

THE IMPACT OF IRAN-INSPIRED ISLAM IN TURKEY: THE PERIOD BETWEEN
1980 AND 2000

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ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF IRAN-INSPIRED ISLAM IN TURKEY: THE PERIOD BETWEEN 1980 AND 2000

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This thesis aims to study the influence of Iranian Revolution in 1979 on Islamism in Turkey. In this study, it is argued that Iranian Revolution influenced Islamist intellectual life in Turkey and a new school, Iran-inspired Islam(ism), emerged in Turkey after 1979. It developed in 1980s and 1990s, and weakened in 2000s.

Key Words: Iranian Revolution, Islamism, Iran-inspired Islam(ism)

ÖZ

İRANCI İSLAMCILIĞIN TÜRKİYE’DE ETKİLERİ: 1980 VE 2000 ARASI DÖNEM

Elhan, Nail

Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Programı

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Bu tez, 1979 yılında İran’da meydana gelen İslam Devrimi’nin Türkiye’deki İslamcı hareket üzerindeki etkilerini incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu çalışmada, İran’daki İslam Devrimi sonrasında Türkiye’de İslamcı hareket içerisinde İrancı İslamcı bir yapının oluştuğu savunulur. İrancı İslam(cılık), 1980’lerde ve 1990’larda etkisi arttırmış ve 2000’li yıllar ile birlikte zayıflamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: İran İslam Devrimi, İslamcılık, İrancı İslam(cılık)

To my family...

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I know that there is still a long way to go to make this thesis a perfect one. So, for any errors or inadequacies that have remained in this work, the responsibility is entirely my own.

As I saw in the introductory chapters of the books of ‘Iran-inspired’ intellectuals that I studied in this work:

Effort from us, success from the ‘God’ ...

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

İnsanlar hangi dünyaya kulak kesilmişse öbürüne sağır.¹

Iranian Revolution had a significant impact on international relations and socio-cultural structure of the Middle East region and as well as the way, in which Islamism is perceived. After the revolution, the US policy changed dramatically in the region. In the late 1970s, phrases to define terrorism or fundamentalism were transformed in response to the developments in the aftermath of the revolution. Although the term ‘Arab terrorism’ was used in 1960s and 1970s, after the revolution in 1979, this was changed to ‘Islamic fundamentalism’, ‘militant Islam’ and ‘Islamic terrorism’.² Iranian Revolution also challenged the relationship between Islam and politics. The revolution strengthened, spread and legitimized the Islamic revolutionary ideas. It invigorated Islamist challenges to the authority of secular states and raised the questions about the legitimacy, governance and authority.³ Iranian Revolution became a turning point. In this respect, the Iranian Revolution had significant influences on Turkey.

¹ A small part from İsmet Özel’s poem: *İçimden Şu Zalim Şüpheyi Kaldır*.

² Kambiz GhaneaBassiri, *A History of Islam in America: From the New World to the New World Order*, (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press), 2010, 307.

³ Vali Nasr, “The Iranian Revolution and Changes in Islamism in Pakistan, India and Afghanistan” in Ed. Nikki Keddie and Rudi Matthee, *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, (Washington: The University of Washington Press), 2002, 327.

Perceptions towards Iran and understandings of Islamists towards Islam in Turkey got changed after the revolution.

The governments of Turkey maintained its relations with new regime in Iran, which was established after the revolution. Although economic and political relations maintained, the government of Turkey was concerned about the territorial integrity of Iran. Since there was a painful process after the revolution in Iran, Turkey was concerned about the end of status quo and establishment of a Kurdish state within Iranian territories. Expansion of religious revolutionary ideas to Turkey was also another source of concern for Turkey. Exporting the revolutionary ideas and the revolution were among the bases in foreign policy objectives of the new regime in Iran. In this context, theocratic characteristic of Iranian regime was perceived as a threatening factor by secular Turkey.

Islamism in Turkey developed without a direct opposition to the state and had no such an ideal of establishing a sharia state. However, Iranian Revolution challenged this rather 'moderate' stand of Islamists. Islamists in Turkey perceived Iranian Revolution in different ways. While some groups welcomed and supported the revolution, others opposed and criticized it. However, there was discontent about Iran and the Shii characteristic of the revolution. As a result there have been divergences among Islamist intellectual life in Turkey about the revolution. Yet, the revolution and establishment of a theocratic state based on Shii Islam became a model for some Islamists in Turkey that they were encouraged to establish a sharia state inspired by Iran. A group of people, which I call as Iran-inspired Islamists, were influenced by the revolution and the ideas of Ayatollah Khomeini. They defined Khomeini as the leader and referred him as the *Īmam*. Without taking the characteristics of Iranian Revolution

into consideration, these Iran-inspired Islamists, most of them coming from Sunni tradition, differed from the Islamists in Turkey and initiated the emergence of a new school, Iran-inspired Islam(ism), within radical Islamic discourse.

Iran-inspired Islam(ism) created a different path in political Islamic literature. In this thesis, I will explain this new school, which benefits from radical Islamic Sunni discourse and, at the same time, differs from it in terms of attitudes towards revolutionary Iran and the Shii Islam. Even though there are studies comparing Iran and Turkey in terms of cultural, economic and political interaction, studies about religious interactions between these two countries are limited. Being an output of these religious interactions, Iran-inspired Islam(ism) is an outstanding subject, which has not been studied. This is why this thesis have been conducted.

The main plan in the thesis will be as follows: In the first chapter I will look at the Iranian Revolution at 1979 and the general intellectual life in Iran before the revolution. Since it became subject to many studies, firstly, I will explain the theories on Iranian Revolution under two classifications, which are development based explanations and culture-religion based explanations of the revolution. Then, since the religion became the main force in the revolution, I will explore the Shii Islam and Ayatollah Khomeini's re-institutionalization of religion. In this context, Khomeini's Valayet-i Faqih Theory and regional and international dimensions of Iranian Revolution will be defined. In addition to these, contributions of Iranian intellectuals to the revolutionary process are also noteworthy. In this respect, contributions of Jalal-al Ahmad, Ali Shariati and Ayatollah Motahhari will be stressed on. In this chapter, the significance of Iranian

Revolution in international relations, regional politics and Islamist discourse will also be analyzed.

The second chapter will focus on Turkey's on the Iranian Revolution. In this chapter, answers to questions of 'how did Turkey perceive the Iranian Revolution?' and 'what were positions of the state and society about the revolution?' will be looked for. As a result, different perceptions and reactions of several Islamic circles and the state towards Iranian Revolution will be explained. In this chapter, significance and influence of the revolution on Turkey as a state and on the society of Turkey will be separately tackled. At the end of this chapter, a background to oppositions or collaborations of several Islamic circles and several political groups towards Iranian Revolution will be provided.

The third chapter will examine the Iran-inspired Islam(ism). Before explaining it, I will briefly focus on political Islam, or Islamism, to locate Iran-inspired Islam(ism) in a more comprehensible manner. Then, I will focus on the Iran-inspired Islam(ism). In this respect, firstly, I will focus on the the Iran-inspired Islam(ism) within several explanations in relation to the revolutionary phases in Iran, and in the context of leadership and faith. Within this context, two sides of Iran-inspired Islam(ism) will be explained: the political side and the religious side. Then, I will broaden the scope by analyzing the Iran-inspired Islamists and intellectuals, and Iran-inspired journals, newspapers and periodicals.

As Iran-inspired Islamists and intellectuals, I analyzed contributions of Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan, Mehmet Metiner, Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin. By referring to their contributions and discourses, I classified them in two groups: Periodical Iran-inspired

Islamists and Ideological Iran-inspired Islamists. While deciding on these people, I chose these people on the basis of their availability to make interviews and availability of their complete. There are also other Islamists and intellectuals that can be categorized as Iran-inspired. Some of them, I will not give their names, did not admit my requests to have an interview and I was not able to reach their published and unpublished works. Thus, I limited this study with these names.

In addition, I benefited from Iran-inspired journals, newspapers and periodicals such as *Düşünce*, *Şura*, *İktibas*, *İstiklal*, *Şehadet*, *Tevhid* and *Selam* in the thesis. While deciding on these, I paid attention to editorial boards and cadres, and their publications about Iran and the revolution. There are more journals that are published by Iran-inspired Islamists and intellectuals, but it would broaden the concept of this study. Thus, I limited the scope of thesis with certain journals, newspapers and periodicals.

Another issue that I have to note is the reason why I did not cover the Hezbollah Community and the Jafari Community in Turkey in this study. Hezbollah is a Kurdish-Islamist organization with two main groups, which were *İlim* and *Menzil*. *Menzil* was pro-Iranian while *İlim* was oriented by Hüseyin Velioğlu within Ikhwan ideology of Saed Havva. In the competitions between these two groups within Hezbollah, *İlim* under the leadership of Velioğlu neutralized *Menzil* by force and became the only group leading Hezbollah. Today, Hezbollah is not such an active group as it was in 1990s. Because of *İlim*'s critical stance against Iran, I did not include Hezbollah in this study. Jafaris are a religious community that believes in Shii Islam. Thus, I exclude them from the issue of Iran-inspired Islam(ism). Since they are followers of Shii Islam as a religious

community, their dependence on Iran and Shii Islam has developed in an expected way.

I know that there is still a long way to go to make this thesis a perfect one. So, for any errors or inadequacies that have remained in this work, the responsibility is entirely my own. This is only a step to a different world waiting to be discovered.

CHAPTER 2

IRANIAN REVOLUTION IN 1979

*At the dawn of Islamic Revolution, the protests begin against Mohammad Reza Shah. Protesters raised their voices against his repressive policies and oppose arrests of opponents. Many opponents escaped to Europe, especially to France. Mohammad Reza calls his Prime Minister Huveyda and says: "When there was a riot against De Gaulle in France, his supporters came together in Champs Elysees. Where are my supporters?" Huveyda replies: "They are in Champs Elysees, Your Majesty!"*⁴

2.1 Introduction

February of 1979 witnessed the collapse of 2500 year-monarchy of Iran and Shah Regime was toppled down by a coalition of workers, bazaaris, urban people and ulama. One of the most loyal allies of United States with exorbitant revenues from oil, and one of the largest armies of the world with equipped finely in terms of technical and physical points was broken down by the end of popular uprisings. Shah was considered as being ruler of such a powerful army and immense bureaucracy that equipped with ultramodern weapons, helped by an efficient secret police network, bolstered by well-financed patronage network and flourished with enormous income derived from oil.⁵ Then, what happened insomuch

⁴ Fred Halliday said this in a conference about the 30th anniversary of Iranian Revolution. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_XZckhB360 Date Accessed: 24.01.2015

⁵ Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1982, 496

Shah's regime was strong? Many groups coming together from different social groups and different ideologies were united around only one purpose, which was 'Death to Shah!' What brought these people together against the Shah? Abrahamian answers these questions that "the revolution erupted not because of this or that last-minute political mistake; it erupted like a volcano because of the overwhelming pressures that had built up over the decades deep in the bowels of Iranian society."⁶ This surprising attempt against the powerful monarchy and its more surprising culmination of establishment of a "sharia state" under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini caused world's turning their face to Iran. Iranian Revolution drew attention of many social groups and scholars both from the West and the East. As well as the world turned their attention to Iran, for some it was an unexpected event. For instance, Theda Skocpol, as a well-known expert on revolutions, then wrote that Iranian Revolution challenged her previous works about the causes of social revolutions⁷ and Kalim Siddiqi⁸ said he was unaware of a state like Iran before the revolution.⁹ Ali Bulaç, an Islamist intellectual in Turkey, never expected

⁶ Abrahamian, *History of Modern Iran*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2008, 155.

⁷ In Skocpol's words, "the revolution came as a surprise to outside observers, which included American friends of the Shah, journalists political pundits, and social scientists including those like me, who are supposed to be experts on revolutions." Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution", *Theory and Society*, 11:3 (May, 1982), 265.

⁸ An eminent and respected Pakistani British Islamic activist studying Iran. For more information: *Stages of Islamic Revolution*, Open Press, 1996 in English and *İslam Devrimi'nin Aşamaları*, Ekin Yayınları, İstanbul, 1997 in Turkish.

⁹ Siddiqi emphasizes that he was unaware of the Islamic potential in Iran before the revolution. See the private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015.

such an event to be in Iran.¹⁰ Even Jimmy Carter, USA President during the time, so unexpected the revolution that he called Iran as ‘the island of stability’ in a volatile region and the fall of the Shah occurred within months.¹¹ Islamic Revolution was unique in the annals of modern history in that it brought to power not a new social group equipped with political parties and secular ideologies, but a traditional clergy armed with mosque pulpits and claiming the divine authority to supervise all temporal authorities, even the country’s highest elected representatives.¹²

In this regard, this chapter is composed of five parts. In the first part of this chapter, it will be emphasized that although religion is considered as the main propellant power of the revolutionary process, this process was a complex combinations of different segments such as economy, international condition, politics and religion. Religion was not the only factor. Since the Shii Islam was one of the components of the revolution and the state that was established after the revolution was inspired from Shii ideology, main assumptions of Shii Islam had to be taken into consideration. Therefore, after explaining views on the Iranian Revolution, I will maintain with the main assumptions of Shii Islam in second part. In this brief view of Shii Islam, the evolution of it with Safavid Dynasty, its historical process and its main guidelines will be explained. Intellectual life was also nourished by Shii Islam in Iran just before the revolutionary

¹⁰ Ali Bulaç says that he studied Persian for 12 years and he never considered the possibility of an Islamic Revolution in Iran. See the private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015.

¹¹ Anoushirvan Ehteshami, *Iran and The Rise of Its Neoconservatives : The Politics of Tehran's Silent Revolution*, (London:New York: I.B. Tauris, London:New York), 2007, xi.

¹² Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1982, 530.

process. Since the founders of new state, for example Khomeini, benefited from both secular and religious intellectuals' ideas, the intellectual life in pre-revolutionary Iran deserves to be discussed. In the third part of this chapter, this issue will be tackled and Ayatollah Motahhari's, Jalal al-Ahmad's and Ali Shariati's ideas, their contributions to revolutionary process will be sought to explain. After a brief analysis of pre-revolution intellectual life, in the fourth part, Khomeini and his Valayat-e Faqih theory will be discussed. Khomeini was the most profound leader of revolutionary movement. He formulated his theory in the context of requirements of time. In other words, he based his theory on Shii ideology and shaped it within a populist discourse in a way that met demands of people. Thus, it is notable to discuss Khomeini's views on state and society. Iranian Revolution and its Islamic character had a significant influence both on the West and on the Islamic societies. In the fifth part of this chapter, international dimension of Iranian Revolution will be discussed. After the revolution, Iran and Khomeini aimed to spread the revolutionary idea to the all Islamic societies. To achieve this, export of revolution was determined. In reaction to this, regional powers in the region followed a policy against Iran. Idea of revolution's export and the impact of Iranian Revolution in the region will be held as the minor issues of the last part.

2.2 Literature on the Iranian Revolution in 1979

Iranian Revolution created an important reaction in the world and it was sought to be understood by different perspectives and ideologies. It broke out as an accumulated reaction against Shah's Iran. There is considerable number of works on Iran Islamic Revolution and most of them are significant contributions of the scholars on the perception and explanation of the issue. Since it is beyond the scope of this thesis to make a detailed

analysis of revolutionary process, I will settle with giving brief information about the literature about the Iranian Revolution. While doing this, firstly, I will explain contributions of some scholars on Iranian Revolution. Looking from different perspectives to Iranian Revolution, I will try to explain the scholars' contributions from economic analysis of revolution to political and ideological effects.

There are contributions about the role of Shii Islam and Islamic culture in bringing people from different ideologies together and put the Shii Islam as the main dynamic of the revolution. Even though, to some extent, taking the religion into account while studying the Iranian revolution is important, it is not sufficient to explain the whole revolutionary process. There are also various reasons in addition to religion that brought these people together from different ideologies and caused the strengthening of clerics. I should note that in the classification of scholars I considered the role of religion in their contributions. In this respect, I will endeavor to display whether the religion was the main factor. "To what extent the revolution was led by the religion and to what extent it was led by social and economic factors?"¹³ It is the fact that the revolutionary process was dominated by the religious ideas. Although the religion, Shii Islam, is introduced as the major factor that accelerated mobilization of people, and the clergy is considered as the leading actor of masses, they were only two of the factors and there were also different motivations. From this point of view, I categorized the ideas of scholars in terms of their priority about religion in their contributions. Thus, two groups of scholars will be defined. First one is the development based model that consisted of contributions of Fred Halliday, Ervand Abrahamian and Mansour

¹³ Fred Halliday, "The Iranian Revolution", *Political Studies*, Vol. XXX, No. 3, (1982), 437.

Moaddel. These scholars' explanation gave lesser priority to the role of religion. While explaining the Iranian Revolution, they emphasized the development and modernization processes, policies of Shah and these policies' causes on the society. The second one is the culture and religion based model that composed of Theda Skocpol, Hamid Algar and Said Amir Arjomand. These scholars gave more attention to the role of religion in Iranian Revolution. They tried to define the role of Shii clergy, its authority on Iranian society and leading role of Shii beliefs in the revolutionary process.

2.2.1 Development Based Model

To begin with; Fred Halliday defines the relation between the role of imperialism in Iran in 1970s and the failure of White Revolution¹⁴ that provided the social and economic context for the revolution.¹⁵ For him, the revolution was a product of contradictions.¹⁶ These contradictions were caused by the uneven development. The Iranian economy was dependent on oil revenues. The rates of agricultural and industrial production in the Iranian economy were not sufficient. The revenue coming from these fields were limited. There was a growing gap between the incomes of upper classes and the others. Unemployment was very high. Increasing urbanization in cities, increasing demands of people for their basic needs,

¹⁴ White Revolution was an attempt to westernize and develop the country economically, socially and culturally, to make land reform, to strengthen social conditions of women, to increase the rate of literacy in the country. It was tried to apply during Shah Mohammad Reza rule. It was opposed by ulama.

¹⁵ New Left Review's November-December 1987 Issue, p. 30, <http://newleftreview.org/I/166/fred-halliday-the-iranian-revolution-and-its-implications>
Date Accessed: 26.02.2015

¹⁶ Süleyman Demirci, "The Iranian Revolution and Shia Islam: The Role of Islam in the Iranian Revolution", *History Studies*, 5: 3, (May 2013), 47.

increasing rates of unemployment, dissatisfaction of bazaaris and opposes of ulama to possible returns of the White Revolution prepared an discontented mass before the revolution. Halliday refers to the social and economic character of Iran and the power of traditional social forces that were able to bring people together and make the revolution. As a result, from Marxist and liberal ideologies to religious forces a large front of opposition emerged under the leadership of Khomeini. It was a populist choice. For Halliday, it was a populist alliance to come together under a Mullah, Khomeini.

Another explanation of Iranian Revolution in terms of significance of economic development rather than impact of religion was provided by Ervand Abrahamian. Similar to Halliday, he explained the causes of revolution with unequal development and he reached the conclusion that the clergy's role in the revolution was limited. According to him, Iran witnessed crucial social and economic transformations during the period between Constitutional Revolution in 1905 and Islamic Revolution in 1979. There were attempts for rapid modernization of the country both during Reza Shah and his son Mohammad Reza Shah periods. This rapid social and economic modernization of the country expanded the gap between the rich and the poor. "The processes of urbanization and industrialization, the expansion of educational and communication systems, the creation of a centralized_ and the creation of centralized bureaucratic state all served to swell the ranks of the modern classes, especially the intelligentsia and the industrial proletariat, and to reduce the relative size of the traditional classes, notably the bazaar petite bourgeoisie and its clerical allies."¹⁷ "Some socio-economic changes on the one hand

¹⁷ Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press), 1982, 530.

undermined patrimonial ties between traditional patrons and their clients, and on the other hand strengthened class consciousness among the modern sectors of the population.”¹⁸

Modernization could not be successful in establishing links between the society and the government. This created a kind of structure that most of the population could not be able to reach channels to communicate with the political system or to enter the process of policy determination. In addition, bazaaris and the ulama, with the concern of losing their social power, opposed to modernization policies of Shah. In this way, the pathway going to the revolutionary process was opened. As Abrahamian argues “under the Pahlavi Monarchy, state autonomy brought not institutional strength but social isolation; and social isolation, in turn, brought weakness and vulnerability to revolution.”¹⁹ In the end, as a result, not because of rapid development or modernization attempts, but because of uneven development and the lack in the extension of policies towards the society, Iran entered the revolutionary process.

Unlike Halliday and Abrahamian, Mansour Moaddel does not overlook the religion and ideology. However, he explains the revolutionary process referring to both the economic development with modernization policies and the religion. He tackled the ideology as the independent factor about Iranian Revolution in 1979. Increase in oil prices in 1970s increased the state revenues. This increase in revenues enabled state the ability of spending much money on modernization policies and military. This accelerated tensions in state and society relations. Corresponding with Iranian Revolution, he developed an alternative approach that focuses on

¹⁸Ibid, 530-531.

¹⁹ Abrahamian, *Radical Islam: the Iranian Mujahedin*, (London: I.B. Tauris), 1989, 11.

the discourse, ideology and changes of it. According to him, Islamic revolutionary discourse was not an ideology that rested on Shii Islam or ulama, but “it was produced by diverse ideologues as a result of the dialectic between the state and its opponents in a broad episodic context.”²⁰ To exemplify it, he initiates the year 1953 and after, when nationalist Mosaddeq government was overthrown by US and Britain with a coup. For him, this coup affected the nationalist and secularist ideologies that after the coup, secularism began to decrease and Islamic revolutionary ideology began to rise. The period of Reza Shah, the father of Mohammad Reza, was also the years of modernization policies that Reza Shah made attempts to modernize country. He also tried to apply West-inspired modernization policies. However, why Islamic revolutionary ideas did not grow in such a great circle during the rule of Father Shah? Moaddel explains it by comparing the rules of two Shahs. “Although the ideology of the state under Reza Shah and under his son, Mohammad Reza Shah, was similar, Reza Shah's secular and anticlerical policies did not lead to the rise of Islamic opposition because the Shah's cultural policies and the dominant cultural trend in society belonged to the same ideological universe.”²¹ On the other hand, during Mohammad Reza's rule, the practices of state and the demands of Islamic opposition were not mutual. White Revolution offered education of women, regulating women's role in terms of socio-economic condition and land reform. These were unacceptable for ulama. With results of economic policies that increase in state's revenue did not reverberate to the society, Islamic opposition used this problem and strengthened. In mass protests between 1977 and 1979,

²⁰ Mansour Moaddel, “Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of the Iranian Revolution”, *American Sociological Review*, 57: 3, (Jun., 1992), 375.

²¹ *Ibid*, 375.

the religion together with its rituals and symbols enabled protesters the ability to communicate and brought them together under the protests against Shah. Shii discourse was a means of opposition against monarchy. Iranian Revolution and overthrow of Shah Regime displayed the increasing importance of religion and decline of secularism.

2.2.2 Culture and Religion Based Model

In contrast to development based explanations of Iranian Revolution, the culture and religion based model explains the revolution by giving more attention to role of clergy and Shii doctrine of Islam.

To begin with, Theda Skocpol, in her article written after Iranian Revolution, developed a new argument, differently from her previous book on social revolutions²², and she introduced Shii Islam as the one of the major factors that took Iran to revolutionary process.

Shii Islam was both organizationally and culturally crucial to the making of the Iranian Revolution against the Shah. Radicalized clerics disseminated political ideas challenging the Shah. Then the networks, the social forms, and the central myths of Shi'a Islam helped to coordinate urban mass

²² Skocpol argues that the Iranian revolution was a social revolution, but it challenged the expectations of revolutionary causation that Skocpol theorized through comparative historical research on the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. Social revolutions, according to Skocpol, "are rapid, basic transformation of a country' s state and class structures, and of its dominant ideology. Because the Iranian revolution was mass-based and transformative of basic socio-cultural and socioeconomic relationships in Iran, "it surely fits more closely the pattern of the great historical, social revolutions than it does the rubric of simply a political revolution, where only governmental institutions are transformed." Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia and China*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1979.

resistance and to give it the moral will to persist in the face of attempts at armed repression. All of this meant that a very "traditional" part of Iranian life - albeit a traditional part fitting in new ways into a steadily changing modern sociopolitical scene - provided crucial political resources for the forging of a very modern-looking revolutionary movement. Many social-scientific theorists of revolution have argued that revolutionary ideologies and organizations must convert and mobilize mass followings before a revolution is possible. Actually, this has rarely been the case in social revolutions of the past, which "were not made," but came unintentionally on all concerned. In Iran, uniquely, the revolution was "made" - but not, everyone will note, by any of the modern revolutionary parties on the Iranian scene: not by the Islamic guerillas or by the Marxist guerillas, or by the Communist ("Tudeh") Party, or by the secular-liberal National Front. Instead it was made through a set of cultural and organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance to the Shah.²³

For her, social revolutions were not the products of rapid modernization periods, but she admits the effect of rapid modernization in Iranian Revolution.²⁴ After the rapid modernization policies and industrialization, many people moved to urban areas from rural areas. Increasing unemployment and increasing social problem with urbanization affected the socio-economic structure of Iran. The results of all these were social

²³ Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution", *Theory and Society*, 11: 3, (May 1982), 275.

²⁴ Vedat Gürbüz, "the Iranian Revolution", *Ankara Üniversitesi SBF Dergisi*, 58-4, 109.

disruption and disintegration of society. “In the end, Shii Islam was organizationally and culturally crucial to the success of the Iranian Revolution in bringing down Mohammad Reza Shah.”²⁵

Secondly, studying on Shii Islam, Islamic Revolution and Khomeini, Hamid Algar proposes Shii Islam and its leading guidance under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as the main causes of Iranian Revolution.²⁶ According to him, there is a different side of the revolution in Iran. Even though the other revolutions around the world seeks to refuse residuals of past and the history before them, create an alternative sense of history and locate the new order against the old one, Iranian Revolution escalated on Islamic legacy of Shiism. Algar insists on the efforts and struggles that are seeking to limit the effect of the Islamic Revolution within the boundaries of Iran.²⁷ To achieve this purpose, the Revolution’s Shii identity is emphasized and it is presented to the world as a Shii Islamic movement. He asserts:

Whereas the Russian, Chinese, and other revolutions, at least in theory, seek to negate the past in a radical fashion, to react against it, on the contrary, Islamic Revolution is the continuation, the culmination of an important part of the Islamic heritage of Iran. In one sense the beginning of the heritage comes with the introduction of Islam to Iran in the seventh century of the Christian era. In a more immediate and important sense, the appropriate point of departure for our

²⁵Demirci, “The Iranian Revolution and Shia Islam: The Role of Islam in the Iranian Revolution”, *History Studies*, 5: 3, (May 2013), 47.

²⁶ S. Sadegh Haghghat, *Six Theories About the Islamic Revolution’s Victory*, (Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, Tehran: Alhoda Publishing), 2000, 24.

²⁷ Hamid Algar, *The Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (Oneonta: Islamic Publications International), 2001, 13.

examination of the historical background of the Revolution is the early part of sixteenth century, which sees the conversion of Iran into the only country in the Muslim world with a majority adhering to Shii school of thought.²⁸

Lastly, Said Amir Arjomand presents a model that makes emphasis on religion and authority of clergy. For him, there were three groups, which were mostly affected by Pahlavis' policies. These groups were the tribal chiefs, who lost their privileges with land reforms, the Shii clergy, whose authority was under attack because of taking control of the Pahlavi Monarchy and the big landlords.²⁹ Opposition to Shah brought these groups together. For Arjomand, clergy had the legitimate authority to perform the leadership. Clergy was powerful in societal domain that it was respected by Iranian people. Due to 1979, clergy increased its authority not only in the religious sphere, but also in politics. This brought clergy to the leadership of revolutionary movements. At the end, Shii Islam became the leading factor of Iranian Revolution. Shii myths like martyrdom and suffering became the main characteristics and ideals of the revolution.

In addition to these, Arjomand does not admit the revolutionary role of peasants and industrial working class in the Iranian Revolution. For him, out of peasants and workers in industry, there were two other actors in the revolution:

The two most important coalition partners of militant clerics consisted of the new middle class -government employees, school teachers, the intelligentsia and the

²⁸ Ibid, 14.

²⁹ Said Amir Arjomand, "Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative Perspective", *World Politics*, 38: 3 (April 1986), 390-391.

white-collar workers in the service sector- and the traditional bourgeoisie in the bazaar.³⁰

Although Arjomand admits the causes of rapid change of society, he emphasizes the role of religion in the formation of revolutionary movements. For him, when there was a conflict between state and society in Iran, the clergy, as the legitimate authority of religion, became the leader of Iranian nation.

In conclusion, there are several contributions of different scholars to explain the Iranian Revolution. Despite Shii revolutionary ideology is admitted as a fact that played role of a unifying actor of Iranian Revolution, it is, of course, one of them, but not the only one. In my opinion, modernization process of Iran has a long history that finds its bases in period of Qajar Dynasty. With the dissolution of Qajars, Pahlavis took the rule of the country and maintained modernization policies. The international relations of Iran, policies of Shah and political economy of oil industry affected the Iranian politics and Iranian society. Mohammad Reza Shah developed close relations with US and West. These relations went so further that Iran became one of the best allies of US in the region. 1970s became the years that oil prices increased and oil producing countries relatively got richer. In addition, the period of after the Second World War witnessed to the rise of political Islam and revolutionary ideas within Islam and decline of secularism. In Iran, topple of Mosaddeq government in 1953 with a coup accelerated decline of nationalist and secularist politics in Iran. Religion's effect in social and political life rose. In 1970s, the increase in state revenue did not reflect on society. In addition to these, the policies of Mohammad Reza Shah such as White Revolution increased the socio-economic gap between the classes of

³⁰ Ibid, 392.

society. While urbanization was increasing, unemployment rate was also increasing. As a result, opposition movements against Shah, his foreign relations and his domestic policies increased. Religion's role, in this context, was like a means that was able to bring the masses together. Failure of modernization policies and uneven economic development created a dissatisfactory social structure.³¹ Shah was unsuccessful in presenting his modernization policies to people and his monarchy was unsuccessful in sharing the revenue coming from oil money with the society. Shah built a political system based on secret police service, SAVAK,³² and he tried to control the opposing movements. SAVAK even went so far that it extended the controls on all spheres of public life; political parties were banned, censorship was extended.³³ The uneven

³¹ Ryszard Kapuscinski, in his book 'Shah of Shahs', conspicuously reveals the economic condition of Iran during Mohammad Reza Shah. Kapuscinski explains the economic revenue of state coming from oil and Shah's policies. As he narrates: "In 1973, Shah was making a statement to journalists. He was speaking about the increasing oil prices. Oil prices had risen to 4 times. Iran was gaining 5 million dollars from oil, its revenue increased to 20 million dollars. Shah declared that he would make Iran, which was a backward and poor country, the 5th superpower of the world. He said to a journalist from Der Spiegel that in 10 years, Iran would have the same living standards like Germany, France and England had. Speaker asked him that whether it was possible that these countries needed very long years to reach these living standards. Shah answered this question as 'Yes, of course'. See, Ryszard Kapuscinski, *Şahların Şahı*, (İstanbul: Habitus Yayıncılık), 2012, 46-47.

³² SAVAK (Sazeman-e Ettelaat va Amniyat-e Keshvar or Organization of Intelligence and National Security) established by Mohammad Reza Shah for intelligence and control of opposing movements.

³³ Kapuscinski exemplifies policies of SAVAK as following: "SAVAK was organized in all levels of society. People were suspected about themselves that one of them would be a SAVAK agent. Speaking freely in public sphere was impossible. At any time, there would be a SAVAK agent. People were afraid of using some words such as depressing, darkness, torture, hell, cage and pocketing. These words would have implications about

development, unequal sharing of state revenues combined with oppressor governing of Shah brought masses together and opened the way to revolution. In the scope of these crises, Shii Islam was introduced as a unifier of masses. Shii Islam was already effective among people. When it was fed with populist ideas of ulama, especially Khomeini, it provided the clergy basis for leadership of anti-Shah and anti-regime movements. As a result, religion was considered as the major factor of revolutionary process.

At this point, the question of historical background of Shii Islam, especially the Ithna Ashariyya³⁴ Shiism, its themes, doctrines and contributions to Islam, which are one of the main themes of this thesis, come to the minds. What are the main aspects of Shii Islam, which became so effective in the Islamic Revolution and shaped its destiny³⁵?

2.3 Shii Islam

Islamic Revolution escalated on Islamic legacy of Shiism, which was accepted in 1501 as the official state religion during Safavid period in Iran.³⁶ Until the 16th century majority of Iran was Sunni and so this Sunni

Shah and his regime and the people, who used these words, would be imprisoned because of opposing to Shah.” See, Kapuscinski, *Şahların Şahı*, 40-46.

³⁴ Ithna Ashariyya is one of the branches of Shii Islam. The general idea here I will try to explain is Ithna Ashariyya line of Shii Islam. Thus, instead of Ithna Ashariyya, I will use Shii Islam or Shiism.

³⁵ Of course, the religion cannot be considered as the soul explanation, which determines the Iranian Revolution, but one of the important factors. As I discussed the other causes of revolution above, there are more factors that caused the revolution. However, I believe that Shia political ideology played its role on the establishment of new state and its institutions.

³⁶ Mohammad Amjad, "Shi'ism and Revolution in Iran." *Journal of Church and State* 31: 1, (1989), 40.

population was compelled to convert to Shii Islam. To provide this, Safavid Dynasty followed two ways: First of all, they had to base their roots to a personage, who could be one of the influential and celebrated clerics of Shii theology. Bearing in mind this, they alleged that their roots were coming from the 7th Imam Mousa Kazem.³⁷ Secondly; since there was a lack of Shii ulama in Iran that needed to institutionalize the Shii doctrine, they had to ‘import’ Shii mullahs from Iraq, Lebanon and Bahrain.³⁸ In this way, they found an ideological reference to strengthen their rule. Forming the state’s identity with Shiism, they applied their politics by declaring or by force from time to time.³⁹ However, religious identity of Safavid Dynasty was much closer to Alevi understanding than Shii Islam, when compared with today’s understandings. Shii Islam began to take its shape with Qajars. After the collapse of Safavid Dynasty, institutionalization of Shii ulama had continued in Iran. It evolved to a more powerful structure in terms of social and economic conditions with Qajar Dynasty and Pahlavi Dynasty. Condition of Shii ulama advanced

³⁷ There are some discussions about the origins of Safavids. According to Hamid Algar, coming from the 7th Imam Mousa Kazem was a false genealogy manufactured by political reasons. In fact, Safavids were of Turkic or ultimately Kurdish descent. See, Hamid Algar, *The Roots of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, Islamic Publications International, Oneonta, 2001, p.18 Moreover, Minorsky quotes a poem of Shah İsmail, well-known Safavid Shah, that Shah İsmail considers himself as the child of Fatima (Daughter of Prophet Mohammad) and Ali (4th Caliph), and the Pir of Twelve Imams: “Adım Şah İsmail Hakkın sırrıyım, Cümle gazilerin men serdariyim, Anamdir Fatima atam Ali’dir, Men Oniki Imam’in da piriyim.” See, Vladimir Minorsky, *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, Vol. 10, No. 4 (1942), 1042a.

³⁸ For more information; Rula Jurdi Abisaab, *Converting Persia: Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire*, (London: New York: I.B. Tauris), 2004

³⁹ Craig A. Lockard, *Societies, Networks and Transitions: A Global History*, (Wadsworth: Cengage Learning), 2011, 435.

with fluctuating trends until its peak in the year of 1979, when it held the power.

For years, the conflict between Sunni and Shii Islam became one of the most controversial issues (maybe the most debated one) within Islam. It certainly has political repercussion specifically in international relations of the Middle East. Especially in the issue of political Islam, both Sunni and Shii schools presented different solutions to different problems in the frame of their worldviews. Throughout the Muslim societies of the Middle East, these are two antagonistic manifestations of political Islam that are referenced for political purposes. Even though Sunnis reclaimed Islam as a means that traditionally legalize and protect the status quo, Shiis appraise it as an ideology of mass protesting and even a revolutionary ideology.⁴⁰ Against the manner of traditional Sunni Islam, which legalizes and protects the status quo, Shii Islam has developed quite radical attitudes.⁴¹

⁴⁰It is a controversial issue that the allegation such as Sunni Islam advocates status quo and Shii Islam is revolutionary. Although the mainstream of Islamism studying scholars shares this idea, it is very problematic. The Arab Spring displayed that Sunni-majority societies also want change and begin protests against governments. This means that considerations claim them as supporters of status-quo are problematic.

⁴¹ Ali Bulaç opposes this argument. According to him there are three methods about changing the governments: Sunnis' self-possession model, Shiis' expectancy model and Haricis' rebellion model. Sunni model offers to be moderate. However, if the ruler is oppressor, Sunni model follows two ways. First, if it is possible to topple the oppressor, a rebellion starts. Second, if it is not possible to topple the ruler, Sunni model offers to gather more strength and to wait for the right time. Shii model, for Bulaç, does not base on rebellion or opposition. This model considers salvation with return of Imam Mahdi. Since it does not base on rebellions, there is no a jihad understanding in this model. However, Bulaç alleges, Imam Khomeini, first time, theorized the change of the ruler without declaring jihad. By this way, he built the Islamic Republic of Iran. Third, Harici model attempts to change the ruler directly by force. Some of Wahhabi and Salafi movements follow this model.

Peak of Shia Islam and victory of Iranian Revolution in 1979, as a revolt ideology opposite to oppressive regimes and international active powers in the region, re-founded Islam with new functions and evoked its impact in a considerable extent in the region. Sunni political tradition is based on obedience of people to authority and most of the Sunni ulama, while emphasizing people's obedience to one, who keeps the power, are grounded on the thesis of 'disorder is better than the governance of one, who is not just'.⁴² Sunni Islam asserts the goodness of the worst administration in comparison with anarchy and disorder. While defending this, it displayed Prophet Mohammad's hadith, which is 'My ummah does not ally on fault' and Nisa Sura of Koran that says 'You who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you. And if you disagree over anything, refer it to Allah and the Messenger, if you should believe in Allah and the Last Day. That is the best [way] and best in result.'(Nisa Sura, 4:59)⁴³ On the other hand, Shii Ulama do not a consensus on this issue. Some believed that real successor of Prophet Mohammad was Twelve Imams and initiated sequence from Prophet's cousin and son-in-law Ali. They claimed that this sequence would come to conclusion with Imam Mahdi, 12th Imam. It is believed that 12th Imam, Imam Mahdi, disappeared after 100 years of death of Imam Hossain in Karbala. In addition, it is believed that in the time of oppression and evil, Mahdi would come again and prepare humanity for the judgement day.

Sunni and Shii understandings of Islam differ in application of Islam, interpretation of Koran, the religion, governance, the rulers and etc. To get on course and at the same time to exemplify the divergences between

⁴² İhsan D. Dağı, *Ortadoğu'da İslam ve Siyaset*, (İstanbul: Boyut Matbaacılık), 1998, 22.

⁴³ <http://quran.com/4> Date Accessed: 29.01.2015

Shii Islam and Sunni Islam, I will content with giving main assumptions of Shii Islam and especially its Ithna Ashariyya (Twelver Shiism) line that is the most effective one in Iranian social, cultural and political life. By this way, the ideology behind the revolution and the influence of Shiism in the formation of Islamic State will be clearer.

One of the most significant doctrines of Shii Islam is Imamate (Walayat). Imam is the person, whose kinship is coming from the Prophet Mohammad and accordingly representative of the Prophet's rule after his death. According to Algar, there is no mistake that both Shiis and Sunnis fully accept and believe in the sealing of prophet hood with the Prophet Mohammed, they differ in theory of the succession, not merely in the identity of the successor; but also in the functions of the successor, the Imam in Shii beliefs, include authoritative explanation of the text of the Koran, interpretation and extension of Islamic law and the guidance.⁴⁴ The Imam has the power to control administration, legislation and the military. Nubuwwa (Prophets' missions) is a gift from God for humanity to rescue them from hell and the Imamate is also a gift from God, like prophecy and its extension, and furthermore, in the absence of the Imamate, the faith (*iman*) is not founded.⁴⁵ In other words, it is believed that after the death of Prophet Mohammad, the Imamate replaced with the prophecy position in the opinions of Shii ulama. The imam, who is infallible, is the legitimate successor of the Prophet, and the Imamate comes to fulfil the prophecy (*nubuwwa*), just as the way or path is the equivalent of the law.⁴⁶ The Imam is the pillar of God's unity (*Tawhid*), immune from sin (*khaja*)

⁴⁴ Algar, 14.

⁴⁵ Aydın Bayram, *Shiism in the Middle East: A Short Introduction*, (Raleigh: Lulu Publishers), 2013, 21.

⁴⁶ Sabine Mervin-Rainer, *The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships*, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers), 2013, 13.

and error (*dalal*).⁴⁷ According to Shiism, after death of Mohammad, the leadership had to maintain with his kin and Ali, who was both son of his uncle and husband of his daughter Fatima, had the priority to be the leader. In Shii Imamate Doctrine, Ali and eleven Imams⁴⁸ coming after him are the just leaders have a divine right for leadership. Out of the last Imam, all the Imams had children and they sustained the chain of rule. The last Imam, Mahdi, disappeared and left no children behind him. Shii ulama solved this problem with the ‘occultation’ (*ghayba*).⁴⁹ Ghayba has freed the Shii community from the need of a ‘visibly’ present political and religious authority, bypassing possible fragmentations along rival political lines.⁵⁰ After the disappearance of Imam Mahdi, different contributions were made by Shii ulama in respect of the governance, the authority and etc.: Usuli and Akhbari Schools. It is a debated issue in the history of Shiism that until the return of Imam Mahdi who will rule the state and direct the society? Algar emphasizes on this issue’s political implications:

...if the sole legitimate successor of the Prophet, if the sole wielder of legitimate authority after him is no longer present

⁴⁷ Arjomand, *the Shadow of the God and Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order and Societal Change in Shiite Iran from the Beginning to 1890*, 35.

⁴⁸ Eleven Imams after Ali are Imam Hasan (624-670), Imam Hussein (625-679), Imam Zayn-Al Abidin (658-711), Imam Mohammad Baqir (675-732), Imam Jafar-al Sadeq (692-765), Imam Musa-al Kazem (744-799), Imam Mousa-al Reza (765-817), Imam Mohammad-al Jevad (809-835), Imam Mohammad-al Hadi (827-868), Imam Hasan-al Askari (847-872) and Imam Mahdi (869-then disappeared).

⁴⁹ Occultation is the belief that the disappeared Imam Mahdi will return and bring the world the justice. With return of Imam Mahdi, Islamic State will be established and Islamic law will be applied.

⁵⁰ Zouhair Ghazzal, “The Ulama: Status and Function”, in Ed. Youssef M. Choueri, *A Companion to History of the Middle East*, Malden and Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005, 80.

on the earthly plane, that means that inherently any worldly power that claims to exercise authority must ipso facto be illegitimate unless it can demonstrate in a clear and indisputable fashion that it exercises rule on behalf of the absent Imam. This very important belief has led the Shii Muslims to assume throughout the major part of their history a stance of rejection or at best limited acquiescence with regard to political authority, with regard to de facto existing authority...⁵¹

In the disappearance of Imam Mahdi, it is believed that the political power and the state is usurped and lost its legitimacy. Shii ulama, on the other hand, preferred to reconcile with state in cyclical conditions. In such a historical environment, Usuli School accepted the authority of independent reasoning (*ijtihad*) as essential for the survival of the community under the guidance of an Imam.⁵² It raised the issue of contribution of ulama in practical matters to society by methodizing new ijtihads. With this contribution, mujtahids were expected to methodize new ijtihads. On the contrary, Akhbari School rejected the authority of a mujtahid Imam, one who would deliver his own independent reasoning over crucial matters, as incompatible with the authority of the imams.⁵³ It alleged that in the non-appearance of Imam Mahdi, any independent ideas or opinions could not execute. According to it, until the return of Imam, hadith and narratives had to accord. Change would be only with the return of Imam Mahdi. As a side of Usuli School, Khomeini based his theory of

⁵¹ Algar, 15.

⁵² Ghazzal, 81.

⁵³ Ibid, 81.

Walayat-al Faqih on the Usuli theology of ‘society cannot be left leaderless’.⁵⁴

Martyrdom is also an important concern of Shii Islam. Although it is a value of all Muslims that Sunnis also give importance to martyrdom, Shiis enshrine in a different place thanks to martyrdom of Imam Hussein, son of Ali and grandson of Prophet, in Karbala. Hussein battled against Yazid, son of Muawiyeh, of Umayyad Dynasty and lost. Death of Hussein in this battle is a watershed in the Islamic history. Hussein’s death made irreparable the division between Shiis and Sunnis: Shiis could never forgive the Sunni caliph’s murder of the son of Ali.⁵⁵ Death of Hussein has a spiritual and profound concernment for Shiis. In the person of him, the whole fate of humanity when faced with overwhelming and tyrannical power is seen to have crystallized in a single incident, and the commemoration of this incident year after year is not merely a matter of pietistic commemoration.⁵⁶ In today’s world, especially Shii Muslims, as it was seen during the fall of Pahlavi Dynasty, used Hussein’s death in Karbala as a symbol against the tyrannies and repressive regimes. Hussein is a means of self-identification and struggle for justice against oppressors. Even though Hussein was martyred, his memory never died in the mind of Shiis that for many Shiis ‘every day is Ashura, everywhere is Karbala’.⁵⁷

To conclude, “The rejection of de facto authorities and the belief in the virtue of martyrdom have given to Shiism, particularly at certain point in its history, an attitude of militancy that has been lacking in a large number

⁵⁴ Ali Bulaç, *Hedeftaki Ülke: İran*, (İstanbul: Çıra Yayınları), 2009, 41.

⁵⁵ P. Clawson and M. Rubin, *Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos*, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan), 2005, 14.

⁵⁶ Algar, 16.

⁵⁷ John A. Morrow, *Islamic Images and Ideas: Essays on Sacred Symbolism*, North Caroline and London: Mc Farland, 243.

of Sunni segments of the Muslim Ummah.”⁵⁸ These features of Shii Islam both constituted and completed the movements and ideologies of masses before, during and after Iranian Revolution. Establishment of Islamic State, its constitution and its institutions drew inspiration from religion.

2.4 Pre-Revolutionary Intellectual Life in Iran

Iranian Revolution put an end to the continuous monarchy of 2500 years, brought down the Pahlavi Dynasty and created a state of Islamic theocracy. Iranian Revolution in 1979 is the first as an Islamic revolution. It not only propounded the deep roots of anti-modernism in the history of Middle Eastern societies but also displayed the possibility of social evolution and dynamism of integrity of modern-day Islam, politics and revolution. In other words; like other Islamic movements, Iranian Revolution is a massive and ideological rebuttal of Western modernism and it contains revenge with Islam’s local history and in this regard it is a phenomenon that belongs to quite new and modern times.⁵⁹

As pointed above, there are variable reasons that caused the revolution. I briefly mentioned significant contributions of scholars about Iran Islamic Revolution. They seek to explain the reasons of the revolution by looking to political, social, economic, etc. condition of Iran before 1979. Here, I want to mention three intellectuals, two of them are out of ulama⁶⁰ and their ideas within Iran before the revolution. Since they were also critical to monarchy in their country and to some extent, they affected Khomeini and some Islamic intellectuals in Turkey, who are also the subjects of this

⁵⁸ Algar, 17.

⁵⁹ Dağı, *Ortadoğu’da İslam ve Siyaset*, 12.

⁶⁰ Ayatollahs Shariatmadari and Taleqani also can be counted as the ‘carriers’ of criticism and revolutionary discourse from ulama in those times.

work; I opted to analyze works of Ayatollah Motahhari (1919-1979), Jalal-al Ahmad (1923-1969) and Ali Shariati (1933-1977)^{61,62}

2.4.1 Jalal Al-Ahmad

In his revolutionary semantics, Ayatollah Khomeini borrowed from these intellectuals, whose influence transcended the context of pre-revolutionary Iran, and for whom struggling against ‘Western’ imperialism was central.⁶³ Born in Tehran in 1923, Jalal-al Ahmad was coming from a clerical family. Even though his background was religion-oriented, he put distance between his thought and Islam, and he inclined to communist ideology in Iran. In his youth, he was influenced by Ahmad Kasravi, who was recognized with militant secular ideas. In 1960s, Jalal-al Ahmad went to Mecca for duty and pilgrimage and then, he re-discovered the importance of Islam for Iranian society. In his writings, he bases the roots of Iranians to Islam and he makes a harsh criticism of secularism and Westernization. Al Ahmad’s book of *Garpzedegi (Plagued by the West)* was the starting point for Iranian intellectual trends that contributed to the ideology of Iranian Revolution.⁶⁴ For example, Khomeini employed the

⁶¹ Jalal-al Ahmad was coming from clerical backgrounds, his family was clerical. Shariati’s father was a prominent religious scholar and teacher. But neither Jalal-al Ahmad nor Shariati were clerical and from ulama.

⁶² For more information about the intellectuals and their contributions before Islamic Revolution in Iran, see Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: the Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers), 2006.

⁶³ Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, *the International Politics of Persian Gulf: A Cultural Genealogy*, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 2006, 107.

⁶⁴ Stephen C. Poulson, *Social Movements in Twentieth Century Iran: Culture, Ideology and Mobilizing Frameworks*, (Plymouth: Lexington Books), 2005, 188.

term *garpzedegi* constructed by him in his indictments.⁶⁵ He describes *Garpzedegi* as a complex of circumstances, which comes about in the life, culture, civilization and way of thinking of a people in one spot on the globe without any kind of supporting cultural context or historical continuity, or any evolving method of integration, coming about only as a result of the charity of machines.⁶⁶ He rejected the Pahlavi Iran's dependency on Britain and oil, and development of corrupted and rough Westernization and considered that if this status goes invariably, Iran loses cultural, political and economic independence. For him, this struggle was between Occidental West and Oriental East, the West was mastering the technology of modernity, but the East was kept in a state of political and economic dependency. What he offered as the solution was 'taming of the machine' through indigenization of technology.⁶⁷ According to him, one could not become free from the West by becoming Western.⁶⁸

Equalizing the penetration and dependency on the West with building a correlation with culture and economy, his ideas were built on a kind of anti-dependency theory or Third Worldism:

Occidentosis (illness of Westernization) has two poles or extremes-two ends of one continuum. One pole is the Occident, by which I mean all of Europe, Soviet Russia, and North America, the developed and industrialized nations that

⁶⁵ Poulson, 188. quoted from Hamid Algar, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981.

⁶⁶ Matteo Legrenzi, *Security in the Gulf: Historical Legacies and Future Prospects*, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 2013, 139. Quoted from Jalal-al Ahmad, *Plagued by the West (Garpzedegi)*, (New York:Caravan), 1982.

⁶⁷ Brad Hanson, "the "Westoxication" of Iran: Depictions and Reactions of Behrangi, Al-e Ahmad and Shariati", *Journal of Middle East Studies*, 15, (1983), 1.

⁶⁸ Poulson, 191.

can use machines to turn raw materials into more complex forms that can be marketed as goods. These raw materials are not only iron ore and oil, or gut, cotton, and gum tragacanth; they are also myths, dogmas, music, and the higher worlds. The other pole is Asia and Africa, or the backward, developing or nonindustrial nations that have been made into consumers of Western goods. However, the raw materials for these goods come from the developing nations: oil from the shores of the Gulf, hemp and spices from India, jazz from Africa, silk and opium from China, anthropology from Oceania, and sociology from Africa. These last two come from Latin America as well: from the Aztec and Inca peoples, sacrificed by the onslaught of Christianity. Everything in the developing nations comes from somewhere else. And we-the Iranians-fall into the category of the backward and developing nations: we have more points in common with them than points of difference.⁶⁹

He sees the West as the weevils and Iran as wheat and emphasizes the Western intervention in Iran as an infestation of weevils. As a result of this infestation, the bran of wheat stays as untouched from outlook, but in fact the interior is empty. According to him, Westernization of Iran, toxified and degenerated the Iranian culture and left it to deterioration.

In our Islamic totality, we seemed unsusceptible to study. Thus in encountering us, the West not only attacked this Islamic totality (in inciting the Shi'a to bloodshed in Safavid times, in playing us against the Ottomans, in encouraging

⁶⁹ Jalal-Al Ahmad, *Occidentosis: A Plague from the West*, (Berkeley: Mizan Press), 1983, 27.

Baha'ism in the middle of the Qajar era, in breaking up the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, in confronting the Shii clergy during the constitutionalist uprising, and so forth), but strived to hasten the dissolution from within of a totality only apparently unified. It sought to reduce us to a raw material like the people of Africa. Then it would take us to the laboratory. This explains why foremost among all the encyclopedias written in the West is the Encyclopedia of Islam. We remain asleep, but the Westerner has carried us off to the laboratory in this encyclopedia.⁷⁰

In this context, Islam is presented as the essence and identifier of the Iranian civilization and it is indicated that Islam is in struggle with West for centuries. Creating an opposition between Islam and West, Al Ahmad offers Islam as a defense mechanism against the cultural attacks of Westernization. Like Khomeini, he regards Islam, at least Shiism, as a political and ideological force, which is capable of reshaping and unifying the Iranian society.⁷¹ On the one hand, he holds the religion as a remedy, on the other hand, he complains about Iranians' weak religious perception. He criticizes them as forgetting mosque and *mihrap* or remembering them only during Muharram and Ramadan.⁷²

Until his death in 1969, Jalal-al Ahmad focused on alienation of Iran to its culture under the Westernization and sought to provide solutions to it. After his death, his ideas and solutions were developed and detailed more by Ali Shariati.

⁷⁰ Ibid, 33.

⁷¹ Nasrin Rahimieh, *Oriental Responses to the West: Comparative Essays in Select Writers from the Muslim World*, (Leiden, E.J. Brill), 1990, 103.

⁷² Al Ahmad, 67.

2.4.2 Ali Shariati

Unlike Jalal-al Ahmad, Ali Shariati directly experienced the West that he took education in France for five or six years from 1958/59 to 1964.⁷³ In 1960s, which were the peak of Marxism inspired ideologies, he actively took part in these Marxist movements. Similar to Al Ahmad, he was also coming from a clerical family. His father, Taqi Shariati, was a religious scholar. As Shariati proudly stated, his father, more than anyone else, had influenced his intellectual development.⁷⁴

According to him, liberation of oppressed states would be possible only with including a religious dimension to Third Worldism. Iran, like other Third World countries, needs two coinciding complementary revolutions. These are a national revolution and a social revolution. National revolution is expected to terminate all forms of imperial domination over cultural, social, political and economic life and revive them again. Social revolution is expected to end all forms of capitalism and inequality in the society and built a classless and just society. At this juncture, Shariati attributes importance to Iranian intelligentsia (*rushenfekran*). Intelligentsia can awaken the society, be a guide to people and underpin to these two revolutions. One substantial characteristic of Iranian intelligentsia is being member of a revolutionary religion. For him, Islam and especially Shii Islam is the most revolutionary religion and this leads it to same way with the two revolutions. As he states:

I am searching for a religion, which provides the scales of justice to today's humanity in this living world before the death, annihilates poverty and class structure, bestows

⁷³ Hanson, 13.

⁷⁴ Abrahamian, "Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution", *MERIP Reports*, No. 102, *Islam and Politics*, (Jan. 1982), 25.

freedom and salvation to humanity in this world. Which is why I am a Muslim and I am a Shii.⁷⁵

According to Shariati, Shiism was not opium, like any other religions, but was a revolutionary ideology that permeated all spheres of life, including politics and inspired true believers to fight all forms of exploitation, oppression and social injustice.⁷⁶ He saw the conservative Islam as a drawback that was generated by ruling classes to desensitize the masses, which were exploited, and criticized the ulama of being in common actions with ruling class. He thought that the biggest obstacle for an Islamic Revolution was Shah and his regime and as well as his crutch religious functionaries. He employed various commonly understood words to refer to the Shah or the regime such as ‘Pharaoh’.⁷⁷ He emphasized to return to true Islam would not be in the leading of ulama, but by the progressive intelligentsia. In his book *Return*, he argued that the Islamic Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment would be brought about more by intelligentsia than by the traditional clergy.⁷⁸ Moreover, he opposes clergy or ulama of being a mediator between people and the God, and he rejects this. In a conversation with Arnold Toynbee he harps:

A religious man sees himself as the representative of God and practitioner of his commands in the earth. In such a condition, people have no right to express their own opinions and oppose to the religious man. Automatically, the religious man sees himself as the leader of the society because of not being approved by the people, but being a religious man.

⁷⁵ Ali Shariati, *Dine Karşı Din*, (Ankara: Fecr Yayınevi), 2012, 111.

⁷⁶ Abrahamian, “Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution”, 26.

⁷⁷ Hanson, 13.

⁷⁸ Abrahamian, “Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution”, 28.

Consequently, he is a man, who is unaccountable! There is no such a thing in Islam. There is no a class that is called as clergy in Islam. There is no one between the God and human beings in Islam.⁷⁹

Consequently, Shariati, as a thinker who believes in the revolution of the poor and pious people of Iran, devoted his life to awareness-raising activities. Nevertheless, Iranian Revolution in 1979 occurred under the leadership of ulama, whom Shariati harshly criticized, and this condition opened new horizons in thinking and action not only for Iranian Islamists but also for Islamists in Turkey.⁸⁰

2.4.3 Ayatollah Motahhari

Ayatollah Motahhari was one of the most influential mullahs of revolutionary process in 1970s. Born in a clerical family in Fariman, Iran, he studied philosophy of Islam in Qom. He took lessons from Ayatollah Khomeini. In 1940s, when Marxism was very well-known in Iran, Motahhari sought to challenge Marxism from an Islamist perspective. He had normal relations with the Shah regime until the uprisings in June 1963. In this year, Khomeini and his followers initiated a revolt against Shah. In these protests, Motahhari was arrested and imprisoned. He taught in *Hosseinih-e Arshad* with Ali Shariati, but since Shariati became very prominent in Iran, he stayed in the background. He was familiar with Western intellectuals that he read Western philosophers such as Bertrand Russell, Descartes and Hobbes. “He maintained membership within the clerical class and continued to make an argument for the continued

⁷⁹ Shariati, 197.

⁸⁰ Ruşen Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları), 2011, 44.

relevance of religious elite.”⁸¹ Since he wanted to challenge Marxism, “Motahhari relied on an interpretation of monotheistic ontology, positing an animal, material, and corporeal side to human existence, on the one hand, and a cultural and spiritual side, on the other.”⁸²

Motahhari was supporting the leading role of clergy. It was right of clergy that to lead the Islamic society. On the other hand, ruling of the state by clergy was controversial. For him, Velayat-e Faqih’s role was different from Khomeini’s Faqih understanding:

Velayat-e Faqih does not mean that the Faqih himself heads the government. The Faqih’s role in an Islamic country is one of being an ideologue, not a ruler. The ideologue’s role is to supervise the implementation of the right ideology. The people’s perception of the Velayat-e Faqih... was not, and is not, that the fuqaha should rule and manage the administration of the state.⁸³

This shows that the idea of privileged position of the clergy in post-revolutionary Iranian political system was not an idea that took a broad participation. As it is seen in Motahhari, the clergy was considered as a leading actor, not as a supervisory actor.⁸⁴ However, Khomeini-led clergy occupied all spheres of political and socio-economic life of Iran.

⁸¹ Poulson, 213.

⁸² Farzin Vahdat, *God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity*, (New York: Syracuse University Press), 2002, 169.

⁸³ Michael Axworthy, *Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2013, 156.

⁸⁴ Naser Ghobazadeh, *Religious Secularity: A Theological Challenge to the Islamic State*, (New York: Oxford University Press), 2015, 146.

After three months of establishment of Iran Islamic Republic in 1979, Motahhari was assassinated by Furqan, a radical religious organization in Iran. Khomeini called Motahhari as ‘the fruit of my life.’⁸⁵ Thanks to Motahhari’s efforts, Khomeini took the ideological control of urban and industrial parts of the country, which were dominated by leftist and nationalist groups. Death of Motahhari caused giving more attention and importance to Khomeini’s personality and ideas. Motahhari, in following years, became one ⁸⁶of the role models of freedom movements and secular intellectuals.

It is, today, impossible to know how Ayatollah Motahhari, Jalal-al Ahmad and Ali Shariati would act against Khomeini’s discourse and how they judge the trajectory of Iran Islamic Republic. However, it is fact that their ideas and formulations still effective both in Iran and Turkey. For instance, Jalal-al Ahmad’s ideas were perfectly reconciled and his criticism of ‘Westernization’ was easily reconciled with the longstanding concerns of the traditional religious forces in Iran.⁸⁷ And ideas of Shariati, emerged unchallenged as the most popular writer of modern Iran during the revolution, and were far better known than those of Khomeini that characterizes Shariati as the ideologue of Islamic Revolution.⁸⁸ Although his many ideas were found as Marxist, materialist or secularist by many people after the revolution, it is fact that his ideas were commonly leaded to masses and used by Khomeini. In other words, Shariati’s ideas became a basis for Khomeini in political mobilization of people and overthrowing of Shah. For example, Khomeini used Shariati’s terminology of oppressive and oppressed (*mostazafin and mostakbarin*) in his speeches

⁸⁵ Vahdat, 168.

⁸⁶ Axworthy, 157.

⁸⁷ Poulson, 193.

⁸⁸ Abrahamian, “Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution”, 28.

and texts to point out the differences between the poor and the rich in Iran and to create a difference between his supporters and the regime.⁸⁹ Furthermore, although Shariati was known as critic of clergy as a symbol of despotic Islam and associating with the regime, he usually praised Khomeini as an exception, a ‘progressive’ cleric fighting relentlessly against despotism and colonialism.⁹⁰ As Moslem claims, Shariati, except the person of Ayatollah Khomeini, was distrustful of the conservative, apolitical clerical establishment in Iran.⁹¹ Moslem also points that the left in Iran used Shariati’s ideas to legalize their revolutionary and egalitarian understandings of Islamic State after the death of Khomeini in 1989.

2.5 Khomeini, *Valayat-i Faqih* Theory and Revolution

The emergence of Ayatollah Khomeini as the leader of the revolutionary movement was a significant issue as well as it was very interesting. He was sent to exile by the Shah regime in 1964 and lived in out of Iran for 13 years. He went to Turkey, Iraq and finally France. Policies of him were considered as new, religious fundamental and anti-Western. Khomeini ‘rebuilt’ the Iranian state with a new ideology that was provided by Shii Islam and re-formulated by him. The doctrine, Velayat-e Faqih (the authority of the jurists), provides the ulama being in the most critical position of the governing. It takes the roots from Shii theology. Even though its roots are in the origins of Shii Islam, it can be said that it is also

⁸⁹ Mark Thiessen, *an Island of Stability: the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Dutch Opinion*, (Leiden: Sidestone Press), 2009, 27.

⁹⁰ For more information, see Kathryn Stoner and Michael McFaul, *Transitions to Democracy: A Comparative Perspective*, (Maryland: John Hopkins University Press), 2013

⁹¹ Mehdi Moslem, *Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran*, (New York: Syracuse University Press), 2002, 98.

today's phenomena. In this part of this chapter, I will seek to explain his becoming the leader of revolutionary movements, his ideas towards society and his doctrine of Valayat-e Faqih.

Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as the leader of the revolution in the peak of protests. He attempted to destroy all influences of West on Iranian social and cultural life. He saw the West, especially the US as the 'Great Satan' and defined everything coming from Western culture as poison. This was such a poison that intoxicating Iranian society with democracy and nationalism. However his role before the revolution is controversial. For example, Dilip Hiro argues:

He had in the past briefly led protests against the Shah. But he was by training, and inclination, a theological teacher, not a politician. He was certainly not a revolutionary, nor even a serious student of revolution. (Very few in the West had heard of him. He had published many books, but even the American Central Intelligence Agency had not acquired a single title.) Despite his lack of knowledge of the dynamics of a revolution, he soon recognized the revolutionary potential of the protest which began in early 1977. He made astute use of Islamic history and Iranian nationalism to create and encourage antimonarchical militancy. His spartan style of life won him popular standing among people who were sick of the corrupt and luxury-living politicians. The fact that he was a man of God gave him the spiritual authority that secular leaders lacked. He kept his message simple. And like revolutionary leaders before him, he united the disparate

opposition to the established order under the highest demand:
an end to the monarchy.⁹²

In addition to Hiro, Misagh Parsa also defines the similar subject and questions the success of Khomeini-lead clergy. According to Parsa, Khomeini was appealing to a very small part of clergy, before he came to power. During the conflicts in 1977, even though Khomeini and clergy also joined the opposition movements, they were not the originators. “Rather, secular intellectuals, members of Writers’ Association, liberal-nationalists, organized in the National Front, and leftist students initiated the opposition and mobilized against the government.”⁹³ Parsa criticizes the views about Islamic movements began in the beginnings of 1970s. She claims that Khomeini and the clergy he led were not successful in the mobilization of people in June 1975 uprisings. However, Khomeini was the head of revolutionary coalition in the beginning of 1979 and this coalition overthrew the Pahlavi Dynasty. Hamid Algar emphasizes the personality and character of Khomeini because of being the undisputed leader of the revolutionary movements. He glorifies Khomeini by virtue of succeeding this without any material resources, without the construction of a political party, without waging of a guerilla war and without support of a single foreign power.⁹⁴

From these points of view, there are several explanations of Khomeini’s becoming the undisputed leader of the revolutionary movements and then, the Islamic State. To begin with, he was using a language similar to the

⁹² Dilip Hiro, *Iran under Ayatollahs*, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 1987, 2.

⁹³ Misagh Parsa, *States, Ideologies and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua and Philippines*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2000, 4.

⁹⁴ Algar, 64.

man in the street. Khomeini's ideas were not offering adherence to a text and were not rejecting the modernity of West. Ervand Abrahamian defines his ideas as not offering new, but offering the borrowed ideas and slogans not only from Muslim world, but also from non-Muslim world. According to him, Khomeini mobilized the lower classes and urban poor by using a radical rhetoric that was directed against imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political establishment.⁹⁵ In other words, as it was argued in previous parts, Khomeini used a populist discourse to mobilize masses and this put him forward that he became the undisputable leader of revolutionary process. This was why clerics occupied the forefronts of post-revolution state and this was why the religion, Shii Islam, was seen as the major unifier of the revolution. He was criticizing the Shah, his expenditures, his relations and his policies. In his book, *Kashf al-Asrar (the Uncovering of Secrets)*, Khomeini made a criticism of Pahlavi Dynasty, especially Reza Shah, and he considered the Pahlavi Dynasty as the debilitating of Islam. Khomeini saw Pahlavis as dictators, who wanted to eliminate Islam from social and political life, and charged them because of being allies of imperialists to discredit Islam throughout the world. According to him, the regime and its men were the people, who were living a luxury life far from the religion, collaborating with the Westerns, who were enemies of Islam and this condition had to be changed. He criticized the regime in so much that he rejected any act of the Shah regime. For example, he wrote about Reza Khan:

All the orders issued by the dictatorial regime of the bandit Reza Khan have no value at all. The laws passed by his parliament must be scrapped and burned. All the idiotic words that have proceeded from the brain of that illiterate

⁹⁵ Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 17.

soldier are rotten and it is only the law of God that will remain and resist the ravages of time.⁹⁶

Secondly, Khomeini used the religious messages to justify his acts and overthrowing of Shah. He drew on the idea of the Hidden Imam returning to dethrone the unjust rulers of the world, and he came to be seen as the destroyer of evil and restorer of justice, paralleling the actions of 12th Imam.⁹⁷ Since the myth of the Hidden Imam, Mahdi, had a very significant place in the minds of Shiis, his usage of this myth provided him a big support from Iranian people. Thirdly, his charismatic leadership, which is very related to previous features of him, helped Khomeini to be the leading person of the movements. One of the main factors of the politicization of Shii Islam and success of Islamic Revolution was charismatic personality of Khomeini. He illuminated a ‘this-worldly’ path of action promising spiritual wholeness to those suffering from the alienating effects of modernization and articulated his mystical activism in terms that resonated with the latent charisma of Persian and Shii cultures.⁹⁸ In addition, his embodiment of Islam, which most of his followers considered endangered, had as much to do with his charismatic appeal as did his heroic stature and resolution.⁹⁹ Algar’s approach to this issue is more romantic that he emphasizes Khomeini was not concerned with obtaining of a personal or sectarian benefit, he had been enabled to

⁹⁶ Ibid, 53-54.

⁹⁷ R. Michael Feener, *Islam in World Cultures: Comparative Perspectives*, (California: ABC-Clio Inc.), 2004, 89.

⁹⁸ Daniel Brumberg, *Reinventing Khomeini: the Struggle for Reform in Iran*, (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press), 2001, 48.

⁹⁹ Arjomand, *Turban for the Crown: the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, 100.

fulfill the great and unparalleled role that he had by his spiritual and moral qualities.¹⁰⁰

Khomeini waged the argument of rule of clerics in his doctrine of Velayat-e Faqih. The most important characteristic of this doctrine is appropriation of an authority, who is the Shii jurist or Faqih. It is precisely an end to the governing and authority arguments of Akhbari and Usuli Schools. Abrahamian, while delineating Khomeini's religious past, claims that as a senior member of the Usuli School of Shiism, Khomeini opposed the Akhbari dissenters of the previous centuries, who had argued that believers could understand Islam by relying mainly on the Koran and the Shii imams.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, as Dabashi wrote:

Velayat-e Faqih is the masterful construction of a relentless argument, supported by the most sacred canonical sources of Shii Islam, for the absolute necessity of the 'Islamic government' led by religious authorities. In it, Khomeini proceeds from a very simple premise: It was the Divine will to establish a just and sacred community on earth, for which purpose He sent His last emissary, the Prophet Mohammad. Upon the death of the Prophet, the future of the Islamic community, thus divinely established, could not have been left to chance or reversal to ungodly rule. Thus the doctrinal position of Shiis on the designation of 12 Infallible Imams perpetuates that Divine will. But in the absence of 12th Imam, neither God Almighty nor the Sacred Text He revealed

¹⁰⁰ Algar, 65.

¹⁰¹ Abrahamian, Khomeinism, 14.

permits the rule of injustice, or tolerates a reversal to ungodly rule.¹⁰²

Khomeini interprets the Koran as before the reappearing of 12th Hidden Imam, ulama, which is the most knowledgeable, will lead the society and have right to rule. From this point, Khomeini displays the illegitimacy of all authorities out of authority of ulama.

During his lifetime, Khomeini created his own ideology, which was an eclectic ideology that named as ‘Khomeinism’ by Ervand Abrahamian. According to Abrahamian, Khomeinism should be seen as a flexible political movement expressing socio-economic grievances, not simply as a religious crusade obsessed with scriptural texts, spiritual purity, and theological dogma.”¹⁰³ Khomeini internalizes general Shii views and believes that God created private property and society together. For him, society is composed of hierarchical interdependent classes. He especially avoids from using ‘class’ word in Marxist terms. According to Khomeini, society is composed of two layers: the *mostazafin* (oppressed) against the *mostakbarin* (oppressors); *the foqara* (poor) against *sarvatmandan* (rich); *the mellat-e mostazaf* (oppressed nation) against *hokomat-e shaytan* (Satan’s government); *zagheh-neshinha* (slum dwellers) against the *kakh-neshiha* (palace dwellers); *the tabaqeh-e payin* (needy class) against the *tabaqeh-e ayan* (aristocratic class).¹⁰⁴ Social structure views of Khomeini were conjectural and changeable. Abrahamian divides his ‘volatile’ views on society into three stages: Traditional and conservative stage between 1940s and 1960s, radical and militant stage from the beginning of 1970s

¹⁰² Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: the Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran*, (New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers), 2006, 447.

¹⁰³ Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 3.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 26.

until beginning of 1980s and populist stage that maintained until his death.¹⁰⁵ While Khomeini, on the one hand asserted the *mostazafin* (oppressed) to struggle against the *mostakbarin* (oppressors), on the other hand, as Abrahamian claims, accepted the conventional paternalistic assumptions that God had created both private property and society; society should be formed of a hierarchy of mutual dependent strata; the poor should accept their lot and not envy the rich and the rich should than God, give generously to the poor.¹⁰⁶

In consequence, Khomeini promised a utopia different from traditional Shii belief that looked longingly to Mohammad's Mecca and Ali's caliphate years as golden times. While doing this, he used a populist discourse, which provided him the leadership of revolutionary movements and incontestable Faqih of new established Islamic Republic. He used the terminology of Shii Islam. For instance, he declared all the deaths during uprisings against the Shah as martyrdoms. By doing this, he made a reference to death of Imam Hussein in Karbala. He compared the streets with desert of Karbala and emphasized holiness of opposing to Shah. In addition, he borrowed ideas from the West. He used the *mostazafin's* (the oppressed) war against the *mostakbarin* (the oppressors). He used the term class to define the social and economic contrasts in the Iranian society. He mostly emphasized the struggle against capitalism to gain the independence again, to save the country from Western invasion and imperialism. These were Third Worldist terms used also in Latin America.¹⁰⁷ In the end, his populist rhetoric, usage of a radical discourse against imperialism, foreign capitalism, and the political establishment brought Khomeini the leadership of masses. Since the Shii Islam and its

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 45.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 26.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 17.

terminology of struggle against the oppressor, the martyrdom was preconceived and very effective on Iranian people, Khomeini combined them with the socio-economic problems caused by uneven development and rapid modernization of the country in order to make his rhetoric more impressive. As Abrahamian argued:

...Khomeini declared revolutionary Iran... For centuries, Shiis had believed that the Mahdi would return when the world was overflowing with injustice and tyranny. Khomeini now argued that the Mahdi would reappear when Muslims had returned to Islam, created a just society, and exported their revolution to other countries...¹⁰⁸

2.6 International Dimensions of 1979 Islamic Revolution

The Islamic Revolution in Iran was one of the peaks of political Islam or Islamism. With the revolution in 1979, Islamist ideology was reinforced. It was a challenge against authority of secular states and it opened new ways for Islamists to reconsider about authority, legitimacy and policy making. After the revolution, Iran wanted to spread the Iran-originated revolutionary ideas to the Muslim countries. Export of regime became the main foreign policy tool of Iran. Iran's desire to spread its revolution in the region compelled the countries in the region to be careful about Iran. In this part, international dimension of Iranian Revolution in 1979 will be argued. This part is composed of two minor parts, which are policy of regime export and the impact of Iranian Revolution in the region.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 32.

2.6.1 Policy of Exporting the Regime

The foreign policy of Iran varies in terms of changing international conditions. In the course of revolution, the foreign policy of Iran aimed to defend the Islamic regime, to guarantee regional security for Iran and to export Islamic revolution to other Islamic countries, and in this respect, Shii communities of the Gulf, especially in Lebanon, were chosen as a first target for the export of revolution to establish a peripheral security zone in the region.¹⁰⁹ Accordingly, Turkey also can be considered as a target country for regime export of Iran. As Khomeini answered the question of “do you think that the reverberations of events in Iran will reach Turkey as well?” answers as:

The sacred movement of Iran is an Islamic movement. It is obvious that all Muslims around the world will come under its influence.¹¹⁰

Iran adopted importing its revolution ideology to other countries as a formal state policy. Tehran based radical/revolutionary Islamic line, which claimed to be universal, was developed in this process and it was called as ‘Hezbollahi Line’. Priority target was Arab world, Afghanistan and Shiite communities in Pakistan. In these places, some organizations were established under the name of Hezbollah¹¹¹ or some of the names of the existing organizations were changed in this way. Also, close relations were being built with Islamic movements in Sunni communities and if

¹⁰⁹ Süleyman Elik, *Iran -Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and the Security in the Middle-Power States*, (New York: Routledge), 2012, 38.

¹¹⁰ *Imam Khomeini on Exportation of Revolution*, (Tehran: the Institution for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini), 2001, 33.

¹¹¹ Hezbollah literally means the “party of God”.

necessary, establishment of new and pro-Tehran organizations were being supported. Since the name of Hezbollah is directly associated with Shiism, establishment of new organizations under this name was not supported in Sunni world, but some pro-Iranian militants were not holding back from defining themselves as *Hezbollahis*.¹¹²

In addition to Iran's aim to expand its influence by using religion, the invasion of Lebanon by Israel in 1982 gave Iran a chance to improve its relations with Shii population in Lebanon.¹¹³ Since there was a war with Iraq since 1980, neighboring Arab countries were suspicious about Iran. Moreover, Lebanon was one of the target countries that Khomeini aimed to export his ideas. Lebanese Hezbollah was formed by Shii clerics, who got inspired from Iranian Revolution, in Lebanon in 1982. In this way, Tehran had a proxy in Lebanon. Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran had intimate relations that one of the founders of Hezbollah said that "Hezbollah is part of the Iranian rulership; it is a component of Iranian military; the ties between Iran and Hezbollah are far greater than those between a revolutionary regime with a revolutionary party or organization outside its borders."¹¹⁴

Iran sees its regime as the solution of all problems of Muslim countries and Article 154 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran provides the state that "The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society, and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the

¹¹² Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, 40.

¹¹³ Robin B. Wright, *the Iran Primer: Power, Politics and US Policy*, (Washington: US Institute of Peace), 2010, 179.

¹¹⁴ Anthony H. Cordesman and Adam C. Seitz, *Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction*, (California: Greenwood Publishing Group), 2009, 85.

world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the mostazafin against the mostakbarin in every corner of the globe.”¹¹⁵ In this way it promises to make Iran fully independent, strive for the total unity of all Muslims, and ‘help the oppressed of the world struggle against their oppressors’.¹¹⁶ As Khomeini alleges in 1980:

When we say ‘we want to export the revolution’, we want this thing, which has appeared, this spirituality, which has emerged in Iran, to be exported. We do not use swords, guns or attack anyone... We want to export our revolution, our cultural revolution, our Islamic revolution to Muslim countries. If this revolution is exported, where is not matter, the problems will be solved.¹¹⁷

2.6.2 Impacts in the Region

The revolution, virtually overnight, transformed Iran’s role from that of a country that most vigorously defended the regional status quo to that of a country that most actively challenged it, at least at the rhetorical level.¹¹⁸ After the revolution, Iran, sought to spread the idea of people of the countries in the region could become free of their oppressive regimes and US by following the Iranian example and for that purpose Iranian

¹¹⁵ <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-10.html> Date Accessed: 02.02.2015

¹¹⁶ Abrahamian, *Khomeinism*, 36.

¹¹⁷ *Imam Khomeini on Exportation of Revolution*, (Tehran: the Institution for Compilation and Publication of the Works of Imam Khomeini), 2001, 81.

¹¹⁸ Eric Hooglund, *Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution: Political and Social Transition in Iran Since 1979*, (New York: Syracuse University Press), 2002, 156.

leaders began to advocate revolutions throughout the region.¹¹⁹ Toppling of the Shah Regime and establishment of a Shii state in Iran and expressions of Iranian leaders alarmed the countries in the region that have a considerable population of Shii Muslim minorities. The idea of Iran's regime export to the countries in the region grew the fears. For instance, those countries that have significant Shii population such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Iraq were put their full alert on impact of Iran Islamic Revolution in the region. Just after the revolution, in November 1979, 400 well-armed Islamists surrounded the Grand Mosque in Mecca and took the control. This condition worried Saudi Arabia authorities and the mosque was retaken about after two weeks. The result was hundreds of deaths from rebels, Saudi forces and even the pilgrims. In the same month, 400.000 Shii came together to protest the ban on Ashura, when the martyrdom of Imam Hussein is celebrated, in the Al Hasa region, which is a region with huge oil wealth. With the transformation of protests from ban on Ashura to a pro-Khomeini way, Saudi authorities again alarmed against the Shii population. Khomeini, on all occasions, was accusing Gulf States as being puppets of US and acting with directions of it. According to him, US were the Great Satan and it was fostering a different type of Islam, which was serving to the US interests. For example, a huge protest was held in Ka'ba in the hajj season of 1987 and 1988.¹²⁰ A group of Iranian pilgrims with the anger of maintaining war with Iraq and excitement of Islamic revolution were protesting USA in Ka'ba and shouting slogans such as 'Death to USA and its allies'. Saudi security forces interfered to protests and by firing on pilgrims and left hundreds of

¹¹⁹ Ibid, 158.

¹²⁰ <http://www.nytimes.com/1987/08/02/world/400-die-iranian-marchers-battle-saudi-police-mecca-embassies-smashed-teheran.html> Date Accessed: 03.02.2015

Iranian pilgrims dead.¹²¹ Iran, by giving a hard response to this action, brought the status of Ka'ba into question. Since according to Iran, Ka'ba was occupied by *tağut* (a person or an organization that does not conform to God's rules) and American collaborator Saudi regime and summoned Islamic world to give attention to Ka'ba and to rescue it from occupation. Furthermore, Iran organized an international symposium to point out the status of Ka'ba in 1987.¹²² Many Islamists from Turkey also joined this Iran financed-international symposium. This symposium was held in London with participation of many Islamists, one of them was Kalim Siddiqi, whom Islamists in Turkey also respected, around the world and all the expenses were met by Iranian government. From Turkey, the Journal of *Girişim* (with its executive editor Mehmet Metiner and two more writers), Fehmi Kuru¹²³, Hüseyin Hatemi¹²⁴, Süleyman Gündüz¹²⁵, Hüseyin Velioğlu¹²⁶ and Atasoy Müftüoğlu participated to this international symposium. This international symposium was one of the products of Iran's call and it is important to show the impact of the Islamic state on the Islamist around the world.

¹²¹ Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, (San Francisco and London: Westview Press), Volume XI, Boulder, 126.

¹²² Mehmet Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap), 2004, 270.

¹²³ Fehmi Kuru is a journalist. He published in *Zaman*, *Yeni Şafak* and *Star*. He also writes with nickname of Taha Kıvanç.

¹²⁴ Hüseyin Hatemi is a professor of law. His father was an Iranian and his mother was from Azarbaijan. His real name was Hüseyin Perviz. However, he dropped out his last name, Perviz, with a court decision. Perviz was the name of a Persian ruler, who ripped letter of Prophet Mohammad.

¹²⁵ Süleyman Gündüz is a journalist. He is also one of the founders of justice and Development Party. He was elected as an MP in 2002 general elections.

¹²⁶ Hüseyin Velioğlu was the leader of Hezbollah in Turkey. He was killed in an operation by security forces.

The revolution and its exportation to the other countries raised the suspicions about Iranian regime that whether it wanted to export Islam or the Shii regime. As a result of this, generally in the region, general sympathy of Sunnis to Iran Islamic Revolution replaced with serious criticisms against Islamic Revolution and fear of Iran. Iran was determined to import its revolution to all Muslim countries. This determination of regime export compelled some countries like Saudi Arabia, which there were suspicions about Islamic character of their regimes, to take countermeasures against Iran. Additionally, some Sunni Islamic movements like Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e Islami that had a rooted striving tradition and institutionalized in their own countries were intensely anxious about Iran's criticisms against their evolutionary Islamic ideologies and Iran's revolutionary-Shii propagandas in their own ranks. In addition to these, Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1988 and the new environment against Iran had influence Iran's respectability in Islamic world. Doubtless, crystallizing of Iranian regime's sectarian aspect played an effective role in this issue.

In Turkey, toppling of Shah Regime in Iran, which was the closest ally of US in the Middle East, by people under leadership of Khomeini, became a significant model for Islamists in Turkey.¹²⁷ The possibility of an Islamic Revolution in Turkey and establishment of a sharia state was argued by Islamist intellectuals with an enthusiasm. However, in front of the revolutionary Islamists of Turkey, which called themselves as 'Hezbollahi Muslims', new barriers began to emerge. Sunni-majority Islamic world's approach was based on the fear of Iran. Consideration of Sunnis on Iran's will was on Iran's exportation of its Shii regime, not the Islam.¹²⁸ It was

¹²⁷ Çakır, *Derin Hizbullah*, 40.

¹²⁸ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 157.

seized by vast majority of Sunni-majority societies. In such a condition, 'Iran-inspired' Islamist intellectuals of Turkey¹²⁹ had a great difficulty to explain their intentions and their perceptions of Iran. They began to become isolated in the Islamic society in Turkey and they started to express their thoughts verbally or by writing in their journals. They wanted to get closer with the other Islamic groups, but they were not able to escape of isolation. This will be argued broadly in the next chapters.

¹²⁹ The term 'Iran-inspired Islamist intellectual' will be explained in Chapter 4 broadly.

CHAPTER 3

TURKEY AND IRANIAN REVOLUTION IN 1979

Bülent Ecevit, the PM of Turkey: “Iran tried to apply industrialization, but it did this without taking any required political and social precautions.

These were the reasons behind the conflicts in Iran. We did the exact opposite policies. We, in Turkey, firstly established democracy and then, began to modernization.”

Milliyet, 29 January 1979¹³⁰

The Iranian Revolution and establishment of a state based on certain understanding of Islam added another dimension to Turkey-Iran relations. Before the revolution, Turkey as a secular and Sunni-majority country and Iran as a monarchy ruled by a secular elite and Shii-majority country had full-fledged relations. Building of Republic of Turkey and establishment of Iran under Pahlavi Dynasty coincides to close times. Turkey, under leadership of Kemal Atatürk, and Iran, under leadership of Reza Khan, accelerated the modernization and Westernization policies in 1920s. Turkey declared republic in 1923 and Iran declared Shah Regime in 1925. The relations between two countries increasingly continued that Reza Khan visited Turkey in July of 1934. In 1937, the Sadabad Pact was signed between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan. This pact was a non-aggression pact and aimed to solve the border conflicts between member

¹³⁰ Selda Kılıç, “İran İslam Devrimi’nin Türk Kamuoyunda Yansımaları: 1978-1979”, 13 https://www.academia.edu/9304053/Iranda_Rejim_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fikli%C4%9Fin_in_T%C3%BCrk_Bas%C4%B1n%C4%B1nda_Yans%C4%B1malar%C4%B1 Date Accessed: 21.03.2015

states and to develop relations among them. During the post-Atatürk period, Turkey and Iran relations continued. After the Second World War, both countries were located in US-leading Western camp. Both Iran and Turkey were allies of US. Revolution in Iran was perceived moderate by Turkey. Turkey recognized new regime in Iran in 1979, just after the revolution. The relations between two countries after the revolution in Iran in 1979 maintained with tensions from time to time. In 1990s, ideological oppositions of them to each other reached its peak. During this period, PKK and Kurds, Sharia rule, hijab and tensions about Anıtkabir, where Iranians did not visit in their official visits, became the basic topics. Since the Turkey and Iran relations in post-1979 period are not the subject of this thesis, they will not be discussed here.

3.1 Perceptions of Turkey towards Iranian Revolution

The existing perception in Turkey towards Iranian Revolution can be understood by looking to two different domains: the official state domain and the societal domain.¹³¹ By referring to the official state domain, Turkey's reactions to regime change in Iran will be defined. In this respect, Turkey's privileged policies towards new Islamic regime in Iran will be studied. By referring to the societal domain, Iranian Revolution's repercussions on society of Turkey will be defined. While giving the reactions of press of Turkey to the revolution, it will be questioned that

¹³¹ When it is said 'the societal perception', it is very clear that any ideologies, political sides or societal layers of a society are referred. Seculars, leftists, Islamists, nationalists and etc. can be counted in these below. Some of them perceived the Iranian Revolution as a threat, some considered it as a movement against international imperialism and US, some emphasized its sectarian side, some welcomed it and some still have a fear of spread of Sharia rule from Iran to Turkey. Here, since the considerations of Islamists are main arguments of this thesis, I will mostly look from Islamists' side and their perception of Iranian Revolution.

how the Islamic circles in Turkey reacted to the revolution. In this context, the opposing and supporting groups of Iranian Revolution will be sought to display.

3.1.1 Reflections in the State Domain

Turkey had two concerns about the Islamic Revolution in Iran. First one was any influence over Islamic movements in Turkey and second one was, in case of Islamic Revolution's failure, dissolution of Iran and establishment of a Kurdish state.¹³² The most important issues were Kurdish nationalism and Islamic movements for Ankara and Turkey's counter policy against Iran was to prevent any possible impacts of these concerns for Turkey's political structure. Apart from these, Turkey sought to have economic relations with Iran before the revolution and after the revolution; it also pursued this desire of development of economic relations. Süha Bölükbaşı emphasizes the three policies of Turkey against the Islamic Revolution: maintenance of existence of state relations, to stay neutral in the war between Iraq and Iran and the development of economic relations between Turkey and Iran.¹³³ The purpose of Turkey's interest in Iran was also to prevent the Soviet influence in Iran.¹³⁴ There are also some scholars like Hakan Yavuz and Süleyman Elik that find connections between Iranian Revolution in 1979 and military coup in Turkey in 1980. Since Iran was one of the most significant allies of US in the region, the regime change in Iran and beginning of sharia rule, which saw US as the

¹³² Robert Olson, *Turkey-Iran Relations 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics*, (California: Mazda Publishers), 2004, 1.

¹³³ Süha Bölükbaşı, "Turkey Copes with Revolutionary Iran", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, vol. xiii, No: 1&2, (1989), 95 quoted in Robert Olson, *Turkey-Iran Relations 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics*, (California: Mazda Publishers), 2004, 1.

¹³⁴ *Ibid*, 1.

Great Satan, alarmed US about the condition of Turkey. According to some, the international condition and the polarization of society in Turkey affected the actions of military of Turkey that the military felt the country insecure and acted. During 1970s, Turkey witnessed conflicts between Alevis and Sunnis, leftists, Islamists and nationalists and Turks and Kurds. According to Yavuz, the 1979 Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan created a deep sense of insecurity within the Turkish military, which some have labeled as the main reason behind the 1980 military coup.¹³⁵ With the end of the Shah Regime in Iran, the US lost an ally in the region and furthermore, emergence of an anti-American and Islamic regime in Iran irritated the US and this ended up with the increase of Turkey's importance as an ally in the region.¹³⁶ In addition, Afghan-Soviet War caused developing Turkey-US relations and the military coup in 1980 provided the US the chance to repair relation with Turkey. According to Elik, the Islamic Revolution in Iran was considered to be a challenge to the secular identity of Turks in 1979; thus, the military coup in 1980 launched the counter-revolutionary activities of Kemalist establishment, and successfully blockaded the influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the radical Islamic movement in Turkey.¹³⁷

Turkey was calculating the possibility of a similar movement like Iran and its possible results. The establishment of Islamic State in Iran brought the

¹³⁵ Hakan Yavuz, *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2009, 50.

¹³⁶ İdris Bal, *Turkish Foreign Policy in Post-Cold War Era*, (Florida: Brown Walker Press), 2004, 119.

¹³⁷ Süleyman Elik, *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and the Security in the Middle-Power States*, (New York: Routledge), 2012, 181.

arguments about recognition of this theocratic state. As Mehmed Kerim¹³⁸ shares National Salvation Party offered recognition of Islamic State without waiting the West. On the other hand, deputies of Justice Party, under the leadership of Süleyman Demirel, were rejecting this offer. In addition, according to Demirel, Khomeini was ‘bullshitting’.¹³⁹

Turkey-Iran relations during the process after Islamic Revolution in 1979 undulated that even though there were issues increased tension, both of them continued economic relations:

...several new developments since then have further clouded relations between Iran and Turkey: the deepening alliance between Turkey and Israel, the divergent interests of Turkey and Iran in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, and the close ties forged between Iran and Syria. Furthermore, while Turkey accused Iran of supporting Islamist movements (including those operating in Turkey), Iran blamed Turkey for its anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian policy (including Turkey’s hosting of Iranian opposition movements). By contrast, economic interests and mutual concern over Kurdish challenge presented some common ground for the improvement of ties...Relations between Tehran and Ankara thus shifted

¹³⁸ Mehmed Kerim is known as the nick name of Ali Bulaç. While studying the issue, I contacted with several Islamists to exchange ideas. All of them told me that Mehmed Kerim was Ali Bulaç. On the other hand, in the private interview with Ali Bulaç, I asked him who was Mehmed Kerim and he, indeterminedly, said he did not know him. However, he was aware of Mehmed Kerim’s book that he said his team and publishing firm published the book ‘İran İslam Devrimi’. In my opinion, he does not admit it because of conjunctural conditions that the book was like propaganda of Islamic Revolution of Iran. Ali Bulaç, today, may not want to be called with it.

¹³⁹ Mehmed Kerim, *İran İslam Devrimi*, (İstanbul: Düşünce Yayınları), 1980, 302-304.

between cooperation and competition, between tranquility and tension.¹⁴⁰

3.1.2 Reflection in the Societal Domain

Allah-u Ekber, Humeyni Rehber!

Iranian Revolution resonated among the people from different world views and from various ideologies in Turkey. Some of them perceived it as a threat, some considered it as a movement against international imperialism and US, some emphasized its sectarian side and opposed its ideology, some welcomed it and took as an example to follow the same way in Turkey, and for some, it can be said also still, have a fear of it because of possibility of spread of sharia rule to Turkey. The military coup in Turkey in 12th September 1980 also changed the agenda of society of Turkey. Prohibitions and limitations on political rights and press impressed activities of leftists, nationalists and Islamists. Their activities were restricted and many of them were arrested. They could not hold meetings, their books were collected and their publications were prohibited. Every of them were preoccupied with their own troubles. Thus, treating the Iranian Revolution was made with limited resources.

When the Iranian Revolution reflected in the press of Turkey, many arguments began in terms of the character of the revolution and its impacts on Turkey. Mehmed Kerim made an ideological and religious distinction of press and he separated the press into three sections. These are the leftist press, rightist press and ‘a cut above’ Muslim press.

¹⁴⁰ David Menashri, *Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power*, (New York: Routledge), 2001, 250.

Firstly, according to him, leftist press, except *Aydınlık*, did not mention the Islamic Revolution. He does not criticize the leftist press because of this and says by not mentioning the Islamic Revolution, leftist press ‘made its job’. If there is no a Marxist movement, it is not expected from leftist press to support or to mention the revolutionary movements. He maintains harsh critiques with questions:

The killed people in Vietnam, Cambodia and Africa were humans, but not in Iran? What kind of an honor of idea is it? Where are the writers, who do not discriminate the people around the world? Where are the humanists, whose hearths palpitate for the happiness of world nations? Do not the 150.000 martyrdoms in Iran equal to 5 Bask guerillas? Did the widowed women in Iran frighten you because of being headscarves? Did the young men, who were killed while fighting against fascism and imperialism, stay out of your interests because of being bearded and turbaned?¹⁴¹

Despite Mehmed Kerim’s critiques there were quite a lot articles and comments in leftist press in Turkey. For example, Ali Sirmen in daily *Cumhuriyet* accuses some writers in the press of Turkey, who calls themselves as religious and nationalist, of supporting Shah. He supported the movements in Iran in daily *Cumhuriyet*. In his article on 28 January 1979, he wrote:

¹⁴¹ Kerim, 305-306.

... Rightists are supporting the Shah. Supporting the Shah of Iran is supporting robbery, murder and infamy.¹⁴²

Similar to Sirmen, Uğur Mumcu¹⁴³ remarks his observations in the press. He writes on 30 January 1979 that the press of Turkey seeks to find Soviet impact in Iranian Revolution.¹⁴⁴

Leftist *Birikim* considered the protests before the revolution as resistance to Shah's despotic rule. It defined the Shah as the most bloody and the most tyrant dictatorship, and it criticized relations of Shah's Iran and the US.¹⁴⁵ It discusses the mass protests in Iran as a rejection of imperialist politics. It says that because of these characters and relations of him, Shah gained the hatred of all socialists and democrats. The Journal of *Birikim*, before the revolution, tackles with the mass protests in Iran and asks: Will the events, which destabilized the regime, go on? It answers this question 'No', but it has suspicions about the coming events:

... The return to the 'old' and bringing back will not be in Iran. However, the change will be in what aspects? Will it be

¹⁴²Kılıç,13.https://www.academia.edu/9304053/Iranda_Rejim_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fikli_%C4%9Finin_T%C3%BCrk_Bas%C4%B1n%C4%B1nda_Yans%C4%B1malar%C4%B1
1 Date Accessed: 21.03.2015

¹⁴³ Uğur Mumcu was a journalist in daily *Cumhuriyet*. He was assassinated in 1993. Some people were arrested as the murderers. There were rumors about assassination of Mumcu that an Iran-led group killed him.

¹⁴⁴Kılıç,14.https://www.academia.edu/9304053/Iranda_Rejim_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fikli_%C4%9Finin_T%C3%BCrk_Bas%C4%B1n%C4%B1nda_Yans%C4%B1malar%C4%B1
1 Date Accessed: 23.03.2015

¹⁴⁵ *Birikim*, Şah'ın Gelişi ve Türkiye-İran İlişkileri, Volume: 9, (November 1975), 48.

limited with a political change or will a social change happen?¹⁴⁶

Birikim's next issue's Iran part, which was published during the revolution in February 1979, begins with the sentence: 'the real thing' in Iran is beginning, now'.¹⁴⁷ In February, the journal was not sure about what to happen after outgoing of Shah. Emphasizing the impact of Shii Islam over the masses, in its February 1979 issue, *Birikim* waited to see how the religious leadership under Khomeini would approach to mass movements. Emphasizing the delusiveness and mistake of speculating on integration of all mass movements under the Islamic ideology, *Birikim* admits the end of Shah Regime by the Ayatollah's leading and warns not to miss out of Ayatollahs' role in activities of masses. Moreover, it offers to religious leadership of the revolution to collaborate with leftist Organization of People's Fedai Guerillas (*Fedaiyan-e Halk*) to carry the revolution to further acquisitions and introduces this collaboration as the solution to social, economic and political problems of Iranian people.¹⁴⁸

As Kerim alleged, *Aydınlık* discussed the events in Iran and Iranian Revolution with considerable articles and comments. From the time, when the mass movements began in Iran, *Aydınlık* began to mention the conflicts. When the time got closer to the revolution in 1979, it increased its publications about Iran. It defined the mass movements as just and governing of Shah as tyranny. In 3 April 1978, Reha Akbay wrote the conflicts in Iran:

¹⁴⁶ *Birikim*, Uluslararası Olaylar ve Sorunlar: İran, Volume: 46-47, (December-January 1978-1979), 13.

¹⁴⁷ *Birikim*, Uluslararası Olaylar ve Sorunlar: İran II, Volume: 48, (February 1979), 5.

¹⁴⁸ *Birikim*, Uluslararası Olaylar ve Sorunlar: İran'daki Gelişmeler Üzerine, Volume: 50-51, (April-May 1979), 13.

Iranian people got tired with imperialism, high cost of living and tyranny of Shah... Progressive ulama protested Shah. Fascist regime is being damned and demands for freedom and independence is being repeated in every street and in every square. Shah, who is oppressing people for years, increases his tyranny when is stalemated. His tyranny cannot stop the struggle of people... People of Turkey is together with people of Iran and supports their struggle.¹⁴⁹

In October 1978, *Aydınlık* mentioned a declaration of TUDEH. Without making any differences between secular opposition and religious opposition in Iran, it was declaring that the aim of the struggle was to destroy the dominant classes and imperialism.¹⁵⁰ According to *Aydınlık*, TUDEH was fighting together with Khomeini. *Aydınlık* captions Shah's leaving the country as 'Shah, who said going to holiday, escapes'¹⁵¹ and heralds the revolution. It gets excited with the return of Khomeini. In addition, it reports Shah's last command, before he left the country, to his generals as 'Start a civil war'.¹⁵² Before Khomeini departed from France to Iran, one of *Aydınlık*'s reporters makes an interview with Khomeini's adviser Yazdi and the reporter gets information about Khomeini's return.¹⁵³ When Khomeini returned to Iran, *Aydınlık* captioned as "Magnificent Meeting".¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ Reha Akbay, "Mazlumun Ahı Devirir Şahı", *Aydınlık*, (3 April 1978)

¹⁵⁰ *Aydınlık*, "İran TUDEH İnkılabı Örgütü: Mücadelenin Hedefi Şah Rejimini, Hakim Sınıfları ve Emperyalist Nüfuzu Yok Etmektir", (8 October 1978)

¹⁵¹ *Aydınlık*, "Tatile Çıkıyorum Diyen Şah Kaçıyor", (4 January 1979)

¹⁵² *Aydınlık*, "İç Savaş Başlatın", (2 February 1979)

¹⁵³ *Aydınlık*, "Halk Tahran'a Akıyor", (1 February 1979)

¹⁵⁴ *Aydınlık*, "Muhteşem Karşılama", (2 February 1979)

Secondly, according to Kerim, the rightist press behaved aggressive about the Islamic Revolution. Furthermore, he finds publications of *Tercüman*, *Sabah* and *Yeni Asya* ‘disgusting’ (*çirkef*). The rightist press claimed that with the Islamic Revolution, Iran missed the chance of democracy. The Islamic Revolution and Khomeini were the factors that were returning the 21th century Iran to back, the 7th century Arabia. He emphasizes that rightist press served to communism with these publications. For him, the expression about Khomeini in the rightist press such as ‘old fox’, ‘Soviet puppet’, ‘enemy of West’ and ‘looney’ were unfriendly.¹⁵⁵ On the other hand, Nureddin Şirin says that *Tercüman*, which was close to Süleyman Demirel, the leader of Justice Party and the Prime Minister, defined Iranian Revolution as a communist movement.¹⁵⁶ Even, it called Iranian Revolution as ‘green communism’. According to Şirin, this was because of not expecting any opposing movements against international status quo. In these years, only American and Soviet authorities were recognized. *Tercüman* considered Iranian Revolution as a political move of Soviets against the US. However, this claim was refuted with Iran’s policies against communist TUDEH Party. In this way, Iranian regime displayed its attitude against the Soviet Regime.

In 1979, there was an article in *Tercüman* that was questioning the revolution and the future of Iran. According to this article:

¹⁵⁵ Kerim, 307-308.

¹⁵⁶ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

Shah was not so bad, but democracy was needed. However, Khomeini had an uncompromising character. So, there could be a military coup in Iran.¹⁵⁷

Thirdly, ‘a cut above’ Muslim press (*Bir Gmlek Daha Mslman Basın*) like *Milli Gazete* accused the Iranian Revolution as Soviet imperialism-inspired. According to Kerim, these were nothing short of hostility to Islam. Another argument of this kind of press was the Shii identity of Iranian Revolution. This press was advocating that there were certain differences between Shiis and Ahl-e Sunna, but Kerim was rejecting these ideas.

After the revolution, many Islamists visited Iran and got excited with the revolution. When they returned to Turkey, they searched ways to make Turkey like Iran. Many books of Iranian Islamists, especially books of Khomeini, were translated into Turkish. Khomeini was so influential on Islamist youth in Turkey that with reference to his jihad understanding of ‘no matter we kill or are killed, we will be in the Heaven’, Islamist youth were not afraid of killing or being killed.¹⁵⁸

Despite suspicious perceptions of more secular ideologies and communities of Turkey about Islamic Revolution in Iran, many Islamists, who were seeking a way how to build an Islamic state, excitedly welcomed the Iranian Revolution. Since it was the overthrow of powerful Shah Regime, which was ‘pupillary’ of imperialism in the Middle East, it found an extensive support in Turkey. Ercmend zkan and Atasoy Mftođlu defined that the revolution was not the revolution of Iran, it

¹⁵⁷ Kılıç, 13. https://www.academia.edu/9304053/Iranda_Rejim_De%C4%9Fi%C5%9Fikli_%C4%9Finin_T%C3%BCrk_Bas%C4%B1n%C4%B1nda_Yans%C4%B1malar%C4%B1
Date Accessed: 21.03.2015

¹⁵⁸ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 79.

was revolution of Islam.¹⁵⁹ They were glorifying the revolution in Iran. The distinction between Shii Islam and Sunni Islam was ignored by them that sectarian differences were not important. A similar view was published in Metiner's journal, *Girişim*, in which Iran was praised of beginning to pray behind the Sunni community.¹⁶⁰ The belief of a revolution's possibility of realization under the leadership of an Imam was consolidated indissolubly after Iranian Revolution.¹⁶¹ Slogan was 'Allah-u Akbar, Khomeini Leader' (*Allah-u Ekber, Humeyni Rehber*).

Iranian Revolution was not welcomed positively by all Islamists in Turkey. There were some contradictions originated from Shii character of the revolution. As Nureddin Şirin mentions:

After the revolution, some religious scholars in Turkey began to produce ideas against Iranian Revolution. They said that there were four religious sects. The one in Iran was the fifth religious sect. Such a thing could not happen. This debate began to increase. Synchronously, counter-revolution policies began. Almost all regimes in the region were dictatorships and they had close relation with the US. They were presenting their lands to the US. On the other hand, Imam Khomeini had a call: 'Muslims! Stand up! This was a call to all Islamic countries in the region and alarmed Riyadh, the US and Israel. They were afraid from the movements that were Iran-inspired. Iranian Revolution would end the status

¹⁵⁹ Kara, *İslamcılık*, 415.

¹⁶⁰ Metiner emphasizes that praying behind Sunnis was not acceptable for Shiis. However, Mahmood Ahmadinajad, former President of Iran, prayed in Friday Pray in Sultanahmet Mosque, İstanbul, in 2008.

¹⁶¹ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 186.

quo and sultanates of tyrants. In Turkey, some of Islamic community opposed the Iranian Revolution, and the others welcomed it. Opposing Islamists produced an argument against Iran. This argument was based on Shii-Sunni conflict. This was a project to imprison the revolution only in Iran and aimed to prevent spreading of it to Arab and Sunni countries in the region. For them, there were two Islams. One was a revolutionary Islam, which was admissible. The other was a moderate Islam that did not oppose to existence of Israel and did not criticize Zionism. This was not insurgent Islam. This project was a message to Sunnis not to come together with Iran and the revolution.¹⁶²

For instance, İBDA-C¹⁶³ rejected the Iranian Revolution. This Islamic group was hard supporter of Sunni Islam and antagonistically opposing to Shii Islam. Members of İBDA-C considered Iran as the place, where drugs and alcohol were consumed most. As Çakır quotes from *Ak-Doğu Journal*'s, a journal which was close to İBDA-C, 4th issue:

For us, there is nothing to advocate about Iran and Shia in terms of their understanding of religion and world. Even though, it is pretended to change many things in Iran, nothing changed in Iran. There is no change between Shah Time's Iranians and today's Iranians. There is no a change that can

¹⁶² Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

¹⁶³ İBDA-C means the Great Eastern Islamic Raiders' Front (*İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncıları Cephesi*). It was founded in 1970 by Salih Mirzabeyoğlu. It aimed to establish a Sunni Islamic state and re-establish the Caliphate. Necip Fazıl Kısakürek was one of the ideologues of this organization. They were hostile to any identity different from Sunni.

merit to call it a revolution. On the contrary, Iran has gone back in terms of many fields.¹⁶⁴

In addition to İBDA-C, Mustafa Talip Güngörge¹⁶⁵ also rejected the Iranian Revolution. In his book ‘Humeyni ve İslam’, he emphasizes the Shii identity of Iranian Revolution and Imam Khomeini. For Güngörge, when Khomeini said Islam, he emphasizes not Islam but his Shii ideas.¹⁶⁶ In the book, Güngörge generally emphasizes differences between Shii Islam and Sunni Islam. Subjects of the book are Khomeini’s hostility to Ahl-e Sunna, Shiis’ cursing of Abu Bakr, Shiis’ using of women for their sexual needs via *muta*¹⁶⁷ marriage. Furthermore, the book criticizes the Shii understanding of Islam because of their belief on innocence of Imams. Güngörge harshly criticizes the newspapers of *Milli Gazete* and *Yeni Devir* because of supporting Iranian Revolution.¹⁶⁸ He defines the

¹⁶⁴ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 174.

¹⁶⁵ Mustafa Talip Güngörge is a nick name. As we learn from Mustafa İslamoğlu, a religious scholar, in 1980s many books were published to defame the Iranian Revolution. According to İslamoğlu, Güngörge’s book ‘Humeyni ve İslam’ was also one of them. In addition, İslamoğlu claims that Güngörge was nick name of a well-known person in mass media, who said ‘hens can be sacrificed’. It is clear that this person was Zekeriya Beyaz. For Mustafa İslamoğlu’s article, see http://www.mustafaislamoglu.com/yazar_973_38_iran-mi-imtihan-mi-.html Date Accessed: 25.03.2015 For Zekeriya Beyaz, who said ‘hens can be sacrificed’, see <http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2001/03/01/g03.html> Date Accessed: 25.03.2015

¹⁶⁶ Mustafa Talip Güngörge, *Humeyni ve İslam*, (İstanbul: Araştırma Yayınları), 1985, 9.

¹⁶⁷ It is a kind of marriage that applied by first Muslim communities and some Shii sects. According to this marriage, man and woman agree on the time and price of marriage. Whether Prophet Mohammad had a muta marriage and whether it is forbidden by Islam or not are controversial issues.

¹⁶⁸ Güngörge, 15.

ideas of Imam Khomeini as dangerous and invites the Islamic countries to take precautions against the revolutionary ideas of Khomeini.¹⁶⁹

Unlike İBDA-C and Güngörge, İskenderpaşa Dervish Lodge (*İskenderpaşa Dergahı*), a Nakşibendi group, was not totally rejecting the Islamic Revolution, but had some suspicions about it. From all publications until today, it is possible to deduce some points from İskenderpaşa considerations about Iran. First of all, Islamic Revolution in Iran is advocated because of its being a movement of people under the leadership of a powerful Imam. Secondly, steps for Islamization of state and practices for treatment of non-Islamic old allies from the state agencies are confirmed. Hardly, point of view is changing when it comes to idea of regime export. This is because İskenderpaşa has suspicions about the thing to be exported: Is it Islamic Revolution or Shii Islam that wanted to be exported? Iran's supports to Shii-oriented groups in Lebanon or Afghanistan and imposition of loyalty to Iran and Khomeini to Sunni-oriented groups are the subjects that are criticized in İskenderpaşa's journal *İslam*. In addition to this, allegations about discrimination of Sunnis in Iran are also pointed out in the journal.¹⁷⁰ İskenderpaşa followed a moderate policy between multi-dimensional debates of Islamic groups and when it was not possible to behave neutral; they supported one side, but did this implicitly or meanderingly.¹⁷¹ For instance in Iraq-Iran War, as Çakır claims, they supported Iran, but they did not openly revealed this support.

Yeni Asya Group, a Nurcu group, looks Iranian Revolution with disaffection and antipathy. It alleges Iranian Revolution as being an

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 247.

¹⁷⁰ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 32.

¹⁷¹ Ibid, 31.

ideology with full of revenge and hostility and it does not admit Islamic Revolution as an Islamic movement. Further, it claims Islamic Revolution displayed Islam to world as a terrifying and evil religion. As Çakır quotes from the journal of Yeni Asya Group, *Köprü*; in June-1987 issue it captions on its cover that ‘Khomeini or Islam?’

According to Khomeini, Koran is a ‘book of politics’. Khomeini describes Islam as the religion of jihad and conflict... In Khomeini’s world of idea, it is not possible to encounter with even a sentence that treats faith.¹⁷²

Gülen movement, another Nurcu group, also approached Iranian Revolution suspicious. Fethullah Gülen¹⁷³, leader of the movement, says that he never got along with Iran.¹⁷⁴ In an interview, he points out two points about Iran.¹⁷⁵ First, Iran behaves as bigotry in the matter of religion and revolution. For him, Iranians give more value to their understandings of Islam more than even the real Islam and then, they want to export it.

¹⁷² Ibid, 96.

¹⁷³ After the beginning of conflicts between AKP Government and the Gülen movement, or the ‘parallels’ as Tayyip Erdoğan, the President and former leader of AKP, used, there were comments from members of AKP that alleged ‘Gülen wanted to return to Turkey like Khomeini’. See, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/gulen_turkiyeye_humeyni_gibi_donecekti-1281495 Date Accessed: 24.03.2015. These allegations were opposed both by Gülen himself and by Iran-inspired circles. Gülen answered these allegations as ‘I have no relationship with Khomeini in terms of character and sect.’ Iran-inspired Rast Haber opposed this allegation as ‘Khomeini and Gülen cannot be compared.’ See, <http://rasthaber.net/gulen-humeyni-benzetmesine-orneklerle-son-nokta/> Date Accessed: 24.03.2015 Rast Haber criticizes Gülen, in comparison with Khomeini, of illegal infiltrating to Turkish National Police Agency and judicial bodies.

¹⁷⁴ http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/20239/172/#_mfg3 Date Accessed: 24.03.2015

¹⁷⁵ <http://tr.fgulen.com/content/view/7878/15/> Date Accessed: 24.03.2015

Gülen opposes export of this kind of Islam. Second, he alleges that Ali is a pretext for Shiis. By using Ali, they legitimize their understandings of Islam. However, what sustains them is not Ali, but the hostility to Abu Bakr, the first caliph, and Omar, the second caliph. Gülen opposes Iran and the revolution because of differentiation of Islam perception. In addition, Gülen believes in the synthesis of Turk-Islam. For him, ‘Turkishness’ completes Islam’s lack of ethnicity and identity. In contrast, for Gülen, Iranian Revolution was emphasizing Iranian identity.

These ideas of Nurcus display their positioning of themselves in the face of the Iranian Revolution and Shiis. The revolution is fed with Shii belief and has no chance in the Sunni world. They consider Khomeini as vengeful and accuse him as considering Islam as a ‘religion of duel’. According to them, in Khomeini’s understanding, there was no any sentence that defines the faith (*iman*). While other religious groups, for example İskenderpaşa, were supporting the revolution’s many features except the idea of regime export and its Shii identity, Nurcus endeavor to discredit the Iranian Revolution. In addition to these, Burhan Bozgeyik, in his book, “İran Meselesi”, opposed the revolution that he wrote the non-existence of an Islamic Revolution in Iran.¹⁷⁶ According to him, the revolution was built on destroying and vandalizing, and there was no place for them in Islam. He added that the revolution in Iran served to the purposes of Soviets and the leftists. This was why he called the supporters of Islamic Revolution as betraying to national culture, identity and sacred values. Ali Bulaç explains opposing of Nurcus to Iranian Revolution with two reasons:

First, there was a Shii-Sunni tension. Since I come from Ikhwan tradition, I was not affected from this tension.

¹⁷⁶ Kara, *İslamcılık*, 415.

Second, a national reflex emerged. Iran would dominate the region and would be ‘boss’ of the region. In addition, Nurus stayed out of politics. They did not think that politics could solve the problems. An Ayatollah, who was 78 years old, made a revolution. This was contradictory and interesting for them. They had no such a thing in their tradition. Their ideas towards state were different. On the other hand, there was no problem for the youth. The youth, especially coming from Ikhwan tradition, were opponents. Then, traditions of Ikhwan and Iran were resolved in Syrian Issue.¹⁷⁷

Cemalettin Kaplan, leader of the *Kaplancıs* (Kaplancılar), offered the replacement of executives with the religious men and because of this left the Erbakan’s National View and then, radicalized his views. He mostly used the ways of Khomeini such as tapes for statement (*tebliğ*). With radicalization of his view, he turned his face to Iran and wrote a book called ‘Constitution of Islam’ (*İslam Anayasası*), which is inspired mostly from Constitution of Iran. Furthermore, there were rumors that he took money from Iran in a substantial amount.¹⁷⁸ When his followers began to question his views about Khomeini and his relations with Iran, he suspended his approach and began to complain from Iranian Revolution’s Shii identity. Historical dispute between Shiis and Sunnis was also effective on his followers’ opposing to Iran.

¹⁷⁷ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

¹⁷⁸ *Amerikan Gizli Belgelerinde Türkiye’de İslamcı Akımlar*, (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları), 1990, 79.

A group of Islamists and Islamist intellectuals¹⁷⁹ were very delighted of Iranian Revolution. They took it as an example to do an Islamic Revolution in Turkey. They became very hopeful, took Khomeini's ideas as guide. Even, some of them unquestioningly supported the Islamic Revolution. For some, Iranian Revolution was affirmation of their Islamic revolutionary claims. For example, Ali Bulaç, a prominent Islamist intellectual, believes that the revolution showed the possibility of an Islamic Revolution.¹⁸⁰ Nureddin Şirin, an Islamist activist, goes beyond and says that when the revolution happened, they were already advocating the ideas such as rejection of ethnicity and race, and demand for a universal Islamic order.¹⁸¹ The Iranian Revolution overlapped with these ideals. Similar to Bulaç, he says he understood that his ideas were not utopia. In addition, he emphasizes another dimension of Iranian Revolution, the Shii dimension, which he accepts, its existence without thinking:

Before the military coup in 1980, revolutionist and Islamic nationalist (*ümmetçi*) Islamists, who were also rejecting the national boundaries, totally interiorized the Iranian Revolution. This was emphasized in books, newspapers and journals. It was the period, when Zia al-Haq seized the power in Pakistan. We were considering that it was Turkey's turn after Pakistan. A slogan, we used in these years, was 'Iran, Pakistan, It is Your Turn Muslim!' It was remarking that we came to power both in Iran and Pakistan and then in Turkey.

¹⁷⁹ Some of these Islamists and Islamist intellectuals were Iran-inspired Islamists that they will be defined in Chapter 4.

¹⁸⁰ He also went to Iran in 1980 in order to join the first anniversary of Islamic Revolution. See the private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015.

¹⁸¹ See the private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

Communication and information was very limited. Our background was Ahl-e Sunnah. With Iranian Revolution, we saw that there were different religious sects, which were Twelver, out of four religious sects we knew, Maliki, Hanbali, Shafi and Hanafi.¹⁸²

Atasoy Müftüoğlu, an Islamist intellectual, considered the revolution as the first awakening movement of Islamic world.¹⁸³ Hüseyin Bülbül, editor of journal *İktibas*, says that the Islamic Revolution in Iran gladdened us like every Muslim.¹⁸⁴ He quotes the ideas of Ercümen Özkan, the founder of *İktibas*. Özkan defines the importance of Islam in Iranian society. He says from Iranian youth to women every Iranian understood that they could survive only by adhering to God.¹⁸⁵

Although Khomeini realized the revolution by questioning and criticizing the status quo and showed his followers that revolution would be possible with a quizzical understanding, his followers understood it as anything could be questioned except the Khomeini himself. Çakır exemplifies this with an example from Turkey. According to him, Muslims in Turkey inherited ‘fetishizing people’ from the past and this got a foothold in their minds.¹⁸⁶ In other words, some Hezbollahi circles in Turkey, worshippingly, believed Imam Khomeini and after a certain point any action he did or Iran did was seen as right. Even they went so far that they advocated Khomeini’s and Iran’s every action and they did not recognize any people speaking about Iran. Metiner criticizes this and writes ‘Iran in

¹⁸² See the private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

¹⁸³ See the private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

¹⁸⁴ See the private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül, editor of *İktibas*, in 16.01.2015

¹⁸⁵ See the private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül, editor of *İktibas*, in 16.01.2015

¹⁸⁶ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 162.

Turkey is not Iran in Iran; Iran in Turkey is a different world that was created by others in terms of their own understandings of Iran'.¹⁸⁷ He endeavors to display Islamists' misunderstanding of Iran. A critical event that shows Islamists' 'Iranist than Iran' (*İran'dan çok İrancı*) and 'Imamist than Imam' (*İmam'dan çok İmamcı*) approaches about Iran, the revolution and Imam Khomeini. In 1982, Islamist masses, most of them were Sunnis, took courage from the idea of Islamic Revolution in Iran and revolted against Hafez Assad regime in Hama, Syria. The revolt was quashed by force and many people were killed during this period. However, Iranian regime overlooked Syria regime's killings in Hama. Syria was under the rule of Baath regime and Hafez Assad was ruling this secular state. Islamic Republic of Iran and Khomeini pretended to be the protector of all oppressed (*mostazafin*) in the world. Iran's attitude to this event was like an exam for Iran supporter-Islamists in Turkey. How would they see the Hama Events and Iran's attitude? A journal called *Davet* behaved Iranist more than Iran and saw Iran's attitude as the following:

Iran was encircled by international embargos and under this condition; it had to protect its close relations with Syria.¹⁸⁸

By doing this, *Davet* was, from its own perspective, showing Islamic conformity of Iran's attitude in Hama. Nureddin Şirin argues that Iran's policies towards Hama should be considered in the frame of Iraq-Iran War between 1980 and 1988, Israel's attacks on Lebanon in 1982 and exclusion of Palestinian commandos from Lebanon in 1982.¹⁸⁹ Iran was under blockage and embargo of international powers. According to Şirin, Iran had no chance to help the Muslims in Hama. Ali Bulaç defines Iran's

¹⁸⁷ Metiner, *Şafakta 10 Gün: İran Notları*, 96.

¹⁸⁸ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 160.

¹⁸⁹ Private Interview with Nureddin Şirin in 06.03.2015

policies about Hama by referring to Khomeini's ideas. According to Bulaç, armed uprisings of Muslims in Hama were not confirmed by Imam Khomeini that armed uprisings were contrary to his methods.¹⁹⁰ Similarly, Atasoy Müftüoğlu alleges that Syrian Islamists were not institutionalized and ready for a revolution and because of this; Iran warned them not to revolt before they took action.¹⁹¹

To conclude, Turkey's perception of the revolution was built on concerns, which were possibility of spreading of Islamic movements to Turkey and the possibility of emergence of a Kurdish state after a possible failure of Islamic State. However, Turkey was careful about the maintenance of economic relations with Iran. Islamic communities' and different ideologies' views on the revolution were diverse. Although some totally opposed the revolution because of its Shii identity, some partially opposed that there were no problem about the Shii ideology but the idea of regime export was rejected. The opposing groups showed reactions against Shii identity of Iran. For some, this was the fifth religious sect and it was unacceptable. In addition, some admitted and supported the revolution as fanatics and whenever possible they advocated the Islamic regime and Khomeini in every issue whatever they do. They advocated themselves by thinking in a universal understanding, which is Tawhid. For them, in addition to its religious aspect, Iranian Revolution was a reaction against international powers and status quo.

¹⁹⁰ Private Interview with Ali Bulaç in 05.03.2015

¹⁹¹ Private Interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

CHAPTER 4

THE IRAN-INSPIRED ISLAM(ISM) IN TURKEY

Compared to other countries in the region, Turkey and Iran, as the heirs of two empires, have a long history of ups and downs. Competition between Ottoman Empire and Safavid Empire to increase their military and political influence in the region, religious contradictions between two empires and the struggle to follow closely the other's domestic affairs are the main milestones of these ups and downs of relations. Although there is a fact that the boundaries between two states have not changed in a great extent since the Qasr-i Shirin Treaty in 1639, different regional and international policies and adherence to different sects of Islam created a 'secret competition' between Turkey and Iran. Establishment of an Islamic regime based on Shii Islam after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 prompted Turkey to give more attention to relations with Iran. Islamic administration in Iran and secular character of Turkey became one of the vital points in bilateral relations. Revolution in Iran alarmed Turkey to pay attention to possible effects of revolution not only in the region, but also in Turkey. Debates on Islamism in Turkey reached its peak with Iranian Revolution. Many Islamists thought that the revolution in Iran demonstrated probability of their revolutionary thesis to actualize in Turkey. Within this context, secular circles in Turkey became uncomfortable with the idea of possibility of 'Turkey's being an Iran'. These were the debates that mentioned concerns of one side on the one hand, which are of seculars and demands of the other side on the other hand, which are of Islamists. Moreover, Iran became one of the issues that

polarized the society based on religion-state relations, conservatives-moderns competition and sharia rule-secular state debates.

Turkey has not become an Iran. However debates on this issue have continued from the revolution in Iran in 1979 until today. In the period between the revolution in Iran and today, it can be seen that there are two kinds of determinant and shifting definitions of the concepts, Iranist and Iran-inspired Islamist¹⁹², that were used to point out the Islamists, who were sympathizing the Iranian Revolution and supporting Iran's policies towards international relations led within Shii Islam. These definitions had changeable meanings and shifting emphasizes depending on the period, they were used in, and the people, they were used by.¹⁹³ Firstly, the concepts of Iranist or Iran-inspired Islamist were used to define the Islamist that were sympathizing the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the new regime based on sharia rule in Iran. These were people supporting Iran's policies towards the religion after the revolution and demanding a similar Islamic revolution in Turkey. They were opposing to secular characteristic of Turkey and demanding to establish a sharia-rule state in Turkey. Even though these concepts were source of pride for some, they were the symbols of reactionism and fanaticism for others. It can be seen that these concepts were also used to point the perpetrators of assassinations in Turkey in 1990s. Killings of Uğur Mumcu, Bahriye Üçok and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı were some of these assassinations that murderers

¹⁹² In this chapter, I will mainly use the concepts such as Iranist (*İrançı*) and Iran-inspired Islam (*İranlı İslam*). By doing so, I do not mean a kind of Islam, which is rooted in Iran. Rather, I mean a kind of Islam that sympathizes to Iran's policies in the region and to Iran's international relations.

¹⁹³ I should note that I define these definitions to show the usage depending on space, time and conjuncture. I will make the definition of Iran-inspired Islam(ism) in the following parts.

were considered to have close relations with Iran. 1990s were the years that the gap between Islamists and seculars was deepened. The monthly journal, *Tevhid*, was published between 1990 and 1993, when movements of secular groups enormously increased after killings of secular and ‘Kemalist’ intellectuals and journalists in Turkey. Muammer Aksoy and Çetin Emeç were killed in 1990 and Uğur Mumcu was killed in 1993. It was believed by the secular public in Turkey that these assassinations were committed by Islamists, which were encouraged by Iran. As a result, reactions against Islamists, especially Iran-inspired ones, and their publications reached its peaks between these years. As a response to these reactions *Tevhid* and several Islamist journals such as *İktibas* and *Girişim* published a call text to public of Turkey, which defined the assassinations as conspiracies designed by international powers to passivate Islamic movements in Turkey.¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, these were the years, when the slogans of ‘followers of sharia to Iran’ (*Şariatçılar İran’a*), were widely popular.

These concepts of Iranist and Iran-inspired Islamist underwent a change in time and became the means of accusations, even of treason. Mostly because of the power competition between Iran and Turkey in the region and the perceptions of Iran, revolution and Shii Islam among some groups in bureaucracy of Turkey, character and purpose of definitions were challenged. As Ayşe Böhürler explains:

Being Iranist or Iran-inspired Islamist were popular arguments in the years after Iranian Revolution in 1979. Today, in Islamic circles, being an Iranist or an Iran-inspired Islamist is perceived as a pretext to be accused. People, who

¹⁹⁴ *Tevhid*, “M. Aksoy ve Çetin Emeç’in Ölümü ve Düşündürdükleri”, Issue: 4, (April 1990), 17-18-19 and *Tevhid*, “Kamuoyuna Duyuru”, Issue: 4, (April 1990), 60.

advocated similar ideas in the past, are charging themselves as being an Iranist or an Iran-inspired Islamist and as being ‘pawns’.¹⁹⁵

This brings us to the changing characteristic and meanings of these concepts. This second usage of the concepts, Iranist and Iran-inspired Islamist, is used as a form of accusation. It began to be used especially after 2000s, in the rule of AKP Governments. As a result of regional competitions between Iran and Turkey, being defined as an Iranist or as an Iran-inspired Islamist became equal to be a traitor.¹⁹⁶ In this scope, many bureaucrats and ministers were defined as Iranists. This was mostly performed by followers of Gülen Movement. As it was emphasized in Chapter Two, Gülen Movement approached Iranian Revolution with suspicions. For Fethullah Gülen, Iran was behaving as bigotry in the matter of religion and revolution. For him, Iranians give more value to their understandings of Islam more than even the real Islam. Gülen is a supporter of Turk-Islam synthesis. Since Islam has deficiency in terms of identity and ethnicity, ‘Turkishness’ is an important complement of Islam. This causes him to oppose ideologically the ideas of Iranian Revolution, its Shii and ‘Persian’ identity.¹⁹⁷ In addition to these, Gülen wants Turks to

¹⁹⁵ Ayşe Böhürler, “İrancı Olmak”, *Yeni Şafak*, (12 January 2013) <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/yazarlar/aysebohurler/iranci-olmak-35810> Date Accessed: 02.04.2015

¹⁹⁶ This may be why some of intellectuals did not admit my invitations to answer my questions in frame of this thesis. There is a fear of being called as Iranist/Iran-inspired Islamist in the society. This is because of campaigns of some Islamic circles to discredit intellectuals, scholars, journalists and bureaucrats.

¹⁹⁷ Fethullah Gülen especially uses the word ‘Persian’ to refer pre-Islamic history of Iran. By doing this, he aims to show that Iranians are heretics. A similar example is performed by ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant) to refer Shii population in Iran, Iraq and Syria. ISIS uses the word ‘Safavid’ to display that Shiis are heretics.

be the leader of Islam. Furthermore, it is important to note that there are not only ideological reasons as mentioned above, but also there are practical reasons of Gülen Movement's opposition to Iran. Gülen Movement has many schools in almost 160 countries in the world. Iran, on the other hand, does not allow Gülen to establish a school in the boundaries of Iran. This is due to the reason that Iran defines Gülen as an 'American agent'. Usage of concepts, Iranist and Iran-inspired Islamist, also can be explained with power struggle within the state of Turkey. Followers of Fethullah Gülen were charged with staffing in key positions of state institutions and establishing a 'state within the state'. In addition, it can be said that change of the meaning of being an Iran-inspired Islamist or an Iranist is related to the relations of Islamists with state. Before AKP came to power, Islamists were in the opposition. They had a limited power to influence the state and the bureaucracy. Thus, they used an international language that recommended collaboration with Muslims in worldwide. This was the reason that Iran and Iranian Revolution became significant for them. However, when AKP came to power and Islamists thought they became the only government, interest on Iran replaced with nationalist ideas.

Even if these concepts of Iranist, Iran-inspired Islam(ism) and Iran-inspired Islamist were used as means of accusations in the political and social life of Turkey, there is a significant Iran-inspired intellectual life in Turkey. There are contributions of these Islamists both in political Islamic discourse and in literature. In this chapter, Iranists/Iran-inspired Islamists and Iran-inspired Islam(ismi) will be analyzed within four courses. To locate Iran-inspired Islamism in a more comprehensible manner, firstly, a brief discussion on political Islam and Islamism will be stressed on. In this regard, literature on political Islam will be explained briefly in the first part. Then, the concepts of Iran-inspired Islam(ism) and Iranist/Iran-

inspired Islamist will be discussed in the second part. In this part, distinguishing features of these concepts will be explained. Although concepts of Iranists/Iran-inspired Islamists and Iran-inspired Islam(ism) have similar features and considerations with Sunni-originated radical Islam(s), or mainstream Islamism, there are specific features that distinguish them.

In the third part, some of Iran-inspired Islamists will be studied. These are Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan, Mehmet Metiner, Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin. While studying them, their contributions to Islamic literature, their distinguished understandings of Islam will be tried to display. Before deciding on these names, I sought to view their relations with Iran and Iranian Revolution at intellectual level. As a result of this, I separated these intellectuals into two groups, periodical Iran-inspired Islamists and ideological Iran-inspired Islamists. While doing this, I used three criteria: First one is the impact of Ayatollah Khomeini on these intellectuals. Second one is their relations with Iran and Iranian Revolution, both during and after the revolution. Last one is their stance against Iran's policies towards the region and Iran's relations with Turkey. The first group, periodical Iran-inspired Islamists, is composed of Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan and Mehmet Metiner, whose relations with Iran and Iranian Revolution stayed limited at intellectual intercourse. As it will be displayed, Iranian Revolution had a significant impact on these intellectuals' thoughts. They approvingly referred to revolutionary ideas originated from Iranian Revolution in 1979. However, after for a length of time, it can be seen that they began to produce ideas not under the influence of Iran and Iranian Revolution, but more independently. In other words, impacts of Iran and Iranian Revolution stayed limited on these intellectuals' ideas, which became clear after death of Khomeini in 1989. Furthermore, these intellectuals adopted a 'patriotic'

or ‘nationalist’ stance against Iran’s policies in the region and against Iran-Turkey relations. They did not automatically support Iran. They refer Ayatollah Khomeini as the *İmam*. After Khomeini’s death, they did not refer Ayatollah Khamenei as the *İmam*. As it can be seen in discourses of Ali Bulaç and Atasoy Müftüoğlu, they say *İmam* instead of Khomeini. The second group, ideological Iran-inspired Islamists, is composed of Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin. These intellectuals developed their relations with both Iran and the ruling elite of Iran that came after Ayatollah Khomeini. They thought Iran was strengthened ideologically after the death of Khomeini in 1989. In addition, their stance against Iran’s policies both in the region and in the world became distinguishing. Reactions of Çamurcu and Şirin towards issues in Syria, Iraq and Yemen are well-selected examples. Both of these intellectuals support Iran’s policies in the region. Unlike periodical Iran-inspired Islamists, ideological Iran-inspired Islamists maintains their support and sympathy to Iranian leadership. For instance, Nureddin Şirin addresses Khamenei as the *İmam*.

In the fourth part, the journals and periodicals began to publish as an effect of Iranian Revolution, will be tackled. Since these publications published between 1979 and 2000, I will limit this part with several journals and periodicals and with several issues of them. By doing so, I aim to show the impact of Iranian Revolution and how it was perceived in the print world of Islamic circles. While deciding on the journals and periodicals, I gave attention to their editorial positions, whether they were Iranists/Iran-inspired Islamists or not, and their treatments in the expressing Iranian Revolution. In this respect, the journals and periodicals of *Düşünce*, *Şura*, *İktibas*, *Şehadet*, *İstiklal*, *Tevhid* and *Selam* will be examined.

4.1 Islam as a Political Ideology

The impact of Islamic movements had continuously risen in the Middle East towards 1980s. One can count establishment of Israel and its policies on Muslim Palestinians, failure of Gamal Abdel Nasser and nationalism in Egypt, Zia al-Haq's military coup in Pakistan and invasion of Afghanistan by Soviets and emergence of Afghan Mujahedeen Movement, the surge of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Palestine and FIS in Algeria as the events that strengthened Islamism. Islamism as a political, cultural and religious project emerged in the 1930s and made a breakthrough in the late 1970s and 1980s. Iranian Revolution was one of the peaks of these Islamic movements. In these years, politicization and radicalization of Islam accelerated. It was alleged that Islam evolved to an ideology from a faith or a pure religion.

Although there is one holy script, which is believed to come without any change until today, defining Islam and marking off its boundaries is a very difficult issue. This is because there are many groups and people from different ideologies and understandings of Islam call themselves as Islamist and claim their belief as the true Islam. This is why there is a debate that there is no Islamism, but Islamisms. Another controversial issue is about Islam as a political ideology. Does Islam has a political side or is it a pure religion of faith? There are supporters of two ideas. The idea, Islam is a political religion, is a challenge for those, who consider Islam as a system of morality and faith. Although some believe that Islam has a political side in itself, others reject this idea. While some scholars such as Olivier Roy, John Esposito, Nazih Ayubi and Mohammad Ayoub claim transformation of Islam to a political ideology, some Islamists, like Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna and Abu Ala al-Maududi, whose ideas were

used by those scholars as bases of their understandings of Islam as a political ideology, argue that Islam already has had a political side.

Olivier Roy uses the term political Islam as a means of politization and identification. In his opinion, Islamists considered the Islamization of the society possible only with social and political action.¹⁹⁸ This was a very significant turn that transformed Islam from a religion of faith to a political religion. In other words, the Islamists in Roy's argument carried Islam from mosque to streets by politicizing it. It was not crucial that the majority of a society was composed of Muslims. Islamists thought structure and foundations of the society had to be Islamic. "Islamism adopts the classical vision of Islam as a complete and universal system, one, therefore, that does not have to modernize or adapt, but it applies this model to a modern object: to society, which is defined in modern terms."¹⁹⁹ The main concerns of Islamism are to transform the society in accordance with Islam and save the society from West's influence.

Esposito claims the roots of political Islam are in contemporary religious revival of Islam in both public and private life. According to him, it emerged stage by stage. On one hand, many Muslims have become more observant with regard to the practice of their faith (prayer, fasting, dress, and family), on the other, Islam has reemerged as an alternative to the perceived failure of secular ideologies such as nationalism, capitalism, and socialism.²⁰⁰ In this context, Islam, obtained the legitimacy from its symbols, rhetoric and institutions, and created a political activism. Modernization and Western culture were perceived as the sources of

¹⁹⁸ Olivier Roy, *the Failure of Political Islam*, (Harvard University Press), 1994, 36.

¹⁹⁹ Ibid, 37.

²⁰⁰ John L. Esposito, "Political Islam and the West", *Joint Force Quarterly*, (Spring 2000), 50.

corruption and therefore, targeted by Islamists. A series of crises and failures, beginning in the late 1960s, discredited many regimes and the western-inspired paradigms of modernizing elites, triggering a politics of protest and a quest for identity and greater authenticity.²⁰¹ This was resulted in Islamic movements' dispersal to political life around the world and the emergence of idea that an Islamic alternative would be possible. Many Islamic movements from moderates to extremists came to the agenda. Among the more prominent have been Muslim brotherhoods of Egypt, Sudan, and Jordan, Jamaat al-Islami in South Asia, the Welfare Party in Turkey, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria, al Nahda in Tunisia, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, and Gamaa Islamiyya and Jihad in Egypt.²⁰² Furthermore, as Roy claimed, Esposito believes social concerns such as authoritarianism, repression, unemployment, lack of housing, lack of social services, distribution of wealth and corruption helped the rise of Islamic movements.

Ayubi defines political Islam as a new invention that does not represent a going back to any situation that existed in the past or to any theory that was formulated in the past.²⁰³ According to him, Islam is an ideology that uses values from past to understand today's world. Political Islam uses religion and tradition of past and links it with today's modern politics. In other words, political Islam is neither a natural condition of Muslims nor the 'essence' of Islam; it is a modern phenomenon, not simply a return to a traditional or original understanding of politics in Islam.²⁰⁴ Similar to

²⁰¹ http://www.unaoc.org/repository/Esposito_Political_Islam.pdf Date Accessed: 18.02.2015

²⁰² Esposito, 50.

²⁰³ Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 1991, 2.

²⁰⁴ Samer S. Shehata, *Islamist Politics in the Middle East: Movements and Change*, (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group), 2012, 6.

Ayubi, Ayoob defines political Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion or theology.^{205,206}

On the other hand, Islamist thinkers defined Islam as a political ideology and argued that Islam already has had a political side. For instance, Hasan al-Banna defined Islam not as a religion of rites and faith, but as a political religion. According to him, Muslims misunderstood Islam that they thought it as a religion, which was compilation of rituals of worship and as a religion of spiritual aspects of life.²⁰⁷ According to al-Banna the word, Islamic, had a broad meaning that it was inclusive and had solutions to all problems of life.

Similar to al-Banna, Abu Ala al-Maududi considered Islam as a political religion. Abul Ala al-Maududi claimed the abandonment of pure Islam as the failure of Muslim empires. For him, an Islamic state had to comprise with Koran and Sunnah. History of Islamic societies was the history of struggle between Islam and un-Islamic behaviors, *kufir*. The only sovereign was God. However, one exception of one man rule was the rule of Prophet

²⁰⁵ Mohammad Ayoob, *the Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press), 2008, 2.

²⁰⁶ According to Ayoob, “the re-appropriation of the past, the ‘invention of tradition’ in terms of a romanticized notion of a largely mythical golden age, lies at the heart of this instrumentalization of Islam. The invention of tradition provides many Islamists the theoretical tools for de-historicizing Islam and separating it from the various contexts, in terms of time and space, in which Islam has flourished over the past fourteen hundred years. In theory, this decontextualizing of Islam allows Islamists to ignore the social, economic, and political milieus within which Muslim societies operate. It therefore provides Islamists a powerful ideological tool that they can wield in order to purge Muslim societies of impurities and accretions, natural accompaniments of the historical process, which they see as the reason for Muslim decline.” See, Mohammad Ayoob, *the Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World*, (Michigan: University of Michigan Press), 2008.

²⁰⁷ Ali Rahnama, *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, (London: Zed Books), 1994, 133-134.

Mohammad and the Four Caliphs.²⁰⁸ Maududi introduced five principles: Anti-apology, anti-Westernism, literalism, politicization and universalism.²⁰⁹ Anti-apology was about Islam's self-referentiality that it did not need any other ideologies to justify itself. Anti-Westernism was reference point of self-s-referentiality of Islam. For Maududi, Islam had to be defined out of any Western ideologies and it had to oppose them. Literalism means to understand Koran's literal form. Politicization emphasized the political nature of Islam. The society had to be re-organized within the context of commands of Islam. Universalism underlined the validity of Islam for all human beings. Maududi separated national, ethnic and regional connotations from Islam.²¹⁰

Born in Egypt in 1906, Sayyid Qutb influenced by Maududi and formed his understanding of Islam on Maududi's ideas. He rejected both the Western lifestyle, which was 'blasphemous', and the idea of government. He opposes to understanding of democracy that he does not believe sovereignty's belonging to human beings. For him, sovereignty only belongs to God, *Allah*. The first purpose of Islamism has to be the God-government or the *hakimiyyet Allah*.²¹¹ According to Qutb, world lives in Jahiliyyah²¹², today. This is because of democracy that it allows human beings to rule the other human beings. This is making some people the Gods of other people.

²⁰⁸ Ibid, 112.

²⁰⁹ Peter R. Demant, *Islam vs. Islamism: the Dilemma of the Muslim World*, (London: Praeger Publishers), 2006, 98.

²¹⁰ Ibid, 99.

²¹¹ Ibid, 100.

²¹² The Jahiliyyah is the state of ignorance and false belief that prevailed before the rule of Prophet Mohammad.

Coming from different social and historical backgrounds, these thinkers played an important role in the foundation of political Islamic discourse. They rejected the shaping of societies, which they claim as Islamic societies, by the Western ideologies and by influence of West. They made a clear cut distinction between Islam and West-oriented ideologies. For them, Koran and Prophet Mohammad's behaviors provided Islam a base for political action. Islamists in Turkey also took their ideas as first references. As Ruşen Çakır states milestones of Islamist thinkers in Turkey were²¹³:

...Hasan al-Banna, the builder of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt; Sayyid Qutb, who radicalized the ideology and practices of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in the era of Nasser; Maududi, the builder of Jamaat al-Islami in Indian Peninsula and developer of Islamic party model... Ali Shariati, the prominent thinker of Iran in pre-revolution period, and, of course, Ayatollah Khomeini.²¹⁴

²¹³ Mehmet Metiner, a prominent Islamist in Turkey, says in first periods of him, he read Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Qutb, Maududi, and Saed Havva. See, Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 30. He states that "Our religious and ideological sources of knowledge were composed of books written by authors and scholars that were affiliated with the Muslim Brothers movement and also the works of Pakistani scholar Maududi. Afterwards, the books of post-revolution Iranian writers were added to the list." See, Burak Özçetin, "Making of New Islamism in Turkey: Transformation of the Islamist Discourse from Opposition to Compliance", Unpublished PhD Thesis Submitted to the department of Political Science and Public Administration in Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 2011, 92.

²¹⁴ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 144.

The term "political Islam" has been adopted by many scholars in order to identify the unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the secular domain of politics and thus to distinguish these practices from the forms of personal piety, belief, and ritual conventionally subsumed in Western scholarship under the unmarked category 'Islam'.²¹⁵

Islamism was perceived to be driven only by authoritarian, angry, and fundamentalist-inspired religious radicals determined to ensure the destruction of modernity, capitalism and Western society and culture.²¹⁶

Islamism is understood as a modern and new phenomenon^{217,218} and at the same time, a reaction against modernism. It is an effort for the revival of Islam. As Shehata argues:

...political Islam is neither a natural condition of Muslims nor the 'essence' of Islam; it is a modern phenomenon, not simply a return to a traditional or original understanding of politics in Islam.²¹⁹

What affected the emergence of Islam in politics are several factors caused by modern times. Rise of industrialization, urbanization and

²¹⁵ Charles Hirschkind, "What is Political Islam?," *Middle East Report, No. 205, Middle East Studies Networks: The Politics of a Field*, (Oct.-Dec. 1997), 12.

²¹⁶ Olivier Roy and Amel Boubekeur, *Whatever Happened to the Islamists? Salafis, Heavy Metal Muslims and the Lure of Consumerist Islam*, (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers), 2012, 1.

²¹⁷ Ayoub, 9.

²¹⁸ Frederic Volpi, *Political Islam*, (New York: Routledge), 2011, 2.

²¹⁹ Shehata, 6.

correspondingly emergence of human problems such as unemployment, poverty and the backwardness of Muslim countries when compared with the Westerns compelled Muslims to question the era they live in. In addition, with the increase of impact of West over society and accordingly by the beginning they started to point out the West as the responsible for their backwardness, Islam emerged as a reaction against these. At this point, there was not a longing to return the Golden Ages of Islam or to the period of Prophet Mohammad. Islam was transformed to a political ideology that inspired by the past, but appeals to the modern times, today. It is not possible to define Islamism, but Islamisms.

4.2 The Iran-Inspired Islam(ism)

Islamism in Turkey entered to the year of 1979, when Iranian Revolution occurred, under the impact of two main profiles. These were radical Islamism, which were demanding a sharia rule in Turkey and opposing to Westernization policies, and moderate Islamism, which was subsisting in movements and charity organizations. Although the first one had suspicions against the products of modernism such as nation-state, elections, democracy, imperialist and capitalist system, secularism and so on, the latter developed good relations with state, regime and political system. Iran-inspired Islam(ism) emerged after the Iranian Revolution within radical Islamism. As a matter of fact, it shared similarities and common values with radical Islamic discourse. Radical discourses, opposing to secularism, rejecting nation-states, discrediting democratic institutions, rejecting yields of modernism and having critical views on Kemalism were some of these common points. Both supported the domination of Islamic rules on both social and political life. Any other ideologies and views out of Islam were rejected and seen as *kufr*. Koran would be the only guide. As it benefited from literature of political Islam

in Turkey, the Iran-inspired Islam(ism) also has distinguishing features and understandings. In this part, a frame for the Iran-inspired Islam(ism) will be drawn. Its similarities with radical Islamism in Turkey and its features making it distinctive will be studied.

While defining Iran-inspired Islam(ism), it is possible to draw its frame with two sides, which are political side and religious side.

4.2.1 Political Side of the Iran-Inspired Islam(ism)

Political side is mostly made up of opposition to foreign powers in the region and rejection of Israel's right to existence. In this respect, carrying radical tendencies, opposition to US and Israel, supporting Iran's policies and rejecting Arab powers, who cooperate with the 'West' can be said as political side of Iran-inspired Islam(ism). Opposition to US and Israel coincides with opposition to imperialism and Zionism. US's policies in the region to enable the security of Israel are opposed by Iran-inspired Islam(ism) and its followers. The US chose to cooperate with regional powers, mostly Arab leaders and Saud Family, and developed close relations with them in the region. Thus, opposition to US and Israel goes arm to arm with opposition to regional powers cooperating with the 'West'. Emergence of Israel is never admitted and even Israel's wiping off the map is demanded. Salvation of Quds is one of the main goals of Iran-inspired Islamists, as it is for many Islamists. Therefore, policies against Israel and Zionism are supported. At this point, the US and imperialism and their regional supporters are targeted because of giving support to Israel. This makes Iran-inspired Islamists as anti-status quo supporters. Iran-inspired Islamism's opposition to the US has also another dimension that distinguishes it from mainstream Islamism. Compelled to make distinction between the US-led camp and the Soviets-led camp, many Islamists in Turkey, during the Cold War before the Iranian Revolution in

1979, supported the US because of opposition to communism. For instance, during the developments, when 6th fleet of the US navy deployed in İstanbul, many Islamists struggled against communist movements. Communist groups were opposing to presence of the US forces on lands of Turkey. Although many Islamist groups in Turkey developed relations with the US, stance against the US distinguishes Iran-inspired Islamists from them.

Cooperation of regional powers with the ‘West’ is mostly criticized. Iran-inspired Islamists accuse regional powers of not firing even a gun against Israel, but firing on opposing groups. These opposing groups are defined as fighters for independence and freedom. For example, Saudi-led intervention to Yemen²²⁰ is harshly criticized. In addition, imperialism, from pax Britannica to pax America, is claimed to be as the causes of backwardness of Muslim societies in the region. As Iran-inspired Islamists were affected by ideas of Sayed Qutb, Hasan al-Banna, Abul Ala al-Maududi, Ali Shariati and Imam Khomeini, imperialism and Western influences were seen as threats for Muslim societies.

Another political side of Iran-inspired Islam(ism) is the stance close to Iran and Iran’s policies. There is an intention to support, or even to justify, Iran’s policies. This is a distinguishing feature of Iran-inspired Islamists and Iran-inspired Islam(ism) from mainstream radical Islamism. Article 154 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran states that “The Islamic Republic of Iran has as its ideal human felicity throughout human society,

²²⁰ In Yemen, Shii Houthi groups began an insurgency against Hadi Government. They demanded revision in the Constitution. As a result, the events turned to a sectarian conflict. Saudi Arabia-led coalition, supported by US, Egypt and Gulf States intervened to Yemen to stop the Shii Houthi groups. As it might be expected, Iran and Hezbollah rejected this intervention. As a result, a new polarization of Shii-Sunni was included to the one in Syria Issue.

and considers the attainment of independence, freedom, and rule of justice and truth to be the right of all people of the world. Accordingly, while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations, it supports the just struggles of the *mostazafin* against the *mostakbarin* in every corner of the globe.”²²¹ Iran-inspired Islamists use this to justify Iran’s policies towards the region. For instance, Nureddin Şirin claims that Iran does not follow a sectarian policy in the region. Rather, it follows a policy against Zionism and imperialism:

Iran supports all the oppressed in the world. It does not look any movement in the world that whether it is Shii oriented or Sunni oriented. Today, Iran supports Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba. It supports these countries because of their stance against imperialism. In addition, Iran supported Bosnia in the war with Serbia. If Iran allocated these resources not for Bosnia, but for Bahrain, there would be many revolutions in Bahrain. As you know, Shii Muslims are majority in Bahrain, but there is also a regime, which is supported by Riyadh and the US. Another example is Palestine. In Palestine, Iran supported Sunni-oriented Hamas. These are the examples that show Iran’s following not a sectarian policy, but a liberation policy.²²²

Another example of their close stance to Iran’s policies is the Hama Massacre in 1982. In Hama, Islamist masses, most of them were Sunnis, took courage from the idea of Islamic Revolution in Iran and revolted against Hafez Assad regime. The revolt was quelled by force and many

²²¹ <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-10.html> Date Accessed: 02.02.2015

²²² Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

people were killed during this period by the Syrian Regime. However, Iran did not support the revolting masses, but the Syrian Regime. Iran-inspired Islamists explained this event in different ways, but all of them proved Iran was right. While Nureddin Şirin explained Iran's decision not to support Syrian Muslims by referring more to international relations, Ali Bulaç mostly refers to Khomeini's ideas. Şirin argues that Iran's policies towards Hama should be considered in the frame of Iraq-Iran War between 1980 and 1988, Israel's attacks on Lebanon in 1982 and exclusion of Palestinian commandos from Lebanon in 1982.²²³ Iran was under blockage and embargo of international powers. According to Şirin, Iran had no chance other than helping Muslims in Hama. On the other hand, for Bulaç, armed uprisings of Muslims in Hama were not confirmed by Imam Khomeini. Armed uprisings were contrary to Khomeini's methods.²²⁴ Atasoy Müftüoğlu uses both of these ideas. For him, Syrian Islamists were not institutionalized and ready for a revolution. Thus, Iran warned them not to revolt before they took action. Moreover, Iran was internationally restricted by embargos and there was no chance for Iran to follow a different policy.²²⁵

On Syrian Issue²²⁶, Iran-inspired Islamists define the problem as an international project caused by imperialism and acted by the US and its

²²³ Private Interview with Nureddin Şirin in 06.03.2015

²²⁴ Private Interview with Ali Bulaç in 05.03.2015

²²⁵ Private Interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

²²⁶ The Syrian Civil War or in other words "Syrian Uprising" or "Syrian Crisis" is an armed conflict between Syrian Ba'ath regime and those that seeking to oust it and it is still ongoing. It began in 2011 as a part of the protest movements in the North Africa, which is called as the Arab Spring. Protesters, at first, demanded a more democratic state and improvement of economic conditions. Nevertheless, when the Syrian army fired on demonstrators across the country, uprisings evolved to an armed conflict. Since the region was in a fragile situation, many states were included into the agenda both from the

allies in the region. This is very similar to Iran's response to Syrian Issue. Iran defines the insurgents fighting against the Assad Regime as terrorists and defines their activities as crimes committed by the Zionists and the United States. For Iran, "the main objective of Western attempts to overthrow Syrian President Assad's government was to target Iran, not to bring freedom to the Syrian people."²²⁷ Iran sees the issue in Syria as the war against West-supported terrorists, who collaborate with United States and Zionists. The main aim of the 'West' is to dissolve Syrian Regime and then, to withdraw it from axis of Iran. Similar to Iran's response, Müftüoğlu, Çamurcu and Şirin refer to the US-led international actors, imperialism and Zionism in the causes of Syrian Issue. According to Müftüoğlu, Syria was exposed to an imperialist project:

The plan was to disable Iran in Syria, then, to disable Syria from becoming a threat for Israel. For this purpose, a Muslim opposition in Syria was created. This opposition is an invention of the 'West'. Syrian opposition and Turkey emerged as tools of this plan. In Turkey, there were attempts to discredit Iranian Revolution. There were many publications about it. These aimed to raise the sectarian

region and the other parts of the world. With the involvement of radical and fundamental groups, such as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIS), into the picture, the issue became internationalized crucially. In addition to these, because of the Syria's importance in terms of its relations with Iran and Israel, the possibility of regime's fall into the hands of Islamist fundamentalists and the possible effects of these to the region and international peace and security brought it to a very critical and controversial position. Moreover the factors that determined the policies of the states that involved in the issue began to change in terms of their identities and interests. "Syrian Uprising" or "Syrian Crisis" is not only a movement or a civil war that occurs in a country.

²²⁷<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/04/iran-orientalism-western-illuio-20144383631581810.html> Date Accessed: 09.04.2015

tensions. Iran, on the other hand, did not become a tool of this plan.²²⁸

As Müftüoğlu, Çamurcu also defines Syrian Issue as one of the parts of the US's project of Middle East. To implement this project, Syria has to rupture its relations with Iran. Çamurcu charges the 'West' with behaving with 'double standard':

The 'Westerners' support the opposition movements in the Syria. However, they also support the Saudi Regime in Arabia and dictatorship in Yemen. They do not support the opposition movements, which do not use arms, in Bahrain.²²⁹

While exemplifying 'double standard' policies, it is significant that Çamurcu uses countries like Yemen and Bahrain, where Shii populations are very effective and majority.

It is very important that all of these Iran-inspired Islamists state their dissenter opinions against the Baath Regime in Syria. They all have agreement on repressive authority of the regime. While drawing the causes of problems, Müftüoğlu does not give any support to Baath Regime in Syria. He defines it as an oppressive regime. In a similar way, Çamurcu points to repressive and rigid policies of the regime on the Syrian people. However; Müftüoğlu and Çamurcu, support Syria's stance against imperialism. For them, problems in Syria are results of imperialism and aim to exclude Iran's influence in the region.

²²⁸ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1VjFn3HQdYA> Date Accessed: 08.04.2015

²²⁹ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NLCuTwtjnqo>

and

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aTNttsKcgtg> Date Accessed: 09.04.2015

4.2.2 Religious Side of the Iran-Inspired Islam(ism)

Religious side is composed of the idea of *Tawhid*, *Ummah* and positive considerations about Shii Islam. *Tawhid* belief is based on the unity of all Muslims. Sectarian differences are not welcomed. All Muslims, whether they are Sunni or Shii, are admitted as the parts of a whole. In addition to this, ethnic and identitical differences are also not welcomed. All Muslims including Arabs, Iranians, Turks and the others are seen equal. In other words; since the God created all human beings, inequalities are unacceptable. As *Tawhid* belief does not pay attention to whatever ethnicity or religious sect, it defines all Muslims under an inclusive concept, which is *Ummah*.²³⁰ *Ummah* is the population or community, which has no ethnical or sectarian reference. In parallel with ideas of *Tawhid* and *Ummah*, Iran-inspired Islamists reject the nation-states. Nation-states are inventions of the ‘West’ and they create ‘far-fetched’ racisms and nationalisms.²³¹ It is believed that establishment of the Islamic State and formation of Islamic unity can be provided through exclusion of ethnicity, nationalism and sectarianism, and inclusion of *Tawhid*. According to Bulaç, *Tawhid* is the mean of Muslims’ lives.²³² Müftüoğlu equals *Tawhid* to moral values:

When the loyalty/affection to land, ethnicity and sect turns to hatred to another land, ethnicity and sect, it is an immoral act.

²³⁰ Some political parties in Turkey, such as Welfare Party, and some Islamic groups combined the idea of *Ummah* and nationalism. Purpose of this combination was to make Turkey the leader of Islamic world. These ideas were differed from Iran-inspired Islamists’ perceptions of *Ummah*.

²³¹ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

²³² Ali Bulaç, “Kin İle Adalet Bir Arada Olmaz”, *Zaman*, (20 October 2014)

Moral values cannot be used as instruments to legalize interests of any social community or sect.²³³

Şirin emphasizes the importance of *Ummah*. For him, *Ummah* was purpose of all Islamists in Turkey. It means union of Islam and establishment of Islam's own political and ideological system. Supporting *Ummah* means rejection of national boundaries and nation-states, which are products of imperialism.²³⁴

Ercümen Özkan views *Tawhid* as the core of Islam. For him, heterodox exercises in Islam and Sufism are opposite to *Tawhid*.²³⁵ These are kinds of polytheism and there is nowhere for them in Islam. *Tawhid* is based on unity of the God, *la ilaha illallah*. On the other hand, Sufism is based on *waḥdat al-wujūd*, the Unity of Existence. Furthermore, Özkan supported Ayatollah Khomeini's views on *Tawhid*. According to Özkan, religion for Ayatollah Khomeini was prior to sectarian differences. Khomeini aimed to surpass sectarian differences. As Özkan claims, for Khomeini, these differences were originating from *ijtihad*. In this respect, Khomeini recommended five-rakat in *namaz* as it was in Sunnis. Even, he recommended not using the word '*Aliyan Wali-ullah*', which means Ali is the Vicegerent of God. Özkan uses an interesting metaphor to indicate this:

Khomeini was holding his religious identity with his right hand and on his front side yet was holding his sectarian identity with his left hand and his backside.²³⁶

²³³ <http://www.iktibasdergisi.com/ahlaki-ufuklari-kaybetmek/> Date of Access: 09.04.2015

²³⁴ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 06.03.2015

²³⁵ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

²³⁶ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

Different from views of Sunni-oriented Islamists towards Shii Islam, Iran-inspired Islamists has positive views on it. As it was defined in previous chapters, Shii Islam was not approved by Sunni Islamists as correspondent with Islam and it was seen out of Islam. However, Iran-inspired Islamists admit it as the fifth sect of Islam and even some of them were converted to Shii Islam from Sunni Islam.²³⁷ Sunni approach was based on the fear of Iran and Shii Islam. Sunnis are concerned about Iran's exportation of its Shii regime.²³⁸ Against such fears, 'Iran-inspired' Islamists and intellectuals in Turkey had a great difficulty to explain their intentions and their perceptions of Iran and began to become isolated in the Islamic circles. They wanted to get closer with the other Islamic groups and so, they referred to concepts of *Tawhid* and *Ummah*. As a result, they aimed to prevent their isolation in Islamic circles. In addition to this, reference to concepts of *Tawhid* and *Ummah* also aimed to increase the importance and influence of Iranian Revolution. By doing this, it is aimed to indicate that ideals and ideas of the revolution are over the sectarian differences. In other words, Islam that is referred by Iran is emphasized as a universal religion.

'Iran-inspired' Islamists and intellectuals in Turkey were affected by Iranian Revolution. This interaction was, at first, an effect of revolutionary ideology, but not an effect of Shii Islam. As Nureddin Şirin argues:

We, as Muslims in Turkey, had limited information about Shii Islam. At first step, we were influenced by the idea of

²³⁷ Nureddin Şirin was considered as one of them. It is believed that he converted to Shii Islam in 1990s. When I asked him whether he converted his sect or not, he did not directly reject or admit. He answered as the following: 'I will answer this question both yes and no. Sunni Hasan al-Banna in Egypt and Shii Motahhari in Iran say similar words. I am from the sect of this word.'

²³⁸ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 157.

revolution. Shii ideology was not so influential on us. Then, we had a sense of belonging to Shii Islam. This was because of its relations with Karbala and Imam Hussein.²³⁹

Atasoy Müftüoğlu and Ali Bulaç, similar to Şirin, were affected by revolutionary ideas of the revolution at first. They also did not pay attention to Shii identity of the revolution. Ercümen Özkan also attached importance to revolution rather than its Shii character. As Hüseyin Bülbül defines Özkan's approach to Iranian Revolution as:

For Özkan, Iranian Revolution was like awakening of a fossilized dinosaur. It stunned the world. It filled all Muslims with hope of establishment of Islamic states through world. However, more emphasize on Shii character of the revolution in following years was criticized by Ercümen Özkan. For him, despite a set of distortions of it, Iranian Revolution was revolution of all Muslims and it had to be protected.²⁴⁰

To conclude, Islamism in Turkey can be divided into two, radical Islamism and moderate Islamism. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, a kind of new Islamism emerged within the radical Islamism. This was a kind of radical Islamism that was emulating Iran, not remaining distant from Shii Islam, respecting to Khomeini and his ideas and supporting Iran's policies towards the region and the world. This kind of radical Islam, which I call as Iran-inspired Islam(ism), sought to realize an Islamic revolution in Turkey. Iran-inspired Islamists shared common ideas with mainstream Islamism and Shii understanding of Khomeini. *Tawhid* idea was rejecting all ethnical, national and sectarian differences. Nation-

²³⁹ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 06.03.2015

²⁴⁰ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

states and national boundaries were rejected. All the Muslims were forming an Islamic unity, the *Ummah*. Religion was tackled not as a discriminator factor, but as a universal and unifying factor. One of the ideas was opposition to imperialism and Zionism. While the US's policies were being opposed, entity of Israel was being rejected. Arguments that distinguish Iran-inspired Islamists from mainstream Islamism were their close relations with Shi' Islam and not putting distance with it, their commitment and sympathy to Iranian Revolution and Khomeini, and their support to Iran's policies towards the region and the world. These caused them to be isolated in the Islamic circles. However, Khomeini's death, changes in Iranian policies and developments both in Turkey and in the region resulted in separation of Iran-inspired Islamists. These will be explained in the next part.

4.3 Impact of 1979 Islamic Revolution on Islamists in Turkey

An Islamist or an Islamist intellectual is a person, who takes Islam as the base and provides contributions to social, political and cultural issues. While expressing opinion, an Islamist or an Islamist intellectual cannot be independent from the religion.²⁴¹ These people call themselves as Muslim intellectual. As Michael Meeker argues in his article, since "they see themselves as Muslim and they write as believers, they use Muslim rather than Islamist or intellectual."²⁴² Intellectualism evokes the 'West' and modernism and Islamist began to associate with radicalism and fundamentalism. Thus, they are not preferable. As I interviewed with

²⁴¹ Zekeriya Karaman, "İslamcı 'Muhafif Entelektüel' Midir?", *Yeni Şafak*, (16 May 2013)

²⁴² Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey" in ed. Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (New York: I.B Tauris), 1991, 189.

some of Islamists, they prefer to be called as Muslim. For instance, Ali Bulaç defines to be called as intellectual as invective.²⁴³ For him, intellectuals are mistrusted and they cannot lead the Muslims. Leadership has to be in the hands of ulama. Moreover, Nureddin Şirin prefers revolutionary Islam instead of radical Islam. However, in this work, I chose the definitions of Islamist and Islamist intellectual to define people and the word radical to define Iran-inspired Islam(ism).

In Turkey, Islamists or Islamist intellectuals make the critique of secular republican policies of the state and demand to apply Islam in public and social spheres of life. Although the period of Ottoman Empire's dissolution is pointed as the emergence and formation of Islamism in Turkey, the period between 1920 and 1980 became the most influential years on Islamism debates. Today's Islamists and Islamist intellectuals that I argue some of them in this thesis, in my opinion, present an intellectual accumulation of these years. Islamist intellectuals criticized political and cultural institutions and advocated re-Islamization of Muslims' lives in Turkey. Intensive westernization policies and the republic's religious policies, which are mostly not adopted by traditional society, became influential in the development of these intellectuals and Islamists.

Iran-inspired Islam(ism) and Islamists developed within this context. Reactions against policies of newly established Republic of Turkey and increasing enthusiasm after Iranian Revolution in 1979 overlapped with Iran-inspired Islam(ism). Abolition of Caliphate, state's interventions to religious sphere and its creating a control mechanism on the religion and 'Westernization' policies' negative perception on Islamists because of the belief of degeneration of culture and religion caused Islamists to oppose

²⁴³ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

them. They demanded to establish a state based on Islamic rules. The revolution in Iran became a model for them. In this respect, Iran-inspired Islam(ism), from 1979 until 2000s, the period covered in this thesis, witnessed two phases. First one is the period from the revolution in 1979 until death of Khomeini in 1989, or the Khomeini period, and the second one is the period between 1989 until today, or the pragmatist period.

Khomeini was the first *Velayat-i Faqih* of the post-revolution Iran and he was a respected cleric by Iran-inspired Islamists in Turkey. In his 10-year rule from 1979 to 1989, Iran was seen as an idealist state aiming to provide unity of all Muslims and aiming to remove ethnical and sectarian differences between Islamic societies.²⁴⁴ In other words, he followed a policy of *Tawhid* and *Ummah*. Khomeini years in Iran witnessed a debate about future of both Islam and Iran, which was whether ‘Islam for Iran’ or ‘Iran for Islam’. Intellectuals and secular politicians wanted ulama to return their *madrasas* that ulama’s role in the revolutionary process ended. Ulama played its role in unifying the masses. However Khomeini disapproved it. According to Khomeini, intellectuals were mistrusted.²⁴⁵ This was the reason of his disagreement with Benisadr and Mahdi Bazargan. Khomeini supported the idea of ‘Iran for Islam’. Benisadr and Mahdi Bazargan supported the idea of ‘Islam for Iran’. Iran was a 2500-year old country. It would strengthen and expand with Islam and would become the leader of Middle East. For Khomeini, this was wrong. Iran had to be sacrificed to Islam. Periodical Iran-inspired Islamists in Turkey,

²⁴⁴ See private interviews with Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Hüseyin Bülbül and Nureddin Şirin.

²⁴⁵ According to him, intellectuals were like grasshoppers. How grasshoppers leave their eggs to fields before they abandon the wheat fields, colonialists left intellectuals to exploited lands before they abandon these lands. Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

composed of Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan and Mehmet Metiner, greatly referred to revolutionary ideas originated from Iranian Revolution in 1979. They were Islamists, whose relations with Iran and Iranian Revolution stayed limited in intellectual level. Even though Iranian Revolution had a significant impact on these intellectuals' thoughts, its impact stayed limited on these intellectuals' ideas. They began to produce ideas not under the influence of Iran and Iranian Revolution, but more independent from their backgrounds. After Khomeini, they pointed the challenge in policies of Iran. According to them, Iran's policies evolved to a pragmatist way from an idealist way. They changed their stance against Iran's policies in the region and against Iran-Turkey relations to a pro-Turkey position.

After Khomeini, Iran began to follow a pragmatist policy in the region and it displayed Shii sectarian tendencies. Rather than the motto of Khomeini period, 'Iran for Islam', the new motto of 'Islam for Iran' came to the forefront. Islam became one of the grounds of Iran's legitimizing its power. The religion became instrumental. Ideological Iran-inspired Islamists in Turkey, which is composed of Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin, developed their relations with both Iran and ruling elite of Iran came after Ayatollah Khomeini. Çamurcu and Şirin claimed Iran strengthened ideologically after death of Khomeini in 1989. In addition, their stance against Iran's policies both in the region and in the world became a distinguishing factor to differ themselves from periodical Iran-inspired Islamists. They rejected the evolution of Iran's policies from idealism to pragmatism and realpolitik after Khomeini's death. For them, Iran's policies during Khomeini increasingly continued. For example, Şirin

rejects the changes in Iran's policies. For him, in post-Khomeini period Iran preserved its ideals and had an expanded impact in the region.²⁴⁶

4.3.1 Periodical Iran-inspired Islamists

4.3.1.1 Ali Bulaç

Iranian Revolution is a real revolution.

Ali Bulaç was born in Mardin in 1951. He completed his primary and secondary education in Mardin, in southeastern Turkey. He graduated from Istanbul Higher Islamic Institute in 1975 and sociology department of Istanbul University in 1980. He studied in a *madrassa* for seven years.²⁴⁷ Thus, he has knowledge of Koran and other Islamic sources. He knows Arabic and Persian.²⁴⁸ After he was graduated from Istanbul University, he began to write in several journals such as *Fikir* and *Sanatta Hareket*. In 1976, he published the journal of *Düşünce (1976-1980)* and in the same year, he established Düşünce Publishing. In 1984, he established another publishing firm, İnsan Publishing. He also published in the journals of *Hareket*, *İslam Medeniyeti*, *Tohum*, *Sur*, *Tevhid*, *Hicret*, *Mavera* in the newspapers of *Milli Gazete* and *Yeni Şafak*. He took part in the foundation of newspaper, *Zaman* in 1987 and he still continues to write in *Zaman* (published in Turkish) and *Today's Zaman* (published in English). He is

²⁴⁶ Şirin refers to Iran's developing relations with the powers like Cuba and Venezuela out of the region. He also mentions Iran's interventions in Bosnia, Syria and Palestine. By pointing these, he tries to show that Iran does not follow a sectarian or nationalist policy.

²⁴⁷ Michael E. Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey" in ed. Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (New York: I.B Tauris), 1991, 197.

²⁴⁸ He said that he took Persian education for 12 years before the revolution in Iran in 1979. See private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

also writer of several books. Intellectuals and ulama of pre-revolutionary Iran have a significant influence on intellectual accumulation of Ali Bulaç. He is mostly influenced by Ayatollahs Motahhari, Taleqhani, Beheshti and intellectuals Ali Shariati and Jalal al-Ahmad.²⁴⁹ Since defining ideas of Bulaç exceeds scope of this thesis, I will content this work with a brief explanation of his ideas. Rather, I will emphasize his intellectual relation with Iranian Revolution.

In his works, he tackles with modernism and tradition debates and “discusses Islam from a historical and sociological point of view.”²⁵⁰ Bulaç problematizes the ‘westernization’ of society in Turkey and, as a result of this, dispersion of Islamic society. Islam was exposed to vigorous modernization efforts, which corrupted the Islamic way of living. This corruption is product of both intellectuals²⁵¹ and ulama. Intellectuals are mostly influenced by Enlightenment and defined the society as ignorant and unenlightened. For them, society is a patient waiting for surgery and if surgery is not operated, it will die. This is a positivist and despotic aspect for Bulaç. He interprets the cases, Westernization, Europeanization and modernization within this context. As a consequence of these cases, intellectuals alienated to culture, history and human of the society, where they live. Thus, Turkey is not able to produce knowledge almost for 200 years. On the other hand, although ulama refer to Islam, they have also responsibility in corruption of Islam and cultural backwardness of Turkey. Ulama attempted to understand Islam within a Western way that it fell into

²⁴⁹ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

²⁵⁰ Michael E. Meeker, “The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey” in ed. Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (New York: I.B Tauris), 1991, 197.

²⁵¹ Bulaç points the secular writers, scholars and philosophers, who were educated in schools in the ‘West’ or ‘West-oriented’ schools in Turkey.

the error of defining Islam with West-originated concepts.²⁵² Without questioning history, Islam was limited to a West-originated pattern. In addition to their corrupting religion and society, both intellectuals and ulama also cause a ‘cultural dichotomy’ in Turkey. Each of them represents one side, which totally rejects the others. While intellectuals fanatically support the ‘West’ against Islam, ulama fanatically support Islam against the ‘West’.²⁵³ Despite all, Bulaç mistrusts intellectuals and considers ulama as the leader of the society. For him, intellectuals are statist, but ulama are populists. His thoughts about intellectuals are mostly influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini. For Khomeini, intellectuals had organic relations with imperialists and colonialists.

Ali Bulaç considers Islamism as an issue that cannot be agreed on. While some consider Islamism as an ideology like socialism, nationalism or Marxism, some consider it as a type of politics. For Bulaç, Islamism is seen even as the misuse of religion in politics by some people. According to Bulaç, Islamism is an intellectual, moral, societal, political, and economic and international movement that aims to establish a new envisagement of human, society, politics, state and world. Therefore, it advocates a new model of social organization and targets an Islamic union in universal meaning. In other words, it is an effort and an ideal to enliven Islam, to apply Islamic rules and to re-build Islam in any social or historical condition in the world. When considered in this context, Bulaç claims that every Muslim, at the same time, is also an Islamist.²⁵⁴ Even going further, he propounds that if they are not Islamists, their perception

²⁵² Toprak, “İki Müslüman Aydın: Ali Bulaç ve İsmet Özel”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, Volume: 29-30, (Spring-Summer 1985), 145.

²⁵³ Bulaç literally says: ‘Aydınlar İslam’a karşı Batı adına radikal, İslam’ı savunanlar da İslam adına, Batı’ya karşı radikal davranmaktadırlar’.

²⁵⁴ *İslamcılık Öldü Mü?*, 17.

of faith is problematic. Muslims are not obliged to define themselves as Islamists, but they have to deal with their relations with society in terms of the frame of religion.²⁵⁵

Bulaç conceptualizes Islamism into two: Official Islam and Civil Islam.²⁵⁶ Official Islam aims to transform society into an Islamic form with political, administrative and judicial means. It is practiced from top to down. Civil Islam, on the other hand, seeks to influence politics with humanitarian and social movements gradually. Islamism locates in the first one, which is Official Islam. Bulaç distinguishes progress of Islamism until today into three periods: First Wave Islamism between 1850 and 1924, Second Wave Islamism between 1950 and 2000 and Third Wave Islamism from 2000 and then.²⁵⁷ For him, in the formation of modern Islamism, reservoirs of Ottoman-Turkey, Egypt, Iran and Indian became considerable influent. However, the most influential event was the creation of Pakistan state. This had an effect on the transformation of political vision and culture of not only Islamists in Turkey, but also Islamists in Egypt and Iran. Emergence of early Islamism happened during Ottoman period in the second half of 19th century. Being defeated politically and militarily by the West, Ottoman Empire was pushed to return Islam and to make regulations in a context within Islam. According to Bulaç, Islamism is both a modern movement and, at the same time, a challenge to the modernity. It is not objector and it is not a kind of

²⁵⁵ It became a controversial issue, and also a prominent debate between Ali Bulaç and Mümtazer Türköne, that whether Islamism died or it was strengthened, or who is an Islamist. Claim of Bulaç, which is every Muslim, at the same time, is also an Islamist, was argued by Islamists in the context of Islamism debate. For more information about the debate, please see Mümtaz'er Türköne's book, '*Doğum ile Ölüm Arasında İslamcılık*'

²⁵⁶ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

²⁵⁷ *İslamcılık Öldü Mü?*, 13.

opposing within system like Marxism or socialism. It looks critical to hegemonic modernity. While splitting Islamism into periods, Bulaç uses various criteria such as political tendency, reference frame and leadership profiles.²⁵⁸

First Wave Islamism takes return to Koran and Sunnah as the reference frame. First Wave Islamists put forward the wakening of jihad spirit and the *door of ijtiḥad*.²⁵⁹ For them, the salvation of Ottoman Empire from the weaknesses in front of the West would be possible only with referring to Koran and Sunnah. If the *door of ijtiḥad* was not open, the ideas coming from West would be directly admitted and applied. This would provide a ‘legitimate’ and intellectual base for secularism. Priority of first wave Islamists was the salvation of the state. Leadership profile of this wave was ulama and educated intellectuals. Bulaç gives Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi as examples of First Wave Islamists.²⁶⁰ They were aware of both Western culture and Islamic culture. These Islamists were liquidated with the establishment of new republic and they felt asleep until 1950s.

Second Wave Islamism took the modern nation-state as reference frame. In this generation, Islamists paid significant attention on Islamization of West-oriented social and political structures. In the minds of this generation’s Islamists, knowledge, education, social institutions, politics and economy took shape in Western character, but this was assumed with Islamic references. The main political theme was an Islamic state and an Islamic society. This wave tried to Islamize the modern nation-state. Leadership profile was composed of the people, who were educated in

²⁵⁸ Ibid, 19.

²⁵⁹ *Ijtiḥad* means the re-definition of Islamic rules.

²⁶⁰ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

West-oriented state school; one of the most well-known leaders was Necmettin Erbakan.

During the transitions between generations, there were some errors. To begin with, the Second Wave Islamists inherited hostility to tradition from the First Wave Islamists. They could not make the difference between custom of Ummah and traditionalism.²⁶¹ As a result, they sometimes were dragged to radicalism. The second wave intentionally politicized Islam. Thus, it remained limited and unconcerned to spiritual, moral, cultural and Sufi dimensions of Islam. As a result, Islam philosophically and intellectually did not develop. Lastly, Islamist discourse was limited and monopolized by poets and story writers. This was why Islamism had a low impact on all spheres of art, science and enlightenment.

According to Bulaç, the beginning of Third Wave of Islam began in the first years of 21st century.²⁶² This wave, without making reclamation and critique of the problems defined above, met with the opportunity of coming power.²⁶³ With the years of 2000s and coming to the power, the ideal of return to Koran and Sunnah was no longer the main topic of agenda. Without referring to the *door of ijihad*, the road map of European Union and liberal policies were adopted. The idea of jihad was discredited,

²⁶¹ *İslamcılık Öldü Mü?*, 35.

²⁶² Ali Bulaç gives 1997 as the exact date for the beginning of Third Wave Islamism in Turkey. As it can be remembered, in 1997, Turkey witnessed to a so called ‘post-modern’ coup. According to Bulaç, Third Wave Islamism began in Iran in the same year with Turkey, when reformists under the leadership of Mohammad Hatemi won the presidential elections. In Egypt, he initiates Third Wave Islamism with the beginning of protests in Tahrir Square. Bulaç alleges that breaking points between Turkey, Iran and Egypt in the history occurs correspondingly in a few years.

²⁶³ *İslamcılık Öldü Mü?*, 35.

passivized and even equaled to terrorism.²⁶⁴ Bulaç takes the argument much further and blames Third Wave Islamist as being ‘the ruler for the power’. For him, the intellectuals, who had an imagination for a new civilization, became the officers of the state, yesterday’s Islamists replaced with today’s conservatives.²⁶⁵

According to Bulaç, First Generation of Islamists like Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi were intellectual-ulama. In other words, they had knowledge both about the ‘West’ and developments in ‘Western’ philosophy, and history of Islam. However, this intellectual-ulama generation was interrupted with Second Generation of Islamists that intellectuals preponderated to ulama.

Ali Bulaç emphasizes the significance of being ‘two-winged’. Being ‘two-winged’ is an ideal for Bulaç. As he explains what intellectuals and ulama lack, and criticizes them of being ‘one-winged’. Intellectuals have a comprehensive knowledge of the ‘West’, its philosophy and developments, but they have limited knowledge about Islam, its history and its sources. Similarly, ulama have no knowledge about the ‘West’. Bulaç emphasizes importance of being aware of both the ‘West’ and Islam. For him, Sayyid Qutb and Fethullah Gülen are ‘two-winged’. Bulaç also defines himself as ‘two-winged’ that he studied both sociology and theology of Islam.²⁶⁶ In this way, Bulaç defines himself as intellectual-ulama and as one of, maybe the last, representatives of First Generation Islamism.

Ali Bulaç has a critical view on ‘West-oriented’ ideas. In this context; concepts of secularism, modernism, democracy are kinds of tricks. Since

²⁶⁴ Ibid, 36.

²⁶⁵ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.05.2015

²⁶⁶ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

the ‘West’ is superior over the ‘East’, it is perceived that it is the homeland of contemporary civilization and all modern concepts. From this point of view, Islam is contained to a backward, philosophically underdeveloped and non-civilized frame. However, Bulaç points out that the ‘West’ is responsible for slavery, hunger, social and sexual deviations and moral corruptions, which are significant threats for human life in modern ages.²⁶⁷ Perception of Islam as an underdeveloped and non-civilized religion is a sophistry and an orientalist view. For him, Islam was already a civilized religion before the emergence of Enlightenment ideas in the ‘West’. He refers to the Charter of Medina (*Medine Vesikası*)²⁶⁸ as the first example of democracy.²⁶⁹ Ali Bulaç defines this Charter as a pluralist formation more developed than ‘Western’ democracies.

Iranian Revolution, establishment of an Islamic regime in Iran after the revolution and charisma of Ayatollah Khomeini had a significant influence on Bulaç. After the revolution, he wrote a book, called *Islamic Revolution of Iran*, on the revolution by using a nickname, which is Mehmed Kerim. The book, *Islamic Revolution of Iran*, is such a propaganda book that it highly praises the revolutionary movements and Iranian people. As Serhan Afacan points, the book, which was published in 1980, clearly emphasizes sympathy to Khomeini and opposition to Shah.²⁷⁰ It struggles to highlight the Islamic character of the revolution.

²⁶⁷ Ali Bulaç, *Çağdaş Kavramlar ve Düzenler*, (İstanbul: Beyan Yayınları), 1993, 22.

²⁶⁸ Charter of Medina was drafted by Prophet Mohammad that provided an agreement between Muslims and non-Muslims. With this agreement; Muslims, Jews, Christians and pagan groups in Medina formed an *Ummah*. This was formation of a multi-religious, but an Islamic, state.

²⁶⁹ Bulaç, *İslam ve Demokrasi*, 11.

²⁷⁰ Serkan Afacan, “Komşuyu Anlamak/Anlatmak: 20. Yüzyılda Türkiye’de İran’a Dair Yayınlanan Kitaplara Dair Bir Değerlendirme”, *İnsan ve Toplum*, 2: 3, (2012), 172.

According to Kerim, or Bulaç, Iranian Revolution was a movement against oppression of Shah Regime and imperialism. Further, he compares the revolutionary movements in Iran with Prophets' struggles against oppression.²⁷¹ The revolution would be realized only through an Islamic and radical belief, which patterned Prophet's policies. Iranian Revolution succeeded it by opposing imperialism and its collaborators. In addition to glorifying the revolution, while defining the Shii character of the revolution, Bulaç gives attention to emphasize the non-conflicting sides of Shii Islam and Sunni Islam. Furthermore, he emphasizes:

What is important is holding the same basic principles. Philosophical and legal issues (*fikhi ve kelami meseleler*) can be solved somehow easily by the *mujtahids* of both sides.²⁷²

To overcome the consisted environment against Iranian Revolution that Shii character of the revolution caused oppositions in Turkey and Iran-inspired Islamists were excluded by the Islamic society in Turkey; Ali Bulaç seeks to claim the convergence between Shii Islam and Ahl-e Sunnah after the revolution.²⁷³ Moreover, he struggles to show historical connection of both:

In the debate between Ali and Muawiyeh, we believe that Ali's action was right. Names of Ahl-e Sunnah's children display their stance against Shii-Sunni conflict. Ahl-e Sunnah gave names such as Ali, Hasan and Hussein to their children. No one used names such as Muawiyeh and Yazid.²⁷⁴

²⁷¹ Kerim, 8.

²⁷² Ibid, 314-315.

²⁷³ Ibid, 399.

²⁷⁴ Ibid, 388.

In 1980, Ali Bulaç went to Iran to join the first-year celebrations of the revolution.²⁷⁵ He was deeply influenced by Khomeini. For him, Khomeini was an impressive leader. During Khomeini's rule, Iran followed a unifying policy towards the region that he saw all Muslims as one community, the *ummah*, and did not support sectarian policies, which it followed a *tawhid* policy. Iran under Khomeini's rule followed the policy of 'Iran for Islam' rather than 'Islam for Iran'. On the other hand, after death of Khomeini in 1989, Islam was instrumentalized for Iran's realist policies. He emphasizes the change in foreign policy of Iran after 1989. Bulaç's article in the journal of *Kitap* displays his considerations about post-Khomeini Iran:

Ayatollah Khomeini died in June of 1989, but he changed the path of history in his lifetime. Now, Rafsanjani and his realist team are in power in Iran. In this new period, it is expected to transform the ideas of Islamic Revolution from ideals and principals to pragmatism and conjunctural changes. After this, we can expect surprising faults from Iran. However, in any case, whatever happened in Iran after Khomeini, the Islamic Revolution left a big legacy to political history of world.²⁷⁶

Although Bulaç points the transition from 'Iran for Islam' to 'Islam for Iran' in post-Khomeini period, he defines Hama Massacre in a realist and pragmatist method. Sunni-oriented Muslims rebelled against Syria under

²⁷⁵ He says that he went to Iran with Selahattin Eş, Abdurrahman Dilipak, Cengiz Çandar and Mümtaz Soysal. He met with Khomeini and he was deeply influenced. Even, he and Çandar so influenced by Khomeini that they looked at each other's faces and expressed their admirations to Khomeini. See private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

²⁷⁶ Bulaç, "Modern Zamanların Gerçeği: Dinin Yükselişi", *Kitap*, Volume: January-February, Issue: 35-36, (1990).

Hafez Assad's Baath Regime in Syria in 1982. They were inspired by Iranian Revolution. They opposed to secular Baath Regime and aimed to establish an Islamic State. However, their rebellion was quelled by the regime. Although there were calls for support of Iran, Khomeini and Islamic regime in Iran did not support this rebellion of Syrian Muslims. Iran's stance against Hama Massacre is defined as a pragmatist and realist response. It was defined as a contradiction of the revolution. Although Hama is considered as the giving up of *tawhid* and *ummah* ideas and following a pragmatist and realist policy, Bulaç emphasizes the contradiction between methods of Khomeini and Syrian Muslims. According to him, methods Syrian Muslims followed were opposite to Khomeini's method:

Since Imam Khomeini did not want the overthrow of Syrian Regime with an armed struggle, he did not support Ikhwan in Syria. This was a confronting movement with his methods. Khomeini made a revolution, but he did not declare *jihad*. He wanted Iranian people to give flowers to soldiers, but not to shot on them. On the other hand, Muslims in Hama performed an armed struggle against Syria. However, the regime quelled them.²⁷⁷

Although Hama can be considered as a retail of Khomeini from his idealist policies to pragmatist policies, Ali Bulaç rejects it. Bulaç points that Hama was already incompatible with Khomeini's ideas. In other words, there was no contradiction between events in Hama and ideas of Khomeini. Response of Khomeini about Hama was not out of his ideas. On the contrary, Khomeini exactly acted in accordance with his ideas.

²⁷⁷ Private interview with Ali Bulaç in 06.03.2015

About the civil war in Syria began in 2011; Ali Bulaç points faults of foreign policies of Turkey and Iran.²⁷⁸

First of all, Turkey miscalculated ethnic composition of Syrian opposition movement. While it was supporting Sunni Muslims because of their opposition to Assad Regime, it overlooked the Nusayris, Christians and Sunni Muslims, which were supporting Assad. Secondly, Turkey miscalculated Syria's relations with Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Hezbollah and Hamas in the region and acted with Saudi Arabia and Gulf states. It misestimated that limited policies could be applied in Syria, in spite of Syria's relation with them. Lastly, Turkey did not offer a proper alternative to Assad.²⁷⁹

In addition to these, Bulaç charges foreign policy of Turkey with supporting radicalism in Syria. Rather than Sunni model, Turkey followed radical methods of Kharijites and caused the deepening of civil war in Syria.^{280,281} In the end, Bulaç points the damages of civil war in Syria both for Iran and Turkey. For him, this war is a designed project of the 'West'

²⁷⁸ Bulaç, "Suriye Bayramda Ölüyor", *Zaman*, (8 August 2013)

²⁷⁹ Bulaç, "Suriye'de Hatalar 1", *Zaman*, (11 October 2012)

²⁸⁰ Bulaç, "Suriye'de Hatalar 2", *Zaman*, (13 October 2012)

²⁸¹ According to Bulaç, there are three methods in Islam to change oppressive rulers and corrupted governments. First one is Sunni model, which follows a moderate policy. If it is possible to overthrow the oppressive and corrupted rulers through uprising, Sunni model offers to act. If it is not, Sunni model offers to wait and accumulate power. Second one is Shii model, which offers to be patient. Although Shii model is considered as rebellious, it offers to wait and make hypocrisy (*takiyye*). Ayatollah Khomeini changed this understanding after Iranian Revolution. Third one is the Kharijites' radicalism model. It offers to oppose the oppressive ruler and overthrow it through violence.

and Israel, who aim to start a war between Turkey and Iran by provoking sectarian differences.²⁸²

To conclude, Ali Bulaç is an ‘intellectual-Islamic scholar’ deeply influenced by revolutionary ideas of Iranian Revolution and Khomeini. It is incontrovertible that Iranian Revolution encouraged Bulaç to establish an Islamic structure in Turkey. The death of Khomeini in 1989 opened a new period in Iran. Ending the policies based on ideals and concepts like *tawhid* and *ummah*. After Khomeini, Iran followed more realist and pragmatist policies. In other words, policies of Iran evolved to a more sectarian and nationalist line.²⁸³ This policy change was from ‘Iran for Islam’ to ‘Islam for Iran’. Bulaç defines Iran-Turkey relations without directly supporting Iran. He mostly relies on criticisms of sectarian policies of two states.

4.3.1.2 Atasoy Müftüoğlu

Döveni dövmek gerek, sövene sövmek gerek.

Atasoy Müftüoğlu, known as ‘white-haired wise man of his age’²⁸⁴, was born in 1942 in Çaykara, Trabzon. He completed his primary and secondary education in Ankara. His high school life started in Atatürk High School in Ankara, but he completed his high school education in different cities. He worked as a substitute teacher for a while and moved to Eskişehir in 1966. He published his articles in the journals such as *Büyük Doğu*, *Yeni İstiklal*, *Edebiyat*, *İktibas* and *Mavera*, and the newspapers such as *Yeni İstanbul*, *Yeni Devir*, *Selam* and *Yeni Şafak*. In 1971, he

²⁸² Bulaç, “Türkiye ve İran Parçalanır mı?”, *Zaman*, (14 February 2015)

²⁸³ Bulaç, “İslamcılık ve Baskı Rejimi”, *Zaman*, (20 April 2015)

²⁸⁴ <http://www.akledenler.com/index.php/portre-atasoy-muftuoglu.html/> Date Accessed: 19.04.2015

published the journal of *Deneme* in Eskişehir. Beginning from 1980s, Müftüoğlu travelled to many countries including England, Iran, Pakistan, India, Germany, France and Switzerland and joined several conferences and seminars.²⁸⁵ In these places, he showed awareness to problems of Muslims. He is also the writer of several books, most of which are essays.²⁸⁶ In his books, he opposed to nationalist ideas and adopted a ‘pan-Islamist’ (*ümmetçi*) perspective. He supported the ideas of *ummah*, which was a religious and moral obligation for him²⁸⁷ and *tawhid*, and mostly emphasized the issues of morality, struggle for Islam. Critical approach to modernism and opposition to imperialism are also main bases of his arguments.

Müftüoğlu defines modernism as a whole structure began with Renaissance, developed with Reformation and continued with industrialization, Enlightenment and urbanization in the ‘West’.²⁸⁸ Modernism caused exclusion of Muslims from public sphere. According to Müftüoğlu, Muslim societies are designed by the ‘West’ without their consent. This design was universalized through colonialism and slavery. This was a fascist project, which he calls as ‘Enlightenment Absolutism’.²⁸⁹ As a result, a secular, modern and democratic model was imposed as the only and universal model. This went even further that people was not able to form a sentence without reminding democracy. With the emergence of nation-states and increase of nationalist ideas,

²⁸⁵ This information is obtained from ‘Publicity Bulletins’ of his books.

²⁸⁶ Müftüoğlu emphasized that he was not writing in a professional way. On the contrary, he devoted himself to revival of *Ummah*. See, private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

²⁸⁷ Atasoy Müftüoğlu, *Ümmet Bilinci*, Denge Yayınları, İstanbul, 1994, p. 8

²⁸⁸ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

²⁸⁹ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

exclusion of Islam accelerated. As a result, the idea of *ummah* and *tawhid* weakened. Weakening of them also caused weakening of consciousness of the Muslims. Nation-states were parts of a project designed to homogenize societies. With the emergence of nation-states, artificial racisms and fiction mythologies were ‘invented’ and nation-states legalized themselves through these ‘inventions’.²⁹⁰ Within this context, concepts such as democracy, human rights, independence, freedom, equality and modernity are the traps that are used subtly to entrap eastern nations, who were overwhelmed, incapacitated and impoverished.²⁹¹ These are intended to prevent revival of Islam.

Müftüoğlu is deeply influenced by Iranian intellectuals. According to him, Muslim society is corrupted and degenerated because of ‘Western’ influence and it is overwhelmed under the impact of ‘Western’ culture. It has difficulties to find a solution. Similar to Ali Shariati and Jalal al-Ahmad, Müftüoğlu complains about alienation of intellectuals to their lands and people. Moreover, he makes emphasize on ‘Westoxication’. For instance, he defines the dichotomy of modern and traditional human, which was also used by Ali Shariati. Shariati points to the difference between modern human being and traditional human being within the context of modernism and tradition dispute. According to him, tradition that liberates people is good and tradition that enslaves people is bad. The same proposition is also valid for modernism. Similar to Shariati, for Müftüoğlu, while modern human is limited with a soulless rationality; traditional human is limited with a mindless spiritualism.²⁹²

²⁹⁰ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

²⁹¹ Atasoy Müftüoğlu, *Firak*, (Ankara: Hece Yayınları), 2013, 62.

²⁹² Müftüoğlu, *Düşsel Ufuklardan Gerçek Ufuklara*, 13.

Atasoy Müftüoğlu was deeply influenced by two events, which are his meeting with Sheikh Abdulqadir as-Sufi²⁹³ and the Iranian Revolution in 1979.²⁹⁴ He welcomed the revolution and defined Iran as “Medina of all Muslims”. Iranian Revolution was a rebellion against oppressions of the ‘West’. Rather than Shii Islam, the revolutionary ideas of Iranian Revolution affected Müftüoğlu:

I, as a Muslim, think that Muslims have to pay attention to all parts of Islam. Shii Islam is also one of them. How it emerged, how it came to these days and whatever direction it developed are different issues. Shii Islam is not a problem for me. However, I principally was influenced by the revolutionary ideas of Iranian Revolution. The revolution was the first in the Islamic world. It was the first challenge, the first revenge, the first re-initialization and the first recovering.²⁹⁵

Similar to Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu also separates Khomeini-period Iran from post-Khomeini period. For Müftüoğlu, Khomeini was following a unifying policy towards all Muslims. *Tawhid* was the main base of his ideas. In this regard, Khomeini did not follow a sectarian policy. However, after the death of Khomeini, international powers that opposed Islamic regime in Iran attempted to contain the idea of revolution within Iran and highlighted Shii identity of the revolution:

²⁹³ His name was Ian Dallas before he converted to Islam, when was second half of 1960s. He is originally from Scotland. He works on politicization of Islam. Atasoy Müftüoğlu said that he met him in England. Müftüoğlu was deeply influenced by his ideas. For more information, see Müftüoğlu, *Sözün Erimi*, 19-23.

²⁹⁴ <http://www.akledenler.com/index.php/portre-atasoy-muftuoglu.html/> Date Accessed: 19.04.2015

²⁹⁵ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

Although Iran had a significant culture and civilization, there were attempts to contain Iran because of its Shia character. Emphasizing its Shia character aimed to ignore the revolution. This was an imperial project. It aimed to give the impression that the revolution and its influences were temporal. When Imam Khomeini was alive, no one tended to do this.²⁹⁶

According to Müftüoğlu, Iranian regime started to behave as nation-states in post-Khomeini period and tended to bureaucratization. Even though behaving as nation-states is comprehensible, bureaucratization is not excusable for Müftüoğlu. This is because of the regional developments after the revolution. 8-year war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988, international embargos and limitations on trade compelled Iran to behave as nation-states. However, Müftüoğlu claims that Iran followed a policy originated from ideas based on Islam, *tawhid* and *ummah* during Khomeini's rule. In this regard, Müftüoğlu defines Iran's stance against Hama Massacre in Syria not as a return from these ideals or realpolitik:

Iran's stance against Hama was not realpolitik. Imam Khomeini met with Muslims in Syria and warned them that they did not have capacity for an uprising.²⁹⁷

Müftüoğlu preserves his stance against modernism and imperialism in Syrian Civil War. According to him, opposition movement in Syria is an invention of the 'West'. While criticizing the opposition groups in Syria, Müftüoğlu also criticizes Syrian Regime: 'No doubt, there is despotism in

²⁹⁶ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

²⁹⁷ Private interview with Atasoy Müftüoğlu in 16.01.2015

Syria.²⁹⁸ However, he points out the role of international powers and imperialism in Syria. It was a NATO project that designed to destabilize Syria, to take Syria out of Iran's sphere of influence and to end resistance movements. In addition to these, it is designed that security of Israel would be provided after destabilization of Syria after the civil war. Müftüoğlu criticizes Turkey policies against Syria that Turkey made financial support to Syrian opposition groups and exacerbated the condition in Syria.

4.3.1.3 Ercümen Özkan²⁹⁹

Küfre olan hasımlığım, İslam'a olan hasımlığımdandır.

Ercümen Özkan was born in 1938 in Kırşehir, one of the cities in Central Anatolia. He completed his primary education there, and the secondary and high school educations in Kayseri. His high school life started in Atatürk High School in Ankara, but he completed his high school education in different cities. He went to Ankara for university education. While studying in Faculty of Law, he contacted with Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver and the 'Turkish Hearths'. In 1960, he founded Press News Agency (*Basın Haber Ajansı*). He contacted with Hizb ut-Tahrir, a Sunni-oriented organization aimed to establish an Islamic state under the rule of a Caliph, and became the leader of this organization in Turkey.³⁰⁰ He was arrested in 1967 and punished with deprivation from all public rights and punished with penal servitude. He was released in 1970. In 1981, he began

²⁹⁸ <http://www.islamidusunce.net/forum/index.php?topic=10707.0:wap2> Date Accessed: 20.04.2015

²⁹⁹ While studying this part about Ercümen Özkan, I mostly benefited from the interview with Hüseyin Bülbül, the editor in chief of *İktibas*. Bülbül worked with Özkan in *İktibas* and he has a significant knowledge about Özkan.

³⁰⁰ <http://www.iktibasdergisi.com/ercumend-ozkan/hayati/> Date Accessed: 20.04.2015

to publish the journal of *İktibas* in Ankara. From 1981 until his death, he was again arrested for several times. He died from hearth attack in 1995.

Özkan aimed to purify Islam from the elements, which were included to Islam after death of Prophet. His offers to achieve this purification were comprehension of the book of *Allah* and the reasoning. Therefore, he opposed to all elements, which were included to Islam, and all ideologies except Islam. For instance, he opposed Sufism and defined it as a separate religion. For him, Sufism was contrary to *tawhid* doctrine of Islam:

Although Islam is based on the fundamental doctrine of *la ilaha illallah* (there is no God, but *Allah*), Sufism is based on *la mevcude illallah* (there is no existing, but *Allah*), which is known as *waḥdat al-wujūd*, (the Unity of Existence). This means that there is no a creator or a created, which means all are parts of a unity. In Sufism, this is explained with a sentence: I shaped in flesh and bones, I appeared as Yunus. (*Ete kemiğe büründüm, Yunus olarak göründüm*), means *Allah* is appeared in other creatures. However, it is ordered in Koran that ‘there is nothing like *Allah*’.³⁰¹

According to Özkan, Sufism is a superstition belief that it is based on other religions. Main concepts in Sufism such as *waḥdat al-wujūd*, curatorship and dhikr are borrowed from other religions.³⁰² In addition, he defines the sectarian divisions in Islam as deforming the core ideas of it. The sects in Islam interpret Koran in terms of formal methods such as how did Prophet Mohammad wear and how did he eat or drink. For Özkan, Koran had to be interpreted in terms of core meanings of Islamic rules.

³⁰¹ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

³⁰² Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 188.

Another criticism of Özkan is about the Sunnah and Hadith. He defines the Sunnah as the practices and behaviors of Prophet Mohammad, which are based in Koran. The Sunnah is transformed and transfigured. While it had the meaning of understanding the real and core meanings of Koran and practices of Prophet Mohammad, it transformed to a formal and perfunctory meaning. People began to give attention to eating or wearing of Prophet rather than his advices. He defines the Hadith as the words of people, who interpret the words of Prophet Mohammad. These are the reasons of deformation and imitation of Islam. For Özkan, salvation is possible only with comprehending the core ideas of religion, but not through imitating it. This is why he said ‘my hostility to impiety is because of my affinity to Islam’.

Özkan welcomes the Iranian Revolution. According to him, Iranian Revolution had two impacts on Muslims and on the world:

Firstly, it reinforced the idea of revival of Islam. It showed that Muslims’ ideals to establish an Islamic state could be realized. Secondly, it displayed that only authority was *Allah*, not the United States or Soviets.³⁰³

He also claimed that the increasing relations between Iran and Turkey after the Iranian Revolution in 1979 were as a result of Islam’s unifying ability.³⁰⁴ Furthermore, he defined his support to any collaboration between Iran and Turkey that this collaboration would be beneficial to Islam.³⁰⁵ However, Özkan makes a differentiation about results of the revolution in terms of religion and politics. As Hüseyin Bülbül argues; Özkan supported the revolution in terms of its political dimension, but he

³⁰³ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

³⁰⁴ Ercüment Özkan, “Entegrasyona Doğru”, *İktibas*, Volume: IV, Issue: 82, 4.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 9.

opposed its dependence on Shii culture.³⁰⁶ Even, as Bülbül points, Özkan offered to protect the revolution that he defined it as the revolution of all Muslims.³⁰⁷ In this regard, as Alev Erkilet points, he criticizes Islamists in Turkey for opposing the revolution in Iran with sectarian attitudes.³⁰⁸ Although he criticizes Islamists in Turkey, he also criticizes Iranian regime of highlighting the Shii character of the revolution. For Özkan, Iran began to follow a sectarian policy after the death of Khomeini, when sectarian ideas were preferred to *tawhidi* ideas. As Bülbül argues:

Imam Khomeini, when he was alive, coped with sectarian differences. He overcame with the sectarian ‘obstacles’ and highlighted Islam. However, some sectarian fanatics accused him with demolishing Shii Islam.³⁰⁹

In addition, imperialism, which was shocked with Iranian Revolution, supported sectarian differences between Sunnis and Shiis to prevent spread of revolutionary ideas to different Islamic societies in the region. After the spread of revolution to different countries, anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist movements would increase in the region. In this context, nation-states collaborated with imperialism that they did not want any change in status quo. As a result, Iran was isolated and the revolutionary ideas were marginalized within Iran through emphasize on sectarian differences. Ercümen Özkan points that if the success of revolution was attributed to Islam, not to the sect, it would be more influential and more successful.

³⁰⁶ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

³⁰⁷ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

³⁰⁸ Alev Erkilet, “Ercümen Özkan” in Ed. Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil, *İslamcılık*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları), 2005, 690.

³⁰⁹ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

To conclude, Özkan was a ‘sui generis’ Islamist that differs from others mentioned in this thesis. First of all, his ideas are one of the most puritan and salafi ideas among Islamists in Turkey.³¹⁰ He rejected Sufism and mysticism, which were kinds of polytheism and non-Islamic for him. In addition, he rejected all sects in Islam because of distorting the core of religion. Secondly, he was the leader of an Islamic organization in Turkey, Hizb ut-Tahrir, which could be defined as the first radical Islamist movement in the history of Republic.³¹¹ Hizb ut-Tahrir was demanding establishment of an Islamic state ruled by a Caliph, establishment of a federation in this Islamic state and establishment of sharia courts.³¹² Thirdly, although he welcomed the Iranian Revolution, he rejected Shii character of the revolution. Since sects were out of Islam for him, he only supported the revolutionary ideas as Iran-inspired Islamists, who are analyzed in this thesis. Iran-inspired Islamists, who are Sunni, are also influenced primarily from the revolutionary ideas of the Iranian Revolution. However, they all admit the Shii Islam and the Shii character of the Iranian Revolution as a fact. In other words, Iran-inspired Islamists define the sectarian division within Islam from the frame of *tawhid* and admitted them as the parts of a whole. In this regard, Özkan is an exception. He rejects sectarian divisions within Islam, which makes him ‘the most detached’ Islamist to Iran-inspired Islam(ism).

³¹⁰ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 192.

³¹¹ Bora and Gültekingil, 684.

³¹² *Ibid*, 686.

4.3.1.4 Mehmet Metiner

*Islamism, which lacks democracy, does not mean anything other than Talibanism.*³¹³

Mehmet Metiner was born in Adıyaman in 1960. He was graduated from Faculty of Literature in İstanbul University. In his youth, he joined to National Turkish Student Association (*Milli Türk Talebe Birliği*) or MTTB, which was an organization acting as a youth organization. Then, he joined the *Akıncılar*, another Islamist organization. He published the journals of *Girişim*, *Yeni Zemin* and *Sözleşme*. He worked as the advisor of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, when Erdoğan was mayor of the Welfare Party (closed in 1998) in İstanbul. He continued his service after Erdoğan became the metropolitan municipality mayor of İstanbul. He also served as the advisor of Recai Kutan, the leader of Virtue Party (closed in 2001), for a while. During 2000 and 2001, he held office as the vice president of HADEP (Democracy Party of People), which was closed for becoming the center of illegal activities in 2003. He lectured in Bahçeşehir University for a while. He began to publish in the newspaper of *Yeni Şafak*. In 2011 general elections, he was elected as the MP of Adıyaman from Justice and Development Party.³¹⁴ He still publishes in the newspaper of *Star* since 2014.

Metiner has a political and ideological line from radical Islamism to democracy and from supporting Iranian Revolution to opposing Iran. As it can be derived from his political background, Metiner had a ‘flexible’ political stance from conservatism to Kurdish nationalism and from opposition to democracy, which was seen as infidelity, to advocacy of

³¹³ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 17.

³¹⁴ While I was studying on this thesis, Metiner was declared as one of the MP candidates of Justice and Development Party in general elections of 2015.

democracy. Although he is mostly criticized because of these ‘inconstancies’, he is not annoyed with it that he admits the rupture from his Islamic past:

I do not believe the possibility of improvement without change in the ideas. Undoubtedly, we are changing and progressing.³¹⁵

Metiner has an important Islamic past. Being involved in several Islamic movements in his youth, Metiner, in fact, demonstrated himself with the establishment of the journal, *Girişim*, in the Islamic community in Turkey. Established in 1985, *Girişim* had a significant position among Islamic groups that in its first issue it rejected religious groups formed through different understandings of Islam and declared its unique and neutral stance.³¹⁶ Metiner, as the editor of the journal, did not oppose to existence of religious groups formed through different understandings of Islam. What he opposed was ‘fanatic tribalism’ of them. Influenced by Islamists Sayyid Qutb, Mohammad Qutb, Maududi, Ali Bulaç and Said Havva, Metiner aimed to create a ‘melting pot’ with reference to several Islamist thinkers and movements emerged in different regions at different times. This would be acquired with melding of universal and valid aspects of Islam with reference to Koran and Sunnah.³¹⁷ This was called as ‘modern calling of Islamic law’ (*Çağdaş Davet Fıkhı*). In the theorization of it, Metiner benefited from Islamist thinkers both from abroad and Turkey such as Hasan al-Banna, the founder of *Ikhwan*, Sayyid Qutb, who radicalized *Ikhwan*, al-Maududi, the ideologue of *Jamaat-e Islami*, Fethi Yeken, the Lebanese Sunni Islamist, Rashid Ghannushi, the Tunisian

³¹⁵ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 17.

³¹⁶ Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan*, 140-141.

³¹⁷ *Ibid*, 144.

Islamist, Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Khomeini and Said Nursi.³¹⁸ As Ayşe Ayata points that this theory aimed to overcome the different understandings in Islam.

...the theory should overcome all differences of sect, opinion and practice in Islam; it should aim at integrating popular Islam with the Islamic movements in a basically anti-Western and rational ideology... This theory of calling turns around six recurrent themes: anti-Westernism, realism, the problem of geographic specificity, pluralism, leadership and the people, and the means of preaching the theory.³¹⁹

In this regard, Metiner advocated the re-interpretation of Islam through the changing conditions of the age and changing demands of societies.³²⁰ This was for universality of Islam.

In addition to these, Metiner was a vigorous advocator of pan-Islamism (*ümmetçilik*). He opposed to nationalism and emphasizes on ethnicities.³²¹ Since he was a pan-Islamist (*ümmetçi*), he considered nationalism factious and harmful. He was so opposing to nationalism that he, himself, was changing words of Turk in the poems and songs to Islam.³²²

³¹⁸ Ibid, 144.

³¹⁹ Ayşe Ayata, "Pluralism Versus Authoritarianism: Political Ideas in Two Islamic Publications" in Ed. Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (New York: I.B Tauris), 1991, 260.

³²⁰ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 100.

³²¹ Ibid, 26.

³²² For instance he changed one of the verses of Necip Fazıl Kısakürek's poem, *Sakarya Türküsü*. The verse, 'Sirtina Sakarya'nın Türk Tarihi vurulur' was changed as 'Sirtina Sakarya'nın İslam Tarihi vurulur'. Moreover, he says that he changed the words of Turk

Similar to Müftüoğlu, in time, Iran was considered as ‘the Medina of all Muslims’ after the Iranian Revolution by Metiner. Metiner’s ideas towards Iranian Revolution changed in late of 1980s and beginning of 1990s, after death of Khomeini in 1989, which also overlaps with closing of *Girişim* in 1990. Metiner was influenced by Khomeini that he claimed Iranian Revolution was in fact Khomeini’s revolution in the hearts of Iranian people. Iranian Revolution, jihadist movement in Afghanistan and military coup of Zia-ul Haq in Pakistan encouraged Islamists in Turkey:

After the successes of these Islamic movements, struggles against secular and impious state of Turkey increased. Some of slogans were as such: ‘Erbakan, Zia, Khomeini, Long Live Islamic Unity’, ‘Sharia is Islam, Constitution is Koran’ and ‘Sharia Rule will Come, Violence will End’.³²³

However, Metiner’s considerations of Iran changed after death of Khomeini. He began to question the structure and institutions of Islamic regime established after the revolution. For him, Iran in post-revolution period was corrupted. The revolution was idolized and ideas generated with the revolutionary process were exposed to the danger of being limited to the boundaries of Iran. Although he admired the revolution, he points the totalitarian practices of the Iranian state established after the revolution. According to him, the regime followed a patronizing and Jacobin institutionalizing process. In addition to these, Metiner argues that Iran began to follow a sectarian policy. The revolution was not comprehended by the Muslim people both in Turkey and Iran. He points out that the ‘Iranist more than Iran’ ideas that Islamists in Turkey mostly

in the song, Çırpınırdı Karadeniz, which was taught them during MTTB times, to Islam. See, Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 34.

³²³ Ibid, 66.

use to define the Iranian Revolution in terms of their understandings began caused misunderstandings. Therefore, the Iranian Revolution is being considered differently by each Islamic group. For instance, there is a common belief in Turkey that Sufism is defined as infidelity by Iranian regime and Iran-inspired Islamists in Turkey, with the intent of praising Iran, accuse Sufis in Turkey of being heretics.³²⁴ However, Metiner points that Sufi traditions such as touching graves of prominent Sufi dervishes, hoping them for help and obeying their rules are also being implemented in Iran.³²⁵ Thus, Metiner defines these Iran-inspired Islamists as ‘Iranist more than Iran’ and the condition as ‘Iran in Turkey is different than Iran in Iran’. Metiner claims that these considerations degenerate the universal ideas of the revolution.

Iran-inspired Islamists in Turkey defines the structure in Iran as a ‘supra-sects’ structure. For them, policies of Iran are not sectarian. With the intent of praising Iran, they re-interpret history and provoke the Ahl-e Sunnah. Muslims, who do not obey Imam Khomeini, are perceived out of Koran and out of Prophet’s practices. They have a slogan, which is ‘the route of Imam is the route of Koran’.³²⁶

To conclude, Metiner is one of the Iran-inspired Islamists. After Khomeini’s death, according to Metiner, Iran began to follow a sectarian and nationalist policy, which is defined as Iran’s giving up the ideals of the revolution. Developments in the region in the axis of sects such as Syrian issue, Lebanon or Yemen compelled Iran to display sectarian

³²⁴ For example Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan and Nureddin Şirin oppose Sufism. See the private interviews with Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Hüseyin Bülbül and Nureddin Şirin.

³²⁵ Metiner, *Şafakta 10 Gün: İran Notları*, 93.

³²⁶ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 382.

reflexes. Today, Metiner defines Iran as the country, which terminates its own revolution:

Even though Khamenei, who is follower of Khomeini and was one of the opponents against Shah, is the leader of Iran today, Iran no longer has not got any attributes of the revolution. Iran turned into a regime that does not follow the ideals of revolution, but follows a nationalist and sectarian policy. Today, Iran supports Syria because of sectarian reflexes. Islamic Republic of Iran is a new oppressive Shah regime. Syria is supported only because of Assad's Shii identity. Iran, which mentioned the export of revolution, seeks to quell the revolutions today.³²⁷

4.3.2 Ideological Iran-Inspired Islamists

4.3.2.1 Kenan Çamurcu

Iran is not only a state. It is also a geo-cultural basin reaching to Anatolia and Europe.

Kenan Çamurcu was born in İzmit, Kocaeli in 1961. He completed his primary and secondary education in Sivas and İzmit. He was educated in a *madrassa* in 1983 for a while. In 1985, he entered to Department of Persian Language and Literature in İstanbul University. He began to write in *Milli Gazete* and *Dönüşüm* in 1984. In 1985, he organized the first meeting of Quds Days.³²⁸ In the same year, Çamurcu took part in Metiner's journal of

³²⁷ Metiner, "Kendi Devrimini Bitiren Ülke: İran", *Yeni Şafak*, (30 August 2012)

³²⁸ Quds Days are annual events that firstly organized in Iran in 1979. It is organized to develop solidarity with Palestinian people. Opposition to Zionism and existence of Israel are the most characteristic features of Quds Days. It is also mostly organized in Turkey. The most prominent one was organized in Ankara in 1997 by Sincan Municipality. This

Girişim. Since he published an interview about the Kurdish Question, he was sued in alleged plot to separatism in 1987. The case was resulted in non-prosecution. He took part in the establishment of the journal, *Tevhid*. From 2003 onwards, he published in the journals, *Bilgi ve Düşünce* and *Birikim*. He served to some municipalities in İstanbul as an advisor, which were the municipalities of the Welfare Party and Justice and Development Party.

Çamurcu, who knows Arabic and Persian in a good level, is also the writer of several books. Besides, he has a reputation for his translations from Persian. He translated Ayatollah Khomeini's book 'The Secret of Prayer' (*Sirr-u Salat*), Ali Shariati's books *Sociology of Economy*, *the Identity of Muslim Iran*, and *World View and Ideology*, Ayatollah Motahhari's book *the Philosophy of Islamic Economy* and Ayatollah Taleqhani's book *Pertevi ez Kuran* from Persian to Turkish. Works of Abdolkarim Soroush and Yahya Yesrebi are also books that Çamurcu translated.

Kenan Çamurcu criticizes the West-inspired intellectuals and the West-oriented ideas that advocate change in Muslim societies can be realized only through adaptation to West-oriented moral values.³²⁹ According to him, this causes alienation of the West-inspired intellectuals both to themselves and their cultures. This is why the rulers in Muslim countries are disconnected to their society. The US and the 'West' aimed to form a moderate Islam that would be directed in their guidance, which were

organization, which Ambassador of Iran also joined, was one of the milestones of the process going to military 'intimidation' on 28 February 1997. In this organization, performances emphasizing jihad and sharia were held and as a result Bekir Yıldız, the mayor of Sincan, and Nureddin Şirin, who spoke in this organization, were arrested. Nureddin Şirin was in prison for 8 years.

³²⁹ Kenan Çamurcu, *Orta Dünya Jeopolitiğinde İslami Uyanış*, (İstanbul: Feta Yayınları), 2013, 9.

called as US-inspired Islam. However, the Iranian Revolution was rejection of the West-oriented ideas and defeat of the West-inspired intellectuals. It terminated the US-inspired Islam and created an alternative to capitalism and communism.³³⁰

Kenan Çamurcu is a prominent supporter of Iranian Revolution and Iran's policies in the region. As Mehmet Metiner, who worked with Çamurcu in the journal, *Girişim*, states that Çamurcu was deeply influenced by Iranian Revolution:

Kenan Çamurcu, in time, began to define Iran as the 'Medina of Muslims' and Imam Khomeini as the Imam of all Muslims, whom had to be respected.³³¹

According to Çamurcu, from the revolution until today, Iran can be explained in three periods, which are the War Period, the post-War Period and the Development Period. The War Period includes the 8-year War with Iraq between 1980 and 1988, when, on the one hand, the new regime in Iran struggled to institutionalize the state institutions and on the other hand, it tried to protect the territorial integrity. In post-War Period, the regime struggled to strengthen its rule. The Development Period corresponds to the period after Khomeini's death. In this period, Rafsanjani and Khamenei came to the power and they followed a liberal policy, which aimed the development of Iranian industry and increase of Iran's relations with world market. Çamurcu argues that Iran transformed itself to a regional power, which increased its non-oil revenues, began to follow an active policy in the region and formed an alternative economic

³³⁰ Ibid, 41.

³³¹ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 166.

and political system against the United States.³³² For him, Iran is one of the exceptional countries that succeeded such a linear development, both economically and politically, from the revolution in 1979 until today.

According to Çamurcu, Iranian Revolution is the last and the most perfect revolution.³³³ After the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini formed an anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist Islamic regime in Iran. Çamurcu defines this religious regime as a synthesis composed of democracy experience of the ‘West’ and Shii Islam.³³⁴ Iranian regime is distinguishing in terms of two features:

Firstly, despite the Islamic theories of legitimacy, Iranian regime takes its legitimacy from the people. The idea of ‘Islamic Republic’ and the constitution of Islamic regime are determined with referendum. Secondly, the regime is a re-interpretation of *Walayat al-Faqih*. By re-interpreting this theory of governing, Khomeini prevented the authorization of governing.³³⁵

According to Çamurcu, after the death of Khomeini in 1989, Iranian regime did not lose any power and it conserved its influence both in Iran and in the region. The revolution was not depending on person.³³⁶ After Khomeini’s death, a constitutional reform was amended. Ali Khamenei was elected as the new *Walayat al-Faqih* and Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected as the president. Çamurcu emphasizes the significance of these

³³² Çamurcu, *Firuze Köprüde Üçüncü Cumhuriyet*, 49.

³³³ <http://www.islamigundem.com/arap-bahari-bir-proje-kenan-camurcu-roportaji-haber-33985.html> Date Accessed: 29.04.2015

³³⁴ Çamurcu, *Firuze Köprüde Üçüncü Cumhuriyet*, 83-84.

³³⁵ *Ibid*, 84.

³³⁶ *Ibid*, 51.

changes in Iranian politics after 1989. In such a period, when the ‘fever of revolution’ was about to die, Iranian people preferred to use their energy in production rather than shouting slogans.³³⁷ As a result, Iranian people elected Rafsanjani as the president and the ‘Second Republic’³³⁸ was established. The ‘Second Republic’ was a rational republic, which aimed economic development. Khomeini period, on the other hand, was the republic of ideals struggling with domestic affairs and 8-year war with Iraq. Furthermore, as Çamurcu argues, although the Khomeini period was called as ‘the government of slogans’, the Rafsanjani government was called as ‘the government of action’.³³⁹ This is an important argument that ideological Iran-inspired Islamists like Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin, who will be argued in the next part, make emphasize on economic development and progress rather than ideology and ideals. As Çamurcu admires the post-Khomeini period:

Iran was transformed to a modern and national state with Rafsanjani period.³⁴⁰

Kenan Çamurcu is so confident about increasing influence of Iran and revolutionary ideas in the post-Khomeini period that he praises Ayatollah Khamenei of promulgating the ideas inspired from the revolution in 1979:

³³⁷ Ibid, 49-50.

³³⁸ According to Kenan Çamurcu, The First Republic began with the revolution in 1979 and ended with election of Rafsanjani as the president. The Second Republic began with Election of Rafsanjani and continued until the elections in 1997. With Mohammad Khatami’s winning elections in 1997, the Third Republic began in Iran. For Çamurcu, the First Republic was a republic of ideals. The Second Republic, on the other hand, aimed economic development. The Third Republic was established on democratic values and ideals.

³³⁹ Çamurcu, *Firuze Köprüde Üçüncü Cumhuriyet*, 59.

³⁴⁰ Ibid, 60.

In Khomeini period, Iran established an independent, honorable and unique future. As for that, Khamenei maintains this aim and moves the accumulation of the revolution to further. Iran's increasing influence in the region and its increasing power points this.³⁴¹

According to Çamurcu, Iranian Revolution is the most significant example of Islamic Revival.³⁴² He analyzes the 'Arab Spring' or Arab uprisings in the frame of this Islamic Revival. For him, the 'Arab Spring' is a result of 'moral expansion' of Iranian Revolution's legacy.³⁴³ Muslim societies in the region opposed to their 'West-inspired' rulers and rejected their authority. They aimed to establish an independent state, which took Iran as the example. These caused the 'West' to perceive Iran as a threat and the Islamic movements in the region as Iran-inspired movements. Çamurcu defines the 'particular interest' to Syria as a result of Syria's connections with Iran in the issues of Lebanon, Palestine and Iraq, which form a direct threat to security of Israel.³⁴⁴ In this respect, Çamurcu criticizes Turkey's stance in Syrian Issue:

The conservative government in Ankara supports terrorist organizations in Syria. It allows terrorists to use the Turkish lands. Turkey, which encouraged Syrian opposition for the

³⁴¹ Çamurcu, *Orta Dünya Jeopolitiğinde İslami Uyanış*, 79.

³⁴² Islamic Revival is defined by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the *Faqih* of Iran. Islamic Revival is an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist movement that aims to improve identical feelings of all Muslims. Islamic Revival began with France's invasion of Egypt under Ottoman rule. Afterwards, Muslims stayed under the attacks of the 'West'. Exposed to the 'Western' influence, Muslims began to become conscious. Iranian Revolution was a result of this awakening. At the same time, it became a model to other Muslim societies.

³⁴³ Çamurcu, *Orta Dünya Jeopolitiğinde İslami Uyanış*, 131.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 83.

establishment of a council, violates the rights of a sovereign state.³⁴⁵

According to Çamurcu, what Turkey obtained from these policies are alienation to the region, turning against its neighbors and being isolated.³⁴⁶

It followed the NATO operations and formed an alliance with the US, Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Opposed to anti-democratic policies of Assad in Syria and supported an intervention in Syria. However, these policies are double-faced for Kenan Çamurcu:

Ankara advocated the Syrian opposition movements as calling them opposition movements of innocent people against Assad. However, why it did not support the opposition movements of Bahrain people against monarchy? Why it did not oppose to oppressive policies against Yemeni people?³⁴⁷

4.3.2.2 Nureddin Şirin

İslam Devrimi 'ne ne kadar minnettar olsak azdır. Devrim canımızdır, onurumuz, izzetimiz ve şahsiyetimizdir. Devrim bizimle var değil, biz devrimle birlikte varız.

Ne devrimi payanda yapmak, ne de sözde devrime payanda olmak... Asıl olan yalnızca ve yalnızca devrim için olmak, pazarlıksız bir şekilde devrim için yaşamak ve devrim için adanmaktır.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ Ibid, 108.

³⁴⁶ Ibid, 120.

³⁴⁷ Çamurcu, *Asimetrik Vakalarda Kible Tayini*, 13.

³⁴⁸ http://www.islamigundem.com/makale_print.php?id=2520 Date Accessed: 06.05.2015

Nureddin Şirin, who is known as ‘Ağacan’³⁴⁹, was born in Trabzon in 1964. He completed his primary and secondary education in İstanbul. After one year education in the School of Foreign Languages in Konya, he entered Faculty of Language, History and Geography in Ankara University. He is known with his stance against Israel and his support to Palestinian Resistance. He joined to MTTB and became the chief of culture committee.³⁵⁰ He published his articles in the journals like *İstiklal*, *Tevhid and Şehadet* and the newspaper, *Selam*. Mehmet Metiner, who worked with Nureddin Şirin for a while, states that he met with Şirin in the period after 1980 military coup:

Şirin was a revolutionary Islamist, who was opposing Sufism and sects in Islam. His ideas radicalized in time. He devoted himself to Iranian Revolution and the leader of the revolution, Khomeini. For him, Iran was an Islamic state and Khomeini was a Caliph, whom had to be respected by all Muslims. He was one of the people that I defined as ‘Iranist than Iran’ and ‘more royalist than the king’.³⁵¹

Nureddin Şirin was arrested after celebration of *Quds Days*, organized by Sincan Municipality of Welfare Party in Ankara in 1997, because of making propaganda of sharia rule. He was accused of making propaganda

³⁴⁹ Ağacan is a Persian originated word means ‘my dear friend’. In the private interview with him, Nureddin Şirin said that he was calling to his friends as ‘Ağacan’ and then, this name turned to as a nickname. There is also a song called ‘Ağacan’ that addressing Nureddin Şirin. For the song, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dyGEUso2hrs> Date Accessed: 07.05.2015

³⁵⁰ Siyami Akyel, *MTTB ve MTTB'liler*, (İstanbul: Hemenora Yayınları), 2000, 199.

³⁵¹ Metiner, *Yemyeşil İslam Bembeyaz Demokrasi*, 102-103.

of Hezbollah and his aim of establishing an Iran-inspired sharia state in Turkey.³⁵²In the end, he was sentenced to 8-year prison.

He is still the chief editor of Kudüs Tv, a television channel, and www.velfecr.com, a news portal. In these institutions, Şirin publishes Iran-inspired broadcasts. He opposes existence of Israel and support the Palestinian resistance movement. For example, anniversaries of important dates of Iranian Revolution, death anniversaries of prominent people, who played an effective role during and after the revolution, are usually showed in Kudüs Tv.

According to Şirin, Islamic movements agreed on three principals before the military coup in 1980. These were ideological opposition to secular-Kemalist regime, pan-Islamism (*ümmetçilik*) and recognition of Prophet Mohammad as the leader.³⁵³ Opposition to secular-Kemalist regime derived from opposition to ‘Westernization’ policies. Practices of the regime were rejected because of being against Islam. Only rules of God would lead to rule the country. Islamists aimed to establish a political and ideological Islamic system, which was possible only through unity of all Muslims. In this regard, nationalism and nation-states were rejected. Since they were products of imperialism, national boundaries were considered as illegal. Prophet Mohammad was approved as the only leader in all spheres of life. Koran had to be prevailed. Frame of legality and legitimacy was the frame that was defined in Koran. As Nureddin Şirin points:

We approved the Prophet as our leader. We rejected the nation-states and national boundaries. We rejected ethnicities and nationalism. We aimed to establish a universal Islamic

³⁵² Abdullah Yıldız, *28 Şubat: Belgeler*, (İstanbul: Pınar Yayınları), 2000, 244-246.

³⁵³ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

order and bring all Muslims under the same flag, which was the Islamic flag. While we were demanding these, Iranian Revolution came true. What we said before the revolution and after the revolution was almost same.³⁵⁴

Nureddin Şirin was mostly influenced by the idea of revolution. Revolutionary ideology of Iranian Revolution appealed to him. At first, he did not have knowledge about the Shii Islam, which Muslims in Turkey also did not have enough knowledge. However, Şirin and his friends began to have a 'sense of belonging' to Shii Islam that they considered the core values of Shii Islam such as Karbala myth and devotion to Imam Hussein were familiar to them.³⁵⁵ Muslims in Turkey mostly emphasized the Shii characteristic of the revolution and unwelcomed it. On the other hand, Şirin defined the Shii Islam as the fifth sect³⁵⁶ of Islam. Furthermore, it was alleged that Nureddin Şirin also converted to Shii Islam.³⁵⁷ According to Şirin, Iran under Shah Regime was one of the allies of the United States in the region and following West-inspired policies. It was not opposing imperialism and existence of Israel.³⁵⁸ However, when the Islamic regime was established in Iran, Iran turned to a country that was opposing to Israel, the United States and imperialism. Ayatollah Khomeini called all Muslims to resist against oppressive regimes and oppose to imperialism. These created a counter-revolution stance against

³⁵⁴ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

³⁵⁵ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

³⁵⁶ Four main sects in Islam were Hanafism, Shafiism, Malikism and Hanbalism, which were all Sunni-oriented sects.

³⁵⁷ In the private interview with Şirin, it was asked to him whether he was a Shii or Sunni. He answered as the following: 'I answer this question as both yes and no.'

³⁵⁸ <http://www.kudustv.com/11022015-kudus-tv-genyayyonnureddin-siriniran-islam-devrimi--4622.html> Date Accessed: 06.05.2015

Iran that aimed to limit the revolution in the boundaries of Iran. Prevention of expansion of revolutionary ideas towards region was the main goal. To achieve this, Saudi Arabia collaborated with Israel and the United States. They highlighted the Shii characteristic of the revolution and emphasized the historical rivalry between Shiis and Sunnis.

It is considered that Iranian policies of international relations and religion toward the region changed after Khomeini's death in 1989. According to Nureddin Şirin there are two views on this policy change:³⁵⁹ One view emphasizes that Iran began to follow realist and pragmatist policies rather than pan-Islamist and idealist policies. The other view rejects the thesis of the first view and advocates the continuity in the Iranian politics. Şirin places himself in the second view and opposes the ideas that Iran transformed to a nation-state and left the *Tawhid* policy after the death of Khomeini. On the contrary, he believes that Iran increasingly maintained revolutionary and *Tawhid* policies in the post-Khomeini period:

As Imam Khomeini applied in practice, Islamic Revolution did not follow a sectarian policy. Today, the *Faqih* after Imam Khomeini, Imam Khamenei, increasingly continued this *tawhidi* and non-sectarian policies. Furthermore, he would be doubled practices of Imam Khomeini. I am saying this as a person, who is closely acquainted with Imam Khamenei.³⁶⁰

In addition to these, Şirin claims that policies of Iran began to prioritize the Sunni world more than the Shii world. In other words, Iran began to use its capacity and its resources for Sunni world more than Shii world.

³⁵⁹ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

³⁶⁰ Private interview with Nureddin Şirin in 05.03.2015

For instance, Iran got involved the civil war in Bosnia and supported Alijah Izetbegovic. If Iran used its capacity, which it used for Bosnia, for Bahrain, there would be revolutions in Bahrain for several times. Another example is Palestine. Iran supports resistance movement in Palestine both economically and politically. When Lebanon and Syria are also considered together with resistance movement in Palestine, the burden for Iran is increasing. If Iran had allocated the fund, which it spent with the aim of supporting Palestinian Resistance against Israeli occupation, for Gulf countries rather than Palestine, there would be several revolutions in the Gulf countries. Gulf countries are composed of a sizeable Shii population. Gulf countries are ruled by Riyadh and the US-led monarchies. As it can be seen, there is a convenient condition for Iran to act. However, to what extent Iran did get involved in these countries? These are examples of Iran's policies that display it does not follow a sectarian policy.

While emphasizing the continuity of Iran's policies towards *ummah* understanding, Şirin also emphasizes anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist aspects of Iran. Iran supports leftist movements and all oppressed people in the world. It has policies towards Nicaragua, Venezuela and Cuba. In other words, Şirin points that Iran's relations with non-Muslim countries display that Iran does not pay attention to whether they are Shii or Sunni. Rather, Iran follows an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist policy, which displays the maintenance in the idealist stance in policies of Iran. According to Şirin, this idealist stance has not changed after Khomeini's death, but increasingly maintained.

Hama Massacre is defined as a part of international plot by Nureddin Şirin. In this regard, he considers Iran's stance against Hama in terms of geopolitical conditions. According to Şirin, Iran's policies towards Hama should be considered in the frame of Iraq-Iran War between 1980 and

1988, Israel's attacks on Lebanon in 1982 and exclusion of Palestinian commandos from Lebanon in 1982.³⁶¹ For him, these were parts of a project designed by international powers to isolate Iran. Iran was under blockage and embargo of international powers. According to Şirin, Iran had no chance to help the Muslims in Hama. In addition to these, he, on the one hand, admits Iran's pragmatic stance about Hama, on the other hand, he compares Iran's stance with Prophet Mohammad's agreement with Christians and Jews in Mecca and Medina. For Şirin, Iran had no chance to act in different ways rather than opposing uprisings of Syrian Muslims in Hama. As a result, Iranian administration acted strategically as Prophet Mohammad did in Mecca and Medina.

4.4 Journals and Newspapers of Iran-Inspired Islamists/Intellectuals in Turkey

Revival of Islamic literature can be studied in three periods that contributed to development of Islamic ideas, socialization and politicization of Islam, strengthening of Islamic way of life. These periods are the Democrat Party Periods of 1950s, National View Periods of 1970s and the period after military coup in 1980.³⁶² In the first period, populist policies of Democrat Party are viewed and its practices in religious sphere and political sphere are analyzed. In the second period, Necmettin Erbakan and his National View emerged as one of the major political actor in Islamic circles that gave hope of coming power to Islamists. In the third period, all political parties and organizations were closed after the military coup. Since Islamic groups were not harmed by practices of military

³⁶¹ Private Interview with Nureddin Şirin in 06.03.2015

³⁶² Ayşe Ayata, "Pluralism Versus Authoritarianism: Political Ideas in Two Islamic Publications" in Ed. Richard Tapper, *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, (New York: I.B Tauris), 1991, 254.

government as profoundly as the leftist groups, there was a considerable revival of Islamic intellectuals. As Ayata analyzes the condition of Islamist movements and Islamic press, it can be said that the third period, from a different point of view, became beneficial for them.

...they have published up to 45 periodicals. They are organized but not necessarily in political parties. Although this is one of the rare periods, when Islamic groups have been very close to power (such as *Nakşibendis* in the Motherland Party government), direct attacks on the secular Turkish state, as well as demands for a totalistic Islamic state, have greatly increased...radical Islamic elements are introduced for the first time in Turkish republican history, especially under the influence of the Islamic Revolution in Iran.³⁶³

The period after 1980 became a period of 'Renaissance' for Islamists. As the revolution in Iran created differences between Islamic movements just like a 'litmus paper', but led to the emergence of differences in Islamic press. While a group of Islamic press followed a more conformist and moderate line, the others followed a radical and activist policy.³⁶⁴ Latter mostly took Iranian Revolution as an example and supported it. Iranian Revolution encouraged them to establish an Islamic state similar to Iran in Turkey. Common points of these publications were the influence of the revolution on them, radical and activist views, opposition to secular Kemalist regime and opposition to imperialism and Zionism (and practices of the US and Israel). In addition to these, they usually used certain concepts such as oppressed people, *tawhid*, *ummah*, *mostazafin*, *shirk*, the

³⁶³ Ibid, 254.

³⁶⁴ Doğan Duman, "Türkiye'de İslamcı Yayıncılık", *Çağdaş Türkiye Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Volume: II, Issue: 4-5, (1995), 83.

‘US as the Big Satan’, the US-inspired Islam, anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism. In this context, journals, newspapers and periodicals, which are published by Iran-inspired Islamists studied in this thesis, will be analyzed in this part of this thesis. Cadres of these publications (ideas of their owners, editors or writers towards Iranian Revolution), their treatments on revolutionary movements in Iran and their support and sympathy to Iranian Revolution are the main points that prompted me to decide to study these publications.

4.4.1 Düşünce

The monthly journal, *Düşünce*, was firstly published in April of 1976 and continued publishing until October of 1978. From this time until June of 1979, *Düşünce* was not published for economic reasons. After this break, it published its first issue in June of 1979, which is after the Iranian Revolution, until November of 1979. The owner of this journal was Ahmet Kuru and editor in chief was Ali Bulaç in the period between April of 1976 and October of 1978. In the new period of the journal, when it began re-publishing in June of 1979, Ali Bulaç is seen as the owner of the journal and Ali Kemal Temizer as editor in chief. Since the articles about Iran and Iranian Revolution mostly began to be published in the new period of the journal, which began in June of 1979, I will analyze this period of the journal, which Ali Bulaç was the owner and Ali Kemal Temizer was the editor in chief.

In the first issue of new period, which is between June of 1979 and November of 1979, *Düşünce* defines the developments in the region in the period, when the journal was not published. According to the journal, Iranian Revolution was the most important of these developments:

There were developments in the world that challenged and transformed the status quo. No doubt, Islamic Revolution in

Iran was the most significant of them. This revolution was so different that the last examples of such a revolution would be seen during times of Prophets. The revolution organized people and brought many people together around Islam and destroyed the monarchy of Shah.³⁶⁵

In this article about the Iranian Revolution; the role of Islam in the revolution, the leadership of Khomeini, opposition to imperialism and monarchy, and originality of the revolution are emphasized. As it is pointed out in the article, the revolution was realized within the context of Islam, which distinguished Iranian Revolution from other revolutions. The leadership of Khomeini played an important role in the evolution of the revolutionary process. He rejected the monarchical system, which was based on *shirq*. According to Khomeini, the roots of Islamic revolution were in Islam. *Düşünce* often emphasize the anti-imperialist and anti-monarchy aspects of the revolution. The revolution was the attitude of Muslims against imperialism and monarchy.³⁶⁶ Despite all, *Düşünce* does not make any emphasize on Shii character of the revolution or Iranian people's beliefs on Shii Islam. This shows that *Düşünce* defined the revolution in terms of *tawhid* and *ummah*, for which sectarianism was not appropriate.

In the second issue of new period, *Düşünce* discusses the practices of new regime in Iran after the revolution. After the Iranian Revolution, the Islamic regime in Iran began to trials of war criminals and supporters of monarchy and Shah. As a result of these, several death sentences were passed. According to the journal, reactions of world public opinions exaggerated the trials. In this way, discrediting of Iranian Revolution and

³⁶⁵ *Düşünce*, "Haber-Yorum", Term: 4, Issue:1, (June 1979), 3.

³⁶⁶ *Düşünce*, "Haber-Yorum", Term: 4, Issue:1, (June 1979), 7.

prevention of spread of revolutionary ideas towards other Islamic countries are aimed.³⁶⁷ Furthermore, to justify the acts of new regime in Iran, *Düşünce* compares the deaths during the revolutionary process and executions of supporters of monarchy and Shah:

The ones, who seek to discredit the Iranian Revolution because of several death sentences, are shameless people. They ignore the 150.000 martyrdoms, died during revolutionary process, and worry about 300 murderers. This is the evidence that they have no Islamic conscience.³⁶⁸

In the third issue of the new period, reactions against the Iranian Revolution in Turkey are discussed. According to the article, while leftists ignored the revolution, rightists and nationalists began to denounce the revolution.³⁶⁹ The journal defines them as the supporters of the US and imperialism. In the last issue of the journal, Ali Shariati's article, 'Civilization and Modernism', was published. These were the years, when works of Islamist thinkers were translated into Turkish.

To conclude, *Düşünce*, which was published between 1976 and 1979, was a journal that pretended to carry the message of Islam. It defined Iranian Revolution in terms of its opposition to imperialism and monarchy and its Islamic character. While doing these, it never emphasized the Shi'i characteristic of the revolution or sectarian differences of Iranian people. In this regard, it praised the Iranian Revolution, which was admitted by *Düşünce* as the Islamic Revolution, and supported it. Administration of the journal was composed of writers, who sympathize to the revolution. One of them was Ali Bulaç.

³⁶⁷ *Düşünce*, "Haber-Yorum", Term: 4, Issue:2, (July 1979), 3.

³⁶⁸ *Düşünce*, "Haber-Yorum", Term: 4, Issue:2, (July 1979), 7.

³⁶⁹ *Düşünce*, "Haber-Yorum", Term: 4, Issue:3, (August 1979), 9.

4.4.2 Şura

The weekly newspaper *Şura* was first published in January of 1978. The owner of newspaper was İhsan Aslan and editor in chief was Yılmaz Yalçiner. *Şura* has a radical discourse³⁷⁰ that it is composed of challenging articles. It was supporter of pan-Islamism and *Tawhid*. It was opposing nationalism. Every issues tackled in *Şura* are defined from an Islamic perspective. Thus, many issues of the newspaper were collected by Turkish state for several times and writers of it were arrested. Yılmaz Yalçiner was one of them. As a result of pressures of state, *Şura* was closed in June of 1978.

Şura mostly tackled the process that progressed to the Iranian Revolution. As the editor in chief, Yılmaz Yalçiner, pointed out that *Şura* was like the voice of the revolutionary process of Iran in Turkey:

In these days, there was a platform to make debated on Islam in Iran. Turkey was also influenced from this. We were translating Khomeini's messages sent from Paris and then, we were publishing them in *Şura*. This caused radicalization of our languages that we began to write parallel to Khomeini's ideas.³⁷¹

In May of 1978, the newspaper was published with the headline of 'Iran Wants Sharia'. As it is written in the newspaper, *Şura* follows the development in Iran:

³⁷⁰ The first issue of *Şura* was published with the headline, which was 'Can a Newspaper be Follower of Sharia?'

³⁷¹ <http://www.yenisafak.com.tr/roportaj/iyi-ki-o-ucagi-kaciramadik-355983> Date Accessed: 07.05.2015

Even though many Iranian Muslims are martyred, Iranian people maintains uprisings against Shah, who is ally of the US and imperialism. Leader of the uprisings is Ayatollah Khomeini, who is from Jafari ulama.³⁷²

Distinguishing Shii belief of Iranian people and Shii characteristic of revolutionary movements in Iran, *Şura* supported the uprisings, which aimed to overthrow the Shah Regime and establish an Islamic state. In this respect, it published articles about the purposes of uprisings, the reasons for their opposition to Shah and the reasons for their opposition to imperialism. All of them were defined as just demands of Iranian people. For instance, recent developments in Iran were evaluated in an article in June of 1978. According to this article, goals of Islamic movement in Iran were to overthrow Shah and to end imperialist exploitation in Iran, to end cultural exploitation of Iran by the ‘West’ and to start cultural revolution of Islam, to establish an independent Islamic state, and to develop close relation both with Third World Countries and the Islamic World.³⁷³

4.4.3 İktibas

*İktibas: Fikir Verir*³⁷⁴

Journal of *İktibas* is the only journal among others examined in this thesis that still continued to be published today. *İktibas* was first published by Ercümen Özkın in 1981. It opposes to values and doctrines that entered to human life with modernization such as democracy and political parties

³⁷² *Şura*, “İran Şariat İstiyor”, (18 May 1978)

³⁷³ *Şura*, “Şah’ın Müşrik Rejimine Karşı Şariatçıların 17 Yıllık Kanlı Mücadelesi: İran”, (5 June 1978)

³⁷⁴ It is motto of the journal.

and it aims an Islamic government inspired from the Iranian model.³⁷⁵ *İktibas* works as a ‘news portal’ and brings many news, interviews, articles and cartoons from different publications together. It is composed of translated news, interviews, articles and cartoons published within Turkey and abroad. Ercümen Özkan’s publishes his articles under the column of ‘Selam İle’. As Özkan explained the purposes of the journal in its first issue, *İktibas* aimed to publish developments in the world and inform the people.

We began to publish this journal for our people. We wanted them to have knowledge about the developments both in Turkey and in the world. We wanted to fill the intellectual gap of our people. World is changing and developing and we did our best to help our country and our people.³⁷⁶

Iranian Revolution was welcomed by *İktibas* of being an Islamic Revolution. Shii character of the revolution was not emphasized by the journal. Rather, it underlined anti-imperialist and Islamic characters of the revolution. Moreover, Ercümen Özkan, editor in chief of *İktibas*, was already opposing to sectarian differences in Islam. Iranian Revolution was a significant event that the journal displayed this in the articles, which were published. In other words, while compiling articles and news from different publications, *İktibas* gave attention to be in accordance between the news or articles published in the journal and its editorial view. In this regard, supportive articles and news were published. For instance, in an article quoted by the newspaper, *Akşam*, the first anniversary of Iranian Revolution was celebrated and anti-imperialist character of the revolution was emphasized:

³⁷⁵ Duman, 83-84.

³⁷⁶ Private interview with Hüseyin Bülbül in 16.01.2015

Iranian Revolution completed its first year. Contrary to the US's attempts to discredit acquisitions of the revolution, the anti-imperialist struggle led by Khomeini is strengthening...Iranian Revolution is a significant step in independence struggles of underdeveloped nations... Iranian Revolution is a hope and a light for all underdeveloped nations.³⁷⁷

As it was emphasized in the part of Ercümen Özkan, sectarian differences in Islam were also rejected by *İktibas* and sectarianism is harshly opposed. In this context, Iranian Revolution was welcomed as the revolution of Islam and Muslims. On the other hand, Shii character of the revolution was opposed. In other words, Özkan and *İktibas* support the Iranian Revolution in terms of its revolutionary ideas, but not the Shii identity of it. When the new regime in Iran began to follow sectarian policies and left the ideals of *tawhid*, both Özkan and *İktibas* criticized this transformation. Furthermore, Shii revolutionary movements in Turkey inspired by Iranian Revolution were defined as 'stealthy' and 'instigation'.³⁷⁸ In addition to taking part of its 'partial' support to Iranian Revolution in its pages, *İktibas* also approached Khomeini's death in 1989. According to it, Khomeini formed a new understanding of Islam based on criterias of *tawhid* and *ummah* and established an Islamic state benefited from core ideas of Islam. After his death, what remained to Islamic community in the world is this new understanding of Islam. As it was emphasized in the journal that ones, who expect the collapse of

³⁷⁷ *İktibas*, "İran Devrimi'nin Birinci Yılı", Issue: 2, (15 January 1981), 4.

³⁷⁸ *İktibas*, "İran Kökenli Devrimci Şii İslami Hareket", (January 1990), 40-41-42.

Islamic Revolution after death of Khomeini, witness a new phenomenon, which is soul of Khomeini lives in Islamic countries.³⁷⁹

İktibas discontinued publishing for two years because of Ercümen Özkan's health problems. After death of Özkan in 1995, *İktibas* still maintains publishing with the editorial staff composed of Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Mukaddes Özkan, wife of Ercümen Özkan, and Hüseyin Bülbül.

4.4.4 *İstiklal – Şehadet*

The monthly journals of *İstiklal* and *Şehadet* are continuation of each other. *İstiklal* was firstly published in 1985 and maintained for one year. Then, *Şehadet* began to be published just after *İstiklal* in 1987 until the end of 1989s. In both of the journals, editor in chief is Nureddin Şirin. Cover designs and editorial staff of both journals are almost the same. Due to these reasons, *İstiklal* and *Şehadet* will be discussed together.

Both *İstiklal* and *Şehadet* define themselves as 'Islamist journal of politics and culture' and both follow a militant activist policy. Both of the journals oppose the Jahiliyyah, *kufur* and imperialism. As Doğan Duman points both the journals 'eliminate passiveness of Sunni Islam and suggest activism of Shii Islam as the universal model of Islam'.³⁸⁰ In this regard, both of the journals support the Iranian Revolution.

İstiklal and *Şehadet* reveal the main aspects of the Iran-inspired Islamism such as opposition to nation-states and nationalism, support to *tawhid* and *ummah*, support to the Iranian Revolution and positive attitude toward Shii Islam. First of all, nationalism and nation-states are the issues that are

³⁷⁹ *İktibas*, "Hümeyni'nin Ruhü Türkiye'de Yaşiyor", (March 1990), 41.

³⁸⁰ Duman, 83.

rejected. In this context, the second issue of *İstiklal* published in November of 1985 tackled nationalism and nation-states.³⁸¹ Nationalism and nation-states are the inventions of the ‘West’ to weaken Islam. They cause a fit between Muslims, which is borders. In this issue, *İstiklal* discusses the nation-states and nationalism:

Islamic statements are limited in national patterns. Due to nation-states, national religions are invented.³⁸²

Secondly, both of the journals support the universality and unity of Muslims. In this regard, sectarianism and sects in Islam are rejected. According to these journals, Islam based on unity and all Muslims, no matter they are who, from where, from which origin or from which ethnicity, are components of this unity. In the third issue of *İstiklal*, which the cover subject is ‘If There is one Islamic Ummah, There should be one Islamic Movement’, Atasoy Müftüoğlu and Mustafa Arafatoğlu wrote on *tawhid*.³⁸³ According to Müftüoğlu, as a result of modernism, Islam is partitioned into sects, and the solution is re-building of Islamic understanding on a *tawhidi* structure. Thirdly, the Iranian Revolution is welcomed, defended and supported by these journals. As Muhammed Ömer Faruk asserted in his article in *Şehadet*, the year of 1979 changed the destiny of Muslims that the Islamic Revolution in Iran started a new period, which ended disappointments of Muslim around the world.³⁸⁴ Furthermore, the Iranian Revolution was defined as an opportunity to end

³⁸¹ The cover of *İstiklal*'s this issue was ‘Nationalism and Nation-States are the Worst Examples of the *Kufr*’.

³⁸² *İstiklal*, “Okur Cevapları”, Issue: 2, (November 1985), 2.

³⁸³ *İstiklal*, Issue: 3, (December 1985).

³⁸⁴ Muhammed Ömer Faruk, “Evrensel İslami Hareket, Dinamikleri ve Çağrısı: İhvan-I Müslimin, Cemaat-I İslami, İran İslam İnkılabı ve Ümmetin Liderliği Meselesi”, *Şehadet*, Issue: 3, (November 1987).

the historical hostility between Shii Islam and Sunni Islam. In addition, Iranian Revolution was considered as a threat to monarchies in the region and imperialism. As Müftüoğlu points in *İstiklal*, this is why the Iranian Revolution was mostly defined with its Shii character. According to Müftüoğlu, by emphasizing Shii character of the revolution, it is aimed to annihilate the positive attitudes of Sunni Muslim in the region towards the revolution.³⁸⁵ Fourthly, Shii identity of Iranian revolution and Shii understandings of Khomeini are welcomed by both of the journals. Iranian Revolution and role of Shii revolutionary movements encouraged all Islamic movements in the world. The journals define Shii Islamic movements or Shii revolutionary movements as the universal Islamic movement.

The main problem of Sunni world is the lack of guidance (*Walayat-e Faqih*) and its main duty is supporting universal Islamic movement. Apart from the lack of guidance, Sunni world is able to get along with universal Islamic movement. Guidance of Imam Khomeini is a bridge between Sunni and Shii worlds.³⁸⁶

Shii-Sunni dispute is planned by the supporters of status quo forces in the region that oppose to emergence of revolutionary movements inspired by the Iranian Revolution. In this regard, monarchies in the region and imperialism highlight the sectarian differences between Shiis and Sunnis and they aim to weaken the Islamic unity. As Nureddin Şirin points in *Şehadet*, these are the reasons of attacks on Shii Islam.³⁸⁷

³⁸⁵ *İstiklal*, Issue: 4-5, (January-February 1986), 6.

³⁸⁶ *İstiklal*, Issue: 3, (December 1985).

³⁸⁷ Nureddin Şirin, “Hizbullah-Hizbuşşeytan Savaşında Dönüm Noktası”, *Şehadet*, Issue:3, (November 1987), 80.

In addition to these, the editorial staffs of both journals are almost the same, which are mostly composed of Iran-inspired Islamists or Iranians. For instance, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Nureddin Şirin and Kenan Çamurcu are Iran-inspired Islamists published in these journals. Moreover, Kalim Siddiqi, a supporter of the revolution, and Hamid Algar, a prominent Iranian intellectual, are the writers, whose articles were published in both of the journals. Furthermore, Ayatollah Motahhari and Ali Shariati's articles were also published in the most of the issues of the journals.

Since both of these journals are published as the voice of the revolution or the Islamic regime, their monthly agenda are formed around the events, which are about Iran or Shii Islam. For example, crash of an Iranian plane by the US had an extensive coverage in *Şehadet*. In 1988, the US crashed the Iranian passenger plane, which was cruising to Dubai from Bandar Abbas and killed 290 people.³⁸⁸ Then, it was announced by the US that the crash happened by mistake. *Şehadet* defined this issue as unlawfulness of the US and shared views of its readers and several intellectuals such as Ali Bulaç and Hüseyin Hatemi.³⁸⁹ Ali Bulaç called the crash of plane and killings of 290 people as massacre. Hüseyin Hatemi, on the other hand, questioned the crash of plane by mistake. According to him, this issue displayed the bad intention of the US. Another example of events that formed the agenda of *Şehadet* was the killings of Iranian pilgrims in hajj season, which was called as 'Bloody Friday of Mecca'. Iranian pilgrims formed a protest against the US and Israel in Ka'ba and shouted slogans such as 'Death to USA and its allies'. Saudi security forces interfered to protests. As a result of firing on pilgrims, hundreds of Iranian pilgrims were killed. *Şehadet* published a particular issue about this event. In this

³⁸⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/ArsivNews.aspx?id=21318> Date Accessed: 12.05.2015

³⁸⁹ *Şehadet*, Issue: 7, (August 1988).

issue, *Şehadet* brought status of Ka'ba into question. Ka'ba was occupied by the US-supported Riyadh regime.³⁹⁰

Death of Khomeini had a significant impact on Iran-inspired Islamists in Turkey. After Khomeini's death, *Şehadet* published a particular issue about life of Khomeini, his contributions and his skills. In this particular issue, *Şehadet* gave place to several writers like Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu and Nureddin Şirin, who wrote about Khomeini. Bulaç defined death of Khomeini as significant as his return to Iran.³⁹¹ According to Müftüoğlu, Islam that was in exile returned from exile thanks to struggles of Khomeini.³⁹²

4.4.5 Tevhid

The monthly *Tevhid* was published between 1990 and 1993 (it published its last issue in December of 1992). It was published by Lütfü Aydemir and Süleyman Gündüz. As it was displayed in the first issue, it aims to create a new language, a new understanding and a new consciousness.

The humankind witnesses to a new period, which reshapes the history. All ideologies are greatly distressed. The modern civilization based on material values is in a process of disintegration...People in both in the West and in the East are trying to produce new inventions. They are asking new questions and looking for new questions. On the other hand, Islamic societies are repeating the past. They are limited with

³⁹⁰ *Şehadet*, Issue: 8, (October 1988), 2-3.

³⁹¹ *Şehadet*, Particular Issue on Imam Khomeini-Issue: 13, (1989).

³⁹² *Şehadet*, Particular Issue on Imam Khomeini-Issue: 13, (1989).

a restrictive understanding of history...Islam, which limits itself with texts and culture of past has no an ideal.³⁹³

Tevhid had a radical line that it follows a challenger language. For instance, its cover of 31th Issue was about the hunger in Eritrea that the journal was criticizing Muslims in Turkey making preparations for Ramadan, while people in Eritrea were dying because of hunger.

Iranian Revolution has a deep influence on *Tevhid*. It is defined as the first response of Muslims against imperialism. Although the first issue of the journal is published after eleven years from the revolution, it is clear that the revolution still has a significant impact.

Islamic Revolution displayed the possibility of an Islamic structure based on societal and political aspects. Islamic Revolution showed Muslims that they were not people, who were created to be ruled. Islamic Revolution claimed that Islam would rise with its own values and institutions. Although it happened eleven years ago, Islamic Revolution is still the only challenge of Islamic world against imperialism.³⁹⁴

In addition to this, in third issue of the journal, 11th anniversary of Iranian Revolution is celebrated:

Islamic Revolution is in 11th year of resistance against international imperialism and imperialist powers. Islamic Revolution claimed that any movement led by rules of *Allah* surpassed all international powers whoever they were.

³⁹³ *Tevhid*, “Yeni Ufuklar İçin”, Issue: 1, (January 1990), 3.

³⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

Islamic Revolution is still the only one for Muslims in the world for the sake of them.³⁹⁵

In the same issue Atasoy Müftüoğlu published an article, which was ‘Islamic Revolution in its 11th Year’, and repeated consolidative features of the revolution. According to him, there was an unreal understanding of Islam, which was isolated from basic concepts of Islam. However, the revolution challenged Islam and presented a new understanding, which was conscious, independent and more related to basic concepts of Islam.

...before the revolution, Muslims believed a kind of Islam lacked understanding of *tawhid*. Islam was a part of nationalist ideologies and these ideologies were controlling religious life...Islamic Revolution in Iran encouraged Muslims to unchain...It provided a unique Islamic understanding for Muslims.³⁹⁶

Since the journal began to be published after the death of Khomeini, publications in the journal are mostly dedicated to legacy of Khomeini and the role of the new leader, Khamenei, in Iranian and world politics. Khomeini is ‘aggrandized’ that he is considered as the leader, who did the best for the sake of Muslims.

During Imam Khomeini’s rule, the rapprochement, which has not seen before, between Muslims around the world realized. This unity, or *tawhid*, was the most important result of Islamic Revolution in Iran. Imam Khomeini prevented the

³⁹⁵ *Tevhid*, “Hizbullahi Uyanışın 11. Yılı”, Issue: 3, (March 1990), 2.

³⁹⁶ Atasoy Müftüoğlu, “11. Yılında İslam Devrimi”, *Tevhid*, Issue: 3, (March 1990), 40-41-42.

performances of imperialists to create sectarian differences among Muslims.³⁹⁷

Khamenei was not considered as overshadowed by the legacy of Khomeini. On the contrary, he resumed Khomeini's policies of *tawhid* and *ummah*. He was considered as a leader, who builds bridges between Shiis and Sunnis.³⁹⁸

Nureddin Şirin, who became executive editor of *Tevhid*'s internal news for a while, Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu and Kenan Çamurcu were intellectuals published in *Tevhid*. *Tevhid* ended its publications in the end of 1992.

4.4.6 Selam³⁹⁹

The weekly newspaper *Selam* began to be published after *Tevhid* in 1993 and maintained its publications until 2000. The first issue of *Selam* was published in August of 1993 by Hasan Kılıç, who was arrested for being involved in assassination of Uğur Mumcu. In 1996, *Selam* began to be published daily, but this did not last long. It maintained its publications until 1997, when it was closed almost for a year. In 1998, it began to be re-published with changes in editorial chief and management. In this new period, editor in chief was Erhan Güngör. It is possible to see many Iran-inspired Islamists publishing *Selam*, some of who are also discussed in this thesis. Nureddin Şirin, Alptekin Dursunoğlu, Selahattin Eş Çakırgil, Müfid

³⁹⁷ *Tevhid*, “İmam Sonrası İnkılab”, Issue: 2, (February 1990), 56.

³⁹⁸ *Tevhid*, “İmam’ın Fetvası Aynen Geçerlidir”, Issue: 3, (March 1990), 29.

³⁹⁹ To research issues of these journals and newspapers, I benefited from archives of National Library of Turkey in Ankara. The library had limited issues of *Selam* that I could not reach the issues of newspaper, which were published before 1999. Thus, this part is written through limited issues (from issues 392 to 426) between June 6th of 1999 and February 5th of 2000.

Yüksel⁴⁰⁰, Burhan Kavuncu and Sefer Turan⁴⁰¹ are some of the writers published in *Selam*.

Selam was published through four main principals, which were sympathy to Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution, direct political support to Iran in the region, opposition to Israel and the US and in this respect, Zionism and imperialism, and opposition to policies of Turkey in the religious sphere. Iranian Revolution was considered as the movement of oppressed people against tyranny of Shah and harshness of imperialism, and its leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, was considered as the leading figure of this movements. According to *Selam*, Khomeini-led Muslim masses started a resistance front against *kufur* and despotic regimes, which became allies of the US and Israel, and Khomeini-led these masses established an Islamic state based on Koran. Thus, Khomeini and the revolution are defined as significant figures for Muslims.⁴⁰² Starting from this point, policies of Iran in the region are directly supported by the newspaper. The newspaper defines the perception of Turkey towards Iran and the revolution as unsubstantial and chooses another way to ‘justify’ Iran.⁴⁰³ According to

⁴⁰⁰ Müfid Yüksel was one of the brothers of Islamist leader Metin Yüksel, who was killed in Fatih Mosque’s courtyard in İstanbul in 1979. Metin Yüksel is defined as a martyr by Islamists. Another brother of Metin Yüksel is Edip Yüksel, who is also an Islamist intellectual.

⁴⁰¹ Sefer Turan is a journalist, who worked in Kanal 7 and TRT. He is also writer of several books such as *Kudüs* and *Coğrafyalar Gezdi Yüreğim*. Today, he is adviser of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since 2014.

⁴⁰² *Selam*, “Mazlumların Mütebessim Önderi”, Year: 2, Issue: 392, (6-12 June 1999), 15, “Aşk ve Devrimin Piri”, Year: 2, Issue: 392, (6-12 June 1999), 20 and Sabiha Ünlü, “Ey İmam! Şahidiz!”, Year: 2, Issue: 393, (13-19 June 1999), 20.

⁴⁰³ Nureddin Şirin, “İran’ı Tartışmak 1”, *Selam*, Year: 2, Issue: 399, (25-31 July 1999), 3 and Nureddin Şirin, “İran’ı Tartışmak 2”, *Selam*, Year: 2, Issue: 400, (1-7 August 1999), 3.

the newspaper, although there are irregularities in the policies of Iran both within the country and in the region, Iran is more poised and consistent than Turkey. Opposition to Israel and the US and rejection of Zionism and imperialism are also one of the most important principals of the newspaper. As Iran defines the US, *Selam* also defines it as the 'Great Satan' that displays the newspaper uses almost the same language with discourse of the Iranian regime. In addition to this, the newspaper defines the Iran-inspired Islam, which is anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-US, as the only way of independent belief. According to it, any understandings of Islam other than Iran-inspired one are American-inspired. The newspaper positions itself such a rejectionist place against imperialism that it defines Turkey as 'subcontractor' of international powers and imperialism in the region.

Turkey, which cannot implement national policies, on the one hand, acts as the subcontractor' of imperialism in its foreign policy and, on the other hand, tries to eliminate the resisting movements within Turkey, who act against imperialism.⁴⁰⁴

Opposition to policies of secular regime in Turkey is also one of the significant principles of the newspaper. It opposes secularizing policies of the regime towards religious sphere of life. Limitations against headscarf in the public realm, deterrent policies against Islamic movements and limitations of acts of Islamists are the main fields that the newspaper often defines. The newspaper bases its stance against secular regime to establishment of the republic. Policies of early republic through Islam and Islamists are criticized. While doing this, the newspaper refers to cases, which are used mostly by Shiis and Iran by reference to history of Shii

⁴⁰⁴ *Selam*, "TC Bölgesel Taşeron", Year:2, Issue: 411, (17-23 October 1999), 1.

Islam. For instance, Sheikh Said Revolt in 1925 was likening to Karbala and analogies were made between policies of republic against Sheikh Said and policies of Yazid against Imam Hussein.⁴⁰⁵ Another field that *Selam* opposed to policies of republic is limitations against headscarves. The newspaper defines the limitations as tyranny and slaughter of secularism.⁴⁰⁶

In addition to its support to Iran and the revolution, *Selam* is also supported by Iran through advertisements. Congratulation messages of Iran and calls for meetings, which are organized by Iran, Iranian merchants or Iranian Embassy in Turkey are made through *Selam*.^{407,408}

Selam was closed in July of 2000 and it got into cases and investigations, which claimed the newspaper was a part of an Iran-supported terrorist organization.⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁵ *Selam*, “1925 Kerbelası”, Year: 2, Issue: 395, (27 June-3 July 1999), 13.

⁴⁰⁶ *Selam*, “Başörtüsü Hicreti”, Year: 2, Issue: 412, (24-30 October 1999), 11.

⁴⁰⁷ *Selam*, “İlan”, Year: 2, Issue: 423, (9-15 January 2000), 16.

⁴⁰⁸ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/index/ArsivNews.aspx?id=-152971> Date Accessed: 30.05.2015

⁴⁰⁹ It was alleged that there was a ‘terrorist’ organization, which was supported by Iran. Name of this organization was Tevhid-Selam. It was alleged that this organization was formed by people publishing and working in the journal, *Tevhid*, and the newspaper, *Selam*. In addition it was claimed that this organization had close relations with Turkey Hezbollah, especially the Menzil group, which was an Iran-inspired group within Turkey Hezbollah. Organization of Tevhid-Selam was claimed to assassinate secular intellectuals and journalists, Uğur Mumcu, Bahriye Üçok, Muammer Aksoy and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı. Organization of Tevhid-Selam is considered to have relations with Quds Army, which is a special force within Iran’s Revolutionary Guards founded by Ayatollah Khamenei. Cases and investigations in Turkey through this organization are mostly supported by Gülen Movement.

CONCLUSION

As explained, the influence of the Iranian Revolution expanded far beyond the borders of Iran. After the Iranian Revolution in 1979, an Islamic government was established under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Seizing the attention of all Muslims, Iranian Revolution became the 'source of emulation' for Islamists and Islamic organizations through the world.⁴¹⁰

Inspired by its success, stirred by its utopian appeal to pan-Islam and against to both the capitalist West and the communist East, Islamists were emboldened to bring about Islamic revolution in their countries.⁴¹¹

In this respect, Islamists in Turkey were also influenced by the ideas of the revolution. It broadened the horizons of Islamists in Turkey. Many Islamists went to Iran after the revolution and returned to Turkey with Iran-inspired ideas, among them to establish a sharia state in Turkey similar to the one in Iran and practice Islamic principles in social life. In these years, there were different forms of understanding Islamism in Turkey, which were radical Islamism led by radical Islamist organizations demanding a sharia rule in Turkey and opposing to Westernization policies, and moderate Islamism led by dervish orders and charity organizations. While radical Islamism was opposing nation-state, elections, democracy, imperialist and capitalist system and secular

⁴¹⁰ Mir Zohair Husain, "The Ideologization of Islam: Meaning, Manifestation and Causes" in Ed. Jerichow, A and Simonsen, J.B. *Islam in a Changing World: Europe and the Middle East*, (New York: Routledge), 2010, 120.

⁴¹¹ *Ibid.*, 120.

structure of Turkey, moderate Islamism, on the other hand, developed close relations with the state. Iran-inspired Islam(ism) emerged and grew within radical Islamist circles. As a result, it shares common values with radical Islamic discourse. As it is mentioned in the previous chapters, radical discourses, opposing to secularism, rejecting nation-states, discrediting democratic institutions, rejecting yields of modernism and having critical views on Kemalism were some of these common points. Both supported the domination of Islamic rules on both social and political life. Any other ideologies and views out of Islam were rejected and they were seen as *kufir*. Koran would be the only guide.

However, the usage of Islamic concepts, supporting the policies of Iran in the region and advocating the Shii doctrine of Islam were distinguishing features of Iran-inspired Islamists. Iran-inspired Islamists were isolated within Islamic circles in Turkey. Since they had close relations with Shii understanding of Islam, they were excluded from Islamic circles in Turkey, which were mostly composed of Sunnis. They had been marginalized because of their ideas towards Iran and Shii Islam. As a solution to their isolation and marginalization, Iran-inspired Islamists introduced the concepts of *Tawhid* and *Ummah*, which were defined in Koran, as the consolidative idea. *Tawhid* means the unity of all Muslims under the unity of *Allah*, and *Ummah* means the Islamic community. Both of these concepts reject sectarian, ethnical and national differences. By introducing these concepts, Iran-inspired Islamists established a ‘consolidative language’ aiming to prevent their marginalization and isolation in the Islamic circles. By using this language, they emphasized brotherhood, Islamic harmony and common fate of all Muslims rather than sectarian differences. In addition to these, Iran-inspired Islamists used these concepts to dignify the ideas of the revolution presented by the

Islamic regime in Iran. Since they wished to present Iran and the revolution as a ‘center of attraction’, they used unifying concepts.

Within this context, Iran-inspired Islam(ism) and Iran-inspired Islamists are examined in this thesis. As the Iran-inspired Islamists and intellectuals, contributions of Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan, Mehmet Metiner, Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin are analyzed. By referring to their contributions and discourses, they are classified in two groups: Periodical Iran-inspired Islamists and Ideological Iran-inspired Islamists. Periodical Iran-inspired Islamists, who are Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan and Mehmet Metiner, are the people, who were influenced by Iranian Revolution and supported its ideas for a while. Between 1979 and 1989, when Khomeini died, Periodical Iran-inspired Islamists supported the revolution. After Khomeini’s death, they began to neutralize against the revolution. According to them, between the years of 1979 and 1989, which was the Khomeini period, Iran followed idealistic policies. It supported the oppressed Muslims throughout the world as part of its policy of ‘Iran for Islam’. However, Khomeini’s death brought an end to this period. In the period after 1989, Iran turned to pragmatist policies and Islam was used as an instrument in politics. As a result, periodical Iran-inspired Islamists began to oppose Iran. On the other hand, they have never given up to idealize the revolution and the *İmam*, Khomeini. Ideological Iran-inspired Islamists, Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin, also continued to idealize the revolution and Khomeini. However, they referred to post-Khomeini period as the peak of achievements of the revolution. They emphasized the period after Khomeini as the period of acting on the ideological premises of the revolution. With this new period, it became possible to display the power and the impact of the regime to the all world. In other words, for Çamurcu and Şirin, influence of the revolution increased during this period even

more than Khomeini years. Ideological Iran-inspired Islamists praise not only Khomeini, but also Khamenei, the *Valayet-i Faqih* after Khomeini.

To conclude, Iran-inspired Islamism reached its peak in 1980s. The rising trend of establishing a theocratic state in Turkey remained until the beginnings of 2000s. The assassinations of secular journalists and intellectuals like Muammer Aksoy and Çetin Emeç in 1990, Uğur Mumcu in 1993 and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı in 1999, which were alleged that the murderers were related to Iran, marginalized the Iran-inspired Islamists. In addition to these, the death of Khomeini in 1989 also caused ideological ruptures in Iran-inspired Islamists. Moreover, when the political parties with Islamic tendencies gained power within the state, they gathered their cadres mostly from these radical Islamists. As a result, the Iran-inspired Islamists opposing to the state and regime were appointed in state bureaucracy deluting their anti-systemic position. In addition, as a result of power struggle within state bureaucracy, Iran-inspired Islam(ism) became as a source of conflict in the competition between Justice and Development Party and the Gülen Movement. In the context of historical tensions and competition between Iran and Turkey, Iran-inspired Islam(ism) turned into a matter of mutual accusation among these two power houses.

Iran-inspired Islam(ism) weakened and deactivated today. Only limited number of intellectuals and Islamists such as Kenan Çamurcu and Nureddin Şirin are following the path opened by Khomeini in 1979. They keep advocating their ideas towards Iran and Shii understanding of Islam under the pressure of Sunni Islamic circles in Turkey. However, they are still marginalized and isolated. Among them, some began to distance themselves from Iran and some others moved to antagonistic stent against Iran. Ali Bulaç returned to religious orders (*tariqats*) and developed close

relations with the Gülen Movement, Mehmet Metiner withdrew to mainstream Sunni Islam and became a member of Justice and Development Party, Ercüment Özkan neutralized his ideas on Iran after Khomeini's death in 1989 and his cadre of *İktibas* followed Ozkan's line towards Iran and Shii Islam. Atasoy Müftüođlu, though remained within the school of Iran-inspired Islamism, got marginalized and isolated in Islamic circles due to his ideas towards Iran and his pro-Iran stance in Syrian Issue.

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APENDICES

APPENDIX A

İSTANBUL

06.03.2015

ALİ BULAÇ İLE SÖYLEŞİ

İslamcılık denildiği zaman akla ilk gelen isimlerden birisi de sizsiniz. İslamcılık sizin tanımınıza göre nedir?

Türkiye’de İslamcılık denildiği zaman geleneksel olarak dini hayatını devam ettiren, biraz da nominal müslüman olan geniş kitlelerden ve İslam’ı daha fazla kavramış hareketlerden söz edebiliriz. Ben ikinci gruptakileri üç ana gruba ayırıyorum: Entelektüel-Kültürel Müslümanlık, Sosyal Müslümanlık ve Siyasi Müslümanlık. Entelektüel-Kültürel Müslümanlık daha çok okumuşların ve yazmışların, yazarların, öğretmenlerin, akademisyenlerin içerisinde bulunduğu ve toplumu zihinsel açıdan, İslami yönde dönüştürmeyi amaçlayan bir gruptur. Bunları tayin ve tespit ederek bir dökümlerini çıkarmak neredeyse imkansızdır. Bunlar Hz. İbrahim’in yıldızları gibi batır çıkarlar. Dergiler, yayınevleri, dernekler, internet siteleri etrafında toplanırlar. Bu hareketler bazen kesilir bazen de yeniden başlarlar. İslami entelektüel ve kültürel hayatı bunlar ellerinde bulundururlar. Arapça’dan, İngilizce’den, Farsça’dan, Urduca’dan tercümele yaparlar. Sosyal Müslümanlık, toplumu daha çok din üzerinden değil de ahlaki, sosyal ve ekonomik açıdan takviye etmeyi amaçlar. Bunları da ikiye ayırmak mümkündür: Bir geleneği devam ettiren tarikatlar ile kentleşme ve göçlerle birlikte ortaya çıkmış, herhangi bir geleneğe dayanmayan cemaatler. İlk gruba

dahil olan ve bir geleneğin devamı niteliğindeki tarikatların içerisinde en etkili olan tarikat Nakşibendi Tarikatı'dır. Ondan sonra Kadiriler, Cerrahiler, Rifailer ve Mevleviler gibi tarikatlar gelir. İkinci gruba dahil olan ve bir sufi tarikata bağlı olmadan sufilik yapan, geleneğe bağlı olmayan grupların en büyüğü ise Nur Cemaati'dir. Bu cemaatin içerisindeki en etkili grup ise Gülen Hareketi'dir. Siyasal İslam'ın Türkiye'deki temsilcisi Milli Görüş'tür. 1969 yılında Necmettin Erbakan tarafından başlatılmıştır. Milli Nizam Partisi, Milli Selamet Partisi, Refah Partisi, Fazilet Partisi ve Saadet Partisi şeklinde devam etmiştir. AK Parti bunların içinden gelmekle beraber referansını terkettiğinden dolayı bana göre siyasal İslam içerisinde yer almaz. Çünkü hem dini referans almıyorum diye siyasi islamcılığı reddediyor hem de geldiği gelenek olan Milli Görüş'ün gömleğini çıkardığını söylüyor. Programı da öyle değil, ittifakları da öyle değil, ekonomik, kültürel ve sosyal politikaları da öyle değil.

Bunu Siyasal İslamcılığın AK Parti içerisinde erimesi olarak mı yorumlamalıyız?

Tam olarak öyle değil ancak İslamcılık'tan vazgeçip iktidar olma formülü ile açıklayabiliriz. Merkez sağ ve merkez sol partiler gibi iktidar olmak istiyoruz dediler. Ne merkez sağda, ne de merkez solda yer bulamadıkları, Milli Görüş ve Erbakan doktrini ile iktidar olunamayacağını olursa bile iktidarda kalınamayacağını gördükleri için muhafazakar demokrat bir kimlik edinip siyaset yaptılar.

Bir İrancı İslam'dan söz etmek mümkün müdür?

İrancı İslam diye bir tanımlama yapmak yerine İran Devrimi'ne, İran'ın bölgedeki politikalarına sempati duyan bir İslam'dan söz etmek daha doğru olur. İrancı İslam denildiği zaman İran merkezli bir İslam yorumu akla gelir.

İran'da devrim olduktan sonra siz de bundan etkilendiniz. Bu süreci anlatırmısınız?

İran’da devrim olacağını tahmin eden ilk ekip bizdik. Düşünce, Tevhid, Hicret gibi dergilerde İran’da bir devrimin olacağını 1977 yılının ortalarında düşünmüştük. Ben 12 yıl Farsça eğitimi almıştım ve günün birinde İran’da böyle birşey olacağı aklımın ucundan geçmemişti. İran’ı da Şiilik’i de çok iyi tanımıyorduk. Şiilik ile olan bilgimiz kitaplarla sınırlıydı.

Devrim’in Şii bir kimlikte olması sizi rahatsız etti mi?

Hayır, bundan rahatsız olmadım. Dünya’da o tarihlerde dini bir uyanış vardı. Türkiye’de de 1960’lardan beri devam eden bir İslami hareket vardı. İslam Devrimi, İslamcı tezi teyid etmiş oldu. Yani bir İslami Devrim mümkündü. 19. Yüzyıl fikirlerine dayalı aydınlanmacı fikirlere baktığınız zaman dinin kamusal alandan çekilmesi lazımdır. Biz bunun aksini iddia ediyorduk. İran’da devrim olunca bizim fikirlerimiz de teyid edilmiş oldu. İslamcı hareketler 1850’den beri özleri itibari ile demokratik hareketlerdir. Padişaha ve saltanata karşı olan hareketlerdir. Örneğin ilk İslamcı nesil istisnasız Abdülhamit’e karşıydılar. O tarihlerde benzer bir hareket İran’da da vardır.

Devrim olduktan sonra İran’a gittiniz mi?

Devrim’den bir sene sonra gittim.

O dönemde de İran İslam Devrimi üzerine Mehmed Kerim müstear adıyla bir kitap mı yazdınız?

Onu bilemiyorum. Düşünce Yayınları olarak onu biz yayımladık. O devrim üzerine ilk bilgileri ele alan bir kitaptı. İran’ın fikri yönünü Türkiye’ye biz anlattık. Şeriatî’nin kitaplarını, İmam Humeyni’nin kitaplarını bastık. İran’daki diğer molla ve aydınlara dikkat çekmeye çalıştık. 1977’de bir devrimin geldiğini biz hissettik. İran’da ne olduğunu anlamaya çalıştık. Ne olup bittiğini bize anlatsınlar diye Türkiye’deki İranlılar’a gittik. Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı’dan bilgi almaya çalıştık.

Türkiye'deki diğer İslamcılar İran Devrimi'ne nasıl tepki verdiler?

Nur Cemaatleri ve tarikatlar biraz soğuk baktılar. Soğuk bakmalarının belli sebepleri var. İlki tarihsel olarak var olmuş olan bir Şii-Sünni geriliminin varlığıdır. Ben İhvan geleneğinden gelen birisi olduğum için bu gerilim beni etkilemedi. İkincisi bir ulusal refleks ortaya çıktı. Eğer İran'da böyle bir devrim olduysa, acaba İran bölgeyi domine etmeye başlamaz mı? Bölgenin patronu olmaz mı? Bu onların İran hakkındaki düşüncelerini etkiledi. Ek olarak, bunlar siyasetten uzak duruyorlardı. Söylem olarak siyasetle uğraşmıyorlardı, bu işin de siyasetle çözülebileceğini düşünmüyorlardı. Fakat bir Ayetullah, bir müçtehid, 78 yaşında bir taklid-i mercii bir devrim yapmıştı. Bu, onlara tuhaf ve aykırı geldi. Çünkü kendilerinden de daha aktif, daha dinamik, daha muhalif ve daha radikal bir dil kullanmaları beklenirdi. Geleneklerinde bu yoktu. Devlete ilişkin görüşleri de buna müsait değildi. Ama biz gençler için öyle bir sorun yoktu. İhvan geleneğinden gelenler özellikle zaten muhalif oluyorlardı. Daha sonra özellikle Suriye meselesinde İhvan geleneği ve İran geleneği ayrıştı.

Devrim'den 1 yıl sonra devrimi yerinde görmek amacıyla İran'a gitmişsiniz. Kimlerle gittiniz?

Azadi Meydanı'nda yapılacak olan devrimin birinci yıl dönümü kutlamalarına gitmiştik. Gidenler içinde Selahattin Eş, Mümtaz Soysal, Cengiz Çandar, Abdurrahman Dilipak gibi isimler vardı.

Ercümend Özkan da var mıydı?

Ercümend Özkan'ı hatırlamıyorum, ancak o da olabilir. O da gidip geliyordu. Epey kalabalık bir grup gitmiştik. Hem devrimin yıldönümü kutlmalarına katıldık, hem Kum'a gittik. En önemlisi de Ayetullah Humeyni'yi yakından görme fırsatımız oldu. Hastanedeydi, yaklaşık 3 ya da 5 metre yakınında da bizler vardık. Oğlu Ahmet ile Beni Sadr iki tarafındaydı. Bayrağı getirip göstermişlerdi, yeni bayrağımız bu demişlerdi. Humeyni orada kısa bir konuşma yapmıştı.

Olağanüstü bir konuşmaydı. Hatta Cengiz Çandar'la birbirimize bakıp, etkilenmeyeceğiz ve objektif davranacağız demiştik. Ancak etkilenmemek mümkün değildi.

Humeyni Dönemi'nde, 1989'da vefatına kadar, İran dış politikası idealler üzerine mi kuruluydu? Tevhid anlayışı ile mi yönetiliyordu? Örneğin Humeyni'nin söylemleri ezilenler ve ezenler üzerine kuruluydu ve nerede olursa olsun İslami hareketler desteklenecek yönünde söylemleri vardı. Onun ölümünden sonra ideallerden sıyrılıp pragmatizme doğru evrilen bir dış politika mı görüyoruz?

Humeyni zamanında 'İslam için mi İran?' yoksa 'İran için mi İslam?' yönünde bir tartışma vardı. Beni Sadr ve Mehdi Bazergan gibi isimler İran için İslam diyorlardı. İran büyük bir devletti, 2500 yıllık bir geçmişi vardı. Onlara göre İslam ile güçlenir, büyür ve Ortadoğu'nun lideri olurdu. İmam Humeyni ise bu haramdır diyordu. Ona göre, İran İslam'a feda olmalıydı. Aslolan İslam'ın yükselmesi, Müslümanlar'ın güçlenmesi ve bölgesel bir entegrasyon kurulmasıydı. Onun için İslam araçsallaştırılamazdı. Eğer bir şey araçsallaştırılacaksa, Humeyni'ye göre bu İran olmalıydı. Bu iki görüş de temelden birbirlerine aykırıydı. Bunlara ek olarak nasıl bir toplumsal düzen oluşturulacağı sorunu vardı. Acaba kapitalizmin üretim teknikleri kullanılarak mı oluşturulacaktı? İktisadi büyüme bir hedef mi olacaktı? Gelir bölüşümü nasıl adil hale getirilecekti? Bu mümkün müydü? Bunlar tartışılıyordu Diğer bir tartışma ise liderliği kimin yapacağı idi. Aydınlar mı yönetici olacaktı, ulema mı yönetecekti? Bu, İran tarihi açısından çok önemlidir. Beni Sadr ve İmam Humeyni'nin birbirlerinden ayrıldıkları nokta buydu. Aydınlar ulemaya siz devrimi yaptınız, halkı mobilize ettiniz, artık medreselerinize çekilin diyorlardı. İmam Humeyni hiç bir aydına güvenmiyordu. İmam Humeyni aydınları şöyle görüyordu: Nasıl çekirgeler buğday tarlasını terkedince yumurtalarını bırakıyorlarsa, sömürgecilerde terkettikleri topraklarda aydınları bırakmışlardır. Beni Sadr ile anlaşamamasının sebebi budur. Bu çok doğru bir teşhistir. Yüz yıllık bir emeği

İslamcı aydınlar heba etmişlerdir. En tipik örneği de sayın başbakanımızdır. Müslüman toplumların liderliğini aydınlar ve akademisyenler yapamazlar. Toplumsal liderlik ulemanın elinde olmalıdır. Benim aydın anlayışım da oradan gelir. Ben de aydına güvenilmeyeceğini düşünüyorum. Eğer bana aydın denilirse bir hakaret yapılmış olur.

Neden?

Aydının referansı aydınlanma devrimidir. Ulemanın referansı ise İslam'dır. Aydın, toplumu cahil ve karanlıkta kabul eder ve pozitivismden hareketle bunu despotça düzeltmeye çalışır. Aydın zihnindeki halk, ameliyat masasına yatırılması gereken bir hasta gibidir. Aksi halde ölecektir ve zorla da olsa operasyon yapılabilir. Modernizasyon politikaları, Batılılaşma, Avrupalılaşma, kalkınma, hukuk gibi kavramların hepsi bu bağlamda yorumlanmalıdır. Ulema geleneğinde ise öyle değildir. Dinde zorlama yoktur. Tebliğ edersin ve anlatırsın. Hiçbir zaman saraylara ve sultanlara güvenilmez. Aydın eninde sonunda, ne kadar demokrat ve halktan yana olursa olsun son kertede devletten yana kalır, halktan yana kalmaz. Türkiye'ye bakıldığında zaman aydınların toplumsal önderliği üstlendikleri bir ülke görürüz. Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi gibi birinci nesil İslamcılar bana göre aydın ve ulema idiler. Fakat o kesintiye uğradı ve aydınlar ortaya çıktı. Bunlar dindar ikinci nesil İslamcılar idiler. Örneğin ben rahmetli Necmettin Erbakan'ı da aydın kabul ediyorum. İslam'ın düşünce dünyasına vakıf değillerdi. Hint ve Arap havzalarında ise aydın-ulemalar vardı. Bunların en tipik örnekleri Seyyid Kutup ve Mevdudi'dir. Seyyid Kutup sosyologtu ve aynı zamanda İslam'ın düşünce dünyasına vakıftı. İran'da ise önderlik tamamen ulemanın elindedir. Aydın, ona ancak yardım ya da muhalefet eder. Ulema, Safeviler ve Kaçarlar arasındaki fetret döneminde bağımsız olmanın tadını almıştır. Humusun merkezileşmesi ile mali olarak da bağımsızlık kazanmışlardır. Böylelikle özerk, mali kaynaklara sahip olan bir ulema sınıfı ortaya çıkmıştır.

Aydın tanımlamasını kabul etmiyorsunuz. Peki, bu aydın ve ulema çatışmasında siz kendinizi nereye koyuyorsunuz?

Ben hem sosyoloji hem de ilahiyat okudum. Said Nursi'nin bir sözü vardır. İki kanatlı olmak lazım der. Aydın-akademisyen tek kanatlıdır. Onlar, Batı eğitiminden geçmiş, Batı ilimlerini bilen ve Batının felsefi hareketlerini takip eden insanlardır. Ancak İslam tarihi ve İslam'ın kaynaklarını bilen insanlar değildir. Türkiye uleması da tek kanatlıdır. Onlar da Batı'dan haberdar değildir. Onun için ilahiyat ve sosyolojiyi beraber okudum.

O halde birinci, ikinci ve üçüncü nesil İslamcılar olarak üç gruba ayırdığınız Türkiye İslamcılarının birinci nesli ile aynı yerde mi konumlandırıyorsunuz? Kendinizi bir aydın-ulema olarak mı görüyorsunuz?

Ben çifte okuma yaptım. Hem Batı'yı yakından takip ettim hem de İslam içerisindeki tartışmaları yakından gözlemledim. Böyle bir profile ihtiyacımız var. Fethullah Gülen'in de böyle bir tarafı vardır. Hem Mozart'tan konuşur, hem de İslami ilimlere hakimdir. İmam Humeyni ise bambaşka birisiydi. Hem alimdi, hem müçtehidti. Çok zengin bir manevi hayata sahipti.

1989 sonrası İran dış politikasına dönersek, siz Humeyni sonrası dönemde bir değişim gözlemliyorsunuz mu?

1989'dan sonra İran'ın dış politikası değişti. Bu kapsamda şurdan ilerlersek, İmam Humeyni Suriye'deki İhvan'ın ayaklanmasına sıcak bakmamıştı. Onların ihtilal ve silahlı mücadele ile rejimi devirmek istemelerine destek vermemişti. Bu onun yöntemine aykırıydı.

1982'de ki Hama Olayları'ndan söz ediyorsunuz değil mi?

Evet, oradan başlamak lazım. İmam Humeyni devrim yaptı ancak cihad ilan etmedi. Eğer cihad ilan etseydi İran'da taş üstünde taş kalmazdı. Askerlere kurşun değil, çiçek atın derdi. Hama'da Müslümanlar silahlı ayaklanma gerçekleştirdiler.

Ancak Suriye rejimi çok güçlü olduğundan dolayı onları bastırdı. Bundan ders çıkarmamış gibi, Türkiye'nin de destekleri ile Suriye'de benzer bir hata daha yapıldı ve geldiğimiz nokta ortadadır. Bir diğer önemli noktada İsrail'dir. İran Suriye'ye bu yüzden de önem atfetmiştir. İmam Humeyni şöyle diyordu: İslam'ın gerçek düşmanı Amerika'dır. Eğer ona zarar vermek isteniyorsa, cepheden saldırılmalıdır. Ben 1989'dan sonraki İran dış politikasının 'İslam için İran'dan 'İran için İslam'a kaydığını düşünüyorum. İmam Humeyni sanki modern raylar üzerinde hareket eden bir trene benzeyen İran'ı 10 yıllığına raylarından çıkardı. Bunu anlamak mümkündür. Çünkü İran o yıllarda Irak ile 8 yıl süren bir savaşa sürüklenmiştir. Savaşlar öncelikleri değiştirirler. Rafsancani ikinci cumhuriyeti başlattı. O, Turgut Özal'a benzetilebilir. Hatta Rafsancani için sarıklı Turgut Özal denilebilir. O, kalkınmaya, iktisadi büyümeye önem verdi. Anlatılan bir hikaye vardır. O yıllarda Batılı birisi İran'da geziyor ve defterine şunları not düşüyor: Sony, Kia, vb. Diyor ki burda değişen bir şey yok, tabelalar yerlerinde duruyor. Ben İranlı Müslümanlar'dan bir değişim çıkacağını düşünüyordum. Ancak küresel durum bunu sabote etti. Afganistan'da Rabbani ve Hikmetyar ile konuşmuştuk. Onlarda Sünni bir damar çıktı. Diyorlardıki, Şiiler İran'da devrim yaptılar. Sünniler olarak bizimde birşeyler yapmamız lazım. Devrimi işte böyle anlıyorlar, algılıyorlar. Bu devrim, Cengiz Çandar'ın tanımlamasıyla, 'devrim içinde bir devrim' idi. İslam içinde bir devrimdi ve Şiilik içinde de bir devrimdi. Bu Şii kalıpların harekete geçirdiği bir devrim değildi. Siyasal İslam'ın iktidara karşı 3 modeli vardır: Ehl-i Sünnet'in temkin modeli, Hariciler'in silahlı mücadele modeli ve Şiiler'in takıyye modeli.

Buna 2012 yılında 'Suriye'de Hatalar' başlıklı arka arkaya Zaman'da yazdığınız 3 yazınızda değinmiştiniz.

Evet orada da belirtmiştim. Şiiler kendilerine yapılan zulümleri İmam Mehdi gelecek ümidiyle normal karşılıyorlardı. Hatta bu zulümlerin İmam Mehdi'nin gelmesi için olması gerekenler olarak düşünüyorlardı. İmam Humeyni, yanına

Ayetullahlar Mutahhari, Beheşti ve Talegani'yi de alarak bu anlayışı tersine çevirdi. Mehdi gelecekti ama bataklığa mı gelmesi daha iyiydi yoksa bir gül bahçesine gelmesi mi daha iyiydi? Tabii ki, bir gül bahçesine gelmesi daha iyiydi. Şeriati gibi Celal el-Ahmet gibi aydınlarda buna destek verince devrim yapılabilecek bir kıvama gelindi.

Celal el-Ahmet ve Ali Şeriati'den bahsediyorsunuz. Ali Şeriati dinin yozlaştırıldığından şikayet edinen ve bundan ulemayı da sorumlu tutan bir aydıydı. Dini bir sınıfın var olmasına karşı çıkıyordu. Sizce devrimi görmüş olsalardı Humeyni'ye tepkileri ne olurdu?

Şeriati tabiki ciddi bir eleştiri yapıyordu. Ama sanki ulemaya gerçek görevlerini hatırlatmak onlara gerçek misyonlarını göstermek için onları provake ediyordu. Onları tahrik ediyordu, nasırlarına basıyordu. Çünkü Şeriati toplumu motive edecek olanın ulema olacağını biliyordu. Yaşasaydı İmam Humeyni'nin yanında yer alacağını zannediyorum. Ancak bugünkü rejimin politikalarına karşı olur ve tekrar mücadele ederdi.

Ayetullah Mutahhari'yi de ele alırsak, ulemanın rolünün yönlendirmek mi yoksa yönetmek mi olduğu konusunda Humeyni'den farklı görüşlere sahipti diyebilir miyiz?

Çok belirgin değildi. Ancak daha sonra o da Humeyni ile aynı çizgiye yaklaştı. Mutahhari fikri açıdan çok derin bir adamdı.

Sizi Mutahhari, Talegani ve Beheşti gibi mollalar mı daha çok etkiledi, Ali Şeriati ve Celal el-Ahmet gibi aydınlardan mı daha çok etkilendiniz?

Ben hepsinden etkilendim. Hepsini zihnimde yakınlaştırmaya çalışıyorum. Bugün çok farklı bir zamanda yaşıyoruz ve İslam'ın hiç bir damarını gözardı edemeyiz. Suhreverdi ile İbni Sina'yı, İbn Teymiyye ile İbn Arabi'yi, aydın ile ulemayı, sufiler ile selefleri diyalog kurarak anlamaya çalışıyorum.

Aynı dönemde beraber çalıştığınız insanlar vardı. Mehmet Metiner ve Nureddin Şirin buna örnek olarak verilebilir. Birlikte çalıştığınız bu insanlardan bazılarının çizgisi değişirken, bazıları konumlarını pek fazla değiştirmeden muhafaza ettiler. Bu konuda neler düşünüyorsunuz?

Nureddin Şirin tertemiz bir insandı, bir aktivistti. Diğer arkadaşlar hakkında ise söyleyebileceğim çok bir şey yok. Onlar iktidar için iktidar istediler. Ben bunu sosyolojik açıdan şu şekilde yorumluyorum. Anadolu'nun çeşitli yerlerinden İstanbul'a gelmiş dini duyguları gelişmiş insanlar vardı. Bunlar kendilerine ne merkez sağda ne de merkez solda yer bulamadılar. Kendilerine bir mecra açmaya çalıştılar. Milli Görüş bu açıdan toplama bir yerdi. İslamın her görüşünden herkes oraya toplanmıştı. Kimisinin Türkiye ve dünya tahayyülü başkaydı, kimisi ise bir an önce iktidar olmak istediler. Onun için bazı arkadaşlarla yollarımız ayrıldı. Onlarla birşey olamaz. Ben İslamcılık'ta ısrar ediyorum.

Mümtazer Türköne ile İslamcılık öldü mü sorusundan hareketle İslamcılığın seyri üzerine bir tartışma yaşadınız. İslamcılık öldü mü ya da radikal veya devrimci İslamcılık öldü mü?

İslamcılık ölmez. Radikal İslam tanımlaması yanlış bir tanımlamadır. Radikalizm herşeyi yıkıp yepyeni bir dünya inşa etmek demektir. Bu mümkün değildir. Her radikalizm sonunda şiddete ve teröre evrilir. Şöyle bir kavramsallaştırma yapmak daha doğru olur: Resmi İslam ve Sivil İslam. Resmi İslam yukarıdan aşağıya politik, idari ve hukuki araçlarla toplumu İslami yönde dönüştürmeyi hedefler. Siyasal Müslümanlık, radikalizm bunun içerisinde yer alır. Sivil İslam ise insani ve sosyal hareketler ile zaman içerisinde siyaseti etkilemeye çalışır. İslamcılık öldü mü tartışmalarına dönersek, 1850 ve 1923 arasında varlık gösteren Birinci Nesil İslamcılar'ın devleti kurtarmak gibi bir dertleri vardı. 1950 ve 1997 arası İkinci Nesil İslamcılar'ın ise kurtaracak bir devletleri yoktu. Ulus-devletin kendilerine sunduğu çerçeve içerisinde düşünüyorlardı ve bir İslami devlet kurmak istiyorlardı. 1997'den sonraki İslamcılar olarak adlandırdığım Üçüncü

Nesil İslamcılar ise AK Parti ile karşılaştılar. Bunların ne devlet kurtarma ne de devlet kurma projeleri yoktu. 1960'tan beri büyük bir İslami birikim vardı. Sürekli tercüme yapardık. Devrimden sonra ne olduysa sürekli takip ederdik. Bu noktada Türkiyeli İslamcılar olarak avantajlıydık. Çünkü İranlılar'ın Araplar'dan, Araplar'ın da İranlılar'dan haberleri yokken biz ikisini de takip edebiliyorduk. Bu çok büyük bir avantajdı. En başta söylediğim entelektüel-kültürel Müslümanlık bize büyük bir birikim sağlamıştı. AK Parti bizim bu aydınlarımızı bürokrat olarak kullandı. Devlet bürokrati yaptı. Bu bizim başımıza gelebilecek en büyük felaketti. Diğer taraftan, bizde çok güçlü bir İslami bilinç vardı. Devlete rağmen ve devletten hiç beslenmeden var olan bir Sosyal Müslümanlık vardı. Kurban derileriyle, zekatla ve fitreyle yürüyen bir sistem vardı. 2000'lerle beraber bu yok oldu. AK Parti bu dinamizmi yok etti. Şimdi cemaatlerin neredeyse tamamı kamuya bağlanmış vaziyettedir. Tarihlerinde hiç görmedikleri büyük imkanlara sahipler. Fakat ruhları yok. Son olarak, modern devleti ve iktidarı sorgulamadan, olduğu gibi alıp kullandılar. Bu da onları adaletsiz yaptı. Bu sistemi bir eğri cetvele benzetiyorum. Eğri bir cetvelden düz bir çizgi çıkmaz. Hz. Ömer de gelse, bu böyledir. Çin efsanesine göre bir ejderha mağarada yaşamaktadır. Mağara tıka basa altın doludur ve ejderha kim oraya giderse öldürmektedir. Sonra bir gün, Kasımpaşa'dan bir tane delikanlı çıkar, ben bunu öldürürüm der, gider ve ejderhayı öldürür. Mağaraya girdiğinde tüm altınları görür. Altınlara dokunduğunda tırnaklarının uzadığını, kıllarının arttığını görür ve ejderhalaşır. Bizim İslamcılarımız da ejderhalaştılar. İktidar onları dönüştürdü.

APPENDIX B

ESKİŞEHİR

16.01.2015

ATASOY MÜFTÜOĞLU İLE SÖYLEŞİ

Şiilik üzerine düşünceleriniz nelerdir?

Bendeniz bir Müslüman olarak, Müslümanların dikkatlerini İslam'ın bütün parçaları üzerinde yoğunlaştırmaları kanaatindeyim. Şiilik de bu bütünün bir parçasıdır, küçük bir parçasıdır. Bu parçanın nasıl oluştuğu, nasıl bugünlere kadar geldiği, hangi doğrultuda geliştiği çok daha farklı bir konudur. Şiilik, benim için herhangi bir problem değildir. Kuşkusuz Şiiliğin Sünniliğe göre farklı boyutları var. Kabul edilebilir yanları var, kabul edilemez yanları var. Benim Şiiliği Usuli yöntemlerle açıklamakla herhangi bir sorunum yoktur. Ancak Bâtını ekollerin eleştirel bir dikkatle incelenmesi gerektiğine inananlardanım.

Şiilik midir, size etkileyen yoksa devrim fikri mi?

Ben tabi ki öncelikle devrimden etkilenen birisiyim. Devrimin hala çok önemli olduğunu ve bu önemin gereği kadar idrak edilmediğini, anlaşılmadığını düşünenlerdenim. Bunun bütün İslam âlemi toplumları içerisinde olağanüstü bir yenilik olduğunu düşünenlerdenim. Bu devrim İslam Dünyası'nda bir ilktir. İlk meydan okumadır, ilk hesaplaşmadır, ilk yeniden başlangıç bilincidir ve ilk yeniden kendine geliştirdir.

Toplumun, Batılılaşma ve modernizm ile birlikte bir yabancılaşma sürecine girdiğini söylüyorsunuz. Kitaplarındaki ana fikirlerden birisidir bu.

Yabancılaşmaya karşı panzehir olarak olarak sunduğunuz argüman ise ‘tevhid’ düşüncesidir. Bu düşünce nedir tam olarak?

Bugün bir tevhid düşüncesinden söz etmek mümkün değildir. Şunun için değildir: Modernleşme diye üzerinde yeteri kadar durmadığımız belirleyici, tayin edici bir gerçeklik var. İslami entelektüeller bu geçmişle yüzleşebilmiş, bununla hesaplaşabilmiş değildir. Bununla hesaplaşacak bir irade ortaya koyabilmiş değildir. Hatta şöyle de denilebilir: Bununla hesaplaşma gereği duyulmamıştır. Burada bir patoloji olduğu gerçeği vardır. Modernleşme pek çok Müslüman düşünürün olumlu bir şeyler yüklemeye çalıştığı bir şeydir. Modernleşme bizim açımızdan bakıldığında olumsuz bir şeydir. Modernite Rönesans’la başlayan, Protestan reformu ile devam eden; bilimsel devrimler, sanayileşme, aydınlanma ve kentleşme gibi süreçleri içeren bir olgudur. Bu süreçlerin oluşturduğu bir bütünlük var. Bu benim “Aydınlanma Mutlakiyetçiliği” diye tanımladığım şeydir. Sömürgecilik yolu ile ırkçılık yolu ile ve tepeden ideolojik bir dil yolu ile zaman zaman da askeri yöntemlerle evrenselleştirilmiştir. Bu bütünüyle reddedilmesi gereken bir şeydir. Müslüman demek Batı’yı reddetmek Doğu’yu kabul etmek anlamına gelmez ama burada gayri insani bir yol var. Kültürler birbirleriyle alışveriş yaparlar, uygarlıklar birbirleriyle alışveriş yaparlar. Ama burada bir alışveriş yoktur. Burada militer ve faşizan bir dayatma vardır. Devrim de bu noktada çok önemlidir. Yani bu militer ve faşizan “Aydınlanma Mutlakiyetçiliği”nin evrensel ve tek bir model olarak dayatılmasının gayri ahlakiliğine yönelik bir isyandır. Bu açıdan çok önemlidir. Çünkü bugün, ‘Tarihin Sonu’ düşüncesini ısrarla gündeme getirenler buradan hareketle modern, seküler, liberal, demokratik modelin nihai başarısını ilan ettiler. Bugün Türkiye’de entelektüel hayat içinde demokrasi sözcüğü geçmeyen cümleler kuramıyor. Bu şu demektir: Demek ki onlara göre tarihin sonudur ancak bu İslami seçenek değildir. İmam Humeyni’ye göre ise tarih yeniden başlatılabilirdi. Nitekim devrim, tarihi yeniden başlatmıştır.

Bu noktada Fukuyama'nın sözünü ettiğiniz 'Tarihin Sonu' tezine göre Sovyetler'in de çöküşü ile liberal demokrasi kazandı ve böylelikle artık ulus-devletlerin çağı da geçti. Söyleşilerinizde ve kitaplarınızda küreselleşmenin ulus-devletle, İslamcılarının yapamadığı, hesaplaşmayı yaptığını belirtiyorsunuz. Ulus-devletle hesaplaşmak, düşünce dünyanın neresine oturuyor, neden hesaplaşılmalı ulus-devlet ile?

Biz küresel, tepeden dayatılan neo-liberal dünya görüşünün diktatörlüğü altındayız. Çünkü neo-liberal diktatörlük bir başka seçenek kabul etmiyor. Hâlbuki neo-liberal diktatörlük 'düşünce özgürlüğü' gibi, 'ifade özgürlüğü' gibi anlamlar içeriyor! Bu neo-liberal diktatörlük nezdinde Müslümanlar için özgürlük yoktur, İslami ifade özgürlüğü, İslami bir modeli hayata geçirme özgürlüğü yoktur. Örneğin Mısır gibi büyük bir ülke İslami bir eğilim seyrettiği için marjinalleştirilmiştir. Bu korkunç bir cinayettir ve İslam dünyasında halen bu cinayet üzerine konuşulabilmiş değildir. Çünkü neo-liberal diktatörlük İslami bir yönelişi askeri yöntemlerle engellemiştir. Bu bakımlardan, ulus-devlet zaman zaman kullanılan bir araçtır. Küreselleşme ulus-devletleri yok edememiştir ancak ulus-devletlerdeki toplumlara yeknesak bir hale getirmiştir. Amerikan kültürü yolu ile basmakalıplaştırmış ve hizaya getirmiştir. Bunlar yaşanırken devrimi yeniden hatırlamak gerekir. Yani devrim bunun için gerekliydi. Bunun için bir karşı çıkış, bir hesaplaşma gerekiyordu. Bugün, ulus-devletlerin bir sapkınlık olduğuna inanıyorum. Çünkü ulus-devletler yapay ırkçılıklar icat etmişler, kurgu mitolojiler icat etmişler ve böylelikle kendilerini meşrulaştırmışlardır. Bu süreçte hiçbir şey doğal ve kabul edilebilir değildir. Ulus-devlet tamamen bir zorlamadır. Eğer Türkiye bugün Kürt sorunu yaşıyorsa bunun sorumlusu ulus-devlettir. Hala da bu refleksler devam etmektedir. Eğer Türkiye bu olaya bir medeniyet varisi olarak yaklaşmış olsaydı bu sorun haline gelmezdi.

Ulus-devlet sonrası için düşüncenizdeki yönetim ya da yaşayış biçimi nedir, ne tasavvur ediyorsunuz?

Ulus-devlet sonrasını düşünebilmek için önce küreselleşmenin adını koymak gerekiyor. Bu masum bir sürecin adı mıdır, yoksa yeni bir emperyalizm midir? Bence bu yeni bir emperyalizm biçimidir ve Anglo-Amerikan ve oryantalist bir içerik taşımaktadır. Küreselleşme ile hesaplaşmak bu kültürleri sorgulamadan mümkün değildir. Önce bu yapılmalıdır. İkinci olarak zihinsel anlamda bir İslami devrim yapılmalıdır. Geçmişten devraldığımız kültür statükocu, konformist ve teslimiyetçi bir kültür olduğu için zihinsel anlamda bir devrim yapılamamaktadır. Bugün Müslüman bir entelektüelden bahsetmek çok güçtür. Çünkü Avrupa tarih yazımının dışında bir fikri yoktur. Kendi hikâyesini, serüvenini anlatamamaktadır, kendi sözcükleri özgür değildir. Müslüman bir entelektüelden bahsetmek için Müslüman genç kuşakların bir “zihinsel sömürgeleştirme” yapmaları gerekir. Sünni dünyanın devrimi böyle başlayacaktır. Ancak benim bu konuda çok umudum yok. Beni karamsar olmakla itham edenlere şunu söylüyorum: Biz tarihin son 200 yılını hayali umutlar peşinde sürüklenerek geçirdik.

İran İslam Cumhuriyeti de bir ulus devlettir. İran’ı ve devrimini önemseyen biri olarak sizce bu bir çelişki midir?

İran ulus-devlet refleksi gösteriyor. Bu bir çelişkidir. Ancak bunu bütün boyutları ile konuşmalıyız. Bunu söylemek bana acı veriyor. Devrim bir bürokratikleşme evrimi gösteriyor, ulus-devlet refleksi gösteriyor. Bürokratikleşmeyi anlamak mümkün değil ama ulus-devletleşmeyi anlamak bana mümkün geliyor. Ulus-devlet refleksi gösteriyor olmasını üzüntüyle karşılıyorum ancak bunun neden böyle olduğunu da devrim sonrası meydana gelen olaylara bağlıyorum. Devrim sonrasındaki olayları iyi anlayabilseydik bunu sorun haline getirebilirdik. Ben bunun bir teamül, bir gelenek haline gelmemesini diliyorum. Ancak İran’a dayatılan çok yönlü kuşatma, İran’ı zaman zaman reel politik yapmaya mecbur bırakmıştır. Bir İslam Devleti de reel politik yapabilir ancak bunu ilke haline getirmemelidir.

Humeyni dönemi ile Humeyni sonrası dönemi karşılaştırsak İran dış politikasında bir değişim olmuş mudur? İran rejimi, rejim ihracı politikasını tevhidi bir yönde mezhep gözetmeksizin devam ettirmiş midir yoksa bu politika Şii mezhepçi bir yöne mi gitmiştir?

İran çok büyük bir kültür ve uygarlığa sahiptir. Bugün, İran'ın Şiiliğe sıkıştırılmasını anlamak mümkün değildir. Burada bir kötü niyet var. Bu İran'ı mahkûm etmeye yönelik bir şey. O büyük medeniyeti mahkûm edemezsin çünkü İran şu an her alanda içerik üretiyor. Şiiliğin öne çıkarılması devrimin inkârına yönelik bir şeydir. Devrimin geçici olduğuna dair bir izlenim yaratma amacına yöneliktir. Şiiliğin öne çıkarılması bir emperyal projenin eseridir. İmam döneminde buna kimse cesaret edememişti. Çünkü İmam, gerçekten modern tarihte benzeri görülmemiş bir şey yapmıştır. Bunu, onu kutsallaştırmak anlamında söylemiyorum. Ben de İmam ile birkaç kez görüşüm, o içimizden birisiydi. Dokunulmazlığı olan birisi değildi, masum değildi. Bilakis masumiyet kavramının tartışılmasını tavsiye ediyordu. İmam hiçbir zaman takiiye yapmadı. Geleneksel Ahbari yöntemi tartışmaya açtı. Bugün Şiilik üzerinde yoğunlaşılmasının nedeni emperyal proje tarafından kuşatıldığımız ve buna karşı bir direnme kabiliyetimiz olmadığı içindir. Eğer kaygımız İslam olsaydı devrimin eleştirilmesine göz yummazdık. Ama burada da ulus-devlet refleksi ortaya çıktı, mezhepçi bir karşı duruş ortaya çıktı. Mezheplerin çatıştırılması kolaydır. Sünni dünya hala devrimci bir dili hazmedebilmiş değildir. Bunun bir Şiilik icadı olduğu konusunda çalışmalar yapılıyor. İslam Devrimi modern tarihi sarsan en büyük olaylardan birisidir. Bu yüzden devrimci her duyarlılık engellenmeye çalışılıyor. Geçenlerde Malatya'da bir konferansta emperyalizmin sağcı ve muhafazakâr olanıyla bir sorunumuz yok, biz emperyalizmin solcu ve materyalist olanını istemiyoruz dedim. Biz de böyle zihinsel bir parçalanma, bir atalet, bir meskenet var. Biz kendi cümlelerimizi ifade edemeyecek kadar özgüvenini yitirmiş bir kültürün çocuklarıyız. Çünkü bir tarihin son birkaç yüzyılını hep maruz kalarak geçirdik. Maruz kalmak ne demektir? Maruz kalmak yetersizlikle

ilgilidir, güçsüzlükle ilgilidir, içerik üretememekle ilgilidir, zihinsel ve ahlaki bağımsızlığı yitirmekle ilgilidir. Maruz kalmak bir irade ortaya koyamamakla ilgilidir. Bu sorunlarla yüzleşerek bu problemi aşabilirdik ancak biz bugün hala maruz kalmaya devam ediyoruz. Maruz kalan bir bünyenin ‘hangi mezhep?’ tartışması yapmak yerine önce kendini özgürleştirmesi gerekir. İmam’ın ortaya koyduğu irade bütün dünyada şaşkınlık uyandırdı. Mesela Kelim Sıddıki derdi ki devrimden önce biz İran’ı bilmiyorduk. Bu, utanç verici büyük bir itiraftır. Hâlbuki İran’daki felsefi üretim bütün dünyayı yakından ilgilendirmeliydi. Modern dünya bu şaşkınlığı üzerinden atamamıştı. İmam ile savaşılamayacağını gördüler. Çünkü İmam İslam’ın bağımsız bir iradesi olduğunu gösterdi ve çıplak elleri ile bir halk dünyanın 4. büyük ordusunu yenmeyi başardı. Bu müthiş bir şeydi. İmam ile uğraşmak zordu ancak Şiilikle uğraşmak kolaydı. Özellikle mezhep bağnazlığıyla malul bulunan toplumlar devrimle değil ama Şiilikle baş edebileceklerini düşündüler.

1982’de Hama’da olan olaylara dönersek, İran sizce neden Suriye Devleti’ne destek verdi de ayaklanmacıların yanında yer almadı? Sonuçta ayaklananlar İran İslam Devrimi’nden ilham alıyorlardı ve karşılarında da seküler bir Baas rejimi ile yönetilen bir devlet vardı. Sizce bunun sebebi ayaklananların tamamına yakınının Sünni oluşu mudur? İran orada mezhepçi bir yaklaşım mı sergilemiştir, reel politik mi yapmıştır?

Bu bir reel politik değildi. Çünkü İmam ve arkadaşları Hama ve Humus’ta Müslümanların karşı karşıya bulunmaları durumunu önceden istihbar ederek ve Suriye’de Müslümanları temsil ettikleri düşünülen otoritelerle görüşerek bir ayaklanma için henüz hazır olmadıkları konusunda onları uyarılmışlardır.

O dönemde olaylardan birkaç yıl sonra Türkiye’de *Davet Dergisi* ‘Hama Olayları ve İran İslam Devrimi’ konulu birkaç sayı çıkarıyor. Bu sayılarda İran’ın neden Hama Olayları’nda ayaklanmalara destek vermediği konusu izah edilmeye çalışılıyor ve zaten ambargo altında bulunan İran’ın iyi ilişkilere sahip olduğu

Suriye ile aralarını bozacak adımlar atmamasının normal karşılanması gerektiği söyleniyor. Bu İran'dan çok İrancılık yapmak mıdır?

Bir İslam devleti yanlış tercihlerde bulunabilir. Dolayısıyla burada sorun şu olmamalıdır: Nasıl bir ifade bulalım da İran'ı aklayalım. Böyle bir noktadan hareket etmemek gerekir. İnsanların kalplerinde olanı Rabbimiz bilir. Ben Suriye ve İran ilişkilerinin mezhep mülahazası ile yürütüldüğünü düşünenlerden değilim. Çünkü gerçek İmamiyye metinlerinde Nusayrilik kınanan bir yorumun adıdır. Ancak şunu dikkate almak lazım ki İran benzeri olmayan bir yalnızlaştırma ile karşı karşıyaydı. Sadece Suriye'nin kapısı açıldı. Suriye'ye ihtiyacı vardı. Ancak Suriye'ye ihtiyacı olması demek devrim fikri ile bu kadar uzaklaşmaya izin verir miydi onu değerlendirmek mümkün olmayabilir. Şunu da eklemek isterim ki İran bütün yalnızlaştırma politikalarına rağmen yıllardır Hamas'ı finanse ediyor. Türkiye'nin Hamas'a romantik ilgisini aşan şeyler yapıyor.

Radikal İslam desem karşı çıkar mısınız, yoksa başka bir ifade mi kullanmalıyım?

Ben radikalizmin hakkını vermek gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Radikalizmin ucuz sloganlara atfedilmemesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Radikalizmin romantik bir takım değerlendirmelere tabii tutulmaması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Radikalizmin varoluşsal bir estetiği olduğunu düşünüyorum. Keşke bu estetiği somutlaştırabilmiş olsaydık diye hüzünleniyorum. Radikal olmakla ilgili bir rahatsızlığım yok.

O halde radikal İslam'a ne oldu? Düzenle barışan bir noktaya gelerek dönüştü mü? Yoksa varlığını sürdürüyor mu?

Bütünleşen radikal İslamcılık değildir. AK Parti iktidarı ile bütünleşen statükocu, gelenekçi, vatancı, mezhepçi, hizipçi unsurlardır. Ama şunu belirtmek gerekir ki radikalizm sayıların sorunu değildir, radikalizm niteliklerle ilgilidir. Radikalizm bugün de yarın da var olacaktır. Ama asıl sorun şudur: Radikalizm maalesef toplumsallaşamamıştır ve siyasallaşamamıştır. Radikal İslam hiç değilse kendini

entelektüel anlamda kanıtlayabilirdi ama bunu başaramamıştır. Burada bir zaaf olduğu gün gibi aşikârdır. Ama daha vahimi AK Parti hinterlandı içerisinde kendilerini konumlandıranları bugün İslam'ın dili ile tanımlamak istediğimizde tanımlayacağımız bir konumda olduklarını belirtmek gerekir. Çünkü bu kesimlerin, yani hem kendilerini İslam'a nispet edenler ama aynı zamanda demokrasi, seküler kültür ve kapitalist kültürle de bütünleşenlerin, İslami anlamda kendilerini yeniden değerlendirmeleri gerekir. Bugün bizim kullandığımız ve İslam'a nispet ettiğimiz dil ne zamana ne de mekâna hitap etmiyor. Bugün bu bahsettiğimiz kesimler İslam'a değil ancak seküler ideolojilere eklenilerek varlıklarını sürdürebiliyorlar. Eğer bir şeye eklenilerek hayatınızı sürdürme ihtiyacı duyuyorsanız, siz kendiniz olmaktan çıkmışsınız, inançlarınızı ertelemişsiniz, her şeyi askıya almışsınız demektir. Bugün tüm bu kesimler sayılar yolu ile iktidarlarını sürdürüyorlar. Türkiye'de iktidar belki sayılardan meşruiyet alıyor ama kültürel iktidar seküler kesimlerin elinde bulunuyor. Buna nasıl tahammül ediyor İslami kesimler? Bunu nasıl hazmediyorlar? Bununla nasıl ünsiyet peyda ediyorlar? Bunu nasıl fark etmeden yaşayabiliyorlar? Namımız yürüsün diye değil, İslam'ı bu temsil ettiği için radikal olmamız gerekiyor. Böyle olmakla onurumuzu kazanıyoruz ve ancak bunun da çok tehlikeli olduğunu biliyoruz. Bunun bedelinin de neyi gerektirdiğini biliyoruz ve nitekim o bedeli de şu anda ödüyoruz. Çünkü iktidar denkleminin dışındayız, iktidara eleştirel bakıyoruz. İktidarın hasmı değiliz ama eleştirel dikkatimizi de muhafaza ediyoruz. İslami varoluş bugünün dünyasında ancak radikal olmakla mümkündür. Zaten İslamcılık demek İslam'ın bir özne olmasını sağlama mücadelesi demektir. İslam'ı sadece politik bağlama hapsedmekle alakası yoktur. O bir bütünlüğün ifadesidir ve bu bütünlüğü yeniden hayata kazandırma mücadelesinin adıdır.

O zaman Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin iktidara gelişinden itibaren Radikal İslam'a getirisinden çok götürüsü olduğunu ifade edebiliriz.

Gayet tabii. Radikal olmak büyük bir mazhariyettir. İlimli olmak ise tanımı olmayan bir çürümeye mahkûm olmak demektir.

Tarikatlar ve tasavvuf hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nelerdir? Bunlar İslam'ın heterodoks yorumları mıdır, İslam'ın aslı mıdır, yoksa sapkınlık mıdır?

Şöyle izah edeyim; Martin Lings'in bir sözü vardır: 'Geçmişte tasavvufun kendisi vardı, adı yoktu. Bugün adı var kendisi yok.' Diyor. Ben bu görüşü paylaşıyorum. Peki geçmişte var olan neydi? Geçmişte tasavvuf diye bir akım mı vardı? Şöyle bir şekilde vardı; bir ahlaki derinlik yolu olarak vardı. Yani naslardan bağımsız bir tasavvuf yolu yoktu. Yani Kitab-ı Kerim'den ve sünnetlerden bağımsız bir tasavvuf yoktu. Bugün ise her biri bir din haline gelmiş tasavvuf okulları var. Yani Kuran'dan ve sünnetten bağımsızlar. Ben tasavvufu reddetmek yerine, bunun Kuran ve sünnet ışığında yeniden eleştirel bir çözümlenme üzerine temellendirilmesi gerektiğini düşünenlerdenim.

Eserlerinizde sık sık entelektüel bir savaştan, modern ve geleneksel insandan bahsediyorsunuz. Ancak bu iki insan modelinin de belirli eksiklikleri var. Örneğin modern insan 'ruhsuz bir akılcılıkla' kısıtlanırken, geleneksel insan ise 'akılsız bir ruhçuluk' tarafından kısıtlanmakta. Bu dikotomi Celal El Ahmet ve Ali Şeriatî'nin kendi toplumlarında gördükleri eksiklikleri tarif ederken kullandıkları kavramları çağırıyor. Bu iki ismin fikir ve düşünce dünyanızda ne boyutta bir etkileri, katkıları vardır?

Şu anda bulunduğum noktadan hareketle size şunu söyleyeyim: Ben bir profesyonel değilim, bir profesyonel olarak yazmıyorum. Ben kendisini aziz İslam ümmetinin ki bugün İslam ümmeti diye bir gerçeklik olmadığı halde, parçası olan bir Müslümanım. Ümmetin yeniden gerçek olması mücadelesine katkıda bulunmak için yazıyorum. Bunun için de ümmetin bütün renklerine açığım. Bütün renklerinden ve bütün isimlerden hiçbir rahatsızlık duymadan yararlanıyorum. Aramızdaki farklılıkları bugün içerisinde bulunduğumuz ağır

koşullar sebebi ile yargılamaya değil, bu farklılıkları ortaya çıkaran tarihsel nedenleri anlamak gibi bir çabaya ihtiyacımız olduğunu düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla şu ya da bu yazar demek yerine onları besleyen damarlar neydi, hangi nedenlerle bu noktaya geldiler bunların bilinmesini istiyorum. Ben bir imam ailesinin çocuğuyum. Babamın yakın dostları vardı. Necip Fazıl Bey ile tanıştım, Necmettin Erbakan Bey ile tanıştım. Büyük Doğu'da yazı yazan en genç yazarlardan biri bendim. Necip Fazıl Bey ile seyahatler yaptım. Ancak o ümmetin önde gelen, çok nezih, mücahit ve mübariz ilim adamlarını tekfir ettiği andan itibaren orayı terk ettim. Çünkü tek yoruma, tek akla, tek üstada, tek yazara kapanmanın büyük bir hata olduğunun bilincindeydim.

Zaten Necip Fazıl'a yaptığımız bir eleştiri de onun Türkiye dışındaki kimseyi okumayın demesiydi.

Evet, o nedenle biz eleştirel bir dikkatle bütün dünyayı okuyun diyoruz. Bunun içinde elinizde tevhide bir rehberiniz olsun. Bu Kuran'ı teknik anlamıyla ezberlemek anlamına gelmiyor. Türkiye'de hemen herkes teknik anlamda Kuran'ı çok iyi biliyor. Ancak bu yanlıştır. İran'da bulunduğum günlerde Ali Şeriatî'nin eylemlerine ilişkin çok çarpıcı öyküler dinledim. Tüm eserlerini ve hayatını da okudum. Çoğu yerinde heyecanlandığım da olmuştur. Kimi noktalarda kendisini eleştirdiğim de olmuştur. Celal El Ahmet için de aynı şeyi söylemek mümkündür. İran'daki İslam felsefesi bağlamında yapılan çalışmalarım da olmuştur. Ancak bu ilgi, bu yakınlık, bu sıcaklık hiçbir zaman Şiiliği nihai bir tercih olarak görme noktasına gelmemiştir. Çünkü ben kendimi bütün mezheplere karşı eşit noktada hisseden birisiyim. Hiçbir zaman hangi mezhepten olduğum benim için tayin edici bir şey değildir. Hep şunu düşünürüm: İlmi meşruiyet sahibi olsaydım ve bir mezhebe ihtiyacım olmasaydı. Kimseyi kategorize ederek değerlendirmiyorum. Örneğin Seyit Hüseyin Nasr'a yönelik ciddi eleştirilerim vardır. Fakat onun aynı zamanda gerçek bir ilim adamı olduğunu ilmi meşruiyet bağlamında düşündüğüm için kimi durumlarda, özellikle de bir irfan okuluna ilişkin görüşlerde bulunmak

için, ondan yararlanılabileceğini düşünürüm. Halbuki ona yönelik çok yoğun eleştirilerim vardır.

Vakti kuşanmak diyorsunuz, yani zamanın bilincine varmak. Küreselleşmiş bir dönemde bireylerin dine olan bakış ve duruşları özden kopmuş denilebilir belki ve bu bireylerden öze dönmeleri bekleniyor. Küreselleşme geri alınabilecek gibi bir şey değil. Bu sebeple bireyleri öze dönmeye çağırarak yerine; dini, özünü bozmadan küreselleşme çağına uyarlamak, yani İslam'a vakti kuşandırmak mümkün müdür?

Zaman zaman Mehmet Akif'i 'Asrın idrakine söyletmeliyiz İslam'ı' dizesinden dolayı sorgulayan entelektüellerimiz var. Bense bunun oldukça masum bir talep olduğunu düşünenlerdenim. 'Asrın idrakine söyletmeliyiz İslam'ı' asrın idrakine teslim olmalıyız anlamına gelmiyor. Asrın idrakine boyun eğmeliyiz anlamına gelmiyor. Asrın idrakinin dikkatini çekmeliyiz. Mesela bugün hiçbir Müslüman entelektüel, yazar veya şair 21.yüzyılın dikkatini çekecek bir şey söylemiyor. Çünkü herkes kendisini bir zihinsel hapishaneye kapatmış durumda. Eğer böyle yaşamaya devam edersek bizim ne bugün ne yarın ne de öbür gün insanlığa, ümmete söyleyecek hiçbir şeyimiz olmayacak. Daha çok sömürülmeye müsait olarak kalmaya devam edeceğiz. Bu yüzden vakti kuşanmak, bugünün dinamiklerine ilişkin çözümler yapmayı icap ettirir. Bugünün dinamiklerine ilişkin çözümler yapmak demek bugünün dinamiklerini kutsallaştırmak anlamına asla gelmez. Eğer zamanın farkına varmazsanız zaman sizi sürükler. Biz sürükleniyoruz.

12 Aralık 2014 tarihinde Yıldırım Beyazıt Üniversitesi'nde katıldığınız bir söyleşide şöyle demiştiniz: 'Toplum İslam'ı kendi içinde yaşamaya maruz bırakılıyor, bunu kamusal alanda yapamıyor.' Buna sebep olarak da neo-liberalizmi göstermişsiniz. Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi döneminde bu sorun çözülebildi mi?

Neo-liberal dünya görüşü, medya aracılığı ile İslami dilde fuhşiyat ve münkerat olarak tanımlanan her şeyi kamusal alana yansıtmayı başarmıştır. Bugün hiçbir sapkınlık gayri meşru olarak görülememektedir. Fuhşiyat ve münkerat kamusal alanda görünür kılındığı halde İslam görünür kılınamamıştır. Çünkü biz bugün İslam hukuku ile amel edemiyoruz. Seküler bilginin iktidarı tarafından araçsallaşmış bulunuyoruz. Ontolojik ve epistemolojik bir emperyalizme maruz bulunuyoruz. Bu varoluşu seküler anlamda açıklamak zorundasınız demektir. Yani bilgiyi ve varlığı ilahi güce nispet etme özgürlüğüne sahip değilsiniz. Seküler hukuk, seküler ekonomi, seküler siyaset, seküler bilgi... Peki, İslam nerede? İslam sadece bir folklor olarak var. Bu ülkede Müslümanların sadece cami inşa etme özgürlükleri vardır. Bilinç inşa etme özgürlüğü yoktur. Bizim İslam'ı talep etme özgürlüğümüz yoktur. Bugün Türkiye'de Diyanet İşleri Başkanı biz İslam'ı istiyoruz diye bir cümle kuramaz.

Yine aynı söyleşide İslam dünyasının düşünmeden ve sorgulamadan kendilerini üstatlarına hapsedtiklerini söylemiştiniz. Humeyni'nin de bu anlamda putlaştırıldığını söyleyebilir miyiz?

İmam Humeyni efsaneleştirilmiş, masum telakki edilmiş birisi değildi. Bugün İran'daki taklit müessesesi toplumun Şii bağlamda da her şeyi sorgulamasına imkân vermiyor. Radikal bir duyarlılık taklidin yerine tahkiki koyar. Zaten İmam'da taklidin yerine tahkiki koyduğu için Gulat-ı Şia tarafından mahkûm edilmiştir. Mesela ben Kum'da çeşitli medreseleri ziyaret ettiğimde oradaki çok tanınmış ulema bana şunu söylemişlerdir: 'Ağa'dan ne haber? Ehl-i Sünnet olmuş.' Dediler. Ondan rahatsızdılar. Burada sorun şudur: İslam dünyası toplumları bugün bir taraftan hem Şii hem Sünni geleneğin baskısı altındadır. Bir taraftan modernitenin baskısı altındadır. Ben bunlara geleneğin ve modernitenin tiranlığı diyorum. İslam dünyası geleneği bütünüyle reddetmeden, moderniteyi de sadece ideolojik klişelere hapsedmeden anlamaya çalışarak, büyük bir entelektüel

ve zihinsel hesaplaşma içerisine girerek her iki taraftan kaynaklanan sorunları çözebilirler.

APPENDIX C

ANKARA

16.01.2015

HÜSEYİN BÜLBÜL İLE SÖYLEŞİ*

Öncelikle İktibas Dergisi'nin kuruluşundan ve amaçlarından bahsedelim. Dergi 1980'lerin başında kuruluyor ve o dönemde çok sayıda İslamcı dergiler yayın yapıyor. Dergiyi kurarken Ercüment Özkan neyi hedeflemiştir?

Rahman ve Rahim olan Allah'ın adıyla... Sayın Elhan, İktibas Dergisi'nin doğum tarihi 1 Ocak 1981'dir. 12 Eylül 1980'de ihtilal olmuş, sıkıyönetim ilan edilmiş ve 13 Eylül'de bütün İslamcı dergiler kapatılmıştır. O günlerde çıkan İslamcı dergi de kalmamıştı. Bu olaylardan 1 yıl sonra, kurucusu olan Ercüment Özkan'ın ifadesiyle "1980 ihtilalinin estirdiği zemheri soğuşunda" yayın hayatına başlamıştır. Özkan, 1960'lı yıllardan beri süre gelen İslam hakkındaki araştırmalarını, Türkiye ve dünyada cereyan eden hadiseler hakkındaki görüş ve düşüncelerini, birlikte olduğu bir grup arkadaşı ile istişare ederek, topluma sunmanın gereğine inandıkları için, bu birikimi fazla iddialı olmayan bir isim olan İktibas'ı tercih ederek yayınlamaya karar vermişlerdi. Bununla Türkiye'de sahasının ilki olan ve Ercüment Özkan'ın kurmuş olduğu Basın Haber Ajansı'nın sağladığı imkânlardan da istifade ederek, gerek yurt içi gerekse yurt dışı kaynaklı dört yüzden fazla yayını tarayarak "mutlaka başkalarının da okuması gerek" diyerek önemli yorum, haber, röportaj, makale, fotoğraf ve karikatürleri bir insicam içinde okuyucuya sunmuştur. Amacı sınırlı imkânlarla bunlara ulaşamayan insanımızın bu eksikliğini gidermeyi, silahsız, kavgasız birbirleriyle diyalogunu temin ederek doğrular üzerinde birleşmelerini sağlamaktı. Zaman olarak, yıllardır anarşinin estirdiği terörün insanlar üzerindeki tedirginliği gitmiş,

heyecanı dinmişti. İnsanların sağlıklı düşünmeye ihtiyaçları vardı. Özkan bu düşüncesini, İktibas'ın ilk sayısının “Selamlayarak” başlıklı yazısında şöyle ifade ediyordu: “Bu dergiyi insanımızı düşünerek yayınlamaya başladık. Evet, insanımızın Türkiye’de ve dünyada neler olup bittiğinden, nasıl olup bittiğinden haberi olsun istedik. Dünyayı yönetenlerin, onlara fikir verenlerin neleri nasıl düşündüklerini sizlere iletmek istedik. İstedik ki gazete ve dergi okuyamamanın kaçınılmaz eksikliğini gidermekte yardımcı olabilelim. Bu suretle okuyucu ufkunun genişlemesine, daha üst düzeyde ve kapsamlı düşünebilmesi için gerekli bilgiler edinmesine katkıda bulunabilelim. Dünya hızlı bir değişme ve gelişme sürecinde iken, özellikle ülkemiz insanının zamanın gerisinde kalmaması için üzerimize düşeni yapabilmeyi istedik.” Bu ifadeleriyle amacının ne olduğunu okuyucu ile paylaşmıştı.

Kısaca bahsetmek gerekirse İktibas’ı diğer İslamcı dergilerden ayıran nedir?

Bir tarihte, İktibas'ın bürosuna adı İslamcı olan birileri tarafından bomba konulmuştu. Bu nedenle karakolda ifade alan memur, Özkan'a aynı soruyu sormuştu: “Sizde İslamcı olduğunuzu söylüyorsunuz onlar da. Sizinle onlar arasında ne fark var ki size karşı böyle davranıyorlar?” Özkan da bu farkı şöyle anlatmıştı: Konunun anlaşılması için size soralım: Allah’a inanıyor musunuz? Evet. Onun gönderdiği kitaba da inanıyor musunuz? Evet. Öldükten sonra dirilmeye ve hesaba da inanıyor musunuz? Evet. Peki, Allah Teâlâ ahirette hesap günü insanları neye göre hesaba çekecek? Dünyada inanıp yaşamaları için gönderdiği kendi kitabına göre mi? Yoksa insanların kendi elleriyle yazmış olduğu kitaplarına göre mi? Memur, “Elbette Allah kendi kitabına göre hesaba çekecek” deyince; Özkan da, şimdi dersimize çalışacağımız kitap belli oldu. Yani sorumlu olduğumuz Allah'ın kitabına çalışacağız ki, soruları doğru cevaplama şansımız olsun değil mi? İşte biz insanlara dersimize Allah'ın kitabından çalışalım ahirette bu kitaptan sorulacağız diyoruz. (Zuhruf 43/44) Onlar ise şeyhlerinin,

üstatlarının, ağabeylerinin, hocalarının ve kendi büyüklerinin kitaplarından çalışmayı öneriyorlar. Bütün farkımız budur” deyince Memur, “kısa ama çok açık olarak anlattınız, anladım teşekkür ediyorum” demişti. İşte İktibas Dergisi’nin farkı budur. Başından beri insanları Kuran’a ve onu ahlak edinen peygamberimizin sahih sünnetine çağırdı. Ne jakoben laikliğin sopasına, ne ılımlı laikliğin havucuna aldırmandan... Bu anlayış ve duruşunu yetmişli yılların başından beri hiç değiştirmedir. Bunu görmek isteyenler, ilk sayımızdan son 443. Sayımıza kadar incelediklerinde göreceklerdir.

İktibas’ın bir sloganı var. İktibas: Fikir Verir. Şu an derginin bu fikrini ulaştırdığı çevre ne boyuttadır?

Bahsetmiş olduğunuz sloganda olduğu gibi İktibas fikir verir. Fikri alıp ondan istifade edecek olan ise onu okuma zahmetine katlanan insanlar olacaktır. Hiçbir tebliğcinin (peygamberler de dâhil) tebliğ ettikleri üzerinde tasarruf etme gücü yoktur. Doğru fikri alıp istifade etmek tamamen kişinin kendi tercihidir. Bir fikrin kıymeti sahiplenen kitlenin kemiyeti ile değil; o fikrin keyfiyeti ile ve Kuran’a uygunluğu ile ölçülmelidir. Bununla birlikte okuyucu mektuplarıyla aldığımız tepkilerden öğrenebildiğimiz kadarıyla memnun olan istifade ettiğini belirten kimseler olduğu gibi. Bugüne kadar bildiklerine ters geldiği için tenkit eden, tartışan insanlar da vardır. Ama genel olarak durumdan memnun olan insanlar olmasaydı bu dergi 35 yıldır çıkma şansını bulamazdı. Dergimiz sahasında en uzun soluklu bir dergi olma şansına ulaşmış olmasından dolayı da bizlere rağbet eden, sesimize ses veren kıymetli okuyucularımıza teşekkürü bir borç biliyoruz.

Kuruluş zamanına bakarsak derginin kurulduğu tarihin İran İslam Devrimi’nden sonra olduğunu görüyoruz. İktibas fikrinin oluşumunda ve yaptığı yayınlarda İran İslam Devrimi’nin bir etkisi var mı?

İktibas'ın yayın tarihi 1 Ocak 1981'dir. Fakat İktibas'ın fikri alt yapısı İran İslam Devrimi'nin 10 yıl öncesine dayanır. Yetmişlerin başından beri Kuran kaynaklı bu düşünce, olgunlaştırılarak 1981'de toplumun gündemine sunulmuştur. İran İslam Devrimi'nin gündeme gelmesi, her Müslüman gibi bizleri de sevindirdi. İslam dünyasında âliminin ve cahilinin İslam'ın yeniden iktidara geleceğini düşünmediği bir dönemde Allah ölüye can vermiş, gömüldüğü kireçli kuyudan hayata döndürmüştü. Özkan yapmış olduğu bir yorumunda şöyle diyordu: “İran'da şunu gözlemledim. Daha yüzünde tüy bitmemiş gençlerden kadınlara kadar herkes İslam'ın önemini kavramış, Allah'a dayanmakla ayakta kalınacağını anlamışlardır. Bu nedenle Müslüman olmayanlara itibar kalmamıştır. Bir diğer konu ise İran'daki toplum Müslüman olduğundan beri Şii, Şii olduğundan beri de Müslüman'dır. Yani Şiilik bütün İran'a kültür olarak, anlayış olarak hâkimdir. Mollalar ve siviller bir vücut olarak Humeyni'nin şahsında birleşmişlerdir.” İran Devrimi siyasi yönüyle her türlü takdirin üzerinde bir işi başarmıştır. Tüm dünya Müslümanları için İslam yeniden bir ümit olmuştur. Ancak düşünsel boyutu için aynı başarıyı ve tutarlılığı gerçekleştiremedi. Velayet-i Fakih anlayışını aşamadı. Humeyni hayatta iken halkın bu yönünü düzeltmek için, mezhebi farklılıkların bir içtihat farklılığı olarak görülmesini ifade ediyordu. Özkan'ın kelimeleriyle: “Humeyni, dinini sağ elinde ve önünde tutuyor; mezhebini ise sol elinde ve arkasında tutuyordu.” O, namazlarını beş vakitte kılmalarını, Ehli Sünnet kardeşlerine namazda uymalarını ve ezandaki “Aliyyen Veliyullah” cümlesi mezhep asabiyetini ifade ettiği için onu çıkarmalarını söylüyordu. Fakat halk, İmam Humeyni'yi Şia'yı unutturmakla suçluyordu. Bütün bunları bilen Özkan, İran İslam Devleti'nin devrimin yıl dönümü kutlamalarına davetli olarak İran'a gitmişti. Kendisi ile röportaj yapmak için gelen bir ekip kameralarını açıp ilk soruyu şu şekilde sorarlar: “İmam'ı ve İran İslam Devrimi'ni nasıl buluyorsunuz?” Özkan bu soruya şöyle cevap verir: “İmam'ın siyasi düşüncesinin hepsinin altına bende imzamı atarım. Fakat fıkhi anlayışlarının altına tırnağımı bile basmam.” Böyle deyince, adamlar tezgâhlarını alıp giderler. İmam'ın

vefatından sonra ise tamamen mezhebi özellik daha ağır basmaya başladı. Gerek İran İslam Devrimi, gerekse dünyanın başka yerindeki herhangi bir hareket mezhebi karaktere sahip olduğu sürece küreselleşmesi mümkün olmadığı için İran İslam Devrimi de mevzi kalmaya mahkûm olmuştur.

Ercüment Özkan'ın İran İslam Devrimi'ne bakışı nasıldı?

Özkan, İran İslam Devrimi'ni şöyle değerlendirmekte idi: “İran Devrimi, dünyada sanki tarih öncesinden fosili kalmış bir dinazor'un, bir devin uyanışı gibi bir çok tesiri yaptı. Denizlerdeki med olayı gibi İslam üzerinde de aynı etkiyi yaptı. İran İslam Devrimi'nin iki tür etkisi vardır. Birincisi dünya Müslümanlarının üzerinde İslam'ın yeniden devlet düzeni olarak hayata dönebileceği inancını artırdı. Onları ümitlendirdi ve bu konuda gelişmeleri hızlandırdı. İkincisi ise sanki yeryüzünde her şeye kadir sanılan ABD ve Rusya'nın değil, yalnız Allah'ın her şeye kadir olduğu hususundaki inançları artırdı ve bu yüzden umutlarını yitiren Müslümanların üzerindeki ölü toprağını atmalarında büyük etkisi oldu. Devrim'in Türkiye Müslümanları üzerinde de olumlu ve olumsuz etkileri oldu. Devrim, Şia kültürüne ait hataları içinde barındırmakla hata yaptı. Bunlar Şiilik ile İslam'ı birbirinden ayıramıyorlardı. Yani mezhepleri onların dini olmuştu. Hâlbuki bütün dünyanın Şii olmadığını bilip bunu daha da gizlemeleri gerekirdi. Ama onlar biz bununla devrim yaptık dediler. İşte Türkiye'de de bazı insanlar devrim yapmak için Şii oldular. Bunun da insanlar üzerinde olumsuz etkisi oldu. Bu etki olumlu bakan insanları da soğuttu, hatta düşman kıldı. Başarının mezhebe verilmesi aynı mezhep de olmayanlar için kazanç olmaz. Fakat başarı aynı dine atfedilseydi, herkesin karı olurdu. Buna engel oldular.” Özkan'a göre, İran İslam Devrimi bir takım çarpıklıklara rağmen Müslümanların devrimidir, sahiplenmek gerekir. Özkan, yukarıda vermeye çalıştığımız gibi İran Devrimi'ni siyasi boyutuyla destekler. Şia kültürüne bağlı kalması, bu konuda değişime en küçük işaret bile vermemesi yönüyle de eleştirir.

Ercüment Özkan'ın İslam'a sonradan girmiş unsurları arındırmak ve öze dönmek gibi bir amacı vardı. Bunun tek yolunun ise 'akletmek' olduğunu söylüyordu. Bu nasıl olabilir? Bu amaca Ercüment Özkan tek başına ulaşabildi mi ya da İktibas'ın gücü bunu sağlamaya yeter miydi?

Akıl insanın bir şeyi anlaması için Allah'ın kendisine vermiş olduğu düşünme, anlama kabiliyetidir. Bu nedenle aklın üzerinde akledeceği şey önemlidir. Özkan'ın insanlara tavsiyesi hakkın ve doğrunun kaynağı olarak gönderilmiş olan Allah'ın kitabını ve onu ahlak edinip yaşayan Resul'ün sünnetini akletmenin, düşünmenin hayati bir öneminin olduğudur. O, hep bunu söylüyor ve yazıp anlatmaya çalışıyordu. Bu amaçla Allah'ın tevhid dinine sonradan sokulan her şeyle mücadele ediyordu. İslam'dan başka tüm beşeri sistemleri İslam dışı olarak nitelendirdiği gibi, İslam'danmış gibi görünen tüm mistik hezeyanları, tasavvufun her çeşidini de İslam'dan ayrı bir din olarak nitelendiriyordu. Bunu bizzat kendi kaynaklarından almış olduğu pasajları dergide iktibas ederek insanların dikkatine sunmuştu. Ne kadar muvaffak olduğu konusuna gelince, Allah-u Teâlâ'nın elçisine bile şu ikazı yaptığını görüyoruz: “Sen sevdiğini doğru yola erdirmezsin. Ama Allah, dilediğini doğru yola erdirtir. Doğru yola girecekleri en iyi bilen de odur.” (Kasas 28/56) Hal böyle olunca Özkan'ın elinde sihirli değnek yoktu ki dokunduğunu hidayete erdirsin. Allah kimseye böyle bir güç de vermemiştir. Hem Peygamber'e hem de onun yolundan giden müminlere düşen hakkı tebliğ edip, doğru olduğuna inandığı şeye insanları çağırmasıdır. Kabul edip etmemek ise insanların tercihine bırakılmıştır. Nitekim ilahi çağrıda bu minval üzeredir: “Ve de ki: Hak, Rabbinizdendir. Öyle ise dileyen iman etsin, dileyen inkâr etsin. Biz, zalimlere öyle bir cehennem hazırladık ki, onun duvarları kendilerini çepeçevre kuşatmıştır. (Susuzluktan) imdat dileyen olsalar, imdatlarına erimemiş maden gibi yüzleri haşlayan bir su ile cevap verilir. Ne fena bir içecek ve ne kötü bir kalma yeri!” (Kahf 18/29) Bununla birlikte bu gayretler

birçok insanın kulaklarına kar suyu kaçmasına vesile oldu. İnsanların üzerinde büyük bir etki yaparak çoğu insanın düşünüp değişmesine sebep oldu. Hak bilinen batılların fark edilmesine de vesile oldu.

Ercüment Özkan'ın vefatından sonra İktibas'ın yayın politikası veya düşünsel kimliğinde herhangi bir değişim oldu mu? Ercüment Özkan dönemi İktibas ve Ercüment Özkan sonrası İktibas diye bir ayrıma gidersek neler değişti İktibas'ta?

Öncelikle şunu teslim edelim ki Ercüment Ağabeyimiz yeri kolay doldurulabilecek bir kimse değildir. O, tek başına hem hayatın hem de derginin maddi ve manevi yükünü taşıyan bir kimseydi. İlk zamanlar 15 günde bir 32 sayfa, sonraları sayfa sayısını ikiye katlayarak ayda bir olmak üzere, 14 yılda (hastalığı sebebiyle iki yıl ara verildi) 12 cilt 192 sayı çıkarmaya muvaffak oldu. Derginin yazılarını yazmadan, pulunu yapıştırmaya varana kadar bizzat meşgul olmaktan kendi ifadesiyle “şasesi eğildi”. Buna rağmen bir gün olsun bırakmayı düşünmedi. Onun bu azmini hiçbir şey kıramadı. O bir yandan maddi ve fiziki sıkıntıları göğüslerken, diğer yandan da devletin tutuklamalarına, halkın sözlü ve yazılı hakaretlerine karşı göğüs geriyordu. Söylenmedik söz, yapılmadık hakaret kalmamıştı. Fakat o bir ”buz kıran” gibi yoluna devam ediyor asla hız kesmiyordu. Allah'ın rızasını düşündükçe bütün olumsuzluklar onun şevkini ve azmini artırıyor. Son kalp krizini de atlatıp biraz kendine geldiğinde şöyle dua ediyordu Rabbine: “Ya Rabbi! Bunca öğrendiğim bilgiler mezarda börtü böceğin işine yaramaz, ben bunları toprağa gömmek istemiyorum. İnsanlara ulaştırmak için bana fırsat ver.” Rabbi ona o fırsatı veriyor ve ender görülen bir iş gerçekleşerek beş damarı tıkalı olan kalbi kendi kendini bypass ediyordu. Ömrünün kalan kısmını o şehirden bu şehre, bir konferanstan diğerine dolaşırken, Rabbi onu bu minval üzere iken Adana seyahatinde teslim alıyordu. İşte onun bu azmi, bizlerin sağlığında kendisine veremediğimiz desteği ve gösteremediğimiz gayreti el birliği ile ortaya koymamıza vesile oldu. Rabbimizin yardım ve

inayetiyle vefatını takiben görevi devralarak, kesintisiz 21 yıldır taşımaya çalışıyoruz. O hayatta olsaydı elbette bu yıllar daha farklı olacaktı. Onun yerini doldurmak, yokluğunu hissetmemek mümkün değildir. Ancak şunu rahatlıkla söyleyebiliriz ki, onun açtığı çığırdan ayrılmadan, ortaya koyduğu anlayıştan taviz vermeden, aynı duyarlılık ve dikkatle bu damarı, sahih İslam anlayışı damarını, devam ettirmeye gereken ihtimamı gösteriyoruz. Dergimizin eski ve yeni sayılarını gözden geçirenler, bunun doğruluğunu göreceklerdir. Bu uzun soluklu maratonda bizlere maddi ve manevi yardımlarını esirgemeyen tüm kardeşlerimize ve vefakâr okuyucularımıza yürekten minnettarız. Canımız sağ oldukça, Rabbimizin de yardımıyla bu hizmeti sürdürmeye kararlıyız. Yüklenmiş olduğumuz bu sorumluluğun üstesinden gelmek için gerekli olan donanımı ve istidadı Rabbimizden niyaz ediyoruz.

Tarikatlar ve tasavvuf hakkında Ercüment Özkan çok sert eleştirilerde bulunmuştur. Peygamber sonrasında eklemelerle, yorumlamalarla İslam'ın farklı bir din yapıldığını söylüyor. Bu nasıl mümkün olmuştur? İnsan-ı kâminden, barıştan, kardeşlikten ilgili oldukları iddiasındaki tarikatlar, tasavvuf ekolleri var. Bunu kabul etmeyişinin sebepleri nelerdir? Tümünden reddetmek doğru mudur?

Tasavvuf, İslam ile esastan en temel olan tevhid akidesinden ayrıdır. İslam, “La ilahe illallah” (Allah’tan başka ilah yoktur.) esasını getirmiş ve insanlar arasında bunu yerleştirmeyi hedef almıştır. Tasavvuf ise bu esasla bağdaşması mümkün olmayan “La mevcude illallah” (Allah’tan başka mevcut yoktur.) akidesinin sahibi olmuştur. Bunun meşhur adı da “Vahdeti Vücuttur.” Yani yaratıcı ve yaratılmış diye bir ayrım yoktur. Hepsi bir tek varlıktır. Gördüğümüz sadece bir görüntüden ibarettir. Ete kemiğe büründüm, Yunus olarak göründüm veya yeni versiyonu ile Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu olarak göründüm demektir ki bu Allah-u Teâlâ’nın eşyaya hulul etmesi demektir. Allah ise Kuran’da: ”Allah yarattıklarından hiç birisine benzemez” (Şura 42/11) buyurmuştur. Özkan bunu,

‘Tasavvuf ve İslam’ isimli kitabında şöyle anlatır: “Tasavvuf, yaratılanların tümünün Allah’ın benzeri olduğu inancındadır. Tasavvufun büyüklerinden ve ona şeklini verenlerden biri olarak nitelendirilen Muhyiddin Arabi ‘Fususil Hikem’ adlı eserinde: “ Hakikat budur ki Halik Mahlûk, Mahlûk Halık’dır. Bunların hepsi tek bir varlıktır. Hayır, belki o tek varlıktır. Ve yine o çokluk içinde olan varlıktır” diyor. Kitabında devam ediyor: “Şu halde Firavun’un iddia ettiği ‘Ben sizin en yüce Rabbinizim” sözü gerçekleşti. Çünkü her ne kadar o iktidar hakkın, yani Allah’ın aynısı ise de, Firavun suretinde tecelli etmiştir” diye inançlarını açıklamayı sürdürüyor. Bu nedenle Özkan, tasavvuf için şu cümleleri kurmuştur: “Tasavvuf dış görünüşü itibariyle Allah’ın dininin yerine geçerek onu temsil ediyor görünmüştür. Bu manzaranın adına geliniz, “batılın hak kılığında; kurdun kuzu kılığında” görünmesi diyelim. Bu deyimde hiçbir mübalağa bulmuyoruz. Belki deyimimizi, maksadımızı ifadede aciz bile buluyoruz. Tasavvufun hak kılığında görünen en büyük batıl olduğu kanaatindeyiz. Bu hali ile de Allah’ın kullarını kolayca saptırmaktadır. Şirk ehlinin İslam’dan öcünü tasavvuf kanalıyla aldığı kanaatindeyiz. Zira, tevhide tasavvufun verdiği zararı hiçbir küfür çeşidi vermemiştir.” Bu nedenle “küfre hasımlığımız, İslam’a olan hısnımızdır.” İşte bu hasımlık ve hısnılık tevhide düşündüğünü iddia eden herkes tarafından sürdürülmek zorundadır.

Humeyni dönemi ile Humeyni sonrası dönemi karşılaştırsak İran dış politikasında devrim ihracı yönünden bir değişim olmuş mudur? İran rejimi, rejim ihracı politikasını tevhide bir yönde mezhep gözetmeksizin devam ettirmiş midir, yoksa bu politika Şii mezhepci bir yöne mi gitmiştir?

Devrimin ilk yıllarında, özellikle İmam hayatta iken, devrimin ihracı konusunda bir şans görünüyordu. Çünkü İmam, mezhebi engeli aşarak dinin öne çıkması için gerekli gayreti göstermesine rağmen, içerideki bağınaz kesim tarafından Şia’yı yok etmekle suçlandı. Bu bağınazlık sadece Şia’da olan bir kusur değildi. Kendilerini

Ehli Sünnet olarak niteleyen kesim de aynı bağnazlığı gösterdi. Bunun iki sebebi vardı. Birincisi küresel emperyalizm İran İslam Devrimi ile şok olmuş, bütün değerleri alt üst olmuştu. Eğer bu anlayış yıllardır seküler değerlerle öldürmeye, yok etmeye çalıştıkları İslam dünyasının diğer yerlerine de sıçrarsa bunun altından kalkılamaz olacak ve batının enerji kaynakları, dünya görüşleri bitecekti. Bunun için buldukları çare mezhep ayrılığını körükleyerek devrimi İran'da hapsetmek için kolları sıvamak oldu. İkincisi, Müslümanların içinde yaşadıkları ulus-devletlerin de işine gelmeyen bu durumu onlar da destekleyerek ülkelerini devrim tehlikesinden, diğer bir ifadeyle İslam tehlikesinden, korumak için ellerinden gelen gayreti gösterdiler. Sonuçta İran İslam Devrimi ve beraberinde İran Devleti dünyada yalnızlığa itilerek etrafı boşaltılmaya çalışıldı. Bölgede yıkılan eski Sovyetler Birliği'nin bakiyesi ile işbirliği yapan İran, teknolojik kalkınmasını tamamlamaya çalışsa da İslam Devrimi'nin ihracı mezhepçiliğe kurban edilmiş oldu.

Radikal İslam'a veya Devrimci İslam'a ne oldu? Düzenle barışan bir noktaya gelerek dönüştü mü? Yoksa varlığını sürdürüyor mu?

Kitlelerin Devrimci İslamı'nın saksıda yetiştirilen gül misali ömrü pek kısa oldu. Mahir Kaynak'ın ifadesiyle ulus-devletlerde ABD'nin yeşil kuşak projesinin tezahürü olarak kiteselleşmesine müsaade edilmişti. Bu mümbit arazide İslam beklenenden fazla gelişince; sağdan üretilen partilerle ılımlı İslam çizgisine çekilerek dönüştürme faaliyetlerine kapı aralandı. 1970'lerden bu yana yürütülen bu çalışmalarla kitleler Radikal İslam'dan ılımlı İslam'a terfi ettirildi. Yeni dünya düzeninin geliştirdiği son projelerle jakoben laiklik ılımlı laikliğe, ılımlı İslam da ılımlı laikliğe terfi ettirilerek izdivaçları sağlanmış oldu. Bunu kotarmak için şimdilerde paralel yapı olarak nitelenen ekibin Yazarlar Birliği Vakfı'nın kanalıyla Abant Toplantıları'nda pişirilen işler sayesinde "demokrasi eşittir İslam" olarak sonuç bildirgelerinde ilan edildi. Sonuçta 1980'li yılların

“radikallerinden” oluşturulan bu yapı, yenedünya düzeninde yeni Türkiye’nin iktidar aktörlerini sahneye çıkardı. Bunların yanında sahih İslam damarını devam ettiren Müslümanlar ise bu oyuna katılmayarak varlıklarını hak bildikleri yolda devam ettirmektedirler. Bunlar için deęişim veya dönüşüm söz konusu olmadı.

Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin, iktidara gelişinden itibaren, İslam Devrimi’nden sonra Türkiye’de oluşan İslamcı atmosfere katkısı ya da zararı olmuş mudur? Katkı veya zarar olmuşsa bunlar nelerdir?

Bir önceki sorunun cevabında ifade ettiğimiz gibi sağcı partilerin gayretleriyle kitleler deęiştirilip dönüştürüldü. Bunu bazen sopa bazen de havuç yöntemini kullanarak yaptılar. Yazarçizer kadrolarından sivil toplum örgütlerine, tasavvufi cemaatlerden cami derneklerine, ev sohbetlerine varana kadar her yolu kullanarak bu deęişimi sağlamaya muvaffak oldular. Geride marjinal olarak “bir Körođlu bir Ayvaz” misali çok az insan kalmıştır. İnanıyoruz ki Allah, ölüden diriye diriden de ölüyü çıkarmaya kadirdir. Sözlerimi şu ayetlerle noktalamak istiyorum: “İslâm'a çağırıldığı halde Allah'a karşı yalan uydurandan daha zalim kim olabilir! Allah, zalimler topluluğunu doğru yola ulaştırmaz. Onlar ağızlarıyla Allah'ın nurunu söndürmek istiyorlar. Hâlbuki kâfirler istemeseler de, Allah nurunu tamamlayacaktır. “ (Saff 61 / 7-8)

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APPENDIX D

İSTANBUL

05.03.2015

NUREDDİN ŞİRİN İLE SÖYLEŞİ

İrancı İslam diye bir kavramdan söz etmek mümkün müdür?

Aslında biz devrimci İslam ifadesini kullanıyoruz. İrancı bir İslam bizim için ayağımızın altında olan bir İslamdır. Yani başkaları bazı tanımlamalar yaparken bu ifadeyi kullanabilir ama bu ifade tamamen ülke, ulus denklemleri ile sınırlanmış birşeydir. Mesela İrancılar diye bir ifade kullanılıyor. Türkiye'deki İslamcılığın zikzakları vardır. Örneğin bir Marksist düşününki enternasyonalist olsun, ancak Latin Amerika'da ki devrimlere ilgisiz kalsın. Böyle olursa bu bir çelişki olur. Bu anlamda Türkiye'deki İslamcılar da İran süreci ile ilgili büyük oranda bir çelişkiye düştüler.

Siz İran İslam Devrimi olduktan sonra İran'a gittiniz mi?

Hayır hemen gitmedim. 1986'da gittim.

Sizi etkileyen devrim düşüncesi miydi, Şiilik miydi? Şiilik'ten mi yola çıktınız?

Tabii ki, Türkiye Müslümanları olarak Şiilik konusunda o zamanlarda pek fazla bilgimiz yoktu. İlk etapta bizi etkileyen de Şiilik değil devrim fikri oldu. Sonrasında temel değerler bazında irdelendiği zaman, Kerbela ve Hz. Hüseyin'e de dayandığı için bir aidiyet hissedilebiliyor.

Benim İrancı İslam tanımına siz Devrimci İslam diyorsunuz. Peki, Devrimci İslam'ı Türkiye'de ki diğer İslamlar'dan ayıran şey nedir?

12 Eylül 1980 öncesinde Türkiye’de İslami hareketler vardı. Bunlar değişik kurumsal ve örgütsel yapılar altında kümelenmiş olsalarda sonuç itibariyle aynı tezleri dillendiren hareketlerdi. Bu hareketler üç temel esasta birleşiyorlardı. İlk olarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu sonrasında Türkiye’de kurulan laik, Kemalist düzene karşı ideolojik ve politik bir karşıtlık vardı. Bu, mevcut Kemalist düzenin politikalarına, uygulamalarına ve projelerine karşı bir itirazdı. Doğal olarak bunun tarihsel bir arka planı vardı. Osmanlı sonrasında ister alimler düzeyinde, ister halk bazında isyanlar, direnişler ve tepkiler oldu. Buna karşılık İstiklal Mahkemeleri süreçleri yaşandı, idamlar oldu. Kitlese bastırmalar oldu. Bütün bunun nedeni Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti’nin laiklik, Batılılaşma ve Çağdaşlaşma adı altında uyguladığı politikalara karşı dinsel temelde bir karşı koyuştu. Bu karşı koyuşlar sadece bir başkaldırı tarzında değil, entelektüel tarzda da oldu. Mehmet Akifler, Eşref Edipler bunun başını çektiler. Sebil’ür Reşat ve Sırata’l Müstakim Dergileri oldu. Necip Fazıl, Bediüzzaman Said Nursi ve Nureddin Topçu yine aydınlar bazında etkili oldular. Bu arada 1969’da başlayan Milli Görüş Hareketi Erbakan Hoca liderliğinde etkili oldu. Tüm bunları Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin Batılılaşma ve laiklik adı altında yaptığı politikalarına karşı bir karşı koyuş adı altında birleştirebiliriz. Yine 12 Eylül 1980 öncesinde Milli Görüş’ün de beslemesiyle bir Ümmetçilik oluştu. Bu, dünyada İslam birliğini savunan, İslam’ı kendi değerleri ile yeniden yorumlayan, İslam’ın kendi ideolojik ve politik sistemini inşaa etmesini isteyen bir ideali savunuyordu. Buna küresel bir İslam Devleti de diyebiliriz. Ulusal sınırları muteber ve meşru kabul etmiyorduk. İslam dünyası 40 parçaya bölünmüş, 40 tane ulus-devlet ortaya çıkmıştı. Bu ulus-devletler arasında sınırlar, mayınlı tarlalar, duvarlar vardı. Biz ulusal ya da resmi sınırlar olarak tanımlanan bu sınırları emperyalizmin bir dayatması olarak görüyorduk. Ulus-devlete karşıydık. Doğal olarak sınırlara da karşıydık. Bunların emperyalizm ve işbirlikçileri tarafından İslam Dünyası’nda oluşturulduğunu düşünüyorduk. Yasallıkları ve meşruiyetleri yoktu. Doğudan batıya, kuzeyden güneye dünyadaki tüm Müslümanlar’ı tek bir çatı altında toplamak gibi bir ufkumuz vardı. İslam

egemenliđi altında evrensel bir devlet istiyorduk. Bu, řüphesiz ki uzun vadeli bir amaçtı. Hz. Muhammed'in her alanda önderliđini tanıyorduk. Bu, Mustafa Kemal gibi ulus önderi kabul edilmiş kişilerin yol göstericiliklerine tepki anlamına geliyordu. Örneđin Önder Atatürk yerine, Önder Hz. Muhammed'dir diyorduk. Anayasamız da Kuran'dı. İslam hayatın her alanını nizam eden bir yaşayış şekliydi. Her alanda İslam hükümlerinin esas alınmasını istiyorduk. Dolayısıyla, Anayasa Kuran ise kanunlar da Kuran'ın meşruiyeti içerisinde olmalıydı. Bu kapsamda olmayan hiç bir yasayı meşru kabul etmiyorduk. Bizim için yasallık ve meşruiyet sınırı Kuran'ın ortaya koyduđu çerçeve idi. Bunun Türkiye'deki karşılığı ise T.C Anayasası'nın 163. Maddesi idi. Bu daha sonrasında T.C.K 312/2'ye dönüştürüldü. Buna göre devletin İslami temellere dayalı olarak yeniden dönüşümünü talep etmek suç idi. Bu bir terör suçu olarak görülyordu. Sonuç olarak talebimiz rejim tarafından bir dirençle karşılaşıyordu. Ümmetçilik, ulus-devlet ve rejim karşıtlığı İslamcılar'ın belli başlı talepleri idi. İslamcılar'ın karşısında ise paralel akımlar vardı. Dindar görünümlü, kendilerini muhafazakar ve sağcı olarak tanımlayan, ancak yerel, ulusal veya uluslararası güçlere itirazları olmayan akımlardı. Tamamen statükoların altında edilgen olarak yaşıyor veya yaşatılıyorlardı.

12 Eylül 1980 öncesindeki İslamcılığı; ümmetçi, rejime ve ulus-devlete karşı olan radikal veya devrimci İslam ile bunun karşısında yer alan statükocu, muhafazakar paralel akımlar olarak ikiye ayırdınız. 1979 İran İslam Devrimi sonrasında bahsettiđiniz radikal veya devrimci İslam içerisinde de ayrılıklar, anlaşmazlıklar oldu mu?

Elbette oldu. Devrimden önce devrimci İslam demiyorduk. Hatta o dönemde devrim kelimesi Marksistleri çağrıştırdığı için sıcak baktığımız bir kelime de değildi. O dönemde Marksistler 'Tek Yol Devrim' derlerken, bizler 'Devrim Yok, Diriliş Var, İslam'a Yöneliş Var' diyorduk. Halbuki istediğimiz bir devrimdi. Devrimci kelimesi İslam Devrimi'nden sonra dilimize girdi. Hatta İslam Devrimi

olunca en çok devrim diyenler bizler olmuştuk. Ancak Devrim'den önce söylediklerimiz, Devrim'den sonra söylediklerimizden farklı değildi. Kuran'a dayalı, Peygamber'i önder olarak kabul eden, ulusal sınırları tanımayan, evrensel bir İslami düzen isteyen, bütün dünya Müslümanları'nın İslam bayrağı altında birleşmesi isteyen, etnisiteyi reddeden bir anlayışımız vardı. Biz bunları söylerken İslam Devrimi oldu. Biz bu aşamada büyük bir sevinç ve coşku yaşadık. Çünkü ideallerimizin bir ütopya olmadığını anlamıştık. O dönemde Demirel'e yakın İlıcıklar'ın Tercüman Gazetesi, İran Devrimi'ni komünist bir hareket olarak nitelendirmişti. Hatta yeşil komünizm demişlerdi. Çünkü o dönemde uluslararası statükoya bir karşı koyuş ne umuluyordu ne de bekleniyordu. Sadece Sovyetler ve Amerika'nın sultasını kabul ediliyordu. Onlara göre İran Devrimi ile Sovyetler Amerika'nın etki alanında olan bir yere dini görüntü altında etki etmiş oluyordu. Bu, TUDEH'in İran'da çökertilmesine kadar böyle devam etmiştir. O zaman devrim kendisinin bir Sovyet hareketi olmadığını kabul ettirmiştir. 12 Eylül öncesinde devrimci olan, ümmetçi olan, ulusal sınırları tanımayan kesimlerden bir kısmını İslam Devrimi'ni bütünüyle benimsedi. Kitaplarda, gazete ve dergilerde bu sık sık vurgulandı. O dönemde Pakistan'da Ziya-Ül Hak'da yönetimi ele geçirdiğinde sıranın artık Türkiye'ye geldiğini düşünüyorduk. O dönemde attığımız bir slogan 'İran, Pakistan, Sıra Sende Müslüman' idi. Bu İran'da da, Pakistan'da da iktidara biz geldik demektir. O dönemde enformasyon ve iletişim sınırlıydı. Bizde de ağırlıklı olarak Ehl-i Sünnet damarı ağır basıyordu. İran Devrimi ile gördük ki bizim bildiğimiz Maliki, Hanefi, Şafii ve Hanbeli mezhepleri dışında Oniki İmamcı mezhepler de varmış. Bu bizim üzerinde düşünüp tartıştığımız bir konu değildi. Sonuç olarak Devrim'den sonra Türkiye'deki bazı alimler İran Devrimi'ne karşı fikirler üretmeye başladılar. Hak mezhep sadece dört tanedir, bu beşinci mezheptir, böyle şey olamaz dediler. Bu tartışma güçlenmeye ve güçlendirilmeye başladı. Eş zamanı olarak bir karşı devrim politikası başlatıldı. Bölgedeki rejimlerin çoğu, Körfez'deki ülkelerin çoğu diktatör rejimleriydi ve topraklarını Amerika'ya peşkeş çekiyorlardı. İmam

Humeyni'nin ise bir çağrısı vardı: Ey Müslümanlar, ayağa kalkın. Bu bölgedeki İslam ülkelerine bir çağrıydı. Dolayısıyla İslam Devrimi'ne düşmanlık noktasında Riyad Rejimi, Amerika ve İsrail'den geri kalmadı. Bilakis onlardan öne de geçti. Çünkü bu öyle bir dalgaydıki bütün Müslümanlar'ı direnişe çağırıyordu. Statükolar, saltanatlar sarsılacaktı. Türkiye'de de İslami camianın bir kesimi İslam Devrimi'ni coşku ile karşılarken bir kesimi buna karşı çıktı. Muhafazakar ve sağcı olarak nitelediğim statükocu hareketler ise buna zaten karşı çıkıyorlardı. İslamcılar içerisinde Devrim'e karşı bir tepki üretildi. Bu tepki üretilirken de mezhep öne çıkarıldı. Bu sadece tarihsel bir mezhep kavgasıyla oluşan bir tepki değildi. Bu bir projeydi. İran Devrimi'ni İran'da hapsederek, Sünni ve Arap Dünya'ya yayılmasını önlemek için bir önlem projesiydi. İslam camiası ancak bu şekilde etki altında tutulabilirdi. Bu konuda Washington ve Riyad birlikte çalıştılar. Onlar için iki İslam vardı: Kabul edilebilir bir İslam ve kabul edilemez bir İslam. Kabul edilebilir İslam, İsrail'in varlığına karşı çıkmayan, Siyonizm'i eleştirmeyen ve direnişçi olmayan bir İslam'dı. Tarikatlar, cemaatler büyük ölçüde bunun içerisindeydi. Bunlar İlimli İslam'dı. Sonuç olarak, Şii kimliğin ön plana çıkarılması Sünniler'e İran ve Devrim ile tarihsel olarak yanyana olmamaları gerektiğinin bir mesajıydı.

Sizin 1990'ların başında Şiiliği kabul ettiğiniz söyleniyor. Bu ne ölçüde doğru?

Şimdi siz bana Şii misiniz ya da Sünni misiniz diye sorsanız hem evet hem de hayır derim. Bunu politik bir cevap olarak söylemiyorum. Tarihsel olarak Şiilik ve Sünnilik üzerinden oluşmuş bir miras var. Bu, bütün literatürde yüzyıllar boyunca biriktirilmiş ve taşınmış bir mirastır. İslam Devrimi, eğer Şiiliği baz alacak olursak, bir kere Şii mirasla örtüşmüyor. Örneğin, İmam Humeyni'nin Velayet-i Fakih, İslam Cumhuriyeti söylemlerini Mevdudi'nin söylemleri ile yanyana getirdiğimizde aslında aynı şeyi söylediklerini görürüz. Hatta Şii geleneksel otoriteler İmam Humeyni'ye bu noktada itiraz ediyorlar. Bazıları İmam Humeyni'yi Şiilik'ten sapmakla, Şiilik'i tahrip etmekle ve Şiilik esaslarına

aykırı bir akım oluşturmakla suçluyorlar. Diğer taraftan Sünni dünyanın alimleri de İmam Humeyni'yi Sünni dünyayı Şiileştirmek ile suçluyorlar. Burada bir paradoks var. Eğer İslam Devrimi Şiilikten uzaklaşmaksa, Sünni dünyanın bunu ayakta alkışlaması lazım. İslam Devrimi'ni doğrudan Şiilik ile eşitlemeye kalkanlar olsa bile bu gerçeğe örtüşmüyor. Hamid Algar'ın kitapları bu konuda ciddi ve aydınlatıcı bilgiler veriyorlar. Sonuç olarak Mısır'da Sünni Hasan el-Benna'nın sözleri ile İran'da Şii Mutahhari'nin sözleri birbirleriyle aynıdır. Mezhepler farklı, etnisiteler farklı, ancak sözleri birdir. İşte ben o sözün mezhebindenim.

İran İslam Devrimi'nin seyrini Humeyni öncesi ve Humeyni sonrası diye ikiye ayırmak mümkün müdür? Humeyni'nin ölümü sizin devrim fikirlerinize bir etki etti mi?

Bu konuda iki akım var. Bir kanat, bir yandan İmam Humeyni'yi takdir ederek, onun ölümü ile birlikte İran'ın bir ulus-devlete dönüştüğünü söylüyor. Onun ölümü ile İran'ın ümmetçi politikadan uzaklaşıp kendi devlet çıkarlarına uygun politikalar ürettiğini söylüyor. Bu kanat Müslümanlar'a karşı devrimci kucaklamayı kaybettiğini belirtiyor. Diğer kanat ise ilk kanadın tezlerini reddederek ümmetçi ve devrimci politikaların derinleşerek devam ettiğini vurguluyor.

Siz kendinizi hangi kanat içerisinde konumlandırıyorsunuz?

Ben ikinci kanadın söylediklerine daha yakın duruyorum. Öncelikle şunu belirtmek gerekir ki İslam Devrimi pozitif olarak tanımlandığı zaman mezhepçilik yapmadığı görülür. İmam Humeyni bunu pratikte de göstermiştir. Bugün İmam Humeyni'den sonraki Rehber'e baktığımız zaman, onun İmam Humeyni'nin bu noktadaki söylemlerini beşe katladığını görürüz. Ben bunu İmam Hamaney'i yakından tanıyan, içerden tanıyan birisi olarak söylüyorum. Hamaney'in ümmetle olan bağı o kadar derin ki; İran, İmam Humeyni Dönemi'ne göre Şii dünyadan

ziyade Sünni dünyayı öncüleyen bir noktaya geldi. Yani İslam Devleti, tüm imkanlarını Şii dünyaya ayırmak yerine Sünni dünyaya ayırmaya başladı.

Buna örnek verebilir misiniz?

Örneğin Bosna-Hersek süreci yaşandı. Aliya İzzetbegoviç, İran'da İslam Devrimi olduktan sonra İmam Humeyni'nin yanına gitti. İzzetbegoviç'in siyasal hareketinin arka planı incelendiğinde de karşımıza İslam Devrimi çıkıyor. İzzetbegoviç, Tito zamanında İran'a gidiyor ve geri döndüğünde de İslam Deklerasyonu'nu yayınlıyor. Savaş başladığı zaman Bosna-Hersek'i ayakta tutan asıl güç İran'dı. Ben, Bosna Savaşı'nda da bulunduğum için biliyorum. Bu Hamaney'in zamanında oldu. İran, Bosna Hersek için ayırdığı kaynağı Bahreyn'e ayırsaydı, Bahreyn'de 40 kere devrim olurdu. Bir diğer örnek Filistin'dir. İran'ın Filistin ve Gazze'ye ayırdığı askeri, siyasi ve ekonomik desteği de düşünmek lazım. Filistin Direnişi'nin İran'a aylık faturası diyelim ki 1 milyar dolardır. Bunun ayrıca Suriye ve Lübnan boyutları da var. İran'ın Filistin Direnişi'nin desteklenmesi ve korunması amacıyla ayırdığı bütçe ile Körfez'de onlarca devrim gerçekleşirdi. Bugün Bahreyn'de nüfusun büyük kısmı Şii'dir. Orada Amerikancı ve Riyad destekli bir yapı var. Ancak İran buraya ne kadar müdahil oldu? Bahreyn'in payına İran'ın bütçesinden ne düştü? Gazze'nin onda biri düşmemiştir. Bunlar İran'ın Şii mezhepçi yaklaşım sergilemediğini gösterir. Ben Bosna ve Gazze örneğini verdim, ancak bu ikisiyle de sınırlı değildir.

Şii dünyaya destek vermezken Sünni dünyaya destek vermenin sebebi nedir? Bu sadece Şii mezhepçi bir yaklaşımda olmadığını göstermek için midir?

İslam Devrimi'nin temellerinde bazı kriterler vardır: Emperyalizm ve Siyonizm'le mücadele ve dünyadaki tüm mazlum müslümanların desteklenmesi, ki bu anayasal bir maddedir. Dolayısıyla İran, dünyadaki müslümanlara mezhepçi bir açıdan bakmıyor. Anti-emperyalist ve anti-Siyonist hareketleri destekliyor. Hatta desteklenen bu hareketler içinde solcu hareketler de vardır. İran Sünni dünya ile

ilgilenirken, ne Şiiliği kaldırayım ne Sünniliği indireyim temelinden ya da tam tersi bir temelden bakmıyor. Emperyalizme ve Siyonizme karşı olan duruşu yükseltmek istiyor. Bu amaçla da nerede Şii, nerede Sünni var ona bakmıyor. Bugün İran'ın Nikaragua, Venezuela ve Küba'ya olan ilgisini buna bağlayabiliriz. Bu ilgi İran'a maddi bir katkı yapmıyor, aksine eksiltiyor. Ama İran, küresel anlamda emperyalizme karşı o ülkelerle birlikte duruşunun önemli olduğundan hareketle böyle davranıyor. Bu İmam Humeyni zamanında da böyleydi, ondan sonra da böyle oldu ve hiç değişmedi.

Sizin çizdiğiniz dış politika çerçevesinde İran, anti-emperyalist ve anti-siyonist hareketlere destek veriyor ve aynı zamanda Şii-Sünni ayrımı gözetmeksizin tüm Müslüman hareketlere destek sağlıyor. Peki, 1982 yılında Suriye'de yaşanan Hama Olayları'nı bu kapsamda nasıl değerlendiriyorsunuz?

O dönem ben o olayları birebir takip etmiştim. 1982 yılı, İran'ın Irak ile savaşının en kritik anlarıdır. Aslında Irak da değil, karşısında tüm dünya vardı. İran, derin bir abluka ve ambargo altındaydı. Savaşın jeopolitiğine bakmak lazım. Suriye ile İran'ın hiç bir sınırdaşlığı yoktu. Suriye'de bir devrim olmuş olsaydı, İran hangi desteği Suriye'ye ulaştırabilecekti? İran desteklemiş olsa bile, bu karşılığı olmayan bir destek olacaktı. O zamanlar çok büyük bir oyun planlanmıştı ve bu oyun bozuldu. Ariel Şaron, 'Beyrut Kasabı' olarak anılıyordu. Peki, Şaron Beyrut'a ne zaman girdi? 1982'de girdi. Bu bir tesadüf olabilir miydi? Eş zamanlı olarak İran'a karşı iki hamle yapılıyordu. Bir taraftan Hama'da Müslümanlar 'Allah, Allah' diye ayağa kalkıyordu, diğer taraftan Şaron Beyrut'a dolu dizgin gidiyordu. Yine aynı dönemde, 1982 yılında, Filistinli komandolar Lübnan'dan çıkartıldılar. Bugün, İslam Dünyası İsrail'in yok edilmesini konuşmuyor. Ancak o dönemde, sürekli İran ve Hama'yı konuştular. Hama'daki ayaklanma İran'ı yalnızlaştırmak amacıyla kullanıldı. Hama Olayları'na İran'ın destek vermemesi konuşulurken pragmatizmden ve reelpolitikten negatif bir anlamda bahsediliyor. Peygamber de reelpolitik yapmadı mı? Mekke ve Medine dönemlerine

bakıldığında bu görülecektir. Yahudi ve Hristiyan güçlerle anlaşmıştı ve stratejik işbirliği yapılmıştı. Peygamberi bu anlaşmaları yapmaya iten şeyler neydi, zorunlu kılan neydi? Görülecektir. daha sonraki yıllarda bu anlaşma yapılanlar ile savaşıldı.

İrancı İslam tartışmamıza dönersek, benim İrancı İslam sizin ise Devrimci İslam dediğiniz bu akım Türkiye’de şu anda ne durumda? Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi’nin süreç içerisinde getirdikleri ve götürdükleri nelerdir?

AK Parti, 28 Şubat sürecinin bir sonucudur. Aynı zamanda 40 yıllık tarih içerisinde mahkum edilen, hapsolunan, yasaklanan, partisi kapatılan bir süreçte bu engellemeleri nasıl aşarız arayışının bir cevabıdır. Bu aynı zamanda, Amerika merkezli Müslümanları siyasal taleplerinden ve siyasal duruşlarından ayırarak onları siyasi koltuklar arasında eritme politikalarının bir etkisidir. Siyasal İslam veya Radikal İslam denildiğinde devrimci bir iradeyle kurulu düzen ve statükonun değişmesi akla gelir. Bunu amaç edinmişseniz engellerle karşılaşmaya ve bedel vermeye hazır olmalısınız. Her kişi İslam der, ancak er kişi İslam’ın yolunda başım fedadır der. Hz. İmam Hüseyin, dilin insanların ağzında bir geçim aracı olduğunu söylemiştir. Ancak bu insanlar zorluklarla sınıdıklarında hemen ortadan kaybolurlar. Dolayısıyla; 28 Şubat gibi süreçle insanları bir tercihle karşı karşıya bıraktı. Mücadeleye devam edebilirlerdi. Ancak devam ederken belli taleplerini bir kenara koymak durumunda kaldılar. Dik durmadılar, eğilip büküldüler. Taktiklerde yapılan değişiklikler insanı ilkesiz yapmaz. İnsanı ilkesiz yapan sabitelerde olan değişikliklerdir.

Tarikatlar ve tasavvuf hakkındaki düşünceleriniz nelerdir? Bunları İslam’ın heteredoks bir yorumu olarak mı değerlendiriyorsunuz?

Tarikatlar meselesi bizim için iki şeyi ifade eder. Tarikatların temel konusu olan tasavvuf ve nefis terbiyesi İslam’ın özüdür. Kuran nefisini arındıran kurtulmuştur der. Bu bir irşat ve terbiye ilişkisidir. Bu bir alimin, mürşidin derslerinden ve

öğretisinden istifade etme şeklinde de olabilir. Biz buna irfan diyoruz. Tarikatlar büyük ölçüde kurumsallaşmışlardır. Kendi disiplinleri vardır, kendi projeleri vardır. Ben bu projeleri ve kurumları doğrulama pozisyonunda değilim. Bunları kökten reddetme durumunda da değilim. Ancak bunların varlık sebebiyle ne kadar uyumlu olup olmadıklarına bakmak durumundayım. Tasavvuf dediğimizde nefis terbiyesi olmuş olması ve dünyaperestlikten arınılmış olması gerekir. Ancak çoğu tarikata baktığımızda başından sonuna kadar dünyaperestlik, para sevgisi, kadın sevgisi görürüz. Sorun burada tasavvufun neyi öngördüğünde değildir. Öngördüğü şey ile ne kadar uyumlu olup olmadığıdır. Peygamber ben en güzel ahlakı tamamlamak için gönderildim diyor. Ancak bu nasıl bir ahlaktırki, ülkende ve komşunda açlık had safhada iken dolarlarından bahsediyorsun. Sakalının uzunluğundan, sarığının büyüklüğünden, cüppenin renginden bana bahsetme. O kasalardaki paraların yoksullar için ne kadar kullanıldığından bahset. Kuran der ki, altını ve gümüşü biriktirip harcamayanlara acıklı bir azabı müjdele. Şimdi bakıyoruz tarikatlara, servet de orda, lüks orda sermaye de orda. Ama yoksullar, evsizler yok. Benim reddim varoluşsal bir reddediş değildir. Bir mürşidin eserlerinden istifade edilebilir. Bir nevi eğiten ve eğitilen ilişkisi olabilir. Benim tarikatlara yönelik eleştirim Kuran ve Peygamber'in dedikleri ortada iken bunu alanda pratik etmemeleridir.

Size 'Ağacan' diye hitap ediliyor. Hatta bu isimle yazılmış bir marş bile var. Bu ismin kaynağı nedir, neden size bu şekilde hitap ediyorlar?

Devrim sonrasında İranlılar ile ve Azeriler ile konuşurken ben hep Ağacan ifadesini kullanıyordum. Bu Farsça bir kelimedir. Türkçe'de karşılığı 'Canım Kardeşim', 'Aziz Kardeşim' demektir. Ben insanlara hep böyle hitap ettiğim için, benim hitabım bana bir isim olarak döndü. O marşıda, sağolsunlar, ben cezaevindeyken yazmışlar.

APPENDIX E

TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmada 1979 yılında İran'da meydana gelen İslam Devrimi ve onun Türkiye'deki İslamcı hareket üzerindeki etkileri ve bu etkileşim sonucunda Türkiye'de ki İslamcı hareket içerisinde ortaya çıkan İrancı İslamcılık ekolü tartışılmaktadır. Bu kapsamda tez, 1979 yılında İran'da devrim olduktan sonraki yıllarda hızla yükselen ve daha sonra 2000'li yıllara gelindiğinde etkisini büyük ölçüde kaybeden İrancı İslamcılık'ın ortaya çıkış seyrini ele almaktadır. Tezin yapısı temel olarak üç ana bölüme ayrılmıştır. Bunlar İran Devrimi'nin teorik ve ideolojik bir çerçevede ele alındığı ilk bölüm, Türkiye'nin bu devrime yönelik tutumunun devlet ve toplum düzeyinde incelendiği ikinci bölüm, ve İran Devrimi sonrasında Türkiye'de ortaya çıkan İrancı İslamcılık akımının tartışıldığı üçüncü bölümdür.

Tez içerisinde İrancı İslamcı olarak savunulan kişiler seçilirken, bu kişilerin kesilerine ve eserlerine ulaşmanın kolaylığına dikkat edilmiştir. Tez çalışmaları sırasında İrancı İslamcı olarak nitelendirilebilecek bazı isimler röportaj yapma teklifini kabul etmemişlerdir ve bu sebeple, bu çalışma içerisinde onların isimlerine yer verilmemiştir. Tez içerisinde kullanılan bazı isimler ile röportajlar yapılmıştır. Bu röportajlara tezin son kısımlarından ulaşılabilir. Kimsi ile röportaj yapılmayan, ancak yine de tezde adı geçen isimlerin seçiminde ise kriter olarak onların yazılı eserlerine ulaşabilme ihtimali göz önünde bulundurulmuştur. Tezde, İrancı İslamcı olarak Türkiye Hizbullahı'na ve Türkiye'de yaşayan Caferi Cemaatine değinilmemiştir. Hizbullah, radikal İslamcı bir örgüttür ve İlim ve Menzil olmak üzere iki ana grup tarafından oluşturulmuştur. İlim,

Suriye İhvan'ı lideri Said Havva'nın fikirlerinden etkilenmişken Menzil İran'dan etkilenmiştir. Örgüt içi çalışmalar sonucunda İlim Grubu Menzil Grubu'nu yok etmiştir. Böylelikle Hizbullah ile İran arasındaki ilişkiler yakın bir seyir izlememiştir. Hizbullah, bu sebeple bu çalışmaya dahil edilmemiştir. Caferi Cemaati ise Oniki İmamcı Şii bir dini grup olup, İran ile doğal bir ilişki içerisindedir. Bu sebeple Caferiler'de bu çalışmanın dışında tutulmuştur.

İlk bölüm olan İran Devrimi kısmında, İran Devrimi'nin ortaya çıkışına dair teorik çerçeve, devrimci sürecin entelektüel arka planı, devrime yön veren temel ideoloji ve fikirler ile devrimin bölgesel ve uluslararası boyutları ele alınmıştır. 2500 yıllık bir monarşi hükümdarlığının ortadan kaldırılması ve yerine Şii İslamcı temellere dayalı teokratik bir devletin kurulması ile sonuçlanan İran Devrimi, çoğu araştırmacı ve çoğu politikacı için 'beklenmedik' bir sonuçtur. İran Devrimi sonrasında yapılan açıklamalar bunu çok iyi bir biçimde özetlemektedir. Devrimlerin oluşu konusunda uzman olarak nitelendirilen Theda Skocpol, İran Devrimi'nin devrimin nedenlerini incelediği önceki çalışmalarını kökten etkilediğini söylerken; önceki ABD başkanlarından Jimmy Carter, devrimin ayak sesleri duymaksızın 1978 yılında İran'ı bir 'istikrar adası' olarak nitelendirmiştir. Kimsenin beklemediği ancak ayak seslerini sert bir şekilde duyuran İran Devrimi araştırmacılar tarafından farklı temellere dayandırılarak ve farklı teorilere dayanılarak açıklanmıştır. Bu açıklamalar tez içerisinde iki ana başlık altında incelenmiştir: Gelişim Temelli Model ve Kültür-Din Temelli Model. İlk model olan Gelişim Temelli Model başlığı altında Fred Halliday, Ervand Abrahamian ve Mansour Moaddel gibi devrimin sebebini ve temelini İran'ın modernleşme ve sanayileşme sürecine bağlayan araştırmacıların çalışmaları incelenmiştir. Bu araştırmacılar, devrimin patlak vermesine sebep olarak İran Şahlığı'nda

yirminci yüzyılın başlarından 1979 yılına gelene kadarki uygulanan Batılılaşma, sanayileşme ve modernleşme politikaları olarak açıklamaktadırlar. Dinin ve Şii İslam'ın rolünün devrimin ortaya çıkışında çok fazla etkisi olmadığını savunan bu araştırmacılar, Şah'ın politik ve ekonomik politikalarının toplum içerisinde sınıfsal farkları belirginleştirdiğini, böylelikle ekonomik eşitsizliğin büyük oranda arttığını ve buna bağlı olarak da toplumda hoşnutsuzluk ve tahammülsüzlüğün yükseldiği söylemektedirler. Şah'ın Beyaz Devrim adını verdiği modernleşme politikalarının bu hoşnutsuzluğu zirveye ulaştırdığını da belirtirler. İkinci model olan Kültür-Din Temelli Model başlığı altında, Theda Skocpol, Hamid Algar ve Said Amir Arjomand'ın İran Devrimi'ne dair fikirleri tartışılmıştır. Bu araştırmacılar diğerlerinin aksine, Şiilik inancının İran toplumu üzerindeki önem ve etkisini vurgulamışlardır. Onlara göre devrimci ve radikal bir yönetime sahip olan Şii İslam, devrimin oluşuna ön ayak olmuş, farklı gruplardan farklı ideolojilere sahip insanları bir araya getirmiş ve sonuç olarak ulemanın öncülük ettiği devrimin en önemli unsuru haline gelmiştir.

İlk bölümün takip eden ikinci kısmında Şiilik konusu ele alınmıştır. Şiilik İran'da Safeviler ile resmi din haline gelmiş ve Kaçarlar Dönemi'nde kurumsallaşarak ve aynı zamanda ekonomî-ik özgürlüğüne kavuşarak güçlenmiştir. 16. Yüzyıla kadar çoğunluğu Sünni olan İran, Safeviler Dönemi'nde Şiilik'e geçişi daha kolay kılabilme amacı ile iki yol izlemiştir. Bunlardan ilki kökenlerinin İslam tarihi açısından da mühim kabul edilenlerden 7. İmam Musa Kazım'a dayandırılarak tarihsel bir meşruiyet elde etme çabasıdır. Ancak bu yöntem çoğu araştırmacı tarafından tarihsel olarak yanlış bir yönelim olarak yorumlanmıştır. Çünkü, Safeviler köken olarak Türk olmakla birlikte Kürt kabileler de yönetim de söz sahibi idi. İkinci yol ise, yeni benimsenen Şiilik'in

kurumsallaşmasının hızlandırılması ve Şii bilgin eksikliğinin giderilmesi için Irak, Lübnan ve Bahreyn'den Şii din bilginlerinin getirilmesi oldu. Bu sayede iktidarlarını pekiştirebilmek için kendilerine tarihi bir referans bulmuş oldular. Sünnilik ile Şiilik yönetim ve politika gibi dünyevi konularda ve belli başlı dini konularda ayrı düşmektedirler. Şiilik, 12 İmamlar'ın sonuncusu olan İmam Mehdi'nin ortadan kaybolduğuna ve zulüm ve şiddetin arttığı bir dönemde tekrar dünyaya gelerek zulmü ortadan kaldırıp, Allah'ın ilahi adaletini kuracağına inanırlar. Bu manada, şiddet ve zulüm dolu bir dünya Mehdi'nin dönüşünü hızlandıracağı için iyi karşılanmaktadır denilebilir. İmam Humeyni bu anlayışı değiştirmiştir. Ona göre, İmam Mehdi'nin tekrar geleceği dünya zulüm ve şiddet dolu ve kötülüğün hüküm sürdüğü bir dünya olmaksızın bir cennet bahçesi olmalıdır. İran Devrimi, bu anlamda Mehdi'nin dönüşünü hızlandıracak ve onu bir cennet bahçesinde karşılayacak ortamı yaratmış ve bir dini rejim ortaya çıkarmıştır. Sünni politika anlayışı ise lidere biad etmek ve onun otoritesine bağlı bulunmak üzerine kuruludur. Dini açıdan ele alındığında da Şiilik ile Sünnilik arasında farklılıklar olduğu göze çarpmaktadır. Şiilik'teki en önemli doktrinlerden birisi İmamet'tir. İmam, soyu Hz. Muhammed'e dayanan ve onun ölümünden sonra yönetim hakkına sahip olan kişidir. Şiiler, Peygamber'in ölümünden sonra yönetme hakkını Hz. Ali ve onun syundan gelen 12 İmam'a ait olduğunu söylemektedirler ve bu açıdan Sünnilik'ten farklılaşmaktadırlar. Şiiler'e göre İmam günahsız doğmuş ve öyle kalmış bir kişidir. Allah'ın birliğini yeryüzünde temsil etmektedir.

İlk bölümün üçüncü kısmında, devrim öncesinde İran'daki entelektüel hayat tartışılmış ve bu kapsamda Celal el-Ahmed, Ali Şeriati ve Ayetullah Mutahhari'nin çalışmaları ve katkıları ele alınmıştır. Bu kişiler devrim öncesinde İran'ın ekonomik, politik, sosyal ve kültürel durumunu ele

almışlardır ve buldukları sorunlara dini bir referansla çözüm arayışı içerisinde girmişlerdir. Devrimin lideri Ayetullah Humeyni, bu isimlerin çalışmalarından faydalanmıştır. 1923 ve 1969 yılları arasında yaşamış olan Celal el-Ahmed, dini bir ailede büyümüş olmasına karşın seküler bir yaşamı benimsemiş, daha sonrasında yaptığı bir Hac ziyaretinden sonra ise dinin İran toplumu üzerindeki etkisini görerek tekrar dini referanslar üzerinden açıklamalar yapmaya başlamıştır. Celal el-Ahmed, Garpzedegi adlı eserinde İran'ın Batı tarafından sömürüldüğünü, eğitim sisteminin bozulduğunu ve sonuç olarak İran kültürünün yozlaştığını söylemektedir. Ona göre, bu Batı hastalığının ilacı İslam'dır. İslam, İran'ın kültürünü Batı'ya karşı koruması için kullanması gereken bir karşı duruştur. 1933 ve 1977 yılları arasında yaşayan Ali Şeriatî, Fransa'da eğitim görmüş bir sosyologtur. Çalışmalarında Marksizm'in etkisi olduğu görülmektedir. Celal el-Ahmed'e benzer olarak, Şeriatî de İran toplumundaki yozlaşmadan, dini değerlerin toplum üzerinde eskisi kadar etkili olmamasından yakınmaktadır. Ona göre İran toplumunu budurumdan kurtarabilecek en etkili faktör, *ruşenfekran* dediği aydın sınıftır. Ona göre, İslam dünyası için bir Rönesans ve Reform hareketi gerekmektedir. Bu hareketler de en iyi bir biçimde Şiilik içerisinde gelişebilir. Çünkü Şeriatî'ye göre, Şiilik sosyal eşitsizliğe karşı, emek sömürsüne karşı çıkan devrimci bir ideolojiye sahiptir. Şeriatî ve el-Ahmed'den farklı olarak molla olan Ayetullah Mutahhari, 1919 ve 1979 yılları arasında yaşamıştır. Humeyni'ye en yakın isimlerden birisi olmuştur. Ancak, yönetim konusundaki fikirleri ile Humeyni'den ayrılmaktadır.

İlk bölümün dördüncü kısmı Humeyni'nin görüşlerini ve onun yeniden teorize ettiği Velayet-i Fakih anlayışını el almaktadır. Humeyni, yıllarca yaşadığı sürgünün ardından Şah'a karşı gösterdiği muhalefet ile devrimin lideri haline gelmiştir. Batı'ya ve ABD'ye İran'ın sosyal ve kültürel

değerlerini yok etmekle sorumlu tutmuş ve ABD'yi 'Büyük Şeytan' olarak nitelendirmiştir. Demokrasi ve milliyetçilik gibi kavramları İran kültürünü yozlaştırmakta olan Batı kültürünün ürünü olmkls nitelemiştir. Humeyni, devrimin tartışmasız lideri olarak ortaya çıkmış olmakla birlikte bunu çeşitli sebeplere borçludur. İlk olarak, Humeyni sokaktaki insan ile aynı dili konuşmakta, onun sorunlarını dile getirmekle halk ile bir yakınlaşma göstermiştir. Emperyalizme, kapitalizme ve politik kurumlara karşı çıkan radikal bir dil kullanmıştır. Şah Dönemi'ni sorunların baş sorumlusu olarak görmüştür ve halkı da bu inanç çevresinde mobilize etmeyi başarmıştır. İkinci olarak, halkı kendi fikirleri etrafında mobilize ederken dini kavramları kendi söylemleri içerisinde bolca kullanarak radikal olan diline meşruiyet kazandırmıştır. Velayet-i Fakih anlayışını yeniden teorize eden Humeyni, kayıp imam olan İmam Mehdi tekrar yeryüzüne gelip adaletli bir dünya inşa edene kadar din bilginlerinin yönetimde olması gerektiğini vurgulamıştır. Humeyni'ye göre toplum iki katmanlı bir yapıdan oluşmuştur: baskı altında tutulanlar (*mustazafin*) ve baskı yapanlar (*mustakberin*). Dünya karşıt olan bu iki grup üzerine kurulmuş olmakla birlikte, baskı altında bulunanların zaferi ile sonuçlanacaktır.

İlk bölümün son kısmında ise İran Devrimi'nin uluslararası boyutu ve bölgesel etkileri incelenmiştir. 1979 yılı İran'da statükonun destekçisi olan bir Şahlık yönetiminin statüko karşıtı bir teokratik rejime dönüşmesine sahne olmuştur. İran Devrimi, bölgeseki seküler ülkelere ve Batı ile ABD'ye karşı bir yöne evrilmiştir. Özellikle rejim ihracını öncüleyen bir dış politika güdülmesi bölgede tansiyonların yükselmesine neden olmuştur. İran Anayasası'nın 154. Maddesi İran'a dünyanın neresinde olursa olsun tüm mazlum ve baskı altındaki milletlerle dayanışma içerisinde olması, bağımsızlık ve özgürlük mücadelelerini desteklemesi konusunda yetki, vermektedir. Bu kapsamda İran, rejim ihracı yolu ile bölgedeki devletlere

etki etme çabasında olmuştur. İran'da Şii karakterli bir devrimin olması ve bu devrim sonucunda Şii ulemanın öne geçtiği bir rejimin kurulması bölge ülkeleri tarafından bir tehdit olarak algılanmış ve bu algı İran'ın rejim ihracı politikaları ile birleşince bölge ülkelerini alarma geçirmiştir. Özellikle Sünni nüfusun çoğunlukta olduğu Suudi Arabistan, Mısır ve Türkiye gibi ülkelerde bu tehdit algısı kolaylıkla görülebilmektedir.

İran Devrimi bölge ülkelerinde de bazı İslamcı gruplar tarafından sempati ile karşılanmıştır. Türkiye'de bu ülkelerden birisidir. İkinci bölüm, Türkiye'de İran Devrimi'nin algılanışı konusunu irdellemektedir. Bunu yaparken, konu iki kısımda incelenmiştir: Devlet düzeyi ve toplum düzeyi. Devlet düzeyinden bakıldığında, devrimin Türkiye-İran ilişkilerinde bir gerilemeye yol açmadığı, ancak iki ülkeyi belirli konularda daha dikkatli politikalar izlemeye sevk ettiği görülmüştür. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti, devrim olduğunda İran konusunda iki konu bağlamında daha dikkatli ve teyakkuzda olmuştur. Bu konular, İran'daki yeni rejimin başarısız olması durumunda İran toprakları üzerinde bir Kürt devlerinin kurulması ve bunun Türkiye'deki Kürtleri'de etkilemesi endişesi ile İran'da ortaya çıkan devrimci şeriatçı fikirlerin Türkiye'yi de etkilemesidir. Bunun dışında, Türkiye devrim sonrasında kurulan rejimi derhal tanımış ve ekonomik ve politik ilişkilerine devam etmiştir. Bunlara ek olarak, Türkiye-İran ilişkileri bağlamında İran'da 1979'da ortaya çıkan devrimci teokratik hareket ile 1980'de Türkiye'de olan askeri darbeyi de ilişkilendiren yazarlar da bulunmaktadır. Hakan Yavuz'a göre İran'da devrimin olması ile İran Sovyet etkisine açık hale gelmiştir. Bu da Türkiye'de ordu içerisinde hoşnutsuzluğa sebep olmuştur. Sağ ve sol çatışmalarının had safhada olduğu o dönemde ordu yönetime el koymuş ve böylece Türkiye'nin de Sovyet etkisine açık hale gelmesini engellemiştir. Süleyman Elik'e göre de İran Devrimi Türkiyeni seküler yönetim yapısına

karşı bir tehdit algısı olarak algılanmış ve ordu bir darbe ile yönetimi ele geçirmiştir.

Toplumsal düzeye bakıldığında ise İran Devrimi'ne yönelik farklı algılamaların olduğu görülmektedir. Bu konuda ilk olarak bazı yayın organlarının devrime yönelik tutumları irdelenmiş ve daha sonra da İslamcı kesimin devrime yönelik duruşları ele alınmıştır. Basına bakıldığında solcu olarak nitelendirilebilecek Aydınlık, Birikim ve Cumhuriyet gibi yayın organlarının Şah'ın devrilişine olumlu baktıkları ancak Şah sonrası rejime ilişkin kuşkularını oldukları görülmektedir. Sağlı olarak nitelendirilebilecek Tercüman, Sabah ve Yeni Asya gibi yayın organlarının ise devrime kuşku ile yaklaştıkları, devrimin ardındaki güç olarak Sovyetler'den kuşku duydukları ve bir komünizm tehlikesi ile teyakkuzda oldukları görülmüştür. İslamcı kesim de devrim konusunda bölünmüş durumdadır. Bazı gruplar devrime kuşku ile yaklaşırken, bazıları devrimin oluş biçimine ve sonunda bir Şii rejimin ortaya çıkmasına şiddetle karşı çıkmış, bazıları ise devrimi sempati ile karşılamışlardır. Örneğin Nakşibendi tarikatına bağlı İskenderpaşa Dergahı devrime tamamen karşı çıkmamış ancak kuşku ile yaklaşmıştır. Şah'ın devrilerek İslami bir rejimin kurulmasını destekleyen İskenderpaşacılar, devrim ihracı konusunda ihraç edilmek istenenin İslam mı yoksa Şiilik mi olduğu konusunda şüphelere sahiptir. Tamamen Şia ve İran karşıtı olan İBDA-C, İran Devrimi'ni tamamen reddetmiş ve onu Şii karakteri üzerine vurgu yapmıştır. Nurcu bir grup olan Yeni Asyacılar, İran Devrimi'ni antipati ile karşılamışlardır. Onlara göre İran Devrimi İslami bir hareket olarak gelişmemiştir. Humeyni dini araçsallaştırmış ve Kuran'ı bir politika kitabı olarak görmüştür. Başka bir Nurcu grup olan Gülenciler de İran Devrimi'nin özelliklerine karşı antipati beslemişlerdir. Grubun lideri Fethullah Gülen'e göre İran ikiye bölünmüş bir politika takip

etmektedir. Şiilik, İran için İslam'dan ileri gelmektedir. İranlılar, Hz. Ali'yi kendi dini inanışlarını meşru kılabilmek amacı ile bir araç olarak kullanmaktadırlar. Türk-İslam sentezine inanan Güleciler, İslam'a Türkler'in liderlik etmesi gerektiğine inanmaktadır. Bazı yazarlar Güleciler'in İran'a karşı çıkışlarının sebebi olarak İran'ın Güleciler'in bir çok ülkede açtıkları Türk Okulları'na kendi topraklarında izin vermemesini de göstermektedirler. Bunlara göre İran, Gülen bir CIA ajanı olarak görmektedir. Kaplancılar'ın ise İran Devrimi konusunda karmaşık bir görüntü çizdikleri görülmektedir. Bu grubun lideri Cemalettin Kaplan İran Devrimi'ni olumlu karşılamış, Humeyni'nin fikirlerinden çok etkilenmiş ve İran Anayasası'ndan ilham alan İslam Anayasası adında bir kitap bile kaleme almıştır. Ancak grup içerisinde daha sonra İran'a ve Kaplan'ın İran'a karşı olan sempatisine karşı gelişen memnuniyetsizlik Kaplancılar'ın İran konusundaki fikirlerinin değişmesine sebep olmuştur.

İran Devrimi'ni sempatile ile karşılayan, Humeyni'yi lider olarak gören ve benzer bir devrimi Türkiye'de de yapabilmek için çalışan diğer İslamcılar ise İrancı İslamcılar başlığı altında son bölümde incelenmiştir. Bu son kısımda öncelikle İslam'ın bir politika aracı ve siyasal bir ideoloji olarak üzerinde durulmuş ve daha sonra İrancı İslamcılık konusuna geçilmiştir. Cemal Abdülnasır'ın politikalarının ve milliyetçiliğin Mısır'da başarısız olması, Pakistan'da Ziyaül Hak'ın askeri darbe ile yönetimi ele geçirmesi, Afganistan'ın Sovyetler tarafından işgal edilmesi gibi olaylar İslamcılık'ın tüm dünya genelinde güçlenmesine etki etmiş olsada, bu güçlenme İran Devrimi ile zirveye çıkmıştır. İslamcılık 1930'lardan itibaren Seyyid Kutup, Mevdudi ve Hasan el-Benna gibi düşünürler tarafından teorize edilmiştir. Böylelikle, İslam bir din olmanın yanında camiden sokağa taşınarak sosyal, kültürel ve ekonomik sorunlara çözümler üreten politik bir ideoloji olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. İran Devrimi ve sonrasında İran'da

kurulan teokratik rejim İslam'ın siyasallaşmasının zirvesi olmuştur. İran Devrimi'nin etkisi Türkiye'de de hissedilmiş ve İran'a ve devrime sempati duyan bir İslamcı grubu ortaya çıkmıştır. İrancı İslam ve İrancı İslamcılar olarak tanımladığım bu yeni grup tezin bu son kısmında açıklanmıştır. İrancı İslamcılık tezde politik İrancı İslamcılık ve dini İrancı İslamcılık olmak üzere iki başlık altında incelenmiş olup daha sonra İrancı İslamcılar kısmı da Dönem İrancı İslamcılar ve İdeolojik İrancı İslamcılar olarak iki grup içerisinde ele alınmıştır. Daha sonra ise İrancı İslamcılar tarafından çıkarılan dergi ve gazeteler incelenmiştir.

İrancı İslamcılık, İran Devrimi sonrasında dini bir devrim fikrini benimsemiş ve Ayetullah Humeyni'nin fikirlerine bağlı kalmış bir grup İslamcı tarafından ortaya çıkarılmıştır. Bu kişiler politik olarak İran'ın devrim sonrası politik söylemine bağlı kalmışlardır. Bunlarda emperyalizm, kapitalizm ve Siyonizm karşıtlığı görülmektedir. ABD'nin küresel politikalarına karşı çıkmakta ve ABD ile Sovyetler'in çekişmesine karşı üçüncü bir yol olarak İran Devrimi'ni göstermişlerdir. Ana akım İslamcılıktan farklı olarak Batı yanlısı politikalar izleyen Mısır, Suudi Arabistan ve Körfez ülkelerinin politikalarına karşı durmuşlardır. Onlara göre bu ülkeler, İslam'ı bir araç olarak kullanmakta olup mezhepçi politikalar izleyerek Batı'nın Orta Doğu ve Müslümanlar üzerindeki projelerine destek olmaktadır. Ancak, İran bu politikalara karşı bir duruş geliştiren yegane ülkedir. Bu nedenle İran'ın politikaları İrancı İslamcılar tarafından dest görmektedir. Dini olarak bakıldığında İrancı İslamcılar'ın Şii karakterli devrime karşı çıkmadıkları görülür. Şiilik onlar için karşı çıkılması gereken bir ayrılıkçı akım değil, dinen uygun olan bir mezheptir. Sünni İslamcılar'ın da sık sık kullandığı tevhid ve ümmet gibi kavramlar İrancı İslamcılar tarafından da kullanılmaktadır. Ancak bu kullanım bazı farklılıklar göstermektedir. İrancı İslamcılar, Türkiye'deki

İslamcı camia içerisinde İran ve Şiilik üzerine olumlu görüşleri nedeniyle izole edilmiş ve dışlanmışlardır. Bu dışlanmışlığı aşabilmek amacıyla tevhid ve ümmet gibi birleştirici kavramları kullanmışlardır. Tevhid, Allah'ın yeryüzündeki birliği ve tüm Müslümanların bu birliğin birer parçası olduğunu ifade etmektedir. Ümmet ise etnik, milli ve mezhepsel özelliklerine bakılmaksızın tüm müslümanların eşit olduğunu ve bir İslam toplumunun parçası oldukları anlamına gelmektedir. Bu iki kavram da milliyetçiliğe, mezhepçiliğe ve ulus-devletlere karşı çıkmayı gerektirmektedir. Bu sebeple, İrancı İslamcılar bu iki kavramı kendilerini Şiilik'e sempatik duymakla suçlayarak dışlayan, İran'a destek vermekle eleştiren İslamcılar'a karşı bir savunma mekanizması olarak kullanmaktadırlar. Ayrıca, bu iki kavramın İran Devrim'i ve devrim sonrası kazanımlarına da vurgu yapmak amacıyla kullanıldığı söylenilebilir. Diğer bir deyişle, Bu iki kavramı da kullanarak İrancı İslamcılar İran'ı bir cazibe merkezi haline getirmek istemişlerdir.

İrancı İslamcılar tezde dönemsel ve ideolojik İrancı İslamcılar olmak üzere iki grup halinde ele alınmışlardır. Dönemsel İrancı İslamcılar olarak Ali Bulaç, Atasoy Müftüoğlu, Ercümen Özkan ve Mehmet Metiner incelenmiştir. Bu isimler, devrim fikrinden etkilenmişler, Şiilik'e çok fazla ilgi duymamışlar, ancak karşı da çıkmamışlardır. Dönemsel İrancı İslamcılar, devrimin olduğu tarih olan 1979 yılından Humeyni'nin öldüğü tarih olan 1989'a kadar İran'a ilgi duymuşlar, ancak daha sonra bu ilgileri azalmıştır. Bu isimler, Humeyni Dönemi ve sonrası olmak üzere devrim sonrası İran'ı iki döneme ayırmaktadırlar. Böylelikle, Humeyni Dönemi'ni yüceltmektedirler. Onlara göre, Humeyni Dönemi'nde İran politikaları idealler üzerine kurulmuş olup, takip edilen ana tez İslam için İran olmuştur. Ancak, Humeyni'nin ölümünden sonra bu anlayış değişikliğe uğramış ve İran, pragmatist politikalar takip etmeye başlamıştır.

Böylelikle, İslam için İran fikri, İran için İslam fikrine dönüşmüş ve din, İran'ın izlediği politikalarda bir araç haline gelmiştir. Bunlardan farklı olarak İdeolojik İrancı İçslamcılar olarak bu tezde incelenmiş bulunan Kenan Çamurcu ve Nureddin Şirin, İran'ın politikalarındaki değişiklik olduğu fikrine ve idealizmden pragmatizme yöneliş olduğu iddiasına karşı çıkmaktadırlar. Onlara göre, devrim sürekli olarak gelişmiş ve bir devamlılık halinde süregitmştir. Çamurcu ve Şirin, bu açıdan idealismin pragmatizme dönüştüğü fikrine katılmazlar. Onlara göre Humeyni Dönemi kazanımları, Hamaney Dönemi'nin başlaması ile katlanarak artmış ve devrim kazanımları devam etmiştir. Onların söylediklerine göre, Humeyni Dönemi sloganlar dönemi iken, Hamaney ve sonrasındaki dönem icraatlar dönemidir. Bu açıdan, devrimin etkisi ve İran'ın küresel rolü, İdeolojik İrancı İslamcılar'a göre, artmıştır.

Üçüncü bölümün son kısmında ise, İrancı İslamcı gazete ve dergiler incelenmiştir. Bu yayın orhanları Düşünce, Şura, İktibas, İstiklal, Şehadet, Tevhid ve Selam'dır. Bu dergilerin İran Devrimi'ne karşı olan olumlu tutumlarını ve bu minvalde yapmış oldukları yayımlar örneklenerek gösterilmiştir. Seçilen bu dergilerin editöryal yapıları ve yazar kadroları İrancı İslamcılar'dan oluşmaktadır.

Özetle, 1979 yılına girerken Türkiye'de İslamcılık iki kol olarak faaliyet gösteriyordu: Devlete ve rejime karşı olan radikal İslamcılık ve bağış organizasyonu şeklinde faaliyet gösteren ılımlı İslamcılık. İrancı İslamcılık radikal İslam'ın içinde yeni bir ekol olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu ekol, 1979 yılından 2000'li yıllara gelene kadar gelişmiş ve yayılmış, 2000'li yıllardan itibaren pasifleşerek marjinal bir pozisyona geçmiştir. İrancı İslamcılık, günümüzde çok fazla takipçisi olmayan bir akımdır. Kenan Çamurcu ve Nureddin Şirin, İran ve devrim konusundaki

fikirleriyle ideolojik olarak savunmaya ve desteklemeye devam ederken, dönemsel İrancı İslamcılar fikirlerinde değişiklikler yaşamışlardır. Ali Bulaç tarikatlara dönmüş ve Gülen Cemaati ile yakın ilişkiler geliştirmiştir. Mehmet Metiner, Humeyni'nin ölümünden sonra İran'ın politikalarındaki değişimi gördüğünü iddia ederek yeniden an akım İslamcılık'a dönmüştür. Kendisi bu çalışma yapıldığı zamanlarda Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin milletvekilidir. Ercümend Özkan, 1995 yılında geçirdiği kalp krizi sonucu yaşamını yitirmiştir. Kendisinin İran'a ve devrime dair fikirleri Humeyni'nin ölümüyle değişikliğe uğramıştır. Bugün, onun çizgisini takip eden İktibas Dergisi için de aynı şeyi söylemek mümkündür. Atasoy Müftüoğlu, savunduğu görüşleri sebebi ile İslami camia içerisinde daha da marjinalleşmiştir. Üstelik, Suriye iç savaşı konusunda İran'a yakın politik söylemleri ile İslami camiada yalnız kalmıştır. Kendisi Eskişehir'de bulunan ofisini desteklediği İran yanlısı politikalar sebebiyle kesilen bağışlardan dolayı kapatmak zorunda kalmıştır.

APPENDIX F

TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

YAZARIN

Soyadı : ELHAN

Adı : NAİL

Bölümü : Orta Doğu Araştırmaları

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : The Impact of Iran-Inspired Islam in Turkey:
The Period Between 1980 and 2000

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
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TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: