

CRITIQUE OF EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM AND DEFENSE OF
FOUNDATIONALIST INTERNALISM

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis argues that epistemic externalism is untenable and defends that, although facing some severe problems, internalism is the only possible remaining option for a theory of knowledge and justification. It defends a foundationalist version of internalism, in which one's beliefs about her own state of mind are taken to be certain. In this way, together with propositions of logic and mathematics, foundationalist requirement of certain and basic beliefs is rendered. Further, based on Laurence Bonjour's argument on induction, this thesis offers an internal justification of induction and reliability, at least as a doxastic decision principle.

Keywords: epistemology, externalism, internalism, justification

ÖZ

BİLGİKURAMSAL DIŞSALCILIĞIN ELEŞTİRİSİ VE TEMELCİ İÇSELÇİLİĞİN SAVUNMASI

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Bu tezin amacı, epistemolojik dışsalcılığın ortaya koyduğu bilme durumunun kabul edilemez olduğunu ve epistemolojik içselciliğin, sahip olduğu tüm ciddi problemlere rağmen öne çıkan seçenek olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Tezde, kişinin kendi zihin durumuna dair kesin veri sahibi olabilmesinden yola çıkılarak temelci bir içselcilik anlayışı savunulmaktadır. İçselciliğin ciddi problemlerinden bir tanesini oluşturan tümevarımın gerekçelendirilmesi sorununa da Laurence Bonjour'un bu konudaki gerekçelendirici argümanı temel alınarak bir çözüm önerisi getirilmektedir. Bu öneri, tümevarımı kesin olarak değil fakat rasyonel bir seçimin sonucu olabilmek açısından gerekçelendirmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Epistemoloji, Dışsalcılık, İçselcilik, Gerekçelendirme

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis aims at rejection of epistemic externalism and defense of foundationalist internalism. The first chapter defines the notions of epistemic internalism and epistemic externalism briefly, in an aim to render an easy conception of the two. The second chapter takes some further steps to clarify epistemic internalism, and explicates which type of internalism is defended in this thesis. The third chapter presents the problems of the notion of justification and the relation between justification and knowledge through Gettier Cases and Lottery Paradox. It concludes that the notion of knowledge should sometimes be composed of an account, which includes probabilistic results and current epistemic situation of the subject, rather than some pure, clear-cut belief about a single state of fact. The fourth chapter introduces and elaborates externalism in detail based on Armstrong and Goldman, and questions externalism's relation to naturalism. The fourth chapter argues that two brands of externalism, namely causal theory and reliabilism bear serious problems in their pure forms and only a theory with components of both can survive. It also shows that both Goldman and Armstrong defend such mixed theories and both thinkers presuppose a necessity of conscious belief in their externalist theories, a situation which can be a drawback for a pure externalism. The fifth chapter presents and sustains Bonjour's criticism of Armstrong's and Goldman's externalist approaches. The sixth chapter focuses on the possible belief cases that animals may possess and shows that externalist knowing has serious problems in those cases. Last section of the sixth chapter examines externalist knowing without belief content, which artificial intelligences alleged to perform. Finally the last chapter argues for certain and self-evident propositions, and for necessity of induction and reliability for most of the knowing cases, and tries to

propose an internal justification of induction and reliability at least as a doxastic decision principle. As a result, a foundationalist internalist model for knowledge, in which induction and reliability can take part, is constituted.

According to mainstream epistemology, from Plato to Chisholm, knowledge is formulated as justified true belief. Justification of a belief means determining the truth value of a belief. It consists in determining what is sufficient to make the belief true or likely to be true and how the belief is true or likely to be true. It may readily be supposed here that a justification of a belief depends on some other belief and/or data, which should themselves be justified; and this yields to a regress. There is such a danger, but not yet necessarily. Because it may also readily be supposed that there are some beliefs and/or data that can be justified by their own sake, without recourse to some other belief. Such beliefs and/or data may be certain, self evident or a priori and it may well be said of them that they in fact do not need a justification; or to be justified by its own sake may not be a justification at all. From this point of view, if such beliefs and /or data exist, then such beliefs and/or data should be given a parenthesis: although not necessarily counted as being justified true belief, they are cases of knowledge for the sake of the fact that they are certain.

Epistemic internalism in the strong sense is the view that, a belief and justification of a belief are wholly a first-person matter and all that which takes part in contributing to justification of a belief with the contribution itself, should be internal to the subject her/himself. That is, justification is to be made exclusively by the faculties of the first-person's own mind and exclusively by the data presented in the first person's mind. Therefore for internalism, it is internal judgment that decides for a belief's truth value. The criterion for being internal or being in the mind is awareness. Thus, to be internal means to be in the realm of awareness. Epistemic externalism is simply the denial of the claim of epistemic internalism, defending that internal constraint is not always necessary for justification. At least

some of a subject's beliefs are somehow justified even if some of the items contributing to the justification of those beliefs are not internal to the subject.

In general, externalist theories of knowledge presuppose some certain relation between truth/fact and true belief. If a subject's belief is directly connected to truth in a certain way, for instance by way of causality, or is less directly connected to truth in a reliable way, for instance by way of a reliably truth producing process or mechanism on the part of the subject—like the subject's cognitive architecture or brain—, then that subject is counted as justified, or as knowing. The opposition between internalism and externalism does not lie in this fact however: internalism does not exclude this way of knowing so far as the subject her/himself is aware of the connection that is at stake. The opposition rather lays in the fact that externalists claim that the subject is not required to be aware of the connection in order to be counted as having the knowledge of the concerned fact. If needed, the connection is detected and affirmed by some outside observer.

To externalism, theory of knowledge is essentially not a philosophical and subject centered, but a scientific enterprise. As externalism depends on some connection between truth/fact and true belief, it presupposes 1- the truth of the connection and 2- the truth of what the true belief is connected to. This presupposition is what naturalism and scientific view of world supposes about truth and reality: It readily accepts the existence of external world, natural law, induction and causality. It treats traditional philosophical questions as invalid approaches, and offers a complete dismissal of skeptical attitudes in favor of naturalistic and scientific reality. Thus, it should be noted that, in this way, it does not solve the traditional problems of philosophy, but rather, ignore them. As its ultimate foundation, externalism strongly embraces the belief that the naturalistic and scientific view of world is true. While rendering internal justification an imperative for knowledge requires dealing with skepticism, and requires a justification of naturalistic and

scientific world view when this world view is at stake; externalism offers leaving aside such requirements and accepts that world view readily.

While internalism does not reject this world view, it demands internal justification for its notions which also necessitates plausible answers to skeptic attacks. Such a demand yields to the result that from a strong internalist point of view, many cases prove to fall short of being a case of knowledge. The significance of this drawback is that most of such cases are in fact taken to be cases of knowledge in real life situations and in practical epistemic dealings. In the case of such situations, externalism approves that such cases are instances of knowledge, therefore has the clear advantage over internalism about the issue of abundance of knowledge.

A raw, but illuminating example for the advantage of externalism over internalism is the simple belief in inductive inference. Given the main rationale, internalism does not allow beliefs gained by inductive inference as a case of knowledge, as far as induction is not internally justified. Many people have knowledge that is based on inductive inference without concerning whether it is in fact really justified to the end or not. And it is actually the case that, except philosophy, no discipline has ever seriously needed to justify it—indeed all base their methodology on induction. Within the everyday life, it occurs as a useful habit and regarded as a means of knowledge; within science, it is the essential part of theory, methodology, gaining knowledge and progress. Many people and most scientists implicitly or explicitly believe that induction is based on causality and natural law about uniformity and regularity, but none are internally justified about whether such a law really exists.

Externalists claim that although induction is not internally justified, people in fact know when their knowledge is based on induction. As stated, the definite position of externalism is a strong naturalist and scientific view of world. This is simply an insight about ‘reality’ and need not be justified internally. To externalists, natural reality already consists of induction as a knowledge producing process or mechanism, and knowledge is determined by conditions of nature. Philosophy and

philosophical reasoning are bound to this reality, are not above it. Thus, there is no predetermination of knowledge as being internally justified true belief. Knowledge is a natural phenomenon and determined by and bound to the conditions of nature which are external to the subject, and induction, as a means of knowledge, is a part of this natural reality. And to the externalists, this reality renders philosophy as unsuccessful in many issues, because philosophical problems are not resolved. As a being more of a follower of the conditions of natural reality, science has proven to be a successful enterprise about knowing while philosophy has not. And, as most of daily knowledge and scientific knowledge depends on inductive inference, it is one of the most important points of attack against internalism.

This thesis offers an internally justified doxastic decision principle in favor of induction against its negation. This would yield to the result that vital notions like reliability, causality, natural law would become justified by internalist epistemology—at least in the form of ‘more probable proposition’. As for the problem of existence of external world, evil demon and brain in a vat cases; if such problems are compatible with some pre-differentiated case comparisons, then inductive solution are open for them. Otherwise internalism is still in trouble with such problems. It should be noted that if there is not a pre-differentiation between a true world and an untrue world—as it seems to be the case of a neutralized demon problem or in a brain in a vat problem—, then there may not be a differentiation between the two propositions/beliefs that depict each world. This means that the two propositions/beliefs are indistinguishable. Thus there is no way to separate them in order to assess which one is more probable. One possible move here in favor of internalism is to argue that such proposition/belief cases are identical and therefore the problem is in fact not about ontology and epistemology but about language. In any case, rendering inductive inference a more probable proposition/belief than its negation is a significant step in advance of internalist

epistemology. An attempt for this rendering is made in the last chapter of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

CLARIFICATION OF INTERNALISM

Although the definition of internalism as formulated above is rather strong and restrictive, internalism is not necessarily defined as a single strong view about epistemic justification. There are rather a bunch of some different views, the common feature they all share being that justification requires internal factors. But this common feature is rather obscure and thus unacceptable if not clarified. Firstly, any weaker version, while requiring internal elements, still implicitly allows external elements and therefore amounts to be a brand of externalism rather than internalism. Secondly, the term internal is open for too broad conceptions which may prevent a sound distinction between internalism and externalism. For example, a certain version of internalism called mentalism potentially absorbs all mental states of the subject into internal, regardless of whether those states are within the subject's awareness or not. This attitude has the danger of making the boundary between internal and external obscured. And as a rule, it is the case for externalism and not internalism that the boundary is wider; so, being weaker and more comprehensive, externalism clearly has the principal advantage over internalism for the in-between issues. Thus for instance, Fumerton warns that in the case of mentalism, "if an epistemic internalist understands mental states as the psychological externalist suggests, then that epistemic 'internalist' identifying evidence with mental states is really an externalist 'in disguise'"¹ This is mainly because some evidence that is not readily open for a first person inquiry at a certain time is not evident at all for that first person at that time. It only has this potential

¹Fumerton, Richard. "What and About What is Internalism?" *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology*. Sanford C. Goldberg, ed. New York: Oxford University Press Inc. 2007. p. 35.

for some other time when the subject has it ready to retrieve for a first person inquiry. Thus the term internal should be reduced to a definite conception that would make a significant ontological difference between internal and external. To Laurence Bonjour, the term internal is restricted to anything that is available or accessible by the subject her/himself, and this notion lies at the heart of epistemology:

..epistemological issues arise and must be dealt with from within the individual person's first-person cognitive perspective, appealing only to things that are accessible to that individual from that standpoint. The basic rationale is that what justifies a person's beliefs must be something that is available or accessible to him or her, that something to which I have no access cannot give me a reason for thinking that one of my beliefs is true.²

What is echoed above is not only the strong and original version of internalism, but it is also the fundamental claim of the most acceptable definition. This claim points to the rule that, for instance, a certain brain state on its own cannot be counted as a justifier if it is not represented by way of a mind state, that is, by a conscious state. A significant merit of this demarcation is that on the part of the subject there is a concrete distinction between a blind brain state and conscious mind state while the distinction between a brain state and what remains as external is quite obscured. A brain can be connected to certain stimuli machines and to some artificial intelligences and to some chemical processors, or to more natural things like body and the stimuli that acts upon the body; and all these can be connected to more and more external environments. Then, as a result, all would form a single integrated system which would consist of an overwhelmingly vast and interconnected environment. The problem here is that it is quite unclear at what point of this environment the line between internal and external will be drawn: A brain is not

² BonJour, Laurence. *Epistemology: Classic Problems and Contemporary Responses*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2002. p. 222.

very differentiated from what it connects to, and what it connects to is not very differentiated from the environment. But a subject can make a clear distinction between what is accessible to her/him and what is not. Thus, accessibility is a good criterion to draw a line between internal and external. Bonjour, not as solely his own view, but as a generally agreed definition of internalism, presents the following formulation:

A theory of justification is *internalist* if and only if it requires that all of the factors needed for a belief to be epistemically justified for a given person be *cognitively accessible* to that person, internal to his cognitive perspective.³

This view is called access internalism and what the conception of access means is an almost wholly agreed point like the above definition. It is exclusively held that one has access to some item only by way of that item's being presented in the realm of awareness. Therefore access internalism amounts to awareness internalism and it is the most agreed brand. Even the proponents of internalism, who in their critics pay the most attention to leave as much space as possible in favor of internalism for a fair critique, accept the awareness requirement. Among these, in a summing up account, Michael Bergmann leaves aside other possible options in favor of awareness requirement and provides the following common feature:

What all forms of internalism have in common is that they require, for a belief's justification, that the person holding the belief be aware (or at least potentially aware) of something contributing to its justification. There are different views on what the subject must be aware of. And there are different views on what sort of awareness is required (though all agree that the awareness must be kind that involves only armchair reflection). But the common denominator is the insistence that if there

³ Bonjour, Laurence. "Externalism/Internalism". *A Companion to Epistemology*. Dancy, Jonathan and Sosa, Ernest, eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992. p. 132.

is no (actual or potential) awareness of anything that might contribute to the belief's justification, the belief is not justified.⁴

Account and defense of internalism pursued in this thesis follows the version that identifies internal with awareness. This provides a clear and sound distinction between internal and external and prevents the possibility of a readily reduction of an internal item to an external one and vice versa. This is mainly because there is an ontological difference between the two that is clearly discerned—perhaps more clearly than any other dualities. Another significant point is that facts like belief, cognitive grasp, understanding, perception, meaning, appropriating of a perception or thought, and affirmation of a belief in terms of truth and falsity—all which are the notions that all internalists base their accounts—, do happen within awareness, even perhaps as some essential feature of it. But most importantly, the subject is certain that all these notions and faculties do really happen within her/his awareness. The certainty of this positive state is a significant feature of awareness. From Cartesian point of view, consciousness guaranties both its own existence and therefore truth of itself and what is presented in it. And significantly it also guaranties a validity of a fit or resemblance of what is presented in it with some concept. If what is presented in it does not fit with a concept clearly, then it is certainly fit with the concept of vagueness. And someone's believing that s/he has some vague conception at a certain time is an instance of knowledge.

Bergmann's formulation given above is an account of internalism in the most general sense. From a certain respect it provides both strong and weak types. The account renders awareness necessary at least for some portion of justification and not necessarily for all justification. A justification, for which both external and internal components are at stake in determination of truth value of a belief may be

⁴ Bergmann, Michael. *Justification without Awareness*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. p. 9.

problematic for both externalist attitude and internalist attitude. But it is, at least in principle, in favor of externalism as it is apparently the weaker thesis. For such in between situations, while not completely dismissing, I will still not favor externalists however. This is mainly because; 1) except inductive inference and reliability, no version of externalism presents a reasonable account for exactly where internal assistance is needed for justification and exactly where it isn't needed; 2) and more importantly, where some internal element is at stake, it is extremely difficult to assess whether the subject believes as a result of an allegedly complete internal justification in which s/he wrongly thinks that s/he is in—and this, although deficient, or misled, is still an instance of pure strong internalism—or believes as a result of some allegedly external element. Even in the case of inductive inference, people without acquaintance with skepticism think that they are completely internally justified in believing that inductive inference is true—for instance by resorting to existence of natural law, which is for them is evident.

On the other hand, it is even more problematic to count a justification that is not completely internal in determining the truth value of a belief as a really internal justification. In comparison to Bergmann's formulation, Bonjour's version is strong—clearly restrictive on this respect. It sticks to the rule that justification wholly depends on awareness of the subject—all justifiers and their contribution to justification should be within awareness. In order to make a sound debate, the most reasonable position is to treat both camps in their restrictive forms as much as possible. Thus, the internalism pursued in this thesis follows Bonjour's strong version.

Vitaly, it should be reminded that the factors in a justifying case are of two sorts: justifying factors or justifiers on the one hand—J-factors, and the factors that determine the justifying conditions of the subject—C-factors. Latter, C-factors, are the factors that make up and determine the subject's cognitive architecture and

environmental factors in which the subject is in. These are external factors and are not readily included within an internal justification. This is for the reason that they are not decisive in determining a truth value. But they are decisive in a subject's capability and success in determining a truth value. The former, J-factors, on the other hand, are exclusively the items that contribute to make the belief true or at least likely to be true within the awareness of the subject. Strong internalism claims that it is the J-factors, all of which should be internal for a justification, not necessarily the C-factors.

Externalists argue that J-factors are constituted by C-factors and internalism is not necessarily a stance against this. All our epistemic tools, including even the concept of certainty, law of identity, fundamental logical and mathematical propositions may well be presented to us by external environment. Even they may be constituted or determined by something external. But in order to be effective on the case of knowing, they should be appreciated and understood by the subject, which is an internal issue. They should be regarded by the subject with their implicit nature, which is that they are autonomous self sufficient epistemic tools and that they are certain. Otherwise they cannot be used as such and permanent skepticism would be inevitable. Thus, not necessarily J-factors, but C-factors should be presented to awareness, *be recognized* within the realm of awareness; and any other option is untenable. And it is the act of this recognition that determines the justification and truth value. In this respect, Chisholm's definition points out the most definite stance of internalism:

The internalist assumes that, merely by reflecting upon his own conscious state, he can formulate a set of epistemic principles that will enable him to find out, with respect to any possible belief he has, whether he is *justified* in having that belief. The epistemic principles that he formulates are principles that one may come upon and apply merely by sitting in one's armchair, so to speak, and without calling for

any outside assistance. In a word, one need consider only one's own state of mind.⁵

What Chisholm presents as the internalist's assumption surely does not consist of data acquiring. It is obvious that one may not have sufficient data to assess whether a belief is true or false when one is exclusively bound to armchair reflection. Thus, one can, by armchair reflection, decide that one needs further data and this is usually the case. Then, the real sense of Chisholmian approach is as follows: One can always determine her/his *current* epistemic status about a belief, and this status may well yield to the belief that one is quite in ignorance about that belief. This is mostly the case about empirical beliefs. In this way one will have the true belief that s/he is in an insufficient epistemic position about the former belief. This latter type of belief can always be gained by armchair reflection.

On the other hand, by a priori reasoning alone, one can always determine the current epistemic status of a belief in the form of counterbalanced, more probable than its negation, evident, certain and vice versa. In the case of total insufficiency, the belief will be counterbalanced. Surely for a belief's being counterbalanced, or more probable than its negation or vice versa, any of these statuses may change when one gets further data about the belief. What is meant to be formulated by armchair reflection is rather the principles that would be decisive in determining the epistemic status of a belief at a certain time. To count a belief as counterbalanced in a case total insufficiency is an example of such principles. These principles are formulated by a priori reasoning. Chisholm offers that these principles are at work when a given belief with its negation or with some other related alternative beliefs or by any other possible beliefs. All these show that Chisholmian internalism embraces a relativistic and progressive approach to knowledge and justification.

⁵ Chisholm, M. Roderick. *Theory of Knowledge*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 1989. p. 76.

Epistemic status of belief may change after a time when epistemic situation of the subject changes, but this can happen only when the subject is aware of the new factors. However, epistemic principles, which are deduced by a priori reasoning, do not change.

I agree with this progressive, account type of knowing, and I defend it against a monolithic type that outmodes probabilistic assessments and highlights once and for all type singular propositions. Examination of Gettier cases shows that a progressive, account type is the only healthy option for internalism. But I also argue that there are critical exceptions, and these exceptions are extremely significant; for without them, any foundation for knowledge is impossible. In this respect, it should be pointed out that Chisholm's relativistic, progressive approach is by no means valid when it comes to certain and evident beliefs. A belief's being certain and evident cannot be identified by comparing it to some other propositions, and furthermore, cannot be identified unless the belief has this feature on its own.

CHAPTER 3

GETTIER CASES AND INADEQUACIES OF TRADITIONAL DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE

3.1 Gettier Cases

It is firstly stated by Plato in *Theaetetus* that knowledge is more than true belief. The concern of this statement is to point out a difference between knowing and making just a lucky guess. What should be added to a true belief to get knowledge is, according to traditional epistemology, justification. And it has always been regarded that justification is internal. This formulation pervades most of the history of epistemology at least until the externalist approach. One of the most contemporary representatives of traditional epistemology, Roderick M. Chisholm highlights this formulation:

The traditional or classic answer –and the one proposed in Plato’s dialogue, the *Theaetetus*—is that knowledge is *justified* true belief. The relevant sense of “justified” is the one we have expressed by means of the term “evident”; knowledge is *evident* true belief. According to this conception of knowledge, three conditions must obtain if a person knows a proposition to be true. First, the proposition is true; secondly, the person accepts it; and, thirdly, the proposition is one that is evident for that person.⁶

Edmund Gettier, in his famous article “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” presents a serious problem in the formulation of knowledge as justified true belief. Gettier firstly deals Plato’s, Chisholm’s, A. J. Ayer’s definitions as the traditionally

⁶ Chisholm. *Theory of Knowledge*. p. 90.

presupposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge and treats them as examples of this formulation. The definitions Chisholm and Ayer are, as follows:

Chisholm's definition:

- S knows that P IFF
- i. S accepts P,
 - ii. S has adequate evidence for P, and
 - iii. P is true.⁷

Ayer's definition:

- S knows that P IFF
- i. P is true
 - ii. S is sure that P is true, and
 - iii. S has the right to be sure that P is true.⁸

Gettier argues that the conditions stated by these philosophers do not really constitute a sufficient condition for the truth of the proposition that S knows that P. Gettier substitutes the phrases 'has adequate evidence for' or 'has the right to be sure that' for 'is justified in believing that' and then treated as if they are all the same.⁹ This substitution is not in fact so legitimate, particularly in the case of Chisholm's approach. In his definition, Chisholm almost bases his notion of justification upon 'being evident' and there are thinkers from the internalist camp to follow this notion. 'Being evident' is a special—but also a very difficult if not vague—criterion for justification and Gettier's examples of justification in his cases clearly do not fit with this criteria.

⁷ Chisholm, M. Roderick. *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 1957. p. 16.

⁸ Ayer, A. J. *The Problem of Knowledge*. London: Macmillan. 1956. p. 34.

⁹ Neta, Ram and Duncan Pritchard, eds. *Arguing about Knowledge*. USA: Routledge, 2009. p. 14.

Ayer's definition, on the other hand can be taken more as a general, non-restrictive notion of epistemic justification than a particular, or a special one. Although there is no clear utterance as to the nature of 'the right to be sure' by Ayer himself, there are at least some hints to take it as an epistemic—not a deontological— notion and to regard it as a general conception of justification. Ayer states that what provides one with the right to be sure is "to state and assess the grounds on which these claims to knowledge are made"¹⁰ and the phrase 'having been grounded' is limited neither to any particular epistemic state or tool nor to a deontological position. Besides, the notion of being grounded is still a widely accepted criterion for epistemic justification among some thinkers, none of them specifying it with any restrictive terms. As a result, noting that he seems to misinterpret Chisholm and legitimately modifying Ayer, Gettier reduces all traditional epistemic approaches to knowledge to this Platonic formula:

S knows that P IFF

- i. P is true
- ii. S believes that P, and
- iii. S is justified in believing that P.

Gettier presents two cases to show that the formulation of knowledge as justified true belief fails to differentiate between knowledge and a mere lucky guess. The Case I is as follows:

Suppose that Smith and Jones have applied for a certain job. And suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive proposition:
d. Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in his pocket.

¹⁰ Ibid. p. 12.

Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he, Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago. Proposition (d) entails:

e. The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.

Let us suppose that Smith sees the entailment from (d) to (e), and accepts (e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this case, Smith is clearly justified in believing that (e) is true.¹¹

It is presupposed strongly that Smith's evidence for (d) is sufficient for justification. It is a clear evidence for Jones even if it can be thought as not sufficient for some other people. The point here is to assure that, from Smith's perspective, the word of the president of the company is extremely reliable, and Smith, from his own perspective, (from his own internalism) has no serious apprehension as to whether things might change in a different direction. However, 'the Gettier Case' goes on in an abnormal direction:

But imagine, further, that, unknown to Smith, he himself, not Jones, will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d), from which Smith inferred (e), is false. In our example, then, all of the following are true: (i) (e) is true, Smith believes that (e) is true, and (ii) Smith is justified in believing that (e) is true. But it is equally clear that Smith does not *know* that (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how many coins are in Smith's pocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man who will get the job.¹²

The Case II presented by Gettier is almost similar to the Case I, however, while it is stronger in form, it is weaker in content: Smith now has strong evidence for the proposition 'Jones owns a Ford'. This evidence comes from his memory. At all

¹¹ Ibid. pp. 14-15.

¹² Ibid. p. 15.

times in the past he remembers his friend Jones driving a Ford and even he was offered a ride by Jones while driving the Ford. Smith has also another friend, Brown, and he does not know Brown's location. Then he constructs this proposition: h. Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona. The Gettier Case is as follows:

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First Jones does *not* own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not know that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.¹³

Gettier concludes that two cases show that formulation of knowledge as justified true belief is not sufficient to discriminate knowledge from mere true belief. One may object here that Smith's justification in both cases are not complete and are not sufficient for making a belief knowledge. But as already stated, the presupposition is that from his own perspective, he is completely justified. The objection to internalism here may seem to be excluding taking into account a view of an overseer, who may be in a position to detect the deficiencies of Smith's line of thought; therefore, such an objection may seem to be targeting only a very restrictive form of internalism. But this is not true. Firstly, there is no such form of internalism to attack, which sticks exclusively to an armchair reflection in the literal sense. Information from outside, from other people, and from other intelligences are surely allowed provided that subject becomes aware of its validity. Second, Smith actually gets information from an outside source in the cases. The point in the Gettier cases is that one should take the line of Smith's thought—apart from skepticism—as much satisfying and complete to everybody as it is to Smith himself. In such a circumstance there is no overseer in the set of intelligent beings.

¹³ Ibid. p. 15.

These intelligent beings are not ideal figures as to become ideal overseers and when there are so little hints in nature to show what is missing in their thoughts, those hints can be so small that neither of them can catch it. An updated version of a case given by Bertrand Russell will illustrate this. Russell's original version is also a critique of the traditional formula of knowledge. It is as follows:

It is very easy to give examples of true beliefs that are not knowledge. There is the man who looks at a clock which is not going, though he thinks it is, and who happens to look at it the moment when it is right, this man acquires a true belief as to the time of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge.¹⁴

It should be noted that in the above example an implicit justification for the clock's working is assumed. And it may well be the case that the justification is quite strong. For instance, the man can be supposed to have been checking the clock for some years every day, and noting that it always works properly. But the duration of the last observation in which the clock is not working is too short and this may be a drawback for the justified true belief. Thus, a different version I propose is that the clock is working, but going slower than a standard one. So there are certain moments when the slower going clock shows the definite time. And there is a set of people to look at the clock one time, separately from each other—without communicating any other on the same task—, within a quite vast period of time—for instance, for some years—and their time for a session, although limited, is by no means short. Thus in any session, they can observe the clock for a while. Coincidentally, in their session, they all look at the clock when it presents the real time. Suppose that these people are intelligent enough to have the suspicion that clock is not working properly, so checking it out carefully to see whether it is going but none of them is perfectly sensible enough to discern that it goes slightly slowly.

¹⁴ Russell, Bertrand. *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits*. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1948. p. 155.

Thus, to all, it seems to be that the clock goes probably correctly. Then they compare their results with a standard clock and see that it gives the same results with the slow moving clock. Afterwards, these people come together and compare their own results. The sum of all these surely provides them a justified true belief about the time of the day when they checked the time by looking at the slower going clock. But their results are coincidentally true.

Now that it is almost impossible to be an overseer against this situation. No human will have such a skeptic suspicion about such a least possibility. And, admittedly, such a least possibility may not occur in real life—in real knowing situations. But epistemologically, such radical Gettier-type cases are valid. There are also real life-real knowing situations where Gettier cases may occur, even at a philosophical level. The crucial point is that one does not need to question her/his justification any more when the result is that her/his belief happens to be true. This is especially the case when Gettier's original examples are taken into account. When one does not detect that s/he is not in a possible Gettier-type situation, then s/he will have no problem with her/his justification, which in fact has no role in rendering the belief true. Besides having no problem with her/his belief when one justifies a belief and it happens to be true and s/he is not aware that there is a possibility that belief is accidentally true, one tends to *trust* her/his justification more. Truth, which is achieved accidentally, will be a reason for the believer to trust her/his justification, which in fact has no role in rendering the belief true, or navigating the believer to truth. Therefore, the trust to her/his justification that one is endowed when the belief happens to be true 1) prevents one from seeing that s/he in fact does not know, 2) leads one to believe more strongly that her/his justification is completely reliable. The real merit of Gettier-type examples is that if one disregards their possibility, then one is prone to such a danger of over-trusting a justification which is in fact weak. However, it should also be noted that the more intrinsic, rational

and sophisticated the justification is rendered, the less possibility any possible Gettier type case will have.

3.2 The Notion of Justification

But the immediate and the most concrete lesson to take from Gettier is that there is not a necessary relation between the notion of justification and truth, at least given the present situation with internalist epistemology. Even Chisholm grants that according to “traditional conception of ‘internal’ epistemic justification, there is no *logical* connection between epistemic justification and truth. A belief may be internally justified and yet be *false*”¹⁵. This may, however, be due to the fact that a complete, perfect justification is yet impossible. There is still no reason to reject that—even with the Gettier cases—a perfect justification bears a necessary connection to truth. The problem, therefore, is that we do not yet have proper epistemic tools for a perfect justification of beliefs. And such epistemic tools are still far from being close to us, if they are not impossible to achieve. Besides, the strongest tools achieved up to the present are invariably under skeptical challenge. Even the propositions that are the most evident cannot be clearly deprived of the possibility that one is in deception:

It is possible that there are some propositions that which are both *evident* and false. This fact makes theory of knowledge more difficult than it otherwise would be and it has led some philosophers to wonder whether, after all, the things we know might not be restricted to those things that are absolutely certain. But if we do in fact know some of those ordinary things that we think we know (for example, that there are such and such pieces of furniture in the room, that the sun was shining yesterday, that the earth has existed for many years past) then we must reconcile

¹⁵ Chisholm. *Theory of Knowledge*. p. 76.

ourselves to the possibility that on occasion some of those things that are evident to us are also false.¹⁶

Although the instances presented above are not valid for the reason that it is difficult to conceive how a belief based on induction can be counted as evident, the main rationale is that justification is not necessarily connected to truth in a perfectly reliable sense. But this is not a rule about the notion of justification. For, if it was ever guaranteed that our epistemic tools were perfect, then it would be quite irrational that there is not a necessary connection between justification rendered by those tools and truth. Suppose that when Smith got information from the president of the company, he had some perfect epistemic tools for assessing whether the president was a completely reliable source of information or not. Or suppose he had perfect tools to determine whether there was a perfectly reliable source of information at and to assess who or what it was. Also suppose that he knows perfectly that the tools are perfect. This *logically* entails that he would surely know who would get the job, because then he would be informed by a *completely* or *perfectly* reliable source, and he would know that it was so. One may suppose here that a truth depending on a logical connection is not in need of a justification; but it should be reminded that the logical connection may be hidden, and thus it should be uncovered by a thinking process. This thinking process may well be called a kind of justification.

The difficulties exposed by Gettier-type cases can be interpreted no more than the difficulties already being faced by the traditional epistemology. What prevents one from perfect tools is that we cannot form infallible, certain basic beliefs in the case of foundationalism, and cannot account for how one's beliefs cohere with one another in the case of coherentism. Or one cannot account for a necessary relation between a certain cause and an effect. A perfect solution to these problems would

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 12.

provide us with a perfect justification at least for most of our beliefs and there would be no Gettier-cases to penetrate between our belief system and truth.

But still, very significantly, Gettier-type cases expose another problematic point: It is simply that the traditional formulation of knowledge is problematic. This is because, if there is necessary connection between justification and truth, and it is achievable with perfect epistemic tools, then it is irrelevant to say both that 1) the belief be justified and 2) the belief is true. For, if the belief is justified and if justification is complete, then the belief of it is proven by the justification itself. There is no need to put the further condition that the belief is true. On the other hand, if the belief is justified and if the justification is not complete, and therefore if there is not a necessary relation between the justification of belief and its being true, then it is vulnerable to Gettier-type cases. This means that the justification has nothing to do with the belief's being true and that in such a case one cannot be said to know on the basis of her/his justification.

But from another point of view, the assertion that justification has nothing to do with a belief's being true does not depict the real situation of the nature of the notion of justification. An epistemically proper justification is at least expected to be truth-conducive, that is to say it aims at being at least closer to truth using some certain epistemic tools—like argumentative reasoning. Thus, if one is to make an empirical judgment, or is to achieve an empirical truth, then s/he, by presupposing some empirical necessities like what is empirical is evident and true, arrives at some empirical truths by some certain reasoning. When s/he presupposes some empirical necessities, s/he simply evades the problems of epistemology, like how empirical is evident and truth. But still her/his presupposing and reasoning is at least conducive to truth, however deficient they may be. A deficient aim for truth is certainly better than refining from truth or distorting it:

The distinguishing characteristic of epistemic justification is thus its essential or internal relation to the cognitive goal of truth. It follows that one's cognitive endeavors are epistemically justified only if and to the extent that they are aimed at this goal, which means very roughly that one accepts all and only those beliefs which one has good reason to think are true. To accept a belief in the absence of such reason, however appealing or mandatory such acceptance might be from some other standpoint, is to neglect the pursuit of truth.¹⁷

Therefore, it is not necessary to demand an almost logical and necessary relation between justification and truth. In fact justification comes to stage when one does not have this logical and necessary relation readily at hand. When such is the case, what one can do with justification is to gain an approximation to truth. Then, if the approximation leaps from its estimated value to a hundred percent degree of certainty, or is exaggerated in favor of a positive value, then it is surely very natural that a justified belief may prove to be wrong. And in such situations it is also natural that there can be results where a justified belief cannot be distinguishable from a lucky guess. Bonjour even defends that it is a necessary situation for a justification to be not connected logically and immediately to truth in order to become significant:

What makes us cognitive beings at all is our capacity for belief, and the goal of our distinctively cognitive endeavors is truth: we want our beliefs to correctly and accurately depict the world. If truth were somehow immediately and unproblematically accessible (as it is, on some accounts, for God) so that one could in all cases opt simply to believe the truth, then the concept of justification would be of little significance and would play no independent role in cognition. But this epistemically ideal situation is quite obviously not the one in which we find ourselves. We have no such immediate and unproblematic access to truth, and it is for this reason that justification comes into the picture. The basic role of justification is that of a means to truth, a more directly attainable mediating link between our subjective starting point and our

¹⁷ Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. p. 8.

objective goal. We cannot, in most cases at least, bring it about directly that our beliefs are true, but we can presumably bring it about directly (though perhaps only in the long run) that they are epistemically justified.¹⁸

Then, it remains to choose the standards and tools of epistemic justification as properly as possible. The task is not necessarily to gain truth but increase the likelihood of finding it, or to be close to it as much as possible. This means that epistemic justification, contrary to the traditional approach, is “in the final analysis only an instrumental value, not an intrinsic one.”¹⁹ Now that the value of justification in the Gettier-type cases is not to be estimated with its relation to truth; but should be estimated with its value of being conducive to truth. Thus Smith’s belief is not a mere lucky guess but a justified belief, which is a reasonable approximation to truth. This is independent from how his belief came to be true—in fact it came to be true by totally other factors than his justification. But this should not degrade his justification. The criterion for the value of a justification is its power of truth-conduciveness and this is estimated by resorting to which tools and standards are used and how they are used to approximate to truth—whether justification is on the right way to truth or not. As Bonjour did, it is reasonable to think that, if justification “did not substantially increase the likelihood of finding true ones, then epistemic justification would be irrelevant to our main cognitive goal and of dubious worth.”²⁰ It is nothing but a justification’s ability to constitute, along with our belief, “a path to truth that we as cognitive beings have any motive for preferring epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically unjustified ones.”²¹

¹⁸ Ibid. pp. 7-8.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 8.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 8.

²¹ Ibid. p. 8.

However, the rescuing of the value of justification in Gettier-cases should not mean that the concept of knowledge is also rescued. It is quite odd to think that there is knowledge of a proposition which is in fact false. Whereas justification is truth-conducive, knowledge should possess more; there is no truth-conducive knowledge. For Bonjour, the rationale behind justification is primarily to render a belief to depart from a counter-balanced position as regards to being true and not being true. It is the second task to approximate truth as much as possible. Thus, a justification is still valid and thus valuable if it only renders that the belief is more likely to be true than being counter-balanced between being true or false, or being withheld. Knowledge, on the other hand is a notion that has more to do with truth. Thus the dilemma here is that the more justification is distanced from the notion of truth—to rescue it from the Gettier-case attack—the more the gap between justification and knowledge gets wider.

The solution offered for this dilemma is to define a way to estimate the probability of truth for a certain justification, and to define a high probability criterion to meet in order to count a justified belief as knowledge. Given such probability conditions for justification, there is a new kind of relation between truth and justification. Being other necessary but still logical, “this relation is ... spelled out in probabilistic terms: given the satisfaction of the conditions of justification, it is highly probable that the pertinent beliefs are true.”²² Bonjour similarly claims the formula of knowledge as highly probable belief as a choice:

Given the intimate connection ... between epistemic justification and likelihood of truth, it seems reasonable to take likelihood or probability of truth as a measure of the degree of epistemic justification and thus to interpret the foregoing question as asking how likely or probable it must be, relative to the justification of one’s belief, that the belief be true in order for that belief to satisfy the adequate-justification requirement for

²² Vahid, Hamid. *Epistemic Justification and the Sceptical Challenge*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. p. 12.

knowledge. Many historical theories of knowledge have answered that knowledge requires certainty of truth *relative* to one's justification. But more recent views have tended to reject this answer, on the grounds that it leads inevitably to an automatic and uninteresting skepticism, and to hold instead that knowledge requires only a reasonably high likelihood or probability of truth.²³

The danger of the older view stated by Bonjour above is that it leaves the task of justification to mental capacities of the subject in question, and more objective dimensions are somewhat excluded. This is because the subject is supposed to be ignorant about them and that they have no positive contribution to her/his justification. For instance, in the case of Gettier's Smith, he does not take into account of what he is not informed; but that which he is not informed still carries a degree of being probable. Therefore, by disregarding this, he is not presented in his own mind a degree of probability about his belief; rather he is presented with a certainty of truth of his belief. He thinks that his justification is accurate. And one of the main reasons for this is that he disregards the possibility of some possible alternative situations. Also suppose he just had the belief that Jones would get the job; then, although his justification is accurate, his belief would be wrong. Thus the problem is not solely about making discrimination from a lucky guess, but it is also that there is a considerable possibility of making mistakes and the subject who did the justification should be aware of this possibility and keep it in mind. A justification which is not fully rational and not complete is always more or less prone to lead either justified false beliefs, or to justified true beliefs that are indistinguishable from lucky guesses. Another significant conclusion of this view is that the beliefs about a certain subject matter may considerably change from one person to another. It even can lead to relatively high proportion of contradictory results. Some 'knowledge' about a certain subject matter cannot contradict with some other 'knowledge'. Suppose another person other than Smith gets information

²³ Bonjour. *Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. p. 54.

from another source that not Jones, but Smith would get the job. Then there would be two contradictory 'knowledges'. This mainly results from the fact that the possibility of alternative situations is quite disregarded by the believers, which would, if taken into account, put their justification into a test of probability and left them with a proportionally lower possibility of truth. A relatively low possibility of truth should deter one to leap from justified belief to knowledge. Therefore, the more a justification accounts for possible alternative situations, the more reliable it becomes; but also the less attainment to facts it gets. In this way, knowledge is reduced to an account of possibilities about facts.

3.3 The Lottery Paradox

Another problem with the formulation arises out of the question of how legitimate to leap from justified belief to knowledge is even when the probability of truth one obtains by her/his justification is extremely high. Surely there is always possibility for any justified belief even with very high probability of being true, for proving to be false eventually. This can be excused to a degree, as like accidents may happen. But there can be more severe results than being prone to accidents. A certain version of famous lottery case, illustrates such a severe result: which is that, a justified belief with even the highest probability of being true, if taken as knowledge, can, not accidentally, but necessarily contradict with reality. Lottery case is originally developed by Armstrong but the version which is relevant is presented by Bonjour. It is as follows:

Suppose, for example, that we decide that a belief is adequately justified to satisfy the requirement for knowledge if the probability of its truth relative to its justification is .99 or greater. Imagine now that a lottery is to be held, about which we know the following facts: exactly 100 tickets have been sold, the drawing indeed be held, it will be a fair drawing, and there will be only one winning ticket. Consider now each of the 100 propositions of the form "ticket number n will lose" where n is replaced

by the number of one of the tickets. Since there are 100 tickets and only one winner, the probability of each proposition is .99; and hence if I believe each of them, my individual beliefs will be adequately justified to satisfy the requirement for knowledge. And then, given only the seemingly reasonable assumptions, first, if one has adequate justification for believing each of a set of propositions, one also has adequate justification for believing any further proposition entailed by the first proposition, it follows that I am adequately justified in believing that no ticket will win, contradicting my other information.²⁴

This is not an accidental, but a necessary contradiction, because it is necessary that there will be a ticket to win. The circumstance is defined and limited with certain conditions defined above and one of those conditions is that a ticket will win. The point here is that it is supposed that each individual to form a justified belief and knowledge about the situation does not have the information that the case is pre-defined with such conditions. In such a case, the individuals have the right to think that there is some real possibility that no ticket will win. Thus, it is very natural to leap to knowledge from a justified belief having such a high probability of being true.

A drawback from the definition of knowledge seemingly solves the problem: It becomes necessary to abandon the concept of knowledge as a hundred percent presentation of truth, and instead abiding to a more moderate definition which is that knowledge presents just a very high probability of truth. This is the view advocated by Goldman to account for his theory of reliability theory of knowledge and justification, but it can be applied to internalist approaches as well. But there is an immediate challenge to this view worth to mention, by highlighting again the lottery case with some new details. This challenge points to the fact that it is sometimes very difficult to determine a value of probability, and some several ways severely contradict with one another:

²⁴ Ibid. p. 54.

Suppose a lottery case is at stake with exactly the same conditions given in the above example. Then each ticket is known to have 99 percentage of losing and also it is known that 100 percent that one ticket will win. Then suppose another case of a lottery, in which every individual is presented with a different pack of a one hundred tickets. For each of the packs, there is one ticket to win. Then, it is clear that in this second case the percentage of a chosen ticket by each individual from each separate pack to lose is 99 percent. However, as it is the case that each individual is provided with a different pack than another, there is the real possibility that at the end of all the session, no ticket will win. Besides, this possibility is quite high. This means that in the second case of lottery the percentage of one ticket winning is extremely low while it is 100 percent in the first case.

If the individuals do not know in which lottery case they are in, how will they reconcile these two results? The gap between a very low probability and a hundred percent is so severe even to dismiss the notion of knowledge as a belief with a high proportion of truth. As to our judgments about empirical facts, we do not know whether we are in a pre-defined system of nature like in the first type of lottery case or we are in an open, not pre-given system of nature like in the second type of lottery case. Unfortunately each case donates us with dramatically different results of probability. In such situations knowledge can only be constituted in the form of some 'rational account of the situation' including as many possible cases as possible and their respective probability, rather than clear cut monolithic results. As presented above, this may sometimes bring out several probabilistic results that are sometimes quite difficult to combine with each other.

CHAPTER 4

EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM

4.1 Armstrong

Epistemic externalism opposes the view that knowledge necessarily requires internal justification and defends that there are at least some instances of knowledge where a true belief is justified only by factors that are not –or are not necessarily– cognitively accessible by the subject. Externalism presents itself as a serious alternative to traditional epistemology—the traditional way of knowing. And this alternative announces that it is, if not a providing a solution to the problems of traditional epistemology, at least providing a gateway to escape from them. The first explicit definition of externalism was given by David Armstrong in *Belief, Truth and Knowledge*, specifically as a reaction to the traditional internalist approach to epistemology:

According to “Externalist” accounts of non-inferential knowledge, what makes a true non-inferential belief a case of *knowledge* is some natural relation which holds between the belief-state, Bap, and the situation which makes the belief true. It is a matter of a certain relation holding between the believer and the world. It is important to notice that, unlike “Cartesian” and “Initial Credibility” theories, Externalist theories are regularly developed as theories of the nature of knowledge *generally* and not simply as theories of non-inferential knowledge.²⁵

Following the basic views of internalism-externalism debate, there certainly appears an immediate confusion over the structure and nature of the notion of justification.

²⁵ Armstrong, M. David. *Belief, Truth and Knowledge*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1973. p. 157.

The main points of confusion are, the sense in order to which the notion of justification should be understood and the degree as to which justification should be internal to the first person, e.g. the subject. What Armstrong points is that justification is not necessarily the epistemic notion internalists generally had in mind, who have been struggling hard with the theories of foundationalism and coherentism. Armstrong offers that justification is more a part of a natural process within our act of gaining or producing knowledge and that neither coherentism nor foundationalism is compatible with or is complimentary to what *naturally* goes on. A natural relation between the world and a belief-state is more a matter of science than a matter of the traditional epistemology and one need not to check out whether the belief coheres with his/her other beliefs or whether the belief has good epistemic foundations. It is more a matter of science because whether a belief is justified is no more a matter of reflection but a matter of measurable reaction. To explicate this, Armstrong introduces the ‘Thermometer’ view of knowledge:

When a true belief unsupported by reasons stands to the situation truly believed to exist as a thermometer-reading in a good thermometer stands to the actual temperature, then we have non-inferential knowledge.²⁶

In Armstrong’s view a belief which is unsupported by any reasons by the subject him/herself can still be an instance of knowledge as far as it is true. Then how is the true belief justified? Here Armstrong points out the law-like connection between the heat of the weather and the behavior of or the reaction of a good thermometer. We, as a part of our scientific practice, accept that there are such law-like connections in nature. Armstrong offers that a subject who holds a belief and being without some mental deficiency is in such a law-like relation to its epistemic environment and his/her holding a belief provides us a behavior of a certain epistemic measurement, just like a thermometer provides us with a measurement of the heat of the weather

²⁶ Ibid. p. 166.

through the working of some natural law. Here justification is understood in a different sense, a belief is justified not by reasoning or reflection of the subject but by detecting the law-like relation between his/her true belief and the world. This is the main distinctive point of externalism, it offers that epistemic enterprise may well be shifted from an armchair reflection practice to an examination of nature in which the knowing or believing subject is treated like a thermometer. In this way some properties of the subject with his/her epistemic behavior would help for finding the natural relation between the world and his/her belief-reaction to the world. Armstrong says that such natural relations or law-like connections should be “the sort of connections which can in principle be investigated by scientific method: by observation and, in particular, by experiment.”²⁷ This is a difficult task, as there are not definite law-like connections readily in hand. Even in situations where an armchair reflection is quite easy to justify a true belief, it may well be very difficult to expose a law like connection between that belief and the world. Armstrong is also aware of this:

In the case of a thermometer the investigation would not be difficult, in the case of beliefs it could be very difficult indeed, but there is no difference in principle between the cases. Were the particular thermometer-reading and the actual temperature at that time connected in a law-like way? We experiment with the thermometer, or a sufficiently similar one, and so draw a conclusion about the original situation. It is far harder to experiment with the beliefs of human beings, and so there may be much more guesswork in the assertion that a similar connection exists. But I take this to be a mere practical difficulty.²⁸

To Armstrong, if it is merely a practical difficulty to detect natural connections between beliefs and truths, and if it is an achievable goal to invent law-like generalizations for the relations between them, then it seems obvious that at least

²⁷ Ibid. p. 168.

²⁸ Ibid. pp. 168-169.

for empirical knowledge, Armstrong's externalism is a serious challenge to internalism. However, as it will be shown, the practical difficulties of externalism as he mentioned are much harder than he imagined.

4.2 Goldman and Inspirations of Externalist Epistemology

Alvin Goldman presents two externalist approaches to knowing and justification: the causal theory of knowing and reliabilism. However, it should be noted that both approaches are not necessarily anti-internalist; that is, they do not necessarily exclude internal elements from knowing and justification and can well be modified for internalism. In principle, they can at most provide a possibility to render internal elements unnecessary and thus open the way for externalism. Thus, the reason for externalists to embrace causal theory and reliabilism is that they are good options to make externalism seriously possible. Armstrong's externalism presented above is a mixture of causality and reliabilism: A nomological model presupposes causality, because a law-like relation is defined in terms of property of things and causal relations among them, and the existence of causality is firstly detected by experiments that aim to determine reliable results. Goldman firstly defends a purely causal theory, later he abandons it in favor of a mixed theory called process reliabilism. A causal theory without reliabilism and a reliabilist theory without causality have serious problems, therefore only option is to embrace a model in which causality and reliabilism are assumed together.

The prominent point with the two approaches is that they highlight a new position for epistemology. This new position is that the determining criterion for knowing is not necessarily the subject's own inclination and assessment that has the belief, but an outside point of view. This view urges that epistemology should be in connection with science, scientific inquiry, and scientific observation and assessment from outside. This doesn't readily mean that the subject's own internal

justification is irrelevant in knowing. Because as the result of an outside assessment, it may well prove to be the case that internal justification is significant for a subject to be counted as knowing.

It should firstly be stressed that Goldman's concern for offering the approaches is exclusively with knowledge of empirical propositions only, since he thinks that "the traditional analysis is adequate for knowledge of nonempirical truths."²⁹ Causal theory simply asserts that a belief is knowledge if it is produced by a causal chain or by a direct cause between the fact that the belief concerns, and the belief. Certainly, it is the fact that causes the belief, not vice versa. More simply, a true belief *p* is knowledge if it is caused by *p*. Thus, for example 1) if there is really a desk in front of me 2) and if it causes something on me, for instance causing a certain visual perception through my eyes, 3) and if that visual perception causes a belief on my mind about the existence of a desk in front of me—call it belief *p*—, then my belief *p* is knowledge. And it is not knowledge if such a cause or causal chain is not detected between desk's being in front of me and my belief that there is a desk in front of me. Causal theory puts forward the insight that causes are not internal elements that the subject is concretely aware of, but rather some mechanical items. Such internal elements here can only be a representation of the mechanical, and in that way, they are insignificant.

In the simplest sense, reliabilism is anything that produces reliably high ratio of true beliefs or outcomes. The outcome or belief itself may also be something reliable; if as a type, or as a series of tokens that can be typified, they present a high ratio of truth. It should be noted that Goldman's reliabilism is not a pure or simple reliabilism, but in fact a mixture of his causal theory and reliabilism; and this brand

²⁹ Goldman, Alvin I. "A Causal Theory of Knowing" first appeared in *The Journal Philosophy* 64 (1967), 357-372. Quot. *Liasions*. p. 69.

is called process reliabilism—and sometimes causal reliabilism. In process reliabilism, the core element of knowing is any belief producing process, which is reliable. Thus, a belief is knowledge if and only if it is produced by a process that is reliable. And any process is an outcome of some causal relations. Goldman's stress of the term process is on one's cognitive architecture, no matter it is in the scope of one's awareness or not. Thus, Goldman's process reliabilism primarily rests on human body and brain as a truth-conducive mechanism that produces high ratio of true beliefs.

Both direct causal theory and reliabilism in the pure and simple sense prove to be inadequate for accounting sufficiently for knowledge. In the case of direct causal theory, there are diverse serious problems and Goldman himself accepts that it cannot account for discriminating between certain alternative and this is one of his main motivations for developing instead a new approach to knowing and justification, namely, process reliabilism. Process reliabilism also embraces causality, but not as a direct relation between an empirical truth and the belief as it is the case in causal theory, but as a much more complex relations between environment, human body, brain and belief. As to the simple reliabilism, Goldman does not deal with it except for a brief criticizing, and as it will be shown, it is certainly very difficult to render it an efficient epistemic instrument. Both causal theory and reliability approach need each other and process reliabilism is the outcome of this.

The new position is inspired from naturalistic epistemology, with the belief that knowledge is a natural phenomenon and thus, like all other natural phenomenon, it may well be investigated as a science, or under the authority of science. In principle, Goldman acknowledges naturalist epistemology; but not necessarily in the empirically radicalized sense. He does not call off all the aspects of traditional epistemology, which he beliefs are altogether omitted by radical versions of

naturalistic epistemology. He preserves the idea that the traditional, normative tasks of epistemology like specifying the criteria, conditions, or standards for justification and/or knowledge are still distinctive components of epistemology and thus they at least should be accounted for before a complete elimination.³⁰ He also points to the fact that radical naturalist epistemology is not clear enough about how all warranted belief is to be treated empirical. His unique stance is called *moderate naturalism*, viewing the naturalist approach more as a generic source of traditional components. His formulation is as follows:

- (A) All epistemic warrant or justification is a function of the psychological (perhaps computational) processes that produce or preserve belief
- (B) The epistemological enterprise needs appropriate help from science, especially the science of the mind.³¹

Scientific approach to epistemology in essence does not eliminate, but decentralizes internalism; but it also *allows* for any possibility of a total rejection of internalism. And yet, it is the only one to allow for such a possibility within the internalism-externalism debate. Thus, with the new position and the possibilities it provides; scientific epistemology, although not essentially anti-internalist, is always central in defense of externalism against internalism. If any philosophical view tends to abide by anti-internalism beforehand, then it is only by this certain route that the way is open.

Goldman, as mentioned above, although not radical in his empiricist naturalism, is clearly an anti-internalist when it comes to his causal theory of knowing and

³⁰ Goldman, Alvin I. *Pathways to Knowledge: Private and Public*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. p.25.

³¹ Ibid. p. 26.

reliabilist approach. The moderate naturalism as defined above is, just a general picture of Goldman's concluding view on the issue of epistemology—perhaps a general resultant of his total views. As it seems, the evolution of his position starts with a radical externalist attitude in which all aspects of traditional epistemology are rejected, but eventually ties up to mild stance in which internal elements are somewhat important. The details of his stance and total views in the issue of epistemology are accounted elaborately with his causal theory of knowing and reliabilist approach, in which he clearly argues against internal elements. The quotation below shows to what degree his radical attitude amounts to:

... consider how tempting it is to say of an electric eye-door that it “knows” you are coming (at least that *something* is coming), or “sees” you coming. The attractiveness of the metaphor is easily explained on my theory: the door has a reliable mechanism for discriminating between something being before it and nothing being there. It has a “way of telling” whether or not something is there.³²

The way of telling that Goldman attributes to mechanical device, however, does not consist in telling a meaning and making a justification with reflection, but only in yielding a consistent output:

By contrast note how artificial it would be to apply more traditional analysis of ‘know’ to the electric eye-door, or to other mechanical detecting devices. How odd it would be to say that the door has “good reasons,” “adequate evidence,” “or complete justification” for thinking something is there; or that “it has the right to be sure” something is there. The oddity of these locutions indicates how far from the mark are the analyses of ‘know’ from which they derive.³³

³² Goldman, Alvin I. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”. *Liasions*. p. 102.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 102.

It is clear in the above example that Goldman views internal elements as irrelevant in the case of knowing and this reflects his general position in the internalism-externalism debate. His main presupposition seems to be that internal elements are not involved in any way in the link between belief and truth; an unconscious causal chain or a reliable mechanism or process can do the job properly. Thus, significantly, with the above example he clearly argues that intentional belief is irrelevant as far as the subject reacts in an appropriate way to a certain stimuli. As intentionality is eliminated, the belief and belief content is also almost to be eliminated. In fact, to regard intentional belief as unnecessary properly completes the main sketch of externalism; the elimination of all internal all items, including conscious belief itself is a better reflection of externalist approach. It would be quite problematic on the part of externalism to regard conscious belief a necessary part of knowing while regarding conscious justification as unnecessary. There is no satisfactory account of the eliminating preferences of externalism. A very striking problem is the question of whether a conscious but unintentional belief is possible. The rescue from this dilemma without eliminating conscious belief can be achieved only by sticking more and more to an old-fashioned, radical naturalism that forces the view that human knowledge is very primitive—composed of unintentional beliefs. However, this would be an unrealistic view about human knowledge. This dilemma is significant, and as it is presented in Goldman's criticism of Armstrong, some of his criticisms are strongly backed up by a consideration of intentional internal elements as vital and necessary, in a way quite inconsistent with his real position.

Goldman's anti-internalist position can be more clarified in his causal theory and process reliabilism. If causal theory rests on detecting the cause or causal process between a fact and a true belief about it, and reliability aims for determining whether some features of the subject's belief state or some process of her brain or cognitive architecture are reliable, and if a type of beliefs or outcomes are evaluated

on the criteria of producing high ratio of true beliefs; then it is primarily not the subject her/himself but an outside perspective that will detect whether these obtain or not. It is because the subject may not have the means to detect them. S/he may not determine whether her/his belief is caused by the fact in question, and s/he may not detect her/his brain's or cognitive architecture's present state, or may not know whether her type of belief is a kind to produce a high ratio of truth. Goldman's analysis does not involve giving "procedures for *finding out* whether a person (including oneself) knows a given proposition."³⁴ The point is that while "we sometimes know that people know certain propositions, ... (and) we sometimes know that their beliefs are causally connected (in appropriate ways) with the facts believed", it is a very difficult, or even impossible task "to find out whether this condition holds for a given proposition and a given person."³⁵ This leaves open the question of whether one's internally justified belief and her/his causal knowing are unconnected. Thus, internal justification, the notion of one's knowing that one knows may be an epistemic illusion from an outside perspective. Considering memory, its current state in a certain case of knowing and justification is a criterion to be used by both an outside perspective and the subject herself, but quite in a different way. The outside perspective has the advantage of detecting *scientifically* whether memory works properly in a certain case, while inside perspective has the advantage of being aware of remembering. That is, there is a 'privileged access' to the case of remembering. But, significantly this privileged access does not provide a certainty about whether the remembering in question is correct or not.

Defenders of causal theory and reliability at least favor the outside perspective over the inside. Linda Zagzebski, who is in fact a critic of reliabilism, points the most agreeable rationale of non-internalist stand on this matter as follows:

³⁴ Goldman, Alvin I. "A Causal Theory of Knowing", *Liasions*. p. 82.

³⁵ *Ibid.* p. 82.

Remembering is a natural conscious phenomenon, but we do not expect that a person can tell from the inside that her putative memory of what happened is an actual memory of what happened. That is, the conditions that distinguish a state of actual memory from mistaken memory are not conditions that the subject herself can determine. Similarly, the conditions that distinguish a state of actual knowing from a state that is not knowing but seems to be knowing to the subject, may not be conditions that the subject can determine.³⁶

What this position highlights is true; and it is quite a neutral position, as it cannot readily highlight externalism. It only highlights a demand for an outside assessment of reliability of memory. And this doesn't mean that a putative memory's being reliable or not cannot be determined by the subject him/herself. The subject her/himself may well check it out from outside. One can possess and interpret a data about oneself. Besides, although reliability of memory may be impossible to determine by an inside perspective, an strong internal conception or belief about it may be a necessary part of a reliable process concerning memory. If the subject knows from an outside assessment that memory is a reliable process, and s/he also knows that her/his strongly conceived internal memorizing-believing function is a necessary part of this reliable process, then it should be said of the internal element that it is necessary. But Goldman is not so neutral about this. For him, a reliable process about belief would possibly end up at most with a belief content that is non-inferential and with weak conception. And all other internal items are possibly not a necessary part of the reliable process, but a representation, or a co-product of it, and therefore they are irrelevant. He argues that there are many cases in which subject knows and all internal elements with strong conception are excluded from taking part her/his knowing—no matter what the nature of taking part is and what the possible function of elements are. It is, from the view of process reliabilism, of no significance how powerful any awareness or determination from inside imposes

³⁶ Zagrebski, Linda. *On Epistemology*. Belmont: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2009. p. 47.

the truth of a belief, as far as the belief is not yet detected to be caused by the fact or by a reliable process that is scientifically linked to the fact. And it is of no significance how weak or how refuting any awareness or determination from inside, as far as the belief is detected to be caused by the fact, or by a reliable process. Thus, when, in a case of true belief acquiring, there is a causal link without any strong conception of awareness on the part of subject—i.e., there is no strong internal element—and when that causal link produces true belief, then, to Goldman, this instance is a case of knowledge:

I know now, for example, that Abraham Lincoln was born in 1809. I originally came to know this fact, let us suppose, by reading an encyclopedia article. I believed that this encyclopedia was trustworthy and that its saying Lincoln was born in 1809 must have resulted from the fact that Lincoln was indeed born in 1809. Thus, my original knowledge of this fact was founded on a warranted inference. But I now no longer remember this inference. I remember that Lincoln was born in 1809, but not that this is stated in a certain encyclopedia. I no longer have any pertinent beliefs that highly confirm the proposition that Lincoln was born in 1809. Nevertheless, I know this proposition now. My original knowledge of it was preserved until now by the causal process of memory.³⁷

In the case of such an instance; Goldman, assuming the defenders of strong internalism, rightly argues that “(the) defenders of the traditional analysis would doubtlessly deny that I really do know Lincoln’s birth year.”³⁸ This is because the subject does not remember the inference of her/his belief, thus, lacking internal justification. To Goldman, internalist rejection on such examples put in danger many cases of knowledge, especially in our daily life, as “it seems clear that many things we know were originally learned in a way that we no longer remember.”³⁹

³⁷ Goldman, Alvin I. “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, *Liasions*. p. 80.

³⁸ *Ibid.* p. 81.

³⁹ *Ibid.* p. 81.

Then, if internalism embraces its most fundamental position, which is that, in order for a justified belief to be knowledge, the justification of the belief should be determined wholly by internal factors or components, then “the range of our knowledge would be drastically reduced... (as) these items were (inevitably) denied the status of knowledge.”⁴⁰

Here, there are two possible objections against Goldman to highlight. First is that, for her/his belief about Lincoln one may have such an internal justification: Although s/he does not remember the inference, s/he remember that, whatever it was, it was a reliable inference. This is surely a weak internal justification, probably a sample of the weakest type. But it is still internal enough and although obscurely, it relies on fresh memory and on a strong conception of the function of an undefined inference. This type of justification may not be sufficient to form reliable beliefs directly by internal decision. But the point here is that there is an option to determine whether such types are reliable or not: they can put under a reliability or causality test. This would surely be an external examination and process, but once the subject is informed about that examination and process—it may also well be the case that this examination and process can be exercised by the subject her/himself—, then s/he is internally justified about the result. If the result were that certain so-called weak types are reliable, or that they are part of causal chain, then they are necessary. And if, reliability or causality is also internally justified, then such weak types will be acceptable as internal justifiers.

The other objection is the question that whether one can have a belief solely without *any* justification? This objection targets the fact that Goldman does not pay significance to the strong conception about the function of an unidentified

⁴⁰ Ibid. p. 81.

inference, and this strong is what enables the subject to have the belief about Lincoln's birth year. There aren't yet any examples of externalist knowing given by Goldman in which the subject believes without any reasons. Thus, the question of whether it is really possible for a human to have a belief without having any clue about why s/he holds that belief is significant. This is a crucial question—the core of criticism of externalism; highlighted by Bonjour. The details of this problem and Bonjour's account will be discussed in the sixth chapter. The immediate point however, is that this issue is really an important problematic that forces externalism to abandon all conscious states in the issue of knowing or allow internal elements into notion of knowing in much more degree than any externalist would accept. To assert that one needs no justification for his beliefs does not mean that one *can* have belief without any implicit justification. Quite possibly, one cannot have it without some implicit sustainment that is concomitant with the belief. And it is unclear whether an implicit justification can be counted as external—although the same can be true for strong internalism, too. The belief may carry some item of the implicit justification, and the subject may have a primitive awareness of it—in such a way that is ready for a strong retrieval—which, on his/her part provides a link between the content of belief and its affirmation. The possibility of affirmation may well be a natural and necessary part of what we call belief—in such a way that without it no belief would occur at all. However, such a situation is in any way quite obscure and it is very difficult to decide whether such cases would really serve for a strong internalism: For a good internal justification, one should clarify the implicit justification within her/his consciousness.

Surely that doesn't mean that such a link cannot exist without the fact in concern being true. Otherwise one wouldn't have any false beliefs coming before one's mind. Thus, some internal element may be unreliable relative to some external justifying factors, but still be necessary in the epistemic sense if an epistemic agent's mind is constituted in a certain way that s/he cannot have any beliefs

without it. Goldman ignores such possibilities and takes belief in its very conceptual meaning, disregarding what in fact goes on in reality when someone has belief. He overlooks that it is one thing to have a propositional attitude and another thing what conditions are required for a human to have a propositional attitude. So, his theory, while trying to detect and put reliable causal conditions, may be missing an important part of the chain by adhering to a radical externalist attitude.

For instance, it is clear that an electric-eye door has a reaction, but does not have a propositional attitude, namely belief. It doesn't have human belief and human belief may well be something quite different from a proposition produced by an electric-eye door. Human belief may demand more intrinsic properties in order to be a phenomenal outcome. These problems on the part of externalism are still unresolved and will be discussed more elaborately on the sixth and seventh chapters. Here, it is sufficient to point out that Goldman tends to ignore such problems by presupposing that at of least some cases of knowing, whether attributed to human or not, is nothing but—at least in principle—an outcome of some mechanism quite like a mechanism of an electric-eye door with or without a belief content.

4.3 Is Naturalism Really That Close to Externalism?

While the question of whether an internal justification or imposing takes a significant part in causal knowing and process reliabilism in the case of *humans* is not answered; there may be cases to compare whether an anti-internalist type of knowing is possible for humans. There isn't yet a detected necessarily causal link between one's internally justified belief, or one's knowing that one knows and her/his causal knowing. But it doesn't mean that there is no such link, as there is no scientific evidence for that. However, as for what in fact goes on in reality, there may be some types of believing, especially the types attributed to animals, which

seem to lack at least an explicit link. These may constitute some paradigm cases for externalism. Goldman relies on this and takes animal believing-knowing as an archetype or even a stereotype for the conditions of human knowing—and as mentioned, for him, animal knowing is a representation of some mechanism. He presupposes that the way humans believe and know is quite compatible with the way animals believe—and in Goldman’s words, the way they know—, and offers an application without any risk of trouble: The answer to the question of how and why we know should be parallel or even identical with the answer to the question of how and why animals know:

In the spirit of naturalistic epistemology (cf. Quine 1969b), I am trying to fashion an account of knowing that focuses on more primitive and pervasive aspects of cognitive life, in connection with which, I believe, the term ‘know’ gets its application. A fundamental facet of human life, both human and, infra-human, is telling things apart, distinguishing predator from prey, for example, or a protective habitat from a threatening one. The concept of knowledge has its roots in this kind of cognitive activity.⁴¹

There are other defenders of the naturalistic view in epistemology, putting their efforts on the view that human knowing has its roots in human’s some primitive reactions to natural affairs for survival and human’s sensation of the environment. Their significant assertion is that human knowing and animal knowing are not that distinct, at least the gap is not as much as the traditional epistemology supposes. But the main trend is different than what Goldman tries to put forward. The results of cognitive ethology indicate that the situation is opposite of Goldman’s conception. Goldman thinks that human knowing is closer to the way animals believe in such a way that he supposes that the way animals believe has internal elements and motivations at a minimum degree—maybe none. This means humans have—or should have—less internal aspects than they are attributed to have and in

⁴¹ Ibid. p. 102.

that way they are closer to animals than traditional epistemology argues. But the other defenders of the naturalist view, who benefit from the approach of cognitive ethology, think in the other way. That is, human knowing is as it is, and animals in fact do possess more internal aspects than they are thought to have. Hilary Kornblith, examining a wide range of cognitive ethology literature, concludes that “the characterization of animal behavior itself, and not merely its explanation, requires intentional terminology.”⁴² This means that animals have intentional beliefs, not automatic behaviors in response to their environmental conditions. This considerably opens the gap between the nature of animal cognition and the mechanism of an electric eye-door:

Animal behavior thus cannot adequately be described, let alone explained, if we insist on narrowly circumscribing our vocabulary to talk of the motions of bodily parts. Even some of the fairly crude behavior of ants requires that we allow for internal states with informational content. Informational content by itself, however, falls short of true mental representation. Thermostats have internal states that register information about their environment; they do not, however, have mental states. And even allowing for the existence of mental states with informational content does not, by itself, give us belief.⁴³

Although arguing that reflection—second-order type awareness—is irrelevant in the case of human knowing and knowing in general, Kornblith is quite in content with the necessity of first-order awareness in the description of any case knowing. In defending that animals in fact know on the basis of cognitive ethologists’ explanations, he bases the argument on the fact that they do possess more internal elements than mere act of believing:

⁴² Kornblith, Hilary. *Knowledge and Its Place in Nature*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. p. 34.

⁴³ *Ibid.* pp. 36-37.

Notice that these explanations require more than just the category of true belief. If we are to explain why it is that plovers are able to protect their nests, we must appeal to a capacity to recognize features of the environment, and thus the true beliefs that particular plovers acquire will be the product of a stable capacity for the production of true beliefs. The resulting true beliefs are not accidentally true; they are produced by a cognitive capacity that is attuned to its environment.⁴⁴

The cognitive capacity mentioned does not necessarily imply a existence of internal elements but it would possibly lead to the conclusion that observations done by cognitive ethologists at least quite strongly suggest that animals have internal elements in their case of believing. This is implied by Kornblith's own conclusion that animals know in a way similar with "the kind of knowledge that philosophers have talked about".⁴⁵ Surely this doesn't readily involve reflection, but should involve a considerable degree of intentionality and awareness:

Indeed, the very idea of animal behavior requires the receptions, integration, and retention of information from a wide range of different sources. But this is just to say that any conception of sophisticated animal behavior that makes any sense of it will have to see the animal's cognitive equipment as serving the goal of picking up and processing information. And this commits one to the notion of animal knowledge.⁴⁶

Therefore, to compare with Goldman's Lincoln case, many beliefs of animals may well be a type of such a case and this type is, as mentioned, a more or less internalist way of knowing. As presented above, animals' cognitive equipment is so diverse and intricate, and such an abundance of equipment leads to conclude that at least some of the items are expected to be internal elements. Thus, it seems to be a

⁴⁴ Ibid. p. 58.

⁴⁵ Ibid. p. 39.

⁴⁶ Ibid. pp. 60-61.

strong possibility that, there are at least some instances where it is not expected from at least some species of animals to believe solely without an intention and without some reasons.

Even it is supposed that the real case with the animals is, contrary to expected, that they do not have internal elements in their beliefs, then there is still a problem on the part of anti-internalism in the issue of assuming animal believing-knowing state as a sample type. The problem is that, as a result of evolution, humans may have naturally different cognitive architecture than animals—not necessarily dramatically superior—and it may be a scientific mistake to think of a human’s cognitive architecture being identical to animals’ in general. There are expected differences between all families and species of animals, and probably some significant differences between animals and human, because every species has had their own conditions of evolution. Even if there isn’t a wide gap between cognitive powers of humans and some animals, it may still be the case that internal elements are necessary components of human knowing. This has nothing to do with the issue of cognitive power. Therefore, the only reasonable offer of externalism should yet be that in terms of attaining true beliefs, a scientific outside position is better than an internal evaluation from inside, but should not be that internal elements are irrelevant or unnecessary. This only amounts to changing internalist elements’ role and function and not eliminating them altogether. A decentralization of an element from a case does not make that element irrelevant; it may still be a necessary component of the case in some other way than before.

CHAPTER 5

CAUSAL THEORY AND RELIABILISM

This chapter gets deeper into causal theory of knowing and reliabilism and shows that causality and reliabilism in their pure forms have serious problems and that they should sustain each other for an acceptable theory of knowledge. Particularly, Goldman's abandonment of a pure causal theory in favor of process reliabilism is also accounted. It also aims to show that Goldman presupposes conscious belief in his externalist accounts and in his critique of Armstrong and to show that contrary to Goldman's interpretation, Armstrong's nomological reliabilism involves causality. As to the existence of belief content in their accounts, the conclusion is that Armstrong explicitly presupposes non-inferential belief on the part of subject, and Goldman even tends to take more steps into internalism by resorting to inferential belief.

5.1 Problems of Pure Causal Theory

From one respect, Goldman's causal theory of knowing is more demanding—stronger—than the traditional analysis of knowing, which defends that knowledge is internally justified true belief. It is more demanding because it requires an appropriate causal link between the event and the belief concerning that event. However, from another respect, it is less demanding—weaker. It does not require an internal justification, at least in the sense that one must not “able, . . . , to *state* his justification for believing p, or his grounds for p.”⁴⁷ There are two advantages of Goldman's causal theory against the traditional view of knowing. First is that it

⁴⁷ Goldman, Alvin I. “A Causal Theory of Knowing”, *Liasions*. p. 80.

cope well with Gettier-type counter examples; if well-formed, a causal link between an event and belief completely eliminates the possibility of Gettier-type situations. The account given by Goldman is as follows:

Notice that what *makes* p true is the fact that Brown is in Barcelona, but that this fact has nothing to do with Smith's believing p . That is, there is no *causal* connection between the fact that Brown is in Barcelona and Smith's believing p . If Smith had come to believe p by reading a letter from Brown postmarked in Barcelona, then we might say that Smith knew p . Alternatively, if Jones did own a Ford, and his owning the Ford was manifested by his offer of a ride to Smith, and this in turn resulted in Smith's believing p , then we would say that Smith knew p . Thus, one thing that seems to be missing in this example is a causal connection between the fact that makes p true (or simply, the fact that p) and Smith's belief of p .⁴⁸

Second advantage is that it also reduces the risk of error; in other words, it reduces the risk of having false beliefs. If one's belief is the result of a causal link between event and the belief, a negative fact—an event that hasn't in fact happened—has no possibility to cause a belief on the subject. Both advantages however, bring a serious difficulty: It is often very difficult to trace the causal link between belief and the event, if belief is not very directly caused by the event. This difficulty is not apparently manifested by Goldman, is an important problem on the side of causal theory and it should have been one of the main reasons for Goldman's laying aside a purely causal theory of knowing, and embracing a causal reliabilist—process reliabilist—approach instead.

As to the construction of the causal theory, Goldman's original formulation of the theory is as follows: "*S knows that p if and only if the fact p is causally connected*

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 70.

in an “appropriate” way with *S*’s believing *p*”⁴⁹ where the components of an appropriate knowledge-producing causal processes include the following items:

1. perception
2. memory
3. a causal chain, ... , which is correctly reconstructed by inferences, each of which is warranted (background propositions help warrant an inference only if they are true)
4. combinations of 1, 2, and 3⁵⁰

The above items are not exclusive of some other components, but they are the necessary parts. Goldman states that while “knowledge can be acquired by a combination of perception and memory”, still “not all knowledge results from perception and memory alone.”⁵¹ There are cases of knowing based on some other items like inference, testimony, and information sources. But they are not necessary items and are usually of secondary significance. Self-warranting propositions, *prominently* internal grounds and reasoning on the other hand, are excluded. Even in the case of inference, it is also rendered the possibility of being devoid of strongly internal qualities:

As I shall use the term ‘inference’, to say that *S* knows *p* by “inference” does not entail that *S* went through an explicit, conscious process of reasoning. It is not necessary that he have talked to “himself”, saying something like “Since such-and-such is true, *p* must also be true.” My belief that there is a fire in the neighborhood is based on, or inferred from, my belief that I hear a fire engine. But I have not gone through a process of explicit reasoning, saying “There is a fire engine; therefore there must be a fire.”⁵²

⁴⁹ Ibid. p. 80.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 80.

⁵¹ Ibid. p. 72.

⁵² Ibid. p. 72.

The externalist motive here is a highlighting of a broader meaning of the term inference, which stresses that the act of inferring can have a more automatic aspect. The reason for this is that Goldman believes that strongly internalist elements, such as reasoning, one's talking to her/himself, etc. are not caused by the fact. They are untied from the fact's existence, from the way that it happens and from the way it imposes itself on the subject as belief-formation. They are rather, some abstractions or interpretations that the aware part of the mind imposes upon its own abstract situation—a situation which is irrelevant when there is the option of a concrete relation of mind with the fact. This concrete relation provides the mind an automatic process of inferring. Thus spirit of Goldman's externalism consists in a fact-domination stance, rather than a mind-domination one:

To illustrate the pertinence of analysis to the resolution of skepticism, consider the mind's access to various classes of objects. The fear of physical objects may be inaccessible to the mind presupposes some sort of account access. I will not try to say what accounts access (explicit or implicit) have led to skeptical worries. One way to allay these fears, though, is to give an adequate account of access, which shows how the mind does, or can, have access to the external world. *Causal* theories of knowledge try to do just this. They suggest that a causal, or causal-subjunctive, relationship between external objects and the mind, mediated by the perceptual systems, can be a sufficient condition for acquisition of knowledge about those objects. Whereas the access metaphor conveys the impression that the mind must somehow make its way 'to' the external world, the spirit of the causal theory is that it suffices for the objects to 'transmit information' to the mind, via energy propagation, sensory transduction, and the like. In short, the direction of epistemic access is not from the mind to the object, but from the object to the mind. If this is roughly right, there is no need to reconstruct objects out of materials that are 'closer' to the mind, namely, the mind's own contents. Knowledge is possible as long as it is

possible for objects and minds to stand in the right sort of causal relationship.⁵³

Against the epistemic strength of the notion of right causal relationship between objects and minds, there are four main problems on the side of a pure causal theory to consider. At least three of these problems explain why a reliability approach is needed to sustain the causal theory. First problem is the difficulty to escape from the requirement of examining every knowing case one by one in causal theory. Dealing all tokens one by one instead of using types is extremely difficult if not impossible. It is also in contrary to present scientific methodology as science works with types. Second and third problems are the questions of whether a causal theory can account for true beliefs about future and true beliefs of generalizations, for instance, a scientific generalization of all bodies attract each other. The fourth problem is directly presented and thoroughly accounted by Goldman himself and this problem seems to be the main reason for his abandoning a pure causal knowing, and embracing a mixed approach of causal theory and reliabilism. The problem is simply formulated as follows: When event P is the cause of belief p of a certain subject, and there is an event Q, such that if it were at stake then it would also cause the belief p on the same subject, then in order for the subject to be counted as knowing p, there must, on her/his side be a way of discrimination between P and Q. If there were no way to discriminate, then there must be an account of the *situation* in which the subject involved, an account that decides whether in the given situation Q is relevantly possible or not. This is called relevant alternative situations account.

First problem highlights the fact that causal theory forces to deal every instance of knowing case one by one because it does not allow for a generalization. In order to make a generalization and to make this generalization meaningful for further study,

⁵³ Goldman, Alvin I. *Epistemology and Cognition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p.36.

reliability theory is needed. It is very difficult to find out the causal link between the event and the belief, if belief is not caused by the event rather directly. Then it would be a hard task to determine when a certain item takes part in a causal chain or not. For instance, as mentioned, feelings and moods do *often* not take part in causal chain of knowing, but there can be instances where they are a part of it. On the other hand, perceptions very often take part in causal chain of knowing, but there are instances in which they take part in a case of false belief formation. Causal theory does not permit to prefer perceptions as a means of knowledge to feelings and moods, because types can have no meaning in a pure causal theory. It dictates that every case of knowing should be noted on its own, forcing a very impractical method. A preference between perceptions and feelings can only be made by evaluating their reliability. In his causal theory, Goldman does not dismiss the role of feelings and modes because they cannot a part of a causal link, but rather because that when they occur in a subject, they are *generally* not a part of a causal link:

What makes a cause, or causal process, the right kind of process for producing knowledge? What distinguishes knowledge-producing causes from other causes? Why isn't a feeling, or mood, an appropriate kind of cause? The natural answer seems to be: because belief formation based on mere feelings, or moods, can easily go wrong. It would be easy to be in a bad mood in the morning although the day is not going to be miserable. So if a belief gets forms in this fashion, it has a very good chance of being false. The belief does not qualify as knowledge—even if it happens to be true—because the style of belief production is error-prone, or unreliable. If, however, the belief-producing process is reliable, that helps qualify the belief for knowledge.⁵⁴

However, there can be instances where feelings and moods are really a part of the causal link or chain of a knowing situation. But then, this requires that every instance of belief should be examined separately, because the only way to

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 43.

understand whether a feeling or mood is part of a causal chain is to check it out. This will require enormously hard work. For a scientific study there must be some applicable patterns beforehand. The significant problem here is not that it is hard to detect whether a particular feeling presented in a subject, is actually involved in causal knowing chain or not. Although difficult, this may well be detected. And when it is positively or negatively detected, the way opens: if it is not a part of a causal chain, in which the fact that the belief concerns causes, or that no causal chain is detected at all while there is the belief and the mood causing it, then it is the case that the belief is not caused by the fact. The real problem however is that, causal theory forces that every case of causal knowing can be unique on its own, with different components and combinations; so every instance of knowing should be checked out one by one.

Therefore, feelings and moods are eliminated not because of they do not take part in knowing cases—actually they can and rarely do take part—but because they are unreliable—that is, they much more often take part in false belief acquirement than true belief acquirement. And to discriminate between every case about them one by one is impractical. Also it should be noted that it is impossible to determine *beforehand* whether a kind of feeling or mood is a potential participant for a certain type of causal knowing situation. Feelings and moods are such that it is not yet possible to categorize them in a way to present which of them has this potential and which of them has not. They cannot easily be discriminated as some diverse types by an outside observation, i.e., by a scientist—this is at least so up to the present.

This problem is not the case for perceptions: perceptions are not only detected to involve in the causal chain of many cases of causal knowing, but also, when they are not in fact involved and so yield to false beliefs, such perceptions that yield false beliefs can be detected and *categorically discriminated*. For instance, defect of eyesight is a concrete type to discriminate and it is detectible beforehand. The case

of feelings and moods yield a necessity of either examining every belief case particularly—in order to determine whether the concerning particular feeling or mood takes part in a causal chain caused by the concerned fact, or not—or to treat all feelings and modes as a single type, and try to discern the significance of the single type in causal knowledge acquiring. The former option is a difficult task in practice and probably not a science at all, as it will be devoid of generalization.

Second option makes reliability necessary. There is no other way than reliability to discern whether an item is significant or not in causal knowing. Goldman defines reliability as follows:

An object (an object, method, system, or what have you) is reliable if and only if (1) it is a sort of thing that tends to produce beliefs, and (2) the proportion of true beliefs it produces meets some threshold, or criterion value. Reliability, then, consists in a tendency to produce a high truth ratio of beliefs.⁵⁵

As to the definition of process reliabilism—i.e., causal reliabilism, and its role in the case of belief-knowledge relation, Goldman offers that a belief is knowledge or it is justified “if and only if it is produced (and/or sustained) by a reliable belief-forming process or sequence of processes.”⁵⁶ Feelings and moods are detected to be unreliable as it is the case that as a uniform, single type, they do not produce a high ratio of true beliefs, or high truth ratio of belief. They also cannot yet be categorized in such a way that some definite type of them produces high ratio of true beliefs. On the other hand, percepts are reliable as they can be categorized in such a way that a certain type of them can be defined and detected as producing

⁵⁵ Ibid. p. 26.

⁵⁶ Goldman, Alvin I. *Knowledge in a Social World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. P. 129.

high ratio of true beliefs. The type can be defined for instance, as something being produced by healthy sense organs—and a sense organ's being healthy or not is something detectable beforehand scientifically. Therefore, reliability takes over causal theory 1) because it renders a work with types as well rather than solely with tokens, and 2) because it provides a basis for elimination of items that cannot be well-defined—like some feelings and moods.

One of the main aspects of process reliabilism is that it focuses on the epistemic mechanism of subject's cognitive architecture; part of the causal link outside the cognitive architecture of subject has secondary importance. This is mainly because every human is supposed to have—or found to have, similar cognitive architecture while outer conditions of causal chain can be quite variable. There are, for Goldman, discernable reliable processes or mechanisms in human cognitive architecture that are mutual to all humans, and probably also to many creatures. This provides classifications and generalizations of some types of reliable processes to be used universally. Then, as far as such processes and mechanisms concerned, it is no more necessary to handle every instance of belief case *uniquely*; because *separate or unique* treatment of every individual subject's cognitive architecture is not needed.

The second problem concerns beliefs about future events. If knowledge is true belief caused by the fact which the belief is about, then it would be impossible to have knowledge of the future events. Because a yet non-existing event cannot be a cause of a belief, as it is simply non-existing. In *Human Knowledge and Human Nature*, Peter Carruthers gives such an example:

Thus, suppose that I have just set light to the fuse on a firework. I know that it is rocket of reliable manufacture, which has never failed in the past. I know that it has been stored in dry conditions, that the weather itself is now dry, and that there is no wind. Surely in these conditions I

may know that the rocket will shortly take off. But it is not the fact that the rocket will take off that causes my belief that it will (as the causal theory of knowledge would require). This would require backwards causation, which is impossible.⁵⁷

Goldman defends his theory against this objection by pointing out that the presupposed definition of causal knowing in such examples is wrong, or incomplete. It is true that in the above example the fact is not the cause of the true belief. However, to Goldman, there are variant causal chains in his causal theory, like for instance, a certain cause of a future event—and not the future event itself—may well be a cause of a true belief about the future event. Then his analysis does not face the above mentioned dilemma:

The analysis requires that there be a causal *connection* between *p* and *S*'s belief, not necessarily that *p* be a cause of *S*'s belief. *p* and *S*'s belief of *p* can also be causally connected in a way that yields knowledge if both *p* and *S*'s belief of *p* have a *common* cause.⁵⁸

As to the third problem, which is that, true beliefs about generalizations cannot be said to be caused by all particular instances of the generalization, and also not by the generalization itself, because a generalization is not a fact. The example of this is given again by Carruthers:

Equally, consider my belief that all massive bodies attract each other (the law of gravity). This may surely count as knowledge. But my belief is not caused by the fact that *all* bodies attract (past, future, and distant), but rather by the bodies that I have observed, and by the reports of other observers and scientists. So again, we appear to have a case of knowledge without causation by the fact which it concerns.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Carruthers, Peter. *Human Knowledge and Human Nature. A New Introduction to an Ancient Debate*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. pp. 72-73.

⁵⁸ Goldman, Alvin I. "A Causal Theory of Knowing", *Liasions*. p. 75.

⁵⁹ Carruthers, Peter. *Human Knowledge and Human Nature*. p. 73.

This problem can be resolved by speculating that whatever causes all bodies to attract also causes in me the belief. But this is a difficult proposal; it requires for instance, an examination that aims to discern the causal relations between gravitation and mind-brain structure and mechanisms. Process reliabilism may provide an easier way to handle the situation, because it does not strongly demand that the *causal role* of outer conditions and influences on the processes and mechanisms of mind be detected and accounted. Outer conditions, such as the environment of the subject are relevant in defining the present epistemic condition of the subject and this is an important component of Goldman's externalism. But the role of outer conditions here does not include being involved in a causal chain or link. The primary significance of the environment is that it just determines and presents a possible suitable assessment of the epistemic condition of the subject, not that it directly causes something on the subject. Process reliabilism would argue that whatever the outer cause to stimulate it be,—and there surely be something to cause whether directly, indirectly, or even remotely—there is a certain reliable aspect or mechanism of cognitive structure which forms true beliefs of generalizations. To determine the cause that simulates it may still be relevant and should be detected. However it is not necessary that it is caused by a total sum of facts—i.e. all bodies attract each other—that the belief proposes as a generalization.

The fourth problem has its roots again in the difficulties of the necessity to check every instance of knowing one by one in causal theory. About this topic, it echoes a more fundamental problem than the ones mentioned above: in order to discriminate simply between the causal chains that produce false beliefs and causal chains that produces true beliefs, a pure causal theory provides no alternative other than a one-by-one examination of the cases. The problem arises mostly from the fact that

human agents are not directly and/or ideally caused in an appropriate way by the truth that form beliefs in them. In some situations this may led to a shortcoming in the case of knowledge. In “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, Goldman presents the following case:

Consider the following example. Henry is driving in the countryside with his son. For the boy’s edification Henry identifies various objects ... Henry has no doubt about the identity of these objects; in particular, he has no doubt that the last-mentioned object is a barn, which indeed it is. Each of the identified objects has features characteristic of its type. Moreover, each object is fully in view, Henry has excellent eyesight, and he has enough time to look at them reasonably carefully, since there is little traffic to distract them.⁶⁰

To Goldman, within the frame given above, it is quite reasonable to many, including himself, to conclude that Henry knows that the object he sees is a barn. The case reflects a typical example of causal theory of knowing, including the internal element that Henry has the visual image of a barn, which is caused by a fact that is assumed to be a barn. A causal chain from an object to a subject forms in the subject a positive non-inferential belief about object. But, for Goldman, contrary to what his causal approach would dictate, the situation is quite different from the content of the non-inferential belief of Henry:

Suppose we are told that, unknown to Henry, the district he has just entered is full of papier-mâché facsimiles of barns. These facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns, but are really just façades, without back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used as barns. They are so cleverly constructed that travelers invariably mistake them for barns. Having just entered the district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine barn. But if the object on that site were a facsimile, Henry would mistake it for a barn. Given this new

⁶⁰ Goldman, Alvin I. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge” first appeared in *The Journal of Philosophy* 73 (1976), 771-791. Quot. Goldman Alvin I. *Liasons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences*. London: The MIT Press, 1992. p. 86.

information, we would be strongly inclined to withdraw the claim that Henry *knows* the object is barn.⁶¹

Given the above problem, Goldman modifies the condition for knowledge in such a way that “a person is said to know that p just in case he *distinguishes* or *discriminates* the truth of p from relevant alternatives.”⁶² In the above example the relevant alternatives are the possibilities of Henry’s assessment of the situation. A proper assessment would consider both the possibility of what he sees is barn and the possibility of what he sees is a fake barn. Distinguishing or discriminating involves considering a series of alternatives, and firstly recognizing which are relevant alternatives or not, and then deciding which of the relevant alternatives is most probable. This brings out reliability method. Because the primary problem here is “to specify when an alternative is “idle” and when it is “serious” (“relevant”),”⁶³ and this is achieved by an inductive inference based on certain number of previous observations on the alternative situations, considering their locations and to determine a proportion and frequency about them—and this means reliability method. In the light of the probabilistic results, one can make a discrimination between relevant and irrelevant alternatives. Then, asks Goldman:

Should we say that the possibility of a facsimile before him is serious or relevant possibility if there are no facsimiles in Henry’s district, but only in Sweden? Or if a single such facsimile once existed in Sweden, but none exist now?⁶⁴

⁶¹ Ibid. p. 86.

⁶² Ibid. p. 86.

⁶³ Ibid. p.88.

⁶⁴ Ibid. pp. 88-89.

This necessitates a reliable sensibility of the cognitive structure on the part of the subject about determining in which alternative situations s/he can be in. However, it is highly doubtful how this sensibility would work successfully without awareness taking part in the process, because this assessment may require rational judgment in the case of humans. Moreover, the consequence of this account is most probably a series of diverse beliefs on the part of the subject, which will necessitate an internal judgment among them. Therefore, a model in which internal justification is at stake, seems to be better, at least practically.

In any case, a causal theory without reliabilism is untenable as shown by the above problems. On the other hand, as the next section shows, a pure reliabilism is also very difficult notion to embrace. That is why both Goldman and Armstrong stick to mixed theories that include both causality and reliabilism in their epistemic positions.

5.2 Problems of Pure Reliabilism

Alvin Goldman calls Armstrong's nomological reliabilism as 'reliable indicator approach'. While it is true that Armstrong's nomological reliabilism is a kind reliable indicator approach, not all reliable indicator approaches are necessarily nomological or causal. The term reliable indicator has broader meaning than what is presented in Armstrong's approach to reliability. Also, contrary to Goldman's interpretation, Armstrong's approach is clearly causal, because it is nomological. A reliabilism without nomological or causal features can also be a reliable indicator approach and a reliabilism in its simplest sense is an example of this. The simplest sense of reliabilism dictates that if there is a high proportion of two events, facts, items, etc. occurring in certain regularity—for instance, occurring at the same time, or between the same time intervals--, then one item is a reliable indicator of the other. This is a type based on purely statistical data and high correlation. As there

is no causality or nomological relation asserted, any of the items can be a reliable indicator of other, no matter which one precedes the other in time.

This kind of reliabilism is nothing but a theoretical kind, which is completely devoid of any nomological, causal, logical and rational relation between the selected items. The aim to introduce it here is to show that 1) it is practically impossible to render it a useful epistemic tool, because it requires enormously complex and large quantity of observations to settle a conclusion by it and it can often lead to mistaken results; and 2) to show that, as it is a deficient tool, then causality should be a necessary component of any externalist theory.

The problems of simple reliabilism, that is, a reliabilism based on pure statistical data and correlation and without any nomological and causal features, if are not impossible to fix, are at least very difficult to cope with, and it may take almost an unknown amount of observation to settle down an instance of true belief. These problems are as follows:

- 1) It is insensitive to Gettier type cases, if such cases present a high frequency of occurring. This is because whenever the frequency of getting justified true beliefs by chance is high, then there would be no problem to be detected on the part of simple reliabilism. However, it should be noted that Gettier type cases have little chance of presenting high frequency of occurring; and if so, only in some limited and probably queer types of sampling. But whenever such a situation occurs, simple reliabilism will admit the correlations as reliable, and thus those lucky true beliefs will be reliable indicators of truth.
- 2) A purely statistical reliabilism may prove to be more reliable than causal reliabilism by providing higher ratio of truths, if the sole criterion is statistical data.

3) Highly remote and intuitively irrelevant correlations may prove to be reliable indicators of one and the other, as, at least theoretically, simple reliabilism is disinterested in inadequacy of such relational qualities.

4) In principle, simple reliabilism provides no insight to fix errors. This is because it does not assume causal mechanisms and nomological relations. When it is sensitive to errors however, it does not show the economical way for the location and fixing up the problem. It is, epistemically very slow compared to causal or nomological systems. Suppose that a watch works properly and shows the conventional real time for a long period of time. For simple reliabilism it is a reliable indicator of truth. When the watch has a problem and begins not to show the real time, simple reliabilism does not dictate that there is a problem with the *mechanism* of the watch. It either would assume that reliability of the watch simply finished or that something has changed so the watch changed. But where to find this change? To simple reliabilism, an irrelevant and remote change may be at stake; because simple reliabilism does not, in theory discriminate between causal and/or nomological factors and neutral factors.

A possible case to illustrate some of these problems is as follows: Suppose there are two people, one of which (A) lives in town P and the other (B) lives in town Q. Also, suppose that town P and town Q are quite remote from each other. One of the persons, A, has the habit of visiting a certain park on every Sunday at 8 o'clock p.m.—never at any other time—and the other one, B, has the habit of visiting the local library on every Sunday at 8 o'clock p.m.—never at any other time. B goes to the park on every Sunday at 8 o'clock because at that time, there is always an amusing concert on the park given by a street band. A lives close to the park and every time before s/he goes to the park, s/he slightly but definitely hears the sound of music, and this makes her/him go to the park to enjoy. Therefore the cause of her/his going to the park is the sound of the music s/he hears at home and the cause of her/his hearing music at home is the concert at the park. Therefore a causal

chain or relation is at stake between A's going to the park and there being a concert at the park. B on the other hand, also has surely some reasons to go to the library at the mentioned time—for instance, like library is not very crowded at that time. Now, to simple reliabilism, A's going to the park is a reliable indicator of both the occurrence of concert at the park and B's going to library. Up to now A's going to the park is equally reliable indicator to each event. But one Sunday A hears no sound of music. But s/he goes to the park at 8 o'clock p.m., thinking that the band is late and there will be a concert. However, s/he does not see and hear any concert. S/he waits there for a time in the hope of a starting but there happens no concert. Unbeknownst to her/him, one of the members of the band has been ill, and thus the band will not perform for three weeks and they haven't informed anybody about this situation. For the next two Sundays, A keeps on visiting the park at 8 o'clock p.m. in the hope of a concert, although s/he hears no sound at home. S/he does not rely on her/his hearing or not hearing of the music at home, because it has always been very slight in volume. But it has always been her/his hearing of the sound at home that caused his/her going to the park. As s/he recalls, the band was happy to perform there, earning some good money; so s/he thought there is just a temporal problem and the band will be back. During all those weeks B keeps on going to the library. After three weeks, the band comes back to continue its weekly performances. So A hears the sound and goes to the park again on every Sunday at 8 o'clock p.m.

Therefore during the band's absence, the cause of A's going to the park shifts temporarily—from the fact of hearing the sound of the concert at home and believing that there is a nice concert at the park to the mere possibility that there would be a concert, although there is no sound. This shift happens three times and if the band had not come back, then A would have stopped going to the park after the three weeks of the band's absence.

Within a set of for example, a hundred incidents, it is reasonable to say that A's going to the park is a reliable indicator of there happening a concert as the truth ratio is 97 percent. Indeed, it is a causal reliabilism. However, according to simple reliabilism, A's going to the park is a more reliable indicator of B's going to the library than there happening a concert in the park; because the truth ratio is 100 percent. And A's going to the concert and B's going to the library are, intuitively, quite irrelevant and remote events.

5.3 Problems in Goldman's Criticism of Armstrong

Two significant problems in Goldman's critique of Armstrong's reliable-indicator approach are that; 1) Goldman ignores the fact that Armstrong's approach is in fact causal; and 2) Goldman's externalist stance is not very stable, and sometimes sways from a strong externalism to a *more internalist* side. This is especially the case in the issue of belief content—in the issue of how a belief-content is acquired and what the subject's intention and awareness consists of when s/he acquires a belief. It is obvious in Goldman's example of the electric door bell that he is quite fond of dismissing awareness and intention on the part of the subject as epistemically irrelevant and thus, unnecessary. However, in his critique of Armstrong, Goldman appeals to the relation of belief-content to the true fact, arguing implicitly that belief should be *intentional* and should *intentionally* represent the true fact.

In *Epistemology and Cognition*, Goldman defines Armstrong's reliable-indicator approach as follows:

D.M. Armstrong has proposed such an account of knowledge. The model on which he bases this account—especially the account of *noninferential knowledge*—is the model of a reliable thermometer. In a reliable thermometer the temperature reading is a reliable indicator of the actual ambient temperature. Similarly, he proposes, a noninferential

belief counts as knowledge when it is a reliable indicator of the true state of affairs. Reliable indicatorship is explicated in terms of a nomological, or lawlike, connection between belief and the state of affairs that makes the belief true. If the having of the belief is nomologically sufficient for the belief's being true, then the belief is a reliable indicator and qualifies as a piece of knowledge.⁶⁵

It should be pointed out here that Armstrong's nomological model necessitates a causal connection, and this is what Goldman is missing in his view of Armstrong's model. A nomological model supposes that certain objects possess certain properties; for instance, bodies have property of attracting, or have the property of gravitational force, or liquids have the property of expanding when heated. Such properties are considered universal and necessary—synthetic a priori—in science; therefore they are rules, or laws of science. However, when these properties are exercised, a causal relation should be asserted, as if it is a causal relation that makes them happen; when a liquid is expanded, it is not only because it has such and such a property, but also that some cause—for instance, a heated surrounding—enables it to present this property. When an object is under an influence of gravity, there is always some other object to be inferred, which is the cause of the influence. Moreover, Armstrong's own analogy of thermometer is clearly based on a causal relation. Goldman gives the following example for the alleged drawbacks of Armstrong's approach:

Let B stand for a particular brain state, and suppose that whenever a human being believes he is in brain state B, this nomologically implies that he *is* in brain state B. This might happen because the only way to realize belief in this proposition is to be in brain state B. It follows from reliable-indicator account that whenever any person believes he is in brain state B, and hence the content of that belief is true, this true belief qualifies as knowledge. But this result is readily susceptible to counterexample. Suppose that what causes a given person to believe he

⁶⁵ Goldman, Alvin I. *Epistemology and Cognition*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986. p. 43.

is in brain state B is not any genuine understanding or information concerning brain states, in particular, no knowledge of the cited nomological fact. Further, suppose that he has no autocerebroscope to monitor his brain states and give readouts about them. He has just a firm hunch that he is in brain state B (it is a state he heard described in a recent lecture, but he dozed through most of that lecture and knows nothing of what was said about the state). Surely, he does not *know* he is in brain state B, although his belief to this effect is a reliable indicator of truth.⁶⁶

The problem Goldman intends to point out in this example is in fact, quite difficult to assess. There are some alternatives to consider:

- 1) He may be assuming that there is a nomological and non-causal relation between the belief in brain state B and the brain state B. This would surely be a mistaken conception of nomological relation as stated above.
- 2) He may be assuming that the belief is not caused by the brain state B but some other fact, and it is in fact the brain state B that is caused by the belief and not vice versa. If this is true, then in the above example, belief B is caused by some reason other than the brain state B, and the causal chain from the cause to the effect bypasses the brain state B, which, occur only after the occurrence of belief B. However, Armstrong rejects this kind of relationship as a criterion for knowledge. Bonjour mentions this in the following:

Armstrong adds several qualifications to this account, aimed at warding off various objections, of which I will mention only one. The nomological connection between the belief and the state of affairs which makes it true is to be restricted to “that of *completely reliable sign* to thing specified”. What this is intended to exclude is the case where the belief itself *causes* the state of affairs which makes it true. In such a case, it seems intuitively clear that the belief is not knowledge even

⁶⁶ Ibid. pp. 43-44.

though it satisfies the condition of complete reliability formulated above.⁶⁷

3) It may be case that in the above example, belief B and the brain state B are caused by some other cause. This does not readily mean that in such a situation there is not a nomological relation between them. Two events occurring together regularly at a certain interval of time, and having a mutual cause; have mutual nomological relation to one and the same item. This makes the two events nomologically related. However, if belief B and the brain state B are caused by some other cause, this shouldn't be a problem as far as considering Goldman's own view. In his analysis knowing future events by causal theory of knowing, he admits such occurrences as a case for knowledge.

4) Most possibly, what Goldman argues by the belief B-brain state B example is that, the belief content of the subject should be relevant to the fact concerned. This is difficult to understand why, as far as Goldman's own view about knowing is externalist. It is supposed in the example that a nomological relation holds, and as nomological relation necessitates causal relation, or a necessary relation, then it should be that the event that Goldman alleges for causing the belief state B, must also cause the brain state B. And it is most probably that it *firstly* causes the brain state B and then the brain state B causes the belief. This is the most plausible account of the example if it is to fit with Armstrong' model. Goldman's critique is that the belief content does not carry with itself about the fact and the fact being true; it seems, in content, to be completely irrelevant to the fact.

If the indicator relation is strengthened to a stronger variant, from nomological to logical sufficiency, what Goldman argues is that "even if the having of a given belief 'logically' guarantees the truth of the belief, the belief may not qualify as

⁶⁷ Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. p. 36.

knowledge.”⁶⁸ The apparent reason for such a *logically guaranteed* true belief’s not being counted as knowledge is that the belief is an indirect indicator of truth because its content is irrelevant to the truth; or to put it more clearly, the believer has nothing to do with the truth *indicated*, s/he has no intention on it and s/he is totally unaware of what s/he in fact reliably indicates as true. This can be illustrated by a person who utters the sentence I exist without knowing the meaning of the sentence. Here her/his uttering this sentence is a logical indicator of her/his existence, and therefore when the person utters this sentence, the meaning of sentence automatically becomes true. But, to Goldman, only for the sake of the reason that s/he does not know the meaning of the sentence, that person cannot be counted as knowing, although the uttering of the sentence is a completely reliable indicator of the truth of its meaning.

But from the perspective of externalism, there should not be any problem in such examples. Suppose that an electronic door bell does ring when there is nobody on the door, and it gets silent when there is somebody on the door. If its ringing is analogical to somebody’s being on the door, its expression—ringing—in the cases does not, in content, reflect the truth. But as far as it is consistent in its expressions with reversed content, there will be no problem; because it is still a reliable indicator of truth, although in reversed way. Thus, for externalism, both the motivation and the content of the belief is an irrelevant factor in case of knowing. The significant point is its consistency of reactions, not what it expresses. Goldman would surely accept that the reversely working electric door bell should be an instance of knowing within a strictly externalist account although the electronic door bell does not know both the meaning of its reactions and the meaning assigned to its reactions by people. This contrast forms the core opposition of internalism against externalism. Thus, anyone arguing for the necessity that a knower should

⁶⁸ Goldman, Alvin I. *Epistemology and Cognition*. p. 44.

know what s/he means will have some internal elements on her/his own account. It is worth to remind here that what externalism finds irrelevant is awareness, content awareness and intentionality primarily on the part of justification, not the belief. Thus an externalist may allow some awareness, content awareness and intentionality on the part of the belief. However, this allowance leads to severe problems on the part of externalism. As it will be shown in Bonjour's account of knowing, if some awareness is allowed, then there must be a complete reasoning. In his analysis of belief, it is found that except for the certain beliefs, a belief without some other beliefs to make it true is quite problematic; and it might even be argued that it cannot exist. This is because, in addition to its content, a belief also carries an additional belief within it; this additional belief is the belief that the content is true. However, this makes it a necessity on the subject to figure out what makes it true and this leads to an internal justification.

The concern of Goldman here is plausible only from an internalist point of view. His main point is to highlight that knowing and being a reliable indicator are different things; the former being an epistemic situation while the latter is, in the epistemic sense, nothing more than a result to be used by an epistemic agent. However, the spirit of externalist position consists in reducing the epistemic agent—the believer—to a non-autonomous epistemic result. Therefore it is difficult to understand the motivation of an externalist like Goldman to insist on intentional conscious belief content on the part of the subject.

Thus, as one belief content brings another and so on, insisting on preserving the belief content poses serious difficulties for Goldman to maintain externalism. In principle, a belief would require as much further belief as possible for a complete justification. In defense of evidentialism in favor of internalism, Conee and Feldman provide an example to show how quantity of facts evident to subject and

quantity of positive evidences as belief instances have positive impact on the justificational status of the subject:

Bob and Ray are sitting in an air-conditioned hotel lobby reading yesterday's newspaper. Each has read that it will be very warm today and, on that basis, each believes that it is very warm today. Then Bob goes outside and feels the heat. They both continue to believe that it is very warm today. But at this point Bob's belief is better justified.

Comment: Bob's justification for the belief was enhanced by his experience of feeling the heat, and thus undergoing a mental change which so to speak "internalized" the actual temperature. Ray had just the forecast to rely on.⁶⁹

The above example is weak in terms of favoring internalism and even evidentialism over externalism. This is because what makes Bob better justified is not that he has evident belief, but that he just has an additional belief. This additional belief need not to be a result of an internalized experience. Suppose Bob did not go outside and did not feel the heat, but just read from a thermometer outside, which told that it is very warm. Then, he would again be more justified than Ray, but this time his extra evidence is not an internalized experience.

However, the example is significant in showing that multiple data and multiple beliefs are more useful to arrive at knowledge than single data or belief. The more data and belief the subject requires the more her/his justificational status changes progressively. Thus, when a subject intentionally, and consciously holds a belief, and when s/he has access to the content of the belief in relation to truth—like Goldman defends—, then it would be inevitable that the subject should be fed by more conscious beliefs in order to progress his/her final belief. However, having multiple data and beliefs and arriving at a conclusion by means of processing it—

⁶⁹ Conee, Earl and Feldman, Richard. "Internalism Defended". *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism*. Hilary Kornblith, ed. Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Inc., 2001. p. 236.

i.e., by rational evaluation—require internal justification; because it would be an internal process. Therefore, demanding for an intentional conscious belief, which, the subject is aware of its content in relation to truth has the risk of inviting internalism.

Even if a single intentional belief with regard to truth is preserved without recourse to some other data and belief, there is still a problem on the part of causal reliabilism: Suppose that Bob did not read the newspaper and Ray did and it says it would be slightly warm today. In addition, the newspaper Ray read is a completely reliable information source about the weather forecast—what it had predicted so far has always turned up to be correct. On the other hand, Bob, unbeknownst to him, is not so successful in discriminating the approximate temperature of the weather by way of feeling—he surely can discriminate a very warm weather from a very cold weather, but cannot tell correctly in the cases when the intensity of hotness or coldness of weather is slight. He goes out and feels the temperature.

Now, both of them would have their own beliefs about the situation no matter what it is. Goldman would surely defend that Ray is better justified than Bob, so he is more a *knower*. This is because his belief is formed by a much more reliable causal process than Bob's. But now, suppose that Ray in fact does not know English, but knows how to read and write. He has a strange constant habit of uttering or writing down what he reads from the foreign newspapers without knowing the meaning of what he utters or writes down—perhaps in the aim of drilling a language he doesn't know yet. Although he does not understand what it says in the mentioned newspaper, he knows that *that* newspaper is a completely reliable source in weather. When he writes down the weather will be warm today, he outputs a proposition, which is justified and true, while the proposition has no relevant attitude on the part of the subject towards the truth. With respect to the previous case, from one perspective Ray's justificational status does change significantly because he no

longer has a conscious belief or belief content of the true fact concerned. From another perspective—which is the core perspective of externalism—his justificational status does not change because the reliability of the causal process does not change—at least, does not change significantly; and his output, what he writes or utters, is still a reliable indicator of truth. Goldman has the tendency to take his side on the former perspective.

CHAPTER 6

LAURENCE BONJOUR'S CRITICISM OF EXTERNALISM

Based upon Laurence Bonjour's criticism of externalism, four severe problems on the part of externalism arise: The problem of unmotivated belief, the problem of irresponsibly held belief, the regress problem and the problem of multiple beliefs. Bonjour's critique targets the form of externalism in which conscious belief on the part of the subject is presupposed. In his critique of Armstrong's externalism, Laurence Bonjour presents a series of cases in which the believer has a belief with totally no or at best only some weak intuition that it is true. Therefore s/he has no real concern or justification for what makes the belief true. It can be assumed, as Bonjour did, that someone may have such belief. There are thoughts with propositional content coming before one's mind without carrying an implication of being neither true nor false—or neither likely to be true nor likely to be false. But in general, no epistemic agent takes it for granted, and so, such thoughts are skipped as far as there is at least some implicit reason to hold them. But to externalism, such thoughts and beliefs are admissible if they are detected to be reliable by an outside observer. Bonjour's main concern for the presented cases is that an irrationally and irresponsibly taken true belief cannot be counted as knowledge on the part of the agent. This, at it seems, is primarily a deontological worry about knowledge. Bonjour's criticism supposes that the striking positive point for internalism is that it in the first place renders the epistemic agent responsible for what s/he believes. Externalist attitude to knowing releases the subject from the pursuit of truth and leaves this task to external processes, thus leaving the subject devoid of epistemic irresponsibility. To Bonjour, existence of such processes alone cannot be a criterion for the notion of justification, as "the idea of avoiding such

irresponsibility, of being epistemically responsible in one's believing, is the core of the notion of epistemic justification."⁷⁰

An irrational act of holding or choosing a belief proves to be imposing serious difficulties on externalism not only deontologically, but also technically. The first problem is, as mentioned, the problem of unmotivated belief. If the epistemic agent has no reasons on her/his part to hold—or maintain to hold—a belief, then it is difficult to imagine her/him to embrace and maintain to hold the belief. Another problem is that an irrationally and/or irresponsibly held belief is under the danger of being defeated by a rational competitor; namely by another belief which has rational grounds or reasons, whenever such a competitor belief is available. Only a *deliberately* irresponsible attitude can evade this possibility. Possibility of competing with other beliefs is also the case for any rational belief; that is, any rational belief, at least in principle, can also be defeated by a more rational one. But this is exactly the spirit of internalism: internal justification is a clash of candidate beliefs for truth and the subject rationally—and consciously—chooses and eliminates between them. Thus, such a problem—the problem of multiple beliefs—does not pose a threat for internalism. On the other hand, if it can be shown that there are at least some cases in which a competitor belief is not likely to occur, then externalism survives. The main point of the debate between moderate internalism and externalism is that moderate internalism argues that internal elements are necessary for every case of knowing and justification while such elements are not necessarily sufficient. Externalism on the other hand, argues that there are at least some cases of knowing where internal elements are not necessary. If the possibility of clash of multiple beliefs at least for some cases of knowing cannot be eliminated, then this implies a necessity of internal treatment for

⁷⁰ Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. p. 8.

knowing: clash of multiple beliefs can be resolved only by way of internal assessment. In the presence of such an outcome, externalism has the non-epistemic option of demanding that availability of competitor beliefs be exiled from the mind of the epistemic agent—perhaps by a pedagogical or even by a neurological operation.

Bonjour's cases also highlight a regress problem on the part of externalism. If externalism assumes that there should be an observer position to determine the validity of the belief formation; and if the observer's judgment should also be reliable and/or well-formed, then another observer is needed to judge it. As the same situation applies to every observer, then this leads to an infinite regress unless one of the observers decides on its own. Surely such a decision would be internal.

6.1 The Problem of Unmotivated Belief

The main point with the concept of unmotivated belief is that it is quite impossible to imagine how can such type of belief be held and maintained by some epistemic agent. The ordinary concept of belief is that it is propositional attitude. Thus, it does consist not only of a content, but also consists of the implicit or explicit inclination that the content is true, likely to be true, false or likely to be false—or some irrational inclination that the content is good, bad, amazing, disappointing, etc. This inclination is the motivation to hold the belief. However, even the irrational inclinations have some motivation with regards to whether the content obtains or not: namely that whether the content is true or not. Without this inclination, or attitude the subject is simply disinterested in the content, and so, s/he cannot be counted to be *really possessing* it as a propositional attitude. In the epistemic sense, the motivation or attitude for a belief is its relation to truth.

In his criticism of externalism, the first case Bonjour presents is as follows:

Samantha believes herself to have the power of clairvoyance, though she has no reasons for or against her belief. One day she comes to believe, for no apparent reason that the President is in New York City. She maintains this belief, appealing to her alleged clairvoyant power, even though she is at the same time aware of a massive amount of apparently cogent evidence, consisting of news reports, press releases, allegedly live television pictures, and so on, indicating that the President is at that time in Washington, D.C. Now the President is in fact in New York City, the evidence to the contrary being part of a massive official hoax mounted in the face of an assassination threat. Moreover, Samantha does in fact have completely reliable clairvoyant power under the conditions which were then satisfied, and her belief about the President did result from the operation of that power.⁷¹

The immediate problem shown with this case, as noted earlier, is that how can one acquire and hold a belief without having any reasons. This is not only a case of deontological difficulty. There is also a technical difficulty with it. People often have irrationally held beliefs. But there is always some reason to hold a belief although it might be an irrational reason. Someone's believing that today is going to be a miserable day on the basis of his/her feeling not so well in the morning is such an example. Here, it is not that s/he has no reasons at all for the belief, s/he just have an irrational basis for the belief. But while the belief is irrationally held, it is still a motivated belief. It intuitively seems to be that only with presence of some motivation can a subject hold and embrace a belief—no matter if the motivation is rational, irrational, epistemic or non-epistemic. In Bonjour's above example, the subject believes to have the power of clairvoyance without even the slightest reason, whether irrational or not. This might be quite impossible for a human being to have a belief without reason, or motivation, or attitude. The concept of epistemically acceptable belief, is that a belief is a total chain of 1) the belief content, 2) the implicit belief that the content is true, false, or likely to be as such

⁷¹ Ibid. p. 38.

(the epistemic *motivation*), and 3) what makes the belief true, or how it is true. In the above example, the subject, who highlights some typical externalist profile, possesses only the first part of the chain. Thus, it plausibly seems to be that in practice s/he should have no belief at all.

This becomes clear if some belief content is thought together with its negation. If someone has a belief content without any implicit belief that the content is likely to be true, then the belief content is counterbalanced with its negation. The result is that the subject cannot make a choice between the belief content and its negation. There are examples of people having beliefs without apparent reasons in their part, but in such cases, they are most probably used to think that if a belief comes to their minds, then it has a certain likelihood of being true. This is an irrational approach, but it is not fully devoid of some justification. The implicit justification is an internal admittance of an external process: Some people tend to believe that if a certain belief comes to their minds, then the belief is produced by some implicit reliable process of their brains, or the environment. For example, people who believe that they have the power of clairvoyance justify their belief—although in a quite irrational way—by asserting that they are granted by God or by nature with some certain holy powers. Samantha has no such justification and motivation. Bonjour rightly argues that as a case of externalist knowing, Samantha should be devoid of being aware of them all—otherwise she should have been in the territory of internal justification. One of the core problems with Samantha then, is that she holds and maintains the belief however; and this is intuitively very difficult to imagine.

Bonjour's above example is striking by some other reason too: It also articulates that while a belief content is attributed to a subject with no reasons at all on the part of the subject—or, at least, the ground of a belief is attributed with no reasons—the negation of the belief on the other hand, is very rationally justified on the part of

the subject. Bonjour argues that externalists force to embrace the belief. This would require on the part of the subject to relinquish rationality, for a completely irrational stance—assuming that, as the example suggests, the subject does have no idea of her/his belief's being formed by a reliable process or whatever. What Bonjour tries to highlight is such a deontological deficiency on the part of the subject if s/he would be an externalist knower:

In this case, it is clear that Armstrong's criterion of reliability is satisfied. There will be some presumably quite complicated description of Samantha, including the conditions then operative, from which it will follow via the law describing her clairvoyant power that her belief is true. But it seems clear nevertheless that this is not a case of justified belief or of knowledge. Samantha is being thoroughly irrational and irresponsible in disregarding the evidence that the President is not in New York City on the basis of a clairvoyant power which she has no reason at all to think she possesses; and this irrationality is not somehow cancelled by the fact that she happens to be right. Thus, I submit, Samantha's irrationality and irresponsibility prevent her belief from being epistemically justified.⁷²

As mentioned earlier, the problem is not only that the subject displays an epistemically irresponsible behavior. Such a pattern of irrational behaviorism is rare among humans. Surely there are patterns of holding irrational beliefs, but they are different from what is presented in the above case. For instance one may believe something only because s/he wants it to be so; like one's believing that s/he has some high chance of winning a lottery although in reality the odds are extremely low. Or one tends to believe that s/he is a good driver only because s/he wants to see her/himself in that way; and indeed, s/he would probably possess some subjective pseudo-evidence in her/his mind sustaining this belief, while in fact there is no objective evidence supporting the belief. However, the above evidence presents a case where the subject is totally disinterested in the belief. It is implicitly

⁷² Ibid. p. 39.

supposed that Samantha has no desire or intention for having the clairvoyance power—she just have a belief without any motivation, which is a strange situation—, and that she has not particularly in favor of the case that the President is in New York City. On the other hand she is supposed to have a normal psychology, by which she is forced to believe that the President is not in New York City, but in Washington D.C., as a psychologically normal person relies on evidence. Or, to put it simply, without existence of some irrational motivation—and such a motivation is excluded from the Samantha case—no one would believe a content of which s/he has no idea of its degree to its likelihood to truth, while there is a negation of the content available with a very high degree of likelihood to be true. Thus, what externalism demands from the epistemic agent is not only epistemic irresponsibility and irrationality, but also an inconvenient—and probably impossible for the present—psychological state.

There are three options for externalism to release from the trouble of unmotivated belief. First option is that there must always be an additional state on the part of the subject to have reasons for her/his belief when s/he is a reliable indicator of a certain truth—this is to make her/him believe. This additional state of mind would motivate the subject to hold the belief content and make him/her believe that it is true, and would not be defeated by a challenge. However, if this reason is rational, then this amounts to be internalism. If, on the other hand, the reason is irrational, this amounts to be a very problematic situation. Suppose Samantha has such a reason for her belief that she has clairvoyant power: she simply desires to have that power and this desire motivates her sufficiently to believe that she has that power. She desires it so deeply that no challenge, either rational or irrational, can defeat her belief. This is a very irrational reason for holding a belief and it is not only evading, but a sheer violation of epistemic duty. Another problem lies in the fact that every case of belief, or every case of being a reliable indicator would require having some irrelevant reasons on the part of the subject; but it is not possible to

render it the case: because such reasons seems to be neither nomologically, nor causally, connected to truth directly, at least in many of concrete cases.

Second option is to abandon all the psychological state of belief on the part of the subject and render human beings, or epistemic agents pure reliable indicators that lack any conscious content about what they indicate, and even about whether they indicate something or not. Armstrong does not explicitly offer such a radical position; and Goldman, as opposed to his earlier example of electronic door-bell; clearly defends existence of belief in any knowing case. Moreover, the offering requires a first internal step, which is to arrange the situation—the connections, regulations, etc.—with the traditional tools like human rationality. Then a radical change of human mind should be pursued, which aims to render humans epistemically mindless.

Third option is to defend a state of nature or a constructed epistemic state in which the subject is rendered by the belief content and its being true by a reliable causal process, and is rendered being devoid of any concerns about how that belief is true. This option is what is supposed by the externalists already mentioned. It may require two lines of connection between the epistemic agent and the state of affair to be known and a constructed state of mind. One connection brings out the content of belief to the knower's mind and the other signals that the content is true, while subject would not ask or being asked how the belief is true. This is close to animal knowing as it is assumed, but human beings do not work like that epistemically. Thus, this is not a state of nature for human beings for the present. Such an epistemic state can only be constructed by neurological and/or psychological and/or neurological work, which again, means modification of human mind. An arrangement of the environment so as to provide healthy conditions for a nomological relation to work may also be required.

The third option without such radical operations is forced to be based on internalism as its starting point. A certain subject can be taken or constructed as a sheer reliable indicator of truth that does not need to be aware of the justification and only have the belief content plus the belief that the content is true. Then, the justification, namely the reliability of the content-formation, would be determined by an outsider. However, if the epistemic agent on the observer position is also deprived of the awareness requirement for the justification of her/his own belief of the determination, then, as a result the conditions and ultimate justification for determining whether a reliable relationship obtains or not, would be left on its own. This in turn will be an unjustified situation or a regress, as it will be presented. Another point is that without radical operations on human mind, internalism will force itself upon, because this is the way the human mind works at present. Besides, given the current situation, the result will not be sufficiently reliable. Experience shows that a nature itself without any interruption of the mind does not yet provide all the healthy or reliable epistemic conditions. In nature, there are nomological relations, like the relation of heat and liquid, resulting in the expansion of the liquid. But there are also non-nomological relations, and nature does not always force for a right selection for our beliefs. The case for knowing without internal elements like internal judgment yet seems to be more likely to be non-nomological than to be nomological.

6.2 The Problem of Knowing as an Irrational and Irresponsible Act

As stated, Bonjour argues that the problem with irresponsible epistemic behavior is not only that it is deontologically unwanted. Another problem is that there is significant difference between an irresponsible epistemic behavior and a responsible, rational epistemic behavior on the issue of getting the truth—or, approaching to truth. A responsible epistemic behavior is responsible in the sense of following a definite and right way to approximate truth, while irresponsible

behavior lacks this motivation. As mentioned above the irresponsibility within the Samantha case is an extreme type, because the subject is required to make a fully irresponsible choice against a rationally justified belief. Bonjour, then modifies his case with another example, in which the subject is not forced for such an unexpected choice:

Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is completely reliable clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or reasons of any kind for or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under certain circumstances in which it is completely true.⁷³

The above example is more realistic than the former one, as there is no rational alternative for the subject to deal with and to reject eventually. However, there is still the problem of unmotivated belief, that is, how can an epistemic agent possess and hold a belief content without having any reasons for it being true. Bonjour supposes two alternatives about Norman's epistemic status and concludes that both are epistemically irrational and irresponsible. First, if it is supposed that Norman does not believe that he has the clairvoyant power and has the belief content about the President, then his belief is fully irrational and unmotivated. Second, if he believes that he has such a power, "is it not obviously irrational, from an epistemic standpoint, for Norman to hold such a belief when he has no reasons at all for thinking that it is true or even for thinking that such a power is possible?"⁷⁴ If Norman believes that he has the clairvoyant power, then his belief is unjustified,

⁷³ Ibid. p. 41.

⁷⁴ Ibid. p. 42.

and this leads to the fact that his belief about the President is, also unjustified—although motivated.

For Bonjour, an epistemic agent's choices, behavior and her/his holding a belief depends necessarily on her/his responsibility to be conducive to truth. It is not only that an ethical problem is at issue, but that it is not to be expected from epistemic agents to choose an option of belief which is farer from truth than one which is closer to it. This is, for Bonjour, only possible from one's own point of epistemic view. If Norman does not believe that he has the power of clairvoyance, then "it becomes quite difficult to understand what Norman himself thinks is going on. Why then does he continue to maintain the belief that the President is in New York City?"⁷⁵ And, if there is an available rational approach for him to embrace—whatever the outcomes would be—, then can he suspend this rational approach? If, to embrace and maintain a belief and knowing are *actions*, then, for Bonjour, externalism has serious difficulties in handling the above questions:

Second, consider the connection between knowledge and rational action. Suppose that Norman, in addition to having the clairvoyant belief describes earlier, also believes that the Attorney General is in Chicago. This latter belief, however, is not a clairvoyant belief but rather is based on ordinary empirical evidence in Norman's possession, evidence strong enough to give the belief a fairly high degree of reasonableness, but *not* strong enough to satisfy the requirement for knowledge. Suppose further that Norman finds himself in a situation where he is forced to bet a very large amount, perhaps even his life or the life of someone else, on the whereabouts of either the President or the Attorney General. Given his epistemic situation as described, which bet is it more reasonable for him to make? It seems clear that it is more reasonable for him to bet that the Attorney General is in Chicago than to bet that the President is in New York City. But then we have the paradoxical result that from the externalist standpoint it is more rational to act on a merely reasonable belief than to act on one which is adequately justified *to qualify as knowledge (and which in fact is knowledge)*. It is very hard to see why

⁷⁵ Ibid. p 42.

it could be so. If greater epistemic reasonableness does not carry with it greater reasonableness of action, then it becomes most difficult to see why it should be sought in the first place.⁷⁶

6.3 The Problem of Regress

It seems that, to externalist view, as far as the reliability condition is satisfied, the problem of conduciveness to truth is resolved. Because reliability is truth-conducive enough and although the subject makes an epistemically irrational act on her/his side, s/he is still approximates to truth sufficiently to be counted as a knower if s/he is under a reliable process. However, the problem arises when this is applied to the case of the observer: If the observer acts epistemically irresponsible and what s/he believes is reliably formed, then it should be guaranteed by some other observer that s/he is also under a reliable process. This requires another observer and then a third one and so on, which means a regress:

... if an epistemologist claims that a certain belief or set of beliefs, whether his own or someone else's, has been arrived at in a reliable way, but says this on the basis of cognitive processes of his own whose reliability is for him merely an external fact to which he has no first-person, internalist access, then the proper conclusion is merely that the belief or beliefs originally in question are reliably arrived at (and perhaps thereby are justified or constitute knowledge in externalist senses) *if* the epistemologist's own cognitive processes are reliable in the way that he believes them to be. Of course there might be a whole series of hypothetical results of this sort: cognitive process *A* is reliable if cognitive process *B* is reliable, cognitive process *B* is reliable if cognitive process *C* is reliable, and so forth. But the only apparent way to arrive at a result that is not ultimately hypothetical in this way is for the reliability of at least some processes to be establishable on the basis of what the epistemologist can know directly or immediately from his first-person, internalist epistemic perspective.⁷⁷

⁷⁶ Ibid. p. 45.

⁷⁷ Bonjour, Laurence & Sosa, Ernest. *Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. p. 39.

Thus, the problem for Armstrong's externalism does not lie on some arbitrarily chosen individual case of knowing. The problem is, rather on the fact that externalist type of knowing cannot be expected from the individual, or groups of individuals who have the responsibility to determine that a law like relation obtains. The first step for externalism requires that an internal justification should be at stake. If the problems mentioned above are applied to the persons who pursuit the scientific work to discern the law like connections and relations between the epistemic agent and the state of facts, then their decisions would either be arbitrary or irrational. If it is not detected that they are under a reliable epistemic situation on their tasks, then there is the high risk that their choices are arbitrary. On the other hand, if they are under any reliable situation, there should be another outside observer to put forward this truth which is her/himself should be reported to be under a reliable situation. To Bonjour, the difficulty inevitably leads to grant that the subject's own acceptance of her/his own belief is decisive:

... we are now face-to-face with the fundamental—and obvious—intuitive problem with externalism: *why* should the mere fact that such an external relation obtains mean that Norman's belief is epistemically justified when the relation in question is entirely outside his ken? As I noted earlier, it is clear that one who knew that Armstrong's criterion was satisfied would be in a position to construct a simple and quite cogent justifying argument for the belief that the President is in New York City: if Norman has property H (being a completely reliable clairvoyant under the existing conditions and arriving at the belief on that basis), then he holds the belief in question only if it is true; Norman does have property H and does hold the belief in question; therefore, the belief is true. Such an external observer, having constructed this justifying argument, would be thereby in a position to justify *his own* acceptance of a belief with the same content. Thus Norman, as Armstrong's own thermometer image suggests, could serve as a useful epistemic instrument for such an observer, a kind of cognitive thermometer; and it is to this fact, as we have seen, that Armstrong appeals in arguing that a belief like Norman's can be correctly said to be reasonable or justifiable. But none of this seems in fact to justify

Norman's *own* acceptance of the belief, for Norman, unlike the hypothetical external observer is *ex hypothesi* not in a position to employ this argument, and it is unclear why the mere fact that it is, so to speak, potentially available in the situation should justify *his* acceptance of the belief.⁷⁸

Externalism does not admit this acceptance however. In externalism, what makes an epistemic agent's belief justified is not only that it is formed reliably, but also that an external observer affirms that it is formed reliably. Otherwise, it would not be understood that there is something reliable at stake. Then, to determine whether some process or relation or connection is reliable also requires another external observer on the part of any external observer, in order to employ the argument. This is an infinite regress. As Bonjour states, the epistemic agent's—in his case, Norman's—status in externalist knowing is that he is just a useful epistemic instrument. In order to determine whether Norman knows or not, there is a need for an external observer. Otherwise it is not so clear that whether there is some criteria to determine whether he knows or not.

Externalism should defend that this status be applied to all epistemic agents in all positions in order to be a consistent approach. When Norman's status is applied to the external observer, then that external observer becomes an epistemic instrument as far as s/he has no idea about her/his epistemic status. This means s/he has no idea about her/his belief's relation to truth. Thus an external observer in such a position alone cannot determine whether what s/he observes is reliable or not. Because to believe or know whether some observed relation is reliable or not requires another reliable relation between the external observer and the fact s/he observes. And this would require some other external observer. Only an internal justification or determination on the part of the observer can finish this regress.

⁷⁸ Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. pp. 42-43.

Thus, although externalism works for some pre-determined types of knowing and justification, any pre-determination would always be a product of internal justification. Thus, a necessary internal justification is implicit in any case of knowing—or, at the roots of it.

Another severe problem arises when it comes to cases of knowing when the truth-conduciveness value of the possible external justifiers and the subject's epistemic status and the situation s/he is involved are not yet determined. This, then, requires a comparison of possible candidates and evaluation of subject's epistemic status. The significant point here is that there is not yet a single universally *most reliable* relation or process to be found powerful enough to override or prevent other candidates immediately for every case. The result of such a situation is an occurrence of multiple beliefs, and/or justifications on the part of the subject to compare and contrast with each other. This makes involvement of internalist elements inevitable.

It may be appealing to think of externalism as a close circuit of reliable processes forming mostly true beliefs on minds of subjects. This may indeed be the case: there can be really reliable processes to form true beliefs. But the problem is that according to externalism no one could really know this as long as the reliable process does not impose the true beliefs while at the same time evading the skeptical questions about the beliefs' being true. Therefore externalism seems more to be evading the possibility of such epistemic questions rhetorically rather than relying on a really reliable process. This means that on the part of externalism there is no interesting solution to the classical problems of epistemology:

Externalists often write misleadingly as though from a perspective in which the reasons that are unavailable to the ordinary believer are apparent to them: from which, for example, it is obvious that our perceptual beliefs about medium-sized physical objects are reliably

caused and so mostly true. But in fact, if externalism is the only solution to the regress problem, *there is no such perspective available to anyone*, no perspective from which anyone ever has good reasons to think that anyone's beliefs of any sort are in fact reliably caused. Thus the externalist should speak instead of the mere *possibility* that beliefs are, in ways that are inaccessible to anyone, reliably caused; and hence of the *possibility*, which may or may not be realized, that they are, in the externalist sense, justified. But putting things in this way would, I submit, utterly destroy the appeal of externalism as a response to skepticism.⁷⁹

However, that doesn't yet mean that internalism is a sufficient epistemic position for knowledge. Regress problem targets and troubles the both camps effectively enough. Foundationalist internalism has not yet been released from the regress problem: for a belief to be justified internally, there must be another belief to be justified, which justifies the former belief; and this goes on as an infinite regress. This is the problem of vertical justification on the side of internalism. That is, where the subject, or the epistemic agent is supposed to possess the capacity to embrace and evaluate all the justifiers within a finite chain of justifiers, s/he still cannot complete the justification because the chain is in fact infinite. Arguing that certain beliefs are possible, this thesis offers a solution to the problem of vertical justification. Coherentist internalism, which requires circular or horizontal justification, also presents this problem: the amount of beliefs to be compared with a certain belief in terms of consistency may be infinite, while the subject has the capacity to assess some finite amount of beliefs. Although, the amount of beliefs in both cases being infinite is only hypothetical, the problem is still serious, at least theoretically.

A less hypothetical, thus a more alarming problem for coherentism is the one concerning the epistemic capacity of the subject or agent. When it is supposed that

⁷⁹ Bonjour, Laurence & Sosa, Ernest. *Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues*. p. 40.

the number of justifiers is finite, and therefore there is a possibility of a complete justification, but when the subject does not possess the capacity to gather them all in her/his consciousness in an appropriate way, there would be no complete justification. This may happen in two ways: 1) the subject may have enough cognitive power to collect the appropriate justifiers and to evaluate them in an appropriate way—that is, s/he can understand their relation to each other and their relation to truth *one by one*—but fails to deal with a very large amount of justifiers *altogether*. 2) The subject may have the capacity to deal with all the justifiers together no matter how much their number is, but fails to get the justifying relation between the items, so s/he cannot complete the chain. The most prominent example for the latter situation is the problem of induction and causality: where the justifier is just that a certain amount of certain two events occurring in juxtaposition, and the supposed truth is that former is the cause of the latter, one cannot relate the justifier to the supposed truth rationally enough.

6.4 The Problem of Multiple Beliefs

One of the most significant problems on the part of externalism is that it is often inevitable on the part of the epistemic agent that s/he possess a variety of beliefs and justifiers regarding the truth—or, s/he finds her/himself in such a situation. A set of justifiers may clash with another set of justifiers leading to the fact that the beliefs resulting or sustained by these distinct set of justifiers will also clash with each other. Then, the subject is forced to resolve this clash internally. It is important that, from the perspective of externalism, such multiplicity of beliefs and diverse set of justifiers is a result of a failure of an external process to handle the situation. It is like a mechanism's providing more than one options while its duty was to determine the single true option. This would mean either that the mechanism is out of order or that its epistemic power is limited to some certain degree. Alston defends that the roots of the notion of epistemic justification lies in

the inevitable occurrence of competing beliefs on the part of the epistemic agent. A critical reflection towards a belief and/or a need for justification for a certain belief implicitly arises out of a concern for possible challenges of some other possible beliefs to that belief:

My suggestion is that the background against which the concept of epistemic justification has developed is the practice of critical reflection on our beliefs, the practice of epistemic assessment of beliefs (with respect to the likelihood of their being true), the challenging of beliefs and responses to such challenges. To respond successfully to such a challenge one must specify an adequate ground of the belief. It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that in order to be epistemically respectable, laudatory, or acceptable (justified) a belief must have actually been put to such a test and have emerged victorious. In suggesting that the concept have developed against the background of such a practice the idea is rather that what it is for a belief to be justified is that the belief and its ground be such that it is in a position to pass such a test; that the subject has what it takes to respond successfully such a challenge. A justified belief is one that *could* survive a critical reflection. But then the justifier must be accessible to the subject. Otherwise the subject would be in no position to cite it as what provides a sufficient indication that the belief is true.⁸⁰

When occurrence of multiple beliefs is the case, internalism becomes necessary and dominant. As both Goldman and Bonjour presents in their closely related examples, if the primacy is given to externalism in such cases of clash of multiple beliefs; that is, if the subject is forced or expected to choose the externally formed belief against the internally formed candidate, then the result is an irrational epistemic behavior. Nomological externalism has two options to defend here. First is that the epistemic agent's belief or belief state can be bypassed in favor of some state of her/his being a reliable indicator of truth. But still, that subject is expected

⁸⁰ Alston, William P., "Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology," *Philosophical Topics* 14 (1986). Cited: Hilary Kornblith, ed. *Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2001. p. 104.

to express the truth in some way, and it is difficult how an expression of truth without belief is possible for many circumstances. The other difficulty with this stance is that the reliable connection between the subject—the reliable indicator—and the truth should be guaranteed. There must be found, or invented a certain kind of reaction to truth on the part of the subject—just as a thermometer reacts to heat. If it is aimed to bypass belief, than this reaction should be something other than belief. Second, beliefs can be admitted to the epistemic system as mere primitive reactions. This view is the one that is actually proposed by Armstrong. Simple beliefs about sense data and memory are good indicators, as they are supposed to be sufficiently reliable. In his causal theory of knowing—which is in general outline similar to Armstrong’s reliable indicator approach—Goldman embraces sense perception and memory as prominent sources of reliably caused beliefs. However, Bonjour warns that 1) if memory and sense perception are fully externally justified, then they are faced with exactly the same problems presented by clairvoyance case—that is, they are not so different from a clairvoyance type of believing; and 2) both memory and sense perception in fact have much more internalist aspects than externalists think of. It is quite clear in the case of memory and sense perception that they have special epistemic status as being intuitively *given* to subjective experience:

Thus one difference between cases of clairvoyance and cases of sense-perception and introspection might be that cases of the latter sort involve immediately given or intuited subjective experience which somehow provides a basis for justification but which is sufficiently tacit in its operation as to yield the mistaken impression that only externalist factors are at work. Such an appeal to subjective experience would represent a version of the doctrine of the given ... A second possibility ... is that the difference between beliefs deriving from sources like clairvoyance, on the one hand, and sensory and introspective beliefs, on the other, depends on the believer’s being epistemically justified in thinking that beliefs of the latter sort are in fact generally reliable (though again this dependence is tacit enough to be easily overlooked). According to this view, if such beliefs were in fact reliable but the believer in question did

not know this at least implicitly, then they would not be justified. Now on neither of these accounts is the externalist basis for justification in fact sufficient for justification; the intuitive impression that it is sufficient is based on overlooking crucial, though inconspicuous, aspects of the situation.⁸¹

Another problem for externalism is that both sense perception and memory open the way for occurrence of multiple beliefs on the epistemic agent even in the cases where they are really reliably formed. Goldman accepts significance of existence of belief in case of knowing, and senses the possibility of the problem of multiple beliefs:

According to our theory, a belief is justified in case it is caused by a process that is in fact reliable, or by one we generally believe to be reliable. But suppose that although one of S's beliefs satisfies this condition, S has no reason to believe that it does. Worse yet, suppose S has reason to believe that his belief is caused by an *unreliable* process (although *in fact* its causal ancestry is fully reliable). Wouldn't we deny in such circumstances that S's belief is justified? This seems to show that our analysis, as presently formulated, is mistaken.⁸²

Goldman accepts that an internally justified belief should take precedence over the one that is formed reliably, but that is not sustained by internal justification. If someone's belief is caused by a reliable process, then her/his belief is justified although s/he has no reasons for the belief being true. But, if an unreliable but internally well justified belief challenges the reliably formed belief, then the reliably formed belief loses its status of being justified. As Goldman does not present a clear outcome of the clash, the result should most possibly be a suspension of both beliefs. The difficulty that his externalist theory is forced into is figured out by Goldman himself with the following case:

⁸¹ Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. p. 50.

⁸² Goldman, Alvin I. *Liasions: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1992. p. 121.

Suppose that James is told on fully reliable authority that a certain class of his memory beliefs are almost all mistaken. His parents fabricate a wholly false story that Jones suffered from amnesia when he was seven but later developed *pseudo*-memories of that period. Though Jones listens to what his parents say and has excellent reason to trust them, he persists in believing the ostensible memories from his seven-year-old-past. Are these memory beliefs justified? Intuitively, they are not justified. But since these beliefs result from genuine memory and original perceptions, which are adequately reliable processes, our theory says that these beliefs are justified.⁸³

Here, the subject is provided with strong evidence from a reliable source against his memories of a certain period of his past. In fact his memories are true and formed by a reliable causal process, but the subject has no other justifier than the memories themselves and the fact that he has those memories to make his belief true. Therefore his belief is not well justified internally. Goldman points out that the subject however, does not use the contrary evidence, which, if had been used, would have made the contrary belief—which is in fact a false belief—internally well justified. Also, Goldman forces that, if he had used them, then he would have certainly given up believing that his memories about his past are true. Goldman does not suggest why the subject does not use the evidence and why the subject insists that his memories are reliably true. This means firstly that the subject, by taking an externalist stance—insisting on an unjustified belief instead of an internally and reasonably justified belief—displays an irrational epistemic act. Secondly, memory, although being a reliable source of knowledge, is quite exposed to serious challenge from some other reliable items; and that would lead to clash of beliefs and suspension of judgment. Goldman defends this takeover; for him, in cases of externally justified belief depending on memory, another reliable process

⁸³ Ibid. p. 121.

or evidence, whether internal or external, *has to* change the epistemic status of the agent:

Now the proper use of evidence would be an instance of a (conditionally) reliable process. So what we can say about Jones is that he fails to use a certain (conditionally) reliable process that he could and should have used. Admittedly, had he used this process, he would have 'worsened' his doxastic states: he would have replaced some true beliefs with suspension of judgment. Still, he couldn't have known this is the case in question. So, he failed to do something which, epistemically, he should have done. This diagnosis suggests a fundamental change in our theory. The justificational status of a belief is not only a function of the cognitive processes *actually* employed in producing it; it is also a function of processes that could and should be employed.⁸⁴

As for the sense data, even it is provided that it is reliable and causal source belief and even provided that it is more reliable than memory, there can still be interrupting possibilities, processes and conditions. These provide for the subject new processes to be employed, resulting with multiple diverse evidences and beliefs clashing one another. There are many realistic cases that can be reported, where a relevant alternative situation can be drawn against the subject's reliably formed true belief based on sense data. But it is not possible to have beforehand all the possible relevant alternatives, and no particular sense data guaranties a sufficient discrimination. Thus, although sense data is quite a reliable formed or cause evidence for a particular belief, it does not prevent a possibility of occurrence of diverse beliefs on the part of the epistemic agent. Goldman, then, demarcates this possibility by revising the definition of justified belief:

If S's belief in p at t results from a cognitive process, and there is no reliable or conditionally reliable process available to S which, had it

⁸⁴ Ibid. p. 123.

been used by S in addition to the process actually used, would have resulted in S's not believing p at t, then S's belief in p at t is justified.⁸⁵

However, Goldman is not in content with this definition. His reliable process approach assumes that competing processes clash and resolve *before* they are presented to the subject's mind. Thus, the competing processes are mutually exclusive and that the result on the subject's mind should be the most reliable one. And, as it seems, the resulting process, if it is used will not permit any other competitor. In a presupposed correct epistemic situation, "one cannot use an additional belief forming (or doxastic-state-forming) process *as well as* the original process if the additional one would result in a different doxastic state. One wouldn't be using the original process at all."⁸⁶ This means that, in a correct epistemic situation, the original—and presumably, the most reliable—process should be somehow *imposing* itself to the subject, so that no interruption can take place. This is a difficult suggestion however. It assumes that the overwhelming process can be determined from outside beforehand and then the subject is provided with the belief it forms, as well as the additional belief that it is true. Here, again the subject should also be provided with one more additional process that solely and rigorously aims to prevent her/him from the question of how that belief is true. Therefore, three doxastic states are required in hand to obtain this condition. Another suggestion would be that the clash of all beliefs and competing processes are a single process, i.e., the original process itself. But, this amounts to be internalism. Thus, Goldman, as an externalist, is more likely to stick to the pre-elimination approach between the competing processes; that is, competing items are resolved before they are presented to the subject's awareness and then subject is presented with the three doxastic states mentioned above.

⁸⁵ Ibid. p. 123.

⁸⁶ Ibid. p. 123.

To Bonjour this is not always the case. A competing item can be internal in character, thus it may be impossible for a resolution to happen before the items are presented to the agent's awareness. Besides, Bonjour argues that the James case of Goldman presented above favors internalist choice over externalist passive standing. Goldman defends that Jones *should* have used the alternative cognitive process in question if it had been available. Bonjour's interpretation of the term *should* is that it "seems to be an appeal to the idea of subjective rationality and as such would favor the alternative situation"⁸⁷, which is internalism: James should be aware of the fact that he must change his belief. Otherwise it is impossible to make a change. Bonjour presents following case to illustrate this point:

Cecil is a historian and is concerned to answer a certain historical question. After spending a large amount of time on his research and consulting all of the available resources and documents, he accumulates a massive and apparently conclusive quantity of evidence in favor of a certain answer to his question. He proceeds to accept that answer, which is in fact correct. At the same time, however, Cecil happens to have in his possession a certain crystal ball; and in fact the answers given by this crystal ball are extremely, but not perfectly, reliable with regard to the sort of subject matter in question, though Cecil hasn't the slightest reason to suspect this (he also has no reason to think that crystal balls are not reliable). Moreover, the crystal ball would, if consulted, have given a different answer to the question at issue (one of its rare mistakes); and Cecil, if he had consulted the crystal ball and accorded to its answer the degree of evidential weight corresponding to its degree of reliability, would have been led to accept neither answer to this question.⁸⁸

Here, consulting the crystal ball is an available alternative cognitive process which is reliable; but its reliability is not available to the subject. If Goldman argues that the subject should change or sustain her/his former belief, as a result of an

⁸⁷ Bonjour, Laurence. *The Structure of Empirical Knowledge*. p. 48.

⁸⁸ Ibid. pp. 48-49.

alternative reliable process which is available; then he demands an impossible or irrational epistemic act on the part of the subject. This is because the subject does not have any idea about its being reliable or not. For internalist approach, the subject is justified in her/his first belief, which is also a true belief. Externalist approach, on the other hand, suggests at least suspension of belief. Bonjour's interpretation is that there is such a suggestion on the part of Goldman's externalism, at least his James case and his above definition with its revision are taken for granted:

Is Cecil epistemically justified in accepting the belief in question? According to Goldman's condition we must say that he is not, for consulting the crystal ball (and taking its answers seriously) is an alternative process which is both available and reliable, but which would, if employed, have led to his not accepting the belief. But this answer is seems mistaken, so long as Cecil has no reason to think that the alternative process is reliable.⁸⁹

Goldman releases from this difficult position by allowing some kinds of processes to compete in subject's awareness. But he warns that some should be demarcated, because this may lead to infinite regress of gathering new evidence, and so new processes. Significantly, this is a beneficial turn for internalism, too. In many cases, especially in cases of empirical knowing, possibility of complete internal justification is always challenged by possibility of new evidence and new skepticisms. Some available processes can challenge the original process and its outcome. But it should be noted that *to be available* is a very broad term, allowing many new evidence and skepticism, and so it should be particularly specified:

What is it for a process to be 'available' to a cognizer? Were scientific procedures 'available' to people who lived in prescientific ages? Furthermore, it seems implausible to say that all 'available' processes

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 49.

ought to be used, at least if we include such processes as gathering *new* evidence. Surely a belief can sometimes be justified even if additional evidence gathering would yield a different doxastic attitude. What I think we should have in mind here are such additional processes as calling previously acquired evidence to mind, assessing the implications of that evidence, etc.⁹⁰

Thus, in any case, a progressive type of knowing, which is open to the possibility new evidence and therefore which regards a possibility of a change of truth value in the future, should be accepted.

Armstrong's externalism is immune to the danger of clashing diverse beliefs on the part of the subject. A nomological relation between belief and truth produces only one belief content, which is the representation of truth. The process is fully reliable and there is even no possible competitor for the belief produced. But this immunity is the case only when an ideal externalism is achieved, and, as mentioned, this is a very difficult task if not impossible. Goldman's reliabilism does not embrace a fully nomological and/or causal aspect. This is mostly due to the fact that he senses the deep difficulty in implementing such a theory to real life situations: A human subject at the current situation cannot be rendered a well-working reliable indicator of truth. The possible items humans possess for this purpose, are not keen enough to satisfy the nomological relation. Sense perception and memory can either be defective or can be challenged by other possible justifiers. Therefore they are not reliable enough to involve in a law-like relation.

Also, knowledge and belief by senses are diversified by many types of reactions and interpretations. Belief content by sense perception and memory can be an instrument for many types of reality and can be under many types of different conditions. It is worth to point out that on the other hand, a thermometer does its

⁹⁰ Goldman, Alvin I. *Liasions: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences*. p. 123.

job of being a reliable indicator only under a very limited type of truth—truth about temperature—and only under very limited conditions. Thus it is very difficult to assert a law-like, nomological relation for a so diversified issue like knowing. That is why Goldman resorts to a more easily gained notion like evidence, which is readily at hand as a useful epistemic tool. But, contrary to externalism, evidence is an internal justifier. Thus if evidence is included in an epistemic theory as a serious candidate for reliable processes, then internalism becomes a significant element within any theory of knowledge.

It should be reminded that Bonjour's above critic targets an externalism in which non-inferential belief on the part of the subject is presupposed. As such, this is the model presented by Armstrong and Goldman. But externalism is not necessarily an epistemic position that supposes belief content on the part of the subject. Indeed, although both Armstrong and Goldman base their accounts of externalist knowing on existence of belief, they do not necessarily argue against a model of knowing without any belief. Besides, as it is already mentioned, Goldman's anti-internalism is clearly inspired by such radical models. First section of the next chapter investigates and criticizes any kind of externalist model with regards to the degree of existence of belief content on the part of the subject staying within the limits of naturalist boundaries while last section examines and criticizes a model of externalism in which belief content is completely lacking.

CHAPTER 7

ANIMALS' KNOWING AND MACHINES' EPISTEMIC STATUS: CONCLUSIVE ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXTERNALISM

In this chapter I will examine the cases of naturalist way of knowing highlighted by naturalist approaches. Such cases involve possible types of animal knowing. Then, in the light of the result I will mention the cases of knowing—or so-called knowing—alleged to unconscious machines or mechanisms; that is, cases of knowing without belief. For the animal cases conscious belief is supposed and preserved for the subject as far as it is possible. This immediately brings out the obvious problem for externalism, which is that, it is difficult to conceive how to maintain and preserve a belief content—how to appropriate it—without a conception of the content with relevance to its truth. It is this conception that turns a belief content into a belief—into something with epistemic relevancy. Otherwise, there is no satisfactory account of how a belief or belief content is appropriated and maintained.

The relation of content and its being true or false—or likely to be such—is satisfied either by content's occurring evidently true or false—or likely to be such—or by justification. As machines and unconscious mechanisms do not have belief, they are seemingly exempt from the mentioned problem. But almost similar and equally severe shortcoming on the part of such items is that they do not even have possibility of maintaining and preserving the truth at all. They are nothing more than a mechanism—no matter how complex—that implements a process of transferring consistency from the truth related—the fact—to the epistemic subject; that is, a subject with belief and conception. Nowhere of the process the truth and content is presented or manifested except in the mind of subject and within the fact;

elsewhere what happens is the transferring of consistency. It is not the mechanism but the subject itself that turn this consistent output of the mechanism into a meaningful presentation of reality. Moreover, the machine or mechanism itself and its consistent reaction—or input—does not at all imply which part of the causal chain it refers as some knowledge content. Then, even if there was a knowing case to be appropriated within a mechanism, it should consist of not only the mechanism itself, but also a conscious subject who can seemingly be the only item to pick up a certain fact within the causal chain to refer as the content of knowledge. This eventually entails that the related fact itself should also be the part of the knowing case. This problem will be dealt thoroughly after the account of naturalism and animal case.

7.1 Naturalism Revisited and its Relation to Internalism

Naturalist epistemology defends the view that both animals and humans know, and that both parts in fact know in the same way. Although naturalist approach does not necessarily refuse internalism, it clearly asserts that what are decisive in knowing are mostly external issues and factors. Knowledge is based on instinctual reactions of creatures in the aim of surviving, adapting, feeding and reproducing. Here, then, it isn't necessary that the creature possess a conscious appropriation of what is the case. It is sufficient that it produces successful reactions to the conditions with respect to its environment. This reaction may be in a form of belief, but this does not a decisive or necessary factor to count the reaction as knowledge. All that is necessary for a case of knowledge is that a certain reaction and behavior—whether habitual or not—of the creature is somehow intentional and successful. I defend that conscious belief and conscious conception of truth and falsity are necessary factors in knowing, and a merely intentional and successful reaction does not entail on the part of the creature a conception of truth and falsity. To put it simply; without truth predicates applied, or without the possibility of their application; no

attitude, reaction or outcome can be counted as knowledge, no matter how successful the result is.

Naturalism rejects that there is a significant difference between a human's case of knowing and animal's case of knowing. The differences are the results of different conditions of evolution that every species has undergone, and there are significant mutual fundamental factors in every species' evolutionary process. To naturalist approach, the basic nature of knowing, as a natural phenomenon, eventually depends primarily of the mutual conditions; and different conditions only reshapes the basic attitudes—therefore different conditions cause slight differences as with respect to the nature of knowing which is all the same in every creature.

Naturalist approach attacks internalism—particularly Cartesian internalism—by alleging that internalist epistemology does not take into account the naturalist account of knowing and evolutionary factors inherent in human case of knowing. The accusation highlights the claim that internalism presupposes an ontological gap between human case of knowing—as justified belief—and animal case of knowing, a case which allegedly has no epistemic value at all to the internalists. Human case of knowing in the philosophical sense is a higher knowledge not within a scale, but it is higher in terms of nature—that is, it belongs to a totally different higher category, which is incompatible with the instinctual so-called knowing of animals.

Although internalism sometimes claims that there is a difference of ranks between human and animal knowledge, the distinction supposed by internalism—as it is in its simple and definite sense—does not put forth a gap between animal and human knowing. What internalism defends is that a belief's relation to truth predicates should be within the awareness of the subject—and this condition often brings with itself a need for a rational justification, particularly when the belief's relation to truth predicates are not readily evident. It may well be the case that—and as I

argue, this is indeed the case—1) the conditions of human evolution somehow has caused this attitude, 2) some animals may well be within a quite close or similar epistemic conditions—as some naturalists argue, many animals show behaviors of rational assessment, which implies that they are in an attitude of choosing rationalism as doxastic decision principle. Thus, in its definite sense, internalism does not violate or reject the principles of naturalist approach. The significant point to remark here is that, although it is true that human knowledge evolved from the same attitudes with animal knowing, like striving for survival, adaptation, feeding and reproduction, it is 1) at least from the time at which philosophy and sciences started, not limited to such concerns, and 2) apparently rational, skeptic and methodological. Whether this kind of evolution implies a significant distinction between animals and humans would be a question about value rather than a question about facts. In any case it does not imply a distinct ontological gap between animals and humans.

7.2 Cases of Animals' Knowing

In this section I will present some possible animal cases of knowing and stress the fact that truth predicate is vitally important to count a case as a knowing case. Thus, my main concern is that animal case of knowing, whether it bears a family resemblance to human knowing or not, should be judged on the basis of whether a truth predicate is applied or not in the supposed cases.

As stated before, for the human case of knowing, a belief without some awareness of what makes it true or likely to be true falls short of being a case of knowledge. The problem here arises from the fact that a belief, as a propositional attitude, is an attitude towards truth; thus, the content of belief should carry in itself some sensitivity for truth of the content. Awareness of a belief should prevail and preserve how the belief is true. The indication of the necessity of this is that a belief

as a propositional attitude is open to the question of what makes the belief true. If the question cannot be answered by the subject who possesses the belief in question, then theoretically there should be no difference in his/her changing the content of his/her belief. What makes a difference on such a subject between proposing a belief and its negation, if this subject is epistemic; in other words, if this subject is conducive to truth? If, in his/her awareness, there is no difference between a belief and its negation with regards to truth, if the possibility of being true is the same with the belief and its negation, then there would be no difference between holding the belief and holding the negation of the belief. It is the case that subjects preserve their beliefs constantly and change them only when some negation of the belief presses upon. There may also be some other factors to hold and preserve or to withdraw or release a belief, like on such cases as where the subject is guided by wishful thinking or that s/he cannot remember the content of the belief exactly. But these are not epistemic situations at all; and a subject with wishful thinking and her/his preserving or withdrawing a belief are not direct issues of epistemology. The case for epistemic belief—a propositional attitude—is that such beliefs can only be appropriated and maintained with some awareness that the beliefs is at least likely be true. And this eventually brings the fact that there should be some awareness of how it is true or what makes it true.

However, animals do not change their beliefs, while they do not account for what makes their beliefs true—or how their beliefs are true. A fox has true belief about where a water source locates on a huge area of land and does not change its mind about it the next day. Perhaps some kind of wishful attitude on the part of the animal is at stake. But still, it has some constant belief and should have some awareness that the belief is true. Otherwise the belief would not be constant and then the animal would be forced to find out the water source again and again on every next day. Also, it is never certain that animals actually cannot give an account or make a justification. What seems to us is that they don't have a

complicated language as to present or even think of some justification. If they actually made a justification, then the problem was resolved. However, there is no good clue about it. On the other hand no one ever guarantees that awareness is not minimum in animals as to the degree that every mental process in them is unconsciously motorized and that what they aware of is only the content of belief. It is even not out of complete possibility that they do not have awareness at all—even about the so-called belief contents.

Thus, animal case is a difficult one and should be examined by taking into account various possibilities about the epistemic status of them. The scale of the possibilities ranges from creatures having even some verbal and surely conscious justification of their beliefs like humans, to completely unconscious mechanisms. One end of the scale is similar to the state of humans and need not to be re-examined. In the other end of the scale, the creatures in question won't have any senses and beliefs at all—as they are completely unconscious. Whether animals are such creatures or not is not important: In any case totally unconscious mechanisms should be examined because there are such mechanisms that produce information—from simple thermometers to very complicated computers. Externalists like Goldman and Armstrong do not deal with them directly; both philosophers implicitly or explicitly assume non-inferential belief in their defense of externalism. Similarly attacks on externalism pursued so far in this thesis also assume existence of belief states on all illustrating cases. So the question of what the situation is on the issue of internalism-externalism debate about a mechanism or machine that does not possess any awareness—and so that does not possess any belief—, arises. Such a mechanism at least produces information and it is causally connected to truth. As it does not possess belief, it is not directly subjected to the criticism made against belief cases. It is not weird for a mechanism to present information without ever believing and meaning whether it is true or not. However, such a disinterest in truth

and meaning poses serious doubts about whether such a mechanism can be counted as a knowing item.

Before dealing with totally unconscious cases, I will firstly examine in-between positions, such as some supposed animal cases falling between the two polar points of the scale given above. There are three significant options to consider:

- 1- An animal may have only the belief content but does not have some other conscious mental state about it.
- 2- An animal may have the additional mental state which is either that the belief content it has is true while it has no justification for it, or that some other drive other than truth predicate is at stake.
- 3- An animal may have the belief that the belief content is true and has a justification for it being true. The justification can be very primitive and quite incomplete but enough to make it believe that the belief content is true.

The third option clearly overlaps with the human case and need not be elaborated; it is a kind of deficit internalism, which is more or less the case with humans. First option is untenable because without a concern of its truth or falsity, the content is not of interest for awareness in terms of knowledge. Thus in a case where only the content occurs this would mean nothing for a belief or an action navigated by the belief. Simply, content alone does not create belief. Thus the animal wouldn't be using it at all. Even for a simple and almost even an automatic navigation role for content and therefore awareness, there should be some concern for truth. Otherwise the dynamic for acting is either missing or totally causal and without awareness. There is also no dynamic for preserving the content for future use. This means that if an animal acts or reacts in such a case, then what happens on awareness is bypassed in the causal chain resulting with the act or reaction. This is because it has no role within the chain. Then the animal would be identical to a machine or

totally unconscious mechanism. Such items will be considered after the animal case. However, there can still be in-between issues, especially when the subject is under some other additional mental state other than concerning truth predicate. This position is to be dealt under the account of a later stage of the second option.

Second option presents two possibilities: either animal takes the belief content immediately as evident—or something as close to this state—and thus holds and preserves the belief, or it is absolutely dogmatic. That is, on its part, truth predicate is applied to the content separately but without any justification. The first possibility is the point where internalism and mainstream forms of externalism would meet and consolidate. Both parts value non-inferential beliefs if they are attainable. At this point, the only difference between the two camps is that internalists treat the notion of evident as a powerful conception in itself, while externalist tend to take it as a production of external mechanisms—but this is an extremist position. For externalism an evident proposition prevents the need for internal justification. Internalism would agree with it while also using it for some internal justification if there is need for that. Internalism's argument is not that justification is necessary; in cases where a true belief is evident, there is no need for justification. If however, there is need for a justification, then it should be an internal justification. Then, if animals' attitude would be counted as case of some primitive and deficient type of justified belief, then possibility that the animal takes the belief content as self evident compromises with internalism.

But how the animal takes empirical belief content as evident while epistemology argues that it is yet not? Here it should be admitted that externalist factors are at stake. The belief content is presented to the animal's consciousness in such a way that it seems to be evident to it. It is not an internal process that makes up the content in such a way. The brain process of the animal hides the distinction between belief and truth, or belief content and truth. It hides the possibilities of

questioning the content. The brain process determining the relation between awareness and belief content by way of regulating the 'nature' of the belief content is external to the awareness. It presumably regulates the belief content in such a way that what occurs in animal's awareness is, to the animal conception, not a belief content, but reality itself. Otherwise the animal would be skeptical—or be hesitated—about the belief content, but its habitual behavior shows that it is supposedly not. It does not think that it has a sensational picture or impression of world and facts—a picture which bears a possibility of being distinct from the world and facts, but rather is in a mood of being more directly related with the world and facts. So in this way, the animal is within an extreme form of direct realism. It is as if there is no medium between the fact and the animal; for instance there is not even the slightest intuition or conception about light coming to its retina and eye lens, which projects the light to project the visual image of the visual fact. The belief content and the world are identical.

Such an arrangement of the belief content is external, as the animal is not aware of it. External determination and/or arrangement of belief are also the case for humans; there are external factors to determine the conditions of knowing, and the conditions of belief content. Actually, many conditions are external and it is not guaranteed that all conditions are detected for a particular case. Thus, there is always an externalist side in the formation and determination of how a belief seems to us.

But the fact that one has the belief content is internal. So the fact that it is evident that one has such and such belief content is internal, because it happens necessarily within consciousness. Without consciousness—without awareness, it would not occur. Meaning and content cannot exist without awareness. Therefore, while the conditions for being evident for some particular belief content are external, its being evident under these conditions is without doubt internal. It is not possible to grasp

something as evident if it is beyond awareness. So the animal's 'knowing case' here is internal although very deficient. It is a case of non-inferential belief, and while its content can be true, its being non-inferential is false.

The second possibility of the second option on animal case invokes the impression that it is a quite remote position to any case of knowing. Here, truth and content are caused and/or processed separately and then presented to the awareness as associated; but the association is not conceptual or logical, therefore the way they are associated is not presented within the awareness. That is to say it is not determined *from within*. However, externalism affirms this position as an option; even partially suggesting that human knowing should come into this position. In addition, naturalist externalists argue that much of human knowledge may well be reducible to either to such an epistemic state, or to the first option discussed above. Externalism mainly relies on the fact that this position would yield successful results as far as a reliable process and a causal connection within a suitable environment is at stake on the part of the animal. Then the belief that the content is true would be the result of the reliable process within the animal's brain and the causal connection between the mind of animal and truth. But this position has intrinsic difficulties. If the truth of the content is presented to the animal solely independently of the belief content—so that the animal would not take it as self evident—then how does the animal associate the belief content and truth? A possible answer is that, not the association, but the necessity or some epistemic need for the association is itself evident to the animal. This would be, roughly, a Kantian approach. In this case, although quite incomplete and deficient, there is indeed internalism. If there is an account of the necessity, or epistemic need, then there will be a good internal justification.

Other possible answer is that the truth and the content are caused by the fact concerned. But then it is not very expectable that they are separately caused by the

fact and follow distinct causal paths. Indeed, a causal knowing is at stake here, and thus the fact concerned is itself the truth. So the content caused by it should carry with itself the truth, and then the content should be evident presentation of fact. And even if this were not so, they would causally or logically be associated eventually, which again would result in evident presentation. Another point to make this model untenable is that if it were the case, then hallucinations would be immediately eliminated by the subject as untruths.

Another possible answer is the externalist stance: truth and content are processed and then presented to the awareness separately, and then the animal is neurologically forced to accept the association of truth and content. This forcing is made by totally external factors; the animal neither has a grasping of something evident, nor a justification for the association. This is explicitly an irrational state on the part of animal. But to externalism, this is almost not a problem as far as it reliably produces true beliefs. So, what is appealing to the externalists about such processes is that they can produce successful results under suitable conditions. However, these conditions are severely difficult to provide. If the truth of the content comes independently from the content, then how and from what source does it come? It is not caused from the fact concerned; otherwise animals would not make mistakes or would not believe in sensory illusions—and to make an arrangement in order to make it cause from the fact requires work on tokens, not types; which is impossible. So the source is neurological, it is the animal's own brain. In this case it can be easier to make an epistemological repair, because a successful work on types can be attained.

The position is not acceptable however. First, it bears the same problem as the Samantha case of Bonjour: the subject cannot answer to the question of how the belief is true. It is not matter that animals are already supposed to be not able to understand and answer any questions: it is explicit that it could not answer it even if

it was able to. On the other hand, if it could understand and answer the questions, then when it believes some content—because of the fact that it is evident that the content is true or that it is evident that the content is the fact itself—it would surely point out the state of being evident as an answer. But the position discussed here bears no such a state of being evident. If the truth is not contained in the belief content and is imposed upon it by a neurological process, and if there is no rational way of association of truth and the content—to put it simply, if there is no way of associating the truth and content within the awareness; then the subject has really no answer about how the content is true. And this is, to internalists, a shortcoming for any knowing case.

Second, it may even be impossible to associate belief content and truth within the awareness if there is no conception within the awareness that provides some way to *affirm* the association. To clarify this it should be noted that this position permits that the animal may change its mind about the truth or falsity of the belief radically without even the slightest change in the belief content and other contents within its awareness. This requires giving primacy *within the awareness* to the dictation of this forcing, of which the animal is *not aware of*, against all content, data and forces *within its awareness*. This is quite difficult to accept, because it is probably the belief content itself which should be the most powerful—most impressing—to the awareness if the concerned issue is the belief content itself.

This is not to be confused with changing of the belief content without any change in the sense content. Suppose a cat sees a mouse and believes that there is a mouse. Then, without any change within its awareness, still seeing the mouse, and without any other empirical data or some rational data to make it withhold the belief, it begins to believe that there is no cat there. This is possible only when the sense content is not forcing. Thus, the sense content is taken by the cat as something not directly related to reality. It is because as the content contains the visual impression

of the mouse, and if the content that it is a mouse was forcing, or taken by the cat as the reality itself; then it couldn't change its belief—it couldn't believe that there is no mouse. This implies a model in which only the sense content is disregarded in the process of forming a belief.

However, the belief content—the content that there is a mouse or the content that there is no mouse—is still the reality itself for the cat. Any change in the belief content without a change in the sense content can be rendered possible by arguing that animal's *conception* upon the sense content changes. Thus, the animal is in fact still interested in the sense content, and it is its conception that determines the belief upon the content. Here, again, although the conception is determined externally—and possibly, the conception's application upon the sense content also happens externally—, its determination of sense content and belief *as true or false* is something evident to the cat—therefore something internal to it.

As for the most critical case to be discussed, it is the situation where the belief content of the animal changes without the slightest change both in the sense content and in the conception upon the sense content. If this happens in such a way that an evident belief leaves itself for another evident belief that contradicts the former belief, then this amounts to an externalist exchange of two contradicting evident beliefs: the cat firstly believes that there is mouse and it is an evident truth to it; then without a change both in the sense content and in its conception of mouse and some other things, it suddenly believes that there is no mouse—and this belief is also an evident truth to it. If both beliefs are evident, then this case is an externally forced internalism—or, a case of non-inferential belief,—because the truth is contained within the content as if it is a necessary part of the content and the cat is aware of this. While in content with internalism, such a case is still deficient in terms of the internalist demands: because in such a situation, there should be an internal justification accounting the belief change. Moreover, externalists

embracing the causal theory would also criticize this case. Because, when the belief changes; the truth, which is assumed to be the cause of the belief, does not change.

The following situation however, will satisfy the externalist causal theory: suppose that it is the truth—the fact—that causes the change of cat's belief and the sense content it has is illusory. That is, the causal chain starts out from the fact and does not consist in the sensory framework of the cat. Then, while the illusory sense content and conception is constant and unchanging, the fact about the mouse changes and this causes a change of belief in the cat—for example, at the moment the mouse dies for some reason while the cat is not aware of this at all, and its sensory perception still consists in an alive mouse image; but contrary to what sense perception presents, the fact that mouse is dead presses upon the cat the belief content of a dead mouse. In this situation, there is nowhere to frame the mental state of 'being evident' for the pressing new belief. It is because the new belief does not occur within the sense perception and conception of the cat—these two seem to be the only items in which a mental state of being evident can settle. Thus, as both the truth of the belief and the content of the belief are caused and to be settled by totally external factors, they should be separately presented before the cat's mind—because an already associated presentation would mean 'being evident' and so would settle as an internal sensation and conception. Then, the content and its being true are externally forced to be associated by the cat.

I argue that this—and also the former case—is only possible when the conception of truth and falsity is completely dismissed and so the animal in fact has no real belief—propositional attitude—at all. What it would have instead is just some content, either as a blind neurological and biological force—or reflex—to make it act or something that is outside of epistemic conception. Thus, this model is the one mentioned under the first option of animal case of knowing, in which it is assumed that there is no truth predicate within the animal's awareness, but some

other drive is at stake. Or, if there is truth predicate, then there is no conceivable way to apply it to the content, as this model excludes the possibility of an evident relation between content and its being true—or likely to be true. If there is no evident relation between them, then one cannot be aware of an association between them, and so it becomes impossible to apply the predicate to the content internally. It is evident from the meaning of truth and falsity that, one applies these predicates to belief content affirmatively and by appropriation—therefore internally. This happens either by way of justification—by way of reflection and assessment,—or by way of conceiving the truth or falsity of the content as more or less evident. And this is, without a justification, only possible by conceiving the truth or falsity of the content as a necessary part of the content. Thus this model implies a situation in which truth and falsity as meaningful predicates are missing. The animal, then, uses a different—a very strange predicate, or uses no predicate at all, and so does not believe; but only acts as a result of an external mechanism which provides it with a content and a stimulant to act—a non-epistemic drive. Here, even the content is not about what is the case at all and its status is quite under shadow as to the degree that the animal cannot be differentiated clearly from a sole mechanism.

7.3 Case of Machines and Unconscious Mechanisms

The immediate problem with unconscious mechanisms and artificial intelligence forms is that they do not carry and transform meaning and content within themselves. Meaning and content are the objects of awareness. What they carry and provide is consistent processes and reactions and it is eventually a conscious mind with conception that converts their outputs into meaningful contents, or statements. As such items work by a causal process, they are reliable in providing consistent outputs from certain inputs. But mere consistency does not mean a presentation of reality. Without the additional item, which is the conscious subject to be faced with the output, the outputs are nothing more than consistent dots

caused by the fact. In this sense the location of knowledge is either missing, or it should include the subject and the presented fact itself. As there is no appropriation of truth within a certain part of the mechanism—because the output is by no means discriminated and appropriated by the mechanism itself—there is no certain location of knowledge within the mechanism except for the whole causal process itself, including the very fact that is the first item within the causal chain. But which fact is to be determined as the very first fact of a causal chain is totally undetermined. The mechanism itself does not point out which part of the causal chain it presents as a case of knowledge. As it is totally unaware and therefore is not conducive of truth, it does not discriminate between truths within the whole chain, and does not appropriate a part of it.

Suppose there is a bottle of water in a room and a certain mechanism is caused by this fact, and makes a certain sound as an effect. Here the effect is consistent about a certain causal process, because it is the result of that process. But it is also the result of other parts of the causal process, like the bottle was filled with water somewhere before put into the room, and it was manufactured somewhere before filled with water, etc. The signal given by the mechanism in itself does not provide a definite preference to choose between any part of this causal process as a knowledge item. It is equally disinterested and equally caused by all parts of the causal process. One may here object that the mechanism is in fact bound only to the fact of existence of bottle inside the room and with water in it, because if the previous parts of the chain had changed, and there had still been the bottle in the room, then the mechanism would have given the same reaction. Thus, it is responsible only with the closest part of the chain to itself. However, this appropriation is not made by the mechanism itself but rather by the subject that is to interpret the situation—or interpret the nature of a causal chain. The mechanism in itself does not give a sign, or reaction of any appropriation. Further, even when the closest effects on the mechanism are different, the reaction, or the output can be the

same: when a thermometer outputs a decrease in the scale—as the level of the liquid dropping—it may be either an effect of the weather getting colder, or an effect of the fact that the thermometer is slightly broken and some liquid of it is trickling out of it temporarily. Here, when some liquid is trickling out, maybe the thermometer does not in fact make a mistake, as it perfectly signals that it is broken—if it would be supposed that it knows. The truth is that, there is no criterion about deciding what the signal is all about except by the help of human invention and interpretation, because the thermometer does not by itself mean anything, it only outputs a consistent effect from a cause. Conscious epistemic beings, on the other hand, are supposed to mean a certain thing—appropriate a certain portion of a definite factual content—with an intentional conduciveness to truth and an ability to frame and appropriate a definite portion of truth; and no matter how successful or not they are, it is such intentions and abilities that make them epistemic beings.

CHAPTER 8

INTERNALISM RESCUED: POSSIBILITY OF SOME FOUNDATIONS AND TWO ATTEMPTS FOR INTERNAL JUSTIFICATION OF INDUCTION

In this section I will defend that 1) basic beliefs are possible and thus there is a starting point for internalist justification; 2) for a sound case of internalist knowing, reliabilism is necessary; and 3) there is some internal justification for reliabilism at least to yield it as a doxastic decision principle. This eventually leads to the conclusions that internalism can embrace reliabilism and in this form, it is rescued from the many difficulties it faces. As externalism is already shown to be inconvenient in the previous sections, then internalism remains the sole option for both the case of knowledge and the case of justification. As an internal justification of reliabilism—particularly for induction, but also for causality, I will present two attempts. The first one belongs to Bonjour, and the second one will be my own justification.

The problem about basic beliefs arises out when the belief content is expected to correspond to reality. Then, as the correspondence relation is open the doubt, the need for further justification starts. But, it is in fact never doubtful that one has some belief content. It may be argued that the content of belief is still open to doubt; for instance, when one has a belief content in which s/he discerns that a visual image of red house is at stake, the skeptic would argue that how can one believe that her/his belief content really contains a visual image of a red house. This kind of skepticism does not target the correspondence relation of the belief content, it points out that the components of the belief content cannot be determined by the subject with certainty. I argue that this is a false skepticism. Firstly, the

subject is totally free from any predetermination about the content of his/her belief: it is quite inconceivable to imagine someone who had a content of a red house and then would assert that the content in fact was different. Second, what is intended to mean by asserting that one has a visual impression of red house is not that one has a visual impression of red house in the strict sense. What is rather meant is that one has such a visual impression that it reminds her/him of a red house. One cannot be skeptical about the act of reminding. What can be the case—and often is the case – is that someone is fallible about the correspondence of the content to reality—not about the content itself. Thus, if someone has a visual impression of a red house as belief content, or if someone has an impression which reminds him/her of a red house and thinks that there is really a red house out there, this belief is open even to a moderate skepticism. But if s/he simply believes that s/he has a belief content of red house, or believes that s/he has an impression which reminds her/him of a red house—and has no further belief as to its correspondence to external world—this is evidently a true belief and is immune even to the most radical skepticism. Here, there is no question of what makes the belief true—its occurrence within the consciousness makes it true: it is impossible to confuse the act of reminding with some other act of mind, and it is impossible to be fallible about what one is reminded of. Even if it is somehow detected that there is even not the slightest resemblance or relation between the impression and what it reminds to the subject, this does not falsify the fact that s/he has the experience of being reminded of a certain content. Thus, in addition to the self-evident beliefs of mathematics and logic—or, a priori propositions in general—, there are further evident beliefs for foundationalist internalism. These are the beliefs about one's own state of mind—of which one is aware. To put it, they are the beliefs that one has some belief content and the beliefs that the content is definite in some way. Sometimes both of the situations can be vague in order to assess. One, for example, may not determine whether s/he really has some belief content at the moment, or one may not clearly discern what the belief content is about. Here, however, the situation is in fact quite

clear: if one cannot determine exactly whether s/he has some belief content or not, then s/he is actually having a belief, the content of which is the following proposition: 'I cannot determine whether I have a belief content or not.' In this way, she in fact is having a clear, definite belief content—a belief content about the ignorance or confusion of the subject. Thus, it is always the case that the so-called vague situations of any state of mind bring about a situation of some definite state of mind.

Such basic beliefs however, provide only a few cases of knowledge. They are, nothing more than knowledge about one's state of mind, and tell nothing about external world. The relation of belief content to external world requires induction and reliabilism. Even the beliefs about one's state of mind that are not purely about a *present* state of mind require induction and reliabilism, because such beliefs rely on memory. No introspection and no awareness can ever guarantee that what is remembered is correct. The determination of correctness of memory can be achieved only by reliability. As for the relation between belief content and its relation to external world, one should also take into account of what proportion senses are well related to external world, and the assessment of this is made only through the notion of causality and induction—both of which are the components of reliabilism.

The lottery paradox and Gettier cases show that clear-cut expressions of truth and falsity justified by induction and reliability cannot be cases of knowledge as justified true belief. It is quite explicit that even a very high probability of truth does not—and should not—equal truth. A ninety nine point nine or even a higher percentage is not equal to a hundred percent, and so beliefs based on reliabilism and induction should leave some space for possibility of error. Therefore, knowledge should rather be an account of what is more likely than the others—not what is true or not. This is determined by doxastic decision principles. The idea behind the

concept is to consider the probabilistic power of the alternatives and make a decision among them. The decision would not be designated as ‘true’, but it would be designated as ‘more likely to be true than the others’. This is achieved through an equilibrium model, in which the relevant data, including not only what is already in hand, but also the implications of one’s ignorance—in other words, what can be inferred positively from ignorance—are put symmetrically to both sides of equilibrium. A slightest change and even *a possibility of a slightest change* in the balance are held positive values for the decision. The outcome, of course, would not be ultimate, but would be temporal—as some new values may be invented in the future. Therefore, this kind of justification and knowledge producing is progressive. Without doubt, the decision is made internally, as a rational assessment and judgment among options can only be done internally—otherwise the situation will face the dilemmas of externalism, which I have extensively accounted for in the previous sections.

Even justifying and accepting induction as just a positive doxastic decision principle is problematic. Even if the sun has been experienced as rising for thousands of years, what would be the rationale behind it to say that it has a higher probability of rising tomorrow than not rising? Bonjour offers the following a priori justification frames for induction:

(I-1) In a situation in which a standard inductive premise obtains, it is highly likely that there is some explanation (other than mere coincidence or chance) for the convergence and constancy of the observed proportion (and the more likely, the larger the number of cases in question).⁹¹

(I-2) So long as the possibility that observation itself affects the proportion of *As* that are *Bs* is excluded, the best explanation, that is, the most likely to be true, for the truth of a standard inductive premise is the straight inductive explanation, namely that the observed proportion m/n

⁹¹ Bonjour, Laurence. *In Defense of Pure Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. p. 208.

accurately reflects (within a reasonable degree of approximation) a corresponding objective regularity in the world (and this likelihood increases as the number of observations and the variety of the collateral circumstances of observation increases).⁹²

The power behind this kind of assessment is that the inductive premise, as it happens, would be a manifestation of an extremely low probability if it is not an outcome of some natural law. That is, if the sun has risen for thousands of years as a result of a chance or coincidence, then the whole series of sun rising up to present moment would be the result of a very surprisingly low probability. Then, some other explanation for the series of sun rising for thousands of years up to present has more or less more probabilistic ratio of truth than it being totally by chance. Surely, any explanation which projects the future situation would also be more probable than a coincidence or chance. An instant example of such kind of explanation can be given with the concept of natural law. If some convergence and constancy is observed within a series of phenomena—in which the number of observed proportion is high, then the series is more likely to be the result of some natural law than to be the result of mere coincidence or chance.

Bonjour's attempt seems quite appealing and plausible, and it is readily a milestone as a sample frame for some other insights about a priori justification of difficult issues. But, as a particular attempt for justification of induction in its own, it may prove to be still doubtful, as there is a serious weakness to consider about its presupposition. Bonjour both predetermines and overvalues constancy and convergence over other kinds of occurrences—the so-called irregular occurrences—and this is what enables him to intuit that a *special* low probability is at stake if taken as a result of chance. However, the reality is that *any* series that are to happen would in fact reflect a very low probability—as low as the constant, uniform pattern. Thus, if the series presented a so-called irregular pattern, then would they

⁹² Ibid. p. 212.

be taken as a result of coincidence or a result of some other explanation? Thus, I defend that the concept of uniformity may be a misleading factor—and it plausibly seems that what Bonjour means by constancy and convergence is nothing but uniformity in some way. For Bonjour's account to be sounder; at least what makes a uniform series more *special* than other series—the so-called irregular series—should be accounted. Consider that a gambling roulette with a hundred different numbers on it, is played a million times and the series of outcome is a very intricate pattern; that is, one cannot frame some constancy for it. Then, in another occasion, it is played one million times again and the outcome is that the pattern is totally uniform—it is always the same number among all other numbers. For the second occasion we would be absolutely stunned and readily admit that a very low probability has happened. But in reality, the so-called irregular pattern resulting in the first occasion is also a happening of an equally very low probability. It is because, although seems to be irregular, it is indeed a unique pattern as much as the uniform pattern—and as much as all other possible patterns. But no one surprises about its occurrence. This is because we do not, or cannot differentiate it as a unique pattern, while we easily differentiate a uniform pattern as a unique pattern. However, it is quite doubtful that nature itself discriminates a uniform pattern as a unique pattern. Therefore, it seems to be more a result of mind work than the nature's feature to associate a uniform pattern with natural law and to dismiss an irregular pattern as a product of natural law. To make an explanation for all possible patterns one by one, on the other hand, would kill the original attempt, which is to justify induction for future projection—not to justify or explain every kind of occurrence. Such an explanation will equalize all kinds of occurrences, thus a uniform pattern would not mean anything for a future projection.

For the above difficulty, I do not argue for a dismissal of the attempt, however. The point is that it has some serious drawbacks to be discussed, but the intuition behind it is quite in content for an a priori, rational justification of some difficult and

important epistemic tools. Our framework for being more sensitive for unique patterns does not necessarily mean a sign for irrational conception of events. Indeed, Kantian justification mainly depends on the existence and acceptance of such frameworks of reason, in the sense that it is such frameworks that make all our epistemic conception possible—without such frameworks one would even have no chance for any epistemic enterprise. But Bonjour does not accept Kantian notions, thus, the deficiency of his account cannot be repaired by a Kantian make-up. Thus, it should be noted that the notion of uniformity, giving a primacy to uniformity, has some possibility of being misleading on Bonjour's account, unless uniformity is based on a more distinct notion.

Such a distinct notion can be defined as epistemic convenience. What makes inductive premise and regularity—uniformity interesting is that they present epistemic convenience. Unless an evil demon case is at stake, epistemic convenience is outstanding in the sense that if regularity and uniformity are in fact at stake in the nature, then it is the case that there is such a natural law that dictates human knowledge—makes human knowledge possible and even affirms human knowledge. In this way uniformity and regularity becomes significant in comparison to irregular and non-uniform patterns.

A more severe problem however, is the one echoed by Goodman's paradox. Bonjour's account cannot handle the possibility of some particular shifting regularity. Consider that the natural law is in such a manner that, at a certain point of time (t_1), the earth begins to revolve in some direction. This shift in the behavior of the earth is not caused by some interrupting force; the causal forces are the same as before. Rather, the shift is the product of a natural law which dictates that there be a change in the property of earth such that it revolves in a certain manner until t_1 , and then revolves in another certain direction. The inductive premise until t_1 does

not give insight about whether this kind of natural law is more likely or a so-called normal kind of natural law is more likely. Both seem to be equally likely to happen.

The problem is not about the possibility of shifting regularities in general, but rather against one specified shift. If Goodman-type laws are handled as a whole unit—as a single pattern that is described as any shifting regularity, then it is possible to apply Bonjour's argument: such a pattern would include cases so much in number that this pattern's not ever occurring until present would provide validity for the argument that the inductive premise, as a normal regular pattern, would prove to be more likely to be a part of a normal regular law than a part of a Goodman-type law. Because its not occurring until present is a matter of so little chance that a it is more likely that there is some meta law about natural laws that they be normal types rather than Goodman types. The problem occurs when a possibility of a normal regular pattern is to be compared with a single, particular Goodman-type law. For instance, suppose such a particular law is defined about a certain element: Its color is green in the many observations up to t_1 , and will chance into a very specific tone of blue at t_1 , where t_1 overlaps with the next observation of the samples. It is doubtful whether a type application for this token is valid enough. Thus it may be necessary to treat it as a particular law on its own. Then the inductive premise will be as equally valid to justify this law as it is to justify a normal regular law—where the color of the element wouldn't change. Therefore, when one by one comparisons of possibility are necessary among specific laws, Bonjour's argument doesn't work.

My own proposal for such comparisons, although presents a very weak, even marginalized likelihood, provides a doxastic decision principle to the above mentioned problems. It is based on introducing the possibility of alternative series of laws using three all-embracing a priori concepts, and therefore no fourth alternative can be introduced. These three concepts are necessity, contingency and

impossibility. The justification depends on the following premise, which, I believe, is an a priori truth:

Something is either necessary, or contingent, or impossible, and no fourth alternative is possible.

The strategy of the justification is to apply the premise to any inductive premise at hand and to some specific contender and to assess which of the options are possible and which of them are impossible in the light of the inductive premise. Consider that the inductive premise includes the series of facts in which water boils at 100 Celsius degree (call the fact A) and the number of the observed facts is 1000, while the specific contender is water's boiling at 63 Celsius degree (fact B) and its number of observation is 0. The application, then, is as follows:

- 1) A is necessary and thus B is impossible.
- 2) B is necessary and thus A is impossible.
- 3) A is contingent and B is impossible.
- 4) B is contingent and A is impossible.
- 5) A is contingent and B is contingent.

Given the inductive premise, 2 and 4 are impossible as A already occurred as a result of the observation, while 1, 3, and 5 are possible. Also, 5 dictates that A and B are almost equally possible. The rationale behind rendering them equally possible is that we equally do not know about them—we have equally ignorant about them and the inductive premise does not in any way change this equal ignorance in a significant way. One may object that it may diminish further possibility of A in a finite series, because there remains little space for B's

occurrence, and as far as it is contingent, there should be equal space from the beginning. This is true, because if both A and B are contingent, then ignorance and a priori reasoning dictates that their occurrence probability are the same and therefore the remaining time-space is more likely to be preserved for B rather than A. However, occurrence of A within the observation already done dictates that 5 is less likely than 1 and 3. Thus the degree of the probability of B's occurrence's getting higher is equalized with the probability of 5's getting lower against 1 and 3, both of which rejects B's occurrence. In this way, if the probability of 1 and 3 are still equal to 5, then A is certainly more possible to occur than B in the future. Even if 1 and 3 had little probabilistic value, A would still be more probable than B provided that A and B have equal probability within 5. The inductive premise dictates that theoretically 1 and 3 cannot be rendered impossible. Therefore; although with only a margin, A is more probable than B.

As for the comparison of the possibility of the specified Goodman-type case defined above, with the possibility of normal regular law; possibility of such an alternative series of laws can be introduced along with the specified Goodman-type law—assuming that inductive premise consists in a good deal of observation of an element in green color until t_1 :

- 1) Goodman-type law: It is necessary for the element to be green and impossible to be blue until t_1 and it is necessary for the element to be blue and impossible to be green after t_1 .
- 2) Normal law.
- 3) Introduced law: It is impossible for the element to be green from beginning to the end and other colors are contingent after t_1 .
- 4) Introduced law: It is impossible for the element to be blue from beginning to the end and other colors are contingent after t_1 .

Number 4 is immediately eliminated as it contradicts with inductive premise. The decisive point on the other hand, is that number 3 squeezes the probability of Goodman-type law, while the probability of normal regular law is preserved at the same degree. Or, as number 1 and number 2 have the same probabilities, and as number 3 has a positive value of probability and as it declares that green is impossible and blue is possible after t1, then the possibility of blue's occurrence after t1 becomes higher than possibility of green's occurrence after t1. Assuming that other possible options and alternative laws are equally serving for both sides, the probabilistic value of combination of law 2 and law 3 is greater than probabilistic value of law 1. What makes introduce of such laws like number 3 legitimate is that, their theoretical possibility cannot be rendered impossible, just as it is well be the case with Goodman-type laws. But it should be noted that this kind of inventing for a priori doxastic decision principle is progressive; new alternative laws that are decisive can be introduced and the situation may change.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION

To sum up, the combination of Bonjour's approach in a repaired version with the above approach provides a doxastic decision principle in favor of induction, in such a way that Goodman-type difficulties are also eliminated. This combination can be applied to causality and reliabilism. If the inductive inference is to be contrasted with its negation as a whole, then Bonjour's approach highlights that as far as inductive inference implies some natural law manifested in terms of subject's epistemic conformity with what is presented to awareness, this natural law is more probable than a mere coincidence. Because, the inductive premise has such a low chance of occurring than its negation that, its occurring is more likely to be a result of some natural law. If, however, the inductive inference is to be contrasted with a specific alternative, Bonjour's attempt is useless and the approach presented above would handle the situation.

For causality, a series of tests or experiments providing the conditions that no possibility of interruption of some other force is at stake can be done to get a series of observation results. A total frequency of fact A always followed by fact B provides a doxastic decision principle for causality being more likely to be at stake as a natural law than its negation as a whole. As for a specific contender, the result of tests would give the a priori intuition that there is always the possibility for the contender to be impossible, while for causality there is always the a priori intuition that it is possible that it is universally necessary and there is no possibility that it is universally impossible.

As for the reliabilism in general, which also relies on high frequencies and not only on one hundred per cent frequencies, the justification can be applied to determine the likelihood of the frequency ranges rather than being the likelihood of totally uniform series. For example, if the inductive premise is such that a series of one hundred observation includes 95 A and 5 –A, then an approximate value of this proportion can be justified as the more likely proportion than any other specified approximate proportion. Thus, an inductive premise with such a proportion yields to the belief that there is some possibility for the proportion of approximately 95 (93-97) percent of A and 5 (3-7) percentage of –A as being universally necessary and there is some possibility for any other proportion to be universally impossible, and therefore the given proportion is more likely than any other proportion. Such results can also be progressively tested and be repaired in order to achieve higher percentages with resort to causality approach, for instance by trying out to detect that whether some causal interrupting force is at stake to be responsible for a 95 per cent of A other than 100 percent of A.

Goodman's paradox can also be treated with the justified reliabilism. The proportion of Goodman cases to normal cases occurring up to the present provides a frequency pattern as an inductive premise. Again, for any shift of uniformity situations, a causality approach can be pursued in order to detect whether the shift is more likely to be a product of some interrupting causal forces or more likely to be a result of some strange natural law about the property of things. If, there is no instance of Goodman case up to the present, then there is at least some theoretical possibility that it is universally impossible, and there is at least a theoretical possibility for a normal case of natural law to be universally necessary. If there is some approximately definite proportion of both cases, then this proportion is more likely than the other proportions.

This justification does not offer clear cut singular beliefs of a first order. It only provides marginal 'more probable' results. But, as it is mentioned already, Gettier cases and lottery paradox makes such attempts very difficult to achieve, if not impossible. The justification can only provide rational assessments about which of the options is more likely, and this is best done by a priori doxastic decision principles about the situation, using legitimate concepts. Use of such concepts, and making rational assessment of the situation with a priori doxastic decision principles about possibility and probability, are all internal issues.

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APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tezin amacı, epistemolojik dışsalcılığın ortaya koyduğu bilme durumunun kabul edilemez olduğunu ve epistemolojik içselciliğin bilme biçiminin, sahip olduğu tüm ciddi problemlere rağmen vazgeçilemez seçenek olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. İçselciliğin ciddi problemlerinden bir tanesini oluşturan tümevarımın gerekçelendirilmesi sorununa da Laurence Bonjour'un bu konudaki gerekçelendirici argümanı temel alınarak bir çözüm önerisi getirilmektedir. Bu öneri tümevarımı kesin olarak değil fakat rasyonel bir seçimin sonucu olabilmek açısından gerekçelendirmektedir.

Platon'dan Chisholm'e kadar ana akım epistemolojide bilginin tanımını gerekçelendirilmiş doğru inanç formundadır. Buna göre bir inanç veya önermenin bilgi olması için gerekçelendirilmiş olması ve de doğru olması gerekmektedir. Bu, Gettier örneklerinde de görülebileceği gibi sorunlu bir tanımlamadır. Daha iyi bir tanımlama bizzat gerekçelendirmenin kendisi ile doğrulanmış olan inanç şeklinde oluşturulabilir ve içselciliğin en nihayetinde talep ettiği durum da budur. Fakat, çoğunlukla gerekçelendirmenin kendisi ile tam bir doğrulama olamamaktadır. Gerekçelendirmenin inancı kesin olarak doğrulayıp doğrulayamadığı meselesi ve bu durumun bilinip bilinmediği meselesi ana akım epistemoloji ve içselciliğin ana konusudur.

İçselci gerekçelendirme bir inancın rasyonel yollarla doğruluk değerinin belirlenmesidir. Gerekçelendirmenin şart olduğu bir bilgi tanımında şöyle bir problem varsayılabilir: bir inancın veya önermenin gerekçelendirmesi başka inançları ve önermeleri, ve onların doğruluğunu gerektirir, ve bu da o inançların ve önermelerin gerekçelendirmesini gerektirir, ve bu durum sonsuz bir geriye gidişe sebep olabilir. Böyle bir tehlike vardır ama bundan kurtulmanın bir yolu da olabilir. Çünkü kendi kendilerinde kesinlik ve doğruluk değeri taşıyan inanç ve önermeler de olabilir. Bu tür önermeler belirlendiği takdirde onların gerekçelendirilmesine gerek yoktur. Bu tür inanç ve önermeler var ise, onlara şu şekilde ayrı bir parantez açmak gerekir: gerekçelendirilmemiş olmalarına rağmen bilgidirler.

Epistemolojik içselcilik, en kısıtlayıcı tanımıyla, bir inanç veya önermenin gerekçelendirmesinin tamamen birinci tekil şahsa ait olduğunu ve gerekçelendirmede yer alan her şeyin birinci tekil şahsın, yani süjenin kendi içselliğinde meydana gelmesi gerektiğini savunur. Buna, gerekçelendirmede gerekçelendirici olma işlevi gören her şey dâhildir: gerekçelendirmenin nesnelere, akıl yürütme, değerlendirme ve bunlara bir şekilde katkı yapan tüm unsurlar, ve doğruluk değerinin belirlenmesi edimi. Fakat gerekçelendirmenin koşullarının, mesela onun başarısına, hızına, hatta olanaklılığına etki eden koşulların süjenin içselliği dâhilinde olması gerekmemektedir. Dahası, söz konusu inanç veya önermenin ifade ettiği olgunun nesnelere için de böyle bir kısıtlama yoktur. Fakat o nesnelere kavramı, bizzat o nesnelere kastediliyor olması durumu, süjenin onlarla olan diğer gerekli ilişkilerinin durumu; mesela onlarla olan ilişkisi dolayımı ise bu dolayımın durumu, ve ilişkinin gerekçelendirmedeki pozitif veya negatif rolü ile ilgili veriler içsellikte yer almalıdır.

İçsel olmanın kıstası bilinçlilik, şuurluluk veya en net ifade ile, farkındalıktır; yani bir şeyin içsel olup olmaması onun süjenin farkındalık alanında olup olmaması

demektir. Birkaç istisna dışında, bu konuda genel bir görüş birliğinden söz edebiliriz. Farkındalığın önemi içsel ve dışsal olarak nitelendirilebilecek iki alan arasında en net ayrımı verebilen kıstas olmasıdır. Süjenin bir şeyin farkındalığında olup olmaması hem kendisinin oldukça net olarak belirleyebildiği bir durum hem de oldukça net iki farklı ontolojiye tekabül eden bir durumdur. Örneğin, eğer kişinin farkındalığında olmadığı beyin fonksiyonları doğrudan içsellığe dahil edilseydi, bu beyin fonksiyonları ile dışsal diyebileceğimiz diğer alan ve unsurlar arasındaki sınırlar zaman zaman oldukça bulanık olduğundan içsel ile dışsalın tam olarak birbirinden demarke edilmesi oldukça zor olacaktı. Mesela bir insanın beynine, ona entegre olabilecek şekilde ek bir mekanizma monte edilebilir ve bu mekanizma da bir başka alete entegre edilebilir ve nihayetinde tüm sistem oldukça dışsal olarak nitelendirilebilecek bir bütünlüğün parçası haline getirilebilir. Böyle bir durumda içsel olan ile dışsal olanın sınırının nerede ve nasıl çizilebileceğine dair net bir koşulumuz yoktur. Hâlbuki bütün bu sistemin geçerli olduğu bir halde bile farkındalık kendi ontolojik özerkliğini net olarak koruyacaktır ve bu da anlaşılabilir bir ayrıma olanak sağlar.

Yukarıdaki örnek dâhilinde unutulmamalıdır ki beyin fonksiyonlarının kişinin farkındalığını meydan getirmek veya onu doğrudan etkilemek gibi bir ihtimali vardır. Dahası, farkındalıkta meydana gelen her şeyi belirlemek ve meydana gelmesini sağlamak gibi bir işlevi de olabilir. Yani farkındalık, var olmak ve bir performansta bulunmak için tamamen beyne ihtiyaç duyuyor olabilir. En azından bilimsel yaklaşım bunu savunmaktadır. Fakat daha önce bahsettiğimiz gibi bu durum bir inanç veya önermenin gerekçelendirilmesi ile değil, o gerekçelendirmenin koşulları ve o koşulların sağlanması ile ilgilidir. Bir gerekçelendirmenin performansı ve başarısı, hatta meydana gelebilmesi tamamen dışsal faktörlerin belirlenimi, güdümü veya kontrolü altında olabilir ve şuur tamamen pasif bir konumda da olabilir. Fakat gerekçelendirme sürecinin

görüngüsü, mesela bir akıl yürütme durumunun takibi ve onaylanmasının görüngüsü farkındalıkta meydana gelmelidir.

Epistemolojik dışsalcılık basitçe içselci kısıtlamanın reddidir. Bir gerekçelendirme için onun her zaman tümüyle içsel bir durum olması gerekmediğini, bazı inanç veya önermelerin kişinin onların gerekçelendirme öğelerinin bir kısmının farkında olmadan da gerekçelendirildiği veya gerekçelendiği ve doğrulandığı takdirde de bilgi sayılabileceğini savunur. Dışsalıcı bilgi teorileri genellikle doğru inanç veya önerme ile bu inanç veya önermelere konu olan olgu veya gerçeklik arasında belirli bir ilişki veya bağ olduğunu varsayarlar. Eğer süjenin inanç veya önermesinin bu olgu veya gerçeklikle olan ilişkisi veya bağı ortaya çıkarılabilirse, ve bu bağ olgu veya gerçeklikten kaynaklanmak suretiyle süjede doğru inanç veya önerme meydana getirebiliyorsa, bu durumda süje bu ilişki veya bağdan haberdar olmasa dahi, yani bu ilişki veya bağın farkında olmasa dahi ortada o süje adına bir bilme durumundan söz edilebilir. Bu ilişki veya bağ, sebep sonuç ilişkisi veya süjede yüksek frekansta doğru inanç veya önerme meydana getirebilen bir mekanizma türünden güvenilirlik düzeyi yüksek bir şey olmalıdır. Fakat belirtilmelidir ki içselcilik ve dışsalcılık tartışması böyle bir bağın olup olmaması üzerine değildir. İçselciler bu tür bağların olabirliğine karşı çıkmazlar. İki taraf arasındaki zıtlama, eğer böyle bir bağ varsa, ve inanç veya önermeyi gerekçelendiren şey bu bağ ise, söz konusu inanç veya önermeye sahip olan süjenin bir bilme koşulu olarak bunun farkında olmasının gerekip gerekmediği üzerinedir. Dışsalcılara göre süjenin bunun farkında olması gerekmez ve en gerekli koşullarda dahi bu bağı dışarıdan bir gözlemcinin saptamış olması yeterli bir durumdur.

Bir kişinin bir inanç veya önermeyi bilip bilmemesinin dışarıdan, ve gerekirse bir gözlemci tarafından belirlenmesi durumu, dışsalıcı bilgi teorilerinin doğalca epistemoloji ve bilimsel yöntem ile olan yakın ilişkisini gösterir. Dışsalcılık, genellikle felsefi bir yaklaşımdan çok, bilimsel pratiğe daha yakındır: doğruluk ve

gerçeklik ile ilgili bilimsel metodun her varsayımını kabul eder ve savunur iken şüpheli yaklaşımları pek fazla hesabını vermeden bir kenara iter. Aynı şekilde felsefenin rasyonel bir gerekçelendirilmesini yapamadığı ama bilimsel yöntemin temelini oluşturan tümevarım, sebep-sonuç ilişkisi gibi nosyonları da sorgulamadan kabul eder ve yaklaşımının temeline yerleştirir.

İşselcilik nasıl her bilme durumunun işsel olarak gerekçelendirilmesi ve bu şekilde akıl yürütme ile doğrulanması gerektiğini savunuyorsa, aynı şekilde tüm bu nosyonların da gerekçelendirilmesi gerektiğini savunmak durumundadır. Bu durumda dışsalcılığın işselciliğe karşı, daha verimli olmak gibi çok belirgin bir avantajı vardır.

Bunun en çarpıcı örneği tümevarımdan elde edilen inanç ve önermelerdir. Bu şekilde elde edilen gündelik ve bilimsel bilginin ve üstelik de işe yarar bilginin miktarı, tümevarıma dayanmayan felsefi yaklaşımın ortaya koyduğu ile karşılaştırıldığında kıyas edilemeyecek kadar fazladır. Bu anlamda başarı elde etme konusunda dışsalcılığın işselciliğe oranla çok daha doğru bir istikamet seçmiş olduğu kesindir. Fakat öte yandan gerçek bilginin kesin bilgi olması gibi bir felsefi misyon söz konusu olduğunda dışsalcılık konudan tamamen sapmıştır. Bu, bilinçli bir konudan sapma durumudur ve bunun en önemli sebebi dışsalcılığın kesin bilgi ve doğruluk arayışına karşı şüpheli saldırılar ile ilgili genel bir pesimizm içerisinde olması ve şüphelilerin ortaya koyduğu problemlerin çözülemeyeceği inancıdır.

Fakat yine de işselciler için şüpheliğe karşı güvende tutulmuş bazı inanç ve önerme türleri mevcut olabilir, ve dolayısıyla işselciliğin kesin bir çıkmaz içerisinde olduğunu varsaymak doğru olmaz. Bunlar mantıksal ve matematiksel önermelerin yanı sıra süjenin belli bir anda kendi bilişsel ve zihinsel durumu ile ilgili sahip olduğu inançlar ve önermelerdir. Bu türde önermeler temelci bir işselcilik için başlangıç noktası oluşturabilecek temel önermeleri oluşturabilir. Kişinin kendi bilişsel ve zihinsel durumu ile ilgili sahip olduğu inançlar ve önermeler ile ilgili

problem bu inanç ve önermelerin kendi kesinlikleriyle ilgili değil bu inanç ve önermelerin dış dünya ile olan ilişkilerindedir. Bu inanç ve önermelerin dış dünya ile olan tekabül etme ilişkisi şüpheciliğe oldukça açıktır ve epistemolojinin temel meselelerinden ola gelmiştir. Fakat kişinin belirli bir anda o inanç ve önermelere sahip olduğu gerçeği şüpheli saldırıya açık değildir. Kartezyen bir yaklaşımla belirtilirse, süjenin kendi farkındalığı o inanç ve önermelere sahip olduğunu garantiler. Belirli bir inanç veya önerme için kişinin gerçekten o inanç ve önermenin içeriğine sahip olup olmadığı da sorgulanabilir gibi gözükse de aslında bu da güvenceye alınmış durumdadır. Mesela eğer bir kişi belirli bir anda bir kırmızı ev imgesine sahip olduğuna, bir kırmızı ev imgesi duyumsaması içerisinde olmak olarak tarif ettiği bir zihin durumunda olduğuna inanıyorsa, imgenin ne olduğundan bağımsız olarak onun kişi tarafından kırmızı bir eve benzetildiği, ve dolayısıyla kırmızı ev kavramıyla ilintilendirilmiş olduğu kesindir. Burada, imgenin aslında neyin imgesi olduğu ve gerçekten bir kırmızı ev imgesi olup olmadığı gibi şüpheli bir soru anlamsız kalmaktadır. Çünkü sahip olunan zihin durumu benzetme ilişkisidir ve benzetmede yanılğı olması mümkün değildir. Yanılğının mümkün olabileceği nokta benzetmenin dış dünyada bir olgu durumuna karşılık gelip gelmediğidir. Kişi bazen kendi zihin durumuyla ilgili olarak bir belirsizlik içerisinde de olabilir ve durumunu netleştiremiyor olabilir. Unutulmamalıdır ki, böyle bir durumda da kişi belirsiz, netleşmeyen bir zihin durumuna sahip olmak olarak ifade edilebilecek bir kesin inanca veya önermeye sahiptir.

Kişinin o andaki bilişsel ve zihinsel durumuna dayanarak hem bir takım kesin doğru önermeler, hem de verili herhangi bir önermenin, bu önermenin değerine veya bir başka önermeye kıyasla sahip olacağı doğruluk değerinin içselci bir gerekçelendirme ile belirlenebileceği M. Roderick Chisholm tarafından savunulan bir görüştür. Chisholm'a göre kişi elinde neredeyse hiçbir veri yokken dahi herhangi bir önermenin doğruluk değeri ile ilgili kesin bir fikre varabilir. Fakat bir

önermenin doğruluk değeri ile ilgili bir fikre varmak, illa ki o önermenin nihayetinde doğru veya yanlış olduğunu saptamak değildir. Bir önermenin, o önermenin değiline-reddine kıyasla daha olası olup olmadığını belirlemek veya değili-reddi ile eşit olasılığa sahip olup olmadığını belirlemek de o önermenin doğruluk değeri ile ilgili bir fikre sahip olmaktır. Chisholm'un ortaya koymak istediği durum şudur ki, her zamana her önerme için bu saptama yapılabilir ve bu şu anlama gelir ki bir kişi her zaman belirli bir önerme ile ilgili kendi bilişsel durumunu kesin olarak tayin edebilir, ve bu tayin üzerinden de o önermeye kendi bilişsel durumu bağlamında bir geçici doğruluk değeri verebilir ve bu tamamen rasyoneldir.

Bu durum şöyle açıklanabilir: bir kişi haklarında hiçbir veriye ve bilgiye sahip olmadığı A olgu durumu ve B olgu durumundan hangisinin daha olası olduğuna dair bir inanca sahip olabilir. Eğer ikisi hakkında da hiçbir veriye sahip değilse, bu bilişsel durumun da farkında ise o zaman bu bilişsel durum bağlamında her hangi birisinin gerçekleşme olasılığı diğerine eşittir. Eğer kişi haklarında hiçbir veriye sahip olmadığı A, B, ve C olmak üzere üç olgu durumu hakkında düşünüyorsa ve A veya B'nin herhangi birinin meydana gelme olasılığı C'nin meydana gelme olasılığına göre kaçtır sorusunun cevabını arıyorsa, kendi bilişsel durumu bağlamında sahip olacağı bilgi A veya B'nin herhangi birisinin meydana gelme olasılığının C'nin meydana gelme olasılığının iki katı olduğudur. Chisholm'un içselciliğinin temeli bu rasyonalitedir ve muhakkak ki veriler arttıkça olasılık durumları değişecektir. Mesela eğer tümevarım rasyonel bir kriter ise ve kişi olgulardan birisi hakkında onun daha önce görülmüş olduğuna dair bir veriye sahipse, o olgu meydana gelme olasılığı diğerlerine nazaran biraz daha olası olacaktır. Dolayısıyla Chisholmcu yaklaşım masa başında düşünmeye yönelik bir durumu temel alsada aslında bilgi edinme anlayışı gelişimcidir ve gelişimin de yeni veriler yoluyla yapılacağı açık olduğu için nihayetinde masa başı düşünmeyi savunan bir yaklaşım değildir.

Chisholm'un bu içselci yaklaşımı gelişimci olmanın yanı sıra yüzde yüz doğruluklar veya yanlışlıklar bildiren inanç ve önermelere dayanmak zorunda olan bir anlayışı da reddeden bir bilgi kuramı ortaya koymakla da öne çıkar. Bu içselci yaklaşım, olasılıklar ve olanakları saptamaya yönelen ve bilgi önermesi olarak olasılık değerleri ve o değerlerin ne şekilde hesap edildiğini ortaya koyan bir tür hesap dökümü formunda bilgi anlayışını savunur. Yine bir diğer önemli nokta bu içselci yaklaşımın olgular ve olgu durumları ile ilgili bir doğruluk değeri belirlenirken sadece onların değil, kişinin bu olgu ve olgu durumları ile ilgili mevcut bilişsel durumunun da net olarak belirlenip hesaba katılması yoluyla gerekçelendirilen bir bilgi anlayışını savunmasıdır.

Bütün bunlar içselciliğin yerinden doğrulması için gerekli koşullardır. Buna göre bilgi, mantıksal ve matematiksel önermelere ek olarak, olgu durumları hakkında çeşitli olasılık durumları belirten, değişime ve gelişime açık, kişinin o andaki bilişsel durumu ile bağıntılı olarak bir şeyler öne süren, fakat bu konuda da rasyonel olarak gerekçelendirilmiş kesin doğru inançlar veya önermelerdir. Bu durumun ilk göze batan sakıncası bilginin kesin doğruluk uğruna fazla içe kapanık ve ihtiyatlı bir hale gelmesidir. Fakat tümevarımın içsel bir gerekçelendirilmesi yapılmadan bu kaderden kurtulmak pek mümkün gözükmemektedir.

Tümevarımın bir şekilde doğru kabul edilmesi durumunda bile olasılık belirten bir doğru inançtan veya önermeden yüzde yüz kesinlik belirten bir inanç veya önermeye sıçramak önemli sorunlara yol açabilir. Edmund Gettier'in bu konudaki meşhur örnekleri tamamıyla rasyonel olan ve tamamlanmış olan bir gerekçelendirmeye dayanan inanç veya önermeler dışında herhangi bir gerekçelendirilmiş doğru inancın veya yüksek olasılık bildiren bir gerekçelendirmeye dayalı bir doğru inanç veya önermenin bilgi olamayacağını göstermektedir. Gettier'in örnekleri şunu anlatmaktadır: bir kişi belirli bir inanç veya önerme içeriği ile ilgili olarak oldukça yüksek bir doğruluk olasılığı ortaya

koyan bir gerekçelendirmenin sonucunda bu inanç veya önermeye sahip olsun. Ve bu inanç veya önermenin dile getirdiği durum bu yüksek olasılık bildiren gerekçelendirmenin ortaya koyduğu sebeplerden değil de başka sebeplerin sonucu olarak doğru olarak meydana gelmiş olsun. Bu durumda kişi gerekçelendirilmiş bir doğru inanç veya önermeye sahiptir, fakat inanç veya önermenin içeriğinin doğru olarak meydana gelmesinde gerekçelendirmedeki hususların hiç birinin rolü yoktur. Bu durumda kişinin gerekçelendirilmiş bir doğru inanç veya önermeye sahip olmasına rağmen biliyor olduğunu söyleyemeyiz. Hâlbuki o inanç veya önerme ile ilgili yüksek olasılık ortaya koyan bir gerekçelendirmenin sonucunda o inanç veya önermenin doğru oluşuna değil de doğruluğunun yüksek olasılığına inansaydı, sonuç ne olursa olsun kişinin bilme durumu güvence altında olacaktır.

Eğer dışsalcılar doğru inanç veya önerme ile o inanç veya önermenin dile getirdiği olgu veya gerçeklik arasında gerçek bir ilişki belirleyebilirlerse kesin doğruluk bildiren inanç veya önermeleri bu tür problemlerden kurtarmış olacaklardır. Fakat bu hem çok zor bir iştir, hem de dışsalcılığın bahsedileceği üzere başkaca çok ciddi problemleri vardır. Dışsalcılığın iki genel biçiminden söz edebiliriz: sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisi ve güvenilircilik. Bu iki biçimin her ikisi de katışıksız halleri ile dışsalcıların kendileri tarafından dahi kabul edilebilir değillerdir. Dikkate değer dışsalcı teoriler bu ikisinin bir birleşimini öne sürenlerdir. Dışsalcı bilgi teorisinde öne çıkan üç özel yaklaşım vardır. Bunlar M. David Armstrong'un ortaya attığı kanun ilişkisine dayalı güvenilirlik, Alvin Goldman'ın sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisi ve yine Goldman'a ait olan güvenilir işlemciliktir. Armstrong'un teorisi çıkarımsız inanç veya önermenin gerçeklik veya olgu ile doğa kanunu tipinde bir bağ ile bağlantılı olduğunu savunur. Bu bağ tıpkı hava sıcaklığı ile termometre arasında olan ilişki gibi genel bir doğa kanunu biçimindedir. Havanın sıcaklığı tıpkı bir termometrede belirli bir tutarlı tepkiye, ve sonucunda da belirli bir sıcaklık değeri ortaya koyan göstergeye yol açtığı gibi, gerçeklik veya olgu da aynı şekilde süjude çıkarımsız bir doğru inanç veya önerme belirmesine yol açar. Armstrong'a

göre bilgi koşulu olarak süjenin bu inanca sebep olan kanunun farkında olmasına gerek yoktur, herhangi bir başka gerekçelendirme vermek durumunda da değildir. Ne var ki, bu türden bir doğru inanç veya önerme ortaya çıkması, mevcut koşullarda tutarlı olarak meydana gelebilen bir durum değildir. Pek çok kişi sıklıkla yanlış inanç veya önermelere sahip olabilmektedir. Armstrong'a göre bunun sebebi kanunun işleme koşullarının henüz tam uygun durumda olmaması ve arada ilişkinin tam olarak gerçekleşmesini engelleyen faktörler olmasıdır. Armstrong için, bu koşulları düzeltmek ve düzenlemek, zor da olsa bilimsel çalışma ile başarılabilir bir iştir.

Goldman'ın sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisi bir olgu ile çıkarımsız inanç veya önerme arasında sebep sonuç ilişkisi olduğunu öne sürer. Örneğin süjenin önünde duran bir sandalye, uygun ışık koşullarında o süjenin retinasında belirli bir uyarıya sebep olur ve retinadaki uyarı belirli sınırlar yoluyla beyinde belirli bir başka uyarıya sebep olur ve nihayetinde beyindeki bu uyarı, süjede doğru inanç veya önerme şeklinde bir sonuca sebep olur. Dikkat edilirse bu tarz bir bilme biçimi Armstrong'un ortaya attığı biçim ile büyük benzerlikler taşır. İlk bakışta Goldman'ın bilme teorisinin kanun tipi bir genellemeye dayanmıyor gibi gözükmesidir. Fakat aslında sebep-sonuç ilişkisi de kanunsal bir ilişkidir ve dolayısıyla Goldman'ın bu teorisinin altında yatan temel dayanak da bir doğa kanunudur. Aradaki en önemli fark, Goldman'ın sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisinde tekil bir olgu ile tekil bir inanç veya önerme arasındaki bir sebep sonuç ilişkisi vurgulanırken, Armstrong'un teorisinde genelleştirilmiş bir olgu grubu ile genelleştirilmiş bir inanç veya önerme grubu arasında güvenilirlik kriterine sahip bir varsayımsal kanun aranmaktadır. Genelleştirmeyi ve kanunu olumlayan öge olan güvenilirlik, yüksek sayıda örnekte yüksek yüzdeli bir doğruluk frekansı olması durumudur. Goldman, Armstrong'un kanun ilişkisine dayalı güvenilirlik teorisini, onun zaman zaman sebep-sonuç ilişkisine dayanmayan bir biçim olduğunu varsayarak eleştiriye tabi tutsa da, bizzat termometre benzetmesinin de gösterdiği

gibi Armstrong'un teorisi de sıkı sıkıya sebep-sonuç ilişkisini varsayan bir yaklaşımdır. Bir doğa kanunu, aynı zamanda güvenilirlik kriteri üzerinden genelleştirilmiş bir sebep-sonuç ilişkisi formudur.

Gerek sadece sebep-sonuca dayalı bir bilme teorisi, gerek sadece güvenilirlik kriterine dayalı bir bilme teorisi dışsalcılar için bile kabul edilebilir durumda değildir. Sağlıklı bir dışsalıcı teori ancak bu iki nosyonun her ikisine de başvurulduğu zaman ortaya çıkar. Hem Armstrong'un kanun ilişkisine dayalı güvenilirliği hem de Goldman'ın güvenilir işlemciliği hem sebep-sonuca hem de güvenilirliğe dayanan teorilerdir. Fakat Goldman'ın sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisinin saf halinde, temel varsayımı dışında güvenilirliğe yer yoktur. Katıksız bir sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisinin problemleri şunlardır: 1) Böyle bir teori genellemelere izin vermediği için tüm sebep-sonuca dayalı bilmeye aday durumların tek tek incelenmesini gerektirir. Bu şekilde, her durum için tekil bir sebep sonuç zincirinin ayırmsamasını gerektirir ki bu neredeyse imkânsız bir iştir. 2) Böyle bir teori gelecek ile ilgili inanç ve önermeleri ya imkânsız hale getirir, ya da onları açıklayamaz. Çünkü gelecekteki bir olgunun şu andaki veya geçmişteki bir inanç veya önermenin sebebi olmasına imkân yoktur. Burada olası bir çözüm yolu geçmişteki bir olgunun hem gelecekteki belirli bir olgunun hem de bu belirli olguyu dile getiren şu andaki bir inanç veya önermenin ortak sebebi olabildiği bir model öne sürmektir. 3) Daha zor bir sorun ise genellemeler veya kavramları dile getiren veya içeren inanç veya önermelerin nasıl imkânlı olduğudur. Salt sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisinin temel dayanağı inanç veya önerme ile bir olgu arasındaki bağıdır. Fakat genellemeler ve kavramlar birer olgu değildir.

Sadece güvenilirlik nosyonuna dayanan bir bilgi teorisi ise birbiriyle hiçbir ilgisi olmayan, her anlamda birbirinden uzak iki olgu arasında, birinin diğerinin güvenilir bir göstergesi olmasına olanak vermek gibi önemli bir soruna yol açar. Mesela birbirinden çok uzakta olan iki ayrı şehirde yaşayan iki kişi ele alınsın. Bunlardan

bir tanesinin her sabah saat sekizde işe giderken, diğerinin de her sabah yaklaşık aynı zamanda koşuya çıktığını gözlemlediğimizi düşünelim. Bu durumda yeterli sayıda gözlem bize bu olgulardan birisinin diğerinin güvenilir bir göstergesi olduğu sonucunu dayatacaktır. İki olgu güvenilir derecede yüksek frekansta birbiri ile aynı zamanda ve uzun süren bir düzenlilik içinde meydana gelmektedir fakat aralarında aslında hiçbir ilişki veya ortak sebep yoktur.

Goldman'ın güvenilir işlemcilik yaklaşımı, onun önceki yaklaşımı olan sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisinin eksiklerini görüşünden kaynaklanan bir sonuçtur. Güvenilir işlemciliğe göre bir inanç veya önermenin bilgi olması için, onun güvenilirlik kriterini sağlayan derecede yüksek bir oranda doğru inanç veya önerme içeren bir işlemcinin ürünü veya sonucu olması gerekir. Sütjede varsayılan temel işlemci beyin, veya daha genel bir ifadeyle, süjenin bilişsel donanımıdır. Burada temel nokta, artık olgu ile inanç veya önerme arasında dolayumsuz bir sebep-sonuç ilişkisi şartı olmadığından ve güvenilirlik nosyonu işin içine girdiğinden dolayı genellemeleri ve kavramları dile getiren inanç veya önermelerin mümkün olabilmesidir.

Gerek Armstrong, gerek Goldman savundukları dışsalıcı bilgi teorilerinde süje nezdinde çıkarımsız inanç veya önermeyi varsaymışlardır. Aslında bu varsayım genel olarak dışsalıcı herhangi bir bilgi teorisi için şart değildir. Hiçbir zihin veya farkındalık durumuna sahip olmayan süjeler veya makineler de dışsalıcı bilmenin öznesi olabilirler. Gerek çıkarımlı, gerek çıkarımsız, farkındalıklı inanç veya önermede yoksun herhangi bir unsur belirtilen diğer kriterleri sağladığı sürece bilmektedir.

Dışsalıcılığı hedef alan eleştiriler genelde onun çıkarımsız inanç veya önermeyi varsayan biçimlerini hedef almaktadır. Laurence Bonjour, bu tür dışsalıcı yaklaşımları dört ana maddede eleştirir. Bunlardan birincisi, bir süjenin, sahip

olduğu inanç veya önerme içeriğini neyin doğru hale getirdiği hakkında veya o inanç veya önerme içeriğinin nasıl doğrulandığı hakkında hiçbir fikre sahip olmadan o inanç veya önerme içeriğine nasıl doğru bir inanç veya önerme olarak inanabileceğidir. Bu, dışsalcılığa yöneltile en önemli eleştiridir. Böyle bir hal içerisinde süjenin söz konusu inanç veya önerme içeriğini epistemolojik olmayan bir takım sebepler haricinde zihninde hangi ilgi ve sebeple tutabileceği bile bir sorundur. Bu durumda, epistemolojik olmayan sebepler haricinde, kişi belirli bir inanç veya önerme içeriği için, ona herhangi bir doğruluk değeri verme ilgisinden yoksun olduğu bir durumda iken neredeyse o inanç veya önerme içeriğine sahip bile olamayacaktır. Ya da en azından onu çabucak terk edecektir. Bir inanç veya önerme içeriğine dair ona doğruluk değeri verme ilgisi ise kaçınılmaz olarak süje nezdinde içselci bir yaklaşımı getirecektir, çünkü farkındalıklı bir doğruluk değeri verme ilgisinin başka bir yönelimi olamaz. Açıktır ki, insanlarda bir inanç veya önerme içeriği ile ona verilecek doğruluk değeri işin başına birbirinden ayrıktır, doğruluk değeri inanç veya önerme içeriğine yaftalanmak üzere ondan ayrık olarak bekler. Ve doğruluk değeri, ister yanlış ister doğru olsun, ancak süjenin farkındalığı dâhilinde bulunan bir sebebin veya gerekçelendirmenin sonucu olarak söz konusu inanç veya önerme içeriğine eklemenebilir. Bu içselci bir durumdur ve bu durumu hesaba katan her hangi bir bilgi teorisi, dışsalcılığın temel iddiasından uzaklaşmış bir teori olmak zorundadır.

İkinci problemin yaklaşımı, bir süjenin, sahip olduğu inanç veya önerme içeriğini neyin doğru hale getirdiği hakkında veya onun nasıl doğrulandığı hakkında hiçbir fikre sahip olmadan, o inanç veya önerme içeriğine doğru bir inanç veya önerme olarak inanabilmesinin, ancak oldukça sorumsuz ve irrasyonel bir edim ile gerçekleştirebileceği iddiasıdır. Mesela kişinin sırf istediği için bir inanç veya önermenin doğruluğuna gerçekten inanmayı başarabildiği varsayalım. Bu durumda dışsalcılığın bilen öznelere açıkça akıl dışı varlıklardır. Bu, kendi içinde başlı başına bir problemdir, fakat dahası, bu tür varlıkların, mesela dışsalcılığın iddia

ettiği biçimlerden farklı koşullara sahip olan ve rasyonellik gerektiren bilme biçimlerine karşı duyarsız kalma ihtimali vardır. Bu durumda, şöyle bir problem ortaya çıkar: eğer kişi tamamen akıldışı sebeplerden dolayı ve dışsalcılığın koşullarını da gerçekleştirilmeyen bir inanç veya önerme içeriğine inanırsa, ve bu inanç ve önermeye yönelik içselci bir karşı çıkışa da duyarsız kalırsa, o zaman sadece içselciliğin değil, dışsalcılığın da hiç kabul etmeyeceği, tamamen yanlış bir epistemolojik durumun içindedir. Süjenin kendisi için dışsalıcı koşulları gerçekleştiren bir durumda olup olmadığının farkında olmak gibi bir koşul olmadığı için, bu kabul edilemez durum ile dışsalcılığın kabul edebileceği bir durum arasında bir ayrım da yapamayacaktır. Eğer dışsalcılık projesinin amaçladığı ideal koşullarda değilsek ve o sırada da süjenin durumunu tespit edecek bir dış gözlemci yok ise, dışsalcılığı bu durumdan kurtaracak olan şey süje nezdinde rasyonel bir tavırdan yardım almaktır. Bu da içselciliğe davet çıkarmak demektir. Üçüncü problem bu konu ile ilgilidir. Dışsalıcı projenin sağlıklı şekli ile ortaya konması çok detaylı ve zor bir bilimsel çalışma süreci gerektirmektedir ve bu durumda içselci bilme biçimleri sıklıkla ve belki her zaman işin içinde yer alacaktır. Böyle bir bağlamda, herhangi bir dışsalıcı bilgi teorisinin iddia ettiği biçimiyle sahip olunan bir inanç ve önermenin süjedeki varlığı, süje tarafından içsel ve rasyonel olarak gerekçelendirilmiş alternatif bir inanç veya önermenin işin içine dâhil olma olasılığını dışlayamayacaktır. Bu durumda, mesela bu iki ayrı inanç veya önerme birbirine zıt durumlar bildiriyorsa, süje bunlar arasında bir seçim veya karşılaştırma yapmak durumunda kalacaktır. Bu da içsel bir süreç veya gerekçelendirmeyi zorunlu kılacaktır.

Dışsalıcı bir bilme projesinin tatmin edici bir şekilde tamamlanması oldukça zordur: Mesela, sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme ile ilgili zorluk yukarıda belirtildiği gibi her tekil bilme olgusunun ayrı bir betim ve dökümünü yapmayı gerektirir. Güvenilir işlemcilik eninde sonunda sebep-sonuç ilişkisi ağırlıklı bir güvenilirlik teorisi ve Armstrong'un ortaya attığı türde kanunların bulunması veya oluşturulması ise,

açıktır ki Newton veya Einstein fiziğindeki kadar kolay olmayacaktır. Hem güvenilir işlemeçilik, hem de Armstrong'un kanun ilişkisine dayalı güvenilirliği ve genel olarak tüm güvenilir-dışsalıcı bilgi teorileri ile ilgili daha somut bir problem ise, çıkarımsız ama farkındalıklı inanç veya önermelerin genelleştirilip kategorize edilmesindeki zorluktur. Farkındalıklı bir inanç veya önermenin farkındalık derecesi süjenin kendisi tarafından farkında olunabilir ve süjenin kendi içsel gerekçelendirmesi amacı içerisinde ayırmsanabilir olsa da, duruma dışarıdan yaklaşan bilimsel bir faaliyet içerisinde bu ayırmsama gerekli nitelikte yapılamayabilir. Bu durumda, mesela eğer inanışlar veya önermelerin güvenilirlik düzeyinin hesaplamasında onların farkındalık düzeyi vazgeçilmez bir etken ise, bu durumda farkındalık düzeyi pek net olarak hesaplanamaz bir şey olduğu için, sağlıklı bir güvenilirlik hesabı yapılamayacaktır. Üstelik her farkındalık derecesi ayrı bir olumlu veya olumsuz değer arzedebilir ve bu da aynen sebep-sonuca dayalı bilme teorisinde olduğu gibi her tekil inanç veya önermenin ayrı bir incelemesini ve hesabını gerektirebilir.

Laurence Bonjour'un dışsalcılığa yönelik olarak ortaya koyduğu dördüncü problem sonsuz geriye gidiş tehlikesidir. Dışsalcılık bir süjenin bilme durumunun dışarıdan, bir gözlemci tarafından tespit edilebileceğini savunur. Eğer kişi dışsalcılığın ortaya koyduğu koşulları yerine getiriyorsa ve bu koşullar bir dış gözlemci tarafından tespit edilmişse kişi biliyor olarak nitelendirilir. Fakat bu gözlemcinin söz konusu kişinin bilip bilmeme durumu ile ilgili yapacağı tespit de doğru olup olmadığını, yani gözlemcinin bu konudaki kendi inanç veya önermesinin dışsalcılığın öne sürdüğü koşulları yerine getirip getirmediğini belirlemek için bir başka gözlemciye daha ihtiyaç vardır. Ve bu bir başka gözlemcinin bilişsel epistemolojik durumunu belirlemek için de bir başka gözlemci gerekir. Bu şekilde, bir kişinin bilip bilmediğinin dışsalcılığın öne sürdüğü biçimde belirlenebilmesi için sonsuz sayıda gözlemci gerekmektedir. Bu sonsuz geriye gidişi durduracak durum ya temelde içselci gerekçelendirmeyi gerekli kabul etmek, ya da dış gözlemciye gerek

duyulmayan bir dışsalıcı bilme teorisini genel geçer olarak kabul etmektir. Fakat böyle bir teorinin, eğer süjede ister çıkarımlı ister çıkarımsız, ama farkındalıklı bir inanç veya önerme içeriği varsayıldığı müddetçe, yukarıda bahsedildiği türden ciddi problemleri vardır.

Farkındalıklı bir inanç veya önerme içeriğinin varsayılmadığı dışsalıcı bilme biçimleri de ciddi problemlerle karşı karşıyadır. Bildiği veya bilgi sahibi olduğu iddia edilen mekanizmalar sebep-sonuç ilişkisinin tutarlılık arz eden verilerinden başka bir şey sunmazlar ve doğru önerme meydana getirmek gibi bir hassasiyete sahip değildirler. Bu veriler ancak onlarla karşılaşan kişiler tarafından anlamlı ve doğru birer içerik haline getirilirler. Mekanizmalar anlam taşımaz ve nakletmezler, ancak anlamlı ve doğru önermelere yol açabilecek işaretler çıkartırlar. Bu işaretler makine nezdinde herhangi bir anlama sahip değildir, onlar belirli bir sebep-sonuç ilişkisinin belirli noktasındaki kör halkalardır. Mekanizmalar kendi içlerinde bir sebep sonuç zincirinin herhangi bir yerini anlam parantezine alma yetisine sahip değildirler. Gerçek bir önerme ise ancak anlam parantezine alma ile oluşturulabilir. Mekanizmaların anlamlı belirli içeriğe sahip önermeler meydana getirebildiği şeklindeki iddianın, o mekanizmanın bağlı olduğu, onun bir parçası olduğu sebep-sonuç zincirinin hangi yerini içerik olarak önermede bulunduğu sorusuna verilebilecek bir cevap yoktur. Mekanizma bir sebep-sonuç zincirinin herhangi bir yerine karşı duyarlılık taşımaz, o sebep-sonuç zincirinin bir parçasıdır ve kendisine gelen kör etkiye karşı kör fakat tutarlı bir tepki vermekten başka bir şey yapmaz. Bu tutarlı tepkiden o tepkinin bağlı olduğu sebep-sonuç zincirinin bilinmesi vasıtası ile o sebep-sonuç zincirinin belirli bir yerini ayımsayarak içerikli bir önerme formu çıkarsayanlar ancak olguları ayımsayabilen ve anlam parantezi oluşturabilen bilinç sahibi varlıklardır.

Yukarıda özetlendiği üzere dışsalıcılığın her biçiminde ciddi problemler vardır. Bunların en önemlileri 1) dışsalıcılığın iddia ettiği bilme biçiminde süjenin kendisine

atfedilen inanç veya önerme içeriği ile ona yaftalaması gereken doğruluk değerini kendi içsel yargılamasının dışında nasıl bir olanak ile birleştirebileceği, 2) kendisine bilme atfedilen herhangi bir unsurun bir inanç veya önerme içeriğini ayırmsayıp bir nevi parantez içerisinde ortaya koymadan, yani böyle bir şeyi amaçlayıp yerine getirmeden bu içeriği bildiğinden nasıl bahsedilebileceğidir. İkinci durumdaki bir örnek, bir olgu veya gerçekliği bilen bir unsur olmaktan ziyade, o olgu gerçekliğin içinde yer aldığı bir sebep-sonuç zincirinin basit bir parçası olarak kalmaktadır. Bu durumda epistemolojik değeri sadece söz konusu olgu veya gerçekliğin içinde olduğu sebep-sonuç zinciri ile ilgili içeriksiz ama tutarlı bir sinyal vermenin ötesinde değildir. Bu sinyal içerisinde söz konusu olgu veya gerçekliğin varlığını zincirin diğer halkalarından ayırmsayıp bilme yetisi bu unsur ile ilişki içerisinde olan farkındalık sahibi bir süjeye özeldir.

Dışsalcılığın kabul edilemez oluşu, ister zayıf, ister güçlü hali ile olsun, içselci bilgi teorisini şimdilik tek vazgeçilmez seçenek haline getirir. Fakat içselciliğin de çok ciddi problemleri vardır ve bunlardan en önemlisi tümevarımı, dolayısıyla güvenilirlik nosyonunu içine alamamasıdır. Tümevarım henüz içselci bir gerekçelendirme ile doğru hale getirememiştir ve bu içselciliğin bilme konusunda çok kısır ve içe kapalı bir halde kalması sonucunu doğurmuştur. Şüpheciliğe karşı demarke edilen inanç ve önermeler, matematiksel ve mantıksal olanları saymazsak, süjenin kendi farkındalık ve bilişsel durumunun birer betimlemesidir ve dış dünya ile bağlantıları ile ilgili doğruluk değerleri tümevarım ve güvenilirlik nosyonları kullanılmadan verilememektedir.

İçselciliğin verimli bir bilgi teorisi haline gelebilmesi için tümevarım ve güvenilirliğin içselci, rasyonel bir gerekçelendirilmesini yapmak gerekir. Tümevarım ve güvenilirliğinin kesin doğruluğu ispatlanamasa bile onun rasyonel bir karşılaştırma ve değerlendirmede, reddine karşı seçilmesi gereken unsur olmasını sağlayacak bir gerekçelendirme bile önemli bir adımdır. Yani tümevarım ve güvenilirliğin geçerli ve doğru olma ihtimalinin, geçersiz ve doğru olma

ihtimalinden daha fazla olduđu sonucunu verecek bir içsel ve rasyonel gerekçelendirme içselcilik için gerekli ve bir miktar yeterlidir.

Böyle bir gerekçelendirme Laurence Bonjour tarafından şu şekilde yapılır: Belirli bir düzenlilik biçiminin uzun bir süre ve frekans dâhilinde ve birbirinde ayrı alanlarda ve konularda gözlemlendiğini düşünelim. Bu durumda iki olasılık vardır. Birinci olasılık bu belirli düzenliliğin tamamen şans eser meydana gelmiş olduğudur. İkinci olasılık da bu belirli düzenliliğin belirli bir kanunun, mesela bir doğa kanununun ürünü olduğudur. Bonjour'un akıl yürütmesi şu şekildedir: Belirli bir düzenlilik biçiminin, uzun bir süre ve frekans dâhilinde, ve birbirinden ayrı alanlarda ve konularda bir şans eseri olarak meydana gelmesinin olasılığı o kadar düşüktür ki, bu durumun belirli bir düzenlilikle ilgili, bu düzenliliği ve onun genel geçerliliğini dikte eden bir kanunun ürünü olma olasılığı muhakkak daha fazladır. Bu durumda bahsedilen gözlemden elde ettiğimiz sonuç üzerine yapılan böylesi bir akıl yürütme bizi bir kanunun var olduğu durumunu, olmadığı duruma tercih etmek, yani onun var olduğunu seçmek durumunda bırakır. Açıktır ki gözlemden elde ettiğimiz veri, tümevarım ve güvenilirliğin öncülleridir ve kanun tümevarım ve güvenilirlik ile inandığımız genellemeyi dikte etmektedir.

Bonjour'un bu argümanı geçerlidir ve tümevarım ve güvenilirlik nosyonları konusunda içselciliği kurtarır. Fakat yine de ufak bir sorun vardır: Bu argüman H. Nelson Goodman'ın öne sürdüğü Gruesome Paradoksu'na karşı korunma oluşturamamaktadır. Bu paradoksa göre tümevarım ve güvenilirliğin öncülü olan belirli bir düzenliliğin gözlem verisi, hem tek tipliliği dikte eden bir kanunun öncülü, hem de belirli bir zamanda kendisine geçiş olacağını dikte edildiği bir başka tek tipliliği dikte eden bir kanunun öncülü olarak ele alınabilmektedir. Belirli bir zümrüt tipi bugüne kadar hep mavi renkli olarak gözlemlenmiş olsun. Bu veri hem onun hep mavi renkli olacağını dikte eden bir kanunu hem de belirli bir zamandan sonra yeşil renkli olacağını dikte eden bir kanunu eşit miktarda destekler.

Dolayısıyla gözlem verisi bizi iki farklı kanuna yönlendirmektedir. Bu ikisi arasından bir seçim yapmayı sağlayacak, birini diğerine daha olası kılabacak bir argüman gereklidir. Şöyle bir argüman önerilebilir: Bu gözlem verisinin desteklediği şu olası kanunlardan bahsedildi: 1) zümrüdün her daim mavi olacağına dair kanun, 2) zümrüdün belirli bir zamanda yeşile dönüşeceğine dair kanun. Bunlara ek olarak şöyle bir olası kanun da eklenebilir: 3) zümrüdün zamanın en başından en sonuna kadar yeşil olması imkânsızdır ve belirli bir zamandan sonra kalan tüm renkler olumsuzdur. Böyle bir kanun ortaya atıldığında mantıksal ilke olarak onun negatif simetrisinin de koyulması gerekeceği için şöyle bir kanun daha eklenmelidir: 4) zümrüdün zamanın en başından en sonuna kadar mavi olması imkânsızdır ve belirli bir zamandan sonra kalan tüm renkler olumsuzdur. Fakat 4'üncü kanun açıkça gözlem verisi ile çelişmektedir; dolayısıyla imkânsızdır ve anında elenir. 1'inci ve 2'inci kanunlar imkânlı ve haklarındaki veri ve veri miktarına dayanılarak eşit olasılıklıdır. 3'üncü kanun de imkânlı ve dolayısıyla ne kadar düşük veya yüksek olursa olsun pozitif bir değere sahiptir. Bu durumda, 1'inci ve 3'ü kanunların olasılık toplamı 4'üncü kanunun olasılık toplamından fazladır. Böyle bir durumda gelecekte yapılacak gözlemler için diyebiliriz ki zümrüdün mavi olma olasılığı yeşil olma olasılığından fazladır. Çünkü geçerli ve olası olan 3'üncü kanunun ihtimali yeşilin imkânsızlık ihtimalini artırmış fakat mavinin imkânsızlık ihtimalini de azaltmıştır. Bu şekilde serinin gözlem verisinde gözlenmiş olan rengin, bir sonraki gözlemde görülme olasılığının, ona karşı öne sürülen alternatif bir renge kıyasla daha fazla olduğu ortaya çıkar.

Yukarıdaki tipte bir akıl yürütme oldukça teorik ve marjinal bir olasılık durumu verse de, bir seçim yapılmasının zorunlu olduğu durumlarda rasyonel olarak belirlenmiş bir yön göstermek açısından işe yarar. Belirtmelidir ki tümevarım ve güvenilirliğin içselci gerekçelendirilmesi konusunda Bonjour'un argümanı esastır ve burada sunulmuş olan diğer argüman ancak birer destekleyici ve yardımcı olma ve Goodman tipi paradokslar gibi özel durumlarla nasıl başa çıkılabileceğini

gösteren bir örnek olma niteliğindedir. Tümevarıma ve güvenilirliğe, onların reddine karşı yapılacak bir olasılık karşılaştırmasında rasyonel olarak gerekçelendirilmiş bir avantaj sağlamak ve tümevarım ile güvenilirliği rasyonel bir seçim unsuru haline getirmek, içselciliğin içine hapsediğı kabuğı kırmanın ilk adımlarını atmaktır.

B. CURRICULUM VITAE

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Soyadı : Altuğ
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Bölümü : Felsefe

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) : Critique of Epistemic Externalism and Defense of Foundationalist Internalism

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans Doktora

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