

PROBLEMATIZING TERRITORIALITY AND IDENTITY IN THE MIDDLE  
EAST  
THE CASE OF IRAQ

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **PROBLEMATIZING TERRITORIALITY AND IDENTITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE CASE OF IRAQ**

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This thesis analyzes the role of territory in the formation of the national identity and state sovereignty. In particular it seeks to address territory's place on the formation of state and national identity in Iraq. It examines the historical development of the territoriality, territorially-bounded state and territory-inspired nationalism in the Middle East and in Iraq. The thesis argues that state territoriality is a socially constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed and it is affected by and shaper of human actions and consciousness. Focusing on the transformations of territoriality that Iraq has experienced, the thesis reveals the difference between Iraq as geographical land and Iraq as a political territory.

Keywords: Territory, Territoriality, Territorial nationalism, Territorial state, Iraq

## ÖZ

### ORTADOĞU'DA ÜLKESELLİĞİN VE KİMLİĞİN SORUNSALLAŞTIRILMASI IRAK ÖRNEĞİ

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Bu tez ülkenin ulusal kimliğin ve devlet egemenliğinin inşa edilmesindeki rolünü incelemektedir. Çalışma özellikle Irak'ın ulusal kimliği ve Irak devletinin oluşmasında ülkeselliğin konumuna odaklanmaktadır. Tez, Ortadoğu'da ve özellikle Irak'ta ülkesellik, ülkesel devlet ve ülkesel milliyetçiliği incelemektedir. Çalışma, ülkenin inşa edilen, yıkıma uğratılan ve yeniden inşa edilen sosyal bir olgu olduğunu iddia etmekte ve insane eylemlerini ve bilincini hem etkilediğini hem de bunlardan etkilendiğini söylemektedir. Irak'ın ülkesel açıdan yaşadığı değişimlere odaklanan tez, coğrafi bir yer olarak Irak'ın siyasi bir ülke olan Irak'tan farklı olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ülke, Ülkesellik, Ülkesel Devlet, Ülkesel milliyetçilik, Irak

To Burak and Meryem

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

[...] being political is always a matter of being, becoming, *in place* and *through space*.<sup>1</sup>

“To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul” writes Simon Weil in his book *The Need for Roots*.<sup>2</sup> The linkage between the people and the space is one of the most crucial components of identity, conscious and soul. Culture which comes from Latin *cultus* which means “care” and French *colore* which means “tilling the land,” “tilling the ground” and “agriculture” is rooted in soil as James Clifford argues: “the idea of culture carries with it an expectation of roots, of a stable, territorialized existence.”<sup>3</sup> When a famous politician or a prominent figure in Turkey dies, soils from the different parts of Turkey are spitted to his or her grave as a demonstration of emotional ties with him/her and “nation.” It is also not uncommon to see Turkish workers in Europe returning to Turkey for their summer holidays to kiss the soil when they arrive their “motherland.” Although it is costly and time-consuming and Islamic faith does not require bodies of people who died outside of Turkey are generally brought to their “national territory.” Because of this emotional tie, desecration of cemeteries such as desecrations of Jewish and Muslim graveyards in Europe is one of the most common ways to demonstrate hostility to a group which is considered alien to “national soil.” Territory is at the center of the national discourse. To be rooted is not only human soul’s need as Weil argues; nations also need to be rooted. Therefore it is not surprising that tree is used as a national symbol by several nations. It is climate and geography that create suitable

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<sup>1</sup> Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert, “The Politics of War, Citizenship, Territory” in *War, Citizenship, Territory*, eds. Deborah Cowen and Emily Gilbert, 1 (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). italics is in the original

<sup>2</sup> Simon Weil, *The Needs for Roots*, trans. Arthur Wills (London and New York: Routledge, [1952] 2002), 40.

<sup>3</sup> James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature and Art* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 338.

conditions for olive, oak, palm date etc, but using them as national symbols or attributing them special meanings reflect the territorial dimension of national identity. Liisa Malkki gathered stunning examples:

Keith Thomas has traced the history of the British oak as “an emblem of the British people.” Edmund Burke combined “the great oaks that shade a country” with metaphors of “roots” and “stock.” A Quebecois nationalist likened the consequences of tampering with the national heritage to the withering of a tree. An old Basque nationalist document links nation, race, blood, and tree.<sup>4</sup>

Nationalist poems, songs, anthems are full of territorial references and emphasis on landscape. The landscape in nationalist thinking is not geographical features of the land; it is source of national pride, myths of origin, reason for sacrifice. Streets, boulevards, universities, businesses and even new-born children are named with territorial features. Territory is also an indicator of the country names as “land” is used as suffix (Deutschland, England, Iceland, Ireland, Thailand, the Netherlands etc). Several colonial possessions were also named similarly by putting the dominant culture and people at the centre: Basutoland, Bechuanaland, French Somaliland, Hausaland, Nyasaland.

Territoriality is the founding principle of modern International Relations and international system. The development of modern state system can be summarized as an evolution “from parcellization to consolidation, from personalization to institutionalization, and from an aspatial ontology to a territorial one.”<sup>5</sup> The world is composed of clearly-bounded, spatially discontinuous, sovereign and discrete units whose territorial control and authority never overlap. Borders are essential component of territorial system and they are permanent, impermeable, unfixable and clearly demarcated. State authority is limited by territory, its sovereignty is exercised over territory and its legitimacy derives from territory. As Gianfranco Poggi concisely puts “the state does not *have* territory, it *is* territory.”<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Liisa Malkki, “National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees” *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (1992): 27.

<sup>5</sup> James Caporaso and Joseph Jupille, “Sovereignty and Territory in the European Union: Transforming the UK Institutional Order,” in *Restructuring Territoriality: Europe and the United States Compared*, eds. Christopher Ansell and Giuseppe Di Palma, 68 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>6</sup> Gianfranco Poggi, *The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 22; italics is in the original.

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century people are unprecedentedly mobile and they constantly move across for variety of reasons. Migrant workers, refugees, diasporas develop new identities without strong geographical bases. However this does not mean that they have no territorial affiliations or sentiments. Although it has an undeniable geographical dimension, “homeland” is a socio-political construction rather than a pure geographical area. It was human actions, narrative construction and perceptions that transform a land to territory and a space to homeland. These uprooted people create new homelands for them in where they live and this situation paves the way for a new territorial affiliations.

Despite the significance of territory in understanding of state, nation and international system, until quite recently, territoriality had been neglected in scholarly world or examined only in geographical terms apart and independent from its political and social dimension. As Andrew Sayer argues “few social scientists have paid any attention to space and difference is supposedly makes.”<sup>7</sup> Territory is so much reflected in the ordinary language as very apparentness of the territory makes it subtle as an academic field of study. As David Jacobson argues “association of nations and states with fixed, clearly demarcated territories has been presumed to be so ‘given’ or even natural that until recently, scholars left the issue of territoriality as implicit, a constant like the weather that did not need to be discussed.”<sup>8</sup> Barry Buzan in his book *People, State and Fear* claims that the physical domain of the state “simply exists.”<sup>9</sup> George Thomas Kurian’s the five-volume *The Encyclopedia of Political Science* does not have an entry for territory.<sup>10</sup> This does not mean that International Relations are unaware of territory and its influence on politics and society. Territorial disputes between states, wars resulted from different territorial claims and territory’s place in power calculations are main issues of International Relations. However territory is generally disregarded as an abstract, theoretical phenomenon. As Uday Singh Mehta argues:

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<sup>7</sup> Andrew Sayer, “The Difference that Space Makes” in *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, eds. Derek Gregory and John Urry, 51 (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1985).

<sup>8</sup> David Jacobson, “New Frontiers: Territory, Social Spaces, and the State,” *Sociological Forum* 12, no.1 (1997): 121.

<sup>9</sup> Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: ECPR, 1991), 70.

<sup>10</sup> George Thomas Kurian, *The Encyclopedia of Political Science* (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2011).

Indeed, it is obvious that we would not recognize either inter- or intrastate political arrangements and deliberations without explicit or implicit reference to this fact [territory]. Rather the problem, at one level, is that the ubiquity of its significance is belied by the lack of theoretical attention paid to it.<sup>11</sup>

Territory is not immune from criticisms. Several scholars question the suitability of territory in understanding of International Relations and world politics. Technological developments and revolutionary innovations in military industry such as aircrafts with supersonic speed and intercontinental range and nuclear weaponry are considered as debilitating factors for territoriality of states. Paul Hirst claims that “fortification as the defence of places ended for all practical purposes with the breaching of the Atlantik Wall in 1944. Thereafter, formal fortifications as a principal means of defence, even on the most extensive scale, were obsolete.”<sup>12</sup> John Herz claims that nuclear weapons violate the impermeability of state territory and make it irrelevant as a protection for citizens of the states.<sup>13</sup> Measures regarding the environmental problems are generally demonstrated as efforts that should be spent by a unified global society without borders.<sup>14</sup> As a consequence of rising interdependence and interconnectedness movement of ideas, people, goods also bypass territorial limits of states. Current security problems are also shown as an erosion of territorial dimension of state and sovereignty. Martin van Creveld argued that in an era of unconventional wars fought by non-state actors, there was little life remaining in what he regarded as the Clausewitzian universe of large, state-based armed forces.<sup>15</sup> Some scholars argue that in the contemporary period conflicts are more likely to involve loosely organized, nonhierarchical, transnational groups.<sup>16</sup> Data collection on rebel organizations demonstrates that “over half (55 per cent) of all rebel groups active since 1945 have undertaken extraterritorial operations in

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<sup>11</sup> Uday Singh Mehta, *Liberalism and Empire: A Study in Nineteenth-Century British Liberal Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), 119.

<sup>12</sup> Paul Hirst, *Space and Power* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 216.

<sup>13</sup> John H. Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” *World Politics* 9, no.4 (July, 1957).

<sup>14</sup> Lester Brown, *World Without Borders* (New York: Random House, 1972).

<sup>15</sup> Martin van Creveld, *On Future War* (London: Brassey’s, 1991).

<sup>16</sup> Mary Kaldor, *New and Older Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999); John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001).

countries beyond their target state.”<sup>17</sup> More importantly there is no direct proportion between the number of trans-territorial fighters who involve an insurgency and their effect on ongoing conflict. For instance in 2005, although trans-territorial fighters comprised less than 10 percent of the Iraqi insurgency, they were responsible for more than 90 percent of suicide bombings which were the most lethal attacks.<sup>18</sup>

In spite of long marginalization, negligence and challenge territory still plays a crucial role in world politics. Territorial state is still at the center of politics, territorially-inspired nationalist or separatist movements are maintaining their significance, territorial states are the most influential players of environmental and economic issues. As Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard argues theories initially challenged the significance of the territorially demarcated authority of states such as functional theories of European integration and interdependency later adopted territoriality.<sup>19</sup> Territory is also one of the most crucial components of the national security. Border fortifications are the most outstanding example of territory’s significance on national security. As Wendy Brown enumerates physical security of borders is primary concern for many states.<sup>20</sup> The United States-built wall along its southern border with Mexico; South Africa-made electrified security wall on South Africa-Zimbabwe border; Saudi Arabia’s high technology border barriers with Yemen and Iraq; India’s mined, barbed and concertina wires along with Pakistan, Bangladesh and Kashmir borders; fence along the entire Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border are some instances. Fortification of borders are also used within the country as can be seen in sectarian division and walling of Iraqi neighborhoods and establishing Green Zone which create spatially segregated area from the rest of Baghdad and strictly protected territory through checkpoints.

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<sup>17</sup>Idean Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 5.

<sup>18</sup> Patrick Quinn, “Foreigners responsible for most suicide attacks in Iraq,” UT San Diego, (accessed July 19, 2015). <http://legacy.utsandiego.com/news/world/iraq/20050630-1258-iraq-suicidemissions.html>

<sup>19</sup> Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, “Analysing Westphalian States in an Integrating Europe and a Globalising World” in *State Territoriality and European Integration*, eds. Michael Burgess and Hans Vollaard, 4 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006).

<sup>20</sup> Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (New York, Zone Books, 2010), 8-20.

Iraq is quite proper case for investigation of territoriality. The formation of Iraqi state and the creation of Iraqi nation are results of transformation of geographical Iraqi land to political Iraqi territory. As Adham Saouli argues “Iraq’s geographical location is a factor that explains not only how domestic power was moulded and remoulded over time, but also, and more importantly, how this power was projected externally.”<sup>21</sup> Iraq is a good research field for territoriality since regime struggles, power changes, foreign relations and domestic struggles are closely related with territoriality as can be seen in Chapter 3.

Iraq is microcosms of the Middle East as ethnic, religious, sectarian divisions put it in a special place. Its vast oil resources, authoritative regime and strong army prior to the American invasion and different discourses and policies such as Arab nationalism, territorial nationalism, patriotism, Islamism or sectarianism expanded Iraq’s influence throughout the Middle East. After the American invasion and the collapse of the Baath regime Iraq is center of region-wide terrorist and insurgency networks and poses a vital threat to regional stability. Considering the central position of Iraq in the Middle Eastern affairs, understanding Iraq is key to understand politics and society in the Middle East.

Iraqi territorial state and Iraqi nation in terms of territorial loyalty have always been controversial terms. When Ottoman Iraq was replaced by modern Iraqi state, it was given almost all characteristics of modern state: clear borders and defined territory, administrative structure, security apparatus etc. What it was missing, however, was roots of these concepts in Iraqi society and territory. Therefore territorial state in Iraq has always been undulated nature. Compared to the Western states, Iraqi state’s monopoly on the use of legitimate violence has been changeable. In 1933, the government possessed 15,000 rifles while there were 100,000 rifles in tribal hands.<sup>22</sup> During the 1980s Iraqi army was one of the strongest in the world and central government’s legitimacy on the use of violence was unquestionable. On the other hand, in 2015, although Iraqi army has 48,000 soldiers, it is estimated that Shiite

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<sup>21</sup> Adham Saouli, *The Arab State: Dilemmas of Late Formation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2012), 103.

<sup>22</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 18.

militia groups have more than 100,000 armed men.<sup>23</sup> Since modern state institutions like citizenship have never been applied perfectly, modern nation-state system in Iraq has always been in crisis. It was the authoritarianism that sustains state apparatus in the country. Since state apparatus, especially security bureaucracy is dominated by a small part of society which the ruling elite is member of it, social movements not only toppled down government but also state apparatus. In addition to this, Iraq's political and social cohesion have always been depended on very sensitive balances. Fanar Haddad's suggestion concisely shows the social division in Iraq:

...Imagine a comprehensive survey of Arab Iraqi households asking respondents to suggest the best embodiment of an otherwise abstract "Day of the Martyr." The results are likely to be deeply divided and divisive. The reason that such a hypothetical survey is likely to be so contentious is that in the current atmosphere of inflamed communal relations in which the enemy — the other — is within Iraq's borders as much as beyond, demands will be made for group-specific events and tragedies to be represented in the "Day of the Martyr."<sup>24</sup>

The fragile territorial roots of the Iraqi nation and the Iraqi state create disputed, fluxional, and fluid territorial structure in the country, both internally and externally. This transformation process is proceeding at full steam and Iraq provides a suitable place for research of territoriality. This thesis aims to reveal the spatial attributes of the state and the society in Iraq. The purpose here is to draw attention to the analytical consequences of territorial dimension of Iraqi state and politics. This work aims to answer the question "what is the territorial dimension of Iraqi state and national identity?" It examines Iraqi history between 1858 and 2003. 1858 was the year that Land Code (*Arazi Kanunnamesi*) was applied the Ottoman territory. It was the first significant initiative that reorganized Iraqi land according to modern territorial principles. American invasion of 2003 opened a totally different page in Iraqi history in terms of territoriality and requires completely different research beyond the scope of this thesis.

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<sup>23</sup> Liz Sly, "Pro-Iran Militias' Success in Iraq could Undermine US," *The Washington Post* (accessed July 19, 2015). [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle\\_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iraqs-pro-iranian-shiite-militias-lead-the-war-against-the-islamic-state/2015/02/15/5bbb1cf0-ac94-11e4-8876-460b1144cbc1_story.html)

<sup>24</sup> Fanar Haddad, "Why Arab Iraq Survives," *Foreign Policy* (accessed July 15, 2015) <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/11/07/why-arab-iraq-survives/> Accessed: 6 June 2015

The first chapter of the thesis *Conceptual Considerations* firstly reveals the significance of territory for world politics, war making, nation building and identity construction and how it still affects International Relations. The subchapter *What is Territory/Territoriality* explains the concept, demonstrates the political meaning that territory has, and differentiates the land as a geographical term and the territory as a political construct. This part shows that territory requires human actions to rise, shape and maintain. Theoretical explanation in this part sheds light on the differences between the questions “how Iraq’s mountains are running” and “where is Iraq.” Next subchapter *Territory, State and Sovereignty* reveals the relations and interactions between territory and state/sovereignty. This part demonstrates territory’s central place for modern state and sovereignty by demonstrating how authority of state is determined, bounded, legitimated by the territory. The rest of the *Conceptual Considerations* reveals the formation and consolidation of territorial state. Territorially-bounded state was born in Europe and spread across the world during the Colonial period. The political system in the Medieval Europe, territoriality of the Church which was a major force in that period and Westphalian transformation are also explained in order to reveal the transformation of state system in Europe from aspatial to territorial one. Last section of the chapter demonstrates the political relations between the people and space and territory’s place in nationalism.

Chapter 2 *Territory, Territoriality, Territorial State in the Middle East* begins with the definition of the term “Middle East” and shows its dynamic nature. Then, territoriality is examined in the framework of traditional Middle Eastern and Islamic political thinking. Contrary to Europe in which territory has been a source of loyalty and affiliation for a long time, in the Middle East, identification with territory is a modern phenomenon. State sovereignty in the traditional Middle Eastern perception is not determined and limited by territory since authority and law is *ad personam*. This point is crucial to understand political crisis, state failures and current instability in the region since the historical incompatibility between traditional system and modern territorial system imposed by the Western powers after World War I is one of the most significant reasons of these problems of the region. This chapter demonstrates the historical development of territorial state in the region. It begins with Ottoman modernization period which commenced the West-inspired reforms and reorganize

the region along with the principles of territorial sovereignty. Many features of the modern statehood inherited by Iraq were introduced at that period. The second phase of the consolidation of territorial state in the region is Mandate period. This period has vital significance for the Middle Eastern history since for the first time in all history the region was demarcated by permanent and clear borders that created some of the Middle Eastern nations (for instance Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) and transformed some of the lands (Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan etc.) into territories. Main motivations behind the demarcation processes, the methods used for this, the reaction of local people and weaknesses of this delimitation are examined in detail. Next part of the chapter examines territorial disputes between Bahrain and Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Egypt and Sudan, Iran and United Arab Emirates in order to revise and elaborate territorial dynamics in the region.

In order to comprehend territoriality of the Middle East, its shortcomings and weaknesses should be investigated as well. The last part of the Chapter 2 is dedicated to this purpose. The subchapter *Challenges to the state centric political imaginary and territorial state in the Middle East* reveals main challenges to the territoriality and territorial state in the region. States's weaknesses; their inability to provide order, security and social services that disable them to create loyalty to the state; indirect and highly transnationalized wars that caused proxy wars, client groups, and transnational insurgencies at the expense of *étatisme*; trans-territorial religious ties; tribal, sectarian, religious, and patrimonial influences in the politics are claimed as the diminishing factors of territoriality. Moreover, migrant workers which changed demographic structure of the region, refugees, and "pan" movements such as pan-Arabism and pan-Islamism are examined in terms of their impact on the territoriality of the Middle East.

The last chapter entitled *The Territoriality of Iraq* focuses on Iraq. This chapter begins with the definition(s) of the term "Iraq" from ancient to Medieval texts. This part reveals that Iraq refers different geographical areas in different times. This is a crucial point to understand current situation in the country as Iraq has different meaning for different segments of the society. For instance, although Baathists thought that Iraq is one and united form Zakho in the north to Faw in the south, the

proponents of independent Kurdish state claim that Iraq does not consist of the area governed by the Kurdistan Regional Government. For some, even the Kurdish-populated areas from Khaneqin to Sinjar are not part of Iraq. This chapter examines the formation of Iraq's boundaries with its every neighbor. Geographical features have very limited role on these borders and majority of the total length of the borders are results of political developments. This chapter divides the investigation of Iraq's territoriality into five periods: Ottoman Rule, British Mandate, Hashemite Period, Qasim Era, and Baath Reign. Every period is examined through territorial lens and efforts to create and consolidate territorial state are demonstrated. Since Mesopotamia-inspired territorial nationalism was at the center of the Iraqiness and Iraqi nationhood it is given a special attention throughout the chapter.

In *Conclusion and Final Remarks* general overview is provided and territorial transformations in Iraq after American invasion of 2003 are investigated. This chapter sheds light on the future of territoriality in Iraq and transformations of territorial understanding of radical groups in the Middle East.

## CHAPTER 2

### CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

#### 2.1. The Significance of Territory

And here are to be answer'd. Tell me, my daughters,  
Since now we will divest us both of rule,  
Interest of territory, cares of state,  
Which of you shall we say doth love us most?  
That we our largest bounty may extend  
Where nature doth with merit challenge.  
King Lear

Territory has always been at the centre of political struggles. Erich Weede states that “the history of war and peace is largely identical with the history of territorial changes as results of war and causes of the next war.”<sup>25</sup> According to Paul F. Diehl’s investigation, between 1816 and 1980, closeness to the disputed area for one side was a basic condition for escalation to war.<sup>26</sup> This means that geographical position was primary cause for war between these years. Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl also list 770 cases of territorial changes from 1816 to 1980 whose repercussions still affect world politics overwhelmingly.<sup>27</sup> Over half of all militarized conflicts between 1816 and 1992 and two-thirds of all full-scale interstate wars occurred between neighbors. This rate increased as transportation and communication technologies improved. Almost every full-scale interstate war (two exceptions are Falkland War between Argentina and Great Britain and Vietnam War between the US and North Vietnam)

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<sup>25</sup> Erich Weede, “Nation-Environment Relations as Determinants of Hostilities Among Nations,” *Peace Science Society Papers* 20, (1973):87.

<sup>26</sup> Paul Diehl, “Contiguity and Military Escalation in Major Power Rivalries, 1816-1980,” *Journal of Politics* 47, (1985): 1203-1211.

<sup>27</sup> Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, *Territorial Changes and International Conflict* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002),147-164

between 1945 and 1992 began between contiguous states.<sup>28</sup> As these examples demonstrate, geographical position and contiguity are one of the most salient reasons for war. After the World War II, although major powers rarely fought against each other, wars have been erupted between small states for mainly territorial issues. Territorial disputes create greater number of casualties than disputes over other matters.<sup>29</sup> In addition to this, conflicts over territorial disputes more likely to create other disputes. Hensel finds that over half of all militarized territorial disputes are pursued by another conflict between same antagonists within 15 years.<sup>30</sup> According to Robert Gilpin “international political change has been primarily a matter of redistributing territory among groups or states following the great wars of history.”<sup>31</sup> Likewise, international relations theorist John Vasquez claims that territorial disputes are the most common reasons for war.<sup>32</sup> Hans Morgenthau, the prominent thinker of realist tradition in International Relations literature, places geography and natural resources which are closely related to territory at the top of national power calculations.<sup>33</sup> Destructive wars of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century in Europe had generally erupted by the reason of competitive territorial ambitions. The first provision of the Treaty of Versailles which ended the Franco-German War of 1870 necessitated France to renounce all rights and titles in territories to the east of newly established Germany-France border.<sup>34</sup> Putting the territorial arrangements at the first provision demonstrates that the main theme of this war was territorial. Rise of geopolitics as a paramount academic field in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century also indicates the weight of the territory at that period. Majority of the preeminent geopoliticians who shape the

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<sup>28</sup> Paul Hensel, “Territory: Theory and Evidence on Geography and Conflict,” in *What do we Know About War?*, ed. John Vasquez, (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming 2000)

<sup>29</sup> Paul Senese, “Geographical Proximity and Issue Salience: Their Effects on the Escalation of Militarized Interstate Conflict,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 15, no.2, (1996): 133-161

<sup>30</sup> Paul Hensel, “One Thing Leads to Another: Recurrent Militarized Disputes in Latin America 1816-1986,” *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no.3, (1994):281-298.

<sup>31</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 37.

<sup>32</sup> John Vasquez, “Why Do Neighbors Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality,” *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 277-93.

<sup>33</sup> Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Knoph, 1985), 127-36

<sup>34</sup> Fred Israel, *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967), 645


discipline and its literature, for instance Alfred Mahan (1840-1914), Fredrich Ratzel (1844-1904), Sir Halford Mackinder (1861-1946), Rudolf Kjellén (1864-1922), Karl Haushofer (1869-1946) lived in this era. Their primary concern was analyzing and conceptualizing state territory and its relation with state security.

Preventing unregulated intrusions across territory and preserving territorial integrity has always been primary purposes of governments. This objective was internalized by the public in the golden age of nation-state in Europe in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century. Indivisibility of the territory was not only geographical unity of territory, but also emblazoning of the image of the motherland. Visual animating of national territories such as the boot of Italy, the islands of Britain, the face of France, the Finnish maiden reinforced the idea of indivisibility of the territory. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century illustrations, France was often illustrated as a face, with Paris is eye, Brittany region as nose and the Loire as mouth.<sup>35</sup> This means that just as eye, nose and mouth do not live separately, so does France. In a similar way, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century illustration maps which showed power struggle in Europe generally portrayed countries as humans with their traditional clothes, or representative animals, for instance bear for Russia, or famous national leader, such as Otto von Bismarck for Germany, located at the exact places of their territories. This illustration is an expression of perception of territorial unity and integrity of states. Landscapes were also used for the same purpose. As Donald Meining argues “every mature nation has its symbolic landscapes. They are part of the shared set of ideas and memories which bind people together.”<sup>36</sup> In this respect, landscape does not refer a scene that visitors or tourists love to see, but a socially constructed phenomenon which people ascribe meaning to it. For instance, Great Pyramids at Giza was illustrated as a symbol of Egyptian national pride by the Egyptian nationalist or two-fold family homes with garage surrounded by grassy yards along a clean, calm street was a symbol of “American dream.”

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
<sup>35</sup> Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 194

<sup>36</sup> Donald Meining, “Symbolic Landscapes: Some Idealizations of American Communities,” in *The Interpretation of Ordinary Landscapes: Geographical Essays*, ed. Donald Meining, 164 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979).



**Figure 1: The Finnish Maiden**

Source: <http://kingsministries.fi/scandinavian-countries/?lang=en>



**Figure 2: Italy Boot**

Source 2: <http://one-europe.info/eurographics/italy-europes-boot>

Territory maintains its significance today in world politics. Territorial disputes remain one of the main reasons for conflicts world-wide. Separation of Yugoslavia evoked one of the bloodiest wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Breakaway regions of Georgia, Moldavia and Azerbaijan have always been cited as a risk for regional stability. Disputed areas between Sudan and South Sudan, Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Israel and Syria, India and Pakistan, Russia and Ukraine etc. instill fears for escalation of conflicts and humanitarian tragedies. The fragmentation of Somalia, the expansion of ISIS in Iraq and Syria which trivializes the border between the two countries, long-standing controversies in Western Sahara, East Timor, East Turkistan, and Tibet show the continuation of territorial struggles. Regulation of maritime boundaries, management of Antarctica, delimiting Arctic Sea remain controversial issues for variety of states. Names of territories are also changed in several cases. Madagascar was formerly appeared as the Malagasy Republic; Benin was Dahomey; Burkina Faso was the Upper Volta; Equatorial Guinea was known as Río Muni; Zimbabwe was called as Rhodesia; Namibia as South-West Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo was labeled “Zaire. In other words, naming, delineation, demarcation, delimitation, distribution, division, and mapping of territories still proceed.

Territory has inherent significance on several counts. The first one is natural resources. It is the natural resources that turn the vast sand-covered areas into the most crucial places for world economy. After the discovery of oil reserves and gold mines in Alaska, “Seward’s icebox”<sup>37</sup> became strategically and economically important place. As can be seen in Israel’s claims on Golan Heights and Iraq’s past efforts to control Shatt-al Arab waterway and Kuwait’s Bubiyan Island, some territories are important for military purposes or accessibility to open seas. Territory also means market and population resources. Almost whole colonial history was a search for new areas in where European powers could sell their oversupplies and find labor force to maintain their production. From time to time territorial expansion is perceived as unavoidable prerequisite for national development and security. German’s quest for *Lebensraum* and Japanese Empire’s expansion to continental Asia in 20<sup>th</sup> century are oft-cited samplings. After all, territory is crucial for agriculture and irrigation. Fertile lands provide considerable economic opportunities and agriculturally self-sufficiency is a strategic aspiration for many countries. This idea can be found in Rousseau’s writings as well. He declares that:

A body politic can be measured in two ways, by the extent of its territory and the by the number of its people, and an appropriate ratio has to obtain between these two measures for the State to be given its genuine size: The men make up the State, and the land feeds the men; thus the ratio requires that there be enough land to support its inhabitants, and as many inhabitants as the land can feed.<sup>38</sup>

Another significance of territory lies in definition of states. Territory provides convenience for defining state and its subjects. A state cannot enumerate all things that it possesses inside its area. The classification, possession and exclusion are made through territoriality by employing some communication varieties. These varieties may be wall on the border, fence, razor wire, no trespass sign, passport control, natural feature or a flag. For instance, one of the earliest territorially defined

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<sup>37</sup> US’ acquisition of Alaska from Russia was one of the projects of William Seward, the expansionist Secretary of State under both Lincoln and Johnson. In March 1867, Alaska was transferred from Russia to the US in return for \$7.2 million. At that time Alaska is huge wasteland with tiny population. This move faced harsh criticism and Alaska was labeled as “Seward’s Folly”, “Seward’s Icebox” and “Johnson’s polar bear garden.”

<sup>38</sup> Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings*, trans. and ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 75-76.

specification was made by the French king Philip the Fair (1285-1314) who defined France as a land which was surrounded by four rivers: the Saône, the Rhône, Meuse, and Escault.<sup>39</sup> James Anderson shows another advantage of territorial definition as follows:

The need to delimit the “relevant political constituency” each time –difficult, time-consuming, and perhaps impossible to achieve by purely democratic means- is obviated by having the standard “pre-given framework”; and it gains legitimacy from being created before and independently of particular contemporary issues. It is further distanced from particular issues through having a more abstract or general spatial basis in territory rather than in social attributes. It avoids a recurring “problem of origins” and the regress of “who decides the decision makers.”<sup>40</sup>

Territory is also attributed a religious meaning in many cases. In ancient times, gods were thought to live in certain territories, such as Greek gods who inhabited on Olympus Mountain. In the Mycenaean period, goddess of Athena and Helen were believed to reside in Athens and Sparta, and that’s why these cities were considered as sacred. *Otukan*, the legendary capital city in Turkic mythology which is considered as a birthplace of Turkish nation carries the same name with Earth goddess.<sup>41</sup> Hanukkah festival of Jews is a celebration of recapture of the Temple and its surroundings from Seleucid Empire which used the Temple for worshipping Zeus. Some religions are centered on and gathered around specific territory and some practices are only performed in several places. Makkah for Islam, Ganges for Hinduism, and Western Wall for Jews are some exemplifications. These sacred places’ repercussions are far beyond what is assumed. Ron Hassner juxtaposes the most stunning examples:<sup>42</sup> the dispute between Russia and France over the rights in the churches of the Holy Land triggered the Crimean War of 1853-56. Riots after theft of a relic from Hazratbal mosque in Kashmir in 1964 caused 160 deaths and

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<sup>39</sup> Hein Goemans, “Bounded Communities: Territoriality, Territorial Attachment and Conflict,” in *Territoriality and Conflict in Era of Globalization*, eds. Miles Kahler and Barbara Walter, 45 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>40</sup> James Anderson, “Theorizing State Borders: ‘Politics/Economics’ and Democracy in Capitalism,” Working Paper CIBR/WP01-1, *School of Geography and Centre for International Borders Research*, Queen’s University, Belfast, 2001

<sup>41</sup> Annemarie von Gabain, “Kök-Türklerin Tarihine Bir Bakış Stepte Yaşayan Kök-Türkler,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil Tarih Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 2, no.5 (1944): 687

<sup>42</sup> Ron Hassner, “To Have and to Hold: Conflicts over Sacred Space and the Problem of Indivisibility,” *Security Studies* 12, o.4 (2003): 4.

exodus of 700,000 refugees and catalyzed the second Indo-Pakistan war. In 1998 the suicide attack that destroyed The Temple of Buddha's Tooth in Sri Lanka abolished negotiations to settle down the civil war.

## 2.2. What is Territory/Territoriality?

Although territory is generally considered as a modern phenomenon, references to territory can be found in early texts, from Greek tragedies<sup>43</sup> to Aristotle<sup>44</sup>, Bible<sup>45</sup> to Quran<sup>46</sup>. For instance the criteria for legitimacy for the early Muslim rulers established by the jurists are very limited. There was a consensus that ruler is legitimate as long as he could defend the Muslim territories and did not prevent practicing Islam.<sup>47</sup> Exile, banishment, consecration of places and lands, contestation, annexation, conquest and land politics had been occupying significant place in earlier political thought and literature. Territories were captured, lost, controlled, distributed, divided, bought, sold, inherited, demarcated, and gifted. Sometimes territory is reconfigured in the form of protectorate, sphere of influence, buffer, suzerainty or neutral zone in order to regulate relations among great powers. Creating borders and thus delimiting territories have been living experiences throughout the centuries, despite the fact that this delimitation was far from modern sense. Great Wall of China, *Fossatum Africae*<sup>48</sup>, *Limes Arabicus*,<sup>49</sup> *Limes Germanicus*,<sup>50</sup> Hadrian's Wall, and the Antonine Wall were some instances among

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<sup>43</sup> Rush Rehm, *The Play of Space: Spatial Transformation in Greek Tragedy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002)

<sup>44</sup> Judith Swanson and David Corbin, *Aristotle's Politics* (New York: Continuum International Publishing, 2009), 115

<sup>45</sup> The Holy Bible, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, Salt Lake City, 2013: Deuteronomy 19:8, Chronicles 4:10.

<sup>46</sup> Maria Massi Dakake, "Sacred Land in the Qur'an and Hadith and Its Symbolic and Eschatological Significance," *The Journal of Scriptural Reasoning* 10, no. 1 (2011)

<sup>47</sup> Mohammed Ayoob, "Political Islam: Image and Reality," *World Policy Journal* 21, no.3, (Fall 2004): 9

<sup>48</sup> A defensive line constructed by Romans in Northern Africa to protect southern borders of the Empire.

<sup>49</sup> A desert frontier of the Roman Empire in the province of Arabia Petraea built in order to protect south-east borders of the Empire.

<sup>50</sup> A frontier which separated Romans from the unsubdued Germanic tribes.

others. As for modern era, Berlin Wall (1975-1989), Moroccan Wall of Western Sahara, Israel-West Bank Wall demonstrates that separating places for political and security reasons are still implemented.

Robert David Sack argues that “territoriality for humans is a powerful geographic strategy to control people and things by controlling area... Territoriality is a primary geographical expression of social power.”<sup>51</sup> By employing this definition, he differentiates social and geographic human territoriality from biological animal territoriality. Biological conceptualization of territoriality which views human territoriality as a natural and intuitive phenomenon which derives from physical environment<sup>52</sup> is widely discredited in academia. Territoriality in academic sense refers to control, influence and affect jurisdiction, property and sovereignty of a certain space. That is to say, unlike “space” which has always existed, territory requires constant efforts to rise, shape and maintain. Space has always existed, whether anyone knows it or not, attributes a meaning or not. However, territory requires human actions to arise. This means that the formation of territory constructs somewhere that did not exist heretofore.<sup>53</sup> Geographic delimitations such as where crop is grown, how mountains are running, how ecosystem is shaped, where people settled do not involved to area of investigation of territory. Territories are “the results of strategies to affect, influence, and control people, phenomena, and relationships.”<sup>54</sup> Likewise José Reis defines territory as actor, interaction, power, capacity, and initiative which has its own status and specific place within social orders and disorders.<sup>55</sup> As Stuart Elden posits territory is not “the static backdrop or container of political actions. Nor is it the passive object of political struggle. It is

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<sup>51</sup> Robert David Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 5.

<sup>52</sup> Robert Ardrey, *The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations* (London: Collins, 1967); Dominic Johnson and Monica Duffy Toft, Grounds for War: The Evolution of Territorial Conflict, *International Security* 38, no.3 (2013): 7-38.

<sup>53</sup> Anssi Paasi, “Constructing territories, boundaries and regional identities,” in *Contested Territory: Border Disputes at the Edge of the Former Soviet Empire*, ed. Thomas Forsberg, 44 (Aldershot: Edward Algar, 1995)

<sup>54</sup> Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 19

<sup>55</sup> José Reis, “An Epistemology of Territory: A Perspective on Context for Social Relations,” in *Territories of Social Responsibility: Opening the Research and Policy Agenda*, eds. Patricia Almeida Ashley and David Crowther, 95 (Burlington: Gower, 2012)

something shaped by, and a shaper of, continual processes of transformation, regulation and governance.”<sup>56</sup> Jean Gottman emphasized this as follows:

Although its Latin root, *terra*, means ‘land’ or ‘earth’, the word *territory* conveys the notion of an area around a place; it connotes an organisation with an element of centrality, which ought to be the authority exercising sovereignty over the people occupying or using that place and the space around it.<sup>57</sup>

Territoriality regulates intercommunication and interaction among space, people, phenomena, and relationships and controls the accessibility to people, things and relationships inside the area. Borders and border-related instruments are created to regulate accessibility to the territory from outside and check the relationship of insiders with the outside. Internal territorial arrangements such as police stations, breakdown lane, no-smoking zones, archeological sites, environmentally protected areas, martyr’s graves, internal administrative divisions, national monuments also control the relationships between inhabitants of the territory. Although territory is generally considered as universal concept which is inherent part of politics and more works focus on specific territories or histories of specific territories rather than territory itself as an abstract and theoretical concept, as Bertrand Badie argues territoriality linked to a historical development.<sup>58</sup> Stuart Elden’s description worth noting at full length:

Territory is a historical question: produced, mutable and fluid. It is geographical, not simply because it is one of the ways of ordering the world, but also because it is profoundly uneven in its development. It is a word, a concept and a practice, where the relation between these can only be grasped genealogically. It is a political question, but in a broad sense: economic, strategic, legal and technical. Territory must be approached politically in its historical, geographical and conceptual specificity.<sup>59</sup>

Critical geopolitics provides a comprehensive theoretical approach to understand territoriality. Contrary to the mainstream geopolitics “this critical work approaches

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<sup>56</sup> Stuart Elden, “How Should We Do the History of Territory?,” *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1, no.1 (2003):17

<sup>57</sup> Jean Gottman, *The Significance of Territory* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1973), 5. Italics is original.

<sup>58</sup> Bertrand Badie, *The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 58

<sup>59</sup> Stuart Elden, “Land, Terrain, Territory,” *Progress in Human Geography* 34, no.6 (2010):812

geopolitics not as a neutral consideration of pre-given 'geographical' facts, but as a deeply ideological and politicized form of analysis."<sup>60</sup> The main focus for critical geopolitics is not the territories, boundaries, or territory-related political interactions but rather the formation of territory itself. According to this perspective geography is not the product of nature but a result of power struggle to affect and organize the space. After concisely stated that "geography is power," Geroid O Tuathail demonstrates the inherently political nature of geography and territoriality:

Geography was not something already possessed by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing, an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests<sup>61</sup>

According to critical geopolitics territorialization of spaces is a discursive development and it creates state power in territorial forms. Tuathail argues that:

geography is a social and historical discourse which is always intimately bound up with questions of politics and ideology. Geography is never a natural, non-discursive phenomenon which is separate from ideology and outside politics. Rather, geography as a discourse is a form of power/knowledge itself<sup>62</sup>

Since the geographical demarcation creates "self" and "other" construction of national spaces in one of the most significant phenomenon that critical geopolitics emphasizes. Borders are constitutive factors of identity formation according to critical geopolitics approach. Prominent scholars of this approach claims that borders do not separate already-existed political entities from each other; they constitute the political entities and differentiate them.<sup>63</sup> As John Agnew briefly states "borders [. . .] make the nation rather than vice versa."<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, "Introduction: Geopolitics and Its Critics" in *The Ashgate Research Companion to Critical Geopolitics*, eds. Klaus Dodds, Merje Kuus and Joanne Sharp, 6 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013).

<sup>61</sup> Geroid O Tuathail, *Critical Geopolitics: The Politics of Writing Global Space* (London: Routledge, 1996), 1-2.

<sup>62</sup> Geroid O Tuathail and John Agnew, "Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy," *Political Geography* 11, no.2 (1992), 192.

<sup>63</sup> David Newman, "The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our "Borderless" World," *Progress in Human Geography* 30, no.2 (2006): 143-161.; Annsi Paasi, "Generations and the "Development" of Border Studies," *Geopolitics* 10 (2005): 663-671.

<sup>64</sup> John Agnew, "No Borders, No Nations: Making Greece in Macedonia," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 97, no.2 (2007): 399.

Territorial rights of states should not be confused with private property rights. Private property rights enable the owner of the land to exclude everyone else from the use and benefits of the land. However, although the owner has the control of access to the land, this land cannot be used in any way that violates the law that is imposed by the higher authority. On the other hand territorial rights give the owner which is generally a state, a jurisdictional power and right to enforce law. For instance if a German citizen buys a property in Turkey's territory, he or she became the owner of this property, but this property still remain under Turkey's jurisdiction, authority and sovereignty. As Allen Buchanan asserts a property is not sovereign territory of the owner.<sup>65</sup> According to this distinction private property rights depend on territorial rights of states.

### **2.3.Territory, State and Sovereignty**

A whole history remains to be written of spaces - which would at the same time be the history of powers (both of these terms in the plural) - from the great strategies of geopolitics to the little tactics of the habitat.  
Michel Foucault<sup>66</sup>

If we are to gain a better understanding of the modern state system, it is important to consider the territorial structures and understandings that developed along with it.  
Alexander Murphy<sup>67</sup>

Territory is understood as an indispensable part of state and state sovereignty for a wide range of scholars. In his intriguing anthropological investigation, Charles Spencer finds that the emergence of first generation of states in six ancient places (Mesoamerica, Peru, Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley and China) was linked to territorial expansion and annexation of other polities.<sup>68</sup> Accordingly, Michael Mann argues that it is not military or economic necessity per se that increase the role of

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<sup>65</sup> Allen Buchanan, *Secession* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), 45.

<sup>66</sup> Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 189.

<sup>67</sup> Alexander Murphy, "The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations," in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, eds. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 82 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>68</sup> Charles Spencer, "Territorial Expansion and Primary State Formation," *Proceeding of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 107, no.16, (2010): 7119-7126.

state; it is rather economically or militarily territorial centralization.<sup>69</sup> Swiss geographer Claude Raffestin claims that territory, population and authority are three main components of the state and “the entire geography of the state derives from this triad.”<sup>70</sup> Ralf Dahrendorf argues that “the essence of the state is its territoriality.”<sup>71</sup> French geographer Jean Gottmann also states that “one cannot conceive a State, a political institution, without its spatial definition, its territory.”<sup>72</sup> Robert Nozick mentions two crucial necessary conditions for being a state: monopoly over the use of force in the *territory* and protection of rights of everyone in the *territory*.<sup>73</sup> Antony Giddens takes this idea a step further and portrays state as a “bordered container.”<sup>74</sup> John Mearsheimer considered survival to include autonomy of the domestic political order and territorial integrity as the primary tenets of the state.<sup>75</sup>

Territory’s impact on state is not limited by its role for defining state’s nature. Territory has also monumental significance on state’s behavior. Harold and Margaret Sprout demonstrate how geography forges states’ abilities with the term they label as “environmental possibilism.”<sup>76</sup> They assert that states calculate their geographic positions in their relations and interactions with other states. The defense strategies of a geographically isolated country and a country has hostile neighbors are different from each other. Likewise Kenneth Boulding classifies states according to their “zones of viability.”<sup>77</sup> He holds that the degree of influence of a state, in other words its viability, alters according to geographical dimensions. It is most viable in places where it is sovereign, and its power shrinks as it moves away from its homeland.

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<sup>69</sup> Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power: A History of Power from the Beginnings to 1760 AD* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 127.

<sup>70</sup> Stuart Elden, *The Birth of Territory* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 7.

<sup>71</sup> Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 290

<sup>72</sup> Sack, *Human Territoriality*, 6.

<sup>73</sup> Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 113. Italics are added.

<sup>74</sup> Anthony Giddens, *A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 5-6.

<sup>75</sup> John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).

<sup>76</sup> Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965)

<sup>77</sup> Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962).

Geography also affects desire of states. For instance, geographic distance may hinder military actions against opponents; because potential failure is too costly, maintaining supply and logistic chains is too expensive.

Territory is also crucial dimension for economy. In a very detailed article, Beth Simmons argues that territorial disputes prevent bilateral trade between feuding parties even if they have great opportunities for themselves and create uncertainties for investors.<sup>78</sup> Therefore border disputes have caused serious economic opportunity costs for disputing countries by the virtue of the uncertainty and ill will even if these disputes are nonmilitary. Jeffrey Anderson demonstrates the significance of territory for economy as follows:

“Politics is rooted in territory. State-building, war-making, porkbarreling, gerrymandering - the examples are legion. Much the same can be said about markets, which allocate resources not just to firms, sectors, factors of production, and individuals, but also to subdivisions of the national space.”<sup>79</sup>

For Robert Jackson, sovereignty is a territorial jurisdiction.<sup>80</sup> State exercises its exclusive authority within limited borders. Everybody and everything that are found under the territorial jurisdiction of the certain state is subject to this state’s law and policies. Daniel Philpott describes sovereignty as an existence of supreme political authority typically lies in a single source within invisible lines that are called borders.<sup>81</sup> Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich and Harpreet Mahajan recognize three types of disputes over sovereignty.<sup>82</sup> All of them are related to the territoriality. The first one is the uncertainty over the definite location of boundaries; the second one is functional disputed on boundaries such as disagreements over the use of transboundary resources, and the third one is about formation of social systems, for instance putting together people with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds into

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<sup>78</sup> Beth Simmons, “Rules Over Real Estate: Trade, Territorial Conflict, and International Borders as Institution,” *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, no.6 (2005): 823-848

<sup>79</sup> Jeffrey Anderson, *The Territorial Imperative: Pluralism, Corporatism and Economic Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), xiii

<sup>80</sup> Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape,” *Political Studies* 47, no.3 (1999): 432

<sup>81</sup> Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 3

<sup>82</sup> Friedrich Kratochwil, Paul Rohrlich and Harpreet Mahajan, *Peace and Disputed Sovereignty: Reflections on Conflict Over Territory* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), 18-19

one state which may cause shortages for state sovereignty such as irredentism. For Michel Foucault “space is fundamental in any form of communal life; space is fundamental in any exercise of power.”<sup>83</sup> He describes territory as a juridico-political notion along with its geographical dimension. By associating territory with political and legal authority, he considers sovereignty and territoriality as equals:

sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory ... sovereignty is basically inscribed and functions within a territory ... the idea of sovereignty over an unpopulated territory is not only a juridically and politically acceptable idea, but one that is absolutely accepted and primary.<sup>84</sup>

According to Foucault, relation between state and people was a territorial contract and it was the central focus in certain period of European history and several prominent thinkers:

From the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century, sovereignty in public law is not exercised on things, but first of all on a territory, and consequently on the subjects who inhabit it... territory really is the fundamental element both of Machiavelli’s principality and of the juridical sovereignty of the sovereign as defined by philosophers or legal theorists.<sup>85</sup>

The usefulness of the concept of territory for analyzing state and sovereignty can be propounded reversely. For instance Pierre George asserts that there are three types of minorities. The categorization of all kinds depends on their territorial stance. The first type is territorial minorities that have been residing particular area for generations and constitutes the majority, for instance Basques. The second category is minorities of ghetto that live in enclaves in order to defend themselves from majority’s attacks, such as Jews in Nazi Europe. The last class is minorities without any certain geographic location, for example Gypsies.<sup>86</sup>

Territory has been an essential fraction of international agreements, especially for those which were crucial for the establishment of the international system. In 1910,

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<sup>83</sup> Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge and Power,” *The Foucault Effect*, ed. Paul Robinow, 252 (Harmondsworth: Penguin).

<sup>84</sup> Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-78*, trans. Graham Burchell, ed. Michel Senellart (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 25-26

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 96

<sup>86</sup> Pierre George, *Géopolitique des minoritiés* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1984), quoted in Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 5

Permanent Court of Arbitration emphasized that “one of the essential elements of sovereignty is that it is to be exercised within territorial limits.”<sup>87</sup> Covenant of League of Nations also envisaged war-torn Europe as discrete territorial units and aimed to protect their inviolability. Article 10 of the Covenant remarked that the signatories agreed “to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”<sup>88</sup> Territory is also an integral part of the Montevideo Convention of 1933. Article 1 of the convention clarifies the qualifications of state as follows: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and capacity to enter into relations with other states.” United Nations Charter Article 2 (4) dictates that “all members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”

#### **2.4. History of Territorially Bounded State**

Traditionally, international system consists of sovereign, independent and separate nation-states. The environment in which power is unequally distributed, and absence of higher authority shapes the dynamics, compactness and coherence of the modern state which keep it away from the outside penetration and foreign intervention is directly related to its physical standing. This physical or material situation is simply the “territoriality” of the state. “Territoriality is a principle by which members of a community are to be defined.”<sup>89</sup> It indicated that members of the system and their subjects are separated from each other by well-demarcated borders and extra-territorial actions are removed. Power strategically, independence politically, and sovereignty legally assures the impermeability of territory.<sup>90</sup> This is one of the primary differences between traditional and modern state-system. While traditional

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<sup>87</sup> Permanent Court of Arbitration, The North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case, 7 September 1910, The Hague, p.8

<sup>88</sup> Wolfgang Friedmann, Oliver Lissitzyn and Richard Crawford Pugh, *Cases and Materials on International Law* (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1969), 917.

<sup>89</sup> Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty,” *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer 2014 Edition*

<sup>90</sup> Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” 475.

states exercised power within ill-defined frontiers, modern states enjoy power within clearly demarcated boundaries.<sup>91</sup>

“The primary function of international boundaries is to demarcate legal or de facto lines of military control and political jurisdiction.”<sup>92</sup> This demarcation reveals one of the basic concepts of international system: sovereignty. Sovereignty means having complete authority over a certain territory. Law enforcement, control of movement across state's borders and authority of use of violence belongs to sovereign entity. The essential rule of Westphalian sovereignty dictates that external authorities should be kept out from the territory of a state.<sup>93</sup> This means that the principle *ius excludendi alios*, that is to say the negative right to prevent outsiders from intervening territory of a state is *sine qua non* for Westphalian system.

Establishment of the territorially bounded state means transition from medieval hierarchy in which authorities and loyalties were interpenetrated to compartmentalized sovereignties. In the Medieval period complex relations among heterogeneous political actors had been at the center of politics. For instance, Richard I of England (1157-1199) was King of England, Duke of Normandy, Duke of Gascony, Duke of Aquitaine, Count of Anjou, Count of Maine, Count of Nantes, Count of Poitiers, Overlord of Brittany, and Lord of Cyprus. Although he was king, he paid homage to French king as a Duke of Normandy.

Nonsegregated and amorphous authorities and power centers characterize the nature of medieval period. Allegiance of lands and subjects were not determined permanently. Feudalism, the predominant political system of this period, succinctly means the fragmentation of political authority, accumulation of public power in private hands, and securing military system through private contracts.<sup>94</sup> Hendrik Spruyt demonstrates three main differences between the logic of feudal organization and organization based on sovereign territoriality.<sup>95</sup> As stated by him feudal rule

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<sup>91</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Nation-State and Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985), 49-53.

<sup>92</sup> Idean Salehyan, *Rebels Without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World Politics* (London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 29

<sup>93</sup> Stephen Krasner, *Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 10.

<sup>94</sup> Joseph Strayer, *Feudalism* (New York: R.E. Krieger, 1965), 13.

<sup>95</sup> Hendrik Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 38.

lacked hierarchy, territorial rule was not exclusive in the feudal system and feudal rule of territory was imperfect. Charles Tilly unveils that Europe during 1500s had been witnessing a rivalry for achieving sovereign power among approximately five hundred heterogeneous political unit whether princes, dukes, bishops or brigands.<sup>96</sup> According to Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, a population of approximately “twenty-one million depended for its government on more than two thousand separate authorities”<sup>97</sup> before the establishment of the Westphalian system. Manorial courts, royal courts, and ecclesiastical courts imposed different laws on same population. The paucity of mechanism that can set rules and regulations for relations among power centers created a situation whose actors can intervene each other. This means that every actor that had *de facto* power was at the same time *de jure* authority. In other words, no one has territorial supremacy and therefore, “in the Middle Ages, virtually nobody was sovereign.”<sup>98</sup> A political system whose boundaries had been loosely demarcated had also conducted multiple loyalties. This situation is well described by Hedley Bull:

In that system no ruler or state was sovereign in the sense of being supreme over a given territory and a given segment of the Christian population; each had to share authority with vassals beneath, and with the Pope and (in Germany and Italy) the Holy Roman Emperor above.<sup>99</sup>

Absence of the “border” notion left the problem of rulership unsettled and caused endless power struggles among actors which were not separated territorially and every change in balance of power caused new wars. Elizabeth Hallam’s observation on this topic is intriguing. She asserts that in the early Capetian reign, France was deficient in clear boundaries, and “rights of justice, tolls and taxes appear on a map as a network, more concentrated in some areas than others, rather than as a unit of land.”<sup>100</sup> This period can be labeled as “pre-international”<sup>101</sup> because there was no

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<sup>96</sup> Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 24.

<sup>97</sup> Cicely Veronica Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years’ War* (London: Methuen, 1981), 34

<sup>98</sup> Daniel Philpott, *Evolutions in Sovereignty How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton and London: Princeton University Press, 2001), 80.

<sup>99</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 245.

<sup>100</sup> Elizabeth Hallam, *Capetian France* (New York: Longman, 1980), 82.

“international” due to the lack of borders. As Spruyt states “borders enabled sovereigns to specify limits to their authority...and also precisely specify who their subjects were.”<sup>102</sup> Absence of borders prevented the specification of limits of authority and definition of subjects. Besides all these, the lack of multilaterally recognized borders and territories ambiguated the internal-external distinction. Earldoms, principalities, leagues, kingdoms, city-states, empires and papacy were both internal and external rivals of each other. Power struggle among them, especially the one between the church and the kingdom paved the way for the determination of the character of this era.

In medieval political thinking the political authority depended on Divine Providence. Theoretically the mediator can be king, emperor, pope, president or judge, but the moral source is God and it informs all notions of legitimacy.<sup>103</sup> In practice, the church played a role as a mediator at that period. Although Christianity was “pursuing religious ends, the leadership of the Church was compelled to adopt political ways of behavior and political modes of thought.”<sup>104</sup> People needed someone to provide order, justice, governance, leadership and, the church did not hesitate to take this responsibility (The Church also claimed that they were taming men’s passions, greed, and selfishness). Acceptance of Christianity as an official religion in 380 by the Roman Empire further institutionalized the church. This institutionalization was so strong that “there was no basic difference between the concept of the monarchic function of the pope and that of the emperor.”<sup>105</sup>

Duality was the main theme of this period. St Augustine emphasized the existence of the earthly city, and the city of God. Gelasius I, pope between 492 and 496, developed Two Swords doctrine. According to this doctrine, the church and the emperor were arms of Christian society and had the responsibility to realize divine plan. These examples show the division of power in Christianity. Although a room

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<sup>101</sup> Gökhan Bacık, *Modern Uluslararası Sistem: Köken, Genişleme, Nedensellik* (İstanbul: Kaknüs, 2007), 50

<sup>102</sup> Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*, 155.

<sup>103</sup> Maurice de Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1922), 244.

<sup>104</sup> Sheldon S. Wolin, *Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 88.

<sup>105</sup> Walter Ullmann, *Medieval Political Thought* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1975), 22.

was given to political authority, this share was decided by the church, and the legitimacy of political authority derived from religion. The church had engaged earthly affairs for years, and the clergy deeply involved in secular politics. While from 1073 to 1119 every pope was a monk, during the 12<sup>th</sup> and 13<sup>th</sup> centuries they were all lawyers.<sup>106</sup> Religion is not a set of spiritual order anymore. It has become a political stance, set of symbols and values and narrative. So, the church had the capacity to act as a state. Just like modern state, Medieval Church could defend its members, provide them social services and justice, limit personal interest for the sake of communal interests.<sup>107</sup> As a vicar of Saint Peter, Pope was the most senior lord in the world.<sup>108</sup> In addition to this the church achieved the coercion and power instruments. Adda Bozeman worded as follows:

“Under Innocent III the church had become an international state. It had the power to set large armies in motion...to control the mighty and the meek, to raise funds by direct taxation, and to bring offenders to justice. It controlled education, propaganda, social welfare, and the courts, and it wielded the awesome power of eternal life and death.”<sup>109</sup>

In conclusion, at the dawn of Westphalian transformation, territorial structures in Europe were overlapping, amorphous and complex. There was no hierarchy of government and political sphere was arena for power struggle among heterogeneous actors. Borders were fluid and could easily be changed by frequent wars.

## **2.5. The Territoriality of the Church**

As stated before, as a community of believers, the Church did not recognize any geographical boundary for its authority. However the Church had territorial features in itself some of which were inherited by Romans. As Strayer claims that the ultimate formation of the territorial sovereign state is “inconceivable without the

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<sup>106</sup> Colin Morris, “Medieval Christendom,” in *The Christian World: A Social and Cultural History of Christianity*, ed. Geoffrey Barraclough, 136 (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981).

<sup>107</sup> Richard William Southern, *Western Society and the Church in the Middle Ages* (London: Penguin, 1990), 18.

<sup>108</sup> John Morris Roberts, *A History of Europe* (Oxford: Helicon, 1996), 88.

<sup>109</sup> Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 256.

Church.”<sup>110</sup> The Church’s organizational capacity, hierarchical power, standardization, and specialization were strongly related with its territoriality and imitated by the state. Boundaries of the bishoprics were drawn in accordance with old Roman territorial units, such as dioceses and civitas and the altar of the Roman cities became bishops’ churches.<sup>111</sup> The great councils of Lateran, Lyon, Clermont and Dalmatia revived the territorial organization of Roman principles for the church.<sup>112</sup> The area of influence of the church officials was defined in accordance with the territorial administrative boundaries such as dioceses. This territorial dimension can be found in the early days of the foundation of the Church. Several canons of Council of Nicaea (AD 325) were related to territorial issues. Canon 4 of the Council states that a bishop should be appointed by all bishops, or at least three bishops in his particular province and ratification should be left to metropolitan bishop, the bishop of the nearest metropolis such as Rome, Antioch or Carthage. This canon associates the appointment of bishop with approval of other territorially designated clergy and attributes the legitimacy to them. Canon 6 and 7 solves the territorial and jurisdictional problems among archbishops, bishops and metropolitans. These canons give permission to ancient customs in Egypt, Libya and Pentapolis to prevail, and regulates the hierarchical order by making concessions to Bishops of Alexandria, Rome, Antioch and Jerusalem.<sup>113</sup> These canons indicate that even in the fourth century, territorial and correspondingly jurisdictional issues were significant affairs for the Church. Canons of Nicaea was not the only decree of the Church in which territoriality can be found. At the beginning of the Church history, a bishop’s departure the territory without permission was considered as disobedience and resistance to the Church’s authority. Therefore a great number of early Christian councils strictly prohibited the leaving the particular area without permission and established the rule which dictates that every bishop must serve in the place where he

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<sup>110</sup> Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State* (New York: R.E. Krieger, 1970), 22.

<sup>111</sup> Saskie Sassen, *Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 38.

<sup>112</sup> Malcolm Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), 17.

<sup>113</sup> “Canons of the Council of Nicaea, Fourth-Century Christianity,” *Wisconsin Lutheran College*, (accessed June 29, 2015). <http://www.fourthcentury.com/nicaea-325-canons/>

was first ordained.<sup>114</sup> Readmission of excommunicants also took place where they were excommunicated.

## 2.6. The Westphalian Order and Territoriality

The Peace of Westphalia in 1648 had caused a paradigmatic change in world history. This change, as political scientist John Gerard Ruggie describes “the most important contextual change in international politics in this millennium.”<sup>115</sup> As Volker Gerhardt explains it was “not a Church Council, nor an Imperial Diet, but a meeting of independent territorial and political entities, where, for the first time, relevant alliances were taken into account. The Holy See was present only as an observer.”<sup>116</sup> (Later Pope Innocent X declared that The Treaty of Westphalia is debilitating for Catholicism). In the post-Westphalian period, the idea of united Christendom had disappeared, the empire lost its significance as a real supraterritorial government<sup>117</sup> and the territorial state had emerged as a main actor of the political system, the main source of political legitimacy and the main center of political loyalty. Robert Jackson describes this transformation as follows<sup>118</sup>:

After Westphalia the language of international justification gradually shifted, away from Christian unity and towards international diversity based on a secular society of sovereign states... The arch constituted by *respublica Christiana* had been broken. An anarchical society of sovereign states had taken its place. Europe displaced Christendom. Europe was now conceived as a plurality of territory-based political systems each with its own independent and supreme governing authority.

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<sup>114</sup> Please look at: Council of Nicaea (AD 325), Council of Arles (AD 314), Council of Antioch (AD 341), Laodicea (AD 341-381).

<sup>115</sup> John Gerard Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist Synthesis,” in *Neorealism and Its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, 141 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

<sup>116</sup> Volker Gerhardt, “On the Historical Significance of the Peace of Westphalia: Twelve Theses,” in *1648: War and Peace in Europe*, eds. Klaus Bussmann and Heinz Schilling (Munster: Westfälisches Landesmuseum, 1999), 485.

<sup>117</sup> John Gagliardo, *Germany Under the Old Regime, 1600–1790* (London: Longmans, 1991), 45.

<sup>118</sup> Robert Jackson, “Sovereignty in World Politics: A Glance at the Conceptual and Historical Landscape,” *Political Studies* 47, no.3 (1999), 439.

As Alexander Murphy argues,<sup>119</sup> Westphalia was not sudden and autogenous development. Free cities of late Medieval Europe, the emergent absolutist states and the principle *cuius regio, eius religio* (religion of the ruler of realm is religion of the realm) had significant impressures on the emergence of Westphalian territorial sovereignty. City states of Northern Italy and Flanders which Fernand Braudel describes as Europe's first fatherlands,<sup>120</sup> for instance Milan, Venice, Bologna, Bruges, Ghent and pseudo-absolutist states of France and England were different from quintessential medieval order in terms of their territoriality. Both types of states had substantial authority and jurisdictional power over territories, even if main actors and methods behind this were different; urban elite and trade for the former and political rulers and military technologies for the latter. The principle *cuius regio, eius religio* was a challenge to the Church's universal and extraterritorial power on jurisdiction and public opinion and it was "the seeming result of the competitive spirit in religion, coupled with the growth of territorial power."<sup>121</sup> Westphalia had three exceptional repercussions on sovereignty. First, in conjunction with Westphalian system the touchstone for where authority begins and ends became geographical affair, in other words sovereignty was bounded by territory. Identity and loyalty were shaped by and directed to location regardless of kinship, personal ties, and religious affiliations. Thus Aquitanians, Normans, and Bretons were *made* into French people.<sup>122</sup> Second, Westphalian sovereignty is permanent. In the Medieval period, claims on certain territory might diversify according to trade routes and seasons. Specifically pastoral people and nomadic tribes were eager to control lands and pastures in seasons when their efficiencies increase. Contrary to this, territory is fixed and strictly demarcated in Westphalian state. Third, Westphalian sovereignty is exclusive. State is the only legitimate source of authority and intermediaries between people and state are denied as well as universal and

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<sup>119</sup> Alexander Murphy, "The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical and Contemporary Considerations," in *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, eds. Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, 84 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

<sup>120</sup> Fernand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism: The Perspective of the World* (London: Collins, 1985), 99.

<sup>121</sup> John Neville Figgis, *Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius: 1414-1625* (Kitchener: Batoche Books, 1999), 50

<sup>122</sup> Spruyt, *The Sovereign State and its Competitors*, 35. Italics is in original.

translocal powers such as the Church and the Empire. The Treaty of Westphalia put territorial state against imperial authority.<sup>123</sup> Crosscutting jurisdictions and overlapping political authorities were replaced by centralized territorial rulers in the post-Westphalian period.

Wars, treaties, alliances, trades, negotiations had continued to exist just like pre-Westphalian era; but this time none of the states claimed legal superiority or higher authority over others and did not seek to achieve this. Article 64 of Treaty of Münster which was part of the Peace of Westphalia is worth noting at length:

To prevent for the future any Differences arising in the Politick States, all and every one of the Electors, Princes and States of the Roman Empire, are so establish'd and confirm'd in their antient Rights, Prerogatives, Libertys, Privileges, free exercise of Territorial Right . . . that they never can or ought to be molested therein by any whomsoever upon any manner of pretence.<sup>124</sup>

According to this new logic, interfering one's territory is equal capturing its territory and plundering its wealth. Emer de Vattel, 18<sup>th</sup> century Swiss jurist, diplomat and philosopher whose ideas has profound effect in shaping of modern international law and political philosophy claimed that entering a country's territories is violation of the safety of the state and its territories and "among nations there is nothing more generally acknowledged as an injury that ought to be vigorously repelled by every state that would not suffer itself to be oppressed."<sup>125</sup> Sovereignty in Westphalian logic was not only characteristic of states, but was also a principle for relations between states.<sup>126</sup>

Equally significant unfolding after Westphalia was another transformation in the political sphere: emaciation of dynastic ties. European monarchs were deeply tied to each other by marriages or family ties and monarchs could interfere domestic issues and territorial affairs of other countries by virtue of their dynastic affiliations. This web of affinities also beclouded the issue of succession. As can be seen from

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<sup>123</sup> Friedrich Kratochwill, "Sovereignty as Dominion: Is there a Right of Humanitarian Intervention?" in *Beyond Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, eds. Gene Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, 25 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).

<sup>124</sup> Israel, *Major Peace Treaties of Modern History 1648-1967*, 27.

<sup>125</sup> Emer de Vattel, *The Law of Nations: Or, Principles of the Law of Nature, Applied to the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, with Three Early Essays on the Origin and Nature of Natural Law and on Luxury* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, [1797], 2008), 308-9.

<sup>126</sup> Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia 1648-1948" in *International Law in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Leo Gross (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), 25.

The War of the Spanish Succession (1701–1714), The Hundred Years' War (1337–1453), or The War of the Portuguese Succession (1580–1583) at certain times throne struggles caused large-scale wars among legal claimants. Kalevi Holsti describes this situation as follows:

Rights of succession had been at the core of international conflict for several centuries. Ancient titles, marriages, cessions, and annexations not only provided a dynast with a patrimony, but also established the right to rule. They were the bases of regal political legitimacy. The territories that reverted to a prince, king, or queen were less significant than the rights that inhered in them.<sup>127</sup>

As territory gained much more significance, this situation was changed dramatically. In the post-Westphalian period, As Evan Luard says territory no longer resulted from a claim; the claim resulted from the demand for territory.<sup>128</sup> Strategic and diplomatic interests, not legal claims or “right to rule” concepts, began to shape matters of succession.

Another significant change that Westphalia brought to the world politics is strengthening the impersonalization of governing. In the pre-Westphalia period, governing was completely understood as a personal state of affairs. King, not kingdom; Pope, not Papacy was at the center of political authority. Kings, who were believed that they had supernatural powers such as healing, ruled their countries as they rule their own property. Contrary to modern abstract political authority notion, the physical presence of the king himself was the political authority. That is to say state or government was body of the king.<sup>129</sup> Same situation is valid for popes who carried the Vicar of Christ title and considered as infallible. As stated by Janice Bueno de Mesquita international system prior to Westphalia is “believed to have been less territorially focused, with feudal ties taking precedence over considerations of state.”<sup>130</sup> Establishment of territoriality conducted aggrandizement of the state and state became timeless organization as distinct from mortal king or pope. Janice

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<sup>127</sup> Kalevi Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 92.

<sup>128</sup> Evan Luard, *War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology* (London: Tauris, 1986), 156.

<sup>129</sup> Jens Bartelson, *The Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 139.

<sup>130</sup> Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “Popes, Kings, and Endogenous Institutions: The Concordat of Worms and The Origins of Sovereignty,” *International Studies Review* 2, no.2 (2000), 93.

Thomson argues that [Westphalian] “sovereignty delineates authority according not to functions but to geography.”<sup>131</sup> That’s why John Agnew concisely describes territorial state as the geographical container of modern society.<sup>132</sup> Geographical institutionalization is essential part of modern sovereignty and sovereignty and territoriality are concatenated each other. In this respect Westphalian sovereignty is different from previous forms.

In conclusion, territorial sovereignty means the consolidation of power within certain territories. These territories are strictly separated from each other and there is no functional, political or legal continuity between territories. As Alexander Wendt describes in this system states are “spatially rather than functionally differentiated.”<sup>133</sup> Political, social and economic issues are understood in territorial terms, identification is defined with reference to territory, and interests are described at the territorial scale. Westphalian system is a reconfiguration of territorial order of politics. As Rob Walker states “the principle of hierarchical subordination gradually gave way to the principle of spatial exclusion.”<sup>134</sup> Permanent armies, sophisticated civil administrations and integrated economies which is essential pillars of modern state system were results of the idea of territorial sovereignty. In territorial sovereign system, the source of political power had shifted from people to land and authority was territorialized. While monarchs called themselves as kings of people, later they used titles which labeled them as kings of the land. Thus, *Rex Anglorum* (King of English) became *Rex Angliae* (King of England) and *Rex Francorum* (King of the Franks) became *Franciae Rex* (King of France). “England was once the country in which Englishmen lived: Englishmen are now the people who inhabit England.”<sup>135</sup>

Westphalian understanding of territoriality has been evolved in time and spread throughout Europe and then the world. Many significant political thoughts and

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<sup>131</sup> Janice Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research,” *International Studies Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (1995), 227.

<sup>132</sup> John Agnew, *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 53.

<sup>133</sup> Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” *International Organization* 46, no.2 (1992), 412.

<sup>134</sup> Rob B.J. Walker, “Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics,” *Alternatives* 15, no. 10 (1990): 10.

<sup>135</sup> Emrys Jones, *Human Geography* (New York: Praeger, 1966), 56.

ideologies of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century, for instance economic determinism, geopolitics, liberal nationalism, social Darwinism, revolutionary ideas whether perceive territory negative or positive, try to solidify or weaken it, somehow were related to territory and territory-related issues.

## 2.7. Political interaction between territory and people

In modern political thought the connection between a political society and its territory is so close that the two notions almost blend.  
Henry Sidgwick<sup>136</sup>

Space and human relations are twofold; material and emotional respectively. Space consists of prerequisites of human sustainability. Life on the earth cannot be sustained without food, water, and air which are comprised by the space. These are material aspects of territoriality but their influence on lives of residents of territory are not limited by physical impacts. They also shape the culture of people. Although human beings have the ability to frame and transform the natural environment, the material culture prospers to the extent permitted by and in the direction of the natural environment. Arab identity would have developed differently if Arabs had lived in tropical regions of South America or Africa. Turks would not be who they are if their historical homeland was an archipelago. Kurdish or Pashtu spirit would have developed differently if they had lived in Flanders. Jewish culture for instance, according to David Sopher, is principally derived from Eastern Mediterranean environment. He finds that Jewish holidays are related to Eastern Mediterranean's seasonal rhythms.<sup>137</sup> Although Jews have been spread throughout the world for centuries their cultural character is still bore the trace of environmental factors.

As for emotional side, people's attachment to territory makes territory a tangible outpouring for national identity. Territory then, becomes "the repository of shared collective consciousness, the place wherein memory is rooted."<sup>138</sup> As Peter Taylor notes "every social organization has its created space so that the spatiality is part of

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<sup>136</sup> Henry Sidgwick, *The Elements of Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1908), 221.

<sup>137</sup> David Sopher, *Geography of Religions: Foundations of Cultural Geography Series* (Prentice-Hall: Englewood Cliffs, 1967), 19-21.

<sup>138</sup> Colin Williams and Anthony Smith, "The National Construction of Social Space," *Progress in Human Geography* 7, (1983), 503.

their being.”<sup>139</sup> This attachment is equally significant in both primitive and complex societies; ancient and modern times. Numerous examples can be given, but Edward Evans-Pritchard’s remarkable illustration on Nuer people should be addressed here to show people’s attachment to their homelands in tribal communities:

Men who intend to leave the tribe of their birth to settle permanently in another tribe take with them some earth of their old country and drink it in a solution of water, slowly adding to each dose a greater amount of soil from their new country, thus gently breaking mystical ties with the old and building up mystical ties with the new.<sup>140</sup>

“Territory appears as a material, spatial notion establishing essential links between politics, people, and the natural setting”<sup>141</sup> claims Jean Gottmann. Territoriality is different from geographical stance and physical distance in terms of its humanly and socially constructed nature. How individuals or groups perceive, construe and evaluate spaces and distances are crucial for creating territory. David Kreps’ experiment confessedly demonstrates the psychological dimension of territoriality.<sup>142</sup> Two groups of students were asked to divide 11 American cities into two groups with only one city in common. These cities are Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Houston, Kansas City, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. While dividing these cities according to their population, economic situation or just enumerating them in alphabetic order seem more appropriate, Kreps realized that 75 percent of the students divided these cities according to which side of the Mississippi River they are located.

According to Robert Sack, “territories require constant effort to establish and maintain” and they are “the results of strategies to affect, influence, and control people, phenomena, and relationships.”<sup>143</sup> Sack also claims that territoriality is a social construct shaped by interactions of its residents. This means that territoriality

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<sup>139</sup>Peter Taylor, “Contra Political Geography,” *Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie* 84, no.2, (1993), 84.

<sup>140</sup> Edward Evans-Pritchard, *The Nuer* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), p.120 quoted in Yi-Fu Tuan, “Geopiet: A Theme in man’s attachment to nature and to place” in *Geographies of the Mind*, eds. David Lowenthal and Martyn Bowden, 32 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

<sup>141</sup>Gottman, *The Significance of Territory*, ix

<sup>142</sup> David Kreps, “Corporate Culture and Economic Theory,” in *Perspectives on Positive Political Economy*, eds. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle, 121 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>143</sup>Sack, *Human Territoriality*, p.19

begins after the actions of a “territorializer” in a certain territory. Yi-Fu Tuan articulates the significance of human actions in defining the territory by utilizing an example from American history:

The movement of the people to the west, combined with the powerful lure of the West as an ideal, distorts the sense of symmetry that the concept of center imparts. Hence the term “Middle States” is short-lived. Heartland America is not known as the Middle States but as the Middle West.<sup>144</sup>

Territory is different from ordinary lands such as geographical features or geographic extension of human activities like hinterlands and market areas. These can become territory if their boundaries are used by some authority “to mold, influence, or control activities.”<sup>145</sup> In David Knight’s words, “territory is not; it becomes, for territory itself is passive, and it is human beliefs and actions that give territory meaning.”<sup>146</sup> Yves Lacoste’s 1976 book “Geography is, above all, making war”<sup>147</sup> laconically demonstrates the political dimension of the territory. Cartography does not just represent the territory, but is actively complicit in its production. Maps and atlases not only portray spaces and shapes of the countries. Sometimes they become principles on their own and play an important role for indoctrination for identity. Some scholars argue that territorial divisions generally precede identity formation, that is to say territory creates identity.<sup>148</sup> For instance after the Treaty of Pyrenees of 1659 which divided Cerdanya Valley between France and Spain, north of the valley

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<sup>144</sup> Yi-Fu Tuan, *Space and Place The Perspective of Experience* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 99.

<sup>145</sup> *Ibid.*, 19.

<sup>146</sup> David Knight, “Identity and Territory: Geographical Perspectives on Nationalism and Regionalism,” *Annals of Association of American Geographers* 72, no.4 (1982): 517.

<sup>147</sup> Yves Lacoste, *La Géographie ça sert d’abord a faire la guerre* (Paris: Maspero, 1976).

<sup>148</sup> David Newman, “Real Spaces, Symbolic Spaces: Interrelated Notions of Territory in the Arab–Israeli Conflict,” in *A Road Map to War*, ed. Paul Diehl, 3-4 (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999).

Anssi Paasi, *Territories, Boundaries, and Consciousness: The Changing Geographies of the Finnish–Russian Border* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1996).

Andrew W. Orridge, “Separatist and Autonomist Nationalisms: The Structure of Regional Loyalties in the Modern State,” in *National Separatism*, Colin H. Williams (ed.), 46 (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1982).

Peter Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).

Donald L Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 21.

became French, and the southern part became Spanish. In a fascinating work which investigates group identity in Southeastern Europe, George White worded on Romanian state as follows:

The identification of an early state was required not only to prove the legitimacy of the Romanian nation but also to *delimit spatially* the Romanian nation-state, which in turn *provided a means for identifying who should and should not be a Romanian*.<sup>149</sup>

Borders drawn along lines of longitude and latitude are also indicators of this claim. 38<sup>th</sup> parallel north is borderline between South and North Korea, 49<sup>th</sup> parallel north is designated as 3.500 kilometers of USA-Canada border. 42 percent of the borderlines in Africa were drawn by longitudes and latitudes. These borders are considered as salient as Pyrenees borderline between France and Spain.

Since nations exist in space, spatial processes and interactions play a big part in developments of nations, thus territory is an essential part of nationalism. Anthony Smith claims that nationalism is primarily about land.<sup>150</sup> Nationalist ideology depends on the links between the people and the territory and territory is perceived as integral part of national prestige and power. Territory which has a psychological importance for people and residents of certain territory can develop an attachment to it and thus, this territory becomes indivisible part of self. Nationalist narratives, histories, songs, poems, arts are rife with territorial imaginary. Konstantin Symmons-Symonolewicz begins his definition of nation with territory: “territorially based community of human beings sharing a distinct variant of modern culture, bound together by a strong sentiment of unity and solidarity, marked by a clear historically-rooted consciousness of national identity, and possessing, or striving to possess, a genuine political self-government.”<sup>151</sup> Tamar Meisels argues that presence in a certain place can carry moral weights:<sup>152</sup>

The fact that some of us happen to be here, while others are there, and others still are somewhere else, can be morally significant. For example, the fact

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<sup>149</sup> George White, *Nationalism and Territory: Constructing Group Identity in Southeastern Europe* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), 125-26. Italics is added.

<sup>150</sup> Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991), 70.

<sup>151</sup> Symmons-Symonolewicz, “The Concept of Nationhood: Toward a Theoretical Clarification,” *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 12, no.2 (1985): 221.

<sup>152</sup> Tamar Meisels, *Territorial Rights* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 117.

that your body is physically occupying a certain space poses not only a practical barrier but also a moral one to my occupying that space.

According to Jan Penrose the success of nationalism is connected with “a fundamental shift in ideas about significance of territory.”<sup>153</sup> The transformation of territory from geographical manifestations of identity to essential principle for defining group and individual makes territory primary factor in defining identification. Territory is central theme for romantic nationalist thought. Johann Gottfried von Herder, German philosopher regarded as a champion of nationalism clearly shows centrality of territory in nationalist sentiments:

Seas, mountain-ranges, and rivers are the most natural boundaries not only of lands but of peoples, customs, languages, and empires, and they have been, even in the greatest revolutions in human affairs, the directing lines or limits of world history. If otherwise mountains had arisen, rivers flowed or coasts trended, then how very different would mankind have scattered over this tilting place of nations.<sup>154</sup>

Emotional attachment to territory and territorial specification creates homeland or motherland/fatherland. All members of the homeland encumber the responsibility to defend it against any external or internal threat. Dwellers of homeland will sacrifice their blood and money for the sake of their motherland, because it is not just soil that feeds them, it distinguishes its dwellers from outsiders, thus creates “we” and “they.” Mary Fulbrook states that: “historically, the formation of states with a centralized government administering and controlling a clearly defined geographical territory preceded the articulation of ideas of the nation.”<sup>155</sup>

Spatial dimension is sine qua non for understanding of world politics. Explanations of formation of modern states and international system, causes of wars and conflicts, formation of national identity and interests have to include territory and territoriality in one way or another. This worldwide phenomenon is also substantially explanatory for political situation in notoriously instable and conflict-ridden Middle East region.

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<sup>153</sup> Jan Penrose, Nations, “States and Homelands: Territory and Territoriality in Nationalist Thought,” *Nations and Nationalism* 8, no.3 (2002): 283.

<sup>154</sup> Johann Gottfried von Herder, *Materials for the Philosophy of the History of Mankind*, 1784 quoted in *Ibid.*, 286.

<sup>155</sup> Mary Fulbrook, “Introduction: States, Nations and the Development of Europe” in *National Histories and European History*, ed. Mary Fulbrook, 3 (London: University College London Press, 1993).

Studies on the Middle East have been focusing on authoritative regimes and state-society relations for a long time. As a consequence of rising sectarianism and religious militancy in recent years, academic literature on the Middle East is heavily influenced by sectarian and religious dimension of the region. The significance of nature of regimes and sect/religion in daily life and politics in the region is an undeniable fact; however negligence towards territory makes the Middle Eastern studies incomplete. One of the major reasons behind the current crises and problems in the region derive from its territorial redesign. The oft-cited sentence “borders in the Middle East are artificial” not only express disaffection to external borders which divide Arab nation into small pieces but also demonstrates the disapproval of inside the borders in where different people who have never been united are forced to live together. Struggle for forming an identity is at the same time a struggle for attributing special meaning to territory. Pan-Islamism, pan-Arabism, territorial nationalism, tribalism, sectarianism and primordialism compete for each other to determine whether Muslim *ummah* spread all over the Earth, Arab nation from Atlantic Ocean to Zagros Mountains, independent Arab states located in the internationally recognized borders, historical rural areas of tribe, religious cities or places, or people’s their own house and family will be the source of identity, loyalty and sacrifice. Domestic power struggles and worldviews of regime elites in the Middle East are also highly territorialized. For instance, one can easily evaluate internal dynamics of Iraqi politics under Saddam period by examining changes of provincial borders and provincial names. Territorial nationalism still remains as an alternative for people who disappointed by trans-territorial movements who failed to realize their trans-boundary and to some extent utopian goal. The idea of citizenship which provides equal rights to all who live in same state’s territory is rising as heal for those who spent their lives under authoritarian regimes, repressive governments and constant marginalization. Territorial, patriotic, secular identity can also reconcile people and terminate violence among diverse groups. The next chapter aims to find answers to the question “what does territory mean for its inhabitants in the Middle East and how did it evolve in time?” The chapter also tried to reveal the complications of the collision between traditional Middle Eastern understanding of territory and the Western model imposed by the Great Britain and France after the

collapse of the Ottoman Empire. This part will show that not just borders, but the idea of borders is alien to the region and the experiences that the Middle Eastern nations have been witnessing has occurred in relatively short time not enough for complete consolidation of territorial state and creation of territory-inspired nationalism.

## CHAPTER 3

### TERRITORY, TERRITORIALITY, TERRITORIAL STATE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

#### 3.1. “Where” is the Middle East?: Territorial Dimension of the Region

As Etzel Percy states, the Middle East is unidentified region.<sup>156</sup> Where is the Middle East, where its boundaries start and end have been a controversial issue. Geographers, politicians, historians have different definitions of the Middle East. The term “Middle East” is political rather being geographical and it has dynamic nature. Since there is no single, agreed definition, the boundaries of the Middle East is generally decided by the power struggle among the great powers.

In 1902, British archeologist David George Hogarth published *The Nearer East* and defines the limits of the region. He includes Albania, Montenegro, today’s Kosovo, Bulgaria, Greece, Egypt, the Ottoman Asia, the Arabian Peninsula and Iran between Caspian Sea and Indian Ocean.<sup>157</sup> In his article “The Persian Gulf and International Relations” published in 1902, Alfred Mahan, an American admiral, historian and geostrategist incorporated the area ranging from Suez to Singapore into the Middle East. He wrote that neither Britain nor Germany could afford to lose Suez route to India and Far East in time of war and therefore, it was in their interest to prevent a possible naval enemy to dominate the Middle East.<sup>158</sup> In 1903, Valentine Chirol, a correspondent for *The Times* published a book entitled *The Middle Eastern Question* in which the Middle East was described as “those regions of Asia which extend to the borders of India or command the approaches to India, and which are

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<sup>156</sup> Etzel Percy, *The Middle East: An Indefinable Region* (Washington DC: Department of State Publication 7684, Near and Middle East Series 72, 1964), 1-12.

<sup>157</sup> David George Hogarth, *The Nearer East* (New York: D. Appleton, 1902).

<sup>158</sup> Alfred Thayer Mahan, “The Persian Gulf and International Relations,” *The National Review* (1902), quoted in Alfred Thayer Mahan, *The Problem of Asia: Its Effect Upon International Politics*, ed. Francis Sempa (New Brunswick : Transaction Publishers, 2003), 30.

consequently bound up with the problems of Indian political as well as military defense.”<sup>159</sup> In 1920, Royal Geographical Society Permanent Commission on Geographical Names differentiated Near East and Middle East which were interchangeably used. In this definition, Near East referred to Balkans and the Middle East referred to area ranging from Bosphorus to the western borders of the India.<sup>160</sup> In 1939, Royal Air Force made one of the strangest definitions of the Middle East. This definition included only Egypt, Sudan and Kenya. During the World War II Royal Air Force formed Middle East Command, but this time its area of responsibility included Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, Jordan, and Palestine.<sup>161</sup>

In 1957, the so-called Eisenhower Doctrine warned the Congress against the threat of expansion of Communism towards the Middle East and suggested American military and economic aid to this region. Then, American decision makers asked Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to explain where the “Middle East” is. He defined the region as “the area lying between and including Libya on the west and Pakistan on the east and Turkey on the north and the Arabian peninsula to the south,” plus the Sudan and Ethiopia.<sup>162</sup> In 1958 State Department gave another explanation of the Middle East to designate an area which includes Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms.<sup>163</sup> This definition excludes Libya, Pakistan, Yemen, Oman, Sudan and Ethiopia which were parts of 1957 definition. In 1958, The State Department Office of Research established the Aegean and Middle East division which comprise Turkey, Cyprus, Greece, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.<sup>164</sup> No Arab country was included. 1959 National Geographic map portrays the area including Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine,

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<sup>159</sup> Valentine Chirol, *The Middle Eastern Question or Some Political Problems of Indian Defense* (London: John Murray, 1903), 5.

<sup>160</sup> Roderic Davison, “Where is the Middle East?,” *Foreign Affairs* 38, no.4 (1960) <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/71575/roderic-h-davison/where-is-the-middle-east> (accessed April 2, 2015).

<sup>161</sup> John Grehan and Martin Mace, *Operations in North Africa and the Middle East 1942-1944: El Alamein, Tunisia, Algeria and Operation Torch* (South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2015), 162.

<sup>162</sup> Davison, “Where is the Middle East?,” 665

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

<sup>164</sup> Karen Culcasi, *Cartographic Constructions of the Middle East* (Ann Arbor: UMI, 2008), 234.

Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Gulf states as “Lands of the Eastern Mediterranean.”<sup>165</sup> During the Cold War Era descriptions of the Middle East had changed and various Middle East maps which stretched from Morocco to Afghanistan had been used.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly-established Central Asian countries were added the list of the Middle Eastern countries for the first time. According to some scholars, these Muslim-majority countries have religious, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with Middle East in the past, and after their independences these dimensions revived. According to Bernard Lewis, “this formation of new Middle East is truly one of the most important developments for the old Middle East.”<sup>166</sup> In this period Americans tended to expand the limits of the Middle East. Geoffrey Kemp and Roberte Harkavy equate and contextualize several regions such as the Middle East including North Africa, Turkey, Sudan and Horn of Africa; Transcaucasus, and the West Central Asia.<sup>167</sup> Another turning point in describing the Middle East is 9/11 attacks. As the concept of the Middle East was shaped by Britain in 19<sup>th</sup> century, scope of the region in the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been determined by the United States. The George Bush administration initiated “the Greater Middle East Initiative” which consisted of the Arab League countries, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 2004, a new description was used by the G8 leaders: Broader Middle East and North Africa.<sup>168</sup>

Middle East is not a geographical definition; it is political description which refers a territory formed, shaped and maintained by human actions. Since the term Middle East is politically constructed, every Middle East definition is inherently subjective, even the term is subjective in itself since it determines geographical region of the southwest Asia to the Western Europe. In this thesis, the Middle East refers the area between Atlantic Ocean to Zagros Mountains, Sahara Desert to Turkey’s southern

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<sup>165</sup> “Lands of the Eastern Mediterranean Map 1959,” National Geographic, <http://www.ngmapcollection.com/product.aspx?cid=1539&pid=15565> (accessed: April 2, 2015).

<sup>166</sup> Bernard Lewis, “Rethinking the Middle East,” *Foreign Affairs* 4, no.4 (1992): 103.

<sup>167</sup> Geoffrey Kemp and Roberte Harkavy, *Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 15.

<sup>168</sup> The United States of America. The White House Office of the Press Secretary, “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the Region of the Broader Middle East and North Africa,” Fact Sheet, 2004.

border. The work mainly focuses on Arab Middle East and non-Arab units such as Israel, Iran and Turkey were ignored for the sake of simplicity. Since the main aim of this work is to shed light on the territoriality of Iraq, Iraqi Kurds are exception. This Middle East definition bands together majority of the Arabic-speaking people with few exceptions of Arab minorities of Iran and Turkey and some Arabic-speaking African countries such as Somali and Comoros.

### 3.1.1. Territoriality in the Middle East

In his article “*Watan*” Bernard Lewis sheds light on territorial understandings in Islamic societies. His comparison of Western and Eastern concepts of *patriotes* and *watan* touches on an important matter:

The Greek *patriotes* and the late Latin *patriota*, which originally meant no more than compatriot or fellow countryman, in their later European versions acquire a new sense, of one devoted to the service and cause of his country, and a new word, patriotism, denotes the sentiments and beliefs of the patriot. The Arabic word *watan*... had a somewhat different evolution. The Arabic verb *watana* means to reside or sojourn in a place; it also means to choose a place of residence or to settle in it. The noun *watan* has none of the paternal or ancestral connotations of *patris* or *patria*, but simply means one's place of residence, which may be adopted or temporary. Normally a *watan* is a town, but it may also be a village or, more extensively, the province in which one's town or village of *watan* is situated.<sup>169</sup>

He argues that the concept of *watan* or homeland can be found in many early Islamic texts but “the *watan* was thus a focus of sentiment, of affection, of nostalgia, but not of loyalty, and only to a limited extent of identity.”<sup>170</sup> He quotes the second Caliph Omar bin al-Khattab’s words in order to strengthen this argument: “Learn your genealogies, and don’t be like the Nabataeans of Mesopotamia who, if asked about their origin, reply: I come from such and such a village.”<sup>171</sup> Lewis argues that there may be question about authenticity of this quotation, but there is no doubt about the authenticity of the sentiment. Caliph Omar urged people to define themselves with their lineages, not their territories or places where they lived. Lewis maintains that

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<sup>169</sup> Bernard Lewis, “*Watan*,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 26, no.3 (1991): 524.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, 525.


<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, 525.

some European monarchs used territorial titles such as King of England, King of France or King of Spain, but Muslim rulers avoided using such titles. They might call their enemies and rivals by such kind of titles but never themselves. As Ann Lambton argues “the basis of the Islamic state was ideological, not political, territorial or ethnical and the primary purpose of government was to defend and protect the faith, not the state.”<sup>172</sup> As a foregone conclusion of this understanding, the believers of the Islamic faith, not territory is main concern for state. Sovereignty of the state is exercised over the people and contrary to modern concept of sovereignty which allocates every part of the earth including unpopulated deserts, steppes and even Antarctica, unoccupied areas lie beyond the scope of state sovereignty in Islamic understanding. This means that sovereignty in this sense is not concrete and united phenomenon in a bounded area but it is a concourse of webs just like nervous system. The area between two cities is not under the sovereignty of the Muslim ruler, but the road between two cities is under the sovereignty of the ruler because people (subjects of the sovereignty) use it.

The majority of the region, Arabs and especially Sunni Arabs dwell in flat areas of the region while mountainous areas are generally inhabited by minorities. Iraq’s mountains are inhabited by Kurds; Lebanon’s mountains are domiciled by Christians; Druzes live at Syria’s mountains, Berbers and Zaydis reside at Moroccan and Yemeni mountains respectively. These mountainous regions are homelands and historical strongholds of these groups. Although some members immigrated to other places, they never abandon territories where they identify themselves. These minority groups developed relatively strong territorial sentiments than majority of the Arabs who dwelled in flat regions and migrated across so much vast areas that lost their original territorial ties.

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<sup>172</sup> Ann Lambton, *State and Government in Medieval Islam: An Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Thought: The Jurists* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 13.



**Map 1: Sovereignty in Ottoman Egypt and Modern Egypt**

Source: Egypt Eyalet, Ottoman Empire (1609) Wikimedia Commons -

[http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Egypt\\_Eyalet,\\_Ottoman\\_Empire\\_\(1609\).png#/media/File:Egypt\\_Eyalet,\\_Ottoman\\_Empire\\_\(1609\).png](http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Egypt_Eyalet,_Ottoman_Empire_(1609).png#/media/File:Egypt_Eyalet,_Ottoman_Empire_(1609).png)

As it is discussed earlier, the basic tenet of the Western state is its territorial dimension. The Western modern state requires loyalty of people in its territory and wants to control every action in its territory. On the other hand, in Islamic societies including the Middle East, political loyalty to the state is not limited by territory and coercion of the state is not exercised over the territory. Although the Western state exhibits homogeneity and unity and establishes impersonal system, personal or group statuses held sway in the Middle Eastern societies. Ottoman *millet* system was one of the tangible examples of this. Three non-Muslim communities of the Empire, Rums (Greek-Orthodox), Armenians (Gregorian) and Jews were recognized as *millets*. They were subject to their religious authorities and laws. They are autonomous self-governing communities which had social and administrative functions. This means that law and authority were determined on a community basis, that is to say, within a certain territory there might be several laws and power centers. As Raymond Hinnebusch summarizes “The Ottoman system was the antithesis of the European nation-states system.”<sup>173</sup> Another instance that shows the inferiority of the territorial understanding in the Ottoman state system is capitulations. These capitulations were

<sup>173</sup> Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 15.

not only economic agreements which gave Europeans commercial privileges, but also they provided extraterritorial rights to Europeans in the Ottoman lands. These capitulations should not be understood as Western imposition on Ottoman Empire, for instance Suleiman the Magnificent gave capitulations to France while Ottoman Empire was superior over France. This capitulation exempted France nationals from taxes, enabled French officials to intervene in any court involving a French subject and granted the right to French officials to resolve disputes between French nationals in Ottoman lands.<sup>174</sup> This means that French nationals had extraterritorial rights in Ottoman territory and French officials in the Empire had not only de facto privileges but also de jure rights since they applied French laws in a place where outside of territory of France. The state of France could extend its sovereignty to the Ottoman territory via its nationals in this territory, since Ottoman philosophy of politics aimed to protect its subjects, not the secure impermeability of its territory. In time, capitulations were given other European countries. Depending on these capitulations, embassies of the European countries violated the territorial sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire and started to provide protection and citizenship to Ottoman subjects, mainly Christian minorities. In 1869, the Istanbul government passed a law which created Ottoman citizenship and thereby making illegal for Ottomans to seek the citizenship of another state, but neither European embassies in Istanbul nor some minority groups respected this law.<sup>175</sup>

The deficiency of the idea of territory as a political construct does not mean that Middle East lacks geographical dimension. The term “Arab island” which means “a living body, of which the head is the Fertile Crescent, the heart, central Arabia, and the extremities, the Arabian coastlands from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Gulf of Basra, the Island is a geographical unit . . . the cradle of the Arabs and their fortress”<sup>176</sup> used by some to show that this area is natural geographical entity. During the Abbasid era, the great judge of Baghdad should not be a non-Baghdadian. The Cairenes sent a delegation to Baghdad, capital of the empire to prevent the nomination of a non-

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<sup>174</sup> André Clot, *Suleiman the Magnificent* (London: Saqi, 2005).

<sup>175</sup> Feroz Ahmad, “Ottoman Perception of the Capitulations 1800-1914,” *Journal of Islamic Studies* 11, no.1 (2000): 7.

<sup>176</sup> Ernest Dawn, “The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 20, no.1 (1988):69.

Egyptian judge to their city. Their demand was accepted. One of the notables of Cairo was consulted in the choice of a judge and he says to the governor of Egypt: "Nominate who you like. We have only one desire: avoid choosing a foreigner [non-Cairene] or a peasant"<sup>177</sup> Although internal borders of the Arab Middle East are substantially blurred, the external borders of the region are relatively clear. Arab Middle East is roughly an area among Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Sahara Desert and Zagros-Taurus Mountains. Most of the land masses of the region are flat covered by deserts with confined arable space. The vast deserts of the region which caused discontinuity of habitation have significant impact on the all aspects of the region. As Charles Issawi argues the Arab world has been likened to an archipelago.<sup>178</sup> Deserts separate almost every important center from other centers: southern from northern Arabian Peninsula; northern Arabia from Fertile Crescent; Syria from Iraq; Palestine and Jordan from Egypt; Egypt from the Sudan; Egypt from Libya; eastern from western Libya; Libya from Tunisia etc. The Middle East has territorial dimension, but this dimension do not attach people with territory and people do not show loyalty to the territory. "The lands of Syria, Iraq, and Palestine were always Arab because they were filled with Arabs. Territory was made Arab by the expansion of the Arabs."<sup>179</sup> This means that Arabs made territory Arab, not vice versa.

### 3.1.2. Territoriality of Islam

Islam has both territorializing and de-territorializing characteristics and affects the Middle Eastern region in both ways. Islam gives special importance to certain places and requires special attitudes in these holy sites. For instance, Grand Mosque in Mecca and its surroundings are considered as *haram* which means sanctuary where non-believers are prohibited from entering. In addition to this, several *miqats* that is to say stated places circle around the Grand Mosque and pilgrimage starts at these points. The area beyond *miqats* is a special place where some restrictions were put on pilgrims. They cannot wear sewn garments, dyed clothes, cloaks, hats and they

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<sup>177</sup> Sami Aldeep Abu-Sahlieh, "The Islamic Concept of Migration," *International Migration Review* 30, no.1 (1996): 41.

<sup>178</sup> Charles Issawi, "The Bases of Arab Unity," *International Affairs* 31, no.1 (1955):42.

<sup>179</sup> Dawn, "The Formation of Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years," 69.

cannot use perfumes. They must avoid every lustful action including kissing and touching. They cannot cut any plant or kill any animal.

Remains of the Prophet, such as his hairs, cardigans, footprints preserved in stone and relics were transported to distant places, especially newly conquered cities as an extension of his authority and remark for the foundation of Islam in that place. For instance *Masjid al-Husayni* and *Ribat al-Naqshbandiya* in Cairo, *Masjid al-Jazzar Pasha* in Acre, the *al-Mashhad al-Husayni* in Damascus, the *Bahubal* in India are founded upon hairs of the Prophet.<sup>180</sup> These relics gave territorial depth to their location and made them sacred.

Another territorializing impact of Islam can be found in *hadith* discipline. Companions of the Prophet and their followers carried his message and words (*hadith*) from generation to generation. During the Third Century after *hijra*, his words were collected into books. One of the ways that the discipline of *hadith* determined the authenticity of the *hadith* is pursuing the chains of transmission and querying every transmitter at the every chain. Where the transmitter lived, where he died are often emphasizes when his narration is reported. In addition to this if there is a gap of time and space between to narrators, this *hadith* is considered as doubtful.<sup>181</sup> That means that narrators' existence in same territory is a criterion for authenticity of narrated *hadith*.

Centrality of the Mecca is another territorializing dimension in Islam. *Kaaba* in Mecca is the most sacred place in Islam and Muslims face toward it when they practice their daily prays. According to Muslim belief, Mecca is also considered as a mother of all cities and center of the world, Adam and Eve met in Mecca, Mecca was raised into heaven during Noah's Flood and buried people in Mecca will be awakened first in the Judgment Day.

Islam also associates some prophets with some mountains, for instance Moses with Mount Sinai,<sup>182</sup> Jesus with Mount of Olives, Solomon with Mount Lebanon, Noah

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<sup>180</sup> Brannon Wheeler, "From Dar al-Hijra to Dar al-Islam," in *The Concept of Territory in Islamic Law and Thought*, ed. Yanagihashi Hiroyuki (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 8.

<sup>181</sup> Israr Ahmad Khan, *Authentication of Hadith: Redefining the Criteria* (Herndon: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2010), 32.

<sup>182</sup> Qur'an, Surah 19, Verse: 53.

with al-Judi,<sup>183</sup> Mohammed with al-Hira. Graves of Martyrs were also conceived as a landmark in the early Islamic tradition. There was strong enthusiasm and vigor among early Muslim warriors during the early expeditions, especially against Byzantine to reach a place of burial further inside the enemy territory. Michael Lecker explains this desire as follows:

The martyr's grave was conceived of as a landmark delineating the furthest point reached by the troops of Islam, and hence the new border of the land reclaimed by the Muslims (who considered themselves its lawful owners)<sup>184</sup>

Islam has also deterritorializing factor in the region. First of all, as a universal religion Islam is not limited by a group or territory and recognizes no boundary. The abovementioned features are not territorial concepts. They are religious and legal constructs that have territorial dimensions. The crucial point is that Islam's emphasis on territory does not create sentimental attachment to the territory. For instance Muslim jurists divided the world in two: *Dar al-Islam* and *Dar al-Harb*. *Dar al-Islam* refers to all lands under the Muslim control and *Dar al-Harb* means lands that will eventually come under Islam's authority. There is also an internal territorial division inside the Muslim territory. This division separated Muslims and religious minorities under the protection (*dhimmis*). This division is legal more than territorial. The borders between them were never exactly drawn. Islamic terms *ummah* which refers Muslim community throughout the world is trans-territorial in its nature and different from the word *Sha'ab* which means people bind together with a common geography or ancestry. The predominance of tribalism and nomadism especially in the early period of Islam also played significant role on the meaning of territory. For nomads "territoriality was thus a function of time more than space; as a tribe moved, its territorial bounds were, in a sense, picked up, carried about, and set down quite unconsciously, rather like a material possession."<sup>185</sup> Ibn Khaldun description of nomads sheds light on territoriality of nomads:

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<sup>183</sup> Qur'an, Surah 11, Verse: 44.

<sup>184</sup> Michael Lecker, "On the Burial of Martyrs in Islam," in *The Concept of Territory in Islamic Law and Thought*, ed. Yanagihashi Hiroyuki, 43 (London and New York:Routledge, 2000).

<sup>185</sup> Parvin and Sommer, "Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East," 7.

These savage peoples, furthermore, have no homelands they might use as a fertile (pasture), and no fixed place to which they might repair. All regions and places are the same to them. Therefore, they do not restrict themselves to possession of their own and neighboring regions. They do not stop at the borders of their horizon. They swarm across distant zones to achieve superiority over faraway nations.<sup>186</sup>

Nomadism's disconnectedness to the territory affected Islam and its territorial dimension. *Hijra*, the emigration from one place to another for religious reasons is one of the central tenets of Islam. This emigration is psychological movement rather than physical. For many scholars, it is a spiritual enlightenment. In case of threat to practicing religion, Islam encourages believers to migrate instead of fighting to preserve it in its domain. Prophet Mohammed himself abandoned Mecca and settled in Medina due to threats of Meccan leaders. This clearly shows how Islam prioritizes human over territory. This concept is also compatible with universal Muslim *Weltanschauung*. As Prophet says: "the earth is a mosque for you."<sup>187</sup> In order to incite people to the conquest of Iraq, Omar also said: "The Hijaz is your home only in as far as it is a pasturage. Those who dwell there have no power over it except in this respect. Where do (you) newcomers who emigrated (to Medina) stand with regard to God's promise, roam the earth?"<sup>188</sup>

In the context of Middle East, Shiite religious doctrines are also an important factor that diminish territorial understanding. For instance the *marja-i taqlid* (source of emulation) institution creates transnational bonds among Shiite believers. *Marja-i Taqlid* are clerics those who have the authority to give a *fatwa* (religious verdict) on religious and also mundane matters and are followed by many people. According to Shi'ism, every person should watch and imitate a cleric with the capacity to interpret the Quran and life of Prophet in order to shape their religious and worldly lives in compliance with the rules of Islam. For Shiites *marjas* are considered as the highest authorities after the Quran, the Prophet, and Imams. At almost every period, some *marjas* gain much popularity throughout the Shiite world and have followers from

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<sup>186</sup> Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, trans: Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), 114.

<sup>187</sup> Sahih Muslim, Kitab al-Salat, No:1057

<sup>188</sup> Parvin and Sommer, "Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and Its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East," p.7

many countries. Shiites choose their *marjas* independent and apart from any territorial consideration. This means that a Lebanese Shiite can choose an Iraqi cleric as a *marja*. A Saudi Arabian Shiite can follow an Iranian jurists or an Afghan Shiite can be follower of a Lebanese cleric. For instance, Iranian-born Iraqi-resident Ali Sistani, the highest authority in Najaf, is the most-followed Shiite *marja* in Lebanon. Followers of the *marja* must obey every decision of him. *Marjas* can issue *fatwas* regarding political issues and this power gives them extraterritorial jurisdiction authority which intervenes impermeability of state authority and territoriality.

### **3.2. Territorial Nationalism and Establishment of Territorially Bounded State in the Middle East**

#### **3.2.1. Ottoman Modernization and Territoriality in the Middle East**

Long before the occupation of the Middle East by European powers, Ottoman Empire had initiated very complex modernization processes by imitating Western modernization during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As Albert Hourani states “the aim of the reforms was to establish uniform and centralized administration, linked directly with each citizen, and working in accordance with its own rational principles of justice, applied equally to all.”<sup>189</sup> The Empire was under the constant political, economic, cultural and even military pressures of the Western countries and Western-type modernization was considered as prerequisite for repelling this pressure and preventing the collapse of the Empire. These Ottoman-era modernization efforts had tremendous effects on the formation of modern Arab states and consolidation of territorial sovereignties in the region. Hourani describes Ottoman effect on Arab states as follows:

Many of the things Middle Eastern countries have in common can be explained by their having been ruled for so long by the Ottomans; many of the things which differentiate them can be explained by the different ways in which they emerged from the Ottoman Empire.<sup>190</sup>

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<sup>189</sup> Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, eds. William Polk and Richard Chambers, 54 (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1968).

<sup>190</sup> Albert Hourani, *The Emergence of the Modern Middle East* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1981), 17.

Newly established states after the collapse of the Ottoman system heavily depended on their Ottoman legacies in terms of cadres, experiences and model. For instance, more than three-fourths of the Iraqi prime ministers between 1920 and 1958 were graduates of the Baghdad military preparatory school opened by Ottoman administration.<sup>191</sup> Hikmat Sulayman, the prime minister of Iraq from 1936 to 1937, was the brother of Mahmud Shevket Pasha, the prominent historical figure of Ottoman history who led deposition of Abdulhamid II.

Before modernization efforts, Ottoman rule in the Middle East was loose and weak. As power of the Empire declined, Istanbul's influence in the distant corners of the Empire went down. Prominent families or tribes had emerged as powerful actors responsible for local issues. For instance *Azm* family of Damascus whose influence reached to central Syria and Tripoli,<sup>192</sup> *Jalili* family that had dominated Mosul for 150 years,<sup>193</sup> The *Shihabs* of Mount Lebanon and *Zahir al-Omar* of Palestine,<sup>194</sup> *Husainids* of Tunisia,<sup>195</sup> *Afrasiyabs* of Basra,<sup>196</sup> *Babans* of Suleymaniya<sup>197</sup> were influential families in their respective areas and in many cases had more power than the central government. Not only local notables, but also Ottoman governors of the peripheral provinces assumed such a role. Sulayman Pasha of Iraq, Jazzar Pasha of Acre, Bechir Chehab II of Mount Lebanon, Mohammad Ali of Egypt and Ahmad Bey of Tunisia detected the weakness of the central state and began to bid for power.<sup>198</sup> Lack of infrastructure, weakness of transportation network and inadequacy of communication lines further prevented central government's control over all of its territory. By mid-19<sup>th</sup> century the situation had changed dramatically after Istanbul

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<sup>191</sup> Michael Provence, "Ottoman Modernity, Colonialism, and Insurgency in the Interwar Arab East," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no.2 (2011) 209.

<sup>192</sup> David Commins, *Historical Dictionary of Syria* (Oxford: Scarecrow Press, 2004), 58.

<sup>193</sup> Nabil al Tikriti, "Ottoman Iraq," *The Journal of Historical Society* 7, no.2 (2007), 205.

<sup>194</sup> Dina Rizk Khoury, "The Ottoman Centre versus provincial Power Holders: An Analysis of Historiography," in *The Cambridge History of Turkey*, ed. Suraiya Faroqhi, 143 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>195</sup> Leon Carl Brown, "The Tunisia of Ahmad Bey 1837-1855," (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 27.

<sup>196</sup> Thabit Abdullah, *A Short History of Iraq* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2003)

<sup>197</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992), 171.

<sup>198</sup> Adham Saouli, *The Arab State: Dilemmas of Late Formation* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 41.

government initiated comprehensive reform programs. As a consequence of these reforms, at that period Ottoman state restored its power in Tripolitania and Tunisia by abolishing the military oligarchy of local dynasties. Ottomans suppressed Saudi revolt in Najd region, reentered in Yemen, tightened controls over Meccan sharifs and reasserted claims on Kuwait. Syrian and Iraqi provinces brought under state control.<sup>199</sup> Ottoman governors began to map out their provinces and regularized land tenure which was crucial for extension of central authority's jurisdiction.

During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the Empire had witnessed centralization and modernization in a wide range of fields. The contact between state and citizens had risen dramatically and direct ties between them were linked through state institutions and bureaucracy. Istanbul governments tried to draw people into Ottoman identity by using modern instruments such as state education and compulsory military service. Malcolm Yapp lists important developments and modernization efforts in this era:<sup>200</sup> In 1834, modern postal services were introduced in the Middle East. Transportation systems were improved dramatically. Cairo-Alexandria railway opened in 1856. The Anatolian, Hejaz and Bagdad Railway stretched from Istanbul to Damascus, Medina and Baghdad through the several important Anatolian cities and ports connected different parts of the Empire and strengthen central government's authority throughout the country. In 1903, Konya-Baghdad railway project was extended to Basra. In 1860, Beirut-Damascus road opened. In 1860 telegraph, in 1885 postal system began to operate in Iraq. Steam navigation commenced on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers in Iraq. Major irrigation systems, barrages for storage, elaborate water canal systems were built across the region. In Iraq and Syria, while the cultivated area in 1860 was about 125,000 decares, it reached 1.6 million decares in 1913. Thanks to introduction of quarantine regulations, improved water supplies for urban centers, better sewage disposal and proliferation of vaccination diseases were reduced substantially. Certain diseases which had been caused many deaths such as bubonic plague, cholera, and smallpox were prevented. Yapp describes this change as follows:

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<sup>199</sup> Iliya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System," in *The Foundations of the Arab State*, ed. Ghassan Salamé, 36 (London: Routledge, 1987).

<sup>200</sup> Malcolm Yapp, *The Making of Modern Near East 1792-1923* (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), 211-13

In 1800, the towns of the Near East were death-traps, drawing in and killing people from the countryside; by 1914 they were healthier than the rural areas.<sup>201</sup>

Concurrently with Istanbul Government, Khedive of Egypt, Mehmed Ali initiated a comprehensive modernization programs in the military, economic, educational and cultural spheres. These reforms had so much significance on Egyptian history that Khaled Fahmy asserts that “Egypt came to refer to a nation so denned only in the nineteenth century and mostly as a result of Mehmed Ali's policies.”<sup>202</sup> He established administrative departments to implement reforms,<sup>203</sup> built a national army and tried to create a civil society through education and public works,<sup>204</sup> consolidated central power by manipulating the *ulama* and eliminating feudal landowners and power holders.<sup>205</sup> He also reorganized Egypt’s territorial structure. After the cadastral survey of 1813-1814 he abolished the former tax farming system (*iltizam*) and cancelled the immunities of religious endowments (*awqaf*) on agricultural lands.<sup>206</sup> Huge infrastructure projects such as *Mahmudiyya* Canal which linked Alexandria to the western Nile increased the territorial control of Cairo over the provinces. Implementation of military conscription, standardization and compartmentalization of bureaucracy, improvements of agricultural, health and industrial sectors underpinned the foundations of modern Egypt.

These developments expedited urbanization and boosted trade. In 1800, the Middle East was more urbanized than many other places in the world except Europe and almost 15 percent of the population lived in towns of over 10,000.<sup>207</sup> Particularly, port cities such as Beirut, İzmir, Alexandria, Salonika attracted population. In Egypt,

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<sup>201</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>202</sup> Khaled Fahmy, *All the Pasha's Men: Mehmed Ali, His Army and the Making of Modern Egypt* (Cairo and New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 1997), 17.

<sup>203</sup> Hibba Abugideiri, *Gender and the Making of Modern Medicine in Colonial Egypt* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 23.

<sup>204</sup> Perri Giovannucci, *Literature and Development in North Africa: The Modernizing Mission* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 105.

<sup>205</sup> Shireen Hunter and Huma Malik, *Modernization, Democracy and Islam* (Westport: Praeger, 2005), 208.

<sup>206</sup> Arthur Goldschmidt, *Historical Dictionary of Egypt* (Lanham: Scarecrow, 2013), 240.

<sup>207</sup> *The Making of Modern Near East 1792-1923*, 15.

Iraq and Syria Bedouins and nomads were settled. 1858 Land Code (*Arazi Kanunnamesi*) and 1864 *Vilayet Law* introduced secular administrative forms and reorganized administrative division of the Empire according to the Western territorial understanding. 1858 Land Code not only increased the efficiency of arable lands and agricultural tax revenues but also weakened the intermediaries between the land and peasant and peasant and the state. It also empowered private property and ownership by enlarging the scope of inheritance and succession rights. The code recognized only individual as a legal subject and extended rights of purchase, sale, mortgaging, transfer and inheritance of agricultural areas.<sup>208</sup> The 1864 *Vilayet Law*, the first national law on provisional administration in Ottoman history, reorganized the Ottoman bureaucracy in a highly centralized and hierarchical way. This Law increased the power of provincial governors' authority to the peripheries of their provinces and provincial headquarters achieved a territorial centrality for all political affairs. The significance of this Law for territoriality in the Middle East derives from its influence on the relations among a territory's administrative status (politics), population (society) and strategic position (geopolitics). For instance administrative divisions were carried out according to several criteria such as the size of the area, its geopolitical position (whether it is a mountainous area or), its position along the border or its strategic importance for the state (whether it has a military base or harbor).<sup>209</sup> These late-Ottoman modernization initiatives provided a basis for the territoriality in the region and the consolidation of territorial states emerged after the World War I.

### 3.2.2. Enlargement of Western Territorial State into the Middle East

We have been engaged... in drawing lines upon maps where no white man's feet have ever trod; we have been giving away mountains and rivers and lakes to each other, but we have only been hindered by the small impediment that we never knew exactly where those mountains and rivers and lakes were.

Lord Salisbury<sup>210</sup>

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<sup>208</sup> Attila Aytakin, "Agrarian Relations, Property and Law: An Analysis of the Land Code of 1858 in the Ottoman Empire," *Middle Eastern Studies* 45, no.6 (2009): 947-48.

<sup>209</sup> Ebubekir Ceylan, *The Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq: Political Reform, Modernization and Development in the Nineteenth-Century Middle East* (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 123.

<sup>210</sup> Lord Salisbury (August 6, 1890) Robert McCorquodale and Raul Pangalangan, "Pushing Back the Limitations of Territorial Boundaries," *European Journal of International Law* 12, no. 5 (2001): 867.

Western expansion into the Middle East had begotten reconversion of political, social and administrative spheres of the region in light of the Western model. This extension was not only spread of Western political and military power, but also diffusion of Western territorial state in the region and caused transformation of Ottoman imperial lands into the homelands of nascent Arab nations. This diffusion brought new phenomena which were in some degree alien to the people of the region such as territorially bounded states, borders, centralized governments, citizenship, homeland etc. Injection of the modern state in the traditional Middle Eastern landscape produced two important consequences: redefinition of relations among new type of political units and the redefinition of relations of these new political units with the people they enclose.<sup>211</sup> The region has generally been redefined from without, based on the strategic interests of outside powers, rather than from within, based on internal characteristics of the area.<sup>212</sup> Thomas Naff demonstrates this situation as follows:

Post-medieval European idea of the state- a territorially defined entity apart from ruler or dynasty organized in accordance with man-made rulers- was alien to Muslim political theory. Ottoman theories of state and government derived from the Muslim concept that God is the source of all authority and law, that government exists to enable the community of true believers (Muslims) to fulfill its obligations to God. The community, not to state, constitutes the basic Muslim policy transcending all boundaries.<sup>213</sup>

This encounter creates confusion and problems that has been affecting the region. Although some scholars argue that the Western model, a perfect form of political organization, annihilates local political models in where it penetrates,<sup>214</sup> this judgment is contested at least in the Middle Eastern context. Even though indigenous political system in the region was not capable of compete with the West, it was not

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<sup>211</sup> Gökhan Bacık, *Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East: The Cases of Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq* (New York and Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 3.

<sup>212</sup> Mohammed Riad, "A view from Cairo," in *The Middle East in World Politics*, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 18.

<sup>213</sup> Thomas Naff, "The Ottoman Empire and the European State System" in *The Expansion of International Society*, eds. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, 143 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984).

<sup>214</sup> Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).

such primitive that the West could easily sweep away. As Michael Hudson argues, the liberal, rational-legal, secular, democratic, and socialist ideologies are not compatible with patriarchal, consultative, religious and feudal norms,<sup>215</sup> but this interaction did not result in either side's victory but a hybrid system. Joseph Massad well describes this transformation:

This is the moment when colonialism establishes a state-framework on a colonized territory/country, either replacing an existing state structure or inaugurating one where it had not existed before. This inaugural moment establishes the political, juridical, administrative, and military structures of the colonized territory/country, effectively rendering it a nation-state (laws of nationality, governance, and citizenship are codified, borders and maps are drawn up, bureaucratic divisions and taxonomies of the territory and the population are imposed, conscription and/or induction of colonized men into colonial military structures is established).<sup>216</sup>

Westerners who perceive politics as an interaction among territorially separated units were in need of demarcating lands that they captured. If a community lived in certain area without organized political power, that is to say state, for European colonial powers inhabitants of this land “were merely factually and not legally in occupation of the territory” and they treated this land as *res nullius*.<sup>217</sup> That's why they started with the demarcation of territories and then installed a new system and transformed whole structure. Even the Ottoman Empire-Persian Empire boundary drawn by 1637 Zohab Agreement was delimited in Constantinople Agreement of 1913 and was demarcated in 1914 by English-Russian team.<sup>218</sup> The definition of borders represented power balances and interests of the colonial powers and was not coherent with ethno-religious, cultural or geographic lines. Although later arrangements finalized administrative distribution of Middle Eastern lands, the lines were firstly drawn by Britain and France after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire. In answering the question “who is Arab” Hamilton Alexander Gibb stated that:

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<sup>215</sup> Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), 104.

<sup>216</sup> Joseph Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), 9.

<sup>217</sup> Malcolm Shaw, *Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986), 31-32.

<sup>218</sup> Gideon Biger, “The Boundaries of the Middle East- Past, Present and Future,” *Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej* 1 (2012): 61.

There is only one answer—whatever ethnographers may say—which approaches historic truth: all those are Arabs for whom the central fact of history is the mission of Mohammed and the memory of the Arab Empire, and who cherish the Arabic tongue and its cultural heritage as their common possession.<sup>219</sup>

In this definition territory is not central theme, and linguistic, historical and cultural features are determinants of Arab identity. This identification changed with the formation of modern Arab state and territory was added to compound of identity. Some of the Middle Eastern nations (for instance Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine) were created by these borders and some of the lands (Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan etc.) became territories through these borders.

Britain and France demarcate the territories in different ways. Some of the borderlines were drawn in accordance with the natural phenomenon. For instance River Jordan became border between Palestine and Transjordan. The Kabir River constitutes Lebanon's northern border with Syria. Syria's northeastern border starts with Tigris River. Another method used by colonial regimes was constitution of borders along with Ottoman administrative lines. For instance Turkey-Iraq border was the northern frontier of Mosul province in Ottoman period. Some of the Ottoman-era man-made features were also used for demarcation. For instance most of the Turkey-Syria border (from Meydanekbez to Nusaybin) was drawn according to railway built in Ottoman era. Straight lines are most common features of the boundaries of the region. Desert regions where lacked of permanent residents were separated by straight lines. Iraq-Syria, Jordan-Iraq, Saudi Arabia-Iraq, Jordan-Syria borders were drawn with this method. 26 East Longitude and 22 North Latitude became western and southern borders of Egypt and the straight line between Rafa at the Mediterranean and Taba at Red Sea became Israel-Egypt border. Western colonial powers also reorganized land holdings inside the newly established states by carving out land reforms. They immediately established cadastral offices, recorded the lands and redistributed them in accordance with the Western private property system. In order to achieve this, they uprooted the traditional *musha* system. In *musha* system, cultivators in a village had the rights to cultivate the lands in

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<sup>219</sup> Alexander Hamilton Gibb, *The Arabs* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), 3.

undivided collective ownership instead of private ownership.<sup>220</sup> Westerners aimed to increase agricultural production and tax revenues by terminating this system because they saw it “as the cause of all agricultural backwardness.”<sup>221</sup> However these arrangements had also increased consolidation and centralization of state power.

Besides all these, it should be noted that the main motivation of demarcation was interests of the colonial powers and these interests shaped the whole process. As Stephen Krasner claims expansion of Westphalian system into the non-Western world occurred in four ways: conventions, contracts, coercion, and imposition. Middle East is no exception. He clarifies these concepts as follows:

Rulers [in this case, leaders of nascent Arab countries] can join international *conventions* in which they agree to abide by certain standards regardless of what others do. Rulers can enter into *contracts* in which they agree to specific policies in return for explicit benefits. Rulers can be subject to *coercion*, which leaves them worse off, although they do have some bargaining leverage. Finally, rulers or would-be rulers can suffer *imposition*, a situation that occurs when the target ruler cannot effectively resist.<sup>222</sup>

1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, 1917 Balfour Declaration and establishment of mandate system shaped territorial structure of the Middle East which subsists even today. Sykes-Picot agreement divided Ottoman Middle East into the British and French zones of influence and determined the boundaries of post-World War I system. This reconversion of the region was alien to the region; it did not originate from local people’s experiences and did not reflect their interests and desires. As Christine Moss Helms argues many of the borders were linear as if they were drawn by a ruler and they have very little meaning for local people.<sup>223</sup> At the request of Karl Twitchell, American mining engineer who surveyed minerals in Saudi Arabia, Abdullah Suleiman, chief finance minister in Ibn Saud’s government from 1928 to 1952, sent a telegraph to the king and asked: “How far does the Saudi territory extend to the south of al Ahsa. Does the boundary extend as far as the Hadramut? Is

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<sup>220</sup> Michael Fischbach, *State, Society and Land in Jordan* (Leiden: Brill), 38.

<sup>221</sup> Eva Kaptijn, *Life on the Watershed: Reconstructing Subsistence in a Steppe Region Using Archeological Survey* (Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2009), 379.

<sup>222</sup> Stephen Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 26.

<sup>223</sup> Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 188.

the Rub al-Khali included in it? Are there demarcation signs on it?”<sup>224</sup> Neither finance minister nor the king knew the answer of this question. In 1937, a Residency Agent who observed border status in the Gulf region said that the rulers admitted that they had no fixed frontiers with their neighbors and the only ruler who was sure of the extent of his territory was Said of Dubai.<sup>225</sup> The borders were not clear even by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century. As can be seen at Map 2, borders of the Arabian Peninsula were undetermined in 1974. Northern frontiers of the peninsula with Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait were drawn thanks to the intense British interference, but Saudi Arabia’s borders with its southern and eastern surroundings were unclear. Only the starting point of the Saudi Arabia-North Yemen, North Yemen-South Yemen and South Yemen-Oman boundaries were determined, but rest of the border remained unclear.

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<sup>224</sup> Michael Quentin Morton, *Buraimi: The Struggle for Power, Influence and Oil in Arabia*, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2013, p.16

<sup>225</sup> Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States*, Macmillan, London, 1978, p.148



**Map 2: Borders of the Arabian Peninsula in the late 20th century**  
 Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle east and asia/saudi arabia rel 1974.jpg>.

Britain established Transjordan by incorporating Aqaba, Ma'an which were historically part of Hejaz province and Amman, Zarqa, former parts of Damascus province of Ottoman Empire. After the creation of Transjordan, Britain was hesitant about which British administration govern Transjordan. India Office and War Office opposed adding Transjordan to Mesopotamia but the idea which included it to the Palestine mandate was rejected because of the fear that Zionists might claim rights on it. Although Transjordan was treated as a separate entity by Britain, British High Commissioner for Transjordan resided in Jerusalem.<sup>226</sup> Britain designed Jordan as a

<sup>226</sup> Yitzhak Gil-Har, "Boundaries Delimitation: Palestine and Trans-Jordan," *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no.1 (2000): 70-71.

buffer zone to prevent French influence in Syria and protect British presence in Palestine. Philip Robins observes that “from its very inception as an entity Transjordan’s value, not for its own sake but as a buffer and bridge among lands of inestimably greater importance, was recognized.”<sup>227</sup> Like many other newly-created Arab states the survival of the Transjordan totally depended on Britain’s help:

[Jordan] had a population of only some 230,000, no real city, no natural resources, and no importance to trade except as a desert thoroughfare. In short, it had no reason to be a state on its own rather than a part of Syria, or of Palestine, or of Saudi Arabia, or of Iraq, except that it better served Britain’s interest to be so.<sup>228</sup>

The name of the country and people were also a matter of debate. Winston Churchill called people on the country as Transjordanian Palestinians. Amir Abdullah named his government formed in 1921 “the Government of the Territory of the Arab East” along with East of the Jordan.<sup>229</sup> Dankwart Rustow describes Jordan as follows:

Jordan “had the distinction of having the most artificial boundaries, the poorest endowment in natural resources and the least developed feeling of civil loyalty of any country in the Middle East.”<sup>230</sup>

For before cited reasons, the survival of the Jordanian state has been a matter of debate from its earliest days. It was expected that then-Transjordan could be absorbed by Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia or even Palestinians. In 1958 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Nutting claimed that days of King Hussein were numbered.<sup>231</sup> Jordanians were also hopeless for the future of their state. Therefore transnational activities such as pan-Arabism have always been significant power in the society. Although 1952 Jordanian Constitution states that Jordan is indivisible and inalienable sovereign state, it also says that Jordan is part of the Arab nation. Even Abdullah I pursued a policy that aimed to established a Greater Syria. He urged his people to

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<sup>227</sup> Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 13.

<sup>228</sup> Mary Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 3.

<sup>229</sup> Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan*, 24.

<sup>230</sup> Dankwart Rustow, *Middle Eastern Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971): 53.

<sup>231</sup> Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism Jordan 1955-1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), vii.

“identify themselves not by geographical region but as members of the Arab nation.”<sup>232</sup>

The French-British partition of Ottoman Syria followed same patterns with Transjordan. Territorial issues have always been a problem for Syria since its beginning. The first constitution of Syria after its declaration of independence on 7 March 1920 did not mention its exact borders<sup>233</sup> and country’s borders changed several times, both internally and externally. Emma Lundgren Jörum describes the formation of Syria as follows:

As the partition of Geographical Syria [today’s Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza] meant the obstruction of traditional trade routes and the enforced separation of territories hitherto integrated, the new borders drawn also brought areas previously not integrated together.<sup>234</sup>

Although some prominent Syrian cities were geographically close to each other their orientations varied. Aleppo had strong cultural and economical ties with Anatolian cities and its access to sea was Iskenderun port. Damascus on the other hand, was in interaction with coastal Mediterranean and its gate to the open seas was Beirut and Palestinian ports. As for northeastern Syria, it was economically linked to Anatolian city of Diyarbakır. On the day that the World War I ended, there was no border between lands that modern Syria and Iraq locates today. Deir ez-Zor which located at the middle of the two countries was no man’s land.<sup>235</sup> This area is also called as *Jazirah* which means island in Arabic. “Island” refers to land between Tigris and Euphrates and even from the Medieval ages it was considered as the part of Upper Mesopotamia, not the Levant.<sup>236</sup> This province was under the direct rule of Istanbul at the Ottoman period. Firstly British Iraq claimed the province and then it was annexed by Syria. However transitivity between Deir ez-Zor and Iraq could not be stopped. Several anti-British Iraqi opposition groups such as *Ahd al-Iraqi* used Deir

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<sup>232</sup> Bacık, *Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East*, 154.

<sup>233</sup> Majid Khadduri, “Constitutional Development in Syria: With Emphasis on the Constitution of 1950,” *Middle East Journal* 5, no.2 (1951), 139.

<sup>234</sup> Emma Lundgren Jörum, *Beyond Syria’s Borders: A History of Territorial Disputes in the Middle East* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2014), 17

<sup>235</sup> Eliezer Tauber, *The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq* (New York and London: Routledge, 2007), 226.

<sup>236</sup> Mustafa Nazdar, “The Kurds in Syria,” in *A People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan* ed. Gerard Chaliand, 195 (London: Zed Press, 1993), 195.

ez-Zor as their headquarters and this place was the center of operation for those who oppose British presence in Iraq. (In light of this information, it is not surprising that after the outbreak of Syrian civil war which began in 2010, Islamic State of Iraq and Sham which had operated only in Iraq could easily penetrate Deir ez-Zor and captured it.) In 1920 Syria was divided into five parts: State of Aleppo, State of Damascus, Alawite State, Greater Lebanon, and Jabal Druze. Later, these states except Greater Lebanon dissolved in the Syrian state. When Syria became independent in 1946, it was by no means a nation-state. Habib Kahaleh, the member of the Syrian parliament in 1947 well described the situation:

I look around me and see only a bundle of contradictions . . . Men whom nothing united, sharing no principles; some were illiterate, others distinguished men of letters; some spoke only Kurdish or Armenian, others only Turkish; some wore a *tarbush*, others a *kafiyeh*.<sup>237</sup>

The formation of state of Iraq is no exception. As Don Peretz indicates, before 1930 “there never had been an independent Arab Iraq, nor was there any demand among the local population for an Iraqi state.”<sup>238</sup> Borders and political structure of Iraq was designed a conference held in Cairo in March 1921 and only two Iraqis, Ja’far al-Askari and Sasson Hesqail were invited to this conference.<sup>239</sup> Lord Amery well described how nascent Iraqi state depended on British support:

If the writ of King Faisal runs effectively throughout his kingdom it is entirely due to British aeroplanes. If the aeroplanes were removed tomorrow, the whole structure would inevitably fall to pieces.<sup>240</sup>

Iraq was one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse place in the Arab Middle East and overcoming overlapping identities and melting different people in a national pot were very difficult. Shiites saw nation-state as Sunni domination, Kurds and Yezidis perceived it as Arab subjection, Assyrians and other Christian minorities thought that it was Muslim supremacy. For this reason, Assyrians for instance,

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<sup>237</sup> Habib Kahaleh, ذكريات نائب (Damascus: Metabi’ al-Halal: 1950) quoted in Moshe Ma’oz, “Syria: Creating a National Community,” in *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics in the Middle East*, ed. Leonard Binder, (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1999), 83.

<sup>238</sup> Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today* (New York: Holt, 1978), 406.

<sup>239</sup> Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor Tejirian, *The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 162.

<sup>240</sup> CP 235 (25), 11 May 1925: CO 730/821/22162 quoted in Ofra Bengio, “The Challenge to Territorial Integrity of Iraq,” *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 37, no. 2 (1995), 74.

demanded to live in Iraq without being Iraqi citizens.<sup>241</sup> This demand was indeed inadmissible for Iraqi elites and their British patrons who were trying to redesign the region in accordance with territorial base and create citizen-based states.

The delimitation of Saudi borders was the most controversial issue in defining Middle Eastern borders due to its central geographical position, outnumbering neighbors and ambitions of the founders of the country. Moss Helms described newly established kingdom's desired area of control:

It is notable that in all treaties with the Ottomans and the British, Abd al-Aziz insisted that one of the first provisions should be the recognition of his family's historical rights and his own right to choose a successor. Moreover, he was to claim that...the territories of Najd and the Badawin world have extended as far north as Aleppo and the river Orontes in north Syria, and included the whole country on the right bank of the Euphrates from there down to Basra on the Persian Gulf...and that these territories, having been formerly under Al Saud control, were now his by virtue of his hereditary rights.<sup>242</sup>

However, Britain shaped the Saudi borders differently. They wanted to prevent Najdi influence in Iraq, therefore they delimited the borders as follows:

Sir Percy took a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map of Arabia a boundary line . . . this gave Iraq a large area of territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate Ibn Saud, he ruthlessly deprived of Kuwait of nearly two thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd.<sup>243</sup>

Western colonialism had also changed spatial extension and territorial dimension of cities in the region. Traditional Middle Eastern cities revolve around mosques and are characterized by complex web of streets and bazaars. Colonial powers built new districts in parallel with their understanding of urban planning which includes multistoried apartments along with broad boulevards. Then, historical centers of cities which were centers of the economic, religious and social activities, *madina* (city for Arabic) or *wasat al madina* (centre of the city) or *qasbah* lost their weights and new districts gained importance. No space left for the expansion of the old city and notables left their homes for new homes in the colonial district. Often an empty space was left between colonial district and *madina* as a buffer zone between them

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<sup>241</sup> Liora Lukitz, *Iraq: The Search for National Identity* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), 28.

<sup>242</sup> Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia*, 110.

<sup>243</sup> Jacqueline Ismael, *Kuwait: Dependency and Class in a Rentier State* (Tampa: University Press of Florida, 1993), 43.

and many *madinas* are strongholds for many anti-colonialist movements. Frantz Fanon describes colonial period urban development as follows:

The European city is not the prolongation of the native city. The colonizers have not settled in the midst of the natives. They have surrounded the native city; they have laid siege to it. Every exit from the Kasbah of Algiers opens on enemy territory.<sup>244</sup>

Border signs, razor wires or flags were not the only novel thing that ordinary people had faced in their daily lives. Although distribution of driver licenses and passports, identification controls by the security forces, celebrating national holidays, compulsory registration of all immovable properties, obligation of carrying identity cards, restrictions on meetings and standardization of currency inside the country might seem practically important, their symbolic value in terms of state-people interaction was tremendous.<sup>245</sup> These are state's coercive apparatuses and moral power.

In conclusion, enlargement of Western territorial state reorganized, uniformed, standardized, and homogenized Arab lands. *Ad personam* Islamic law were replaced by law shaped by territorial state and its needs. Nomadic people and tribes were tried to settle in order to protect the impermeability of the borders in the modern state. However these changes created inherited problems in the region because not only borders and central authorities were alien to region, but also the idea of territory and territorially separated areas were alien to local people.

### **3.3.The Rise of Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East and the Creation of *Homo Nationalis***

Since division of countries did not depend on salient determinants, Western colonialists and new ruling elites needed to create these determinants by emphasizing uniqueness and peculiarities of their countries. They also had to create new shared myths and historical origins for all citizens other than Islam to redirect their loyalty to the state. The most frequently used method was reviving ancient civilizations

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<sup>244</sup> Frantz Fanon, *A Dying Colonialism*, trans. Haakon Chevalier (New York: Grove Press, 1965), 51-52.

<sup>245</sup> Bacık, *Modern Uluslararası Sistem: Köken, Genişleme, Nedensellik*, 185.

which shared same places with newly established countries. This means that “the definition of the region’s heritage, through which the newly emerging states were defining themselves, were confined to the classical, religious and ancient monuments.”<sup>246</sup> Pharaonic in Egypt, Nabattein in Jordan, Phoenician in Lebanon, Akhaemenian in Iran, Hittite in Turkey and Mesopotamian in Iraq became source of national inspiration in that period.<sup>247</sup> Although for centuries the existence of these ancient civilizations had been known, they were never source of identity or loyalty. The infusion of territorial state in the region required the creation of territorially-bounded identities and myths of origins. Thus, the oft-cited description of “cradle of civilization” is not only cultural or artistic expression but also reference to territory-inspired nationalism. According to Anthony Smith, myth of origin and descent include several components. These are myths of temporal origin (when we born), spatial origin (where we born), ancestry (who bore us), migration, liberation (how we freed), golden age (how we became heroic), decline (how we were decayed), rebirth (how we shall be restored).<sup>248</sup> Ancient civilizations became answers of these stages. Their victories, defeats, achievements, inventions, myths and histories were reproduced in order to inspire people and create a collective identity. Yusuf al-Sauda, Lebanese writer and supporter of Phoenician identity, shows the logic behind this movement:

Every nation has a strong desire to return to its roots by drawing from the well of its past to its present the glory of its pedigree. Italy is proud to be the heir of mighty Rome with its victories, its glory and its banner. The Greeks glorify in their lineage to the important dynasty of personalities of the Iliad with its poets and philosophers. The civilized world thanks Italy and Greece and respects their descendants and the greatness of their forefathers. ...As a nation is proud of its roots and draws its good virtues from its good progeny, so is Lebanon proud to remember and remind us that it is the cradle of civilization in the world. It was born at the slopes of its mountain and ripened on its shores, and from there, the Phoenicians carried it to the four corners of the earth. The same as Europe has to be committed to Italy and

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<sup>246</sup> Rami Farouk Daher, “Amman: Disguised Genealogy and Recent Urban Restructuring and Neoliberal Threats,” in *The Evolution of Arab City: Tradition, Modernity and Urban Development*, ed. Yasser Elsheshtawy (London and New York: Routledge, 2008), 40.

<sup>247</sup> Examples of territorial nationalism can be found in almost every nation. Significance of the territory is not limited by its role on the formation of nations. Territory is also main factor behind “Great” movements. Proponents of Great Greece, Great Serbia, Great Bulgaria, Great Hungary, Great Italy etc who aim to control lands where they allegedly ruled once upon a time claim rights over these territories.

<sup>248</sup> Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 192.

Greece it also has to be committed to a land that is the teacher of Rome and the mother of Greece.<sup>249</sup>

In order to bring ancestors' monuments to light and create national pride of being indigenous to that land, archeological excavations and researches were supported and archeology faculties were opened in the most prestigious universities of the countries.<sup>250</sup> School curricula were redesigned and ancient civilizations were added to school books. Pictures of monuments and figures of ancient civilizations were put at the banknotes. Temples, statues, monuments, Sphinxes were used in banknotes and stamps in various Arab countries. As Amatzia Baram finds "the pyramids, Nefertiti, and Tut- Ankh-Amon in Egypt, the Lion of Babylon, and the ruins of Ur in Iraq, Ugaritic and Hellenistic figurines in Syria, became widespread images."<sup>251</sup>

Egypt has always been at the center of Arab and Muslim politics. It is the most populous Arab country, home of Arab nationalism and Islamic institutions such as al-Azhar whose influence can reach every part of the Muslim world. However it has also very long and glorious history that differentiates Egypt from other Arab states and gives its people unique sense of belongings. Niloofar Haeri summarizes this sense of territorial loyalty thus:

Its territorial continuity since ancient times, its unique history as exemplified in its pharaonic past and later on its Coptic language and culture, had already made Egypt into a nation for centuries. Egyptians saw themselves, their history, culture and language as specifically Egyptian and not "Arab."<sup>252</sup>

Egyptian president Anwar Sadat who struggled against both pan-Arabist and pan-Islamist movements and tried to follow Egypt First policy described this feeling as follows:

The Egyptian man, in my belief, is the cornerstone on which society as a whole will rise ... this people ... carries in its depth the values of seven thousand years old civilizations. And despite the fact that these civilizations

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<sup>249</sup> Asher Kaufman, "Pheonicianism: The Formation of an Identity in Lebanon of 1920," *Middle Eastern Studies* 37, no.1 (2001), 181.

<sup>250</sup> For the relations between archeology and nationalism see at: Philip Kohl and Clare Fawcett, *Nationalism, Politics and the Practice of Archeology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

<sup>251</sup> Amatzia Baram, "Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East," *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no.4 (1990): 429.

<sup>252</sup> Niloofar Haeri, *Sacred Language, Ordinary People: Dilemmas of Culture and Politics in Egypt* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 47-136.

elevated him then died . . . changed and were reborn again, the people know always how to emerge from these tests while preserving its original attributes and its pure whole innate character.<sup>253</sup>

In Iraq, archeological museums spread all over the country. Iraqi media gave wide coverage to archeological excavations and Mesopotamian heritage. In 1987 Iraqi government decided to rebuild the ancient city of Babylon at the cost of US \$100,000,000 even if whole country was suffering economic crisis.<sup>254</sup> In addition to this, names of some provinces were changed and ancient Mesopotamian names replaced Islamic names. For instance, Dulaim Province became Anbar, Mosul became Nineveh, Kirkuk became Temim, Hilla became Babil and Diwaniyah became Qadisiyah.

In Jordan the state tried to create distinctive Jordanian identity by emphasizing Nabataean period and especially remnants of Petra. Asher Susser well described the attempts to establish a territorial sense in Jordan:

Jordanian territorialism was projected from a secular vision of history that appropriated equally the pre-Islamic and the Islamic and modern Arab history of the land that became Jordan, all embraced as vestiges of a specifically Jordanian heritage.<sup>255</sup>

Contrary to their predecessors new Jordanian kings promoted unique Jordanian identity. In King Hussein words “Jordan is not a stepping-stone of last resort to other, greater domains, but a model in its own right for Jordanians to be proud of and for other Arabs to follow.”<sup>256</sup> In accordance with rising influence of Jordanian identity, Palestinians who have been inflowing to Jordan after successive Israeli attacks and wars and constitute more than half of the country were removed from the policy making circles of the country. Palestinian issue has always been a transnational problem which should be dealt with by all Arabs or Muslims. Abandoning Palestinian rhetoric and replacing the old slogan “Jordan is Palestine, Palestine is

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<sup>253</sup> Baram, “Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East,” 432.

<sup>254</sup> Ibid., 435.

<sup>255</sup> Asher Susser, “The Palestinians in Jordan: Demographic Majority, Political Minority,” in *Minorities and the State in the Arab World*, eds. Ofra Bengio and Gabriel Ben-Dor (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 98.

<sup>256</sup> Ibid., 99.

Jordan” with “Jordan is Jordan, Palestine is Palestine”<sup>257</sup> weakened the power of transnational powers in Jordan.

Attempts to create *homo nationalis* was a difficult task for ruling elites of Arab countries, because they had to struggle against competing ideologies such as Islam and Arab nationalism. Territorial nationalism was also different in Arab Middle East from Turkey and Iran. 2000 years ago Turks spoke Turkish, Persians spoke Persian. However Arabic was not the language of Iraq, Syria or Lebanon 2000 years ago. In addition to this, pre-Islamic times in Turkish and Persian histories are glorious period for these nations. On the other hand, for many Arabs the era before Islam was *jahiliyya* which means ignorance. In addition to this, leaders of the countries were not originated in where they lived. Iliya Harik well summarizes this situation:

...Sanusi of Libya, whose teachings and authority were accepted by the Cyrenaican tribes, was an Algerian, and the Idrisis of Asir were Moroccans. Al-Mirghani was a Meccan whose following developed in the Sudan and became known as the Khatimiyah movement. The Iraqis and Jordanians accepted Hashemite kings from Hijaz who, though not learned scholars, were nevertheless sharifs.<sup>258</sup>

### **3.4. Territorial Disputes in the Middle East**

Although artificiality of borders in the Middle East is widely accepted phenomenon and several problems of the region are based on these Western-imposed borders, interestingly there are few instances of territorial disputes in the region and states avoid escalate tension because of the territorial problems. With a few exceptions most of the territorial disputes have been peacefully resolved through bilateral agreements. The main challenge to borders of the region comes from the pan-movements or sub-national movements of the region, not states. Although at certain period some states claimed historical rights over their neighbors, such as Syria’s claim over Lebanon or some strong states such as Egypt’s efforts to unify Arab lands, almost all of them gave up their claims. Although some Arab countries are described as “tribes with flags” or “gas stations” the people of these states prefer being a tribe with flag rather being subjects of other countries. Unification of Arab

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<sup>257</sup>Bacık, *Hybrid Sovereignty in the Arab Middle East*, 158.

<sup>258</sup>Harik, “The Origins of the Arab State System, 43.

lands is more controversial than what mainstream thinking suggests, as a teacher in Jordan told “Arabs have nothing in common except Qur’an.”<sup>259</sup>

Borders of the Middle Eastern states are generally considered as lines in the sand, and actually they are lines in the sand. Most of the current borders are first borders that ever have been drawn in throughout the history. However, considering the abundance of oil and gas reserves in the region, where the line is drawn is vitally important issue.<sup>260</sup> Border disputes between Bahrain and Qatar, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Egypt and Sudan, Iran and United Arab Emirates are prominent examples of the territorial disputes in the Middle East.

**Bahrain-Qatar:** Qatar and Bahrain claimed sovereignty over the Hawar Islands although Hawar Islands geographically close to Qatar, the fashts (shoals) of al-Dibal and al-Jaradah, territorial waters of the Persian Gulf, and Zubarah district of the Qatari peninsula. These areas are potentially oil rich and in 1986 the armed struggle between two countries was only avoided by Saudi mediation. This dispute was resolved by International Court of Justice in 2001, and this case is the only territorial dispute between two Arab states resolved by the Court.<sup>261</sup> According to the Court’s decision Hawar Islands and al-Jaradah were given to Bahrain, Zubarah, the Janan Islands, and al-Dibal were given to Qatar.

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<sup>259</sup> Interview with the author, 15 June 2014, Amman

<sup>260</sup> Iraq’s territorial disputes with other states will be examined in Chapter 3

<sup>261</sup> Krista Wiegand, “Bahrain, Qatar, and the Hawar Islands: Resolution of a Gulf Territorial Dispute,” *The Middle East Journal* 66, no.1 (2012): 79.





**Map 4: Iraq-Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia-Kuwait Neutral Zones**  
**Source: Frank Jacobs, Put it in Neutral, The New York Times, 1 May 2012**


**Saudi Arabia-Jordan:** Even before the creation of Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud, then leader of Najd region and future founder of Saudi Arabia, protested British border arrangements in the areas known as Jordan today. Both Najd and Transjordan claimed Ma'an, Wadi Sirhan and Aqaba. The Hadda Agreement of 1925 between the government of Najd and the government of Transjordan determine the border between the areas and left Wadi Sirhan to Najd and incorporated Ma'an and Aqaba to Transjordan.<sup>262</sup> However Saudi Arabia did not give up its claim on Aqaba until 1965. After series of bilateral negotiations Saudi Arabia recognized Jordan's full control on Aqaba which was only port of Jordan and thus carries a significant importance for Jordan.

**Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States:** Saudi Arabia maintained territorial claims against Qatar from 1965 to 2008, Abu Dhabi from 1952 to 1974, Oman from 1934 to 1990 and Yemen 1934 to 2000.<sup>263</sup> The main dispute between Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Oman was al-Buraimi region. In 1952 Saudi troops invaded one of the nine villages in Buraimi Oasis but later British-led forces expelled them. Later, Saudi

<sup>262</sup> Clive Leatherdale, *Britain and Saudi Arabia 1925-1939: The Imperial Oasis* (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), 376.

<sup>263</sup> Krista Wiegand, "Resolution of Border Disputes in the Arabian Gulf," *The Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies* 1, no.1 (2014), 37.

Arabia withdrew its claim on this region by signing Treaty of Jeddah in 1974. In return for this renounce, Saudi Arabia took Khor Duweihin corridor. With this achievement Saudi Arabia has another access to the Gulf and cut the physical connection of Qatar and UAE. However this treatment was signed by Abu Dhabi on behalf of UAE but UAE government never ratified the agreement. That's mean UAE-Saudi borders are de facto borders.




**Map 5: Saudi-Emirati Border Change**

Source: Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection, the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin, [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/unitedarabemirates.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/unitedarabemirates.jpg) and [http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle\\_east\\_and\\_asia/united\\_arab\\_emirates\\_rel95.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/united_arab_emirates_rel95.jpg).

The Western part of Yemen-Saudi Arabia border was settled by Taif Treaty of 1934 but eastern part of the border which is 800 kilometers long was not demarcated. Yemen's claims based on Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1914 which determined Ottoman and British spheres of influence and borderline offered by Britain in 1935. On the other hand Saudi Arabia grounded on Ibn Saud's 1935 proposals.<sup>264</sup> Yemen and Saudi Arabia battled over the border in 1995, 1997, and 1998. In 2000 through

<sup>264</sup> G.H. Blake, "International Boundaries and Territorial Stability in the Middle East: An Assessment," *GeoJournal* 28, no.3 (1992): 368.

bilateral negotiations border was clearly delimited and Yemen gave up claims on territory which is annexed by Saudi Arabia in 1926.



**Map 6: Saudi Arabi-Yemen Territorial Disputes**

Source: John Roberts, "The Saudi-Yemeni Boundary Treaty," *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin* (2000): 71.

**Egypt-Sudan:** Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1899 set the Egypt-Sudan border which runs along the 22 North Latitude, but in 1902, although it is north of the 22th latitude, the control of Halaib Triangle located on the Red Sea coast was given to Sudan in order to facilitate administration of nomadic tribes. The area is under the de facto control of Egypt but Sudan claims sovereignty over the area.

**Iran-United Arab Emirates:** The dispute between Iran and UAE derives from three islands in the Gulf: Abu Musa, Tunb and Lesser Tunb. These islands were under the British control but Iran's claim on these islands dated back to old times. In 1968, Britain declared its withdrawal from the region and Iran's ambitions revived. After Britain's withdrawal sovereignty of Abu Musa was transferred to Emirate of Sharjah and Tunb and Lesser Tunb's control were given to Emirate of Ras al-Khaymah. In that period, Iran's military capacity dramatically increased. As military might of Iran

increased, so its territorial ambitions grew. Iran occupied these three islands in 1971. Sharjah and Iran reached an agreement, but dispute between Ras al-Khaimah and Iran remains.



**Map 7: UAE-Iran Territorial Disputes**  
**Source: Independent Analytical Center for Geopolitical Studies**

There are several factors behind these disputes. European borders are results of centuries old struggles for most of the countries. After scores of wars, conflicts and negotiations European borders were settled. Since the majority of the borders in the Middle East are recent creations several disputes arose after the initial demarcation. For the first time in the history, the region was demarcated by clear-cut borders and intensely mobile Middle Eastern tribes could not adopt their lifestyles easily. Their annual migration violated border system of the region and some of them had multiple loyalties. The new type of sovereignty which is bounded by territory was different from the old one which can be carried by people. This contradiction created some problems at the early phase of foundation of territorial system in the region. Newly-established states were another reason for territorial disputes in the region. The legitimacy of Kuwait, Lebanon and Jordan was lately recognized by Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia respectively. According to mainstream Iraqi perception Kuwait was integral part of Iraqi territory. Lebanon was at center of Great Syria narrative and

Saudi Arabia gave up its claims over Jordan's southern province after the British mediation. Natural resources or strategic reasons are another dimension of the disputes, especially in the oil rich Gulf region.

### **3.5. Challenges to the state centric political imaginary and territorial state in the Middle East**

Comprehending the territoriality in the Middle East requires understanding obstacles and challenges to the territoriality and territorial state in the region. The Middle East region is rift with deterritorializing factors which erode state territoriality and Westphalian sovereignty. These factors have been effective since the implementation of territorial state in the region and states' power has been too weak to counter these factors.

The injection of Western territorial state weakened the former system but it could not entirely replace it. As it is mentioned earlier, the Western modern state requires centralized, territorial and sovereign state which possesses the monopoly on the use of legitimate force and inhabited by its citizens who have equal rights regardless of any social, religious or ethnic barrier. Although central governments have been operating in a territorially bounded area and they have components of modern statehood such as diplomatic relations with other states, administrative state apparatus and borders, they lack of institutional and structural power to govern their territories at the operational level. They also failed to redirect people's loyalty from religion, tribe or region to the state. As Sami Zubaida puts they are not "modern states" but are "like Western states."<sup>265</sup> Scott Pegg's description of quasi-state envisages many of the Middle Eastern states:

States which are internationally recognized as full juridical equals, possessing the same rights and privileges as any other state, yet which manifestly lack all but the most rudimentary empirical capabilities. The quasi-state has a flag, an ambassador, a capital city and a seat at the United Nations General Assembly but it does not function positively as a viable governing entity. It is generally incapable of delivering services to its population and the scope of its governance often does not extend beyond the capital city, if even there.<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>265</sup> Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and the State* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 145.

<sup>266</sup> Scott Pegg, "De Facto States in the International System," *Institute of International Relations The University of British Columbia Working Paper*, no. 21 (1998): 1.

This means that, according to Robert Jackson's conceptualization<sup>267</sup> several Middle Eastern states are negative sovereigns. Negative sovereignty means freedom from outside interference and prioritizes the non-intervention principle. It refers to state-state relations. On the other hand, positive sovereigns provide political goods for its citizens. Many Middle Eastern states lack this capacity. Abdulaziz Alheis describes this as follows:

As a general rule, the modern Arab state has been unable to entice a sense of comfort among its citizens based on the achievement of social justice, the welfare of the citizen, the preservation of rights and security, and the permission for popular participation; additionally, over half a century, the state was unable to present itself as a unionist, patriotic, and mature experiment that could be relied upon by the individual citizen.<sup>268</sup>

This incapability of the state in the region weakens the territorial dimension of politics and creates a significant obstacle for consolidation of territorial state in the region. Modern territoriality requires a sovereign state which has the supreme authority in a clearly demarcated territory and this territory is the source of political loyalty. Establishment of the Western territorial state was also the triumph of the central state against its rivals. This means that de facto and de jure authority was united and allocated to only the state. In several Middle Eastern countries, state is not the only political power and its territorial control is limited. Moreover, the state lacks the capacity to direct people's loyalty to the territory and unite them around territorial sentiments.

Weak correlation between war-making and state formation in the Middle East is another significant difference between European and Middle Eastern state. As Charles Tilly's classic works *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*<sup>269</sup> and *Coercion, Capital, and European States AD 990-1990*<sup>270</sup> suggest wars, especially war preparations which cause countrywide mobilizations in Europe had significant

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<sup>267</sup> Robert Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 26-29.

<sup>268</sup> Abdulaziz Alheis, "The Tribe and Democracy: The Case of Monarchist Iraq (1921-1958)," *Arab Center for Research & Policy Studies*, (2011): 3.

<sup>269</sup> Charles Tilly, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

<sup>270</sup> Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990* (Cambridge and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990).

role on the creation of states and expansion of their capacities. On the other hand wars in the Middle East have destructive impact on state structures, because as Steven Heydemann explains “in the Middle East as in other developing regions, war making has been indirect, mediated, and deeply transnationalized.”<sup>271</sup> For instance Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Jordan used Palestinian Liberation Organization against each other at certain time. Iran and Syria used Kurdish groups against Turkey although they have Kurdish problem as well. Iranian opposition movements such as *Mujahidin-e Khalq* easily found protection in Iraq. Iraq supported revolutionary groups in the Gulf; the Gulf countries helped Salafi militant movements to spread in other states. Palestinian group Fatah was formed in Cairo, Algerian group of military officers and politicians who led the Algerian Independence War gathered in Oujda, Morocco. In addition to this, Arab states generally financed their wars with oil rent, aids of other Arab states or in the Cold War, Soviet aids. Weapons, especially advanced weaponry, financial support especially capital flows, and military assistance especially military advisors came from other states. Thierry Gongora clearly shows that the period of most intense war making in Egypt (1967-73), Iraq (1980-88), Iran (1980-88), and Syria (1980-90) resulted a liberalization and privatization of economy instead of a strengthening *étatisme*.<sup>272</sup> War making is constructive destruction for territorial state, but in the Middle East it causes constant destruction to state authority.

Iraq after the 2010 is remarkable example for destructive effects of war and war preparations for state in the Middle Eastern countries contrary to European states. It became clear that Iraqi army could not protect Iraqis and defend Iraqi territory when ISIS captured the city of Mosul within a very limited time. Many of the soldiers deployed in Mosul deserted at the beginning of the assault and none of the unit of the Iraqi Army could start counter attack. Then, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the religious leader of the majority of the Iraqi Shiites whose verdicts bind his followers issued a *fatwa* on June 10, 2014 which urged people to fight against ISIS, defend

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<sup>271</sup> Steven Heydemann, “War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East,” in *War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East*, ed. Steven Heydemann (Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 2000), 9.

<sup>272</sup> Thierry Gongora, “War Making and State Power in the Contemporary Middle East,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29, no.3 (1997): 323-340.

their people, country and holy places.<sup>273</sup> After this *fatwa* a huge wave of armament occurred, numerous militia groups were formed and hundreds of Shiites joined these militia groups. Although Sistani recommended joining army and regular units, majority of the volunteers preferred militia units rather than notoriously corrupt army. ISIS attack on Mosul could have been a chance for the creation of an effective Iraqi army, state, and nation. However this mobilization strengthened numerous militia groups which have different agendas, affiliations and methods and strengthened their position against Baghdad government. Although militia groups play a crucial role in defeating ISIS, some of these unregulated and uncontrolled groups commit extrajudicial executions and human rights violations which erode the sovereignty of state and its territorial control.

Modern Middle Eastern territorial state could not uproot primordial and traditional institutions which are obstacles to the establishment of the territorial state and political loyalty. Although large and modern bureaucracies and institutions were formed, they have always been under the influence of tribal or family bonds and personal followings played a great political role. “The roles of tribalism, sectarianism, regionalism, primordial sentiments, and ascriptive identities in Middle Eastern politics contributed to the view that the state is little more than an arena of socially engendered conflict or an instrument of family, sect, or class domination.”<sup>274</sup> One-man (Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt), one-clan (Tikritis of Iraq) or one-family (Assad family of Syria) rules have always been a driving force in Arab politics. Most of the members of the 1914 Egyptian Legislative Assembly belonged to the same families.<sup>275</sup> As can be understood from their names, Hussein Party or Nashashibi Party of Palestine were not Western-type political parties, they are formed by great families of Palestine to pursue these families’ interests. That applies to The National Defense Party founded by Nashashibi family; Reform Party established by Khalidi family; the Palestine Arab Party set up by the Hussein family as well.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>273</sup> بيان صادر من مكتب سماحة السيد السيستاني - دام ظلّه - في النجف الأشرف حول التطورات الأمنية الأخيرة في محافظة نينوى <http://www.sistani.org/arabic/statement/24906/> (accessed: July 9, 2015).

<sup>274</sup> Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Comparative Politics* 20, no.1 (1987): 1.

<sup>275</sup> Alfred Bonne, *State and Economics in the Middle East* (Oxford: Routledge, 2001), 97.

<sup>276</sup> Zvi Elpeleg, *The Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Hussaini: Founder of the Palestinian National Movement* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 1993), 35.

Sectarianism and tribalism are the most significant examples of subnational identities in the Middle East. The Middle East has been witnessing a widespread sectarian strife among different Sunni and Shia groups which creates political, social and humanitarian concerns. Doctrinal, cultural, historical and ritualistic differences between Sunnis and Shiites have always existed. However secular military regimes or wealthy monarchies can drape this division with Arab nationalism or Islamism for a long time. However these state structures which were sustained by authoritarian regimes were shaken by Arab Uprisings. In some countries state apparatus completely collapsed or verged on collapse. In this atmosphere political or juridical constructs such as citizenship has weakened and more salient and immediately present identities such as sects or tribes have replaced citizenship. The sectarian conflict in the region has prompted local Shiite and Sunni groups in many Muslim countries to back different factions in conflict-zones, therefore commencing a key radicalization process in the other parts of the Middle East. For instance crisis in Iraq creates distrust between indigenous Shiite and Sunni population in Bahrain, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Yemen. With the devastating civil war afflicted upon Syria, the area encompassing Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon has become one crisis zone. In this atmosphere, sectarian groups begin to act as a state and their membership bonds are stronger than citizenship. The institutionalization of sectarian identities has imbued a religious guise on the political interests and strategies between different groups in the whole region. Therefore, completely mundane matters concerning daily life can take the form of indisputable religious dogmas. For instance all economic, social, political and geographical reasons behind the Syrian war are senseless for both Sunni and Shiite sectarians. For Sunni sectarians it is a jihad that every Muslim should join and for Shiite sectarians it is second Karbala (traumatic war which grandson of Prophet Mohammed was killed) and ongoing struggle between good and evil. The inability to develop a concept of citizenship that covers all segments of society and their interests, desires and fears has accentuated sectarian and tribal identities, and the dispute for power, wealth, and status between different groups has become a zero-sum game.

Tribalism is also another significant subnational identity in the region. Tribalism in the Middle East is not primitive way of politics. It is a very complex phenomenon

that affects political and social life. In some cases, tribal affiliations are more important than ethnic or religious bonds and older than these. For instance some Shiite tribes in southern Iraq adopted Shiite Islam only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>277</sup> Alheis argues that “the Arab man’s receptivity to the culture of the tribe has made this culture and its notions persist with him in urban areas as they do in the desert or the countryside. This culture is as active and influential in the modern state as it was in the time of caravans and Bedouin modes of living.”<sup>278</sup> Modern Arab state’s failure to create national identity and provide security for all play crucial role on the rise of tribal social structures just like sectarianism. On the other hand states and regimes which cannot create loyalty among its subjects to the political authority also use tribalism to secure themselves. For instance *al-Murra* tribe of Saudi Arabia is one reserve unit within the Saudi Arabian National Guard.<sup>279</sup> Saddam Hussein gave privileges and exemptions to tribes in order to gain their support. In some cases, tribes are given extrajudicial rights and tribal code of honor was supported by the highest political figures to improve their prestige in the eyes of public. Tribalism in the region is not limited by Muslim Arabs. Christians and other minorities also deeply depend on their tribal networks. Many tribes in the region have different branches in different countries. For instance prominent Arab tribes such as *Annizah*, *Dulaim*, *Jubur*, *Shammar* have branches in Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and even southern Turkey and in some cases interaction among them is higher than their fellow citizens. These trans-territorial networks damage the territorial base of the state and due to patronage ties make states more vulnerable to the outside penetration.

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<sup>277</sup> Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: The Role of Tribes,” Council on Foreign Relations, (accessed: 8.2.2014), <http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-role-tribes/p7681>

<sup>278</sup> Alheis, “The Tribe and Democracy: The Case of Monarchist Iraq (1921-1958),” 4.

<sup>279</sup> Daniel Bates and Amal Rassam, *People and the Cultures of the Middle East* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2001), 140.

### **3.5.1. Extraterritorial Peoples of the Middle East: Refugees, Displaced Peoples, Migrant Workers**

#### **3.5.1.1. Labor Migration and Migrant Workers**

Massive migration in the region is another factor that weakens territorial dimension of identity in the Middle East. Like 18<sup>th</sup> century tribes which migrated for economic and political reasons, migrant workers lose their links with places where they are rooted and therefore forget their territorial identity. Migration has the same effect on the host country. Since majority of the host countries are tiny-populated Gulf sheikdoms, massive migration changed the demographic structure of the society and native people became minority in quantitative terms.

Labor migration is an effective phenomenon that shapes the social structure of the Middle East. Poverty, unemployment, underemployment, lack of social services and squalid living conditions are severe problems of the one part of the region. As for the other part, underpopulated overgrowing countries due to oil money need labor force in every sector. This situation causes high level of migration in the region and Middle East hosts several “migrant dependent” countries. According to International Monetary Fund statistics, between 1980 and 1985 the world’s most migrant dependent states were North Yemen, South Yemen, Jordan, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Egypt respectively.<sup>280</sup> This means that there were four Arab states in the list and the other two states mainly sent their workers to the Middle East.

According to Gulf Labor Markets and Migration Statistics, in 2014, 48 percent of the total population of Gulf Cooperation Council which includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates are non-nationals. This rate is 51.1 percent in Bahrain, 68.9 percent in Kuwait, 85.7 percent in Qatar, 88.5 percent in United Arab Emirates.<sup>281</sup> Although several times the Gulf countries tried to nationalize their labor market, they did not achieve this because of their tiny native population. Rich oil states aim to employ migrant workers in short term, reject their citizenship demands and prevent them to integrate with the local society. In addition to this, if host countries have a problem with emigrant countries, they deport them.

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<sup>280</sup> International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1990. (In 2013, top three were Tajikistan, Liberia and Kyrgyzstan, Remittance Man, Economist, 7 September 2013)

<sup>281</sup> GCC: Total Populations and Percentage of Nationals and Non-Nationals in GCC Countries, 2010-2014, Gulf Labor Markets and Migration

Because of Palestine Liberation Organization's support for Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War, the Gulf countries deported thousands of Palestinian workers. Host governments also spatially segregate these workers, especially Asians from indigenous people. These workers generally live in distant desert sites or work camps. *Ruwais* (Abu Dhabi), *Jebel Ali* (Dubai), *Shuaibi* (Kuwait), *Umm Said* (Qatar) and *Jubail* (Saudi Arabia) are examples of workers enclaves that reduce interaction between workers and local people at the minimum level.<sup>282</sup>

### 3.5.1.2. Refugees and Displacements in the Middle East

No part of the world has been more suffered from forced immigrations, refugee influxes and internally displacements than the Middle East. Arab-Israeli wars, civil wars, coups and political instability make Middle East and North Africa the main region of origin of refugees worldwide.<sup>283</sup> Displacement is not result of the political and security crisis, sometimes it is a tool for strategic and political goals orchestrated by political actors. The most known example of this is Saddam Hussein's demographical policies. Saddam uprooted thousands of Kurds from their lands and forced them to settle in southern Arab regions. Similarly, Arabs were settled in the Kurdish areas and oil-rich Kirkuk. He also brought Arabs from Sudan and Mauritania to settle the Kurdish highlands.<sup>284</sup> Saddam also drained wetlands of the marshes by diverting the flow of Tigris and Euphrates. As a consequence of this, only in December 1991 and January 1992 over 50,000 people left their homes.<sup>285</sup>

Jordan is at the centre of displacement movements in the Middle East. Circassian immigrants from the Caucasus came to Jordan in 1870s. Then, urban merchants from Syria, Lebanon and Palestine resided in Amman after Hejaz Railroad reached the city

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<sup>282</sup> Allan Findlay, *The Arab World* (New York and London: Routledge, 2003), 115.

<sup>283</sup> UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2014, p.4

<sup>284</sup> Mehrdad Izady, *The Kurds: A Concise Handbook* (New York and London, Routledge, 1993), 69.

<sup>285</sup> Michael Wood, "Saddam drains the life of the Marsh Arabs: The Arabs of southern Iraq cannot endure their villages being bombed and their land being poisoned, and are seeking refuge in Iran," (accessed: June 7, 2015), <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saddam-drains-the-life-of-the-marsh-arabs-the-arabs-of-southern-iraq-cannot-endure-their-villages-being-bombed-and-their-land-being-poisoned-and-are-seeking-refuge-in-iran-michael-wood-reports-from-huwaiza-marsh-on-the-death-of-a-5000-year-old-culture-1463823.html>

in 1903. A massive Palestinian migration in 1948 after Israeli occupation changed Jordan's destiny. This influx was followed by other waves after every Arab-Israeli war. Jordan also hosted immigrants from Lebanon during the civil war of 1975-1991. Escalation of violence in Iraq after 2003 and especially 2010 exceedingly increased Iraqi immigrant in Jordan. According to estimation of International Organization for Migration, more than 750,000 Iraqis reside in Jordan.<sup>286</sup> After the escalation of sectarian strife in Iraq under Nouri al-Maliki rule, several Sunni notables including tribal leaders, former high level state officials and politicians had resided in Jordan as well. Lastly, outbreak of Syrian civil war displaced millions of people and they fled neighboring countries. As of June 2015, United Nations had registered 629,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan.<sup>287</sup>

Lebanon, religiously and ethnically divided country whose internal stability depends on very sensitive balances has been confronting serious refugee problems. Almost 10 percent of the country is Palestinians and overwhelming majority of them is stateless and have no civil rights.<sup>288</sup> Syrian war creates another massive influx of refugees. It is estimated that more than 1.3 million registered-Syrians live in Lebanon whose total population is only 4.5 million. Considering the living conditions of Syrian refugees, the current situation is unquestionably a humanitarian crisis. In addition to refugees' impact on Lebanon's economy, demographics, political instability, and security, it creates also a crisis for territorial nation-state and prevents the consolidation of it. Lebanon has no national foreign policy towards Syrian civil war. Different groups in the country took different sides and even involved in the war and their attitudes toward Syrian refugees vary. Several groups in Lebanon, especially Christians and Shiites oppose Syrians presence in their country and this situation damages the fragile political stability in the country. Stateless Syrians are also another anomaly in the era of nation states. A 2014 survey of 5,779 Syrian newborns

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<sup>286</sup> International Organization for Migration, <https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/where-we-work/africa-and-the-middle-east/middle-east-and-north-africa/jordan.default.html?displayTab=facts-and-figures>, (accessed: March 7, 2015).

<sup>287</sup> The UN Refugee Agency, Syria Regional Refuge Response, (accessed June 9, 2015). <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107>

<sup>288</sup> Simon Haddad, "The Palestinian Predicament in Lebanon," *Middle East Quarterly* 7, no.3 (2000), 29.

in Lebanon found that 72 per cent do not possess an official birth certificate and it seems unlikely that the Damascus regime will provide them citizenship.<sup>289</sup>

Growing sectarian strife and assaults of Islamic State of Iraq and Sham created one of the biggest internal displacements in modern history of the Middle East. According to Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimations, at least 3,276,000 Iraqis were internally displaced as of 15 January 2015.<sup>290</sup> They spread all over the country and especially Kurdistan Regional Government received a considerable amount of refugees.

Refugees and internally displaced people pose a crucial threat to territorial design of the region. These uprooted people lost their territorial links and beliefs. Since majority of the children in squalid living conditions do not have education opportunities, areas of socialization, national symbols or narratives they develop a consciousness without territorial belongings.

### 3.5.2. “Pan” and Transnational Movements

Every “pan” movement is transnational and trans-territorial in its nature and contradicts territorial sovereignty and nationalism. For instance, for an Iraqi patriot Iraqi territory with its history, landscape, culture, and traditions is what an Iraqi citizen should sacrifice his life. For this patriot every people who live in Iraqi territory have equal rights because citizenship, rights, and identity is shaped according to territory. On the other hand many “pan” movements are *ad personam*, they focus on people rather than territory. Focal point is all Arabs for pan-Arabism, and Muslim *ummah* for pan-Islamism. This trans-border affiliation complicates consolidation of territorial identity. Moreover, “pan” movements tend to violate the essence of the territoriality: the impermeability of territory. These movements usually intervenes other states affairs and try to influence their politics. For instance, Baathist Iraq when pan-Arabism was at its peak overthrew the territorial structure of the region. Palestine was seen as a first and foremost Arab issue and was almost a

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<sup>289</sup> Lebanon, 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile, <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e486676.html>, (accessed: March 7, 2015).

<sup>290</sup> Iraq IDP Figures Analysis, IDCM, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/figures-analysis>, (accessed: March 7, 2015).

domestic issue for Iraq. Jordan was also Iraq's target area. The slogan "the road to victory and to the liberation of Palestine goes through Amman" was popular among Baath circles.<sup>291</sup> Iraq also supported revolutionary movements across the Gulf. Iraq deployed airfields and 12,000 soldiers in Jordan after the Six Days War<sup>292</sup> and 6,000 troops in Syria in 1969.<sup>293</sup> Iraq also accused its rival for the leadership of pan-Arabism Nasser's Egypt for "imperialism, reaction, capitalism dictatorship, military and civilian bureaucracy."<sup>294</sup>

Transitivity of the Middle East has always been high and people, movements and ideas move easily. Middle Eastern history is full of consecutive developments which occurred in different parts of the region. Likewise several phenomena influence whole region due to its transnational character. The mean of transnational in this context is well described by Fred Halliday:

'Transnational' here identifies the ways in which, not just recently but in all of history, no single society and no process within it can be insulated from the broader international context in which it is located: the Middle East was from 1800 onwards influenced by the rise of Europe; more recently no Arab society is immune to the Palestine issue, just as no Muslim society was insulated from the Iranian revolution.<sup>295</sup>

For instance, succession of secular Arab nationalist movements occurred in a short time. In 1952, Free Officers in Egypt staged a coup and took control of the country. In 1956 Tunisia gained its independence. In 1958 Abd al-Karim Qasim seized power in Iraq. In 1962 Algeria became independent, in 1963 Baath coup seized power in Syria, in 1964 Sudan October Revolution occurred and in 1969 Muammer Gaddafi took power in Libya. Spread of Muslim Brotherhood throughout the region is another example of the transitivity of the region. Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928 in Egypt and then expanded in Syria in 1940, among Palestinians and

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<sup>291</sup> Joseph Nevo, "Jordan and Saudi Arabia: The Last Royalists in *Jordan in the Middle East 1948-1988: The Making of a Pivotal State*, eds. Joseph Nevo and Ilan Pappé, 120 (Essex and Oregon: Frank Cass, 1994).

<sup>292</sup> Daniel Dishon, *Middle East Record: 1968* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1973), 164, 379.

<sup>293</sup> Daniel Dishon, *Middle East Record: 1969-1970* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press), 563

<sup>294</sup> Baram, "Qawmiyya and Wataniyya in Ba'thi Iraq," 190.

<sup>295</sup> Fred Halliday, *The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics, and Ideology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 232.

Transjordanians somewhat later and Sudan in 1949. Democratization process in the region also followed similar patterns. Starting in the late 1970s and continuing for the next decade Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Yemen, Morocco lifted press censorship, released political prisoners and authorized several political parties. Arab Uprisings which started in 2010 in Tunisia also influenced whole region in a limited time.

In addition to this feature, Middle Eastern lands bear the stamp of Arab and Islamic civilizations. These are two main dynamics that have had and continue to have a great influence on almost everything in the region. Although these have culturally constructive impacts, for territorial state they are obstacles to consolidate it. All transnational and “pan” movements such as pan-Arabism, pan-Islamism, jihadism etc. are transterritorial. Their proponents believe that territorial states and borders are artificial creatures imposed by the Westerners to divide Arabs or Muslims. Common ground of all these movements is their disapproval of territorial system of the region because they see it as a humiliation for their nation or *ummah*. These movements aim to transcend territorial states and redirect people’s loyalty to their ideals. As Lisa Anderson argues:

The notions of citizenship, patriotism, and love of country which undergird loyalty to the modern state frequently face competing conceptions of identity, loyalty, and legitimacy. Indeed, even state elites often find themselves better served by nonstate ideologies: the pan-Arab nationalism of the ruling Ba’th in Iraq and Syria, the international vocation of the Libyan revolution, and the Islamic republic in Iran all constitute efforts to inspire loyalty on bases--ethnicity, ideology, religion--which deny the primacy of the state as an object of fidelity.<sup>296</sup>

Pan-Arabism attracted millions of people during 1960s and Egyptian president Gamal Abd an-Naser was champion of this idea. When he nationalized Suez Canal, survived after 1957 war, built Aswan Dam, these were not perceived as Egyptian national achievements but as a pride and aspiration for all Arabs. According to John Esposito:

The emergence of the Arab nationalism/ socialism of Nasser and the Baath party signaled a period in which local or state nationalism was transformed into or equated with a transnational, Pan-Arab nationalist sentiment that

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<sup>296</sup> Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” *Comparative Politics* 20, no. 1 (1987): 13.

stressed Arab political unification and independence from foreign domination.<sup>297</sup>

In 1945 Arab League was established, in 1953 the Arab Games were inaugurated in Alexandria. One of the aims of the games was “to unite the youth from different Arab States who have common sporting ambitions. This allows them to get to know each other better and to help each other at the sporting level.”<sup>298</sup> Arab Renaissance Day of Iraq and Jordan which celebrates the beginning of 1916 Arab Revolt, Egypt’s Revolution Day after the coup of the Free Officers, Iraq’s commemoration of 1920 Revolt against British occupation, Evacuation and Martyr Days of Syria became an arena for anti-imperialist pan-Arab solidarity. At the sixth National Party Congress in 1963, Syria was described as an “Arab homeland” inhabited by Arabs ranging from the Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>299</sup> Even in 2000, newly-elected Syrian president Bashar al-Assad suggested that “Arab unity had become a crucial demand and that the Arab world should look forward to achieving unification, even stages by stages and if the unity has not been achieved so far, it remains a legitimate goal.”<sup>300</sup> Iraqi president Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr’s words are one of the best examples that shows the scope of pan-Arabism:

[It is our duty] to liberate the Arab people everywhere. Colonialism doesn't exist in Palestine alone; but ... in every Arab land. . . . [Thus] we should . . . ignite the Arab revolution in every Arab land.<sup>301</sup>

It was not easy to consolidate territorial states in the region for a long time. Diminishing Western-imposed borders and create a pan-Arab state was very prevalent promise of Arab leaders who wanted to attract people’s attention and support. Several attempts of unification were made, but they were generally failed. The most striking example of this idea was emergence of United Arab Republic

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<sup>297</sup> John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 72.

<sup>298</sup> Luis Henrique Rolim Silva and Hans-Dieter Gerber, “Our Games! The Pan-Arab Games (1953-1965),” *The International Journal of the History of Sport* 29, no. 15 (2012), 2103.

<sup>299</sup> Jordi Tejel, *Syria’s Kurds: History, Politics and Society* (Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 57.

<sup>300</sup> President Bashar Assad’s First Words, (accessed July 7, 2015) [http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=category&id=106&Itemid=496](http://www.presidentassad.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id=106&Itemid=496)

<sup>301</sup> Amatzia Baram, “Qavmiyya and Wataniyya in Ba’athi Iraq: The Search for a New Balance,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no. 2 (1983), 190.

(1958-1961), a political union between Egypt and Syria. Later, North Yemen (Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen) and United Arab Republic formed United Arab States (1958-1961). Muammar Gaddafi aimed to unify his country first with Egypt, and Tunisia and later Morocco, but failed to achieve it. Gaddafi even once personally drove a bulldozer through Libya-Egypt border crossing to show his belief that there should be no limitation on movement between Libya and Egypt.<sup>302</sup> The only successful unification in this period is unification of North Yemen and South Yemen. Although two Yemens are united in terms of external territories, structural differences and power struggles between them remained as it became clear after 2015 Houthi coup.

Pan-Islamism, a transnational idea that aims to bind all Muslims by establishing Islamic state and demolishing barriers among Muslims is another enemy of the territorial state in the region. They generally portray leaders of the Arab states as puppets of the Western powers and humiliate territorial states as artificial creatures. Their Ideologically motivated Islamists who felt disappointment, frustration, and anger from local and national problems could not achieve their goals in their societies. Neither could they transform society nor toppled their secular governments. These people involved transnational activities and tried to find opportunities that they could not find in their homelands. As Dīa Rashwan writes “radical Islamic groupings began to reorient their vision outwards, away from their societies, toward issues among which there is the widespread popular and official consensus in the Arab and Islamic worlds.”<sup>303</sup> As David Malet puts, “transnational ideological affiliation was a highly salient identity because immigration and modernization had destroyed other communal ties and produced isolated, embattled individuals ripe for recruitment by movements that spoke to their particular fears.”<sup>304</sup> They are concerned primarily with local and national issues,<sup>305</sup> but disappointment,

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<sup>302</sup> Alasdair Drysdale, “Transboundary Interaction and Political Conflict in the Central Middle East: The Case of Syria,” in *The Middle East and North Africa World Boundaries*, eds. Clive Schofield and Richard Schofield, 22 (New York and London: Routledge, 1994).

<sup>303</sup> Dīa Rashwan, “Wishful thinking, present and future”, *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 7-13 February 2002.

<sup>304</sup> David Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions”, *Orbis*, 2010,p.109

<sup>305</sup> Sidney Tarrow, *The New Transnational Activism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), xiii, 53, 54.

frustration and anger derive from local or national issues lead them to involve transnational activities because they have no not that opportunity in their homelands. Palestinian issue is another obstacle to the consolidation of the territorial state. First of all, Palestinians constitute one of the biggest refugee, migrant, stateless and extraterritorial group in the world. They played a significant role in transnationalizing the region. Olivier Roy describes this situation as follows:

The third generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, such as those living in the Nahr Al Barid refugee camp, has experienced what I would call a process of de-Palestinization. They are no longer focused on Palestinian politics and have no hope of returning to that land, but neither have they acquired a new identity or citizenship. As a result, they have 'switched' from a desperate national struggle to identification with the global ummah."<sup>306</sup>

Secondly, Palestinian issue has been at the center of almost every transnational movement in the Middle East. Both pan-Arab and pan-Islam movements attach great importance to the Palestinian case. In 1970s, Palestinian cause was considered as an Arab issue, and the existence of Israel was seen as an imperialist plot against Arabs. The establishment of Israel is not only a territorial loss, but also a humanitarian crisis because of the refugees, an indicator of the weaknesses of Arab people, more importantly a huge humiliation in consequence of defeats in wars against Israel. Abd al-Khaliq al- Samarra describes the importance of Palestine for pan-Arabism:

The Palestine issue is the core and essence of all the slogans and aims of the Arab revolution. . . There is no revolutionary impulse progress, no pan-Arabism, and no local patriotism in the case of a regime, party or individual ... detached from ... the struggle to liberate it [Palestine]<sup>307</sup>

With the rise of religious consciousness and its political repercussions, Palestine became a religious issue and the struggle to liberate Palestine was legitimized by Islamic terms. In time, religion forged ahead of different dimensions of the problem like territoriality, ethnicity, identity, and power politics.

Founding fathers of Islamist movements had strongly emphasized the importance of Palestine for their ideologies and aims. This emphasis could range from propaganda documents to armed struggle. Abdullah Azzam described Palestine as a blessed land

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<sup>306</sup> Olivier Roy, "Radicalisation and De-radicalisation, Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence," (paper presented at the first International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, London, 17-18 January 2008).

<sup>307</sup> Baram, "Qavmiyya and Wataniyya in Ba'athi Iraq," 193.

and heart of the Islamic world and the foremost Islamic problem.<sup>308</sup> He also encouraged people many times to regain Palestine. He claimed that “if only the Muslims would apply their Lord's command and implement the laws of their *Shariah* concerning the General March for just one week in Palestine, Palestine would be completely purified of Jews.”<sup>309</sup> For Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Palestinian issue is beyond political or geostrategic dimensions. He accused political parties in Egypt being aloof to Palestinian cause and claimed that their nationalism is below the level for creating a feeling for Arabism and for the Islamic bond.<sup>310</sup> According to him, defending Palestine is a religious duty for all Muslims. He wrote in *Al-Nazeer* magazine on March 25, 1937 and saying that “Palestine is not the case of a specific geographical entity; it is rather the case of the Islam that you embrace; Palestine is an injured part of the Islamic body; any part that doesn't feel the pain and suffering of Palestine doesn't belong to that body or structure.”<sup>311</sup> He also said in the *al-Ikhwān Al-Muslimūn* newspaper on June 6, 1936 “the Palestinian people are our brethren; those stopping short of helping Palestine, are actually stopping short of defending Allah and His messenger, and didn't defend Islam; those who helped it and exerted efforts and money for it, defended Allah and His messenger and defended Islam.”<sup>312</sup>

Palestinian problem had tremendous influence on some Shiite scholars. Ayatollah Khomeini was the leading figure of this camp. He was strict enemy of Israel and this attitude continued after he established Islamic Republic. He believed that establishment of Israel is not only Palestinians' problem. It is a grave danger that threatens all region because the power that built Israel will not stop in Palestine. He claimed that “everyone must know that the goal of the great powers in creating Israel

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<sup>308</sup> Abdullah Azzam, *Defense of the Muslim Lands The First Obligation After Iman*, no publisher, no date <http://www.kalamullah.com/Books/defence.pdf>

<sup>309</sup> Ibid.

<sup>310</sup> Quoted in A. El-Awaisi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928–1947* (London, 1998), 27–28.

<sup>311</sup> Quoted in Daud Abdullah, “The hyped “Gaza State” in Sinai is a diversionary smokescreen,” *Middle East Monitor* (accessed: September 20, 2013), <https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/resources/commentary-and-analysis/7460-the-hyped-qgaza-stateq-in-sinai-is-a-diversionary-smokescreen> .

<sup>312</sup> Quoted in Mohsen Saleh, Hasan al Banna's Centenary Attitude towards Palestine, *Ikhwānweb* (accessed: September 20, 2013), <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=820>

does not end with the occupation of Palestine. They are planning to make the entire Arab countries share in Palestine's fate, God forbid."<sup>313</sup> He argued that Israel wants the area from the Nile to the Euphrates to establish its authority and make this land to be its own.<sup>314</sup> He further claimed that Israel intend to seize the Grand Mosque in Macca and the mosque of the Prophet in Medina.<sup>315</sup>

Iraq situates at the center of all abovementioned challenges to the territory. Although Iraqi state possesses military might in several periods it has never created consent to unite people around the idea of Iraqiness. Although progressivist and socialist military regimes purposed to eliminate subnational primordial identities such as tribe and sect, these structures were so much powerful that the regime had to collaborate with them to secure regime survival. Although great efforts were spent to create a territorial nationalism that unite every Iraqis, these efforts were unable to beyond Sisyphus' destiny. Iraqi state had also failed to gain territorial control of all country since a considerable part of the territory is inhospitable to Baghdad regime. Baghdad regime especially under Saddam's rule could achieve territorial control only through extreme violence to Kurds and Shiites and destruction of Iraqi natural landscape such as southern marshlands.

Impact of refugees and internally displaced people on the territorially can be analyzed in Iraq perfectly. Unending violence, deteriorating security conditions, demographic engineering and banishment of opponents create hundreds of refugees and internally displaced people. The people who are forced to leave their ancestral territories or living spaces develop more salient identities than constructed territorial nationalism. For instance, after ISIS attacks, it is hard to expect that uprooted Christians, Turkmens, Yazidis and other people can develop a belief to territorial, meta-historical, mythological, eternal, sacrosanct Iraq.

As next chapter will demonstrate in detail, from its creation to recent political developments, politics in Iraq has always been related to territoriality. Mesopotamia-

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<sup>313</sup> Ruhullah al-Musawi el-Khomenei's message in support of Palestine, 10 November 1972, Sahifeh-ye Imam, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomenei's Works, Vol.2, 479

<sup>314</sup> Ruhullah al-Musawi el-Khomenei's message on the occasion of the Hajj (pilgrimage), 29 August 1984, Sahifeh-ye Imam, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomenei's Works, Vol.19, 26-7

<sup>315</sup> Ruhullah al-Musawi el-Khomenei's message, 25 November 1979, Sahifeh-ye Imam, The Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomenei's Works, Vol.11, 91

inspired nationalism had been a state policy for a long time, the biggest wars of the country, namely war against Iran and Kuwait, originated from territorial reasons along with other issues, ruling elite in Baghdad has always been pursuing territorial strategies to depress opposition or minority groups. Therefore while adding territory in the analyses over Iraq is essential to understand Iraq, Iraq is also a comprehensive research field for both analyzing territoriality and understanding territorial structures in the Middle East as a whole.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE TERRITORIALITY OF IRAQ

#### 4.1. Geographical and Political Iraq

According to Edward William Lane's *Arabic-English Lexicon*, Iraq generally means the side or shore of sea or of water.<sup>316</sup> Iraq bore its name of its territorial feature since Iraqi territory has two fertile rivers (Tigris and Euphrates) and irrigation systems that distributed the water. In addition to the term Iraq, Greek name Mesopotamia (land between rivers) which also refers to the territorial feature of the area was also used. *Anabasis of Alexander*, the military history of the campaigns of Alexander the Great written by Arrian of Nicomedia in the second century AD, was considered the earliest reference to the Mesopotamia as a geographic name.<sup>317</sup> In ancient times, all the places where the Semitic peoples settled were named after *Aram*, and the Old Testament refers to today's Iraq as *Aram Nahrain*<sup>318</sup> which means Aram of Two Rivers, and the Bible called this area *Paddan-Aram*,<sup>319</sup> the plain of Aram, both are territorial definitions. This area was home of great ancient civilizations such as Babylon, Sumer, Assyria whose inventions changed the course of human history. The battle of Qadisiyya in 637 opened the territory of Mesopotamia to Arabs and this area was gradually Islamized and Arabized. Islamization of Semitic Mesopotamia was easier than the Islamization of Hellenistic Levant and fertile territories of Mesopotamia became the political, intellectual and economic center of the Muslim world. In 762 Caliph Mansur founded the city of Baghdad whose population was

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<sup>316</sup> Edward William Lane, *Arabic-English Lexicon* (London and Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1863, Book I), 2021.

<sup>317</sup> Arrian of Nicomedia, *The Anabasis of Alexander or The History of the Wars and Conquests of Alexander the Great*, ed. and trans. E.J. Chinnock (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1884), 153,156,161,172,308,380,385.

<sup>318</sup> Syed Muzaffaruddin Nadwi, *A Geographical History of the Qur'an* (Lahor: Islamic Book Trust, 2009), 65.

<sup>319</sup> Genesis 48:7.

approximately 1.5 million at that time. This city became the capital of Abbasid Caliphate and center of trade ranging from Baltic Sea to China.<sup>320</sup> For more than three hundred years Iraq had witnessed Ottoman-Persian rivalry. Iraq came under the full Ottoman control in mid-sixteenth century, but dynasties that ruled Iran never relinquished their desire to rule Iraq. They saw Euphrates as their natural border<sup>321</sup> and had special interests to the holy cities and Shiite shrines of Iraq. Therefore, as Donald Pitcher asserts, the Iraqi frontiers during Ottoman-Persian rivalry “fluctuated greatly and tended to advance or recoil as the central government grew strong or weak.”<sup>322</sup> Territorialization of the Ottoman Iraq and Persia which required fixed, permanent and clear borders was a late development since influential figures such as tribal leaders, merchants or military commanders demarcated the border in line with their trade and migration, political and economic interests.<sup>323</sup>

Today, Iraq is a country which bordered by Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Arabian Gulf, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria. Before the World War I, Iraq was not a political term; it was only a geographical expression. Although the term “Iraq” as a geographical expression had been used since the Medieval period, Iraq as a source of loyalty and identity is a modern creation. Iraq’s prominent sociologist Ali al-Wardi explains this situation thus as quoted by Phebe Marr:

The history of the plain of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, at least since the Mongol conquest in the thirteenth century, had been one of invasion, disruption, and discontinuity- an environment in which a cohesive identity, especially one based on territory, did not easily strike root. Ottoman rule provided a modicum of stability but was too weak to affect much more than elements of urban areas. With discontinuity of leadership and incursion of tribal groups right up to the twentieth century, Iraq’s population has been more influenced by tribalism than by roots in the soil.<sup>324</sup>

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<sup>320</sup> Abd al-Aziz al-Duri, “Baghdad,” in *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960), 925.

<sup>321</sup> Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804–1946* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 71.

<sup>322</sup> Donald Edgar Pitcher, *An Historical Geography of the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: Brill, 1972), 141.

<sup>323</sup> Hala Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf, 1745–1900* (Albany: State University of New York, 1997), 19.

<sup>324</sup> Phebe Marr, “One Iraq or Many: What Has Happened to Iraqi Identity?” in *Iraq Between Occupations: Perspectives From 1920 to the Present*, eds. Amatzia Baram et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 19.

Various parts of Iraq had different names in different times such as Mesopotamia, Jazira, Sumer, Babylon or Sawad. For instance, 9<sup>th</sup> century Persian historian Abu al-Abbas Ahmed al-Baladhuri used Sawad to refer the area where Caliph Omar conquered.<sup>325</sup> Reeva Simon and Eleanor Tejirian well describe the shifting names of Iraq:

Under Roman-Persian rule, “Iraq” was understood to be the part of the north, primarily in eastern Turkey, that formed a province of the Roman Empire that, ironically, was outside the borders of modern Iraq. “Babylonia” was the term used for the area south of Baghdad. Arabs used the term “al-Iraq” (cliff or shore; having deep roots) for the delta or marshlands, “al-Jazira” (the island) for the area between the two rivers north of Baghdad and south of the Taurus foothills, and “al-Sawad” (the Black Ground) for the alluvial plain.<sup>326</sup>

After the Mogul invasion, Iraq referred to two neighboring regions separated by Zagros Mountains: *Iraq-i Arab* and *Iraq-i Ajam*. *Iraq-i Arab* was almost synonymous modern Iraq and *Iraq-i Ajam*<sup>327</sup> was central-western Iran. Since *Iraq-i Ajam* was a mountainous region in medieval period it was also called as *Jabal* (mountains). Some epithets used to describe some cities in early Islamic period also show that some regions that are Iranian territory in modern era were described as Iraq. For instance *ayn al-Iraq* (eye of Iraq) for Basra, *qalb al-Iraq* (heart of Iraq) for Baghdad, *surat al-Iraq* (navel of Iraq) for Isfahan.<sup>328</sup> 12<sup>th</sup> century geographer Yaqut al-Hamawi explains the use of Iraq as a name of region:

The Seljuk sultans came to rule over both Iraq proper and the region of Jabal, hence were styled *sultan al-Iraq*, but since their capital came normally to be at Hamadan in Jabal, the latter province became known as Iraq. The two regions came in fact to be distinguished as Iraq-i Arab and Iraq-i Ajam.<sup>329</sup>

Most of the early definitions of Iraq exclude northern mountainous region such as Mosul. Mosul literally means “that which connects” Syria and Upper Mesopotamia

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<sup>325</sup> Tsugitaka Sato, *Sugar in the Social Life of Medieval Islam* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 19.

<sup>326</sup> Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor Tejirian, “The Creation of Iraq: The Frontier as State,” in *The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921*, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor Tejirian (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 2.

<sup>327</sup> The name of Arak city located southwest of Tehran took its name from Iraq-i Ajam.

<sup>328</sup> Zayde Antrim, *Routes and Realms: The Power of Place in the Early Islamic World* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 40.

<sup>329</sup> Edmund Bosworth, “Erāq-e ‘Ajam,” *Encyclopedia Iranica* 8, p.538.

or the Euphrates and Tigris.<sup>330</sup> Even the naming of the city shows that geographical position of the city is more related with Anatolian plateau and Levant than Mesopotamian flats. As Hanna Batatu quotes<sup>331</sup> Abu Bakr al-Khawarizmi (d. A.D. 993) argued that since Iraq hosts tomb-sanctuaries of Ali ibn Abi Talib, his son Hussein and other martyrs Shi'ism is Iraqi. When al-Khawarizmi made this observation Iraq referred the area which lay south of line connecting today's Ramadi on Euphrates and today's Tikrit on Tigris. This definition excludes mountainous areas of northeastern Iraq and today's Nineveh province. Arab geographers Ibn Hawkal and al-Muqaddasi also used the term Iraq to describe the area south of Tikrit on the Tigris and near Hit on the Euphrates.<sup>332</sup> Al-Muqaddasi also states that "the people of Iraq call everything that, from their side, is beyond the Euphrates, al-Sham."<sup>333</sup> In *Seyahatname-i Hudud* written by Ottoman statesmen Mehmet Hursit Pasha 'Iraq' was used to designate today's southern Iraq. In an 1893 German map again today's southern Iraq was labeled as Iraq while northern and central Iraq was called al-Jazira.<sup>334</sup> During 1930s, Encyclopedia Britannica defined Iraq without Mosul.<sup>335</sup> At certain periods, Ottoman government in Istanbul treated Mosul, Baghdad and Basra provinces as separate entities, let alone loosely-connected units. At another times, they considered Iraq as one province subdivided into 17 *sanjaks*.<sup>336</sup> In 1922, Suleymaniyah was not officially part of Iraq and an Iraqi newspaper *al-Iraq*

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<sup>330</sup> Antrim, *Routes and Realms*, 39.

<sup>331</sup> Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Bathists and Free Officers* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 39.

<sup>332</sup> Magnus Bernhardsson, *Reclaiming a Plundered Past: Archeology and Nation Building in Modern Iraq* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2005), 97.

<sup>333</sup> Basil Anthony Collins, *Al-Muqaddasi: The Man and His Work* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1974), 152.

<sup>334</sup> Nabil al-Tikriti, "Was There an Iraq Before There was an Iraq," *International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies* 3, no.2 (2009): 142.

<sup>335</sup> Sarah Shields, "Mosul Questions: Economy, Identity and Annexation," in *The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921*, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor Tejirian, 54 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 54.

<sup>336</sup> Abida Samiuddin, *Administrative Development in the Arab World* (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1985), 19.

urged the government by publishing articles to protect “the natural Iraqi borders” by incorporating Suleymaniya into the Iraqi territory.<sup>337</sup>

Before the World War I, Westerners generally used the term Mesopotamia to refer to the area that became Iraq. After the British occupation, several British officers in the country had also used Iraq and Mesopotamia interchangeably.<sup>338</sup> The phrase “the two Iraqs” was used to describe newly established garrison towns of Basra and Kufa. In 12<sup>th</sup> century this term referred to Lower Mesopotamia (Iraq) and Upper Mesopotamia (the *Jazira*).<sup>339</sup> In Hans Wehr’s *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* the term *al-Iraqan* which means “two Iraqs” refers Basra and Kufa.<sup>340</sup>

As Euphrates and Tigris change their main beds, territoriality of the country is also changed. For instance, after the change in Tigris riverbed the city of Wasit built in the 7<sup>th</sup> century as an administrative center by Hajaj bin Yousif al-Thaqafi was abandoned.<sup>341</sup> On the other hand, new towns like Amarah and Nasiriyyah in which Tigris and Euphrates get through respectively had emerged. Some manmade changes on the water flow also changed the significance of cities and thus their territorial positions. For example, building of *Hindiyya* canal in 1803 which brought water from the Euphrates drained the *Shatt al-Hilla* waterway<sup>342</sup> and therefore enmeshed Hilla, once a center of desert trade and Shiite religious training in a lower position while prospered Najaf and Karbala in terms of agricultural production and population.

#### **4.2. Territorial Consolidation of Ottoman Iraq**

Modern Iraq is a combination of three Ottoman provinces: Baghdad, Basra and Mosul. However modern Iraq’s territories does not completely synonymous with these provinces since Basra province included al-Hasa region of eastern Saudi Arabia

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<sup>337</sup> Sherko Kirmanj, “The Clash of Identities in Iraq,” in *Iraq Between Occupations: Perspectives From 1920 to the Present*, eds. Amatzia Baram et.al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 45.

<sup>338</sup> Bernhardsson, *Reclaiming a Plundered Past*, 252.

<sup>339</sup> James Lindsay, *Daily Life in the Medieval Islamic World* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 2005), 101.

<sup>340</sup> Hans Wehr, *A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic* (Ithaca and New York: Spoken Language Services, 1976), 607.

<sup>341</sup> UNESCO World Heritage Convention, <http://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1468/>, (accessed June 6, 2015).

<sup>342</sup> Zackery Heern, *The Emergence of Modern Shi'ism: Islamic Reform in Iraq and Iran* (London: OneWorld Publications, 2015).

and Kuwait; Mosul province contained several Kurdish territories which are under Iranian sovereignty today. During the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent, territory of northern Iraq was divided into two administrative units which were responsible to governor of Diyarbakır: Mosul and Shehrizor.<sup>343</sup> As Mosul developed and its significance increased it became a provincial center. According to 1864 *Vilayet Law* Baghdad province contained all Ottoman Iraq and divided into ten sub-provinces: Baghdad, Mosul, Shehrizor, Suleymaniya, Dulaim, Karbala, Hilla, Basra, Amarah, Muntafiq.<sup>344</sup> Several times Baghdad subordinated other provinces, but after 1884 they continued their existence as separate entities. Each of them had several subdivisions, *sanjaks*. Baghdad province contained Baghdad, Diwaniyah, and Karbala *sanjaks*. Basra contained Basra, Amarah, Muntafiq and Najd (Hasa) *sanjaks* and Mosul contained Mosul, Kirkuk and Suleymaniya *sanjaks*.<sup>345</sup> Internal borders of Ottoman Iraq were different modern Iraq's ethno-sectarian lines. Baghdad-Basra borders run through Amarah-Muntafiq line and left most of the Shiite-majority areas including Najaf and Karbala in the Baghdad *vilayet*.<sup>346</sup> Basra *sanjak*, the center of Basra *vilayet*, reached from Fav in the south to al-Uzair near Hawizeh marshes in the north.<sup>347</sup> Territory of Mosul was bordered with Cizre in the north (modern Turkey), Penciwın in the east (at the Iran-Iraq border), Tikrit in the south (modern Iraq) and Zor in the west (modern Syria).<sup>348</sup> After the 18<sup>th</sup> century, Ottoman Iraq gained significance in the Empire's policies. Especially Baghdad province had a special significance for Istanbul. Governors of Baghdad had been chosen among the triple horse-tailed banner granted viziers who were the highest-rank Ottoman officials and 6<sup>th</sup> Army was based in Baghdad. The 6<sup>th</sup> Army had vital significance for Ottoman military strategies, because it was the main military force against Iran, reserve force for 4<sup>th</sup> Army in Erzincan which faced Russian aggression, safety valve for Ottoman

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<sup>343</sup> Sinan Marifođlu, *Osmanlı Döneminde Kuzey Irak 1831-1914* (Istanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1998), 34.

<sup>344</sup> Ceylan, *Ottoman Origins of Modern Iraq*, 124.

<sup>345</sup> Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2006), 15.

<sup>346</sup> Cengiz Erođlu et al., *Osmanlı Vilayet Salnamelerinde Bağdat* (Ankara: ORSAM, 2012), 85.

<sup>347</sup> Cengiz Erođlu et al., *Osmanlı Vilayet Salnamelerinde Basra* (Ankara: ORSAM, 2012), 12.

<sup>348</sup> Cengiz Erođlu et al., *Osmanlı Vilayet Salnamelerinde Musul* (Ankara: ORSAM, 2012), 113.

Iraq against tribal revolts, observer of British presence in the Gulf and the instrument of pressure over Najdi families especially al-Saud.

Ottoman Iraq was diverse in terms of religious and ethnic identities. Arabs, Turcomans, Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews, Sabians, Armenians, Persians etc. constituted ethnic composition of the Ottoman Iraq. In addition to ethnic division, Ottoman Iraq was also religiously divided country. Several times tension increased among Sunni, Shiite, Christian and Jewish communities. Religious orders (*tarikats*) were influential. Especially *Qadiriyya*, *Naqshbandiya* and *Rifaiyya* orders tried to influence people. Cities were divided into neighborhoods along ethnic, religious, tribal or sectarian lines.<sup>349</sup> Late Ottoman period was an era of transformation in Iraq. “Eighteenth-century Iraq is depicted more or less as a loosely related collection of plural, relatively isolated, and autonomous city-states and tribal confederations,”<sup>350</sup> politics of this era was an oscillation between different power sources such as countryside and urban, nomad and settled, capital and frontier etc and victors of this tension was about to emerge.

Two interrelated issues had been the primary goals of almost every Ottoman governor in Baghdad, Basra and Mosul provinces: land reform and pacification of tribes. Contrary to central provinces of the Empire; Baghdad, Basra and Mosul were exceptional provinces (*müstesna eyaletler*) and their lands were at the status of *arazi-i haraciye*.<sup>351</sup> At this status, land was an area of tribe’s common use instead of private property. Since the farmer had no direct right on the land which he cultivated, the link between people and land was weak. The Land Law of 1858 redefined the legal status of land. State properties were given their occupiers. Rights of actual cultivators were improved and state’s rights over imperial lands were reasserted. With this law, Ottoman administrators aimed to increase taxes and state revenues and weaken the tribal base of society by strengthening the link between individuals and their lands.

Large tribal populations and lands outside the government’s control were common concern of Ottoman governors and Inspection Commissions sent by the Sublime Port. Tribes had semi-autonomous political status, strong social power and military

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<sup>349</sup> Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, 152.

<sup>350</sup> Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq*, 8.

<sup>351</sup> John Robert Barnes, *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986), 35.

strength, in several territories even more than the central government. They were ruled by their own chiefs, they had their own legal system and loyalties. Ottoman officials saw them as obstacles for establishment of public order and security, effective taxation and conscription system and state authority. In other words, tribes were obstructions for territorial state in the country. For instance, although Basra-Damascus desert route was shorter than Basra-Baghdad-Aleppo route, Ottoman administration ordered all caravans and merchants to go through Baghdad to reach Mediterranean ports since desert route was constantly attacked by the tribes.<sup>352</sup> Especially nomadic tribes that recognized no restriction on their movements opposed Baghdad and Istanbul's efforts to consolidate territorial state in their lands. These tribes opposed Ottoman's policy of sedentarization. Massive tribal migrations were also out of Ottoman control. Many tribes in Iraq migrated from Arabian Peninsula and have similarities and affinity with Arabian tribes. Some of them, such as *Muntafiq*, *Zubayd*, *Khaz'al*, *Beni Lam*, *Ubayd*, *Rabia* migrated Iraq at the early periods of Islamic conquest. Other significant tribes such as *Shammar* and *Bani Tamim* migrated to Iraq in 18<sup>th</sup> century. Especially rise of Saudi-Wahhabi power forced several Arabian tribes to settle in Iraq.<sup>353</sup> This massive migration in late-Ottoman period changed tribal and societal map of Iraq.

Kurdish populated areas of Mosul province were under the influence of strong tribes and notables. Barzinjis controlled tribes of Suleymaniyah and had considerable power and wealth. Sheiks of the tribe were considered as descendants of Prophet Mohammed and they were adherents of *Qadiri* order. This religious dimension enhanced the legitimacy of Barzanji family. Talabanis of Kirkuk was primary rival of Barzanji and they also had considerable power and wealth in their region. Talabanis organized raids and brigandages and opposed central governments' authority. Another Kurdish tribe Jaf was nomadic cattle owners and their lands reached western Iran. Their annual migration across Turco-Persian border caused problems between

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<sup>352</sup> Rudi Matthee, "Boom and Bust: The Port of Basra in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," in *The Persian Gulf in History*, ed. Lawrence Potter (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 106.

<sup>353</sup> Madawi al-Rasheed, *A History of Saudi Arabia* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26.

two countries<sup>354</sup> and weakened the territoriality of the border. Hamawand tribe which inhabited the area between Suleymaniyah and Kirkuk had a stronghold in mountainous Ottoman-Iranian borders and embarked upon a career of brigandage and lawlessness.<sup>355</sup> Despite the repeated military campaigns Ottoman administration could not passivate this warlike tribe. These tribes' threat to the Empire was not limited by their challenge to the central authority. Intra-tribal conflicts were also challenges to public order, security and therefore state authority in the region.<sup>356</sup> Arab tribes in southern part of Ottoman Iraq caused same problems for Ottoman administration. They had constantly raised revolts, resisted Ottoman territorial control, violated Ottoman-Iran border, attacked and plundered villages and cities. Land and tax issues created armed conflicts between tribes and government and between rival tribes. Kerbela, for instance, became a virtual city-state led by local notables who had religious legitimacy and economic resources.<sup>357</sup>

When Baghdad governor Midhat Pasha tried to settle *Shammar* tribe, its chief Abdul Karim said that his tribe had a lot of cattle, horses and camels and they will not "become shopkeepers."<sup>358</sup> In traditions of Arab tribal society in the Middle East, tribal lands were called as *dirah*. *Dirah* is the homeland of the tribe over which it had sovereign rights. *Dirah's* boundaries were spatially vague and had no clear demarcation unless there was an important keystone such as water source.<sup>359</sup> The *dirah* was collectively owned and sheikh of the tribe has an authority as a supervisor and divider of harvest. Sheikh also extracted brotherhood (*khuwwa*) tax on all those

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<sup>354</sup> Cecil John Edmonds, *Kurds, Turks and Arabs: Politics, Travel and Research in North-Eastern Iraq 1919-1925* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), 139-50.

<sup>355</sup> Fredrik Barth, *Principles of Social Organization in Southern Kurdistan* (Oslo, 1953), 14.

<sup>356</sup> Gökhan Çetinsaya, "The Caliph and the Shayks: Abdülhamid II's Policy Towards the Qadiriyya of Mosul," in *Ottoman Reform and Muslim Generation*, eds. Itzhak Weismann and Fruma Zachs, 101-103 (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2005).

<sup>357</sup> Juan Cole and Moojan Momen, "Mafia, Mob and Shiism in Iraq: The Rebellion of Ottoman Karbala 1824-1843," *Past and Present* 112 (1986): 115.

<sup>358</sup> Abd al-Aziz Sulayman Nawwar, *تاريخ العراق الحديث من نهاية حكم داود باشا الى نهاية حكم مدحت باشا* [History of Modern Iraq from the End of Davud Pasha Rule to the End of Midhat Pasha Rule] (Cairo: Dar al-Katib al Arabi, 1968), 156.

<sup>359</sup> Andrew Gardner, "The New Calculus of Bedouin Pastoralism in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," in *Political Ecology across Spaces, Scales, and Social Groups*, eds. Susan Paulson and Lisa Gezon (Piscataway: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 86.

unaffiliated with his tribe or traversed the area.<sup>360</sup> Ottoman administrations divided, registered and redelivered *dirah* lands in order to weaken the tribal base of the society. For instance during the Midhat Pasha's governorship, *Hadhdhal* branch of *Annizeh* tribe was given gardens and land on the Upper Euphrates, lands of the *Farhan* of the *Shammar Jarba* in *Shirgat* was registered through a property title (*tapu senedi*). Midhat Pasha appointed the sheikh of *Muntafiq* tribal confederation as *mutasarrif* and registered large part of the tribal land in his name.<sup>361</sup> Mehmet Namık Paşa, the governor of Baghdad between 1861 and 1867 tried to divide tribal lands and incorporate them into the state properties. In 1862 he persuaded *Albu Muhammad* tribe to choose settled life and built a government building, military barrack, and mosque in tribe's land and gave them *sanjak* status.<sup>362</sup> These policies were effective at some point. For instance, Baghdad province outside of city of Baghdad was generally rural and not under the direct control of the state. Prominent sheiks were given some privileges and their lands were registered for maintaining order in the countryside. As consequence, many of them moved to Baghdad city and became players in Baghdad politics.<sup>363</sup>

As a consequence of these efforts percentage of tribal population in Iraq decreased. In 1867, 50 percent of the population in southern Iraq was nomads and 41 percent were cultivators. In 1905 this ratio was 19 and 72 percent, respectively. In central Iraq this ratio of nomads and cultivators changed from 23 and 39 percent to 7 and 78 percent, respectively.<sup>364</sup>

Ottoman Iraq, especially Baghdad and Basra provinces were home to considerable Shiite population and relation between Shiite population and Ottoman administration was problematic. An important point which should be addressed about sectarian demographics of Ottoman Iraq is that none of sects had overwhelming majority over

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<sup>360</sup> Hala Fattah, *The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia and the Gulf 1745-1900* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1997), 30.

<sup>361</sup> Isam al-Khafaji, *Tormented Births: Passages to the Modernity in Europe and the Middle East* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 29.

<sup>362</sup> Ebubekir Ceylan, "Namık Paşa'nın Bağdat Valilikleri," *Toplumsal Tarih*, no.186 (2009): 82.

<sup>363</sup> Reeva Spector Simon, "The View from Baghdad," in *The Creation of Iraq 1914-1921*, eds. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor Tejirian, 39 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004).

<sup>364</sup> M.S. Hasan, "Growth and Structure of Iraq's Population, 1867-1947" in *The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800-1914*, ed. Charles Issawi, 344 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

others. Although Shiite population in Basra and Baghdad was higher than Sunnis, there was substantial Sunni population in these provinces. Shiite population in Ottoman Iraq in 1920 is estimated to be 56 percent of whole population.<sup>365</sup> Ottoman Empire was a Sunni state and Ottoman officials were deliberate towards their Shiite subjects. Ottoman sultans were caliphs at the same time and this specialty had been strongly emphasized in several periods, especially during the Abdülhamid II's reign, but this did not affect Shiites because they had *Imamet* understanding which was different from Caliphate and they did not see Ottoman Caliph as a legitimate leader of Muslim world. Moreover, Shiites of Iraq were neighbors of Iran, a Shiite state whose claims over Iraq caused numerous wars. The connection between Iran and Iraqi Shiites were strong. Iraq is home of the holiest places of Shiite Islam. Najaf, Karbala, Samarra, Kazimayn host shrines of sacred imams. Therefore each and every year thousands of pilgrims from Iran visit these holy places. Najaf was also center of the religious training and students came from every corner of the Shiite world to study their religion. Some of them became higher ranked clerics and resided in Iraq but they also kept alive their links with their native countries. Indian and Iranian opponents who were forced to exile by their governments had also taken refuge in these cities. Active involvement of clergy who resided in Iraq to Iran's several internal crises such as Tobacco Protest of 1891 an Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905 show this interconnectedness. Although holy sites were under Ottoman *waqf* legislation, Iranian shahs made donations and grants to holy places and their favorable *mujtahids* in order to expand their influence.<sup>366</sup> Moreover, Iranian consular officers also held extra-territorial jurisdiction.<sup>367</sup> This transitivity and trans-border relations was seen as an obstacle to establishment of state authority and territorial control by the Ottomans and Shiite cities were considered as Iranian enclaves. In addition to this, Iran had advantage for territorial control in Iraq especially in Basra region. Basra in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the biggest city in the Gulf littoral and the commercial hub whose hinterland ranged from Istanbul to Gujarat, Beirut to Shiraz was approximately 600 kilometers from Iran's 17<sup>th</sup> century capital Isfahan. On the

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<sup>365</sup> Joyce Wiley, *The Islamic Movement of Shi'as* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 9.

<sup>366</sup> Juan Cole, *Sacred Space and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi'ite Islam* (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2002), 25.

<sup>367</sup> Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 17.

other hand, in order to reach Basra, Ottoman government in Istanbul had to pass 2,500 kilometers of hostile territory inundated with mountains, deserts and marshes. Massive conversion of Sunni tribes into the Shi'ism was another vital threat for Ottoman rule in the country. During the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries several Sunni tribes which had significant population converted to Shi'ism. These conversion waves had changed demographic, political and territorial structure of Ottoman Iraq. Ottoman policy of centralization and settlement had a significant impact on conversion to Shi'ism. Yitzhak Nakash describes this as follows:

The transition of the tribes from nomadic life to agricultural activity disrupted tribal order and created a major crisis among the tribesmen, forcing them to reconstruct their identity and relocate themselves on the socioreligious map of their surrounding environment<sup>368</sup>

Meir Litvak reaches the same conclusion:

The settlement process diversified the tribal economy and sharply stratified tribal society. Oppressed by their sheiks and by the increasing taxation of the Sunni government, the tribespeople were receptive to Shi'ism with its messages stressing government oppression and tyranny. Equally important, sedentarization, and its consequent weakening of tribal structure and solidarity, created a crisis of identity as well as a sense of displacement and alienation among the tribespeople. The significance of the crisis caused by sedentarization is further shown by the fact that the purely nomadic tribes remained Sunnis.<sup>369</sup>

The rise of Najaf and Karbala as religious centers and economic revivalism in these two cities were concurrent developments. Although these cities located well inside the country, they can be regarded as border cities because they are at the edge of vast desert. This geographic position made them desert markets for nomadic tribes and trade center when seasonal migration occurred. In addition to this *Husayniyya* and *Hindiyya* canals allowed great economic growth. The opening of *Hindiyya* canal in 1803 which brought water to Najaf from Euphrates increased the cultivable areas. So much water was channeled new agricultural sites by this canal that the one part of

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<sup>368</sup> Yitzhak Nakash, "The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiism," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 26, no.3 (1994): 444.

<sup>369</sup> Meir Litvak, *Shi'i Scholars of Nineteenth-Century Iraq: The 'Ulama of Najaf and Karbala'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 130.

Euphrates dried up by the late 1800s.<sup>370</sup> This economic growth attracted tribal communities and they came under the influence of powerful Shiite propaganda machine. Almost all tribes that settled along these canals were converted to Shi'ism. Canal projects began to arouse suspicion of Ottoman officials. In one report dated 1893, it is said:

By building a canal between Euphrates and Tigris under the guise of visitations [to the Atabat], the British and even the Iranians in fact wish to plant vineyards and gardens and settle their own subjects there.<sup>371</sup>

In addition to these internal developments, two significant external events strengthened the Shi'ism in Iraq and paved the way for Najaf and Karbala to be the center of Shi'ism. Before the 18<sup>th</sup> century center of Shiite scholarship was Iranian city of Isfahan. However, the Afghan invasion of Isfahan in 1772, Nadir Shah's efforts to promote Sunni-Shiite rapprochement which angered traditional Shiite *ulama* and expropriate endowments that supported clergy caused massive *ulama* and student migration to Iraq. They brought their families with them and settled in Najaf and Karbala. Firstly Karbala and then Najaf replaced Isfahan and became center of Shi'ism. Another important external development was the emergence of Wahhabism in Najd region. Wahhabis constantly attacked and plundered Najaf and Karbala for political, economic and religious reasons until they were stopped by Muhammad Ali of Egypt. These attacks reinforced the sectarian Shiite identity and radicalize the population because they posed existential threats for Shiites' religion, security and income. Combining the missionary zeal of Shiite theology, Wahhabi attacks pushed Shiite clergy to spread Shiite doctrine among tribes in order to protect themselves by gaining tribal support while central government was incapable of doing it. Rise of Najaf and Karbala as religious centers added territorial dimension in the region. Geographic position became determinant over religion. For instance, branch of *Shammar* tribal confederation *Shammar Tuqa* that settled down near Karbala became Shiite. On the other hand other branch *Shammar Jarba* that inhabited area between

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<sup>370</sup> Zackery Heern, *The Emergence of Modern Shi'ism: Islamic Reform in Iraq and Iran* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2015).

<sup>371</sup> İsmail Safa Üstün, "The Ottoman Dilemma in Handling the Shi'i Challenge in Nineteenth Century Iraq" in *The Sunna and Shi'a in History: Division and Ecumenism in the Muslim Middle East*, eds. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 89.

Tigris and Euphrates north of Baghdad remained Sunni. Likewise, although much of the *Dulaim* tribe was Sunni, its *al-Fatla* branch that settled down near Najaf converted to Shi'ism.<sup>372</sup>

Tanzimat reforms reorganized the administrative structure of the Empire and weakened the autonomous position of local officials by using supervision and control mechanisms in order to terminate misgovernment and inefficiency. Governors' power was reduced and officers responsible directly to Istanbul gained importance in administrative affairs of provinces. Another important step was the reorganization of administrative divisions. Boundaries of provinces were redrawn in order to create homogenous units of comparable resources and population. Army was also divided into provincial commands, led by a Field Marshal appointed by and responsible to Minister of War in Istanbul.<sup>373</sup> During the Tanzimat period Ottoman Iraq had witnessed extensive innovations. Population census was held, conscription for the army was regulated, navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates and communication lines were improved, use of wheeled traffic increased especially on the routes radiating from Baghdad, irrigation and drainage systems were developed, Basra harbor was enhanced, printing press flourished and first official newspaper (*Zawra*) was published, modern schools and factories were opened. After the opening of the Suez Canal, a company named *Umman-ı Osmani* was established to operate ships between Basra and Istanbul through Suez Canal.<sup>374</sup> Central control provided better security conditions and provided suitable environment for trade and agriculture. Between 1870 and 1913, the value of imports increased from 152,000 to 3,264,000 sterling and the value of exports rose from 218,000 to 2,593,000 sterling.<sup>375</sup> During his tenure (1869-1872) Midhat Pasha reorganized the administrative structure in the direction of Western system, tried to settle the tribes, and established secular education institutions. He introduced a new administrative system closely inspired by the French Prefect system used by him in Danube while he was governor of the

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<sup>372</sup>Nakash, "The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiism," 456.

<sup>373</sup> Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*, 6.

<sup>374</sup> Selda Kaya Kılıç, "19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı İdaresi Altında Basra Vilayeti ve Körfezine İlişkin Bazı Tespitler," *Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakültesi Dergisi* 54, no.2 (2014.): 323.

<sup>375</sup> Charles Issawi, *The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914: A Documentary Economic History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 132.

province.<sup>376</sup> In line with this reform provincial boundaries were redrawn, their territories became almost equal in size and subdivisions were created. He expanded Baghdad's authority into the countryside and established a framework that modern Iraq depends on. He introduced secular schools (*rüşdiye* and *idadi*) that created native Iraqi elites. The three-year Law College, the first higher education institution in the area that consists of today's Iraq, was opened in 1908.<sup>377</sup> As a result of these developments Iraq's population increased from 1.3 million in 1867 to 2.3 million in 1905.<sup>378</sup> Urbanization was also significant characteristic of this period. As Nakash argues "no less than twenty cities, including Amara and Nasiriyya, were either established or expanded from small villages in the second half of the century."<sup>379</sup> This rapid urbanization was the consequence of sedentarization and disintegration of tribes. Berlin-Baghdad railway project which tied Iraqi and Anatolian cities to continental Europe was another factor that deepened territorial dimension of Iraq. It increased the connectedness of Iraqi cities and interlocked long-isolated people who lived in different part of Iraq. The first part of Berlin-Baghdad railway in Iraqi territory was constructed between Baghdad and Samarra<sup>380</sup> and increased the interaction between two cities. Until 1970s when Baghdad received huge migration waves, city of Baghdad and Samarra was in the same administrative province.

### **4.3.The Formation of Modern Iraq's Boundaries**

As a main political and military power in the region, Britain shaped the boundary formations of the countries which it created. Border demarcation of Iraq is no exception. Like other post-Ottoman Arab states, Iraq's borders were designed in accordance with Britain's imperial strategies and interests. Britain had several goals in determining Iraq's boundaries with Jordan. First of all, boundaries were keystone

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<sup>376</sup> Walter Weiker, "Ottoman Bureaucracy: The Modernization and Reform," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13, no.3 (1968): 465.

<sup>377</sup> Phebe Marr, *The Modern History of Iraq* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2004), 7.

<sup>378</sup> Bassam Yousif, *Human Development in Iraq 1950-1990* (Oxford and New York: Routledge, 2012), 40.

<sup>379</sup> Nakash, "The Conversion of Iraq's Tribes to Shiism," 450.

<sup>380</sup> W.B. Fisher, *The Middle East: A Psyhical, Social and Regional Geography* (New York and London: Routledge, 2013), 391.

for the establishment of modern-state system which Britain wanted to install. Second, Britain's traditional policy of securing the road to India necessitated measures to stabilize the area between the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Third, Britain wanted to control and resist the spread of aggressive Ibn Saud of Najd. The northern borders of Saud dynasty were surrounded by Hashemite family, the main rival of Ibn Saud for the conquest of Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, Britain-imposed borders cut traditional migration routes for tribes. Ibn Saud demanded a boundary contiguous with Syria.<sup>381</sup> Hereby he could unite tribes which spread over the Fertile Crescent under Saudi banner. In some cases, he succeeded to gain loyalties of some tribes. For instance some sub-tribes of *Ruwala* in Syria joined Ibn Saud. Some lineages of the *Fidan* and the *Aghaydat* migrated to central Arabia.<sup>382</sup> That's why Britain was concerned about possible Saudi attack against nascent states. Britain chose 32°13'51 North and 39°18'09 East as the intersection point of Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan/Jordan and secured its route to India and Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline and contained Saudi Arabia. Demarcation of Iraq-Transjordan/Jordan boundary did not create problems since the border area is desert region with tiny population and contains almost no natural resources for both countries.

Iraq-Syria border is one of the novel creatures of the Middle East imposed by the European powers. This border was drawn by the "Franco-British Convention on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia" in 1920. According to the agreement the border was delimited as follows:

The boundaries between the territories under the French mandate of Syria and the Lebanon on the one hand and the British mandates of Mesopotamia and Palestine on the other are determined as follows:- On the east, the Tigris from Jeziret-ibn-Omar to the boundaries of the former *vilayets* of Diarbekir and Mosul. On the south-east and south, the aforesaid boundary of the former *vilayets* southwards as far as Roumelan Koeui; thence a line leaving in the territory under the French mandate the entire basin of the western Kabur and

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<sup>381</sup> Vartan Amadouny, "The Evolution of the Transjordan-Iraq Boundary, 1915-40," in *The Middle East and North Africa: World Boundaries*, eds. Clive Schofield and Richard Schofield, 131-32, (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 131-32.

<sup>382</sup> Dawn Chatty, "The Bedouin in Contemporary Syria: The Persistence of Tribal Authority and Control," *Middle East Journal* 64, no.1 (2010): 34.

passing in a straight line towards the Euphrates, which it crosses at Abu Kemal, thence a straight line to Imtar to the south of Jebul Druse<sup>383</sup>

The border is essentially artificial and represents the interests of European powers. Although Mosul historically and geographically connected to Syria, this demarcation incorporated Mosul province into the British-controlled Iraq due to persistence of Britain which wanted to control Mosul oil and saw it necessary to balance Shiites of Iraq. On the other hand, Deir ez-Zor province which had connection with central Iraq through Euphrates valley was given to Syria. However, despite these artificial interventions there were no territorial disputes or border problems between Iraq and Syria since their creations. Because Syrian foreign policy was generally related to its West (the Mediterranean, Lebanon, Israel) and Iraq's main concerns came from its East (the Gulf, Kuwait, Iran) and the border area between two countries is a desert area with no economic or social significance. The main territorial issue between these countries was unification debates. Since the formation of Syria, several groups such as Aleppo-based People's Party supported unification with Iraq.<sup>384</sup> Both Iraqi and Syrian elites considered unification as a cure for their weakness derived from their artificiality. In 1949, after the first coup in the Arab world, General Husni Za'im took power and suggested a defense treaty between Iraq and his country.<sup>385</sup> His successor Sami al-Hinnawi also proposed unification. His unification plans involved the removal of custom barriers, passports and might also include the unification of Iraq and Syria's military structures.<sup>386</sup> In 1979 According to *Agence France Presse*, "the two Iraqi ministers will focus on the finalization of various accords dealing with the unification of both the Syrian and Iraqi armies and the Ba'ath Party of each country."<sup>387</sup> However these efforts to unify Iraq and Syria failed

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<sup>383</sup> Franco-British Convention on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria and the Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia, *The American Journal of International Law* 16, no. 3, Supplement: Official Documents (1922): 122.

<sup>384</sup> Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958* (London: Yale University Press, 1965), 30.

<sup>385</sup> Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, *The Crystallization of Arab State System* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 107.

<sup>386</sup> Youssef Chaitani, *Post-Colonial Syria and Lebanon: The Decline of Arab Nationalism and the Triumph of the State* (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 2007), 143.

<sup>387</sup> Mary Jane Coates, "Behind the Surprising Iraq-Syria Unification," *Executive Intelligence Review* 6, no.3 (1979): 46.

and Iraq and Syria which were aimed to melt in one single state began to compete each other for the leadership of Baath ideology and Arab nationalism.

Border demarcation between Iraq and Najd (later Saudi Arabia) is another injection of clear-cut borders into the region. Iraq-Saudi Arabia border was first delimited by Treaty of *Muhammarah* (*Khorramshahr*) of 1922 and *Uqair* Convention of 1922, but exact demarcation of entire border was not completed until 1981. After he consolidated his power in Najd region, Ibn Saud became neighbor to Iraq. Moreover, Ibn Saud's victories against his rivals and land reclamations made Najd region neighbor of Britain due to Britain's existence in Iraq. He claimed that "all the tribes of the *Shammar* and *Anaza* confederation submitted to him and therefore his suzerainty spread to territories that the British considered a part of Iraq."<sup>388</sup> In addition to this, although Britain insisted that a permanent border must be drawn between Iraq and Najd, Ibn Saud demanded that borders should be based on *diras*, traditional tribal lands without clear and permanent borders.<sup>389</sup> He rejected the idea of fixed boundaries which means "to curb, by an imaginary line in the open desert, the movement of tribes who are accustomed to roam widely in search of pasturage and water."<sup>390</sup> However British prevailed over Ibn Saud and Najd had to recognize the borders of Iraq by signing *Uqair* Protocol of 1922. He was convinced to agree border demarcation on the condition that Najdi tribes would be free to pass Iraqi side of the boundary. Narrative of Harold Richard Patrick Dickson who took part of the protocol well describes the demarcation of the border and worth noting at length:

At a general meeting of the conference, Sir Percy took a red pencil and very carefully drew in on the map of Arabia a boundary line from the Persian Gulf to Jabal Anaizan, close to the Transjordan frontier. This gave Iraq a large area of the territory claimed by Najd. Obviously to placate Ibn Sa'ud, he ruthlessly deprived Kuwait of nearly two-thirds of her territory and gave it to Najd, his argument being that the power of Ibn Sabah (the desert title of the Shaikh of Kuwait) was much less in the desert than it had been when the Anglo-Turkish Agreement had been drawn up. South and west of Kuwait proper, he drew out two zones, which he declared should be neutral and known as the Kuwait Neutral Zone and the Iraq Neutral Zone.

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<sup>388</sup> Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia* (New York: NYU Press, 2000), 519.

<sup>389</sup> *Ibid.*, 521.

<sup>390</sup> International Boundary Study, Iraq-Saudi Arabia Boundary, No.111 (1971), 10.

. . . that evening there was an amazing sequel, Ibn Sa'ud asked to see Sir Percy alone. Sir Percy took me with him. Ibn Sa'ud was by himself, standing in the centre of his great reception tent. He seemed terribly upset. 'My friend,' he moaned, 'you have deprived me of half my kingdom. Better take it all and let me go into retirement.'

...The emotional storm did not last long. Still holding Ibn Sa'ud's hand, Sir Percy said: 'My friend, I know exactly how you feel, and for this reason I gave you two-thirds of Kuwait's territory. I don't know how Ibn Sabah will take the blow.'<sup>391</sup>

Demarcation of Iraq-Najd border was also a tribal problem. Territorial states and sovereignty were alien to local tribes and these novel phenomena created problems. One of the most significant of these was loyalty and allegiance issue. As Joseph Kostiner well describes the transformation of loyalties after the establishment of territorial state:

In the Ottoman period, when there were no state boundaries and no question of regional sovereignty or allegiance to any single authority, the tribes had shifted loyalties as circumstances warranted, without any problem of legitimacy arising from such reorientations. After the war, however, the newly created states tended to consolidate their authority and territorial jurisdiction under officially acknowledged rulers, and so tribes in Iraq, Transjordan, and, to a certain extent, the Gulf states, were required to declare allegiance to the respective authorities of these states. The setting of the frontiers and the various states' attempts to rally tribal allegiance generated a continuous struggle along the newly established frontier areas.<sup>392</sup>

Several tribes had transborder connections and changing loyalties. They also used Iraq and Najd as a shelter for their raids against other side. For instance *Dhafir* tribe who lived in the southern Iraq pledged allegiance to Ibn Saud.<sup>393</sup> *Uqair* Convention created a neutral zone between the two countries about 2,500 square miles and two parties agreed in 1975 to equally divide this zone<sup>394</sup> and in December 1981 parties signed treaty that divide the neutral zone and delimit the final Iraqi-Saudi border.

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<sup>391</sup> Harold Richard Patrick Dickson, *Kuwait and Her Neighbours* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1956), 274-75.

<sup>392</sup> Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia 1916-1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 79.

<sup>393</sup> *Ibid.*, 79.

<sup>394</sup> International Frontier Treaty between the Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia and the Republic Of Iraq, United Nations Treaty Series, 1991

After the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq became a British mandate in 1921, inheriting the Ottoman-Iran borders. The border remained more or less consistent with the Ottoman-Iran borders and a substantial part of the border was stable. The main territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran was division of Shatt al-Arab waterway. According to Constantinople Protocol of 1913 signed by Ottoman, Persian, Russian and English representatives, Shatt al-Arab was left under Ottoman sovereignty. Later, Iranian government refused this provision and by the end of 1914 and Ottoman and Iranian governments accepted the settlement of the issue “by placing the boundary in the middle of the river from a point one mile below the mouth of the Karun River [the longest river in Iran which also incorporates Shatt al Arab] to a point about four miles above it.”<sup>395</sup> Two prominent Iranian cities, Khorramsahr and Abadan are located at the edge of Shatt al-Arab and these cities flourished in the 20<sup>th</sup> century as oil industry and oil export developed. In line with this development, Iran requested shifts in the border demarcation. After 1930, the conflict escalated and border clashes and ship’s flag questions became routine. In 1937, Iran and Iraq signed border agreement which confirmed 1913 Constantinople Protocols. This means that Iraq-Iran border continued to run along the east side of the Shatt al-Arab which extended Iraq’s sovereignty over half of the river which was previously under Iran’s control. However Iran was also given some concessions. Iran was granted four-mile anchorage zone off Abadan, Shatt al-Arab was opened to all merchant ships of all nations and navies of Iran and Iraq.<sup>396</sup> However this treaty did not satisfy feuding parties. The shah claimed that this treaty was forced upon weaker Iran by a more powerful Iraq with the help of British Empire.<sup>397</sup> He asserted that:

In the past we had agreements with Iraq on the Shatt al-Arab which were never respected by Iraq... Naturally a river which forms the boundary between two nations cannot be used exclusively by one side only... We cannot accept the imperialistic policy of Iraq in this respect.<sup>398</sup>

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<sup>395</sup> Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh, “Evolution of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute after the 1913 Protocol,” in *Boundary Politics and International Boundaries of Iran*, ed. Pirouz Mojtahed-Zadeh (Boca Raton: Universal Publishers, 2006), 149.

<sup>396</sup> Peter Hünseler, “The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute,” in *The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis*, ed. M.S. El-Azhary, 15 (London and New York: Routledge, 2011).

<sup>397</sup> Joseph Kechichian, “Boundaries with Iraq,” *Encyclopædia Iranica* 4, no.4, 415-17.

<sup>398</sup> Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, *The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), 173.

As for Iraqi side, Qasim also refused to implement 1937 treaty, claimed the entire waterway and even some Iranian territory such as Khorramshahr.<sup>399</sup> This stalemate continued until 1975 Algiers Agreement. In this agreement, *thalweg*<sup>400</sup> became the boundary and Iraq gave concessions to Iran in control of the waterway in return for Iran's pledge to abandon its support for Kurdish rebellion which Baghdad government could not suppress due to Iranian support. This agreement brought relative stability to Iran-Iraq relations but the outbreak of Iranian revolution ended this short period. The Khomeini regime, hoping for spread revolution among Iraqi Shiites declared that Iran did not recognize the Algiers agreement anymore. Likewise, after a bit Saddam Hussein also renounced the treaty and both countries violated each other's territories.<sup>401</sup>

Iraq's border with Kuwait had been the source of problems for a long time. From the establishment of independent Iraq until recent times, Iraqi leaders requested rearrangement of the border or denied the existence of separate Kuwaiti state and claimed sovereignty over Kuwait. Six days after the independence of Kuwait on June 19, 1961 General Qasim claimed sovereignty over Kuwait.<sup>402</sup> He said:

The Republic of Iraq has decided to protect the Iraqi people in Kuwait and to demand the land, arbitrarily held by imperialism, which belongs [to Iraq as part] of the province of Basra...We shall, accordingly, issue a decree appointing the Sheikh of Kuwait as qa'imaqam of Kuwait, who will come under the authority of the Basra province...<sup>403</sup>

Iraqis asserted for a long time that Kuwait under the Ottoman period was part of Basra province and creation of Kuwait is separation of historical lands of Iraq. Iraq's claims over Iraq was not only historical or nationalist demand, it also depended on strategic reasons. First of all, Kuwait's vast oil resources attracted Iraq. In 1960,

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<sup>399</sup> Ibid., 174.

<sup>400</sup> Thalweg is the line connecting the lowest elevations of a river.

<sup>401</sup> Kechichian, "Boundaries with Iraq," 415-17

<sup>402</sup> Maurice Mendelson, "Legal Aspects of the Iraqi Sovereignty and Boundary Disputes with Kuwait," *The Middle East and North Africa: World Boundaries*, eds. in Clive Schofield and Richard Schofield, 146 (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

<sup>403</sup> Majid Khadduri and Edmund Ghareeb, *War in the Gulf 1990-91: The Iraq-Kuwait Conflict and Its Implications* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 65.

Kuwait's proven oil reserves were 65 billion barrels while Iraq had 27 billion<sup>404</sup> since Kuwait's oil fields were discovered earlier than Iraq's fields. For instance Kuwait's supergiant Burgan field was discovered in 1938 while Iraq's biggest oilfield Rumalia was discovered in 1953.<sup>405</sup> Secondly, Iraq's coastline on the Gulf is only 58 kilometers in length. This situation makes Iraq almost a landlocked country. In addition to this, this coastline is not sufficient for Iraq's needs and navigation. Bubiyan and Warba islands captured by Kuwaiti ruler Sheikh Mubarak al-Sabah with the encouragement of Britain due to their strategic importance<sup>406</sup> blocks Iraq's access to open seas. These islands have no population or economic significance, but their strategic position is significant for both Iraq and Kuwait. Kuwait constructed two bridges between Bubiyan and mainland Kuwait. The main aims of these bridges are not transportation, because there is no movement of people or goods between the two. With these bridges Kuwait aims to demonstrate that Bubiyan is territorial extension and indivisible part of Kuwait. In addition to this Kuwait began the constructing of Mubarak al-Kabir port in Bubiyan. As Iraq's aggression towards these islands increased, Bubiyan and Warba names proliferated as business and ship names. Silt continuously accumulates in where Shatt al-Arab meets the Gulf, cleanup costs are high and the navigation of large ships through seascape is difficult. Therefore Iraqi media commented that Kuwait is the cork in the bottle and a prominent Kuwaiti politician once said Iraq is a big garage with a small door.<sup>407</sup> Moreover after the discovery of oil in the southern Iraq, it was found that Rumelia oilfield, one of the biggest oilfields in the world, located underneath of both countries. Kuwait drills even one kilometer behind the border and Iraq accused Kuwait for stealing Iraq's oil. These reasons played crucial role in Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait in 1990.

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<sup>404</sup> OPEC Library Statistics,  
<http://www.opec.org/library/Annual%20Statistical%20Bulletin/interactive/current/FileZ/XL/T31.HTM>

<sup>405</sup> Xiaobing Li and Michael Molina, *Oil: A Cultural and Geographic Encyclopedia of Black Gold* (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2014), 32,152.

<sup>406</sup> Richard Schofield and Gerald Blake, *Arabian Boundaries: Primary Document 1853–1957* (Farnham Common, 1988), 35.

<sup>407</sup> David Long and Christian Koch, *Gulf Security in the Twenty-first Century* (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1997), 300.

From the secret treaty between Britain and Sabah family in 1899 to Kuwait's independence in 1961, Kuwait was under the British influence. With the 1899 Treaty Sabah family transferred their territorial rights to Britain:

Sheikh Mubarak bin Sheikh Sabah ... pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors, not to receive the agent or representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory ... binds himself... not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation for any other purpose, any portion of his territory ... without previous consent of Her Majesty's Government<sup>408</sup>

The first formal boundary definition between Iraq and Kuwait was made by Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913 which separated Ottoman and British spheres of influence in the Gulf region. According to this convention, Kuwait was separated from Basra province with two lines. First of all, Kuwait's sovereignty extended a full 80 kilometers from Kuwait City. This allocation was shown with a red circle on the map and a green line was used in order to delineate an additional 100-kilometer radius which was under the Kuwait's influence.<sup>409</sup> Within the red line the Sheikh of Kuwait was "exercising complete administrative autonomy", but within the outer zone he was "tribal over-lord, and entitled to levy tribute in his capacity as a *kaymakam* (deputy-governor) of the Ottoman Empire."<sup>410</sup> Due to the outbreak of World War I the convention was not ratified but set an example for future border delimitation endeavors.

Although Uqair Protocol of 1922 defined the Iraq-Najd and Kuwait-Najd boundaries, Iraq-Kuwait borders left undefined. In 1923, Britain recognized the green line as limit of Kuwait's sovereign territory. In 1934 correspondence the boundary was described thus:

"...from the intersection of the Wadi-el Audja with the (Wadi al) Batin and thence northwards along the Batin to a point just south of the latitude of Safwan; thence eastwards passing south of Safwan Wells, Jebel Sanam and Umm Qasr leaving them to Iraq and so on to the junction of the Khor Zobeir with the Khor Abdulla. The islands of

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<sup>408</sup> Archibald Chisholm, *The First Kuwait Oil Concession Agreement: A Record of the Negotiations 1911-1934* (Oxford and New York: Frank Cass and Company, 1975), 85.

<sup>409</sup> Michael Casey, *The History of Kuwait* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 200), 52.

<sup>410</sup> M.H. Mendelson and S.C. Hulton, "The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary: Legal Aspects," *Revue Belge de Droit International*, no.2 (1990): 297-98.

Warbah, Bubiyan, Maskan (or Mashjan) Failakah, Auhah, Kubbar, Qaru and Ummel-Maradim appertain to Kuwait”<sup>411</sup>

At that period, Iraq was under the British mandate and King Faisal had nothing to but accept this boundary. However, after Iraq gained its independence Iraqi leaders brought forward this issue which was closed for Kuwaitis.

In 1938, Iraqi Foreign Minister Taufiq al-Suwaidi sent a letter to British Foreign Office and claimed that Kuwait belongs to Iraq as Iraq was successor of Basra Province of Ottoman Empire.<sup>412</sup> After this demand was ignored by London, Al-Suwaidi also said that Iraq wanted an access to the Gulf through Kuwaiti territory by extending its railway to the coast of Kuwait and to shift the southern latitude as northern half of Kuwaiti territory would be annexed by Iraq.<sup>413</sup> In 1955, Iraq announced its aim “to advance its frontier to a depth of some four kilometers, covering a desert strip, the uninhabited island of Warbah and the waters of Khawr Abdallah which surround it.”<sup>414</sup> These moves were prevented by Britain. After the independence of Kuwait, Iraq’s claim on Kuwaiti territory increased and military mobilization which was considered as a will of invasion in south Iraq was reported.<sup>415</sup> Although correspondence of 19 June 1961 terminated the 1899 Treaty, it also ensured that Britain will assist Kuwait if it requests such assistance.<sup>416</sup> In accordance with this correspondence Kuwait submitted a request for military and political assistance and Britain responded quickly and deployed its troops in Kuwait. In 1963, after the overthrow of Qasim government by Abd al Salam Arif, Iraq recognized Kuwait’s independence and complete sovereignty over the territory defined in 1932 correspondence.<sup>417</sup> After this recognition both countries had

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<sup>411</sup> Harry Brown, “The Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Dispute: Historical Background and the UN Decisions of 1992 and 1993,” *IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin* (1994): 67.

<sup>412</sup> Richard Schofield, *Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993), 75.

<sup>413</sup> David Finnie, *Shifting Lines in the Sand: Kuwait’s Elusive Frontier with Iraq* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1992), 116.

<sup>414</sup> Miriam Joyce, *Kuwait 1945-1996*, Frank Cass, London, 1998, p.99-100

<sup>415</sup> *Ibid.*, 106.

<sup>416</sup> Elihu Lauterpacht et al., *The Kuwait Crisis: Basic Documents* (Chicago: Grotius Publications, 1991), 50.

<sup>417</sup> Agreed Minutes Between the State of Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq Regarding the Restoration of Friendly Relations, Recognition and Related Matters, 4 October 1963, 485 UNTS.

developed cordial relations for a while, but Iraq's territorial aspirations had remained. Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was the peak of this ambition. During the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait supported Iraq in different ways. Iraq used Kuwaiti ports for transshipment; Kuwait provided zero-interest loans and grants, oil and logistic support. However, after the devastating war Saddam Hussein began to target Kuwait and Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait in 1990 and annexed it.

Iraq-Turkey border had been a controversial issue for both countries for a while. Nascent Turkish state relinquished claims to all non-Turkish Ottoman territories and all territories that were under the occupation when Armistice of Mudros was signed. Mosul had considerable Turkish population and Britain occupied Mosul after the armistice as signed. Mosul was also part of Turkish homeland according to *misak-ı milli* (national oath), set of principles set by the last Ottoman parliament. Therefore Turkey claimed territorial jurisdiction and sovereignty over Mosul. On the other hand Britain ascribes a crucial meaning to Mosul. It has crucial significance for Britain to secure its route to India and its oil reserves were Britain's strategic interests. Britain also wanted to balance Shiite population of Iraq by annexing Mosul and considering the geographical proximity of Mosul and Baghdad Britain believed that if Turkey gained Mosul, it could pose a threat to Iraq. The problem of Mosul's belonging could not be solve in Lausanne Treaty and was parried with a provisional clause:

The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months. In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations. The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.<sup>418</sup>

The problem had different meaning for feuding parties. For Britain it was a border demarcation issue and the problem was a territorial dispute. However, for Turkey it was the fate of one part of the national homeland. The tension at the border area

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<sup>418</sup> Turkey. Lausanne Peace Treaty, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i\\_-\\_political-clauses.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/lausanne-peace-treaty-part-i_-_political-clauses.en.mfa) (accessed June 6, 2015).

increased as the negotiations failed and border clashes were erupted. In order to avoid the military escalation League of Nations determined a temporary border known as Brussels Line.<sup>419</sup> This line left Mosul to Iraq and Hakkari which was claimed by Britain to Turkey. Bilateral negotiations between Britain and Turkey could not solve the problem and both parties brought the issue before the League of Nations and the League chose Brussels Line as permanent border and Iraq annexed Mosul. By this annexation Turkey-Iraq borderline was drawn and Turkey never asserted any official claims regarding the status of Mosul.

#### **4.4. Mesopotamia-inspired Territorial Nationalism in Iraq: General Overview**

Territory was not major component of traditional Iraqi identity. Tribal affiliations, religious loyalties, language-centered identities preceded territory-based identities. Tribesmen are tied to each other by geography, intermarriage, land ownership, collective business and employment and most importantly lineage. Tribe provides social network, helps those in need, and sometimes judges and punishes wrongdoers. Social relations in Iraq are under the strong influence of tribal code of honor which shapes people's life from the cradle to the grave. Tribes and their values are internal parts of justice, retaliation and mediation. Even progressive leaders and parties that spent vast time and resources to weaken tribal base in society exploited and invigorated tribalism when they needed. Tribe's territorial arrangements are far from modern concept of territory and they are proud of their lineages, even the small tribes can trace their lineages to early Medieval period, not the territory they lived on. In addition to this, several great tribes of today's Iraq migrated to their current lands in 18<sup>th</sup> or 19<sup>th</sup> century, very late time to create a territorial loyalty and territorial sense for identity.

Religion is also source of identity and way of political expression in Iraq. Not only religious minorities such as Assyrians, Mandeans or Chaldeans defined their identity by religion, but also for Sunnis and Shiites religious beliefs are driving behind their identity. Therefore it is not surprising that in many cases, a local notable who has

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<sup>419</sup> Mustafa Kibaroglu and Aysegül Kibaroglu, *Global Security Watch: A Reference Handbook* (Westport: Greenwood, 2009), 23.

considerable political or economic power is at the same time has a religious position whether a cleric, a descendent of Prophet or a guardian of a holy shrine. Especially Shi'ism has an overwhelming influence on its adherents. Religious obligation to follow a religio-political leader (*marja*); a fifth of net income (*khums*) given to Shiite endowments led by Shiite clerics; holy shrines and pilgrimage destinations located on Najaf, Karbala, Samarra and Kazimayn (*Atabat*) in which everyday life is encrusted with Shi'ism; Shiite festivals, commemorations, rituals especially during the month of *Muharram* which keep alive strong Shiite symbolism left little place for territorial sentiments.

Although aforementioned loyalties target different components of identity, they have one thing in common: They are particularistic and address only particularistic needs and interests of the group. Creating a common past for all Iraqis who were diverse in every respect necessitated an upper identity which was found in ancient Mesopotamia. Proponents of Mesopotamian civilization considered Iraq as a modern manifestation of this great ancient civilization. Therefore they incorporated Mesopotamian history, symbols and narratives into the Iraqi identity which they tried to create. After the 1958 revolution state began invest cultural production through cultural agents, such as writers and intellectuals. As Orit Bashkin argues these agents had three main objectives:

First, they celebrated the nation's past, starting in the days of ancient Mesopotamia, continuing through the Islamic era, and manifesting itself in the present. They underscored the importance of "the people" (*al-sha'b*) as a social group formed by Iraq's geography, natural traditions, and history. Third, they celebrated the July revolution [of 1958] as materializing dormant hopes for independence and freedom.<sup>420</sup>

*The Journal of Popular Culture* whose first issue was published in September 1963 was one of the significant products of this cultural production. Published by Mesopotamia-inspired intellectuals and financially supported by the state, the editors declared that their aim was to improve understanding of ancient history and therefore

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<sup>420</sup> Orit Baskin, "Hybrid Nationalism: Watani and Qawmi Visions in Iraq under Abd al-Karim Qasim, 1958-61," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43 (2011): 296.

fostering greater integration between ancient and modern Iraq.<sup>421</sup> Saddam Hussein also held with this idea. He said:

It is well-known that long before [the rise of] Islam Hammurabi's laws set an example to others, and that the civilizations of Babylon, Assyria and Sumer were the cradle of world civilization. This is how you Iraqis were five thousand years ago. Today you are called upon to revitalize this eternal heritage by establishing a new civilization...<sup>422</sup>

Iraqi folklore, songs and poems inundated with these symbols. After the 1958 coup, new national flag took an eight-pointed star in the middle which symbolized the goddess of love and war *Inana* and *Ishtar* and the emblem of sun god *Shamash* were chosen as national emblem. After this change, Iraq became the second Arab country whose flag carried a territorial figure after Lebanon that uses Cedar Tree. Mesopotamian symbols such as Ishtar Gate of Babylon, Ziggurat of Assyria, and Golden Lyre of Sumer became visible in political and social domains. Secular holidays and anniversaries dedicated to Iraqi people and territory such as Mother's Day, Child Day, May Day, and Arbor Day were introduced. Mesopotamia-inspired rhetoric, art and style affected various aspect of life ranging from politics to architecture, education to fashion. In 1970, The Iraqi Fashion House was established. The aim of this was

“to preserve traditional attire from the various parts and communities of Iraq, and thus create a horizontal fusion, but also to protect and cultivate ancient Iraqi fashion, and to raise the standard of design of Iraqi textiles with designs inspired by the ancient Iraqi paintings, thus establishing a vertical connection with Iraq's pre-Islamic past.”<sup>423</sup>

Freedom Monument in Baghdad completed in 1962 by famous Iraqi sculptor Jewad Salim, contains pre-Islamic motifs and symbols. Annual festivals in which alleged affiliation between modern Iraq and ancient Mesopotamian civilizations was constantly emphasized took place. Mosul Spring Festival, for instance, inaugurated in 1969 was “Ba'athi attempt to create a Mesopotamian identity, linking Iraq to its

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<sup>421</sup> Eric Davis, *Memories of State: Politics, History, and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2005), 220.

<sup>422</sup> Amatzia Baram, “Mesopotamian Identity in Ba'athi Iraq,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 19, no.4 (1983): 445.

<sup>423</sup> Liam Anderson and Gareth Stansfield, *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy, or Division* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 76.

pre-Islamic past, which could serve as a new basis for Iraqi identity.”<sup>424</sup> Schoolbooks, banknotes and stamps carried heroes, monuments, and symbols of Mesopotamian civilizations. Ancient names were given to hotels, streets, boulevards, markets and commercial enterprises. This renaming was also applied in larger scale. Names of some provinces were changed by their ancient equivalent. For instance Dulaim province became Anbar, Mosul became Nineveh, Kirkuk became Temim, Hilla became Babil, and Diwaniya became Qadisiyah. Ancient city of Babylon was chosen as a center for the celebrations of the first anniversary of Iraqi invasion of Iraq. Iraqi leaders, especially Saddam Hussein portrayed themselves as last representatives of Mesopotamian heritage. Deputy President Taha Muhyi al-Din Ma’ruf’s words clearly show how Iraqi leaders associated themselves with ancient civilizations:

O the masses of our great nation, O victorious sons of Iraq, O grandsons of Nebuchadnezzar... O sons of middle Euphrates... your salute to the battle of Saddam’s Qadisiyya [reference to associate Saddam Hussein’s war against Iran and Caliph Umar’s conquest of Sasanids] under the slogan Yesterday Nebuchadnezzar, Today Saddam Hussein establishes the link between the historical contribution of this country . . . and the heights of today and the flags of victory fluttering under the leadership of the fearless and inspired leader Saddam Hussein.<sup>425</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> Elie Podeh, *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 152.

<sup>425</sup> Amatzia Baram, *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Ba’athist Iraq, 1968-89* (New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1991), 48.



**Figure 3: Saddam Hussein in ancient warrior clothes**

**Source: Kamyar Abdi, “From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein’s Cult of Personality: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iraqi National Ideology,” *Journal of Social Archeology* 8, no.1: 27.**

Archeology was one of the main instruments that Iraqi state used to unearth and revive the Mesopotamian civilization in order to inspire Iraqi people and direct their loyalties to Iraq. Archaeological researches were not limited by excavations. Renovation and reconstruction and even fabrication of historical monuments were also carried out by archeologists educated in the most prestigious universities in the country. Huge amount of money was allocated for this task and significant historical sites which were in ruin such as Hatra, Nineveh, Ctesiphon and especially Babylon were reconstructed. Museums which showed the continuity of Iraqi history proliferated all over the country. In 1930, archeology courses were included in school curricula by the parliamentary education committee.<sup>426</sup> In 1940, the new education law enacted by Rashid Ali al-Kaylani government added the management of antiquities and the establishment of museums in to the responsibilities of the Ministry of Education.<sup>427</sup> Department of Antiquities established in 1922 under the British Mandate improved in time and by the 1970s had become a fully professional

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<sup>426</sup> Amatzia Baram, “A Case of Imported Identity: The Modernizing Secular Ruling Elites of Iraq and the Concept of Mesopotamian-Inspired Territorial Nationalism, 1922-1992,” *Poetics Today* 15, no.2 (1994): 285.

<sup>427</sup> *Ibid.*, 296.

organization employing archeologists, specialists, site guards.<sup>428</sup> The name of the official journal of the Department was Sumer.<sup>429</sup> In 1979 the Department was transformed into the “State Organization for Antiquities and Heritage” and this archaeology department was elevated to the ranks of a ministry.<sup>430</sup> Especially Saddam Hussein gave prominent importance to the archeological researches. Saddam allocated at least US \$100,000,000 in 1987-88, during the harsh times of Iran-Iraq war, to the reconstruction of Babylon and archeological excavations in the area.<sup>431</sup> He said:

Antiques are the most precious relics the Iraqis possess, showing the world that our country, which today is undergoing an extraordinary renaissance, is the [legitimate] offspring of previous civilizations which offered up a great contribution to humanity.<sup>432</sup>

Iraqi ruling elites had also tried to spread Mesopotamian legacy among Iraqi people through plays and films. Between 1968 and 1979, at least six different plays which carried Sumerian or Babylonian messages were produced. The interpretation of Gilgamesh was the most important one.<sup>433</sup> In addition to this, since mid 1970s, one or two films dedicated to Mesopotamian civilizations were produced each year.<sup>434</sup> In addition to this, Ministry of Guidance which is responsible for supervision of media institutions promoted arts encumbered with Iraqi territory.

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<sup>428</sup> Neil Brodie, “The Market Background to the April 2003 Plunder of the Iraq National Museum,” in *The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq*, eds. Peter Stone and Joanne Farchahkh Bajjaly, 41 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008).

<sup>429</sup> James Goode, “Archeology and Politics in Iraq: From British Mandate to Saddam Hussein,” *Assyrian Reliefs: From the Palace of Ashurnasirpal II*, eds. in Ada Cohen and Steven Kangas, 114 (Hanover: Hood Museum of Art).

<sup>430</sup> Kamyar Abdi, “From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein’s Cult of Personality: Ancient Mesopotamia and Iraqi National Ideology,” *Journal of Social Archeology* 8, no.1 (2008): 18.

<sup>431</sup> Amatzia Baram, “Territorial Nationalism in the Middle East,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 26, no.4 (1990): 425.

<sup>432</sup> James Cuno, *Who Owns Antiquity: Museums and the Battle Over Our Ancient Heritage* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 54.

<sup>433</sup> Baram, “Mesopotamian Identity in Ba’athi Iraq,” 429.

<sup>434</sup> *Ibid.*, 429.

#### 4.5. Territoriality of Iraq under the British Mandate

You are flying in the face of four millenniums of history if you try to draw a line around Iraq and call it a political entity! Assyria always looked to the west and east and north and Babylonia to the south. They have never been an independent unit. You've got to take time to get them integrated, it must be done gradually. They have no conception of nationhood yet.

John Van Ess to Gertrude Bell in 1919<sup>435</sup>

Iraq is a result of British activity in the Middle East. Before the British presence in the area there was neither Iraq nor the desire for creation of Iraq. An Iraqi sheikh who was under arrest by Britain because of his anti-British activities said:

You have offered us independence; we never asked for it, nor dreamed of such a thing till you put the idea into our heads. For hundreds of years, we have lived in a state as far removed from independence as it is possible to conceive: now we have asked for it, you imprison us<sup>436</sup>

When it became clear that Ottoman Empire would enter the First World War as an ally of Germany, Britain occupied Basra and Faw, strategic locations for Britain on the Gulf. By occupying Basra and Faw, Britain aimed to prevent Russian and German expansions and influences in the Gulf, protect its strategic interests in Iran's oilfields and gain trust of its client sheiks. This occupation was the first significant contact between Britain and Iraqi territory. Britain's Middle East policy had been designed in London, Cairo, Delhi and Iraq had been a backwater issue for Britain for a long time. Therefore Britain was not completely prepared for this invasion. They met armed resistance everywhere and the defeat of Kut al-Amara was a national humiliation inflicted upon Britain by weak Ottoman foe.<sup>437</sup> However Britain continued its march by following Tigris and Euphrates valley and took Baghdad. In 1918, after the armistice was declared, Mosul fell under the British control.

First years of British rule in Iraq appeared similar with other British colonial possessions. They brought the idea of "white man's burden" to Iraq and distrusted Iraqis' capacity to rule themselves. British nationals were given extraterritorial

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<sup>435</sup> George Packer, *The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq* (New York: FSG Books, 2005), 334.

<sup>436</sup> Arnold Talbot Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920: A Clash of Loyalties* (London: Oxford University Press, 1931), 295-96.

<sup>437</sup> David Fromkin, *A Peace To End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2009), 203.

rights, British officers took charge of the administrative duties and Arabs were systematically kept off from positions of responsibility. British rule also revived the tribal power and gave tribal leaders the paramount authority in their districts. They aimed to increase British control over Iraq by tying tribal leaders to British administration through bribes, grants or privileges and contain Turkish-educated urban Arabs who were inclined to nationalist sentiments. As Charles Issawi argues “under the Mandate the British introduced minor improvements, but did not attempt to alter the system for fear of antagonizing the landlords and tribal leaders, on whose support they were dependent.”<sup>438</sup> Reversing Turkish policy which aimed to vitiate tribal sentiments and mold them into nationhood was one of the problematic legacies of British rule.<sup>439</sup>

This policy alienated Arabs of Iraq from nascent Iraqi state and led to 1920 Revolt. The revolt was peaceful in its early days. Shiite and Sunni Muslims gathered in mosques and demanded self determination and independence for Iraq. As British administration dismissed the demands, the nature of the movement changed and armed revolt began. Shiite religious leaders, Euphrates tribes and nationalists were driving forces behind this revolt. Influential Shiite cleric Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi al-Shirazi issued a fatwa and declared that “service in British administration was unlawful.”<sup>440</sup> The revolt lasted three months, affected almost one-third of the country and the biggest even the last social movement that Sunni and Shiites took part together. Britain suppressed the revolt by force; however this revolt became a symbol of national honor and prestige. This revolt started in mid-Euphrates region and strongly supported by Shiite religious leaders. However, one of the Sunni insurgency groups in Iraq founded after 2003 invasion was named as 1920 Revolution Brigade. Britain’s treatments to Iraqis were not the only reason for displeasure among ordinary Iraqis. Britain was also seen as a foreigner that occupied Iraq. Ottomans could secure people’s loyalty at same point. The *millet* system defined political structure communally rather than territorially and allowed communities to manage their affairs with little government intervention. In addition to this as a Muslim ruler

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<sup>438</sup> Charles Issawi, *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa* (Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 147.

<sup>439</sup> Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq 1914-1932* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), 231.

<sup>440</sup> Charles Tripp, *A History of Iraq* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 41.

and Caliph, Ottoman sultans had sympathy among Iraqis. Although Ottomans had faced many revolts and outbreaks in Iraq, none of them were secessionist or nationalist. However, Britain was seen a foreign power in Muslim territories. For instance Iraqi historian Abbas al-Azzawi claimed that Iraqi history was interrupted by two foreign powers, by Mongols in 1258 and Britain in 1917.<sup>441</sup>

After Britain took control of the Iraq, they immediately began territorial regulations and arrangements. Administrative centers were formed in major towns and civil administration structures largely recruited from British India were formed. Iraqi territory was organized along the lines of a province of British India.<sup>442</sup> Provinces were divided into subdivisions ruled directly by the British officers.<sup>443</sup> Ottoman *Tapu* Department responsible for land registration was revived.<sup>444</sup> Iraq Occupied Territories Code, an Indian-based penal code was introduced in 1915 and applied until 1919.<sup>445</sup> Several governmental institutions such as Departments of Land, Post and Telegraph, Agriculture, Irrigation, Police, Custom, Finance were established. These institutions' headquarters were in Baghdad.<sup>446</sup>

British administration regulated and reformed land tenure in order to create precise and enumerated spaces and homogenize Iraq's territories. Britain's land policy in its colonies included several steps. First of all they surveyed all cultivable lands and found that who the owner was, divided communal lands into private properties, delineated village boundaries and by clarifying internal borders territorialize the land, protected the rights of the owners and encouraged them to be engaged in agriculture as efficient as possible to increase tax revenues. Main aims of the land regulations were to increase revenue, to provide order and to enhance state authority. Same process was carried out in Iraq. Since the success of this territorial regulation was depended on agricultural efficiency, British administration initiated several irrigation

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<sup>441</sup> Abbas al-Azzawi, *تاريخ العراق بين احتلالين* (Baghdad, 1945).

<sup>442</sup> Peter Sluglett, *Britain in Iraq: Contriving King and Country* (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007), 4.

<sup>443</sup> *Ibid.*, 12.

<sup>444</sup> *Ibid.*, 168.

<sup>445</sup> Thomas Metcalf, *Imperial Connections: India in the Indian Ocean Area 1860-1920* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2007), 206.

<sup>446</sup> Samiuddin, *Administrative Development in the Arab World*, 32.

and agricultural development projects such as *Abu Ghraib*, *Diyala Weir*, *Hindiyya Dam*, *Hawija Irrigation Project*, and *Kut Barrage*.

Public sphere and public opinion emerged in Baghdad and then radiated to the whole country. Intellectuals, writers, poets, and journalists that gathered around clubs, magazines and newspapers, and reading clubs played a crucial role for the creation of public opinion, rise of sense of patriotism and nationhood and awareness of the territorial sentiments that attached the Iraqi land regardless of ethnicity and religion. During this period, Baghdad became home of prolific intellectual activity and a considerable amount of societies, journals and newspapers. Institutions such as Scientific Institute, the Reform Club, the Society of the Brethren of Culture, Women's Revival, and the Najafi Society of Islamic Revival organized night classes and lectures for the education of illiterate Iraqis, served as a venue for discussions on Iraqi history, brought Iraqi intelligentsia and the ordinary people together.<sup>447</sup> The impacts of these clubs and institutions on the establishment of Iraq as a territorial unit which attracted its inhabitants' loyalty were tremendous. They increased people's awareness of where they live through Iraqi history and culture lectures; they were proponents of independence of Iraq and struggled against British domination in the country; their progressive and patriotic approaches privileged Iraqi people and territory. Newspapers such as *al-Istiqlal*, *al-Dijla*, *al-Fallah*, *al-Rafidan*, *al-Mawsil* played similar roles. They connected fellow citizens to each other, provided transmission between people and their state and acted as representatives of public opinion even if the "public" was indistinct and blur. Their coverage to the people's daily problems such as housing conditions and rents in big cities, educational problems in villages, or land ownership<sup>448</sup> united people who shared same territory, not with ideals or ideology but problems this time.

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<sup>447</sup> Orit Bashkin, *The Other Iraq: Pluralism and Culture in Hashemite Iraq* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 25.

<sup>448</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

#### 4.6. Iraq under Hashemite Rule

International boundaries had never been heard of in Arabia... In practice, the Baghdad administration had never made any attempt to extend its control into the desert to a distance of more than two or three miles [3–5 km] from the Euphrates...

John Bagot Glubb<sup>449</sup>

The efforts to create a nation bounded by territory and defined by territory continued after Iraq gained its independence, again as a British policy. Formal independence of Iraq changed little about the relations between Britain and Iraq. Britain remained its superior position and continued to intervene Iraq's internal affairs as evidenced by the British invasion of Iraq in 1941 to oust pro-Nazi Rashid Ali government. As Paul Kingston enumerates Britain had significant influence on every crucial sector in Iraq:

While the key to this influence was found in the two British air bases at Habbaniyya and Shaiba in Iraq which formed a vital part of Britain's air defence strategy for the Persian Gulf, the strength of this influence was nowhere more marked than in the economic sphere. The Iraqi dinar was linked to sterling and its supply was regulated by a currency board in London; major sectors of the economy were controlled by private British business concerns, be it in oil with her 23.5 per cent interest in the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC), railroads or banking; and, most importantly with regards to the issue of economic policy, government departments were staffed by a large number of British technicians and administrators.<sup>450</sup>

Moreover, Iraq was still in need of British support to maintain internal order and provide external security:

Iraq was nowhere near being able to fulfill the other four criteria of internationally sanctioned sovereignty: that the state be "capable of maintaining its territorial integrity and political independence," that it be "able to maintain the public peace throughout the whole territory," that it have "adequate financial resources to provide regularly for normal Government requirements," and that it have laws that afforded "equal and regular justice to all."<sup>451</sup>

Although Britain injected the idea of territorial sovereignty and instruments of modern territorial state, Iraqi leaders were not ready for this idea and the reality of

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<sup>449</sup> John Bagot Glubb, *War in the Desert* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), 62.

<sup>450</sup> Paul Kingston, *Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East 1945-1958* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 97.

<sup>451</sup> Toby Dodge, *Inventing Iraq: The Failure of Nation Building and a History Denied* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 31.

Iraqi state. Arab nationalism and aspirations for Arab union which triggered revolt against Ottoman Empire were still effective among new elites, especially King Faisal who used Arab Revolt for legitimacy. Iraqi flag when Faisal became the king contained two stars which represented Hashemite kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan. Egyptians, Syrian and Palestinians were given state position and rising anti-British sentiments were intermingled with allegedly anti-colonialist pan-Arabism. As Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald Blake claims:

Not only did Iraq lack a convincing *raison d'être*, but...many of its early leaders sought to prevent the development of a distinct Iraqi identity, preferring to emphasize its Arab identity.... Nationalists assumed that Iraq would eventually disappear and be submerged in some larger Arab identity<sup>452</sup>

Even the king Faisal admitted the depth of division in Iraqi society and the lack of “national, religious and ideological unity” in social life.<sup>453</sup> During this period, Iraqi intellectual sphere was remarkably under the influences of other Arab countries, especially Egypt and Lebanon. “Cairo writes, Beirut publishes, and Baghdad reads” has been a famous expression of intellectual exchange in the Arab world. In addition to this, many Iraqis educated in Cairo’s and Beirut’s old and prestigious universities because the higher education in Iraq reached sufficient level very lately. Iraq’s peripheral position in intellectual and cultural affairs decelerated nation-building in territorial terms.

The efforts to create territorial nationalism among Iraqis had changed the cultural sphere and commenced new practices different from the former religious, tribal or sectarian ones. For instance during the Faisal reign, Scientific Institute in Baghdad organized a cultural festival to revive *Suq Ukaz* to revive poetry, oratory and fine arts in Iraq.<sup>454</sup> In pre-Islamic Arabia, leading poets, public speakers and men of letters gathered in this festival, publicized and spread their works and showed their language aptitudes by arguing and discussing each other. Imitation of *Suq Ukaz* in Iraq had a territorial significance, because poems and oratories were generally

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<sup>452</sup> Alasdair Drysdale and Gerald Blake, *Middle East and North Africa: A Political Geography* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), 272.

<sup>453</sup> Kirmanj, “The Clash of Identities in Iraq,” 45.

<sup>454</sup> Bashkin, *The Other Iraq*, 36.

propound in colloquial Arabic and attracted more attention than the standardized Arabic which Arab nationalists saw as a unifying factor for Arabs. Promoting Iraqi accent and colloquial language in oral literature emphasized the uniqueness of Iraqis and therefore their territorial distinctness. Artist and sculptor Jawad Salim, an ardent proponent of Mesopotamia-inspired territorial nationalism deliver some of his lectures in Fine Art Institute in the Iraqi dialect.<sup>455</sup> Satirical journals such as *Habazbuz* also used vernacular language.<sup>456</sup> Iraqi print media was another institution that emphasized Iraq's unique character by giving coverage to Iraq's geography, history, culture, literature and values. Later, radio and television took this task. The first period of radio and television broadcasting in Iraq represents a pluralist and territorial approach. The first Iraqi radio was established in 1930, in 1939 Kurdish radio began transmitting and Turkmen radio was established in 1959. Kirkuk TV station which was one of the first TV stations in the country began transmission in Arabic, Kurdish, Turkmen, and Syriac in 1967.<sup>457</sup>

Academic interest towards Iraqi geography, history, ethnography, music and tribes were another landscape of this era. Several majestic books on Iraqi history were written in this period, such as *Asha'ir al-Iraq* (The Tribes of Iraq) and *Ta'rikh al-Iraq baina ihtilalain* (The History of Iraq between two Occupations) by Abbas al-Azzawi; *Tarikh al-Wizarat al-Iraqiyya* (The History of Iraqi Governments) and *Tarikh al-Iraq al-Siyasi al-Hadith* (Political History of Modern Iraq) by Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani; *Shakhsiyat al-fard al-Iraqi: Bahth fi nafsiyyat al-Shab al-Iraqi ala daw ilm al-ijtima al-hadith* (A Study in the Psychology of the Iraqi People in Light of Modern Sociology) by Ali al-Wardi to name a few. Literature, especially poetry that dedicated to themes unique to Iraq also increased at that period. Glories and might of ancient Mesopotamian civilizations, Iraqi landscape especially the Tigris and the Euphrates, passion for Baghdad, devotion for homeland became main themes of literature. Iraqi intellectuals also demanded from government to terminate

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<sup>455</sup> Lorna Selim and Ulrike Khams, "Lorna Selim Remembers," in *Strokes of Genius: Contemporary Iraqi Art*, ed. Maysaloun Faraj, 44 (London: Saqi, 2002), 44.

<sup>456</sup> Peter Wien, *Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, Totalitarian, and pro-Fascist Inclinations 1932-1941* (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 2006), 80.

<sup>457</sup> Ahmed al-Rawi, *Media Practice in Iraq* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 15-16.

Egyptian and Levant domination in print market and especially school textbooks. For instance Iraqi Jewish intellectual Anwar Sha'ul stated that:

The Arab textbooks, small and large, are Egyptian. You cannot find in them even a mere mention of the name of Iraq or its special features... Did our honorable Ministry of Education think about addressing this shortcoming by publishing a series of Iraqi textbooks that are written in modern fashion? The production of Iraq-focused textbooks, argued the editorial, would be the only way to ensure that students would become loyal Iraqis.<sup>458</sup>

Constant emphasis on uniqueness of Iraq during the Hashemite rule differentiated Iraqis from other Arabs. The term *dukhala* which means outsiders used by Iraqi press to humiliate Arabs in Iraq, especially Egyptians, Palestinians and Syrians.<sup>459</sup> Although Egyptians' arrogant attitudes towards Iraqis, Syrians anti-Shiite positions and Palestinian Pan-Arabs negative stance towards Kurds created anger among population, the impact of the investment on the territorial identity of Iraqis was substantially significant in this development. Iraqi identity had many 'others' such as Turks, British colonizers, Zionists etc. However, choosing other Arabs as stranger incorporated non-Arab Iraqis such as Kurds into the nation-state, sharpened territorial distinctness of Iraq and secured its independence by rejecting unification with other Arabs. These developments strengthened the territorial identity of Iraqis by differentiating them from other Arabs and consolidate territorial state by distributing equal rights to its citizens regardless of their ethnicity.

Hashemite rulers lacked the sufficient power to govern because both their regime and the state apparatus that they rule had no roots in the society. This power vacuum created instability in Iraq. Army began to fill this vacuum and became increasingly visible in Iraqi politics as evidenced by coups of Bakr Sidqi and Hikmat Sulaiman in 1936 and Rashid Ali al-Kaylani coup in 1941. From then on, army became a motif for nationhood and was seen as an integral part of national solidarity. Monarchy failed to develop national roots and therefore popular base. Faisal ensured the support of some Sunni notables, tribal sheiks and the Sherifians but his influence on ordinary Iraqis was quite low and his position in their eyes was not higher than

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<sup>458</sup> Orit Bashkin, *New Babylonians: A History of Jews in Modern Iraq* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 42.

<sup>459</sup> Orit Bashkin, "Iraqi Shadows Iraqi Lights: Anti-Fascist and anti-Nazi Voices in Monarchic Iraq 1932-1941," in *Arab Responses to Fascism and Nazism: Attraction and Repulsion*, ed. Israel Gershoni (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2014), 164.

British governor in Iraq. Faisal tried to incorporate Iraqi intellectuals to his patronage system by offering them state positions<sup>460</sup> and aimed to use their influences on the Iraqi people, but Faisal failed to achieve success. State institutions did not work properly and Iraqis lost their reliance on state, assembly and bureaucracy. One Iraqi poet of this era criticized this period as follow:

Senators they say and a National Assembly  
performing public duties in every way  
But when we tested them we find distortions  
and a game in which a thousand actors played  
Oh Seat are you able to hear me  
for only you do I call and only you reply  
They acquired you without right or merit  
except to spread oppression and receive salaries<sup>461</sup>

Failure to create a leadership that appealed everyone who lived in the Iraqi territory strengthened local politics and interest which damage the territorial consolidation of loyalty in Iraq. Tribes were also another great obstacle to formation of territorial-nation state. Ottoman efforts to debilitation of tribes were interrupted by British policies that revived tribal power. For instance, by 1943, only seventeen percent of the agricultural land was privately owned and most of these private owners were local notables.<sup>462</sup> Just before the 1958 Revolution “55 per cent of all cultivable land was controlled by 1 per cent of landowners leaving only 3.6 per cent of the land to be divided up between 64 per cent of all landowners.”<sup>463</sup> Baghdad government tried to alleviate the gap between local notables and ordinary people by selling state lands (*miri sirf*). For instance, between 1946 and 1950, 1058 farmers were given hundred-donum (decare) plots. The cultivators owned these lands and did not have to pay any

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<sup>460</sup> Abdel Salaam Yousif, “The Struggle for Cultural Hegemony During the Iraqi Revolution,” in *Iraqi Revolution of 1958: The Old Social Classes Revisited*, eds. Robert Fernea and William Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), 173.

<sup>461</sup> quoted in Mohammed Tarbush, *The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraq to 1941* (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 2010), 61.

<sup>462</sup> Doreen Warriner, *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948).

<sup>463</sup> Kingston, *Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East 1945-1958*, 96.

share to landlords.<sup>464</sup> However this project failed to increase people's status as sheiks and city merchants also bought state land and accumulated much of it.<sup>465</sup>

The Treaty of Saadabad signed by Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey on July 8, 1937 was another territorializing factor in Iraqi history. With this treaty, signatory states sought to secure their territorial integrity and territorial sovereignty. As Serdar Palabıyık demonstrates the Treaty required the non-intervention to internal affairs and impermeability of boundaries principles.<sup>466</sup> This treaty was not only a regional security alliance which aimed to stabilize the region but also an instrument which newly-independent countries sought for consolidating their domestic legitimacies. Contrary to supporters of *qawmiyya* policy, Iraqi patriots who gained power after the 1936 coup emphasized the independence of Iraq rather than unification with other Arab states and believed that developing cordial relations with neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran should be the main tenet of the Iraqi foreign policy.<sup>467</sup> The Treaty of Saadabad was one of the earliest diplomatic initiatives that Iraqi statecraft involved to achieve domestic and international legitimacy and gain recognition for its regime and territory. It was also an early official declaration that based on Iraq as a territorial unit against the transnational and subnational policies.

#### **4.7. 1958 Revolution and Qasim Era: Golden Age of Territorialism in Iraq**

Territorial dimension of Iraq had a tortuous history after 1958. The overthrow of the old regime by a bloody coup led by General Abdal Karim Qasim in 1958 opened a new era for Iraq. Qasim was one of the most ardent proponents of territorial nationalism in Iraqi history. Contrary to his pan-Arab opponents who worked for Arab unity and even unification with other Arab states he pursued Iraq First policy. His policy that aimed to consolidate Iraqi state within Iraqi territory instead of developing trans-border ties with other Arabs provided relatively free environment to

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<sup>464</sup> Joseph Sassoon, *Economic Policy in Iraq 1932-1950* (Oxford and New York: Frank Cass, 2006), 173.

<sup>465</sup> Riad al-Ghonemy, *The Political Economy of Rural Poverty: The Case for Land Reform* (New York: Routledge, 1990), 175.

<sup>466</sup> Serdar Balabıyık, "Sadabad Paktı (8 Temmuz 1937): İttifak Kuramları Açısından Bir İnceleme," *Ortadoğu Etüdleri* 2, no.3 (2010): 157.

<sup>467</sup> *Ibid.*, 162

Kurds. This means that for the first time in Iraq's history, Kurds' rights were recognized by Baghdad government. Although his reign was short for a regime changer his popularity in modern Iraq is high. Therefore it is not surprising that Qasim is the only Iraqi leader that a museum was dedicated his life and works in today's Iraq.

The tension between *qawmiyya* (Pan-Arabism) which considers Arab language, culture and history as a constitutive element of identity and strives for Arab unity; and *wataniyya* (Iraqi nationalism) which reflects that Iraq is unique and Iraqi nation is different from other Arabs by emphasizing Iraqi geography, culture and archeology marked this era. Contrary to rising Pan-Arabism in the Middle East in that period, Qasim pursued a *watani* policy. He began with restricting the working conditions of non-Iraqis:

Non-Iraqis may not practice any work, trade, profession or occupation in Iraq unless they obtain a work permit from the Directorate General of Labor and Social Security. These permits, which are of one-year duration, are issued only on proof to the Directorate General that the work or occupation carried out by the non-Iraqi is of a specialized nature and that there is no Iraqi capable of performing it.<sup>468</sup>

Nascent Iraqi state and Iraqi territorial-patriotic nationalism lacked sufficient internal instruments and was suppressed by the trans-territorial movements, Pan-Arabism in particular. In order to secure Iraqiness, Qasim filled social life with unprecedented symbolism. He began with replacing Hashemite symbols such as flag, anthem, insignia with new Mesopotamia-inspired, territory-based symbols. Names of streets, squares, quarters, buildings became the reflections of the new regime. Qasim renamed royal palace as Republican palace, and built Revolution City (*Madinat al-Thawra*) to provide housing to the urban poor. Liberation (*Tahrir*) Square, Republic (*Jumhuriyya*) Street became the centers of Baghdad. The annual celebration of the Revolution was a sacred time created by the regime when all Iraqis gathered in certain places decorated with symbols dedicated to Iraqi territory, pictures of leaders, slogans that praised regime in certain times. This means that this celebration united all Iraqis, but only Iraqis symbolically, spatially and temporarily.

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<sup>468</sup> Iraq. The Iraqi Revolution: One Year of Progress and Achievement, 14th July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, p.111-12.

Qasim unveiled the Monument of the Unknown Soldier and made it a major site for foreign delegations that previously pay their tribute at the al-Azamiyya tomb.<sup>469</sup> The tomb of Imam al-Azam Abu Hanifah, the founder of Hanafi sect of Sunnism, in al-Azamiyya neighborhood of Baghdad is a sacred place for Sunnis. Qasim replaced this place with a secular monument that represented all Iraqis regardless of their religion and sect. He used secularism as a uniting factor in a religiously diverse country. Although Shiite clerics saw Qasim reforms as a threat for their position and authority he carried out these reforms. 1959 Personal Status Law that prevented women under 15 from forced marriages and gave them equal inheritance rights with men was a significant example of this secularization process.<sup>470</sup>

In Qasim's mind, Iraq's territory as shown in famous slogan, reached "from Zakho in the North to Kuwait in the South"<sup>471</sup> which was also used by Saddam Hussein to legitimize invasion of Kuwait.<sup>472</sup> Although his attempts to incorporate Kuwait to Iraqi territory were prevented by the Great Britain, he tried to consolidate state's power in whole Iraqi territory by development projects, road and communication line constructions, and most importantly anti-sectarian and anti-ethnic policies. Qasim recognized Kurdish Newroz as a national holiday<sup>473</sup> and Iraqi constitution recognized national rights of Kurds: "Iraqi society is based on complete cooperation between all its citizens, on respect for their rights and liberties. Arabs and Kurds are associates in this nation; the constitution guarantees their national rights within the Iraqi whole."<sup>474</sup> The Directorate General of Kurdish Educational Affairs was established to take care of educational and cultural affairs of Kurds.<sup>475</sup>

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<sup>469</sup> The Politics of National Celebration in the Middle East, op.cit., p.125

<sup>470</sup> Law No 188 of the year 1959 Personal Status Law and Amendments, [https://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/iraqi\\_personal\\_status\\_law\\_1959\\_english\\_translation.pdf](https://apps.americanbar.org/rol/publications/iraqi_personal_status_law_1959_english_translation.pdf) Accessed: 13 June 2015

<sup>471</sup> Yitzhak Oron (ed.), Middle East Record, Vol.2, Tel Aviv University The Reuven Shiloah Research Center, Jerusalem, 1961, p.121

<sup>472</sup> Open Letter to US President George Bush from Saddam Hussein, 16 August 1990

<sup>473</sup> Mehrdad R. Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Handbook, Taylor and Francis, Washington DC, 1992, p. 243

<sup>474</sup> Quoted in David Romano, The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity Mobilization and Identity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006, p.190

<sup>475</sup> The Iraqi Revolution: One Year of Progress and Achievement, 14th July Celebrations Committee, 1958-1959, p.126

#### 4.8. Baath Takeover and the Cult of Saddam Hussein

Qasim was overthrown and killed by a coalition of Pan-Arab army officers and Baathists in 1963. After the short period of presidency of Abdul Rahman and Abdul Salam Arif brothers, Baath Party took power and ruled Iraq until American invasion of 2003. From then on, territorial-patriotic Iraqi nationalism, Pan-Arab loyalties, religious (especially Sunni) rhetoric and the leader cult had fused. Rise of Islamism in the Middle East, growing popularity of Palestinian issue after subsequent Israeli occupations, war against Iran and Saddam Hussein's unquestionable power affected these changes. While he spent great effort to revive territorial uniqueness of Iraq and ancient civilizations resided there, he openly pursued a Pan-Arabist policy as well:

We don't look on this piece of land, here in Iraq, as the ultimate limit of our struggle. It is part of a larger area and broader aims, the area of the Arab homeland and the aims of the Arab struggle. We look on our Iraqi people of twelve million as part of a people of 140 million. We look at the present divisions as an unnatural state which must be ended with unity<sup>476</sup>

The military parade called *Nida al-Aqsa* (Aqsa Call) held in 2001 was a unique example of the fusion of different components in Baath era Iraqi identity.<sup>477</sup> The parade was named as *Aqsa* referring to the Muslim sacred place in Jerusalem in order to show solidarity with Palestinians. Palestinian cause was inherently trans-territorial and Pan-Arab issue and by emphasizing preeminent Arab cause, Saddam also reinforced his image as leader of Arabs. During the parade Saddam was the main focus and the personality cult of Saddam was strongly emphasized. His rifle fire with only one hand and cigar which were irrevocable elements of parades became famous across the world. He was also depicted as religious man as he headed the nearest mosque when pray time came. This parade had also territorial sentiments since the army, its weapons and soldiers represented Iraqi nation and might. Throughout the Saddam era military parades was one of the most symbolized events in Iraq.

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<sup>476</sup> Saddam Hussein, *Social and Foreign Affairs in Iraq*, trans. Khalid Kishtainy (New York and Oxford: Routledge, 2009), 32.

<sup>477</sup> Podeh, *The Politics of National Celebrations in the Arab Middle East*, 132.

In 1981, Iraq adopted a new national anthem, *Ard al Furataini* (The Land of Two Rivers). Then name of the anthem reflects the unique characteristics of Iraqi territory and there are strong references to homeland, fatherland and ancient Mesopotamian civilizations in the anthem. References to religious or Arab dimensions of Iraq was also included the anthem as a consequence of mixed Iraqi identity supported by Saddam regime. He also added *takbir* (God is Great) to the Iraqi flag written by his own handwriting.<sup>478</sup> Adding his handwriting to the national flag was obviously one of the most outstanding of personality cult in the history.

In order to unite people and create a common identity, Saddam commenced a massive cultural production such as construction of monuments. Saddam era monuments had significant territorial dimension since they had intense political meanings and radiate these meanings to their surroundings. They were reminders of the regime, sacred space for propaganda and area of legitimacy affirmation. After the heavy Iranian bombardment during the Iran-Iraq War, the Iraqi side of the Shatt al-Arab was lined with 101 bronze statues, each representing Iraqi soldier whose fingers pointed Iran.<sup>479</sup> *Nusb al-Shahid* (the Martyr's Monument) decorated with Islamic and Babylonian motifs and represents dedication and sacrifice to the country was opened in 1983 and became a landmark of Baghdad. *Qaws al-Nasr* (Victory Arch), two pairs of crossed swords that bookend a parade ground, made by smelted rifles of dead Iraqi soldiers and helmets of Iranian soldiers and inaugurated by Saddam himself was another product of Saddam's culture machine.<sup>480</sup> Saddam had also temporarily reorganized people's life. Martyr's Day dedicated to Iraqi soldiers died in Iran-Iraq War; *Bay'a Day* (Day of Allegiance) when Iraqi people showed their loyalty to the Saddam; *Yawm al-Nasr al-Azim* (Great Victory Day) organized to celebrate Iraq's "victory" against Iran after eight-year war, Liberation Day marking the recapture of Faw Peninsula from Iranian forces. His birthday was also one of the major events in Iraq and it became a major celebration for the country. Even in some aspects, it was

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<sup>478</sup>Michael O'Brien, *America's Failure in Iraq: Intervention to Withdrawal 1991-2010* (Bloomington: Author House, 2010), 132.

<sup>479</sup>Jeremy Scahill, "Report From Basra: Iraq's Oil Belt Prepares for War," *Iraq Journal* (accessed June 16, 2005). <http://www.iraqjournal.org/journals/021103.html>

<sup>480</sup>Sinan Antoon, "Bending History," *Middle East Research and Information Project*, (accessed June 16, 2005). <http://www.merip.org/mer/mer257/bending-history>

comparable to the birthday of Prophet Mohammad.<sup>481</sup> “April 28<sup>th</sup> [Saddam’s birthday] is the birthday of all Iraqis,” declared the state-owned weekly al-Zawra.<sup>482</sup> For instance, in his 65<sup>th</sup> birthday, the last birthday, in 2002 he was given a golden statute of Salah ad-din, more than 500 Iraqi couples were married at a mass wedding in Saddam’s honor, Youth Television station, run by Saddam’s son Uday, has changed its name to Birthday Television.<sup>483</sup> Education was primary instruments to inject territorial sentiments to the public. Ofra Bengio demonstrates crucial examples:

Husayn [Saddam Hussein] formed a national (watani) education committee and discussed with its members ways and means of strengthening patriotic feelings among the pupils. The Iraqi flag was to be raised in schools every Thursday morning. Curricula were to give salience to watani culture. The minister for youth affairs, Ahmad Husayn al-Samarrai, said that youth centers all over Iraq were busy “developing feelings of patriotism and Arab nationalism [qawmiyya].” During the war against Iran, special hymns were composed for schoolchildren. They were given such titles as “My Homeland is the Friend of the Sun,” or “The Defenders of Our Frontiers.”<sup>484</sup>

Although Qasim spent great efforts to build his personal cult, his main aim was to unite Iraqis around Iraqi territorial-patriotic nationalism. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein constantly made references to ancient Mesopotamian civilizations and themes unique to Iraqi territory, but his primary policy was consolidation of Iraqi identity whose starting point was Saddam himself. Qasim tried to incorporate Kurds in Iraqi system by recognizing their rights and Shiites through development projects. As for Saddam, he symbolized himself with sacred figures or heroes of Kurds and Shiites. He identified himself with Salah ad-din, Kurdish hero who conquered Jerusalem in 1187 as he associated himself with the King of Babylonia Nebuchadnezzar.<sup>485</sup> Likewise Saddam’s giant portraits hanged in shrine cities and he

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<sup>481</sup> Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 184.

<sup>482</sup> Saddam Birthday Festivities Begin in Iraq, *The Irish Times*, (accessed June 16, 2005). <http://www.irishtimes.com/news/saddam-birthday-festivities-begin-in-iraq-1.381835>

<sup>483</sup> Caroline Hawley, “Iraq Celebrates Saddam birthday,” *BBC News*, (accessed June 16, 2005). [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/1955899.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1955899.stm)

<sup>484</sup> Ofra Bengio, *Saddam’s Word: Political Discourse in Iraq* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 91.

<sup>485</sup> Bishara Bahbah, “The Crisis in the Gulf: Why Iraq Invaded Kuwait,” in *Beyond the Storm: A Gulf Crisis Reader*, eds. Phyllis Bennis and Michel Moushabeck, 53 (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1991).

spent lavish budgets to restoration and gifts for holy sites. A banner in the tomb of Imam Abbas proclaimed that “the visitors to the holy shrine in Karbala ask God to preserve Saddam Hussein.”<sup>486</sup> The government placed a banner in front of the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf that said “we take pride at the presence here of our great father Ali, because he is the leader of Islam, because he is the son-in-law of the Prophet, and because he is an Arab.”<sup>487</sup>

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<sup>486</sup> Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 64.

<sup>487</sup> Jerry Long, *Saddam's War of Words: Politics, Religion, and the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2004), 64.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION AND FINAL REMARKS

Dig deeper your moats; build higher your walls; guard them along with your people  
Mencius to Prince Wen of Teng<sup>488</sup>

Territory is socialized and politicized space created by human actions, conscious and appropriation. Territory is a result of a social process that translated psychical space which has always been existed to the abstract category with a social meaning. The interaction between human and territory is not one-way; territory also socialized and politicized humanbeings. It is sometimes a shaper of and sometimes shaped by human identity. People and societies first and foremost have to dwell in a space, control and use it and regulate the accessibility to this space by outsiders. The preceding chapters sought to demonstrate the significance of the territory in world politics and explain its impacts on state, sovereignty, and identity. This work traces the intellectual genealogy and historical examination of territoriality to reveal its influence on one of the most significant human creations, namely state, sovereignty and identity.

As *Conceptual Considerations* outlined, territory has been a significant phenomenon for world politics. It has been a primary reason for escalation to war and military conflicts. Territory is one of the main determinants of material powers of states and also it shapes their behaviors and definitions. Although some scholars argue that territory lost its significance because of the rapidly-growing technology, interconnectedness among people and free movement of people, capital and thoughts which erode state sovereignty, territorial practices still continue to influence world politics.

Territory is not static or neutral asset; it is a result of strategies to control an area with its inhabitants and subjects. Territoriality controls, influences and affects

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<sup>488</sup> Quoted in Wei-Bin Zhang, *Taiwan's Modernization: Americanization and Modernizing Confucian Manifestations* (Singapore: World Scientific Publishing, 2003), 180.

sovereignty, property, jurisdiction and relationships inside a certain space. Although mainstream Political Science and International Relations have tended to acknowledge territory as pre-given or already exist concept, as it is argued in detail it is a historical development.

Territory is not only physical asset that affect the material power of the states. It is also a driving force behind the formation of states and an essential part of it. Wide range of scholars argues that territoriality is a constructive and constituent factor for modern states. State authority is limited by territory, its sovereignty is exercised over territory and its legitimacy derives from territory in the modern state system. Territory as a juridico-political concept along with its geographical dimension is also at the center of modern international system which was born in Europe and spread all over the world. Modern international system composed of independent, sovereign and separate territorial nation-states. The international system is anarchic and power is unequally distributed in this system. Under these circumstances compactness and coherence of the modern state which keep it away from the outside meddling and invasion is directly related to its physical standing that is to say its territory. Violations of borders, targeting territorial integrity, operating extra-territorial policies have been the greatest sins since the emergence of the territorial state. State's military power, political relations with other states, legal and international principles which they advocate all aim to protect territorial impermeability of the state.

Territorial state is a European invention. Nonsegregated and amorphous authorities whose lands and subjects had multiple loyalties had nonexclusive and imperfect territorial authority which was generally overlap with other political actors. Westphalian system which ended sectarian wars in Europe also had changed territorial structure of the Europe. The idea of universal Christendom and united Empire was replaced by territorial and sovereign states and territorial states became the most powerful actors of international politics. Extraterritorial jurisdictions of the Papacy and the Empire were removed. According to the Westphalian system the limits of authority became a geographical affair, that is to say where authority of state begins and ends was determined according to its territorial limits. Identity and loyalty were also directed to the territory and permanent borders were initiated contrary to Medieval period's fluid, flexible and temporary borders. This means that

while England was a land in which Englishmen lived before, after Westphalia Englishmen became people who live in England. States were clearly separated from each other without any judicial or political extension in another state.

Territory is also essence of national identity. Territory is a storehouse of collective history and consciousness and indispensable part of nationalist narrative. Emotional attachment to the territory creates a unique identity and plays a crucial role in defining moral principles and worldview of this nation. Therefore narratives of nationalist movements and nationalist culture are rife with the references to the territory, its meaning and significance for the nation which inhabit the “homeland.”

After elaboration of the territory in theoretical terms, the thesis examines the territoriality in the Middle Eastern context. The definition of the Middle East is a clear example of difference between land and territory. Since its invention the term has been used to refer different distinct areas because it is political rather than geographical and it has a dynamic nature shaped by great powers’ struggles. Therefore there are various Middle East definitions ranging from the Atlantic Ocean to China or very limited area composed of two or three countries. The answers of the question “where is the Middle East, where its boundaries start and end” are not geographical features, political actions determine the frontiers of the region. Since the term Middle East is politically constructed, every Middle East definition is inherently subjective, even the term is subjective in itself.

During the early Islamic period the basis of state was ideological and territory had little significance in Islamic political thought. The main concern of the state was its inhabitants, more clearly believers of the Islamic faith, not the security of its territory. Territory was not the source of loyalty or affiliation and contrary to the modern sovereignty; state sovereignty is exercised over people instead of territory. Satellite photos of countries at night can be used to understand the territoriality according to the Middle Eastern tradition. In these photos, populated areas are shown lightened while unpopulated areas such as deserts are in dark. According to the traditional Middle Eastern understanding, these lightened areas are under sovereignty of political authority. For instance in an aerial view of Syria at night, the line of Aleppo, Hama, Homs, Damascus are seen illuminated and there is no light in Syrian desert. Muslim rulers of the pre-modern period claimed territorial sovereignty in

these areas and did not extend their territorial control to the desert unless tribes or bandits who used the desert as safe haven to attack the cities. Islamic understanding of territory carries similarities with Middle Eastern tradition. Islam has both territorializing and de-territorializing characteristics but these characteristics do not aim to create a territorial identity and loyalty.

Injection of territorial state in the Middle East was commenced by the Ottoman Empire during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The Empire aimed to modernize its state apparatus along with the Western model in order to prevent collapse of the state whose signs became obvious. The purpose of this modernization process is to establish uniform and centralized state administration directly tied with every citizen. To extend its authority to the every corner of the Empire, Istanbul Government fought against local dynasties and powerful governors whose power exceeded central government in many aspects. As a consequence of centralization and modernization in a wide range of fields, Ottoman government abolished its rivals' authority and made connection between state and its citizen through state bureaucracy and institutions. During that period, infrastructure of the Middle East had developed dramatically, Bedouins were settled, and administrative territorial divisions were redesigned according to secular territorial understanding.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain and France occupied Ottoman Middle East and injected new phenomena which were in some degree alien to the people of the region such as territorially bounded states, borders, centralized governments, citizenship, homeland etc. Great Britain and France transformed Ottoman lands in the Middle East into political territories. Some of the borders they draw are first borders in this region in all human history. Although the names Iraq, Syria, Palestine had been used throughout history, the areas which refer Iraq, Syria, and Palestine after European designation are different from their traditional scope.

Several Middle Eastern countries were chosen to demonstrate patterns of border demarcations and establishment of territorial system in the region. All examples reflect that main motivation behind this process was interests of colonial states and the Middle Eastern populations could not absorb transformations imposed by new masters of the region. Efforts to create territorial nationalism after Arab countries gained their independence are point of academic interest in this work. Middle Eastern

countries are lucky, since their lands were home of great civilizations of human history. Ruling elites of these countries tried to redirect people's loyalty to Pharaonic in Egypt, Nabatean in Jordan, Phoenician in Lebanon, Akhaemenian in Iran, and Mesopotamian civilizations in Iraq and unite their highly diverse population. To some extent these policies were successful, political sphere of these countries were dominated by territorial nationalism and patriotism, however, this success lasted a short time. Challenges to the territorial state and territory-inspired nationalism have centuries old roots in the region contrary to nascent territorial state and premature territorial nationalism. In addition to the historical challenges, modern time also poses difficulties for consolidation of territoriality in the region. The crucial point is that state in the Middle East has never been able to create coercion and consent at the same time and therefore failed to melt people in united, equal and territorial nationhood. Even states under the populist regimes pursued policies that eroded their sovereignty and territoriality ironically and these policies created a power vacuum that state could not fill and were obviously very crucial reasons instability and conflicts in the region.

Iraq as a geographical expression had been used since the medieval period, however, Iraq as a political entity and source of identity is a late creation. Like the term Middle East, "Iraq" refers to different areas at different times. The last chapter of the thesis examines the history of transformation of geographical Iraq to the political Iraq which its inhabitants directed their loyalty.

Tanzimat Era had changed the administrative, legal and political structure of the Ottoman Empire. Iraq was not out of this transformation. The modernization process initiated by Ottoman governors in Iraq laid the foundations of modern Iraq and territorial Iraqi state. At that period Ottoman officials aimed to expand central authority's power to every corner of Iraq by developing communication and transportation facilities and settled nomadic tribes which were seen as a biggest obstacle to the establishment of territorial state. Istanbul government also tried connect every people in Iraq and the state by promoting the idea of citizenship.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain entered the region and reorganized territorial structure of Iraq. The invention of Iraq as a separate state by incorporating three Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad and Basra was a British

plan. Formation of Iraq's boundaries was also highly mediated by the Britain. From that period to the last days of Baath regime Baghdad government and a group of intellectuals spent their efforts to consolidate unique Iraqi identity although these efforts had been constantly interrupted by subnational or transnational identities. Culture industry financed and led by the central government produced scores of cultural products that promoted Mesopotamia-inspired territorial nationalism. Turkmens, Kurds, Shiites, Sunnis, Christians and other minorities are aimed to unite under single, united Iraqi nation. However, these efforts failed to create a nation and a state in modern terms. In addition to obstacles and challenges to the territoriality in Iraq, successive governments and regimes eroded territorial structure of Iraq for their survival.

After 2003, whole territorial structure of Iraq had changed dramatically. US-led invasion in 2003 has a devastating effect on cultural heritage and territorial features of Iraq. Many historic and cultural institutions including museums, libraries, archives, galleries, universities, publishing houses, mosques, historic palaces were either looted, sabotaged or destroyed. In addition to collateral damages and intentional crimes like thief and plunder, feuding factions of Iraq had also revenged on their enemies by targeting their monuments, symbols and artifacts.

However the biggest damage on cultural sites had occurred after the invasion. Coalition forces and nascent Iraqi Army set up several military bases and training centers in culturally and historically important areas. For instance Babylon, the home of remnants of 4,000-year-old civilization and *Hanging Gardens of Babylon*, had hosted "Camp Alpha" for 18 months. As UNESCO report indicates this military base caused a "grave encroachment" and "major damage."<sup>489</sup> Transforming *Malwiyya Minaret* at Great Mosque of Samarra into barracks and training camp for Iraqi National Police had also produced significant damage.<sup>490</sup> In addition to these, Baath-era monuments had also used for military purposes. Baghdad Martyr's Memorial, the monument dedicated to 500,000 Iraqi soldiers who died in Iraq-Iran War, was used as a military base. The complex in which heroic intellectual of Arab nationalism and

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<sup>489</sup> Final Report on Damage Assessment in Babylon, International Coordination Committee for the Saveguarding of the Cultural Heritage of Iraq, UNESCO, 2009, p.13

<sup>490</sup> Peter Stone and Joanne Bajjaly, "Introduction" in *The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq*, eds. Peter Stone and Joanne Bajjaly, 12 (Boydell: Woodbridge, 2008).

founder of Baath Party Michel Aflaq's mausoleum was found was also used recreation center for Coalition forces.<sup>491</sup>

Coalition forces had targeted or misused everything which was part of Saddam Hussein regime or reminder of his reign including state buildings. However history is not always glories, heroes, valor or supremacy. Defeats, tyrants, shameful experiences are also part of the national history. In different parts of the world, these "bad memoirs" are kept for new generations or reformed for new purposes. Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu's palace is now serving as a Romanian Parliament. Nazi concentration camps became museums. Many of the Soviet period monuments were transformed from icons of the Soviets to symbols of united Russia.<sup>492</sup> In order to build post-Baath Iraq, people have to face good and bad sides of the former regime. Destruction of Baath-era artifacts weakened the sense of continuity in the people's mind and had an effect on erosion of national Iraqi identity which is already weak.

The collapse of the Baath regime had changed Iraq's political sphere dramatically. After American invasion of 2003, Iraq's political atmosphere reminded of Medieval Europe on several counts. First of all, with the collapse of Iraqi state, heterogeneous actors such as central government in Baghdad, Shiite militias, Sunni insurgency groups, tribes, religious groups, provincial councils, and federal Kurdish region struggled to influence political sphere of the country. Second, cities or even town are divided among these groups, or there is constant struggle for dominance. The area of a mosque, tomb or cemetery can be the territory of religious authority while rural areas of the city may be the historical territory of tribe, state buildings mark the territory of state and a suburb is militia's territory. Moreover, different groups had also overlapping claims over territory and inter/intra-group struggles were routine part of Iraqi politics. Under this circumstance the question "who rules where" has no answer. As Vali Nasr puts<sup>493</sup> Iraq is the first Arab Shiite state in the modern history and the emergence of new elites who were repressed during Baath rule not only

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<sup>491</sup> Benjamin Isakhan, "Targeting the Symbolic Dimension of Baathist Iraq: Cultural Destruction, Historical Memory, and National Identity," *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 4 (2011): 272-273.

<sup>492</sup> Benjamin Forest and Juliet Johnson, "Unravelling the Threads of History: Soviet-Era Monuments and Post-Soviet National Identity in Moscow," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 92, no.3 (2002): 524-547

<sup>493</sup> Vali Nasr, *Shia Revival* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 185.

changed the political landscape of the country, but also created seismic activity among Arab Shiites throughout the Middle East who were in longstanding silence. Then, state structure in Iraq which was sustained by an authoritarian regime was shaken due to the new regime's incompetence to fill the power vacuum. Widespread corruption, state's inefficiency to provide basic services, sectarian strife, daily bombings and high casualties and central government's weak responses to these security challenges put entire state apparatus of Iraq at danger. Recent years has demonstrated clearly that sectarianism is indivisible part of political and daily life in Iraq. Civil war in Syria, Sunni and Shiite foreign fighters involvement in different conflict zones, regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia have increased the intension of sectarianism in Iraq which is already tensed. Hate speeches of some clerics on both sides which can easily meet the audience thank to social media and technology further intensify the rift between two groups. In this atmosphere political or juridical constructs such as citizenship has weakened and more salient and immediately present identities such as sects or tribes have replaced citizenship and territorial structure of the country is changed. As Gregory Gause states the salience of sectarianism (and other sub-national identities, like tribalism and regionalism) rises as the power of the state declines.<sup>494</sup> State weakness and lack of complete authority of the state on the territory induce the strengthening of sub-national identities including sects. Lack of complete state authority also gives suitable environment to sectarian or armed groups to flourish. Rise of sectarianism caused proliferation of insurgency groups in Iraq. For instance, militant groups such as *Islamic State of Iraq and Sham*, *Jamaat Ansar al-Islam*, *The Islamic Army of Iraq*, *Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqat al-Naqshbandia*, *Ahrar al-Iraq*, *Jaysh al-Izza wa al-Karama*, *Kataib Thuwar al-Sunna*, *Asaib Ahl al-Haq*, *Kataib Hezbollah*, *Promised Day Brigades*, *Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas* gain much more power.

It became clear that after the formation of Shiite-led governments and emergence of long-suppressed Shiites who consist of the majority of the Iraqi population, territoriality of Iraq is in a state of dramatic change. The sharpest component of this change is Shiification of Iraqi territory. One may easily understand this transformation by looking at the logos of Shiite militia groups generally formed after

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<sup>494</sup> Gause III, "Sectarianism and the Politics of the New Middle East"

the emergence of ISIS as an existential threat to Iraqi state. Majority of the militia groups use map of Iraq and Shiite symbols such as dome of a sacred Shiite shrine, image of Ali ibn abi Talib, *Zulfiqar* (the legendary sword of Ali bin Abi Talib with a two-pronged v-shaped point) or a Shiite slogan. For instance logos of Shiite militia groups *Asaib Ahl al-Haq*, *Faylaq al-Wa'ad al-Sadiq*, *Haraqat al-Abdal*, *Hezbollah al-Abrar*, *Kataeb Ahrar al-Iraq*, *Kataeb al-Difa al-Muqaddes*, *Kataeb al-Fatah al-Mobin*, *Kataeb al-Imam Ali*, *Kataeb Ansar al-Hijja*, *Kataeb Hezbollah*, *Liwa al-Imam al-Hasan al-Mujtaba*, *Quwwa Shaheed al-Sadr*, *Saraya al-Jihad* consists of Iraqi territorial map and abovementioned Shiite symbols.<sup>495</sup>



**Figure 4: Emblems of Asaeb Ahl al-Haq, Kataeb Hezbollah, Kataeb Imam Ali and Kataeb Asad Allah al-Galib**

Source: Websites, Facebook pages and media appearances of groups

As Figure 4 demonstrates the logo of *Asaib Ahl al-Haq* contains Iraqi territorial map at the center surrounded by two *Zulfiqars*. *Kataeb Hezbollah's* logo contains Iraqi territorial map at the center of the world map and a hand which holds a weapon arises from Iraq's map. This image suggests that the group derives its strength from Iraq. The world map is covered by curves shaped like dome characteristics to the

<sup>495</sup> Visual examination by the author


Shiite shrines. The first emblem at the second line, *Kataeb Imam Ali* uses Iraqi territorial map and *Zulfiqars* and two letters of “h” in Arabic calligraphy remind of the sons of Ali bin Abi Talib, Hassan and Hussein. The lion at the *Kataeb Asad Allah al-Galip* represents Ali bin Abi Talib as he is known as the lion of God and two *Zulfiqars* are sided with Iraqi territorial map.

Another sharpest transformation of this era is the alteration of the possession of Mesopotamian culture. As Chapter 3 demonstrates in detail Mesopotamia-inspired territorial nationalism was a state policy implemented by Sunni elites. Shiites were passive actors of this policy and many of them from the religious background were skeptical about it. However as ruling elite in Baghdad changed so the advocacy of Mesopotamian civilization passed in other hands. While ISIS destroys archeological artifacts of Mesopotamian civilizations; archeological sites, symbols of ancient civilizations and narrative of this period has flourished Shiite-majority areas of Iraq. Iraq’s National Museum was reopened and at the opening ceremony Prime Minister Haidar Abadi said that “Those barbaric, criminal terrorists [ISIS] are trying to destroy the heritage of mankind and Iraq's civilization.”<sup>496</sup> As Nicolas Pelham states “While ISIS destroys museums, the south refurbishes them; while ISIS destroys shrines, the ayatollahs expand them; and while ISIS is burning relics and books, the Imam Ali shrine hosts a book fair...”<sup>497</sup> Although they are far from institutionalized power supporters of independent Shiite state in the southern Iraq proposes “Sumer Republic” as a name for their countries.

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<sup>496</sup> Looted Iraqi Museum in Baghdad reopens 12 years on, *BBC News* (accessed: July 27, 2015), <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31672857>

<sup>497</sup> Nicolas Pelham, “ISIS and the Shia Revival in Iraq,” *The New York Review of Books* (accessed: July 24, 2015). <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2015/jun/04/isis-shia-revival-iraq/>



**Figure 5: Sentence written in Arabic reads Salaf al-Salih (the Righteous Predecessors) with ancient Mesopotamian artifacts**

**Source: The image disseminated by supporters of independent Shiite state accounts on Twitter touches on an important matter. The term Salaf al-Salih (the Righteous Predecessors) is generally used to refer companions of Prophet Mohammed in Muslim world. Describing ancient Mesopotamian artifacts as righteous predecessors by Shiite accounts demonstrates significant change in the championship of Mesopotamia-inspired territorial nationalism.**

Consolidation of territorial state with its instructions and creation of territory-based nationalism in Iraq has always been problematic although consecutive governments spent great efforts. A state centered in Baghdad which controls all Iraqi territory has not existed at least since 1991 when safe havens for Kurds in the north and Shiite in the south were formed. Although during the reign of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki debates over highly centralized state was widespread, today the very existence of Iraqi state is under question. The belief in the idea of territorial Iraqi nation-state has also been under constant pressures but never more so than since the emergence of ISIS and its establishment of territorial control in large swaths of Iraqi territory. As Fanar Haddad argues “belief in a sacrosanct, meta-historical, mythological, eternal Iraq has been severely eroded.”<sup>498</sup> Kurds have their own territorial stronghold and national identity distinct from Arab one, Christians and other religious minorities almost give up the idea of Iraq after massive atrocities, coexistence of Shiites and Sunnis is controversial issue since too much blood is spilled between them.

<sup>498</sup> Interview with the author

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## APPENDICIES

### A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Ülkesellik (territoriality) uluslararası siyasetin en önemli unsurlarından biridir. Dünya tarihi boyunca meydana gelen savaşlar tarihsel bir incelemeye tabi tutulduğunda, toprakla ilgili meselelerin bu savaşların çıkmasındaki en öncelikli sebeplerden biri olduğu görülmektedir. Üstelik toprakla ilgili sorunlardan ya da mücadelelerden dolayı meydana gelen savaşlar, diğer nedenlerden kaynaklanana göre hem daha fazla can kaybına yol açmaktadır hem de ileriki dönemlerde tekrarlanma olasılığı daha fazladır. Ülke ve ülkesellik, birçok Uluslararası İlişkiler teorisyenine göre uluslararası değişimin, devletlerin güç değerlendirmelerinin ve stratejik çıkarlarının temelinde yer almaktadır. Jeopolitik ve Siyasî Coğrafya gibi toprak ile insan faaliyetleri arasındaki ilişkiyi ve bu ilişkinin devletlerin ve uluslararası sistemin doğası üzerindeki etkilerini inceleyen iki disiplinin ortaya çıkması ve gelişmesi, ülkesellik ve ülkenin (territory) dünya siyasetindeki önemini göstermektedir. Devletlerin ülkesel bütünlüğü ve topraklarının dokunulmazlığı uzun zamandan beri uluslararası sistemin temel kuralıdır. Devletler uluslararası ilişkilerini, askerî yapılanmalarını ve hukuk düzenlerini, topraklarının dokunulmazlığını korumak üzerine kurarlar.

Ülke çeşitli açılardan insan hayatının vazgeçilmez unsurudur. İnsan yaşantısının devam etmesi için gerekli olan materyaller ülke üzerinde yer almaktadır. Ayrıca ülke, egemenlik sınırlarının belirlenmesini de sağlamaktadır. Bir devlet, üzerinde egemen olduğunu iddia ettiği her şeyi/herkesi tek tek sayamaz. Ancak bu egemenlik alanının alansal bir kavram ile belirlenmesi devletin egemenlik hatlarının çizilmesini mümkün kılmaktadır. Ülke aynı zamanda dinsel açıdan da önem taşımaktadır. Belli dinler belli mekânlara kutsiyet atfetmekte; bu mekânlarda özel uygulamalar belirlemekte ya da bazı ibadetlerin sadece belli mekânlarda yapılabilmesini gerektirmektedir. Bu durum mekâna ayrı bir anlam katmakta ve onu coğrafi bir kavram olmaktan çıkarıp ona hukukî ve dinî bir anlam yüklemektedir.

lke, tarih boyunca insan faaliyetlerinin merkezinde olmuştur. Srgn, iştgal, fetih, mekânların kutsanması antik dnemlerden beri başvurulmuş alansal pratiklerdir. Buna karştın lkenin soyut teorik anlamı geçmiş dnemlerdeki anlamından farklıdır. Buradaki farklılık, lke ile arazi arasındaki ayırmadan gelmektedir. Arazi coğrafi bir kavramdır ve srekli vardır. Oluştması için insan faktrne ihtiyaç yoktur. lke ise insan eylemlerinin bir sonucudur ve deėiştkenidir. lke, bir arazi zerindeki zneleri, nesneleri, iliştikleri ve fenomenleri kontrol etmek, dzenlemek ve srdrmek için giriştilen stratejilerin bir sonucudur. Bu açından lke edilgen ve statik bir kavram deėildir. Kimi zaman insan eylemlerinin, bilincinin ve kimliėinin sekillendiricisidir; kimi zaman ise bunlar tarafından sekillendirilmektedir. lke, insan eylemlerini sekillendirmekte ve dzenlemektedir. rneėin dikenli tel, duvar, bayrak, askerî birlik ya da uyarı levhasıyla grselleştirilmiş lkesel sınırlar hem lke içine dıřarıdan gelecek mdahaleleri engellemekte ve eriştimi dzenlemektedir hem de lke içindekilerin dıřarı ile olan etkileşimlerini kontrol etmektedir. Sınır hatlarının bu fonksiyonu lke içindeki alansal dzenlemeler ile de yapılabilmektedir. rneėin sigara içilemeyen alanlar, emniyet seřitleri, sit alanları bu tr lkeselleştirici faktrlere rnek olarak gsterilebilir.

lkesellik devletlerin oluştum srecinde hayatî rol oynamış bir kavramdır. İlk devletlerin ortaya çıkması lkesel merkezileşme ile olmuştur. lkenin nfus ile birlikte devleti oluşturan ana unsurlardan olduėu ise akademik literatrde genel bir kanı olarak edilmiştir. lke devletlerin sadece oluştmasını saėlamakla kalmaz, aynı zamanda onların davranışlarını da byk oranda etkiler. Bir ada lkesi ile etrafi dřman lkelerle çevrili bir lkenin davranışlarının aynı olması elbette beklenemez.

Modern uluslararası sistemin ana aktr olan lkesel devlet, ilk olarak Avrupa'da ortaya çıkmış ve Kolonyal Dnem boyunca dnyanın deėiştik yerlerine yayılmıştır. Avrupa'da lkesel devletin kurulmasından nceki dnemde hâkim Ortaçaė siyasî kltr, lkesel kavramlara uzak bir konumdaydı. Birbiriyle trdeř olmayan siyasî birimler, birbirleri ile st ste gelen hâkimiyet iddialarına sahipti ve siyasî birimler arasında iyice belirlenmiş sınırlar yoktu. O dnemin Avrupası, sınırları belli alansal bir birimden deėil, daha çok sinir sistemini andıran bir aėlar btnnden oluştmaktaydı. Vestfalya dzeni ile bu sistem kkl deėiştimlere uėradı ve

günümüzdeki ülkesel devlet kavramına evrildi. Avrupa içindeki mezhep savaşlarını sonlandıran Vestfalya Anlaşması aynı zamanda ülkesel devletleri evrensellik iddiasındaki imparatorluk ve Papalık'ın önüne koymuştur. 1648 düzeninden önce savaşlar daha çok aileler veya hanedanlar arasındaki taht mücadeleleri, arazi anlaşmazlıkları ya da ekonomik sebeplerden ötürü meydana gelmekteydi. Bu savaşlar hiçbir bağlamda -bırakın milletleri- devletler arasında vuku bulan savaşlar bile değildi. Ulus devletin politik sisteme hâkim olmasıyla beraber bu durum değişti ve savaşlar planlı, sistemli, belli bir merkezden yönetilen, hiyerarşik bir düzene tabi, belli bir milli amaç uğrunda bir araya gelmiş ordular arasında vuku bulmaya başladı. Bu andan itibaren savaş uluslararası sistemin “politik” bir konusu oldu. Clausewitz'in ünlü sözüyle açıklarsak, “Savaş politikanın başka araçlarla devamı” haline geldi. Bu gelişmelerle birlikte uluslararası anarşi devletlerin birbirleriyle savaşmalarındaki kilit yapısal faktör oldu. Devletler bu anarşik ortamda hayatta kalmanın, dengeyi sağlamanın ve ya bu anarşik ortamı yumuşatmanın yollarını aramaya başladılar. Savaşlar ve güvenlik yine uluslararası sistemin belirleyici unsuru oldu. Vestfalya düzeni ile birlikte heterojen siyasî birimler yerini merkezî devletlere bırakmış ve bu merkezî devletlerin ülkeleri üzerindeki egemenliği kalıcı, sürekli ve dokunulmaz hale getirilmiştir. Siyasî güç belli bir alansal sınır içinde uygulanmaya başlamış ve bu sınırlar keskin bir ayrımla belirlenmiştir. Siyasî, sosyal ve ekonomik meseleler ülkesel kavramlar çerçevesinde ele alınmaya başlamış; ulusal kimlikler ülkesellik ile ifade edilmiş ve devletlerin ulusal çıkarları ülkesellik ile özdeşleştirilmiştir. Bu gelişmelerle birlikte İngiltere bir zamanlar İngilizlerin yaşadığı yerken, Vestfalya düzeni ile birlikte İngiliz İngiltere'de yaşayan haline gelmiştir.

Ülkenin milliyetçi akımlar ve ulus inşası açısından da önemli bir rolü vardır. Öncelikle her toplum üzerinde yaşadığı coğrafyadan bir şekilde etkilenmektedir. Eğer Araplar bugün yaşadıkları yerde değil de tropik iklimin hâkim olduğu yerlerde yaşasalardı günümüzdekinden çok farklı bir Arap kimliği ortaya çıkacaktı. Aynı şekilde, Türkler bir takımada dizisinde yaşayan bir millet olsaydı, bugünkünden çok farklı bir Türk kimliğine sahip olacaktı. Aynı durum diğer milletler için de söylenebilir. Bu durum coğrafyanın kimlik üzerindeki etkisini göstermektedir. Buna ek olarak ülkesellik de kimliğin belirleyici unsurlarındandır. İnsan faaliyetleri

tarafından ortaya konan sınırlar kimliğin şekillenmesinde çoğu durumda doğal özelliklerden daha fazla rol oynamaktadır. Ortasından sınır geçen ve tarihsel olarak bir bütün olan yerleşim birimlerinin farklı milletler haline gelmesi bunun bir göstergesidir. Örneğin Pirenelere üzerinde yer alan Serdanya vadisinin kuzeyi Fransız olurken, güneyi İspanyol olmuştur. Bu açıdan birçok düşünürün göre sınırların çizilmesi ya da ülkeselliğin belirlenmesi ulusun ortaya çıkmasından önce gelmektedir. Bu demek olmaktadır ki; ulusları belirleyen ülkesel sınırlardır, tam tersi değil.

Ülkesellik uluslararası siyasetin en önemli unsurlarından biridir. Devletlerin oluşumu, devletlerin davranışlarının değişimi, egemenlik kavramının uluslararası sistemde belirgin hale gelmesi ve ulus inşa süreçleri ülkesellik ile yakın bir şekilde ilişkilidir. Uluslararası sistemi anlamlandırabilmek için mutlaka başvurulması gereken bu kavram, istikrarsızlığı ve güven ortamından mahrum bulunmasıyla sürekli gündeme gelen Ortadoğu siyasetini anlamak için de başvurulması gereken bir kavramdır. Ortadoğu’da meydana gelen birçok çatışma ve gerilimin nedeni bölgenin ülkesel yapısından kaynaklanmaktadır.

Ülke kavramı Ortadoğu için yeni bir kavramdır ve modern anlamda Birinci Dünya Savaşı’ndan sonra bölgeye yerleşen Batılı güçler tarafından empoze edilmiştir. Her ne kadar geleneksel Ortadoğu devlet anlayışı ve politik kültürü coğrafi bir bilince sahip olsa da, bu anlayış mekân bazlı bir aidiyet hissi ve mekâna yönelik bir sadakat oluşturmaktan uzaktır. “Vatan” sözcüğü Arapça literatürün eski eserlerinde görülse de bu kavram insanların sadakatlerini yönelttiği ya da kendilerini tanımladığı bir kavram değildir. Ortadoğu’da insanlar geleneksel olarak kendilerini ya soyları ile ya da dinleri ile nitelemişlerdir ve yaşadıkları yer ile olan duygusal bağları sürekli göçler nedeniyle zayıf kalmıştır. Ortadoğu devlet anlayışında da devletin temel ilgi alanı ülkesi değil tebaasıdır. Modern Batı sisteminde devlet otoritesi ülke üzerinde uygulanır ve devlet meşruiyetini ülkesinden alır. Ortadoğu devlet felsefesinde ise egemenlik ve hukuk insanlar üzerinde etkilidir. Örneğin modern Batı anlayışında üzerinde insanların yaşamadığı çöl, tundra, kutup gibi bölgeler dahi devletin egemen olduğu alanlardan sayılmıştır ve dünya üzerindeki bütün alanlar belli siyasî otoriteler arasında paylaştırılmıştır. Buna karşın geleneksel Ortadoğu devleti, üzerinde nüfusun

yaşamadığı yerlerde egemenlik iddiasında bulunmamıştır. Eğer bu döneme ait bir harita çizilecek olursa, devletin egemen olduğu yerler sınır sistemi gibi birbirine bağlı konsantrasyon alanlarından oluşacaktır. Modern Mısır'ın egemenlik alanı Libya-Mısır sınırındaki yaşama elverişsiz çölü de kapsarken, geleneksel Ortadoğu devlet anlayışı sadece Nil nehrinin çevresi üzerinde egemenlik iddiasında bulunmuştur.

Ortadoğu'nun siyasî yapısı üzerinde büyük etkisi olan İslam dininin de bu durum üzerindeki kritik rolü tartışılmalıdır. İslam her ne kadar bazı ülkeselleştirici özelliklere sahip olsa da, bunlar mekân bazlı aidiyet geliştiren kavramlar olmaktan ziyade, coğrafi derinliği olan hukukî ve dinsel kavramlardır. Örneğin İslam fakihleri tarafından geliştirilen “dar'ül harb” ve “dar'ül İslam” kavramları ülkesel özellikte değildir. Çünkü bir mekânın ülke olabilmesi için sınırlarının net bir şekilde belli edilmesi gerekmektedir. Oysa dar'ül harb ve dar'ül İslam ayrımları, tıpkı Ortaçağ Avrupası'nın üniversal imparatorlukları gibi sınırları belli olmayan ve tüm dünyayı kapsayan bir çerçeve sunmaktadır.

Ortadoğu'da ülkeselliğin meydana gelmesi, Osmanlı Devleti'nin 19. yüzyılın ikinci yarısında bu bölgede başlattığı modernizasyon hamlesi ile gerçekleşmiştir. İstanbul Hükümeti, Osmanlı Devleti'nin ülkesel bütünlüğünü sağlamak ve ülkesel devleti etkin hale getirebilmek için öncelikle devlet otoritesini Ortadoğu'daki topraklarının tamamına yaymaya çalışmıştır. Bunun için öncelikle rakiplerini ortadan kaldırmaya girişmiştir. Bu rakipler genellikle o bölgedeki köklü aileler ya da bütün siyasî gücü ellerinde toplayan valilerdi. Köklü aileler ve valiler, çoğu durumda merkezî otoriteden daha fazla siyasî, sosyal ve ekonomik güce sahiptilerdi. Osmanlı Hükümeti uyguladığı idarî reformlarla merkezî hükümetin gücünü arttırmış ve yerel güç odaklarının etkisini zayıflatmıştır. Bu durumda, aynı dönemde başlanılan ulaşım, iletişim ve altyapı yatırımlarının da büyük etkisi olmuştur. Bu yatırımlar sadece insanların yaşamlarını ve ülkenin ekonomik durumunu iyileştirmemiş, aynı zamanda devlet otoritesinin ülkenin her köşesine taşınmasını sağlamıştır. Özellikle 1858 Arazi Kanunnamesi ve 1864 Vilayet Kanunu, Ortadoğu'nun ülkeselliğini derinleştirmiştir. Bu kanunla Osmanlı Devleti toprak ile köylü ve köylü ile devlet arasındaki aracıları ortadan kaldırarak, modern devlet sisteminin oluşmasının önünü açmıştır.

Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nın sonunda Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılması ile birlikte Ortadoğu'ya gelen Büyük Britanya ve Fransa, bölgenin siyasî yapısını kendi siyasî kültürlerine göre yeniden düzenlemeye başlamıştır. Ülkesellik, ülkesel devlet ve ülkesel milliyetçilik gibi kavramlar yoğun bir şekilde bölgeye enjekte edilmiştir. Bu dönem Ortadoğu tarihi açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır; çünkü bu dönemde çizilen sınırlar Ortadoğu'da var olan devletlerin oluşmasını sağlamış ve bölge tarihinde büyük bir kırılmaya yol açmıştır. Bu sınırların büyük bir kısmı insanlık tarihi boyunca bu bölgede çizilen ilk sınırlardır. Irak, Suriye, Filistin gibi tarihsel olarak mevcut olan mekânlar yeni sınırlar ile tarihsel olarak sahip oldukları anlamdan çok farklı anlamlara bürünmüş; buna ek olarak Ürdün, Katar, Kuveyt gibi yeni ülkeler ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu sınır çizimlerinde dikkat edilen birinci konu sınırı çizen ülkelerin çıkarlarıdır. Tarihsel, kültürel ve sosyal sınırlar dikkate alınmadan yapılan bu değişiklikler ileriki dönemde önemli sorunlara yol açmıştır. Pek çok yerde sıklıkla dile getirilen “Ortadoğu'da sınırlar yapaydır” ifadesi bir noktayı ıskalamaktadır. Ortadoğu'da sadece sınırlar değil, sınır kavramının kendisi de yapaydır. Bu anlayışın yerleşmesi ve ülke sınırlarının net bir şekilde çizilmesi bazı örneklerde görüldüğü gibi 1980'leri bulmaktadır. Büyük Britanya Ortadoğu'daki sınırları belli etmeye başladığında farklı ülkelere yayılmış olan aşiretlerin tabiiyeti sorun olmuştu. Çünkü o zamana kadar kişi üzerinde uygulanan egemenlik yetkisi bir ülkeye yöneltilmekteydi. Örneğin modern Suudi Arabistan'ın temellerini atan İbn Suud, ana merkezleri Suudi Arabistan olan, Suriye ve Irak'ın çeşitli yerlerine yayılmış aşiretler üzerinde egemenlik iddia etmekteydi. Bu iddia İbn Suud'a kendi ülkesel egemenliği dışında olan bir yerde sürekli mobilize olabilen ve İbn Suud'un otoritesini gittikleri yere taşıyan bir grup üzerinde etkin olmasına yol açacaktır. Bu anlayış sadece sınırları belli bir ülke içinde konsolide olmuş bir devlet anlayışını belirleyen Batı anlayışına tersti ve İngilizler İbn Suud'un bu iddialarını reddettiler.

Bu dönemde yaşanan en önemli gelişmelerden biri de ülke temelli bir milliyetçilik anlayışının desteklenmesidir. Bu zamana kadar kendilerini dinleri ya da soyları ile ifade eden ve tanımlayan insanlardan, bundan sonra ülkesel sınırlara göre bir kimlik geliştirmeleri istenmiştir. Bunun için o ülkenin ev sahipliği yaptığı antik medeniyetler kullanılmış, bu medeniyetlere yönelik çalışmalar çoğaltılarak farklı ve özgün bir kimlik geliştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Mısır'da Firavun dönemi, Ürdün'de

Nebatiler, Lübnan'da Fenike medeniyeti, İran'da Sasaniler ve Irak'ta Mezopotamya medeniyetleri ulusal kimliğin ana unsurları olarak öne çıkarılmıştır. Sıklıkla kullanılan “medeniyetler beşiği” kavramı sadece bir kültürel ya da arkeolojik önemi vurgulamamaktadır. Bu ifade aynı zamanda yeni kurulan ya da icat edilen ülkelerdeki insanların ülke temelli yeni bir kimlik oluşturmak için yeterli altyapıya sahip olduklarını göstermektedir. Bu anlayışı geliştirmek için yeni kurulan rejimler büyük yatırımlar yaptılar. Arkeolojik kazılar büyük hız kazandı. Edebiyat, müzik, folklor, moda ülkesel motiflerle dolmaya başladı. Ülkeyi yöneten elitler sıklıkla ülkesel motifleri kullandılar ve bu sayede oldukça farklılaşmış olan halklarını ortak bir zeminde buluşturmaya çalıştılar.

Ancak bu çabalar belli zorluklarla ve meydan okumalarla karşılaştı. Her şeyden önce ülkesel bir milliyetçilik akımı geliştirmek devletin yapabileceği bir işti ve güçlü bir devlet otoritesinin varlığını gerekli kılmaktaydı. Ortadoğu'da ise zor ve rıza araçlarını eş zamanlı olarak üretebilecek bir devlet otoritesini hiçbir ülke tam manasıyla üretememişti. Avrupa'da savaşların yol açtığı kaynak ve insan mobilizasyonu devletin oluşması ve gelişmesinde büyük rol oynamıştı. Ortadoğu'daki savaşlar ise genellikle tersi bir etki oluşturmuş ve devletlerin gücünü zayıflatmıştır. Ortadoğu'da ülkesel devletin tesisi ve ülkesel milliyetçiliğin gelişmesinin önündeki bir diğer engel ise alt ve üst kimliklerin çok güçlü olması ve sürekli olarak ülkeselliği erozyona uğratmasıdır. Ortadoğu'da güçlü olan alt kimliklerin en önemlileri mezhep ve aşiret kimlikleridir. Bu kimlikler mensuplarının ülkesel kimlikler içinde erimesine engel olmaktadır. Özellikle zaten zayıf olan devlet otoritesinin iyice sarsıldığı savaş ve kriz gibi dönemlerde bu kimlikler daha da güçlenmektedir. Alt kimlikler gibi üst kimlikler de ülkeselliği aşındıran etmenlerden biridir. Modern Ortadoğu tarihinde özellikle iki akım Ortadoğu'nun ülkeselliğini zayıflatmıştır. Bunlar pan-Arabizm ve pan-İslamizmdir. Pan-Arabizm bütün Arapları tek bir çatı altında birleştirmeyi amaçlayan, Arap dili, kültürü ve tarihini merkeze alan ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı'ndan sonra çizilen sınırların emperyal güçler tarafından dayatıldığını iddia eden bir akımdır. Aynı şekilde pan-İslamizm de bütün Müslümanları bir araya getirmeyi amaçlamış ve mevcut sınırların ümmet anlayışına aykırı olduğunu iddia etmiştir. Bu iki akımın ortak noktası, her ikisinin de Ortadoğu'daki devletlerin, rejimlerin ve sınırların yapay olduğunu iddia etmeleri ve

doğrudan bunları hedef almalarıdır. Ayrıca her ikisinin de hedefi ülkesel değil kişiseldir. Tıpkı geleneksel Ortadoğu devlet felsefesinde olduğu gibi belli bir alan üzerinde değil kişiler üzerinde egemenlik kurma anlayışı benimsenmiş ve politikalar buna göre dizayn edilmiştir.

Ortadoğu'nun mikrokozmosu olan Irak ülke ve ülkesellik kavramlarının en iyi şekilde izlenebileceği yerlerden biridir. Kurulduğu günden bu yana Irak'ın yaşadığı iç ve dış gelişmelerin büyük bir kısmı ülkesellikle yakından alakalıdır. Kelime anlamı olarak Irak kıyı demektir. Bu isimden Fırat ve Dicle'nin Irak için ne kadar merkezî bir konumda olduğu anlaşılabilir. Uzun zaman boyunca Irak kelimesi coğrafi bir bölgeyi nitelemek için kullanılmıştır. Irak isminin coğrafi kalıplardan çıkıp siyasi bir anlam kazanması ise Kolonyal Dönem içinde gerçekleşmiştir.

Ülkesellik açısından Irak tarihini beş dönemde incelemek yararlı olacaktır. Bu beş dönem sırasıyla Tanzimat sonrası Osmanlı dönemi, Kolonyal periyot, Haşimi dönemi, Abdülkerim Kasım yönetimi ve Baas iktidarındır. Osmanlı Devleti'nin alansallık açısından Irak'ta gerçekleştirdiği girişimler modern Irak'ın oluşumunda büyük rol sahibidir. Bu dönemde merkezî hükümetin otoritesi Irak kırsalına doğru genişletilmiş, seküler tarzda bir yönetim anlayışı oluşturulmuş, ulaşım ve iletişim alanlarında köklü düzenlemelere gidilmiştir. Hepsinden önemlisi arazi reformu gerçekleştirilmiş ve özel mülkiyetin önü açılarak komünal tarımsal alan mülkiyeti zayıflatılmıştır. Bunlara ek olarak aşiretlere karşı sistemli bir yerleşik hayata geçirme politikası izlenmiştir. Haşimi döneminde ise Irak modern bir devletin özelliklerine sadece kâğıt üzerinde sahiptir. Yeni kurulan devlet sadece İngiliz desteği ve askerî gücü ile ayakta durabilmektedir. Bu dönemde özgün bir Iraklı kimliği oluşturmak amacıyla çeşitli girişimlerde bulunulsa da Irak'ın büyük bir Arap ulusu içinde erimesi gerektiğini düşünenler önemli bir güce sahip bulunuyorlardı. Abdülkerim Kasım dönemi ise Irak tarihinde ülkeselliğin altın dönemini yaşadığı bir periyot olmuştur. Yönetimi ele geçirdiği andan itibaren pan-Arabist akımlarla mücadele eden Kasım, özgün bir Irak kimliği ve Iraklılık bilinci oluşturmaya çalışmıştır. Üstelik bu dönemde Irak devleti belli bir güce ve yeteneğe de ulaşmış, bu durum Kasım'ın işini kolaylaştırmıştır. Kasım görev yaptığı süre boyunca Irak'ın diğer Arap devletlerden ayrı politikalar izlemesini sağlamış ve aynı şekilde diğer Araplardan farklı bir

Iraklılık bilinci geliştirmeye çalışmıştır. Bu dönem aynı zamanda eşi görülmemiş bir sembolizmin hem resmî söylemleri hem de insanların günlük yaşantısını etkilediği bir dönemdir. Ülkenin bayrağından meydanların adlarına, resmî törenlerden eğitim-öğretim müfredatına, moda tasarımlarından medya yayınlarına kadar hayatın her alanında Irak'ın ülkesel özelliklerini ön plana çıkaran ve ülkesellikten mülhem bir milliyetçiliği temel alan bir anlayış hakim olmuştur. Ancak her ne kadar Bağdat Hükümeti diğer Araplardan ayrı bir Iraklılık bilinci geliştirmeye çalışsa da aşiret bağları, aile grupları ve mezhepsel aidiyetler önemini korumaya devam etmiştir. Buna karşın Irak'ın ülkesel bütünlüğü açısından bu dönemde elde edilen en büyük başarı Kürtlerin sisteme entegre edilmesidir. Arap milliyetçileri tarafından şüphe ile yaklaşılan Irak Kürtleri, Kasım'ın geliştirdiği vatanseverlik anlayışı çerçevesinde Irak siyasetine dâhil edilmeye çalışılmıştır. “Zaho'dan Fav'a kadar Irak” söylemi sıklıkla tekrarlanmış ve Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğü sadece komşu devletlerin onayı alınarak değil, halka da benimsetilerek korunmaya çalışılmıştır.

Baas dönemi Irak tarihi açısından ülkeselliğin en yoğun şekilde ele alındığı dönemlerden biridir. Bu döneme damgasını vuran ise Saddam Hüseyin'in icraatlarıdır. Saddam Hüseyin tıpkı Abdülkerim Kasım gibi Mezopotamya merkezli bir ulus inşasına büyük önem atfetmiştir. Bu dönemde Mezopotamya temelli motifler içeren çalışmalar için, Irak gelirlerinden büyük kaynaklar ayrılmıştır. Ancak bu dönem öncekilere nazaran büyük farklılıklar içermektedir. Öncelikle Saddam Hüseyin'in ulus inşasında çok farklı kaynakları kullanması ülkesel kimliğin erozyona uğramasına yol açmıştır. Her ne kadar Saddam Hüseyin Mezopotamya merkezli ülkesel kimliklerin gelişmesine büyük kaynaklar ayırsa da yeri geldiğinde Arap milliyetçiliği ve İslamcılık'a da başvurmuştur. Uluslararası ve bölgesel konjonktürdeki gelişmelere göre Saddam Hüseyin de kendi rejimine meşruiyet kazandırmaya çalışmıştır. Örneğin Filistin meselesinin Ortadoğu gündeminde birinci sırada olduğu ve Arap milliyetçiliğinin öncelikli meselesi olduğu dönemlerde Saddam Hüseyin, Filistin'i Irak iç ve dış siyasetinin en önemli gündem maddesi yapmıştır. Bu değişken politikalar Irak'ın ülkesel birikimine zarar vermiştir. Ayrıca Irak'ın kurulduğu günden bu yana rejim, güvenliğini sağlamak maksadıyla kendi otoritesine düşman olarak kabul ettiği aşiret ya da mezhep yapılarıyla işbirliğine gitmiştir. En ilerlemeci rejimler bile bu yapıların toplum içindeki güçlerini bir

noktadan sonra kabul etmek zorunda kalmışlardır. Bunlara ek olarak Saddam Hüseyin dönemindeki bütün politikaların nihaî noktası bizzat Saddam Hüseyin'in şahsı olmuştur. Saddam Hüseyin sık sık kendinî İslam, Arap ya da Mezopotamya tarihinin önemli figürleri ile özdeşleştirmiş ve Iraklılık kimliğini kendi şahsı etrafında şekillendirmeye çalışmıştır. Ancak bu politika başta Şiiler ve Kürtler olmak üzere hem ülkenin çoğunluğunu oluşturan insanların marjinalize olmasına yol açmış hem de rejimin takip ettiği politikaların sonucunda uluslararası müdahale sonucu bir dönem dünyanın en büyük konvansiyonel güçlerinden birine sahip olan Irak ülkesinin kuzeyinde ve güneyinde ülkesel kontrolünü kaybetmiştir.

Amerikan işgali sonrası dönem Irak'ın ülkeselliği açısından büyük değişimleri de beraberinde getirmiştir. Modern tarihte ilk defa çoğunluk oldukları yerde iktidara gelen Şiiler Irak'ın ülkeselliğini de değiştirmiştir. Bu dönemde Irak ülkesi yoğun Şii sembolizmiyle tanışmış ve Mezopotamya merkezli kültürün savunuculuğunu bu kez Şii elitler üstlenmişlerdir. Meydana gelen olaylar “Irak neresidir?” ve “Irak'ın ülkesel özellikleri nelerdir?” sorularının sürekli farklı şekillerde yanıtladığını göstermektedir. Avrupa'da yüzyıllara varan ülkesel devletin dönüşüm süreci Irak'ta yüzyıllık bir tarihe bile sahip değildir ve bu sebeple değişimlere daha açıktır. Son dönemde Irak'ta Ortaçağ Avrupası'nı andıran bir siyasî tablo ortaya çıkmıştır. Heterojen birimler birbiriyle çelişen ülkesel hakimiyet iddialarına sahiptir. Merkezî hükümet, dinî otorite, aşiretler, milisler birbirleriyle güç mücadelesi içine girmişlerdir. Kent merkezleri, banliyöler, kırsal alanlar, dinsel yoğunluğu fazla olan bölgeler farklı grupların güçlerini gösterdikleri alanlar olmuşlardır. Irak'ın geleceğini bu gruplar arasındaki mücadele kadar bu mekânların ağırlıklarını Irak siyasetine ne ölçüde yansıttıkları da belirleyecektir.

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