

LIMITS TO NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE: ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET  
POLICIES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING COURSES IN ANKARA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

MERVE KAYADUVAR

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC  
ADMINISTRATION

SEPTEMBER 2015



Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha ALTUNIŐIK  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of  
Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Ayőe AYATA  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully  
adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kemal BAYIRBAŐ  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Prof. Dr. Gamze YÜCESAN ÖZDEMİR

ANKARA UNIVERSITY, Faculty of Communication

Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kemal BAYIRBAŐ

METU, Political Science and Public Administration

Assist. Prof. İpek EREN VURAL

METU, Political Science and Public Administration







**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name : Merve Kayaduvar

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **LIMITS TO NEOLIBERAL GOVERNANCE: ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING COURSES IN ANKARA**

Kayaduvar, Merve

M. S., Department of Secondary Science and Mathematics Education

Supervisor : Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ

September 2015, 181 pages

Active Labour Market Policies began to be implemented all over the world especially since the 1990s to combat the unemployment. With reference to the idea that the great majority of the unemployment is structural and the labour force is lack of the necessary skills and qualifications, in the context of active labour market policies, the vocational training courses were popularized in order to enable inactive portion of the labour force with skills deemed necessary by the labour market. Correspondingly, in Turkey the vocational training courses have gained prominence especially since the 2000s. In this study, the aim is to analyse the implementation process of the vocational training courses conducted by the Turkish Employment Agency (İŞKUR) in the case of Ankara and this study argues that the contracting out of the vocational training courses to the private sector in the context of



neoliberal logic of governance leads to policy deadlocks in the implementation process which generates dysfunctional policy environment and waste of resources. Therefore, in Turkey vocational training courses do not serve to the intended purpose of enhancing the employability of the unemployed people. In this regard, this study discusses that on the contrary to the neoliberal claims, the neoliberal logic of governance prescribed as prerequisite to the implementation process of active labour market policies particularly vocational training courses contradicts with the neoliberal objectives of efficiency and effectiveness.

Keywords: Active Labour Market Policies, Vocational Training Programs, Neoliberal Logic of Governance, Contracting out

## ÖZ

### NEOLİBERAL YÖNETİŞİMİN SINIRLARI: AKTİF İŞGÜCÜ PİYASASI POLİTİKALARI VE ANKARA'DA MESLEKİ EĞİTİM KURSLARI

Kayaduvar, Merve

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Anabilim Dalı

Tez Yöneticisi : Doç. Dr. Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ

Eylül 2015, 181 sayfa

Aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları tüm dünyada işsizlikle mücadele etmek amacıyla özellikle 1990lı yıllardan itibaren uygulanmaya başlandı. Aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları kapsamında, işsizliğin en önemli kısmının yapısal işsizlik olduğu ve işgücünün piyasanın ihtiyaç duyduğu niteliklerden yoksun olduğu düşüncelerinden hareketle atıl durumdaki işgücüne piyasada ihtiyaç duyulan nitelikleri kazandırmak amacıyla mesleki eğitim kursları yaygınlaştırıldı. Türkiye’de de benzer bir şekilde özellikle 2000li yıllardan itibaren aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları kapsamında mesleki eğitim kursları uygulaması yaygınlaşmaya başladı. Bu çalışma, İŞKUR tarafından uygulanan mesleki eğitim kurslarının uygulanış sürecini Ankara örneği üzerinden analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır ve bu çalışmada mesleki eğitim kurslarının neoliberal yönetim mantığı kapsamında özel sektöre ihale edilmesinin politikanın

uygulanma sürecinde politikayı işlevsizleştiren ve kaynak israfına sebep olan kilitlenmelere neden olduğu tartışılmaktadır. Bu nedenle Türkiye’de mesleki eğitim kursları asıl amacı olan işsizlerin istihdam edilebilirliklerinin artırılması amacına hizmet etmemektedir. Bu bağlamda, bu çalışmada neoliberal yaklaşımın iddialarının aksine aktif işgücü piyasası politikalarının özellikle mesleki eğitim kurslarının uygulanma süreci için zorunluluk olarak gösterilen neoliberal yönetim mantığının neoliberal yaklaşımın etkililik ve verimlilik hedefleriyle çeliştiği tartışılmaktadır.

**Anahtar Kelimeler:** Aktif İstihdam Politikaları; Mesleki Eğitim Kursları; Neoliberal Yönetişim mantığı, İhale Yöntemi

*To my parents...*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Mustafa Kemal Bayırbağ. This thesis would not have been possible without his enduring support, patience, encouragement and constructive criticism. He gave me the freedom to explore on my own and at the same time he gave me guidance to recover when my steps faltered. He rescued me many times when I hit the thesis wall by motivating me and giving practical advice. I hope that one day I would become as good an advisor to my students as M. Kemal Bayırbağ has been to me.

I would like to express my sincere thanks to the members of my thesis committee, İpek Eren Vural and Gamze Yücesan Özdemir. I owe İpek Eren Vural a debt of gratitude for helping me to structure my research question, offering invaluable advices about my study and motivating me from beginning to end of the thesis. I am so grateful to Gamze Yücesan Özdemir for her invaluable suggestions, insightful comments, constructive criticism and contributions to my thesis. She has a warmhearted and friendly attitude towards me.

I would like to acknowledge TÜBİTAK (The Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey) for granting me scholarship during my graduate education.

Also thanks to all of the interviewees participated the in-depth interviews for their time, effort and sharing their knowledge and insights with me. I feel deep gratitude for sparing time to me in their overstretched schedules.

I wish to express my heartfelt gratitude to my friends. Firstly, thanks to Semra Saçıcı Tahancalıo for her love, friendship, support, encouragement and motivation. Also she deserves special thanks for her cakes and dessert prepared for my thesis defence. I would like to thank Fulya Kırimer Aydınlı as a good friend is always warm-hearted and willing to help and give her best suggestions. I have been following her path since the high school and she always share her experiences with

me. A special thanks also goes to Meral Özmeral and Hakan Erek. You are always my favourite couple. Meral, although you are far away, I know that you are always close to my heart. Hakan, you have been a rock of support and encouragement varied from financial to moral. Also thanks to Tuba Ceren Deveci for her love, good fellowship and wonderful assistance in editing and translation. Very special thanks goes out to Sibel Önal, Ebru Toptaş, Nihan Aytaç and Özlem Tantu who I consider sisters. Thank you for always being there. My gratefulness also extends to Melih Gökhan Kuzucu, Enis Kobal and Ömürcan Kumtepe. Enis and Ömürcan, thank you for patiently editing my English. I also would like to express my deepest love to Hazal Oğuz and Elif Korkut. Lastly, many thanks to my colleagues at METU especially to Feyza Kalav, Aslıhan Çoban and Çoşku Çelik for making the days at the office more enjoyable. Without you, my days at work would probably have been quite boring.

The biggest thanks go to my mother Sevgi Kayaduvar and my father Yusuf Kayaduvar for supporting me spiritually throughout writing this thesis and my life in general. You have been a constant source of love, concern, support and strength all these years.

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ASO	Ankara Chamber of Industry (Ankara Sanayi Odası)
ALMPs	Active Labour Market Policies
BELMEK	Manipulative Skills and Occupational Training Courses for Women Provided by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality (Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Meslek Edindirme Kursları)
BELTEK	Vocational Training Courses Organized by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and Gazi University (Gazi Üniversitesi - Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi Teknik Eğitim Kursu)
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialization
İİBK	Turkish Job Placement Agency (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu)
İİMEK	Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Board (İl İstihdam ve Mesleki Eğitim Kurulu)
İŞKUR	Turkish Employment Agency (Türkiye İş Kurumu)
KWNS	Keynesian Welfare Nation State
MESS	Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries (Türkiye Metal Sanayicileri Sendikası)
MNE	Ministry of National Education
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSTİM	Middle East Industrial and Trade Center (Ortadoğu Sanayi ve Ticaret Merkezi)
PEO	Private Employment Offices

SGK	Social Security Institution (Sosyal Güvenlik Kurumu)
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SWPR	Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime
TOBB	The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliđi)
TÜİK	Turkish Statistical Institute (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu)
WB	World Bank

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) have been presented as a significant policy tool to combat the high and persistent unemployment since the 1980s. The importance of these policies in the fight with the unemployment problem was insistently emphasized in most of the reports of OECD, WB, EU and ILO. Through the influence of these institutions, these policies began to be implemented all over the world especially from the 1990s onwards. The underlying idea behind the implementation of active labour market policies is that unemployment could be prevented by only improving the human capital of the labour force because labour force does not have required skills and qualifications to adopting new production system based on the high technology. Therefore, the great majority of the unemployment is structural (OECD, 1998). Within this context, active labour market policies aim to enhance adaptability of the labour force by improving their human capital.

Correspondingly, as seen in the Table 1, Turkey has had high and persistent unemployment rates, which have prompted the governments to seek solutions to this problem. Under the overwhelming influence of the international organizations, labour market policies have been reoriented towards the active labour market policies in Turkey from the 1990s onwards especially during the 2000s in order to solve this serious unemployment problem. In this regard, the Turkish Employment Agency (the İŞKUR) was restructured in 2003 along the lines of neoliberal logic of governance in order to enable the agency to implement active labour market policies. The İŞKUR conducts various programs such as work programs for public benefits and entrepreneurship trainings. Among these programs, the vocational training courses are the most common program because according to the İŞKUR, the most significant problem in the Turkish labour market is lack of occupation and the rapid change

experienced in production system requires skilled and qualified labour force (2011). Therefore, vocational training courses have a central place in the active labour market policies implemented in Turkey.

**Table 1:** Unemployment Rates in Turkey<sup>1</sup>

<b>Years</b>	<b>Unemployment Rate</b>
<b>1989</b>	<b>8.7</b>
<b>1991</b>	<b>8.5</b>
<b>1993</b>	<b>9.2</b>
<b>1995</b>	<b>7.3</b>
<b>1997</b>	<b>7.2</b>
<b>1999</b>	<b>7.4</b>
<b>2001</b>	<b>8.4</b>
<b>2003</b>	<b>10.5</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>10.3</b>

Source: Ministry of Development.

According to the İŞKUR (2011), vocational training courses were structured within the frame of the İŞKUR's understanding that "one primarily has to struggle against unskilled labour so as to struggle against unemployment" (p.19). In this context, the İŞKUR has given considerable significance to the vocational training courses and devoted excessive resources to these courses; however the İŞKUR could not serve to this purpose of struggle against the unemployment. Impact analyses conducted about the vocational training courses of the İŞKUR show that the impact of these trainings on the employment probability is statistically insignificant or negligible (WB, 2013; Diriöz, 2012).

Therefore, this study aims to analyse the implementation process of vocational training courses with an emphasis on its subcontracting nature and put forward the underlying reasons behind the policy deadlocks emerged in the implementation process, which resulted in inefficient and ineffective policy environment. In this regard, this thesis argues that subcontracting nature of implementation process of the vocational training courses which is an extension of the neoliberal logic of

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<sup>1</sup> This table pictures the period before the implementation process of ALMPs.

governance results in policy deadlocks in the implementation process. Thus, on the contrary to claims of the neoliberal approach, neoliberalization of the service provision does not always generate efficiency and effectiveness in the policy implementation process. While neoliberal approach links the ineffective and inefficient service provision to the faults in the implementation process represented as best way to do by neoliberalism, in Turkey the subcontracted nature of the implementation process results in inefficient and ineffective policy environment itself.

This thesis analyses the implementation process of these courses on the case of Ankara. This is because the general directorate of the İŞKUR locates in Ankara and the characteristics of the economy in Ankara are suitable for the development of the field of vocational training courses. Firstly, the economy of Ankara is generally composed of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the vocational training courses mainly train labour force for the SMEs because large industrial firms generally train their employees with their own means. Secondly, the economy is mainly based on service sector and most of the vocational training courses are organized in occupations of service sector because the courses of the İŞKUR are organized upon the demand from employers, due to the dominance of service sector in the Turkish economy, the demand for the courses in occupations of service sectors always exceeds the demand for occupations in industry. Therefore, Ankara has an advanced vocational training sector.

### **1.1 Literature Review: Relevance of the Thesis**

Active labour market policies as mentioned before gained prominence during the 1980s in fighting high structural unemployment rate all over the world. Even though the emergence of these policies dated back to the Keynesian period in the Nordic countries, they became a popular debate in literature from the 1980s onwards.

There is now a huge literature on the active labour market policies however the literature mainly focuses on the evaluation of these policies in specific countries or on their cross-national analyses (See Martin & Grubb, 2001; Kluve, 2006). In this regard, the study of Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991) has a profound importance, in this book; they examine the impact of active labour market policies on the unemployment rates of the OECD countries. The studies of De Koning (2005) and Dar and Tzannatos (1999) are also significant because these studies give a detailed account of the evaluation literature. In his study, De Koning (2005) makes an extensive literature review to detect that what the theoretical frameworks and international evaluation literature tell about the impact of the active labour market policies (ALMPs). While theoretical literature review entails that ALMPs have a crucial role in fighting unemployment, according to review of the international evaluation literature composed of 130 evaluation studies, training may produce positive results for adult and older unemployed people but the results are negative for young unemployed people. Dar and Tzannatos (1999) also survey the studies about the evaluation of active labour market policies. In this regard, they analyze 100 evaluation studies including mostly studies about the major OECD countries as well as individual evaluations about developing and transition economies such as Turkey, Mexico, Poland and Czech Republic. According to their survey, to combat high and persistent unemployment via implementation of ALMPs is extensively difficult. In the regard of training, their study shows that while training for the long-term unemployed could provide positive impacts during the period of economic improvement, the training for young unemployed generally does not provide any positive impact on probability of employment and wages after the training.

Within the context of evaluation studies in specific countries, a great number of these studies are about the developed countries particularly Scandinavian countries, Germany, UK, US and Canada (See Hill & Halpin, 2008; Forslund & Krueger, 1997; Sianesi, 2004; Nordlund, 2010; Perry, 2007). However, during the last decade the studies about the developing and transition economies have considerably increased



(See Aguayo, 2007; Olga, 2000). Besides the literature on the evaluation of active labour market policies, there are various studies on pros and cons of active labour market policies, their compatibility with a jobless growth model of economic development and extensive cross-country analyses regarding types of active labour market policies, expenditures on these policies and implementation process of these policies (See Bonoli, 2010; Ballo, 2013; Klassen & Schneider, 2001). However, the impact of the neoliberal nature of the implementation process of vocational training programs on the service provision has so far remained relatively unexplored in the literature. To that regard, there are some studies conducted about United Kingdom, Australia, USA, Netherland, Canada (See Fuertes, 2013; Clark, 2002; Bruttel, 2004) and Hartz Reform in Germany (See Calmfors, 2002; Kemmerling & Bruttel, 2006; Konle-Seidl, 2008; Ochel, 2007), however these studies mainly focus on the changes in the implementation process of employment policies as well as in the active labour market policies towards decentralization and marketization along the lines of neoliberal logic of governance in specific countries. Therefore, this thesis aims to contribute to the literature by exploring the impact of subcontracting based implementation process on the service delivery of these policies particularly vocational training courses in Turkey.

This thesis also seeks to provide contributions to the literature about active labour market policies in Turkey because while there is a rich international literature on the active labour market policies, the Turkey specific literature has been still immature. Most of the studies focus on the emergence and type of the active labour market policies implemented in Turkey (See Sanal, 2013; Kapar, 2005; Kaynak, 2009; Uşen, 2007).

Within the frame of the evaluation of these policies, while there are some theses and dissertations analysing the impact of these policies on the probability of the employment (See Karabulut, 2007; Bulut, 2010; Diriöz, 2012) and about the impact of trainings particularly on the empowerment and employment of the women (See

Güray, 2012; Ege-Özkan, 2013; Öksüz 2010), there is still a gap in the literature. This is because the dates of these analyses mostly correspond to the periods before the consolidation of legal and institutional structures of the İŞKUR. In regard to impact analysis, there are also various case studies (See Taş, 2011; Işığışok, 2011; Aydın, 2011; Eser, 2010). For instance, Işığışok ve Emirgil (2009) examine the impact of the Job Guaranteed Workforce Training Courses in the case of Bursa conducted in cooperation with four companies locating in Bursa, Erdil-Şahin and Sevimli (2013) explores the impact of vocational training courses through the case study of the 13 courses conducted in collaboration between the İŞKUR and İstanbul Kültür University in 2010 and Çetinkaya (2008) analyses the impact of active labour market policies on the youth unemployment in the case of “IT Apprentices Projects” (Bilişim Çırakları Projesi) through interviews and surveys conducted with participants of project and administrators of the İŞKUR. Nevertheless, there is need for a country-wide impact analysis of the active labour market policies but the İŞKUR as the major implementer of these policies has not conducted impact analyses excepting the evaluation report prepared by World Bank (2013). In this report, WB analyses the impact of vocational training courses on employment of the trainees (2013).

Moreover, critical studies about the active labour market policies are insufficient in Turkey. There are only a few studies having critical approach against these policies (See Şahin, 2012, Biçer, 2014). One of these studies is a master thesis in which Dertli argues that active labour market policies serve to different purposes in the countries of North and South. While these policies generate industrial reserve army by activating the inactive and unemployed portion of the labour force in this way the pressures are increased on the labour in the Northern countries, ALMPs are considered as an instrument to decrease the social pressures and to control the social discontent and exclusion due to unemployment, social inequalities and poverty led by market-oriented neoliberal policies in Southern countries including Turkey (2007).

Due to these inadequacies, there is a significant gap in the literature on active labour market policies implemented in Turkey. This study aims to fill this gap by critically analyzing the implementation process of the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR and this thesis will be the sole study about the implementation process of active labour market policies in Turkey.

## **1.2 Research Methods**

This research has a qualitative research design with an in-depth study of the implementation process of the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR. The evidence of this thesis is based on multidisciplinary literature review, analysis of policy documents, reports, policy papers, official statements, memoranda, press releases, empirical data collected from the İŞKUR and primarily expert interviews conducted between June 2014 and February 2015. The underlying idea behind the choice of expert interviews as the primary resource for data collection is that as Meuser and Nagel (2009) states, expert interviews are crucial for the researches focusing on the implementation of a policy because experts are directly involved in the decision making and implementation process of a policy hence they have very specific knowledge and also they have privileged to access to information about the policy making and implementation process. Therefore, interviews with the experts could provide with the interviewer to get ‘practical insider knowledge’ (Bogner, Littig & Menz, 2009, p.2). Within this context, the interviews with experts in the field of vocational training courses provided valuable insight into the implementation process of these courses which could not be gathered through the analysis of empirical data and policy documents.

In this regard, thirty seven semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with the experts from different private and public institutions but the first few interviews were explorative for better structuring the research question. All interviews were conducted by the writer and meetings took place in the workplaces in which experts were working and typically lasted for one hour or one and half hour. Excepting a few

interviews conducted with the experts from the private firms, all the interviews were conducted without using a recording device. Therefore a few words may be missed but the quotations used in this thesis represent all main ideas completely as possible.

In order to get access to experts, mostly mail or direct calling to private firms was used in the first contact and some interviewees helped for reaching to other experts. However, most of the contacts were realized through personnel effort. In the selection of the interviewees, the positions and the status of the interviewees were the major determinant. Selection process started with a list of key experts in the field of vocational training courses in Ankara and all interviewees were determined deliberately under the guidance of the thesis advisor.

The field of vocational training courses has a fragmented and dispersed structure in Ankara therefore an expert from all major institutions involving in vocational training courses were interviewed in order to see the big picture of this field. In this regard, interviews were conducted with a higher officer from BELTEK (vocational training courses provided by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality and Gazi University) and BELMEK (manipulative skills and occupational training courses for women provided by Ankara Metropolitan Municipality) and a higher officer and an education specialist from the Life-long Learning General Directorate of Ministry of National Education. Moreover, because service providers directly involve in implementation process and my research focuses on the devolution of the service delivery to the private sector, two general directors (at the same time owners) of private education institutions were interviewed and also interviews were conducted with seventeen human resources managers or owners of the private firms. In the selection of the private firms, the importance was given to the scales and sectors of the firms so as to see a general picture of the sector. To that respect, four small scale, five medium scale and eight large scale (one of those was a holding) firms were chosen from both service and industry sectors. While the branches of industrial firms

varied from food, defence, plastic, furniture, extractive, construction to automotive, the fields of service sector firms were catering, tourism, carpet washing and security.

Alongside the service providers, more significantly interviews were conducted with experts from the İŞKUR in order to examine the decision making and implementation process of the vocational training courses. In this regard, in order to understand the decision making process, a member of the board of directors and a higher officer from Department of Active Labour Services of the İŞKUR were interviewed. Also, interviews were conducted with two employment expert from the same department because as Van Audenhove (2007) points out, experts working on lower level may possess much more detailed knowledge. Moreover, to detect the implementation process in Ankara, a higher officer and a specialist from Ankara Provincial Directorate of the İŞKUR were interviewed.

Besides, as it will be examined later, Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards (İİMEK) are the major decision maker about the vocational training in the provincial level and these boards are composed of social parties such as representatives from provincial organizations of the public institutions, chambers of industry, trade unions and employer associations. Therefore, in order to examine the decision making process of vocational training courses, interviews were conducted with experts from major umbrella organizations in Ankara such as Ankara Chamber of Industry, Polatlı Chamber of Industry, Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations, Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries and Genel-İş (a trade union affiliated to the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions).

Although a great majority of the interviewees permit to use their name in the study, in order to provide the consistency, the names of the interviewees were kept anonymous.

### **1.3 Outline of the Study**

Active labour market policies (ALMPs) emerged as an extension of the rising neoliberal transformation in labour market and these policies are complementary of the flexible and deregulated labour markets. Therefore, in order to understand the growing significance of ALMPs in the neoliberal labour policy, the neoliberal transformation in the labour policies should be examined. In this regard, following this introduction, chapter two will give a detailed account of neoliberal transformation in the labour markets and labour policy. By doing these, it will touch upon the several key concepts which are interrelated to the emergence of the ALMPs. These concepts are; flexibility and deregulation in the labour markets, workfare orientation of the social policy, employability of the labour force and flexicurity. Moreover, this chapter outlines the basic features of the change in the general framework of the service delivery because under the neoliberal logic of governance, like the delivery of other social services, the provision of the employment services including the active labour market policies was reoriented towards decentralization and marketization.

Then, the third chapter will concentrate on Turkey. This section will provide a brief history of the neoliberalization that Turkey experienced during the 1980s and outline the restructuring of the Turkish employment institution along the lines of neoliberal logic of governance. Moreover, the active labour market policies implemented in Turkey will be presented by focusing on the vocational training courses and a brief description of the environment in which these courses operate will be provided by touching upon the decision making and service delivery in the field of vocational training courses.

Subsequently, chapter four will entail an analysis of the implementation process of vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR in the case of Ankara. In that sense, this chapter will provide an account of design and delivery process of the courses organized by the İŞKUR by focusing on subcontracting nature of the

implementation of vocational training courses. Then, this chapter will discuss the underlying reasons behind the policy deadlocks emerge in the implementation process due to the defects in the institutional design of the implementation, which results in ineffectiveness and inefficiencies in the policy implementation process. Within this frame, firstly this chapter will focus on ineffectiveness and will analyse the dysfunctional policy environment emerges due the institutional shortfalls in the contracting out based design and provision of vocational training courses and secondly, fourth chapter will concentrate on inefficiencies in the implementation process of vocational training courses by analysing the fund transfer to non-public institutions mainly private institutions through these courses and manipulation of insurance premium incentives of the İŞKUR by the private sector.

Finally, the conclusion chapter will provide a summary of the significant theoretical and empirical findings and offer possible areas for future research and policy conclusions.

## CHAPTER 2

### NEOLIBERAL TRANSFORMATION OF LABOUR POLICY

#### 2.1 The Roots of Neoliberal Labour Policy

Neoliberalism emerged as a new phase of capitalism from the destruction of the earlier Keynesian Welfare State which briefly refers to “the transfer of the control of the macro economy to the state” (Duménil & Lévy, 2005a, p.22) and direct and indirect government intervention into the all segments of the economy. Jessop defines the ideal-typical state of the post war period as ‘Keynesian Welfare National State’ (KWNS) and he characterizes the accumulation regime of this period as ‘Atlantic Fordism’ (or only Fordism). This state promoted conditions for profitable accumulation in Fordist production and it aimed to secure full employment mostly via using demand-side intervention in a relatively closed national economy. KWNS also depended on a specific class compromise between organized labour and capital. In this state, social policy was based on state provision of welfare services as a citizenship right (Jessop, 1999).

KWNS had been maintaining during the period between 1945 and 1970s which is called as ‘Golden Ages of Capitalism’; however during the 1970s, Keynesianism started to deteriorated both nationally and internationally. The decrease in the profit rates of the capital and two subsequent oil shocks put pressures on the post-war consensus. These pressures were intensified by domestic problems such as high inflation rates, unemployment and public debts. In the period of stagflation, targeting full-employment as the primary goal of the macroeconomic policy and comprehensive social protections and welfare services engendered a fiscal crisis for KWNS. The failure of Keynesian policies to overcome the profitability crisis, stagflation and unemployment associated with the 1970s structural crisis and changing domestic and international conditions (growing economic internationalization) created a room for a new social and economic order (Duménil &



Lévy, 2005a). Neoliberalism emerged as a new economic and social order to confront to these problems. All the dimensions of the Keynesian order; accumulation regime, mode of regulation, class compromise, state-market relations and international order have begun to be transformed. This Neoliberal transformation is widely referred as “a restoration of the rule of market and a dwindling role of the states” (Duménil & Lévy, 2004a, p.1).

The economic philosophy behind the neoliberalism is ‘principally associated with Chicago School of Economics’ which claims that markets automatically tend to reach equilibrium thereby provide full-utilization of the all factors of production including full employment thus permanent state intervention into the market through fiscal and monetary policies to increase employment only produces inflation (Palley, 2005). In this regard, according to this approach, “government macro-economic intervention is worse than useless – it is actually counterproductive” (Lapavitsas, 2005, p.34). Therefore, interventionism aiming at full-employment must be abandoned to provide price stability which is indeed a necessity for preserving the wealth and income of the capitalist classes. For neoliberalism, unemployment is ‘a necessary price for the restabilisation of capitalist economies’ (Lapavitsas, 2005, p.33). According to neoliberal approach, alongside the state interventions to reach and maintain the full employment, huge government expenditures of the welfare states are another significant factor of the inflation since huge welfare spending leads to large government deficits which are usually financed by government borrowings and by the central banks via purchasing government bonds. Therefore, it is asserted by neoliberalism that fiscal austerity including cuts in government expenditure and welfare retrenchment is required for preventing the fiscal deficits.

Moreover, like the neo-classical economics which emphasizes the priority of the self-regulating market, the fundamental tenet of neoliberalism is ‘free market’ since the most efficient allocation of the resources is made through the market forces and the state interference in economy leads to inefficiencies and government failures. “State decisions on matters of investment and capital accumulation were bound to be wrong

because the information available to the state could not rival that contained in market signals” (Harvey, 2005, p.20). Therefore, for neoliberalism, state intervention and regulations should be market-friendly and aim only to remove market imperfections (Lapavitsas, 2005). Because free market is accepted as the ‘optimal organising mechanism for capitalist economy’ (Lapavitsas, 2005, p.30), liberalization of economic transactions and privatization of state-owned enterprises are central for the restoration of the market-logic in the economy. Additionally, state shall withdraw from the provision of public services such as education and health and devolve or contracting-out the provision of these services to the private sector or provide through the private-public initiatives in order to provide more efficient service provision and to decrease the burden of these services on government deficits. Moreover, deregulation plays a key role in neoliberal restructuring because state regulations prevent the proper functioning of the markets hence reduce the well-being of the individuals. According to Harvey,

Privatization and deregulation combined with competition, it is claimed [by neoliberalism], eliminate bureaucratic red tape, increase efficiency and productivity, improve quality, and reduce costs, both directly to the consumer through cheaper commodities and services and indirectly through reduction of the tax burden. (2005, p.65)

In regard to international economy, free trade and financial deregulation are the central components of the Neoliberalism. These are the demands of the transnational companies and financial institutions because tight controls over the finance and strict regulations on import and export create obstacles for the capital profitability. Neoliberalism tries ‘to disembody capital from these constraints’ (Harvey, 2005, p.11). Due to internationalization and recently globalization, international competition has been intensified in terms of exports and foreign direct investments (FDIs). Neoliberalism accepts the international competition “as healthy since it improves efficiency and productivity, lowers prices, and thereby controlling inflationary tendencies” (Harvey, 2005, p.65).

According to Harvey, these theoretical principles of neoliberalism have functioned ‘as a system of justification and legitimization’ for prioritizing the market over the state and society (Harvey, 2007, p.29). He interprets neoliberalism as ‘a *political* project to re-establish the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites’ (Harvey, 2005, p.19). Therefore he argues that whenever the neoliberal principles have conflicted with the need of capitalist classes to restore their wealth and power, these principles have been immediately given up (Harvey, 2007, p.29). For example, while in theory, neoliberalism advocates for the state a ‘minimal role, acting only to secure the conditions for the continued expansion of the liberal market economy and a self-organizing civil society’ (Jessop, 2002a, p.454), in practice, neoliberals are not completely opposed to the state intervention and government regulation but these are redirected towards the areas to facilitate the functioning of the free market and to benefit the capitalist classes. One of these areas is the labour market. Neoliberalism did not remove the state intervention into labour market, but reoriented labour market policies towards the interests of the capital. Within the context of neoliberal restructuring of labour markets, state has continued to regulate the market but a significant shift from the passive labour market policies towards the active labour market policies emerged. As Duménil and Lévy assert, as a result of the neoliberal transformation, state’s “role vis-a-vis the economy was altered but not suppressed” (Duménil & Lévy, 2003, p.4).

The incorporation of these theoretical and ideological principles into a policy reform program was formally initiated with the elections of Thatcher in the UK in 1979, Reagan in the US in 1980 and Özal in Turkey in 1983. Since this period, a comprehensive set of economic, political and social policies favouring the capitalist classes has begun to be implemented with the motto of ‘There is no alternative’ all over the world including the advanced capitalist and the developing countries. And these policies still have been shaped and incessantly reshaped by the demands of the domestic and international capital. According to Jessop, the neoliberal transformation gave way to the emergence of a new global accumulation regime. Atlantic Fordism

was replaced with the 'Post-Fordist' accumulation regime which is more suitable to the changing needs of domestic and international capital. Therefore, Jessop uses the term 'Post-Fordism' to define the period after 1980s or neoliberal era of the capitalist system. This redesign of the accumulation regime required a break with the KWNS which no longer served the interests of global capital accumulation and necessitated new economic and social bases for capital accumulation; in other words, a new type of state for its sustainability. Therefore, the drift from the Fordism towards the Post-Fordism transformed the KWNS as one of main regulatory forms of the former to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (SWPR) which is appropriate to the emerging Post-Fordist accumulation regime. The emergence and consolidation of the SWPR have helped to build the dynamics of the emerging global economy and capital accumulation on a solid ground. This transformation reflected the changes in the four functions of state in reproduction of the capitalist system (2002b).

Firstly, in respect to state's distinctive role to secure the conditions for profitable capital accumulation, this state is **Schumpeterian** since it seeks "to promote permanent innovation and flexibility in relatively open economies by intervening on the supply-side and to strengthen as far as possible their structural and/or systemic competitiveness" (Jessop, 1999, p.355; Jessop, 2003a, p.38). According to Jessop (1993), moving beyond the mass production towards the flexible and innovative production was crucial for the capital accumulation in the new Post-Fordist era because during the late 1960s and 1970s, the growth potential of Fordism deriving from extension of mass production into new branches gradually exhausted and markets for mass consumer durables reached to relative market saturation. Economic growth and capital accumulation were no-longer attained through the Fordist virtuous circle of production based on increasing economies of scale and standardized mass production for the national mass consumption. Therefore, expansion into new markets and relocation of the production were required for the maintenance of the capital accumulation. However, expansion into new markets necessitated transformation in the production system because production must be

adaptable to the ‘rapidly changing and differentiated patterns’ in the demands of international markets and must be adequately competitive to compete internationally, especially with the newly industrialized countries having low cost of production and low technological production (Jessop, 1993, p.12-27). Due to the primary place of competitiveness in SWPR, Jessop denotes also this ideal typical Post-Fordist state as the Schumpeterian Competition State (Jessop, 2002b) like Cerny’s conceptualization as ‘competition state’ (Cerny, 1990).

Within this context, states thus sought to transform their production system towards a flexible and more innovative production. In this respect, transformation in the structure of production system, development of the new technologies and the ‘knowledge-based economy’ (Jessop, 2005) have generated a need for more flexible labour markets and for a labour force which is well-educated, skilled, creative, more capable and more flexible to adopt the changing conditions. To this end, in the context of active labour market policies, technical and vocational education to improve skills, adaptability and creativity of the labour force has gained considerable importance.

Secondly, in respecting social reproduction of labour power, SWPR has a **workfare** regime characteristic because in this state “social policy is subordinated to the demands of flexibility and international competitiveness” (Jessop, 1999, p. 355; Jessop, 2003a, p.39). Hence, instead of extending social rights of national citizens, “the SWPR is concerned to provide welfare services that benefit business and thereby demoting individual needs to second place” (Jessop, 1999, p. 355).

Thirdly, unlike the national characteristic of KWNS, the SWPR has a **post-national** characteristic due to ‘the increased significance of other spatial scales and horizons of action’. The significance of national states thus decreased as a ‘power container’. This is related to the transfer of some state capacities to the up such as international agencies and devolution to the bottom such as local governments or horizontally (Jessop, 1999, Jessop, 2003a). This situation makes state boundaries blurred and

decreases state autonomy; thus, Jessop refers this as ‘hollowing out of the national state’ (Jessop, 1993, p.10).

Lastly, when compared to the statist feature of the KWNS, in the context of “the mode of delivery of economic and social policies, the SWPR has a **regime** form because of the increased importance of non-state mechanisms in compensating for market failures and inadequacies and in the delivery of state-sponsored economic and social policies” (Jessop, 1999, p.356). This is associated with the proliferation of private-public networks, partnerships or initiatives in public services and activities.

This shift from the KWNS to SWPR has occurred through a long-lasting restructuring of the economic and social policy within the countries of Atlantic Fordism. However, other countries such as Latin American countries also underwent the restructuring similar to those of Atlantic Fordist countries under the overwhelming influence of the international institutions; although they have never had an institutionalized Keynesian welfare state. One of these countries is Turkey. As it will be discussed in the third chapter, Turkey has never been an ideal-typical KWNS. However, within the context of global neoliberal transformation, likewise Atlantic Fordist states, the social and economic policies in Turkey have been restructured in line with the neoliberal framework but this restructuring had a different path from those experienced in Atlantic Fordist states. Neoliberal restructuring has been imposed to Turkey through structural adjustment programs and stand-by agreements and implemented under the direct supervision of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), and Turkey has utterly embraced these neoliberal policies.

As a result of this neoliberal restructuring, social policy as Jessop points out was reoriented “from redistributive concerns based on expanding welfare rights in a nation-state towards more productivist and cost-saving concerns in an open economy” (Jessop, 1993, p.17-18). He expresses that the underlying motive behind this shift is ‘scissors effect’. “One blade of this involves growing inactivity rates that

are largely due to rising levels of unemployment and (often early) retirement; the other blade involves increasing public expenditure based on entrenched insurance-based and corporatist-mediated entitlements” (Jessop 2002b, p.155).

This paradigm shift in the social policy is defined in various ways. While Jessop and Torfing characterize this shift as from ‘Welfare State’ to ‘Workfare State’ (Jessop, 1993; Jessop 2002b; Jessop 2003a; Torfing 1999), it is labelled as ‘Enabling State’ by Gilbert (1999) and as ‘Activating State’ by OECD (1990). In this thesis, I use the ‘workfare’ in order to describe the reorientation of social policy. All these conceptualizations seek to show that social policies have been restructured by fundamentally different normative frameworks than those shaping the social policies of the post-war period. Jessop states that since 1980s, social policy has been reoriented to “the perceived needs of the private sector” (Jessop, 1993, p.29). This statement is in line with the Duménil and Lévy’s argument that neoliberalism as a counter-revolutionary project of the capitalist classes has restructured economic and social policies according to the interests of these classes (Duménil & Lévy, 2005b).

Firstly, in the neoliberal era, social policies were restructured by the demands of international competitiveness because economic internationalization has brought about the domination of competitiveness on the all facets of economy and due to its profound influence on competitiveness; economic internationalization has redesigned the priorities of the social policy (Jessop, 2002b). The competitiveness concerns thus resulted in the imposition of considerable downward pressures on the welfare delivery of the state. Therefore, Shin describes the reorientation of the social policy as ‘business-friendly social policy’ especially for international business and he adds that international pressures for competitiveness started “a race to bottom of social policy” among the countries (Shin, 2000, p.24).

Secondly, in the neoliberal era, social policies were restructured according to domestic profitability calculations. According to Jessop, Keynesian states provided welfare services in three forms:

(1) collectively organized social insurance leading to financial entitlements in the case of certain contingencies, such as unemployment, sickness, pregnancy or retirement; (2) redistribution through the fisco-financial system, including not only transfer payments but also fiscal welfare and state-subsidized occupational welfare and state-subsidized private provision of goods such as housing and various other tax reliefs; and (3) collective consumption in the sense of public finance of public goods and services. (Jessop, 2002b, p.148-149)

The delivery of these welfare services was not matter when profitability was high and economic growth was increasing, indeed these services were decisively maintained by the state without any complaint from the capitalist classes due to their function as a source for the domestic demand. However, gradual growth of welfare state brought about adding cost of production, huge government deficits and rising tax burden on the private firms, and these policies in a period of profitability crisis began to be seen as creating “an unproductive deduction from revenues that could be better spent by individual economic agents in the market” (Jessop, 2002b, p.153). On this ground, demands for retrenchment of the welfare services considerably increased. Therefore, it can be said that social policy is redesigned from counter-productive towards ‘market-friendly social policy’.

Within this new institutional framework of social policy, systematic downward pressures began to be imposed on the public expenditures “through the use of targeting eligibility, which involves allocating benefits on the bases of criteria that seek to identify the most needy and the most deserving, rather than to all citizens as a universal right” (Gilbert, 1999, p.22). Besides introduction of means tested social assistances and tightening eligibility criteria for social protections, time limits of the entitlements were considerably reduced. These changes were strongly advised by international organizations. For example, in 1991 report, OECD recommended that “the welfare system should be refocused and made less generous in terms of eligibility and benefit” (cited in Gilbert, 1999, p.20-21).

Parallel to these changes, welfare benefits have been increasingly linked to active participation into labour market. The conceptualization of reorganized social policy as workfare, enabling or activation reflects this change in welfare delivery. The



common point of these conceptualizations is that the rhetoric of welfare was replaced by rhetoric of work-first, which refers to “encouraging and/or enforcing work through active forms of social and employment policy and the development of transitional labour markets intended to smooth the path (or transition) from welfare into work” (Jessop, 2002b, p.154). In this regard, benefiting from welfare services became dependent on ‘behavioral requisites’ such as active search for a job and acceptance of work (Gilbert, 1999, p.23). According to Mead, this signals a shift from ‘social rights’ towards ‘social obligations’ (cited in Gilbert, 1999, p.7). Thus, it is safe to say that decommodifying features of the welfare state have been increasingly eroded through these essential changes in the delivery of welfare benefits. As a result, these changes have left larger and larger segments of population exposed to re Commodification. In other words, individuals have become more and more dependent on the market for their survival.

This paradigm shift in the social policy is justified by neoliberalism on the grounds of ‘welfare dependency’ and ‘poverty trap’. As Offe (1984) pointed out, after 1970s structural crisis, welfare policies began to be blamed for creating disincentives to work. Generous welfare spending and social protections provided decommodification by supplying non-market sources of income in order to maintain the mass-consumption; however by hampering incentives to work, they created welfare dependency. Especially social protections kept welfare recipients as inactive towards the labour market by providing passive support to them thereby creating welfare dependency. According to Jessop, welfare dependency is seen as a problem “to be eliminated through a mandatory neo-liberal programme of workfarism” (Jessop, 2003b, p.19). The neoliberal reorientation of the social policy towards workfare thus emphasizes increasing concern in reducing the passivity of welfare recipients by facilitating their reintegration into the labour market rapidly as possible. Because there is now “a direct linkage between different kinds of social protection systems and labour market participation,” it is said that “there is no longer a clear distinction between labour market policies and social policy” (Caswell, Larsen &

Marston, 2008, p.2). Labour market policies have been extensively shaped and reshaped in line with the neoliberal transformation in the social policy towards ‘more productivist and cost-saving concerns’ (Jessop, 1993, p.18).

## **2.2 Neoliberal Transformation of the Labour Policy**

Labour market is ‘a favourite target of neoliberalism’ (Duménil & Lévy, 2004b, p.2) because during the Keynesian period, the balance of class power changed in favour of the labour and in order to restore the income, wealth and power of the capitalist classes, neoliberalism seeks to entirely change the circumstances under the labour market functions. In this context, labour markets have been transformed in line with the neoliberal reorientation towards more productivist and cost-saving social policy.

In the Keynesian welfare states, high growths in the real wages were the norm in other words labour classes were increasingly getting larger share from the economic pie. In addition, institutional frameworks regarding the labour market including recognition of union right, collective bargaining, right to strike, job protections and minimum wage provided high growth rate in real wages and profound protections against the exploitation of the labour. Because Fordist production was grounded on the mass-production for the mass-consumption, a “tolerant stance towards wage-labor by way of recognition of many labor rights” and ‘strong wage incomes’ served to interests of the capital by sustaining the mass consumption (Yeldan, 2007, p.6). However, this tolerant attitude changed towards “an outright hostile attitude against the rights of labor” (Yeldan, 2007, p.9) after the transformation of Fordist production to the Post-Fordism. Keynesian institutional frameworks regarding the labour market could not coexist with the emerging Post-Fordism because as mentioned before the economic growth in the Post-Fordist accumulation regime is based on flexible production and as Jessop states, in the Post-Fordist era states no longer compete with each other “through economies of scale in the production of standardized goods and services using dedicated production systems”; however they compete “through the capacity to introduce flexible manufacturing or service delivery systems and exploit

the resulting economies of scope” (Jessop, 1993, p.15). In this regard, rights of labour such as unionization, collective bargaining, job protections and minimum wage began to be seen as labour market rigidities since they restricted the behaviours of private firms in respect to adjustment of size, time, function and wage of labour to changing market conditions. These institutional frameworks thus were characterized as ‘anti-competitive’ and adding production costs for the international competition (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.394). McBride and Williams (2001) state that “[s]cholars, both left and right, argue that rigidities in labour markets, either due to welfare state largesse in social provision or excessive state regulation of companies’ labour force management, lead to a ‘sclerosis’ which increases production costs and, in turn, reduces global competitiveness” (p.283). Therefore, Palley points out that a “global race to the bottom which has countries ratcheting down labour standards” has begun in order for competitiveness and attracting international capital (Palley, 2005, p.28). In this context, the notion of ‘flexibility’ emerged as a catchword to express the transformation of labour market in line with the concerns for competitiveness. While companies need to have more flexibility to adjust and compete in the international market, state must consolidate the flexibility in the labour market to support the flexible production. Therefore, the institutional frameworks regarding the labour market must be rendered cost-saving and adaptable to the changing market conditions.

In this respect, ‘deregulation’ which includes simplifying the rules about hire and fire, thereby creating insecurity of job, tightening rules for working conditions and reducing or removing minimum wage, etc. emerged as the major and longer lasting component of the placement of flexibility in the labour market. In addition, for neoliberals, flexible working arrangements are required in the world of economic internationalization because as OECD (1994) expresses, “they would permit firms better to exploit their productive capacities by matching production more closely to shifts in demand” (part 2c, para. 5). In this regard, flexible working arrangements regarding hours of work, type of employment such as temporary, part-time, on-call

work, discontinuous and job sharing, and location of work such as working from home were made legal for the consolidation of the flexibility in the labour market.

Alongside the deregulation and promotion of flexible, ‘wage flexibility’ is also crucial for complementing the flexibility in the labour market because neoliberalism claims that wages are downwardly rigid due to the labour legislations such as right for unionization, collective bargaining, right to strike, job protections and minimum wage. Labour market thus could not function smoothly because for the healthy functioning of the market, prices (wages as the price of labour) shall be determined automatically through the process of supply and demand. Therefore, interventions into self-regulating market such as these labour legislations create market distortions by preventing the wage adjustments to the market signals. As a result, capitalist firms could not adjust the wages to the changing conditions in the both domestic and international markets. Thus, this wage rigidity hampers the flexibility and competitiveness.

Moreover, it is claimed by neoliberals that downwardly inflexible wages create mass unemployment (Lapavitsas, 2005) because institutional frameworks regarding labour market interfere the operation of the market which is “automatically self-adjusted to full-employment” (Palley, 2005, p.20) by creating the wage rigidities. If market functions as self-regulating mechanism, all individuals who want to work at that wage are employed. Therefore, there is no need for these labour legislations and also for the state intervention through fiscal and monetary policy to attain full-employment which can be automatically reached through operation of the free-market (Palley, 2005).

Indeed, the existence of unemployment is welcomed by neoliberalism. According to Duménil and Lévy (2004b), fighting against the unemployment problem has not been fit in with the neoliberalism because unemployment triggers the imposition of the downward pressures on the wages. In this regard, Akkaya claims that while unemployment is seen as a plague for the economy, for neoliberals it is antidote for

the capitalist system (2003). Marx expressed this argument in his analysis of the 'reserve army of labour'. In the wage determination, the regular refilling of the reserve army of labour has a fundamental role. (Duménil&Lévy, 2009, p.48). While it mitigates demands of labour during the period of expansion, it downwardly pressures the wages during the period of stagnation and thereby compensating wage increases of economic expansion period (Duménil&Lévy, 2009, p.48). Similarly, Kalecki stated that unemployment intensifies "the disciplinary effects of 'the sack' on the workforce" (cited in Overbeek, 2003, p.27). Regarding this, Lapavistas pointed out that labour market flexibility has addressed the creation of mass unemployment in order to ease keeping real wages down and to repress claims of labour for better working conditions. In this context, the 'natural rate of unemployment' has emerged as a cover-up phrase for the existence of high unemployment which has weakened the bargaining position of the labour (2005). Palley states that almost all over the world full-employment was abandoned 'under the guise of the natural rate' and high average rates of unemployment could be maintained by dressing with the notion of natural rate because this "rate is unobservable" (2005, p.24-25).

However, while neoliberals were contended with the existence of unemployment, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, especially in the European countries, unemployment rates reached the levels that resulted in increasing social discontent (See Table 2). Therefore, governments and international organizations "found themselves needing to seem to 'do something' about rising unemployment rates" (White, 2001, p.6).

As a response to this high unemployment rates, OECD conducted a study in 1994 in order to propose "policy prescriptions for each member state" (Mcbride & Williams, 2001, p.287). According to 1994 Jobs Study of OECD, the great majority of the unemployment was structural rather than cyclical (cited in Mcbride & Williams, 2001, p.287). 1998 Job Strategy also supported this finding and revealed that "in 1996, structural unemployment accounted for an average of 91 percent of actual

unemployment in OECD member countries. The residual amount might be considered cyclical” (cited in McBride & Williams, 2001, p.287). The problem of structural unemployment was “attributed to the difficulty of the labour market to adjust to fundamentally new economic conditions, such as the globalization of capital and the role of new knowledge-based technologies” (White, 2001, p.4). In other words, OECD “identified the problem as related primarily to the quality and flexibility of the labour supply” (White, 2001, p.5); therefore, as a solution to high structural unemployment; it proposed policy reforms consisting of promotion of labour market flexibility, reducing wage rigidities and enhancing the labour force skills (McBride & Williams, 2001). Like OECD, European Commission (EC), IMF and WB recommended similar policy reforms against the structural unemployment.

**Table 2:** Unemployment rates in selected countries

	<b>1983</b>	<b>1985</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1995</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>2014</b>
<b>Canada</b>	<b>12.03</b>	<b>10.67</b>	<b>8.15</b>	<b>9.51</b>	<b>6.82</b>	<b>6.76</b>	<b>6.91</b>
<b>Denmark</b>	<b>8.37</b>	<b>6.66</b>	<b>7.17</b>	<b>6.72</b>	<b>4.33</b>	<b>4.84</b>	<b>6.53</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>8.76</b>	<b>10.38</b>	<b>9.37</b>	<b>11.95</b>	<b>9.56</b>	<b>8.87</b>	<b>10.30</b>
<b>Italy</b>	<b>7.37</b>	<b>8.14</b>	<b>8.87</b>	<b>11.18</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>7.71</b>	<b>12.65</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>9.51</b>	<b>8.45</b>	<b>6.08</b>	<b>8.36</b>	<b>3.67</b>	<b>5.88</b>	<b>7.42</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>8.18</b>	<b>9.15</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>7.18</b>	<b>5.08</b>	<b>8.77</b>	<b>14.13</b>
<b>Sweden</b>	<b>3.67</b>	<b>2.88</b>	<b>1.72</b>	<b>8.80</b>	<b>5.60</b>	<b>7.64</b>	<b>7.93</b>
<b>UK</b>	<b>10.82</b>	<b>11.20</b>	<b>6.87</b>	<b>8.49</b>	<b>5.37</b>	<b>4.79</b>	<b>6.16</b>
<b>USA</b>	<b>9.62</b>	<b>7.19</b>	<b>5.62</b>	<b>5.61</b>	<b>3.99</b>	<b>5.07</b>	<b>6.17</b>

Source: OECD.

These solutions are directly related to the unemployment conceptualization of the neoliberal approach. The causes of unemployment have been redefined by the neoliberalism (Overbeek, 2003). During the Keynesian period, unemployment was attributed to shortage of jobs due to the inadequacies of aggregate demand and regarded as a structural problem of the capitalist system because capitalism as a system is subject to aggregate demand fluctuations thereby creating unemployment. However, unemployment has begun to be seen in the neoliberal era as a personal problem of falling outside the market due to individual insufficiency, lack of necessary knowledge and skills, welfare dependency or unwillingness at the

prevailing rates of wage (Overbeek, 2003). Therefore, neoliberalism conceptualizes the unemployment as independent phenomena from the capitalist system. When unemployment is reduced to individual problem, its connection to the capitalist economy is broken and it becomes no longer a problem of the market economy. Hence, approaches to unemployment such as approaches of OECD and WB focus on its appearance rather than its underlying structural factors (Dertli, 2007), which provides opportunity to offer solutions to unemployment problem that do not require structural changes in the capitalist system. Therefore, supply-side solutions are proposed and it is claimed that structural unemployment could be eliminated through adjusting the unemployed labour force to the requirements of redefined labour market. In this context, the concept of 'employability' was put forward by neoliberals as a major policy objective. This refers to "the likelihood of obtaining a job" (White, 2001, p.6). The concept of 'human capital' is complementary of the 'employability'. According to Jessop (2003a), workfarism is "modelled on human capital theory and becomes a form of human resource management" (p.39). White (2001) states that, human capital is a comprehensive concept besides "physical and motivational traits", it also includes "technical and social skills, education and literacy, previous work experience, behaviours, attitudes, appearance and any other individual traits that could be considered assets or liabilities on the labour market". Employability is measured according to possession of these traits. In other words, employability is "a function of one's exchange value on the labour market" (p.6-7).

In the neoliberal policy orientation, because unemployment is resulted from lack of 'marketable skills', it could be solved through increasing the employability of the unemployed people and thus the "responsibility for becoming employable is devolved to individual members of the labour force, who should acquire the individual skills, competencies, flexibility, adaptability and personal dispositions to enable them to compete for jobs in national and global labour markets" (Jessop, 2002b, p.165). Therefore, in the neoliberal era people are encouraged "to see themselves as individualized and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own

well being” (Larner, 2000, p.13). This society is conceptualized as ‘active society’ (Larner, 2000, p.13). However, while the responsibility for human capital investment is assigned to individuals, the state and social partners support them by providing programs enhancing their skills (Jessop, 2002b). In this regard, active welfare-work policies became common trend among the advanced capitalist countries (Jessop, 2003b). These policies are generally named as active labour market policies. OECD, EU and other international organizations such as WB and IMF have increasingly advocated these policies for their role in enhancing employability thereby combating structural unemployment.

### **2.3 Active Labour Market Policies in the Context of Neoliberal Labour Market**

Active Labour Market Policies began to be implemented all over the world especially since the 1990s to combat the unemployment by enabling inactive portion of the labour force with skills deemed necessary by the labour market. Although before this time, there were policies regarding improvement of skills and qualifications of labour force, their role in social policy was insignificant in Atlantic Fordist economies. However, Nordic countries were apart from that because active policies were significant in social policy of these countries. The motive behind keen interest of international organizations and states in ALMPs was high unemployment rates during the 1980s and 1990s (See Table 1). Therefore, these policies have gained importance as the major policy option to fight with unemployment. The funds allocated to active policies have considerably increased in the OECD countries. Bonoli (2010) states that “between 1980 and 2003 the proportion of GDP invested in this field has nearly doubled, from 0.4 to 0.7 percent of GDP” (p.6).

In line with these developments, in Turkey the labour market policies have been reoriented towards the active labour market policies during the 1990s but this shift has especially accelerated during the 2000s. In Turkey, ALMPs have majorly begun to be implemented with the support of WB and these policies emerged as a response to massive labour market adjustments in the economy associated with privatization



of state economic enterprises and high unemployment rate caused by deep economic recessions.

Broadly, ALMPs “include measures to improve the access by the inactive or unemployed to the labour market, investment in skills, and generally the functioning of the labour market. These are in contrast to the more traditional *passive* income maintenance benefits” (Barrientos & Powell, 2004, p.88). There are varied types of programs in regarding the active policies. OECD and Eurostat classifies these programs into six main categories. According to their classifications, these categories are trainings; vocational and on-the-job, private sector incentive programs, direct employment programs in the public sector, job search assistance, youth programs and measures for disabled (European Commission, 2005, p.19-20). Among them, trainings “constitute the ‘classic measure’ of Active Labor Market Policy” (European Commission, 2005, p.19). According to work of Dar and Tzannatos (1999, p.3), there are five major active labour market policies. These are:

1. direct job creation (public works schemes/public service employment)
2. public employment services/job search assistance agencies;
3. training/retraining for unemployed adults and those at risk of unemployment;
4. support to unemployed persons in starting up small businesses (micro-enterprise development);
5. wage/employment subsidies to firms to hire unemployed individuals.

In parallel to these categorizations, as it will be discussed in Chapter 3 in Turkey active labour market policies are implemented under the names of; Vocational Training Courses, On-the-job training programs, Disabled and Ex-Convicts Trainings and Rehabilitation, Entrepreneurship Training Programs, Work Programs for Public Benefits and Social Security Insurance Premium Incentives for hiring trainees.

Active labour market policies are central to the new orientation of social policy towards workfare. The underlying reason behind the shift from passive policies to active policies was restructuring of social policy in line with the needs of capital accumulation. Dependence on welfare benefits for a long period is costly and

harmful for individuals because “as people spend long periods out of work, their chance of moving into work declines significantly. They cease to be effective in their search for work – to all intents and purposes leaving the market altogether” (cited in Grover & Piggott, 2006, p.713). This is described as ‘negative duration dependence’ (Halpin & Hill, 2008, p.7). Thus, according to workfarist approach, “people could not be allowed to ‘languish’ outside of the market” (White, 2001, p.6). Workfarism emphasizes that welfare should be eliminated as an option and those who are unemployed and inactive should get into labour force (White, 2001). To this end, policies enabling people to work and to contribute to the economy should be designed and implemented by the states. In this context, active labour market policies play a key role in reintegration of inactive portion of the labour force into the labour market by increasing their employability. Therefore, it is thought by neoliberals that both welfare dependency and public expenditures could be reduced through active labour market policies.

Also, in the context of workfare, ALMPs have a central place in imposing downward pressures on the wages. According to neoliberal approach, passive policies paving the way for disincentive to work and long-term unemployment creating discouraged unemployment weaken the link of unemployed people with the labour market and those individuals go out of the labour force. As a result, the labour force participation thereby the size of reserve army reduces, which adversely affects wage inflation. For neoliberals, “[i]t is not enough to have a pool of non-employed people. They must be competing for employment if inflationary pressures are to be kept in check” (Grover & Piggott, 2006, p.712). In the 1998 pre-budget report of HM Treasury of UK, it is stated that when more people become employable and get back into to labour market, the number of people who compete for the available job opportunities increases. This provides pressures on wage inflation and prevents skills shortages (cited in Grover & Piggott, 2006, p.713). Therefore, in order to sustain downward pressures on the wages, besides the magnitude of the reserve army, “its closeness to labour markets” is also significant (Grover & Piggott, 2006, p.712; Dertli, 2007, p.105). In

this regard, ALMPs are fundamental to increase this closeness through improving employability of labour force.

Alongside the workfare policies, ALMPs have also complemented and reinforced the consolidation of flexibility in the labour market. Transformation in the structure of production system towards flexible production has required flexible labour force adaptable to changing market conditions, various work tasks and developing technologies. This labour force could be realized through improving their employability, which rises mobility and adjustment of labour force. International competitiveness could not be maintained only through simple cost-cutting in the era of globalizing, knowledge-based economy. Burroni and Keune (2011) state that “increasingly success in the global economy is seen to require innovation and improvements in quality and productivity, which then require a highly skilled and motivated labour force” (p.77). Due to competitiveness depends on high human capital, policies to create a well-educated, skilled, creative, more capable and more adaptable labour force have been increasingly needed and the place of ALMPs in this context is enhancing “human capital of potential workers” (White, 2001, p.26) and equipping them with up-to-date skills (Bonoli, 2010) thereby increasing their adaptation to “new economic demands” (White, 2001, p.26). As a result, “flexible, enterprising workers suited to a globalizing, knowledge-based economy” could be created (Jessop, 2002b, p.168). In addition, within the environment of flexible labour markets, “all those who can work must work” (Peck & Theodore, 2000, p.120). Almost every individual in the society is accepted as ‘a potential worker’ (White, 2001, p.16). Living a life dependent on welfare benefits could only be allowed to ‘unemployable’ people. Unemployability must be identified with medical grounds and everyone else is accepted as ‘employable’ and they have to work (White, 2001, p.17). In this regard, in the neoliberal era, most of the people who were formerly regarded as unemployable began to be referred as not ‘disabled enough’ to be exempt from workfare requirements (White, 2001, p.17). In this context, those accepted as employable must be reintegrated into labour market.

Active labour market policies have eased the redeployment of previously inactive portion of the labour force into the labour market through transformation of “redundant qualifications into employable skills” (OECD, 1994, part 2d, para. 1). These policies thus provide a “steady supply of appropriately qualified” (Bonoli, 2010, p.15) and flexible labour force required for the flexible production. In this regard, Jessop states that in the workfarist era, states have created the conditions for ‘full-employability’ rather than ‘full-employment’ in the flexible labour markets (Jessop, 2002b, p.154). Thus, it is safe to argue that full-employability replaced full-employment. Additionally, flexibility requires the skilling and continuous re-skilling of labour force because conditions in the market, production systems and technologies have changed rapidly in the globalizing, knowledge-based economies. Therefore, policies regarding ‘life-long-learning’ strategy have gained considerable importance. OECD expresses that to sustain their own competitiveness in the labour market, individuals have to participate in life-long learning and they must constantly upgrade their skills (cited in Gavric, 2012, p.6). In this respect, ALMPs are key elements in consolidation of the life-long learning strategy by providing re-skilling of the labour force.

ALMPs and its extension life-long learning are inherent to debates on ‘flexicurity’ which has become a popular concept in the social policy during the late 1990s. The Dutch scholar Ton Wilthagen coined ‘flexicurity’, based on developments in Netherlands to describe ‘flexibility-security nexus’. He and his colleague Rogowski (2002) define flexicurity as “a policy strategy that attempts, synchronically and in a coordinated way, to enhance the flexibility of labour markets, the work organisation and labour relations on the one hand, and to enhance security – employment security and social security – notably for weaker groups inside and outside the labour market on the other hand especially since it has been placed in European social policy-making” (p.250). Therefore, in the contrary to “the general view of an inevitable trade-off between promoting flexibility, i.e. firms’ capacity to adjust swiftly to a change in labor demand, and at the same time safeguarding workers security”

(Wilthagen & Muffels, 2013, p.113), the founding principle behind the concept of flexicurity is that “flexibility and security are not contradictory, but mutually supportive” (Bredgaard & Larsen, 2007, p.4). Therefore, flexicurity is called as ‘happy marriage’ of flexibility and security.

Although, the concept of flexicurity was coined on the base of Dutch labour market, it describes the labour market strategy of neoliberal states especially European countries in the face of growing insecurity and social exclusion due to flexible labour markets. The unsecured environment of flexible labour markets has increased the demand for security and mounting social discontent has become hard to contest. Against the evidence of deteriorated consequences of flexible labour market, more humane and interventionist social policies at least in appearance have begun to be implemented. This transition is associated the Peck and Tickell’s argument of “historical shifts in the constitution of the neoliberalism”. According to them, neoliberalism has been transformed from ‘roll-back neoliberalism’ which is “the purposeful construction and consolidation of neoliberalized state forms, modes of governance, and regulatory relations” (Peck & Tickell, 2002, p.384) towards ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ in which “neoliberal project itself gradually metamorphosed into more socially interventionist and ameliorative forms” and this shift was motivated from the growing social unease due to destructive economic outcomes and widening “social externalities of marketcentric forms of neoliberalism” (Peck&Tickell, 2002, p.388). In the context of roll-out neoliberalism, flexibility was dressed with the notion of ‘flexicurity’ and increasingly emphasized by international organizations. Especially, European Commission has placed flexicurity in a central position in European social policy making. In the EC’s term, “[f]lexicurity is an integrated strategy for enhancing, at the same time, **flexibility and security** in the labour market. It attempts to reconcile employers' need for a flexible workforce with

workers' need for security – confidence that they will not face long periods of unemployment” (European Commission)<sup>2</sup>

While flexicurity is referred as double-faced strategy, the security leg of it is a seeming security because it aims to provide sustainable employment not job security, which is remaining “in the same job with the same employer for relatively long periods” (Wilthagen & Muffels, 2013, p.112). Therefore, Wilthagen and Muffels (2013) argue that in “the flexicurity concept this notion of job security and life-time employment is replaced by the notion of employment security pertaining to the security to stay in secured employment during the entire career but not necessarily in the same job with the same employer” (p.112). In this context, ALMPs and life-long learning are key policies to promote employment security because only employability could provide safeguard with individuals in the flexible labour markets. Thanks to investments in human capital through ALMPs and “career-long investments in employability” in the context of life-long learning, when individuals become unemployed, they can easily find a new job in the very short time (Wilthagen & Muffels, 2013, p.113). Therefore, it is argued that even if workers do not have a job security in the flexible labour market, they have a sustainable employment throughout their work-career. In this regard, conventional notion of security was transformed into ‘adaptability or employability’ (Uslu, 2008, p.4). However, in contrary to what is claimed, employment security is not a formula against unsecured working environment of flexible labour markets therefore flexicurity is only a cover-up concept disguising the perverse consequences of flexibility in the labour market.

Briefly, it could be argued that ALMPs are complementary of the workfare policies and the flexibility in the labour market. These policies also have a significant role in the flexicurity debates in the social policy. Against the unsecured labour markets resulted from the flexibility and deregulation, ALMPs provide employment security

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<sup>2</sup> Retrieved from <http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=102>

by improving the employability of the labour force. Therefore, it is safe to say that active labour market policies play central role in the neoliberal transformation of the labour markets.

When we look at the implementation process of the ALMPs, it is seen that as other public employment services such as job placement, ALMPs have also expose to the ‘marketization’ (Berkel & Graaf, 2007) under the neoliberal logic of governance. As discussed earlier, from the 1980s onwards, the great concerns for international competitiveness and economic efficiency prompted neoliberal governments to cost-minimization or cost-cutting. Within this frame, minimal state, deregulation and privatization which are central tenets of neoliberal theory have been brought into the forefront by neoliberals. Welfare retrenchment became the common point of all neoliberal governments especially in the Anglo-American countries. In this context, in order to decrease social expenditures, states have begun to withdraw from the provision of social services such as health and education. The idea behind this withdrawal is that private sector provides services at a lower cost because its productivity rate is higher than public sector. In other words, in this mindset private sector works more efficiently than public sector. Moreover, it is thought that private sector is more responsive to the needs of demanders. Neoliberals explain these as private provision leads to “better service for users and better value for money for the tax payers” (Davies, 2008, p.136). As public choice theory argues, because public delivery is inferior to private provision, governments should allow greater penetration of private sector to these sectors which are close to private sector. In this regard, as Harvey points out, in this neoliberal logic of governance, states should create markets in areas where markets do not exist (2005).

Employment service is one of these areas due to the public monopoly in that area. During 1980s, the existence of large public employment agencies started to be questioned within the context of neoliberal paradigm emphasizing efficiency. With reference to the idea that competition results in improved efficiency in the delivery of

services, in order to create a market (so competition) in regard of employment services, public monopoly was removed and private employment agencies were allowed to operate, and most significantly in the context of neoliberal logic of governance, public employment agencies have begun to contract out employment services to private sector. In other words, employment services have started to be transferred from public monopoly to private sector to rationalize provision of services. In creation of a market, the primary precondition is purchaser-provider split which divorces demand from supply and introduce competition between different suppliers (Vabo, 2009). In the context of employment services, public employment agencies as a purchaser expose employment services to ex-ante competition among different providers through contracting out. One of these employment services purchased from the private sector is the active labour market policies. Although there are significant variations in countries, in the context of neoliberal logic of governance, while the mode of service delivery of the ALMPs is generally subcontracting or partnership, the decision making authority are decentralized to regional or local agencies in order to increase the adaptability of the policies to local needs (Berkel & Graaf, 2007).

However, the tendencies of marketization and decentralization in the service provision under the neoliberal logic of governance could produce conflicts with the neoliberal objectives when coming together with the flexibility and deregulation brought about by the neoliberalism. The neoliberal objective to provide efficiency and effectiveness in the policy implementation process through private provision requires adequate regulatory and supervisory capacity of the state. However, flexibility and deregulation manifesting in the service provision create ambiguities in the implementation process. Therefore, in the flexible and deregulated policy environment, it is difficult to monitor the decentralized and subcontracted policy implementation process. In this regard, ineffective and inefficient policy environment could occur because the neoliberal regulatory and supervisory state intervention may



not be possible via neoliberalization of the service provision in the flexible and deregulated implementation process.

## **2.4 Summary of the Chapter**

Since the mid 1980s active labour market policies have come into the prominence all over the world including developed and developing countries as a significant policy tool to combat the unemployment which has been in rise since the 1980s. In the wide extension of these policies, the impacts of international organizations were crucial. The significance of active labour market policies in confronting the unemployment problem was highly emphasized in most of the reports of OECD, WB, EU and ILO. Within this context, especially during the 1990s, the passive labour market policies have started to be replaced by the active labour market policies.

The shift from the implementation of passive labour market policies towards the active labour market policies was associated with the transition from Keynesian Welfare State to Neoliberalism. As discusses in detail earlier according to Jessop, the ideal-typical post-war state was the Keynesian Welfare National State (KWNS). This state seeks to secure the conditions for profitable accumulation in Fordist production and it aimed to reach and maintain the full employment in a relatively closed national economy and pursued this goal mainly through demand-side management. In general, KWNS implemented economic and social policies which expanded and institutionalized economic and social rights of national citizens (2002b). This in turn provided 'decommodification' of labour power thus in the post war period labourers depended less on the market for their well-being.

KWNS provided a profound prosperity during the period between 1945 and 1970. However, during the early 1970s considerable contractions in profit and growth rates and high unemployment and inflation became apparent in all capitalist countries. Growing economic internationalization and associated concerns for international competitiveness and changing domestic conditions such as demographic changes and changing family structures exacerbated this situation. The KWNS was no longer

working for securing the reproduction of capitalist system (Jessop, 2002b). This environment generated a room for the emergence of a new social and economic order. Within this regard, neoliberalism emerged as a new order. According to Jessop, as mentioned before KWNS gave way to the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (SWPR) from the 1980s onwards and this transition was closely connected to the search for solutions to the Fordist crisis. SWPR seeks to increase the competitiveness of the economy in the international market by promoting innovation, high technology and flexibility via supply side policies (2003a). In regard to social policy, SWPR has a workfare characteristic in which policy is subordinated to the demands of labour market flexibility, employability and competitiveness. Rather than providing high social protections to unemployed persons and keeping them outside the labour market, SWPR emphasizes re-integration of unemployed persons into the labour market. That is to say, unemployed persons remaining passive out of the labour market must be activated to decrease their welfare dependency. Living dependent on the welfare benefit is no longer an option in the workfare states (Jessop, 2003b). Workfare approach functionally complements the deregulated and flexible labour market which is the central tenet of neoliberal ideology (Peck & Theodore, 2000).

Flexibility and deregulation have been championed by neoliberalism all over the world for their role in increasing international competitiveness. Under the intense international competition, cost-saving has a profound importance for increasing competitiveness and private firms must be competitive as possible by improving their adaptability to the changing conditions in the international markets. Within this frame, flexibility and deregulation in the labour market have a central role to support flexible production and to provide cost-reductions because overregulated and inflexible labour markets increase the costs by increasing social wage and preventing the behaviors of private firms regarding wages and hire-and-fire.

Alongside the flexibility and deregulation in the labour market, adaptability of the labour force to the market conditions is also crucial for the international

competitiveness. In the era of flexible production equipped with high technology, there occurs a need for skillful, qualified and flexible labour force. In this regard, neoliberalism features the notion of 'employability'. Besides its function in generating flexible and skilled labour force required for the new production system, employability is also vital for the security of labour in the flexible labour markets. This function is associated with the 'flexicurity' which refers to the balance between flexibility and security. Consolidation of flexibility and deregulation in the neoliberal states has resulted in unsecured labour. Against the social discontents due to deteriorated consequences for the labour, flexibility was applied make up under the name of flexicurity which became a popular concept during the 1990s. Flexicurity has been presented by neoliberalism as a win-win situation. Flexicurity offers employment security instead of the consolidated job securities of Keynesian period. That is to say even though "the Fordist Fantasy of jobs for life" (Jessop, 2002b, p. 165) was ended, the maintenance of employment not necessarily in the same job and workplace proposes a kind of security to the labour. In this regard, increasing employability of labour force provide sustaining of their employment. In other words, employability yields a safeguard to labour force in the risk situations in the flexible labour markets.

Active labour market policies are key policy in promotion of employability of the labour force. Thanks to ALMPs, the labour force having skills and qualification required for the flexible production equipped with high technology, and human capitals of the individuals are increased by acquiring necessary skills and qualification so that they can easily find a new job in the case of unemployment. This is deeply associated with the neoliberal conceptualization of the unemployment. Because the definition of problem shapes the way of solution, neoliberal definition of unemployment problem forms the solution of unemployment. According to neoliberal understanding, unemployment is a problem of falling outside the market or disability to involve in market. Therefore, unemployment is related to individual insufficiency, lack of knowledge or lack of necessary skills. Unemployment is thus

reduced to an individual problem or individual risk (Dertli, 2007). Hence, neoliberalism emphasizes personal development as a solution to unemployment. In this regard, ALMPs provide re-integration of unemployed or inactive portion of labour force into the market by increasing their employability. That is to say, ALMPs enable individuals to solve their unemployment problem by improving their human capital. Therefore, it is argued that ALMPs are crucial for solution of unemployment problem and for employment security of labour.

Active labour market policies as one of the significant neoliberal labour policy are implemented according to the neoliberal logic of governance. Like most of the social services, employment policies became subjected to the marketization tendencies of the neoliberalism since the 1980s. The underlying idea is that private provision is more efficient and more effective and it also provides flexibility in the service delivery. Within this context, neoliberalism champions the state withdrawal from the service provision. Correspondingly, states started to withdraw from the employment services and devolve these services such as job placement and active labour market policies to the private sector.

In parallel to global developments, in Turkey from 1990s onwards, active labour market policies have gained significance but especially during the 2000s, these policies began to dominate the labour market policies of Turkey. However, the emergence of these policies in Turkey has a different story than those in the Keynesian welfare states. In order to understand the particular dynamics of the active labour market policies, it is necessary to examine the neoliberal restructuring of Turkish labour market. The particular features of the neoliberal transformation in Turkey have shaped the way of the emergence of the ALMPs. Therefore, in the next chapter, firstly the neoliberal transformation of the Turkish labour market will be briefly examined, and then the restructuring of the Turkish public employment institution in line with the neoliberal principles will be entailed. The third section of the next chapter will give an account of the active labour market policies in Turkey and finally vocational training courses implemented in Turkey will be explored.

## CHAPTER 3

### ACTIVE LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN TURKEY

#### 3.1 Neoliberal Transformation of Labour Market in Turkey

The global transformation towards the neoliberalism since the 1980s as underlined earlier has restructured economic and social policies prevalent during the Keynesian period. Within this frame, labour markets were restructured along the lines of neoliberal principles. The restructuring of the labour markets has a profound role in the consolidation of neoliberalism because policies regarding flexibility, deregulation, welfare retrenchment, minimizing state which are among the central tenets of neoliberalism are associated deeply with the labour market regulations. In the context of neoliberal restructuring of labour market, consolidated labour rights such as job security, collective bargaining, right to strike and right for unionization and welfare rights such as health and education have begun to be curbed from the 1980s onwards. In the words of Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir (2004), “in the neo-liberal social policy regime, at the end of the twentieth century, the working class was disassociated from the rights which were gained by the class march across the political stage throughout the century” (p.34). Therefore, it is safe to say that neoliberal transformation in the Keynesian welfare states brought about a radical break regarding the labour markets.

However, in “countries without mature welfare states” in which Buğra and Adar includes Turkey, neoliberal transformation of labour markets has had a different path from institutionalized Keynesian welfare states (2008). This is resulted from the particular characteristics of the institutional history of these countries without mature welfare states (Buğra & Adar, 2008). Despite the variations between countries due to societal differences, the countries without mature welfare states have common features which are;

First, working life is not necessarily limited to labor market relations based on formal contracts as in developed market economies. Where peasant agriculture and/or the informal sector remain important, the role of social policy in assuring social protection to the individual in risk situations can hardly be the same as in contexts where the employment relation has a rule-bound contractual character. Second, the centrality of the family appears as a defining feature of the social security regime. Third, state-society relations do not strictly conform to a legally bound context where rights and duties are formally defined. Clientelism appears as a salient feature of the societal context in which mechanisms of social integration are shaped (Buğra & Adar, 2008, p. 4-5).

Similar to these characteristics of the countries without mature welfare states, in Turkey employment structure has been heavily based on agricultural employment. During the 1960s and 1970s, about 70 percent of total employment was agricultural employment which preserved its dominant position until 1990s (See Table 3). In association with the large share of agricultural employment, the proportion of the unpaid family workers within the working population has been high (See Table 4). Although the share of wage earners has considerably increased after 1980s, it has been lower when Turkey is compared with the countries with mature welfare states (Buğra & Keyder, 2003). In addition, the share of informal (unrecorded) employment within the total employment has been large in Turkey. During the late 1980s, informal employment reached to about 60 percent of the total employment (Karagöl, & Akgeyik, 2010, p.12).

**Table 3:** Sectoral Distribution of Employment (Percentage)<sup>3</sup>

<b>Years</b>	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Industry</b>	<b>Services</b>
<b>1960</b>	<b>69.8</b>	<b>11.1</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>1970</b>	<b>59.9</b>	<b>15.5</b>	<b>24.6</b>
<b>1980</b>	<b>50.6</b>	<b>19.3</b>	<b>30.1</b>
<b>1990</b>	<b>46.8</b>	<b>20.1</b>	<b>32.9</b>
<b>2000</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>23.9</b>	<b>40</b>

Source: İstatistik Göstergeler (1923-2011), Turkish Statistical Institute (TUİK) and Çalışma İstatistikleri, 1995.

<sup>3</sup> This table pictures the period before the implementation of ALMPs.

**Table 4:** Structure of Employment by Status at Work (Percentage)<sup>4</sup>

<b>Years</b>	<b>Wage Earners</b>	<b>Self-Employed</b>	<b>Unpaid Family Workers</b>
<b>1970</b>	<b>27.6</b>	<b>27.3</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>1980</b>	<b>35.3</b>	<b>24.2</b>	<b>40.4</b>
<b>1990</b>	<b>38.4</b>	<b>23.6</b>	<b>38</b>
<b>2000</b>	<b>48.5</b>	<b>29.8</b>	<b>21.5</b>

Source: İstatistik Göstergeler (1923-2011), Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK) and Murat, 2007.

The social security system in Turkey until 2006 had a fragmented structure resulted from the corporatist tendencies of the system. This system was composed of three different social security institutions based on the employment status of individuals which were the Retirement Chest (Emekli Sandığı) covering public employees, the Social Insurance Institution (SSK) covering employees in private sector and the Bağ-Kur for the employers and self-employed individuals. This corporatist structure of social security system has excluded a large part of the population from social protection (Buğra & Adar, 2008). This situation of Turkey provides an appropriate basis for the flexibility. In Turkey, health insurance system was also based on the occupational status of individuals as social security system. Therefore, unlike Keynesian welfare states, Turkey has never had a free universal health insurance to cover all citizens.

This fragmented and exclusionary structure of social security and health insurance systems has created significant inequalities however the informal social protection mechanisms such as local governments, religious institutions especially the family has had an important role in promoting welfare and providing help in risk situations such as illness and unemployment (Buğra & Adar, 2008). Furthermore, in Turkey state plays a profound role in welfare provision through patronage relationships (Buğra & Keyder, 2005).

Due to these characteristics of Turkish state, it is argued by some scholars that Turkish state could be described as a Southern Eastern Welfare States<sup>5</sup> (Gough,

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<sup>4</sup> This table pictures the period before the implementation of ALMPs.

1996; Grütjen, 2008; Buğra & Keyder, 2003; Saraceno, 2002). However, Turkey has never had a fully institutionalized welfare state (Yalman, 2007) although it has common features with the Southern Eastern Welfare States such as Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece. According to Yalman, the full-employment which is the major macroeconomic goal of the welfare states have never become a primary aim of the state in Turkey and unlike the comprehensive social policies of welfare states, in Turkey social policy was limited to the labour relations and labour market regulations (2007). On the contrary to wide labour rights working classes gained through class struggles in Keynesian welfare states, in Turkey although to a lesser extent, fundamental labour rights such as collective bargaining, right to strike and right for unionization were asserted with the 1961 Constitution (Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010) without considerable demand and class movements for “them as a matter of social right”. (Özbudun, 1980 cited in Aybars & Tsarouhas, 2010, p.752). Unlike consolidated job securities of welfare states during the Keynesian period, in Turkey Job Security Law for the first time was enacted in 2003 and it brought out limited protection for termination of employment contract for convenience. Within the frame of job protection, severance payment has been the sole passive labour market policy in Turkey until the beginning of unemployment insurance with the enactment of Unemployment Insurance Law numbered 4447 in 1999.

Given these peculiar characteristics of Turkey, it is safe to argue that as Yalman points out the Turkish state has never been a typical Keynesian welfare state (2007). Due to the distinctive labour market dynamics in Turkey; the transformation of the Turkish labour market in line with the neoliberal ideology has sui generis features. Unlike the radical break experienced in Keynesian welfare states, there was relative continuity in Turkish labour market between before and after neoliberal era. However, this does not mean that neoliberalism did not cause destruction on social policies of Turkey. As Özdemir and Yücesan-Özdemir states, in the neoliberal era

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<sup>5</sup> This typology is proposed by Ferrera (1996;1997).



“the foundations of the quasi-social welfare state of Turkey have collapsed” (2011, p.70; 2004, p.33).

In line with the global developments, Turkey has become one of the precursor countries has undergone the deep-seated neoliberal transformation from the 1980s onwards (Mütevellioglu & Işık, 2009). Since 1930s, especially after the 1960 military intervention, Turkey had implemented import-substitution industrialization (ISI) strategy which had remained predominant industrialization model during the state-planned industrialization period until 1980. ISI was an inward-looking economic strategy and heavily dependent on state support and tariff protection thus under this strategy export was deemphasized (Pamuk, 2008). During the 1970s, economic problems especially chronic trade deficits and foreign exchange bottleneck made maintenance of ISI difficult. Budget deficits and high inflation rates exacerbated this situation. Within this context, as a solution to these structural problems of Turkish economy, a major stabilization program in line with the overall neoliberal understanding imposed by IMF through stand-by agreement and WB through structural adjustment loans was initiated by Turkish government in 24 January 1980 to reform Turkish economy.

This stabilization program called as ‘24<sup>th</sup> January Decisions’ has brought about a fundamental transformation in industrial strategy and import-substitution industrialization strategy was replaced by the export-oriented free market economy which is mainly based on service sector including construction, tourism and to a degree labour intensive industries such as textiles. Therefore, industrialization which was the major objective of the economic model during the ISI period regressed and the service sector based on the more unskilled and unqualified labour force gained prominence in the Turkish economy. This new market oriented strategy has required opening Turkish economy to international markets. In favour of export oriented growth strategy, the reform program brought out trade liberalization, abandonment of import protections, financial liberalization, encouragement of exports and foreign direct investments and transferring resources towards the sectors of export such as

food and textile industries. In addition, this stabilization program included fiscal austerity measures, privatizations of state owned enterprises, reductions in agricultural subsidies, and cutbacks in public services. Until the 1983, these neoliberal policies based on 24<sup>th</sup> January Decisions were decisively implemented under the military government (Mütevelliöğlu & Işık, 2009) which provided necessary conditions for the implementation of unpopular policies by suppressing all societal organizations such as trade unions, leftists groups and political parties. After the return to civil government, Prime Minister Turgut Özal deepened these neoliberal policies he started to implement during the technocratic cabinet of the military government (Karadağ, 2010). Tuncel states that this process of neoliberal transformation was accepted as one of the most radical change Turkey has experienced during the whole course of the capitalist system in Turkey (2012).

The neoliberal transformation accompanied by the shift from import substitution model towards export oriented growth model required a total restructuring of state which brought about the transformation of labour market. Within this frame, the labour market in Turkey has been restructured towards a flexible and deregulated labour market from the 1980s onwards in parallel to developments in the labour markets of Keynesian welfare states. With the switch toward outward looking economic model, concerns for international competitiveness has come to the forefront, which has brought about reorientation of the labour market policies towards improving the international competitiveness of Turkey. In the context of increasing international competitiveness, flexibility and deregulation in the labour market has gained prominence in order to provide cost-containment. International organizations such as IMF, WB and OECD and domestic private sector representatives such as TİSK, TUSİAD have frequently expressed that Turkish labour market is extensively regulated and inflexible regarding the working arrangements and hire and fire thus there is an urgent need for deregulation and legal changes in the direction of flexibility in order to increase international competitiveness.

However, firstly on the contrary to these claims Turkey has already had a flexible labour market. In Turkey, the high rate of informal employment and limited job protections creates a room for flexible arrangements in the labour market. At the same time, implementation of the regulations widened flexible employment relations such as subcontracting, temporary work and flexible types of employment such as home working, part-time, on-call work increases the informal employment in Turkey. Therefore, the share of informal sector in total employment has steadily increased from the 1980s onwards. During the late 1980s, the share of informal employment reached to about 60 percent of the total employment (TUIK) and during the early 2000s, the share of informal employment was about 50 percent (TUIK) and in non-farm payroll employment, it was about 30 percent (Çelik, 2012, p.32). Therefore, it can be argued that informal sector and flexibility reproduce each other.

Secondly, in contrast with the claims of international institutions and Turkish bourgeoisie, description of the Turkish labour market as rigid is contradictory (Çelik, 2012). According to the neoliberal approach, the existence of broad passive policies and consolidated labour rights are regarded as labour market rigidities however in Turkey as mentioned before there wasn't unemployment insurance until 2003 and severance payment was the only passive labour market policy until the introduction of unemployment insurance. The labour rights such as collective bargaining, right to strike provided with the 1961 Constitution were restricted by the military government in the early 1980s. Therefore, in Turkey labour rights and protections are limited. Moreover, due to the particular features of Turkish economy, only a limited segment of the working population is subject to the regulations that could be regarded as rigidity (Çelik, 2012). As raised earlier, in Turkey informal employment has a significant share in total employment. In addition, given that the unionization rates including public sector was about 20 percent during the late 1980s and between 6 and 9 percent during the 2000s (OECD), it is safe to argue that the large part of the working population has been excluded from the labour market regulations which are defined as rigidities. Furthermore, as discussed before in Turkey regarding the job

security there is a limited protection for termination of employment contract for convenience and only employees who are working in workplaces employing 30 or more employees are subject to the job security law. Taking into consideration that Turkish economy is composed of generally small and medium scale enterprises, most of the workplaces are excluded from the job security regulation. Thus, this regulation legally generates a room for extensive flexible arrangements to small enterprises. Therefore, as Çelik (2012) points out, even though Turkey has rigid labour market regulations as it claimed, a major part of the working population has been out of the scope of these regulations. In parallel, Taymaz and Özler (2004) states that the EPL [employment protection legislation] in Turkey seems to be “rigid”, but it excludes a large part of the economy, legally, small business and certain sectors, and illegally, the informal sector” (p.22). Within this regard, it is safe to say that the rigidity of Turkish labour market is controversial.

In this context, it could be argued that labour market policies regarding the flexibility and deregulation are transferred to Turkey under the overwhelming influence of IMF and WB and more recently and these policies were embraced utterly by the Turkey because Turkey had very suitable labour market for enhancing flexibility and deregulation. That is to say Turkey has already to a certain extent flexible labour market before the neoliberal transformation. Global neoliberal turn has prompted all countries including developed and developing countries to enter into the same road. Correspondingly, the same neoliberal measures applied in Keynesian welfare states have been prescribed by the international institutions against the structural problems of Turkey even though Turkey has different labour market conditions and characteristics from Keynesian welfare states. Turkey has been compelled through structural adjustment programs, stand-by agreement and recently via pre-accession instruments by the international institutions to incorporate flexibility and deregulation into its labour market that has already been flexible.

Turkey has implemented policies emerged in old Keynesian welfare states as a result of their particular dynamics, however as Kazgan states, Turkey experienced an

‘ideology change which came as a bolt from the blue’<sup>6</sup> therefore Turkey did not have institutional and legal infrastructures for these policies (2009). Thus there occurred policy deadlocks in the implementation process due the lack of required infrastructures because Turkey has transferred or imposed the same policies without having the institutional, legal and organizational infrastructure Keynesian welfare states already had. Therefore, attempts to turn the Turkish labour market which has been already flexible into the less regulated and more flexible one without the necessary legal, institutional and organizational infrastructures have generated deadlocks in the implementation of labour policies, particularly active labour market policies. As a result, ambiguities and arbitrariness occur in the implementation process.

In Turkey, active labour market policies which are indeed prone to fail even in the institutionalized Keynesian welfare states began to be implemented with inadequacies in the institutional, legal and organizational infrastructure required for the implementation of these policies. As a result, deadlocks emerged in the both decision making and service delivery of active labour market policies. Turkey has begun to implement ALMPs from the 1990s onwards to cope with the unemployment problem under the influence of international organizations such as IMF, WB, OECD and ILO. Especially World Bank during the 1990s and EU during the 2000s supported the implementation process of ALMPs by providing financial resources to these policies through projects.

However, unlike the tendency towards the replacement of passive policies by active policies in Keynesian welfare states, in Turkey the most significant passive policy, unemployment insurance, was introduced during the period in which ALMPs dominated labour market policies all over the world. Therefore, in Turkey it is not reasonable to talk about considerable shift from passive policies to active policies in the labour market. Therefore, Turkey has tried to incorporate the same active policies

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<sup>6</sup> Gülten Kazgan uses ‘tepeden inme ideoloji değişikliği’ in Turkish (2009, p.123)

into its labour market which has distinctive institutional history from the countries in which these policies emerged. Due to different institutional history, Turkey and particularly public employment institution as the main implementer of these policies did not have the legal and institutional structure required for the implementation of the ALMPs. This creates the inappropriateness between these policies and the structure of the Turkish labour market which required the restructuring of the public employment institution in line with the necessities of the implementation process of the ALMPs. Alongside the lacking necessary infrastructures for the ALMPs, public employment institution was also inappropriate to the needs of flexible and deregulated labour market. Therefore, Turkish public employment institution was restructured in line with the overall neoliberal understanding in 2003. However, this restructuring in institutional, legal and organizational structure of the institutions has still infrastructural defects for the proper implementation of the ALMPs particularly vocational training courses which is the focal point of this thesis, which leads to deadlocks in the implementation process.

Briefly, the implementation of the active labour market policies could not produce the expected policy output in Turkey. This is because; firstly, Turkey has never been a fully institutionalized Keynesian welfare state and the Turkish labour market has already been flexible. Therefore, policies for labour market flexibility originated from Keynesian welfare states provide the legitimization of the existent flexible labour market in Turkey. In this regard, active labour market policies as one of the main complementary of the flexible and deregulated labour markets ease the legitimization of the existent labour market. Even in the Keynesian welfare states, as raised earlier, active labour market policies serve primarily to the consolidation of the flexibility in the labour market rather than enhancing employability. Secondly, as discussed before, while the flexible and deregulated service provision process brought about by neoliberalization makes the monitoring of the service provision more difficult, as will be discussed in detail later, the provision of the active labour market policies have been marketized in Turkey. Therefore, there have occurred

policy deadlocks in the implementation process due to lack of adequate monitoring. Besides them, in Turkey active labour market policies began to be implemented in absence of the necessary institutional, legal and organizational infrastructures therefore the design of the implementation structure is distorted, which also generates policy deadlocks. As a result, inefficient and ineffective policy environment emerges in the provision of vocational training courses.

In order to examine these deadlocks emerged in the implementation process; the next section will give a brief account of the restructuring of Turkish public employment institution.

### **3.2 Restructuring of Public Employment Institution in Turkey<sup>7</sup>**

Turkish Job Placement Agency (İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu) or the İİBK (hereafter) was established in 1946 in order to combat unemployment and increase the employment standards. The legal base of this agency was Labour Law numbered 3008 which for the first time defined ‘labour-employment exchange’ as public service and it forbidden launch of private employment offices (PEOs). In the period between the establishment of Turkish Job Placement Agency in 1946 and 1980, which is denoted as ‘The Classical Period’ (İŞKUR, 2011, p.2), İİBK had considerably focused on sending workers to foreign countries due to growing labour force requirements of European countries especially Germany. Increasingly more and more workers had been sent to these countries between 1960 and 1973 via this institution. The total number of workers sent to foreign countries by İİBK during this period was 790.289 (İŞKUR, 2011, p.7). However, the structural crisis in the 1970s profoundly decreased the labour force requirements of European countries hence the number of workers sent to these countries had declined even it almost came to a halt in 1980s. So, during the classical period, the focus of İİBK was not domestic labour

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<sup>7</sup> The following part is considerably based on İŞKUR. (2011). *İŞKUR from Past to Present, 1946-2011*. Ankara: İŞKUR.

market. In Turkey until the late 1970s, domestic job placement service was not key function of İİBK.

By 1980s, in line with the neoliberal transformation of the economy and the labour market, Turkish Job Placement Agency started to change itself from an institution mainly sending workers to foreign countries towards an institution implementing policies for adopting labour force to changing conditions of the market. In this regard, alongside its existent functions, agency was assigned new functions “such as compiling, analysis and publishing the labour force market data, increasing the employability of labour force, developing programs in the frame of active and passive labour force policies” (İŞKUR, 2011, p.24). However, until 2000, the implementation of these policies had remained limited due to inadequacies of agency’s organizational capacity. Adjustment of İİBK to contemporary developments in economies and labour markets has required re-structuring of the agency in line with the neoliberal principles in the context of new public management. Moreover, Unemployment Insurance Law numbered 4447 was passed and took effect in 1999. According to this law; Turkish Job Placement agency was assigned the duty of executing unemployment insurance, which required the re-structuring in the organization of İİBK. Additionally, both the accelerating European Union adaptation process and the requirement of Article 10 of the ILO Agreement numbered 88<sup>8</sup> intensified the need for re-structuring of the İİBK.

In this regard, Turkish Job Placement Agency was replaced by a new employment institution through a fundamental and comprehensive re-organization. New institution was named as ‘Turkish Employment Agency’ (Türkiye İş Kurumu) or the İŞKUR (hereafter). This change was based on the Decree Law dated 4 October 2000 and numbered 617. This decree however was abrogated by Constitutional Court in 8 November 2001. As a result of this, the İŞKUR lost its legal infrastructure and it had to fulfil its functions and duties without a legal basis. In order to remove this lacunae

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<sup>8</sup> Article 10 of the ILO Agreement numbered 88 on Establishment of Job Placement Services was approved by Turkey in 1949 for conferring place to social parties in management of the agency.



in law, in July 2003 a new law was legislated. This new law initiated the ‘Re-Organization Period’ of the agency (İŞKUR, 2011, p.24). Thanks to Turkish Employment Agency Law numbered 4904, the legal status of Turkish Employment Agency was clarified as affiliated institution of Ministry of Labour and Social Security and defined as a “public organisation subject to private laws, legal entity and autonomous both administratively and financially” (İŞKUR, 2011, p.25). This law has also brought about a large scale transformation in duties and functions of the İŞKUR. Within the regard of this transformation, besides its function as traditional job placement function, Turkish Employment Agency Law numbered 4904 assigned also such functions and duties to the İŞKUR<sup>9</sup>;

- Establishment of National Employment Policy
- To create labour market information system
- To improve the quality of labour force and on the job training
- To give career counselling services
- To apply vocational enhancement measures
- To practice job creating measures
- To support for setting up a business
- Work programs for public benefit
- Unemployment Insurance
- Compensation of job loss (İŞKUR, 2011, p.25)

The re-structuring of the İŞKUR was not limited to these changes. As mentioned before the responsibility for execution of the unemployment insurance was assigned to Turkish Job Placement Agency before re-organization of the agency. After the replacement of İİBK by the İŞKUR, in order to provide financial resources for fulfilment of the duties about unemployment insurance, Unemployment Insurance Fund was established, and the İŞKUR was authorized to manage this fund.

Moreover, for the purposes of using resources more efficiently, determining local needs properly and increasing the pace of services, in the context of new law the organizational structure of the agency was localized through terminating Regional Directorates and establishing Provincial Directorates (İŞKUR, 2011). With the entry of this law into force, in the frame of increasing significance of the social dialogue

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<sup>9</sup> Article 3 of the Turkish Employment Agency Law numbered 4904.

and the ILO requirement, social parties started to join into the management of the İŞKUR. In this regard, the representatives of main actors of labour market namely workers, employers, and vocational institutions (merchants and craftsmen) have begun to take place in General Board, Executive Board and Provincial Employment and Vocational Education Boards (İŞKUR, 2011).

Furthermore, in the context of neoliberal free market logic and delimited state intervention, all over the world, a tendency towards transferring job placement services to private sector has emerged and became concrete with the adoption of ILO Convention No.181 on Private Employment Agencies in 1997, which initiated a movement to remove public monopoly in job placement services (İŞKUR, 2011). As a reflection of these developments, the prohibition of establishing private employment offices (PEOs) was annulled by the Turkish Employment Agency Law. From this time, the number of PEOs has been rapidly increased. However, this increase has not decreased the role of the İŞKUR in job placement services because the İŞKUR and PEOs are addressing to different segments of labour force.<sup>10</sup> While the İŞKUR is usually serving to disadvantaged groups and low-skilled, less-educated labour force (generally blue collar workers), PEOs are mostly concentrating on more qualified, high-skilled labour force (white collar workers).

Within the frame of transformation in the duties of the İŞKUR, active labour market policies (ALMPs) have gained considerable significance. Alongside the implementation of passive labour market policies (unemployment insurance, short-time working benefit, job loss compensation, wage guarantee fund), the İŞKUR has specified the implementation of ALMPs as its major mission in order to upgrading the skills of labour force and facilitate their access to labour market.

Alongside the activation of those who are unemployed by enhancing their employability via active labour market policies and providing them with smooth transition to employment, the inactive portion of the labour force depending on social

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<sup>10</sup> Private employment offices are autonomous bodies from the İŞKUR.

assistances also must be gotten back to the labour market in the context of ‘workfare state’. As Jessop (2002b) points out, during the 1990s, to link social assistances to employment began to be emphasized and in this regard encouraging recipients of social assistance to work through active labour market policies and active search for job has become the norm. Then, encouragement of welfare beneficiaries to work has been transformed into obligating them to participate to trainings and to work. It is no longer easy to refuse participate into trainings or a job offered by public employment institution because non-participation is sanctioned by cutting social assistances and unemployment insurance. Within this context, in order to establish a connection between social relief system of Turkey and employment, an action plan namely ‘Action Plan Related to Making Contact between Social Relief System and Employment and Its Activation’ was accepted in 2010. In regarding to this plan, a protocol was signed between the İŞKUR and public institutions for social assistance; Social Security Institution (SGK), Ministry of Family and Social Policies (General Directorate of Social Aids and General Directorate of Child Services) and General Directorate of Foundations. According to this plan, individuals who are beneficiaries of social assistance or who apply to social assistance and the other members of their households who are in employable conditions are registered to the İŞKUR and provided the utilization of active labour market programs and employment services such as counselling and job placement thereby social assistances have been tied to active labour market policies and employment.

### **3.3 Active Labour Market Policies in Turkey**

Active labour market policies (ALMPs) as mentioned earlier began to be implemented during the 1990s in Turkey; however these policies have gained prominence during the 2000s. Before the restructuring of Turkish employment agency, mainly World Bank supported the implementation of ALMPs through projects and programs especially for the individuals became unemployed after the privatizations of state owned enterprises. During the 2000s, besides WB, European

Union has also supported the implementation of ALMPs through projects such as Active Labour Market Project and Operation on Promoting Women’s Employment. However, since the restructuring of the agency particularly after the beginning of resource transfer out of the unemployment insurance fund in 2009, ALMPs have been financed through the domestic resources. Table 5 shows the total spending on the active labour market policies.

**Table 5:** The amounts of spending on active labour market programs

<b>2006</b>	<b>27.974.000 TL</b>
<b>2007</b>	<b>29.672.000 TL</b>
<b>2008</b>	<b>35.511.000 TL</b>
<b>2009</b>	<b>306.366.000 TL</b>
<b>2010</b>	<b>392.644.000 TL</b>
<b>2011</b>	<b>408.597.000 TL</b>
<b>2012</b>	<b>1.102.864.000 TL</b>
<b>2013</b>	<b>984.200.000 TL</b>
<b>2014*</b>	<b>1.021.600.000 TL</b>

Source: 2015 Annual Program, 10<sup>th</sup> Development Plan (2014-2018).

\* Between January-August

In the context of active labour market policies, the İŞKUR has implemented Vocational Training Courses, On-the-job training programs, Disabled and Ex-Convicts Trainings and Rehabilitation, Entrepreneurship Training Programs, Work Programs for Public Benefits and Social Security Insurance Premium Incentives to employers when hiring trainees. Among these programs, vocational training courses have occupied the major place.

### **3.4 Vocational Training Courses in Turkey**

Vocational training is the principal tool of labour market policies of Turkey since its establishment. However, its structure has changed in time and today vocational training has a very fragmented and dispersed structure in Turkey. There are several public, private and civil society institutions serving in the field of vocational training. The vocational training courses of the İŞKUR are only a component of the vocational training. Technical and vocational high schools in the context of formal education

compose the major part of the vocational training. Besides these schools, vocational training has been provided through courses within the frame of non-formal education. In this regard, Ministry of National Education (MNE) organizes vocational training courses via apprenticeship training and public training centres (Halk Eđitim Merkezleri) in the context of life-long learning strategy. Moreover, local governments are authorized to organize vocational training courses according to Article 14 of the Municipality Law numbered 5393 and Article 7 of the Metropolitan Municipality Law numbered 5216 in the context of global decentralization tendencies. On this basis, great numbers of local governments provide vocational training programs. Besides them, there are also various private educational institutions, professional organisations with public institution status such as chambers of commerce and industry and civil society organizations such as foundations, associations servicing in the field of vocational training.

#### **3.4.1 Implementation: Decision Making**

Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards (İl İstihdam ve Mesleki Eđitim Kurulları) or the İİMEK (hereafter) were established in 2000 as an autonomous body of the İŞKUR in the context of decentralization tendencies in provision of public services and they have been authorized “to make labour market analysis to direct the labour market in line with local requirements” (İŞKUR, 2011, p.34). These boards are the major decision-maker about the vocational training in provincial level and their decisions are binding (İŞKUR, 2011). All decisions about vocational training such as curriculum, establishment of new branch in a technical and vocational high school or courses opened by the İŞKUR are made by these boards and they are also the main decision maker about financial issues. For example, in a province, the amounts fund required for vocational training courses of the İŞKUR are determined by the İİMEK of this province. According to the Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards’ Regulation about the working principles and procedures, under these boards, there are ‘Board of Directors’

composed of several members of the İİMEK as the executive organ of the İİMEK and ‘Audit Board’ to monitor the implementation of the vocational training and on-the-job training in their provinces. About these boards, a higher manager in Ankara Chamber of Industry or the ASO (hereafter) and also a member of Ankara İİMEK states that;

The Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Board (İİMEK) is the only decision-making mechanism at the provincial level, that is to say, the board has full authority regarding vocational education in Ankara. Many state powers are exercised through this board, which has the power to use resources, conduct analyses, prepare reports, and make all sorts of decisions. The board also has a ‘Board of Directors’, consisting of four members: provincial director of the İŞKUR, representative of Ankara Chamber of Industry (ASO), representative of HAK-İŞ Confederation, and a representative for the disabled. The board of directors carries out the technical duties of İİMEK and the board has a ‘Board of Auditors’ which has the authority to audit vocational education courses (Interview 26).

Even though the İİMEK was established through decentralization, the emergent structure is centralized because all authority to make any decision on the vocational training and to monitor the implementation is vested in the hands of these boards. That is to say while authority was given by İŞKUR from top to down, it has become the sole authority in provincial level and has become so powerful. Its authority fully covers the field of vocational training in a province.

These boards consist of representatives of social parties and public institutions present in the province such as the mayor, the provincial directorate of İŞKUR and Ministry of National Education and chaired by the governor (İŞKUR, 2011). However, although the policy making process was rendered representative, this representative structure has not worked effectively because of the inadequateness of active participation of the members. In this regard, a higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR points out that;

Social parties take place in the board of directors of the İŞKUR and in İİMEK but both the board and the İİMEK have an awkward structure. The representatives of the social parties do not internalize. There is frivolity in everywhere. They are never participate into the decision making process. The

social parties remain too passive and as a result, the decision-making process is troublesome in the board (Interview 22).<sup>11</sup>

So, the decision-making process in these boards is dysfunctional due to the lack of active participation. Therefore, it can be said that introduction of the participatory structure does not always guarantee the active participation. In these boards, members only attend to the meetings but they do not have any voice on the decisions. The weight of the İŞKUR and the Ministry of National Education (MNE) is high in these boards; the offers of these institutions regarding any decision are approved by the members of the İİMEK. Therefore, rather than being a principal decision maker in a province, İİMEK serves as an approving authority of the decisions taken by the İŞKUR and the MNE. Thus, as the field research and the study of Mütevellioğlu and Aksoy (2010) shows, the boards meetings are mostly held perfunctorily. In this respect, the higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of the İŞKUR points out that;

The Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards currently meet only due to legal requirement. The agenda is prepared by the İŞKUR. No one even asks “Why did you do it this way?” People who attend the board just sit on their hands. They do not ask the İŞKUR “Why did you do this? Why is this done this way?” In Ankara, the most participatory member in this sense is the President of ASO. He makes his views known in every meeting, and makes contributions. I personally have not witnessed a lot of discussion taking place regarding the employment market. The board meets only as a formality. It does not work with attendees trying to get it over within half an hour or one hour. There are labour unions, academicians on the board, but I have yet to see an academic making a comment on any issue. No one contributes to the board. The boards have an unwieldy structure (Interview 22).<sup>12</sup>

Similarly, in the executive organs of the boards, decisions are taken without asking the members of the board of directors. In this regard, the higher manager in ASO and also a member of Ankara İİMEK states that;

The decision-making process is not healthy in the İİMEK. The board meets in every 3 months as a matter of procedure. There is attendance but there is no

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<sup>11</sup> The same observations are also repeated by the Interviewee 26.

<sup>12</sup> The same insights are also repeated by the higher officer in the department of active labour services (Interview 18).

participation. The board members just sign the decisions presented to them. Sometimes the board of directors takes a decision and issues an offer for decision without asking us and we are informed about that only in the meeting. We are also a member of the board of directors but they take decisions without finding it necessary to ask us. At least the documents should be passed formally from one to another even if we don't meet, our signatures must be taken, but they don't even do that. Therefore it is wrong to wait for productive results from the board. How could a board whose decision making mechanism is so problematic and which only meets as a matter of procedure provide the coordination and cooperation in a city? (Interview 26).

Likewise, a higher officer in Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries or the MESS (hereafter) and also a member of Ankara İİMEK expresses that;

The İİMEK organizes hundreds of courses. These courses are decided and approved without any serious background research. What usually happens is that the Ministry of National Education and the İŞKUR come up with a proposal to open a course, and we approve. I have been the representative of TİSK (Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations) for 8-10 years, but I cannot make a contribution to the Provincial Employment and Vocation Education Board. This Board mostly brings small business owners together, and it cannot integrate large industrial enterprises (Interview 31).

So, it is questionable to claim that members are unwilling to participate into the decision making process. The influence of İŞKUR and the Ministry of National Education is evident which may have an exclusionary effect on the active participation of the other members. Therefore, participatory structure does not always provide equal access with each member to impact the decision. Also, the governor is the principal actor in these boards, although the İİMEK is a decentralized body. About the role of the governor in the board, the higher officer in the department of active labour services states that;

İİMEK is not at a level we would like to see, which we repeatedly state as an organization. There are too many stakeholder organizations, but we cannot receive the same support from all of them. Each province has its own capacities, and decision-makers in provinces have very different perspectives on issues. If the governor of a province cares about the board, İİMEK can be very active. Governors have a major role to play in these boards (Interview 18).

The higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR explains the impact of the governor on the Ankara İİMEK. In his words;



Ankara İİMEK is usually not attended by the governor, and therefore is not taken very seriously. In the boards which the governor attends, everyone gets serious. When the governor is represented by his deputy, everyone just sits in their seats. The governor has a big influence on the board (Interview 22).<sup>13</sup>

The determinant role of the governor on the effectiveness of the board demonstrates that İİMEK is a loosely structured body because the functioning of the board is dependent on the attitude of the governor. In these boards, there are many representatives and the role of the governor would be a coordinator however in practice if the governor does not give importance to the board, it could not work effectively. Thus, the smooth operation of the board is under the heel of the governor. Because of this dependence of these boards in their functioning on the governor, İİMEK has a noninstitutionalized and loose structure.

Briefly, even though İİMEK was established through decentralization, all responsibility and authority to make decision on vocational training is vested in the hands of these boards thus they are so powerful bodies. The representative structure of these boards could not provide the active participation of the members. Thus, these boards are held only perfunctorily. The members attend to the meetings but not participate into the decision making process in which the weight of the İŞKUR and the Ministry of National Education (MNE) is high. This excessive influence of the İŞKUR and the MNE on the decision making may have exclusionary effect on the participation of the other members. In some cases, decisions in the board of directors could be taken without consulting to the members. Moreover, the governor is the determinant factor in the effectiveness of the İİMEK in the province. Therefore, while these boards are powerful and sole authority in the province regarding the vocational training, they are loosely structured bodies because their smooth functioning is dependent on the attitude of the governor. This situation of the İİMEK is resulted from the defects of the institutional design of these boards. In Turkey

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<sup>13</sup> Similarly, the higher manager in ASO and also a member of Ankara İİMEK states that; “Ankara İİMEK’de yönetimden dolayı sıkıntılar var. Vali yardımcısı vali adına başkanlık yapıyor ve onun tavrı kurul üstünde çok belirleyici oluyor” (Interview 26).

participatory structures and social dialogue have not yet consolidated even though Turkey shaped the structure of the İİMEK under the international influence through ILO requirement for conferring place to social parties in management of the agency<sup>14</sup> and the impact of EU on the increasing social dialogue in the public decision making process. Therefore, the decision-making structure of the İİMEK has not yet settled in Turkey as a result deadlocks emerged due to the defects of the institutional design, which posing dysfunctional decision making process.

### **3.4.2 Implementation: Service Provision**

As raised previously, vocational training has a fragmented and dispersed structure. Within the regard of vocational training courses excluding formal education institutions such as technical and vocational high school, several private, public and civil society organizations operate in the same field. This structure has decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of the vocational training because providers are disconnected and there is no complementary relation between these courses of diverse providers. That is to say all of them operate in the same field but there is no coordination and collaboration between distinct providers therefore this dispersed and fragmented environment results in waste of resources transferred to the vocational training courses.

In the field of vocational training courses, according to the report of World Bank, the vocational training courses of the İŞKUR have a dominant position (2013). Similarly, a member of the board of directors of the İŞKUR states that the İŞKUR came to dominant position and now plays a leading role in the field of vocational training courses (Interview 21). Therefore, it can be said that the İŞKUR has increased its impact in the field of vocational training, which shows that it tries to regulate this field.

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<sup>14</sup> Article 10 of the ILO Agreement numbered 88.

However, this dominant position of the İŞKUR has an obstructive effect on the other vocational training courses such as courses organized by public training centres (Halk Eğitim Merkezleri). The vocational training courses organized by the İŞKUR decrease participation into other courses because the İŞKUR pays a daily stipend of 20 TL<sup>15</sup> to all trainees participated into its vocational training courses and trainees' universal health insurance premiums and vocational accident and illness insurance premiums are paid by the İŞKUR. These payments have considerably increased the preference of courses of the İŞKUR than other vocational training courses. Ministry of National Education, local governments, other public institutions such as professional organisations and civil society organizations provide courses free of charge but they have not paid a daily stipend and any insurance premiums. By decreasing the participation into other courses, the vocational training courses of the İŞKUR lead to waste of the resources transferred to courses organized by other providers.

This fragmented and dispersed structure of the vocational training could be explicitly observed in the case of Ankara. Beside, the broad vocational training courses implemented by the İŞKUR; Ankara Metropolitan Municipality organizes vocational training courses in the name of the BELTEK in collaboration with Gazi University and the BELMEK for women. Metropolitan district municipalities also offer vocational training courses such as Çankaya Municipality and Keçiören Municipality. Alongside the courses organized collaboratively with the İŞKUR, public training centres (Halk Eğitim Merkezleri) offer diverse vocational training courses in Ankara. In addition to these courses, there are lots of private educational institutions, civil society organizations and professional organisations with public institution status giving vocational training courses for example Chamber of Engineers and Ankara Chamber of Industry are very active in provision of vocational training. It is safe to say that among these institutions regarding the vocational training, there is scarcely any coordination and collaboration and this has led to

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<sup>15</sup> For on-the-job training, minimum wage is paid to trainees.

waste of public resources. A higher officer in the Department of Active Labour Services in the İŞKUR states about this issue that;

Regarding the vocational education, there are multiple institutions which offer services to same people in the same field with the same purpose. (Public training centers, municipalities, etc.) For example, one goes to the vocational high school, a fund is transferred to that person for 4 years. If he graduates and gets a job, then there is no problem. If he goes to a university, a fund is also transferred in the vocational school of higher education. Then he registers to the İŞKUR, and we also transfer a fund through vocational training courses for 6 months. If he doesn't find a job, he goes to BELTEK, and a fund is transferred there as well. In other words, there isn't an integrated approach at all. In order to solve the problem of the vocational educational in Turkey, it is necessary to show a integrated approach and use the funds from only one source. Only one single fund must be used for one single person. Otherwise, the funds are wasted and unproductive vocational education is given. Now, several different funds are transferred to the same person but it doesn't provide the employment of that person (Interview 18).

As mentioned earlier, the obstructive effect of the İŞKUR's courses in the uncoordinated environment also increases the waste of resources. According to the head of the Life-long Learning General Directorate in Ministry of National Education, due to the daily stipend paid by the İŞKUR, public training centres could not fill their quotas for vocational training courses because people do not prefer their courses thus their courses realize in underperformance. He adds that in order to prevent waste of resources, public training centres must organize their all vocational training courses by collaborating with the İŞKUR because the İŞKUR and public training centres offer courses mostly on the same branches (Interview 36). However, although the İŞKUR makes collaboration with public training centres in the implementation of vocational training courses; it is dissatisfied with these courses because it is argued that these courses are not appropriate to the needs of the market. A higher officer in the Department of Active Labour Services in the İŞKUR explains this as;

Public training centers are institutions with which we cooperate very often but we don't support cooperation very much. We call the public training courses as trinket courses. The training is not given in the current occupations but given in ordinary occupations. Considering their own curriculum, it is normal because

they have to teach within the scope of a program. Because they don't have to ask whether the training has a return in labour market; they don't make a research about it, this because they don't have a duty to employ people. However we want to offer courses about more valid jobs. We don't want to train people in trivial jobs just because we organize courses without job guarantee requirement. Even if there is no job guarantee, we want to train people in occupations with which one can find easily a job in labour market (Interview 18).

So, lack of necessary coordination between İŞKUR and public training centres could be the conscious strategy of the İŞKUR. Likewise, a higher officer in the BELTEK expresses that the İŞKUR consciously does not endeavoured to make collaboration with the BELTEK and the higher officer in the Department of Active Labour Services accepts that İŞKUR does not make collaboration with the BELTEK due to high costs of organizing a course with the BELTEK. In their words;

We don't have any connection and cooperation with the İŞKUR right now and the İŞKUR does nothing to change this situation. Once, the İŞKUR demanded to organize a course with us. They have been saying that "let's do this with you together" for almost a year but we offer them a protocol draft, they say "we will get back to you", three months pass and they say "could please change there and send us back?". However they never complete and conclude it because they really don't want to cooperate. The İŞKUR doesn't want to cooperate with us because they want to get this service cheaper. We understand this attitude of the İŞKUR because they keep asking during the protocol "how much will it cost if we offer that much course?", or "how much will it cost if that much people attend the course?" and they attempt to lower the price. Our system is obvious, our administrative expenses are the same either one course is offered or ten courses are offered. Apart from that, the salary of the trainer and the cost of the consumable material also increase when the number of courses increases. Nevertheless, the İŞKUR wants to open courses with lower cost. There are a lot of limitations about protocols in the regulations. They look for the employment guarantee. However, we cannot accept that. We can't look for a job for the trainees. If the İŞKUR say that it will guarantee the employment of ten percents of the trainees, we will fill up the courses in three days (Interview 34).

We have made some negotiations with BELTEK but they don't want to guarantee the employment as a public institution. We can open the courses without job guarantee requirement with them, however, when we want to organize a course with BELTEK, we have to give more than fourth percent of the total expenses of the education to the Gazi University as working capital because BELTEK is associated to the Gazi University. Recently, we have calculated that approximately 100.000 TL of the total cost which is 184.000 TL is counted as administrative expenses which is going to be paid starting from the rector to the undermost civil officer. In fact, the real cost is 84.000 TL and

we don't want to give that much money. We do have opportunity to give but we don't want to, because this money will not go to the education; it is not spent to make the quality of the education higher. Ankara Metropolitan Municipality can pay this money to Gazi University (Interview 18).

On this basis, it can be argued that the orientation of the İŞKUR to get the service on the cheap or the cost calculation prevents the coordination with the BELTEK. However, the courses implemented by the BELTEK are successful in terms of training quality and therefore these courses are much sought after by people. According to the higher officer in the BELTEK;

Our courses are very much in demand. Our spots are quickly filled even though we do not pay the course attendants. We usually do not have any vacancies. The İŞKUR has many vacancies even though they pay a daily stipend to all trainees. Our courses are more popular than the İŞKUR's courses because we have highly qualified instructors, offer higher quality courses overall, and utilize the infrastructure of the university. Courses are taught by our instructors who are highly qualified. Even some professors teach in these courses. In addition, we have a very intensive program of applied education, and we have all the facilities required for applied education. We have had four different rectors in our university since the program was initiated, but the program continued in its original format. There have not been many ups and downs in the number of trainees over the years. In an institutionalized organization, change of administrators does not mean a change in operations. We have a well-established organization. The İŞKUR, on the other hand, does not have a well-established structure. With its BELMEK and BELTEK, Ankara Metropolitan Municipality is able to offer a more capable service than the İŞKUR. As a matter of fact, the municipality is able to offer a better service than a government agency tasked with this service (Interview 34).

So, even though the BELTEK courses have a better performance than the İŞKUR's vocational training courses, the İŞKUR puts aside the better performance because of its cost calculations. The underlying idea behind this cost calculation is the private sector orientation of the İŞKUR. This is directly related to the neoliberal logic of governance that private sector is prior to the public in terms of efficiency and service quality. However, in this case, the BELTEK is serving much better than the courses of the İŞKUR implemented via private providers but the private sector priority prompts the İŞKUR to push better performance into the background.

Therefore, it could be argued that lack of coordination between İŞKUR and other public institutions organizing vocational training in Ankara is the conscious strategy of the İŞKUR. Due to the perception of the İŞKUR about the inappropriateness of the public training centres' courses to the requirements of the market, the İŞKUR does not prefer to make collaboration with these institutions and the private sector orientation of the İŞKUR prevents the its coordination with the BELTEK.

However, in order to increase the cooperation, some attempts have been recently done. In this regard, some projects have been designed between various public institutions to provide coordinated vocational training. Specialized Profession Acquirement Centres (SPAC) Project / Skills'10 (UMEM Beceri'10) is the major example of these projects. Partners of UMEM are Ministry of Labour and Social Security/İŞKUR, Ministry of National Education/ General Directorate of Vocational and Technical Education, Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TOBB) and Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges-University of Economy and Technology (TOBB ETÜ). The main objective of this project is “to strengthen the relation between education and employment by providing some solutions for unemployment caused by the supply-demand incompliance in the labour force market” (Erol, 2012).

However, this partnership does not work properly. About UMEM project, the higher officer in the department of active labour services in İŞKUR states that;

We have a project called UMEM to offer an integrated approach to the vocational education. The Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) University of Economics and Technology, Ministry of National Education (MNE), the İŞKUR and the TOBB are the shareholders of the project. But things have not happened as we want. The purpose of this program is to train people in vocational high schools in association with work places, to provide with them to make practice in the work places, and then to employ them in these work places. TOBB University would do need analysis of this project. TOBB and ASO would make a contact with the companies. The İŞKUR would give the money and MNE would ensure the coordination. When you look it closely, it is an incredibly beautiful project. However the teachers at schools create virtual students to earn more money. They say to, for example, graduated students to hang out there. Then, when it is time for trainees to be employed,

trainees say “we have never talked about employment”. As a result, the project collapses. They don't take on responsibility completely; they pretend that they are taking this responsibility. TOBB and ASO can reach all industrialist and businessmen. We were going to employ one million people in total, and almost every work place was going to employ 1 person. However, because everything is on the shoulders of the İŞKUR, it is impossible to do all in one: to advertise the project, to find the school, to find the workplace and to find the trainee. Approximately 200.000 people were employed but when a link in the chain loosens, the system collapses. We were paying both the headmaster and the janitor in the schools which are associated t to the MNE, and they were opening courses to earn more money. In order to fix this situation, we have taken the major responsibility since 2014. Unfortunately, the integrated approach couldn't be established at all. (Interview 18).

So, the implementation process of the project could not be managed efficiently because deadlocks emerged in the implementation process. This is because of the lack of coordination and lack of clearly defined procedures for the project. Trainees do not know the procedures of the project before the beginning of the training. There is no monitoring on the implementation process and all partners do not carry out its responsibility. Thus, it can be said that there is frivolity in the implementation process. Therefore, even though this project was put into practice to provide collaboration in the field of vocational training, this multi-partnered structure collapses due to lack of coordination and clearly defined terms of agreement.

### **3.5 Summary of the Chapter**

During the 1980s all over the world labour markets began to be restructured in line with the neoliberal principles. In this regard, a considerable shift from the passive labour market policies towards the active labour market policies (ALMPs) came into sight. This shift is deeply associated with the transformation in the Keynesian Welfare states towards the workfare state. Within the context of workfare approach, living dependent on the welfare is not an option and everyone who is employable must work. Passive policies lead to labour market rigidities and disincentive to work therefore deregulation in the labour market is emphasized by the workfare approach. In order to provide re-integration of the unemployed and inactive portion of the labour force, their employability must be increased in this regard ALMPs have



central role. Therefore, workfare approach championed the active labour market policies instead of passive policies. ALMPs are also the complementary of the flexible and deregulated labour market because the flexible production equipped with high technology has required a flexible and skilled labour force in this regard improving employability of the labour force has gained prominence and also the improved employability functions as a security against the unemployment especially in the unsecured labour markets resulted from flexibility and deregulation. Within this context, as the way of enhancing employability, the active labour market policies came to the forefront in the labour market policies and replaced the passive policies.

However, in Turkey the shift in the social policy from welfare to workfare orientation has a different path because in Turkey there has never a fully institutionalized welfare state as the Keynesian welfare states. Before the neoliberal period, the Turkish labour market was already flexible and deregulated when comparing the Keynesian welfare states. However, although Turkey has a different institutional history from the Keynesian welfare states, from the 1980s onwards, policies similar to those of Keynesian welfare states began to be implemented. In other words, even though Turkey has never had a typical Keynesian order, the neoliberal order was exactly set by Turkey under the overwhelming influence (or conditionality) of IMF and WB. Active labour market policies (ALMPs) also began to be implemented within this context. However, for Turkey it is hard to mention about the replacement of passive labour market policies by the active labour market policies because until the introduction of the unemployment insurance in 2003, only severance payment was implemented as a passive policy and unemployment insurance was introduced during the period in which ALMPs has a domination in the labour market policies all over the world. Thus, the transformation of the labour market policies in Turkey does not follow the same road with the Keynesian welfare states. Therefore, Turkey has considerable inadequacies in legal and institutional infrastructures required for the implementation of ALMPs.

In spite of these inadequacies in the institutional and legal infrastructures of Turkey, the decisive implementation of the active labour market policies which are indeed prone to fail in the institutionalized Keynesian welfare states has brought about deadlocks in policy implementation process. In the context of vocational training, the provincial employment and vocational training boards (İİMEK) was established as a representative body under the international influence however this representative structure does not work efficiently due to the defects of the institutional design. Thus policy deadlocks emerge in the decision making process, which brings about ineffectiveness in the decision making. Likewise, the private sector orientation of neoliberal ideology shapes the attitude of the İŞKUR towards the coordination with the public institutions. According to neoliberalism, private sector is prior to the public in terms of efficiency and service quality. However, due to this private sector priority, the İŞKUR may ignore the better performance. In the case of Ankara, unlike the claims of neoliberalism, a public institution has a better performance than the private sector. However, the private sector priority prompts İŞKUR to avoid from cooperation with the BELTEK. Therefore, implementation of a policy regardless of its appropriateness to the situation leads to deadlocks in the implementation process, which produces inefficiencies and the implementation of the policy become dysfunctional.

Similarly, the contracting-out based implementation process of the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR have generates deadlocks in the implementation of these courses due to the defects in the design of implementation structure. As a result, these courses do not deliver the expected outputs because they lead to inefficient and ineffective policy environment. Thus İŞKUR could not serve to its original purpose of combating unemployment by enhancing employability of the labour force via these courses. In the next chapter, the emergence of the deadlocks in the implementation process of the vocational training courses of the İŞKUR were analysed through the case of Ankara.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESSES OF THE VOCATIONAL TRAINING COURSES OF İŞKUR: THE CASE OF ANKARA

Active labour market policies (ALMPs) as discussed before emerged as a profound policy tool within the context of neoliberal transformation of the labour market. These policies are recommended to the all countries by international organizations such as IMF, WB, OECD and ILO. In this regard, a shift from passive labour policies towards active labour market policies became common all over the world and public employment institutions reorganized under neoliberal principles during the 1980s have started to take an active role in the implementation of ALMPs.

In parallel to the international developments, in Turkey public employment institution underwent an organizational and managerial restructuring in line with the neoliberal principles (See Chapter 3) and also the İŞKUR has changed its method of service provision towards the marketization of service provision in the context of neoliberal logic of governance and contracting out (or subcontracting) has begun to be primary service delivery arrangement in the employment services. The underlying idea is to secure the service provision at the lowest cost and highest quality. Moreover, subcontracting provides flexibility in the policy implementation. In this regard, the İŞKUR contracts out employment services particularly active labour market programs to non-public organizations (for profit or non-profit). In this context, the İŞKUR creates a quasi-market to implement its active labour market policies especially the vocational training courses.

However, the subcontracting based implementation process of the vocational training courses generates deadlocks in the implementation process because of institutional capacity deficiencies of the İŞKUR and the private service providers.


#### **4.1 The Bases of Implementation Capacity: Fiscal Issues and Information**

For the implementation of the active labour market policies, the Department of Active Labour Services of İŞKUR is responsible. The Department of Active Labour Services has been executing ALMPs according to the Active Labour Market Services Regulation which went into effect in 2013. According to this regulation, in the provincial level, the responsibility to conduct active labour market programs belongs to the provincial directorates.

Among the active labour market policies implemented by the İŞKUR, the vocational training courses are the most common program (Interview 18). Vocational training courses have been organized since 1988 however these were limited due to financial and organizational inadequacies. During the period between 1993 and 1998, only 4358 training courses were conducted by the Turkish Job Placement Agency. After the re-structuring of the agency, resources allocated to vocational training courses have increasingly raised and also external resources used for these courses have been increased. Thanks to increased resource transfer, training courses have begun to increase (See Figure 1).

However, as seen in the Figure 1, the number of the vocational training courses has further extended after the ‘Employment Packages’. First employment package was explained in May 2008 and second one was explained in June 2009. These employment packages have paved the way for using unemployment insurance fund in the implementation of active labour market policies. This has considerably increased the resources transferred to training courses. Therefore, the service procurement process has accelerated ‘by minimizing bureaucratic obstacles related to sourcing’ (İŞKUR, 2011, p.38). Accordingly, a higher office in the department of active labour services in İŞKUR states that;

The most important incident about the transformation of the İŞKUR is the transfer of this fund because if you have money, you can do everything (Interview 18).



**Figure 1:** Number of Vocational Training Courses

Source: İŞKUR<sup>16</sup>

Thanks to resources transferred from unemployment insurance fund, the number of training courses and trainees has rapidly grown after the 2008. While the total amount of courses during 6 years period between 2002 and 2008 was 3010 and the amount of total trainees was 64.674, between 2009 and 2014 1.111.598 trainees participated into 111.289 courses (İŞKUR). Particularly after 2011, the most drastic developments have realized, this is deeply associated with that even though resource transfer out of the unemployment insurance fund began in 2009, the legal infrastructure about the usage of the financial resources has been consolidated from the 2012 onwards (Interview 18). The consolidation of legal infrastructure has been stimulating the increase in the number of courses and trainees since 2012.

Although external resources and the İŞKUR's budget were used before, these programs have been financed completely through resources transferred by unemployment insurance fund since 2009. Accordingly, a higher officer in the department of active labour services in İŞKUR expresses that;

<sup>16</sup> Drawn by the writer by basing on İŞKUR, 2011; Annual Activity Report, İŞKUR, 2009-2014. The data about the years 1999, 2000 and 2001 are unavailable.

Before 2008, we financed the vocational training courses through the resources from our budget therefore the number of courses was low. Since 2009, we have not get resources from the budget for the courses, all resources used for the vocational training courses are domestic resources which are allocated out of the unemployment insurance fund. Now, there is no European Union fund used for the vocational training. If we make a project with EU, fund is transferred from EU but there is now no Project with the EU (Interview 18).

In regarding to the usage of these resources transferred from the unemployment insurance fund, the provincial directorate is responsible. To account the required budget, the provincial directorate tries to determine the needs of the province. In this regard, the provincial directorate makes ‘Labour Market Needs Analysis’ or ‘Demand Analysis’ by contacting with the work places employing 10 or more people through Job and Occupational Counsellors. A higher officer in the department of active labour services in İŞKUR explains need analysis as such;

We conduct labour market research under the name of need analysis, but even that is not sufficient because labour market research provides a snapshot of a given period, whereas the labour market has a dynamic structure, subject to changes on a daily basis. We gather the concrete demands of employers. There are also umbrella organizations, chambers, exchanges, chambers of commerce and industry, associations, foundations, labour unions etc. that are major actors in the labour market, and these organizations also express the needs in their sectors. Provincial directorates conduct research on the courses to be offered, based on market research, data on the demands of the different sectors, and demands directly expressed by the employers. A full need analysis was conducted in seventy four provinces in 2014, that is to say, all workplaces with ten or more employees were identified using the records of TÜİK (Turkish Statistical Institute) and SGK (Social Security Institution). All workplaces are visited by job and occupation counsellors, who have questionnaires with them to be filled. They ask the firms questions such as “Do you have any open positions?”, “What are your future needs?” and “What qualities do you require in your employees?”. We have a response rate of eighty to ninety percent. In other large provinces, such as Ankara and Istanbul, we draw samples. Last year about 130.000 workplaces were visited, and more than 110.000 responded. Most of those that we could not reach were either closed because their records were not updated, or were inactive companies that exist on paper only. This survey is conducted twice a year. One is very comprehensive and conducted at the local level, the other one is national in character and conducted with a smaller sample size of 10,000-15,000 (Interview 18).

So, it can be argued that the İŞKUR makes a great effort to have its finger on the pulse of the labour market. However, the interviewees from the private sector state that these analyses are made slapdash because in the regard of the analysis, only questionnaires are filled out and there is no control about how this questionnaire is filled out (Interview 6; 7; 8; 10; 12; 17; 34). Most of the private sector firms fill out the questionnaire quickly and perfunctorily. According to the human resources manager in a furniture firm;

The İŞKUR's job and occupation consultant occasionally visits and asks us to fill a questionnaire, but we usually do not have the time thus fill them in a slipshod manner. Sometimes they just send the questionnaire, it just sits there for days, and we fill it at the last minute. Other than that, there is nothing done to identify the needs (Interview 8).

Likewise, the higher officer in Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries (MESS) and also a member of Ankara İİMEK notes that need analysis by visiting workplaces remains on the paper. Private sector firms could not allocate time to the questionnaires or do not prefer. Therefore, he adds that the need analyses do not have sound footing. In his words;

It is debatable whether the results of the need analysis are scientific or not. The İŞKUR says they have made analyses, visited workplaces, and defined the courses needed, and we approve, but it is not clear how the need for this course is identified. For example, there is a trade school in Çubuk, they suggest opening a course in there. Okay, but what measurements did you conduct to decide that this course was needed? It is as if either the provincial manager had a dream about it last night, or someone at the coffeehouse asked them "why not open this course", and this was the basis of their proposal. Unfortunately, this is how I think things are run. I have a feeling that the İŞKUR's meeting with employers one by one, and identifying their needs are mostly on paper. Sometimes we receive questionnaires from the İŞKUR or from the provincial directorate, and we forward them to the workplaces, but no one has the energy or the time to fill in 3-5 page questionnaires. This is why I do not think these surveys are really conducted (Interview 31).

So, it is questionable that the need analyses of the İŞKUR reflect the realities about the need of labour market. However, on the basis of these analyses, Annual Vocational Education Plan is prepared by the provincial directorates and presented to Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards for approval. The İİMEK

as the major decision maker on the vocational training could offer changes on the plan and add courses to open in the following year. However in order to open a training course in any occupation, there must be demand by the employers for the labour in this occupation which could not be filled by existing registered labour force of the İŞKUR. According to the legislation, no course can open without be specified by the annual vocational education plan and if any need occurs within the year after approval of the annual plan; the İİMEK could add training courses in the field of this need into the plan.

#### **4.2 Implementation: Service Provision**

As mentioned earlier, İŞKUR contracts out vocational training courses to non-public agencies. İŞKUR uses two methods in contracting out vocational training courses namely *tender* and *cooperation*. The service providers for both methods are indicated in the Active Labour Market Services Regulation as;

- Training and education institutions affiliated to Ministry of National Education
- Universities
- Private educational institutions and private firms established for the purposes of education and rehabilitation
- Private sector work places
- Associations and foundations
- Public institutions and organizations
- Professional organizations with public institution status
- Unions of workers, employers and craft man
- Banks and their organisations founded by special law and work places subject to them
- Private Employment Offices

Because of these varied providers, it is hard to provide standardization in the service provision. The İŞKUR prepared and implements a general regulation in order to provide service standardization however to develop one legal procedure to regulate all relations with different providers poses problems due to distinctive features of the providers. According to the higher officer in the BELTEK;



The İŞKUR has prepared a general regulation for courses, and thus it is unable to take into account the special qualities of the organization with which it will have a protocol. For example, we cannot provide employment guarantees, however since the regulation requires that an employment guarantee of at least 50 percent is provided for purchasing service, we cannot organize courses through service purchasing. It is very restrictive because they only have a general regulation. Thus, there is a need for separate regulations on the basis of the qualities of service providers and the courses offered, instead of a one-size-fits-all regulation. How could a university and a private employment office follow the same guidelines in service purchasing (Interview 34).

Even though the İŞKUR organizes the vocational training courses with all providers according to the general regulation, the Active Labour Market Services Regulation brings specific regulations about the two different methods of organizing vocational training courses.

In the context of the cooperation method, Public institutions and organizations (including state universities) and professional organizations with public institution status could open courses with at least 20 percent job guarantee requirement but these courses are limited to maximum 5 percent of budget allocated to the provincial directorate. The training and education institutions affiliated to Ministry of National Education such as vocational and technical high schools can organize courses merely via cooperation method and in these courses there is no job-guarantee requirement. However, these courses are limited to maximum 10 percent of budget allocated to the provincial directorate. Other types of service providers must provide at least 50 percent job guarantee to organize courses. For the courses organized via cooperation method, İŞKUR only pays daily stipend for trainees, universal health insurance premiums and vocational accident and illness insurance premiums of trainees, wage of trainer and equipment costs.

Within the regard of the tender method, provincial directorates are authorized to delimit the service providers in line with the characteristic of the training courses. Therefore, a provincial directorate could initiate a tender for the application of all types of service providers or of some of them. Provincial directorates make tenders through direct supply method according to Article 22 of the Public Procurement Law

numbered 4734. According to a higher officer in the department of active labour services,

We go out to tender for services. We have the opportunity of using direct procurement as per the public procurement law. Firms that meet the criteria make their offers. We use the security method. There are certain criteria defined in the regulations. Those meeting the technical criteria are then evaluated in terms of financial criteria, and a final ranking is created. We then send the trainees based on firms' quotas, depending on the number of suitable firms (Interview 18).

Public institutions and organizations (including state universities) and professional organizations with public institution status could open courses via tender method with at least 20 percent job guarantee requirement but these courses are limited to maximum 5 percent of budget allocated to the provincial directorate. All other service providers must provide minimum 50 percent job guarantee in regarding to tender methods. For these courses, İŞKUR pays daily stipend for trainees, universal health insurance premiums and vocational accident and illness insurance premiums of trainees and hourly cost of course for per trainee predetermined by the tender that includes all cost of service providers such as equipment costs, training field cost, wage of trainer and profit of service provider. Accordingly, a higher officer in the department of active labour services states that;

Training is provided by the service providers. We pay them on the basis of hourly cost per trainee. They are paid according to the unit prices specified on their offers, including all education related costs. We are not interested in details such as instructor costs, material costs, etc. We require full service, and we ask the service providers to provide employment to a certain percentage of the trainees, specified in the regulations (Interview 18).

In both methods, job guarantee requirements cannot be lower than the duration of training or at least 120 days for the courses shorter from 120 days and the required amount of trainees must be employed within 30 days following the date of course-end examination. According to Turkish Employment Agency Law numbered 4904, the responsibility for monitoring the implementation of vocational training course and job guarantee requirement in line with the regulation belongs to Audit Boards of Provincial Employment and Vocational Training Boards.

In regard to service providers, in the both implementation methods, the private sector has the largest share (See Table 6). The increased penetration of private sector into the sector is preferred by the İŞKUR with reference to idea that private sector provides services more efficiently than public sector. In their view, in order to save public resources, private sector is more preferred by the İŞKUR instead of public institutions. An employment expert in the department of active labour services of the İŞKUR explains the viewpoint of the İŞKUR as;

The private sector is more preferable because private sector uses resources more efficiently and more effectively. This is because the competition in which private sector operates provide to reach more efficient, more effective and more qualified outputs. Because the private sector is profit-seeker, it is more advantageous in organizing vocational training courses. The weight of the private sector in the provision of the courses is larger since it is more advantageous in using the public resources more efficiently and effectively (Interview 20).<sup>17</sup>

However, as seen in the Table 6, although the private sector providers have still the largest share, since 2013 there has been decrease in the share of the private sector providers and increase in the share of public sector providers.

**Table 6:** Distribution of Providers in Vocational Training Courses of the İŞKUR<sup>18</sup>

	2011	2012	2013	2014
<b>Private Sector</b>	<b>%53</b>	<b>%60,5</b>	<b>%66,21</b>	<b>%56,2</b>
<b>Public Sector</b>	<b>%37,1</b>	<b>%33,3</b>	<b>%31,85</b>	<b>%39,7</b>
<b>Civil Society</b>	<b>% 9,9</b>	<b>% 6,2</b>	<b>% 1,94</b>	<b>% 3,5</b>

Source: Department of Active Labor Services, İŞKUR.

This situation is directly related to the changes made in the Active Labour Market Services Regulation in 2013. With these legal changes, the priority of the İŞKUR

<sup>17</sup> The same observations are repeated by the member of the Board of Directors of the İŞKUR.

<sup>18</sup> These data shows the types of providers in the total courses implemented via tender and cooperation method for Turkey.

became the cooperation method instead of tender method (Interview 18). This shows that the İŞKUR is aware that contracting out via tender method could not bring the expected policy outputs. This is because deadlocks emerge in the policy implementation process of vocational training courses. The next section entails an analysis of the emergence of these policy deadlocks.

### **4.3 Policy Deadlocks in the Implementation Process**

As raised earlier, the inadequacies in the institutional, legal and organizational infrastructures result in the emergence of deadlocks in the policy implementation process. Accordingly, in the implementation of the vocational training courses, institutional capacity deficiencies of the İŞKUR and the private sector providers which have the largest share among the service providers (See Table 5) generate deadlocks in the implementation process. As a result, the İŞKUR could not reach the expected policy output. Within this context, firstly, the lack of the required institutional capacity of the private sector for the implementation leads to the deadlocks in the implementation process of the vocational training courses via the tender method. As a result, a dysfunctional thereby ineffective policy environment emerged. Secondly, through contracting out vocational training courses to the private sector, the İŞKUR generates a profitable economic field for private investment and these courses become a way of fund transfer to the private sector, which leads to waste of resources thereby inefficiencies in the implementation process. Thirdly, the İŞKUR provides incentives to the employers employing the trainees of the İŞKUR's courses. However, due to the inadequacies in the institutional capacity of the İŞKUR, deadlocks occur in the implementation of the incentives, which brings about the manipulation of these incentives by the private sector thereby creates inefficiencies in the implementation process. Therefore it can be argued that the defects in the institutional design of the implementation process of the vocational training courses obstruct to reach the expected policy output and this neoliberal mode of service delivery tends to create inefficiencies and an ineffective implementation environment, contrary to the expected outputs and outcome of the ALMPs.

### **4.3.1 Dysfunctional policy environment**

So far it has been argued that according to neoliberal perspective, state intervention into the economy leads to the decline in quality of services and waste of resources and public administration is in an ‘ungovernmentality crisis’ (Ataay, 2007, p.34). As a solution, restriction of the state intervention and penetration of the principles and means of the market into the economy are strongly advocated by neoliberalism. The direct outcome of this approach in the context of public services is to limit the provision of services by public authority (Ataay, 2007). The proposed solution is contracting out of public services to the private sector (Ataay, 2007). As mentioned earlier, in Turkey the implementation of vocational training programs has been devolved to the non-public agencies mostly to the private sector by the İŞKUR through contracting out.

For the courses implemented via tendering method, private service providers are obliged to go beyond their conventional area of activity (training). Alongside the provision of training, they are also responsible for selection of trainees, placement of trainees into the job and providing the maintenance of employment of trainees over the course of time predetermined by the active labour market services regulation. However, the concurrent fulfillment of these four tasks requires coordinated actions among different tasks and special implementation capacity is required for each of these four different tasks. That is to say, private service providers need having specific capacity and authority in order to carry out properly the tasks of selection of trainees, their job placement and providing the maintenance of their employment and they need policy coordination capacity for performing all these tasks at the same time.

However, private sector does not have necessary capacities and when the responsibility for these four tasks is transferred to the private sector, this lack of capacity and policy coordination has generated deadlocks in the system which has prompted private service providers to malpractices in fulfillment of these tasks.

Additionally, the İŞKUR could not properly monitor the implementation process of the vocational training courses because it has considerable deficiencies in the institutional capacity regarding the supervision and monitoring and also supervision of the implementation process of the courses is hard because for effective monitoring, the İŞKUR must assign an inspector to all private firms organizing the course. Furthermore, the contracting out provides flexibility to the providers in the implementation process, which creates a room for malpractices of the private service providers when coming together with the lack of effective supervisory capacity of the İŞKUR.

As a result, the malfunction of the system in the face of lack of capacity and policy coordination of the private sector has stimulated a dysfunctional thereby inefficient policy environment regarding the vocational training courses and due to the deficiencies in its monitoring capacity, the İŞKUR could not prevent this malfunctioning in the policy implementation.

#### **4.3.1.1 Selection of Trainee**

In vocational training courses implemented by the İŞKUR, some qualifications are required for the participation into the courses. These requirements are; ‘to be older than 15 years, primary school graduates, having appropriate qualities for the occupation they would make progress in, having the qualities required by the employer and being in the status of available unemployed’<sup>19</sup>that is to say being registered to the İŞKUR. For the vocational training courses implemented through tendering methods, as mentioned previously private educational institutions and private firms are obliged for selection of trainees for their courses. As the higher officer in the department of active labour services states, in order to help these institutions in selection of trainee, İŞKUR sends message to registered unemployed who might be interested in these courses. He adds that;

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<sup>19</sup> <http://www.iskur.gov.tr/en-us/jobseeker/courses.aspx>

For the vocational training courses, we as the Turkish Employment Agency send message to the registered people but actually we want from the service providers to find trainees (Interview 18).

So, the İŞKUR devolves a task which indeed the İŞKUR has to carry out to the private sector. Consciously, the İŞKUR do not help to the private institutions. However, selection process has some inconveniences so this task is not easy for private sector. Therefore, this process turns into the finding trainee instead of selection of trainee. The system of İŞKUR about registered unemployed persons does not work properly because İŞKUR could not always do necessary up-dates. Therefore, İŞKUR does not refer trainees to the courses run by the private institutions. The general director of a private education institution expresses that;

The İŞKUR supposedly sends messages to the job seekers on its records, but their system is half-dead, not even one person shows up. I have been doing this job for four years now, and not even one person showed up. If we are to have 100 trainees, for example, İŞKUR sends messages to 300 people, but they do not know if those 300 people want to work or not, or whether they are already employed. For example, I registered to the İŞKUR years ago, and still receive messages despite the fact that I own my own business for many years now, messages asking whether I would like to attend such and such course. They have a bad system. The İŞKUR also make announcements on its website, regarding courses offered, but no one shows up (Interview 33).<sup>20</sup>

Due to the fact that İŞKUR could not help private institutions; these institutions have to find all trainees off their own bat and in order to get their full progress payment, they are obliged to fill their entire quota. Therefore, they seek to find trainee from their neighbourhood. The general director of a private education institution states that;

We find the trainees using our own means, have them register with the İŞKUR, and then register them for the course. Therefore, no job seeker who is already registered with İŞKUR attends the courses. The course seems to be organized to train job seekers registered with the institution, but in fact we find the trainees and register them (Interview 33).

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<sup>20</sup> The same observations are also repeated by Interviewee 32.

Moreover, private institutions have to provide maintenance of the participation of trainees in courses throughout the training period in order to get their progress payment. The human resources manager of a catering firm expresses that;

You have to achieve a certain level of attendance. For example, if 100 people are registered, seventy percent of them need to attend. If the number of attendants drops below a certain point, you are required to fill the spots with new trainees, which is required to be able to get the final progress payment at the end of the course. If you fail to meet these criteria, you cannot get the progress payments, and a fine is imposed. We find the trainees on our own, because even though İŞKUR channels job seekers to us, almost no one from the İŞKUR shows up (Interview 12).

So, because the private institutions do not have the power of sanction to maintain the participation of the trainees, they have to continue to the task of finding the trainee during the period of training. Because this task is hard for these institutions without the help of the İŞKUR, private institutions keep the age range of trainees wider in order to find trainees more easily. As the specialist in Ankara provincial directorate of the İŞKUR explains, private institutions are allowed to determine the age limit to be trainee for their vocational training courses. The İŞKUR determines only lower age limit as 15 years. Therefore, because the private institutions gain money according to the number of the trainee, they try to increase their trainees by keeping age range wider thereby they can easily find more trainees.

Accordingly, interviewee 33 and interviewee 32 who are both director of a private education institution accept that they have to register old-aged people as the trainee to fill their quota and get their entire progress payment because İŞKUR do not provide assistance in finding trainee and so they have considerable difficulty in doing such. Interviewee 32 states that;

We have great difficulty in finding trainees. When no trainee from İŞKUR arrives, we find trainees from among our acquaintances and social circles. Otherwise, we cannot get our progress payments. Registration itself is not enough; these trainees also have to attend the course if we are to get our payments. Our trainees are mostly elderly people ages 55-60 (Interview 32).



Therefore, it could be argued the flexibility in the age range of trainees granted to the private institutions contradicts with the neoliberal idea of ‘employable labour force’ because private institutions manipulate this flexibility to earn more money by finding more trainees and accept the old-aged peoples as the trainee. These old-aged peoples do not want to work after training or firms do not prefer these people to employ. Therefore, while the reason behind the vocational training courses is to make the labour force more employable in order to reintegrate them into the labour market especially the young unemployed people, in Turkey the vocational training courses deviate from their this aim. Thus, the defect of the implementation structure of the vocational training courses generates a policy output contradictory to the target of the neoliberalism. While the expected policy output is to improve the human capital of the employable labour force especially of the young unemployed people, the policy outcome becomes the minor increase in the human capital of old-aged trainees which are unwilling to work or unpreferable by private firms to employ.

However, the higher manager in ASO and also a member of Ankara İİMEK points out that the İŞKUR is not complaining about the old-aged trainees even though it is seen as complainer because İŞKUR has to meet the performance criteria. Since these criteria are determined upon the number of trainee and number of course, İŞKUR is only interested in increase of trainees rather than their ages. In his words;

In almost all the courses, providers work with the minimum criteria for trainees. Because they earn their money based on the number of trainees, finding trainees is very important for them. Thus, any unemployed person is acceptable. If they were to use age criteria, for example, finding trainees would be even more difficult, and they would face the risk of failing to fill their quotas. The İŞKUR itself has difficulty meeting annual performance criteria, thus they do not complain about training courses not requiring additional criteria. This way, the number of trainees increases, and they meet their performance criteria. This is why there are no additional criteria, both the İŞKUR and providers are content with the single criterion of being unemployed (Interview 26).

So, it can be said that while the İŞKUR is implementing a neoliberal policy, indeed it does not care the neoliberal orientation regarding the creating an employable labour force. However, the driving reason behind this indifference of the İŞKUR is the

performance orientation of the neoliberal logic of governance. Therefore, the İŞKUR aims to meet performance criteria regardless of how.

Besides old-aged trainees, those who do not want to work are also accepted as trainee by private institutions. Because private education institutions have to find trainees on their own due to inadequacies or conscious strategy of the İŞKUR regarding finding trainee from registered unemployed, they accept almost all people regardless of that they want to work or not. Therefore, generally those who really aim to work do not participate in courses. The impact analysis of World Bank regarding vocational training courses implemented by İŞKUR reveals that trainees are unwilling to work therefore they do not search for a job or accept jobs offered them (WB, 2013). Their aim is only to get daily stipend (20 TL) paid by İŞKUR. In other words, most of the trainees participate in courses for money rather than enhancing their skills and finding a job (Interview 33; 32; 22; 26; 18). Trainees thus are mostly composed of housewives. This situation is known as ‘housewife effect’ (Ibarra, 2005 cited in Aguayo, 2007, p.8). According to the general director of a private education institution;

Most trainees are local housewives rather than real job-seekers registered with İŞKUR. This is why most trainees are female. ... We have 50-60 year old housewives, with zero previous job experience, registered in our courses. Would they work once the course is over? Even if they wanted to work, would anyone hire them? These women are glad to get the monthly 400 TL stipend, 20 TL a day, and they ask to be notified when another course is organized, but they have no intention of working when the training is over. ... About 95 percent of the trainees do not work following training. They are not here for job preparation anyways, they are after the 20 TL daily stipend. The remaining 5 percent, on the other hand, do not register with the intention of working once the course is over, but decide to do so in order not to waste their certificates (Interview 33).

So, even if it is nominal, there occurs an opportunity to get rent for the trainees. Thus, the trainees mostly participate in courses for this rent acquired via daily stipend paid by İŞKUR.

On the basis of these findings of field research, it can be argued that the transfer of responsibility of the task of selecting trainee to the private sector resulted in malfunctioning in this selection. It is resulted from lack of capacity of private institutions to reach potential trainees. For profit maximization through filling up their quotas, private institutions try to find trainee from their neighbourhood and have to accept old-aged and persons unwilling to work as trainee. These persons participate in courses for daily stipend paid by İŞKUR instead of employment. Indeed, expectation for private institutions to perform this task properly is unrealistic because even though İŞKUR has a capacity to reach potential trainees from its pool of registered labour force, it cannot or consciously does not provide trainees to these institutions. The İŞKUR devolves a task which indeed it has to carry out to the private sector. Within the context of deficiencies in the institutional capacities of private institutions, it is almost impossible for these institutions to find trainees.

#### **4.3.1.2 Job Placement**

Vocational training courses implemented through tender method as mentioned before have job guarantee requirement. Both private firms and private education institutions have to provide at least 50 percent job guarantee for a predetermined period (cannot be lower than the duration of training or at least 120 days for courses shorter than 120 days) to get the tender. As will be discussed later, there is an intense competition between firms and education institutions to get the tender due to high profitability in the field of vocational training courses. This competition prompts firms and education institutions to make a commitment for providing job placement more than 50 percent. In regarding this, according to a higher officer in the department of active labour services;

The competition in the tenders of vocational traditional courses is so severe. A lot of private firms incorporate into the tenders and in order to win the tender, they promise to give up to 80 percent job guarantee. They take great risks (Interview 18).

Private firms could employ trainees in their workplaces but private education institutions have to find workplaces to employ trainees. Job placement function which normally belongs to public employment agency is transferred to the private education institutions. As private employment offices, education firms try to find job for their trainees. Therefore, they have to function as shadow private employment offices. However, private employment offices carry out job placement function through their connections with firms and companies. Official PEOs collect knowledge about vacant jobs and employ unemployed persons to vacant jobs suitable their skills and qualifications. Unlike PEOs, private education institutions do not have connections with private firms, capacity to access vacant jobs and personal to coordinate job placement of trainees. Therefore, while private education institutions are expected to function as private employment office, they could not perform this function properly due to lack of capacity. Nevertheless, in spite of their incapability, these institutions have to employ their trainees. In this context, in most cases, they seek to employ trainees in workplaces which they have connection with and mostly fire trainees after finish of legal period. When they could not find workplaces to employ trainees or as mentioned previously, most of the trainees do not want to work, in order to provide job guarantee requirement, private education institutions pays only social insurance premiums of trainees as if they are working in practice without employing them. According to the general director of a private education institution;

We have become a sort of sub-contractor of the İŞKUR, looking for jobs for our trainees. People started to think of us as employment agencies, companies call us asking whether we have personnel with such and such qualifications. Cooks and waiters have an easier time finding jobs, but sometimes there are groups having difficulty finding jobs, which is a lot of trouble for us. For example, assistant accountants are difficult to place in a job. The employment guarantee clause requires that the social security premium of this person is paid for a minimum of 120 days. So what do we do? We have an acquaintance to hire the person for 4 months, we pay the premiums whether she/he works or not, and fire her/him at the end of 4 months. ... Everyone knows some company that is willing to do this, they hire the graduates on paper, and let go after 4 months. We have to submit hiring documents to the İŞKUR, they check the premiums

using the Turkish ID number, and it is enough for them if 120 days of premiums are paid (Interview 33).<sup>21</sup>

Trainees accept the payment of their social security premiums without working in practice because they already do not want to work. Most of them participate in courses for getting daily stipend paid by İŞKUR. In this regard, the human manager of a food firm state that;

We hire the İŞKUR trainees so that our acquaintances can meet their employment requirements, but the trainees do not work, they say “Just pay the premiums, we will not work”. They say they only want their premiums paid, nothing else. To the training company, they say “You don’t have to pay us, just get us insured, in turn you will get your quota filled” (Interview 7).

So, it could be argued that contracting out provides flexibility in the service provision but under the environment of inadequate monitoring capacity of the İŞKUR, flexibility creates ambiguity in the implementation process and both the private institutions and the trainees take the advantage of the defects of the institutional design of implementation of the courses.

The İŞKUR is also aware of these malpractices of the private education institutions. The higher officer in the department of active labour services admits that some private education institutions only pay social security premiums of trainees in order to show them as if they are employed. However, in spite of the awareness of the İŞKUR, these malpractices continue. Thus, it is evident that the İŞKUR has considerable deficiencies in its supervisory capacity. In his words;

There are too many firms making it look like their trainees are employed, simply by paying their social security premiums. We impose serious fines when they are caught (Interview 18).<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, in the case of failure to find workplaces to employ trainees, private education institutions seek to negotiate with private firms on the basis of making payment to them. Education institutions pay social security premiums of trainees via these private firms and in return for this, private firms get money from education

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<sup>21</sup> Same observations are also repeated by the Interviewee 31, interviewee 32 and interviewee 26.

<sup>22</sup> Interview 18

institutions. Therefore, education institutions have informal networks with several private firms and they seek to discharge their job guarantee requirement via these firms. In this context, devolution of a public function (job placement) to the private sector creates an opportunity to get rent for private firms. The owner of a catering firm states that;

We know each other for a very long time, I and the owner of X education institution. We also do business with his wife. He has been offering the İŞKUR courses for years. I hire the trainees who graduate from his cooking course, but sometimes, when I do not have open positions, I hire them on paper, and he pays their premiums for 4 months as if they were working, then we terminate employment. Many of the trainees who are actually hired do not want to work, only about 3-4 of them keep working, the rest are let go at the end of 4 months. ... We are very old friends, there is no question of payment between us, but I know that he sometimes pays other companies to get his trainees employed. He has to, I mean, how else do you find jobs for all the accounting trainees, cashier trainees, etc. The other company also makes some money. At the end of the day, it is willing buyer willing seller, everyone is happy. The trainees are also happy, for they get four months of their premiums paid, without even working (Interview 9).<sup>23</sup>

Besides these practices, some private education institutions establish front companies in order to provide job placement over these companies. The director of administrative and financial affairs of a private education institution talks about several private education institutions establishing front companies (Interview 32) and the human resources deputy manager of a food company expresses that he has heard some front companies established by private education institutions. In his words;

Private education institutions have to get their trainees employed; sometimes they come to us as well, asking whether we are looking for workers. However, it is very difficult to place the trainees, because how could they visit all the companies and find empty positions? The İŞKUR cannot help either, since companies do not report their empty positions to the İŞKUR. This is why they establish shell companies sometimes, registered under someone else's name, to meet the employment guarantee requirement. I know many such companies. I heard that many of them only pay the premiums (Interview 14).

Depending on these findings, it can be discussed that the transfer of responsibility for job placement function to the private sector via job guarantee requirement prompts

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<sup>23</sup> Similar observations are repeated by the Interviewee 33.

the private education institutions to some malpractices because the İŞKUR expects from these institutions to perform as if they are public employment agency or private employment office. While PEOs have capacity regarding organization and staff to get information about workplaces demanding labour force and vacant jobs in order to fulfill job placement function, public employment agency in addition to capacities of PEOs has an authority to oblige firms for employment and power to use incentives for job placement. Moreover, it is argued that in the provision of job placement services economies of scale is determinant (Mosley & Speckesser, 1997). However, private education institutions are lack of these capacities and authorities and also they are mostly small scale organizations. In order to carry out job guarantee requirement, they generally employ trainees in workplaces with which they have connections and mostly they only pay trainees' social security premiums as if they are working. Because trainees do not already aim to work after training, they accept payment of their social security premiums without working during the legal period. Whether they are really working or not, trainees are fired after the legal predetermined period. Therefore, as the higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate states, only about 10 percent of trainees employed by private education institutions work after the legal predetermined period (Interview 22). Because İŞKUR is only interested in employment of trainees during the legal period, it does not check whether trainees work or not after the finish of the legal period. A higher officer in the department of active labour services explains this as;

After the finish of the program, it is checked that whether the trainees are employed during the 120 days or not. Until this time, we have not monitored that whether the trainees are employed after the finish of legal time or not and whether they are fired or not (Interview 18).

Likewise, the general director of a private education institution discusses that İŞKUR do not monitor employment of trainees after the legal period.

When you take employment documents to the İŞKUR, they will only check if 120 days have passed. They will not even ask why there was a mass firing of trainees on day 121 (Interview 33).<sup>24</sup>

This is because İŞKUR determines performance criteria as mentioned previously over the number of trainee and number of course thus it measures its success according to these criteria. In recent years, employment of trainees has been also added to performance criteria. However, employment is measured via launching of social security insurance instead of duration of employment. This is deeply associated with the neoliberal logic of governance which prioritizes the output of the policy instead of the process. Therefore, the İŞKUR emphasizes the meeting the performance criteria instead of the impact of the policy. Within this regard, it is pointed out by a higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR that;

The general directorate sets its performance criteria based on the number of courses and trainees. From a distance, it looks very nice: this year our goal is to train 15,000 people, give them certificates, and place 50 percent of them in a job. However, there are no performance criteria regarding whether these people actually work, or whether they are employed on paper only, and then let go. Our goal is not to create permanent employment, but to offer a certain number of courses and provide training to a certain number of people (Interview 22).

Therefore, although İŞKUR tries to employ trainees through devolving job placement function to private education institutions by implementing of job guarantee requirement, this employment is temporary or perfunctorily because incapability of these institutions directs them to malpractices. In this context, devolution of job placement function to private education institutions only results in employment for a short time period or only payment of social security contributions of trainees during the legal period. It has no contribution on employment in the medium and long term. Similarly, the impact analysis of World Bank reveals that vocational training courses have a small impact on employment of trainees and this impact is statistically negligible or insignificant (2013).

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<sup>24</sup> Similar observations are repeated by the Interviewee 31.



Alongside the job placement, private education institutions are also responsible to provide continuance of the employment of trainees over the course of time predetermined by the active labour market services regulation. This task is more difficult than job placement because they have to monitor all trainees and if any trainee quits the job, private institutions have to convince them to work again or they have to find another trainee to work instead of him/her until the finish of the legal period. In order to carry out this function, private institutions must have a capacity to monitor all employed trainees and to find a new trainee rapidly in case of leaving the job. As mentioned before, trainees mostly do not want to work after training therefore they can easily quit the job when they do not like working conditions or wages or employers could be dissatisfied with trainees and could fire them before the finish of legal period. Therefore, turn-over is so high and to monitoring this and maintenance of employment with another trainees challenge private education firms. Even İŞKUR could not provide maintenance of employment after job placement; it is so hard for private institutions without capacities of İŞKUR such as monitoring and sanction power.

Within this context, to pay social insurance premiums of trainees rather than employing them becomes more preferable for private institutions. In this regard, they do not have to monitor whether trainees quit or continue to work and they are not obliged to find another trainees when some trainees quit to work or they are fired. According to the general director of a private education institution;

It is not sufficient to get the trainees employed; they also have to be employed for the duration equal to that of training. We place them in a job, and then they quit or are fired because of reckless behavior. We individually monitor every company where we have placed trainees. If they quit, we try to reach them again. We cannot reach most of them, or they do not want to work. It does not matter to the trainee, but I have to get this period completed. Otherwise I don't get my progress payments, and on top of that get fined because of failure to provide employment. This is why we prefer to get them employed on paper by paying their premiums until the mandatory period is over (Interview 33).

Likewise, the owner of a catering firm states that;

We help education institution X with their employment guarantee requirement, but some trainees quit after a while. They go to another place where the wage is 50 TL higher, or they are late to work, or do not work properly. We are in the catering business, we are always racing against time, and we cannot deliver lunch half an hour late. When this happens, we let them go, and the institution X has to find a replacement. Sometimes we do not like the replacement, or mostly they do not want to work. When the education institutions are in a lot of trouble, they choose to have a deal with a trainee to complete the period by paying their premiums only (Interview 9).

To summarize, on the basis of the findings of field research, it can be argued that tasks unsuitable to capacities of private institutions result in the deadlocks in the implementation process of the vocational training courses.

Private institutions do not have good general knowledge about the labour market like the İŞKUR which has connections with jobseekers and employers so has information about vacancies. Also because the İŞKUR has provincial directorates, it could gather information easily about local needs of labour market. However, private education institutions are obliged to fulfill tasks normally belongs to public employment agencies without such capacities of the İŞKUR. Thus, the transfer of responsibilities for selection of trainees, job placement and maintenance of employment to the private sector results in deadlocks in the implementation process because they could not discharge properly these tasks without necessary authorities and capacities to access to labour market information., Due to their inadequate organizational structure for realizing these tasks, private institutions tend towards malpractices to achieve these greater responsibilities. They are interested in only getting their full progress payments from the İŞKUR instead of providing persistent and stable employment of trainees because for private sector profit maximization could outweigh the social consequences of the service provision.

Also, the İŞKUR emphasizes outputs over the process of implementation of vocational training courses in the context of neoliberal logic of governance. In other words, the İŞKUR pays private institutions for outputs and is not really interested in what private institutions do for achieving these outputs that is to say from the view point of neoliberal logic of governance, the İŞKUR makes output-related payments

to the private sector. Lack of impact analysis of the courses shows the aim of the İŞKUR to meet performance criteria regarding number of course and number of placement of trainees into the job instead of sustained employment of trainees. Therefore, İŞKUR knows little about what happens to the trainees after the legal period. Moreover, İŞKUR do not commensurately scrutinize the behaviour of private institutions to triumph black box that is an area İŞKUR has no idea about how private institutions fulfill the tasks transferred to them by İŞKUR. This insufficient monitoring provides high degree flexibility for private institutions in how they realize these tasks. Additionally, taking into consideration the flexibility provided by the contracting out, a deregulated environment emerges in the implementation process of the vocational training courses due to lack of sufficient supervision, which creates a room for the malpractices of private education institutions. The purpose of the vocational training courses for enhancing the employability of the labour force and their integration into the labour market could not be achieved by the İŞKUR. However, while the İŞKUR cannot serve to its original purpose, it generates a profitable field of activity to the private sector.


#### **4.3.2 Generating Profitable Field of Activity for Private Sector**

As discussed earlier (See Chapter 2), during the late 1960s and 1970s, the profitability of the capital plunged and this decline resulted in 1970 structural crisis. Neoliberalism emerged as a project of capitalist classes to restore their profitability and power after eradication of several decades. Because one of the ways of overcoming the profitability crisis has always been generating new profitable areas for capital or creating new markets, as Gilbert points out, new institutional framework emerged after 1980s i.e. neoliberalism has led to opening up new markets for the private sector (1999) and this has brought about penetration of profit maximization into the every sphere of activities previously regarded as non-economic. In this regard, neoliberal policies of state withdrawal from the production and service provision have provided new sources and profitable areas to be exploited

by the capital. State withdrawal from the employment services is one of the significant examples of generating profitable assets for the private sector. To this regard, Ataay states that transfer of public service provision to the private sector has paved the way to ‘commodification of public services’ so that public services which were free from capital accumulation logic have been functioned as economic field for capital valorization (2007, p.21).

In this context, in Turkey as mentioned earlier establishment of private employment offices were allowed and İŞKUR has devolved the implementation of active labour market programs to non-public organizations through contracting out. While as it is stated by the member of the board of directors of the İŞKUR, the increasing frequency of private sector involvement in provision of job placement services and active labour market programs is advocated for higher quality of service provision due to higher responsiveness of private sector to the demand and needs of individuals and most significantly for the economic efficiency thereby preventing the waste of public resources (Interview 21; 19; 20), indeed İŞKUR unintentionally or intentionally creates a new profitable field of activity for the private sector to invest in Turkey.

In the regard of public employment offices (PEOs), a very profitable sector which has been increasingly expanding by varying its services such as introducing worker leasing (temporary employment) was created in 2003 through allowing establishment of PEOs (Sayın, 2002). Because the statistics of the total revenues of PEOs in Turkey is not kept by İŞKUR or TUIİK, the global total revenue of PEOs could be used to provide some insight about the expansion of the size of this sector under neoliberalism. While the total revenue of all private employment offices in the world was 83.2 billion Euro in 1996, until 2013 this revenue increased more than 3 times and reached to 299.3 billion Euro in 2013 (See Figure 2).



**Figure 2:** The global total revenue of private employment offices

Source: Ciett Annual Economic Reports<sup>25</sup>.

However, in Turkey private employment offices (PEOs) have not yet consolidated (Interview 21) but the size of the market has been in rise. More importantly than the PEOs, a profitable investment area for the private sector was generated by contracting out active labour market programs particularly vocational training courses through competitive tendering. As mentioned earlier, İŞKUR conducts vocational training courses by using two methods namely tendering and cooperation<sup>26</sup>. Both of these methods introduce purchaser-providers split in the sector of vocational training courses but while there is no competition between service providers in the cooperation method, there is an ex-ante competition between

<sup>25</sup> Drawn by writer of the thesis by basing on International Confederation of Private Employment Agencies (Ciett) Annual Economic Reports (2007, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014).

<sup>26</sup> In the context of the cooperation method, the İŞKUR and the service providers mostly public institutions make a protocol to organize vocational training courses in collaboration. The service providers must provide at least 50 percent job guarantee but the training and education institutions affiliated to Ministry of National Education (no job guarantee requirement) and public institutions and organizations (including state universities) and professional organizations with public institution status (at least 20 percent job guarantee requirement) are the exceptions.. However, in the context of the tender method, the İŞKUR purchase service from the providers mostly private sector providers as a result of the competitive tendering. The service providers excepting public institutions and organizations (including state universities) and professional organizations with public institution status (at least 20 percent job guarantee requirement) must provide at least 50 percent job guarantee.

different service providers in the tender method. Whereas the İŞKUR has the responsibility of securing the service provision and controlling the performances of providers in courses implemented through both methods, the responsibilities and earnings of service providers change according to the method used.

While in the cooperation method, service providers get only the wage of trainer and they have to provide job guarantee responsibility in their workplaces, in the tender methods, service providers get progress payment paid according to the hourly cost of course for per trainee predetermined by the tender that includes all cost of service providers such as equipment costs, training field cost, wage of trainer and profit of service provider. Service providers are obliged to find workplaces (if they are not private firms) to employ trainees for fulfillment of job guarantee requirement. In other words, while in the tendering alternative, service providers can make profit, in the other alternative they cannot get anything except the wage of trainer. Therefore, the demand from private sector to courses implemented via cooperation is low, which prompts the İŞKUR to rely on tendering methods. In this regard, the higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of the İŞKUR points out that;

Private sector earns money through tender method thus this method is more preferable. Cooperation is not preferred because we do not give money in the courses organized via cooperation method. Because the providers do not have material benefit, they do not want cooperation method. Only some private firms need skilled labour want to cooperate. Last year, cooperation was made to train employee for the call centre. Excepting this, cooperation was not so much (Interview 22).

Because private sector could generate profit, through contracting out the vocational training courses via tendering to the private sector, a profitable market was generated by the İŞKUR. Before the start of implementation of vocational training courses by İŞKUR, there have been private education institutions conducting vocational training courses but their number was limited and the size of this sector was small. Moreover, the private sector firms could not organize vocational training courses. However, İŞKUR generated a wide market in which both private education institutions and private firms could operate and could get profits. The penetration of private firms

and education institutions into the sector is so high therefore this sector is dominated by the private sector (Interview 18; 19; 20; 21). Table 6 shows the private sector domination in the implementation of vocational training courses through tender method in Ankara. About this penetration, the higher officer in the BELTEK states that;

The İŞKUR mostly works with private teaching institutions, adding another dimension to the sector of private teaching institutions (Interview 34).<sup>27</sup>

**Table 7:** Number of course and types of providers in tendering method (Ankara)

Year	# of courses	Number of Trainee			Types of Providers					
		Man	Woman	Total	Private Edu. Inst.	Public Inst.	MNE	Univ	Private Firm	Civil soc. Org.
2009	98	1789	2497	4286	39	7	19	0	5	28
2010	70	1259	2311	3570	41	6	4	0	2	17
2011	133	2341	5236	7577	114	0	0	12	3	4
2012	133	2440	6835	9275	110	0	0	4	10	9
2013	114	2197	8239	10436	108	0	0	0	1	5
2014	64	391	4349	4740	64	0	0	0	0	0

Source: Ankara Provincial Directorate, İŞKUR.

This private sector dominance is preferred by the İŞKUR as mentioned earlier and the high profitability of the sector appeals the private firms to this sector. Therefore, there is a severe competition between private institutions to get the tenders of the İŞKUR. About the profitability of the sector, the higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of the İŞKUR states that;

Offering courses under contract by the İŞKUR is very lucrative business. There would not be so much demand if it weren't so profitable. Just visit this place during the period of application for tenders, and see for yourselves how long the lines are. There is fierce competition between the firms; of course they are in business to make profits (Interview 22).<sup>28</sup>

<sup>27</sup> In Turkey, private teaching institutions (dershane) have a central place in the education system. The market size of these institutions was 1,5 Billion TL in 2012 (Ministry of Finance).

<sup>28</sup> The same observations are repeated by the Interviewee 18.

Likewise, the director of a private education institution mentions that they gain high profits from the organizing courses with the İŞKUR<sup>29</sup>. She adds that without organizing courses with the İŞKUR, they cannot earn money because there is demand shortage for the private training courses. In her words;

There is not much profit in cooperation, but profits can be made in tender method. I do not want to be unfair; we are earning a lot of money. We have high profit margins. I employ 12-15 people in this training center. Without the İŞKUR, I could not employ these trainers. There is not much demand for our own courses, because no one wants get vocational training. No one wants to spend money on getting training from private centers and getting certificates. Most companies hire people who have no certificates. This center could not survive with our own courses only. To us, the İŞKUR means bulk money every 3-4 months, it means cash flow. We make a good profit (Interview 33).

Therefore, it can be argued that the market for the vocational training courses could not operate on its own through the market dynamics. Due to the demand shortages, without the stream of the resources from the public purse, the market cannot function properly. Thus the market needs the public intervention to operate and the İŞKUR provides the operation of the market by purchasing the service. Thus, as discussed earlier the İŞKUR generated profitable a market in the field of vocational training courses.

The profitability of this market has also resulted in the establishment of private institutions only for these courses. In other words, some private institutions owing their existence to vocational training courses of İŞKUR implemented via tendering method have emerged to utilise from high profit opportunities. According to a higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR;

The so-called private education institutions subject to law no. 5580 are places of business; they have turned education into a commercial enterprise. To them, training centers are not much different from convenient stores or supermarkets. There are private education institutions that do not provide any education excepting the courses of the İŞKUR, they only hunt the İŞKUR contracts, their only source of income is the payments they receive from the İŞKUR. There are

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<sup>29</sup> Similarly, the Interviewee 12 notes that the organization of courses with the İŞKUR by winning the tender is a very profitable activity for private sector.



private education institutions established specifically for the İŞKUR contracts (Interview 22).

Likewise, the owner of a catering firm points out that;

Many firms got into this business because offering courses under contract by the İŞKUR is very lucrative. We even have shady firms established specifically to hunt the İŞKUR contracts and make money. It has become a sector in itself, offering a course under the İŞKUR contract is how you strike gold now (Interview 9).

This profitable market generated by the İŞKUR operates through the resources allocated out of the unemployment insurance fund. As pointed out earlier, vocational training courses are financed with resources transferred from the unemployment insurance fund. This resource transfer started with Employment Packages of 2008 and 2009. Only after that time, vocational training courses have begun to be widespread and numbers of course and trainee have considerably increased. However, according to the higher officer in the department of active labour services, although the funding began since the 2009, the needed legal and institutional infrastructure has consolidated from 2012 onwards (Interview 18).<sup>30</sup> He adds that;

We (the İŞKUR) are an institution that got duped until 2012, but now we have come to our senses and started to establish a system (Interview 18).

So, while the vocational training courses began to grown in 2009, the required regulations about the implementation came later. After the start of the resource transfer, the legal regulations were made. This demonstrates that behind the implementation process of the vocational training courses, there is necessarily no institutional planning. Therefore, the institutional design of the implementation process has considerable defects, which results in policy deadlocks.

Thanks to the resource transfer out of the unemployment insurance fund, in the financing of the vocational training courses, the external resources have not been necessary anymore and these courses have been financed completely through

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<sup>30</sup> Therefore, statistics about vocational training courses and resource allocation to these courses have begun to be kept properly after 2012.

resources transferred from unemployment insurance fund since 2009. According to the Law on the Restructuring of Certain Receivables and Amendment to the Law of Social Insurance and General Health Insurance and Certain Other Laws and Decree Laws Numbered 6111, the 30 percent of the premium incomes of unemployment insurance fund collected in the previous year could be used for the aim of increasing employment such as improving the employability of the labour force, job placement services and counseling, and Council of Ministers is authorized to increase this ratio until 50 percent (Uğur, 2011). Therefore, the 30 percent of the premium incomes of unemployment insurance fund is allocated to the İŞKUR for the active labour market policies.

On this basis, in 2014 the amount of resource allocated to İŞKUR was 23.73 Billion TL from the unemployment insurance fund whose asset was 79.1 Billion TL in 2014 (See Table 8).

**Table 8:** The assets of Unemployment Insurance Fund

<b>2012</b>	<b>61.2 Billion TL</b>
<b>2013</b>	<b>70.35 Billion TL</b>
<b>2014</b>	<b>79.1 Billion TL</b>

Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

However, out of this resource allocated to the İŞKUR for employment services, between January and August 2014, 1.021 Billion TL was spent for active labour market programs (See Table 5 in Chapter 3). That is to say, during the first 8 months in 2014, only 4 percent of the resources could be spent by the İŞKUR. Nevertheless, the spending on active labour market programs has increasingly risen. Therefore, although the spending is small in proportion to size of unemployment insurance fund, this is derived from that resources has been transferred since 6 years and taking into consideration that the consolidation of legal and institutional infrastructures of the usage of resources transferred from the fund realized in 2012, it can be said that the market is still too young thus the size of the market in proportion to size of the resources transferred from the fund is still small. However as seen in the Table 4, the

size of the market has a tendency to rise. From 2009 to 2014, its size increased more than 3 times.

When we look at the amounts spent on the vocational training courses, the spending on the courses have increased (See Table 9). The size of the field of vocational training courses was 216 Million TL in 2013. Accordingly, although it has not been yet an advanced market, the profitable sector generated by the İŞKUR through service purchasing for the private investment has been growing (See Table 10). Therefore, as sector grows, the resources transferred to private sector proportionately increase. In this regard, from one side it could be argued that implementation of vocational training courses by İŞKUR via tendering method becomes a means for funds transfer to the private sector.

**Table 9:** The amount of spending on vocational training courses

<b>Year</b>	<b>Spending</b>
<b>2004</b>	<b>56.313.000</b>
<b>2005</b>	<b>9.515.000</b>
<b>2006</b>	<b>27.974.000</b>
<b>2007</b>	<b>29.672.000</b>
<b>2008</b>	<b>35.000.000</b>
<b>2009</b>	<b>192.907.000</b>
<b>2010</b>	<b>242.243.000</b>
<b>2011</b>	<b>199.204.000</b>
<b>2012</b>	<b>336.318.000</b>
<b>2013</b>	<b>216.531.000</b>

Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security.

As it is shown by Table 9, the spending on the vocational training courses implemented via cooperation method has been larger than the courses implemented via tendering method since 2013.

**Table 10:** The amounts of spending on vocational training courses according to the methods of implementation

	<b>2012</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014*</b>
<b>Training Courses by Cooperation Method</b>	<b>137 Million TL</b>	<b>123 Million TL</b>	<b>78 Million TL</b>
<b>Training Courses by Tendering Method</b>	<b>141 Million TL</b>	<b>83 Million TL</b>	<b>47 Million TL</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>278 Million TL</b>	<b>206 Million TL</b>	<b>125 Million TL</b>

Source: Department of Active Labor Services, İŞKUR.

\* Between January-June

This situation is related to the legal changes made in the Active Labour Market Services Regulation in 2013. As mentioned before, in 2013 the İŞKUR changed its priority towards the cooperation method. With this change, the İŞKUR aims to organize courses through cooperation with the private sector due to its private sector orientation under the neoliberal logic of governance (Interview 18). Therefore, changing in the priority of the İŞKUR is only about the method not the providers. However, because private sector is ill-disposed to cooperate with the İŞKUR due to lack of profit, the İŞKUR could increase cooperation with public institutions especially with the Ministry of National Education.

Due to this unwillingness, the İŞKUR could not increase the cooperation with the private sector. The number of courses and spending on the courses organized via cooperation with the private sector is considerably less than the courses organized through tendering (Interview 22). The increased spending on the courses organized via cooperation method is related to organization of a large number of courses through cooperation with the Ministry of National Education (MNE). According to a higher officer of Ankara provincial directorate of the İŞKUR, the İŞKUR conducts most of the courses implemented via cooperation method with public education centres (Interview 22).

As raised earlier, İŞKUR could organize courses with training and education institutions affiliated to the MNE such as vocational and technical high schools merely through cooperation method and in these courses there is no job guarantee.

However these courses are limited to maximum 10 percent of budget allocated to the provincial directorate. In the light of that budgets allocated to provincial directorates could not be spend due to the ample resources transferred from unemployment insurance fund (See Table 11 for the budget of Ankara), 10 percent of these budgets remains so high. Therefore, a great number of course could be organized in cooperation between the İŞKUR and the MNE. It is thus shown as more spending is made on courses implemented via cooperation method. The specialist from Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR states that;

The general directorate allocates us a budget, but we can demand an increase if it is not sufficient. This, however, is almost impossible, as we were able to spend only 27 million of the 75 million allocated for Ankara last year. It looks as if more money is spent on courses offered via the cooperation model, but this is only because the courses we organize with the Ministry of Education (MNE) takes the form of cooperation, and most of our courses are offered in cooperation with the MNE. In a sense, we are financing the public training centers by our courses. They make proposals on a regular basis, and since there is no requirement of employment guarantee, a large number of courses can be offered. This way, the number of courses and the number of trainees increase, and we are able to meet our performance criteria. If MNE courses were not offered, there would be very few courses and this spending would not be made. Leaving MNE courses aside, most of the money is transferred to the private sector via tender method (Interview 23).

**Table 11:** The budgets of Ankara Provincial Directorate of İŞKUR for courses implemented via tendering and cooperation

<b>Year</b>	
<b>2012</b>	<b>49.119.066,02 TL</b>
<b>2013</b>	<b>56.076.750,00 TL</b>
<b>2014</b>	<b>75.000.000,00 TL</b>
<b>2015</b>	<b>75.000.000,00 TL</b>

Source: Ankara provincial directorate, İŞKUR.

So, even though the İŞKUR tries to spend the resources allocated out of the unemployment insurance fund, the entire of the resources could not be spent. This is associated with the capacity of the providers especially the private providers because

this sector is so young and still developing. The private sector has still has infrastructural deficiencies. In order to meet the performance criteria, the İŞKUR mostly organize courses with the training and education institutions affiliated to the Ministry of National Education (MNE) because there is no job guarantee so the implementation process is easier and there is a high demand from these institutions. As discussed earlier, the İŞKUR puts aside the better practice due to its private sector orientation. Similarly, the output orientation prompts the İŞKUR to ignore the service quality and employment of the trainees because as mentioned before the İŞKUR is dissatisfied with the training and curriculum of the institutions affiliated to the MNE and there is no job guarantee in these courses.

In addition, as the specialist from Ankara provincial directorate states, the İŞKUR transfers fund to the institutions affiliated to the MNE. Therefore while the tendering method became a means of funds transfer to the private sector, the cooperation method provides fund transfer to the public sector especially the institutions affiliated to the MNE. Similarly, Şahin states that vocational training courses have a function to transfer funds to private sector, local governments, civil society organizations, universities and etc (2012). In this regard, a higher manager in ASO (also member of Ankara İİMEK) points out that;

These courses provide benefit the İŞKUR the most. It helps them spend the money in the fund. The government tells them to spend the money, because like the EU funds, this money has to be spent as a legal requirement. The İŞKUR spends this money by giving 20-25 TL daily stipends to job-seekers, and transferring it to schools of Ministry of National Education, to private education institutions, and to private firms. This is one way for the government to subsidize the economy. They lower course criteria, trying to get more courses offered and more people trained. They provide certain flexibilities to the education institutions offering courses. Also this is very good for the private education sector because money transfer takes place (Interview 26).

So, the implementation of the vocational training courses turns into a money spending activity. However, the aim is to improve the employability of the labour force and reintegrate them into the labour market. While the expected policy output is enhanced employability, the policy outcome is a rather dysfunctional policy

environment and the creation of a profitable field of activity for the private investment. Correspondingly, the higher officer in the MESS (also a member of Ankara İİMEK) states that;

When I talked to labour inspectors with the İŞKUR background, I learnt that these courses are abused a lot. İŞKUR has a very large budget. Through these courses, a large amount of money is transferred to some centers. The goal is not to enrich them or to transfer money, the goal is to train people and help them find jobs, but the spending does not serve the intended purpose (Interview 31).

However, more critically than the fund transfer to the private sector, this fund transfer is made out of unemployment insurance fund which is composed of premiums paid by workers, employers and the state. While all workers contributes to this fund as they are working, only a small portion of them could be benefited from this fund when they become unemployed. For example in 2014 whereas there were seasonally adjusted 3.014.000 unemployed people (2.747.978 unemployed registered to the İŞKUR) (See Table 12), only 510.943 unemployed people could be benefited from unemployment fund (See Figure 3). That is to say, merely one-sixth of the unemployed people could be entitled to unemployment insurance payment. When consider that these numbers of unemployment does not reflect the real numbers, the proportion of unemployed people benefiting from the fund becomes considerably low. Therefore it can be argued that while not all employees can benefit from the fund in which they contribute, by using this fund, an investment opportunity is opened by the İŞKUR and resources are transferred to private sector.


**Table 12:** Amounts of Registered Unemployment and Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment

	<b>Registered Unemployment*</b>	<b>Seasonally Adjusted Unemployment**</b>
<b>December, 2012</b>	2.372.262	2.666.727
<b>December, 2013</b>	2.610.969	2.684.956
<b>December, 2014</b>	2.747.978	3.014.000***

\*Source: Turkish Labor Agency (İŞKUR).

\*\*Source: Turkish Statistical Institute (TUİK).

\*\*\* This date belongs to January, 2015.



**Figure 3:** Numbers of Beneficiary of Unemployment Insurance and Total Amounts of Payment

Source: İŞKUR.

Following the line of reasoning that neoliberalism has transformed the conceptualization of unemployment towards a simplistic individual problem of falling outside the labour market due to being unskilled, unqualified and lack of knowledge necessitated by the capital and has broke the connection of unemployment with capitalist system, it is safe to say that unemployment has become an independent phenomena from the capitalist market economy and it is regarded as not a problem of market economy. In this context, unemployment could be turned into an economic activity on which profit can be earned. Vocational training courses have made unemployment into a profitable field of activity. In other words, a profitable sector for the capital has been created from the most significant social problem of the capitalist economy. Within this context, I argued that because unemployment is indeed not a commodity in nature but it is used to gain money in the context of vocational training courses, unemployment is commodified and a new market is created over it for the capital investment. Thus, this can be called as *commodification or commercialization of unemployment* through contracting out vocational training courses to the private sector. As Overbeek states, neoliberal



marketization has left very few areas preserved from the pursuit of profit (2003) even unemployment could not evade from the pursuit of profit.

#### **4.3.3 Manipulation of Market-styled incentives of İŞKUR**

Active labour market policies besides programs for improving employability of the labour force such as vocational training courses includes also job creation programs like public works and incentives to rise the employment levels of some groups in society such as young unemployed and disabled people. In Turkey, in this regard the İŞKUR implements Work Programs for Public Benefits and Social Security Insurance Premium Incentives for hiring registered unemployed people or trainees of vocational training courses.

The İŞKUR provides the insurance premium rebates to the employers according to the Provisional Article 10 of the Unemployment Insurance Law numbered 4447. According to this law,

- When employers hire someone who is a woman older than 18 or a man at the age between 18 and 19, and completed the vocational courses of İŞKUR, the amount of insurance premium shares of employers is paid from Unemployment Insurance Fund for 36 months (Erol, 2012).
- When employers hire someone who is a man older than 29, and completed the vocational courses of İŞKUR, the amount of insurance premium shares of employers is paid from Unemployment Insurance Fund for 24 months (Erol, 2012).
- If these people are selected from unemployed people who are registered to İŞKUR, these periods are extended for 6 additional months (Erol, 2012).
- In order to be benefited from these incentives, the trainee employed by an employer must be addition to the average number of worker of this employer within the last 6 months and trainees must be employed in the occupations for that they are trained.

The intent behind these incentives is to ease the hire of the trainees. This is required for the operation of the market created by İŞKUR in the field of vocational training courses because in order to provide the reproduction of the market, trainees must be employed. Trainees of İŞKUR's courses are mostly composed of people with work experience at the low end of the market that is to say contingent, low paid

occupations or with no work experience like housewives and the improvement of employability of these people is difficult through trainings provided by İŞKUR because İŞKUR's courses provided a minor increase in human capital of trainees. This is because İŞKUR's courses are criticized to provide unqualified training (Interview 26; 34; 31; 10) and their durations are condemned as being insufficient for a technical training (Interview 12; 22). Due to these insufficiencies, trainees could not have necessary skills and qualifications required for an occupation. Therefore, the probability of trainees to find a job is very low after the course thus an action is necessary to get trainees into the employment. In this regard, incentives play a central role in easing the employment of trainees.

About the low quality of trainings, a higher officer in ASO (also member of Ankara İİMEK) states that;

When the Ministry of National Education prepares its modular system for training courses, it does not consult properly with private sector actors. The modules, prepared by people who do not really know how the sector works, are applied in all the centers, which in turn prevents adjusting the quality of training according to the needs of the sector (Interview 26).<sup>31</sup>

As this statement shows, the curriculum of the courses is shaped without necessary cooperation with real sector parties by Ministry of National Education (MNE) which does not have required expertise about the real sector therefore the content of the curriculum is not appropriate with the needs of the real sector. Moreover, it is pointed out by the higher officers in BELTEK and in the MESS (also member of Ankara İİMEK) that İŞKUR implements courses at inappropriate places for training therefore courses are unqualified. In their words;

Some of the education institutions that sign protocols with the İŞKUR do not have proper qualifications. Can you really teach welding in a education institutions in downtown Kızılay? But these institutions are happy with this arrangement. There is a big question mark on the quality of training provided in these places. (Interview 34).

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<sup>31</sup> The same observations are repeated by the Interviewee 10.

The physical location where training is provided is very important. Employers sometimes offer so-called vocational training courses on the 7<sup>th</sup> or 8<sup>th</sup> floor of an apartment block. People who attend these courses are usually at an advanced age, have very little formal education and zero work experience, and the low-quality training they receive is not enough to make them employable (Interview 31).

Alongside the insufficiencies about course curriculum and training places, the duration of trainings are evaluated as inadequate for acquiring an occupation. Trainings of İŞKUR last generally 3-4 months and it is stated that this duration is very short for training qualified, skilful trainees demanded by employers (Interview 12, 1; 5; 6; 7; 10; 17).

Likewise, White (2001) notes that as the duration of training is ‘relatively short’ (3-12 months), it provides only minor qualifications on the skills of the trainee (p.18). Notwithstanding, İŞKUR prefers to organize short term courses. It is stated by interviewees that a driving reason behind this is the objective of İŞKUR to increase .number of courses and trainees and to provide immediate labour market attachment of trainees (Interview 26; 33; 22; 29). This short-term vision of İŞKUR leads to poor returns on the training. In this regard, a higher officer in Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR states that;

The İŞKUR’s vocational training courses do not serve their purposes. It is all a sham. Out of ten courses organized, maybe one works as intended. Can you teach a profession in three months? It is impossible. Add to this the fact most trainees have very little or zero experience, and are uneducated and unqualified, and it becomes clear that you cannot teach these people an occupation in 3-4 months. Shorter courses are organized so that more people are trained in a short period of time and employed on paper through training companies. This way, we are able to meet the performance criteria (Interview 22).

These short-term and unqualified training courses of İŞKUR could not provide empowerment of low-skilled, undereducated and inexperienced trainees regarding necessary skills and qualifications therefore employers said that they have to re-train the trainees of İŞKUR when they hire them (Interview 17; 14; 12; 8; 7; 6; 3; 2; 5) and thus they do not want to hire İŞKUR’s trainees. In the words of the human resources manager of an extractive company;

Training received in the İŞKUR is useless for the employers. If you hire people via the İŞKUR, you have to re-train them. The only reason I hire people with the İŞKUR training is to get the incentive, I then re-train them myself (Interview 10).

In this regard, the incentives of İŞKUR have a significant place in the context of improving the functioning of the market by easing the employment of the trainees. Within the frame of this need, incentives enable the smooth operation of the labour market by expediting the employment of trainees otherwise their employment is difficult and private firms could increase their profits through the insurance premiums rebates. Hence, incentives are appropriate to market logic. On this basis, in this thesis these incentives are defined as market-styled.

The incentives of İŞKUR ease the employment of trainees by making cheaper them on the market because these incentives function as a way of declining non-wage costs of labour. Pressures for competitiveness are so high in the market and it is claimed by the private sector that labour costs especially non-wage costs of labour are very high so they are counter-productive by hampering the profitability. Therefore, private firms always search for the ways of escaping from labour costs and one of the significant ways of this has become the incentives of İŞKUR. Employers prefer to hire trainees of İŞKUR's courses only to avoid from these costs rather than their improved human capital. In this context, incentives make trainees cheaper in comparison with other job seekers thereby increase the probability of trainees to find a job. Since employability is defined as 'the likelihood of obtaining a job' (White, 2001, p.6), İŞKUR enhances the employability of the trainees by reducing their price that is to say trainees become more employable due to lower non-wage labour cost and their employment probability increases.

Parallel to the argument about incentives of İŞKUR, White (2001) mounts an argument about in-work benefits and states that "in-work benefits increase potential workers' employability by making them able to sell themselves more cheaply on the market" (p.24). Because İŞKUR could not provide improvement in the employability of the trainees by enhancing their human capital due to unqualified and short term

trainings, it seeks to increase their employability through making them cheaper on the market by declining non-wage labour costs. Therefore, the notion of employability is transformed from empowerment to ‘lowering workers value on the market’ (White, 2001, p.26). It is associated with the Offe’s notion of ‘saleability’ He defined the employability as the saleability of labour force on the market (Offe, 1984). Labour power is made more valuable or saleable on the market either through increasing human capital and adaptability or through making cheaper. Given the circumstances that İŞKUR’s trainees are generally undereducated, low-skilled and less-experienced, the most efficient way for increasing the saleability of these trainees is to decrease their ‘exchange value’ (White, 2001, p.21) on the market. White (2001) relates this shift in the employability towards making labour force cheaper especially low-skilled labour force with the “‘Walmart Strategy’; any commodity can be sold if priced cheaply enough” (p.21).

In this context, İŞKUR help the smooth functioning of the market it created through easing the employment of low-skilled, undereducated and less-experienced trainees by making them more valuable on the market than they would otherwise be. As mentioned in the previous sub-chapter, trainees placed in a job by the private education institutions are mostly fired at the end of the period of employment requirement. Other trainees employed by the private firms without procurement of private education institutions generally are fired at the end of the incentive period. Therefore, to reiterate, the probability of trainees for employment is increased only by declining their costs to the firms through incentives rather than improvement in human capital but this employment could be provided only during the incentive period. Employers fire trainees after the finish of incentive period then trainees become again unemployed thus while incentives more or less ease the hiring of trainees by making cheaper them on the market, they could not produce stable and permanent employment for the trainees.

Moreover, these incentives provide rent opportunities to the private sector. Although İŞKUR is restructured in line with the neoliberal principles to regulate the employment services and to provide smooth functioning of the labour market, its regulatory mechanisms are inadequate especially İŞKUR has significant structural insufficiencies in regarding monitoring, as already noted. Therefore, in the policy implementation process of the incentives deadlocks emerged which are used by private firms to provide the rent. In this respect, a higher officer from BELTEK states that;

The İŞKUR does not really know the market, and consequently has a very low capacity to regulate and audit the market, and identify its problems. Thus, the İŞKUR is misused due to its own incompetence (Interview 34).

The findings from my field research analysis demonstrate that employers derive improper personal benefits from the incentives of İŞKUR. In this context, employers send their employees to the training courses of İŞKUR even though these employees do not need vocational training and after the completion of the course; they re-employ these employees to decline their insurance premium payments (Interview 1; 2; 4; 7; 8; 10; 14; 31; 26; 34).

Firstly, employers send their employees working informally to the courses and after the course they insure these employees and benefit from incentives up to 42 months (Interview 1; 2; 10; 22). In this regard, the owner of a firm in defence industry states that;

Most firms operating in Ankara OSTİM Organized Industrial Region have undeclared employees. Likewise, we employ uninsured employees from time to time, but when we heard about the İŞKUR's incentives, we decided to take advantage of that and have all our employees declared. We sent our employees to the course, and once the course was over, re-hired them, this time formally as well. Now we do not have to pay their social security premiums for about 3 years. ... They did not need the training, they already knew the job, but they had to attend the course to get the incentives. ... We kept paying them for the duration of the training, at a lower rate (Interview 1).

Likewise, a specialist from Ankara provincial directorate of İŞKUR states that;

Employers take advantage of the İŞKUR incentives to formally hire their undeclared employees, and we are happy about this, as it decreases informal employment. However, this also means that the incentives are not serving their intended purpose. The İŞKUR provides these incentives to help trainees find jobs easily once the training is over, to make them more desirable from the viewpoint of the employers. Declining informal employment is not the intended goal (Interview 23).

As it is stated by Interview 23, even though it is good for the fight against the informal employment, this is not the primary objective of the incentives of İŞKUR. These incentives are used for the objective different from the intended one. In this regard, İŞKUR does not serve to its original purpose.

Secondly, employers send their currently insured employees to the courses to benefit from insurance premium rebate especially during the period of economic distress but in this circumstance employers re-hire these employees the two or three months later after the finish of the course. This is because according to the Provisional Article 10 of the Unemployment Insurance Law numbered 4447, in order to benefit from insurance premium incentives, employers have to hire individuals who are not registered employees in the workplaces of these employers during the 6 months before the starting date of employment. Therefore, because the courses of İŞKUR last generally 3-4 months, employers wait for 2-3 months to hire their ex-employees after the finish of the courses to complete 6 months period. The owner of a catering firm in this regard points out that;

Sometimes we have economic difficulties, which is natural if you have a business. When this happens, we have to lower our labour costs, since it is the single most important cost item in the service sector. Because the İŞKUR provides incentives when you hire their trainees, taking advantage of these incentives is very important for us, especially when we are in dire straits. We never did that but I know of some firms, in the catering business like us doing that. Catering business slows down in the winter, and employers start firing people, but because they know the business will pick up again in the summer, they send some of the people they fired to the İŞKUR's courses. The course lasts 3-4 months, and they wait another 2-3 months because you cannot receive the incentive if the people you hire have been your employees within the last 6 months. Then they re-hire them and enjoy the incentives for about 3-4 years (Interview 9).

As it is seen in this quotation, employers manipulate the İŞKUR's incentives to decline their insurance premium payments. This is because the monitoring capacity of İŞKUR is insufficient to determine the malpractices of the private firms in regard to benefit from the incentives.

In addition, when employers hire new employees, in the first instance they find their potential employees among the applicants through the private employment agencies such as kariyernet and secretcv and they send these applicants to the vocational training courses of İŞKUR then they hire them to avoid from the insurance premium payments of these employees (Interview 2; 3; 7; 10; 11; 12; 14; 31).

Therefore, it can be argued that while the objective of the incentives is to ease the hiring of trainees thereby provide the smooth functioning of the market; incentives are used by the employers to decline the labour costs of their new employees who do not need vocational training and have already found a job. These employees participate into the courses and employers benefit from the incentives over these them. Thus, these incentives of İŞKUR do not serve to the purpose of easing the employment of the trainees.

The incentives of İŞKUR have considerable significance especially for the small and medium enterprises (KOBİ) because labour costs particularly non-wage labour costs play central role on the profitability of these enterprises. Taking into consideration that the Turkish economy is mostly composed of KOBİ, the significance of these incentives becomes more evident. In this regard, the owner of a firm in the defence industry states that;

For the small and medium enterprises like us, it is important to not paying social insurance premiums. Therefore, most of the firms have uninsured employees. To get these incentives benefits mostly the firms like us. Large firms do not seek to employ undeclared employees because the cost of social insurance is very small in their endorsements but this cost affects directly our profitability (Interview 1).



As this quotation shows, insurance premium rebate during the approximately 3 years period provides profound declines in the costs of these enterprises and due to the heavy competition in the market when one firm gets into one of those ways discussed earlier to take advantage of the incentives, this prompts other firms to behave in the same way. In this respect, the owner of a firm in the machinery industry notes that;

Many firms in İvedik Organized Industrial Zone are in the same business. Almost all the firms are subcontractors producing parts for big companies. If a firm is able to avoid paying social security premiums thanks to an incentive, this means higher profit margins, which is very important in our business. The machinery we use is very expensive. If we had higher profits, we would take out some loans and buy another machine, producing faster and in larger quantities. Thus, social security premiums, which might be insignificant for some firms, are vitally important for us. So, when we heard that some firms received incentives by sending their undeclared employees to the İŞKUR courses and then re-hiring them formally, we immediately decided to do the same. It spreads from one firm to another, and before you know it everyone starts doing the same (Interview 3).

This situation is similar to the bribery problem in economics. In the economy, “[i]f one agent bribes while others do not, that agent is made better off while others suffer. As a result, all agents have an incentive to bribe. Left to itself, the market therefore generates a ‘bad’ equilibrium in which all agents pay bribes. The ‘good’ equilibrium in which none pay bribes can only be supported by laws imposing penalties that deter bribery” (Palley, 2005, p.27). Within the regard of İŞKUR’s incentives, because firms getting into rent-seeking behaviours become better off against the other firms, most of the firms seek for rent by making use of the incentives of İŞKUR. The manipulation of the incentives becomes the rule of the game because behaving within the borders of the regulation decreases the profit in proportion to those of rent-seeker firms and makes you worse off. Therefore, most of the firms start to behave in the similar manner.

As the findings from the field research shows, the insufficiencies of İŞKUR regarding regulatory and monitoring mechanisms create deadlocks in the implementation process of the incentives which generate an opportunity for rent-seeking. Employers decline their insurance premium payments by making use of

these insufficiencies. They have found ways for benefiting from the incentives in this regard they send their employees working informally or currently insured employees to the vocational training courses of İŞKUR and then re-employ them, or they firstly find their potential employees and send them the courses then hire these individuals. Because these ways to benefit from the incentives provide significant declines in labour costs especially for KOBİ, under the heavy competitive environment most of the firms get into similar ways to avoid from their insurance premium payments. Due to its lower monitoring capacity, İŞKUR could not prevent these malpractices of the private sector.

#### **4.4 Summary of the Chapter**

The İŞKUR conducts the vocational training courses through two different method namely tender and cooperation method. The tender method which is the focal point of this study is mostly used for the courses organized by the private education institutions. In the implementation process of the vocational training courses via tender method, there emerge policy deadlocks due to the defects in the subcontracting nature of the implementation structure. As a result, ineffective and inefficient policy environment occurs in the field of vocational training courses.

Firstly, the deficiencies in the institutional capacities of the private institutions lead to dysfunctional policy implementation process. The vocational training courses are organized by the private education institutions on the behalf of the İŞKUR and these institutions receive progress payment in return of the training. However, in order to get their entire progress payment, private education institutions are obliged to fill their quota by selecting trainee and to place their trainees into the job according to the ratio of their job guarantee requirement and to provide the maintenance of the employment of the trainees over the course of time predetermined by the regulation. Because the underlying neoliberal idea behind the active labour market policies is to provide reintegration of the unemployed persons into the labour market as quickly as possible, the job guarantee requirement is an indivisible part of the vocational

training courses almost all over the world. However, the concurrent fulfilment of the tasks of selection the trainee, training, job placement and provide the maintenance of the employment require coordinated actions among different tasks and special implementation capacity for each these tasks and the private education institutions do not have these necessary institutional capacities to carry out these tasks. This situation prompts the private institutions to the malpractices. That is to say, they fulfil their responsibilities perfunctorily thus the expected policy output could not be reached.

Within this context, because the İŞKUR does not help to the private sector in trainee selection process, the lack of institutional capacity to reach potential trainees prompts private institutions to fill their quotas by finding trainee from their neighbourhood and have to accept old-aged and persons unwilling to work as trainee. Thus, these trainees do not aim to work after the training and participate in trainings in order to earn money via daily stipend paid by the İŞKUR. Moreover, due to the job guarantee requirement, the private institutions turn into the shadow private employment office (PEOs). However, the private institutions do not have institutional capacities the official PEOs have therefore they seek to carry out job placement of the trainees by placing the trainees into the jobs in workplaces with which they have connections or these institutions initiate the social insurance of the trainees and pay the premiums during the legal period as if the trainees are employed. And, the trainees are generally fired at the end of the legal period. As a result, these courses do not increase the employment in the medium and long term. In addition, the task of maintenance of the employment of the trainees over the course of time predetermined by the regulation requires monitoring capacity to check all employed trainees and convincing other trainees to work instead of the trainee who left the job. Since trainees are generally unwilling to work because of the defects in the selection process, they could easily leave the job or the trainees could be fired. Therefore, the task of maintenance of the employment challenges the private institutions so these institutions prefer the payment of social insurance premiums of trainees than the

employing them. Within this frame, it could be said that a dysfunctional policy environment occurs in the field of vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR.

Secondly, the İŞKUR contracts out the vocational training courses to the private sector in this way a profitable economic field for private investment is generated and the vocational training courses turn into a fund transfer mechanism to the private sector. As a result, waste of resources emerges in the implementation process.

Thirdly, the İŞKUR gives social security premium incentives to the employers who employ the trainees of the courses organized by the İŞKUR. Through these incentives, the İŞKUR aims to ease the employment of the trainees thereby smooth functioning of the market of vocational training courses. However, due to the deficiencies in the supervisory capacity of the İŞKUR, these incentives could be manipulated by the private firms in order to decrease their costs of social insurance premiums. To that respect, the employees working informally or currently insured are sent to the vocational training courses of İŞKUR and after the training these employees are reemployed by the private firms. In addition, employers firstly find their potential employees and send them the vocational training courses then they employ these persons. Therefore, inefficiencies occur in the implementation process of these incentives.

As the findings of the field research demonstrate, the defects in the contracting out based implementation process of the vocational training courses generate policy deadlocks in the service provision. As a result, a dysfunctional and ineffective policy environment emerges in this way the İŞKUR could not reach the expected policy outputs which is improving the human capital of the unemployed people and reintegrating them into the labour market as quickly as possible.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS

In this study, the aim has been to analyse the implementation process of the active labour market policies (ALMPs) and as part of ALMPs, the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR on the case of Ankara. As discussed in detail, active labour market policies gained prominence during the 1990s in Turkey. During this period, active labour market policies were implemented through the support of World Bank however European Union became the major supporter of the implementation of these policies during the 2000s. In Turkey, vocational training courses are the most common active labour market programs conducted by the İŞKUR and these courses implemented under the neoliberal logic of governance through contracting out to the non-public agencies or through partnership between the İŞKUR and the service providers. The focus of this thesis has been the contracting out method called as tender method in which the service delivery of the vocational training courses is devolved to service providers mostly the private institutions by competitive tendering and this study has argued that this contracting out based nature of the implementation process results in ineffective and inefficient policy environment in Turkey because of the defects in the subcontracting based institutional design of the implementation process.

#### 5.1 Theoretical Findings

Theoretical contributions of this thesis could be outlined as follows; firstly, efficiency and effectiveness in the service delivery is one of the significant targets of neoliberal ideology. In this regard, private provision is championed by neoliberalism because neoliberal approach assumes that private sector would naturally offer a better service provision environment thanks to the logic of competition and institutional flexibility of the private sector. However, this study indicates through the case of vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR in Ankara that

private sector is not that flexible and apt for the service provision. Besides, logic of competition tends to waste resources, rather than creating an efficient service structure.

Secondly, the private sector orientation of the neoliberalism can lead to ignorance of the best practice or better performance when it turns into private sector obsession. This study shows this through the case of the İŞKUR which puts aside the better performance by avoiding from the cooperation with BELTEK performing better than the courses conducted by the private sector due to the private sector priority.

Thirdly, the principles management-by-objectives and output or goal orientation which are applied in the context of neoliberal logic of governance could contradict with the neoliberal objectives. Neoliberalism targets to generate an employable labour force by improving their employability and reintegrate this labour force into the labour market as quickly as possible. However, the flexibility in the age range of trainees is granted to the private institutions by the İŞKUR and this flexibility is manipulated by the private institutions to gain more money by increasing their trainees through accepting the old-aged peoples as the trainee. Old-aged people mostly do not work after the training or they could not find a job due to their ages. However the İŞKUR allows this in order to meet the performance criteria based on the number of courses and trainees. Through accepting old-aged people as a trainee, private education institutions could easily find trainees thereby the number of trainee increases and the İŞKUR can meet the criteria. Therefore, the application of management-by-objectives and output orientation into the provision of vocational training courses contradicts with the neoliberal idea of employable labour force.

Fourthly, establishment of representative structure in decision making process do not always provide to take decisions more democratically and to respond more to the needs of society by contrast with the neoliberal logic of governance. The case of provincial employment and vocational training boards (İİMEK) demonstrate that representative structure does not always mean active participation of the members

because institutional design of the decision making body may not provide equal access with each member to impact the decision. The İİMEK is held generally perfunctorily because the weight of the İŞKUR and the Ministry of National Education (MNE) on the decision making process is high, which has exclusionary effect on the participation of the other members thus the members attend to the meetings but not participate into the decision making process. And also, the institutional structure of these boards was established as dependent on the local conjuncture. That is to say, the local actors particularly the governor is the determinant factor in the effective operation of these boards. Therefore, the smooth decision making process is dependent on the attitude of the governor. This prevents the effective working of the participatory structure of the İİMEK. As a result, it can be said that the impacts of the institutional design of the decision making process outweighs the impacts of representative structure and representative decision making process does not always yield active participation of social parties and more democratic and responsive decision making.

Fifthly, due to the presentation of the neoliberal policies as stereotyped and universal prescripts, all over the world these policies began to be implemented without shaping these policies according to particular features of the policy environments. However, neoliberal claim of generating efficiency and effectiveness could fail when the policies are not implemented as tailor made solutions to the circumstances. As a result, the policy outputs could contradict with the neoliberal objectives. The implementation of active labour market policies in Turkey could be an example of such situation. These policies were transferred from outside to the Turkey under the overwhelming influence and financial support of the international institutions. However, on the one hand, these policies were not structured along the lines of institutional infrastructures of the İŞKUR and the other institutional actors involved in the implementation of these policies and on the other hand, these institutional actors and the İŞKUR were not sufficiently reorganized according to the requirements of these policies. Therefore, after the beginning of the

implementations, considerable problems occurred and so legal, institutional and organizational changes were made later. This shows that these policies began to be implemented without coherent and comprehensive planning.

## **5.2 Empirical Findings**

The findings from the field research analysis show that in Turkey, the implementation process of the vocational training courses is prone to the policy deadlocks due to the defects in the institutional design of the implementation process. The implementation process was not structured according to the institutional capacities of the actors involved in the service provision. Therefore, deadlocks emerge in the policy implementation process, which generates an ineffective (dysfunctional) and inefficient policy environment. To get more specific;

Firstly, deficiencies in the institutional capacity of the private institutions lead to the deadlocks in the implementation process of the vocational training courses organized via the tender method. Alongside the training, private sector institutions are obliged to select trainees, to place them into a job and to provide the maintenance of employment of trainees over the course of time predetermined by the active labour market services regulation in order to organize vocational training courses through tender method. However, the concurrent fulfillment of these four tasks requires coordinated actions among different tasks and special implementation capacity is required for each of these four different tasks. Because the private sector institutions do not have institutional capacity to fulfill these four tasks and policy coordination capacity to carry out this task at the same time, they engage in malpractices to fulfill their responsibilities. As a result, a dysfunctional (ineffective) policy environment emerge because the implementation of these courses could not provide the expected policy outputs which is enhancing the employability of the unemployed people and reintegrating them into the labour market as soon as possible.

Within this regard, due to lack of institutional capacity to reach potential trainees, private institutions seek to fill their quotas by finding trainee from their



neighbourhood and have to accept old-aged and persons unwilling to work as trainee. These persons participate in courses for daily stipend paid by İŞKUR instead of employment.

Moreover, by devolving the task of job placement to the private institutions, the İŞKUR expects from these institutions to perform as if they are public employment agency or private employment office (PEOs). However, while PEOs have capacity regarding organization and staff to get information about workplaces demanding labour force, and vacant jobs in order to fulfill job placement function, the public employment agency in addition to capacities of PEOs has an authority to oblige firms for employment and power to use incentives for job placement. However, the private institutions are lack of these institutional capacities and authorities. Therefore, to fulfill their job guarantee obligations, private institutions they place the trainees into the jobs in workplaces with which they have connections or only pay trainees' social security premiums to show them as employed. And, whether the trainees are really working or not, they are fired after the legal predetermined period. Therefore, these courses do not provide any contribution on the employment of trainees on the medium and long run. In addition, by expecting from the private institutions to operate as private employment office, the İŞKUR leads to the replacement of one institutional structure by another institutional structure. That is to say, while private employment offices and private education institutions are two distinct institutional structure, the private education institutions are obliged to operate as PEO and these institutions has begun to turns into private employment offices so they have started to replace the PEOs.

Furthermore, the task of providing the continuance of the employment of trainees over the course of time predetermined by the regulation challenges the private education institutions because these institutions have to monitor all trainees and if any trainee quits the job, they have to convince them to work again or they have to find another trainee to work instead of him/her until the finish of the legal period.

Therefore, this task requires an institutional capacity to monitor all employed trainees and to find a new trainee rapidly in case of leaving the job. Taking into consideration that most of the trainees do not prefer to work after training due to the deficiencies of the selection process thus they can easily quit the job and firms can fire the trainees due to lack of skills or motivation to work, it could be said that the turnover is high, which makes this task more challenging for the private institutions. In this regard, payment of social insurance premiums of trainees instead of employing them becomes more advantageous for these institutions in this way they avoid from monitoring the trainees and obligation of finding a new trainee to replace the trainee who quits the job.

Therefore, a dysfunctional policy environment occurs in the field of vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR thus the İŞKUR could not serve to its original purpose of combating unemployment. Instead, through contracting out vocational training courses to the private sector, the İŞKUR generates a profitable economic field for private investment and these courses become a way of fund transfer to the private sector, which leads to waste of resources thereby inefficiencies in the implementation process.

Secondly, deficiencies in the monitoring capacity of the İŞKUR lead to the deadlocks in the implementation process of social insurance premium incentives. The İŞKUR gives incentives to the employers who employ the trainees of the İŞKUR's courses. These incentives enable the smooth operation of the labour market by expediting the employment of trainees because otherwise their employment is difficult. However, inadequacies in the regulatory and monitoring mechanisms of the İŞKUR generate policy deadlocks in the implementation process of the incentives. As a result, there occurs room for rent-seeking behaviors of the private sector. Private sector firms manipulate the incentives of the İŞKUR to decline their labour costs. In this regard, private firms send their employees working informally or currently insured employees to the vocational training courses of İŞKUR and then re-employ them, or

they firstly find their potential employees and send them the courses then hire these individuals. Therefore, there occurs an inefficient policy environment in the implementation of these incentives. And, the İŞKUR could not prevent these malpractices of private firms thereby inefficiencies in the implementation process because of deficiencies in its institutional supervisory capacity.

### **5.3 Further Areas for Future Researches**

This thesis has several limitations from which further areas could be derived for future researches. First, this thesis has focused on the vocational training courses because the vocational training courses are the most common policy among the active labour market policies, however other policies such as on-the-job training and entrepreneurship trainings are also implemented intensively but due to time limitations, these programs have been kept out of the scope of this study. About these programs, there is a huge gap in the literature about active labour market policies.

Second, the focal point of this thesis is the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR. However, as discussed earlier, even though the İŞKUR has the dominant position in the field of vocational training courses, there are other institutions such as Ministry of National Education and local governments. While the vocational training courses organized by these institutions have been briefly dealt with in this thesis, these courses have so far remained relatively unexplored in the literature.

Third, in this thesis I have not intended to provide a full picture of the vocational training courses and deadlocks emerged in the implementation process. My objective is less ambitious to explore the implementation process of the vocational training courses conducted through tender methods and the social security incentives provided by the İŞKUR to the private sector for employing the trainees of these courses. Therefore, this thesis has taken a brief look at the cooperation method used by the İŞKUR for organizing vocational training courses.

Fourth, this study concentrates on the contracting out of vocational training courses to the private sector however, although the private sector has the largest share, the İŞKUR can also purchase service from public institutions. The delivery of vocational training courses by public institutions has not analysed, yet in Turkey.

Fifth, this study has explored the implementation process of the vocational training courses over the case of Ankara. While the main arguments could be generalized to Turkey, empirical examples are drawn from Ankara, thus analyses about the implementation process of these courses in other cities could enrich the arguments of these thesis.

#### **5.4 Policy Conclusions**

Active labour market policies (ALMPs) as raised earlier are complementary of the neoliberal labour markets because these policies ease the sustainability of unsecured labour markets stemmed from flexibility and deregulation. These policies are thought to enhance the employability of the labour force thereby individuals could easily find a new job in the case of unemployment thus employment security is provided instead of the job security in the context of flexicurity. Moreover, these policies increase the closeness of the inactive portion of the labour force to the labour market so these people are incorporated into the reserve army of labour, which imposes downward pressures on the wages. ALMPs also function as an instrument to decrease the social pressures and to control the social discontent and exclusion because market-oriented neo-liberal policies led to the increase in unemployment, social inequalities and poverty. Therefore, active labour market policies have a central role in neoliberal labour markets. Within this frame, it could be argued that the primary purpose of the active labour market policies is the sustainability of the neoliberal labour markets and the improving employability of the labour force is a tool serving to this purpose. Therefore, the defects of a neoliberal policy could not be fixed through further neoliberal reform. However in the short and medium run, some policy changes could be done.

As discussed up to now, an inefficient and ineffective policy environment occurs in the field of vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR. This situation is resulted from the policy deadlocks emerged in the implementation process. In order to overcome these problems, the İŞKUR changes its regulation in 2013 and revised its priority towards cooperation method however this change cannot produce the expected output because while the structure of the implementation process remains same, only priority is changed from tender towards the cooperation. Private sector does not prefer the cooperation method due to lack of profit thus giving priority to the cooperation method does not increase the cooperation with the private sector instead the cooperation with Ministry of National Education (MNE) rises. However, the desire of the İŞKUR is to increase cooperation with the private sector thereby decrease the service purchasing because the policy deadlocks emerge due to the contracting out of vocational training courses to the private sector. With the change in the priority, whereas the cooperation with the MNE increases, the service purchasing continues. Therefore, reform in the implementation process cannot solve the problems as long as the design of implementation structure remains unchanged. Because the implementation structure was established as distorted at the beginning, the reforms are doomed to fail. Within this regard, it can be said that in order to prevent the policy deadlocks, the implementation structure must be redesigned instead of reforming it. New implementation structure should not assign tasks which excess their institutional capacities to the private sector in order for effective provision of the vocational training courses via tender method.

Correspondingly, the task for selecting the trainee should belong to the İŞKUR because the İŞKUR has a capacity to reach potential trainees from its pool of registered labour force and the job placement task should be carried out by the private employment offices (PEOs) in this way as raised before, the private education institutions avoid from the obligation for operating as PEOs. Therefore, the replacement of PEOs by the private education institutions would be prevented.

Moreover, the decision making process of the vocational training courses is problematic due to inefficient working of the provincial employment and vocational training boards (İİMEK). The representative structure does not operate properly due to the overweight of the İŞKUR and the MNE on the decision making process and the determinant role of the governor thus the effective decision making is dependent on the local conjunctures. In order to institutionalize the decision making process by avoiding the influence of local actors, a professional director could be assigned to these boards.

Furthermore, the institutional supervisory capacity of the İŞKUR must be increased in order to prevent the manipulations of the social insurance premium incentives by the private firms and in order to obstruct the malpractices of the private education institutions because if the implementation structure continues to remain the same, private education institutions seeks to fulfill their tasks by engaging in malpractices. In this regard, the İŞKUR must have necessary monitoring capacity to provide effective implementation process.

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Interview 2 Sales manager. Small Scale Firm (plastic industry) held on 09.01.2015

Interview 3 Owner. Small Scale Firm (machinery industry) held on 28.11.2014

Interview 4 Owner. Small Scale Firm (service sector-carpet washing) held on 02.12.2014

Interview 5 Human Resources Manager. Medium Scale Firm (service sector- security) held on 20.12.2014

Interview 6 Human Resources Manager. Medium Scale Firm (service sector- five-star hotel) held on 24.11.2014

Interview 7 Human Resources Manager. Medium Scale Firm (food industry) held on 18.11.2014

Interview 8 Human Resources Manager. Medium Scale Firm (furniture industry) held on 18.11.2014

Interview 9 Owner. Medium Scale Firm (service sector- catering) held on 09.12.2014

Interview 10 Human Resources Manager. Large Scale Firm (extractive industry) held on 19.11.2014

Interview 11 Personnel Management and Industrial Relations Manager. Large Scale Firm (automotive industry) held on 24.10.2014

Interview 12 Human Resources Manager. Large Scale Firm (service sector- catering) held on 24.11.2014

Interview 13 Industrial Relations and Administrative Affairs Manager. Large Scale Firm (tractor industry) held on 19.12.2014

Interview 14 Human Resources Deputy Manager. Large Scale Firm (food industry) held on 16.12.2014

Interview 15 Human Resources Planning and Evaluation Manager. Large Scale Firm (defence industry) held on 13.11.2014

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<sup>32</sup> I denoted firms having less than 30 employees as small scale, firms having employees between 30 and 300 as medium scale and firms having employees more than 300 as large scale.

Interview 16 Expert engineer. Large Scale Firm (defence industry) held on 20.12.2014

Interview 17 Human Resources Specialist. Holding (construction- energy- real estate- health-education) held on 02.12.2014

Interview 18 Higher Officer. Department of Active Labour Services. Turkish Employment Agency held on 18.02.2015

Interview 19 Employment Expert. Department of Active Labour Services. Turkish Employment Agency held on 18.02.2015

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Interview 22 Higher officer. Ankara Provincial Directorate. Turkish Employment Agency held on 26.02.2015

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Interview 25 Higher Officer. Employment and Working Life Department. Social Sectors and Coordination General Directorate. Ministry of Development held on 14.11.2014

Interview 26 Higher Manager. Ankara Chamber of Industry ( also Member of Ankara Provincial Employment and Vocational Education Boards) held on 27.02.2015

Interview 27 Higher Officer. Polatlı Chamber of Industry held on 27.02.2015

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Interview 31 Higher Officer. Turkish Employers' Association of Metal Industries (also Member of Ankara Provincial Employment and Vocational Education Boards) held on 16.06.2014

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

#### Interview Questions for Group I Organizations<sup>33</sup>

- 1) How do you assess the importance of vocational training courses in active labour market policies? What are the advantages of vocational training courses when comparing with other active labour market policies?
- 2) Do you find vocational training courses useful to provide labour force with qualifications required in the labour market? What are the deficiencies of these courses?
- 3) Is your opinion received when the content of the vocational training courses are determined? What is the role of private sector in the determination process of the vocational training courses? Is the role of private sector effective?
- 4) Do you think that the need analysis is made healthfully? How do you as an umbrella organization contribute to the need analysis?
- 5) What are the shortcomings of the process of identifying needs? What can be done for better identification of the needs? Do you think that the courses are organized in line with the identified needs of the labour market?
- 6) Generally, the vocational training courses are offered in the occupations of service sector, is the reason of this situation that there is more need for the labour force in the service sector? Are enough courses offered to provide the labour force needed by the industrial sector?
- 7) The vocational training courses are determined in the İİMEK. A representative from your organization participates into this board. Can your representative be effective in the decision-making process to provide opening of the courses which train the labour force needed by the industry?

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<sup>33</sup> This group is composed of the umbrella organizations such as ASO and TİSK.

- 8) Do you think that these boards work effectively?
- 9) The vocational training courses are organized through cooperation or tender method. Which method is more successful in contributing to the enhancing the skills of the labour force and the employment of the labour force? Compared with each other, what are the advantages and disadvantages of cooperation and tender method?
- 10) Could it be more useful for enhancing the skills of the labour force that workplaces give the education to their employees instead of the vocational training courses offered by the İŞKUR?
- 11) What are the advantageous of the organization of the vocational training by the İŞKUR?
- 12) Is the participation of the private sector into the organization of vocational training courses sufficient? Is the private sector adequately integrated into the field of vocational training? What are the advantageous of the private sector in the service of provision?
- 13) What are the impacts of the private provision on the effectiveness of the vocational training courses?
- 14) What can be done to make the usage of resources allocated to the vocational training courses more efficient? In this regard, what do you think about the impacts of the private provision on the efficient usage of the resources?
- 15) The curricular of the courses are determined according to the module system of the Ministry of National Education. Do you think that these curricular are appropriate to the needs of the real sectors?

### **Interview Questions for Group II Organizations<sup>34</sup>**

- 1) How do you evaluate the success and effectiveness of the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR in enhancing the skills of labour force?
- 2) Do you organize vocational training courses with the İŞKUR? Why?
- 3) Vocational training courses are organized through tender or cooperation method. Which method do you use when organizing courses with the İŞKUR?
- 4) In organizing the vocational training courses, how much of the cost of the courses are borne by the İŞKUR? What is your gain from offering these courses?
- 5) How do you select or find the trainees? Do you have trouble in the selection or finding of the trainee?
- 6) Are your courses organized with the İŞKUR job guaranteed?
- 7) Where are your trainees employed after the training? What are the problems you face when employing the trainees?
- 8) How much of your trainees do continue to be employed after the finish of legal period?
- 9) What are the advantageous of the private sector in the service of provision?
- 10) What can be done to improve the effectiveness of the vocational training courses organized by the private sector providers?
- 11) Do you find the resources allocated to the vocational training courses sufficient? What can be done to make the usage of these resources more efficient?
- 12) How do you determine which course you offer when you organize your own private courses?
- 13) How does the organization of the vocational training courses by the İŞKUR affect your own private courses?

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<sup>34</sup> This group is composed of private education institutions.



### **Interview Questions for Group III Organizations<sup>35</sup>**

- 1) What is the major objective of the active labour market policies?
- 2) How do you assess the importance of vocational training courses in active labour market policies? What are the advantages of vocational training courses when comparing with other active labour market policies?
- 3) Do you find vocational training courses useful to provide labour force with qualifications required in the labour market? What are the deficiencies of these courses?
- 4) Do you find the İŞKUR as an institution competent about the vocational training? What are the deficiencies of the İŞKUR? What can be done to make the İŞKUR more competent?
- 5) What are the purposes of your vocational training courses? What are the similarities and distinct characteristics of your courses compared with other vocational training courses organized in Ankara?
- 6) What are the differences your courses have from the courses conducted by the İŞKUR? Is there any relation between your courses and the courses of the İŞKUR? Any coordination? Are your courses considered as the complementary of the İŞKUR's courses?
- 7) What is the reason behind that different institutions organize vocational training courses? Do these courses operate where the courses of the İŞKUR is insufficient?
- 8) Do you make cooperation with the İŞKUR? Why?
- 9) When you determine which courses you organize, what are your priorities? What is the role of the private sector in determination process?
  - a) Do you make need analysis?
  - b) How do you make the announcements of your courses?
  - c) How do you select or find the trainees?

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<sup>35</sup> This group is composed of BELTEK, BELMEK and Ministry of National Education.

d) Is there any criteria to be a trainee in your courses such as being unemployed? Could everyone participate into your courses?

e) How are the profiles of the trainees?

10) Do you provide job guarantee to your trainees?

11) What are the advantageous and disadvantageous of the provision of vocational training courses by the local governments or central government?

12) How do you finance your vocational training courses?

13) How do you evaluate the effectiveness of your courses? Do you make any impact analysis?

### **Interview Questions for Group IV Organizations<sup>36</sup>**

- 1) What is the major objective of the active labour market policies?
- 2) How do you assess the importance of vocational training courses in active labour market policies? What are the advantages of vocational training courses when comparing with other active labour market policies?
- 3) Do you find vocational training courses useful to provide labour force with qualifications required in the labour market? What are the deficiencies of these courses?
- 4) Which institutions do organize vocational training courses besides the İŞKUR? What are the differences of the courses of the İŞKUR from the courses conducted by other institutions? Is there any relation between your courses and the courses of the İŞKUR? Any coordination? Are these courses considered as the complementary of the İŞKUR's courses?
- 5) What is the reason behind that different institutions organize vocational training courses? Do these courses operate where the courses of the İŞKUR is insufficient?
- 6) How do you determine which courses you organize? What are your priorities in determination process? Does the private sector have a role in determination process? Is this role effective?
  - a) How is the need analysis made? Is the need analysis made only through questionnaire? Do the provincial directorates make these analyses?
  - b) Are all workplaces visited for the need analysis?
  - c) Do all workplaces have a job and occupational counsellor?
  - d) Do the job and occupational counsellors have visit workplaces? How many times in a year these counsellors have to visit the workplaces?

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<sup>36</sup> This group is composed of the expert from the İŞKUR.

e) What are the shortcomings of the need analysis? Do these analyses provide the determination of exact needs of the private sector? What can be done for better need analysis?

f) Is the annual vocational education plan prepared after the need analysis? Are there any roles played by private sector and social parties in preparation of these plans? How could they participate into the process? Or are these plans prepared only according to the need analyses?

g) The annual vocational education plans are approved by the İİMEK. How these boards operate? How do the social parties participate into the approval process? Are these boards authorized to make changes on the plans? How are the decisions taken in these boards? What are the deficiencies of the decision making process? Are all decisions taken according to the need analysis and the annual plan prepared in line with the need analysis? Could vocational training courses which do not take place in the need analysis and annual plan be organized? If so, can this situation result in misappropriations?

h) Is the provincial directorate authorized to prepare the annual plans? Does the department of active labour services have any responsibility in preparation of these plans? How could this department get involved into this process?

i) Who does determine the amount of resources allocated to the courses taking place in the annual plan? What is the role of the İİMEK in the determination process of the resources?

j) How is the amount of resources allocated to the vocational training courses out of the budgets of the provincial directorates?

k) How are the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR financed?

7) The vocational training courses are organized through cooperation or tender method. Which method is more successful in contributing to the enhancing the skills of the labour force and the employment of the labour force? Compared with each other, what are the advantages and disadvantages of cooperation and tender method? Which method do you as an institution prefer?

- 8) What are the challenges you faced in the implementation of vocational training courses through cooperation and tender method?
- 9) When you look at the vocational training courses which has been implementing since the beginning of 2000s, which method is more used in organizing these courses? Why?
- 10) Do you think that the participation and integration of the private sector into the provision of vocational training courses is sufficient?
- a) When you look at the vocational training courses which has been implementing since the beginning of 2000s, which service provider has the largest share in organization of these courses? Private sector? Public sector? Or civil society organization? Why?
- b) Is this situation stem from the conscious preference of the İŞKUR?
- c) What are the advantageous and disadvantageous of private provision in the field of vocational training courses?
- d) Which sector private or public is more successful in efficient usage of the resources?
- 11) Do the private sector institutions have sufficient information about the vocational training courses conducted by the İŞKUR? Does the İŞKUR give the information to private sector about these courses? How does the İŞKUR give information?
- 12) Does the İŞKUR give incentives to the private sector? What are these incentives? What are the conditions of these incentives? Does the İŞKUR inform private sector about these incentives?
- 13) Does the İŞKUR get feedback from private institutions after the organization of courses with these institutions? How are these feedbacks evaluated?
- 14) How are the private institutions organizing vocational training courses on behalf of the İŞKUR monitored?
- 15) What are advantageous of organization of the vocational training courses by the İŞKUR?

16) Could it be more useful for enhancing the skills of the labour force that workplaces give the education to their employees instead of the vocational training courses offered by the İŞKUR?

17) Do you find the resources allocated to the vocational training courses sufficient? What can be done to make the usage of these resources more efficient?

18) How are the trainees selected or found? Does the İŞKUR select or find? Does the İŞKUR help private institutions to select or find the trainees?

## APPENDIX B: QUOTATIONS IN TURKISH

*“İİMEK mesleki eğitimle ilgili tüm konularda tek karar mekanizması yani kurul Ankara ilinde mesleki eğitimle ilgili ne yapılacaksa tam yetkili. Devletin elindeki birçok yetki bu kurulun elinde, kaynağın kullanımı, analiz, rapor, her türlü kararı alma yetkisi kurula ait. Bir de bu kurulun yönetim kurulu var. Yönetim kurulunda 4 kişi var; İŞKUR il müdürü, ASO temsilcisi, Hak-iş temsilcisi bir de engelliler temsilcisi var. Yönetim kurulu İİMEK’in teknik işlerini yapıyor ve denetim kurulu var bu kurulun da mesleki eğitim kurslarını denetleme yetkisi var” (Mülakat 26).*

*“İŞKUR’un yönetim kurulunda, İİMEK’lerde sosyal taraflar var. Ama yönetim kuruluda, İİMEK’ler de hantal bir yapıya sahip. Sosyal taraf temsilcileri içselleştirmiyorlar. Her tarafta ciddiyetsizlik var. Karar alma noktasında hiç bir katılımcılık göstermiyorlar. Sosyal taraflar çok pasif kalıyorlar ve kuruldaki karar alma süreçleri o yüzden çok sıkıntılı” (Mülakat 22).*

*“İl istihdam ve mesleki eğitim kurulları şuan için sadece mevzuatta yazdığı için toplanıyor. İŞKUR ne hazırlıyorsa ortada o oluyor, bunu niye böyle yaptınız diye soran olmuyor. Kurula katılan kişiler gelip tuzluk gibi oturuyorlar. İŞKUR’a bunu yapmışsın da niye yapmışsın, bu neden böyle olmuş diye sormuyorlar. Ankara’da bu konuda en katılımcı olan ASO başkanıdır. Her toplantıda görüşlerini bildirir, katkıda bulunur. İşgücü piyasasına yönelik çok fazla bir şey konuşulduğunu ben görmedim. Kurul prosedür gereği yapılıyor. Yarım saatte, 1 saatte toplantı bitsin diye bekleyen kişilerle bu iş yürümüyor. Kurulda sendikalar, akademisyenler var ama ben daha bir kere bile akademisyenin bir yorumunu görmedim. Kurula katkı yapanlar olmuyor. Kurulların hantal bir yapısı var” (Mülakat 22).*

*“İİMEK’deki karar alma süreci çok sağlıklı bir süreç değil. Kurul 3 ayda bir prosedür gereği toplanıyor. Katılım var ama katılımcılık yok. Üyeler önlerine gelen kararları imzalıyorlar sadece. Bazen haberimiz olmadan yönetim kurulu karar almış, karar teklifi çıkarmış oluyor biz İİMEK toplantısında görüyoruz. Biz de yönetim kurulu üyesiyiz ama bize sorma gereği duymadan karar alabiliyorlar. En azından usulen bir araya gelmesek de evrakın dolaşması gerekir, imzamızın alınması gerekir ama bunu bile yapmıyorlar. Bu nedenle kuruldan verimli sonuç almayı beklemek yanlış olur. Karar alma mekanizması bu*

*kadar problemlili olan, prosedür geređi toplanan bir kurul o ildeki koordinasyonu ve işbirliğini nasıl sağlasın” (Mülakat 26).*

*“İl istihdam kurulunda yüzlerce kurs açılıyor. Ciddi bir arka planı olmadan bu kurslara karar verilip, onaylanıyor. Ağırlıklı olarak MEB ile İŞKUR şu kurs açılсын diye bir şeyle geliyor bizde bunu onaylıyoruz. Ben 8-10 yıldır TİSK’in temsilcisiyim ama il istihdam ve mesleki eğitim kuruluna bir katkı sağlayamıyorum. Bu kurul daha çok esnafların bir araya geldiđi, büyük sanayici kesimini entegre edecek bir kurul değil” (Mülakat 31).*

*“İİMEK bizim istediğimiz düzeyde değil. Kurum olarak bunu sürekli söylüyoruz. Çok fazla paydaş kuruluş var ama hepsinden aynı katkıyı alamıyoruz. Her ilin kapasitesi ve o ildeki yöneticilerin olaylara bakış açıları çok farklı. İlde vali bu işe çok fazla önem veriyorsa İİMEK çok etkin olabiliyor. Valinin çok temel bir rolü var kurulların içerisinde” (Mülakat18).*

*“Ankara İİMEK’e genelde vali katılmıyor bu nedenle ciddiyeti de olmuyor. Valinin geldiđi kurullarda herkes daha ciddi oluyor. Vali yardımcısı katılınca herkes kendi halinde oturuyor. Valinin kurul üstünde etkisi çok yüksek” (Mülakat 22).*

*“Mesleki eğitim konusunda aynı alanda aynı kişilere aynı amaçla hizmet sunan birden fazla kurum var. (halk eğitim merkezleri, belediyeler vs.) Örneğin bir kişi 4 yıl meslek lisesine gidiyor, bu kişiye 4 yıl kaynak aktarılıyor. Mezun oluyor işe girerse sıkıntı yok. Üniversiteye giderse mesela meslek yüksek okulunda da kaynak aktarılıyor. Sonra İŞKUR’a geliyor 6 ay boyunca da kurs vererek biz kaynak aktarıyoruz. Eğer iş bulamazsa BELTEK’e gidiyor orada da kaynak aktarılıyor. Yani bütüncül bir yaklaşım yok. Türkiye’de mesleki eğitim probleminin çözülmesi için bütüncül bir yaklaşım olması ve kaynakların tek bir yerden kullanılması lazım. Bir kişi için tek bir kaynak kullanılması lazım. Bu şekilde kaynaklar israf olurken, verimsiz bir mesleki eğitim verilmiş oluyor. Şuan aynı kişi için 10 farklı kaynak aktarılıyor ama kişinin işe girmesini sağlamıyor” (Mülakat 18).*

*“MEB halk eğitim merkezleri bizim çok fazla işbirliği yaptığımız bir kuruluş ama biz çok fazla işbirliği yapma taraftarı değiliz. Biz halk eğitim kurslarına inci boncuk kursları diyoruz. Güncel mesleklerde eğitim verilmiyor. Alışlagelmiş mesleklerde eğitim yapılıyor. Kendi müfredatlarını düşündüğünüzde normal çünkü bir program dahilinde eğitim*



yapıyorlar. Çünkü işgücü piyasasında bir karşılığı var mıdır sorusunu sormak zorunda değiller, bunun araştırmasını da yapmıyorlar, çünkü işe yerleştirme gibi bir görevleri yok. Ama biz daha geçerli mesleklerde kurslar açmak istiyoruz. MEB ile istihdam garantisiz kurs açıyoruz diye ıvır zıvır mesleklerde eğitim vermek istemiyoruz. İstihdam garantisi olmasa da iş piyasasında iş bulması kolay bir meslekte eğitim vermek istiyoruz” (Mülakat 18).

“İŞKUR’la şuan hiçbir bağlantımız ve işbirliğimiz yok. İŞKUR bu durumu değiştirmek için bir şey de yapmıyor. Bir kere İŞKUR’dan bir talep geldi. Bizim adımıza kurs düzenleyin diye. Yaklaşık 1 yıldır sizinle yapalım diyorlar ama protokol taslağı öneriyoruz size döneceğiz diyorlar 3 ay geçiyor, şurayı bir daha değiştirip gönderir misiniz diyorlar ama sonucunu getirmiyorlar çünkü gerçekten işbirliği yapmak istemiyorlar. İŞKUR bizimle işbirliği yapmak istemiyor çünkü 10 liralık hizmeti 2 liraya almak istiyor. Parasal olarak ucuza getirmek istediğini bizimle protokol yaparken şu kadar kurs verirsek kaç olur, şu kadar kişi gelirse kaç mal olur diye sürekli sormalarından ve düşürmeye çalışmalarından çıkartıyoruz. Bizim sistemimiz belli, bizim yönetim giderimiz 1 kurs da açılrsa aynıdır 10 kurs da açılrsa aynıdır. Bunun dışında kurs sayısı arttıkça kurs eğitmeninin ücreti ve kullanılan sarf malzemesinin maliyeti artar. Ama İŞKUR az maliyetle çok kurs açmak istiyor. Yönetmeliğinde protokollerle ilgili bir sürü kısıtlamalar koymuş. İstihdam garantisi arıyor. Ama biz bunu kabul edemeyiz. Biz mezun ettiklerimize iş arayacak değiliz. O bize kursiyerlere %10 istihdam garantisi vereceğim dese biz 3 günde tüm kurslarını doldururuz” (Mülakat 34).

“Biz BELTEK ile görüşmeler yaptık ama bir kamu kurumu olarak istihdam taahhüdü vermek istemiyorlar. Onlarla istihdam garantisiz kurs da yapabiliriz ama BELTEK’le bir kurs düzenlemek istediğimizde BELTEK Gazi Üniversitesi’ne bağlı olduğu için eğitimin toplam maliyetinin %40’ından daha fazlasını üniversiteye döner sermaye olarak vermek zorundasınız. Geçenlerde bir hesap yaptık 184.000 TL’lik maliyetin yaklaşık 100.000 TL’si rektörden başlayarak en altta çalışan memura kadar idari gider diye geçiyor. Oysa maliyet 84.000 TL bu kadar parayı vermek istemiyoruz. Verme imkânımız var ama vermek istemiyoruz. Çünkü bu eğitime giden bir para değil, eğitimin daha kaliteli olması için harcanmıyor. Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi bu parayı ödeyebiliyor Gazi üniversitesine” (Mülakat 18).

“Bizim kurslarımız çok fazla rağbet görüyor. Bizim kurslarımızda kursiyere para ödenmiyor ama kurslarımız hemen doluyor. Boş kontenjanımız neredeyse hiç kalmıyor. İŞKUR kursiyerlere günlük para ödemesine rağmen İŞKUR’un kurslarına kursiyer bulunamıyor. Bizim kurslarımızın İŞKUR’un kurslarına göre daha fazla rağbet görmesinin sebebi bizim eğitmenlerimizin niteliğinin çok yüksek olması, daha nitelikli kurslar açılması ve üniversitenin altyapısının kullanılması. Kurslarımızda eğitimi üniversitemizin öğretim elemanları veriyor. Öğretim elemanı niteliğimiz çok yüksek. Üniversitemizin profesörleri bu kurslarda ders veriyor. Ayrıca uygulamalı eğitimlerimiz çok yoğun ve verilen eğitimle ilgili uygulamalı eğitim için gerekli her türlü altyapıya sahibiz. Bizim bu programa başladığımızdan beri üniversitede 4 rektör değişti ama program aynı şekilde devam ediyor. Yıllar içerisindeki kursiyer sayılarımıza baktığımızda çok fazla iniş çıkışlar yoktur. Kurumsallaşmış bir kurumda yöneticilerin değişmesi işleyişi değiştirmez. Bizim oturmuş bir işleyişimiz var. Ama İŞKUR’da henüz oturmuş bir yapı yok. Ankara Büyükşehir Belediyesi İŞKUR’dan daha etkili bir hizmet yürütüyor BELMEK ve BELTEK’lerle. Bir belediye başkanlığın bu işle yetkili hizmet biriminden daha iyi hizmet üretebiliyor” (Mülakat 34).

“Mesleki eğitimde daha bütüncül bir yaklaşım sunmak için UMEM projemiz var. TOBB ETÜ üniversitesi, MEB, İŞKUR, TOBB projenin paydaşlarıyız. Ama istediğimiz gibi olmadı. Programın amacı işyerleriyle bağlantılı bir şekilde meslek liselerinde eğitmek, işyerlerinde pratik yaptırmak sonra işyerlerinde istihdam etmektir. TOBB ETÜ üniversitesi bunun ihtiyaç analizini yapacak. TOBB ve ASO firmalarla iletişime geçecek. İŞKUR parasını verecek, MEB koordinasyonu sağlayacaktı. Baktığımızda inanılmaz güzel bir proje. Ama okullardaki öğretmenlerimiz daha fazla para kazanmak için sanal öğrenciler yaratıyorlar. Mezun öğrencilerine falan gelin takılın burda diyorlar. Sonra istihdam edilmeleri gerektiğinde kursiyerler biz istihdamı konuşmamıştık diyorlar. Proje çöküyor. Taşın altına ellerini tam sokmuyorlar, sokuyor gibi yapıyorlar. TOBB, ASO bütün sanayicilere, işyerlerine ulaşabiliyor. Toplamda 1 milyon kişi istihdam edilecekti neredeyse her işyeri 1 kişi istihdam edecekti. Ama herşey İŞKUR’a kalınca, hem tanıtımını yap, hem okulu bul, hem işyerini bul, hem kursiyeri bul tabiki olmuyor. Yaklaşık 200.000 kişi oldu ama zincirin bir halkasında gevşeklik olunca sistem çöküyor. MEB bağlı okullarda müdüründen hademesine kadar para veriyorduk ve daha çok para kazanmak için daha çok kurs açıyorlardı. Bu durumu düzeltmek için 2014ten itibaren sorumluluğun büyük kısmını üstümüze aldık. Bütünsel yaklaşım maalesef ki tam olarak oluşturulamadı” (Mülakat 18).

*“İŞKUR’un dönüşümündeki en önemli olay bu kaynağın aktarılmasıdır çünkü para olunca her şey yapabiliyorsunuz” (Mülakat 18).*

*“2008den önce kurslar için genel kurum bütçesinden kaynak aldığımız için kurs rakamlarımız çok düşüktü. 2009 yılından beri mesleki eğitim kursları için Maliye Bakanlığının kuruma ayırdığı bütçeden kaynak almıyoruz. Mesleki eğitim kurslarına ayrılan kaynaklar tamamen bizim kaynağımız. Tamamı işsizlik sigorta fonundan gelen kaynaktır. AB fonlarından bize hiç kaynak gelmiyor. Proje yaparsak geliyor ama şuan bir projemiz yok. Mesleki eğitim anlamında AB fonlarından kaynak almıyoruz” (Mülakat 18).*

*“İhtiyaç analizi adı altında işgücü piyasası araştırması yapıyoruz. Bu da yetmiyor çünkü işgücü piyasası araştırması belli bir dönemin fotoğrafını çekiyor. Ama iş gücü piyasası dinamik bir yapıya sahip her gün değişebiliyor. İşverenlerden somut bir talepleri topluyoruz ya da işgücü piyasasının temel aktörleri olan çatı kuruluşlar var odalar, borsalar, sanayi ve ticaret odaları, dernekler, vakıflar, sendikalar bu kuruluşlar sektördeki ihtiyaçları ortaya koyabiliyorlar. İl müdürlükleri hem işgücü piyasası araştırmasını, hem de sektörden alınan ihtiyaçlarla ilgili verileri, doğrudan işverenden gelen ihtiyaçları kullanarak hangi kursun açılması gerektiğini araştırıyor. İhtiyaç analizi için 2014 yılında 74 ilde tam sayım yapıldı yani TÜİK’deki ve SGK’daki kayıtlardan 74 ildeki 10+ sayıda çalışmanı olan tüm işyerleri tespit edildi. Bütün işyerlerine bilfiil iş ve meslek danışmanları gidiyor. Anket doldurtuyorlar. Firmalara şuan açık işin var mı, gelecekte neye ihtiyacın var, aradığın işgücünün ne gibi özellikleri olmalı diye soruyorlar. Yüzde 80-90’a yakın bir cevaplama oranı var. Diğer illerde yani Ankara, İstanbul gibi büyük illerde örneklem seçiliyor. Örneklem de iyi bir rakam. Geçen sene yaklaşık 130.000 işyeri gezildi. 110.000 den daha fazlasından cevap alındı. Ulaşamadıklarımızdan çoğu da kayıtların güncel olmamasından dolayı kapalı ya da faal olmayıp sadece kâğıt üstünde olan şirketler. Yılda 2 kere yapılıyor bu çalışma. Bir tanesi yerel düzeyde geniş kapsamlı, bir tanesi ulusal düzeyde daha az örnekleme yani 10.000-15.000 örnekleme yapılıyor” (Mülakat 18).*

*“İŞKUR’un iş ve meslek danışmanı zaman zaman gelip anket doldurtturuyor. Ama vaktimiz olmuyor genelde üstün körü dolduruyoruz. Bazen gelmeden direk anketi gönderiyorlar günlerce doldurmaya vakit bulamıyoruz sonrasında doldurmuş olmak için hızlıca dolduruyoruz. Bunun dışında ihtiyaç tespitine yönelik hiç bir şey yapılmıyor” (Mülakat 8).*

“İhtiyaç analizinin sonuçlarının bilimsel verilere dayanıp dayanmadığı tartışmalı. İŞKUR analiz yaptık, işyerlerini dolaştık şu kurslara ihtiyaç var diyor bizde onaylıyoruz ama bu kursa olan ihtiyaç hangi verilere dayanarak belirlendi bu belli değil. Mesela Çubuk'ta bir sanat okulu var orada şu kurs açılsın. Tamam, da neyi nasıl ölçtünüz de orada o kursun açılmasına karar verdiniz. Ya il müdürü gece rüya gördü ya da birkaç kişi kahvede sohbet ederken niye böyle bir şey açmıyorsunuz dedi de bunun üzerine o kursun açılmasını öngördüler. Maalesef benim gördüğüm bu İŞKUR'un tek tek işverenlerle görüşüp ihtiyaçları belirlemesi bana biraz yönetmelik üstünde kalıyor gibi geliyor. Bize İŞKUR'dan ya da il müdürlüğünden anketler geliyor işyerlerimize gönderiyoruz. Ama kimsenin 3-5 sayfalık anketleri çözecek zamanı ve enerjisi olmayabiliyor. Bu nedenle bu anketlerin hakiki olarak yapıldığını düşünmüyorum” (Mülakat 31).

“İŞKUR kurslar için genel bir yönetmelik hazırlamış bu nedenle protokol yapacağı kurumun özel niteliklerini göz önünde bulunduramıyor. Örneğin biz istihdam garantisi sağlayamayız ama yönetmeliğinde hizmet alımında en az yüzde 50 istihdam garantisi sağlanması gerekir yazdığı için hizmet alımı yapamıyoruz. Genel bir yönetmelik hazırladıkları için bu çok sınırlayıcı oluyor. Bu nedenle genel bir yönetmelik yerine her hizmet alıcısının niteliğine ve kursun niteliğine göre ayrı bir yönetmelik hazırlaması gerekiyor. Bir üniversite ile özel istihdam bürosunun hizmet alımı şartları aynı olabilir mi?” (Mülakat 34).

“Hizmet alımı yapmak için ihaleye çıkıyoruz. Kamu ihale kanunu kapsamında doğrudan temin imkânımız var. Şartları uyan firmalar, tekliflerini sunuyorlar. Teminat usulü uygulanıyor. Belli kriterler var mevzuatta belirlenmiş. Teknik şartları geçenler, mali şartları da geçtikten sonra nihai bir sıralama yapılıyor. Uygun kaç firma varsa firmaların kontenjanlarına göre kursiyer gönderiyoruz” (Mülakat 18).

“Yüklenici firmalar eğitim veriyorlar. Biz onlara kursiyer başı ders saati maliyeti üstünden ödeme yapıyoruz. Tekliflerini verirken verdikleri birim fiyat üzerinden ödeme yapıyoruz. Bunun içerisinde eğitimle ilgili her şey var. Biz onun detaylarıyla ilgilenmiyoruz, eğitici gideri, malzeme maliyeti vs. gibi. Biz anahtar teslim iş istiyoruz ve hizmet sağlayıcıdan mevzuatta belirtilen oranda kursiyeri işe sokmasını istiyoruz” (Mülakat 18).

“Kamu kaynaklarını daha etkin ve verimli kullandığı için özel sektör tercih sebebi çünkü özel sektörün içinde bulunduğu rekabet ortamı daha verimli, daha etkin daha kaliteli

sonuçlara ulaşmayı sağlıyor. Özel sektör kar amacı güttüğü için daha avantajlı mesleki eğitim kurslarının gerçekleştirilmesinde daha etkin daha verimli. Özel sektörün kursların gerçekleştirilmesinde ağırlığı daha fazla çünkü kamu kaynaklarının daha etkin ve verimli kullanılması açısından özel sektör daha avantajlı” (Mülakat 20).

“Kurslar için İŞKUR olarak kayıtlı işsizlere mesaj gönderiyoruz ama bizim asıl istediğimiz hizmet aldığımız yerlerin kursiyer bulması” (Mülakat 18).

“İŞKUR güya kendine kayıtlı işsizlere mesaj gönderiyor ama sistemi ölü bir kişi bile gelmiyor. Ben bu işi 4 yıldır yapıyorum 1 kişi bile gelmedi. İŞKUR örneğin biz 100 tane kursiyer alacaksak 300 kişiye mesaj atıyor. Ama 300 kişinin çalışmak isteyip istemediğini, belki zaten işe girdiğini bilmiyorlar. Örneğin ben İŞKUR'a kayıt olmuştum yıllar önce kaç yıldır kendi işletmem var ama hala bana mesaj atıyor İŞKUR şurada şu kursumuz var katılmak ister misiniz diye. Sistemleri problemlidir. İŞKUR ayrıca kendi sitesinde ilana da çıkıyor şöyle bir kurs açılacak diye ama hiç gelen olmuyor” (Mülakat 33).

“Kursiyerleri kendimiz kendi çevremizden buluyoruz sonra da İŞKUR'a kayıt ettiriyoruz ve kursa kayıt ediyoruz. Yani İŞKUR'a zaten kayıtlı olan işsizlerden kursa katılan olmuyor. Kurs aslında kuruma kayıtlı işsizlere nitelik kazandırmak için açılıyor gibi görünüyor ama kursiyeri biz dışarıdan bulup kayıt ettiriyoruz” (Mülakat 33).

“Belli bir oranda kursiyer sayınızın hiç azalmaması gerekiyor. Örneğin 100 kişi geldiyse %70'nin devam etmesi gerekiyor. Kurs süresinde kursiyer sayısı azalırsa dışarıdan yine kursiyer alıp sayıyı tutturmanız gerekiyor. Kurs bitiminde hak ediş alabilmemiz için bunlar şart. Eğer bu şartları sağlayamazsak hak ediş de alamıyoruz para cezası da var. Kursiyerleri biz buluyoruz çünkü İŞKUR kursiyer yönlendirse de İŞKUR'dan neredeyse hiç kursiyer gelmiyor” (Mülakat 12).

“Kursiyer bulma konusunda çok zorlanıyoruz. İŞKUR'dan kursiyer gelmeyince kontenjanlarımızı eş dosttan, çevremizden bulduğumuz kursiyerlerle dolduruyoruz. Öbür türlü hak ediş ödememizi tam alamıyoruz. Sadece kayıt etmek de yetmiyor bu kursiyerler kursa devam etmek zorundalar paramızı alabilmemiz için. Biz ancak kursiyeri 55-60 yaşındaki yaşlı kişilerden bulabiliyoruz” (Mülakat 32).

“Kursların hemen hepsinde hizmet sağlayıcılar kursiyer bulmak için asgari kriterleri tercih ediyorlar. Kursiyer üstünden para kazandıkları için kursiyer bulmak çok önemli. Bu yüzden işsiz olsun yeter diyorlar. Mesela yaş kriteri koysa, kursiyer bulmak zorlaşacak belki de kontenjanını dolduramayacak. İŞKUR’da yıllık performans kriterlerini sağlayamıyor bu nedenle eğitim yerlerinin kriter koymamasından İŞKUR şikayetçi değil. Bu şekilde kursiyer sayısını artırmış ve performans kriterini tutturmuş oluyor. Bu nedenle kriter belirlenmiyor, hizmet sağlayıcı da İŞKUR’da yeter ki işsiz olsun diyor” (Mülakat 26).

“Kurslara gerçekten iş arama amacıyla olup İŞKUR’a kayıt yaptıranlardan çok çevremizde bulabildiğimiz ev kadınları geliyor. O yüzden kursiyerlerin çoğu kadın oluyor. ...Kursa 50-60 yaşına kadar hiç çalışmamış ev kadınlarını kayıt ediyoruz bu kadınlar kurstan sonra çalışır mı? Çalışsa bile kim işe alır o ayrı da zaten çalışma amacı yok. Bu kadınlar günlük 20 TL’den ayda 400 TL’yi alınca hayır duası ediyorlar yine kurs açarsan çağır diyorlar ama kurs sonrasında çalışmıyorlar. ...Kursiyerlerin %95’i kurstan sonra çalışmıyorlar zaten çalışmak için gelmiyorlar ki tek dertleri günlük verilen 20 TL’yi almak. Çalışan %5 de kursa çalışmak için gelip sonrasında çalışmıyor. Madem geldik sertifika aldık bari çalışalım diyor” (Mülakat 33).

“Hizmet alımı ihalelerinde rekabet çok yoğun, ihaleye o kadar çok firma giriyor ki aralarından ayrılmak için firmalar %80’lere varan istihdam garantisi veriyorlar. Çok büyük risklere giriyorlar” (Mülakat 18).

“Biz artık İŞKUR’un taşeron firması gibi buradan mezun ettiğimiz kursiyerlere iş arıyoruz. Artık bizi istihdam bürosu gibi biliyor insanlarda işyerleri bizi arıyor şu özellikte eleman arıyoruz elinizde var mı diyorlar. Aşçı, garson biraz daha kolay yerleşiyor ama yerleşemeyen gruplar oluyor o gruplar bizim için baya sıkıntı oluyor. Örneğin muhasebe yardımcısı zor yerleştiriliyor. İstihdam garantisi bize o kişinin 120 gün sigorta primini ödeyeceksin diyor. Bizde ne yapıyoruz 4 ay bir tanıdığın yanına veriyoruz. Çalışıyor ya da çalışmıyor bizde sigortasını ödüyoruz. 4 ay sonra çıkışını yapıyoruz. ...Herkesin tanıdığı şirketler var, oradan girişlerini yaparlar 4 ay sonra da çıkışlarını yaparlar. İŞKUR’a işe giriş belgelerini götürüyoruz, orada TC kimlik numarasından kontrolünü yaparlar sadece 120 günü dolmuş mu diye bakarlar” (Mülakat 33).

*“İŞKUR kursiyerlerini işe alıyoruz tanıdığımız firmalar istihdam zorunluluğunu yerine getirsin diye ama kursiyerler siz bizim sigortamızı yatırın biz çalışmayalım diyorlar. Ben prim günüm dolsun istiyorum diyor. Sen sigorta yap bana ücret ödeme sende kotanı doldur diyor eğitim firmasına” (Mülakat 7).*

*“Kursiyerlerin sadece sigorta primlerini ödeyerek istihdam etmiş gibi gösteren çok fazla firma oluyor. Yakaladığımızda ciddi cezalar veriyoruz” (Mülakat 18).*

*“X eğitim kurumunun sahibiyle çok eskiden birbirimizi tanırız. Eşiyle de çok iş yapıyoruz. Yıllardır İŞKUR kursları açar. Aşçılık kurslarını bitiren kursiyerleri benim firmamda işe sokuyoruz ama sürekli alım yapamayabiliyorum bu durumlarda sadece sigortasını yapıyoruz sanki çalışıyormuş gibi bütün primleri o ödüyor. 4 ay sonar çıkışını yapıyoruz. Gerçekten işe soktuğumuz kursiyerlerde çalışmak pek istemiyorlar aralarından 3-4 kişi anca devam ediyor gerisinin çıkışını da yine 4 ay sonra yapıyoruz. ...Biz çok eski ahbab olduğumuz için aramızda para söz konusu olamaz ama diğer kursları için tanıdık firma bulamadığı için para vererek işe soktuğunu biliyorum. Mecburen ne yapsın yani muhasebeci kursu var, kasiyer kursu var hepsini işe sokacak yer bulmak kolay değil ki. Karşıdaki şirket de bir miktar para kazanmış oluyor sonunda alan memnun satan memnun oluyor. Kursiyerler çalışmak hevesinde olmadığı için onlarda memnun en azından 4 ay da olsa sigortaları yatırılıyor hem de çalışmadan” (Interview 9).*

*“Özel eğitim firmalarının istihdam etme zorunluluğu var bazen bize de geliyorlar işçi arıyor musunuz diye. Ama işe yerleştirmeleri çok zor çünkü tek tek firmaları nasıl gezsinler de işçi arayan yerleri tespit etsinler. Her işveren İŞKUR’a açık işlerini bildirmediği için İŞKUR’dan da yardım alamazlar. Bu yüzden paravan şirketler kuruyorlar başka birilerinin üstüne ve o şirketlerde istihdam garantisini yerine getirmeye çalışıyorlar ben öyle çok şirket biliyorum. Birçoğunda sadece sigorta girişlerini yaptıklarını duydum” (Mülakat 14).*

*“Program bittiği zaman kursiyerler kontrol ediliyor, yüz yirmi gün istihdam edilmişler mi diye. Bu zamana kadar bu sürenin sonunda istihdam edilip edilmediklerini, işten çıkarılıp çıkarılmadıklarını takip etmedik” (Mülakat 18).*

*“İŞKUR’a sigorta başlama belgeleri götürünce 120 gün dolmuş mu diye bakarlar. 121.gün neden tüm kursiyerler toplu bir şekilde işten çıkmış diye sormazlar bile” (Mülakat 33).*

“Genel müdürlük performans hedeflerini kurs ve kursiyer sayısı üzerinden belirliyor. Uzaktan baktığınızda çok güzel bu seneki hedefimiz 15.000 kursiyer yetiştirmek, sertifika sahibi yapmak, %50’sini işe yerleştirmek ama bu kişiler çalışıyor mu yoksa sigortaları başlatılıp işten mi çıkarıldılar bunlara yönelik performans hedefi yok. Kalıcı istihdam sağlamak değil hedefimiz bize koyulan hedef kadar kurs açmak, kursiyer yetiştirmek” (Mülakat 22).

“Kursiyerleri işe sokmakla da olmuyor ki bir de en az kurs süresi kadar istihdam edilmelerini sağlamamız gerekiyor. İşe yerleştiriyoruz bir zaman sonra işi bırakıyor ya da lakayt davranıyor ve işten atılıyor. Biz tek tek işe yerleştirdiğimiz firmaları takip ediyoruz. Ayrılan olunca tekrardan kursiyerlere ulaşmaya çalışıyoruz. Çoğuna ulaşamıyoruz ya da çalışmak istemiyor. Ama ben bu süreyi tamamlamak zorundayım. Kursiyer bunu düşünmüyor ki. Yoksa hem hak edişimi alamıyorum hem de istihdam sağlayamadığım için cezalı duruma düşüyorum. O yüzden çalışmadan sadece sigortalarını yapıp süre bitene kadar çalışmış gibi göstermeyi tercih ediyoruz” (Mülakat 33).

“X eğitim kurumuna işe yerleştirme de yardım ediyoruz ama bir süre sonra kursiyerlerden bazıları işi bırakabiliyor. Başka iş buldum diye 50 TL fazla veren bir yere gidebiliyor. Ya da işe gelmiyor, geç geliyor işi doğru düzgün yapmıyor. Biz catering işi yapıyoruz işimiz sürekli zamana karşı bir okulun öğle yemeğini yarım saat geç götüremezsiniz. O durumlarda işine son veriyoruz. Böyle olunca yerine X kurumunun hemen birini bulması gerekiyor. Bulduklarını biz beğenmeyebiliyoruz ya da çoğu çalışmak istemiyor. Çok zorlandıkları zamanlar oluyor böyle olunca bir kursiyerle anlaşıyorlar ve sadece sigorta girişini yaparak kalan süreyi doldurmaya çalışıyorlar” (Mülakat 9).

“Hizmet alımı özel sektöre para kazandıran bir yöntem bu yüzden daha çok talep ediliyor. İşbirliğine gelen olmuyor çünkü işbirliğinde yükleniciye para vermiyoruz. İşbirliğinde yüklenicinin maddi menfaati olmadığı için yanaşmıyorlar, sadece gerçekten yetişmiş elemana ihtiyacı olan işyerleri yapmak istiyor. Geçen sene sadece hizmet sektöründe çağrı merkezi çalışanı yetiştirmek için yapıldı onun dışında çok fazla yapılmadı” (Mülakat 22).

“İŞKUR daha çok özel dershanelerle bu işi yürütüyor. Burada dershaneciliğe başka bir boyut kazandırılmış oluyor” (Mülakat 34).



“İŞKUR’dan ihale alarak kurs açmak çok karlı bir iş. Karlı olmasa bu kadar talep olur mu? İhalenin başvuru zamanı buraya bir gelin de görün nasıl bir sıra oluyor. İhaleye girmek isteyen firmalar kıyasıyla rekabet ediyorlar tabii ki de kar etmek için bu işe giriyorlar” (Mülakat 22).

“İşbirliğinde sadece eğitmen parası verdiği için kar yok ama hizmet alımında kar elde ediliyor. Haksızlık etmek istemem iyi para kazanıyoruz. Kar marjımız yüksek. Ben bu eğitim kurumunda 12-15 arası kişi istihdam ediyorum. İŞKUR’dan bu iş olmasa ben eğitmen alıp çalıştıramam. Özel kurslarımızda bize çok talep yok. Çünkü meslek edinmeye kimsenin eğilimi yok. Kimse özel kurslara para ödeyip, meslek sahibi olup, sertifika almaya istekli değil. Çoğu işyeri zaten sertifikasız işçi çalıştırıyor. Özel kurslarımızla böyle bir işletme ayakta durmaz. İŞKUR bizim için 3-4 ayda toplu bir para demektir, para akışı demektir. İyi bir kazanç elde ediyoruz” (Mülakat 33).

“5580 sayılı kanuna tabi özel eğitim kurumu dediğimiz yerler birer ticarethane, kurs işini ticarete çevirmiş. Sanki bir bakkal, süpermarket gibi bakıyor kurs işine. Öyle özel eğitim kurumları biliyoruz ki normalde eğitim faaliyeti yapmıyor, İŞKUR’un ihale açmasını bekliyor tek gelir kaynağı İŞKUR’dan kazandığı karlar. Sadece İŞKUR için kurulmuş özel eğitim kurumları var” (Mülakat 22).

“İŞKUR’la kurs açmak çok karlı diye bir sürü firma bu işe girdi. Hatta birçok merdiven altı firma açıldı sırf İŞKUR’un ihalelerini alıp para kazanmak için. Öyle bir sektör haline geldi ki çok para kazanmanın yeni yolu oldu İŞKUR’la kurs açmak” (Mülakat 9).

“2012’ye kadar kazığı yemiş ama artık akıllanmış sistemini oturtmaya başlayan bir kurumuz” (Mülakat 18).

“Genel müdürlük bize resen veriyor bütçeyi ama azalırsa bütçe talep edebiliyoruz. Ama azalması mümkün değil geçen sene Ankara’ya ayrılan bütçe 75 milyondur bu bütçenin sadece 27 milyonunu harcayabildik... İşbirliği yöntemiyle açılan kurslara daha çok para harcanyor gibi görünüyor ama bunun sebebi MEB ile yaptığımız kursların işbirliği kapsamında yaptığımız kurslar olması ve en çok MEB ile kurs düzenlememiz. Bir nevi halk eğitim merkezlerini finanse ettiğimiz için birlikte kurs açarak, onlardan sürekli talep geliyor. İstihdam garantisi de olmadığı için çokça kurs açılabilir. Kurs ve kursiyer sayısı artıyor böylece performans kriterlerimizi tutturabiliyoruz. Eğer MEB ile kurs açılmasa işbirliği ile

*neredeysse hiç kurs açılmaz ve bu harcamalar yapılmaz. O yüzden MEB dışarıda bırakılırsa paranın çoğu aslında hizmet alımıyla özel sektöre aktarılıyor” (Mülakat 23).*

*“Bu kurslar en çok İŞKUR’un işine yarıyor. Fondaki paranın harcanmasını sağlıyor. Hükümet bu parayı harca diyor çünkü AB fonları gibi yasal bir zorunluluk olarak harcanması gerekiyor. İŞKUR’da işsizlere günlük 20-25 TL vererek, MEB okullarına, özel eğitim yerlerine, işyerlerine para vererek harcıyor. Bu şekilde devlet ekonomiyi beslemiş oluyor. Kurs kriterlerini aşağıya çekip daha çok kurs açıp daha çok kursiyer yetiştirmeye çalışıyor. Kurs veren eğitim yerlerine belli esneklikler sağlanıyor. Ve özel sektörün eğitim hizmeti veren kesimlerine çok faydası oluyor çünkü para aktarılıyor” (Mülakat 26).*

*“İŞKUR kökenli iş müfettişleriyle konuştuğumda bu kurslarda çok büyük su istimallerin olduğunu öğrendim. İŞKUR’un elinde ciddi bir fon var. Bu açılan kurslar aracılığı ile bir takım merkezlere para aktarılıyor. Burada amaç onları zengin etmek ya da para aktarmak değil aslında insanları eğitip istihdama katmak ama amacına hizmet etmiyor” (Mülakat 31).*

*“MEB mesleki eğitim kursları için hazırladığı modüller sistem hazırlanırken sektöre düşünceleri çok fazla sorulmuyor bu nedenle reel sektöre uzak kişiler tarafından hazırlanan modüller tüm kurslarda uygulanıyor bu da eğitimlerin kalitesinin sektörün ihtiyaçlarına göre olmasını engelliyor” (Mülakat 26).*

*“İŞKUR’un protokol yaptığı yerlerin bazıları merdiven altı kurs yerleri. Kızılay’daki bir dershanede kaynakçılık kursu verilebilir mi? Ama dershaneler bundan memnun. Buralarda verilen eğitimin kalitesi tartışmalı” (Mülakat 34).*

*“Bu kurslar nerelerde veriliyor bu çok önemli. Bir apartmanın 7-8. Katında işverenler mesleki eğitim kursu diye kurslar açıyorlar. Bu kurslara katılanlarda eğitim seviyesi düşük, yaşlı, hiç iş tecrübesi olmayan kişiler olunca bu niteliksiz eğitimle sektörde istihdam edilecek becerilere sahip olamıyorlar” (Mülakat 31).*

*“İŞKUR’un mesleki eğitim kursları amacına uygun işlemiyor. Tamamen kandırmaca. Düzenlenen 10 kurstan belki sadece 1 tanesi amaca hizmet ediyor. 3 ay gibi bir sürede meslek öğretilir mi mümkün değil. Bir de kursiyerlerin az deneyimli hatta deneyimsiz, eğitim seviyesi düşük, niteliksiz olduğunu düşününce bu kişileri 3-4 ayda meslek sahibi yapamazsınız. Daha çok kursiyer i kısa zamanda yetiştirip eğitim firmaları üzerinden işe*

*girişlerinin yapılması için daha kısa kurslar düzenleniyor. Bu şekilde performans kriterlerini tutturmuş oluyoruz” (Mülakat 22).*

*“İŞKUR’da alınan eğitimler işverenin işine yaramıyor ki. Oradan istihdam ettiğiniz kişiye tekrar eğitim vermek zorunda kalıyorsunuz. O yüzden sırf teşvikten yararlanmak için İŞKUR’un kursunu bitirmiş kişileri istihdam ederim ve yine kendim eğitim veririm” (Mülakat 10).*

*“İŞKUR piyasaya hâkim değil bu nedenle piyasayı düzenleme, kontrol etme ve aksaklıkları saptama kapasitesi çok düşük. Bu nedenle İŞKUR kendi yetersizliklerinden dolayı istismar ediliyor” (Mülakat 34).*

*“Ankara’da OSTİM’de faaliyet gösteren firmaların çoğunda sigortasız çalışanlar var. Aynı şekilde biz de zaman zaman çalıştırdık ama İŞKUR’un teşviklerini öğrenince bundan istifade edip sigortalıya geçirelim dedik. Çalışanları kursa gönderdik kurs bitince işe aldık sigortasını yaptık 3 yıla yakın sigorta primi ödemeyeceğiz. ... Kursu ihtiyaçları yoktu zaten işi biliyorlardı ama teşvik için gitmeleri gerekiyordu. ... O süre içinde biz eski aldığı kadar olmasa da ücret ödedik” (Mülakat 1).*

*“İşverenler sigortasız çalıştırdıkları işçileri sigortalıya geçirme yolu olarak İŞKUR’un teşviklerini kullanıyorlar. Bu bizi memnun eden bir şey bu şekilde kayıt altına alınmış oluyorlar. Ama teşvikler tam olarak amacına hizmet etmiş olmuyor. İŞKUR bu teşvikleri kursiyerler kurs sonrası işe kolayca yerleşsinler ve işveren bu kişileri daha çok tercih etsin diye veriliyor kayıt dışı çalışanlar sigortalı olsun değil amaç” (Mülakat 23).*

*“Bazen ekonomik zorluklar yaşayabiliyoruz iş hayatının doğası böyle öyle zamanlarda bizim gibi hizmet sektöründeki firmaların en büyük maliyet kalemi işgücü maliyeti olduğu için bu kalemden kısıntı yapmak zorunda kalırız. İŞKUR kursunu bitirmiş kişileri işe alınca teşvik verdiği için bundan faydalanmak çok işimize geliyor özellikle sıkıntımız varsa daha da önemli oluyor. Biz hiç yapmadık ama bizim gibi catering işi yapan firmalardan yaptığını bildiğim firmalar var. Bizim işlerimiz kış aylarında büyük oranda yavaşlar böyle zamanlarda yavaş yavaş işçi çıkarmaya başlıyorlar ama işlerin yaz aylarında düğün mevsimi geldiği için açılacağını bildikleri için o çıkarttıkları işçilerin bazılarını İŞKUR’un kurslarına gönderiyorlar. 3-4 ay kurs sürüyor kurs bitince 2-3 ay bekliyorlar çünkü teşvikten*

*faydalanabilmek için işe aldığımız kişinin son 6 ayda sizin işyerinizde sigortalı çalışmanız olmaması gerekiyor. Sonra tekrar işe alıyorlar ve 3-4 yıla yakın süre teşvikten faydalanıyorlar” (Mülakat 9).*

*“Bizim gibi KOBİ’ler için sigorta primini ödememek çok önemli bir şey. Zaten o yüzden çoğu firma sigortasız çalıştırıyor. Bu teşviklerden faydalanmak en çok bizim gibi firmaların işine geliyor. Büyük şirketlerin zaten sigorta yapmamak gibi bir derdi olmuyor çünkü bu cirolarının içinde çok küçük bir paya sahip ama bizim karlılığımızı direk etkiliyor” (Mülakat 1).*

*“İvedik Organize Sanayi’deki birçok firma aynı işi yapıyor. Neredeyse tüm firmalar büyük şirketlere taşıeron olarak parça üretiyor. Eğer bir firma işçileri üzerinden teşvik alıp sigorta primi ödemiorsa bu onun karını birden artırır bu da bizim iş için çok önemli. Kullandığımız makineler çok pahalı eğer karımız artsa kredi çekip bir makine daha alırız daha çok ve hızlı üretiriz o yüzden bazı firmalar için küçük olan sigorta primleri bizim için hayati derece de önemli. Bu yüzden birileri sigortasız çalışanını İŞKUR’a kursa göndermiş sonra işe alıp teşvik almış diye duyduk biz de hemen yapalım dedik. Bu şekilde firmadan firmaya yayılıyor ve bir bakıyorsunuz herkes yapmaya başlamış” (Mülakat 3).*

## APPENDIX C: TURKISH SUMMARY

Aktif işgücü politikaları (AİP) tüm dünyada işsizliğe çözüm getirmek amacıyla özellikle 1990lı yıllardan itibaren tüm dünyada uygulanmaya başlandı. Bu politikaların ön plana çıkmasında 1980'li yıllarda yükselen ve kalıcı hale gelen işsizlik oranları çok etkili oldu. Ekonomik Kalkınma ve İşbirliği Örgütü (OECD) 1994 yılında yaptığı çalışmada işsizliğin en önemli kısmının yapısal işsizlik olduğunu ve bunun sebebini de gücünün piyasanın ihtiyaç duyduğu niteliklerden yoksun olması olarak ortaya koydu (OECD, 1994). Bu kapsamda, OECD üye devletlere işsizlikle savaşma aracı olarak aktif işgücü politikalarını önerdi. Ayrıca Dünya Bankası (DB), Avrupa Birliği (AB), Uluslararası Çalışma Örgütü (ILO) gibi birçok uluslararası örgüt de raporlarında aktif işgücü politikalarının işsizlikle mücadeledeki önemini vurgulamaya başladı.

Aktif işgücü politikalarının işsizlikle savaşma aracı olarak ön plana çıkması neoliberal işsizlik kavramsallaştırmasıyla doğrudan ilişkilidir. Neoliberal yaklaşıma göre, işsizlik kişilerin işgücü piyasasında ihtiyaç duyulan niteliklerden, becerilerden yoksun olmasından dolayı işgücü piyasası dışında kalması durumudur. Bu kavramsallaştırma işsizlik olgusu ile kapitalist sistem arasındaki bağlantıyı kopartmakta ve işsizlik, kapitalist sistemin yarattığı bir sorun olmaktan çıkartılmaktadır (Dertli, 2007). Böylece işsizlik kişisel bir probleme indirgenmekte ve çözümlerde kapitalist sistemin yapısını değiştirmektense kişi odaklı çözümlere odaklanmaktadır. Bu şekilde işsizliğe karşı önerilen politikalar sorunun temelinde yatan yapısal sorunlar yerine işsizliğin görünen sonuçlarının azaltılmasına odaklanmaktadır (Dertli, 2007). Bu bağlamda, aktif işgücü politikaları neoliberal arz-yanlı politika yaklaşımına uygun bir şekilde ön plana çıkartılmakta ve birçok ülkeye işsizlikle savaşmak için en iyi araç olarak tanıtılmaktadır. Ama aslında bu politikalar işsizlikle mücadele aracı olmaktan çok işgücü piyasalarının neoliberal dönüşümünün en önemli saç ayaklarından birini oluşturmaktadır.

Aktif işgücü politikaları neoliberalizm ile birlikte esnekleştirilmiş (flexible) ve kuralsızlaştırılmış (deregulated) işgücü piyasalarının bir tamamlayıcısı olarak rol oynamaktadır. İlk olarak bu politikaların, yüksek teknoloji kullanan esnek üretim sisteminin ihtiyaç duyduğu esnek işgücünün yetiştirilmesini sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bu politikalar sayesinde esnek üretime ayak uydurabilen, ileri teknoloji kullanılan üretim için gerekli bilgi ve birikime sahip olan işgücü yetiştirilebilmektedir.

İkinci olarak, aktif işgücü politikalarının esnek ve kuralsızlaştırılmış işgücü piyasalarının yarattığı güvencesizlik ortamında görece güvenlik sağladığı düşünülmektedir. Bu iddia 'istihdam edilebilirlik' (employability) kavramıyla açıklanmaktadır. Aktif işgücü politikaları sayesinde işgücünün nitelikleri artırılarak piyasada istihdam edilme olasılığının artırılacağı ve bunun da bireylere işsiz kalma durumunda bir nevi güvence sağlayacağı iddia edilmektedir. Bu kapsamda, piyasada ihtiyaç duyulan niteliklere sahip bireyler işsiz kalsalar dahi kolayca yeni bir iş bulabilecekler. Bu düşünce 'güvenceli-esneklik' (flexicurity) kapsamında yapılan iş güvencesi yerine istihdam güvencesi tartışmalarının temelini oluşturmaktadır.

Üçüncü olarak, çalıştırmacı (workfare) yaklaşıma göre, toplumda çalışabilecek durumda olan herkes çalışmalıdır çünkü sosyal yardımlarla hayatını sürdüren kişilerde sosyal yardımlara olan bağımlılık artmakta ve kişiler işgücü piyasasından tamamen uzaklaşmaktadır. Bu kaynak israflarına ve refah harcamalarının artmasına sebep olmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, atıl durumda olan işgücünün piyasaya entegre edilmesi gerekmektedir bu hem sosyal harcamalarının azaltılmasını sağlayacaktır hem de ücretler üzerindeki baskıları artıracaktır. Ücretler üzerinde baskı oluşturabilmesi için atıl durumda olan işgücünün piyasaya entegre olması ve aktif biçimde iş araması gerekmektedir. Bu düşünce Marx'ın yedek sanayi ordusu olgusuyla doğrudan ilişkilidir. Grover ve Piggot'un belirttiği gibi neoliberallere göre ücretleri kontrol etmek için işsiz ordusunun varlığı yeterli değildir bu işsizlerin piyasada birbiriyle rekabet etmesi gerekir (2006). Bunun içinde işsizlerin ve atıl

durumdaki işgücünün işgücü piyasasına yakınlaştırılması gereklidir (Grover & Piggot, 2006; Dertli, 2007). Bu bağlamda aktif işgücü politikaları atıl durumdaki işgücünün piyasaya kazandırılmasında çok önemli bir role sahiptir.

Son olarak, aktif işgücü politikaları piyasa temelli neoliberal politikaların ortaya çıkardığı örneğin yoksulluk, toplumsal eşitsizlikler gibi sorunlara karşı oluşan ya da oluşabilecek olan toplumsal hoşnutsuzlukları ve sosyal baskıları azaltmanın ve kontrol etmenin bir aracı olarak işlev görmektedir. Bu nedenlerden dolayı, aktif işgücü politikalarının neoliberal işgücü piyasalarının yeniden üretimini ya da sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamanın kolaylaştırdığını söyleyebiliriz. Bu bağlamda, İşgücünün niteliğinin artırılması bu amaca hizmet eden bir araç olarak işlev yapmaktadır. Asıl amaç beşeri sermayenin (human capital) artırılması değildir.

Aktif işgücü politikalarının uygulanış süreci incelendiğinde diğer neoliberal politikalar gibi bu politikalarında neoliberal yönetim mantığı çerçevesinde piyasalaştırıldığı ve hizmet sunumunun özel sektöre devredildiği görülmektedir. Bu uygulama özel sektörün kamu sektörüne göre daha etkin ve verimli çalıştığı, özel sektörün daha esnek olduğu ve bu nedenle de piyasanın değişen koşullarına kendini adapte edebildiği bunun da hizmet kalitesini arttırdığı savına dayanmaktadır. Bu nedenlerden dolayı neoliberal ideoloji hizmet sunumunun özel sektör tarafından gerçekleştirilmesini bir zorunluluk olarak görmektedir. Ama özel sektöre devredilen hizmetlerin beklenen etki ve verimliliği göstermesi neoliberal ideolojinin yaygınlaştırdığı esnek ve kuralsızlaşmış siyasa ortamında mümkün değildir çünkü hizmet sunumunun özel sektöre devri devletin düzenleyici ve kontrol mekanizmasının etkin çalışmasını gerektirir. Fakat esnek ve kuralsızlaştırılmış bir işgücü piyasasında devletin piyasaya yaptığı düzenleyici ve denetimsel müdahalesi yetersiz kalmaktadır. Bu sebeplerden dolayı neoliberal yönetim mantığının zorunluluk ortaya koyduğu piyasa temelli hizmet sunumu neoliberal etkinlik ve verimlilik amaçlarıyla çelişmektedir. Bu sebeplerden dolayı özel sektöre devredilen aktif işgücü politikalarının özellikle mesleki eğitim kurslarının neoliberaler

tarafından beklenen politika sonuçlarını doğurması mümkün değildir. Diğer bir deyişle, özel sektör tarafından sunulan aktif işgücü politikaları başarısız olmaya meyillidir bu nedenle işgücünün niteliğinin artırılması amacına gerçekleştirmesi çok zordur.

Bu bağlamda, Türkiye’de de uygulanan aktif işgücü politikalarının bilhassa mesleki eğitim kurslarının başarısız olmaya mahkûm olduğu iddia edilebilir. Çünkü Türkiye’de de mesleki eğitim kursları hizmet alımı ve işbirliği yöntemiyle İŞKUR dışındaki kurumlara devredilmektedir. Devredilen kurumlar arasında en büyük paya özel sektör kuruluşları sahiptir yani bu kursların birçoğu özel sektör kuruluşlarına devredilmektedir. Kursların uygulanma yöntemindeki kusurlar nedeniyle bu kursların uygulanması sonucu işlevsiz yani etkin olmayan siyasa ortamı ve verimsizlikler diğer bir deyişle kaynak israfları ortaya çıkmaktadır. Uygulama sürecinde ortaya çıkan aksaklıklarda uygulanma sürecinin uygulayıcıların kurumsal kapasitelerine göre şekillendirilmemesi temel rol oynamaktadır. Bu politikaların Türkiye’ye tüm dünyaya olduğu gibi uluslararası kuruluşların etkisi altında transfer edilmesinin ve Türkiye’nin işgücü piyasasının özelliklerine ve piyasanın aktörlerinin kapasitelerine göre şekillendirilmemesinin sonucunda bu politikaların uygulanma sürecinde kilitlenmeler ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu nedenle bu politikalar istenilen amaca hizmet etmemektedir.

Aktif istihdam politikaları Türkiye’de 1990lı yıllardan itibaren uygulanmaya başlasa da özellikle 2000’li yıllardan itibaren yaygınlaşmıştır. 1990lı yıllarda uluslar arası kuruluşların finansal destekleriyle uygulanırken 2000li yıllardan itibaren daha çok Türkiye’nin kendi kaynaklarıyla uygulanmaya başlamıştır. Daha önce değinildiği gibi bu politikalar neoliberal işgücü politikalarının tamamlayıcı olarak esneklik ve kuralsızlaşmış işgücü piyasalarının sürdürülebilirliğini sağlamaktadır. Türkiye’de 1980li yıllardan itibaren neoliberal dönüşüm başlamış ve ekonomik ve sosyal programlar neoliberal ideoloji çerçevesinde yeniden şekillendirilmiştir. Ama Türkiye’de tam anlamıyla kurumsallaşmış bir refah devleti hiçbir zaman olmadığı



için Türkiye’de neoliberal politikaların ortaya çıktığı refah ülkelerinin sahip olduğu bu politikaların uygulanması için gerekli hukuksal ve kurumsal altyapılar bulunmamaktadır. Benzer şekilde, Türkiye’de kamu istihdam kurumu aktif işgücü piyasası politikalarının uygulanması için gerekli olan altyapılardan yoksun olduğu için bu altyapıları oluşturmak ve işgücü piyasalarının neoliberal dönüşümünün getirdiği değişikliklere ayak uydurması amacıyla 2003 yılında iş ve işçi bulma kurumu yeniden yapılandırıldı ve İŞKUR kuruldu. İŞKUR’a aktif işgücü piyasası politikalarını uygulama sorumluluğu verildi. Aktif işgücü piyasası politikaları kapsamında İŞKUR, mesleki eğitim kursları, girişimcilik eğitimleri, işbaşı eğitimleri, eski hükümlü ve engellilere yönelik kurslar ve toplum yararına çalışma programları düzenlemektedir. Ayrıca istihdamı artırmak amacıyla talep yönlü politikalar uygulamaktadır. İŞKUR’a kayıtlı ve İŞKUR’un mesleki eğitim kurslarını bitirmiş kişilerin istihdamı karşılığında işverenlere verilen teşvikler bu kapsamda uygulanan politikalardan biridir.

İŞKUR’un uyguladığı mesleki eğitim kurslarının uygulanma süreci incelendiğinde daha önce bahsedildiği gibi kurslar iki yöntem kullanılarak gerçekleştirilmektedir. İşbirliği yöntemiyle uygulanan mesleki eğitim kurslarında kursiyerlerin genel sağlık sigortası ve iş kazası ve meslek hastalığı sigortası primleri İŞKUR tarafından ödenmektedir ayrıca kursiyerlere günlük 20 TL ödeme yapılmaktadır. İŞKUR hizmet sağlayıcılarına kurs eğitmeninin ücreti ve kullanılan bazı malzemeler dışında ücret ödememektedir. Bu nedenle işbirliği yönteminde hizmet sağlayıcının kar elde etme imkânı yoktur. Ama hizmet alımı yönteminde İŞKUR kursiyerlere işbirliği yöntemindeki gibi sigorta yapıp, günlük 20 TL öderken hizmet sağlayıcılarına hizmet alımı ihalesinde tespit edilen yaklaşık kursiyer başı ders saat maliyeti üzerinden ödeme yapmaktadır. Bu ödemenin içerisinde eğitimle ilgili her şey ve hizmet sağlayıcının karı da yer almaktadır. Bu sebeple, hizmet alımı yöntemiyle açılan kurslarda hizmet sağlayıcılar kar elde etmektedirler. İki yöntemle de uygulanan kurslarda özel sektör sağlayıcıları en yüksek paya sahiptir. Bu durum İŞKUR’un neoliberal yönetim mantığı çerçevesinde özel sektöre öncelik vermesiyle ilgilidir.

Bu kursların gerçekleştirilmesi için gerekli kaynak işsizlik sigorta fonundan İŞKUR'a aktarılan kaynaktan karşılanmaktadır.

Bu çalışma hizmet alımı yöntemiyle gerçekleştirilen mesleki eğitim kurslarına odaklanmaktadır. Daha önce belirtildiği gibi mesleki eğitim kurslarının uygulanma süreci politika uygulayıcılarının kurumsal kapasitelerine göre tasarlanmamıştır bu nedenle uygulanma sürecinde aksaklıklar ve kilitlenmeler ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bunların sonucunda işlevsiz bir politika ve kaynak israfları oluşmaktadır.

İlk olarak özel eğitim kurumlarının kurumsal kapasitelerindeki eksikliklerden dolayı işlevsiz yani etkin olmayan bir siyasa ortamı oluşmaktadır. Bu nedenle beklenen politika sonucuna yani işsizlerin niteliklerinin artırılıp bir an önce piyasaya yeniden entegre edilmesi sonucuna ulaşılamamaktadır. Hizmet alımı yöntemiyle uygulanan kurslarda özel eğitim kurumları, mesleki eğitimin yanında kursiyerleri seçmek, ihalede belirlenen oranda (en az yüzde elli olmak şartıyla) kursiyeri işe yerleştirmek ve kursiyerlerin 120 günden az olmamak şartıyla kurs süresine eşit bir süre boyunca istihdamının devamını sağlamakla yükümlüler. Ama bu dört işlevi aynı anda yerine getirmek koordinasyon kapasitesi gerektirmektedir ayrıca bu dört işlev her birine özgü uygulama kapasitesi gerektirmektedir. Fakat özel eğitim kurumları bu kapasitelere sahip olmadığı için uygulama sürecinde kilitlenmeler meydana gelmekte ve istenilen sonuçlara ulaşılamamaktadır.

Kursiyerlerin seçilmesi konusunda özel eğitim kurumları işsiz kişilere ulaşma kapasitesine sahip olmadığı için ve İŞKUR'da bu kurumlara kendine kayıtlı işsizlere ulaşma noktasında yardım etmediği ya da edemediği için kursiyerleri çevrelerinden seçmek zorunda kalmaktadır. Bu durumda kursiyer seçme işi kursiyer bulma işine dönüşmektedir. Özel eğitim kurumlarının kurs sonucunda İŞKUR'dan hak edişlerini alabilmeleri için İŞKUR'a ihalede belirttikleri sayıda kursiyeri bulmaları gerekiyor. Kursiyer bulmakta çok zorlandıkları için bu kurumlar çevrelerinden, tanıdıklarından kursiyer sayısını tamamlamaya çalışıyorlar. Bu sebeple de çalışmayı düşünmeyen, istemeyen ya da çok yaşlı kişileri bile kurslara kayıt ediyorlar. Bu sebeple

kursiyerlerin çoğunu ev hanımları, çalışmayı düşünmeyen kişiler ya da yaşlı kişiler oluşturuyor. Bu kişiler çoğunlukla kurslara İŞKUR'un verdiği günlük 20 TL ücret için geliyorlar ve kurs sonunda genellikle çalışmıyorlar. Bu bağlamdan baktığımızda neoliberal bir politika olan mesleki eğitim kurslarının sonuçlarının neoliberal yaklaşımın aktif işgücü politikaları aracılığıyla istihdam edilebilir bir işgücü yaratma hedefiyle çeliştiğini söyleyebiliriz. Diğer bir deyişle, Türkiye'de mesleki eğitim kurslarında yetiştirilen işgücünün neoliberal yaklaşımın amaçladığı istihdam edilebilir işgücü olduğunu söylemek çok zordur.

Kursiyerlerin işe yerleştirilmeleri noktasında, İŞKUR'un kendine ait olan işe yerleştirme görevini özel sektöre mesleki eğitim kursları üzerinden devrettiğini söyleyebiliriz. İŞKUR özel eğitim kurumlarından kursiyerleri işe yerleştirmesini bekleyerek bu kurumların özel istihdam bürosu gibi çalışmasını beklemektedir. Ama özel eğitim kurumları özel istihdam bürolarının sahip olduğu kurumsal kapasitelerden yoksundur. Özel istihdam bürolarının özel şirketlerle ve firmalarla bağlantıları bulunmaktadır ve bu bağlantılar sayesinde açık işlerden haberdar olmaktadır. Ayrıca bağlantıları olmasa bile işverenler çalışan ararken bu bürolara başvuru yapmakta ve özel istihdam büroları işyerlerinden ücret almaktadır. Fakat özel eğitim kurumları hem bu bağlantılara sahip değildir, hem açık işleri araştırarak, şirketlerle bağlantı sağlayacak personele sahip değildir hem de işyerleri açık işleri için bu kurumlara başvurmamaktadır. Bu sebeplerden dolayı özel eğitim kurumlarının açık işlere ulaşması çok zordur. Ama bu yetersizliklerine rağmen bu kurumlar ihalede belirttikleri oranda (yüzde elliden az olmamak kaydıyla) kursiyeri işe yerleştirmeye çabalamaktadır. Bu konuda çok zorlandıkları için işe yerleştirmede bazı usulsüzlüklere başvurmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, kursiyerleri tanıdıkları şirketlerde yasal süre doluncaya kadar işe yerleştirip ve yasal süre bitince işten çıkartabiliyorlar ya da tanıdık işyerinde çalışıyormuş gibi göstermek için sigorta girişlerini yapıyorlar ve yasal süre bitince sigorta çıkışını yapıyorlar. Kursiyerler zaten çalışmak istemedikleri genellikle çalışmadan sadece sigortalarının yatırılmasını kabul ediyorlar.

Bunların yanında, özel eğitim kurumları işe soktukları kursiyerlerin yasal süre boyunca istihdamının devam etmesini sağlamak zorundalar. Bu nedenle, bu kurumlar kursiyerlerin işten atılıp, atılmadığını ya da kendi arzusuyla ayrılıp ayrılmadığını kontrol etmek eğer böyle bir durum olursa işten ayrılan kursiyer yerine yeni bir kursiyer bulmak zorundalar. Kursiyerlerin çoğunun çalışmak istemediği düşünüldüğünde çalışacak kursiyer bulma sorunu daha da zorlaşmaktadır. Bu nedenle, özel eğitim kurumları kursiyerleri takip etme ve yerine birini bulma sorumluluğundan kurtulmak için genellikle kursiyerleri çalışıyormuş gibi gösterip sigorta primlerini ödemeyi tercih ediyorlar. Bu zamana kadar İŞKUR etki analizi yapmadığı için ve kursiyerlerin yasal süre bitiminden sonra çalışıp çalışmadığını kontrol etmediği için kursiyerler çoğunlukla yasal süre sonunda işten çıkartılıyorlar. Bu nedenle mesleki eğitim kursları kısa vadede istihdam sağlarken orta ve uzun vadede istihdama katkı sağlamıyor. İŞKUR kendi performans kriterlerini yetiştirilen kursiyer sayısı, açılan kurs sayısı ve işe yerleştirme üzerinden belirlediği için kursiyerlerin orta ve uzun vadede istihdamlarının durumunu kontrol etmiyor.

Bu bağlamda, mesleki eğitim kurslarının amacına hizmet ettiğini bu kurslar sonucunda işsizlerin nitelikleri geliştirilerek yeniden piyasaya entegre edildiklerini söylemek çok zordur. Beklenen politika sonucu işsizlerin beşeri sermayesinin artırılması ve piyasaya yeniden dâhil olmalarını sağlamakken, ortaya çıkan politika sonucu işlevsiz ya da etkin olmayan bir politikadır. Bu kursların özel sektöre ihale edilmesi çalışmayı düşünmeyen, yaşlı kişilerin eğitilmesi, bir kısmının bir süre boyunca çalıştırılması ya da kâğıt üstünde çalışıyor gibi gösterilmesi sonuçlarını doğurmaktadır. Daha önce değinildiği gibi hizmet sunumunun özel sektöre devredilmesi etkin bir düzenleme ve kontrol mekanizması gerektirmektedir. Fakat İŞKUR'un kurumsal kapasitesinin yetersizlikleri özel sektöre zaten esnek ve kuralsızlaştırılmış siyasa ortamında geniş bir esneklik sağlamaktadır. Bu durum suiistimaller ve usulsüzlükler için uygun ortam sağlamaktadır. Bunların sonucunda bu kurslardan istenilen sonuçlar alınamamaktadır.

Fakat bu kurslar amaçlandığı şeye hizmet edemese de, özel sektöre karlı bir yatırım alanı yaratarak hizmet etmektedir. İŞKUR mesleki eğitim kurslarını özel sektöre ihale ederek bu kurslar üzerinden bir piyasa yaratmakta ve bu piyasa üzerinden de özel sektöre fon aktarmaktadır. Bu tez için yapılan alan çalışması yaratılan bu piyasanın karlılığının çok yüksek olduğunu ve bu nedenle de çok sıkı bir rekabet olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Bu piyasanın ortalama büyüklüğü şuan için 100 milyon TL civarındadır ama piyasaya büyümeye devam etmektedir. İŞKUR tarafından uygulanan mesleki eğitim kurslarının kurumsal, hukuksal ve finansal olarak oturmaya başlaması 2012 yılından itibaren gerçekleşmiştir bu nedenle hala çok genç bir sektör olarak kabul edebiliriz. Sektörün büyüme eğilimi de göz önüne alındığında mesleki eğitim alanında yıllar içerisinde gelişmiş bir piyasa oluşacağını söyleyebiliriz. Bu kapsamda, sektör büyüdükçe özel sektöre aktarılan fonlarda artacaktır. Bu fon aktarımı kursların uygulanma sürecinde kaynak verimsizliklerine sebep olmaktadır.

Mesleki eğitim kursları daha önce bahsedildiği gibi işsizlik sigorta fonundan aktarılan kaynaklarla finanse ediliyor. Çalışanların hepsi işsizlik sigorta fonuna prim yatırırken, işsiz kaldıklarında çok küçük bir kısmı bu fondan faydalanabilmektedir. Fona katkıda bulunan çalışanların çoğunun işsiz kaldığında faydalanamadığı işsizlik sigorta fonundan özel sektör için bir yatırım alanı yaratılarak fon aktarılıyor. En önemli toplumsal problemlerden biri olan işsizlik üzerinden kar elde edilmeye başlanıyor. İşsizlik doğası gereği bir meta olmamasına rağmen, para kazanmak için kullanılmaya başlanıyor. Bu noktada, işsizliğin metalaştırıldığını ya da ticarileştirildiğini iddia edebiliriz.

Son olarak, İŞKUR'un kontrol mekanizmasındaki yetersizlikler İŞKUR'un uyguladığı sigorta primi teşviklerinin amacı dışında kullanılmasına uygun ortam hazırlamaktadır. İŞKUR mesleki eğitim kurslarını bitiren kursiyerlerin işe alınması karşılığında işverenlere 42 aya varan teşvik sağlamaktadır. Bu kapsamda, işverenler yerine kursiyerlerin sigorta primleri işsizlik sigorta fonundan ödenmektedir. İŞKUR

bu teşvikleri mesleki eğitim kursları sektörünün çalışmasını kolaylaştırmak amacıyla vermektedir çünkü bu sektörün sürdürülebilirliğinin sağlanması için yetişen kursiyerlerin işe girmesi gerekmektedir. İŞKUR kursiyerlerinin genellikle düşük nitelikli, eğitim seviyesi düşük ve iş deneyimi neredeyse yok denecek kadar az kişiler olduğu göz önüne alındığında bu kişilerin piyasada ihtiyaç duyulan niteliklere kavuşturulmasının zorluğu ortaya çıkmaktadır. İŞKUR kurslarının genellikle üç ya da dört ay sürdüğü ve işgücü piyasasının temel aktörleri tarafından iddia edildiği gibi eğitim kalitesinin tartışmalı olduğu da düşünüldüğünde İŞKUR kursiyerlere kısa ve kalitesiz kurslar ile piyasada aranılan nitelikler kazandırılması çok zordur. İşverenler İŞKUR kursiyerlerini tercih etmemektedir çünkü birçok firma bu kursiyerleri işe aldığı anda tekrar eğitim vermektedir. Bu sebeplerden dolayı İŞKUR'un teşvikleri kursiyerlerin istihdamının kolaylaştırılması noktasında kilit bir öneme sahiptir. Bu teşvikler sayesinde istihdamları zor olan kursiyerler piyasada tercih edilebilir hale gelmektedir. Bu noktada, İŞKUR'un işsizlerin istihdam edilebilirliğini onların niteliklerini artırmaktan çok onları piyasada daha ucuz hale getirerek artırdığını söyleyebiliriz. Diğer bir deyişle, İŞKUR'un mesleki eğitim kursları sonucunda nitelikleri çok da fazla artmayan kişiler teşvikler sayesinde işverenler için daha az maliyetli oldukları için tercih ediliyorlar. Yani İŞKUR işgücünün değerini artırmayı amaçlarken, aslında işgücünü piyasada daha değersizleştirmiş oluyor.

İŞKUR'un bu teşvikleri özel firmalar tarafından amacı dışında kullanılıyor ve İŞKUR'un denetim kapasitesinin yetersizlikleri bu durumun tespit edilip engellenmesini zorlaştırıyor. Özel firmalar özellikle küçük ve orta büyüklükteki işletmeler işgücü maliyetlerini azaltmak için İŞKUR'un teşviklerini suiistimal ediyorlar. Çünkü bu işletmeler için işgücü maliyetleri en büyük maliyet kalemlerinden birisini oluşturuyor. Bu bağlamda, özel firmalar sigortalı ya da sigortasız çalıştırdıkları çalışanlarını mesleki eğitime ihtiyaçları olmasa da işten çıkartıp İŞKUR'un kurslarına gönderiyorlar. Kurs sonunda tekrar işe alıyorlar ve teşvikten faydalanıyorlar. Ya da yeni bir çalışan alacakları zaman öncelikle

çalıştırmak istedikleri kişiyi buluyorlar o kişiye İŞKUR'un kursuna gidip kurs sonunda gelmesini söylüyorlar. Kurs sonunda o kişiyi işe alıp teşvikten faydalanıyorlar. Bu çerçevede, İŞKUR'un teşviklerinin suiistimal edilmesiyle özel sektör için bir rant imkanı ortaya çıktığı söylenebilir. Bu nedenlerden dolayı da sigorta primi teşviklerine aktarılan kaynaklar israf edilmiş oluyor ve politika uygulama sürecinde verimsizlik ortaya çıkıyor.

Özet olarak bu çalışma da neoliberal yaklaşımın iddia ettiğinin tersine özel sektörün her zaman hizmet sunumunda etkinliği ve verimliliği sağlayamadığı tartışılmaktadır. Bu çalışma neoliberal yönetim mantığının özel sektör yöneliminin hatta bazen özel sektör takıntısının işlevsiz ya da etkin olmayan bir uygulama süreci doğurabildiğini, kaynak israfı yaratabildiğini ve bazı durumlarda iyi performansın göz ardı edilmesine neden olabildiğini Ankara'da İŞKUR tarafından uygulanan mesleki eğitim kursları üzerinden göstermiştir. Ayrıca neoliberal yönetim mantığının sonuç ya da politika çıktısı odaklı bakışı politikanın uygulanma sürecinde yaşananların, hataların ya da usulsüzlüklerin göz ardı edilmesi sonucunu doğurabilmektedir. Politikanın başarısının performans kriterleri üzerinden değerlendirilmesi politikanın kısa vadedeki sonuçlarına odaklanılmasına ve orta ve uzun vadede sonuçlarının değerlendirilmesinin göz ardı edilmesine neden olabilmektedir.

Bu kapsamda bu çalışmada bazı politika önerilerine yer verilmiştir. Daha önce değinildiği gibi aktif işgücü politikalarının işgücünün istihdam edilebilirliğini artırma amacını gerçekleştirmede başarısız olmasının kaçınılmaz olması nedeniyle bu politikalarda yapılacak reformlar istenilen sonuca ulaşmayacaktır. Neoliberal bir politika yapılacak neoliberal bir reformla düzeltilemeyecektir. Ama kısa ve orta vadede bazı politika değişiklikleri yapılarak uygulanma sürecindeki işlevsizlikler ve kaynak israfları azaltılabilir. Kısaca mesleki eğitim kurslarının uygulanma süreci yeniden tasarlanarak politika uygulayıcılarının kurumsal kapasitelerine göre şekillendirilmesi gerekmektedir. Mesleki eğitim kurslarının karar alma süreçlerinin yerel yöneticilerin tutumuna bağlı olan yapıdan kurtarılıp kurumsallaştırılması ve il

istihdam ve mesleki eğitim kurullarındaki kararlar üzerinde İŞKUR'un ve Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı'nın ağırlığı yerine katılımcılığın artırıldığı bir karar alma süreci oluşturulmalıdır. Ayrıca İŞKUR'un denetim mekanizmasının güçlendirilmeli ve İŞKUR piyasaya daha hâkim ve düzenleyici ve denetimsel kapasitesi yüksek bir kamu istihdam kurumu haline getirilmelidir.



## APPENDIX D

### TEZ FOTOKOPİSİ İZİN FORMU

#### ENSTİTÜ

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Enformatik Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>
Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü	<input type="checkbox"/>

#### YAZARIN

Soyadı :  
Adı :  
Bölümü :

TEZİN ADI (İngilizce) :

TEZİN TÜRÜ : Yüksek Lisans  Doktora

1. Tezimin tamamından kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
2. Tezimin içindekiler sayfası, özet, indeks sayfalarından ve/veya bir bölümünden kaynak gösterilmek şartıyla fotokopi alınabilir.
3. Tezimden bir bir (1) yıl süreyle fotokopi alınamaz.

TEZİN KÜTÜPHANEYE TESLİM TARİHİ:

