

THINKING WITHOUT THE SUBJECT: NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF
CARTESIAN AND KANTIAN SUBJECTIVITY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

SEPTEMBER 2015

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

THINKING WITHOUT THE SUBJECT: NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN AND KANTIAN SUBJECTIVITY

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M.A., Department of Philosophy

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif Çırakman

September 2015, 148 Pages

In this M.A. thesis, I investigate Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity with regard to the subject-thought relationship as has been conceptualised in modern philosophy. Firstly, I attempt to elucidate the constitution of the subject and the modern image of thinking by focusing on the ideas of two major figures of modernity, namely, Descartes and Kant. Then, I problematize the concept of the subject with respect to Nietzsche's genealogical critique, and try to show that the subjectivist interpretation of the human being is valorised throughout the history of Western thought and civilization from a nihilistic perspective. Finally, focusing especially on the themes of knowledge, truth, language, consciousness

and the body, I discuss Nietzsche's deconstruction of modern subjectivity, and attempt to demonstrate how his physiological thinking enables us to reconceptualise the human being and thought in an immanent and more affirmative manner.

Keywords: Subjectivity, thought, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche.

ÖZ

ÖZNESİZ DÜŞÜNMEK: NIETZSCHE'NİN KARTEZYEN VE KANTÇI ÖZNELİK ELEŞTİRİSİ

İlbaşı, Kıvılcım
Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Elif Çırakman

Eylül 2015, 148 Sayfa

Bu Yüksek Lisans tezinde, modern felsefeye kavramsallaştırılan özne-düşünce ilişkisi bağlamında Nietzsche'nin öznellik eleştirisi incelenecektir. Öncelikle modernizmin iki temel figürü olan Descartes ve Kant'ın düşüncelerine odaklanarak öznenin yapısı ve modernitede sunulan düşünce kavrayışı açıklanmaya çalışılacaktır. Ardından, Nietzsche'nin soykütükçü eleştirisi bağlamında özne mefhumu sorunsallaştırılacak ve Batı düşünce ve uygarlık tarihi boyunca insanın öznelci yorumunun nihilist bir perspektiften değer kazandığı gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır. Son olarak, özellikle bilgi, hakikat, dil, bilinç ve beden temalarına odaklanılarak Nietzsche tarafından modern özne mefhumunun nasıl yapışöküme uğratıldığı tartışılacak ve Nietzsche'nin fizyolojik

düşüncesinin nasıl daha içkin ve olumlu bir biçimde insanı ve düşünceyi kavramsallaştırmayı mümkün kıldığı gösterilmeye çalışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Öznellik, düşünce, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche.

To my mother

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First of all, I would like to thank most sincerely Assoc. Prof. Dr. Elif ırakman for accepting me to her supervisorship. Without her encouragement, understanding, support, advice and critical feedbacks, this thesis would have never been completed. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Tahir Kocayiđit for having introduced me to philosophical thought, and taught me how to think and read critically. I believe I will remain indebted to him for his intellectual and personal guidance throughout my life. I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. Andrea Rehberg, who has radically changed my entire worldview by introducing me to Nietzsche's thought. I would also like to express my gratitude for the METU Philosophy Department, for all my professors and colleagues, for providing a richly stimulating and friendly atmosphere to freely discuss our ideas and enhance our philosophical skills.

I would like to thank my mother and brother, who have never gotten bored of listening to details of my study and have inspired me to improve my ideas; and my father for having taught me the innocence and transience of everything. I am also thankful to my close friends for their joyful presence in this tough process: especially to Ekin Ertürk, who has never withheld her emotional support and friendship in years; to Merve Burnazođlu for not making me feel her physical distance by spending hours to encourage me, and also for listening, reading and correcting various parts of this study; to Burcu Tamko, Berfu Safranbolulu, Gizem Gner, Fulden Ergen and Nesli Uras for their invaluable friendship and support. Finally, I show my appreciation to all the encounters and harshest challenges that I have gone through in this process: I believe and hope, at the end, I have learnt to see the beauty in their necessity.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Although we are accustomed to regard ourselves as subjects and thinking as an activity that is originated from and belongs exclusively to our consciousness, these conceptions have come to the fore only in the modern period of Western philosophy in a well-formulated manner. As is widely accepted, subjectivity is one of the most crucial notions of modernity, even the central one that has shaped the philosophical discourse of this period. It is true that the question with regard to the nature of the human being has been one of the leading problems of philosophy from the Ancient Greece and the human being has already occupied a relatively privileged position with respect to many other beings in earlier ontologies, nevertheless the subjectivity of the human being has become the principal target of inquiry only with modern philosophy. However, the human being did not provoke the interest of modern philosophers in terms of its empirical characteristics including its physical, historical and cultural determinations. Rather they have sought to reveal the universal determinations of the human being especially with regard to its capacities for knowledge. The reason for this is that, from its initial beginning with Descartes, modern philosophy has been oriented by epistemological concerns and the human being has been located at the centre of philosophical interrogation only because it has been considered to possess a privileged access to truth. In this context, the modern notion of the subject, understood as an autochthonous being who is the originator of thought, was for the first time instilled in philosophy by Descartes. Despite great differences among the ideas of the prominent figures, especially

Kant's recasting of the very grounds out of which the subject is constituted, the generative role of the self-conscious subject in the thinking processes has been the core idea of modern thought. In this period of the history of thought, consciousness and rationality have been the essential categories that define the human being, and thinking was conceived as a conscious mental activity stemming from the human subject.

In spite of the fact that Kant's reformulation of the subject contains an intrinsic critique of its Cartesian constitution and Kantian subjectivity has also been subjected to criticism by the subsequent figures of German Idealism, their notions on this theme were in many ways similar to Kant's and they can be considered as continuations of and revisions within the same idealist paradigm. By contrast, providing a new framework for understanding the human being which goes beyond the idealist paradigm, Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity can be claimed to have a special importance and novelty in the history of philosophy¹. However, Nietzsche's thought is often misrepresented as radical subjectivism partly due to the negative connotations of his key technical term 'the will to power' and partly due to the linguistic strategies in his writings, including his usage of terms that are metaphysically overloaded. On the contrary, emphasising the impossibility of any self-identical point of origin in becoming and denoting the dynamics of the ceaseless impersonal happening, the thought of the will to power, to my reading, trivialises both the modern conception of subjectivity and its corresponding understanding of thinking. Furthermore, by making the value the critical element of his philosophy, he has

¹ By saying this, I do not claim that Nietzsche is the first anti-subjectivist thinker in the history of philosophy. Yet, as I shall discuss in the third and fourth chapters of this study, his non-oppositional and monistic thought offers a new manner for understanding the human being, that is, the human being is relocated to the historical and physiological processes of life and it becomes possible to investigate the human being without ignoring its embodiment and contingent aspects. It is in this sense that I claim that Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity constitutes a special moment in the history of philosophy and goes beyond idealist framework.

become the first philosopher who has asked the question of the origin and value of subject-interpretation. This has enabled him to show that although the subject has been explicitly come to the fore in modernity, it has been one of the core beliefs throughout the Western philosophy and civilization, and also Christianity and morality. Moreover, Nietzsche problematizes the relationship between truth, knowledge and subject, which are adhered strictly in the modern paradigm, and frees thinking from the limits of truth and knowledge by renaturalizing the human being and reinscribing thinking into physiological processes. His reintegration of the body (as Nietzsche constantly emphasises, the body has been excluded and devaluated throughout the history of metaphysics with the exception of Spinoza's thought) to the philosophy constitutes a breakthrough, which opens up new possibilities of thinking that were inaccessible within the framework of metaphysics. For these reasons, Nietzsche's ideas had a significant influence on several major figures of recent continental philosophy, including post-structuralists, psychoanalysts and critical theorists, who have taken aim at the modern conception of subjectivity in their criticism of metaphysics and modernity.

In this conjuncture, the purpose of the present study will be to elaborate the main line of the arguments which has shaped Nietzsche's critique of the modern conception of the subject and of thinking activity. Nevertheless, as I have mentioned above, because Nietzsche emphasises that the belief in a neutral subject had been one of the oldest presuppositions of Western metaphysics but not thoroughly formulated until the modern period, it seems necessary to trace the notion of the subject back to its origin in order to account for Nietzsche's criticism in its entirety. Thus, one of the central aims of this study is to lay bare the genealogical origin of the subject, as is shown by Nietzsche, in order to clarify the fundamental rationale underlying Nietzsche's claim that the subject-interpretation is a nihilistic tool that has been exploited by religion, civilization

and morality in order to master over the human existence. In doing this, the present study does not intend to establish Nietzsche's overall critique of Western thought and civilization rather it has in its target specifically the modern constitution of subjectivity together with the philosophical presuppositions and concerns that underlies such conceptualisation in modernity.

The second chapter of this study aims to shed light on both the philosophical concerns that have brought the subject into the centre of philosophical questioning and the ways in which subjectivity has been constructed in the modern period. Nevertheless, rather than investigating all modern theories of the subject in an exhaustive manner, this chapter concentrates exclusively on the constitution of Cartesian and Kantian subjectivity since these two theories represent two fundamental attitudes in modernity that have been explicitly concerned with the subject in regard to the nature of its thinking activity. Accordingly, this chapter consists of two main sections in which Cartesian and Kantian theories of the subject are discussed and it is concluded with a relatively short section where a number of critical considerations are presented with regard to modern subjectivity.

In the first section of this chapter, in order to provide the background for clarifying the motivations behind the emergence of subjectivity, the epistemological crisis that had led Descartes to reconsider the fundamental principles, which underline his previous opinions and beliefs, will be introduced (2.1.1). Then, I will present the main lines of the *cogito* argumentation as is presented in Descartes's *Meditations on First Philosophy*² (2.1.2). There, I will also discuss how Descartes conceptualises thinking as a purely intellectual activity that belongs to consciousness. In the following section, focusing on the Cartesian substance dualism, I will attempt to demonstrate the constitution of the

² René Descartes, *Meditations, Objections, and Replies*, Roger Ariew and Donald Cress (eds.). Indianapolis: Hackett, 2006; hereafter *Med*.

subject as *res cogitans* (2.1.3). In the second section, I will proceed to discuss some fundamental characteristics of Kant's transcendental philosophy and the implications of his Copernican Turn for the reformulation of subjectivity (2.2.1). Then, I will try to clarify Kant's understanding of consciousness, transcendental apperception and thinking which have especially important roles in his construction of the transcendental subject (2.2.2). In the following, focusing on the problem of self-knowledge, I will discuss Kant's distinction of the empirical self and the transcendental subject (2.2.3). Lastly, laying bare Kant's critique of the Cartesian subject, the transcendental status of Kantian subjectivity will be problematized (2.2.4). In the last section of this chapter, I will attempt to bring together some critical points so as to arrive at an understanding of the modern constitution of the subject and conception of thought (2.3).

The third chapter aims to expose Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity within the framework of his philosophy of values. The leading questions of this chapter will be in what historical circumstances the subject-interpretation has become the dominant model for the self-understanding of the human being and from whose perspective the subject has been valorised as the privileged being among other entities. It begins with an introductory section where the general lines of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics are attempted to be elucidated in order to problematize modern philosophy as a certain historical moment of Western thought (3.1). I will show that although modern philosophy has distinguished itself from the earlier thought by a number of idiosyncratic concerns and presuppositions, for Nietzsche, it shares the basic structure (oppositional thinking) and orientation (nihilism) of metaphysics that has started to predominate philosophical thinking from Socrates onwards. In the following section, Nietzsche's physiological thought will be introduced together with some central themes such as the will to power, force, body and perspectivism so as to provide a background for elucidating his understanding of the value and

genealogical method (3.2). This section also aims to dissipate one of the most common misrepresentations of Nietzsche's philosophy, namely radical subjectivism, by showing in what ways the thought of the will to power implies the ontological impossibility for the existence of the subject as has been constituted by Descartes and Kant. Then, Nietzsche's conception of the value and of genealogy will be presented (3.3). There, I will also claim that there is an indispensable link between Kant's transcendental philosophy and Nietzsche's physiological thinking in a way that Nietzsche adopts and advances the critique as a historical interrogation of the sense and value of phenomena. Finally, a reading of the first two treatises of *On the Genealogy of Morality*³ will be presented in order to clarify the origin and value of subjectivity from Nietzsche's perspective (3.4). Throughout this reading, I will attempt to draw the implications of the subjectivist interpretation of the human being and its subsequent internalisation.

The main target of the fourth chapter will be Nietzsche's critique of modern philosophy and the conception of subjectivity in this period. Firstly, the relationship between truth, knowledge and the human being will be revisited (4.1). It will be argued that considering the pursuit of knowledge as a physiological affair, Nietzsche demystifies the modern conviction that the human being has a privileged access to truth. In this section, his own pursuit of reinterpretation and revaluation of truth and knowledge will also be presented. Then focusing on the questions of language and consciousness, the metaphysical workings of which, for Nietzsche, are responsible for hypostatising entities behind all impersonal happenings, the paralogistic inferences underlying the emergence of modern subjectivity and the modern image of thought will be shown (4.2). Finally, in the last section, his critique of the modernist conception

³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, tr. Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swenson. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998; hereafter *GM*.

of thinking, and the ways in which it comes to trivialise the notion of the subject will be elaborated (4.3). Moreover, this chapter also attempts to interpret Nietzsche's hypothetical statements with regard to the human soul, body and subjectivity in regard to the question how we can reconceptualise thinking from a physiological framework.

CHAPTER 2

THE EMERGENCE AND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE THINKING SUBJECT IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

Modern philosophy is often regarded as the period of Western thought in which subjectivity has become the central theme and the notions of the self and the subject have shaped the discussions in ontology, epistemology, ethics, politics and the sciences in general. Although philosophy was already acquainted with the concept of the self or the subject (for example, in Augustine's concept of *interior homine*), the modern notion of the subject, understood as an autochthonous being who is the originator of thought, was for the first time instilled in philosophy by Descartes. Furthermore, what is revolutionary about Descartes's philosophy is not only his conception of the subject as such but his taking it as the legitimate site of philosophical inquiry, which is especially evident in his canonical work *Meditations on First Philosophy*. The central place of subjectivity and the generative role of the self-conscious subject in the thinking processes has been the core idea of modern thought despite great differences among the ideas of the prominent figures. It is also true for Kant's transcendental philosophy which recasting the very grounds out of which the subject is constituted has remained centred on subjectivity. In this period of the history of thought, consciousness and rationality have been the essential categories that define the human being, and thinking was conceived as a conscious mental activity stemming from the human subject.

Yet this chapter aims not to be exhaustive in terms of explaining all theories of modern subjectivity but to present the general line of argument that have brought about the subject to the centre of philosophical inquiry and to provide the background material for Nietzsche's critique which will be discussed in the following two chapters. For this reason, in this chapter, I will exclusively discuss two crucial moments of modern philosophy for the constitution of subjectivity, namely Cartesian rationalism and Kant's transcendental idealism. Nevertheless the selection of Cartesian and Kantian theories of subjectivity is not by accident and it does not depend on an arbitrary choice. First of all, these theories are the ones that Nietzsche obviously engages mostly with in his writings targeting modern conception of the subject. Secondly, I see it necessary to give an extensive account of Cartesian subjectivity since it is with Descartes that the human subject makes its initial appearance in the history of philosophy and his formulations have shaped the subsequent discussions on the theme. The reason for devoting a long section for Kantian subjectivity is that it represents a decisive breakthrough not only for reconceptualising both philosophical inquiry and human subjectivity in modern thought but also for paving the way for Nietzsche's own transcendental thought by making philosophy a critical endeavour. Lastly, the absence of a discussion related to moral subjectivity (specifically the Kantian conception of it) is due to the exclusive concern of this chapter: it aims not to explore all aspects of subjectivity or being human but to lay bare how the human subject is conceptualised in relation to thought or 'thinking activity' in modern philosophy.

2.1. The Emergence of the Subject as *Res Cogitans*: Cartesian Subjectivity

While Descartes's notions on subjectivity can be traced back to *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* and *Discourse on the Method*, where the famous *cogito ergo sum* appears for the first time, in this study, my focus will be exclusively on the *Meditations*, which is not only the canon of Descartes's philosophy but also

that of modern subjectivity. In this section, I will discuss how in the *Meditations* the Cartesian subject is constituted in relation to Descartes's understanding of thought as a self-conscious mental act belonging to the subject. In order to do this, I will, first, introduce the general problem of the *Meditations*, i.e., the epistemological crisis, and the method that is followed by Descartes in order to overcome it. Then, in the second subsection, I will proceed to discuss how Descartes demonstrates the existence of the subject, of the 'I', through the existence of a mental act in the Second Meditation. In doing so, I will also try to clarify Descartes's usage of the terms "thought" and "*cogitationes*", which are profoundly important to understand in what way the Cartesian subject is conceptualised as a thinking substance. In the third subsection, I will introduce some important themes of Cartesian ontology by focusing on the Sixth Meditation and examine their implications for the constitution of Cartesian subjectivity.

2.1.1. Radical Doubt and the First Meditation

The First Meditation starts with the description of an epistemological crisis in which the meditator has been finding himself for many years and it brings about the need for a new beginning from the foundations⁴. To state the obvious, in spite of the autobiographical character of the narrative, this crisis cannot be reduced to an individual crisis, given the overreaching intentions of the work, namely to prove the immateriality of the soul and the existence of God, and also to put science on a new and firm ground which is based on principles and foundations other than those of the scholastic Aristotelian ones that were predominant in Descartes's time⁵. Thus, the crisis that the meditator finds himself in, at the same time, refers to the crisis of philosophy and the sciences.

⁴ *Med.* I 17.

⁵ Margaret D. Wilson, *Descartes*. London: Routledge, 1978; hereafter *D*, p. 3.

The epistemological crisis that leaves all previous opinions of the meditator in doubt stems from his realisation that the opinions that he has been assenting were false and this realisation brings out the fact that what is actually uncertain and dubitable are the foundations themselves⁶. Thus, in order to overcome the crisis and to start from new and firm foundations, the meditator emphasises the necessity to practice doubt concerning the so-called foundations of all his opinions⁷, that is to say, he needs to amplify doubt and radically open himself up to the crisis until he finds something certain and indubitable. But, to this end, he states that he does not need to deal with each single opinion individually, since such an endeavour would demand an inexhaustible work, but it would be enough to examine the principles that support these opinions⁸. Moreover, in accordance with the first-person narrative, the meditator indicates the fact that he pursues this procedure necessarily by himself, without any external authority, and in an ultimate withdrawal from daily cares and the surrounding world⁹. This emphasis brings about the idea that it is not only possible for a human being to find the foundations within its own mind or consciousness but also that the human mind or consciousness is actually the legitimate site of the investigation of truth.

The first principle on which the meditator casts doubt is the reliability of the senses by reminding us of the fact that, in the case of “very small and distant things”¹⁰, the senses sometimes deceive us. However, he concludes that although the senses are deceptive in some cases, this does not mean that all sensory

⁶ Ibid., I 17.

⁷ Ibid., I 17.

⁸ Ibid., I 18.

⁹ Ibid., I 17-8.

¹⁰ Ibid., I 18.

information, including the simplest ones, should be considered false¹¹. Next, he points out the difficulty of differentiating two mental states, namely being awake and dreaming¹². Having no criterion to know whether he is awake or sleeping, he realises that there is no ground to give assent to the sensory experience either. There remain only the most simple and universal truths of geometry and arithmetic since they do not change even in dreams¹³. The third object of doubt is whether God, who is the all-powerful creator of everything, is deceptive and has put all these opinions, even the simplest truths, into the meditator's mind¹⁴. However, because deception is inconsistent with the idea of a benevolent God, the meditator concludes that the goodness of God is unquestionable¹⁵. Instead, in order to amplify doubt to the most extreme level and to prevent giving assent to his habitual beliefs, the meditator suggests a thought experiment which assumes that there exists an evil genius that is said to be "supremely powerful and clever, who has directed his entire effort at deceiving"¹⁶ the meditator. By this means, even the simplest propositions of geometry and arithmetic become doubtful and the meditator, by the end of the First Meditation, is left without anything indubitable and certain as if he were "fallen into a deep whirlpool"¹⁷, which

¹¹ *D*, p. 17.

¹² *Med.*, I 19.

¹³ *Ibid.*, I 20.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, I 21.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, I 21.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, I 23.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, II 24.

symbolises the extreme deprivation of anything certain on which to base knowledge¹⁸.

2.1.2. Thinking and the Existence of the Subject

At the beginning of the Second Meditation, the meditator reasserts his resolve to withhold from assenting to anything that includes even the slightest doubt until he reaches something certain and unshaken that is described in analogy with the “one firm and immovable point”¹⁹ that Archimedes required in order to move the whole world. This one unshakable and certain thing need not necessarily be something prior in the order of things since, as Descartes remarks, it can be “slight”²⁰, but it should be the first in the order of knowledge. That is to say, the Archimedean point that he seeks will be the first certainty from which others can be derived and to which opinions will be compared in order that we can decide whether they are also indubitable or not.

The meditator intimates this one firm and indubitable point by reminding us of the fact that, by the end of the First Meditation, he has persuaded himself of the non-existence of the world, the sky, the earth, bodies and minds²¹. Then he realises that, even if he is persuaded of this, i.e., even if a supremely powerful deceiver were deceiving him regarding the content of this persuasion, the fact that he exists is indubitable²². Instead, the supposition of a supremely powerful deceiver immediately brings out the fact that the meditator exists insofar as he is

¹⁸ Moreover, consistent with the above points regarding the withdrawal of the meditator, the meditator finds himself more isolated within and withdrawn into his own consciousness as doubt reaches its most extreme levels.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, II 24.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II 24.

²¹ *Ibid.*, II 25.

²² *Ibid.*, II 25.

being deceived. That is to say, insofar as a mental act, in Descartes's terminology a *cogitatio*, takes place, the subject immediately and indubitably becomes aware of his or her existence. Thus, the existence of himself that is intuited through his mental acts of being persuaded and deceived becomes the Archimedean point that the meditator needed to move beyond the whirlpool of uncertainty.

In this context, Descartes firmly states that it is not through a syllogistic inference that the existence of the subject is proven, as is the case in the famous "*cogito ergo sum*" statement in the *Discourse on the Method*, which never appears in the *Meditations*. Rather one recognizes one's existence "as something self-evident by a simple intuition of the mind"²³. Given the fact that Descartes sees intuition as the first source of immediate certainties and strictly distinguishes it from deduction, which is a secondary source of knowledge and which can only arise out of the premises provided by intuition²⁴, both the statement of the *cogitatio*, the mental act of doubting, and the existence of the subject should be conceived as inseparably belonging to one intuition. In other words, the existence of the *cogitatio* and of the subject are not shown by two different, detachable propositions that form a syllogistic argument but they together form one simple, experienced fact of consciousness²⁵. Moreover, the

²³ Ibid., Reply to the Second Set of Objections 140.

²⁴ René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, tr. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985; hereafter *CSM I* 14-5.

²⁵ Jean-Marie Beyssade, "Descartes' 'I Am a Thing That Thinks' versus Kant's 'I Think'", in Daniel Garber and Béatrice Longuenesse (eds.), *Kant and the Early Moderns*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008; hereafter *DIT*, p. 32. It is seen important to emphasise that the existence of the subject is not found through a syllogistic inference in the *Meditations* since if it were found in that way, the knowledge of the existence of the subject would not have the character of absolute and immediate certainty that is intuited by reason but it would be a logical inference that is in need of a major premise. However, because the certainty of existence is established as an immediately intuited fact of consciousness, the meditator can be said to have reached the immediate certainty without depending on nothing but the sources of its own isolated consciousness. Moreover, it is on the condition that the consciousness of a mental act involves the consciousness of one's existence

existence of the subject *qua* mind or consciousness becomes the first principle of philosophy, not only because it survives the radical doubt but also, as the pure intuition of the mind, it appears as the first indubitable and certain fact, which precedes God's divine guarantee and upon which the whole system of knowledge can be constructed. It is the Archimedean point that Descartes was seeking in order to provide the first foundation for knowledge.

After the meditator attains the insight that his own existence is the one indubitable and certain fact, he proceeds to investigate and characterize what the 'I', "who now necessarily exists"²⁶, is. In order to do this, he first considers the traditional Aristotelian determination of the human being as a rational animal but this determination immediately fails since it would be an externally imposed definition which would require the examination of the meaning of each of these terms. Then he continues with the attributes of the human being that are suggested in the Aristotelean framework, namely nourishment, movement and thinking²⁷. Because the first two are closely tied to a body, the existence of which is yet doubtful, there remains only thinking, the existence of which is known with certainty:

What about thinking? Here I make my discovery: thought exists; it alone cannot be separated from me. I am; I exist—this is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking; for perhaps it could also come to pass that if I were to cease all thinking I would then utterly cease to exist. At this time I admit nothing that is not necessarily true. I am therefore precisely nothing but a thinking thing...²⁸

that Descartes claims the subject can only be certain of its existence in the enduring of its conscious states thus he can also claim that thinking, the distinguishing element of which is self-reflexivity, is the essence of the subject.

²⁶ *Med.*, II 25.

²⁷ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, tr. J.A. Smith. Stilwell: Digireads.com, 2006, 413a20-25.

²⁸ *Med.*, II 27.

At this point, in order to articulate how the subject is conceptualised as a thinking being in the *Meditations*, it is of great importance to discuss how Descartes understands thinking, which is the most essential and inseparable property of the subject. Descartes presents a broad list of *cogitationes*, including doubting, understanding, affirming, willing, refusing, imagining and sensing in order to exemplify what thinking is²⁹. This list seems extraordinary given the fact that except for doubting and understanding, other modes have hardly been considered equally as the modes of thinking in the greater part of the history of philosophy. Besides, Descartes also confirms that some of the mental acts in this list, such as willing, imagining and sensing, are confused modes of thinking and, taken as such, cannot yield the certainty of one's existence, since they require the existence of a body³⁰. However, as John Cottingham analyses a number of passages from Descartes's texts, what makes these mental acts true *cogitationes* is not their content or their special mode of directedness to their content but the self-reflexive element that they involve³¹. That is to say, seeing, by itself, is not capable of bringing out the certainty of its own existence since we cannot be sure whether we have eyes and a body in general that could carry out such a sensation. Rather, seeing is counted as a *cogitatio* insofar as it is capable of registering in consciousness and bringing out its own awareness, such as in the sentence "I think I am seeing". Thus, although the content of a *cogitatio* may be false and the specific mode of thinking may not be taking place as in the example of seeing, the fact that a *cogitatio* registers in consciousness is indubitable and sufficient for Descartes to prove the existence of the subject³².

²⁹ Ibid., II 28.

³⁰ John Cottingham, "Descartes on Thought", in *Cartesian Reflections: Essays on Descartes's Philosophy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008; hereafter *DT*, p. 103.

³¹ *DT*, p. 103.

³² *D*, p. 54.

Then, it is true that the self-awareness that accompanies all mental acts and that is represented in the “I think” of “I think I am seeing” is what makes any act a true *cogitatio*³³. Accordingly, all *cogitationes* are modes of thinking, which are capable of proving the existence of the subject, insofar as they involve this self-reflexive element. This is why, in the Second Reply, Descartes defines thinking as “everything that is in us in such a way that we are immediately aware of it”³⁴. Therefore, we can conclude that Descartes conceptualises thinking necessarily as a self-conscious mental act in a strict intellectualistic framework³⁵, in spite of his broad list, which seems to suggest a totally different and anti-intellectualistic understanding of thinking by involving appetitive and affective acts³⁶.

Lastly, in the Second Meditation, Descartes claims that all *cogitationes* belong to one and the same subject. According to him, this is an obvious fact since all the *cogitationes* yield the fact that I exist and none of them are “distinct from my

³³ In contrast to Kant’s claim that the transcendental representation ‘I think’ does not need to accompany every representation but it must be able to do so, Descartes seems to suggest that self-awareness or the ‘I think’ necessarily accompanies any mental act (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. Norman Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan, 1964; hereafter *CPR* B131-2). Accordingly, Descartes’s claim of the necessity of self-consciousness in every *cogitatio* implies an understanding of self-consciousness as a container of conscious states. In the subsection 2.2.2, I will discuss Kant’s understanding of the transcendental self-consciousness in contrast to Descartes’s.

³⁴ *Med.*, Reply to the Second Set of Objections 160.

³⁵ This is also evident in the Sixth Meditation where Descartes distinguishes imagination from pure intellection or understanding by saying that even if we did not have the power of imagination we would not stop being a thinking thing, hence the imagination requires something else other than the mind in order to perform. On the other hand, pure intellection is the only essential power of a thinking being and it requires nothing other than the mind in order to understand. It is described as follows: “when [the mind] understands, in a sense, turns towards itself and looks at one of the ideas that are in it.” (*Med.* VI 73). Thus, thinking as the essence of the subject is conceived fundamentally in intellectualistic terms and all *cogitationes* are considered as modes of thinking by participating in the element of self-reflexivity but not all of them are essential to my being as a thinking thing.

³⁶ *DT*, p. 99.

thought”³⁷. However, the unity of *cogitationes*, thinking and of the subject, and the relation of *cogitationes* to the subject or to the self-consciousness as the unifying element are not as clear as the existence of the ‘I’ until the subject is shown clearly and distinctly as the *res cogitans*, i.e., the thinking substance, and Descartes’s substance ontology is unfolded in the Sixth Meditation. Moreover, even if Descartes tends towards determining thinking as the only essential attribute of the thinking subject in the Second Meditation, he hesitates to do so since the distinction of the mind and body is not yet known with certainty and body could be as essential as thinking is. Thinking as the essence of the subject finally becomes indubitable in the Sixth Meditation, where the absolute distinction of the mind and body is conceptualized³⁸. Thus, in order to articulate the constitution of the Cartesian subject purely as a thinking being, we must first discuss Descartes’s substance ontology that is unfolded in its complete form in the Sixth Meditation.

2.1.3. Substance Dualism and the Constitution of the Cartesian Subject

Cartesian dualism most commonly refers to the ontological distinction between two substances, namely, the *res cogitans* (thinking thing) and the *res extensa* (extended thing), both of which have totally different characterizations and attributes³⁹. Yet, substance dualism also brings out the distinction between consciousness and the world, and between the inner and the outer. The Second Meditation already intimates the epistemological distinction between the mind and the body. That is, the meditator knows himself existing, without knowing whether he has a body, insofar as his thinking registers in his consciousness. Due

³⁷ *Med.*, II 28-9.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, VI 78.

³⁹ In addition, it is important to remember that, apart from two finite substances, there is also God who is conceived as the infinite substance, on which other substances depend in order to exist.

to this epistemological sufficiency of thinking in knowing the existence of oneself, Descartes concludes that thinking is the essence of the human being and the human being is necessarily a thinking thing, but at this stage we still do not know whether its essence could also include something else. Moreover, as I have noted above, Descartes argues that it is obvious that all *cogitationes* belong to one and the same subject as its modes of thinking but he never explains the nature of this relationship. However, all these claims are properly demonstrated to be certain and indubitable only in the Sixth Meditation where Descartes accounts for the ontological dualism between two substances.

Regarding substance dualism, there are some important concerns with regard to the constitution of Cartesian subjectivity. First of all, the clearly and distinctly perceived distinction between the 'I' and extended things corresponds to a real distinction between two substances: the *res cogitans* and the *res extensa*⁴⁰. Even though Descartes suggests different definitions of substance in different texts, the most emphasised feature of a substance is self-subsistence, i.e., being independent in existence⁴¹. In this conception, two substances exist independently of each other and are separated according to the law of the excluded middle, that is to say, a particular mode or attribute either belongs to the *res cogitans*, the subject as the thinking substance, or to the *res extensa*. In addition, both substances are defined by their principal mode: the *res cogitans* by thinking and the *res extensa* by extension⁴². The *res cogitans* is a definite, immutable and indivisible substance generating and bringing together particular *cogitationes* and ideas, the *res extensa* is conceived as an indefinite, mutable and

⁴⁰ Ibid., VI 78. The mind-body distinction becomes an ontological determination of things only after the existence of God has been proven and clear and distinct perception is introduced and becomes the only reliable guide to reality with the epistemological guarantee of God (*D*, p. 197).

⁴¹ John Cottingham, *A Descartes Dictionary*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; hereafter, *DD*, p. 160.

⁴² *DD*, p. 53.

divisible heap of matter within which any particular body lacks an essence of its own⁴³. Thus, the ‘I’ is essentially a thinking thing that is, according to the law of the excluded middle distinct from the extended thing, even from the body “which by a certain special right I called *mine*”⁴⁴. Therefore, the subject is, without any reservation, determined as a substance whose only essential property is thinking.

Another important theme for the constitution of Cartesian subjectivity is the substance-mode relationship; more specifically, the relationship between the *res cogitans*, and *cogitationes*. A mode or an attribute is that which cannot exist without the substance in which it inheres⁴⁵. Therefore, there is a dependence and inherence relationship between a substance and its modes. As the modes, all *cogitationes* belong to the same subject: it generates and gathers the multiplicity of its thoughts within its indivisible unity. In this conception of the subject, Descartes adopts the *substantia et accidentis* model of metaphysics and applies it to the subject whose particular thoughts are conceived as modes or accidents, in each of which the ego reasserts itself⁴⁶. In other words, according to him, the subject is the ontologically simple ‘I’ that is not constituted by or reducible to its permanently changing *cogitationes* but it is the self-identical cause of them. Moreover, as all *cogitationes* and ideas inhere in it and all exteriority is excluded from it, the subject is conceived as the personal interiority over against all that is extended and exterior to it, including the body that is closely associated to it. As a result, Cartesian subjectivity is constituted as a self-subsisting personal interiority, encapsulated within itself, which generates thought and bears ideas

⁴³ *D*, p.167.

⁴⁴ *Med.*, VI 76.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, VI 78-9.

⁴⁶ *DIT*, 38f.

and the body is radically excluded from thinking processes that are modes of the *res cogitans*.

In view of the above points, the subject, as conceived in Descartes's philosophy, is a self-present⁴⁷, self-conscious, self-subsisting, indivisible, simple, self-identical⁴⁸ and atemporal⁴⁹ thinking being who is substantially separated from the body; whose relationship with the world is purely intellectual; and whose relationship with thought, which is also defined in pure cognitive terms, is that of a substance with its modes. However, the strict separation of two substances seems to contradict Descartes's claims that certain modes of thinking, such as sensing and imagining, depend on the body⁵⁰, and the ideas, other than the innate ones, are formed through these modes⁵¹. Even though Descartes emphasizes that the subject can exist without the body "that is very closely joined to"⁵² it, the

⁴⁷ The subject is immediately aware of itself and its *cogitationes* whereas the ideas regarding the external things are not directly given.

⁴⁸ The subject does not differ from itself but it is the identical unity which holds the multiplicity of *cogitationes* together.

⁴⁹ Because the *res cogitans* is fundamentally indivisible and strictly separated from all the laws that govern the extended substance, it must also be atemporal.

⁵⁰ *Med.*, VI 72-5. As has been shown above, Descartes accepts that certain mental acts such as sensing and imagining are confused acts in the sense that they do not occur as acts of reason's own reflection but they require a body which has sense organs and can be exposed to the world. However, he also claims that what makes a mental act a *cogitatio* that is able to bring about the certainty of one's existence is precisely the intellectual element, namely self-reflexivity (reason's own reflection upon itself) that brings about the consciousness of 'I think'. Therefore, the element that is needed for proving one's existence is not the bodily element involved in a *cogitatio* but the self-reflexive element that pertains to my being as a thinking thing. It is in this sense Descartes believes that the *cogitationes* like imagination, which also participate in the bodily element, are not crucial for my being as a thinking thing. The reason for this is that even if I didn't have imagination (because imagination requires a body, the existence of which can only be proven after the existence of the subject is shown), I would be in a position to know that I exist with certainty. In this regard, these confused acts are modes of thinking but they are not essential to prove my existence as a thinking being since their existence might well depend on the body, the existence of which can be shown only after the existence of thinking and the thinking thing.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, VI 80.

⁵² *Ibid.*, VI 78.

relation between and the interaction of these two separate substances puts substance dualism and the subject's purely atemporal and self-subsisting status in question, together with the whole intellectualist investment in it⁵³. In the next section, I will try to draw out how Kant solved this problem by carrying subjectivity into another level and secured the above determinations of the subject.

2.2. Kantian Transcendental Subjectivity

Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* can be considered to be the second crucial moment for the constitution of subjectivity in modern philosophy. Following Descartes's inception of the subject in philosophy, rationalist and empiricist camps had long discussed the conception of the human subject, within an epistemological framework, in terms of its existence as a real thing and a simple substance (rationalism; e.g., Descartes), or as a non-entity and/or a habitual fiction that brings together a multiplicity of impressions (empiricism; e.g., Hume). Nevertheless, Kant shows the fact that two seeming counterparts, namely rationalism and empiricism, share the basic transcendental realist assumption in epistemology, that is, that the human being has access to things as they are, independent of its own modes of knowing. Accordingly, although their conceptions of the knowing subject seem to be irreconcilable, these conceptions originate from a common understanding of reality and of human being's access to that reality. In contrast, as I will explain in more detail in subsection 2.2.1 below, Kant's Copernican revolution, carried philosophical enquiry to another

⁵³ The problem of interaction that I mention here regards the question of how the subject as an essentially thinking substance can have mental acts which at the same time depend on a body that is substantially different from the thinking substance. In other words, the question is how two ontologically different substances can interact so that they can both contribute to form a mental act which seems to belong to one of these substances. This problem also regards how a part of the extended substance can be said to be 'mine' given the fact that it is considered as a substance that is devoid of any individuation. That is to say, the epistemological problem of the possibility of having confused modes of thinking and their products, ideas, leads to an ontological problem in Descartes's substance dualism.

level, namely to that of the conditions of possibility of experience and, consequently, caused a profound change in the manner that we conceive reality. Because the world could be no longer understood as a collection of things that are independent of the knowing subject, these conditions of possibility are not only the conditions that enable knowledge and thought but also those that construct the whole of reality as it appears to the human subject⁵⁴. As a result, this turn from naive realism to what Kant calls transcendental idealism radically changed the subject's status by carrying it over to a purely formal level, i.e., the level of conditions of possibility, so that it becomes entirely different from Descartes's thinking thing and other subsequent conceptions of it.

In the first part of this section I will try to elaborate the transcendental framework and some important concepts of Kant's critical philosophy within and through which he reconstructs subjectivity and criticises the Cartesian conception of the subject. In the second subsection, I will proceed to discuss the constitution of transcendental subjectivity with regard to Kant's conception of thinking and knowledge. Thirdly, I will focus on the question of self-knowledge and try to elaborate the distinction between the empirical self and transcendental subjectivity in Kant's philosophy. Lastly, focusing on the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason', I will articulate how Kant criticises the rationalist understanding of the subject.

2.2.1. The Copernican Turn, Conditions of Possibility and Transcendental Faculties

In the Prefaces to both editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant points out the central problem that is said to motivate his entire work, namely, the failure of metaphysics in the face of the progress of other sciences and its present situation

⁵⁴ Otfried Höffe, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy*. Dordrecht: Springer, 2010; hereafter *K CPR*, p. 41-2.

as a battleground of the contradictory opinions of different parties⁵⁵. By contrast, according to him, other rational sciences which yield theoretical knowledge, namely, mathematics and natural science (physics), have had remarkable success due to the fact that they have found a sure path of steady progress through an intellectual revolution in the procedure they follow⁵⁶. For Kant, this revolution has been brought about by acknowledging the role of pure reason in knowing its objects and as a species of rational science, metaphysics should imitate their procedure⁵⁷. At this juncture, Kant proposes to change the basic assumption that has been predominating metaphysics, that is “knowledge must conform to objects”⁵⁸ and holds this assumption responsible for the failure of metaphysics, since it is incapable of extending our knowledge, on legitimate bases, of metaphysical objects simply through a priori concepts. In this context, he writes

Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them *a priori*, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the task of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects *a priori*, determining something in regard to them prior to their being given.⁵⁹

Just as Copernicus made trial of an alternative hypothesis in astronomy when the existent geocentric theories failed to account for the movements of heavenly bodies, so Kant proposes to do the same in regard to the conception of human knowledge throughout his *Critique of Pure Reason*⁶⁰.

⁵⁵ *CPR*, Avii-viii, Bxv.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, Bx-xiii.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, Bxvi.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Bxvi.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, Bxvi.

⁶⁰ Norwood Russell Hanson, “Copernicus’ Role in Kant’s Revolution”, in Ruth F. Chadwick and Clive Cazeaux (eds.), *Immanuel Kant, Critical Assessments: Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason*. London: Routledge, 1992, p. 40.

Yet this is not the main point of the analogy between Copernicus's revolution and Kant's own, through which he distinguishes himself from the entire previous philosophical tradition. Just as Copernicus's hypothesis changed the geocentric paradigm in astronomy by taking the movement of the observer into account in explaining the apparent motions of the heavenly bodies and so it led to the heliocentric theory, so Kant proposes to change the naïve realist account of knowledge which holds that knowledge, independent of the knowing subject, grasps its object as it is in itself⁶¹. By contrast, the new, 'Copernican' hypothesis suggests that the constitution of the knowing subject determines the characteristics of the object and of all reality as it appears to the knower⁶².

With this initial insight, the main question regarding human knowledge turns out to be about the conditions of possibility of theoretical judgments in different sciences. Because, as Kant points out, mathematics and physics have already attained the status of true sciences that actually and legitimately extend human knowledge, the question is not to show whether they are possible at all. The question is whether metaphysics as a science, that is, as a theoretical enterprise which produces and extends human knowledge regarding metaphysical objects, is possible. Kant suggests that this question is answerable by analogy with the actual procedure of other rational sciences, namely mathematics and physics, since all three domains of knowledge proceed through theoretical judgments. Thus, laying bare the conditions of possibility of theoretical judgments in

⁶¹ H. J. Paton, *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience*. London: Routledge, 2002; hereafter *KME*, vol. I, p.75.

⁶² *KME* I, p.75. Although Paton and many other Kant scholars use the term 'mind' in order to refer to the unity of transcendental operations, acts and powers which constitute the conditions of possibility of human experience and thought in general, I hesitate to follow their terminology since it is both an overloaded and restricted term that is unable to provide the entire significance of Kant's own term *Gemüt* and it carries the danger of substantializing the transcendental faculties of the subject.

mathematics and physics is supposed to indicate the way that metaphysics could be elevated to the same point that they are in.

In this context, Kant analyses the constitution of theoretical judgments that are able to advance our knowledge of objects in a necessary and universal manner, the only manner that knowledge can be legitimately extended. Until Kant, the tradition had acknowledged, although by different names, only two types of knowledge, namely, analytic a priori and synthetic a posteriori⁶³. However, for him, analysing merely the concept of the subject of the judgment, the former is unable to extend knowledge, while the predicate of the latter cannot relate to the concept of the subject universally and necessarily (two conditions that are needed for a theoretical science to advance our knowledge legitimately). At this juncture, Kant's novelty is the discovery of the notion of the synthetic a priori judgment by taking the synthetic element from the latter and the a priori from the former⁶⁴. The distinction between a priori and a posteriori knowledge is an epistemological distinction which regards our mode of knowing. Kant calls *a priori* to a knowledge which does not proceed from experience and implies a universal and necessary rule⁶⁵. On the other hand, a posteriori knowledge is the one that is empirical because it depends on experience⁶⁶. The distinction between analytic and synthetic is a distinction that concerns "the relation of a subject to the predicate"⁶⁷ in a judgment. He explains this distinction as follows:

In all judgments in which the relation of a subject to the predicate is thought [...], this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A,

⁶³ A.D. Lindsay, *Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970; hereafter *PIK*, pp. 56ff.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁶⁵ *CPR*, B2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, B2.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, B10.

as something which is (covertly) contained in this concept A; or B lies outside the concept A, although it does indeed stand in connection with it. In the one case I entitle the judgment analytic, in the other synthetic.⁶⁸

Because, in an analytic judgment, we do nothing other than breaking the subject to its constituents, these judgments are all a priori, having no empirical constituent⁶⁹. However, because the predicates of empirical judgments add something, which is not analytically contained the concept of the subject, all empirical judgements should be synthetic according to Kant⁷⁰. However, this does not mean that all synthetic judgments are *a posteriori* since some of them constitute a universal and necessary relation between the subject and the predicate. In this sense, a synthetic a priori judgment is the judgment, the predicate of which adds something to the subject, which is not already contained in the concept of the subject, in a necessary and universal fashion⁷¹. According to him, the principles of all theoretical sciences should be synthetic a priori judgments insofar as these sciences are to extend our knowledge in a universal and necessary manner⁷². In mathematics and physics, it is clear that their principles proceed not only from pure concepts alone but also from a priori forms of intuition, namely space and time. Moreover, as Kant notes, although metaphysics has not succeeded in extending human knowledge by then, if it is to be regarded as a rational science, it must also employ synthetic a priori principles.

To elaborate, the Copernican hypothesis, in the first place, denies the possibility of having theoretical access to things as they are in themselves and instead it

⁶⁸ Ibid., B10.

⁶⁹ Ibid., B11.

⁷⁰ Ibid., B11.

⁷¹ Ibid., B11-13.

⁷² Ibid., B14.

emphasizes the peculiar condition of the human being as a finite rational being who can only have conditional and limited knowledge (as opposed to God's unconditional and absolute knowledge⁷³) of objects. Accordingly, human knowledge is essentially restricted to appearances, i.e., things as they appear to the human being in time and space. Yet, this necessary restriction has a positive outcome since it is only through such a restriction that knowledge can extend in a necessary and universal manner, that is to say, the human being can have synthetic a priori knowledge in addition to the more common synthetic a posteriori and analytic a priori judgments. In other words, if human knowledge were confined to things in themselves, it would be impossible to demonstrate how our knowledge could be extended in an a priori manner in mathematics and natural sciences⁷⁴. Granting all this, the enquiry regarding the conditions of possibility of synthetic a priori judgments is at the same time an enquiry into the necessary and universal constitution of the subject to whom all reality appears. However, to say that the conditions of possibility of any knowledge lie in the constitution of the subject does not mean that, in this conception, the subject is looked in terms of its empirical characteristics or its natural existence. Instead it is conceived by Kant in terms of its universal and necessary constitution, in other words, in terms of its transcendental constitution, as a finite rational being. Finally, as the Copernican assumption necessarily brings about the idea that the only reality accessible to the human being is essentially a construction that depends on the transcendental constitution of the knowing subject, philosophy

⁷³ One of the senses of human finitude regards the fact that its intuition is dependent in terms of the existence of the object, that is to say, in order to have an intuition, our sensibility must, first of all, be affected by that object. Thus our intuition, one of the two stems of human knowledge, is conditioned by its a priori forms and it can only intuit appearances, not things in themselves. In this sense, our knowledge is not unconditioned and absolute like God's knowledge, which is at the same time the origin of objects' existence, such that only God can be said to have intellectual intuition of objects (Ibid., B71-2).

⁷⁴ *KME* I, pp. 76f. For the justification of this claim in terms of mathematics see §7 of 'Transcendental Aesthetic' (B56ff) and in terms of natural sciences see 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding' (B129-69).

becomes a transcendental enquiry of the conditions of the possibility of any construction.

Accordingly, the transcendental subject as understood by Kant could be conceived as the unitary site of the universal and necessary conditions of the possibility of experience (including the transcendental powers, operations and acts) and as the correlate of the object of experience. While the transcendental subject can be conceived in such a way, Kant also uses the term *Gemüt* when he refers to “the position or place of the *Gemütskräfte* (the *Gemüt*’s powers)”⁷⁵. The *Gemüt* is the collection, source and foundation of different transcendental faculties and, at the same time, it is also held as the vivifying principle, which, through its self-affection, yields a feeling of life, without corresponding to a substantial entity⁷⁶. Through a topography of *Gemüt*, Kant differentiates certain transcendental faculties, more precisely, powers (*Vermögen*), namely, sensibility, the understanding, the imagination, judgment and reason. These powers are presented not as separate entities or parts of the mind but as different factors and elements in constituting any perception or judgment⁷⁷. Kant arrives at these various faculties through a method of elimination, that is to say, through examining and distinguishing different aspects, abilities or functions that are required in order to bring about a certain judgment, experience or thought in general.

To introduce the transcendental faculties briefly, according to Kant, sensibility is the capability of receiving impressions through its a priori forms of time and

⁷⁵ "Gemüt" in Howard Caygill, *A Kant Dictionary*.. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1995; hereafter *KD*, pp. 210-2.

⁷⁶ “Gemüt” In Barbara Cassin et al. (eds.), *Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014, pp. 373-5.

⁷⁷ H. W. Cassirer, *Kant’s First Critique*. London: Routledge, 2002; hereafter *KFC*, p. 53.

space; it is the passive dimension of our knowledge⁷⁸, whereas the understanding, imposing unity upon intuitions through its pure concepts, is the active power of knowing⁷⁹. Kant defines these two faculties as two equally indispensable and radically separate stems of knowledge⁸⁰. The problem of bringing together these two distinct modes of knowledge is solved by the imagination, the faculty of synthesis⁸¹. The pure synthesis of the imagination is the transcendental act which produces schemata, i.e., time-determinations, according to the categories of the pure understanding⁸². The faculty of judgment is the power of subsumption which produces judgments by subsuming representations under concepts⁸³. Lastly, reason is the faculty of inferences; it helps to organize our knowledge as a whole by means of its ideas⁸⁴. In the next section, in attempting to explain how the transcendental subject is constituted, I will also outline how these faculties operate together so that we can have experience.

2.2.2. Transcendental Apperception, Consciousness and Thinking

After introducing the transcendental powers separately, the constitution of the transcendental subject must be shown in the unity of its activity⁸⁵. One of the

⁷⁸ *CPR*, B33-7. However, the passivity of sensibility is not to be understood in the sense of it merely registering intuitions, since it actually organises and orders them by imposing a priori forms of space and time on them .

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, B74-6.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, B74.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, B103.

⁸² *Ibid.*, B177-8.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, B171.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, B355-6.

⁸⁵ In order to show the constitution of subjectivity in its unity I will focus on the ‘Deduction’ of the first edition, the so-called ‘A-Deduction’. However, later, in characterizing transcendental

most crucial and fundamental chapters regarding the constitution of transcendental subjectivity in the First *Critique* is the ‘Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding’, which aims to show the objective validity of the pure concepts of the understanding, i.e., their necessary relation to objects⁸⁶. In the ‘Deduction’, we do not only see the proof of the objective validity of the categories, but also how the two irreducible and indispensable aspects of human experience, namely receptivity and spontaneity, come together in order to produce a united whole of experience and how the unity of the subject and the unity of the object necessitate each other. Furthermore, because, for Kant, the conditions of the possibility of experiencing any object coincide with the constitution of transcendental subjectivity in a way that objectivity is “conditioned by subjectivity itself”⁸⁷, the ‘Deduction’ also brings the constitution of transcendental subjectivity to light.

The threefold synthesis that is introduced in the first edition of the ‘Deduction’ consists of one synthesis which unceasingly and spontaneously occurs in each instance of identifying an object that is a unitary whole in experience. Although the threefold synthesis cannot be separated into three distinct steps in experience, Kant notionally separates it into three different modes of the imagination’s transcendental synthetic activity. According to him, threefold synthesis is necessary in order to identify an object in general. Through all these logically differentiated steps of one indivisible synthesis, the pure concepts of the understanding relate to a sensible manifold, which somehow has affected receptivity. The first synthesis, the synthesis of apprehension in intuition, is the

apperception, the question of the two aspects of subjectivity and of self-knowledge, I will, most of the time, concentrate on the second edition.

⁸⁶ Ibid., B117.

⁸⁷ *KCPR*, p.44.

synthesis of a manifold in a single moment⁸⁸. Secondly, the synthesis of reproduction reproduces the representations in the absence of their objects so that they can be determined in their coherence by the pure concept of the understanding⁸⁹. The synthesis of recognition in a concept is the one which gives unity to synthesized representations⁹⁰. The concept that is in question here is the concept in general, referring to the general function of concepts, that is, to give unity to an undetermined manifold. However, Kant insists that in order to impose a unity on and hence to determine a manifold, first of all, consciousness must be numerically identical⁹¹. Due to the requirement of bringing the synthesized manifold under a unity, the transcendental unity of apperception comes to the fore with its spontaneous representation ‘I think’. However, it is not the case that there is only a one-way conditioning of the unity of the concept by the unity of transcendental apperception. Instead the unity of consciousness is also conditioned by the unity on the part of the object, as if they were two ultimate necessary conditions which mutually support and sustain each other in order to ground all experience and thought. The product of this last synthesis is “the transcendental object=X”⁹² which corresponds to the possibility of encountering any object as a unity of a synthetic manifold in the experience.

Since all three of these different modes are distinguished logically in the exposition of the threefold synthesis but are not distinguishable in the actual experience of an object, all powers of representation, namely sensibility, the imagination and understanding, must be subject to the transcendental unity of

⁸⁸ *CPR*, A99.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, A100.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, A103-4.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, A103.

⁹² *Ibid.*, A109.

apperception in order that they can all work together to produce experience as a synthetic unity of a sensible manifold. Besides, as the necessary correlate of the transcendental unity of the object, transcendental unity of self-consciousness also bestows unity on the subject. We can have synthetic representations only on the condition that all representations belong to one consciousness, i.e., a consciousness that is numerically identical in time, for otherwise consciousness would change along with its constantly registering intuitions and would not even be capable of connecting them through the syntheses of imagination⁹³. According to Kant, the unity of empirical consciousness throughout its momentary changing representations is made possible by the transcendental unity of self-consciousness which is represented in the ‘I think’. Similarly, because the subject also lacks unity in the constant change of representations, its identity is provided by this pre-empirical self-consciousness⁹⁴.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that all the representations of empirical consciousness are actually self-conscious or “self-owned”⁹⁵ by the accompanying representation ‘I think’. It is in this sense that Kant emphasises,

It must be possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me which could not be thought at all, and that is equivalent to saying that the representation would be impossible, or at least would be nothing to me⁹⁶.

One of the crucial implications of this conception is that consciousness here is not conceived as a container which involves constantly registering representations, as could be claimed for Descartes’s understanding of consciousness (see fn. 31). Rather, consciousness, in the Kantian sense, can be

⁹³ Ibid., A116.

⁹⁴ *K CPR*, p. 156.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 155.

⁹⁶ *CPR*, B131-2.

understood as the power or the form of representation in general⁹⁷ and could be totally embedded in its empirical representations most of the time. However, all representations “require an accompanying unity bestowing consciousness”⁹⁸, not empirically but transcendently, if they are to be combined in a significant unity.

Moreover, because Kant defines the understanding as the faculty of thought in general, which becomes the faculty of knowledge only when it is connected with sensibility and grasps a manifold of intuition through its empirical employment⁹⁹, all thought, where thought is conceived by Kant as “a multiplicity of representations grasped as a unity”¹⁰⁰, depends on the transcendental unity of apperception. With regard to his claim that all the employment of the understanding is based on the original unity of apperception as its supreme principle¹⁰¹, we must also consider that thought is subject to this unity. Therefore, thought, being a function of the absolute unity of transcendental apperception, in the last analysis, is necessarily an act that can be reflectively accompanied by the transcendental representation ‘I think’. That is to say, although their conceptions of consciousness are quite different, both Descartes and Kant, in principle, conceive thinking as an (actually or possibly) self-conscious mental act that originates in the subject.

⁹⁷ Ibid., A346.

⁹⁸ *KCPR*, p. 155.

⁹⁹ *CPR*, A126.

¹⁰⁰ Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983; hereafter *KTI*, p.138.

¹⁰¹ *CPR*, B137.

2.2.3. The Problem of Self-knowledge: Transcendental Apperception vs Inner Sense

To say that Descartes and Kant have similar conceptions of thinking is not to claim that the ‘I think’ of the apperception directly corresponds to the Cartesian *cogito*. Here, a comparison with Descartes’s *cogito* will be helpful in order to characterise Kantian transcendental apperception in more detail. Whereas Descartes holds ‘I think’ to be a statement of the fact that there is a mental act going on in consciousness, which is intuited along with the existence of the thinker and which could yield self-knowledge, Kant’s transcendental apperception is not of an intuitive character but is inferred necessarily as a transcendental condition that the unity of representations presupposes. According to Kant, the ‘I think’ that the Cartesian meditator finds as the ultimate ground of certainty, is the representation of the transcendental unity of self-consciousness, which is a pure, original and empty consciousness that is capable of accompanying all representations necessarily. He calls it *pure* in order to distinguish it from the empirical self-consciousness which actually accompanies a particular determination of the mind; and *original* in order to emphasize that it is not grounded or conditioned by any other representation but must be able to accompany all others¹⁰².

Moreover, although Kant claims that the analytic unity of the ‘I think’ presupposes a synthetic unity, there is no manifold of intuition corresponding to this pre-categorial (since it is itself the necessary correlate of categories) synthetic unity¹⁰³. Insofar as apperception is understood as a transcendental power, it is defined according to its transcendental act, which is essentially synthetic, and it is in this sense that Kant regards the synthetic unity of

¹⁰² Ibid., B132.

¹⁰³ *KTI*, p. 142.

apperception as the condition of its analytic unity¹⁰⁴. However, this pre-categorical consciousness is no more than the bare consciousness of the spontaneous thinking activity, which cannot be presented in intuition, that is to say, no sensible manifold could be given to correspond to this empty consciousness. Yet, since apperception implies the consciousness of my thinking activity and the existence of an activity for Kant logically presupposes the existence of an agent, ‘I am’ is already and pre-conceptually included in the merely formal representation ‘I think’¹⁰⁵. But because no sensible manifold is met within this bare consciousness of the spontaneity of the transcendental subject, it cannot generate any knowledge of the subject, but only the thought of it as intelligence or self-active being¹⁰⁶.

For Kant, the only possibility of having self-knowledge is through the determination of a sensible manifold that is presented in inner sense, “by means of which the mind intuits itself or its inner sense”¹⁰⁷. In the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, Kant had already suggested that we have intuitions of external things only insofar as the *Gemüt* is affected by appearances¹⁰⁸. However, the inward

¹⁰⁴ *KME* I, p. 408.

¹⁰⁵ *KTI*, p. 280.

¹⁰⁶ *CPR*, B157-8.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, A22.

¹⁰⁸ At first sight, it seems contradictory to say that there is already an appearance before we intuit it. Hence, it is quite difficult to determine what exactly affects us in order to have an intuition. This difficulty leads to the interpretation that, for Kant, what actually affects human sensibility is the thing-in-itself. However, according to Kant, the thing-in-itself is merely a limit-concept which prevents the understanding to overstep its legitimate domain, namely the domain of possible experience (*CPR*, A254f). Moreover, it is only in the sense that all appearing presupposes a non-appearing that Kant insists on the necessity of thinking objects as things-in-themselves for, as he says, “otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears” (*CPR*, Bxxvif). Therefore, the *Gemüt* cannot be affected by things-in-themselves, which is a mere notional entity that demarcates the limits of experience and implies the logic of every appearing. Given the fact that Kant draws a distinction between phenomena and appearances by defining the former as appearances insofar as they are thought under the unity of the categories (*CPR*, A248), it would be legitimate to say that the *Gemüt* is affected by an

affection of the *Gemüt* constitutes a paradox, which may cause the illegitimate identification of transcendental apperception with inner sense, since it seems to presuppose a contradictory relation in which the *Gemüt* is passively affected by itself through an active affection¹⁰⁹. As Paton reminds us, for Kant, the self-affection does not present a new material as is the case with the external affection, but it “merely combines the given matter under the form of time”¹¹⁰, which cannot be represented by itself, save as a line through an analogy with space. But like all combination, this is only possible through the synthetic act of understanding in determining sensibility, thus by bringing its manifold under the unity of apperception¹¹¹.

Accordingly, although the synthetic act of apperception (the 'I think') actuates the consciousness of the existence of the subject in its thinking, inner sense cannot supply a manifold of the subject insofar as it is conscious of itself as a self-active being in relation to its spontaneous thinking activity but only as a phenomenon in time, that is to say, as an appearance, like others. Then the question is “how [can] the ‘I’ that thinks be distinct from the ‘I’ that intuits itself...and yet, as being the same subject, can be identical with the latter”¹¹². Hence, the paradox shows itself as that of the identity of two incompatible conceptions of the self, one formed through the consciousness of the thinking activity and the other through the determination of the inner intuition. Whereas the former refers to the consciousness of the unity of a transcendental act and,

appearance. A further problem with the interpretation of the cause of this affection as things-in-themselves is that it may lead to the confusion of the spontaneity, which causes inner intuitions by affecting the *Gemüt*, with the subject-in-itself.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., B153.

¹¹⁰ *KME* II, p. 400.

¹¹¹ *CPR*, B153.

¹¹² Ibid., B155.

for this reason, can be considered in relation to the transcendental subject¹¹³, the latter refers to an empirical self, the knowledge of which is made possible by the transcendental unity of apperception together with other transcendental faculties.

David Carr, in his study, in which he specifically focuses on this paradox, reformulates the question of the two selves as that of “two incompatible sorts of relations to the world...the empirical self stands in a relation of inclusion and thus a part-whole relation to the world; the transcendental self stands in an intentional or subject-object relation to the world”¹¹⁴ which suffices to say that the transcendental subject is the one which constitutes the world as it appears to us, yet is unthinkable without its relation to the world. In this sense, as a part of the world, the empirical self is already conditioned by the transcendental powers and acts of the subject, yet also depends on contingent factors of our experience, and thus it is an individuated, private and contingent self as opposed to the transcendental subject, which is universal and necessary, and makes possible such an empirical relation to ourselves¹¹⁵. As a result, there is not really the issue of two selves but two different levels with regard to experience, namely the empirical and the transcendental. Henceforth, in order to articulate the constitution of subjectivity in Kant’s philosophy, I will exclusively focus on the transcendental subject rather than the empirical self. In the following chapter, I will give an account of the transcendental status of the subject by discussing Kant’s critique of the rationalist conceptions of subjectivity in the ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’.

¹¹³ Yet, the transcendental subject cannot be reducible to its active aspect, namely spontaneity and its condition of possibility, namely the transcendental unity of apperception, since it also implies the passive aspect and all other intermediary powers. It is important to be aware of the fact that in the bare consciousness of ‘I am’, the subject is only aware of this active aspect of itself, not of both its aspects (Ibid., B159).

¹¹⁴ David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; hereafter *PS*, pp. 45f.

¹¹⁵ *PS*, pp. 53f.

2.2.4. The ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ and the Transcendental Status of the Subject

Although we can leave aside the empirical subject, since our main question regards the universal constitution of the subject, there appears a more striking and complicated question, namely, whether the transcendental subject, considered exclusively with regard to its thinking activity, implies a noumenal or a real subject. Although it is quite obvious that, in the context of his moral philosophy, Kant talks about a noumenal self, in the ‘Paralogisms of Pure Reason’ he rejects the equation of the thinking subject that is represented in the empty representation ‘I think’ with a thinking substance which is held to be the subject in itself, or the noumenal self. Here I will, first of all, expose the inner logic of the transcendental illusion of rational psychology, which claims to extend knowledge regarding the thinking subject and which is at work in the ‘Paralogisms’ then, I will discuss the implications of all four paralogisms with regard to how we should consider the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ in a transcendental framework.

According to Kant, the rational doctrine of the soul (i.e., Cartesian rational psychology), which claims to extend our knowledge of the subject in an *a priori* manner, is based merely on the single proposition ‘I think’¹¹⁶. The way in which the rational psychologist claims to produce knowledge of the soul is through a number of inferences which are based on the ‘I’ of transcendental apperception, which – at least to the rational psychologist – immediately reveals the existence of a subject of the activity of thinking. However, being merely a subjective ground of our thinking, the ‘I’ of the ‘I think’ does not designate anything objective, since the representation ‘I am’ is as empty as that of ‘I think’ (see 2.2.3). Moreover, as Kant explicitly states, because transcendental apperception

¹¹⁶ *CPR*, A342.

is the ultimate condition of possibility of the pure concepts, it is not the case that this apperception knows itself through pure concepts but that pure concepts themselves rest upon and are known through it¹¹⁷. Thus, due to the inability to differentiate what necessarily belongs to all thought from a real object, the rational psychologist, revolves in a “perceptual circle”¹¹⁸. That is to say, in order to determine something with regard to the subject of all thoughts, the rational doctrine of the soul applies the categories, which already necessarily include transcendental apperception, upon the bare representation ‘I’. Accordingly, we can show the illusion of such a theory by showing that it operates in two fallacious steps: firstly, by hypostasising the empty representation ‘I’, it designates a pseudo-object that subsists all constantly changing thoughts; secondly, it illegitimately applies the pure concepts of the understanding to the ‘I’ and thus claims to generate knowledge of the thinking subject in itself by overstepping the limits of all possible experience.

Therefore, Kant finds that the general illusion of all paralogisms lies in treating the synthesis of the conditions of thought in general (categories and the ‘I’ of the transcendental apperception) as if it could produce objective knowledge¹¹⁹. In all four paralogisms, the major premise presents “transcendental use of the category [the employment of which transgresses all empirical conditions], the minor premiss and the conclusion, in dealing with the soul which has been subsumed under this condition, use the same category empirically”¹²⁰. To exemplify, in the first paralogism, the major premise gives the transcendental employment of the concept of substance as the rule of the syllogism, then in the minor premise this

¹¹⁷ Ibid., A402.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., B404.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., A 397.

¹²⁰ Ibid., A402.

purely formal thought of the substance is applied to the 'I' of the 'I think' as if it were an object given in intuition. In all paralogisms, one of the pure concepts of the understanding, namely substance, simplicity, unity and possibility, is used in such manner. Thus, the following propositions are inferred as objective knowledge of the soul: the soul is a substance; it is simple, it is a unity in time and the objects in space, to which it has a relation, are merely possible¹²¹. However, for the reasons cited above, according to Kant, all these four propositions are far from designating something with regard to the subject, implying also the fact that Descartes's thinking substance with all its ontological designations was a mere chimera constructed out of the inner illusion of pure reason. Next, I will summarise all the four paralogisms in which the rational psychologist translates the logical features of the 'I' of the 'I think' into real features of a thinking being¹²².

In the first paralogism, where the inference is 'the soul is a substance', Kant does not deny that the 'I' is the referent of something that somehow underlies the thinking activity but he finds it illusory, for the above reasons, to attribute substantiality to it as if it were a permanent object whose accidents change¹²³. For him, it is impossible to attribute permanence to the 'I' since it is impossible to show objectively within our own empirical consciousness, which is necessarily accompanied by the same 'I', that whether the 'I' does or does not change together with the constantly changing determinations of the empirical consciousness and its particular thoughts¹²⁴. Only, as a formal condition of all thought, the 'I' does not change, simply because as a unity it necessarily

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, A344.

¹²² *DIT*, p. 20.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹²⁴ *CPR*, A364.

accompanies all acts of consciousness. So it will always be the same 'I' regardless of all empirical changes of the empirical 'I'. But for the same reason, as a transcendental condition of all thought it cannot be predicated of permanence, thus of substance.

The second paralogism posits the simplicity of the soul so that the indivisibility of thought can be guaranteed in its relation to one simple subject¹²⁵. However, since the proposition 'I think' is not itself an experience, but is the form of apperception and merely the transcendental condition of the unity of thinking activity, its grammatical subject cannot be held as a thinking being to which the category of quality can be applied. Nevertheless, Kant acknowledges its logical and pre-categorical simplicity as a transcendental condition, but one which cannot yield any knowledge of actual simplicity of the soul¹²⁶.

The third paralogism, which attributes a numerical identity to the soul through time, for Kant, proceeds from the same illusion, namely the one which holds the merely formal transcendental unity of consciousness as the unity of a real subject. Being the transcendently ideal form of inner sense, time itself derives its unity from the unifying act of transcendental apperception hence the unity of the logical subject is prior to the conceptual identification of time-relations and unity in experience¹²⁷.

Finally, the fourth paralogism regards the certainty of the existence of the subject and the possibility, thus uncertainty, of the existence of extended things, which leads to the privileged status of the subject's self-knowledge. Briefly, Kant rejects this claim by showing that both time and space are a priori forms of

¹²⁵ Ibid., A352.

¹²⁶ Ibid., A356.

¹²⁷ *DIT*, p. 23.

intuition through which we have access to appearances. Therefore, insofar as the subject and its mental states are represented in inner sense their reality is no more indubitable than that of external things. Accordingly, both kinds of intuitions have the same transcendently ideal status and for this reason they both also have empirical reality. The transcendental illusion that leads to this paralogism arises when the empty and merely logical representation ‘I am’ that is tautologically implied in ‘I think’ is thought to be a categorial existence¹²⁸.

Moreover, according to Kant, all these paralogistic knowledge claims have a common practical end, namely to distinguish the soul from corruptible matter and to attribute immortality to it¹²⁹. Therefore, at the basis of the mind-body dualism, there exists a need for securing our thinking subject from the “danger of materialism”¹³⁰, namely the idea that the soul will dissolve as our material body does. Acknowledging that this end is a natural interest of practical reason, nevertheless, Kant rejects the possibility of having such knowledge with regard to the thinking subject in the theoretical domain. On the other hand, he insists that he has already solved the problem of distinguishing the subject of inner sense from the material things as they are intuited through the a priori form of space, that is to say by reformulating the question according to the Copernican Revolution¹³¹. In this sense, rather than being two ultimately separate substances (mind and body), the ‘I’ is the formal condition of possibility of all thoughts that are perceived as the mental states of a unitary empirical consciousness, whereas

¹²⁸ *CPR*, A355.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, A383.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, A383. What is quite interesting about this point is that Kant here tends to maintain that, like Nietzsche, at the basis of our will to knowledge, at least regarding this one special matter, namely self-knowledge, there lies a need for security. Yet, Kant finds a rational basis in this need. In the following chapter, I will discuss how Nietzsche conceives subjectivism in the context of the human need for self-preservation.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, A385.

the matter is the common aspect of outer appearances which are a priori represented in the form of extensionality. Thus both mental states and material things are intuitions, but of different kinds, according to the forms through which they are represented, namely space and time. Moreover, by solving the problem of the mind-body communion, Kant also invalidates the role of God as that which is to reconcile two fundamentally separate substances in the domain of theoretical knowledge. Yet, as I will discuss in the following section, his solution of the mind-body problem implies that the body is reduced to an external representation of human reason which has no vital role for the constitution of the subject and thinking processes.

Allison notes that the tendency to equate the 'I' of the 'I think' with the noumenal self, which is partly due to the ambiguous statements in the *Critique*¹³², is centred on the so-called dilemma of self-knowledge, that is, "how the subject of apperception can know itself as an object"¹³³. Yet, Kant's fundamental insistence on the necessity of a sensible content to know any object strictly forbids the possibility of knowing the 'I' that is expressed in the empty representation of the transcendental apperception. For him, as I have noted above, we can only know ourselves as we are determined in time, therefore as a phenomenon among others in the world. So this confusion of the subject of transcendental apperception and the so-called noumenal self might be said to be originated on the basis of a simplistic dualism: if empirical self-consciousness only reveals self-knowledge of the subject as a phenomenon (or as a succession of the conscious representations) then the subject implied in the transcendental apperception, which cannot be given to the senses, must be the noumenal self.

¹³² Allison refers to the statement "apperception is something real" as an example of such ambiguity that leads to the equation of the subject of apperception with the noumenal (real) self. According to him, such statements become main reference points of the ontological interpreters of Kant (*KTI*, p. 273).

¹³³ *KTI*, p. 288.

However, this inference misses another level that leads to the very distinction between phenomena and noumena: the transcendental level, the level of conditions of possibility. Mandt is right to assert that the problem of knowing the transcendental subject is also valid for all transcendental faculties¹³⁴. In this point, it is important to reconsider Kant's method for the entirety of his transcendental philosophy: transcendental conditions of knowledge are designated, first, by eliminating all empirical elements from judgments and, then, by analysing and differentiating non-empirical elements, functions, capabilities and acts necessary to bring about judgments from each other. Thus, it is not an enterprise which reveals theoretical knowledge of any condition, including the transcendental subject itself, but one which analytically identifies necessary and universal elements of all human knowledge without hypostasizing them as objects. To exemplify, the unity of transcendental apperception is not claimed to be known as an empirical object in experience but its necessity is shown by pointing out its spontaneous unifying function for having any thought in general since thought implies a unitary structure of representations. Therefore, the 'I' of the 'I think' should be seen as the transcendental ground rather than the noumenal thinking being to the refutation of which conception the entire chapter 'The Paralogisms of Pure Reason' is devoted.

After all these points, we can conclude that the transcendental subject, for Kant, is the unity of different powers that come together under the unity of transcendental apperception in order to produce any perception, experience or judgment in general. Original apperception is considered here as the core element of Kant's transcendental subjectivity since it brings together not only representations but also the modes of thought, which are the impersonal powers and capacities, such as sensibility, the imagination, the understanding and

¹³⁴ A. J. Mandt, "The Inconceivability of Kant's Transcendental Subject: An Impasse in Kant's Metaphysics", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 23, 1983, 13-33.

reason¹³⁵. Therefore, although the core element is the unity of self-consciousness and its pure representation ‘I think’, it is just one of the many necessary aspects of the transcendental subject. When the subject is considered purely in its thinking activity, we are faced with its spontaneous or intelligent aspect; nevertheless, transcendental subjectivity in its entirety should be thought as the site of the powers of unifying, synthesizing, subsuming and inferring and the capacity for being exposed to the world, which are brought together thanks to transcendental apperception.

In conclusion, Kant laid bare the constitution of a universal subject by recognizing the role of pure reason in experience (the Copernican Revolution) and by his thinking through the conditions of possibility. Thus, the transcendental subject did not emerge as a real substance or merely empirical and habitual referent of impressions but as a correlate of any possible experience, or as a unity of conditions of possibility. In relation to its thinking activity, the intelligent self is far from designating “an independent reality with access to the supersensible”¹³⁶, as it was still conceived by Descartes. As I have discussed in detail, it is only through hypostasizing the activity of thinking into something substantial that Descartes concluded that the subject is a thinking substance which is fundamentally separate from what is extended. By overcoming substance dualism and placing the subject on a purely formal level, Kant realises the intellectualist dream that the subject should be atemporal (thus beyond all change), self-identical and self-coincident insofar as it is considered as the purely formal and empty ‘I’. Yet the Kantian subject is related to the world not in a purely intellectual manner but its relation also involves a sensible and passive aspect (the receptive component of knowledge necessitates that the

¹³⁵ *CPR* A107.

¹³⁶ *KFC*, p. 104.

subject must somehow be exposed to the world passively). Nevertheless, in concert with his understanding of subjectivity, Kant maintains the modernist conception of thinking as an at least potentially self-conscious mental activity and this conception will be the main target of Nietzsche, although he attacks it through thoroughly different conceptual machinery (see 4.3-4).

2.3. Concluding Remarks

In general, we might say that modern philosophy has distinguished itself from medieval thought with its predominance of epistemological concerns. As I see in the medieval era, philosophy was concerned basically with the problem of God's creation and its distinction from the entirety of what is created. Accordingly, the fundamental dualism in this paradigm was the one between the creator and the created where the ontological priority and fullness had been attributed to the God. It is true that in the medieval era as well philosophers have concerned with epistemological problems such as the problems of the possibility of God's knowledge and of the distinction between human knowledge and God's knowledge. However, in modern philosophy, the operative distinction became the one between the knower and the known as the leading question of philosophical thought has become that of knowledge: how can the human being know anything whatsoever with certainty, what are the grounds and modes of human knowledge leading to truth, etc. But what has made this epistemological concern modern is the motivation to found knowledge anew without resting on any external authority. As I have shown in the first section, seeking to overcome the epistemological crisis of philosophy and the sciences, Descartes reaches one firm and unshakable point which obviously did not move the whole earth from one place to another yet this new foundation of philosophy and science has triggered a change of the entire paradigm of thought. It is true that God still occupies the top of the hierarchy in Cartesian philosophy but its priority and importance, as regards the truth and thought, started to dissipate with Descartes.

With Kant, philosophy is secularised to the highest degree insofar as the God is totally dislocated from the economy of truth and knowledge, leaving its place to the human subject: it is reduced merely to a postulate for practical reason¹³⁷. As a corollary of that, the human being as the knowing and thinking subject not only became the legitimate site of truth but also centralised to the extent that the universal constitution of it came to be the principal domain of inquiry for modern epistemology and metaphysics.

In the following I will draw out some of the underlying assumptions of and critical points about the emergence and constitution of modern subjectivity as they are elucidated in the previous two sections. These will also be the main focuses of the following chapters where Nietzsche's critique of modern thought in general and subjectivity in particular will be elaborated.

1. *The tripartite economy of modern philosophy*: As I have emphasised throughout this chapter, the subject emerges as an essential part of a tripartite economy together with truth and knowledge. We see that even in the First Meditation, Descartes presupposes that the interiority of the meditator, his consciousness, as is isolated from any external interference, i.e., previous opinions and philosophical theories, his own body and senses etc., would and must be the site for finding an unshakable point to ground knowledge that is the whole project of his philosophy (2.1.1). Pursuing this initial presupposition, this unshakable point is ascertained to be the self-assuredness of the subject, i.e., the certainty of its mental act and its own existence, without God's warrant (2.1.2). On the other hand, according to Descartes, truth is something that is achieved as the human knowledge accomplishes certainty (or absence of doubt) in terms of the accuracy between the ideas of reason and the thing-in-itself whereas such

¹³⁷ CPR, A633f-B661f.

feeling of certainty is provided again by the light of reason¹³⁸. That is to say, from the initial appearance of the subject in the history of philosophy, there is supposed to be an intimate and undivorceable relationship between truth, knowledge and the human subject insofar as it is conceived as a self-conscious and rational being. Again, in Kant, we see the same tripartite relationship although the human capacity of knowledge is limited to the realm of phenomena with the Copernican Turn (2.2.1). For Kant, truth is the conformity of the concepts of the understanding with their object¹³⁹. Now the object of knowledge is limited to the phenomenon, which is, in turn, constituted by the transcendental sources and acts of the subject. That is to say, the subject is given a reality-constitutive role (reality is taken here in the sense of the phenomenal reality). As a corollary to this idea, the whole project of the First *Critique* can be seen as an inquiry into the transcendental constitution of the subject in order to determine the legitimate boundaries of the human reason. In summary, the human subject concerns modern philosophy insofar as it is preoccupied by epistemological concerns; truth is understood in terms of certain knowledge (accuracy of the idea/representation with the object); and subjectivity is theorised as the locus of truth and knowledge.

2. *Reductive understanding of the human being*: Although I have underscored the fact that in modern philosophy the human being has started to occupy the central place, this is only partly true. The human being is located at the centre insofar as it is reduced to its consciousness and rational capacities which, according to the main figures of this paradigm, leads it to knowledge and truth. Although, there are totally different formulations of the subject, i.e., as substance or as transcendental unity, what is constitutive of subjectivity is consciousness

¹³⁸ *Med.*, IV 58-9.

¹³⁹ *CPR*, A642.

and reason. The physiological, historical, social and all other empirical determinations of the human being are radically excluded from the sphere of modern subjectivity. Regarding the physiological determinations, we see that from the very beginning (the First Meditation), the human being is encapsulated in its consciousness whereas its body is reduced to a mere heap of matter, having no essence as its own (2.1.3). One consequence of this regards the separation of the human being into two irreconcilable substances which comprises one of the core tensions of the Cartesian philosophy (2.1.3). Kant's solution for this tension by converting the dualism of the body and mind into that of the inner and outer representation does by no means establish the unity of the human being but ends up with the absolute exclusion of the question of the body (also of the animal nature of the human being) both from the sphere of subjectivity and of philosophical inquiry (2.2.4). Secondly, neither the human being nor its consciousness and rational capacities are investigated in terms of their historical and social determinations and evolutions rather they are supposed to be universally given. Below, I will explain this point further. Another consequence that follows from the complete isolation of the subject into its consciousness regards the problem of inter-subjectivity¹⁴⁰ and the trivialisation of societal relations for defining what it means to be human.

3. *The subject as self-identity that is generative of difference:* In both Descartes's and Kant's notions on subjectivity, the subject appears as the simple self-identical factor that gives birth to a manifold of ideas, representations and modes

¹⁴⁰ Because the gap between two subjects is presumed from the very beginning, any subsequent effort to overcome this gap fails in one or another way. This has profound consequences for the ethical, social and political theories, the starting point of which is the autochthonous subject isolated to its consciousness. This point will be of interest for this study only in terms of the role of language that is implicitly presupposed in the modern subjectivist paradigm: language is a neutral tool for communication of one's isolated inner states to another. Therefore, not only the body and social relations are disregarded in theorising the essential constitution of the subject and of thought, but also language's role in thinking is never made into a question. For Nietzsche's critique of this modernist conception of language see section 4.1.

of thinking. In Descartes, it is quite obvious: the *res cogitans* is the self-same and simple substance which generates various kinds of *cogitationes* and ideas from itself (2.1.3). In Kant, although the subject seems to be comprised of a number of faculties and all unity is referred back to a unifying activity of the understanding, the transcendental apperception is the ultimate unity that conditions the possibility of having any representation whatsoever and the unifying act of understanding (2.2.3). The transcendental apperception is the self-identical core of transcendental subjectivity. Thus, it is also the element that makes the transcendental subject identical to itself. However, what differ from itself are the representations that are conditioned and, in a way, (the unifying and synthesising powers of the subject) generated by the self-identical subject. Both the *res cogitans* and the transcendental subject are understood as self-identical generators of difference. It is in this sense that Nietzsche sees the subjectivist paradigm as a mere continuation of the Western metaphysical tradition (see 3.1).

4. *The modern image of thinking*: As I have laid stress in several occasions in this chapter, thinking is conceived as a necessarily (Descartes) or possibly (Kant) self-conscious mental act in the modern paradigm. Descartes determined the essence of the *res cogitans* as thinking and, for him, what makes an act a true *cogitatio* is the element of self-consciousness it includes, not the sensuous and bodily elements or its content (2.1.2). That is to say, thinking is exclusively a self-conscious act of the mind although bodily elements may interfere to bring out some confused modes of thinking. Similarly, for Kant, thinking is an activity of producing a synthetic unity from a manifold of representation in general (2.2.2). As we have seen, the ultimate condition of the possibility of unity, both for the unitary function of the concepts and for encountering any object in experience, is the transcendental unity of apperception, the representation of which is the ‘I think’ (2.2.2). Although, it might be claimed that the senses might also have a role in thinking, especially for empiricists and partly for Kant—when

we consider the possible role of sensibility in thinking— it is clear that their role is not constitutive of what it means to think. In general, for the modern thought, the sphere of human consciousness is where the activity of thinking takes place¹⁴¹.

5. Atemporality and ahistoricity of the subject and its essential constitution: The subject, together with its essential constitution, whether it is a substance (Descartes) or a transcendental unity (Kant) is conceived as an atemporal root of all that is changeable and manifold. In Descartes, we have seen that the *res cogitans* is a substance that does not go under any modification where the various modes of its thinking, which are substituted by it, are subjected to temporality (2.1.3). Although with Kant, human finitude, thus temporality, became a crucial concern, we see that the subject, insofar as it is conceived as the a priori constitution of the human being, has an atemporal structure and, even further, this atemporal constitution makes any cognition of temporality possible. The atemporality of transcendental subjectivity is also guaranteed by the claim that the ‘I think’, the core element of Kantian subjectivity, is an empty representation that denies any temporal determination (2.2.3). The atemporality of the subjective constitution of the human being also brings about its ahistoricity. That is, the human being, from its initial appearance in the earth until its total disappearance, has had and is going to have the same universal and necessary constitution in terms of its nature and fundamental capacities (knowing, thinking, judgmental and moral). Although there are deficient modes of being human (an idea which provides a suitable ground for legitimising

¹⁴¹ One exception to this in modern philosophy is Spinoza’s views with regard to the role of bodily encounters in thought and idea generation. Yet, his conceptualisation of thinking in terms of the body could not become influential to be mainstream to represent the modern paradigm and the possibilities it contains could not be acknowledged until contemporary discussions in the literature, which might be said to have started with Deleuze’s reading of Spinoza. In the following chapters, as the occasion arises, I will merely point out how Nietzsche’s understanding of the body enhances the Spinozistic understanding rather than presenting a detailed discussion which would obviously extend the limits and the main concern of this study.

colonial, racist and misogynist practices of the modern Western civilization), this universal and necessary nature of the human being is presumed to be immunised to all empirical change. It is strictly out of question that, for instance, whether a human being can have a totally different mode of rationality (even nonrationality) as its defining characteristic (as it would be utterly incomprehensible, for Kant, that a human being can develop another form of space that does not yield the intuition of appearances in three-dimensional form). In the following chapter, I will discuss how Nietzsche's conception of the human being "*as yet undetermined animal*"¹⁴² exemplifies a historical (and physiological) understanding of the human being which opens up new potentialities to understand human existence in more flexible and positive manners.

I will elaborate Nietzsche's criticism of these points further in the following two chapters. In the next chapter, I will present a general framework of Nietzsche's physiological and genealogical thinking by focusing on the question of the development and the value of the subjectivist interpretation of the human being. Then in the last chapter, I will focus precisely on his critique of the modern conception of the subject and of thought.

¹⁴² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1989; hereafter *BGE* no. 62.

CHAPTER 3

THE VALUE OF SUBJECTIVITY IN NIETZSCHE'S PHYSIOLOGICAL AND GENEALOGICAL CRITIQUE

In the previous chapter, I have discussed the emergence and the constitution of subjectivity in modern philosophy by focusing on two dominant models, namely the Cartesian and Kantian transcendental subjectivity. As I have shown, in this paradigm, the human being insofar as it occupies the privileged position for philosophy is considered reductively as the self-conscious origin of thought. Based on the discussions in the previous chapter, I will discuss Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity and of the modern conception of thinking in the following.

Nietzsche's novelty in the history of philosophy is, for the great extent, due to the thoroughly new orientation that he gives to philosophy in general and transcendental thinking in particular by expanding the critique to the values that are operative in Western philosophy and civilization. Nonetheless, his understanding of values is both wider than the common understanding, which narrowly takes pre-established moral values into consideration when it comes to the question of value, and goes beyond the subjectivist interpretation that sees the human being at origin of value-generation. Rather, starting from the immanent realm of the physiological, Nietzsche shows that values, including moral ones, represent historically changing conditions of life (and not merely human life) and they presuppose complex processes of evaluation oriented from certain physiological perspectives. In this chapter, my main focus will be the

question of the value of subjectivity, which is, for Nietzsche, a prevalent interpretive tendency with regard to the human being.

In the first section of this chapter, I will present the general framework within which Nietzsche criticises subjectivity and this presupposes to introduce his entire critique of the Western metaphysical tradition that is conceived by him as different articulations of what he calls the ‘two-world theory’. In this section, I will also briefly explain his conception of nihilism, its different senses and development, underscoring how in and through metaphysical thought the value of life is dwindled down to *nihil*, to nothing. Then, in the second section I will introduce his physiological thought, which constitutes a non-metaphysical and monistic ontology, together with some of his key technical terms and conceptual machineries (e.g., the will to power, forces, the body, perspectivism etc.). Introducing Nietzsche’s famous concept of the will to power, in this section, I also aim to dissipate the misunderstandings and distortions of Nietzsche’s philosophy as radical subjectivism or egoism, and to point out how his thought of the will to power contains an intrinsic critique of subjectivity. In the third section, I will elaborate his conception of genealogy, which is a historical and transcendental investigation of values. Doing this, I will also point out how Kant’s interrogation of the conditions of possibility (transcendental thinking) has made possible Nietzsche’s critical thought, at least on a formal level, but, in turn, has been radicalised in his genealogical and physiological thinking. Lastly, I will proceed to discuss two treatises of his *On the Genealogy of Morality* insofar as they present the history of the development of the interpretation of the human being as an autochthonous subject, which is fundamentally paralogistic and destined to fail, yet, which has an enormous value for human existence, as Nietzsche lays emphasis. There, the fundamental questions of this chapter will be addressed: namely, what value subjectivity has for human existence, how and under which historical conditions it has become the dominant model of our self-

understanding, and whether it furthers or diminishes the potentialities of the human life.

3.1. Nietzsche's Account of the Western Metaphysics

For Nietzsche, Western metaphysics is the mode of thinking that operates and distributes values hierarchically according to the law of excluded middle that does not permit any transition between two terms. From the beginning of the Western tradition, the terms of the binary logic have designated a division between the 'true world' and 'apparent world'. In this sense, Nietzsche calls metaphysics the two world theory, which, as Micheal Haar analyses, comprises "any thought or belief that separates, opposes, or sets a hierarchy between 'world of appearances' and a 'true world'"¹⁴³. In this account, separation, opposition and hierarchical evaluation can be said to be structural moments of metaphysics. To elaborate, metaphysical thinking, first, divides the entire existence into two realms ('true world' and 'apparent world'), then, it conceptualises these two realms in an absolute opposition to each other and distribute values in an asymmetrical manner that the so-called 'true world' gathers all the value and meaning whereas 'apparent world' is totally depreciated and seen as inferior to the former. In this mode of thinking, the superior term is regarded as the ontologically perfect, self-identical, self-sufficient, unconditioned and independent, while the inferior is seen as deficient, changing, conditioned by and dependent on the former for its existence.

Although the terms that occupy this dualistic model has changed and substituted by others throughout the history of Western metaphysics, for Nietzsche, the oppositional model itself has preserved and unfolded itself in different oppositions.

¹⁴³ Michel Haar, *Nietzsche and Metaphysics*. New York: SUNY Press, 1996; hereafter *NM*, p. x.

How the 'Real [True] World' at last Became a Myth [Fable]

HISTORY OF AN ERROR

1. The real world attainable to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man – he dwells in it, *he* is it.

(Oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, convincing. Transcription of the proposition 'I, Plato, *am* the truth.')

2. The real world, unattainable for the moment, but promised to the wise, the pious, the virtuous man ('to the sinner who repents').

(Progress of the idea: it grows more refined, more enticing, more incomprehensible – *it becomes a woman*, it becomes Christian. . .)

3. The real world – unattainable, undemonstrable, cannot be promised, but even when merely thought of a consolation, a duty, an imperative.

(Basically the same old sun, but shining through mist and scepticism; the idea grown sublime, pale, northerly, Königsbergian.)¹⁴⁴

As is seen, according to Nietzsche, the dichotomy between 'true world' and 'apparent world' is, for the first time, injected to the Western thought by the Platonic interrogation of the true being, i.e., the One that underlines the Many. In Plato's theory of the Forms, a transcendent, unchangeable and eternal realm is posited as the 'true world', i.e., the realm of being, fullness, plenitude and ontological sufficiency. On the other hand, the world that we inhabit, the world of becoming, temporality and materiality, is degraded as a mere copy or shadow of the realm of the Forms. In this paradigm, the transcendent Forms had been seen as the ground and the essences of things that appear in a more or less deficient manner in the world of becoming. With the advent of Christianity, the monotheistic God had taken the place of the Forms (thus, it can simply be characterised as the personification of the form of the Good, i.e., the highest form as the origin of all other forms that is symbolised as the sun in Plato's *Republic*¹⁴⁵) and becomes the true being, i.e., the eternal, omnipotent and

¹⁴⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, "How the 'Real World' at last Became a Myth", *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*, tr. R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin Books, 1990; hereafter *TI*, pp. 50f.

¹⁴⁵ Plato, *Republic*, tr. G.M.A. Grube. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992, VII 517b-c.

omnipresent cause of all creation. In the Christian thought, the God, who has never come to exist and will never cease to be, becomes the centre of all meaning and value in contradistinction to all creation, the degree of reality of which decreases as one gets far from the God and approaches to the matter in the hierarchy of beings. From Nietzsche's perspective, we can also claim, as Lingis does, that, in the modern epoch, with Cartesian philosophy, the One is identified with the *res cogitans*¹⁴⁶ and the subject has started to become the self-identical centre of the world, which has, in turn, reduced into the play of representations that register to the subject's consciousness. In Kantian transcendental philosophy, Nietzsche sees another variety of the two-world theory¹⁴⁷. The empirical diversity of the phenomenon is conditioned by the transcendental, ahistorical and formal structure that is united through the transcendental unity of apperception.

At the basis of this historically prevailing model of evaluation that invests all value to the One (the self-same and the self-present), Nietzsche sees an idiosyncratic prejudice against difference and change, which underlies the metaphysical subjugation of the Many to the One, becoming to being. From Nietzsche's perspective, philosophers, with the exception of Heraclitus, have always had an urge to see becoming as a deception, thus they claim "what is, does not *become*; what becomes, *is not*..."¹⁴⁸. Metaphysics seeks the ground of all there is since it proceeds from the assumption that all phenomenal divergence and change cannot be real or generate and sustain itself without a self-subsisting

¹⁴⁶ Alphonso Lingis, "The Will to Power", in David B. Allison (ed.), *The New Nietzsche: Contemporary Styles of Interpretation*. New York: Dell Publishing, 1977; hereafter *TWP*, p. 40.

¹⁴⁷ To what Nietzsche refers as the two world-theory of Kantian philosophy is, in some of his texts, the distinction between the thing-in-itself and appearance, in others, between the transcendental and the empirical.

¹⁴⁸ "Reason' in Philosophy", *TI*, p. 45.

ground, a *hypokeimenon*¹⁴⁹. In this mode of thinking, identity is supposed to be constitutive and generative of difference; it bestows reality and being to the appearance. Besides, a thing is also conceived as a unity, a substance which sustains itself in time and space although it appears to the senses always in a state of differing¹⁵⁰. That is to say, metaphysics attributes ontological priority to the identical, whereas the only difference that it takes into account is the difference between two self-identical entities. The same model can also be seen in the Cartesian conception of the subject: the subject is the unity which gathers together and generates from itself the multiplicity of *cogitationes*, i.e., thoughts, ideas, perceptions, wills etc. Moreover, it is implicit in Kant's notion of the 'I think', which is the atemporal and formal unity that is necessary for any thought and representation.

From Nietzsche's perspective, the common trait of metaphysics is that it demands self-identical and atemporal essences, i.e., the underlying truth of all that appears to the senses, to which only reason can have access¹⁵¹. The plurality and change of appearances are considered as the deception of the senses (of our bodily existence), which can only yield 'knowledge' of appearances from a partial perspective and insofar as they are in a state of differing. What appears to the senses can be nothing but a deficient sign of something (essence) that subsist them. In this perspective, truth is always the truth of the absolute, self-identical and unconditioned. Accordingly, the question of the essence is articulated, from the earliest inception of metaphysics, in the form of 'what is...?' for beings can

¹⁴⁹ *TWP*, p. 40.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

¹⁵¹ "'Reason' in Philosophy", *TI*, p. 45

have an ontological status insofar as they conform to the principle of identity¹⁵². The first instance of this mode of interrogation of essences is the Socratic question ‘what is...’, e.g., ‘what is beauty?’, ‘what is justice’. The interlocutors in Plato’s dialogues count examples, mere appearances, when they are asked ‘what is...’, but they are unable to present a universal definition, which could be the only answer that is based on reason. As Deleuze notes, what Nietzsche finds problematic in this form of question is not that it seeks for essences but its presumption that there is an absolute opposition between the essence and appearance, being and becoming, and the prejudice that being of something should be beyond change and can be grasped without taking into account of various perspectives¹⁵³. At the same time, such an understanding of truth and essence underlies the prejudice against the senses and our bodily being in contrast to the overestimation of reason and human being’s rational aspect.

Trivialising the conviction that truth must be that of atemporal and unchanging essences by insisting on the immanency of becoming, Nietzsche asks where the drive for truth that has dominated the Western philosophical tradition comes from¹⁵⁴. For Nietzsche, the overvaluation of being, reason and truth in contrast to the depreciation of becoming, the senses and error (illusion/semblance) is neither based on a rational judgment nor merely implies a moral will behind it although the equation of truth with the good, which has been an implicit core assumption of philosophy after Socrates, signifies a moral evaluation. He writes, “truth, will

¹⁵² Friedrich Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense”, in Raymond Geuss and Alexander Nehamas (eds.), *Writings from the Early Notebooks*, tr. Ladislaus Löb. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; hereafter *TL*, p. 40.

¹⁵³ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, tr. Hugh Tomlinson. London: Continuum, 2006; hereafter *NP*, p. 71.

¹⁵⁴ *TL*, p. 257. For a detailed discussion about Nietzsche’s understanding of truth, see 4.1.

to truth is really something else and only a disguise”¹⁵⁵. Beneath the hyperbolic value of truth, Nietzsche discovers fear and hatred towards death, dissolution, aging, and also towards becoming, procreation and growth¹⁵⁶. Since all these are not only the essential functions of time, temporality and physicality but also inseparable phenomena of life, the denigration of becoming and of its all other aspects indicates the negation of life itself. Starting with the Socratic search for truth in something which does not become (the universal definition, the Form, God, the subject, etc.), Western metaphysics has been driven by a will to truth that denies the reality and value of that which becomes, hence life itself. Nevertheless, according to Nietzsche, such a judgment on the value of life has not come from *ex nihilo* but, because all judgments are passed on by certain perspectives within life, the denigration of life must have emerged from a certain perspective within life. It is in this way that, for Nietzsche, it is life (or a certain life form) that devaluates life as it valorises self-identical truths.

In this account, metaphysical thinking and evaluations are both symptoms and cures of what Nietzsche calls the *décadence* of life. They are symptoms of *décadence* since they signal the weakness that holds life (and the human being in particular) back from affirming itself immanently in the absence of an absolute reference point, i.e., an origin, *telos* or self-identity, to attribute a value and meaning to life once and for all, because, within life, there is only incessant, impersonal production of new forms and it presupposes the disintegration and destruction of the previous ones in each moment¹⁵⁷. For Nietzsche, the acknowledgment of these irrevocable characteristics of life produces a feeling of

¹⁵⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. New York: Random House, 1967; hereafter *WP*, no. 377.

¹⁵⁶ “‘Reason’ in Philosophy”, *TI*, p. 45.

¹⁵⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1974; hereafter *GS*, no. 26.

total meaninglessness and worthlessness of life for the decadent human being who is too weak to generate meaning and also deprived of value-proliferating cultural institutions¹⁵⁸. If this is the case, in order to preserve itself, the descending life depreciates itself through inventing “a true world that possesses all the attributes that life does not have: unity, stability, identity, happiness, goodness”¹⁵⁹. It is in this sense that Nietzsche calls metaphysical thinking, which posits a transcendent realm as the unchangeable centre of all meaning and value, the cure for *décadence* although the long term effects of it have been disastrous for the human existence by narrowing down human potentialities¹⁶⁰.

With the metaphysical step taken by Plato, which can be seen as a systematic unfolding of Socratic drive for truth, a fictitious ‘beyond’ is, for the first time, posited as the centre that accrues all value and meaning to itself¹⁶¹. Although it is posited as the realm of plenitude, for Nietzsche, the ‘true world’ is not; it designates nothingness. For him, the ‘beyond’, whether in the guise of the Forms, God, subject or atom, is the ideal through which this world, the only

¹⁵⁸ Nietzsche acknowledges the role and the effect of culture and social institutions for the proliferation of values in terms of human life. His admiration for the Greek culture is due to his conviction that Greeks could have established a social institution, the contest, that is conducive for value-proliferation and able to motivate individuals for excelling themselves and enhancing their qualities and skills while also acknowledging the role of culture and society for their accomplishments. Acampora presents a detailed discussion on this matter in the first two chapters of her work *Contesting Nietzsche* (Christa Davis Acampora, *Contesting Nietzsche*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013; hereafter *CN*).

¹⁵⁹ *NM*, p. 12.

¹⁶⁰ Here, I do not use the term ‘potentiality’ in a quasi-Aristotelean sense, that is, I do not intend to claim that Nietzsche believes that the human being has a certain unchangeable essence which, under the influence of metaphysical interpretations and nihilistic values, cannot get actualised. On the contrary, I intend to emphasise that the human being can be interpreted in a number of different manners and can develop a variety of capacities which would transform what it means to be human historically.

¹⁶¹ However, it is important to note here that, for Nietzsche, neither Socrates nor Plato are responsible agents for the invention of metaphysics rather life, the weakening and descending life, evaluates and interprets itself through those physiologically suitable channels (here, Socrates and Plato) in order to sustain itself in its weakness.

world, has been devaluated for centuries. Accordingly, he calls the will to invent a supra-sensible world at the expense of the sensible world nihilism since the value of life is reduced to *nihil* through every metaphysical projection of a supra-sensible world¹⁶². Therefore, Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics is not a critique of a particular moment of the historical articulation of metaphysics but of all beliefs and values that are oriented by a will to negate life. By the same token, all thoughts and notions that take self-identical units as constitutive of difference are nihilistic since, as Nietzsche constantly emphasises, life is essentially an unceasing process of self-differentiation within which everything is transient and changing in every moment. Accordingly, presupposing the negation of becoming and reduction of difference into self-sameness, the belief in the principle of identity, eternal and immediate truths, logic, morality and notions of causality, unity, substance, origin (hence, the subject, –whether it is conceived as a substance or a transcendental unity– the self-conscious originator of thought, as is conceptualised in the modern period) and *telos* are essentially nihilistic.

Notwithstanding that, Nietzsche announces the approach of nihilism, the “uncanniest of all guests”¹⁶³, in the gradually increasing scepticism towards the highest values and knowledge, and the tottering of all meaning and aim, which induces disorientation, pessimism, gloom, terror, disgust and distress in the nineteenth century European human being. This is the second sense of nihilism and it points out a passing psychological state when Western metaphysics' latent nihilism is getting more and more manifest. For Nietzsche, the ever-growing nihilism of the contemporary era is the consequence of a much more fundamental and sophisticated event that leads to the devaluation of the highest values. This event is uttered by Nietzsche in his famous statement “God is

¹⁶² *NP*, p. 139. In this sense, Haar notes that the Platonic division of the realm of appearance and of the Forms “constitutes the nihilistic act *par excellence*” (*NM*, p. 12).

¹⁶³ *WP*, no. 1.

dead”¹⁶⁴. As I have explained above, the monotheistic God was one of the most enduring articulations of the authority of the ‘true world’, which has been the ultimate signifier of all senses and values, and in the name of which life has been devalued for centuries. Thus, the ‘death of God’ implies an alarming condition where all significations, evaluations and fixed identities are in danger due to the fact that the metaphysical ground is being shaken¹⁶⁵. Behind this overwhelming event, Nietzsche sees that the drive for truth, which has been the leading force of the metaphysical interpretation of the world, has turned against the God, the True being of the Christian paradigm¹⁶⁶. Although nihilism, like any historical phenomenon, does not change its form throughout the history of metaphysics in a linear manner, Nietzsche sees an inner necessity to the cultivation of truthfulness starting from the Platonic invention of the ‘true world’ to the level that it is found to be fallacious and implausible. More specifically, the epistemological preoccupation of the modern era that has started with Cartesian philosophy and furthered by Kant’s Copernican Turn, the feat through which God is no longer a legitimate object of knowledge, paved the way to the overall diminishment of God in scientific positivism.

Yet, Nietzsche is cautious to say that with the collapse of the theocentric ground and its values, nihilism would simply complete and consummate itself, that is, the ‘two-world theory’ and its life-denying values would abate. On the contrary, he writes, under the heading of ‘[n]ew struggles’, “God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown. –And we– we still have to vanquish his shadow, too.”¹⁶⁷ That is

¹⁶⁴ *GS*, no. 125.

¹⁶⁵ *NM*, p. 11.

¹⁶⁶ *WP*, no. 5.

¹⁶⁷ *GS*, no. 108.

to say, Nietzsche is well-aware of the fact that the nihilistic interpretations and evaluations of the world would not diminish simply when one of the representations of the Ideal is collapsed, on the contrary, in spite of the greatness of the loss, the descending life is still unable to produce life-affirming values out of itself. Rather other terms (shadows of God) are likely to substitute the place of the Christian God and, thus, will lead up to new oppositions and nihilistic evaluations. This is why the madman, who announces the ‘death of God’ to the crowd, addresses himself precisely to the atheists¹⁶⁸, who are not yet shaken by the ultimate pessimism of the complete nihilism thanks to a series of ideals and values that still refers to something superior to life –mere opposition (atheism) to a certain metaphysical position (monotheism) merely reproduces the essential structure of metaphysics, namely the logic of binary oppositions. Then, rather than bringing with it the end of metaphysics and the immanent affirmation of existence, the self-diminishment of the theocentric worldview and its valorisations have led to the rise of the anthropocentric paradigm and its valorisations, which have started to predominate with the Enlightenment and been furthered by the emergence of subjectivity and its concomitant secular values in the modern period. The human being insofar as it is the subject who has the privilege to attain truth thanks to its consciousness and reason, and insofar as it is totally detached from its physicality, has become the representative of the Ideal in the name of which life is subjugated. Thus, the belief in the subject constitutes one of the targets of ‘new struggles’ for Nietzsche. In the following section, I will present how Nietzsche’s thinking of the will to power opens up a new way to understand reality and shapes his critique of subjectivity.

¹⁶⁸ *GS*, no. 125.

3.2. The Thought of the Will to Power

The will to power is the central notion of Nietzsche's non-metaphysical ontology and the essential element of his post-Kantian critical method, namely genealogy. Within the boundaries of metaphysical thought, it is difficult to make sense of a thinking of being, which does not proceed from concepts such as origin, ground, unity and the unconditional. In this context, Alphonso Lingis describes the will to power as "an abyss (*Abgrund*), the groundless chaos beneath all the grounds, all the foundations, and it leaves the whole order of essences groundless"¹⁶⁹. The will to power is the productive abyss of all phenomena, including bodies, ideals, thinking, meaning and value, which do not inhabit in another world (the conditioned) but is immanent to the same abyss that characterises the will to power. Then the will to power is the thought of difference and relationality as such, since it does not signify an ultimate ground of all there is but points out the absence and the profound impossibility of any self-identical ground.

In contrast to the oppositional model of metaphysics, Nietzsche's thought starts from the standpoint of a radically immanent whole:

This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size...a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms...this, my Dionysian world of the eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying... –do you want a name for this world? A solution for all its riddles? A light for you, too, you best-concealed, strongest, most intrepid, most midnightly men?– This world is the will to power—and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power—and nothing besides!¹⁷⁰

For him, becoming is not anchored in a particular point of origin; instead, it is an eternal, ongoing, impersonal happening which constantly produces new forms without a beginning and an end; without an agency behind or a *telos* governing

¹⁶⁹ *TWP*, p. 38.

¹⁷⁰ *WP*, no. 1067.

it. Whereas the world is characterised by the eternal process of becoming, it is finite in terms of its territory, there is nothing transcendent to this world: all values, ideas and senses are immanent to this unceasing process of self-differentiation. Nietzsche names this monistic and immanent realm of becoming the ‘physiological’, alluding to the ancient Greek word *phusis*. His understanding of the physiological overcomes the duality between two allegedly rival world-explanations, namely materialism and idealism, and encapsulates all aspects of existence, including bodies, thoughts, ideals, political, moral and social structures etc., without reducing one to the other.

Nietzsche names the agonistic element of becoming the will to power, i.e., the will to dominate existence, that is, the motor of the eternal self-creating and self-destroying play of unconscious forces. Through his ontology of the will to power, which issues from the conviction regarding the priority of the impersonal and uninterrupted self-happening, Nietzsche trivialises the belief that the *ego*, the self-conscious subject, is the origin of events and its so-called inner processes. As Deleuze emphasises, the common understanding of the will to power as ‘wanting more power’ is only a metaphysical misrepresentation and reduction of the locution¹⁷¹. Neither the first term of the locution signifies a unitary will that is understood as a capacity or faculty that the subject voluntarily puts into effect in the world or Schopenhauer’s relentless universal desire¹⁷² nor does the second term refer to socio-political or physical (in the reductive sense) power to dominate others. Rather than signifying a being who seeks for more power, the thought of the will to power represents the immanent logic of the agonistic dynamics of forces and whole existence. The will is a sensation of

¹⁷¹ *NP*, p. x.

¹⁷² It is precisely in this sense that Nietzsche proclaims “There is no will: there are treaty drafts of will [*Willens-Punktationen*] that are constantly increasing or losing their power” (*WP*, no. 715). It is only due to the linguistic conventions that philosophers assign unity to the will, which, in fact, comprises of a number of complicated processes (*BGE*, no. 19.).

power which cannot be distinguished from its manifestation; strictly speaking, it is a feeling of power, which primarily manifests itself in enhancement and growth. It is only in this sense that the will to power is the will to dominate existence, to expand the territory in which it prevails. This brings us to the crucial characterisation of the will to power as *pathos*¹⁷³ and in order to articulate what it means, I shall briefly explain how it is embedded to the forces of life.

The will to power is the differential element that orients the specific incorporation and relation of forces, i.e., unconscious orientations of the physiological, in each moment of their becoming. Thus, what is to be formed, in Nietzsche's physiological thinking, is not the matter (understood as a formless heap by the tradition) but forces, which are not conceived as substances having causality in the world but which are defined by what they can do. In their becoming, forces take different qualities (active and reactive) by the auto-affectation of the will to power¹⁷⁴. The will to power affects and puts them in relation so that they could gain different qualities. But this does not mean that the will to power has a temporal priority to the relationality of forces. Rather the will to power is precisely this agonistic relationality. This amounts to say, there can be no will preceding a certain coalition of forces¹⁷⁵. In their agonistic play, each force seeks to incorporate the other and, in consonance with their different feelings of power, which has always already been determined within their eternal struggle, one of them plays the part of the resistance that the former seeks to subdue. Whereas the resisting force is driven by the will to escape the struggle and narrow down its territory in order to preserve itself, the active force is

¹⁷³ *WP*, no. 635.

¹⁷⁴ *TWP*, p. 41.

¹⁷⁵ *NP*, p. 37.

oriented towards growth and, in its action, immediately affirms the *agon* that is the ultimate principle of its becoming. In a healthy physiology, active forces give form to and rule over reactive forces by constantly acting upon them. On the other hand, the descending periods of life are marked by the internalisation of active forces (inward manifestation of their power) due to the reactive forces' failing to re-act or not responding to the active forces when the latter act upon the former¹⁷⁶. In this context, unconscious forces are, as Marsden depicts, "immanent perspectives on life, its internal differentiations"¹⁷⁷ that are variably qualified on a scale of two perspectives, namely the perspective of self-preservation (the slavish perspective) and that of expenditure (the master's perspective). Although these perspectives cannot exist without each other (reaction without action would be absurd as well as it is impossible for an active force to manifest itself without a resistance limiting it) there is a certain primacy of active forces, for Nietzsche, since they are seen as the form-giving and creative forces of life. In manifesting its power and expending itself, an active force differs from itself as it changes the phenomenon which it dominates. In this regard, life, defined as the uninterrupted struggle of forces, has primarily an ecstatic character together with all its forms even though some life forms deny this indispensable characteristic.

In order to qualify the becoming of forces, the will to power must have its own qualities. Deleuze suggests that the qualities of the will to power (affirmative and negative) are immediate and primordial qualities of becoming and signifies ascending or descending tendencies of life¹⁷⁸. Two qualities of the will to power

¹⁷⁶ *NP*, pp 104f. This is precisely how *ressentiment* (as a no longer re-acting to action) that is developed among the weak type became triumphant under the disguise of morality in history (see 3.4).

¹⁷⁷ Jill Marsden, *After Nietzsche: Notes towards a Philosophy of Ecstasy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002; hereafter *AN*, p. 27.

¹⁷⁸ *NP*, p. 49.

are two different responses of the will “to its own internal imperative: *to be more*”¹⁷⁹. An affirmative will is the one that affirms and surmounts itself in its manifestation as a differing-from-itself; it is the will which celebrates the entirety of existence without denying the most terrible aspects of it (e.g. the artistic will in the Greek tragedy and the will to illusion). In contrast, the will to negate, the nihilistic will, is at work in the *décadence* of life as the drive to deny difference, change, action, and life itself (e.g. the will to knowledge and morality). Although it negates and dissimulates itself as the will to nothing, it is still a will: the belief in a neutral subject, disinterested and universal knowledge claims and ascetism in general are still manifestations of a will which, due to its lack of strength, cannot affirm itself as a will and is disguised as un-will¹⁸⁰.

Furthermore, active and reactive forces do not manifest themselves as they are but only through the phenomenon that they appropriate. The incorporation of a force by another, rather than signifying a terminal point of the struggle between forces, points out to the synthetic nature of the phenomenon that is produced and reproduced at each moment of the ongoing struggle of forces as their intrinsic affectivity changes or channelized into other directions. Whether it is a body, an event, a person or a concept, a phenomenon is the site of their play; it is a point of intersection, appropriation and intensification of forces that are at work in a certain moment of their becoming¹⁸¹. In turn, as a densification of power –for Nietzsche, there are no self-identical entities but only momentary constellation of forces and punctuations of power–, a phenomenon also becomes a force among others; acts and reacts as a multiplicity of wills. In this account, the

¹⁷⁹ *NM*, p. 8.

¹⁸⁰ Since a discussion of the inner dynamics of the transition between two qualities of the will to power (thus, from the Dionysian to the nihilistic through the slave revolt and then the future self-obliteration of nihilism as Nietzsche envisages to happen) would overreach the limits of this study, I had to confine myself to mere descriptions of them.

¹⁸¹ *NP*, p. 3.

human being itself is a transitory phenomenon that is appropriated by unconscious forces and multiplicity of wills, thus it is not more privileged than other beings are in contrast to the claims of metaphysicians.

At this point, we may discern some consequences of the thought of the will to power for the critique of modern subjectivity. In Descartes's thinking, the subject has been conceived as the self-coinciding substantial unity, out of which a multiplicity of representations and thoughts is generated. However, the thought of the will to power invalidates the possibility of any self-coincidence, self-subsistence, self-identity and self-presence, not the least, a point of origin for any multiplicity by emphasising the priority of difference. Like Kant, also Nietzsche finds Descartes' inference of the existence and substantiality of the subject paralogistic but he goes a step further than Kant by pointing out unjustified assumptions regarding the nature of thinking (see 4.2). Nevertheless, Nietzsche's relationship to Kant's transcendental thinking is rather complicated. His ontology of the will to power and forces constitutes a post-Kantian understanding of reality but one that is freed from subjectivity and epistemological concerns. To clarify, we might claim that both of them rejects the idea that reality is given as it is and agree on that it is constructed either through the synthesis of the representations produced by certain faculties (Kant) or through the incorporation of unconscious forces (Nietzsche). Yet, Nietzsche's thought of the will to power goes a step further by showing the impossibility of any anthropological origin (or a subject-centre), even a merely formal one such as the representation 'I think'¹⁸². Thought, for Nietzsche, is a part of the ongoing impersonal happening that is orientated by the will to power. That is to say, any attribution of unity or substantiality behind ceaseless becoming, in which everything differs from itself eternally, would be illegitimate. Moreover, the role

¹⁸² Andrea Rehberg, "Nietzsche Beyond Kant: From Critique to Physiological Thinking", *New Nietzsche Studies: The Journal of the Nietzsche Society*, vol. 9, Numbers 1 & 2, Fall 2014, 121-33; hereafter *NBK*, p. 122.

of the forces, which appropriate the phenomenon through the will to power as their synthetic element, is not limited to representation as it could be said for Kant's faculties but they have productive and reproductive role in an ontological sense. In addition, Nietzsche, by ruling out the opposition between the condition and the conditioned and emphasising that every phenomenon is at the same time a force (or a multiplicity of forces) among others, allows the proliferation of forces that constitute the phenomenon. In the following section, I will elaborate the post-Kantian kernels of Nietzsche's thought in the context of his critical method, genealogy.

It is important also to note that rather than claiming to depict reality as it is in itself, Nietzsche's ontology of the will to power and forces artistically dramatizes the ceaseless impersonal happening by tracking the constant change of senses and values which historically and physiologically makes up the phenomenon for the phenomenon is essentially a product of interpretation. In this sense, the will to power is a metaphorical device for interpreting the world and what differentiates it from the metaphysical mode of interpretations is not only the fact that it avails us to think difference immanently and non-anthropomorphically but also that it carries out an affirmative attitude ('positive spirit') with regard to its own illusionary and artistic character. In this context, Nietzsche criticises the manner in which phenomena are grasped as given facts not because their reception depends on the subjective modes of perception but because they are products of interpretation¹⁸³. He drastically rejects the idea that the subject is the one who interprets phenomena since the subject as the agency of interpretation is itself an interpretation that is posited in order to make sense of the phenomenon of interpretation¹⁸⁴. On the contrary, behind every interpretation of phenomena, Nietzsche discovers a will to dominate existence

¹⁸³ *WP*, no. 481.

¹⁸⁴ *WP*, no. 481.

either from a perspective of self-preservation which simplifies and solidifies in order to inhabit the world of constantly shifting appearances or from an artistic perspective which augments and mobilises senses. Accordingly, interpretation is not a matter of an anthropocentric relativism, which would still assume a human subject as the origin, but that of perspectivism, which points to a certain physiological condition within life (ascending or descending life which encounters a resistance to overcome) that is oriented by an affirmative or negative will¹⁸⁵. Moreover, interpretation is the process of assessment of the forces that appropriate the phenomenon and, since, in every appropriation, there are a variety of active and reactive forces in different degrees and qualities, there must also be that variety of possible interpretations. Therefore, we may claim that interpretation is a matter of affinity between the forces that appropriate the phenomenon and the will to power that interprets it. Then, philosophical thinking, being essentially a matter of interpretation (hermeneutics), does not originate in the consciousness of an authentic genius but is also immanent in the *phusis* (as both life in general and the life of the thinker in particular) out of which it differentiates itself as *logos*¹⁸⁶.

In this view, considered as the metaphysical habit of projecting a neutral and universal agency behind every doing, subjectivism is just another manner of interpreting the world, which signifies a weakening form of life that is at the disposal of a negative will which orients forces from the perspective of survival. As I shall elaborate in the following section, it yields a weakness and reactivity that cannot endure the thought of self-happening, pure relationality and difference. The subject is a nihilistic interpretation also because, rather than actively allowing a diversity of senses to overflow, the will behind positing the subject interprets the world, once and for all, without recognising its own

¹⁸⁵ WP, no.s 254, 258, 259.

¹⁸⁶ For the discussion of life-thought or *phusis-logos* relationship see 4.3.

contingency and historicity. Nietzsche emphasises that the subject has been “the best article of faith on earth”¹⁸⁷ although it has come to the fore in a well-formulated manner only in the modern era with Descartes. The persistence of the subjectivist interpretation brings out the question of the value of the belief in the subject: for what type of life is it invaluable to hypostasise an agency behind all happening? This question, as a question of value, regards genealogy, Nietzsche’s critical method of investigating the origin and the value of our valorisations. After discussing some crucial characteristics of genealogy in the following section, I will proceed to elaborate a reading of the first two treatises of the *On the Genealogy of Morality* from the framework of the value and internalisation of subjectivity.

3.3. Genealogy as the Transcendental Philosophy of Values

In the Preface of the *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche presents the key concern of his work as the search for the origin and value of our moral evaluations and introduces genealogy as the critical method for this inquiry¹⁸⁸. Showing the descent of moral values, genealogy enables us both to see that values are neither principles given ahistorically nor facts proceeding from so-called natural dispositions of the human being but that they are produced (and reproduced) as consequences of certain physiological conditions, and also to evaluate them from the perspective of life (whether they enhance or inhibit human development)¹⁸⁹. In this sense, genealogy is an historical method yet one that does not presuppose a linear development of events in any teleological or mechanistic sense. Rather, as Foucault emphasises, genealogy attends to sentiments, desires, traits, institutions and values (very phenomena that are

¹⁸⁷ GM I:13.

¹⁸⁸ GM, Preface:3.

¹⁸⁹ GM, Preface:3.

excluded from the narrative of history) in their singularity and as intertwined with others in different historical moments in a way that they gain different values and senses, without assuming any self-contained origin or “monotonous finality”¹⁹⁰. Therefore, Nietzsche’s conception of the ‘genealogical origin’ (in the sense of *Herkunft*—translated as ‘descent’ and distinguished, by Foucault, from *Ursprung*¹⁹¹) is exorbitantly different from the metaphysical conception of origin, i.e., the self-same essence or ground of what is manifested. The descent that the genealogy searches for is the shift of perspectives from which a phenomenon is interpreted and reinterpreted, valorised, revalorised and devalued in the history which is, in turn, understood in terms of ruptures, explosions, silences, and atavisms of certain traits.

What makes genealogy a critical enterprise is the fact that it does not content itself with the exploration of the origin of values but it only does so in order to assess their value for the enrichment of life. Deleuze suggests that although philosophy had first become a critical enterprise with Kant, Nietzsche’s philosophy of value realises the true critique by asking the value of values, e.g. truth, good etc., rather than taking them as unquestionable principles to conform¹⁹². There are number of ways in which Nietzsche radicalises the Kantian notion of critique in his genealogy. First of all, Kant was the first one to suggest that the critique should be immanent, that is, reason must be both the judge and the judged in determining the scope of its own legitimacy. However, as Deleuze points out, the transcendental conditions that Kant has found are “principles of conditioning and not of internal genesis”¹⁹³, and, for this reason,

¹⁹⁰ Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader*. London: Penguin, 1991; hereafter *NGH*, p. 76.

¹⁹¹ *NGH*, p. 77ff.

¹⁹² *NP*, p. 1f.

¹⁹³ *NP*, p. 85.

the conditioned constitutes an irreducible externality to reason. In other words, what the principles of reason condition are not generated by them rather they condition the modes of intelligibility of what is conditioned. If we adopt Nietzsche's view that there is nothing above or beyond the ongoing physiological happening out of which reason itself historically emerges and evolves, then it is clear that Kant's transcendental philosophy fails to accomplish the truly immanent critique.

On the other hand, as I have pointed out, although the will to power could be seen, in a way, as a transcendental condition that is generative of phenomena, the investigation of the qualities of the will to power and the forces that are oriented by it does not mean to step back to an atemporal and unchangeable ground but to open up a perspective which is still immanent in life and from which a phenomenon presents itself problematic. In Nietzsche's texts, we encounter a continuous shift of perspectives (the perspective of the slave, the noble, the weak, the strong, the philosopher, science, or even that of the *cosmos*¹⁹⁴) from which a certain phenomenon is interpreted and evaluated differently. Operating perspectivism in this way, Nietzsche demystifies the notion of self-identical essences and absolute values, and signifies the historicity and contingency of them in the immanence of life. To elaborate, in order to show the descent and value of a phenomenon, genealogy becomes symptomology and typology. As symptomology, it takes the phenomenon as a symptom, reflecting the state of forces and the quality of the will to power that orients them¹⁹⁵. Then as typology, it distinguishes the forces that appropriate the

¹⁹⁴ For example, in the first paragraphs of "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense", we see how Nietzsche compares the value of reason from perspectives of human life and of the *cosmos*, and, by this way, he shows that the value attained to human reason is not absolute and self-evident but transient and necessary only for a certain form of life (descending life) that is oriented by the perspective of self-preservation.

¹⁹⁵ *NP*, p. ix.

phenomenon and shows them in their struggle in a dramatized manner¹⁹⁶. Furthermore, what evaluates a phenomenon by orienting the struggle of forces from within is the will to power and, for that reason, it is, *inter alia*, the proper genetic, genealogical and critical element that is intrinsic to what is subjected to the critique. Therefore, we might agree with Deleuze on the claim that Nietzsche realises the truly immanent critique by attending to the intrinsic element of evaluation and interpretation. In this sense, the thought of the will to power presents itself as an inquiry into the conditions that make a certain interpretation and evaluation necessary and predominant. Yet these genetic conditions are not seen in a complete separation with the conditioned but always in relation to each other in a monistic physiological realm. In this sense, the principle of the will to power provides Nietzsche with a suitable method to immanentize the critique.

Another way in which genealogy radicalises Kantian critique consists in Nietzsche's consideration of reason and truth. Kant wanted to make reason the ultimate authority in attaining to the truth, and critique was the means to establish the legitimacy of reason as the only legislator against dogmatic claims. In Kant's critique, reason was both the judge and the judged. But, from Nietzsche's perspective, such a critique is destined to fail since it perpetuates the anthropocentric and metaphysical overvaluation of reason and truth (and subjectivity as the true site of truth) without recognising their actual value for life and human development. For Nietzsche, reason is nothing short of a tool or an organ that works mainly for the self-preservation of the human being through

¹⁹⁶ In *On the Genealogy of Morality*, we come across a number of pairs such as the weak/strong, slave/master, and base/noble. Instead of portraying physical characteristics or socio-political belongings of real individuals, these are Nietzsche's heuristic devices to talk about different perspectives and orientations of life. Regarding Nietzsche's typology, it is also noteworthy to emphasise that two 'opposing' types always signify two extreme points in a continuum of perspectives, which can hardly present themselves in a phenomenon purely, without quantities, since the domination of absolute perspectives (of expenditure and self-preservation) could not sustain without immediately annihilating themselves and the phenomenon that they appropriate.

simplifying and subsuming difference into self-identical categories (see 4.1.)¹⁹⁷. In this sense, reason, rather than revealing the truth of things and being the legislator of values, perpetually constructs a reality, not in a disinterested manner, but for the purposes of life and conforms to a framework of evaluations within which it is valorised. Thus, as a tool for survival, reason cannot decide its own legitimacy nor can it occupy the place of the legislator.

Nietzsche's conception of value and evaluation underlies his accounts of reason and truth. According to him, values are neither principles prescribed eternally and universally nor creations of autochthonous subjects. Instead, they presuppose the evaluation of the will to power whereas all evaluations are made from certain perspectives within life¹⁹⁸. In contrast to theocentric or anthropocentric understanding of values, Marsden likens them to viruses (adumbrating the idea that values are immanent to the physiological) since, in Nietzsche's understanding, being the products of the diverse relations between poor or abundant physiologies and their environments, they incorporate themselves into bodies and become self-replicative¹⁹⁹. In turn, they become decisive factors for life by orienting it through impoverishing or enriching its multiplicity. In this conjuncture, the anthropocentric and rationalistic understanding of value, which assumes that the human being, thanks to its consciousness and reason, is the self-coinciding origin of values, is overcome in Nietzsche's conception: "physiology of the human animal is an achieved and

¹⁹⁷ "In the formation of reason, logic, the categories, it was need that was authoritative: the need, not to 'know', but to subsume, to schematize, for the purpose of intelligibility and calculation—(The development of reason is adjustment, invention, with the aim of making similar, equal—the same process that every sense impression goes through!) ... No pre-existing 'idea' was here at work, but the utilitarian fact that only when we see things coarsely and made equal do they become calculable and usable to us... The categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they are conditions of life for us..." (*WP*, no. 515)

¹⁹⁸ *TI*, "Morality as Anti-Nature", 5.

¹⁹⁹ *AN*, pp. 25ff.

reinforced product of its own...values”²⁰⁰. Rather than conforming to pre-established values as Kant has done with regard to truth, rationality and the good, genealogy liberates the critique from prejudices by assessing the value of values for life and human development through pursuing the quality of will to power (the negative or affirmative *pathos*) underlying them. Yet, doing this, genealogy does not wage war against present values²⁰¹. It recognises their historical and physiological necessity and contributes to develop a positive sensibility²⁰² which is needed for the articulation of more affirmative and life-enriching values by laying bare the contingency of present values and interpretations. In the following section, I shall try to show how Nietzsche operates genealogy in order to discover the origin and to assess the value of subjectivity.

3.4. *On the Genealogy of Morality: The Origin, Development and the Value of Subjectivity*

In this section, I will present first two of the three treatises of the *Genealogy* insofar as they shed light on different moments of the development of the interpretation of subjectivity, and of the differentiation of the human being from the animal. Although these moments with their corresponding themes, i.e., *ressentiment*, bad conscience and the ascetic ideal, are discussed as separate moments, they cannot be totally distinguished from each other as if they corresponded to historically disassociated or consecutive moments. On the contrary, all these moments belong to each other and represent, from different angles, the one and the same development. For instance, Nietzsche introduces the phenomenon of the overdevelopment of memory, which is the necessary

²⁰⁰ *AN*, p. 28.

²⁰¹ *WP*, no. 435.

²⁰² *NP*, p. 88.

condition for the interiorisation of the subject-interpretation by the strong, only in the second treatise, the first treatise already presupposes it as the necessary condition for the weak to develop *ressentiment* both as the condition that turns the weak into the slave and as the motivation behind the positing of a neutral subject. Another point to stress is the reason for devoting a separate section for a seemingly moral theme (the development of the moral subject and moral categories) whereas the main concern of this study is the subject-thought relationship or, in other words, the theoretical subject. For Nietzsche, the humanisation of the human animal and its internalization of the subjective interpretation have been entwined with its moralisation and the historical development of moral categories. It is true that Descartes is the first one in whose philosophy the subject initially appears and explicitly theorised with regard to its thinking activity, nonetheless, for Nietzsche, the interpretation of the human being as a subject with regard to its actions has been already available and implicitly presupposed in moral evaluations of the world, particularly in Christian morality. Therefore, if we are interested in Nietzsche's consideration of the value and thus the origin of the subject-interpretation, we have to take the development of moral values and themes into account.

The First Treatise: Ressentiment, Responsibility and the Origin of the Idea of a Neutral Subject

In the first treatise of *On the Genealogy of Morality*, Nietzsche shows that the fiction of a neutral subject (conceived as the *substratum* underlying action) has a crucial role for the 'slave revolt' in morality. Although an exhaustive discussion of the triumph of slavish values would exceed the limits of this study, I will try to sketch it out in order to show the value and impact of subjectivity. According to Nietzsche, as has been discussed in previous sections, active forces are the form-giving and creative forces. They have the same function in the creation of values because active forces, in a healthy condition, valorise themselves (and the

phenomenon that they appropriate) through the spontaneous affirmation of their action. In addition, since they cannot be separated from the manifestation of their power, the affirmation of their action is at the same time a self-affirmation. In the first treatise, active forces are dramatized as the noble whose self-affirmation has first given rise to the value judgment ‘good’. Although Nietzsche identifies the noble with characteristics of strength, health, beauty, happiness and wealth, these only denote some of the physiological conditions that are conducive for developing the ‘*pathos of distance*’ that is the very condition of possibility for generating values²⁰³.

The ‘*pathos of distance*’ is, to my reading, has two crucial aspects. First of all, because value-production is seen, by Nietzsche (as I will discuss below with regard to the noble evaluation ‘good’ and ‘bad’), as a consequence of the noble’s affirmation of its own action and, moreover, because all action is unavoidably a differing-from-oneself, the value-productive element, the ‘*pathos of distance*’, must at the same time denote an affirmative recognition of one’s differing from oneself. Secondly, it points out to the fundamental fact that action always requires a feeling of distinction of the self from what is acted upon; it is only possible in the grounds that a force is able to perceive what it can subdue²⁰⁴. Therefore, in the former sense, values are created through the affirmation of one’s difference from oneself, the impossibility of self-coincidence; in the latter sense, it regards the affirmation of the order of rank, of one’s superiority over others. In both senses, the ‘*pathos of distance*’ implies the love of difference as the necessary condition for generating values. Accordingly, for Nietzsche, the

²⁰³ *GM I:2*. Here, it should be reminded that the will to power is characterised, by Nietzsche, as the *pathos* that is intrinsically leads to the incessant self-differentiation of the *phusis* by mobilising the forces from a distance. Therefore, the ‘*pathos of distance*’ of the noble can be read as denoting a certain affinity with the affirmative will that seeks to expend itself in action.

²⁰⁴ “In order for the will to power to be able to manifest itself it needs to perceive the things it sees and feel the approach of what is assimilable to it” (cited in *NP*, p. 58.).

original mode of evaluation is brought about by the spontaneous self-affirmation of the noble (its yes-saying to itself as its originary speech act) in its every action hence the values of the noble are not absolute and unchangeable but mobile and fluid²⁰⁵. A further point considering the noble's value judgments is that they are purely descriptive in the sense that they do not necessitate mediations of symbols and concepts, they are rather straightforward²⁰⁶. The primary term of noble mode of evaluation is 'good' that is no more than saying 'I like it' or 'it gave me pleasure' whereas 'bad' comes only lately as a by-product of affirmation, without contemplating upon what is despised²⁰⁷.

Nietzsche contrasts this affirmative mode, which, at the same time, refers to the affirmation of the natural processes without interrupting them with moral categories, with the negative mode of the slave that develops as the feeling of *ressentiment* towards the strong and that leads to the violent interruption of natural processes by moral categories. In *GM* I:13, he dramatizes the weak and the strong in the image of the lambs and the birds of prey. Lambs feel anger towards the birds of prey which manifest their power upon the lambs by hunting them. For Nietzsche, there is nothing inconceivable in their fear and anger but what seems strange and complicated is lambs' *ressentiment*, i.e., their negation to re-act, to be unable to have done with and get over their negative affects²⁰⁸,

²⁰⁵ *GM* I:10.

²⁰⁶ *GM* I:6.

²⁰⁷ Nobles are also characterised by their folly; the spontaneity of their action. They do not plan or think ahead before they act. Cleverness, as a type of instrumental reason, is not a necessary condition for their existence but it becomes so for a slavish existence which suffers from the lack of the strength to act upon its negative impressions and affects, thus ponders upon both the weaknesses of its enemy and the roundabout ways through which it can be overreached (*GM* I:10). Then, it can be said that the overvaluation of reason (together with the underestimation of action) is also connected with the inversion of the noble mode of evaluation.

²⁰⁸ Here, as I claimed earlier in the introduction of this section, the role of memory is already presupposed. As Acampora points out, *ressentiment* is by no means identical to revenge: "Nietzsche calls our inability to be done with experience *ressentiment*, which differs from revenge against others in response to specific acts. Ressentiment is a revolt against the temporal-historical

and its mechanisms of inversion. As a negative mode, the slavish perspective²⁰⁹ starts with the negation of the strong (attribution of evil), and only after this negation can it affirm its own weakness. This evaluation is, for Nietzsche, the first instance of moralisation since it entails the moral concept of responsibility of one's acts and this, in turn, requires the separation of strength from its manifestation. From the standpoint of the will to power and life, however, the strong cannot be separated from the manifestation of its strength, just as the lightning is inseparable from the flash, that is, there is nothing to blame if the birds of prey eat the lamb²¹⁰. Nonetheless, the lambs' will to self-preservation, in their inability to affirm themselves immediately, becomes the will to avenge by holding the birds of prey responsible for their necessary manifestation of strength. As a means for their 'spiritual revenge', according to Nietzsche, a neutral and free subject, who is responsible for its deeds, is imposed upon a sheer happening. That is to say, for the negation of the strong, the slave requires a mystification which comprises the insertion of a doer behind the simple, impersonal, and involuntary self-happening and this insertion is the first step towards positing a neutral subject. It is only in this way that they can affirm themselves in their weakness as if they had chosen to be weak, this is why the

character of human existence as such, the revenge against time and all 'it was'" (CN, p. 137). That is to say, *ressentiment* does not grow out of a spontaneous reactivity to an action but of a suspension of reaction and an inability to get rid of one's negative feelings. Thus, it is conditioned by, or, at least, concurrent with the overdevelopment of memory.

²⁰⁹ What turns the weak –a term that would refer to nothing more than a physiological misfortune–into the slave is precisely this negative *pathos*, namely *ressentiment*, which prevents the weak from affirming itself immediately by reacting to action (letting the active power of forgetfulness to act upon its negative affects) but which leads it to negate any otherness by fabricating fictions such as a force separated from its manifestation (the responsible subject), God and the eternal Sabbath, where the weakness will be rewarded by happiness, in order to take a 'spiritual revenge' from the strong. Nevertheless, as I will discuss with regard to the Third Treatise, the fabrication of these ideals should not be attributed to the slave, the reactive forces of life, but to a special caste, namely the priests (a cast which has bifurcated from the aristocratic-knightly caste), which represents the negative will to power (nihilism) (NP, pp. 52ff, 118, 133ff).

²¹⁰ GM I:13.

fiction of the subject is of indispensable value for the survival of a slavish type²¹¹. Moreover, the *ressentiment* of the slave is also not completely productive in regards to this fiction: it merely exploits the grammatical habit of separation of the subject and the verb for its own triumph²¹².

The Second Treatise: Bad Conscience, Internalisation of the Human Animal and the Problem of the Sovereign Individual

While the first treatise gives an account of how the inversion of the noble evaluation is achieved through the paralogism of the subject, which constitutes the first moment towards the moralisation of the human animal by the attribution of responsibility, the second treatise scrutinises the moment of internalisation (development of guilt and bad conscience, and also the soul in the human animal), through which the ‘slave revolt’ could have triumphed in a decisive manner. Without the second moment, the inversion of noble evaluation would not be able to change the existing state of affairs (the predomination of the noble) but could only explain how the noble is seen from a slavish perspective.

Nietzsche begins the second treatise by introducing the problematical phenomenon of ethics and morality, namely promising and promise-keeping: “[t]o breed an animal that *is permitted to promise*—isn’t this the paradoxical task nature has set for itself with regard to man? Isn’t this the true problem of man?...”²¹³. First of all, from this sentence, we understand that the human being, before this entire process of breeding the capacity for promising²¹⁴, was an

²¹¹ *GM* I:13.

²¹² *GM* I:13. For a further discussion of the relation between language, subjectivity and other metaphysical concepts see 4.2.

²¹³ *GM* II:1.

²¹⁴ Christa Davis Acampora, “On Sovereignty and Overhumanity: Why It Matters How We Read Nietzsche’s *Genealogy* II:2”, in Christa Davis Acampora (ed.), *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006; hereafter *SO*, p. 148.

animal among others. If it is so, the question actually regards how the humanisation of the human animal is achieved; how the beasts of prey became morally responsible and accountable human beings (as I shall discuss in the following, this also means that the fiction of the first treatise has been internalised by the strong through this process). Secondly, breeding an animal with the capacity of promising is put, by Nietzsche, as a paradoxical task and it is said to constitute the true problem of the human being. According to Nietzsche, to promise is, in itself, a paradoxical phenomenon when the nature of becoming is considered: it requires, firstly, that the active faculty of forgetting, which ensures a healthy physiology and happiness for the animal, be overcome by the overdevelopment of memory and, secondly, both the world and the one who promises to become in a sense atemporal, unchangeable and thus predictable and measurable²¹⁵.

In other words, this ‘prehistorical work’ attempts to make the human animal self-identical, calculable, able to suspend the manifestation of its will and not prone to change while, at the same time, it endeavours to suppress time, becoming and, thus, life itself. In addition, all the presuppositions that promising requires, i.e., “to separate the necessary from the accidental occurrence, to think causally, to see and anticipate what is distant as if it were present, to fix with certainty what is end, what is means”²¹⁶, refer to our metaphysical modes of thinking (*substantia et accidents*, causality, spatializing time, etc.). It is in this sense that the overdevelopment of memory, for Nietzsche, also brings about the rationalisation of the human being insofar as the above-mentioned modes of thinking represent rational thinking and fundamental capacities of human reason. Therefore, it seems that Nietzsche considers human reason as a by-product of the same ‘prehistorical’ process that aims to breed a conscientious animal with the

²¹⁵ *GM* II:1.

²¹⁶ *GM* II:1.

capacity of promising²¹⁷. As we will see immediately, Nietzsche describes this ‘prehistorical work’ as a very long and extraordinarily torturous process that transforms the human being into an interesting animal. Therefore, rationality is not a pre-given feature of the human being as modern philosophers consider it. Rather, for Nietzsche, it is historically produced and incorporated into the human body through (or at the end of) an agonistic struggle between forgetfulness and memory. Nietzsche writes ironically: “–Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, this entire gloomy matter called reflection, all these prerogatives and showpieces of man: how dearly they have been paid for! How much blood and horror there is at the base of all ‘good things’!...”²¹⁸. But before accounting for how these things achieved, I will first focus on the goal or the fruit behind this ‘prehistorical process’.

Nietzsche declares that the paradoxical task is ‘fulfilled’ by the prehistoric work of “society and its morality of custom”²¹⁹ and has given its end-product, namely the sovereign individual:

...the individual resembling only himself, free again from the morality of custom, autonomous and supermoral (for ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive), in short, the human being with his own independent long will, the human being who *is permitted to promise*—and in him a proud consciousness, twitching in all his muscles, of what has finally been achieved and become flesh in him, a true consciousness of power and freedom, a feeling of the completion of man himself. This being who has become free, who is really *permitted to promise*, this lord of *free will*, this sovereign...and how this mastery over himself also necessarily brings with it mastery over circumstances, over nature and all lesser-willed and more unreliable creatures?²²⁰

From the outset, we might notice that all these characteristic features of the sovereign individual, namely autochthonousness, uniqueness, autonomy, free

²¹⁷ *GM II:3*.

²¹⁸ *GM II:3*.

²¹⁹ *GM II:2*.

²²⁰ *GM II:2*.

will, liberation from any external authority and mastery over nature and fate, are, at bottom, the ideals of the modernist discourse and radical subjectivism. Given that Nietzsche emphasises *amor fati* for a healthy physiology and joyful celebration of existence in contradistinction to the negativity that is intrinsic in the dreams of mastery over fate, and that he conceives the human being as a phenomenon of becoming that is immanent to pure relationality and the unceasing process of self-differentiation and as a bodily being which is governed by unconscious forces so that it could never become fully present to itself, transformation of the human animal to the sovereign individual does not only seem to be undesirable and nihilistic but also impossible and absurd for Nietzsche²²¹. But still, we might claim that the sovereign individual is produced at least as the dominant interpretation of the human being and as an affect regarding how we understand or desire to understand ourselves and the world.

The dominant instinct of the sovereign individual is said to be its conscience, i.e., the consciousness of its responsibility regarding the promises it made and freedom to keep them²²². The development of conscience in the human animal, however, requires a metamorphosis that is achieved after the long history of the struggle between two active forces, namely forgetfulness and memory, and the triumph of the latter at the expense of the former's decay. For Nietzsche, forgetfulness is "an active faculty of... suppression" that is the condition of possibility not only of the healthy continuation of several functions of the organism (e.g., nourishment of the body necessitates both a good digestion and excretion where a number of agonistic processes underlying such operations do not enter to our consciousness) but also of the maintenance of an healthy psychic order in a way that it enables us to have new experiences and enjoy the present moment by constantly forgetting and acting upon old ones. This is also related to

²²¹ *SO*, pp 151ff.

²²² *GM* II:2.

how Nietzsche understands consciousness as fundamentally a reactive organ, which has evolved in some life forms when their relation to the external world generates a need for self-preservation (see 4.2)²²³. Being a reactive capacity to receive impressions and to communicate them, consciousness needs to be directed and acted upon by the active force of forgetfulness so that unnecessary information and life-endangering impressions could be suppressed whereas a room for the incorporation of new and necessary impressions and experiences could be opened. Only by this way, the organism remains light and cheerful, that is, not overloaded by the burdens of old painful memories and feelings of *ressentiment* and guilt.

But, in order to develop a capacity for promising, this positive faculty should be outstripped by the counter-faculty of remembering, which is also active in the sense that it is “an active no-longer-wanting-to-get-rid-of”²²⁴. Although, at the first sight, the memory that is required for promising seems to be a memory of the will that is oriented towards future²²⁵, it necessarily brings about with itself the imprisonment of the human will in the past (what is willed in the past cannot be undone), thus the impossibility of its discharge. The preclusion of the will from its discharge by taking away the resistance (the object of the will is now the ‘it was’) upon which the active force acts, the latter is really separated from its

²²³ *WP*, no. 524.

²²⁴ *GM* II:1.

²²⁵ Both Deleuze and Lingis interpret the sovereign individual as an active human being due to the futural orientation of its will and its feeling of power over itself, nature and fate (NP, pp.130f, 135f; TWP, pp.55ff). However, I claim, with Loeb, that the memory of the will is the memory of a burden, the burden of the past that cannot be undone, thus the conscience of the sovereign individual is the highest articulation of bad conscience (Paul S. Loeb, “Finding the *Übermensch* in Nietzsche’s *Genealogy of Morality*”, in Christa Davis Acampora (ed.), *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006; hereafter *FU*, p. 164f) Therefore, rather than symbolising an active type, the sovereign individual is really “the ripest fruit of bad conscience” (*FU*, p. 165) and thus the sickest animal in the earth.

manifestation²²⁶. But this does not mean the cancellation of willing, instead, in this occasion, the will of the active force turns back upon itself: its violence is directed towards within and it starts to suffer from its own violence. This turning back, like a whirlpool, in turn, gradually constructs an interiority (the soul) that provokes suffering and guilt within the active force and transforms it into a reactive one, which can no longer react.

It is precisely this mechanism which underlies the long history of how the beast of prey finally come to understand themselves as the sovereign individual. In the second treatise, the development of memory is traced back to the work of the *mnemo-techniques* of society and civilization²²⁷. First of all, by means of its *mnemo-techniques*, society has reinforced the memory of debt in the view of organising the economic and material relations among its subjects (the relation of the debtor-creditor within the society and also the consciousness of debt towards the ancestors)²²⁸. But, on this level, as Nietzsche emphasises, the pain inflicted on the body of the debtor, who had failed to keep his/her promises, was, in a sense, a way of externalising the creditor's anger and compensating his/her loss through the joy taken from cruelty and of reconstituting the innocence of the debtor rather than producing a consciousness of an irredeemable guilt²²⁹. Moreover, the debt that is owed to ancestors and gods could be paid back by material sacrifices. Nietzsche also draws attention to the fact that the debtor was not seen yet as a free agent of his/her deeds on this level²³⁰. There are two steps to the internalisation of the human animal that have their kernels in this

²²⁶ *NP*, p. 119.

²²⁷ *GM* II:3.

²²⁸ *GM* II:4, 8, 19.

²²⁹ *GM* II:11, 14.

²³⁰ *GM* II:10.

materialistic economy. The first step is achieved when the society is overpowered, develops priestly values and ceases to implement penal procedures as violent as before. As a conclusion, animal instincts of the human cannot be externally discharged²³¹. Imprisoned in the peaceful settlement, the tamed human being begins to develop ‘bad conscience’ to inflict pain and torture to its animal self. The second step constitutes the actual moralisation of the concepts of responsibility and guilt when the creditor, who was the ancestor of the community earlier, is transformed into the monotheistic God. With the Christian God, who had sacrificed his own son for the sins of the human, the past and the animality belongs to the past become terrible burdens over the human being²³². Because no bodily pain or punishment can redeem his/her debt (God has already taken the punishment on himself, too), the pain of the human being cannot be externalised and consummated, thus turns back upon itself and creates an ever deeper interiority, namely the soul, out of the consciousness of guilt²³³. For Nietzsche, ‘bad conscience’ is what makes the human animal the sickest of all beings in the earth²³⁴.

If the development of memory in the human animal brings with it bad conscience, then the end-product of the process of its cultivation, the sovereign individual, must also represent the highest and the modern form of *décadence* for Nietzsche. Its conscience is bad conscience that suffocates it from within; its

²³¹ *FU*, p. 164.

²³² This is also related to the linear understanding of time, which is introduced by Christianity and which precludes any intervention to the past. Loeb compares this understanding, which necessarily carries out a negativity towards past, to Zarathustra’s experience of the eternal return that opens up the possibility of actively and positively dealing with the past. As Loeb underlines, such an affirmative experience of time becomes possible by the recovery of animal forgetfulness (yet recovery does not mean to turn back to an earlier state of affairs) in Zarathustra, who announces the incidence of the ‘overhuman’ (*FU*, pp. 169f).

²³³ *GM* II:21f.

²³⁴ *GM* II:16, 22.

so-called free will and autonomy hides the extreme internalisation of the morality of custom (the placement of the external authority within); its fascination with its own power over nature and fate resembles the hubristic tragic hero which makes him/her so blind to realise his/her own place in the *cosmos*. Moreover, its interiority, its soul, does not amount to the same thing that is conceptualised as the subject (the self-conscious origin of representations and acts), rather it is comprised of a totality of memory traces and their accompanying negative affects such as *ressentiment* and bad conscience. Moreover, as the regulating ideal of the process of the humanization, it has succeeded the domestication of the beasts of prey to the level of the modern human, who represents the extreme form of alienation from and cruelty towards our animal past and bodily being²³⁵. In this sense, Acampora notes that “the sovereign individual is the pinnacle of the current state of existence of *humankind*”²³⁶, and thus the notion of overcoming in Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘overhuman’ refers precisely to the overcoming of the ideal of sovereign individual. Because Nietzsche understands the human being always in change and in a process of self-overcoming together with all phenomenon of life appropriated by the creative and destructive forces, the human self-interpretation is open to future transformations. It is in this sense that Nietzsche acknowledges that the human being “*as yet undetermined animal*”²³⁷. Although a discussion of how the self-overcoming of the human being would be achieved and what the human being would be like after that process would overreach the limits of this study, we might maintain that such an overcoming requires a critical stance towards subjectivist interpretations of the human being that are still predominant in the present state of affairs. It is not only because that the subject is a nihilistic

²³⁵ *GM* II:24.

²³⁶ *SO*, p. 156.

²³⁷ *BGE* no. 62.

tool for the triumph of the slave revolt that ends up with the extreme domestication, weakening and suffering of the human animal, but also because such an interpretation that is blind to the differences among human beings becomes embodied to the degree that it cancels out the '*pathos* of distance', which is, for Nietzsche, the ultimate condition of generating ever new values that are conducive for breeding a human being with more affirmative sensibility²³⁸.

In this chapter, I have attempted to present Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity within the framework of the most remarkable aspects of his thought, namely his critique of nihilism, ontology of the will to power and genealogy. As I have shown, modern philosophy articulates and valorises the fiction of a thinking subject as the site of truth when the previous theocentric interpretations and evaluations have begun to dissolve. Yet, suppressing difference that is constitutive of life, the subject conceived as the self-identical origin of thinking implies a continuation of the same nihilistic interpretation that perpetrates metaphysical violence against life for centuries. Through his genealogy, Nietzsche shows that although the subject has been overtly conceptualised in the modern era, it is at the basis of the moral and metaphysical interpretation of the human being and the world. The valorisation of the subject, as the neutral agent who is responsible for his/her deeds is a part of the process of human being's moralisation and denaturalization. Because this involves a long process of internalization and incorporation by the work of civilisation and religion, the human being has come to understand itself as an autochthonous subject, whereas, in truth, this process had caused a profound deformity and negativity in the human by alienating it to its animal self and body. Thus, the subjectivist interpretation of the human being also brought about denigration of its body that is seen as the reminiscent and the signifier of its animal nature and the cause of

²³⁸ WP, no.s 866, 987.

its imperfection, obliqueness and mortality. As a continuation of the metaphysical paradigm, modern philosophy takes these valorisations and implicit presuppositions over by substituting the representative of the nihilistic ideal of the medieval philosophy with its own, the self-same subject. In the following chapter, I will focus more precisely on Nietzsche's critique of the modern constitution of the subject with regard to his views on language, consciousness, truth, knowledge and thinking. In connection with his critique, I will also discuss how Nietzsche, rather than simply disposing of the metaphysical concept of the soul, reconceptualises it in a non-metaphysical manner, and valorises the body and renaturalizes thought as a part of his project of the 'renaturalization of the human being'.

CHAPTER 4

DECONSTRUCTION OF THE SUBJECT AND RENATURALIZATION OF THOUGHT IN NIETZSCHE'S PHILOSOPHY

In the previous chapter, focusing on the question regarding the value of subjectivity, I have discussed Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and the main features of his physiological and genealogical thought. Nietzsche has shown that rather than being a necessary and natural determination of the human being, the subject is one of the possible interpretations of the human being, one that has been articulated with a certain inner necessity in the development of Western nihilism. The discussion on Nietzsche's genealogical thinking enabled us to see that the fiction of a self-identical subject which is seen as the neutral origin of a multiplicity of actions is not only reductionist but also essentially nihilistic. That is, the subject-interpretation carries out a primal negativity to life, difference and plurality. It is valuable only for a living form which is unable to enhance, overcome or grow its potentialities due to its weakness but tries to narrow down itself, its boundaries and activities down to the level of *inertia* in order to survive and protect itself²³⁹. Moreover, the origin of the interpretation of the human being in this way and its internalisation are crucial prerogatives of the moral interpretation of the world that has started much earlier than the beginning of modern philosophy.

²³⁹ This is not to say that one understands oneself in some manner due to its atomistic individual circumstances but such an understanding grows out of all-encompassing physiological circumstances that include societal, cultural and historical conditions, at least in terms of human interpretations and values.

Nietzsche's physiological thought not only offers us a new framework to reinterpret the human being as a living being who is immanent to an utterly complex and constantly changing web of physiological processes but it also enable us to reconceptualise phenomena like truth, knowledge, language and thought that have been seen completely detached from the physiological by the tradition. In this chapter, I will concentrate on Nietzsche's critique of modern thought and its central themes. In the first section, I will discuss Nietzsche's critical stance towards the relationship between truth, knowledge and the human being, which is of utmost importance for modern philosophy and epistemology. There, I will also try to present his efforts of reinterpreting and reevaluating truth and knowledge within the horizon of his physiological thinking. In the second section, I will address myself to the questions of language and consciousness, the metaphysical workings of which are responsible, according to Nietzsche, for the conceptualisation of a unitary subject. In the last section, I will elaborate his critique of the modernist conception of thinking, and how it comes to trivialise the notion of the subject. Doing this, I will also try to interpret Nietzsche's hypothetical and metaphorical statements such as "soul as subjective multiplicity"²⁴⁰, "soul as social structure of the drives and affects"²⁴¹ and, body as "a social structure composed of many souls"²⁴² in regard to the question how we can reconceptualise thinking from a physiological framework.

4.1. The Critique of Epistemology: Rethinking the Bounds between Truth, Knowledge and the Human Being

As has been constantly emphasised in the second chapter, epistemological concerns have outweighed all others in the modern period and they have led

²⁴⁰ *BGE*, no. 12.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*

²⁴² *BGE*, no. 19.

philosophers of this paradigm to conceptualise something like the subject as the legitimate site of truth in order to account for the possibility of knowledge. I have also pointed out (3.1) that what Nietzsche sees in this period is the overgrowth of truthfulness to the extent that it separates itself from and begins to destroy God, who is formerly seen as the ‘true being’ in Christian interpretation of the world²⁴³. Truthfulness, for Nietzsche, is one of the unconscious forces, which has separated itself from and triumphed over others (especially, artistic instincts), and started to orient Western tradition from Socrates onwards (3.1). Like all other forces and wills, truthfulness and the will to truth gain various signification, value and orientation within different historical and physiological circumstances and various incorporations of forces, and from different perspectives of life. What Nietzsche sees problematic in Socratic/Platonic will to truth is, first of all, its orientation towards a self-identical and rationalistic ‘universal definition’, which has later transformed into the ‘form’ in Plato and the ‘God’ in Christianity. Secondly, it ties truth to the good, that is to say, it attributes intrinsic moral value and desirability to truth²⁴⁴. As a result, the moral evaluation of truth (truthfulness) valorising the self-identical as the good beyond also brings about a moral devaluation of this worldly existence. That is to say, it judges what appears to senses as illusion, error and semblance, and looks beyond them in order to see truth. Thirdly, in this way, the will to truth as has been cultivated by (Plato’s) Socrates represents the beginning of the oppositional thinking (appearance and illusion vs. thing-in-itself and truth), thus that of nihilism. It is nihilistic in the sense that, rather than willing to contemplate and endeavour to interpret the diversity of existence artistically and joyfully, it condemns existence as illusory and false and, points out a beyond, a ‘true world’, in the view of correcting existence by schematising all that appears

²⁴³ *WP*, no. 1.

²⁴⁴ *TI*, “The Problem of Socrates” 4.

within a hierarchically organised system of categories²⁴⁵. Fourth, truth's detachment from ever-changing forms of existence also brings about perhaps not the total abolishment of but a significant detainment of the stimulation and enhancement of the human being's artistic/interpretative potentialities. In the Socratic/Platonic paradigm, human reason has been alienated from its artistic and bodily basis²⁴⁶ and tyrannised as the supreme capacity to govern human life since it had been seen as the only tool for reaching the 'universal definition' or the 'form'²⁴⁷.

Socratic rationalism together with its corresponding understanding of truth, for Nietzsche, has lent itself to modern philosophy and science, although it has gone through certain transformations²⁴⁸. But he sees something peculiar that has happened in the beginning of modern philosophy: the detachment of truthfulness from the 'true being', the Christian God, and the subsequent abolishment of the latter²⁴⁹. The initial beginning of the disarticulation of the God must have provoked, from a Nietzschean perspective, a sense of distrust, insecurity and groundlessness since the God had been interpreted as the ultimate ground and the supreme authority for centuries, and the belief in him has yielded feelings of trust and security for the nihilistic human being, who is unable to endure the

²⁴⁵ *TI*, "'Reason' in Philosophy" 1.

²⁴⁶ I will explain this point further in this section.

²⁴⁷ *TI*, "The Problem of Socrates" 10. For Nietzsche, this is also a crucial factor for the persistence of nihilism. The human being, stripped off its artistic potentialities to a great extent, cannot develop a positive attitude towards existence because, for Nietzsche, the justification of life and thus the immanent affirmation of the entirety of existence are possible on aesthetic bases (Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy* and *The Case of Wagner*, tr. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Random House, 1967; hereafter *BT*, § 5).

²⁴⁸ *CN*, p. 83.

²⁴⁹ Nietzsche has different accounts with regard to what has brought about the 'death of God'. Because a discussion of them would exceed the limits of this study, here I will focus on what happens to the truthfulness when it has detached from the 'true being' of Christianity.

world of constantly shifting appearances and to give meaning to existence already interpreted as futile suffering. But, what is precisely at stake in this period of history is that truthfulness is still the binding force (and value) that is capable to appropriate other instincts and forces, yet a new domain or ideal is required for it to orient itself towards. Accordingly, the underlying problem of modern form of nihilism must have more than one facet: where the new site of truth will be (after God), what standards should be satisfied to reach it and how we, as human beings, can attain it. Thus, in this period of Western thought, epistemology has gained priority over other domains of philosophy.

In the First Meditation, we encounter this multifaceted phenomenon when Descartes declares his dissatisfaction with all his previous opinions and beliefs, and his intention to reach at least one absolute certainty to found the sciences. We might read the following quotation from Descartes's *Meditations* as an indicator of the peculiar nihilistic state that comes to affect the human being on the edge of modernity: "It is as if I had suddenly fallen into a deep whirlpool; I am so tossed about that I can neither touch bottom with my foot, nor swim up to the top"²⁵⁰. It is true that Descartes comes to that conclusion after his method of doubt (that is 'devised' so as to reach absolute certainty) has accomplished to evoke what it aims at from the beginning. But the feelings of insecurity and doubt can be sensed even from the opening sentences of the *Meditations* when Descartes declares the unreliability of his previous beliefs and opinions. What he needs is an unshakable point in order to reconstruct an intellectual edifice (his beliefs in the senses, in the God and in the existence of the external world, etc.) on a secure ground and to protect it from invasions of scepticism²⁵¹. That is to say, rather than being ready to inhabit in the uncertain and the unknown, he seeks to re-establish the land of the familiar and the knowable upon secure

²⁵⁰ *Med.* II 24.

²⁵¹ *AN*, p. 2.

foundations²⁵². A similar attempt can be seen in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, as Marsden depicts, when he "likens the 'territory of pure understanding' to an 'island of truth' surrounded by 'a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion' (CPR A235/B295)...Since the desire to migrate beyond the familiar is insatiable and prone to recur, Kant cautions against any contact with alterity which is not already safely anchored in the form of the same – the territory of possible experience"²⁵³. For Nietzsche, this implies a weakness and lack of courage on the part of the modern sceptical human being whose will to self-preservation underlies his/her demands for certainty, for unshakable ground and firmly established boundaries of the familiar.

The utilisation of the method of doubt, on the other hand, implies the fact that Descartes is not totally distrustful: he trusts in that the absolute certainty can be found through and within human reason alone. Even when he subjects all the foundations of previous opinions to hyperbolic doubt, he was not, according to Nietzsche, prudent enough to doubt about the actual capacities and operations of reason and of his rationalistic method²⁵⁴. We see the same phenomenon in Kant, who made a trial to determine human rational capacities in terms of its legitimate domains of knowledge, when he gives the ultimate authority to reason to be its own judge. Neither of them raised the question regarding the value of truth and reason or asked why we seek truth rather than untruth²⁵⁵. As a result of the unconditional trust in reason and the continuing demand for certainty, there

²⁵² AN, p. 2.

²⁵³ AN, p. 2.

²⁵⁴ Sarah Kofman, "Descartes Entrapped", in Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy (eds.), *Who Comes After the Subject?* London: Routledge, 1991; hereafter *DE*, p. 179. In the following section, I will discuss Nietzsche's view that Descartes's imprudence is mainly due to his treatment of language as a neutral means to communicate one's thoughts and his inability to see that reason and consciousness work in accordance with conventional linguistic schemes.

²⁵⁵ *BGE*, no. 1.

occurs a substitution of the God with the human subject thanks to its rational capacities to reach truth after truthfulness separates itself from the ‘true being’ beyond. That is, the human subject becomes the new guarantor of the land of security and familiarity.

Yet this does not mean that modern philosophy has accomplished to immanentize truth to the world of becoming by making the human being new site of truth. On the contrary, because the human being and his/her capacities are not interpreted in terms of their own historical and cultural evolution together with the manifold of forces affecting and redefining them but are taken as universally given, neither Descartes nor Kant could have succeed (nor were they willing to succeed) in seeing and characterising the human being in immanent terms. The ‘I’, whether as a substance or a formal principle of unity, is still an abstraction, a fictitious ideal beyond the world. In corollary to that, the concept of truth remains transcendental to this world. That is the modern religiosity for Nietzsche:

What is the whole modern philosophy doing at bottom? Since Descartes...all the philosophers seek to assassinate the old soul concept, under the guise of a critique of the subject-and-predicate concept—which means an attempt on the life of the basic presupposition of the Christian doctrine. Modern philosophy, being an epistemological skepticism, is, covertly and overtly, anti-Christian—although, to say this for the benefit of more refined ears, by no means anti-religious.²⁵⁶

As Schacht emphasises, Nietzsche deals with truth and knowledge in a variety of his writings but he has never established one systematic analysis of these terms, nor does he use these terms referring to a single signification²⁵⁷. Like all other terms, truth and knowledge, in Nietzsche’s writings, carry a variety of different meanings and evaluations depending on their contextual occurrences. Similarly,

²⁵⁶ *BGE*, no. 54.

²⁵⁷ Richard Schacht, “Nietzsche: Truth and Knowledge”, in Babette Babich and Robert S. Cohen (eds.), *Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999; hereafter *NTK*, p. 25.

he does not unconditionally attack the will to truth, which would be absurd for a thinker who finds any unconditional position utterly problematic²⁵⁸. In fact, his appeal for a more refined “intellectual conscience”²⁵⁹ and his critical endeavour to give science and philosophy a new, non-metaphysical direction represent a will to truth that is quite different from that of metaphysicians, which, at the end of the day, discloses itself as a will to untruth.

The determinative aspect of Nietzsche’s approach to epistemological issues is that, rather than taking them as disinterested issues belonging to our conscious life (which has been used to be held as a totally detached realm of being and processes untouched by other aspects of life), he acknowledges the fact that they are “human affairs”²⁶⁰. For that reason, knowledge and truth should be understood as ‘species-specific’ dealings with life and reason as embedded in nature²⁶¹. Such an approach makes it necessary to inquire into physiological, societal and historical contexts within which a specific animal, namely human being, has evolved together with its so-called rational capacities and the concerns for knowledge and truth. In the previous chapter (3.4), I have shown how Nietzsche accounts for the emergence and development of reason in the human animal through the work of civilisation that aims at breeding an animal that is permitted to promise. Now, I will focus on the actual workings of reason in establishing ‘human truths’ within the context of Nietzsche’s assault on the traditional opposition of truth and error. Nevertheless, it will be incomplete

²⁵⁸ Ken Gemes, “‘We Remain of Necessity Strangers to Ourselves’”, in Christa Davis Acampora (ed.), *Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006; hereafter *WRN*, p.197.

²⁵⁹ *GS*, no. 2.

²⁶⁰ *NTK*, pp. 25f.

²⁶¹ *NTK*, pp. 25f.

without elucidating reason's relation to language, a matter to which I will turn in the next section where I deal with the paralogistic nature of the modern subject.

In accordance with his general strategy for overcoming metaphysical oppositions, Nietzsche first reverses the terms of the asymmetrical evaluation (e.g., truth and error), then he reinscribes both terms into an immanent realm. In the case of the opposition between truth and error –in order to implicate the moral basis of the overvaluation of truthfulness, he usually contrast truth with lie–, the tradition has valorised truth as the primary and self-identical phenomenon above error which is, in turn, considered as an aberration from truth. In the first step, Nietzsche points out that reason, in accordance with linguistic conventions, produces categories through a process of assimilation of differences and 'equalisation of the non-equal'²⁶². In his famous example, he writes: "As certainly as no leaf is ever completely identical to another, so certainly the concept of leaf is formed by arbitrarily shelving, these individual differences or forgetting the distinguishing features"²⁶³. That is to say, in the 'flux of becoming', there are no self-identical units but only temporal constellation of individual appearances. However, being primarily an instrument of dissimulation, reason arbitrarily omits the differences among similar things and assimilates them into self-identical instances, which, in turn, become concepts. It is only through forgetfulness of this somehow necessary and spontaneous procedure that absolute truths are established for the first time²⁶⁴. That is to say, in what the tradition sees truth, Nietzsche finds an arbitrary solidification and fixation of certain errors. Accordingly, knowledge is not about accessing to a thing's inner nature or determinations but about cutting it off

²⁶² *TL*, p. 256. It is also noteworthy that, from this analysis, he also adumbrates the fact that what is primary is not self-identity but pure differing, out of which the former is constructed.

²⁶³ *TL*, pp. 256f.

²⁶⁴ *TL*, p. 257.

violently from its individual and temporal differences, and placing it within a formerly established system of concepts.

Yet, Nietzsche does not repeat the oppositional model by placing error above truth rather he stresses on the fact that the only reality consists of the appearance that can never be identical to itself and, that illusion, error and forgetfulness are constitutive elements of what the tradition (and also the sciences) celebrate as truth. What he wants to show is that human reason is not designated to reach the so-called independent reality of things in the sense of achieving correspondence between representations and things-in-themselves but it is a tool for generating a domain of familiarity out of the world of becoming, which is otherwise an unintelligible chaos without reason's operations of subsuming, organising and regularising. Moreover, for Nietzsche, all these operations of reason are not rationalistic in the traditional sense of the world: they are rather arbitrary and artistic. They are arbitrary not in the sense that they come to predominate our modes of knowing by chance or due to our voluntary choice but in the sense that there could and can be other modes of knowing depending on historical and physiological conditions of human existence.

Nietzsche's standpoint with regard to human modes of knowing is comparable to Kant's. Kant wanted to show that the human being is not in a position to know things independent of its own modes of knowing, and, the 'Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding' implicitly suggests that before the synthesising and subsuming activities of the human reason, the world is an unintelligible 'manifold' or rather is in a state of pure-difference and chaos, of which we could have no experience. Herein, Nietzsche would totally agree with Kant on the impossibility of independent knowledge²⁶⁵ and the priority of pure-difference

²⁶⁵ It is true that Nietzsche harshly criticises Kant's thing-in-itself/appearance distinction, in several occasions, as a manifestation of the two-world theory. However, to my reading, Kant's concept of the thing-in-itself, at least in the First *Critique*, has a function to prevent reason from extending knowledge claims to what exceeds the possible domain of experience. In this regard,

that is not anchored in identity. However, Kant's retreat to the *a priori* sources of the subject that is unified under the form of the self-same, the 'I think', in order to prove the possibility of objective knowledge, is precisely where Nietzsche's main criticism begins. First of all, for Nietzsche, the notion of the '*a priori*' is utterly problematic since it disregards the historical development of our modes and forms of knowing, that is, it implies that they are unconditionally and universally given. For him, "the categories are 'truths' only in the sense that they are conditions of life for us"²⁶⁶ and as these conditions change and generate different needs (or as these needs are overcome to bring about a different manner of inhabiting this world), we might develop other modes of knowing²⁶⁷. That is, what Kant has appreciated as the transcendental conditions of experience are themselves conditioned by the 'empirical' conditions of our existence.

The most strongly believed a priori "truths" are for me—*provisional assumptions*; e.g., the law of causality, a very well acquired habit of belief, so much a part of us that not to believe in it would destroy the race. But are they for that reason truths? What a conclusion! As if the preservation of man were a proof of truth!²⁶⁸

For these reasons, categories of the understanding cannot provide us with 'objective knowledge' in the sense of the correspondence of things and the ideas we have of them, even when the concept of thing is limited to the appearance, as Kant has wanted to establish in the First *Critique*.

Moreover, Nietzsche also finds the unification of these modes of knowing in the self-identical 'I think' metaphysical. For him, it is illegitimate not only to

thing-in-itself/appearance distinction is a consequence of his Copernican Turn, that is, we can only know things as they appear to us depending on our a priori modes of intuiting and knowing.

²⁶⁶ *WP*, no. 515.

²⁶⁷ "To what extent even our intellect is a consequence of conditions of existence—: we would not have it if we did not *need* to have it, and we would not have it *as it is* if we did not need to have it *as it is*, if we could live *otherwise*." (*WP*, no. 498)

²⁶⁸ *WP*, no. 497.

consider human reason as detached from the entirety of existence but also to attribute it an independent unity. This is, for the great extent, due to the metaphysical habits of language that are secretly at work also in Kant's work, which I will discuss in the following section. Apart from that, for Nietzsche, there can be no self-identical ground to ascribe our modes of knowing since the human being in all its capacities and activities expresses the will to power, which implies the impossibility of any self-identical origin in becoming. Knowledge as he understands (a product of simplification, subsumption and organisation) is just one way of the expression of the will to power: it expresses a will to familiarise what is different or a will to construct a safe, calculable and predictable reality to master over²⁶⁹. Moreover, what makes us believe that we have reached truth or certainty is a feeling, that is, truth of a proposition is not confirmed by a rational standard but through an increased sensation of power or satisfaction²⁷⁰. But the will to power does not have a unitary structure like the subject that is constructed in modern philosophy, rather it is diverse and multiple (see 3.2). For this reason, the human being might have only a momentary unity, which is prone to change through being appropriated by different incorporation of forces oriented by different qualities of the will. Each of these forces, including drives, affects and thoughts, in their different incorporations opens up a variety of perspective from which phenomena are interpreted.

In this regard, for Nietzsche, knowledge is and should be considered as an art of interpretation, even though in the state of affairs that he criticises, where human knowing cannot go further than an activity of locating what it encounters into a pre-given system of concepts. Accordingly, in order to account for any phenomena, including our modes of knowing, he offers a theory of 'radical

²⁶⁹ *NTK*, p. 33.

²⁷⁰ *WP*, no. 533.

perspectivism'²⁷¹, which is not anchored in a unitary subject or reason as is the case in epistemology but which tries to trace our modes of interpretations back to the perspectives and perspectives to the interpretations (since there is no one-way traffic between them). His dissidence against absolute truths is due to his acknowledgement of the perspectival nature of knowledge: "There are many kinds of eyes. Even the sphinx has eyes—and consequently there are many kinds of 'truths', and consequently there is no truth"²⁷².

When Nietzsche acknowledges that errors and illusions are intrinsic and necessary to the human pursuit of knowledge and talks about the impossibility of self-same truths, he does not invite us to give up spending any effort to know. Rather through his critiques of epistemology and of traditional understandings of truth and knowledge, he wants to develop a more affirmative understanding of knowledge that recognises itself as an artistic and physiological endeavour, i.e., as an art of interpretation that is conditioned by and does condition a diversity of perspectives within life. That is to say, rather than denying the physiological conditions of possibility of knowledge and mystifying it as a disinterested matter of a higher kind, Nietzsche naturalises knowledge and wants to reconcile art with the human pursuit for knowing. The underlying idea is that human knowledge could also be cultivated in different ways in different physiological and historical circumstances which would open up different perspectives. Moreover, such recognition of the physiological basis and perspectival nature of knowledge unties the relation between the human being, truth and knowledge, which is one of the basic presuppositions of modern thought. As a consequence, the human being, who is no longer considered as the site of truth, loses its metaphysical value and the privileged position in the hierarchy of things. Yet new fruitful ways, which could account for its physiological and historical

²⁷¹ *WP*, no. 462.

²⁷² *WP*, no. 540.

existence, are opened up to reinterpret what it means to be human and to revalorise the elements that make up the greatest part of its being, including its instincts, affects and desires, that are formerly despised by the religious-moral evaluation.

4.2. Language, Consciousness and the Paralogism of the Subject

From his earlier philosophical works, the problems of language and consciousness have been integral aspects of Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics and subjectivity. For him, rather than being merely a tool for communication, as has been presupposed in modern philosophy (2.3), language determines the scheme within which thought emerges. It is true that, for Nietzsche, language has emerged and developed historically as a capacity to communicate when the human being's need to communicate increases²⁷³. Nonetheless, this does not mean that with language the human being is gifted with a means to know the true designation of things. Moreover, the fact that it has developed out of a need to communicate does not necessarily mean that it is only a neutral means to verbalise what our isolated consciousness thinks. On the contrary, because both consciousness and language have a common origin, namely the need to communicate, our conscious thoughts follow the same schemes that language and grammar provide²⁷⁴. That is to say, thought becomes conscious always within pre-established linguistic boundaries.

To elaborate, instead of revealing absolute and independent truth of things language designates "the relations between things and [the human being]"²⁷⁵. In other words, the truths that are expressed in language are merely expressions of

²⁷³ *GS*, no. 354.

²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁵ *TL*, p. 256.

networks of anthropomorphic relations. There can be no truth in the sense of the correspondence relation between a proposition and independent reality since, according to Nietzsche, the truth of a proposition is actually determined by the standard of conformity to these anthropomorphic and conventional networks of relations²⁷⁶. Expression of these relations in language, in turn, requires metaphorical transferences:

A nerve stimulus first transformed into an image—the first metaphor! The image then reproduced in a sound—second metaphor! And each time a complete overlapping of the sphere concerned, right into the middle of an entirely new and different one.²⁷⁷

Although language is originally a metaphorical device, its artistic origin had been forgotten as it has gotten fixed through centuries of use hence it could have been taken as if it were designating the reality of things²⁷⁸. Moreover, all sound-images immediately become concepts since they do not intend to signify the uniqueness of one's experience but to fit it into a general scheme that is generated "through the equation of non-equal things"²⁷⁹. In this sense, what reason knows with regard to anything is nothing more than its place that is assigned within thus generated referential system of language. Therefore, covering over the plurality and fluidity of things, like reason, language also works as a tool for simplifying and ordering phenomena for the sake of human life.

For these reasons, Nietzsche warns philosophers to be sceptical regarding language and concepts. What is to be done seems to be acknowledging the misleading and metaphorical nature of language (the idea that not identity but self-differentiation is constitutive of it) and inhabiting it in a more critical and

²⁷⁶ *NTK*, pp. 29f.

²⁷⁷ *TL*, p. 256.

²⁷⁸ *TL*, p. 255.

²⁷⁹ *TL*, p. 256.

artistic manner (allowing and affirming the pluralisation of meanings) that would make it possible for thought to get released from the limitations of reason and truth that is understood by Nietzsche as a series of conventional metaphors and linguistic determinations²⁸⁰. His acknowledgement with regard to the regulative role of language and rhetoric in philosophical texts have led him to disclose the ways in which metaphorical and figural workings of language have permeated the truth claims of the philosophical discourse. When Nietzsche targets at the concept of the subject and also many others like free will, his critical strategy that consists of reading texts against themselves and detecting the linguistic influences, which are at work even (and especially) in the texts that are structured around strictly logical argumentations, can be said to be a precursor of contemporary deconstruction²⁸¹. His reading of the *cogito* argument in a number of notes reveals the fact that both the emergence and the constitution of modern subjectivity are paralogistic, i.e., they are constructed around illegitimate inferences which seem to follow each other naturally due to the hidden workings of language.

As noted in the previous chapter (3.4), according to Nietzsche, the separation of the doer and the deed, the fiction of a neutral and unitary subject, finds its model in the grammatical habit of separating the subject and the verb²⁸². Furthermore,

²⁸⁰ It could be said that Nietzsche's own inhabitation of language and his writing strategies (mobilising the senses of words in the highest degree that they seem to contradict with themselves, leaving sentences incomplete, enormous use of punctuations, writing in the form of aphorisms and notes rather than in that of traditional narratives that follow a logical progress from introduction to conclusion etc.) demonstrate such an effort.

²⁸¹ David Booth, "Nietzsche on 'the Subject as Multiplicity'", *Man and World*, vol. 18, 1985, 121-146; hereafter *NOS*, p. 128.

²⁸² However, this does not amount to say that Nietzsche attributes an arbitrary priority to linguistic conventions, rather he stresses that they develop in interaction with the societal and physiological conditions of the human being. For example, he points out to the coherence of evaluations, societal conventions, grammatical and linguistic habits and philosophical thinking within a given society and how they could differ all together from those of another community (*BGE*, no. 20).

the unity that is attributed to the subject also finds its basis in the linguistic unity of the 'I'. Following this presupposition of grammar and the illegitimate transference of the unity of words to things, there follows a number of metaphysical beliefs and projections. To count some of them, the belief in *ego* as unity, as cause and as substance; the projection of *ego* to things, turning everything into substance, attribution of causality to the world; the hypostatisation of faculties; the belief in the atom; the projection of *causa sui* which represents the highest abstraction of the concept cause, thus the belief in God are all rooted in the inner metaphysical workings of language²⁸³. In other words, for Nietzsche, all concepts and ideas of reason are deeply imbedded in linguistic conventions. Yet, metaphysical thinking inverts the order of the linguistic derivation of concepts in a way that the last product of the derivation, the God, is projected at the top of the hierarchical order of things, of the order of origination.

Although the belief in *ego* underlies nearly all metaphysical concepts, *ego* is formulated as the subject and becomes the true site of truth only with modern philosophy. Descartes believed that he has subjected all opinions to hyperbolic doubt but, for Nietzsche, he has failed to do so with regard to language by treating language as a neutral medium to communicate one's ideas. Thus he ended up with the formulation of the most common grammatical habit as if it were determining the nature of thinking processes²⁸⁴. The immediate certainty of the 'I think', for Nietzsche, was actually mediated by a number of assumptions hidden in the metaphysics of language²⁸⁵. Nietzsche tracks down the inner

²⁸³ "'Reason' in Philosophy", *TI*, p. 48.

²⁸⁴ *DE*, p. 186.

²⁸⁵ The idea of immediate certainty is ridiculous for Nietzsche precisely because every proposition that occurs in consciousness is already mediated by language and linguistic schemes imbedded in the human consciousness: "But that 'immediate certainty' ... involve[s] a *contradictio in adjecto*, I

workings of the paralogistic thinking that is at work in the metaphysics of subjectivity. First of all, the meaning of thinking is determined without any justification: it is a mental activity²⁸⁶. Secondly, it is presumed to be an activity that is caused by something substantial and, lastly, this underlying substance is said to be the ‘I’²⁸⁷. While the last two presuppositions could be and are also refuted by Kant as paralogisms, he is entrapped in the first one by considering thinking as a mental activity that originates in consciousness although it does not necessarily become self-conscious in an explicit manner (see 3.2.). For Nietzsche, such a conception of thinking is just a misrepresentation of the actual process by arbitrarily “selecting one element from the process and eliminating the rest, [it is] an artificial arrangement for the purposes of intelligibility—”²⁸⁸. Consciousness is this element, in the case of thinking, upon the overvaluation of which the modern image of thinking and subjectivity are constructed.

Because consciousness is nothing more than a tool for communication within and without, becoming conscious of something is at the same time interpreting it according to the linguistic schemes²⁸⁹. Instead of causing so-called inner states or mental acts, consciousness, as a reactive organ of the body, merely reflects and simplifies the effects of the unconscious struggle of forces and wills that appropriate the human *psyche* in a way that it leads us to represent ourselves as unitary subjects of inner phenomena. By focusing on Nietzsche’s notes about ‘inner phenomena’ from the *Will to Power*, Hillis Miller, in his work

shall repeat a hundred times; we really ought to free ourselves from the seduction of words!”
(*BGE*, no. 16)

²⁸⁶ *BGE*, no. 16.

²⁸⁷ *BGE*, no. 16.

²⁸⁸ *WP*, no. 477.

²⁸⁹ *WP*, no. 479.

“Disarticulation of the Self in Nietzsche”²⁹⁰, distinguishes five deconstructive procedures through which Nietzsche dismantles the unity of the subject and all these procedures consists of demystifications regarding consciousness’s misrepresentation of psychic processes. First of all, the individual entities such as thoughts, feelings and faculties are actually fictitious products of simplifying construction of consciousness according to linguistic schemas²⁹¹. Secondly, rather than attaining the minimal differences and rapidly changing effects of unconscious struggle, consciousness posits regularity, continuity and identity to these individual entities: two different thoughts or feelings are made equal²⁹². But for Nietzsche, no thought, affect or feeling could be same or permanent. Third and fourth misrepresentations of consciousness regard the causality between psychic states and Nietzsche’s deconstructive strategy consists of, first, untying the apparent causal links and then showing that they “are the result of that preposterous figure of speech which puts the early late and the late early: metalepsis”²⁹³. Because only the terminal point, the effect, of the unconscious struggle can register to it, consciousness projects the previous effect or a previous ‘outer’ perception as if it were the cause of the present effect. But the projection of cause always comes after we perceive an effect, that is, the causality of psychic phenomena is drawn retrospectively (e.g., first we feel pain and then we project it to a part of the body that is injured). However, for Nietzsche, there is no necessarily causal link between psychic phenomena (they

²⁹⁰ J. Hillis Miller, “Disarticulation of the Self in Nietzsche”, *The Monist*, vol. 64(2), 1981, pp. 247-261; hereafter *DSN*.

²⁹¹ *DSN*, p. 250.

²⁹² *DSN*, pp. 250f.

²⁹³ *DSN*, p. 251.

merely follow each other)²⁹⁴ and the separation between inner and outer phenomena is also illegitimate. Lastly, consciousness, operating according to linguistic arrangements, projects a unitary self that holds these individualised entities and their interrelations together²⁹⁵. However, after the first four deconstructive procedures, the unity of the self could find no basis; it is an artefact of consciousness and its linguistic schemas. Therefore, the 'I' is not the ground of activity but is a result of consciousness's reductive and figural interpretation of a complex, synthetic and hierarchical state of forces that appropriate the sphere of the human *psyche*. In other words, the self or the human *psyche* represents an ever-changing synthesis whose multiplicity is covered over by linguistic operations.

On the other hand, the overvaluation of consciousness depends on a separation that violently cuts off the human being into a consciousness and a body. Only then consciousness is valorised as the self-identical and self-transparent origin of representations whereas the body together with its manifold processes is reduced to a heap of matter that has nothing to do with thought rather than distorting its purity (Descartes) or to an external representation that deserves no specific investigation (Kant). Yet, Nietzsche sees this conceptualisation as one of the foremost oppositions of the modern version of the 'two-world theory'. Rather than perpetuating the oppositional model by reversing the asymmetrical evaluation of the body and consciousness, Nietzsche immanentizes consciousness to the body as an organ or instrument that is evolved in a certain species under specific physiological circumstances. In the following section, I will investigate how the Nietzschean understanding of the body provides us with

²⁹⁴ "We believe that thoughts as they succeed one another in our minds stand in some kind of causal relation: the logician especially, who actually speaks of nothing but instances which never occur in reality, has grown accustomed to prejudice that thoughts cause thoughts—" (*WP*, no. 478).

²⁹⁵ *DSN*, pp. 255ff.

richer potentialities to understand not only our individuality but also our integrity with the historical becoming of the entirety of *cosmos*. In connection with such reconceptualization of the human being, I will discuss how his physiological thinking radically changes our conception of thinking.

4.3. Towards a New Conceptualisation of the Human Soul and Renaturalization of Thinking

As has been shown in the previous section, the modern image of thought that defines thinking as a mental activity originating in consciousness is a misunderstanding that is rooted in the metaphysical workings of language and the erroneous operations of consciousness. In order to get rid of the dominant image of thought, Nietzsche attacks the metaphysical priority of consciousness over the body by showing not only that what appears in consciousness is only a terminal point or a shadow effect of much greater processes that happen on the level of the unconscious but also the fact that consciousness is an epiphenomenon of the body, which has developed just recently in the evolution of organic life²⁹⁶. Originally a thin layer separating the organism from its environment, it is neither the origin of psychic states nor governs the organism and its relations²⁹⁷. Rather, it is merely an instrument in the service of the body,

²⁹⁶ WP, no. 479.

²⁹⁷ In his *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, Freud makes nearly the same points with regard to consciousness: “Psycho-analytic speculation takes as its point of departure the impression, derived from examining unconscious processes, that consciousness may be, not the most universal attribute of mental processes, but only a particular function of them...What consciousness yields consists essentially of perceptions of excitations coming from the external world and of feelings of pleasure and unpleasure which can only arise from within the mental apparatus; it is therefore possible to assign to the system Pcpt.-Cs. a position in space. It must lie on the borderline between outside and inside; it must be turned towards the external world and must envelop the other psychical systems.” – [Emphasis added] (Sigmund Freud, *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, tr. James Strachey. W. W. Norton & Company: New York, 1961; hereafter *BPP*, p. 18). Situating consciousness in this way, he goes further in speculation to say that consciousness is spatially located in the most external sphere of the brain: “Indeed embryology in its capacity as a recapitulation of developmental history, actually shows us that the central nervous system originates from the ectoderm; the grey matter of the cortex remains a derivative of the primitive superficial layer of the organism” (*BPP*, p. 20), i.e., of the primitive form of consciousness. Freud

the sure and well-functioning of which depends on the condition that various operations of its organs and agonistic states remain unconscious.

In many of his writings, Nietzsche expresses his astonishment over the sure working of a plurality of organs that are integrated miraculously in an individual body. Moreover, although it is somehow individualised, the body is the openness where the ceaseless struggle of the unconscious forces of existence, which has shaped and continues to shape the human being's historical, physiological and cultural existence, leave their traces (this is also the condition of our historicity). For this and similar reasons, Nietzsche sees this plural yet integrated structure of the body as a more suitable candidate to take our departure from in reconceptualising the human being and any phenomenon with regard to being human in a more fruitful, comprehensive and affirmative manner.

The body and physiology the starting point: why?— We gain the correct idea of the nature of our subject-unity, namely as regents at the head of a communality (not as "souls" or "life forces"), also of the dependence of these regents upon the ruled and of an order of rank and division of labor as the conditions that make possible the whole and its parts. In the same way, how living unities continually arise and die and how the "subject" is not eternal; in the same way, that the struggle expresses itself in obeying and commanding, and that a fluctuating assessment of the limits of power is part of life. The relative ignorance in which the regent is kept concerning individual activities and even disturbances within the communality is among the conditions under which rule can be exercised. In short, we also gain a valuation of *not-knowing*, of seeing things on a broad scale, of simplification and falsification, of perspectivity. The most important thing, however, is: that we understand that the ruler and his subjects are of the same kind, all feeling, willing, thinking—and that, wherever we see or divine movement in a body, we learn to conclude that there is a subjective, invisible life appertaining to it. Movement is symbolism for the eye; it indicates that something has been felt, willed, thought.²⁹⁸

agrees with Nietzsche in a number of points: consciousness covers just a very small part of the human *psyche*; it has developed when the organism has increased interaction with the outer world and this has developed a need to protect the *psyche* from the total invasion of the external forces; it has no more function than to provide communication with the so-called external world; it is one of the latest developments of the organism; and it must be of a bodily nature. However, because Nietzsche's understanding of the body, as I shall discuss in the following, overcomes the reductive interpretation that identifies it with space, he never seeks to equate the human *psyche* with the brain even for the sake of speculation.

²⁹⁸ WP, no. 492.

In this note from Nietzsche's posthumously published work, *The Will to Power*, we find a number of crucial metaphors and characterisations about the body. First of all, the unity of the subject that is formerly attributed to the unity of self-consciousness by modern philosophers is said to be more accurately grasped in terms of the unity of the body. The body is composed of a plurality of cells, tissues and organs; yet this plurality is integrated into an individual unity, the parts of which, without exception, reciprocally depend on each other. Thus the idea of unity that the body provides is one that is not stemmed from a self-identical substance. Rather it points out the fact that the lively unity of the body (and also of its organs) is underlain by a diversity of forces and activities and, has to be regenerated in each moment through the collaborative work of its several elements. Such an understanding overcomes the metaphysical notion of unity by emphasising the material, temporal and contingent aspects of any unity that could be found in the nature. It is also more affirmative in the sense that it has a lower risk to assimilate diversity and difference into self-same categories²⁹⁹. For this reason, it is thought-provoking to think of unity in this way for it forces us to inquire more attentively into possible diversities and integrities that make up a phenomenon.

In other occasions, Nietzsche refers the correct origin of our concept of unity back to the unity of the body (not only as the one that we should follow in order to overcome its metaphysical interpretation but as the necessary condition of possibility of developing any concept of unity)³⁰⁰. This seems to contradict the previous point that I have made in the previous section with regard to the fact that Nietzsche finds the belief in a unitary *ego* as the source of the belief in other metaphysical categories (e.g., substance, causality and being). On the contrary, by resituating the unity that is attributed to the *ego* onto its originally

²⁹⁹ *NM*, p. 89.

³⁰⁰ *NM*, pp. 85f.

physiological basis, Nietzsche provides us with a new horizon to reconsider the *ego*, the soul or the subject as multiplicity. Nevertheless, this should not be considered as an attempt to reconcile subjectivism with a physiological philosophy. Because such a reconsideration of the concept of unity deprives the subject of its most essential characteristics and fundamental footings (such as its being atomistic, self-identical and self-present; being totally detached from the body; and being rooted in the atemporal unity of consciousness), it can be counted as a deconstructive attempt rather than reconciliatory one. It is only from the restricted and erroneous perspective of consciousness that the unity of the collaborative work of the bodily parts is interpreted as a self-same simplicity. Furthermore, once this is shown and the belief in a unitary *ego* is traced back to its physiological origin, the mystification of any self-identical unity can be dissipated so as to pave the way for “the collapse of the metaphysical system of categories, which in its entirety is derived from properties attributed to the subject”³⁰¹.

Secondly, Nietzsche does not conceive the unity of the body as a spatial unity or a heap of matter which would be, at most, reductive interpretations of consciousness. Rather, the body is a unity in terms of the integrity, collaboration and the ongoing struggle of its parts, impulses and sensations. This is the underlying idea when Nietzsche likens the body to “a social structure composed of many souls”³⁰². That is, each ingredient of the body together with their countless sub-elements expresses a multiplicity of wills and perspectives but somehow they come together to establish a unitary structure. The pure relationality of the ingredients of the body is directed to a number of different

³⁰¹ This will bring about the question of the possibility of thinking and philosophising without self-identical categories, the subject being at the first place. In the concluding chapter, I will assess the implications of such a manner of thinking, i.e., possibility of a philosophy without the subject.

³⁰² *BGE*, no. 19.

actions, the orientation of which is constantly altered in relation to its overall interest. This also brings about the idea that there is no ultimate ruler of the organism but there are 'regents' that are continuously replaced by others. Taking the risk of over-simplification, we can exemplify this thought as follows: the regent could be the stomach when the chief operation is digestion but immediately after digestion, a sensation of satisfaction come to orient the body. In this conjunction, Nietzsche employs political metaphors denoting the body as "group of leaders at the head of a collectivity", an 'aristocracy' of forces that are used to giving orders and to ruling together, a 'directing committee'"³⁰³.

Yet this ruling committee is composed only of unconscious forces whose struggle and collaboration also remain unconscious. It is on this precondition that the smooth and sure working of the numerous processes within and without the unitary structure of the body can be ensured. That is to say, on the contrary to the common supposition that it is consciousness that directs the body and its so-called movements, Nietzsche underscores the fact that consciousness neither has a part in most vital operations of the body nor does it have a direct access to them.

Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic and hence also what is most unfinished and unstrong. Consciousness gives rise to countless errors that lead an animal or [human] to perish sooner than necessary, "exceeding destiny," as Homer puts it. If the conserving association of the instincts were not so very much more powerful, and if it did not serve on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its misjudgements and its fantasies with open eyes, of its lack of thoroughness and its credulity—in short, of its consciousness; Rather, without the former, humanity would long have disappeared.³⁰⁴

As a matter of fact, these operations do not have to be the most vital ones. For example, when we just think of, not exactly becoming conscious of, all the bodily mechanisms that are involved in a simple act of stepping, we get

³⁰³ *NM*, p. 89.

³⁰⁴ *GS*, no. 11.

confused and become unable to walk as we do naturally. It is so, because consciousness is essentially a reactive organ, which works mainly in terms of inhibiting action³⁰⁵. Accordingly, if we think of the manifold of organic processes that happens automatically in a single moment, it is quite obvious that becoming conscious of them would cause enormous feeling of disturbance and displeasure, let alone the impossibility of their being governed by consciousness. Accordingly, for Nietzsche, a healthy body is the one which is governed oligarchical, and whose momentarily changing regent remains hidden³⁰⁶. This necessary condition also involves a misrepresentation about the ruler of the organism: consciousness believes that it is the ruler where it merely registers and executes the orders³⁰⁷. This also implies that, the self-presence and self-consciousness, the very knots that tie subjectivity to truth in modern thought, represent radical impossibilities for any bodily being, according to Nietzsche.

Thirdly, the body provides us with a model to reconceptualise the human soul in more naturalistic terms. Acampora notes that “Nietzsche’s naturalism...does not simply abolish certain metaphysical notions but rather revises them on the basis of differently construing their purpose and utility”³⁰⁸. Apart from enabling us to see inner plurality and relationality in every unity, this new conception of the soul accentuates the mortality of the human being³⁰⁹. From this respect, Nietzsche’s revision of the concept of the soul is antipodean to that of the Western tradition which has ascribed immortality to the soul in holding it apart from life. For Nietzsche, the human being together with its all aspects is prone to

³⁰⁵ *NM*, p. 90.

³⁰⁶ *WP*, no. 492.

³⁰⁷ *NM*, p. 90.

³⁰⁸ *CN*, p. 107.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

change, dissolution and death like all other beings in nature. Moreover, this revision also prohibits any dualistic tendency in accounting for the human existence. On the one hand, the concept of the soul no longer denotes another realm of being that is purer and more valuable than the body (including instincts, affects and drives) rather it is immanent to the body. As he writes in the passage cited above ('the ruler and his subjects are of the same kind, all feeling, willing, thinking'), all aspects of being human are of the same nature. That is, no phenomenon of the human *psyche* can be distinguished from others in kind. Accordingly, there cannot be any purely intellectual processes in the sense of the modern conception of thought that are not permeated by other bodily processes. Rather, thinking, like all other phenomena, is interwoven with instincts, drives and affects. On the other hand, Nietzsche's revision of the soul prevents us from falling into the trap of language that bifurcates the impersonal happening into a doer and a deed. As we have seen, the bodily processes that make up the human soul happen automatically and involuntarily as consequences of the unconscious forces like all other processes in nature. Although, we have a tendency to see the stomach as the agent behind digestion, it is a mere oversimplification of the multifarious ingredients and processes that bring out the unity of the stomach and its digestive functions³¹⁰.

Fourth and perhaps the most striking implication of Nietzsche's physiological understanding of the human soul regards its bound to the *cosmos*. The separation of the individual from the rest of the world depends on the distinction of the inner from the outer phenomena, which is connected with illegitimate inferences of consciousness that I have shown in the previous chapter. Although we can

³¹⁰ Even when we talk about organs, we are the victims of the metaphysics of language. Similarly, although Nietzsche himself refers consciousness as an organ, it is just a way of emphasising its bodily nature. In some places, however, rather than using the word '*Bewusstsein*' (consciousness), he prefers '*Bewusstheit*' (the state of being aware) in order not to substantialise the process of becoming conscious and not to hypostasise an entity (consciousness) behind impersonal happening.

notionally separate the individual from the world in this way, for Nietzsche, as a bodily being, the individual is always already embedded in multifarious processes of the world³¹¹. He writes: “The isolation of the individual ought not to deceive us: something flows on underneath individuals”³¹². This subterranean flow is comprised of the ceaseless and unintermittible struggle of the unconscious forces of life that appropriates seemingly isolated bodies, and of wills that orient the direction of the *agon*. For this reason, the individual human being carries within itself traces of the entire evolution of life and also of the human history from the remote ancient past to the current day³¹³: “[t]he human body, in which the most distant and most recent past of all organic development again becomes living and corporeal, through which and over and beyond which a tremendous stream seems to follow”³¹⁴. Yet, Nietzsche does not conceive the individual simply as an ‘heir’ or ‘result’ of its past rather it is at the same time “the process itself”³¹⁵. In stressing this, Nietzsche points out the possibility or perhaps the necessity of the self-overcoming of the human being in the future. Although we have been defined by the previous interpretations and past or present institutions of our civilization and culture that have become incorporated into our bodies after centuries of prevalence, we are “yet undetermined

³¹¹ This point is related to Nietzsche’s conception of the body in general, not necessarily the human body, as has been shown in 3.2.

³¹² *WP*, no. 686.

³¹³ I believe, Nietzsche’s understanding of the body might also give us an opportunity to rethink the Jungian notion of the ‘collective unconscious’. In a note from the *Gay Science*, Nietzsche talks about how some characteristics from our remote past become apparent in an individual again and this makes that individual seem extraordinary in his/her own times (*GS*, no. 10). However, it seems that these traces are also susceptible of dissolution when the tempo of becoming is too rapid (*Ibid.*). This gives us a clue about how the body could have the role of the unconscious and how this unconscious should not be separated from the historical and collective unconscious not only of the humankind but of all life in Nietzsche’s thinking.

³¹⁴ *WP*, no. 659.

³¹⁵ Cited in *NM*, p. 100.

animal[s]”³¹⁶. Thus we are open to incorporate other interpretations and capacities.

Given the consequences of the discussion above, namely that the soul/subject is not an atomistic, self-identical unity but it can be conceived more naturalistically as a complex, bodily and relational (both in terms of its ingredients’ mutual relationality and of their relationality with what seems to be ‘external’) multiplicity, now we must draw out the implications of such a reconceptualization of the human being for developing a new and physiological image of thinking that overcomes its modern image. In line with the discussion of the previous section, Nietzsche stresses that thinking is not a simple activity of consciousness. In contrast, like all other great events, it is an unconscious activity which arises out of the physiological and which has its own course of becoming thus it never implies a unitary and purely intellectual process. “A thought comes whenever ‘it’ wants”³¹⁷ is to say that thought has its own life, own development, and when it reaches a certain point, it articulates itself through the human being. In other words, the human being is nothing but a suitable channel through which the unconscious processes of thought get articulated and the product of which, in a way, becomes available to consciousness within linguistic limits. In this sense, thoughts of a human being are products of its life, its way of living as a bodily being, and also of its societal and historical conditions. As a physiological activity, thinking is comprised of a

³¹⁶ *BGE*, no. 62. In his discussion of the development of the capacity for promising (3.4), Nietzsche shows that the human being that we are now is determined by the struggle of the two unconscious forces, namely forgetfulness and memory, which has ended up with the overdevelopment of memory. Yet, as Nietzsche ceaselessly stresses, there could be no terminal point of the struggle of the forces since their agonistic relationality, namely the will to power, is the constitutive principle of all existence (3.2). Therefore, although memory seems to have outweighed the active force of forgetfulness, and gave rise to the development a number of human capacities and also deformities, it is by no means the end of the process. Thus, the human being will overcome itself as the struggle of these forces continues to reinterpret what it means to be human.

³¹⁷ *BGE*, no. 17.

plurality of ever-changing physiological processes and elements (such as feelings, wills, affects etc.) that are, as has been shown above, arbitrarily separated from each other. In other words, thinking, as Nietzsche understands it, is not a purely intellectual or mental activity as is formulated by Descartes and Kant.

Marsden emphasises that, according to Nietzsche, “[w]hat it is possible to *think* given the kind of physiology that is actually cultivated is less a question of what a body *is* than what it can do or *become*”³¹⁸. This is so, because, according to Nietzsche, the body is not a self-identical *substratum* but it must be understood in terms of a momentary constellation of forces and wills. Therefore, thought must be understood as an indication or a symptom of the state of forces and the qualities of the will to power that cut across our bodies. Moreover, the “cosmic link”³¹⁹ that ties the individual human being to the destiny of the rest of the world makes any claims of being autochthonous ridiculous. That is, although we are disposed to think ourselves as the generators of our thoughts (or actions) as modern individuals, these thoughts are not necessarily ours but are results of a historical articulation that is underlined by the interpretive forces of the *phusis*. Because thinking is an interpretive activity for Nietzsche and all interpretation arises from physiological circumstances, it must be conceptualised as an aspect of the overall impersonal happening of life: “‘who then interprets?’ for the interpretation itself is a form of the will to power, exists (but not as a ‘being’ but as a process, a becoming) as an affect”³²⁰. Nietzsche’s thought of the will to power precludes any attribution of an anthropocentric origin or any agent, whether human or divine, behind the ongoing physiological happening. In this

³¹⁸ AN, p. 29.

³¹⁹ NM, p. 87.

³²⁰ WP, no. 556.

sense, philosophy is not an enterprise of an individual genius but is in the service of life, functioning for its enrichment or preservation, and life chooses the most physiologically suitable channel for the articulation of thought³²¹.

In this chapter, I have attempted to elucidate, from Nietzsche's perspective, the fallaciousness of the basic presuppositions of modern philosophy that has led both Descartes and Kant, and also other modern thinkers to construct the fiction of the subject. Nietzsche is well-aware of the fact that because subjectivism is deeply embedded in our habits of thinking and language, we face great difficulties when we attempt to think otherwise. However, as is seen in this chapter, his physiological thinking provides us with a possibility to understand the human being in an immanent manner by showing how it is integrated to the overall becoming of life as a bodily and historical being. Accordingly, the attributes of the modern subject such as self-coincidence, self-identity and self-presence are also shown to be invalid for the human being that is reconceptualised as a sphere of the momentarily changing struggle of forces and wills. Moreover, because the modern constitution of the subject has emerged together with a concomitant understanding of thinking, once the unity of the subject is dispersed and immanentized into the physiological, thinking is also interpreted as a physiological activity that is composed of various processes and states rather than as a purely intellectual act of the self-conscious subject. Carving out a naturalistic image for thinking, Nietzsche's philosophy does not only introduces totally novel ways for understanding the relationship between the human being and thinking but also suggests a profoundly different manner of

³²¹ Accordingly, Nietzsche takes a certain philosophy as a symptom of the mutual affinity between physiological, societal and historical circumstances of the entire life and those of the life of a philosopher. For example, in "The Problem of Socrates", he spares a section just for describing Socrates's physical appearance, family background and social status in order to give an account of how his physiological circumstances have made him the most suitable human being to sense the approaching downfall of the Athens and to offer a certain mode of thinking as cure (*TI*, "The Problem of Socrates" 3, 5, & 9.).

setting the relationship between the historico-physiological orientation of life (the will to power), the philosopher and thought in contradistinction to the modernist tendency of assuming an autochthonous genius as the origin of philosophical enterprise.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The underlying motivation of the present study was to assess modern subjectivity, from Nietzsche's perspective, in terms of both its effect on human life and its theoretical soundness, and also to point out that another conception of thinking is possible. For this reason, it was necessary to lay bare the ways in which subjectivity has been conceptualised in relation to thinking in modern philosophy. Accordingly, I have investigated two major models of subjectivity in this period. The first one was Descartes's notion of the *res cogitans* and the second was Kant's transcendental subjectivity which also contains an intrinsic critique of the former. I have attempted to show that although these two philosophers differ from each other both in the ways that they construct human subjectivity and in the manner of their philosophising, there is a number of common points which could also be generalised to give an overall insight into the modern conception of the subject and thinking. These common aspects include the epistemological motivation underlying the initial formulation and subsequent revisions of subjectivity; the reductionist attitude in conceptualising the nature of the human being that ends up with the overvaluation of certain aspects of being human and belittlement of others; the ahistorical perspective predominating these philosophies; the metaphysical presupposition that the self-identity is constitutive of difference; the exclusion of the body from thinking processes; and the tendency to understand thinking as an activity stemming from consciousness (2.3).

With these initial insights, I have discussed Nietzsche's critique of subjectivity from two different yet interwoven aspects. The discussions about the origin and the value of subjectivity have enabled us to see that rather than denoting the essential determination of the human being, subjectivity is just one possible manner of interpreting it, which has, in its roots, a primal negativity towards life that has been taken over from a long metaphysical tradition. Then, the discussions with regard to the theoretical inconsistencies of the modern constitution of the subject have brought about the need to reconceptualise the human being in different terms. Accordingly, I have tried to elucidate Nietzsche's own understanding of the human being as a bodily being which is comprised of a plurality of forces and wills similar to other beings in nature. Furthermore, I have argued that in contradistinction to modern philosophy that conceives thinking at the disposal of the human being, Nietzsche's physiological thought enables us to appreciate thinking as an impersonal self-happening which endows itself to the human being. Here, I will, first, attempt to point out some crucial implications of Nietzsche's critique of modern subjectivity then, I will interrogate the possibility of the overcoming of the subject-interpretation.

As I have pointed out (3.1), modern philosophy is, for Nietzsche, a continuation of the nihilistic metaphysical paradigm which situates the subject in the place of the self-identical ideal in the name of which life is condemned. However, the term life, for Nietzsche, is not an abstract or empty concept rather it refers to our actual lives together with the life in the earth. Therefore, the condemnation of life is not merely a theoretical phenomenon but it is to be understood as the most intimate concern of ours. One of the crucial features of nihilism is its negative attitude towards difference. In the modern form of nihilism, the human subject has been constructed as the self-identical ground of all that differs, including its own thoughts and representations of the so-called external world. Moreover, it has been valorised as such insofar as it is seen as a rational being, endowed with

universal capacities for thinking and knowing. Nevertheless, this conception of the human being constitutes an ideal beyond this world which sets standards to which no living human being can attain. The reason for this is that, first of all, as living beings, we are necessarily subject to change, in other words, there can be no means, in this world, to reach self-coincidence. Secondly, as Nietzsche intimates, the human being has a much wider spectrum of potentialities and features so that it can neither be defined only in terms of its rational capacities nor can it be fully rational without the interference of those other aspects of being human. However, presenting the ideal of a self-identical rational being as the most valuable and desirable goal to reach, and also as the standard, according to which one's value is to be determined, the subjectivist mode of evaluation induces the feelings of inadequacy, unworthiness and even self-hatred to human beings.

Furthermore, as Nietzsche emphasises, the nihilistic condemnation of life goes hand in hand with the oppositional thinking. In this occasion, there are more than one set of oppositions that cut across the human being such as body-mind, animal-human, instinct/emotion-reason, etc. Accordingly, the feeling of self-hatred is especially directed towards our body and all that is associated with it (emotions, affects, desires and instincts) since it has been seen as the source of our being subject to temporality, change and so-called irrationalistic dispositions. Thus, this mode of evaluation does not permit us to grow an affirmative feeling towards ourselves together with all aspects of being human. Moreover, although it seems to valorise the human being as the privileged entity among others thanks to its seemingly exceptional access to truth, interiorisation of this interpretation as the dominant manner of our self-understanding is bound to a manifold of complex processes that have alienated us from our artistic powers and bodily being (3.4). In this way, it inhibits both the development of

other capacities and their incorporation with rational ones, and the proliferation of values other than the subjectivist ones.

Moreover, the nihilistic attitude towards difference does not only bring about feelings of inadequateness and unworthiness with regard to ourselves but it also provides a theoretical background for subordination of non-human beings and a number of discriminatory practices towards those who are seen as not possessing or deficiently manifesting rationality. First of all, as has been shown in the discussion of the 'sovereign individual' (3.4), the interiorisation of the subjectivist interpretation of the human being, promotes a hubristic attitude as it yields a fascination with one's power over nature and fate although no individual can actually have such power. This fascination depends on, to some extent, the development of reason, which enables the human being to objectify everything by self-identical categories, thus to represent nature as calculable, predictable, and, more importantly, as manipulable for human ends. Yet, the problem is not that the human being has historically developed such a capacity but that it evaluates itself as the most valuable being, thanks to its reason, at which disposal all others are given. Reminding the wisdom of Greek tragedy, Nietzsche wants to show that the consequences of this hubristic attitude can be disastrous since it prevents us from seeing our actual place in the universe and from acknowledging our vital interconnection with other beings. One far-reaching implication of such attitude might regard the legitimation of the exploitation of non-human beings and the thoughtless and violent practices of manipulation of nature, the consequences of which can be seen in the ecological disasters today. Although, ecological concerns have not been sensed and problematized in his times, in my view, Nietzsche's thought enables us to see the strong relation between anthropocentric systems of interpretation and evaluation and the ecological problems we encounter today. I believe, further research can focus on

new possibilities that Nietzsche's physiological thinking opens up for reconsidering the human-nature relationship.

Similarly, the subjectivist interpretation together with its oppositional evaluations reproduces the metaphysical background for legitimising discriminatory practices towards those who are seen as less rational, that is, as different from those who represent the subject-ideal. For instance, considered as inconstant, emotional, instinctual and mysteriously bounded to the nature, women have been exempted from possessing the privileges of those who are acknowledged as autochthonous subjects, and have been excluded from many domains of life, including the law, politics, and public space. We see a similar attitude towards non-Western individuals in modernity: because their societal and cultural institutions are different from those of the West they have been labelled as irrational and primitive, thus seen as exploitable. On the contrary, Nietzsche's conception of the human being allows the celebration of what is different by precluding the absolutisation of any perspective within life as the truest or the most valuable. As I have attempted to show, Nietzsche's criticism of the overvaluation of reason does not represent his hatred towards rationality as it could be understood at the outset. What he wants to establish is that reason is one of the physiological capacities of the human being that cannot be separated from the body. Although it opens up a certain perspective that facilitates our existence in this world, there are also a variety of different perspectives (affective, instinctual, artistic etc.) to make sense of phenomena among which we cannot establish an absolute hierarchy (since in order to establish such a hierarchy we would require the judgment of an absolute perspective). Through reaffirming the difference and self-differing, it forces us to realise that there can be a variety of senses of being human, and capacities to be celebrated and incorporated with others so as to open up novel ways to inhabit this world. Considering the far-reaching implications of such affirmation,

Nietzsche's critical thought can also provide a fruitful source for the political debate.

After the elaboration of Nietzsche's view that subjectivist interpretation of the human being is a continuation of the metaphysical paradigm that condemns life and it is essentially paralogistic and reductionist, we are also faced with questions and suspicions with regard to the possibility of an actual overcoming of this interpretation. As I have shown, Nietzsche's genealogical analysis has also brought about the fact that neither the human being has always been interpreted in this manner nor it had always had the same capacities such as consciousness and reason. In this sense, Nietzsche's philosophy provides us with a historical understanding of being human which also foreshadows the possibility of a future where the human being can develop other set of qualities and powers and be interpreted in more affirmative manners. However, it would be preposterous to expect that an actual overcoming of the subject in all the domains of the human life could be accomplished only by means of showing negative effects of its valorisation and philosophically arguing for its triviality, given the fact that the subject-interpretation has been deeply embedded not only in our modes of thinking but also in our manners of feeling and desiring (as is seen in the reading I presented with regard to the 'sovereign individual'). In this sense, a mere critique of values and metaphysical concepts is by no means able to move us beyond our present interpretive tendencies and evaluations. Moreover, Nietzsche's philosophy does not aim to present us projects and agendas for the future since it would presuppose the voluntary action of self-conscious subjects. Yet, in my view, his critique of subjectivity constitutes a crucial step towards such an overcoming by establishing a critical stance that is conducive to cultivate a different manner of philosophising.

The first part of the title of the present study, 'thinking without the subject', has two different but interconnected connotations. First of all, it points out the

possibility of conceiving thinking without being anchored in a self-conscious human subject, as I have already accounted for in the previous chapter. Secondly, it shadows forth the possibility of a philosophical thought that does not proceed from and is not grounded upon self-identical concepts and the secure frontiers that are delineated for thinking in this way. As I have pointed out (4.2), Nietzsche shows that the belief in the subject as unity underlies the belief in other metaphysical concepts, and once the belief in the former is shaken, it might be expected that the unity of those concepts fall apart too. Then the question arises: what will happen to thought when it is freed from the secure frontiers and the self-identical metaphysical ground to which it could attach itself comfortably? What does it mean to liberate thinking from the confines of metaphysical truths?

In my view, Nietzsche's physiological thinking constitutes an example for such an abysmal philosophy that does not proceed from self-identical unities like the subject of modern thought. By taking the fragile and transitory unity of the body as its model, it enables us to realise the intrinsic plurality and temporality of things and to mobilise senses in language by demystifying the unity of the words. Rather than sticking to another otherworldly ideal to keep our 'land' unshaken (if it is not yet shaken), demands us to show the courage to open ourselves to the unknown, the unpredictable, and to try to inhabit in the infinite to the extent that we get rid of the need for metaphysical security. In this way, it can be said that Nietzsche's philosophy, at least as a manner of interpretation, has accomplished to overcome subjectivity in this way.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Modern felsefe çoğunlukla Batı düşüncesinde öznelliğin merkezi tema olarak öne çıktığı ve benlik ile özne fikirlerinin ontoloji, epistemoloji, etik ve politika gibi alanlardaki tartışmaları yönlendirdiği bir dönem olarak kabul edilir. Batı felsefesi, Augustine'in *interior homine* kavramsallaştırmasında olduğu gibi, halihazırda benlik fikri ve özne benzeri kavramsallaştırmalara aşina olmasına rağmen modern özne fikrinin, insanı ussal yetileri sayesinde kendi kendini belirleyebilir ve diğer varlıklardan ayrıcalıklı olarak hakikate ulaşabilir bir varlık olarak yorumlaması bakımından ele alındığında Kartezyen düşünce ile başladığı söylenebilir. Bu dönemde epistemolojik bir ağırlık kazanan felsefe, insanı ussal özellikleri ve bilinci ekseninde tanımlamıştır. Modern özne anlayışının inşa edildiği temelleri radikal bir biçimde değiştiren Kantçı felsefe de dahil olmak üzere modern filozoflar arasındaki büyük farklılıklar olmasına rağmen, diyebiliriz ki modern dönemi biçimlendiren fikirlerin en önemlilerinden biri benlik bilincine sahip öznenin düşünceyi üretici rolü olmuştur. Bu bağlamda, düşünce tarihinin bu dönemde insanın, bedenselliğin tamamen dışlandığı, bilinçli ve rasyonel özne kavramsallaştırması çerçevesinde felsefi sorgulamanın merkezine yerleştiğini ve düşüncenin özne tarafından üretilen bilinçli bir zihinsel edim olarak anlaşıldığını söyleyebiliriz.

Öznenin felsefe tarihinde merkezi bir rol alması Kartezyen *cogito* kavramsallaştırılması ile başladığından, öznelliğin yapısını incelemek için Descartes'in felsefesinin temel eseri olarak kabul edilen *Meditasyonlar*'a bakmamız gerekmektedir. Descartes, *Meditasyonlar*'a başlarken felsefenin içinde

bulunduğu epistemolojik krizi betimler. Eski düşünceler ve inançlarının meşru bir temelden yoksun olduğunu farketmesiyle bunları tekrar temellendirebileceği sarsılmaz tek ve kesin bir hakikat bulmaya yönelir. Ancak diyebiliriz ki bu kesin ve sarsılmaz hakikati ararken kullandığı şüphe yöntemi halihazırda hakikat arayışının meşru zemini olarak kendi içine kapalı ve dışarıdan soyutlanmış bir özne fikrini varsaymaktadır. Descartes'ın radikal şüphesi, en aşırı ifadesini fevkalade güçlü ve zeki olup tüm gücünü meditasyon yapan kişiyi aldatmak için kullanan 'kötü cin' fikrinde bulur. Descartes'ın İkinci Meditasyon'da gösterdiği üzere, bu düşünce deneyi, meditasyon yapanın bilinç durumlarının varlığı dışında bilginin temellendirileceği hiçbir temel bırakmaz. 'Kötü cin', tüm düşüncelerimizin içeriği hakkında bizi yanıltıyor olsa da düşünüyor olduğumuz gerçeği doğrudur ve bu da zorunlu olarak düşünen öznenin varlığını gerektirir. Dolayısıyla Descartes bilgiyi temellendirmek için ihtiyaç duyduğu tek sarsılmaz doğruya ulaşır: Düşünen öznenin varlığı. Ancak bu hakikate Descartes, *Yöntem Üzerine Konuşma*'sında geçen 'düşünüyorum öyleyse varım' gibi tasımsal bir çıkarımla ulaşmamıştır. Zihinsel edimin varlığı ile öznenin varlığı birbirinden farklı ve ayrılabilir iki mantık ifadesini değil, daha sonradan Kartezyen felsefenin ilk ilkesi haline gelecek bilincin yalın ve deneyimsel tek bir olgusunu işaret eder.

Düşünsel süreçlerin ve öznenin varlığı bu şekilde şüphe edilemez kesinlikte bir olgu olarak gösterildikten sonra Descartes 'düşünüyorum'daki 'ben'in neliğini araştırmaya girişir ve bu araştırma ile Kartezyen öznelliğin yapısı şekillenir. Öncelikle, Descartes'a göre zihinsel edimlerin zemini olan 'ben', *res cogitans* yani düşünen şeydir. Ontolojik olarak yalın olan 'ben', temellendirdiği zihinsel edim çokluğundan oluşmaz ya da düşünsel edimler tarafından yapılandırılmaz. Tersine 'ben', zamansal olarak kendine özdeş kalıp değişmeyen üniter bir tözdür ve düşünsel çokluğun yalın kaynağıdır. Bu noktada, Descartes'ın metafizik gelenekten töz-ilinek modelini alıp bunu özneye uyarladığı görülmektedir. Bu modele göre özne, düşünen töz olarak tanımlanırken öznenin her bir düşünsel edimi, *ego*'nun kendi varlığını onların vasıtasıyla ortaya koyduğu kipler veya

ilinekler olarak kavramsallaştırılır. Özetle, Kartezyen özne, düşünen töz olarak gerçek bir varlık, diğer tüm fikir ve düşüncelerin zemini olarak tanımlanmıştır. Bununla bağlantılı olarak düşünce ise algılamak, arzulamak, aldatılmak, anlamak gibi pek çok zihinsel edimi kapsayan bir terim olarak kullanılsa da Descartes'a göre bu edimlerin herbirini düşünce yapan temel unsur ben-bilinci taşımalarıdır. Dahası bu kavramsallaştırma yoluyla, öznenin dünyayla asli ilişkisi fikirler vasıtasıyla, yani tamamıyla entelektüel bir ilişki olarak resmedilmiştir.

Öznelliğin Kartezyen inşasında bir başka önemli nokta ise düşünen tözün uzamsal tözden üçüncünün olmazlığı ilkesi ile kökten ayrıştırılmış olmasıdır. Bu da herhangi bir kipin ya düşünen töze ya da uzamsal töze ait olacağı anlamına gelmektedir. Düşünen töz, zihinsel edimleri meydana getiren ve bir arada tutan belirli, değişmez ve bölünemez bir varlık olarak tasarlanırken uzamsal töz, kendisinin parçası olan herhangi bir bedenin kendine ait bir öz taşımadığı müphem, değişebilir ve bölünebilir bir madde yığını olarak görülür. Aynı zamanda düşünen töz zihinsel edimleri, fikir ve tasarımları bir araya getiren kişisel içsellik her tür dışsallık, bireyin kendi bedeni de dahil olmak üzere, uzamsal töze ait olarak tanımlanır. Bu anlamda, Kartezyen dualizm, bilinçli özne ile onun dışında kalan her tür uzamsallığı birbirinden ontolojik olarak kesin çizgilerle ayırarak zihin-beden birlikteliği yani insanın bütünlüğü sorununa yol açmıştır.

Yukarıda açıklanmaya çalışıldığı gibi Descartes felsefesinde öznellik fikri zihinsel edimlerin bilincinden ortaya çıkmış, felsefe ve tüm bilgi araştırmaları için vazgeçilmez bir zemin haline gelmiştir. Dahası, Descartes tarafından yapılandırıldığı biçimiyle modern özne, kendinden menkul, kendiliğinden anlaşılır, kendi kendini temellendiren, yalın, kendine özdeş ve zamansal olmayan düşünen bir töz olarak inşa edilmiş, düşünce ile ilişkisi ise geleneksel anlamda bir tözün ilinekleriyle ilişkisi model alınarak kavramsallaştırılmıştır.

Kant'ın *Saf Aklın Eleştirisi* isimli eseri modern felsefede öznelliğin inşası için ikinci dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilebilir. Kant tarafından ortaya konulduğu şekliyle, *Eleştiri*'nin temel projesi Kopernikçi hipotezin yani 'nesnelerin bizim bilme biçimlerimize uyması' fikrinin sınanmasıdır. Bu hipotezin başarılı olduğunu gösterebilmek için *Eleştiri*, bilginin ve düşüncenin mümkünatının koşulları olan önsel kaynakları, yetileri ve edimleri bütünlüklerinde ortaya koymalıdır. Dahası, Kopernikçi hipotez ile birlikte gerçeklik, düşünen öznenen bağımsız olan şeylerin toplamı olarak değil, özneye bağlı olan bu önsel koşullar ile yapılandırılmış bir görünüm bütünü olarak görülmeye başlanmıştır. Bu şekilde, naif realizmden Kantçı a idealizme geçiş ile öznenin konumu da tamamıyla biçimsel bir düzeye taşınarak Descartes'ın düşünen tözünden kökten farklı bir şeye dönüşmüştür.

Kantçı transandantal öznelliğin temel unsuru, bilincin transandantal birliğinin temsili olan 'düşünüyorum'dur. Bilincin transandantal birliğinden ilk olarak Kant'ın anlağın kavramlarının nesnel geçerliliğini kanıtladığı *Eleştiri*'nin 'Saf Anlağın Kavramlarının Tümdengelimi' bölümünde bahsedilmektedir. Anlağın kavramlarının bilgideki işlevi duyarlık ile alımlanan ve imgelem ile sentezlenen çokluğa birlik vermek ve bu sayede nesneyi belirlemek ve üretmektir. Ancak Kant'ın gösterdiği üzere, nesneye birlik verebilmek için bilincin kendisinin de birlik sahibi olması gerekir. Bu bağlamda kavramın birliği ile bilincin transandantal birliği karşılıklı olarak birbirini koşullamakta ve bu sayede Kant tarafından birliğe getirilmiş bir temsiller çokluğu olarak tanımlanan düşünceyi olanaklı kılmaktadır.

Birinci *Eleştiri*'de Kant 'düşünüyorum' temsili için farklı nitelikler ve roller önermiştir ve Kantçı öznelliğin anlaşılması ve Kartezyen öznelikten ayırt edilebilmesi için bunların ortaya konulması gerekir. Salt biçimsel bir temsil olan 'düşünüyorum'u ortaya çıkaran birlik halindeki öz-bilinç Kant tarafından saf, orijinal ve transandantal olarak adlandırılmıştır. Saf olarak tanımlanmasının nedeni zihnin herhangi bir belirlenimine halihazırda eşlik eden ampirik bilinçten

onu ayırmaktır. Orijinal olarak tanımlanmasının nedeni başka bir temsil ile temellendirilmemiş ya da koşullandırılmamış olduğunu, ancak diğer tüm temsillere eşlik edebileceğini göstermektir. Transandantal olmasının sebebi ise tüm bilginin mümkünatının nihai koşulu olmasıdır. Fakat ‘düşünüyorum’ herhangi bir içerikten yoksun yalnızca biçimsel bir koşuldur. Dolayısıyla Kant’a göre bu koşul herhangi bir benlik bilgisine kaynaklık edemez. Bu bağlamda, *Meditasyonlar*’da radikal şüpheden sağ çıkmış olan *cogito*, Kant için tüm temsillere eşlik etmesi transandantal anlamda zorunlu olan düşünsel edimin birliğinin boş ve yalnızca biçimsel olan temsilidir. Bu yüzden de en radikal şüphe ile bile ortadan kaldırılamaz. Ancak yine de Kant’a göre bu temsil, düşünsel edimin birliğinin bilincini temsil ettiği için ve herhangi bir edimin varlığı ardında bir eyleyenin olmasını, diğer bir deyişle etkin bir zeminin varlığını zorunlu kıldığı için ‘varım’ önermesi halihazırda kavram-öncesi olarak ‘düşünüyorum’ önermesi tarafından içerilmektedir. Dolayısıyla ‘düşünüyorum öyleyse varım’ Kant için yalnızca bir totolojidir ve Descartes’ın bu önermeden töz olarak varolan gerçek bir özne çıkarımı ise yanılmalı bir tasım örneğidir. Kant’ın transandantal özne kavramsallaştırması öznelliği bir töz olarak değil transandantal bir koşullar toplamı olarak ortaya koymaktadır.

Burada gösterildiği haliyle bilincin transandantal birliği, yalnızca çeşitli temsilleri yanyana getirmeyip aynı zamanda düşünce ve bilgi kiplerini; duyarlık, imgelem ve anlık gibi öznelliği meydana getiren yetilerin de bir arada çalışmasını mümkün kıldığı için Kantçı transandantal öznelüğün temel unsurudur. Başka bir deyişle, bilincin transandantal birliğinin bu işlevi, Kantçı transandantal öznelüğün doğasını, düşünce kavramında varsayılan temsiller birliği fikrini mümkün kılan öznel yetilerin ve işlevlerinin evrensel ve zorunlu koşulu olarak açığa çıkarmaktadır. Ancak transandantal öznelik yalnızca bu transandantal birliğe indirgenemez. Diğer transandantal yetiler de öznelüğün aynı oranda vazgeçilmez unsurlarıdır. Dolayısıyla Kantçı öznelik transandantal bilinç ile bir araya gelmiş olan birleştirici, sentezleyici, yargı verici ve çıkarımsal yetiler ile dünyaya maruz

kalma kabiliyeti olan duyarlılığın bütünü olarak algılanmalıdır. Ancak transandantal öznelik her ne kadar Kant tarafından Kartezyen öznelikten farklı olarak kurulmuş olsa da Kantçı düşünce kavramsallaştırılması, Descartes'ın düşünce anlayışına, düşünceyi öz-bilince getirilebilecek zihinsel bir edim olarak görmesi açısından oldukça yakındır. Diğer bir yandan Kant, zihin-beden ikiliği probleminden, bedeni tamamıyla dışsal bir temsile indirgeyerek, büyük ölçüde kurtulmuştur. Denilebilir ki, Kant felsefesi, en azından düşünen özne bağlamında ele alındığında, beden sorununu tamamıyla iptal etmiştir.

Bu noktada modern özneliğin bu iki önemli modeline bakarak modern felsefenin insan ve düşünce kavramsallaştırmaları ile ilgili bazı eleştirel notlar düşebiliriz. İlk olarak görüldüğü üzere modern dönemde insan, bilgi ve hakikat üçgeninde ele alınmış, ussal özellikleri sayesinde hiçbir dış otoriteye ihtiyaç duymaksızın kendi bilincine kapanarak hakikate ulaşabilecek bir varlık olarak tasarlanmış ve bu özellikleri nedeniyle felsefi bir önem kazanmıştır. Ancak ussallık ve bilinçlilik özellikleri dışında kalan fizyolojik, tarihsel, toplumsal ve diğer tüm ampirik belirlenimleri felsefi sorgulamanın dışarısında bırakıldığından bu dönemde insan indirgemeci bir bakış açısından anlaşılmış ve bu kısıtlı insan anlayışı pek çok ayrımcı fikir ve pratiğin meşru bir zemin kazanmasına olanak sağlamıştır. Bir diğer önemli nokta ise hem Descartes'ın hem de Kant'ın kavramsallaştırmalarında görüldüğü üzere öznenin, düşünce ve temsil çokluğunun kendine özdeş kaynağı olarak görülmesidir. Dahası, bu dönemde düşünce, bilinçli özne tarafından üretilen zihinsel bir edim olarak görülmüş ve Spinoza haricinde neredeyse diğer tüm filozoflar tarafından bedenin ve bedensel işlevlerin düşünce üzerinde herhangi bir rolü olabileceği fikri tamamıyla göz ardı edilmiştir.

Descartes'ın öznelik kavramsallaştırılmasının eleştirisi Kant felsefesinde içerilmiş ve Kantçı öznelik yapısı Kant'tan sonra gelen Alman İdealizminin önemli figürleri ve bu paradigmanın dışında kaldığı söylenebilecek olan Schopenhauer gibi figürler tarafından eleştirilmiş olsa da denilebilir ki, bu eleştiri

ve yeniden yapılandırmalar aynı idealist paradigmanın içerisinde kalmıştır. Bunlardan farklı olarak Nietzsche'nin öznellik eleştirisi insanın anlaşılabilirliği için tamamıyla farklı ve kendine özgü bir çerçeve sunması ve idealist paradigmanın ötesine geçmesi anlamında felsefe tarihinde ayrı bir yer tutar. Nietzsche'nin öznellik eleştirisi, Platon ile başlayan Batı metafiziği eleştirisinin önemli bir parçası olup ahlak, us, dil, bilinç, düşünce ve beden gibi birbiri ile yakından ilişkili olan pek çok tartışmayı bir araya getirmektedir.

Nietzsche'ye göre, Batı metafiziği başından beri, başı-sonu ve ereği olmayan, gayrişahsi, iradedışı ve durmaksızın devam eden oluş süreçlerine kendine özdeş bir kaynak, zemin, töz, neden ya da fail atfetme alışkanlığındadır. Platon'da idealar, Hristiyanlıkta tanrı olarak tanımlanan bu üretici kaynak ya da zemin, modern dönemde düşüncenin ve diğer temsillerin üretici zemini olarak kavramsallaştırılan öz-bilinçli özne olarak tanımlanmıştır. Nietzsche'ye göre bu metafizik paradigma, yaşamın en temel unsurları olan oluş, devinim ve farklılık gibi olguları değersizleştirirken kendine özdeş bir hakikat ya da zemin arayışında olup bunlara mümkün olan tüm değer ve anlamı atfetmektedir. Ancak yaşamda kendine özdeş, zaman ve devinim dışı hiçbir unsur bulunmadığından hakikat alanı olarak tanımlanan her bir metafizik zemin kurgusu yaşama hiçbir değeri verdiğinden Nietzsche'ye göre bunlar, nihilist kurgular ve değer sistemleridir. Bu anlamda, modern özne fikri de çokluğun ve farklılığın bir potada eritildiği kendine özdeş bir insan kurgusu üzerine inşa edildiği için nihilist paradigmanın bir devamı niteliği taşımakta, ayrıca yaşam ve yaşamın çokluğunu değersizleştirmek için meşru bir felsefi zemin sunmaktadır. Metafizik paradigmanın aksine Nietzsche'nin 'güç istenci' kavramı ve fizyolojik ontolojisi farklılığı, oluşu ve devinimi olumlayarak yaşamda kendine özdeş hiçbir hakikatin olamayacağı fikrini vurgulamaktadır. Nietzsche, tüm olguları, bedenleri, düşünce ve değerleri, kısacası varolan her şeyi içine alan monistik ve fizyolojik tek bir dünya olduğunu iddia eder. Oluşun diferansiyel unsuru olarak tanımlanan güç istenci gerçekliği meydana getiren bilinçdışı kuvvetlerin devamlı çatışma halinde olmalarını ve bu

sayede olguları belirleyip, yeniden yoruma açmalarını ve değerlendirilmelerini sağlayan prensiptir. Bu tarz bir ontolojide her şey değişmez bir kaynak olmadan devamlı bir oluş süreci ön plana alındığından çokluğun indirgenebileceği idea, tanrı ya da özne gibi metafizik bir zemine izin verilmez. Bu anlamda güç istenci fikri ve Nietzsche'nin fizyolojik ontolojisi herhangi bir öznellik kurgusuna zemin bırakmamaktadır.

Nietzsche'nin *Ahlakın Sokütüğü Üstüne*'nde tanıttığı şekliyle soykütük çalışması değerlerin kaynağının araştırıldığı ve bu kaynağın yaşam açısından değerinin belirlendiği tarihsel bir araştırmadır. Diğer bir deyişle, soykütük araştırması ile değerlerin, inanç ve kavramların izleri sürülerek bunların ortaya çıktığı kaynak olarak belirli varoluş kipleri gösterilir ve bunların yaşam içinde, belirli şekillerde yorumlanıp anlam ve değer kazandıkları perspektifler bulunur. Bu bağlamda *Soykütük*, ahlaki değerlerin ortaya çıktığı tarihsel kaynakları araştırırken aynı zamanda Batı ahlakının bazı önemli yönlerinin nasıl olup da insanın belirli bir yorumlanmış tarzı olan öznellik kurgusu ile tarihsel olarak bir arada geliştiğini göstermektedir.

Soykütük'ün ilk incelemesinde Nietzsche, 'İyi ve Kötü' ile 'İyi ve Fena' olmak üzere iki tür değer sisteminden bahseder. Bu değer sistemleri, kendini tüketme ve aşma perspektifine sahip olmasıyla ayırt edilen efendi ve kendini koruma perspektifine sahip olan köle olmak üzere yaşam içerisinde iki temel varoluş kipi ile bağlantılıdır. Ancak Nietzsche, köle-efendi terimlerini belirli sosyo-ekonomik statülerdeki gerçek kişileri tasvir etmekten ziyade çatışmaları sayesinde oluşu mümkün kılan etken ve edilgen bilinçdışı kuvvetleri simgelemek için kullanır. Bu kuvvetlerin arasındaki çatışmanın niteliği, yani çatışmanın yönünü belirleyen güç istenci, ya olumlu ya da olumsuzlayıcı olabilir. Bu bağlamda, Nietzsche efendiliğin yalnızca güç sahibi olmakla tanımlanmadığını aynı zamanda onun olumlu bir duyarlılık gerektirdiğini; köleliğinse kendi anlık zayıflığına karşı süregelen bir olumsuzlayıcı tutumla belirlendiğini iddia etmektedir. Buna bağlı

olarak, ‘İyi ve Kötü’ değer sistemi, hem efendinin gücünün bu gücün ifadesinden ayrıştırılamamasından hem de efendinin eyleminde kendini olumlamasından ortaya çıkmıştır. Aynı zamanda doğal süreçleri ahlaki kavramlarla ve yargılarla kesintiye uğratmaksızın kabul etmeyi de beraberinde getiren bu olumlayıcı modelin aksine kölenin olumsuzlayıcı tutumu güçlü olana karşı kölede derin bir ‘hınç’ gelişmesine neden olur. Nietzsche’ye göre bu ‘hınç’ yalnızca efendinin ilksel değerlendirme sistemini tersine çevirmesi anlamında üretken bir olgudur. Olumsuzlayıcı bir tutum olarak, köle perspektifi ancak efendiye fenalık atfedip onun varoluşunu olumsuzladıktan sonra kendisine dönüp kendi zayıflığını olumlayabilir. Nietzsche’ye göre kölenin değer sisteminin bu şekilde ortaya çıkışı ahlaki yargılamamanın başlangıcıdır çünkü bu değerlendirme tarzı ancak gücün ifadesini güçten, yani eylemi eyleyenden ayırıp, bu şekilde eyleyene ahlakın en temel unsuru olarak kabul edilebilecek olan sorumluluk kavramını yüklemektedir. Diğer bir deyişle, güçlünün olumsuzlanması için köle yalın, kendi kendine ve istenç dışı meydana gelen oluşun ardına bir eyleyen atfetmelidir ve bunun için de nötr bir özne kurgusuna ihtiyaç duymaktadır. *Soykütük*’ün ilk incelemesinde gördüğümüz üzere özne kurgusu ancak kendisini eyleminde olumlamaktan aciz olumsuzlayıcı ve zayıf bir varoluşun dolaylı bir biçimde kendisini olumlayabilmesi açısından değerlidir.

Soykütük’ün ikinci incelemesinde ise Nietzsche, ‘kötü vicdan’ ismini verdiği olgunun insanın içselleşmesi süreci içerisinde nasıl geliştiğini tartışır. Bu inceleme aslında nasıl olup da kölenin değer sisteminin ve özne kurgusu ile sorumluluk bilincinin efendi tarafından içselleştirildiğini anlatmaktadır. Bu incelemede çalışmamız açısından en elzem nokta ‘egemen birey’ fikridir. Egemen birey, insanın henüz bir hayvandan kesin çizgilerle ayrışmadığı tarih öncesi dönemde görenek ahlakının muazzam işlevinin nihai hedefi ve ürünü olarak tanımlanır. Bu hedef söz vermeye yetkin bir hayvan yani insanı üretmektir. Nietzsche’ye göre söz vermek oluşun en temel niteliği yani tahmin edilemez bir devinim içinde olduğu göz önüne alındığında paradoksal bir olgudur. Bununla birlikte söz

vermek için sağlıklı bir fizyolojiyi mümkün kılan en temel yeti olan unutma yetisinin hatırlama yetisi ile üstesinden gelinmesini gerektirir. Ayrıca söz verme yetisine sahip olmak için yalnızca dünyanın değil aynı zamanda söz verenin de yani insanın da bir bakıma değişmez ve zamandışı yani kendine özdeş olarak kalabilmesini gerekmektedir. Dolayısıyla egemen birey ideali, kendi eylem ve istencinin sorumluluğunu taşıyabilecek kendine özdeş ve değişmeyen bir insan kurgusunu da beraberinde getirdiğinden modernitenin özerk özne fikri ile örtüşmektedir. Fakat Nietzsche'ye göre insan, bu ideale ulaşmak için istencini ertelemek ve sağlıklı bir fizyolojinin gereği olan unutma yetisini köreltmek durumunda kaldığından tamamıyla acıdan oluşan bir içsellik geliştirmiş ve bu şekilde Nietzsche'ye göre dünya üzerindeki en hastalıklı hayvan haline gelmiştir. Ancak insan her ne kadar bu süreç sonunda değişmiş ve farklı bir varlık haline gelmiş olsa da Nietzsche'ye göre yaşamın sürekli devinim halinde olduğu gerçeği göz önüne alındığında 'egemen birey' idealinin gerçekleşmesi olanaksızdır. Yine de bu uzun sürecin sonunda 'egemen birey' idealinin en azından kendimizi ve dünyayı yorumlama tarzı olma anlamında hüküm sürdüğünü söyleyebiliriz. Sonuç olarak, Nietzsche'nin 'üstün insan' idealinin gerçekleşmesinin tam da modern öznellik kurgusuyla pek çok bakımdan uyuşan 'egemen birey' idealinin ve yorumunun üstesinden gelinmesini ve aşılmasını gerektiğini iddia etmekteyiz.

Özne kurgusunun soykütüğü bu şekilde gösterildikten sonra modern özneliliğin ve buna bağlı düşünce kavramsallaştırmasının Nietzsche tarafından nasıl eleştirildiğine ve yapısöküme uğratıldığına bakabiliriz. Nietzsche, *İyinin ve Kötünün Ötesinde*'de özneliliğin nasıl yanılmalı tasımsal bir yapısının olduğunu ortaya koyar. Descartes'ın dolaysız kesinlik olarak ele aldığı 'düşünüyorum' önermesinin ardında yatan gizli varsayımları gösterir. İlk düşünme edimi bilinçli bir zihinsel edim olarak ele alınmıştır. İkinci olarak diğer tüm edimler gibi düşünce ediminin de ardında etken bir töz olması gerektiği varsayılmış ve son olarak bu etken tözün özne olduğu iddia edilmiştir. Burada bahsi geçen yanılmalı tasım, Nietzsche'ye göre ilk örneğini ve desteğini dildeki özne-yüklem

ayrımından almaktadır. Dahası özneye atfedilen yalınlık niteliği de dilin en temel işlevlerinden olan karmaşık olanı basite indirgeme işlevinden ileri gelmektedir. Nietzsche'ye göre kelimelerin yalın görünümü, muazzam bir süreç, duygulanım, istenç, dürtü ve kuvvet çatışması ile güç ifadesi çokluğunu gizlemektedir. Bu durum düşünce ve özne kavrayışımız için de geçerlidir. Dilin metafizik işleyişinin ayırdaya varmayan epistemolojistler düşünceyi meydana getiren süreç ve unsur çokluğunu göz ardı etmiş ve bu düşünceyi düşünsel süreçte etken olan tek bir elemente yani bilince indirgemişlerdir. Aynı şekilde modern felsefe, insanın her an değişmekte olan fizyolojik özellikleri, dürtüleri, istenci ve duygulanımlarını görmezden gelinerek insan kendine özdeş bir özne olarak resmedilmiştir.

Modern düşünce kavrayışını ve insan anlayışını bertaraf edebilmek için Nietzsche metafizik düşüncenin bilinci bedenden ayırmasını ve bedeni değersizleştirirken bilince büyük bir değer atfetmesini eleştirir. Bu eleştiri temel olarak bilincin evrimsel sürecin belli bir döneminde insan fizyolojisinde kendini koruma ihtiyacının ortaya çıkması sonucunda bedenden türemiş bir yan olgu olduğu iddiası üzerine kuruludur. Bu şekilde bilinci bedene içkinleştirerek Nietzsche bilincin bize yalnızca bilinçdışı bir düzeyde meydana gelen çok daha karmaşık ve geniş süreçlerin sonuç noktasını ya da gölge etkisini gösterdiğini ifade eder. Fakat bu noktada Nietzsche'nin beden anlayışının Descartesçı bir beden anlayışından tamamıyla farklı olduğunu hatırlamamız gerekmektedir. Beden Descartes'a göre uzamsallığa indirgenmiş bir madde yığını iken Nietzsche'ye göre bilinçdışı kuvvetlerin ilişkilenmesi ve çatışması ile şans eseri üretilen ve bu kuvvetlerin devamlı olarak üzerinde etkin olduğu alandır.

Bu bağlamda, Nietzsche insan ruhunu bilindışı kuvvetlerin ve bilincin şiddetli çatışmalarının gerçekleştiği bir çokluk ve devinim alanı olarak görür. Bu tür bir ruh anlayışı ile insanın fizyolojik bir çokluk olarak görülebilmesinin önü açılır ve düşünce süreçlerinde bedenin ve bilinçdışının bilince göre çok daha etkin olduğu ortaya koyulur. Nietzsche'ye göre düşünce bedensel bir süreç olduğundan insanın

bilincine baęlı, istençli olarak gerçekleştirilebilecek bir edim deęildir. Tersine insan bedeni, dünyayı meydana getiren kuvvetler çatışmasının alanı ise düşünce de kendine-özdeş bir öznenin ürünü olarak deęil birbiriyle zorunlu olarak iç içe geçmiş oluş süreçlerinin bir yansımasıdır. Sonuç olarak Nietzsche'nin fizyolojik düşüncesi bilincin öncelięi varsayımı üzerine kurulmuş olan öznellik düşüncesini aşarak insanın ve insana dair tüm olguların anlaşılabilmesi için daha olumlayıcı bir çerçeve sunmaktadır.

APPENDIX B: TEZ FOTOKOPİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : İLBAŞI
Adı : Kıvılcım
Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : THINKING WITHOUT THE SUBJECT:
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF CARTESIAN AND KANTIAN
SUBJECTIVITY

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: