

WELL-PRESERVED BOUNDARIES: FAITH AND CO-EXISTENCE IN THE LATE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

GÜLEN GÖKTÜRK

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SEPTEMBER 2015

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Ayşe Ayata
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kürşad Ertuğrul (METU, ADM) _____

Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım (METU, ECON) _____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. E.Attila Aytekin (METU, ADM) _____

Prof. Dr. Esra Danacıoğlu Tamur (YTU, PSIR) _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Aslı Iğsız (NYU, MEIS) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Gülen Göktürk

Signature:

ABSTRACT

WELL-PRESERVED BOUNDARIES: FAITH AND CO- EXISTENCE IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

Göktürk, Gülen

Ph.D., Department of Political Science and Public Administration

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım

September 2015, 294 pages

The purpose of this dissertation is twofold; firstly, it focuses on the transformation of the social identity of Orthodox Christians from religious to national in the region of Cappadocia in the late Ottoman Empire through an analysis of the relationship between co-existence practices of religious communities and their ultimate nationalization. Secondly, it opens a debate about the romanticist view of the Ottoman Empire, which portrays it as “a land of tolerance” and Ottoman plurality as “a historical example of multiculturalism”. In pursuit of these goals, this dissertation is based heavily on the Oral Tradition Archive and the library of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

The region of Cappadocia was chosen as the setting for this dissertation due to the fact that it was devoid of any visible hostility between religious communities even during the age of nationalism; hence, if one is to talk about “peaceful cohabitation,” no other part of the Empire but Cappadocia would be better qualified to buttress the prevailing romanticism. However, even there,

people maintained their community borders and established their social identities on the basis of religious differences and, when the Ottoman rule was challenged during and after the Balkan Wars, people found themselves more intensely engaged on the path of nationalization. Based on an analysis of plurality in Cappadocia, this dissertation offers a normalizing perspective against the existing romanticism with a special emphasis on the role of pre-existing social relations in national identity formation.

Key words: Ottoman tolerance, antagonistic tolerance, religious nationalism, Anatolian Orthodox, Greek Protestants.

ÖZ

İYİ KORUNMUŞ SINIRLAR: GEÇ DÖNEM OSMANLI İMPARATORLUĞU'NDA İNANÇ VE BİR ARADA YAŞAMA

Göktürk, Gülen

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Onur Yıldırım

Eylül 2015, 294 sayfa

Bu tezin iki amacı bulunmaktadır. İlk olarak, dini cemaatlerin ortak yaşam pratikleri ve onların nihai milletleşmeleri arasındaki ilişkinin analizi üzerinden geç dönem Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Kapadokya Bölgesi'nde Ortodoks Hıristiyanların sosyal kimliklerinin diniden milliyeye dönüşümüne odaklanmaktadır. İkinci olarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nu “bir hoşgörü toprağı” ve Osmanlı çoğulluğunu “çokkültürlülüğün tarihi bir örneğı” olarak gösteren romantik bakış açısını tartışmaya açmaktadır. Amaçlarının takibi için bu tez ağırlıkla Küçük Asya Araştırmaları Merkezi'nin Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi'ne ve kütüphanesine dayanmaktadır.

Kapadokya bölgesinin bu tez için seçilmiş olmasının sebebi milliyetçilik çağında bile cemaatler arasında görülür bir çatışmadan yoksun olmasıdır. Eğer biri “barışçıl beraber yaşamadan” bahsedecek ise, imparatorluğun başka yeri değil ama Kapadokya var olan romantizmi desteklemenin hakkını en iyi verir. Ancak, orada bile insanlar cemaat sınırlarını korumuş ve sosyal kimliklerini dini farklılıkları üzerine kurmuşlardır ve Osmanlı yönetimine Balkan Savaşları sırasında ve

sonrasında meydan okunduđu zaman, insanlar kendilerini daha yoğun bir biçimde milliyetçilik yoluna bağlanmış bulmuşlardır. Kapadokya'daki çoğulluğun analizine dayanarak, bu tez önceden var olan sosyal ilişkilerin milli kimlik inşasındaki rolüne özel bir vurgu yaparak mevcut romantizme karşı normalleştiren bir bakış açısı sunar.

Anahtar kelimeler: Osmanlı müsamahası, antagonistik müsamaha, dini milliyetçilik, Anadolu Ortodoksları, Rum Protestanlar.

For Eleni

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to my advisor Onur Yıldırım for his support and encouragement not only during the writing process but also at every other step in my academic life thus far. I still remember the very first time I knocked his door in 2005 as a sophomore who wanted to become an academician. From that moment on he shared his knowledge and experience with me. Through times when I felt discouraged by unlucky experiences he never let me give up. I owe so much to him. I wholeheartedly thank the members of my thesis committee, Kürşad Ertuğrul, E. Attila Aytakin, Aslı Iğsız and Esra Danacıoğlu Tamur for their time, valuable critiques and supportive attitude not only during the defense but also before and after. I particularly thank Aslı Iğsız for exchange of ideas in our first meeting in New York, for inviting me to one of her lectures and for unhesitatingly sharing with me her unpublished article.

I should like to thank the Turkish Scientific Council (TÜBİTAK) for supporting me within “graduate student research program 2214-A” at Wellesley College in 2014 and to Anastasia Karakasidou for inviting me to the U.S. to work with her for my dissertation. I would like to express my special thanks to Stavros T. Anestidis, the director of Centre for Asia Minor Studies, for facilitating my research process and to Dimitris Kamouzis for his valuable advice during my time at the centre. I would also like to thank Sia Anagnostopoulou for being my advisor when I was an Erasmus exchange student at Panteion University in 2013 and for her valuable advice during our short meetings. I owe thanks to Prodromos B. Spirakos for unhesitatingly giving me precious photos of his refugee origin grandparents. My thanks also go to John Tzevas, the director of Greek Historical Evangelical Archive, for sharing with me documents and information about the Greek Protestants, and to Anastasia Papazoglou for hosting me many times in her village, Neokaisaria, and inviting me to an annual gathering of Cappadocians in Greece. Lastly, it was a precious opportunity to meet Cemal Kafadar and to exchange ideas for my thesis. I thank him for inspiring me as a great scholar and as a modest person.

I wish to thank my high school friends for always making me feel their presence especially when I am abroad. I have never felt lonely during thesis writing process. A special thanks is reserved for Mine Toker for helping me in formatting and for Aytek Soner Alpan for our exchange of ideas and sources and his assistance during my first days in Athens. I have spent and shared the long Ph. D. process with Esin Kırak. I thank her for her support and friendship. I also thank Margarita Pavlou, Rudina Billa, Haris Mexa and Sofia Siasou for being great friends and a great family to me during my visits to Greece.

My greatest debt is always to my parents. Without their support and patience, I would have given up long ago. They have always encouraged me with their unconditional love and never ending effort. My history lover and story-teller father inspired me so much to become an academician. He enjoyed my dissertation topic as much as I did and took me to several Cappadocian settlements to track the traces of Anatolian Orthodox together. Finally, I would like to thank Eleni Patoucha for hosting me for months; for making her apartment home to me, for patiently teaching me Greek, for helping me in my translations, and more than that for being an elder sister to me. I have learned so much from her. This dissertation is dedicated to her.

LIST OF TABLES

Tables

Table 1	55
---------------	----

LIST OF FIGURES

Figures

Figure 1. The Exchange Memorial at Neokaisaria.....	2
Figure 2. Flyer of the fifteenth pan-Greek <i>Gavoustima</i> of Cappadocians	4
Figure 3. The Hasatani family in their local costumes in Sille, Konya.....	14
Figure 4. Map of Cappadocia.....	15
Figure 5. Kayabaşı: An Orthodox Christian neighborhood in the nineteenth century Niğde.	102
Figure 6. Anatolian Christians from Nevşehir.	111
Figure 7. An inscribed stone panel of a house door from Cappadocia	121
Figure 8. Despina Raftopoulou in local costume of Niğde.	124
Figure 9. The wedding ceremony of Rahil Loukopoulou in Nevşehir.....	130
Figure 10. St. Vasilis Church of Misti (Çarıklı) Niğde.....	131
Figure 11. Greek language teacher Phillippos Papagrigoriou Aristovoulos in Nevşehir.....	162
Figure 12. A Greek Orthodox family from Talas.....	163
Figure 13. Greek speaking Orthodox Christians from Ürgüp in the late nineteenth century.	164
Figure 14. The seal of brotherhood organization of Andaval	171
Figure 15. The Oratory House of Evangelicals in Zincidere	222
Figure 16. A building of the American Hospital in Talas	225
Figure 17. Anatolia College, Merzifon.	230

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
LIST OF TABLES	xi
LIST OF FIGURES	xii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	xiii
CHAPTER	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 Names and places	7
1.2 Methodology	16
1.2.1 Problematization of sources	16
1.2.2 Problematization of literature	25
1.3 Theoretical concerns	29
1.4 Outline	33
2. OTTOMAN TOLERANCE RECONSIDERED	38
2.1 Tolerance in contemporary plural societies	43
2.1.1 Different mechanisms to attain justice in contemporary plural societies	43
2.1.2 Tolerance	55
2.1.3 Why be tolerant?	63

2.1.4	Can tolerance be accommodated?	66
2.2	Ottoman tolerance and the myth of the <i>millet</i> system.....	69
2.3	Summary and plan of the next chapter	82
3.	MAINTAINING BOUNDARIES: FAITH AND CO-EXISTENCE IN LATE OTTOMAN CAPPADOCIA.....	85
3.1	Practices of co-existence.....	90
3.1.1	Disrupting illusion, normalizing Ottoman plurality	90
3.1.2	Communal identity and determining the Other for border maintenance.....	104
3.1.3	Reading co-existence from another angle	109
3.1.3.1	Religious Syncretism	111
3.1.3.2	Intermarriages	124
3.2	Summary and plan of the next chapter	130
4.	THE PATH TOWARDS NATIONALISM	133
4.1	Greek nationalism	138
4.2	Interrelated phenomena: <i>Xenitia</i> , education and nationalism	146
4.2.1	The phenomenon of immigration	146
4.2.2	Community, schools and brotherhood organizations	156
4.2.3	Prominent Orthodox figures of Greater Cappadocia.....	174
4.3	Karamanlidika press.....	180
4.4	<i>Χαλάσανε τα πράγματα</i> (things spoiled): years after <i>Hürriyet</i>	188
4.4.1	Economic boycott and exile policies of the Young Turks .	192
4.4.2	General military conscription and the long war	197
4.4.3	Turkish Greek War and the movement of Papa Efthim	201
4.5	Summary and plan of the next chapter	208

5.TOLERATING THE HERETICS: THE DISTINCTIVE CASE OF GREEK PROTESTANTS	211
5.1 The missionary activities and the genesis of the Protestant Greek communities.....	214
5.2 Tolerating the “heretics”: a glimpse inside the Protestant life in Anatolia.....	225
5.3 Inter-communal relations during the long war (1912-1922)	235
5.4 Summary.....	239
6. CONCLUSION.....	241
BIBLIOGRAPHY	250
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY	273
B. CURRICULUM VITAE.....	293
C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU	294

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I remember the first time I read about the Turkish inscriptions, written in Greek letters, on the stone panels of fountains and house gates in some settlements of Cappadocia, and on grave stones in the Monastery of the *Zoodokhos Pigi*, also known as *Balıkli*, in Istanbul, in a travel magazine called *Atlas* in August 2003. A year later I found myself making a presentation about this written language, called *Karamanlıca* or *Karamanlidika*, in a Turkish language class at my university. In 2009 I wrote a Master's thesis about *Karamanlılar* (also known as *Karamanlides*), and graduated from the Nationalism Studies Program at the Central European University in Budapest. *Karamanlılar* are known to be a Turkish speaking Greek Orthodox community and their ostensibly “incongruent” language and religion for the Greek and Turkish nationalisms constitute an interesting case study for a thesis of nationalism studies.¹

The following summer I met an authentic group of Turcophone Greeks in a village called *Neokaisaria* (New Kayseri-Caesarea) in Ioannina, Greece. Until this encounter, I had always visualized these people as an extinct ancient community. They are not. Although spoken only by the elderly, Turkish is still alive among some second and third generation refugees. I distinctly remember attending a funeral that day. I was standing outside a funeral house with Maria, the daughter-in-law of the deceased woman. She was telling me how she feels when she speaks Turkish: “I speak Turkish from my heart, it is my mother tongue. I learned Greek at school, I just speak it.” In the meantime the familiar melody of lament rose from the house: *Keçi bağlarında dolanıyorum, yitirdim yarimi aranyorum*.² That

¹ See G. Göktürk, *Clash of Identity Myths in the Hybrid Presence of the Karamanlis*.

² I am moving around *Keçi (Gesi)* vineyards; I have lost my beloved and I am looking for him. A well-known folk song in Turkey and, apparently, in Greece. The song was sung by Nikos Papazoglou in September 2009 in Neokaisaria, Ioannina, Greece. His parents were refugees from Kayseri and his mother tongue is Turkish.

summer day was a magical experience for me. It was a cloudy day, and in my imagination, the lament was heard from the mountains of Epirus, and an Argaeus-like mountain greeted once again in the village of Caesareans. The guest room of the village church was decorated with photos of the ancestral land and the tiny memorial in the small square of the village was there to remind the villagers of their refugee origins. That day I realized that my journey with these people was not over yet.



Figure 1. The Exchange Memorial at Neokaisaria. On its stone panel is written: “The live memory of Neokaisaria. Here and there. Never forgotten!” Photograph: Gülen Göktürk

Three years after my first encounter with the Turkish speaking Greeks, I attended a festival of Cappadocians to make observations. The festival was *Gavoustima*, the annual gathering of Cappadocians from all over Greece, which has occurred annually for almost two decades. *Gavoustima* is a word derived from the Turkish word *kavuşma*, which means “coming together,” and it was coined by the Cappadocian Greeks and given as a name to the festival (πανηγύρι), which is organized each year by a different local Cappadocian association in a different locality. Hundreds of Cappadocian Greeks have gathered at this organization every August for the eighteen years it has been alive. Anything and everything one can think about Cappadocia was there during the festival; music, dances, food, language, memories, and stories from the family members about the motherland. Only Cappadocia itself was absent from the picture. I tried to interview people, but

our conversations were often interrupted by chit chat. I could not insist, and tried to be part of the atmosphere. We were in *Neo Agioneri, Kilkis* but it seemed to me that we were pretending to be in *Misti, Niğde*.

During the festival, I also observed that the speakers addressed the audience as “the children of Cappadocian Hellenism”, a title which implies that they distinguish themselves from the rest of the Greek society with an emphasis on their Cappadocian origins, but without putting their “Greekness” in question. That is to say, they celebrate their origins with feelings of nostalgia; however, nationalistic feelings are not absent in this picture.³

Still, when I think of my observations about *Gavoustima*, I find myself lost between amazement and incomprehension. I wonder if one can really miss a place that one has never physically been to. It is like craving for the food you have never tasted. I do not, of course, have doubts about the genuineness of their feelings of nostalgia. Rather, I question why second and third generation refugees still have these feelings. Confused by this question, I recall the moment when I talked to a second generation Turcophone refugee in *Neokaisaria* in 2009. He was telling me about his visit to Turkey. “Do you know, my daughter? I was asked to buy a land from my village of origin in Kayseri,” he said; “I rejected; why to settle there?” “My home is here.” Now I realize that the attendees of *Gavoustima*, when celebrating their origins, were not longing for the lost land. The ancestral land was actually alien to them. It was the land of their deceased parents and grandparents. They could happily attend touristic tours to ancestral lands, but they would not live there. Their feeling of nostalgia has nothing to do with the lost land; it is rather a romance with fantasy (Boym, 2001, p. 12); a way of celebrating their differences from the rest of the society. All these observations make me believe that my study has contemporary repercussions, although its focus is on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

³ For my personal experience in *Gavoustima*, see G. Göktürk, *Yunanistan’dan Anadolu Manzaraları [Anatolian views from Greece]*.



Figure 2. Flyer of the fifteenth pan-Greek *Gavoustima* of Cappadocians on 24-25 August 2012, organized by “Cultural Society of *Misti*”

This dissertation investigates the relationship between tolerance, co-habitation, and nationalism by focusing mainly on Orthodox-Muslim and Orthodox-Protestant practices of living together in Cappadocia in the last fifty years (from 1870s until the Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey, 1923) of the Ottoman Empire, due to constraints of the obtained sources. It is also an analysis of transformation of social identity of the Cappadocian Orthodox Christians from Christians to Greeks through various mechanisms, such as the elite endeavor of utilizing education and press, and through all sorts of nationalist aggression during the long war (1912-1922). My greatest disappointment is that due to absence of first-person testimonies to study the Turkish-Muslim perspective for co-habitation, the subject matter could only be examined through the Greek Orthodox perspective.⁴ For the purpose of this study, I looked at the refugee

⁴ Early Turkish novels can give us some perspective on the Turkish point of view towards the Greek or Orthodox element in the Ottoman Empire. However, having been written in the internecine first two decades of the 1900s and mostly by intellectuals who had been deeply affected by the political conjuncture, I do not think that these novels portray a lay point of view.

testimonies in Oral Tradition Archive of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies (hereinafter KMS) and several Greek Orthodox and Missionary publications from the concerned time period.

The study includes many theses but argues fundamentally that the co-habitation practices of different communities in the pre-nationalism era gave clues to understanding the process of embracement of nationalism by the people. In other words, it affirms that nationalism settles into pre-existing boundaries and dynamics of relationships between faith groups. This is not a primordialist argument that reduces national identity to church affiliation. Conversely, it investigates tolerance and competitive living together between faith groups, and attributes special attention on the one hand to cultural flirting between religious communities, and on the other to ways of preserving boundaries and keeping the group (Self) intact against the potential intervention of the Other. The center of attention is micro cosmos of lay people rather than macro cosmos of rulers and Church authorities.

The unique quality of this project is that it focuses on a territory of non-conflict, in contrast with the general tendency of nationalism studies, which tend to focus on conflict zones, considering the fact that the nationalist ferment can easily stick to controversy. History demonstrated that even in areas of relative peace, nationalism found ways to establish itself, and even penetrated places where there was no visible inter-communal conflict. Cappadocia was one of those places. Despite the confessional differences between religious communities, people were not in conflict, and they were enjoyed common customs, religious rituals, and a shared language, spoken by most of the Christians of the region. Nevertheless, even the Cappadocian Christians eventually were nationalized in the first decades

For Cappadocia in particular it seems that the only novel that was written about the Orthodox of the region was Mahmut Yesari's first novel "Bir namus meselesi" (A matter of honor) which was serialized in the magazine *Kelebek* in 1923. This was a novel about Orthodox Christians from Kayseri who continued their lives in Istanbul. For more information about this novel see, S. T. Anestidis, Yunan ve Türk Edebiyatında erken Karamanlı tiplerleri [Early Karamanli typologies in Turkish and Greek literature]. In short, due to a lack of sources the Turkish point of view about their Christian compatriots is unfortunately absent in this study.

of the twentieth century, a period that I call years of discontinuity, as it was a rupture from previous epochs due to the strict nationalist policies of the Committee of Union and Progress (hereinafter CUP), never-ending wars, and the eventual displacement of peoples with the Turkish-Greek Population Exchange in 1923. The elite endeavor to Hellenize the Anatolian Orthodox began earlier in the second half of the nineteenth century, but it was only successful in creating a sort of broader Community consciousness, or proto-national bonds, if we follow Hobsbawm (1992), especially among the people who received an education in local community schools, and among Cappadocian immigrants in big coastal towns. I will most certainly discuss the various responses to the nationalization attempts of the elites. By pinpointing the traditional relations between faith groups in a relatively peaceful ecosystem in a pre-nationalism era, the project explains this seemingly inconceivable nationalization process and, in doing this, benefits from Robert M. Hayden's (2002) concept of "antagonistic tolerance" and Peter Van Der Veer's (1994) "religious nationalism," two terms that complete one another. The former refers to competitive co-habitation, and the latter to the transformation of pre-existing religious belongingness to nationalist belongingness in some regions like India and the Balkans. In India, for example, religious issues generated passionate feelings among faith groups, and violent action against the Other; dreams of nation always take religion as one of the main aspects of national identity (van der Ver, 1994).

This dissertation ultimately aims to respond to current Pax-Ottomana romanticism through an investigation of a relatively peaceful region which had the potential to suit best the myth of "Ottoman multiculturalism," as well as through a detailed discussion of contemporary theories of accommodating plurality in order to not arbitrarily utilize concepts like tolerance, multiculturalism, and justice. It is hard to deny that the official historiography in Turkey was nation-state oriented until recently; homogenization policies of the early republican era were almost never questioned, and the history of the Ottoman Empire was underrated. Nowadays the wind blows in the opposite direction; the Ottoman Empire is overly

exaggerated; and politicians and some scholars go even further, claiming that Ottoman plurality was “a pre-modern” or “a pre-nation-state” multiculturalism⁵ and that the Ottoman Empire was a land of “tolerance”⁶. This approach is faulty at several points. One is that it employs the term “tolerance” positively and, in fact, randomly, without any reference to tolerance/toleration debates in liberal and critical theories of justice, and implies “peaceful living together” even though these two concepts are not equal. Additionally, it remains inadequate to answer the awaiting questions: If the Ottoman Empire was an example of “peaceful cohabitation,” why was it dissolved into several nation states? Was there really a glorious past to which we can look for solutions to solve the problems of today? And how can we label a historical occurrence with contemporary concepts like multiculturalism? This dissertation hopes to answer these questions with an approach that questions Ottoman romanticism through an examination of Cappadocia that had the potential to suit romanticist arguments. As we will see, however, even there co-habitation was highly competitive if not conflictual, and cannot form an example for today.

1.1 Names and places

From the beginning of my research I know that I am not in a position to invent borders within contemporary Greek society. The object of my research is a historical group of people, not contemporary Greeks of Cappadocia origin, and I am by no means trying to question anybody’s “Greekness.” Additionally, I am aware that historical debates one way or another have contemporary repercussions. With in mind, I made continuous readings about the topic, and I eventually decided to drop the term *Karamanlı* (pl. –lar), a label that is often used in

⁵ For a criticism of this perspective, see A. İğsız, Documenting the past and publicizing personal stories: sensescapes and the 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange in contemporary Turkey.

⁶ For a typical example of this scholarship, see Y. Yıldırım & K. H. Karpat, (Eds.), *Osmanlı hoşgörüsü* [Ottoman tolerance]. In the introduction of the book the authors explain that their purpose for studying Ottoman tolerance is to present this historical model as an inspiration to find ways to develop peaceful co-habitation for the peoples of the Middle East. For another example, see J. McCarthy, *The Ottoman peoples and the end of Empire*, pp. 2-9.

historical and philological studies about the Cappadocian Orthodox. I myself also used the term in my previous studies. *Karamanlı* was a title that was historically used by some Orthodox Christians pejoratively to address the Turcophone (and even the Grecophone) Christians from the Ottoman province Karaman of being vulgar peasants and savages.⁷

Cappadocians never named themselves *Karamanlı*. They used instead phrases like Christians, Christians who inhabit the East, Anatolian Christians, Anatolian Orthodox, and Anatolians when referring to their compatriots in their publications at the time.⁸ The following passage from Balta reveals the change in self-definition of the Anatolian Orthodox in line with how they referred to their reading public in *Karamanlidika* publications:

The readers are called simply “Christians” or “Christians of Anatolia” during the early years of *Karamanlı* book production, when the religious books cover 95 %. When the activity of the Bible Society begins and its first publication appear around 1826, the term “Christians” is completed by the designator “Orthodox”, and so continues throughout the duration of *Karamanlı* book production. [...] So religion quite clearly defines the community of the Turcophone *Rums*. It defines them within the total of the population of the Ottoman Empire; Christians as opposed to Muslims, and Orthodox in contradiction to Catholics and Protestants of Anatolia (Balta, 2003, p. 41).

For Richard Clogg the term *Karamanlı* was first used to refer to Turcophone Anatolian Christians in the Greek texts of the eighteenth century, and possibly earlier. Clogg also cites a German traveler who narrated the presence of Turcophone Christians known also as “Caramanians” in Istanbul in the sixteenth century (Clogg, 1996). It seems that the term *Karamanlı* was not coined in later centuries; it was in fact in use for a long time. Some scholars have recently revived the term *Karamanlı* and embraced a new category for the history and publications of Turcophone Orthodox of Anatolia separate from the general community of the

⁷ See F. Benlisoy & S. Benlisoy, *Türkdilli Anadolu Ortodokslarında kimlik algısı* [Perception of identity in Turcophone Anatolian Orthodox].

⁸ See R. Clogg, *Some Karamanlidika inscriptions from the monastery of the Zoodokhos Pigi, Balıklı, Istanbul*; F. Benlisoy & S. Benlisoy, *Türkdilli Anadolu Ortodokslarında kimlik algısı* [Perception of identity in Turcophone Anatolian Orthodox].

Greek Orthodox of Asia Minor. Their reference point to distinguish them from the rest of the Greek Orthodox Community was their speaking of Turkish as their mother tongue and their use of a special written language called *Karamanlidika* (Karamanlîca), Turkish in Greek letters, to express themselves in inscriptions and publications (Balta, 2003). The pioneer of studies of *Karamanlides* and *Karamanlidika* is Evangelia Balta, and several other scholars embrace the term *Karamanlî* in their studies.⁹ In an alternative fashion, Stefo Benlisoy and Foti Benlisoy hesitate to use the term *Karamanlî*, especially in their later works, and instead refer to Anatolian Orthodox with the titles they used for themselves in their publications in the nineteenth century.¹⁰

This study rejects the category of *Karamanlî*, and studies the Orthodox of Anatolian interior (or Cappadocia) within the general framework of Greek Orthodox Community (i.e. *Rum*) of the Ottoman Empire. There are two reasons for this perspective. Firstly, historically they were offended by the term *Karamanlî* as it was a label to humiliate the Anatolian Christians. Secondly, speaking Turkish as a mother tongue was not peculiar to them; for Anagnostopoulou (2013), except for few places in the *Aydın* province, like *Izmir*, the majority of the Greek Orthodox in Asia Minor was Turcophone. Some scholars find her argument exaggerated, but it would not be wrong to affirm that the Turkish speaking Orthodox did not only exist in Cappadocia, but also in other parts of Asia Minor.¹¹

⁹ In addition to Evangelia Balta, Richard Clogg, Elif Renk Özdemir, Merih Erol, Şehnaz Şişmanoğlu Şimşek and Robert Anhegger preferred to use various versions of the term *Karamanlî* like *Karamanlides* (plural Greek form), *Karamanlis* (an Englishized form), *Karamanlılar* (plural Turkish form). See E. Balta, The adventure of identity in the triptych: vatan, religion and language; R. Clogg, A millet within a millet: Karamanlides; E. R. Özdemir, Borders of belonging in the “exchanged” generations of Karamanlis; M. Erol, Cultural manifestations of a symbiosis: Karamanlidika epitaphs of the nineteenth century; Ş. Ş. Şimşek, The Anatoli newspaper and the heyday of the Karamanlî Press; R. Anhegger, Evangelinos Misailidis ve Türkçe konuşan dindaşları [Evangelinos Misailidis and his Turkish speaking co-religionists].

¹⁰ For a critical article about the use of the term *Karamanlî*, see F. Benlisoy & S. Benlisoy, Türkdilli Anadolu Ortodokslarında kimlik algısı [Perception of identity in Turcophone Anatolian Orthodox].

¹¹ According to the Greek census of 1928, there were 103.642 Turcophone Christians in Greece. 50.000 of them were from Cappadocia and others were from Pontus and other regions of Asia Minor. M. Harakopoulos, *Ρωμιοί της Καππαδοκίας: από τα βάθη της Ανατολής στο θεσσαλικό*

Further to this, despite the common belief that the Anatolian Orthodox spoke Turkish, a special Greek dialect was still present in some Orthodox settlements of Cappadocia even in the late nineteenth century. Amongst all eighty-two Orthodox villages of Cappadocia, Greek was spoken in the nineteenth century in only twenty of them (Manousaki, 2002). Therefore, language on its own cannot form a category. Last but not least, the written language called *Karamanlidika* was not only used in Cappadocia but also in Pontus and in other regions of Asia Minor, and publications in this written language could reach many places in Asia Minor and be read by members of the general Orthodox public. In short, there is no need to put the Cappadocian Orthodox in an imaginative cage and separate them from the rest of the Greek Orthodox Community. To put it differently, although the Greek Orthodox communities of each and every region had peculiar traits that differentiated them from the broader Community¹²; they were pieces of a whole. For example, the Pontic community was different from the Ionian community. Similarly, the Cappadocian community had distinguishing characteristics due to its peculiar geography, neighborly relations, socioeconomic conditions and history. However, they all belonged to the Greek Orthodox Community. We can certainly distinguish and categorize them in line with their place of origin and study a particular local community, but I disapprove of any approach that has the tendency to invent new “ethnic” groups within an “ethnic” group¹³.

As a general rule, the Orthodox communities of city centers were Turcophone (Merlie, 1977). Greek was preserved predominantly in villages. The more conservative the people the more they tended to remain attentive to their linguistic identity. Since they dealt with economic activities in public places like

κάμπο, η τραυματική ενσωμάτωση στη μητέρα πατρίδα [The *Rums* of Cappadocia: from depths of Anatolia to Thessalian plains, the traumatic integration in mother country], p. 34.

¹² When I write Community with capital “C”, I mean the Greek Orthodox Community as a whole rather than a local community.

¹³ It does not seem proper to call the Orthodox Community in the nineteenth century an ethnic group, since they were simply a faith group, most of whose members had primitive to no ethnic consciousness for the time being. Here, I use the term “ethnic” from a contemporary perspective.

markets and bazaars, men spoke Turkish, whereas women, if they did not live in a mixed village, continued to preserve and speak Greek and have a limited knowledge of Turkish. In the nineteenth century, however, this situation changed. As a result of male immigration to big cities, in poorer villages women started to work in Turkish fields and houses. Due to the fall in male population and female exposure to the Turkish language, the Cappadocian Orthodox faced a loss of linguistic identity much more than in previous centuries. Towards the end of the century, even in the few remaining Greek speaking villages, Greek was replaced with Turkish (Dawkins, 1916).

In light of the above stated arguments, throughout the study I interchangeably use the terms Cappadocian Orthodox, Cappadocian Christians, Cappadocians, Anatolian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox of Anatolia or simply Orthodox and Anatolian Christians. Since their nationalization was in process and incomplete for the time being, I hesitate to use the term Greek since it denotes ethnicity and nationality. As for the other side, I either employ the term Muslim or Turk; in the pre-nationalism era both of them meant adherence to Islam. And the concept of Turk did not have any ethnic connotations and was often used by non-Muslims for their Sunnite neighbors. Interestingly, the Anatolian Orthodox referred to the Alawite communities as Turkmens (Turcomans).¹⁴ It seems that the concepts of Turk and Turkmen had completely religious meanings for them. Concerning the Protestant converts of Greek Orthodox origin, I coined the concept of Greek Protestants. Here, Greek refers to their previous membership to the Greek Orthodox congregation.

Another important point to clarify is the geographical term Cappadocia. As mentioned above, the Orthodox Christians who are also called *Karamanlı* were the inhabitants of the Karaman *Eyalet* (a subdivision of the Ottoman Empire), and they were named after their place of origin in their places of immigration (the suffix *-lı* is used to denote place of origin in Turkish). Until the promulgation of Provincial Redistricting Act (*Teşkil-i Vilayet Nizamnamesi*) in 1864, the Karaman

¹⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, Symeon Kosmidis.

Eyalet would include seven sanjaks (provincial districts): Konya, Niğde, Akşehir, Beyşehir, Aksaray, Kayseri, and Kırşehir, in line with contemporary Turkish administrative structure. The territories of the Karaman *Eyalet* were at the same time the land on which the Karamanid Dynasty had reigned (1250-1487). With this new Act, the Karaman *Eyalet* turned into the province of Konya (Konya *Vilayeti*). For the new administrative act, the province of Konya consisted of the sanjaks of Konya, Isparta, Burdur, Antalya, and Niğde. Kayseri and Kırşehir were now parts of the province of Ankara, along with the sanjaks of Yozgat, Çorum, and Ankara. In short, the Anatolian Orthodox were the settlers of a union of Konya and Ankara provinces. In this explanation the only missing area is the sanjak of Adana in consideration with the Orthodox settlements.

Sia Anagnostopoulou (2013) maps out the geography where there was high concentration of Greek Orthodox communities in interior Asia Minor, and employs Byzantine province names. In accordance with that, there were two areas with a significant proportion of Greek Orthodox communities: Cappadocia and Lycaonia. Cappadocia included the sanjak of Adana from Cilicia and Kırşehir from Galatia. For her, Cappadocia and Lycaonia together set the Greater Cappadocia. Evangelia Balta (2003), on the other hand, defines the Greater Cappadocia in accordance with the settlements of Turcophone communities. In her explanation, it lays to the north as far as Ankara, Yozgat, and Hüdavendigâr; to the South Antalya and Adana; to the East Kayseri and Sivas; and to the west as far as the borders of Aydın province.

The Cappadocian Orthodox were very few in number compared to their Muslim neighbors, and their settlements were very scattered. For this reason we cannot possibly limit the borders of Cappadocia with the physical particularities of the region. Due to dispersion, the ecclesiastical division did not overlap with the Ottoman administrative structure. For example, a metropolis could contain two or three different provinces; conversely, there could sometimes be two or three metropolises in one Ottoman province (Merlie, 1977). For this reason, historians' descriptions of Cappadocia might seem confusing, because some are inclined to

define it in accordance with the ecclesiastical division, and some with the Ottoman administrative division.

As claimed before, this dissertation is not particularly concerned with the Turcophone Orthodox of the whole Asia Minor but with the Orthodox of Cappadocia and draws the boundaries of Cappadocia as union of the provinces of Ankara and Konya plus the sanjak of Adana in line with the 1864 Administrative Act. The study focuses predominantly on the Greek Orthodox settlements in Kayseri, Niğde, Aksaray and Nevşehir. For the purpose of this dissertation, in addition to the interviews with the refugees from these areas, the narrations of refugees from Keskin (Kırşehir), Gürümce (Adana) and Silli (Konya) are also utilized. Throughout the study, Cappadocia and interior Anatolia are used interchangeably.

By the time of the Turkish-Greek Exchange of Populations (1923), the Orthodox communities who lived in the periphery of Kayseri were Turcophone. The region was famous among the Greek Orthodox Community as the land of St. Basil the Great (4th Century CE), and was an old centre of Christianity. The Metropolitan Bishop of Kayseri lived in Zincidere (thirteen kilometers north of Kayseri), a centre of education and religion for the Orthodox since the Monastery of John the Forerunner, and the only Seminary located in Cappadocia (Merlie, 1977). Unlike Kayseri, the Greek Orthodox communities of Niğde were mixed in terms of their mother tongue. The ones who lived in the city centre were Turcophone, but there were both Grecophone and Turcophone villages, as well as villages where people spoke both languages. Interestingly, in Grecophone villages, people are reported to have sung their songs in Turkish (Merlie, 1977). The Metropolitan Bishop of Konya lived in Niğde. As for Nevşehir, there were both Turcophone and Grecophone settlements. For example, the community of Sinasos was Grecophone, whereas the community of Malokopi was Turcophone. Lastly, the number of Greek Orthodox people in Aksaray was low compared to other

above-mentioned centers of Cappadocia. The most important Orthodox settlement was Gelveri with its four thousand Orthodox inhabitants (Merlie, 1977)¹⁵.



Figure 3. The Hasatani family in their local costumes in Sille, Konya. Source: Prodromos B. Spirakos.

¹⁵ According to “Ksenofanis,” a periodical of the “Society of Anatolians, The East,” the number of Orthodox in Gelveri was three thousand five hundred by 1905. For statistics about inhabitants of Cappadocian settlements, and for information about Orthodox schools, see Στατιστική της Επαρχίας Ικονίου [Statistics of the Eparchy of Konya], *Ksenofanis* (3), pp. 44-47; Στατιστική της Επαρχίας Καισαρείας (Στατιστικός πίνακας) [Statistics of the Eparchy of Kayseri (Statistical table), *Ksenofanis* (3), pp. 230-233.




Figure 4. Map of Cappadocia. Source: Η Έξοδος τόμος Β' [The Exodus volume 2].

1.2 Methodology

1.2.1 Problematization of sources

The findings and arguments of early studies about the Cappadocian Orthodox have been very crucial for this dissertation. However, in order to make a solid contribution to the existing literature I chose to dwell on the faces of the crowd and, therefore, devoted an enormous amount of my research time to the examination of the Oral Tradition Archive (Αρχείο Προφορικής Παράδοσης) of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies (*Κέντρο Μικρασιατικών Σπουδών* –hereinafter KMS) in Athens, where I explored the testimonies of refugees from Central Anatolia and also utilized the library collection. Additionally, I made use of the rare books about individual Evangelicals and the missionary publications available at the Greek Historical Evangelical Archive (Ελληνικό Ιστορικό Ευαγγελικό Αρχείο). Finally, I employed various *Karamanlidika* (i.e. Turkish in Greek letters) publications of the time, including almanacs, regulations of brotherhood organizations, newspapers, periodicals like *Anatoli*, *Terakki*, and the missionary newspaper *Angeliaforos*.

The Oral Tradition Archive at the KMS contains interviews conducted with over five thousand refugees from the early 1930s to the early 1970s. The project was initiated by Melpo Logotheti Merlie (1890-1979), a cosmopolitan Greek aristocrat who wanted to document the life of the Greek Orthodox Population in Asia Minor (Papailias, 2004). My first impressions of the oral tradition accounts was that I was in serious trouble, as the refugee testimonies were purely nostalgic; they were conducted at least fifty years after the events and with the people who had already passed away, so I had no opportunity to ask for the clarification on a point I did not understand. I was totally passive in this investigation. Further to that, I had no idea of the questions asked by the researchers of the KMS to the refugees; I was reading only the answers and attempting to guess the questions in accordance with the thematic categories they provided like schools, migration, the Exchange of Populations, Turkish-Greek relations, nearby villages etc. I read the accounts in Greek even though most of the refugees were documented as

Turkophone for my region of focus, and I was unsure about the accuracy of the translations. For example, I had no idea what word would have been used by the informants in Turkish for the word Greek (Έλληνας) that I come across very often. Were they using *Yunan* which means ethnic Greek or *Rum* which means Greek Orthodox Christian? With these questions in mind I read the writings of two scholars, namely Papailias (2004) and Kapoli (2008) who critically, even fiercely evaluated the Oral Tradition Archive of the KMS. Their works helped me refine my thoughts about the Oral Tradition Archive and make my analysis carefully.

First of all, Papailias warns the researchers about the founder of Oral Tradition Archive Merlie's interpretation of Turkish-Greek coexistence with a desire for more tolerant future. For Papailias, Merlie encouraged her researchers to find signs of harmonious interethnic relations and not to demonstrate Turkish violence against Greeks. What could be the reason of this stance? Was she a philanthropist, a humanist, or just a liberal? It is a difficult question to answer this question, but it seems that it was mainly a romantic attitude, probably because she was fascinated by her encounter with the Turks in Cappadocia where she went to for a centre-sponsored journey as she herself stated in one of her correspondences. In line with Merlie's interest, Cappadocia became the Centre's focal point (Papailias, 2004). Because of this thirty-four percent of the interviewees selected were Cappadocians (Kapoli, 2008). As previously mentioned, Cappadocia and/or Central Anatolia was perhaps the most peaceful region in the Ottoman Empire so "Ottoman tolerance" or "peaceful cohabitation" discourse could easily be generated with reference to Cappadocia. According to the lines of Papailias, Merlie was aware of the fact that Cappadocia would suit her objective of portraying harmonious living together for the Ottoman Asia Minor. Papailias's warning drove me to be more cautious in order to better evaluate the heavy nostalgia for the lost homelands (χαμένες πατρίδες) and for the "good Turkish neighbor" in refugee testimonies.

Secondly, for Papailias and Kapoli, when the KMS researchers knocked on the doors of refugees to gather information about their hometowns in Asia Minor,

the stories that they were expected to tell were of a distant past for them, and few of them were eager to narrate this past. For many it was “a lament over ruins” (Kapoli, 2008, p. 19). They had relatively positive feelings about their life in Asia Minor, especially in light of the following Second World War, Civil War, and all the hardships of refugee life after their expulsion and the Exchange (Papailias, 2004). Papailias’s statements match my observations. I have not come across any testimony that argues that life in Greece was better than life in Asia Minor. Therefore, the refugees were recreating a world of peace in a distant past under the sway of discomfort they had in the conditions of the time in which they were interviewed, and looking back was a source of pleasure for them (Walder, 2011).

The interviews invented Asia Minor but not the land the refugees lived on. The source of their imagination was the difference between present and past. In the words of Layoun (2001), their nostalgia harbored dichotomies like past and present, existing and non-existing, here and there, remembering and forgetting, us and them etc. There were also other dichotomies in the Oral Tradition Archive, including good and bad Turk, Asia Minor and Greece, present and past, native Turks and refugee Turks, Asia Minor refugees and locals (ντόπιοι), Christianity and Islam, and the periods before and after the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. Almost every detail or experience was narrated in comparison to something else. The frustration of the present conditions was reflected as a longing for the past. Remembering the bad was always accompanied by remembering the good. Dichotomies are important in weighing refugee perceptions and making conclusions. For example, a distinction between good and bad Turks in a refugee narrative implicitly means that Turk is the Other, an external actor, if not an enemy.

Many historians find memory as a source of history writing less credible since it is open to distortion more than written sources. Especially oral histories, which deal with the distant past, there is the possibility of distortions influenced by changes in values and norms that might unconsciously change perceptions (Thompson, 2000). In parallel with this argument, when KMS researchers

interviewed people about their life in Asia Minor, a lot of water had flown under the bridge and their memories were already reshaped by the recent past and the present. In addition to all these concerns about oral history, another difficulty was raised by an eighty two year old informant Alexandros Yagtzoglou to a KMS researcher in 1957: “You should have come ten years before. In those years everything was fresher in my mind. Now it is late. Most of our people died and so did the brains of the remaining people, we are not able to tell anything.”¹⁶ Yagtzoglou was right; their experiences in Asia Minor were now filtered by the years between then and now; they could barely remember the details, and as they were elderly their memory was also under the pressure of longing for youth. All these are fair concerns for oral history in general and Oral Tradition Archive in particular. A student of oral history should be clear about what (s)he looks for in oral history as a material for an academic study because its credibility lies in the symbolism, imagination, and meaning they include, if not in its adherence to facts (Portelli, 2002).

The term “memory” is a highly controversial one, and historians use different concepts like “collective memory”, “social memory”, “collective remembrance” and “popular history making” to cope with their uneasiness about such a subjective source (Kansteiner, 2002). I prefer to use the term “collective memory” with a slight difference in approach concerning the value of individual remembering. “Collective memory” was coined by Maurice Halbwachs. In his theorization remembering is an individual activity, whereas memory is shaped by the community. We keep memories of different time periods in our lives and we continually reproduce them and in this way also perpetuate a sense of identity. Memories are repetitions and since they are reproduced in very different systems of notions and at different periods of our lives, they lose the form and appearance they originally had (Halbwachs, 1992). Halbwach’s theory is criticized due to its determined anti-individualism (Karsteiner, 2002) and some scholars remind us of the need to re-assert the value of individual remembering and the capacity of

¹⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Niğde.

conscious self to reject and criticize cultural scripts of discourses (Green, 2004). My personal stance is that memory is a reflection of societal norms and past experiences; therefore it is collective, but this does not mean that individuals are totally passive in this process. I agree with Paul Thompson (2000) that memory is a social as well as an individual process, because the more significant a name or face the more likely it is to be remembered, so memory depends on individual comprehension but also upon individual interest. This is in line with what I observed in the Oral Tradition accounts. The presence of good inter-personal relations with a member of the Other positively affected the general perception of Turks in the eyes of refugees. Despite the hardships originating from nationalist CUP policies in the last two decades of the Empire, a relentless period that was lived through by interviewed refugees, and despite the anti-Turk propaganda they faced after their expulsion, a refugee could say, for instance, “nowadays they say a lot about Turks; we have never met such Turks. They must have been other people. They were good and respectful to women. I wish everybody would be like Turks.”¹⁷ Or, conversely, a refugee could label Turks pejoratively in line with his bad inter-personal encounters and antagonistic inter-communal relations in his/her locality, and easily adopt “the bad Turk” image created by Greek nationalist propaganda. As in the lines of a refugee testimony: “When they saw us coming from a revelry, Turks would be jealous of us. They could initiate a fight. You could not say ‘long live Greece!’”¹⁸

As previously claimed, the testimonies at the KMS were overly nostalgic, and I initially regarded this as a pitfall for my research. Many scholars see nostalgia as “sentimental kitsch” (Walder, 2011, p. 4). Against this bias, as argued by Boym (2001), nostalgia is a way of thinking about time like modernity, and it should be considered along with the apprehension of loss and the reinvention of identity. Nostalgia might distort past events, but it tells us about the meaning of them in the present time. It might also create a problem of anachronism since it

¹⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Endürlük (Androniki), Evanthia Ikenderoglou.

¹⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Misti, Mak. Damianoglo

informs about the past with the feelings of present. As an example, in the oral testimonies I work on, refugees make distinctions about the years before and after the Young Turk Revolution (1908), according to which the Hamidian years were relatively good in comparison with the hardships they went through afterwards. If not approached carefully, the Hamidian years could be evaluated as “good old days”. However, it was also a period of censorship, Armenian massacres, forced conversions, and Islamist policies, and most likely it was worse than the previous *Tanzimat* period for the Christians. Since the testimonies in the Oral History Archive do not tell anything about the years before the reign of Abdülhamit II, one can easily but erroneously conclude that the Hamidian period was *belle époque* (Doumanis, 2013). In order to escape this anachronism emerging out of nostalgia, a researcher has to have a sense of history developed through supporting readings and comparative analysis of different geographies of diversity.

Selectiveness is also an issue in researches supported by oral history and memory. It is often claimed that there are good memories and bad memories and memory mostly works in favor of good memories. According to Fabian, this argument is futile because the notion of good and bad differs from person to person and there is no criterion for separating good from bad (Fabian, 2007). Remembering good or bad, I believe, is closely related with the intention of the informant and the researcher. If a researcher conducts a study about massacre of a particular group of people, for example, his/her questions would more often remind the informants of bad memories, and if an informant has bad feelings towards the people (s)he is talking about (s)he might stress the bad memories. Therefore, if forgetting and selectiveness are pitfalls, my suggestion to overcome these issues is to not focus on the interesting and rare stories of individual informants, but instead on the common things in different informants’ narratives. As Counce (2011) claimed, it is the ordinary events that shape our lives and for this reason a historian should be interested in typical events, not extra-ordinary ones. To put it a different way, the collection and analysis of specific details of narrowly limited events, developments, or phenomena results in losing the

perspective and neglecting the context (Phillip, 2004). My study covers many informants, both urban and rural, from different settlements of Cappadocia, and I focus on the common points in their narratives because shared social frameworks of individual recollections constitute the basis of this study. I believe that in this way I prevent myself from the romantic vision that prevails in studies about Ottoman plurality.

As a last remark for the Oral Tradition Archive, despite its deficiencies it plays the role of “mediator of memory” (Alpan, 2012, p. 220) and gives researchers perspective about Asia Minor Greeks and their relations with other faith groups. It deserves appreciation at this point but it also has to be employed cautiously in order not to fall into Ottoman romanticism. As for my study, I will try to complete the picture drawn by the Oral Tradition Archive through historical imagination in addition to two publications of the Anatolian Orthodox *Anatoli* and *Terakki* as well as the missionary publications *Angeliaforos* and “*The Missionary Herald*”.

Except for “*The Missionary Herald*” all three of the above mentioned publications were in *Karamanlidika* and emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. “The teacher of Anatolia”, Evangelinos Misailidis, started publishing *Anatoli* in Izmir in 1843 and after a break he continued to publish it in Istanbul starting in 1851. The newspaper survived until 1912 or 1922. Scholars do not agree upon an exact date. *Anatoli* was followed by *Nea Anatoli* which survived between the years 1912-1923 (Tarinas, 2007). *Anatoli* was one of the major and most circulated newspapers of the time among the Orthodox community and contributed massively to the development of Turkish in the Greek alphabet. In time the expression of Turkish sounds with Greek letters took conventional form in the newspaper and became a source of reference for *Karamanlidika* for the Anatolian Orthodox. It was so that after a while the newspaper started to criticize those who made orthography mistakes when writing Turkish in Greek alphabet. As an interesting remark, the Turkish language used in the paper became plainer in time. It was firstly due to reader complaints since many of its readers were not

familiar with Ottoman Turkish and could only speak simple Turkish. Secondly, it was a result of the general pattern of elimination of Arabic and Persian words and phrases in language at the time. The readers of *Anatoli* were mainly the Turcophone Orthodox from Istanbul and interior Anatolia. The fact that readers' correspondence came from cities such as Adana, Adapazarı, Samsun, Bafra, Ünye, and Şebinkarahisar indicates that it was also circulated in other regions of Anatolia (Şimşek, 2010). For the time concern of this dissertation, I benefit particularly from the issues of *Anatoli* that were published in the last decade of the nineteenth century (1891-1897); however, a few issues from the period of 1851-1854 were also used to see how *Anatoli*'s purpose of emergence was portrayed during its initial years, and to cite some relevant examples. One could easily write a whole book about *Anatoli*, but this study is not intended to dwell specifically on *Anatoli*, only to benefit from it.

The short-lived *Terakki* (progress) was another publication I perused and it was published in the heart of Cappadocia in Nevşehir in the year 1888. As understood from the title of the periodical it aimed at the progress of Anatolia as did *Anatoli* and published articles about science, medicine, general knowledge, religion, history, including Ottoman history, morality, human development, and concerns for the future of Anatolia.

Unlike from the above-mentioned two, the missionary newspaper *Angeliaforos* was first published in 1872 by the ABCFM in Istanbul. It was published in *Karamanlidika*. There were also Armenian and Armeno-Turkish versions of the paper, both of which were called *Avedaper* and emerged in 1855 and 1860, respectively. *Angeliaforos* means “the Bringer of Good News” or simply “the Messenger”. The paper is composed of three main departments; religion, education, and family, and concludes with a summary of both interior and foreign news (Greene, 1905). For this project, the issues of *Angeliaforos* published between 1889-1890 and 1903-1904 could be reached and employed. *The Missionary Herald* reported that by 1903, the number of subscribers of the three versions of the paper was almost exactly two thousand five hundred (Barnum,

1903). Although the other two versions were bought by Armenians, this means that *Angeliaforos* was circulated almost twice as much as *Anatoli*, whose subscribers were five hundred by 1890 and three hundred by 1895.¹⁹ The missionary newspapers *Avedaper* and *Angeliaforos* had the same content and they not only targeted the newly converts but also the large classes of people who sent their sons and daughters to missionary schools and the people who never attended their services.

Another written source used for this dissertation is *The Missionary Herald*, the magazine of ABCFM published in Boston. It was reporting from foreign missions over a large area, including China, India, the Near East, Africa, and indigenous populations of the Americas. This magazine covered a wide range of topics, including; local customs, cultures, geography, and history; success stories in topics regarding missionary work; education and health missions or the reasons for their failure, were all published. For this dissertation its issues from the 1870s to 1922 were scanned and the relevant information was employed.

This dissertation aims to contribute to several fields of study, including nationalism studies that focus on particular regions,²⁰ studies about tolerance and coexistence²¹, historical studies that examine Ottoman plurality at provincial level;²² the specific field of *Karamanlular* and/or *Karamanlıca*;²³ studies about

¹⁹ N. T. Soullidis. (11 December 1890). Hemşerilerimize [To our compatriots]. *Anatoli*, 4271; N. T. Soullidis. (5 December 1895). *Anatoli gazetesi ser muharriri rifatlı Ioannis Kalfaoglou Efendi'ye* [To editor in chief of Anatoli newspaper Mr. Ioannis Kalfaoglou]. *Anatoli*, 5173.

²⁰ See G. W. White, *Nationalism and territory: constructing group identity in Southeastern Europe*; I. N. Grigoriadis, *Instilling religion in Greek and Turkish nationalism: a "sacred synthesis"*.

²¹ See R. M. Hayden, *Intersecting religioscapes and antagonistic tolerance: trajectories of competition and sharing of religious spaces in the Balkans*.

²² See M. Mazower, *City of ghosts: Salonica*; M. U. Campos, *Ottoman brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in early twentieth-century Palestine*; İ. Yosmaoğlu, *Blood Ties: religion, violence, and the politics of nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia*; Sibel Zandi Sayek, *Ottoman Izmir: the rise of a cosmopolitan port, 1840-1880*; B. Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: the roots of sectarianism*.

²³ This field of study is pioneered by E. Balta.

Ottoman Greeks,²⁴ and finally the anthropological studies or studies benefiting from the anthropology discipline to investigate the communities who seem to have exceptional cases from the perspective of official nationalism of states²⁵. To locate itself within a relevant scholarship, the study benefited from samples of these studies as much as possible.

1.2.2 Problematization of literature

The nationalist scholarship in Turkey categorized the Anatolian Orthodox as Turks. The reference point of “Turkishness” in these studies is language and shared customs with Muslims Turks. These studies call the Cappadocian Orthodox *Karamanli Orthodox Turks*, *Christian Turks*, and *Turkish Orthodox*. All these works focus on the issue of origins and determine the Turcophone Christians as “racially” Turks in opposition with the nationalist Greek perspective that regards these people as “racially” Greek but lost their language under Turkish oppression.²⁶ The first of these studies was written by Cami Baykurt. For Baykurt, there were three criteria that prove the “racial” Turkishness of the *Karamanli* Christians; their speaking of Turkish in contrast to their Grecophone co-religionists living in coastal areas, their practice of Orthodox Christianity in Turkish, and their use of *Karamanlidika* to express Turkish language (Baykurt, 2007). He argues that long before Turkish nomads entered Anatolia *en masse* in

²⁴ See A. Ozil, *Orthodox Christians in the late Ottoman Empire: a study of communal relations in Anatolia*; G. Augustions, *The Greeks of Asia Minor: confession, community, and ethnicity in the nineteenth century*; S. Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία: 19ος αιώνας -1919: οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος* [Asia Minor: 19th century- 1919: the Greek Orthodox communities from the Rum millet to the Greek nation].

²⁵ See T. Dragostinova, *Between two motherlands: nationality and emigration among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900-1949*; A. Karakasidou, *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: passages to nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*; R. Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: the social life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus*.

²⁶ For recent versions of this perspective, see M. Harakopoulos. *Ρωμιοί της Καππαδοκίας: από τα βάθη της Ανατολής στο Θεσσαλικό κάμφο, η τραυματική ενσωμάτωση στη μητέρα πατρίδα* [The Rums of Cappadocia: from depths of Anatolia to Thessalian plains, the traumatic integration in mother country], p. 36; S. E. Tsilimagkou. *Ταρσός Κιλικίας και λαογραφικά Καππαδοκίας* [Tarsus of Cilicia and folklore of Cappadocia], p. 41.

the eleventh century some Turkic tribes had already been living under Byzantine rule in Anatolia and in the Balkans, and some of them had been serving as mercenaries in the Byzantine army. As for the *Karamanlı* Christians, they were the grandchildren of colonizing Turkish troops who were sent by Byzantine administrators to places around Kayseri and Konya in the first half of the tenth century to fight against the Arab raiders (Baykurt, 2007). To support this claim, Baykurt references Byzantinists like Charles Diehl and Gustave Schlumberger. Compared to his successors, Baykurt was the only one who referred to Byzantine history written in foreign languages. His followers could only produce the replicas of his work and repeat the same arguments.²⁷ An interesting work as a representation of nationalist scholarship about *Karamanlides* is that of Teoman Ergene, who was considered to be Papa Efthim himself, with a nickname by Richard Clogg (2004). Ergene's book is about the activities of Papa Efthim during the Turco-Greek War to assemble the Anatolian Orthodox under the Turkish Orthodox Church in 1922 in Kayseri, and his struggle against the Ecumenical Patriarchate. The book is not involved in the debate of origins since it is more of a biography of Papa Efthim but acknowledges the Anatolian Orthodox as ethnic Turks by definition (Ergene, 1951)²⁸.

In a world where people's identities were not yet determined by nationalism, origins debate does not make any sense. From another angle, as a nationalism studies student, I do not accept any biological definition for discussions about the concepts of ethnicity and nation. "Turkishness" and "Greekness" are constructs and adopted by people as a result of "nationalization," a process which included education and propaganda through various channels, all of which entered people's lives in the second half of the nineteenth century in the Near East. Accordingly, this dissertation does not take a position on the origins

²⁷ For other examples of this scholarship, see M. Ekincikli, *Türk Ortodoksları* [Turkish Orthodox]; Y. Anzerlioğlu, *Karamanlı Ortodoks Türkler* [Caramanian Orthodox Turks].

²⁸ In the fourth chapter you will find a detailed discussion about Papa Efthim.

debate. In the end, each community might have some “unexpected” origins from blind nationalist perspective. Our origins do not make us automatically members of some national community. What matters is how people defined and categorized themselves in their historical time and reality.²⁹ Against this primordialist attitude, this study portrays borders between communities, co-habitation practices, and the ultimate transformation of religious identity especially during years of discontinuity, and makes a judgment about social identity accordingly.

In the last two decades, studies focusing on plurality in specific territories of the Ottoman Empire emerged as a response to nationalist scholarship in nation states that were carved from the Empire. This state sponsored nationalist scholarship claimed that the Turkish invasion destroyed national states in the Balkans, that Ottoman rule brought backwardness, and that the original Muslim culture developed in the Balkans did not belong to national heritage (Kolodziejczyk, 2006). The new trend of studies of Ottoman pluralism aims to portray complex, heterogeneous, sometimes intermingled or day-saving, and superficial or proximate relations of different faith groups in the Ottoman Empire, and recognize and relocate Ottoman history within their national histories rather than disregarding it as years of subordination that ought to be forgotten.³⁰ Lately, some studies specifically attempt to discover the experience of co-existence in particular regions of the Empire before and during the age of nationalism, in order to see if the pre-existing boundaries provided a suitable setting for nationalist movements in the late nineteenth century. Within this fashion, Bruce Masters (2001) analyzed the transformation of the collective identity of Christians and Jews in Ottoman Syria in line with the dichotomy of tolerance and intolerance, and

²⁹ For a discussion on nationalist literature in Turkey and about the Anatolian Orthodox, see G. Göktürk, *Bir siyasi arkeoloji örneği olarak Türkiye’deki tarih yazınında Karamanlılar* [As an example of political archeology: Karamanlides in historiography in Turkey].

³⁰ For the recent scholarship dealing with the co-existence of faith groups in the Ottoman Empire from a critical perspective, see M. Campos, *Ottoman Brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in early twentieth-century Palestine*; B. Masters, *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab world: the roots of sectarianism*; N. Lessersohn, ‘Provincial cosmopolitanism’ in late Ottoman Anatolia: an Armenian shoemaker’s memoir; N. Doumanis, *Before the nation: Muslim-Christian co-existence and its destruction in Late Ottoman Anatolia*.

argued that religion served as the primary criterion which established who was included within the larger political community and who stood outside of it for most of the Ottoman period. He affirmed that confession served as an internalized anchor to each individual's sense of a broader Community, and as the primary signifier of his or her identity to those outside it (Masters, 2001). For Masters (2001), religious communities were psychologically separated from one another, even if not segregated by law, but it is difficult to reconstruct the parameters of social distance since historical records of European observers, whether Jews or Christians, were often questionable. Alternatively, he perused court records from various Arab cities about the cases of Jews and Christians and discovered a positive picture of co-existence despite some dissonances (Masters, 2011). He concluded that although people of different faiths casually intermingled and shared food, music, and material culture, religion provided group solidarity for each community and this inevitably drew the sectarian lines (Masters, 2001). I agree with Masters' thesis in line with my study about Cappadocia. In the pre-modern traditional ecosystem of Cappadocia, religion was the main dividing line between communities. Separation of religious groups does not mean that they were in endless conflict with one another. In Cappadocia, despite the competitive nature of inter-communal relations, people had neighborly affinity at inter-personal level. Nevertheless, in times of crisis and discontinuity borders between religious communities became firmer and nationalist propaganda benefited greatly.

In the late nineteenth century nationalist separatism was everywhere in the Ottoman Empire, from the Balkans to Syria, from Crete to Eastern Anatolia. Infiltration of nationalist ideology was often direct but there were also various other mechanisms like schooling, press and activities of associations that tried to create a national consciousness indirectly by teaching "national" language and history. In line with the pre-existing structure of society, nationalism was adopted by ordinary people or a late national awakening arose, as in the case of Cappadocia. In her study about the transformation of Ottoman Crete, particularly in the 1896 and 1897 revolts, Pınar Şenışık (2011) rightly argues that Cretan

revolts were nationalist movements that developed not only as a result of separatist propaganda but also as a reaction to the local structure of Ottoman Crete. It was, at the same time, a “hegemonic struggle,” in Gramscian terms, since a subordinate group endeavored to become a dominant one. This was also the case in Macedonia. For İpek Yosmaoğlu (2014), nationalism and nationalist violence were to a large extent shaped by the vacuum left by the failing Ottoman Empire, whose legitimacy was already eroded in the eyes of its Christian population as a result of shifts in the fiscal/military system and the concomitant abuse of rights over the peasantry. In Cappadocia the situation was much different. As with Macedonia or Crete, Cappadocia was one of the targets of the *Megali Idea*, the cultural irredentism of which successfully instilled Community consciousness through indirect propagation of teaching history and language. Despite such endeavors, however, a late national awakening happened in Cappadocia. Conflicts before the First World War were on a very minor scale, and mainly happened between natives and new comers (refugees coming from Caucasus or the Balkans). There were three major reasons for this situation. The first is that unlike other parts of the Empire, Anatolia was the heartland of the Empire, with a dominant Turkish-Muslim population which meant a Muslim dominated cosmopolitanism. That is to say, the Orthodox were under the cultural dominance of the Muslims. Secondly, Orthodox settlements were scattered and sparsely populated due to male emigration, and that meant almost no possibility of coming together to fight for a cause. And thirdly, there was almost no difference in socio-economic terms between Christians and Muslims. In some Cappadocian settlements Christians were well off, and in some the Muslims were more dominant in economic terms. In general there was no big inequality between the two to set the fire of hegemonic struggle against one another.

1.3 Theoretical concerns

The novelty of this study originates from the political science perspective it employs. Accordingly, concepts like identity tolerance, plurality, multiculturalism, and nationalism are not randomly utilized in this dissertation. Further to that, the

study ultimately aims to make an argument about the free-floating concept of Neo-Ottomanism that has been recently portrayed as a historical model of multiculturalism.

This project makes a differentiation between the “individual identity” that is at the centre of thoughts since the last decades of our time (Bauman, 2004), and the “social identity” of pre-modern times. In the nineteenth century people rarely asked themselves “who I am.” This is a contemporary concern and this question makes sense only if you believe that you can be someone other than yourself (Bauman, 2004). In nineteenth century Cappadocia the alternatives and horizons of the people were very limited, and most of them did not have the chance to invent “another identity” for themselves. Their identity was of course transformed by the influence of various mechanisms over time, but they were not bombarded as we are today with the huge possibilities of being “another person”. Additionally, in traditional societies people could only survive as a member of some religious community, and if they questioned it they risked being labeled as heretic and subsequent punishment. For these reasons I am concerned with social identity, meaning the dynamics of belonging to a group or connection with some social category in this study. In Barth’s definition social identity is a product of a border formation process and it is moderated by the contrast between “them” and “us” (Barth, 1969). Therefore, social identity is basically based on social categorizations of “us” and “others”. To put it differently, social identity is “we-ness” and becomes real only when there is interaction with another group; the stronger the difference between them the higher the actuality of a particular identity becomes, and the higher the threat coming from the other, thus identity rises immediately (Korostelina, 2007).

In the traditional ecosystem of Cappadocia, people’s social identity was shaped by religious affiliation. If “us” meant Orthodox Christians, “them” would be Turks, Turkmens, Armenians, Evangelists, or all of them. The relations between “us” and “them” constituted inter-communal relations and these relations had two axes: one was to protect boundaries and keep the group intact, and the

other was to prevent conflict with “them” and share the common space as peacefully as possible. Certainly, peace was not always prevalent. However, for the peculiar case of Cappadocia, there was no visible conflict either. The Cappadocia folders of the Oral Tradition Archives are full of nostalgic narratives for the “good old neighbor Turks”. In to avoid being trapped by the Neo-Ottomanist perspective in this dissertation I differentiate between inter-personal relations, in other words neighborly relations, and inter-communal relations. To distinguish these two I use a very basic criterion: if some interaction with the member of Other concerned the whole community, that interaction was in the domain of inter-communal relations; on the other hand, if some intimacy with the member of Other had nothing to do with the community, then that was inter-personal relation. Accordingly, an individual’s economic transaction with a member of the Other is an inter-personal relation. Or a neighborly intimacy of a Christian with a Turk is an inter-personal relation. A Muslim woman visiting a church was an individual behavior as well and should be seen in the scope of inter-personal relations. However, issues like mixed marriages or shrine sharing have to be evaluated within inter-communal relations. Since inter-marriages meant a loss of members in favor of Muslims for the non-Muslim communities they were never appreciated. Similarly, shared shrines were domains of competition because each community attributed their own saints to shrines. Therefore antagonistic tolerance (Hayden, 2002), characterized mostly by contestation, non-persecution, and indifference, was prevailing in Cappadocia.

This project has a critical outlook on the term “tolerance”. It adopts Wendy Brown’s (2006) critical perspective and describes tolerance as a form of power relation enforced by the dominant actor over the passive actor(s). It is not a virtue, as claimed by Michael Walzer (1997), and is instead an expedient behavior because one way or another the tolerator will benefit from his/her tolerant behavior. In this sense Ottoman tolerance over its non-Muslim subjects was an expedient behavior shaped by Islamic law and sultanic firmans that ultimately sought obedience, order, and tax revenue taken in higher amount from the non-

Muslims. Against the prevailing Ottoman romanticism we have to state that at times of crisis Ottoman tolerance turned out to be intolerance against non-Muslims. For Karen Barkey (2008), the reason for the glorification of Ottoman plurality was that it handled diversity better than its contemporaries in the West. Nevertheless, it was ultimately negative tolerance of non-persecution and indifference even in the heyday of Empire, and the subjects of the Sultan could do nothing but consent. At a societal level and in the particular case of Cappadocia, it was “antagonistic tolerance” based on “competitive sharing” dominated by the power holding Muslims.

Against the Neo-Ottomanist perspective of seeing Ottoman plurality as “historical multiculturalism”, this study portrays the anti-individualistic, unequal and imbalanced face of the Ottoman society from one of its least conflictual regions. Multiculturalism as a remedy to contemporary problems of plural liberal societies is debatable even for today. In a historical monarchical empire, a discussion about its presence is both anachronistic and absurd. Rather, a discussion about Ottoman cosmopolitanism could be made but, again, it cannot be a model for today since Ottoman cosmopolitanism was shaped by separated religious communities, second-class citizenship for non-Muslims, and imbalanced dominance of one community over others in different cities in line with their economic and demographic dominance (Georgelin, 2012). For example, in the Cappadocian ecosystem it was the Muslims who dominated other communities with their culture, due to their population.

This project adopts a modernist stance about nationalism. It sees nations as children of nationalism, and pinpoints a particular *Zeitgeist*, a rupture from past, a discontinuity in embracement of nationalism by masses in Cappadocia. While recognizing the elite role in infusion of nationalistic ideals, a broader Community consciousness, or proto-national bonds (Hobsbawm, 1992), it emphasizes the role of pre-existing cohabitation practices shaped by the Self and Other dichotomy as a suitable basis for nationalism to construct itself. In Cappadocia co-habitation was not conflictual but competitive, and the reason for this competition was religion.

This ecosystem worked well until times of discontinuity, that is to say the long war, the nationalistic aggressiveness of Young Turks, and displacement. Thus it was that the elite endeavor only succeeded in creating proto-national bonds among the educated, and, until the Young Turk Revolution (1908), people hesitated to embrace it as a part of their social identity since they regarded it as an attack on their religious identity. During the years of discontinuity religious competition turned out to be “religious nationalism” (van der Veer, 1994) since Greek nationalism, rather than remaining a secular ideology, slowly set itself upon pre-existing religious identifications after the foundation of the Kingdom (1832) and became “a sacred synthesis” of nation and religion (Grigoriadis, 2013).

1.4 Outline

This dissertation aims ultimately to give an answer to Pax-Ottomana romanticism prevailing especially in political discourse nowadays. This anachronistic perspective portrays Ottoman plurality as a pre-modern equivalent of multiculturalism, and seeks to cure current minority issues and identity claims of the country in reference to the “Ottoman tolerance” myth. I call it a myth since this discourse randomly utilizes the term “tolerance” without any reference to theoretical discussions about the term. Similarly, multiculturalism is arbitrarily employed disregarding its fallacies. In order to respond to Pax-Ottomana romanticism, in chapter 2 I firstly make a complete theoretical discussion about contemporary theories of justice, including political liberalism, multiculturalism, post-multiculturalism, politics of difference, and deliberative democracy with a special emphasis on public-private sphere distinction in handling plurality in contemporary liberal democracies. After this background discussion I analyze the term tolerance as a sub-topic of theories of justice, and discuss the possibility of generating a new perspective for the term tolerance. Following this normative analysis, I continue with the Ottoman way of dealing with diversity, and open a debate about some free floating terms like *millet* system and religious tolerance. In guidance of contemporary normative theories of justice and tolerance, I determine the Ottoman tolerance to be a *negative, religious* (but not in Lockean sense of

withdrawal of state from religious matters), and *pragmatist* (in times of crisis it could also be intolerant) form of tolerance, major characteristics of which were non-persecution and indifference. Accordingly, I argue that Ottoman tolerance cannot be a model for today since it is a pre-modern, non-democratic monarchic way and modern identity claims are much more complicated and multi-faceted.

In chapter 3 I analyze Ottoman tolerance at a societal level and open to discussion the practices of living together in Cappadocia, because it is my contention that no other region of the Empire would be better suited than Cappadocia to buttress the romanticist thesis of “peaceful cohabitation”. Nevertheless, a close-up study of Cappadocia illustrates that, even there, religion – as the primary vehicle of border maintenance– set the rules of rivalry between communities, and it was in fact this rivalry that generated the suitable setting for nationalism. There is a general misinterpretation that at a societal level tolerance is equal to peaceful living together. In an ecosystem where tolerance prevails we often do not observe any conflict until times of crisis, but no conflict or less conflict does not necessarily equate to peaceful cohabitation. Although Cappadocia was one of the least conflictual regions of the Ottoman Empire practices of living together were still highly competitive, rather than peaceful, indicating antagonistic tolerance at inter-communal level. In this form of tolerance, Muslims were the tolerators, due to their religion, and they were privileged in the eyes of Ottoman authorities in comparison with non-Muslims. Non-Muslim communities like the Anatolian Orthodox, on the other hand, were the tolerated who had no other choice but to consent. In this ecosystem of Cappadocia (and elsewhere in the Empire), the borders between “us” (Self) and “them” (Other) were determined by religion, and the Anatolian Orthodox did not want to lose members in favor of either the dominant religion of Islam, or other Christian denominations like Protestantism. The Orthodox community was already small and was shrinking due to emigration in the nineteenth century *vis à vis* the Muslim masses, so border maintenance was particularly important. For this reason, inter-marriages were never appreciated by the Orthodox, because they meant losing

community members. Further to that, syncretic behaviors were very much signs of antagonistic tolerance for two reasons: firstly, shrines of the Orthodox became those of Muslims after the Islamization of Anatolia, which refers to a historical contestation; and secondly, the Orthodox were dominated by the majority of Muslims and had no other choice but to embrace common customs and rituals. However, Muslims being both numerous and culturally dominant in Cappadocian cosmopolitanism does not imply that non-Muslims closed themselves off from Muslims. Despite the prevailing competition at the inter-communal level, there was also proximity and intimacy at the inter-personal level.

Like the non-Muslims of other regions of the Empire, the Cappadocian Orthodox entered a process of nationalization in the late nineteenth century. In chapter 4 I analyze their Hellenization process and show the relation between pre-existing cohabitation practices and nationalism. Three main factors helped in creation of broader Community consciousness and proto-national bonds among the Cappadocian Orthodox: firstly, increasing male emigration to foreign lands due to economic opportunities emerged with the entrance of European capital to major port cities of the Empire, and construction of railroad networks that facilitated the connection between homeland and foreign lands; secondly, the foundation of the Greek Kingdom and its irredentist policies over Asia Minor Orthodox, initially through cultural means like education and propagation through the *sylogoi* (societies) and press; and thirdly, the importance attributed to education by the Church as a response to missionaries and as an outcome of Ottoman Reforms that facilitated the entrance of lay people to administrative bodies of *millet*. Consequently, the Anatolian Orthodox became aware of their kinship ties with the Orthodox of other regions for the first time, and began to realize the presence of a broader Community that included other communities as well as their own local community (*koinotis*). However, until the nationalist aggressiveness of CUP policies particularly targeted foreign investments and non-Muslims, Orthodox folk were still relatively indifferent to nationalism, and regarded it as an attack on their religious identity. On the other side of the coin; among the intellectual circles of

the Orthodox there were Greek nationalists who received their educations at the important institutions of Athens, Istanbul, and elsewhere; there were Ottomanists who were also educated at major schools but believed in the integrity of the Empire; and there were proto-nationalists who received education from local community schools and were taught by nationalist teachers. As for the remaining people, seeds of Greek nationalism could only bear fruit after the Young Turk Revolution, and only then began to forge the social identity of the great amount of people in favor of nationalism. During this process, the germ of nationalism settled on the pre-existing Self-Other dichotomy that had long been based on religious differences. In the end, both Turkish and Greek nationalisms were religious nationalisms that chose their prospective members according to their religion. As a general rule, the relatively peaceful atmosphere created by antagonistic tolerance dissolved in times of crisis, and mostly ended in internecine wars and massacres. This is what happened in the Balkans, for example. In Cappadocia, however, even during times of crisis, we do not observe big clashes or conflicts but instead the rise of communal borders and an adoption of national identity more intensely compared to previous epochs. Accordingly, I argue that the nationalization of the Cappadocian Orthodox could only be completed after their expulsion and their direct exposure to the ideological apparatus of the Greek state.

Coming back to the tolerance debate, there were occasions when the Anatolian Orthodox were in the position of tolerators. In their relations with the Greek Protestants who changed their denomination under missionary influence, the Orthodox were either intolerant or, due to their kinship relations with the converts, they remained indifferent and exercised negative tolerance. In chapter 5 I analyze the curious case of the Greek Protestants who remained invisible in the historiography of the non-Muslims of the Ottoman Empire, and portray their lives especially in their relations with the Orthodox with whom they had blood ties. Conversion meant the weakening of the Orthodox Community due to a loss of members, and was never appreciated by Community members or Church authorities. In the nineteenth century it also meant *denationalization* (Deringil,

2012) for the Orthodox, since Orthodox Christianity had already become an ingredient of Greek nationalism and the converts would be seen as traitors of the nation. On the other side of the coin, Greek Protestants were relatives of the Orthodox and this made the situation complicated. For this chapter, I analyze correspondence coming from prominent members of the Greek Protestants to the missionary newspaper *Angeliaforos*, and I utilize the few testimonies of Greek Protestants I happened to find in the Oral Tradition Archive of the KMS. This chapter is of particular importance for the entire study because it is the only work that focuses on individual stories and pictures the lives of converts.

CHAPTER 2

2 OTTOMAN TOLERANCE RECONSIDERED

There are signs left to earth from a hand. There are fragments to exhibit the scattered footprints of humans in our planet and the subsequent generations on the path of civilization and their roots; and they [the fragments] mainly remind the respect that our world needs. Cappadocia is one those fragments. The Greeks have also a share in it. Another piece of Hellenism and Orthodoxy was flourished there. It is an image that shows the coexistence of cultures and religions and it is an example for today. We may not have the land, the churches and the aroma but we have our memories and they are alive for her and for our future. The future that people are invited to live together and apart (Tzalla, 2013).

These poetic words blended with a feeling of nostalgia for Cappadocia are excerpted from a March 2013 issue of a local newspaper, Epirus; they are about a theatre performance in a village called *Neokaisaria* “where the heart of Cappadocia beats” (Tzalla, 2013). This is also the village where I first met the Cappadocia origin Greeks in 2009.

We are surrounded by nostalgic sentiments triggered by personal archeology of investigating our individual past in the identity-oriented world of the post-Cold War era. The nostalgia for ancestral lands that no longer exist or that never existed, or longing for some phantasmagoric past is closely associated with reinvention of identity. Nowadays we frequently ask ourselves the question of “who I am”. Why is it that modern individuals are so preoccupied with inventing or discovering new identities for themselves? With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, identity politics replaced the ideological politics of the Cold War era. Identity politics did not, of course, appear suddenly as a result of the weakening of ideological politics. They have actually existed for a long time. Scholars date the beginning of identity politics to the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King Jr., the Black Power movement, and global anticolonial movements, where activists called for a new collective identity to counterbalance White imperialism.

When the Cold War ended, identity politics became much more popular compared to the past. On one hand, it is an activism of consciousness raising a question of inferiority (Storr, 2010); on the other hand it promotes identity to be “the loudest talk” in town, with which everyone’s mind is occupied (Bauman, 2004). Interestingly, not only subaltern people but also other individuals invented new ways to show pleasure to their particular identity; they established foundations and societies in their ancestral hometowns, celebrated feasts, opened museums, performed arts focusing on specific identity traits, and initiated a new form of tourism that could be considered nostalgic travels to places of origin.³¹

The above mentioned theatre performance, the article published about it in a local paper, and the other activities of the associations (σύλλογοι) of the Cappadocian Greeks in Greece like *Gavoustima* (see above) are all outcomes of an atmosphere created in the post-Cold War era. The contemporary story of the Cappadocian Greeks is not the concern of this dissertation. I focus primarily on the historical community of the Cappadocian Christians in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The reason I gave the above mentioned example is to show how “origins” and “identity” talk prevails today not only in immigrant countries like the U.S. and Canada but also in nation states like Greece. The only distinction is that Cappadocians do not manifest any political demand from the Greek government other than freely celebrating their identity. For many identity groups,³² this is not the case. They are mostly preoccupied with recognition and representation demands, which in turn creates a huge debate concerning the dilemma between the liberal ideal of individual liberty and group autonomy.

³¹ For a discussion about how memory and nostalgia generate new market opportunities, see E. Özyürek, *The politics of public memory in Turkey*; and A. S. Alpan, *But the memory remains: history, memory and the 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange*.

³² Amy Gutmann differentiates between four different types of identity groups: cultural groups, voluntary associations, ascriptive groups and religious groups. These are neither good nor bad in and of themselves, and they should be evaluated in accordance with their affirmation of democracy and justice. See A. Gutmann, *Identity in democracy*.

In the last twenty years or so scholars in Western liberal societies have produced ideas to reconcile group demands and group autonomy with individual liberty and individual autonomy in an effort to attain justice. This dilemma opened to discussion liberalism's flaws and shortcomings when it comes to dealing with diversity, and introduced different theories of justice to Western politics. In this process, scholars from various schools rediscovered forms of living together in remote geographies and in history of far away countries and revived the debates about possible ways of cohabitation in nations of turmoil. The Ottoman "*millet* system" is one of those examples rediscovered in the West as an historical example of group autonomy and religious tolerance.³³

In a parallel vein, "Ottoman romanticism" is a new phenomenon in Turkey. Until recently, the official historiography had a nonsensical tendency to underestimate anything that belonged to the Ottoman past. Today, the river flows in opposite direction, and this situation generates ahistoric studies and discussions and non-scientific perspectives both towards the past and the present. In parallel timing with western scholarship that refers to the Ottoman experience of pluralism (often in a critical way), some scholars and politicians in Turkey dove into a discourse about Ottoman tolerance nowadays. In other words, these scholars and politicians support their theses of Ottoman tolerance with the studies in the West and regard the Ottoman way of dealing with pluralism as a remedy to Turkey's current minority problems, including the political and linguistic demands of Kurds, the religious accommodation of Alawites and Assyrians, the violation of the minority rights of Greeks, the Armenians, the Jews, and the stigmatizing language used against all minorities, including the Roma. There are two problems in this perspective: firstly they use "tolerance" as a free floating concept without an

³³ For studies that discuss and appreciate the Ottoman "*millet*" system, see J. A. Sigler, *Minority rights: a comparative analysis*; V. V. Dyke, *Human rights, ethnicity, and discrimination*; P. Thornberry, *International law and the rights of minorities*. For two studies that critically discuss Ottoman tolerance see W. Kymlicka, *Two models of pluralism and tolerance*; M. Walzer, *On toleration*.

analysis of what it implies in both pre-modern and modern times; and secondly they offer to imitate a historical case to solve the identity claims of today.

I claimed previously that if we were to talk about peaceful living together and tolerance for the Ottoman context, Cappadocia would be the best-suited example compared to other regions of the Ottoman Empire. For example, in Lebanon there was sectarian warfare between Maronite Christians and Druzes in 1860; in the Balkans peasant revolts turned into the nationalist movements of Serbs, Greeks, Bulgarians and Albanians; in Crete despite the presence of kinship ties, Christians and Muslims were at each other's throat; in the Western shores of Anatolia Cretan refugees were in conflict with local Greeks; among other examples. As for Cappadocia, there was no turmoil or visible clash between different religious groups until the very last decades of the empire, and it also presents a great example of religious diversity because of its inclusion of the Sunni and Alawite Muslims, Orthodox Christians, Armenians, Protestants and foreign missionaries. Accordingly, it is a perfect example to study tolerance and cohabitation in the Ottoman context and, thus, it offers an ideal case study to open into debate the practicality of the "Ottoman tolerance" in today's Turkey. In this study, I focus in particular on the Orthodox Christians' relations with the Turks and the Greek Protestants due to the limitations of sources. Before getting into a detailed documentation and analysis of my case, I must first mention plurality, justice, and tolerance in the present chapter.

To employ modern concepts like tolerance and multiculturalism might not seem appropriate for a study that is occupied with a historical community and I completely agree with criticism that argues that it is often a futile endeavor and an anachronistic approach to evaluate historical phenomena with modern concepts. In contemporary evaluations of Ottoman context, however, tolerance is repeatedly used, referred to as the "peaceful co-existence" of different religious groups, portrayed as an ideal world, and suggested by some that it should be emulated in today's world. However, a detailed discussion of the term has not been attempted

until recently.³⁴ I thereby argue that in order to address tolerance it must be discussed as both religious tolerance and as a modern liberal concept, taken from a study that aims to respond to and challenge an understanding of a historical model as that could serve as an example for solutions to today's minority issues.

This is not an easy task for two reasons. First of all, except for pre-modern religious tolerance conceptualizations, tolerance discussions are conducted in the context of liberal democratic societies. These are mostly normative, theoretical debates that take liberal democracies as givens and envisage an ideal world which is usually inadequate in the face of the complex poly-cultural realities in existence, as well as in terms of diversity of identity/affinity groups, their inner heterodoxies, permeability of group boundaries, and non-fixable characteristics of identities. Additionally, critical theories of tolerance are occupied with the replacement of this system altogether and with attempting to make fundamental transformations to society and in its norms in a range, from its constituting principles to its basic codes of relationship between human beings in various fields. Therefore, the pre-modern Ottoman world remains totally alien to contemporary tolerance debates for a very basic reason: it was not a liberal democratic country; rather, it was a pre-modern monarchy. Secondly, - leaving aside the critiques of a liberal capitalist system- in contemporary liberal states justice is an end, an objective to be reached by setting fundamental rights of freedom and equality for every citizen. But for the Ottoman Empire justice itself was a tool, a means to preserve the hegemony of the dynasty over its subjects. Therefore, we are again talking about two completely different systems. The only resemblance is that in both systems tolerance is required as a means to minimize conflict and ensure continuity, even though the scope of the concept is different. In Ottoman context, tolerance is "religious tolerance" (in non-Lockean sense). As we will see later in this chapter, only religious diversity was tolerated and even this type of tolerance was limited with tolerating "the peoples of the book" in line with Islamic rule. In the Ottoman

³⁴ For a recent analysis of Ottoman tolerance, see D. B. Eğılmez, *Justice as the requirement of toleration: contemptuous tolerance and punitive intolerance in the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire*.

tradition there was no room for heresies and heretics of any religion. People could exist as long as they belonged to a religious community. For the contemporary liberal societies, however, we can talk about super-diversity; and accordingly, tolerance has been discussed in a broader context and some scholars even think of replacing tolerance with recognition or respect.

Considering these pitfalls, how one can possibly benefit from contemporary tolerance debates for a historical study? As an initial step, showing the contemporary tolerance disputes will strengthen my position that romanticizing the Ottoman experience as an example for our contemporary minority problems is vain because Ottoman tolerance was totally irrelevant to what we need today. Secondly, such debates help us to disrupt our average point of view about the concept of tolerance, which has often been employed arbitrarily and regarded positively. Accordingly, we need to develop a more sophisticated perspective to analyze and understand the Ottoman performance of tolerance. Lastly, this will provide a basis to build a comparative perspective between past and present without falling into an error of anachronistically judging the past with present ideals, and imitating past practices for current problems of diversity.

2.1 Tolerance in contemporary plural societies

2.1.1 Different mechanisms to attain justice in contemporary plural societies

As claimed before, after the Cold War the vacuum filled by the ideological opposition between communism and liberalism was pervaded by identity talk and identity demands. This was especially true in immigrant countries where identity demand of any kind is quite noticeable, and scholars found themselves engaged with theories of peaceful living together. They started to develop theories to handle the problems of plural societies. The main questions were how to accommodate difference, and on what criteria to differentiate between public and private spheres. This distinction of public-private realms is important when it comes to determining the borders of political arena; for coming to a consensus in

political matters; for “action” which corresponds to political activity that goes on directly between men in an Arendtian sense; to decide on “constitutional essentials”; to create more democratic societies; or simply to attain respect among different sections of the society. The issue is complex and includes various normative perspectives. In this chapter, I will briefly refer to theories of justice and plurality, starting with John Rawls’s political liberalism since many academicians from various schools, including multiculturalism, critical theory and deliberative democracy, have drawn extensively upon his arguments.

Political liberalism is differentiated on the basis of its attempt to generate minimum morality criteria against the comprehensive and general moral doctrine in Classical Liberalism, and it aims to solve the deadlock emerging from the arguments concerning what is good in plural societies and, in this way, create peaceful living together and a stable political union. The major question political liberalism tries to answer is, how it is possible that there can be a stable and just society whose free and equal citizens are intensely split by conflicting or even incommensurable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines (Rawls, 1993)? Proponents of the approach claim that insisting on a particular notion of good might result, in the end, in conflicts and violence. Correspondingly, what is offered in political liberalism is a contract approved by all reasonable and rational citizens; or, to put it differently, a constitution in which the essential tenets are agreed upon by all equal and free citizens, who are expected to approve in the light of principles and ideas acceptable to human reason (Rawls, 1993). Therefore, we can claim that the consensus of reasonable and rational citizens is the way justice is achieved, and it is independent of any moral, religious, or philosophical conception. Such a constitutional regime operates in a special domain of the political that is different from the associational; it is voluntary in ways that the political is not, and stems from the personal and the familial, which are also affectional in ways the political is not (Rawls, 1993). Many scholars, especially communitarians, criticize political liberalism for being insufficient since it focuses on individual rights rather than on using common good to attain justice, and

confines diversity decisively to the private sphere to preserve stability, in contrast to the desire of the many identity groups to see their values and cultural practices acknowledged and protected by the wider socio-political framework (Baumeister, 1999). In other words, Rawlsian liberalism adopts tolerance and non-interference in the private sphere, which means that individuals can exercise their customs and preserve their group values at home, and by this way the public order and equality of citizens are sustained. In Rawls' wording:

Given the principles of justice, the state must be understood as the association consisting of equal citizens. It does not concern itself with philosophical and religious doctrine but regulates individuals' pursuit of their moral and spiritual interests in accordance with principles to which they themselves would agree in an initial situation of equality (Rawls, 1999, p. 186).

That is to say, Rawlsian liberalism claims to be capable of accommodating diversity, but no belief or value can be justified at the political level if it does not appeal to all. Justice itself is maintained by contract principle or public reason, to which everyone agrees, but Rawls ignores potential antagonisms and conflicts in the creation of public reason. He assumes that people can be communitarian in the private sphere and liberal in the public sphere. Nevertheless the problem is if a member of a religious community sees his/her religion as very essential to his/her being, to the extent that (s)he cannot reevaluate it in accordance with the liberal norms, how could (s)he behave without his/her religion in the public sphere? Parekh (2006) makes a harsh criticism of the Rawlsian model, claiming that political liberalism does not mention human beings but citizens, not human reason but public reason, not a human person but the political conception of a person, not human powers but the powers of the citizen. In line with these perspectives, political liberalism is inadequate for two reasons: firstly, many identity groups want to be visible and represented in the public sphere with their peculiar characteristics, and this is totally against the contract principle in political liberalism; and secondly, they demand specific group rights and this challenges equality and individual liberty principles.

Another problem in the Rawlsian model is the vague boundary between public and private domains. Rawls differentiates between the political, the associational and the personal sphere, the last two of which belong to the private domain. However, there are some other relations that are neither private nor public if we follow Rawls's theory. For example, are we in the public realm when we are shopping in a supermarket? What about standing in line for a bus? Parekh defines an intermediate space between the structured relations of organized public realm and the intimate relations of the personal or private realm. For him, some aspects of these relations are regulated by law, but most are not and cannot be, since people conduct relations with other people in their neighborhood, on public transportation, at work, and so on and so forth, and all these relations are regulated by rules of civility and depend on a sense of civic values (Parekh, 2006). If Parekh is right, the intermediary realm seems to occupy more space than private and public realms, and this makes the issue more complicated. Arendt's definition of public and private spaces,³⁵ on the other hand, provides another perspective for the whole discussion. Arendt claims that people have the feeling of reality for their presence only if they appear and exist in public spaces so they are seen, heard, and tolerated by other people. Therefore, she regards public space as a sphere of appearances, and to live an entirely private life would mean to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life and of the reality that comes from being in touch with others. Privatization of privacy means the absence of others, so it means non-existence (Arendt, 1998). It is quite apparent that political liberalism tolerates difference so long as it is invisible; when it is locked in the private sphere. For Arendt, assuming one's religious identity and other moral or philosophical concerns are his/her private identity would be transforming men into something they are not (Arendt, 1998). In a similar vein, Sennett argues that the myth of impersonality in the public sphere is Self-destructive and the pursuit of common interest is destroyed in the search for a common identity. That is to say, in modern liberal societies the public is emptied of people who wanted to be

³⁵ Arendt prefers to use the word space rather than sphere or realm; I use these three words interchangeably throughout the text.

expressive in that sphere. Hence people mask the Self, and masks permit pure sociability naked of private feelings; wearing a mask is seen as the essence of civility. Nevertheless, in the end what we have is a fascist state in one form of intimate tyranny (Sennett, 1992).

Political liberalism has the potential to end up as fascism since it aims to separate Self and action (in the Arendtian sense) and it remains out of reach, since the political sphere is not always within rational human control to decide on “founding principles” (Button, 2005). To summarize what I have discussed so far, there are three main problems in the creation of “constitutional essentials” in Rawlsian political liberalism: firstly, individuals cannot act in the public space without Self (without their morals); secondly, we cannot expect them to behave totally rationally in deliberative process without entering into conflicts, so the whole process has the potential to end up in deadlock; thirdly, their opinion is shaped within the particularities of society (background, culture, etc.) they live in, so they are already limited, and the outcome might be totally illiberal.

Any study focusing on issues like democracy, justice, multiculturalism, and tolerance cannot be designed without referring to Rawls’ political liberalism because his study was one of the first to target the matter of contemporary plurality. Many other scholars followed him or addressed to his work and tried to cope with the deficiencies of his model. One of the issues that occupied scholars from many different schools of thought was his attempt to keep diversity in the private sphere. He was certainly not the only one who offered to preserve differences in private level. The history of the idea of tolerance exhibits many other examples on a scale from Lockean religious toleration to the modern tolerance of minorities. Therefore, public-private distinction occupies a critical part in discussions concerning tolerance/toleration.

For Heyd (1996), today we expect to prevent hostility to differences, not for the sake of performing toleration, but as a matter of rights or recognition of the value of their ways of life, because it is basically not our business to interfere with the actions and beliefs of other human beings. There is a difference between non-

intervention in the public sphere and non-intervention in the private sphere. The former means creating a mechanism for identity groups to represent themselves in the public sphere, while the latter implies confining differences to the private sphere. Hence, we are talking about positive and negative tolerance, respectively. Rawls equated “the principle of toleration” to the idea of individual freedom of conscience. Thereby, his model offered to separate church from state to protect each religious community (Kymlicka, 1996). His notion of non-intervention was to make invisible the differences in the public domain, and for this reason he was extensively criticized. Again, we come to the same conclusion where tolerance is concerned, one cannot skip the discussions about the dichotomy of public and private, and the whole debate is closely associated with group rights-individual rights dichotomy, debates about multiculturalism, and thus attaining justice.

I employ here three perspectives in dealing with diversity rather than preserving it in the private sphere, like Rawls. These are the group rights model, politics of difference, and deliberative democracy. Will Kymlicka, as a representative of the group rights model, criticizes Orthodox Liberalism of separating ethnicity and state as it separated religion and state with universal citizenship rights by disregarding disadvantaged group specificities. The state should, instead, be charged with providing a comprehensive theory of justice that requires group-specific rights and considers the special status of minority cultures in addition to the universal rights that do not require any group membership and value individual autonomy (Kymlicka, 1998). Thus, for him, collective rights and individual rights are compatible. His liberal minority rights theory basically aims to integrate immigrants into majority culture under fair conditions, and to allow national/ethnic minorities to protect themselves as separate communities. (Kymlicka, 1997). These two groups cannot share the same group rights because in order to protect immigrants from marginalization in their new country, about which they know very little, the state has to take some measures to integrate them into the society to which they voluntarily immigrated while their compatriots chose to remain in their fatherlands (Kymlicka, 1998). On the other hand,

national/ethnic minorities existed long before they joined the body of the state, and they already have various institutions to preserve their culture,³⁶ but if their group specific rights are not recognized they will find themselves deprived of opportunities that are automatically granted to the majority culture (Kymlicka, 1998).

Kymlicka (1998) accepts the criticisms that there are also grey domains where immigrants and minorities cannot easily be distinguished, and that there are also communities who are neither minorities nor immigrants, like the Roma, African Americans, Russians in Baltic countries, and refugees; however, for him, despite its shortages his theory is the most comprehensive theory concerning diversity and, even if there are exceptions, the immigrants and the minorities are the most widespread disadvantaged groups in the world. He also warns that any form of group rights that restricts the civil rights of group members is inconsistent with liberal principles and, thus, should not be employed (Kymlicka, 1998). This point is harshly criticized by Parekh with an argument claiming that Kymlicka defends cultures only after suitably liberalizing them rather than accepting their authentic otherness. For him, most of the minority groups in the West are not liberal and are imposing liberalism, which is a form of culture developed only in the West and is akin to imposing Christianity on non-Christians (Parekh, 1997). In a similar vein, Žižek labels multiculturalism as a new form of fascism and adds that multiculturalist respect for the Other's specificity is the very form of asserting one's own superiority (Žižek, 1997). Kymlicka (1998) regards these views as exaggeratory since many minority groups in the West are devoted to the norms of liberal democracy, including the Catalans, Scots, Flemings, African Americans, and most immigrants. For him, philosophers eagerly find examples to demonstrate that multiculturalism is a "clash of civilizations" and are overly concerned with the

legitimacy of the democratic principles of liberalism, when in reality multiculturalism has another concern, which is how to interpret the liberal norms.

Criticism of multiculturalism is as old as multiculturalism itself. Beginning in the 1970s, when the first multicultural policies were enforced in many countries, there have always been criticisms (Gozdecka et al., 2014). The most important criticisms that are directed against Kymlicka's multiculturalism are; his theory ghettoizes minorities, approaches cultures as fixed entities, reifies the borders between communities, disregards the interaction between cultures, rejects the transcultural epistemic claims (Wagner, 1994), ignores heterogeneity of minority cultures, and creates an atmosphere under which new minorities are invented. Kymlicka (1995) views these criticisms as over-generalizations that misinterpret his theory. Aware of the fact that there may be some groups that remain outside of his categories, he attempts to analyze group specificities with their historical institutions, identities, and expectations before offering some form of multiculturalist policies. Certainly, this explanation does not respond to all of the above-mentioned concerns. His theory also remains inadequate when trying to answer the question of how to deal with non-liberal minorities that have internal restrictions that deny the liberty of an individual because he is indecisive concerning the scope of intervention in internal affairs of illiberal minorities.

In order to satisfy some of these criticisms and comply with new circumstances, some scholars, including Vertovec and even Kymlicka himself, coined the term "post-multiculturalism" to indicate a particular phase of multiculturalism, according to which strong common national identity is combined with recognition of cultural diversity (Vertovec, 2010). In many multicultural countries like the UK, USA, Australia and Canada, the failure of integration was proven indisputably in the 2000s. In the UK, for example, different ethnic and religious groups had been living parallel lives in segregated spaces. For this situation, many people believe that multicultural policies were largely to blame (Vertovec, 2010). Further, compared to the 1960s and 1970s when large immigrant groups from specific countries arrived frequently in Western countries, nowadays

newer, smaller, transient, more socially stratified, less organized and more legally differentiated immigrant groups comprise global migration flows. Accordingly, “super diversity” is the current phenomenon (Vertovec, 2010). In order to accommodate diversity within integration, governments implement post-multiculturalist policies that demand increasing language requirements, citizenship courses, and tests to receive citizenship (Vertovec, 2010). Certainly, there are also critics of post-multiculturalism that pinpoint the paradoxes, such as emergence of new forms of racism, excessive focus on gender inequality within minority cultures, and relativization of human rights regimes, as well as parameters changing from ethnicity and culture to religion (especially after 9/11), and from diversity to cohesion and security.³⁷

One step further of Kymlicka’s collective rights model is Iris Young’s “politics of difference” in which she argues that equality means the participation and inclusion of all groups. And this inclusion sometimes requires different treatments for oppressed or disadvantaged groups. Young (1990) criticizes an ideal that seeks a society in which differences of race, sex, religion, and ethnicity no longer make a difference for people’s rights and opportunities. For her, an ideal of justice that defines liberation as the transcendence of group difference basically means assimilation, and the liberal ideal of equality and the ignorance of difference can have oppressive consequences. Firstly, only the oppressed groups are marked with their peculiarity, not the privileged groups, and these disadvantaged groups are expected to assimilate in to mainstream behavior. Secondly, they come into the game after it has already begun, and its rules and standards have already been set (Young, 1990). Thus, Young’s (1990) model, unlike that of Kymlicka, rejects liberal comprehensive justice and the individualism of liberal humanism. Young’s “politics of difference” offer instead group autonomy, or, specifically set rights for each group. With this vision, she expects to achieve equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups who mutually respect one another and affirm one

³⁷ See D. A. Gozdecka, S. A. Ercan & M. Kmak, From multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism: trends and paradoxes.

another in their differences. Again straying from Kymlicka, Young (1990) labels disadvantaged groups as “affinity groups” which include not only immigrants, national/ethnic minorities, race groups but also feminists, LGBTI, disabled people, and so on. Being aware of the complexity of plural society in which every social group has group differences cutting across it, Young (1990) accepts that one might be black, elderly, gay, and disabled, and the affinity group of such a person would be the one with whom she feels the most comfortable. She claims to acquire social justice by this way and assumes full participation and inclusion of everyone in a society’s major institutions. Difference, she says, no longer means otherness and exclusive opposition in such a society, but specificity, variation and heterogeneity.

The problem in Young’s model is that it has too many problems. Similar to Kymlicka’s multiculturalism, politics of difference reifies “affinity group” borders, fixes identities, fetishizes diversity, ignores the internal heterogeneity of groups and has the tendency to permit inhumane restrictions of a group on an individual member. Adding to these, although Young accepts that a person might have more than one affinity, she pushes her to select one from many and expects her to stay there, and by this way disregards the fluid nature of identity. She also does not set the principles of “affinity group” membership and the rules of political representation inside or outside the groups. Moreover, her theory seems to be developed for oppressed groups, excluding the group’s interests. Last but not least, one is tempted to ask about the situation of an individual person who rejects to be part of any affinity group. Is (s)he going to be outside of the system? Isn’t it a kind of oppression that she criticizes severely in political liberalism?

Diversity and pluralism are phenomena of our time not only in immigrant countries but also in nation states that seem to be less homogeneous. The identity demands of any kind, ranging from national identity to sexual orientation, are at stake, but the other concerns of our lives like unemployment, minimum wage, working hours, equal distribution of wealth, welfare, social inequality, freedom of speech, etc. also interest individuals. These are the concerns that we should act together to initiate pressure mechanisms on our governments. As claimed also by

Gutmann, when identity politics neglect class and concentrate on group specificities such as race and ethnicity, as in the case in the U.S., they are less likely to pursue an egalitarian agenda (Gutmann, 2004). Thus, I believe, we need a democratic model that neither creates atomistic individuals nor fetishizes identity groups, but instead promotes respect over tolerance (below you will find a detailed discussion of this idea). With this thought in mind, I wonder if there could be a system where all individuals benefit from equal rights of coexistence, but at the same time have an opportunity to discuss publicly their identity claims, enjoy their differences, and are able to come together for their common problems that transcend their ascriptive attributes.

Deliberative democracy seems to approximate the above mentioned ideals. According to Habermas (1999), persons, including legal persons, become individualized only through a process of socialization. Thus a correctly understood theory of rights requires a politics of recognition that protects the integrity of the individual in the life context in which his or her identity formed. For this logic, Habermas (1999) claims that we do not need an alternative model that corrects the individualistic design of the system of rights through other normative perspectives. What he argues is basically that without offering collective rights, we can create a mechanism that includes a free and open public sphere for the individuals whose identity is interwoven with collective identities. That is to say, he offers a deliberative mechanism through which private individuals come together and discuss public matters; they do not have to see each other during the process since there are other realms in modern world. At this point one may argue that since Rawls also suggested a deliberative model to agree upon a constitution, what is the difference? Contrary to Rawlsian political liberalism, Habermas's (1999) deliberative democracy suggests deliberation for all sorts of decision making, not only agreeing upon founding principles; further, it does not appropriate difference as private property, and it does not limit agencies including individuals and institutions having an opinion about public matters, but rather it conceptualizes the public sphere as a gathering of private persons of the Enlightenment to use their

private reason to discuss public matters. Accordingly, he expects both conflicts and antagonism to happen between individuals during this process (Benhabib, 1997). The most important argument in his theory is his emphasis on the need concerning the dissolution of the fusion that came into existence between the political culture that was demanded by all citizens coming from different cultural backgrounds, and the majority culture. For Habermas (1999), if we are seeking to create a society where different cultural, ethnic and religious life forms have equal rights of coexistence, common political culture should be reshaped independently from the previously set political culture, where sub-cultures could not find space for themselves. Long story short, deliberative democracy acknowledges the citizens as the main actors in democracy but, at the same time, requires a strong ideal of deliberation. And this model is believed to be the only way to hold together a multicultural society. However, it disregards the fact that if there is antagonism in the deliberation process no consensus would be possible (Benhabib, 1997).

All the above-mentioned theories of justice are normative theories that take liberal society as a given. Such theories often do not coincide with prevailing diversities and their complexity. However, they enable us to uncover some deficiencies of the existing system, and to develop better ways to attain freedom and equality. As previously mentioned, a discussion about liberal and critical theories of justice and tolerance prevents us from randomly employing some modern concepts like multiculturalism and tolerance for a historical study. Before getting into the debate on tolerance, below you will find below a short summary of the above discussion in a chart.

Table 1

different mechanisms of justice:		
	Diversity Represented in Public sphere (deliberative models)	Diversity Confined in Private sphere
Equality achieved through individual autonomy	Deliberative Democracy	Political Liberalism Multiculturalism Post-multiculturalism
Equality achieved through group autonomy	Politics of Difference,	Multiculturalism* Post-multiculturalism

*Multiculturalism does not reject liberal principle of individual autonomy. It offers a comprehensive liberal theory including both universal law of equal citizenship and collective rights for different groups. And it accepts diversity in public sphere only if that diversity is adaptable to liberal values so there is no room for non-liberal groups in public sphere. As for post-multiculturalism, it is integration oriented multiculturalism focusing more on common civic values rather than group differences.

2.1.2 Tolerance

The whole discussion made above is also about the concept of tolerance, which hid itself in different mechanisms of justice developed to meet the needs of diversity. Tolerance is one of the greatest tributaries to justice (King, 1998), and a thick concept with different layers each of which evokes different meanings that can be considered both to be either positive or negative depending on one's political stance. One can either take it as a core of liberalism or as that of fascism. While in Western scholarship it is mostly seen as a liberal value and a civilizational virtue that each liberal individual should carry, it is regarded as

dominance of powerful over the weak by the critical theory. By its nature, tolerance does not have a unified meaning across nations and cultures. It is attached to different objects in different national contexts (Brown, 2006) including groups with various identity or interest demands like religion, race, ethnicity, sexual tendency, patriarchy, environmental concerns, and so on.

Further to its multi-layered structure and diverse cultural contexts, there is confusion about either employing “tolerance” or “toleration”. For Walzer (1997), “tolerance” is an attitude or virtue; on the other hand “toleration” is a practice. In a similar way, Tyler (2008) states that “toleration” is principally a sociopolitical sanction or concession by which the majority/strong “tolerate” the weak/minority, whereas “tolerance” is an attitude and it has no relation to the power holders. For Tyler, “toleration” and “tolerance” can be employed as strategies by individuals, communities, or regimes but “toleration” is more restrictive than “tolerance” because of its limited application. Cohen (2004), on the other hand, after making a detailed debate about the semantics of these two words, portrays the ambiguity of “tolerance” and claims that we do better if we reserve “toleration” for the activity, using endurance and “tolerance” for the attitude (or virtue). My argument at this point is that anyone can perform “tolerance” because it is a behavior, but not everyone is capable of executing “toleration” since it is an action or sanction. Since I am referring to both government policies of tolerating minorities and behavior of tolerating the Other in relations of co-existence, I will be employing the term “tolerance” unless the scholars quoted in this study use “toleration”.

Tolerance is also complicated concerning the dichotomy between tolerance in public versus private spheres; we can call the former positive tolerance and the latter negative tolerance. The question here is to what extent we can tolerate differences. Do we tolerate them as long as they remain in private sphere in the Rawlsian sense (negative tolerance), or are there any mechanisms to appreciate diversity in public sphere (positive tolerance)? Concerning the difficulty for a scholar to position herself in discussions about tolerance, I believe asking a few

questions might be helpful in attempting to develop a perspective for the term tolerance:

1. Who are the objects of tolerance?
2. Do people need to tolerate the ones whom they appreciate and like?
3. What are the different levels of tolerance?
4. Is it inherently a power relationship?
5. Is tolerance a middle way between rejection and assimilation?
6. Do two equally powerful people/groups tolerate each other?³⁸

Toleration, as a term, was first coined by Locke as “religious tolerance” in his 1689 letter to his friend Philipp van Limborch, titled *A Letter Concerning Toleration*. In the letter, Locke described the Christian virtues of charity and love and criticized the insistency on penalizing these beliefs, which he considered to be against the profession of Christianity. For him, no one who follows Christ and his teachings is a heretic, and tolerating those who have different religious views is compatible with the Gospel. Corresponding with this view, he offered to distinguish between religious and political matters and to define the boundary between religion and commonwealth, which for him was an association of people constituted solely for the purpose of preserving and promoting civil goods like life, liberty, physical integrity, freedom from pain, external possessions (including money), and the necessities of life. The ruler is solely responsible for civil goods, and the care of souls cannot belong to him. Locke (2010) states that neither persons, nor churches, nor even commonwealths can have any right to attack one another’s civil goods or steal each other’s worldly assets on the pretext of religion. And the ruler, who plays the most important part in toleration, cannot use sanctions of civil law to enforce any ecclesiastical rites or ceremonies in the worship of God, nor can he prohibit any ritual performed by any church. Basically, Locke’s “religious toleration” would refer to separation of church and state. Later

³⁸ I am particularly inspired by Michael Walzer in questions 2 and 6; and by Wendy Brown in questions 4 and 5.

in the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill questioned the limits of the authority of society over the individual:

Individuality has its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards one another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part be observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but in each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to free exercise (Mill, 2009, p. 129).

Certainly we have the right to act upon our unfavorable opinion of anyone but not upon the oppression of his individuality. Therefore, straying from Locke's "religious toleration", Mill calls for toleration in virtue of oppression of society with the individual, and determines the necessary conditions of tolerable intervention of society on individuals. These are the harmful activities and the inconveniences which are inseparable from the unfavorable judgment of others (Mill, 2009).

As for modern theories of tolerance, Monk (1999) describes the practice of toleration as the voluntary acceptance of attitudes and/or actions, which are severely disapproved of since they are judged to be wrong, and which could be prevented or restrained if the dominant force chose to do so. In a similar vein, Miller regards toleration as more of a negative toleration of indifference. A policy of toleration, he claims, involves leaving groups free to assert their identity and express their cultural values in private or through associations of their members. The state's role in this form of toleration is negative, since it neither forces minority groups to conform to the dominant culture, nor erects artificial barriers that make it harder for minority cultures to flourish. Adding to that, it does not shoulder a positive responsibility to protect minority cultures (Miller, 1999). Walzer (1997), on the other hand, broadens its content and lists various forms of tolerance. According to his perspective, standing for the ones whom you think have fallacies, solely for the sake of peace, can be a form of toleration. Moreover, disregarding the Others or accepting firmly that they also have rights might be different levels of toleration. One can also be curious or even enthusiastic about the Others. Does that imply tolerance? Walzer puts a question mark at this last

point and wonders if it is possible to be tolerant towards someone about whom we feel supportive. The important point is that if you are tolerating someone you think that (s)he is different than you because they have different values and beliefs, and you are inclined to stay away from her/him. However, if you want Others to live with you in a society or you are enthusiastic about them, this means that you are not tolerating but supporting them. After all, people do not tolerate the things or people they appreciate; they would instead want to live with them. To make it short, the loved ones are never the objects of toleration because they are not aliens who break into our comfort zone. For Walzer (1997), whatever your motive to be tolerant, you are ultimately performing a virtue because you do not have to like and appreciate a certain Other but one way or another you perform cohabitation. From the perspective of the states, on the other hand, there will always be some groups who have some peculiar characteristics that do not meet the general norms of the society.

The scope of tolerance might either be allowing the Other to enjoy her peculiar identity in public, or expecting her to keep it in her private life. So the public-private dichotomy is still prevalent. For Phillips, a prescription of mutual disinterest and indifference can only work in societies where power is relatively evenly distributed. By that she means an understanding, according to which a “you leave me alone to do what you disapprove of and I will leave you alone in turn” type attitude is adopted. However, for her, toleration is often called on to regulate a relationship between minority and majority groups, and the above mentioned bargain is rarely employed. Quoting her example, those who happily tolerate their unassuming gay neighbor may still object violently to the high-profile activist who “flaunts” his sexuality in public (Phillips, 1999). She calls this type of toleration “hands off” toleration, which confines diversity to the private sphere and assimilates a plurality of ethnic groups into a unified citizenship (Phillips, 1999). We can also name this form of tolerance as negative tolerance, since the majority is either totally indifferent to minority culture or it consciously lock it up in private sphere. Similar to what Phillips says but in a stricter way, Brown defines tolerance

as a power relationship. For her, tolerance usually comes into existence when there is an asymmetry of power, that is, a situation involving a more powerful (potentially tolerant) agent and a less powerful (potentially tolerated) agent (Carter, 2013). According to Brown (2006), almost all objects of tolerance are marked as deviant, marginal or undesirable —something one would prefer did not exist— by virtue of being tolerated, and this creates a hierarchical relationship based on subordination of the tolerated.

To put it another way; if X is tolerating Y:

- a. There is a power relationship between the two.
- b. X is more powerful than Y.
- c. X is tolerating; Y is tolerated.
- d. X is issuing power on Y.
- e. X is the norm holder; Y is the deviant.

Like Phillips, Brown also criticizes the individualizing aspect of tolerance in liberalism that maintains a separation between politics and culture and permits individuals only private enjoyment of their identities. For this very reason Brown rightly sees tolerance as a middle road between rejection and assimilation. In line with arguments of Phillips and Brown, I suggest thinking about Arendt's statement:

The space that is relegated to private life in civilized society is a permanent threat to public sphere because the public sphere is based on the law of equality as the private sphere is based on the law of universal difference and differentiation. Equality, in contrast to all that is given in mere existence, is not given to us; we are not born as equals; we become equals as members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee each other equal rights. The dark background of givenness that we enjoy in our private lives breaks into the political scene as the alien (Arendt, 1976, p. 301).

For Arendt (1976), this is the reason why highly developed political communities, like the ancient city states or the modern nation-states, so often insist on either ethnic homogeneity or confining difference to the private sphere. Arendt's explanation is valid for the present-day multicultural liberal societies and supports

Phillips' and Brown's theses, since such societies try to suppress diversity in the public sphere through the discourse of tolerance that is portrayed as a virtue but is inherently a mechanism of restriction. What has to be done then? What would be other mechanisms to provide peaceful living together without one dominating the other? Brown's argumentation can lead to expand our horizons at this point. She neither places herself against tolerance, nor does she support intolerance. She is basically against the liberal notion that sees tolerance as a virtue:

The pronouncement of "I am tolerant man" conjures seemliness, propriety, forbearance, magnanimity, cosmopolitanism, universality and the large view, while for those for whom tolerance is required to take their shape as improper, indecorous, urgent, narrow, particular, and often ungenerous or at least lacking in perspective [...] [T]he tolerating and tolerated are simultaneously radically distinguished from each other and hierarchically ordered according to a table of virtue (Brown, 2006, pp. 178-187).

To put it more simply, she does not see tolerance as useless, and accepts that it ended some violence in human history. Instead, she calls to remove the scales from our eyes about the innocence of tolerance in relation to power, and warns that tolerance is more of a historically protean element of liberal governance rather than a virtue (Brown, 2006). Her solution to overcome the pitfalls of tolerance is to deploy alternative political speech and practices (Brown, 2006). Phillips' (1999) solution, on the other hand, is to use the difference to enter into politics in dynamic process of deliberation, contestation and change. Walzer (1997), although he is not critical about the nature of tolerance and sees it as a virtue, seeks a value beyond tolerance, such as mutual respect. For him, the better solution that would lead to a more peaceful society would be to encourage individuals to entered deliberative process by joining groups, because individuals are the products of community life and they cannot reproduce by themselves without the relations that make their power realizable (Walzer, 1997). Thus, we can claim that Walzer approves of a positive form of tolerance which allows individuals to enter the deliberative process as members of groups and permits them to flourish their culture.

Another very important contribution comes from Brown, who stresses a significant problem concerning the tolerance discourse. For her, tolerance

discourse leads to identity production, which in the end reduces political action and justice projects to sensitivity training (Brown, 2006). This, for her, simply means that depoliticization and the recent situation of the liberal societies are evidence for Huntington's "clash of civilizations" conceptualization, according to which "the iron curtain of ideology" has been replaced by the "velvet curtain of culture" (Brown, 2006, p. 20). Huntington (1997) stated right after the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe that the dichotomy between "us" and "them," which is determined in accordance with the membership to a certain civilization which is characterized with a certain religion, is the fixed variable of human history and, he predicts, will be based not on ideology but on civilization in the contemporary world, where clashes are the destiny of human beings. For Brown (2006), the present-day liberal political culture and legal doctrine situate culture as its Other and also as antagonistic to its principles unless it is subordinated or liberalized. This is a valuable criticism, but we cannot simply trash tolerance discourse because it reifies identities or invents new ones. Some scholars suggest evaluating tolerance in accordance with the motive behind it. Monk (1999), who discusses the issue from a moral will perspective, argues that a crucial feature of toleration is that we can only name acts as tolerant in terms of the motive from which they were performed:

We can only correctly even identify cases of tolerance if we know that an individual or authority failed to interfere with a disapproved of action not because he/she/it judged themselves incapable of affecting it, but because they regarded it as right and proper to so refrain (Monk, 1999, p. 24).

However, for Monk (1999), detecting the motivation behind indifference to some minority behavior helps only to identify toleration; it is not a task of appraising it. So Monk encourages us to think about the moral will behind tolerance in order to identify and evaluate it. In a similar vein, King explores what it really means to be tolerant, and concludes that one can only be accepted as tolerant if she/he chooses to be tolerant in disregard of any benefit, fear, incapability or other sort of motives. It is tolerance when one has the power or is not stopped by any other motive to persecute but chooses not to do so. If one is restricted by some motive like

religion, fear, incapability, certain interest or so on to persecute the Other, she/he is not being tolerant but acquiescing or exercising expediency. Long story short, for King (1998), tolerance means objection and acceptance but only where the acceptor is free to reject the item accepted.

2.1.3 Why be tolerant?

Without a doubt tolerance is better than intolerance and we need it to cope with troublesome outcomes of intolerance. Tolerance is not a virtue in itself, but maybe a necessity or a strategy that calls upon virtues, such as patience, humility, moderation, and prudence (Conyers quoted in Tyler, 2008, p. 83); or it is an epiphenomenon that emerges from virtuous intentions (DeMarco quoted in Tyler, 2008, p. 84). I argue that tolerance is interwoven with expediency so it cannot be regarded as a virtue. Even if we do not have a reason to be tolerant, we have the tendency to perform tolerance to minimize any sort of conflict. This is an expedient behavior too. So I argue that the most important reason to behave tolerantly is expediency. Below you will find some other motives and principles of tolerance.

In early theoretical foundations of tolerance, the requirements of tolerance were “individual liberty,” and “autonomy of an individual,” both of which could be attained by “separation of church and state”, in other words, withdrawal of state from the credence of individuals. As Eğılmez (2011) rightly put it, the contemporary debates share considerable similarities with the pre-modern ones. We have seen previously that justice is the basic concern of modern plural societies and the mechanisms to accommodate differences at the fairest way is the focal issue for scholars. These discussions are no different than the concerns of Locke and Mill. Only now we are occupied with much more complex forms of diversity, including not only religious difference but also intermingled identities of ethnicity, class, gender, and so on. However, one way or another the tolerance talk is still supported by ideas like *humanism*, *skepticism*, *prudence*, and *morality* in very much parallel with pre-modern concerns.

The scholars who think that tolerance is a virtue in itself build their argument on a claim that the discipline of tolerance is based on deeper intuitions, according to which we may disapprove of something for the love of some moral good yet we may be moved to put up with it from still deeper intuitions about the same moral good or other moral goods. In this perspective tolerance is a fruit of judgment, and for this reason it is “true tolerance” (Budziszewski quoted in Tyler, 2008, p. 85). For this form of tolerance, morality both determines the element of objection and works as a requirement to be tolerant of that element. These two do not always overlap. And sometimes some moral good may form the element of intolerance and be the requirement to be intolerant of that element. Religion and nationalism are good examples of such moral goods when we think of persecutions of peoples throughout history.

Correctly for some, toleration is needed because the alternative to toleration is war; and war is too costly—in all sorts of ways— as a method for negotiating disputes and disagreements. Correspondingly, toleration is a practical strategy to be adopted by reasonable people who realize that the attempt to convert all others to their cause can never be successful (McKinnon, 2006). Such rationality behind tolerance basically refers to the principle of prudence. And for some, it is also the reason why tolerance should be seen as a virtue.

Where tolerance is concerned, McKinnon’s (2006) question is fair: if opposition is heartfelt and genuine, how and when can toleration with respect to the other object of opposition be practiced? Firstly, the person who feels the opposition might be skeptical and her skepticism might be related to her relativism or to her subjectivism. Relativism is a view about the scope of moral judgments, statements, prescriptions, and principles, which is derived from the observation that moral practices and norms differ enormously across cultures, traditions, and time. Given this form of relativism, the claim for toleration is this: if there is more than one true morality then it is always possible that a person’s opposition to others is opposition to a form of life informed by a morality just as true as her own. If subjectivism is prevailing, toleration is possible and required because each

person has to recognize that, regardless of how strongly she is opposed to others, and how responsibly she has formed the beliefs constitutive of this opposition, her judgment of opposition is nothing but one opinion or emotional response among many (McKinnon, 2006).

Putting aside ideational motives behind pluralism, Parekh discusses the principles behind the practice of tolerance by the states in handling diversity in their countries. For him, multicultural societies are facing a dilemma. If they indiscriminately tolerate all minority practices, this can abdicate moral judgment, but to disallow them all can be an extreme case of intolerance. Thus the states need guiding principles to decide what to tolerate. He lists five different principles including moral universalism, core values, no-harm principle, human rights and dialogical consensus as the bases of toleration. In his conceptualization, moral universalism refers to universally valid values transcending different cultures like personal autonomy; human rights principles take the primary commitment of the government as human rights. Core values, on the other hand, mean historically distinct characteristics of each society. Conversely, no-harm principle rejects the core values notion and claims that every society is deeply divided along class, gender and other lines and even though it had core values in the past, it has no right to impose them on those holding different values. And lastly, dialogical consensus rejects the existence of universally agreed upon human rights, universally valid moral values as well as the core values of society. The only way in which a society can decide what minority practices to allow is to be involved in an open minded dialogue with minority spokesmen (Parekh, 2006). All these, for Parekh, have fallacies that do not meet the needs of multicultural societies. For example, he points out the vague and limited nature of moral universalism and human rights to meet the unique circumstances of some societies. Core values, however, create a hierarchy in favor of the majority group in a society. In contradiction to the core values principle, the no harm principle denies core values altogether, but for Parekh no society is possible unless its members generally, though not universally, agree on a broad range of values and for this very reason

no harm principle cannot work too. Adding to these, he criticizes dialogical consensus of happening in a pre-existing moral setting and points out the disadvantaged position of the minority in relation to the majority in dialogical process (Parekh, 2006). In line with these concerns, what he offered as the basis of tolerance is a society's "operative values" which includes the minimum body of values that Parekh names as civic values, enjoyed by different classes, social and religious groups in shared spaces— in intermediary realms— in addition to legal and constitutional values. For him since operative public values are bound up by practices, they are not static, in change and realizable. Additionally, Parekh does not claim that operative values are not negotiable, and he stresses the need for a bifocal dialogue centering both on minority practice and the society's operative public values (Parekh, 2006). In a dialogue about a certain minority practice, Parekh offers that the minority spokesmen would wish to maintain their practice; the critic might be able to challenge it on the grounds that it is not essential for the group existence; and as a result the spokesmen would now want to demonstrate the internal rationality behind that particular practice. Finally if it is found totally against the operative values of the society, it is rejected (Parekh, 2006).

2.1.4 Can tolerance be accommodated?

The whole discussion made above takes tolerance as a relationship between the tolerating power holders, and the tolerated minority members. Carter (2013), however, questions if toleration is always a power relationship and if respect and toleration are compatible. He firstly states that the toleration discourse is mostly disliked by minorities since it implies inferiority. And thus, he prefers to talk about respect rather than toleration. Respect, for him, means assigning persons a set of rights through which to exercise their political agency. And when the relationship of two mutually powerful groups is concerned, it is more of recognition and acting on the Other's equal rights to public goods. Carter differentiates between two forms of respect: the recognition respect and the appraisal respect. The former requires treating people as opaque; whereas the latter requires a positive evaluation. He explains it further with an example:

We might show respect for a judge in virtue of her status by recognizing her legal authority and avoiding any kind of behavior that would amount to contempt of court. We might at the same time think her a very bad judge, and in this alternative sense have ‘little or no respect’ for her as a judge. These two attitudes are compatible, for the first is one of recognition respect while the second is one of appraisal disrespect (Carter, 2013, p. 198).

For him, toleration might be —if not always—, compatible with recognition respect but not with the appraisal respect since the latter implies affirmation and support rather than any sort of objection or power based relationship. So what he implies is that toleration always requires a power condition and for this very reason, when two equally powerful groups are concerned, their relation would not be toleration but respect.

Arendt (1998) described respect as “a kind of ‘friendship’ without intimacy and without closeness; it is a regard for the person from the distance which the space of the world puts between us, and this regard is independent of the qualities which we may admire or of the achievements which we may highly esteem.” To the extent that we depersonalize the public and social life, we lose respect. Her opinion takes us back to the distinction between public and private space. If we follow Arendt, people should be represented in public space with their values, beliefs, differences, shortly, with Self; so they should not be enclosed in private space. Only under these conditions can we exchange tolerance with respect. In a system of inequality respect is unachievable. As argued by Sennett, the inequalities of class and race obviously make it difficult for people to treat one another with respect (Sennett, 2004). Sennett’s definition of respect is different from Arendt’s; it is rather an expressive performance, which means that treating others with respect does not just happen, even with the best will in the world; to convey respect means finding the words and gestures which make it genuine and convincing (Sennett, 2004). And he rightly wonders how, in a world of inequality where people feel themselves in a disadvantaged position in terms of their class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and so on, or to put it differently, when they struggle with loss of confidence, can people be aware of others (Sennett, 2004)?

Since other formulations still remain weak, it seems that we cannot simply ignore “tolerance” in modern era. What should be done is to change the perceptions about tolerance and re-design the term justice. In this regard, I agree with Tyler’s position:

A peaceable global society –coexistence– renders necessary a cross-cultural, interreligious conceptualization of tolerance. An understanding of tolerance must be developed (or restored!) that is not divorced from the comprehensive doctrines out of which moral clarity and societal consensus must ultimately find succor. Common, overlapping foundations are imperative, but they must first be found within the ultimate concerns of the individual and his community– not simply under the moral shadow of political liberalism (Tyler, 2008, p. 82).

In other words, we can deliberate on the motivations and principles of tolerance (and respect as an ultimate outcome) as human beings who have the capacity to act freely in the public sphere to create fairer, more attainable conditions both for groups and for individuals without being naked of Self in the public realm and without domination of one group over another.

Up until now, modern debates on how to rehabilitate plurality in modern liberal countries have been discussed and several fundamental issues were examined, including individual and/or group autonomy debate, the public-private sphere dichotomy, tolerance as power condition, and the super-diverse nature of contemporary plurality in contrast to the religion-based plurality of pre-modern times. Contemporary diversity issues are much more complicated because today individuals are in search of new possible identities for themselves, and identity attachments are much more fluid and multiple compared to previous times when people’s horizons were limited by their motherland, occupation, and religion. Additionally, today’s immigration patterns are very diverse and unsystematic. In immigrant countries today there are millions of people who are ethnically, religiously, and linguistically diverse. Despite the incomparable difference between past and present, all these contemporary debates provide an insight into the concerned historical context. As I previously mentioned in this chapter, these normative discussions will prevent me from arbitrarily employing terms like

tolerance and multiculturalism; they will also prevent me from an anachronistic attitude of judging the past with present ideals, and imitating the past for present minority issues. Last but not least, these discussions are relevant to refute the Pax-Ottomana perspective within which Ottoman plurality is offered to address the contemporary minority demands. In the upcoming part, Ottoman tolerance discourse will be shown and discussed.

2.2 Ottoman tolerance and the myth of the *millet* system

In the Turkish context, multiculturalism debates are blended with romanticism towards the Ottoman plurality and the pundits of multiculturalism started to demonstrate the Ottoman way of handling diversity as the pre-modern model of multiculturalism. One of the problems with this Pax-Ottomana nostalgia is not that Ottomans were not tolerant of diversity; they, in fact, were tolerant. The problem is that Pax-Ottomana view portray Ottoman tolerance as equal to “peaceful living together”, which is totally erroneous, as we will see later in this dissertation. Another problem to be addressed is the unquestioned belief in the so called *millet* system and labeling it as an Eastern multiculturalism mostly in reference to some Western scholarship including Thornberry who described the *millet* system as a beneficial autochthonous system, not as one imposed by treaty, in comparison with the Christian world where the treatment of religious (and later national) minorities was set with treaties (Thornberry, 1991). Last but not least, although taken mostly as a liberal virtue in contemporary studies, tolerance is not a virtue but a power relationship. Therefore, when we are concerned with Ottoman tolerance, we have to consider this and neutralize our perspective about the Ottoman way of handling diversity. To put it differently, we cannot simply conclude that tolerance is a positive, humanistic phenomenon and define it within the context of “peaceful living together”.

Without a doubt the concept of tolerance is not a contemporary phenomenon. Walzer (1997) differentiated between five different regimes of toleration, one of which is multinational empires. In this regime, as long as they received their taxes and there was peace, the state administrators would not

interfere in the internal affairs of the communities. They also would not care about how the members of communities treated one another. The individuals, on the other hand, were confined to their communities, to a particular ethnic or religious identity. Thus, given the fact that the administrators and the group leaders were often cruel to heretics who broke the rules of the group that they were a part of, we can only talk about group autonomy rather than individual autonomy. Walzer gave the Ottoman *millet* system as an example to this regime. In the *millet* system, the Greek Orthodox, Armenian and Jewish religious communities were permitted to establish group autonomy to regulate the internal restrictions of their group and to control their members. In this system everyone belonged to a religious community and individual liberty was unknown (Walzer, 1997). Kymlicka also touches upon the *millet* system and defines it as a federation of theocracies in which Muslims did not try to suppress the non-Muslims and granted them a substantial measure of self-government. He also points out that the heretics were always punished and apostasy was banned (Kymlicka, 1996); by this way, he emphasizes the lack of individual liberty and the *millet* system's insufficiency for the modern era. Similarly, Tyler points out that despite the anachronistic misinterpretations of the Ottoman inter-communal coexistence as equality, tolerance of individual liberties within and across the various *millets* remained historically unwarranted and theoretically inconceivable (Tyler, 2008). Parekh also notes the subordinate status of minority communities in pre-modern societies, including the Ottoman Empire and minorities' extensive cultural but few political rights (Parekh, 2006). Walzer, Kymlicka, Tyler and Parekh are all political philosophers who have an understandably shallow knowledge about Ottoman history. Hence, their statements have to be clarified through an in-depth analysis. Firstly, we should note that there was no "*millet* system!"

Where the Ottoman treatment of non-Muslim communities is concerned, it is inevitable to talk about the Kur'anic texts and the Sunna of the Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet's attitude towards Jewish groups in Medina and in other parts of Arabia after the expansion of his authority across Arabia and "his edict to

all Christians” and then “...to all mankind,” and the so-called “Covenant of Umar,” which was known to be the first formal, institutional arrangement of tolerance between Muslims and the “People of the Book,” were recognized as the basis for the treatment of non-Muslims.³⁹ The articles of the Covenant, which restricted the non-Muslim behaviors from restrictions on clothing to church repair, from respect towards Muslims to a prohibition on carrying arms⁴⁰, demonstrate the negative tolerance wielded by the Muslims and the obedience and consent of the Christians of Syria to them. Additionally, the essential Kur’anic text IX, 24: “Fight those who do not believe...until they pay the *djizya*...” implies that if they are paying the *djizya* tax (*cizye*), there is no reason for fighting the non-Muslims (Cahen, 227). This was the case in the Ottoman Empire as well; as long as they received their taxes, they remained indifferent to the internal affairs of the non-Muslims. However, not every community enjoyed this regime of tolerance. In Islam, only the *dhimmis* (*zimmi*) are granted the right to receive hospitality from the Islamic society and, of course, the flexibility of these rules was dependent upon changing local conjuncture and popular attitudes (Tyler, 2008).

The *dhimmi* is defined as against the Muslim and the idolater (with reference to Arabia, but this is scarcely more than a memory); also as against the *harbi* who is of the same faith but lives in territories not yet under Islam; and finally as against the *musta’min*, the foreigner who is granted the right of living in an Islamic territory for a short time (one year at most). Originally only the Jews and Christians were involved; soon, however, it became necessary to consider the Zoroastrians, and later, especially in Central Asia, other minorities not mentioned in the Kur’an (Cahen, 227).

In the Ottoman case the Greek Orthodox people, the Armenians, and the Jews were recognized as *Ahl al-kitab* (i.e. people of the book) and were considered to be *dhimmis*; on the other hand, the *zindiks* (i.e. heretics, Ar. *zindiq*) were not the objects of tolerance in Islamic law. According to the Encyclopedia of Islam that was published by the Directorate of Religious Affairs in Turkey, *zindik* would

³⁹ See C. Cahen, *Dhimma*; C. E. Bosworth, The concept of *dhimma* in early Islam; A. Tyler, *Islam, the West and tolerance: conceiving coexistence*.

⁴⁰ See P. Halsall, Pact of Umar, 7th century: the status of non-Muslims under Muslim rule.

originally mean Manichean but in time it was also used to name the atheists and the ones who did not believe in the judgment day; the hypocrites (Tr. *münafık*) and the ones who behaved recklessly in religious matters (Öz, 2013); likewise for the Encyclopedia of Islam, the Abbasid caliphs, who were intolerant of religious diversity, carried out a systematic purge of individuals suspected of *zandaqa* (abstract/collective noun for the *zındık* behaviour) and their repression was directed against Manichean tendencies in Islam and, more generally, against nominal Muslims suspected, of holding Persianizing, dualistic, syncretistic, subversive, free-thinking, and atheistic ideas (Daniel, 429). The people who renounced Islam were not considered *zındık* but instead *mürted* (i.e. apostate, Ar. *murtadd*) (Öz, 2013) and they were to be executed. All in all, both heretics and apostates were regarded as Islam's dissidents and the objects of intolerance.

The *dhimmis*, traditionally, were given the autonomy of their internal law, and, if they wished, they were able to apply to a Muslim judge. However, they could not marry a Muslim woman, even though the reverse was possible; they could not own a Muslim slave, although the converse was possible; they were distinguished in dress; they paid additional taxes like *kharadj* (*haraç*) and *djizya* (*cizye*), they were also forbidden to construct new buildings or to possess ones higher than those of Muslims, and they were excluded from government offices. However, all these regulations had never been respected for any length of time in Islamic states (Cahen) and the Ottoman Empire was not an exception.

The Ottomans followed the Islamic tradition in their treatment of non-Muslims. In addition to that, they introduced an independent body of practical rules and regulations based on a ruler's judgment, and these were not always in line with the *shari'a*. In academia the Ottoman regime was regarded as unique, and the myth of the *millet* system was created and adopted by early Ottomanists, including Halil İnalcık, who argued that *millet* system was part of Ottoman state system from the beginning (İnalcık, 1991). Like İnalcık, Stanford Shaw made claims about the jurisdiction of recognized authorities who were responsible to the leaders of the state in Middle Eastern Empires, and affirmed that the Ottomans

added few details to the system and institutionalized it by making it part of the structure of state as well as society (Shaw, 1976). Similarly, Bernard Lewis argued that there were organized and legally recognized religious communities in the Ottoman Empire (Lewis, 2002). The myth of the *millet* system originates from the contention of the Greeks, the Jews and the Armenians that Mehmed II had close relations with their respective community heads (Braude, 1982). For the Greek case, the *millet* myth was based on a lost *berat* (charter) given to Gennadius by Mehmed II in 1453 after the conquest of Constantinople. Depending upon the supposition for the content of the charter, extensive privileges were believed to be devoted to the Patriarch and the Greek Orthodox community (İnalçık, 1991). The charter is lost; all we know is that Mehmed the Conqueror, in appointing Gennadius to the Patriarchate, made it clear that he would have no less power and authority than what was enjoyed under the Byzantine Emperors (Kritovoulos, 2013). For Macar, the reason behind this decision was political since Mehmed II wanted to strengthen the Orthodox Church against the authority of the Pope. In this way he kept the Christian world divided and curbed the power of the Vatican (Macar, 2003). No charter survived for the Armenian Patriarchate either. According to eighteenth century historian Mikayel Camcean (1738-1823), after Mehmed II conquered Constantinople, he brought the Bishop Yovakim from Bursa with a number of eminent Armenian families and made the prelate the patriarch; however, Camcean did not identify his sources and this information remained mythical (Bardakjian, 1982). For Bardakjian (1982), during the reign of Mehmed II, there were at least four bishops under Ottoman rule with uncertain jurisdiction, and this strongly suggests that the Ottomans recognized the Armenian communities separately. For him, a restricted number of evidences also show that the transformation of the seat of Constantinople from a vicariate into a universal patriarchate was an evolutionary process rather than a conscious, or explicit Ottoman policy (Bardakjian, 1982). A similar story is valid for the Jews as well. When Constantinople was captured by the Ottomans, Rabbi Moses Capsali, who was the head of the Jewish community under the Byzantines, emerged as the

political and spiritual head of the community but the scope of his jurisdiction at the time is unknown (Epstein, 1982) and there was no Jewish institutional entity.

According to İnalcık, the reason why the Ottomans maintained the Churches, including the Armenian and Jewish religious structures, originated from the peculiar social system of previous Islamic empires, in which the authority of the state was often mediated to the individual. In medieval empires individuals were not citizens in the modern sense of the term, and they were perceived as members of a community. The charter given to the heads of these communities would grant them a sort of autonomy to look after their communal affairs, but it was not a total autonomy and the heads of the *millet*s were not regarded as the state officials by the Ottomans (İnalcık, 1991).

An examination of Greek Orthodox “ecclesiastical” documents shows that not until the end of seventeenth century was the term *millet* used to refer to non-Muslim religious Communities, and only beginning in the 19th century was it used commonly. During the first period of Ottoman rule, the word *ta’ife* (pl. *teva’if*, in Greek sources *taifas*) was used to refer the non-Muslim communities (Konortas, 1999). And for the Greek Orthodox case, throughout the first three centuries of the Empire, in ecclesiastical *berats* (diploma) or firmans, the Greek Orthodox Patriarch was never called as *ethnarches* or *milletbaşı* (Konortas, 1999). It was as late as the eighteenth century that the term “Patriarch of the *Romioi*” (Romans) was first used, and it coincides with the concession of increased power to the Patriarchate as well as to the leaderships of other religious communities (Stamatopoulos, 2006). Orthodox Christians and the other non-Muslim communities never possessed legal corporate status with their top religious authorities. And the establishment of *millet*s was a latter day phenomenon in the Ottoman Empire and even that did not change their legal status (Ozil, 2013). For Braude (1982), it was with the reforming decrees of Mahmud II and Abdülmeçid in the nineteenth century that the European understanding of “*millet*” entered the Ottoman legal documents. For example, the rank of *Hahambaşı* was created with an imperial decree in 1835, showing that it wasn’t until then that the Ottomans

recognized the Jews as a unified whole (Stamatopoulos, 2006). Thus, the historians pursuing a view of the *millet* system are very much mistaken for two reasons. Firstly, *millet* as a term was employed commonly only in the nineteenth century and, secondly, no legal corporate status was granted either to the communities themselves or to the heads of the communities throughout Ottoman history, including the nineteenth century. For instance, when we look at the communal structure of the Greek Orthodox *millet* in localities, what we observe is a very loose structure changing from one place to another.⁴¹ As Ozil (2013) claims, from the perspective of Ottoman authorities there were Greek leaders, Christian metropolitans, and people themselves, but never institutions. In a similar vein, the Jewish community was not institutional and was rarely hierarchical; the congregational organizations were jealously opposed to any superstructure of authority; and the Ottomans would feel little institutional need for a Jewish community head (Braude, 1982). They were only concerned with whether the communities effectively administered themselves and relieved the Ottoman administration in that as well as in the taxes they received (Epstein, 1982).

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries intense political struggles to strengthen their hegemony over the masses led by the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Apostolic elites in Istanbul ended in a definitive establishment of the *millets* acknowledged by Sultan's writ during the *Tanzimat* era (1839-1876). However, in the final analysis this, rather than creating a peaceful atmosphere, instead centralized the administration of the non-Muslims by one single authority, the patriarch, and paved the way for nationalism (Masters, 2006). Augustinos agreed with this argument in consideration with the Greek nationalism in the nineteenth century. He claimed that the Ottoman reforms legitimizing the *millets*

⁴¹ Ozil makes a detailed analysis of Greek Orthodox communities in Northwestern Asia Minor and shows that in one particular region structures of the *koinotis* (or *koinotita*) differed greatly from one town to another in a variety of matters, including legal, financial, material, and administrative issues. In her study, Ozil also shows that *commune* and *community* denoted different meanings for the Greek Orthodox communities; the former consisted of community leaders rather than the whole society, and it was not an institution since it lacked legal status and changed from one settlement to another. And the Community or the *Rum millet* meant a loose belongingness for the people having same faith. See A. Ozil, *Orthodox Christians in the Late Ottoman Empire*.

solidified the ethnic character of the different churches with the other developments including the new economic opportunities created by the imperial European powers, increasing missionary activities, and the establishment of the Greek Kingdom (Augustinos, 1992). Interestingly enough, against the assumptions of the scholars following the myth of the *millet* system, when the *millets* were officially recognized in the nineteenth century, the cohabitation practices began to dissolve since the Churches started to adopt a national character and the pace of nationalism intensified.

Up to this point I have discussed the source of Ottoman tolerance and the myth of the *millet* system. The arguments made above were meant to claim that there was no Ottoman tolerance. There was Ottoman tolerance, giving certain autonomy to recognized ethno-religious communities, but it was not a well-structured system, but rather a loose composition based on the Islamic doctrine and the Sultanic *firmans*, and for the authorities it helped collect taxes and prevent conflicts. This was religious tolerance, but not in the Lockean sense, since the state was highly involved in religious matters. The basis of tolerance was religion and the Ottomans ruled the country with Islamic law. They never allowed heretics of any religion; apostasy was prohibited; and conversion to no religion other than Islam was permitted. Therefore, there was no separation between state and religion. The Ottomans were at the same time intolerant and performed actions like persecution, imprisonment, banishment, exile, corporal punishment, boycott, prohibition, and exclusion against its minorities, including non-Muslims and heretics. The level and degree of (in)tolerance changed from time to time depending on the conditions of time and space. Therefore, Ottoman tolerance was based on political pragmatism rather than a well-structured system.⁴²

⁴² Ottoman tolerance can also be interpreted as governmentality in the Foucaultian sense, since it is a technique or an art of the state to maintain order. According to one of its definitions, governmentality is the mentality behind three forms of power which are “sovereignty-discipline-government”. See M. Foucault, *Governmentality*; M. Dean, *Governmentality: power and rule in modern society*.

The reason for crediting the Ottoman tolerance also stems from the comparison of it with its predecessors like the Roman Empire and the Byzantine Empire and its contemporaries like the Spanish Empire, the Habsburgs and the Russians. The Roman Empire persecuted the Christians; the Byzantium tried to convert Jews and Muslims; the Spanish Empire expelled the Jews, and in the Habsburg Empire there was a policy of “confessional absolutism”. Among all these examples, the Russian Empire resembled the Ottomans in handling diversity in line with its state pragmatism, flexibility, and tolerance. Despite the existence of episodes of forced conversion, assimilation, and persecution, it also granted protection and privileges to some groups like the Muslims especially during the reign of Catherine the Great (Barkey, 2008). We can also add to this list the persecutions during the Reformation of Europe. Barkey (2008) rightly points out that empires did not have direct goals of tolerance and persecution. Rather, they tried to preserve their dominions, conquer, and maintain their power. The relatively good position of the *dhimmi*s in the Ottoman Empire compared to the position of religious minorities in its contemporaries was an outcome of pragmatic policy (based on Islamic law and principles) and expediency to receive consent, minimize conflict, collect taxes, and preserve continuity of domination.

What was the limit of the Ottoman tolerance for the non-Muslims? As we have seen earlier, in Islamic societies, there were things that non-Muslims were not permitted to perform. In the Ottoman Empire the *dhimmi*s were not allowed to wear clothes in certain colors and fabrics; they could not ride a horse, carry weapons or own Muslim slaves; their buildings could not be higher than those of Muslims; they were prevented from living close to a mosque; and there were even restrictions if they wanted to construct, or even restore, buildings or temples. Additionally, before the court, non-Muslims were treated like second class subjects. For example, a Muslim would be sentenced to less punishment if he killed a non-Muslim than those who killed a Muslim. A non-Muslim was not accepted as a witness in Muslim cases. And the language of the laws, *fetwas* (ruling by Ottoman judges) and legal records was humiliating for the non-Muslims

(Ben-Naeh, 2009). For example, language used in the rulings of Ebu Suud Efendi (1574), *Seyhülislam* (the chief religious official) of the Empire, reinforced the public opinion that the second class *dhimmi* communities should be separated from the Muslim community. He also preferred to use the term *kafir* (infidel) to label the non-Muslims, rather than the value natural term, *dhimmi* (Tyler, 2008). As other examples of humiliation in terminology, when they were addressed the names of non-Muslim women were not added to the title of respect *hatun*, and the dead body of a non-Muslim would be called *leş* (carrion) which had a pejorative meaning (Ben-Naeh, 2009).

As for the clothing prohibitions, they were held to differentiate the Muslims from the non-Muslims, as well as to demonstrate the different social status of the peoples. Certainly, the regulations concerning the non-Muslims were held to show their inferior position in society. For example, from the beginning of the seventeenth century Jews were required to wear purple and dark blue. Sometimes they were also restricted from wearing expensive jewelry and gorgeous clothes. There were also restrictions concerning the shape and length of their turbans and caftans (Ben-Naeh, 2009). The clothing regulations provided a sort of social discipline and segregation for the different religious communities. Taking its root from Mahmud II's clothing regulations that replaced occupational signs of differentiation with a homogenizing status marker- fez;⁴³ the restrictions disappeared during the *Tanzimat* era but differences in clothing continued especially in port cities among the upper class people since non-Muslims more readily adopted European dress than Muslims (Davison, 1982).

In the Ottoman Empire different religious communities mostly lived in separated neighborhoods. (Certainly, there were exceptions. As we will see in the upcoming part, in Cappadocia, there were also mixed villages.) For example, in Istanbul, the non-Muslim communities were mostly repelled toward the fringes and periphery of the city – Greeks along the Golden Horn and Marmara shores,

⁴³ For Mahmud II's clothing regulations, see D. Quataert, Clothing laws, state, society in the Ottoman Empire 1770-1829.

Armenians in Yenikapı, Samatya, Topkapı, and Jews on both sides of the Golden Horn but more specifically in the facing quarters of Balat and Hasköy. The sole exceptions to the ethno-religious segregation were the districts of financial and economic function (Eldem, 1999). In Izmir, different religious communities lived in homogeneous ghettos built around mosques, churches, and synagogues (Goffman, 1999). In this way the potential frictions that might result from excessive contact and intermingling were avoided. The constitution of physical ghettos provided non-Muslims with a relative freedom in the management of their internal affairs and an indirect assignment of collective responsibility and the Ottoman administrators were reluctant –and very often, unable– to impose any unifying concept of identity different from the vague notion of being a tax-paying subject of the Empire. The Ottoman state was attempting to preserve and strengthen all other forms of identity and solidarity, thus creating an illusion of freedom and autonomy for the *dhimmis*. Ultimately, what was perceived as pluralism or even cosmopolitanism in a nostalgic way, today is in fact a diversity which could not possibly develop into any real integrative process (Eldem, 1999). Interestingly enough, the relations of minority religious communities were not very easy. For example, Greeks and Jews did not get along well due to economic rivalry and blood libel accusations against the Jews (Barkey, 2008). Additionally, conversion from one religion to another was prohibited until the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876). A Christian or a Jew could only become Muslim. A Christian could not convert to Judaism, nor was the inverse possible (Ortaylı, 2008). I think spatial segregation, impervious concrete boundaries, and rivalries between religious communities played a prominent role in the nationalization that occurred later in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I will elaborate on this point by examining the case of Cappadocia in the next two chapters.

All the restrictions set for the non-Muslims intended to differentiate them from the rest of society, providing group solidarity and preventing integration. The restrictions were not always very strict; there were certainly exceptions. For example, the Jewish doctors of the palace were permitted to ride horses and wear

kalpak (Ben-Naeh, 2009). And there were times when the Ottomans behaved more or less tolerantly to their non-Muslim subjects. For Ben-Naeh (2009), the Ottomans, to receive the support of the Muslim public and the religious authorities, and to mediate their inconvenience in crisis times, behaved more strictly and less tolerantly to non-Muslims. The religious authorities also influenced the administrative authorities to restrict the *dhimmi* behaviors. For example, a group of zealot Sunni preachers called *Kadızedelis* (1630-1680), who were against any non-Muslim groups and Sufi orders, put the Sultans under pressure (Barkey, 2008). Hence, Ottoman history was not totally free of persecution and intolerance, and all the above mentioned diversities and exceptions in approaching the *dhimmis* were related to Ottoman political pragmatism in addition to Islamic principles. The *dhimmis* were tolerated as long as they did not disturb or go against the Islamic order as secondary subjects (Barkey, 2008). We should also note that during the formation years of the Empire tolerance was deemed necessary to legitimize their domination in the eyes of their mostly non-Muslim subjects. As Campos rightly observes:

The Ottoman state throughout much of its existence looked upon ethnic and religious diversity among its subject population and state officials in an altogether pragmatic fashion; it did not care about their “identity” per se [...] This political pragmatism, to a certain extent, was born of demographic realities. For the first centuries of its existence, the Ottoman Empire had a majority non-Muslim population, and the dynasty was careful not forge favorable alliances with adjoining Christian principalities (Campos, 2011, p. 9).

In addition to early demographic concerns, later this policy brought other benefits. First of all, the state maintained a sort of inter-communal order; it accommodated religious diversities, and in a way pursued its interests legitimately in the eyes of its subjects. In localities community leaders settled agreements with the Ottoman authorities in accordance with their desire to preserve their community existence and religious autonomy (Barkey, 2008). In this way, religious communities maintained their distinctiveness and control in their competitive relations with the Other, be it other minority religious communities or

the dominant majority of the Muslims. Thus, the results was multiple, and such political pragmatism or –as I call it, tolerance (negative) –bore fruit in the form of “minimum conflict” until the age of nationalism. In this system of dealing with a minority, one with whom you could not eat, marry, or enter into political or military alliance, was that both parties could concentrate on a rational cost-benefit analysis of the actual specific deal in question, and expect, on the whole, to get what they bargained for, neither more nor less (Gellner, 1983). What was performed in this transaction by the hegemonic power was tolerance; for the minorities, however, it was simply consent.

King (1998) called the Ottoman version of handling diversity expedience rather than tolerance, since it pursued such policies for two reasons: 1. Islamic law and tradition; and 2. the benefits it received from this order. As we mentioned previously, in his theory, if something restricts one and forces her/him not to act or not to persecute, that is not tolerance but expediency. Were the Ottomans expedients, rather than tolerators? My answer would be that they were expedient tolerators; because there were also times when they persecuted people. This means that their motive was pragmatism in line with the conjuncture of time. While crediting King’s differentiation between tolerance and expediency, I find it problematic at two points: firstly, I think that an expedient behavior is also a tolerant behavior; secondly, if we follow his approach, we would inevitably accept that tolerance is a virtue, since in his theorization one can only be seen as tolerant if he bears the disliked person pure of any interests, moral codes, fear and so on.

Although there were times when the Ottoman Sultans were zealot enough to pressure groups of people to convert (like the curious case of Rabbi Shabbatai Tzevi and his followers in 1665),⁴⁴ there was lack of a strategy of forced conversion and there was a solid economic reason behind this policy; the “head tax” (*cizye*) was one of the major sources of treasury (Deringil, 2012). Lack of forced conversion also meant lack of religious persecution and homogenization,

⁴⁴ For cases of Sultans’ zealot behaviors to put pressure to convert some groups of people, see M. D. Baer, *Honored by the glory of Islam: conversion and conquest in Ottoman Europe*.

but there was a limit to such religious tolerance; the apostates and the heretics, including believers of some forms of Sufi, heterodox order (*zındık*), unbelievers (*kafir*), and the ones who were critical of the doctrine of Islam and the Prophet (*mülhid*), were never tolerated. Only during the period of *Tanzimat* (1839-1876) were the Ottoman authorities relatively indifferent to cases of apostasy; and was capital punishment rarely employed. However, they were unwilling to officially demonstrate their indifference –or let’s say tolerance– to apostasy (Ortaylı, 2008). As for the heretics, most were the adherents of mystical orders (*tarikât*) and were persecuted despite the fact that some of these orders, like the Mevlevîs, Bektaşîs, and the Nakşibendis, served as the architects of the rise of the Ottomans. The reason was that heterodox orders did not meet any organizational pattern of the Empire; although their ideology and doctrines were familiar to the Sultans and even adopted by some of them, the continued fluidity of movement, the covert activities, and alternative assemblies and ceremonies were seen as threats since they remained outside the purview and organization of the state (Barkey, 2008).

2.3 Summary and plan of the next chapter

In this chapter I have discussed the normative theories of justice in liberal societies, since a debate about the term tolerance inevitably requires references to liberal theories of justice. Next, I portrayed modern concerns and disputes about the term tolerance to generate a broader perspective. Lastly, I discussed the Ottoman way of dealing with diversity and practices of tolerance. In light of these discussions I must assert that the pre-modern Ottoman imperial world is totally alien to the modern liberal world, which is regarded as a given by the normative theories of justice and debates about tolerance. There are four points to differentiate between the Ottoman practice of tolerance and contemporary debates about tolerance: a. the Ottoman Empire was pre-modern and not democratic; inequality was the norm and nobody questioned it; b. justice was a means to preserve the domination of the ruler over his subjects; whereas in modern liberal societies it is the objective to be reached through promotion of freedom and equality; c. in the Ottoman world, the only acceptable diversity was religious

diversity, with the exception of the heretics of any religion, people were confined to their religious communities and prevented from disrupting them with any sort of individual opposition; there was no individual freedom or authority; whereas in modern societies diversity is various, much more complicated and multi-faceted, and people demand both group specific rights and individual freedom; d. in the Ottoman context we can only discuss the scope of tolerance in its historical setting; any debate about respect or recognition cannot possibly be made; for our modern societies surely we can discuss ways and motives to be tolerant but we can also be concerned with replacing tolerance with respect and recognition. In consideration with these differences, one could feel tempted to ask why I discussed modern normative theories of justice and tolerance. First of all, without a thorough understanding of these discussions I would not be able to assert that Ottoman plurality and plurality in modern liberal democratic societies are extraneous to one another. Secondly, they provide a thorough knowledge about the term tolerance. Considering the fact that many studies and scholars randomly employ the term with a lay point of view by attributing virtue to it, in the absence of an analysis of modern debates I would be trapped by the same attitude. Thirdly, after examining modern concerns, I showed that Ottoman tolerance cannot be a remedy to our modern diversity concerns in Turkey. It is historical and should be evaluated in line with the conjuncture of its time. Therefore, I showed that the modern debates *de facto* refute the Ottoman romanticism that prevails nowadays.

Up to this point, I have analyzed the general framework of Ottoman tolerance. The next chapter is devoted to the analysis of the relationship between co-habitation practices and tolerance at a societal level. Despite the existence of non-conflictual living together, antagonistic tolerance was prevalent in Cappadocia. That is to say, there was competition between Orthodox and Muslim communities, since the former was trying to keep itself intact under the demographic and cultural dominance of the latter. The domain of competition was religious sphere. For this reason, a discussion about religious syncretism and inter-marriages is also indispensable. The theoretical concepts that have their imprints

on my discussion throughout the following chapter are “antagonistic tolerance” of Robert M. Hayden, “religious nationalism” of Peter Van Der Veer and “proto-nationalism” of Eric Hobsbawm.

CHAPTER 3

3 MAINTAINING BOUNDARIES: FAITH AND CO-EXISTENCE IN LATE OTTOMAN CAPPADOCIA

In Ottoman history there is a romanticist belief among some circles, both in Turkey and Greece, that Muslims and non-Muslims lived peacefully within the “*millet* system” until the Great Powers intervened in the domestic affairs of the Ottoman Empire and aroused the nationalistic sentiments of non-Muslims, leading to the promotion of national consciousness in collaboration with Western powers and eventually leading to the destabilization of the peaceful cohabitation of previous years.⁴⁵ I contend that for a scholar engaged in nationalism studies, one of the most crucial and debatable issues is how and under what circumstances nationalism magnetized and was adopted by the people. What were the previous conditions over which nationalism was placed, and did the existing conditions inadvertently provide the necessary infrastructure which had been less visible or less meaningful during previous centuries? Prominent scholars of nationalism studies have been preoccupied with such questions for a very long time. Anderson wondered why the invitation of nationalism seemed so attractive to humble people (Anderson, 1991). Likewise, Hobsbawm inquired why and how the concept of “national patriotism” that is so remote from the real experience of most human beings could so quickly become such a political force of such magnitude (Hobsbawm, 1992).

In the previous chapter I analyzed the general structure of the relations between the state and its subjects under the all-encompassing term of tolerance. The motive behind Ottoman administration’s tolerance of the *dhimmi* communities took its cue from the Islamic law and principles. There was religious tolerance but

⁴⁵ For a response to such views, see A. Aktar, Debating the Armenian massacres in the last Ottoman parliament, November-December 1918; S. Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία: 19ος αιώνας -1919: οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος* [Asia Minor: 19th century- 1919: the Greek Orthodox communities from the Rum millet to the Greek nation].

not in the Lockean sense of the separation of church and state. The Ottomans were, in fact, very much involved in religious matters and ruling the country with religious law. Although they were to a certain extent indifferent to non-Muslim communal affairs, they were trying to control over Muslim orders and sects. So yes; it was religious tolerance; but only because tolerance originated from Islam, not because the state was indifferent to creed of its subjects; in reality it was not for the sake of social order. So long as they obtained material benefit (head tax) and social order Ottomans preferred to leave their non-Muslim subjects on their own rather than persecuting or forcefully converting them. This negative tolerance was characterized by non-persecution of the undesired and indifference to its affairs so long as they did not give harmfully interfere with social order. There were two principal references of Ottoman tolerance: Islamic tradition and the sultanic firmans. On one hand Islamic law set the basic principles of the treatment of non-Muslims, and on the other hand the firmans that were formed with expedient concerns regulated the scope of tolerance. The flexibility of both was changed from time to time, and in times of crisis the administrators tended to treat the non-Muslims in less tolerant or totally intolerant manners. Hence, the benefits of this structure enjoyed by *dhimmi* communities were a non-structural form of autonomy of regulating their internal affairs and sustaining their religion without a systematic threat of forced conversion to Islam. Certainly there were exceptions, and it is known that some prominent non-Muslims enjoyed privileges and high ranking positions (like Phanariots, Φαναριώτες), but in general the *dhimmis* were second class subjects vis-à-vis the Muslims at least until the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876) when non-Muslims were acknowledged as equal citizens on paper with regulations of *Tanzimat* (1839) and *Islahat* (1856) edicts.

Asking questions similar to those I listed at the beginning of this chapter, Anthony Smith tried to understand national identities and ideologies by analyzing them within the long lasting perspective of group identities and attitudes. He named long prevailing group identities *ethnie*. According to this perspective, “many nations and nationalisms spring up on the basis of pre-existing *ethnie* and

their ethnocentrism, but in order to forge a ‘nation’ today, it is vital to create and crystallize ethnic components” (Smith, 1986, p. 17). Thus, a social identity that had no relation with nationalism for centuries could evolve into a national identity under specific conditions brought about by modernity. I agree with Smith in part arguing that previous relations offered a foundation for the nationalist ideal to settle, but rejecting his conceptualization of *ethnie*, since common characteristics believed to be shared by a group of people before the era of nationalism were mostly random, and humble rural populations had no way of seeing themselves as a part of a larger whole. Take languages as an example; as a component of *ethnie*, language exchange had many variations depending on geography and flexibility of communal boundaries *vis à vis* Others in a locality. Further to that, the socio-economic, regional differences, and diverse customs of people were highly dependent on their locality. Last but not least, a community in one settlement had little to no information about communities in other regions who, in the age of nationalism, were claimed to be their kin. For instance, the *Pontiaka* (Greek dialect of Pontus region) speaking Greek Orthodox Community of Pontus had few similarities with the *Kritika* (Greek dialect of Crete) speaking Greek Orthodox population of Crete before the age of nationalism. They most likely—at least as a majority—were unaware that they could form a Community together. Previous boundaries certainly worked well for the articulation of a local community into a nation, but in the end this process favored not the similarities of distantly located kin groups, but the differences with the Other sharing the same locality. Therefore, I would rather adopt Tilly’s (2005) approach, according to which relationships hold the master key to understanding social processes, as it was the inter-communal dynamics within a settlement that offered a suitable basis for the seeds of nationalism.

In this chapter I will discuss tolerance at the societal level and analyze the practices of living together. The theoretical concepts that shape my thinking here are “antagonistic tolerance” of Robert Hayden, “religious nationalism” of Peter Van Der Veer, and “proto-nationalism” of Eric Hobsbawm. Antagonistic tolerance

prevails when there is competition between groups who share the same space, and “tolerance” is a pragmatic adaptation to a situation in which repression of the other group’s practices may not be possible rather than an active embrace of the Other. For Hayden, this competition produces syncretism (Hayden, 2002), which has commonly been seen as the proof of peaceful living together. In a similar vein, “religious nationalism” refers to a type of nationalism in which pre-existing religious antagonisms determine the constituting Other of nationalism and members of different religious groups automatically become members of different nations. “Religious nationalism” was put forward by Peter van der Veer in accordance with his studies about the co-existence of different religious groups in India. For him nationalism in India fed upon religious identifications since its beginning in the nineteenth century, and the Hindu-Muslim, Hindu-Sikh and Hindu-Buddhist antagonisms directly affected nation building (van der Veer, 1994).⁴⁶ Robert Hayden was influenced by Van Der Veer’s “religious nationalism” in developing his conceptualization of “antagonistic tolerance”, and William Hasluck’s writings on religions and denominations under the Ottoman rule contributed to his perspective. For competitive living together in which antagonistic tolerance triumphs, religiously separated groups define themselves and one another respectively as Self and Other. Such groups, while frequently intermingling, rarely inter-marry. For Hayden (2002), “antagonistic tolerance” refers to “tolerance” in the passive sense (permitted co-existence) of permitting the subordinated group to follow their religion and its practices, and occurs only when dominance is clear. The dominated groups, on the other hand, simply consent in order to protect their religion and keep their group intact.

In my case I argue that the competitive relations between different religious groups kept the group members together, preserved boundaries, and provided the necessary infrastructure to proto-nationalism first and, later, to nationalism that aimed to mobilize feelings of collective belonging. Proto-

⁴⁶ The term “religious nationalism” was first coined by the Serbian scholar M. Ekmečić in his *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1818* [Creation of Yugoslavia 1790-1818] in 1989.

nationalism refers to a pre-national feeling of collective belonging, a transitory phase to nationalism which has the potential to be articulated in modern states and nations. For Hobsbawm, features like language and religion could be constituents of proto-nationalism, though the concept is vague and can easily be confused with Smith's *ethnie*. The main difference between the two is that proto-nationalism is not essentialist like the concept of *ethnie*, which means proto-national bonds are constructs, whereas the attributes that form *ethnie* are regarded as objective characteristics in Smith's understanding. It is extremely difficult to detect proto-national bonds because traditional, proto-national, and national identities can exist at the same time within a community. In the case of development of a national Greek identity in Cappadocia, for instance, there were nationalistic teachers who had already adopted national Greek identity during their education in Athens or elsewhere, there were proto-nationalist students who acquired a broader Community consciousness through education, along with traditional, mostly illiterate, people whose main constituents of identity were still religion and soil.

For proto-nationalism, Hobsbawm argued that it is the consciousness of belonging or having belonged to a lasting political entity that is the strongest cement, and that the existence of proto-national bonds does not necessarily mean that the outcome will be nations or nationalities (Hobsbawm, 1992). In applying Hobsbawm's theory to my case study, I concentrate on co-existence practices and means of maintaining communal borders for the religious groups in Orthodox settlements in Cappadocia. During the age of nationalism through schooling activities these local communal bonds transformed into proto-national bonds. Later during the long war these proto-national bonds started to transform into national bonds due to their complete rupture from the past. Tolerance was replaced with intolerance and nationalism served like a safe blanket for people to cure their resentment.

As I claimed previously when discussing Smith's *ethnie*, it is the dichotomization of others as strangers rather than the similarities of a group that distinguishes a community. I thereby follow Barth's perspective about the

discrete/ethnic groups: “Ethnic groups are not merely based on the occupation of separate territories. They only persist as significant units if they imply an obvious difference in behavior. In other words, it is the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the cultural stuff it encloses (Barth, 1969, pp. 9-15).” Accordingly, I argue that it is not the similarities that hold groups together but the specific difference(s) that separate the group from the Other that are the sources of social identity. In our case it was a religious difference that shaped the inter-communal relations and served later as a national bond. Put simply, it was not religion itself but the structural opposition or the competitive cohabitation based on religious distinction that eased embracement of nationalism in a time of discontinuity from the past, despite the existence of shared characteristics including language in some localities of Cappadocia.

Studying co-existence practices of Muslims and Orthodox Christians in Greater Cappadocia will inform us about the borders of belonging, social or communal identities, and the reasons why nationalism found a space in a region without any visible conflict. The nationalist movements and the instruments of nationalism will be discussed in the third chapter. In this chapter, I will analyze the relationship between religion, tolerance, and nationalism in line with practices of cohabitation. In doing so I differentiate between inter-communal and interpersonal relations. According to this differentiation, the former refers to the public sphere where relations are competitive while the latter refers to the private sphere, in which relations could also be very intimate. I finally stress that in this context tolerance is not equal to peaceful cohabitation but rather to competitive living together. If it was peaceful living together, we would not call it tolerance; instead, it could be called as respect or recognition.

3.1 Practices of co-existence

3.1.1 Disrupting illusion, normalizing Ottoman plurality

There are two major perspectives on the Ottoman history: the nationalist anti-Ottoman perspective in ex-Ottoman territories seeing the Ottoman

administration as “yoke”, and the recent romanticist perspective that is overtly nostalgic for Ottoman plurality. Both views are misleading. We are familiar with the rhetoric of the former. For advocates of the latter perspective, people were totally innocent and the politicians and Great Powers provoked the atrocities.⁴⁷ Thus the latter trend portrays the Ottoman Empire as “a world without national borders” and a multicultural empire, memories which were silenced by the nationalisms of the Balkan states. An example representing this view is the “A Balkan Tale” project. Put into action in years 2012 and 2013, it was a European Union sponsored project led by historians from Balkan countries and pioneered by the Greek historian Christina Koulouri. The project included photograph exhibitions, historical excursions, education programs, and documentaries with the goal of providing some historical awareness to both adults and children about the Ottoman Empire as a response to official nationalistic history narratives of the Balkan countries.⁴⁸ For Hayden and Naumovic, this initiative presented an ideal Ottoman co-existence – a fantastical world in which people of different faiths lived together, cultivated together, shopped from each other, and enjoyed each others’ company in coffee shops and market places – and it was all about “imagining commonalities” (Hayden & Naumovic, 2013). Interestingly enough, despite any mention of it, most of the places mentioned in this project were still heterogeneous both in royal and socialist Yugoslavia. For the authors, this project was more of a contemporary political agenda that emphasized multiculturalism as opposed to nationalism (Hayden & Naumovic, 2013). This is what I want to stress in this dissertation - Ottoman romanticism is an ahistoric perspective with the present-day intention of replacing the nation state with a form of multiculturalism which has

⁴⁷ For responses to romantic view of co-existence in the Ottoman Empire, see A. Aktar, Debating the Armenian massacres in the last Ottoman parliament, November-December 1918; S. Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία: 19^{ος} αιώνας -1919: οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος* [Asia Minor: 19th century- 1919: the Greek Orthodox communities from the Rum millet to the Greek nation]; E. Kirtsoglou & L. Sistani, *The other then, the other now, the other within: stereotypical images and narrative captions of the Turk in northern and central Greece*; R. Hirschon, *Knowledge of diversity: towards a more differentiated set of “Greek” perceptions of “Turks”*.

⁴⁸ For more information, see <http://www.balkantale.com/>

particularly Islamic references in Turkey. If it was not so, the followers of this view would have already found proper answers to these questions: why the so called “harmony” was disturbed suddenly with nationalism in the Ottoman Empire; how politicians, nationalist intellectuals or the Great Powers stirred up conflicts if people enjoyed peaceful cohabitation; and what made people believe in them?

I argue that most of the time it is the people themselves who produce enmity. Certainly, I am not talking about rigid or continuous feelings of negativity from one group to the Other. The conjuncture of time influences the practices of living together and might generate various feelings like intimacy, expediency, competition and sometimes aggression. In times of aggression, community boundaries become less flexible and much more rigid. To put it differently, even in the absence of nationalist elite mobilization, communities can be inimical to each other. Some case studies, especially those about Bulgarian and Greek revolts, show that the nationalist elites benefited from existing conflicts and mobilized them for nationalistic purposes. To make a long story short, communities can be at each other’s throat for reasons other than ethnic conflict—it might be because of religious or economic reasons or might be an uprising against hegemony—so we cannot blame nationalism alone for separating people. Rather, nationalism is a last touch which draws the irrevocable border in such examples. On the other side of the coin, communities that are not in direct conflict with each other are not necessarily living together peacefully. There might be intimate inter-personal relations but at an inter-communal level they might be in competition due to other reasons. In this chapter I discuss and defend the need to consider cosmopolitanism, identity formation, borders of belonging, practices of living together and the flexibility or relativity of all these parameters before nationalist ferment was introduced to people’s life in Cappadocia, because explaining hostilities with nationalism is an oversimplification. Furthermore, Eurocentric explanations of the emergence of nationalism like industrialization, modernity, reformation etc. remain inadequate to understand nationalisms of Near Eastern communities.

Accordingly, to conduct a better analysis I make a distinction between inter-communal relations of the public sphere, which are competitive in nature, and inter-personal relations of the private sphere, which are better able to accommodate differences. At this point I have to admit that I follow the agonal public that Arendt employed for the ancient Greek model with Benhabib's interpretation, according to which a morally homogeneous and politically exclusive community behaves in an egalitarian way to its members but antagonistically to those whom it perceives as Others (Benhabib, 1997). In the end, where the Ottoman Empire is concerned, we are still talking about a pre-modern society where private and public spaces were shaped by faith. The faith groups were egalitarian within themselves, but antagonistic at the inter-communal level; and they did not intermingle as in modern societies. I believe that this perspective will prevent me from being trapped by romanticism. As another measure to cope with romanticism, I open to discussion the meanings of some free floating terms employed in romanticist reading of the Ottoman plurality like cosmopolitanism, inter-communality, tolerance, peaceful cohabitation and religious syncretism, and proceed with my analysis accordingly.

The study that inspires this chapter is the recent book of Nicholas Doumanis: *Before the nation: Muslim and Christian co-existence and its destruction in late-Ottoman Anatolia*, in which the author analyzes inter-communality on the basis of relationships, religious traditions and routines before nationalism separated the communities in Asia Minor. The framework of the book is mainly constructed on the Oral Tradition Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies (KMS) like the study at hand. There are two fundamental ideas in the book. Doumanis, firstly, argues that before the Young Turk Revolution (1908) and the succeeding Balkan Wars (1912-1913), in Anatolia people enjoyed what is called inter-communality, which refers to the accommodation of differences between religious communities that happened to live in the same neighborhood until it was destroyed by nationalism. Secondly, he argues that the testimonies of refugees are a veiled criticism of nationalism since they also experienced the good

old days before nationalism penetrated the Ottoman lands. Their vision of a “Turk” was in fact a good person and a neighbor, which completely clashes with the vision of the “educated” (*μορφωμένος*) nationalist Greek who is required to see the “Turk” as an eternal enemy.

Doumanis (2013) portrays a very romantic vision of Anatolia before the Balkan Wars and blames nationalism for being solely responsible for terminating the inter-communal life of communities as well as *interfaith cohabitation*, *religious transculturation*, and *popular ecumenism* (the italics are mine) they enjoyed. In a similar vein, several other scholars emphasized the *harmonious co-existence* of religious groups in Asia Minor on the basis of their interviews with the refugee origin people.⁴⁹ Unquestionably we can talk about relative harmony at certain time periods and in certain localities in Asia Minor or specifically in Cappadocia, but it should be noted that it was often competitive. Scholars make such statements on the basis of the narratives of neighborly relations between individuals. We must understand that inter-personal relations cannot be summed up and portrayed as inter-communal relations. Friendship between members of different communities cannot be deduced to lack of competition or conflict at inter-communal level. And friendship or religious syncretism does not mean that people were confused about their religious identity. Despite the presence of friendly inter-personal relations, the boundaries between communities were sharp and people were cognizant of their religious identities. For example, they were totally against inter-marriages between group members.

Therefore, we have to be very cautious not to be seized either by romanticism or by “clash of civilizations” thesis. I argue that a careful reading of KMS oral tradition accounts paints a realistic picture of co-existence in Cappadocia. As previously mentioned in the introduction, what I seek to find in oral testimonies are not facts, but meanings and symbols. It must be remembered

⁴⁹ See R. Hirschon, Knowledge of diversity: towards a more differentiated set of “Greek” perceptions of “Turks”; R. Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek catastrophe: the social life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus*; B. Tanc, Where local trumps national: Christian Orthodox and Muslim refugees since Lausanne.

that the interviews with refugees conducted by KMS researchers took place many years later, and their memories were highly affected by their disappointment in Greece owing to severe hardships. When they were interviewed beginning in the 1940s, a lot of water had flowed under the bridge and their days in Asia Minor were like a distant dream. However, despite the nostalgia in oral testimonies, the refugee narrations overtly demonstrate the borders of belonging and the scope of co-existence. On the one hand, these interviews portray relations of neighborliness, openness, sympathy and intimacy; on the other hand, in almost all testimonies, the “Turk” is specified as the Other, a stranger who is outside the community borders. The refugee narration is full of dichotomies like past and present, good neighbor Turk and bad outsider Turk, Christianity and Islam, Greece and Turkey, before and after Young Turk Revolution and so on. All these dichotomies help to detect the meanings and symbols that I seek to find in oral history accounts.

Doumanis defines inter-communality as simply the accommodation of difference between cultural, ethnic, or religious communities that happened to occupy the same street, neighborhood, village, or rural environ. For him, these practices of co-existence were conducted in a manner of neighborliness, and highlighted by everyday practices, social bonds, and shared values. In his eyes inter-communality is the reason why many former Ottoman Greeks and Turks recall the years before the Balkan Wars as *belle époque* (Doumanis, 2013). Different from Doumanis, as I stressed multiple times above, I distinguish between inter-personal and inter-communal relations. That is to say neighborly relations do not necessarily denote a lack of competition or conflict at an inter-communal level. As for his argument about the years prior to and following the Balkan Wars, it is true that testimonies emphasize “the good old days” before the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) or *Hürriyet* (Liberty, the Young Turk Revolution of 1908). However, I believe such accounts should be analyzed more carefully since each of them implies different meaning in their use of the phrase “good old days”. The

following testimonies reveal various narratives referring to dissimilarity in refugee lives before and after the Young Turk Revolution:

We got on well with the Turks. We were like brothers until Hürriyet. Things spoiled afterwards (χαλάσανε τα πράγματα). The Turks became wild (αγρίεψαν οι Τούρκοι).⁵⁰

Until the Balkan Wars, we got along well. We traded with each other. We did not have social relations (κοινωνικές σχέσεις δεν ήχαμε). They were did not interfere in our affairs. They left us free in our religion; we sang our national anthem between among us. Their ministry of education did not get involved because we had privileges. Everything spoiled afterwards.⁵¹

We did not have complaints about the Turks. In older times our relations were better. After Hürriyet, in our last years, before the Exchange, during the time of Kemal, they got wild. Not all of them. There were always good Turks. They were good friends and they would sacrifice themselves for us.⁵²

Until 1908, we and the Armenians were responsible for the trade in Bor. The Turks were sleeping. The Young Turks awakened them; they encouraged the Turks to enter the Christian (fields of) trading.⁵³

In all these testimonies there is a shared opinion as claimed by Doumanis: things were relatively good before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913). However, unlike Doumanis, I argue that the perceptions of “good old days” and “good Turk” differ from interviewee to interviewee since they were from different localities and their relations were shaped by distinct socio-economic situations and their experiences of co-existence and the frequency of their encounters with Turks varied greatly from person to person. For some of them, before the *Hürriyet*, things were better since they were enjoyed relative freedom in trade and in their internal affairs, including religion and education, and the Turks were fine because they were indifferent to non-Muslims. However, for some, the old days were better because their relations with

⁵⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Niğde, Konstantinos Haleplidis, Elisavet Hasirtzoglou.

⁵¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Talas, Iordanis Giabroglou.

⁵² KMS Cappadocia, Bor, Grigorios Azariadis.

⁵³ KMS Cappadocia, Bor, Sofoklis Fakidis, Dim. Haralampidis.

Turks were friendly and harmonious. Some of their good neighbors became wild after the Young Turk Revolution, and for this reason things worsened in their last decades in Cappadocia. Accordingly, the only thing that we can generalize from the KMS testimonies is that the lives of Christians were better off before 1908 in Cappadocia. We cannot, however, claim that the years before *Hürriyet* there was a *belle époque* in which people enjoyed a completely harmonious inter-communality. It may have been so for some localities but as we have seen in the above stated testimonies, some Christians did have minimum relations with the Turks.

Doumanis's romantic perspective should also be evaluated from the angle that has to do with the Ottoman state's policies of censorship, Islamist policies, forced conversions, and its general attitude towards non-Muslims during the reign of Abdülhamit II. For example, Orthodox Christians were worried about their situation when their Armenian neighbors were butchered during the *Hamidian* massacres of 1894-1895:

*Makrina Karadagli's father was in Istanbul during the Armenian massacres, he was so scared that he went mad.*⁵⁴

*The Armenians of our village were saved and were not harmed thanks to the intervention of Yosifaki Tatsoglou, the son of Makariou. Yosifakis was in Kaisaria when the persecution and slaughter broke out in 1895. He happened to find the hodja of the village there. He commanded him not let the Turks to do what happened in Caesarea. After paying him, he asked him not to touch in general any Christian so he wanted to protect the Armenians. The hodja rode his horse to village, found the Turks gathered them, talked to them and persuaded them.*⁵⁵

*During the Hamidian years, some problems arose with the Armenians. The Turkish army came to Nevşehir to massacre Armenians. They did not touch the Christians. A rich Turkish man Hatzigoura (Hacımurat?) saved them.*⁵⁶

⁵⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Makrina Karadagli, interviewer Sofia Anastasiadi's note.

⁵⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Erhilet (Erkilet), Anastasios Isaakidis.

⁵⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Neapoli (Nevşehir), Triggidou Euf.

All in all, the Hamidian years may have been relatively more peaceful than the continuously anxious years of the long war (1912-1922) for Orthodox Christians in terms of intercommunal relations and the attitude of authorities towards non-Muslims, but it was certainly not *belle époque*.

Some scholars also refer to the concept of cosmopolitanism⁵⁷ in their analyses of inter-faith cohabitation in the Ottoman Empire, but they mainly refer to major port cities, especially after the flow of Europeans to the Ottoman Empire for economic reasons. Interestingly, for this reason, cosmopolitanism is regarded as “quasi-colonialism” by sociologist Georg Simmel (Simmel quoted in Hanley, 2008). For my case I employ Lessersohn’s (2015, p. 552) “*provincial cosmopolitanism*” meaning “a local cosmopolitanism, a lived disposition, affinity, and identity of individual persons and of collective groups that was the direct result of living in a demographically concentrated provincial urban environment in which individuals and groups of diverse and differentiated ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural composition engaged in an ecosystem of interaction”. *Provincial cosmopolitanism*, as its name suggests, applies to provinces where diversity prevails. For Cappadocia, things were too complicated to apply the term, as Cappadocian provinces were predominantly Turkish in character and generally the non-Muslims were either ghettoized in villages or in separate neighborhoods (*mahalles*). For this reason, I also refer to Georgelin’s interpretation that cosmopolitanism is not an anarchic social process, and that not all components of a multiple society have the same role in the resulting balance (Georgelin, 2012). Generally speaking, for the Ottoman cosmopolitanism there were various levels: imperial, urban governance, neighborhood, professional association and so on (Lafi, 2008). At each of these levels there were two parameters: the general structure of the Ottoman society in which the non-Muslims were secondary citizens, and the provincial dynamics, which were more diverse and based on demographics, socio-economic differences and linguistic predominance. For

⁵⁷ For a detailed overview of “cosmopolitanism” literature, see W. Hanley, Grieving cosmopolitanism in Middle East studies.

example, in Izmir until 1922, the shops belonged overwhelmingly to non-Muslims, but Turkish remained the main language spoken in markets and bazaars. There was cultural dominance of Greeks over the native Christian populations including the Armenians (Georgelin, 2012). For Cappadocia, cosmopolitanism was under dominance of Turkish-Muslim culture to the extent that some Greek speaking villages adopted Turkish in the last decades of the nineteenth century, according to foreign observers. Demographics were also in favor of Muslims as Christian communities were small islands in a Muslim ocean, and were continuously losing population as a result of immigration, as stated by Merlie (quoted in Manousaki, 2002, p. 43).⁵⁸

Another important point to be stressed in order not to embrace Ottoman romanticism is the fact that people of different faiths rarely shared the same spaces; in cities they lived in different neighborhoods, and their villages were mostly separated; if they lived in a mixed village, their neighborhoods were separated.⁵⁹ Separation meant protecting the comfort zone. When faith groups lived close to each other in mixed spaces, they were rarely comfortable with the presence of one another (Barkey, 2008). As you will see in the forthcoming testimonies, this was also valid for Cappadocia:

There were no Turks in our village. We did not let them stay. Once a shepherd wanted to live, he was not permitted because in Telmison (a nearby village) there were only Christians once upon a time. A shepherd went there and got married. Later, they (the Turks) became more than the Christians (in number).⁶⁰

⁵⁸ According to demographical statistics, before the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) in the vilayet of Konya the total population was 1.101.549. The number of Greek Orthodox was 87.021, the Turks were 988.723 and the other groups were 25.805. M. Harakopoulos, *Ρωμιοί της Καππαδοκίας: από τα βάθη της Ανατολής στο Θεσσαλικό κάμφο, η τραυματική ενσωμάτωση στη μητέρα πατρίδα* [The Rums of Cappadocia: from depths of Anatolia to Thessalian plains, the traumatic integration in mother country], p. 34.

⁵⁹ See E. Eldem, Istanbul: from imperial to peripheralized capital; D. Goffman, Izmir: from village to colonial port city; K. Barkey, *Empire of difference: the Ottomans in comparative perspective*.

⁶⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Aravan, Lioudaki ?.

*All the residents of our village were Christians. There were only a Turkish bath keeper (hamamcı) and a Turkish baker (fırıncı). The bath keeper with his family was living in our village. The baker would come in the morning and leave in the evening.*⁶¹

*Kayabaşı (Christian neighborhood of Niğde) was ten minutes away from Niğde. There were around seven hundred Greek families,⁶² a few number of Armenians and none Turks.*⁶³

*Listen how they founded our village! Fifteen Greek, fifteen Turkish families left Tsouhour (Çuhur- a village in Kayseri) after the revolution (επανάσταση, Greek Revolution of 1821). Do you know why? Because they had suffered much from the Turks. The Turks wanted to come with them [...] They said: “we leave Tsouhour to stay away from the Turks; why to stay with the Turks again?”[...] So they left the Turks and built a village near Sivas.*⁶⁴

*In Andaval, we were always scared of getting massacred. There were only Christians and no Turks [in our village]. In mixed villages they [the Christians] were not afraid of [massacres] because the Turks would fend off the bandits.*⁶⁵

*Turkish neighborhood with its dirty roads and short houses was separated from our neighborhood which had beautiful houses and clean and good roads. We got on well with the Turks as they were always the best of us (γιατί αυτοί ήταν πάντα καλύτεροί μας). They would reap our fields.*⁶⁶

*There were four hundred fifty Turkish and fifty Greek families in our village. We had good relations. We lived like brothers (ζούσαμε σαν αδέρφια). They were honest in trading. They were respectful to our religion and to our women. They would go to foreign lands (gurbet, ξενιτιά) with our people.*⁶⁷

⁶¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Tenei, Stefanos Yazitzoglou.

⁶² In oral testimony, it is written as “Greek” families (Gr. ελληνικές οικογένειες). We do not know if the interviewee named her people as *Yunan* (Greek, Έλληνες) or *Rum* (Greek Orthodox Christians or Romans, Ρώμηοι). This difference is important since the former refers to ethnic identity and the latter refers to religious identity. We can never know what she called her people, only that the interviewer noted it as “Greek” families.

⁶³ KMS, Cappadocia, Fertek, Pipina Arapoglou.

⁶⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Rumkavak, Iosif Parlakoglou.

⁶⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Anas. Athanasoglou.

⁶⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Agirnas, Alexis Sevntinoglou.

⁶⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Zile (Kayseri), Eleutherios Iosifidis.

As we have seen in the testimonies of people from various localities in Cappadocia, Turks and Christians rarely shared the same space, and if they did, the scope of co-existence did not always show signs of inter-communality as they usually remained socially separated. Further to that, the fear of losing community members and being suppressed under the demographic dominance of the Turks indicates competitive living together, according to which communities tried to protect their communal borders and to keep their members intact against the Other. It should also be noted that there was a gender difference in terms of their communication with the Turks. For example, in Tsarikli (Çarıklı, Misti-Niğde), women did not speak Turkish and were familiar with few Turkish words because they had almost no communication with Turks. Their husbands, on the other hand, were mostly quilt makers and moved around Anatolia for their work so they had relations with the Turks and knew Turkish (Karalidis, 2005). Unquestionably, there were places where different religious communities enjoyed inter-communality, as we have seen in the last two of the above mentioned testimonies, but it was not the paradigm and we should not over-generalize the aspects of practices of living together. Additionally, we should be cautious when labeling relationships as inter-communal. Inter-personal relations generally denote neighborliness and intimate relationships between individuals at private level. Inter-communal relations, on the other hand, indicate group behaviors or behaviors that affect the other group members. For example, an economic transaction between a Muslim and a non-Muslim may not symbolize an inter-communal relationship (Ozil, 2013), but Muslim community (not few individuals) attending Christian weddings might be a sign of inter-communality. Inter-communality is a complicated issue I will deal with in a detailed way in the upcoming parts.



Figure 5. Kayabaşı: An Orthodox Christian neighborhood in the nineteenth century Niğde. Photograph: Gülen Göktürk

The source of romanticism in some studies about Ottoman plurality comes from the contention that tolerance and peaceful living together are equals. Such a perspective has two major problems. Firstly, tolerance and peaceful living together do not always mean the same thing; as I previously stated, tolerance is performed when there is a power relationship; so we should be careful not to dress a wolf in sheep's clothing. Secondly, just because there is no visible conflict between communities does not prove that there is peaceful cohabitation because there might also be a competition between the communities. Cohabitation, in fact, might be experienced in two ways: people might be unbiased to each other, in exchange of goods and values, and in full communication with one another, or they might just not be at each other's throat. The former version is peaceful cohabitation. The latter is antagonistic cohabitation but this does not mean that in the second version they are not tolerating one another, since we can still talk about the negative tolerance of not persecuting the undesired. Certainly, these are superficial categorizations and in real life things are always much more complicated and interwoven and the practices of living together might change in scope from time to time depending on the conjuncture of the locality. At this point, what I try to

emphasize is that coexistence is not always an evidence of positive valorization of pluralism. It can also be a matter of competition between members of different groups manifesting the negative definition of tolerance as passive non-interference (Hayden, 2002).

Further, as mentioned in the previous chapter, tolerance means voluntary acceptance of the people or the attitudes that we disapprove of. Hence it requires some form of self-restraint by the tolerator (King, 1998). Appreciating people, liking them, and wanting to live with them, is not practicing tolerance. Tolerance exists when there is a power relationship and the promotion of toleration simply presupposes an inequality (King, 1998). Tolerance is something you perform when you can wield power but choose not to do so. Therefore, only the powerful can exercise tolerance. For the Ottoman Empire, only the Muslims could be tolerant of the Others. The non-Muslim subjects, regardless of how wealthy or powerful they were, vis à vis the Muslim subjects were considered to be second class citizens by the Ottoman authorities, so the position of non-Muslims against Muslims cannot be called tolerance, but rather expediency or consent, as we see below in the radical example of King:

An agent who loathes a ruler may yet desist from firing upon his car simply because it is bulletproof or because the agent believes it is so. He is not “tolerant” because he suspends the act. He either is or believes himself to be powerless (King, 1998, p. 23).

Concerning the structure of the Ottoman Empire, the non-Muslims, as the secondary subjects, were simply powerless to perform tolerance. Certainly, in inter-personal relations we can talk about tolerance but as for inter-communal relations, only the Muslims were given the power to be tolerant. No matter if a non-Muslim was wealthy and prestigious in his relation to Muslims, in the end, the Islamic law was designating the Muslim subject superior than him. Therefore, in inter-communal relations, the tolerant side could only be the Muslims; the non-Muslims, since they were powerless, could only be in compliance with the disapproved Other, or they could wield expediency or consent to facilitate their lives. As for Muslim performance of tolerance, it diverged from non-persecution

to peaceful living together from time to time and changed from one locality to another and after 1908 in many places it turned out to be intolerance.

Although the non-Muslim subjects were incapable of performing tolerance, they were definitely not passive at all levels of human interaction. They would continuously rebuild their social identity and determine their position in accordance with the changing Muslim attitude of tolerance, governmental policies and other developments that affected them. Additionally, they had the power to be (in)tolerant of the people whom they consider as heretics among themselves, which constitutes the content of the last chapter.

3.1.2 Communal identity and determining the Other for border maintenance

We come across the concept of Other firstly in Hegelian Master-Slave dialectic according to which man's humanity "came into light" as he satisfies his Desire through recognition by the Other and that is the Desire which generates his Self-Consciousness. In a fight for recognition to satisfy the Desire, both parties should be alive since death is the complete negation of Consciousness. Hence each party inevitably has to assume the role of either Master or Slave. The Slave is the one who accepted life given to him by the Master and thus he depends on another. The Master, on the other hand, is objectified and "mediated" by the Slave (Kojève, 1980). Shortly, Hegelian philosophy necessitates the existence and the recognition of the Other for a person to realize and enjoy his/her Self-Consciousness and so be a complete human agent. And "Self-Consciousness is simple-or-undivided Being for-itself; it is identical-to-itself by excluding from *itself* everything *other* [than itself] (Kojève, 1980, p. 10)." Hegelian Master-Slave dialectic involves a tension between two parties "othering" each other. Taylor, on the other hand, focuses on the dialogical character of human life and claims that through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression we become full human agents capable of understanding ourselves and hence of defining our identity. For him, discovering my own identity does not mean that I work it out in isolation, but that I negotiate it

through dialogue, partly overt, partly internal, with others (Taylor, 1994). In both perspectives, to define and realize ourselves we need the Other. As also argued by Tilly, identities reside in relations with others: you-me and us-them (Tilly, 2005). In a similar vein, Barth argued that what closes community borders were a particular difference from the Other not the similarities shared within the Self.

In this study I am not particularly concerned with individual identity, since it is a concern of our modern time. However, we cannot simply dismiss individual identities, since refugee testimonies reveal not only communal matters but also personal feelings and belongingness. Certainly, the identity question in this part will not be a Post-Cold War concern of individual identity, but this does not mean that individual feelings and interpersonal relations are ignored. I rather make a differentiation between interpersonal and inter-communal encounters in order not to mix apples and pears.

A social group is a set of individuals who view themselves as members of the same category or who have a common social identification that they acquired through a social comparison process. In this process, persons who are similar to the self are labeled as the in-group, and persons who differ from the self are categorized as the out-group (Stets & Burke, 2000). As stated in the introduction, social identity is “we-ness”; it binds a group as a social aggregate and leads to common forms of thinking and behavior, but becomes actual only when there is interaction with another group (Korostelina, 2007). In the self-categorization process, not the common characteristics, which are presumably more in number with the Other, but certain differences establish the in-group out-group difference. This is quite understandable since the Other is always the neighbor who shares a common space and thus shares many characteristics, cultural products and customs. Accordingly, the social comparison process selectively determines the relatively inflexible, rigid, and stable features of the Other different from the Self like religion, language, race, class and sex. Such differences ensure enclosure and continuity of the border between in-group and the out-group, between the Self and the Other. However, creation of borders between us and them does not mean

isolation from the Other. As stated by Tilly (2005), when a social boundary is established, it includes not only a dividing line but also relations on each side of the line, relations across the line, and shared stories about those relations. It is in fact the interactions across groups that maintain the continuity of borders. The following quotation from Barth takes a similar position:

One finds that stable, persisting, and often vitally important social relations are maintained across such boundaries, and are frequently based precisely on the dichotomized ethnic statuses. In other words, ethnic distinctions do not depend on an absence of social interaction and acceptance, but are quite to the contrary often the very foundations on which embracing social systems are built. Interaction in such a social system does not lead to its liquidation through change and acculturation; cultural differences can persist despite inter-ethnic contact and interdependence (Barth, 1998, p.9).

For the Muslim-Christian co-existence in Cappadocia, many studies refer to the commonalities that people of different faiths share in the region including the language. First of all we have to note that for people sharing the same geography, it is almost impossible not to have many things in common. Can anyone claim that different religious communities did not share common characteristics in areas like Trabzon, Aleppo, Salonika and Diyarbakir? Additionally, not only in Cappadocia but in many other places in Asia Minor and Pontus, where Muslim Turks dominate non-Muslims in number, the *Rums* were mostly monolingual Turcophones (Anagnostopoulou, 2013) and they had, no matter how, relations with the Turks either at minimum or maximum level of proximity. Having in mind these points, Cappadocia cannot be designated as a unique case. Therefore, Tilly and Barth are right; commonalities and interaction with the Other are not obstacles to establish borders. One distinctive feature is enough to encircle a social group, and in our case it was religion.

In the pre-modern world, the most important constituent of one's identity was his/her religion. Historical surveys show that this was so both for the Muslims and Christians of Cappadocia. For Anagnostopoulou (2013), Cappadocia, with its mountainous landscape, its lack of resources, and its abandonment by the state, harbored feelings of religiosity in the hearts of both Christians and Muslims.

Religion was so important that, unlike the coastal areas like Smyrna, in Cappadocia, it was the priests who wielded absolute power in communal organizations during the Ottoman epoch. Adding to that, many studies built upon the testimonies of Asia Minor refugees or *Karamanlidika* publications show the value given to religion by the Cappadocians.⁶⁸

Similarly, Hirschon observed in her field study of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus refugees that “the sense of identity of the Asia Minor refugees was rooted in a shared heritage which centered on their religious affiliation (Hirschon, 1998, p. 17).” For her, Ottoman Greeks had a tendency to ignore regional and socio-economic divisions amongst their community and it was their religious identity that bonded them (Hirschon, 1998). The KMS Oral Tradition Archive also demonstrates that religion was the constituent element of the Christians’ identity and the boundary maintenance *vis-à-vis* the Muslim Turks in Cappadocia. Firstly, the refugees would often use the word “Christian” when they were talking about themselves, their possessions and their characteristics in relation to their Other: the Turks. We can list them as such: Christian women/men, Christian neighborhood, Christian families, Christian population, Christian settlers, Christian labor, Christian houses and so on. They rarely employed the word “Greek” and we are not sure if they labeled themselves as Greek (Ελληνας, Yunan) or *Rum* (Ρώμος, Roman, Greek Orthodox Christian), since most of the interviewees coming from Cappadocia were Turcophone and we do not know if the KMS interviewers preferred to translate *Rum* as Greek or the interviewees actually used the word *Yunan* (Greek) when they were referring to themselves. This differentiation is particularly important because Greek refers to ethnic whereas *Rum* refers to religious identity. Secondly, in *Karamanlica* (Turkish in Greek alphabet) publications, the publishers would address their readers with the words

⁶⁸ See R. Hirschon, *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe*; E. Balta, *Karamanlica* kitapların önsözleri [The prefaces of *Karamanlica* books]; E. Balta, *The adventure of an identity in the triptych: vatan, religion, language*; F. Benlisoy, S. Benlisoy, “Karamanlılar,” “Anadolu ahalisi” ve “aşağı tabakalar:”Türkdilli Anadolu Ortodokslarında kimlik algısı [“Karamanlılar,” “Anatolian folk” and “subaltern classes:” identity perception in Turcophone Anatolian Orthodox].

“Christians”, “Orthodox Christians”, “Christians of Anatolia” and “Orthodox Christians of Anatolia”. Balta (2003), in her analysis of forewords of the *Karamanlica* publications, classified these terms and determined the turning points in the lives of *Rums*. According to her study, the readers were simply called “Christians” or “Christians of Anatolia” in the early years of *Karamanlica* publications. When the activity of the Protestant missionaries began, they added the designator “Orthodox” to emphasize their denomination. In my own observations including *Anatoli*, *Terakki* and several other *Karamanlica* publications, I often came across the terms “Orthodox Christians,” “Anatolians,” “Anatolian Orthodox Christians,” and “Anatolian *Rums* (Anatol Rumları).⁶⁹ The identification was again based on religion since religion was the main constituent of the Self. It was even so important that if a person had converted to Islam, she/he would have automatically become a Turk in the eyes of Christians:

My brother Dimitris Prodromos’ sister in law was Turkified (τούρκεψε)... She stayed in Limna (Tr. Gölcük). There are 25-30 women who were Turkified and stayed in our fatherland and they have relatives here [in Greece].⁷⁰

Eighty years ago, a Christian of our village got Turkified because she married to a Turk. Her grandchildren became the worst of all Turks. Once they stoned the Ai Giorgi (Αἱ Γιώργη) Church which was neighboring with Turkish neighborhood (Tr. mahalle).⁷¹

In these testimonies they use the term “Turk” not in ethnic but in religious terms. A person who changes his/her religion would inevitably be considered a member of other group in the eyes of group members. No matter a convert’s origins, he/she would already be seen as the Other. Barth affirms that “ethnic boundary defines the group, not the cultural stuff that encloses (Barth, 1969, p. 15).” I change “ethnic boundary” in Barth’s wording with “social boundary” because this concept makes more sense for our case, as, for the time span we focus on, the conditions

⁶⁹ See *Anatoli*, 1891: 4280, 4287, 4288, 4295, 4297, 5440; also see I. H. Kalfoglou, Ημερολόγιον: η Ανατολή [Almanac: the East].

⁷⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Limna, Anastasia Prodromou.

⁷¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Zincidere, Iraklis Papazoglou.

were not ripe enough to designate the religious communities in Cappadocia as ethnic communities. I also agree with his conclusion that when one passes the dividing line that defines and encloses a social group, despite whatever shared commonalities may exist, one remains outside the group.

3.1.3 Reading co-existence from another angle

In the very beginning of this chapter, I quickly referred to intercommunality and stressed that I cannot simply name any interaction between Christians and Muslims as intercommunal. In this dissertation, I intentionally hesitate to use the term “intercommunality” when referring to Muslim-Christian co-existence in Cappadocia. The reason for my position is the arbitrary utilization of tolerance and intercommunality as equals. As I discussed before, I regard tolerance not in Walzer’s sense of a virtue of peaceful living together; instead I see it as a power relationship in Brown’s understanding and as something that emerges only when there is inequality. Tolerance can be performed by the power holder in his relation with the dominated; and it can only be called tolerance when the power holder has the capability to persecute the undesired but he does not choose to do so for some reason, most of the time for expediency. Therefore, intercommunality, if we understand it in Doumanis’s way, has nothing to do with tolerance but rather with peaceful living together. This perspective is misleading for my case since it includes features of peaceful living together but also competitive living together. In the end, the condition of intercommunal relations was a matter of time and space (Mazower, 2000). For instance, the below mentioned testimony refers to peaceful living together since attendance at one another’s weddings can be an evidence of inter-communality:

We were sweethearts (with the Turks) (Ημασταν αγαπημένοι). They would come to take us as agricultural laborers (εργάτες) to reap their fields. They would invite us to their weddings and come to ours.⁷²

There is no expediency in attending one another’s wedding. In this example, the communal borders are not closed and the boundary between “us” and “them” is

⁷² KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Paraskevas Ignatiadis.

permeable. However, solely an economic relationship or a transaction between religious communities cannot be regarded as peaceful living together since there is no intimacy but there is expediency or necessity. Additionally, as claimed by Ozil (2013), religious affiliation might have been irrelevant for the economic relations either in communal or in inter-communal level.

I very often came across lines such as “*we were sweet hearts,*” “*we lived like brothers,*” or “*we got on well*” in refugee testimonies in folders about the “relationships with the Turks.” As claimed by Doumanis, the accounts in the Oral Tradition Archive of KMS have the potential to refute the official nationalist discourse in Greece. The below stated testimony openly exemplifies the dichotomy between official historiography and refugee narration. I have to confess that such testimonies are not exceptions:

*I wish everyone was like the Turks. They were very good and respectful to women. Nowadays a lot is said about them (she means in a negative way). We never met such people. Those had to be the other Turks.*⁷³

Such testimonies referring to peaceful and intimate aspects of living together cannot and should not be disregarded. However, we should be careful in analysis of such testimonies to see if they narrate inter-personal relations of neighborliness or intercommunal relations. The personal practices of living together and the border maintenance of community should not be mixed since while the former refers to intimacy, the latter might refer to competition. In other words, the relations of *Ayşe* and *Eleni* might be very friendly and sympathetic, but the relations of Muslims and Christians in their village might be competitive in terms of maintaining the borders and keeping the group intact against the potential interference of the Other. To say that identities are “fluid” and changeable does not mean that distinctions between groups can easily be removed (Hayden, 2002). Bringa hypothesizes a condition for a Catholic-Muslim mixed village in Bosnia that coincides with my argument for Cappadocia:

⁷³ KMS, Cappadocia, Endürlük, Evanthia Ikenteroglou.

The neighborhood (*komşuluk*) was an important sociopolitical unit within the village [...] Hospitality and related social exchange (such as women's coffee visiting and men's work parties) was the basis for neighborliness between them. These activities involved the two communities and in emphasizing a shared (and therefore nonreligious) identity acknowledged the existence of a village community beyond the ethno-religious one. Socializing between villagers, Muslim and Catholic, provided an opportunity for identifying with one's ethno-religious community and expressing this belonging to nonmembers [...] Symbolic boundaries of separateness were initially established by referring to "our customs" or "among us" Muslims or Catholics respectively, or "ours" and "theirs", "we" and "they" [...] The separate identities of the Muslim and Catholic communities are ultimately maintained by the disapproval of intermarriage between members of the two communities (Bringa, 1995, pp. 65-79).



Figure 6. Anatolian Christians from Nevşehir. Source: Photography Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies

3.1.3.1 Religious Syncretism

Competitive co-habitation mostly demonstrates itself in two seemingly minor but important issues: religious syncretism and inter-marriages. Inspired by religious nationalism and antagonistic tolerance, in this part I will try to demonstrate the importance of religious identity as a dividing line between communities in Cappadocia. It is my contention that the case of Cappadocia was

competitive co-habitation originating from the motive to protect community borders and community members. Although it eventually offered a foundation for the national identities to set themselves, in the initial phases of nationalization it served paradoxically as a fulcrum for people to resist the primacy of nation as the main constituent of their social identity. That is to say, religious identity was so important for people that they resisted any identity that had the potential to replace their religious identity. Accordingly, national identity was found irrelevant and uninteresting for ordinary people in the beginning. For some it was even a threat to their religious identity. As long as nationalism kept its distance to religion, lay people remained indifferent to it. For this reason, Greek and Turkish nationalisms integrated religion into other components of national identity. The end result was religious nationalism, which is not very much in line with modernist explanations of nationalism since nothing else but religion designated the ethnic categories of “Greek” and “Turk”.

For the case at hand, nationalism set itself on the preexisting religion based separateness. This argument does not indicate that Huntington was right in his “Clash of Civilizations” thesis. As I mentioned above, it is in fact the interaction between religious groups that preserves the group boundaries and it does not have to be antagonistic at all times as Huntington claimed. It could be either competitive or peaceful. Ottoman Cappadocia was not an ideal world of freedom and equality both at an individual and a communal level but even in pre-modern Cappadocia people managed to live together without any visible conflict until the age of nationalism. This proves Huntington to be wrong, as we see in our case that inter-faith cohabitation is not inherently virulent although it had competitive and even antagonistic aspects.

In his article about antagonistic tolerance Hayden (2002) drew a pessimistic picture about plurality under popular democratic governments, arguing that any division between groups of peoples becomes politicized leads to the suppression by the majority of minority symbols. For him, diversity prevails best under conditions that deny democracy. While stating his view as fact, he accepts

that it is a disturbing claim. I disagree; modern plural societies have more potential to be peaceful. We live in a world where most people receive an education in one form or another, individuals have intertwined identities much more complex than those of the pre-modern people, and are bombarded by ideas and information of all sorts through internet and other means of communication. We have invisible bonds with people we do not know and we have the opportunity to see and follow better lives and societies, and make demands to beautify ours. As Bowman (2002) puts in his comment about “antagonistic tolerance”, anthropologists (and other social scientists) need not –and must not- provide legitimacy for the creation and maintenance of a world of ethnically pure nations-states. In benefiting from Hayden’s “antagonistic tolerance”, I do not come to the conclusion that in liberal democracies diversity cannot be handled better than pre-modern monarchies.

Both “religious nationalism” and “antagonistic tolerance” theories argue that the pre-existing faith groups of an area –be it South Asia, the Balkans, or Cappadocia– were disturbed when a new religion arrived via trade, conquest or indigenous development and challenged them (Hayden et al., 2011). For example, in India it is thought that Hinduism is a natural given to their soil, while Islam is seen as coming from the outside to convert Hindus (van der Veer, 1994). This was the case in Anatolia as well. When its inhabitants were predominantly Orthodox Christian during Byzantine times, with the Turkish raids and conquests masses gradually became Muslim. For Ménage and Vryonis, the Islamization of Asia Minor was effectively completed by 1500 at latest, and the Christian majority gradually became a minority.⁷⁴ Since the adherents of a religion often see the adherents of other religions as rivalries who have the desire to convert or persecute them, they develop and enclose their social identity on the basis of religion and feel themselves in contestation with the Other. Hayden names it as structural opposition (Hayden, 2002); an opposition based on long lasting religious rivalry.

⁷⁴ See V. L. Ménage, *The Islamization of Anatolia*; S. Vryonis Jr. *Religious change and continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the fourteenth through the sixteenth century*.

The romanticist vision opposes this view by referring to common religious rituals or shared religious shrines, and names it as religious syncretism by attributing solely a positive value to the term. Syncretism means borrowing, affirmation, or integration of concepts, symbols, or practices of one religious tradition into another through a process of selection and reconciliation (Berlin quoted in van der Veer, 1994). It is not an anomaly, it happens everywhere, and it is definitely not equal to tolerance. Syncretism is regarded positively by some as a sign of tolerance, but negatively by others as a decline of pure faith and loss of identity (van der Veer, 2003). Syncretic behaviors are also shown as proofs to make claims about a community's origins and nature. Based on syncretism and crypto-Christianity, some Serbian scholars, for example, argue for real religion and Serbness of observed Muslim or Catholic populations of their neighborhood (Aleksov, 2005). Some other scholars like Hayden regard syncretism more as pragmatism. I will follow this perspective rather than make essentialist arguments about communities' origins.

The romanticist scholarship focusing on Ottoman plurality agrees with the former view via making references to the common religious practices, supernatural beliefs and people's way of surpassing the Orthodoxy. For example, Doumanis reserved two chapters for the popular understanding of religion and adapted various concepts to name it like popular ecumenism, religious transculturation and interfaith intimacy. Ottoman subjects, he claimed, were prepared to stray beyond the boundaries of their own religion, which was limited by high religious authorities and appealed to the same saints, shrines and shared same superficial beliefs. In the eyes of Doumanis this was intense religious transculturation and interfaith intimacy. Additionally, for him the most intimate forms of Ottoman intercommunal engagement, which he observed in KMS testimonies, where Muslims and non-Muslims could recognize most clearly each other's humanity without consciously crossing the line of apostasy, would imply popular ecumenism (Doumanis, 2013). Doumanis' argument is not totally wrong but it is misleading since he did not consider the competitive nature and restricting aspects

of “intimacy” or, as I like to call it, “flirting” between different faiths. A careless reading of the KMS Oral Tradition accounts, in fact, could easily lead a researcher to a romanticist vision since it is full of testimonies narrating common religious and superstitious practices:

One day a Turk from Eskigümüş came and said “Muhtar Efendi (Mister Headman), I love a woman from our village; would you go to Priest Nikolaos for me to ask if he writes an amulet to make this woman love me?” Priest Nikolaos wrote some nonsense on a piece of paper in Greek, folded it and gave it to me. I brought it to the Turk and said him to put the paper on the way of this woman so she could step on it. They got married. The Turk sent me four hundred walnuts; I gave half of it to Priest Nikolaos.⁷⁵

The Turks would not come to our churches. Neither would they interfere in our religion. Only once we saw a Turkish woman in our Church Ioannis Prodromos [...] There was food in her bag. She stayed silently and watched carefully what we were doing. When we were crossing ourselves, she was doing the thing that they do [when praying]. She told the Christian women she knew that she would come to church every year. The priest blessed the food she brought from home for her to have everything well at home.⁷⁶

In addition to such unique stories of individuals, one can frequently find stories narrating how Muslim Turks would become mentally or physically healed after sleeping in a church yard or when a priest prayed for them. As claimed by Valensi in her article about Ottoman Syria, it was proximity that facilitated reciprocal borrowing of social practices and the sharing of customs and values among Muslims and non-Muslims but at the same time the passage from one church to another through marriages were frowned upon by the communities of origin which sought to defend themselves by every available means (Valensi, 1997). Hence, we can conclude that cultural borrowing does not mean that there were no communal borders or contestation between two groups; and neighborliness, personal feelings of friendship, and individual demands of help from the Other do not mean that people were confused about their religion.

⁷⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Paraskevas Ignatiadis.

⁷⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Gölcük, Eleftheria Alexiadi.

Additionally we should note that syncretic behaviors are often pragmatic behaviors for two simple reasons. One is that individuals have the desire to seek help through whatever means will bring about the end they need in their lives. They ask for supernatural intervention and miracles (Hayden, 2002) and they hope to receive good no matter if the way to good is through another religion. For example, people who faced special dangers often displayed ecumenical piety, exemplified in that sailors of all faiths – especially pirates and corsairs- respected icons of the Virgin Mary. Specific saints were believed to protect some cities, and their ability to prevent danger was recognized by Muslims and Christians alike in the Balkans (Mazower, 2000). In the end, they believed that if some people believed and benefited from miracles of a saint or a ritual, they could as well. Secondly, in an ecosystem of antagonistic tolerance, the tolerated group follows the dominant group's traditions inevitably, since their own traditions are suppressed by those of the Other. At this point, I again want to warn the reader that inter-personal relations cannot be deduced to inter-communal relations. Much like having a gay friend but simultaneously feeling uncomfortable about gay marriage; one can be against something while still maintaining good personal relations with people who exemplify the thing to which one is opposed. In our historical case, personal relations and the pragmatic behavior of syncretism do not refute the fact that there was competitive co-habitation between religious groups and the contestation was fundamentally religious. For Hayden (2002) it was in fact the syncretic behaviors that prove that there is antagonistic tolerance in an ecosystem of co-existence. In the below mentioned testimonies, you will see that the pragmatic behavior of Christians benefitted from the healing capability of the Muslim religion. In Cappadocia both priests and *hodjas* were considered medicine men:

When we would run a temperature, we would go to the house of hodja. He would take a cotton yarn, bless it, make knots and tie it to our hand. It sounds strange but we would become well.⁷⁷

When I was nine, I had a terrible toothache...My grandmother took me to the nearby mosque. We had heard that it was once the church of St.

⁷⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Tsouhour, Ioakeim Papadapoulou.

*Nicholas. The hodja of the mosque was called Tap Tap Hodja. He was a respectable old man [...]He asked me to put my finger over the aching tooth; I did. He wrote something in Turkish letters on a paper and put the paper on a piece of wood. Every time I told him that my tooth was still aching, he banged a nail on each letter he wrote on the paper until my tooth stop aching.*⁷⁸

In Asia Minor, there were many cases of worshiping to the same shrines, and Cappadocia was no exception. One of many such examples was the shrine of the Christian Saint Mammas, known as Şammas Baba by the Turks, which was famous for a series of miraculous incidents in an entirely Turkish village of *Mamasun* (Gökçe) in Aksaray, Cappadocia. The sanctuary was called *Ziyaret Kilise* (Pilgrimage Church) and at the east of it there used to stand a Holy Table with an icon of St. Mammas for the Christians, while in the south wall there was a niche (*mihrab*) for the Muslims. The skull and other bones of the saint, discovered on the site, would be shown in a box and work miracles for Christians and Muslims alike. The sanctuary would be tended by a dervish and the Christian itinerant priests would officiate at the Holy Table (Hasluck, 1929). I came across testimonies about the Saint Mamas in Aksaray folder of KMS oral tradition testimonies:

*A Turkish woman used to come to our house to make pastry for us [...] She told us a miracle of St. Mammas: “my son was in the army and I did not even receive a letter from him. I thought of lighting a candle of St. Mammas and begging to him to show me my son [...] I took the key of the church, opened its door and asked for a miracle. I saw my son even before I arrived at home. He showed his miracle.”*⁷⁹

Certainly, the shrine of St. Mamas was not unique. Many other shrines would serve for the Muslims and Christians alike:

*The patients from Turkish and Greek villages would come to Agioi Anargyroi Church (Ο Ναός των Αγίων Αναργύρων) to sleep and get well. Turks called it a tekke (dervish lodge).*⁸⁰

⁷⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Zile-Kayseri, Eleftherios Iosifidis.

⁷⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, Evdoxia ?.

⁸⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, Makrina Loukidou.

For Hasluck, the reverse concept of Christians visiting Muslim shrines also happened, though less frequently. Hacı Bektaş *tekkesi* (dervish lodge) near Kırşehir was the most important Muslim shrine in Cappadocia. The *tekke* was not only frequented by the Muslims of *Bektaşî* order but also by the Christians. For some local authorities of the time, as cited in Hasluck, it was believed by the Christians that in the place of the *tekke* there had been a monastery that was the site of the Saint Haralambos (Hasluck, 1929). In this example, while sharing the same holy site, the identity of the saint is contested. As Hayden (2002) argued for a similar example in India, transformation of the shrine and the identity of the Saint seem to be an expedient case of pure power and oppression. Since the dominant religious community was the Muslim community, the shrine was attributed to their own Saint. The Christians, on the other hand, privately continued to name it for their own Saint. For this particular case, Hasluck argued about the competition of Islamic sects with Christianity and the non-violent triumph of the former over the latter. For him Bektashism gained ground at the expense of Christianity through reception of the new God by the old one or through the identification of the two personalities. In his words:

A religion carried by a conquering race or by a missionary priesthood to alien lands super-imposes itself, by force or persuasion, on an indigenous cult; the process is expressed in mythological terms under the figure of a personal combat between rival gods or of the 'reception' of the new god by the old. Eventually either one god or the other succumbs and disappears or is relegated to an inferior position; or, again, the two may be more or less completely identified and fused (Hasluck, 1929, pp. 564-565).

Mazower regarded Bektashism as an Islamic mysticism that was counterposed to the formal hierarchies of Sunni Islam and that united Christianity and Islam with the claim that "a saint belongs to the whole world" (Mazower, 2000, p. 63). The ecumenical character of Bektashism might be a source of syncretism for Cappadocia. In the eyes of the Orthodox, the followers of Bektashism were the Turkmens (Turcomans) - they were not called Turks in order to emphasize their denominational difference - to whom the Orthodox felt closer than they were to

Turks since they drank wine.⁸¹ The heterodox practices of the Bekthashi order do not change my argument about religious syncretism. In the end, there were borders between all religions and denominations and, despite the existence of shared practices, the members of communities never wanted to lose members in favor of some other religion or denomination.

Coming back to shrine sharing, Hayden (2002) strictly regards it as a pragmatic attitude and stresses the competitive nature of syncretism. He claims that whoever is acknowledged as a community in a region, it is likely that the practice of the believers will continue to incorporate that community's religious elements in the worship of the saint. Bowman finds Hayden's point of view to be an over-generalization:

Identities at syncretistic shrines can function with relative unfixity, only being forced towards aggressive articulation, closure and mobilization by the perception of another setting itself against the inchoate identity it focuses and brings to expression. That perception can be propagated by political and/or religious elites, or can result from antagonistic activities by another community of people (Bowman, 2002, p. 220).

Bowman criticizes Hayden of regarding identities as fixed, but I do not read his "antagonistic tolerance" in the same way. First of all, he clearly states that syncretism is a practical behavior. To behave in accordance with interest implicitly means that individual identities were unfixated and had the tendency to adapt to conditions. Additionally, it is true that people practiced rituals in contrast with the doctrines of their religions in plural Ottoman society. However, despite the presence of grey areas between religious communities, they were in contestation since they wanted to keep their groups intact. As an example, a Muslim woman might go to a priest to ask for help to cure her illness, but this does not indicate that she questions her own religion. If one asks her if she wants to be converted, she would refuse and most probably would not want to hear about the idea. At an individual level people were cognizant of their religions, and at community level, no community wanted to lose its member in favor of the Other.

⁸¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, Symeon Kosmidis.

Religious syncretism in Cappadocia was not restricted to visiting the same shrines or sanctuaries or believing in the healing capability of other religions. Kostas Tsolakidis narrates in his memoir that her grandmother and the other Christians of their village (Zincidere-Kayseri) would not eat pork with a rationale that the animal is dirty. For the author they had to be affected by their Muslim neighbors. Most likely this began as a desire to not provoke their neighbors, and this respect gradually turned into a belief (Tsolakidis 2007). Not eating pork is a syncretic behavior but again there is expediency and a power relationship behind the idea: to not provoke Muslims so as not to engage in conflict with them. There is contestation in this example too. Probably if the Christians had been greater in number, they would not have cared about what their Muslim neighbors thought. There were Muslims in Peloponnese but the Christians outnumbered the Muslims and did not give up eating pork.

As another example of syncretism, Erol's article on *Karamanlica* epitaphs of the nineteenth century demonstrates the linguistic manifestation of syncretism since she detected Islamic terms like *Amin* (Arabic invocation said after a prayer meaning "so be it"), *Allah* (Arabic name for the God), *hadji* (used for pilgrim to Jerusalem, derived from the Arabic *hajj* meaning to make the pilgrimage to Mecca). Utilization of Islamic terms is also observed in the *Karamanlica* publications (Erol, 2014). Additionally, I myself observed the display of Islamic concepts like *Mashallah* (May God preserve him/her from evil) in fountain and door epigraphs. Concerning the fact that Christians were very few in number among Muslim majority and some of them lost their vernacular Greek over time, it is fairly understandable that they adopted Islamic terms. Again, we do not see such examples in the particularly Christian territories Muslims were the minority. These were the outcomes of demographic dominance of the Muslim Turks in the region.



Figure 7. An inscribed stone panel of a house door from Cappadocia: “the house of Tylkiar Anastas, Masallah, 1871). Photography: Gülen Göktürk

When discussing religious syncretism, one should not forget the fact that some Muslim populations of Asia Minor were local converts. As previously mentioned, Islamization of Anatolia was almost complete in the sixteenth century and was followed by individual conversions afterwards. Accordingly, some Christian rituals might have lasted past conversion among such Muslims due to their perceived effectiveness over the ages. As we saw in the observations of Busbecq about the Muslims on the island of Lemnos: “If you ask them why they do this, they reply that many customs have survived from antiquity the utility of which has been proved by long experience; the ancients, they say, knew and could see more than we can and custom which they approved ought not to be wantonly disturbed (Busbecq quoted in Mazower, 2000, p. 59).” All in all, religious syncretism or “flirting” between believers of different faiths in Cappadocia was based on pragmatic logic and does not refute the competitive side of the story. The first volume of Hasluck’s *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* records in a detailed way the transference of Christian sanctuaries and shrines to Muslims including converted churches and secularized sanctuaries when the dominance of

Islam was established in Anatolia. Testimonies about transferences also exist in oral accounts:

There [in Eskigümüſ] there was a church called St. Haralambos. We would go there to light candles. Turks converted it to a larder. It was carved into a rock and there were icons. Turks would say that it was once a monastery. Eskigümüſ was a Christian village, then came the Turks.⁸²

For Hayden (2002), transference and conversion of sanctuaries from one religion to another are symbols of dominance, and one would be hard pressed to find a clearer instance of contest between believers. In Anatolia, and particularly in Cappadocia, the Christian element gradually declined⁸³ and religious manifestations followed the dominant polity of the Muslims. Parallel to this, Van der Veer's (1994) evaluation for Islamization in India is also applicable to Anatolia:

The evidence of a gradual process of Islamization should not make us forget that identity formation works by a dialectics of inclusion and exclusion. It is often observed that Sufism has open boundaries, that its beliefs and practices are syncretistic, allowing room for local customs. While this is true, it should not be exaggerated. There have always been mechanisms for boundary maintenance within Sufism that stress Islamic exclusivity (Van der Veer, 1994, p. 43).

The dominance of Muslims over Christians and the threat of Islamization in the eyes of the Christian population were the main reasons behind the competitive nature of relations between communities. In line with that, by the eighteenth century the Greek Orthodox Church was already beginning to get interested in the Turcophone Christians of the Anatolian interior and how to protect them from conversion to Islam and religious propaganda of other Christian denominations (Balta, 2003). I will discuss in detail in the upcoming chapter.

⁸² KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Paraskevas Ignatiadis.

⁸³ For more on the Islamization of Anatolia, see S. Vryonis Jr., *The decline of medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the process of Islamization from the eleventh through the fifteenth century*; S. Anagnostopoulou, *Μικρά Ασία: 19^{ος} αιώνας -1919: οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος* [Asia Minor: 19th century- 1919: the Greek Orthodox communities from the Rum millet to the Greek nation].

From another angle, contestation between religious groups is also observable in refugee testimonies about religion. The Orthodox believed that their religion was better than that of the Muslims:

*Turks would admire and respect the Christian religion. We would invite Turkish couples to our wedding ceremonies at church. They would watch the ceremony with admiration...They would say to each other that the Rums had good traditions.*⁸⁴

*They [Turks] would say that our religion was better than their religion but the sword had the power and they would handle it so we were not able to select our administrators.*⁸⁵

Such testimonies show that the Christians were proud of their religion and placed it at a higher level among the monotheistic beliefs, a view that is echoed by Hirschon. In her fieldwork in Pireaus, her informants often told her that the Turks were envious of them since their religion was beautiful (οι Τούρκοι μας ζηλεύανε, η θρησκεία μας είναι ωραία) (Hirschon, 1988, p. 21). The Muslims, on the other hand, called the Christians *gavur* (infidel) to show that they undervalue their religion.

To sum up, in Cappadocia, people enjoyed religious syncretism in numerous activities and attitudes, including visiting same shrines, employing same religious concepts and adapting the Other's religious behavior to the Self, and in the end what mattered most for them was the benefit obtained from practice rather than the dogma. However, even while experiencing these overlapping features, people maintained their borders and believed in the superiority of their religion over the Other, especially as the political domination of the Muslims overtly established itself in the sharing of religious sites. These two seemingly contradictory behaviors actually complemented one another. For Hayden, syncretism exists as long as the dominance of one over the Other continues. When dominance is challenged, it is likely that the interaction between the self-differentiating groups will turn to violence until dominance is restored (Hayden et

⁸⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Zile-Kayseri, Eleftherios Iosifidis.

⁸⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Tsouhour, Ioakeim Papadopoulou.

al., 2011). That is essentially why Christians found themselves more intensely on the path of nationalization, if not violence, when the dominance of the Ottoman Empire was challenged during and after the Balkan Wars.



Figure 8. Despina Raftopoulou in local costume of Niğde. Source: Photography Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

3.1.3.2 Intermarriages

I will now discuss the scholarly approach that regards mixed marriages to be a sign of inter-communality. I discussed above that we cannot simply call Muslim-Christian co-existence inter-communality, since it was inherently competitive and inter-personal intimacy and the unfixed nature of individual identities could not abolish the borders between religious communities. Certainly in times of crisis the borders were more concrete, and in times of peace they were more permeable. However, one way or another, there were always borders, and the issue of inter-marriage clearly indicated the presence of said borders since it was never appreciated by community members and leaders, including religious authorities. Here I feel the need to stress that I look at the issue of inter-marriages as a part of the issue of conversion. In the end, mixed marriage meant either

conversion of the woman, or an acceptance on her part to raise her children as Muslims. This is a clear intervention on border maintenance for Christians since it meant the loss of both current and prospective members.

In contradiction to my argument, Layoun (2001) regards the visual image that a Greek woman becomes Turkish through marriage as a powerful sign of inter-communality. She was wrong in her claim because the oral testimonies reveal that marriage with a Turk meant crossing the border and Turkification, and it was not favorable for the Christian community. Interestingly, Ottoman authorities were also very concerned about forced marriages and conversions, and when such cases were brought to the *kadis* they often stood in favor of the families of the forced person. For example, *Anatoli* newspaper reported the case of a young Greek Orthodox girl who went to a hodja's house in order to become Muslim. According to the newspaper her mother was suspicious of the situation so she went to a clerk of local pasha to complain. As a result, the girl was interrogated to see if she really wanted to convert. After seeing her hesitation, she was returned to her mother.⁸⁶ Intermarriages, if they happened how KMS informants stated, were usually impeded by members of the community who had the tendency to find excuses to legitimize the unapproved behavior:

In 1890, a widow got Turkified. A hodja took her by force. It was said by force but she was eager [to get married] too. The council of elders (Δημογεροντία) wanted to prevent her but she did not listen [to them].⁸⁷

In our village, women would not migrate; they would rather stay at home and do the agricultural labor. They were so poor that they would work in nearby villages. Because of poverty, some of them got married to Turks and got Turkified.⁸⁸

In the rest of the testimony, the interviewee listed the names of fourteen women who married Turks. Except one of them, who made a love marriage, all of them wedded because they had no possession to continue their lives. Interestingly,

⁸⁶ *Anatoli*, 16 October 1851, 39.

⁸⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Zile, Kayseri, Eleftherios Iosifidis.

⁸⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Limna, Anastasia Prodromou.

five of them were widows and had children from their ex-husbands. Some of them became second wives in polygamous marriages, and some wanted to leave their Turkish husbands and leave for Greece with their relatives during the Exchange. According to refugee narration, these women were excused because they were desperate. Further, some of them wanted to leave their Turkish husbands so their behavior could be forgiven. Be it direct or as an outcome of inter-marriage, conversion was a sensitive issue. As Bojan Aleksov indicates, conversion is among the most unsettling and destabilizing events in a society, since it necessitates a change of balance between members of different faith communities (Aleksov, 2005). This instability relates to inter-marriage as well. In the example below we see a mixed marriage that resulted in unrest between Muslim and Christian communities:

The Turkish (man) Hayrullah who got married to Lavrentia murdered four men in our village because they went to his wife and said that it was not good to marry a Turk. She told this to her husband and he killed them.⁸⁹

In his memoir, Kostas Tsolakidis devotes a chapter to the story of Lavrentia and Hayrullah. According to Tsolakidis's (2007) narration, the Council of Elders convened after they heard that Lavrentia had wedded a Turk and asked the bishop to resolve this inappropriateness in accordance with the old traditions; the ones who asked for a motion to dissolve the marriage were the ones who were murdered. As seen in the testimonies, inter-marriages were not approved of by Christians, even in cases of marriages with Christians of other denominations. In the only case I encountered in the oral testimonies, the father of a Greek Orthodox woman accepted his daughter's marriage to an Armenian man only after the man was baptized as an Orthodox Christian.⁹⁰ In the earlier centuries, conversion reduced the number of non-Muslims and demoralized communities; in the nineteenth century, however, conversion and abandoning of a religious community were approached as *denationalization* and particularly dangerous because the

⁸⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Zincidere, Maria ?.

⁹⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Tsouhour, Sofia Koutlidou.

apostates/converts were seen as potential *unravellers* who could unveil “national” secrets. Deringil (2012, p.3) describes *denationalization* as “the loss of a soul and a body from an increasingly ‘nationally imagined’ community. This loss is like a symbolic rape of the community’s honor if the convert/apostate was a woman or a child.” As we will see later, religion, as pre-modern person’s fundamental denominator of identity, was to be the main constituent of national identity for the peoples of the Ottoman Empire in the age of nationalism. As Aleksov rightly put it:

National traditions are created and transformed through ample use of inherited religious content, values and symbols. Existing beliefs and knowledge took on new forms, and even more important, gained a new, comprehensive and teleological function in the formation of the national state. Although religion was repressed through modernization efforts, secularization and eventually the atheist campaigns of the twentieth century, the nationalism of the Serbs and their neighbors had by then already been built on the historical memory and models that stemmed from and exploited religious divisions and intolerance of the past (Aleksov, 2005, p. 114).

Given the role of religion in nation-building, Deringil (2012) accurately claims that loss of community members, either through conversion or inter-marriage, meant exclusion from the prospective nation and becoming a member of the Other, and thus being seen as a potential traitor, especially if the conversion/apostasy was presumably voluntary.

Up to this point, we have discussed the practical dimension of mixed marriages. What about the dogma? How would Islam Christianity approach the idea of inter-marriage? Mixed marriages are allowed in Islam; conversely, Christianity and particularly Orthodox Christianity are stricter and do not permit intermarriages. According to Islamic law, Muslims are allowed to take non-Muslim (Christian or Jew) wives if there is lack of Muslim women. It was not recommended, but it was tolerated. Mixed marriages were in line with Prophet Muhammad’s order, which deeply permeated the religious consciousness of most Muslims who from the beginning married non-Muslim women, but the women

were required to pursue them in Islam (Pashalidou, 1996). In terms of Islamic Law, it was unacceptable for a Muslim woman to wed a non-Muslim man as it resulted in an incongruity between the superiority that the women should enjoy by virtue of being Muslim, and her unavoidable wifely subservience to her infidel husband. Such a marriage involved an extreme lack of *kaf'a*, that is, compatibility between husband and wife, which required that a woman not marry a man lower in status than herself (Friedmann, 2003). The interfaith marriage between Muslims and Christians was set according to Islamic law like the marriages between Muslims, with one main difference; children resulting from intermarriages always belonged to the Muslim parent (Pashalidou, 1996). Even if it was a valid marriage according to Islamic law, a mixed marriage was often regarded as faulty in the consciousness of the Muslim public (Pashalidou, 1996).

In Christian canon law, religiously mixed marriages are allowed only if they occurred after the conversion of the non-Christian spouse. However, numerous councils of the church urged Christians of both genders not to enter into wedlock with any non-Christian and some of them imposed stiff penalties for breaking this rule.⁹¹

As for the Orthodox denomination, since the end of the nineteenth century interchurch marriages involving Orthodox and non-Orthodox Christians within the Orthodox Church were allowed with the official authorization of the Church, but such marriages had to follow the written conditions below:

1. they must be performed by an Orthodox priest;
2. children born must be baptized and nurtured in the Orthodox faith;

⁹¹ 10 and 31 of Laodicea, 21 of Carthage [419], 14 of Chalcedon, and 72 of Trullo address the issue of "interchurch marriage," or marriage with a non-Orthodox Christian. Characteristically, the normative canon 72 of Trullo states: "An Orthodox man is not permitted to marry a heretical woman, nor an Orthodox woman to be joined to a heretical man." Marriage with a non-Christian or non-believer is not mentioned at all, except in the case of pre-existing marriage, where either one of the spouses had subsequently espoused the Orthodox faith. The continuation of such marriage is permissible, according to the teaching of St. Paul (I Cor 7, 12-14), if so willed by the believing spouse. See, L. J. Patsavos, C. J. Joanides, Interchurch marriages: an Orthodox perspective.

3. marital problems must be arbitrated by the Orthodox Church (Patsovos & Joanides, 2000, pp. 434-435).

The two religions were very contradicting regarding the topic of mixed marriages. While Islam permitted it only for Muslim men and required the conversion of the non-Muslim woman to Islam, Christianity prohibited completely marriages with people of different religions both for women and men and required conversion for the non-Christian party in case of marriage. For our case, all the cases were contracted within the Islamic religion despite the strictness of Christian law. As seen in the above quoted testimonies, the Orthodox Community was uncomfortable with interfaith marriages. Unfortunately, we do not have any evidence on the Muslim point of view. However, despite the one-sided view, I can claim that it was the domination of Muslims over Christians that rendered Christians powerless when a Christian woman wanted to wed a Turk. Hence, if a Muslim man and Christian woman agreed to get married, the Christian community had no other option than to consent. As stated in a testimony, “the sword had the power”⁹² and it was the Muslims who held it. However, the power of the sword was generally dependable. Marriage and conversion did not happen when the non-Muslim party was reluctant or a minority, and in such cases family and community members had the right to intervene in and ask for justice before the *kadi* courts. Such cases were often resolved in favor of non-Muslims.⁹³

All in all, intermarriages, in contrast to the view of Layoun who regarded them as a clear sign of intercommunalism, were in fact an overt symbol of competition, since the subordinate, in our case the Christians, tried to prevent apostasy and preserve their population. Interfaith marriages were also prohibited by Christian canon law; thus the Christian communes constantly attempted to discourage and warn Christian women against marrying Turks. However, such attempts were

⁹² KMS, Cappadocia, Tsouhour, Ioakeim Papadapoulou.

⁹³ For a detailed study about conversion, see S. Deringil, *Conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire*; S. Deringil, “There is no compulsion in religion:” conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire 1839-1856.

generally volatile since Muslims were dominant and Christians were only able to wield consent. There was too much of an imbalance in society – as Muslim women could not be wives to non-Muslims – to categorize inter-marriages as a sign of inter-communality. Interestingly enough, in cases of interfaith marriages or direct conversion, converts were automatically regarded as Turks, demonstrating religion’s role in boundary maintenance. As Deringil (2012, p.18) claims, “beliefs, syncretic as they may be, are still beliefs, and even the most ‘syncretic’ of Christians could violently object to any forced Islamization.”



Figure 9. The wedding ceremony of Rahil Loukopoulou in Nevşehir. Source: Photography Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies

3.2 Summary and plan of the next chapter

In this concluding part, I could add that for the case of Cappadocia, inter-communal differences did not restrict inter-personal affection; however, the presence of inter-personal intimacy between members of different denominational communities, religious syncretism and inter-marriages did not indicate balanced cosmopolitanism. In fact, the inter-communal relationship in Cappadocia was imbalanced in favor of Muslims; for this reason for Christians of the region came to see religion as the only remaining disparateness of their identity that separate

them from the Other, and it became the strongest component of their social identity. Therefore, Christians tried to protect their community borders and demonstrate that they were a firm and intact group through whatever means necessary, in part by building giant churches in their villages –despite the poor number of population due to immigration– during the *Tanzimat* era, when permits to church construction was given relatively more easily than in the following years.⁹⁴ I hypothesize that these churches were very much the symbols of competition between Muslims and the Orthodox in Cappadocia. All in all what I seek to emphasize is that despite the various forms of cultural “flirting”, boundaries of religious communities were always preserved and religion was at all times a domain of contestation.



Figure 10. St.Vasilis Church of Misti (Çarıklı) Niğde. The construction of the church was completed in 1922. The Orthodox community of the village could only use it for two years (Karalidis, 2005: 99). It is a giant church for the size of the village community at the time. Photography: Gülen Göktürk.

In this chapter I discussed the competitive aspects of co-habitation and antagonistic tolerance wielded by the dominant group; in the following chapter I will analyze the particular events of discontinuity on the path to nationalization of

⁹⁴ During the *Tanzimat* era, non-Muslims could receive permits to build churches, schools and charity organizations relatively easily in comparison to previous years. However, there was not total freedom on this issue; they had to continue to ask for permission in the old way. See İ. Ortaylı, *Osmanlı'da milletler ve diplomasi* [*Millets and diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire*], p.63.

the Cappadocian Orthodox. Immigration to foreign lands from Cappadocia, activities of societies and brotherhood organizations, and involvement of the Church and the Kingdom in schooling activities were the foundations of the Greek Kingdom and its irredentist policies. All these factors and the parameters behind them, such as the introduction of European capital into the Ottoman economy and Ottoman reforms and missionary activities, sowed the seeds of nationalism in Cappadocian settlements. However, refugee testimonies reveal that not until the expulsion of Cappadocian Orthodox from their motherland, or even until the completion of the process of their articulation into Greek society, did they become nationalists of the Greek cause *en masse*. The interviewees of KMS differentiate between the years before and after the Young Turk Revolution. After the revolution they faced the nationalistic policies of the CUP and some of them adopted the ideals of Greek nationalism, but their position was very much heterogeneous and complex as a community. Until the Exchange, in Cappadocian communities there were Greek nationalists, proto-nationalists, and traditional people, and their position towards Greek and Turkish nationalist fluctuated in line with the humane instincts of protecting their lives and remaining in their motherland. After discussing of all factors that led to the transformation of the social identity of Orthodox Cappadocians, I argue that pre-existing competitive relations, based on religious criterion, provided a suitable atmosphere for nationalism to settle itself in Cappadocia in the age of nationalism.

CHAPTER 4

4 THE PATH TOWARDS NATIONALISM

Scholars have long been trying to explain and understand the emergence and success of nationalism. They do not commonly agree upon “the date of birth” of nationalism. The political explanations of nationalism place it in either the English, the American, or the French Revolution; economic explanations, on the other hand, put the emphasis on the capitalist mode of production and industrialization. It is always difficult to pinpoint a particular period for the emergence of a historical phenomenon since timing changes from place to place. For this reason, it is difficult to apply modernist theories to explain the nationalisms that emerged from Ottoman territories. Concerning the non-Muslim Balkan populations, who had their own kingdoms at different points in history, as well as separate churches and literary languages, the second defeat of Ottoman Empire in Vienna (1683) created suitable conditions for them to generate secessionist ideals as a result of the loss of Ottoman authority both inside and outside its territories (Ortaylı, 1987). This sounds like an early date for developing national awareness from a modernist perspective. Most likely it came out from millenarian ideology that had been prevailing among Orthodox Christian clerics and intellectuals since the conquest of Constantinople (1453). According to millenarian belief, Ottoman rule was a punishment for the sins of Christians and their “liberation” was predicted to occur simultaneously with the Second Coming (Roudometof, 1998). Millenarianism was not nationalism; it was a religious belief, separate from nationalism, designed as a secular ideology. It could be hypothesized that not the defeat in Vienna but the commercial activities of the non-Muslims with foreign lands and their encounter with the ideals of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century cultivated nationalistic ideals among the non-Muslim intellectuals and elites (Stoianovich, 1960). A student of nationalism has to be cautious not to confuse nationalism with millenarianism.

The question of the genesis of nationalism is certainly a concern of modernists since in their understanding nations and nationalism were neither givens, already existing in nature as the primordialists claim, nor ancient or immemorial, as the perennialists suppose. Modernists approach nationalism as a manifestation of a particular *zeitgeist* and regard it within a specifically modern and European time and space (Smith, 1998). In other words, the modernists refer to some “discontinuity” from which nationalism was generated. For Gellner (1983), the discontinuity from the past was the transformation of societies from agricultural to industrial. For Anderson (2006), the deep-seated transformation in societies as an outcome of the Age of Enlightenment, Reformation, and geographical discoveries, including the declining authority of the monarchs and religions and the birth of administrative vernaculars and print-capitalism, paved the way of nationalism. Similarly, some scholars refer to the progressive collapse of a cultural value system derived from the predominance of the religious factor and its substitution by the principle of the nation-state (Stamatopoulos, 2006). Hobsbawm (1992), on the other hand, use the term ‘nationalism’ in the sense defined by Gellner namely to mean “primarily a principle which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent” as a necessity of capitalist mode of production. All these modernist explanations contributed to the explanation of date of birth of nationalism; however, they definitely explain nationalisms of some countries more than others. There is a major problem in these approaches, which is that “nationalism is narrowed down to the dichotomy between traditional and modern (van der Veer, 1994, p. 15).” What about the in-between situations like that of the still-traditional societies which imported nationalist ideals from the industrialist ones? For modernists, tradition is what societies have before they experienced the great transformation of capitalism and the time when they were still under the influence of religion. For example, Anderson claims that nations could only be “imagined” within the ruins of traditional world (van der Veer, 1994). Is it really so? I contend that we need a broader perspective to explain and understand the nationalisms of traditional or quasi-industrial societies.

I argue that what makes the modernist explanation reliable is this magic word: “discontinuity”. That is to say that there are some breaking points or epochs in human history that transform societies and pre-existing belongingness of people and lead to new forms of attachments. Placing myself closer to the modernist school of thought but at the same time maintaining certain distance from it, I will apply the discontinuity approach to understand the transformation of the identity of a non-western community that I am working on. With a strong emphasis on elite activism and conjuncture of modernity and with a strong belief in the idea that nations are the children of nationalism, my perspective differs from the modernity school of thought at two main points; firstly I find the modernist school very Eurocentric, as it remains sometimes inadequate to explain nationalisms of traditional or quasi-industrial societies, and secondly, I acknowledge and even emphasize the previous structures of interfaith relations and particularly religion and its symbols which suited well to the needs of nationalism. This is not to say that nations are givens or have historical roots. Neither do I claim that pre-modern *ethnies* turned out to be nations in times of discontinuity since I reject the ethno-symbolist theorization of nationalism which totalizes accidental belongingness or arbitrary common characteristics of people as *ethnies*. I argue, rather, that we should take into consideration the previous relations of different communities whom were mostly divided on the basis of their religion, denomination, local belongingness or power relations. For the case at hand, it was the religious factor that shaped the collective identity of people, as I have discussed in the previous chapter. Again, as mentioned before, in Cappadocia, the borders of belonging were determined by religion and the relations of religious groups were fundamentally competitive since no minority community wanted to lose a member in favor of the dominant Other, namely, the Muslim Turks. The reverse was not possible. Under such conditions, the dominant religious group would execute negative tolerance of indifference or non-execution and received consent in return. The existing system of relations had the tendency to dissolve only in times of crisis or discontinuity- be it modernity, industrialization, violence

or structural inequalities - depending on the degree of resent of minority communities and certainly on other factors, like how their resent was mobilized by able elite and intellectual hands through nationalist propaganda. It is my contention that nationalism owes its presence to discontinuity; and to be able means for the intelligentsia, as Smith argues, is to rediscover an entire ethnic heritage, ancestry and history that furnish vital memories, values, symbols and myths. Therefore, to achieve success, the nationalist presumption must be able to sustain itself in the face of historical enquiry and criticism. The search for past, invention of tradition, and rediscovering symbols that are supposed to unite people is certainly the job of intellectuals, but without an existing mechanism of self-differentiation *vis-à-vis* the already present Other, nationalism would remain ineffective (Smith, 1998). In line with this argument, I follow Hobsbawm's proto-nationalism that I discussed in the previous chapter. Different from him, however, I argue that proto-national bonds are set more by inter-communal relations and structural opposition between groups rather than shared intra-group characteristics like religion, language, and customs.

Without a doubt the process is not that mechanical since people respond to discontinuity in varying degrees. As stated before, in the late nineteenth century Christian settlements of Cappadocia there were Greek nationalists like teachers and prominent figures who received a high level of education, there were proto-nationalists who were to develop a broader Community consciousness through education, and there were traditional people whose identity was still shaped by religion. Interestingly enough, most of the time religion and religious identity act as a barrier for development of national consciousness. I suggest that people's adherence to religion has two contradictory outcomes; on one hand, people resist any propagated national identity with an emphasis on their religious identity, and on the other hand, nation formation itself utilizes religious identity as an ingredient of national identity in determining the Other through which nationalism builds itself. For our case, this dichotomy is quite clear since Cappadocian Christians resisted accepting any self-definition other than Christian for a long time, despite

the endeavor of Greek nationalism to incorporate them into Greek national identity. One's religion was the primary component of his/her identity, and it was religious identity that fundamentally shaped one's life not only in religious terms but also in aspects ranging from taxation to selection of spouse. Regardless of one's religiosity, if he belonged to the Orthodox Christian Community, he had to pay higher taxes than Muslims and he had no option to wed outside his religious community. Boundaries were clear and based solely on one's religion.

Nationalism has been viewed in social sciences as a secular ideology that replaced the religious systems found in pre-modern, traditional societies. In this context "religion" refers to tradition and "nationalism" refers to modernity; the former is replaced unavoidably by the latter in an evolutionary process (Gazi, 2009). I argue that for some societies this might have been the case; but for the Turkish and Greek nationalisms in question, religion was not switched to nationalism. Certainly, we can talk about a discontinuity since two peoples became the inimical Other of one another at certain time but rather than a replacement between religion and nationalism, we can talk about a coalescence between the two and we can name it as "religious nationalism" in Peter van der Veer's terms. As discussed in the previous chapter, religious nationalism comes into being when religion constitutes the main aspect of national identity and when nationalism settles into existing religious identifications and antagonisms (van der Veer, 1994). The term "religious nationalism" may sound incongruent with the modernist view since it regards nationalism as a secular entity in which religion is out of context. However, as we will see, despite the elite endeavor to place it in secular denominators like ancient past, territory, and common language, both Turkish and Greek nationalisms were carved in opposition with religious rivals of the faith groups, and lay people rationalized it within the framework of their existing relations. Further to this, we should consider that in the Age of Nationalism, the Ottoman Empire was still agrarian to a great extent and nationalism entered its territories not as a natural outcome of industrialism or capitalism but as a fruit of intellectual endeavor. Nationalism was so unknown to the Ottoman language that

nationalist vocabulary firstly entered Ottoman language through the letters of ambassadors in European capitals in the early nineteenth century and later through the translated manuscripts of leading nationalist intellectuals of the Greek Revolution (Erdem, 2005). Nationalism became a matter for the Ottomans during the Serbian (1804) and the Greek (1820s) revolts. For the first time in its history, the Ottomans faced secessionist movements different from previous rivalries with its traditional opponents like Austria or Russia for territory (Stamatopoulos, 2006). These happened without any relation to any substantial transformation from traditional to industrial society. Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider elite and intellectual power in nationalizing communities in the Ottoman Empire.

There were five factors for transformation of identity of Ottoman Orthodox in the nineteenth century: 1. the foundation of Greek Kingdom and its irredentist policies; 2. an urban class of merchants, as the carriers of the idea of nationalism, whom were mostly educated in Europe; 3. the Ottoman reform edicts; 4. immigration of all sorts; 5. missionary activities. All of these had direct and indirect effects on *Hellenization* of the Orthodox. Except for the fifth article, which is the topic of the last chapter, all the articles will be discussed in this chapter.

4.1 Greek nationalism

By the middle of the eighteenth century, German, French and English scholars provided in printed form the entire extant corpus of the Greek classics. In the last quarter of the century this “past” became accessible in an increasing way to a small number of Greek expats (Anderson, 2006) living in Italy (especially Venice), the Romanian lands, the Habsburg territories (especially Vienna and Trieste), the Russian empire (Black Sea) and elsewhere. They not only became familiar with philhellenism but also expanded their experience, their imaginative and intellectual horizons, explored a wider world, learned the ways of foreign peoples (and thereby learning about themselves as a people) and extended their social, economic, political and intellectual possibilities (Mackridge, 2009). The outcome of this encounter with European civilization was the desire to make a

radical break with the past and embrace Western modernity with a renewed interest in the heritage of Classical Greece (Özkırımlı&Sofos, 2008). They began to see the presence of Greeks under Ottoman rule as an interval period throughout which the Greeks suffered from unjust administration, superstition and ignorance of their glorious past and ancestral origins. At an early date in the eighteenth century the only alternative to tolerating the Ottoman dominance was to expect and pray for “salvation” by Russia, which would have meant a hope to be ruled by an Orthodox Christian Empire instead of a Muslim one. Catherine the Great in fact made Russia the protector of the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire and gave the opportunity for enormous economic development to the bourgeois elements of the Greek peninsula (Stamatopoulos, 2006). The Russian Expectation, in Kitromilides’s (1992) phrase, was abandoned after the signing of a peace between the Russian and Ottoman Empires in 1792 (Mackridge, 2009) since the Greeks regarded it as a betrayal by the Russians of their Orthodox co-religionists; they stopped placing their hopes in the prophecies (Clogg, 1996) according to which the Orthodox populations would be saved by fair haired Christian saviors. When they gave up their hopes about “the blonde race (ξανθός γένος),” the Greeks felt the necessity to achieve independence on their own.

In a refuting manner of Gellner’s point of view, which rejects the power of intelligentsia in nationalization, Greek nationalism was created, flourished, and propagated by intellectuals and elites. At first sight, Modern Greek nationalism is indebted to the revival of ancient Hellenism (Gazi, 2009). Adamantios Korais, for example, aimed at reviving in the minds of his compatriots the cultural and intellectual primacy of Classical Greece (Tatsios, 1984). His writings aimed to fill his compatriots with pride; for him, the modern Greeks were ultimately the grandchildren of a glorious ancient civilization that enlightened the contemporary Europeans: the Greeks, he would preach, [being] “proud of their origins, far from shutting their eyes to European enlightenment, never considered the Europeans as other than debtors who were repaying with substantial interest the capital which they had received from their own ancestors (Koraes, 1970, pp. 158-159).” For

Rhigas Pheraios [Velestinlis], on the other hand, the main pillar of Greek nationalism was the common heritage of the Byzantium (Tatsios, 1984). For this reason he addressed his message not only to the Hellenic nation or Orthodox Christians, but also to all religious communities of the Ottoman Empire. Highly influenced by the French Revolution, “he called for the overthrow of the despots by the coordinated action of all Balkan peoples (Roudometof, 1998, pp. 28-29).” Sharing similar views with Rhigas, Friendly Society (Φιλική Εταιρία), a nationalist conspiratorial organization founded in Odessa in 1814 by three merchants (Emmanuil Ksanthos, Nikolaos Skoufas, Athanasios Tsakalof), aimed to replace the Patriarchate’s religious and the Porte’s political authority with a new secular, liberal authority inspired by the French Revolution (Roudometof, 1998). The Society succeeded to build a coalition among different Balkan communities and organized an Orthodox Balkan uprising in 1821 (Roudometof, 1998). Thus, we can claim that Greek nationalism in the beginning had a secular character highly influenced by the French Revolution and Enlightenment. However, religion could not be underestimated in the long run. Even Korais himself realized later, at the time of the Greek Revolution, that accommodation of Orthodoxy in a Modern Greek nationalist project was needed, perhaps because it was inevitable (Özkırmılı&Sofos, 2008). The Orthodox Church was in fact still influential on rural societies so they could neither ignore Orthodoxy nor Byzantium (Özkırmılı&Sofos, 2008) (although Byzantium was not rehabilitated in school manuals until the end of the nineteenth century, the Byzantine Museum was not founded until 1914, and the first professors of Byzantine Art and Byzantine History were only appointed at the University of Athens in 1912 and 1924, respectively. Appropriation of the Middle Ages with Greek national historiography took some time) (Koulouri & Kiousopoulou quoted in Liakos, 2008, pp. 209-210). Accordingly, folklorists and historians like Zambelios and Paparrigopoulos tried to merge Classical Greece with Byzantium. For example, Paparrigopoulos argued in his manuscript that “without Hellenism Christianity would have suffocated in the humid atmosphere of Judea; without Christianity the Hellenic nation would not

have survived in the deluge in which the rest of the ancient world drowned (Paparrigopoulos quoted in Grigoriadis, 2013, p. 28).”

Greek nationalism inevitably played the religion card for its national propaganda on “unredeemed Greeks” in Ottoman territories, especially on those who spoke foreign languages. As Grigoriadis (2013) put it, only religion could unite Orthodox Christians with such diverse vernaculars. Early in the nineteenth century, Greek nationalism turned out to be “religious nationalism” since, in the end, the official narrative excluded all non-Christians and kept certain distance with those of different denominations, like the Protestants, Catholics and Eastern Rites Catholics (The Eastern Rite Churches). Adding to that, the Exchange of Populations was based on religious criteria, and the Greek speaking Muslims of Crete, Macedonia and Epirus were exchanged with mostly Turkish speaking Orthodox Christians of Cappadocia and Pontus (The Greeks of Western Anatolia and Thrace were already expelled from Turkey during and after the Turco-Greek War (1919-1922).) Grigoriadis gives two other examples that demonstrate Greek nationalism as “a sacred synthesis” of nation and religion. These set the 25th of March as Greece’s Independence Day and invented the myth of “Clandestine School (κρυφό σχολείο)”. According to national narrative, the revolution officially began on the 25th of March when the Bishop of Old Patras Germanos summoned all the leading revolutionaries in the monastery of Agia Lavra and swore them to the revolution under a banner. However, there is no official indication that any such meeting actually occurred. Interestingly, the very same date is the very date, according to the Christian calendar, that the Archangel Gabriel visited the Virgin Mary and announced that she would conceive a son [the Annunciation of Virgin Mary]. The Greek national narrative thus built a myth of “national annunciation” (Grigoriadis, 2013) and devoted a religious meaning to a national day. The “Clandestine School” contention, on the other hand, is a legend of secret schools run by priests and monks to keep alive the national identity of Greeks through the Ottoman domination. These two myths portray the role of the church as “an ark of national values” (Grigoriadis, 2013) and prove my argument of “religious

nationalism” at an intellectual level. Religion was articulated to secular nationalist ideas by intellectuals. The reason was simple. For the lay people religion was the determinant of identity and it was the basis that separated communities from one another. There were already borders between “us” of religion A and “them” of religion B. Nationalism simply settled into the existing and transformed and even closed the borders. At times of crisis, like war, economic rivalries, and so on, the task was easier since people were more prone to manipulation.

Almost a century after intellectuals began to develop nationalist ideals, in significant parts of the Southern tip of the Balkans the populations, many of whom were Greek speaking Christians, grew dissatisfaction with the corruption of Ottoman administrators. The unrest of the people was utilized by nationalist intellectuals to reshape and portray protests in the form of a nationalist revival. The *topos* (place) and the inhabitants of Hellas were rediscovered; and the social malaise and unrest fused with a political and intellectual movement inspired by European Romanticism. “Culturally superior” Greeks were now rising against the “backward” and “oriental” Ottomans (Özkırmılı & Sofos, 2008, p. 23). The upheaval by skillful hands, blended with nationalist romanticism generated “discontinuity” from the past led to the replacement of “traditional” with “modern”. Interestingly, it was an overlap of religious millennialism with secular nationalism. We are, in fact, not sure what the motivation of the Peloponnesians was when they were fighting against their religious Others and, at the same time, their rulers. Most probably millennialism was still dominant over nationalism. Consequently, the Greek Kingdom was established in 1832, and it was time to reunite the Greeks who had once been a heterogeneous group of people under the administration of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, including Orthodox Christians of various cultures as well as Grecophone or Hellenized Vlachs, Serbs, or Orthodox Albanians. Nationalism was now ready to be slowly embraced by the masses through various mechanisms such as education, press and propaganda.

When the Greek state was eventually formed in the 1820s and recognized internationally in 1832, less than one-third of [assumed] Greek “nationals” were

included within the boundaries of the established state. For this reason, its future was posed with a dilemma: the struggle between irredentism on the one hand, and internal reconstruction and modernization on the other (Tatsios, 1984). The first American diplomat to Greece, Charles K. Tuckerman narrated his observation about this dilemma in the 1860s as such: “often a Greek may say to you in private that his countrymen are wasting their energies in chasing a phantom, which might better be employed in studies of political economy at home, he would not dare to advise any one of them to abandon the Great Idea nor does he himself believe that it should be abandoned (Tuckerman, 1872, p. 124).” It seems that until its termination in 1922 as a result of the failure of Asia Minor campaign, irredentism with the name Great Idea (*Megali Idea*) was the primary policy of the Greek Kingdom. The irredentist logic in terms of a Greek irredentist addressing the American public was such:

Suppose that a foreign army, composed of people alien in civilization, feelings, religion and race to you, would overrun America; by fire and sword subjugate the American people, burn their churches and their schools, refuse to allow you to speak your own language, not allow you to educate yourselves in your traditions, compel you to accept their faith and in many instances to be their slaves night and day. Would you American people accept this condition of affairs as a course of Kismet, fate? Would you remain quiet and passive and never try to regain your place under the sun, your own home; to liberate yourselves from the yoke of the invader and thus regain your home country? (Tsolainos, 1923, p. 160)

These romantic and primordialist lines are certainly erroneous from the eyes of a contemporary student of nationalism studies, but they were mistaken at the time. There is no doubt that non-Muslims occasionally suffered at the hands of their Ottoman rulers, especially in provinces ruled by the local administrators, but there were never official policies of conversion, pressure to abandon native languages, prohibition of schooling, or church burning. Conversely, it is often claimed that the Greek Orthodox Church was able to preserve its institutions and tradition as well as a communal identity under Ottoman authority (Mackridge, 2009). These lines are important in the sense that they portray the way of rationalization of *Megali Idea* in the eyes of Greek irredentists. *Megali Idea*, despite some

nationalistic endeavors to trace its origins to the efforts of the thirteenth century Lascarid rulers of Nicaea to liberate Constantinople from “Frank” domination, was mainly a nineteenth century phenomenon whose greatest achievement was the national integration of all Greeks (Tatsios, 1984).

In the nineteenth century the Orthodox Community of the Ottoman Empire was heterogeneous in multiple ways. Since it embraced not only ethnic Greeks but also various other groups, Romanians, Serbs, Arabs, Vlachs, Albanians, Macedonians, Bulgarians and so on were included in its ethnic diversity, though there was some socio-economic differentiation among its members. For example, the polyglot primate of Phanar had little in common with the Turckophone tavern keeper of Niğde (Clogg, 1982). When it comes to influence of Greek nationalism on these people, there were several standpoints. We could classify the Ottoman Greeks in four categories in terms their relation to Greek nationalism: 1) the ones who felt devoted to the Greek national cause; 2) the ones who developed proto-national community consciousness but were not yet Greek nationalists; 3) the ones who remained loyal to Ottoman Empire and status quo, and 4) the ones (mostly humble peasants) who were simply indifferent to any political stance. For example, the Phanariots distanced themselves from the ideals of Enlightenment after the Russo-Turkish rapprochement in 1791 (Roudometof, 1998), most probably due to a fear of losing their privileged position in the Empire. The Ecumenical Patriarchate, on the other hand, initially resisted the inclusion of ethnicity in the definition of Greek national identity (Grigoriadis, 2013); in the end, that meant the exclusion of non-Greek Orthodox Christians and, eventually, the loss of many members of its congregation as well as its power. Concerning the special case of the Ecumenical Patriarchate *vis à vis* nationalism, only in the late nineteenth century, there appeared a split between those who favored the nationalistic ideals and those who stressed its ecumenical character and an external divide among the Orthodox clergy also corresponded to the internal confrontation (Stamatopoulos, 2006). Hence, there was no single Ottoman Greek response to Greek nationalism of the time.

After the foundation of the Greek Kingdom, a range of questions emerged concerning the prospective boundaries of the Greek state. In order to solve the boundary issue, the category of “Greek” had to be determined. What criterion should have been embraced to agree on “Greekness,” language, religion or both? Should people of non-Greek ethnic origin (Vlahs and Slavs, for example) who nevertheless spoke the language fluently be accepted as Greeks? (Livianos, 2003) What would be the situation of the Turcophone Orthodox Christians of Anatolian interior or the Greek speaking Muslims of Crete or the Turcophone Protestants of Orthodox descent living in Cappadocia? Ethnicity was not considered the main determinant of “Greekness” in the early nineteenth century; instead, language and religion were the main criteria. However; many communities had “incongruent” religion-language combination from the eyes of nationalists.

In the second half of the nineteenth century the intellectual “irredentism” of the Greek Kingdom aimed at developing a sense of Greek national consciousness among the Orthodox Christians of Asia Minor. School teachers, trained at the University of Athens (and later in local Greeks schools like the seminaries in Heybeliada (Halki) and Zincidere), and whom were frequently of Anatolian origin, propagated the gospel of Hellenism (Clogg, 2006), mostly in less provocative ways by teaching language and history. Despite the fact that the Ecumenical Patriarchate was irritated by the secularizing tendency of Greek nationalism and distanced itself earlier in the nineteenth century, it also stressed the importance of schooling in order not to lose its congregation to newly emerging national churches like the Bulgarian Exarchate and the Protestant and Jesuit missionaries. These two endeavors coincided and schools were opened in almost all Orthodox settlements in Anatolia. In the upcoming parts education and enlightenment endeavors will be discussed, but before that another important phenomenon of the time for the Christians of Anatolian interior will be examined: immigration to foreign lands (ξενιτιά, gurbet). As we will see later in this chapter, immigration, education and nationalism are all interrelated for our case.

4.2 Interrelated phenomena: *Xenitia*, education and nationalism

4.2.1 The phenomenon of immigration

—Why do you cry my kid?

Asked the priest by approaching [him].

[...]

—My father is in foreign lands for six years and has not yet come back.

[...]

—And my father is away for three years in Smyrna and the year before last year he came to [visit] us.

—And mine! Added the dark hair child who sits in the back benches

—And mine! Cried the third [child sitting] near him.

—My father comes regularly.

—Mine too!

[...]

—Listen, my class! *Xenitia* is one of the most important issues of our country and our tribe in general. Our dear compatriots are greedy and money lovers. It is their great defect [...] And so today we observe that most of the men are struggling in Constantinople, Smyrna, Samsun, Adana, [and] Mersin [and] damage the morals of modern Babylon. Today our dear village has one hundred Christian families but in the past it had five hundred (Samouilidis, 2010, pp. 23-24).

The priest, who was at the same time the teacher of the poor village called Kermira in Kayseri, faced the sorrow of his students during a class and tried to explain the reasons for immigration to foreign lands and blamed his compatriots of being greedy enough to empty the village in pursuit of wealth. The lines are from Hristos Samouilidis's novel narrating the last days of Christians in a village of Cappadocia. The author of the novel worked for the Centre for Asia Minor Studies between the years 1955 and 1970, and interviewed a great number of Asia Minor refugees. Those interviews were the source of inspiration for the author and for this reason the book deserves attention. The excerpt in fact refers to three important phenomena occurring in Cappadocia at the time: education, immigration and population decline, all of which were interrelated and would lead to transformation in the social identity of the Orthodox Christians.

For the priest, the reason for immigration was greed, though actually lack of resources drove people from Cappadocia to foreign lands. Immigration caused population decline in Christians of Cappadocia and this meant becoming more vulnerable to Muslim Turkish culture. The Christian communities of Cappadocia were already like islands in a Turkish sea (Merlie quoted in Manousaki, 2002) and many scholars explained their cultural resemblance to Muslim Turks of the region and their speaking of Turkish with this very reason. Towards the end of nineteenth century, however, the few Greek speaking villages slowly became Turkish speaking as well; Andaval and Limna (today Gölcük) were two of those. In Andaval, for example, Greek was spoken up until 1884 but then it almost disappeared (Karolidis quoted in Dawkins, 1916). According to a KMS informant, one hundred fifty men went to foreign lands from Andaval in the beginning of the twentieth century.⁹⁵ Women stayed in their hometowns and started to work in the fields of the Turkish village Eskigümüş to cope with their misery.⁹⁶ Similarly, the left behind women of Limna would work in the fields of nearby Turkish villages, and many of them married Turks to escape poverty.⁹⁷ Therefore, for these villages, *xenitia* and poverty were the reasons for Turkification both in lingual and religious terms. The situation of these villages clearly explains the reason for the anxiety of the above quoted priest. Immigration, in the end, meant deserting ones ancestral homeland both physically and culturally, and it eventually indicated a sort of defeat for the Orthodox Christians in the ongoing contestation between themselves and the Muslim Turkish communities in the region. But the issue was not quite that simple, because on the other side of the coin the newly emerging schooling activities supported by the money coming from brotherhood (αδελφότητα) organizations established in foreign lands created another opportunity to maintain and support the existing social identity and maybe even discover a new one, the national Hellenic identity. In the end, as claimed before, immigration, population

⁹⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Paraskevas Ignatiadis.

⁹⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Makrina Karadagli.

⁹⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Limna, Anastasia Prodromou.

decline, and schooling were interwoven subjects and they all led to social identity transformation, unquestionably in varying degrees, from one locality to another.

Continuous mobility characterized the populations of villages in Cappadocia not only during the nineteenth century but also in earlier years. Up to eighteenth century there were various reasons for mobility, including colonization policies of the Ottoman administration in newly conquered areas, concerns about security, poverty and clashes with nomads who were forced to settle by the government (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). In the nineteenth century, however, the pull factors of immigration were more influential than the push factors due to the economic development in coastal areas (as an example of push factors, the famine in Cappadocia of 1873-1875 drove many families of Sinasos to fertile regions like Cilicia) (Hatziosif, 2005); for the first time a physical and organic bond was maintained between the immigrants and their homelands as a result of modern transportation networks like the railroad. The Istanbul-Bagdad and Izmir-Aydın railroads, while facilitating the transportation of people from one place to another, provided a link between the community at home and the community in foreign lands. This, in the end, not only eased the contact and transportation between the two, but also assisted the flow of both economic means and ideas from *xenitia* to *patrida*. The railroad was a discontinuity, a breaking point from the past. During this period immigration was in three directions: to the financial centers of Asia Minor, located were close to the railroad, to the urban centers of coastal areas, and abroad. The areas that had a great increase in Orthodox population were Ankara, Yozgat, the *kaza* of Sarımsaklı in the *vilayet* of Sivas in the North, the *sanjak* of Sis in the *vilayet* of Adana in the South and the whole area of Konya to the West (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). Cappadocians eventually migrated to and settled in Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Mersin, Samsun, Cairo, Alexandria, Athens and America in the late nineteenth century. Port cities like Izmir, Alexandria, Beirut and Thessaloniki attracted increased flows of capital, investors, and immigrants after the opening of these ports to free trade as a result of the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman commercial treaty. Among these, Izmir and Alexandria (particularly after the

British occupation in 1882) were preferred by the Cappadocians. As for Izmir, with the commercial treaties signed with European powers, the city enhanced its role as a center of export trade with agricultural products like figs and grapes. Other items such as silk, cotton, opium, rugs, and carpets brought from interior towns were also assembled, packed and shipped to various European destinations from Izmir's port (Sayek, 2012). There was a flow of people towards places of economic opportunities from almost all cities, towns, and villages of Cappadocia (Anagnostopoulou, 2013), so much so that by 1834 in seventeen Christian Orthodox settlements of Kayseri the rate of participation of immigration was 38 % (Renieri quoted in Kapoli, 2004), and only one of them, Tsuhur (Çukur), showed a low immigration rate (Kapoli, 2004). According to another source, by the year 1835 3.080 men out of a total of 7.842 male populations of eighteen settlements of Kayseri had already immigrated (Istikopoulou quoted in Harakopoulos, 2014). In addition to the growing transportation facilities, newly emerging trade possibilities with the entrance of European capital into the Ottoman Empire, the privileges given to European traders, and export opportunities were some of the other reasons for immigration to commercial centers, since it was the non-Muslims who really benefited from the new economic situation in the Empire (Augustinos, 1992). There were two reasons for the flourishing of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century. Firstly, the international trade between the Ottoman Empire and the world markets depended mainly on agricultural products, and there were no monopolized lands at the hands of land-owning class. Instead there were small peasants producing diverse crops and it was almost impossible for foreign investors and merchants to control small peasants. Thus there was a need for mediators to tie Ottoman peasants to the world economy. Secondly, the European merchants preferred to consult with the non-Muslim native merchant class as intermediaries to avoid the instability of inter-state relationships (Çetinkaya, 2010). Certainly, not all Cappadocians were able to engage in commerce; most of them, in fact, continued to earn their livelihoods from unskilled jobs, since they were plain farmers in their place of origin and only those who originally dealt with

trade and crafts were able to become rich. For instance, it was not a coincidence that immigrants from Kayseri or Sinasos were engaged in commerce very often and the traders of Kayseri would encourage those remaining in Kayseri to migrate to the economic centers of the Empire, especially to Istanbul to be involved in commerce (Tsalikoglou quoted in Kapoli, 2004). That is to say, the Cappadocians who originated from rich places were better able to get rich and be among the wealthiest of Greeks. Among them there were wholesalers from Niğde, Aksaray, Konya, Kayseri, Bor, Fertek and Tyana, who would buy their merchandise and send it to the major ports of Asia Minor (Anagnostopoulou, 2013).

There were two patterns of immigration in the nineteenth century in Cappadocia. One of them was temporary immigration without family for relatively long or short terms, and the other was permanent immigration without return. During the initial years of immigration, men would immigrate without their family and they would make occasional visits to their place of origin to see their family for some months. Later on, some men, after getting wealthy enough, started to take their families with them. Of course it depended on the person, but it was observed beginning from the twentieth century that the number of families declined in Cappadocia.

In the case of Pharasa, for instance, the inhabitants of the village did not immigrate previously because their mines held them in their place. In time their mines ran out, and some of them started to go to Cilicia to work temporarily in cotton fields. When the harvest was complete, they would return to their families. Later on they also discovered Izmir because Izmir was connected to Cilicia by sea transportation. There, immigrants from Pharasa worked as porters, photographers, and bodyguards of the rich. The males of Pharasa occasionally came to their village to get married and see their families (Loukopoulos, 1984-1985). For the males of Andaval, on the other hand, there were various destinations, including Istanbul, Romania, Bulgaria and America. In those places they worked as porters,

grocers or laborers.⁹⁸ Some of them were dry fruit merchants and moneylenders. In the last decades, they brought their families to foreign lands with them.⁹⁹ Every three years or so they would visit Andaval and stay for a while; the young ones would get married and make children.¹⁰⁰ For Endürlük, *xenitia* started very early around the last decades of eighteenth century and when the Exchange took place in 1924 there were only fifty three households compared to the six or seven hundred houses of previous times. Men started to take their families with them few years before the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 (*Hürriyet* in their own words).¹⁰¹ In the early phases of *xenitia* men would go to foreign lands without their family and they would visit them only every few years. In Vexe, all the men were in foreign lands. Young boys, when they reached the age of eleven, were sent to *gurbet*, and would come back at the age of nineteen or twenty to marry and then would leave again.¹⁰² The destination of immigration was mainly Istanbul. A lot of males from Vexe were timber and dye merchants and a few of them were carpenters and they would occasionally visit their villages.¹⁰³ Further to these examples, in Talas, men started to take their families with them beginning in 1895, before that only men went to foreign lands.¹⁰⁴ From Talas, there were around three hundred families in Izmir and Istanbul. The Onasis family was one of those families who settled in Izmir. There were also immigrant families in Cilicia and in Karaman from Talas.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Paraskevas Ignatiadis.

⁹⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Aravan, Haralambos Koum.

¹⁰⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Andaval, Haralambos Pasalis.

¹⁰¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Endürlük, Isaak Karamanoglou.

¹⁰² KMS, Cappadocia, Vexe, Evgenia Tokatloglou.

¹⁰³ KMS, Cappadocia, Vexe, Lazaros Farsakoglou.

¹⁰⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Moutalaski, P. Kiostoglou, Lioudakis Oktovrios.

¹⁰⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Moutalaski, P. Kioseoglou.

For almost all informants of KMS, the reason of immigration was scarcity of resources and lack of trading activities in Cappadocia. An interviewee would quote the phrase of Strabo to explain the reason of *xenitia*: “Cappadocia: an arid and stony country”. According to the same informant, Cappadocians were only able to grow fruits, and such farming could only feed their families, leaving no surplus production to merchandise for money. Therefore, every Christian family started to send their sons at early ages to foreign lands and sold their lands; by this way the Christian fields changed hands and the Cappadocia was eventually devastated, including the famous Gesi gardens, where the interviewee had grown up.¹⁰⁶ Another refugee made almost the same argument for his village Ai Kosten (Ai Konstantinos). There, men would go to foreign lands since there was a lack of transportation and the surplus farm products remained in their hands. For this reason their crops had very cheap prices. They could not survive under such conditions, and they went to foreign lands to work as grocers, shoemakers and carpenters. Almost all families in the village made a living with the money coming from foreign lands.¹⁰⁷

For the males of Prokopi (Ürgüp), *xenitia* was started as early as 1800. Their first destination was Istanbul. There they would work as rowers and they would bring loads from big merchant ships at the port. The rowers’ brotherhood [Kayıkçı Kasası (The Chest of Rowers, Ταμείο των Βαρκάρηδων) was its original name] was in fact the first brotherhood organization founded in Istanbul. Later in the nineteenth century they started to go to Izmir, Samsun and Ankara to work as moneylenders, grocers and merchants.¹⁰⁸

One of the few exceptions to the phenomenon of emigration from Cappadocia was Bor. From Bor, very few families emigrated, since Bor was a rich place that could maintain itself with sufficient trading activities for people to make

¹⁰⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Kesi, V. Leontiadis.

¹⁰⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Ai Konstantinos, Iordanis Aleksandridis, Pantelis Lazaridis.

¹⁰⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Prokopi, Eustathios Hatzieuthimiadis.

living. One of the few families who went to foreign lands was the famous Mpodosakis family, who was poor and went to Adana. Generally, males of Bor would only make seasonal migration to bring goods and animals from places like Mersin, Tarsus, Aleppo and Arabia. Permanent immigration started from 1912 onwards, and the most common destinations were Istanbul, Adana, Izmir, Mersin, Tarsus, Ankara and America. There was a tendency among the immigrants from Bor to return home after making money and to invest their homeland so they would rarely take their families with them.¹⁰⁹ Another exception of immigration was Tsouhour. There, immigration started quite late, around 1885. In 1922, there were around one hundred men in Izmir from Tsouhour and only a few of them went to Adana for seasonal work.¹¹⁰

There were Orthodox Christians from almost every province and Orthodox villages of Anatolia in Istanbul. Most of them were merchants, artisans, industrialists and plain laborers. For example, immigrants from Molu and Erkilet were mostly *araytzides* (Αραϊτζηδες); they would find undamaged, useful items right after the big fires in Istanbul, clean and sell them. They also looked for useful metals on the seaside. Since they were constantly entering newly burnt houses, many of them got sick at an early age.¹¹¹

The general pattern of *xenitia* was men's immigration. Young males, mostly right after they finished the elementary school (δημοτικό σχολείο), which had between four to seven grades depending on the wealth of locality, would go to foreign lands to work with their fathers, relatives, or compatriots as apprentices. When they reached the age of marriage, they would write a letter to their parents to get their consent for a wedding. So they would come back, get married, stay for a short while and then leave for foreign lands again. Depending on the distance between their homeland and place of immigration they would come back

¹⁰⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Poros, Ioannis Kamalakidis, Amfil. Amfilokiadis.

¹¹⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Tsouhour, Kostas Misailidis, Iak. Hairoglou.

¹¹¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Erkilet, Anastasios Isakidis.

occasionally to visit their families. After learning the business as apprentices for some time, they would generally open their own business and work for themselves.¹¹² The pattern of *xenitia* was portrayed in lullabies and songs of the area. A lullaby from Zincidere depicts the situation very well: “my son will sleep, will grow up, will leave for foreign lands and will earn money (Renieri quoted in Kapoli, 2004, p. 27).”¹¹³ Therefore, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Christian settlements of Cappadocia were deserted by men and mostly inhabited by women, children and elderly people. Many anonymous women’s songs demonstrate the hardship experienced by females at the time. The lyrics of one of them illustrate the longing of a woman left behind by her husband:

*My agha, it has been three years since you left,
The saplings you had planted bear fruits
All the aghas left with you came back
Come quickly, my agha, come quickly, isn't it permitted?
The cruel foreign land doesn't let you by?*¹¹⁴

The phenomenon of immigration was a major concern of intellectuals in the late nineteenth century. In his article in *Terakki* magazine Iordanis I. Limnidis wrote about the immigration of boys at early ages. For Limnidis, many parents sent their sons at early ages to foreign lands to make money for their family as a consequence of widespread poverty in the region. For this very reason, boys were forced to leave school right after learning how to read and write, and rather than being enlightened by education they were broken off their spiritual mothers, namely their teachers, and sent to faraway places like Istanbul and Izmir to work. Thus, poverty was the main reason for the lack of education and enlightenment in

¹¹² KMS, Cappadocia, Tenei, Kurillos Terkendoglou.

¹¹³ «το αγόρι μου θα κοιμηθή, θα μεγαλώση, θα ξενιτεύση, και θα κερδίση λεφτα...»

¹¹⁴ “Ağam sen gideli üç yıl oldu. Diktiğin fidanlar hep meyve verdi. Seninle giden ağalar geldi. Tez gel ağam, tez gel elvermiyor mu? Zalim gurbet sana yol vermiyor mu?” KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, D. Loukidou, M. Hatzopoulou.

Anatolia.¹¹⁵ For him parents could have taken care of their children for a few more years until they finished their education, feed them at least until their adolescent years. But unfortunately, parents would not consider that their children, who could have brought them two to three hundred qurush a year, but could bring them thousands if they could received an education for just a few more years. Accordingly, Limnidis warned parents to be more conscious about the importance of education and the negative outcomes of beginning work at early ages.¹¹⁶ This excerpt shows just how interrelated immigration and education were. It also indicates the intellectual concern of enlightenment of the fellow Cappadocians in the late nineteenth century.

The two fundamental outcomes of immigration were quite contradictory to one another. These outcomes were: a decline in population in the region, and a flourishing of education and the enlightenment of the Cappadocian Orthodox. Through the money they made in foreign lands Orthodox communities were able to build schools and other institutions as well as repair the old infrastructure in their places of origin, so they initiated a sort of development campaign in their motherlands. For Anagnostopoulou this bloom was superficial, and caused an increasing economic and cultural dependence of Cappadocian communities on coastal areas (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). One way or another, Orthodox settlements in Cappadocia benefited in terms of wealth and education from male immigration. However, this did not prevent people from deserting their motherlands. The Christian population in Cappadocia was constantly in decline as its emigration rate increased. Eventually the region began to receive refugees from the lost lands of the Balkans and Muslim Caucasians escaping from Russia. Throughout the

¹¹⁵ I. Limnidis. (16 July 1888). Anatol'da ilm niçin ileri gitmiyor? [Why doesn't education make progress in Anatolia?]. *Terakki*, 5.

¹¹⁶ I. Limnidis. (15 August 1888). Anatol'da ilm niçin ileri gitmiyor? [Why doesn't education make progress in Anatolia?], *Terakki*, 7.

nineteenth century the demography in the region continued to slowly change, and this transformation was finalized with the Exchange of Populations in 1923-1924.

As claimed by Livianos for the Balkan Christians, Cappadocian Christians had an understanding of boundaries that consisted of four layers: family, village, agriculture and Christianity (Livianos, 2003). Immigration transformed or even destroyed all of these layers. Firstly, families were separated and family as an institution no longer offered a safety net for women, children and the elderly. Secondly, deserted villages became more vulnerable to outside influences and threats. Some depopulated Grecophone villages, for example, abandoned their vernacular and adopted Turkish. Due to poverty and fear of bandits, some women got married to Turks and became Muslims; the long preserved belongingness of Christian communities to their religious and communal identity was severely damaged. As for their previous occupation with agriculture, it was also damaged by loss of male power in fields. Not only the people left behind but also the immigrants faced the process of transformation in their lives. That is to say, the immigrants came across their co-religionists of different cultures, enlightenment efforts and nationalist ideals. In major cities of the Empire and in the Greek Kingdom intellectuals were the producers and purveyors of these linguistic cultures through their publishing and schooling activities. Immigrants, though certainly in varying degrees, were affected by these novelties, and some of them wanted to transfer these novelties to the lives of their compatriots in their homelands. Accordingly, they founded brotherhood associations to help educate and nationalize the left behind people. The upcoming section will cover schools, brotherhood organizations, and their activities for enlightening and nationalizing the left behind.

4.2.2 Community, schools and brotherhood organizations

Due to the fact that only a small group of privileged people were literate in agricultural societies there was a huge gap between upper and lower cultures (Gellner, 1983). In Anderson's wording, literate people were like small islands in big oceans of illiteracy (Anderson, 2006). The Orthodox populations of the

Ottoman Empire were no exception. Only a few people had the opportunity to receive education from private tutors. Some others were lucky enough to learn from the local priest how to read, write and memorize religious texts in old Greek. They spoke either a local Greek dialect or foreign languages in their scattered hometowns and neither of these languages were found to be noble or historical enough to be imposed on masses of diverse backgrounds. In other words, as Hobsbawm manifested, the ‘imagined’ Greek nation was not supposed to speak *dimotika* or any other foreign language, like Turkish, since the actual or literal “mother tongue” (i.e. the idiom children learned from their illiterate mothers and spoke for everyday use) was certainly not in any sense a “national language” (Hobsbawm, 1992). So the intellectuals realized the importance of education to teach the members of prospective Greek nation an engineered language combining ancient Greek with vernacular Greek, called *katharevousa*. This was a language that was designed by Korais to be “pure” of all traces of foreign language by replacing foreign words with ancient Greek words (Grigoriadis, 2013) and the Greek Kingdom pursued a policy of teaching it even to the scattered communities of the Anatolian interior. This objective of enlightening the “prospective Greek nationals” living in exterior lands deviates from modernist conceptualizing, in which the state provides means of education for its own citizens to unify them under a nationalistic ideal. Education was the intellectual branch of Greek irredentism. It worked hand in hand with the effort of the Patriarchate to protect its congregation from the secessionist Churches and the missionaries.

In 1839 and 1856 the Patriarchate was threatened by the Imperial Edicts, according to which a mixed council consisting of lay participants (eight laymen, four cleric members of Holy Synod) necessitated in *millet* administration (Kamouzis, 2013). The resistance of the Church against early Greek (secular) nationalism and the secularizing attempts of the Edicts were simply in resistance to the tradition against the novel, in order not to lose its power and privileges. The foundation of the Bulgarian Exarchate (1872) made the position the Patriarchate defensive in the sense that it was now deemed necessary to employ every means

not to lose the members of its congregation, and even to regain the secessionists through instilling Greek consciousness on non-Greek speaking Orthodox Christians through schooling activities. As a result, [intellectual] “irredentism” of Greek nationalism to educate “unredeemed” Ottoman Greeks coincided with the defensive schooling activities of the Patriarchate (Kamouzis, 2013).

The introduction of Greek nationalism to Cappadocian communities started in the 1870s and continued until the 1920s. Intellectuals, the *syllogoi* (societies), and the brotherhood organizations of Orthodox settlements all assumed roles in the endeavor of nationalizing the Cappadocian Orthodox, most of whom were Turcophone. The involvement of the Patriarchate in educational activities was also a response to the increasing influence of Protestant and Jesuit Missionaries in the East. Accordingly, the first aim of education was to raise Orthodox piety, but in time a policy of linguistic “rehellenization” was articulated to previous efforts (Kitromilides, 1990). Before an examination of schools in Cappadocia, I will briefly discuss general features of Orthodox communities, with a particular emphasis on Cappadocia, in order to understand the administrative aspects of schools.

In most cases, the Greek Orthodox Community was organized under religious administrative units like parishes and dioceses. Apart from this, the council of the elderly (*dimogerontia*), established by local community leaders (Τσορμπατζήδες, Çorbacı-kocabaş), was the secular authority. Consisting of eight to twelve members (Anagnostopoulou, 2013), it was the body that dealt with the administrative and financial issues of the local community (*koinotis* or *koinotita*). The local community was so important that even when the members of a *koinotis* immigrated, they would establish a miniature community of their locality in their new settlement (Augustinos, 1992).

Counter to a common misunderstanding, the so-called *millet* system was a late Ottoman Empire phenomenon, rather than a classical institution. Non-Muslim institutions were in fact without legal status. In the eyes of Ottoman authorities, there were Greek Orthodox leaders, Christian metropolitans, and individuals, but

never institutions (Ozil, 2013). Further to this, despite the fact that in the nineteenth century there was no Orthodox settlement without community organization, the structures of the *koinotis* differed from one locality to another, and there was no single structure for communities of different localities. For example, the community of Smyrna had similarities with that of Thessaloniki and had nothing to do with a community of Cappadocia (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). For community organization of Cappadocian settlements, the priest held the absolute power; however, this was not the case in coastal areas, especially in advanced communities like Smyrna. This situation can be explained by the socio-economic and geographical environments surrounding these communities. First of all, the people of Cappadocia, both Christians and Muslims, developed strong religious feelings, in part due to the fact that they were encircled by high mountains, virtually abandoned by the state, and suffered in poverty. Secondly, they were deprived of the economic and cultural opportunities of the coast, and with the high rate of emigration throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these communities recorded an increasing demographic decline. However, depending on the level of socio-economic development as a result of emigration, some of them gradually developed sophisticated structures similar to those of coastal communities. These places were mainly places that maintained a significant population despite emigration, and the places where the emigrants maintained a close connection with their place of origin. Nevertheless, wealth did not automatically bring about a sophisticated community organization. For example, Konya had an economically powerful Orthodox population, but it only succeeded in organizing a well-structured community when the Bagdad railroad was built. The communities of Sinasos, Gelveri, Nevşehir, Ürgüp, Niğde, and Kayseri, on the other hand, had sophisticated communal structures (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). Through the end of nineteenth century almost all villages and settlements in Cappadocia had schools. The quality of schools and education changed from place to place in accordance with the population and wealth of the locality. For example, the first school in Sinasos opened as early as 1780s and its education system

changed in 1880 to produce better results. Similarly, Kayseri already had a school by 1792 and İncesu by 1814 (Hatziosif, 2005). On one hand, in Orthodox settlements like Gesi and Zile children continued to receive education from the priest in traditional way due to drastic population decline as in the case of Gesi or due to lack of wealth as in the case of Zile; but on the other, in some localities, like Sinasos, Tenei, and Nevşehir, there were special schools serving children of different age and gender groups. There were also many in-between situations. For example, Tsarikli (a village in Niğde) had a *dimotiko* school, but the children could go to school only for four months during the winter, since the assistance of children was needed for agricultural work. For this reason, very few of them successfully learned how to read Greek. The others only learned the basics of religion and chanting psalms (Karalidis, 2005).

Over all, except for few examples, every Orthodox Christian settlement in Cappadocia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century at least had an elementary school (Δημοτικό Σχολείο), whereas up to mid nineteenth century, education was usually acquired through private tutors, who were usually the local priests. Previously, children were taught how to read and write and arithmetical operations, and to memorize prayers, but the possibility of learning Greek was very rare (Benlisoy&Benlisoy, 2000). This was the traditional way of education. During the nineteenth century, however, Cappadocian communities developed a formal education system, thanks in large part to their Brotherhood organizations, School Boards and benevolent compatriots; even though some of education systems remained relatively less developed or even traditional. The following part reveals the conditions of education in some developed Orthodox settlements in the region according to the Oral Tradition Archives of KMS.

In Gelveri (Güzelyurt today), there was one kindergarten (νηπιαγωγείο), one girls' school (παρθενγωγείο), and one boys' school (αρρενωγωγείο). Beginning in 1890, Modern Greek was taught in the schools of the Turcophone village. The teachers would force children to speak Greek; the ones who spoke Turkish were beaten. Anyone who finished elementary school was able to speak

katharevousa and read Greek books and newspapers. According to testimonies, the children were also taught Turkish and French.¹¹⁷

Similarly, Tenei (Yeşilburç today) had a big school founded in 1866 with a kindergarten and an urban school (αστική σχολή). These schools were originally separated by but in later years they were combined. Children were taught Greek, Turkish, and French, as well as Greek history, geography, and the history of saints. The school also boasted a library.¹¹⁸

Nevşehir had a very developed schooling system, with T three kindergartens (νηπιαγωγείο), one girls' school (παρθεναγωγείο), and one boys' school (αρρεναγωγείο). There was also a middle school (γυμναστήριο) for Orthodox Christians. According to the KMS informant, in schools they received a good education; the ones who finished middle school in Greece were said to only know as much as those who finished elementary school in Nevşehir. In Nevşehir, the council of elderly (δημογεροντία) appointed the teachers. The two school boards (Η σχολική εφορία) supervised the schools and maintained their needs for things like writing materials and books. The boards and the council of elderly also collaborated on matters concerning the schools. The books, writing materials, and salaries of the teachers were sent from Istanbul. The community had an entire bazaar (çarşı) of its own in Istanbul; they rented shops in it and sent the money to their homeland. In the boards there were people who wanted to work for the progress of the community; they gave scholarships and sent successful children with scholarships to Zincidere to continue their education in the Theological Seminary (Ιερατική Σχολή).¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, K. Sotyropoulos, G. Dopridis.

¹¹⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Tenei, Efterpi Koursoglou, Stefanos Giapitzoglou, A. Kuriomidis.

¹¹⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Neapoli, Vithleem Kalavoutsoglou, Foteini Georgiadou, Evronia Georgiadou, Marika Trellopoulou.



Figure 11. Greek language teacher Phillippos Papagrigoriou Aristovoulos in Nevşehir.
Source: Photography Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies

Another community with a developed education system was Talas. There was one urban school, one girls' school, and three kindergartens in town. In kindergarten the children were taught the Greek language, arithmetic, measurement, and songs. In urban school the children learned the history of the saints, history, catechism, ancient Greek, geography, French, Turkish, physics, and chemistry. The school was free only for poor children and the community paid for all expenses, including the salaries of the teachers and supervisory bodies, and writing materials and heating. The salaries of the teachers were sent from Istanbul.¹²⁰

¹²⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Moutalaski, Mihail Giavroglou, P. Kiostoglou.



Figure 12. A Greek Orthodox family from Talas. Source: Photography Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

Prokopi (Ürgüp) had a structured educational system as well. There was one girls' school, one urban school, and one kindergarten. The girls' school had a theatre stage where performances were presented. The annual spending of the schools was gathered from the incomes of community property in Prokopi and Istanbul, the annual tuition of the subscribers, the aids of beneficiaries, the proceeding records, offerings, and tributes of the church, and from the taxes taken at name day celebrations, trials, funerals, baptisms, weddings and cemetery, as well as from the fees of theatric performances and the money gathered in exhibitions of handcrafts. The immigrants in Istanbul founded a brotherhood organization in 1912 called Areti (Αρετή). It was the school board (σχολική εφορεία) which took care of everything, including the provision of school materials, management the school properties, repair of school buildings, appointment of teachers, tuition fees, and so on.¹²¹

¹²¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Prokopi, Efsthathios Hatziefthimiadis, Georgios Isaakidis.



Figure 13. Greek speaking Orthodox Christians from Ürgüp in the late nineteenth century.
Source: Photography Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies

For the Orthodox Christian settlements of Anatolia Zincidere was undoubtedly of particular importance, since the Theological Seminary (Gr. Ιερατική Σχολή, Tr. Kayseriye Mekteb-i Kebiri), the Cappadocian Central Girls' School, the Kindergartners Training College, and two gender separated orphanages were all located there. It would, in fact, not be wrong to say that Zincidere was also an educational center for Cappadocia in addition to its role as a religious center, since the Metropolitan Bishop of Kayseri lived there along with the Monastery of John the Forerunner (Μοναστήρι του Ιωάννου του Προδρόμου). The Theological Seminary was at the top of the educational pyramid in the region and was at the level of gymnasium. It was established primarily to educate a competent group of clergy and a body of local teachers to serve in the community schools and churches of the region (Benlisoy, 2010). The school was established in 1882 with the donations of Theodoros Rodokanakeis, a businessman from Chios, and carried his name for some years (Benlisoy, 2010). The main mission of the school was to raise an educated clergy in the struggle against the missionaries,

since up until that time the Orthodox lower clergy was mostly illiterate, which was cause for ridicule and criticism by the missionaries (Benlisoy, 2010).

The teachers of the school had to take exams at the University of Athens in order to be employed by the Seminary. Beginning in 1895, the graduates of the Seminary were accepted by the University with the official recognition of the Greek Ministry of Education.¹²² According to KMS Oral Tradition Archive, through the last years of Orthodox presence in Cappadocia the Seminary successfully to received children from other Orthodox settlements of Cappadocia. Some brotherhood organizations provided scholarships for those who wanted to further their education in the Seminary and become teachers or priests. Some teachers of the village Tenei were graduates of the Seminary.¹²³ Further, the first teacher of Zile, appointed in 1903, was a graduate of the Seminary.¹²⁴ In the case of the deserted village Gesi, the priest, who was simultaneously the teacher during last few years leading up to World War I, also studied in the Seminary.¹²⁵ I should note that employing teachers from Istanbul or Greece was costly for the communities of Cappadocia, and the teachers struggled with adapting to the conditions of the region. Further to this, the communities of Cappadocia were mostly Turcophone and knowledge of Turkish was an important criterion in order to be employed as a teacher by the communities. In an article in the periodical *Terakki*, for example, it was argued that a teacher had to speak the language of his/her students' mother tongue in order to be helpful.¹²⁶ In considering all this, the

¹²² Kayseriye'deki Kappadokiki İeratiki Sholi [The Cappadocian Theological Seminary in Kayseri]. (12 March 1895). *Anatoli*, 5012.

¹²³ KMS, Cappadocia, Tenei, A. Kuriomidis.

¹²⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Zile-Kayseri, Eleftherios Hatzipetros.

¹²⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Gesi, Diianeira Manolaka.

¹²⁶ Anatol'da hemcinslerimiz Rumca tahsilinde niçin suupet çekiyorlar? [Why does our compatriots have difficulty in learning Greek?]. (30 September 1888). *Terakki*, 10.

Seminary served the needs of Cappadocia very well, especially for the poor villages which were unable to appoint teachers from elsewhere.¹²⁷

According to refugee testimonies, in Turcophone villages of Cappadocia children were able to learn Greek through schooling. In some villages (for example, Gelveri), Turkish was prohibited from being spoken in schools.¹²⁸ However, some refugees narrated that despite the endeavor of teachers, children continued speaking Turkish at home.¹²⁹ Teaching the Greek language and Greek history was intended to generate national Greek consciousness in the minds of children, but its success is questionable. My claim is that *Hellenization* attempts in Cappadocia were not successful until times of discontinuity, namely the nationalist CUP policies and the long war (1912-1922), and I argue that the nationalization of these communities was only successfully completed after their expulsion to Greece. For earlier times we can talk about intermittent proto-nationalism and a broader Community consciousness which fluctuated between preservation of status quo, conduct of daily business, and sympathy towards the national Greek cause. An interesting example is that of a prominent Cappadocian emphasizing the importance of learning how to write and read Turkish (in Arabic letters) for the Neapolitans (Nevşehirli) in *Anatoli* newspaper in 1891:

We are in transaction with the subjects of Sultan and ninety nine percent of our exchange is conducted in Turkish. Why don't we read and write it? [...] Why does not exist anybody who can read and write Turkish in each shop? [...] It is more useful to teach Turkish language to pupils than Astronomy or theology.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ For statistics about schools I used refugee testimonies because they gave the latest information about the schools. Another source for education statistics was Ksenofanis; however it only informs us about the period between 1905-1906. These two sources do not fully match. See Στατιστική της Επαρχίας Ικονίου [Statistics of the Eparchy of Konya], *Ksenofanis* (3), pp. 44-47; Στατιστική της Επαρχίας Καισαρείας (Στατιστικός πίνακας) [Statistics of the Eparchy of Kayseri (Statistical table)], *Ksenofanis* (3), pp. 230-233.

¹²⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Gelveri, K. Sotiropoulos, G. Dopridis.

¹²⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Gölcük-Limna, Neofitos Apostolidis, Kosmas Serafimidis.

¹³⁰ "Biz teba-i şahanedan ve ez cümle alış-veriş içinde bulunuyoruz. Ahz-u itamızın yüzde doksan dokuzu Türkçe'dir. Niçin yazıp okumayalım? [...] Niçin her dükkanda bir Türkçe yazıp okuyan

The importance attributed to the Turkish language was also visible in other issues of *Anatoli*. For example, in one of its issues from 1895, an announcement was made for those who wanted to learn to read and write Ottoman Turkish¹³¹. It seems that at both the public and the intellectual level special value was given to Turkish. For most Cappadocian Orthodox of the time Turkish was the mother tongue and therefore it meant a comfort zone where people easily express themselves; whereas for intellectuals it was a means to assume a role in Ottoman society and, for this reason, the Orthodox had to learn to read and write in the Arabic alphabet.

In general, administration, control, and supervision of Orthodox schools was held by mixed bodies including ecclesiastical and lay members at different levels of the organizational structure of the Community. At the top of the hierarchy were the ecclesiastical and national (ethnic) authority in Istanbul, consisting of the patriarch, the Holy Synod, and the Permanent Mixed (clergy-laity) National (ethnic) Council. At the local level there were three levels of educational administration: district, community, and parish. At the district level, the head was the metropolitan; there were also Mixed Ecclesiastical Councils and Education committees, who were responsible for the “intellectual progress” in the district. At the community level, School Boards, elected by the representatives from communal parishes, carried out direct administration and supervision of educational establishments. At parish level, the elected School Boards managed financial affairs, implementation of curriculums, appointment and dismissal of teachers, and so on (Papastathis quoted in Kazamias, 1991, p. 354). In practice,

bulunmasın? [...] Mekteplerde Astronomia veyahud teologia okutmaktan ise lisan-ı Türki'yi layıkı ile belletmek daha evliyadır.” Y. Gavriilidis, (24 January 1891). Nevşehirli'lere hem tavsiye hem rica [A suggestion to and a request from the Neapolitans]. *Anatoli*, 4288.

¹³¹ “Lisan-ı Osmani'yi tahsil etmek arzusunda bulunanlara az vakit zarfında yeni usul üzere tarif olunur. Arzu edenler gazetemize müracaat etsinler.” For the ones who want to learn Ottoman language, a new method will be described. The ones who have the will can apply to our newspaper. *Anatoli*, 21 February 1895, 4948.

affairs were never actually this tidy since there were also brotherhood organizations and *syllogoi* (societies) which were very influential (Kazamias, 1991).

As previously stated, it was the period of Ottoman reforms (1839-1876) that curbed the traditional privileges of the Patriarchate with the introduction of a mixed council consisting of both clerical and lay members to run communal affairs (Clogg, 1982). Before that the Church was the sole authority on the education of its congregation. Beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century, with reforms, the secularized intelligentsia began to lead educational efforts, rediscovering their ethnic past and attempting to revitalize the Greek ethnic ties and sentiments. The middle class in particular became involved in educational matters and initiated privately funded cultural and educational societies (*syllogoi*) to promote Helleno-Christian tradition; Athens became the ideological centre of Hellenism during this period (Kamouzis, 2013). Many of the individuals connected with the developing *syllogos* movement well aware of the fact that the Ecumenical Patriarchate had neither financial nor administrative resources to reform and standardize the educational system of the Greek Orthodox Community of the Empire (Vassiadis, 2007). During this process, the role of the Modern Greek state cannot be disregarded, as it aimed to enlighten the East, and the National University of Athens had a pivotal role in this mission as it became the intellectual center for both the Greeks of the Kingdom and the Ottoman Greeks (Kamouzis, 2013).

The associations, which were founded in Athens like the “Association for the Propagation of Greek Letters” (Ο Σύλλογος προς διάδοσιν των Ελληνικών Γραμμάτων -established in 1869), the “Society of Anatolians, the East” (Ο Σύλλογος των Μικρασιατών, η Ανατολή – founded in 1891), and the Greek consuls in various localities of the Ottoman Empire, also started to get involved in the educational and communal affairs of the Anatolian Orthodox people (Kamouzis, 2013). Istanbul, with its three hundred thousand Greek Orthodox, was the rival of Athens as another intellectual center of Greeks. Coupled with their

numerical strength, the Greeks of the city were well represented in economic fields, including banking, shipping, manufacturing, commerce, and the free positions. A network of *syllogoi* bore witness to the highly-corporate life of the Greek community. One of them was the Hellenic Literary Society of Constantinople (Ελληνική Φιλολογική Εταιρεία Κωνσταντινουπόλεως) (EFSK), which was founded in 1861 (Alexandris, 1982). EFSK put on public lectures on topics like physics, chemistry, hygiene, physiology, history, ancient and modern philology, among others, to encourage the advancement and intellectual development of society. It also published a scholarly periodical. In addition to such efforts it encouraged the intellectual advance of Ottoman Greeks by establishing a library and a public reading room in Constantinople. It inaugurated a series of competitions devoted to the topographical and ethnographical study of the various “Greek provinces” of the Ottoman Empire (Vassiadis, 2007). The presence and activities of EFSK was inspiration for many other *syllogoi* in Istanbul. There is no doubt that the Ottoman reforms provided an appropriate climate for the initiation of different societies that had both cultural and educational orientations. Finally, *syllogoi* helped the spread of middle class values among the poor segments of the Community (Kamouzis, 2013).

The *syllogoi* were known to be the most appropriate intermediaries between the wealthy Ottoman Greeks and the educational institutions or activities they wished to support (Vassiadis, 2007). These societies tried to raise the national consciousness of Ottoman Orthodox Christians by supporting schools as well as non-school cultural activities, such as public lectures and competitions in the Greek language, history, and culture, cultural contacts with Greek Kingdom, publication of the works of ancient Greek authors, the creation of libraries, and so on. However, their national-political goal was not always apparent; they aimed to create a sense of Greek ethnic national consciousness in a natural way by exposing people to Greek culture and its achievements and by teaching the Greek language (Kazamias, 1991). They did not talk about their *Hellenization* attempts out loud, although the educational activity of the *syllogoi* was influenced by the political

precepts of the *Megali Idea* (Great Ideal), and targeted supporting, encouraging, and reinforcing the Hellenic consciousness of the Greek population of the Empire. Long story short, regardless of the private views and aspirations of their members and sponsors, the *sylogoi* never publicly espoused the irredentist precepts of the *Megali Idea* (Vassiadis, 2007). Another reason for their stance was certainly the fact that their activities and publications were under strict Ottoman scrutiny. For example, the EFSK made statements of an open political nature only after the Young Turk Revolution (Vassiadis, 2007). All in all the *sylogos* movement in its heyday aimed not only to found new schools and raise money for the maintenance of the existing educational institutions in the Ottoman Empire but also to utilize their members as carriers of intellectual irredentism. In other words, the most enduring legacy of the *sylogos* movement was its contribution to the maintenance of the Hellenic identity of the Greek inhabitants of remote parts of the Ottoman Empire (Vassiadis, 2007).

Coming back to Cappadocian immigrants, the ones who found themselves among the Greek intelligentsia in Istanbul began to become influenced by the atmosphere created by Greek nationalism, and many of them began to imitate EFSK, and got involved in educational activities (Benlisoy, 2003) that often resulted in the foundation of their own (relatively minor scale) societies. Not all of immigrants were able to create such bodies, Gesi, for example, did not have a brotherhood organization in foreign lands. Although there were exceptions like Gesi, we cannot disregard the importance of brotherhood organizations for the development of infrastructure and enlightenment of peoples in Cappadocian localities. For example; according to the first article of the regulation of the Brotherhood of *Agios Georgios*, founded in Istanbul in 1905 for the benefit of the village Aravan, the founding principles of the society were:

- i. Supporting the school of Aravan by covering its annual budget deficit;
- ii. Repair and continuous control of water pipes of the village since the village has water scarcity and it is an absolute necessity.

- iii. In a determined time of a year, provides aids to the needy families of village in accordance with the respective resources of Brotherhood.¹³²

Similarly, the regulation of the Brotherhood of *Nazianzos* of Gelveri, founded in 1884 in Istanbul, specified the purposes of the organization as such:

- i. Protection of Orthodox Christian schools of Gelveri;
- ii. Continuous progress of kindergarten (νηπιαγωγείο), girls' school (παρθενγωγείο) and urban school (Αστική Σχολή);
- iii. Provision of books, and writing materials for free for the successful and disadvantaged boys and girls.¹³³



Figure 14. The seal of brotherhood organization of Andaval: The Educational Brotherhood of Three Hierarchs, Andaval, Konya, 1910. Source: Oral Tradition Archive of Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

As another example, Stefo Benlisoy cites the objectives of the society of Papa Georgios, that of Nevşehir, as such:

- i. Supporting the progress of education in Nevşehir;

¹³² Κανονισμός της εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει αδελφότητος της κώμης Αραβάν: Ο Άγιος Γεώργιος [The regulation of the Brotherhood of the village Aravan: Agios Georgios, founded in Constantinople].

¹³³ Κανονισμός της εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει φιλεκπαιδευτικής αδελφότητος Καρβάλης: Ναζιανζός, ιδρυθείσης τω 1884 [The regulation of the Educational Brotherhood of Karvali: Nazianzos, founded in Constantinople in 1884].

- ii. Negation of propagation with necessary means and strengthening religious and national feelings;
- iii. Developing a contact mechanism between compatriots;
- iv. Improving the wills and wishes of compatriots about Nevşehir;
- v. Spreading the national language (Benlisoy, 2003, p. 37).

In a similar vein, the founding principles of Areti, the philanthropic society of Prokopi (Ürgüp) founded in 1909, were to improve the schools and financially support the students studying in the schools of locality (Benlisoy, 2003). As seen in the above quoted regulations of different societies, the main reason for the establishment of Brotherhood organizations was to support education efforts in their place of origin. Receiving education meant developing national consciousness and learning the “national language”, Greek, which was an inevitable component of Hellenic identity that was not yet comprehended by the Orthodox of Cappadocia. As a secondary role, they financially supported the poor, providing scholarships for needy students or by supporting their learning of crafts. For example, the Brotherhood organization of Tenei sent looms from Istanbul for the poor girls learning weaving. Later those girls worked for the Armenian carpet company (the original name of the company was “Halı Fabrikası”) and were able to earn a living.¹³⁴

As an interesting point, one of the means of collecting money for the schools was organizing theatric performances (Θεατρική παράσταση) in major theatre halls of the time. Issues of *Anatoli*, especially in years 1890 and 1891, were full of invitations to such performances, as well as news and analyses about the attendance and interest of the Anatolian Christians.¹³⁵ *Anatoli*'s role in education cannot be disregarded. It continuously supported schooling activities since its first issues in the 1850s. Development and enlightenment of Anatolia seem to be the reason for its very existence. The owner of the newspaper, Evangelinos Misailidis,

¹³⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Tenei, Efterpi Koursoglou, Stefanos Giapitzoglou.

¹³⁵ Dahiliye [internal affairs]. (22 January 1891). *Anatoli*, 4287.

was in fact known as the teacher of Anatolians. Many articles were published to raise consciousness about the importance of education not only during his supervision of the paper, but also after his death. Below you will find an interesting excerpt from the newspaper:

[...]We shall open our eyes. We are no longer on our own. Railroads are being built in our Anatolia. American people will come to our motherland for work. If we remain illiterate, we could only be their servants.¹³⁶

Coming back to schooling activities, girls' schools and kindergartens had a particular importance in the acquisition of Greek language at early ages by children. In the eyes of intellectuals the role of women was to raise the children; therefore, if they knew the national language, they could teach it to their children. Accordingly, the primary objective of girls' schools was to teach women Greek (Benlisoy, 2010). Kindergartens were also important for the acquisition of Greek by Turkish speaking Orthodox communities. Children were sent to kindergartens at four or five years old with the intention of distancing them from their Turkish speaking family members and being taught Greek (Benlisoy, 2010). Further to their role of planting ethnic national consciousness in the minds of people from an nationalist intellectual point of view, the schools worked as a safeguard against plausible, alien, religious, or national proselytisation (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Islamic or Slavic) from the angle of the Greek Orthodox Church (Kazamias, 1991). Through education the position of Orthodox Christianity was strengthened in its competition with other faiths, in other words, in its struggle to not lose members in favor of other sects. In the case of Cappadocia, the primary rivals of Orthodoxy were Islam and Protestantism. I discussed its relation with Islam in the previous chapter. The upcoming chapter is reserved for its relation with Protestantism. As a final remark, among its other consequences, it could be hypothesized that the most important outcome of schooling was expansion of nationalism from an elite level to a popular level by providing an ideological basis

¹³⁶ “[...] Gözümüzü açalım. Bundan böyle biz bize kalmıyoruz. Anadolumuzda demir yolları yapılıyor. Geçim için ta Amerika’dan memleketimize ademler gelecektir. Cahil kalır isek hizmetçilikten başka işe yaramayacağız [...]” Anadolumuzun mektepleri [schools of our Anatolia]. *Anatoli*, 24 February 1891, 4295.

for already existing cracks, contestations, and antagonisms between religious communities. It would not be wrong to claim that education initiated proto-nationalism in the minds of students and, thus, indirectly in minds of their parents. It raised the consciousness of a broader Community People as people became aware of their kinship ties with people living in remote places.

4.2.3 Prominent Orthodox figures of Greater Cappadocia

Thanks to schools and immigration, an urban educated Cappadocian class emerged in the late nineteenth century. There were also many prominent Turcophone figures of Anatolian origin in the fields of politics, education, press, and medicine.¹³⁷ Among those who dealt with commerce, the Onasis and Mpodosakis families became the wealthiest in Greece. Additionally, the number of students who continued their education in University of Athens grew steadily. Some of these people met nationalist romanticism much before their compatriots, and tried to help and enlighten them through the *sylogos* movement. Some of them, on the other hand, worked for and believed in the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and served as deputies in Ottoman parliament, as we will see in the cases of Emmanouilidis and Carolidis.¹³⁸ I even came across a medical doctor from Niğde, Alexandros Yagtzoglou, who received his diplomas from the Universities of Athens and France, respectively, and who worked for the Ottoman army in the First World War and for the army of Mustafa Kemal in Turco-Greek War (1919-

¹³⁷ For a list of prominent people of Asia Minor origin, see H. A. Theodoridou, *Διακριθέντες του ξεριζωμένου Ελληνισμού: Μικράς Ασίας - Πόντου - Αν. Θράκης - Κωνσταντινουπόλεως*, τόμος Β [The distinguished figures of uprooted Hellenism: Asia Minor – Black Sea - Eastern Thrace – Istanbul, volume 2].

¹³⁸ Other deputies of Cappadocian origin were Pant. Kosmidis (Istanbul, 1908-1912); Mihalakis Stelios (Limni, 1908-1913); Anas. Mihailidis (Izmit, 1908-1918); Georg. Kourtoglou (Niğde, 1908-1912); Aris. Georgantzoglou; (İzmir, 1908-1911); Ananias Kalinoglou (Niğde, 1912-1918); Theod. Arzoglou (Samsun, 1914-1918); I. Gkevenidis (Karahisar, 1914-1918); Vang. Meymeroglou (İzmir, 1914-1918); Vikt. Tsormpatzoglou (1914-1918). M. Harakopoulos, *Ρωμιοί της Καππαδοκίας: από τα βάθη της Ανατολής στο θεσσαλικό κάμπο, η τραυματική ενσωμάτωση στη μητέρα πατρίδα* [The *Rums* of Cappadocia: from depths of Anatolia to Thessalian plains, the traumatic integration in mother country], p. 50.

1922).¹³⁹ In consideration with these dissimilar standpoints of educated Cappadocians, we could suggest that, unlike what nationalists wanted to believe, people had complicated feelings of belongingness and nationalism was often too tight for complex individual concerns. On one hand there were strict communal boundaries based on religious affiliation, and nationalism strengthened these boundaries, particularly during years of discontinuity or crisis; however on the other hand, individuals were torn between various identities. In the early twentieth century, for example, one could be a devoted Christian and an enthusiast of Ancient Greek Civilization, a loyal citizen of the Ottoman Empire, a critic of Young Turk policies, a sympathizer of royalists in the Greek Kingdom, an opponent of Venizelists, and an admirer of Asia Minor and Turkish language all at once. Before the age of nationalism, all these could be accommodated in single Christian identity. In the end, being a Christian only indicated not being a Muslim or a Jew, and competition between religious communities did not necessarily mean that there was conflict, as borders were impervious. Unlike pre-modern religious identity, national identity was tighter and less permeable; the Other was regarded the foe, and homogeneity was more acceptable than diversity. Under the strictness of nationalism, individuals juggling with various states of belonging were forced to pick sides.

Emmanuil Emmanuilidis was one those individuals who was forced to change sides as a result of the nationalist aggressiveness of the Young Turks. Having lived most of his life as a devoted Ottoman citizen but passing away as a Greek patriot, Emmanuilidis was an interesting figure and one of the few prominent and educated Cappadocians. He was born in Tavlusun, Kayseri in 1860 and studied law in both Istanbul and Athens. He worked as a lawyer in Izmir for many years. In the aftermath of the Greek-Ottoman War of 1897, he published the journal *Aktis* (ray), in *dimotika* [i.e. popular Greek vernacular] as a reaction against

¹³⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Niğde, Alexandros Yagtzoglou. For his short biography, see H. A. Theodoridou, Διακριθέντες του ξεριζωμένου Ελληνισμού: Μικράς Ασίας - Πόντου - Αν. Θράκης - Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, τόμος Β, [The distinguished figures of uprooted Hellenism: Asia Minor - Black Sea - Eastern Thrace - Istanbul, volume 2].

the purists using *katharevousa*, despite fierce opposition. Emmanuilidis served as a deputy in the Ottoman parliament due to his close relations with the local branch of Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) and represented Izmir and Aydin provinces between the years 1912-1919 (Kechriotis, 2014). Having certain distance from the two established perceptions of nationalism adopted by the Greek intellectuals whom had been known either as *Yunancılar* (the Hellenists who supported the unification of “unredeemed Greeks” under the Hellenic state) or as *Bizansçılar* (the Byzantinists who supported the replacement of Ottoman rulers with Orthodox Christians), Emmanouilidis was an Ottomanist who believed in collaboration with Muslim Turks for the integrity of the Empire (Kechriotis, 2014)¹⁴⁰.

Like Emmanouilidis, Pavlos Carolidis was an Ottomanist who spent most of his life in Athens as a university teacher. During his years in Athens, he devoted himself to the Enlightenment of his compatriots from Asia Minor. Similar to the biography of Emanuilidis, Carolidis was born in the town of Endürlük (Andronikio), near Kayseri, in 1849. His parents were wealthy Turkish-speaking landowners. He studied first in Smyrna at the *Evangelical school (Evageliki Sholi)*, and then in Istanbul at the Patriarchal Academy, known also as the *Supreme School of the Nation (Mekteb-i Kebir, Megali tou Genous Sholi)*. He later moved to Athens, where he studied history at the University. He continued his studies in Munich, Strasburg, and Tübingen, Germany. Following his long lasting studies, he worked as a professor in Istanbul, Izmir, and finally at the University of Athens upon the encouragement of the Greek Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis (1832-1896). In Athens he became a member of the Society of Anatolians, the East (see above), and played a prominent role within the Asia Minor-Athens network.¹⁴¹

¹⁴⁰ For the Turkish version of this article, see V. Kechriotis, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminde Karamanlı Rum Ortodoks diasporası: İzmir mebusu Emmanuil Emmanuilidis [Karamanli Greek Orthodox Diaspora at the end of the Ottoman Empire: deputy of Izmir Emmanuil Emmanuilidis].

¹⁴¹ See V. Kechriotis, Ottomanism with a Greek face: Karamanli Greek Orthodox diaspora at the end of the Ottoman Empire; V. Kechriotis, Atina'da Kapadokyalı, İzmir'de Atinalı, İstanbul'a

Amongst the twenty-four deputies of Greek origin, Carolidis represented Izmir in the Ottoman Parliament after the 1908 elections (Boura, 1999). Though he was an independent member of parliament in 1908; he was elected within the CUP in 1912. As an Ottoman patriot he valued the integrity of the Empire.

Unlike these two Ottomanists, Ioakeim Valavanis was a Greek nationalist of Cappadocia origin. Born in Aravan, Niğde; Valavanis completed his education at first at the *Supreme School of the Nation (Mekteb-i Kebir, Megali tou Genous Sholi)* in Istanbul, and later received philology and philosophy degrees from University of Athens. He was also known by his three volume book, *Νεοελληνική Κιβωτός (Yunani-I Cedit'in Sandukasi, Modern Greek Ark)*, an anthology of Modern Greek poets and prose writers.¹⁴² His other educational works were *Απανθίσματα Ελληνικών Γραμμάτων (Anthologies of Greek Literature)* and *Αναγνωσματάριον εκ του Ηροδότου (Reading book from Herodotus)*. Valavanis devoted himself to the enlightenment of his compatriots about their ethnic identity. In his *Mikrasiatika* (1891), he complained about the indifference of Anatolians to their ethnic origins: “For if you ask a Christian, even one speaking as a corrupted Greek: ‘What are you?’ ‘A Christian (Christianos)’, he will unhesitatingly reply. ‘All right, but other people are Christians, the Armenians, the Franks, the Russians...’ ‘I don’t know’, he will answer, ‘yes, these people believe in Christ but I am a Christian’. ‘Perhaps you are a Greek?’ ‘No, I’m not anything. I’ve told you that I am a Christian, and once again I say to you that I am a Christian!’ he will reply to you impatiently (Valavanis quoted in Clogg, 2006, p. 67).” With these lines, Valavanis was pinpointing the indifference of humble people to Greek nationalism. He was right. Even in the late nineteenth century many people had

mebus: Pavlos Karolidis’in farklı kişilik ve aidiyetleri [Cappadocian in Athens, Athenian in Izmir and deputy in Istanbul: Different identities and belongingness of Pavlos Carolidis]; H. A. Theodoridou, *Διακριθέντες του ξεριζωμένου Ελληνισμού: Μικράς Ασίας - Πόντου - Αν. Θράκης - Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, τόμος Β* [The distinguished figures of uprooted Hellenism: Asia Minor - Black Sea -Eastern Thrace – Istanbul, volume 2], pp. 42-43.

¹⁴² I. H. Kalfoglou. (1894). Ιωακείμ Βαλαβάνης: Νεοελληνική Κιβωτός [Ioakeim Valavanis: Neoelliniki Kivotos]. *Ημερολόγιον: η Ανατολή* [Almanac: the East]. Karamanlidika Book Collection, Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

not yet embraced Greek national cause and had been unresponsive to it. Conversely, Valavanis was a Cappadocia origin Greek nationalist and always a critic of his compatriots since he found them ignorant.

Another prominent figure from Greater Cappadocia area was Evangelinos Misailidis, who was born in Kula in 1820 and died in Istanbul in 1890. Like the intellectuals mentioned above, he went to the *Evangeliki Sholi* (Evangelical School) in Izmir and continued his education at the University of Athens as a student of Philology. Afterwards, he worked as a teacher in Alaşehir for a while. Misailidis was one of the most important people in the Turcophone Christian community of the time. He spent his entire life trying to enlighten his compatriots through press. His publications contributed greatly to the progress of the language *Karamanlidika*. He published several journals like *Mektep-i Fünun-i Mersiki* (School of Eastern Sciences, 1849) and newspapers (*Pelsaret-il Masrik*- Eastern Herald, 1845; *Şark*- East; *Fünun-u Şarkıyye*, *Risale-yi Havadis*- News Bulletin, Scientific East, 1850-1851; *Kukurikos*, 1876-1881) the most famous of which was the long lived *Anatoli* (1851-1912 or 1922) (Balta, 2010). In addition to his contributions to the press, Misailidis is known because of his novel *Temaşa-i Dünya* (1872), which was one of the first novels written in Turkish. Throughout his life, Misailidis published ninety two books in *Karamanlidika* which constitutes the thirty percent of the total *Karamanlidika* publications.¹⁴³ Having read many issues of his *Anatoli*, I can claim that Misailidis was a devoted Orthodox and an admirer of Greek culture and history. A careful reading of his articles in *Anatoli* and his novel indicates that he had ethnic Greek consciousness and he invited his fellow compatriots to discover their origins. He was also a modernist being aware of the importance of knowledge, science, literature, hygiene and history. He aimed to enlighten his reading public in all of these issues. However, it is not easy to decipher if he was an admirer of Greek irredentism or an Ottoman patriot. In the end, he published under Ottoman scrutiny and during the reign of Abdülhamid II

¹⁴³ See M. Erol, Evangelinos Misailidis and E. Balta, Gerçi Rum isek de Rumca bilmez Türkçe söyleriz: the adventure of an identity in the triptych: vatan, religion and language.

under strict censorship. Under such conditions *Anatoli* did not hesitate to praise the Sultan at every possible occasion. Especially in times of crises between the Ottoman Empire and the Greek Kingdom, the paper followed an ostensibly neutral stance.

Originally from Pontus, raised in Cappadocia, Ioannis Kalfoglou was another important personality of the Turcophone Orthodox community. He learned Greek only later in his life and adopted it as the language of culture and the Greek national ideology (Petropoulou, 2002). After finishing his studies at the Seminary in Zincidere (*Ροδοκανάκειο Ιερατική Σχολή*, later known as *Καππαδοκική Ιερατική Σχολή*), he followed the steps of Misailidis and proceeded to publish almanacs in *Karamanlidika* to enlighten his compatriots. Between the years 1892-1898, he worked as the editor of Misailidis's newspaper *Anatoli* (Anestidis, 2002). His major work was "Historical Geography of Asia Minor" [originally *Mikra Asia Kitasının Tarihi Coğrafyası*] that he wrote in *Karamanlidika*.

Except for Ioannis Kalfaoglou, all the above-mentioned personalities were graduates of University of Athens. Certainly there were other Cappadocia origin graduates of the University whose names are not stated here. It seems that there was an intellectual-educational link between Cappadocia and Athens in contrast with the common belief that Cappadocia was an isolated place. Before the nineteenth century it might have been, but in the nineteenth century things changed; technology and transportation developed; Western capital entered the Ottoman Empire, new opportunities opened up, and all these induced a new flow of immigration from Cappadocia. This time, however, immigration did not break the connection between the migrants and the left behind. Rather, various links were maintained, including economic, educational, intellectual, and socio-political ties between the Greeks living in big cities and in the Kingdom, and the Cappadocians. Though it was on a relatively minor scale in comparison with those for example between Ionia and Athens, an intellectual-educational connection was also built between Cappadocia and Athens. The schools founded in Cappadocia with the help and aid of the immigrants and societies in foreign lands tied the

educated Cappadocians to the rest of the Hellenic world. It is true that immigration deserted the Orthodox settlements in Cappadocia but it helped to strengthen the religious (and later helped to develop a national identity) identity of the Orthodox of the region.

4.3 Karamanlidika press

Most often nationalism is pioneered by intellectuals and/or professionals. Intellectuals develop the basic definitions and characterizations of the nation, and the intelligentsias are the most enthusiastic consumers and purveyors of nationalist myths. For Smith (1998), what is more important is the relationship between the ‘intellectuals’ and “the people”. The question is how nationalism moved from the elite level to the level of the general populace. In the nationalization process of the Orthodox Christians of Cappadocia, schools, associations, and the press were the channels for nationalist ideas to flow from an elite level to a popular one. The success of these channels was controversial, but it would not be wrong to claim that such efforts planted the first seeds of nationalism and raised local intellectuals to spread the gospel of nationalism and certainly created a Community consciousness that linked Cappadocians to the broader Orthodox community. The general schema of the process was: A) a group of people from an Orthodox settlement emigrated to a large commercial city where they met their co-religionists whom had already developed nationalist consciousness; B) they were influenced by their endeavor to enlighten and educate the Community in line with Hellenic identity, mostly propagated by the Kingdom; C) the relatively wealthy ones came together and initiated an association/brotherhood to assist and enlighten the village through propagation by means of schools and church; D) several intellectuals were raised in local schools and helped their local community to be illuminated about many issues on a scale from national consciousness to hygiene.

The intellectual propagation of nationalism was not always visible, but penetrated through teaching of the “ancestral language and history”. In this endeavor of enlightening the Community, the publications, especially the ones in mother tongue Turkish, were of special importance. Many newspapers and

periodicals were published in *Karamanlidika* like *Aktis* (1910-1914), *Zebur* (1866), *Mikra Asia* (1873-1876), and *Nea Anatoli* (1912-1921) in the last decades of the Empire.¹⁴⁴ In this dissertation I refer to *Anatoli*, *Terakki*, and the missionary paper *Angeliaforos*.

Enlightenment of fellow compatriots was the main concern of *Anatoli*. In its initial years, the mission of *Anatoli* was to bring progress to Anatolia. When we look at the first issues of the paper published between the years 1851-1854, many articles were published about the geography and history of Orthodox settlements in interior Anatolia and different Greek dialects spoken in Cappadocia. It seems that *Anatoli*'s primary target was to create awareness and appreciation for the motherland. Further to this, an extreme emphasis was devoted to education and schools. Many news articles were about schooling activities in various Cappadocian towns; gratitude for those working for the foundation and development of schools; condemnation of those who did not work enough for the schools; and the importance of education in general. Below is an excerpt from an article written by Misailidis early in 1851 about importance of schooling:

[...] each human being comes to life as an animal but in school he leaves the state of animality and develops into a human being; he learns way and method and becomes distinguishable from animals in school. He recognizes his God and begins to contribute to world in every means and serves to his people and his God and works for the benefit of everyone [...]¹⁴⁵

Humble people always tend to disapprove of the new. When the education movement began in the second half of the nineteenth century, many were suspicious about its benefits. At the time, *Anatoli* played a prominent role in raising awareness about schooling. For example, a letter from Kermira was

¹⁴⁴ See S. Tarinas, *Ο ελληνικός τύπος της Πόλης* [The Greek Press of Istanbul]. For bibliographies of publications in *Karamanlidika*; E. Balta, *Karamanlidika: nouvelles additions et complements I*; E. Balta, *Karamanlidika: XXE siècle: Bibliographie Analytique*; E. Balta, *Karamanlidika: Additions (1584-1900)*; E. Balta, *Karamanli Press Smyrna 1845- Athens 1926*; E. Balta & Matthias Kappler, (Eds.), *Cries and whispers in Karamanlidika books*.

¹⁴⁵ E. Misailidis. (11 December 1851). Akil potasi nedir? Sholeion'dur![What is wisdom pot? It is school!]. *Anatoli*, 47.

received by the newspaper in 1852, which gave information about fundamentalists, including local prelates, who tried to prevent children from going to schools and families from contributing to school expenditures.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, a group of people in Niğde tried to prevent the establishment of a school, despite patriarchal support, using religious arguments in 1852.¹⁴⁷ It seems that in early phases of the education movement in Cappadocia there were reactionaries who tried to preserve the traditional against the potential attack of the progressive. *Anatoli*'s stance was tough against the fundamentalists. It always pursued a progressive path and even in its early years it aimed to inform its readers about any advancement in science, medicine, and technology, and also about the history of the Ottoman Empire and Anatolia, as well as about the origins and importance of Greek and Turkish languages.

In the 1850s, *Anatoli* encouraged the Anatolian Orthodox to open schools and work for their progress. Those were the initial years of schooling activities and there were many fundamentalists who condemned the schools as working for evil. In the 1890s, however, in almost all Orthodox settlements of Anatolia there were schools. This time *Anatoli* was concerned about the advancement of these schools and supported them in every respect. Firstly, it assumed the role of publishing invitations for theatric performances for the benefit of specific schools of Orthodox settlements, and encouraged Anatolians to attend those activities and contribute to the financing of schools. It also criticized those who attended performances but behaved disrespectfully during the show.¹⁴⁸ Secondly, news about schools and orphanages and their progress were frequently published; schools of special kind like the Seminary in Zincidere were introduced to the

¹⁴⁶ An anonymous letter from Kermira. (28 October 1852). *Anatoli*, 90.

¹⁴⁷ Dahiliye[Internal affairs]. (8 April 1852). *Anatoli*, 62.

¹⁴⁸ Dahiliye[Internal affairs]. (22 January 1891). *Anatoli*, 4247.

readers,¹⁴⁹ and the employees of these institutions and their benefactors were praised for their devotion to cause of enlightenment. In the end, *Anatoli* was always committed to the education and enlightenment of fellow Christians. As part of its mission it continuously published news from interior and exterior lands, articles about scientific advancements, translated pieces about child rearing, and other issues of human development, and French, Greek, and Turkish serial novels. For Şimşek, *Anatoli* promoted a secular medium in the community and tried to strengthen consciousness of citizenship rather than solely promoting religious identity (Şimşek, 2010). This is a valid interpretation for the newspaper but one should not disregard *Anatoli's* sensitivity about Orthodoxy; the newspaper informed its readers about “true faith”. Throughout its years of publication, *Anatoli* assumed the role of protector of religion, especially against the missionaries.

During its years under the editorship of Ioannis I. Kalfoglou (1892-1898) *Anatoli* was under considerable financial burden due to reader indifference. Many readers did not pay their subscription fees. At first they were warned politely; Kalfaoglou himself wrote an open letter, addressing readers as “education lover Anatolians” (İlimperver Anadolulular), that explained the sacrifices of *Anatoli* for fifty-five years, and requested graciously that Anatolians appreciate their work.¹⁵⁰ In later issues he was much more explicit in his warnings. Almost every issue included a criticism of those who did not pay their fees. The last warning article was exceptionally harsh, with the title “Why doesn’t Anatolia progress?” (Anatoli neden terakki etmiyor?); the “education lover Anatolians” were now labeled as “freeriders” (otlakçı) due to their continued unwillingness to pay their debts. Not only that, but the newspaper staff was aware that often a single issue of the newspaper was circulated among several people. For the editor this behavior by

¹⁴⁹ Kayseriye'deki Kappadokiki İeratiki Sholi [The Cappadocian seminary in Kayseri]. (12 March 1895). *Anatoli*, 5012.

¹⁵⁰ I. I. Kalfoglous. (31 August 1895). İlimperver Anadolululara[To education lover Anatolians]. *Anatoli*, 5097.

Anatolians was ruthless, and their disregard of *Anatoli* was the reason for the backwardness of Anatolia.¹⁵¹ These lines indicate that the cadre of *Anatoli* assumed the role of teacher of their fellow compatriots and the paper itself was a means for enlightenment. The founder of the paper, Evangelinos Misailidis, was referred to as the “teacher of Anatolia” (*Anadolu Hocası*)¹⁵² in the paper in the years after he passed away. It is apparent that the administrators of *Anatoli* always took their position seriously, and for this reason they were offended by the indifference of Anatolian Christians.

Subscription to *Anatoli* went from around five hundred in 1890 to closer to three hundred in 1895. This was less than half of the expected numbers, according to editors of the paper, and for this reason a discussion was started in December 1895 as to whether or not there was really a need for continuation of *Anatoli*. This discussion was initiated by the previous editor of the paper Nikolaos Soullidis.¹⁵³ As a response to Soullidis, one of the writers of the paper came up with an idea, called the rich personalities of Anatolia, to help the paper financially. Several other letters and articles about the issue were also published until the first months of the next year and all of them agreed on the fact that *Anatoli* was important for Anatolians both as a means for progress but also to save Orthodox Anatolians from the paws of Protestants and Jesuit missionaries.¹⁵⁴ Further to that, *Anatoli* was defended considering the fact that it informed its readers about their religion in their mother tongue, in contrast with the Patriarchate which totally disregarded the Turcophone Anatolian Christians and published the “Ecclesiastical Truth”

¹⁵¹ Anatoli neden terakki etmiyor? [Why does not Anatolia progress?]. (4 December 1895). *Anatoli*, 5172.

¹⁵² Hemşehrilermize [to our compatriots]. (7 February 1891). *Anatoli*, 4293.

¹⁵³ N. Soullidis. (5 December 1895). Anatoli gazetesi ser muharriri rıfatlı İoannis Kalfaoglou Efendi'ye [To editor in chief of Anatoli newspaper Mr. İoannis Kalfaoglou]. *Anatoli*, 5173.

¹⁵⁴ A. Grigoriadis. (8 December 1895). Anatoli'nin devamına lüzum var mı yok mu? [Is there a need for the continuation of Anatoli?]. *Anatoli*, 5175.

(Εκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια) only in Greek, a language that was not spoken by thousands of Anatolian Orthodox.¹⁵⁵

As opposed to *Anatoli*, *Terakki* was a short-lived periodical published in the heart of Anatolia, Nevşehir, different from *Anatoli* and *Angeliaforos*. For this reason, teachers and prominent figures of the region would write articles for the periodical. As did *Anatoli*, *Terakki* targeted progress for the Anatolian Orthodox. In the preamble of the first issue of the periodical, the low number of publications in *Karamanlidika* was discussed in a critical way, and the endeavors of Evangelinos Misailidis to enlighten Anatolia were commended.

One interesting part was the promise for the language of the periodical. The administrators stated that the language of *Terakki* would be plain Turkish, but also argued that some meanings could not be expressed with simple words, and asked for pardon if they occasionally used a high-level language.¹⁵⁶ Although the administrators of the periodical were careful about language, by its second issue *Terakki* already started to receive letters complaining about its language. A grocer, for example, asked for simple Turkish, a language that could be understood even by grocers, with an emphasis on his occupation.¹⁵⁷ There was a particularly interesting point about the letter of the grocer. Cappadocian Orthodox were known to be grocers in big cities. There was even a character called “*Karamanlı Bakkal*” (Karamanli grocer) in a traditional Ottoman shadow theatre. Referring to a common occupation of Cappadocians, *Terakki* had published an article in its first issue and in this article it had claimed that Anatolians had to follow technology and science rather than traditional ways unless they wanted to continue to be

¹⁵⁵ I. Sadeoglou. (26 February 1896). *Izhar-I hissiyat* [An expression of feelings]. *Anatoli*, 5235.

¹⁵⁶ *Erbab-ı mütalaaya* [For opinion experts]. (15 May 1888). *Terakki*, 1.

¹⁵⁷ *Bir mektup: Terakki idaresine* [A letter: to administrators of Terakki]. (30 June 1888). *Terakki*, 4.

grocers.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, most probably the writer of the letter was sarcastic in his letter and referring to this article.¹⁵⁹

I have come across complaints about the use, or lack thereof, of plain Turkish in three *Karamanlidika* publications that I used for this dissertation. The Anatolian Orthodox, if they did not receive higher education in community schools, or if they attended Ottoman schools, did not have any knowledge of Ottoman Turkish. They did not know the Ottoman alphabet, nor did they use Arabic and Persian words. Most of them barely learned how to read *Karamanlidika* in local elementary schools. For this reason, they constantly demanded plain Turkish from the editors. The editors, on the other hand, were individuals educated in higher institutions and capable of using both Ottoman Turkish and Greek (and *katharevousa*), and their purpose was educating the humble folk and raising their intellectual level, rather than publishing in line with popular standards. With this purpose, the publications promoted not only learning Greek but also writing and reading in Ottoman Turkish. As a remarkable example, *Terakki* magazine answered the complaints it received from its readers about the language with these lines:

[...] If the reason of publication of *Terakki* is to serve for the public, it has to explain itself with a medium level language; [by this way] the Anatolian could get opinion as well as he could be able to learn the Ottoman language that he already knows or does not know. [...]¹⁶⁰

Anatoli, *Terakki* and other publications in *Karamanlıca*, despite their low number of subscribers, commonly reached thousands of Turcophone Christians around Anatolia, since one single paper was circulated among many people. The most important benefit of these printed materials was that their reading public in

¹⁵⁸ M. I, Portakaloglou. (15 May 1888). *Terakki* [Progress]. *Terakki*, 1.

¹⁵⁹ For an article about *Terakki*, see M. Orakçı (2014). *Karamanlıca bir gazete: Terakki* [A Karamanlidika newspaper: *Terakki*].

¹⁶⁰ “Eğer *Terakki*’nin neşrinden maksat ulum-u maarife hizmet ise, bunu orta derecede bir lisan tasvir etmek lazımdır, ta ki Anadolu yazılan şeyden fikir ala, hem de aynı zamanda, az bildiği veya hiç bilmediği Osmanlıca lisanını da öğrenmiş ola.” Bafralı Yanko. (30 September 1888). Muharrerat: 8. nüshadan mabat [Letters: continuation from the eighth issue]. *Terakki*, 10.

Anatolia now had the necessary means to “imagine” the presence of other members of their greater Community. They could now picture how their co-religionists in Pontus, Athens, Thrace, and Macedonia were living. Anderson’s argument for Europe is valid for our case: “print capitalism made it possible for people in growing numbers to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways (Anderson, 2006, p. 36).” It would be an exaggeration to name the print press as the first example of print capitalism in the Ottoman Empire, but it certainly had an effect on people developing a consciousness about various matters, including their communal (in terms of their broader Community of co-religionists, *millet*), religious, and/or national identity.

Further to the creation of “Community” consciousness, publications helped to create a single literary language called *Karamanlidika* for the Anatolian Christian. Although there were already *Karamanlidika* publications before the nineteenth century, they were mostly religious works and were only accessible to a few people. The development of *Karamanlidika* as a literary language was made possible especially through the endeavors of Evangelinos Misailidis and his long lasting newspaper *Anatoli*. Unlike previous times when use of Turkish in written forms was rare and incoherent, proliferation of *Karamanlidika* started to create a unified culture with a special devotion to education and enlightenment, and bonded Orthodox communities of different settlements together. For a still agrarian society, these developments should be evaluated within elite endeavor. As previously mentioned in this chapter, elites, not only through publications but also through societies, assumed a great role for the realization enlightenment of Anatolian Orthodox.

In concluding this part, I want to stress a few points. It is true that schools, other educational activities, and press aimed to revive some sense of ethnic consciousness in the Orthodox populations of Cappadocia. One part of this story concludes that these attempts were successful, and several people were advantageous enough to receive education and follow newspapers. Some of them were even lucky enough to continue their academic path abroad. Yet the other part

of this story means that a lot of men found themselves living and working in foreign lands indefinitely from a very early age, due to economic scarcity and lack of education. This was also true for men and women of relatively poor settlements. Schooling, press, and the endeavors of the *syllogoi* and brotherhood organizations were indeed successful, but only to a limited extent. They could successfully inculcate a comprehension of Greek language and create proto-national bonds, but it was not until the times of violence and discrimination after the Young Turk Revolution (1908) and the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) that the national identity of ordinary people started to truly forge; their nationalization could only be finalized after their transfer to Greece and reception by the ideological apparatuses of the Greek Kingdom.

4.4 Χαλάσανε τα πράγματα (things spoiled): years after *Hürriyet*

The refugee narrative in testimonies was always filled with dichotomies. There were good Turks and bad Turks, local Turks and refugee Turks, the years before Young Turk Revolution and after it, local Greeks and refugee Greeks, life in Turkey and life in Greece, Christianity and Islam, etc. Concerning these dichotomies, one constituent of dichotomy was always relatively good and the other was always relatively bad. “Goodness” and “badness” were determined in accordance with the other component of dichotomy. Relativity is prevailing and there is no other measure to be able to test the components. For instance, the testimonies of refugees in the KMS Oral Tradition Archive portray relatively a peaceful world to the extent that they talked about the years before the Young Turk Revolution (1908), *Hürriyet*, in their own wording. Hamidian years were the “good old times” in their narratives. As suggested earlier, Doumanis interpreted these accounts in an overly positive way and named the Hamidian years as *belle époque* for the Orthodox Christians. It is questionable whether the period of Abdülhamit’s reign was really quiet and peaceful. As stated in the second chapter, in the nearby Armenian settlements in Cilicia and Cappadocia in 1894-96 Armenians were massacred with his order, and the refugees themselves expressed their fear of being killed even at the time in their testimonies. Further, press was

under strict scrutiny and censorship. I concede that refugees talked about those years in a relatively positive manner and their perceptions drastically change for the period after *Hürriyet*; however, we should evaluate their narratives in accordance with their displacement and loss of homeland after the Turco-Greek Population Exchange and the hardships that met them in their new country, not to mention the persecutions, exile, confiscations, economic boycotts, hunger, and ethnic violence they experienced during the “long war” (1912-1922). In the end, oral history is not solely about the past, it is also about present and future expectations. Therefore, when they were narrating the Hamidian years their perception of the time in question was tainted by the experiences they went through later. It should also be noted that the refugee testimonies did not tell us anything about the years before Hamidian era, since almost all of the refugees were born during and after the reign of Abdülhamit. So yes, Hamidian years were perhaps better in their narratives than the years after the Young Turk Revolution, but it was definitely not *belle époque*.

For the case of Cappadocia, fortunately, we do not need to talk about massive violence and persecutions that the Greeks of Western and Northern Anatolia suffered, since their population was small and their settlements were scattered. Further to that, Orthodox settlements in Cappadocia were half empty and consisted mainly of women, children and elderly because of male immigration throughout the nineteenth century. In a traditionally male dominated world, where clashes occurred due to male aggressiveness, this situation prevented Muslim-Orthodox clashes. Further, miserable Orthodox women started to work in the fields of Muslims and even got married to Muslim men due to economic hardships. Interestingly enough in some villages, rather than fighting with each other, Orthodox and Muslim individuals were brought closer together.

There is a common understanding that Cappadocians were mostly indifferent and did not take sides during the “long war”. Some scholars explain this situation with the isolated location of the region, both from the main centers of Hellenism and from the battlefields. I disagree with this point of view for three

reasons: firstly, Cappadocians were not indifferent to war; they had diverse views and perspectives about the war. Secondly, they were living among the Muslim masses and most of the male population was away from the homeland so they remained relatively silent out of necessity. Thirdly, Cappadocia was not an isolated region; it had strong familial, socio-political, religious, intellectual, and educational ties with coastal areas. There were Cappadocian immigrants in big coastal cities and they had strong ties with their motherlands; there was a flow of students from Cappadocia to Istanbul and Athens; the Greek Kingdom had been interested in Cappadocia for a long time and Greek consulates were already opened in some Central Anatolian *vilayets* like Konya (established in 1906); in this way Athens, in collaboration with the Ecumenical Patriarchate, mobilized its diplomatic powers to create the feeling of “mother country” for Greece (Harakopoulos, 2014). Newspapers and publications were also in circulation in the region, and Cappadocian dioceses were under the hierarchy of the Ecumenical Patriarchate for ages. In consideration with all these factors, again, I suggest that the Cappadocian Orthodox was ostensibly indifferent to war, but they actually had some perspective and stance. Due to their small number they hesitated to declare their political stance out loud. The lack of male power was a fundamental factor in their silence.

In consideration with the above-mentioned conditions, how and why did the Orthodox in Cappadocia gradually get nationalized? This is an important question, but its answer is not a complicated one and the case of the Cappadocians is not that different from the cases of the Orthodox in other Ottoman territories. As narrated above, educational activities were aimed at instilling a national consciousness into the Cappadocian communities, most of whose maternal language was Turkish. It initiated the “nationalization” process and created the “imagination” of broader Community; thus generating proto-national bonds. However, its success concerning the adoption of the Greek language was controversial; refugee testimonies show that people resisted, be it consciously or unconsciously, the adoption of the Greek language. Adding to that, the memories

of intellectuals and European travelers also showed that many of them resisted accepting the national Greek identity since they regarded it as an attack on their Christian identity. It seems that national identity was very rigid for individuals who had diverse or even contradictory identities.

Nationalism categorizes that to be an ethnic Greek one had to be a Greek speaking Orthodox Christian with a sense of attachment to the Greek cause. For the humble folk, the Greek national identity was not as important and influential as it was for Greek intellectuals. Their identity was shaped by their religion, and by village and familial bonds. Their maternal language, Turkish, was not alien to them, as it was regarded by Greek nationalists. Speaking Turkish meant speaking without thinking. As a Turcophone Greek native to Samsun expressed to me ninety years after her settlement in Greece: “I speak Turkish from my heart; it is my mother tongue; for Greek, I just speak it.” This does not mean that she feels like a Turk. Cappadocian Christians of the time occupied a third seat, outside of Turkishness or Greekness, as a quasi-literate rural community. I argue that not until their settlement in Greece did most of people adopted a national identity; Turks were no exception. National identity was alien to traditional communities. For Orthodox Christians the economic boycott of 1914, the continuous wars, the Greek campaign in Asia Minor, and the exile they suffered all forged the communal belongingness that originated from religion and was strengthened by the walls between the Self and the Other. Their previous relations with the Turks, the competitive nature of co-existence, or religious millenarianism had nothing to do with nationalism. They were first exposed to nationalistic ideals at school, but they couldn't fully grasp the its meaning until the years of war, when they began to wear it like a safe blanket. Nationalistic policies, wars, and violence were a discontinuity from the past; there was now a legitimate atmosphere to make the masses believe the nationalistic cause of the elites and politicians. Nationalism was a new phenomenon but it settled and fed on the existing features of relations and belongingness. Schools and publications planted the first seeds, but it was the war years that made most people believe in national cause to a great extent, and their

nationalization was finalized after their settlement to the Greek national state and reception by its institutions.

4.4.1 Economic boycott and exile policies of the Young Turks

The increasingly nationalistic policies of the Young Turks generated a discontinuity from the past. Such policies affected Orthodox Christians all over Anatolia. Cappadocians may have been the luckiest of all Orthodox Christians, but their testimonies show that things radically changed even in their lives. According to general refugee narration, “things spoiled: *χαλάσανε τα πράγματα*”.

The Young Turk Revolution was initially a movement promising equality to all citizens of the Ottoman Empire regardless of their religious beliefs. During its first phases it indeed created an atmosphere of freedom and generated a genuine feeling of hope for non-Muslims. In fact, they thought that the revolution would open posts for them in higher positions in the state mechanism, and help them to strengthen their position in economy. With a few exceptions, such as the Patriarchate, whose authorities feared losing their traditional power, Orthodox Christians supported the Revolution (Ahladi, 2008). In time, however, several issues, such as like general military conscription, the boycott movement first against foreigners and later against local non-Muslims, and finally persecutions, including exile and confiscation, alienated Orthodox Christians from the Ottomanist ideal of the Revolution. Cappadocians were no exception. The question here is why the Young Turks chose to diverge from their original ideas about creating a multinational federative state with a liberal constitution. For Mourelos (1985), the successive defeats of 1911 and 1912-1913, the almost total loss of the Ottoman territories in North Africa and the Balkans, and the change in the ethnic composition of the population with a predominantly Turkish element resulted in the creation of strong nationalist tendencies.

Especially from 1913 onwards the Young Turk program evolved into a triptych: Westernization, Turkification, and Islamization. The latter two went hand

in hand because Turkification could only be effective on the Muslim population. The Muslim religion played a facilitating role in Turkification of the Muslim population, and Turkish state bourgeoisie was the instrument of modernization of society. These two policies would eventually de-Otomanize the state, society, and Anatolia (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). By early 1908 the Committee of Union and Progress (hereinafter CUP) had already initiated a movement of Turkification in the economy by means of eliminating foreign elements from the Turkish economy through the Boycott Movement. Different foreign merchants and the business activities within the Ottoman Empire of foreign countries such as Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, United States, and Greece were the targets of this policy. The reasons for the boycott movements were mainly political. For example, Austria-Hungary's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the reason for boycotting the Austrian products. Intensification of the boycott of European products affected non-Muslims severely. Non-Muslim merchants had been benefiting from the absorption of the Ottoman economy into the world capitalist economy throughout the nineteenth century and they had been operating under the protection of the Great Powers. Accordingly, when a Muslim protest spoke out against foreign states, including Greece, the native merchants acting in close collaboration with the Great Powers and those who could benefit from the opportunities provided by the capitulations suffered just as much as the foreign merchants. As the boycott movement strengthened its network and organization, the resentment of non-Muslim communities increased.

The call for a National Economy (*Milli İktisat*) gradually led to a demand for a Muslim/Turkish dominance in the Ottoman economy (Çetinkaya, 2010). In 1909 and, particularly, 1910 the economic dominance of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire slowly became one of the main intentions of this political and economic protest movement. The movement slowly moved against native non-Muslims who subsequently suffered greatly. The protests against Crete's call for *enosis* (union) with Greece provoked a wave of political meetings. Ottomans started to call for a boycott against particularly Greek merchandise in the years

1910-1911. The boycott organizations, which were mainly comprised of port workers, notables, and low-ranking bureaucrats, were reactivated during the mass meetings against Greece. Within a short time, problems emerged regarding the definition of what was Greek. The boycott officially targeted the Hellenes, the citizens of the Greek state, and exempted the Greek citizens of the Ottoman Empire. Yet the Greek community and the patriarchate argued that the Ottoman Greeks were also influenced by the boycott, since both groups had deep and close relationships (Çetinkaya, 2010).

Emmanuil Emmanuilidis, a deputy of CUP between the years 1912-1919 who I mentioned earlier in this chapter, wrote about the boycott movement taking place in 1914 in his memoir, saying, “economic boycott was declared in mosques, societies and in newspaper articles for the sake of God and the prophet. Muslims were prevented of shopping from the non-Muslims and the transactions would be annulled. If one rejected it, he was beaten severely and the object was destroyed. The law was named as “national revival” (*milli uyanış*).¹⁶¹ The boycott movement affected the Cappadocian Orthodox merchants as well. The resentment against the movement was quite clear in a refugee testimony:

In 1908, the Young Turks appointed Tahir Bey to our city. He first visited the Orthodox and Armenian Churches and then gathered the Turks in Paşa Mosque. He made them promise before our eyes and said: “donkeys! You surrendered the city to Christians; I don’t see any single trading activity at your hands; Christians made you their slaves. Afterwards, the wealthy Turks of Bor initiated a company to dispose us but they could not succeed. We started to lose. Turks confidentially entered Christian trade; they were buying for cheaper and were able to bring better goods. The Young Turks encouraged them to enter trading. In time, especially during the time of Kemal [Mustafa Kemal Paşa], things got worse. Young Turks started to force Turks to abandon shopping from Christian stores.”¹⁶²

¹⁶¹ See E. Emmanuilidis, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son yılları* [The last years of the Ottoman Empire].

¹⁶² KMS, Cappadocia, Bor, Sofoklis Fakidis, Dim. Haralambidis.

In another testimony an interviewee narrated how Christian possessions changed hands during the long war:

They bring you an illiterate Turk to be employed. After a while they want you to take him as your partner. In few months he wants to change his work and by this way you lose your own shop. In the end, shopkeepers were forced to be dependent on Turkish aghas and merchants.¹⁶³

The Turkification of the economy, particularly through the boycott movement, and the following ethnic cleansing policies led to the final and irrevocable decline of the Greek Ottoman bourgeoisie (Exertzoglou, 1999). In 1914, right after the outbreak of World War I, thousands of Greeks were forced to either convert to Islam or leave Western Anatolia and Thrace for Greece. This policy was justified with security concerns in coastal and border areas; the Turkish army claimed to be caught between two fires: foreign enemies vs. internal enemies (Emmanuilidis, 2014). Around the time of the 1914 cleansing operation, the Ottoman diplomatic minister in Athens, Galip Kemali (Söylemezoğlu), proposed to the Greek authorities that the Muslims of the Greek administrative provinces of Macedonia and Epirus should be exchanged with the rural Greek population of the Smyrna province and Ottoman Thrace. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos seemed to approve of this idea of exchange on the condition that it would be voluntary and that the persecution and forced migration of Greeks would cease. Unfortunately, the outbreak of WWI prevented the project of exchange (Mourellos, 1985; Bjørnlund, 2008).

Administrative harassment was followed by the persecutions of bandits (*başıbozuk*) in Western Anatolia. Among them were Cretans who suffered at the hands of Greeks and who wanted to take revenge (Bjørnlund, 2008: 47). To a lesser extent, bandits persecuted people in Cappadocia, especially after the termination of Turco-Greek war. Among these settlements there were

¹⁶³ KMS, Cappadocia, Bor, Papakostis Papadopoulos.

Bereketlimaden and Gürümce (Kurumza).¹⁶⁴ According to Ottoman sources, 163.975 people were forced out of only from the Northwestern Anatolia to Greece (Gingeras, 2009). Exile policies continued throughout the Great War. Pontus region and, to a minor degree, Cappadocia were no exceptions, and the reasons for exile were always security concerns and rebellious activities of the Orthodox. Refugee testimonies show how the Orthodox suffered after the Young Turk revolution. As previously stated, they usually made a distinction between the years before and after the Young Turk Revolution: “before *Hürriyet*, our Turks never harmed us; only the foreigners would bully us.”¹⁶⁵ “We got along well with the Turks and lived like brothers; after the constitution, however, they got wild and wanted to kill all the Christians but the governor (*mutasarrıf*) of Niğde did not let them do it.”¹⁶⁶ Testimonies also reveal the times of exile:

*Two-three years before the Exchange, Turks forced many Orthodox to exile from Western shores to interior lands. All of them were fifteen to sixty years old males. We hosted in our village around sixty men from Isparta. They stayed for several days and left our village for nearby villages. Only ten of them stayed in our village. We helped them.*¹⁶⁷

*In 1919, expatriate Christians from Antalya, Isparta, Alanya and Silifke came to our village. They stayed with us and we all left with the Exchange.*¹⁶⁸

My husband was a soldier in Kırşehir. Once he went to a public bath and met a friend of his. This guy met a Christian girl on the road. She was speaking Greek to him. All her family members were in exile. She lost her father and elder sister on the road. Her mother and her younger sister were killed before her eyes. A Turkish colonel wanted to marry her off to

¹⁶⁴ See P. Kitromilides, (Ed.), *Η Έξοδος τόμος Β': μαρτυρίες από τις επαρχίες της Κεντρικής και Νότιας Μικρασίας* [The exodus volume 2: testimonies from Central and Southern provinces of Asia Minor].

¹⁶⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Limna-Gölcük, Mihail Savvidis.

¹⁶⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Niğdi-Niğde, Konstantinos Haleplidis Elisavet Hasirtzoglou.

¹⁶⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Ağırnas, Avraam Avramidis.

¹⁶⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Zincidere, Katina Piniatoglou.

*his brother in law but she rejected. My husband and his friend helped this girl to escape and she joined the other expatriates.*¹⁶⁹

The boycott movement and, later, the exile policies of the Young Turks were part of their economic and political homogenization policies. Non-Muslims were no longer seen as members of a whole that used to comprise the Ottoman nation, now instead it was the Turkish nation. Muslim groups could be absorbed by the Turkish nation in the long run, but non-Muslims were seen as betrayers and their presence was regarded as harmful for the prospective Turkish nation. Tolerance was rapidly replaced by persecution. The constitutive Other of the Self had become a “constitutive foe” for a nation to be realized. In the end all nations require a “foe” to come into being. The nationalist aggressiveness of the CUP leadership raised the communal borders at societal level; however, individual responses were still torn between resentment of the state and the need to protect the existing, to remain in ones hometown, to survive, and to continue economic transactions.

4.4.2 General military conscription and the long war

Under the CUP administration compulsory military service entered the lives of the Orthodox in 1909 as one of the first causes of resentment. The idea first came to table in 1855 when the *jizya* tax levied upon non-Muslims was abolished in order to generate equal citizenship for everyone. At the time, military service was made compulsory for everyone, and the decision became official with the Reform Decree (Islahat Fermanı) in 1856. However, non-Muslims were reluctant to serve for the army and the decision was not applied. A tax in lieu of military service called *bedelat-ı askeriye* was open to everyone, including Muslims, who did not want to be conscripted.¹⁷⁰ In August 1909, the compulsory

¹⁶⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Neapoli, Sofronia Georgiadou.

¹⁷⁰ The amount paid by the Muslims was more than that paid by the non-Muslims (8000 *kuruş* and 5000 *kuruş*, respectively). For those who served for the army, conscription was based on lots. One from every 180 men would be conscripted. Therefore, every 180 people payed the *bedel* of one man. In the end, the amount paid by every non-Muslim was more or less equal to the amount previously paid as *jizya* (*cizye*).

military service law was enacted and most of the non-Muslim deputies supported the idea with reference to equal citizenship.¹⁷¹ At the grassroots level, however, many young Christian men, especially Greeks, who were wealthy enough and had overseas connections, opted to leave the country or obtain a foreign passport. For example, many males of Sulucaova (Kayseri) were exempted from military obligations when they either left for Western countries or paid a certain amount of money (Harakopoulos, 2014). Several of them, rather than leaving the country, changed their nationality or paid a larger amount called *bedel-i nakti* (along with the prosperous Muslims) but they too were recruited during the First World War. Most non-Muslim soldiers worked in labor battalions (*amele taburları*) doing repair work on roads and railways, or carrying supplies to the front, and most were unarmed.¹⁷² For Sir Samuel Hoare conscription of non-Muslims in labor battalions was the most effective way of exterminating the Christian populations employed by the Young Turks.¹⁷³ Below you will find refugee testimonies that portray the consequences of general military conscription from the perspective of lay people.

*Greeks were also conscripted in the Balkan Wars. The ones who did not have forty-four golden liras were recruited. [In our town] sixty men paid the amount and one thousand two hundred men joined the army. It seems that they were not good soldiers because in the European War [they call the World War European War] they were recruited not in the army but in the labor battalions.*¹⁷⁴

Beginning from Hürriyet [they also call it Syntagma which means constitution in Greek], it began to be difficult for us because before we were paying an amount not to become soldiers. With Hürriyet, they recruited us as soldiers. The rich people could settle their children in

¹⁷¹ See M. Hacısalıhoğlu, Osmanlı imparatorluğunda zorunlu askerlik sistemine geçiş: ordu-millet düşüncesi [Transition to compulsory military service system in the Ottoman Empire: the thought of nation in arms].

¹⁷² See E. J. Zürcher, The Ottoman Conscription System In Theory And Practice, 1844-1918.

¹⁷³ See G. Kritikos, Motives for the compulsory exchange.

¹⁷⁴ KMS, Cappadocia, Prokopi, Eust. Eu8imiadis, Elisavet Isaakidou.

*wherever they wanted since they had money. The ones who suffered were the children of poor people. They served as soldiers.*¹⁷⁵

*During the war [1914] they recruited me, my brother and my father in the army. [...] We laid out the roads.*¹⁷⁶

*We hid inside keleria (cellars) not to become soldiers during seferberlik [campaign]. I was recruited only for ten or twelve days. Afterwards, I brought a false document showing that I am forty five and I was not taken as soldier again.*¹⁷⁷

According to refugee testimonies, the conditions in the army were much worse for the non-Muslims since they would be working in labor battalions and the wars were continuous. For this reason, the ones who could afford *bedel-i nakti* did not serve in the army. Among the poor, many ran away from the Ottoman army and hid in cellars (underground settlements of Cappadocia), which they called *keleri*.

Deserters were not few in number but there were also people who continued to serve in the Ottoman army and, later, in the army of Mustafa Kemal during the Turkish-Greek War (1919-1922). People had various attachments and most of their behaviors were shaped by fear during the long war. While some people tried to show their attachment to the Turkish cause, many others sought to run away or to be dismissed. Also, we cannot disregard the perplexed people whose national attachment was shaped by either self-interest or personal antipathy to Greek or Turkish nationalists for some reason. An interesting figure with a confused mind was Kosmas Serafeimidis. Blocked by the trenches of the Turkish nationalists in Mersin, he went to the Lesvos Island from the port of Mersin in 1920 in order to be a volunteer in Greek army in Izmir. He was a Turkophone Orthodox, and was rejected for this very reason. Later, we see him as a volunteer in Turkish army; eventually he reached Izmir and became a postman in the

¹⁷⁵ KMS, Cappadocia, Tynana, Vas. Seferiadis.

¹⁷⁶ KMS, Cappadocia, Misti, Mak. Damianoglou.

¹⁷⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Misti Georg. Mpolasih. ?

department of boxes in a local post office.¹⁷⁸ There were different soldier stories narrating diverse attachments of individuals. It seems that although soldiers fought for either the Turkish or Greek national cause, their national identities were still not concrete and were mostly shaped by fear, weariness, and resentment, and changed in according to the circumstances. For example, Ioannis *Çavuş* (sergeant) from Karacaören fought in the Ottoman army beginning from 1914. In 1920 he was recruited by the army of Mustafa Kemal; in 1923 he was dismissed and returned to his village.¹⁷⁹ Similarly, Eleftherios Iosifidis worked in the labor battalions of the Turkish army in Sivas between the years 1921-1922.¹⁸⁰ Dimitrios Misailidis, on the other hand, ran away from the Ottoman army in 1914 and lived in the mountains with a false Turkish identity until the armistice. In 1919 or 1920 he was recruited to the army of Mustafa Kemal, when he again ran away with his compatriots.¹⁸¹ Alexandros Yagtzoglou, a gynecologist from Niğde, was recruited by the Ottoman Army in 1914 and served in Black Sea, Iraq, and Iran until 1918. Between 1919 and 1924 he got closer with the army of Mustafa Kemal.¹⁸² Deserters, dismissed soldiers, and voluntary fighters, among other things, the Orthodox of Cappadocia responded in many different ways during the continuous wars. Some of them believed in the Greek cause and expected to be saved by Greece. However, there were also perplexed individuals who were altering sides in accordance with the shifting conditions. We cannot even be sure that people supported the Greek cause with nationalistic feelings. It might still have been millenarianism; they could have desired to be saved from the Muslims, as devoted Christians who believed that their punishment by God to be dominated by the “infidel” had to end. One way or another, continuous wars and the ultimate

¹⁷⁸ KMS, Cappadocia, Limna, Kosmas Serafeimidis.

¹⁷⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Karatzoren, Ioannis Misailoglou.

¹⁸⁰ KMS, Cappadocia, Zile, Eleftherios Iosifidis.

¹⁸¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Akso, Dimitrios Misailidis.

¹⁸² KMS, Cappadocia, Niğde, Aleksandros Giagtzoglou.

displacement of peoples strengthened the borders of communities, and the final separation of communities completed their nationalization through ideological state apparatuses.

The war years were endless hardships. The number of losses had never been so huge. Death was not natural phenomenon at the time. Thousands of people killed each other and there was no sacred cause behind it, as not only soldiers but also civilians lost their lives. This abundance of loss created emptiness in people's souls. What was the reason for all this suffering? At this very time, the ideal and feeling of nationalism arrived to save masses from emptiness or misery. People understood that all the hardships suffered until that time was for the benefit of the nation. Losses and despair suddenly became meaningful. National identity was no longer something to be escaped; it was not an alien swallowing religious identity, but rather a safe blanket at a time when religion remained inadequate to answer the question of why. Up until that time it was an empty concept for the humble masses, but now it became a sanctified cause for the sake of which millions could die.¹⁸³

4.4.3 Turkish Greek War and the movement of Papa Efthim

During the war years, the Anatolian Orthodox met a problem that they had never faced before. For the first time, they realized that they could be forced to leave their motherlands. The Armenians had already experienced that end, and the same could happen to them as well. In this sense, Papa Efthim was in a way a savior for many of the Orthodox. Efthim was a realist whose decisions were in line with the changing circumstances of the time. He was also a passionate personality who was always sought for leadership opportunities.

Efthim, originally from Akdağmağden, was appointed in Keskin Maden as a priest by the Metropolitan of Trabzon in 1918. He established the “Turkish

¹⁸³ I am particularly inspired by Jay Winter's lecture titled “sites of memory, sites of mourning” in Open Yale courses for the class “History 202: European Civilization, 1648-1945” in this paragraph.

Orthodox Church” (1921) and aimed to separate the Turkish-speaking congregation of the Anatolian interior from the Ecumenical Patriarchate, with the support and direct involvement of the Ankara government (Benlisoy, 2002). For him, “the Orthodox community was “deservedly” (emphasis is mine) under rage as a disastrous consequence of Phanar’s inimical activities towards the government. It was Phanar’s irrational policies that were responsible for all the suffering they had been living through at the hands of Turks, so it was natural that Turks enraged against the Orthodox Christians in consideration with the activities of Phanar in Istanbul. The Turkish government had protected the interest, life, property and honor of the Orthodox community for five hundred years; therefore, the Orthodox community should have been obedient and loyal.”¹⁸⁴ The landing of Greek troops and the support by Phanar of the Greek cause threatened the lives of thousands of Anatolian Christians; Efthim claims that these were his reasons to get close with the Ankara government and initiate the project of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate in Anatolia (Papa Efthim, 1925).

The Ankara government followed an open policy of separating the Anatolian Orthodox from the Phanar. The reason for this support, according to Benlisoy, was to weaken and counter the Greek and foreign propaganda on the “Turkish atrocities” towards the Anatolian non-Muslim by providing assistance to Papa Efthim and the “Turkish Orthodox Church” project. It was also a way to oppose the Greek territorial claims on Asia Minor since the Turkish national church was demonstrating that there were no “unredeemed Greeks” in Anatolia but Christian Turks (Benlisoy, 2002). As an indicative example of these concerns, the former Minister of Justice and deputy of Saruhan Refik Şevket Bey informed the government with a memorandum dated 26th of July that the foundation of a Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate would curb the power of the Phanar and at the same time would show that there was no minority issue in Anatolia (Benlisoy, 2002).

¹⁸⁴ Papa Efthim Efendi’nin Orthodoxos Ahaliye Müracaatı ve Patrikhaneye karşı müdafaanamesi [Papa Efthim Efendi’s appeal to Orthodox community and his apology against the Patriarchate]. (1925). *Karamanlidika* book collection. Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

The support given to the Turkish cause by Papa Eftim seems to be no exception. Beginning in 1919, telegrams and petitions, argued to be coming from Orthodox Christians to Ankara government claiming that they were Turkish and they were against the inimical activities of Phanar against the Turkish cause, were published in newspapers like *İkdam*, *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, *Sada-yı Hak* (İzmir), *İstikbal* (Trabzon) and *Yeni Şark*. By 1921 the number of telegrams increased and they repeated their wish for the foundation of a Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate. The telegrams came from various parts of Anatolia, including Safranbolu, Isparta, Samsun, Kastamonu, and Sivas. As an indicative example of such telegrams, eleven notables and the local priest, in the name of the 2749 Orthodox residents of Safranbolu, sent a petition to Ankara asking for the foundation of a Turkish Orthodox Church in a proper locality of Anatolia. The Christian notables of Safranbolu affirmed that they were Turks in their language, tradition and origins; but because they were under the pressure of the Patriarchate that served Pan-Hellenic ideals, they could not express in public their real nationality (*milliyet-i asliyemiz*). The petition was published in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* on the 1st of May 1921 (Benlisoy, 2002). For Benlisoy, we cannot be sure whether these letters represent the real wishes and loyalty of the Anatolian Christian communities to the Ankara government. They might even be made up in a way, by forcing the Orthodox communities to express such opinions (Benlisoy, 2002), or perhaps simply some of them were real and some were false. No matter how the Orthodox expressed their will during war time, we can hypothesize that people were anxious about the possibility of losing their lives, their long lived routines, and, of course, their motherlands, leading them to pursue every possible way to save themselves. For this reason they seem to be tangled between Turkishness and Greekness during the Turco-Greek War.

The Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate was eventually founded on September 21st, 1922 in Zincidere, Kayseri. It was not an exception when we consider the previous endeavors of Slavic churches and even the Greek national church to

separate themselves from the Ecumenical Patriarchate.¹⁸⁵ However, it remained weak and unrecognized after the termination of the war and the uprooting of much of the Anatolian Orthodox population due to displacement as a result of the Population Exchange.

Coming back to Papa Efthim himself, as claimed in the manuscript of a refugee from Keskin Maden, Papa Efthim came and went between Greek and Turkish nationalisms. In fact, he changed his side in accordance with the changing circumstances during the war. According to an informant of KMS, in the first years of the Greek occupation in Western Anatolia, Efthim brought to the village a Greek fiver that had Venizelos's picture on it, and this made the community very happy. For the informant, Efthim was like the biggest gift from God; whatever he said or wanted was a holy command or a national mandate for the community. During the war, he was continuously going to Ankara, and they knew that he had good relations with Mustafa Kemal. It is because of this that the Christians of Keskin Maden were saved from exile; four days after their uprooting they returned to their village, thanks to Efthim. Through the last phases of war, Papa Efthim was mostly away wandering around Christian settlements. Once he gathered the community in Keskin and warned Orthodox Christians that they needed to change their attitude in order to stay in Turkey. He aspired to power and wanted to be the patriarch of the Turkish Church, and with this in mind he chose to become Turk.¹⁸⁶ In refugee testimonies, only for the case of Papa Efthim, becoming "Turk" was not associated with becoming Muslim. Papa Efthim kept his religious identity but became a "Turk" in ideal. Efthim's case was a unique case of a "secular" approach to ethnicity in refugee narration. As we have seen in the previous chapter, refugees often labeled women who got married to Turks and converted to Islam as having been "Turkified".

¹⁸⁵The Orthodox Churches in Greece, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania declared their independence or autocephaly unilaterally in 1833, 1865, 1870 and 1922-37 respectively. See F. Benlisoy, Papa Eftim and the foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church, pp. 26-35.

¹⁸⁶ KMS manuscripts, Galatia, Keskin Maden, Nikos Fotiadis.

Refugee testimonies about Papa Efthim provide us with contradictory views about him and his Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate movement:

I don't know where Papa Efthim was from. We had learned how he had his own separate church in Poli (The City; short version of Constantinople in Greek). Christians would not go to his church because they knew how he became Turk. This could be a lie because an acquaintance of mine told me that a woman in Istanbul saw the Virgin Mary in her dream and she asked her "Why don't you go to the church of Efthim?" and ordered "go to his church". If he was bad, why would she see that dream? At the time we learned how he visited the villages and made goodness. We waited for him like we waited for god. They wanted to take for exile fifty men of our village. When he came (Efthim), we found him. In two days he brought our people from exile. He would be friends with many Turks. Whomever he wanted, he brought from exile because he was supported by Kemal.¹⁸⁷

We were not harmed by the Turks until the time brigands emerged in 1919 but they did not touch us thanks to Papa Efthim.¹⁸⁸

I met Papa Efthim in Prokopi. Kemal sent him to make a tour with deputy of Adrianoupoli [Edirne] Tanis Bey in Greek villages to persuade the Christians to proceed with Kemal [Mustafa Kemal Paşa] in order not to leave their villages [...] Later that day he invited the council of elderly and some rich people of Prokopi to school. He called me too. When we gathered, he started to talk about Kemal and tried to persuade each one of us to demand to stay in our village. "We knew the Turks very well. We have been living with them from since the years of our great grand fathers. What would we do in Greece? Kemal wanted our good" he said. He also told about his relation to Kemal. (How he met him etc.) We listened to him but we did not want to stay with the Turks. We even did not want to hear about it. We wanted to come to Greece but now we don't find it as we expected.¹⁸⁹

We can never know Papa Efthim's motivation to become "Turk". It is very likely that he wanted to protect the Anatolian Orthodox from being deported and his desire coincided with the Ankara government's policies of abolishing the Phanar. As a passionate person, he could also satisfy his ego of becoming a patriarch by completely breaking with the Phanar in the end. For Psomiades, the

¹⁸⁷ KMS, Cappadocia, Neapoli-Nevşehir, Sofronia Georgiadou.

¹⁸⁸ KMS, Galatia, Keskin Maden, K. Giorgiadis.

¹⁸⁹ KMS, Cappadocia, Prokopi, Sythimios Sofoulis.

Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios IV (patriarch since 1921) was against any disciplinary action against Papa Efthim and the other prelates supporting him, like the Metropolitan of Konya Prokopios, and bishops Meletios and Yervas; he was even prepared to set up “a special ecclesiastical province” to meet their demands.¹⁹⁰ However, Efthim was zealous and his extremism proved an embarrassment even to the Ankara government (Clogg, 2006).

Papa Efthim’s movement remained weak after the uprooting of the Anatolian Orthodox as a result of the signing of a convention concerning the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey. In the beginning of the Lausanne negotiations Turkish-speaking Christians were thought to be exempt from the Exchange. İsmet Paşa argued that Anatolian Christians never demanded treatments differing from that enjoyed by their Turkish compatriots. Venizelos and Lord Curzon also didn’t oppose the idea that the Turkish speaking Orthodox could remain in their place. As negotiations continued, the Turkish delegation insisted in its anti-Greek sentiment and wanted to expel the Ecumenical Patriarchate and replace it with the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate of Papa Efthim; on the other hand, the Greek delegation, as well as American and British representatives were firmly opposed to the idea. In the end, Venizelos assured the Turkish delegation that the Patriarchate would stay only to meet the ceremonial needs of the Greek community in Istanbul. This shifted the idea of the Turkish delegation about the Anatolian Orthodox, because thousands of people could be hard to deal with concerning the possibility that they might insist on being loyal to the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate. As for the Greek point of view, the presence of thousands of Orthodox Christians as the congregation of a Turkish Church would be able to curb the power of Greek Orthodox Patriarchate and even terminate its presence in

¹⁹⁰ See H. J. Psomiades, *The Ecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic: the first ten years*, pp. 61-62; T. Ergene, *İstiklal harbinde Türk Ortodoksları* [The Turkish Orthodox in the Independence War], pp. 25-26.

the long term.¹⁹¹ In the end the Anatolian Orthodox was the very last group of people to leave Turkey during the Exchange; Papa Efthim and his family were exempted with a special resolution; his movement remained weak. The number of followers of the Turkish Church has been debated, but most probably it consists of very few people.

If promoted more sensitively, the project of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate would be beneficial for the Anatolian Orthodox. In the end humble Anatolians most of whom had slight information about Greece were uprooted and suffered incomprehensively during and after their journey to Greece and their reception at the hands of indigenous Greek population was not always a happy one (Clogg, 2006). It would also be an opportunity for the Turkish nationalism to embrace more civic values because the presence of Turkish Christians in the country could prove that Turks might have other religious beliefs as well. The Anatolian Orthodox was unfortunately abandoned easily both by Turkish and Greek politicians. During Lausanne negotiations their future was locked onto the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Greece was not ready to receive another flow of refugees (or exchangees) and Turkey could accept the Anatolian Orthodox only if the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate would be expelled from the country. As a result of the negotiations, Turkey was forced to accept the stay of the Ecumenical Patriarchate and Greece was forced to accommodate a new mass of refugees. Turkish politicians always regarded Phanar as a Trojan horse and wished to reduce its power to that of a local church. The presence of almost one hundred thousand Anatolian Orthodox, the potential congregation of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, caused problems for the country in the long run due to their nationalist stance.

¹⁹¹ See O. Yildirim, *Diplomacy and displacement*, pp. 75-76; H. J. Psomiades, *The Oecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic: the first ten years*, p. 62.

4.5 Summary and plan of the next chapter

In the previous chapter, I argued that there was contestation between religious communities of Cappadocia in regard to keeping communal borders and not to losing members to other communities. Antagonistic tolerance was prevailing, according to which Muslims were the power holders and the Christians were passive subjects who could only wield consent. I additionally made a distinction between inter-personal and inter-communal relations not to be trapped by Ottoman romanticism. According to this distinction, although inter-personal relations were close and sometimes even intimate, inter-communal relations were competitive and communal borders were concrete. This ecosystem of co-habitation did not lead to a major inter-communal conflict and even in the years of discontinuity from Young Turk Revolution to the Exchange of Populations between Greece and Turkey, Cappadocia remained relatively less conflictual and silent. In this chapter, I have been concerned mostly with the external parameters that affected the Cappadocian ecosystem and helped transform the social identity of the Anatolian Orthodox.

Until the nineteenth century immigration in Cappadocia occurred due to push factors, since the soil was arid and the area was isolated from other areas as transportation facilities were scarce. In the nineteenth century, however, immigration took place due to pull factors since major port cities grew after the introduction of European capital into the Ottoman Empire. At the time, Cappadocia lost the majority of its male power due to emigration, especially to big port cities. Unlike previous centuries, transportation provided a necessary means to keep connection between homeland and *xenitia*. The link was strong and the remittances of immigrants to Orthodox settlements of Cappadocia initiated a new epoch of enlightenment in Cappadocia. These developments overlapped with newly founded Greek Kingdom's cultural irredentism and Patriarchal response to missionary activities and to nationalisms of other Orthodox folks through schooling activities. Societies found in Athens and Istanbul, as well as brotherhood

organizations of the Cappadocians themselves aimed at enlightening the Anatolian Orthodox and sowing the seeds of ethnic consciousness. In this process, the *Karamanlidika* press, owned by the Orthodox, and the longstanding *Anatoli* newspaper had a special importance since they emphasized in particular the role of education, the protection of religion, and the teaching of Greek language. All these developments created a sort of greater Community consciousness in the minds of those who received education and we might argue that these people started to develop not yet national but proto-national consciousness. In terms of nationalization, Cappadocians maintained a heterogeneous position until the long war, and their nationalization was not completed in full until their accommodation by the Greek Kingdom following their expulsion. For the time between the 1870s and 1920s, there were Greek nationalists who received an education in Athens and Istanbul, there were proto-nationalists who receive an education from nationalist teachers in their homelands, there were illiterate traditional people who were still strongly attached to their religion, and there were Ottomanists among the elites who support the well-being of the Empire and status quo among the Cappadocians. Refugee narratives make a distinction between times before and after *Hürriyet*. According to testimonies, “things spoiled” after the Young Turk Revolution. Nationalist policies of the CUP, which firstly aimed at a “national economy” and secondly at a “religiously homogeneous” country, created a lot extent of resentment among the Cappadocian Orthodox, as it did among the Orthodox of other regions. Before the *Hürriyet*, they had relatively less problems with the Ottoman state apparatus and its officials. In accordance with that there is a “before and after *Hürriyet*” dichotomy in which “before *Hürriyet*” is restricted by the life duration of refugees whom could have born in 1860s at earliest. Doumanis refers to years before the Revolution as *belle époque*, an argument with which I completely disagree. The years before *Hürriyet* could have been relatively better compared to hardships experienced afterwards, but it was also a period of censorship of press, persecution, and strict Islamist policies.

For the humble folk, even as late as the Turco-Greek War (1919-1922), people's identities were entangled between saving their lives and resentment against nationalist Turkish aggressiveness. As a small community with slight male power among the Muslim masses, the Anatolian Orthodox remained relatively silent and passive during war years. For this reason, the "nationalization" process of the Cappadocian Orthodox could only be completed after their expulsion to Greece. All in all, the competitive ecosystem worked well with almost no inter-communal conflict in Cappadocia until the time of discontinuity, a time period marked by continuous wars, which I call "long war", the nationalist policies of CUP including boycott movement, exile, and persecution. All these strengthened the communal borders and started to create "national" awareness but complete nationalization occurred only after the final separation of peoples with the Exchange and absorption of refugees into the Greek nation through ideological state apparatuses.

Following an analysis of the "nationalization" process of the Cappadocian Orthodox, the "denationalization" process of potential members of the Greek nation through conversion to Protestantism will be presented in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

5 TOLERATING THE HERETICS: THE DISTINCTIVE CASE OF GREEK PROTESTANTS

I have thus far analyzed the position of Orthodox Christians in the Anatolian interior vis-à-vis their Muslim neighbors, as well as portrayed a picture of competitive living together, and examined the scope of tolerance performed by privileged Muslims towards the Christians. Finally, I explored the process of nationalization of the Orthodox community in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. The years before and after the Young Turk Revolution were varied when it came to indifference and intolerance. In both cases, however, the non-Muslims were left in the position of being (in)tolerated. The only thing they could do in their relation with the ruling polity was to consent. In this chapter I will investigate the position of Orthodox Christians as “tolerators” in their relation with the Protestants, some of whom had familial bonds with them. The situation is complex and the scope of reaction towards the Protestants varied from persecution to negative tolerance, though there were some anomalies, like the case of *Zincidere*, in which there was a non-conflictual center of seemingly irreconcilable denominations, namely Orthodoxy and Protestantism.

Conversion to Protestantism in the nineteenth century was regarded as an attack not only on dogma but also on tradition for the Orthodox. It would also mean *denationalization* since Orthodox Christianity became the main component of “Greekness” after the foundation of the Kingdom of Greece (1832). Interestingly enough, during the years of long war, the boundaries between the Orthodox and the Protestant communities ostensibly faded away in some regions like Pontus. Nonetheless, this situation did not eventually end up in total acceptance of Protestants by the Orthodox in contemporary Greece. In this chapter, the Greek Evangelical community will be explored in their relation with the community out of which they came out in the late nineteenth century in Asia

Minor. By this way firstly their presence will be introduced to history writing in which they have remained invisible because studies have focused on the Armenian Protestants. Secondly, the exclusive case of Greek Protestants as passive objects of tolerance and as a challenge to Greek nationalism will be analyzed.

It is difficult to find a term for a person who was originally Orthodox Christian, later became Protestant and Turkish speaking, and had not yet encountered or was to encounter nationalistic ideals. He or she cannot simply be called Protestant because of the need to distinguish between previously Orthodox newly Protestant communities and the missionaries and Armenian Protestants in Anatolia at the time. To make it easier for me and for the reader I have decided to call them Greek Protestants. Here the term Greek does not refer to their ethnicity, but to their previous membership of the Greek Orthodox congregation.

The studies about Protestantism in the Ottoman Empire have always focused on the activities of missionaries, not on the Protestants themselves. On one side, the missionaries praised themselves on their work and their success in converting people to the “genuine” path of God. On the other side, those who faced the “evil” objectives of the missionaries imprecated proselytism. In Turkey most of the studies about Protestantism focus on the educational activities of the missionaries, their inimical positions during the grand war, and the “damage” given to Turkish culture and society.¹⁹² In such nationalist scholarship, there is an obvious enmity. For Greeks, the studies focus on the rivalry between the missionaries and the church authorities. In fact, the enmity in ecclesiastical sources the time was especially counter-missionary.¹⁹³ As expected, the Church authorities

¹⁹² For such scholarship, see H. Ertuğrul, *Azınlık ve yabancı okullarının Türk toplumuna etkisi* [The impact of minority and foreign schools on Turkish society]; İ. P. Haydaroğlu, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda yabancı okullar* [Foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire]; H. Özsoy, *Kayseri’de Amerikan misyoner faaliyetleri ve Talas Amerikan Koleji* [American Missionary Activities in Kayseri and Talas American College].

¹⁹³ For a nineteenth century source concerning Orthodox reaction to Protestant missionaries, see K. H. N. Lamprylos, *Ο Μισσιοναρισμός και προτεσταντισμός εις τας Ανατολάς: Ἦτοι Διαγωγή των Προτεσταντῶν Μισσιοναρίων εις τα μέρη μας, εις τινὰ τε ἄλλα τῆς γῆς μέρη. Καὶ σχέσεις του Προτεσταντισμοῦ προς τὴν Μητέρα πασῶν των Εκκλησιῶν καὶ το Ἑλληνικόν Ἔθνος* [The missions

did not want to lose their members either in favor of denominations like Catholicism and Protestantism or in favor of Islam. The religious authorities wanted to protect the community borders and keep their congregation intact. Further, in the nineteenth century loss of members also meant loss of the prospective members of recently invented nations. Deringil (2012) calls this situation *denationalization*. Indeed, the converts were seen as potential traitors of the nation. Additionally, religion in the age of nationalism was the main component of Greek national identity and proselytism was an attack not only on the religious dogma but also on the hundreds of years old tradition and could not be accepted. All these concerns indicate that there was competition between denominations and this competition was the determinant of inter-communal encounters.

The above mentioned scholarship and the ecclesiastical sources give us no information about the Protestants themselves. What was the motive behind their conversion? How did they convert? How did it change their lives? What were relations between Protestants and other communities like? What was the scope of tolerance towards the Protestants wielded by the Orthodox? The focal point of this chapter is particularly the Greek Protestants and I aim to paint a picture of the lives of converts by pursuing answers to these questions as much as I can on the basis of reader correspondence in missionary newspaper *Angeliaforos*, testimonies of Protestant refugees of *Zincidere* at KMS Oral Tradition Archive, memoirs of missionaries, the articles in the Missionary Herald, and the relevant materials I found at the Greek Historical Evangelical Archive (Ελληνικό Ιστορικό Ευαγγελικό Αρχείο) in Athens.

and Protestantism to the East: namely misconduct of Protestant missionaries in our lands, in other parts of the earth. And relations of Protestantism with the Mother all the churches and the Greek nation]. For the Greek scholarship portraying the rivalry between the missionaries and the Patriarchate, or the autocephalous Greek Church, see I. N. Karmiris, *Ορθοδοξία και Προτεσταντισμός* [Orthodoxy and Protestantism]; K. Mamoní, *Αγώνες του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου κατά των Μισσιονάριων* [Competitions of Ecumenical Patriarchate against the Missionaries].

5.1 The missionary activities and the genesis of the Protestant Greek communities

In the year 1819 the first American missionaries arrived in Western Asia to spread the Gospel of Christ to Muslims, Jews, crypto-believers like the Dönmes, and to the adherents of syncretic religions like the Alawites. The missionary work was a part of American millennialism to unite the world, the great pillars of the Papal, Judaic and Islamic faiths, under the umbrella of Protestantism around the year 2000 or earlier;¹⁹⁴ but in the Near East their success was very limited.¹⁹⁵ Even forty-five years after their arrival on Near Eastern shores the missionaries were still struggling at the hands of Turkish authorities in consideration with their endeavor to convert Muslims. According to correspondence presented to both houses of parliament in the U.K dating to 1864, “Turkish Protestants” (ten to thirteen people) were imprisoned and ill-treated at the Police Department for endangering public peace and the situation caused significant trouble in the country.¹⁹⁶ Just a few years before freedom of religion had been introduced to all subjects of the Empire with the Reform Edict of 1856, and the missionaries would regard it as authorization to convert Muslims (Richter, 2010). Nevertheless, in practice not only conversion but also any sort of move against Islam or propagation was not tolerated. For example Abdülhamit II, when he came to the throne in 1873, pledged the missionaries not to attempt to convert the Muslims, just as his predecessors had. (Cobb, 1914). All in all, the Turkish officials kept scanning the reports of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (hereinafter ABCFM) with suspicion and for this reason the Board

¹⁹⁴ See U. Makdisi, *Artillery of heaven: American missionaries and the failed conversion of the Middle East*, pp. 61-62.

¹⁹⁵ For the “Turkish Protestants” and the curious case of the apostate Ahmet Tevfik, see S. Deringil, *Conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 78-84.

¹⁹⁶ House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online. (1865) *Correspondence respecting Protestant Missionaries and converts in Turkey presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty*. London: Harrison and sons, 1865. Retrived May 21, 2015, from www.parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk My thanks to Pınar Çakıroğlu for accessing this document for me.

remained very chary of information about the “Turkish converts”. Correspondingly, the number of “Turkish Protestants” remains unknown, but it could be hypothesized that the missionaries did not insist on this effort in order to avoid jeopardizing their presence in the country (Richter, 2010).

Under such conditions, the missionaries changed their targets. They limited their mission to trying to correct the faults of Islam and to proselytizing among the native Christians (Cobb, 1914) and Jews. They regarded the oriental Christian sects as ignorant, illiterate, superstitious and idolatrous in their faith (Jessup, 1891). Initially they aimed to reform the Armenian Church and revive the knowledge of the Gospel among the Armenians. However, this early position failed and their converts were excommunicated by the Armenian Church (Rufus, 1873). As a result, in 1846 Protestant Armenians were asked to sign a charter of faithfulness in order to be accepted again by the main Church. The ones who did not sign the charter were excommunicated, their properties were confiscated by the Patriarchate, their debts were discharged by force, and the ones who were indebted to Protestants were prohibited to pay their debts (Artinian, 2004). The missionaries were also not welcomed by the Greek Orthodox Church. The Greek Ecclesiastical Committee at Izmir published charges against the English and American Missionaries in 1836, claiming that they could not be ignorant, given that three of the Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles were written in their own language, Greek; thus, missionary translations would darken rather than clarify their meaning. The Greek Ecclesiastical Committee also emphasized the unifying function of their religion to keep their nation distinguished.¹⁹⁷ The same year, a thesis was written by Kyriakos H. N. Lamprylos in Izmir in an attempt to record the efforts made by missionaries and to show how they strived to proselytize to attract people to their circles. According to this publication the missionaries distorted the meaning of Scriptures to support their heresy and frequently targeted uneducated people. For Lamprylos (1836), the poor and the wretched were confused by the ideas

¹⁹⁷ *An answer to the charges of the Greek Ecclesiastical Committee at Smyrna against the English and American missionaries*, pp. 11-19.

presented by missionaries, which in the end caused more harm than good. Jewish authorities were also highly uncomfortable with missionary activities, and regarded missionaries as “ecclesiastical imperialism” and a threat to their traditions and sacred language. Rabbis went to extreme measures to prevent people from attending missionary services, including standing on the corner of missionary houses to prevent Jews from entering. Due mainly to this resistance the ABCFM decided to annul their mission to Jews by 1855 (Şişman, 2015). In accordance with these reactions to missionary works, it is well established that the missionaries were not welcomed by any of the religious communities in the Near East. Missionaries were seen as threat and their presence in the country generated a never-ending competition, particularly for non-Muslim denominations, until the collapse of the Empire.

There is a widespread impression that the Protestants in Anatolia at this time were only of Armenian descent. While it is true that Armenians substantially outnumbered the Greeks, the latter was still a very significant population. By 1884, remarkable success was achieved by the Greek Orthodox Church in Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, Merzifon, Talas, Sivas, Bahçecik (Bardezag) and Gürümce.¹⁹⁸ In Kayseri and the surrounding area there were eleven Protestant Churches with members of both Orthodox and Gregorian descent.¹⁹⁹ Interestingly, there are a few examples in direct contradiction to the claim that Armenian Evangelists were greater in number, such as Ordu, where Greek Protestants outnumbered Armenians. In fact, by 1899 Ordu’s Protestant population was so heavily Greek that Armenians decided to withdraw from the shared church, where both communities worshipped in their common language of Turkish, so as to be

¹⁹⁸ Turkish missions. (1884). *The missionary herald*, 426; Central Turkey Mission: the revival at Adana. (1884). *The missionary herald*, 317.

¹⁹⁹ Western Turkey mission: church organized in Gemerek. (January 1904). *The Missionary Herald*, 28.

able to use their native tongue.²⁰⁰ According to a Greek source, the total number of Greek families subscribing to an Evangelical faith throughout Pontus was around five hundred (Agapidis, 1948), while in Asia Minor the first Greek Evangelical community was established in the village *Demirtaş* (ten kilometers north of Bursa) in 1867 and the total number of the Greek Evangelicals towards the Turco-Greek Population Exchange (1923) throughout Asia Minor was roughly around two hundred to two hundred fifty families (Agapidis, 1950).

For Özsoy (1996) the missionaries targeted Armenians more often than Greeks because of the difficulties associated with the strong sense of nationhood that the Greek Kingdom was providing, the tough central authority of the Patriarchate, and the challenges of infiltrating large groups with strong ties in their settlements. Özsoy's argument is accurate given the conversion of Greek Orthodox Arabs of the Church of Antioch. Conversion of Arab Orthodox in Syria, Lebanon and Palestine occurred mainly due to the fact that the Church lacked cohesion, as the upper clergy was Greek not Arab, and the priests who took care of the daily affairs were poorly trained, incompetent and hardly educated. Additionally, they lacked the organization and discipline necessary to hold the congregation together (Sabra, 1999). Conversely, however, the Lebanese Maronite Community as a coherent body was much more reactionary and cruel against the missionaries and the converts, especially until 1847 when Protestant *millet* was recognized by an imperial decree which legitimated the place of Protestant converts.²⁰¹

For Asia Minor and Greece, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Orthodox Church was constantly working to prevent missionary activities and to strengthen community ties, mainly through publications and increasing involvement in schooling activities. The Orthodox Church used two starkly different channels of opposition against the missionaries.

²⁰⁰ Letters from the missions: Western Turkey mission: joy at Ordoo. (May 1899). *The Missionary Herald*, 194.

²⁰¹ For Maronite opposition to missionaries and for the curious case of an Arab reformer (and a convert), see U. Makdisi, *Artillery of heaven*.

One was theological; since the Protestant churches lack the Episcopal succession and an unbroken communion with the ancient church in order and doctrine (Sabra, 1999), they were in opposition of the standards of Christian truth accepted by privileged leaders, meaning they could be called heretics (White, 1835). The other opposition was more culturally focused, as the missionaries posed a challenge to Orthodox traditions and customs, thereby threatening cultural unity of the previous few centuries. The reaction of the Church, however, was not only an endeavor to preserve the integrity and purity of faith, but also a defense of the ecclesial authority (Evans, 2008). Interestingly enough, behind closed doors Orthodox authorities knew that the missionaries were right in their claims that the local priests and monks of Orthodoxy were illiterate. In this sense, missionaries' first impact on the Greek Orthodox Church was a positive one, as in church authorities now felt the need to educate both the priests and the congregation. Many articles were published in Greek newspapers and in the magazine of the Patriarchate on this subject (Εκκλησιαστική Αλήθεια; Ecclesiastical Truth). For example, in Greco-Turkish newspaper *Anatoli*, various articles were published to call for the conservation of Orthodoxy. The following passage is from one of those articles:

The Orthodox Christians are not informed about their religion and the metropolitan bishops do not take it seriously. They do not even employ priests in some villages and in such villages the number of Orthodox is in decline. Additionally, in the last years, Turcophone Christians are distracted since the Evangel, the Epistles and the prayers are being read in Greek; hence, they prefer the churches where the services are conducted in Turkish.

After setting the problem, the writer of the article lists some solutions not to lose members in favor of other religions and denominations:

1) Sunday classes (Κυριακόν Μάθημα) must be serviced; 2) the metropolitan bishops must employ two or three preachers (ιεροκήρυξ); 3) the illiterate people should no longer be accepted as priests; 4) the scripture classes should be taken seriously in schools; 5) the capable teachers must make religious classes.²⁰²

²⁰² Orthodoksia'nın muhafazası [Conservation of Orthodoxy]. (12-14 February 1894). *Anatoli*, 4773-4774.

Evidently both religious authorities and intellectuals were aware of the “threat” created by the missionary activities. The presence of Evangelical missionaries along with Catholics challenged the comfort zone of the Orthodox community, whose borders were already occasionally confronted by the ruling Muslim polity, and created another field of competition between the Orthodox Church and the missionaries. Interestingly, the motive to cope with them generated a strong sense of religious identity and initiated an enlightenment process via education among the Orthodox. Thus, the competition with Evangelicals created an atmosphere of *Protestantization*, in Effi Gazi’s term. In her theorization, the objective of the missionary was not solely conversion of people. The missionaries also aimed to reinforce a more “secular” version of religious beliefs, strongly related to the image of a reformed and “enlightened” individual (Gazi, 2009). Gazi’s interpretation was accurate because the missionaries themselves stated their mission as *direct evangelization, literary effort and education* (Riggs, 1886) and an introduction of practical gospel which makes for better living, both material and moral (Richards, 1919). The latter two of these objectives could be categorized under *Protestanization*; this process, not only in the Ottoman Empire but also in the Greek Kingdom, was experienced by sections of Greek Orthodoxy, who eventually adopted certain Protestant particularities, including piety, moral individualism, and the use of the vernacular for the improvement of faith (Gazi, 2009). The missionaries evaluated their effort at the time as such: “the moral influence permeated the mass of the people, stimulating them to intelligent efforts for their own reformation, and rousing an almost universal desire for something higher and better than they had before, in religion, literature and education (Riggs, 1886).” As a result, the missionary effort and the responses to it created an atmosphere of competition; and the Evangelicals, while criticizing the low level of education of the Orthodox priests, continued to attract people through native pastors and preachers with sound theological views (Benlisoy, 2010).

In addition to high ranking prelates, local priests also waged war against the missionaries. *The Missionary Herald* reported many complaints about

persecution of the Protestants by local clerics. As previously mentioned, another channel of criticism against the missionaries were the newspapers of the time, which frequently reported clashes between local authorities and Protestants from surrounding provinces. For instance, in an issue of the Greco-Turkish newspaper *Anatoli*, it was reported that in Izmir the Metropolitan Bishop and some others burned the books that missionaries had distributed to deflect people from Orthodoxy.²⁰³ In another issue it was claimed that even if the Protestants and Jesuits tried hard to deceive the members of Greek Orthodox Community, they would be unsuccessful and this was the reason that they targeted the Armenians.²⁰⁴ It was also contended in the paper that a Greek would always remain Greek and an Armenian would always remain Armenian and any attempt to invite a Christian to another Christian sect would not be licit in Christianity.²⁰⁵ In another Greco-Turkish newspaper, *Terakki*, a warning article was published in 1888 for those who had hesitations about their denomination. The article claimed that hesitation would mean accepting to go to hell.²⁰⁶ Concerning the converts themselves, excommunication was the worst possible punishment. In the nineteenth Sinasos, it was forbidden even to salute the excommunicated who had broken the rules of the community (Benlisoy, 2010). However, the actual frequency of this punishment remains unconfirmed. Stefo Benlisoy (2010) affirmed that most of the time the achievements of the missionaries were transitory, and many people returned their original sect after the passage of a certain time. Despite the presence of confused minds, beginning in the nineteenth century, a Protestant community with both Armenian and Greek converts started to emerge, and its number increased year by

²⁰³ *Anatoli*, 14 August 1851, 30.

²⁰⁴ *Anatoli*, 14 February 1853, 104.

²⁰⁵ *Anatoli*, 11 June 1863, 638.

²⁰⁶ Mezhebe tereddüt [Hesitation to the denomination]. (30 Iouliou 1888). *Terakki*, 6.

year until the *millet* status of the Protestants was officially recognized by the *firman* of Sultan Abdülmecit in November 1847.²⁰⁷

Regardless of this official legitimacy, the authorities of the Greek Orthodox Church used every means possible to keep their congregation united, and the Orthodox prelates continued to respond to Protestant criticisms of their faith. For example, the Metropolitan Bishop of Kayseri Efstathios Kleovoulos wrote letters to address three missionaries (W. A. Fransworth, S. Bartlett, O. Barrows) who temporarily settled in Talas, Kayseri in 1872 to proselyte among the local Christians. In the first letter, Kleovoulos asserted his resentment to missionaries since they tried to attract people among the Orthodox congregation, some members of which were illiterate, unconscious and prone to novelties. He stressed that their mission could only be appreciated if they would try to proselyte among the pagans and idolaters and teach them the name of Christ.²⁰⁸ In the second letter he claimed that the missionaries exploited the glossiness of science to attract people, and that if they aimed at providing goodness to the world through science and politics, they should have kept themselves away from the faith of Anatolians. He also added that the Orthodox learned the Evangel in their own language and became martyrs for the sake of it ages before the discovery of America and they did not really care whether the missionaries translated the holy scripts into one hundred seventy different languages.²⁰⁹ Lastly in his third letter, Kleovoulos likened the missionaries to lazy birds that nestle in nests of other birds.²¹⁰ Kleovoulos was clearly very uncomfortable with the activities of missionaries, nevertheless, even the presence in the region of the residence of the

²⁰⁷ Translation of the firman granted by Sultan Abd-ul Mejeed to his Protestant subjects. (1853). *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 4, pp. 443-444. For the principal charter of Protestant community [Protestan Cemaati Nizamname-i Esasiyesi], see V. Artinian, *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ermeni Anayasası'nın doğuşu: 1839-1863* [A study of the historical development of the Armenian constitutional system in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1863].

²⁰⁸ E. Kleovoulos mektupları [The letters of E. Kleovoulos]. (31 August 1888). *Terakki*, 8.

²⁰⁹ E. Kleovoulos mektupları [The letters of E. Kleovoulos]. (15 September 1888). *Terakki*, 9.

²¹⁰ E. Kleovoulos mektupları [The letters of E. Kleovoulos]. (30 September 1888). *Terakki*, 10.

Metropolitan Bishop could not terminate the missionary activities. Interestingly enough the place of his residence, Zincidere, and nearby Talas, became the centers of Protestantism in Cappadocia. Between the years 1876 and 1877 the Protestant community in Talas was comprised of three hundred people, Greeks and Armenians in equal numbers. In Zincidere, however, most of the Evangelicals were from the Greek Orthodox community (Çelebi, 2009). This is curious because Zincidere was already a center for Orthodoxy with its schools, orphanages and the Seminary, as well as with the monastery of Ioannis Prodromos (John the Forerunner) and the residence of the Metropolitan Bishop of Kayseri. During my investigation about Orthodox-Protestant cohabitation in the village, I did not come across any conflict between the two communities until their uprooting in 1924. In the following years Zincidere continued to be a center for two different Christian sects in Cappadocia.



Figure 15. The Oratory House of Evangelicals in Zincidere with its congregation on left (Source: Agapidis, 1950) and its current state on right (Photograph: Gülen Göktürk)

During this time missionaries were not moving around and settling only in Ottoman territories, but also in the Greek Kingdom. However, even during the early years of missionary work, the missionaries met opposition there. The

national Greek Church was increasingly antagonistic towards the so-called *Ioutherikalvinoi* (Lutheran-Calvinists), putting up such strict restrictions on them that they could not even work as a private tutor in a family without official permission. Even when they conducted their Sunday services in their own private houses, the ecclesiastical authorities often watched the houses to assure that no Greek attended. Anti-heresy and anti-proselytism departments were established to neutralize Protestant influence, while the Holy Synod circulated encyclicals condemning the missionary publications; moreover, a number of civil laws were passed outlawing proselytism, the violation of which was punishable by fines, imprisonment, or both. Consequently, missionary schools were closed down in 1842 and the American missionary Jonas King was put on trial for proselytism (1845-1852).²¹¹ In the Kingdom, the Church and the State cooperated against the missionaries. In the Ottoman Empire, however, the state seemed to be indifferent to them unless they proselyte among the Muslims. For Makdisi, the Ottomans were operating under the “constraints of the day and age” (Makdisi, 2008, p. 184); that is to say their position against proselytization of non-Muslims was one of pragmatism. Compared to their colleagues in the Kingdom, the Patriarch and the prelates in localities remained relatively passive in their struggle against the Evangelists. Interestingly, adopting “my enemy’s enemy is my friend” doctrine in the first decades of 1800s, Patriarchal circles were flexible towards missionaries due to their shared hostility towards the Catholics (Gazi, 2009). Because of this Archimandrite Hilarion of Mount Sinai, the supervisor of the Patriarchal Press, allowed Protestants tracts to be printed there between the years 1818-1820. For Clogg (1996), this also shows that the first missionaries to Near East primarily wanted to promote a kind of Protestant reformation within Orthodoxy.

The missionaries frequently used press and schools for proselytizing and Protestantization purposes. From the missionaries’ point of view, newspapers had


²¹¹ See J. Richter, *A history of missions in the near East*, p. 165; Metallinos (1977), Karmiris, (1937) and Thanailaki (2005) quoted in E. Gazi, *Revisiting religion and nationalism in nineteenth-century Greece*.

an important missionary influence, and a considerable portion of their readers were non-Protestants (Barnum, 1903). The objective of missionary papers like Armeno-Turkish *Avedaper* and Greco-Turkish *Angeliaforos* was to deepen the spiritual life of the Protestant population, and to serve as a common board to share information among the Protestants about their annual meetings, their work of education, and their situation at the local level, thus helping to establish a brotherhood and sisterhood among them (Greene, 1905). As stated in the introduction, I reviewed the issues of *Angeliaforos* published between 1889-1890 and 1903-1904. For *The Missionary Herald*, the majority of the subscribers of *Angeliaforos* had no other paper and no other means of contact with the outside world. Additionally, the paper was a means to respond to the insults and criticisms of the Greek Orthodox Church authorities. This is evidenced in a published reply to a sermon of an Orthodox deacon, who accused Protestantism of being a fake faith, a claim that was rebutted by the statement that Protestantism would not accept any church under the power of a patriarch, only those under the power of Jesus Christ.²¹²

Like press, schooling occupied a very important place in missionary activities. People were required to receive education because uneducated people could not follow them, read the bible, understand the sermons or develop a world view that binds him/her to the West. The schools were an inevitable medium for the missionary activities. Accordingly, as Protestants increased in number, their demand for teachers, preachers, and priests increased. While on one hand they raised an educated generation for religious purposes, on the other hand, they also created an economic and socio-cultural sphere of life in the orient designed to connect it to Western capitalism (Kocabaşoğlu, 2000), and cultivated an inner drive that would transform “nominal” into “enlightened” Christians (Gazi, 2009, p. 101), another central aspect of *Protestantization*. For Augustinos, even though the missionaries could not generate any great religious transformation either in Islam or Eastern Christianity, they offered an example and an opportunity for aspiring

²¹² *Angeliaforos*, 7 May 1904, 19.

Eastern Christians by their industriousness, initiative and enterprise. They left a permanent legacy of philanthropic and educational work, and of girls' education. Additionally, they made a significant contribution to the development of bourgeois culture, primarily among Anatolian Greeks (Augustinos, 1986). As a matter of fact, by 1899, the total number of schools, including primary schools, girls' schools, boys' schools, colleges and theological schools, in Western Turkey was one hundred thirty six (Kocabaşoğlu, 2000).



A BUILDING OF THE AMERICAN HOSPITAL, TALAS

Figure 16. Source: The Missionary Herald, 1914.

5.2 Tolerating the “heretics”: a glimpse inside the Protestant life in Anatolia

In this section I will paint a picture of the lives of individual Protestants and their relations with the other religious groups. My sources are very limited, so because of this scarcity I will not be able to clearly portray the Greek Protestant residents of Cappadocia. I believe that the information about Greek Protestants of other regions such as Pontus and North Western Anatolia can provide a general picture about the lives of Evangelicals in Anatolia. I should also note that the below mentioned people were had to have been either Turcophones or in good command of Turkish in order to follow the Greco-Turkish missionary newspaper *Angelioforos*. As for the testimonies of KMS Oral Tradition informants, they came from Turcophone Greek Protestants from Zincidere, Cappadocia.

For all missionary publications, each missionary was responsible for printing in one language. They were, in general, in command of three or four languages besides English, but several educated Armenians of literary ability also worked for them for proof-reading and translation purposes (Dwight, 1898). In other words, the literary productions of the missionaries were supported by the educated Armenians.

The Turcophone Evangelical communities of Anatolia—if they did not attend any college or higher school—were mostly capable of understanding only plain Turkish, like their Orthodox compatriots. Thus, incomprehensibility of the language of publications was a problem for many readers. In a letter, they complained about the language of *Angeliaforos* as such:

[...]We are sorry to declare that the language of the newspaper is complicated and because of this we are losing the most of the information. With this letter, we demand from the editor and the people of pen who are writing externally to the paper to be careful about this for the benefit of the reading public. The benevolent people, who are writing articles with devotion to the newspaper, aim to enlighten the minds of the community. This is the mission of *Angeliaforos*. If it is published with its real purpose and in accordance with the agreement of 85 (1885) promising more plain language, more people will buy it and it will serve for the benefit of larger communities. [...]Since we, as the subscribers of the newspaper, are not students, we do not know Arabic and Persian words and we do not have time to learn them.²¹³

Angeliaforos was a way to create bonds between the scattered Protestant communities. Through this correspondence they obtained news from other parts of Anatolia and spread the news of their locality. For example, in a letter coming from Zincidere, Stefanos I. Serinidis informed the reader of details from his town; everything from mentioning the cold relations among community members, to the fact that many youths of their locality had begun obtaining education in local and overseas American schools.²¹⁴

²¹³ *Angeliaforos*, 5 January 1889, 1.

²¹⁴ *Angeliaforos*, 29 June 1889, 26.

The life of the Protestants was not easy. Both missionaries and new converts were disliked by the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Church authorities, and faced dislike from their kin, as they were taught by local prelates who regarded the Protestants as harmful to their religion to target their dogma and tradition and treat them as an enemy who diminished their members and attacked their comfort zone. Unlike the contestation between Orthodox and Muslim communities, the contestation between the members of Orthodox and Protestant communities was tough and often violent. As previously mentioned, in their relations with the Muslims the Orthodox were the tolerated people who could only wield consent. In their relations with the Evangelicals, however, they assumed the role of “tolerators” due to their demographic superiority and their historical status in the Ottoman society. Bağçeci, in line with his research in Ottoman archives, lists many conflicts between Gregorian and Protestant Armenians all over Ottoman territories, including physical abuse, proselytism and the boycotting of Protestants by Gregorian Armenians as a reaction to their conversion.²¹⁵ Such conflicts were also narrated in *Angeliaforos*. In an anonymous letter from Everek (Develi) to the newspaper, it was stated that a local notable preached in a Church warning the local Christians not to read the Bible distributed by the Protestants, and not to be gentle in a quarrel with them even if they themselves were wrong. The sermon also invited the local Christians to call the Protestants *porod*, which means mangy, wounded and bruised in Armenian. Additionally, he preached not to let the Protestants enter their houses. His speech was influential among the other Christians and they started to call the Protestants *porod* and irritated them with nasty behaviors. A Protestant called Zakar, for example, was attacked by Armenians when he was in his shop but was saved by Muslims. A Protestant woman was harassed by a group of Armenian women as a result of the agitation of a priest when she was bringing water from a fountain.²¹⁶ According to these

²¹⁵ See Y. Bağçeci, Osmanlı Devleti’nde Gregorian Ermenilerle Protestan Ermeniler arasındaki ilişkiler [The relations of Gregorian Armenians with Protestant Armenians in the Ottoman Empire].

²¹⁶ *Angeliaforos*, 2 March 1889, 9.

stories, it seems that Muslims did not regard Protestants as a threat to their religion. For Cyrus Hamlin (1893), the founder and first president of Robert College, the Muslims were more sympathetic to the Protestants than the local Christians since they were not worshipping the same icons. Hamlin was wrong in his claim. The reason for Muslim sympathy or indifference was not that they weren't defending their religion, but rather that they did not regard the missionaries as a threat to their religion; apostasy from Islam was prohibited and the Sultan had already assured that the missionaries would not take action among Muslims. The local Christians, however, were struggling to keep their congregation intact against missionary influence. This was especially important because their religion was what kept them together as a community; they did not want to become divided like the Armenians. In their perspective, "to leave one's church was to become alien from one's people (Augustinos, 1986, p. 140)." Therefore, local Christians were in competition with Protestants just as much as they were with Muslims, but the latter was the dominant ruling party, forcing Christians into a passive position in their relations with Muslims. Against the missionaries and local converts, however, they had more power and were occasionally intolerant. Their harassments seem to be a cause of great horror of Protestant life. Another example, a correspondence in *Angeliaforos* written by Hacı Savvas, shows the attack of a Protestant colporteur by a Metropolitan Bishop:

[...]In order to collect the tax called *kapnika*, the Metropolitan Bishop every year walks around the coastal villages and uplands. In his tour, he also serves Liturgy for the souls of the dead people [...]When he was in an upland called Çambaşı, in a village called Armut Eli, accidentally a colporteur called Yannis Deliyannidis who is under our administration came to the village with a bag full of the Bible. When the bishop was informed that a Protestant colporteur was in the village on his way to church for Liturgy service, he ordered to send him away from the village until he was back from the church. Compliant with his order, an averter found him in a house when he was taking a bath and kicked him [...] When the colporteur felt better; he got the guts and went to the Bishop to ask for justice. When the colporteur approached him, the Bishop went crazy and

asked for his revolver. The bishop and his averter beat and injured the colporteur severely [...]²¹⁷

The Missionary Herald also reported many types of harassment against the Protestants by the Orthodox. For example, in Ordu, the Protestant congregation suffered from repeated stoning and endless reviling and insults.²¹⁸ In another case, a Protestant chapel was burnt in Everek and a preacher was sentenced to three months imprisonment because the Armenian Church regarded his language to be slanderous.²¹⁹

Joining the Protestant congregation sometimes had negative outcomes for individuals other than direct persecution. One example of this was the alienation from family and relatives converts often experienced. *The Missionary Herald* reported many stories narrating isolation of individual Protestants from their kin. For instance, a letter from Izmir in the magazine dated 1886 narrated a Greek convert's family cutting off contact following his conversion by no longer writing to him. Likewise, another Evangelist gave up his business and his fiancée. Further, two girls who had already become Protestants only had the courage to come out openly a full year and a half after their conversion due to the opposition of their family.²²⁰ However, the inter-communal and inter-personal relations between the members of Orthodox and Protestant denominations were not always bitter. Even if it is rarely seen, there were also places where Orthodox and Gregorian Churches had positive attitudes toward Protestants. One of those places was Marsovan (today Merzifon) where the presence and good work of the Anatolia College and the hospital created a relatively peaceful atmosphere.²²¹ In another case, the

²¹⁷ *Angeliaforos*, 6 September 1890, 36.

²¹⁸ Letters from the missions: Western Turkey Mission: Joy at Ordo. (May 1899). *The Missionary Herald*, p. 195.

²¹⁹ Western Turkey Mission: new churches and pastors. (November 1902). *The Missionary Herald*, p. 480.

²²⁰ Western Turkey mission: Smyrna: the Greek work. (April 1886). *The Missionary Herald*, p. 146.

²²¹ An American Oasis. (June 1902). *The Missionary Herald*, pp. 407-409.

Protestants were almost never persecuted by the Orthodox; and the latter even attended the Protestant services in *Sardovan* (today Serdivan), a Greek village in Adapazari.²²²



ON THE CAMPUS OF ANATOLIA COLLEGE IN 1920

Figure 17. Anatolia College, Merzifon. (Source: The Missionary Herald, 1921)

As far the Anatolian Protestants are concerned, it is quite curious how they increased in number and how they were formed as communities in localities. In one of the correspondences in *Angeliaforos* the Protestant community in Bartın was explained as such:

[...] It is not an exaggeration to claim that twelve years ago, there was no community of the Bible and the people did not even know what Protestant was. When this town was sleeping, the name of Protestant was heard due to the arrival of a precious clock-seller Hagop Apelyan from Merzifon. One year later, I came to this town as a result of my father's demand who is dealing with his own work and I started to help him. By this way our number became two. Every week we gathered in our room to pray. One and a half years after our union, another youth joined us [...] Thus, we became three people [...] Even though in those years we heard swear words from the children of the neighborhood and faced with difficulties, these hardships were overcome due to our friendship and conciliatory words.²²³

A missionary letter narrated the way a group of pilgrim women of both Armenians and Greeks were attracted by the missionaries in Ordu:

²²² A typical Greek village. (August 1904). *The Missionary Herald*, pp. 319-323.

²²³ *Angeliaforos*, 30 January 1830, 5.

The deck of the Russian steamer was crowded with Greek and Armenian pilgrims to Jerusalem, and we soon found opportunities of seed-sowing by the way. ‘You will not find Christ at Jerusalem,’ I said, after pleasant conversation with some of the women. ‘What!’ exclaimed an aged mother, ‘is he not there? Then there is no use in our going.’ [...] ‘No,’ I replied, ‘he is not there in *person*; but in spirit he is here and everywhere and you need not take the long journey to the Holy City to find him.’[...] We left among them a number of tracts and portions of Scripture in their own tongue, with prayer for the divine blessing.²²⁴

For the newly converted it was important to legitimize their position and their beliefs in the eyes of their ex-coreligionists. Either by criticizing their religious beliefs or by criticizing those who accused them of having false beliefs, they tried to obtain a position in their locality. This was also a matter of competition to gain new members from other denominations and not to lose members to these other sects. In a correspondence coming from Ünye, Ilias El. Meymaridis criticized a youth of spreading false beliefs and the Armenian and Greek Orthodox people of his region of being ignorant. In this letter he also warns his fellow Protestant co-religionists not to accredit false beliefs:

[...] the Armenians and Greeks of our community are non-religious, if not faithless. On Sundays, they are going to coffee-houses to play backgammon rather than going to church. When our community is under such conditions, a heathen youth who thinks he is wise coming from Ordu deceived some of our ignorant youth with such words: ‘God exists; it is important to be a good person; there is no need to the Holy Book.’[...]The heathens, who think that there is no need to the Holy Book and it is more important to be a good person, are very much mistaken. Because in our century, there still exists savages not accepting the Holy Book, lacking of moral values and eating human flesh. Conversely, the ones who accepted the Holy Book - like the people of Fiji Islands who used to eat human flesh – became good people [...] For this reason; some wise heathens abjured and started to obey the Holy Book. Voltaire, the head of the heathens, once said that he was compelled to believe since he was scared of death.²²⁵

The Protestant communities were rarely established as a result of a spontaneous coming together of individual Protestants. The local Protestant

²²⁴ Western Turkey mission: a visit to Ordu. (1886). *The Missionary Herald*, p. 219.

²²⁵ *Angeliaforos*, 13 April 1889, 15.

preachers, the colporteurs as well as the missionaries themselves were moving around Anatolia to spread the Evangelical message. For example, in a letter coming from Nikolaos Kuzudzakoglou, an Armenian preacher called Zenot Filcyan, who was sent to Trabzon as a representative of the Christians (Protestants), was praised for his devotion to spread the Evangel in their locality.²²⁶ Likewise, the correspondence of Kosmas Korpoglou wrote about the genesis of the Evangelical community in Keskin after the appointment of a graduate of Merzifon College, Agop Der Gazarian to their town as a preacher.²²⁷ The missionaries or the preachers, when they were new in a locality, organized gatherings and performed prayers in private houses. I can talk about two different types of gatherings, one for clarifying parts of the Bible and one for assembling for prayers. Likewise, in a correspondence, coming from Samsun, Hacı Antonoglou stated gatherings for the youths to clarify some issues from the Bible and to generate will for religious matters among them.²²⁸

Schooling was important for the missionaries since uneducated people could not follow them (Thanailaki, 2004). For this reason, the importance of education was always stated in *Angeliaforos*. However, in correspondence, I rarely encounter information about the schools. Instead I came across short lines about scholarships for the ordinary people of Anatolia, including the Protestants not yet affluent enough to send their children to school. Hence, scholarships were important for the youths' access to an education. In relation to this, in his correspondence, Gavriologlou, the treasurer and the clerk of a youth company in Samsun, declared his contribution to the youths' education at Anatolia College and asked wealthy readers to contribute to this work duty and provide scholarships.²²⁹ Another correspondence cited with pleasure the approval of a poor pupil from

²²⁶ *Angeliaforos*, 2 March 1889, 9.

²²⁷ *Angeliaforos*, 27 July 1889, 30.

²²⁸ *Angeliaforos*, 3 August 1889, 31.

²²⁹ *Angeliaforos*, 9 January 1890, 2.

Denek Maden to the Saint Paul School in Tarsus with a scholarship of half his tuition.²³⁰

The rationality behind conversion would certainly change from individual to individual. According to a lay point of view, however, poor people became Protestants for upward movement in socio-economic strata. According to an Orthodox point of view “they mainly targeted the uneducated people whom did not know how to distinguish the words and fooled them (Lamprylos, 1836).” There is no information at our hands that economically disadvantaged people chose to become Protestants; the correspondence in *Angeliaforos*, and the few testimonies in the Oral Tradition Archive, in fact, show that some Protestants were already well situated before their conversion. However, it would not be wrong to claim that Protestantism provided advancement in people’s lives. In the end, they could at least have the opportunity to be taught how to read and write, and to read the bible in their own language. The advancement was especially significant for women. Protestants who received education in the Missionary Schools learned science and foreign languages and thus developed a broader world perspective. Additionally, Protestantism introduced these people to the capitalist culture of West and imbued a sense of enlightenment. This is observable in refugee testimonies of the KMS Oral Tradition Archive in which I came across narratives of the Protestants from Zincidere. For example, Viktoria Seirinidou, born in Zincidere in 1889, received her education firstly in the American College in Talas; afterwards she went to Arsakeia Schools in Corfu (Αρσαίκειο Κερκύρας) and Athens (Αρσαίκειο Αθηνών). She worked as a teacher in American schools in Izmir and Gedik Paşa (Istanbul), and as a director in the Talas American College. Right before the Asia Minor catastrophe, she went to Athens. Many of her friends received assistance from the missionaries to go to Athens. Another missionary provided scholarship for seventeen women, who worked as teachers in American schools, to go to the United States. Hereby she went to the U.S and studied dental medicine in Boston. She ultimately continued her life as a dentist in Piraeus and

²³⁰ *Angeliaforos*, 4 October 1890, 40.

Athens.²³¹ The story of Viktoria Seirinidou is a great achievement for the time being as she joined a working life dominated by or, arguably, solely for men. Her narration proves to a degree that Protestantism provided people the necessary means through the assistance of the missionaries to realize themselves and obtain self-actualization. The KMS interviewer described Viktoria as a smart, determined, courageous person who was not fanatical like many other Protestants. This statement is important to understand the stereotypic image that Protestants had in the eyes of the ordinary Orthodox.

As for the other view claiming that uneducated people were attracted to Protestantism, there is no information at our hands, but we can hypothesize that most of the Anatolians at the time were uneducated or not sufficiently educated to be able to fully comprehend religious texts. I pose another idea about these conversions. I wonder if the native Christians regarded conversion as salvation, or as an opportunity to leave the country for Britain or America, especially during times of crisis and persecution. I only once came across such statement in *The Missionary Herald*, according to which a man from a mixed Armenian and Turkish village asked if he could go to America with his family on occasion of his conversion. The missionary response was that he could not, arguing that Protestantism was not a changing of nationality but a changing of heart (Crawford, 1906). I do not have the necessary sources to answer this question clearly. I theorize that this might have been a factor in individual choices. Comparing the rate of conversion before and after the persecutions such as massacres, exiles, and boycotts may provide some sense on the issue.

I came across two other Protestant informants in oral tradition accounts, neither of them economically disadvantaged. Eleni Serafeimidou's family was Turcophone Protestants from Zincidere. Her father Hatzisavvas was a tobacco merchant in Amasya who came to Zincidere once every five years. Hatzisavvas was not a Protestant and he rejected one of his sons after he converted to Protestantism. The punished son went to Merzifon to study at the American

²³¹ KMS, Cappadocia, Zincidere, Viktoria Seirinidou.

College. He returned to Amasya to see his father after finishing school but was once again shunned. Eventually, missionaries hired him to work in the American Consulate in Izmir and he later went to the U.S. As for Eleni, she lived with her mother in Zincidere with the help of her brothers, as her husband lived and worked in various places including Batumi, Athens and Patras. He sold the Bible on Filellinon Street in Athens before the World War I. They had six children and her daughters were living in the U.S. when the interview was conducted in 1954.²³² The Haritonidis family, like the Serafeimidou family, was wealthy enough for a good life. Nikolaos Haritonidis was a Turcophone grocer from Zincidere. Their surname was Sarmousakoglou in Turkish documents; his father (Ayan Ioannis) was a sculptor in the Ottoman palace. After finishing community school he went to Istanbul, where he worked as a grocer for fifteen years. He later came back to Zincidere and opened a grocery store. In 1914, he worked as a housekeeper in an American orphanage in Zincidere, after the Americans left the village because of the war. Upon their return in 1918 he continued to work as a housekeeper in American schools and the orphanage. Nikolaos came to Athens after the Americans left the village. All the personnel and children of American schools were called to leave Turkey, but the Evangelists were not included in the Exchange. None of them, according to Nikolaos, went back to Turkey to sell their properties. He worked as a moneylender in Athens, and although he learned Greek at school, he would continue to read his bible in Turkish until he died in 1958.²³³

5.3 Inter-communal relations during the long war (1912-1922)

It is clear from earlier in this paper that the Greek and Armenian Church authorities waged war against the activities of missionaries and even against the Evangelicals themselves. They also provoked the members of their congregations to reject the Protestants vehemently. Through these methods they attempted to close their community borders to Greek Protestants, but shutting the door on

²³² KMS, Cappadocia, Zincidere, Eleni Serafeimidou.

²³³ KMS, Cappadocia, Zintzidere, Nikolaos Haritonidis.

Protestants was not so simple, largely due to the familial bonds they had with Orthodox Christians. In the case of the Arab Protestants of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, Sabra argues that the converts tended to remain in close contact with their families and their larger Orthodox environment, though he claims these interactions were often followed by envy and resentment as converts began to fare better economically, socially and educationally and they often adopted a condescending attitude towards their relatives and friends (Sabra, 1999). Although familial bonds could not be easily removed, Greek Protestants lived through hardships originating from the preaching of Orthodox and Gregorian clergy. The issue was complicated and the behaviors of other Christians towards them varied from persecution to negative tolerance, since they may have had kin relations. Additionally, even if they converted to Protestantism, most continued their old customs of cultivation, nutrition, trading, child rearing, etc., and they still shared the same geographical territories. Therefore, the two communities had many intersecting zones. However, despite their common roots, shared spaces and same customs with the exception of religious ones, the Greek Protestants portrayed a different trajectory of community development and because of the prejudices they faced in the course of time, they became a closed community in contemporary Greece. Only during the long war (1913-1922) did the wartime hardships make the differences between the two communities somewhat less visible and allowed room for some of the Greek Protestants to become part of Greek nationalist movement, especially in Pontus.

Incidents in the first two decades of the twentieth century forced people to pick their sides in line with the hardships they lived through. During the years of war the peoples of the combat zones inevitably got politicized and some of them even got nationalized. Traditional religion based forms of self-definition were replaced by nationalistic ones. The Greek Protestants also found themselves at a time of discontinuity and had to choose their side. We know that some of them adopted Greek nationalism, as happened in Pontus where Greek Protestants joined bandits to fight against Turks. We also know of the Greek Protestants that left

Turkey during the war or in the following Exchange of Populations –with the exception of a few families like the Kantartzi family from Ordu who stayed in their homeland, sold their property in a proper way and left in 1925²³⁴ although Greek Protestants, like Greek Catholics, were excluded from the procedure (Ladas, 1932). According to Greek Protestant scholars Papageorgiou and Kalfas, although the Treaty of Lausanne excluded the Protestants, they sacrificed everything and came to Greece. They preferred the hardships and great risks, including death, of refugee life over the idea of remaining in Turkey away from their compatriots. For these scholars, even though they believed in different sects and had disputes in doctrinal matters, the Protestant and Orthodox Greeks were still one community. For example, in the Pontus region, Protestant Greeks were just as impressed by the spread of Greek nationalism as their Orthodox compatriots had been in the first decades of the twentieth century, and since they fought for the autonomy of Pontus, Protestant Greeks were not excluded from the persecutions of the Young Turks (Kalfas & Papageorgiou, 2001). Unfortunately we know very little about the position of Greek Protestants in Cappadocia. Like their Orthodox compatriots, they were mostly isolated from the conflict zones. We do not know if they were indifferent to Greek or Turkish nationalism, or whether they sided with one or the other. How would they respond, for example, to the Papa Efthim movement, which claimed that the Anatolian Orthodox were of Turkish origin? What would be the position of the Anatolian Protestants if his movement had been successful? We cannot estimate what would have happened to Turcophone Greek Protestants of Anatolia if the Anatolian Orthodox stayed in Turkey. We only know that all the Greek Protestants left Turkey either for Greece or U.S.²³⁵ during and after the long war.

²³⁴ Personal communication with a family member.

²³⁵ Compared to other Western powers, it was the U.S. that gave citizenship status to Ottoman Christians the most. Thus, in Ortaylı missionaries raised citizens for their country in missionary schools. İ. Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Amerikan okulları üzerine bazı gözlemler* [Some observations on the American schools in the Ottoman Empire], p. 76.

There are several possible reasons for the emigration of Protestant Greeks from Turkey. Many of them were probably unaware of the fact that they were not included in the Exchange Protocol so they simply joined the crowd. Some of them probably left Turkey because of their family bonds with the Orthodox Greeks and their desire to accompany their loved ones. And we can assume that some of them left because of their fear that the persecutions of the Turks would continue. An example of this occurred in Gürümce (Κουρούμτζα) in February 1922 when the local bandits (κομητατζήδες) put all the Christians, including Protestants and Orthodox Christians, in the Orthodox Church St George (Η Ορθοδοξη εκκλησία του Αγ.Γεωργίου) and burnt them.²³⁶ There were about fifty Protestant families in the village and one hundred ten to one hundred twenty inhabitants were killed in the fire while the rest of the community went to Greece and resettled in the village Neos Mylotopos in Giannitsa (Νεος Μυλότοπος).²³⁷ For the Pontus region things were different. When the Exchange of Populations protocol was signed in 1923, most Greek Evangelicals had already been driven out of their homes and exiled to Syria. Çambaşı (Ordu) was one of those villages deserted long before the Exchange.²³⁸ In accordance with the above stated narrative of a KMS interviewee, the Greek Protestants left Zincidere with the personnel of American schools and orphanage. Like the Protestants, most Greek Catholics (Uniates), who were not included in the Exchange Protocol, left Turkey for Greece in 1923 with a fear for their future in Turkey despite the severe opposition of national Greek Orthodox Church against the Uniates and the support they received from the Greek state.²³⁹ In conclusion, the Greek Protestant's exodus from Turkey could be or could not be

²³⁶ KMS manuscripts, Cappadocia, Gürümce, Georgios Karaoglanidis, 1958.

²³⁷ Interview with Sofia Kosmoglou, 17.05.2013.

²³⁸ Interview with Paris A. Papageorgiou, 28.01.2014.

²³⁹ A small group of Greek Catholics remained in Turkey. According to documents from the Vatican they were only 45 in 1998. The last priest of the Greek congregation, Thomas Varsamis, died in 1996. The remaining Greek Catholics currently do not have a separate church and they attend the services of Latin Churches. E. Macar, *İstanbul'un yok olmuş iki cemaati: doğu ritli Katolik Rumlar ve Bulgarlar* [Two extinct communities of Istanbul: Uniate Greeks and Bulgarians].

related to their sympathy towards the Greek cause. As with the other communities of the time, their self-definition and belongingness were determined by various factors, including fear of death or expulsion, kinship relations, nationalist propaganda, their relations with the Armenian Protestants, and the opportunities presented by the Americans to local converts. Thus we cannot determine a rigid form of identity for the Greek Protestants at the time; it was probably fluctuating between their religious identity and relations with the Americans on one hand, and their blood ties with the Orthodox on the other.

As discussed in the previous chapter, Greek nationalism consequently evolved into a religious nationalism and excluded those who were not Orthodox Christians, like the Cretan Muslims, Catholics, Uniates and Protestants. Already in the first Greek constitution of 1822 the first article declared, “The established religion of the Greek State is the Eastern Orthodox Church of Christ; the government of Greece, however, tolerates every other religion, and its services and ceremonies may be practiced without interference (Konstantinos Oekonomos quoted in Frazee, 1979).” This means that the Greek national identity was built upon confessional identity. As we have seen above, the Protestant Church from the beginning found itself in profound otherness *vis-à-vis* the Orthodox Church not only in the Kingdom but also in the Ottoman Empire. As for the official Greek nationalism’s perspective on Greek Protestants we can talk about suspicion about the fact that they did not share the fundamental marker of Greek identity, Orthodox Christianity, just like the Greek Catholics of Aegean and Ioanian islands and the Greek Uniates (Skopetea, 1988).

5.4 Summary

Up until the years of turmoil there was a competition between Orthodox and Protestant communities focused on not losing members in favor of the other and trying to keep the groups intact. The religious dispute between the two denominations was prevailing and Protestant arguments about Orthodoxy created severe resentment both in ecclesiastical circles and among its pious believers. Despite the official legitimacy they received from the Ottoman administrators and

the support of missionaries and American diplomats, Greek Protestants were still in a passive defensive position in their relations with Orthodox people. It was the Orthodox who tolerated or persecuted the Protestants, since they were dominant both in number and power due to their economic, demographic and administrative advantage in the Empire. At an inter-personal level things were much complicated due to the kinship relations that discouraged hostilities. Conversely, we could talk about competitive living together at inter-communal level. The Protestants were either tolerated negatively –so long as they did not proselytize– or harassed as a result of their activities, whereas during the years of turmoil things became much more complicated and people's belongingness fluctuated. In those years some Greek Protestants cooperated with the Greek forces and devoted themselves to the Greek cause. We do not have enough information about the others and with the sources at hand we can only speculate. Some were likely indifferent to either Turkish or Greek nationalism, and perhaps even felt themselves closer to the Americans, as many of them eventually decided to emigrate to the U.S.

CHAPTER 6

6 CONCLUSION

As a student of nationalism studies I have always wondered how nationalism magnetized people so powerfully in the Ottoman Empire. My readings about nationalism theories and case studies helped me to find several explanations to this question, but only one of them was all-encompassing. In almost all examples, nationalist revivals were inherently struggles against the political and economic hegemony of the local administrators or the Ottoman authority itself. Nationalist flavor was added to these movements later on by intellectuals. When I started studying Cappadocia I initially thought that my hegemony theory was not applicable. The inhabitants of the region, including members of all religious groups, seemed to be equal parts of a whole with their shared customs, similar socio-economic situation, and, for many of them, even with their language. During the initial steps of this study, I was amazed by the syncretic behaviors and friendly statements about Turks I found in refugee testimonies. However, all these could not explain the nationalization of the Orthodox in the region. I knew that nationalist awakening happened quite late in Cappadocia, but sooner or later it sowed the seeds of suspicion and resentment in communities against one another; it raised ethnic consciousness and made people believe that they could no longer live together. As a result of continuous readings, I decided to include a debate about tolerance, with the hope of seeing the correlation between the scope of tolerance and nationalization, and I accidentally discovered Hayden's theory of "antagonistic tolerance". Adopting this theory was a real challenge because it was a seemingly negative attitude that argued that maintaining community borders against possible attacks by the religious Other was the reason for competition between faith groups. This would mean that the borders of social relations were drawn with religiously defined Self and Other dichotomy. In this ecosystem of antagonistic tolerance syncretic behaviors were outcomes of hegemony of one group over the others. All these arguments seem pessimistic but, one has to keep in

mind that the presence of antagonistic tolerance does not automatically mean that antagonism was prevalent in Cappadocia. As I stressed several times, antagonistic tolerance turned into antagonism only in times of crisis when hegemony could possibly be abolished. For Cappadocia, clashes between religious groups did not take place even during the years of long war, not because there was peaceful cohabitation in the region but because of certain specificities in demographics and male emigration. Thus, hegemony theory was applicable for Cappadocia as well and competitive living together, imbalanced cosmopolitanism, and syncretic behaviors were all signs of it.

In addition to an analysis of the process of nationalization of the Anatolian Orthodox through an examination of the correlation between the co-habitation practices of neighboring faith groups, tolerance, and nationalism, this dissertation aimed to respond to Pax-Ottomana romanticism concerning Ottoman plurality on the basis of a case study concentrating on one of the most “peaceful” regions of the Empire, Cappadocia, since it provides a good setting to test the peaceful co-existence myth.

In this study I asked various “why questions.” One of them was why the Ottoman Empire dissolved into several nation states if different faith groups peacefully lived together. To answer this question I utilized concepts like tolerance, intercommunality, plurality, and multiculturalism, with reference to normative discussions in political philosophy against the prevalent tendency of similar studies to employ these terms arbitrarily. Furthermore, I made an examination of competitive sharing between religious communities with an emphasis on the unequal and hegemonic aspect of religious syncretism. Sharing common customs and developing syncretic behaviors, in fact, do not mean that people were confused about their religion. To overcome any sort of romanticism, I also differentiated between testimonies that narrated inter-personal and intercommunal relationships. Inter-personal encounters were neighborly relationships that included intimacy. On the other side of the coin, however, at the inter-communal level the community borders were sharp, and the walls of

boundaries became higher or lower in line with the circumstances of the time. In times of peace the walls were more pervious, while in times of crisis, like wars and persecutions, community walls were higher.

This dissertation focuses also on several misconceptions. For example, non-conflict or less conflict does not denote “peaceful cohabitation”. For the case of Cappadocia there were two parameters of co-habitation: one was a general rule according to which non-Muslims were secondary subjects in line with Islamic tradition, and the second was imbalanced cosmopolitanism in which Muslim Turks were the dominant group, both demographically and culturally. In this ecosystem of co-existence the Cappadocian Orthodox tried to save their religion against possible attacks which came through conversion to Islam and mixed marriages with Turks. In the nineteenth century they were also threatened by missionaries, who proselytized among their co-religionists. Hence, they were competing with Turks to save their religion and to preserve the population of their faith group; while simultaneously competing with both missionaries, to protect their members from proselytism, and at ecclesiastical level to protect the religious dogma. In the Ottoman Empire the Muslims were the ultimate tolerators who remained indifferent to their Others. The Orthodox, on the other hand, was the tolerated group who had no choice but to consent in their relations with the dominant group. Interestingly, they assumed the role of tolerators in their relations *vis à vis* the Greek Protestants because they were demographically strong and more powerful with their established authorities and prestige in the Ottoman court. And all these parameters prove that Cappadocia could be a setting for Hayden’s antagonistic tolerance.

Another question that this dissertation hoped to address was the concept of whether or not there really was a glorious past to which we can refer to solve the problems of today. The answer is negative from two different angles. If our reference point is handling diversity, the Ottoman Empire cannot be an example for today because contemporary diversity is much more complicated and multi-faceted. As I argued in the second chapter, the reason for crediting the Ottoman

tolerance was an outcome of comparing it with its predecessors and contemporaries. It is true that the Ottomans were more flexible in handling diversity compared to other Empires of its time, and must be judged within the limits of history. However, there were also times and places in which Ottomans arbitrarily limited non-Muslim liberties. The Ottoman ecosystem was not an ideal world that we can romanticize and aspire to imitate today. Even the non-conflictual Cappadocia cannot be an example for us. The Ottoman Empire was a pre-modern imperial state that was run with the Islamic doctrine and by the will of Sultans that could not possibly be questioned. In this system, justice was only a means to accommodate hegemony and to preserve the imperial domains. There were no individuals, only subjects of the Sultans and members of religious communities; in other words, individuals were confined to their communities. There was autonomy for faith groups, but no freedom for individuals. Heretics of all religions were persecuted. Cosmopolitanism in cities was imbalanced in favor of those who were demographically and economically dominant. Faith groups were often spatially separated, living in different neighborhoods and coming together in market places. Competitive sharing and competitive co-habitation were prevalent at inter-communal relations. All these cannot be a remedy for the minority problems and identity claims of today. In accordance with all these arguments, naming Ottoman plurality as historical multiculturalism means mixing apples and oranges, since the pre-modern, imperial, and Islamic Ottoman Empire is totally alien to contemporary discussions which take liberal democracies as givens. This last remark led me to a judgment: offering to imitate the past for resolutions to present day problems and analyzing the past with modern concepts are both anachronistic behaviors; every phenomenon should be assessed in its time and place.

Throughout the study the modernist explanation of nationalism was adopted to explain Greek nationalism and the “Hellenization” of the Cappadocians. However, this was not a complete embracement since modernist theories of nationalism are mostly Eurocentric and remain inadequate for

understanding the nationalisms of traditional societies. Modernist theories focus on certain discontinuity to explain the emergence of nationalism. For some modernists discontinuity was revolutions in England, France, and the U.S. and for some it was industrial capitalism. In the Near East there was no such discontinuity separating traditional from modern. To put it differently, nationalism was not a natural outcome of some indigenous political, cultural or economic transformation. Rather, it was exported from the West through non-Muslim commercial class. Thus, nationalism spread through elite endeavor, especially when we think of Greek nationalism.

After the Kingdom of Greece was established in 1832, the politicians of the newly founded country were torn between working for the welfare of its people and investing for irredentism to save the “unredeemed Greeks”. Until its termination with a catastrophe in Asia Minor shores, the Greek irredentism used every possible means to revive Hellenism among the Orthodox of Macedonia and Asia Minor. As early as the 1830s Greek nationalism turned out to be religious nationalism, and played on the religion card to save the Orthodox that were considered to be prospective nationals of the Kingdom. One of the targeted areas was Cappadocia, a region in which most Christians were Turcophone. The introduction of Greek nationalism to the Orthodox settlements of Cappadocia started in the 1870s, and various parties including the *syllogoi* (societies) and brotherhood organizations of the Orthodox settlements assumed roles in this process. New schools were opened in Cappadocian settlements and their expenditures, supervision, and administration were carried out by School Boards that consisted of prominent members of the local community (*koinotis* or *koinotita*) at the bottom of the hierarchy. During this period, as a result of Ottoman reforms (1839-1856), the traditional authority of the Patriarchate, which had been the sole authority in education, was curbed by the introduction of lay members to (mixed) councils that ran communal affairs. In line with that, the middle class started to get involved in educational matters through the *syllogoi* that were founded in both Athens and Istanbul, two centers of Greek nationalism at the time.

Being influenced by the activities of the *syllogoi*, the Cappadocian immigrants in big cities founded their brotherhood organizations to help their hometowns. Except for few examples, almost all Orthodox settlements of Cappadocia had brotherhood organizations in foreign lands. These not only targeted the welfare of the remaining people in the hometowns, but also their enlightenment. As a result of all these endeavors, Cappadocian settlements experienced progress according to the power and wealth of their immigrants in foreign lands.

Throughout the nineteenth century there was flow of male population from Orthodox settlements of Cappadocia to places of economic opportunities like Istanbul, Izmir, Adana, Samsun, Cairo, Alexandria, Beirut, Odessa, Athens, and even to America. Immigration had two contradictory outcomes in terms of the enlightenment and Hellenization of the Cappadocian Orthodox. On one hand, due to increasing immigration rates, the Orthodox settlements were deserted, mainly women, children, and elderly remained in homelands; this made them vulnerable *vis à vis* the already dominant Muslim culture. In relatively poor villages this impact was especially high. In this way in some Greek speaking villages Turkish replaced Greek; some women were exposed to Turkish Muslim culture more than in previous times since they were no longer isolated at home, but instead running the daily business of the household and had to experience some contact with Turks. Some women started to work in fields of Turks as a result of poverty, and some even got married to them. On the other side of the story, a flow of wealth was transferred by male immigrants to homelands. With the cash flow new houses, infrastructures, churches, orphanages, and schools were built. Children who received their education in these institutions developed broader Community consciousness and proto-national ties. The successful ones went on to continue their education elsewhere, often in Athens or Istanbul, and became prominent intellectuals of their time. Emmanuil Emmanuilidis, Pavlos Carolidis, Ioakeim Valavanis, and Evangelinos Misailidis were among the Cappadocia born intellectuals who graduated from the University of Athens. This shows that there was a connection between Athens and Cappadocia. For example, Carolidis himself

played a prominent role in this connection as a member of Society of Anatolians (Boura, 1999).

In terms of nationalization and adopting a national identity, the Cappadocian Orthodox embraced different stances: there were educated people who were Greek nationalists like Valavanis; there were intellectuals who supported Ottomanism and Ottoman integrity, like Emmanuilidis and Carolidis; there were proto-nationalists who developed a broader Community consciousness; and there were less educated or non-educated humble folk who still identified themselves with religion. Interestingly, this last category of people regarded national identity as an attack on their religious identity during the early years of age of nationalism. Unquestionably, boundaries between these categories were not fixed, and they could have changed in line with circumstances. For instance, Emmanuilidis and Carolidis dropped Ottomanism right after World War I as a reaction to persecution of non-Muslims during the war. Later they became Greek nationalists. As for the lay people; I followed their stances through refugee testimonies. For example, they expressed their changing situation on nationalist policies in this phrase: “things spoiled.” They often referred to a discontinuity. The peaceful atmosphere promising freedom and equality to everyone with the Young Turk Revolution (1908) rapidly came to an end, especially after the Balkan Wars. Tolerance was replaced with intolerance flavored by increasingly nationalistic policies. In refugee testimonies years of hardship were explained with reference to previous years. According to their narrative, “things got spoiled” mostly due to external factors and groups like the Young Turks, the refugee Turks, the bandits etc. They hesitated to blame their neighbors, but stated that some of them became wild or opportunist in this period.

Papa Efthim was the most prominent figure of the war years in Cappadocia. With the direct support of the Ankara government, he initiated the Turkish Orthodox Church project. His initiative, however, remained ineffective since the Anatolian Orthodox was abandoned by the Turkish politicians during the Lausanne negotiations. After their displacement, the Turkish Orthodox

Patriarchate remained ineffective with a very small congregation, which included family members of Papa Efthim (Erenerol family), who were exempted from the Exchange. Sadly enough, the Anatolian Orthodox were also abandoned by Greek politicians at Lausanne. Under the pressure of the flow of refugees expelled from Asia Minor during and after the war, Greece was reluctant to receive thousands of new refugees. As a result of give and take politics that were carried out to handle the deadlock about the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Anatolian Orthodox population was eventually exchanged with the Muslims residing Greece. This was another rupture for the Anatolian Orthodox, and accelerated their process of “nationalization” as citizens of the Kingdom of Greece.

The last chapter of this dissertation was reserved for the Greek Protestants who had been invisible in the historiography of non-Muslims in the Ottoman Empire. The case of the Greek Protestants is interesting in the sense that they had kinship relations with the Orthodox. For this reason, although they were sometimes persecuted at the hands of the Orthodox, they were not totally alienated from the Orthodox Community. In other words, despite the fact that there was antagonism at the inter-communal level to protect the Orthodox from proselytization, inevitable kinship relations existed at an inter-personal level. As for inter-communal relations, the boundaries between Protestants and the Orthodox ostensibly faded away during the long war; the Protestants preferred to leave Turkey either for Greece or the U.S, although they were not included in the Exchange Protocol. We could hypothesize several reasons for their departure: they might have not known that they remained outside the Protocol; they might have followed their Orthodox relatives; they might have left due to a fear of persecution at the hands of Turkish authorities; or they might have already left when the Protocol was signed as it happened in Pontus where Christians were sent to exile. Concerning the reception of Protestants by Greek nationalism, it was not a happy one, as Orthodox Christianity was the main marker of national Greek identity and conversion meant *denationalization* (Deringil, 2012).

When I started writing this dissertation, I continuously repeated to myself that this study needed to have something to say about today. A friend of mine from Macedonia once told me that the Ottoman Empire is still dissolving.²⁴⁰ He was right. The Kurdish question at the heartland of the historical Empire, and the civil war in Syria and subsequent flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey both make me feel like the nineteenth century continues. To overcome the “disease of nineteenth century,” we should demand more empathy, freedom, and equality for everyone. Today what we need is respect rather than tolerance, and we must remind ourselves that history is a lesson to be learned, not a model to be imitated.

²⁴⁰ I have to give credit to my friend Anastas Vangeli.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Archives and Libraries

Greece

Centre for Asia Minor Studies

Oral Tradition Archive of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies (KMS)

Photography Archive of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies (KMS)

Greek Historical Evangelical Archive

The Gennadius Library

Turkey

National Library of Turkey

Newspapers and periodicals

Anatoli 1851-1854; 1891-1897

Terakki 1888

Angeliaforos 1889-1890; 1903-1904

The Missionary Herald 1870-1922

Almanacs and Regulations of Brotherhood Organizations

I. H. Kalfoglou. (1894). *Ημερολόγιον: η Ανατολή* [Almanac: the East]. *Μικρασιατικών ημερολογίων: Ο Αστήρ* [Almanac of Asia Minor: the Star]. (1914). Konstantinoupoli: G. D. Protopapa Press.

Κανονισμός της εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει αδελφότητος της κόμης Αραβάν: Ο Άγιος Γεώργιος [The regulation of the Brotherhood of the village Aravan: Agios Georgios]. (1905). Konstantinoupoli: Patriarhikou Tipografeiou.

Κανονισμός της εν Κωνσταντινουπόλει φιλεκπαιδευτικής αδελφότητος Καρβάλης: Ναζιανζός, ιδρυθείσης τω 1884 [The regulation of the Educational

Brotherhood of Karvali: Nazianzos, founded in Constantinople in 1884] (1909). Konstantinoupoli: Tipografeiou Pl. Misailidou.

Books and Articles

Agapidis, I. (1948). *Ελληνικαι Ευαγγελικαι Κοινοτητες του Ποντου* [Greek Evangelical Communities of Pontus]. Thessaloniki: Nikos Z. Zlatanovs Publication House.

———. (1950). *Ελληνικαι Ευαγγελικαι Κοινοτητες της Μικρας Ασιας* [Greek Evangelical Communities of Asia Minor]. Thessaloniki: Nikos Z. Zlatanovs Publication House.

Ahladi, E. (2008). İzmir’de İttihatçılar ve Rumlar: Yunan-Rum Boykotu (1908-1911). *Kebikeç*, 26, 188-190.

Aktar, A. (2007). Debating the Armenian massacres in the last Ottoman parliament, November - December 1918. *History Workshop Journal*, 64(64), 240-270.

Alexandris, A. (1982). The Constantinopolitan Greek factor during the Greco-Turkish confrontation of 1919-1922. *Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies*, 8(1), 137-169.

Anderson, B. (2006). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*. New York; London: Verso.

Anagnostopoulou, S. (2013). *Μικρά Ασία: 19^{ος} αιώνας -1919: οι ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος* [Asia Minor: 19th century- 1919: the Greek Orthodox communities from Rum millet to Greek nation]. Athens: Pedio.

Anestidis, S. T. (2002). Introduction. *Ιστορική γεωγραφία της Μικρασιατικής χερσονήσου* [Historical Geography of Asia Minor-Greek edition]. I. Kalfoglou. (S. Anestidis, Trans.). Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies. (Original work published 1899), 13-34.

———. (2014). Yunan ve Türk Edebiyatında erken Karamanlı tiplerini [Early Karamanli typologies in Turkish and Greek literature]. In E. Balta (Ed.), *Cultural Encounters in the Turkish-speaking communities of the late Ottoman Empire* (pp. 29-40). Istanbul: The Isis Press, 29-40.

Anhegger, R. (2001). Evangelinos Misailidis ve Türkçe konuşan dindaşları. *Tarih ve Toplum*, XXXV(209), 11-18.

- Anzerliođlu, Y. (2009). *Karamanlı Ortodoks Türkler* [Caramanian Orthodox Turks]. Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi.
- Aleksov, B. (2005). Perception of Islamization in the Serbian national discourse. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 5(1), 113-127.
- Alpan, A. S. (2013). But the memory remains: history, memory and the 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange. *The Historical Review/La Revue Historique*, 9, 199-232.
- Arendt, H. (1998). *The human condition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . (1976). *The origins of totalitarianism*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
- Artinian, V. (2004). *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Ermeni Anayasası'nın doğuşu: 1839-1863* [A study of the historical development of the Armenian constitutional system in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1863]. Istanbul: Aras Yayıncılık.
- Augustinos, G. (1992). *The Greeks of Asia Minor: confession, community, and ethnicity in the nineteenth century*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press.
- . (1986). "Enlightened" Christians and the "Oriental" Churches: Protestant missions to the Greeks in Asia Minor: 1820-1860. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 4(2), 129-142.
- Bağçeci, Y. (2008). Osmanlı Devleti'nde Gregorian Ermenilerle Protestan Ermeniler arasındaki ilişkiler" [The relations of Gregorian Armenians with Protestant Armenians in the Ottoman Empire]. *Turkish Studies*, 3(7), 169-192.
- Baer, M. D. (2008). *Honored by the glory of Islam: conversion and conquest in Ottoman Europe*. Oxford University Press.
- Balta, E. (2003). Gerçi Rum isek de Rumca bilmez Türkçe söyleriz: the adventure of an identity in the triptych: vatan, religion and language. *Türk Kültürü İncelemeleri Dergisi*, 8, 25-44.
- . (1990). *Karamanlîca kitapların önsözleri* [The prefaces of Karamanlîca books]. *Tarih ve Toplum*, 74, 18-20.
- . (1987). *Karamanlidika: Additions (1584-1900): Bibliographie Analytique*. Athenes: Centre D'Études De'Asie Mineure.

- . (1987). *Karamanlidika: nouvelles additions et complements I. Athenes: Centre D'Études De'Asie Mineure.*
- . (1997). *Karamanlidika: XXE siècle: Bibliographie Analytiqu. Athenes: Centre D'Études De'Asie Mineure.*
- . (2010). Karamanli Press Smyrna 1845- Athens 1926. *İzzet Gündag Kayaoğlu hatıra kitabı makaleler* [Izzet Gündag Kayaoğlu memory book articles]. O. Belli, Y. Dağlı, S. M. Genim eds. İstanbul: Türkiye Anıt Çevre Turizm Değerlerini Koruma Vakfı, 27-33.
- Balta, E. & Kappler, M. (Eds.). (2010). *Cries and whispers in Karamanlidika books.* Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag.
- Bardakjian, K. B. (1982). The rise of the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (vol.1).* New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers.
- Barkey, K. (2008). *Empire of difference: the Ottomans in comparative perspective.* New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Barnum, H. S. (1903). Periodical literature from the mission press. *The Missionary Herald*, 436-439.
- Barth, F. (1969). Introduction. *Ethnic groups and boundaries: the social organization of culture difference.* F. Barth ed. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 9-38.
- Bauman, Z. (2004). *Identity: conversations with Benedetto Vecchi.* Cambridge; Malden: Polity Press.
- Baumeister, A. T. (1999). Multicultural citizenship, identity and conflict. In J. Horton & S. Mendus (Eds.), *Toleration, identity and difference.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Baykurt, C. (2007). *Hıristiyan Türkler* [Christian Turks]. İstanbul: Karma Kitaplar.
- Benhabib, S. (1997). The embattled public sphere: Hannah Arendt, Juergen Habermas and beyond. *Theoria*, 90(1), 1-24.
- Benlisoy, F. & Benlisoy, S. (2010). “Karamanlılar”, “Anadolu ahalisi” ve “aşağı tabakalar”:Türkdilli Anadolu Ortodokslarında kimlik algısı [“Karamanlides, Anatolian folk and subaltern classes: perception of identity in Turcophone Anatolian Orthodox]. *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, 11, 7-22.

- . (2000). 19. Yüzyılda Karamanlılar ve eğitim: Nevşehir mektepleri [Karamanlis and education: schools of Nevşehir]. *Toplumsal Tarih*, 24-33.
- Benlisoy, F. (2002). Papa Eftim and the foundation of the Turkish Orthodox Church (Unpublished MA Thesis. Boğaziçi University, 2002).
- Benlisoy, S. (2003). İstanbul'a göçmüş Ürgüplü Ortodoksların kurduğu bir cemiyet: 'Areti' Maarifperveran Cemiyeti [A society founded by the Orthodox who migrated to Istanbul from Ürgüp: "Areti Maarifperveran Cemiyeti"]. *Tarih ve Toplum*, 233,4-9.
- . (2003). İstanbul'da yaşayan Nevşehirli Ortodokslar tarafından kurulan Papa Yeorgios nam Cemiyet-i Islahiyyesi [The development society called Papa Yeorgios founded by Nevşehirli who live in Istanbul]. *Tarih ve Toplum*, 236, 35-41.
- . (2010). Education in the Turcophone Orthodox communities of Anatolia during the nineteenth century (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Boğaziçi University, 2010).
- Ben-Naeh, Y. (2009). *Sultanlar diyarında Yahudiler: 17. yüzyılda Osmanlı Yahudi toplumu* [In the Realm of Sultans: Ottoman Jewish Society]. Istanbul: Goa Basım Yayın.
- Boym, S. (2001). *The future of nostalgia*. New York: Basic Books.
- Braude, B. (1982). Formation myths of the millet system. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (vol.1)*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 69-88.
- Bringa, T. (1995). *Being a Muslim the Bosnian way: identity and community in a central Bosnian village*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brown, W. (2006). *Regulating aversion: tolerance in the age of identity and empire*. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Bosworth, C. E. (1982). The concept of *dhimma* in early Islam. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (vol.1)*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 37-54.
- Boura, C. (1999). The Greek millet in Turkish politics: Greeks in the Ottoman parliament (1908-1918). In D. Gondicas & C. Issawi (Eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the age of nationalism*. New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 193-206.

- Bowman, G. (2002). Comment on R. Hayden, Antagonistic tolerance: competitive sharing of religious sites in South Asia and the Balkans. *Current Anthropology*, 43(2), 219-220.
- Bjørnlund, M. (2008). The 1914 cleansing of Aegean Greeks. *Journal of Genocide Research*, 10(1), 41–57.
- Button, M. (2005). Arendt, Rawls and public reason. *Social theory and practice*, 31(2), 257- 280.
- Cahen, C. Dhimma. *Encyclopedia of Islam* 2. Brill: Online Publication, 227-231.
- Carter, I. (2013). Are toleration and respect compatible? *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 30(3), 195-208.
- Cauce, S. (2011). *Sözlü tarih ve yerel tarihçi* [Oral history and local historian]. Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları.
- Campos, M. (2011). *Ottoman brothers: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in early twentieth-century Palestine*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Clogg, R. (1982). The Greek *millet* in the Ottoman Empire. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: the functioning of a plural society (vol. 1)*. New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 185-207.
- . (1996). Some Karamanlidika inscriptions from the monastery of the Zoodokhos Pigi, Balıklı, Istanbul. *Anatolica: studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th centuries*. Hampshire; Vermont: Variorum, 55-67.
- . (1996). Anadolu Hristiyan Karındaşlarımız: the Turkish-speaking Greeks of Asia Minor. *Anatolica: studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th centuries*. Hampshire; Vermont: Variorum, 65-91.
- . (1996). Greek merchantile bourgeoisie. *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th centuries*. Hampshire; Vermont: Variorum, 1-20.
- . (2004). *Kath'imas Anatoli: studies in Ottoman Greek history*. Istanbul: The Isis Press.
- Cobb, S. (1914). *The real Turk*. Boston; New York; Chicago: The Pilgrim Press.
- Cohen, A. (2004). What toleration is. *Ethics*, 115(1), 68-95.

- Crawford, L. S. (1906). For the younger people: Trebizond and its people. *The Missionary Herald*, 378-381.
- Çelebi, Ç. L. (2009). Socio-economic relations between Christian and Muslim communities in the sanjak of Kayseri in 1870-1880 (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2009).
- Çetinkaya, Y. D. (2010). Muslim merchants and working-class in action: nationalism, social mobilization and boycott movement in the Ottoman Empire 1908-1914 (Published Doctoral Dissertation, University of Leiden, 2010).
- . (2014). *The young Turks and the boycott movement: nationalism, protest and the working classes in the formation of modern Turkey*. London; New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Daniel, E. L. Manicheanism. *Encyclopedia of Islam 2*. Brill: Online Publication, 428-429.
- Davison, R. H. (1982). The millets as agents of change in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (vol. 1)*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 187-208.
- Dawkins, R. (1916). *Modern Greek in Asia Minor: a study of the dialects of Silli, Cappadocia and Pharsa with grammar, texts, translations and glossary*. Cambridge at the University Press.
- Dean, M. (1999). *Governmentality: power and rule in modern society*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.
- Deringil, S. (2012). *Conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . (2000). There is no compulsion in religion: conversion and apostasy in the late Ottoman Empire 1839-1856. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40, 547-575.
- Doumanis, N. (2013). *Before the nation: Muslim-Christian co-existence and its destruction in late Ottoman Anatolia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dragostinova, T. (2011). *Between two motherlands: nationality and emigration among the Greeks of Bulgaria, 1900-1949*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

- Dwight, O. H. (1898). The publication department of the Western Turkey mission. *The Missionary Herald*, 51-54.
- Dyke, V. V. (1985). *Human rights, ethnicity, and discrimination*. London: Greenwood press.
- Eğilmez, D. B. (2011). Justice as the requirement of toleration: contemptuous tolerance and punitive intolerance in the sixteenth century Ottoman Empire (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Middle East Technical University, 2011).
- Ekincikli, M. (1998). *Türk Ortodoksları* [Turkish Orthodox]. Ankara: Siyasal Kitapevi.
- Ekmečić M. (1989). *Stvaranje Jugoslavije 1790-1818* [Creation of Yugoslavia 1790-1818]. Belgrade: Prosteva.
- Eldem, E. (1999). Istanbul: from imperial to peripheralized capital. In E.Eldem, D. Goffman & B. Masters (Eds.), *The Ottoman city between east and west*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 135-206.
- Emmanuilidis, E. (2014). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son yılları* [The last years of the Ottoman Empire] (N. Çanakçıoğlu, Trans.). Istanbul: Belge Yayınları. (Original work published 1924)
- Epstein, M. A. (1982). The leadership of the Ottoman Jews in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In B. Braude & B. Lewis (Eds.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire (vol.1)*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 101-115.
- Erdem, H. (2005). “Do not think of the Greeks as agricultural laborers”: Ottoman responses to the Greek war of independence. In F. Birtek & T. Dragonas (Eds.), *Citizenship and nation-state in Greece and Turkey*. Oxon; New York: Routledge, 67-84.
- Ergene, T. (1951). İstiklal harbinde Türk Ortodoksları [The Turkish Orthodox in war of independence]. Istanbul: İ. P. Neşriyat Servisi.
- Erol, M. (2004). Evangelinos Misailidis. *Toplumsal Tarih*, 70-71.
- . (2014). Cultural manifestations of a symbiosis: Karamanlidika epitaphs of the nineteenth century. In E. Balta (Ed.), *Cultural encounters in the Turkish-speaking communities of the late Ottoman Empire*. Proceedings of the III International Workshop of Karamanlidika Studies. İstanbul: Isis Press, 77-104.

- Ertuğrul, H. (1998). *Azınlık ve yabancı okullarının Türk toplumuna etkisi* [The impact of minority and foreign schools on Turkish society]. Istanbul: Nesil Yayınları.
- Evans, G. R. (2008). *A brief history of heresy*. Hoboken: Wiley.
- Exertzoglou, H. (1999). The development of a Greek Ottoman Bourgeoisie: investment patterns in the Ottoman Empire, 1850-1914. In D. Gondicas & C. Issawi (Eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the age of nationalism*. New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 89-114.
- Fabian, J. (2007). *Memory against culture: arguments and reminders*. Durham; London: Duke University Press.
- Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In A. Burchell & C. Gordon, P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 87-104.
- Frazer, C. A. (1979). The Greek Catholic islanders and the Revolution of 1821. *East European Quarterly*, 13(3), 315-326.
- Friedmann, Y. (2003). *Tolerance and coercion in Islam: interfaith relations in the Muslim tradition*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gazi, E. (2009). Revisiting religion and nationalism in nineteenth-century Greece. R. Beaton & D. Ricks (Eds.), *The making of modern Greece*. Surrey: Ashgate, 95-106.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and nationalism*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Georgelin, H. (2012). Armenian inter-community relations in late Ottoman Smyrna. In R. G. Hovannisian (Ed.), *Armenian Smyrna/Izmir: the Aegean communities*. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers, 177-190.
- Gingeras, R. (2009). *Sorrowful shores: violence, ethnicity, and the end of the Ottoman Empire, 1912-1923*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Goffman, D. (1999). Izmir: from village to colonial port city. In E. Eldem, D. Goffman & B. Masters (Eds.), *The Ottoman city between east and west*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 79-134.

- Gozdecka, D. A., Ercan, S. A. & Kmak, M. (2014). From multiculturalism to post-multiculturalism: trends and paradoxes. *Journal of Sociology*, 50(1), 51-64.
- Göktürk, G. (2013). Yunanistan'dan Anadolu Manzaraları [Anatolian views from Greece]. *Sol Bakış*.
- . (2009). Clash of Identity Myths in the Hybrid Presence of the Karamanlis (Unpublished MA thesis, Central European University, 2009).
- . (2011). Bir siyasi arkeoloji örneği olarak Türkiye'deki tarih yazınında Karamanlılar [As an example of political archeology: Karamanlides in historiography in Turkey]. *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, 13, 257-276.
- Green, A. (2004). Individual remembering and collective memory: theoretical presuppositions and contemporary debates. *Oral History*, (32) 2, 35-44.
- Greene, J. K. (1905). The jubilee of "Avedaper". *The Missionary Herald*, 171-173.
- Grigoriadis, I. N. (2013). *Instilling religion in Greek and Turkish nationalism: a "sacred synthesis."* New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Gutmann, A. (2004). *Identity in democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1999). C. Cronin & P. D. Greiff (Eds.), *The inclusion of the Other: studies in political theory*. Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Hacısalıhoğlu, M. (2007). Osmanlı imparatorluğunda zorunlu askerlik sistemine geçiş: ordu-millet düşüncesi" [Transition to compulsory military service system in the Ottoman Empire: the thought of nation in arms]. *Toplumsal Tarih*, 164, 58-64.
- Halbwachs, M. (1992). *On collective memory*. Chicago; London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Hamlin, C. (1893). *My life and times*. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company (Publishers of Evangelical Literature).
- Hanley, W. (2008). Grieving cosmopolitanism in Middle East studies. *History Compass*, 6(5), 1346-1367.
- Hasluck, F. W. (1929). *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

- Harakopoulos, M. (2014). *Ρωμιοί της Καππαδοκίας: από τα βάθη της Ανατολής στο θεσσαλικό κάμφο, η τραυματική ενσωμάτωση στη μητέρα πατρίδα* [The Greek Orthodox of Cappadocia: from depths of Anatolia to Thessalian plains, the traumatic integration in mother country]. Athens: Pedio.
- Hatziosif, H. (2005). *Συνασός: Ιστορία ενός τόπου χωρίς ιστορία* [Sinastos: history of a place without history]. Heraklion: University Press of Crete.
- Haydaroglu, I. P. (1990). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda yabancı okullar* [Foreign schools in the Ottoman Empire]. Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı.
- Hayden, R. M. (2002). Antagonistic tolerance: competitive sharing of religious sites in South Asia and the Balkans. *Current Anthropology*, 43(2), 205-231.
- . (2013). Intersecting religioscapes and antagonistic tolerance: trajectories of competition and sharing of religious spaces in the Balkans. *Space & Polity*, 17(3), 320-334.
- Hayden, R. M., Sözer, H., Tanyeri-Erdemir, T., & Erdemir, A. (2011). The Byzantine mosque at Trilye: a processual analysis of dominance, sharing, transformation and tolerance. *History and Anthropology*, 22(1), 1-17.
- Hayden, R. M., & Naumovic, S. (2013). Imagined commonalities: the invention of a late Ottoman "tradition" of coexistence. *American Anthropologist*, 115(2), 324-334.
- Heyd, D. (1996). Introduction. In D. Heyd (Ed.), *Toleration: an elusive virtue*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3-17.
- Hirschon, R. (1988). *Heirs of the Greek catastrophe: the social life of Asia Minor refugees in Piraeus*. New York; Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- . (2006). Knowledge of diversity: towards a more differentiated set of 'Greek' perceptions of 'Turks'. *South European Society and Politics*. 11(1), 61-78.
- Hobsbawm, E. (1992). *Nations and nationalism since 1780: programme, myth, reality*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Huntington, S. P. (1997). *The clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order* (1st Touchstone ed.). New York: Touchstone.
- Iğsız, A. (2008). Documenting the past and publicizing personal stories: sensescapes and the 1923 Greco-Turkish Population Exchange in contemporary Turkey. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 26, 451-487.

- . (2015). Palimpsests of multiculturalism and museumization of culture: Greco-Turkish population exchange museum as an Istanbul 2010 European capital of culture project. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 35(2), 324-345.
- İnalçık, H. (1991). The status of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch under the Ottomans. *Turcica*, XI-XII, 195-219.
- Jessup, H. H. (1891). *The Greek Church and Protestant Missions or missions to the oriental churches*. New York: Christian Literature Co.
- Kalfas, A. G. & Papageorgiou, P. A. (2001). *Ο συνοικισμός Ευαγγελικών της Κατερίνης. τοπική ιστορία και κίνηση των θρησκευτικών ιδεών* [The settlement of Evangelicals of Katerini: local history and movement of the religious ideas]. Katerini.
- Kamouzis, D. (2013). Elites and the formation of national identity. In B. C. Fortna, S. Katsikas, D. Kamouzis & P. Konortas (Eds.), *State-nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire, Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830-1945*. London; New York: Routledge, 13-46.
- Kansteiner, W. (2002). Finding meaning in memory: a methodological critique of collective memory studies. *History and Theory*. 41(2), 179-197.
- Kapoli, E. (2008). Archive of oral tradition of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies: its formation and its contribution to research. *Ateliers d'anthropologie*, 32.
- Kapoli, P. P. (2004). *Πόλη και μετανάστευση στην Οθωμανική Αυτοκρατορία: Κωνσταντινούπολη και Καππαδόκες μετανάστες (1856-1908)* [Istanbul and immigration in the Ottoman Empire: Istanbul and Cappadocian immigrants (1856-1908)] (Unpublished MA thesis, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, 2004).
- Karalidis, K. I. (2005). *Τσαρικλί Νίγδης Καππαδοκίας* [Tsarikli of Niğde Cappadocia]. Έκδοση του Συλλόγου Καππαδοκών Μαυρολόφου Ο Άγιος Γεώργιος-Τσαρικλί, Athens.
- Karmiris, I. N. (1937). *Ορθοδοξία και Προτεσταντισμός* [Orthodoxy and Protestantism]. Athens.
- Karakasidou, A. N. (1997; 2009). *Fields of wheat, hills of blood: passages to nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Kazamias, A. (1991). The education of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1923: a case study of 'controlled toletation.' In J .J. Tomiak (Ed.), *Schooling, educational policy and ethnic identity*. New York: New York University Press, 343-367.
- Kechriotis, V. (2014). Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son döneminde Karamanlı Rum Ortodoks Diasporası: İzmir mebusu Emmanouil Emmanouilidis [Karamanli Greek Orthodox diaspora in the late Ottoman Empire: the deputy of Izmir, Emmanouil Emmanouilidis]. *Toplumsal Tarih*, 251, 38-43.
- . (2015). Ottomanism with a Greek Face: Karamanli Greek Orthodox diaspora at the end of the Ottoman Empire. In M. Isabella & K. Zanou (Eds.), *Mediterranean diasporas: politics and ideology in the long 19th century*. Bloomsbury, 189-204.
- . (2015). Atina'da Kapadokyalı, İzmir'de Atinalı, İstanbul'a mebus: Pavlos Karolidis'in farklı kişilik ve aidiyetleri [Cappadocian in Athens, Athenian in Izmir and deputy in Istanbul: Different identities and belongingness of Pavlos Carolidis]. *Toplumsal Tarih*. 257, 28-35.
- King, P. (1998). *Toleration*. London: Frank Cass Publishers.
- Kirtsoglou, E. & Sistani, L. (2003). The other *then*, the other *now*, the other *within*: stereotypical images and narrative captions of the Turk in northern and central Greece. *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 13(2), 189-213.
- Kitromilides, P. M. (1990). Greek irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus. *Middle East Studies*, 26(1), 3-17.
- . (1992). *The enlightenment as social criticism: Iosipos Moisioudax and Greek culture in the eighteenth century*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- . (Ed.). (1982). Η Έξοδος τόμος Β': μαρτυρίες από τις επαρχίες της Κεντρικής και Νότιας Μικρασίας [The exodus volume 2: testimonies from Central and Southern provinces of Asia Minor]. Centre for Asia Minor Studies. Athens.
- Kocabaşoğlu, U. (2000). *Anadolu'daki Amerika* [America in Anatolia]. Ankara: İmge Yayınları.
- Kojeve, A. (1980). In place of an introduction. In A. Bloom (Ed.), *Introduction to the reading of Hegel*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 3-30.
- Kolodziejczyk, D. (2006). The "Turkish yoke" revisited: the Ottoman non-Muslim subjects between loyalty, alienation, and riot. *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 93, 177-195.

- Korostelina, K. V. (2007). *Social identity and conflict: Structures, dynamics, and implications*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kritikos, G. (1999-2000). Motives for the compulsory exchange. *Deltio: Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies*, 13, 209-224.
- Kritovulos. (2013). *İstanbul'un fethi: tarih-i Sultan Mehmet Han-ı Sani* [History of Mehmed the Conqueror]. İstanbul: Kapı Yayınları.
- Konortas, P. (1999). From ta'ife to millet. In D. Gondicas & C. Issawi (Eds.), *Ottoman Greeks in the age of nationalism: politics, economy, and society in the nineteenth century*. Princeton; New Jersey: The Darwin Press, 1999, 169-180.
- Koraes, A. (1970). Report on the present state of civilization in Greece. In E. Kedourie (Ed.), *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*. New York: World Pub. Co., 153-188.
- Kymlicka, W. (1995). *Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- . (1997). Do we need a liberal theory of minority rights? Reply to Carens, Young, Parekh and Forst. *Constellations*. 4(1), 72-87.
- . (1996). Two models of pluralism and tolerance. In D. Heyd (Ed.), *Toleration: an elusive virtue*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 81-105.
- Ladas, S. P. (1932). *The exchange of minorities: Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Lamprylos, K. H. N. (1836). *Ο Μισσιοναρισμός και προτεσταντισμός εις τας Ανατολάς : Ήτοι Διαγωγή των Προτεσταντών Μισσιοναρίων εις τα μέρη μας, εις τινα τε άλλα της γης μέρη. Και σχέσεις του Προτεσταντισμού προς την Μητέρα πασών των Εκκλησιών και το Ελληνικόν Έθνος* [The missions and Protestantism to the East: namely misconduct of Protestant missionaries in our lands, in other parts of the earth. And relations of Protestantism with the Mother all the churches and the Greek nation]. Izmir.
- Lafi, N. (2008). The Ottoman Cosmopolitan Hypothesis in the Light of Pheng Cheahs Critical Explorations of Cosmopolitanism. *Transnationalism and Colonialism. EUME Summer School*, Istanbul.

- Layoun, M. N. (2001). *Wedded to the land? Gender, boundaries and nationalism in crisis*. Durham; London: Duke University Press.
- Lessersohn, N. (2015). "Provincial cosmopolitanism" in late Ottoman Anatolia: An Armenian shoemaker's memoir. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 57(2), 528-556.
- Lewis, B. (2002). *The emergence of modern Turkey*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Liakos, A. (2008). Hellenism and the making of Modern Greece: time, language, space. In K. Zacharia (Ed.), *Hellenisms: culture, identity, and ethnicity from antiquity to modernity*. Hampshire; Burlington: Ashgate, 201-236.
- Livanios, D. (2003). Making borders, unmaking identities: frontiers and nationalism in the Balkans, 1774-1913. *Seminar paper delivered at the Watson Institute for International Studies*. Brown University.
- Locke, J. (2010). A letter concerning toleration. In R. Vernon (Ed.), *Locke on toleration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3-46.
- Loukopoulos, D. (1984-1985). Η Ξενιτειά [The foreign lands]. *Deltio: Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies*, 5, 505-511.
- Macar, E. (2003). *Cumhuriyet döneminde İstanbul Rum Patrikhanesi* [Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul during the republican era]. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- . (2006). *İstanbul'un yok olmuş iki cemaati: doğu ritli Katolik Rumlar ve Bulgarlar* [Two extinct communities of Istanbul: Uniate Greeks and Bulgarians]. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Mackridge, P. (2009). *Language and national identity in Greece 1766-1976*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Makdisi, U. (2008). *Artillery of heaven: American missionaries and the failed conversion of the Middle East*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Mamoni, K. (1980-1981). *Αγώνες του Οικουμενικού Πατριαρχείου κατά των Μισσιονάριων* [Competitions of Ecumenical Patriarchate against the Missionaries]. Μνημοσυνή.
- Manousaki, S. A. (2002). *Μνήμες Καππαδοκίας* [Memories of Cappadocia]. Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies.

- Masters, B. (2001). *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Arab World: the roots of sectarianism*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . (2006). Christians in a changing world. In S. N. Faroqhi (Ed.), *The Cambridge history of Turkey vol. 3: the later Ottoman Empire, 1603-1839*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 272-280.
- Mazower, M. (2000). *The Balkans*. New York: Modern Library.
- . (2005). *Salonica, city of ghosts: Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430-1950*. New York: Knopf.
- McCarthy, J. (2001). *The Ottoman peoples and the end of Empire*. New York: Arnold Publishers.
- McKinnon, C. (2006). *Toleration: a critical introduction*. London; New York : Routledge.
- Ménage, V. L. (1979). The Islamization of Anatolia. In N. Levtzion (Ed.), *Conversion to Islam*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 52-67.
- Merlie, M. L. (1977). Οι ελληνικές κοινότητες στη σύγχρονη Καππαδοκία [the Greek communities of contemporary Cappadocia]. *Deltio: Bulletin of the Centre for Asia Minor Studies*, 1, 29 -74.
- Mill, J. S. (2009). *On liberty*. The Floating Press (from a 1909 edition).
- Miller, D. (1999). Group identities, national identities and democratic politics. In J. Horton & S. Mendus (Eds.), *Toleration, identity and difference*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 103-125.
- Monk, I. H. (1999). Toleration and moral will. In J. Horton & S. Mendus (Eds.), *Toleration, identity and difference*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 17-37.
- Mourellos, Y. G. (1985). The 1914 persecutions and the first attempt at an exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey. *Balkan Studies*, 26(2), 389-413.
- Orakçı, M. (2014). Karamanlıca bir gazete: *Terakki* [A Karamanlidika newspaper: *Terakki*]. In E. Balta (Ed.), *Cultural Encounters in the Turkish-speaking communities of the late Ottoman Empire*. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 411-428.
- Ortaylı, İ. (2008). *Osmanlı'da milletler ve diplomasi* [Milletts and diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire]. Istanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları.

- Ortaylı, I. (1987). *İmparatorluğun en uzun yüzyılı* [the longest century of the empire]. Istanbul: Hil Yayın.
- Ozil, A. (2013). *Orthodox Christians in the late Ottoman Empire: a study of communal relations in Anatolia*. New York: Routledge.
- Öz, M. (2013). Zındık. *İslam Ansiklopedisi* [Encyclopedia of Islam]. Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı.
- Özdemir, E. R. (2006). Borders of Belonging in the “Exchanged” Generations of Karamanlis (Unpublished MA Thesis, Koç University, 2006).
- Özkırımlı, U. & Sofos, S. A. (2008). *Tormented by history: nationalism in Greece and Turkey*. London: Hurst Publishers.
- Özyürek, E. (2007). *The politics of public memory in Turkey*. Syracuse; New York: Syracuse University Press.
- Özsoy, H. (1996). *Kayseri’de Amerikan misyoner faaliyetleri ve Talas Amerikan Koleji* [American Missionary Activities in Kayseri and Talas American College]. Kayseri: Talas Belediyesi Kültür Yayınları.
- Papailias, P. (2004). *Genres of recollection: archival poetics and modern Greece: anthropology, history, and the critical imagination*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pashalidou, A. P. D. (1996). *Η λύση του γαμου στο Μουσουλμανικό Δίκαιο: με ειδική αναφορά στα προβλήματα των μεικτών γαμων* [The dissolution of marriage in Islamic Law: with special reference to mixed marriages and the conflict of laws]. Lefkosia.
- Rawls, J. (1993). *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- . (1999). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Riggs, E. (1886). Anatolia College, Western Turkey. *The Missionary Herald*, 417-418.
- Roudometof, V. (1998). From Rum millet to Greek nation: enlightenment, secularization, and national identity in Ottoman Balkan society, 1453-1821. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 16, 11-48.
- Papa Efthim. (1925). *Papa Efthim Efendi’nin Orthodoxos ahaliye müracaatı ve Patrikhaneye karşı müdafaanamesi* [Papa Efthim Efendi’s appeal to

- Orthodox community and his apology against the Patriarchate]. Centre for Asia Minor Studies. *Karamanlidika* book collection.
- Parekh, B. (1997). Dilemmas of a multicultural theory of citizenship. *Constellations*, 4(1), 54-62.
- . (2006). *Rethinking multiculturalism: cultural diversity and political theory*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Patsavos, L. J. & Joanides, C. J. (2000). Interchurch marriages: An orthodox perspective. *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 45(1/4), 433-442.
- Petropoulou, I. (2002). Foreword. In I. Kalfoglou, *Ιστορική γεωγραφία της Μικρασιατικής χερσονήσου* [Historical Geography of Asia Minor-Greek edition]. (S. Anestidis, Trans.). Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies. (Original work published 1899), 9-12.
- Philipp, T. (2004). Bilād al-šām in the modern period: Integration into the Ottoman Empire and new relations with Europe. *Arabica*, 51(4), 401-418.
- Phillips, A. (1999). The politisation of difference: does this make for a more intolerant society? In J. Horton and S. Mendus (Eds.), *Tolerance, identity and difference*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 126-145.
- Portelli, A. (2002). What makes oral history different? In R. Perk & A. Thomson (Eds.), *Oral History Reader*. New York: Routledge, 63-74.
- Psomiades, H. J. (1960). The Oecumenical Patriarchate under the Turkish Republic: the first ten years. *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 6(62), 56-80.
- Richards, G. L. (1919). Are foreign missions worth while? *The Missionary Herald*, 265-267.
- Richter, J. (1910). *A history of missions in the near East*. Edinburgh: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier.
- Rufus, A. (1873). *History of the missions of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions to the oriental churches* (Vol. I). Boston: Congregational Publishing Society.
- Quataert, D. (1997). Clothing laws, state, and society in the Ottoman Empire, 1720–1829. *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 29(3), 403-425.

- Sabra, G. (1999). Orthodox-Protestant relations: a view from the Middle East. *The Ecumenical Review*, 51(4), 372-375.
- Samouilidis, H. (2010). *Καραμανίτες: οι τελευταίοι Έλληνες της Καππαδοκίας* [Karamanites: the last Greeks of Cappadocia]. Athens: Estia.
- Sennett, R. (1992). *The fall of public man*. New York, London: W. W. Norton.
- . (2004). *Respect: the formation of character in an age of inequality*. London: Penguin.
- Shaw, S. (1976). *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Empire of the Gazis: the rise and decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808* (Vol. I). Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sigler, A. J. (1983). *Minority rights: a comparative analysis*. Connecticut: Greenwood press.
- Skopetea, E. (1988). *Το πρότυπο βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα* [The model kingdom and the Great Ideal]. Athens: Πολύτυπο.
- Smith, A. D. (1986). *The ethnic origins of nations*. New York: Basil Blackwell.
- . (1998). *Nationalism and modernism: A critical survey of recent theories of nations*. London, New York: Routledge.
- Stamatopoulos, D. (2006). From *millet*s to minorities in the 19th century Ottoman empire: an ambiguous modernization. In S. G. Ellis, G. Halfdanarson & A. K. Isaacs (Eds.), *Citizenship in historical perspective*. Pisa: Pisa University Press, 253-273.
- Stets, J. E. & Burke, P. J. (2000). Identity theory and social identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63(3), 224-237.
- Storr, J. (2010). Identity Politics. In R. L. Jackson & M. A. Hogg (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of identity*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 368-370.
- Stoianovich, T. (1960). The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant. *The Journal of Economic History*, 20(2), 234-313.
- Şenişik, P. (2011). *The transformation of Ottoman Crete: revolts, politics and identity in the late nineteenth century*. New York: I.B. Tauris.
- Şimşek, Ş. Ş. (2010). The Anatoli newspaper and the heyday of the Karamanlı Press, In E. Balta & M. Kappler (Eds.), *Cries and whispers in Karamanlidika books*. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 109-124.

- Şişman, C. (2015). Failed proselytizers or modernizers? Protestant Missionaries among the Jews and Sabbateans/Dönmes in the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. *Middle Eastern Studies*, 51(6), 932-949.
- Tanc, B. (2001). Where local trumps national: Christian Orthodox and Muslim refugees since Lausanne. *Balkanologie*, 5(2), 273-289.
- Tarinas, S. (2007). *Ο ελληνικός τύπος της Πόλης* [The Greek Press of Istanbul]. Istanbul: Tempo.
- Tatsios, T. G. (1984). *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: the impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek irredentism, 1866-1897*. New York: East European Monographs, Boulder, distributed by Columbia University Press.
- Taylor, C. (1994). The politics of recognition. In A. Gutmann (Ed.), *Multiculturalism*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Thanailaki, P. (2004). The American Protestant missionary schools in Greece in the nineteenth century and Greek Orthodox education. *Greek Orthodox Theological Review*, 49(1/2), 75-87.
- Theodoridou, H. A. (1975). *Διακριθέντες του ξεριζωμένου Ελληνισμού: Μικράς Ασίας - Πόντου - Αν. Θράκης – Κωνσταντινουπόλεως* [The distinguished figures of uprooted Hellenism: Asia Minor – Black Sea - Eastern Thrace – Istanbul]. Athens: Εκδ. Σύλλογων Εθνικής Μνημοσύνης και Φοιτησάντων εις την Ευαγγελικήν Σχολήν Σμύρνης.
- Thompson, P. (2000). *The voice of the past*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thornberry, P. (1991). *International law and the rights of minorities*. New York: Clarendon Press.
- Tsilimagkou, S. E. (2009). *Ταρσός Κιλικίας και λαογραφικά Καππαδοκίας* [Tarsus of Cilicia and folklore of Cappadocia]. Athens: Gordios.
- Tsolainos, K. P. (1923). Greek irredentism. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 108. America's relation to the European Situation.
- Tsolakidis, K. (2007). *Belki bir gün dönerim* [I may return one day - Το χρονικό μας Ζωής] (B. Myisli, Trans.). Istanbul, Literatür Yayınları. (Original work published 2001)

- Tilly, C. (2005). *Identities, boundaries & social ties*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- Tuckerman, C. K. (1872). *The Greeks of to-day*. New York: G. P. Putnam & sons.
- Tyler, A. (2008). *Islam, the West, and tolerance: conceiving co-existence*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
- Valensi, L. (1997). Inter-communal relations and changes in religious affiliation in the Middle East (seventeenth to nineteenth centuries). *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39(2), 251-269.
- Van der Veer, P. (1994). *Religious nationalism*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.
- . (2003). Syncretism, multiculturalism si discursul tolerantei (syncretism, multiculturalism and the discourse of tolerance). *Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies*, (5), 4-20.
- Vassiadis, G. (2007). *The syllogos movement of Constantinople and Ottoman Greek education 1861-1923*. Athens: Center for Asia Minor Studies.
- Vertovec, S. (2010). Towards post-multiculturalism? Changing communities, conditions and contexts of diversity. *International Social Science Journal*, 61(199), 83-95.
- Vryonis, S. Jr. (1982). Religious change and continuity in the Balkans and Anatolia from the fourteenth through the sixteenth century. In S. Vryonis Jr (Ed.), *Byzantina kai metabyzantina: studies on Byzantium, Seljuks, and Ottoman*. Malibu: Undina Press, 127-140.
- Wagner, J. (1994). The trouble with Multiculturalism. *An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 77(3/4), 409-427.
- Walder, D. (2011). *Post-colonial nostalgia: writing, representation, memory*. Abingdon; New York: Routledge.
- Walzer, M. (1997). *On toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- White, J. B. (1835). *Observations on heresy and orthodoxy*. London: J. Mardon.
- White, G. W. (2000). *Nationalism and territory: constructing group identity in Southeastern Europe*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Yıldırım, O. (2006). *Diplomacy and displacement: reconsidering Turco-Greek Exchange of Populations 1922-1934*. New York: Routledge.
- Yıldırım, Y. & Karpat, K. H. (Eds.). (2012). *Osmanlı hoşgörüsü* [Ottoman tolerance]. İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları.
- Yosmaoğlu, I. K. (2014). *Blood ties: religion, violence, and the politics of nationhood in Ottoman Macedonia, 1878-1908*. New York: Cornell University Press.
- Young, M. I. (c1990). *Justice and politics of difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Zandi-Sayek, S. (2012). *Ottoman Izmir: the rise of a cosmopolitan port, 1840/1880*. London; Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Žižek, S. (1997). Multiculturalism or the cultural logic of multinational capitalism. *New Left Review*, 1/225, 28-51.
- Zürcher, E. J. (1998). The Ottoman conscription system in theory and practice, 1844-1918. *International Review of Social History*, 43(3), 437-449.
- An answer to the charges of the Greek Ecclesiastical Committee at Smyrna against the English and American missionaries*. (1836). Smyrna: Harlow American Press.
- Στατιστική της Επαρχίας Ικονίου [Statistics of the Eparchy of Konya]. (1905-1906). *Ksenofanis* (3), 44-47.
- Στατιστική της Επαρχίας Καισαρείας (Στατιστικός πίνακας) [Statistics of the Eparchy of Kayseri (Statistical table)]. (1905-1906). *Ksenofanis* (3), 230-233.

Electronic Sources

- Halsall, P. (1996). Pact of Umar, 7th century? The status of non-Muslims under Muslim rule. *Medieval Sourcebook*. Retrieved June 6, 2015, from <http://legacy.fordham.edu/halsall/source/pact-umar.asp>
- Tzalla, L. (2013, March 1). Σπίτι πεντάρφανο της Μικρασίας. [An Orphan home Asia Minor]. *Ηπειρωτικός Αγών* [Epirus's struggle]. Retrieved April 5, 2013, from <http://www.agon.gr>
- Winter, J. *Sites of memory, sites of mourning*. Retrieved April 13, 2015, from Open Yale courses Web site: <http://oyc.yale.edu/history/hist-202/lecture-18>

House of Commons Parliamentary Papers Online. (1865) *Correspondence respecting Protestant Missionaries and converts in Turkey presented to both Houses of Parliament by command of Her Majesty*. London: Harrison and sons, 1865. Retrived May 21, 2015, from www.parlipapers.chadwyck.co.uk

A Balkan tale. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from <http://www.balkantale.com/>

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışmanın iki amacı vardır. Birincisi, ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısından Türk-Yunan Savaşı'na (1919-1922) kadar olan süreçte, Kapadokya Bölgesi'nde, Hıristiyan-Müslüman ortak yaşamını ve onların nihai “milletleşme” sürecini Ortodoks Hıristiyanlar üzerinden incelemektedir. Kaynak olmaması nedeniyle ne yazık ki durum Müslümanların gözünden aktarılamamaktadır. Dini-cemaatler arası ilişkiler, birlikte yaşama pratikleri, müsamaha²⁴¹ ve yüzyıl sonuna doğru Kapadokya Hıristiyanlarının “Yunanlaşma” yani kimlik dönüşümü süreci ele alınmaktadır. Çalışma, içerisinde elbette pek çok tez barındırmaktadır ancak temelde iddia edilen milliyetçiliğin kitlelerce kabul görme sürecini anlamak için milletçilik öncesi dönemde farklı dini-cemaatler arasındaki ilişkilerin göz önünde bulundurulması gerektiğidir. Buna göre, aslında milliyetçilik tam da mevcut olan ilişkiler dinamiğinin üzerine bina olmaktadır. Buraya kadar çok farklı ve özgün bir şey söylenmiyor gibi görünebilir. Ancak şunu ifade etmeliyim ki benzer argümana sahip olan çalışmalar genel olarak etnik çatışmaların yaşandığı bölgeler üzerinden bu iddiayı yapmaktadırlar. Hâlbuki Kapadokya'da savaş yıllarında dahi gözle görülür bir çatışma yaşanmamıştır. İşte, çalışmanın özgünlüğü buradan kaynaklanmaktadır çünkü Kapadokya'yı ve Kapadokya Hıristiyanlarını inceleyen çalışmalar onların bölgedeki Müslüman Türklerle olan benzerlikleri üzerinden – çoğu zaman birçoğunun Türkçe konuşuyor olmasını vurgulayarak– romantik bir bakış açısı benimsemektedirler. Bu çalışmada ise iki tip ilişki biçimi ortaya konulmaktadır: birincisi çoğunlukla bireyler arası olan dostluk ve komşuluk ilişkileri ve ikincisi iki farklı dini cemaatin birbirine karışmasını engelleyen, din

²⁴¹ Müsamaha sözcüğü İngilizce metindeki “tolerance” kavramını karşılamak için kullanılmıştır. “Tolerance” dilimize genellikle hoşgörü olarak çevrilmektedir ancak bu yanlış bir kullanımdır. Zira kavram aslında sevilmeyen bir kişiye veya hoşnut olunmayan bir duruma müdahale etmeden katlanmak anlamına gelmektedir. Ancak hoşgörü sözcüğünün karşılığı bu değildir. Hoş görmek adı üzerinde bir kişi ya da duruma olumlu bakmaktır. Bundan ötürü Türkçe özetle “tolerance” teriminin karşılığı olarak “müsamaha” sözcüğü tercih edilmektedir.

temelli olan ve müsamaha üzerinden şekillenen cemaatler arası ilişkiler. Birincisi ne kadar yakınlık içeriyorsa, ikincisi o kadar rekabete dayalıydı çünkü hiçbir dini-cemaat kendi üyelerini bir başka dine ya da mezhebe kaptırarak nüfuz kaybetmek istemiyordu. Örneğin, farklı cemaat üyelerinin birbirleriyle evlenmeleri asla hoş karşılanan bir durum olmamıştı.

Tezin ikinci amacı ise “Osmanlı Barışı” tezini, Kapadokya’daki ortak yaşam üzerinden tartışmaya açmaktır. Bu teze göre Osmanlı toplumunda farklı dini-cemaatler “hoşgörü” çerçevesinde barış içinde beraber yaşamışlardır. Bu görüşün sahipleri için, Osmanlının çokluk (plurality) deneyimi barış tesis etmek açısından o kadar iyi işleyen bir sistemdi ki, onu “tarihi bir çokkültürcülük” örneği olarak tanımlamak mümkündür. “Osmanlı barışı” anlayışı birçok farklı açıdan hatalıdır. Birincisi, burada kastedilen hoşgörü değil müsamahadır. Zira Osmanlı ortak yaşamının özünde hâkim olan eşitsizliktir. Yöneten millet Müslümanlardır ve gayrimüslimler ikinci sınıf öznelerdir. Düzenin kaynağında bir tarafta şeriat ve İslam geleneği, bir tarafta da padişah fermanları vardır. Bu çerçevede içinde gayrimüslimlere müsamaha gösteren devlet otoritesi düzenli vergi toplamak, huzuru tesis etmek gibi yararlılıklar elde etmiştir. Elbette kriz dönemlerinde müsamahanın yerini zulme bıraktığı da olmuştur. Kısacası Osmanlıda müsamaha bir güç ilişkisiydi ve bu ilişkide güçsüz olanlar korku ve baskıdan ötürü veya mevcut düzenini bozmamak için ancak rıza gösterebilirdi. Buradan yola çıkarak tezde bir Osmanlı hoşgörüsünün değil, Osmanlı müsamahasının olduğu iddia edilmektedir. Ancak bu iddia edildiği gibi “tarihi bir çokkültürcülük” örneği asla değildir. Çalışma, bu konudaki romantizmi kesinlikle reddetmektedir.

Tezimi dayandırdığım ana malzeme Atina’daki Küçük Asya Araştırmaları Merkezi’ndeki Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi ve aynı merkezin kütüphanesindeki Karamanlıca yayımlar ve el yazmalarıdır. Bunun dışında, Ankara’daki Milli Kütüphane ve Atina’daki Gennadius Kütüphanesi’nden elde edilmiş Karamanlıca basılmış gazete ve yıllıklardan faydalanılmaktadır. Bunlar arasında *Anatoli*, *Terakki* ve misyoner gazetesi *Angeliaforos’un* ilgili dönemdeki nüshalarının elde edebildiğim bir kısmı bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca ilgili literatür Türkçe, İngilizce ve

Yunanca kaynaklardan takip edilmektedir. Protestanlar hakkında daha fazla bilgi edinebilmek için Atina'daki Evangelistlerin Tarihi Arşivi'ne de gidilmiştir. Yeni kurulmaya çalışan arşivde konuyla alakalı yalnızca birkaç kitap ve *Angeliaforos* gazetesinin bazı nüshaları bulunmuştur.

Asıl tartışmaya geçmeden önce, kafa karışıklığını gidermek için Kapadokya bölgesini tanımlamam gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Bu tezde Kapadokya olarak kastedilen, bugün anladığımız anlamda turistik bir bölge olan Kapadokya değildir. Rum cemaatin yaşadığı yerleşim birimleri doğrultusunda bazı yazarlara göre Kapadokya Doğu'da Kayseri ve Sivas'tan Batı'da Aydın vilayeti sınırına, kuzeyde Ankara ve Yozgat'tan Güney'de Antalya'ya uzanan bir bölgedir (Balta, 2013). Bazı yazarlara göre bölge Bizans İmparatorluğu'daki adlandırmalar ile Kapadokya ve Likonya bölgelerinin toplamına işaret etmektedir (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). Bu tezde Kapadokya bölgesi 1864 Vilayet Nizamnamesi doğrultusunda Ankara ve Konya vilayetleri artı Adana sancağının toplamı olarak ele alınmıştır ve bu bölgeden Yunanistan'a gönderilen insanların sözlü anlatımları kullanılmıştır. Kapadokya yerine zaman zaman İç Anadolu veya Orta Anadolu ifadeleri de tezde yer almaktadır.

Son olarak değinmek istediğim noktalardan biri, kasıtlı olarak tezde "Karamanlı Rum" ifadesini kullanmadığımdır. Çoğunlukla anadilleri Türkçe olan ve Türkçe'yi Yunan harfleri ile Karamanlıca adı verilen yazılı dil ile ifade eden Kapadokya veya bir başka ifade ile Orta Anadolu Rumları akademik yazında genel olarak "Karamanlılar" olarak adlandırılırlar. Karamanlı sözcüğünün kullanımı çok gerilere gider. Çoğunluğu Osmanlı devletinin Karaman Eyaleti'nden olan bu insanlara göçmen olarak buldukları büyük kentlerde Karamanlı denilirdi. Ancak bu kullanım onları "köylü" ve "kara" olarak görmenin bir sonucuydu. Karamanlı kelimesinin pejoratif bir anlamı vardı ve aşağı tabaka olmayı ifade ediyordu (Benlisoy & Benlisoy, 2010). Bu yüzden Anadolu Rumları kendilerine asla "Karamanlı" demediler. Kendi yayınlarında kendilerini "Anadolu Hıristiyanları", "Anadolulular", "Ortodoks Hıristiyanlar," "Anadolu Ortodoksları" gibi tamlamalarla ifade ettiler (Balta, 2003). Anadolu Rumlarının kendileri

“Karamanlı” adlandırmasını reddettiği için ve Anadolu coğrafyasının birçok yerinde Rumların Türkçe konuştukları (Anagnostopoulou, 2013) gerçeğinden hareketle Kapadokya Rumlarını ayrı bir kategori gibi değerlendirmenin anlamsızlığından ötürü bu tezde “Karamanlı” ifadesi kullanılmamaktadır. Onun yerine Anadolu Rumları, Kapadokya Rumları, Kapadokyalılar, Anadolu Ortodoksları gibi ifadeler tercih edilmiştir. Ayrıca mezhepleri Ortodoksluk olup sonradan Protestan olan Rumlar da Rum Protestanlar olarak ifade edilmektedir. Buradaki Rum kelimesi onların önceki dini aidiyetlerini göstermektedir.

Teorik Çerçeve

Bu çalışmanın özgünlüğü siyaset bilimi bakış açısıyla tarihsel bir duruma ışık tutmasında yatmaktadır. Bundan ötürü, benzer bir takım çalışmalardan farklı olarak müsamaha, çokkültürcülük, ve milliyetçilik gibi kavramlar rastgele kullanılmamış ve genel anlamda bir adalet tartışmasının içine yedirilmiştir.

Tezde başlangıç olarak modern liberal normatif literatür üzerinden genel bir çokluk, adalet, çokkültürcülük ve müsamaha tartışması yapılmaktadır. Tarihi vakaları modern kavramlarla değerlendirmek pek doğru bir yaklaşım değildir ancak normatif literatürü ele almanın çalışma açısından iki önemi bulunmaktadır: birincisi müsamaha kavramının rastgele ele alınmasını engellemektir çünkü kavram kendi içerisinde çok tartışmalıdır ve araştırmacının kavram üzerine nasıl bir bakış açısını benimsediğini ortaya koyması gereklidir; ikincisi “Osmanlı hoşgörüsü” tartışmasının bugüne yansıyan tarafına bir cevap olarak günümüz tartışmalarını göstermek gerekmektedir. Bazı kesimlerin Osmanlının çokluğu ele alış biçiminin günümüz için ideal bir modelmiş gibi yansıtma çabasına bir karşılık olarak geçmişte yaşanmış olanın bugün açısından ne kadar alakasız olduğunu tartışmak önemlidir.

Son yirmi yılda liberal Batılı toplumlarda grup özerkliği ve birey özgürlüğü kavramlarının bağdaştırılmasıyla daha adil bir toplum düzeni yaratılabilir mi tartışmaları yapılmaktadır. Bu tartışma üzerinden çeşitli modeller ortaya atılmaktadır. Bunlar arasında Rawls’un (1993) siyasal liberalizmi, Kymlicka’nın

(1996) çokkültürcülüğü, Habermas'ın (1999) müzakereci demokrasi ve Young'ın (1990) farklılaştırılmış yurttaşlık gibi kuramları bulunmaktadır. Aşağı yukarı hepsinde tartışılan meseleler kamusal alan ve özel alanın sınırlarının nasıl çizilmesi gerektiği, farklılığın kamusal ve siyasi alanda temsil edilip edilemeyeceği, gruplara özgü haklar tanınmasının liberalizmin temel prensibi olan birey özgürlüğünü olumsuz etkileyip etkilemeyeceğidir. Young'ın kuramı dışındaki bütün bu kuramlar liberal demokrasiyi verili olarak alır ve bunun üzerinden bir adalet tartışması yapar.

Müsamaha kavramı da tüm bu tartışmalar ile ilintilidir. Batı toplumları bugün “süper” olarak nitelenebilecek kadar çeşitliliği kendi içinde barındırmaktadır. Göçmenlerin sayısı fazla, geldikleri ülkeler farklı farklıdır. Dinleri, dilleri, hayat tarzları birbirinden farklı birçok yeni grup ve birey hali hazırda çeşitliliğe sahip olan Batı toplumlarının içine karışmıştır. Böyle bir ortamda farklılıklara nereye kadar ve hangi ölçüde müsamaha gösterilmelidir. Farklılık özel alanın içinde hapsedildiği sürece mi müsamaha gösterilebilir? Yoksa farklılığa kamusal alanda müsamaha göstermenin sınırları çizilebilir mi? Yoksa ihtiyacımız olan ve tartışmaya açmamız gereken müsamahanın kendisi midir ve müsamaha göstermek yerine saygı duymak veya farklılığı tanımak daha adil bir duruş sergilemek anlamına gelir mi?

Tezde müsamaha kavramını Brown gibi bir güç ilişkisi olarak tanımlıyorum. Müsamahadan eşitsizliğin olduğu yerde söz edilebilir. İki eşit grubun birbirine müsamaha göstermesi beklenemez. Aynı güce sahip olan iki grup birbirlerini tanırlar veya saygı gösterirler. Müsamaha göstermek demek gücü olduğu halde bir insanın veya bir grubun hoşlanmadığı bir başkasını veya bir başka grubu bastırmak yerine onun veya onların davranışlarına, geleneklerine, dinine, diline vs. göz yummasıdır. Bir çeşit tahammül etme halidir ve Walzer'ın (1997) iddiasının tersine bir erdem değildir. Eşitsizliğin olduğu yerde ya zulüm olur ya da müsamaha. Elbette müsamaha göstermek zulmetmekten iyidir. Ancak müsamahayı olumlu algılamak eşitsizliğe göz yummak anlamına da gelir. İşte bu yüzden müsamaha yerine saygı veya tanıma kavramları bugün akademik

çevrelerce tartışılmaktadır. Arendt'e (1998) göre saygı bir sıcaklık veya bir yakınlık içermeyen bir arkadaşlık halidir. Bunun olması için ihtiyacımız olan eşitliktir. Buna henüz ulaşamadığımıza göre müsamaha hakkındaki söylemimizi değiştirmeli, onun erdem olmadığını kabul etmeli ve içeriğini tartışmaya açmalıyız.

“Osmanlı hoşgörüsü” diyerek “Osmanlı müsamahasını” olumlu adlandıran romantik bakış açısı kavramın günümüz bağlamından kopuktur. Müsamaha tartışmalarından bihaberdir veya onları görmezden gelmektedir. Bu tartışmaları göstermek ise birkaç açıdan çok önemlidir. Birincisi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu antidemokratik bir monarşidir, çokkültürcülük ve müsamaha tartışmaları ise modern tartışmalardır ve liberal demokratik toplumları verili olarak kabul ederek yapılmaktadırlar. İkincisi, Osmanlı için adalet kavramı devletin bekası için bir araçtır, günümüzde ise adalet bir amaçtır. Üçüncüsü Osmanlı müsamahası dini bir müsamaha biçimidir, böyle bir ekosistemde birey değil dini cemaatler vardır yani dininizin sizi koyduğu kalıbın dışına çıkarak var olmanız pek mümkün değildir. Liberal toplumlar için ise birey özgürlüğü tartışılmaz bir öğedir.

Osmanlı müsamahasını çağına göre değerlendirmek ve bugün için örnek alınması gereken bir vaka olarak görmemek meseleye daha bilimsel yaklaşmak anlamına gelir. Bu bakış açısıyla Osmanlı müsamahasını çağdaşı olan diğer imparatorlukların azınlıklarına davranışı ile karşılaştırma yaparak değerlendirmek daha doğru bir yaklaşım olacaktır. Meseleye buradan yaklaşırsak pozitif bir tablo ile karşılaşmamız olasıdır. Zira Osmanlı müsamahası çağdaşlarına kıyasla daha olumlu bir tablo sunmaktadır.

Müsamaha kavramını Osmanlı bağlamında tartışmak bizi ister istemez “millet sistemi” mitine yönlendirmektedir. İnalçık'a (1991) göre Osmanlı kendinden önceki İslam devletlerinin izinden giderek Rum Ortodoks ve Ermeni kiliseleriyle, Yahudi cemaatini tanıdı. Bu grupların dini önderlerine verilen beratlarla onlara bir ölçüde bir özerklik sağlanmıştı. Ancak dini cemaatlerin resmi olarak bir millet olarak tanımlanmaları ve kurulmaları ondokuzuncu yüzyıl gibi çok geç bir tarihte gerçekleşmişti. Örneğin Hahambaşılık 1835'te bir kararname ile

kurulmuştu (Braude, 1982). Ancak bu dönemde bile milletlerin yasal bir tüzel kişiliği yoktu. Bir başka örnek vermek gerekirse, Ozil'e (2013) göre Osmanlı otoriteleri için Rum liderler, Hıristiyan piskoposlar ve Rumlar vardı, ancak Rum kurumları yoktu. Osmanlıyı ilgilendiren dini cemaatlerin ödemeleri gereken vergiyi ödemeleri ve toplum için huzursuzluk yaratmamalarıydı. Bu zulmetmeyen ve ilgisiz davranan bir müsamaha biçimiydi. Zaman zaman kriz dönemlerinde Müslüman ahaliyi veya softaları yatıştırmak için gayrimüslimlere zulmedildiği de oluyordu.

Osmanlı müsahahası kapsamında, gayrimüslimler daha çok vergi verir, bazı renkleri giyemez, ata binemez, silah taşıyamaz, camilere yakın oturamaz ve kısıtlı bir biçimde mabetlerini onarabilirdi. Yapılabilecekler ve yapılması yasak olanlar listesi uzundu ve diğer başka alanlarda da tam bir eşitsizlik hâkimdi ancak tüm bunların istisnaları da vardı. Fenerli Rumların önemli yönetsel kadrolarda yer almaları veya sarayın Yahudi doktorlarının at binmeleri gibi. Netice olarak Osmanlı müsahahası son derece pragmatik olan ama aynı zamanda dinin ve İslam geleneğinin sınırladığı biçimde bir "dini müsamaha" idi. Ancak bu Locke'un tanımladığı şekilde devletin din işlerinden elini çekmesi anlamında değil, tersine din üzerinden müsahahanın şekillenmesinden ötürü bir dini müsamaha idi.

Tezde müsamaha kavramına ek olarak iki önemli kavram kullanılmaktadır. Bunlar Robert M. Hayden'in (2002) "antagonistik müsamaha" ve Peter van der Veer'in (1994) "din milliyetçiliği" kavramlarıdır. "Antagonistik müsamaha" aynı mekânı paylaşan dini gruplar arasındaki ilişkilerin rekabet üzerine kurulu olduğu durumlarda kullanabileceğimiz bir kavramdır. Böyle durumlarda hoşgörünün kendisi de pragmatik bir ayak uydurma olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır çünkü azınlık olan grup baskın "Öteki" ile baş edemeyeceğini gördüğü için "Ötekiyi" ve "Ötekinin" adetlerini benimsemekte ya da benimsemek durumunda kalmaktadır. "Birleştirici" (syncretic) olarak tabir edilen ortaklıklar da aslında tam da bu rekabete dayalı hoşgörü biçiminin bir ürünü olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Örneğin, farklı dini gruplar aynı türbede ibadet etseler bile o türbeyi kendi dinlerinin evliyasına veya azizine mal etmektedirler.

Çalışma, Kapadokya'daki cemaatler arası rekabeti karşı taraf lehine üye kaybetmek istememe, "birleştirici" davranışlar ve başka dine mensup biri ile evlenmeye karşı çıkma durumu üzerinden tespit ettikten sonra, bölgeye milliyetçiliğin nasıl, ne gibi çabaların ürünü olarak nüfuz etmeye çalıştığını incelemektedir. Bu noktada modernist milliyetçilik kuramlarından yararlanmakla beraber, onların Osmanlı'dan kopan ulusların milliyetçiliklerini açıklamakta yetersiz olduklarını da vurgulamaktadır. Modernist milliyetçilik kuramları milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkışını büyük toplumsal, kültürel, siyasi, ekonomik veya hepsinin bir araya geldiği büyük değişim süreçleriyle, yani geleneksel toplumlardan modern toplumlara geçişle açıklar. Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna milliyetçilik bir fikir olarak ticaretle uğraşan gayrimüslim burjuvazi tarafından taşınmıştır. Fikir elitlerin çabasıyla bir ölçüde halk kitleleri arasında yayılmış ancak geniş anlamda kabul görmesi için Osmanlı hegemonyasının veya yerel yöneticilerin yolsuzluklarının yol açtığı ayaklanmaları, Osmanlı otoritesinin sarsıldığı savaş dönemlerini beklemesi gerekmiştir. Her türlü hali hazırda var olan ve din üzerinden şekillenen "Kendi" ve "Öteki" ayrımı üzerine kendini bina etmiş ve dini millet kavramının en önemli unsuru haline getirerek bir din milliyetçiliği şeklini almıştır. Özellikle Türk ve Yunan milliyetçilikleri birer "din milliyetçiliğidir". Dinin sosyal kimliğin kurucu unsuru olması geleneksel toplumlara özgüdür. Modernistlere göre modern çağda milli kimlik dini kimliğin yerini almıştır. Din eskiye, geleneksele aittir. Milliyetçilik çağında etkisini yitirmiştir. Bu tespit Türk ve Yunan milliyetçilikleri için geçerli değildir. Grigoriadis (2013), Türk ve Yunan milliyetçiliklerini "kutsal sentez" olarak tanımlamıştır. Çalışmada bu fikir benimsenmektedir.

İnanç ve bir arada yaşama

Özel olarak Kapadokya'da ve genel olarak Osmanlı toplumunda sosyal kimliği belirleyen din faktörü olmuştur. Din grupları arasındaki sınırları çizmiş, birlikte yaşamının kurallarını belirlemiş ve "Kendinin" sınırını dini "Ötekinin" başladığı yer olarak çizmiştir. "Biz" olmak aynı dine mensup olmak üzerinden şekillenmiştir. Kapadokya özelinde "Biz" ve "Onlar", "Kendi" ve "Öteki"

arasında gözle görülür bir çatışma milliyetçilik çağında ve hatta Türk-Yunan Savaş'ında (1919-1922) bile gözlemlenmemiştir. Ancak bu durum Doumanis (2013) gibi bazı yazarların iddia ettiği gibi bölgede barışçıl bir sembiyoz olduğu anlamına gelmez. Bir başka deyişle çatışma olmaması otomatik olarak barışçıl bir arada yaşama anlamına gelmez. Başka türlü bir arada yaşama biçimlerinde de çatışma görülmeyebilir. Bunlardan bir tanesi de eşitsizliğin bir norm olduğu Osmanlı toplumunda görülen rekabetçi bir arada yaşamadır (Hayden, 2012). Rekabetçi bir arada yaşama demek bir grubun diğer gruplardan daha baskın ve güçlü olması ve buna bağlı olarak müsamaha gösteren taraf olmasıdır. Böyle bir beraber yaşam pratiğinde müsamaha gösterilen grubun rıza göstermekten başka bir şansı yoktur. Ancak “Kendinin” sınırlarını ve grup bütünlüğünü korumaya azami derecede dikkat edecektir. Grup bütünlüğünü bozan durumlar, diğer grup üyeleri ile yapılan evlilikler gibi veya direkt olarak din değiştirme gibi davranışlar asla kabul görmez. Müsamaha gösterilen grup, müsamaha gösteren grup karşısında sayıca azalmak istemez. Bunun için elinden geleni yapacaktır. İşte bu yüzden bir rekabet söz konusudur ve gruplar arasında var olan “antagonistik müsamaha” biçimidir (Hayden, 2002).

Kapadokya'da müsamaha gösteren taraf hem millet-i hâkime durumunda olmalarından dolayı ayrıcalıklı olan, hem de Kapadokya'da nüfusun çoğunluğuna sahip olan Müslüman Türk kitledir. Kapadokya'nın kozmopolitliği Müslümanlar lehinedir. Rumlar sayıca azdır ve yerleşim yerleri oldukça dağınıktır (Merlie, 1977). Bu koşullar altına bir grup olarak Rum cemaati sınırlarını korumak isteyecektir. Bundan dolayı cemaatler arasında rekabet söz konusudur ancak cemaatler arasında “antagonistik müsamaha” olması demek kişiler arasında komşuluk ve dostluk ilişkileri yoktur anlamına gelmemektedir. KMS'nun Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi'ndeki kayıtların birçoğu da farklı cemaatlere mensup bireyler arasında yakın ilişkiler olduğunu göstermektedir. Tüm bunlar ışığında tezde bireyler arası ilişkiler ve cemaatler arası ilişkiler ayrımı yapılmaktadır. Birincisi ne kadar yakınlık içeriyorsa ikincisi sınırları koruma odaklı ve rekabetçidir.

Böyle bir ekosistemde “birleştirici” davranışlar olması yani Hıristiyanların ve Müslümanların aynı türbelere gitmeleri, Hıristiyanların bazı Müslüman adetlerini uygulamaları tam da “antagonistik müsamahanın” olduğu rekabetçi bir arada yaşama biçiminin doğal bir uzantısıdır. Bir bölgede baskın olan dini grup zaman içinde göçler ve fetihler ile gücünü kaybedebilir. Böyle bir durumda yeni gelen grup mevcut mabetleri kendi mabetleri haline getirir ve mevcut azizleri veya evliyalari kendi azizleri olarak benimser. Anadolu’da yaşanan da bu olmuştur. Orta Asya’dan göç eden Türkler zaman için sayıca çoğalmış, gücü ele geçirmiştir. Onaltıncı yüzyıla gelindiğinde Anadolu’nun Müslümanlaşması tamamlanmıştır (Vryonis, 1982). Bazı Hıristiyan mabetleri Müslüman mabetleri haline gelmiş; bazı Hıristiyan azizleri Müslüman evliyalar ile bütünleşmiştir. Bundan ötürü bazı türbeler hem Hıristiyanların hem de Müslümanların uğrak yerleri olmuştur. Hacı Bektaşî Veli türbesi ve Şammas Baba türbesi bu duruma örnek gösterilebilir. Hıristiyanlar Hacı Bektaşî Veli’nin türbesinin yerinde Aziz Haralambos’un mezarı olduğunu düşünürler, Şammas Baba ise onlar için Aziz Mamma’s’tır (Hasluck, 1929). Kapadokya Hıristiyanlarının domuz eti tüketmemeleri (Tsolakidis, 2007), veya Müslümanlara özgü “Allah, Maşallah, hacı, Amin vb.” gibi Arapça sözcükleri benimsemeleri de yine Kapadokya ekosisteminde Müslümanların nüfusça ve gelenekte baskın olmalarından kaynaklanmakta ve tam da eşitsizliğin hakim olduğu “antagonistik müsamahaya” örnek teşkil etmektedir. Rekabetin var olduğunun bir diğer göstergesi de Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi tanıklıklarında gözlemlediğim Hıristiyanların kendi dinlerini Müslümanlarınkinden üstün görmesi durumudur. Aynı gözlemi yetmişli yıllarda Pire’de Anadolu mültecileri arasında sözlü tarih çalışması yapan Hirschon (1988) de gözlemlemiştir. “Türkler bizi kıskanırdı, çünkü dinimiz çok güzeldi,” (Hirschon, 1988, s.21) cümlesi mültecilerin sık tekrarladığı bir şeydir. Çalışmada Müslüman bakış açısı kaynak eksikliğinden ötürü aktarılamamıştır ancak onların da kendi dinlerini üstün gördüklerini iddia etmek yanlış olmayacaktır.

Sözlü Gelenek arşivi kayıtlarında rastladığım bir diğer konu da Türklerin de Ortodoksların da din adamlarına “tıp insanı” muamelesi yapması ve her iki

cemaate mensup bireylerin de diğler cemaatin din adamından sağık konularında çoğunlukla spiritüel düzeyde yardım istemesidir. Elbette bu durum barışçıl bir birliktelik çağrışımı yapsa da çok da abartılmamalıdır. Her şeyden önce bir Hıristiyan'ın hocadan veya bir Müslüman'ın papazdan yardım dilemesi, dua istemesi veya muska yazdırması bu insanların dinlerinden şüphe duydukları anlamına gelmez. Bir derdine çözüm bulmak için hocadan muska isteyen bir Hıristiyan kadına o günlerde Müslüman olmak ister misin diye sorulacak olsa tüm kalbiyle hayır derdi. Herkesin dininden emin olduğu ve bu konuda kafa karışıklığının olmadığı bir dünyadan söz ediyoruz. Cemaat üyelerinin zaman zaman diğler dinin pratiklerine sığınması insanca bir ihtiyaçtan kaynaklanıyordu ki o da dertlerine çare bulmaktır.

Kapadokya'da dini cemaatler arasında "rekabetçi bir arada yaşamının" olduğunun bir başka göstergesi de karışık evliliklerin asla tasvip edilen bir durum olmamasıdır. Bunun iki sebebi vardır: birincisi Hıristiyan inancı bu durumu reddetmektedir, Müslüman inancına göre ise yalnızca Müslüman erkekler kitabi dinlere inanan kadınlarla evlenebilir ancak pek de hoş karşılanan bir durum değildir. İkinci sebep ise Ortodoks cemaatin üyelerini kaybetmek istememesi, cemaat olarak iyice zayıf bir hale gelmemesidir. Zira bir Hıristiyan kadın Müslüman bir adamlar evlenecek olursa, kadın din değiştirmese bile çocukları Müslüman olarak dünyaya gelecektir. Bu da cemaatin müstakbel üyelerini kaybetmesi anlamına gelmektedir. Bu yüzden karışık evlilikler din değiştirme bağlamı içinde değerlendirilmelidir. "Ötekinin" olası müdahalesine karşı "Kendinin" sınırlarını korumaya çalışan Ortodoks cemaat için bu kabul edilebilir bir şey değildir. Elbette karışık evlilikler olmuştur ancak genelde cemaat önderleri bu evlilikleri engellemeye çalışmış başarısız oldularsa da "fakirlikten" veya "mağduriyetten" bu kadınların Müslümanlarla evlendiklerini vurgulayarak meşru bir zemin hazırlamaya çalışmışlardır. Milliyetçilik çağında karışık evliliğin bir uzantısı olan din değiştirme aynı zamanda "milletten çıkma" (*denationalization*) ve "millete ihanet" olarak da algılanmıştır (Deringil, 2012).

Bu kısımda söylediklerimizi kısaca özetleyelim. Kapadokya ekosisteminin Müslümanlar lehine olmasından ötürü eşitsiz bir düzen vardı. Bu düzende Ortodoks cemaat kendini Müslümanların olası müdahalelerinden –ki bunun en kabul edilmez olanı din değiştirme ve karışık evlilikler– korumaya çalıştılar. Ondan ötürü cemaatler arasında rekabetçi bir arada yaşamının olduğu “antagonistik müsamaha” vardı. Bu durum bireyler arasında sıcak komşuluk ilişkilerinin olmadığı anlamını taşıyordu. “Birleştirici davranışlar” bu düzenin bir ürünüydü ve çoğunlukla Müslüman hegemonyasının eseri idi. Bu düzen milliyetçilik çağında da pek değişmedi; Osmanlı hegemonyasının sarsıldığı günlere kadar çatışmasız süregeldi. Hatta savaş yıllarında bile iki cemaat birbirine girmediler. Bunun sebebi ise aşağıda anlatacağımız gibi Kapadokya’daki Ortodoks yerleşimlerinden büyük şehirlere ciddi bir erkek göçü olmasından ötürü Kapadokya cemaatlerinin nüfusça iyice zayıflaması, cemaatlerin kadınların baskın olduğu topluluklar haline gelmesi, daha çok Müslüman kültürüne maruz kalmaları ve iki grup arasında belirgin bir ekonomik farklılığın olmamasıydı.

Milliyetçilik çağında Kapadokya

Onsekizinci yüzyılın ortalarına doğru Alman, Fransız ve İngiliz düşünürler Yunan klasiklerinin tamamını kendi dillerine çevirmişlerdi. Aynı yüzyılın son çeyreğinde bu eserler yurtdışında çalışan Yunanlar için erişilebilir oldu (Anderson, 2006). Bu insanlar Batı’daki “filhelenizm” ile böylece tanışmış oldular; bu geçmiş farkındalığı ile Osmanlı egemenliğini Yunanlıların vurdumduymazlık ve cehaletle hapsedilip geçmişlerinden koparıldıkları bir “karanlık” dönem olarak görmeye başladılar. Gellner (1983), milliyetçiliğin filizlenmesinde entelektüellerin rolünün olmadığını iddia eder. Onun iddia ettiğinin tersine Yunan milliyetçiliği entelektüeller ve ticaret burjuvazisi tarafından yaratılmış, filizlendirilmiş ve yayılmıştır. Korais gibi Yunan milliyetçiliğinin ilk önderleri Klasik Yunan’ın entelektüel kapasitesine vurgu yapmış ve çağdaş Yunanları bu üstün medeniyetin varisleri olarak görmüşlerdir (Tatsios, 1984). Yunan milliyetçiliği ilk çıktığı günlerde seküler bir milliyetçiliktir. Ancak aşağıda tartışıldığı gibi kısa bir süre sonra kaçınılmaz olarak din kartını oyuna sürmüştür.

Yunan Krallığı 1832’de tanındığı zaman çetrefilli bir durumla karşı karşıyaydı. Müstakbel Yunanlar olarak görülen kitlenin üçte birinden de azı krallık sınırları içinde yaşıyordu, kalanı hala Osmanlı tebaasıydı. Yeni kurulan devlet yayılmacı bir politika gütmekle kendi iç yapılanmasını ve modernleşmesini tamamlamak arasında kalmıştı (Tatsios, 1984). Tercih birinciden yana kullanıldı. Ancak bir sorun vardı. 1922’de Küçük Asya’nın Ege kıyılarında hezimete uğrayana kadar sürecek olan yayılmacı Büyük Ülkü’nün hitap ettiği halk kitleleri son derece heterojendi ve onları “Biz” kümesinin içine alabilecek tek unsur Ortodoks Hıristiyanlıktı. Rum cemaati olarak bilinen grubun içinde bütün Ortodoks Hıristiyanlar vardı ve bunların içine Sırp, Bulgarlar, Romenler de dâhildi. Öte yandan İstanbul’daki Fenerli Rum ile Niğde’deki küçük esnaf bir Rum’un pek bir ortak özelliği yoktu (Clogg, 1982). Milliyetçilik çağında bile Osmanlı Rumları dörde ayrılıyordu: 1) Yunan milliyetçiliğini benimseyip, yayılmacıktan taraf olanlar; 2) eğitim kurumlarında “büyük bir cemaatin” üyesi olma algısı geliştiren veya kendini Yunan olarak görmeye başlayan ama henüz milliyetçi olarak tanımlanamayacak proto-milli (Hobsbawm, 1992) bağlar geliştirenler; 3) Osmanlı devletinin bütünlüğünü savunan Osmanlı Rum entelektüeller; 4) hala geleneksel olarak kendini dini kimliği ile tanımlayan, çoğu eğitimsiz halk kitleleri.

Yunan milliyetçiliği eninde sonunda seküler çizgisinden kayarak dini Yunanlılığın birinci unsuru olarak ele aldı. Böylelikle hali hazırda Ortodoks olan ve kültürde Yunanlılığı benimseyebilecek olan herkes, konuştukları dil ne olursa olsun Yunan ulusuna dâhil edilebilecekti. Ondokuzuncu yüzyılın ikinci yarısında Büyük Ülkü’nün ilk ayağı olan kültürel yayılmacılık etkisiyle Osmanlı topraklarında Rumların yaşadığı yerlerde okullar kuruldu. Amaç bir Yunanlılık bilinci yaratmaktı. Bu dönemde önce Atina ve ardından İstanbul Hellenizm’in iki başkenti haline geldiler. Atina Üniversitesi bu milli uyanışta büyük rol oynadı. Okulların kurulması ve öğretmenlerin yetiştirilmesi dışında birçok dernek de kuruldu. Bu dernekler halkı tarihten, dine, felsefeden, fizik ve kimyaya ve hatta hijyen konusuna kadar biliçlendiriyor, yarışmalar düzenliyor, seminerler veriyordu

(Vassiadis, 2007). Elbette tüm bunların Kapadokya Rumları için de yansımaları vardı. Kapadokya Rumlarının “milletleşmesi” veya “Helenleşmesi” sürecine geçmeden önce millet olma sürecinin bir ön ayağı olarak Kapadokyalıların büyük şehirlere yaptıkları göç konusuna değinelim.

Ünlü coğrafyacı Strabon’un dediği gibi kurak bir bölge olan Kapadokya tarihi boyunca dışarıya göç vermiştir. Ancak ondokuzuncu yüzyılda göçler kuraklık gibi itici bir güçten ötürü değil demiryollarının kurulması, Osmanlı liman şehirlerine Batı sermayesinin girmesiyle ekonominin canlanması gibi çekici güçler nedeniyle olmaya başlamıştır (Anagnostopoulou, 2013). Kapadokya’daki Ortodoks yerleşim birimlerinde yaşayan erkek nüfus birer ikişer büyük şehirlere çalışmaya gitmiştir. Bunların içinde vasıfsız işler yapanlar kadar ticaretle uğraşan küçük esnaf da vardır. Geçmişten farklı olarak yeni ulaşım imkânları sayesinde sıla ile gurbet arasındaki bağ kopmamış aksine gurbetten sılaya fikir ve sermaye akışı olmuştur. Göç olgusunun ilk yıllarında sadece erkekler göç etmiş, eşlerini ve çocuklarını geride bırakmışlardır. Bu dönemde erkeklerin belirli aralıklarla memleketlerini ziyaret etmiş olduklarını Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi tanıklıklarında gözlemleyebiliyoruz. Erkek çocukları da belirli bir yaşa geldikten sonra babalarının, akrabalarının veya tanıdıklarının izinden gurbete gitmişlerdir. Daha sonraki yıllarda bazı erkekler ailelerini de yanlarına almışlardır. Öyle ya da böyle ondokuzuncu yüzyılda, göçlerden ötürü Kapadokya’da birçok Ortodoks yerleşim birimindeki hayat kadınların egemen olduğu ve hayata daha çok karışmak ve Türk komşularıyla daha çok bir araya gelmek zorunda kaldıkları bir yaşam biçimine evrilmiştir. Bundan ötürü, daha önce Yunanca konuşulan köylerde bile Türkçe baskın bir dil olmaya başlamıştır (Dawkins, 1916).

Ortodoks nüfus açısından göçün birbiriyle çelişen iki boyutu vardır. Birincisi Kapadokya’da zaten görece az ve dağınık olan Ortodoks nüfus iyice azalmış, bundan ötürü Ortodokslar Müslüman kültürü ile rekabetlerinde iyice güçsüz kalmışlardır. Öte yandan gurbetçiler gittikleri şehirlerde hemşeri (kardeşlik) dernekleri kurmuş, para toplamış ve memleketlerine yardım etmeye başlamışlardır. Kardeşlik derneklerinin görevleri arasında okul kurmak, bir okul

varsa onun ihtiyaçlarını gidermek, öğretmenler getirtmek, onların maaşlarını vermek, kiliseleri onarmak, alt yapı hizmetlerine katkı sağlamak, öğrencilere burs vermek vb. vardır. Bundan ötürü Yunan milliyetçiliğinin taşıyıcısı olan derneklerle paralel, belki de onlardan etkilenecek ve okullara maddi destek vererek geride kalanların aydınlanmaları için emek vermişlerdir. Kısacası göçe bağlı olarak Kapadokya'daki yerleşim birimleri bir taraftan zayıflamış ama bir taraftan da zenginleşmiştir. Elbette tüm bunlar genellemedir ve ondokuzuncu yüzyılın sonlarında bile hala bir okula sahip olmayan veya öğrencilerin geleneksel olarak papazlardan eğitim aldıkları veya okul olsa bile hayat koşulları nedeniyle ve öğrencilik çağındaki çocukların ev ekonomisine katkı sağlamak zorunda olmalarından ötürü geri kalmış olan Ortodoks yerleşimleri vardır (Karalidis, 2005). Okulların durumlarını Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi tanıklıklarından takip etmek mümkündür. Bazı yerleşim birimlerinde kız okulları, erkek okulları, anaokulları ve ortaokullar gibi birkaç çeşit öğretim kurumu vardır. Bir kısım köylerde bunların bazıları vardır veya hiç okul yoktur, papaz eğitim vermektedir. Tüm okullar arasında Yunanlılık bilincinin oluşması açısından anaokullarının ve kız okullarının önemi büyüktür. Anaokulunda çocuklar küçük yaşta Yunanca öğrenmektedirler. Kız okulları ise geleceğin çocuklarına Yunanca öğretecek geleceğin annelerini yetiştirmektedir (Benlisoy, 2010). Bu aydınlanma hareketinin ne kadar başarılı olduğu bir muammadır. Okula gidebilenler arasında bir “Yunanlılık” bilinci veya “proto-milli” bağlar yarattığını söylemek mümkün olabilir. Ancak ondokuzuncu yüzyılın sonlarına doğru dahi birçok Anadolu Rum’u kimliğinin birincil parçası olarak hala dinini görüyordu ve milli kimliği bir hakaret olarak algılıyordu. Öte yandan Türkçe’ye ve Türkçe konuşmaya olan bağlılık hayli yüksekti ve Yunanca öğretebilmek için bazı okullarda Türkçe konuşan çocuklara fiziksel şiddet uygulanıyordu.²⁴²

Anadolu Ortodokslarını aydınlatma çabasının bir diğer boyutunu başta Kulalı Evangelinos Misailidis olmak üzere Anadolu Rumlarının kendilerinin önderlik ettikleri “Karamanlıca” basın olduğunu eklememiz gerekir.

²⁴² KMS, Kapadokya, Gelveri, K. Sotyropoulos, G. Dopridis.

“Anadoluluların hocası” olarak tanınan Misailidis kendi matbaasında bastığı en uzun soluklu Karamanlıca gazete olan *Anatoli* (1851-1912) ile Anadolu Rumlarını tarihten, bilime ve hijyene, geleneğe sahip çıkmaktan, çocuk yetiştirmeye, misyonerler karşısında dini muhafaza etmeye ve eğitim kurumlarını güçlendirmeye kadar birçok konuda aydınlatmaya çalışmış ve Anadolu Rumlarına Osmanlı coğrafyasından ve dış dünyadan haberler vermiştir. *Anatoli* dışında Terakki (1888), Aktis (1910-1914), Zebur (1866), Mikra Asia (1873-1876), ve Nea Anatoli (1912-1921) gibi başka Karamanlıca yayınlar da vardır (Tarinas, 2007).

İlk ortaya çıktığı dönemde seküler bir nitelik gösteren Yunan milliyetçiliğinin “din milliyetçiliğine” (religious nationalism) dönüştüğünün kanıtlarından biri de Türkçe dilli Anadolu Ortodokslarının Yunanlılığa kazandırılma sürecinde ortaya çıktığını görüyoruz. Van der Veer’e göre din milliyetçiliği mevcut dinler arası çekişmenin milliyetçiliğin “Ötekisini” belirlemesidir. Bizim örneğimizde de Kapadokyalı Ortodoksları “müstakbel Yunanlar” olarak gösteren onların dinleri olmaktadır. Ancak yukarıda bahsi geçen eğitim ve aydınlanma hareketinin Kapadokyalıyı ne kadar Yunanlaştırdığı tartışmalı bir konudur zira savaş yıllarına kadar Kapadokyalının Hıristiyan kimliğinde Yunanlılık lehine belirgin bir kırılma gözlemlenmemektedir. Asıl dönüşüm İttihat ve Terakki döneminde Rum mallarının boykotu, Balkan savaşları, sürgünler ve savaş yıllarında yaşanmaya başlanmaktadır. Uzun yıllar süren savaşlar (1912-1922) ve İttihat ve Terakki’nin giderek agresifleşen milliyetçi politikalarına kadar Kapadokya Hıristiyanlarını Yunan milliyetçiliği karşısındaki durumlarında göre şöyle sınıflandırabiliriz: 1) Valavanis gibi Yunan milliyetçisi olanlar; 2) Emmanuilidis ve Karolidis gibi Osmanlıcı entelektüeller ve milletvekilleri; 3) eğitim almış Yunanlılık bilinci geliştirmiş ancak henüz milliyetçi diyemeyeceğimiz gruplar ve 4) dindar halk kitleleri.

Balkan Savaşları’na kadar Türklerin ve Rumların dil dâhil paylaştıkları onca ortaklığa rağmen sahip oldukları belki de tek farklılık olan dinleri onları yüzlerce yıl rekabet üzerine kurulu bir müsamaha çerçevesinde yaşatmıştı. Çatışma yaşanmamıştı ve savaşın en yoğun yıllarında bile huzursuzluk cemaatler

arası olmaktan ziyade çete ve eşkıyaların verdiği rahatsızlıktan kaynaklanıyordu. Ancak savaş yıllarının olumsuz tablosu içinde Kapadokya Hıristiyanlarının Yunan milliyetçiliğine hiç olmadıkları kadar yakın olduklarını söyleyebiliriz. Çatışma yaşanmamasının sebebi de Kapadokya'nın savaştan izole bir konumda olmasından ziyade Rum nüfusun sayıca az ve dağınık olmasından kaynaklanıyordu. Din üzerinden kurulan “Kendi” ve “Öteki” ayrımı “din milliyetçiliği” olarak kendini tekrar üretmişti. Artık Müslümanlar ve Hıristiyanlar değil, Türkler ve Yunanlar vardı.

İlginçtir ki savaş yıllarında Türk milliyetçiliği Türkçe konuşan Anadolu Rumlarını keşfetti ve onların savaş esnasında görece pasif kalmalarına da dayanarak onları Hıristiyan Türkler olarak belirleme yoluna gitti. O dönemde TBMM'ye Rumlar tarafından gönderilen veya kurmaca olduğu iddia edilen mektuplarda Anadolu Rumları da Türk tarafına biat ediyor görünüyordu (Benlisoy, 2002). Yine aynı dönemde ortaya çıkan Yozgatlı Papaz Papa Eftim Anadolu Rumlarının Türk olduğunu iddia edecek ve Ankara hükümetinin de desteğiyle 1922'de Kayseri'de Türk Ortodoks Patrikhane'sini kuracaktı. Başlangıçta Fener Rum Patrikhanesi'nin gücünü kırmak ve hatta onu sınır dışı etmek isteyen Türk hükümeti tarafından bu girişim oldukça hevesle desteklenmiş ancak Lozan görüşmelerinde Fener'in durumuna takılan müzakerelerde Anadolu Ortodokslarının da Yunanistan'a gönderilme kararıyla Türk Ortodoks Patrikhanesi bir avuç cemaatiyle etkisiz kalıvermişti. Yalnızca Papa Eftim ve ailesi mübadeleden muaf tutularak ödüllendirilmişlerdi. Papa Eftim'in girişiminin Anadolu Rumları arasında nasıl bir etki yarattığını ancak Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi'nden takip edebiliyoruz. Papa Eftim'in Türkleştiğini iddia eden mülteciler için bu kısımdan memnun görünmeseler de savaş esnasında Anadolu Rumlarının birçoğunu sürgünden kurtardığı için kendisine minnet duyuyorlardı. Papa Eftim'i hırslı ve pragmatik bir figür olarak anlatıyor ve savaşın ilk yıllarında Eftim'in Yunan tarafını desteklediğini iddia ediyorlardı.²⁴³

²⁴³ KMS el yazmaları, Galatia, Keskin Maden, Nikos Fotiadis.

Eğer daha hassas bir biçimde ele alınsaydı “Türk Ortodoks Patrikhane’sinin” kurulması Yunanistan hakkında pek fikri olmayan Anadolu Ortodoksları açısından bir kurtuluş olabilirdi (Clogg, 2006). İçinde Hıristiyan Türkler adı verilen bir unsur olması Türk milliyetçiliğinin de “din milliyetçiliği” çizgisini vatandaşlık odaklı bir milliyetçiliğe çekebilirdi. Lozan’da mübadele protokolüne son anda dahil edilmeleriyle Anadolu Ortodoksları Anadolu’yu terk etmek mecburiyetinde kaldılar. Türk tarafı onları yalnız bırakmıştı. Mülteci sorunu altında ciddi bir buhranla cebelleşen Yunan tarafı da Anadolu Rumları’nın Yunanistan’a gelmeleri fikrini pek beğenmese de kabul etmeye mecbur kalmıştı. Yani Anadolu Rumları Yunanlar tarafından da yalnız bırakılmışlardı. Yunanistan’daki hayat ise pek mutlu geçmeyecekti. Ancak hali hazırda Yunan milliyetçiliği ile tanışmış ve bir etnik bilinç geliştirmiş bu insanlar “Helenleşme” süreçlerini Yunanistan Krallığı’nın ideolojik aygıtları elinde tamamlayacaklardı.

Bir başka müsamaha ilişkisi: Rum Ortodokslar ve Rum Protestanlar

Müsamaha çerçevesinde ele aldığım bir diğer konu da Rum Protestanlar (Greek Protestants) ve Rum Ortodokslar arasındaki ilişkidir. Türklerle olan ilişkilerinde hoş görülen konumunda olan Ortodoks Rumların kendi içlerinden çıkan Protestanlar ile olan ilişkilerindeki durumları zaman zaman müsamaha gösteren, zaman zaman zulmeden baskın grup şeklinde özetlenebilir. Bir taraftan Rum Protestanların Ortodokslar ile aile bağları devam etmektedir ancak öte yandan Ortodoks ve Protestan cemaatler arasında başta din önderlerinin çektiği bir rekabet vardır. Rekabet bir taraftan dogmatik düzeyde ilerlerken, öte yandan cemaat üyelerini karşı tarafa kaptırmama çabası görülmektedir. Tüm bunlara ek olarak, milliyetçiliğin nüfuz etmeye başladığı dönemde din değiştirmenin bir boyutu daha karşımıza çıkmaktadır: “milletten çıkma” (denationalization) (Deringil, 2012). Zira dini terk etmek milli ülkeye ihanet olarak algılanmaktadır. Ancak ilginç bir biçimde daha önce gördüğümüz Müslüman-Hıristiyan rekabet ilişkisinden farklı olarak, savaş yıllarında Ortodoks-Protestan rekabet ilişkisi ortak düşmana karşı bir yakınlaşma doğuruyor gibi görünmektedir. Yine de Ortodoks olmanın Yunanlılığın en temel kriterlerinden biri olarak görüldüğü Yunan

milliyetçiliği için Protestanların ne kadar kabul edilebilir olduğu tartışmalı bir konudur. Anadolu Protestanlarının bir kısmının da savaş sonrasında Amerika'ya göç ettiğini ve Yunanistan'da bugün varlıkları çoğunlukla bilinmeyen bir avuç Protestan'ın yaşadığı göz önüne alınırsa resmi milliyetçi anlayış tarafından kabul gördüklerini söylemek pek doğru olmayacaktır.

Sonuç

Milliyetçilik çalışmalarıyla uğraşan bir öğrenci olarak Osmanlı toplumunda milliyetçiliğin nasıl bu kadar güçlü bir biçimde cemaatleri kendine çektiğini anlamaya çalıştım. Tarihi ve teorik çalışmalar beni milliyetçi başkaldırının özünde hep hegemonyaya karşı bir başkaldırı olduğu sonucuna ulaştırdı. Kapadokya'ya çalışmaya başladığımda ise bu teorinin bölgedeki milletleşme sürecini açıklayamayacağını düşündüm. Bir taraftan da Sözlü Gelenek Arşivi'ndeki tanıklıkların “birleştirici” davranışları ve “komşuluk” ilişkilerini gösteren içeriklerinden etkilendim. Ancak tüm bunlar Kapadokya Hıristiyanlarının milletleşme sürecini açıklamama yardımcı olmuyordu. Milliyetçiliğin mevcut hegemonya ilişkisi üzerine kurulmuş olmasını bekliyordum. Elimdeki kaynaklar beni yanıltıyordu. Müsamaha üzerine okumaya başladığım bir dönemde Hayden'in “antagonistik müsamaha” kavramı ile karşılaştım. Başta oldukça karamsar bir tablo çizdiğini düşündüğüm bu görüşü tezime uygulamam, kendimi ifade edebilmem ve yanlış anlaşılmadan bunu yapabilmem çok güç görünüyordu. Netice olarak şunu ortaya koyabildiğimi düşünüyorum bireyler arası komşuluk ilişkilerinin varlığı direkt olarak “barışçıl sembiyoz” anlamına gelmez. Benzer bir şekilde bir bölgede “antagonistik müsamaha” olması da o bölgede çatışma olduğu anlamına gelmez. Özellikle din alanındaki birleştirici davranışlar insanların kendi dinlerinden şüphe duyduklarını göstermez. Din sosyal kimliğin kurucu unsurudur ve “Kendi” ve “Öteki” ayrımı din üzerinden şekillenir. Özellikle hali hazırda ikincil durumda olan, müsamaha gösterilen taraf “Öteki” karşısında daha da güçsüz hale gelmemek için sınırlarını iyi korumak ve üyelerini bir arada tutmak zorundadır. Bu sistem hegemonyanın sarsılabileceği zamana kadar çatışmasız devam edebilir. Devlet gücünün sarsılabileceği dönemlerde Balkanlar'da veya

Girit'te görüldüğü gibi çatışma ortamına evrilebilir. Kapadokya'da bunun yaşanmamasının sebebi Ortodoks nüfusun sayıca az ve dağınık oluşudur. Çatışma görülmeyen Kapadokya'da bile milliyetçilik görece geç de olsa kendini kurmuş, din tarafından şekillenmiş mevcut ayrımın üstüne oturmuş ve din milliyetçiliği şeklini almıştır.

Tüm bunların ışığında, çatışmasız ve görece huzurlu olan Kapadokya'daki beraber yaşama pratiğinin bile bize bugün için örnek oluşturamayacağını, Osmanlı Barışı konusunun kendi tarihsel gerçekliği içinde değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini ve bugünün toplumları için ideal olarak ortaya konulması gerekenin eşitlik ve adalet çerçevesi içinde kurulmuş saygı ve karşılıklı tanıma olduğunu düşünüyorum. O amaca ulaşana kadar "müsamaha" göstermek elbette zulmetmekten ve savaştan daha iyidir. Ancak müsamaha tanımını bir güç ilişkisi olarak ortaya koymalı ve onu bir erdem olarak göstermekten vazgeçmeliyiz.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name: Göktürk, Gülen

Nationality: Turkish (TC)

Date and Place of Birth: 30 July 1985, Kütahya

Phone: +90 555 485 34 51

Email: gulen.gokturk@gmail.com

Address: TOKİ Turkuaz Vadisi Evleri CK 2/47

Yukarı Yurtçu Mh. Etimesgut Ankara Turkey

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
PhD	METU, Political Science and Public Administration	2015
MA	CEU, Nationalism Studies	2009
BS	METU, Political Science and Public Administration	2008
High School	Çankaya Milli Piyango Anadolu Lisesi	2003

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
Present	Başkent University, Department of Political Science and International Relations	lecturer
2013 Fall	Başkent University, Department of Political Science and International Relations	lecturer

PUBLICATIONS

Göktürk, G. (2012). Bir siyasi arkeoloji örneği olarak Türkiye'deki tarihyazımında Karamanlılar", *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, 13, 257-276.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

English (fluent), Greek (upper-intermediate), Ottoman Turkish (reading competence), Karamanlidika (reading competence)

C. TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü

Enformatik Enstitüsü

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü

YAZARIN

Soyadı : Göktürk

Adı : Gülen

Bölümü : Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce): Well-preserved boundaries: faith and co-existence in the late Ottoman Empire

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans

Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.

3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ: