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ABSTRACT

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This study explores the notion of interpretation in the field of architecture from the viewpoint of an architect's interpretative attitude within the architectural tradition. A notion of *specificity* for the architectural works is aimed to be discussed in relation to their aesthetic constitution which involves a sense for the 'architectural' that discloses itself in the architectural experience. The sense for the 'architectural' is evaluated through an examination of aesthetic form as the communicative instance of artworks. Thus the experience of the work of art is discussed and estimated as a fulfillment of the formative mediation the artwork demands. It is suggested that an architect's interpretative approach to architectural works, as an intent of interpreting the 'architectural', is directed to this formative mediation that the *architectural object* regulates. Accordingly, it is claimed that this intent of interpreting the 'architectural' concerns the translative sense for the 'architectural' which operates between any imagined life situation as the 'articulated' and the *architectural object* as the 'articulation'.

Key Words: Aesthetics, Artwork, Specificity of Art, Architectural Object, Architectural Work, Artistic Experience, Architectural Experience.

ÖZ

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Bu çalışma mimarlık alanında yorum olgusunu, bir mimarın mimari gelenek içerisindeki yorumlayıcı yaklaşımı açısından tartışmaktadır. Mimari yapıtlar üzerine, mimari yapıtın -mimariyi deneyimlerken farkedilen *'mimari olan'a duyum* düşüncesini içeren- estetik kurgusu ile ilişkili olarak, bir *kendine özgünlük* olgusunun tartışılması amaçlanmıştır. 'Mimari olan'a duyum anlayışı, estetik formun sanat yapıtlarının iletişimsel yapısı olarak incelenmesi çerçevesinde ele alınacaktır. Bununla ilişkili olarak sanat yapıtının deneyimlenmesi, yapıtın gereksinim duyduğu biçimsel ilişkinin yerine getirilmesi anlamında değerlendirilecektir. Bir mimarın -'mimari olan'ı yorumlamak amacıyla- mimari yapıtlara yorumlayıcı yaklaşımı, *mimari nesne*'nin düzenlediği biçimsel ilişkiye yönelmiş olarak önerilecektir. Bu çerçevede 'mimari olan'ı yorumlamak amacı, 'kurgulanan' olarak imgelenen herhangi bir yaşantı ile 'kurgulanış' olarak *mimari nesne* arasında dönüşümü sağlayan 'mimari olan'a duyum ile ilgilenmek şeklinde tartışılacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Estetik, Sanat Yapıtı, Sanatın Kendine Özgünlüğü, Mimari Nesne Mimari Yapıt, Sanat Deneyimi, Mimari Deneyim

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INTRODUCTION

1.1. Intention of the Study

This study is an attempt to understand an architect's interpretative attitude to works of architecture. It is an attempt to comprehend the interpretative attitudes within the architectural tradition whereby a distinct praxis evolves. The aim is not to provide a decisive frame; rather, the study intends to explore a notion of *specificity* in relation to the tradition of architecture which, one thinks, determines the grounds of an architect's relation to the works of the previous generations. The study is occasioned by a specific case where one encounters various interpretations of a work of architecture none of which seems to fulfill the expectations of a student of architecture. This particular example, Le Corbusier's Chapel at Ronchamp, is presented in the third chapter as a case study where one intends to examine some of its interpretations. The main problem in regard to different interpretations of Ronchamp is that none of them seems to answer the question of *what is there as a piece of architecture*. This problem, one may suggest, is not a specific one for this case. Most of the interpretations of architectural works one encounters seem to take for granted the answer to the question of *how an architectural object becomes what it is* and directly proceed to the building up of an exposition of the *architectural work*. The problem is twofold: when the interpretation loses communication with the *architectural object* its plausibility ceases to

exist in its evaluation of the *architectural work*; and even when the interpretation rests on a valid consideration of the *architectural object* it is already a shift to the other instances of the *architectural work*. Hence, it is suggested in this study that the *architectural object* and the *architectural work* might be considered as two different levels of penetrating into an architectural production. The *architectural object* might be understood as the actual building in its concrete physical existence as the object of architectural experience. The *architectural work* constitutes the level where the architectural production is understood as a cultural work belonging to a specific historical social context in all its interrelatedness. However these two levels are not considered in their isolation but in their unity, their discrimination may be important in that the *architectural object* is understood as the translation, via a specific formative act, of a life situation imagined by a historical consciousness into experienced architectural form where the interpretations which consider the *architectural work* often aim to build upon this imagined life situation and its related instances. Hence it might be suggested that a proper communication with the *architectural object* is a necessary part of understanding an *architectural work*. Moreover, it might be suggested that an architect's concern in his interpretative attitude within the architectural tradition is the *architectural object* itself rather than the particularity of the life situation that discloses itself in the architectural experience. Because one may suggest that the architectural experience is the level where also a sense for the 'architectural' seems to be disclosed as the translative capacity operating between any imagined life situation as the 'represented' and the *architectural object* as the 'representation'. Accordingly, one aims to scrutinize the relevancy of a 'sense of art' as a distinct mediation between the instances of the representation and the represented, beyond the changing forms and functions of art throughout the history, which, one may claim, offers the possibility of a tradition of art, hence of architecture. Hence, the second chapter is an attempt

to understand the experience of artworks and the related problem of meaning through a consideration of the *specificity* of the work of art in relation to its aesthetic constitution. The second chapter begins with an evaluation of the architectural experience in terms of an imaginative attention to the *architectural object*. This imaginative mode of attention in the architectural experience is explored in relation to Kant's understanding of taste and aesthetical ideas. Thus a main concern in this chapter is a critical consideration of Gadamer's notion of aesthetic non-differentiation as it is introduced in his *Truth and Method* (1960). And the aim is to explore the possibility of a recuperation of Kant's stand point of taste (1790), without ignoring the claim made by the notion of aesthetic non-differentiation, in relation to the experience of artworks as their communicative mode. Accordingly this study attempts to understand art as a translative capacity operating between the representation and the represented and to explore an idea of the continuity of the tradition of art on the grounds of this capacity as artistic mediation. So, one may suggest that the 'sense of art' belongs to a specific human mediation which not only regulates the experience of the works of art, but also constitutes the core of an artist's relation to the works of the past. One is aware that the subjects evaluated in the second chapter belong to a much wider area of study in scope than explored in this work. However, it seems impossible to understand a sense for the 'architectural' without an attempt to comprehend the 'sense of art'.

1.2. A Framework for Artwork as a Cultural Object and Its *Specificity*

Gombrich (1991:36-47) emphasizes the foundations that constitute the common ground of man's relation with art. However much varied art is among different cultures, he asserts that all these variations "operate within fields of tension which derive their energy from the original polarity of universal human reactions" (1991:44). And he repudiates an aesthetic relativism

which promotes a merely subjective approach to art; rather, he refers to a Kantian frame where aesthetical response is understood to be universally valid for its being rooted in human nature as a universal dimension. Accordingly he claims that all arts stem from this common ground of universally human response; which in its turn, explains the preservation of art works throughout the course of time as they enrich human experience by making accessible to one's imaginative response the value systems they embody. This function of artworks is also underlined by Cassirer (1960:192): as a cultural object the work does not stand in isolation, but it is the medium of transmission within the living process of culture; that is, the artwork as an object of culture becomes a mediator between the poles of 'I' and 'Thou'. And Cassirer foregrounds that this transmission is not so much a mere carrying of finished contents as it is opening up of a shared world in which the two poles realize themselves (1960:192). This indicates an active process of preservation of artworks in which one is addressed by what speaks out of them. The same point is also highlighted by Heidegger in *The Origin of The Work of Art,* where he calls preserving of the work as "to stay within the truth happening in the work" (1971:691): the work speaks to and preserved by the one who accepts the claim made by the embodied human significance in it.

In this connection, it seems plausible to mention the notion of aesthetic non-differentiation introduced by Gadamer (1960) to emphasize that one's encounter with artworks is not an isolated state of mind from the continuity of one's whole meanings in which one lives. Hence, the experience of a work of art is an *Erfahrung*, in that it is a participation in *what* the work *says*. That is, the world offered by the work makes its own claims on one's limited historical 'horizon'. He suggests that:

> "We should admit, for example, that an ancient image of gods, which was not exhibited in the temple as a work of art for the aesthetic, reflexive enjoyment of viewers, but is now on display in a modern museum, contains in the way it stands

> before us today the world of religious experience from which it sprang. This has the important consequence that its world still belongs to ours. And it is the hermeneutic universe that encompasses both." (1960:xxxi)

Subsequently one may suggest that one not only lives in a limited practical reality but, above and beyond it, has a share in a common universe of humanity and the experience of the work of art is one among other ways that one has access to other 'horizons'. And here, one may claim that what is true for the work of art is also true for all other human works. All human production carries with it the significance by which others have an access through the act of understanding; that is, making the meaning the specific production bears part of one's own meanings. This seems to be what Gadamer calls hermeneutic experience, and the notion of aesthetic non-differentiation, within the frame of *Truth and Method* [1](1960), implies that the experience of the work of art is an act of understanding which is regulated on the basis of a shared subject-matter. However, one may claim that while it is the human embodiment, which seems to be relevant also for all cultural work, that moves one in the experience of the work of art, there may be a *specificity* of artworks in relation to the manner of disclosure of this human significance:

> "The essence of art is nothing less than *the conservation of human experience itself.* The artwork as symbolically significant sensuous manifold is able to express the decisive relation between subject and world at a level which does not obliterate the concreteness of the relation." (Crowther:1993:7)

> "...the artwork is a human experience, which transcends the practical continuity of life, and, in so doing, returns us the very nature of experience itself." (Crowther:1993:46)

> "For if there is a distinctive form of human experience, wherein ideas are sensibly or imaginatively embodied in such a way that their embodiment is an inseparable part of their meaning, then we need a special term for it. The term 'art' has evolved and established itself for just this purpose." (Crowther:1997:186)

> "Each moment of the past (or of other cultures) has a very special sentence or judgment to pass on the uniquely reified world in which we ourselves live; and the privilege of artistic experience is to furnish something like a more immediate

> channel through which we may experience such implicit judgments and attain a fleeting glimpse of other modes of life." (Jameson:1988:59)

What comes to the fore in these ideas, one may suggest, is that there is something of an intensity and vividness of the human significance embedded in the works in the experience of art whether it is a poem, a painting, or a piece of architecture. And one may argue that this intensity and vividness mark the experience of the works of art with a *specificity* which seems to have important consequences for the notion of interpretation of architectural works. And it seems plausible to suggest that architectural experience has its primacy in penetrating into a work of architecture and it presents a *special* task for the hermeneutic effort in that it becomes the basis for a proper *communication* only through which the embedded human significance comes forth as the object of the hermeneutic attention. In this sense, architectural experience might be understood as to imply a kind of *decoding* of the fixed and mute forms of architecture to reach the human imprint behind them, which, one may claim, only then comes into being as an object to be resolved into one's whole of meanings.

Gombrich, in *Art History and the Social Sciences* (1979:131-166), scrutinizes the notion of interpretation in the field of art by clarifying certain themes through his particular example of Christopher Wren's Sheldonian Theater. He differentiates between scientific explanation and interpretation as the task of an art historian in the sense that the former seeks for general notions about the regularities where the latter's aim is to 'make sense' of an individual event which he emphasizes to be inexplicable in general terms. For penetrating this ineffability, he emphasizes the Popperian notion of the logic of situations, and claims that the art historian, in order to 'make sense' of the individual, should reconstruct the circumstances of this particular work, the situation of the designer: his aims, means, choices. Emphasizing that such a reconstruction always implies assumptions on the side of the art historian, he asserts that, for

the field of art, the situation may be less tightly structured than it is for science and technology. Therefore he emphasizes the importance of an awareness of the situation in art itself along with the awareness of the historical situation for a deeper penetration into the particular work. Likewise, Steinberg (1977:314) underlines this sense of a *specificity* in relation to the works of art and describes them as remarkable deeds never repeated. He emphasizes that: "... it is aesthetic judgment that largely structures the world of artistic forms at their inception: it was the *best* artists who got the big royal commissions; the *best* architects who came to St. Peter's" (311). Thus he might be understood as to indicate the importance of a 'sense for art' in the practice of the art historian: "if Manet did not seem greater to us than Leon Gerome, then a history of nineteenth century painting in France would not even be possible; only an incomplete index of paintings produced". (312)

In a similar manner, one might claim that a sense for the 'architectural' should be operative in 'making sense' of the architectural works. And an architectural work may be understood as a mediating production which is endowed with meaning via its origin in a specific formative activity. One may find an understanding of the *specificity* in relation to a distinct praxis in Cassirer's discussion of *sign* and *content* (1953:86). For Cassirer, (1960:98) human significance always presents itself in sensuous and material forms and embodies itself in these presentations. Hence, he underlines that a *knowledge* of the physical things constitute the foundation upon which one constructs the 'cultural object' (1960:98); since these physical entities are achievements as 'symbols' of the human world of meaning (1944:32) whereby man builds up, through symbolic imagination and intelligence, a world of his own. So, *sign* may be understood as the actual physical form by which a *spiritual* content represents itself; that is, makes itself available to others through this embodiment. Moreover, for Cassirer (1953:86) *sign* is not an arbitrary vehicle for mere transmission of meaning, but an essential implement

of the content whereby it defines itself according to a peculiar formative activity of man which has an inner logic of its own. And this point reveals the significance of Cassirer's 'philosophy of symbolic forms', since he underlines the polydimensionality of culture. He emphasizes that man builds up a world of meaning that constitutes the intermediary realm through which man interacts not only with the world but with himself as well (1953). And this world of meaning is constructed through different formative activities each of which has its own peculiar qualities (1953). These formative activities as different qualifications of man articulate themselves in their specific cultural domains which reflect man's diverse orientations. Here it should be mentioned that Cassirer does not work out these formative powers as some fixed and transcendental functions; rather, he turns to culture, man's achievement as his work, to understand these formative powers in their distinctiveness (1944). Hence one may suggest that this insight is important in that it emphasizes the validity of different traditions within culture which are irreducible to one another. That is, it underscores the specificity of different human activities each of whose achievement can be evaluated in itself, and not by the standards of another [2].

As a cultural object the work of art stands within the complex network of relations of a society. So, 'what it says' can be altered from various points of interaction according to different questions raised by different intentions. Chaplin mentions some of the questions about the works of van Gogh, Gauguin, Seurat, and Cezanne -i.e., the Post-Impressionists- entailed by a *social* history of art, in order to 'grasp' the complex historical social realities within which these works are produced: "What were the works made for? Whom were they made for? To do what kind of job? What do they mean? Do they achieve meaning?"; that even goes so far as to explore the ways in which the land-use and the landscape of Brittany altered during the nineteenth century, in the context of changing economic and social geography in

France (1994:73-74). One might suggest that to devise a finished set of questions to be asked in relation to any object in order to 'understand' what it 'means' is impossible. Any human production can become a source from which one may lead into numerous directions that endeavor to determine different 'meanings' in relation to different connections it has in the society, all of which can be valid. So one thinks that there is no single viewpoint to judge the relevancy of these different directions for interpretation. Similarly, Gombrich mentions some questions that can be posed about an ordinary teacup which ranges from coming of tea from China to West, to the problem of conduction of heat by chine (1991:66). And he stresses that, in the face of this opportunity of going into any direction: "precisely because this is so, I think we should not be tempted too easily to neglect the object itself. (1991:68)" He emphasizes that the questions asked by the art historian -e.g., in relation to a painting from Renaissance- would concern the issues which are more or less organized around the artistic tradition, like the painter's craft itself; rather than, for example, the class structure of the city of Florance (1991:69), that is, the questions that the artist and the art historian seem to be concerned with. Hence, one may suggest that, even though there are no clear cut boundries of interpretation for a cultural object, it seems plausible to underline the specificity of the work of art on the basis of the distinct formative act of which it is the product. Other then the questions derived from different interests concerning diverse factors that play their role around the relations in which the artwork stands, it seems also important to focus on the object as a specific *sign* in terms given by Cassirer. And one thinks that it is this kind of a *specificity* in relation to the work of art underlined by Gombrich and Steinberg as mentioned above, which -besides the complex relations of any synchronic section of a society in which the artwork is produced- also marks art as a distinct tradition having a life of its own. However, this is not to undervalue these different orientations towards the work of art which indeed, one thinks, can not be isolated

from the complex mechanisms of the life of a society by any *pure* attitude to art. Rather, the point is to emphasize the necessity of an understanding of art in itself against reductive approaches. Moreover, besides Gombrich's 'making sense' of the individual artwork which he suggests as the task of the art historian, there is the artist's approach to his own tradition which seems to be difficult to comprehend without a notion of the *specificity* suggested above.

Likewise Wolff (1975:54-55) underlines: "the answer to the question of how art expresses social and other meanings seems to me to be almost exclusively one which is intrinsic to the study of art itself" (55). She maintains that sociology must take account of aesthetics; otherwise it has no directives in its approach to art. Since, while the questions concerning the social ideas, values and beliefs expressed in artworks constitute the focus of a sociological approach, Wolff asserts that *how* they are thus expressed is a question related to aesthetic concerns (55). And she criticizes an attitude of indifference to these aesthetic considerations as reductive (55). Within a similar line of discussion, Hauser (1959:205-213) underlines the limits of a sociological approach. He claims that the tracing of the different sources upon which the artwork draws and the contextual definitions may blind one to the object itself which, for him, should be considered as an independent entity with an inner logic of its own; and that artwork should not become a record of something else which is more important than itself (206). Moreover, Hauser raises another important issue that sociology cannot explain the notion of quality; that is, it cannot account for the qualitative differences between the works from the same socio-historical context (210). Thus, one may suggest that the approaches which derive their operative tools from other regions of cultural studies, however much valid may be what they can say about the works of art, may not offer a frame in which it is able to answer why, in words of Steinberg, "Manet seems greater to us than Leon Gerome" (1977:312). And this may not be to suppose that one really can give definitive

answers for such a valuation because one has a discipline of 'art theory' or 'art history', but, at least, one may claim that the idea that one owes one's 'sense of art' to the evolution of a specific human dimension makes relevant the demand on the validity of artistic tradition, its contiunity and the questions concerning the inherent problems of this activity. Hence Cassirer's (1944:70) insight into the unity of culture in its diversity seems to be significant. He underlines that human culture is divided into various activities proceeding along different lines and pursuing different ends; and that the outcomes of these activities are impossible to reduce to a common denominator.

David Watkin (1977) and Roger Scruton (1979) discuss the importance of architectural tradition against the attitudes which tend to reduce architecture to an expression of some other historical or social determinant by ignoring the dynamics of architectural practice [3]. Both of the authors are concerned with the specificity of architecture as a distinct human praxis. As a challenge to the validity of the one-sided arguments on the relation between architectural practice and its relations within the life of a society, Watkin refers to the remark made by Gombrich that "it is one thing to see the interconnectedness of things, another to postulate that all aspects of a culture can be traced back to one key cause of which they are the manifestation." (1977:56). This is also what Scruton (1979:52-57) focuses in discussing the approaches which tend to *explain* architecture as merely an 'expression' of its historical-social circumstances. His point is that such an evaluation of architecture through other cultural factors underestimates the inner logic of the architectural works and the architectural experience by reducing architecture to a mere manifestation of *something else*. And he underlines that although the relation between the entire form of life and architecture through which it is expressed is of vital importance for the architectural experience, the conceptual frames that neglect architectural tradition as a distinct field of practice may not be able to give

any general principle for the comprehension of the nature of the relation between architecture and the whole life. Moreover, Scruton's criticism also involves the point that a work of architecture might succeed in expressing something other than its historical reality and consequently derive its success from that. Hence he emphasizes that the term 'expression' is a means for associating a work of architecture with a human significance, while giving no general understanding as to *how* the meaning is derived. (1979:57)

It should be admited that an understanding of the relation of an architectural form to the way of life out of which it is produced is an important constituent of the architectural experience. In this sense Scruton gives Boileau's Bon Marche as an example. Here he mentions that the space conception of the department store and the configuration of the staircase reflect the spirit of mass consumption in the late nineteenth century (1979:56). And one may suggest that the contextual conditions that the staircase discloses in the architectural experience is a concern of a different kind than *how* it reflects them. And it seems that the manner the contextual circumstances are revealed in the experience is a function of the specific 'architectural' articulation of space. Hence one may suggest that the staircase not only discloses its historical-social reality, but also brings forth a sense of the 'architectural'. Likewise Gombrich underlines (1991:41): "it is wrong to equate the world encountered in the art of foreign or past civilizations with the everyday reality from which they sprang". He asserts that also the traditions are effective in artworks' formation (41). Hence one may suggest that the cultural object belongs not only to a specific historical-social context, but also a tradition of its own. And it may reveal distinct attitudes on the grounds of the tradition it belongs. Hence, one might suggest that this seems to be what Panofsky (1955), in reference to Cassirer, explains as an 'essential tendency of the human mind' which constitutes the object of a *deeper* level of understanding the artworks (30-31). And tradition here may not be conceived

as a structurally isolated instance devolved upon itself; rather, one may claim that via one's familiarity with the tradition one is offered a different insight into the 'horizon' of a different people. That is, the architectural tradition should not be understood in isolation but in its relatedness to the life of a society. Podro's (1982:xvi) discussion of the two kinds of questions in relation to the work of art seems to offer a plausible insight: the historical questions and the questions concerning some general notion of art. He states that there is no clear distinction between these two kinds of considerations, since one's own notion of art dictates what to look for in an artwork; that is, one's own sense of art determines the historical questions. While reminding that the conception of art is itself a historical fact, he underlines that one can understand the conception of art revealed in an artwork only because one himself has a sense of art. And this sense of the tradition of art is emphasized in one's concern of the *specificity* of art. Podro points out that art is context bounded, but at the same time irreducible to these contextual conditions (1982:xvii). Since, however much inextricable from the circumstances that give rise to it, an artwork sustains a life of its own in time. This sense of artwork's persistence thoughout history and the appeal it rises out of its particular context is underlined above in the notion of preservation as the embodiment of human imprint which the work of art makes available to the imaginative response of a later consciousness. But it should be suggested that this idea of tradition which indicates a *sense for art* is not something like a continuous, unbroken flow of some universal concerns. That would be an *essentialist* [4] claim which presupposes the incarnation of the same values and themes in works of art of whichever historical period. This kind of an understanding is that against which Gombrich warns one. He makes explicit that within the life of a tradition the values pursued by different historical people tend to change in the process -e.g., in art, "beauty may be felt to be less important than tension, or feeling less artistic than cold purity" (1979:126). But beyond this embodiment of

different value systems, one may claim that it is the 'sense of art' that which makes the artworks from different historical and social contexts available to one. And it may not be because there are some firm principles or rules valid for all people for all times. Rather, above the canons of the art of different times and beyond the particular preferences of *tastes* [5], it seems to be the sense of art on the basis of which one is able to *attune* oneself to different historical styles [6].

It might be claimed that the qualitative changes in art throughout the course of history which makes impossible to find some apparent commonness between works of art also puts the notion of a tradition of art in question. Moreover, it might be claimed that 'art in itself', which is the germ of the idea of a 'sense of art' that makes up the notion of a tradition of art, is a modern abstraction when one considers the times when there is no such separation from other instances of human activity like myths or religions which are moulded together in the life of a society [7]. It might also be claimed that architecture, as it is much more embedded into the totality of everyday life, testifies to the inaptness of this kind of a separation. Likewise, Gadamer (1960:156) argues that the work of architecture shows how untenable a conception of 'the work of art in itself' is. These claims raise important questions and will be discussed in the second chapter; however, the delineation of a sense of art, hence, of architecture, apart from the concerns and interests bounded to the particular contexts expressed in -and served by- the works of art and architecture, seems to be valid even when one admits that it is an abstraction between the 'articulated' and its 'articulation' in a specific medium. Since, one thinks, this abstraction is a vital part of the artist's practice on which his whole effort is condensed in finding the appropriate *formulation* of his ideas within the specific medium he works. And this special effort, one may suggest, also regulates an architect's relation to the works of the past generations; where the past works, which are not to be confused with models

for imitation, provide references by which an architect acquires his medium, a sense for the 'architectural', to be appropriated for the articulation of *new* contents. Moreover, one may claim that this is not restricted to the continuity of certain world views and their accompanying styles [8], but a necessary constituent even in the betrayals of past attitudes of *making*; since, whether transmission, translation, or betrayal, an architect's interpretative attitude, in any case bears an understanding which penetrates in-between of the articulation and the articulated. That is, he focuses on the distinct architectural way a life situation takes form and is disclosed in the experience.

Hence, Gombrich (1979:152-155) indicates that the transmissive function of the art works is not the only reason for their preservation in the society. Another reason, as he claims, is their existence as a continuous challenge to those who come after; that is, in the field of art particular examples are conceived as touchstones as the criteria for judging others; and this, in its turn suggests a comparative process in the evolution of the artistic tradition. One can find a sound explanation for this idea in Kant's notion of the art of genius (1790:168-169). Kant foregrounds that the art as art of genius should be understood as exemplary because of the absence of definite rules or laws underlying its creation. It is emphasized as exemplary in the sense that it becomes a basis of comparison in judging the value of other works in the absence of a definitive system of measure. And one may suggest that this is where the 'sense of art' is operative. Similarly Gombrich underlines such works of art as cultural peaks which are conceived as points of references for one to orient himself. Moreover, he suggests that: "... mastery is not only multi-dimensional, it is also infinitely supple and resourceful, both in the development of technical solutions and in the compensation for technical short-comings through novel and unexpected moves in other directions; small wonder that such richness could never be achieved if the master had to create his miraculous configuration from

scratch." (1979:153)

It is in this manner that the architect's attitude to his tradition seems to bear importance in the discussion of the interpretation of architectural works; that is, one may suggest that Gombrich's 'making sense' of an individual event, which is claimed to be ineffable, seems to be a different task than that of an artist. It seems to indicate a different level where more complex terms come into question as the subject of various humanistic disciplines. Although, these two tasks stem from the same ground, they seem to deviate in their intentions. And one may argue that within the architectural tradition, a special interpretative task takes place on the side of the architect which is not only concerned with *what* is revealed in the architectural work but also particularly with *how* it is revealed through the architectural experience. In addition to this, it seems also the case that where the 'making sense' of an architectural work fails because of some inability to penetrate into the work's internal dynamics, a comprehension of the dimension on which the architect's specific concern operates may function as a corrective; however, not to override an interpretation but to point out a direction for a more plausible *communication*.

1.3. A Framework For the Interpretation of Artworks

> "The artwork is not only aesthetic but sub- and supra- aesthetic; in that it originates in empirical layers of life, has the quality of being a thing, a *fait social*, and ultimately converges with the meta-aesthetic in the idea of truth, it implies a critique of any chemically pure attitude to art." (Adorno:1970:269)

One might refer to two senses of the notion of interpretation. In one sense, it may be understood as "an effort of evaluation of an architectural statement and of proposing hypothesis as to its possible meaning which necessarily constitutes transcoding operations in which we frame equivalents for architectural and spatial phenomenon in other codes or

theoretical languages." (Jameson:1991:120). In another sense, it indicates a "pointing in a particular direction, rather than an end point"; that is, "not a conceptual explanation but much more like understanding and explicating"; "not a reading in of some meaning but clearly a revealing of what the thing itself already points to" (Gadamer:1986:68). In the first sense of the term, one may suggest that there might occur some gaps between the products of the transcoding operations that Jameson mentions and the architectural product; that is, a transformation of an architectural statement into other means of expression or languages seems to bear abstractions of some sort via the transcoding that the architectural product is exposed to as underlined above in section 1.1 in relation to the sociological approaches to artworks. Hence the second sense of the term seems to be important in relation to an understanding of the notion of interpretation of artworks. Because it might be understood to refer to the 'sense of art' as a communicative instance whereby the determined human experience is disclosed.

And it might be suggested that an operational dichotomy between the *architectural object* and the *architectural work* as different instances of interpretation of an architectural production seem to be helpful in discriminating the different levels of meaning that an architectural production bears. The term *architectural object* can be explained as a hermeneutical concept in relation to the studies of Gadamer. It is derived from the term 'eminent text' which Gadamer (1989:38) uses for his discussion of literary texts where the term suggests "a woven texture that holds together" as something that 'stands' in its own right (1986:142,1989:38). This hermeneutical notion, in the frame of this study, may be understood as the product of a specific activity which is capable of transmitting -meaning in relation to- the human experience determined in itself on the grounds of the distinct human effort which has a life of its own as a tradition in the sense given above. In this sense, *architectural object* is to be

evaluated as the actual product of the architectural activity in its physical existence where the architectural activity might be understood as a specific medium for the realization and communication of ideas. And one may claim, *architectural object* is capable of transmitting the human experience embedded in itself on the common ground of a sense for the 'architectural'. Hence, one may also define *architectural object* as the concern of the form of knowledge generated and transmitted by architectural tradition.

The term *architectural work,* on the other hand, may be understood to be referring to a broader frame which contains *architectural object* with its existence as a cultural object in relation to certain historical and social circumstances; that is, it refers to the particular cultural product in all its interrelatedness to its historical and social context. Each of the instances involved in the notion of *work,* which may range from its authorial reference to its place within the particular social relations, may bear different levels of meaning through its relation to architectural production, as it is discussed above; for example, a research into the social and historical context may reveal certain relations of the architectural activity to other cultural activities which seem to bear different meanings on a level where the questions about a particular social totality and the location of the architectural activity in it comes into consideration. And all these different levels of meaning seem to be of vital importance in understanding man and culture. But it may be suggested that even such contextual circumstances require a mental adjustment in one's approach to architectural production, it may still be the case that to penetrate into the conditions under which an architect works is not itself to penetrate into the *nature* of his work. Moreover, one should point out that there may be other *readings* free from these instances of the *architectural work*, that is a communication with the *object* not necessarily involved with an understanding of the *work*, which, one may argue, is a level of immediate transmission of meaning in the architectural experience where, it

may be claimed, one is able to formulate certain internal relations without recourse to any information other than that contained in the *architectural object* itself. And it is important to underline that this does not mean an exclusion of particular conventional elements which may only come to the fore through a familiarity with an iconographical system [9]; since one thinks that even when one is familiar with a particular conventional system of representation, it is only through the architectural experience that these iconographical elements acquire their *genuine* significance. That is, even the elements of a building which bear specific historical or social meaning, one may claim, are accessible only when they become the objects of architectural experience in their appropriate place within the *architectural object* which is "a woven texture that holds together" (Gadamer:1986:142). Hence architectural experience might be understood as an initial level of interpreting architectural productions. And one may suggest that the meaning disclosed in the architectural experience is potentially there for everyone who accepts the constructive task the *architectural object* imposes.

Hence the level of architectural experience might be underlined as the communicative dimension; since not only '*what* it means' but also the constructive achievement on the side of the beholder -i.e., '*how* it is *what* it is'[10]- seem to bear a specific significance for the works of architecture. Langer (1967:104-106), who follows Cassirer and emphasizes art as a specific symbolic form, maintains that the physical character of the art symbol its not irrelevant to its meaning; and she foregrounds that what it conveys has the only intuitive form it can take. Thus one might suggest that the architectural experience as an aesthetic interaction with the *architectural object* is a level through which one establishes a fruitful and healty dialogue with the *architectural work.* And it seems not so arbitrary to make such a discrimination. Gadamer (1986) underlines that "every work of art only begins to speak when we have already learned to decipher and read it. (48)" and that (1986:53) "the work of art transforms our

fleeting experience into the stable and lasting form of an independent and internally coherent creation." Hence he deliniates the artwork on the grounds of this internal coherency as a "creation" as different from a "work" (1986:126). Since he asserts that "the manifestation in question in a strange way transcended the process in which it is originated" as self-sufficient creation "which demands to be apprehended in itself as pure manifestation".

The notion of internal coherency in relation to artworks might be explained in reference to Karl Popper's idea of knowledge without a knowing subject. Popper (1972) differentiates between the physical world, the world of consciousness and mental states, and the world of ideas in an objective sense (-i.e., shareable). He introduces the world-three as the shared world of meaning. And it is related to the idea of knowledge as a self-sufficient shareable entity differentiated from the subjective act of thinking -i.e., knowledge as a world-three object distinct from its genetic sources in the world-two of which it is the outcome (1972:108-109). He suggests that understanding and interpretation are always operations with obtained world-three objects, hence they belong to the world-three. And one may suggest that an artwork itself may be understood as a world-three object via its immanent cohesion and it can be interpreted independently of its genetic conditions of production. On the other hand, Popper suggests that only a formulated theory can be objective; that is, it is the formulation which makes it shareable, hence open to interpretation and criticism (1972:112-113). Likewise, he maintains that a book contains objective knowledge not because that it is useful, true or false; but because it has a dispositional character of and a potentiality for being understood and interpreted (1972:115-116). Thus one may suggest that, in following an analogy, aesthetic reflection is also a *formulation* of this sort; that is, one may claim that the immanent cohesion in an artwork is always the outcome of an aesthetic reflection, and this is what makes it shareable as a world-three object. Hence aesthetic experience as communication with artworks

always traces such *formulation* on the grounds of the comprehensible relations it bears. And this might be suggested as the constructive act that the work demands. One may refer to Gombrich (1991:125):

> "Take an elementary artistic problem that may go back to the dawn of history: the decoration of a pot with an evenly spaced row of marks. Whether or not we postulate a subjective 'decorative urge' that derives the craftsman on, he must still submit himself to the objective realities of the situation and work out the number and the intervals of marks till they fit."

Likewise, van Gogh explains his work (Gombrich:1991:126):

> "the *mental effort* of balancing the six essential colours, red, blue, yellow, orange, violet, green. This is *work and cool calculation*, when one's mind is utterly stretched like that of an actor on the stage in a difficult part, when one has to think of a thousand different things at a time within half an hour. ... but I'd like to see a drunkard before his canvas, or on the stage... Don't think that I would ever artificially work myself into a feverish state. Rather remember that I am engrossed in a *complicated calculus*, which leads to the quick production of one rapidly painted canvas after the other, which has, however, been *calculated at length* beforehand. And so, if they tell you that it is done too quickly, you can reply that they have looked too quickly." [11]

In relation to van Gogh's explanations, Gombrich (1991:126) suggests that "it is precisely the desolation of aesthetics that we cannot formulate it with the same precision we can formulate the problems of science or the rules of a game." And Langer underlines that (1967:77) understanding art differs from other forms of realistic cognition; artworks bear a sort of significance that differs from the definable meaning of words, and a logic that is not like the logic of discourse; yet they bear a from of reasonableness. Hence one may suggest that architectural experience might be understood as a dialogue with an immanent system, which bears the guiding principle of its resolution in itself. Thus it might be considered as an aesthetic experience, an exercise of taste in Kantian terms, a penetration into a purposiveness without a purpose. And an interpretation at the level of the *architectural object* might be

experience determined in the forms of architecture comes to 'speak'.

It is mentioned above in reference to Gombrich that art rests on the grounds of universal human responses. However it should be mentioned that this universality in relation to the experience of artworks suggests a potentiality rather than a necessity. And Gombrich underlines that: "it can never be emphasized enough that in art, as in life, 'understanding' is a matter of degree, and that neither our share in what is universally human nor our intellectual preparation makes us safe from misunderstanding (1979:159)". Consequently he highlights his qualms about conclusive judgments on the works of art:

> "The fault may lie with us, because we are not in the right mood. As soon as we even consider this possibility, we have ceased to be complete relativists and subjectivists. We have sided with tradition against our own reactions. In fact we may feel that as far as the peaks of art are concerned, it is not so much we who test the masterpiece, but the masterpiece which tests us." (1979:164)

This point seems of extreme importance; since, as will be mentioned in the third chapter in relation to some interpretations of Ronchamp, there might be cases where a penetration into the art work is impeded at the level of communicating with the *architectural object*; and consequently an obstruction of 'the awareness of the situation in art', which may be the result of various factors, may lead to an interference with the 'making sense' of the particular work. For one may claim that the *architectural object* might be understood as an aesthetical unity that absorbs its sources whether authorial or historical-social, or typological in a unique way. And the level of communication with the *architectural object* may not be healthy in the sense that the dialogue with the architectural product can not be furthered plausibly on different instances of the *work*. Therefore, one may suggest that the level of communication with the *architectural object* provides the base for a valid understanding of the *work*. Because interpretations on the different instances of the *work* necessarily constitute a transformation of

the human experience encapsulated in and transmitted by the *architectural object* into the other means of expression. And when one considers each interpretation as a construction, a failure in the communication with the *architectural object* may be suggested to lead an unhealthy foundation for constructing interpretations on further levels. It is important to point out that such an argument should not be understood as offering a linear additive process in interpretation of architectural products, rather what is suggested is a dialectical relation between the levels of communication with the *architectural object* and understanding the different instances of the *architectural work*. Hence, in relation to genetic explanations of an architectural production, which will be discussed in section 3.3, one may suggest that *architectural object* can be considered as an object of communication in itself; that is, it can transmit meaning independently of its generation: its author, formal or typological predecessors, or process of creation. It becomes an irreducible composite in which, for example, every ancestor has turned out to be endowed with a new meaning in a new system of reference that is capable of revealing the human experience embedded in it through the architectural experience at a level of immediate transmission of meaning. Thus, to trace the genealogy of a work may reveal the mechanisms of transformation that took place throughout the architectural activity and it may disclose the process of generation which seems to be pregnant with levels of meaning unfolding the nature of human creativity; however, it may have the risk of losing sight of the *architectural object* itself. And it might be suggested that explanations of the generation process of an architectural production belongs to a different order than communicating with it through the architectural experience. Therefore, one might argue that the architectural experience bears its priority in penetrating into an architectural production and for a 'making sense' of it.

Gombrich (1979:136) in his interpretation of Christopher Wren's Sheldonian Theater uses the

adjective 'festive' for the building which he takes for granted for the observer to experience and this constitutes an important part in his 'making sense' of the building. One may argue that this utterance of 'festive' is an interpretation at the level of the *architectural object*. And one may suggest that in some other occasions the experiential qualities of a building may be more difficult to penetrate, for which one may refer to the case of Ronchamp as an example. The significance of a proper communication with the *architectural object* in interpretation seems to lie in its being the initiator of dialogues that can be furthered on other levels; that is, in its opening way to an understanding the *work*. On the other hand, one may argue that this level constitutes the most vital part of an interpretative attitude within the architectural tradition which takes part on the side of the architect whose intention may be distinguished from that of an art historian or an expert of another social science. That is, an architect, in relation to Wren's building, would ask the question *why* or *how* it is 'festive'; his concern would be the *architectural object* itself, *how* it explores, and consequently in the experience, conveys 'festive'; that is, *how* an idea, an experience is realized through the *architectural object* via architectural activity. To relate this experience of the 'festive' to a broader context into the social and historical circumstances through the different instances of the *architectural work* seem to be the task of the art historian.

Notes

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[1] One may suggest that there are differences between *Truth and Method* and *The Relevance of the Beautiful* in relation to the ideas about the shareability of artworks. And this difference comes to the fore in the second chapter.

[2] The standards of achievement within any domain of human production -e.g., architecture, is rather a vague term, however it indicates the critical value of tradition at least where some interpretations fail to penetrate into the specific object under discussion.

[3] It should be mentioned that both Watkin and Scruton discuss certain attitudes in architectural theory and history writing without specifically dealing with actual architectural practices. And, their understanding of architectural tradition is not shared by the author of this study; since their concern seems to be a distinct "style", rather than evaluating architectural tradition in its full richness, which comes to the fore in their "moralizing" judgments on the architectural practice of twentieth century. However, both studies are valuable apart form this implicit concern in that their criticism focuses on the insufficiency and arbitrariness of justifying architectural practice with reasons derived from other domains of cultural studies.

[4] Duve (1996) and Wolff (1983) discuss such an understanding of continuity in artistic tradition and criticize it as *essentialist*.

[5] That there may be a generic sense of taste beyond preferences for specific contents will be discussed in the second chapter. See also in section 2.3.4. Podro's comment in Kant's judgment of taste.

[6] Gombrich uses this phrase: "one's attuning oneself to different historical styles". Gombrich, E. H., Art and Illusion, Pantheon Books, 1961: 62.

[7] This seems to be related to a misunderstanding of Kant's idea for the judgments of taste. See also Danto's argument in section 2.4.2.

[8] The term style is used here as to indicate particular "ways" of making architecture and using particular architectural forms.

[9] Here the term iconographical is used in terms given by Panofsky, see section 3.1.

[10] See the last chapter. Susan Sontag makes use of these terms in a significant way in *Against Interprtation*, (1964)

[11] Italics belong to this study.

CHAPTER II

EXPERIENCING ARTWORKS

2.1. An Idea of Architectural Experience

Scruton (1979) describes architectural experience in terms of an aesthetic interest and explains that "to take an aesthetic interest in a building is to attend to it in all its completeness, to see it, not in terms of narrow or pre-determined functions, but in terms of every visual significance that it will bear" (206). And he suggests that the aesthetic considerations have a central place in one's interest in architecture; hence, for him, the architectural experience lies on the grounds of an imaginative attention. Moreover, he underlines the importance of this immediate imaginative attention in that it constitutes the pre-condition for the transformation of the architectural experience into a symbol of *deeper* values. And this transformation seems to be where the notion of meaning that accompanies the architectural experience comes into question. He explains that the act of imaginative attention which underlies the architectural experience belongs to an active state of mind (70-77). This imaginative concentration might be understood as the construction of the *architectural object* as the instance of communication. A characteristic feature of this imaginative heed, Scruton maintains, is that it is creative and free in a way that literal perception is not. Hence he suggests "it can impose unity and order on its object when the literal mind would see nothing but disjointedness and chaos" (1979:103).

Likewise Cassirer foregrounds this imaginative attention in the experience of the works of art:

> "In ordinary experience we connect phenomena according to the category of causality or finality. Accordingly as we are interested in the theoretical reasons or practical effect of things, we think of them as causes or as means. Thus we habitually lose sight of their immediate appearance until we can no longer see them face to face. Art, on the other hand, teaches us to visualize, not merely to conceptualize or utilize things. Art gives us a richer, more vivid and colorful image of reality." (1944:170)

Scruton also underlines that "once we abstract from day-to-day perception and enter the world of imagination, our experience ceases to obey normal theoretical and practical strictures; it is neither an instrument of knowledge nor a premise to action" (1979:102). This imaginative ordering of experience can be understood in relation to a sense of openness to the *architectural object* in its full richness which requires a certain labor of observation. Hence, one might suggest that the meaning immanent to the architectural experience demands a constructive participation of the beholder. And it betrays a characteristic active state of mind. Scruton suggests that like all imaginative experience, architectural experience is transformed into a *sign* of deeper values that reflect the workings of human consciousness. In this sense, he asserts that there is an inherent tendency in the architectural experience, as in all aesthetic experience, to transcend the immediate imaginative attention, to proceed a reasoned reflection on the nature and the significance of any architectural choice. This is where the experience is elevated to a status of 'symbol' by the incorporation of further intellectual influences. Scruton gives an example from Wittgenstein:

> "Imagine that a man wishes to build a door and that he stands back while another traces its possible outline against a wall. His response will be "Too high! Too low! Now that's right!" This is a primitive example of aesthetic choice, unmediated by extraneous reflections, a choice which is wholly abstract and divorced from even ideas of meaning and expression. We suppose that the demands of utility are already satisfied: a choice still remains to be made among indefinitely many forms. It can be explained, perhaps, but it has, initially at least, no further basis."(1979:201)

Thus, one may suggest that the meaning in the experience lies on the grounds of the human significance that the object bears in relation to its formation. And the *architectural object* becomes the expression of the choices derived from the processes of aesthetic reflection which has its roots in the whole meanings of the consciousness that produced it. Hence the human significance which is explored by the object of the experience, locates itself into the center of the act of the imaginative attention. And it might be referred as the immanent meaning disclosed in the architectural experience. Scruton draws a parallel between the grasping of an aesthetical significance and the comprehension of the expression on a face or of a gesture. In relation to Michelangelo's Medici Chapel, he suggests that "characteristic of expression is the presence of 'reference' without predication: sadness is expressed by the sculpture but nothing is sad about sadness; eternity is made present in Michelangelo's brooding figures, but it is not described there" (1979:187). Thus, he emphasizes that "we regard the building as 'imbued with character', and this 'character' is not only immediate -part of the way the building looks- but observable in principle by every one."(1979:196) One may suggest that this is a 'poetic grasp' -i.e., an immediate recognition of an aesthetic character. And it brings forth a life situation via the *architectural object* into which the life experience is transformed. Thus Scruton, in relation to a Romanesque cloister, suggests: "a certain idea of monasticism becomes a visible reality: the idea is not merely a personal association occasioned by some anectodal or historical reminiscence: we *see* in the details of the building" (1979:109). Likewise, Lefebvre in his discussion of 'monumental space' (1991:220-226) underlines an intimation of a 'horizon' of meaning within the architectural experience whereby a social reality is transmuted into appearance that is experienced. Gadamer seems to foreground this dimension of the architectural experience (1960:156) while suggesting that the problems posed by the original context of purpose and life, even when the building is completely alienated

from its context and lives in a different physical and social environment, endures to 'speak'. He asserts "something in it points back to the original." (1960:156)

In a similar manner, Scruton (1979) discusses an awareness of the historical and social situation in understanding a work of architecture. And, like Gombrich's demand of an awareness of the situation in art itself which is mentioned above, he suggests that the ideas in relation to the contextual circumstances should find detailed correspondences in the architectural experience: "historical understanding can transform our experience but one cannot arrive mechanically at historical significance simply by throwing to object its original context" (1979:123). He asserts that this interpretation is a critical achievement via deriving significances that "penetrates down into the smallest detail of architectural understanding" (1979:123). One may mention his interpretation of Borromini's Oratory in Rome:

> "the Oratory was designed to house one of the most vital institutions of the late Counter-Reformation, and to give expression to its remarkable combination of civilized self confidence and spiritual humility. It is important to see in these forms the balance of competing claims, of worldly competence and spiritual grace. Now the language of Borromini, while it speaks to us outwardly in definite and self-confident accents, embraces, too, a powerful subjectivity of outlook. It is not absurd to see in this a correlate of the earlier Counter-Reformation attempts to reconcile the outward show of the church with the raise of an inner conscience, and certainly not absurd to see that spirit in a building dedicated to the order of St Philip Neri. When we understand this wrestling and reconciling between outer and inner we see just how significant is the visual achievement of the Oratory. Here we find a perfect marriage between the inventive and flexible exterior, in which elegant variety is presented at the same time a species of unassuming simplicity, and a quiet ponderous quality within, in those parts designed for the contemplative life of the Filipini."(1979:120)

And one may suggest that his publishing of photographs from different sections of the building is an interpretation at the level of the *architectural object* where he aims to confirm his explanations about the architectural work and intends to show *how* a life situation is experienced via the play of architectural forms (figure.1). Hence this act might be understood

as an interpretation that intends to regulate an experience that leads to an understanding and appreciation of the building -i.e., a 'revealing' of the immanent logic of the *architectural object*. It might be understood as a communication.

Hence one may suggest that a human mediation becomes visible in the architectural forms; an idea is traced in its becoming architecture via the interplay of space, materials and forms. And one may claim that the 'artwork in itself', which is mentioned above, lies in this becoming architecture. That is, not only the particular idea or the world view that finds embodiment in the *architectural object*, but also its unique embodiment, transformation into architectural form seems to be one of the constituents of the human significance that move one in the architectural experience. Since it brings forth the workings of the human mind and the sensitivity that leaves its traces between the articulated and the articulation. Thus, one may suggest that aesthetic judgment belongs to this dimension of communication. And this may not preclude the condition of the continuity between aesthetic judgments and theoretical or moral-practical ones. Since one may claim that to 'grasp' something into a purposiveness and to evaluate this purposiveness on another ground may be different. That is, apprehending some purposiveness as some human experience, however much dim it may be, belongs to a level of aesthetic communication where the manifold is not immediately ordered into a known significance and judged accordingly -e.g., as in the ordinary use of language, but pondered upon in its individuality -e.g., as in the case of poetry where one has to re-enact the unique formal articulation in order to have an access to the significance it bears; and one may suggest that to evaluate this human experience within one's moral-practical or theoretical orientations belongs to a different order of judgment. And this seems to be where the Kantian principle of disinterestedness of the judgment of taste lies.



Figure.1: Examples form Scruton's interpretation of Borromini's Oratory at the level of the *architectural object*.

2.1. Taste and Aesthetical Ideas

Kant explains that the judgment of taste belongs to a separate faculty of distinction, by which the imagination refers to the representation of an object in the subject and its feeling of pleasure or pain. Thus the judgment of taste is aesthetical and it is different than any logical judgment of cognition where the presentation is referred to the object. He underlines that it adds nothing to the cognition, but compares the given representation in the subject with the whole faculty of representations, of which the mind is conscious in the feeling of its state. For him, the difference between aesthetical and logical judgments lies in the fact that the presentation is referred to the subject and to its feeling of life in the first case, whereas it is referred to the object in the second. (1790:41-42)

Defining 'interest' as the satisfaction combined with the representation of the existence of an object (42), Kant makes clear that the satisfaction determining the judgment of taste is disinterested since it is not related to the existence of the object but to the representation of it within one's self (42-44). On the other hand, the satisfactions in the pleasant and in the good are explained as something bound up with interest. The pleasantness is the feeling by which the object is considered as an object of satisfaction, and it belongs to a mere subjective sensation (45). For Kant, this subjective sensation can not constitute any representation of the object and it is not available for any cognition. He emphasizes that the pleasant, as a judgment about an object expresses an interest in it (45), which is due to the relation of one's state to the existence of the object. Also Kant uses the word 'gratification' for the effect of the object where the impressions of sense determine an inclination in the subject (44-45). Similarly, the good, that is which pleases through mere concept by means of reason, expresses a satisfaction in the presence of the object, thus involves a kind of interest. The good is an object of will

(48), which is brought by the concept of a purpose under the principles of reason (46-48). On the other hand, Kant distinguishes the judgment of taste as being merely contemplative (48). This contemplation is not directed to concepts nor has its concepts as its purpose, since, for Kant the judgment of taste is not a cognitive judgment (49). He states that the impressions of sense which determine the inclination, the fundamental propositions of reason which determine the will and mere reflective forms of intuition which determine the judgment are quite the same as regards the effect upon the feeling of pleasure. But they are distinguished from each other in reference to the pleasant, the good and the beautiful respectively which designate three different relations of representations to the feeling of pleasure and pain(48-50).

The judgments corresponding to the pleasant and the beautiful are both aesthetical, but Kant discriminates between these two judgments, respectively *the taste of sense* and *the taste of reflection*, in relation to their communicability (54). He clarifies that the taste of sense rests upon private feeling and is limited to mere sensations of a subject, whereas the taste of reflection claims a universal validity, yet without depending on a concept, which for him is the case in a judgment of cognition. Moreover, this universality is due to the universal validity of the reference of representation to the feeling of pleasure and pain for every subject, thus it is subjective. Yet, the judgment of taste does not postulate the agreement of everyone, since this is only valid for a logical universal judgment where the universality is due to a concept of the object which employs reason as its determining ground. Kant makes clear that the universality of the judgment of taste can not be proved by reasons and that it is an idea, which relies on the notion of a promised agreement of everyone (53-57). This is comprehensible since the taste of reflection is explained to be merely disinterested, without any contamination of inclination or will and one can rightly impute his judgment to everyone, for it does not involve any satisfaction in relation to the existence of the object but it is a pure judgment of the

representation compared to the whole faculty of representations in himself.

Kant also diagnoses that the universal character of the judgment of taste is through the universal communicability of the mental state, since for him, nothing can be universally communicated except cognition, and representation which belongs to cognition as well. This, on the other hand, also explains the particularity of the taste of sense for everyone, where the feeling of pleasure or pain is occasioned by the immediate sensation which is not available for any cognitive power at all. For Kant, the state of mind in relation to a given representation is the determining ground of the universality of the taste of reflection. Because, this state of mind involves cognitive powers and for Kant cognition is the only kind of representation which is valid for everyone. Yet the judgment of taste has nothing to do with any judgment of cognition, since the cognitive faculties are in a free play without the determination of a definite concept, consequently without a definite rule of cognition. Therefore, the consciousness of this state is an internal sensation of the effect, of the free play of imagination and understanding, on the mind. Thus, it is aesthetical but not intellectual, which would be the case if the given representation in the judgment of taste were a concept uniting understanding and imagination into a cognition of the object (57-60). Cassirer interprets the role of understanding in this relation of free play as fixing the movement of imagination and extracting from it some closed form without abstractions of habitual ways of thinking (1918:313,327).

Explaining the purpose as the relation of a concept to an object, where the object as an effect is only possible by means of the concept, Kant underlines the relationship of the feeling of pleasure and pain to the notion of purposiveness (61-62). He defines pleasure as the consciousness of the causality of a representation, where the representation of the effect provides the determining ground of its cause. For Kant, a definite representation of a purpose

is not the only condition for an object to be called purposive. An object, a state of mind or even an action can be purposive without purpose; when one can not place the cause in a definite concept, but can only make explanations of its possibility intelligible by reflection. In that sense, the judgment of taste is a reflective judgment, for it is related to a purposiveness according to form, which without being based on a purpose is remarked in the object only by reflection. Thus it has nothing to do with any concept of internal or external possibility of the object by means of any cause (61-63).

Another important point, as Kant explains, is that the consciousness of the formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers in a representation is the pleasure itself, which is an inner causality without being limited to any cognition. Moreover, this pleasure is contemplative, but not practical like the one arising from pathological ground of pleasantness or the other from the intellectual ground of the presented good. Therefore, the contemplation of the beautiful strengthens and reproduces itself, whilst the condition may be that of consumption in the case of the pleasant and the good. Here it seems important to notice Kant's differentiation between the pleasure in ordering a manifold into some purposiveness and the pleasure in relation to the ordered itself (Podro:1972:21,32)

For Kant, beauty has a necessary reference to satisfaction and this is different from a theoretical objective necessity which suggests the *a priori* cognition that everyone will feel the satisfaction, or from a practical necessity which is the result of an objective law that initiates a pure rational will serving as a rule for freely acting beings (81). The necessity in an aesthetical judgment can only be exemplary that is considered as an example of a universal law which one can not state, since the judgment of taste requires the agreement of everyone and it relies on a subjective principle. Kant points out that this subjective principle can only be a *common*

sense, which is essentially different from *common understanding* (82). The difference between the two terms lies in the fact that the latter does not judge by feeling but by concepts (83). Kant analyses the ground for a common sense deriving from the universal communicability of human knowledge, as follows: he emphasizes that the state of mind as the subjective condition of cognition is communicable, since cognitions themselves are communicable and they are not possible as an effect without this subjective condition, the universal communicability of the state of mind as a subjective condition provides the universal validity of the judgment of taste, because it is also related to the internal relations of the cognitive powers. Moreover, its universal validity is only comprehensible through this internal play of the cognitive faculties for it does not rely on the grounds of definite concepts; the lack of any definite concepts in the judgment of taste leads to the conclusion that one can only be conscious of this free play of imagination and understanding as an effect on his mind by a feeling of it; since the universal communication of a feeling presupposes a common sense, one can infer that there is a ground for assuming the latter (83-84). He also adds that this indeterminate norm of a common sense is mere an ideal norm under the supposition of which one has right to claim for the agreement of everyone. And under such a presupposition of a common sense, the subjective necessity of the universal agreement in the judgment of taste can be represented as an objective necessity (151).

On the other hand , Kant introduces his notion of genius as the capacity that gives its rule to the artwork. It might be suggested that, rather than referring a personality, genius may be understood as to indicate the exemplary significance in the work of art which bears its *formula* in itself. Kant underlines that every artwork is in need of rules, however this indicates a state of purposiveness which cannot be subsumed under a definite concept (167). And here the relation between taste and genius comes to the fore. Kant underlines their complementarity

and emphasizes taste as the necessary judging capacity for the productions of genius (172). Since taste refers to the communicative dimension; Kant maintains the notion of the beautiful representation of a thing as the form of the representation of a concept by means of which the latter is communicated universally (175). And he makes a significant remark on the work of the artist by suggesting that taste is requisite to give form to an artwork in order to represent an idea adequately:

> "By taste the artist estimates his work after he has exercised and corrected it by manifold examples from art or nature, and after many, often toilsome, attempts to content himself he finds that form which satisfies him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a thing of inspiration or the result of a free swing of the mental powers, but of a slow and even painful process of improvement, by which he seeks to render it adequate to his thought, without detriment to the freedom of the play of his powers." (175)

As Kant underlines that the form of the object, the mode of its representation is the only vehicle of communication, he asserts that taste is not a productive capacity but a judging one (174-175). This point seems to be of extreme importance, since his argued formalism seems to be a necessary concern about the communicative mode of artworks. And to understand this concern as indicating art "as the realm of non-purposive creation and disinterested pleasure" (Burger:1984:42) seems to be reductive. For it seems to overlook the standpoint of aesthetical ideas as Kant introduces it: "and by aesthetical idea I understand that representation of the imagination which occasions much thought without however any definite thought, i.e. any concept, being capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and made intelligible by language" (176). An aesthetical idea, for Kant, is a production of imagination where it presents an idea beyond the bounds of experience (176). Hence it might be understood as an intensive, vivid representation which makes an idea available to intuition in its full richness which may not be possible in conventional ways of expression. Moreover this is not an arbitrary representation for its own sake. Because Kant

underlines that imagination, while aesthetically enlarging a concept in an unbounded fashion, brings reason into play and this irreducible representation "expresses the consequences bound up with the concept and its relations to other concepts (177)"; while it occasions much thought to be comprehended within a concept, it remains "yet purposive in reference to the presentment of the given concept" (180). And one may suggest that the cognitive import of aesthetical ideas comes to the fore in Kant's concern with poetry:

> "The poet ventures to realize to sense, rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, hell, eternity, creation, etc.; or even if he deals with things of which there are examples in experience -e.g. death, envy and all vices, also love, fame, and the like- he tries, by means of imagination, which emulates the play of reason in its quest after a maximum, to go beyond the limits of experience and to present them to sense with a completeness of which there is no example in nature. This is properly speaking the art of the poet, in which the faculty of aesthetical ideas can manifest itself in its entire strength." (176)

And it seems important to mention that Kant devotes poetry the first rank among arts according to "aesthetical worth" (191-196) which seems to indicate that his understanding of art is far beyond a "gratification for the eye.[1]" Also Kant's standpoint of taste as the communicative instance in relation to artworks seems to underline his concern for art's import within the society:

> "Taste, like the judgment in general, is the discipline of genius; it clips its wings it makes it cultured and polished; but, at the same time, it gives guidance as to where and how far it may extend itself if it is to remain purposive. And while it brings clearness and order into the multitude of thoughts [of genius], it makes the ideas susceptible of being permanently and, at the same time, universally assented to, and capable of being followed by others, and of an ever progressive culture. If, then, in the conflict of these two properties in a product something sacrificed, it should be rather on the side of genius; and the judgment, which in the things of the beautiful art gives its decision from its own proper principles, will rather sacrifice the freedom an the wealth of the imagination than permit anything prejudical to the understanding." (183)

2.3. An Evaluation: Aesthetic Non-differentiation

2.3.1. Aesthetic Non-differentiation as Formal Abstraction

Gadamer in *Truth and Method* (1960), uses the notion of aesthetic-differentiation, hence aesthetic consciousness, in two senses, which one thinks, are not consequential. In one sense he seems to indicate an awareness of the relation between the representation and the represented and this conception will be discussed in section 2.4.1. In another sense he uses the term to indicate what may be called 'formal abstraction'; that is, an abstraction of the formal qualities of a representation which tends to evaluate 'form' in itself as it were a separate element, unrelated to the 'content' of the representation (1960:85-87). Here, aesthetic consciousness is understood as an intention of appreciating the sensuous qualities of an artwork irrespective of the historical human significance embedded in it. And this notion of aesthetic consciousness is related to the experience of art as *Erlebnis* (1960:61-70) which is introduced as a mere subjective experience regardless of the artwork's intention. Hence Gadamer distinguishes this kind of an experience as free and arbitrary. This insight pertains to the idea that the experience of artworks is a unique mediation whereby knowledge is conveyed; and an understanding of this experience as a mere subjective response overlooks the cognitive dimension within one's encounter with art. Thus, Gadamer refers to Kierkegaard's criticism of aesthetic consciousness from the standpoint of the moralist and suggests that the discontinuity and immediacy of aesthetic experience should be returned back to one's whole life, like an adventure to be dissolved into the continuity of one's whole meanings (95). And he points out that the genuine experience of art is an *Erfahrung* which "is a mode of knowledge of a unique kind, certainly different from that sensory knowledge which provides science with the ultimate data from which it constructs the knowledge of nature, and certainly different from all moral

rational knowledge, and indeed from all conceptual knowledge-but still knowledge, i.e., conveying truth" (1960:98)

But one should point out that within the frame of *Truth and Method* (1960), Gadamer seems to pursue the continuity of meaning between artworks and their 'world' through particular representational contents or functions which are embedded in the life of a society -i.e., like religious or moral themes which are endowed with meanings binding for the society. And, moreover, he claims that when these contents or functions are left apart, one has no access to works. Thus he suggests:

> "Aesthetic experience is directed to towards what is supposed to be the work proper -what it ignores are the extra aesthetic elements that cling to it, such as purpose, function, the significance of its content. These elements may be significant enough inasmuch as they situate the work in its world and thus determine the whole meaningfulness that it originally possessed. But as art the work must be distinguished from all that. It practically defines aesthetic consciousness to say that it differentiates what is aesthetically intended from everything that is outside the aesthetic sphere. It abstracts from all the conditions of a work's accessibility." (1960:85)

On the other hand, in reference to Lukacs, Gadamer states that "the work of art is only an empty form, a mere nodal point in the possible variety of aesthetic experiences, and the aesthetic object exists in these experiences alone; as is evident, absolute discontinuity -i.e., the disintegration of the unity of the aesthetic object into the multiplicity of experiences- is the necessary consequence of an aesthetics of Erlebnis" (1960:95). And he claims that this kind of an approach to art destroys not only the unity of the artwork, but also "the identity of the artist with himself" (1960:95). However, one may suggest that the emphasis on the dimension of the specific representational contents for one's approach to artworks turns out to be an overemphasis on the binding meanings for art's import of the society. That is, an argument about the nature of the experience of artworks extends into the practice of the artist. Hence, it

seems to be in a risk of being reductive. Gadamer's debate, thereby, one may claim, comes closer to what Bernstein (1992:1-16) explains as the discussion of the 'alienation' of modern art: "although the history of art up to modern age appears to licence the claim of art's cognitive potential (for example, religious art re-presenting the truth of Christian metaphysics), the modern experience of art does not; on the contrary, modern experience of art, it is argued, is precisely the experience of art as cut off and seperated from truth, as silenced, as dirempted from all that would give it significance" (1992:4) Hence, Gadamer emphasizes the true meaning of an image as that it emerges in relation to the significance it has for the community, like that of a representation in a religious rite (1960:116); and the genuine experience of such an image is understood by him as a participation in the "redemptive event itself" (1960:128). Hence he claims: "it is not accidental that religious concepts come to mind when one is defending the special ontological status of works of fine art against aesthetic leveling" (1960:150). Moreover, he also characterizes 'modern framed picture' as placeless -i.e., that it bears no relations to its 'world': "thus we make every work of art, as it were, into a picture; by detaching all art from its connections with life and the particular conditions of our approach to it, we frame it like a picture and hang it up" (1960:135). For Gadamer, artwork loses its world via aesthetic differentiation and correlatively, "the artist too loses his place in the world" (1960:87).

One should point out that Gadamer's line of argument proceeds from a content-oriented approach to taste, which also determines the kernel of his criticism of Kant's (1790) discrimination between constitutive and regulative judgments. This criticism will be mentioned in section 2.3.2, but before, one may refer to Gadamer's understanding of taste which seems to cast light on his discussion of aesthetic differentiation as 'formal fallacy'. He claims that while certain contents are appropriate to be depicted in works of art, some are not (1960:150). He

also suggests that:

> "The unity of an ideal of taste that distinguishes a society and bonds its members together differs from which constitutes the figure of aesthetic culture. Taste still obeys a criterion of content. What is considered valid in a society, its ruling taste, receives its stamp from the commonalities of social life. Such a society chooses and knows what belongs to it and what does not. Even its artistic interests are not arbitrary or in principal universal, but what artists create and what the society values belong together in the unity of a style of life and an ideal of taste." (1960:84)

In another occasion he claims:

> "I shall leave to one side the question whether the 'sense of quality' in relation to a work of art represents an independent possibility of knowledge, or whether, like all taste, it is not only formally developed but cultivated and shaped. Taste, at any rate, is necessarily cultivated by things that indicate what it is cultivated for. In this regard, it includes, perhaps always, preferences for and barriers to specific types of content." (1960:xxx)

While Gadamer plausibly suggests that it is the elements of content that induce one to take up a moral or religious stance towards the artwork (1960:85), he seems to conceive this as the sole possibility of one's relation to artworks. However, within such a frame, the question of how one can penetrate into the so-called non-representational art seems to be unanswered. One may argue that to understand taste as a formally developed capacity does not preclude its cultivation for particular contents, but a content oriented approach seems to be restrictive in that it reduces taste to a judging capacity that operates on the basis of familiarity to particular contents. And one may suggest that it seems more fruitful to understand taste as a formal discriminative capacity to which belongs the capability of finding adequate expressive means for an idea and of communicating with which speaks thus, no matter how *alien* the specific content may be. And one may also suggest that the 'sense of quality' belongs to this *genuine* communication above and beyond any preference for particular meanings. On the other hand, the problem of isolation of the aesthetic experience and its integration to the whole of life

seems to be discussed from the opposite extreme of the notion of 'formal fallacy' -i.e., from the stand point of binding contents, known significances- and this seems to be what makes Gadamer's account of modern art, within the frame of *Truth and Method* [2] (1960), *biased.* Moreover, in this specific use, the term aesthetic differentiation does not seem to refer to Kant's judgment of taste; rather the criticism entailed within this sense of the term may only be directed to judgment of sense, which, as outlined in section 2.2, has no binding condition. It is merely subjective since it has no relation to cognitive capacities. However, taste itself might be understood as binding beyond specific contents, since it is the communicative dimension, and may not be an object of the discussion of content. Because as Kant introduces it, it is not a productive but only a judging capacity. It judges in relation to the representation itself before a judgment on the particularity of what is represented. This seems to be where the principle of purposiveness without a purpose is operative via which one's judgment penetrates into the cohesiveness of an artwork even before any known significance to regulate the experience.

2.3.2. An Idea of Experience and Meaning

In *Truth and Method* (1960), Gadamer's position entails a criticism of what he calls aesthetic consciousness which, for him, does not realize the cognitive potential of the experience of art. Because he emphasizes that such consciousness is already based upon a restrictive understanding of knowledge which stems from the scientific conception of *truth*. Hence, his criticism of Kant's standpoint in *Critique of Judgment* (1790) is directed to the discrimination between constitutive and reflective judgments; where in the constitutive judgments -i.e., theoretical and moral practical- the particular is subsumed under universal concepts while in the judgment of taste, which is explained as reflective, there is no *a priori* universal under which the experiential manifold is evaluated. Gadamer states that Kant's doctrine of

schematism and principles maintains no relation to the notions of common sense and taste and limits them to aesthetic judgments. His point is that knowledge cannot be restricted to fixed principles. Hence, he understands taste as a special way of knowing:

> "This kind of sense is obviously needed wherever a whole is intended but not given as a whole- that is, conceived in purposive concepts. Thus taste is in no way limited to what is beautiful in nature and art, judging it in respect to its decorative quality, but embraces the whole realm of morality and manners. Even moral concepts are never given as a whole or determined in a normatively univocal way. Rather, the ordering of life by the rules of law and morality is incomplete and needs productive supplementation. Judgment is necessary in order to make a correct evaluation of the concrete instance." (1960:38)

That is, Gadamer suggests that judgment is always both reflective and determinative in that one seeks the universal within the particular concrete instance where also the universal is gained a new dimension through the particular. Hence it is not a mere subsumption under a determinate universal, but also a living interaction with the concrete individual. Thus, Gadamer's content-oriented approach to taste may be explained as indicating this process of evolution of human knowledge on the grounds of common orientations to world and life whereby universals, which are handed down by effective traditions, are not mere pregivens but always in constant formation through the reciprocal relations with the new individual cases. And this course is underlined by Gadamer as the basic concept formation in language. He states that the preestablished verbal meanings are in constant formation via new experiences whereby the life of a language evolves through the enrichment of these meanings (1960:428-429). He also emphasizes the metaphoricity of language which points to the difference between the processes of concept formation in language and in science (1960:428-435). Gadamer's concern, one may suggest, is to foreground that living language of a society is already an evolving body of knowledge on which, only secondarily, and via an abstraction, science operates -i.e., to free the notion of human knowledge from its scientific conceptions.

He suggests that concept formation in language, different from that in science, follows 'human aspect' of things, man's needs and interests; and consequently he highlights that: "what a linguistic community regards as important about a thing can be given the same name as other things that are perhaps of a quite different nature in other respects, so long as they all have the same quality that is important to community" (1960:436) Hence, Gadamer's concern for art and the experience of artworks is also centered around the same intent of criticising the scientific conception of knowledge which also ignores the cognitive potential of the artistic experience. However, one may claim that, while recuperating the idea that experiencing artworks is a medium of knowledge, Gadamer's content-oriented approach to taste in *Truth and Method* (1960), still, seems to raise questions about the nature of one's encounter with art. Because, as deliniated above, his model overlooks the communicative dimension of taste beyond shared subject-matters -i.e., taste's potential, when understood as a cognitive capacity beyond its cultivation for particular communal orientations, to penetrate, even without any universal to be looked for, into some self-contained purposiveness. And one may suggest that taste, as scrutinized by Kant (1790), seems to be operative in this sense in the domain of art. Moreover, Gadamer's extension of the notion of taste to other domains of knowledge in order to explore and explain the untenability of the differentiation between determinative and reflective judgments, one may suggest, does not necessarily imply this content-oriented understanding of taste in art. One of the reasons for this suggestion is that while Gadamer's model indicates that understanding artworks bears, as its possibility, the same hermeneutical conditions as those involved in understanding -e.g., a legal text, one cannot specify, in this model, the *difference* between one's approach to a historical report of a legal instance and -e.g., a poem. Even when one admits that the one and the same 'reason' [3] is operative in both cases, in order to go beyond the differentiation of cognitive capacities on transcendental

grounds as one has with Kant, one might claim that there may be *differences* between one's approach to artworks and documents from other traditions. Hence, aesthetic experience still seems to be a valid notion to be explored in relation to this difference. Because, one may claim, it prevents not only the experience of artworks from a subordination to experiencing of shared subject-matters on the basis of common practical-moral orientations, but also the practice of the artist from a submission to communal interests, in order to be 'understood'. Because one may suggest that artworks are able to bridge the communicative gap themselves even in the case of a most bizarre and unfamiliar theme; and this seems to find a plausible explanation in Kant's exegesis of taste as a judging capacity to penetrate into some purposiveness even when there is no guiding principle available beforehand -i.e., a self-contained finality with no relation to outside itself. One should point out that this insight into art seems to be recovered by Gadamer in a plausible way in his notions of "play" and "transformation into structure"; however, as will be mentioned below in 2.4.1, in his scheme of discussion, the artist's mediation seems not to come to the fore.

Cassirer (1918, 1957:11-15) also repudiates Kant's discrimination between constituive and regulative judgments. And he claims that already in *Critique of Judgment*, the schematizm[4] of *Critique of Pure Reason* has been altered by Kant himself:

> "We *discover* in nature what we call the affinity of species and of natural forms only because we are constrained by a principle of our power of judgment to *seek* it in nature. This shows, of course, that the relation between principle of knowledge and object has altered if we compare this example with the established by analytic of pure understanding. Whereas the pure understanding was revealed to be "legislator for nature" because of the demonstration that it contains the conditions of the possibility of its object, here reason approaches empirical material not as if commanding but as if questioning and inquiring; thus the relation is not constitutive, but regulative, not determinative but reflective. For in this case the particular is not deduced from the universal so as to specify its nature, but the attempt is to discover in the particular itself, by successive considerations of the relations it bears within itself, and the similarities and differences which its individual parts show with respect to one another, a

> connection that can be expressed in ever more comprehensive concepts and rules." (1918:293)

On the other hand, he also repudiates the scientific world view as the sole ground of knowledge and claims that other than the scientific, man is also capable of creating 'worlds' different in character and meaning the knowledge of which evolves in various 'symbolic forms' (1957:11-15). Moreover, Cassirer also emphasizes that scientific traditon itself is open to shifts in frames of mind; that is, it is not evolving on ever-fixed grounds. As mentioned above, this insight, despite Gadamer's criticism [5], seems to be important since it has the potential to prevent the specificity of different traditions. One is aware that Cassirer introduces his 'symbolic forms' not as traditions, but as modes of formal construction, as spheres of possibility (1960:22). However, one may suggest that his understanding does not hinder the possibility of treating traditions as he treated his symbolic forms. For even when one leaves out the problem of unique modes of formal construction, hence Cassirer's particular classification of language, myth, religion, art and science as symbolic forms, his insight that man should not be reduced to a single essence but should be understood in his diverse orientations (1944,1953) seems to be important for the distinctiveness of various traditions. That is, when one understands different traditions as evolutionary bodies of different human activities whereby diverse human experiences as the outcome of distinct orientations accumulate in their seperate domains, one seems to have a room for a suggestion that there are differences between -e.g., the sense of law, or moral sense, or a 'sense of art', and it may not be the same thing to treat a poem as a poem or as a moral statement within one's moral-practical orientations. And it might be that the 'intuitive seed', in Cassirer's terms, seems to differ among distinct traditions. The term is used by Cassirer to explain Kant's notion of purposiveness (1918:288). It denotes a unity of principles underlying an accumulative whole, where it is unlimited but controllable and surveyable in its regulation of the system and open

to ever richer findings; and also each new fresh step expands the previous content of knowledge. One may suggest that each tradition might be understood as having such an 'intuitive universal' at its base, not as something fixed but as a 'seed' in constant formation which defines itself anew with the particular instances. And one may claim that Gadamer's account of content-oriented taste seems to have its full legitimation here. Since as he underlines, the element of tradition, which might be considered as handing down a sense for the universal to order a manifold, operates as an enabling prejudice in understanding works of culture; that is, it enables the anticipation of meaning which initiates a dialogue with a given work (1960:293). And tradition, while it is the condition of access to a work, is also produced anew by the mutual relation between the interpreter and the work. Hence, one may suggest, in Gadamer's account, tradition provides the guiding principle for taste -i.e., 'what to look for' within a particular instance. And this also has its correspondance in taste's cultivation for particular contents. But one may claim that this principle of operation may not be the sole performance of taste. Since even if the term has as one of its meanings 'a sense for the appropriate', it seems not to fill in the notion of appropriateness; that is, -e.g., juristic and moral sense, while functionally bear the same conditions of handling an individual instance, may differ in their viewpoints from which they organize the manifold into some "appropriateness". They might be understood as differing in relation to their 'intuitive seeds'.

On the other hand, Gadamer refers to Aristotle's model of moral knowledge. It is underlined as the knowledge of the particular situation through an aquired sense of rightness, -i.e., through the guiding principle of what is right. And he also foregrounds that here experience and knowledge are inseperable: "for moral knowledge contains a kind of experience in itself" (1960:322) The idea seems to be that the experience is determined in relation to the universal to be sought for. Hence, the experience, one may suggest, is endowed with meaning via this

act of understanding a particular instance under a guiding principle. And, accordingly, one may claim that traditions might be understood as bearing their own conventions of meaning, as saturated channels for the expression of human experience. Since it might be suggested that they are the domains whereby man orders and accumulates his experience of world and life via different orientations. Similarly Cassirer underlines that the formation of meaning is effective even in perception; that is, experience is worked out by a meaning giving function which he calls "symbolic pregnancy within perception"(1954:94,1957:193-197) When one leaves out the definite principles of articulation and formation (1957:299), his insight into the interlacement of experience and meaning might be understood as indicating the constant concept formation within a tradition whereby the 'seed' gains new significances through the encounters with the new individual cases. Cassirer suggests that there is no one single line of signification for a given individual instance, but any sensuous manifold can take on diverse meanings via different acts of subsumption under varying orientations (1957:200). Hence, even when one repudiates the fixed structural principles, as fields of possibilities, operative within the perception as meaning giving functions, it might still be the case that the determinateness of the experience under the guiding principles -e.g., the sense of rightness- handed down by the effective traditions that Gadamer underlines in the concept formation process in language seem to indicate a similar condensation of meaning around these traditions. One is aware that Gadamer introduces his understanding of language to indicate its open 'horizon', to free language from its supposed conventionalism and schematism (1960:549). However, one may claim that the freedom of the concept formation process within the living life of a language may not itself provide an adequate account of the exemplary meaning disclosed in the encounter with art. His model of the interwovenness of meaning and experience is as follows: he suggests that knowledge rests on the grounds of the regularity of

the experience where the questions of science as to the reasons of the regular occurrences only secondarily operate. And Gadamer explains that a new experience means that the old one is not confirmed, hence both one's knowledge and the object itself has changed. However, "the new object contains the truth about the old one", that is what is not eliminated through the new experience survives. And here the concept formation continues upon the previous conception of a universal (1960:350-352) even if the universal has gained a new significance and direction through the new instance. Thus, this explains the role of the effective traditions in understanding as they provide the previous experiences and whereby they are produced anew through the successive acts of understanding. And it seems that there is always the determinateness by a universal in the production of knowledge, and there seems to be no room for the 'singular', exemplary meaning in art within this model of content-oriented approach to taste. This determinateness may not be under *a priori* universals as in Kant, and may not be within definite structural domains of articulation as in Cassirer, but in any case it indicates a determination under some sort of universal handed down from previous experiences condensed around traditions as channels of knowledge resulting from common orientations and Gadamer seems to leave no room for the formal principle of purposiveness without a purpose operative in Kant's idea of judgment of taste (1790) which, one may claim, secures the cognitive potential of the experience of the work of art as being the binding communicative condition beyond common meanings and known significances. The particularity of experience, on the other hand, Gadamer suggests, is overcome by the metaphorical capacity of language, but still here the experience seems to be handled into some 'order of things': "the spontaneous and inventive seeking out of similarities by means of which it is possible to order things" (1960:432). And one thinks that "the conventions of meaning that have become sedimented in language" (1960:401), as underlined by Gadamer, seems to indicate this process of ordering

into some shared domain of signification even if it follows "human aspect" of things through communal interests, as mentioned above. And Gadamer asserts the singular meaning in the experience of artworks in another essay (1989:46): "metaphor disappears when the intellectual insight which it serves is awakened" and he suggests that metaphor cannot provide an account of poetry. One may claim one has room for the particularity of the experience of the works of art via their aesthetic constitution which might indeed be understood as the unity of a meaning as a determined human experience however dim and indeterminate it may be for the conventions of meaning within language. Hence Cassirer underlines the artwork's singularity: he suggests that while in theoretical or moral-practical considerations the experience is guided by some universal, in the experience of art one submits to the work in its uniqueness which, for him, should be understood as a universal in itself (1918:306). And this may be via which an artwork resists to immediate consumption within one's habitual orientations to world and life.

2.3.3. An Idea of Aesthetic Experience

> "Our aesthetic perception exhibits a much greater variety and belongs to a much more complex order than our ordinary sense perception. In sense perception we are content with apprehending the common and constant features of the objects of our surroundings. Aesthetic experience is incomparably richer. It is pregnant with infinite possibilities which remain unrealized in ordinary sense experience." (Cassirer:1944:145)

One may underline that even though a sharp dichotomy between aesthetic and ordinary sense experience is not plausible, Cassirer's point seems to be important in that it indicates a difference in attention. And one may suggest that aesthetic experience has the freedom and readiness for the unsought and unfamiliar aspects of things, which is a capacity to engage in them in their full intensity and vividness. It displays a kind of imaginative attention which may be lacking in a literal experience of things. And one may suggest that this kind of experience

forms the basis of one's encounter with art. Since one does not look for the already familiar but the work interprets itself, for the one who dwells upon it, through its unique formation. Panofsky also suggests that artworks demand to be experienced aesthetically (1955:10). And his claim seems not to indicate a sense of aesthetic differentiation in the sense of formal abstraction. Rather he points to the idea that an artwork always bears aesthetic significance and his concern is the experience of artworks in their full significance; that is, one may suggest, a going along with the work's intent and submitting oneself to the particularity of the work in its wholeness. Panofsky also makes clear that "when confronted with a natural object, it is an exclusively personal matter whether or not we choose to experience it aesthetically; a man made object, however, either demands or does not demand to be so experienced, for it has what the scholastics call an 'intention'" (1955:11). Moreover, Panofsky underlines that it is only via the re-enactment of the work's intention that the meaning embedded in the work reveals itself to become an object of the humanities (1955:14). One may interpret this intention as a determined human experience, even it cannot be grasped as a known significance within the saturated conventions of meaning. Hence, it may be claimed that aesthetic experience indicates the communicative basis for one's encounter with artworks, where a human response to form discloses itself as some immediate meaning before any experience of some definite content available through one's customary orientations.

Gadamer also stresses the difference in one's attention to poetic texts which he distinguishes from ordinary discourse: "on the one hand, in discourse as such we are continually running ahead in thought searching for the meaning being conveyed; on the other hand, with a literary text the self-manifestation of each and every word has a meaning in its sonority, and the melody of the sound is also used by the discourse to augment what is said through the words" (1989:43). One may suggest that this augmentation of meaning is aesthetic distending that

Kant underlines in aesthetic ideas (1790:176-180) -i.e., a making tangible some experience of meaning to intuition in its vividity which cannot be achieved through conventions of expression. And the meaning that can only be disclosed via such poetic attention can be explained in Cassirer's terms as an aesthetic grasp of a whole. He suggests that the object under consideration is not dissolved into its conditions but it is affirmed and immediately given; it is not dissolved into conceptual grounds or consequences but one stays with the thing itself (1918:309). And this points out a suspension of habitual attention which is only possible by a difference in concentration. Hence the idea seems to be important since it also leaves room for the capacity of art to draw upon "the fabric of brute meaning" and to "hold the world suspended" [6] as Merleu-Ponty underlines (1961:161). Adorno introduces this capacity as the subjective paradox of art: " to produce what is blind, expression, by way of reflection, that is, through form; not to rationalize the blind but to produce it aesthetically, "to make things of which we dont know what they are" (1970:114) And in a very similar manner to Kant's notion of aesthetic idea, he also points out that: "art is the intuition of what is not intuitable; it is akin to the conceptual without the concept" (1970:96). In another occasion, Gadamer foregrounds the singularity of meaning one encounters in artworks as follows: "it is precisely the indeterminacy of reference that addresses us in modern art and that compels us to be fully conscious of the significance of the exemplary meaning of what we see before us" (1986:31). And here, one may claim, exemplariness of meaning can be understood as indicating that the depiction is a pure representation without pointing towards a meaning that can be identified in some 'order of things'. Accordingly, in reference to Hegel who defined beauty as "the sensuous showing of the idea", Gadamer suggests that "the idea, which normally can only be glimpsed from afar, presents itself in the sensuous appearance of the beautiful; nevertheless, this seems to me to be an idealistic temptation that fails to do justice to the fact that the work speaks to

us as a work and not as the bearer of a message" (1986:33). And he explains this as that the meaningful content of an artwork which reveals itself only in its particularity cannot be recuperated in a concept, hence cannot be appropriated for knowledge (1986:33).

Hence, it might be that art does not formulate what it says into some structure of meaning as one has in discursive thought, rather it seems to be able to bring what it reveals in its singularity. Even when it concerns a known significance as its thematic content, one may suggest, it enlarges it in a way that the idea resists consumption in customary attitudes. And that is possible, one may claim, because its communicative capacity can overstep the conventional ways of expression. Then, one may claim, the communicative dimension -i.e., the experience of artworks, comes to the fore as vital because it seems to be the only access to works. For, here, there seems to be no question of a universal given beforehand which guides one in penetrating into the work, that is because the work itself can be understood as, as mentioned in reference to Cassirer, the universal in itself with no relation to an order outside itself. And it is important to mention that this principle does not yet involve the historicality of the artwork. Definitely the work belongs to an order outside itself, to its historical social reality. But the work, as pointed out above in section 1.2, also extends beyond this order via its capacity to speak to the later generations; and this capacity itself, one may suggest, is a function of its internal purposiveness which enables the work to communicate without recourse to anything outside itself.

Gadamer's discussion of the notion of style in an appendix to *Truth and Method* (1960:496-497) seems to offer clues about the necessary level of constructive re-enactment of artworks. He underlines style as the unity of expression which can be considered independent of the content of what is represented; and suggests that the performance of the artwork must be

stylistically faithful. This seems to be the level of communication which, one may argue, is aesthetic experience and it is an exercise of taste -i.e., a penetrating into something even when it is unfamiliar but displays a purposiveness in itself. Hence, Gadamer suggests:

> "Style belongs, in fact, to the fundamental basis of art; it is one of its inevitable conditions, and what emerges in the question of performance is obviously true also for our general receptive attitude to art of all kinds (performance, after all, is nothing but a particular kind of mediation facilitating our reception of art). Like that of taste, with which it is related (cf. the word Stilgefühl-"feeling for style"), the concept of style is inadequate to describe the experience of art and the scholarly understanding of it-it is adequate only in the sphere of decoration-but it is necessarily presupposed wherever art is to be understood." (1960:496)

And one may suggest that he finds taste as necessary but inadequate because he considers taste from the viewpoint of content. But, as mentioned above in section 2.2, Kant does not understand taste as a productive capacity. Hence, already it is left outside the domain of content; that is, taste itself may not be an object for the discussion of content in art. Rather it is artworks' communicative mode of being, hence from this standpoint it may be even not enough for the sphere of decoration. Since decoration itself might be understood to produce meaning according to its inner purposiveness which stems from some determined human experience, and this generation of meaning via the formative act seems not to be different from that -e.g., of a portrait. Because, also in such a depiction which represents something familiar from life experience, the known significance is distended and transformed through the internal purposiveness. Both of the instances, one may suggest, bear the same relation to taste as the mode of their communication; that is, taste, before considering any relation to a known significance, -e.g., to a *wearer* [7]-, may be able to judge a decorative element in itself and endow this with a unity of some meaning however much dim it may be. And this seems to be also the way it judges the formative character of a painting and endues it with the direction of the dilation which bridges the gap between the thematic content and its expanded form in the

work. For, whether representational or abstract, the formative act itself might be understood to produce meaning and to determine its direction in relation to a human response to form, whether it devolves itself around a known significance and extends it or remains a monad and devolves upon itself; and indeed it seems to be this character of the formal articulation in art that makes the dichotomy between 'representational' and 'non-representational' unsound. Moreover, one may claim that this seems to be the kernel of the relation of taste to aesthetic ideas within the frame of *Critique of Judgment* (1790).

Thus in *The Relevance of the Beautiful* (1986), Gadamer underlines the significance of Kant's concern for the formal articulation as the communicative dimension in artworks (1986:27). He also suggests that:

> "Kant rightly characterizes such taste as *sensus communis* or common sense. Taste is communicative; it represents something that we all possess to a greater or lesser degree. It is clearly meaningless to talk about a purely individual and subjective taste in the field of aesthetics. To this extend it is to Kant that we owe our initial understanding of the validity of aesthetic claims, even though nothing is subsumed under the concept of a purpose." (1986:19)

And Gadamer's analogy of play in relation to the experience of artworks also indicates this dimension of communication on the grounds of a purposiveness without a definite end: "something is intended as something, even it is not something conceptual, useful, or purposive, but only pure autonomous regulation of movement" (1986:24)

2.3.4. Aesthetic Form as the Communicative Instance of Artworks

It is mentioned above, in section 2.3.1, that Gadamer's criticism of aesthetic consciousness in *Truth and Method* (1960) focuses around the center of the supposed discontinuity between art and life which epitomizes itself in an understanding of art 'for art's sake'. So he claims aesthetic experience as non-binding and disintegrative -i.e., merely subjective and, in return,

he introduces the notion of aesthetic non-differentiation. In one of the senses he uses the term it refers, as pointed out before, to a pure formalistic approach which seems to be already untenable, for it can not apprehend the function of the world signification and offers no access to the consciousness behind the artwork. On the other hand, he uses the term in another sense where it indicates the dimension of formal mediation whereby the work, one may suggest, becomes what it is in the first instance. Hence it refers to the tension between the represented and the representation. And one may argue that this second sense seems to be inconsequential with a formalistic approach as indicated in the first sense of the term. Rather, one may claim, it is via this formal mediation that artworks produce and transmit meaning. Hence to overlook this dimension seems to be an underestimation of the instance of artistic mediation which, as will be discussed in section 2.4, seems to be important for artistic tradition and an understanding of its continuity. Moreover, it may be suggested that the articulation into form is that which makes artworks shareable even before shared subject-matters and that the continuity between art and life maintains itself even when there is no representation of a known significance. Hence, Cassirer, while also being critical of the argued opposition between art and life, seems not to overlook the dimension of formal articulation:

> "To be sure, it is not the same thing to live in the realms of forms as to live in that of things, of the empirical objects of our surroundings. The forms of art, on the other hand, are not empty forms. They perform a definite task in the construction and organization of human experience. To live in the realm of forms does not signify an evasion of the issues of life; it represents, on the contrary, the realization of one of the highest energies of life itself." (1944:167)

Likewise, Adorno understands aesthetic form as sedimented content on the basis of the idea that every form bears the significance of being something imagined, hence endowed with an immanent meaning via this significance which reveals itself through an inner purposiveness. This idea, one may suggest, is also the seed of Gadamer's notion of aesthetic non-

differentiation. However, Adorno's significance lies in his emphasis that "the mediation of form and content is not to be grasped without their differentiation" (1970:5). His idea is that artworks speak through their particular structure via which the elements drawn from other layers of life come to be transformed and distended in a unique way. But more than this transformation of representational contents, Adorno's emphasis on the differentiation between the represented and representation leaves room for comprehending the artistic practice itself which, one may argue, operate this in-between. Moreover, Adorno understands the formal realization itself as the condition of the accessibility for artworks:

> "Incontestably the quintessence of all elements of logicality, or, more broadly, coherence in artworks, is form. It is astonishing, however, how little aesthetics reflected on the category of form, how much it, the distinguishing aspect of art, has been assumed to be unproblematically given. The difficulty in getting a grasp on it is in part due to the entwinement of all aesthetic form with content (Inhalt): form is not only to be conceived in opposition to content but through it if aesthetics is not to fall prey to an abstractness that habitually makes it the ally of reactionary art." (1970:140)

Cassirer also underlines the element of form as providing one the access to artworks: "every work of art has an intuitive structure, and that means a character of rationality" (1944:167). And he suggests that "it may give us the most bizarre and grotesque vision, and yet retain a rationality of its own -the rationality of form" (1944:167). Likewise, Crowther, against Gadamer's argument on aesthetic disintegration in *Truth and Method* (1960), claims that:

> "Although the constitution of a purely aesthetic object is a function of the cognitive activity of those who observe an artwork, we are not entitled to say it is just a function of that activity. We are guided, surely, in forming our attitude by the perceptible formal features of the work, and are able in principle to justify and argue the validity of our response by reference to them. This capacity, indeed, gives a rational continuity to aesthetic consciousness." (1993:37)

This emphasis on the dimension of formal realization seems to be important since, one may claim, it emancipates the shareability of artworks from being a function of the familiarity of

particular contents. Hence, Crowther also criticizes Gadamer's claim on the instances of function, purpose or content as the only conditions of accessibility to artworks:

> "What Gadamer is really saying, of course, is that content ought to be that to which access is sought, in so far as it is keenly relevant to the task of self-understanding. However, whilst self-understanding may be a preeminent concern of mankind, another defining characteristic of the species is our capacity to create and appreciate artefacts for their own sake. Gadamer completely overlooks, in other words, the possibility that formalist appreciation may have an important role to play in self-understanding conceived in a broader sense." (1993:35)

And one may suggest that even the purest formal play resides in itself the element of content in relation to the determined human experience it discloses; since, as an already "realized field of possibilities" [8], it concretizes a specific response. Gombrich seems to make a similar point by suggesting that "we cannot and need not try to understand a rock or a tree, but we can seek to understand the creations of another human being, however far removed in place or time" (1991:60). Hence, one may claim that the immediate -i.e., not mediated within an 'order of things', singular and spontaneous- meaning revealed in the experience of artworks is a function of the externalization of some human experience which is always a formative process. And aesthetic experience can be understood as a fulfillment of this necessary demand of constructive communication in order to disclose the determined experience in form. Here, also lies the difference between taste and sensuous appreciation which Kant (1790:54-57) underlines, and that which, one may claim, should be concerned with in any discussion of the element of form in art. In this juncture one may refer to Adorno: "intuitive element in art differs from sensuous perception because in art intuitive element always refers to its spirit" (1970:96). Here spirit refers to the constructive mediation by which the work is conferred with its unity. And he also suggests that:

> "What can rightly be called form in artworks fulfills the desiderata of that on which subjective activity takes place just as much as it is the product of

> subjective activity. In artworks, form is aesthetic essentially insofar as it is an objective determination. Its locus is precisely there where the work frees itself from being simply a product of subjectivity." (1970:142)

Because of its aesthetic unity, which is indeed the unity of meaning no matter this meaning is 'blind' or singular, artwork becomes a world-three object, in terms given by Popper as mentioned in the first chapter, and emancipates from its origins to achieve a status of a shareable idea. And Adorno understands this unity as attained through the inner purposiveness of the work which externalizes the mimetic instance:

> "The obligation of artworks to become self-alike, the tension into which this obligation brings them with the substratum of their immanent contract, and ultimately the traditional desideratum of homeostasis require the principal of logical consistency: This is the rational aspect of artworks. Without its immanent necessity no work would gain objectification; this necessity is art's antimimetic impulse, one borrowed externally, which unites the work as an interior." (1970:136)

On the other hand, Adorno foregrounds the inner consistency that artworks display as the uniting and binding instance, even though it is different from the rationality of things and events of everyday life; and he does not consider this aesthetic unity as a source of some disintegrative and mere subjective experience. Moreover, he comprehends this as a necessary constituent of art as determining its specificity by which, one may claim, art preserves its 'aesthetic distance' to life. In a passage, suggestive of the mutual relation between imagination and understanding that Kant underlines in judgment of taste, Adorno says that:

> "The autonomous law of form of artworks protests against logicality even though logicality itself defines form as principle. If art had absolutely nothing to do with logicality and causality, it would forfeit any relation to its other and would be an a priori empty activity; if art took them literally, it would succumb to the spell; only by its double character, which provokes permanent conflict, does art succeed at escaping the spell by even the slightest degree." (1970:138)

And one may argue that Kant's standpoint of taste as the communicative dimension of

artworks bears its significance here, since it represents a binding cognitive capacity without reducing the shareability of artworks to a familiarity with their specific contents. However, it should be underlined that the universality Kant claims for the judgment of taste may not be necessarily understood as a universality beyond space and time. That is, one may claim, one may have room for the historicality of changing *tastes* and still consider taste as a formal capacity -i.e., a sense for style, before particular preferences, which enables one to have a share in other *tastes* that offer different world views. And one may claim, this capacity itself endows art with a privilege among other cultural activity in that artworks not only bring forth *what* they say as their representational content but also disclose it in such a way that a distinct orientation to world and life reveals itself which, one may suggest, is a function of the manner they communicate this content -i.e., the *how* of their mediation of the particular subject-matter. Podro, while discussing Kant's point in taste, suggests that "in claiming that the pure judgment of taste is valid for all men, we would not be saying that all men would in fact take pleasure in this particular configuration, but that all men would take pleasure in this configuration if they started from a similar level of familiarity with the components and the mode of their combination" (1972:19). And if one leaves out the instance of pleasure, that is the particular choices and preferences, the dimension of communication in taste comes to the fore, in that, on the grounds of this capacity that one has an access to the world of images of a *different* consciousness. Since, even a familiar theme in an image is accessible in its expanded form via one's judgment of taste which, one may claim, penetrates into the in-between of the represented and the representation where the manner of representation endows the represented with a new significance; that is, the known significance is aesthetically enlarged in such a way that in its distended form it also brings forth *how* it is conceived. Adorno also highlights that taste belongs to the basic cognitive powers. He suggests that "the knowledge of artworks is

guided by their cognitive constitution: they are the form of knowledge that is not knowledge of an object; this paradox is also the paradox of artistic experience; its medium is the obviousness of the incomprehensible" (1970:347). And he underlines that "the oneness of aesthetic constituents with those of cognition is, however, the unity of spirit and thus the unity of reason; this Kant demonstrated in his theory of aesthetic purposefulness" (1970:138)

In *The Relevance of the Beautiful*, Gadamer points out to the same communicative capacity of artworks and suggests that "art unites us in its communicative dimension" (1986:39). He also highlights the Kantian emphasis on the element of form in that artworks should be constructed actively under the regulation of their formal articulation [9] (1986:27). One may refer to Gadamer's (1986:71-73) example of Kafka in whose writings, Gadamer underlines, the everyday world is presented in such a specific manner that what one encounters is precisely a dissolution of any shared horizon of meaning. One may suggest that this seems to be via the transformative power of artistic mediation; that is, aesthetically producing the 'blind' in Adorno's terms which, one may suggest, seem to depend on the way Kafka depicts his narrative which exerts its power of communication without a recourse to the conventions of meaning. Likewise Gadamer maintains the shareability of modern art despite the dissolution of the shared world views and the accompanying symbolic languages with the modern era:

> "At the very start I pointed out how the so-called modern age, at least since the beginning of the nineteenth century, had emancipated itself from the shared self-understanding of the humanist-Christian tradition. I also pointed out that the subjects that previously appeared self evident and binding can now no longer be captured in an artistic form that would allow everyone to recognize them as the familiar language within which new statements are made. This is precisely the new situation as I described it. The artist no longer speaks for the community, but form his own community as far as he expresses himself. Nevertheless, he does create a community, and in principle, this truly universal community extends to the whole world. In fact, all artistic creation challenges each of us to listen to the language in which the work of art speaks and make it our own. It remains true in every case that a shared or potentially shared achievement is at issue. This is true irrespective of whether the formation of a work of art is

> supposed in advance by a shared view of the world that can be taken for granted, or whether we must first learn to "read" the script and language of the one who speaks in the creation before us." (1986:39)

Adorno's example of the "absurd" that he refers frequently in his *Aesthetic Theory* (1970) also seems to underline this communicative capacity of art even in a state of emancipation from a shared horizon of meaning [10]. He suggests this emancipation itself becomes the content itself that the work communicates without becoming simply "nonsense" via the power of its being articulated into an aesthetic unity (1970:27,153). And in relation to form and content dialectic in artworks he underlines: "against the philistine division of art into form and content it is necessary to insist on their unity; against the sentimental view of their indifference in the artwork it is necessary to insist that their difference endures even in their mediation" (1970:147). Thus he criticizes Lukacs, whom Gadamer refers as mentioned in section 2.3.1, in that he cannot apprehend the transformative power of the formal articulation within a medium and the manner of composition and style in making effective the subject-matter (1958:76-77). He also suggests:

> "Lukacs' unreflected concept of form, with its hue and cry over formalism, sets form in opposition to the content of poems, compositions, and paintings as an organization that can be lifted simply off the work. Form is thereby conceived as something superimposed, subjectively dictated, whereas it is substantial only when it does no violence to what is formed and emerges from it. Indeed what is formed, the content (Inhalt) does not amount to object external to form; rather the content is mimetic impulses that are drawn into the world of images that is form." (1970:142)

2.4. An Idea of Artistic Mediation

2.4.1. Between the Represented and the Representation

In its second sense, aesthetic non-differentiation refers to a discrimination between the represented and the manner of representation. Gadamer suggests that "when a distinction is

made, it is between the material and what the poet makes of it, between the poem and the 'conception'; but these distinctions are of a secondary nature" (1960:117). And he claims that "we have here a *double-mimesis*: the writer represents and the actor represents; but even this double mimesis is *one*: it is the same thing that comes to existence in each case" (1960:117). Hence, he adds, "the double distinction between a play and its subject-matter and a play and its performance corresponds a double non-distinction as the unity of the truth which one recognizes in the play of art" (1960:117). The idea, reminiscent of Heidegger's notion of 'unconcealedness' related to the ancient Greek notion of *aletheia*, also resides in the center of Gadamer's notions of play and transformation into structure as he claims that "in being presented in play what is emerges" and that transformation is not alteration but a revealing of a "superior truth" (1960:101-113). Likewise, in *The Origin of The Work of Art*, Heidegger emphasizes art as "setting into work of truth", a "bringing forth of the unconcealedness of what is" (1971:678-686). Hence, in his interpretation of van Gogh's painting which he apprehends as bringing forth the "equipmentality" of peasant shoes, he suggests that "the artwork lets us know what shoes are in truth" (665) and that "if there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work; in the work of art the truth of an entity has set itself to work" (666). Heidegger's concern is the inadequacy of the dominant thing-concepts for the "thingness of things" which, he claims, the artwork is able to disclose. Thus he says that "science is not an original happening of truth, but always the cultivation of a domain of truth already opened, specifically by apprehending and confirming that which shows itself to be possibly and necessarily correct within that field" (686) and he suggests:

> "Truth means today and has long meant the agreement or conformity of knowledge with fact. However, the fact must show itself to be fact if knowledge and the proposition that forms and expresses knowledge are to be able to conform to the fact; otherwise the fact cannot be binding on the proposition. How

> can fact show itself if it cannot itself stand forth out of concealedness, if it does not itself stand in the unconcealed?" (678)

One may suggest that here the concern is on the mimetic impulse that the artwork discloses. The idea seems to be that the mimetic element that moulds itself into the work is already knowledge, about world and life, of a kind which scientific conception cannot apprehend. And this seems to be related to the distending and intensifying power of artistic representation, which, one may argue, is only possible through the distinct act of constructive mediation whereby the work regulates the experience. Hence, Crowther makes a distinction between what he calls 'external' and 'internal' *aletheia*. And he relates the former to Heidegger's use of the term as the awareness of a representation's subject-matter, while introducing the latter as an awareness of the representation's status as a 'made thing' where the element of workmanship, material and content merge into a "self-disclosive *aletheia*" (1993:42). Here, one may suggest that the awareness of the representation's subject-matter is already a function of this "self-disclosive *aletheia*". That is, the mimetic impulse is there only because it has formed itself into an intuitive structure. And, one my suggest, this is precisely the artistic mediation which operates between the representation and the represented. This is also what Gadamer seems to have in mind in suggesting that "in imitating one has to leave out and to heighten; because he is pointing to something, he has to exaggerate, whether he likes it or not" (1960:115). On the other hand, in affirming Kant's point in the notion of the aesthetical ideas, Gadamer suggests that: "we do not consider the intentional agreement between what is represented and the reality we know, we do not look to see what it resembles, we do not measure its claim to significance by a criterion that we already know well, but on the contrary this criterion -the 'concept' -becomes, in an unlimited way, aesthetically expanded" (1960:52). So one may claim that one has room for the idea that the artwork brings something 'mediated' from a specific point of view; since the "exaggeration in the imitation" determines a direction

for the 'expansion' of the subject-matter. And one may suggest that this is revealed in the experience of the work as a function of *how* the artist articulates his material rather than being mere a function of the subject-matter. The importance of this point, which will be discussed below, seems to be that it releases art and artistic tradition from a subjection to particular orientations; that is, it frees the 'poetic meaning' form being a function of specific contents and elevates it to a level of 'human mediation' and underlines one's response as directed to this mediation itself, rather than the particular themes. This may be clarified as follows: In discussing the difference between copy and picture, Gadamer uses the model of mirror image to underline the inseparability of the represented and the representation in a picture, although he suggests that the picture has its own status as representation. And he claims that "that special intention of differentiation that we called 'aesthetic' differentiation is only a secondary structure based on this; it distinguishes the representation as such from what is represented." He also adds that "the mirror can give a distorted image, of course, but that is merely an imperfection: it does not perform its function properly" (1960:136-137). If one carries Gadamer's analogy farther, one may suggest that the mirror functions improperly in the case of kitsch; and aesthetic differentiation is a necessary discrimination if it is understood in the sense of a penetration into the in-between of the represented and the representation [11]; since, like art itself, kitsch seems to operate here, between the represented and the representation where the intention of the work is revealed. And the distortion the mirror displays in the case of kitsch discloses itself as "having designs upon us", it reflects a "forced quality". This is what Gadamer himself underlines in *The Relevance of the Beautiful*: "this means that the person who is already prepared for the language of art can sense the intention behind the effect" (1986:52). This seems to indicate that the 'conception' -i.e., *how* the subject-matter is conceived- is already in the experience. While in the experience of kitsch, one may claim, one

realizes the disjunction between *what* is said and *how* it is said as an immanent problem, in an encounter with art the two instances are supportive of each other in a mutual expansion. Hence the notion of aesthetic non-differentiation seems to imply this mutual relation where *what* is said and *how* it is said are inseparably bound to each other within an artwork. Because the mimetic impulse moulds itself into the intuitive form in which it manifests itself. However, that it is the function of the artistic mediation itself does not come to the fore.

Umberto Eco defines the problem of kitsch in structural terms, rather than in terms of an opposition between 'high' versus 'mass' culture [12], in order to underline that it cannot be reduced to particular themes or ideas. He highlights that kitsch discloses itself in "prefabrication and imposition of an effect" -i.e., not production of a particular effect but the way it is imposed on the recipient (1989:181-185). And he suggests that "to become a piece of Kitsch, a passage needs more than the linguistic factors intrinsic to the message: it also needs the author's intent to sell it to his audience" (1989:185). Hence, the principle that diverges between kitsch and art seems to be related to an immanent problem between the articulated and the articulation where some effort to persuade and unnaturalness about the way the idea is presented is realized within the experience -i.e., inherent in the work:

> "The term Kitsch does not apply only to the kind of art that aims at producing an immediate effect; other forms of art, and other respectable activities, have a similar aim. Nor does it simply designate a formal imbalance, since that is a characteristic of most ugly works. Nor does it refer only to the kind of work that has borrowed stylemes which have previously appeared in a different context, since this can happen without lapsing into bad taste. Kitsch refers to the kind of work that tries to justify its provocative ends by assuming the garb of an aesthetic experience, but palming itself off as art." (Eco:1989:203)

A similar point is made by Lotte H. Eisner, (1968:197-219)in a study on the notion of kitsch in cinema: "what is really important, at all events is *how* a film has been made and not *what* it relates" (1968:208). Likewise, Adorno locates what he calls 'truth content' of an artwork,

which is discussed below, between the representation and the represented which is grasped via an immanent critique of the internal logic of the work:

> "Intention does not miscarry as the result of the inadequate form-giving powers of the subject. The untruth of intention interrupts the objective truth content. If what is supposed to be truth content is in itself untrue, that prohibits inner consistency." (1970:151)

And this principle seems to be beyond the presented in terms of subject-matter. Since, one may argue, artistic representation, from whichever point of view it dwells upon a theme and to whatever direction it enlarges it, makes the direction of this distending available to intuition via its constructive play on the subject-matter. And this resides within the work as its inner purposefulness upon which one passes judgment. Adorno underlines this character of artistic mediation as follows:

> "It is not that artworks differ from significative language by the absence of meanings; rather, these meanings through their absorption become a matter of accident. The movements by which this absorption of meaning occurs are concretely prescribed by every aesthetically formed object." (1970:124)

Cassirer, on the other hand, suggests that "no artist can present nature without revealing himself in and through this presentation; and no artistic expression of the self is possible except that something material be set before us in all its plasticity and objectivity" (1960:82)[13]. And this seems to indicate that via the formative process within a material medium, whereby the mimetic element moulds itself into aesthetic unity, as the necessary moment of the production, artwork bears the traces of the consciousness of which it is the product and this cannot be reduced to a function of the subject-matter. Moreover, this specific formation is also what regulates the experience whereby, even familiar, a subject-matter is disclosed in a unique way. Similarly, Langer suggests that imaginative articulation reflects "the principles of representation by which human sensibility records itself" (1967:95). Hence,

Adorno differentiates between constructive and mimetic instances in art. He suggests that: "incomparably deeper and socially relevant experiences can be sedimented in the *how* of a painting than in faithtul portraits of generals or revolutionary heros" (1970:150). And his idea seems to point out that the immanent consciousness that the work discloses in the experience is beyond the particular theme that the work represents and it reveals itself via the constructive instance. This may also explain why even a pure decorative configuration brings forth a certain attitude to life, without representing anything other than itself [14]. Adorno explains the relation between the mimetic and constructive impulses as follows:

> "Mimesis in art is the prespiritual; it is contrary to spirit and yet also that on which spirit ignites. In artworks, spirit become their principle of construction, although it fulfills its telos only when it emerges from what is to be constructed, from the mimetic impulses, by shaping itself to them rather than allowing itself to be imposed on them by sovereign rule. Form objectivates the particular impulses only when it follows them where they want go of their own accord. This alone is the methexis of artworks in reconciliation. The rationality of artworks becomes spirit only when it is immersed in its polar opposite." (1970:118)

And he claims that "the spirit of artworks is bound up with their form, but spirit is such only insofar as it points beyond that form; the claim that there is no difference between the articulation and the articulated, between immanent form and content, is seductive especially as an apology for modern art, but it is scarcely tenable" (1970:89). Accordingly, his apprehension of the experience (*Erfahrung*) of the work of art, besides an understanding of the thematic content and grasping the intention as it is realized in the actual work, comprises a critical approach into the work's immanent logic which operates between the actual realization and the intention. Adorno's notion of truth content belongs to this level of understanding the consciousness that lies in the relation between the representation and the represented within a work [15]. And this grasp is via a reflection on one's spontaneous fulfillment -i.e., the experience- that the work demands in relation to its aesthetic unity achieved by formal

articulation, and concerns *how* the work comes out to be *what* it is:

> "One becomes conscious of the works content by way of the full experience of it (Erfahrung).This concerns the works relation to its material, to its appearance and its intention, as much as it concerns its own truth or falseness in terms of the artwork's specific logic, which instructs as to the differentiation between what is true and false in them. Artworks are understood only when their experience is brought to the level of distinguishing between true and not true, as a priliminary stage, between correct and incorrect. Critique is not externally added into aesthetic experience but rather immanent to it." (1970:346)

Accordingly, Adorno understands artistic achievement as follows: "aesthetic success is essentially measured by whether the formed object is able to awaken the content (Inhalt) sedimented in form; in general, then, the hermeneutics of artworks is the translation of their formal elements into content (Inhalt)" (1970:139). Hence, his discrimination between the mimetic and the constructive instances seems to be an important constitution. Since it frees art from the spell of particular orientations to world and life, within such an understanding of art, one can have room for the idea that any human experience and idea can be artfully dwelled upon -i.e., can be the source of poetic expression- and that 'art' may not be necessarily a matter of specific contents, but a principle in relation to the way these contents are communicated -i.e., not the dignity of subject-matter, but the mediation itself seems to determine 'art'. Gadamer suggests that "it is clear that every thing that constitutes everyday speech can recur in the poetic word; if poetry shows people in conversation, then what is given in the poetic statement is not the statement that a written report would contain, but a mysterious way the whole of the conversation is as if present" (1960:470). The point seems to be *how* one articulates language, besides the particularity of *what* is said. And this seems also to be the principle underlying Adorno's comprehension of form as sedimented content. Hence, one may suggest, it refers to the communicative potential of the formative act within a material medium. So it might be suggested that the meaning in artworks is a function of

specific articulation -i.e., artistic mediation- and this mediation itself seems to be a main concern in the experience of artworks which also brings forth the necessary distance in one's approach to art works.

2.4.2. An Idea of Artwork in Itself

Adorno's understanding of 'truth content' in artworks is that it is "neither the work's factual content nor its fragile and self-suspendible logicality; nor -despite traditional philosophy- is art's truth content is its idea, even if the idea is so broad as to include the tragic or the conflict between finite and infinite" (1970:128), and he adds it is also not the intention of the artist: "the difference between truth and intention in artworks becomes evident to critical consciousness when the object of the artist's intention is false itself, those usually eternal truths in which myth simply reiterates itself" (1970:129) For him, 'truth content' cannot be determined within the immanent experience, but constituted via this experience. Hence it only reveals itself in the mediation of internal coherence of elaboration, reflected awareness of the 'thingness' of the work itself -i.e., of the "self-disclosive *aletheia*" in Crowther's terms. Hence, it is not only what they speak about as their thematic content, but how they achieve their unity, how they handle all its constituent elements. And one may suggest that it is the 'human mediation' itself [16]; the principle that regulates one's relation to artworks. Wolff underlines that the specificity of artworks reveals itself in their particular character which is irreducible to political or moral value: "if a good novel is not good simply because it is politically correct, or morally admirable, or useful for any extraneous purpose, then we are saying it is good *as a novel*, or *as a work of art*" (1983:22). On the other hand, Duve (1996:448-450) describes his attitude to an artist whose ideological disposition he opposes as follows:

> "Although Beuy's ideology is more than problematic to me, what matters is whether it hijack the works, or whether the works stand on their own, formally:

> whether, in order to appreciate his work, I ought to believe the myth he constructed around himself, or whether its aesthetic qualities resist even the cruelest political and psychoanalytic deconstructions of the myth; whether I am supposed to buy into the symbolic meanings he gave to fat and felt, or whether I can look at the works the way an atheist looks at the Memling madonna" (449)

In a Kantian sense, one may suggest, Duve explains that his judgment on the works belongs to a different order from that which has the ideological assumptions and prejudices of the artist as its object. And he points out that "but I do feel the aesthetic power of his ideological convictions; I do feel that it is they which give the works their unique form; and I do feel their failure in the forms, which is precisely what, to my eyes, gives those forms their artistic relevance and authenticity" (1996:450). What he is concerned with seems to be the relation between the mimetic and the constructive instances within the works. And one may suggest, he understands his aesthetic judgment as a necessary instance of communication with the work, whereby the idea discloses itself via the constructive mediation:

> "But this I can say only because the works and their forms succeeded in 'quickening' imagination and understanding in me, in activating my critical vigilance reflexively, and in prompting me to surrender to the works quality. What would you call this involuntary "free play of my cognitive powers" if not an aesthetic judgment? The critical function of artistic activity is exerted via this aesthetic judgment, although of course it does not stop here- rather, that is more where it starts. It offers an analogical and reflexive bridge linking knowledge to will, theoretical or ideological activity to practical or ethical action, but it does not confound them; it does not mix them; it does not make one derivative of the other; it does not mortgage the one or hijack the other." (450-451)

And one may suggest that this kind of an approach does not indicate a *seeing* works as seperate from the ideas embedded in them, but it refers to the special attention and concern that focuses on the object as a *human made thing* without the mingling of one's interests on the particular theme. This may mean to have a share in a more elevated realm than one's immediate, practical interests. Likewise, David Carrier claims that:

> "To respond aesthetically to a painting is to see it for its own sake, as opposed to identifying it as a sacred image, a political statement, or a historical document.

> Very often, paintings have religious, political, or historical importance as well as aesthetic value. Of course, visual artworks have many legitimate functions. But the important conceptual point, which sometimes gets lost in critical historical accounts of "the aesthetic", is that identifying the genealogy of this way of thinking does not necessarily undermine its importance or diminishing its value. No doubt the aesthetic way of seeing can seem apolitical, even antipolitical. But seeing an artwork aesthetically by no means excludes looking at it in other ways; no more than enjoying the language of Yeats's late poetry excludes critical evaluation of his political ideas." (1996:139)

Hence one might suggest that meaning in artworks seems to be a function of *how* one articulates his material; and this seems to be via the formal construction, the mediation within a medium. Moreover this might be understood as the sublimation of an idea where the principle of purposiveness without a purpose operates, which is the vivifying power of art that functions between the concept and the aesthetical ideas in Kantian terms. And this sublimation seems to be what resists to the consumption of the idea to the practical interests. In addition, the principle of the imaginative mediation which locates art in-between the represented and the representation seems also to be the principle that binds various artistic practices of the past and the present:

> "Do what ever so that it be called art. But make it such that, through what you will have made -the thing resulting from your maxim- you make it felt that this something was imposed on you by an idea of the anything whatever that is its rule. This regulative idea can be an idea of the beautiful or of sublime, an idea of painting or of any other medium, an idea of revolution, an idea of real or utopian society, an idea of the artist or an idea of art or of the non-artist and non-art. This regulative idea that truly imposes itself can be whatever idea, so that you can act as if all such ideas were simultaneously valid, and imperatively valid." (Duve:1996:364)

Before referring to the notion of continuity, one may mention a misinterpretation of Kant, as formal, disinterested pleasure devoid of any 'content'. Since it seems to characterize a common misunderstanding of Kant's ideas. Danto (1997:81-84) in criticizing Greenberg, as a Kantian art critic [17], is concerned with what Gadamer (1960) calls the standpoint of taste. And he understands the notion of disinterestedness as a principle of content whereby he assumes that

it impedes any moral-practical intent to motivate the production or reception of artworks. Hence he argues that Kant's understanding involves only a visual interest remaining at a level of "gratification to eye"; accordingly he suggests that "art may have other aims than aesthetic ones" (1994:343). And, in considering art praxis after 60's, Danto claims that a Kantian approach to art, because it prevents 'any human interest' to be a concern in art, is inadequate - e.g., for a comprehension of political dispositions of artists (1997:84-86). However, as underlined above, Kant's understanding of taste does not invole any relation to the discussion of content in art, rather it is related to the communicative mode of artworks. Hence, already, there may not be an 'aesthetic aim' in itself as understood by Danto. Moreover, Danto's position seems to miss Kant's notion of aesthetic ideas and its cognitive status which comes to the fore in Kant's concern for poetry and its import for the society, as underlined in 2.2.

2.4.3. An Idea of Continuity for Artistic Tradition

Steinberg in his discussion of Vasari's and Malraux's approach to art suggests that: "..not a difference in aesthetic judgment, nor even in the definition of art; we are dealing with two distinct valuations..." (1977:289). He underlines the continuity in the tradition of art in relation to art's representative capacity and highlights this as the "central aesthetic function in all art" (1977:291). Hence, he evaluates the profound changes in the representative techniques and forms of modern art as a reaction against the conventional ways of *seeing* the world and life. Because for him, "artist's will to formulate his found reality" necessitates to surpass past works in the search for finding an adequate expression (1977:295-296). Likewise, Merleu-Ponty suggests:

> "The language of painting is never 'instituted by nature'; it is to be made and remade over and over again. The perspective of the Renaissance is no infallible "gimmick". It is only a particular case, a date, a moment in a poetic information

of the world which continues after it." (1961:175)

Adorno affirms the same dimension of varying dispositions towards world and life that regulates the changes in artistic forms:

> "Right up to the present, all transformations of aesthetic comportment, as transformations of the comportment of the subject, involved changes in the representational dimension; in every instance new layers emerged, were discovered by art and adapted to it, while others perished." (1970:354)

On the other hand, Meyer Schapiro also assesses changes in the art forms in relation to varying understandings of the world: "the reactions were deeply motivated in the experience of the artists, in a changing world with which they had to come to terms and which shaped their practice and ideas in specific ways" (1979:191). Both Steinberg and Schapiro approach art from the view point that, whether natural representations or abstract configurations, the contents of artworks are related to historically changing interests and that discussions of art should not remain enclosed within the institutionally isolated frames (Schapiro:1979, Steinberg:1977). And the underlying idea is that aesthetic quality is not a function of particular contents or distinct artistic practices, rather it is related to the instance of representation of any human interest and experience. Hence Schapiro maintains that "all rendering of objects, no matter how exact they seem, even photographs, proceed from values, methods and viewpoints which somehow shape the image and often determine its contents; on the other hand, there is no 'pure art', unconditioned by experience; all fantasy and formal construction, even the random scribbling of the hand, are shaped by experience and by nonaesthetic concerns" (1979:196). In a similar manner Steinberg claims that "to an eye still immersed in the visual habits of the nineteenth century, the abstract way often seems willful and arbitrary" (1977:301) and he asserts "...they do not depict what we normally see; but to call them "simply painting", as though they had no referent outside themselves, is to miss both

their meaning and their continuity with the art of the past" (1977:306). And one may suggest that different conceptions of life and world might be understood as to express themselves in different articulations of artistic media. Nevertheless, it might be that, as underlined by Poggioli (1968:163), situations condition art but may not determine it. And Schapiro elevates aesthetic quality beyond specific choices. He underlines, whether natural representation or abstract, these choices are only materials for art that are related to historically changing interests: "but as little as a work is guaranteed aesthetically by its resemblance to nature, so little is it guaranteed by its abstractness or 'purity'" (1979:196). Thus he might be understood as to point out that aesthetic quality is not something separable but resides inherent in the work beyond preset systems of evaluations. And Poggioli's differentiation between a cultural ambiance and the artworks produced within seems to be important, as he offers in his *Theory of Avant-Garde*. For him, contextual factors provide only data and "no discourse on art, even if inspired by nonaesthetic considerations" can dispense with an understanding of the individual work (1968:163). Hence it might be suggested that contextual conditions furnish art's materials on which it operates and sublimates and that the specific concerns, 'data' in Poggioli's terms, that motivate the artistic praxis and choices change and accordingly representational techniques change. Nevertheless, one may suggest that the functional relation between the particular motivations and their realizations in the medium of art endures. And it might be that the productive act of imaginative reflection persists as artistic mediation; that is, making available to intuition of any human idea of whatever[18]. Likewise, Adorno underlines that the work of art is never given in advance, but it is always in need of one's capacity of judgment that moves within the work without an *a priori* notion of the relations it bears (1970:140). Thus, it might be that "representation is a central aesthetic function in all art" as Steinberg underlines.

Burger, on the other hand, in his *Theory of Avant-Garde* (1984) discusses art from an institutional frame in relation to the cycles of function, production and reception of artworks within different social formations (47). And he constructs his understanding of the avant-garde art as an attack on the historical institutional frame which for him determines art's reception in bourgeois society. His study offers remarkable insights[19]. However, for the aims of this study, his argument about the profound modification of the category of artwork via the avant-gardiste attack on the institutional frame of art seems to demand scrutiny. For one may suggest that the frame from which he discusses art seems to be insufficient for developing conceptual tools for a consideration of the individual work [20]. And Burger's discrimination between the organic and the avant-gardiste work of art may not be convincing. The discrimination seems to overlook the dimension of artistic mediation as the principle of their continuity. Burger claims that insertion of 'reality fragments', which for him left intact, into the avant-gardiste work destructs "the unity of the painting as a whole, all of whose parts have been fashioned by the subjectivity of its creator" (77). Hence he argues: "a system of representation based on the portrayal of reality, i.e., on the principle that the artistic subject must transpose reality, has thus been invalidated" (78). One may suggest that while the principle of collage, the avant-gardiste work of Burger, offers new possibilities of representation, the problem of meaning may not be reduced solely on the grounds of technique. For it still seems to be a function of *how* the artist uses his material -i.e., of the artistic mediation. Burger suggests that the interdependency between the meaning of the whole and the parts in the organic work is altered and interpretation of meaning is renounced in the avant-gardiste work (80). However Adorno [21] evaluates the same refusal of providing common meanings in the reactionary art of the early twentieth century as follows: "although art revolts against its neutralization as an object of contemplation, insisting on the most extreme

incoherence and dissonance, these elements are those of unity; without this unity they would not even be dissonant" (1970:157) and he seems to underline the dimension of artistic mediation as the source of meaning even in its refusal: "artwork that rigorously negates meaning is by this very rigor bound to the same density and unity that was once requisite to the presence of meaning" (1970:154). And it seems that the reason for Burger's confinement in the 'shock' value of his avant-gardiste work (80) is a consequence of his overlooking of the dimension of artistic mediation only through which artworks come to 'speak' even when they refuse to provide existential comfort. And this dimension seems to be immanent in the work, rather than being mere a function of the technique or any other formal criteria. Avant-gardiste attack on the institutional frame seems to be a significant insight; however, it seems to be a 'material' for the artist to be dwelled upon and may not be reduced to abstract oppositions like art versus life or art versus anti-art. For these oppositions may not afford an understanding of the individual work and its conditions of operation whereby the 'material' is transformed into an artistic statement. Likewise, from the viewpoint of art versus anti-art, ready-made and found objects bear the same conditions as they are mass produced and this opposition seems to be unable to offer a standpoint to reflect upon their profound difference related to the instance of artistic mediation[22]. Hence the frame offered by Burger seems to remain in generalizations in relation to artistic mediation: "most recent investigators of avant-garde practices have criticized Burger for his repression of the heterogeneity of avant-garde's response to modern, popular, and industrialized culture, a response that included, but was not limited to, the goal of Berlin Dada" (Gibson:1996:161). In a similar manner Foster is critical of Burger's evaluation of avant-garde: "for example he misses its *mimetic* dimension, whereby the avant-garde mimes the degraded world of capitalist modernity in order not to embrace it but to mock it; he also misses its *utopian* dimension, whereby the avant-garde proposes not what can be so

much as what *cannot* be- again as a critique of what is" (1996:15). Foster underlines contextual and performative dimensions of the art practices that Burger concerns. And these seem to be related to *how* any motivation finds an appropriate form to 'speak', which might be understood as the instance of mediation that resides within the work. Hence one might suggest that without estimating the individual work, and without comprehending the manner it resolves its 'materials', it might not be apt to treat meaning in artworks as merely a function of some other determinant whether derived from the cultural motivations of the artists or the productive techniques they employ. Likewise, 'shock' seems not to be an exhaustive term for the technique of collage as it seems to be a function of *how* the medium is used:

> "The impact of collage is enormous: more than any other formal device of the avant-garde, collage and its mutations (photomontage, assemblage, sampling, etc.) entered the culture at large. Collage is everywhere, from the gallery to the preschool to the highgloss ad; in this age of the putative disappearance of master narratives it is a master form in its own right. One reason for this success is that collage is both loaded and empty: a rich formal apparatus, a compelling critique of pictorial convention, and a blank on which any number of cultural programs can be inscribed." (Mann:1991:103)

On the other hand Hays (1984,1988) extends Burger's ideas into architecture. He introduces his "critical architecture between culture and form" (1984): an approach to architectural work between treating it as representative of the context in which it is produced or evaluating it as a detached, formal configuration in itself neglecting the work's historicity. While these two attitudes seem to belong to the field of criticism -i.e., to the interpretative frames, Hays seems to make the opposition between the two approaches a principle for the architectural praxis and generation of meaning. One may suggest that no architectural work may be reduced to one of these extremes and Hays seems to overlook the dimension of architect's mediation in the generation of meaning. He evaluates Mies van der Rohe's Friedrichstrasse project of 1919, where Mies inserts a glass tower block into a traditional fabric, as "critical, resistant and

oppositional" (1984:16). That is, Hays claims that the building can be interpreted neither as a representation of external forces nor as a formal system in itself to be read in terms of its internal logic. Also in *Reproduction and Negation* (1988) he interprets Hannes Meyer's competition project for the League of Nations, in reference to Burger's thesis, as an engaged avant-garde work; in that he claims there is no manipulation of form and mediation by the architect (1988:156). Hence he argues that what the building signifies is a sole function of materials and production systems in "negating the controlling action of the artist as the determination of architectural signification" (1988:167). However, there might be a reductive approach to the notion of architectural meaning in Hays's interpretations. For, one may suggest that architect's mediation and generation of meaning may not be reduced to customary attitudes in building production and may not be evaluated in abstract oppositions like 'eternit versus honorific stone' (1988:159). For the particular choices of these materials and the way they are employed in a building seems to make no difference from the view point of architect's mediation. That is, it may be that neither eternit nor stone is able to generate meaning in itself as bare material, but it is the way they are used in a building that regulates the experience. Hence, no material may dispense with the condition of being articulated through imaginative reflection, since it seems that no material, like no abstract function, is able to generate architectural form, via which a building becomes what it is in the first place, without mediation of the architect. Likewise Adorno asserts that "with regard to content, the concept of material best does justice to the mediated distinction; according to an almost universally accepted terminology in all the arts, material is what is formed" (1970:147) And he uses the phrases 'cult of material' and 'aura of essentiality' to criticize the idea that individual materials and elements have inherent meanings without being mediated within a system of articulation (1979:9-13). Accordingly he underlines that "clearly there exists, perhaps imperceptible in the

materials and forms which the artist acquires and develops something more than materials and forms; imagination means to *innervate* this something" (1979:13). Also for Hays's argument that the architectural meaning is made a function of 'impersonal' building techniques (1984,1988), one can find a sound response in Adorno. While discussing productive procedures like submission of an artist to constructive systems, he is critical of the idea that the construction system replaces subjective imagination. And he maintains that the constructive system itself is only possible through the imaginative mediation of the artist (1970:23-24): "in any case, it is clear that insofar as experimental procedures, in the most recent sense, are in spite of everything undertaken subjectively, the belief is chimerical that through them art will divest itself of its subjectivity and become the illusionless thing in itself which to date art has only feigned" (1970:24). That Hays makes meaning a function of customary attitudes to architectural production seems to be evident in that he *reads* Mies's Alexanderplatz project as maintaining no dialogue with its context where for him the plaza "favors a curved, peripheral building" (1984:21). Likewise he interprets Mies's Barcelona Pavillion as an opposition to 'normal system' of expectations [23] about building materials (1984:24). However, it seems that in both projects Mies offers distinct experiences through his architectural articulation of a life situation. And to evaluate these in oppositional terms to settled attitudes in producing architecture seems to overlook their continuity on the level of architect's mediation. Hence, one might suggest that there may not be an aesthetic choice in itself as Hays implies in his understanding of 'architecture as autonomous form' (1984:16-17), but always some choices about the life situations which find embodiment in architectural realizations that come about by aesthetic reflection, via a special formative act. And it might be that the formal articulation in any act of the architectural production reflects these choices, whether they are created by hand, by drawing, or generated with computer, or chosen from an

existing system. That is, every formal choice seems to be an aesthetic choice that leads back to a decision on a life experience, and every aesthetic choice seems to have its ground in some way of seeing things, life and world. And it might be that every architectural choice is a decision on life, even in the case of imposing an arbitrary grid and leaving things seemingly unchanged and undecided, undesigned. Because this itself seems to be an imaginative reflection about an anticipated way of life; and architecture realizes this decision in built form. Thus, no built object may dispense with formal decisions and choices which seem to be in need of the productive act of imagination, the imaginative reflection. And it seems that *how* any idea finds its realization in architectural form is a function of the architect's mediation where a world view discloses itself; as it seems to be even in the case of Meyer's League of Nations: "no pillared reception rooms for weary monarchs but hygienic workrooms for the busy representatives of their people; no back corridors for backstairs diplomacy but open glazed rooms for the public negotiations of honest man" (Hays:1988:167).

Notes:

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[1] See section 2.4.2. for Danto's argument.

[2] "To a certain extent, Gadamer's treatment of art in Truth and Method is one-sided precisely because he uses the example of art to make a point of more general significance." editor: Robert Bernasconi (Gadamer:1986:xii) The same point is made by Janet Wolff (1975:127) and Paul Crowther (1993:35)

[3] In reply to Habermas, Gadamer suggests: "Now it is certainly the case that our experience of the world does not take place only in learning and using a language.There is a pre-linguistic experience of the world, as Habermas, refering to Piaget's research, reminds us. The language of gesture, facial expression, and movement binds us to each other. There are laughters and tears." ....."But even these forms of self-representation must constantly be taken up in the interior dialogue of the soul with itself. I acknowledge that these phenomena demonstrate that behind all the relativities of language and convention there is something in common which is no longer language, but which looks to an ever-possible verbalization, and for which the well-tried word "reason" is, perhaps, not the worst." (Gadamer:1960: Supplement-II,546-547)

[4] Popper suggests that Kant's error in fixing the system of categories was due his belief in Newtonian physics that Kant accepted as ever-valid truth. For Popper this was unavoidable before Einstein's challenge and restrained Kant from the critical search for errors in his system. (Popper, K. R., (1963), Conjectures and Refutations, Butler and Tanner Ltd.; London, 1981: 190.)

[5] Gadamer criticizes Cassirer's understanding of language as a separate symbolic form. Also he is critical of Cassirer's discrimination between art and myth. However one may claim that this discrimination seems to be a relevant one; since while myth imposes an "order of things" onto world and life art may not do this as a translative capacity. That is, they may belong to different kinds of human activity. And such an understanding seems to underlie Cassirer's point in this differentiation.

[6] One may suggest that here art and myth differ. see footnote 5 above.

[7] Gadamer suggests that decoration has no aesthetic import of its own and only becomes to be something when it belongs to a wearer. (1960:157,159).

[8] Umberto Eco uses this term in relation to Action Painting as to its informational capacity (1989).

[9] Gadamer reformulates: "what I described as aesthetic non-differentiation clearly constitutes the real meaning of that cooperative play between imagination and understanding which Kant discovered in 'judgment of taste'." (1986:29)

[10] It might be suggested that for Adorno this character of art is an indispensable element of its critical capacity by means of which art can 'speak' without offering existential comfort.

[11] One should point out that one of the reasons for Gadamer to underline this discrimination as an extreme instance seems to be his model of the I-Thou relation for the genuine hermeneutic experience. That is, not to know Thou in its otherness but to participate in his claim to truth, to be open to this claim in order to make him speak his own truth (1960:359-361).

[12] For example Clement Greenberg evaluates the notion through this opposition in *Avant-Garde and Kitsch* and understands kitsch in terms of 'acceptance by population'. (Greenberg, C., Art and Culture-Critical Essays, Beacon Press; Boston, 1961: 3-21.)

[13] One thinks that this may not be understood as an attempt to "know the 'Thou' in its otherness". Since this kind of an understanding seems to be also valid in one's relation to his own work where there is a feed-back relation. See footnote 11 above.

[14] See footnote 7 above.

[15] However, one point demands to be mentioned in relation to Adorno's notion of truth content. One may claim that the term comprises a specific and a generic sense. In its specific form, it comes closer to Panofsky's "iconological understanding in a *deeper* sense", where a specific historical attitude to life reveals itself. And its generic sense, it seems to be related to art itself as a cast of mind; that is, a relation to things of world and life

beyond immediate practical concerns whereby an aesthetic distance is achieved. And this aesthetic distance, one may suggest, is also a necessary communicative distance which one should maintain in relation to artworks.

[16] "The self understanding of Greek poetry begins with Hesiod's poem in which the muses appear before the poet and make their promises to him: they are capable of telling both much that is false *and* much that is true. (Gadamer:1986:143)

[17] "As far as I know, most critics of Greenberg, form the conceptualists on, have taken his reading of Kant for granted and have rejected the Kantian aesthetics along with its Greenbergian misreading." (Duve:1996:322)

[18] Langer suggests that this dimension is also true for the cave paintings of pre-history, since she underlines that any intention can be the source of visual representation, but the artistic motive, even unconscious, persists: projection of any human idea and feeling into visible forms (1967:130-132), even at the most primitive level, like to paint the body to "enhance motion and posture" (143).

[19] The aim is by no means to evaluate his whole work; rather it is only to treat a specific point in relation to the notion of artistic mediation.

[20] According to Burger, avant-gardiste attack exposes itself on the level of production as a negation of individual creation. Hence he mentions Urinal of Marcel Duchamp and claims that via the ready-mades the form-content totality and the related notion of meaning becomes problematic (1984:51.52). However, when one considers the actual performance of Duchamp this claim may be questionable. Duve explains that Urinal was sent to the first exhibition of the Society of Independent Artists, April 1917, whose motto was "No jury, no prizes"; that is, there was no criteria other than the participation fee to exhibit a work. However, Urinal was censured and not shown to the public and not listed in the exhibition catalogue. Duchamp, then, mocked this censure in the magazine *The Blind Man*. And Duve explains that it is this censure and Duchamp's ridicule after the exhibition which made the Urinal famous and he evaluates Duchamp's gesture as aesthetic rather than political (1996:96-97,142,271). One may suggest that art precisely lies in the difference between writing a letter to the exhibition comittee for the untenability of the system of organization and sending the urinal. Hence the form-content totality seems to be there as the gesture's poetic unity; that is, Duchamp seems to find the appropriate *form* of action and Urinal seems to fulfill a certain *formal* task beyond its literal 'shock' value.

[21] Burger suggests that Adorno's insight is insufficient since he does not consider the institutional frame.

[22] Surrealist *objet* trouve, common object chosen for its accidental aesthetic qualities. Ready-made, common object chosen as a *rendezvous* for any idea (see footnote 20: the Urinal of Duchamp) and not for the aesthetic quality of the object. (Tomkins, C., (1965), The Bride and the Bachelors: 5 Masters of the Avant-Garde, The Viking Press; New York, 1968:26)

[23] In a similar reductive approach, but on the opposite extreme in relation to *preferences*, Norberg-Schulz, one may suggest, understands 'meaning' as realizations of these 'normal' expectations: "meaning in architecture is accomplished when the work of architecture reveals the spatiality of the life-world" (1986:197). "Existence becomes devoid of meaning"... "loss of poetic, imaginative understanding of the world" (1986:12). He makes the "poetic" a function of a particular orientation to world and life, and crticizes other attitudes. One may argue that 'irony and skepticism', which is criticized by Norberg-Schulz, seems to be already a poetic awareness in itself. Likewise while he claims that architecture should create a "meaningful" frame for human activity, he criticizes the social life itself as 'lacking coherency and meaning' (1965:129) and he claims 'true purpose of architecture is to make human existence meaningful" (1974:433). Norberg-Schulz, C.,: (1965), Intentions in Architecture, The MIT Press; Massachusetts, 1988; (1974), Meaning in Western Architecture, Praeger Publishers; New York, 1975; (1986), Architecure: Meaning and Place, Electa/Rizzoli; New York, 1988.

CHAPTER III

A CASE STUDY FOR INTERPRETATION OF ARCHITECTURAL WORKS: LE CORBUSIER'S CHAPEL AT RONCHAMP

3.1. An Idea of Interpreting Artworks

> "Something can only be called art when it requires that we construe the work by learning to understand the language of form and content so that communication really occurs." (Gadamer:1986:52)

> "Certainly it is true that there is something like a sudden instant of understanding here in which the unity of the whole formulation is illuminated; we find this phenomenon both in relation to the poetic text as well as the artistic image." (Gadamer:1989:48)

Panofsky (1955:28-39), in his scheme for interpreting artworks, differentiates between three levels of experience: the level of primary-natural subject matter is identification of visible forms as objects which depends upon the practical experience of things and events; conventional subject-matter -i.e. iconographical analysis- is the level of themes and concepts

an encounter with the work of art and that the interpretation is a result of all (39). He also considers some exceptional cases where the whole sphere of iconographical analysis is eliminated as in landscape painting, still-life, and 'non-objective' art and where there is a direct transition from motifs to intrinsic content (32). One may suggest that this last consideration is a significant insight that offers a penetration into the relations between the levels Panofsky delineates. He underlines that the second level -i.e., iconographical analysis- is not an interpretative one; rather it "collects and classifies the evidence" (31) as a research into the themes and the concepts represented in the images. And one may suggest that while stories and allegories are available through written documents, it is the first level of artistic visualization that endows these themes with a new interest of *how* they are conceived. This seems also coherent with aesthetic distending of a known significance through artistic mediation. Hence it may be suggested that the iconological understanding is a function of this mediation; that is, it is the disclosure of the consciousness that lies in-between the representation and the represented. It is a reflection on the immanent logic of the artwork. Likewise, Podro evaluates the relation between the image and the concept in Panofsky's scheme, in a way reminiscent of Kant's notion of aesthetic ideas (1982:190-193). He suggests that Panofsky's conception of the role of visual representation is that it concretizes a general abstract idea: "we come to enrich or transform our grasp of the concept by reflecting upon its embodiment" (192). Hence he indicates the priority of aesthetic experience in penetrating into the significance of the works of art. And as already underlined in the second chapter this is a constructive task. Hence, Gadamer underlines: "a synthetic act is required in which we must unite and bring together many aspects" (1986:27) And he introduces his notion of hermeneutic identity, one may claim, indicating the singular meaning that the artwork bears via its aesthetic unity:

> "The hermeneutic identity of the work is much more deeply grounded. Even the most fleeting and unique experience is intended in its self-identity when it appears

> or is valued as an aesthetic experience. Let us take the case of an organ improvisation. This unique improvisation will never be heard again. The organist himself hardly knows afterwards just how he played, and no one transcribed it. Nevertheless, everyone says, "That was a brilliant interpretation or improvisation", or on another occasion, "That was rather dull today". What do we mean when we say such thing? Obviously we are referring back to the improvisation. Something "stands" before us; it is like a work and not just an organist's finger exercise. Otherwise we should never pass judgment on its quality or lack of it. For there was something there that I passed judgment upon and understood. I identify something as it was or as it is, and this identity alone constitutes the meaning of the work." (1986:25)

And he maintains that this meaning imposes itself as a demand on the beholder and exists "only for the one who plays along" (1986:25). Since, "the identity of the work is not guaranteed by any classical or formalist criteria, but is secured by the way in which we take the construction of the work upon ourselves as a task" (1986:28). Similarly Adorno emphasizes that understanding an artwork means neither mere genetic explanation, nor explicating work's thematic content or complexion; rather, "understanding has as much in need of the nonexplanatory level of the spontaneous fulfillment as it does of the explanatory level" (1970:349). And one may suggest this is the level of communication on the grounds of the principle of purposiveness without a definite end. Thus, again in Adorno's words, "the tension between form and content which makes all artistic creation possible" (1979:15) seems to be the source of meaning in relation to the artistic mediation. In considering Kant's notion of purposiveness without a purpose, Adorno makes explicit that "the formula reflects an essential impulse in the judgment of taste; and yet it does not account for the historical dynamic" (1979:7). And one may suggest that this principle operates in architecture between any imagined life situation and its realization in the architectural form, where any choice on the side of the life experience to be offered by the *architectural object* implies the historical dynamic, the anticipated meaning which unites the *object* around itself -i.e., which holds the 'woven texture together'. Hence Adorno might be understood to underline Kant's principle as

indicating the realization of any human intention -i.e., the mimetic instance- into an intuitive structure via sublimation through an imaginative-constructive act:

> "Purposefulness without purpose is thus really the sublimation of purpose. Nothing exists as an aesthetic object in itself, but only within the field of tension of such sublimation. Therefore there is no chemically pure purposefulness set up as the opposite of the purpose-free aesthetic. Even the most pure forms of purpose are nourished by ideas -like formal transparency and graspability- which in fact are derived from artistic experience." (1979:8)

And it might be suggested that claims such as, "while Kant includes architecture in his organization of the fine arts, its instrumental aspects are difficult to reconcile with a definition of art 'as purposiveness without purpose' " (Hubert:1988:218, Wilson:1992:1-74) seem to be rooted in a misconception of Kant's standpoint of taste as underlined in the second chapter and specifically in section 2.4.2. in relation to Danto's arguments. That architecture is a practical and public art (Wilson:1992:1-74, Scruton:1979:1-30), one may suggest, makes no difference in relation to its constructive, hence communicative, mode. Moreover, the differentiation of art forms as 'public' versus 'private' or 'practical' versus 'non-practical' may not be an appropriate approach when the notion of the *specificity* of art, hence the 'sense of art', as endeavored in this study, is understood as being related to a distinct mediation between the represented and the representation. Because it indicates a functional connection and does not account for either side of the relation in itself as underlined in section 2.4.3.; that is, it indicates the mediative relation of any human idea of whatever -i.e., the mimetic instance, the represented- to the appropriate intuitive structure -i.e., the constructive instance, the representation- to unfold itself. Hence, the 'sense of art', as a sense for the immanent cohesiveness of the work of art, may not be different than a sense for the 'architectural', as a sense for the internal coherency of an *architectural object*, other than the difference in the materials on which architectural activity operates; and these materials might be understood to include what Hubert calls

'instrumental aspects' and others call 'public aspects'. And the 'sense of art' as a generic notion might be understood as operating, in its specific form, in the sublimation of these materials into the *architectural object*. Thus, the sense for the 'architectural' might be understood only as a specific exercise of the 'sense of art'. Accordingly a discrimination of architecture, in considering its specific requirements, from the *realm of art* may not be convincing. Likewise Adorno underlines in relation to the artworks that "each has to test itself against its own immanent logic, regardless of whether or not it is motivated by some external purpose" (Adorno:1979:6) and that "architecture, indeed every purposeful art, demands constant aesthetic reflection" (Adorno:1979:18).

The author of this study has chosen Le Corbusier's Chapel at Ronchamp as an example. The reason for dwelling upon this particular building is that, as a touchstone of Le Corbusier's architecture, it has been employed by many authors in their interpretative works. Being the object of very different interpretative approaches, Ronchamp seems to offer a fruitful case study for exploring the notion of interpretation of architectural works. It is important to mention that this section does not aim to suggest a conclusive frame for interpreting architectural works; rather its focus is to pose questions on the treated interpretative attitudes in order to investigate the different dimensions of interpretation in the field of architecture and to underline the priority of the 'open horizon' of the architectural experience in relation to the aesthetic constitution of the *architectural object*.

Gombrich (1982) quotes Braque's words in seeing Picasso's *Les Demoiselles d'Avignon*: "it is as if you asked us to drink petrol" (242). And Gombrich underlines that "but art is an acquired taste and I confess that actually I have come to like drinking this petrol -the so-called experiment of cubism, which started with this picture" (242). Likewise, one may suggest that

each encounter with an artwork might be understood as a *new* event and each artwork demands from the beholder its 'spontaneous fulfillment' the communicative fulfillment before imposing an interpretative frame on to the work. Kuspit (1984) reminds that thinking about the art object with preestablished set of values and predetermined judgments bears inherent difficulties (4). He emphasizes that a critical apparatus formed to analyze particular works may not be adequate for other works and may be an obstacle for the critics inducing an "inability to see the 'otherness' of the work -that is, its distinctness as a product separate from their own systems or ideologies" (11). Hence he points out that evaluative concepts should be drawn from the artistic experience itself, and not from settled attitudes toward art(8).

Mies van der Rohe, in response to the question on what he thinks about Ronchamp, suggests that: "it is a very beautiful thing, but not architecture" (Kortan:1977:1). As Enis Kortan indicates (1977:1), this reply has suggestions more about Mies van der Rohe's own understanding of architecture than about Ronchamp. Likewise, Curtis points out similar responses:

> "When architects and critics flocked to Ronchamp in the mid-1950s to see the finished building, they returned home with mutterings about 'a new Baroque' or 'a descent into irrationality'. Nikolaus Pevsner, the historian who had written *Pioneers of Modern Design*, was puzzled by what he took to be a departure from the true way. Stirling wrote of 'the rationale and the initial ideology of the modern movement being mannerised and changed in a conscious imperfectionism. Ronchamp was contrasted with the supposed 'rationalism' of the architect's earlier works and with the mechanistic precision and industrial standardization of American modern architecture of the 1950s, especially that stemming from the example of Mies van der Rohe. These reactions perhaps tell more about the preoccupations of the period than they do about Ronchamp." (1995:178)

One may suggest that these conclusive comments seem to indicate a deficiency in the openness to Ronchamp as an *architectural object*; that is, they seem to be raised from an initial frame to which the *object* becomes mute in the sense that it resists to be interpreted within such a

framework. Accordingly, one may argue that, because of the failures in the communication with the *architectural object*, Ronchamp is conceived as a break in Le Corbusier's architecture. However, as Curtis underlines: "it had roots in the artist's early paintings, sculptures, buildings and urban schemes, as well as in his analysis of a number of vernacular and monumental structures from the distant past" (1995:178). It is true that the formal configuration explored in Ronchamp bears a significant difference from the earlier works of Le Corbusier; nevertheless it is a continuation in the sense that it exposes the same strategies, that is, it seems to be in pursuit of the same architectural ideas within the same understanding of architecture. Colquhoun underlines that, for Le Corbusier, architecture was a matter of creating states of mind and even on the notion of standardization in architecture, his conception was significantly divergent from that of his contemporaries (1989:163). As Colquhoun points out: "for Le Corbusier, the problem was to standardize only certain elements with highly specific functions, falling under the category of 'equipment', and leave the architect free to arrange these elements according to artistic principles and within an envelope that need not be fixed *a priori*" (1989:178). And this dimension is also underlined by Le Corbusier himself when he was unfolding his conception of architecture:

> "The business of Architecture is to establish emotional relationships by means of raw materials.
> Architecture goes beyond utilitarian needs.
> Architecture is a plastic thing.
> You employ stone, wood and concrete, and with these materials you build houses and palaces. That is construction. Ingenuity is at work."
> But suddenly you touch my heart, you do me good, I am happy and I say: 'This is beautiful.' That is architecture. Art enters in." (Le Corbusier:1923:151,153)

When one considers this frame where the artful dimension is always given priority, Ronchamp ceases to be mute. Moreover, the sensitivity to plasticity in Ronchamp as a way of creating and communicating states of mind is not different from that of his early works; that is, it bears

the character of a new experiment in Le Corbusier's continuous search. And it is the degree of this plasticity in Ronchamp which seems to confuse the mentioned interpreters. Here it should be noted that the reference to Le Corbusier for reflecting on his understanding of architecture is not directly related with the task of interpreting Ronchamp at the level of *architectural object*; however the question of 'making sense' of a particular work, as mentioned above, entails further levels which seem to bear inescapable relations with this communication. And for an achievement on other levels, one may argue, the communication with the *architectural object* as the initiator of dialogues on other levels should be fruitful in the sense that it can be furthered without disruptions. In this manner, the conclusive claim about Ronchamp that it is a clear break in Le Corbusier's architecture, seem to disclose a gap between these interpretations and the building when the dialogue is attempted to be advanced on other levels where Le Corbusier's architecture comes into question.

3.2. Two Dialogues with Ronchamp

3.2.1. Childs: Ronchamp as a Symbolic Inscription

> "It is in fact likely to lose sight of the work of art as such and to consider it a record of something more important than the work itself." (Hauser:1959:209)

> "The question is never once broached whether a psychologically sound Baudelaire would have been able to write *The Flowers of Evil*, not to mention whether the poems turned out worse because of the neurosis." (Adorno:1970:8)

One may indicate another kind of interpretation that is executed by Andrew Childs. However he asserts that his work belongs to the realm of speculation, one thinks it may be explored for it exposes the characteristics of an interpretative attitude. Childs's focus is Le Corbusier's belief system which he tries to unfold by scrutinizing various phases of his life. He traces different events to construct a picture of Le Corbusier's individual cosmology and claims to

offer this cosmology as a frame of reference for interpreting his architectural work. Mentioning some symbols that he derives from this supposed cosmology, Childs argue that:

> "Nor was his use of spiritual symbolism limited to Le Corbusier's paintings. The Sun and the Moon, numerically represented by the Triad and the Tetrad, figure throughout Ronchamp as their sum, seven, which according to Pythagoras represented the union of man and divinity. If one examines the plan of Ronchamp from south to north, the outline of a human head looking east is discernible, but orient the plan north to south, and the roof line of the southern facade produces the unmistakable horn motif of the Taurus paintings. Perhaps Le Corbusier meant us to discover this for ourselves when he wrote in his commentary on Ronchamp: 'Counterpoint, and fugue -music -grand music, undertake to look at the image upside down, or turn them a quarter angle. You will discover the game.' " (1996:4)

Here it may be claimed that Childs's interpretation seems to be a reader oriented one. Umberto Eco, in *Interpretation and Overinterpretation,* underlines the differences between three kinds of interpretative attitudes: that is, the reader, the author, and the text oriented approaches. And he also discriminates between interpreting and using a text (1992:67-88). Eco's discussion is performed around the examples of literary texts; however one may suggest that the main idea seems to offer a plausible transformation into the field of architecture. He suggests that "the internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader" (64-65). And this textual coherence might be understood as the inner cohesiveness of an *architectural object.*

One may emphasize that Eco's claim indicates a continuity in the dialogue for checking its relevance. The plan configuration of Ronchamp may be associated with some figures as Childs suggests, however this communication ceases to be fruitful in the architectural experience in the sense that the plan, rather than indicating its independent existence as being merely a graphic in itself inscribed on the surface of the land, tends to be suggesting certain experiences with its control on the other elements of the third dimension; that is, the plan can

also be interpreted as to be generated in pursuit of creating certain experiences that have the potential to occasion certain states of mind, in case of which the dialogue seems to be plausibly furthered. And these experiences, one may argue, seem not to be so arbitrary that they may be the result of a totally different generator. Moreover, one may even suggest an analogy with playing chess through forms to create experiences pregnant with states of mind. In other words, internal coherence of the *architectural object* seems not to indicate a significance of a human head, or another figure as the generator of Ronchamp's plan. On the other hand, Childs's attempt may be construed also to use Le Corbusier's words in order to confirm his assumption. Childs's quotation from Le Corbusier appears in his book on Ronchamp as follows:

> "Observe the play of shadows, learn the game... Precise shadows, clear cut or dissolving. Projected shadows, sharp. Projected shadows, precisely delineated, but what enchanting arabesques and frets. Counterpoint and fugue. Try to look at the picture upside-down or sideways. You will discover the game." (1957:38-39)

Written on two pages, these words come into sight together with two photographs of Ronchamp. And when the part that Childs quotes is located in this context, they may also be interpreted, in a more economical way, as to indicate the graphic quality of these images which in their turn connote the plastic qualities that are revealed through the architectural experience. It is important to mention that this should not be understood to be a conclusive judgment both on the claim of Childs and for Le Corbusier's words. Because it seems not possible to hand down the original meanings as emerged in the architect's mind; however this may not bear importance, for both Ronchamp as an *architectural object* and Le Corbusier's book as a literary-visual text seem to carry their own intentions which have the potential to initiate other dialogues independent of their author. Moreover the interpretation of Le Corbusier's words can be furthered throughout the book. For example the model is

photographed before some paintings of Le Corbusier as its background (Le Corbusier:1957:104). Again there seems to be the same emphasis on the plasticity as the medium for creating and transmitting states of mind that Le Corbusier explored in both painting and architecture.

There may be also other evidences that weakens Childs's interpretation of the plan of Ronchamp as a figure indicating certain meanings within the frame of Le Corbusier's cosmology; that is, it gets difficult to advance this dialogue with the *architectural object* through other levels. For example, inscribing a figure in a plan and transforming it to an architectural element seem to demand differentiation in terms of their levels of symbolism. The bull horn is suggested by different authors as a motif that frequently occurs in Le Corbusier's late works. It may have certain meanings for the architect which seems to be beyond our access; however it should be noted that every time he employs the motif, he does it architecturally. In other words, horn is transformed into another thing that becomes the part of the architectural experience; and one may suggest that this is the kind of symbolism that Le Corbusier employs in his architecture. The bull horn is there architecturally as an element in the experience. The symbolic element, whatever it is, communicates within the *architectural object*. Moreover one may advance this claim throughout Le Corbusier's understanding of the way a work of architecture communicates. In *Towards A New Architecture* (1923), Le Corbusier discusses 'the illusion of plans' throughout a whole chapter:

> "Arrangement is the gradation of aims, the classification of intentions."
>
> "Man looks at the creation of architecture with his eyes, which are 5 feet 6 inches from the ground. One can only consider aims which the eye can appreciate and intentions which take into account architectural elements. If there come into play intentions which do not speak the language of architecture, you arrive at the illusion of plans, you transgress the rules of the Plan through an error in conception, or through a leaning towards empty show. " (177)

3.2.2. Stirling: Ronchamp as 'Mannerism'

One may point out another interpretation of Ronchamp by James Stirling in order to reveal the notion of openness to an *architectural object*. Stirling in his essay *Ronchamp: Le Corbusier's Chapel and The Crisis of Rationalism* (1957) gives a very detailed outline of his actual experience of the building not only in terms of the relations between different architectural elements, and materials and techniques of construction, but also of related experiential qualities (64-67). However, some of his comments seem to demand discussion. For example, he draws a parallel between the Mannerist period of the Renaissance and Ronchamp, and interprets the building as "a derision of modern movement in a state when its vocabulary can no longer be extended" (65). On the other hand, he claims a similarity between Ronchamp and Erich Mendelsohn's Einstein Tower. Even though he underlines that: "....but only inasmuch as the walls and roof are fused into one expression." (65), together with his other comments one may claim that the appearance of Einstein Tower in his interpretation suggests an association of the two buildings in their supposed expressionistic qualities. So, Stirling argues:

> "The sensational impact of the chapel on the visitor is significantly not sustained for any great length of time and when the emotions subside there is little to appeal to the intellect, and nothing to analyze or stimulate curiosity. This entirely visual appeal and the lack of intellectual participation demanded from the public may partly account for its easy acceptance by the local population." (66)

One may argue that Stirling's own position in and conception of architecture seems to impede his communication. For there is an extreme difference between the plasticity of Ronchamp and the Einstein Tower; every move in the former suggests a conscious intention related to the human existence within the forms; that is, rather than being a large scale sculpture, where the forms are generated from and adjusted to a single expression for vision, Ronchamp indicates the human body and not only sight but its experiences as a whole as the generator of its forms.

This taking into account of the human body in its turn, counts for the creation of states of mind which may explain the acceptance of the building by local population whose devaluation seems unfair. Moreover this serious and difficult task of intensifying certain states of mind by the architectural forms may not be understood as mannerism. Because it stands against an explanation in terms of a derision with certain elements in a deficiency of extending the architectural vocabulary. Some authors underline that in the design process of Ronchamp Le Corbusier immersed himself in books on the rituals of the Catholic religion and gathered information about the tradition of pilgrimage associated with the place (Baker:1984:212). It seems clear that Le Corbusier achieved the desired 'mood' for the rituals without falling into a game of 'dead' forms; in response to the question why they had chosen Le Corbusier as the architect for the Monastry of La Tourette, a member of the community explains:

> "Why? For the beauty of the monastery to be born of course. But above all for the significance of this beauty. It was necessary to show that prayer and religious life are not bound to conventional forms, and that harmony can be struck between them and the most modern architecture, providing that the latter should be capable of transcending itself." (Baker:1984:212)

It may be true that in case of considering architecture as a problem of vocabulary, Ronchamp can be an epitomization of 'imperfectionism' for 'modern movement' (Stirling:1975:65); however the public acceptance which, one thinks, find a sound explanation in the words of the monk who has probably known Ronchamp, seems to demand much more than this interpretation.

3.3. Genetic Explanations for Ronchamp

> "It stands, so to speak, only for itself and in itself. Now this is decisive for dealing with the question at hand concerning the intention of the author. When it comes to a work of art, it could be said that the intention has, so to speak, "gone into" the work, and can no longer be sought behind it or before it. This sharply limits the value of all biographical insights related to a work of art, as well as those associated with the history of its origins. Works of art are detached from

> their origins and, just because of this, begin to speak-perhaps surprising even their creators." (Gadamer:1989:123)

Daniele Pauly, in *The Chapel of Ronchamp as an Example of Le Corbusier's Creative Process*, suggests that to explore the architect's creation process of the architectural work and to trace his references for the precursors form an indisputable part of the 'reading of an architecture' (1989:127). Moreover, she claims that such 'reading' can only be authorized by the research on the genesis of the architectural work through an examination of the 'story of the project's birth' (1989:130). One may mention the genesis of Ronchamp as evaluated by Pauly.

Pauly differentiates between implicit and explicit sources that play part in the generation of Ronchamp (1989:128-132). The implicit sources are suggested to reveal an unconscious process of association belonging to the incubation period of the project. For instance, Pauly claims that the south wall of Ronchamp with its thickness and the articulation of the openings has its origin in one of the local architectures of northern Africa which Le Corbusier has absorbed into his architectural repository during a trip in 1931 (132). The explicit sources, on the other hand, as Pauly explains, are the ones Le Corbusier himself refers in the design process such as the Villa Adriana at Tivoli which provide the solution for light penetration into the side chapels of Ronchamp, the shell of a crab that became its roof, a hydraulic dam whose working mechanisms employed for collecting the rain water, or an airplane wing which is transformed into the structure of the roof, all of which are employed as sources of solutions for different architectural problems (129-131).

One may suggest that, being explicitly referred or not, these two kinds of sources bear discrimination for neither the creative process nor the *architectural object* in the sense that both kinds of the sources have their places in Le Corbusier's repository and that they are

exposed to the same kind of transformation in the creation of the architectural production. On the other hand, tracing the genesis of the *architectural object*, or finding out the precursors of forms may not be always possible since it is evident that the incubation period of the idea is beyond access even for the architect himself. Moreover, the predecessors of the architectural form, whether be generated subconsciously in this incubation period or interpreted consciously for specific architectural problems, belong to the creative process; that is, they may not belong to the *architectural object* in which they are transformed into something unique in itself. It is true that they are of indisputable value for reflecting on the nature of architectural creation; however, it seems important to distinguish between the creation process of the work and the end product as an *architectural object* which may bear meaning independently of its generation. Likewise Eco differentiates between textual strategy as a linguistic object and the creative process as "the story of the growth of that textual strategy" (1992:85). Indeed Ronchamp resists such an analysis for the origins in the sense that the crab shell is not the crab shell anymore but the roof with its unique form; every predecessor has transmuted into something different than its original which bears a new meaning in a different system of references which becomes an irreducible composite. And this system of references can be suggested to be the particular *architectural object* that stands in its unity and uniqueness. In other words, either the crab shell, or the other precursors mentioned by Le Corbusier himself or suggested by interpreting authors seem to have no place in Ronchamp other than their places in the creation process. In that sense an analysis of the project's genealogy may be appraised to be an attempt to decipher the creative procedure, but it may fail to communicate with the end product of this process which becomes to bear different levels of meaning independently of its generation. For example, the south wall of Ronchamp may have its origin in a local architecture of northern Africa, as suggested by Pauly; however, there are other

authors ascribing different origins. It is true that the south wall carries certain qualities transmitted through tradition; nevertheless, one may claim that it also has an existence in itself independent of its origins and is endowed with other qualities in a different setting. Likewise Podro underlines that "in the case of many major works, we have no idea of the immediate sources upon which the artist drew (1982:136)" And giving the example of Brunelleschi's augmented column motif, which has numerous anticipations, used in Santo Spirito he suggests: "what concerns us is the way the device is used in the context of Brunellschi's building" (1982:136). It seems also possible to claim that these qualities, transmitted through tradition, themselves are transformed into another character within another system of references which is the *architectural object*. Therefore it seems important to penetrate into the *architectural object* not only for understanding Ronchamp in its uniqueness but also to reflect upon certain qualities that are carried through the architectural tradition and gained new expressions within this particular example.

3.4. An Architect's Interpretative Attitude Towards Tradition

> "Making a comparison between Ronchamp and a megalithic tomb, (John) Alford argued that the chapel 'can best be understood as a symbolic fortress and tomb', and characterized it as a 'fortress...against death.' He also recognized the chapel visual affinity to a ship, calling it 'a ship of life'." (Serenyi:1975:8)
>
> Ronchamp may be viewed as the summation of the human predicament, as the ship of life of the transient pilgrim, or as the fortress against death for the weary and the restless- a fortress which inevitably becomes his tomb." (Serenyi:1975:8)
>
> "The whitewashed rendering is applied to the interior as well as to the exterior and the openings scattered apparently at random over the south and north walls splay either inwards or outwards, similar to the reveals of gun-openings in coastal fortifications." (Curtis:1995:65)
>
> "……- in part Maltese tomb, in part Ischian vernacular, its half-cylindrical side chapels, toplit through spherical cowls and oriented towards the trajectory of the sun, serve to remind one that this Christian site was once the location of a sun

temple." (Frampton:1980:228)

> "The transition into the interior at Ronchamp is dramatic. One enters an otherworldly cave, a catacomb." (Curtis:1995:177)

> "The inside / outside idea is brought to a crescendo which conveys the feeling of an Early Christian gathering in a landscape, while touching on the artist's private agenda of a mystical cult of nature." (Curtis:1995:177)

> "..., there is the idea of the 'deep grotto', rendered by the effects of soft, round masses that surround the observer and give a sense of reassurance." (Pauly:1989:130)

These quotations on Ronchamp are selected from interpretative works of different authors; however, they reveal similar associative processes occasioned in the observers through their experience of the building. It is evident that Ronchamp with its unique form initiates a reaction of associative thinking which consequently leads to a process of ascribing meanings. And it should be suggested that the selected interpretations seem plausible in their associations; moreover, they all belong to Ronchamp as an *architectural object* for they belong to the architectural experience. It might be suggested that these associative explanations for the particular experiences while exemplifying the architectural experience by multiplying its references, they may not be adequate in the sense of giving the reasons for the peculiar character of the building. That is, *how* it is endowed with such a quality and *what* causes this particular experience as the pattern of attention generated by the *architectural object*. And it might be that an architect may be in need of a penetration into the mechanisms of that particular pattern regulating the internal logic of the architectural experience.

The significant effort performed by Le Corbusier through his architecture seems to exemplify such an attitude of transforming the architectural knowledge transmitted by tradition. It is mentioned above that Pauly indicates two kinds of sources in relation to the generation process of Ronchamp. The sources from the architectural tradition are interpreted in Ronchamp as

they stand for 'spatial facts', 'architectural facts' ,in Pauly's terms (1989:133), like the play of volumes, ideas of arrangement of light and shadows, or the relations maintained with the site. In a broader context, this kind of interpretative attitude to the architectural tradition may be suggested to be the kernel of Le Corbusier's work. Stanford Anderson, in *Architectural Research Programmes in the Work of Le Corbusier*, evaluates Le Corbusier's sketches from Acropolis in relation to his notion of 'promenade architecture' and claims that through these sketches Le Corbusier has interpreted the sequential experience of the site rather than studying the temple forms or orders (1984:151-152). Similarly, Alan Colquhoun (1989) and William J. R. Curtis (1995) point out the same interpretative attitude of Le Corbusier. Colquhoun suggests that, by Le Corbusier, tradition is construed as a set of concrete examples the knowledge of which is communicated by his drawings: "most of Le Corbusier's general precepts seem to have their origin in particular examples: Turkish houses, the monasteries of Mount Athos and Emo, the temple sites of India, Cambodia, and Chaldaea, Pompeian houses, the urban schemes of Louis XVI, the studios and cafes of late-nineteenth-century Paris" (1989:95)

"Some light! In 1911, I had noticed something like that in a Roman grotto in Tivoli- no grotto, here at Ronchamp, but the hump of a hill" (Pauly:1989:129); this is one of the many cases that Le Corbusier refers to past examples in order to acquire solutions for the architectural problems that he encountered throughout his work. In another instance, he notes: "for the study of the lighting of the church: Santha Sophia, the rays of the sun at the cosmic hours" (Le Corbusier:1964:18); where he exercises through sketches the light quality inside his unbuilt church in Firmini. Besides these concrete examples interpreted for specific architectural works, one should underline that there are also architectural ideas which bear significance in terms of interpretation of tradition in Le Corbusier's work. Like the idea of *promenade*

architecture mentioned above, *brise-soleil* may be construed as an example of the kind where the problem of the fully glazed facade is countered by the conversion of the solution provided by the traditional solid wall into another architectural element (Colquhoun:1989:95)

However, it seems important to underscore that such an attitude should not be confused with a process of cut-and-paste; as underlined by Curtis, "designing a new building was never just a case of sticking pre-existing types into a new assemblage; rather it was a matter of re-thinking customary elements to fit new intentions, and then of embedding them in an emerging new synthesis" (1995:226). This interpretative approach to tradition may be conceived to reveal an important issue. As an alternative to Pauly's claim on the 'reading of an architecture', mentioned above, that it necessitates a research on the work's genesis, Le Corbusier himself *reads* past examples of architecture on another level free from their processes of creation; in other words, as *architectural objects* which reveal in one's experience a form of knowledge that is transmitted through architectural tradition. And it seems to be this level that an interpretative attitude within tradition takes place, as performed by Le Corbusier himself. One may claim that the examples interpreted by Le Corbusier, themselves, might be understood as interpretations of other past examples; and independent of their course of generation, they are able to transmit certain meanings at the level of the *architectural object* which are embedded in them through interpretative processes within the architectural tradition and potentially ready to be revealed in the architectural experience.

Colquhoun also indicates that this specific interpretative attitude is not restricted to Le Corbusier's transformation of the knowledge transmitted through the architectural tradition; the *object-types* through which the modern civilization is interpreted and the *objects of poetic reaction* like the female figure that are introduced in his work around 1930s belong to the

same habit of mind of interpreting images from different settings in order to produce and convey new compounds of ideas (1989:95). Curtis suggests that:

> "Le Corbusier's creative procedure relied upon a period of subconscious immersion in which unprecedented links were made. To judge from his sketchbooks, he oscillated back and forth between raw impressions of the world and the sorting of perceptions into categories. His mind contained an elaborate mythical structure in which objects were stolen from their customary niches and reused for his own bizarre purposes. A crab's shell might rhyme with an airplane wing and the hull of a boat to become a chapel roof; memories of a ruined Roman basilica might fuse with the type of a diwan and a parasol in concrete to express the idea of the sheltering power of the law." (1995:226)

And he underlines that for Le Corbusier diverse things bear poetic correspondences in relation to different analogies, sometimes due to their function, sometimes because of formal or structural similarities (1995:179). It seems important to notice that this transmutation of disparate things into each other for architectural solutions is the result of the same mechanisms at work in Le Corbusier's interpretative attitude to tradition; not only an element from architectural tradition but a seemingly unrelated object may also become a predecessor for Le Corbusier's work being exposed to the same creative act. It might be suggested that the elements from the architectural tradition are already *structured* for specific architectural solutions. And a re-evaluation of these elements, hence their transformation, might be understood as a function depending on a sense of the 'architectural'. This sense, as the form of knowledge transmitted by the architectural tradition, might be understood as a knowledge of *how* some experience comes to communicate architecturally; that is, *how* an idea about a life situation can be transformed into an *architectural object*. Hence it might be suggested that even when an architect experiments, the sense for the 'architectural' handed down by tradition seems to be authoritative as the grounds of justification. And the elements from tradition may not be understood to be used literally; instead, Le Corbusier might be understood to *penetrate* into their 'form-content' dialogue and to perform a functional transformation in a search for

new forms for *new* ideas. Also for the 'found objects', it might be suggested that the same transformation is operative, knowledge of which is cultivated by his relation to architectural tradition; that is, the objects are also exposed to the same mechanisms of the 'architectural thinking'.

Curtis, referring to T. S. Elliot, suggests that: "the good work of architecture 'communicates before it is understood': its deepest and indivisible symbolic powers are exteriorized through patterns of forces that have an immediate and dynamic effect on the emotions and thoughts of the observer" (1989:183) And this level of immediate transmission of meaning between the object and the observer can be suggested to be the level where the sense of 'architectural' functions. In that sense, Curtis's discussion of the *authentic work* seem to underline the interpretative processes within the tradition (1989:183). He indicates that the *authentic work*, as opposed to a superficial assemblage, entails a sort of temporal depth and resonance in its indivisible and irreducible character; that is, it absorbs all its ingredients into a unique whole. Hence the *authentic work* is understood deeply rooted in the lessons of the past; and besides its temporal depth it belongs to the present in the sense that it transcends the historical realities of its predecessors by transforming them into its own expressive presence. Moreover, in this presence, as Curtis highlights, it shares a common ground with its predecessors, that is, "a substructure of values essential to the medium which is tapped by works of principle no matter what their period", as emphasized by Curtis (1989:183). His statement seems to be significant in that it denotes a certain continuity throughout the works regardless of their historical context; and this continuity can be suggested to be due to the persistence of the way they communicate in the sense of the term used by T. S. Elliot. And it might be claimed that this communication is via the special mediative act on the side of the architect occasioned via the sense of the 'architectural'. Cassirer emphasizes that "in actuality, the particular manner in

which the work of art is expressed belongs not only to the *technique* of construction of the work but also to its very *conception*; Beethoven's intuition is musical, Phidias's intuition is plastic, Milton's intuition is epic, Goethe's intuition is lyric" (1960:205). Hence it might be suggested that Le Corbusier's intuition is 'architectural'. Cassirer maintains that the idea is inseparable from the medium in art, in that the intuition is born into a particular medium (1960:205). Likewise Podro highlights that: "when an artist draws upon earlier works he derives from it not simply visual forms but dramatic dispositions, not only ways of defining forms but sensitivity toward the character of what is depicted" (1982:129). The relation to past in Le Corbusier's works, as underlined, is not a process of mere imitation. Rather his focus seems to treat the past as a source of knowledge which, in its transformation, provides answers for ways of tackling with the present problems. As an architect, what Le Corbusier studies through past examples may be construed as the way they reveal knowledge as *architectural objects*: the way they inform and effect the observer. One can find a sound response to these ideas from Le Corbusier ; however not as the author of Ronchamp, but as an artist reflecting on his own work:

> "Today I am accused of being a revolutionary. Yet I confess to having had only one master: the past; and only one discipline: the study of the past."
>
> "..... carried away by the defense of the rights to invention, I used the past as a witness, this past which was my only master and which continues to be my permanent counsel.
> Every level-headed man, once cast into the unknown of architectural invention, can really only sustain his impetus by looking to the lessons provided over the centuries. The testimonies provided by the ages have a permanent human value.
> Flower of the creative spirit, chain of traditions which embody it and each link of which is and can only be a work that is innovative, and often revolutionary, within its working; a contribution.
> The history that bases itself on reference points preserves only these faithful testimonies; the imitations, plagiaries, and compromises fall behind them, abandoned, even destroyed.
> Respect for the past is a filial attitude natural to every creator."

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION: ANOTHER DIALOGUE WITH RONCHAMP AND CONCLUDING REMARKS

> "The Chapel at Ronchamp perhaps shows that architecture is not an affair of columns, but an affair of plastic events." (Le Corbusier:1957:22)

It is mentioned in section 1.1 in reference to Cassirer that an artwork is a cultural object mediating between the poles of "I" and "Thou". It is an embodiment of a determined human experience. Hence it is in need of being 'understood' to fulfill its mediating function; that is, it is in need of being 'made sense' of, as underlined by Gombrich. It is also suggested that to this extent the artwork shares its mediating function with all other cultural works; it transmits the human significance it embodies. And it is claimed that the artwork bears a *specificity* in relation to its communicative mode which imposes a *special* task on the side of the interpreter. Accordingly it is claimed that the experience of the work of art is a distinct mode of mediation whereby the beholder is asked to re-enact its unique articulation via which the embodiment is revealed only then to become an object to be 'made sense' of. This *specificity*, marking the communicative dimension of artworks, is tried to be explored in relation to a notion of aesthetic experience. And aesthetic experience is claimed to be a realization of the necessary constructive act the artwork imposes and regulates via its inner coherency; that is, it is suggested that *what* is conveyed in the experience of an artwork is already a function of *how* it is conveyed -i.e., of the work's aesthetic constitution. It is also claimed that it is this capacity

of an artwork to 'speak' on its own which secures its afterlife beyond the original context of creation. Accordingly, it is suggested that such an understanding of a notion of *specificity* in relation to the work of art may locate 'art' as a translative capacity between the representation and the represented, above and beyond the particularity of the represented as a historical human experience the intensity and the concreteness of which is preserved via the manner of the representation. This, in return, is claimed to be the binding condition for a notion of tradition in art. Hence, it is suggested that an artist's relation to the works of art form the past generations may be understood to be regulated on the basis of this translative capacity whereby the past works may be understood as transmitting a 'sense for art' besides the specific historical content. Thus it is claimed that an artist may be concerned not only with *what* is revealed in the experience of the work of art as a historical intention but specifically with *how* it is revealed in the experience -i.e., *how* the *art object* regulates the determined experience. It is also suggested that this level of a relation to an artwork may operate as a guide for the interpretations intending to 'make sense' of it.

Likewise Gadamer underlines that a poetic text has its own status as a linguistic object which demands to be grasped in its originality before referring to anything outside itself (1989:44). In another instance he suggests: "in its replaceability the work of art is no mere bearer of meaning -as if the meaning could be transferred to another bearer; rather the meaning of the work of art lies in the fact that it is there" (1986:33) and he differentiates between 'work' and 'creation': "the thing now 'stands' and thereby is 'there' once and for all, ready to be encountered by anyone who meets it and to be perceived in its own 'quality'" (1986:33). In a similar manner, Adorno highlights that to become what they are artworks should be interpreted at a level which he calls "illuminating the comportment" of the work (1970:125). And he suggests "if artworks do not make themselves as something else but only like

themselves, then only who imitate them understand them" (1970:125) Also Langer seem to understand this level of an interaction with the artwork as it precedes any 'making sense' of it: "artistic import requires no interpretation; it requires a full and clear perception of the presented form" (1967:84). Susan Sontag (1964:216-222), in relation to the notion of interpretation of artworks, also points out the difference between "*what* it means" and "*how* it is *what* it is".

The sketchs presented here may be explained to be in pursuit of the architectural ideas demonstrated in Ronchamp by Le Corbusier (figures.2,3,4). The idea is to try to transform the notion of 'plastic events' which are entailed with the religious activity in Ronchamp into other settings in the sense of an experimentation on intensifying experiences related to some different activities in order to *communicate* states of mind. In that manner 'plastic events' are considered as a way of exploring diverse subject matters. And the presented works are only momentary productions of another dialogue with Ronchamp which may be claimed to be an assignment for a student of architecture. The idea behind the sketches might be understood as a multiplication of references for one's experience of Ronchamp in order to explore and communicate *how* it is *what* it is from a particular point of view. Hence, this should not be understood as an attempt to make a conclusive statement about Ronchamp; rather the aim is an effort to understand through an exemplification of Ronchamp's architectural strategies, the way it is constituted as an *architectural object*, and to make oneself *attune* to the way it realizes itself. Thus the aim is only an attempt to 'co-speak' that Gadamer points to: "in contrast to all other texts, the literary text is not interrupted by the dialogical and intermediary speaking of the interpreter; rather it is simply accompanied by the interpreter's constant co-speaking."



Figure.2: Interpreting Ronchamp 1.



Figure.3: Interpreting Ronchamp 2.



Figure.4: Interpreting Ronchamp 3.

The author's intention for a later study is to enlarge the field of concern through an examination of different frameworks of thought from which different interpretative approaches in the field of architecture emerge and to specify an understanding of the notion of *autonomy* in architecture in relation to the *specificity* mentioned in this study. This kind of a study may be important for a comprehension of the current debates in architecture and especially of the misdirected criticism -whether positive or negative- of the actual works. That is, some practices of criticism and interpretation seem to take place on other instances than what distinctively belongs to architecture as a way of thinking and making, as a specific medium of realization and communication of ideas. One thinks, the *specificity* of architecture lies in its being a distinct way of translation. And most of the criticism on architectural works seem not to contribute to *architectural knowledge* because of their ignorance of this kind of an *autonomy*. That is, they focus on a variety of things circulating around the *work* but do not mention *what really is there as a piece of architecture* and *how it is what it is*. Moreover, such an understanding of the *specificity* of architecture seems to cast light on the reductive critical frameworks in the field of architecture, whether it be *formalism, modernism, postmodernism, regionalism, functionalism, materialism, deconstructivism*, etc., or any other *-ism* to be possibly introduced into architectural criticism, no matter how different they *operate* as 'claims on architecture'. For instance without a consciousness of this *specificity*, it seems not easy to defend what you do as an architect in the presence of a certain *criticism of culture*, since whatever architecture creates will be understood as producing *ideology*, which indeed may be true; but for the most part the work itself is reduced to the -cost of- materials used or the people it serves with an ignorance of the particular 'mediation' on the side of the architect and the distinct life experiences that the *architectural object* offers. Or on a very different dimension, it seems not easy to evaluate *positively* a work of architecture in the

presence of a *conservative* criticism which claims that it *loses communication* with its public -because of its *newness*; or conversely you may not be able to offend a *kitsch* claiming to *revive* the past. Similarly, it may be *difficult* to defend a *good* work of architecture which is *sensitive* to its local and cultural *context* by using conventional strategies of *making* architecture in the presence of an *avant-gardist* denouncement. One may give more examples, but the main point is a demand for the awareness of the *how* of the architectural works via which they become *what they are*. That is, a consideration of *how an architectural interpretation of a life situation takes place* and *how ideas are realized through architecture* should be underlined in order to estimate different critical attitudes in the field of architecture. Because one thinks that most of the discussion on architecture remains at the level of 'mimetic instance', the 'represented', and the architectural criticism turns out to be a criticism of the world views expressed in the 'representations'. This is not to deny the importance of this kind of a debate in architecture. But it might be that it should be done not under the name of 'architectural criticism'. For, one thinks one cannot isolate the 'mimetic instance' from the whole of one's meanings. And the discussion on the particularity of the *way of life* offered by the *architectural object* may not be *specifically* an 'architectural' concern.

Through an examination of the different approaches to problems of meaning and interpretation in architecture, it seems that one may locate a formulation of *autonomy* of architecture without losing the dimension of its interconnectedness to the other instances of culture: an *autonomy* which will not yield to the *essentialist* demands for the *eternal truths of architecture* -i.e., for the *ever-recurring* 'representations'- but also will resist to the total reduction of architecture to any other historical or social determination -i.e., to the 'represented'. And this may pave a way to the potential of creating a perspective for the evaluation of different 'claims on architecture' which, for the most part, are misdirected in

their reductionism and losing communication with each other in the absence of a common ground; however much questionable it may seem to suggest the possibility of such a ground.

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