

UNDERSTANDING THE REFORM PROCESS OF THE OTTOMAN
DIPLOMACY: A CASE OF MODERNIZATION?

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ABSTRACT

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The reasons that forced the Ottoman Empire to change its conventional method of diplomacy starting from late 18th century will be examined in this Thesis. In the first part, the basis of diplomacy and foreign policy will be examined with given political understandings and practices on certain issues drawn mainly from the European diplomatic history. In the second part, history of the Ottoman Empire would be mentioned briefly since it serves as the general contextual framework for understanding the need of reform/Europeanization of the Ottoman Diplomacy in 18th century. In the third part, history of Ottoman Diplomacy will be examined with main principles and practices of diplomacy, and its reform and Europeanization in late 18th century and mid 19th century will be discussed. The aim of this thesis is to highlight that there is a negative correlation between the decay of the Empire and the Europeanization of its army and diplomatic services. Modeling Europe had become the key motivation for the modernization and reform of the Empire. Taking Europe as the model in the reforms was the logical and pragmatic option for the Empire.

Key words: Diplomacy, Ottoman Empire, Europeanization, Reform of the Foreign Policy Making Tools.

ÖZ

OSMANLI DİPLOMASİSİNDE REFORM SÜRECİNİ ANLAMAK: BİR MODERNLEŞME ÖRNEĞİ Mİ?

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Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun 18.yy'ın sonu itibariyle, uyguladığı diplomasi yaklaşımını değiştiren nedenler bu tezde incelenecektir. İlk kısımda, diplomasi ve dış politikanın kaynağı, Avrupa diplomasi tarihinden siyasi alanda örneklenen bazı olaylar çerçevesinde açıklanacaktır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarihine Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun 18.yy'daki yenilenme ve Avrupalılaşmasının kavramsal çerçevesini oluşturması sebebiyle kısaca bakılacaktır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu diplomasisi, diplomasinin bazı prensipleri ve uygulamaları çerçevesinde incelenecek, 18.yy'ın sonu ve 19.yy'ın ortasına kadar olan dönemde diplomasinin Avrupalılaşması tartışılacaktır. Bu tezin amacı, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun düşüşü ile askeri ve diplomasi alanda Avrupalılaşması arasındaki ters ilişkinin ön plana çıkartılmasıdır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu düşüşteyken, geleneksel üstünlük anlayışını özellikle askeri ve diplomatik temelde sürdürmesinin çok zor olduğu açıktır. Bu da Osmanlıdaki devlet sisteminin değişimini gerekli kılmıştır. Avrupa'nın modellenmesi, Avrupalılaşma ve yenileşme hareketinin ana motivasyonu olmuştur. Kaldı ki Avrupa'nın model olarak alınması da mantıklı ve pragmatik bir adım olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Diplomasi, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Avrupalılaşma, Dış Politika Araçlarının Reformu.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Subject in Question

Diplomacy is a phenomenon that is almost as old as the state. Broadly, diplomacy is an act of communication. Therefore, keeping communication channels open attains at most importance. The relationship between foreign policy and diplomacy defines one of the basic pillars of the State. State is an entity created by people for people; therefore the aim of diplomacy should also be the same as serving people. State's role on the preservation of the integrity of its citizens projected itself on the concept of diplomacy.

Diplomacy has kept its original purpose in its contemporary application; yet, the ways to conduct it had been regulated and conceptualized over the time. It is assumed that the conceptualization of modern diplomacy collides with the rise of the medieval Italian states. The inter-state relations between Northern Italian states and papacy define the early backgrounds of modern sense of diplomacy. This definition includes a certain purpose especially for the foreign policy plus a structure on the regulations on how to conduct foreign policy.

Considering Medieval Italy there were two important aspects on the issue. First is the recognition of a miniature state system where city states were recognized as sovereign independent entities and the second is the understanding the origins of sovereignty which does not necessarily comes from a divine perspective. The emergence of the miniature state system enables the application of the concept of

diplomacy and foreign policy matters in a trial and error system. Sustaining a certain amount of peace could be the first pillar of this understanding while preservation of the right to rule could be the second. The idea of right to rule comes from a divine order that is seriously challenged with the rise of relatively secular sovereign state. Yet, assuming secularism gets a powerful grip in Northern Italy would be wrong. However the transition started to be realized in the period.

Rise of the sovereign state based diplomacy and foreign policy started to spill over from the Northern Italy to the world. While spilling over, the ideology that defines a pragmatic basis for it was also spread. The Machiavellian pragmatism that defines the inter-state relations of Italian Peninsula, transformed itself toward Richelieu's *raison d'état* eventually. This transformation should be considered as the second significant reaction towards the concept of divinity. In this concept, states had their sovereign right to conduct relations beyond the pretext. Thus, diplomacy also transformed itself not only towards a bilateral representation but also a defining force that determines the faith of the states.

Starting from Richelieu period, diplomacy and foreign policy almost completed its transformation as close as today's modern concept. The regulations on how to conduct foreign relations in modern sense was not finalized yet; it was on the right track now. Starting from Italian city states, complex foreign policy organizations, foreign ministries, organized representation systems were active. In this point the European system defines the trademark for the concept of diplomacy.

While diplomacy was conceptualized in the West, the Ottoman Empire's fate with the modern sense of diplomacy was relatively different. While the Ottoman Empire was a force that determined the inter-European relations after the conquest of Constantinople, it was not directly part of the European legal system. The clash between pragmatism and divinity was also a case for the Ottoman Empire. In the Western literature, divinity pillar of the Ottoman Empire emerged as the dominant force that limited the Ottoman maneuverability. Yet in practice, while recognizing

the divinity pillar, the Ottoman Empire acted as a pragmatic entity in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy.

In this context, it is a fact that the Ottoman Empire was a part of European-based understanding of diplomacy and foreign policy however it was not playing the game by the rules of the West. The most important aspect of this decoupling in the application of diplomacy was based on a non-preference of bilateral diplomacy that relied on reciprocity by the Ottoman Empire. The reason for this non-preference was based on the might of the Ottoman Empire, the Empire simply did not feel the necessity to conduct diplomacy as Western/European enemies did. The Ottoman Empire's might did not necessitate the empire to conduct relations with other entities in equal terms because the Ottoman Empire was a power base. The Ottoman Empire assumed itself as a global entity that "others" sent it permanent representatives, not vice versa. Therefore, latency to adopt the European way of conducting diplomacy comes from the military might of the Empire. Diplomacy could only be used to "inform" rather than "negotiate".

However, starting from the 17th century the military force of the Empire was not sustainable, therefore it was realized that the concept of diplomacy now can be used in the form of "negotiation". This change of understanding was the case for "modernization/Europeanization" debate for the Ottoman Empire. Modernization of the means of diplomacy, namely, military and foreign services is the main concept of this thesis.

The Ottoman Empire felt the necessity to change itself since it wasn't able to cope with the world surrounding it as it had used to be. Since the recognition of the problem in late 16th century, the Empire tried to take measures, however the transformation starting in late 18th century was the main focus of this thesis. Starting from late 18th century Europeanization/Modernization of the Empire would be focused on two important aspects, the first is the military since it was the most important foreign policy tool of the Empire and the second is the transformation of the institutionalization of foreign policy.

These two points were only a part of the Ottoman modernization debate, therefore Ottoman reform in later Islahat and Tanzimat periods were not be elaborated in this thesis. The main reason for the exclusion for those periods was to highlight a different degree of transformation from the late 18th century to mid-19th century than Tanzimat and Islahat Period. Starting from Paris Treaty of 1856 Ottoman Empire was officially recognized as a part of the Europe, where Tanzimat and Islahat periods reforms especially on institutionalization of foreign policy and diplomacy was based on this understanding. However the transformation period that took place during Selim III's (r. 1789-1807) and Mahmud II's (r. 1808-1839) reign was subject to the birth pains of this understanding. It is also a fact that before the Paris Treaty of 1856, the Ottoman Empire had been still a part of European state system for a certain degree especially after the treaty of Karlowitz where the Ottoman Empire started to recognize the European state system in legal terms. Yet, it was trying to grip and integrate further into that system. Therefore, modernization/Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire was an attempt to integrate further towards to European state system. Basically the Modernization/Europeanization of the Ottoman Diplomacy had three pillars. First one is the acceptance of the sovereign and equal state's system, second is the establishment of the organized and regulated exchange of diplomatic permanent representation and third is the establishment of institutions that regulates the foreign relations. These three pillars became crystallized by the late 18th and early 19th century; the reason for focusing this period is therefore the emergence of modernization of Ottoman diplomacy in this particular era.

The rise and fall of the Ottoman Empire is subject to many debates, modernization of the diplomatic system of the Empire is only the tip of the iceberg on the broad modernization issue of the Empire. The state system, political understanding, internal affairs, inter-community relations both within and outside of the Empire, foreign policy, military, administration, navy are some of the subjects that are worth to be researched in this context.

With the help of these writers, the issue of diplomacy will be examined in this thesis, within the framework of Modernization/Europeanization of the Empire between the late 18th and early 19th centuries. If it is considered in a very broad manner, diplomacy is a phenomenon that offers a peaceful solution to the chronic problems of the world. Most of these chronic problems are either caused if not would cause as a result by inter community conflicts around the world. We are living in a world that state is the primary diplomatic actor. That is the reason why, diplomacy has such an importance. Diplomacy keeps the communication channels open until the last second. Thus issues could be discussed and resolved within a peaceful manner. Diplomacy of the Ottoman Empire should be considered within the framework explained above. The Ottoman Empire is one of the most important political entities existed in the world history because of its 600 years of live span. The rise and fall of the Empire had either direct or indirect influence in the region that surrounds it. Within this framework, as the Ottoman Empire had affected the world around it, it had also been affected by it. What was important for the Ottoman Empire in terms of its diplomatic services is the urgency of transformation after a serious period of military decay. In this context, the role of the Ottoman army is also important. The Ottoman army has been the most powerful, skillful and technologically advanced military force until the 17th century. This powerful army enabled the Ottomans to pursue their interests by force especially in the field of foreign policy. The Ottoman conquest of Istanbul, Belgrade, Budapest and its expansion toward Vienna could be given as examples. Therefore, diplomacy and foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire could not be decoupled from the fluctuations in the military might of the Empire. Despite its strength, the army was also a political component of the Ottoman state system. As long as the Ottoman military had functioned as it was desired, the Empire's foreign policy goals were likely to be fulfilled. When the military started to decay along with the Empire, following the foreign policy goals became rather difficult. And the Modernization/ Europeanization of the military of the Ottoman Empire is one of the two pillars of its modernization process along with diplomatic modernization.

Diplomacy in modern sense which depends on the principle of reciprocity was functioning between the European countries since the 16th century. Starting from the Italian peninsula, diplomacy which depends on the principle of reciprocity was performed in the European courts along with using of agents and specialized institution on diplomacy. On the other hand, the rise of the Ottoman diplomacy in European terms, considering the fact of decay in the Ottoman Empire by the 18th century, was due to come. But, this should not necessitate us to think that the Ottoman Empire did not have a diplomatic pillar before the 18th century. Instead, the Empire had a functioning diplomatic life. There were diplomatic representations in the Ottoman Empire, even though the Empire did not have permanent representation abroad until late 18th century, and for a certain degree, but not as much as the European counterparts, there were diplomatic institutions.

The reason why the Ottoman Empire was lagging two centuries behind comes from the Islamic ideology of conducting interstate relations, since it prevents the Ottomans to have permanent peace with non-Muslims because they were subjects to holy war for spreading the religion to land that are not controlled by Muslims. Also the military superiority of the Empire is another factor. This superiority dictates that there is a constant war between the Muslims and the Non-Muslim infidels. Between these two parties, peace could only be sustained as a form of ceasefire not in “everlasting” form. Therefore sustaining a constant relationship with non-Muslims, based on the principle of reciprocity was very difficult. Most of the states that the Ottoman Empire had to have political connection were in Europe and they were dominantly Christians. The lack of incentive to have communication because of the belief system, plus an army which was powerful enough to dictate the interests of the Empire did not require the Empire to hold negotiations and conferences in the conventional understanding. However, as the world had started to change in the 18th century, this ideology was started to be undermined, because at the same time, Europe was employing rationality instead of religious belief systems where criticism of the human mind, liberal individualism, irreversibility of progress, belief to the absolutism of the rule of

nature was prevailing in the period in Europe.¹ And this would eventually lead to a state system where it was based on sovereign equality of the states. This necessitated the Ottoman Empire to employ conventional method of diplomacy as in the European states, which depended of the principality of reciprocity by disregarding the order of Islam on interstate relations.

Therefore, Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire comes from the westernization of the Ottoman institutions. The urge for modernization after the 18th century was the result of the decay in the Ottoman Empire. The reason that modernization is defined as Europeanization for this study is the emergence of Europe as a role model in the eyes of the Ottoman politics for intended change. While the Ottoman Empire maintained traditional means of diplomacy, the key institutions of Europe surpassed the Ottomans after the enlightenment in terms of technological advancement. The effects of the enlightenment were visible in the field of technology and this had a direct impact on the military since it was promoting positivist thinking, natural sciences and new military trainings. Thanks to these advancements, European militaries could defeat the Ottoman armies in the battlefield and this necessitated the change in the Ottoman institutions in a broad range varying from army to foreign service. This thesis aims to illuminate this concept of change within the framework of modernization/Europeanization debate on diplomacy which the Ottoman Empire understands the necessity of change in the field of diplomacy and adopt “European/Modern” system in the eyes of a declining political position of the Empire.

1.2 Methodology

The subject of this thesis necessitates a research in a broad perspective. In other words, it requires information from a broad variety of disciplines varying from International Relations to History. Despite its historical explanation of the issues,

¹Celal Metin *Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme Türk Modernleşmesi ve İran (1800-1941)* (Ankara: Phoenix Publishing, 2011), 23.

this thesis is not a History thesis but it rather enjoys the information provided from the field of History. With this respect, historical definition of the concept diplomacy would be in this thesis. Examples of the application of the diplomacy and foreign policy within the framework of the definition would be examined. This would be applied to the Ottoman Empire within the context of modernization/Europeanization. There are various reasons behind the motivation for Europeanization/Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire. These motivations came from the history of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, the history of the Ottoman Empire will be briefly visited to define the motivations. Following the definition of the concept of diplomacy and foreign policy, and examination of the history of the Ottoman Empire, the modernization of the Ottoman Institutions related with diplomacy and foreign policy will be discussed. In this discussion, Europeanization will be used as the main derivative for the modernization/reform of the Ottoman Empire. Also, modernization/Europeanization debate will be briefly examined in the conceptual level. In order to achieve this, secondary sources such as books, academic articles will be utilized during the elaboration of the definitions especially on the understanding of the Europeanization and while primary sources will be used in the definitions of the terms.

1.3 Outline of the Thesis

The thesis starts with the definition of the emergence of diplomacy. The blurriness in the definition is subject to different debates on the use of force within the framework of diplomacy. In this context, the evolution of the concept of the diplomacy starting from medieval Italy will be examined. This evolution includes the formation of the modern sense of diplomacy along with the rise of sovereign state system. Rise of the sovereign state system is also intertwined with the rise of pragmatism in the application of diplomacy. In that part, it would be seen that the foreign policy application is subject to certain issues because of the religious background of the Empire. In the second part, establishment period of the

Ottoman Empire and its implications on Ottoman diplomacy and foreign policy will be examined. In this part, the emergence of Ottoman principality under Anatolian Seljuks, Osman Bey (r. 1299-1326) and his *Ghazi* ideology will be examined. Additionally, the effect of Islamic ideology on Ottoman diplomacy will be elaborated. There are two important points to understand the pre-reform Ottoman Diplomacy. First, the Ottoman Empire did not had bilateral, reciprocity based permanent representative diplomacy. Second, on the other hand, the Ottoman Empire welcomed the European permanent representatives, thus Ottoman Empire had an active foreign policy and diplomacy atmosphere. As the Empire started to decline, the traditional means of diplomacy in the Ottoman Empire was subject to the pressure for change.

The Ottoman diplomacy and its reform period would be examined within this context. Before the period of decay, the Ottoman Empire was enjoying a military superiority and this does not necessitate the Empire to conduct diplomacy in the conventional European method of the time. However as the Empire decayed, modernization/Europeanization emerged as a must. In this context, the modernization/Europeanization axis is examined. The reason for this debate is to define what the modernization is and as a result why modeling Europe is emerged in this period. After this examination, it would be assumed that, Ottoman modernization was a Europeanization attempt, it was a top down approach, and it was directed to the fields of military and foreign service.

With this understanding in mind, Ottoman diplomacy of pre-reform period will be examined. After this examination, the reform attempt of the Selim III on the field of military and diplomacy will be discussed. The reform in the field of military could not be undermined in the context of diplomacy and foreign policy since it was the primary tool for the application of it. After Selim III period, Mahmud II will be examined within same framework. Some of the reforms/modernization attempts of Selim III were either unsuccessful or faced serious resistance and some of them were reversed because of this resistance. Mahmud II's importance

was his determination to reintroduce these attempts of modernization in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy.

CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY

2.1 The Origins and the Basics of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy

Diplomacy might be as old as politics which is as old as state and people and as long as the debate of “we” and “them” existed, the concept is likely to prolong. Diplomacy is the art of dealing with others and therefore it builds on a strong concept of “other”. If there is an “other”, then there should be “we” and consequently there should be ours and theirs. And ours refers to what we own. What is our own? What defines ownership are; possession of goods, land, animals, house, village, or state and eventually being a part of something; family, nationality, class, ideology. These are the things that define the humanity beyond its universal existence especially since the time when men walked out of cave, and start to climb up on the food chain and eventually discovered the ways to conquer the mother earth. Since people started to plow the earth and learned to be self-sufficient rather than being hunter gatherer, a new concept had emerged: the ownership. Men own the land, crops, animals, revenue as private properties. Therefore his/her possessions have to be protected because she/he has worked on them. How to protect a possession varies from time to time and from issue to issue. When a man holds a stick, he/she can project power. Thus his/her ownership can be protected by a mean. Connectively he or she can claim their ownerships as long as they are able to pose danger to those who challenge them.

If we accept the state as the primary actor to protect of its possessions, diplomacy is one of “the sticks” in the tool box that can be used to deter those who pose dangers on those possessions such as wealth, peace, prosperity, land, manpower, natural resources and the sovereignty. Namely there is a correlation between diplomacy and how powerful one is. The relationship between power and diplomacy is referred in Geoffrey Berridge’s book as “Diplomacy is an essentially a political activity and, well-resourced and skilful a major ingredient of power.”² In the case of diplomacy and foreign policy, it is almost impossible to decouple the use of force from the exercise of diplomacy and foreign policy. Ongoing debate about the uncertainty of the issue in the definition also raised many questions. One of them is asked by Temel Iskit as “As it is accepted generally, could diplomacy only be exercised through peaceful means or “proportional” use of force can also be included as a means of diplomacy?”³

This uncertainty lies in the definition of the word of diplomacy as well. When the Oxford Dictionary is consulted; the first meaning is referred to the activities of representation of ones country in abroad with related skills. The second definition in the same dictionary dictates diplomacy as; “the art of dealing people in a sensitive and tactful way”⁴ Technically there is a grey zone in the relationship between diplomacy and power. Ideally diplomacy is a means to prevent using force in the interstate relations however in general, diplomacy functioned in parallel with the use of force.

² G.R Berridge, *Diplomacy Theory and Practice 4th Edition* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 1.

³ Temel Iskit, *Diplomasi Tarihi, Teorisi, Kurumları Uygulanması* (Istanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), 2.

⁴ *Oxford English Dictionary*, s.v. “Diplomacy,” June 2015
<http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/diplomacy>

2.2 Evolution of Diplomacy and Corner Stones of Diplomatic History

2.2.1 Diplomacy From Early States to Medieval Times

Early examples of diplomacy have stretched a long period of time in the history. Early records of inter-state agreements in Mesopotamia are dating back around 2850 B.C. There are also other sources referring to ancient tablets in Sumerian language, about the conflicts between the states of Mesopotamia. One of them refers to a war between Uruk city-state and Aratta city-state. It is very important to give this example in order to show the means of diplomacy. In these tablets, use of force is a mean of diplomacy but it is not the only one. According to ancient Sumerian tablets, a city state residing between Euphrates and Tigris, Uruk was envying the riches of Aratta, another city in the south of Uruk. The wealth and prosperity of Aratta extended beyond Uruk, which provoked them to initiate a “war of nerves” against Arattans. This war of nerves included “messengers” carrying messages between the rulers of the cities.⁵

2.2.2 Early Form of Diplomacy in Italian City States and Machiavellian Approach to the Diplomacy

It is widely accepted that the dawn of modern diplomacy comes from the relation between the Italian City states during the 16th century. Therefore it makes sense to start with this period of time to have a quick outlook to modern Diplomatic which depends on the principle of reciprocity. This period is accepted as the origins of modern diplomacy, since it is the period of time that first networks of first organized diplomatic contacts.⁶ Emerged in the 16th century, Italian inter-state

⁵ For Further Information Samuel Noah Kramer, *Tarih Sümerde Başlar*(Istanbul: Kabalıcı, 2002)

⁶ “M. S Anderson *The origins of the modern European State System 1494-1618* (Harlow, 1998), 52-53” Quoted in J. Black *a History of Diplomacy* (London : Reaktion Books, 2010), 43.

diplomacy was a complex system composed of many political units. This mixture included city states, principalities and counties. In order to understand the number of different lords, dukes, bishops of medieval Italy, Machiavelli's famous book, *the Prince* which was written to give advices to Lorenzo de Medici who was the ruler of Florence, provides with a number of examples to the political picture of the time.

When the king (Louis XII 1470-1489) recaptures Lombardy, he regained the respect that Charles (Charles VIII 1462-1515) lost. Genoa surrendered, Florence become friend with him. Marquiz Mantova, Duke of Ferrera, Bentivogli, Countesss of Forli, Faenza, Pesaro, Rimini, Camerino, Duke of Piombino, Luca, Pisa, Siena they all look for the way to become friend with him on their own good".⁷

The complexity of state system in Italy made the task of maintaining the relationships among the states quite difficult. Jeremy Black connects this difficulty with the fragmented political spectrum of Italian city states by saying "the fragmented political system in Italy, alongside expansionism of the most of the powers, and more particularly, the determination by seigniorial families to establish their position, encouraged conflict. In turn, conflict led to pressure for diplomacy."⁸ This complex structure of city states in Italian Peninsula necessitated the states to keep the communication channels open in any case of eventuality. Thus, this is the period that city states started to have permanent representatives and Italian city states such as Venice, Florence, Milan and Naples had each other's permanent representations by 1540.⁹

The Republic of Venice as one of the city states in medieval Italy with its broad commercial ties in the Mediterranean world is a good example of complex network of diplomatic agents. One of the earliest examples for the permanent

⁷ Nicholo Machiavelli, *Hukümdar* (Istanbul : İşbankası Yayınları, 2008), 11-12.

⁸ Jeremy Black, 44.

⁹ M.S. Anderson. *The Rise of Modern*, 7.

representation of the Republic of Venice was in 1435, by sending Zacharias Bembo to Rome.¹⁰ *Relazzioni*, which acted as a guidebook to define the relationship between Venice and their host country for those who intended to work in the receiving state are written by the Venetian diplomats at the Time. One of the first examples of these reports was written by Andrea Gritti about the Turkish Lands.¹¹ The term of “ambasciatore” also emerged in the 12th century’s Italy.¹² Plus, early ambassadors were also named as “nuncius” which the word translated as message bearer.¹³ These people were regarded as safer way of communication than letters because letters could be confiscated and altered by the enemy. Additionally, they presented a more flexible means of communication,¹⁴ because ambassadors were likely to change their position in case of an acute situation requiring immediate action in order to prevent any misunderstandings. However, restrictive means of communication was still the case at the time. Even tough representatives were much more flexible than the letter, they were still subject to the conventional means of communication. Sending a message from Milan to Venice on horseback took 24 hours, a message from Rome to Venice took 50 hours, and a message from Istanbul to Venice through Corfu took 20 days by sailing in early 16th century.¹⁵ Therefore, the issues on communication recognized as the most important obstacle in front of the ad hoc basis diplomats.

Additionally, while applying foreign policy through diplomacy, the diplomatic ways should stay within a framework of applicability, basically demanding more than actually capacity should be avoided. Therefore, foreign policy actions have to be logical and down to Earth within this framework. While searching for a

¹⁰ Jeremy Black, 44.

¹¹ Ibid., 45.

¹² Temel İskit, 86.

¹³ Donald E Queller. “Medieval Diplomacy” In *Diplomacy Vol.2*, Ed. C. Jönsson and R. Langhorne (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi : SAGE, 2004), 193.

¹⁴ Ibid., 193-194.

¹⁵ Jeremy Black, 49.

logical background to application of diplomacy, looking back the Machiavelli as a guide is very beneficial. In “the Prince”, Machiavelli’s approach provides with good basis for political rationalism and pragmatism. Machiavelli recognizes that the interest of the state has to be protected in any case and military option should always be on the table. According to Machiavelli, state have to has army to deter enemies from attacking but size of the army should be under control and limited in order not to be attacked by others because a large army could provoke the enemy by making it feel insecure.¹⁶ While giving advices to the ruler, Machiavelli’s pragmatism also defines the relationship between diplomacy and foreign policy. Machiavelli argues in his book, that rulers have to protect their rule with any cost. For this purpose, the ruler can spend his wealth, his army and this subject. The book also defines the understanding of diplomacy of its time as hypocrite and cheating.¹⁷ But it is also necessary to be hypocrite and cheating since diplomats are obliged to lie and cheat to pursue his/her own states’ interests because man can be bribed, intimidated and deceived.¹⁸ What can be deduced from this understanding is that, political will of “the prince” defines a foreign policy that ensures the continuation of his rule and survival of the state disregarding any moral, ethical or even religious values. Therefore, continuation of the rule and survival of the state at any cost creates a logical background for the rationalization of application of foreign policy and diplomacy of the time. In order to achieve this aim, diplomacy can be based on cheating and hypocrisy when it is necessary. The Italian city state system which depends on Machiavellian pragmatism will eventually evolve to the French system of diplomacy, which also relies on the bilateral system.¹⁹

¹⁶ G.R Berridge, M. Keens-Soper, and T.G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory From Machiavelli to Kissinger* (New York : Palgrave, 2001), 10.

¹⁷ Hüner Tuncer, *Eski ve Yeni Diplomasi* (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü, 1991), 18-19.

¹⁸ G.R Berridge, M. Keens-Soper, and T.G. Otte, *Diplomatic Theory From....*,2001, 10.

¹⁹ G.R. Berridge, *Diplomacy Theory and Practice...*, 2010, 22.

2.2.3 Diplomacy in the 16th Century

The evolution of the Italian diplomacy toward the French system will be examined in this part. As it was explained above in the Italian city state system, diplomacy was conducted by the nuncios and other representatives in an ad hoc manner. Yet, the resident representatives system was also emerged in the 15th century.²⁰ The phenomenon of bilateral permanent representation among Italian states started to spread “over the Alps”. Between 1425 and 1432 there was a permanent representative of the Duchy of Milan in the court of Sigismund, King of Hungary and Holy Roman Emperor elect while Sigismund had one in Milan.²¹ Additionally by 1463 another resident diplomat was sent to France by Milan.²² In addition to Milan, Florence had a diplomat in the French Court by 1474 and Republic of Venice had a permanent representative in Paris by 1479.²³

2.2.3.1 Diplomacy in France and Cardinal Richelieu

France not only received the early examples of permanent representatives from the Italian States it also dispatched its own representatives not only to the Italian peninsula but also the beyond. By 1521 France under François I sent a permanent representative to Switzerland. By 1535 “the most Christian Majesty”, François I (r.1515-1547), King of France, made an embassy operational in Istanbul which worked with court of Suleiman the Magnificent(r. 1520-1566), Sultan of the Ottoman Empire, Shadow of God on Earth – and spear of the Muslim Holy war

²⁰ Ibid, 103.

²¹ M.S Andersson, *The Rise of Modern.*, 7.

²² Temel İskit, *Diplomasi Tarihi.*, 87.

²³ M.S. Andersson, *The Rise of Modern.*,7-8.

against the Christendom.²⁴ Name of the representative was Jean de la Forest.²⁵ The importance of this attempt was the establishment of a reason-based diplomacy which put the interest of the state above all, especially the religion. Establishment of a permanent representation in a Muslim capital took ten years after the François I appeal for aid to the Ottoman Sultan while he was captivated in Madrid after the defeat in the Battle of Pavia on 1525. However, while Christians were in fight among each other, it was not in good nature to ask the “Turk” to intervene. The reason for such delay to establish a permanent representation after the appeal of François I was the mutual distrust between Muslim Ottomans and their traditional feeling of superiority and Christians whom had a strong history and understanding of crusade in the social code, additionally there is an agreement between Charles V (r. 1519-1556) and François I after the battle of Pavia. Despite the agreement, the hesitance of breaking the front “respublica Christiana” (a body of community of Christian World under the same understanding of religious law which was generally promoted by Papacy and/or Holy Roman Empire’s Habsburgs) on the basis of sovereignty of an individual state was not an easily acceptable phenomenon given the facts of the understanding of crusade.²⁶ However, starting from 16th century, the concept of reason d’état started to get more and more grip in the European diplomatic atmosphere. The key player in the history of the France for the conceptualization of the issue was Cardinal Richelieu.

The leading actors in France in the diplomatic scenery were King Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) and his first Minister on foreign affairs, Cardinal Richelieu (1585-1642) of early 17th century whom served for Louis the XIII (r.1610- 1643). Antony Levi recognizes Louis XIV as one of the most politically effective ruler of Europe history. However, “Despite the price of peasant starvation, financial

²⁴ G.R. Berridge *Diplomacy Theory*, 104.

²⁵ K. Hamilton and R. Longhorne. *The practice of Diplomacy Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 37-38.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

bankruptcy and military defeat which he ended up to pay".²⁷ Louis XIV was a reckless ruler. But Louis XIV's importance as a foreign policy actor comes from his claim of the leadership of the Bourbons who were ruling France to fight with the hegemony of Holy Roman Empire.²⁸ For Louis XIV and Cardinal Richelieu, warfare was an inevitable part of the state and policy making. Richard Wilkinson's book explains the situation as;

France was at war for fifty out of seventy-two years of Louis XIV'S reign, and for thirty-two out of the fifty-four years of his personal rule. To a great extent therefore, when we talk about his foreign policy, we mean his preoccupation with war: occasional attempts to avoid war but more often preparations for war, the conduct of war, the exploitation of victory or the mitigation of defeat. Furthermore, because Louis' domestic policy was foreign-policy-led, it too was dominated by war: rising taxation to fund war, requiring men to fight war, helping civilians to survive the economic hardship of war, enabling France to recover from war.²⁹

The ongoing power struggle between France and the Habsburg Germany played a critical role in the world diplomatic history since Cardinal Richelieu's foreign policy understanding emerged as a counter-reaction to the hegemony of Habsburg Dynasty in the continent.³⁰ For this period of time we can argue that Machiavelli's pragmatism soldiered on in the ideas of Cardinal Richelieu, since he believed that, a state could form alliances with any other former foes under any conditions if that alliance will serve for the greater good of the state.³¹ He did not miss any chance to become stronger and formed alliances with protestant Sweden and Muslim Ottomans to confront Holy Roman Empire. What makes Richelieu a key player of this period of struggle in terms of diplomacy is, his concept of reason

²⁷ Antony Levi, *Louis XIV* (New York: Anthony, Carrol & Graf, 2004), 2.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Richard Wilkinson. *Louis XIV*, (Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY : Routledge Historical Biographies, 2007), 122.

³⁰ For Further information on the issue: Aristotle Tziampiris. *Faith and Reason of State: Lesson From Early Modern Europe and Cardinal Richelieu* (Hauppauge, NY : NOVA, 2009)

³¹ Hüner Tuncer. *Diplomasinin Evrimi: Gizli Diplomasiden Küresel Diplomasiye (Istanbul : Kaynak Yayınları, 2009)*, 48.

d'état, the rationality in the application of foreign policy. The concept rationalizes putting the interest of the state in front of all other things. This includes having diplomatic relations beyond religious understanding. By 17th century, Richelieu was in touch with the Muslim Ottoman Empire in the East, and Protestant Sweden in the North to break away from the aggression of the Holy Roman Empire based on Catholicism. Therefore, rationalization of decision making for the good of the state presented the logical base for the application of diplomacy. He also supported the concept of singular ministry of foreign affairs.³² Richelieu believed that the continuous negotiation as being the logical and soft spoken way to persuade other states into agreements was the ultimate way of diplomacy along with timing and appropriateness.³³

2.2.3.2 England's Role on Raison d'état

Along with other European states, the England's journey on the diplomatic representation was on ad hoc basis. As the rising momentum of diplomacy at the time, Henry VII of England (r. 1485-1509), was only represented in Rome.³⁴ By 1505 John Stile was sent to Spain as he became resident vis-à-vis the Spanish resident representative de Puebla since 1496.³⁵ By the time of Henry VIII (r. 1509-1574) there were representations in Netherlands, Holy Roman Empire, Rome, Venice and France.³⁶ Considering the emergence of the sovereign states and the breaking of the religious understanding on the application of diplomacy as it was explained above, England also played a pivotal role. Henry VIII, King of England (1491- 1547) passed an act through parliament, which terminates the

³² Ibid.

³³ Temel İskit, 30.

³⁴ K. Hamilton and R. Longhorne. *The practice of Diplomacy Its Evolution, Theory and Administration*. Routledge. (London and New York 1995) , 38.

³⁵ Ibid., 38.

³⁶ Ibid., 38.

jurisdiction of the Papacy, by claiming the England as the sovereign state on its territory.³⁷ This approach paved the way to the further application of the reason d'état and decoupling from religious understanding in the field of diplomacy.

2.3 Conclusion

In this chapter definition of diplomacy, its emergence, evolution and its transformation into the modern form were examined. Diplomacy is a tool of state and serves its people. Even though diplomacy is a peaceful concept, its definition is blurry on the means to use. This leads us to the debate on whether using force in the diplomacy should at stake or not. The answer is hidden in the history: The use of force had always been a part of the diplomacy. When considering the examples from ancient times up to today, the ideas on conceptualization of diplomacy have been put forward by the thinkers, Machiavelli and Richelieu they kept their importance, such as reason d'état and pragmatism to ensure the existence and the continuation of the state.

Diplomacy in early ages was dependent to the ad hoc basis diplomats. These people were a step forward compared to the letters to communicate. Additionally rising complexity of international order also necessitates a flexible mean of communication. In order to define this concept, the Italian city states are the best example. The Italian peninsula with its complicated state system necessitates the ongoing open channels of communication in order to preserve the interest of the nation. Therefore, representations in one another's courts become the most important step towards modern diplomacy. The early representation in the early states brings a conceptualization too. Machiavelli's pragmatism in the preservation of the state defines the background for diplomacy. This approach also defines the secularization of the sovereign state. Eventually, Machiavelli's

³⁷ Ibid., 30.

approach on pragmatism, together with the concept of diplomacy raised within the Italian city states, which depends on bilateral, resident basis diplomats started to spread from the Italian peninsula to the Northern Europe.

The warfare between the German Habsburgs and France on the Northern Italy helped to the spread of permanent representation from Italian states to France. Starting from the late 15th and early 16th century France dispatched its permanent representations to the Italian peninsula and beyond. The Ottoman Empire was one of the early examples of diplomatic exchanges of France. The diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire should be considered as the early example of the *raison d'état* and an application of Machiavellian pragmatism in the field of diplomacy. Because despite the exchange of diplomats on certain issues, the full scale alliance that was established between the Ottomans and the French after the François I's appeal to the Suleiman the Magnificent was something new that challenges the idea of *respublica Christiana* on the continent. Additionally Henry VIII's declaration of sovereignty from the jurisdiction of the Pope was another impact for the Christian front. Therefore, the application of rationality instead of religious pretext becomes the key concept for European Diplomacy. Cardinal Richelieu conceptualized this background with his approach called *raison d'etat*. According to this principle the state's interest comes above all including religion.

To sum up, diplomacy is an old phenomenon. Along with the state, diplomacy is used to protect one's or state's possessions. Therefore, protecting or expanding the wealth, land, or any other valuables requires maintenance of certain level of relationship between different entities which were struggling to reach these commodities. The degree of relationship may vary from peaceful diplomatic negotiation to warfare. While employing a peaceful approach of diplomacy, maintaining the bond of communication either through messengers or diplomats is very important. In this context, a network of agents was established and starting from medieval Italy they were evolved. As it was explained above with Machiavelli, and Richelieu's example, pragmatism plays the key role for the conceptualizing of diplomacy and foreign policy. These agents were first on ad

hoc basis, and later they become permanent representatives. The concept of permanent representation spread from Medieval Italy to the European Continent and eventually to the world.

Starting from these cornerstones of diplomatic history and diplomacy, the following chapter will try to examine the Ottoman Side of the picture and in this context It would be tried to explain the Ottoman Empires situation on the concept of diplomacy and foreign policy given the facts of diplomatic representation of the Ottoman Empire and its motivation behind applying such understanding on diplomacy. The reason for giving these examples before going into further details with the Ottomans is to emphasize the general outlook of diplomacy and foreign policy application of the time period that shapes Ottoman Diplomacy.

CHAPTER III

THE HISTORIC PERSPECTIVE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

3.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, the evolution of diplomacy was explained by certain corner stone events. In this chapter, the Ottoman Empire's approach towards diplomacy and foreign policy will be examined. The Ottoman Empire had a long existence in world politics. This existence affected the world around the Ottomans along with them. The Ottoman Empire had not been an isolated entity especially after the conquest of Byzantine Constantinople. Its relations with its surrounding states along with those other important powers in the world had increased over the time.

The examination of the Ottoman history will start with the examination of the establishment period. In this part, Osman Bey, who is the first leader of the Ottoman State will be examined. He was a dominant figure not only as the head of the state but also the commander of the army. The Ottomans were established as a border principality; therefore war with the neighbours defines main characteristics of the people living under Osman Bey. The Ottoman Empire would expand and define its existence as a state through warfare, otherwise without this ambition it would be dissolved in the history as many other principalities which were established around same time and around same size. When we applied this concept to the foreign policy, the constant warfare with warriors who were

fighting for the holy cause of Islam emerged as a critical motivation of Ottoman foreign affairs. As long as Ottoman Empire was able to sustain a powerful army as in the establishment period of the Empire, it had the ability to dictate its foreign policy interests over its enemies.

Having a powerful army which was able to dictate the Ottoman Empire's interest along with its Islamic doctrine could be seen as the primary objective for the establishment period of the Ottoman Empire. Yet this was not the only case for the Ottoman Diplomacy. It is a fact that, the Islamic doctrine that allowed only a limited degree of contact with non-Muslims. Yet, the Ottoman Empire was also employed pragmatic actions in the foreign policy and conducting diplomatic relations with other states. While the Ottoman Empire was not conducting diplomacy on bilateral level it was accustomed with current diplomatic atmosphere of the time.

Despite the pragmatism in the application of diplomacy and foreign policy, the lack of reciprocity based diplomacy was still the case in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire's rise in the field of diplomacy was a case of change. While the late 18th century was marked as the turning point in the Ottoman Empire where it had dispatched the first permanent representation, Ottoman diplomatic affairs did not initiated on that particular point in time. While expansion was the main goal and religion was a motivation, pragmatism was the case.

3.2 Emergence of the Ottoman Empire

In this chapter, emergence of the Ottoman Empire will be examined very briefly. While examining this period, the religious aspect of the establishment period will also be elaborated since it defines the philosophical background of foreign policy and diplomacy making of the Empire in the period, along with certain applications in Ottoman diplomacy and foreign policy that defies the religious philosophical background, in the name of pragmatism.

The Ottoman Empire's rule, lasted almost 700 years between 1299 and 1922 ceased with the proclamation of the Republic of Turkey. The evolution of once a small tribe of warriors towards an Empire is both painful and magnificent progress all together. Ottomans were one of the local principalities of the Seljuks whom ruled over the Anatolia before they emerged as an independent state. The Ottomans and other principalities of Seljuks under families of Karaman, Menteşe and Aydin had emerged as relatively independent entities during the power vacuum created by the dissolution of Anatolian Seljuks.³⁸ These principalities were located to the borders by Anatolian Seljuk state to defend the western borders while Seljuks were having problems due to the aggression of Mongols in the East It is estimated that, Ertugrul Gazi who is father of Osman Bey, (the founder of Ottoman Empire) settled in the area of Eskişehir-Sakarya of North West Anatolia around 1260's in order to stay away from the Mongolian aggression, on Anatolian Seljuks.³⁹ Technically, the Ottomans did not have a distinctive advantage in terms of size over other principalities such as Aydın, Karaman and Saruhan which were established under same political conditions.⁴⁰

However, the most important advantage of the Ottomans over other principalities except its size and legal status from the Anatolian Seljuks was its close location to the Byzantine Empire. The Byzantine Empire was on the verge of collapse when the Ottomans were founded. Norman Stone argues that the collapse of the East Rome comes from West not from East (the Ottomans) and he also adds that there was a power struggle between Rome and Constantinople since Pope was promoting a singular Christian world while East Rome provided its own approach on Orthodox Christianity. The religious divergence reached its peak point when

³⁸ Suraiya Faroqhi. *The Ottoman Empire: Short History*, Translated by Shelley Firsch, Markus (Princeton : Wiener Publishers, 2009), 41.

³⁹ Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu üzerine araştırmalar Volume 1*, (Istanbul : İşbankası Kültür Yayınları, 2009), 5.

⁴⁰ Stanford Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 1 Empire of the Gazis the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977),10-11.

Constantinople was invaded by the Latin Crusaders at 1204.⁴¹ Thus, the Ottomans were in an advantageous position because the closest enemy was in terrible political condition and likely to dissolve. And, eventually the Ottomans would end the existence of the Byzantine Empire by the conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

Rise of Osman Bey, whom was the first sultan of the Ottoman Empire, as a *Ghazi* warrior and holy war of *Gaza* was quite critical since they define the religious background of the Ottoman Empire for the time. *Ghazi* is a term used in the Islam for the warriors fighting for the sake of Islam against the non-Muslim infidels called *kafir*.⁴² Prominent Ottoman historian, Halil İnalcık argues that this *ghazi* ideology defines the basis for the establishment of the Ottoman Empire, he also recognizes the *Gaza* as main holy motivation that mobilised the *Ghazi* warriors under Osman.⁴³ In this context ongoing and constant warfare against the infidel is one of the foreign policy actions for the Ottoman Empire. However after the conquest of Istanbul a self sufficient, sustainable and compact empire was created around its new capital Istanbul and Straits.⁴⁴ The expansion of the Ottoman Empire had proceeded until 16th century. In late 16th century Ottomans were ruling a significant part of the Old World consist of Africa, Europe and Asia. They were controlling trade, involving in continental politics with Europe, enjoying the riches of the East and they had the military might to protect all this vital interest. Ottomans were to enjoy a long and prosperous period.

⁴¹ Norman Stone. *Turkiye Kısa Bir Tarih.* (Istanbul : Remzi Kitabevi, 2011), 23.

⁴² *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. 4, s.v. “Kafir”

⁴³ Halil İnalcık, *Devlet-i Aliye.*, 10-11.

⁴⁴ Halil İnalcık, ‘Turkey and Europe: A Historical Perspective’, *Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs* Vol.II, No.1 (March-May 1997), 76-92.

3.3 Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in the Classical Era

Ottoman Diplomacy had a different nature compared to the European counterparts especially on the basis of permanent representation abroad. The modern bilateral understanding of diplomacy that emerged and spread from Northern Italy to the world based upon the concept of reciprocity, where the Ottoman Empire was lagging due to the various reasons until late 18th century. The most important aspect of latency comes from the religion. The Ottoman Empire was generally defined by the European scholars with its Islamic identity and generally with the idea of Islamic superiority. This superiority necessitated the believers not to stay long in the land of the Infidel, since the land of the Infidel was land of war and inferiority, which eventually made it difficult to have diplomatic relations based on reciprocity. The concept of relations with non-Islamic world is simplified in Nuri Yurdusev's words.

According to the prevalent view the Ottomans, being faithful to the Islamic precepts, distanced themselves from the infidel Europeans and, adopting a negative attitude toward (European) diplomacy, refused to send resident missions to the European capitals until the late eighteenth century. At this point the Empire had lost its strength in comparison the European powers and had to establish resident embassies as part of its reform attempt.⁴⁵

The reason behind this concept comes from the Islamic ideology which regulates inter-state relations. According to the regulation of Dar-al Islam (Muslims living under the law of Islam) and Dar-al Harb. (applies to the Infidels who lives outside the law of Islam, which Muslims are at war)⁴⁶ For those who were not Muslim, Ottoman Empire could not have multilateral relations. As M.S. Anderson explains;

⁴⁵ Nuri Yurdusev, The Ottoman Attitude toward Diplomacy Pelgrave in *The Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional* Ed. By Nuri Yurdusev (New York : Pelgrave, 2004), 6.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

(...) The Ottoman Government also, in control of a huge territory and the greatest military sources in Europe and buttressed by an unshakable sense of superiority to the entire Christian world, felt no need at all in the sixteenth century for organized diplomatic relations with that world. It was not seriously to feel any such need, indeed, for almost three centuries to come.”⁴⁷

However despite the fact that this approach to the application of the Ottoman Diplomacy did not directly subjected to the Islamic doctrine for entire duration of the Empire. Nuri Yurdusev also argues that the Ottoman Empire was in theory an Islamic state in theory.

“Officially speaking, the Ottoman Empire was claimed to be an Islamic system. Ottoman Rulers always championed themselves for defending the cause of Islam. In theory they always tried to observe Islamic rules via *fetva*, the declaration that whatever was done was compatible with the rules of Islam, Issued by the Grand Mufti, Sheik ul-Islam. Ottoman rulers repeatedly made it known that they could go war when they were attacked and Islam was insulted. They considered themselves to be the servants and protectors of Islam.”⁴⁸

However he also argues that in the practice it also had some degree of pragmatism. While the Islamic regulations were the part of the system, customary law and other local laws were much respected.⁴⁹ The Ottomans had created a hybrid system where local customs, traditional Turkic laws and Islamic pretext were applied coherently. This might be one of the examples of peaceful coexistence of Muslims and Christians in the Balkans until 19th century.

However it is still a fact that the Ottomans did not send permanent representations to Europe, yet, permanent representatives from European Powers were welcomed.⁵⁰ This proves that the Ottoman Empire conducted diplomatic relations with the Western counterparts in their own land. Therefore, the Ottomans had

⁴⁷ M. S. Anderson *The Rise of Modern.*, 9.

⁴⁸ Nuri Yurdusev, 14.

⁴⁹ Ibid, 14-15.

⁵⁰ Ibid, 3.

contact with the European infidels without breaking the Islamic law. There were European permanent representatives in Istanbul for a long time. The best example was the Venetian “balio”. Venetian neighbourhood of contemporary Galata area of Istanbul is founded by an agreement between emperor Aleksios Komnenos I and the Venetians due to their contribution for the war against the Normans.⁵¹ After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, an agreement reached between the Republic of Venice and the Ottomans, as a result Venice gained the right to have a permanent representative in Istanbul.⁵² Therefore, the “balio” who served for the protection of the Venetian expat in Byzantine Constantinople kept its role in the Ottoman Empire’s Istanbul. Bartelemy Marcelo was appointed as the Venetian balio in 1454; he was later followed by France’s resident representative Jean de la Foret in 1535, England’s representative William Harborne in 1583 and Cornelius Haga of the Netherlands in 1612.⁵⁴

While the Ottoman Empire did not have permanent representations abroad until late 18th century, Ottoman diplomacy was still active. Orhan Ghazi (r. 1326-1362), who was the son of Osman Ghazi, was conducting diplomatic relations with the Byzantine Empire which was predominantly Orthodox Christian. One of the early diplomatic actions of Orhan Ghazi was his marriage with the daughter of Emperor Kantakuzinos in 1346.⁵⁵ This marriage comes after the civil war in the Byzantine Empire, where both sides, Empress Anna and Kantakuzinos, appealed for the help of Orhan Ghazi. Orhan accepted the offer of Kantakuzinos and married with his daughter.⁵⁶ Therefore Orhan gained higher hand since his father-in-law was the

⁵¹ Tomasso Bertelé, *Venedik ve Konstantiniye. Tarihte Osmanlı-Venedik İlişkileri* Translated by Mahmut H. Şakioğlu (Istanbul : Kitap Yayınevi, 2012), 31.

⁵² Ibid., 47.

⁵³ Onur Kınılı *Osmanlı’da Modernleşme ve Diplomasi* (Ankara : Imge Kitabevi, 2006) 80.

⁵⁴ Bulent Arı. Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period., in *Ottoman Diplomacy Conventional or Unconventional*.Ed. By Nuri Yurdusev (New York : Pelgrave Macmillian, 2004), 39.

⁵⁵ Kemal Girgin. *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Teşkilatımız Teşkilat ve Protokol*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), 37-38.

⁵⁶ Lord Eversley and Sir Valentine Chirol *The Turkish Empire From 1288 to 1914* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1969), 26-27.

Emperor of the Byzantine Empire who gained the throne by the help of him. Ottoman's had a good relation with the Byzantines at the time, these good relations were resulted with the annexation of the *Çimpe* castle in Gallipoli where Ottoman's started to realise their ambition towards the West. The following Sultan after Orhan, Murad I (r.1362 – 1389) mostly secured the Ottoman presence in the Balkans. In diplomatic terms his agreement with the Ragusa was quite important because he granted the rights to continue the trade in 1365,⁵⁷ where Ottomans seeking upper hand against Genoa and Venice. As the Empire grew after the conquest of Constantinople, Mehmed II (r. 1444-1446; 1451 – 1481) was subjected to growing understanding of the diplomacy at time. Mehmed II not only re-granted the rights of the Venetian balio in Istanbul to represent the rights of Italian merchants, he also granted immediate capitulations, by re-admitting the existing agreements between the Byzantine Empire and Italian city states.⁵⁸ Another important diplomatic event of the time was the Cem Sultan affair between Pope Innocent VIII (r.1484-1492) and Bayezid II (r.1481-1512). Cem Sultan was younger son of Mehmet II, who claimed the throne before the Bayezid II after their father died despite Bayezid had the priority in the line of succession. Eventually Bayezid II claimed the throne with the help of Janissaries. Later, Cem Sultan was held by Knights of Rhodes and by Papacy in Rome. Halil İnalcık mentions that Mustafa Pasha was sent by Bayezid II as ambassador to Rome in order to solve the problem and conduct relations on Cem Sultan in 1489-1490 in order to prevent him from releasing.⁵⁹ Last, but not least, the agreement reached between François I and Suleiman the Magnificent which was explained above. Therefore, it is impossible to decouple the Ottoman Empire from the diplomatic atmosphere of the time. Despite the Islamic ideology on conducting foreign relations, Ottoman Diplomacy in the classical era was active. This activeness did not necessitate for Ottomans to adopt the European “ways” of diplomacy. The

⁵⁷ -Kemal Girgin. *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet.*, 38-39.

⁵⁸ Nuri Yurdusev *The Ottoman Attitude.*, 15-16

⁵⁹ Halil İnalcık “a Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II on Djem Sultan” “in *The Ottoman Diplomacy: Conventional or Unconventional.* (New York : Pelgrave Macmillian, 2004), 67.

most important indicator of such understanding was the lack of Ottoman permanent representation abroad, while permanent representation was welcomed in to the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Therefore, unlike the European practice of the time, early diplomatic missions of the Ottoman Empire conducted on “ad hoc” basis with special envoys which these people travelled abroad for many times.⁶⁰

3.4. Conclusion

The Ottoman Empire was founded as a border principality of the Anatolian Seljuks. The fundamental basis for the fight in the name of the Islam defines the main motivation for the Ottoman Empire’s diplomacy and foreign policy for a certain period. Osman Bey, as a warrior himself, led his army of *Ghazi* warriors against the infidel Byzantine. During this period, as the Empire had been transformed from a border principality to a full Empire, its foreign relations required variations in terms of the application of diplomacy. While empowering its religious background, the Ottoman Empire was also following the concept of pragmatism and had diplomatic relations. Having a powerful military was an effective foreign policy tool for the Ottomans during the expansion period.

However starting from the early 18th century, traditional understanding of policymaking for the Ottoman Empire started to be challenged by its adversaries. By the 18th century Ottoman Empire started to lose its territories. The late 17th and early 18th century wars with Austrian Habsburgs, Venetians, Poles and Russians were resulted in the treaties of Karlowitz in 1699, Passarowitz in 1718 and Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. The Ottomans lost the territories they had conquered in the name of Islam as the result of these treaties. The decline period after the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683 forced the Ottomans to recognize the conventional method of foreign policy making was not applicable as it had been before. During the 17th-18th centuries, the Ottoman Empire was still a powerful Empire however

⁶⁰ Onur Kınlı, *Osmanlıda Modernleşme.*, 3.

it was becoming more and more vulnerable against the foreign threat coming from Europe.

The reason behind this chapter is to define the background for the Ottoman History which had a legacy on the change in the Ottoman diplomacy before going into modernization/Europeanization. The Ottoman Empire's diplomacy and foreign policy understanding had some differences with those of the European counterparts of the time. The modern sense of diplomacy that emerged in medieval Italy which depends on reciprocity was not employed in the Ottoman Empire mainly because Ottoman Empire did not require it. The Empire had positioned itself above the other states due to its understanding of Islamic superiority. The Islamic superiority collides with a powerful army, providing the necessary reasoning for the Ottoman Empire not to have reciprocity based diplomacy in its own name.

However there were also two important points on the issue. Firstly, Ottoman Empire welcomed the permanent representatives from other countries and secondly it had diplomatic relations with its enemies by not arrogantly rejecting an advantageous political position due to its Islamic ideology. The best example of such understanding was the agreement between Suleiman the Magnificent and François I. Sultan Suleiman did not miss the chance to counter balance the Habsburg aggression by forming an alliance and granting economic privileges to France. Therefore, Ottoman Empire did not reject the establishment of a diplomatic relation with other nations.

Yet, as the Empire started to lose its military and political leverage towards its Western enemies, reform became the case for the Ottoman Empire. That's the reason why the Ottoman Empire changed its policy on not sending permanent representatives and dispatched its own permanent representations in late 18th century.

CHAPTER IV

REFORM/EUROPEANIZATION AND THE OTTOMAN DIPLOMACY

4.1 Introduction

In this thesis, the Ottoman Europeanization concept is regarded as a mean of westernization/modernization of the traditional Ottoman State institutions. Therefore before going into the details it is important to define the Europeanization in a broad sense. The Europeanization is widely accepted as the recognition of the change for those candidate countries before they were admitted to the European Union. In this thesis, Europeanization is also used for a broad term for the Ottoman Modernization.

However it is beneficial to define theoretical Europeanization since it had certain similarities and differences compared to the Ottoman Modernization/Reform/Transformation that is also referred as Europeanization in this thesis. The Europeanization was defined by Reuben Wong as a term generally refers to political and policy changes caused by the impact of membership in the European Union on Member States.⁶¹ It is also added that Europeanization is a top-down process as policies were designed in the higher level then implemented in the national level.⁶² Secondly, Europeanization is national adaptation of certain issues for greater good of the rest of the Europe. This was a bottom-to-top approach to

⁶¹ Reuben Wong “The Europeanization of Foreign Policy” in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith Ed., *International Relations and the European Union* (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2005), 135.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 136.

the Europeanization which people, not the state, actually are the driving force behind the Europeanization.⁶³ Third approach is the creation of a common identity.⁶⁴ Fourth is the modernization defined in political, economic and social modernization aspects mobilized for EU membership⁶⁵ and lastly it was defined as policy isophormism which enables different members to adopt similar policies in order to achieve certain purpose.⁶⁶ The Ottoman Europeanization might be categorized under the modernization pillar of the Europeanization as it was defined at the theoretical level. The Ottoman Europeanization is a form of modernization that was applied under the concept of Westernization. During the Ottoman modernization period the European Union was a dream. However it is still a fact that there was a common European legal system that defined the complex structure of the states and how they had dealt with the issues in their hands. Integration to that system for a certain degree was compatible for the theoretical Europeanization. Additionally, Ottoman Europeanization is also subject to a top-down approach as in the theoretical definition. However these similarities do not necessarily mean that the Ottoman Europeanization is directly comparable with the theoretical Europeanization. Ottoman reform/modernization was applied by modeling the current European system at the time instead of policy application as it was defined in theoretical Europeanization. Ottoman Empire was in close contact with Europe, therefore the modernization of the Ottoman Empire was conducted within the framework of the Westernization.

While the Empire was enjoying its prime time, the Westernization did not emerge as a necessity. However as the decay of the Empire started, especially in the military, reform became an important insight for the Ottoman Empire both in military and diplomatic services. The idea of modern derives from the Latin where the word “modernus” defines the difference between “new” Christians and

⁶³ Ibid., 137.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 138.

⁶⁵ Ibid., 139.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

“old” pagans.⁶⁷ Technically this term had been reapplied whenever there was a dialectical clash of new and old in history. In the late 18th century when the enlightenment challenged the religious universality and promoted positive sciences as the old and new concept, the idea of westerners which argues that the West was superior since it was empowering the rationality and positive sciences to the rest emerged as the new “new”.⁶⁸ The reason why the modernization had been connected with the West is because of the fundamental and deeply-rooted transformation occurred in Western Europe and Northern America.⁶⁹ This transformation was related with technological innovations and geographical discoveries. Additionally the collected knowledge until the 18th century was supported with education and positive sciences, and eventually with factorization to increase the speed of transformation.⁷⁰

The modernization in the Ottoman Empire is explained by Celal Metin, within the framework of Cyril E. Black.⁷¹ In this framework, the Ottoman Empire is recognized under the “societies which are modernizing, without direct influence from outside yet under the influence of these societies which were modernized beforehand.”⁷² The countries which are categorized under this title had long bureaucratic traditions, were unified with a tradition of state despite they were subject to foreign aggression and were not fully occupied and/or colonized. The modernization was employed to change the state system and it was carried by a leader who came to power with the traditional ways. Yet once they reached to power, the idea of traditionalism resurfaced in their minds, therefore they cannot

⁶⁷ Celal Metin, *Emperyalist Çağda..* 23.

⁶⁸ Ibid. 23-24.

⁶⁹ Ibid., 25.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 25.

⁷¹ For Further information Cyril E Black *The dynamics of modernization : a study in comparative history* (New York : Harper & Row, 1967) c1966.

⁷² Celal Metin *Emperyalist Çağda..* 61.

effort to continue to reform despite of traditional ways which put them once in the power.⁷³

The Ottoman modernization had similarities with this approach. First, the Ottoman Empire had significant state traditions, even though the Ottoman Empire was at war with the West, it had not been fully occupied until the First World War. Second, the incentive of change came from capable sultans and their political elite. Additionally, the Ottoman Empire started modernization only after the 18th century with the means of Europe such as military technologies, military tactics and reciprocity based foreign policy institutions system because it was the closest example of society which had been modernized before the Ottomans, meaning there was an entity to be modeled or influenced by as it was explained in Cyril Black's approach. Therefore, Europeanization was the main course of modernization in the Ottoman Empire.

In the Ottoman Empire, modernization should be considered within this context. The Ottoman military became the starting point of transformation and modernization. Ercümen Kuran recognizes the army as the first institution to be modernized, because standing against the technological superiority of the armies of Europe in the 18th century was only possible with an army that employed European ways of war.⁷⁴ While Europe was presenting its civilization as unique and superior with its technological advancement, the Ottoman Empire started to modernize the army by modeling Europe.⁷⁵ In this context "Westernization" emerged after the devastating defeat at the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683, by recognizing the necessity of change in the army because of the defeat, later this

⁷³ Cyril E. Black. *Çağdaşlaşmanın İtici Güçleri* Translated by Farih Gümüş Verso Yayınları Ankara 1989. Quoted in "Celal Metin, *Emperyalist Çağda Modernleşme Türk modernleşmesi ve İran (1800-1941)*(Ankara : Phoenix Publishing, 2011), 61.

⁷⁴ Ercümen Kuran. *Türk Ordusu ve Batılılaşma* Türk Kültürü Dergisi August 1964. in "*Batılılaşma veya Çağdaşlaşma*" in Ahmet Köklügiller ed. IQ (Istanbul: Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 2009), 159.

⁷⁵ Ahmet Kolbaşı. "XIX Yüzyıl Osmanlı Yenileşmesi ve Değişimi Üzerine Kavramsal Yaklaşım. In *Tarih Boyunca Yenileşme Hareketleri*". in *Nizam-ı Cedid Başlangıcının 220.yılı Münasebetiyle* Edited by Mehmet Ali Beyhan (Istanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2014), 5.

attempt became the outlet of future definition of Turkish modernization.⁷⁶ Selim III and Mahmud II were recognized as the progressive leaders of the Ottoman modernization by Metin Heper.⁷⁷ He also adds that new world view had emerged in the Ottoman Empire which accepted the superiority of the Europe.⁷⁸ Another important point in this debate is the role of the religion. Religious/traditionalist resistance to the Ottoman modernization is a case as it would be examined in this thesis. As Metin Heper examines, reform/religion axis was also important in the Ottoman Empire and he names this concept as dual-institutionalism.⁷⁹ In this context religion and secular based institutions coexisted in the Ottoman Empire such as *Madrasa* schools where there was a religion based education and secular schools of military engineering. Within this framework, first attempts of reform/Europeanization of the Ottoman Army sought the justification of Islamic institutions while borrowing new technologies from Europe.⁸⁰ In case the borrowing from the Europe was kept limited, Islamic institutions could tolerate the reform in the military, because, “*Sharia* permitted Muslims to use the enemies’ tricks to overcome them.”⁸¹ This approach should not necessarily mean that the army was a fully secular organization beforehand; rather newly introduced reforms had a secular sense. Additionally in the Metin Heper’s words, “But when the borrowing increased, even in the military, the limits of what could be tolerated by the Islamic traditions were quickly reached.”⁸² Because while borrowing from the Europe to enrich the army; military sciences, training

⁷⁶ Kolbaşı, 6.

⁷⁷ Metin Heper. *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State. An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition.* (Ann Arbor Michigan : University Microfilms A XEROX company, 1971), 96.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 100.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Halil İnalçık [“Turkey: the Nature of Traditional Society” p.49] Quoted in Metin Heper. *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman Turkish State. An Analysis of the Emergence and Development of a Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition.* (Ann Arbor Michigan : University Microfilms A XEROX company, 1971), 101.

⁸² Ibid.

procedures and uniforms of Europe should have also been borrowed, however this conflicted with the idea of Islamic superiority.⁸³ Challenging the understanding of Islamic superiority should be considered as the part of the traditional side of the army. And it also raises the question of how the army of the true believers could fight the holy war of Islam against the infidel with the means of the infidel?

The modernization and the reform of the Ottoman Empire were conducted by modeling the European system. The modeling of the European system was initiated by the sultans and the Ottoman ruling elites in the institutions such as the army and the foreign ministry. The *Nizam-ı Cedid* was established by Selim III as the first attempt of modernization in the military, since the army was the main policy tool of the Ottoman state system. It was believed if the army was westernized; it would be used as leverage for reforming the entire state system. Simply once the army was reformed, because it was the primary source of Ottoman foreign policy, the application of the state policies would change as well and this would eventually halt the decay of the Empire. Considering this fact the Ottoman modernization could be accepted as a top-down process. Yet before going into further details with the modernization of the army, the change in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy would be considered.

4.2 Diplomacy in the Transition Period

4.2.1 Why Change?

By the 17th century, the victories that fed the fundamental principle of warrior based Empire started to back fire. Ottoman conquest, of Crete over Venetians

⁸³ Ibid.

might be the only significant conquest because Crete was a guarding point for Istanbul – Egypt trade.⁸⁴ However, the war in the Balkans, especially the second failure in Vienna in 1683, resulted with a total devastation for the Ottoman army since in the first siege of Vienna in 1529 the army could be kept protected while withdrawing, yet, in the second siege the army was persuaded by the Habsburgs to Hungary.⁸⁵ After the Second Vienna Siege Europeans realized the Ottoman Empire’s weakness and they “moved to take advantage of it”.⁸⁶ Ottomans, unlike their European enemies, did not have the economic means to support such expensive spending on chancing military technologies.⁸⁷ The decline would eventually bring the urge of reform in the Empire. It is not to be forgotten that the decline did not happened over a night, Bernard Shaw say’s the decline “was a gradual one”.⁸⁸

Şerif Mardin explains “During the rising period of the Ottoman Empire, Ottomans accepted their civilization as the superior one therefore, following Europe as a “model” did not emerged as an issue” and he adds on the other hand “while the Empire was declining, the question of why the Empire is decaying is answered either by defining the problem of corruption within the state or recognizing the military superiority of the West.”⁸⁹

The military dominance of the Ottoman Empire was sustainable only for a while during the decline period. Yet, the Ottomans started to lose their technological superiority over the enemies. Halil Inalcık argues that, Austria-German armies have been superior against the Ottomans in the Austria-Ottoman wars of the 18th

⁸⁴ Suraiya Faroqhi, *The Otoman Empire: Short History.*, 92.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 93.

⁸⁶ Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789 – 1807.*(Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,1971), 6.

⁸⁷ Donald Quartaert, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu 1700-1922* (Istanbul : İletişim Yayınları, 2013), 74.

⁸⁸ Stanford Shaw *Between old and New.*, 169.

⁸⁹ Şerif Mardin *Türk Modernleşmesi Makaleler* Ed. by Mümtazer Türköne / Tuncay Önder. (İletişim Yayınları, 2012) 9-10.

century due to the “military revolution”. Rifles that shoot rotating bullets, recruiting soldiers among citizens, city walls reinforced with artillery fire, quality produced steel and gunpowder were some of the inventions of the military revolution.⁹⁰ This had broken the power balance in favour of the enemies of the Ottoman Empire. Ottomans were now facing an enemy which they could not cope with. Stanford Shaw recognizes this as following;

“The process of decentralization and decline was as complicated as was the structure affected. Much was, indeed, internal, within the Ottoman body politic itself. But also at work were conditions and developments outside the Empire, outside the ability of even the ablest sultans and ministers and most efficient of bureaucrats to control or remedy: the increasing power of the nation states of Europe, whose political, economic, military and cultural advances in particular left them far stronger than what great fifteenth and sixteenth century sultans had faced, thus requiring the Empire not only to regain what it had but to advance and develop if it was not to fall further behind.”⁹¹

In general, considering the fall of the Empire, the rise of diplomacy and increasing number of military defeats goes hand in hand. Ottoman Empire always had the military means to dictate its interests. İsmail Yeşil argues that, the approach that necessitates Ottomans to pursuit diplomacy along with military iron fist could be understood by the army’s lack of capability to dictate the interest of Istanbul over the enemies.⁹² Ottoman Empire’s transformation from its traditional sense of diplomacy is the result of decay of its might and decline in almost any given areas.

⁹⁰ Halil İnalçık. *Devlet-i Aliye Osmanlı İmparatorluğu üzerine araştırmalar volume II* (Istanbul : Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014), 6.

⁹¹ Stanford Shaw, *Between Old and New.*, 169.

⁹² İsmail Yeşil. *Bir Osmanlı Gözüyle Avrupa Siyasetinde Güç Oyunu* (Istanbul: Kitabevi Osmanlı Tarihi Kaynakları 14., 2012), X-XI.

4.2.2 What Changed?

The transformation during the late 17th and 18th century was very crucial for the Ottoman Diplomacy. During this period, a number of treaties with western enemies of the Ottoman Empire defines the inclusion of the Empire to the European state system for a certain degree. The first of such treaties was the Treaty of Karlowitz. Apart from other important points of the treaty, which will be held in the following parts, Treaty of Karlowitz defines the point where the Ottoman's attended a peace multilateral peace conference, instead of conducting bilateral talks with those the Empire had a superior position with.⁹³ The Treaty of Karlowitz marked a point in time because it represented the ending of an era where Ottoman foreign policy understanding depended on of expansion on an ever-expanding frontier was challenged by a decisive military defeat.⁹⁴ With this treaty, the Ottoman Empire realized the limits of its territorial expansion and recognized Europeans as equals⁹⁵ and it came to terms with the European legal system. During this period Ottoman bureaucrats and ruling elite recognized the importance of comprehending European legal structure and started to "adopt the European mode of international relations."⁹⁶ the adaptation of bureaucratic (Kalemiye) system instead of military leaders (Seyfiye) was one of the pillars of this transformation. From the Treaty of Karlowitz it could be seen that the integration of the Ottoman Empire in European legal system increased. The Ottomans were aware for a certain degree of European legal system for example the principle of *uti possidetis* (as one possess) applied in the treaties before Karlowitz.⁹⁷ Additionally, the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 included that

⁹³ Mustafa S. Palabıyık "The Emergence of the Idea of 'International Law' in the Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of Paris (1856)" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 233–251 (2014), 236.

⁹⁴ Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj *Ottoman Diplomacy at Karlowitz* Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1967), pp. 498-512.

⁹⁵ Virgina Aksan *Ahmed Resmi Efendi. Savaşta ve Barışta Bir Osmanlı Devlet Adamı 1700-1783* (Istanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997), 25.

⁹⁶ Mustafa S. Palabıyık, 237.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

principle with a reference that it was also used in the Treaty of Karlowitz.⁹⁸ Apart from having connections with already existed legal framework, the agreement between Ahmed II and Russian Tsar Peter I in 1720 defines a “lasting peace” between two realms.⁹⁹ This is a very important point, since it contradicts with the concept ongoing war understanding of Islam with the “infidel”. In this point we must remember the concept of “law of Islam” and “law of others”¹⁰⁰ which it is expected to force Ottomans to follow a religious approach to the foreign policy instead of a pragmatic one. However in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy pragmatism was also the case.¹⁰¹ The religious approach was applied in the early diplomatic life of the Ottoman Empire, however as the Empire grew it bend some rules in preference to the political gains in the field within the framework of pragmatism as it was explained above. 19 years after the agreement reached with Russians, another agreement was concluded with Habsburg in Belgrade also defines the “lasting peace” concept, yet this time it had a time limit of 25 years.¹⁰² Another point during this period was the Treaty of Sistova on 1791 where the Ottoman not only had the concept of *uti possidetis* but also *status quo ante bellum* (the status quo before the war) was also employed.¹⁰³ These are the point that mainly challenged the traditional understanding of the Ottoman Diplomacy and foreign policy at the time.

By the 18th century, as Findley explains, European expansionism, started to threaten all Muslim world including the Ottomans. As the epicentre of the Muslim world, the Ottomans started to realize the necessity of change, especially after the devastation caused by Russian and Austrian defeats in the second half of the 18th century. During this period, Ottoman ruling elite realized “the seriousness of the

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 237.

¹⁰⁰ A. Nuri Yurdusev, *The Ottoman Diplomacy.*, 6.

¹⁰¹ Ibid, 6-7

¹⁰² Mustafa S. Palabiyık, 237.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 238.

issue” and the need for how to play the game of European infidels with their own methods in order to overcome them.¹⁰⁴ Ahmed Resmi, who was a diplomat in the negotiations of the Treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca and one of the prominent members of the ruling elite of the Empire by the 18th century, realized the need for change and modernization in the Empire. Suraiya Faroqhi explains the role of the Ottoman elite in the recognizing the necessity of change as following

“By contrast (Here Faroqhi compares with the religious, traditionalist elite), members of the Ottoman Upper Class such as aforementioned Ahmed Resmi, had a very pragmatic attitude. In order to emerge victorious once again, they reasoned, they would first have to compensate for previous political and military errors. The result was a demand for strategic and tactical reform. But diplomacy also gained importance, so as to anticipate the shifting alliances that were so typical of European politics.”¹⁰⁵

Recognition of need for change in the political and diplomatic chambers of the Empire emerged as a must. In this sense the events after the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699 was important because using the member of Ottoman bureaucrats (Kalemiye) to conduct negotiations were some of the early changes toward a modernized/European system of policy making since state official were used within a bureaucratic manner as in the European States.¹⁰⁶ Through these events, “integration with European system was accelerated”,¹⁰⁷ this was one of the purposes of modernization of the Ottoman Empire. This can be considered as first attempts to modernization/Europeanization in terms of policy making and application in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire.

Feroz Ahmad, recognizes the urge of change in the Ottoman Empire, He also emphasizes the importance of the Sultans, and some able statesmen such as Grand

¹⁰⁴ Carter Findlay *Kalemiyeden Mülkiyeye Osmanlı Memurlarının Toplumsal Tarihi* (Istanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2011), 20.

¹⁰⁵ Suraiya Faroqhi. 112-113.

¹⁰⁶ Virginia Aksan *Ahmed Resmi Efendi. Savaşta ..* 49.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

Viziers from Sokullu and Köprülü families. But he adds, not only the declining profile of the Sultans but also, political past of the Empire and its socioeconomic structure are also important factors for decline. Being unable to have an imperial currency which will withstand against growing Atlantic trade and did not having a well-functioning land and taxation regime are other reasons for decline. He also recognizes the attempt of reform in the Empire which only postponed the fall for a certain period of time.¹⁰⁸ However, early Europeanization of the 18th century was mimicking the way of life in Europe instead of offering solutions to the important problems in the first place. The import of clocks and European furniture is a good example for the situation.¹⁰⁹ And this was a “superficial Europeanization”.¹¹⁰

The bright side of the picture is the Europeanization of the ruling elite for a certain degree. In the same book, Feroz Ahmad argues that ruling elite was making trips to Europe and especially to France¹¹¹ and they tried to apply what they saw to the Empire. This helped the Ottoman elite to understand the fundamental basis of the superiority of the European and to realize that important changes must be done in their own system.¹¹² This resembles of one of the pillars of the Europeanization which is, being in contact with Europe. The reform in the Ottoman Empire was always subjected to backlash from the traditionalists. This was a quite understandable concept as we can deduce from Stanford Shaw’s book; in the 18th century, the Ottoman elites were in close contact with foreigners and this contact was increasing. The Ottoman elites had the chance to see how Europeans live; European expats came to the Empire with considerable amount of information on Europe. However these contacts were undermined by both the rulers and majority of the subjects. Because as Shaw also explains, these information “did not fit into the patterns of life and thought of even the most well

¹⁰⁸ Feroz Ahmad. *Modern Türkiye'nin Oluşumu* (Kaynak Yayınları, 2012) 34-35.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 35.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

educated Ottomans, so its effect was “superficial at best.”¹¹³ While the ruling elite was growing an appetite for the Europeanization, traditionalist especially the military was against this change.

One of the key aspects of this bureaucratic transformation collides with the period when the Ottoman Diplomacy was conducted with “ad hoc” diplomats, and *sefaretnames* which are written by them documents were the daily records of Ottoman diplomats who were sent to the European capitals for a short period of time and for a certain issue. One of those diplomats called “Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi” wrote a *sefaretname* during his service in Paris in 1720, which is a good example of understanding such diplomacy.¹¹⁴ In the *sefaretnames* the diplomats were observing the capital they were assigned to. They were obliged to report back to Istanbul about the developments in various fields including the military advancements. Additionally they also reported the daily living conditions about the post they were sent. The issues that the Ottoman diplomats were sent abroad for varies in a broad scale; announcing a new sultan’s rise to throne, representation in coronation days for European rulers, transferring the agreements, rapprochement with enemies, settlement of border disputes, sniffing the air for new alliance opportunities, transferring letters etc.¹¹⁵ Some of the “ad hoc” diplomats served for time periods close to one or two years however they were not permanent representatives in the modern sense.

These “ad hoc” diplomats were rewarded with a local title before going abroad for their service. These ranks or *payes* were given only for the duration of their official duties. The sense of not having a fully functioning foreign office system resulted with relatively random selected diplomats coming from variety of backgrounds during this period. However the language ability was considered as an important asset. The number of people that was escorting to these diplomats

¹¹³ Stanford Shaw *Between Old and New.*, 7.

¹¹⁴ For further information Şevket Rado *Paris’te Bir Osmanlı Sefiri: Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi’nin Fransa Sefaretnamesi* (Istanbul : Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014)

¹¹⁵ Temel İskit, 149-150.

varies and there were no certain knowledge about it. When a diplomat was appointed for the duty, he officially came into by the presence sultan and wear robes (*Hilat*) for duty.¹¹⁶ The robe was the official indicator of being an officer in the Ottoman administration. Ad Hoc diplomats were the examples for post modernization period of Ottoman diplomacy and foreign policy making tools. These people were the product of an era that Ottoman enjoyed superiority against its Western enemies.

Before the 18th century as it was explained military power was the one of the resourceful means of diplomacy and foreign policy for the Ottomans. This was challenged after the Second Vienna siege as it was explained earlier in the text. Until the second Vienna siege, using military action or warfare was seen as the most important way of settling disputes.¹¹⁷ But, by the 18th century, the role of the diplomacy started to grow in the Ottoman Empire. Especially an official's role in the Ottoman Court started to shine as the person for in charge of the Foreign Affairs. That person was the *Reis-ül-küttap*. (Chief of the Clerks)¹¹⁸ The *Reis-ül-küttap* was the head of the clerks of the Ottoman Empire, he was positioned under the *Vezir-i azam* (*grand vizier*) in the imperial court.¹¹⁹ *Reis-ül-küttap* was also responsible with the correspondence in the Empire, additionally in the cases of negotiations such as those between 1672-73 Franco-Ottoman negotiations on capitulations; *Reis-ül-küttap* was employed.¹²⁰

The office of the *Reis-ül-küttap* was one of the three offices under the grand vizier of the Ottoman Sultan. There was also *Kahya bey* (interior) and *Cavus basi* (law

¹¹⁶ Ibid. 152-153. Also see Mehmet Zeki Pakalın. *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü I* (Istanbul: M.E.B. Yayınları, 2004) 883-884.

¹¹⁷ Ri'fat. A. Abou-El-Haj, "Ottoman Diplomacy in Karlowitz" *Journal of the American Oriental Society*" Vol. 87, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1967), 498-512.

¹¹⁸ Carter Findley "The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry" *International journal of Middle East Studies*. Vol.1, No.4 (Oct, 1970), 334-357, 336.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

¹²⁰ İbrahim Yıldırım *Osmanlı Devleti'nde Elçi Kabulleri* (Kitap Yayınevi, 2014), 42.

enforcement).¹²¹ *Reis-ül-küttap* was responsible for the correspondence of the imperial court, preparing reports for sultan and mainly doing the chancery of the Empire before his role in the foreign affairs had been expanded.¹²² His role in the foreign policy emerged during the Karlowitz negotiations. Grand Vizier, appointed *Reis-ül-küttap* to conduct negotiations, later this became a custom for Ottoman Diplomacy.¹²³ The function of the office of the *Reis-ül-küttap* is briefly summarized by carter Findley as following;

In this way, (Becoming involved with foreign affairs) while the *reis effendi* (shortened version of *Reis-ül-küttap*) acquired some of the functions of a Foreign Minister, he continued to be a man of multiple capacities. This fact was also reflected in the miscellaneous character of the offices under his supervision (...) *Beylikçi* office was charged with the issuing and recording of a great variety of documents having to do with most of the non-financial affairs of the state. (...) *Tahvil* office (...) issued and recorded warrants for the investiture of provincial governors, the most important of the provincial judicial officials, and other, including holders of the various types of essentially feudal landholdings. The *Rü'us* office had charge over warrants by which appointments were granted to many other servants of the state, including the personnel of the offices here under discussion and certain pension were granted.¹²⁴

The office of the Reis-ül Küttab was the most likely institution in the Ottoman Diplomacy that had similarities with the ministry of foreign affairs' of the European states. Yet it is not the same because as the person responsible for diplomatic correspondance. The *Reis-ül Küttap* was not a part of imperial divan.

¹²¹ Carter Findley, 336.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Halil İnalçık "Reis-ül-Küttab" İslam Ansikolpedisi, Vol IX p682 Quoted in Carter Findley The Legacy of Tradition to Reform: Origins of the Ottoman Foreign Ministry "*International journal of Middle East Studies*". Vol.1, No.4 (Oct, 1970), 334-357

¹²⁴ Carter Findley, *The legacy of tradition* 336-337.

4.3 Selim III Era in the Transformation of the Ottoman Empire

The reform of the Ottoman Empire under Selim III is definitely the marking point in the reform history of Ottoman Empire. Norman Stone accepts that first deliberate westernization starts with Selim III.¹²⁵ The events and issues that forced the Ottoman Empire to modernization are explained above. These modernization attempts were both directed to the army and the foreign service of the Ottoman Empire. Selim III's first encounter with the concept of modernization and Europeanization was when he was the heir apparent. He had relatively free living environment compared to the other heirs to the Ottoman Throne. He had close connections with foreign expats in Istanbul. His doctor Lorenzo helped him to have connections with the French Embassy.¹²⁶ According to Gül Akyılmaz, there were two important aspects of his connection with France. First, Selim III's demand for help from France for his reforms in the form of military expertise, and second is a new foreign policy understanding since Selim III sought France's help while fighting against Russia¹²⁷ until the France invasion of Egypt in 1798. But, in general, Selim III had good relations with the French, since he was corresponding with both France's king and ambassador of France.¹²⁸

On the other hand, The military was the primary object for the Ottoman Empire, therefore it is not surprising that Selim III 's reform attempts were directed to the military in the first place. Decline of the military might hinder the foreign policy goals of the Ottoman Empire because it was losing almost every battle with its backward army. Ongoing wars with Austria and Russia and Küçük Kaynarca Treaty –where Ottomans lost the first territory with Muslim population which was Crimea- were the sings of declining military power. From this time on, Ottomans

¹²⁵ Norman Stone, *Türkiye Kısa Bir*, 98.

¹²⁶ Stanford Shaw *Between Old and New.*, 32-33.

¹²⁷ Gül Akyılmaz III. *Selim'in Dış Politika Anlayışı ve Diplomasi Reformu Çerçevesinde Batılılaşma Siyaseti* (Türkler Yeni Türkiye Yayınları c.12, 2002), 660.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.* Stanford Shaw *Between Old and...*

recognized that did not have any significant victories on the battle field. Therefore Selim III's motivation to reform the army with the European system is quite understandable. In this context, what was logical for the Ottoman officials to start the reform from the Janissaries was because Janissaries were the primary combative elements of the army. Virginia Aksan gives the example of early modernization attempts especially in the Janissary system as following;

“Selim first attempted to reform the Janissary organization, by appointing a supervisor (*nazır*) to each of the corps, weeding out incompetent officers, and setting the terms of their service at three years. He also created a hierarchy of command, dividing the troops into proper battalions (*orta*) and companies (*bölük*), with the companies assigned cannons or mortars, and each manned by master gunners. New barracks were built, with parade grounds, and drilling with arms was ordered a minimum of two days a week for the Janissary regiments; five days a week for the artillerymen (...)”¹²⁹

Reform attempts were followed by the income regulations and grain rations for the army since there were problems in supplying the troops and the city. Selim III introduced the Grain Administration and ordered granaries to be build, since famine and shortages of grain were causes for several riots in Istanbul.¹³⁰ New gunpowder factories in Istanbul and Azadli were introduced, so Ottoman produced equivalent gunpowder as much as they imported from Netherlands and Great Britain by 1798 according to Aksan.¹³¹

Janissaries were the main opposition against the reform attempts in the military as it included many of the traditionalists. Also not all the Janissaries were full time soldiers, M.S. Simpson explains, by the 18th century most of them were craftsman, they were soldiers in name, their lack of discipline made them a threat in cities especially in the capital, they were conservative and determined to preserve their

¹²⁹Virginia Aksan. *Ottoman Wars* ., 193-194.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 194.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 195.

privileges therefore they were against the reforms.¹³² They had deep roots in the society and they did become a part of the craftsman in the cities where they were garrisoned. Therefore their resistance to the modernization and Europeanization attempts was more likely to get a grip within the Ottoman Society. Faroqi explains the backlash in the reform measures among Janissaries with their economic privileges.

Despite the sultans' interest in initiating structural changes in the military in the early 19th century, opportunities for innovation in this area were severely restricted, as least until 1826. The new technologies required specially trained soldiers, but these soldiers would have competed with the Janissaries, who had close ties to the craftsman in the big cities (...) But the craftsman's ability to eke out a living depended on the tax privileges they enjoyed because of their membership in the military corps, which had evolved into militias the limited economic leeway also explains why the janissaries adamantly opposed all innovations that would have compromised their privileges.¹³³

Therefore introducing the reform and Europeanization to the Ottoman army was a difficult task to perform. While trying to reform current troops, the plan was reducing the number of Janissaries from 50.000 to the half, as, the sultan aimed to increase the efficiency of the troops. Also, the order was given to equip the janissary troops with modern rifles.¹³⁴ By doing so in Shaw's own words, "Thus, the government had a dual purpose – to restore the Janissaries' traditional organization while at the same time getting them to accept new rifles and tactics."¹³⁵ Apart from applying changes to a existing force of Janisaries, establishing a new army was in order for Selim III. This new army is called *Nizam-ı Cedid*.

¹³² M.S. Anderson, *The Eastern Question. 1774-1923 A Study in International Relations* (London : Macmillian St. Martin Pres, 1966), XIV.

¹³³ Suraiya Faroqi, 112.

¹³⁴ Stanford Shaw. *Between Old and..* 119.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

The *Nizam-ı Cedid* army is founded in 1798 first they were estimated as 12.000 men however the real number is lower, almost half were turned out in the barracks called *Levend Cifliđi*.¹³⁶ Later with the help of foreign officers, the army was proven to be powerful especially in the campaign against Napoleon and that was the peak point of the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army. Since the army was the key tool of the Ottoman Diplomacy, *Nizam-ı Cedid's* success was also very important. Despite the opposition from the traditionalists, *Nizam-ı Cedid* proved it's effectiveness in the combat actions even tough it was rarely used in action during 1799 Franco-Ottoman war. During this campaign, 700 of them helped Cezzar Ahmed Pasha (local governor) to defend Gaza, and two thousands of them helped to maintain the blockade in Alexandria with the help of British Navy.¹³⁷ This army served to deal with local rebellions too, however they were subjected to pressure from by the Janissaries and eventually the *Nizam-ı Cedid* army is decommissioned in 1807.¹³⁸

Formation of a new army was a planned, top down and partial Europeanization/reform attempt. Rather than making additional changes within the existing institutions, such as Janissaries, during this period *Nizam-ı Cedid* army emerged as single new entity. These new troops collected around Anatolia instead of Istanbul, because Janissaries were powerful in Istanbul, and they might affect how the new army functioned if they were requited into it. As Aksan exemplifies that it was almost impossible to reform and Europeanize the Janissary troops since they were resisting to any form of reform targeting their established order. They were likely to rebel in the streets and could even demand the beheading of superiors both in the army and the court if they were discontent with them. Therefore, new troops of *Nizam-ı Cedid* were isolated as a precaution in

¹³⁶ Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars..* 196.

¹³⁷ Oral Sander, *Ankanın Yükselişi ve Düşüşü* (Ankara : İmge Kitabevi, 2012), 180.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, 180-181.

places like Levend Çiftliği or Usküdar which were relatively far from the city of Istanbul.¹³⁹

With the *Nizam-ı Cedid* reforms the Empire had a temporary solution to its chronic issue of foreign policy because the army was the main tool for the foreign policy and diplomacy and it was not functioning as it was during the pre 18th century period. *Nizam-ı Cedid* reform was an optimistic attempt to change, for one if the most important foreign policy tool of the Empire. The rise of diplomacy emerged as a necessity as Oral Sander argues, “the state is weak in terms of military therefore in need of diplomacy to protect its land and its independence.”¹⁴⁰ Selim III’s first reform on the field of diplomacy was sending permanent representatives to the European capitals. These representatives were not responsible for “Ad Hoc” events, rather they were sent to represent the Ottoman “State” in the European capitals. Thus, the pillar of reciprocity for modern diplomacy started to get a grip in the Ottoman State.

As it was explained above there were permanent representatives of the world’s great powers in Istanbul. Diplomats who had been appointed by the Sultan for an “Ad Hoc“, situation were used to conduct early diplomatic relations of the Empire. In this way Istanbul knew the situation of allies and foes thank to these diplomats, these diplomats wrote “*seferetnames*” or chronicles in order to send them to Istanbul. In these documents diplomats expressed their impression and the events that took their interest in their appointments.¹⁴¹ These diplomats were also accompanied with non-Muslim translators. Apart from accompanying the ongoing diplomats of the Empire, Greek translators were in close contact with the

¹³⁹ Virginia Aksan, *Ottoman Wars.*, 195-196.

¹⁴⁰ Oral Sander., *Anka...*, 179.

¹⁴¹ Ercümen Kuran. *Avrupa’da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Siyasi Elçilerin Faaliyetleri 1793-1821.* (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları 20 Seri III Sayı A4, 1968), 9.

translators of permanent representatives of the Foreign Embassies in Istanbul too.¹⁴²

Considering all the facts given, it makes sense for Ottoman Empire to shift the traditional understanding to a modern one in the field of diplomacy along with military. This brings us to the establishment of the first permanent representation abroad. The first permanent representative of the Empire was Yusuf Agah Efendi. Yusuf Agah Efendi was sent to London. Despite traditionally good relations, the French revolution and the war in Europe against the French revolutionaries changed the ideology in Istanbul because entire Europe was united against the revolutionaries and the Ottoman did not want to be seen as supportive to French. Therefore first representative was sent to London instead of France as it was expected.¹⁴³

Yusuf Agah Efendi was ordered with the rank of Ambassador and reach to London in December 1793.¹⁴⁴ Next ambassadors would be sent to Prussia and Austria in 1795, Seyyid Ali Efendi was sent to Berlin, and Ibrahim Afif Efendi was sent to Vienna. These appointments were held because France was putting pressure on the Sultan to have a representative in Paris. With the help of the Sultan, Seyyid Ali Efendi was reappointed as the resident diplomat to Paris in September 1796 and Nail Efendi was sent to Berlin.¹⁴⁵ By this time, Ottoman had representatives in four important capitals. The exception was Russia whom the Ottomans saw as the arch enemy at the time. The diplomats before they were sent abroad went through the “*hilat*” ceremony. During this ceremony, officers wore the official robe (*Kaftan*) in order to show that they received the duty; this robe differs from rank to rank in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 13.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 15.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 24.

¹⁴⁶ Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih..* 883-884.

However, the capacity and function of the early Turkish diplomats were rather questionable. The best example for the issue is the anecdote on Seyyid Ali Efendi. He was the ambassador during the French military offensive on Egypt. During this period, France was building an armada in Toulon in Mediterranean coast. Ambassador Seyyid Efendi was aware of the situation and sending reports to Sublime Porte about the movements of Napoleon Bonaparte and the army in Toulon. When Napoleon set sailed from Toulon for unknown location, the news about the conquest of Malta by Napoleon reached Paris. However Seyyid Ali Efendi was conformed by Talleyrand, who was the minister of France's foreign affairs of the era, about there would be no aggression to the Ottoman Lands. Seyyid Ali later received a letter from Istanbul urging him to question the rumors about Egyptian campaign of Napoleon. Seyyid Ali Efendi made an interview with Talleyrand once more and demanded the answers for these rumors. Yet, Talleyrand assured him that there was no need to worry, and he continued: "the campaign is made to conquer Malta only," and "since it was a hub for pirates in the region, Sublime Porte should be happy about it. However, France's troops were landed in Egypt in July 1, 1798. Selim III was furious for the issue and he mentioned "what a donkey he is!"¹⁴⁷; in one of his decrees ¹⁴⁸ about Seyyid Ali Efendi, because he was fooled by Talleyrand, and couldn't predict the aggression of Napoleon to the Ottoman soil.

Between the years 1793-1811, there were total of seven representatives in four European capitals namely; London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin.¹⁴⁹ Thanks to these diplomats, the Sublime Porte was now able to employ European ways to conduct diplomacy and know more about Europe.¹⁵⁰ Additionally, the Muslim personnel

¹⁴⁷ Enver Ziya Karal quoted in Ercümen Kuran. *Avrupa'da Osmanlı İkamet Elçiliklerinin Kuruluşu ve İlk Siyasi Elçilerin Faaliyetleri 1793-1821*. Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları 20 Seri III Sayı A4 Ankara 1968 p31.

¹⁴⁸ Ercümen Kuran *Avrupa'da Osmanlı*., 25-31.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 64.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 65.

of the permanent representatives started to learn foreign languages due to inefficiency of dependence on Greek Translators,¹⁵¹ people who learned foreign languages in the permanent representations would also be utilized in the modernization of Ottoman foreign policy and diplomacy, even their experiences would be utilized during Mahmud II's reign.¹⁵²

Yet, the issue of Greek translators and Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia should be examined very briefly since the issue would be a subject of change in the Ottoman diplomacy in coming years. Greek translators were selected from the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire which generally living in the area called Fener in historic part of the citadel of Istanbul. Phanariot Greeks is a broad term that defines Istanbul's local; Greek, Romanian, Albanian, Islander and Italian rooted noble families who saw themselves as the descendants of the Byzantine Empire.¹⁵³ These families were traditionally dealing with international trade where Ottoman Muslims were reluctant to do, therefore they had knowledge on foreign languages such as Italian and French.¹⁵⁴ Apart from being translators and conducting trade and commerce and being part of the Ottoman Navy due to their capability to speak multiple languages starting from Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730) they were also appointed as the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, between 1711 and 1821.¹⁵⁵ These Princes had utilized their connections throughout Europe and gathered information on the continent¹⁵⁶ for both for their own and they were reporting the information they had gathered to the throne in Istanbul. Thanks to

¹⁵¹ For Further Information on Translators in the Ottoman Empire. Cahit Bilim *Tercüme Odası* <http://dergipark.ulakbim.gov.tr/otam/article/download/5000085743/5000079828> accessed Semptember 2015.

¹⁵² Ercümend Kuran, 65.

¹⁵³ Cafer Çiftçi, "Bab-ı Ali'nin Avrupa'ya Çevrilmiş İki Gözü: Eflak ve Boğdan'da Fenerli Voyvodalar (1711-1821)" *Uluslararası İlişkiler, Cilt 7, Sayı 26 (Yaz 2010)*, 32.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

them, the Empire was following the event in Europe. However by 1821 the Greek rebellion ended the era of Phanariotes' reign in Wallachia and Moldova.

To sum up, the modernization attempts during the Selim III period were not fully applied to the state system. However, Selim III tried to take serious actions by recognizing the need of change. Military's role in the formation and the continuation of the Empire is undeniable, so Selim III was one of the important leaders in the Ottoman Empire introducing the *Nizam-ı Cedid* (new order) as the response to need of change. Therefore, it is only logical to start the reform in the military. The change which was aimed in the traditional organization of the Ottoman army and the establishment of a new fully functioning branch of the army did have different results. While the reform of traditional institutions was almost impossible, if not difficult to implement, establishment of a new army on the other hand, enjoyed a limited amount of success. However it also had to be nullified with backlash from the traditionalists. Even tough Selim III attempts were ambitious, in Oral Sander's words "The weakest side of Selim III is that, he did not had enough courage to insist on his beliefs. If the traditionalists reactions were likely to expand, he did not hesitate to sacrifice the reform attempts in order to save himself".¹⁵⁷ The same issue applies to the reform/Europeanization attempts of the diplomacy and foreign policy making tools. The changed approach towards modernization/Europeanization in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy was suffered by the same issue as it was in the military. Selim III's reign was stopped by traditionalist Kabackı Mustafa's rebellion. There were rumors spreading among the Janisaries saying, if they wore the new *Nizam-ı Cedid* uniforms, which were tailored in the modern European style, they would lost their Islamic belief.¹⁵⁸ When Kabakcı Mustafa marched to Istanbul he made propaganda against the *Nizam-ı Cedid* in order to gather support form those opposed to Selim III and his reforms and attempt of Europeanization. Selim III issued a decree on dissolution of the *Nizam-ı Cedid*, when some of the Ottoman ruling elite supported the rebellion. Additionally some of those members of the elite who supported Selim's

¹⁵⁷ Oral Sander *Anka'nın yükselişi*.. 180.

¹⁵⁸ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi Cilt 5* (Ankara : Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1983), 80-81.

reforms, once changed their sides and fought against him when they saw that the rebellion had enjoyed wide public support. Eventually rebels demanded Selim III's withdrawal from the throne. In 1807 he was replaced with Mustafa IV.¹⁵⁹

4.4 Mahmud II Era in the Transformation of the Ottoman Empire

In the post Selim III period, the main focus was the institutionalization of diplomacy and foreign policy. The most important institutionalism step taken after the rise of the office of "*Reis-ül Küttap*" was in the field of translators. Early diplomatic missions of the Ottoman Empire suffered lack of Muslim officers who did not have enough knowledge in any of the foreign languages. Dependence on Istanbul's Greek population for translation in diplomatic missions became a major issue due to the lack of efficiency and even treasons of these translators.¹⁶⁰ This necessitated Ottoman diplomatic officers to learn foreign languages to become self sufficient when they were stationed in abroad. Learning foreign languages was a pragmatic consequence of the changing political understanding in the Ottoman Empire.

As a successor of Selim III, Mahmud II was the key reformer of the period. Mahmud II's reign was also in turmoil. During this period, the Empire tried to establish control over its local governors, dealt with Greek rebellion in Peloponnesus, and dealt with Kavalalı Mehmed Ali of Egypt. The turbulent political nature of the time, rising inter-state activities and intra-state activities such as rebellions necessitated revision and re-establishment of the institutions of the foreign services. When there was a lack of interest for the diplomatic offices of the Ottoman Empire, the embassies were functioned under mainly Greek

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 81-84.

¹⁶⁰ Ercümen Kuran *Avrupa'da Osmanlı*. 65.

Chargé d'affaires from 1811 to 1821¹⁶¹. When the Greek rebellion started in the Peloponnesus peninsula, it was understood that, the Greek *Chargé d'affaires* were sending false information to Sublime Porte deliberately. Therefore the embassies were either shot down or down graded by the Ottoman Authorities¹⁶². The office of the translators was established in 1821 after the Greek Rebellion.¹⁶³ The purpose of the Chamber of Translators (*Tercüme Odası*) was to raise Muslim translators for duties in Sublime Porte and in foreign services to be replaced with discredited Greek translators. Apart from the establishment of the office of the translators, the office of *Reis-ül Küttap* was transformed to the ministry of foreign affairs by a decree issued by Mahmud II in 1836.¹⁶⁴ Mehmed Akif Efendi who had served as the *Reis-ül Küttap* since 1832 was appointed as *Hariciye Nazırı* –the Minister of Foreign Affairs¹⁶⁵ following Mehmed Akif Efendi, important persons of the Ottoman History such as Mustafa Reşid Paşa also served as the minister.¹⁶⁶ Shifting from the scribal class to modern/Europeanized system consists of establishment of the office of the undersecretary, partition of the office of Amedi - who was responsible for writing documents- between the office of the Grand Vizier and the foreign ministry, rising importance of *Muhimme Odası* where the secret documents were prepared, establishment of two new bureaus for embassies and consulates and finally the expansion of the office of the translator – *Tercüme Odası* which was now governed by Muslims instead of Greeks.¹⁶⁷ During this period, Mahmud II sent new ambassadors to Paris, London and Vienna by 1832, and to Berlin by 1837 while he was on the throne. Additionally, there were embassies in the following capitals after Mahmud II's reign; Athens in 1840, Tehran in 1849, Brussels and Den Haag in 1854, St Petersburg in 1857,

¹⁶¹ İsmail Soysal *Umur-ı Hariciye Nezaretinin Kurulması 1836*, in İsmail Soysal *Çağdaş Türk Diplomasisi: 200 yıllık Süreç* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1997), 71-72.

¹⁶² Temel İskit *Diplomasi Tarihi.*, 159.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., 44-45.

¹⁶⁵ İsmail Soysal, *Umur-ı Hariciye*.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

Washington in 1867, Bucharest in 1878, Belgrade in 1879, Stockholm in 1898, Sofia in 1909 and Copenhagen in 1917.¹⁶⁸

The most important reform of Mahmud II in his reign was the dissolution of the Janissaries. After the Greek rebellion, Mahmud's ambition to change the system of the janissaries or get rid of them for all surfaced His first attempt was to recruit his loyal men to the various positions in the *Ulema* or in the Janissary regiments. In Shaw's words;

In order to gain support of the mass of the people, Mahmut worked not only through their natural leaders among the *ulema* but also through a concentrated propaganda campaign unequalled in Ottoman History. He emphasizes his own firmness, resolution, and enlightenment while pointing out the decrepit state of the Janissaries, their inability to defend Empire against its enemies, as shown in the campaigns against the Greeks and Persians and the contrast between them and the Modern and efficient Egyptian Army.¹⁶⁹

Mahmud II tried to reform the Janissary troops instead of abolishing the system in the first place. Unlike Selim III, Mahmud II had presented a solid stance against the rebellious Janissaries and their allies within the craftsmen in Istanbul. Most of the craftsmen that supported Janissary rebellions had payment tickets which they bought from the Janissaries or had through heredity from their fore fathers who were soldiers.¹⁷⁰ Mahmud II dissolved the Janissaries with the help of the people in 1826. he did enjoy a public support for the dissolution of the Janissaries the common people were also against the corrupted Janissaries and when Mahmud II opened the flag of the prophet Muhammad while his loyal man in the army was marching to the barracks in the *Et Meydanı*, people followed him. He was seen as

¹⁶⁸ Temel İskit. *Diplomasi tarihi.*, 160.

¹⁶⁹ Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: Reform, Revolution and, Republic. The Rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975.* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977), 19.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 20.

a “moderate reformist”¹⁷¹ whom people believe he “acts on the basis of religion and tradition against the corrupt Janissaries”.¹⁷²

The abolishment of one of the problematic pillars of the army strengthened the hand of Mahmud II in the foreign policy. While made reforms in the military he also modernized the Sublime Porte as the ministries system as in the Europe. The important point of the Europeanization of the Sublime Porte to function as a center of government in terms of Diplomacy and Foreign Policy is the establishment of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire in March 11, 1836.¹⁷³ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was supported by newly emerged bureaucracy in the Ottoman Empire. The office of the translators within this bureaucracy was significantly important. It was also a place where the capable diplomats and statesmen of the future of the Ottoman Empire were raised. The transformation of the Ottoman bureaucracy continued after the Mahmud II’s reign. However the rise of Sublime Porte as the governmental center became an important fact of the Ottoman policy making, regardless of who ruled the Empire. modernization/Europeanization of the Ottoman State system would be subject to a faster pace of transformation with the implementations *Tanzimat* and *Islahat* reforms. Yet they were the results of the revolutionary changes on how the government functions by Selim III and Mahmud II.

4.5 Conclusion

The changing nature of intensifying foreign relations necessitates also a change in the institutions of the Ottoman Empire. Some of the institutions that had been subject to change had deep roots in the Ottoman Society. The most important institution in these terms is the army. The importance of the Ottoman army in the

¹⁷¹ Ibid., 20.

¹⁷² Ibid., 20.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 36.

making of diplomacy and foreign policy making is already addressed in the previous parts. Here, the connection between the army and foreign policy will be revisited in order to emphasize its importance in relation to the process of transformation. Ottoman Empire's approach to the broad sense of foreign policy was to conquer lands of the infidel and expansion. Therefore the military had become the key tool of the foreign policy.

Since Ottoman's had a powerful and modern army in the medieval times, it was always able to dictate its interest over the enemies. However, as Ottomans were enjoying the prosperous times, the adversaries mainly in Europe were changing themselves towards more and more powerful opponent to the Ottomans. Growing trade with the new world enabled European powers to accumulate more capital to invest for further developments. On the other hand, blaming the Ottoman's for not keeping up with the changes in the Europe is also wrong because during this period of time Ottoman did not require to seek new ways of income since it was enjoying almost all the riches of the East.

Ottoman Empire was relatively late to realize the rising power of Europe. The Ottomans realized that they were lagging behind in the competition with the European powers only by the 18th century. Additionally, the traditional understanding of Islamic superiority was challenged in this period. Ottoman Empire started sending diplomatic missions to the European capitals in permanent terms.

Before the permanent representatives of the Ottoman Empire in the late 18th century, there were naturally diplomatic missions. These missions were ad hoc basis and they were not a prosperous post in the Ottoman government. Leaving the capital to the land of the infidels was a contradiction to the Islamic ideology of the Ottoman Elite. There were some diplomatic services before Selim III's permanent representatives. However, the permanent representatives became the starting point of the Europeanization of the Ottoman Foreign Service.

When we accept the military as the main power basis for the sustainability of the Ottoman Diplomacy for many years, we cannot undermine the change in the military and its effects to the Ottoman diplomacy and foreign policy making. Considering this background understanding the modernization in the military helps to understand the change in the foreign service of the Empire.

Finally with Selim III and Mahmud II, Ottoman Empire shifted its traditional understanding of Ottoman army, diplomacy and foreign policy towards a modern/ European one. Before the Tanzimat era, the transformation of the traditional offices was almost done. During this period, Europeanization and reform in the Ottoman Empire were always subject to the resistance from the traditionalists. On the other hand, the traditionalist reaction was vanished from the Ottoman political atmosphere after Mahmud II. However, transformations of the offices reached to an irreversible point for those who were supporting the traditional form of government.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

In this thesis the Ottoman modernization is examined in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy within the framework of the Europeanization. The Ottoman Empire is a vast and complex structure; therefore examination of it as a whole organization is almost impossible. In this complex system, diplomacy and foreign policy played a pivotal role. In order to define the importance of diplomacy understanding of the Ottoman Empire it was beneficial to visit the concept of diplomacy as a whole.

Diplomacy as a tool of the state apparatus is almost old as the concept of the state. There are many branches to define the responsibility to protect the state. Diplomacy is regarded as one of them. In this context, the emergence of modern understanding of diplomacy which depends on the principle of reciprocity is very important. The first permanent diplomatic interstate relations have taken place in the medieval Italy as an example of the application of complex diplomacy on interstate relations. The terms such as the “ambassador” has also emerged in Italy, the city states such as Republic of Venice had representatives in the countries which they had relations with both inside and outside the Italian peninsula.

The existence of the relationship between different states also necessitates the background for the application of the diplomacy and foreign policy. In this sense, Machiavellian approach was explained in the beginning of the thesis. Machiavelli argues that the pragmatism should be applied in any parts of the state system, including diplomacy and foreign policy. The bilateral diplomatic system had emerged as a result to this quest. The important actors such as Richelieu were also mentioned. The most important contribution of the Richelieu to the field of diplomacy and foreign policy was his approach of the *raison d'état*. According to *raison d'état* the state comes first and therefore pragmatism can be applied.

The situation in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy is different in the Ottoman Empire. In order to understand the difference, the early history and the decline period of the Empire were covered. The Ottoman Empire was established on the concept of constant warfare. Therefore, conquests in the name of Islam had become the key point of the Ottoman diplomacy, in this context *Ghazi* ideology is also discussed in the thesis. Another important effect of the Islam on the Ottoman political atmosphere is the concept of superiority against the infidels. Due to this Islamic concept, the West/Europe was the target point of the Ottoman expansion since it was the land to be conquered in the name of Islam. This ideology functioned well as long as the Ottoman Empire had enjoyed military superiority over the European powers. Yet, defining only that the Ottoman diplomacy is initiated after the Selim III period would be wrong. It is a fact that, Ottoman Empire had diplomatic relations with the world that surrounded it. It had received permanent representations around the world; it had also dispatched some diplomatic missions and had diplomatic relations with its enemies in the West. These missions were ad hoc basis. Therefore, the argumentation that the Ottoman Empire did not send diplomatic missions to the world due to its Islamic identity is true for a certain degree. On the other hand, following a singular blatant Islamic ideology was not the case for the Ottoman Empire. Additionally, the military power of the Empire did not necessitate having a diplomatic mission to negotiate foreign policy issues. Rather, the Ottoman Empire used the diplomacy to announce a certain actions or announce its post war demands etc.

However, this was about to change by the 17th and 18th centuries. In the 17th and 18th centuries, Europe went through the process of enlightenment which had direct effects on its military. By the 18th century the Ottoman army was facing an enemy that was rather difficult for them to face since the enemy was technologically advanced and employing new tactics. Facing a rather difficult opponent is the main issue for the understanding of the need of change. Starting from the 17th century Ottoman Empire was subject to aggression and it had assumed a defensive position. The turning point for such understanding was the Treaty of Karlowitz in 1699. Starting from 1699, the Empire started to adopt the European legal system gradually. Especially on the field of diplomacy, the transformation of the representation duties from the military class to clergy was one of the pillars of such transformation. This necessitated a change in the state system of the Ottoman Empire. The direction of this change signaled the West/Europe. In this point modeling Europe had become the key motivation for the modernization and reformation of the Empire. The modernization/Europeanization debate should be examined in this context. In this study Europeanization is accepted as the primary way of modernization of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman reforms and modernization was based on the “new” state practices of Europe. Taking Europe as the model in the reforms was the logical and pragmatic option for the Empire.

Modeling Europe in military and foreign services was the two important pillars of the Ottoman modernization. In this context reforms under Selim III and Mahmud II is also emphasized. In order to understand what was done by Selim III, especially in the field of diplomacy and foreign policy, it is important to comprehend the previous diplomacy practice and institutions of the Ottoman Empire. The first pillar of the historic form of the Ottoman diplomacy is the “Ad Hoc” diplomats. These were the people who were sent by Sultan to serve in a certain foreign policy actions. The second pillar is the office of the *Reis-ül Küttap*. *Reis-ül Küttap* was responsible for the chancery works of the Ottoman Imperial court.

With the rise of the Sublime Porte in the governance of the Ottoman Empire, the role of *Reis-ül Küttap* had started to shift from the chancery work to the foreign services, thus *Reis-ül Küttap*'s role as the representative of the Empire increased. This office would eventually evolve to the ministry of foreign affairs in Mahmud II's reign. The most important modernization under the office of the *Reis-ül Küttap* was sending the permanent representatives to the European capitals by the end of the 18th century. The importance of sending permanent representatives to the European capitals was the implementation of the principle of reciprocity in the Ottoman Diplomacy. Additionally, there were permanent representatives of various European states in Istanbul long before the Ottomans sent permanent representatives to Europe. Before the late 18th century, living for a long time in the land of the infidels was an unacceptable issue for the Ottomans, however as the political situation necessitated, the Ottomans had adopted the pragmatic approach to the issue by undermining this concept.

The modernization/Europeanization in the fields of diplomacy and military had been continued by Mahmud II. Selim III reforms were short lived due to the resistance by the traditionalists within the Empire, especially those within the Janissaries and in the *Ulema* (the religious elite). Selim III had to reverse his attempts under the threat of rebels. On the other hand Mahmud II disbanded the Janissaries which were the primary source of concern against the reforms; thereafter he re-organized the office of *Reis-ül Küttap* and transformed it into the ministry of foreign affairs. The permanent representations that had been either closed down or down graded to the level of charge d'affaires at the end of the Selim III reign were re-opened by Mahmud II. Mahmud II's reign lasted until the mid 19th century. After the mid-19th century reform/Europeanization of the Ottoman State system had continued. The Tanzimat and Islahat reforms were the examples of this modernization attempts in the state apparatus. The difference between the Tanzimat/Islahat reform/Europeanization and the reforms of Selim III and Mahmud II was in their ways of application. While Tanzimat and Islahat reforms were taken place as changes in the existing institutions and legality basis that was ratified officially in the Treaty of Paris; the reform and Europeanization

attempts of the Selim III and Mahmud II were both aimed to change the existing institutions fundamentally. The reform in the Ottoman diplomacy and foreign policy was emerged as a necessity; this necessity had a connection with the declining might of the Empire. As long as the Empire sustained its might especially in the field of military it did not required to change its approach toward diplomacy, however as the military decline increased the Ottoman Empire's approach towards diplomacy was increased.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: TURKISH SUMMARY

Diplomasi devletlerarası ilişkilerin yürütülme biçimidir. Diplomatik hareketlilik bu taban içerisinde barışçıl ve barışçıl olmayan uygulama biçimlerini de içermektedir. Özetle, diplomasi her zaman barışı sağlamak amacı ile değil, yer yer barışı bozmak için de kullanılabilir. Diplomatik unsurların işleyiş biçimlerinin düzenlenmesi ise çoğunlukla geçmişi uzun yıllara dayanan deneme yanılma yöntemleri ile anlaşılabilir. Örneğin “elçiye zeval olmaması” ‘nın belirli bir amacı vardır. Bu amaç devletlerarası ilişkilerin yürütülebilmesi için azami gereklilik olan iletişimin kesintisiz olarak sağlanmasına duyulan gerekliliktir. Geçmişten günümüze kadar bakıldığında özellikle de 19. ve 20. Yüzyıllarda batı temelli hukuk sisteminin içinde düzenlenerek son halini alan diplomasi bugün devlet işleyişinin en önemli parçalarından biri olarak kabul edilebilir. Devletler arası sistemin özellikle Napolyon savaşları sonrasında hemen hemen bugünkü devletlerin öncülleri olan devletlerin de ortaya çıkmış olması nedeniyle modern dönem olarak kabul edebiliriz. Bu bağlamda modern dönemin önemli aktörlerinden biri olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu da, diplomasi sistemine entegredir. Osmanlı’nın devletlerarası ilişkileri yürütme biçimi devletin yükselişi ve düşüşü süreçlerinde bazı farklılıklar göstermektedir. Özellikle 18.yy’dan itibaren Avrupa Devletler sistemi ile artan, hukuk zemini üzerine inşa edilen ilişkiler Osmanlı diplomasisinin yıkılışına ve hatta Cumhuriyet diplomasisinin oluşumunda oldukça etkili olmuştur. 18.yy öncesi diplomasi alanında Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun olmadığını söylemek iste yanlış bir önerme olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Osmanlı diplomasisi, oldukça aktiftir, Avrupa’daki mevcut sistemin bazı unsurlarını kabul etmekte, fakat yine bazı unsurları kabul etmemektedir. Bu kabul etmeme çoğunlukla imparatorluğun gücü ile ölçülebilir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu

çıkarlarını güç projeksiyonu ile dikte edebildiği dönemde diplomasisini bir ayağını bu kapasite ile oluşturmaktadır. Tekrar ile belirtmek gerekirse güç kullanımı ve ordu İmparatorluk diplomasisinin bir parçasıdır fakat diplomasinin tamamını bu unsur oluşturmamaktadır. Osmanlı imparatorluğunda aktif diplomatik yaşam Orhan Gaziye kadar dayanmaktadır. Orhan Gaziden sonra diğer imparatorlarda diplomasiye önem vermektedirler. Osmanlı ordusu güçlü bir caydırıcı unsur olarak diplomasiye de kuşkusuz yön vermiştir. Fakat özellikle Fatih Sultan Mehmet dönemi ile beraber, devlet imparatorluk vasfına ulaşmıştır. Bu çerçevede içerisinde dönemin diplomatik açıdan en aktif bölgesi olan İtalyan yarım adasında bulunan şehir devletlerle Osmanlı imparatorluğunu ilişkileri artmaktadır. İmparatorluk kendi göndermesi de ilk daimi temsilcisini bu devletlerden olan Venedik'ten kabul etmiştir. Bu Venedikli temsilci Bizans'ın fethine kadar Bizans imparatoruna gönderilmiş olan temsilcidir. Fatih bu temsilcilik ofisinin bölgedeki tüccarların hakkın savunmak olan görevinin devam etmesi için izin vermiştir. Osmanlı diplomasisinin kurumsal yapısı da döneminin Avrupalı devletlerinden farklılık göstermektedir. Örneğin direkt olarak dış ilişkilerin yürütülmesinden sorumlu bir bakanlık ancak 19.yy'ın ortalarına doğru Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda çalışır hale gelmiştir. Bakanlık sınıfı öncesi Reis-ül Küttab özellikle 17.yy'ın sonundan bakanlığın kurulduğu 19.yy'ın ortasına kadar dış politikada düzenlenmesinde aktiftir. Yine de Reis-ül Küttab divan üyesi değildir. Kalemiye sınıfına mensup olan Reis bey'in dış politikada aktif rolünün artması da yine bir değişim sürecinin sonucudur. Kalemiye sınıfına mensup reis bey'den önce Seyfiye sınıfından askerler dış politikanın yürütülmesinde görevlidir. Bu kurumsal değişiklikler Osmanlı imparatorluğunu devlet unsurları içinde zamanın ruhuna göre değişim yapabileceğini de göstermektedir. İmparatorluk arkaik bir yapıda değildir. Değişime İmparatorlukta yaşanmaktadır fakat bu süreç zaman alabilmektedir. Osmanlı imparatorluğunda değişim ve yenilenme ise Batı temellidir. Batı ile yakın ilişkiler içinde bulunan imparatorluğun yenilenme için Batı'ya bakması ancak makuldür. Osmanlı imparatorluğunda değişim Batılılaşmadır gibi bir yaklaşımla kesin bir hükme varmak problemlidir bir yaklaşım olabilir. Bu yaklaşım Batı'nın ne olduğuna dair felsefi bir tartışma ile derinleştirilebilir fakat Tezde bu alan incelenmemiştir.

Tez'in içerinden kabul edilen Avrupalılařma, modern manada AB'ye üyelik perspektifi ile oluřturulan sistemsel deęişiklikler yapmayı içiren Avrupalılařma olarak kabul edilmemiřtir. Osmanlı Avrupalılařması bir bakıma bu sistemsel deęişiklikleri de kabul ederken, kültürel manada bir kökten deęişiklik sosyoekonomik yapıda gerçekteşmemiřtir. Konuda uzman çoęu yazar, Osmanlı Avrupalılařmasının daha çok şekilsel bir deęişiklik motivasyonu olduęunu belirtirler. Osmanlılar Avrupa'dan saati almıřlardır fakat aydınlanma gibi felsefi, kültürel ya da sanayi devrimi gibi teknik bir deęişiklik Osmanlı hayatına kolayca işleyememiřtir.

Yukarıdaki yaklaşım göz önünde bulundurularak Osmanlı İmparatorluęunun 18.yy'ın sonu itibariyle, kendi uyguladıęı diplomasi yaklaşımını deęiřtiren nedenler bu tezde incelenecektir. İlk kısımda, diplomasi ve dıř politikanın kaynaęı, Avrupa diplomasi tarihinden siyasi alanda örneklenen bazı olaylar çerçevesinde açıklanacaktır. İkinci kısımda, Osmanlı İmparatorluęunu tarihine kısaca deęinilecek, İmparatorluęun reform öncesi dönemde uyguladıęı diplomasi deęerlendirilecektir. Reform öncesi dönemde uygulanan diplomaside İslami doktrinle baęlantılı olarak, kendini üstün görme ve buna baęlı olarak, Avrupa diplomasinin bir normu olan karşılılık ilkesinin Osmanlı imparatorluęunun diplomasisinde uygulanmaması ele alınacaktır. Bu uygulamama durumu imparatorluęun Avrupa güçleri ile temas halinde olmaması demek deęildir. Aksine Osmanlı İmparatorluęu tarihi boyunca yerleşik temsilcilere kapılarını açmıřtır. Bir sonraki kısımda da, Osmanlı İmparatorluęu diplomasisi, diplomasinin bazı prensipleri ve uygulamaları çerçevesinde incelenecektir. Bu kısımda Avrupalılařmanın teorik arka planı incelenecektir. Osmanlı İmparatorluęunda çöküře baęlı olarak diplomasi anlayışının deęiřmesi bu kısımda incelenecektir. Son kısımda ise, geçiř dönemi sonrası ortaya çıkan iki reformcu padiřahın döneminde özellikle askeri ve diplomasi anlamında yapılan deęişiklikler deęerlendirilecektir. Bu tezin amacı, Osmanlı İmparatorluęunun düşüřü ile askeri ve diplomasi alanda Avrupalılařması arasındaki ters iliřkinin ön plana çıkartılmasıdır. Osmanlı İmparatorluęu düşüřteyken, geleneksel üstünlük anlayışının özellikle askeri ve dini temelde çok zorlandıęı açıktır. Bu da

Osmanlıdaki devlet sisteminin deęişimini gerekli kılmıştır. Avrupa'nın modellenmesi, Avrupalılaşıma ve yenileşme hareketinin ana motivasyonu olmuştur. Kaldı ki Avrupa'nın model olarak alınması da mantıklı ve pragmatik bir adım olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır

Nasıl ki siyaset iki insanın olduđu yerde en başından beri var olagelmiş ise, diplomasi de insanın sahip olmaya başlayışı ve dolayısıyla sahip olduklarını koruma ihtiyacının doğuşundan itibaren var olagelmiş bir kavramdır. Sahip olduklarına karşı tehdit oluşturan diğerlerinden koruma ve korunma ihtiyacı içerisinde olan insan, bu tehdidi emek vererek sahip olduklarını tehlikeye atmadan önce savuşturma ya da yok etme yollarına başvurur. İnsan, kendine ve sahip olduklarına herhangi bir zarar vermeden önce korkutarak düşmanını hamle yapmaktan caydırma içgüdüsünü, küçük insan toplulukları devlet sistemine evirildikçe ve sahip olunan şeylerin değeri arttıkça geliştirmiş; zaman içerisinde sistematikleştirmiş ve bugünkü modern diplomasiyi elde etmiştir. Başka bir deyişle, modern diplomasinin ilk yapı taşları, sahiplik kavramının ortaya çıkışı ve insanın kendini ve sahip olduklarını diğer insanlardan koruma içgüdüsünün 'zarar gelmeden önce kurtarma' fikriyle tedbire dönüşmesidir denilebilir; bu tedbirler korunacak şeyin öneminin artmasına paralel şekilde zaman içerisinde gelişmiş ve bugünkü haline evrilmiştir.

Diplomasinin zaman içerisindeki evriminin dönüm noktası modern devlet sisteminin ortaya çıkışıdır denilebilir. Ne zaman ki devlet egemenlik hakkını elinde bulundurarak kendi toprakları içinde bulunan her nesneden sorumlu olmuş, işte o zaman bu nesnelerin kaybedilmemesi ve korunması için güçlü ordulara sahip olmanın bir adım gerisinde diğer devletlerle ilişkiler geliştirmiştir. Daha basit söylemek gerekirse, modern devlet anlayışı egemenlik kavramını ortaya çıkarmış ve devleti saldırmadan önce "korumak" ile yükümlendirmiş, akabinde modern devletler kayıp getiren savařlardan önce birbirleriyle işbirliđi yoluna gitmişlerdir. İlkel diplomasinin öznesi insan iken modern diplomasinin öznesi devlet olmuştur.

Modern devlet anlayışıyla beraber devlet sistemlerinin parçası olan diplomasi zaman içerisinde kavramsallaşmasına ve sistematikleşmesine tanık oluyoruz. Konsept olarak ortaya çıkan modern diplomasi içerisinde birtakım kurallar ve işleyiş biçimleri barındırır.

Çizilen bu çerçeve içerisinde tezin ilk kısmı diplomasi alanına genel bir bakış ile açılmaktadır. Bu genel bakış diplomasi kelimesinin anlamındaki bazı boşlukların incelenmesini gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu tanım içerisindeki en önemli boşluk güç kullanımının diplomasi kavramı içerisindeki yeri ile alakalıdır. Diplomasinin günümüzde teknik olarak çağrıştırdığı anlam güç kullanımının engellenmesi olarak görülse de, güç kullanımının geçmişten günümüze kadar diplomasinin bir dalı olarak kabul edildiği bu tezde inkar edilmemiştir. Diplomasi ve dış politikanın uygulanabilirliği konusu ve bu tartışmayı takiben modern diplomasinin kuruluş aşaması da yine burada incelenmektedir. Bu dönemde, diplomasinin yaptığı işin kavramsallaştırılmasında önemli bir aktör olarak Makyavelli ile karşılaşılmaktadır. Makyavelli, Hükümdar isimli kitabında diplomasinin uygulanmasındaki en önemli adımın diplomatların hükümdarın hükmünün devamı ve devletin bekası için gerektiğinde yalan söyleyebilecekleri ya da hileye başvurabileceklerinin olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Bu davranış biçimleri diplomasi anlayışının pragmatik bir arka planla uygulanması gerekliliğini de ortaya çıkarmaktadır. Bu açıdan incelemeye devam edildiğinde özellikle diplomasinin kurumsal yapılanmasının Orta Çağ İtalya'sında ortaya çıktığını ve Venedik Cumhuriyeti'nin karmaşık çalışan ağı ile Akdeniz havzası içinde temsilciler bulundurduğunu görmekteyiz. Orta Çağ İtalya'sında ortaya çıkan bu diplomatik sistem, genel manada karşılıklılık ve egemen eşitlik ilkelerine dayanmaktadır. Bu dönemde İtalya'dan kıtaya yayılan diplomasi anlayışı ve pragmatizm fikri giderek dış politika alanına yayılmaya başlamaktadır. Bu dönemde hükmetme hakkının tanrısal yolla alındığına inanılan devlet anlayışı yavaş yavaş yerini toplumların oluşturduğu ve tanrısal bir hüküm hakkındansa eşit ve egemen bir hükmetme anlayışına bırakmaktadır. Bu dönüşüm özellikle "raison d'etat" fikrinin ortaya çıkması ile de özellikle hız kazanır hale gelmiştir. Fransa'da devleti önceleyen bu akımın ortaya çıkmasının ve bu ortaya çıkışın tanrısal bir anlayışla devlet

yönetimine olan tepkisi kolaylıkla Fransa Kralı 1. François ile Kanuni Sultan Süleyman arasındaki anlaşmadan anlaşılabilir. Bu anlaşma sayesinde bir Müslüman İmparatorluk ile bir Hristiyan Avrupa krallığı ortak bir düşmana karşı aynı safta yer almışlardır. Bu konu her iki taraftan bakıldığında da, karşı taraf ile bir anlaşma yapılmamasını öngören dini yaklaşıma bir alternatif oluşturmaktadır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için İslami üstünlük anlayışı bu vesile ile tehdit altına girerken, Hristiyan dünya için Müslüman bir ülke ile yapılan bu anlaşma dini temel alan haçlı cephesinde bir yarılma olarak görülebilir.

Osmanlı imparatorluğunun diplomasi anlayışına bakıldığında, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun kuruluşu kendi içerisinde imparatorluğun gelecekteki dönüşümünün sinyallerini de içermektedir. Bu nedenle kuruluşunda özellikle dış politika anlayışını belirleyen bazı unsurların değerlendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Osmanlı Devleti, Anadolu Selçukluları'nın doğudan gelen Moğol tehdidi altında parçalandığı dönemde inşa edilmeye başlanmıştır. Bu noktada İmparatorluğun en önemli dış politika amacı kutsal dava, ya da başka bir deyişe cihat anlayışı, olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Kendisini İslam'ın savunucusu ve yayıcı olarak gören Osmanlı Devleti'nin bir küçük sınır beyliğinden bir imparatorluğa dönüşmesinde en önemli yaklaşım bu kutsal dava anlayışındır. Bu dava kuruluşta diğer sınır beyliklerinden pek farkı olmayan Osmanlı'nın batısında yıkılmakta olan Bizans İmparatorluğu bulunması sebebiyle gerçekleştirilebilmiştir. Osman Bey'in bir önder olarak ortaya çıkabilmesinde, çevresinde toplananları bir kutsal dava anlayışı içinde ve gazilik arka planı ile bir araya toplayabilmiş olması oldukça önemlidir. Osman Bey'in beyliği batıya doğru genişletmesinde Bizans'ın, Latin bir dini anlayışa sahip o zamanın batı devletleri tarafından yalnız bırakılması en önemli sebeptir. Batı tarafından yalnız bırakılarak zayıflayan Bizans İmparatorluğu Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun yıkıcı darbeyi indirmesi ile tamamen çökmüştür.

Tüm bunlar göz önüne alındığında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda dış politika ve diplomasi anlayışının 18. yy'a kadar şekillendiğini görmekteyiz. Bu tarihe kadar, düşmanları ile karşılaştırıldığında oldukça etkili ve güçlü bir orduya sahip olması

imparatorluğun diplomasinin gerekliliklerini yerine getirmekte isteksiz davranmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Kendi gözünde Osmanlı İmparatorluğu öylesine muhteşemdir ki, kafirlerle bir temas kurmasına gerek yoktur, aksine kafirler onunla temas kuralıdır. Kaldı ki bu yaklaşım İslami bir doktrinle de kendini desteklemiştir. Bu noktada söylenmesi gereken en önemli nokta, Osmanlı imparatorluğunu hiç bir diplomatik bağlantısının İslami üstünlük anlayışı sebebiyle olmadığını belirtmektir. Kuruluş döneminden 18yy.'a kadar Osmanlı imparatorluğu çevresindeki unsurlarla sürekli bir diplomatik temas halinde olmuştur. Bu diplomatik temas sadece Avrupa'da kabul edilen normlar üzerine bina edilmemiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, İslami doktrinin yanı sıra, İstanbul'un fethi sonrasında beri batı ile diplomatik temas halindedir. Bu diplomatik temas genel manada tek taraflı bir anlayışa dayanmaktadır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda başta Venedik olmak üzere batılı devletlerin temsilcileri sürekli bir temelde bulunmaktadırlar. Fakat Osmanlı imparatorluğun karşılıklılık ilkesine dayanan diplomasi anlayışını benimseyerek daimi temsilciler göndermesi 18.yy'ın sonunu bulacaktır.

Osmanlı imparatorluğu, 18.yy ile beraber Avrupa, aydınlanmanın ilk adımları ile dönüşmeye başlamıştır. Dini evrenselliğin yavaş yavaş terk edilmeye başlanması, akli düşünce ve pozitif bilimlerin etkisinin artması, gelişen bilimin dolayısıyla teknolojiyi etkilemesi sonucunda teknolojinin yardımı ile Avrupa orduları gelişmeye başlamıştır. 18.yy'daki Avusturya-Osmanlı savaşlarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun ordularının karşısında artık dağlan orduların olmaması; Avusturyalıların, yivli tüfekler kullanmaya ve yeni askeri taktikler uygulamaya başlaması Osmanlı İmparatorluğun'un yenilgilerinin sebeplerindedir. 18.yy ile beraber değişmekte olan Avrupa, İslami bir üstün görme anlayışına sahip olan Osmanlılarda değişim rüzgârlarının esmesinde de etkili olmuştur. İmparatorluk yara aldıça, bu durumun engellenmesi için adımlar atılması gerekliliğinin ortaya çıktığı görülebilir.

Bu durumun engellenmesi için atılan adımların ana eksenini batılılaşma/yenileşme/Avrupalılaşmanın bir kavram olarak ortaya çıkması olarak değerlendirilebilir. Tezin bu bölümünde Avrupalılaşma /yenileşme ana eksenini modernleşme çerçevesi içerisinde incelenmektedir. Avrupalılaşma, Batılılaşma kavramlarının Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda modernleşme olarak ortaya çıkmasındaki en önemli husus, modern kavramının eski ve yeniye ayırmasının altında yatmaktadır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun yenileşme ihtiyacı hissettiği bu dönemde, 'yeni' kavramı Batı'da Aydınlanma fikrine dayanılarak meydana getirilmiş olan yeniliklerin modellenmesi olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Basitçe incelendiğinde, modernleşme "yeni" ye doğru bir dönüşümdür. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu için "yeni" olan Avrupa ve Avrupalı uygulama modelleridir. Avrupa'daki yenilikler ve bu yeniliklerin Osmanlı tarafından uzun bir müddet görmezden gelinmesi özellikle askeri ve dış politika alanında Osmanlıların geride kalmasına sebebiyet vermiştir. Bu nedenle yeniye modelleme, Avrupa'dakini almak şeklinde tezahür etmiştir. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından bakıldığında yeni Avrupa'dır. Bu nedenle Osmanlı reformu bir Avrupalılaşma girişimidir. Bu Avrupalılaşma Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından devlet tekelinde yukarıdan inme bir şekilde devlet araçlarında gerçekleştirilmiştir.

Peki, modernleşmeden önce Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun başlıca dış politika araçları olan orduda ve dış ilişkilerdeki durum nedir?. Erken dönemde Osmanlı elçileri genellikle geçici görevlendirmelerle yurt dışına çıkan görevlilerdir. Bu kişilerin diplomatlıkları, belli haberlerin taşınması ya da antlaşmaların yapılması gibi belirli görevler için sadeleştirilmiş bir görev olarak değerlendirilebilir. 3.Selim öncesi diplomasi anlayışı içerisinde, geçici görevlendirilmiş diplomatlar çeşitli görevler ile "kafir" Avrupa'da bulunmuş, bunlardan bazıları buldukları yerlerden edindikleri izlenimlerini "sefaretnameler" altında toplamışlardır. Bu sefaretnamelerden biri olan Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi'nin Avrupa seyahatnamesi bu amaçla okunulabilir. Sefaretnameler dönemi ile birlikte Osmanlı imparatorluğunda Avrupa hukuk sistemi ile de bir yakınlaşma başlamıştır. 1856 yılında tam manası ile kabul edilecek olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun bir Avrupa devleti olduğu ve bu sistemi bir parçası olduğuna dair olan yaklaşım, Osmanlı

imparatorluğunda geçiş dönemi diplomasisinin önemli bir adımı olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu geçiş dönemi adımları Karlofça antlaşması ile atılmaya başlanmış, zamanla kademe kademe devam etmiştir. Karlofça anlaşması ile beraber, yabancılarla yazışmaların kaleme alınmasında sorumlu olan Reis-ül-Küttap'lık ofisi ve reis bey, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun dış politika temsilcisi haline gelmeye başlamıştır. Reis-ül Küttap ofisi ilk ortaya çıktığında Osmanlı divanına dahi dahil değildir. Bu ofisin vezir-i azam'ın altında konumlandırılmış bir yeri vardır. Bu mana ile geçiş döneminde Sefaretnameler, Osmanlı imparatorluğunun Avrupa siyasi sistemine yavaş yavaş entegre olması ve diplomatik temsilcilik görevinin asker kökenli seyfiye sınıfından bürokrat kökenli kalemiye sınıfına devri de önemli bir adım olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

3. Selim dönemindeki yenileşme hareketleri bu mevcut kurumların üzerine bina edilmiş bir yaklaşımdır. 18.yy ile beraber Osmanlı seçkinleri Avrupa ile daha yoğun bir temas içerisinde olmaya başlamışlardır. Bu dönemde, Avrupa'dan saat getirtmek, bazı Avrupai mobilyaları kullanmaya başlamak moda olmuş hatta giyimde bazı değişimler de yaşamıştır; fakat bu değişimler seçkin zümreler tarafından yapılan yüzeysel batılılaşma çabaları olarak görülebilir. Fakat yine de batılılaşmanın yenileşme/modernleşme olduğu algısı Osmanlı seçkinleri arasında yavaş yavaş karşılık bulmaya başlamıştır. Bu konunun önemi, Osmanlı yenileşme/Avrupalılaşmasının yukarıdan aşağı yapıda olması ile direkt olarak alakalıdır.

Bu yukarıdan aşağıya doğru gerçekleştirilen Avrupalılaşma'nın öncü kişiliklerinden biri 3. Selim olarak görülebilir. 3. Selim'in dış politika alanındaki en önemli değişimi bazı Avrupa başkentlerinde daimi Osmanlı elçiliklerinin açılması olmuştur. Bu döneme kadar bu elçiliklerin açılmamasının başlıca nedeni olan kendini üstün görme anlayışının terk edilmesi Osmanlı İmparatorluğu açısından bir dönüm noktası olarak kabul edilmelidir. Bu dönemle birlikte Avrupa diplomasi sisteminin en önemli ayağı olan karşılıklılık ilkesinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu tarafından da kabul edilip uygulanmaya başladığı görülmektedir. Bu çerçevede Londra'da, Berlin'de, Viyana'da ve Paris'te açılan sürekli

temsilcilikler bir dönüm noktasını belirtirler. Bu bölgelere gönderilen diplomatlar, göreve çıkmadan önce sultan tarafından kabul edilirler, kendilerine devlet görevi için bir kaftan giydirilir ve sonra yola çıkarlardı. Bu temsilcilerin kapasitesi tartışmaya açık bir unsurdur. Bu tartışmaya açıklık unsuruna örnek olarak bir anekdot aktarmak gerekirse; 1798-99 yıllarında Fransa'da elçi olan Seyyid Ali Efendi, dönemin Fransa dış işleri bakanı Talleyrand tarafından gerçek manada kandırılmıştır. Seyyid Ali Efendi Fransa'nın Akdeniz sahilinde oluşturulan filonun neden oluşturulduğunu sorduğunda, Talleyrand bu filonun Malta adasını ele geçirmek için olduğuna Seyyid Ali Efendiyi ikna etmiştir. Neden sonra, Mısır Malta'yı dayanak noktası olarak alan Fransızlarca işgal edilmiştir. 3. Selim'in bu alanda bir diğer yenileşme hareketi de Nizam-ı Cedid ordusudur. Dış politika araçlarının en önemlisi olan ordunun yenilenmesi Osmanlı açısından oldukça önemlidir. Fransa'nın Mısır'ı işgalinden önce Fransa hakkında pozitif düşüncelere sahip olan 3. Selim, kendi özel ulakları yardımıyla Fransız kraliyeti ve İstanbul'daki Fransa temsilciliği ile temas halindeydi. Nizam-ı Cedid ordusu Fransa yakından incelenerek ve Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'na dışarıdan gelen eğitmenlerle oluşturulur. Fakat bu ordu geleneksel olarak bazı ayrıcalıklara sahip olan Yeniçerileri rahatsız etmiştir. Nizam-ı Cedid, Mısır seferindeki başarılarına rağmen, ordu ve devlet içerisindeki bazı gelenekçilerin baskısı ile kaldırılmıştır. 3. Selim'in yaptığı yeniliklerin tamamının arkasında durması bu çerçevede beklenmemelidir. Nitekim, Selim Nizam-ı Cedid anlayışını terk etmek zorunda bırakılmış ve onun yurt dışında açtığı temsilcilikler de birer birer derecelerini kaybetmiştir. Bu temsilciliklerde yerel Rum işgüderler, Mora'daki Yunan isyanına kadar görev yapmışlardır; fakat isyandan sonra elçilikler tamamen kapatılarak işlevsiz hale gelmiştir.

3.Selim'den sonra 2.Mahmud yenileşme hareketinin öncüsü olarak ortaya çıkar. 2.Mahmud'un yenileşme adına en önemli adımı Yeniçeri ocaklarını kaldırması olarak görülebilir. Yeniçeri ocaklarının kaldırılmadan önce reforma tabi tutulmaya çalışılması önemli bir adımdır. Fakat yenileşme hareketleri Yeniçeriler tarafından yine direnişle karşılanmış fakat 2.Mahmud 3.Selim'in aksine yenileşme hareketlerinin arkasında daha kuvvetli durmuş ve en sonunda, 1826 yılında, Yeniçeri ocaklarını tamamen lağvetmiştir. Bu adımla Osmanlı dış politika araçları


arasında en önemli unsur olan ordunun yenilenmesinde gelenekselciler için bir dayanak noktası olan grup dağıtılmıştır. Bu olay akışı içerisinde reis-ül kütta'lık ofisinin Bab-1 Ali reformu içerisinde dışişleri bakanlığına dönüştürülmesi önemli bir rol oynar. Bununla birlikte geçmişte bazı sıkıntılara sebebiyet veren Rum tercümanlar yerine Müslüman personelin yetiştirilebilmesi için tercüme odası açılmıştır. Tercüme odası içerisinde Osmanlının geleceğine yön verecek Mustafa Reşit, Ali ve Fuad paşalar zaman içinde yetişmişlerdir. 2.Mahmud ile beraber dış temsilcilikler yeniden açılmaya başlanmış ve sayıları 19.yy içerisinde hızla artmıştır. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda değişim 2.Mahmud ile sona ermemektedir, 19.yy'ın ikinci yarısında ortaya çıkan Tanzimat ve Islahat fermanları gibi yenileşme hareketleri de vardır. Fakat bu tez içinde incelenen zaman dilimi ile Tanzimat/Islahat dönemi arasında farklılıklar vardır. Bu farklılıkların en önemlisi 3.Selim ve 2.Mahmud döneminde ortaya çıkan yenileşme/Avrupalılaştırma hareketlerinin mevcut kurumların yenilenmesi ile beraber yepyeni kurumların Bab-1 Ali sistemi içerisinde oluşturulmasıdır. Yani, eski yıkılıp yerine yenileri yerleştirilmeye başlanmıştır. Tanzimat /Islahat dönemlerinde yıkma ve yerine yenisi getirme anlayışı daha önce tecrübe edilmiş bir anlayıştır. Yani fikri açıdan bir yıkılma zaten yaşanmış ve bu yıkılmanın üstüne yeni bir durum inşa edilmiştir. Fakat 3.Selim ve 2.Mahmut 'un ilk dönemlerinde bu gelenekselden moderne yıkım ve yeniden yapım süreci ilk defa tecrübe edilmiş ve bunun sancıları ciddi anlamda yaşanmıştır.

Osmanlı Avrupalılaştırması, imparatorluk tarihinin en önemli adımlarından biri olarak görülmelidir zira bu adım sayesinde imparatorluğun ömrü bir miktar uzatılmıştır. Osmanlı diplomasisinin batı tarzı karşılıklılık ilkesine dayalı akılcı ve pragmatik bir çerçeveye oturtulması oldukça önemlidir. Bu çerçeve içerisinde Osmanlının kuruluşundaki arka planın oluşturulmasında İslam'ın rolü incelenmiştir. Bu rol, gazi olma motivasyonu ile beraber İslam'dan güç alarak İslamiyet'in kâfir dünyasına yaymaktır. Bu rolün bir dış politika ve diplomasi anlayışı olarak kendini devam ettirmesi 18.yy'a kadar öyle ya da böyle mümkünken, bu tarihten sonra bu anlayışın yavaş yavaş ve göreceli bir sancımayla terk edilmesi kaçınılmazdır. Bu kaçınılmazlığın, Avrupa'nın yeni

olarak ortaya çıkması ve bu çıkışıyla da iş bu geleneksel anlayışın dengelemesinde kesin olarak etkili olduğunu söyleyebiliriz. 18. yy itibari ile kendini üstün olarak görme yaklaşımının terk edilmesi ve buna bağlı olarak yukarıdan inme bir tutum ile Avrupalaşma/yenileşme hareketi başlamıştır. Bu yenileşme hareketi Osmanlı'da ordu ve dış politika araçları üzerinde yoğunlaşmış ve sonunda bu araçların yeniden yapılanması ile sonuçlanacak sürece girilmiştir. Bütün bu veriler göz önüne alındığında, askeri ve diplomatik başarıları azalan imparatorluk yeni bir anlayışa yönelmiş ve bu anlayış da Avrupa'yı model alan bir yenileşme olarak ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu yaklaşımdan hareketle Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun geleneksel gücü azaldıkça diplomasi gibi batı kaynaklı unsurları kabul etmeye gitgide daha gönüllü olması arasında bir ters ilişki bulunduğu görülmektedir.


APPENDIX B: ILLUSTRATIONS

Illustration 1. The traditional Structure of the Office of the Reis-ül-Küttab



Şekil 3.2. Reis-ül Küttab ve Kadrosu 1789.

Illustration 2. The Structure of the Sublime Porte



Carter Findlay *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Bürokratik Reform BabıAli 1789-1922*. (İstanbul : Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2014)

Illustration 3. Grand Vizier and Reis-ül-Küttap discussing the state affairs.




Sadrazam ile Nişancı ve Reisülküttap bir devlet işini görüşürlerken

Kemal Girgin. *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Teşkilatımız Teşkilat ve Protokol.*

(Ankara : Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi 1994)

Illustration 4.Receiving Foreign Diplomats




Padışahın elçi kabul töreni (Topkapı Sarayı Arz Odası)

Kemal Girgin. *Osmanlı ve Cumhuriyet Dönemleri Hariciye Teşkilatımız Teşkilat ve Protokol.*

(Ankara : Turk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994)

Illustration 5. Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi is at Paris



Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi'nin muhteşem bir kabile ile Paris'e girişi.

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Şevket Rado *Paris'te Bir Osmanlı Sefiri: Yirmisekiz Mehmet Çelebi'nin Fransa Sefaretnamesi.*
(İstanbul :Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2014)

Illustration 6. Some Officers and Soldiers with different specialization and ranks (pre-reform)




PLATE 5 Members of various pre-reform Ottoman forces (*Chevet Pacha (Mahmond), L'organisation et ces uniformes de l'armée Ottomane (Depuis sa création jusqu'à nos jours), Vol. 1, 1900.*)

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Virginia Aksan. *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 an Empire Besieged.* (Harlow England : Pearson Longman, 2007)

Illustration 7.Soldier's After Reform





PLATE 16 Uniforms of the Asakir-i Mansure of Mahmud II after the adoption of trousers (Chevket Pacha (Mahmond), L'organisation et ces uniformes de l'armée Ottomane (Depuis sa création jusqu'à nos jours) Vol. 1, 1900).


Virginia Aksan. *Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 an Empire Besieged*. (Harlow England : Pearson Longman, 2007)

Illustration 8. Map of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1683



Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: Volume 1 Empire of the Gazis the Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*. (Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977.)

Illustration 9. Map of the Ottoman Empire 1683-1775



Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II: Reform, revolution and, Republic. The rise of Modern Turkey 1808-1975.* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 1976-1977)

APPENDIX C: TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
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YAZARIN

Soyadı : Erülker
Adı : Cem
Bölümü : Avrupa Çalışmaları

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Understanding the Reform Process of the Ottoman Diplomacy: a Case of Modernization?

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
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