

ISLAMIC PROLETARIAT & THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS DYNAMICS  
IN THE CONTEXT OF GEZI PARK PROTESTS IN NEOLIBERAL TURKEY

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **ISLAMIC PROLETARIAT & THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS DYNAMICS IN THE CONTEXT OF GEZI PARK PROTESTS IN NEOLIBERAL TURKEY**

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Considering the rudiments of neoliberalism; hierarchy, stratification, and thus inequality must be continuously reproduced, in which the analytical and empirical importance of 'class' cannot be denied. Bear in mind, Gezi Park protests, which were the most prominent civil uprisings, revealed particular structural staples of neoliberal Turkey – one of the critical is the class dynamics. Accordingly, the primary concern of this thesis offers an examination of Islamic proletariat and the new middle classes (secular & Islamic) in a critical way. Furthermore, the fragmentation of the working class, the relations between the state and the social classes, and how these classes positioned themselves during Gezi are further issues discussed from a sociohistorical perspective. In this sense, Gezi is detected as a breaking point rather than a singular reality by itself. Consequently, it is argued that neoliberalism has been struggling for continuing its hegemony through Islam because of the growing size of secular new middle class, which was manifested by Gezi. Dialectical critical realism constitutes the methodological structure of this research. Critical literature review and analysis of secondary data/statistics are used with a support of in-depth interviews with leading scholars conducted in the summer of 2015.

**Keywords:** Islamic proletariat, new middle class, Islamic new middle class, Gezi Park Protests, Turkey

## ÖZ

### GEZİ PARKI PROTESTOLARI BAĞLAMINDA NEOLİBERAL TÜRKİYE'DE İSLAMCI PROLETARYA VE YENİ ORTA SINIF DİNAMİĞİ

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Neoliberalizmin temelleri dikkate alındığında; hiyerarşi, katmanlaşma ve sonuç olarak eşitsizlik sürekli bir biçimde yeniden üretilmelidir. Bu sebeple 'sınıf analitik ve deneysel olarak red edilemez bir öneme sahiptir. Bunu göz önünde bulundurarak Gezi Parkı eylemleri, en çok öne çıkan sivil başkaldırı olarak, neoliberal Türkiye'de bazı yapısal gerçekleri açığa çıkardı – en önemlilerinden biri ise sınıf dinamikleriydi. Bu nedenle, bu tezin temel ilgisi İslamcı proletaryanın ve yeni orta sınıfların (seküler & İslamcı) eleştirel bir şekilde incelenmesidir. Ayrıca, Türkiye'de işçi sınıfı içindeki bölünme, devlet ve bu üç sosyal sınıfın arasındaki ilişki ve bu üç sosyal sınıfın Gezi'de nasıl bir tutum aldıkları sosyo-tarihsel bir yaklaşımla tartışıldı. Bu bağlamda, Gezi kendi başına tikel bir olgu olarak değil, bir kırılma noktası olarak saplanmaktadır. Sonuç olarak, büyüyen seküler yeni orta sınıf dikkate alındığında Türkiye'de neoliberalizmin İslam üzerinden hegemonyasını devam ettirmekte zorlandığı ve Gezi'nin bunu açıkça gösterdiği öne sürülmektedir. Bütün bunlar ele alınırken, diyalektik eleştirel gerçekçilik araştırmanın metodolojik yapısını oluşturmaktadır. Eleştirel literatür taraması ve ikincil veri/istatistik kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca alanında önde gelen bilim insanları ile derinlemesine mülakatlar 2015 yazında gerçekleştirilmiş ve kullanılmıştır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** İslamcı proletarya, yeni orta sınıf, İslamcı yeni orta sınıf, Türkiye, Gezi Parkı protestoları

**To Gülsüm Elvan**



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

DP	Democrat Party
EU	European Union
FP	Felicity Party
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
ISI	Import-Substitution Industrialization
JDP	Justice and Development Party
LPT	Labor Party of Turkey
MP	Motherland Party
NOP	National Order Party
NSMs	New Social Movements
NSP	National Salvation Party
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
RPP	Republican People's Party
SPO	State Planning Organizations
TIS	Turkish-Islamic Synthesis
TURKSTAT	Turkish Statistical Institute
UN	United Nations
VP	Virtue Party
WB	World Bank
WP	Welfare Party

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

'Gezi Park' is a public garden in Taksim/Istanbul. The Justice and Development Party's – hereafter the 'JDP' – plan was to demolish the park and construct a shopping mall instead. It was the starting point of the so-called 'Gezi Park protests' – hereafter 'Gezi' – related to ecological apprehensions where lives of people are being subjected not on the demands of democratic forum, but on the demands of the market.<sup>1</sup> In the following process, growing demonstrations throughout Turkey took over an anti-authoritarian theme rather than an ecological one. In that context, Gezi was the biggest and probably the most significant civil uprising in the history of Turkey containing various unique and global components, and it was a clear indication of the crisis of JDP's Sunni-Islamic/conservative neoliberal hegemony.<sup>2</sup> To put it more clearly, Gezi emerged as a robust reaction against the increasing authoritarianism and widening inequalities by the people who could not find place for them within the political representation of neoliberal democracy.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the protests made explicitly visible the social classes' importance<sup>4</sup> in contemporary Turkey by demonstrating how different classes positioned themselves during Gezi.<sup>5</sup> In that regard, while considering social class in the context of Gezi, I am going to concentrate on three social classes in Turkey: Islamic proletariat, new middle class<sup>6</sup> and Islamic new middle class. The first mentioned and the other two classes generate

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1 Tuğal, C. (2013). "Resistance Everywhere": The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective. *New Perspective on Turkey*. 49 (1), p157-172. (1), p157-172.

2 Doğan, A., E. (2013). Hegemonya Krizine Geri Dönülürken Tarihsel Momentin Gereklere. In: Coşkun, M., Bulut, Ç. & Durak, Y. *Praksis*. Ankara: Dipnot Yayınları. p95-105.

3 Tuğal, C. (2013). "Resistance Everywhere": The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective. *New Perspective on Turkey*. 49 (1), p157-172.

4 Savran, S. (2014). Halk İsyanının Sınıf Karakteri Üzerine Notlar. In: Savran, S., Tanyılmaz, K. & Tonak, E., A. *Marksizm ve Sınıflar*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap. p295-303.

5 My periodization while referring 'contemporary Turkey' is from 2002 when the JDP came to power to the present.

6 It always refers to 'secular' one throughout this study.

respectively manual and non-manual workforce of neoliberal economy, all are indispensable for the continuity of the system. According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), the population of Turkey in 2014 is about 77.5 million, and 77.2 per cent of the total population resides in urban areas.<sup>7</sup> Hence, these classes predominantly live in the urban and produce their socioeconomic and sociopolitical presence in cities which is considerable regarding neoliberal economic and social reproduction. Gezi has pointed out a serious clash between new middle class as the bulk of the protests on the one side, and Islamic proletariat and Islamic new middle class as the social bodies of JDP on the other.<sup>8</sup> The JDP cannot establish hegemony over new middle class because its cultural and ideological norms are only compatible with Sunni-Islamic/conservative components of Turkish society like Islamic proletariat and Islamic new middle class, whereas the new middle class is seriously different in terms of its sociocultural existence. In fact, the primary concern of this study is to investigate; *how do Gezi Park protests reflect Islamic proletariat & the new middle class dynamics in neoliberal Turkey?* In this context, three subquestions may be posed:

- How the fragmentation of working class occurred in the process of Turkey's neoliberal structuring?
- What are the relations between the state and the social classes?
- How the expert interviewees have interpreted these dynamics?

The beginning of Islamic proletarianization in Turkey dates back to the 1950s when the liberal transformation gained momentum after the Democrat Party's (DP) accession. Afterwards, the pre-neoliberal epoch (1960-1980) entailed the state active intervention to develop capital accumulation and industrialization that increased urban proletarianization. Lastly, the period call as the neoliberal transformation of Turkey started with the *coup d'état* in

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<sup>7</sup> <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

<sup>8</sup> Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islam Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.



September of 1980 to 1990 accelerated Islamic urban proletarianization.<sup>9</sup> Islamization/political Islam are the headliner in the process of creating Islamic proletarianization. In another saying, capitalism created a class through Islamization/political Islam to consolidate its existence.<sup>10</sup> I classify 'Islamic proletariat' in this study as: workers complying with religious norms, deprived of educational opportunities and working for extremely low wages at industry or service sectors in urban areas (Urban Poor), which form the fundamental class members. By all means, economic and material-based approaches are not sufficiently explanatory to understand why Islamic proletariat still indulges neoliberalism despite of their extreme poor economic and social circumstances. In the present day, Islamic proletariat presents a substantial proponent of the neoliberal JDP rule.

Neoliberalism entered a new stage when the JDP came into power in 2002; the institutionalization of neoliberalism considerably deepened and widened in the state and society.<sup>11</sup> As a result of that, the advancement of 'neoliberal Islamic society' gained acceleration.<sup>12</sup> This society has notable distinctiveness when compared to its predecessor; more individual, pragmatic, opportunistic and conformist.<sup>13</sup> Along with these aspects, 'Islamic new middle class' in Turkey emerged as a new phenomenon since 2002<sup>14</sup>, and it can be seen as the economic and cultural backbone of the JDP rule.<sup>15</sup> Islamic new middle class has many similarities with secular new middle class in terms of its educational level, intellectual capital and position in neoliberal reproduction.

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9 Atasoy, Y. (2009). *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

10 *Ibid.*, p107-137.

11 Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islam Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

12 *Ibid.*, p22-23.

13 *Ibid.*, p235-250.

14 Nasr, V. (2009). *Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What It Will Mean for Our World*. New York: Free Press. p232-252.

15 *Ibid.*, p232-252.

However, the cultural and ideological essentials of this class rely on Sunni-Islamic/conservative norms and values, which is totally different than its secular counterpart. In this sense, these norms and values are based on a liberal interpretation of the Quran. Consequently, the collaboration of Islamization/political Islam and the market regime is asserted.<sup>16</sup> This could be defined as 'sanctification of capitalism' through religion.

“Religious civil society (formerly Islamist newspapers, communities, orders, associations, etc.) combined its forces to sacralize the JDP’s economic program. Without this spiritualization, neo-liberalism could not be sustained. The molecular Islamization of economic discourse and dispositions were an inseparable part of new capitalist hegemony.”<sup>17</sup>

Turkey's neoliberal transformation during the 1980s necessitated more skilled labor that was the creative force of new middle class. People of this class have mostly bachelor degree, can speak at least one foreign language and use global information networks effectively.<sup>18</sup> Eventually, their intellectual capitals are considerably higher than 'old' middle class, which brings new social dynamics. Besides, urban and public spheres are indispensable of new middle class wherein producing and experiencing of their sociocultural are realized.<sup>19</sup> They do not want to live in a monolithic and mechanic society. Freedoms, environment, gender, secularism and anti-authoritarianism are such concerns regarded sensitively. Primarily, the people stand against paternal state, family and traditions as well as oppressive religious norms. Individualism is indispensable reality of their lives. Politically, even if new middle class contains a wide range of ideological perspectives, religious and ethnics identities – more heterogeneous than

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16 Adaş, E., B . (2006). The Making of Entrepreneurial Islam and the Islamic Spirit of Capitalism. *Journal for Cultural Research*. 10 (2), p113-137.

17 Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islam Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press. p55.

18 Keyder, Ç. (2013). *Yeni Orta Sınıf*. <<http://bilimakademisi.org>> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

19 *Ibid*.

Islamic proletariat and Islamic new middle class<sup>20</sup>, – the people can easily mobilize for recovery of their freedom, citizenship rights and democracy, but not for demanding enhancement to their material conditions. By doing that, their purpose is not to change the structure of state, but to force the state for fulfilling their demands. All in regard, there are basically at least two major concerns of new middle class as reasons of why they have participated Gezi vigorously. Firstly, their demands could not be met politically within the authoritarian neoliberal democracy.<sup>21</sup> Secondly, the JDP limited some of fundamental rights and freedoms and started to threaten particular commonly shared values such as secularism.<sup>22</sup>

In fact, the JDP has tried to build a Sunni-Islamic/conservative nation for a long time.<sup>23</sup> People who are not included in the Sunni-Islamic/conservative classification of the JDP have been excluded from the decision-making mechanisms. For this reason, their sociocultural and sociopolitical practices have been endangered by the JDP's authoritarianism. In this respect, several social movements have been mobilized before Gezi in relation to *HES*<sup>24</sup>, the 4+4+4 education system<sup>25</sup>, the anti-nuclear movements, anti-subcontractor labor resistances, political lawsuits against students and journalists<sup>26</sup>, etc. Therefore, Gezi was not a sudden cyclical mobilization; *au contraire*, it has

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20 Tuğal, C. (2013). "Resistance Everywhere": The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective. *New Perspective on Turkey*. 49 (1), p157-172.

21 Örs, I., R. (2014). Genie in the Bottle: Gezi Park, Taksim Square and the Realignment of Democracy and Space in Turkey. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*. 40 (4-5), p489-498.

22 Gürçan, E., C. & Peker, E. (2015). *Challenging Neoliberalism at Turkey's Gezi Park: From Private Discontent to Collective Class Action*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

23 Yaşlı, F. (2014). *AKP, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus: Yeni Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap. p164-184.

24 *HES* in Turkish refers hydroelectric power plants. *HES* protests are ecological movements in certain locations of Turkey against the deforestation in order to build hydroelectric power plants.

25 It is the new education system of Turkey since 2012 for all primary, secondary and high schools. It has been seriously criticized because of its non-scientific and religious structure. It is also seen a threat to secularism in the long-term. However, the JDP has used its political power to enact that by ignoring all criticisms.

26 According to the report dated October 2012 by the Committee to Protect Journalists, Turkey has the greatest number in world with 49 journalists imprisoned because of journalistic activity. These were 45 in Iran, 32 in China respectively.

strong social and political origins where Sunni-Islamic/conservative and neoliberal implementations of the JDP played a important role. Gezi is neither purely class-based nor classless, but the excluded groups such as Kemalists, Alawites, socialists/communists, secular Kurds, LGBT members, feminists, environmentalists and so forth were the driving mass of the protests. Consequently, Gezi was the hegemony crises of neoliberal JDP rule<sup>27</sup>; an examination of the social classes and their cultural consciousness in the context of Gezi is perceived as necessary to understand particular social and political dynamics in Turkey.

After these introductory words, it should be indicated why 'class' is significant to understand the interconnection of neoliberalism, the JDP and Gezi. While some scholars have discussed the significance of 'class' analysis for understanding of social movements, some others perceive it as redundant at the same time. A wide range of scholars has argued that class analyses are 'outdated' owing to the post-class reality of postindustrial societies. For instance, Jean Baudrillard<sup>28</sup>, Jean-François Lyotard<sup>29</sup> and Mike Featherstone<sup>30</sup> put into words that the alteration includes the differentiation of former social relations, and even becomes more complicated since World War II in Western societies is called as postmodernity – The new social system overthrew modern capitalist society. Similarly, Zygmunt Bauman mentions the diversity, ambiguity, discontinuities of modernism and invalidity of grand ideologies in the postmodern era.<sup>31</sup> In that context, Ulrich Beck<sup>32</sup>, Stephen Crook<sup>33</sup>, Jan Pakulski<sup>34</sup> and Malcolm Water<sup>35</sup> have argued that postmodernism had rounded off the class understanding of modernism.

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27 Taştan, C. (2013). The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: A Qualitative Field Research. *Insight Turkey*. 15 (3), p27-38.

28 Baudrillard, J. (1983). *Simulations*. New York: Semiotext(e).

29 Lyotard, J-F. (1984). *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*. Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press.

30 Featherstone, M. (1988). In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An Introduction. *Theory, Culture and Society*. 5 (1), p195-215.

31 Bauman, Z. (1997). *Postmodernity and Its Discontents*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

32 Beck, U. (1992). *Risk Society: Toward A New Modernity*. London: Sage.

“As argued in the concluding section, ‘classness’ reached its peak in industrial society and has been declining while postindustrial and postmodern trends intensify. Contemporary advanced societies remain unequal, but in a classless way. These increasingly complex configurations of classless inequality and antagonism, it is argued here, call for more comprehensive theoretical and analytic constructs.”<sup>36</sup>

E. P. Thompson and Raymond Williams had indicated that the class is the primary unit of analysis in cultural examinations was criticized by such as Frank Parkin<sup>37</sup>, Rosemary Crompton<sup>38</sup> and Nicholas Abercrombie & John Urry<sup>39</sup>. Antonio Negri himself decelerated the demise of Marxist class perceptions depends on the means of production.<sup>40</sup> Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe consider Marxism as reductionist from Marx to Gramsci and Althusser whereas poststructuralist theory is the milestone to attain pluralist radical democracy.<sup>41</sup> David Ashley emphasizes the term of ‘technocapitalist society’ whose culture has already produced a new type of capitalist society, significantly different than the former on the issue of class.<sup>42</sup> Furthermore, neo-Weberian scholars mention about class competition to get better living

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33 Crook, S. (2003). Social Theory and the Postmodern. In: Ritzer, G. & Smart, B. *Handbook of Social Theory*. London: Sage. p308-324.

34 Pakulski, J. (1996). The Dying of Class Theory or of Marxist Class Theory. In: Lee, D. & Turner, B. *Conflicts About Class*. London: Longman.

35 Water, M. (1991). Collapse and Convergence in Class Theory. *Theory, Culture and Society*. 20 (2), p141-172.

36 Pakulski, J. (2005). Foundations of A Post-Class Analysis . In: Wright, E. *Approaches to Class Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

37 Parkin, F. (1972). *Class Inequality and Political Order*. London: Paladin.

38 Crompton, R. (1993). *Class and Stratification: An Introduction to Current Debates*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

39 Abercrombie, N. and Urry, J. (1983). *Capital, Labour and the Middle Classes*. London: Allen Unwin.

40 Negri, A. (1991). *Marx Beyond Marx*. London: Pluto Press.

41 Laclau, E. & Mouffe, C. (1985). *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward A Radical Democratic Politics*. London: Verso.

42 Ashley, D. (1997). *History without a Subject: The Postmodern Condition*. Boulder: Westview Press.

conditions instead of class struggle in Marxist understanding.<sup>43</sup> In short, the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism in the market economy, the decline of modern politics in capitalist globalization and the state, technological developments and the emergence of new class forms and configurations are considered as crucial in this sense.

Gezi can be analyzed in relation to neoliberalism, class, postmodernism, authoritarianism, social identity and Sunni-Islamic/conservative hegemony. In that regard, Gezi should be categorized as a new social movement (NSMs).<sup>44</sup> NSMs in theory reject the materialistic understanding of consumerism in neoliberal societies by interrogating the modern idea, which argues happiness depends on process, productivity and growth in relation to the material world.<sup>45</sup> Gezi was not a class-based uprising and did not contain economic demands. Instead, anti-authoritarianism, freedom, environment, women's rights, right to the city and so on were the leading concerns. Besides, there was no hierarchal structure among the protesters. Therefore, it is not possible to comprehend Gezi merely under economic and material approaches.

On the other hand, Douglas Kellner stresses the continuities and discontinuities of the present moment; there is not an ontological break from modernity to postmodernity.<sup>46</sup> According to Anthony Giddens, the capitalist society is class-based all the way, and the classes are the center of social struggle which implies that the class analyses are analytically and empirically important.<sup>47</sup> In other words, class is still indispensable in order to

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43 Lockwood, D. (1975). Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society. In: Bulmer, R. *Working-Class Images of Society*. London: RKP. p16-31.

44 Yıldırım, Y. (2014). The Differences of Gezi Parki Resistance in Turkish Social Movements. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 5 (1), p177-185.

45 Melucci, A. (2001). *Challenging Codes: Collective Action in the Information Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

46 Kellner, D. (1999). Theorizing the Present Moment: Debates Between Modern and Postmodern Theory. *Theory and Society*. 28 (1), p639-656.

47 Giddens, A. (1973). *The Class Struggle of the Advanced Societies*. London: Hutchinson.

comprehend economic, political and social realities of the present moment.<sup>48</sup> David Harvey emphasizes the transition from Fordism to post-Fordism that has brought less demand on traditional labor power and more consumption.<sup>49</sup> Harvey's point on postmodernism is an ongoing form of capitalism and class-based society with new dynamics.

"The world of the working class becomes the domain of that 'other,' which is necessarily rendered opaque and potentially unknowable by virtue of the fetishism of market exchange. And I should also add parenthetically that if there are already those in society (women, blacks, colonized peoples, minorities of all kinds) who can readily be conceptualized as the other, then the conflation of class exploitation with gender, race, colonialism, ethnicity, etc. can proceed apace with all manner of invidious results. Capitalism did not invent 'the other' but it certainly made use of and promoted it in highly structured ways."<sup>50</sup>

Similarly, Fredric Jameson refers to postmodernism as a stage in the development of capitalist society and a cultural reflection of multinational capitalism.<sup>51</sup> Jameson has realized more than numerous hermeneutical philosophers in attaining of an intellectual refinement and furthering theoretical demur of Marxist school in the 'postmodern times'.

"(...) how a historian (literary or other) posits a radical break between two henceforth distinct periods. I must limit myself to the suggestion that radical breaks between periods do not generally involve complete changes of content but rather the restructuration of a certain number of elements already given: features that in an earlier period or system were subordinate now become dominant, and features that had been dominant again become secondary. In this sense, everything we have described here can be found in earlier periods and most notably within modernism proper: my point is that until the present day those things have been secondary or minor features of modernist art, marginal rather than central, and that we have something new when they become the central features of cultural production."<sup>52</sup>

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48 Scott, J. (1994). Class Analysis: Back to the Future. *Sociology*. 28 (1), p933-942.

49 Harvey, D. (1990). *The Condition of Postmodernity*. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishing.

50 Ibid., p104.

51 Jameson, F. (1991). *Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

52 Jameson, F. (1983). Postmodernism and Consumer Society. In: Foster, H. *The Anti-Aesthetic*. Washington: Bay Press. p111-125.

This research remarks that 'class' as a unit of analysis is very important in the process of social and political scrutiny. Antagonisms, possibilities for conflict and eventually alliances among the classes, as well as different alliances and conflicts between these classes and the state are essential to comprehend the social and political dynamics in neoliberal Turkey. A macro scale and complex content is addressed about Islamic proletariat and the new middle class dynamics in the context of Gezi Park protests. Through a set of various subjects, the attempt is to present a critical analysis. In that context, chapter 2 firstly presents dialectical critical realism as the study's methodological framework. Secondly, research method and process are given. Chapter 3 offers a brief history of Turkey's transition to neoliberalism starting from 1950. Dividing it into three historical periods, a sociohistorical look is made to realize the roots of Islamic proletariat and the new middle class. In chapter 4, a critical look to the JDP is expressed. This chapter consists of two subtitles. Firstly, the economic sociology of JDP's roots is evaluated with a particular regard to Islamism/Political Islam. Secondly, an analysis is being done to understand the party ideology; thus, it is argued that the JDP is formed by a complex interplay of neoliberalism, political Islam and conservatism. Chapter 5 focuses on the historical and social aspects of Gezi, and besides a theoretical approach to some discussions over Gezi was presented. This chapter points out that Gezi is a breaking point rather than a singular reality by itself. Chapter 6 is a modest attempt of protoconceptualization about Islamic proletariat. This chapter can be regarded as a draft in a future work. Also, Islamic proletariat's discontent to Gezi is discussed. Chapter 7 contains an inclusive examination of the new middle classes. A broad conceptual approach is given through various school of thoughts and scholars in a comparative manner. Lastly, chapter 8 is the conclusion & discussion.



## **CHAPTER 2**

### **METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH**

In this chapter, the methodology and research method used is introduced. The methodological structure of this study is shaped under the fundamentals of Roy Bhaskar's 'dialectical critical realism' – hereafter 'DCR' – as a philosophy of science that is very briefly expounded with respect to its involvement in social sciences. In the first part, from a philosophical perspective, some major points of DCR related to the study are briefly introduced. Secondly, the ontological approach of DCR as material practice is presented. What the ontology of social in DCR is pivotal in this sense? Moreover, the stratified character of social reality is stressed as a distinguishing component of DCR. In other words, the structure of scientific knowledge shows that the material entities and causal processes which constitute the world are 'ontologically stratified' that is why; several of structurally discrete levels of reality are in existence and irreducible to each other. Thirdly, the structure-agency dichotomy in DCR is stressed. Eventually, what DCR suggests to social sciences is summarized.

Taken into consideration the mentioned philosophical and methodological components, fourthly, the importance of DCR for the study is accentuated. Why the ontological assumptions are valuable, and why the theoretical conceptualization on the issue of structure-agency is significant are explained.

Lastly, the research methods and processes are mentioned. The study includes both qualitative and quantitative methods. The parts of my research consist of content analysis and critical evaluation of existing literature relevant for the analysis. Expert in-depth interviews have been also realized with scholars have academic studies on class, neoliberalism, the state Islamization/political Islam, the JDP rule and Gezi. Furthermore, statistics/documents (i.e. economic indicators, poverty statistics) are used to provide quantitative data relevant for the study.

## 2.1 Critical Realism: A Very Brief Introduction

As mentioned above, the study's methodological structure is shaped by Roy Bhaskar's critical realism. Since its origins in the 1970s, critical realism as Anglo-American originated philosophy of science has successfully accompanied many disciplines in social sciences – sociology, political science, economics, anthropology, psychology and some others.<sup>53</sup> However, critical realism essentially consists of several different schools. Bear in mind, current critical realism is often linked with the studies of Roy Bhaskar and his philosophy of science. Over the last three decades, Bhaskar himself has addressed certain of the thorniest issues of social sciences. He has set forth a criticism to poststructuralism and postmodernism, yielded a philosophy of the experimental method, and argued how ideas concerning agency could be associated into naturalistic dimension of social sciences. That is to say, from the philosophical stand of DCR, he has challenged idealist ascendancy in social sciences. In this respect, DCR has sought a 'middle path' as an alternative to both positivism and hermeneutic. While avoiding interpretive theory and positivism, DCR bases naturalism and its explanations in social sciences. The proposed middle path has been able to find a ground for development of its ontological and methodological foundations. Indeed, Bhaskar as a leading scholar provides a workable synthesis.<sup>54</sup>

DCR is composed by two pivotal schools in philosophy of social sciences, namely 'transcendental realism' and 'critical naturalism'. In that context, Bhaskar's philosophical ontology is molded in transcendental realism and his realism in science as well. Herein, Bhaskar proposes that the scientific knowledge must adhere to absolute structures of the world – scientific knowledge is possible. This is an explicit objection against the assertion that 'knowledge makes the world be intelligible'. On the other hand, critical naturalism focuses immediately on the methodological question; whether it is

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53 Brown, A. (2014). Critical Realism in Social Research: Approach with Caution. *Work, Employment and Society*. 28 (1), p112-123.

54 Harvey, D. (2002). Agency and Community: A Critical Realist Paradigm. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*. 32 (2), p163-194.

or not possible to speak about an authentic natural science of society? It means – what is the possibility of talking on ‘laws of society and of human behavior’ like talking of ‘laws of nature’? Bhaskar’s answer is positive. However, he qualifies his answer to mark the difference of subject matter in social sciences, compared with natural sciences. There is a duality underlined; (1) the self-determining instants of human mind and (2) the irreducibility of structures, thereby ‘the sociological whole’ realized through the duality that is detailed in the part on ‘the structure-agency dichotomy’ (2.1.2). The affirmation is called at the end as critical naturalism.

“For the object of scientific inquiry are neither empirically given nor even actually determinate chunks of the world. Rather, they are real structures, whose actual presence and appropriate concept have to be produced by the experimental and theoretical work of science. What properties do societies and people possess that might make them possible objects of knowledge for us?”<sup>55</sup>

DCR acknowledges serious disparities between social and natural structures, and besides the differences in their forms. Bhaskar’s primary ontological consideration is to specify what the properties of social reality are. Additionally, the structure of knowledge makes comprehensible the social reality and individual mind in action. The presented is distinctive to both the ontology of social and the ontology of individual in Bhaskar’s understanding maintains a distinguishing analytical structure to scrutinize the twofold interaction. Thus, this framework is advanced in the ‘Transformational Model of Social Activity’ by Bhaskar himself – detailed in 2.1.2.

The upshot, Bhaskar’s DCR may empower the possibility of realization on explanations of social phenomena referring their causal mechanisms by liberating knowledge from both the radicalized subjectivity and objectivity. By emphasizing this, DCR offers four categorical instants of dialectic – negativity, totality, non-identity and transformative agency (Praxis).<sup>56</sup>

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55 Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*. London & New York: Routledge. p14.

56 Bhaskar, R. (2008). *Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom*. London & New York: Routledge.

### **2.1.1 Ontology as Material Practice**

In the first instance, DCR is a philosophy concerned with ontology that is the philosophical studying of being. In its first move, it calls attention to ontology, and thus argues you could not reduce statements about the world to merely statements about epistemology – epistemic fallacy.<sup>57</sup> That is, the nature of scientific object could determine its authentic epistemology instead of vice versa. Additionally, Bhaskar's critical realism comes out against the implicit ontology which depicts the world as unstructured, unchanging and undifferentiated. By contrast, DCR argues for a structured, changing and differentiated world. Turning to social sciences, it is asserted that social structure is a compulsory condition and preexists in space and time where human agency is in, but human agency is required at the same time for reproduction and transformation of social structure.

A deeper analysis on the philosophical legacies of DCR may make its ontological assumptions more comprehensible. In that respect, it would not be untrue to state that critical realism is remarkably influenced by Kant and his legacy. Kant's account of reason is significant for critical realist philosophy. I mean, for instance, British empiricists David Hume and John Locke have claimed that we merely get knowledge from how the world appears to us. These appearances maintain ideas about the world via our experiences. Thus, reason is entirely inactive and never a source of knowledge. Kant rejected this passive picture of human mind on the ground that human's emergence from the self-imposed immaturity is actualized by reason.<sup>58</sup> According to him, the development of reason saves people from the darkness of dogma, and puts them into the royal path to transcendental critical judgment. Furthermore, reason is necessary to realize connections not only among discrete phenomena, but it also indicates how the world could be critically comprehended. In brief, Kantian legacy in philosophical

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<sup>57</sup> Bhaskar, R. (1998). Dialectical Critical Realism and Ethics. In: Bhaskar, R., Archer, M., Collier, A., Lawson, T. & Norrie, A. *Critical Realism: Essential Readings*. London & New York: Routledge. p641-688.

<sup>58</sup> Kant, I. (1991). An Answer to the Question: What is the enlightenment? In: Reiss, H. *Kant's Political Writings*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p54.

formation of DCR is vital to understand particularly its ontological approach to 'causal powers' of objects.

Additionally, Hegel asserts that an object's essence must naturally appear to consciousness. However, although the essence presents itself via appearance, this appearance is not completely the same as essence.<sup>59</sup> This signifies the illusions of an object as parts of an essence. In other words, the real illusionary being is in existence when the essence appears. Correspondingly, subject and object are identical to each other; thereby there is not an absolute dichotomy between our subjectivity and world's objectivity even if our experiences are not able to reveal full aspects of the world. In this context, according to DCR's ontology, the existence of the structured world is separate from our consciousness and subjectivity. It refers to an independent object of scientific knowledge. The ontology also claims that certain spheres of existence create social reality and these spheres are 'real' and 'phenomenal' ones. Real sphere is comprised of the structures and mechanisms. Phenomenal is also the sphere we experience, but real cannot be fully realized within phenomenal.

“The necessity for categorical distinctions between structures and events and between open systems and closed are indices of the stratification and differentiation of the world, i.e. of the transcendental realist philosophical ontology.”<sup>60</sup>

By stating that, Bhaskar stands out to criticize positivism and its empirical realism. Causal laws which are identified as a constant conjunction of events comprehended via experience. This assertion of empirical realism proposes the world as a closed system. Against this, DCR emphasizes the impossibility of constant conjunction of events, so that what governs phenomena needs an open system. Consequently, DCR manifests a materialist ontology that argues the object of knowledge is free from human consciousness, but it does not mean a demise of human agency; a dualistic and stratified ontological structure in existence.

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<sup>59</sup> Hegel, G. W. F. (1969). *Science of Logic*. London: Allen & Unwin. p528.

<sup>60</sup> Bhaskar, R. (2008). *A Realist Theory of Science*. London & New York: Routledge. p19.

### **2.1.2 Structure-Agency Dichotomy: The Sociological Whole**

The structure-agency dichotomy is one of the fundamental issues in sociology. The relationship between structure and human agency is still a debatable matter, DCR as philosophy of social sciences had to deal with this issue, and thereof it did.

Society  $\Rightarrow$  Socialization  $\Rightarrow$  Individuals

In the beginning, the arrows above indicate causal flows of this process. It portrays causal power comes from society as structure to individuals as agency. This reflects the perspective of 'society creates human'. Institutional power in shaping individuals is the fundamental viewpoint in this respect. By underestimating human agency's power of reproduction in everyday life and the transforming capability over structure, it exaggerates the institutional power. Bhaskar associated it with sociology of Emile Durkheim, and named it as 'the Durkheimian stereotype'.<sup>61</sup>

Individual  $\Rightarrow$  Reproduction/Transformation  $\Rightarrow$  Society

On the other hand, the arrows above indicate a second schema of causal vectors as a reserved form of the previous. In contrast to the Durkheimian stereotype, human agency is in central stage and structure is pictured as merely production of individuals. Formative and active impact of human agency shapes institutional structure, for this reason, structure is an outcome of human's collective peculiarity. The reversed maxim refers now 'human creates society'. Bhaskar associated this overestimated agency power with sociology of Max Weber, and named as 'the Weberian stereotype'<sup>62</sup>

While studying diametrically, there are separately 'half-truths', why it is not possible merging them into a complementarity which is not only superior to both, but also contradictory in essence. Such a combination could result in unavoidable mediations, whereby structure and agency reciprocally reproduce each other. That is what Bhaskar's scheme does.

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<sup>61</sup> Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*. 3th ed. London & New York: Routledge. p34.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, p34.




Figure 1. Roy Bhaskar's 'Transformational Model of Social Activity'<sup>63</sup>

“This scheme thus seems able to do justice both to the subjective and intentional aspects of social life and to the externality and coercive power of social facts. And thus to avoid at once any voluntaristic implications of the Weberian tradition and any reification associated with the Durkheimian one. For a categorial distinction is now drawn between natural and social facts, in that the latter, but not the former, depend essentially upon human activity.”<sup>64</sup>

The dual aspect of Bhaskar's DCR strongly emphasizes the dialectic between structure and agency via unavoidable mediation processes. Eventually, Bhaskar explicitly attempts to merge the maxims 'society creates human' and 'human creates society' into a reorganized dialectically structure, namely 'the sociological whole'.<sup>65</sup> Notably, this theoretical framework is complementary with the philosophical standpoint of DCR on ontology – existing presences independent from or out of human consciousness. At the same time, human consciousness is capable of accommodating its productive strategies that provide relative autonomy to both human agency and mediating processes. Consequently, structure, agency and the mediation are ontologically irreducible elements in the reproduction of the sociological whole.

63 Harvey, D. (2002). Agency and Community: A Critical Realist Paradigm. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*. 32 (2), p167.

64 Bhaskar, R. (1998). *The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the Contemporary Human Sciences*. 3th ed. London & New York: Routledge. p35.

65 Harvey, D. (2002). Agency and Community: A Critical Realist Paradigm. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*. 32 (2), p168.

### **2.1.3 Importance of Critical Realism for the Study**

Regarding the major concerns of the study, how all the concerns are operationalized in this study under DCR must be stressed. Even if value-free social research is myth, I think that DCR may help me to catch up greater objectivity based on six major grounds.

1. Yielding a philosophical basis to social sciences
2. Insisting on ontological priority and separating transitive and intransitive spaces.
3. By emancipating from the stereotypes about structure, agency and the mediating processes, and providing a dialectical framework for the conceptualization of social reproduction.
4. Maintaining ontological abstractions for a better comprehension of phenomenal sphere and human subjectivity.
5. Pursuing a philosophical partisanship in favor of the possibility of scientific knowledge.
6. DCR yields a pluralistic approach to research methods. This is, research methods could thus be selected according to their properness without any methodological restriction.

Furthermore, DCR as philosophy of science is freestanding from ideologies such as Marxism, neoliberalism or poststructuralism that is why; it may be more capable to get greater objectivity for the study. More specifically, for instance, from Marx to present, Marxism as materialist interpretation of historical development and the critique of class society, systemic of capital, and privatizing of social life is crucial in social sciences; it is essential for this study *ipso facto*. However, this study does not only provide a critique to mainstream sociological understanding, but also a critique to Marxism in certain points of the concerns mentioned. Hence, DCR may make a contribution on the realization of the epistemological limitations, and what they exclude in the process of producing knowledge while encouraging us to rethink the literature.



## **2.2 Research Method and Process**

In this part, the method and process used are briefly expressed. This study is composed of both qualitative and quantitative methods. This research necessitates critical literature review for a deeper and more sophisticated realization and representation. Besides, I have conducted expert in-depth interviews with the scholars have significant academic studies related with the scope of this study. Additionally, I think quantitative method must be used to investigate the validity of theoretical assertions. The presence of quantitative data could be necessary for attaining greater objectivity while dealing with the issues.

- **Critical Literature Review**

The parts of my research consist of a critical literature review as relevant for an analysis of the study interests. By doing that, post-1950 literature has been particularly in concern, and both Turkish and English sources are used. Critical literature review as nonreactive research could provide me a ground for revealing content in a source of communication. Besides, a researcher with content analysis is able to compare different themes through a wide range of different books, articles, messages and meaning that could yield a more comparative approach to issues. A specific focus is given to the academic literature.

- **In-depth Interviews**

In the study, I have conducted expert in-depth interviews with scholars have academic researches on the scope of this study. The method could produce very detailed and specific answers as well as an exhaustive and varied knowledge for the study. Moreover, the interviewees are from different disciplines in social sciences that provided a multidisciplinary perspective in this sense. The interviewees were selected according to their expertise and of course there is no claim of representativity, but their opinions are considered as important contributions to my in-depth analysis. The interviews were tape recorded and later transcribed. Certain passages from the interviews were

translated and used throughout the study and analyzed with a critical perspective. The questions have been asked to the interviewees are given in appendix A. The transcriptions of the original Turkish answers can be found in appendix B.

*Table 1. The List of Interviewees<sup>66</sup>*

<b>Name, Surname</b>	<b>Institution &amp; Faculty/Department</b>	<b>Date of Interview</b>
Prof. Dr. Korkut Boratav (Emeritus)	Ankara University, the Faculty of Political Science	06/08/2015
Prof. Dr. Çağlar Keyder	Boğaziçi University, the Atatürk Institute	24/08/2015
Prof. Dr. Erinç Yeldan	Bilkent University, the Department of Economics	25/08/2015
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Pınar Bedirhanoğlu	Middle East Technical University, the Department of Int. Rel.	12/08/2015
Assist. Prof. Cenk Saraçoğlu	Ankara University, the Faculty of Communication	20/08/2015
Emrah Göker	Independent Researcher, Writer	11/08/2015
Tanıl Bora	Independent Researcher, Writer	01/09/2015

▪ **Analysis of Secondary Data/Statistics**

I use data/statistics which related with the study. A better understanding of what the economic, social and political circumstances of Turkey were and are could obtain a workable ground for operationalization of the study interests. By doing that, post-1950 data/statistics have been of special concern when felt necessary, and also certain statistics/data were used to introduce the pre-1950 period. The United Nations (UN), the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat) are the main sources for statistic/data; additionally, statistics/data from other institutions/organizations are used when necessary. The used statistics/data are particularly on the following issues:

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<sup>66</sup> All interviewees were informed about the aim of this thesis and the purely academic purpose. They agreed that their names could be used as sources in this academic work.

- Poverty
- Unemployment/Employment
- Finance
- Education
- Migration
- Demography

These statistics/data could help me to draw a general framework about the issues because the understanding of the study interests is not sufficiently apprehensible without considering economic, social and political transformations of Turkey. In the following process, I also used secondary quantitative statistics/data about Gezi Park protests for a better comprehension of its sociology. Have in mind, quantitative method may ensure at least four benefits for this study.

1. Obtaining a ground for 'falsification' to epistemological theories, hypothesis and assumptions.
2. For reducing and restructuring a complex issue into a limited number of variables.
3. Providing more objective and reliable causalities.
4. Reducing subjectivity of researcher.

## CHAPTER 3

### TRANSITION TO NEOLIBERALISM: A BRIEF HISTORY

This chapter introduces a brief socioeconomic history of Turkey since 1950. Firstly, the DP rule and the liberal transformation period are introduced while dealing with major themes. Secondly, the period between 1950 and 1980 is discussed which I call the pre-neoliberal epoch. Lastly, the period 1980-2000 as the neoliberal transformation is taken into consideration. This chapter focuses on the relationship between economic transformations and the social classes from a sociohistorical outlook. Survey data, official statistics and academic studies are also used in order to strengthen the arguments.

Turkey was established in 1923 after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. The population had declined from 16 million in 1914 to 13 million in 1925 within the present borders of Turkey – then it gradually increased; 21 million in 1950, 45 million in 1980 and 68 million in 2000.<sup>67</sup> This number reached to 77.5 million in 2014.<sup>68</sup> From 1923 to present, Turkish economy has experienced serious structural transformations, the most remarkable of which are urbanization and industrialization. During this process, per capita gross domestic product (GDP per capita) was \$710 in 1923, \$1620 in 1950 and \$1566 in 1980.<sup>69</sup> It was \$3576 when the JDP came to power in 2002 and \$10542 in 2014.<sup>70</sup> However, the gap in purchasing power narrowed slightly between advanced countries and Turkey from 1923 to the present.

The first period from 1923 to 1950 is characterized as ‘nation-building’. While Turkish economy was still mainly agrarian, it shifted from Ottoman’s free market to an inward-oriented model. Turkey as a new established nation

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67 (2003). Modern Turkey. In: Moky, J. *The Oxford Encyclopedia of Economic History, Volume 1*. United States: Oxford University Press. p135.

68 <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

69 Pamuk, Ş. (2008). Economic Change in Twentieth-Century Turkey: Is The Glass More Than Half Full?. In: Kasaba, R. *The Cambridge History of Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press. p267.

70 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>

state had been affected negatively by the Great Depression, the World War II and the failure in the world market for agricultural goods.<sup>71</sup> The 1930s were the years of ‘etatism’, which entailed vigorous state interventionism and the promotion of domestic industrialization through five-year development plans and state enterprises. Dramatic falls in production and national incomes during the 1920s were the major reasons of putting etatism into practice. World War II signaled a new period although Turkey did not join the war actively. From 1940 to 1945, the war economy was in practice. Turkey began to integrate itself into the Bretton Woods right after the war.

Turkey accomplished its ‘nation state building’ more than a hundred years later, compared to Europe. During that time, bourgeoisie’s inefficiency in Turkish economy hindered them to hold an autonomous stance against Turkish bureaucracy.<sup>72</sup> The absence of agricultural oligarchy also enabled the bureaucracy’s unrivalled ruling class position, which might have jeopardized their power if had existed. Considering the level of industrial production and urban population, it was also impossible to determine a prominent working class in existence. Consequently, the peculiar position of the bureaucracy as ruling class from 1923 to World War II delivered strong authority over economic and social evolution. This is, Turkey’s modernization was initiated by a bureaucratic ruling class instead of bourgeoisie. Thus, starting with 1923, Turkey has not pursued a way to capitalist modernization for a long time, but the post-World War II period was harbinger for new class paradigms.

*Table 2. Production Types & Shares in the National Income (%), 1923-32<sup>73</sup>*

	1923	1924	1925	1926	1927	1928	1929	1930	1931	1932
Agriculture	39.8	47.6	48.6	49.0	41.4	44.3	51.9	45.8	45.5	40.2
Industry	13.2	9.9	9.7	10.1	13.0	11.6	9.9	11.4	2.9	14.1
Trade	7.8	7.1	7.2	7.0	8.0	7.3	6.3	6.5	6.9	7.2
Other Services	39.2	35.4	35.1	33.2	37.6	36.8	31.9	36.3	34.7	38.5

71 Owen, R. & Pamuk, Ş. (1998). *A History of Middle East Economies in 20. Century*. London: Tauris. p10.

72 Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso. p71-117.

73 Kepenek, Y. (2012). *Türkiye Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. p52.

The period of 1950 - 1960 can be called 'the liberal transformation' of Turkey. The first democratic multi-party election was held in May 1950, and the Democratic Party (DP) came into power. The economic agenda of the DP in the beginning of 1950s basically aimed to set a free market regime and to attract foreign capital. Although the DP had been in power for ten years, the 'free marketers' did not succeed in ensuring an intensive liberalization in economy.<sup>74</sup> The state was still a dominant actor in economy, technological capacity was primitive, and the economy still heavily dependent on agricultural production with a little increase in industrialization. However, during this period, the bourgeoisie has been strengthened against the bureaucracy. Besides, while the mechanization of agriculture resulted in flows of migration from rural to urban, the increasing urbanization was a juncture for early proletarianization and class formations. These have induced considerable economic, social and political alterations, in which Turkey had experience a macro scale transformation in a nutshell.

From 1960 to 1980 was the period of planned economy to arrange entailments of neoliberal transformation. After the first coup in 1960, both the military and civilian rule adopted a model of regulated economy. Some applauded the active state involvement into the economy due to the belief that it stands against free market by defending common interests; however, the bureaucratic control has served for capitalist accumulation. In this regard, it is foremost that the import substituting industrialization (ISI) was a major dimension of the pre-neoliberal epoch, which had aimed to empower industrial bourgeoisie while protecting from foreign competition – the required capitalist accumulation was maintained. In addition, the pre-neoliberal epoch paved the way for proletarianization with increasing numbers of labor force in the industry. The second military coup in 1971, the oil crisis in 1973, increasing rural-urban migration, the labor and student movements and the economic crisis were some snapshots of the second half of the epoch, the next stage has begun in 1980.

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74 Aydın, Z. (2005). *The Political Economy of Turkey*. London: Pluto Press. p32.

*“The import substitution industrialization model, which is unique to Turkey, pertaining to Turkey started to be deadlocked due to economic problems in the mid-1970s. Hence, Turkey was dragged into a period where the main element of profitability derived from the export rents, instead trade rents in domestic demand. Also, the suppression of the export-oriented income came out instead of both high level of income and the opportunities derived from social welfare states relied upon domestic demand. The 1980 coup and the ‘January 24th decisions’ and following that Özal government were the implementers of that transformation.”<sup>71</sup> – [Erinç Yeldan]*

In 1980, the ‘January 24th decisions’ and the military coup were the two milestone events in the process of integration to capitalist economy. Turkey’s economy has realized a process of structural adjustments that is why; the period is called as ‘the neoliberal transformation’.<sup>75</sup> This transformation has gone slow and painful, and the Turkish economy started a process of deregulation, in which international actors such as the IMF, the WB and the OECD have been effectively involved. The policies implemented by the state since the 1980s have been compatible with the fundamentals of the Washington Consensus that aimed to neutralize the state in economy by privatization and deregulation. Promoted private sector and free trade, and also liberated financial sector and restructured public expenditures were the fundamental in this context.<sup>76</sup> The neoliberal transformation as a threshold for Turkey is not only crucial economically but also socially and politically considering its results upon class paradigms.

Since 2002, neoliberalism in Turkey entered a new phase under the JDP rule. In this period, neoliberalism advanced economically and socially. During the JDP rule, the number of big bourgeoisie has increased incrementally, and then more capital groups emerged as major actors in the economy. Turkey had 24 dollar billionaires in 2013 and it is 32 in 2015<sup>77</sup>; compared to 2002,

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75 Savran, S. (2002). The Legacy of the Twentieth Century. In: Balkan, N. & Savran, S. *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and State in Turkey*. New York: Nova Science Publishers. p1-21.

76 Öniş, Z. & Şensen, F. (2005). Rethinking the Emerging Post-Washington Consensus. *Development and Change*. 36 (2), p263-290.

77 <http://www.forbes.com/>

the number of billionaires has accelerated immensely. As already mentioned, the GDP per capita of Turkey is \$3576 in 2002 and \$10542 in 2014. In spite of these two positive indicators of the market economy, the GINI index<sup>78</sup> was 41.4 in 2002 and 40.2 in 2011.<sup>79</sup> In this respect, the OECD average on GINI index was 32 in 2012 and Turkey is 3<sup>rd</sup> out of 34 members in the most unequal distribution of wealth.<sup>80</sup> Besides, the richest 10 per cent in Turkey holds 77.7 per cent of the total wealth in 2014; it was 67 per cent in 2000.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, the ranks of Turkey in United Nations Human Development Index were 85<sup>th</sup> out 173 (2002), and 69<sup>th</sup> out of 187 (2014).<sup>82</sup> Eventually, poverty and social inequality as social facts in Turkey has always prevailed substantially, and are still ongoing during the JDP rule.

### **3.1 The Liberal Transformation: 1950-1960**

It is certain that the 1950 election was a turning point in Turkish history. The Republican People's Party (RPP) had ruled the country for 27 years under a single party regime, and it was voted out of the governance. In May 1950, the DP received 55 per cent with 416 deputies and the RPP was 39.5 per cent with 69 deputies. The DP's electoral success was mostly on the ground that the successful mobilization of various social classes and groups such as peasantry, Islamists, small producers and bourgeoisie were critical.<sup>83</sup> There were both economic and social realities behind this successful mobilization. For instance, Islamists' hatred stance was against the RPP due to the enforced secularism that encouraged them to support the DP strongly<sup>84</sup>. As

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78 GINI index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.

79 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/>

80 <http://www.oecd.org/social/>

81 <http://publications.credit-suisse.com/>

82 <http://hdr.undp.org/>

83 Sarıbay, A., Y. (1991). The Democrat Party: 1946-1960. In: Heper, M. & Landau, J., M. *Political Parties & Democracy in Turkey*. London: Tauris. p99-119.

84 Religious orders are always powerful in the society, even in contemporary Turkey. The support of religious orders to the DP was important in its social mobilization and success.



another supporter, the commercial and industrial classes were increasingly dissatisfied with the etatist economic policies which have inhibited them under the bureaucracy's monopoly. The DP's vocal criticisms against etatism and its advocacy for liberalism and encouragement of private enterprises provided them a greater support from both industrial and commercial spheres. However, the bourgeoisie by itself was not yet sufficiently powerful to move the DP in power.

The DP introduced a new economic programme, which aimed to remove the economic barriers, and to foster foreign direct investment via a series of measures which included lowering quotas on import, the state guarantees to Turkish private companies for external borrowing, devaluation, privatization of the state enterprises and tariff reductions. However, the targeted minimization of the state and the integration to free market regime have failed in this process. Despite the liberalization attempts, the state remained powerful in the economy.

*Table 3. Public Manufacturing Industries, 1950-60<sup>85</sup>*

	Share in Employment (%)	Share in Value-Added (%)
1950	45.95	58.33
1955	39.72	50.41
1960	42.50	59.11

In 1950, 80 per cent of total population was living in periphery – great majority was generated by small producers, 37 per cent of workers in manufacturing sector were family/self-employed, and only 400.000 workers were independent wage earners.<sup>86</sup> These numbers indicate that the overwhelming majority of the economy was composed of small producers; that is, the socioeconomic structure at that time did not allow a possible 'ideological construct' of capitalist relations of production in the state and civil society. Under these circumstances, the optimism for liberal economic restructuring was also fostered by United States in the post-World War II

<sup>85</sup> Altuğ, S. & Filiztekin, A. (2006). Productivity and Growth, 1923-2003. In: Altuğ, S. & Filiztekin, A. *The Turkish Economy: The Real Economy, Corporate, Governance and Reform*. London & New York: Routledge. p35.

<sup>86</sup> Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso. p118.

atmosphere. As a part of the 'Western Bloc', Turkey was eligible to take financial aid for economic liberalization. Besides, a new economic model was developed for Turkey by American experts. This model offered a new agenda dependent on the implied investments in agriculture and agricultural industry rather than other industrial sectors, and by doing that it required Turkey to specialize in agriculture in the world market. The dramatic increase in agricultural output between 1950 and 1953 led to economic growth, where GDP per capita increased 28 per cent, and resulted into an increase in export by 50 per cent over the same years, wherefore the period of 1950-1953 is considered as the most successful economic years of the DP rule.<sup>87</sup> In summary, the DP's endeavors for economic liberalization and industrialization mostly failed; the economy still based on agriculture, and has increasingly become dependent on foreign debts and international subsidies.<sup>88</sup> In 1958, Turkey needed to admit the IMF stabilization intervention. Consequently, the DP had oscillated between liberalism and economic interventionism, but the introduced liberalism succeed in restructuring the economy in a certain degree that could change social and political dynamics as well in following times.

The liberalism was not suddenly discovered by the DP. Before the DP rule, the bourgeoisie's discontent with the bureaucracy was already known because of the absolute bureaucratic control in the economy. Having obtained sufficient power through bureaucratically mediated capital accumulation and increased profitability during the World War II, the bourgeoisie could start to free from the state dominance. Regarding all, the bourgeoisie's desire of autonomy from the state was not romantic; conversely, realistic in this sense. At the end of World War II, Turkey was an ally of the liberal block, and the international conjuncture was in favor of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. Thus, the DP became a liberal resistance movement against the RPP and etatism.

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<sup>87</sup> Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso.

<sup>88</sup> Aydın, Z. (2005). *The Political Economy of Turkey*. London: Pluto Press.

*Table 4. Production Types & Shares in the National Income (%), 1946-60<sup>89</sup>*

	1946	1950	1955	1960
Agriculture	45.8	41.7	39.0	37.9
Industry	15.2	14.6	16.0	17.2
Trade	17.4	16.2	17.4	20.4
Other Services	21.6	27.5	27.6	24.5

Due to the mechanization in agriculture, the demand for labor diminished tremendously in the rural, which brought about a notable rural-urban migration. Additionally, the economic vividness in the big cities also attracted migrants. In the rural, one out of every ten migrated to urban between 1950 and 1960, and the largest four cities' populations increased by 75 per cent during that time.<sup>90</sup> The *gecekondu* (squatter housing) started to be a phenomenon in the big cities that caused cultural confrontations between urban natives and migrants at the first instance. Therefore, urban proletarianization began to gain a new dimension and to mature capitalist class structuring. The class contradictions than would be more evident in the next epoch.

### **3.2 The pre-Neoliberal Epoch: 1960-1980**

The first coup in Turkey was against the DP rule in May 1960. Some interpreted the coup as the intervention of discredited military and bureaucracy during the DP governance. It was seen as restorationism by those discontented with the DP's policies. However, it was not restorationism; the economic model did not go counter to the market regime. Capitalist accumulation needed to be regulated and developed that entailed the state active intervention. In fact, it showed great similarities with post-war Keynesianism. Very shortly, the state undertook an initiating role in boosting the market and protecting the interest of domestic industrial bourgeoisie. In the logic of capitalist system, the capitalists must maximize their profit, which also requires the minimization of workers' wage among

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<sup>89</sup> Kepenek, Y. (2012). *Türkiye Ekonomisi*. İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi. p115.

<sup>90</sup> Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso. p137.

other costs. However, workers' wage as component of demand in the market must be consistent with the volume of production. At this juncture, the role of state with an instrumental autonomy from the bourgeoisie's interests is to adjust the distribution of income that could serve the logic of capitalist accumulation and the dominant fraction of bourgeoisie.

The economic model after the coup was in peace with the market and the bourgeoisie, and the necessity to the development of private entrepreneurship was stated clearly. The state's aim was to take initiative and to give support when the private ownerships were not capable to flourish alone. In this environment, the epoch was not harbinger toward an inward-oriented economy. Moreover, the bureaucracy was not able to regain power to become an unrivalled ruling class. The State Planning Organization (SPO), which was established just after the coup in September 1960, was the leading institution for the planning of economic and social goals. In the vanguard of the SPO, more than half of the total investment has been realized, and the foreign exchange regime and foreign trade were controlled. Inward-looking simulations implemented by the state aimed at increasing industrial and agricultural productivity and profitability while concentrating on the objective of domestic market expansion. Hence, the state interventions gave the desired result; the increased public investment positively affected the private investments as well as the capital accumulation.

*Table 5. Private and Public Gross Investment, 1962-67<sup>91</sup>  
(Billions of Turkish Lira, 1965 prices)*

Year	Private Sector		Public Sector	
	Plan	Realized	Plan	Realized
1962		3.8		4.4
1963	4.3	5.3	6.6	5.5
1964	4.8	5.0	7.6	5.8
1965	5.4	5.5	8.4	6.5
1966	6.0	6.6	8.9	7.9
1967	7.0	7.3	9.5	8.4

91 Fry, M., J. (1972). *Finance and Development Planning in Turkey*. Leiden: Brill. p27.

Another important aspect in the epoch was the import substitution industrialization (ISI). Its origin derived from the etatism in the 1930s, whereas the real implementations were started to be realized in the 1960s.<sup>92</sup> Quotas, import restrictions and custom duties were the main apparatuses of the ISI to protect domestic industries. The protected Turkish industry against foreign competition met the expected outcomes to a certain degree.<sup>93</sup> Some people in the bourgeoisie have gone from strength to strength, and monopolies in certain sectors were formed.

*“The period between 1960 and 1980 presents the era of Fordism in the global economy, which was shaped under the social welfare states and the relative tolerance and reconciliation atmosphere between collective labor class and particularly industrial capital in the post-World War II. In the late capitalism periphery economies such as Turkey, this period specifically refers the highly productive and national industries depending on import and assembly line, which were deepened for the domestic demand. In that phase, the state aimed for the expanding economic conjuncture, by leading employment, production and investors through both the role of mediator and the state economic enterprises.”<sup>94</sup> – [Erinç Yeldan]*

However, at the end of 1970s, the dependency of import for the domestic industry reached to a serious level where the state was insufficient to fulfill the necessities of inward-oriented sectors. In addition, the protective measures such as quotas and high tariffs were redundant since the industries desperately required technology import for developing and being more competitive in the world market. To emphasize, the ISI was never in confrontation with market regime and international capital; on the contrary, in Turkish context, it was indispensable for the integration into free market regime in the long term.<sup>94</sup>

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92 Boratav, K. (1974). *Türkiye’de Devletçilik*. İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi.

93 Pamuk, Ş. (1981). Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey. *MERIP Reports*. 93 (1), p26-32.

94 Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso. p141-165.

Table 6. Structural Transformation of GDP and Labor Force<sup>95</sup>

	GDP		Labor Force	
	Shares (%)		Shares (%)	
	Agriculture	Industry	Agriculture	Industry
1950	51.1	48.9	78.9	21.1
1963	38.4	61.6	73.1	26.9
1968	31.0	69.0	69.5	30.5
1973	29.0	71.0	63.5	36.5

From 1960 to the early 1970s, the overall amount of foreign direct investment still remained at a very low level. The state's influential assistance to the domestic industry has strengthened the development of industrial bourgeoisie, while populist policies for satisfying welfare needs set up a proper atmosphere for the enlargement of the private sector.<sup>96</sup> The 1961 Constitution generated a context of freedom that augmented worker union movements and increased the number of civil society organizations. However, this positive wave started to perish slowly in the aftermath of the 1971 military intervention and the oil crisis in 1973. In addition, the ongoing rural-urban migration, and hence increasing population in the cities also contributed to a market expansion. At the end of 1960s, almost half of housing in Istanbul was classified as the *gecekondu*.<sup>97</sup>

*“Squatting, marginalization, informalization and urban economy turned into storage for cheap labor and urban proletarianization – in terms of cheap labor, cheap resources and urban demand of neoliberalism – revealed as the extension of distorted industrialization.”<sup>III</sup> – [Erinç Yeldan]*

The epoch is also important in terms of class sociology and politics. The working class gained important legal rights with the 1961 Constitution which seriously empowered the labor movements, and therefore they could be influential in the social and political spheres until the 1971 military

95 Derviş, K. & Robinson, S. (1980). The Structure of Income Inequality in Turkey: 1950-1973. In: Özbudun, E. & Ulusan A. *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey*. London & New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers. p88.

96 Aydın, Z. (2005). *The Political Economy of Turkey*. London: Pluto Press. p38.

97 Karpat, K., H. (1976). *The Gecekondu: Rural Migration & Urbanization*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

intervention. However, these rights were not obtained as a result of long-lasting social and political struggles, like in Europe; the bureaucratic reformism granted to advance legal rights for workers such as the right of collective bargaining or strike. It indicates that the bourgeoisie was not an unrivalled ruling class in the early 1960s. In other words, if the bourgeoisie was strong enough, the enactment of the 1961 Constitution might not be possible – however, it was more powerful compared to pre-1960 period. In the 1970s, the balance of power dynamics in class politics showed a rapid change in favor of the bourgeoisie. Deepening economic and political crisis in the late 1970s accelerated the transition to neoliberal restructuring through the ‘January 24th decisions’ and the coup.

“In 1976 the IMF advised the Turkish government to freeze workers’ wages and implement a serious devaluation. At the time, inflation rose over 50 per cent (...) In 1978, the IMF was called in but two attempts at standby agreement failed. It was not until June 1979 that a stabilization programme was put into effect along with devaluation, 1 USD = 47 Turkish Lira (...) but the main reform package that would restructure the whole economy came in January 1980.”<sup>98</sup>

### **3.3 The Neoliberal Transformation: 1980-1990**

Regarding the shortages in commodity, the output and import contradictions and the problematic relations with the WB and the IMF, the Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel declared an unexpected and also sweeping stabilization programme on 24 January 1980. Turgut Özal as a former chief of the SPO was responsible to supervise the programme which aimed to place and deepen the neoliberal economy in Turkey. While Demirel’s government could not obtain the necessary political support to conduct the programme, the military rule after the coup in September 1980 initiated the implementations in a triumphant manner. The military rule appointed Özal as the deputy prime minister – responsible for economic affairs, while carrying on his duty as supervisor of the programme. Thus, the long-term aspiration was to

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<sup>98</sup> Altunışık, M. & Tüür, Ö. (2005). *Turkey: Challenges of Continuity and Change*. New York: Routledge. p75.

establish a functioning neoliberal economy with a shift from inward to outward-oriented industrialization.

In the initial process, the implementations consisted of devaluation, trade liberalization, subsidy reductions, freeing of interest rates and abandonment of price control mechanisms. Besides, both the real wages and income for both workers and agricultural producers were cut.<sup>99</sup> In this respect, the share of labor wages and salaries in the national income was approximately 35 per cent in 1976-1978; it was 20 per cent in 1983-1986.<sup>100</sup> Likewise, the social expenditures of the state also declined which induced the explicit deterioration of public health and education services. The military rule banned all labor union that is why; the dramatic declines in labor incomes could not find an organized response by the working class. By all means, the stabilization programme could not attain its impact without totalitarianism of the military rule.<sup>101</sup>

*Table 7. Public Manufacturing Industries, 1980-2000*<sup>102</sup>

	Share in Employment (%)	Share in Value-Added (%)
1980	36.09	40.54
1985	29.47	38.03
1990	24.29	31.28
1995	16.59	23.11
2000	11.02	18.95

In 1983, the Motherland Party (MP) came to power, and Özal was elected as prime minister. He immediately started a new wave of liberalization practices in payments and trade system. The MP also enacted new measures in order to liberalize the financial system on capital inflow and outflow; for instance, the Istanbul Stock Exchange and the inter-bank money market were

99 Owen, R. & Pamuk, Ş. (1998). *A History of Middle East Economies in 20. Century*. London: Tauris. p118.

100 Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso. p225.

101 Arıcanlı, T. & Rodrik, D. (1990). An Overview of Turkey’s Experience with Economic Liberalization and Structural Adjustment. *World Development*. 18 (10), p1343-1350.

102 Altuğ, S. & Filiztekin, A. (2006). Productivity and Growth, 1923-2003. In: Altuğ, S. & Filiztekin, A. *The Turkish Economy: The Real Economy, Corporate, Governance and Reform*. London & New York: Routledge. p35.



reopened. The applied economic program accelerated the productivity level; thereof the real value-added in manufacturing grew 9.77 per cent until 1988.<sup>103</sup> However, the real wages declined 34 per cent from 1980 to 1987.<sup>104</sup> Henceforth, the distribution of income was now highly unequal; the economic discrimination against working class became more visible.<sup>105</sup> The rapid withdrawal of the state from the economy increased the unemployment rate along with the diminution in standard of living as a result of cuts in the state's social expenditures.<sup>106</sup>

“(…) it is a well-known fact that there had emerged a new convergence of opinion, dubbed as the Washington Consensus, both in theory and policymaking environments since the early 1980s which would increasingly as a ‘new hegemonic apparatus’ in countries which would be experiencing ‘policy reforms’, thereby putting an end to half-hearted attempts to manipulate the notion of ‘mixed economy’ as a hegemonic apparatus.”<sup>107</sup>

In spite of the dramatic fall in social spending, the state expenditures in the GDP raised from 18 per cent in 1982 to 24 per cent in 1990.<sup>108</sup> It was mainly due to the direct and indirect subsidies through domestic borrowing and infrastructure costs to advance industrialization.<sup>109</sup> As a matter of fact, neoliberalism does not mean necessarily shrinking state both economically and politically rather a powerful one in favor of capitalist accumulation. In that regard, neither Smith nor Hayek have mentioned about the shrinking government along with development of individual entrepreneurial freedoms

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103 Altuğ, S. & Filiztekin, A. (2006). Productivity and Growth, 1923-2003. In: Altuğ, S. & Filiztekin, A. *The Turkish Economy: The Real Economy, Corporate, Governance and Reform*. London & New York: Routledge. p20.

104 Owen, R. & Pamuk, Ş. (1998). *A History of Middle East Economies in 20. Century*. London: Tauris. p120.

105 Arıcanlı, T. & Rodrik, D. (1990). An Overview of Turkey's Experience with Economic Liberalization and Structural Adjustment. *World Development*. 18 (10), p1343-1350.

106 <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

107 Yalman, G. (2009). *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey In the 1980s*. İstanbul: Bilgi University Press. p254.

108 <http://www.turkstat.gov.tr/>

109 Keyder, Ç (1987). *State & Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso. p225.

and the market.<sup>110</sup> So it has to be powerful to create new markets for capital accumulation and to increase profitability by making and implementing related laws and investments.<sup>111</sup> Thus, decline on democratic representation, monopolization of executive power and state authoritarianism would be the realities of neoliberal state.<sup>112</sup>

*“(...) a semantics reading of Hayek also points out that the state can be authoritative. Thus, it is generally more important how neoliberalism works in practice, (...)”<sup>TV</sup> – [Pınar Bedirhanoglu]*

In conclusion, in the late 1970s, the state’s ability was now insufficient in advancing capitalist accumulation *vis-à-vis* the bourgeoisie.<sup>113</sup> The state was also inadequate against the increasing neoliberal trend at global level. The bureaucratic structure which was formed by the 1961 Constitution might have slowed down the transition to neoliberalism, whereby the coup provided the required radical moment for the transformation.<sup>114</sup> Regarding the extreme social and political tensions in the country, the economic crisis and the weakness of the civilian governments before 1980, the coup was easily able to legitimize itself. In the light of the ‘January 24th decisions’, the currency was devaluated and the subsidies to export-oriented industry were considerably increased; conversely, the subsidies were decreased for inward-oriented producers at the same time. These resulted in a shrinking of the domestic market, and thus many small and middle scale producers have gone bankrupt. It means that merely big scale manufacturing firms, which were able to export, survived. All indicated to a rapid intensification and centralization of capital – monopolization. Additionally, the ongoing urbanization with depoliticized workers provided a cheap and disciplined

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110 Gündoğdu, İ. (2013). Haziran İsyanı'nın İki Temel Dinamiği Üzerine. *Praksis*. 30 (4), p35-44.

111 Bonefeld, W. (2010). Free Economy and Strong State: Some Notes on the State. *Capital and Class*. 34 (1), p15-24.

112 Poulantzas, N. (2000). *State, Power, Socialism*. 3rd ed. New York: Verso. p203-241.

113 Pamuk, Ş. (2015). *Türkiye'nin 200 Yıllık İktisadi Tarihi*. İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları. P235-275.

114 Pamuk, Ş. (2008). Economic Change in Twentieth-Century Turkey: Is The Glass More Than Half Full? In: Kasaba, R. *The Cambridge History of Turkey*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

labor force. Therefore, this whole process resulted in favor of capitalist accumulation by increasing bourgeoisie's ideological hegemony.

*“The economies like Turkey experienced this process (neoliberal transformation) very painfully because they did not have national industries standing by themselves. Export-oriented industries gradually have required more capital intensive technologies instead of labor intensive one. Under these circumstances, the unemployment became more structural. The countries like Turkey managed this process naturally by promoting internal migration in order to transfer of cheap labor from rural economy to urban economy.”<sup>v</sup> – [Erinç Yeldan]*

## CHAPTER 4

### THE JDP RULE: A CRITICAL LOOK

After the 2001 economic crisis, the 2002 elections clearly indicated that the economy was the first priority for citizens in Turkey. In the pre-election period of 2002, a poll conducted demonstrated that 90 per cent of respondents declared that the most significant issue for their life was the economic well-being; particularly inflation and unemployment as the leading problems.<sup>115</sup> The economic collapse has been regarded as the primary reason of voters to withdraw their support from the incumbent parties during the 2001 crisis. The voters brought the JDP to power with 34.2 per cent, and the JDP won 363 seats out of 550 in the parliament.<sup>116</sup> The JDP's priority was to manage the national economy better in order to stay in power.

*Table 8. The Election Results of JDP<sup>117</sup>*

Year	Percentage	Number of Deputies	Total Votes Received
2002	34.2%	363	10.763.904
2007	46.5%	341	16.327.291
2011	49.8%	326	21.442.206
2015	40.8%	258	18.851.953

The JDP did not hesitate to go hand in hand with neoliberalism – the party promised a neoliberal market regime, which would be followed with all requirements. Indeed, the JDP became the most successful political party in Turkish history in terms of accomplishing neoliberalism's fundamentals. This triumph of neoliberalism was not only based on economic transformations, but also its socialization deepened and widened in the civil society, which is a prerequisite for economic advancement of neoliberal capitalism. Since 2002, the JDP has constantly emphasized the development of private enterprises

115 Turan, A., E. (2004). *Türkiye'de Seçmen Davranışı: Önceki Kırılmalar ve 2002 Seçimi*. İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları. p273.

116 The JDP obtained 66 per cent of all the seats in the parliament while taking 34 per cent of the total votes due to highly unequal election system in Turkey with 10 per cent electoral threshold.

117 From Turkey's Supreme Election Board, <[www.ysk.gov.tr](http://www.ysk.gov.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

for the benefit of ‘our nation’; as well as, its importance as a vital source of economic growth and development. The JDP’s nationalist discourse – our nation *vis-à-vis* neoliberalism – also declared that the state should ensure all necessary conditions for the protection of the market and private entrepreneurship by embracing both domestic and international capital. Particularly the elections in 2002 and 2007, by recalling the Article 2 of the Constitution<sup>118</sup> defining Turkey as a social state, the JDP has stated that social justice is the major concern and foremost objective of the party<sup>119</sup>. Besides, they paved the way for more integration to global markets along with a more powerful technocratic middle classes.<sup>120</sup>

The JDP’s ideological roots date back to the transition period from single-party to multi-party regime in early 1950s when Islamic movements gained access to the mainstream politics, and increased their power. Between 1950 and 1960, Islamic movements were in an early period of their politicization; they were rather active in social and cultural level. From 1960 onwards, Islamic movements have started to get involved in political movements and to seek different ways to gain more power, improve their economic conditions and transform the state institutions in favor of their ideology. In this respect, the National Order Party<sup>121</sup> was established in 1970 as the first political Islamist party. Since 1980, Islamic movements and political Islam have come into existence as a strong socioeconomic body that has emphasized the market economy’s significance, and also the civil society in order to transform the state.<sup>122</sup> Without political Islam, it is impossible to

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118 The Article 2 – “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.”

119 The JDP’s 2002 and 2007 elections manifestos, < [www.akparti.org.tr](http://www.akparti.org.tr) > [Last access: 15/09/2015]

120 Hale, W. & Özbudun, E. (2010). *Islamism, Democracy and Liberalism in Turkey: The Case of the AKP*. London & New York: Routledge. p100.

121 *Milli Nizam Partisi*

122 Yavuz, M., H. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

comprehend the causality between the togetherness of Islamic movements and neoliberalism.

“In its 2002 election manifesto, the JDP interpreted its commitment to conservatism mainly in cultural terms, arguing that society renewed itself with the context of basic institutions such as ‘the family, school, property, religion and morals,’ and that interference in these institutions and values by the state would lead to conflict and disorder.”<sup>123</sup>

The secular state has always been seen as a threat against Islamization of civil society by political Islamists.<sup>124</sup> Whenever the JDP reached a great power, the ideological state apparatus has been transformed to advance Islamization in the civil society. Now, the state is not a threat anymore, the other way around, an entailment for the JDP’s Sunni-Islamic/conservative ideological expansion. For instance, the number of *İmam-Hatip* schools<sup>125</sup> has remarkably increased during the JDP rule, which also illustrates how JDP’s ideology penetrated into society through different mechanisms such as education.

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123 Hale W. (2005). Christian Democrats and the AKP: Parallels and Contrasts. *Turkish Studies*. Summer, Special Issue, p293-310.

124 For instance, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has publicly declared many times until 2001 when the JDP was established that Islam and the secular state are not able to go hand in hand. Additionally, he has asked Muslims to strive for the implementation of the Sharia.

125 Because of highly antagonist ideological stances in Turkey, these schools are always controversial. The education system of them is intensively in religious (Islam) context. The secularists have criticized these schools being non-progressive, an ideological tool for Islamists, and a threat to secularism and modern values. On the other hand, Islamists and conservatives defend the existence of the schools because of the right to religious education. In brief, the *İmam-Hatip* system is routinely an issue for political struggle in Turkey. During the JDP rule, particularly with the 4+4+4 education system since 2012, these schools are used as the ideological state apparatus in order to deepen Sunni-Islamic/conservative ideology in civil society.

For a comprehensive study: Özgür, İ. (2012). *Islamic Schools in Modern Turkey: Faith, Politics and Education*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Table 9. *İmam-Hatip Schools in the JDP rule*<sup>126</sup>

Year	Number of Students	Number of Schools
2003	71.100	450
2004	90.606	452
2005	96.851	452
2006	108.064	453
2007	120.668	455
2008	129.274	456
2009	143.637	458
2010	198.581	465
2011	235.639	493
2012	268.245	537
2013	380.771	708
2014	474.096	854

It is important to remind that neoliberalism in Turkey has been successfully able to legitimize itself via political and social Islamization, thereby the collaboration of neoliberalism and Islamization is vital to recognize the causalities within a structural framework. In this respect, this chapter firstly discusses the economic sociology of the JDP's root, and then the party ideology, secondly.

#### **4.1 The Economic Sociology of JDP's Roots**

In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Islamism as a credo appeared both in Ottoman Empire and other Islamic countries. The objective was to make Islam a dominant ideology within society as well as politics. Transforming Islam into an ideological formation against universal ideas and institutions, which surfaced in the West, aimed to challenge the Western and/or Christian dominance in the world.<sup>127</sup> Thus, Islamism was regarded as a religious revival by creating religious consciousness and institutionalization. Thus, political Islam as a movement seeks the actualization of Islamic commands at state level. It means that Islamism cannot survive without the power of state – ideological and repressive state apparatus; state must be captured *ipso facto*. The reason is that secular state by its nature constantly represses and controls Islam. Hence, Islamists believed that they have been subjected by a

<sup>126</sup> From the Education and Science Workers' Union, <[www.egitimsen.org.tr](http://www.egitimsen.org.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

<sup>127</sup> Kara, İ. (1986). *Türkiye'de İslamcılık Düşüncesi: Metinler/Kişiler*. İstanbul: Risale Yayınları. p48.

process of ideological eradication, which is a widespread and puissant belief on their motivations. In this regard, Political Islam has totalitarian tendencies with attempts of imposing 'official' religious context from top (state) to bottom (civil society).<sup>128</sup> In the process of capturing state power, the method/approach can be varied, depending on the principles of Islamic groups/movements; some prefer to use armed struggle, and others seek to gain socioeconomic and sociopolitical power within civil and political society.<sup>129</sup>

In Muslim nations such as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Algeria, political Islam failed<sup>130</sup>, or it has been still a controversial issue like in Iran, Sudan and Malaysia; all faced with numerous criticisms in 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> century. For instance, Samuel Huntington associated an aspect of political Islam with an increasing trend towards the spiritual against modernism<sup>131</sup>, or some has asserted that political Islam is meaningless in the contemporary epoch, which we are experiencing, while the concept of state is in trouble. The state already lost its meaning, which connotes the idea of capturing state becoming absurd. Besides, many perceive Islamism as non-progressive, anti-humanist or vicious. Since the 1950s to present, Political Islam has undergone a transformation in Turkey that is why; Islamism, political Islam and their transformations are critical to comprehend the JDP as an Islamist party.

The Kemalist political and bureaucratic elites achieved a radical break from Ottoman state system. Almost everything associated with the empire was condemned and discarded through the reforms in governance and other social and political areas. Turkey was now based on westernization and

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128 Eligür, B. (2010). *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

129 Gramsci thought the capitalist state as being comprise of two different spheres; political society – dominates through force and civil society – dominates through consent.

130 Roy, O. (2007). *The Failure of Political Islam*. London. Tauris.

131 Huntington, S. (1996). *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster.



secularization, in which Islamic movements have been strongly oppressed until the multi-party system.

“The DP promised to end some of the draconian secularist policies instituted by the Kemalist regime (...) In effect, the DP ‘relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values.’ As a result, these groups gradually were drawn into the competitive political arena for the first time. At the same time, the DP’s more liberal economic policies involved a limited movement away from the state-driven economic model.”<sup>132</sup>

Over the last several decades, the power of Islamism and political Islam increased in Turkey. Before 1970, Islamic movements were merely a fraction within right-wing parties. They have been working mostly in sociocultural areas at that time, and religious orders as social phenomena were influential and respected by a great number of people.<sup>133</sup> In the 1970s, it emerged as a freestanding political program with the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan, the initiator of the *Milli Görüş* movement. In this respect, Şevket Kazan, the minister in Erbakan’s government and as a leading name in *Milli Görüş*, defined the movement as a return to core/identity (Öz) while refusing Western norms and morals.<sup>134</sup> In 1970, the National Order Party (NOP) was established as the first legal party supporting political Islam in Turkey. The *Nakşibendi* and *Nurcu* orders as two foremost Islamist orders<sup>135</sup> explicitly declared their support to the party, and played an active role in it.

Erbakan’s movement advocated the spread of Islamic culture, education and justice. Erbakan openly enunciated that the NOP was open to all people excluding communists, Zionists and freemasons.<sup>136</sup> The NOP firstly received financial and electoral support by some small/middle scale ‘Muslim’ bourgeoisie in Anatolia. This was not an astonishment ; Erbakan’s economic

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132 Rabasa, A. & Larrabee, F., S. (2008). *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. Pittsburgh: RAND. p35-36.

133 Mardin, Ş. (1993). *Türkiye’de Din ve Siyaset*. İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları.

134 Eligür, B. (2010). *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p66.

135 These two religious orders are still very powerful in contemporary Turkey.

136 Emre, S., A. (2002). *Siyasette 35 Yıl, Volume 1*. Ankara: Keşif Yayınları. p182.

and cultural discourse was compatible with them. In fact, before the NOP, Erbakan as president of the Union of Chamber and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (*TOBB*) had defended the interests of petty bourgeoisie of Anatolia against big bourgeoisie.<sup>137</sup> During his political life, he had frequently accused the big bourgeoisie as being a comprador and a puppet of Western capitalism. However, Erbakan and the *Milli Görüş* have never had an ideological sophistication to ‘challenge’ the criticized Western capitalism, indeed. In the aftermath of the 1971 coup, the constitutional court shut down the NOP by the reason of Islamist activities threatening secularism and principles of the state. Erbakan fled to Switzerland because of judicial inquiry and the risk for being arrested. However, the military’s approach to the *Milli Görüş* was merely a mild one, since the real threat was perceived the leftist movements. It was permitted that the National Salvation Party<sup>138</sup> (NSP) was established in 1972; the successor of the NOP. However, even though the Labor Party of Turkey (LPT)<sup>139</sup> was closed at the same time with NOP, it could become active again in 1975 due to the state oppression. The LPT’s leaders were sent to the court and jailed.

After Erbakan’s return to Turkey in 1972, he officially joined the NSP in May 1973 and took the chair in October 1973. Kazan stated that there were three primary targets of the NSP; (1) spiritual and moral development, (2) equal distribution of wealth, (3) economic development through heavy industrialization.<sup>140</sup> Furthermore, the party was strongly opposing the European Economic Community; Erbakan already manifested that the community is the crusade of modern times. In short, the NSP refused both

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137 Sezgin, İ., G. (2013). How Islamist Parties Emerge: The Case of National Order Party. In: Massicard, E. & Watts, N., F. *Negotiating Political Power in Turkey: Breaking Up the Party*. New York: Routledge. p77-99.

138 *Milli Selamet Partisi*

139 The LPT was a Marxist political movement, and one of the most influential in Turkey. It was the first Marxist political party had deputies in the parliament.

140 Eligür, B. (2010). *The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p69.

capitalism<sup>141</sup> – ‘as the rule of big bourgeoisie’ and socialism – ‘as limiting individual freedom’; thereof both are materialist and selfish with lack of morality. Within this scope, it received 11 per cent of total votes in the 1973 election with 48 deputies and 8.5 per cent with 24 deputies in 1977. The NSP gained its electoral support mostly by small merchants, conservative petty bourgeoisie, Islamists and citizens who had low income, in the periphery and small provinces in Turkey.<sup>142</sup> In this context, some argue that the reason how NSP attracted the voters was not religious, rather the promises for industrialization and economic well-being instead until its closure by the military regime in 1980.<sup>143</sup> However, data about the NSP’s voters motivations in the elections by Binnaz Toprak pointed out Islamic appeal of the party was critical in the mobilization and the electoral success.

*Table 10. Support Reasons of Potential NSP Voters, the 1973 Election<sup>144</sup>*

Reason	(%)
-Because of it is a religious party	42.5
-Because the Justice Party changed its goals and became a party of Freemasons	12.3
-Because of Erbakan's leadership	9.4
-Because of the influence of close friends or relatives	6.6
-Because it expresses the respondent's own political outlook	5.7
-Because the Justice Party has failed during its tenure in office	5.7
-Because of rising prices	2.8
-Do not know	0.9
-Other	27.4

12 September 1980 is the date of 3<sup>rd</sup> military intervention in the last two decades. The military rule has governed the country between 1980 and November 1983. The NSP was banned like all existing political parties in that

141 There was always a critique to capitalism in the discourse, but the *Milli Görüş* never suggested an alternative to it.

142 Landau, J., M. (1976). The National Salvation Party in Turkey. *Asian and African Studies*. 2 (1), p1-57.

143 Yavuz, M., H. (2003). *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. P210.

144 Toprak, B. (1981). *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden: Brill. p97.

period. The military regime particularly eradicated the leftist movements from the political sphere, while both ideological and repressive apparatus have been used to depoliticize the society. This environment provided a more convenient ground for political Islam to become stronger. Furthermore, the military rule made religious courses (Islam based) obligatory in all schools, Quran classes were introduced, and hence religious education was promoted. By elimination of the leftist movements, the urban poor who had voted for Marxist and the leftist parties before 1980 started to support Islamist parties in a remarkable degree.<sup>145</sup>

The civilian rule was partially restored in the 1983 election, but the military rule allowed only three parties to join the election. The Motherland Party (MP) received 45 per cent of the votes with 211 deputies in 1983 and 36 per cent with 292 deputies in 1987. The MP rule had stayed in power for almost a decade (1983-1991). Turgut Özal as the prime minister and the party leader contended that the MP was an amalgamation of four different ideologies: conservatism, economic liberalism, nationalism and social democracy.<sup>146</sup> In fact, the party succeeded in receiving electoral support from various groups, mostly residing in urban and more developed regions. The big and petty bourgeoisie, urban self-employed, urban workers and former NSP voters constituted the social base. Besides, the *Nakşibendi*, the *Nurcu*, the *Fetullahçı*, the *Süleymancı* and the *Kadiri* as leading Islamic orders supported the party.<sup>147</sup>

Herein, the ‘Turkish-Islamic Synthesis’ (TIS) should be taken into consideration for a better understanding of the JDP’s ideological background. It is argued, the JDP has a three-legged ideology, and thus conservatism and

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145 Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islam Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

146 Kalaycıoğlu, E. (2002). The Motherland Party: The Challenge of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party. In: Rubin, B. & Heper, M. *Political Parties in Turkey*. London: Frank Cass. p45.

147 Özçetin, B. (2011). *Making of New Islamism in Turkey: Transformation of the Islamist Discourse From Opposition to Compliance*. PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Turkey.

neoliberalism were inspired by the TIS. In structuring of the TIS, the military rule promoted the work of some conservative scholars from the *Aydınlar Ocağı*.<sup>148</sup>, and it was institutionalized the state elites.<sup>149</sup> Despite of TIS's vagueness in essence, it was a teleological attempt to combine Sunni Islam and Turkish nationalism. It argues that being Turk cannot be thought separately from Islam. Meaning, Islam should actively participate in shaping Turkish nationalism. The TIS as moral and philosophical rationale aimed to legitimize the hegemony of new ruling after the coup<sup>150</sup>, which was also maintained by the MP through its implications. It was formed to eliminate the appeal of the leftist movements, to depoliticize the society and to weaken the effects of non-Turkish Islamic thinking from other Islamic countries.<sup>151</sup> Also, it is consistent with neoliberalism.<sup>152</sup>

*“In order to prevent all the ways of ideological/political collectivism, the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis used as a guide for determining an ideological framework for the entire social relations, education system, types of socialization or collectivism and the press. In both political and legal areas, all institutions, organizations, trade unions, political parties, which were not in the framework of the TIS, were suspended/excluded. (...) The TIS became an important reference point for how to determine the role of the ideological apparatus of the state.”<sup>VI</sup> – [Cenk Saraçoğlu]*

Erbakan was elected as the chair of the Welfare Party (WP) in 1987 when his political ban came to an end. In the 1994 local elections, the WP received 19 per cent of the votes, and got the mayor's offices in the 28 cities including

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148 It can be translated in English as 'Intellectuals' Hearth'. It is a kind of think tank association and still active in Turkey.

149 Toprak, B. (2001). Civil Society in Turkey. In: Norton, A., R. *Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume 2*. Leiden: Brill. p108.

150 Rabasa, A. & Larrabee, F., S. (2008). *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*. Pittsburgh: RAND. p37-38.

151 *Ibid.*, p37.

152 Çoşar, S. (2012). The AKP's Hold on Power: Neoliberalism Meets the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis . In: Çoşar, S. & Özdemir, G. *Silent Violence: Neoliberalism, Islamist Politics and the AKP Years in Turkey*. Ottawa: Red Quill Books. p67-93.

Istanbul<sup>153</sup> and the capital Ankara. In the 1995 parliamentary elections, the WP came out as the first with 21.4 per cent of votes and 158 deputies out of 550. It meant that a political Islamist party was firstly the largest in the parliament. More specifically, a strong shift to the market oriented economy fostered Islamic orders to engage in more economic investment with a substantial level. Hence, Islamic business networks had developed considerably during the 1990s, and being major actors in the economy.<sup>154</sup> These Islamic capital groups have grounded for a financial base of the WP, and were significant in the electoral successes. In January 1998, the Constitutional Court shut down the WP according to the Article 68<sup>155</sup> of the Constitution. The leaders of the party were banned from legal politics for five years including Necmettin Erbakan. Subsequently, the Virtue Party<sup>156</sup> (VP) was established as the fourth party of the *Milli Görüş*. The VP remained weak, compared to the WP. The VP was also closed down according to the Article 68. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and some others left the Felicity Party<sup>157</sup>, the successor of the VP, and they established the JDP.

According to Ziya Öniş, Islamist political movements have been a voice of the poorest and excluded strata in Turkey, as an ideology and a protest movement to challenge the leftist and the right-wing politics in secular order.<sup>158</sup> In contrast to that problematic perception, I argue that Islamist political movements have never maintained an alternative ideology to

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153 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was elected as the mayor of the WP in İstanbul.

154 Öniş, Z. (1997). The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective. *Third World Quarterly*. 18 (4), p743-766.

155 The Article 68 – "... The statutes and programs, as well as the activities of political parties shall not be contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of equality and rule of law, sovereignty of the nation, the principles of the democratic and secular republic; they shall not aim to promote or establish class or group dictatorship or dictatorship of any kind, nor shall they incite citizens to crime..."

156 *Fazilet Partisi*

157 *Saadet Partisi*

158 Öniş, Z. . (1997). The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective. *Third World Quarterly*. 18 (4), p743-766.

challenge neither poverty nor social inequality. Islamist movements are always articulated themselves into capitalism in various routes. The material conditions are not primarily binding on voting behaviors of ‘the poorest and excluded strata’ who have voted to political Islam, rather the moral and spiritual discourse are more decisive.

*“Political Islam’s project is to reconstruct society and the world in accordance with Islamic principles. This project, in this manner, has no direct connection with capitalism. However, when it is conducted in the real world, political Islam successfully integrated itself to capitalism. (...) Consequently, the belief in destiny, the gratitude to employer and additionally, the exercise of the religious rituals with together are some in Islamic faith that makes invisible the class differences in the people’s consciousness.”<sup>VII</sup> – [Korkut Boratav]*

#### **4.2 The Party Ideology**

The bifurcation occurred within political Islam ended up with the establishment of JDP in August 2001. The party manifested itself as a ‘conservative democrat’, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that the party was the follower of democracy and secularism. His statement also expressed that the main goal of the JDP is to reproduce the national deep-rooted values in the light of the universal conservative politics.<sup>159</sup> Particularly between 2002 and 2007, The JDP’s implementations have created an impression on many people that it was integrated into liberal democratic norms with conservative cultural politics.<sup>160</sup> The JDP’s dedication on the membership to European Union (EU) through the enacted laws, which addressed liberal democracy and pluralist discourse, has particularly reinforced the acceptance that its ideological stance broke away from political Islam. However, this ‘new’ portrait of it faded away since 2010 and most especially with Gezi in

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159 Akdoğan, Y. (2005). Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. In: Bora, T. & Gültekingil, M. *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: İslamcılık*. İstanbul: İleşitim Yayınları. p625.

160 Tuğal, C. (2009). *Passive Revolution: Absorbing the Islam Challenge to Capitalism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

2013. The JDP has been strongly criticized to be authoritarian by moving away from democracy and implementing Islamist politics.

*“Integrating center-right politics and religious discourse simultaneously like the JDP followed was not something new, but it was remained at that level in the years. Hence, the involvement of such a movement with the bourgeoisie is inevitable pragmatically. Since it is in relation with the bourgeoisie, the interests of bourgeoisie need to be taken into account such as European Union relations, democratization process, etc. at that time. Therefore, JPD’s past initiatives can be considered as the initiative of inclusiveness of liberals, and the democratization was appeared in this scope, but then what happened? With ‘then’, it means very close time like 2010s. Then, something was happened, I don’t know what it happened exactly. It may be characterological. Maybe, it is a leader’s caprice or fear or it is something psychotic but this change became more visible, particularly since Gezi”<sup>VIII</sup> – [Çağlar Keyder]*

In this study, I argue that the JDP’s rise and stay in power are the results of a complex interplay of three ideologies: neoliberalism, conservatism and political Islam. From the JDP’s establishment to present, conservatism and political Islam was synthesized within neoliberalism in a pragmatic and flexible manner.

*“(In the context of Turkey) Islamism, conservatism and nationalism have been a kind of integrated relationship like an amalgam, which also have some conceptual differences in the meanwhile. There are also some political and social differences, whereas their common base provides them a more transitive structure. This situation is because of the pragmatism of the right-wing politics, (...) which aims political power.”<sup>IX</sup> – [Tanıl Bora]*

In this respect, Islamism has always been an integral dimension of the JDP. With the rise and power of the JDP, political Islam eventually realized that an effective political struggle was impossible without the full integration into neoliberalism and the hegemonic world order, which also enables them to create its own class power. In addition, the boundaries between conservatism and Islamism have always been blurred in Turkey, and therefore conservative people have been attracted to Islamic movements most of times. Since the



1980s, conservatism was already pushed into a religious context due to the TIS, which also enabled the JDP to embrace both an Islamic and conservative base in the society.<sup>161</sup>

*“The JDP is an Islamist movement. At the same time, it is in compliance with the domestic and foreign capital. Due to its Islamist characteristic, the JDP can be neither democrat nor liberal”<sup>x</sup> – [Korkut Boratav]*

Since the 1970s, in the constructing of neoliberalism, various countries have followed different ways, which also altered how the consent was formed in different contexts. In post-Soviet Eastern Europe, a strong emphasis on the impossibility of democratization without the market regime was the dominant thought on the consent formation<sup>162</sup> or the military oppression in Latin America could be considered another example of consent formation. Turkey might represent a combination of these two different kinds. While the military regime in the 1980s paved the way for neoliberalism to a large extent, Islamic/conservative discourse and its practices have strengthened the sociocultural formation in the sake of neoliberalism. For that reason, Islamization of society and politics provided a ground for neoliberalism, which aims to be advanced for converting people into *homo economicus* within an Islamic/conservative culture.

“What Gramsci calls ‘common sense’ (defined as ‘the sense held in common’) typically grounds consent. Common sense is constructed out of longstanding practices of cultural socialization often rooted deep in regional or national traditions (...) Common sense can, therefore, be profoundly misleading, obfuscating or disguising real problems under cultural prejudices. Cultural and traditional values (...) and fears (of communists, immigrants, strangers, or ‘others’) can be mobilized to mask other realities. Gramsci therefore concluded that political questions become ‘insoluble’ when ‘disguised’ as cultural ones.”<sup>163</sup>

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161 Simten, Ç. (2014). AKP'nin İktidarla Dansı: Neoliberalizm ve Türk-İslam Sentezi. In: Çoşar, S. & Özdemir-Yücesan, G. *İktidarın Şiddeti: AKP'li Yıllar, Neoliberalizm and İslamcı Politikalar*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. p72-91.

162 Mandel, R. (2012). Transition to Where? Developing Post-Soviet Space. *Slavic Review*. 71 (2), p223-233.

163 Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press. p39.

The discussions to criticize the JDP rule until Gezi have mostly gone through antagonist epistemologies as interior of the modernization paradigms such as secularism versus anti-secularism. After Gezi, authoritarianism appeared as the foremost problem rather than such discussions. In this sense, the JDP's authoritarianism is dualistic, in which neoliberalism and Islamism must be addressed together. In the matter of authoritarianism, neoliberalism succeeds in being less visible than Islamism that is why; the protestors in Gezi responded Islamic face of this dualism, in general.

“It is crucial that we don't see the Turkish protests merely as a secular civil society rising up against an authoritarian Islamist regime supported by a silent Muslim majority. What complicates the picture is the protests' anti-capitalist thrust: protesters intuitively sense that free-market fundamentalism and fundamentalist Islam are not mutually exclusive. The privatization of public space by an Islamist government shows that the two forms of fundamentalism can work hand in hand.”<sup>164</sup>

According to Slavoj Žižek, there was a state of consciousness during Gezi against neoliberal authoritarianism. Differently, I argue that by atomizing working classes and by promoting identity politics through the potent use of ideological and repressive state apparatus, particularly since 1980<sup>165</sup>, class-based politics was already veiled in Turkey. The promoted Islamic type of solidarity in conjunction with neoliberal agenda has ignored class contradictions.<sup>166</sup> Besides, new middle class as the major component in Gezi voiced their objections on their sociocultural freedoms, not on the material conditions. In short, the dualistic authoritarianism reached the peak with the JDP rule, but the JPD was not the initiator, rather it emerged out as an outcome of certain historical dynamics.

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164 Žižek, S. (2013). Trouble in Paradise. *London Review of Books*. 35 (14), p11-12.

165 Yalman, G. (2009). *Transition to Neoliberalism: The Case of Turkey In the 1980s*. İstanbul: Bilgi University Press.

166 Moudouros, N. (2014). Rethinking Islamic Hegemony in Turkey through Gezi Park. *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*. 16 (2), p181-195.

During the JDP rule, the state supported numerous medium scale capital groups in Anatolia, which enabled them to gain political power and to get wealth in a remarkable degree. This situation was considered as JDP's commitment to the post-Washington Consensus by internationalizing the state apparatus in the sake of financial capital.<sup>167</sup> The post-Washington Consensus led the way by admitting an active role for the state to promote capitalist development.

“The seemingly loyal stand of the JDP to the neoliberal agenda should not however lead to the illusion that the Party has taken all the expressed targets of the post-Washington Consensus seriously in the 2000s; this can better be interpreted as the articulation of different political projects into each other. To give some example; while the neoliberal anti-poverty agenda has very well matched with the conservative Islamic community – and charity – based anti-poverty strategy of the JDP, the neoliberal privatization agenda has helped the Party create its own capital base through transferring public assets to a selected list of ‘green’<sup>168</sup> companies (...)”<sup>169</sup>

Islamic capital accumulation under the JDP's rule was presented as a ‘national success’ against global big bourgeoisie. These capital groups also guarantee the continuity of unorganized proletarianization in a successful manner, with the instrumentalization of religious mindset in Turkey. The hegemonic religious understanding in Turkey greatly depends on a liberal interpretation of Quran. For example, the widespread and prevailing discourse among Muslims implies that ‘both poverty and richness come from God, and then God may test people by this poverty; so a good Muslim has to embrace this fact and obey it.’ The JDP's social policy regime via ‘Islamic charity’ was implemented as an effective tool for the coexistence of neoliberalism and Islamism. This type of regime also reduced the social

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167 Marois, T. (2012). *States, Banks and Crisis: Emerging Finance Capitalism in Mexico and Turkey*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. p180.

168 It refers Islamic/conservative.

169 Bedirhanoğlu, P. & Yalman, G. (2010). *State, Class & Discourse: Reflections on the Neoliberal Transformation in Turkey*. In: Saad-Filho, A. & Yalman, G. *Economic Transition to Neoliberalism in Middle-Income Countries*. New York: Routledge. p120.

reactions, which might occur because of eliminated social rights.<sup>170</sup> There are several reasons why 'Islamic charity' is crucial in terms of social policy in Turkey. Firstly, the Islamic charity network corresponds with Hayekian neoliberalism, which refers to free individual's decision on choosing whom to concern for or care. Secondly, it acutely contributes to the propagation of Islamization. Consequently, an important bridge between social rights and the state body distorted; social rights were reorganized in this sense. Along with these transformations, Islamism was integrated to the state body with a paternalistic understanding.

"By common opinion our chief concern (...) [is] the welfare of our family. But we also show our appreciation and approval of others by making them our friends and their aims ours. To choose our associates and generally those whose needs we make our concern is an essential part of freedom and of the moral conceptions of a free society. General altruism, however, is a meaningless conception. Nobody can effectively care for other people as such; the responsibilities we can assume must always be particular, can concern only those about whom we know concrete facts and to whom either choice or special conditions have attached us. It is one of the fundamental rights and duties of a free person to decide what and whose needs appear to him most important."<sup>171</sup>

On the subject of the JDP's Islamic legacy, many philosophical and theoretical questions can be raised; most importantly, from my point of view, how did political Islamism make a sudden peace with the global bourgeoisie and capitalist order which had been cited as 'devil' in the discourse of political Islam? In addition, how Islamic theology experienced a rapid transformation, and eventually how it admitted secularism instead of the Sharia?<sup>172</sup> Considering political Islam as a set of Islamic rules covering both

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170 Simten, Ç. (2014). AKP'nin İktidarla Dansı: Neoliberalizm ve Türk-İslam Sentezi. In: Çoşar, S. & Özdemir-Yücesan, G. *İktidarın Şiddeti: AKP'li Yıllar, Neoliberalizm and İslamcı Politikalar*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları. p75.

171 Hayek, F. (1978). *The Constitution of Liberty*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. p78-79.

172 For instance, according to Max Weber, the essence of Islam is inadequate for coexistence with secularism. Although Weber was not able to finish his study about Islam, and his analyses are problematic, I agree with Weber on that because the Sharia covering both private and public sphere and putting forwards the laws regulating even criminal actions.

private and public space, in this case, how can Islamism and secularism be together? These questions can be answered by various perspectives; my approach to the question is based upon the transformative power of neoliberalism. To be more concrete, the material conditions of life are the most substantial component in the constitution of knowledge and society – in a complex manner.<sup>173</sup> Hence, the material conditions and economy prevail over social order including religion. The force of production and the capitalist economic relations are decisive over the transformation of political Islam and Islamic movements in Turkey; some describe this scheme as ‘moderate Islam’. Consequently, I argue that neoliberalism is the paramount ideological component of the JDP.

“(Capitalism) a purely cultic religion, perhaps the most extremely cultic that ever existed. Within it, nothing has meaning that is not immediately related to the cult; it has no specific dogma or theology. Utilitarianism acquires in it, from this viewpoint, its religious coloration.”<sup>174</sup>

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173 Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998). *The German Ideology : Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: Prometheus Books.

174 Benjamin, W. (1921). *Capitalism as Religion*.

## CHAPTER 5

### GEZI PARK PROTESTS AS A MIRROR

No one could anticipate that a peaceful small environmental activism on 28 May 2013 against the JDP's plan to demolish Gezi Park, in the centrum of Istanbul, for constructing a shopping mall instead, would escalate into the greatest resistance movement across the country – indisputably one of the most serious social and political crises in Turkey. Police brutality against a peaceful environmental protest, and Prime Minister Erdoğan's intractable and polarizing discourse triggered the quick spread of the demonstrations outside of Istanbul. According to the state's official report, approximately 3 million citizens have actively participated demonstrations, in 80 out of Turkey's 81 provinces. Almost 5,000 people had been detained from May 28 to June 23 (the validity and reliability of the official statistics are mistrustful; the real numbers might be higher). Besides, the Turkish Medical Association wrote down that almost 10.000 people have been injured, many seriously,<sup>175</sup> and the most distressing, 7 people died.<sup>176</sup>

What turned Gezi into a nexus of various dissatisfactions was mostly the overall consequences of the ruling JDP's authoritarianism. Erdoğan preferred to ignore the protests and the demonstrators accused them of being 'marauders' (*Çapulcu*) whose aim was allegedly to tarnish Turkey's and JDP's worldwide reputations. In the beginning, the protests have been interpreted above superficial analogies like 'the Turkish Spring'. The Arab uprisings in 2011 were followed by numerous mobilizations such as *Indignado* in Spain, the revolts in Greece, Occupy Wall Street in the United States and the anti-corruption movements in India. The protests in Turkey and Brazil have

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175 From the Turkish Medical Association, <[www.ttb.org.tr](http://www.ttb.org.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

176 The names as follows: Mehmet Ayvalıtaş, 20 years old, he died as a result of traffic accident during the protests. Abdullah Cömert, 22 years old, he died as a result of police and the JDP supporters beatings. Ethem Sarısülük, 27 years old, he was shot in the heat by police. Ali İsmail Korkmaz, 19 years old, he died as a result of police and the JDP supporters beating. Berkin Elvan, 15 years old, he was shot in the heat by police. İrfan Tuna, 47 years old, and Selim Önder, 88 years old, dead as a result of tear gas used by police – not active participants in demonstrations.

erupted in 2013 as mass mobilizations against the states, unlike armed-polarizations in Ukraine. What were the motivations behind these movements? What kinds of social, economic and political driving forces were prevalent?

*“Compared to Turkey, particularly in occupy movements and other relevant movements in the Western world, the reactions against capitalism and the process of precarization were more visible. (...) In Arab Spring and Turkey’s Gezi protests, these kinds of reactions were more hidden. We may claim that there is such a difference. What makes similar and closer in the cases of Arab Spring and Turkey presents the escalating reactions against authoritarian regimes, which incrementally intensified its power. Again, one of the common patterns, making the reactions mutually shared by all movements in the world was about the hatred against police. Strengthening of police force like a domestic army in the all over the world and in return, the reactions against rapidly increasing police raids were the globally shared pattern.”<sup>XI</sup> – [Tanıl Bora]*

The project initiated by the JDP aimed to reconstruct Gezi Park into a complex with a new mosque and shopping center without taking public consent. Nevertheless, Erdoğan argued that neoliberalism and liberal democracy can function collaboratively, in which Turkey should represent a prototype of ‘moderate Muslim democracy’ complying with the market’s fundamentals.<sup>177</sup>

*“The Gezi mosque may make most sense once we understand that it was linked to luxury apartments and shopping malls. Perhaps it was to be part of a broader advertisement to come shopping in Istanbul? The mosque, then, as a neoliberal icon, was set up, it seems, to draw greater investment (emotional and capital) from the more monied states in the region.”<sup>178</sup>*

Despite the JDP’s power grounded upon democratic elections, it nevertheless is an example of how authoritarianism can co-exist hand in hand with liberal democracy governed by neoliberal order. Indeed, the immense pressure and

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177 Butler, J. (2014). 'Foreword'. In: Özkırmlı, U. *The Making of A Protest Movement in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. pvii-xvii.

178 *Ibid.*, pxi.

control on media in order to criminalize the demonstrators along with the discourse as ‘security’ demonstrated how neoliberal state can eliminate democratic liberties such as the right to protest. For instance, brutal police power has been there as ordinary component of authoritarianism. The blocking entrance to Gezi Park was a picture of violation on the right of access to public sphere.

The outburst of Gezi protests evoked social sciences, in which initiated a series of discussions and studies contributed to the literature. The prevalent discussions about the protests have usually formed around the disputes of ‘new middle class’. According to these discussions, Gezi protests were a political manifestation of new middle class on democracy and secularism; the class has been not able to represent itself under the JDP rule.<sup>179</sup>




Figure 2. Level of Secularism among Gezi Supporters (%)<sup>180</sup>

By contrast, some interpreted that Gezi cannot be reduced to neither new middle class nor secular rebellion; instead it should be perceived as an action of multiple wage/salary earning class fractions such as university graduate workers with lower income or service sector employees faced with the proletarianization under neoliberal exploitation.<sup>181</sup> Also, many analyses about Gezi simply constructed upon the identity politics – there is no room for class perspectives.

179 Yörük, E. & Yüksel, M. (2014). Class & Politics in Turkey's Gezi Protests. *New Left Review*. 89 (1), p103-123.

180 *Ibid.*, p120.

181 Gürcan, E., C. & Peker, E. (2013). A Class Analytic Approach to the Gezi Park Events: Challenging the 'Middle Class' Myth. *Capital & Class*. 39 (2), p321-343.



*“(Compared to other occupy movements) Gezi Park protests has a unique aspect to Turkey. However, this demography has a heterogeneous dimension. Some people want to label as a proletariat revolt, or vice versa some others called it as pure new middle class movement but nothing else. Both of them are not true.”<sup>XII</sup> – [Emrah Göker]*

All these viewpoints may support us to apprehend Gezi’s different aspects. Nonetheless, the study does not offer a Gezi examination; it offers a class sociology, in which Gezi is used a mirror to get certain causalities. Therefore, in this chapter, I attempt to introduce a theoretical approach on Gezi Park protests, which may open some further discussions about the social classes in the following chapter 6 and 7. The theoretical analysis of Gezi can offer different dimensions aimed at understanding the social classes by including various phenomena such as the state violence, power and multitude.

### **5.1 The State & Gezi: M. Weber versus C. Tilly**

The discussions over the state’s legitimacy in Turkey spring out with the excessive political violence during Gezi. The state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force described by Max Weber has been referred in several analyses. Owing to Weberian understanding of state theoretically, the use of excessive police force and political oppressions in Gezi, which revealed the state’s brutality, were easily justified.

“Every state is founded on force,’ said Trotsky at Brest-Litovsk. That is indeed right. If no social institutions existed which knew the use of violence, then the concept of ‘state’ would be eliminated, and a condition would emerge that could be designated as ‘anarchy,’ in the specific sense of this word (...) we have to say that a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.”<sup>182</sup>

Many scholars interpreted the role of state in Gezi considering Weber’s conceptualization. However, in many respects, Weber’s definition of state, which was constrained to the territory and the physical use of force, is profoundly problematic. If the use of force is possessed by the state as a

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<sup>182</sup> Weber, M. *Politics as a Vocation*.

legitimate right in all manners, every protest or social movement would face with legitimacy problem. Indeed, Weberian approach applies the reconstruction of Hobbesian social contract, which refers that the legitimacy of state by its nature already relies on the violence; otherwise the existence of state becomes redundant. Thus, state authoritarianism can be blessed without any doubt. In addition, although the state should not be considered as a completely autonomous body, Weber's thought ignores the relation between the state and social classes. In essence, the supposition on the state's monopoly of violence signifies a historical form of economic and social exploitation and coercion.<sup>183</sup>

*“The state violence in Gezi was a reflection of the class content of the state. (...) These times like Gezi, this content surfaces explicitly, but the state would attempt to cover it through various new discourses as much as it appears”<sup>XIII</sup> – [Pınar Bedirhanoglu]*

Charles Tilly's approach may provide a peculiar perspective on the role of the state in Gezi. According to Tilly, the moment state resorts to violence, the collective violence is a matter of politics.<sup>184</sup> The collective violence denotes the state's repressive apparatus on the one side, and the citizens on the other. In this scope, the state in Gezi, as a concrete example, may coincide with Tilly's understanding of violence and his conceptualization, defining the state as 'organized crime'. State's activities consistently and immensely maintain enormous intimidations against its own citizens to legitimize its power, to make itself credible and to reproduce its existence.<sup>185</sup> Hence, the state violence is a prerequisite of its being. Along with that, the state violence would generate individual violence, which also functions for the state itself.

*“The desire to release life from a guilt secured through legal contract with the state — this would be a desire that gives rise*

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183 Hirsch, J. (2011). *Materyalist Devlet Teorisi*. İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık. p28.

184 Tilly, C. (2003). *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

185 Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p169-192.

to a violence against violence, one that seeks to release life from a death contract with the law, a death of the living soul by the hardening force of guilt.”<sup>186</sup>

Considering the approaches of Weber and Tilly, the state and violence are complementary to each other under any conditions. Weberian thought of the state legitimizes constraints of democratic rights and freedoms. In this respect, Weberian approach may be adapted into Carl Schmitt's the state of exception. There is not any legal structure, in Schmitt's view, which is able to manage an extreme situation of emergency or the state of exception. Under an absolute abnormal condition, regular implementations of law through legal and judiciary means would lead erratic, perilous and unpredictable consequences. Schmitt also added that the state itself decides on the state of exception. The widespread constitutional and legal violations by state officials during Gezi could be seen as a reproduction of that. The police officers along with the paramilitary forces of JDP brutally killed Gezi protestors, were safeguarded by the laws and regulations of the state without any hesitation.

To conclude, the state's position in Gezi can be understood more inclusive with Tilly's perception rather than Weber's. Tilly emphasizes the state's position as 'relative autonomous' or 'subordinate to dominant classes', in which it never applies equal treatment of the use of physical force.<sup>187</sup> That is, Tilly stresses class-based characteristics of the state as an outcome of the interaction between the capital accumulation and the means of coercion.<sup>188</sup> While taking lessons from European history, Tilly underlines the state's enthusiasm to monopolize the means of violence while supporting to capital accumulation, and therefore class-based society.

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186 Butler, J. (2006). Critique, Coercion, and Sacred Life in Benjamin's "Critique of Violence". In: Vries, H. De & Sullivan, L., E. *Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World*. New York: Fordham University Press. p211.

187 Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p176.

188 Tilly, C. (1992). *Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 990-1992*. Cambridge & Oxford: Blackwell.

“What distinguished the violence produced by states from the violence delivered by anyone else? In the long; run, enough to make the division between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ force credible. Eventually, the personnel of states purveyed violence on a larger scale, more effectively, more efficiently, with wider assent from their subject population ...”<sup>189</sup>

## **5.2 Power, Violence and Neoliberalism: Arendtian Inadequacy**

Hannah Arendt has also been cited to make theoretical explanations about ‘power’ and ‘violence’ in the context of Gezi. Unlike Weberian state and power, Arendt argues that ‘power’ and ‘violence’ are apart from each other, even they are opposites. Arendt defines ‘power’ as the capability to act for a political goal without violence. The essence of power does not derive from coercion; it must come from consent and rational suasion.

“(...) it is insufficient to say that power and violence are not same. Power and violence are opposites; where the one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy, but left to its own course it ends in power’s disappearance. This implies that it is not correct to think of the opposite of violence as nonviolence; to speak of nonviolent power is actually redundant.”<sup>190</sup>

For Arendt, the political space, where politics is done, is belonging to civil society instead of the state. That is, politics is made by people who are within the same space and time, share a common life and are all equal<sup>191</sup>, but not identical. In short, a collective action of people with shared practices in public sphere makes politics, not political parties or the state. Since people share a common world, the politics as a form of social connection is perpetually in existence.<sup>192</sup> In this respect, Arendt’s pluralism is indeed notable in terms of Gezi. Liberal pluralism based on competition between interest groups, the desire for unity based on the identity politics or radical democracy’s pluralist

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189 Tilly, C. (1985). War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In: Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. & Skocpol, T. *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p172-173.

190 Arendt, H. (1972). *Crisis of the Republic: ‘On Violence’*. Florida: Harcourt Brace & Company. p155.

191 Arendt’s conception of equality covers all people as equal.

192 Arendt, H. (1998). *The Human Condition*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

propositions are different than Arendtian approach of plurality.<sup>193</sup> So the unification of people in a common identity, the merge of all different identities in pursuit of a common goal generates a collective political action. At a glance, the plurality in Gezi – it is twofold; solidarity and individuality must be in tandem– may be interpreted in Arendt’s conception of politics and power.<sup>194</sup> In that respect, as consequences of the JDP’s authoritarian implementations, a powerful anti-JDP front was composed of various groups such as Kemalists, Alawites, socialists/communists, feminists, LGBT members, secular Kurds, etc.<sup>195</sup>

The alliance of Kemalists and secular Kurds by demonstrating ‘shoulder to shoulder’ in Gezi might illustrate Arendt’s plurality and political power. The JDP’s aggressions towards Kemal Atatürk and secularism encouraged Kemalists to vigorously join in Gezi protests.<sup>196</sup> On the other hand, several Kurdish political prisoners went on hunger strike due to Abdullah Öcalan’s<sup>197</sup> deprived prison conditions. The following civil disobedience in Kurdish intensive regions and PKK’s<sup>198</sup> guerrilla attacks against the Turkish army compelled the JDP to negotiate with PKK. Besides, the retreat of Bashar Assad’s regime from Northern Syria (*Rojava*), and Kurd’s accelerating *de facto* dominance in the region put pressure on the JDP to carry out a new Kurdish policy agenda. In a few words, with the introduction of official negotiations between JDP and PKK, the level of nationalist sensibility has risen up immensely. In this respect, Kemalists having a strong ‘Turkish’

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193 Berktaş, F. (2012). *Dünyayı Bugünde Sevmek: Hannah Arendt’in Politika Anlayışı*. İstanbul: Metis Yayınları.

194 Gök, S., Ü. (2014). Politikayı Deneyimleyen Bir Toplumsal Hareket Olarak Gezi Direnişi. *Marmara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilimler Dergisi*. 2 (1), p75-92.

195 Yıldırım, Y. (2014). The Differences of Gezi Parki Resistance in Turkish Social Movements. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*. 5 (1), p177-185.

196 Yaşlı, F. (2014). *AKP, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus: Yeni Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap. P164-184.

197 He is one of the founding members and the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and may be the most important name of the Kurdish movement in Turkey.

198 The Kurdistan Workers’ Party, typically referred to by its Kurdish acronym – *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê* (PKK) is a militant organization based in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. It was established in 1974 and is the most important armed and political organization of the Kurdish movement in Turkey.

nationalism represents one of the strongest opponents against the JDP's Kurdish policy. Nevertheless, Kemalists and Kurds as two politically antagonist groups could mobilize together against the JDP, which may be interpreted with reference to Arendt.

However, Arendt's epistemological and methodological conceptions on violence have serious insufficiencies, which constrain a holistic approach to the protests. The violence conceptualized by Arendt presents that violence is unhistorical, apart from the routine, and autonomous from economic and political structures. In other words, the structural relationship between neoliberalism and violence is neglected. Arendt's point enables a 'pure violence' discounting structural mechanisms.

As famously Gramsci stated, hegemony embodies the consent as well as the force. Dominated by hegemonic bourgeoisie and political elites, civil society becomes advanced in hegemonic benefits by delivering neoliberal values. With a Marxist skepticism towards non-structural social and political conceptualizations, Gramsci called attention to, different than Arendt, the essential divisions of power, in which force and consensus are not mutually exclusive.<sup>199</sup> As Gramsci emphasized, the consensus would not be possible without force in capitalist rule. Gramsci theorized dominant classes; political elites and state by setting up their positions through a combination of sheer force and coercion via political society. The use of force in the routine of domination presents the terrain of what Gramsci called 'political society' including the armed forces, police, army, prisons, law courts and so on with all the administrative institutions including taxation, trade, finance, industry, social security, etc. Indeed, the fundamental goal of political society – the apparatus of state coercive power – is to execute discipline on all groups.<sup>200</sup> Similarly, Louis Althusser emphasizes that capitalist state is apparently conceived as a repressive apparatus, a 'machine' of enforcement,<sup>201</sup> which

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199 Gramsci, A. (2007). *Prison Notebooks*. New York: Columbia University Press.

200 *Ibid.*

201 State as a 'machine' – Althusserian is detailed in 5.4 regarding Gezi.

empowers the ruling classes and political elites to ensure their domination over society.<sup>202</sup> Therefore, while analyzing the violence in the context of Gezi with regard to Arendtian approach, events and phenomena are detached from their material structure. Violence is subject to ethical principles, and hence the immanence of violence in neoliberalism is passed over.

### **5.3 Gezi, Multitude & Autonomism: A Critique to Post-Marxism**

The theory of multitude and autonomism by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt is another prominent approach used to describe Gezi. The book of *Empire* presents a 'shift' within the ideological/political current known as post-Marxism. Although their theoretical framework is mostly correlated with the demonstrations against globalization – albeit not within classical Marxist school; Negri and Hardt themselves offered 'locality' as a form of autonomous resistance.

"Local differences preexist the present scene and must be defended or protected against the intrusion of globalization."<sup>203</sup>

Postmodernism has been explicitly accelerating theoretically since the mid-1980s (*Postmodern Condition* by Jean-François Lyotard in 1984), the disenchantment with Marxism escalated immensely since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Bloc and the defeat in the Central American Revolution. The postmodern turn in Marxist theory supposed that socialism cannot be realized on the ground of nation state; the failure of former socialism attempts – considering such states – could have improved the conviction that the classical school of Marxism was *passé*. Postmodernism constantly defends the meaningless of ideas including nation state in a 'globalized' world. Roger Burbach with Orlando Núñez and Boris Kagarlitsky enunciated this ideological mood frankly in *Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodernist Socialisms*.

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<sup>202</sup> Althusser, L. (2014). *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. London: Verso.

<sup>203</sup> Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2001). *Empire*. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. p44-45.

"The left has to accept the fact that the Marxist project for revolution launched by the Communist Manifesto is dead. There will certainly be revolutions (the Iranian Revolution is probably a harbinger of what to expect in the short term), but they will not be explicitly socialist ones that follow in the Marxist tradition begun by the First International."<sup>204</sup>

Gezi has been analyzed through different theoretical perspective; the multitude is one contextualized in the light of 'postmodern condition'. The presence of various identities from different socioeconomic and sociocultural groups, the absence of organized workers<sup>205</sup>, and thus non-hierarchical characteristic of Gezi has been considered as multitude by referring Negri and Hardt.




Figure 3. Answers to: Are You Member of Any Political Movement? (%)<sup>206</sup>

The demand-driven and pragmatic peculiarities of Gezi revealed the importance of matters for the protestors such as environment, the right to the city, freedoms and anti-authoritarianism. Gezi with the establishment of alternative living zones, horizontal organizational structure and democratic decision-making mechanism strengthened autonomist/communal theories well-matched with post-Marxism. In this sense, the established communal life in Gezi Park exemplifies what Negri argues about the idea of plurality in practice. The occupy movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Greece, Spain and the

204 Burbach, R., Núñez, O. & Kagarlitsky, B. (1997). *Globalization and Its Discontents: The Rise of Postmodernist Socialisms*. London: Pluto Press. p142.

205 Worker unions and organizations did not give direct support to Gezi.

206 KONDA countrywide survey, <www.konda.com.tr> [Last access: 15/09/2015]



United States might be other instances around the world, which may be interpreted in a similar way.

“In the long decades of the current crisis of the communist, socialist, and liberal left that has followed the 1960s, a large portion of critical thought, both in the dominant countries of capitalist development and in the subordinated ones, has sought to recompose sites of resistance that are founded on the identities of social subjects or national and regional groups, often grounding political analysis on the localization of struggles.”<sup>207</sup>

The common aspects of all these movements were the togetherness of diverse set of classes, identities and ideologies with a horizontal mobility. Even if Gezi like other recent occupy movements may be apprehended through Negri’s plurality and multiplicity, this approach can lead to a misinterpretation due to some reasons. Is this kind of occupying movements capable of being to change the *status quo*?

*“(About Hardt & Negri’s multitude) I am not confident about what it explains, from a sociological or social science perspective, I am not sure about what the concept of multitude can be operationalized or to explain what this concept was presented to use (...) As if we already completed our work with class category, solved, attacked and strengthened, falsified or verified and eventually completed; now a new era starts such as globalization, etc. (...) for my view, the concept of multitude cannot be more than a theoretical exercise in terms of corresponding with Gezi.”<sup>XIV</sup> – [Emrah Göker]*

In Turkey, the ideas and discussions on autonomism have been presented in critical intellectual academia for a long time. Considering the studies on Gezi; poststructuralist scholars are cited in numerous analyses while interpreting Gezi as the quest for freedom over the subject. For this reason, while some scholars applauded it, some have criticized due to lack of structural analysis in the meantime. Instead of entering power struggle against neoliberalism and authoritarian state power, the thought of establishing alternative living spaces is regarded as consecrated, which also refers a new form of struggle

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<sup>207</sup> Hardt, M. & Negri, A. (2001). *Empire*. Cambridge. Harvard University Press. p44.

both at theoretical and practical levels. In this respect, it is mainly criticized to be romantic as well as its inability to resist the neoliberal order and its brutality as a non-organizational formation. The examinations without taking into account the structural dynamics of neoliberalism, class relations and cultural reproduction mechanisms take us back to Weber's legitimation of right to use violence and bureaucratic state. Accordingly, the organized state holds the power over civil society, which places the state at a superior level than the civil society. In this process, the sanctification of state's authoritarianism is instrumentalized with the pretext of security and order.

With the loss of theoretical innocence of revolutionary socialism after the Soviet Russia experience – regarding authoritarian and bureaucratic state structure – and anti-democratic practices as consequences of neoliberal restoration in former socialist countries, the idea of 'stateless socialism' became more widespread and attractive. For instance, John Holloway argues that revolutionary socialism missed 'something' such as freedom, equality and wealth, in which ways must be sought without the state power in order to bring about the end of capitalism.<sup>208</sup> Holloway advocated to emphasis on the practices of everyday life.

"The world cannot be changed through the state. Both theoretical reflections and a whole century of bad experiences tell us so (...) There is no doubt that the fall of the Soviet Union and the failure of national liberation movements throughout the world have brought disillusionment to millions of people. The notion of revolution was so strongly identified with gaining control of the state that the failure of those attempts to change the world through gaining control of the state has led very many people to the conclusion that revolution is impossible."<sup>209</sup>

Although Holloway made some important clarifications, I believe, there has still some drawbacks. There have been some important questions to be raised; How to ensure the continuity of these autonomous relations? How the

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208 Holloway, J. (2005). *Change the World Without Taking Power*. London: Pluto Press.

209 *Ibid.*, p19.

attacks of neoliberal state are able to be prevented? Is there any chance for splitting a point of autonomy and neoliberal state?

Gezi could be a significant example of how autonomous perspectives may be criticized from several aspects. First of all, Gezi demonstrated that, for any reason, the authoritarian state does not allow such local autonomous practices, which may jeopardize the continuity of the *status quo*. The state has guaranteed the persistence of the *status quo* by using physical force. With the police's harsh intervention to the commune in Gezi Park, it was totally terminated. The state's interventions showed how the autonomous movements can be devastated with the direct use of repressive apparatus. Although Gezi triggered the 'togetherness', in the last two years after Gezi, the impacts of it has been explicitly diminishing. For instance, the participation rate in the anniversary of Gezi has been decreasing every year, and hence the impacts became more blurred. The parliamentary and municipal elections have been realized after Gezi were other instances of how the continuity of the *status quo* was preserved – there was no notable decline in the JDP's votes. Therefore, it is difficult to say that these autonomous relations did not yield positive results for the political struggle in 'emancipation'.

#### **5.4 State, Class and Gezi: An Althusserian Glance**

From Adam Smith to present, the state is a matter of discussion both in liberal and neoliberal theories. However, neutrality of the state towards individuals aimed at promoting the market economy – in theory – is constantly advocated.<sup>210</sup> Liberal and neoliberal principles, along with the social structure of accumulation theory have encouraged pursuing certain economic and political forms intended for promoting a favorable business environment.<sup>211</sup> Then, the state must establish a trusted business environment by stabilizing the market through the state regulations and public expenditures. In Turkey, there is a parallelism between public

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<sup>210</sup> Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

<sup>211</sup> Barrow, C., W. (1993). *Critical Theories of the State: Marxist, Neo-Marxist, Post-Marxist*. Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press. p75-76.

expenditures and private sectors investments, as compatible with the theory, Table 11, below, shows that for during the JDP rule.

*Table 11. Public & Private Sector Fixed Capital Investments, 2002-14*<sup>212</sup>

	Public	Private
2002	17.307.672	42.733.310
2005	24.578.314	114.236.943
2010	47.003.477	164.326.491
2014	85.355.366	276.234.902

Also, the state interventions would essentially facilitate capitalist development by increasing labor market participation rate, enhancing industrialization and creating various opportunities for profitable business investment. Thus, the state's active role is required in order to accomplish the objectives.

“According to theory, the neoliberal state should favour strong individual private property rights, the rule of law, and the institutions of freely functioning markets and free trade.”<sup>213</sup>

In contrast with this teleological assertion, Marx made the first structural criticism by arguing that capitalist state is a ‘committee’ to ensure the permanence of reproduction of capital and capitalist relations.<sup>214</sup> While Marx defined the state as a committee of capitalists, Althusser presented the state as a ‘separate’ entity and ‘machine’, which is not a direct body of bourgeoisie.

“The state is plainly still ‘separate’, but now it has become a ‘machine’ or an ‘apparatus’, and there is no longer any question of accounting for it in terms of alienation.”<sup>215</sup>

These two approaches to the state have some distinctive characteristics in terms of how the relationship between the state and bourgeoisie is formed. In *1844 Manuscripts*, Marx rejected Hegel, and stressed the state's instrumentalist role. Whereas the state was described as ‘instrument’ by

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212 <http://www.kalkinma.gov.tr/>

213 Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p64.

214 Marx, K. & Engels, F. (2012). *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Verso. p37.

215 Althusser, L. (2006). *Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87*. London & New York: Verso. p67.

Marx and as ‘stick’ by Lenin, Althusser defined it as ‘machine’ and ‘apparatus’, it is not instrumental. Althusser stresses that the state must be a separate body to serve interests of dominant classes in a best way.<sup>216</sup> Moreover, the state as machine cannot be reduced to economy.<sup>217</sup> In ultimate point, all economic and political actualities must be in relation with the state, for this reason, it stands at a crucial intersection point. It must be powerful to preserve the continuity of the *status quo*, and must impose the benefits of dominant classes as common benefits of whole society.




Figure 4. Althusserian Infrastructure-Superstructure Relations<sup>218</sup>

Althusser likewise underlines another important point, which depicts the state’s outstanding ability on hiding its relationship with bourgeoisie. As stated, Althusser strongly highlighted autonomous structure of the state from dominant classes; nevertheless, the state operates for the sake of bourgeoisie. In this regard, the state’s autonomous structure does not exist spontaneously while protecting bourgeoisie’s interests; hence, this relationship between the state and bourgeoisie is shrouded under highly complicated bureaucratic arrangements through numerous administrative apparatuses.

“(…) even if hierarchy and responsibility, state secret and state reserve are the principles of the functioning of the state, it is so complex today that by the time we arrive at a counter at the post office, national railway or national health service, we have long since lost sight of the class politics that govern all our

216 Althusser, L. (2014). *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. London: Verso.

217 Althusser, L. (2005). *For Marx*. New York: Verso.

218 Paul, R. (1992). *Althusser and the Renewal of Marxist Social Theory*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

administrative apparatuses from afar, yet imperiously. We may well have the impression that we are dealing with 'formalities', which are, it is true, complicated, but which could be simplified, and are 'natural'."<sup>219</sup>

Like Gramsci, Althusser accentuates the roots of superstructure, which are embedded in infrastructure; so superstructure is determined 'in the last instance' by economy. For Althusser (and for Marx), ideology plays an essential role on ensuring the reproduction of capitalist relations. As long as the reproduction is ensured; production, coercion, exploitation and ideologization would permanently work for the sake of dominant classes.<sup>220</sup> Bear in mind, Gezi is a prominent example on the relationship between capitalists and the state; the ideological state apparatus<sup>221</sup>, also the repressive ones used for the expansion of capital accumulation – the privatization of Gezi Park to construct a shopping mall without democratic consent.

Borrowing from Gramscian and Althusserian perspectives, Nicos Poulantzas also highlights that the state – despite of relatively autonomous body from bourgeoisie – serves for protecting the smooth proceeding of capitalist relations.<sup>222</sup> From time to time, capitalism may collaborate with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes such as fascist dictatorships. This is to say, Poulantzas stresses, democracy is not the indispensable criteria or prerequisite for capitalism, rather it can be adopted to any kind of regimes.<sup>223</sup> The connection of neoliberalism and the state in Turkey also resulted in the limitation of democratic rights in favor of capital accumulation, as parallel to the theoretical ground of Althusser and Poulantzas. For instance, the JDP did not hesitate to use excessive amount of physical force during Gezi in order to defend the interests of capital owners. Gezi revealed the class content of the state, in which the elimination of democratic rights and the state violence are outcome of historical and structural dynamics in this sense.

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219 Althusser, L. (2006). *Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings, 1978-87*. London & New York: Verso. p79.

220 Carnoy, M (1984). *The State and Political Theory*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. p89-128.

221 For instance, the protesters have been accused of being terrorists by many TV channels, newspapers and media institutions.

222 Jessop, B. (1985). *Nicos Poulantzas: Marxist Theory and Political Strategy*. New York: Macmillan

223 Poulantzas, N. (2008). *The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law & the State*: London: Verso.

## CHAPTER 6

### ISLAMIC PROLETARIAT: A PROTOCONCEPTUALIZATION

Considering the ontological structuring of capital, neoliberalism must produce and reproduce inequalities on people's access to the material conditions.<sup>224</sup> Whether through the means of production in a Marxian or consumption in a Weberian sense/‘Class’ itself reflects the reality of neoliberal structuring that is why; it is a primary unit of analysis in society. Under neoliberal rule, there has been always an inevitable decomposition between big/small capital and labor power (manual and non-manual) without capital. In other words, inequality, stratification and hierarchy, as the fundamental elements, must be reproduced and ensured for the continuity of the class relations. Most importantly, neoliberalism creates enormous inequalities on people's access to the material conditions. To illustrate, social statistics determine that the 85 richest people have as much wealth as the 3.5 billion poorest<sup>225</sup>, and the richest 1 per cent of people owned almost half of the global wealth in 2014, which is a simple but important indicator on how wealth is unevenly distributed among people.<sup>226</sup> Aside from the excessive amount of accumulation of wealth, over 3 billion people live on less than \$2.50 per day.<sup>227</sup> In the case of Turkey, the richest 10 per cent owned 77.7 per cent of the total wealth in 2014; it was 67 per cent in 2000.<sup>228</sup>

In order to justify the current social system, the possibility of upward social mobility provides opportunities for individuals, which presents one of the key mechanisms of neoliberalism’s legitimacy. However, in terms of accessing the material conditions, upward mobility for some would also lead to downward

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224 Horootunian, H. (2004). *The Empire’s New Clothes*. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press. p122.

225 <http://www.forbes.com/>

226 <https://www.oxfam.org/>

227 <http://www.globalissues.org/>

228 <http://publications.credit-suisse.com/>

mobility for the rest, which demonstrates how dynamics of neoliberalism essentially works. This distorted balance means the impoverishment and dispossession for people. In this respect, including direct and indirect exploitation, inequalities in terms of material conditions are inherent in class relations; not only economically, but also politically and socially; these inequalities determine class relations; thereof the class as an ontological reality cannot be ignored. For this reason, Islamic proletariat, Islamic new middle class and new middle class must be discussed to comprehend the causalities as the focus of the study.

On the other hand, it would not be accurate to claim that 'class' by itself represents the whole reality. Interpreting class as the central or the most important unit of analysis would not be appropriate. In this sense, the inequalities consist of a lot of different realms such as gender, race and ethnicity. However, the significance of class cannot be denied considering that it includes all the relations of inequality within itself, and because of the decisive capability on the above-mentioned inequalities. Neoliberalism's approach to different inequalities varies between identity and class matters. As today's dominant ideology, while it is partially sensitive to the inequalities on identity matters such as ethnicity, gender, religion and cultural identities, LGBT rights and so on – the identity politics, the class contradictions and inequalities are permanently ignored and perceived as unnecessary. Hence, neoliberalism legitimizes the inequalities on class and people's access to the material conditions.

Historical materialism is many times perceived as compulsory reference in dealing with class studies that may produce a one-dimensional understanding and may also create prejudices. There are numerous studies about class with the inclusion of historical materialism and also criticizing it. As another significant issue, the lack of certainty regarding its extremely complex structures and components complicates the use of class. Along with its complicated structure, the understanding of class is quite controversial and open to subjective approaches such as the classification of middle class in



the literature. With regard to the American sociology tradition, economical approaches are conducted for the classification of middle class, mainly positioning social groups based on variations between minimum and maximum incomes. In this regard, the dominant sociological understanding insists on certain conceptualizations of poverty and wealth, and people who are not inclusive of these conceptualizations are categorized as middle classes. For instance, an university instructor in Turkey with monthly income of 3,500 TRY – Interestingly, according to TURKSTAT, the poverty line in Turkey is 3470 TRY (2014)<sup>229</sup> – or a factory manager with monthly income of 10,000 TRY are both classified as members of middle classes. In Turkey, the classification of social groups as middle class relies on this sociological tradition in general. This may be seen as a reductionist approach not only economically, but also socially and politically. On the other hand, certain Marxist scholars in Turkey stand against the mainstream classification of middle class and put forth their own classifications. However, in my opinion, both confronting classifications have certain deficiencies. The Marxists generally categorize the middle classes as a variant of the working class with regard to their material conditions. This approach seems not fully capable to explain the cultural dimensions of the middle classes in Turkey. Even if they might be called as working class regarding their material conditions – I agree on that, the cultural consciousness of the middle classes is considerably different.

The simple instance about how certain Marxist scholars approach middle class indicates that the class as a matter of subject can be very difficult and complex owing to its epistemological diversity, highly open structure to subjective approaches and the relations with a quite number of social realities. Even if certain objective relations between social classes are taken for granted, the researcher's subjectivity cannot be independent from the scope of class study. In addition to that, the possibility of upward and downward mobility among classes makes it difficult to analyze neoliberal

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<sup>229</sup> <http://www.turkis.org.tr/>

mechanisms. Even as the objects and empirical indications of class analysis are very complex, theoretical approaches may be seen as just a subjective attempt to interpret the study in sociology. Consequently, class should not be only described as a field of political struggle, but also it must be considered as a reality of science in order to understand the sociological whole.

“The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance.”<sup>230</sup>

Determining a single dominant class clearly would not be possible in society, and for this reason it would not be true to say that bourgeoisie completely dominates the intellectual space. However, keeping in mind that this assertion is too sharp, there is a certain degree of accuracy on that. In other words, the class can be very decisive over the ideas we internalize as normal. For instance, in a capitalist society, the bourgeoisie’s right of confiscating the surplus value is internalized and accepted as the reality by the people. Marx and Engels's words are at least an invitation to the idea of a critical effort.

While approaching the matter of class in this study, I am merely concentrating on three social classes in Turkey – Islamic proletariat, new middle class and Islamic new middle class. Although these classes are defined by consumption – not the means of production, all three should be in fact considered as different fractions of the working class regarding their access to the means of production. Despite theoretical and methodological problems of ‘middle class’ classification, denying the existence of middle classes and perceiving them basically as working class would be a scientific fail. In regard

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<sup>230</sup> Marx, K. & Engels, F. (1998). *The German Ideology : Including Theses on Feuerbach and Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy*. New York: Prometheus Books. p64.

to the cultural and intellectual properties, manual and non-manual labor force are two separate phenomena from each other, in which sociocultural and sociopolitical positions are differentiated from each other that refer different sociological realities.

In this chapter, I argue that lower class formations<sup>231</sup> are inevitable in the establishment and continuity of the rise of modern power, violence, and then the knowledge-power axis.<sup>232</sup> Therefore, the three classes are vital in order to understand neoliberal hegemony, the JDP rule and Gezi in the light of sociological causalities.

### **6.1 Islamic Proletariat: An Attempt to Define**

The proletariat (from Latin; *proletarius*) refers – etymologically – poor and free human in ancient Rome. It presents the lowest or one of the lowest economic and social strata among all citizens. As stated in the Constitution of the Roman Republic, the *proletarius* constituted a social class including Roman citizens owning little or no property.<sup>233</sup> The *proletarius* who had no property of importance was called as *capite censi*<sup>234</sup> because they were

"(...) persons registered not as to their property (...) but simply as to their existence as living individuals, primarily as heads (*caput*) of a family."<sup>235</sup>

The proletariat refers to 'producers of offspring' literally meaning that was the lowest rank in the whole society of the Empire. At that time, the proletariat was the wage earners, particularly people who had earned their living by manual labor, and were totally dependent to causal or daily

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231 Herein, it refers to Islamic proletariat.

232 Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977*. New York: Pantheon Books.

233 Berger, A. (1952). *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange LTD.

234 *Capite censi*, literally in Latin: 'those counted by head' in the ancient Rome. It was used to indicate the lowest class of people who had not the nobility or belonged to middle classes. Therefore, they had been counted by the head rather by their property.

235 Berger, A. (1952). *Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law*. New Jersey: The Lawbook Exchange LTD. p380.

employment. Certainly, the proletariat was an integral part of working class, but they were at the bottom level regarding economic and social circumstances that they live in. In the simplest term, they were the poorest of the poorest.

In Marxist theory, the class of workers – proletariat, particularly the wage earners at industry, do not have capital or the means of production, and must sell their labor power in order to survive. However, for Marx, the wage laboring also includes having a salary *per se* rather than getting a wage.

“The proletariat is that class in society which lives entirely from the sale of its labor and does not draw profit from any kind of capital; whose weal and woe, whose life and death, whose sole existence depends on the demand for labor...”<sup>236</sup>

Labor already became more and more diversified among individual workers – especially the main distinction emerged out between manual and non-manual labor power. Hence, workers previously responsible of the entire production process, now assign to work for only a part of the process, which leads to the division of labor in industry. The division of labor – particularly for manual workers – shortened the production time by enabling wage earners to work faster and more ‘efficient’, which lead to the decrease in wages, unlike the increase in the production of goods with lower costs for producers. Since the division of labor disintegrates the workers from the production processes and, in this way, it does not require high-skill for manual workers anymore. Regarding how proletariat can be defined and under what circumstances they live, in this study, I concentrate on ‘Islamic proletariat’ in Turkey under two main dynamics; social and economic.

From economic perspective, Islamic proletariat represents the poorest strata in the society of Turkey – in the lowest ranks of the working class regarding their access to the material conditions, economic well-being and socioeconomic presence. These workers are deprived of education opportunities and social capital; they work for extremely low wages and

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236 Engels, F. (1847). *The Principles of Communism*. <<https://www.marxists.org>> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

salaries in industry or service sectors in the urban – therefore I also call them ‘urban poor’, includes unskilled and manual individuals who work in formal and informal sectors, as a social class.

In addition to their economic condition, considering their social composition, Islamic proletariat mostly complies with religious norms and values, but also they have certain fragmented and diversified ideas. For instance, while some opposing the secularism demand for the Sharia, some others have no opposition either secularism or the Sharia at the same time. In both cases, the religion portrays a social framework, which binds people culturally and mentally under the same structure. In general, Islamic proletariat live in suburbs of big cities or in small and medium scale Anatolian cities, which also paved the way for maintaining and protecting their Islamic identity and culture.

Although the labor processes are already differentiated between varied sectors and labor power in contemporary world, the demand for skilled and cultural capital – based labor power increased, unlike manual labor<sup>237</sup>. However, neoliberalism still must keep the existence and continuation of manual workers at expected level. In this scope, I argue that the number of Islamic proletariat increased immensely after 1980 with the effective use of the state's ideological apparatus. Since 1980, the parties in power continuously supported the development of Islamic proletariat; the Motherland Party in 1980s, the Welfare Party in 1990s and lastly the JDP in the contemporary Turkey. Islamic proletariat has easily channeled to the parties characterized with Islamic norms and discourse.

## **6.2 Interpellation, ‘Self-Panopticism’ & Islamic Proletarianization**

Why Islamic proletariat has permanently given consent to neoliberal order despite being one of the poorest segments of the society? Put it differently, the class has extremely low level of access to the material conditions, and hence they live in economic and social scarcity, but nevertheless mostly not

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<sup>237</sup> In Bourdieuan.

taken a position against the order. I think this question is crucial, and must be scrutinized. In this respect, different disciplines of social sciences and their various approaches have different answers to this phenomenon, and all of them would enrich our point of view on the issue in certain aspects. As a matter of fact, it is impossible to speak of merely one reason or correct answer; each epistemological approach may help us to comprehend one facet of the whole reality – it should be called as ‘overdetermination’.

In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Sigmund Freud stated that numerous features of dreams are commonly ‘overdetermined’. A dream is constituted by multiple reasons in the dreamer’s life – very briefly. In this context, various levels and factors are in process of the occurrence of a reality like in Islamic proletarianization. For instance, in some sub-branches of analytical philosophy, a reality or event may be expressed to be overdetermined if there are two or more discrete and sufficient reasons.<sup>238</sup> As mentioned in the famous example of ‘firing squad’, the soldiers are simultaneously firing the target, which would be eventually killed. Evidently, no single soldier is able to be said to have caused the death, but all. In this regard, Althusser placed this concept into Marxist theory. Inspired by Freud and Mao Zedong, Althusser emphasized the concept of overdetermination as a way of expression of the multiple, which may locate in many of the political and social realities, without falling into superficial generalizations of all these various elements being simply ‘contradictory’.<sup>239</sup> Regarding the overdetermined aspects of Islamic proletariat’s consent and support to neoliberalism and its representative the JDP, in this part, Althusser’s ‘interpellation’ and the term of ‘self-panopticism’ are used – I call it inspired by Foucault’s panopticism to approach the question in order to get a vantage point within the sociological whole.

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238 Danto, A., C. (1973). *Analytical Philosophy of Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

239 Althusser, L. (2005). *For Marx*. New York: Verso. p87-129.

Interpellation, in Althusserian term, is defined as the processes through which ideology addresses the people. Interpellation states that an idea is not basically yours alone (For instance, 'I like pink') but rather it had been presented to/for you to admit. Ideologies, which are decisive our thoughts and behaviors towards such as ethnicity, class, religion, gender, etc., must be thought rather as 'social processes'.<sup>240</sup> According to Althusser, it is the way of how ideology mostly affairs over us. Althusserian interpellation theoretically points out that autonomous ideas, fully actualized by human subject, are imagination. People are in fact enmeshed in countless social and political structures, institutions and discourses – a greater or lesser degree – that forms human subjectivity.

“(…) there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects. Meaning, there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: meaning, *by the category of the subject* and its functioning.”<sup>241</sup>

Henceforth, 'ideology' is pivotal in forming human identity, and then determining a particular role in society, for Althusser. That is to say, an individual interpellated means that she/he was triumphantly brought into admitting a pre-given role and that internalized the values willingly. In brief, ideology creates subject. In regard to Althusser's structuralism, the validity of interpellation can be criticized or totally rejected by poststructuralists, postmodernists or humanists, etc. However, at least, I think Althusser is right on that to a certain degree. Particularly since 1980, the ideological state apparatus has been effectively used for Islamization of the people. Islamic orders and institutions have been promoted, and hence they are more influential over the society. To remind, this Sunni-Islamization is quite consistent with the neoliberalism's fundamentals. For instance, – as already mentioned above – It is a common and prevailing belief among Muslims in

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<sup>240</sup> Althusser, L. (2014). *On the Reproduction of Capitalism: Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*. London: Verso.

<sup>241</sup> *Ibid.*, p261.

Turkey that 'both poverty and richness come from God and that God can test people by this poverty, so a good Muslim has to embrace this reality and obey it.' This example indicates that due to successfully interpellated Islamic proletariat, neoliberalism can easily access the manual workers what the system requires for, and consolidate its existence.

Secondly, the 'self-panopticism' can be applied for examining the phenomena of 'Islamic Proletariat' from a Foucauldian perspective. The word of 'panopticism' came originally from 'panopticon' – Greek; *pan* 'all' + *optikon* 'optic' in etymologically. In 1791, the name was used by Jeremy Bentham to designate a type of prison where warders has a constant view over all prisoners from an invisible place. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault grounded on the concepts of 'panopticon' by Bentham details into the process of disciplinary mechanisms in a penitentiary, and demonstrated the disciplinary mechanisms as an inevitable apparatus of power.

"(...) the peculiarity of the disciplines [elements of Panopticism] is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfills three criteria: firstly, to obtain the exercise of power at the lowest possible cost (economically, by the low expenditure it involves; politically, by its discretion, its low exteriorization, its relative invisibility, the little resistance it arouses); secondly, to bring the effects of this social power to their maximum intensity and to extend them as far as possible, without either failure or interval; thirdly, to link this 'economic' growth of power with the output of the apparatuses (educational, military, industrial or medical) within which it is exercised; in short, to increase both the docility and the utility of all elements of the system"<sup>242</sup>

In the panopticism, the individual is perpetually visible, but is not able to get in touch with the neighbors; and warders are always invisible – In fact, they are not necessary to be there. The individual is not continuously watched, but the individual believes that she/he is constantly under the surveillance. Therefore, self-discipline is maintained – the individual controls her/himself even if she/he is not under any surveillance at that

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242 Foucault, M. (1995). *Discipline & Punishment*. New York: Vintage Books. p218.



time. Discipline as a type of power appears among individuals in this manner. Foucault, like Friedrich Nietzsche, envisages different things based on 'power'. Foucault focused on how power works through individuals and their language/discourse. He concluded that 'discourse' is an integral part of the power.

“The circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power”.<sup>243</sup>

Considering the prevailing interpretation of Islam and Islamic discourse in Turkey, the individuals within Islamic proletariat apply themselves 'self-panopticism' that the God is constantly watching them, in which a strong self-discipline is now present. Within power-knowledge relationship, power produces religious knowledge as well; this is cheap, reliable and effective disciplinary mechanism for the continuity of neoliberal order. Eventually, the existence of Islamic proletariat is indispensable for neoliberal hegemony in Turkish context. In that sense, the self-panopticism applied by Islamic proletariat by continuously complying with the orders of Islam, embracing their current socioeconomic situation and obeying what they were told in society, maintains the power of neoliberalism not only economically, but also socially and ideologically.

### **6.3 Islamic Proletariat's Discontent to Gezi**

During Gezi protests, Erdoğan has blamed the demonstrators in various ways such as accusing them of being marauder, anarchist or terrorist. Some media organizations and Islamic institutions, with close ties to the JDP, have labeled the demonstrators at the same way, while some already declared that Gezi was an Alawite rebellion. It was already known that Alawites have actively been in the protests, which was not a surprise. The JDP rule, for a long time, has established Sunni-Islamic/conservative references to the base of its politics, developed a Sunni discourse and oppressive Sunni hegemony.

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<sup>243</sup> Foucault, M. (1995). *Discipline & Punishment*. New York: Vintage Books. p88.

Everyday lives of people are under these constraints where Alawites are one of the most disturbed for many reasons. As the first instance, the JDP's codification on Alawite identity as enemy seems not a coincidence.<sup>244</sup> The declaration of Bashar al-Assad and his Alawite identity as evil, and the JDP's neo-Ottomanism and its consolidation via Sunnism in foreign policy should be taken into consideration in how JDP's politics oppresses Alawite identity, and why the Alawites supported Gezi.

*“The most important action of JDP was to remove ‘Turkish’ identity as the main reference point from the definition of the nation and to describe Sunni-Islam as the fundamental, complementary and existential element of the nation. (...) It is inevitable for certain identities in Turkish society to take the opposition because Sunni-Islamic definition of the identity has a particular structure excluding and discriminating Kemalists, socialists, leftists and specifically Alawites. Eventually this ideological structure has to face with these excluded groups and this would lead to conflict. The moment that this conflict did not solve, the JDP would be more authoritative and it would cause to embrace Sunni-Muslim oriented nationalism more. That’s how it paved the way for Gezi Resistance”<sup>xv</sup> – [Cenk Saraçoğlu]*

The JDP successfully integrated Islamic proletariat to its hegemonic system. They are now able to feel more comfortable to express their Islamic identity, which was very essential for this group and one of the main reasons of their support. The JDP has been in power since 2002 and for three periods – except the election in June 2015, but still they came out as the first party with 40 per cent of the total votes in the 2015 elections although it is not the ruling party. For this reason, the high level of public support to the JDP is an important fact that requires a clarification. At this point, Çağlar Keyder argues that such classes with lower income have voted the JDP because of the economic reasons rather than the religious or cultural ones.

*“Are people who vote for JDP always rational in terms of their own interests? It is hard to tell they are not. Considering the minimum wages – did you hear about the study of Alpkan Birelma? – His study shows that the workers are not in bad conditions at all, their reel wages have been increasing, and*

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244 Yaşlı, F. (2014). *AKP, Cemaat, Sünni-Ulus: Yeni Türkiye Üzerine Tezler*. İstanbul: Yordam Kitap. p164-184.

*the opportunities in terms of consumption are more if compared to the past because the credit mechanisms are presented.*"<sup>XVI</sup> – [Çağlar Keyder]

The sociocultural and socioeconomic picture of Islamic proletariat's support to the JDP must be examined under both Islamic and neoliberal populist models in Turkey. In other words, I argue that Islamic proletariat supported the JDP is the result of both Islamization and the neoliberal populist model. For instance, Islamic social aid networks are effectively performed to reincorporate the low income and poor masses such as Islamic proletariat into the market economy and in this way; the public finance can be reduced to its minimum level for lower income classes.<sup>245</sup>

The populism as a concept, which has been used in various different meanings, requires a detailed explanation for this study in order to understand the relationship between Islamic proletariat and the JDP. Populism involves not only a one-dimensional definition, but also multidimensional; the initial definition subdivides it into two different wholes as political and economic. By contrast, the multidimensional approach defines populism via a combination of economic, social, cultural and political aspects.<sup>246</sup> Hence, the multidimensional perspective ties populism into certain socioeconomic and sociocultural processes in political mobilization and deep-rooted cultural realities – a combination of all. However, populism can reveal different characteristics in practice, and it does not present a coherent entity.<sup>247</sup> In this respect, two different types of populism such as classical and neoliberal should be analyzed in order to comprehend how populism has appeared in Turkey through its history.

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245 Karahanoğulları, Y. (2012). Neoliberal Popülizm: 2002-2010 Kamu Maliyesi, Finans, Dış Ticaret Dengesi ve Siyaset. *Toplum ve Bilim*. 123 (1), p116-146.

246 Weyland, K. (1999). Neoliberal Populism in Latin America and Eastern Europe. *Comparative Politics*. 31 (4), p 379-401.

247 Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C., R. (2012). Populism and (Liberal) Democracy: A Framework for Analysis. In: Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C., R. *Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy?* New York: Cambridge University Press. p1-27.

First, classical populism can be seen in 1960-70's Turkey; due to the deterministic power of voters over politics and the rivalry between the citizens, bureaucracy and bourgeoisie – there was no dominant class in society despite of continuous competition. The implementations of classical populist policies was to satisfy the people through the strengthening of social security and the welfare state or the development of economic, legal and social rights of workers, etc.<sup>248</sup> As second, the purpose of the neoliberal populism is to keep people within the system who are economically and politically discriminated and exploited.<sup>249</sup> For instance, on the one hand, neoliberal populism is the distributed free textbooks to all students; on the other, the public resources transfer to the market as a result of the printed millions of books by private sector. This means the direct contribution by the state to the capital accumulation, and eventually the marketization of education system. Another example is the cash transfers programs to poor families in order to send their children to school, but also these programs encourage the privatization of education at the same time.

*“The neoliberalism radically distorted the balance between labor and capital in favor of bourgeoisie. Currently, no more active labor movements emerge like in 19<sup>th</sup> century. Despite of serious economic crisis and instability along with the financialization, this financialization integrates workers to the neoliberal order at the same time. Nowadays, the capital's hegemony over labor has strengthened drastically via credit mechanisms such as credit cards, loans, etc. (...) JPD is one of the examples of that and also very successful one.”<sup>XVII</sup> – [Pınar Bedirhanoglu]*

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248 Cardoso, E. & Helwege, A. (1991). Populism, Profligacy, and Redistribution. In: Edwards, S. & Dornbusch *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press. p45-74.

249 Bozkurt, U. (2013). Neoliberalism with a Human Face: Making Sense of the Justice and Development Party's Neoliberal Populism in Turkey. *Science & Society*. 77 (3), p372-396.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE NEW MIDDLE CLASSES

Since Gezi protests burst out, there has been a wide range of literature discussing about its reasons, context and outcomes. One of the prominent and broadly accepted assertions about Gezi refers that the demonstrators were mostly from the new middle class. Briefly, Gezi has been perceived as a political manifestation of secular new middle class in Turkey<sup>250</sup> – This generalization, in my view, is pretty problematic, but not quite wrong.

Not only for Turkey, but also in general, how to define and conceptualize the new middle class varies upon different approaches. Naturally, along with different approaches, numerous different interpretations emerged how new middle class can be conceptualized. They all provide a vantage point to a dimension of the reality. Due to its heterogeneous formation, the definition of new middle class presents a very complex structure to reduce to a single ‘correct’ identification. Likewise, this excessive level of heterogeneous composition leads to the division of the new middle class into subparts within itself. In this study, while recognizing the existence of a notable new middle class in Turkey<sup>251</sup>, it is divided into two subheadings; (secular) new middle class in this chapter, and Islamic new middle class in chapter 8.

In this chapter, first, certain major conceptualizations during the historical development of new middle class and the current situation are briefly presented. Secondly, the conceptualization of new middle class is elaborated from the Marxist perspective. In the last section, in the case of Turkey, a comparative overview of different approaches such as Marxist, Weberian, Bourdieuan etc. to new middle class is stated. Besides, an attempt to analyze the importance of new middle class in the neoliberal order considering class antagonism and Gezi is discussed.

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250 Yörük, E. & Yüksel, M. (2014). Class & Politics in Turkey's Gezi Protests. *New Left Review*. 89 (1), p103-123.

251 This paper senses new middle class as non-identical from the classical proletariat considering its own unique sociocultural and sociopolitical demands. However, while taking into account their members' access to the material conditions and the class contradictions in capitalist society, it is categorized within the working class.

## 7.1 New Middle Class: A Conceptual Approach

When 'new middle class' is addressed in academic debates, the attention is mostly concentrated on their consumerist and Western lifestyles, along with their sociopolitical stances. This conceptualization is regularly applied in various regions of the world both in normative and practical accounts. Then, the question should be raised; why it takes so much attention? A diverse range of studies has indicated that the Western consumerist lifestyle explicitly is not anymore confined to the advanced industrialized countries.<sup>252</sup> Instead, this type of lifestyle has also become widespread and turned into an inevitable and permanent dimension of developing countries, even in Turkey. In this case, then, why is new middle class regarded as a problematic issue rather than a testimonial of wealth or affluence? In terms of their significance, the new middle classes tremendously grew throughout the world and their potential for consumption has accelerated significantly. Their economic structure as well as political and cultural structures regarding the norms, values, education, habits, professional qualifications and lifestyles; the whole occupy a remarkable place in terms of social dynamics.

In political sociology, limited topics have attracted the attention as much as the new middle class. In Marxist theory, it has been more than a century that the non-manual workers' class position has been a matter of dispute. The discussions on that firstly date back to the revisionism issue in the 1980s.<sup>253</sup> It had been a major concern for the Marxist examinations on fascism in the 1930s, and one of the most polemical themes among not only the Western socialists/communists, but also in non-Western ones. In non-Marxist theory, the ascending popularity of new middle class has invoked no less glamour. Since the predictions of Thorstein Veblen and James Burnham to the postindustrial theorizing of Alvin Gouldner and Daniel Bell, social theorists

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252 Lange, H. & Meier, L.. (2009). Who Are the New Middle Classes and Why Are They Given So Much Public Attention?. In: Lange, H. & Meier, L. *The New Middle Classes: Globalizing Lifestyles, Consumerism and Environmental Concern*. New York: Springer. p1-29.

253 Burris, V. (1986). The Discovery of the New Middle Class. *Theory and Society*. 15 (3), p317-349.

in different eras have scrutinized the characteristics of new middle class as a social order. According to the concept of 'new class' developed by Gouldner in 1970s, technical intelligentsia with her/his cultural capital enters into clash with the ruling classes because of the tensions between their subjective and objective conditions and aspirations.

“The blockage of their opportunities for upward mobility, the disparity between their income and power, on the one side, and their cultural capital and self-regard, on the other.”<sup>254</sup>

In other words, the history of new middle classes holds an essential place in political sociology under the name of whether white collar, new working class or new petite bourgeoisie and so on.<sup>255</sup> That is, the reinvention of new middle class in the advanced industrial societies and the developing countries might be more frequent than the wheel. Due to the heterogeneous composition of new middle class, the most debated issue for the categorization of people centers around their positions in the social reproduction of capitalist relations. Hence, the controversies upon the constitution of new middle class have been discussed on that level. In any case, new middle classes are frequently one of the critical phenomena in sociopolitical structuring of a country. It has engrossed a significant place in the study of political practices on the cleavages and alignments. Besides, due to the increasing number of people in new middle class compared with other classes, it has caused the conflicting theories about the transformation of social classes. Thus, the new middle class utterly stands as a reality in the theories of class.

As widely seen in sociology, different approaches to new middle class commonly serve for reinforcing various political insights. For instance, the social democrats in Weimar Republic assumed that the absence of class consciousness among white collar workers paved the way for legitimizing

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<sup>254</sup> Gouldner, A. (1979). *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Middle Class*. New York. p58.

<sup>255</sup> Ross, G. (1978). Marxism and the New Middle Class. *Theory and Society*. 5 (2), p163-190.

their reformist movement.<sup>256</sup> From the 1930s onward, a particular Marxist description of fascism as a prompt response by the lower classes served for rerouting the concentration from the critical failures of social democrat and socialist/communist parties. Mainstream social scientists have referred similar explanations to vindicate the bourgeoisie in the rise of fascism. Liberals have welcomed new middle class as the harbinger of a new epoch of class consonance with social diversity. The remarkable increase in the non-manual labor income since the 1930s and the Fordist period after 1945 have continued to accelerate. Hence, during the 1950s, American sociology has applauded this concept owing to the expansion of a well-off new middle class, which was seen as an indicator of 'the end of ideology' and a certainty for the continuity of capitalist system. During 1960s, some scholars in the New Left have theorized new middle class as new working class. From the 1970s, the endeavor of socialist/communist parties in Europe shaped upon maintaining a political pact that renewed disputes in Marxist theory about new middle classes.

Aside from the Marxist discussions, in the 1930s, the concept of a 'universal mind' against capitalism was very popular in terms of conceptualizing new middle class in Hegelian perspective. Historically, since 1930s, the technocracy profoundly became crucial and it has been believed that the better could be done compared to what capitalists have done until now. In the following process, well-educated people with technical knowledge and skill have participated in the political parties, particularly in advanced industrial countries at that time. Thus, a new 'power elite' was emphasized and historically perceived as a 'universal group' in some discussions. In the formation of postindustrial society during 1960s, this group; in other words, new middle class, played significant role. In this respect, well-educated individuals with technocratic knowledge and similar socialization did not only become indispensable for the state, but also for the development of private sector. With the gradually decreasing demand of manual labor force

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256 Kaes, A., Jay, M. & Dimendberg, E. (1994). *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook*. Berkeley: University of California Press. p181-195.



regarding increasing technological development and the transformation of the labor process, new middle classes since the 1950s the 1950s were now phenomena, which cannot be denied for advanced industrial countries. Most importantly, new middle class also brought a new class culture, which can be defined as the most original and important aspect. The creation of new class culture paved the way for transformations in sociocultural and sociopolitical dynamics at the same time.

## **7.2 Marx, Marxism & New Middle Class**

One of the most prevalent interpretations of Marx ascribes to him a vulgar conceptualization of class duplication, in which the evanescence of petty bourgeoisie (old middle class) paved the way for the confrontation between bourgeoisie and proletariat – two remaining classes in capitalist society. This interpretation leads to the following point: Marx fully ignored the emergence of salaried working class or the new middle class.

Even though the commonness of those interpretations has been attributed to Marx and Engels, it is still suspicious whether they ever considered a theory of class. Corresponding with that crude polarization assertion, interpretations ordinarily put forward to the selected sections in the *Communist Manifesto* where Marx and Engels mentioned about the increasing bifurcation of capitalist society.

“Two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing one another: bourgeoisie and proletariat.”<sup>257</sup>

This specific passage demonstrates the ‘greatest’ evidence for this interpretation that Marx and Engels enunciate the gradual disappearance of petty bourgeoisie.

“The lower strata of the middle class – the small trader people, the shopkeepers, and retired traders generally, the handcrafters and peasants – all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on which Modern Industry is carried on, and is swamped

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<sup>257</sup> Marx, K. & Engels, F. (2012). *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Verso. p31.

in the competition with the large capitalists, partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless by new methods of production. Thus, the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population.”<sup>258</sup>

However, Marx and Engels admitted the ongoing regeneration of the ownership on small possession, but also remarked the alteration of petty bourgeoisie into another variety of intermediate class, which was composed of increasing number of salaried workers such as managers, supervisors and other management level positions without capital ownership.

“In countries where modern civilization has become fully developed, a new class of petty bourgeois has been formed, fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself as a supplementary part of bourgeois society. The individual members of this class, however, are being constantly hurled down into the proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society, to be replaced, in manufactures, agriculture and commerce (...)”<sup>259</sup>

The historical development of the stated salaried ‘new petty bourgeoisie’ has been discussed at broader respect in Marx and Engels’ late works – some claim that they advocated the conceptualization of new middle class, indeed.<sup>260</sup> This assertion, at the same time, also seems to be pretty oversimplified. In fact, in the writings of Marx and Engels, certain passages refer the concept of ‘middle class’ whenever they point out the intermediate people with salaries. For instance, according to Marx’s theories of surplus value, the machination and technological development in industry would ensure new realms for productive professions of labor (Ricardo had already mentioned), additionally, make possible to employ more and more ‘unproductive’<sup>261</sup> workers, which it is referred as middle classes by Marx.

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258 Marx, K. & Engels, F. (2012). *The Communist Manifesto*. London: Verso. p40.

259 *Ibid.*, p63.

260 Nicolaus, M. (1970). Proletariat and Middle Class in Marx. In: Weinstein, J. & Eakins, D. *For a New America*. New York: Random House.

261 Non-manual

“What Ricardo forgets to emphasize is the constantly growing number of the middle classes, those who stand between the workers on the one hand and the capitalist on the other. The middle classes maintain themselves to an ever increasing extent directly out of revenue; they are a burden weighing heavily on the working base and increase the social security and power of the upper ten thousand.”<sup>262</sup>

Marx also includes police and military officers, low-rank state officials, lawyers, inventors, teachers, scholars, artists, musicians as the segments of middle class.<sup>263</sup> Even though Marx considered each of these non-identical occupations as parts of middle classes, that does not mean necessarily he addressed to all of them identically at socioeconomic and sociopolitical level. In spite of Marx’s explicit awareness about these occupations and their expansion in terms of number, in his writings, Marx never tended to classify them as a class by itself in the capitalist society like he defined bourgeoisie and proletariat.

At this point, the reasoning of Marx might have been detailed in the well-known uncompleted chapter in the *Capital*, Volume 3 about the *class*. This matter might be in fact addressed by Marx at the place where the manuscript terminated. Marx stressed that capitalism attained its upper most development stage and says that:

“The stratification of classes does not appear in its pure form. Middle and intermediate strata even here obliterate lines of demarcation everywhere.”<sup>264</sup>

Nonetheless, Marx professed three main and distinct classes in existence in capitalist society – bourgeoisie, proletariat and landlords. Marx has not precisely classified the salaried individuals adhere to this intermediate stratum, and he could have incorporated among the working class as a matter never satisfactorily contended. Approximately, Marx defines the proletariat

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<sup>262</sup> Marx, K. (1968). *Theories of Surplus Value*, Part 2. Moscow: Progress Press. p573.

<sup>263</sup> Marx, K. (1968). *Theories of Surplus Value*, Part 1. Moscow: Progress Press. p218.

<sup>264</sup> Marx, K. (1967). *Capital*, Volume 3. New York: International Publishers. p885.

with regard to the productive labor, which must produce the surplus value for earning the wage in return of the production of commodity.<sup>265</sup> Moreover, it must be employed by capitalists in the simplest term. However, Marx acknowledged in certain passages that an absolute distinction on productive/unproductive was not appropriate to draw the borderline of proletariat. Besides, the exclusion of the entire unproductive individuals from the proletariat was unnecessary. For instance, commercial workers were held as unproductive; they share certain similarities with new middle class today:

“The commercial worker produces no surplus value directly (...) she/he creates no direct surplus-value, but she/he adds to the capitalist's income by helping her/him to reduce the cost of realizing surplus value, in as much as she/he performs partly unpaid labor.”<sup>266</sup>

Marx also had few statements about distinctive characteristics of the politics of this middle or intermediate groups, but he sometimes highlighted their erratic political stances like petty bourgeoisie.<sup>267</sup> This intermediate stratum experiences similar economic circumstances with proletariat, and hence it may be expected to be classified in proletarian ideology considering certain dimensions. Meanwhile, due to their distinctive position from manual workers in a certain respect, they may position themselves differently from the proletariat and may look down upon the proletariat. In brief, during life time of Marx, capitalism, labor processes and production relationship were very different from today; therefore, it cannot be expected from Marx to describe exactly the present facts of the world. However, the main point of these discussions should be that Marx was aware of intermediate groups, and made remarkable statements about their sociocultural and sociopolitical characteristics.

*“From a Marxist perspective, since the concept of new middle class derived from a definition of class upon distribution*

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265 Burris, V. (1986). The Discovery of the New Middle Class. *Theory and Society*. 15 (3), p317-349.

266 Marx, K. (1967). *Capital*, Volume 3. New York: International Publishers. p300.

267 Carter, B. (2015). *Capitalism, Class Conflict and the Middle Class*. New York: Routledge. p52-83.

*relations, it is not a familiar approach to Marxism. The category of middle class does not comply with the Marxism (...) However, there have been social scientists and philosophers who attempt to use the concept of middle classes in compatible with the production relations such as Nicos Poulantzas or Eric Olin Wright. From a Marxist perspective, the concept of middle class can be used as well. In my opinion, the concept of middle class – as long as it complies with the relevant theoretical framework – can be evaluated as a part of analysis.*<sup>xviii</sup> – [Cenk Saraçoğlu]

Doubtlessly, Nicos Poulantzas showed one of the most notable endeavors for constructing a theory within Marxism about the new middle class. The book of *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism* should be regarded as a straightforward criticism to the economic approaches to conceptualize the new middle class. For instance, Guglielmo Carchedi displayed an economic presence based on the capitalist production in the formation of new middle class<sup>268</sup>, whereas Poulantzas offered a multidimensional formulation by including political and ideological aspects.

“The relations of production and the relationships which comprise them (economic ownership/possession) are expressed in the form of powers which derive from them, in other words class powers; these powers are constitutively tied to the political and ideological relations which sanction and legitimize them. These relations are not simply added on to relations of production that are 'already there', but are themselves present, in the form specific to each mode of production, in the constitution of the relations of production. The process of production and exploitation is at the same time a process of reproduction of the relations of political and ideological domination and subordination.”<sup>269</sup>

Poulantzas’ study discusses how the political and ideological relations are reproduced mutually within the division of labor. Social classes are categorized mostly but not purely by their emplacement in the economic structure. Their position may be certainly decisive over the mode of

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<sup>268</sup> Carchedi, G. (1975). *On the Economic Identification of the New Middle Class*. *Economy and Society*. 4 (1), p1-86.

<sup>269</sup> Poulantzas, N. (1975). *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: Verso. p21.

production and also sociocultural structuring. However, the superstructure – political and ideological – is also vital and cannot be overpassed. According to Poulantzas, the boundaries between proletariat and new middle class are at the economic level so far as productive or unproductive labor.

“The working class is not defined by a simple and intrinsic negative criterion, its exclusion from the relations of ownership, but by productive labour.”<sup>270</sup>

Besides, Poulantzas needs to ‘ameliorate’ the definition of productive labor by Marx, because he argues that the definition invokes certain ambiguities due to Marx’ unsystematic approach. Thus, Poulantzas makes a definition for the productive labor in the capitalist class society.

“We shall say that productive labour, in the capitalist mode of production, is labour that produces surplus-value while directly reproducing the material elements that serve as the substratum of the relation of exploitation: labour that is directly involved in material production by producing use-values that increase material wealth.”<sup>271</sup>

By emphasizing the amended conceptualization of productive labor, which defined as a prerequisite for being a worker in proletariat, Poulantzas himself excludes all workers with some exceptions, in service sector and all state officers from membership of proletariat.<sup>272</sup> Eventually, Poulantzas underlines that the economic aspects are not sufficient alone to determine the class position of an individual. It is also determined by individuals’ tasks on the political positioning in the capitalist order. In this respect, the new middle class as unproductive workers have a unique place in the theory of Poulantzas, but they still produce the surplus value seized by capitalists, as well as exploited by them.

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270 Poulantzas, N. (1975). *Classes in Contemporary Capitalism*. London: Verso. p210.

271 *Ibid.*, p216.

272 *Ibid.*, p214.

*“In Marxist theory, there have been some social scientists and theorists using the concept of new middle class in the framework of production relations. One of them is Poulantzas, for instance. He tended to define middle class as unproductive social groups in labor process selling their labor power such as state officials. Afterwards, Erik Olin Wright used the concept of new middle class in order to describe social groups, who mostly work at the level of supervision in production processes; in other words, they control the production process, but also sell their labor power to capitalists.”<sup>XIX</sup> – [Cenk Saraçoğlu]*

In the book of *Class, Crisis and the State*, Wright poses a different conceptualization of strata, which was earlier named as new petty bourgeoisie by Poulantzas. Wright maintained the argumentation that all these groups of individuals cannot be categorized under a single class, but rather the vagueness of their class formation must be admitted. This vagueness means that these groups are placed at ‘objectively contradictory location’ in terms of the capitalist class relations. In this regard, the cleavage between bourgeoisie and proletariat in capitalist society has appeared. In this respect, Wright also argues that identifying an objectively contradictory location becomes more rational to comprehend concrete relations in capitalism.

*“The concept of contradictory locations within class relations (...) does not refer to the problem of pigeon-holing people within an abstract typology; rather it refers to the objective contradictions among the real processes of class relations.”<sup>273</sup>*

Wright constituted three fundamental elements of structuring in the social division of labor, portrayed as taking distinctive positions. Wright argues that supervisors and managers are in a ‘contradictory location’ that is between bourgeoisie and proletariat. The semiautonomous wage earners who hold relatively more control upon their own labor force are in a contradictory location between petty bourgeoisie and proletariat. The small employers are in a contradictory location between bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie.

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<sup>273</sup> Wright, E., O. (1978). *Class, Crisis and the State*. London: Verso. p62.




Figure 5. E. O. Wright's 'Contradictory Locations' in the Class Relations

Therefore, Wright asserts that Marxism must yield hypotheses about 'the world we experience, should be empirically studied'.<sup>274</sup> His purpose was to pursue hypotheses that should be 'systematically accessed to Marxist theory's inner logic'. This is fostered by the postulate that a thriving revolutionary movement in advanced capitalist countries must be supported by the middle class components.<sup>275</sup> Moreover, Wright proposes a distinction between 'class interests' and 'class capacities' while emphasizing the class struggle.

### 7.3 The New Middle Class & Gezi

The words of 'new middle class' and 'Gezi' have been used together in many studies discussing the demonstrators profile in Gezi and the new middle class. I also prefer to use the title because it provides me a wide range of a field for tackling with the issue. In this part, I concentrate on (secular) new middle class and its discontent with the JDP rule regarding the sociocultural and sociopolitical class dynamics. Considering theoretical discussions based on new middle class above, the evaluation of their sociocultural sociopolitical stance in the case of Gezi is essential to glance at class formation in Turkey under neoliberal order.

In this scope, it is important to determine how Gezi was perceived as a new social movement and its class components from different perspectives such as Marxist, Weberian and Bourdieuan. One of the primary discussions about

<sup>274</sup> Wright, E., O. (1978). *Class, Crisis and the State*. London: Verso. p10.

<sup>275</sup> Brownlee, W., E. (1979). Class, Crisis, and the State by Erik Olin Wright. *The Journal of Economic History*. 39 (3), p835-836.



the class in Gezi focuses on the ideological function of new middle class concept. While some scholars described Gezi as a reaction of new middle class, others such as Marxist scholars strongly criticized this approach due to its ideological role in the neoliberal order. For instance, Alain Badiou called Gezi as a revolutionary attempt and emphasized – at the same time – the significant role of the educated youth and new middle class in Turkey.<sup>276</sup> In this respect, defining Gezi as a new middle class revolt or speaking of the importance of it during the protests have been often considered a sign of being liberal and strongly criticized by certain Marxist currents. Just perceiving the middle class as a Weberian concept is sufficient for that labeling. However, this prejudice depends on certain justifications as well. In capitalist societies, the class conflict, exploitation of labor and social inequality, as fundamental facts, are ignored and curtailed by hegemony of sociology's new middle class conceptualization, which cannot be refused in reality. Moreover, the neoliberal transformation strengthened in the world started in the 1970s and along with this transformation, the ideological function of the middle class conceptualization and its scope expanded.

In the subsequent process, this alleged new middle class differs itself from the old one in many respects. While the old middle class – or the petty bourgeoisie in Marxist terminology – had generally defined with frugal and responsible characteristics, also shared common culture, on the other side, the new middle class mostly is considered as hedonist and cynic.<sup>277</sup> The development and internalization of the consumption culture and hedonism for new middle class in Turkey have similarities with its counterparts elsewhere. For instance, Barbara Ehrenreich made an analysis of new middle class culture in the United States; the study focuses on the psychosocial aspects of class. The study indicates that the members' anxiety about their status and future is highly considerable.<sup>278</sup> In this regard, similar realities are

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<sup>276</sup> From the conference: '*Globalization and the New Left*' by Alain Badiou & Slavoj Žižek. İstanbul, 12 October 2013.

<sup>277</sup> Bora, T. (2014). Gezi ve Orta Sınıf. *Birikim*. 302 (1), p23-33.

<sup>278</sup> Ehrenreich, B. (1989). *Fear of Falling: The Inner Life of the Middle Class*. New York: Pantheon Books.

also present for the case of Turkey mainly for two crucial reasons: the precarization and hedonism of class members, which will be analyzed in detail in the further discussions. Under these considerations, it is important to highlight that the ideological role of new middle class and so-called distinctive characteristics influence how to approach the class formation.

I think the assumptions that new middle class is not worth to be analyzed or this 'group' is not a class, just a fraction in the proletariat are superficial approaches. Structural conditions or locations in the production, consumption or culture by alone would lead to limited explanations about class characteristics. The formation processes of classes, subject dynamics of class members, culture and consciousness structures are fundamental in particular must be considered. For instance, by using the approach of E. P. Thompson, the middle classes can be also evaluated in this sense. The conceptualization of new middle class should not be perceived as merely a liberal approach because the new middle class has become in its own culture/consciousness/demands rather than the material conditions.<sup>279</sup> Although in terms of accessing to the material conditions, the difference between new middle classes and manual workers is not seriously significant, the new middle class members desire for the bourgeoisie's lifestyle and more importantly, they distinguish themselves from proletariat. For this reason, their sociocultural and sociopolitical demands play fundamental role, which differentiate them as a class.


With these discussions, the first considerable class analysis on Gezi came from the eminent social scientist Çağlar Keyder. He argued that Gezi came out of the new middle class' dissatisfaction with the authoritarian neoliberal governance of the JDP.<sup>280</sup> Keyder attempts to integrate the concept of 'new middle class' developed by Alvin Gouldner in 1970s into Turkish context in this sense. According to Gouldner, technical intelligentsia with its cultural

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279 Gülhan, S., T. (2014). Teşhisin Tedhişinden Çıkış: Gezi Eylemleri Üzerine Sosyolojik Bir Araştırma İçin Öneriler. In: Öğütte, V., S. & Göker, E. *Gezi ve Sosyoloji*. İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları. p17-80.

280 Keyder, Ç. (2013). *Yeni Orta Sınıf*. <[www.bilimakademisi.org](http://www.bilimakademisi.org)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

capital enters into clash with the ruling classes because of the tensions between their subjective and objective conditions and aspirations.<sup>281</sup> Keyder's conception seems compatible with Gouldner's in Turkish context, and this class constituted the bulk of Gezi demonstrators. Based on Keyder's arguments, the protesters were mostly university-educated young individuals, taking advantage of the economic growth and openness to global impacts of 2000s. Keyder also argues that the educational background of new middle class is one of the fundamental factors distinguishing them from old middle class because the education level and 'cultural capital' of these members are considerably higher than old middle class.



*Figure 6. Gezi Park Protests Support by Educational Level (%)*<sup>282</sup>

Even though they do not own the means of production, their cultural capital – knowledge, skills and education – is indispensable for the market economy and the ruling classes, whereas old middle class is not as important as new middle class in the neoliberal reproduction.

“Turkey now has some 200 universities and more than 4 million university student; 2.5 million new graduates have been added to the population since 2008. These figures portend a new middle class in formation, whose members work in relatively modern workplaces, with leisure time and

<sup>281</sup> Gouldner, A., W. (1979). *The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class*. New York: The Seabury Press.

<sup>282</sup> KONDA countrywide survey, <[www.konda.com.tr](http://www.konda.com.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

consumption habits much like their global counterparts. But they also look for new guarantees for their way of life, for the environment, for their right to the city; and they resent violations of their personal and social space.”<sup>283</sup>

While the conceptualization by Keyder on the new middle class is being taken into consideration, Pierre Bourdieu’s term of ‘cultural capital’ should be emphasized. According to Bourdieu, cultural capital as a sociological concept primarily refers to non-financial individual social assets beyond economic assets. It includes the collection of the social elements such as intellectual skills, credentials, mannerism, clothing, posture, material belonging, etc. which all of them are recognized as the indication of a particular social class. Moreover, sharing similar or identical forms of cultural capital with other individuals provides collective identity and class position. As Bourdieu stated, cultural capital presents also inevitably a fundamental source of social inequality because cultural capital is able to provide social mobility for individuals as much as income and wealth.<sup>284</sup>




Figure 7. The Age Range of Participants in Gezi Park Protests (%)<sup>285</sup>

Similarly, the political sociologist Cihan Tuğal has stressed the important role played by the new middle class during Gezi and states as follows:

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283 Keyder, Ç. (2013). *Law of the Father*. < <http://lrp.co.uk> > [Last access: 15/09/2015]

284 Swartz, D. (1998). *Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

285 KONDA countrywide survey, <[www.konda.com.tr](http://www.konda.com.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

“Professionals not only led the movement, but also constituted the core of the participants (...) The Gezi Resistance appears to be an occasionally multi-class, but predominantly middle-class movement. Generously paid professionals who have some control over production and services (even though they may not have ownership), rather than white-collar proletarians (such as waitresses, sales-clerks, subordinate office clerks, etc.) seem to predominate.”<sup>286</sup>

For Loïc Wacquant, Gezi is the confrontation between the new cultural bourgeoisie of intellectuals, urban professionals and the urban middle class, and economic bourgeoisie and the ruling class.<sup>287</sup> New middle class, as the new reality, owns the potential for cultural transformation, and also this conflict may be regarded as new cultural bourgeoisie (new middle class) versus economic bourgeoisie (capitalists). As a matter of fact, new middle class must be a producer of the culture due to its existential structure.

*“(About the cultural transformative power of the middle classes) Look at the service sector, the middle classes are more prevalent in the segments of producing service. They are not managing or controlling the capital. They do not have control over the production, etc. but they are more interested in the production of service. One of the important dimensions of the production of service corresponds with the symbolic and cultural production. In terms of that, Loïc Wacquant may be right.”<sup>XX</sup> – [Emrah Göker]*

In that point, the question may be remarkable: Does the new middle class’s culture transformative power constitute a structural risk for the existence of the ruling elites in Turkey? This assumed power of new middle class would be considered as one of the indicators of why they became so visible in Gezi as the main source of the protests.

In contrast to the new middle class discussions in Gezi above, Korkut Boratav as one of Turkey’s leading Marxist and eminent scholars designated Gezi as a

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<sup>286</sup> Tuğal, C. (2013). “Resistance Everywhere”: The Gezi Revolt in Global Perspective. *New Perspective on Turkey*. 49 (1), p157-172.

<sup>287</sup> Wacquant, L. (2014). *Urban Inequality, Marginality and Social Justice*. <[www.istifhanem.com](http://www.istifhanem.com)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

'mature working class uprising'.<sup>288</sup> The demonstrators were predominantly highly educated and skilled proletarians, incorrectly categorized as new middle class. According to Boratav, Gezi should be identified as class revolt against capitalism and the JDP government as its political representative. With a Marxist perspective, Boratav doubts about the concept of middle classes, and then stresses the ambiguity of this term in American sociology tradition. Boratav argues that the evaluations on Gezi as new middle class uprising are reductionist under the hegemony of bourgeoisie sociology tradition. The proletariat was active participant of Gezi even if the labor unions were inconclusive during the protests.




Figure 8. The Participation Rate of Gezi Protestors by Occupation (%)<sup>289</sup>

According to Boratav, proletariat's active participation at Gezi happened without any vertical and hierarchical decisions. For him, the people who were killed during the protests demonstrate that Gezi was a proletariat uprising. For instance, Ethem Sarısülük, was shot in the heat by police and killed, a manual worker in Ankara.

*“Regarding the local differences, there are big similarities between Gezi and the occupy movements around the world. There were protests/uprisings against the world stereotyped by the capital. For instance, based on a very brief class explanation about Americans: who governs the United States?”*

288 Boratav, K. (2013). *Olgunlaşmış Bir Sınıfsal Başkaldırı*. <www.sendika.org> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

289 KONDA countrywide survey, <www.konda.com.tr> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

*In accordance with a very concise look, the Wall Street governs % 99 of the United States. What is Wall Street? It is big capital, which is called as 'cooperation' by Americans. They called as 'big cooperation', but not as 'big capital' because that is the national discourse. Terminologies at Gezi were not similar, but the protesters made similar analysis in Turkey.*<sup>290</sup> – **[Korkut Boratav]**

In addition, Boratav questions the reasons for categorization of university students and graduates as new middle class, and asked; does the capitalism essentially provide a distinguishable class position for them? For Boratav, the answer is not affirmative.

“People who were in Gezi are mostly university and high school students. They are categorized as middle class which is nonsense. If there is no information about their class background they are coming from (...) However, objective positions of students are more close to proletariat. Their schools educate them as the future workers for labor supply. Additionally, capitalism promises them unemployment. Thus, they will go into reserve labor force at the first instance in which their objective position is in working class.”<sup>290</sup>

On the other hand, Boratav argues that the only exception to all is the ‘independent professionals’, who may be classified as new middle class because their livelihood depends on the provision of services to their own clients. Such as architect, engineer, lawyer, consultant and financial advisor having their own job and selling their labor to their own consumers may be considered in that categorization. Compared to proletariat and bourgeoisie, these independent professionals have different social and economic circumstances such as their culture, norms and lifestyles presenting particular class characteristics. Boratav also asserts that these independent professionals are included in the category of ‘new petty bourgeoisie’, whose position at the class struggle is ambiguous and slippery.

*“From a Marxist perspective, the only social category complied with the concept of new middle class is the independent professionals in Turkey. Except them, all social*

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290 Boratav, K. (2013). *Olgunlaşmış Bir Sınıfsal Başkaldırı*. <[www.sendika.org](http://www.sendika.org)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

*segments and related groups fit into the proletariat. That's why, everyone surviving by selling labor belong to proletariat in general.*"<sup>XXII</sup> – **[Korkut Boratav]**

Another Marxist scholar Ahmet Tonak claims that Gezi demonstrators were mostly workers, potential workers (students), and unemployed workers with regard to their relationship to the means of production.<sup>291</sup> Similar to Boratav, Tonak's position stands against Keyder's approach by criticizing the categorization of American sociology tradition.

*"Those who define the majority of Gezi demonstrators as 'middle class', occasionally replace the concept of 'middle class' with petty bourgeoisie like their meanings are the same. However, the petty bourgeoisie is a Marxist concept, whereas the concept of middle class 'middle class' belongs to the mainstream sociology."*

For him, the class is nothing more than proletariat whose labor is based on their intellectual skills instead of physical. They do not own the means of production, and also their labors are exploited within the class society. Along with Boratav's statements, Tonak also confirms that independent professionals may be taken into account as new middle class.

*"I do understand Korkut Boratav's stance, but I do not agree with him. From a classical Marxist perspective, the middle class is not a matter, because there are bourgeoisie and proletariat as two extremes. The individuals between these two are easily reduced to one side or the other. The middle classes do not want to be seen as a political problem for the Marxists. However, Marxist social scientists have to confront with this issue as an empirical problem. Some have attempted to bypass or some others totally ignored that. However, according to social science researches, there is an obvious mass needed to be identified. (...) In the discussions on middle class, there is undeniable sociological phenomenon."*<sup>XXIII</sup> – **[Emrah Göker]**

Besides the debates on class in Gezi, in general, the new middle class suffers due to economic downturn and financial crisis throughout the world, which

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291 Tonak, A. (2014). İşyanın Sınıfları. In Göztepe, Ö. *Gezi Direnişi Üzerine Düşünceler*. Ankara: Nota Bene Yayınları. p21-28.



leads to jeopardize their socioeconomic and sociopolitical position. First, I mean that the crises of capitalism during the 1990s and the global financial crisis in 2008 have purged the old middle class (artisans and craftspeople), also bruised the economic and social status of the new middle class.<sup>292</sup> The class members must be cautious in order to sustain continuous economic survival. Shortly, even if new middle class has actually not even a class – let’s assume –, it is now a problem for the system as a source of discontent. The middle class’ concern for losing the position might have been one of the classic sources of authoritarianism or fascism.

*“As we all know, middle classes – this will be an extreme generalization – have their own assets, recently possessed and they produce a particular class culture, which embodies tremendous anxieties about losing their wealth. This condition may carry very antidemocratic risks from time to time. The middle classes at the same time have high risk for anti-democracy. These people composing a class have their possessions at risk and these assets are in more vulnerable position than that of the bourgeoisie. Consequently, they are more reactionary, and hence they have sometimes tendencies for more authoritarian and fascist solutions. This should be distinguished from others. Thus, the expansion of middle classes does not mean necessarily democratization, or vice versa their growing size does not automatically produce a risk of fascism.”<sup>XXIV</sup> – [Tanıl Bora]*

Second, the fundamental contradiction point is that despite of the growing importance of intellectual labor and its business volume, skilled labor has also lost its value and credibility. Hence, it may be called as the *deskillized*<sup>293</sup> of skilled labor.<sup>294</sup> In this process, the depreciation of intellectual labor led to the precarization of new middle class. The uncertainty of their career and business life cause the precarization of future expectancy as well. In this context, some characterizes Gezi as proletarianized middle class rebellion.<sup>295</sup>

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292 Solimano, A. (2014). *Economic Elites, Crises, and Democracy: Alternatives Beyond Neoliberal Capitalism*. New York: Oxford University Press.

293 The loss of prestige of professional skill – *shk*

294 Bora, T. (2014). Gezi ve Orta Sınıf. *Birikim*. 302 (1), p23-33.

295 Bürkeç, Y. (2014). Sınıf, Toplumsal Muhalefet ve Siyasal Rejim Açısından Haziran İsyanı. In Göztepe, Ö. *Gezi Direnişi Üzerine Düşünceler*. Ankara: Nota Bene Yayınları. p35.

*“This is not the growing size of new middle class; it is actually the manifestation of fragmented labor force structure, due to work conditions forced by the capital”<sup>XXV</sup> – [Erinç Yeldan]*

In that sense, it can be argued that deterioration of new middle class' position such as their precarization within society may be the source of the discontent towards the state or the neoliberal system. However, Gezi neither had an anti-capitalist tone like in the United States or Spain nor a manifestation of anti-precariation. Therefore, while the new middle class in Turkey does not have anti-capitalist core, at least two possibilities come to mind as the reasons of their stance in the capitalist system. First, they are indeed pleased with their access to the material conditions and their positions in the market economy.

*“In the past, there have been capitalists and proletariat. Then, groups of new people emerged. These new people are not capitalist, or not entirely proletariat. Why they are not entirely proletariat? Because they have salaries paid by capitalists, but they are in degrading position as much as workers, because they have something to sell, mostly related with the education. Due to what they can sell, they are not as vulnerable as traditional proletariat. For instance, during Marx's lifetime, a worker would starve, if she/he did not get paid for 15 days, whereas a person in the new middle class has more savings and his salary is not totally based on employer's decision because there is demand in the market for what she/he do. Hence, Marx has already defined the middle class as groups of individuals who sell things in the market, employ themselves and have their own capital. This group disappeared slowly. In Turkey, we have seen this transition; grocery stores, shoe-dealers, plumbers, etc. are disappearing slowly.”<sup>XXVI</sup> – [Çağlar Keyder]*

Keyder asserted that new middle class is satisfied with their access to the material conditions and their position in the market. Second, the members are not able to think in proletarian consciousness that is why; they are not aware of how neoliberal system makes them precariat – or the latter is perhaps the cause of the first. If we make an analogy, for instance, Georgy Chicherin criticized the German working class to adopt middle class values

and norms, and argued that because of this tendency the revolution could not come true in Germany. Chicherin also added that if the guns on the street would be fired, the workers would concern about their porcelain sets at home.<sup>296</sup> For sure, this instance is not unique to Germany.

#### **7.4 Islamic New Middle Class: To Glimpse the Ambiguity**

While there have been lots of sociological studies about secular new middle class, there are very few studies concentrating specifically on Islamic new middle class. Along with a limited number of studies, the lack of available data sets also hinders a comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon. Keeping that in mind, Islamic new middle class represents an essential part of this study, and thus two main questions should be raised in this context; how the members of this class differentiate themselves from its secular counterpart? (and) why is this class important in the context of Gezi? In this respect, Islamic new middle class has similar aspects with its secular counterpart such as their positions in neoliberalism, their cultural capital and consumer habits.

*“Islamic new middle class is one of the topics I am curious too. There is an Islamic segment among the new middle class in Turkey. They are also university graduate engineers, managers, etc. work in companies. It means there have been Islamic families which provide high standard of education to their children. Hence, these two segments (secular & Islamic) are structurally in the same position, but what is the relationship between them. That is what you are asking. This is very serious question. As a sociologist, we may think that the structural dimension of it should come first, at least that is what I want to think of”<sup>XXVII</sup> – [Çağlar Keyder]*

This class itself is essential in terms of historical origins, development and present significance, in which I attempt to glimpse at it in the scope of this study. Although insufficient number of sociological data/statistics/research does not allow building on an ambitious theory about this class; nevertheless, it must be highlighted regarding its significance in existing structural dynamics of neoliberal Turkey.

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296 Bora, T. (2014). Gezi ve Orta Sınıf. *Birikim*. 302 (1), p23-33.

“The determining factor in history is, in the final instance, the production and reproduction of the immediate essentials of life. On the one side, the production of the means of existence; on the other side, the production of human beings themselves. The social organization under which the people of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is determined by both kinds of productions.”<sup>297</sup>

According to Engels, the reproduction of human existence is the basis of all manners of economic, social and cultural practices throughout the human history. In 1960s, Pierre Bourdieu following Gramsci's footsteps on non-economic forms of domination discussed the reproduction of social strata in a cultural manner. In order to examine how non-economic practices would cause the reproduction of new middle classes, Bourdieu's conceptualization of 'habitus' may provide an explanatory perspective for aspects, consciousness and mobilization of Islamic new middle class. Due to the commodification of education and culture, the significance of social and cultural capital increased for new middle class families during neoliberal capitalism and globalization.<sup>298</sup> Herein, that question may be posed; how the class still preserves its Islamic/conservative culture despite the accumulation of cultural capital under global standards along with a high level of education?

*Table 12. Attitude towards Homosexuality*<sup>299</sup>

	Support	Do not Support	No Answer
2006	38.1	57.7	4.2
2012	39.1	54.4	6.5


Habitus by Bourdieu refers to a mechanism of embodied tendencies that constitute practices with regard to structural fundamentals of the social world. For Bourdieu, the concept of culture is a complicated matter; a system

<sup>297</sup> Engels, F. (1942). *The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State*. New York: International Publishers.

<sup>298</sup> Bourdieu, P. (1997). The Forms of Capital. In: Halsey, A., Lauder, H., Brown, P. & Wells, A., *S. Education: Culture, Economy and Society*. New York: Oxford University Press. p46-59.

<sup>299</sup> TESEV. (2014). *Türkiye'ye İçeriden Bakış: Yükselen Orta Sınıf*. <[www.tesev.org.tr](http://www.tesev.org.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

of meaning shaped by certain productive basis, in which habitus as an objective reality is pivotal on determination of cultural and social practices. In fact, habitus as a structuralist approach towards the culture emphasizes the importance of formal and informal morals, traditions, norms or rules of a community, and also unstructured causalities of homology which make possible the existence of different orders and meanings.



*Figure 9. Minimal Bourdieuan Model*

Habitus is produced by a person's place within the entire social structure. As a consequence of realizing an individual's position in society, this individual is able to decide what is attainable for her/him within the social structure. It means that the outcomes of habitus in the individual's development are critical; Bourdieu stated that the habitus determines the reproduction of social and cultural structures.

“The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transportable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and reproductions that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor.”<sup>300</sup>

All of the depictions indicate habitus is an attribute for people, and Bourdieu claims that people in a social class are having the same or a similar relation

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300 Bourdieu, P. (1980). *The Logic of Practice*. California: Stanford University Press. p53.

(homologous).<sup>301</sup> This is not explicit whether Bourdieu conceives habitus as an attribute or an aspect of institution.<sup>302</sup> While emphasizing the distinctiveness of habitus from institutions, Bourdieu also says that the dialectic between habitus and institutions are decisive on class position. Habitus is maintained through individuals' historical backgrounds; having a peculiar logic on internalization of values and norms. Henceforth, Habitus refers that an individual's instinctual feeling of what may be realized is determined by the structured pattern of tendencies. The patterns of behavior and tendencies, maintained by habitus, have been passed throughout the generations, imbued from individual's birth and socially consolidated by family and education.

“The source of historical action, that of the artist, the scientist or the member of government just as much as that of the worker or the petty civil servant, is not an active subject confronting society as if that society were an object constituted externally. This source resides neither in consciousness nor in things but in the relation between two slates of the social, that is, between the history objectified in things, in the form of institutions, and the history incarnated in bodies, in the form of that system of enduring dispositions which I call habitus.”<sup>303</sup>

Bourdieu's sociology and habitus may be criticized in different ways; however, habitus may provide a beneficial insight into the issue in this sense. The family, as one of the dominator, must be addressed in the first place. The family plays a key role in the reproduction of culture, and thus an indispensable element in the reproduction of Islamic new middle class.<sup>304</sup> As one of the most significant institutions, the family ensures this class by providing cultural codifications.

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301 Bourdieu, P. (1980). *The Logic of Practice*. California: Stanford University Press. p58.

302 Smith, E. (2003). Ethos, Habitus and Situation for Learning: An Ecology. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. 24 (4), p463-470.

303 Bourdieu, P. (1990). *In Other Words: Essays Towards A Reflexive Sociology*. California: Stanford University Press. p190.

304 Balkan, E. & Öncü, A. (2014). Reproduction of the Islamic Middle Class in Turkey. In: Balkan, N., Öncü, A. & Balkan, E. *The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist Capital in Turkey*. Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books. p166-201.

Secondly, education as cultural practice must be examined too with regard to Islamic new middle class. One of the main tasks of the education is to reproduce social inequalities. However, this reproduction through education is neither mechanical nor linear. The education performs under demanding constraints of habitus, but also it is a response to external structures – economic, social and political. These structures are sensed through a filter of experienced habitus; already in existence. This relationship between education and reproduction makes the education turning into a hegemonic agency for the production of producers. Furthermore, the educational structure arranges itself in light of the imperatives which are intrinsic of its own reproduction. Consequently, the education like family adhere their own internal logic. Bourdieuan theory then infers that the reproduction of family is more important than the reproduction of class.<sup>305</sup> The education is more decisive on shaping consciousness, more than the power of family. However, family is decisive over cultural consciousness. Concisely, habitus itself is mostly relevant with transmission within family.

“But because it fulfills not only functions of reproducing skilled labour power, but also functions of reproducing the positions of the agents and their groups within the social structure positions which are relatively independent of strictly technical capacity – the educational system depends less directly on the demands of the production system than on the demands of reproducing the family group.”<sup>306</sup>

For a long time, the entire education system – primary, secondary and university level – of Turkey was already integrated into the market economy. Eventually, a remarkable increase in the number of private schooling has been realized. The marketization of education further increased during the JDP rule, and many of these new private schools belong to religious groups

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305 Harker, R., K. (1984). On Reproduction, Habitus and Education. *British Journal of Sociology of Education*. 5 (2), p117-127.

306 Bourdieu, P. & Boltanski, L. (1981). The Educational System and the Economy: Titles and Jobs. In: Lemert, C. *French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal since 1968*. New York: Columbia University Press. p142-14

and communities.<sup>307</sup> Especially, the *Gülen* community<sup>308</sup> as a religious group plays an important role in this context – the highest number of private schools and educational institutions among the religious groups in Turkey. *Curricula* of these schools are designed as compatible with neoliberal and global necessities such as the compulsory learning of foreign language. At the same time, the daily life practices in these schools are based on religious fundamentals. For instance, social control is applied through the fulfillment of the religious rituals, Islamic discourse is continuously in use and the importance of Islamic brotherhood often emphasized. Therefore, Islamic consciousness is consistently reproduced over the functioning of an automatism.<sup>309</sup> However, the education also provides necessary tools for complying with the Western life style.<sup>310</sup> During the integration process to Western capitalism, Islamic new middle class successfully generated its own consumption culture.<sup>311</sup> The economic policies of the JDP have supported the growth and expansion of the Islamic new middle class. It induced the mass obtainability of a dizzying group of new commodities, shopping center, advertisements, TV series, and also popular culture. For instance, a growing numbers of Muslims in Turkey while referring to the distinction between

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307 Balkan, E. & Öncü, A. (2014). Reproduction of the Islamic Middle Class in Turkey. In: Balkan, N., Öncü, A. & Balkan, E. *The Neoliberal Landscape and the Rise of Islamist Capital in Turkey*. Oxford & New York: Berghahn Books. p166-201.

308 The *Gülen* community is probably the most powerful religious order in Turkey. They are remarkable powerful in the state and civil society through media, education, Islamic social networks and so on. The community has been very controversial in terms of its social and political power. For many people, it is seen as one of the biggest threats to secularism in Turkey. This community was a very close relations with the JDP, but it was recently declared as an enemy of Turkey by the JDP. The main reason of that is the hegemony struggle between the JDP and the community.

309 As a matter of fact, the functioning of an automatism is open to errors. In another saying, it sometimes does not perform as desired, or a problem may come into existence as if the breakdown of a working machine because of certain reason(s). For instance, a person who grew up in a Muslim family, got a strong religious education and was living within an Islamic community, but later becomes an atheist. This example was stressed for the fact that the reproduction of culture is not as structural as Bourdieu argued in the theory of habitus.

310 TESEV. (2014). *Türkiye'ye İçeriden Bakış: Yükselen Orta Sınıf*. <[www.tesev.org.tr](http://www.tesev.org.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

311 Atasoy, Y. (2009). *Islam's Marriage with Neoliberalism: State Transformation in Turkey*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.



*halal* and *haram*<sup>312</sup> develop their market of commodity. The produced discourse via Islam fosters people to develop their consumption habits. It is a popular discourse in Turkey that ‘every Muslim should be rich and should have the best of everything. That is in God’s order for Muslims.’

In brief, Islamic new middle class has been more visible and popular with the JDP rule. It is also a part of non-manual labor force of neoliberalism like its secular counterpart. This class’ increasing economic and social prosperities since 2002 are the main reasons of their support to the JDP. Moreover, the class’ member can express their Islamic identity more freely. All in regard, Islamic new middle class perceived Gezi as a ‘civil coup’ against the JDP and Islamic norms, thereof opposed to Gezi<sup>313</sup>

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312 According to Islamic law, *halal* refers every material things are permitted to eat, drink and use for Muslims. *Haram* refers every material things are not permitted to eat, drink and use such as alcohol or pork meat.

313 TESEV. (2014). *Türkiye’ye İçeriden Bakış: Yükselen Orta Sınıf*. <[www.tesev.org.tr](http://www.tesev.org.tr)> [Last access: 15/09/2015]

## **CHAPTER 8**

### **CONCLUSION & DISCUSSION**

Whether through the means of production in a Marxian, the consumption in a Weberian or culture in a Bourdieuan sense, etc., ‘class’ itself is the reality of neoliberalism and cannot be ignored as a unit of analysis. This research deals with Islamic proletariat and the new middle class dynamics in Turkey; due to the very complex components, it is a difficult and controversial ground of study. Through a set of various themes, the purpose was to make a critical analysis under the multifaceted sociological whole. In that context, I was interested in Gezi Park protests as a mirror which revealed certain structural dynamics frankly; because of that, the sociological and political positions of the social classes are critical. In another saying, Gezi was neither a singular reality by itself nor a concrete outcome of cyclical political problems in Turkey. Rather, it was a breakage point of the historical dynamics. Hence, a sociohistorical approach was adopted, particularly by emphasizing the transition period of Turkey’s neoliberalism.

Considering the content of this research, Roy Bhaskar’s dialectical critical realism (DCR) is applied as the methodology. DCR as the combination of ‘transcendental realism’ and ‘critical naturalism’ advocates the scientific knowledge should comply with structures of the world. It means that the assertion of ‘knowledge makes the world be intelligible’ is unacceptable – It stands against the idealist ascendancy in social sciences. However, the active position of human agency in transformation and reproduction processes of structure is not denied. The duality between the self-determining instants of human mind and the irreducibility of structures is accentuated throughout the study, which points out that the sociological whole can be realized through structure, agency and the mediating. Therefore, DCR may help on liberation of knowledge from both radicalized subjectivity and objectivity.

In the light of DCR’s methodological structure, both qualitative and quantitative methods have been conducted necessarily to analyze and discuss

various themes and concerns. In this respect, critical literature review was done to present a deeper and more sophisticated comprehension and representation of relevant issues. Also, the expert in-depth interviews have been conducted in the summer of 2015 with scholars from different disciplines in social sciences. Owing to the contribution of experts' multidimensional responses, a wide range of knowledge with manifold and different perspectives was gotten. In addition to the qualitative methods, analysis of secondary data/statistics was also done to obtain more objective and reliable results as well as to eliminate my subjectivity.

While implementing methodology and research, a sociohistorical approach was required to introduce an analysis of Islamic proletariat and the new middle class dynamics in the context of Gezi Park protests. For this reason, Turkey's transition to neoliberalism was illustrated in chapter 4; a particular focus was to the class formations and paradigms since 1950. First of all, from 1950 to 1960 as the liberal transformation was discussed under the impact of DP's power. Both industrial and commercial bourgeoisie supported the DP's advocacy for liberalism in the line with its strong opposition against etatism; the bourgeoisie strengthened their economic as well as political power. In the pre-neoliberal epoch, Turkey has experienced more advanced capitalist relations as outcomes of empowered bourgeoisie by promoting the regulated and supported capital accumulation through the state's active intervention. The state's instrumental autonomy from the bourgeoisie facilitated to regulate income distribution, which served for capital accumulation, and eventually for the sake of bourgeoisie. Lastly, between 1980 and 2000, Turkey's neoliberal transformation was realized. The period witnessed the rapid monopolization and intensification of capital, and this entire process enabled to increase the bourgeoisie's ideological hegemony, and provided a disciplined and cheap labor force. In a nutshell, chapter 3 discussed how the relations between economic transformation and the social classes are formed.

In chapter 4, the JDP itself was elaborated critically. Firstly, the economic sociology of the JDP's roots was examined. Islamism/political Islam was discussed, specially its political mobilization. Moreover, the Turkish-Islamic

Synthesis was also stressed for a more comprehensive depiction of the JDP's ideological position. Chapter 4 argued that the JDP's ideology is a peculiar amalgam of neoliberalism, political Islam and conservatism. In other words, the integration of Islamism/political Islam and conservatism to the market economy has been achieved very smoothly and efficiently. Meanwhile, this alliance strengthens Islamism, and also enables it to penetrate into the state and the civil society.

In the following chapter, Gezi Park protests were perceived as an indicator for certain structural causalities, rather than a main concern of the study, which has been stressed out repeatedly throughout the study. Because of that, the introduction part of chapter 5 outlined the main points descriptively about Gezi. These points mostly sought answers for various questions; For instance, what kinds of social, economic and political driving forces were prevalent? Which aspects differentiate Gezi from other occupy movements? Thus, chapter 5 introduced particular historical and social aspects of Gezi. Subsequently, theoretical approaches to Gezi were presented with intent of leading more inclusive discussions about the social classes in the following chapter 6 and 7.

First of all, a comparative examination of Weber and Tilly's approaches to the state was made by taking Gezi into account. Tilly describes the role of the state as 'relative autonomous' or 'subordinate to dominant classes', which never applies equal treatment when the use of physical force. Hence, the class-based characteristic of the state is derived from the interactions between the capitalist accumulation and the means of coercion from Tilly's perspective. Following that, Arendt's conceptualization on violence refers that the state's use of repressive apparatus was unhistorical, apart from the routine and independent from economic and political structures. Arendt's point enables a 'pure violence' discounting causalities and structural dynamics; that is why Arendtian inadequacy was stressed. Based on these discussions, Gezi undoubtedly illustrated that the authoritarian neoliberal state constraints autonomous/communal political practices for guaranteeing the permanence of the *status quo*. Henceforth, a critique to post-Marxism

was stated because of the idea on autonomous/communal political practices would get positive results in ‘emancipation’ against neoliberal authoritarianism. Lastly, the connection between infrastructure and superstructure was discussed from an Althusserian perspective. Gezi is an example of the relationship between capital and the state, in which the repressive state apparatus were used strongly for the sake of neoliberal reproduction – the privatization of Gezi Park to construct a shopping mall without democratic consent. That is to say, the continuity of capitalist relations needs for reproduction of economic and social inequalities. Therefore, Islamic proletariat, and the new middle classes must be discussed.

In chapter 6, Islamic proletariat was defined as the poorest segment of Turkey. Along with the lack of education opportunities and intellectual capital, they struggle to survive by working in industry or service sectors despite the extreme low wages and salaries. In this respect, the concept of ‘urban poor’ which defines manual labor in formal and informal sectors, developed as a social class in the study. In terms of Islamic proletariat’s social and cultural aspects, although diverse and fragmented ideas exist among Islamic proletariat, the majority of them adhere to religious norms and values. One of the major achievements of the JDP was on consolidating Islamic proletariat under its hegemony. With the JDP rule, they feel more comfortable to express their religious identity, which is very essential on their support to the JDP. Moreover, this support is not only result of Islamization/political Islam, the neoliberal populism was also stressed. In other words, with the implementation of neoliberal populist model and through Islamization, the JDP gained the support of Islamic proletariat, which is one of the main arguments in the chapter. In addition, interpellation and ‘self-panopticism’ were put forward as two determinants in shaping of Islamic proletariat’s subjectivity. Lastly, Islamic proletariat’s discontent to Gezi was discussed.

Secondly, one of the main discussions was based on how Gezi protests were broadly perceived as a new middle class movement. According to the popular argument, Gezi is a political manifestation of secular new middle class in

Turkey – This generalization cannot be neither totally true nor mistake. Depending on the various approaches, the conceptualization of new middle class differs in multiple ways. Many of these approaches were strongly highlighted in chapter 7 with a comparative manner. The multifarious structure does not allow new middle class to be described as a singular ‘correct’ identification. In this respect, firstly, certain major conceptualizations during the historical development of new middle class and the current situation were briefly presented. Secondly, the approaches to new middle class in Marxist theory were detailed. Hereafter, an overview of different approaches by different scholars about new middle class and Gezi has been comparatively done. Lastly, as an essential part of the study, a theoretical approach to Islamic new middle class was attempted at introductory level by emphasizing there is limited number of academic studies; the absence of sufficient statistic/data hinders a comprehensive analysis. By using Bourdieu’s habitus with a special concentration to family and education, two questions were sought: (1) How the members of Islamic new middle class differentiate themselves from its secular counterpart? (2) Why is this class important in the context of Gezi?

Gezi Park protests reflected a conflicted order of the class dynamics. In this respect, Islamic proletariat mostly complies with religious norms and values, and constitutes one of the main fragments in Islamic current of Turkey. As a result of rapid fragmentation of working class since 1980; Islamic proletariat has been one of the main arteries among the working class. Secondly, Islamic new middle class is also based on Islamic culture like Islamic proletariat. Both two social classes have mostly supported the JDP. On the other hand, new middle class manifested its powerful presence with Gezi. Its secular characteristic with various cultural identities made them seriously different from other two classes. In this regard, although Gezi was a multiclass uprising, new middle class was the main dynamic of the protests. Regarding the fragmented structure of society in Turkey between secularism and Islamization, Gezi was a breaking point the antagonist social dynamics – neoliberalism no longer establishes an efficient hegemony over Islam.

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS' QUESTIONS**

#### **Common Questions for All Interviewees**

- How do you interpret the relationship between Islamism/political Islam and capitalism in Turkey? For instance, some people identified the Welfare Party as the protest movement of the poorest classes/social groups. However, the others argue that Islamism and political Islam have been always integrated with capitalism. What do you think on that?
- There are different interpretations about the JDP's ideology. For instance, some define it as conservative democrat, whereas some others detect as Islamist. How do you define the JDP's ideology?
- As a theoretical discussion, some people assert that the JDP's support for 'Anatolian Tigers' (*Anadolu Kaplanları*) and MUSIAD against TUSIAD is the manifestation of the state's autonomy against the big bourgeoisie in Turkey. Do you agree with this statement? How do you interpret the current relationship between the state and bourgeoisie in Turkey?
- Today, manual workers, who define themselves primarily as Muslim, have strongly supported the JDP for a long time. Do you think Islamism or/and political Islam has still influence over these people, or this support of Muslim manual workers is the result of anything else?
- How do you approach to conceptualization of new middle class sociologically?
- With the JDP, we hear more often the term of Islamic new middle class. Regarding the social base of JDP, some people argue that this new middle class presents the main sociocultural and sociopolitical dynamics of the JDP rule. What do you think about that?
- What are the differences and similarities of Gezi Park protests, compared to Arab Spring, occupy movements such as Occupy Wall Street in the United States and *Indignados* in Spain, or the uprising in Brasilia?

- Considering the state violence at Gezi Park protests, some people justified the state violence from Weberian perspective by referring the state's monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force. On the other hand, some others have interpreted it as violence. How do you consider the state's use of repressive apparatus during Gezi?

### **Interviewee Specific Questions**

#### **To Korkut Boratav**

- Do you think Islamic charity networks in Turkey, which strongly supported by the JDP, comply with neoliberalism's fundamentals?
- After Gezi Park Protests, do you think that neoliberalism have difficulties to establish hegemony in Turkey via Islamization?
- How do you see the future of neoliberalism in the world and Turkey regarding the occupy movements and uprisings?

#### **To Çağlar Keyder**

- There are different interpretations about the class formations in Gezi Park protests. While some scholars defined it as working class uprising, some other discussed it as multi-class movement. As far as I knew, you defined it as new middle class movement, but what do you think about other classes' participation or absence at Gezi?
- Some argue that the transformation of former Islamic lower classes/groups into middle class would contribute the democratization of Turkey? Do you agree with that?
- Considering the political outcomes of Gezi Park protests, do you think Gezi was whether successful or not? If it is/is not, why so?

#### **To Erinç Yeldan**

- Between 1960 and 1980, how do you describe the triple relationship between the state, bourgeoisie and working class?

- How do you evaluate the relationship between Turkey's neoliberal transformation and urban proletarianization after 1980?
- What are the JDP's distinct characteristics of neoliberal understanding in the context of Turkey?
- How do you approach to the new middle class formation in Turkey as an economist?
- The manual workers, who primarily define themselves as Muslims, have seriously supported the JDP for a long time. In this regard, to what extent the JDP's economic policies are decisive to get this support?

**To Pınar Bedirhanoğlu**

- Do you think Islamic charity networks in Turkey, which strongly supported by the JDP, comply with neoliberalism's fundamentals?
- Regarding the post-Washington Consensus, how do you interpret the intervention of the state as an active and dominant player in the economic sphere to support bourgeoisie?
- Some argue that the transformation of former Islamic lower classes/groups into middle class would contribute the democratization of Turkey? Do you agree with that?
- How do you consider Gezi Park protests and the multitude of post-Marxist school correspondingly? Do you think Gezi was an example of the multitude?

**To Cenk Saraçoğlu**

- How do you evaluate Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the context of Turkey's neoliberal transformation?
- Some scholars argue that without the participation of the new middle class, Gezi would not be effective because the cultural capital of new middle class, in terms of Bourdieu's perspective, mobilized the protests immensely. Do you agree with this approach?
- How do you evaluate Gezi Park protests and David Harvey's 'accumulation by dispossession' correspondingly?

- Many have discussed the participation or absence of Kurdish people in Gezi Park protests. What do you think about that?
- After Gezi Park Protests, do you think that neoliberalism have difficulties to establish hegemony in Turkey via Islamization?

**To Emrah Göker**

- Do you think dealing to the concept of new middle class from a Weberian, Marxist or Bourdieuan perspective is a political approach to the sociological object? What do you think about value-free sociology?
- How do you interpret Gezi Park protests along with Bourdieu's sociology?
- Some scholars argue that new middle class owns the culture transformative power in postindustrial societies. Do you agree with this statement? Do you think new middle class has cultural transformative power?

**To Tanıl Bora**

- How do you evaluate Turkish-Islamic synthesis in the context of Turkey's neoliberal transformation?
- How do you describe the triple relationship between Islamism, conservatism and nationalism in Turkey?
- Some argue that the transformation of former Islamic lower classes/groups into middle class would contribute the democratization of Turkey? Do you agree with that?
- What do you think about the new middle class and precarization in Turkey correspondingly?
- Many have discussed the participation or absence of Kurdish people in Gezi Park protests. What do you think about that?
- Considering the political outcomes of Gezi Park protests, do you think Gezi was whether successful or not? If it is/is not, why so?

## APPENDIX B

### IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS QUOTATIONS IN TURKISH

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<sup>I</sup> “Türkiye'ye özgü olan bu ithal ikameci sanayileşme iktisaden tıkanıklığa girdi. Dolayısıyla, artık iç talebe dayalı yüksek ücret ve sosyal refah devletinin getirdiği olanaklar yerine, ihracatta yönelik ücretlerin bastırıldığı ve karlılığın unsurunun iç talepteki ticaret rantlarından değil, ihracata yönelik rantlarından beslendiği bir döneme sürüklendik. 12 Eylül darbesi ve 24 Ocak kararları ve ondan sonra süre gelen Özal iktidarı bu dönüşümün uygulayıcısı oldular.”

<sup>II</sup> “Şimdi söz konusu dönem 2. Dünya Savaşı sonrasında küresel ekonomide şekillenen Fordist dediğimiz sosyal refah devletiyle biçimlenen ve işçi sınıfı ile özellikle sanayi sermayesi arasında göreceli bir hoşgörü ve anlaşma ortamının yaratıldığı bir dönemi sergiliyor. Türkiye tipi geç kapitalistleşen çevre ekonomilerinde, özellikle ithalata dayalı, montaj hattına dayalı ve yüksek üretkenlik içeren sanayilerin, ulusal sanayilerin iç talebe yönelik olarak derinleştirildiği devletinde bu aşamada hem bir uzlaştırıcı hakem hem de kendi işletmeleri aracılığıyla istihdam üretim ve yatırımcıları yönlendirdiği bir genişleyici ekonomik konjonktürü deniyor.”

<sup>III</sup> “Gecekondulaşma, marjinalleşme, enformelleşme, kent ekonomisi ucuz iş gücü deposu haline dönüştü ve kent proleterleşmesi neoliberalizmin ucuz iş gücü, ucuz kaynak ve kentli talep anlamında çarpık sanayileşmenin bir uzantısı olarak önümüze çıkmış oldu.”

<sup>IV</sup> “(...) Hayek'in semantik okumasından da oldukça otoriter bir devlet çıkıyor aslında. O yüzden neoliberalizmin pratikte ne yaptığı çok daha önemli, (...)”

<sup>V</sup> “ (...) Türkiye gibi ekonomiler bu dönüşümü (neoliberal dönüşüm) çok sancılı yaşadılar, çünkü kendi ayakları üzerinde durabilecek bir ulusal sanayi söz konusu değildi. İhracata dayalı sanayilerde giderek daha sermaye yoğun daha az emek yoğun teknolojiler içeriyordu. İşsizlik bu koşullar altında

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yapısal bir görünüm aldı. Türkiye gibi benzeri çevre ülkelerinin bu süreci doğal yürütüp, iç göçü daha canlı tutmak, iç göç yoluyla emek transferi yoluyla köy ekonomisinden kırlardan şehirlere ucuz iş gücünü transfer etmek biçiminde gelişti.”

VI “İdeolojik toplumsallaşma kanallarını tıkamak gerektiği noktada, Türk-İslam sentezi aynı zamanda bütün bir toplumsal ilişkilerin, eğitim sisteminin, toplumsallaşma biçimlerinin, basın-yayının ne tür bir ilkeler üzerinden ne tür bir ideolojik çerçeve üzerinden hareket edeceği noktasında da bir referans noktası haline geldi. Yani siyasi ve hukuki alanda Türk-İslam sentezinin belirlediği çerçevenin dışındaki kurumlar, kuruluşlar, sendikalar, partiler uzaklaştırıldı. (...) devletin ideolojik aygıtlarının nasıl bir rol oynayacağını belirlenmesi noktasında Türk-İslam sentezi çok ciddi bir referans noktası haline geldi.”

VII “Siyasal İslam’ın projesi toplumu ve Dünyayı İslami ilkelere göre yeniden biçimlendirmek. Bu projenin bu biçimiyle kapitalizmle doğrudan bir ilişkisi yok. Fakat, gerçek hayata taşındığı zaman, kapitalizme entegre olmayı büyük bir başarıyla gerçekleştirdi. (...) Yani, kader inancı, büyüğe saygı, patrona saygı (ekmeğini yiyorum inancı), ve birde dini ritüelleri birlikte yaparak sınıf farklılıklarını insan bilincinde görünmez kılma.”

VIII “Çok yeni bir şey değil; AKP’nin o dönemde bir yandan merkez sağ olup, bir yanda da dinci söylemi devam ettirmesi. Ama o düzeyde kalmıştı o sıralarda. Tabi, böyle bir hareketin pragmatik anlamda burjuvazi ile ilişkiye girmesi kaçınılmaz. Burjuvazi ile ilişkiye girdiği zamanda tabi burjuvazinin o andaki isteklerini de hesaba katmakta var. O andaki istekleri daha demokrat, AB ile ilişki meseleleri, vs. Yani aslında AKP’nin o dönemdeki açılımı; liberal dediğimiz kesimi içermeye açılımı olarak düşünülebilir ve onun çerçevesinde bu demokratikleşme söz konusu oldu. Ama sonra ne oldu? Sonra dediğimizde aslında epey yakın. 2010’lardan söz ediyoruz. Sonra bir şeyler oldu, ne olduğunu bende tam anlamıyorum. Belki karakterolojik bir şeydir. Belki

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liderin bir kaprisi, korkusu belki bir psikotik bir şey. Ama bu değişiklik, dönüşüm özellikle Gezi'den sonra çok belirginleşti.”

IX “Üçü arasında bir nevi amalgam diyebileceğimiz bir iç içelik var, aynı zamanda kuşkusuz aralarında kavramsal ayrılıklar var. Sosyal, siyasi ayrımlar da var ama aralarındaki geçişleri kolaylaştıran ortak bir zemin var. Bu bir bakıma sağ bünyenin pragmatizminden kaynaklanıyor, (...) politik güç elde etmeyi hedefleyen.”

X “AKP İslamcıdır bir harekettir. Aynı zamanda, iç ve dış sermayenin hegemonyasıyla uyum halindedir. İslamcı olduğu için liberal veya demokrat olamaz.”

XI “Ama şöyle bir fark var; özellikle bu *occupy* hareketi ve Batı dünyasındaki hareketlerde anti-kapitalist ya da anti-prekarya/prekarizasyon sürecine yönelik tepki ve anti-kapitalist tepki çok daha görünür (...) Arap Baharı'nda ve Türkiye'de bu daha gizlidir. Bence bir etmen olarak – dolaylı bir etmen olarak da olsa – bu işin içinde var ama daha gizli. Böyle bir fark olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. Arap Baharı ile Türkiye örneğini birbirine daha çok benzeştiren, daha çok yaklaştıran bir anti-otoriterlik; yani otoriter bir rejime karşı giderek daha çok otoriterleşen bir rejime karşı bir tepki. Yine bütün dünyadaki tepkileri ortaklaştıran, ortak bir motif olarak polis nefreti yani polisin bütün dünyada bir tür iç ordu olarak güçlenmesi ve polis baskınının giderek artmasına karşı bir tepki ile küresel motif olarak görüyorum.”

XII “(Dünyadaki diğer işgal hareketleriyle kıyaslandığından) Türkiye'ye özgün boyutu vardı. Fakat heterojen bir boyutu da var bu demografinin; bir proleter ayaklanması gibi etiketlemek isteyenlerde oldu bunu, tamamen salt biçimde başka bir şey olmayan yeni orta sınıf şeklinde tanımlamak isteyenlerde oldu. İkisi de doğru değil.”

XIII Gezi devletin sınıfsal içeriğinin açığa çıkmasıydı. (...) Böyle anlar zaten devletin sınıfsal içeriğinin apaçık yüz üstüne çıktığı ama çıktığı ölçüde de

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tekrar üstünü kapatmak içinde bir sürü yeni söylemin işe koşulduğu zamanlardır.

xiv “(Hartd ve Negri’nin çokluk teorisi hakkında) Ama yine ne açıkladığından emin değilim, sosyolojik açıdan, sosyal bilimsel açıdan baktığımda çokluk diye bir kategorinin neyi işlemselleştirebileceğinden, neyi açıklamak için önümüze konduğundan emin değilim. (...) Yani sınıf kategorisi ile bütün işimizi bitirdik de, çözdük, saldırdık, güçlendirdik, yanlışladık ya da doğruladık ve bunları bitirdik, şimdi yeni bir dönem başladı, küreselleşme, vs. (...) Gezi ile bağlantısını kurmak bana teorik bir egzersizden öte gelmiyor.”

xv “AKP’nin yaptığı en önemli şey millet tanımı içerisinde Türklüğü ana referans noktası olmaktan çıkararak Sünni-Müslüman kimliği milletin en temel tanımlayıcı varoluşsal unsuru olarak tarif etmesi. Türkiye toplumunun başka dinamiklerinin daha muhalif bir pozisyon alması ise bu durumda kaçınılmazdı. Çünkü böyle bir kimlik tanımı hem Türkiye’de ki Kemalistleri, sosyalistleri, solcuları ve özellikle Alevileri dışlayan onları kimlik tanımının dışında bırakan bir yapıya sahipti. Eninde sonunda bunlarla karşılaşacaktı, bu ideolojik düşünce bunlarla bir sürtüşme bir gerilim yaşayacaktı ve bu gerilimde çözülemediği noktada AKP’nin daha da fazla otoriterleşmesinde daha da fazla bu Sünni-Müslüman kimlik etrafındaki milliyetçiliğe sarılmasına neden olacaktı. Gezi Direnişine giden süreçte birazcık böyle başladı zaten.”

xvi “AKP’ye oy veren insanlar her zaman rasyonel mi çıkarları anlamında? Rasyonel olmadıklarını söylemek çok zordur. Bakarsan bilmem asgari ücret olayına, işçilerin belli – Alpkın Birelma’nın yaptığı çalışma biliyor musun? – Gösteriyor ki işçiler aslında hiç kötü durumda değiller, reel olarak ücretleri yükseliyor, artı tabi şu var; tüketim açısından baktığın zaman, imkânlar eskiye nazaran fazla. Çünkü kredi mekanizması ortaya çıkmış.”

xvii “Neoliberalizm emekle sermaye arasındaki sınıfsal dengeyi çok köklü bir biçimde bozdu. Yani 19 yüzyılda güçlü emek hareketleri günümüzde yok örneğin. Bu kadar ciddi krizler olmasına rağmen, çok ciddi finansallaşmanın



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beraberinde getirdiđi istikrarsızlıklar olmasına rağmen yok. Bu finansallaşma aynı zamanda emekçi sınıfların sisteme entegrasyonunda sağlıyor. İşte kredi kartlarıyla, borçlanmayla vs. Öyle olduđu için aslında günümüzde sermayenin emek üzerindeki tahakkümü çok güçlenmiş durumda (...) AKP'de bunun bir örneđi, üstelikte başarılı bir örneđi bana kalırsa.”

xviii “Yeni orta sınıf kavramı Marksizm açısından bakıldığında bölüşüm ilişkilerini merkeze alan bir sınıf tanımı içerisinde çıktıđı için Marksizm’e yabancı bir kavram gibi görülür. (...) Fakat Marksizm içerisinde de bu orta sınıf kavramını bu üretim ilişkileri içerisinde bakan çerçevesine uyumlu bir şekilde kullanmaya çalışan sosyal bilimciler, düşünürlerde olmuştur. Bunlardan ikisi Nicos Poulantzas ve onu takip eden Erik Olin Wright. Marksizm içinde de bunun kullanımlarına rastlanabilir. Bana kalırsa da yeni orta sınıf kavramı içerisinde çıktıđı teorik çerçeveye uyumlu olduđu müddetçe akademik anlamda değerlendirilip bir analizin parçası haline getirilebilir.”

xix “Marksizm içerisinde de bu orta sınıf kavramını bu üretim ilişkileri içerisinde bakan, çerçevesine uyumlu bir şekilde kullanmaya çalışan sosyal bilimciler, düşünürlerde olmuştur. Bunlardan birisi Poulantzas’tır mesela. O üretken olmayan emek süreçlerinde yer alan ama aynı zamanda emek gücünü satan kesimleri örneđin memurları orta sınıf olarak tanımlama eğiliminde olmuştur. Onu takip eden Erik Olin Wright daha çok üretim süreçlerinde yönetici konumunda olan yani üretim sürecinin gözetimini yapan fakat aynı zamanda emek gücünü de sermayeye patrona satan kesimleri tarif etmek için yeni orta sınıf kavramını kullanmıştır.”

xx “(Orta sınıfların kültürel dönüşüm gücü hakkında) Hizmet üretici kesimlere bak, hizmet üretici kesim de daha fazlalar. Yönetmiyorlar, sermayeyi kontrol etmiyorlar ve üretim araçlarına sahip değiller vs. Üretimde kontrolleri yok ama hizmet üretimi ile daha fazla ilgileniyorlar. Hizmet üretiminin önemli bir boyutu olan sembolik ve kültürel üretime temas ediyorlar. Bu açıdan Loïc Wacquant’ın bir haklılık payı olabilir.”

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xxi “Şimdi ülkesel ve yerel ayrımlar bir yana bütün bunlarla büyük benzeşme olduğu düşünüyorum. Yani ortada sermayenin tek tipleştirdiği bir dünyaya karşı protesto var, ayaklanma var. Mesela Amerikalılar bunu hızla bir sınıf teşhisi yaparsak: Amerika'yı kim yönetiyor? Teşhis ise %1' e %99 Wall Street. Wall Street nedir? Büyük sermaye demektir. Amerikalılar ona *cooperation* diyorlar. *Big cooperation* diyorlar, büyük sermaye demiyor ama ulusal dil, söylem meselesi %1' e %99. Bizim Gezi'dekilerde terminoloji böyle değil ama aynı teşhisi yaptılar.”

xxii “Orta sınıf tanımına Marksist perspektifle uyabilecek tek toplumsal kategori, Türkiye'de, kendi hesabına çalışan profesyonel meslek gruplarıdır. Bunun dışındaki bütün sosyal katmanlar, sınıfsal veya sınıfların türevleri olan tabakalar proletarya şablonunun içine oturur. Onun için iş gücünü satarak hayatını geçiren herkes en genel anlamıyla işçi sınıfının mensubudur.”

xxiii “Yani şöyle Korkut Boratav'ın pozisyonunu anlıyorum, ama katılmıyorum. Kendisi için klasik Marksist açıdan bakıldığında bir mesele değildir orta sınıf, çünkü burjuvazi vardır, proletarya vardır, iki ekstrem vardır. Aradaki şeyler ya bir tarafa indirgenebilir, ya da diğer tarafa. Siyasi açıdan bir problem olarak görülme istenmez. Ama her zaman yine de Marksistlerin karşısına ampirik bir problem olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bunun etrafından dolanmaya çalışanlar olmuştur, tamamen inkâr edenler olmuştur. Ama sosyal bilimsel araştırmalara baktığınızda orada çözülmesi gereken bir kitle var. (...) bence inkâr edilemez sosyolojik bir olgu var orta sınıf tartışmasında.”

xxiv “Orta sınıflar aynı zamanda biliyorsunuz – tabi çok büyük bir genelleme yapıyorum ama – sahip oldukları bir şeyler olan ve bu sahip olduklarını yeni yeni sahip olan ve bunu kaybetme ile ilgili olan şiddetli korkuları olan bir sınıfsal kültür üretirler. Ve bu zaman zaman çok antidemokratik bir risk de doğurabilir. Orta sınıflar aynı zamanda çok büyük bir demokrasi riskidir. Kaybedeceği bir şey olanların ve kaybedeceği şeyler büyük olanlardan farklı olarak kaybedeceği şeylerin kırılabilir olduğu bir sınıfsal bir gruptur bunlar,

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dolayısıyla çok tepkisel, çok reaksiyoner ve dolayısıyla otoriter ve faşizan çözümlere de çok kolay yatabilecek bir vasat oluşturlar. Bunu ayırt etmek gerekir, dolayısıyla orta sınıfların yaygınlaşması illa demokratikleşme sonucu doğurmaz, illa tersi de olmaz faşizm tehlikesi de otomatik olarak doğurmaz ama anlattığımı zannediyorum.”

xxv “Dolayısıyla burada büyüyen bir orta sınıf değil, aslında parçalanmış doğal olarak sermayenin çalışma biçiminin getirdiği koşullar nedeniyle parçalanmış işgücü yapısının tezahürü bence.”

xxvi Eskiden sermayedarlar vardı, işçiler vardı. Ondan sonra, ortaya yeni bir takım insanlar çıktı. Bu yeni ortaya çıkan insanlar, ne sermayedar, ne de tam anlamıyla işçi. Neden tam anlamıyla işçi değil! Çünkü sermayeden alıyor gelirini ama bir şekilde işçi kadar aşağılık bir konumda değil, çünkü kendinin satabileceği bir şey var, o satabileceği şey genellikle eğitim ile ilişkili. O satabileceği şeyden dolayı, işçi kadar savunmasız değil. İşçi mesela Marx’ın döneminde 15 gün ücret almasa aç kalacaktır, oysa bu adamın hem kendi birikimi daha fazla olacak, hem de ücret alması tamamen işverenin keyfine bağlı değil, çünkü yaptığı işe talep var. Dolayısıyla, Marx’ın kendisi orta sınıfı tanımlamıştı, daha henüz hala piyasada bir şeyler satmaya çalışan, kendi kendisini istihdam eden, kendi sermayesi olan insan olarak tanımladı ve ortadan kalktı yavaş yavaş. Türkiye’de de görüyorsunuz son dönemde, bakkallar, ayakkabıcılar, tesisatçılar, araba tamircileri, vs. Bunlar yavaş yavaş ortadan kalktı.

xxvii İslami yeni orta sınıf benim de merak ettiğim bir konu. Türkiye’de yeni orta sınıfın içerisinde İslami bir kesim var. Şirketlerde çalışan üniversite mezunu mühendisler, yöneticiler, vb. Yani çocuklarını yüksek standartta eğitim sağlayan İslami bir kesim de var. Dolayısıyla, burada yapısal olarak aynı konumda olan, İslami ve seküler kesimler arasındaki ilişki nedir? Bunu soruyorsun. Bence bu çok ciddi bir soru. Yani sosyolog olarak yapısalın öne çıkması gerektiğini düşünebiliriz, ben de öyle düşünmek isterim.