changes or series of transformations are expressed as uninterrupted affective flux—*flux affectif ininterrompu* (Duffy, 2011, p. 52; Macherey, 1995, p. 121). As the affective life is being composed, first regime is obvious that which oscillates between pain and pleasure. And the second regime that between active and passive. Yet, the problem arises when a third question is asked in the light of the question of Macherey: how are these two regimes related to each other in generation of affections and which one is prior in the affective life? This question divides interpretations of Macherey and Deleuze.

Macherey defends that passions ought to be considered with negative connotations, wholly omitting its role in activity as joyful passive affections (or joyful passions). It might be confused with the question of transition between active and passive; nevertheless, this question is different from that, that is, at which point a line can be drawn between active and passive states. The crucial point that Macherey intends to make is that there are no transformations an active state may undergo with the effect of passions or passive states. We can never bridge that gap. For Macherey, there are no such effects or transformations that motivate pain or pleasure to become active states, because they are of different kinds which are also clarified by Spinoza in three types of understanding (or knowledge) in the second book. Another argument, a more radical one, Macherey utilizes is that we cannot agree on a division between passive affections themselves, whether it is joyful or passive. Along these lines, Macherey concludes that “rather bluntly that for Spinoza all passions, without exception, are sad—even those that are or appear to be joys” (Duffy, 2011, p. 57; 1995, p. 153). With that in mind, Macherey’s own version of Table 6 would not even include a distinct

category of joyful passions or, at least, reduce it to a general set of passions. The reason behind his thesis rests on temporality. He contends that either, and at best, joyful passions are “passing” and “unstable” or they can easily be reversed to sadness and decomposition of the individual (Duffy, 2011, pp. 58–9). On the other hand, Deleuze endorses exactly the opposite position. For him, although there is a distinction between active and passive affections (albeit not as distinct as in Macherey), joyful passive affections does not only have the capacity to shift the mind to a more complete state but, by doing so, increases the possibility of us being active. He stresses the importance of these two points:

Thus, if we consider such as succession of joyful affections, following one from another, beginning with an initial feeling of joy, we see that our capacity to be affected is exercised in such a way that our power of action continually increases. But it never increases enough for us to come into its real possession, for us to become active, to become the adequate cause of the affections that exercise our capacity to be affected. (1990, p. 241)

It does not only hold an intermediary position but also mediates between active and passive. To hold such a view, unlike Macherey, Deleuze should that power (increase or decrease in it) fluctuates in a single line. In other words, there are no multiplicity in kinds of power. If it were, then the promotion of power with joy in passions does not translate into a power in the active affections. Deleuze does not argue that this translation manifest in the same sense as in the passive affections but it is still applicable to active affections. But how does he support that view?<sup>164</sup> Deleuze does it both in terms of ontology and epistemology, yet still this point is closely related to Spinoza’s philosophy. At first, we “do not experience the passive affection as the passion of sadness because our power to act is not diminished by the encounter” (Duffy, 2011, p. 55). In fact, it is far from that, since external body has something common with our own or the external body assists our own bodily relations. Those commonalities (or agreements) are constitutive in ontological sense (from EIIP13). In addition to that, epistemologically, Deleuze provides another angle. He says that “to the extent that passive joys increase our power of action, *they agree with reason*” (Deleuze, 1990, p. 274). It might seem odd since there is no direct textual evidence for this. It is true that passive joys increase power of action (EIIPost1 and EIIP11S)

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<sup>164</sup> Along with that, Deleuze also asks another important question. “How can we come to produce active affections?” It is a practical question at the end of our line of reasoning but it is outside the scope of my investigation. I have only aimed to focus on the conditions that such a question might have been brought forth.

but it is only implicit that such encounter *agree with reason*. Here, by reason, apparently, Deleuze means two things. First is that it is constitutive to powers of thinking (from EIIP7 and EIIP14) and second is that joy directly promotes reason. It can be deduced from EIIP13Post3, EIIP13Post6, EIIP11S and EIIP40S2. For Deleuze's interpretation, then, we can say passive joys are important in increasing activity. On the other hand, if we presume the contrary, that is Macherey's position, and assert an indifferent stance to joy and sadness under passivity, then, at least, some problems arise.

There are philosophical reasons to be inclined to Deleuze's position. At first sight, if there weren't such continuity between active and passive states, it would lead to two distinct problems. Firstly, in scholastic terms, it causes a discrepancy in God's knowledge. God, as far as cause of all things, having all kinds of knowledge and capable of all types of understanding could produce and have inadequate knowledge owing to EIIP36.<sup>165</sup> Nonetheless, if they are incompatible without any external faculty (i.e. transition to a totally separate kind of idea), then it would lead to contradiction in terms of God's expression as thinking attribute. Related to that, we should have an initial means of attaining adequate knowledge and we should also have attained it so that we can construct other adequate knowledge out of this initial one. This leads to a second problem, which is similar to problems of methodology because "the method in question is itself an item of knowledge" (Parkinson, 1954, p. 9). A necessary search for a fundamental method, inevitably, for Spinoza, results in infinite regression. In order to, find a method, we should first look for a method that is proper to our needs, that is, finding a method. Hence, a step further is that we need a method that is needed to find a method for a method which goes *ad infinitum*. Parkinson, therefore, gives the material tool analogy. He describes the conditions of attaining by the analogy:

But the fact is that men were at first able to make certain very easy pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, by means of natural tools (*innatis instrumentis*); and when these

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<sup>165</sup> "All ideas are in God, and insofar as they are related to God, they are true and adequate. So there are no inadequate or confused ideas except insofar as they are related to the particular mind of someone. So all ideas, both adequate and inadequate, follow by the same necessity" (2002, p. 264). This goes hand in hand with his necessitarianism concerning ideas.

had been made, they made other more difficult pieces of workmanship with less labour and more perfection.<sup>166</sup> (1954, p. 9)

Existence of a starting point which is an adequate knowledge, thus, seems to be an untenable idea. It leads to a conception of adequacy which requires transcendence in Spinoza's metaphysical system because, even from the start, there need to be both a method and an adequate knowledge.<sup>167</sup> Nevertheless, this does not only lack textual evidence but also in contrast with the previous philosophical itinerary of Spinoza. As a result, Macherey's interpretation has severe drawbacks both in ontology and epistemology, and that is why we have to cling to a view that repositions activity and passivity in a continuum. Even though we might visualize it as discontinuing and evolving through successive jumps, we should imagine an expansive movement on the favor of active side if it is triggered "by a favorable external influence, taking the form of a sudden detachment" (Schrijvers, 1999, p. 77).

### 5.3. *Cupiditas* and *Conatus*

Spinoza's theory of affections include another essential ingredient, namely *cupiditas*. With joy and sadness, it is one of the primary emotions (2002, p. 285).<sup>168</sup> Although it is one of the primary ones, it stands in an external relation to other two. In EIIP37, Spinoza indicates that desire fluctuates according to the power of joy and sadness accompanying that desire (2002, p. 297). This is because in joy man's power of activity (or effort) increases and sadness steals power of activity as desire or appetite is employed to eliminate sadness. In all translations, it is given that *conatus* participates in the demonstration. Nevertheless, the first seeds of his own

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<sup>166</sup> This practicality does not only conclude in methodology but also in his aim. "Unlike Descartes and other moderns whose goal was knowledge, Spinoza's ultimate goal is happiness or well-being" (Clatterbaugh, 1999, p. 130). It is only of secondary importance to knowledge as such.

<sup>167</sup> In fact, it could be argued that *Ethica* proves contrary. From EIIP24 to EII31, Spinoza claims that mind's default state is prone to inadequate ideas.

<sup>168</sup> Emotions and affections are used in same way; however, Shirley translated it as emotion which forms the basis of that section. Even though Lord urges not to confuse affection and affect, which stay as *affectio* and *affectus* respectively, it is confusing and utilized conflictingly (2010, p. 159). Deleuze's second and third level of meaning for affection gives that intricacy but it is not adopted by other authors. Furthermore, the term affect only denotes passive transitions. So, I kept up the term affection and gave nuances in the context (1988, pp. 48–9). See footnote 21 for alternative translations of affection in first book of *Ethica*.

conceptualization of *conatus* can be found in *Cogitata Metaphysica*. Even at these initial stages, he reproved distinction between the thing itself and the *conatus* of that being.<sup>169</sup> It is rather confusing “distinction by reason with real or modal distinction” which is the claim made by proponents of metaphysical good. For Spinoza, we cannot ascribe something beyond that force. If it were possible, then there will also be a necessary “*conatus* to persevere in its own being”, a *conatus* for *conatus*, and so ad infinitum (2002, p. 188). This challenging view of *conatus* is crystallized in EIIP7.<sup>170</sup> Here, he equates power, striving and essence which was previously hinted in EIP34. It is perfectly plausible to state that EIIP7 depend heavily on EIIP4, which is almost an axiom rather than proposition, because definition of anything affirms, “and does not negate” its essence (2002, p. 282).<sup>171</sup> They both form a complete psychological account. Yet, how is it related to the rest of his philosophy?

For Spinoza, *conatus* can be accessed within active and passive affections’ framework. Joy and sadness cause fluctuations in the striving.

Every affection of the body is said to increase the acting power of the body in so far as it increases that endeavor for self-preservation; it diminishes the acting power of the body in so far as it diminishes that endeavor. (Wolfson, 1962b, p. 195)

Nonetheless, *conatus* is a generic term and, although it can be used generally without any perplexity, Spinoza had articulated on several subcategories. He says:

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<sup>169</sup> The term *conatus* has been derived from *conatur* and has, in fact, various translations. Curley mainly puts it as striving, while Wolfson sometimes translated it as endeavor and rarely as self-preservation, especially when denoting the terms relation with preceding philosophies of Stoics, Aquinas, Augustine, some Hebrews and Hobbes (1994, p. 160; 1962b, pp. 198–9). Shirley also attributed the term a central role which instantiates “an inherent tendency towards self-preservation and activity” (2002, p. 283). Elwes held the term endeavor to persist.

<sup>170</sup> The claim that the thing’s essence is nothing else than its *conatus*, “its endeavor to persist in its own being” is not positively proven but only the necessity of the *conatus* that is deduced from the essence (2002, p. 283). Hence, we can only maintain the negative proof in *Cogitata Metaphysica* concerning the equality of thing’s essence and *conatus*.

<sup>171</sup> One does not need to meticulously read the third book to recognize that there is a circular definition of *conatus* and essence. A thing strives to realize its essence and its essence is the *conatus* itself. I think that Spinoza did it on purpose to naturalize the teleological (and metaphysical, in his own words) psychology of his philosophical lineage. Cook expressed it as “homeostatic maintenance of the organic unity” with an inertial tendency (Cook, 2007, p. 96). Schrijvers also rebuked teleological interpretation of Spinoza’s desire and argued that desire’s expansivity can be “explained on the basis of Galileo’s principle of inertia” (1999, p. 69).

When this conatus is related to the mind alone, it is called Will [voluntas]; when it is related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite [appetitus], which is therefore nothing else but man's essence, from the nature of which there necessarily follow those things that tend to his preservation, and which man is thus determined to perform.<sup>172</sup> Further, there is no difference between appetite and Desire [cupiditas] except that desire is usually related to men insofar as they are conscious of their appetite. Therefore, it can be defined as follows: desire is "appetite accompanied by the consciousness thereof". (2002, p. 284)

EIIP9 brings not only a differentiation between will (as relating to mind only) and appetite (as relating to mind and body) but also, between *appetitus* and *cupiditas*.<sup>173</sup> First kind of distinction is familiar from the inquiry of joy (pleasure) and sadness (pain) which rely on either pertaining to mind or both mind and body. However, the second kind invokes a fresh distinction which is between conscious and unconscious. Nevertheless, consciousness, for Spinoza, cannot be defined as a separate faculty of mind other than ideas. It, rather, refers to the ideas that we can access, or we are aware.<sup>174</sup> When we say that we are not conscious, it means that we are ignorant of thing or event (and its causes in the case of our actions according to EIIP35S). Spinoza, himself, does not extend that distinction of consciousness and unconsciousness to the analysis of passive emotions. Nonetheless, LeBuffe, gave an account of how we might think of basic emotions such as joy (*laetitia*) and sadness (*tristitia*). He describes with the help of EIIP28. He states that "we are, in desiring, conscious of striving in some sense but not necessarily in the sense that our consciousness of it is veridical" (2010, p. 133). So, what we *imagine* to be conducive, that is either through adequate or inadequate knowledge, to our being, is something that we are inclined to bring about; on the other hand, what we *imagine* to be opposing to our joy and conducive to our sadness is something that we are inclined to destroy (2002, p. 293).<sup>175</sup>

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<sup>172</sup> Concerning this determined expression of our own nature (or essence) as *conatus*, Lord says that "as finite modes, we actualise a degree of God's thinking and physical power and we strive to carry on actualising it" (2010, p. 89). And the term power fits better since it refers back to Spinoza's ontology.

<sup>173</sup> Wolfson remarks that the term appetite has its roots in Stoic philosophy in terms of self-preservation as animal's "first impulse". A similar use is evinced in Duns Scotus, according to Wolfson (1962b, pp. 195–6).

<sup>174</sup> He says that "an idea is nothing but a certain awareness" (2002, p. 22). In that case, we may roughly think of being conscious of *x* as having an idea that *x* exists in whatever sense.

<sup>175</sup> A further example might be brought in evolution. Although, humans along with other animals, we desire certain things, we are not always conscious of them. Rather, these desires are products of

Active and passive joys differentiate in terms of conscious and unconscious desire as it is shown in pertaining to mind and mind-body, while I omit *conatus* since it is a general term that inheres in both. On the basis of being conscious, Spinoza proposed appetite (*appetitus*) and desire (*cupiditas*). Only the latter is differentiated from the former because it is accompanied by consciousness. In the light of this, Wolfson indicated that, in Spinoza, there are two primary active emotions, namely desire and joy or pleasure.<sup>176</sup> He defines active desire as “the effort to self-preservation by dictates of reason” and active pleasure as “the enjoyment experienced from the mind’s contemplation of itself whenever it conceives a true or adequate idea” (1962b, p. 218).<sup>177</sup> Although Spinoza does not clearly put it this way, with the hidden twist of *conatus intelligendi*, we may say, Spinoza would likely to accept such concept and definition.<sup>178</sup> At that point, we may find a yardstick to distinguish passive and active joy. In passive, desire is not necessarily followed by joy since it does not arise from mind’s own nature. However, in active, we say, joy ensues desire necessarily because it directly comes from the nature of mind and its inclinations, according to Spinoza.

If we take consciousness as “correlate in Thought of the extraordinarily high complexity of the human body in Extension”, which is totally agreeable in Spinoza’s general metaphysical system and suitable for some contemporary neuroscience views, with that complexity, we can envisage a conscious being is capable of great diversity of activity (Nadler, 2008a, p. 575). Yet, as the capacity to act and capacity to be acted upon increases (with complexity), it leads to a simultaneous expansion—both in activity and in passivity. This mutual relationship between imaginative and rational sides is summed in these words:

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evolutionary processes and adaptations over long periods of time. The same point is indicated by Damasio by exemplifying hardwiring of brain circuitry to ensure survival and well-being (2003, p. 36).

<sup>176</sup> Now, regarding this point, it should be added that, for Spinoza, desire can be either active or passive.

<sup>177</sup> I could not find any textual evidence on the existence of a passive desire but only unconscious desire. Yet, for the conceptual clarity, I took it as active desire.

<sup>178</sup> *Conatus intelligendi* is an extension of *conatus* in which one overcomes the mere necessities of survival and embraces desire to understand. In that sense, we can think of an enjoyment through “mind’s contemplation of itself whenever it conceives a true or adequate idea”. Its various interpretations provide answers to a wide range of problems from suicide to inclination to understand. However, a full-blown explanation and investigation of it is outside the scope of this work.

The larger the imaginative field, the more favorable is the environment or “biotope” where the mind can be active; at the same time, this activity places the mind in a favorable state for increasing the distance that separates it from the imaginative field. (Schrijvers, 1999, p. 75)

Hence, this seemingly conflictual image of the active-passive does not only connect consciousness with activity but, more generally, it also brings *conatus*, active-passive and consciousness together in which *conatus* fluctuates.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

Spinoza has always been a controversial figure in history of philosophy. He provoked so many responses in different ways that Freudenthal says “Ever since he appeared on the scene and began to beat out a new path in the domain of thought, praise and blame, veneration and depreciation have fallen to his lot to an unusual degree” (1895, p. 17). This both arises from the content and style, even though all of reception is hard to collect and classify. Apart from its thought-provoking content, *Ethica*’s “stiff mathematical structure” has also aroused distress and anxiety. Nevertheless, that does not mean Spinoza has missed the target because, for him, “*omnia praeclara tam difficilia quam rara sunt*”.<sup>179</sup>

*Ethica* had a different aim than most of its contemporaries, so it extends further than theory of knowledge and ontology. Amongst these, ethics and politics are, of course, of utmost importance but not within the scope of this study. This is uncommon in the revival of Spinozism. Most of the current trend about Spinoza’s philosophy turns around politics, especially within the scope of political and moral philosophy which can perhaps be attributed to a search of alternative ground for materialism and Marxism as in the case of Negri and Balibar.

In that study, I did not limit the range of answers from *Ethica* but also previous studies included. Yet, fourth book of *Ethica* is used rarely and fifth is left out, almost totally, since the driving questions are not related to them. Although there are other minor problems that I have focused in this work, in the main itinerary, I tried to maintain immanent and naturalist framework with its link to theory of understanding, desire

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<sup>179</sup> It is infamous last words of *Ethica* which means “all things are excellent as difficult as they are rare” (2002, p. 382).

and *conatus*. In fact, in that work, theory of knowledge should only be understood in conjunction with emotions and *conatus*. In naturalism, which goes hand in hand with immanence in Spinoza, no single force of nature, not any single being, is exempt from the natural order itself. In other words, as Armstrong said, naturalism is “nothing but a single all-embracing spatio-temporal system” (1978, p. 261). Even though it would be asynchronistic to ascribe Spinoza that position, Morgan also touches this point in introducing *Ethica* (2002, p. 215). In fact, it can be said that Spinoza would not only accept such a definition on the basis of size neutrality, but apparently would make some additions to that definition (such as rejection of teleology and purposiveness in nature).<sup>180</sup>

Throughout the thesis, I tried to hold the same scheme as Spinoza’s, that is, there is a direction of evolution (or construction) of concepts. In other words, “the centrifugal direction from God to the thing in order to discover and express the principles that animate the system of being” is maintained in the work as far as possible in spite of not being comprehensive as Spinoza’s own (Hardt, 1993, p. 58). In first book, there are definitions and explications of a barrage of idiosyncratic concepts, even though they have some roots in antiquity and medieval philosophy. However, I did not advance to practical dealing of the Spinoza’s philosophy as he did in fourth and fifth books. Rather, my aim is to establish the ground of attaining human excellence, as Spinoza says.<sup>181</sup> In such an establishment, I have tried to push Spinoza’s initial position about immanence to its limits, that is, with necessitarianism, in areas of understanding (or more broadly in theory of knowledge) emotions, desire and *conatus*. Some conceptualizations, aforementioned, should be redefined to be integrated to

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<sup>180</sup> Size neutrality denotes that features of a thing does not alter with respect to its size (Bennett, 1996, p. 62). In Spinoza’s terms, in composition of a composite body the relation between simple bodies does not change.

<sup>181</sup> Surprisingly, in that fashion, he can both be considered as “a consequentialist and a virtue ethicist”. In the same page, Garrett explicates this by appealing to “temporal duration” and self-preservation. In accordance with that, he concludes “the highest virtue is not merely a means toward self-preservation; it is itself a kind of self-preservation” (1997, p. 297).

Spinoza's immanent ontology. Hence, I have touched them in the respective chapters as well.

To provide a brief recapitulation, it is more convenient to start from the ending point in explaining the aim without any further additions. First of all, theory of knowledge, desire and *conatus* are taken together in a sense that Spinoza's views about knowledge beyond the connection of knowledge with desire or *conatus* are left out. In other words, theory of knowledge or understanding cannot be conceived separately, at least in this work and in that sense they can be considered under a common theme.<sup>182</sup> I confined these chapters; otherwise, it would both lose main direction and require a larger study. Yet, Spinoza occupies a distinct place because of his views between partiality and completeness (i.e. whether we can read his theory of knowledge and activity-passivity as continuous or not). Starting from the theory of knowledge, I tried to hold a moderate view between them rather than common interpretation of Spinoza which defends separation between partial and complete, inadequate and adequate, passion and action.

Second is that in order to provide a background to Spinoza's views on *conatus* and theory of knowledge, I tried to expound his necessitarianism. Though there are several interpretations, ranging from strong to moderate to weak, such as Garrett's and Curley and Walski's, I submitted to a strong position of necessitarianism. It might be thought that this does not leave room for action. On the contrary, this brings us a relentless capacity to explore and discover, as being a mode of substance, both ourselves and nature in general. To increase that capacity, it is possible to reconsider our nature (with respect to EIIA2), endeavor to change our perspective to bring joy so that our capability to action also increases which, as a result, leads us to act more complex. What a Spinozistic outlook cannot reject in that frame is that there is external circumstances and forces in which, not only us but nothing can escape, either in increasing or decreasing ability to act and feel.

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<sup>182</sup> In that case, Spinoza could be interpreted as a pragmatist, with regard to this practical notion.

In order to understand theory of knowledge and desire in necessitarianism, third in recapitulation, we need turn to his basic ontological elements which are comprised of substance, attributes and modes. This is what I have tried to do in the second chapter. Especially the substance monism is imperative in designating his metaphysical system as immanent. Nonetheless, it cannot be understood properly without resorting to attributes and modes because they include essential discussions in discerning all concepts. In the immanence chapter, although it is one of the hot topics, I skipped debates on materialism, of which Bayle accuses him, though it could be said that Spinoza lays the grounds of a materialistic view of nature (especially starting from EIIP13). It is claimed that we were to read this proposition as an exposition of materialism, as Curley and Bennett did, because “understanding never proceeds from mind to body” (1988, p. 78).<sup>183</sup> Nonetheless, these points are indecisive and, similar to other areas in Spinoza’s philosophy, are not sufficiently backed up. It demands a critical evaluation and reinterpretation.

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<sup>183</sup> Bennett notes that it is not parallelism and ascribes Spinoza an asymmetrical view in which body is prior (1984, p. 126).

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Spinoza erken modern dönemin en önde gelen düşünürlerinden biri olmasının yanı sıra, felsefe tarihinde alternatif bir görüşü temsil eder. Kartezyen görüşün bir çok unsurun tersine bir bakış açısından başlayarak felsefesini oluşturur. Genel olarak diğer bir bakış açısını temsil etmesi aynı zamanda onun yorumlanmasında da çok geniş ve değişik fikirlere yol açmasının en önemli sebeplerinden biridir. Bu değişik fikirler neredeyse birbirleriyle zıtlık gösterme noktasına kadar varmaktadır. Bir diğer göz önünde bulundurulması gereken etken ise her ne kadar Spinoza'nın kullandığı terimlerin aslında önceki felsefe geleneklerden alınmış olduğu gerçeği yadsınamazsa da aslında neredeyse tüm bu terimleri yeniden tanımlanmasının da altının çizilmesi gerektiğidir. Şüphesiz ki sıkı örgülü bir düzen içerisinde bu geriye ve ileriye dönüşleri kaçınılmaz kılmaktadır. Bu da her ne kadar sistematik de ilerlense okuyucu açısından bir parça zorluğa sebep olmaktadır.

Her yorumun ve okunmanın mutlak bir başlangıç noktası olması gerektiğinden yola çıkarak, bu Spinoza çalışmasının başlangıcının içkinlik mefhumu olduğunu belirtmek gerekir. İçkinlik ve Spinoza denilince ilk akla gelen felsefecilerden biri, hatta birincisi olan Deleuze ile bir kıyaslamaya tabi tutulmadığı bu çalışmada, daha çok Spinoza'nın kendi eserlerinden gelen fikirlere sadık kalmaya çalışıldı. Yalnız bunu yaparken Etik'in 4. ve 5. Kitabı ve Teoloji-Politik İncelemeler gibi bazı temel metinlerini de çalışmamın içerisine koymadım çünkü esas olarak içkinlikten varoluş çabasına doğru gelişen çizginin pratik sonuçlarına değil, varoluş koşullarına yönelmek istedim.

Esas olarak Spinoza'nın Etik'teki ilerleme sırasına sadık kalmaya çalıştım. Öncelikle içkinlik kavramını Spinoza'nın yapacağı biçimde tanımlamak için ilk kitapta bahsedilen ontolojik tartışmalara yoğunlaştım. Ardından zorunluluk kavramını

açıklarken önceki ontolojik sistemden nasıl çıkarıldığına yoğunlaştım ve bazı problemlerden bahsetmeye çalıştım. Böylece ardından gelen anlayış ve duygulanımlar arasındaki ilişki kurma biçimini Spinoza'nın Etik'teki pozisyonuna mümkün olduğu kadar bağlı biri biçimde gerçekleştirmeye çalıştım. Ardından gelen anlayış ve varoluş çabası bölümleri, aslen birbirinden bağımsız olmamasının hem bilgi hem de duygu teorisiyle uyumlu olmasının arkasında yatan sebeplerden bir tanesidir.

İlk bölüm olan içkinlikte başlangıç olarak felsefe tarihindeki aşkınlık, ışığa ve içkinlik kavramlarına kısa da olsa bir bakıştan bahsetmek lazım. Aşkınlık kabaca ontolojik olarak ötede olan olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu dünya'da ya da evrende olmama durumudur. Dolayısıyla gerek ontolojik gerekse epistemolojik düzlemde açıklamanın daha başka yerde olduğu bir alana yönelmek zorunda kalırız. Bu durumda "gerçek" olanın yeri bu farklı iki yerden birinde yer alacaktır. Baştan bu şekilde bir görüşün temelinde ise "gerçek" diğer tarafta olanın içinde yer alır. Felsefe tarihinde, özellikle de Nietzsche'den sonra, Platon'a atfedilen bu görüş aslında ilk başta *Parmenides* diyalogunda da geçen Formlar Teorisi'yle özdeşleşmiş olsa da daha başka birçok alanda da kendini gösterir. Bu alanların başında din ve dinin temellendirilmesinde etki rol oynayan felsefi görüşler yer almaktadır. Buna bir örnek olarak Tanrı bir yaratım sürecinin başlangıcı olarak tüm evrenin kuralları ve işleyişinin dışında olduğuna dayanan düşünce sistemleri verilebilir. Tüm aşkın felsefi görüşlerde birinin diğerini ötesinde olduğu bir zemin ve birinin diğerinin temsili olduğuna benzer bir hiyerarşik sisteme rastlanır. Aşkınlığa bir alternatif olarak Yeni Platoncu felsefelerle birlikte ortaya çıkan bir diğer görüş ışıktır. Bu görüşe göre her ne kadar ayrı düzlemler ve bunların arasındaki hiyerarşi kalsa da, yayılım keskin bir biçimde olmak yerine azalarak olur. Bir başka deyişle hiyerarşide yukarıda olan düzlemde aşağıya doğru olan düzlemde doğru dereceli olarak azalan bir ontolojik geçiş söz konusudur. Böylece aşkınlıktaki keskin kopuşun yerini kaynağıyla ilişkisini kaybetmeyen bir akış alır. Ancak yine de yaratılan ve yaratan arasındaki ayrım yerli yerinde durur. İçkinlikte ise iki farklı düzlem, bu dünya dışında başka bir dünya, ve aralarındaki hiyerarşi fikrine karşı çıkar. Spinoza Etik'te bunu nedensellik üstünden açıklamaya çalışırken diğer erken modern bir çok görüşün tersine Tanrı'nın geçişken değil içkin neden olduğunun altını çizer. Bu nedenselliğin arkasında farklı olarak hem diğer herşeyin Tanrı içinde

yer alması ve Tanrı dışında bir töz olmadığı düşüncesi yatar. Töz ya da Tanrı Spinoza için farklı şeyler değildir ve bununla beraber Tanrı'nın etkisi kendi dışına değil içine doğrudur.

Spinoza'da içkinlik üç temel ontolojik kavrama dayanır. İlki olan töz kavramı Spinoza'ya göre kendi içinde kavranan ve kendi kendinin sebebi olan şeydir. Yani Spinoza'nın kullandığı dille özü varoluşunu içerir. Doğasında var olmak olduğu için de var olmaması imkansızdır. Tözün tek olması, bölünememesi ve sonsuz olmasına bakılmaksızın düşünüldüğünde diğer ontolojik ispatlardan farklı değildir. Spinoza'nın töz tanımlamasında tözün mutlak sonsuz olması ve tözün tekliği birbirinden ayırt edilemez biçimde paralel olarak gelişir. Tözün başka bir tözden ayrılabilmesinin tek yolu onun değişimleri yoluyla, yani sıfat ve tavırları yoluyla, olduğundan birden çok tözün olabilmesi için ya tözün ya bazı dönüşümlerini başka tözlerce paylaşılması ya da bambaşka etkilenimlere sahip olması gerekir. Paylaşılması durumunda tözlerin ayırt edilebilme sorunları ortaya çıkarken, tamamen ayrı dönüşümlere sahip tözlerin ise birinin mutlak sonsuzluğunu engelleyeceğinden tek töz geçerlidir.

Tarihsel olarak bakıldığında sonsuzluk fikrinin gelişimini vermek çalışmanın kapsamının dışında olacağından Spinoza'daki sonsuzluk fikrinin açıkça ortaya çıkarıldığı 12. Mektup ve Etik'in ilk bölümündeki tanımlamalarına yönelebiliriz. Özellikle de Etik'in ilk kitabındaki tanımlardan çıkarılabilecek iki tür sonsuzluk vardır. İlki mutlak ikincisi ise görece sonsuzluk denilebilecek bu iki farklı sonsuzluk türü Etik'in ilk kitabında “kendi türünde sonsuz” olma ya da “mutlak olarak sonsuz olma” olarak doğrudan karşılandığı söylenebilir. Yalnız bu açıdan bakıldığında aynı zamanda Spinoza epistemolojik bazı sebeplerden dolayı sonsuzluğun anlaşılmasındaki problemlerden bahseder. Bunu açık hale getirmek için en temelde söylediği sonsuzluk fikrinin ilki hayalgücünde ortaya çıkarken ikincisi akıl yoluyla ulaşılabilecek bir alanda ortaya çıkar. İkisini birbirine karıştırmanın ise yanlış sonuçlar ve çıkarımlara neden olacağını söyler.

Spinoza'ya göre sonsuzluğun anlaşılmasıyla da bağlantılı olarak töz bölünemez. Bunun dışında her ne kadar iki adet sıfattan uzam sıfatının bölünebileceği düşünülse bile Spinoza bu fikre karşı çıkar ve bölünme durumunda ortaya çıkabilecek çeşitli sorunları ortaya koyar. Bahsedilen sorun Spinoza'daki Cantor öncesi sonsuzluk anlayışından kaynaklı olup sonsuzluk ve bölünme arasındaki erken modern bir tartışmayla ortaya çıkıyor. Spinoza karşı çıkanlardaki esas sorunun uzamsal sıfatın ve tözün sonsuz olmadığı ve bölünebildiği arasındaki ilişkiyi yanlış anladıklarından dolayı hataya düştüklerine vurgu yapar.

Spinoza'nın ontolojisinde bir diğer önemli kavram da sıfattır. Tözün farklı biçimde "algılanışı" olarak dile getirilse de hem yardımcı kaynaklarda hem de Etik'teki gelecek bölümlerde açıldığı üzere ortada "algılanıştan" çok, bir "olma" durumu vardır. Yani sıfatlar tözün farklı "olma" durumlarıdır. Ancak bu açıdan bizim algılayışımızda farklı bir yere yerleşir. Sıfatlarla alakalı olarak bahsedilebilecek önemli sorunlardan bir tanesi de ister "olma" ister "algılanış" sorunu olarak alalım, tözün kaç farklı biçimde ortaya çıkacağıdır. Spinoza her ne kadar Etik'te ya da önceki çalışmalarında düşünce ve uzam dışında başka bir sıfattan bahsetmese de tözün sonsuz sayıda sıfatı olduğunu savunur. Bu nokta tözün sonsuzluğu ve kudretiyle açıklanır. Sadece iki sıfatın olabileceğini öne süren Bennett'in karşıt görüşü ise metne sadık bir okumadan ilerleyerek Spinoza'nın tözün tüm sıfatları içerdiğini söylerken aslında sadece iki sıfatı kastettiğini söyler. Bu noktada Etik'in ilk kitabında ve önceki eserlerinde açık bir biçimde sonsuz sıfat olduğunu söylemenin yanı sıra tözün önceden tanımlanan doğasıyla da çeliştiği için sonsuz sayıda sıfat fikrine sadık kaldım.

Spinoza'nın sıfatlar konusunda ve belki de ontolojisinin tümünde en ilginç unsurlardan bir tanesi de paralellik ve karşılıklı etkileşimin olmamasıdır. Bu görüşe göre farklı iki sıfat arasında hem etkileşim yoktur hem de paralel bir sebepsellik anlayışı mevcuttur. Spinoza'ya göre, düşünce ile uzamı ele alırsak ikisi arasında sebep-sonuç ilişkisini herhangi bir yönde görmemiz imkansızdır. Bu görüş Descartes'ın zihin-beden problemine daha değişik bir bakış getirmektedir. Zihnimiz bedenimizi hareket ettirmenin sebebi değildir. Zihnimizde bir düşüncenin

onaylanmasıyla kolumuzu kaldırma hareketi değildir Spinoza'ya göre. Asıl olarak bunlar paralel süreçlerdir ve tözdeki uzamın her bir unsuruna karşılık yine tözde bir düşünce vardır. Daha önceden de söylendiği gibi sıfatların tözün farklı iki “oluş” biçimi olmasından kaynaklı olarak zihin, bir fikirler bütünü olarak, bedenün uzamdaki karşılığıdır. Dolayısıyla nedensellik ilkesi ise ancak düşüncenin ve uzamın kendi içinde işler. Birbirlerine karşılık gelmeleri ise tözün farklı yansıma biçimleri olmalarıdır. Bu ise Leibniz'in önceden kurulmuş düzen (harmoni) fikrinden çok farklıdır.

Diğer temel ontolojik eleman ise tavrılardır. Erken modern dönem felsefelerin bir çoğunun aksine tavrın anlamı farklıdır. Esas olarak tavrıdan anlaşılması istenen şey tözün sonlu ya da sonsuz olarak tekil dışavurumlarıdır. Etrafımızdaki nesnelere kadar biz de tözün (ya da Tanrı'nın) bir tavrıyızdır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında iki görüş vardır. İlki bu ilişkiyi tözün bir hareketi, bir yüklemi gibi anlayabileceğimizi söylerken ikincisi töz ile tavrı arasındaki ilişkiyi bir tür bağımlılık ve bağımsızlık olarak ele alır. Her ikisi de birbirine benzemesi ve temelde çelişmemesine rağmen Spinoza'nın da Etik'te belirttiği halinden anlamamız gerekenin bağımlılık ve bağımsızlık ilişkisi üzerinden tanımlanması gerektiğini açıklamaya çalıştım.

Tavrıların çeşitleri üzerine Etik'te pek fazla tanımlama yok. Bu yüzden *Anlağın Geliştirilmesi Üzerine* adlı önceki çalışması içerisinde ikincil kaynakların da katkısıyla sonlu ve sonsuz tavrılardan bahsettim. Özellikle de sonsuz tavrılardan bir kısmının (dolayimsız sonsuz tavrı) nedensellik ve yasalar açısından önemini üzerinde durdum. Bir tarafta dolayimsız sonsuz tavrıların yasalar ya da işleme prensipleri olarak yorumlanması gerektiğini düşünen yorumları açıklayarak kendimi de bu konuma yerleştirdim. Dolayimli sonsuz tavrılara bakmamız gerektiğinde önümüze tek bir tanım çıkıyor o da Mektup 63 ve Mektup 64'te yer alan ve evrenin tüm yüzü anlamına geldiğini söyleyen tanımdır. Spinoza'ya göre bu tüm sonlu tavrıların toplamıdır. Sonlu tavrılar ise ilk başta tanımlandığıyla ilişkili olarak tözün belirlenimleridir. Bunların tanımlanmasında çeşitli yorumlara ve anlayışlara yer verilirken tavrıların nesnelere ve şeylerden ayırt edilmesine özen gösterdim.

Bu ontoloji ve nedensellik ilkesi temelinde Spinoza'nın metafizik sistemi ve felsefesinin tümünü belirlenimcilik açısından nasıl okunabileceğini göstermek için ilk olarak belirlenimcilik ile determinizm arasındaki ayrımı odaklandım. Belirlenimciliği kabaca açıklamak için determinizmin daha kuvvetli bir türü olduğu söylenebilir. Daha açık biçimde ifade etmek gerekirse determinizmde sonucun sebepten zorunlu biçimde geldiği söylenirken, belirlenimcilikte bunun üstüne bir de doğanın tümünün daha farklı biçimde bir nedensellikle işleyemeyeceğini söyler. Yeterli sebep prensibiyle bağlantılı olarak söylemek gerekirse sonucun gerçekleşmesinin nedenini verebildiğimiz kadar olmadığı durumda neden olmadığına da sebebini sunabilmeliyiz. Bu bakış açısından Spinoza'da yatay ve dikey nedensellikleri nasıl algılayabileceğimizi inceledim ve aslında iki tür bakışın özünde farklı olmadığını aynı süreçlerin iki farklı yansıması olduğunu iddia etmeye çalıştım. Böylece Etik'teki öz ve etkileşimden gelen bazı ayrımlarının aslında aynı süreçleri olduğunu ve bu açıdan bakılması gerektiğine odaklanarak yorumlanmasıyla daha anlamlı bir bakış olacağını savunmaya çalıştım. Aynı cinsteki etkileşimler olduğunu söylerken sadece ebediyet ve birey arasındaki farklılıklardan kaynaklandığını söylemek mümkündür.

Belirlenimciliğin de determinizm ile paylaştığı sıkı sıkıya örülü varsayımından ileri gelen sorunlardan dört tanesi (bağımlılık, olasılık, olumsuzluk ve mucizeler) üstüne yoğunlaştım. Bunları açıklarken ve Spinoza'nın verdiği cevapları irdelerken en dolayimli cevabın bağımlılıkta olduğuna vurgu yaptım. Spinoza'da ortaya çıkan diğer sorunların daha önceden yaptığı açıklamalarla kolayca çözüldüğü göz önünde bulundurulunca bu noktada yorumlarda yer yer Spinoza'nın metinlerinin dışına çıkmak kaçınılmaz hale geliyor. Günümüzde akla gelebilecek örnekleri de göz önünde bulundurarak Spinoza'yı yorumlarken nedenselliği kesikli olarak algılamak yerine daha kademeli olarak görülmesi gerekir. Böylece daha sonra da bahsedilen etkenlik ve edilgenlik konusunda da benzer olarak gelişecek bir görüşü belirlenimcilik bölümünün altında ortaya koymuş oldum. Nedensellik zincirinde sadece belirli oranlarda etki eden ve etkilenen olabileceğinin düşüncesiyle Spinoza'nın belirlenimciliğine baktım.

Peki, Spinoza’da çok açıkça bahsedilen öz mefhumu bu sonsuz nedensellik zincirinde nereye yerleşiyor? İki açıdan bakıldığında bu ilişkiyi tanımlamak mümkün. İlk olarak Spinoza bize ilk kitapta özleri varoluşunu içeren ve içermeyen olarak iki farklı varlık tipinin varlığından söz ediyor. Ağır bir biçimde ortaçağ felsefesinin kavramlarını kullanmaktan geri durmasa da, Spinoza’nın burada vardığı sonuç biraz daha farklı. Özden gelen zorunluluk ve nedensellik zincirinden gelen zorunluluklar farklıdır. Buradan Spinoza’nın felsefesine bakarken daha çok sebep-sonuç zincirinden gelen zorunluluğu ön plana çıkarmaya çalıştım böylece Spinoza’daki öz kavramının bu belirlenim içerisinde okunabilme olanağı doğuyor. Diğer bir yanda ise her şeyin özden kaynaklandığını savunan görüşün ortaya çıkardığı sorunlardan bahsettim.

Belirlenimcilik felsefesinin anlamlı bir hale gelebilmesi için gereksinimlerin ve imkansızlıkların fikirlerine sahip olmak gerektiğinden, bir sonraki bölüm için Spinoza’nın bilgi ya da anlam kuramını açıklamakta fayda var. Bu açıklama Spinoza’nın bilgi kuramının tamamen bir açıklamasından ziyade sadece içkinlik ve varolma çabasını açıklayacak biçimde olması gerektiğinden ilk başta uygun ve uygun olmayan fikirlerin tanımlamasıyla işe başlamalıyız. Spinoza bize zihnin bedenin fikri olduğunu ve zihnin kendisinin de fikirden başka bir şey olmadığını gösterir. Dolayısıyla Spinoza’da Aristo ve Descartes’in zihin ve duygu ile düşüncelerinin aksine fikirlerin kendilerinin dışında yetilerinden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Önemli bir noktaya parmak basan bu önemli ayrıma göre bütün zihinsel yetiler, ki buna irade de dahil, fikirlerin birbiriyle ilişkisi içerisinde anlaşılması gerekir. Aslında gördüğümüz irade ve seçim özgürlükleri ise sadece fikirlerimizin oluşmasına sebep olan öncüllerin (öncü fikirlerin) farkına varılamamasından kaynaklanır. Peki, hata bu durumda nasıl olmaktadır? Sahip olduğumuz bir fikre inanıp inanmama gibi ayrı bir yetiye sahip değil miyiz? Spinoza bize hatanın ya da inanma durumunda (yani bir tür düşünceye onay verme ya da vermeme denilebilir) iki farklı düşünce arasında ilişkiyi akla getirmemizi söyler. Bu iki fikrin de olumlanmasıyla ancak arada bir karar meydana gelir. Fikirler ile ilgili bu karışımın tözün düşünce sıfatındaki nedensellik zincirindeki düşünceleri akla getirmeliyiz. Eğer bu zincirdeki sıralamaya uygun bir biçimde fikirlere sahip olursak bunlara uygun

fikir, olmaz ise upuygun olmayan fikir denilir. Daha önce bu iki fikir sonsuzluk düşüncesinin ontolojik olarak oluşturulmasında öne çıkmıştı. Hegel ve Macherey'in Spinoza yorumlarındaki kıyaslamayla bu noktayı biraz daha açtım ve tartışmaları netleştirmeye çalıştım.

Upuygun ve upuygun olmayan düşüncelerin sonsuzluğa uyarlanmasından sonra Spinoza'nın felsefesinin tümüne hakim olan ve ilk kitabın sonundan beri gelen düşünce silsilesinin önemli ayaklarından bir tanesi olan özgür iradenin reddinden bahsettim. Spinoza'ya göre zihin fikirlerden oluşur ve fikirlerin tümünün dışında bir zihin kavramsallaştırmasına yer yoktur. Bu noktada o zamanlar da zihinsel açıklamalarda özellikle de Descartes tarafından çok kullanılan iradenin yerine fikirlerin kendi aralarındaki ilişkisellik ve fikirlerin kendi kuvvetleri eklenecektir. Spinoza iradenin aslında bir fikirler bütünü ya da bir fikir olduğunu söyleyecektir. Tamamıyla özgür bir irade ise sadece düşünme sıfatındaki nedensellik zincirinin algılanmamış bir hali olacaktır ve dolayısıyla upuygun olmayan bir düşüncenin ürünü olacaktır. Bir diğer deyişle sonuç olan düşüncenin sebeplerini göremediği için kendini özgür zannedecektir. Spinoza'nın sunduğu ispatın dışında içkinlik düşüncesine bakıldığında insanı doğanın dışına iten doğanın dışında tutan bir güç olarak özgür irade bir "krallık içinde krallık" yaratmaktadır. İkinci bir şekilde de yeterli sebep prensibini ihlal etmektedir çünkü özgür olmasının arkasında yatan ne özsel ne de nedensellik zincirinde bir sebep yoktur.

Upuygun olan ve olmayan düşüncelerden Spinoza üç farklı bilgi türü çıkarıyor. İkinci kitabın sonunda ortaya çıkan bu üç bilgi türünden ilki sanı ve hayallerden oluşuyor. İlk bilgi türünün Spinoza'ya göre bir kaç farklı sebebi olabilir. Düzenlenmemiş tecrübeler, tümeller ve işaretlerden kaynaklanan bilgi bu ilk tür bilgi içinde yer alıyor. İkinci bilgi türü akla dayalı olup upuygun düşüncelerden türüyor. Peki, upuygun düşüncelerden nasıl türüyor? Spinoza'ya göre bu sorunun cevabı ortak nosyonlar. Akıl nesnelere arasındaki ortaklıklara bakarak değişmeyen ve ortak kalan nosyonu bularak, ya dış nesnelere arasında ya da bedeni ile dış nesnelere arasında, upuygun düşünceye sahip oluyor ve bunun sayesinde ikinci tür bilgiye de sahip olmuş oluyor.

Üçüncü tür bilgi ise yine upuygun düşüncelerden oluşması bakımından ikinciden tür olarak farklı değil. Bir görüş bu fikir türünün sezgi olarak algılanabileceğini ve bu bakımdan ispatlardan arınmış olarak doğru bir biçimde kavranabileceğini söylerken bir diğer görüş ise ortaklıklar arasında ortaklık kurduğunu söyleyerek bir üst düzey rasyonel bilgi olduğunu söylüyor. Ancak bu tartışma tezin normal izlencesi içerisine dahil değil. Kısaca sezgi kaynaklı üçüncü tür bilginin ikinci tür bilgi ile arasında sadece bir derece farkı olduğunu söylememiz mümkün.

Upuygun düşünceden türeyen bilgi türlerinin nasıl kaçınılmaz bir biçimde birinci tür bilgiden türediğinin duygularla alakalı olarak bir açıklamasının yapılması zorunluluğu vardır. Eğer bu soruyu geçerse Spinoza'nın felsefesini okurken içkinliği bir kenara bırakmış oluruz. Bu yüzden duygu(lanım) teorisini incelerken mutlaka bilgi kuramı ile bağlantısının göz önünde bulundurulması gerekir.

Varolma çabasının incelemesinin bilgi kuramıyla bağlantısının kurulabilmesi için mutlaka öncelikle Spinoza'nın duygulanım üzerine fikirlerinin anlaşılması gerektiğinden temelde düşüncesinin bu alandaki en basit uzantılarından bahsetmek gerekiyor. Spinoza'da duyguları sadece zihinle ilgili olmaları bakımından açıklarken karşımıza üç ana kavram çıkıyor. Bunlar neşe, keder ve arzu. Zihin ve bedenle ilişkilerini de hesaba katarak ve hangi fikirlerle beraber ortaya çıktığını irdeleyerek Spinoza üçüncü kitapta çok sayıda duygunun nasıl üretildiğini inceliyor. Ancak bu kısma çok fazla girmeden temelleri üstüne konuşmamız gerektiğinde üç temel kavramının açıklanmasını ele almak gerekiyor. Neşe zihnin edilgen olarak daha mükemmel bir hale geçmesidir. Bir diğer deyişle gücünün artmasıdır. Keder ise tam tersine zihnin edilgen bir biçimde daha az mükemmellikte bir hale geçerek zihnin gücünün azalmasına sebep olur. Burada dikkat edilecek nokta aslında edilgen olmasıdır. O yüzden edilgen ve etkenin tanımlamasına yönelmeliyiz. Spinoza'nın üçüncü kitabta incelediği birçok duygu edilgen alanda yer alıyor ve sadece kitabın son iki önermesi etken duygulanımlara ayrılıyor. Spinoza'ya göre edilgenlik sebebinin kendisi olmadığı durumlara, etkenlik ise sebebinin kendisi olduğu durumlara karşılık geliyor. Eğer birisi duygulanımın sebebi olarak kendi doğasından geldiğini gösterirse

bu durumda etkendir diyoruz. Etken-edilgen ve neşe-keder durumlarını aldığımızda ortaya daha karmaşık bir yapı çıkıyor. Eğer neşelenme duygusu varsa, ancak bu duygulanım edilgen ise, bunu nasıl değerlendirmemiz gerekir? Bu noktada iki tane yorumdan bahsettim. İlk, Macherey'in yorumu, ikincisi ise Deleuze'ün yorumu. İki yorumlamayı da Spinoza'nın önceki kavramsallaştırmalarını akılda tutarak yapmaya çalıştım. Macherey'e göre edilgen duygulanımlar ister neşe kaynaklı ister de keder kaynaklı olsun mutlaka edilgen bir noktaya geleceğinden ve dolayısıyla duygulanımın sebebi kişinin kendisi olmayacağından kederlenme ile sonuçlanacaktır. Macherey o yüzden keskin çizgilerle etken ve edilgeni ayırır. Diğer yanda Deleuze ise buna benzer keskin bir ayırım yapmaz ve edilgen neşelenmenin zihni tanım gereği daha mükemmel bir hale getireceğinden bizi etken olma durumuna iter. Her ne kadar etken hale sokmak için yeterli olduğunu söyleyemese de iki duygulanım türü arasında (etken ve edilgen) geçişli bir sistem kurmaya çalışır. Bu bakışın hem bilgi kuramında hem de içkinlik içerisinde bahsedilmiş olan altyapıyla uyumlu olduğunun altını çizmekte fayda var. Dolayısıyla edilgen neşeli duygulanımlar aslında bizi etkenliğe ittiğinden üçüncü kitabın son iki önermesinde bahsedilen etken duygulanımlara geçiş sağlanmış olur. Etken duygulanımların temelinde ise sadece iki unsur vardır. Bunlar neşe ve arzudur. Spinoza'da arzunun birden çok tanımlaması vardır. Varolma çabasının sadece zihinde bulunmasıyla doğan arzu (irade), zihin ve beden etkilenmesi tanımlanmasındaki arzu (iştah) farklıdır. Bunların dışında bir de Spinoza bize farklı bir ölçüt verir ve bu arzunun farkında olup olmama durumuna göre de iştah ve arzu'yu ayırır. İştah, arzunun bilinçsiz bir halidir. Üçüncü kitapta bilinç hakkında daha derin bir yoruma rastlanmamasına karşın daha sonraki iki kitapta ve bazı önde gelen yorumcuların dediklerine göre bir bilinç kuramı olmasa bile, bilinç hakkında söylenebilecek tutarlı bir bütün yakalanabilir. Derinlemesine bahsedilmese de bedenin kapasitesi arttıkça zihnin de artan karmaşıklığından doğan bir bilinç kuramına yakın bir alanı savundum. Etken duygulanımların temelinde yatan iki unsur ancak etkin haldeyken gelişen duygulanımlardır. Etken olma durumunda neşelenerek ve onun etkisinde arzunun doğal olarak artmasıyla daha da uygun düşüncelerin edinimine daha elverişli bir zemin sağlanır. Spinoza'nın etik görüşünün zeminini sağlayan bu görüşe göre varolma çabası ise duygulanımların denetlendiği bir kavram olarak değil onlardaki değişikliklerin sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan değişimlerin bütünü olarak

nitelendirilmelidir. Her ne kadar tezde yer vermesem de varolma çabası ile bilinç arasında kurulabilecek muhtemel bir ilişki ise buradan yorumlanabilir.

Spinoza'nın bu zorlu yapısından çıkan felsefesinden politik ve etik alanlarına dair söylenecek çok şey olsa da bu bölümü tezin içeriğinin dışında bıraktım. İlk üç kitap ve daha önceki yazılarını ve bazı önemli Spinoza yorumcularını kaynak olarak kullanırken bölümlerin gelişiminde Spinoza'nın kendi kullandığı sırayı takip etmeye çalıştım. Her ne kadar felsefi olarak bu yapı anlamlı gibi gözüксе de esas amacı tersten gidince daha iyi anlamak mümkün: varolma çabasının anlamak için bilgi kuramına, bilgi kuramını anlamak için belirlenimcilik sistemine ve Spinoza'da belirlenimci bir felsefenin ilerlediği içkinliğe doğru. Tez boyunca ontolojiden varolma çabasına doğru gelişen bu yolda doğalcılığı ve içkinliği tutarlı olarak savunmaya ve geride kalan bilgi ve varlık alanına dair söylemleri hep bunlarla dengeli biçimde okumaya çalıştım. Böylece Spinoza'nın Etik'i yazmadaki amacı olan insanın mükemmelliğe ulaşma çabasının hangi varsayımlar (ontolojik ve epistemolojik olarak) üzerine inşa edildiğini inceledim.

## APPENDIX B. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

### YAZARIN

Soyadı : Yaylım

Adı : Berk

Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Revisiting Immanence and *Conatus* in Spinoza

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: